aass_EAuS. Book Γ p ) ' . I CONTENTS. Biographical Sketch oi 1 Demosthenes PAGE ORATIONS AGAINST PHILIP. Preface „ 1 First Philippic First Olynthiac Second Olynthiac . Third Olynthiac On the Peace • . 20 . 47 . 60 . 75 . 86 Second Philippic On the State of the Chersonesus . 98 . 112 Third Philippic Fourth Philippic On the Letter of Philip • . 136 . 159 . 196 Conclusion . » . . 203 ORATIONS ON OCCASIONS OF PUBLIC DELIBERATION. Preface On the Classes On the Megalopolitans For the Liberty of the Rhodians On the Regulation of the State On the Halonesus On the Treaty with Alexander Oration of Dinarchus against Demosthenes Appendix to the Notes on the Philippic Orations, con- taining an Account of the Exile and Death of Demo- sthenes ...*... 207 228 248 265 316 326 357 ORATIONS OF ^SCHINES AND DEMOSTHENES. iEschines against Ctesiphon Demosthenes on the Crown 363 462 " In the Translation of Demosthenes, Leland unites the man of taste with the man of learning, and shows himself to have possessed not only a competent knowlege of the Greek language, but that clearness in his own conceptions, and that animation in his feelings, which enabled him to catch the real meaning, and to preserve the genuine spirit, of the most per- fect orator Athens ever produced." — Parr. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DEMOSTHENES. The period in which Demosthenes florished may be justly styled the age of Athenian eloquence. This distinguished orator was born 882 years before the Christian era : he was the son of one of the princi- pal citizens of Athens, and inherited a considerable fortune ; but as he was only seven years of age at the time of his father's death, he remained nearly ten years under the care of guardians, who con- verted a part of his fortune to their own use, defrauded his tutors of their salaries, and thus de- prived him of those advantages of early education to which he was intitled. At the age of sixteen he first heard the orator Callistratus plead in an important cause, and, ex- cited by a spirit of emulation, from that time de- voted himself with the strictest assiduity to the study of eloquence. Isaeus was his first preceptor; VI BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH but it is stated that he received assistance from Plato, and Callias the Syracusan, and that he also derived great advantages from the systems of rhe- toric taught by Isocrates and Alcidamus. In his eighteenth year he called his guardians to account ; and as they resorted to various methods of delay, he had thus many opportunities for exer- cising his talents at the bar, and at length succeeded in recovering a portion of his patrimony. From this period he took part in the public de- bates, in the hope of obtaining a share in the ad- ministration ; but in this he was at first wholly unsuccessful. The natural weakness of his voice rendered him unfit to address a popular assembly ; and he now began to prepare himself, by strong bodily exercise, for the labors of the rostrum, and studied to acquire that grace and dignity of action, without which the best oration could produce but little effect. For this purpose he constructed a subterraneous study, where he might form his action, exercise his voice, and adjust all his motions before a mirror. In this retirement he is said to have composed many of those orations which have excited the admiration of every succeeding age. Demetrius relates an account which he received from Demosthenes himself, of the remedies to which OF DEMOSTHENES. Vll the orator resorted with a view to remove the defects under which he labored at the commencement of his career. By accustoming himself to speak with small pebbles in his mouth, he overcame a natural hesitation ; by running or walking up a steep hill while pronouncing some passage in an oration, he succeeded in strengthening his voice ; and by fre- quently declaiming alone on the sea-shore, he pre- pared himself to harangue a tumultuous assembly. At other times, when he occasionally made or received visits, some part of the conversation which had passed formed a subject for exercising his growing talent. He also committed to memory the substance of speeches which he heard, and reduced them to regular periods and sentences, — a practice in which he was imitated by Cicero. Demosthenes was in his twenty-eighth year when he entered on public business ; and in the time of the Phocian war, at the age of thirty, he com- menced his orations against Philip, king of Macedon. The purposes for which these orations were originally pronounced — a summary review of the affairs of Greece, particularly of the divisions which so long subsisted between the states of Lacedaemon, Athens, and Thebes — and an account of the measures pur- sued by Philip to lay the foundation of a most ex- Vlll BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH tensive empire, — will be found in the following Preface ;* and the Introductions to the several Ora- tions furnish the reader with an interesting view of the effects which they produced on the Athenians. To defend the cause of Greece against the artful policy of Pi ilip afforded the Orator a glorious sub- ject for his political ambition ; and he soon ac- quired great reputation for his eloquence and the bold truths which he uttered. He was admired in Greece, and courted by the king of Persia : Philip himself entertained a high opinion of him, and even his enemies acknowleged his superior talents and integrity. The key of politics he first touched, he kept to without variation. Panotitis asserts that most of the Orations of Demosthenes are written on a virtuous principle ; and Plutarch observes, " that he does not exhort his countrymen to that which is most agreeable, or easy, or advantageous, but points out honor and propriety as the first objects, and leaves the safety of the state as a matter of inferior consideration.' 7 The r3j.utation he acquired placed him at the head * This is concluded by a brief sketch of the characters of Demades, Hyperides, Lycurgus, and ^Eschines, with some remarks on the peculiar excellences of Demosthenes as an orator. OF DEMOSTHENES. IX of the government of Athens : in this public ca- pacity he opposed the inclinations, and corrected the errors, of his countrymen. His eloquence is not distinguished by the arts of mild persuasion, but by a bold, manly, and energetic style, which failed not to fix the attention and to rouse the energies of his hearers, and to awaken that spirit of pa- triotism which is calculated to secure, the liberties of a people. In integrity of conduct he is acknowleged to have surpassed all his contemporaries except Phocion; and if he had not been suspected of want of cou- rage in the field of battle, and of receiving a bribe from Harpalus, he would have deservedly ranked with Cimon, Thucydides, and Pericles. In the battle of Chseronea, according to the testimony of Plutarch, he betrayed his pusillani- mity, quitted his post, and fled. But the charge of bribery, preferred against him at a later period of his life, strongly excited the Athenians against him, as will be seen in the Translator's Introduction to the Oration of Dinarchus. Demosthenes had long resisted the assaults of corruption from Philip, and boasted that all the gold of Macedonia could not tempt him ; but his enemies accused him of having received a present of a golden vase, accom- X BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. panied by twenty talents, from the handi of Bar pains,* which is said to have induced the Oratoi to feign indisposition in the assembly, and to nak< signs that he had lost his voice; on which it wai observed, that ' it Mas no common hoarseness he had got in the night— it was occasioned by swal- lowing gold and silver Γ I lis accuser was a venal orator; but the court of Areopagus condemned him, and he was compelled to retire from At 1 ,, ng, Pausanias, who entertained a high opinion of tin integrity of Demosthenes, treats the charge as a calumny, and offers strong proofs of his innoc — proofs which appear to have had din weight with the learned Translator in his Appendix to the Notes on the Philippic Orations, (see p. 357;) to which the reader is referred for a history of the Orator, from his public administration down to the fatal period of his life. * During the expedition of* Alexander to India, Harpalus had the charge of the Babylonian treasury, on which he committed great excesses : fearing the resentment of his master, he fled to Attica with five thousand talents, accom- panied by six thousand men, and sought refuge in Athens. THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES, PRONOUNCED TO EXCITE THE ATHENIANS AGAINST PHILIP, KING OF MACEDON. PREFACE. VIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL STATES OF GREECE — CHA- RACTERS OF DEMADES, HYPERIDES, LYCURGUS, AND ESCHINES, THE ORATORS — CHARACTER OF DEMO- STHENES. To animate a people renowned for justice, humanity, and valor, yet, in many instances, degenerate and corrupted ; to warn them of the dangers of luxury, treachery, and hribery ; of the ambition and perfidy of a powerful foreign enemy ; to recal the glory of their ancestors to their thoughts, and to inspire them ygith resolution, vigor, and unanimity ; to correct abuses ; to restore discipline ; to revive and enforce the generous sentiments of patriotism and public spirit; — these were the great purposes for which the following Orations were originally pronounced. The subject, therefore, may possibly recommend them to a British reader, even under the disadvantages of a translation, by no means worthy of the famous original. His candor may pardon them ; or sometimes, perhaps, they may escape him, if he suffers his imagination to be possessed with that enthusiasm, which our orator is, of all others , DEM. A 2 PR] PACE. moat capable of inspiring ; and will, for a while, ml est himself in the cause of linens. To the bietorj of ( Ι π ι ce I must sup] - do stranger. '^ et, though it ma) not inform dim. bis iiinn m;i> possibly be assisted bj β summary review of the affairs and interests of that country ; particularlj of those divisions which bad a long time subsisted be tween its principal states, and on which Philip justly grounded bis hopes of success in bis attempts < could have on thai It And, if this be so, it conlirms an observation which I before (see a preceding note) : viz. that the Athenians bl yet e^iven Philip no remarkable opposition in Babose. The letter must have been written when Philip began to raise commotions in that island, in order to make himself master of it. I am induced to think, both from history and Demo- sthenes, that he did not make any -attempts of ties kind so early as the first Philippic, and therefore that this is no part of that oration. 2 Possessed of the greatest power, Cxc] They could then command three hundred ships of w;ir, and those CSp a hls of encjacjincc a navy of douhle that number : they had twenty thousand foot, and two thousand eight hundred horse ; and their revenue amounted to above twelve hundred talents. — Tourreil and Mounteney . PHILIPPIC THE FIRST. 43 seasonably, but are ever last in the field. Just as bar- barians 1 engage at boxing, so you make war with Philip ; for, when one of these receives a blow, that blow engages him : if struck in another part, to that part his hands are shifted : but to ward on° the blow, or to watch his antagonist — for this he hath neither skill nor spirit. Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus, you resolve to send forces thither ; if in Thermopylae, thither ; if in any other place, you hurry up and down — you follow his standard, But no useful scheme for carrying on the war, no wise provisions 2 are ever thought of, until you hear of some enterprise in execution, or already crowned with success. This might formerly have been pardonable ; but now is the very critical moment, when it can by no means be admitted. It seems to me, Athenians, that some divinity who, from a regard to Athens, looks down on our conduct with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this restless ambition : for were he to sit down in the quiet enjoy- ment of his conquests and acquisitions, without pro- ceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you who, I think, would be unmoved at those transactions, 3 which have branded our state with the odious marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is base. But as he still pursues his conquests, as he is still extending his ambitious views, possibly, he may at last call you forth, unless you have renounced the name of Athe- nians. To me it is astonishing that none of you look 1 As barbarians, &c] The learned reader will find a beau- tiful passage in Aulus Gellius (1. iii. c. 27.), where, on the contrary, a man of true prudence who engages in the business and dangers of the world, is compared to a skilful boxer, who is ever attentive to defend himself and annoy his adversary. — Τ our veil. 2 Xo wise provisions, &c] I have followed the reading which Mr. Mounteney adopts — Uepi των πρα'γματων, &c. in- stead of χρημάτων. 3 At those transactions, &c] The taking of Pydna and Potidcea and Amphipolis may warrant what the orator here says. Yet I should choose to apply it to their suffering Olyn- thus by their misconduct to fall under the power of Philip. 14 OR ITIONS Off DBM08THBN1 Β. back to the beginning ' of this war, and consider that ire engaged in it to chastise the insolence of Philip; but that now it is become a defensive war, to secure us from his attempts : and that he will ever be repeat these attempts is manifest, unless some power ri^< oppose him. I>n(, if we unit in expectation ol this ; if we send out armaments composed of empt\ gallies, and those hopes with which some speaker ma\ have flattered yOU; can yon then think your interests well secured I Shall we not emhark I shall we not sail, with at least a part of our domestic force, now, since we have not hitherto? — But w here shall we make our de- scent I — Let us bul engage in the enterprise, and the vvar itself, Athenians, will show us where he is w fin- est. But if we sit at home, Listening to the mutual invectives and accusations of our orators, we cannot expect — no, not the least success, in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city is detached, although the whole he not present, the favor of the gods and the kindness of fortune attend to fight on our side ; hut when we send out a general, and an insignificant de- cree, and the hopes of our speakers, misfortune and disappointment must ensue. Such expeditions are to our enemies a sport, hut strike 4 our allies with dea<)l\ apprehensions : for it is not — it is not possible for any one man to perform every thing you desire. He ma\ 1 Look hack to the beginning, &c] Τ shall trouble the reader but with one argument more in favor of my suspicion that this is no part of the first Philippic. The passage I now quote I cannot think is applicable to the transactions of the Athenians and Philip, before bis attempt on Thermopylae, when (from the time of A.rgeus' death) they acted against each other only indirectly ; and, instead of punishing Philip, the Athenians could not even prevail on themselves to de- fend those dominions which they claimed as their own. But it is a very exact description of what happened after their de- claration of war against Philip, which succeeded the taking of Olynthus ; for this declaration was made from a sense of the danger of Philip's growing power, a resentment of his infrac- tions, and a resolution to reduce him : and yet they wen quickly obliged to defend themselves against farther attempts. PHILIPPIC THE FIRST. 45 promise, and harangue, and accuse this or that person : but to such proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For when a general who commanded a wretched col- lection of unpaid foreigners hath been defeated ; when there are persons here, who, in arraigning his conduct, dare to advance falsehoods, and when you lightly en- gage in any determination, just from their suggestions, what must be the consequence ? How then shall these abuses be removed ? — By offering yourselves, Athe- nians, to execute the commands of your general, to be witnesses of his conduct in the field, and his judges at your return ; so as not only to hear how your affairs are transacted, but to inspect them. But now, so shamefully are we degenerated, that each of our com- manders is twice or thrice called before you to answer for his life, though not one of them dared to hazard that life by once engaging his enemy. No ; they choose the death of robbers and pilferers, rather than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors should die by the sentence of the law. Generals should meet their fate bravely in the field. Then, as to your own conduct — some wander about, crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedaemonians, and they are concerting the destruction of Thebes, and the dissolution ! of some free states ; others assure us he hath sent an embassy to the king ; 2 others, that he is fortifying places in Illyria. 3 Thus we all go about framing our several tales. I do believe, indeed, Athenians, he is intoxicated with his greatness, and does entertain his imagination with many such vision- 1 The dissolution, &c] Wherever the Lacedaemonians had power they were always for establishing oligarchies, as has been observed in the preface to these orations. 2 To the king.] So the king of Persia was called. — The intent of this embassy was supposed to be, to make such de- mands as must produce a war with the Persian, which Iso- crates had exhorted him to very early. 3 He is fortifying places in Iilyria.] Possibly these rumors were spread by Philip's friends, to persuade the Athenians that his views and schemes were removed to a great distance from Athens. 16 ORATIONS Of DEMOSTHENES. ary prospect», as In• sees DO power rising to Op] him, and is elated with his success. Bui I canaot be persuaded that lie hath so taken his measures that the weakest among us know what he is next to do (fork is the weakest among us who spread these rumors). — Let us disregard them: let us he persuaded of this, that he is our enein\ ; that he hath spoiled u.s ol OBI dominions; that we have Long been subject to his inso- lence ; that whatever w< expected to be done for us by others hath proved against us; that all the resource left is in ourselves ; that, if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we may he forced to engage here: — let us be persuaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper determination ; then shall we be freed from those idle tales. For we are not to be solicitous to know what particular events will happen ; we need but be convinced nothing good can happen unless yon grant the due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes Athenians. I, on my part, have never on any occasion chosen to court your favor, by speaking any thing but what I was convinced would serve you ; and, on this occa- sion, I have freely declared my sentiments, without art, and without reserve. It would have pleased me. indeed, that, as it is for your advantage to have your true interest laid before you, so I might be assured that he who layeth it before you would share the ad- vantage, for then I had spoken with greater alacrity. However, uncertain as is the consequence with respect to me, Τ yet determined to speak, because I was con- vinced that these measures, if pursued, must have their use : and, of all those opinions which are offered to your acceptance, may that be chosen which will best advance the general weal ! THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION : pronounced four years after the first philippic, in the archonship of callimachus, the fourth year of the hundred and seventh olympiad, and the twelfth of Philip's reign. INTRODUCTION. The former oration does not appear to have had any considera- ble effect. Philip had his creatures in the Athenian assembly, who probably recommended less vigorous measures, and were but too favorably heard. In the mean time, this prince pur- sued his ambitious designs. When he found himself shut out of Greece, he turned his arms to such remote parts as he might reduce without alarming the states of Greece : and, at the same time, he revenged himself on the Athenians, by making himself master of some places which they laid claim to. At length his success imboldened him to declare those intentions which he had long entertained secretly against the Olynthians. Olynthus (a city of Thrace, possessed by Greeks originally from Chalcis, a town of Euboea, and colony of Athens) com- manded a large tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty-two cities. It had risen by degrees to such a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent and remarkable con- tests both with Athens and Lacedaemon. Nor did the Olyn- thians show great regard to the friendship of Philip when he first came to the throne, and was taking all measures to secure the possession of it ; for they did not scruple to receive two of his brothers by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealousy ; and endeavored to conclude an alli- ance with Athens against him, which he, by secret practices, found means to defeat. But as he was yet scarcely secure on his throne, instead of expressing his resentment, he courted, or rather purchased, the alliance of the Olynthians, by the cession of Anthemus, a city which the kings of Macedon had long disputed with them, and afterwards, by that of Pydna and Potidaea, which their joint forces had besieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians could not be in- fluenced by gratitude towards such a benefactor. The rapid 48 ι\ ι.;ΐ)ΐ)ΐι ΓΙΟΝ. progress of his arm - and hi - Lai ing . trmed them exceedingly. He bad already made di on their territories, :m< ,\ \ ; ' liom lie called the conspirators ; and, under ι > r« • ' . • 1 1 < . • of pnnii their infractions, pursued his hostilities with double ri made himself ma ι .•• of their cities, and threatened the capital with a In the mean time, the ( Myiitln. I the Atlo : for immediate Buccors. Their ambas tadors opened their ι mission in an assembly of the people, who had tie• right either to agree to, or to reject then demand. \s the im the occasion increased the number oi orators bad debated the affair before Demostl ■ . In the following oration, therefor•', already informed; urges the n. < . ι the ( »1\ nthiane, and confirms his opinion by powerful lays open the designs and practices of Philip, and tat» remove their dreadful apprehensions of his power. II» eludes with recommending to them to reform abi ancient discipline, and to put an end to a! OLYNTHIAC THE FIRST. In many instances, Athenians, have the gods, in my opinion, manifestly declared their favor to this state : nor is it least observable in this present juncture. For that an enemy should arise against Philip, on the very confines of his kingdom, of no inconsiderable power, and, what is of most importance, so determined on the war, that they consider any accommodation with him, first, as insidious ; next, as the downfal of their country : this seems no less than the gracious inter- position of Heaven itself. It must, therefore, be our care, Athenians, that we ourselves may not frustrate this goodness: for it must reflect disgrace, nay the foulest infamy on us, if we appear to have thrown away not those states and territories only which we once commanded, but those alliances and favorable incidents which fortune hath provided for us. To begin on this occasion with a display of Philip's power, or to press you to exert your vigor, by mo- tives drawn from hence, is, in my opinion, quite im- proper. And why ? Because whatever may be oifered on such a subject sets him in an honorable view, but seems to me as a reproach to our conduct : for the higher his exploits have arisen above his former estimation, the more must the world admire him ; while your disgrace hath been the greater the more your conduct hath proved unworthy of your state. 1 I have disposed the Olynthiac orations in the order pointed oat by Dionysius of Halicarnassus : and it plainly appears that this should precede the others ; for in this Demosthenes solicits the immediate conclusion of an alliance with Olyn- thus : in the others he supposes the alliance already con- cluded, and insists only on the necessity of effectually fulfil- ling their engagements. DEM. D ><» ΟΙ Ι ΡΙΟΝβ ΟΙ DEM081 Η ι These things therefore I shall pass over. He, ind who examinee justly, must find the source of .ill his greatness here, oof in himself. Bui the^ervicei \k ΙκιίΙι bere received, from those whose public adminis- tration hath been devoted to liis interest those rices vrhicli yon must punish, I do not think it sonable to display. There are other points of m* »r* moment for yon all to bear, and which must excite tin greatest abhorrence of bim in ever) reasonable mind• — These I shall lay before you« And now, should I call him perjured and pei /idniis. and not point out the instances of this his guilt, it might be deemed the mere virulence of malice ; and with justice. Nor will it engage too much of y OUT at- tention to hear him full) and clearly convicted, fr< m a full and clear detail of all his actions. \nd this I think useful on two accounts: first, that he may ap] as lie really is, treacherous and false; and then, that they who are struck with terror, as if Philip WHB » thing more than human, may see that he hath exhausted all those artifices to which lie owes his present el. tion, and that his affairs are now read} to decline* For I myself, Athenians, should think Philip π to be dreaded and admired, if I saw him raised bj ho- norable means. But ί find, on reflectioi , that at the time when certain persons drove out the Olynthtans from this assembly, when desirous of conferring with you, he began with abusing our simplicity by his pro- mise of surrendering Amphipolis, .and executing the secret article l of his treaty, then so much spoken that, after this, he courted the friendship of the Olyn- 1 The secret article, &c] When Philip had declared Am- phipolis a free city, the Athenians, who wore desirous of recovering it, sent ambassadors to Philip to solicit hifl Μ ance for that purpose; and on this condition promised to make him master of Pydna. But, lest the people of Pydna, who were averse to Philip's government, should take the alarm, the whole negotiation was transacted secretly in the senate, without being referred as usual to the .^senibly of tin- people. — This account llpian and Suidas cite from Theop< pus. FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 51 thians by seizing Potidaea, where we were rightful sovereigns, despoiling us his former allies, and giving them possession : that, but just now, he gained the Thessalians, by promising to give up Magnesia ; l and, for their ease, to take the whole conduct of the Pho- cian Avar on himself. In a word, there are no people who ever made the least use of him but have suffered by his subtlety ; his present greatness being wholly owing to his deceiving those who were unacquainted with him, and making them the instruments of his success. As these states therefore raised him, while each ima- gined he was promoting some interest of theirs, these states must also reduce him to his former meanness, as it now appears that his own private interest was the end of all his actions. Thus then, Athenians, is Philip circumstanced. If not, let the man stand forth who can prove to me I should have said to this assembly that I have asserted these things falsely ; or that they whom he hath de- ceived in former instances will confide in him for the future ; or that the Thessalians, who have been so basely, so undeservedly enslaved, 2 would not gladly embrace their freedom. — If there be any one among you who acknowleges all this, yet thinks that Philip will support his power, as he hath secured places of strength, convenient ports, and other like advantages, he is deceived. For when forces 3 join in harmony 1 Magnesia.] He bad made himself master of this city when he marched into Thessaly against the tyrants. The Thessa- lians remonstrated against this proceeding, but suffered them- selves to be amused by his assurances that he would give it up ; while he really determined to keep possession of it. — Tourreil. 2 Enslaved.] When Philip had dispossessed the tyrants of Thessaly he began to set himself up in their place ; but not by open force. He was so complete a master of dissimulation, appeared so gentle, so affable, so humane, so amiable, even to the conquered, that the Thessalians gave themselves up to him with an intire confidence, which he knew how to take the advantage of. — Tourreil. 3 For when forces, &c] I need not take notice to the 52 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. and affection, and one common interest unites the con- federating powers, then they share the toils with ala- crity, they endure the distresses, they persevere. But when extravagant ambition and lawless power (as in his case) have aggrandised a single person, the first pretence, the slightest accident, overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to the ground : for it is not — no, Athenians, — it is not possible to found a lasting power on injustice, perjury, and treachery. These may perhaps succeed for once, and borrow for a while from hope a gay and florishing appearance : but time betrays their weakness ; and they fall into ruin of themselves. For, as in structures of every kind, the lower parts should have the greatest firmness, so the grounds and principles of actions should be just and true. But these advantages are not found in the actions of Philip. I say then that you should despatch succors to the Olynthians (and the more honorably and expeditiously this is proposed to be done, the more agreeably to my sentiments), and send an embassy to the Thessalians, to inform some, and to enliven that spirit already raised in others (for it hath actually been resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasae, 1 and to assert their claim to Magnesia) : and let it be your care, Athenians, that our ambassadors may not depend only on words, learned reader how highly this passage is ornamented in the original, by the beauty of the metaphors, the grandeur of the composition, and the fineness of the sentiment. The word ανβχαιτισ*, by which he expresses the downfal of Philip, I apprehend, is not to be rendered into our, or perhaps any other language. It gives us the idea of a generous steed, tossing his mane, impatient of the bit, and casting his rider to the ground ; which at once expresses the subjection of the states conquered by Philip, their impatience of his govern- ment, their bold effort to regain their liberty, and the downfal of their master. The change of tenses (α^χαιτισΈ και SicKvaev) adds greatly to the force and beauty : it seems as if the de- struction of Philip was too quick for words. 1 Pagasee.] A city of Thessaly, which he had made himself master of five years before. — Tourreil. FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 53 but give them some action to display, by taking the field in a manner worthy of the state, and engaging in the war with vigor : for words, if not accompanied by actions, must ever appear vain and contemptible ; and particularly when they come from us, whose prompt abilities, and well-known eminence in speaking, make us to be always heard with the greater suspicion. Would you indeed regain attention and confidence, your measures must be greatly changed, your conduct totally reformed ; your fortunes, your persons, must appear devoted to the common cause ; your utmost efforts must be exerted. If you will act thus, as your honor and your interest require, then, Athenians, you will not only discover the weakness and insincerity of the confederates of Philip, but the ruinous condition of his own kingdom will also be laid open. The power and sovereignty of Macedon may have some weight indeed when joined with others. Thus, when you marched against the Olynthians under the conduct of Timotheus, it proved an useful ally ; when united with the Olynthians against Potidaea, it added something to their force ; just now, when the Thessalians were in the midst of disorder, sedition, and confusion, it aided them against the family of their tyrants (and in every case, any, even a small accession of strength, is, in my opinion, of considerable effect). But of itself, un- supported, it is infirm ; it is totally distempered : for by all those glaring exploits, which have given him this apparent greatness, his wars, his expeditions, he hath rendered it yet weaker than it was naturally : for you are not to imagine that the inclinations of his subjects are the same with those of Philip. He thirsts for glory : this is his object, this he eagerly pursues, through toils and dangers of every kind ; despising safety and life, when compared with the honor of achieving such actions as no other prince of Macedon could ever boast of. But his subjects have no part in this ambition. Harassed by those various excursions he is ever making, they groan under perpetual ca- lamity ; torn from their business, and their families, 54 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. and without opportunity to dispose of that pittance which their toils have earned ; as all commerce is shut out from the coast of Macedon by the war. Hence one may perceive how his subjects in general are affected to Philip. But then his auxiliaries, and the soldiers of his phalanx l have the character of won- derful forces, trained completely to war. And yet I can affirm, on the credit of a person from that coun- try, incapable of falsehood, that they have no such su- periority : for, as he assures me, if any man of expe- rience in military affairs should be found among them, he dismisses all such, from an ambition of having every great action ascribed wholly to himself (for, besides his other passions, the man hath this ambition in the highest degree) : and if any person, from a sense of decency, or other virtuous principle, betrays a dislike of his daily intemperance, and riotings, and obsceni- ties, 2 he loses all favor and regard ; so that none are left about him but wretches, who subsist on rapine and flattery, and who, when heated with wine, do not scruple to descend to such instances of revelry as it would shock you to repeat. Nor can the truth of this be doubted ; for they whom we ail conspired to drive from hence, as infamous and abandoned, Callias, the public servant, 3 and others of the same stamp ; buf- 1 The soldiers of his phalanx.] In the original, 7reJeratpoi, fellow -soldiers ; a term invented for the encouragement of this body, and to reconcile them to all the severities of their duty. Such kind of familiarities cost but little, and are often of con- siderable service to a prince. — TourreiL 2 Obscenities.] In the original, χορΰακισμους. Certain la- scivious dances, so called from the name of a satyr, said to have invented them. Theophrastus mentions it as a part of the character of a man utterly abandoned, that, when inflamed by wine, he is even capable of dancing the chordax. — Tourreil. In this description of the dissolute manners of Philip and his court, one would imagine that the orator had aggravated a little ; yet we have the whole description still more height- ened in history. The learned reader will find it in Athenaeus, book vi. — Tourreil. 3 The public servant.] One of those public slaves, who at- FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 55 foons, composers of lewd songs, in which they ridicule their companions ; these are the persons whom he en- tertains and caresses. And these things, Athenians, trifling as they may appear to some, are to men of just discernment great indications of the weakness both of his mind and fortune. At present, his successes cast a shade over them ; for prosperity hath great power to veil such baseness from observation. But let his arms meet with the least disgrace, and all his actions will be exposed. This is a truth, of which he himself, Athe- nians, will, in my opinion, soon convince you, if the gods favor us, and you exert your vigor : for, as in our bodies, while a man is in health, he feels no effect of any inward weakness ; but, when disease attacks him, every thing becomes sensible — in the vessels, in the joints, or in whatever other part his frame may be disordered ; so in states and monarchies, while they carry on a war abroad, their defects escape the general eye ; but when once it approaches their own terri- tory, then they are all detected. If there be any one among you who, from Philip's good fortune, concludes that he must prove a formi- dable enemy, such reasoning is not unworthy a man of prudence. Fortune hath great influence, nay, the whole influence, in all human aifairs : but then, were I to choose, I should prefer the fortune of Athens (if you yourselves will assert your own cause with the least degree of vigor) to this man's fortune ; for we have many better reasons to depend on the favor of Heaven than this man. But our present state is, in my opinion, a state of total inactivity ; and he who will not exert his own strength cannot apply for aid either to his friends or to the gods. It is not then surprising that he who is himself even amidst the dangers and labors of the field ; who is every where ; whom no op- tended the Athenian generals in the field. They chose slaves for this business, that, if there was occasion for their evidence on any public inquiry into the conduct of the war, they might be put to the torture, from which free citizens were ex» empted.—Ulpian. 56 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. portunity escapes ; to whom no season is unfavorable ; should be superior to you, who are wholly engaged in contriving delays, and framing decrees, and inquiring after news. I am not surprised at this ; for the con- trary must have been surprising : if we, who never act in any single instance as becomes a state engaged in war, should conquer him, who, in every instance, acts with an indefatigable vigilance. This indeed sur- prises me ; that you, who 1 fought the cause of Greece against Lacedaemon, and generously declined all the many favorable opportunities of aggrandising your- selves ; who, to secure their property to others, parted with your own, by your contributions, and bravely exposed yourselves in battle, should now decline the service of the field, and delay the necessary supplies, when called to the defence of your own rights : that you, in whom Greece in general, and each particular state hath often found protection, should sit down quiet spectators of your own private wrongs. This I say surprises me : and one thing more ; that not a man among you can reflect how long a time we have been at war with Philip, and in what measures this time hath all been wasted. You are not to be informed that, in delaying, in hoping that others would assert our cause, in accusing each other, in impeaching, then again entertaining hopes, in such measures as are now pursued, that time hath been intirely wasted. And are you so devoid of apprehension, as to imagine, when our state hath been reduced from greatness to wretch- edness, that the very same conduct will raise us from wretchedness to greatness ? No : this is not reasonable, it is not natural ; for it is much easier to defend than to acquire dominions. But now, the Avar hath left us nothing to defend : we must acquire. And to this work you yourselves alone are equal. This, then, is my opinion. — You should raise sup- plies ; you should take the field with alacrity. Prose- cutions should be all suspended until you have reco- 1 See note 2 p. 23. FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 57 vered your affairs : let each man's sentence be deter- mined by his actions : honor those who have deserved applause : let the iniquitous meet their punishment : let there be no pretences, no deficiences on your part; for you cannot bring the actions of others to a severe scrutiny unless you have first been careful of your own duty. What indeed can be the reason, think ye, that every man whom ye have sent out at the head of an army hath deserted your service, and sought out some private expedition (if we must speak ingenuously of these our generals also) ? The reason is this : when engaged in the service of the state, the prize for which they fight is yours. Thus, should Amphipolis be now taken, you instantly possess yourselves of it : the com- manders have all the danger, the rewards they do not share. But, in their private enterprises, the dangers are less ; the acquisitions are all shared by the generals and soldiers ; as were Lampsacus, Sigaeum, 1 and those vessels which they plundered. Thus are they all de- termined by their private interest. And, when you turn your eyes to the wretched state of your aifairs, you bring your generals to a trial ; you grant them leave to speak ; you hear the necessities they plead ; and then acquit them. Nothing then remains for us but to be distracted with endless contests and divisions (some urging these; some, those measures), and to feel the public calamity : for in former times, Athenians, you divided into classes, 2 to raise supplies. Now the 1 Lampsacus, Sigaeum, &c] Chares received these two cities of Asia Minor from the Satrap Artabazus, in return for his service. (See note 2 p. 27.) This general, instead of em- ploying the fleet he had been intrusted with for the reco- very of Amphipolis, according to his instructions, joined with some pirates, and committed considerable outrages in the iEgean Sea. He was accused of this at his return, but escaped, by flying from public justice, until his faction grew powerful enough to reinstate him in his former command. — Tourreil. 2 Classes, &c] ^υμμοριαι. Each of the ten tribes elected one hundred and twenty of the richer citizens, out of their own body, who were obliged to perform the public duties, 58 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. business of these classes is to govern; each liatli Μ orator at its head, and a general, \nJio is his creature; the Three Hundred are assistants to these ; and tin of you divide, some to this, some to that party. You must rectify these disorders: you must appear your- selves : you must leave the power of speaking, of ad- vising•, and of acting, open to every citizen. But if you suffer some persons to issue out their mandates, as with a royal ! authority ; if one set of men be forced to fit out ships, to raise supplies, to take up arms, while others are only to make decrees against them, without any charge, any employment besides, it is not possible that any thing can be effected seasonably and success- fully ; for the injured party ever will desert you ; and then your sole resource will be to make them feel your resentment instead of your enemies. To sum up all : my sentiments are these : — That every man should contribute in proportion to his fortune ; that all should take the field in their turns, until all have served ; that whoever appears in this place should be allowed to speak ; and that, when you give your and to raise supplies for the exigences of the state, out of their private fortunes. The twelve hundred persons thus chosen were divided into two parts, and each of these into ten classes, called συμμυριαι. These were again subdivided into two parts, according to the estates of those who com- posed them. And thus out of the ten first classes were ap- pointed the Three Hundred, that is, such a number of the wealthy citizens, who were on all occasions to supply the commonwealth with money, and with the rest of the twelve hundred to perform all extraordinary duties in their turns. It seems, however, that in the time of Demosthenes these classes sought pretences to avoid their duty, and contended for the power of throwing the whole weight of public busi- ness on each other. 1 As with a royal, &c] Eubulus, Aristophon, Hyperides, and Lycurgus, governed every thing with an absolute power in the assemblies : the conduct of military affairs was intirely engrossed by Diopithes, Menestheus, Leosthenes, and Chares. Thus the administration of affairs was shared among a few men as it were by lot; so that the popular government dege- nerated into an oligarchy. — See Plutarch, in Phocion. — Tour. FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 59 voices, your true interest only should determine you, not the authority of this or the other speaker. Pursue this course, and then your applause will not be lavished on some orator the moment he concludes ; you your- selves will share it hereafter, when you find how greatly you have advanced the interests of your state. THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC ORATION: PRONOUNCED IN THE SAME YEAR. INTRODUCTION. To remove the impression made on the minds of the Athe- nians by the preceding oration, Demades and other popular leaders in the interest of* Philip rose up, and opposed the propositions of Demosthenes with all their eloquence. Their opposition, however, proved ineffectual ; for the assembly decreed that relief should be sent to the Olynthians; and thirty gallies and two thousand forces were accordingly de- spatched, under the command of Chares. I>ut these succors, consisting intirely of mercenaries, and commanded by a gene- ral of no great reputation, could not be of considerable ser- vice ; and were besides suspected, and scarcely less dreaded by the Olynthians than the Macedonians themselves. \n the mean time, the progress of Philip's arms could meet with lit- tle interruption. He reduced several places in the region of Chalcis, rased the fortress of Zeira, and, having twice defeated the Olynthians in the field, at last shut them up in their city. In this emergency they again applied to the Athenians, and pressed for fresh and effectual succors. In the following oration Demosthenes endeavors to support this petition, and to prove that both the honor and the interest of the Athenians demanded their immediate compliance. As the expense of the armament was the great point of difficulty, he recommends the abrogation of such laws as prevented the proper settle- ment of the funds necessary for carrying on a Avar of such im- portance. The nature of these laws will come immediately to be explained. It appears, from the beginning of this oration, that other speakers had risen before Demosthenes, and inveighed loudly against Philip. Full of the national prejudices, or disposed to flatter the Athenians in their notions of the dignity and importance of their state, they breathed nothing but indig- nation against the enemy, and possibly, with some contempt of his present enterprises, proposed to the Athenians to correct his arrogance, by an invasion of his own kingdom. Demosthenes, on the contrary, insists on the necessity of self-defence ; endeavors to rouse his hearers from their se- curity, by the terror of impending danger ; and affects to consider the defence of Olynthus as the last and only means of preserving the very being of Athens. OLYNTHIAC THE SECOND. I am by no means affected in the same manner, Athe- nians, when I review the state of our affairs, and when I attend to those speakers who have now declared their sentiments. They insist that we should punish Philip : but our affairs, situated as they now appear, warn us to guard against the dangers with which we ourselves are threatened. Thus far therefore I must differ from these speakers, that I apprehend they have not pro- posed the proper object of your attention. There was a time, indeed, I know it well, when the state could have possessed her own dominions in security, and sent out her armies to inflict chastisement on Philip. I myself have seen that time when we enjoyed such power. But now, I am persuaded we should confine ourselves to the protection of our allies. When this is once effected, then we may consider the punishment his outrages have merited. But, till the first great point be well secured, it is weakness to debate about our more remote concernments. And now, Athenians, if ever we stood in need of mature deliberation and counsel, the present juncture calls loudly for them. To point out the course to be pursued on this emergency I do not think the greatest difficulty : but I am in doubt in what manner to pro- pose my sentiments ; for all that I have observed, and all that I have heard, convinces me that most of your misfortunes have proceeded from a want of inclination to pursue the necessary measures, not from ignorance of them. Let me intreat you, that, if I now speak with an unusual boldness, you may bear it, considering only whether I speak truth, and with a sincere intention to advance your future interests ; for you now see, that ί>\> <>h\tk>vs οι DBM08TH1 b) BOme orators, who stinU hut in gain \nur faVOT affairs have hern reduced to the extremity ofdistri J think it necessary, in the first place, to r< Late transactions to your thoughts. Yon maj rem* her. Athenians, that about three or four years since you received advice thai Philip was in Thrace, and had laid siege to the fortress I then the month of November. 1 Great commotions and de- bates arose: it was resolved to send out fort} that all citizens under the age of fi\ e-aml-lOri \ ■ should themselves embark; and that si\t\ talents should be raised. Thus it was agreed ! that year passed a* then came in the months July, 1 itigust, September. J η this last month, λ\ ith great difficulty, when teries had first heen celebrated, \ou sent on! Ciiaride- mus, 4 with jusl ten vessels, unmanned, and five talents of silver. For when reports came oi tli. and the death of Philip (both of these wen• affirmed), you laid aside your intended armament, imagining, thai at 1 Of November.] The reducing the Attic months to Julian lias occasioned some dispute among the Learned. I thought it best to make use of Roman oamee in the tra tion, 1 have followed the reduction ofS< 9 Under the age of five-and -forty, 6cc.1 Ί his expresses their zeal, and their apprehensions of the oai tie- laws of Athens a citizen was exempted iron, at the age of forty, except on some very :> July, fitC•] That is, the tirst months of t? • the reader is to observe, that the At τ that new moon whose lull moon immediately ! the summer solstice. i Charidemus.] That is, the worst of all > Is j a foreigner, a soldier of fortune, who had sometui against you, sometimes betrayed your cause, and who, on many occasions, had proved himself u] dence you reposed in him. — Monsieur Tonrreil trai passage tlms : ' Ce fut en ce dernier moia qu'imnn diatement apres la celebration (h- d'ici Cha- rideme, 1 6:c. Here there are two unfortune hich express haste and expedition: whereas the description in the original labors on in the elowesl and heaviest manner possible. Every single word marks out the tedious- meanness of their armament. SECOND OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 63 such a juncture there was no need of succors. And yet this was the very critical moment ; for, had they been despatched with the same alacrity with which they were granted, Philip would not have then escaped, to become that formidable enemy he now appears. But what was then done cannot be amended. Now, we have the opportunity of another war : that war I mean which hath induced me to bring these transac- tions into view, that you may not once more fall into the same errors. How then shall we improve this opportunity ? This is the only question. For, if you are not resolved to assist with all the force you can command, you are really serving under Philip ; you are fighting on his side. The Olynthians are a people whose power was thought considerable. Thus were the circumstances of affairs : Philip could not confide in them : they looked with equal suspicion on Philip. We and they then entered into mutual engagements of peace and alliance. This was a grievous embarrassment to Philip, that we should have a powerful state confe- derated with us, spies on the incidents of his fortune. It was agreed that we should by all means engage this people in a war with him. And now, what we all so earnestly desired, is effected : the manner is of no moment. What then remains for us, Athenians, but to send immediate and effectual succors, I can- not see : for besides the disgrace that must attend us, if any of our interests are supinely disregarded, I have no small apprehensions of the consequence, (the Thebans, 1 affected as they are towards us, and the Phocians exhausted of their treasures,) if Philip be left at full liberty to lead his armies into these territories, when his present enterprises are accom- 1 The Thebans, &c] They had a mortal hatred to the Athe- nians, as they had favored Lacedaemon after the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, and had lately taken part with the Phocians against them in the sacred war. [And even before these times, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans strenuously contended for the utter extirpation of Athens.] — Tourreil. 