b'33 \n\n\n\nW6I \n\n\n\n\xe2\x80\xa2Jfe \n\n\n\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS \n\n\n\n019 971 828 9 #t \n\n\n\nHollinger Corp. \npH 8.5 \n\n\n\nr, \n\n\n\nON FREE WILL \n\n\n\n\nBY \n\nREV. ALAN S. HAWKESWORTH \n\nCLERK IN HOLY ORDERS \n\n\n\n\xc2\xbbH \n\n\n\n-i \n\n\n\n\\\\ \n\n\n\nALBANY, N. Y.: \nRIGGS PRINTING COMPANY, \n\n/ 1896. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n3 \n\n\n\n\n\n\nCopyright, 1896, \n\nBy \n\nA. S. HAWKESWORTH. \n\n\n\nON FREE WILL. \n\n\n\nIf, in the history of our human race, there is one question on \nwhich more brain toil, more genius, and more terrible agony of \nbody, mind, and soul, has been expended than on any other, it is \nprobably on this question of the freedom of man\'s will. Is he, on \nthe one hand, merely the creature of circumstances ? \xe2\x80\x94 a being \ndoomed to an iron fatalism from which there is, and can be, no pos- \nsible escape? \xe2\x80\x94 or is he, on the contrary, a being endowed with a \nfree will? \xe2\x80\x94 a power of guiding to some extent his own destinies \n\xe2\x80\x94 and therefore a being amenable to judgment, to punishment, or \nreward. \n\nNow it may be said, and possibly justly said, that in a discussion \nso old as this, a discussion too that has enlisted some of the ablest, and \nsubtlest minds of our race, little now can remain to be advanced. \nNevertheless it is to the very daring notion that living men can do \nbetter than the wisest of their fore fathers, that human progress is \nentirely due; and I am therefore/with this reward of daring be- \nfore my eyes, encouraged to contribute my quota towards the solu- \ntion of this ancient, and sphinx like riddle ; it is for my readers to \njudge of the success that has been mine. \n\nBut before commencing the discussion I would like, first of all \nto accurately define the meaning of some of the terms we are to \nuse. Old Homer declares that "wide is the range of words, this \nway and that" (Iliad, xx, 249), and a true saying it is. \nTake any of the sciences of thought \xe2\x80\x94 Metaphysics, Phil- \nosophy, or Theology \xe2\x80\x94 and I think that both history, and \nexperience will show us that nine-tenths of the misun- \nderstandings, misconceptions, and false and heretical thought \nso prevalent in these sciences is due, simply and entirely, \nto a loose, and inaccurate phraseology. One thinker expresses an \n\n\n\nidea by one word, another thinker the same idea by another word; \nresult, mutual misunderstanding: or again, a writer will use a \nword in one sense, and shortly after uses it in a different sense ; re- \nsult, confusion, and false thought. \n\nLet us then, before attempting to "prove" free will, first of all \ndefine what we mean by "proving" a thing, and then go on to see \nwhat kind of "proofs" are in this instance valid. \n\nNow we may say that "proving" a thing is first knowing a \nthing, and secondly communicating that knowledge to other per- \nsons, and showing how, and why a thing is so. \n\nBut again this term "knowledge" is, I think used for two very \ndiverse, and indeed opposite workings of the mind, namely knowl- \nedge "a priori," or deductive, and knowledge "a posteriori," or in- \nductive. This being as it follows that there are also two kinds of \n"proofs," again "a priori," and "a posteriori," corresponding to \nthese two classes of knowledge. \n\nTo elucidate my meaning. "A priori," or deductive knowledge, \nis knowing a thing from its origin to its result \xe2\x80\x94 from its "why" to \nits "how." It is therefore knowing a thing as it is "in itself," and \nis absolute, perfect, and final knowledge. \n\n. Thus if you give a mathematician the factors of a sum, he will \nwork it out, and will know "a priori" the result: or to alter the \nillustration, describe to a mechanician a given arrangement of \ncog wheels, ratchets, and pinions, and he knows "a priori" the re- \nsultant machine, and what it can accomplish. So too, describe \nto an astronomer a certain planet or comet, and the laws that gov- \nern its motion, and he will trace out for you its future path, and \nwhere it will be at a certain time. These then are all illustrations \nof "a priori" knowledge, a mental operation working from the \n"data" to its result \xe2\x80\x94 from the "why" to the "how" \xe2\x80\x94 giving us, \nI repeat, the knowledge of a thing as it is "in itself," and there- \nfore perfect, absolute, and final. \n\nFurthermore, I would like to point out, this knowing a thing \n"a