64 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. pushed. If any one among you can be so far im- mersed in indolence as to suffer this, he must choose to be witness of the misery of his own country, rather than to hear of that which strangers suffer, and to seek assistance for himself, when it is now in his power to grant assistance to others. That this must be the con- sequence, if we do not exert ourselves on the present occasion, there can scarcely remain the least doubt among us. But, as to the necessity of sending succors : this, it may be said, we are agreed in ; this is our resolution. But how shall we be enabled ? that is the point to be explained. — Be not surprised, Athenians, if my senti- ments on this occasion seem repugnant to the general sense of this assembly. Appoint magistrates for 1 the inspection of your laws : not in order to enact any new law ; you have already a sufficient number ; but to repeal those whose ill effects you now experience. I mean the laws relating to the theatrical funds 2 (thus 1 Magistrates for, &c] In the original νομοθέτης. So were those citizens called who were intrusted by the people with the regulation of their laws. They were chosen by lot, to the number of 1001, that their votes might not be equal. Every citizen, at certain times, and in certain assemblies, had usually a right to complain of any law. The president of the as- sembly proposed the complaint to the people : five advocates were allowed to plead in defence of the law ; and after hear- ing them, the people referred the affair to the nomothetae. — TourreiL 2 The theatrical funds.] The Athenians, as well as the other Greeks, were ever passionately fond of the entertainments of the theatre. Disputes for places soon became remarkably inconvenient, and called for a regulation. The magistrates therefore ordered that a small price should be paid for places, to reimburse the builders of the theatre, which as yet knew not that magnificence which riches and luxury afterwards introduced. This purchasing of places began to be com- plained of by the poorer citizens ; and therefore Pericles, out of a pretended zeal for their interest, proposed that a sum of money (which had been deposited in the treasury, after the war of Egina, when they had made a thirty years' peace with Lacedaemon, and was intended as a public resource in case of SECOND OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 65 openly I declare it), and some about the soldiery. 1 By the first, the soldier's pay goes as theatrical expenses, to the useless and inactive ; the others screen those from justice who decline the service of the field ; and thus damp the ardor of those disposed to serve us. When you have repealed these, and rendered it con- sistent with safety to advise you justly, then seek for some person to propose that decree, which 2 you all are sensible the common good requires. But, until this be done, expect not that any man will urge your true in- terest, when, for urging your true interest, you repay him with destruction. You will never find such zeal ; especially since the consequence can be only this : he who oiFers his opinion, and mo\es for your concur- any invasion of Attica) should be distributed among the ci- tizens, to defray the expense of their entertainments in time of peace only. The proposal and the restriction were both agreed to : but as all indulgences of this kind degenerate, sooner or later, into licentiousness, the people began to con- sider this distribution as their unalienable property ; and, the very year of the Olynthiac orations, Eubulus, a popular leader, of a party opposite to Demosthenes, prevailed to have a law passed, which forbad any man, on pain of death, to make a motion, or proposal of a decree, for restoring what was now called the theatrical funds to the military, or any other pub- lic service. This is the law which Demosthenes here attacks. 1 About the soldiery•] The laws of Solon exacted personal service from every citizen, with the utmost rigor. Those which the orator complains of must have been made when the state began to be corrupted. 2 That decree, which, &c] A decree for the alienation of the theatrical funds. While Eubulus' law was in force such a decree could not be proposed. The usefulness and neces- sity of it, however, the orator ventures to insinuate ; for the penalty was not understood as extending to a man's barely declaring his sentiments, provided he did not make the mo- tion in form. In the latter part of this oration he seems to propose another method of avoiding the ill consequences of the law of Eubulus ; and that is, that the theatrical distribu- tions should be still continued ; but that all those who were in public offices, and who usually received their several sa- laries and appointments, should now serve the state without fee or reward. The name only of these distributions would have then remained. DEM. Ε 66 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. rence, suffers some unmerited calamity ; but your affairs are not in the least advanced : nay, this addi- tional inconvenience must arise, that for the future it will appear more dangerous to advise you than even at present. And the authors of these laws should also be the authors of their repeal : for it is not just that the public favor should be bestowed on them who, in framing these laws, have greatly injured the com- munity ; and that the odium should fall on him whose freedom and sincerity are of important service to us all. Until these regulations be made you are not to think any man so great, that he may violate these laws with impunity; or so devoid of reason, as to plunge himself into open and foreseen destruction. And be not ignorant of this, Athenians, that a decree is of no significance unless attended with resolution and alacrity to execute it : for were decrees of them- selves sufficient to engage you to perform your duty ; could they even execute the things which they enact ; so many would not have been made to so little, or ra- ther to no good purpose ; nor would the insolence of Philip have had so long a date : for, if decrees can punish, he hath long since felt all their fury. But they have no such power : for though proposing and re- solving be first in order; yet, in force and efficacy, action is superior. Let this then be your principal concern ; the others you cannot want : for you have men among you capable of advising, and you are of all people most acute in apprehending. Now, let your in- terest direct you, and it will be in your power to be as remarkable for acting. What season, indeed, what opportunity do you wait for more favorable than the present ? or, when will you exert your vigor, if not now, my countrymen ? Hath not this man seized all those places that were ours? Should he become master of this country too, 1 must we not sink into the lowest 1 Of this country too, &c] That is, the country of Chalcis, where Philip took two-and-thirty cities before he laid siege to Olyntlms. — Tourreil, SECOND OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 67 state of infamy ? Are not they whom we have promised to assist, whenever they are engaged in war, now at- tacked themselves ? Is he not our enemy ? is he not in possession of our dominions? is he not a barbarian? 1 is he not every base thing words can express ? If we are insensible to all this, if we almost aid his designs ; Heavens ! can we then ask to whom the consequences are owing ? Yes, I know full well we never will im- pute them to ourselves. Just as in the dangers of the iield, not one of those who fly will accuse himself ; he will rather blame the general, or his fellow-soldiers : yet every single man 2 that fled was accessary to the defeat : he who blames others might have maintained his own post ; and, had every man maintained his, success must have ensued. Thus then, in the present case, is there a man whose counsel seems liable to ob- jection? let the next rise, and not inveigh against him, but declare his own opinion. Doth another offer some more salutary counsel ? pursue it, in the name of Hea- ven ! ' But then it is not pleasing/ This is not the fault of the speaker, unless in that he hath 3 neglected 1 A barbarian ?] This was the term of reproach which the Greeks applied to all other nations : nor were the Macedo- nians excepted. In the time of Xerxes, Alexander, king of Macedon, could not be admitted into the Olympic games until he had proved his descent to be originally from Argos : and when he came over from the Persian camp, to give the Greeks notice of the motions of Mardonius, he justified his perfidy by his ancient descent from Greece ; which he needed not to have had recourse to if Macedon had not been then considered as a part of the barbarian world. — Tourreil. 2 Yet every single man, &c] The orator did not foresee that, in ten years after, he himself would be guilty of this very crime ; be branded with a name of infamy, for casting away his shield at the battle of Chaeronea, and have nothing to oppose to the reproaches of his enemies but a weak and trifling pleasantry. — Tourreil. 3 Unless in that he hath, &c] This passage, which is translated pretty exactly from the original, seems, at first view, to have something of a forced and unnatural air. In- deed it is not possible for us to perceive fully and clearly the strength and propriety of every part of these orations. To θβ ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. to express his affection in prayers and wishes. To praj is easy, Athenians, and in one petition ma\ be col- lected as many instances of good fortune as nc phase. To determine justly, when affairs are to be considered, is not so easy. But what is most useful should erer he preferred to that which is agreeable, where both cannot be obtained. I>ut if there be a man who will leave us the theatri- cal funds, and propose other subsidies for the service of the war, are we not rather to attend to him ? 1 grant it, Athenians, if that man can be found. But Ϊ should account it wonderful, if it ever did, if it ever can hap- pen to any man on earth, that while he lavishes Ids pre- sent possessions on unnecessary occasions, some future funds should be procured to supply his real necessi- ties. But such proposals find a powerful advocate in the breast of every hearer. So that nothing is so ensy as to deceive oneself; for what we wish, that we readily believe : but such expectations are oftentimes incon- sistent with our aifairs. On this occasion, therefore, let your aifairs direct you ; then will you be enabled to take the field ; then you will have your full pay. And men, whose judgments are well directed, and whose souls are great, could not support the infamy which must attend them, if obliged to desert any of this it would be requisite to know the temper and disposition of the hearers, at that particular time when each of them was delivered ; and also to have before us every thine, said by other speakers in the debate. In many places we rind very plain allusions to the speeches of other orators ; and it is not unreasonable to think, that there are other more obscure ones which escape our observation. If we suppose, for instance, that, in the present debate, before Demosthenes rose some other speaker had amused the people with nattering hopes, with professions of zeal and affection, with passionate excla- mations, and prayers to the gods for such and such instances of public success ; while at the same time he neglected to point out such measures as were fit to be pursued, or perhaps recommended pernicious measures : — on such a supposition, I say, this passage, considered as an indirect reproof of such a speaker, will perhaps appear to have sufficient force and propriety. SECOND OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 69 the operations of a war from the want of money : they could not, after snatching up their arms, and marching against the Corinthians l and Megareans, 2 suffer Philip to enslave the states of Greece, through the want of provisions for their forces. I say not this wantonly, to raise the resentment of some among you. No ; I am not so unhappily perverse, as to study to be hated, when no good purpose can be answered by it ; but it is my opinion, that every honest speaker should prefer the interest of the state to the favor of his hearers. This (I am assured, and perhaps you need not be in- formed) was the principle which actuated the public conduct of those of our ancestors who spoke in this assembly (men, whom the present set of orators are ever ready to applaud, but whose example they by no means imitate): such were Aristides, Nicias, the former Demosthenes, and Pericles. But since we have 1 The Corinthians.] This alludes to an expedition that the Athenians had made about an age before. Some time after the Persian war, when the Greeks began to quarrel among themselves, Corinth and Megara had some dispute about their boundaries. The better to support their quarrel, the Megareans quitted the Lacedaemonians, and entered into an alliance with Athens. But, as this state was then engaged both in Egypt and Egina, the Corinthians imagined they would not be able to give any assistance, and therefore in- vaded the territories of Megara. But the Athenians came immediately to the assistance of their allies, although they were obliged to commit the defence of their city to their old men and boys ; and the Corinthians were repulsed. — Tourreil. 2 The Megareans.] This war happened twelve years after that mentioned in the preceding note. The Megareans, after having put an Athenian garrison to the sword, that was sta- tioned in their territory, joined with Lacedaemon, and even with Corinth, their mortal enemy, against whom the Athe- nians had espoused their quarrel. This state, incensed at the ingratitude of their revolt, determined to reduce them to rea- son. They issued out a mandate, directing the Megareans to abstain from cultivating a piece of ground consecrated to Ceres and Proserpine ; and, on their refusing to comply, pub- lished an edict, to exclude them from all commerce in Attica, and bound their generals by an oath to invade their territories once every year. — Tourreil. 70 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. had speakers who, before their public appearance, ask you — What do you desire ? what shall I propose ! how can I oblige you? the interest of our country hath been sacrificed to momentary pleasure and popu- lar favor. Thus have we been distressed ; thus have these men risen to greatness, and you sunk into dis- grace. And here let me intreat your attention to a summary account of the conduct of your ancestors, and of your own. I shall mention but a few things, and these well known: for, if you would pursue the way to happiness, you need not look abroad for leaders ; our own coun- trymen point it out. These our ancestors, therefore, whom the orators never courted, never treated with that indulgence with which you are flattered, held the sovereignty of Greece, with general consent, five-and- forty years ; l deposited above ten thousand talents in our public treasury ; kept the king of this country in that subjection which a barbarian owes to Greeks ; erected monuments of many and illustrious actions, which they themselves achieved, by land and sea ; in a word, are the only persons who have transmitted to posterity such glory as is superior to envy. Thus great do they appear in the affairs of Greece. Let us now view them within the city, both in their public and private conduct. And, first, the edifices which their administrations have given us, their decorations of our 1 Five-and-forty years.] In Wolfius' edition it is 65. But this reading is found in other copies, and is confirmed by the parallel passage in the oration on regulating the common- wealth. The orator computes from the death of Pausanias, when the supreme command was given to the Athenians, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Add to this the 27 years of that war, during which time the Athenians maintained their power, though not with consent, and the whole will be 72 years complete, and part of the 73d year. Agreeably to this last calculation, Demosthenes says, in the third Philip- pic, that the Athenians commanded in Greece 73 years. These two accounts are thus easily reconciled by distinguishing the times of the voluntary and the involuntary obedience of the' Greeks. — Tourreil. SECOND OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 71 temples, and the offerings deposited by them, are so numerous and so magnificent, that all the efforts of pos- terity cannot exceed them. Then, in private life, so exemplary was their moderation, their adherence to the ancient manners so scrupulously exact, that, if any of you ever discovered the house of Aristides, or Mil- tiades, or any of the illustrious men of those times, he must know that it was not distinguished by the least extraordinary splendor : for they did not so conduct the public business as to aggrandise themselves ; their sole great object was to exalt the state : and thus, by their faithful attachment to Greece, by their piety to the gods, and by that equality which they maintained among themselves, they were raised (and no wonder) to the summit of prosperity. Such was the state of Athens at that time, when the men I have mentioned were in power. But what is your condition, under these indulgent ministers who now direct us ? Is it the same, or nearly the same ? — Other things I shall pass over, though I might expatiate on them. Let it only be observed, that we are now, as you all see, left without competitors ; the Lacedaemo- nians lost ; l the Thebans engaged 2 at home ; and not one of all the other states of consequence sufficient to dispute the sovereignty with us. Yet at a time when we might have enjoyed our own dominions in secu- rity, and been the umpires in all disputes abroad, our territories have been wrested from us ; we have ex- pended above one thousand five hundred talents to no purpose ; the allies 3 which we gained in war have been 1 The Lacedaemonians lost.] The battles of Leuctra and Mantinea had intirely destroyed their power. — Tourreil. 2 Engaged, &c] In the Phocian war. 3 The allies, &c] Ulpian and Wolfius understand this of the peace, by which the Athenians consented that the people of Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, and other revolters, should all continue free. But it seems more natural to apply it to some prior events ; as the taking of Pydna and Potidaea, and other cities of Thrace, that were then subject to Athens, and which Philip made himself master of, after he had concluded 72 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. lost in time of peace ; and to this degree of power have we raised an enemy against ourselves. (For let the man stand forth, who can show whence Philip hath de- rived his greatness, if not from us.) ' Well ! if these affairs have hut an unfavorable as- pect, yet those within the city are much more fl oris hi η g than ever/ Where are the proofs of this ? The walls which have been whitened ? the ways we have re- paired ? the supplies of water? and such trifles. Turn your eyes to the men of whose administrations these are the fruits : some of whom, from the lowest state of poverty, have arisen suddenly to affluence ; some from meanness to renown : others have made their own private houses much more magnificent than the public edifices. Just as the state hath fallen, their private fortunes have been raised. And what cause can we assign for this ? How is it that our affairs were once so florishing, and now in such disorder? Because, formerly, the people dared to take up arms themselves ; were themselves masters of those in employment; disposers themselves of all emoluments: so that every citizen thought himself happy to derive honors and authority, and all advan- tages whatever, from the people. But now, on the contrary, favors are all dispensed, affairs all trans- acted by the ministers: while you, quite enervated, robbed of your riches, your allies, stand in the mean rank of servants and assistants ; happy if these men grant you the theatrical appointments, and send you scraps of the public meal : l and, what is of all most sordid, you hold yourselves obliged to them for that which is your own : while they confine you within these walls, lead you on gently to their purposes, and soothe a peace with the Athenians, in the second year of his reign. — Tourreil. 1 Of the public meal.] Demetrius Phalereus records a say- ing of Demades, in ridicule of the custom of distributing vic- tuals to the people. ' The state,' said he, ' is now become a feeble old woman, that sits at home in her slippers, and sups up her ptisan/ SECOND OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 73 and tame you to obedience. Nor is it possible, that they who are engaged in low and groveling pursuits, can entertain great and generous sentiments. No! Such as their employments are, so must their disposi- tions prove. — And now I call Heaven to witness, that it will not surprise me if I suffer more by mentioning this your condition than they who have involved you in it ! Freedom of speech you do not allow on all oc- casions ; and that you have now admitted it, excites my wonder. But if you will at length be prevailed on to change your conduct ; if you will take the field, and act worthy of Athenians ; if these redundant sums which you receive at home be applied to the advancement of your affairs abroad ; perhaps, my countrymen, perhaps some instance of consummate good fortune may attend you, and you may become so happy as to despise those pittances, which are like the morsels that a physician allows his patient : for these do not restore his vigor, but just keep him from dying. So, your distributions cannot serve any valuable purpose, but are just suffi- cient to divert your attention from all other things, and thus increase the indolence of every one among you. But I shall be asked, What then ? Is it your opinion that these sums should pay our army? And besides this, that the state should be regulated in such a man- ner, that every one may have his share of public busi- ness, and approve himself an useful citizen, on what occasion soever his aid may be required. Is it in his power to live in peace ? He will live here with greater dignity, while these supplies prevent him from being tempted by indigence to any thing dishonorable. Is he called forth by an emergency like the present ? Let him discharge that sacred duty which he owes to his country, by applying these sums to his support in the field. Is there a man among you past the age of ser- vice ? Let him, by inspecting and conducting the pub- lic business, regularly merit his share of the distribu- tions which he now receives, without any duty en- joined, or any return made to the community. And 74 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENIC thus, with scarcely any alteration, either of abolishing or innovating, all irregularities arc removed, and the state completely settled, by appointing one general regulation, which shall intitle our citizens to receix e, and at the same time oblige them to take arms, to ad- minister justice, to act in all cases as their time of life and our affairs require. J]ut it never hath, nor could it have been moved by me, that the rewards of the di- ligent and active should be bestowed on the useless citizen ; or that you should sit here, supine, languid, and irresolute, listening to the exploits of some gene- ral's foreign troops (for thus it is at present). Not that I would reflect on him who serves you, in any instance. But you yourselves, Athenians, should perform those services for which you heap honors on others, and not recede from that illustrious rank of virtue, the price of all the glorious toils of your ancestors, and by them bequeathed to you. Thus have I laid before you the chief points in which I think you interested. It is your part to embrace that opinion, which the welfare of the state in general, and that of every single member, recommends to your acceptance. THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC ORATION PRONOUNCED IN THE SAME YEAR. INTRODUCTION The preceding oration had no farther effect on the Atheni- ans, than to prevail on them to send orders to Charidemus, who commanded for them at the Hellespont, to make an at- tempt to relieve Olynthus. He accordingly led some forces into Chalcis, which, in conjunction with the forces of Olyn- thus, ravaged Pallene, a peninsula of Macedon, towards Thrace, and Bottia, a country on the confines of Chalcis, which, among other towns, contained Pella, the capital of Macedon. But these attempts could not divert Philip from his resolu- tion of reducing Olynthus, which he had now publicly avowed. The Olynthians therefore found it necessary to have once more recourse to Athens ; and to request, that they would send troops, composed of citizens, animated with a sincere ardor for their interest, their own glory, and the common cause. Demosthenes, in the following oration, insists on the im- portance of saving Olynthus ; alarms his hearers with the apprehension of a war, which actually threatened Attica, and even the capital ; urges the necessity of personal service ; and returns to his charge of the misapplication of the public money, but in such a manner as showeth that his former remonstrances had not the desired effect. OLYNTHIAC THE THIRD. I am persuaded, Athenians, that you would account it less valuable to possess the greatest riches, 1 than to have the true interest of the state on this emergency clearly laid before you. It is your part, therefore, readily and cheerfully to attend to all who are disposed to offer their opinions : for your regards need not be confined to those whose counsels are the effect of pre- meditation : 2 it is your good fortune to have men among you who can at once suggest many points of moment. From opinions, therefore, of every kind, you may easily choose that most conducive to your in- terest. And now, Athenians, the present juncture calls upon us ; we almost hear its voice, declaring loudly that you yourselves must engage in these affairs, if you have the least attention to your own security. You entertain I know not what sentiments on this occasion. My opinion is, that the reinforcements should be in- 1 The greatest riches.] Ulpian finds out a particular pro- priety in this exordium. He observes, that, as the orator intends to recommend to them to give up their theatrical ap- pointments, he prepares them for it by this observation ; and, while he is endeavoring to persuade them to a just disregard of money, appears as if he only spoke their sentiments. 2 Premeditation.] M. Tourreil admires the greatness of mind of Demosthenes, who, though he gloried in the pains and labor his orations cost him, was yet superior to that low and malignant passion, which oftentimes prompts us to decry those talents which we do not possess. I suspect, however, that this passage was occasioned by some particu- lar circumstance in the debate. Perhaps some speaker, who opposed Demosthenes, might have urged his opinion some- what dogmatically, as the result of mature reflection and de- liberation. THIRD OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 77 stantly decreed ; that they should be raised with all possible expedition ; that so our succors may be sent from this city, and all former inconveniences be avoided ; and that you should send ambassadors to notify these things, and to secure our interests by their presence. For as he is a man of consummate policy, complete in the art of turning every incident to his own advantage, there is the utmost reason to fear, that partly by concessions, where they may be sea- sonable ; partly by menaces (and his menaces may l be believed), and partly by rendering us and our ab- sence suspected, he may tear from us something of the last importance, and force it into his own service. Those very circumstances, however, which contri- bute to the power of Philip, are happily the most fa- vorable to us : for that uncontrolled command, with which he governs all transactions public and secret ; his intire direction of his army, as their leader, their ■sovereign, and their treasurer ; and his diligence, in giving life to every part of it, by his presence ; these things greatly contribute to carrying on a war with ex- pedition and success, but are powerful obstacles to that accommodation which he would gladly make with the Olynthians. For the Olynthians see plainly that they do not now fight for glory, or for part of their territory, but to defend their state from dissolution and slavery. They know how he rewarded those traitors of Amphi- polis, who made him master of that city, and those of Pydna, who opened their gates to him. In a word, free states, I think, must ever look with suspicion on an absolute monarchy ; but a neighboring monarchy must double their apprehensions. Convinced of what hath now been offered, and pos- sessed with every other just and worthy sentiment, you must be resolved, Athenians, you must exert your spirit ; you must apply to the war now, if ever ; your fortunes, your persons, your whole powers, are now 1 His menaces may, &c] Although his promises could by no means be relied on. 78 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHEM'.S. demanded. There is no excuse, no pretence left f<>?• declining the performance of your duty : for that which you were all ever urging loudly, that the ()l\n- thians should be engaged in a war with Philip, hath now happened of itself; and this in a manner most agree- able to our interest. For, if they had entered into this \var at our persuasion, they must have been precarious allies, without steadiness or resolution : but, as their private injuries have made them enemies to Philip, it is probable that enmity will be lasting, both on account of what they fear, and what they have already suffered. My countrymen ! let not so favorable an opportunity escape you : do not repeat that error which hath been so often fatal to you. For when, at our return from assisting the Eubceans, 1 Hierax and Stratocles, citizens of Amphipolis, mounted this gallery, 2 and pressed you to send out your navy, and to take their city under your protection, had we discovered that resolution in our own cause, which we exerted for the safety of Eubcea, then had Amphipolis been yours, and all those difficulties had been avoided in which you have been since involved. Again, when we received advice of the sieges of Pydna, Potida?a, Methone, Pagasa?, and other places (for I would not detain you with a particular recital), had we ourselves marched with a due spirit and alacrity to the relief of the first of these cities, we should now find much more compliance, much more humility in Philip. But by still neglect- ing the present, and imagining our future interests will not demand our care, Ave have aggrandised our enemy, w r e have raised him to a desrree of eminence greater 1 The Eubocans.] This refers to the expedition in favor of the Euboeans against the Thebans, which is mentioned in the note 2, p. 30. The Athenians prepared for this expedi- tion in three days, according to Demosthenes ; in five, accord- ing to ^Eschines : and their success was as sudden as their preparation. 2 This gallery. J In the original, τουτι το ΒΗΜΑ ; that eminence where all the public speakers were placed, and from whence the people were addressed on all occasions. THIRD OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 79 than any king of Macedon hath ever yet enjoyed. Now, we have another opportunity — that which the Olynthians of themselves present to the state ; one no less considerable than any of the former. And, in my opinion, Athenians, if a man were to bring the dealings of the gods towards us to a fair account, though many things might appear not quite agreeable to our wishes, yet he would acknowlege that we had been highly favored by them ; and with great reason : for that many places have been lost in the course of war is truly to be charged to our own weak conduct. But that the difficulties arisen from hence have not long affected us ; and that an alliance now presents itself, to remove them, if we are disposed to make the just use of it ; this I cannot but ascribe to the divine goodness. But the same thing happens in this case as in the use of riches. If a man be careful to save those he hath acquired, he readily acknowleges the kindness of fortune ; but if by his imprudence they be once lost, with them he also loses the sense of gra- titude. So in political affairs, they who neglect to im- prove their oppox.„_ ; ties, forget the favors which the gods have bestowed ; for it is the ultimate event which generally determines men's judgment of every thing precedent : and, therefore, all affairs hereafter should engage your strictest care ; that, by correcting -our errors, we may wipe off the inglorious stain of past actions. But should we be deaf to these men too, and should he be suffered to subvert Olynthus ; say, what can prevent him from marching his forces into what- ever territory he pleases ? Is there not a man among you, Athenians, who re- flects by what steps Philip, from a beginning so incon- siderable, hath mounted to this height of power ? First, he took Amphipolis ; then he became master of Pydna ; then Potidaea fell ; then Methone ; then came his in- road into Thessaly : after this, having disposed affairs at Pherse, at Pagasa?, at Magnesia, intirely as he pleased, he marched into Thrace. Here, while engaged ' in ex- 1 Into Thrace. Here, while engaged, &c] Thrace was in- 80 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. pelling some, and establishing other princes, he fell sick. Again, recovering, he never turned a moment from his course to ease or indulgence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians. His expeditions against the Illyrians, the Paeonians, against Arymbas, 1 I pass all over. — But I may be asked, why this recital now ? That you may know and. see your own error, in ever neglecting some part of your affairs, as if beneath your regard; and that active spirit with which Philip pur- sues his designs ; which ever fires him, and which never can permit him to rest satisfied with those things he hath already accomplished. If then he determines firmly and invariably to pursue his conquests ; and if habited by an infinite number of different people, whose names Herodotus has transmitted. And he observes, that could they have united under a single chief, or connected them- selves by interest or sentiment, they would have formed a body infinitely superior to all their neighbors. After Teres, the Thracians had divers kings. This prince had two sons, Sitalces and Sparadocus, among whose descendants various contests arose, till, after a series of usurpations and revolu- tions, Seuthes recovered part of the territory of his father Maesades, and transmitted the succession peaceably to Cotis the father of Cersobleptes (as Demosthenes says ; not his brother, as Diodorus). At the death of Cotis the divisions recommenced, and in the place of one king, Thrace had three, Cersobleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus. Cersobleptes dis- possessed the other two, and was himself dethroned by Philip. Frontinus reports, that Alexander, when he had conquered Thrace, brought the princes of that country with him in his expedition into Asia, to prevent their raising any commotions in his absence ; a proof that Philip and Alexander had es- tablished several petty kings in Thrace, who were vassals to Macedon. — Tonrreil. 1 Arymbas.] He was the son of Alcetas, king of Epirus, and brother to jS T eoptolemus, whose daughter Olympias Philip married. About three years before the date of this oration the death of their father produced a dispute between the brothers about the succession. Arymbas was the lawful heir : yet Philip obliged him, by force of anus, to divide the king- dom with Neoptolemus : and not contented with this, at the death of Arymbas, he found means by his intrigues and me^ naces, to prevail on the Epirots to banish his son, and to con- stitute Alexander the son of Neoptolemus sole monarch. — Tourreil. THIRD OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 81 we are obstinately resolved against every vigorous and effectual measure ; think, what consequences may we expect ! In the name of Heaven ! can any man be so weak, as not to know that, by neglecting this war, we are transferring it from that country to our own ? And should this happen, I fear, Athenians, that as they who inconsiderately borrow money on high interest, after a short-lived afficience are deprived of their own fortunes ; so we, by this continued indolence, by con- sulting only our ease and pleasure, may be reduced to the grievous necessity of engaging in affairs the most shocking and disagreeable, and of exposing ourselves in the defence of this our native territory. To censure, some one may tell me, is easy, and in the power of every man : but the true counsellor should point out that conduct which the present exigence de- mands. — Sensible as I am, Athenians, that when your expectations have in any instance been disappointed, your resentment frequently falls not on those who merit it, but on him who hath spoken last ; yet I can- not, from a regard to my own safety, suppress what I deem of moment to lay before you. I say, then, this occasion calls for a twofold armament. First, we are to defend the cities of the Olynthians ; and for this purpose to detach a body of forces : in the next place, in order to infest his kingdom, we are to send out our navy manned with other levies. If you neglect either of these, I fear your expedition will be fruitless: for, if you content yourselves with infesting his dominions, this he will endure, until he is master of Olynthus ; and then he can with ease repel the invasion : or, if you only send succors to the Olynthians, when he sees his own kingdom free from danger he will apply with constancy and vigilance to the war, and at length weary out the besieged to a submission. Your levies there- fore must be considerable enough to serve both pur- poses. — These are my sentiments with respect to our armament. And now as to the expense of these preparations. You are already provided for the payment of your DEM• f" 82 , ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. forces better than any other people. This provision is distributed among yourselves in the maimer most agree- able ; but if you restore it to the army, the supplies will be complete without any addition ; if not, an addi- tion will be necessary; or the whole, rather, will re- main to be raised. How then ? (I may be asked) do you move for a decree to apply those funds to the mi- litary service ? By no means. It is my opinion, indeed, that an army must be raised ; that this money really belongs to the army ; and that the same regulation which entitles our citizens to receive, should oblige them also to act. At present you expend the sums on entertainments, without regard to your affairs. It re- mains then that a general contribution be raised : a great one, if a great one be required : a small one, if such may be sufficient. Money must be found : with- out it nothing can be effected. Various schemes are proposed by various persons : do you make that choice which you think most advantageous ; and, while you have an opportunity, exert yourselves in the care of your interests. It is worthy ' your attention to consider how the affairs of Philip are at this time circumstanced : for they are by no means so well disposed, so very florish- ing, as an inattentive observer would pronounce. Nor would he have engaged in this war at all, had he 1 It is worthy, &c.l Hitherto the orator has painted Philip in all his terrors. He is politic, and vigilant, and intrepid : he has risen gradually to the highest pitch of power ; and is now ready to appear before the walls of Athens, if he is not instantly opposed : but, lest this description should dispirit the Athenians, he is now represented in a quite different manner. His power is by no means real and solid ; his allies are prepared to revolt ; his kingdom is threatened with war and desolation ; and he is just ready to be crushed by the very first effort that is made to distress him : but as it was necessary that the danger, to which they were exposed, should make the deepest impression on the minds of his hearers, he returns to his former description, and concludes with the dreadful image of a formidable enemy ravaging their territory, and shutting them up within their walls. THIRD OLYXTHIAC ORATION. 83 thought he should have been obliged to maintain it. He hoped that the moment he appeared all things would fall before him. But these hopes were vain ; and this disappointment, in the first place, troubles and dispirits him. Then the Thessalians alarm him ; a people remarkable for their perfidy * on all occasions, and to all persons; and just as they have ever proved, even so he finds them now. For they have resolved in council to demand the restitution of Pagasae, and have opposed his attempt to fortify Magnesia : and I am informed, that for the future he is to be excluded from their ports and markets, as these conveniences belong to the states of Thessaly, and are not to be in- tercepted^ by Philip. And, should he be deprived of such a fund of wealth, he must be greatly straitened to support his foreign troops. Besides this, we must sup- pose that the Pasonian and the Illyrian, and all the others, would prefer freedom and independence to a state of slavery. They are not accustomed to subjec- tion ; and the insolence of this man, it is said, knows no bounds : nor is this improbable ; for great and unex- pected success is apt to hurry weak minds into ex- travagances. Hence it often proves much more dif- ficult to maintain acquisitions than to acquire. It is your part, therefore, to regard the time of his distress as your most favorable opportunity ; improve it to the utmost ; send out your embassies ; take the field your- selves, and excite a general ardor abroad ; erer con- sidering how readily Philip would attack us, if he were favored by any incident like this — if a war had broken out on our borders. And would it not be shameful to 1 Their perfidy.] This people had a bad character from the earliest times, so as to become even proverbial ; and Greece, and Athens particularly, had experienced their want of faith on very important occasions. They invited Xerxes into Greece, and were not ashamed to join Mardonius after the battle of Salamis, and to serve him as guides in his inva- sion of Attica; and in the heat of a battle between Athens and Sparta they on a sudden deserted their allies, the Athe- nians, and joined the enemy. See Thucyd. b. i. — TourreiL 84 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. want the resolution to bring* that distress on him which, had it been equally in his power, he certainly would have made you feel ? This too demands your attention, Athenians, that you aro now to determine whether it be most expedient to carry the war into his country, or to fight him here. If Olynthus be defended, Macedon will be the seat of war: you may harass his kingdom, and enjoy your own territories free from apprehensions. But, should that nation be subdued by Philip, who will oppose his marching hither? Will the Thebans ? Let it not be thought severe when I affirm that they will join readily in the invasion. 1 Will the Phocians? a people scarcely able 2 to defend their own country without your assist- ance. Will any others? 3 — But, sir, cries some one, he would make no such attempt. — This would be the greatest of absurdities ; not to execute those threats, when he hath full power, which now, when they appear so idle and extravagant, he yet dares to utter. And I think you are not yet to learn how great would be the difference between our engaging him here, and there. Were we to be only thirty days abroad, and to draw all the necessaries of the camp from our own lands, even were there no enemy to ravage them, the damage would, in my opinion, amount to more than the whole expense of the late war. 4 Add then the presence of an 1 Join readily in the invasion.] The reasons of Thebes' hatred to Athens have been already assigned. See note on Olynth. ii. p. 63. 2 Scarcely able, &c] The Phocians were at this time re- duced to a very low state, by a continued series of ill success in the sacred war. Philomelus and Onomarchus had pe- rished ; Phayllus and Phalecus, their successors, had been frequently defeated ; and the Thebans were continually gain- ing advantages over them. — Tourreil. 3 Will any others ?] He avoids all mention of the Thessa- lians ; because he had just shown that they were ill-affected to Philip, and therefore might be supposed willing to join with the Athenians. 4 Of the late war.] That is, their expedition into Thrace, in order to recover Amphipolis, which, according to the cal- THIRD OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 85 enemy, and how greatly must the calamity be increased ! But, farther, add the infamy ; and to those who judge rightly, no distress can be more grievous than the scandal of misconduct. It is incumbent therefore on us all (justly influ- enced by these considerations) to unite vigorously in the common cause, and repel the danger that threatens this territory. Let the rich exert themselves on this occasion ; that by contributing a small portion of their aifluence, they may secure the peaceful possession of the rest. Let those who are of the age for military duty ; that, by learning the art of Avar in Philip's do- minions, they may become formidable defenders of their native land. Let our orators, that they may safely submit their conduct to the public inspection ; for your judgment of their administrations will ever be determined by the event of things. And may we all contribute to render that favorable ! dilation of iEschines, cost them one thousand five hundred talents. — Tourreil. THE ORATION ON THE PEACEs PRONOUNCED IN THE AHCHON8HIP OF ARCHIAS, THREE YF..SHS AFTER THE OLYNTHIAC OR ATI O» 8. INTRODUCTION. The Athenians sent those succors to Olynthus which were recommended in the preceding oration. But they could noc defend that state against its domestic enemies ; for, the year following, two of its citizens, Lasthenes and Euthycrates, be- trayed the city to Philip. He rased it, threw part of the in- habitants in chains, sold another part, and distinguished the two traitors only by the cruelty of their death. His two brothers, who had been harbored in Olynthus, he also sacri- ficed to his jealousy and revenge. These events, no less than the repeated instances of De- mosthenes, prevailed on the Athenians to declare war against Philip in form. Hitherto he had kept some measures with them, and had sought various pretences for glossing over his hostilities ; but now he fell with the utmost fury on all their tributary states, and obliged Demosthenes to appear once more in the assembly, to persuade the Athenians to defend the islanders and their colonies which lay on the Hellespont. But scarcely had the war been declared when the vigor of their enemy, and their own fickleness and indo- lence, made them weary of it. Ctesiphon and Phrynon were sent to sound Philip's dispositions towards a separate peace. This was as he could wish. The Phocian war was at present the object of his views ; and his arts had just regained the Thessalians over to the confederacy, who had been prevailed on to stand neuter. To the Athenian ministers, therefore, he made such professions, that Demosthenes and nine others were sent to negotiate the peace ; who proceeded as far as they were authorised, and returned with Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus, on the part of Philip. Ambassadors were sent soon after from Athens, with full powers to conclude the treaty. In the first of these embassies Demosthenes had met INTRODUCTION. 87 with some Athenian prisoners in Macedon, whom he promised to redeem at his own expense, and took this opportunity to perform it ; while his colleagues, in the mean time, were to proceed, with all expedition, in order to conclude with Philip. Three months elapsed, however, before they came to an au- dience with the king, who was all this time making himself master of those places in Thrace which the Athenians claimed as their right. At last the terms of the treaty were agreed to ; but by affected delays, and by corrupting the ambassadors, he found means to defer the execution of it until he had ad- vanced his troops into Thessaly, in order to proceed against the Phocians. He then conducted the peace ; and, on their return, the ambassadors who had conducted the treaty (and iEschines in particular) expatiated on his candor and since- rity. They declared at the very time when he was giving Thebes the most solemn assurances that he would exterminate the Phocians, that his sole views were to screen this people from the fury of their enemies, and to control the insolence of the Thebans. They also vouched for his performing several things in favor of the state, not formally stipulated in the treaty. Thus were the Athenians amused, and Philip suffered to pass the straits of Thermopylae, and to pursue his march into Phocis. His reputation and approach struck such a terror into the Phocians that, although they received a reinforcement of a thousand Spartans, they yet sent to treat, or rather to submit. He allowed Phalecus, with eight thousand mercenaries, to retire into Peloponnesus ; but the rest, who were inhabitants of Phocis, were left at his mercy. The disposal of these he referred to the amphictyons, from an affected regard to the authority of an assembly composed of the representatives of the states of Greece. They thundered out the severest de- crees against this wretched people. Among other things, it was enacted that they should lose their seat in the amphic- tyonic council, and that the double voice which they had en- joyed in it should be transferred to Philip, who, by the same resolution, gained the superintendency of the Pythian games, which the Corinthians forfeited by taking part with the Pho- cians. The Athenians had not been present at Philip's election into this council ; and probably, to avoid all opposition, he had assembled only such amphictyons as were devoted to his interest. He thought it proper, however, to send circular letters to the absent states, inviting them to assemble at Del- phos, and to ratify his election. Athens, among others, received the invitation ; and as Philip's ambitious designs could be no longer concealed, 88 INTRODUCTION. Sonny were for violent measures. The proposal raised ι fer- ment in the assembly, which seems to have breathed nothing but indignation and opposition. On this occasion Demo- sthenes thought it his duty to moderate their heat ; and, in the following oration, endeavors ro prevent their being betrayed into any rash and imprudent measures. THE ORATION ON THE PEACE. 1 Athenians ! I see that this debate must be attended with many difficulties and great commotion ; not only 1 I shall here take the liberty to transcribe a remark from the authors of the Universal History. Libanius and Photius have taken pains to prove that the oration to which we refer above ought not to be ascribed to Demosthenes. We might well enough defend ourselves by alleging, that it has been generally esteemed his, and, as such, Las constantly maintained its place in his works. This would be sufficient for our purpose ; but, in truth, the arguments on which the opposite sentiment is built are so easily over- turned, that we might be justly blamed for neglecting so favorable an occasion of setting this point in a true light. Demosthenes, say those who will not allow this oration to be his, charged JEschines with betraying his country, on account of his recommending warmly a peace with Philip ; they can- not therefore think that Demosthenes would run openly into those measures which he had so lately and so warmly decried ; or that he, who on every other occasion singly opposed Phi- lip, and ran all hazards to bring him into odium with the peo- ple, should now be single on the other side, and attempt to cross the disposition of the Athenians, in favor of peace and Philip. These objectors forget that Demosthenes was a patriot as well as an orator ; that he did not pursue Philip with im- placable hatred, because he was king of Macedon, but because he thought him both willing and able to obstruct the designs of Athens, and even to reduce her, from that splendid pre- eminence which she now held in Greece, to the ordinary rank of a state, in name free, but in truth dependent on him : this was the motive of Demosthenes' heat on other occasions ; and the motive to his coolness now was the strict alliance be- tween Philip and the other Grecian states, which rendered it a thing impracticable for Athens to contend with him and them alone. Besides, as he rightly observes in the harangue, it would have been ridiculous for those who refused to enter into an equal war for rich cities and fertile provinces, to have 90 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES• because many of our interests are already given up, and tliereibre unnecessary to be now laid before you ; but because it is impossible to agree on such expedients as may secure what λ el remain : hut that a variety of clashing opinions must divide the assembly. Then, to advise, is naturally a difficult and distressing part. But you, Athenians, have rendered it yet more dis- tressing : for all other people naturally seek counsel while affairs are yet depending : you deliberate when the event hath made it too late. Hence hath it hap- pened, through the whole course of my observation, that the man who arraigns your conduct is heard with esteem, and his sentiments approved; yet have your affairs ever miscarried, and the objects of your deli- beration have all been lost. But, although this be too true, still I am persuaded (and from this persuasion I arose to speak) that if you will put an end to tumult and opposition, and grant me that attention which be- comes those who are consulting for their country, and on so important an occasion, I have some points to urge, some measures to propose, which may serve our present interests, and repair our past miscarriages. Sensible as I am, Athenians, that to expatiate on those counsels one hath formerly given, and to speak of oneself, is the most successful artifice of those who dare to practise such artifice ; yet to me it is so odious, so detestable, that, although I see it necessary, yet I loathe it. However, it will assist your judgment, I presume, on this occasion, if you recal to mind some- thing of what I formerly have mentioned. — You may remember, that during the disorders of Eubcea, when rushed suddenly into a most unequal contest about an empty title, or, as he emphatically expresses it, ' To take away the shadow of Delphos from him who was master of Delphos itself.' We therefore acknowlege this to he the oration of Demosthenes, because he was worthy of it. It is scarcely worth while to take notice of a small mistake in this remark. Libanius does not deny that Demosthenes was the author of this oration. He allows it to have been written by him, but is of opinion that he never ventured to pronounce it. ORATION ON THE PEACE. 91 certain persons persuaded you to assist Plutarchus, 1 and to undertake an inglorious and expensive war, I was the first, the only one who rose up to oppose it, and scarcely escaped their fury, who for a trifling gain were urging you to many highly pernicious measures. In a little time, when the load of infamy had fallen on you, and that you had suffered such treatment as no people ever received from those they had assisted, you were all made sensible of the iniquity of your seducers, and the justness and integrity of my coun- sels. Again, when I saw Neoptolemus the player, 3 in that full security which, his profession gave him, in- volving the state in the greatest distress, and, in all his public conduct, devoted to Philip,. I appeared, and warned you of the danger ; and this from no secret motive, no private enmity ; 3 no officious baseness, as the event itself discovered. But it is not the defenders of Neoptolemus that I accuse (for he was not depending 1 To assist Plutarch us.] Philip had long regarded Eubcea as very proper, by its situation, to favor the designs he medi- tated against Greece. He therefore took pains to form a party in the island, and fomented divisions and factions in the se- veral states of which it was composed. Plutarch, the go- vernor of Eretria, one of the principal cities of Eubcea, ap- plied to the Athenians for assistance against some attempts of Philip, and obtained it: but afterwards (having probably been gained over to Philip's party) he took up arms against the very auxiliaries he had invited. But this perfidy did not disconcert Phocion, who commanded them. He gained a vic- tory over the Macedonians, and drove Plutarch out of Eretria. Phocion was afterwards recalled, and Molossus, his successor in this war, was defeated and taken prisoner by Philip. — Τ our veil, 2 Neoptolemus the player.] This Neoptolemus was also a great tragic poet, though the orator only mentions the less ho- norable distinction. Not that the profession of a player was held in disesteem in Greece. Players were the favorites of princes, and were raised to the highest employments in the state. This very man was nominated, the year before, one of the ten ambassadors that were to conclude the peace with Philip. — Tourreil. 3 No private enmity, &c] Probably this is a repetition of the very words of Neoptolemus' party. Μ OH IftONfl Of DBMOSTfl ι on a single one), but you yourselves; for, had yon been spectators in the theatre, not engaged in affairs of the highest and most intimate concernment te the public, \<>n could not have heard him \\\\\\ more indul- gence, nor me with more resentment. And now yon all know, that he who then went over to the enemy, pretending to collect 'some debts, thai he might bring them hither, as he said, to enable him to sβ ORATIONS OF m.MOSTHKM.s. «piences. And yet persons of but moderate (lis• . ment may have sonic manifest examples to alarm thriii, which I had occasion to ' mention to the- Mcsscnians and to the Aryans. Perhaps it may be proper to re- peat them here. w Mcsscnians!' said I, ' how highly, think ye, would the Olynthians ha\c been offended if any man h;id spoken against Philip at that time when he gave them up Anthemus,* a city which the former kings of Mace- don had ever claimed ? when lie drove out the Athe- nian colony, and gave them Potidaea ? when he took all our resentment on himself, and left them to eirjoj our dominions.' Did they expect to have suffered thus? had it been foretold, would they have believed it ? You cannot think it ! Yet, after a short enjoyment of the territories of others, they have been for ever despoiled of their own by this man. Inglorious has been their fall, not conquered only, but betrayed and soLd by one another: for those intimate correspond- ences with tyrants ever portend mischief to free states.' — 4 Turn your eyes/ said Ι, ' to theThessalians! think ye, that when he first expelled their tyrants, when In- then gave them up Nicaea 3 and Magnesia, that they ex- pected ever to have been subjected to those governors ' 1 Which I had occasion to, 6cc] When Philip first ΪΗ to interest himself in the disputes between these stat»-> and Laceda?mon the Athenians sent an embassy to endeavor to weaken his interest in Peloponnesus, and to dissuade the Messenians and Argians from accepting of his interposition. On this occasion it was that Demosthenes made the oration from which he now quotes this passage. ^ Anthemus.] This city of Macedon had been possessed by the ancestors of Philip from the earliest ages ; for we learn from Herodotus, b. v. that about two hundred years b» Amyntas made an offer of Anthemus to Hippias the son of Pisistratus.— Tourreil. S Xica>a.] This city of Locris had been given up to Philip by Phalecus, at the conclusion of the sacred war.— Tourreil. I Those governors, 8ccJ The tyranny said to have been im- posed by Philip on the Thessalians is, in the original of this passage, called a government of ten ; yet, in the third Phi- PHILIPPIC THE SECOND. 107 now imposed on them ? or that the man who restored them to their seat in the amphictyonic council would have deprived them of their own proper revenues? yet, that such was the event, the world can testify. In like manner, you now behold Philip lavishing his gifts and promises on you. If you are wise, you will pray that he may never appear to have deceived and abused you. Various are the contrivances for the de- fence and security of cities ; as battlements, and walls, and trenches, and every other kind of fortification ; all which are the effects of labor, and attended with con- tinual expense. But there is one common bulwark, with which men of prudence are naturally provided, the guard and security of all people, particularly of free states, against the assaults of tyrants. What is this ! Distrust. Of this be mindful : to this adhere : pre- serve this carefully, and no calamity can affect you/ — 4 What is it you seek?' said I. * Liberty? And do ye not perceive that nothing can be more adverse to this than the very titles of Philip ? Every monarch, every tyrant is an enemy to liberty, and the opposer of laws. Will ye not then be careful lest, while ye seek to be freed from war, you find yourselves his slaves V But although they heard these things, and loudly expressed their approbation ; though the like points were frequently urged by the ambassadors while I was present, and probably were afterwards repeated ; yet still they have no less dependence on the friend- ship and the promises of Philip. But it is not strange that the Messenians and some of the Peloponnesians should act contrary to the dictates of nature, reason, and reflection. Even you, who are yourselves fully sensible, and constantly reminded by your public speakers that there are designs forming against you, lippic,it is styled a tetrarchy, or government of four. Hence, there are grounds to presume that an error has crept into the ancient copies. Unless it be supposed that Philip divided the country of Thessaly into four districts, and over each of those established ten governors ; if, by such a supposition, the authority of the copies may be preserved. 10S orations οι DEMOSTHENES* that the toils of your enemies arc BUlTOIindiog you, will, I fear, be plunged by \oiir supineness into all those dangers that threaten you; so prevalent is the pleasure and indulgence of a moment o\er nil \our future interests.— But, as to the course necessary to he pursued, prudence requires that this he debated here- after among yourselves. At present, J shall propose BUch an answer to these ministers as may he worth} of your concurrence ' It would be just, Athenians, to call the men before you who gave those promises which induced you to conclude the peace: for neither would I have under- taken the embassy, nor would you, I am convinced, have laid down your arms, had it been suspected that Philip would have acted thus when he had obtained a peace. No: the assurances he then gave were quite different from his present actions. There are others also to be summoned. Who are these ? The men who, at my return from the second embassy (vent for the ratification of the treaty), when I saw the state; abused, and warned you of your danger, and testified the truth, and opposed with all my power the giving up Thermopylae and Phocis ; the men, I say, who then cried out that I, the water-drinker, was morose and peevish ; but that Philip, if permitted to pass, would act agreeably to your desires; would fortit\ Thespia and Platiea ; restrain the insolence of Thebes; cut through the Chersonesus 2 at his own expense; and give you up Euboea and Oropus, as an equivalent lor 1 Though none of our editors take notice of it, in this place the proper officer must have proposed the orator's motion in form : unless we suppose that this oration has descend» us imperfect; for, as the text now stands, then• is a manifest want of connexion between this sentence and what follows. — Olivet. 'i Cut through the Chersonesus, flcc.1 AN' hen Cersobh . had given up the Chersonesus to the Athenians it became per- petually exposed to the incursions of Thrace. The only of putting a stop to them was to cut through the isthmus, for the Thracians had no ships ; and this Philip promised to do in favor of the Athenians and their colonies. — Tourreil. PHILIPPIC THE SECOND. 109 Amphipolis. — That all this was positively affirmed you cannot, I am sure, forget, though not remarkable for remembering injuries. And, to complete the dis- grace, you have engaged your posterity to the same treaty, in full dependence on those promises : so in- tirely have you been seduced. And now, to what purpose do I mention this? and why do I desire that these men should appear ? I call the gods to witness, that without the least evasion I shall boldly declare the truth ! Not that, by breaking out into invectives, 1 I may expose myself to the like 1 Xot that, by breaking out into invectives. J Wolfius, whom the translator here follows, has been severely censured for this interpretation by the Italian commentator, who renders the former part of the sentence thus : ' Eos non ideo vocari velim, ut qui olim convitiis dehonestatus fui, aequenunc mihi a vobis famam conciliem.' — Παρ ϋμιν ought not to be rendered a vobis, but apud vos ; or, as the translator, who follows Luc- chesini's authority, has justly explained it in his note, in y (rur -presence. But my objection to this interpretation does not arise from grammatical nicety, but from a regard to the context, the surest comment. If Demosthenes, instead of the disgraceful treatment he formerly received, both from the partisans of Macedon and from the people, was now to be re- ceived with applause, and to triumph over his opposers, how could these have another opportunity of receiving Philip's gold? Such wages were only paid when earned. They were bestowed, not on ineffectual efforts, but real services ; and these his friends could not perform if disgraced and dis- couraged by the assembly. The whole sentiment of the ora- tor, as translated by Wolfius, is this : I do not wish that these men may appear, in order to indulge my indignation and resentment against them, that so they may retort my accusa- tions with double virulence (as was the case when we first returned from our embassy), and thus by once more gaining your favor, and triumphing over me, they may have an op- portunity of boasting their services to Philip, and obtaining their reward.' The passage manifestly alludes to the trans- actions of the assembly, when the ten ambassadors returned who had been sent to treat with Philip about a peace ; and which are particularly described by Demosthenes in his ora- tion on the embassy : and we may safely appeal to the reader, who consults that oration, as to the propriety of the pre- sent interpretation. 110 ORATIONS Of I>1. Μ OSTIUM^. treatment, and once more give my old enemie• m op- portunity of receiving Philip's gold ; nor \ el that I ma \ indulge an impertinenl ranitj of haranguing: but I apprehend the time must conic when Philip ■ actions will gire you more concern than at present. 1 1 is de- signs I see are ripening. 1 wish my apprehensions may not prove just : but I fear that time is not far Off. And when it will no longer be in your power to disre- gard events; w lien neither mine nor an\ other person's information, but your own knowlege, your own senses w r ill assure you of tin; impending danger, then will your severest resentment break forth. \nd as your ambassadors have concealed certain things, influenced (as they themselves are conscious) by corruption, 1 fear that they who endeavor to restore what these men have ruined may feel the weight of your displeasure ; for there are some, I find, who generally point their anger not at the deserving objects, but those most im- mediately at their mercy. While our affairs, therefore, remain not absolutely desperate — while it is yet in our power to dehate — give me leave to remind you all of one thing, though none can be ignorant of it. — Who was the man 1 that per- suaded you to give up Phocis and Thermopylae ? which once gained, he also gained free access for his troops to Attica and to Peloponnesus, and obliged ns to turn our thoughts from the rights of Greece, from all foreign interests, to a defensive war, in these very territories ; whose approach must be severely felt by every one of us : and that very day gave birth to it ; for had we not been then deceived, the state could have nothing to apprehend. His naval power could not have been great enough to attempt Attica by sea ; nor could he have passed by land through Thermopylae and Phocis. But he must have either confined himself within the 1 Who was the man, &c] The person pointed at is .Ks- chines. These two statesmen accused each other when the had consequences of this treaty came to be universally felt and acknowleged. PHILIPPIC THE SECOND. Ill bounds of justice, and lived in a due observance of his treaty, or have instantly been involved in a war equal to that which obliged him to sue for peace. Thus much may be sufficient to recal past actions to your view. May all the gods forbid that the event should confirm my suspicions ! for I by no means de- sire that any man should meet even the deserved punishment of his crimes, when the whole community is in danger of being involved in his destruction. THE ORATION ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS: PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHON8HIP OF BOSIGENE8, TWO YEARS AFTER THE SECOND PHILIPPIC. INTRODUCTION. In the foregoing oration the vehemence of Demosthenes de- termined the Athenians to oppose the attempts of Philip ; and his representations to the Argians and Messenians in- spired them with suspicion, and at length detached them from all connexions with Macedon. When Philip therefore found his practices in Peloponnesus unsuccessful, he began to turn his thoughts to other enterprises ; to pursue his con- quests in Thrace, and cross the Athenian interest in the Chersonesus. This peninsula had, with some little interrup- tion, been for many years in the hands of the Athenians. Cotys, as king of the country, had lately wrested it from them, and left it in succession to his son Cersobleptes. But he being unable to support himself against the power of Philip, resigned it again to the Athenians; and they, according to custom, sent in a colony, which the inhabitants received, and freely shared their lands and habitations with their new guests. The people of Cardia, the principal city, however, etill asserted their independence ; and, when Diopithes, the commander of the Athenian colony, would have reduced them by force of arms, had recourse to Philip, who immediately de- tached a body of forces to their support. Diopithes considered this proceeding as an act of hostility against Athens : without waiting for instructions from his state, raised a considerable force ; and, while Philip was engaged in war in the inland parts of Thrace, entered the maritime parts (which were his territories) with fire and sword, and brought offa great booty, which he lodged safe in the Chersonesus. Philip was not at leisure to repel this insult : he therefore contented himself with complaining by letters to the Athenians of this conduct of their general. The pensioners which he had at Athens INTRODUCTION. 113 immediately exerted themselves for their master. They in- veighed loudly against Diopithes; accused him of violating the peace which then subsisted between them and Philip ; of involving the state in war ; of exaction, rapine, and piracy ; and pressed for his being recalled. Demosthenes, judging that at such a juncture the public interest was connected with that of Diopithes, undertakes his defence in the following oration ; throws the whole blame of the exactions and piracies he is accused of on the Athe- nians themselves ; turns their attention to Philip and his hostilities ; and concludes, that whoever opposes or distresses him in any manner, does a service to the state ; and that, in- stead of disavowing what Diopithes had done, or directing him to dismiss his army, they should reinforce him, andshow the king of Macedon they know how to protect their territo- ries, and to maintain the dignity of their country, as well as their ancestors. It appears, from the beginning of this oration, that before Demosthenes arose the affair had been violently contested in the assembly. Possibly the heat of opposition added to the natural fire of the orator ; for the style of the oration is, in my opinion, remarkably animated ; and we find an extraor- dinary degree of severity and indignation breaking out in every part of it. DEM. THE ORATION ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. It were to be wished, Athenians, that they who speak in public would never suffer hatred or affection to influ- ence their counsels ; but, in all that they propose, be directed by unbiassed reason ; particularly when affairs of state, and those of highest moment, are the object of our attention. But since there are persons whose speeches are partly dictated by a spirit of contention, partly by other like motives, it is your duty, Athe- nians, to exert that power which your numbers give you, and in all your resolutions, and in all your ac- tions, to consider only the interest of your country. Our present concernment is about ^the affairs of the Chersonesus, and Philip's expedition into Thrace, which hath now engaged him eleven months : but most of our orators insist on the actions and designs of Diopithes. As to crimes objected to those men, whom our laws can punish when we please, I, for my part, think it quite indifferent whether they be considered now or at some other time ; nor is this a point to be violently contested by me or any other speaker. But when Philip, the enemy of our country, is now actually hovering about the Hellespont, 1 with a numerous army, and making attempts on our dominions, which, if one moment neg- lected, the loss may be irreparable ; here our attention is instantly demanded : we should resolve, we should prepare with all possible expedition, and not run from 1 Hovering about the Hellespont.] By the Hellespont we are to understand not the strait itself that separates Europe from Asia, but the cities and countries all along the coast. ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 115 our main concern, in the midst of foreign clamors and accusations. I have frequently been surprised at assertions made in public ; but never more than when I lately heard it affirmed in the senate, 1 that there are but two expe- dients to be proposed — either absolutely to declare war, or to continue in peace. The point is this : if Philip acts as one in amity with us ; if he does not keep pos- session of our dominions, contrary to his treaty ; if he be not every where spiriting up enemies against us ; all debates are at an end ; we are undoubtedly obliged to live in peace, and I find it perfectly agreeable to you. But if the articles of our treaty, ratified by the most solemn oaths, remain on record, open to public in- spection ; if it appears that long before the departure of Diopithes and his colony, who are now accused of involving us in a war, Philip had unjustly seized many of our possessions (for which I appeal to your own decrees) ; if, ever since that time, he has been con- stantly arming himself with all the powers of Greeks and barbarians to destroy us — what do these men mean who affirm, we are either absolutely to declare war, or to observe the peace ? You have no choice at all ; you have but one just and necessary measure to pursue, which they industriously pass over. And what is this ? To repel force by force. Unless they will affirm that, while Philip keeps from Attica and the Pirgeus, 2 he does our state no injury, makes no 1 In the senate.] Into which Demosthenes had been ad- mitted in the archonship of Themistocles, a little after the taking of Olynthus ; and (if we may believe iEscliines) not in the regular manner, but by intrigue and bribery. 2 The Piraeus.] This is the first time the orator mentions this celebrated port of Athens. It was at first detached from the city, but afterwards joined to it by two long walls, which the Greeks called the Legs of the Piraeus ; and from that time, by the advice of Themistocles, the Athenians made this their principal harbor. It could contain four hundred ships of war ; was well fortified, and furnished with a market, to which all the trading part of Greece resorted. Historians call it the. triple port, for it really contained three : the first called 116 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. war against us. If it be thus they state the bounds of peace and justice, we must all acknowlege that their sentiments are inconsistent with the common rights of mankind — with the dignity and the safety of Athens. Besides, they themselves contradict their own accu- sation of Diopithes. For shall Philip be left at full liberty to pursue all his other designs, provided he keeps from Attica ; and shall not Diopithes be per- mitted to assist the Thracians ? And if he does, shall we accuse him of involving us in a war ? — But this is their incessant cry : c Our foreign troops commit out- rageous devastations on the Hellespont : Diopithes, without regard to justice, seizes and plunders vessels ! These things must not be suffered/ Be it so : I ac- quiesce ! but while they are laboring to have our troops disbanded, by inveighing against that man, whose care and industry support them (if they really speak from a regard to justice), they should show us, that if we yield to their remonstrances, Philip's army also will be disbanded : else, it is apparent that their whole aim is to reduce the state to those circumstances which have occasioned all the losses we have lately suffered. For, be assured of this, that nothing hath given Philip such advantage over us- as his superior vigilance in improving all opportunities. For, as he is constantly surrounded by his troops, and his mind perpetually engaged in projecting his designs, he can in a moment strike the blow where he pleases. But we wait till some event alarms us: then we are in motion ; then we prepare. To this alone I can impute it, that the con- quests he hath lately made he now enjoys in full secu- rity ; while all your efforts are too late, all your vast expenses ineffectual : your attempts have served only to discover your enmity, and inclination to oppose him ; and the consequences of your misconduct are still farther aggravated by the disgrace. KavQapoSy from a hero of that name ; the second Αφροδισιον, from two temples of Venus that were erected near it ; the third Zea, because it was the mart for corn. — Tourreil. ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 117 Know then, Athenians, that all our orators allege at present are but words, but idle pretences. Their whole designs, their whole endeavors are to confine you within the city ; that, while we have no forces in the field, Philip may be at full liberty to act as he pleases. Consider the present posture of affairs. Philip is now stationed in Thrace, at the head of a large army, and (as we are here informed) sends for reinforcements from Macedon and Thessaly. Now, should he watch the blowing of the Etesian winds, march his forces to Byzantium, and invest it ; in the first place, can you imagine that the Byzantines would persist in their pre- sent folly ; or that they would not have recourse to you for assistance ? I cannot think it. No : if there were a people in whom they less confided l than in us, they would receive even these into their city .rather than give it up to him, unless prevented by the quick- ness of his attack. And, should we be unable to sail thither, should there be no forces ready to support them, nothing can prevent their ruin. — 4 But the extra- vagance and folly of these men exceed all bounds/ — I grant it. Yet still they should be secured from dan- ger; for this is the interest of our state. Besides, it is by no means clear that he will not march into the Cher- sonesus itself. On the contrary, if we may judge from the letter which he sent to you, he is determined to 1 If there were a people in whom they less confided, &c] In the third year of the 105th olympiad the Byzantines en- tered into a league with Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, against the Athenians, and withdrew themselves from their dominion. This is what Demosthenes calls their folly and extravagance. They had reason to think the Athenians would regard them as rebellious subjects, and treat them with the resentment of offended sovereigns. * However,' says the orator, ' if they were reduced to the alternative of either submitting to Philip, or having recourse to you for protection, they would without hesitation choose the latter.' The event confirmed his pre- diction. Philip besieged Byzantium, the Byzantines had recourse to the Athenians, and Phocion at the head of their army obliged Philip to raise the siege. — Tourreil. 118 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. oppose us in that country. If then the forces stationed there be still kept up, we may defend our own domi- nions, and infest those of our enemy ; if they be once dispersed and broken, what shall we do if he attempt the Chersonesus ? — ' Bring Diopithes to a trial/ — And how will that serve us ? — ' No : but we will despatch succors from hence/ — What if the winds prevent us ? — ' But he will not turn his arms thither/ — Who will be our surety for this ? Consider, Athenians, is not the season of the year approaching in which it is thought by some that you are to withdraw your forces from the Hellespont, and abandon it to Philip ? But suppose (for this too merits our attention) that at his return from Thrace he should neither bend his force against the Chersonesus, nor Byzantium, but fall on Chalcis or Megara, as he lately did on Oreum, 1 which would be the wiser course, to oppose him here, and make Attica the seat of war, or to find him employment abroad ? I think the latter. Let these things sink deep into our minds ; and let us not raise invidious clamors against those forces which Diopithes is endeavoring to keep up for the service of his country, or attempt to break them : let us rather prepare to reinforce them ; grant their general the ne- cessary supplies of money, and in every other instance favor his designs with a hearty zeal. Imagine this question proposed to Philip : 6 Which would be most agreeable to you, that the forces commanded by Dio- pithes ' — of whatever kind they be, for I shall not dis- pute on that head — ' should continue in full strength and good esteem at Athens, and be reinforced by de- tachments from the city ; or, that the clamors and in- vectives of certain persons should prevail to have them broken and disbanded V I think he would choose this latter. And are there men among us laboring for that 1 As he lately did on Oreum.] In the third Philippic we shall find a particular account of the manner in which he reduced this city to his obedience. OX THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 119 which Philip would intreat the gods to grant him? and if so, is it still a question whence our distresses have arisen ? Let me intreat you to examine the present state of Athens with an unbiassed freedom ; to consider how we are acting, and how our affairs are conducted. We are neither willing to raise contributions, nor do we dare to take the field, nor do we spare the public funds, nor do we grant supplies to Diopithes, nor do we approve of those subsidies he hath procured himself; but we malign him, we pry into his designs, and watch his motions. Thus we proceed, quite regardless of our interests ; and while in words we extol those speakers who assert the dignity of their country, our actions favor their opposers. — It is usual, when a speaker rises, to ask him, ' What are we to do V Give me leave to propose the like question to you : ' What am I to say V For, if you neither raise contributions, nor take the field, nor spare the public funds, nor grant subsidies to Diopithes, nor approve of those provisions he hath made himself, nor take the due care of our interests, I have nothing to say. If you grant such unbounded license to informers, as even to listen to their accusations of a man for what they pretend he will do, before it be yet done, what can one say ? But it is necessary to explain to some of you the effect of this behavior. 1 (I shall speak with an un- 1 But it is necessary to explain to some of you the effect of this behavior.] To the same purpose has the sentence been translated by Wolfius and Tourreil. But this interpre- tation, which is acknowleged consonant to grammatical rules of construction, has yet been stigmatised, as a total perver- sion of the author's reasoning and the sense of the context. Clamors had been raised against an Athenian general, who had exacted contributions from the islanders and Grecian settlements along the coast of Asia. Demosthenes appears as his advocate. He proceeds, as it is observed, to show that it had ever been the custom of other commanders to raise the like contributions. Hence it is inferred, that the meaning of the phrase here quoted must be, that the general is warranted by justice and custom to act as he had done. The orator, indeed, 120 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. daunted freedom, for in no other manner can I speak.) — It has been the constant custom of all the commanders who have sailed from this city (if I advance a false- hood, let me feel the severest punishment) to take money from the Chians, and from the Erythrians, and from any people that would give it ; I mean of the inhabitants of Asia. They who have but one or two ships take a talent ; they who command a greater force raise a larger contribution : and the people who give this money, whether more or less, do not give it for nothing (they are not so mad) : no ; it is the price they pay to secure their trading vessels from rapine and piracy, to provide them with the necessary con- voys and the like ; however they may pretend friend- ship and affection, and dignify those payments with doth proceed to give instances of this custom. But this con- clusion I cannot admit ; for whatever deference and respect the writers who have adopted it may justly claim, a greater deference and respect is due to the original, where we find a conclusion of a different nature, deduced in express terms. * It has been the constant custom,' says Demosthenes, * of all the commanders who have sailed from this city (if I advance a falsehood, let me feel the severest punishment) to take money from the Chians, and from the Erythrians, and from any people that would give it ; I mean of the inhabitants of Asia. They who have but one or two ships take a talent ; they who command a greater force raise a larger contribution : and the people who give this money, whether more or less, do not give it for nothing (they are not so mad) : no ; it is the price they pay to secure their trading vessels from rapine and piracy, to provide them with the necessary convoys, and the like ; however they may pretend friendship and affection, and dignify those payments with the name of free gifts. It is therefore evident that, as Diopithes is at the head of a consi- derable power, the same contributions will be granted to him. Else, how shall he pay his soldiers 1 how shall he maintain them, who receives nothing from you, and has nothing of his own 1 From the skies 1 No ; but from what he can collect, and beg, and borrow. ' Then follows the conclusion from the whole : OvSe OTN a\\o ττοιουσιρ ol κατη-γορουντες €V υμιν, η προΧνγουσιν απασΊ, &c. So that the whole scheme of his accusers (or the whole effect of their accusations) is to warn all people to grant him nothing, &c. This is the meaning (or this is the tendency^) of their clamors. ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 121 the name of free gifts. It is therefore evident, that as Diopithes is at the head of a considerable power, the same contributions will be granted to him. Else, how shall he pay his soldiers ? how shall he maintain them, who receives nothing from you, and has nothing of his own ? From the skies ? No ; but from what he can collect, and beg, and borrow. So that the whole scheme of his accusers is to warn all people to grant him nothing ; as he is to suffer punishment for crimes yet to be committed, not for any he hath already com- mitted, or in which he hath already assisted. This is the meaning of their clamors. * He is going to form sieges ! he leaves the Greeks exposed/ Have these men all this tenderness for the Grecian colonies of Asia ? They then prefer the interests of foreigners to that of their own country. This must be the case if they prevail to have another general sent to the Helles- pont. If Diopithes commits outrages ; if he be guilty of piracy, one single edict, 1 Athenians— a single edict will put a stop to such proceedings. This is the voice of our laws ; that such offenders should be impeached ; 2 and not opposed 3 with such vast preparations of ships 1 One single edict.] In the Greek τηνακιον, which in this place may either signify the tablet which was fixed up in public, containing a citation of the accused party, and an account of the crimes of which he was accused ; or that which was given to the judges who sat on his trial to write their sentences on. I have chosen the first of these senses. 2 That such offenders should he impeached.] The Greek words eivayyeKeiu, and sitfayyeXia, which I have translated to impeach, and impeachment, are terms in the Athenian judi- cature, and relate to those particular kind of actions which were not referred to any court of justice, but immediately brought before the senate of five hundred, or assembly of the people, and sometimes before the archon ; and in which both the accusation and defence were made by word of mouth, without any written articles. 3 And not opposed, &c] The accusers of Diopithes raised loud clamors against his conduct. They insisted that he had committed depredations on the Grecian colonies, and was meditating farther hostilities against them, contrary to his 122 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. and money : (this would be the height of madness:) it is against our enemies, whom the laws cannot touch, that we ought, we must maintain our forces, send out our navies, and raise our contributions. But, when citizens have offended, we can decree, we can impeach, we can recal. 1 These are arms sufficient; these are the measures befitting men of prudence : they who commission and instructions. They declared, that a force should he despatched to defend them ; which Demosthenes calls raising an army against Diopithes. * It is against our enemies/ says he, ' whom our laws cannot reach, that we are to raise our forces ; when citizens have offended, we can im- peach them/ &c. But this interpretation has been loaded with the heavy charge of absurdity. If the translator had a right to pronounce so peremptorily and so severely, he would declare that, by the same rule, every ardent expression, every bold figure, every lively image ; in short, every thing . in eloquence not literally and strictly consonant to metaphysi- cal truth, might be pronounced equally absurd. The meaning of the passage here quoted is said to be, ' We are not to pro- tect the islanders by our armies, but to employ them against our enemies.' But why were they to raise their armies against their enemies ? Because their enemies were not punishable by the laws. Those, therefore, against whom they were not to raise their armies must have been such as were punishable by the laws. This conclusion might perhaps be deemed na- tural and necessary, even if the orator had not expressly pointed out both those against whom they were, and were not to raise their armies. Επ* rovs €χθρους — against enemies: and, €7rt δ' ήμας avrovs ; but against ourselves, i. e. our own citizens. 1 We can recal.] In the original, we have the Uapa\os, that is, the galley (so called, from the hero Paralus, who with Theseus signalised himself against the Thebans). The Athe- inians had two gallies, the Salaminian and Paralian, appointed for the most pressing occasions of the state. In allusion to this usage, Pericles was called the Salaminian galley, because he affected to appear in public only on extraordinary emer- gencies. When Ly sander had beaten the Athenian fleet at the Hellespont the Paralian galley was despatched with the melancholy news to the people ; and when Alcibiades was recalled from Sicily to defend himself against the charge of impiety, the Salaminian galley was ordered to bring him home. Both the one and the other were employed to recal such generals as were superseded. — Tourreil, ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 123 would raise disorder and confusion in the state may have recourse to such as these men propose. But, dreadful as it is to have such men among us, yet the most dreadful circumstance of all is this. You assemble here, with minds so disposed, that if any one accuses Diopithes, or Chares, 1 or Aristophon, 2 or any citizen whatever, as the cause of our misfortunes, 3 r ou instantly break forth into acclamations and ap- plause. But if a man stands forth, and thus declares the truth : ' This is all trifling•, Athenians ! It is to Philip we owe our calamities : he hath plunged us in these difficulties : for, had he observed his treaty, our state would be in perfect tranquillity. ' This you can- not deny ; but you hear it with the utmost grief, as if it were the account of some dreadful misfortune. The cause is this — (for when I am to urge the interest of my country, let me speak boldly) — certain persons, who have been intrusted with public aifairs, have for a long time past rendered you daring and terrible in council ; but, in all affairs of war, wretched and con- temptible. Hence it is, that if a citizen, subject to your own power and jurisdiction, be pointed out as the author of your misfortunes, you hear the accu- sation with applause ; but if they are charged on a 1 Or Chares.] This apology, says M. Tourreil, savors a little of faction and cabal : their ill success might with great justice have been charged on Chares. Indeed, what could have been expected from a general no less incapable than lux- urious, who in all his military expeditions drew after him a train of musicians, whom he kept in pay at the expense of his troops ? Accordingly, his enterprises were unsuccessful ; and, to crown all his miscarriages, he lost the battle of Chaeronea. And yet this Chares was able to support himself to the last by the credit of those orators who protected him. 2 Or Aristophon.] Another Athenian general. Aristotle (Rhet. 1. ii. c. 23.) mentions a smart answer made to him by Iphicrates. Aristophon accused him of having betrayed the fleet which he commanded. Iphicrates, with that confidence which an established reputation inspires, asked him, * Would you be guilty of such a piece of treachery V ' By no means/ answered he. ' What V returned the other, ' can Iphicrates have committed what Aristophon would refuse to do?' — Tour, 124 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. man who must first be conquered before he can be punished, then you are utterly disconcerted : that truth is too severe to be borne. Your ministers, Athenians, should take a quite contrary course. They should render you gentle and humane in council, where the rights of citizens and allies come before you : in mili- tary affairs, they should inspire you with fierceness and intrepidity ; for here you are engaged with enemies, with armed troops. But now, by leading ^ou gently on to their purposes, by the most abject compliance with your humors, they have so formed and moulded you, that in your assemblies you are delicate, and attend but to flattery and entertainment ; in your affairs you find yourselves threatened with extremity of danger. And now, in the name of Heaven ! suppose that the states of Greece should thus demand l an account of those opportunities which your indolence hath lost. ■ Men of Athens ! you are ever sending embassies to us ; you assure us that Philip is projecting our ruin, and that of all the Greeks, you warn us to guard against this man's designs/ (And it is too true we have done thus.) ' But, Ο most wretched of mankind! when this man had been ten months detained abroad ; when sickness, and the severity of winter, and the armies of his enemies, rendered it impossible for him to return home, you neither restored the liberty of Euboea, nor recovered any of your own dominions. But while you sit at home in perfect ease and health (if such a state i Suppose that the states of Greece should thus demand, &c] After the taking of Olynthus, when the Athenians were at last prevailed on to declare war in form against Philip, they sent embassies to all the states of Greece to represent the danger of his growing power, and to engage them to join against him. From hence the orator takes occasion to intro- duce this beautiful prosopopoeia, by which he throws out the bitterest reproaches against his countrymen, so artfully, as not to give them offence, and yet at the same time sets the shamefulness of their misconduct in the strongest light. — Toun-eiL ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 125 may be called health),' Eubcea is commanded by his two tyrants; 1 the one, just opposite to Attica, to keep you perpetually in awe ; the other to Scyathus. Yet you have not attempted to oppose even this. No ; you have submitted ; you have been insensible to your wrongs ; you have fully declared that if Philip were ten times to die, it would not inspire you with the least degree of vigor. Why then these embassies, these accusations, all this unnecessary trouble to us V — If they should say this, what could we allege? what answer could we give ? I know not. We have those among us who think a speaker fully confuted by asking, 4 What then is to be done V To whom I answer, with the utmost truth and justness, 6 Not what we are now doing/ — But I shall be more explicit, if they will be as ready to follow^ as to ask advice. First, then, Athenians, be firmly convinced of these truths : that Philip does commit hostilities against us, and has violated the peace (and let us no longer accuse each other of his crimes) ; — that he is the implacable enemy of this whole city, of the ground on which this city stands, of every inhabitant wdthin these walls, even of those who imagine themselves highest in his favor. If they doubt this, let them think of Euthy- crates and Lasthenes, the Olynthians. They who seemed the nearest to his heart, the moment they betrayed their country, were distinguished only by the superior cruelty of their death. But it is against our constitution that his arms are principally directed ; nor, in all his schemes, in all his actions, hath he any thing so immediately in view as to subvert it. And there is in some sort a necessity for this. He knows full well that his conquests, however great and exten- sive, can never be secure while you continue free ; but that, if once he meets with any accident (and 1 By his two tyrants.] Philistides and Clitarchus : the one fixed at Eretria, opposite to Attica ; the other at Oreum, 07 er against Scyathus, an island subject to Athens. 126 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. ' every man is subject to many), all those whom he hath forced into his service will instantly revolt, and fly to yon for protection : for you are not naturally disposed to grasp at empire yourselves, but to frustrate the ambitious attempts of others ; to be ever ready to op- pose usurpation, and assert the liberty of mankind ; this is your peculiar character. And therefore it is not without regret that he sees in your freedom a spy on the incidents of his fortune. Nor is this his reason- ing weak or trivial. In the first place, therefore, we are to consider him as the enemy of our state, the implacable enemy of our free constitution. Nothing but the deepest sense of this can give you a true, vigorous, and active spirit. In the next place, be assured that every thing he is now laboring, every thing he is concerting, he is con- certing against our city ; and that, wherever any man opposes him, he opposes an attempt against these walls : for none of you can be weak enough to imagine that Philip's desires are centred in those paltry villages of Thrace ; (for what name else can one give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, 1 and all those places he is now reducing to his obedience ?) that he endures the severity of toils and seasons, and braves the utmost dangers for these, and has no designs on the ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the silver mines, and all the other revenues of Athens ; but that he will leave them for you to enjoy; while, for some wretched hoards of grain in the cells of Thrace, he takes up his winter-quarters in the horrors of a dungeon ? 2 Impos- 1 For what name else can one give to Drongilus, and Ca- byle, and Mastira, &c] Drongilus and Cabyle, however the orator affects to treat them with contempt, are yet mentioned in history. As to Mastira, it is intirely unknown : hence Harpocration suggested, that instead of Mastira we should read Bastiia ; a town of Thrace of that name having been mentioned in a history of Philip written by Anaximenes, a work a long time lost. — Tourreil. c 2 In the horrors of a dungeon.] In the original it is, in a Barathrum. There was a ditch or cavern in Athens of that ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 127 sible ! No ; these and all his expeditions are really intended to facilitate the conquest of Athens. Let us then approve ourselves men of wisdom ; and, fully persuaded of these truths, let us shake oft' our ex- travagant and dangerous supineness ; let us supply the necessary expenses ; let us call on our allies ; let us take all possible measures for keeping up a regular army ; so that, as he hath his force constantly prepared to injure and enslave the Greeks, yours too may be ever ready to protect and assist them. If you depend on occasional detachments, you cannot ever expect the least degree of success : you must keep an army con- stantly on foot, provide for its maintenance, appoint public treasurers, and by all possible means secure your military funds : and, while these officers account for all disbursements, let your generals be bound to answer for the conduct of the war. Let these be your measures, these your resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real observance of an equitable peace, and to confine himself to his own kingdom (which is most for our interest), or we shall fight him on equal terms. If any man thinks that the measures I propose will require great expense, and be attended with much toil and trouble, he thinks justly. Yet let him consider what consequences must attend the state if these mea- sures be neglected, and it will appear that we shall really be gainers by engaging heartily in this cause. Suppose some god should be our surety (for no mortal ought to be relied on in an affair of such moment) that, if we continue quiet, and give up all our interests, he will not at last turn his arms against us ; it would yet be shameful ; it would (I call all the powers of Heaven to witness!) be unworthy of you, unworthy the dig- narne, into which criminals were precipitated. So that by this figure he not only represents the dreadful and deadly na- ture of the country, hut at the same time sets Philip in the light of a wicked wretch, who merited the vilest and most ignominious fate.