priori" implies an "imaging" it forth in the mind, an "ideal \ncreation," corresponding to the "Divine Ideals" of Plato, and the \nSchoolmen, those archetypes of Creation. In other words this \n\n\n\n"a priori" knowledge is, primarily and principally, the "knowl- \nedge" that the Godhead has, "imaging forth" His Creation. Yet \ninasmuch as man is in the image of God, he has a portion of this \npower, and can to some small extent "know" things "a priori" (as \nin the instances given) ; or, in other words, can be a Creator, both \nideally in his brain, and actually in the external world. \n\nThis then is "a priori" knowledge; knowledge, I repeat, per- \nfect, absolute, final, and implying an "ideal creation." \n\nBut the second mental process, to which we also apply the term \n"knowledge," is of a totally different type. It is, in fact, the re- \nverse operation to the former, is "a posteriori," or inductive, as \nthat is "a priori," or deductive: it is, in short, a blind groping \nfrom the "how," to the "why" \xe2\x80\x94 from the manifestation, to the \nreality as it is "in itself," \xe2\x80\x94 or, in philosophical language, from the \n"phenomenon" to the "noumenon." \n\nThe vast majority of our \'"knowledge" is of this character, as \nour "knowledge" of the external world around us, of the various \nphenomena of life, even our "knowledge" of our Creator, aye! \nand even of the depths of our own being. This type of "knowl- \nedge" is, as you will perceive, capable of degrees, is external, \nfragmentary, incomplete, and exceedingly apt to mislead. It is, \nin short, the empirical, sensational, and partial "knowledge" of \nthe creature, as opposed to the ideal, creative, and perfect "knowl- \nedge" of the Creator. \n\n"Now corresponding to these two diverse, and opposite types of \n"knowledge" \xe2\x80\x94 "a priori," and "a posteriori" \xe2\x80\x94 there are, it seems \nto me, also two classes of "proofs," or manifestations of our \nknowledge, again "a priori," and "a posteriori." \n\nThus, to return to my previous illustration, the mechanician \n"images" forth his machine, and "knows" it "a priori," and so is \nable to "prove" it to you, also "a priori," by "imaging" forth to \nyou the various sequences in the chain of its creation. This is an \nexact, and perfect "proof," satisfying the mathematical sense. \n\nOn the other hand we have the "a posteriori" proof, showing \nthat a thing is so, or probably so, by its consequences. \n\nThus if we were required to prove the reality of the external \n\n\n\nworld, we would be unable to do so "a priori/\' not being its crea- \ntors, but must proceed to do so "a posteriori," \xe2\x80\x94 or empirically \xe2\x80\x94 \nby pointing to its results \xe2\x80\x94 its persistence with us, our constant \nreliance upon it, and the practical necessity of our so treating it \nas real. \n\nThis class of "proofs" then are, as you will notice, empirical, \nsensational, and "common sense," and are only probable in a \ngreater or less degree. They can never, in short, reach absolute \nand necessary certainty, as the former \xe2\x80\x94 or "a priori" \xe2\x80\x94 class of \nproofs do. \n\nHaving made this vital distinction between the two types of \n"knowledge" \xe2\x80\x94 "a priori," and "a posteriori," \xe2\x80\x94 and the result- \nant two types of "proofs" \xe2\x80\x94 again "a priori," and "a posteriori", \xe2\x80\x94 \nI will now proceed to inquire which of these two classes of \n"proofs" are valid for the establishment of the philosophic truth \nof our free will. \n\nAssuredly not "a priori" proofs, for we are not God, to create \nourselves "de novo," even ideally. !N~or are facts, or arguments, \ndrawn from our consciousness, or from the external world, avail- \nable in this connection; for free will is, as I will show, a primal \nfact of consciousness, ranking with our consciousness of an exter- \nnal world, and only second to the prime certainty of our own in- \ndividual existence. To endeavour then to "prove" free will by \n"a priori" arguments, or corolleries, deduced from external \nphenomena, would involve us in the absurdity of trying to prove \na more certain, by a less certain \xe2\x80\x94 a prime fact of consciousness, by \nthe minor facts, or deductions of experience or reason. \n\nThe only class then of arguments that are at all available in this \ncase are the "a posteriori" ones of congruous effects. In other \nwords, having first shown "free will" to be a primary fact of con- \nsciousness, and therefore not