— Tourreil. 128 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. nity of your country, and the glory of your ancestors, to abandon the rest of Greece to slavery for the sake of private ease. I, for my part, would die rather than propose so mean a conduct : however, if there be any other person who will recommend it, be it so ; neglect your defence ; give up your interests ! But if there be no such counsellor ; if, on the contrary, we all foresee that the farther this man is suffered to extend his con- quests, the more formidable and powerful enemy we must find in him, why this reluctance ? why do we delay ? or when, my countrymen, will we perform our duty ? Must some necessity compel us? What one may call the necessity of freemen not only presses us now, but hath long since been felt : that of slaves, it is to be wished, may never approach us. And how do these differ ? To a freeman, the disgrace of past misconduct is the most urgent necessity ; to a slave, stripes and bodily pains. Far be this from us ! It ought not to be mentioned. I would now gladly lay before you the whole con- duct of certain politicians : but I spare them. One thing only I shall observe : The moment that Philip is mentioned there is still one ready to start up, and cry, ' What a happiness to live in peace ! how grievous the maintenance of a great army ! certain persons have de- signs on our treasury V Thus they delay their resolu- tions, and give him full liberty to act as he pleases: hence you gain ease and indulgence for the present (which I fear may at some time prove too dear a pur- chase) ; and these men recommend themselves to your favor, and are well paid for their service. But in my opinion there is no need to persuade you to peace, who sit down already thoroughly persuaded. Let it be re- commended to him who is committing hostilities : if he can be prevailed on, you are ready to concur. Nor should we think those expenses grievous which our security requires, but the consequences which must arise if such expenses be denied. Then as to plun- dering our treasury, this must be prevented, by intrust- ing it to proper guardians, not by neglecting our af- ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 129 fairs. For my own part, Athenians, I am filled with indignation when I find some persons expressing their impatience, as if onr treasures were exposed to plun- derers, and yet utterly unaffected at the progress of Philip, who is successively plundering every state of Greece ; and this, that he may at last fall with all his fury on you. What then can be the reason, Athenians, that, not- withstanding all his manifest hostilities, all his acts of violence, all the places he hath taken from us, these men will not acknowlege that he hath acted unjustly, and that he is at war with us ; but accuse those of em- broiling you in a war who call on you to oppose him, and to check his progress ? I shall tell you. That po- pular resentment which may arise from any disagree- able circumstances with which a war may be attended (and it is necessary, absolutely necessary that a war should be attended with many such disagreeable cir- cumstances) they would cast on your faithful counsellors, that you may pass sentence on them, instead of oppos- ing Philip ; and they turn accusers, instead of meeting the punishment due to their present practices. This is the meaning of their clamors that certain persons would involve you in a war : hence have they raised all these cavils and debates. I know full well that, before any Athenian had ever moved you to declare war against him, Philip had seized many of our dominions, and hath now sent assistance to the Cardians. If you are resolved to dissemble your sense of his hostilities, he would be the weakest of mankind if he attempted to contradict you. But suppose he marches directly against us, what shall we say in that case ? He will still assure us that he is not at war : such were his professions to the people of Oreum, when his forces were in the heart of their country; and to those of Pherae, until the moment that he attacked their walls ; and thus he at first amused the Olynthians, until he had marched his army into their territory. And will you still insist, even in such a case, that they who call on us to defend our country are embroiling us in a DEM. ι 130 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES* war? Then slavery is inevitable. There is no other medium between an obstinate refusal to take arms, on your part, and a determined resolution to attack us on the part of our enemy. Nor is the danger which threatens us the same with that of other people. It is not the conquest of Athens which Philip aims at : no; it is our utter extirpation. He knows full well that slavery is a state you would not, or, if you were inclined, you could not submit to ; for sovereignty is become habitual to you. Nor is he ignorant that, at any unfavorable juncture, you have more power to obstruct his enterprises than the whole world besides. Let us then be assured that we are contending for the very being of our state ; let «this inspire us with ab- horrence of those who have sold themselves to this man, and let them feel the severity of public justice : for it is not possible to conquer our foreign enemy until we have punished those traitors who are serv- ing him within our walls. Else, while we strike on these as so many obstacles, our enemies must neces- sarily prove superior to us.— -And whence is it that he dares treat you with insolence (I cannot give his pre- sent conduct any other name), that he utters menaces against you, while on others he confers acts of kind- ness (to deceive them at least, if for no other pur- pose)? Thus, by heaping favors on the Thessalians, he hath reduced them to their present slavery. It is not possible to recount the various artifices by which he abused the wretched Olynthians, from his first insidi- ous gift of Potidsea. But now he seduced the Thebans to his party, by making them masters of Boeotia, and easing them of a great and grievous war. And thus, by being gratified in some favorite point, these people are either involved in calamities known to the whole world, or wait with submission for the moment when such calamities are to fall on them. I do not re- count all that you yourselves have lost, Athenians ; but in the very conclusion of the peace, how have you been deceived ? how have you been despoiled ? Was ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 131 not Phocis, was not Thermopylae, were not our Thra- cian dominions, Doriscum, Serrium, and even our ally Cersobleptes, 1 all wrested from us ? Is he not at this time in possession of Cardia ? and does he not avow it? Whence is it, I say, that he treats you in so sin- gular a manner ? Because ours is the only state where there is allowed full liberty to plead the cause of an enemy ; and the man who sells his country may ha- rangue securely, at the very time that you are despoiled of your dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip at Olynthus, until the people of Olynthus had been gained by the surrender of Potideea. In Thessaly, it was not safe to speak for Philip, until the Thessalians had been gained by the expulsion of the tyrants, and the recovery of their rank of amphictyons ; nor could it have been safely attempted at Thebes, before he had restored Boeotia, and extirpated the Phocians. But at Athens, although he hath robbed us of Amphipolis, and the territory of Cardia ; though he awes us with his fortifications in Euboea ; though he be now on his march to Byzantium ; 2 yet his partisans may speak for Philip without any danger. Hence some of them, from the meanest poverty, have on a sudden risen to affluence ; some, from obscurity and disgrace, to emi- nence and honor : while you, on the contrary, from glory, have sunk into meanness ; from riches, to po- verty : for the riches of a state I take to be its allies, its credit, its connexions ; in all which you are poor. And by your neglect of these, by your utter insensi- bility to your wrongs, he is become fortunate and 1 And even our ally Cersobleptes.] The late treaty of peace between Philip and the Athenians was concluded without giving Cersobleptes (then in alliance with Athens) an opportunity of acceding to it : nor was any provision made by it for his security and protection. By this means Philip found himself at liberty to turn his arms against him, and a few years after drove him from his kingdom, and obliged him to become his tributary. 2 To Byzantium.] See the introduction to the following oration. 132 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. great, the terror of Greeks and barbarians ; and you abandoned and despised ; splendid indeed in the abun- dance 1 of your markets ; but, as to any real provision for your security, ridiculously deficient. There are some orators, I find, who view your in- terests and their own in a quite different light. They would persuade you to continue quiet, whatever in- juries are offered to you : they themselves cannot be quiet, though no one offers them the least injury. When one of these men rises I am sure to hear, ' What ! will you not propose your decree 1 will you not venture ? No ; you are timid ; you want true spirit/ — I own, indeed, I am not, nor would I choose to be a bold, an importunate, an audacious speaker. And yet, if I mistake not, I have more real courage than they who manage your affairs with this rash hardiness. For ha who, neglecting the public interests, is engaged only in trials, in confiscations, in rewarding, in accus- ing, doth not act from any principle of courage ; but as he never speaks but to gain your favor, never proposes measures that are attended with the least hazard : in this he has a pledge of his security ; and therefore is he daring. But he, who for his country's good, often- times opposes your inclinations ; who gives the most 1 Splendid indeed in the abundance, &c] They who op- posed Philip's interest in the Athenian assembly were ever urging the fallen condition of their country, and the dishonor of suffering another power to wrest that pre-eminence from her which had been enjoyed for ages. The speakers on the other side at first affected to despise the power of Philip, or insisted on the sincerity and uprightness of his intentions. But now, when the danger became too apparent, and his de- signs too flagrant to be dissembled, it appears that they had recourse to other arguments. They endeavored to confine the views of the Athenians to what passed within their own walls ; displayed the advantages of their trade, the norish- ing state of their commerce ; and perhaps recommended it as their true policy to attend only to these, without making themselves a party in the quarrels of others, or loading the state with the expense of maintaining wars to support the power and interest of foreigners. ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 133 salutary, though not always the most agreeable coun- sel ; who pursues those measures whose success de- pends more on fortune than on prudence, and is yet willing to be accountable for the event : this is the man of courage ; this is the true patriot : not they who, by flattering your passions, have lost the most important interests of the state : men whom I am so far from imi- tating, or deeming citizens of w r orth, that should this question be proposed to me, ' What services have you done your country V though I might recount the gallies I have fitted out, and the public entertainments I have exhibited, 1 and the contributions I have paid, and the captives I have ransomed, 2 and many like acts of be- nevolence, I would yet pass them all by, and only say, that my public conduct hath ever been directly op- posite to theirs. I might, like them, have turned ac- cuser, have distributed rewards and punishments : but this is a part I never assumed : my inclinations were averse ; nor could w r ealth or honors prompt me to it. No ; I confine myself to such counsels as have sunk my reputation ; but, if pursued, must raise the reputa- tion of my country. Thus much I may be allowed to say without exposing myself to envy. — I should not have thought myself a good citizen had I proposed} such measures as w r ould have made me the first among? my countrymen, but reduced you to the last of states : on the contrary, the faithful minister should raise the 1 The public entertainments I have exhibited.] In the ori- ginal it is, ' the offices of choregus that I have discharged.' Each of the ten tribes of Athens had their hands of musicians to perform in the feasts of Bacchus, together with a poet, to compose the hymns and other pieces ; and these bands con- tended for a prize. The feasts were exhibited with great mag- nificence ; and, in order to defray the charges, they appointed the richest citizen out of each tribe (or sometimes he offered himself) to exhibit them at his own cost. He was called the choregus ; and, if his band gained the prize, his name was inscribed, together with those of the tribe and the poet, on the vase, which was the reward of the conquerors. — Tourreil. 2 The captives I have ransomed.] See the preface to the Oration on the Peace. 134 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. glory of his country ; and, on all occasions, advise the most salutary, not the easiest measures. To these nature itself inclines ; those are not to be promoted but by the utmost efforts of a wise and faithful coun- sellor. I have heard it objected, ' that indeed I ever speak with reason ; yet still this is no more than words : that the state requires something more effectual, some vigorous actions/ On which I shall give my senti- ments without the least reserve. The sole business of a speaker is, in my opinion, to propose the course you are to pursue. This were easy to be proved. You know, that when the great Timotheus moved you to defend the Eubceans against the tyranny of Thebes, he addressed you thus : ' What, my countrymen ! when the Thebans are actually in the island, are you deliberating what is to be done ? what part to be taken ? Will you not cover the seas with your navies ? Why are you not at the Piraeus ? why are you not embarked V Thus Timotheus advised ; thus you acted, and success en- sued. But had he spoken with the same spirit, and had your indolence prevailed, and his advice been re- jected, would the state have had the same success? By no means. And so in the present case ; vigor and execution is your part ; from your speakers you are only to expect wisdom and integrity. I shall just give the summary of my opinion, and then descend. You should raise supplies ; you should keep up your present forces, and reform whatever abuses may be found in them (not break them intirely on the first complaint). You should send ambassa- dors into all parts, to reform, to remonstrate, to exert all their efforts in the service of the state. But, above all things, let those corrupt ministers feel the severest punishment ; let them, at all times, and in all places, be the objects of your abhorrence; that wise and faithful counsellors may appear to have consulted their own interests as well as that of others. If you will act thus, if you will shake off this indolence, per- haps, even yet, perhaps, we may promise ourselves ON THE STATE OF THE CHERSONESUS. 135 some good fortune. But if you only just exert your- selves in acclamations and applauses, and when any thing is to be done sink again into your supineness, I do not see how all the wisdom of the world can save the state from ruin, when you deny your assistance. THE TENTH ORATION AGAINST PHILIP : Commonly called the Third. PRONOUNCED IN THE SAME YEAR. INTRODUCTION. The former oration had its effect : for, instead of punishing Diopithes, the Athenians supplied him with money, in order to put him in a condition of continuing his expeditions. In the mean time Philip pursued his Thracian conquests, and made himself master of several places, which, though of little importance in themselves, yet opened him a way to the cities of the Propontis, and above all to Byzantium, which he had always intended to annex to his dominions. He at first tried the way of negotiation, in order to gain the Byzantines into the number of his allies ; but this proving ineffectual, he re- solved to proceed in another manner. He had a party in the city, at whose head was the orator Python, that engaged to deliver him up one of the gates : but, while he was on his march towards the city the conspiracy was discovered, which immediately determined him to take another route. His sud- den countermarch, intended to conceal the crime of Python, really served to confirm it. He was brought to trial ; but the credit and the presents of Philip prevailed to save him. The efforts of the Athenians to support their interests in Eubcea, and the power which Philip had acquired there, and which every day increased, had intirely destroyed the tranquil- lity of this island. The people of Oreum, divided by the Athe- nian and Macedonian factions, were on the point of breaking out into a civil war, when, under pretence of restoring their peace, Philip sent them a body of a thousand forces, under the command of Hipponicus ; which soon determined the su- periority to his side. Philistides, a tyrant, who had grown old in factions and public contests, was intrusted with the government of Oreum, which he administered with all possi- ble severity and cruelty to those in the Athenian interest ; while the other states of the island were also subjected to INTRODUCTION. 137 other Macedonian governors. Callias, the Chalcidian, whose inconstancy had made him espouse the interests of Athens, of Thebes, and Macedon, successively, now returned to his engagements with Athens. He sent deputies thither to de- sire assistance, and to prevail on the Athenians to make some vigorous attempt to regain their power in Eubcea. In the mean time the king of Persia, alarmed by the ac- counts of Philip's growing power, made use of all the in- fluence which his gold could gain at Athens to engage the Athenians to act openly against an enemy equally suspected by them both. This circumstance perhaps disposed them to give the greater attention to the following oration. PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. Though we have heard a great deal, Athenians, in almost every assembly, of those acts of violence which Philip hath been committing ever since his treaty, not against onrs only, but the other states of Greece ; though all, I am confident, are ready to acknowlege, even they who fail in the performance, that we should, every one of us, exert our eiforts, in council and in action, to oppose and to chastise his insolence ; yet to such circumstances are you reduced by your supine- ness, that I fear (shocking as it is to say, yet) that had we all agreed to propose, and you to embrace such measures, as would most effectually ruin our aifairs, they could not have been more distressed than at pre- sent. And to this perhaps a variety of causes have conspired; nor could we have been thus affected by one or two. But, on a strict and just inquiry, you will find it principally owing to those orators who study rather to gain your favor than to advance your interests ; some of whom (attentive only to the means of establishing their own reputation and power) never extend their thoughts beyond the present moment, and therefore think that your views are equally confined. Others, by their accusations and invectives against those at the head of affairs, labor only to make the state inflict severity on itself; that, while we are thus engaged, Philip may have full power of speaking and of acting as he pleases. Such are now the usual me- thods of our statesmen ; and hence all our errors and disorders. Let me in treat you, my countrymen, that if I speak some truths with boldness, I may not be exposed to your resentment. Consider this : on other occasions, PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 139 you account liberty of speech so general a privilege of all within your walls, that aliens and slaves 1 are allowed to share it : so that many domestics may be found among you speaking their thoughts with less reserve than citizens in some other states. But from your councils you have utterly banished it. And the consequence is this : in your assemblies, as you listen only to be pleased, you meet with flattery and indul- gence : in the circumstances of public affairs you find yourselves threatened with the extremity of danger. If you have still the same dispositions I must be silent : if you will attend to your true interests, without ex- pecting to be flattered, I am ready to speak. For al- though our affairs are wretchedly situated, though our inactivity hath occasioned many losses, yet by proper vigor and resolution you may still repair them all. What I am now going to advance may possibly appear incredible ; yet it is a certain truth. The greatest of all our past misfortunes is a circumstance the most favor- able to our future expectations. And what is this? That the present difficulties are really owing to our utter disregard of every thing which in any degree affected our interests. For, were we thus situated, in spite of every effort which our duty demanded, then we should regard our fortune as absolutely desperate. But now Philip hath conquered your supineness and in- 1 Aliens and slaves.] The Athenians piqued themselves on being the most independent and most humane of all people. With them a stranger had liberty of speaking as he pleased, provided he let nothing escape him against the go- vernment. So far were they from admitting him into their public deliberations, that a citizen was not permitted to touch on state affairs in the presence of an alien. Their slaves en- joyed a proportionable degree of indulgence. The Saturnalia, when they were allowed to assume the character of masters, was originally an Athenian institution, and adopted at Rome by Numa. At Sparta and Thessaly, on the contrary, slaves were treated with such severity, as obliged them frequently to revolt. The humanity of Athens had its reward : for their slaves did them considerable service on several occasions ; at Marathon, in the war of Egina, and at Arginusse .—Tourreil. 140 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. activity ; the state he hath not conquered. Nor have you been defeated ; your force hath not even been exerted. Were it generally acknowleged that Philip was at war with the state, and had really violated the peace, the only point to be considered would then be how to oppose him with the greatest ease and safety. But since there are persons so strangely infatuated that, although he be still extending his conquests, although he hath possessed himself of a considerable part of our dominions, although all mankind have suffered by his injustice, they can yet hear it repeated in this assembly that it is some of us who are embroiling the state in war. This suggestion must first be guarded against ; else there is reason to apprehend that the man who moves you to oppose your adversary may incur the censure of being author of the Avar. And, first of all, I lay down this as certain : if it were in our power to determine whether we should Tbe at peace or war ; if peace (that I may begin with this) were wholly dependent on the option of the state, there is no doubt but we should embrace it. And I expect that he who asserts it is, will, without attempting to prevaricate, draw up his decree in form, and propose it to your acceptance. But if the other party hath drawn the sword, and gathered his armies round him ; if he amuse us with the name of peace, while he really proceeds to all kinds of hostilities, what remains but to oppose him? To make professions of peace, indeed, like him ; — if this be agreeable to you, I acquiesce. But if any man takes that for peace, which is enabling him, after all his other conquests, to lead his forces hither, his mind must be disordered ; at least it is our con- duct only towards him, not his towards us, that must be called a peace. But this it is for which all Philip's treasures are expended ; that he should carry on the war against you ; but that you should make no war on him. — Should we continue thus inactive till he declares himself our enemy, we should be the weakest of mor- tals. This he would not do, although he were in the heart of Attica, even at the Piraeus, if we may judge PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 141 from his behavior to others. For it was not till he came within a few miles 1 of Olynthus that he declared that ' either the Olynthians must quit their city, or he his kingdom. ' Had he been accused of this at any time before, he would have resented it, and ambassa- dors must have been despatched to justify their mas- ter. In like manner, while he was moving towards the Phocians, he still affected to regard them as allies and friends : nay, there were actually ambassadors from Phocis who attended him in his march : and among us were many who insisted that this march por- tended no good to Thebes. Not long since, when he went into Thessaly with all the appearance of amity, he possessed himself of Pherae. And it is but now he told the wretched people of Oreum that he had, in all affection, sent some forces to inspect their affairs ; for that he heard they labored under disorders and sedi- tions ; and that true friends and allies should not be absent on such occasions. And can you imagine that he, who chose to make use of artifice, rather than open force, against enemies by no means able to distress him, who, at most, could but have defended themselves against him — that he will openly proclaim his hostile designs against you ; and this when you yourselves obstinately shut your eyes against them ? Impossible ! He would be the absurdest of mankind if, while his outrages pass unnoticed, while you are wholly engaged in accusing some among yourselves, and endeavoring to bring them to a trial, he should put an end to your private contests, warn you to direct all your zeal against him, and so deprive his pensioners of their most specious pretence for suspending your resolu- tions ; that of his not being at war with the state. Heavens ! is there any man of a right mind who would judge of peace or war by words, and not by actions ? Surely no man. — To examine then the actions of Philip, — When the peace was just concluded, before 1 A few miles, &c] In the original, forty stadia, about five miles. 142 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. ever Diopithes had received his commission, or those in the Chersonesus had been sent out, he possessed himself of Serrium and Doriscum, and obliged the forces our general had stationed in the citadel of Ser- rium and the Sacred Mount to evacuate these places. From these proceedings, what are we to judge of him ? The peace he had ratified by the most solemn oaths. And let it not be asked, 1 of what moment is all this? or how is the state affected by it ? Whether these things be of no moment, or whether we are affected by them or no, is a question of another nature. Let the instance of violation be great or small, the sacred obli- gation of faith and justice is, in all instances, the same. But farther : when he sends his forces into the Cher- sonesus, which the king, which every state of Greece acknowleged to be ours ; when he confessedly assists our enemies, and braves us with such letters, what are his intentions ? for they say he is not at war with us. For my own part, so far am I from acknowleging such conduct to be consistent with his treaty, that I declare, that by his attack of the Megareans, by his attempts on the liberty of Eubcea, by his late incursion into Thrace, by his practices in Peloponnesus, and by his constant recourse to the power of arms, in all his transactions he has violated the treaty, and is at war with you ; unless you will affirm, that he who prepares to invest a city is still at peace until the walls be actually as- saulted. You cannot, surely, affirm it ! He whose designs, whose whole conduct tends to reduce me to subjection, that man is at war with me, though not a blow hath yet been given, not one weapon drawn. And, if any accident should happen, to what dangers must you be exposed ! The Hellespont will be no longer yours : your enemy will become master of Me- gara and Euboea : the Peloponnesians will be gained 1 Let it not be asked, &c] The partisans of Philip affected to speak with contempt of these places. To deny the right of Athens to them was dangerous and unpopular ; they there- fore endeavored to represent them as beneath the public re- gard. PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 143 over to his interest. And shall I say that the man who is thus raising his engines, and preparing to storm the city, that he is at peace with you I No : from that day in which Phocis fell beneath his arms I date his hostilities against you. If you will instantly oppose him, I pronounce you wise ; if you delay, it will not be in your power when you are inclined. And so far, Athenians, do I diiFer from some other speakers, that I think it now no time to debate about the Chersone- sus or Byzantium ; but that we should immediately send reinforcements, and guard these places from all accidents, supply the generals stationed there with every thing they stand in need of, and extend our care to all the Greeks, now in the greatest and most imminent danger. Let me intreat your attention while I ex- plain the reasons which induce me to be apprehensive of this danger ; that, if they are just, you may adopt them, and be provident of your own interests at least, if those of others do not affect you : or, if they appear frivolous and impertinent, you may now, and ever hereafter, neglect me as a man of an unsound mind. That Philip, from a mean and inconsiderable origin, hath advanced to greatness ; that suspicion and faction divide all the Greeks ; that it is more to be admired that he should become so powerful from what he was, than that now, after such accessions of strength, he should accomplish all his ambitious schemes : these, and other like points which might be dwelt on, I choose to pass over. But there is one concession which, by the influence of your example, all men have made to him, which hath heretofore been the cause of all the Grecian wars. And what is this ? An absolute power to act as he pleases ; thus to harass and plunder every state of Greece successively ; to invade and to enslave their cities. You held the sovereignty of Greece se- venty-three years; 1 the Lacedaemonians commanded for the space of twenty-nine years ; 2 and in these latter 1 Seventy-three years.] See note p. 70. 2 Twenty -nine years.] That is, from the destruction of 144 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. times, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans were in some degree of eminence. Yet neither to yon, nor to the Thebans, nor to the Lacedaemonians, did the Greeks ever grant this uncontrolled power : far from it. On the contrary, when you, or rather the Athenians of that age, seemed to treat some persons not with due moderation, it was universally resolved to take up arms ; even they who had no private complaints espoused the cause of the injured. And, when the Lacedaemo- nians succeeded to your power, the moment that they attempted to enlarge their sway, and to make such changes in aifairs as betrayed their ambitious designs, they were opposed by all, even by those who were not immediately affected by their conduct. But why do I speak of others ? We ourselves, and the Lacedaemonians, though from the first we could allege no injuries against each other, yet, to redress the in- jured, thought ourselves bound to draw the sword. And all the faults of the Lacedaemonians in their thirty years, and of our ancestors in their seventy years, do not amount to the outrages which Philip hath com- mitted against the Greeks within less than thirteen years of power ; l or rather, do not all make up the smallest part of them. This I shall easily prove in a few words. Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and the two and thirty cities of Thrace, I pass all over ; every one of which felt such severe effects of his cruelty, that an ob- server could not easily determine whether any of them Athens by Lysander, in the last year of the 93d olympiad, to the first war in which the Athenians, when re-established by Conon, engaged against Sparta, to free themselves and the other Greeks from the Spartan yoke, in the last year of the 100th olympiad. — Tourreil. 1 Thirteen years of power.] Philip had now reigned nine- teen years. But, being at first engaged in wars with his neighbors, he did not begin to make any considerable figure in Greece until the eighth year of his reign ; when, after the taking of Methone, he expelled the tyrants of Thessaly, and cut off the Phocian army commanded by Onomarchus. From this period Demosthenes begins his computation. — Tourreil, PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 145 had ever been inhabited or no. The destruction of the Phocians, a people so considerable, shall also pass un- noticed. But think on the condition of the Thessalians. Hath he not subverted their states and cities ? Hath he not established his tetrarchs over them, that not only single towns, but whole countries * might pay him vas- salage ? Are not the states of Euboea in the hands of tyrants, and this in an island bordering on Thebes and Athens ? Are not these the express words of his let- ters — ' they who are willing to obey me may expect peace from me V And he not only writes, but confirms his menaces by actions. He marches directly to the Hellespont : but just before he attacked Ambracia : Elis, 2 one of the chief cities of Peloponnesus, is in his possession : not long since he entertained designs against Megara. All Greece, all the barbarian world, is too narrow for this man's ambition. And, though we Greeks see and hear all this, we send no embassies to each other, we express no resentment : but into such wretchedness are we sunk (blocked up within our several cities) that even to this day we ,have not been able to perform the least part of that which our interest or our duty de- manded ; to engage in any associations, or to form any confederacies ; but look with unconcern on this man's growing power; each fondly imagining (as far as I can judge) that the time in which another is destroyed is gained to him, without ever consulting or acting for the cause of Greece ; although no man can be ignorant that, like the regular periodic return of a fever, or other disorder, he is coming on those who think them- selves most remote from danger. You are also sensible that whatever injuries the 1 Whole countries, &c] The word in the original signifies a number of different people dependent on one principal state or city. 2 Elis, &c] He made himself master of this place by treaty, not by force of arms. Elis entered into the league of the am- phictyons, by which Philip was acknowleged as their chief; and maintained its freedom till after the death of Alexander. — Tourreil. 146 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. Greeks suffered by the Lacedaemonians, or by us, they suffered by the true sons of Greece. And one may consider it in this light. Suppose a lawful heir, born to an affluence of fortune, should in some instances be guilty of misconduct : he indeed lies open to the justest censure and reproach ; yet it cannot be said that he bath lavished a fortune to which he had no claim, no right of inheritance. But should a slave, should a pretended son, waste those possessions which really belonged to others, how much more heinous would it be thought ! how much more worthy of resentment ! And shall not Philip and his actions raise the like in- dignation ? he, who is not only no Greek, no way allied to Greece, but sprung from a part of the barbarian world unworthy to be named ; a vile Macedonian ; where formerly we could not find a slave fit to pur- chase. And hath his insolence known any bounds? Besides the destruction of cities, doth he not appoint the Pythian games, 1 the common entertainment of Greece ; and, if absent himself, send his slaves to pre- side ? Is he not master of Thermopylae ? Are not the passes into Greece possessed by his guards and merce- naries ? Hath he not assumed the honors of the tem- ple, 2 in opposition to our claim, to that of the Thessa- lians, that of the Dorians, and of the other amphictyons ; honors to which even the Greeks do not all pretend '? Doth he not prescribe to the Thessalians how they shall 1 The Pythian games, &c] To this honor he was admitted by being made an amphictyon, and declared head of the sacred league. By his slaves, we are to understand no more than his subjects : for those old republicans affected to speak thus of the subjects of every king or tyrant. — Tourreil and Olivet. 2 The honors of the temple, &c] Προμαρτειαν, the right of precedency in consulting the oracle of Delphos. This the Phocians had enjoyed, as being in possession of the temple ; and Philip was invested with it as well as their other privi- leges. It was thought of considerable consequence by the Greeks, as appears from the first article of a peace made be- tween the Athenians and the allies of Lacedaemon. See Thu- cyd. b. v. — Tourreil. PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 147 be governed ? Doth he not send out his forces, some to Porthmus, to expel the Eretrian colony ; some to Oreum, to make Philistides tyrant ? And yet the Greeks see all this without the least impatience. Just as at the fall of hail : every one prays it may not alight on his ground, but no one attempts to fend against it: so they not only suffer the general wrongs of Greece to pass unpunished, but carry their insensibility to the ut- most, and are not roused even by their private wrongs. Hath he not attacked Ambracia and Leucas, cities of the Corinthians ? Hath he not wrested Naupactus from the Achseans, 1 and engaged by oath to deliver it to the iEtolians ? Hath he not robbed the Thebans of Echinus ? 2 Is he not on his march against the Byzan- tines? 3 And are they not our allies? I shall only add, that Cardia, the chief city of the Chersonesus, is in his possession. Yet these things do not aifect us : we are all languid and irresolute : we watch the motions of those about us, and regard each other with 1 Wrested Naupactus from the Achseans, &c] Naupactus was not a city of the Achaeans, but of the Locri Ozolae. Pos- sibly Demosthenes speaks with the liberty of an orator, and founds his assertion on some alliance which Naupactus might have had with the Achasans against the iEtolians, its invete- rate enemies. This city, thus delivered up, remained ever after under the jurisdiction of iEtolia, and is mentioned by Livy and Polybius as the principal city of that country. — Tourreil. 2 Echinus.] There were two places of this name ; the one in Acarnania, the other, which is here spoken of, founded by the Thebans on the Maliac Gulf. — Tourreil. 3 Against the Byzantines.] He had threatened them al- ready, but had not as yet executed his threats : for we learn from history that Philip, having for a considerable time be- sieged Perinthus, raised the siege in order to march to that of Byzantium. If the siege of Perinthus had preceded this ora- tion Demosthenes could not have forgotten so memorable an expedition in recounting the enterprises of Philip. Probably this prince made a feint of marching to Byzantium in order to conceal his designs against Perinthus. — Tourreil. In the introduction to this oration the reader has another account of Philip's first march against Byzantium. 148 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. suspicious eyes ; and this when we are all so manifestly injured. And if he behaves with such insolence to- wards the general body, to what extravagances, think ye, will he proceed when master of each particular state ? And now, what is the cause of all this ? (for there must be some cause, some good reason to be assigned why the Greeks were once so jealous of their liberty, and are now so ready to submit to slavery.) It is this, Athenians. Formerly, men's minds were animated with that which they now feel no longer, which con- quered all the opulence of Persia, maintained the free- dom of Greece, and triumphed over the powers of sea and land ; but, now that it is lost, universal ruin and confusion overspread the face of Greece. What is this ? Nothing subtle or mysterious : nothing more than a unanimous abhorrence of all those who accepted bribes from princes, prompted by the ambition of sub- duing, or the bare intent of corrupting Greece. To be guilty of such practices was accounted a crime of the blackest kind ; a crime which called for all the severity of public justice : no petitioning for mercy, no pardon was allowed. So that neither orator nor general could sell those favorable conjunctures with which fortune oftentimes assists the supine against the vigilant, and renders men utterly regardless of their interests superior to those who exert their utmost efforts : nor were mutual confidence among ourselves, distrust of tyrants and barbarians, and such-like noble principles, subject to the power of gold. But now are all these exposed to sale, as in a public mart; and, in exchange, such things have been introduced as have affected the safety, the very vitals of Greece. What are these ? Envy, when a man hath received a bribe ; laughter, if he confess it ; pardon, if he be con- victed ; resentment, at his being accused ; and all the other appendages of corruption. For, as to naval power, troops, revenues, and all kinds of preparations, every thing that is esteemed the strength of a state, we are now much better and more amply provided PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 149 than formerly : but they have lost all their force, all their efficacy, all their value, by means of these traf- fickers. That such is our present state you yourselves are witnesses, and need not any testimony from me. That our state in former times was quite opposite to this I shall now convince you, not by any arguments of mine, but by a decree of your ancestors, which they inscribed on a brazen column erected in the citadel ; not with a view to their own advantage (they needed no such memorials to inspire them with just sentiments), but that it might descend to you as an example of the great attention due to such affairs. Hear then the inscrip- tion : i Let Arthmius 1 of Zelia, the son of Pythonax, be accounted infamous, and an enemy to the Athenians and their allies, both he and all his race/ Then comes the reason of his sentence : ' Because he brought gold from Media into Peloponnesus/— Not to Athens. This is the decree. And now, in the name of all the gods, reflect on this ! think what wisdom, what dignity ap- peared in this action of our ancestors ! One Arthmius of Zelia, a slave of the king's (for Zelia is a city of Asia), in obedience to his master, brings gold, not into Athens, but Peloponnesus. This man they declare an enemy to them and their confederates, and that he and his posterity shall be infamous. Nor was this merely 1 Let Arthmius, &c] This, in a few words, was the occa- sion of publishing this terrible decree against Arthmius, of which Themistocles was the author. Egypt had thrown off the yoke of Artaxerxes Longimanus. A formidable army marched to reduce the rebels ; but failed of success, as Athens had provided for their defence. The resentment of Artaxerxes then turned against the Athenians. He sent Me- gabyzus, and other secret agents into Peloponnesus, to raise up enemies against them by the force of bribery, and to blow up the flame of resentment and jealousy in Sparta, which was ever ready to break out. But the attempt was ineffectual. Arthmius probably was one of the king of Persia's agents in this affair ; and Diodorus, who does not name him, includes him however in the general appellation of ' the emissaries -of Artaxerxes.' — Tourreil, 150 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. a mark of ignominy ; for how did it concern this Zelite whether he was to be received into the community of Athens or no ? The sentence imported something more : for, in the laws relating to capital cases, it is enacted that, * When the legal punishment of a man's crime cannot be inflicted he may be put to death/ And it was accounted meritorious to kill him. * Let not the infamous man/ saith the law, ' be permitted to live/ Intimating that he is free from guilt who executes this sentence. Our fathers therefore thought themselves bound to extend their care to all Greece ; else they must have looked with unconcern at the introduction of bribery into Peloponnesus. But we find they proceeded to such severity against all they could detect in it as to raise monuments of their crimes. Hence it was (and no wonder) that the Greeks were a terror to the barba- rians, not the barbarians to the Greeks. But now it is not so ; for you do not show the same spirit on such or on any other occasions. How then do you behave? You need not be informed. Why should the whole censure fall on you ? the conduct of the rest of Greece is no less blameable. It is my opinion, therefore, that the present state of things demands the utmost care and most salutary counsel. What counsel ? Shall I propose it? and will ye not be offended? — Read this memorial. [Here the secretary reads. And the speaker resumes his discourse.] And here I must take notice of one weak argument made use of to inspire us with confidence: That Philip is not yet so powerful as the Lacedaemonians once were, who commanded by sea and land, were strengthened by the alliance of the king, 1 were absolute and uncon- 1 Were strengthened by the alliance of the king.] After the expedition into Sicily, an expedition as unfortunate as it was imprudent, the Athenians might still have supported them- selves if the king of Persia had not concurred to precipitate PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 151 trolled ; and yet we made a brave stand against them ; nor was all their force able to crush our state. In an- swer to this, I shall observe, that amidst all the altera- tions and improvements which have happened in affairs of every kind, nothing hath been more improved than the art of war : for, in the first place, I am informed, that at that time the Lacedaemonians and all the other Greeks used to keep the field four or five months, just the convenient season ; and having so long continued their invasion, and infested the territories of their enemy with their heavy-armed and domestic forces, they re- tired into their own country. Then, such was the simplicity, I should say the national spirit 1 of that age, their ruin. Tissaphernes, the satrap of Darius Nothus, con- ducted the first alliance between his master and the Lacedae- monians. This alliance had at that time no very great effect. But when Cyrus the Younger was sent, by order of his father, to command in Asia Minor, Lysander gained the affection of this young prince, who soon made him able to give law to Athens. It is this period which Demosthenes points out. — Tourreil. 1 I should say the national spirit, &c] Circumstances pe- culiar to any people, singular customs, particular relations, and the like, give rise to words and phrases incapable of being precisely rendered into any other language. And such I take to be the word πολιτικώς. Every particular state of Greece was a member of a larger political body, that of the nation, in which all the several communities were united by national laws, national customs, and a national religion. This I have explained at large on another occasion. (See .Pre- lim. Dissert, to the Life of Philip.) The word πολιτικώς, therefore, I understand as expressive of that duty which each state owed to the Hellenic body, which prescribed bounds and laws to their wars, and forbad their passions, contests, and animosities against each other, to break out into any ex- cesses which might affect the welfare of the 'nation. They were to fight, not as inveterate foes, but competitors for power and honor. To recur to bribery, in order to defeat their antagonists, was to be guilty of corrupting the morals of what, in an extensive sense, may be called their country. In like manner the word civilis, in Latin, is used in a sense somewhat analogous to this, as denoting the regard which every citizen should. pay to the rights of others, in opposition 152 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. that the power of gold was never called to their assist- ance ; but all their wars were fair and open. Now, on the contrary, we see most defeats owing to treachery ; no formal engagements, nothing left to the decision of arms. For you find the rapid progress of Philip is not owing to the force of regular troops, but to armies com- posed of light horse and foreign archers. With these he pours down on some people, already engaged by civil discord and commotions ; and, when none will venture out in defence of their state, on account of their private suspicions, he brings up his engines, and attacks their walls : not to mention his absolute in- difference to heat and cold, and that there is no peculiar season which he gives to pleasure. Let these things sink deep into all our minds : let us not suifer his arms to approach these territories : let us not proudly * de- pend on our strength, by forming our judgments from the old Lacedaemonian war : but let us attend with all to despotism, pride, imperiousness, and all those passions which are enemies to liberty and the general good. Thus we find in Tacitus, ' J uveni civile ingenium, mira comitas.' Ann. i. * Silentium ejus non civile, ut crediderat, sed in superbiam. accipiebatur.' Ann. vi. And of Tiberius the historian says, ' Liberatus metu, civilem se admodum inter initia, ac paulo minus quam privatum egit.' I have observed in a note on the exordium of the second Philippic that a regard to the inter- est of Greece was generally the most extensive affection in the minds of its inhabitants. And that the extensive social affections were denoted by the Greek word ττολιτικον, we learn from Cicero. Let the following quotation, from the fifth book of his treatise De Finibus, suffice on this occasion : * Cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam in- natum quasi civile et populare, quod Graeci ttoXltikov vocant, quicquid aget qureque virtus, id a communitate, et ea quam exposui caritate, atque societate humana, non abhorrebit.' The authority of a writer who devoted so much of his atten- tion to the moral and political learning of the Greeks, and took so much pains to explain it to his countrymen, may surely be deemed decisive. 1 Let us not proudly, &c] In the original, ςκτραχηλισθηναι, which, besides the signification which Wolfius assigns it, is frequently rendered insolescere, superbire. PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 153 possible precaution to our interests and our armaments ; and let this be our point in view ; to confine him to his own kingdom ; not to engage him on equal terms in the field. For if you be satisfied with committing hos- tilities, there Nature hath given you many advantages. ■ (Let us but do our part.) The situation of his kingdom, for instance, exposes it to all the fury of an enemy ; not to speak of many other circumstances. But if we once come to a regular engagement, there his experi- ence must give him the superiority. But these are not the only points that require your attention : nor are you to oppose him only by the arts of war. It is also necessary that reason and penetration should inspire you with an abhorrence of those who plead his cause before you ; ever bearing in mind the absolute impossibility of conquering our foreign enemy until we have punished those who are serving him within our Avails. But this, I call the powers of Heaven to witness, ye cannot, ye will not do ! No : such is your infatuation, or madness, or — I know not what to call it, (for I am oftentimes tempted to believe that some power, more than human, is driving us to ruin,) that through malice, or envy, or a spirit of ridicule, or some like motive, you command hirelings to speak (some of whom dare not deny that they are hirelings), and make their calumnies serve your mirth. Yet, shocking as this is, there is something still more shock- ing : these men are allowed to direct the public affairs with greater security than your faithful counsellors. — And now observe the dreadful consequences of listen- ing to such wretches. I shall mention facts well known to you all. In Olynthus, the administration of affairs was di- vided between two parties ; the one, in the interest of 1 Many advantages.] Although the Athenians had lost Am- phipolis, Pydna, and Potidaea, they were still in possession of Thassus, Leninos, and the adjacent islands, from whence they might readily have attempted a descent on Macedon. — Tourreil. 154 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. Philip, intirely devoted to him ; the other, inspired by true patriotism, directed all their efforts to preserve the freedom of their country. To which of these are we to charge the ruin of the state ? or who betrayed the troops, and by that treachery destroyed Olynthus t The creatures of Philip. Yet, while their city stood, these men pursued the advocates for liberty with such malicious accusations and invectives, that an assembly of the people was persuaded even to banish Apollo- nides. But this is not the only instance. The same custom hath produced the same calamities in other places. In Eretria, at the departure of Plutarchus and the foreign troops, when the people had possession of the city, and of Porthmus, some were inclined to seek our pro- tection , some to submit to Philip. But, being influenced by this latter party on most, or rather all occasions, the poor unfortunate Eretrians were at length persuaded to banish their faithful counsellors. And the conse- quence was this : Philip, their confederate and friend, detached a thousand mercenaries under the command of Hipponicus, rased the fortifications of Porthmus, set three tyrants over them, Hipparchus, Automedon, and Clitarchus ; and after that, when they discovered some inclination to shake off the yoke, drove them twice out of their territory ; once by the forces com- manded by Eurylochus; and again, by those under Parmenio. To give but one instance more. In Oreum, Philisti- des was the agent of Philip ; as were Menippus, and Socrates, and Thoas, and Agapseus, the present masters of that city. And this was universally known. But there was one Euphraeus, a man for some time re- sident at Athens, who stood up against captivity and slavery. Much might be said of the injurious and contemptuous treatment which he received from the people of Oreum on other occasions. But the year before the taking of the city, as he saw through the traitorous designs of Philistides and his accomplices, he brought a formal impeachment against them. PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 155 Immediately considerable numbers form themselves into a faction (directed and supported by Philip), and hurry away Euphraeus to prison, as a disturber of the public peace. The people of Oreum were witnesses of this ; but, instead of defending him, and bringing his enemies to condign punishment, showed no resentment towards them ; but approved, and triumphed in his sufferings. And now the faction, possessed of all the power they wished for, laid their schemes for the ruin of the city, and were carrying them into execution. Among the people, if any man perceived this, he was silent ; struck with the remembrance of Euphraeus and his sufferings. And to such dejection were they re- duced, that no one dared to express the least appre- hension of the approaching danger until the enemy drew up before their walls, and prepared for an as- sault. Then some defended, others betrayed their state. When the city had thus been shamefully and basely lost, the faction began to exercise the most tyrannic power ; having either, by banishment or death, removed all those who had asserted their own cause and that of Euphraeus ; and were still ready for any noble enterprise. Euphraus himself put an end to his own life ; and thus gave proof that, in his opposition to Philip, he had been actuated by a just and pure re- gard to the interest of his country. And now what could be the reason (you may pos- sibly ask with surprise) that the people of Olynthus, and those of Eretria, and those of Oreum, all attended with greater pleasure to the advocates of Philip than to their own friends? The same reason which prevails here. Because they who are engaged on the part of truth and justice can never, even if they were inclined, advance any thing to recommend themselves to favor : their whole concern is for the welfare of their state. The others need but to soothe and flatter in order to second the designs of Philip. The one press for supplies ; the others insist that they are not wanted : the one call their countrymen to battle, and alarm them with apprehensions of danger; the others are 156 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. ever recommending peace, until the toils come too near to be escaped. And thus, on all occasions, one set of men speak but to insinuate themselves into the affections of their fellow-citizens ; the other to preserve them from ruin ; till at last the interests of the state are given up ; not corruptly or ignorantly, but from a desperate purpose of yielding to the fate of a consti- tution thought to be irrecoverably lost. And, by the powers of Heaven ! I dread that this may prove your case, when you find that reflection cannot serve you ! And, when I turn my eyes to the men who have re- duced you to this, it is not terror 1 that I feel ; it is the utmost detestation. For whether they act through de- sign or ignorance, the distress to which they are re- ducing us is manifest. But far be this distress from us, Athenians ! It were better to die ten thousand deaths than to be guilty of a servile complaisance to Philip, and to abandon any of your faithful counsel- lors ! The people of Oreum have now met a noble return for their confidence in Philip's creatures and their violence towards Euphraeus. The Eretrians are nobly rewarded for driving out our ambassadors, and committing their affairs to Clitarchus. Captivity and stripes, and racks are their reward. Great was his indulgence to the Olynthians, for choosing Lasthenes their general, and banishing Apollonides. It were folly and baseness to be amused with such false hopes as theirs, when neither our counsels direct us nor our inclinations prompt us to• the pursuit of our true in- terests, and to suffer those who speak for our enemies 1 It is not terror, &c] The word in the original -signifies the most abject fear and dismay ; and the whole passage seems to have a particular reference or allusion. Possibly some of Philip's partisans might have accused Demosthenes of beings thus affected at their sight ; while they magnified their own integrity and resolution, their true discernment, and patriotic zeal for the interest of their country ; and possibly might have called out for severe punishment on the man who dared to utter the most hitter invectives against a powerful prince • in alliance with Athens. PHILIPPIC THE THIRD. 157 to persuade us that the state is too powerful to be af- fected by any accident whatever. It is shameful to cry out when some event hath surprised us, ' Heavens ! who could have expected this? We should have acted thus and thus, and avoided these and these errors/ There are many things the Olynthians can now men- tion which, if foreseen in time, would have prevented their destruction. The people of Oreum can mention many : those of Phocis many : every state that hath been destroyed can mention many such things. But what doth it avail them now? While the vessel is safe, whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every person should exert himself in his particular sta- tion, and preserve it from being wrecked either by villany or unskilfulness. But when the sea hath once broken in all care is vain. And therefore, Athenians, while we are yet safe, possessed of a powerful city, fa- vored with many resources, our reputation illustrious — what are we to do ? (Perhaps some have sat with impatience to ask.) — I shall now give my opinion, and propose it in form ; that, if approved, your voices may confirm it. Having, in the first place, provided for your defence, fitted out your navy, raised your supplies, and arrayed your forces (for, although all other people should sub- mit to slavery, you should still contend for freedom) ; having made such a provision, I say, and this in the sight of Greece, then we are to call others to their duty ; and, for this purpose, to send ambassadors into all parts, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, and even to the king (for he is by no means unconcerned in opposing the rapidity of this man's progress). If ye prevail, ye will have sharers in the dangers and ex- pense which may arise ; at least you may gain some respite ; and, as we are engaged against a single per- son, and not to the united powers of a commonwealth, this may be of advantage ; as were those embassies of last year into Peloponnesus, and those remonstrances which were made in several places by me and Poly- datus, , that true patriot, and Hegesippus, and Clito- 158 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. machus, and Lycurgus, and the other ministers, which checked his progress, prevented his attack of Am- bracia, and secured Peloponnesus from an invasion. I do not mean that we should endeavor to raise that spirit abroad which we ourselves are unwilling to assume. It would be absurd to neglect our own in- terests, and yet pretend a regard to the common cause; or, while we are insensible to present dangers, to think of alarming others with apprehensions of futurity. No : let us provide the forces in the Chersonesus with money, and every thing else that they desire. Let us begin with vigor on our part ; then call on the other Greeks ; convene, instruct, exhort them. Thus it be- comes a state of such dignity as ours. If you think the protection of Greece may be intrusted to the Chal- cidians and Megareans, and so desert its cause, you do not think justly. It will be well if they can protect themselves. No : this is your province : this is that prerogative transmitted from your ancestors, the re- ward of all their many, and glorious, and great dan- gers. If every man sits down in ease and indulgence, and studies only to avoid trouble, he will certainly find no one to supply his place ; and I am also apprehensive that we may be forced into all that trouble to which we are so averse. Were there persons to act in our Stead, our inactivity would have long since discovered them ; but there are really none. You have now heard my sentiments. You have heard the measures I propose, and by which I appre- hend our affairs may be yet retrieved. If any man can oifer some more salutary course, let him rise and de- clare his opinion. And, whatever be your resolution, the gods grant that we may feel its good effects ! THE ELEVENTH ORATION AGAINST PHILIP : Commonly called the Fourth, PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF NICOMACHUS, THE YEAR AFTER THE FORMER ORATION. INTRODUCTION. Soon after the preceding oration the Athenian succors ar-. rived at Eubcea. Demosthenes had proposed the decree tot them ; and the command was given to Phocion, whom the Athenians gladly employed on all extraordinary emergences, and who was always ready to serve them, at the same time that he highly condemned their conduct. Demosthenes attended Phocion, not in a military character, but to endeavor to gain over the people of Euboea to the Athenian interest ; in which he had some success : while the general, on his part, acted with so much conduct and resolu- tion, that the Macedonians were forced to abandon the island ; and the Eubceans entered into a treaty of alliance with Athens. In the mean time Philip marched along the Hellespont, to support his fleet then in view, and to prevent Diopithes from cutting off his provisions. When he had crossed the Isthmus of the Chersonesus he returned, and by a forced march ar- rived with the choice of his army at Cardia, where he sur- prised Diopithes, and defeated him in an action in which that general fell. This he affected to consider, not as an open breach of his treaty, but only as the consequence of the pro- tection he had granted to the Cardians, and an act of particu- lar revenge he had determined to take on Diopithes. Philip then joined his army, and encamped before Perin- thus, a place considerable by its commerce and situation, ever firm to the Athenians, and consequently dreadful and dan- gerous to Philip. The Perinthians defended themselves with a courage almost incredible, and which, it appeared, could not be abated by danger or fatigue. Philip, on his part, pressed them by all the methods of assault ; and, after many vigorous efforts on each side, when the city was just on the point of 160 INTRODUCTION. being taken by assault, or of being obliged to surrender at discretion, fortune provided for it an unexpected succor. The fame of Philip's army having alarmed the court of Per- sia, Ochus sent his letters mandatory to the governors of the maritime provinces, directing them to supply Perinthus with all things in their power : in consequence of which they filled it with troops and provisions. While the Byzantines, justly conceiving their own turn would be next, sent into the city the flower of their youth, with all other necessaries for an obstinate defence. The Perinthians, thus reinforced, resumed their former ar- dor ; and, as all they suffered was on account of Athens, they despatched ambassadors thither to demand the speedy and effectual assistance of that state. On this occasion Demo- sthenes pronounced the following oration. PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 1 As I am persuaded, Athenians, that you are now con- vened about affairs of greatest moment, such as affect the very being of the state, I shall endeavor to speak to them in the manner most agreeable to your in- terests. There are faults of no late origin, and gradually in- creased to no inconsiderable number, which have con- spired to involve us in the present difficulties. But, of all these, what at this time most distresses us is this ; that your minds are quite alienated from public affairs ; that your attention is engaged just while you are as- sembled, and some new event related : then each man departs ; and, far from being influenced by what he hath heard, he does not even remember it. The insolence and outrage with which Philip treats ail mankind are really so great as you hear them represented. That it is not possible to set bounds to these, by the force of speeches and debates, no one can be ignorant ; for, if other arguments cannot con- vince, let this be weighed : whenever we have had oc- casion to plead in defence of our rights, we have never 1 We shall find in this oration many things which occur in those that are precedent ; and as it is on the same subject, already exhausted by so many orations, it was in some sort necessary for the orator to make use of repetitions : and it should seem, that in such a case repetition is by no means a fault, particularly as we may consider this as a recapitulation of all the others ; and may in effect call it the Peroration of the Philippics ; in which the orator resumes the argu- ments he had already made use of; hut, in resuming them, gives them new force, as well by the manner in which they are disposed, as by the many additions with which they are heightened — TourreiL DEM. L 162 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. failed of success ; we have never incurred the censure of injustice : but all places and all persons must ac- knowlege that our arguments are irresistible. Is he then distressed by this ? and are our affairs advanced? By no means. For, as he proceeds to take up arms, leads out his troops, and is ready to hazard his whole empire in pursuit of his designs, while we sit here pleading, or attending to those who plead the justness of our cause, the consequence (and I think the natural consequence) is this : actions prove superior to words : and men's regards are engaged, not by those arguments which we ever have advanced, or may now advance, how just soever ; but by the measures we pursue : and these are by no means fitted to protect any of the injured states: to say more of them is unnecessary. As then all Greece is now divided into two parties ; the one composed of those who desire neither to exer- cise nor to be subject to arbitrary power, but to enjoy the benefits of liberty, laws, and independence ; the other, of those who, while they aim at an absolute command of their fellow- citizens, are themselves the vassals of another person, by whose means they hope to obtain their purposes ; his partisans, the aiFecters of tyranny and despotism, are superior every where. So that, of all the popular constitutions, I know not whether one be left firmly established except our own. And they, who in the several states have been raised by him to the administration of aiFairs, have their superiority secured by all the means which can ad- vance a cause. The first and principal is this. When they would bribe those who are capable of selling their integrity, they have a person ever ready to supply them. In the next place, (and it is of no less moment,) at whatever season they desire it, there are forces at hand to overwhelm their opposers : while we, Athe- nians, are not only deficient in these particulars, but unable even to awaken from our indolence, like men reduced by some potion ' to a lethargic state. In con- 1 Like men reduced by some potion, &c] In the original, PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 163 sequence of this (for I hold it necessary to speak the truth), we are fallen into such contempt and infamy that, of the people immediately threatened with danger, some contend with us for the honor of commanding*, some about the place of conference ;. J while others de- termine rather to trust to their own strength than to accept of your assistance. And why am I thus particular in recounting these things? I call the gods to witness, that I would not• willingly incur your displeasure ; but I would have you know, and see, that in public as well as in private affairs, continued indolence and supineness, though not immediately felt in every single instance of omission, yet in the end must aifect the general welfare. You see this in the instance of Serrium and Doriscum. When the peace was made we began with neglecting these places. (Perhaps some of you have never heard of them.) And these places, thus abandoned and de- spised, lost you Thrace and your ally Cersobleptes. Again, when he saw that this did not rouse you, and that you sent no assistance, he rased Porthmus ; and, to keep us in continual awe, erected a tyranny in Eu- boea, over-against Attica. This was disregarded ; and his attempt on Megara was well nigh successful. Still you were insensible, expressed no impatience, no in- clination to oppose him. He purchased Antronas; and soon after got possession of Oreum. I pass over many things ; Pherse— the march to Ambracia — the Like men who had drank of mandragora ; an herb ranked by na- turalists among those of the soporiferous kind. It seems to have been a proverbial phrase to signify indolent and negli- gent persons. — Tourreil. 1 For the honor of commanding, some about the place of conference.] In all the confederate wars of the Greeks, that state which was acknowleged the most powerful had the honor of giving a commander-in-chief, and of appointing the place of general congress for concerting the operations. In the Persian war we find the Lacedeemonians and Athenians sometimes contending for these points ; which in effect was a dispute which of these states was most respectable. 164 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. massacre of Elis, 1 and thousands of the like actions r for it is not my design to give a detail of Philip's acts of outrage and injustice, but to convince you that the property and liberty of mankind will never be secure from him until he meets with some eifectual opposi- tion. There are persons who, before they hear affairs debated, stop us with this question, * What is to be done?' not that they may do it, when informed (for then they would be the best of citizens), but to prevent the trouble of attending. It is my part, however, to declare what we are now to do. First, then, Athenians, be firmly persuaded of this : that Philip is committing hostilities against us, and has really violated the peace : that he has the most implacable enmity to this whole city; to the ground on which this city stands ; to the very gods of this city: (may their vengeance fall on him!) but against our constitution is his force principally directed: the destruction of this is, of all other things, the most im- mediate object of his secret schemes and machinations. And there is, in some sort, a necessity that it should be so. Consider ; he aims at universal power ; and you he regards as the only persons to dispute his preten- 1 Pherae — the march to Ambracia — the massacre of Elis.] An orator does not always pique himself on an exact adher- ence to history ; hat sometimes disguises facts, or aggravates them, when it serves his purpose* One would imagine that Philip had committed some terrible outrages at Pherae ; and yet he only restored the liberty of that city, by expelling its tyrants : and as to the massacre of Elis, it is not to be im- puted immediately to Philip. He had, indeed, as chief of the allies in the sacred war, and head of the amphictyons, suggested the resolution of proscribing the Phocians and all the favorers of their impiety. Some of these, who had fled into Crete with their general Phalecus, joined with a body of men who had been banished from Elis, made an inroad into Peloponnesus, and attempted an attack on their country- men, who, with the assistance of the Arcadians, obliged this rebellious army to surrender at discretion ; and, in obedience to the decree of the amphictyons, put it to the sword, — Tourreil. PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 165 sions. He hath long injured yon : and of this he him- self is fully conscious ; for the surest harriers of his other dominions are those places which he hath taken from us : so that if he should give up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would not think himself secure in Mace- don. He is then sensible that he entertains designs against you, and that you perceive them ; and, as he thinks highly of your wisdom, he judges that you hold him in the abhorrence he deserves. To these things (and these of such importance) add, that he is perfectly convinced that although he were master of all other places, yet it is impossible for him to be secure while your popular government subsists : but that, if any accident should happen to him (and every man is sub- ject to many), all those who now submit to force would seize the opportunity, and fly to you for protection ; for you are not naturally disposed to grasp at power, or to usurp dominion ; but to prevent usurpation, to wrest their unjust acquisitions from the hands of others, to curb the violence of ambition, and to preserve the libertjr of mankind, is jour peculiar excellence. And therefore it is with regret he sees in that freedom you enjoy a spy on the incidents of his fortune : nor is this his reasoning weak or trivial. First, then, he is on this account to be regarded as the implacable enemy of our free and popular constitution. In the next place, we should be fully persuaded that all those things which now employ him, all that he is now pro- jecting, he is projecting against this city. There can be none among you weak enough to imagine that the desires of Philip are centred in those paltry villages l of Thrace, (for what name else can we give to Dron- gilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, and all those places now said to be in his possession ?) that he endures the severity of toils and seasons, and exposes himself to the utmost dangers for these ; and has no designs on the ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the 1 Those paltry villages, &c] See the notes of the oration on the State of the Chersonesus, p, 126, 166 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. silver mines, and other revenues, and the situation, and the glory of Athens, (which, never may the con- quest of this city give to him or any other !) but will suffer us to enjoy these ; while, for those trifling hoards of grain he finds in the cells of Thrace he takes up his winter quarters in all the horrors of a dungeon. It cannot be ! Even in his march thither he had these in view: these are the chief objects of all his enterprises. Thus must we all think of him. And let us not oblige that man, who hath ever been our most faithful counsellor, to propose the war in form : that would be to seek a pretence to avoid it, not to pursue the interest of our country. To yourselves I appeal : if, after the first, or the second, or the third of Philip's infractions of his treaty (for there was a long succession of them), any man had moved you to declare hostilities against him, and he had given the same assistance to the Car- dians as now, when no such motion came from any Athenian, would not that man have been torn to pieces? Would you not have cried out with one voice that it was this which made him ally to the Cardians ? Do not then seek for some person whom you may hate for Philip's faults ; whom you may expose to the fury of his hirelings. When your decree for war hath once passed, let there be no dispute whether it ought or ought not to have been undertaken. Observe his man- ner of attacking you : imitate it in your opposition : supply those who are now opposing him with money, and whatever else they want : raise your supplies : prepare your forces, gallies, horse, transports, and all other necessaries of a war. At present, your conduct must expose you to derision. Nay, I call the powers to witness, that you are acting as if Philip's wishes were to direct you. Opportunities escape you ; your treasures are wasted ; you shift the weight of public business on others ; break into passion ; criminate each other. I shall now show whence these disorders have proceeded, and point oat the remedy. You have never, Athenians, made the necessary dispositions in your affairs, or armed yourselves in PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 167 time ; but have been ever led by events. Then, when it proves too late to act, you lay down your arms. If another incident alarms you, your preparations are resumed, and all is tumult and confusion. But this is not the way. It is impossible ever to secure the least success by occasional detachments. No : you must raise a regular army, provide for its subsistence, appoint state -treasurers, and guard the public money with the strictest attention ; oblige those treasurers to answer for the sums expended, and your general for his conduct in the field ; and let this general have no pretence 1 to sail to any other place, or engage in any other enterprise but those prescribed. Let these be your measures, these your resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real observance of an equi- table peace, and to confine himself to his own terri- tory ; or you will engage him on equal terms. And perhaps, Athenians, perhaps, as you now ask, ' What is Philip doing ? whither is he marching V so there may come a time when he will be solicitous to know whither our forces have directed their march, and where they are to appear. If it be objected that these measures will be attended with great expense, and many toils and perplexities, I confess it. (It is necessary, absolutely necessary that a war should be attended with many disagreeable cir- cumstances.) But let us consider what consequences must attend the state if we refuse to take this course, and it will appear that we shall really be gainers by a seasonable performance of our duty. Suppose some god should be our surety (for no mortal could be de- pended on in an affair of such moment) ; for, although you are quite inactive and insensible, yet he will not at last lead his armies hither ; still it would be igno- minious, it would (I call every power of Heaven to witness !) be beneath you, beneath the dignity of your state, beneath the glory of your ancestors, to abandon all the rest of Greece to slavery for the sake of private \ Have no pretence, &c] See note 3, p. 34. 168 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. ease. I for my part would rather die than propose such a conduct : if, however, there be any other person to recommend it to you, be it so ; make no opposition ; abandon all affairs : but if there be no one of this opi- nion ; if on the contrary we all foresee that the farther this man is suffered to extend his conquests the more dangerous and powerful enemy we must find in him, why is our duty evaded ? why do we delay ? or when will we be disposed to exert ourselves, Athenians ? Must some necessity press us ? What one may call the necessity of freemen not only presseth us now, but hath long since been felt : that of slaves, it is to be wished, may never approach us. How do these differ? To freemen, the most urgent necessity is dishonor ; a greater cannot, I think, be assigned : to slaves, stripes and tortures. Far be this from us ! It ought not to be mentioned ! • And now the neglect of those things to which your lives and fortunes should be devoted, it must be con- fessed, is by no means justifiable : — far from it ! some pretence, however, may be alleged in its excuse. But to refuse even to listen to those things which demand your utmost attention, which are of the greatest mo- ment to be fully considered, this deserves the most severe censure. And yet you never attend but on occasions like this, when the danger is actually pre- sent ; nor in time of disengagement do you ever think of consulting ; but, while he is preparing to distress you, instead of making like preparations and providing for your defence, you are sunk in inactivity ; and if any one attempts to rouse you, he feels your resent- ment. But when advice is received that some place is lost or invested, then you attend, then you prepare» The proper season for attending and consulting was then, when you refused : now, when you are prevailed on to hear, you should be acting, and applying your preparations. And by this supineness is your conduct distinguished from that of all other nations : they usually deliberate before events ; your consultations follow them. — There is but one course left, which PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 169 should long since have been pursued, but still may be of service. — This I shall lay before you. There is nothing which the state is more concerned to procure on this occasion than money ; and some very favorable opportunities present themselves, which, if wisely improved, may possibly supply our demands. In the first place, they whom the king regards 1 as his faithful and strenuous adherents are the implacable enemies of Philip, and actually in arms against him. Then, the man who was 2 Philip's assistant and coun- sellor in all his designs against the king hath been lately seized ; so that the king will be informed of his practices, not by our accusations, to which he might suppose our private interest prompted us, but by the very agent and conductor of them. This will give weight to your assertions ; and there will be nothing left for your ministers to urge but what the king will gladly attend to : ' That we should unite to chastise the man who hath injured us equally : that Philip will be much more formidable to the king if his first attack be made on us ; for that, if he should be permitted to gain any advantage here, he will then march against him, free from all apprehensions.' For all these rea- 1 They whom the king regards, &c] He probably means the Thebans, who had given Ochus powerful assistance in the siege of Pelusium ; and who were now much provoked at Philip, on account of Echinus, which he had taken from them. — Tourreil. % The man who was, &c] As Philip seems to have already projected an expedition into Asia, he received with open arms all the malcontents of Persia, and held secret intelli- " gence with the rebel satraps. Hermias, the tyrant of Artanea, a city of Mysia, was of this number, and had been in confi- dence with Philip. Mentor, the Rhodian, general of the Persian army, drew him to an interview by feigned promises, where he seized him, and sent him in chains to Ochus. In- stead of ανάρπαστος, some copies have ανασπαστος, brought back : in which case it must be understood of Memnon or Ar- tabazus, two rebellious satraps, who had taken refuge in Phi- lip's court, but, by the mediation of Mentor, were reconciled to the king of Persia. — Ulpian and Tourreil, 170 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. sons, I think you should send ambassadors to treat with the king, and lay aside those idle prejudices which have so often been injurious to your interests — * that he is a barbarian, our common enemy, and the like.' For my own part, when I find a man apprehending danger from a prince whose residence is in Susa and Ecbatana, and pronouncing him the enemy of our state, who formerly re-established its power, 1 and but now made us 2 such considerable offers, (if you rejected them, that was no fault of his,) and yet speaking in another strain of one who is at our gates, who is ex- tending his conquests in the very heart of Greece, the plunderer of the Greeks, I am astonished ; and regard that man, whoever he is, as dangerous, who doth not see danger in Philip. There is another aiFair wherein the public hath been injured, which hath been attacked most unjustly and indecently ; which is the constant pretence of those who refuse to perform their duty to the state ; to which you will find the blame of every omission which every man is guilty of constantly transferred. I cannot speak of it without great apprehensions. Yet I will speak : for I think I can serve my country by advancing some things, both in behalf of the poor 3 against the rich, 1 Who formerly re-established its power.] That is, when Conon, by the assistance of Artaxerxes Mnemon, beat the Lacedaemonian fleet at Cnidos, and restored the liberty and splendor of his country. 2 And but now made us, &c] Artaxerxes Ochus, in order to reduce Egypt, which had revolted from him, solicited suc- cors from the principal cities of Greece. Argos and Thebes consented : but from Athens and Lacedaemon he could obtain only vain professions of friendship. He had, without doubt, offered large advantages to such people as would concur with him. Demosthenes here insinuates an accusation of the im- prudence of Athens in rejecting these offers. — Tourreil. 3 Some things, both in behalf of the poor, &c] The theatrical distributions afforded a perpetual occasion of public contests between the several orders of the state. The poor w r ere ever dissatisfied that the richer citizens shared the largesses, which they considered as their own peculiar right : and the rich be- held with impatience the dissipation of the public funds, PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 171 and of the rich against the necessitous ; if we first banish those invectives unjustly thrown out against the theatrical funds, and those fears that such an appoint- ment cannot subsist without some dismal consequences ; an appointment which, above all others, may be most conducive to our interests, and give the greatest strength to the whole community. Attend, then, while I first plead for those who are thought necessitous. There was a time, not long since, when the state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents ; l and yet none of those who were to which threw the whole weight of the supplies on them. But there was still a greater cause of complaint. The revenues of the state were not always sufficient to defray the immense expenses of feasts and entertainments ; and, in this case, some factious leader, who was willing to gain popularity, would propose to tax the rich ; or, perhaps, by some infamous calumnies, would raise a prosecution, which would bring in a large pecuniary fine. The rich, it may be imagined, were alarmed at such proceedings : they inveighed loudly against the authors of them, and sometimes ventured to accuse them in form, and bring them to trial. When their baseness and evil designs were publicly exposed, the people were ashamed to avow their intentions of supporting such flagrant injustice. Their clamors were loud against the person accused : but, as in all judicial processes they gave their votes by ballot, they then had an opportunity of saving their friend. All that the orator here says in defence of the theatrical ap- pointments is expressed with a caution and reserve quite opposite to his usual openness and freedom, and which plainly betray a consciousness of his being inconsistent with his former sentiments. How far he may be excused by the supposed necessity of yielding to the violent prepossessions of the people, and giving up a favorite point, I cannot pretend to determine. But it is certainly not very honorable to De- mosthenes to suppose (with Ulpian) that his former opposi- tion was merely personal, and that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it. 1 The state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents.] We must understand this of those revenues raised out of Attica only ; for the contributions of the allies, according to the taxation of Aristides, amounted to four hun- dred and sixty talents annually. And Pericles raised them yet higher. In order to know the real value of their revenues, 172 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. command or to contribute to the equipment of a galley ever had recourse to the pretence of poverty to be ex- empted from their duty ; but vessels were sent out, money was supplied, and none of our aifairs neglected. After this (thanks to fortune!) our revenues were con- siderably improved ; and, instead of one hundred, rose to four hundred talents ; and this without any loss to the wealthy citizens, but rather with advantage ; for they share the public affluence, and justly share it. Why then do we reproach each other ? why have we recourse to such pretences to be exempted from our duty ? unless we envy the poor that supply with which fortune hath favored them. I do not, and I think no one should blame them ; for in private families I do not find the young %o devoid of respect to years, or indeed any one so unreasonable and absurd as to refuse to do his duty unless all others do quite as much : such perverseness would render a man obnoxious to the laws against undutiful children ; for to nothing are we we should consider the prices of things. In the time of So- lon an ox was sold at Athens for five drachmae ; as we learn from Plutarch, in the life of Solon. A hog, in the time of Aristophanes, was worth three drachmae ; as appears from one of his comedies called ' The Peace.' — Olivet, A drachma, according to Arbuthnot, was equal to 7f d. of our money. A hundred drachmae made a mina, or 31. 4s. 7d. We may also, from the same author, add to the foregoing note these particulars. In the time of Solon corn was reckoned at a drachma the medimnus, or 4s. 6d. per quarter. In the time of Demosthenes it was much higher, at five drachmae the medimnus, which makes it 11. 2s. 7\d. per quarter. In Solon's time the price of a sheep was 7§ d. A soldier's daily pay was a drachma. The yearly salary of a common school- master at Athens was a mina. In the early times of the re- public, five hundred drachmae, 161. 2s. lid., were thought a competent fortune for a gentlewoman. To Aristides' two daughters the Athenians gave three thousand drachmae, 961. 17s. 2d. The arts and sciences were rated very high ; and, though the price of a seat in the theatre was no more than two oboli, or 2\d. y yet the performers were rewarded mag- nificently. When Amcebaeus sang in the theatre of Athens his pay per diem was a talent, PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 173 more inviolably bound than to a just and cheerful dis- charge of that debt in which both nature and the laws engage us to our parents. And as we each of us have our particular parents, so all our citizens are to be esteemed the common parents of the state ; and there- fore, instead of depriving them of what the state be- stows, we ought, if there were not this provision, to find out some other means of supplying their neces- sities. If the rich proceed on these principles, they will act agreeably not to justice only, but to good po- licy ; for to rob some men of their necessary subsist- ence is to raise a number of enemies to the common- wealth. To men of lower fortunes ϊ give this advice : that they should remove those grievances of which the wealthier members complain so loudly and so justly (for I now proceed in the manner I proposed, and shall not scruple to oifer such truths as may be favorable to the rich). Look out, not through Athens only, but every other state, and, in my opinion, you will not find a man of so cruel, so inhuman a disposition, as to complain when he sees poor men, men who even want the necessaries of life, receiving these appointments. Where then lies the difficulty ? Whence this animo- sity? When they behold certain 1 persons charging private fortunes with those demands which were usu- ally answered by the public ; when they behold the proposer of this immediately rising in your esteem, and, as far as your protection can make him, immortal; when they find your private votes intirely different from your public clamors ; then it is that their indig- nation is raised ; for justice requires, Athenians, that the advantages of society should be shared by all its members. The rich should have their lives and for- tunes well secured ; that so, when any danger threatens their country, their opulence maybe applied to its de- fence. Other citizens should regard the public trea- sure as it really is, the property of all, and be content 1 When they behold certain, &c] See note on p. 170. 174 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. with their just portion ; hut should esteem all private fortunes as the inviolable right of their possessors. Thus a small state rises to greatness ; a great one pre- serves its power. But it may he said that possibly these are the duties of our several citizens : yet, that they may be per- formed agreeably to the laws, some regulations must first be made. — The causes of our present disorders are many in number, and of long continuance. Grant me your attention, and I shall trace them to their origin. You have departed, Athenians, from that plan of government which your ancestors laid down. You are persuaded by your leaders, that to be the first among the Greeks, to keep up your forces ready to redress the injured, is an unnecessary and vain expense You are taught to think, that to lie down in indolence, to be free from public cares, to abandon all your interests one by one, a prey to the vigilance and craft of others, is to be perfectly secure, and surprisingly happy. By these means the station which you should have main- tained is now seized by another, and he is become the successful, the mighty potentate. And what else could have been expected ? for as the Lacedaemonians were unfortunate, the Thebans engaged in the Phocian war, and we quite insensible, he had no competitor for a prize so noble, so great, so illustrious, which for a long time engaged the most considerable states of Greece in the severest contests. Thus is he become formidable, strengthened by alliances and attended by his armies ; while all the Greeks are involved in so many and so great difficulties, that it is hard to say where they may find resources. But of all the dangers of the several states, none are so dreadful as those which threaten ours ; not only because Philip's designs aim princi- pally at us, but because we, of all others, have been most regardless of our interests. If then, from the variety * of merchandises and plenty 1 If then, from the variety, &c] See note on the oration on the State of the Chersonesus, p. 126. PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 175 of provisions, you flatter yourselves that the state is not in danger, you judge unworthily and falsely. Hence we might determine whether our markets were well or ill supplied: but the strength of that state which is regarded by all who aim at the sovereignty of Greece as the sole obstacle to their designs, the well-known guardian of liberty, is not surely to be judged of by its vendibles. No : we should inquire whether it be secure of the affections of its allies ; whether it be powerful in arms. These are the points to be consi- dered; and in these, instead of being well provided, you are totally deficient. To be assured of this you need but attend to the following consideration. At what time have the affairs of Greece been in the great- est confusion ? I believe it will not be affirmed that they have ever been in greater than at present : for in former times Greece was always divided into two par- ties, that of the Lacedaemonians and ours. All the several states adhered to one or the other of these. The king, while he had no alliances here, was equally suspected by all. By espousing the cause of the van- quished, 1 he gained some credit, until he restored them to the same degree of power with their adversa- ries ; after that, he became no less hated 2 by those 1 By espousing the cause of the vanquished, &c] Lacedag- mon first entered into an alliance with Darius Nothus, by the mediation of Tissaphernes ; which enabled Lysander to con- quer Athens. Conon obtained from Artaxerxes Mnemon the succors necessary to revenge his country and to re-establish it. And it was with reason that the kings of Persia attended to the preservation of a due balance between the Grecian states, lest the prevailing power might turn its thoughts to Asia, and attempt an invasion there. — Tourreil. C Z He became no less hated, &c] Lacedaamon had no sooner subjected the Athenians, by the help of Darius, but she ravaged the Persian provinces in Asia Minor, and joined with the rebellious satraps. And as soon as the Athenians were delivered by Artaxerxes from the Spartan yoke they espoused the quarrel of Evagoras, who had revolted from Artaxerxes, and usurped a great part of the kingdom of Cy- prus. Benefits could not bind these states. Interest alone formed their engagements, and interest dissolved them. The 176 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. whom he had saved than by those whom he had con- stantly opposed. But now, in the first place, the king lives in amity with all the Greeks (indeed, without some immediate reformation in our conduct, we must be excepted). In the next place, there are several cities which affect the characters of guardians and pro- tectors. They are all possessed with a strong passion for pre-eminence ; and some of them (to their shame !) desert, and envy, and distrust each other. In a word, the Argians, Thebans, Corinthians, Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Athenians, have all erected themselves into so many distinct sovereignties. But among all these parties, all these governing states, into which Greece is broken, there is not one (if I may speak freely) to whose councils l fewer Grecian affairs are submitted than to ours ; and no wonder, when neither love, nor confidence, nor fear, can induce any people to apply to you. It is not one single cause thai hath effected this (in that case the remedy were easy), but many faults of various natures and of long continuance. Without entering into a particular detail, I shall men- tion one in which they all centre ; but I must first intreat you not to be offended if I speak some bold truths without reserve. Every opportunity which might have been improved to your advantage hath been sold. The ease and su- pineness in which you are indulged have disarmed picture here exhibited of the conduct of the Greeks towards the kings of Persia is by no means nattering in point of •morals. But it is not in ancient times only that we find morals must be silent when politics speak. — Tourrert. 