to be denied, we can then go on to \nmake assurance doubly sure by pointing to common every day \nexperience, and the other facts of the case, and showing that the \npractical workings of our nature are in accordance with this neces- \nsary theory of free will. \n\n\n\nHaving made these preliminary and needful remarks let us \nnow proceed to discuss the various philosophical arguments in the \ncase. \n\nTo begin then we may say that the arguments for fatalism, \nand against any free will in man, may be briefly summed up under \nthree heads, first the "religious" argument, secondly the "scien- \ntific" one, and thirdly the appeal to experience, and facts in the \nobserved phenomena of "atavism." \n\nAs to the "religious" argument, it is alleged that our Creator, \nbeing Omniscient, must perforce know what our future actions \nwill be: from this it follows that our future actions being fore- \nknown, they must also be inevitable ; and if inevitable, then they \nmust have been fore-ordained, or pre-destined by some Almighty \npower; and Who should that Power be but our Creator Him- \nself? \n\nThis then is the argument from the Omniscience of God, and \nis, it will be noticed, the reasoning underlying not only the Cal- \nvanistic fatalism, but also that of Mohammedanism, and of other \nEastern systems older still; taking its origin from a Theism that, \namong all the Infinite Attributes of the Godhead, feels only, and \ndwells only on His Wisdom, and above all on His Power; a The- \nism, in fact, closely akin to the monergism of Pantheism. \n\nA very good presentation of this phase of thought is given us \nin the Rubaiyet of Omar Khayyam (Lxxiii), where it is said: \n\n"With earth\'s first clay they did the last man knead \n"and there of the last harvest sowed the seed \n"and the first morning of creation wrote \n"what the last dawn of reckoning; shall read" \n\n\n\n*-& \n\n\n\nBut leaving until later the consideration of this "religious" \nfatalism, let us pass on to the second, and more weighty line of ar- \ngument (and the one I will therefore first answer), which is of a \ntotally different class, and springs rather from what is known at \nthe present day as a "scientific spirit." \n\nMen who have studied Nature in her manifold activities point \nto the world around us, and bid us observe everywhere the reign \n\n\n\n6 \n\nof uniform laws, and causation. To make a familiar comparison \none may liken it to a child\'s card house, where the fall of the first \ncard pushes down in turn its companion cards, until the motion \nhas passed through the whole set ; this is not at all a bad illustra- \ntion of w T hat is known as "the law of sequence, and universal \ncausation in Xature," and of "conservation of force." Whatever \nhappens, it is said, has been inexorably caused by an occurrence in \nthe past, and inexorably causes in its turn some other event in the \nfuture: it follows then that whatever happens, must happen, is, \nin fact, merely a link in the chain of universal causation, \xe2\x80\x94 and \nthat in this chain there is, and can be, no possible break. "Free \nwill!!" exclaims the Necessitarian philosopher, "it is but the \nmocking shadow of man\'s romantic longings, the vain surmisings \nof his idle regrets ; man is but the mere battle ground of contend- \ning emotions and desires, the helpless, and hopeless captive of cir- \ncumstances and events." \n\nWell to this the following "a posteriori" arguments may at once \nbe objected. If, in the first place, man\'s soul is the "battleground \nof contending emotions, and desires," then the very fact of these \nemotions being contending conclusively shows, I think, that these \nemotions, like the external phenomena that give rise to them, are \noutside of the citadel of the will. Surely in no sense can it be said \nthat these external phenomena, and the impressions, and emotions \narising from them, are originators \xe2\x80\x94 creators \xe2\x80\x94 of our will; they \nare rather coveted things \xe2\x80\x94 attractions \xe2\x80\x94 to be weighed by our \npre-existent will, "pro," and "con" in making a decision. Emo- \ntions "per se" have certainly no concrete, prior, or separate ex- \nistence ; but can only be predicated as being passing phases in the \ncouncils of a pre- existent volition, or free will: and again, any idea \nof "contending emotions" in a machine, or automaton is absurd on \nthe face of it. \n\nStill further we can point out that this "romantic longing," \nthis wish, nay! (he very conception