1 To whose councils, &c] The ruling states of Greece ac- counted it their greatest glory to see and hear a number of ambassadors in their assemblies, soliciting their protection and alliance. The conquests which Philip made in Thrace had put an end to many applications of this sort, which had formerly been addressed to the Athenians. Arid their indo- lence made people decline any engagements with them. Fo- reigners were persuaded, that they who were insensible to their own interests, were not likely to grant the due attention to those of others. PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 177 your resentment against the traitors ; and thus others are suffered to possess your honors. — But at present I shall take notice only of what relates to Philip. If he be mentioned, immediately there is one ready to start up and cry, ' We should not act inconsiderately ; we should not involve ourselves in a war/ And then he is sure not to forget the great happiness of living in peace, the misfortune of being loaded with the main- tenance of a large army, the evil designs of some per- sons against our treasures ; with others of the like momentous truths. But these exhortations to peace should not be ad- dressed to you ; your conduct is but too pacific : let them rather be addressed to him who is in arms. If he can be prevailed on, there will be no difficulty on your part. Then, it cannot be thought a misfortune to provide for our security at the expense of some part of our possessions : the consequences that must arise, if this provision be neglected, rather deserve that name. And, as to the plundering of your treasury, this must be prevented by finding some effectual means to guard it ; not by neglecting your interests. Nor can I but express the utmost indignation, when I find some of you complaining that your treasures are plundered, though it be in your power to secure them, and to pu- nish the guilty ; and yet looking on with indifference while Philip is plundering every part of Greece suc- cessively ; and this, that he may at last destroy you. And what can be the reason, Athenians, that when Philip is guilty of such manifest violations of justice, when he is actually seizing our cities, yet none of these men will acknowlege that he acts unjustly, or commits hostilities; but assert that they who rouse you. from your insensibility, and urge you to oppose these out- rages, are involving you in war ? This is the reason ; that whatever accidents may happen in the course of the war (and there is a necessity, a melancholy ne- cessity that war should be attended with many acci- dents), they may lay the whole blame on your best and most faithful counsellors. They know, that if with a DEM. Μ 178 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. steady and unanimous resolution, you oppose the in- solent invader, he must be conquered, and they de- prived of a master whose pay was ever ready. But, if the first unhappy accident calls you oif to private trials and prosecutions, they need but appear as accu- sers, and two great points are secured — your favor, and Philip's gold ; while you discharge the vengeance due to their perfidy against your faithful speakers. These are their hopes ; these the grounds of their com- plaints that certain persons are involving you in war. For my own part, this I know perfectly, that although it hath never been proposed by any Athenian to de- clare war, yet Philip hath seized many of our terri- tories, and but just now sent succors to the Cardians. But, if we will persuade ourselves that he is not com- mitting hostilities, he would be the most senseless of mortals should he attempt to undeceive us : for, when they who have received the injury deny it, must the offender prove his guilt? But when he marches di- rectly hither, what shall we then say ? He will still deny that he is at war with us (as he did to the people of Oreum until his forces were in the heart of their dominions ; as he did to those of Pheras until he was on the point of storming their walls ; as he did to the Olynthians until he appeared in their territories at the head of an army). Shall we then say that they who urge us to defend our country are involving us in a war ? If so, we must be slaves. There is no medium. Nor is your danger the same with that of other states. Philip's design is not to enslave, but to extirpate Athens. He knows that a state like yours, accustomed to command, will not, or, if it were inclined, cannot submit to slavery : he knows that, if you have an op- portunity, you can give him more disturbance than any other people ; and therefore, if ever he conquers us, we may be sure of finding no degree of mercy. Since, then, you are engaged in defence of all that is dear to you, apply to the great work with an attention equal to the importance of it : let the wretches who have openly sold themselves to this man be the objects PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 179 of your abhorrence : let them meet with the utmost severity of public justice : for you will not, you can- not conquer your foreign enemies until you have punished those that lurk within your walls. No : they will ever prove so many obstacles to impede our pro- gress, and to give our enemies the superiority. And what can be the reason that he treats you with insolence (for I cannot call his present conduct by another name) ; that he utters menaces against you ; while he at least condescends to dissemble with other people, and to gain their confidence by good offices? Thus, by heaping favors on the Thessalians he led them insensibly into their present slavery. It is not possible to enumerate all the various artifices he prac- tised against the wretched Olynthians (such, among others, was the putting them in possession of Potidsea). In his late transactions with the Thebans, he enticed them to his party by yielding Boeotia to them, and by freeing them from a tedious and distressing war. And thus, after receiving their several insidious favors, some of these people have suffered calamities but too well known to all : others must submit to whatever may befal them. What you yourselves have formerly lost I shall not mention ; but, in the very treaty of peace, in how many instances have we been deceived ? how have we been despoiled? Did we not give up Phocis and the Straits ? Did we not lose our Thracian dominions- — Doriscum, Serrium, and even our ally Cer- sobleptes ? Is he not in possession of Cardia ? and doth he not avow his usurpation ? Whence is it, then, that his behavior towards you is so different from that towards others ? Because, of all the Grecian states, ours is the only one in which harangues in fa- vor of enemies are pronounced with impunity ; and the venal wretch may utter his falsehoods with security, even while you are losing your dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip at Olynthus until the people had been gained by Potidasa. In Thessaly it was not safe to speak for Philip until that people had been gained by the expulsion of their tyrants, and by being 180 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. reinstated in the council of amphictyons. Nor could it have been safely attempted at Thebes until he had given them up Bceotia, and exterminated the Phocians. But, at Athens, without the least danger may Philip be defended, although he hath deprived us of Amphi- polis, and the territory of Cardia ; although he threa- tens our city by his fortifications in Eubcea ; although he is now marching to Byzantium. Hence some of his advocates have arisen from penury to affluence ; from obscurity and contempt to honor and eminence ; while, on the other hand, you have sunk from glory to dis- grace ; from wealth to poverty : for the riches of a state I take to be the number, fidelity, and affection of its allies ; in. all which you are notoriously deficient. And by your total insensibility while your affairs are thus falling into ruin he is become successful, great, and formidable to all the Greeks, to all the barbarians ; and you deserted and inconsiderable ; sumptuous in- deed in your markets ; but, in every thing relating to military power, ridiculous. There are some orators, I find, who view your inter- ests and their own in a quite different light. To you they urge the necessity of continuing quiet whatever injuries you are exposed to ; they themselves find this impossible, though no one offers them the least injury. .To you I speak, Aristodemus ! x Suppose a person should, without severity, ask you this question : 6 How is it that you, who are sensible (for it is a well-known truth) that the life of private men is serene and easy, and free from danger — that of statesmen, invidious and insecure, subject to daily contests and disquiets — should yet prefer the life encompassed with dangers to that of peace and disengagement V What 1 To you I speak, Aristodemus !] He was by profession a player, and was one of the ten ambassadors which the Athe- nians had sent to the court of Macedon to treat about the peace. At his return, Demosthenes proposed a decree for crowning this very man for his good serviced, whom he here inveighs against with so much bitterness. PHILIPPIC THE FOURTH. 181 could you say ? Suppose we admit the truth of the very best answer you could make, ' that you were prompted by a desire of honor and renown/ is it pos- sible that you, who engaged in such painful under- takings, who despised all toils and dangers for the sake of these, should advise the state to give them up . for ease and indulgence ? You cannot, surely, say that it was incumbent on you to maintain a degree of emi- nence in the city ; and that the city was not concerned to maintain her eminence in Greece ! Nor do I see how the public safety requires that we should confine ourselves to our own concerns ; and yet, than an offi- cious intrusion into those of others should be necessary for your safety. On the contrary, you are involving yourself in the greatest dangers by being unneces- sarily assiduous ; and the city, by being quite inactive. 4 But then you have an illustrious reputation, derived from your family, which it would be shameful not to support ; while, on the contrary, nothing has been transmitted from our fathers but obscurity and mean- ness/ This is equally false. Your father was like you, and therefore base and infamous. To the honor of our ancestors let all Greece bear witness — twice rescued ' by their valor from the greatest dangers. There are persons, then, who do not act with the same firmness and integrity in the conduct of their own affairs and those of the state. Is not this the case, when some of them, after escaping from prison, have raised themselves so high, as to forget their for- mer condition ; and yet have reduced a state, whose pre-eminence in Greece was but now universally ac- knowleged, to the lowest degree of infamy and mean- ness ? I could say more on these and other points ; 1 Twice rescued, &c] First at Marathon, and afterwards at Salamis. Isocrates mentions a third time, when they de- livered Greece from the Spartan yoke. Demosthenes (fre- quently speaks of this in the highest terms, but) here rather chooses to lessen the glory of his country than to recal an event which reflected on the Lacedaemonians, now in alliance with Athens. — Tourreil. 182 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. but I forbear : for it is not want of good counsel that now distresses, or ever hath distressed you. But when your true interests have been laid before you, and that you have been unanimous in your approba- tion, you can, with equal patience, attend to those who endeavor to discredit, to overthrow all that hath been advanced. Not that you are ignorant of their characters (for you can, at first glance, distinguish the hireling and agent of Philip from the true patriot) ; but that by impeaching your faithful friends, and by turning the whole affair into ridicule and invective, you may find a pretence for the intire neglect of your duty. You have now heard truths of the highest moment urged with all freedom, simplicity, and zeal. You have heard a speech, not filled with flattery, danger, and deceit, calculated to bring gold to the speaker, and to reduce the state into the power of its enemies. It remains, therefore, that the whole tenor of your conduct be reformed ; if not, that utter desolation which will be found in your affairs must be imputed wholly to yourselves. THE TWELFTH ORATION AGAINST PHILIP : Commonly called the Oration on the Letter, PEOXOUXCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF THEOPHRASTUS, THE YEAR AFTER THE FOREGOING ORATION. TO WHICH IS PREFIXED PHILIP'S LETTER TO THE ATHENIANS. INTRODUCTION. The former oration inspired the Athenians with the resolu- tion of sending succors to all the cities that were threatened by Philip's arms ; and their first step was to despatch to the Hellespont a convoy with provisions ; which weighed anchor in view of Selymbria, a city of the Propontis, then be- sieged by the Macedonians, and was there seized by Amyntas, Philip's admiral. The ships were demanded by the Athe- nians, and returned by Philip, but with declarations suffi- ciently alarming. The obstinate valor of the Perinthians had forced Philip to turn the siege into a blockade. He marched off with a con- siderable body of his army to attack other places, and made an incursion into the territories of Byzantium. The Byzan- tines shut themselves up within their city, and despatched one of their citizens to Athens to desire the assistance of that state ; who, with some difficulty, prevailed to have a fleet of forty ships sent out, under the command of Chares. As this general had not the same reputation in other places as at Athens, the cities by which he was to pass refused to re- ceive him : so that he was obliged to wander for some time along the coasts, extorting contributions from the Athenian allies ; despised by the enemy, and suspected by the whole world. He appeared at last before Byzantium, where he met with the same mortifying treatment as in other places, and was refused admission ; and shortly after was defeated by Amyntas in a naval engagement, in which a considerable part of his fleet was either sunk or taken. Philip had for some time perceived that, sooner or later, he must inevitably come to a rupture with the Athenians. 184 INTRODUCTION. His partisans were no longer able to lull them into security. Their opposition to his designs, however imperfect and in- effectual, was yet sufficient to alarm him. He therefore de- termined to endeavor to abate that spirit which now began to break through their inveterate indolence ; and for this pur- pose sent them a letter, in which, with the utmost art, he laid open the causes of complaint he had against them, and threat- ened them with reprisals. This letter was not received at Athens till after the news of Chares' defeat. Philip had now laid siege to Byzantium, and exerted all his efforts to make himself master of that city. On the other hand, the Athenians were disheartened by the ill success of their commander, and began to repent of having sent any succors, when Phocion, who always assumed the liberty of speaking his sentiments freely, assured them that, for once, they themselves had not been in fault ; but that their general only was to blame. He was immediately desired to take on himself the charge of relieving Byzantium ; aud set sail with a numerous body of forces. He was received with the greatest demonstrations of joy ; and his whole conduct expressed the utmost wisdom and moderation. Nor was his valor less con- spicuous : he sustained many assaults with an intrepidity, worthy of the early ages of the commonwealth, and at last obliged Philip to raise the siege. Phocion then departed amidst the general acclamations of the people whom he had saved. He proceeded to the relief of the colonies of the Chersonesus, who were ever exposed to the attacks of the Cardians. In this way he took some vessels laden with arms and provisions for the enemy, and obliged the Macedonians, who had attempted Sestos, to abandon their enterprise, and shut themselves up in Cardia. And thus, after various expeditions highly honorable both to himself and to his country, Phocion returned home, where he found the Athenians engaged in a debate on Philip's let- ter : on which occasion Demosthenes pronounced his last oration against Philip. To have answered the letter parti- cularly would have been very difficult; for, though Athens had the better cause, yet many irregularities had really been committed, which Philip knew how to display in their full force. The orator therefore makes use of his art to extricate himself from the difficulty ; avoids all former discussions of facts, and applies himself at once to raise the lively pas- sions : affects to consider this letter as an open declaration of war; inflames the imaginations of his hearers with this idea ; and speaks only of the means to support their arms against so powerful an enemy. PHILIP'S LETTER TO THE ATHENIANS. 1 Philip, to the Senate and People of Athens — greeting: As the embassies I have frequently sent to enforce those oaths and declarations by which we stand en- gaged have produced no alteration in your conduct, I thought it necessary thus to lay before you the several particulars in which I think myself aggrieved. Be not surprised at the length of this letter ; for, as I have many causes of complaint, it is necessary to explain them all distinctly. First, then, when Nicias the herald 2 was forcibly taken out of my own territory; instead of punishing the author of this outrage, as justice required, you added to his wrongs, by keeping him ten months in pri- son ; and the letters intrusted to him by us 3 you read 1 This letter is a masterpiece in the original : it has a ma- jestic and persuasive vivacity ; a force and justness of reason- ing sustained through the whole ; a clear exposition of facts, and each followed by its natural consequence j a delicate irony : in short, a noble and concise style, made for kings who speak well, or have taste and discernment at least to make choice of those who can make them speak well. If Philip was himself the author of this letter, as it is but just to be- lieve, since we have no proof to the contrary, we may reason- ably pronounce of him as was said of Csesar, ' that he wrote with that spirit with which he fought/ Eodem animo dixit, quo bellavit. Quint. Inst. 1. x. — Tourreil. 2 When Nicias the herald, &c] Probably he had been seized on his journey from Thrace to Macedon by Diopithes, at the time of his invading Philip's Thracian dominions, as mentioned in the preface to the oration on the State of the Chersonesus. — Tourreil. 3 And the letters intrusted to him by us, &c] The Athe- nians hoped, by opening this packet, to get some light into Philip's secret schemes and practices against them. There 186 Philip's letter to the Athenians. publicly in your assembly. Again, when the ports of Thassus were open * to the Byzantine gallies, nay, to any pirates that pleased, you looked on with indiffer- ence ; although our treaties expressly say that such proceedings shall be considered as an actual declara- tion of war. About the same time it was that Diopi- thes made a descent on my dominions, carried off in chains the inhabitants of Crobyle and Tiristasis, 2 ra- vaged all the adjacent parts of Thrace, and at length proceeded to such a pitch of lawless violence as to seize Amphilocus, 3 who went, in quality of an ambassa- dor, to treat about the ransom of prisoners; whom, after he had reduced him to the greatest difficulties, he compelled to purchase his freedom, at the ratoof nine talents. And this he did with the approbation of his state. Yet the violation of the sacred character of heralds and ambassadors is accounted, by all people, the height of impiety : nor have any expressed a deeper sense of this than you yourselves ; for, when the Megareans had put Anthemocritus to death, 4 the were found in it some letters directed to Olympias, Philip's queen, which they treated with a most scrupulous respect, and took care she should receive them in the same condition in which they had been intercepted. — Tourreil. 1 When the ports of Thassus were open, &c] The Athe- nians had engaged, by an article of their treaty, that the Thas- sians, who were their subjects, should not receive any ships that committed piracies on the subjects or allies of Philip. This article had not been strictly observed ; perhaps on ac- count of Philip's own infidelity. — Tourreil. 2 Crobyle and Tiristasis.] The first ofthese places is quite unknown. Tiristasis is placed by Pliny in the Thracian Cher- sonesus. — Tourreil. 3 As to seize Amphilocus.] It is impossible to save the honor of Diopithes but by denying the fact ; at least in the manner that Philip represents it. — Tourreil. 4 For when the Megareans had put Anthemocritus W death, &c] Philip here beats the Athenians with their own weapons, and cites, very much to the purpose, the example of a memorable vengeance which they had taken about an age before on the Megareans. They had accused this people of favoring a revolt of their slaves, and of profaning a tract of Philip's letter to the Athenians. 187 people proceeded so far as to exclude them from the mysteries, and erected * a statue before the gates as a monument of their crime. And is not this shocking•, to be avowedly guilty of the very same crimes for which your resentment fell so severely on others, when you yourselves were aggrieved? In the next place, Callias your general hath made himself master of all the towns on the bay of Pagasae, though comprehended in the treaty made with you, and united in alliance to me. Not a vessel could steer its course towards Macedon but the passengers were consecrated land ; and on this account excluded them from all advantages of commerce in the ports and markets of Athens. Thucydides stops here ; but Pausanias adds, that Anthemo- critus went from Athens in quality of a herald to summon the Megareans to desist from their sacrilege, and that for answer they put him to death. The interest of the gods served the Athenians for a pretence ; hut the famous Aspasia, whom Pericles was so violently in love with, was the true cause of their rupture with Megara. Some young Athenians, heated by wine, had taken away from Megara a remarkable courte- zan called Simaetha; and the Megareans, by way of reprisal, seized two Athenian ladies of the same character that were in Aspasia's train. Pericles espoused his favorite's quarrel; and, with the power which he then possessed, easily per- suaded the people to whatever he pleased. They thundered out a decree against the Megareans, forbidding all commerce with them on pain of death : they drew up a new form of an oath, by which every general obliged himself to invade the territories of Megara twice every year. This decree kindled the first sparks of contention, which at length flamed out in the Peloponnesian war : it was the work of three courtezans. The most illustrious events have sometimes as shameful an origin. — Tourreil. 1 To exclude them from the mysteries, and erected, &c] All the Greeks had ordinarily a right to be initiated into what were called the lesser mysteries, which the Athenians cele- brated at Eleusis in honor of Ceres and Proserpine ; but on the death of Anthemocritus the Megareans were excluded, and a statue or tomb erected in honor of this herald on the road leading from Athens to Eleusis, near the gate called Dipylon. According to Aristophanes (in Acharn. act. ii. sc. 5.) the Megareans denied this murder, and threw the whole blame of it on Aspasia and Pericles. — Tourreil, 188 Philip's letter to the Athenians, all treated by him as enemies, and sold ; and this his conduct hath been applauded by the resolutions of your council ! So that I do not see how you can pro- ceed farther if you actually declare war against me. For, when we were at open hostilities, you did but send out your corsairs, make prize of those who were sailing to my kingdom, assist my enemies, and infest my territories. Yet now, when we are professedly at peace, so far have your injustice and rancor hurried you, that you have sent ambassadors to the Persian * to persuade him to attack me ; which must appear highly surprising ; for, before that prince had subdued Egypt and Phoenicia, it was resolved 2 that, if he at- tempted any new enterprises, you would invite me, as well as all the other G reeks, to an association against him. But now, with such malice am I pursued, that you are on the contrary, confederating with him against me. In former times, I am told, your ances- tors objected it as an heinous crime to the family 3 of 1 You have sent ambassadors to the Persian, &c.l Diodo- rus informs us that about this time the satraps of the Lesser Asia had obliged Philip to raise the siege of Perinthus. The historian does not say that the Athenians invited them ; but Philip complains of it here : and Pausanias observes, that in this expedition the Persian forces were commanded by Apol- lodorus, an Athenian general. We may observe with what disrespect Philip (whose ancestors in their greatest prospe- rity never aspired higher than to the alliance of some satrap) here speaks of the Great King — ' the Persian !' — Tourreil. % Before that prince had subdued Egypt and Phoenicia, it was resolved, &c] Artaxerxes Ochus, who governed Persia at that time, before his reduction of these revolted provinces had marched into the Lesser Asia against Artabazus, a re- bellious satrap. The approach of the Persians alarmed the Greeks ; and Athens conceived a design of attacking them in their own country. This gave occasion to the oration of Demosthenes intitled Ilepi των 'Ζυμμοριων. Philip pretends that they had resolved to admit him into the confederacy which was then forming in favor of the Greeks, with whom he affects to rank, and by his expressions removes every idea of foreigner and barbarian, which are the representations that the orator frequently makes of him. — Tourreil. 3 Your ancestors objected it as an heinous crime to the fa- Philip's letter to the Athenians. 189 Pisistratus that they had led the Persian against the Greeks : and yet you are not ashamed to commit the very same action for which you were continually in- veighing against those tyrants ! But your injustice hath not stopped here. Your de- crees command me to permit Teres and Cersobleptes to reign 1 unmolested in Thrace, as being citizens of Athens. — I do not know that they were included in our treaty, that their names are to be found in the re- cords of our engagements, or that they are Athenians. But this I know, that Teres served in my army against you ; and that when Cersobleptes proposed to my am- bassadors to take the necessary oaths, in order to be particularly included in the treaty, your generals pre- vented him, by declaring him an enemy to the Athe- nians. And how is this equitable or just ; — when it serves your purposes, to proclaim him the enemy of your state ; when I am to be calumniated, to give him the title of your citizen ; when Sitalces was slain, 2 to mily, &c] The comparison which Philip makes here, be- tween the sons of Pisistratus and the orators who advised an alliance with Persia, is founded on a history too well known to be enlarged on. It is undoubtedly by no means just: for, in different conjunctures, the good citizen may em- ploy the same forces to save his country that the wicked one had formerly employed to destroy it. However, the turn he gives it was the fittest in the world to affect the people, who thought it their greatest honor to express an inveterate hatred to the Persians. 1 To permit Teres and Cersobleptes to reign, &c] History speaks only of Cersobleptes. They had suffered him to be overthrown hy Philip ; and, when they found how nearly they themselves were affected by his fall, employed those decrees to endeavor to restore him. — Tourreil. 2 When Sitalces was slain, &c] This Sitalces was the grandfather of Cersobleptes. In the beginning of the Pelo- ponnesian war he rendered the Athenians such important services, that they, by way of acknowledgement, admitted his son Sadocus into the number of their citizens. In the eighth year of this war Sitalces was killed in a battle against the Triballi. His nephew Seuthes seized the kingdom, in preju- dice of his children ; and hence became suspected of being 190 Philip's letter to the Athenians. whom you granted the privileges of your city, instantly to enter into an alliance with his murderer ; yet to en- gage in a war with me on account of Cersobleptes ? and this, when you are sensible that not one of these your adopted citizens have ever showed the least re- gard to your laws or determinations ! — But to bring this aiFair to a short issue. You granted the rights of your community 1 to Evagoras of Cyprus, 2 to Diony- sius the Syracusan, and to their descendants. Pre- vail therefore on the men who have dispossessed each of these to restore them to their dominions, and you the cause of his death. Philip argues from this suspicion as if it were an undoubted truth. — Tourreil. 1 You granted the rights of your community, &c] What idea must we form of the splendor of that city, where even kings solicited for the rank of private citizens ! The other states of Greece affected the same kind of grandeur. At a time, when ambassadors from Corinth were congratulating Alexander on his victories, they made him an offer of the free- dom of their city, as the greatest mark of honor possible. Alexander, now in the full splendor of his fortune, disdained to return them any answer but a contemptuous smile. This stung the ambassadors to the quick ; and one of them was bold enough to say, ' Know, Sir, that the great Hercules and you are the only persons whom Corinth has ever deigned to distinguish in this manner.' This softened the prince : he received them with all possible marks of respect, and accepted of a title which had been so dignified. — Tourreil. 2 To Evagoras of Cyprus.] The Athenians erected a statue to Evagoras, the elder of that name, and declared him a citi- zen of Athens, for having assisted Conon in restoring their liberty. He caused Salamis to revolt from the Persians, and subdued most part of the island of Cyprus ; but was after- wards reduced, and fell by the hands of Nicocles. His son, Evagoras the Younger, however, asserted his claim to the king- dom of Cyprus, and was supported by the Athenians against Protagoras, the successor of Nicocles. But his attempts were not successful. Protagoras supplanted him at the court of Persia, where he had been in full favor. He was cited to answer to some heads of an accusation ; and, upon his justi- fying himself, he obtained a government in Asia well worth his little kingdom. But his bad conduct soon obliged him to abdicate, and fly into Cyprus, where he perished wretchedly. — TGurreil, Philip's letter to the Athenians. 191 shall recover from me all those territories of Thrace 1 which Teres and Cersobleptes commanded. But if you have nothing to urge against those who expelled them, and yet are incessantly tormenting me, am not I justly warranted to oppose you? — I might urge many other arguments on this head, but I choose to pass them over. The Cardians, 2 I freely declare, I am determined to support, as my engagements to them are prior to our treaty, and as you refused to submit your differences with them to an arbitration, though frequently urged by me : nor have they been wanting in the like solici- tations. Should not I therefore be the basest of man- kind to abandon my allies, and to show greater re- gard for you, my inveterate opposers, than for my constant and assured adherents ? Formerly (for I cannot pass this in silence) you contented yourselves with remonstrating on the points above mentioned. But lately, on the bare complaint of the Peparethians, that they had been severely treated by me, you proceeded to such outrage, as to send orders to your general to revenge their quarrel. Yet the punishment which I inflicted was no way equal to the heinousness of their crime ; as they had in time of peace seized Halonesus ; nor could be pre- vailed on, by all my solicitations, to give up either the island or the garrison. The injuries I received from the Peparethians were never thought of ; but their pu- nishment commanded all your attention, as it afforded a pretence for accusing me ; although I did not take the island either from them or from you, but from the pirate Sostratus. If then you confess that you deli- vered it to Sostratus, you confess yourselves guilty of 1 All those territories of Thrace.] In the original, την Θράκης, δσην, &c. By the ironical pomp of this expression he sets their dominions (which were really inconsiderable) in the most contemptuous light. — Tourreil. 2 The Cardians, &c] See the preface to the oration on the State of the Chersonesus, 192 Philip's letter to the Athenians. sending out pirates : if he seized it without your con- sent, how have I injured you by taking possession of it, and by rendering it a secure harbor ? Nay, so great was my regard to your state, that I offered to bestow on you this island : but this was not agree- able to your orators: they 1 would not have it ac- cepted, but resumed. So that, if I complied with their directions, I proclaimed myself an usurper : if I still kept possession of the place, I became suspected to the people. I saw through these artifices, and therefore proposed to bring our differences to a judicial determination ; and, if sentence was given for me, to present you with the place : if in your favor, to re- store it to the people. This I frequently desired you : would not hear it : the Peparethians seized the island. What then was I to do ? Should I not punish the vio- lators of oaths ? Was I tamely to bear such an auda- cious insult ? If the island was the property of the Pe- parethians, what right have the Athenians to demand it ? If it be yours, why do you not resent their usur- pations ? So far, in short, have our animosities been carried, that, when I had occasion to despatch some vessels to the Hellespont, I was obliged to send a body of forces through the Chersonesus to defend them against your colonies, who are authorised to attack me by a decree oi Polycrates, 2 confirmed by the resolutions of your council. Nay, your general has actually invited the Byzantines to join him, and has every where publicly declared that he has your instructions to commence hostilities at the first favorable opportunity. All this could not prevail on me to make any attempt on 1 But this was- not agreeable to your orators : they, &c] Demosthenes in particular opposed their receiving a restitu- tion under the name of a present. 2 By a decree of Polycrates.] This orator had great credit at Athens, and on many occasions favored the designs of Philip. Possibly he acted otherwise on this occasion, the better to conceal his attachment ; or that he might afterwards sell his integrity at a dearer rate. — Tourreil. Philip's letter to the Athenians. 193 your city, or your navy, or your territories, although I might have had success in most, or even all of them. I chose rather to continue my solicitations to have our complaints submitted to proper umpires. And which, think ye, is the fittest decision — that of reason or of the sword ? Who are to be judges in your cause — your- selves or others ? What can be more inconsistent than that the people of Athens, who compelled the Thassi- ans and Maronites 1 to bring their pretensions to the city of Stryma to a judicial decision, should yet refuse to have their own disputes with me determined in the same manner ? particularly, as you are sensible, that if the decree be against you, still you lose nothing ; if in your favor, it puts you in possession of my con- quests. But what appears to me most unaccountable is this : when I sent you ambassadors, chosen from all the confederated powers, on purpose to be witnesses of our transactions ; when I discovered the sincerest in- tentions of entering into reasonable and just engage- ments with you, in relation to the affairs of Greece, you even refused to hear these ambassadors on that head. It was then in your power to remove all their apprehensions who suspected any danger from my designs, or to have openly convicted me of consum- mate baseness. This was the interest of the people ; but the orators could not find their account in it ; for they are a set of men to whom (if I may believe those that are acquainted with your polity) peace is war, and war is peace ; 2 as they are always sure to make a 1 Who compelled the Thassians and Maronites, &c] The first of these people inhabited an island in the Egean sea. the other a maritime place in Thrace. The Thassians had founded Stryma, according to Herodotus ; but, as it was in the neighborhood of Maronea, probably the Maronites had, in quality of protectors, or benefactors, acquired some pre- tensions to it. — Tourreil. 2 Peace is war, and war is peace, &c] Aristotle, in his Rhetor. 1. iii. c. 10, quotes this (nearly) as an example of an agreeable antithesis ; which, joined to the force, and, what is dem. :n 194 philip's letter to the Athenians. property of the generals, either by aiding their designs* or by malicious prosecutions. Then they need but throw out some scandalous invectives against persons of worth and eminence, citizens or foreigners, and they at once acquire the character of patriots among the many. I could have easily silenced their clamors against me by a little gold, and even have converted them into praises ; but I should blush to purchase your friendship from such wretches. To such insolence have they proceeded on other occasions, that they even dared to dispute my title to Amphipolis, which is founded, I presume, on reasons beyond their power to invalidate : for, if it is to belong to those who first conquered it, what can be juster than our claim ? Alexander, our ancestor, was the original sovereign ;* as appears from the golden statue 2 which he erected at more, to the order of the arguments contained in this letter, inclines me to think that Aristotle was his secretary on this occasion. But my conjecture, whether well or ill founded, does not detract from Philip in point of genius and spirit. The true talent of a king is to know how to apply the talents of others to the best advantage : and we do not want other proofs of Philip's abilities in writing ; witness his letter to Aristotle on the birth of Alexander. — Tourreil. 1 Alexander, our ancestor, was the original sovereign.] Philip asserts boldly, without giving himself much trouble even to preserve probability : for in the time of Alexander, the contemporary of Xerxes, there was no city, nor any forti- fied post in the place where Amphipolis was afterwards raised ; nor was it till thirty years after the defeat of the Per- sians that Agnon founded it.— Tourreil, 2 As appears from the golden statue, &c] Herodotus speaks of this statue, and places it near the colossal statue which the Greeks raised, according to custom, out of the Persian spoils. The proximity of these statues serves Philip as a foundation for giving his ancestors an honor which really belonged to the Greeks. Solinus mentions that Alexander, a very rich prince, made an offering of a golden statue of Apollo in the temple of Delphos, and another of Jupiter in the temple of Elis ; but not that the Persian spoils were any part of these offerings. — This Alexander, surnamed Φιλελλην, friend of Greeks, had the reputation of an able politician, but not of a good soldier or great commander. He served the Persians a long time, philip's letter to the Athenians. 195 Delphos from the first fruits of the Persian spoils taken there. But if this admits of contest, and it is to continue the property of those who were last in pos- session, it is mine by this title too (for I took it from the Lacedaemonian inhabitants, who had dispossessed you) ; l and all cities are held either by hereditary right or by the right of conquest. And yet you, who neither were the original possessors, nor are now in possession, presume to lay claim to this city, under pre- tence of having held it for some short time ; and this when you have yourselves given the strongest testi- mony in my favor ; for I frequently wrote to you on this head, and you as often acknowleged me the right- ful sovereign : and, by the articles of our late treaty, the possession of Amphipolis and your alliance were both secured to me. What title therefore can be better established ? It descended to us from our ancestors ; it is ours by conquest ; and, lastly, you yourselves have acknowleged the justice of our pretensions ; you who are wont to assert your claim even when it is not supported by right. I have now laid before you the grounds of my com- plaints. Since you have been the first aggressors ; since my gentleness and fear of offending have only served to increase your injustice, and to animate you in your attempts to distress me, I must now take up arms ; and I call the gods to witness to the justice of my cause, and the necessity of procuring for myself that redress which you deny me ! rather by force than inclination ; and, before the battle of Salamis, declared of a sudden for the Greeks. — Tourreil. 1 I took it from the Lacedaemonian inhabitants, who had dispossessed you, &c] Brasidas, the Lacedaemonian general, took Amphipolis from the republic of Athens ; and, by the assistance of Sparta, it afterwards maintained its independ- ence until it fell into the power of Philip. — Tourreil, THE ORATION ON THE LETTER. 1 Now, Athenians, it is fully evident to you all that Philip made no real peace with us, hut only deferred hostilities. When he surrendered Halus to the Phar- salians, 2 when he completed the ruin of Phocis, when he overturned all Thrace, 3 then did he really attack the state, under the concealment of false allegations and unjust pretences ; hut now he hath made a formal declaration of war hy this his letter. That we are not to look with horror on his power ; that, on the other hand, we are not to he remiss in our opposition, hut to engage our persons, our treasures, and our navies ; in one word, our whole strength, freely, in the common cause ; these are the points I would establish. 1 It must be confessed that this oration consists almost wholly of repetitions. This great man seems to have thought himself superior to all vain criticisms; and, only concerned for the safety of Athens, was in no pain about his private glory. He speaks as an orator whose end is to persuade and convince ; not as a declaimer, who seeks only to give pleasure and excite admiration : he therefore resumes those topics he had already made use of, and gives them new force by the close and lively manner in which he delivers them. — Tourreil. C Z When he surrendered Halus to the Pharsalians, &c] Halus was a town of Thessaly on the river Amphrysus. Parmenio besieged and took it ; after which Philip put the people of Pharsalia in possession of it. — Tourreil. 3 When he overturned all Thrace, &c] This is the lan- guage of an orator who, to represent Philip's outrages with the greater aggravation, takes the liberty of speaking of a part of that country as of the whole. Philip had indeed made himself master of the territories of Teres and Cersobleptes, both kings in Thrace, and allies of the Athenians : but Pau- sanias observes, that before the Romans, no one had ever made an intire conquest of Thrace. — Tourreil. ORATION OX THE LETTER. 197 First, then, Athenians, the gods we may justly regard as our strongest allies and assistants ; since, in this unjust violation of his treaty, he hath trampled on religion and despised the most solemn oaths. In the next place, those secret practices to which his greatness hath hitherto been owing, all his arts of de- ceiving, all his magnificent promises, are now quite exhausted. The Perinthians, and the Byzantines, and their confederates, 1 have at length discovered that he intends to treat them as he formerly treated the Olynthians. The Thessalians are no longer ignorant that he affects to be the master, and not the leader of his allies. The Thebans begin to see danger in his stationing a garrison at Nicsea, 2 his assuming the rank of an amphictyon, his bringing into Macedon the em- bassies from Peloponnesus, 3 and his preventing them in seizing the advantage of an alliance with the people of that country. So that, of those who have hitherto been his friends, some are now irreconcilably at war with him ; others no longer serve him with zeal and sincerity; and all have their suspicions and complaints. 1 And their confederates.] The inhabitants of Chios, Rhodes, and some other places, joined to defeat Philip's designs on Perinthus and Byzantium. — Tourrvil. 2 At Nicaea.J This town was situated near Thermopylae and was counted among the principal towns of the Locrians (Epicnemidii), the neighbors and allies of the Boeotians and Thebans. Philip made himself master of it at the time that he seized Thermopylae, under pretence of putting an end to the sacred war. — Tourreil. 3 His bringing into Macedon the embassies from Pelopon- nesus, &c] Probably this was at the time when he interested himself in the disputes between Sparta and the Argians and Messenians, as mentioned in the preface to the second Phi- lippic oration. — Strabo mentions an application of the Argians and Messenians to Philip to regulate a contest between them and Lacedaemon about their boundaries ; and Pausanias de- claims against the pride of Gallus, a Roman senator, who thought it derogated from his dignity to decide the diiferences of Lacedaemon and Argos, and disdained to meddle with a mediation which Philip had formerly not only accepted, but courted. — Tourreil. 198 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. Add to this (and it is of no small moment) that the satraps of Asia have just now forced him to raise the siege of Perinthus, by throwing in a body of hired troops : and as this must make him their enemy, 1 and as they are immediately exposed to danger, should he become master of Byzantium, they will not only readily unite their force with ours, but prevail on the king of Persia to assist us with his treasure ; who, in this particular, far exceeds all other potentates ; and whose influence in Greece is so great, that formerly, when we were engaged in a war with Lacedaemon, he never failed to give the superiority to 2 that party which he espoused : and now, when he unites with us, he will with ease subdue the power of Philip. I shall not mention, as a balance to these so consi- derable advantages, that he hath taken the opportunity of the peace to make himself master of many of our territories, our ports, and other like conveniences : for it is observable, that where affection joins, and one common interest animates the confederating powers, there the alliance is never to be shaken ; but where subtle fraud, and passions insatiable, and perfidy, and 1 As this must make him their enemy.] This proved an exact prediction of what happened some time after. Alex- ander, in his letter to Darius, alleges, as one of the principal subjects of their rupture, the powerful succors which Pe- rinthus received from the Persian satraps. Arrian. 1. i. — Tourreil. 2 He never failed to give the superiority to, &c] History represents the king of Persia as the supreme ai'biter of the fate of Athens and Lacedaemon during the whole time of their quarrels. Darius Nothus joined with the Lacedaemonians ; and Lysander their general destroyed Athens. Artaxerxes Mnemon protected Conon, the Athenian general, and imme- diately Athens resumed her former splendor. Lacedaemon afterwards joined in alliance "with the great king ; and this intimidated the Athenians, and obliged them to seek for peace. Artaxerxes dictated the articles of it, threatening to declare against those who should refuse to subscribe to them. Athens instantly obeyed. Thus it was that a foreign power lorded it over the Greeks, and by means of their divisions had the absolute command of their fate. — Tourreil, ORATION ON THE LETTER. 199 violence have formed it (and these are the means which he hath used), the least pretence, the slightest accident, gives it the fatal shock, and in an instant it is utterly dissolved . And, from repeated observations, I am convinced, Athenians, that Philip not only wants the confidence and affection of his allies ; but, even in his own kingdom, he is by no means happy in that well-established regularity, and those intimate attach- ments, which might be expected. The power of Mace- don, indeed, as an ally, may have some eifect ; but, if left to itself, is insufficient ; and, when compared with his pompous enterprises, quite contemptible. And then his wars, his expeditions, and those exploits which have given him this splendor, are the very means of rendering it yet weaker : for you are not to imagine, Athenians, that Philip and his subjects have the same desires. He is possessed with the love of glory; they wish only for security. The object of his passion must be attended with danger ; and they but ill endure a banishment from their children, parents, wives ; a life worn out with toils, and exposed to continual perils in his cause. Hence we may learn how his subjects in general are affected to their prince. But then his guards, and officers of his foreign troops : these you will find have some military reputation : yet they live in greater terrors than the obscure and mean. These are exposed only to their avowed enemies : the others have more to fear from calumny and flattery than in the field. The one, when engaged in battle, but share the com- mon danger : the others, besides their part, and this not the least of that danger, have also their private apprehensions from the temper of their prince. Among the many, when one hath transgressed, his punishment is proportioned to his crime : the others, when they have most eminently distinguished themselves, are then, in open defiance of all decency, treated with the greatest insolence and disdain. That these are incontestible truths, no reasonable man can doubt : for they who have lived with him 200 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. assure us that his ambition is so insatiable, that he will have the glory of every exploit ascribed wholly to himself ; and is much more incensed against such commanders as have performed any thing worthy of honor, than against those whose misconduct hath ruin- ed his enterprises. But, if this be the case, how is it that they have persevered so long in their attachment to his cause ? It is for this reason, Athenians, because success throws a shade on all his odious qualities (for nothing veils men's faults from observation so effectu- ally as success) : but let any accident happen, and they will all be perfectly discovered. Just as in our bodies ; while we are in health our inward defects lie concealed ; but, when we are attacked by a disorder, then they are all sensible, in the vessels, in the joints, or wherever we are affected : so in kingdoms and governments of every kind, while their arms are vic- torious their disorders escape the common observa- tion ; but a reverse of fortune (and this he must ex- perience, as he hath taken up a burden much beyond his strength) never fails to lay them open to every eye. If there be a man among you, Athenians, who re- gards Philip as a powerful and formidable enemy, on account of his good fortune, such cautious foresight bespeaks a truly prudent mind. Fortune, indeed, does greatly influence, or rather, has the intire direction of all human affairs ; but there are many reasons to ex- pect much more from the fortune of Athens than that of Philip. We can boast of an authority in Greece, derived from our ancestors, not only before his days, but before any one prince of Macedon. They all were tributaries of Athens : Athens never paid that mark of subjection to any people. In the next place, the more inviolably we have adhered to piety and justice, the greater may be our confidence in the favor of the gods. But, if this be the case, how is it that in the late war his arms had such superior fortune ? This is the cause (for I will speak with undaunted freedom) ; he takes the field himself; endures its toils, and shares ORATION ON THE LETTER. 201 its dangers : no favorable incident escapes him ; no season of the year retards him. While we (for the truth must not be concealed) are confined within our walls, in perfect inactivity, delaying, and voting, and wandering through the public places in search of news. Can any thing better deserve the name of new, than that one sprung from Macedon should insult Athens, and dare to send such letters as you have just heard recited ? that he should have his armies and his orators in pay ? (yes, I call Heaven to witness, there are those among us who do not blush to live for Philip, who have not sense to perceive that they are selling all the interests of the state, all their own real in- terests for a trifling pittance!) — while we never once think of preparing to oppose him ; are quite averse to hiring troops, and want resolution to take up arms our- selves. No wonder, therefore, that he had some ad- vantage over us in the late war : on the contrary, it is really surprising that we, who are quite regardless of all that concerns our cause, should expect to conquer him who leaves no means omitted that may assure his success. Let these things be duly weighed, Athenians, and deeply impressed on your minds. Consider that it is not at your option whether to profess peace or no; for he hath now made a declaration of war, and hos- tilities are commenced. Spare no expenses, public or private : let a general ardor appear for taking arms : appoint abler commanders than you- have hitherto chosen ; for it must not be imagined that the men who, from a state of prosperity, have reduced us to these difficulties, will again extricate us, and restore us to our former splendor : nor is it to be expected that, if you continue thus supine, your cause will find other assertors. Think how infamous it is that you, whose ancestors were exposed to such incessant toils and so great dangers, in the war with Lacedagmon, should refuse to engage with resolution in defence of that rightful power which they transmitted to us ! How shameful that this Macedonian should have a soul so 202 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. daring that, to enlarge his empire, his whole body is covered with wounds ; and that the Athenians, they whose hereditary character it is to yield to none, but to give law to all their adversaries, are now supine and enervated, insensible to the glory of their fathers, and regardless of the interests of their country ! That I may not detain you, my sentence is this : that we should instantly prepare for war, and call on the other states of Greece to join in the common cause, not by words, but by actions ; for words, if not attended with actions, are of no force. Our professions particularly have always had the less weight, as we are confessedly superior to the rest of Greece in prompt address and excellence of speaking. CONCLUSION. Having thus far traced the progress of Philip's attempts on Greece, it may be no improper conclusion to continue the account down to his final triumph over the liberty of that country. We have seen the Athenians at last exerting themselves in a manner worthy of that renowned people : and Philip now returning from his Scythian expedition, in which he had en- gaged when foiled in his attempts on Perinthus and Byzan- tium, found himself considerably distressed and harassed by the hostilities of Athens. To extricate himself from these difficulties he formed a bold and subtle project of entering Greece ; and so laid his scheme as to make the Athenians themselves the instruments of his designs. By his intrigues he procured ./Eschines to be sent as their deputy to the council of amphictyons. This was in reality of the highest consequence: for no sooner had the deputy taken his seat but a question was moved, whether the Lo- crians of Amphissa had not been guilty of sacrilege in plough- ing the fields of Cirrha, contiguous to the temple of Delphos? Sentiments were divided. ^Eschines proposed a view : this was decreed ; and, when the amphictyons came to take it, the Locrians, jealous of their property, and no doubt inflamed by those who were in the secret of the whole design, fell on those venerable persons, and obliged them to consult their safety by flight. Such an outrage was judged to demand the severest punishment; and it was decreed that all Greece should join in inflicting it. But when the army came to the place of ren- dezvous, their appearance gave no great prospect of success. His agents and partisans then rose, and by their artful repre- sentations prevailed on the amphictyons to declare Philip general of the Grecian forces, and to invite him to execute their decrees. As the event was expected, his army was ready. He marched into Greece ; but, instead of attacking the Locrians, he immediately seized Elataea, a city of Phocis, of the utmost moment, as it awed Boeotia, and opened him a passage into Attica. This step struck Greece with astonishment. Athens par- ticularly received the news with inexpressible confusion. The 204 CONCLUSION. people ran dismayed to an assembly, and called on their usual counsellors to give their opinion in this critical juncture. De- mosthenes rose, and his eloquence was exerted to animate their drooping courage ; by his advice ambassadors were sent through Greece, and particularly to Thebes, to engage the states to rise at once to oppose the Macedonian torrent before it bore down all. Demosthenes himself headed the embassy to the Thebans. He found a powerful antagonist in Python, Philip's agent : yet, in spite of his remonstrances, he so fired that people, that they at once forgot all the favors Philip had conferred on them, and joined against him with the most cordial zeal. The confederates met at Eleusis. The Pythian priestess uttered the most terrible predictions, and threatened them with the severest fate ; but Demosthenes took care to prevent the effect of this by treating her oracles with contempt ; which he declared were dictated by Philip, and calculated to serve his interests. This prince now saw all his arts defeated ; and therefore resolved on an engagement, as his last resource. He ad- vanced to Chaeronea, in the neighborhood of which city the confederates were incamped, under the command of Chares and Lysicles, two Athenian generals, by no means worthy of commanding so illustrious an army. The next day by sun- rise both armies were in the field. Alexander, then but nineteen years old, surrounded by a number of experienced officers, commanded the left wing of the Macedonians. He began the onset, and was bravely opposed by the Sacred Band of the Thebans. On the right Philip himself commanded, where the Athenians made their attack with such vigor as obliged his soldiers to give ground. The advantage was pur- sued with the most imprudent and intemperate heat : but, while the Athenians were rushing on without any order, Philip bore down on them with his phalanx, and obtained an easy, though a bloody victory. At the same time, and with a like effusion of blood, Alexander triumphed over the Thebans. Thus were the confederates totally overthrown, and the liberty of Greece lost for ever. THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES ON OCCASIONS OF PUBLIC DELIBERATION. TO WHICH IS ADDED, THE ORATION OF DINARCHUS AGAINST DEMOSTHENES. PREFACE. The Public Orations of Demosthenes here presented to the reader, are not indeed of the same interesting nature with those which precede them, but such as have been always deemed well worthy the regards of the learned : and, if we may ever hope to gain an attention to the remains of this eloquent statesman, we must look for it in Britain, where a love of liberty possesses its inhabitants, and a freedom of debate, the natural consequence of a freedom of constitution, is held sacred and inviolable ; where opposite opinions, accidental abuses and corruptions, various plans of policy, contentions for power, and many other causes, conspire to animate its counsellors, and call forth their abilities ; where a profusion of glittering ornament, gay flights of fancy, and figurative eloquence, do bv no means form the character of national eloquence : but simplicity and severity of reasoning, force and energy, eminently distinguish the speakers of every kind from those of the neighboring nations : and where, above all, a warm benevolence of heart, con- fessedly the glory of its citizens, may at some times engage their attention to the interests and concerns of a people who experienced the vicissitudes of integrity and corruption, happiness and misfortune ; who were 208 PREFACE. disgraced or renowned, just as their councils were weak or well directed. The history of the wars, negotiations, government, and policy, of the conquests and defeats, of the pro- gress and declension of all ancient states, is universally allowed to be a study highly delightful and interesting to the ingenuous mind. The harangues and counsels of their statesmen are no inconsiderable part of this history. Nor can it be deemed an useless or unafFecting occupation to inquire what were the arguments used in a free assembly, on any occasions where the public interests were concerned ; what were the topics urged to awaken the indolence, or to check the violence of the people — to elevate their hopes, or to alarm their apprehensions-^to correct their prejudices, and to re- form their abuses ; — what schemes of policy were pro- posed, what measures suggested — what artifices were used, what arguments urged by contending parties to establish their power and interest— what motives were proposed to engage the community in war, or to in- spire the people with pacific dispositions, to prompt them to form, or to dissolve alliances — to extend their views to the interests and concerns of foreigners, or to confine their regards to their own security. These, I say, and such like, are by no means unworthy of attention ; and these we find in a translation of an ancient orator, executed with any tolerable care and fidelity, however it may be discovered by the learned reader inferior to the illustrious original, in dignity of expression, and excellence of style and compo- sition. Or, if we consider the remains of an ancient orator^ PREFACE. 209 in a critical view, merely as the productions of art and genius, it can be no unworthy curiosity to en- deavor at gaining a just, though faint idea of that excellence which, we are told, had such wonderful effects. The appearance of a great public speaker, and the power of his eloquence, are so feelingly described by Cicero, that we may be certain the piece was copied for himself, and from what he ac- counted his greatest glory. ' Give me the orator/ says he, ' who can produce the following effects : when it is once known that he is to speak, let there be the utmost impatience to secure places in the court, which must be instantly crowded : let all be hurry and eagerness ; the clerks and officers must fly up and down with an obliging solicitude to provide seats and accommodations for the assembly. The auditors must press forward in a crowded circle. Let the judge be roused to the utmost attention. When the speaker rises the audience must command silence ; all must be hushed, till some marks of approbation are extorted, and expressions of wonder break out at frequent in- tervals. If he would inspire them with mirth, the smile must be universal — if with sorrow, their tears must instantly flow. So that a person at a distance, though he does not know directly what piece is acting, must yet be witness of the powerful impression, and assured that some great and favorite actor is on the stage. He that has such power we may pronounce the truly complete speaker: as we have heard of Pericles, as of Hyperides, as of iEschines ; but chiefly of Demosthenes himself/ 1 1 Yolo hoc oratori contingat, ut cum auditum sit eum esse DEM. Ο 210 PREFACE. And if Demosthenes appeared with so great splendor in his judicial pleadings, his speeches in public deliberations seem to have been attended with cir- cumstances still more honorable, and with proofs of his abilities still more forcible. He generally acted in scenes of turbulence and public confusion. The speakers of the opposite party had first labored to prepossess the people against the sentiments he was to deliver : to this their own corrupted inclinations con- spired, and vengeance was denounced against all that should dare to control them. In the midst of clamor and commotion the orator rises : his adversaries dread him, and endeavor to drown his remonstrances in tumult. By degrees he gains a patient audience. Opposition is checked, dismayed, and silenced. His countrymen hang on him as on some oracle, that de- nounces destruction on their vices and misconduct, and points out the only way to security. They feel their own weakness and unworthiness ; they acknow- lege the justice of his severity ; they resign themselves to his direction, and rush enthusiastically forward to the dangerous field of glory which he points out to them. Such were generally the immediate impressions, though not always permanent and effectual. dicturum, locus in subselliis occupetur, compleatur tribunal ; gratiosi scribae sint in dando et cedendo loco, corona mul- tiplex, judex erectus ; cum surgit is qui dicturus sit, signifi- cetur a corona silentium, deinde crebrae assentationes, multae admirationes ; risus, cum velit ; cum velit, fletus ; ut qui hasc procul videat, etiamsi quid agatur nesciat, placere tamen, et in scena esse Roscium intelligat. Haec cui contingant, eum scito Attice dicere : ut de Pericle audivimus, ut de Hy- peride, ut de ^Eschine ; de ipso quidem Demosthene maxime. — Cic. in Brut, PREFACE. 211 At other times he appeared when an universal terror and dismay had seized the assembly. When the enemy seemed to be at their gates, when destruction appeared inevitable, and despair had buried the faculties of those speakers in a mournful silence who, in times of less danger, were ever forward to take the lead ; — then did their country (as Demosthenes himself describes the solemn scene) call on her sons to aid and support her by their counsels in this affecting hour of distress. But, in a case of extreme difficulty, who can dare to propose any measures whose event must be precarious, where ill success may be imputed to the first adviser, and be severely avenged as his crime ? — Neither the dangerous situation of affairs, nor the well-known in- justice and capriciousness of his countrymen, could deter Demosthenes. He is known, on such occasions, to have risen in the assembly, and, by his appearance only to have inspired his countrymen with some con- fused expectation of relief. He has awakened them from their despair, and gradually calmed their appre- hensions ; he has dispelled the mist of terror, and dif- fused bright hopes and cheerful expectations through the assembly. Confidence and resolution, magnanimity and courage, indignation and martial rage, vigorous efforts and generous contempt of danger, have fully confessed the irresistible force and energy of the speaker. Such effects were a full reward for the patient assiduity with which Demosthenes labored to qualify himself for a public speaker and leader; not by weigh- ing words, culling rhetorical flowers, and arranging periods ; but by collecting a large treasure of political 212 PREFACE. knowlege, with which his most early performances appear to be enriched : by learning and habituating himself to strict and solid reasoning ; by studying the human heart, and the means of affecting it ; by ac- quiring from constant practice a promptness which no difficulties could embarrass, an acuteness which no opposition, however subtle and unexpected, could dis- concert ; and a copiousness inexhaustible — prepared for all emergencies — ever flowing, and ever abundantly supplied from its rich and bountiful source. 6 Eloquence/ says an admired writer, 1 ' must flow like a stream that is fed by an abundant spring, and not spout forth a little frothy stream on some gaudy day, and remain dry for the rest of the year/ Such was the eloquence of all those illustrious ancients that history has celebrated ; and such, in every free state, must be the eloquence which can really bring advantage to the public or honor to the possessor. The voice may be tuned to the most musical perfection ; the action may be modelled to the utmost grace and propriety ; expressions may be chosen of energy, delicacy, and majesty; the period may be taught to flow with all the ease and elegance of harmonious modulation : yet these are but inferior parts of genuine eloquence ; by no means the first and principal, much less the sole objects of regard. The weapon of the orator should be bright and glittering indeed ; but this should arise from the keenness of its edge : it should be managed with grace, but with such a grace as is an indication of consummate skill and strength. 1 Lord Bolingbroke, * Spirit of Patriotism.' PREFACE. 213 We are told of a Grecian general who, when he travelled and viewed the country round him, revolved in his mind how an army might be there drawn up to the greatest advantage ; how he could best defend himself, if attacked from such a quarter ; how advance with greatest security ; how retreat with least danger. Something similar to this should be the practice and study of a public speaker : and thus was Demosthenes for the most part employed in his days of retirement and severe application. It is indeed insinuated by his enemy l that he was more solicitous about rounding a period than preserving his country. But this is an object fitted rather to the minute regards of such a speaker as the noble author quoted above describes with so just a contempt, whose whole abilities consist in providing a slender fund for some particular occa- sion, when perhaps a weak or wicked cause is to be graced and ornamented ; who lays on his thin covering with the utmost care and most scrupulous nicety ; which dazzles for a moment, till the first blast of true forcible eloquence puifs away the flimsy produce of his labors, and leaves all beneath in its native condi- tion of deformity and shame. But to return from this digression. Ancient elo- quence in general, and that of Demosthenes in parti- cular, we are told had wonderful eifects. The im- pression was strong and violent ; the consequences, sometimes, of the utmost moment. But by reading the orator in a modern language, how fully and justly soever it might be possible to express the genius and 1 JEschines in Ctesiph. 214 PREFACE. general spirit of the original, or by consulting the original itself, are we always affected with the like impressions ? or, can we always trace the artifice, or feel the force which produced effects so magnificently described ? By no means. And this is partly to be imputed to the fault of the reader, partly to a diffe- rence of circumstances. He who applies himself to the study of Demosthenes after a long intercourse with writers of a different cha- racter ; who hath been accustomed to pointed periods, phrases of affected delicacy, fanciful allusions, figures and images calculated to dazzle and delight the eye rather than to illuminate and cast the full glory of evidence round simple truth ; he, I say, must throw by the author in disgust, or labor through him in a cold and lifeless progress, which must serve but to fatigue and disappoint him. He whose taste is ever so justly formed to relish simplicity and true manly grace, must yet read the orator to great disadvantage if intirely a stranger to the spirit of free uncontrolled debate. Liberty (if we may so speak) hath its own ideas and its own language, whose force cannot always be felt, or even its meaning rightly and thoroughly conceived by strangers. Tourreil, the French interpreter of Demosthenes, and Lucchesini, the Italian commentator, seem to have been instances of what is here advanced. The first appears to have had no just taste for the simplicity of modest Attic elegance. He dressed out his author in all that finery to which he annexed the notions of grace and beauty, and presented him to his countrymen tur- gid and inflated, incumbered and disgraced by adven- PREFACE. 215 titious ornaments. The latter lived and wrote in a country where the voice of liberty is but seldom and faintly heard ; where political transactions are of a confined nature, and not generally discussed in bold and spirited debate ; where parties are seldom formed, public dissensions seldom raised ; no grand interests boldly asserted ; no political measures freely censured. And the effect seems to have been this ; the commen- tator appears shocked at the free, lively, and animated excursions of Demosthenes : he endeavors to reduce him within more sober bounds, and is sometimes per- haps misled by trying his expressions by the rules of cold precision. Passages might be produced to war- rant these observations ; but I shall content myself with just hinting at one, of which notice has been taken in the oration on the Classes, and which seems to prove what may be deemed the boldest assertion, that Demosthenes cannot be always even understood but in a country of liberty. ' I am sensible/ says the orator, ' that the Persian is the common enemy of the Greeks/ To the Italian this assertion was strange and unaccountable, at a time when the two nations were at peace, and when treaties actually subsisted between them. History was ransacked and tortured for some plausible pretence or grounds for this extraordinary declaration. But in Britain such pains were needless : there, no idea is more familiar than that of a natural and hereditary enemy* The reader's taste, however, may be strictly just ; he may be well acquainted with the sentiments and language of liberty ; he may be duly instructed in the 216 pheface. history of an ancient people ; he may suffer their affairs and interests to make a lively and forcible impression on his mind : yet still, though well prepared for the perusal of an orator, he cannot always perceive his whole force and artifice ; as, at this distance of time, facts may appear trivial and arguments inconclusive, which fired every imagination, and silenced all oppo- sition in the assembly to which they were originally addressed. We know, in general, the genius, cha- racter, and temper of a people whom the orator may have endeavored to affect : we can, therefore, in ge- neral, conceive, and must acknowlege his force and delicacy, the propriety and energy of his representa- tions : they must please and surprise us, and some- times affect and warm us ; and such impressions suffi- ciently reward our attention. But in particular pas- sages the traces of excellence must be faint, or perhaps totally effaced ; where the art and force of the speaker consist in a judicious attention to particular circum- stances of times, occasions, conjunctures of aifairs, and dispositions of the auditors. A modern reader is struck with some particular argument or topic ; he is perhaps disappointed to find that it is not extended and enlarged on. But it is possible, nay, very likely, that the disposition of those who heard it required but a single hint, and that a minute detail would have tired and offended. We read, that such a particular stroke of eloquence had wonderful effects ; that such a passage raised a general acclamation, affected, trans- ported, or terrified : we examine this passage by the general rules of criticism, and we pronounce it inade- PREFACE. 217 quate to the wonderful effects ascribed to it. But here we seem to confine our regards to our own senti- ments, our own passions, and our own situations ; we argue from our own feelings to those of other persons in circumstances totally different. Cicero, by intro- ducing the mention of the battle of Pharsalia, and the danger which Caesar there encountered, in a manner artful and lively indeed, but such as by no means indi- cates a surprising or singular elevation of genius, is said to have made this hero turn pale and tremble. And why should we doubt of the reality of these effects ? We can read of this battle of Pharsalia with- out emotion : but it was a more important object to a Roman ; still more affecting to the soldier who fought in that famous, field ; but to the general who there gained the victory, and by this victory rescued himself from destruction and obtained the sovereignty of the world, what object can be conceived more capable of alarming his passions and filling his mind with the most turbulent emotions ? But it may be said, that however true the general position, yet the instance brought to illustrate it is but unhappily chosen ; for that in this case Caesar's emo- tion was but pretended. — ' He was himself an accom- plished orator, and knew all the windings of the art : he courted Cicero's friendship ; he saw where his va- nity and his weakness lay : with perfect address, there- fore, he played back the orator's art on himself : his concern was feigned.' i — With deference to the author here quoted, I must declare that I cannot think this 1 See Brown's Essay on Ridicule. 218 PREFACE. suggestion well warranted, no more than I can suppose that Octavia, the sister of Augustus, meant to pay a compliment to the poet, and but pretended concern when she appeared to faint at the recital of the famous passage in the sixth iEneid : Heu, miserande puer ! si qua fata aspera rumpas, Tu Marcellus eris. If Caesar was too well acquainted with the arts of eloquence, and of consequence too well armed against them to receive any real impression from the efforts of Cicero, this orator, who was equally well acquainted with those arts, the proper occasions of exerting them, and the effects to be expected from them, could not well be deceived by any unnatural semblance of emo- tion. I say unnatural semblance, because it is sup- posed that such emotion, in such a case, is contrary to reason and the nature of things ; and therefore Cicero, amidst all his vanity, must have seen and despised the injudicious artifice. The truth seems to be, that in minds the most en- lightened the passions frequently retain a considerable degree of strength, and when kindled by some touch of the orator's address, the combustion is too sudden, as well as too violent, to be effectually suppressed by reason. At least the ancients seem persuaded of this ; for whatever may be said of eloquence being made for the multitude and the forum, 1 yet, when they addressed themselves, not to the populace, but to select and re- fined judges, they were by no means (as Quintilian 1 Cicero in Brut. PREFACE. 219 expresses it) ζ quadam eloquentiae frugalitate contenti, ac manum semper intra pallium continentes/ On the contrary, some of the noblest and boldest efforts of art were exerted, some of the sublimest flights of genius indulged on such occasions. To be convinced of this we need but turn to any of the judicial pleadings of Cicero. Take the beautiful passage in an oration against Verres, quoted by Mr. Hume in his elegant Essay on Eloquence : or, read the following passage in the oration for Milo : * On you, ye Albanian mounts and groves, on you I call. Bear witness for me, ye ruined altars of Alba (equal in sanctity to the Roman shrines), destroyed, and buried under the profane edi- fices raised by his outrageous sacrilege. Your influ- ence, your power it was which then prevailed. Your divinity then triumphed, and completed its vengeance on all his profanations. And thou, Ο holy Jove, didst then, at length, look down from thy mount; then didst thou execute thy justice on the wretch whose wickedness and abandoned impurity had so often pol- luted thy lakes, thy groves, thy boundaries. To thee — to thee, and in thy presence, did he pay the late but justly merited punishment/ * That the circumstances 1 Vos enim jam, Albani tumuli atque luci, vos, inquam, im- ploro atque obtestor, vosque Albanorum obruta? arae, sacro- rum populi Romani sociae et aequales, quas ille praeceps amen- tia, caesis prostrfytisque sanctissimis lucis, substructionum insanis molibus oppresserat : vestrae turn arae, vestrae religio- nes viguerunt, vestra vis valuit, quam ille omni scelere pol- luerat : tuque ex tuo edito monte Latiari, sancte Jupiter, cu- jus ille lacus, nemora, finesque saepe omni nefario stupro et scelere macularat, aliquando ad eum puniendum oculos ape- ruisti ; vobis illae, vobis, vestro in conspectu serae sed justae tamen, et debitae pcenae solutae sunt. 220 PREFACE. of the trial contributed to animate the orator's style is certain, as he himself informs us. 1 Yet, amidst all his enthusiasm, the consummate master must have had a due regard to propriety. He could not have for- gotten that he addressed himself immediately to a few- selected judges. And if such elevated strains of elo- quence sometimes failed of success in select assemblies, and before judges of penetration and refinement, the game may be observed of sober, solid, and just argu- ment. Modern times are acquainted with refined as- semblies, in which aifairs of highest moment are com- monly discussed ; and if the spirited and impassioned orator does not on all occasions obtain a majority in such assemblies, they do not always impute it to the superior strength of reason that fortifies his hearers against the assaults of eloquence. In poetry, the impression made on the hearer is so far from being lessened or defeated by his refine- ment and understanding, that it is really heightened and increased in proportion to the accuracy of his judgment and the delicacy of his sentiments. And although the man of sense, who in this case resigns himself up to the pleasing delusion, guards and arms himself against all artifice — in that of eloquence, it might not be difficult to show how this vigilance is sometimes defeated and eluded. But the points which I am at present concerned to establish are no more than these : That the wonderful eiFects ascribed to ancient eloquence are not mistaken or exaggerated : that its force was really extraordinary, and its im- 1 In Brut. PREFACE. 221 pressions in proportion violent ; but that the reader who applies himself to study the remains of an ancient orator, and of Demosthenes in particular, may some- times be disappointed in his sanguine expectations of delight, if he hath been long accustomed to composi- tions of less intrinsic worth, though of more glittering ornament ; if he is in general unused to the energy of free debate ; if he is unacquainted with the history and character of the people to whom the orator addressed himself; or if he precipitately judges of the real force and efficacy of his eloquence from his own sentiments and feelings, without making the necessary allowance for a difference of times, circumstances, passions, and dispositions. He who will not acknowlege that some particular traces of that exquisite skill which our orator possessed are now become faint and obscure, pays him a vene- ration rather too implicit : and he who does not still perceive and feel 'his rapid harmony exactly adjusted to the sense ; his vehement reasoning without any ap- pearance of art ; his disdain, anger, boldness, freedom, involved in a continued stream of argument/ 1 may justly suspect his own deficiency in point of taste : nor is it any indication of a superior strength of reason if he does not sometimes accompany the orator in those impetuous passions and exalted sentiments which ani- mate his compositions. It is a common observation, how much an orator is assisted by the charms of action or pronunciation ; which Demosthenes is said to have regarded as the 1 See Hume's Essay on Eloquence. 222 PREFACE. chief part, or rather the whole of his art : and how much the loss of these must diminish his lustre ! Yet there are other advantages which such a speaker de- rives from subjecting his works to a private review, to a strict, dispassionate, and reiterated .study. The justness of his reasoning, the soundness of his policy, the worth and elevation of his sentiments — and these are the really valuable parts of an orator — are thus brought to a new and severe trial : and if, on such a trial, these excellences preserve their weight and lus- tre, this is an additional proof that they are real and intrinsic. What Longinus observes of the sublime is equally applicable to all the excellences of an orator ; that if they are really genuine, we must form the higher ideas of them the more frequently and attentively they are considered ; and that the true and indisputable proof of a writer's value arises from the consenting approbation of all ages, professions, and inclinations. This last and final sanction our orator's merit has received from private examination ; though at this time but a part of his merit can thus appear. And hence, again, we may form a judgment of the force and influence of his living eloquence. If he still com- mands our approbation, and even warms our hearts, how must the Rhodians have been aifected when iEschines read his celebrated performance to that people ! And if they were strongly aifected, how must the speaker himself have shaken and transported the souls of his hearers in the Athenian assembly ! It may be said, that the excellence of this author, in the original, is a point too plain to require proof or illustration ; that it is universally acknowleged, and PREFACE. 223 has been the subject of repeated praise ; but that this consummate excellence of the original necessarily in- spires a prejudice against all attempts to copy it in another language : that such attempts are presumptu- ous ; the learned despise them, others are deceived by them, and made to think with less honor of the great author than his own genuine undisguised merit must ever obtain. I could wish that this objection could be easily eluded, and that I could persuade myself that the present work did not enforce and confirm it. How- ever, something I presume to say in apology for such attempts, and for the manner in which they are exe- cuted. It has been already observed that the sentiments and arguments of an ancient orator may be conveyed to the reader in a translation executed with tolerable care and fidelity. To this we may add the manner and order in which he arranges his thoughts — no in- considerable part of his address and artifice. And surely the attention of the reader unskilled in ancient languages is rather liberally rewarded by these ad- vantages ; although the learned may despise the in- glorious toil of the translator, whose composition dis- graces his noble original : yet, even in this point, should our attempts be judged with some degree of candor and indulgence. And ancient language, even were it not superior to our own, must ever be read with favorable prejudice : antiquity renders it respect- able and venerable. Its sounds and phrases are not de- based by common and familiar use, but preserve their dignity in a stately and solemn retirement. Longinus 224 PREFACE. speaks of some vulgar phrases to be found in Demo- sthenes ; but all such now lie concealed ; and unless the image conveyed be low, nothing can appear in the language humbled or debased ; all flows on in one equal course of decency, grandeur, and dignity. But this is not the case in our own language. Familiarity tempts us to regard it with less reverence. Its phrases and expressions are in constant use ; and what we hear and pronounce every day cannot easily endure a com- parison with a language to whose very name we have been long taught to annex the ideas of grandeur and excellence. If in our composition we adhere scrupu- lously to the simple and natural form, the pomp and dignity of the original may seem to be lost and de- graded. In order to avoid this extreme, we sometimes recur to a grave and labored style, transpositions un- natural, and periods distorted — an unpardonably awk- ward substitute to ease and graceful majesty. And scarcely can we steer our course so happily but that we must be in danger of touching, or appearing to touch, on one or other of these dangerous extremes. But our difficulties appear stronger, and our claim to indulgence more just, when the real excellence of the ancient languages is considered. The Greek, in particular, is superior even to that of the Romans in point of sweetness, delicacy, and copiousness. This is the judgment of the great Roman critic ; l and, with liim, an English translator may still say, 'He that ex- pects from us the grace and delicacy of the Attic style, must give us the same sweetness, and an equal copi- 1 Quintil. Inst. Orat. 1. xii. c. 10. PREFACE. 225 ousness of language.' 1 To acknowlege tins inferiority in our own language is not to derogate from its real merit. It is a weapon keen and forcible, if carefully preserved, and wielded with due skill. But he who should attempt to follow the great writers of antiquity in every maze and winding, through which their ad- vantages enabled them, and their circumstances ob- liged them to direct their course ; he who should labor through all the straits of a minute and scrupulous imi- tation, to express their words and dispose their periods exactly in the same form and order, must be equally inattentive to the genius of the language from which he copies and to that of his own ; equally inattentive to the excellences of this, and to its comparative de- fects. At least this is a state of subjection to which the present translator thought it by no means necessary to stoop : and, if in this he should be judged to have taken too great a liberty, he flies for shelter to the au- thority of Quintilian, 2 who compares the copy formed from the outward traces and aspect of the original to those airy phantoms which were supposed by Epicurus to issue from all bodies. If it may be thought a vio- lation of the Attic simplicity that he hath sometimes ventured on an epithet, a metaphor, or some other figurative form of speech to express what is natural 1 Quare qui a Latinis exigit illam gratiam sermonis Attici, det mihiin loquendo eandem jucunditatem, et parem copiam. 2 Nee — sufficiat imaginem virtutis effingere, et solam,ut sic dicerem, cutem, vel potius illas Epicuri figuras quas e sum- mis corporibus dicit effluere. Hoc autem illis accidit, qui non introspeciis penitus virtutibus, ad primum se velut aspectum orationis aptarunt, et cum iis felicissime cessit imitatio, ver- bis atque numeris sunt non multum differentes, 1. x. c. 2. DEM. Ρ 226 PREFACE. and unadorned in the original, let it be remembered, that in this he confines himself within much stricter bounds than the same great critic prescribes to those who translated from Greek into Latin. In such works he tells us, ζ Figuras — quibus maxime ornatur oratio mult as ac varias excogitandi etiam necessitas quae- dam est : quia plerumque a Graecis Komana dissen- tiunt/ 1. x. c. 5. And in imitations of every kind in a language inferior to that of the original, in order to supply the defect his rule is this : ' Oratio translatio- num nitore illuminanda/ 1. xii. c. Ϊ0. To exhibit Demosthenes such as he would have appeared in an English assembly similar to that of Athens should certainly be the scope of his translator. Though he may be unfortunate in his aim, a voluntary deviation would be unpardonable : and an English Demosthenes would undoubtedly attend to the genius of his language. To express his dignity and majesty he would not assume a constrained, uncouth and per- plexed air. He would have confined himself within the modest bounds of Atticism, but of English Atti- cism (if the expression may be allowed). He would have adopted a greater share of ornament, because a greater share of ornament would not be inconsistent with neatness, decent elegance, and manly dignity. If it be still observed that our language has been corrupted, and the cause of learning disgraced by translation, it might be easy to show in what cases this has been and must be the consequence ; and, that an attempt to copy the excellences of ancient writers of renown does not necessarily fall under this censure. Or if the meanness and insignificance of the employ- PREFACE. 227 merit should be urged, a translator might observe in the fulness of his vanity, that the great Roman orator himself thought it not beneath his dignity to publish his translations from Plato, Xenophon, and Demo- sthenes. But as to the utility of this employment, it need not be pointed out or defended to the learned. As to its dignity, the translator is not at all solicitous to maintain it. He is ready to acknowlege that the pittance of reputation to be acquired in this way is but trifling and insignificant, if he is so fortunate as to meet with that candor and indulgence which have hitherto favored his attempts. THE ORATION ON THE CLASSES : PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF DIOTIMUS, THE THIRD YEAR OF THE HUNDRED AND SIXTH OLYMPIAD. INTRODUCTION. The title of this oration is taken from one particular part of it, in which the speaker enlarges on the method of dividing the citizens into ΊΖυμμοριαι, or Classes, in order to raise the supplies, and to answer the exigences of the state. The de- sign of it was to allay an extravagant ferment which had been raised at Athens, and to recommend caution and circumspec- tion, at a time when danger was apprehended. Artaxerxes Ochus, king of Persia, had been for some time employed in making preparations for war. These were represented to the Athenians as the effect of a design formed against Greece, and against their state in particular. They were conscious of having given this prince sufficient umbrage, by the assist- ance which their general Chares had afforded to some of his rebellious subjects: they were intirely possessed by the notions of their own importance, and therefore readily list- ened to their suggestions who endeavored to persuade them that some important blow was meditated against their domi- nions. An assembly of the people was convened ; and the general temper both of the speakers and auditors is distinctly marked out in several passages of the following oration. The bare mention of a war with Persia at once recalled to their minds the glorious days of their ancestors, and the great actions of Athens and her generals against the barbarians. These were now displayed with all the address and force of eloquence, and the people urged to imitate the bright examples of antiquity ; to rise up in arms against the Persian, and to send their ambassadors through Greece to summon all the states to unite with Athens against the common enemy. To flatter the national vanity of their countrymen was an expe- dient which many speakers had found effectual for establish- ing their power and credit in the assembly. And possibly INTRODUCTION. 229 some might have spoken with a corrupt design of diverting the attention of their countrymen from those contests and dangers in which they were now immediately concerned. But, however this may he, the impropriety of those bold and precipitate measures which they recommended is urged with the utmost force in the following oration ; in which we shall find the speaker moderating the unseasonable zeal of his countrymen without absolutely shocking their prejudices. Demosthenes is more generally known as an orator by the fire and energy with which he rouses his countrymen to arms. But the delicacy of address and artifice which he displays in this and many of the following orations is a part of his character no less worthy of attention. A youth of twenty- eight years, thoroughly acquainted with the constitution, in- terests, and connexions of his country, rising for the first time in a debate on public affairs, opposing himself with boldness and resolution, and at the same time with the utmost art and insinuation, to the general bent of the assembly, calming the turbulence of his countrymen, and presenting their true interests to their view in the strongest and most striking colors, is an object truly pleasing and affecting. THE ORATION ON THE CLASSES. The men who thus dwell on the praises of your ancestors seem to me, ye men of Athens, to have 1 That this oration was pronounced in the third year of the hundred and sixth olympiad we are assured by Dionysius (in Epist. ad Ammseum), and that Demosthenes was at this time in his twenty-eighth year. Plutarch indeed (if he be the author of the lives of the Ten Orators) places his nativity in the fourth year of the ninety-eighth olympiad. But, not to mention the inaccuracies in this tract, the orator himself declares, in his oration against Midias, that he was then in his thirty-second year. This oration was spoken in the archonship of Callimachus, that is, according to Diodorus, in the fourth year of the hundred and seventh olympiad; and therefore, by calculating from hence, the reader will find the authority of Dionysius, as to the time of our orator's birth, clearly and fully confirmed. — How then came it to pass that he was allowed to speak on public affairs before the age of thirty years ? for in the Attic laws respecting public speakers it is expressly enacted, M77 $ισς\θςιν τίνα απξΐν μηπω τριάκοντα €τη yeyovoTa : Let no man enter the assembly 10 speak who hath not yet attained to the age of thirty. The solution of this dif- ficulty by Lucchesini seems solid and satisfactory. I know, says he, there are some who assert that this, as well as some other laws of Athens, fell into disuse ; but such a method of solving the difficulties of antiquity, without any manner of proof or authority, is unsafe and fallacious. Besides, the assertion is contradicted by iEschines, who, in his oration against Timarchus, declares, that not only this, but other severer laws relative to public speakers were in full force. In my opinion the difficulty should rather be explained in this manner. Among the other magistrates who were chosen every year at Athens, there were ten orators appointed by lot, whose business it was to deliver their opinions in the assemblies on all affairs that concerned the state, and for which they received the gratuity of a drachma (seven pence three farthings) from the treasury. To these only must that ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 231 chosen a subject fitted rather to gratify the assembly than to do the due honor to those on whom they lavish their applause. As they attempt to speak of actions which no words can worthily describe, the illustrious subject adorns their speech and gives them the praise of eloquence ; while their hearers are made to think of the virtues of those heroes with much less elevation law of Athens which determines the age of orators be con- strued to extend. As it was their duty to deliver their opi- nions in the senate, they ought of course to be of the senatorial age : but no person could be admitted to the senate who had not completed his thirtieth year. But as for the law of So- lon, it excludes no citizen whatsoever from the liberty of speaking who might attend the assembly ; nor had the seni- ors any other privilege than that of speaking first. The law runs thus : ' Let the senior first propose such measures as he thinks most expedient for the republic, and after him such other citizens as choose it, according to the order of their age.' yEschines cites it in the same words against Ctesiphon. No mention is here made of thirty years. Such of the citizens as were in their twentieth year might attend the assembly, and had their names enrolled. That they had a share in the administration, and might speak in public at this age, is con- firmed by Lucian in his Jupiter Tragoedus, where Momus thus addresses Apollo : ' You are now become a legal speaker, having long since left the class of young men, and enrolled your name in the books of the duodecemviri.' Now that the citizens were considered as having arrived at the age of man- hood in their eighteenth year we learn from Demosthenes in his oration against Aphobus ; for his father died when he was but seven years old, and he remained for ten years under the care of his guardian, at which time, being released from his hands, he pleaded his own cause against him. Now his father had given directions that he should be under a guardian till he had arrived at the age of manhood, and this he did as soon as he had reached his eighteenth year ; all which is col- lected from his own words. These circumstances considered, it is very easy to suppose that Demosthenes spoke in public, as he really did, in his eight-and-twentieth year. Nor does any manner of difficulty arise from what he says himself in his oration for the Crown : ' When the Phocian war was raised, &c. for I had then no hand in the administration ;' that war be- ing begun in the second year of the hundred and sixth olym- piad, under the archonship of Callistratus, at a time when our orator was only in the twenty-seventh year of his age. 232 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. than these virtues of themselves inspire. To me, time itself seems to be the noblest witness to their glory. , A series of so many years hath now passed over, and still no men have yet appeared whose actions could surpass those patterns of perfection. It shall be my part therefore solely to endeavor to point out the means which may enable you most effectually to pre- pare for war : for, in fact, were all our speakers to proceed in a pompous display of their abilities, such parade and ostentation could not possibly prove of the ]east advantage to the public ; but if any man what- ever will appear, and can explain to your full satisfac- tion what kind of armament, how great, and how sup- ported, may serve the present exigences of the state, then all these alarms must instantly be dispelled. This I shall endeavor to the utmost of my abilities, having first briefly declared my opinion of our situation with respect to the king. I do regard the king as the common enemy of all the Greeks : * but I cannot for that reason advise that we should be the only people to undertake a war against him ; for I do not find the Greeks themselves united to each other in sincere affection : 2 nay, some 1 The commentators who endeavor to account for this assertion, by considering the present state of Greece, or any late transactions with Persia, seem to examine the orator too rigidly, and with too much coldness and abstraction. It is by no means the result of any recent events. It had been the language of Greece for ages ; the language of poets, histori- ans, and orators. Even in those times of corruption the po- pular leaders seldom ventured to use any other, particularly in an assembly where national vanity was so predominant as in that of Athens. Whatever treaties had been made with the king of Persia, however peace might have now subsisted between him and the Greeks, still he was their natural enemy. 