itself of free will, proves its \nexistence. The very ability man has of conceiving such a thing \nas "free will" \xe2\x80\x94 "volition" \xe2\x80\x94 at all, proves that however much he \nmay be dominated by adverse circumstances, yet the utmost that \n\n\n\ncan truthfully be said is that his actions are limited by, not pro- \nduced by, these circumstances; otherwise his conceptions would \nnever, and could never set against them : for observe, free action \nis by no means necessary to the existence of free will; an inno- \ncent man\'s hand may be seized by an assassin, armed with a dag- \nger, and driven to a stranger\'s heart ; but the forced action in no \nsense, and in no way, affects the freedom of his will, and conse- \nquently his abhorence, and innocence of the crime. \n\nBut we can go even deeper than this, and say that not only is \nthis conception, and consciousness we possess of free will a strong \nargument in its favour, but also that it is the \'prime argument in \nthe case. \n\nIn the first place it is generally true that our primal intuitions \nare the basis of all our knowledge ; not only our religious princi- \nciples, and our ethics, but even those things that we look upon as \nmost indubitable \xe2\x80\x94 our mathematical science, and even the exist- \nence of a material world around us \xe2\x80\x94 are all ultimately based on \nthe intuitional, or necessary knowledge of our intellectual nature. \nISTow, as Aristotle well said, "they who reject the testimony of \nself evident truth, will find nothing surer on which to build," and \nthe man therefore who refuses to credit his natural perception of \nhis own free will, and styles it a "self delusion," is, in reality, cut- \nting away the ground on which every argument, and every per- \nception of truth must be based. \n\nBut more than this: in thus refusing to credit his own percep- \ntions of free will, he is not merely denying necessary truth in gen- \neral, but is, in particular, suicidically destroying the very platform \non which his whole argument rests. \n\nIf we go down to the root of the matter we will find, I think, \nthat our conceptions of necessary cause and effect take, in the first \nplace, their origin from our natural intuitions as to our own power \nof prime origination. I form a certain volition, perform a certain \nact, and from this act I perceive certain results to follow: from \nthis sequence I deduce by analogy a law of cause and effect in \ngeneral, and apply it to the world around me; and, if I am a \nscientist, I call this analogy "the law pf sequence, and universal \n\n\n\ncausation. " I furthermore, if I am a thoughtful man, perceive \nthat while I can originate motion, no such power is observable in \nthe material world around me; it can merely transmit, or hand \non, motion, and that by reason of its inertia, or deadness, which \nwill not suffer it to either add, or take away, one iota from the sum \ntotal committed to it: this fact I then denominate "the law of the \nconservation of force." But since the material world cannot \noriginate force, and since both my experience, and my intuitions \nteach me that force, equally with matter, cannot originate itself, \nI am therefore led to predicate a Great Primal Cause \xe2\x80\x94 a God of \nall \xe2\x80\x94 Who is the Creator, and Upholder of the Universe Around \nme, and of its manifold activities. \n\nSo then from my intuitions as to my power of prime origin- \nation,- or a free will" spring not only my conceptions of "necessary \ncause and effect" in general, but also of a Great Creator of all in \nparticular. In fact our conception of "cause, and effect," as a \nprominent Agnostic, and Necessitarian philosopher has pointed \nout, is altogether an anthropomorphic one (as indeed all our con- \nceptions are, and must be), and it has even been denied to be cer- \ntainly true on those very grounds. It therefore follows, as I have \nalready stated, that the man who adduces "the law of universal \ncausation in Nature" as a reason for denying the truth of our in- \ntuitions of free will, is, in reality, cutting from under him the very- \ngrounds on which his whole argument is based. And this con- \nsideration disposes too of the argument from "the law of the con- \nservation of force;" for any "law of conservation" must, to be in- \ntelligible, be based on the primary law of "cause and effect;" or \nin other words, on the inability, on the one hand, of an effect to \nbe without an adequate cause (as would be the case if the sum \ntotal of force were increased) ; or in the other, of a cause to be \nwithout an adequate effect (as would be the case if the sum total \nof force were diminished). But if we treat our instinctive feeling \nof free will and origination as a baseless phantasy, on what pos- \nsible grounds can we predicate such a thing as "cause and effect" \nat all? \n\n\n\n"Arguing in a circle" has always been held to be an utterly in- \nconsequent and delusive act; but the "Necessitarian school" even \ndisprove themselves "in a circle/\' their argument ending, as I \nhave shown, by denying the very intuitions and axioms upon \nwhich it is based ! ! \n\nThis is such a self evident, and flagrant absurdity that we need \nhardly call attention to the lesser, yet still vital one, of attempt- \ning to confute "a priori" a prime fact of consciousness (namely \nfree will), by the secondary and derived facts of experience and \nreason (namely the laws of "cause and effect," and of "conserva- \ntion of force"). \n\nIn this connection should be noticed the very significant and \nominous fact, so clearly, and repeatedly illustrated in history, that \nthose philosophies that begin by denying "free will," logically go \non to also deny "free thought," and "self consciousness," suicidi- \ncally styling them "the delusive phantasies of a fancied individ- \nuality." In short it is undeniably certain, both logically, and \nhistorically, that "free will," "free thought," and "self conscious- \nness of personality" are indissolubly linked together, and are all \nnecessary to one another, and to intellectual sanity. \n\nTaking then, as we must, our intuitions of a free will as valid, \nwe may say we instinctively feel that we, as free spiritual beings, \nare above, and outside of, the chain of causes in material Nature: \nthis, I repeat, is a prime fact of consciousness, and must be ac- \ncepted as a self evident truth, if we are to have any basis for argu- \nment, or knowledge at all. \n\nBut to still further enforce this truth, and to assure us (if as- \nsurance can be needed!), that we are not deluded by these our \nprimal intuitions, we can point to still other "a posteriori" proofs \nof our free will, such as the following : \n\nIn the first place, not only can we originate motion, but we can \nalso mould, or modify existent phenomena; and again we can \nalso, to some limited extent, apprehend, analyse, and comprehend, \nthe laws of Material Nature; I need hardly point out that this \npower of comprehension, imperfect as it may be, yet implies a \nseparateness from, and superiority to, the thing comprehended \n\n\n\n10 \n\n(i. e. Material Nature) in that respect : we become, in fact, to some \nsmall extent, Nature\'s Gods, by thus exercising our powers of \n"ideal creation. 77 \n\nSelf consciousness too, as already noticed, is another phenom- \nenon that points the same way. In its very essence it implies a \npersonality \xe2\x80\x94 an "I," and a "not I," \xe2\x80\x94 and a self limitation; and \nso a separateness from, and superiority to, Material Nature; and \ntherefore a freedom from its causation; for a Necessitarianism \nspringing from "universal causation in Nature" can only be pred- \nicated of something that is an integral part in the machinery of \nthe Material world ; and so far as a thing is separate from Material \nNature, so far is it also separate from the chain of causation in \nMaterial Nature. \n\nAgain we may ask what possible interconnection is there be- \ntween material laws, and spiritual powers ? Gravity, heat, colour, \nwhat possible fellowship have they with thought, conscience, or \nvolition? Surely the two classes of phenomena seem absolutely \nnon-related. \n\nAnd finally we may lay it down as an axiom that a sentient be- \ning must perforce possess free will, as without this power thought \nwould be impossible. Abeve I have used the expression "power \nof prime origination" as synonymous with "free will," and rightly \nso ; but yet looking at the matter more minutely we may say that \n"\'prime origination" is rather the will in action, and that the ulti- \nmate intrinsic note of free will is perhaps more strictly the "power \nof choice." \n\nNow if we endeavor to trace the operations of thought, we will, \nI think, find it to be somewhat as follows: firstly, certain sensa- \ntions arising from external phenomena are presented to the pre- \nexistent mind, which then proceeds to "think" of them, or in other \nwords to codify, and arrange these sensations, first by an act of \nsynthesis, producing experience, and then by an act of analysis, pro- \nducing knowledge (that is, "a posteriori" knowledge) ; and it is in \nthis codifying, and arranging \xe2\x80\x94 this choosing, and shifting the \nphenomena presented to the mind \xe2\x80\x94 that thought essentially con- \nsists. Sensations "per se" are not thought (as the "Sensational \n\n\n\n11 \n\nschool" wrongly supposes), but are rather the subjects of thought; \nthe ability for which is, and must be, external, and prior to these \nsensations. Or to put the thing in a more metaphysical way, be- \nfore a sensation can be apprehended, and become knowledge, the \nintellect must read into it previous categories: and if our intel- \nlect could not so interpret it, if, in other words, it were possible \nthat the sensation, or thing, as our mind apprehended it, was "non- \nrelated/ 7 or out of the necessary relations of likeness, and of con- \ntrast to other known things, then in such a case it would be, so \nfar as we are concerned, no thing at all. \n\nThis will explain the well known fact that a man can see (to \ntake one class of sensations) only what his mind allows him to see ; \nand that, with the same identical sense perceptions, a farmer, and \na hunter, will view a very different landscape. \n\nk * Thought" then consists of, first apprehension, secondly syn- \nthesis, and thirdly analysis: it follows then that the "power of \nchoice," to enable this analysis to be made, is an absolute neces- \nsity for thought; an automaton, or even a person temporarily \nguided by another\'s will (such as a hypnotised person is claimed \nto be), because it, or he, cannot choose, cannot therefore think, \nIt is therefore true that, as I have stated above, every sentient \nbeing must perforce possess free will. \n\nIn fact, as an ultimate analysis will, I think, show us, free will \nis the vital core, not only of thought, but of personality itself. It \nis, in other words, the prime, and essential note of differentation \nfrom the surrounding universe, the vital, and primal element then \nof a self-conscious, self-determined, and self-contained individ- \nuality. This coincides with what is said above of the vital con- \nnection between free will, free thought, and self consciousness \nof personality. \n\nBut the above arguments, while they show the freedom of our \nspiritual being from the laws of necessity in Material Nature, \nat the same time also show us that our material tabernacle \xe2\x80\x94 our \nbody \xe2\x80\x94 is subject to the laws of "universal, and necessary causa- \ntion" in general, just as it is subject to one of these laws in particu- \nlar, that namely of "gravitation." In short we may rightly con- \n\n\n\n12 \n\nelude that in so far as a man is spiritually considered, he is free; \nbut in so far as he is material, he is predestined; or in other words \nthat while " universal causation " does not govern, yet i{ circum- \nscribes him. \n\nThis formula of "circumscribed, not governed" will, I think, \nelucidate, and show us the proper bearing of the puzzling ques- \ntion of "Atavism," or in other words "inherited peculiarities," a \nphenomenon in our highly complex beingjhat is often brought \nforward as a third argument for Necessitarianism. \n\nNow it is true that no one who studies human nature can shut \nhis eyes to the constantly observed fact that the peculiarities \nand idiosyncrasies of parents and ancestors are constantly being \nreproduced in their offspring. Tricks of manner, and modes of \nthought \xe2\x80\x94 predispositions to various faults and vices on the one \nhand, or to virtues and talents on the other \xe2\x80\x94 recur in the same \nfamily again and again. How often we see a child reproduce \nwith startling, and well nigh photographic accuracy the person- \nality of a grandfather, or great grandfather ; who has not repeat- \nedly observed this phenomenon, and observing been struck by it? \nBut on the other hand we have also the well known fact that no \none can predict the future of a child : there will be three brothers, \nsons of the same parents, with the same inherited peculiarities \nand dispositions, the same training, and the same influences in \nall respects brought to bear on them, so far as we can see; yet each \none of those three lives will be different; how different, until \nactually lived, who can tell? \n\nIn fact similar laws to those which obtain in biology, obtain \nalso here. We have first the law 7 of "the permanence of type," \ndetermining with unswerving rule that like can only produce like, \nand that animals continue after their kind. But conjoined to this \nlaw, and balancing it, is its opposite, and correlative one "Evo- \nlution," or "development," determining that the type advances, \nor degrades, becomes better, or worse, according as it is moulded \nby each individual\'s life. \n\nSo too in human character; each one of us has at his birth a \npre-determined, or inherited nature \xe2\x80\x94 body, and disposition \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n\n\n13 \n\ngive him; which said nature we proceed to develop into a char- \nacter, good, or bad, by our daily lives. To apply the imagery of \na well known parable, we may say that each of us, at his entrance \ninto life, has given into his hands an inheritance of pre-determin- \ned "talents" \xe2\x80\x94 five, two, or one, \xe2\x80\x94 which inheritance we then pro- \nceed to augment, or diminish, until death lays us low, and we are \ncalled to a solemn reckoning for the use of the treasure com- \nmitted to our care. In short "Atavism" decides where a man \nshall start from, it rests ultimately with himself which way he \nwill go; and we are plainly taught that "of him to whom much \nhas been given, much will be required;" or in other- words, that \nour standard of judgment will not be the hard, and fast one of \nactual deeds, but will rather be a "sliding scale," in which individ- \nual inheritance, opportunities, and comparative results, will be \nthe factors. \n\nIn truth a little consideration will show us that this "law of de- \nvelopment" must needs be a factor in the problem, or there would \nbe no such thing as human history at all, or a race of human be- \nings such as the present. For, scientifically speaking, it is at least \nprobable that all the human race have sprung from one pair of \nprogenitors ; and even were this denied, yet it is absolutely certain \nthat millions of the human family have common ancestors. Now \nhad the law of "Atavism" no balancing and correcting law of \n"development," such as I have pointed out above, how could we \npossibly account for the numberless observed peculiarities of \ndisposition, and type ? There are in this world as many differing \ncharacters as there are individuals ; were the law of Atavism alone \ntrue, all these human beings should be as alike as the peas in a \npod; and as for human "history," it would be a misnomer, the \nstory would be as mathematically regular and eventless as the \nstory of the revolutions of a planet ! ! \n\nSo much then for the argument from "Atavism," a fact of our \ncomplex and finite being, and yet one in no way contradicting, or \nimpairing the prime verity of the freedom of our will. To re- \npeat in brief my foregoing conclusions we may say that this \n"power of choice," or "free will," is an essential power of the spir- \n\n\n\n14 \n\nitual Ego; which yet, inasmuch as it works through a material \nbody, is circumscribed (not governed) by the material laws of \nnecessary sequence affecting that body: and furthermore; seeing \nthat our Spirit can comprehend and govern "matter" \xe2\x80\x94 be in \nshort, its "god," \xe2\x80\x94 we can, by the due use of our opportunities, so \nbend and sway Material Mature to our will, both in our bodies \nand in the external world, as to render practically inappreciable \nthe circumscribing wall of material laws. \n\nFinally let us consider the first argument for Necessitarianism \nthat I noticed, the one namely that our Creator, being Omnis- \ncient, and Almighty, foreknows what our future actions will be \nwhich therefore must be inevitable, and predestined by Him. \n\nYet is not this an idea founded on a misconception arising from \nwords? We give a name, and forthwith proceed to argue from \nthat name ! \n\nSpeaking with all solemnity and reverence, may we not say \nthat there are things that Omnipotence cannot do, such as make \n"a round square," and that because such a thing would be a mis- \nnomer \xe2\x80\x94 a self contradiction. To advance Infinity as a reason \nfor performing self contradictions is absurd; as well might we \nargue that infinite parallel right lines must include a space, be- \ncause they are infinite : absurdity multiplied by infinity is certain* \nlyy not less an absurdity than before; on the contrary, it is \n"infinitely absurd." \n\nNow, reverting to our above conclusions as to the free will of \nman\'s spirit, on the one hand, and the sequence of material causa- \ntion in his body, on the other, we may say that our Creator has an \nabsolutely perfect foreknowledge of the latter. ]\\Ian even, by \nhis empirical acquaintance; with some natural laws, can to some \nextent foreknow, and predict occurrences in the natural world. \nBut this knowledge, partial, imperfect, and "a posteriori" in man, \nis absolute, perfect, and "a priori" in the Great Creator, and \nOriginator of all: lie Who, not formed, but forms all Nature, \nand is its Omnipresent and Omniscient Underlying Reality, does \nand must have absolute foreknowledge of all the infinite se- \nquences in His Universe. \n\n\n\n15 \n\nBut granting that man, in his spiritual being, has a free will \xe2\x80\x94 \na power of choice, and of prime origination \xe2\x80\x94 (and as I have \nshown above, we must acknowledge this as true, or else have no \npossible base to argue from), then, I say, to state that whatever \nhis free will may originate in the future, can be, and is fore- \nknown, is a flagrant contradiction in terms, seeing that what may \nbe originated in the future is a non entity \xe2\x80\x94 is, in other words, not \nin existence now, either actually, or in embryo. It is no contra \ndiction then, but a valid distinction, to say that while Omniscient \nWisdom does, and must foreknow, and fore-ordain, in accordance \nwith set laws, man\'s bodily nature \xe2\x80\x94 his inherited disposition, \xe2\x80\x94 \nyet Omniscience neither knows, nor fore-ordains, his future de- \nvelopment and character; on which, and on which alone, his fu- \nture judgment will depend. This distinction does justice both \nto our inherent beliefs in God\'s government of His world, and to \nour intuitions of a judgment hereafter, and of right and wrong \ndeeds here; words entirely without meaning were there no such \nthing as a "free will" in man. \n\nBut besides the fact that this argument from Omniscience \nsprings from an analysis of our own definitions, it is also true, as \nI have shown above in relation to the argument from "the law of \nuniversal causation," that such an argument is itself based On the \nvery intuitions it seeks to overthrow. If my creations are only \nfancied deeds, and self delusions, how can I possibly prove, or \neven imagine, such a thing as "a Creation" at all; -my intuitions \nbeing false, all conceptions based on those intuitions must them- \nselves be false. True, there might be, in such a case, a Creator \nand Ruler, and His Creation; but what possible conception could \nI form, either of Him, or of a Cosmos that had no possible rela- \ntion, or semblance to my fancied world of self hallucination? \n\nIn fact such fatalistic conceptions agree far better with an \nextreme, mechanical Pantheism, and are not at all congruous to \nthe idea of a Personal God. A loving, allwise Father, giving \nto His children personality, and a free will, to enable them to \nbuild up their characters, and work out their salvation; that is \none conception. A Universe of unvarying laws \xe2\x80\x94 "Karma," or \n\n\n\n16 \n\n"Fates/\' \xe2\x80\x94 with beings who have for a few brief moments the \ndelusion of personality, and then dissolve in death, like bubbles \nthat float and burst in an illimitable ocean of being; that is an- \nother conception, having nothing in common with the previous \none, but rather being utterly incompatible, and lying at the oppo- \nsite pole of thought. \n\nTo sum up then we may say that man must perforce be allowed \nto have a free will, circumscribed, it is true, but not governed, \nby the laws of the Universe, for no other supposition is logically \ncoherent, or possible. As "a posteriori" proofs (and the only \nones valid) of this, not only have we the positive arguments de- \nrived from the phenomena of self consciousness, of personality, \nand of thought, etc., and with which the "law of Atavism" is per- \nfectly congruous, but we have also the conclusive fact that Scien- \ntific Necessitarianism can only advance for itself arguments that \nare themselves founded on the very ideas, and instincts it seeks \nto overthrow; while a fatalism based on a religious definition is \nequally suicidical; and is besides far more coherent with a me- \nchanical, impersonal, and illogical Pantheism, than with the \nHeavenly Father of Christianity, or even the Personal God of \nTheism, and Natural Religion. \n\n\n\n\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS \n\n\n\nlift \n\n\n\n019 971 828 9 \n\n\n\n'