2 The sacred war now raged in Greece. The Phocians, Lacedaemonians and Athenians were engaged on one side ; the Boeotians, Thessalians, Locrians, and some other inferior states on the other : each party was harassed and exhausted by the war. The Phocians had reason to complain of the Athenians, who proved a useless and inactive ally. What- ever connexions had lately subsisted between Athens and. ORATION ON THE CLASSES 233 among them seem to have more confidence in him than in certain of their own body. In such circumstances, I account it of the utmost moment that we should be strictly attentive to the origin of this war, that it may be free from every imputation of injustice. Let our armament be carried on with vigor ; but let us care- fully adhere to the principles of equity : for, in my opinion, Athenians, the states of Greece (if it be once evident and incontestible that the king makes Sparta, this latter state still hated its ancient rival, and was impatient to recover its former splendor and power. A pros- pect of assistance from Persia must have at once determined the Lacedaemonians to detach themselves from the confede- racy, and to act against the Athenians ; particularly if any plausible pretence could be alleged for uniting with the Per- sian. The Phocians, who were not always influenced by the most religious engagements, might fairly be suspected of making no scruple of accepting effectual assistance from the great king, and at once renouncing their alliance with the Athenians. The Italian commentator supposes that the ora- tor expresses his apprehensions only of the Lacedaemonians, and that they are particularly pointed out as the men who hare more confidence in the Persian than in their own bre- thren, and who would sacrifice every consideration to the support of their wars with the Greeks. The Phocians, he observes, could not possibly unite with the Persians, on ac- count of the former injuries they had received from them, as well as of their invariable union with Athens. But a view of the politics of Greece, and indeed of the politics of all ages and nations, may convince us that too much stress is not to be laid on such an argument. Nor was there less to fear from the confederates on the other side. They fought with an in- veterate and implacable rancor, and all their efforts were scarcely sufficient to support the quarrel. Their strength was continually wasting, and their treasures were quite exhausted ; the most favorable occasion for the great king to gain them to his purposes. The speaker indeed declares, in another part of this oration, that the Thebans would not concur with the Persian in any design confessedly formed against the nation of Greece. Yet still they might, in their present circum- stances, and in a cause which they affected to consider as the cause of the nation, accept of his assistance. They actually did accept of it in the course of this war. 234 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. attempts against them) will instantly unite and express the most ardent gratitude to those who arose before them, who, with them, still stand faithfully and bravely to repel these attempts. But while this is yet uncer- tain, should you begin hostilities, I fear we may be obliged to fight against an enemy reinforced by those very men for whose interests we were so forward to express our zeal. Yes ! he will suspend his designs (if he hath really designs against the Greeks) : his gold will be dispersed liberally amongst them ; his promises of friendship will be lavished on them ; while they, distressed in their private wars, and attentive only to support them, will disregard the general wel- fare of the nation. Into such confusion, into such weak measures let us not precipitate the state. With respect to the king, you cannot pursue the same counsels with some others of the Greeks. Of these many might, without the charge of inconsistency, neglect the rest of Greece, while engaged in the pursuit of private interest ; but of you it would be unworthy, even though directly in- jured, to inflict so severe a punishment on the guilty as to abandon them to the power of the barbarian. Thus are we circumstanced ; and let us then be careful that we do not engage in this war upon unequal terms ; that he whom we suppose to entertain designs against the Greeks may not recommend himself to their confidence so as to be deemed their friend. And how shall these things be effected ? By giving public proof that the forces of this state are well appointed and complete for action ; but that in this our proce- dure we are determined to adhere inviolably to jus- tice. Let the bold and hazardous, who are vehement in urging you to war, attend to this. It is not difficult* when an assembly is convened to acquire the reputa- tion of courage : no ; nor when dangers are actually impending to speak with an impassioned boldness : but it is truly difficult, and it is our duty in the time ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 235 of danger to support the character of superior bravery ; in our councils, to display the same superiority of wisdom. I, on my part, ye men of Athens, think that a war with the king may prove dangerous ; in a battle, the consequence of such a war, I see no danger. And why ? Because wars of every kind require many ad- vantages of naval force, of money, and of places. Here he is superior to the state. In a battle, nothing is so necessary to insure success as valiant troops ; and of these, we and our confederates can boast the greater number. For this reason I earnestly recom- mend to you by no means to be the first to enter on a war ; but for an engagement I think yo u should be effectually prepared. Were there one method of pre- paring to oppose barbarians, and another for engaging with Greeks, then we might expect with reason that any hostile intentions against the Persian must be at once discovered : but as in every armament the manner is the same, the general provisions equally the same, whether our enemies are to be attacked, or our allies to be protected and our rights defended ; why, when we have avowed enemies, 1 should we seek for others? Shall we not prepare against the one, and be ready to oppose the other, should he attempt to injure us? — Call now on the Greeks to unite with you. — But sup- pose you should not readily concur with them in all their measures (as some are by no means favorably inclined to this state), can it be imagined that they will obey your summons ? — ' Certainly ; for we shall con- vince them that the king forms designs against their interests which they do not foresee/ — Ye powers ! is it possible that you can be thus persuaded ? Yes ; I know you are : but whatever apprehensions you may raise, they must influence these Greeks less forcibly 1 The Boeotians, Thessalians, &c. were the avowed enemies of Athens, in consequence of the attachment of this state to Phocis ; and the king of Macedon, by his invasions of their settlements in Thrace, and other acts of hostility. 236 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. than their disputes with you and with each other ; and therefore the remonstrances of your ambassadors will but appear like the tales of idle wanderers. 1 If, on the other hand, you pursue the measures now proposed, there is not a single state of Greece that will hesitate a moment to come in and to solicit your alliance when they see our thousand horse, 2 our infantry as numer- 1 In the original, ovtisv ovv αλλ' η ΡΑΨΓ2ΔΗ20Τ2ΙΝ ol ττρζσ- βςις 7T€puouT€s. It was urged by the speakers on the other side that ambassadors should be sent through Greece to re- present the dangerous designs of the Persian, and to exhort the several states to suspend their private animosities, and to unite with the Athenians against the common enemy. The orator, who is endeavoring to represent the useless and inef- fectual nature of such a measure, compares these ambassadors to the ancient rhapsodists, or bards, whose lives were spent in travelling, and amusing their entertainers with songs and poems. And this similitude seems to arise not only from their repeating the same declarations, but from the circum- stance of going from city to city, and exciting curiosity by their speeches, without any other effect. 2 At first sight it may appear extraordinary that the orator should speak in high terms of such a body as one thousand horse. But we must consider that Attica was a mountainous country, and therefore unfit for breeding horses. In the in- fancy of the state, when Athens was governed by kings, their cavalry amounted to no more than ninety-six, each ναυκραρια, or twelfth part of a tribe, furnishing two. But the number of such divisions was then but forty-eight, as the tribes were originally but four. This small body was at first an object of derision to the Persians at Marathon, but after- wards proved formidable and dangerous. After the defeat of the Persians the city began to increase in power, .and was enabled to raise a body of three hundred horse, which in the time of the Pelopcnnesian war was augmented to twelve hundred (as we learn from Thucyd. lib. ii. and JEschines ΤΙαραττ.). This was the greatest body of cavalry the Atheni- ans ever possessed, which seems by the distresses of the state to have been reduced to a thousand in the time of Demosthe- nes, as he mentions no greater number, though it was his busi- ness rather to magnify their force in this passage than to ex- tenuate it. The equestrian order was a rank of dignity at Athens as among the Romans. But in latter times the citi- zens were allowed to keep this rank and to substitute others to serve in their stead. — Lucchesini, ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 237 ous as could be wished, our three hundred ships ; an armament which they must regard as their surest re- fuge and defence. Should you apply for their assist- ance, you must appear as supplicants ; should they refuse it, you incur the shame of a repulse : but if, while your forces are completed, you suspend your operations, the protection you then grant to them must appear as the consequence of their request ; and be assured they will all fly to you for this protection. With these and the like reflections deeply impressed on my mind, I have not labored to prepare a bold, vain, tedious harangue. No, my fellow-citizens ! our preparations have been the sole object of my thoughts, and the manner of conducting them with effect and expedition. Grant me your attention, and if my sen- timents be approved, confirm them by your voices. It is then the first and most important part of pre- paration to possess your minds with due resolution, so that every citizen when called to action may exert himself with alacrity and zeal. You know that in every instance where, having first resolved on your designs in concert, every single member deemed it incumbent on him to labor vigorously in the execu- tion, you have never once proved unsuccessful : but whenever we hav r e first decreed, and then each man hath turned his eyes on others, fondly imagining that he himself need not act, that his neighbor would do all, our designs have never once been executed. With these sentiments, and these vigorous resolu- tions, I recommend that you should proceed to the appointment of your twelve hundred, and raise them to two thousand, by a farther addition of eight hun- dred. Thus, when all necessary deductions are made of those who by their condition l are excused from 1 Those who by their condition, &c] These are particularly specified in the original, ςπικληρων, maiden-heiresses ; ορφα- νών, orphans of the other sex ; κληρουχικων, men appointed to form a colony ; and κοινωνικών, men incorporated into certain societies which were exempted from contributing. 238 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. contributing, or by any circumstances are unable to contribute, still the original number of twelve hundred will remain complete. These I would have formed into twenty classes, each consisting of sixty citizens, agreeably to the present constitution. And it is my opinion, that of these classes each should be divided into Hye parts, consisting of twelve persons, ever at- tending to a just and equal distribution of the richer with the poorer. Thus should our citizens be arranged : the reason will appear when the whole scheme of the regulation hath been explained. But our ships ; how are they to be appointed ? Let their whole number be fixed to three hundred, divided by fifteenth parts into twenty portions. Of the first hundred, let five such parts ;* of the second hundred, five parts ; and of the third hundred, five be appointed to each class. Thus shall a fifteenth of the whole be allotted to every class ; three ships to each subdivision. When these establishments are made, I propose, 2 as From whence it seems evident that the duty and honor of composing the twelve hundred, who were to supply the exigences of the state, must have been annexed to cer- tain families, and continued to them when time and various circumstances might have produced alterations of fortune in many. The inconveniences which arose from hence were partly removed by the avridoaeis, or exchanges of fortunes (of which see note 2 p. 41.), and by allowing exemptions to persons in certain circumstances : yet both these ex- pedients must have occasioned delays, and retarded the busi- ness of the public. Hence the orator recommends the ap- pointment of the additional eight hundred. 1 Of the first hundred, let five such parts, &c] It should seem, from this passage, that each century of the three hun- dred ships were to be of a different rate and order, by this minute specification of ' five of the first hundred, five of the second/ &c. 2 When and in what manner this estimate of the lands was made, we learn from Polybius, lib. ii., whose words shall be quoted immediately. That the barren lands of Attica should produce such a revenue (amounting, according to Arbuth- not's computation, to 1,162,5002.) seems wonderful ; espe- cially as the lower ranks of citizens held their lands free from ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 239 the revenue arising from our lands amounts to six thousand talents, that in order to have our funds duly regulated, this sum may be divided into a hundred parts of sixty talents each : that five of these parts may be assigned to each of the twenty great classes ; which may thus give severally to each of their divisions a single part of sixty talents. So that, if we should have occasion for a hundred ships, 1 sixty talents may all taxation. The soil of Athens itself was celebrated by Ho- mer for its fertility. But this is of little moment when the barrenness of the Attic territory in general is considered. But what says Polybius ? Τις yap ύπερ Αθηναίων ουχ ιστορηκε διότι καθ' ους καιρούς μβτα Q -ηβαιων εις τον προς τους Αακεδαι- μυνιους ανεβαινον πολςμον, και μύριους μζν ςξςπςμπον στρατιωτας, εκατόν δε ςπληρουν τριήρεις, ότι τότε κριναντςς απο της αξίας ποιεισθαι τας εις τον πολεμον εις φοράς, ετιμησαντο την τε χωράν, και την Αττικην, άπασαν, και τας οικίας, ομοίως 5e και την λοι- πην ουσιαν. Αλλ 5 όμως το σύμπαν τίμημα της άξιας ενελιπε των εξακισχιΚιων ΰιακοσιοις και πεντήκοντα ταλαντοις ; • What his- torian hath not informed us that the Athenians, at the time when they engaged in war, on the part of Thebes against the Lacedaemonians, sent ten thousand men to the field, and man- ned an hundred ships; that the Athenians, I say, in order to make a just estimate of the subsidy they might properly grant for this war, then proceeded to a general valuation of their lands, of the whole territory of Attica, their houses, and all their effects? And yet the whole valuation fell short of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty.' Which agrees pretty exactly with this passage of Demosthenes. — Lucchedni. 1 One hundred ships seem to have been the ordinary ma- rine establishment at Athens; and to this the ordinary re- venues seem to have been proportioned. When it was ne- cessary to fit out an extraordinary number the additional charge was answered by an extraordinary taxation on the richer members of the state. The passage before us is in- deed concisely expressed, as became a speaker who addressed himself to persons to whom the least hint was sufficient. But the full meaning of it I take to be this : ' If we have occasion but for a hundred ships, the charge of furnishing each may be divided among twelve trierarchs, who are to be supplied for the expense of this and other preparations with sixty talents. If for two hundred, these twelve trierarchs must provide two ships ; if for three hundred, three. In every case the revenues of the state are to be equally divided 240 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. be granted to each, and twelve trierarchs ; if for two hundred, there may be thirty talents assigned, and six trierarchs to each ; if for three hundred, twenty talents may be supplied for each, and four trierarchs. In like manner, my fellow-citizens, on a due esti- mate of the stores necessary for our ships, I propose that, agreeably to the present scheme, they should be divided into twenty parts : that one good and ef- fectual part should be assigned to each of the great classes, to be distributed among the small divisions in the just proportion. Let the twelve, in every such division, demand their respective shares ; and let them have those ships which it is their lot to provide thoroughly and expeditiously equipped. Thus may our supplies, our ships, our trierarchs, our stores, be best provided and supplied. — And now I am to lay before you a plain and easy method of completing this scheme. I say, then, that your generals should proceed to mark out ten dock-yards, as contiguous as may be to each other, and capable of containing thirty vessels each. When this is done, they should assign two classes, and thirty ships to each of these docks. Among these also they should divide the tribes and the respective trierarchs ; so that two classes, thirty ships, and one tribe, may be assigned to each. Let then each tribe divide its alloted station into three amongst them. But the greater the force required, the greater must be the burden on the trierarchs, who are to be taxed for the additional expense, if any such may be required for fitting out the fleet, and completing the other parts of the intended armament/ This latter part, indeed, is not expressed, or in- sinuated ; but I take it to be understood. But, if my explana- tion should not be intirely consonant to the sentiments of the learned reader, who may have the curiosity to examine this part of the oration with accuracy, I must endeavor to screen myself irom the severity of his censure by subscribing to the following ingenious declaration of Wolfius : ' Whatever is here said of fleets, stores, armaments, and supplies, must, to us, who never saw a fleet, or war, and never were conversant in aflairs of state, be attended with considerable obscurity. ' ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 241 parts, and the ships in like manner. Let these thircl• parts be distributed by lot. Thus shall one tribe pre- side over one intire division of your shipping, and each third of a tribe take care of one third of such division ; and thus shall you know at all times, first, where each tribe is stationed ; then, where each third ; then, who are the trierarchs ; and lastly, the number of your ships. Let affairs be once set in motion after this manner ; and, if any thing hath been omitted (as it is by no means easy to provide accurately for every circumstance), the execution will itself discover it : and thus may your whole marine and all its several parts be uniformly and exactly regulated. And now, as to money, as to any immediate sup- plies ; sensible as I am that the opinion I am now to declare must appear extraordinary, yet I will declare it; for I trust that, when duly weighed, it will be found the only one which reason can recommend, and which must be approved by the event. I say, then, that at this time we should not speak at all of money : we have a fund, if occasions call for it, a great and honorable, and an equitable fund. Should you at- tempt to raise it now, far from succeeding in such an attempt, you could not depend on gaining it when really wanted. But, suspend your inquiries, and you will secure it. What fund is this, which now hath no being, yet will be found hereafter ? This appears a kind of mystery ; but I shall explain it. Cast your eyes round through all this city. Within these walls, Athenians, there are treasures — I had almost said, equal to those of all other states. But such is the disposition of their possessors, that if all our speakers were to rise with the most alarming declarations, ' That the king was marching against us ; that he was at our gates ; that the danger did not admit of any possibility of donbt ; — if, with these speakers, as many ministers of Heaven were to rise, and pronounce the same declarations as the warning of the gods ; so far would these men be from contributing, that they would not even discover their riches ; they would not ac- DEM. Q 242 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. knowlege the possession of them. But should it once appear that all those dangers, denounced with so much terror, were really, and in fact impending, where is the wretch that would not give freely, that would not urge to be admitted to contribute ? For, who would choose to abandon his life and fortune to the fury of an enemy, rather than give up a small portion of his abundance for the safety of himself and all the rest of his possessions? Thus shall we find treasures when occasions really demand them ; but not till then. Let us not therefore inquire for them now. Suppose that we were now strictly to exact the subsidies from all our citizens, the utmost we should raise would be more contemptible than none. Imagine the experi- ment made : it is proposed to exact an hundredth part of the revenue arising from our lands. Well, then, this makes just sixty talents. ' Nay, but we will raise a fiftieth part/ This doubles the sum : we have then one hundred and twenty talents. But what is this to those hundreds, or those thousands of camels, which, they assure us, are employed to carry the king's money ? But suppose it were agreed to raise a twelfth part, amounting to five hundred talents. This, in the first place, would be too great a burden; and, if im- posed, still the fund produced would be insufficient for the war. Let then all our other preparations be com- pleted ; but, as to money, let the possessors keep it ; and never can they keep it for a nobler public service. When their country calls for it, then shall they freely and zealously contribute. This, my fellow-citizens, is a practicable scheme — a scheme highly honorable and advantageous, worthy of this state to be reported to the king, and which must strike him with no small terror. He knows, that by three hundred vessels, of which one hundred only were supplied by us, his ancestors lost a thousand ships. 1 He will hear that now we have ourselves 1 Whoever consults Herodotus will find that Demosthenes is by no means exact in his account either of the Athenian or ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 243 equipped three hundred. He cannot then, if he hath not lost all reason — he cannot deem it a trivial matter to make this state his enemy. If, from a dependence on his treasures, he is tempted to entertain proud thoughts, he will find this but a vain dependence when compared with your resources. 1 They tell us he is coming* with heaps of gold ; hut when these are once dispersed he must look for new supplies. Not the richest streams, not the deepest sources hut must at length be totally exhausted when we copiously and constantly drain away their waters. But we, he will be told, have a perpetual resource in our lands — a fund of six thousand talents. And with what spirit we defend these lands against invaders his ancestors who fought at Marathon could best inform him. Let us continue to conquer, and our treasures cannot ever fail. Nor yet do I think their terrors justly founded who apprehend that he may employ his gold in raising a large army of mercenaries, I do indeed believe that in an expedition against Egypt, against Orontes, 2 or Persian fleets ; b t we are not to expect historical precision from the orator. His representations are suited to delight and animate his hearers ; and probably his success was too great to give them leisure to attend to any inaccuracy in his account. 1 It is just now the orator has represented the wealth of Athens as contemptible, that of Persia as magnificent and great. Now, on the contrary, the resources of Persia are neither solid nor permanent ; the riches of Athens great and inexhaustible. Various are the instances of this artifice in Demosthenes, which the judicious reader cannot fail to ob- serve without the direction of the annotator. 2 Two of this name are mentioned in history. The first was put to death by the younger Cyrus, on account of a con- spiracy. The other, whom Demosthenes points out, was a satrap of Mysia, and served in the army which Artaxerxes sent against Cyprus, under the command of Teribazus. On this occasion he attempted to ruin the reputation of his gene- ral ; was detected and disgraced ; and, in revenge, joined with the rebels of Egypt, Caria andPhrygia, and headed the army they had raised against the king. But, in hopes of recover- 244 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. any of the other barbarians, there are many of the Greeks that would gladly receive his pay ; not from any zeal for aggrandising him, but each in order to obtain such a supply as might relieve their present necessities. But I never can persuade myself that any one Greek would assist him to conquer Greece. Whither should he turn after such an event ? Would he go and be a slave in Phrygia ? He must know that when we take up arms against the barbarian, we take them up for our country, for our lives, for our customs, for our liberty, and all such sacred rights. Who then could be so base as to sacrifice himself, his parents, the sepulchres of his ancestors, his coun- try, to a trifling pittance? Surely no man I 1 Nor is it the interest of the Persian that his merce- naries should subdue the Greeks ; for they who can conquer us must first prove superior to him. And it is by no means his scheme, by destroying us to lose his own empire. His wishes are to command all ; if this cannot be obtained, at least he would secure his power over his own slaves. If then it be imagined that the Thebans will unite with him, 2 it is a hard part to speak of Thebes in this ing his credit at the Persian court, and of gaining the com- mand of some maritime towns, he betrayed the forces, &c. of the rebels into the hands of the king's lieutenants. History speaks no farther of this Orontes. But, as in this year, the eighth from the time of his revolt, Demosthenes mentions him as an enemy to the Persian, we may conjecture that his last services had been disregarded, and that he had again taken up arms. — Lucchesini. 1 I cannot persuade myself that there is occasion to point out to the reader the force and pertinency of this argument, although it be elliptically expressed. To be assured of the true signification of the phrase προς top βαρβαρον, we need but cast our eyes to a sentence a little farther on ; βκ μβν ye των ΠΡ02 τους εαυτού irpoyovovs πολέμων — from the wars waged against his ancestors, 2 The history of both nations accounts for the detestation with which the Athenians are supposed to hear the name of the Thebans ; and perhaps it were impossible that two na- tions so different in genius and manners ever should enter- ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 245 assembly : for, such is your aversion to this people, that you will not hear the voice of truth itself, if it seems at all to favor them. However, it is the duty of those who debate on great affairs, by no means, and on no pretence whatever, to suppress any argument which may prove of use. — I say, then, that so far are the Thebans from ever, at any time, uniting with the king against the Greeks, that they would freely give the greatest treasures, were they possessed of them, to purchase a fair occasion of atoning for their ancient errors with respect to Greece. But let the Thebans be ever so unhappily disposed, still we must all be sensible, that if they unite with him, their enemies must necessarily unite with the Greeks. And I trust that the cause of justice and the friends to this cause will ever prove superior to traitors, and to all the force of the barbarian. Let us not then yield to these extravagant alarms, nor rashly brave all consequences, by being first to take up arms. Nor do I think that any other of the Grecian states should look on this war with terror. 1 Is there a man among them who is not sensible, that while they re- garded the Persian as their common enemy, and main- tained a firm union with each other, their fortune was completely happy ; but when, by a fatal reliance on his friendship, they were betrayed into contests and dissensions among themselves, their calamities were tain any sentiments of friendship and esteem for each other. Our orator, however, was far superior to vulgar national pre- judices. He considered, without partiality, the real interests of his country, whose welfare should be a statesman's pas- sion. Yet his regard for the people of Thebes was numbered by yEschines among* his crimes. — The error which, he says, they would, if possible, redeem, was their joining with Xer- xes in his invasion of Greece. — Francis. 1 The well-known and great events described in the his- tory of Greece confirm these observations of the orator fully with respect to all the Grecian states. Yet we may concur with the Italian commentator in supposing that they had the Lacedaemonians particularly in view ; to whom they are, in- deed, eminently applicable. 246 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. so great as to exceed all the imprecations which the most inveterate malice could invent? And shall that man, whom fortune, whom Heaven itself pronounces, as a friend, unprofitable ; as an enemy, of advantage ; shall he, I say, be feared? By no means. Yet let us have the due regard to ourselves ; let us have the due attention to the disorders and suspicions of the rest of Greece ; and let us not incur the charge of injustice. Could we, indeed, with all the Greeks united firmly on our side, attack him single and unsupported, I would not then suppose that you could be charged with injustice. But, as this is not to be expected, let us be cautious ; let us afford him no pretence of ap- pearing to assert the rights of the other Greeks. If we continue quiet, his applications to them will be suspicious : if we are the first to take up arms, he will seem justified by our hostilities in his attempts to gain their friendship. Do not then discover- to the world the melancholy state of Greece, by inviting those to an alliance whom you cannot gain, and by engaging in a war which you cannot support. Be quiet ; be resolute ; be prepared. Let not the emissaries of Persia report to their king that Greece and Athens are distracted in their coun- cils, are confounded by their fears, are torn by dissen- sions. No ; let them rather tell him that if it were not equally shameful for the Greeks to violate their honor and their oaths, as it is to him matter of triumph, they would have long since marched against him ; and, that if you now do not march, you are restrained solely by a regard to your own dignity ; that it is your prayer to all the gods that he may be seized with the infatuation which once possessed his ancestors, and then he would find no defect of vigor in your measures. He knows that by our wars with his ancestors this state became happy and powerful ; that, by our peace- ful demeanor before these wars, we acquired a supe- riority over the other Grecian states never more ob- servable than at present. He knows that the affairs of Greece require some power to be either voluntarily or ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 247 accidentally the instrument of a general peace : he knows that he himself must prove that instrument if he once attempts to raise a war, and therefore these informations will have their due weight and credit. That I may not longer abuse your patience, I shall repeat the sum of my advice, and then descend. You should prepare your force against your present enemies : you should use this force against the king, against any power that may attempt to injure you ; hut never be the first to break through the bounds of justice, either in council or in action. You should be solicitous, not that our speeches, but that our conduct may be worthy of our illustrious descent. Act thus, and you will serve not yourselves only, but the men who oppose these measures ; for they will not feel your resentment hereafter if they be not suffered to mislead you now. 1 1 What effect this oration had on the people we may learn from a passage in the oration for the Rhodians, of which the following is a translation: ' There are some among you who may remember, that at the time when the affairs of Per- sia were the subject of our consultations, I was the first, the only, or almost the only one, to recommend it as the wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the king as the motive of your armament : to make your preparations against your avowed adversaries, and to employ them even against him, should he attempt to injure you. Nor did I urge these things without your full concurrence : they were received with applause/ ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS : PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF EUDEMUS, THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE HUNDRED AND SIXTH OLYMPIAD. INTRODUCTION. In order to prepare the reader for the perusal of the following oration, it is necessary to recal to his view some of the late important transactions in Greece. He is not to be informed of the florishing condition of Sparta after the famous Pelo- ponnesian war, the immoderate ambition of that state, and the war in which the Spartans were consequently involved with Thebes. The conduct and vigor of Epaminondas, the Theban, proved fatal to Sparta, and the battle of Leuctra put an end to the tyrannical dominion which this state had long exercised in Peloponnesus• Immediately after this battle several of the Peloponnesian states revolted from the Lacedaemonians. The Messenians, their ancient rivals, were restored to their original settlement by the Theban arms, after many ages of dispersion. The Arcadians and Argives asserted their independence, and, as- sisted by the Thebans, took up arms against their former so- vereigns. The Spartans now seemed on the point of having their ruin completed ; they were reduced to fortify their city, whose defenceless condition had been so long their boast : they armed six hundred of their slaves, and sent a deputa- tion to Athens, humbly to solicit the assistance of their old rivals in this their state of extremity. The Athenians, who began to conceive a jealousy of the rising power of Thebes, readily consented to join with the Lacedaemonians. Iphicrates was sent with twelve thousand men to their relief ; and on advice received that Epaminon- das was marching against Lacedaemon at the head of the Thebans, Argives, and Arcadians, Chabrias was despatched with another reinforcement to join the Spartans and their confederates. It is not to the present purpose to mention particularly the INTRODUCTION. 249 several events in the course of this war. It is only necessary to observe that the Arcadians, in order the better to secure that liberty for which they now contended, determined to collect all their force into one body, brought the detached settlements of their countrymen to an union, and fixed their common resi- dence in a city built by the advice and assistance of Epami- nondas (if we may believe Pausanias), and called Megalopolis, or the Great Ciiy. This was one considerable barrier against the Lacedaemonian power in Peloponnesus ; which still sub- sisted, together with the other equitable regulations of Epa- minondas for securing the liberty of the Peloponnesians. These were considered by the Lacedaemonians as so many memorials of their disgrace. And the least respite from the calamities of an unsuccessful war was sufficient to inspire them with an earnest desire of recovering their ancient power and superiority. Greece was now harassed by the sacred war. Several cities of inferior note had changed their mas- ters in the course of this quarrel. The re-establishment of peace, and a settlement of the whole nation of Greece, were universally urged as objects highly worthy of the general at- tention. And now Archidamus, the king of Sparta, a subtle and designing prince, proposed a plan for this purpose, in appearance advantageous to the whole body, but, in effect, only calculated to restore the superiority of Sparta. He pro- posed that, in order to restore the general tranquillity, the several ciiies should be re-established in the same condition as before the late wars. This was a scheme which promised some advantage to all the leading states. Oropus, a city on the confines of Bceotia, once commanded by the Athenians, and still claimed as their right, but now possessed by the Thebans, must have returned to its an,cient masters. Thespia and Plataea, two eminent cities in Boeotia, that had felt the jealousy and revenge of Thebes, and now lay subverted and depopulated, were by the same plan to be restored and fortified. The Phocians were to give up two important acquisitions gained in the course of the sacred war, the cities of Orchomenus and Coronea. But these and the other Boeotian cities were only to acknow- lege Thebes as the principal and leading city in Boeotia, without any absolute submission or dependence, and without any obedience to that jurisdiction which the Thebans claimed and had exercised over them. On the other hand, Pelopon- nesus was to be reduced to its former state of dependence ; the cities of Messene and Megalopolis were to be destroyed, and their inhabitants dispersed ; so as to restore the Spartans to the power of resuming that tyrannical dominion which they had formerly exercised over their neighbors. Archidamus began with endeavoring to regain that autho- 250 INTRODUCTION. rity in Peloponnesus to which the Spartans aspired. A dis- pute was soon raised between Sparta and Argos about the boundaries of their dominions ; and the king of Sparta hav- ing in vain attempted to succeed by practising secretly with Nicostratus, the principal citizen of Argos, determined to have recourse to arms. The people of Megalopolis were equally concerned in this quarrel. A war was on the point of breaking out in Pelopon- nesus ; each side was assiduous to gain over the other states of Greece : and on this occasion both the Megalopolitans and Lacedaemonians sent their ambassadors to Athens ; the one to solicit for assistance and support; the other to prevail on the Athenians to continue neuter. On this occasion was the assembly convened, in which the following oration was delivered. Each state had its partisans in this assembly, and the speakers on both sides seem to have delivered their sentiments with the utmost heat and animo- sity. The orators who opposed the demands of Megalopolis urged the connexions of Athens with the Lacedaemonians in the Theban war, and the dishonor and inconsistency of arming against their old fellow-soldiers. They represented the old attachment of the Megalopolitans to Thebes in the most odious and suspicious colors ; and declared that, by supporting them and depressing Lacedaemon, they would in effect render the Theban power highly formidable, if not irre- sistible : nor did they forget to urge that by acquiescing in the attempts of Lacedeemon to re-establish its power in Pe- loponnesus, they themselves would be intitled to the assist- ance of that state, in order to recover the dominions which had been wrested from them. Through this whole debate the Athenians seem to have been intirely influenced by motives of policy and convenience ; and the reader will find these urged by Demosthenes, with the utmost address and arti- fice, in favor of the people of Megalopolis, in the following oration. That this oration was pronounced in the archonship of Theo- demus or Eudemus, we are informed by Dionysius of Hali- carnassus (in Epist. ad Ammae.) : and this Eudemus was archon, according to Diodorus, in the fourth year of the hundred and sixth olympiad. In the beginning of the next year the Lacedaemonians made their irruption into Arcadia. So that it is probable that the ambassadors were received at Athens about the latter end of the year (i. e. a little before the summer solstice), when the Lacedaemonians were just pre- paring to take the field, and the Arcadians threatened with immediate danger. ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. The speakers on both sides seem to me, ye men of Athens, equally to blame — the partisans of the Arca- dians and the advocates for Lacedaemon. Like the deputies of these communities, not like your citizens, to whom their deputations are addressed, they excuse, they inveigh against each other. 1 This, I say, is to act like deputies: but to speak with a true patriot spirit, to attend intirely to the interest of the state, free from all factious principles, these are their duties who assume the character of our counsellors. But now, were not their persons known, did they not speak our language, I should have taken many of them for two distinct people ; the one of Arcadia, the other of Lacedasmon. How hazardous a part it is to urge your real inter- 1 This heat and acrimony did not always proceed from con- viction and zeal for the public interest. Every city or com- munity that solicited any matter in the Athenian assembly first took care to secure managers and advocates among the popular speakers. If the interposition of these pleaders proved successful, they were sometimes rewarded with a statue erected in the city whose interests they had sup- ported ; sometimes, and indeed more frequently, with a sum of money. Agreements were formally made, and, in some cases, securities given for the payment of this fee. In the oration of iEschines against Ctesiphon we have one instance of a transaction of this nature between the city of Oreum and Demosthenes himself, where the stipulation was so noto- rious as to appear on the public records of this city ; and so firm and binding, as to oblige the people of Oreum, in;t time of their distress, to mortgage their revenues to the ora- tor as a security for the sum agreed on, and to pay interest monthly until the principal could be discharged. 252 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. ests is to me apparent : for in this violence of opposi- tion, where you are all alike deceived, as well the favorers of this as the supporters of the opposite opi- nion, should a man attempt to point out the just mean between them, and should you prove impatient of di- rection, he would gratify neither party ; he would be calumniated by both. Yet still, I freely choose, if such must be my fate, rather to be thought weakly imper- tinent than to suffer any men to mislead you from what I deem most advantageous to the state. There are other points of which, if I have your permission, I shall hereafter speak. I now proceed, from principles acknowleged equally by all, to deduce such truths as I think of greatest moment. There is not a man 1 who can deny that it is for the interest of Athens that both the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans also should be weak : but such is the present state of things, (if any conjecture may be formed from the discourses we so often hear,) that if Orchomenus 2 and Thespia and Plataea be repeopled, 1 There is not a man, &c] On this principle it is that the orator founds all his reasoning. The wars which these three leading states carried on against each other were either for acquiring, or supporting, or recovering the sovereignty in Greece. A passion for this pre-eminence constituted the principal part of national virtue and merit. They talked, in- deed, of the interest of the whole "body of Greece, of an ex- tensive regard and affection to this body, and of the necessity of a just balance of power ; yet, in these days of degeneracy, at least, the duty of aggrandising their own community was frequently made the great law of the morality of statesmen. And this contributed no less to the final ruin of the Grecian states than their luxury and corruption. ' Grseciae civitates, dum imperare singulse cupiunt, imperium omnesperdiderunt,' says Justin. A strict union with each other was necessary, even to the being and support of each. But for extensive dominion, the constitution and circumstances even of the most eminent of their communities were by no means calculated. Λ There were two cities in Greece of this name ; the one in Arcadia ; the other, of which, the orator here speaks, in Bce- otia, an ancient and illustrious city, to which Thebes was tri- butary, in the heroic times, until Hercules enabled it to assert ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 253 the Thebans must be weak ; that the Lacedaemonians, 1 if Arcadia be reduced to their obedience, and the Great City be possessed by them, must once more become powerful. We are therefore to be careful not to suifer these to be great and formidable before the others are reduced ; nor to betray ourselves into greater inconve- niences by the strength of Lacedasmon than can pos- sibly be compensated by the weakness of Thebes. Not its independence. After the battle of Leuctra the Thebans determined to reduce this rival city to their obedience, but were restrained by the moderation of Epaminondas, who pre- vailed on his countrymen to admit the people of Orchomenus to their alliance, instead of reducing them to slavery. How- ever, after the battle of Mantinea, in which this general fell, the Thebans found a pretence for executing their former severe purposes against Orchomenus. Three hundred Or- chomenian cavalry had joined with certain Theban exiles in a conspiracy to overturn the aristocratical constitution of Thebes, and were betrayed by those whom they had agreed to assist. The Thebans, not contented with confining their vengeance to the guilty, seized the city of Orchomenus, put the citizens to the sword, and made slaves of their wives and children. — Lucchesini. Of Thespia and Plataea the reader will find some short account in the Oration on the Peace, note 2 p. 92. The vici- nity of these three cities to Thebes, and their hatred to the Thebans, inspired by the remembrance of injuries never to be forgotten, sufficiently explain the assertion of Demosthenes. 1 The subversion of the Lacedaemonian power seems to have been not so much the eifect of the defeat at Leuctra as of the revolt of their allies in Peloponnesus, and particularly of the Arcadians. It was not difficult for a warlike nation to have reassembled and reinforced its troops after such an en- gagement. Nor could the Thebans have ventured to pursue their victory so far, as even to threaten Sparta with slavery, unless they had been assisted by the Arcadians. Hence both the Thebans and Athenians ever courted the alliance of the Peloponnesians, and cultivated their friendship with the greatest assiduity. And hence the orator is justly warranted to observe that the power of Lacedsemon must rise to a for- midable pitch by the reduction of the Arcadians, who, by the extent of their territory, and the strength of their towns, were, next to Sparta, evidently the most considerable of the Peloponnesian states. — Lucchesini. 254 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. that we assert that it is more eligible to have the Lacedaemonians our enemies than the Thebans. This is not the point we would support ; but that neither of them should have the power of injuring us in any instance : for thus only can our fears be removed and our security established. But it will be said, ' Yes ! this is indeed a point of utmost moment : yet it is grievous to make those our allies against whom we fought at Mantinea, to unite with them against the very men with whom we then shared the dangers of the field/ Grievous I confess it is ; but let such delicacy gain some attention among others : let the parties once agree to live in peace, and we shall not, we need not, send support to the Mega- lop olitans ; our swords shall not then be drawn against our old fellow-soldiers. One party (as they profess) are already in alliance with us, the other are now soli- citing our alliance. What have we farther to desire ? But what if justice should be violated ? if war should be resolved on ? If it be the sole object of debate whether we should give up the Great City to the dominion of Lacedasmon or no, let us give it up : I do not contend against it, though it be not just: let us not arm against those who once shared with us the dangers of the field. But as we are all convinced that, if once masters of this city, they will instantly attack Messene, let any one of those who have been so severe on the Megalopolitans rise and say what conduct he would recommend to us on such an emergency. They are silent : but you are not to be informed that whether they should urge us or dissuade us, we should be obliged to send succors, both by those sacred oaths which engage us to Mes- sene, and by our interest, which requires that this city should subsist. 1 Consider therefore with yourselves 1 The Lacedaemonians, mortified and incensed at the re- establishment of Messene, refused to include this state in the general peace which was made after the battle of Mantinea ; and when the Thebans were once involved in the Phocian war, determined to seize the opportunity of oppressing those ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 255 which would be the noblest and most benevolent pro- cedure, to begin your opposition to the encroachments of Lacedasmon by the defence of the Megalopolitans, or that of the Messenians. In the one case, you will ap- pear attentive only to the safety of the Arcadians, and to the solid establishment of that tranquillity for which you have exposed yourselves to the dangers and the toils of war : in the other, all mankind must see that in defending Messene, you act not so much from prin- ciples of equity as from your fears of Lacedasmon. Our designs and actions should be just ; but we should be careful that at the same time they may also prove con- ducive to our interest. 1 It is urged by those who have spoken on the other side that we should endeavor to regain Oropus. But should we now make those our enemies who would Peloponnesians who had united with their rivals. Hostilities were declared against the Messenians : this people applied for succor to the Athenians, who engaged to defend them against invasions, though they refused to assist them in any offensive measures. This seems to have been the engage- ment to which the orator refers. 1 The reasoning in this passage may possibly deserve to be opened and illustrated somewhat farther than can be done by a simple detail of historical facts. It is one of the numberless instances of our orator's accommodating his style and manner of address to the quickness and liveliness of his countrymen ; and complimenting their understandings, by leaving some- thing to be supplied by them. The purport of his argument seems to be this : ' Sooner or later we must oppose the at- tempts of Lacedaemon, to extend our sovereignty. Our own interest requires it, as well as our regard to equity and the general interest of Greece. To both we owe the due attention, and it should he our care to make them coincide : while the Arcadians are supported, the Lacedaemonians cannot be sup- posed sufficiently powerful to become an object of terror : our interposition therefore in favor of the Arcadians will be re- garded as the pure effect of public spirit. But, if the Lacedae- monians be first suffered to reduce Arcadia, and the Atheni- ans then begin to oppose their farther progress, the motives of equity and public spirit may, indeed, still be pleaded ; but those of self-interest must necessarily be supposed to have had the greater influence.' 256 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. assist us in this design, we must forfeit all hopes of their assistance. It is my opinion too that we should attempt to regain Oropus. But that Lacedsemon will now become our enemy if we unite with those Arca- dians who sue for our alliance, they, of all men, never should assert, 1 who persuaded us to support the Lace- daemonians in the time of their distress : for when the whole body of the Peloponnesians was ready to unite with us, when they called on us to lead them against the Lacedaemonians, the very men who now urge this objection persuaded you to reject their overtures, 2 which forced them to apply to Thebes, then their sole resource, and to expend your treasures, and endanger 1 They, of all men, never should assert, &c] Because these men then reasoned from the necessity of preserving a due balance of power, and preventing any one state from becom- ing formidable. The resentment of the party to be opposed they then considered as of no weight against so cogent an argument. The same argument was now urged, with equal force and propriety in favor of the Arcadians. They could not, therefore, urge an objection now which, in a case exactly parallel, they had affected to despise. 2 The history of this fact, as described by Xenophon, does not exactly agree with this passage, unless supplied and il- lustrated by the narration of Diodorus. After the battle of Leuctra the Athenians offered liberty to all the states of Pe- loponnesus. The Mantineans, thus encouraged, determined to fortify their city, but were opposed by the Lacedaemonians, who first remonstrated by their deputies, and then took up arms. Many of the Arcadians themselves refused to give up their authority over some of their dependent cities. This pro- duced a war between the Lacedaemonians, Tegeans, and their allies, on one part ; and the Mantineans, and the principal Arcadian states, on the other. The Mantineans and Arca- dians were victorious : ' Yet still,' says Diodorus, (1. xv. An. 4. Olymp. 102.) ' they dreaded the weight of Sparta, and could not venture by themselves to carry on the war. They there- fore gained over the Argians and Eleans, and sent an em- bassy to the Athenians, inviting them to unite in the confe- deracy against the Spartans. But, as they could gain no at- tention at Athens, they had recourse to the Thebans, and pre- vailed on them to join in a league against Lacedaemon.' This extract from Diodorus throws sufficient light on the present passage. — Lucchesini. ORATION FOR THE MEG ALOPOLITANS. 257 your persons in defence of Lacedaemon. Surely you could not have acted with such spirit to save this peo- ple had you been fairly told that, when once saved, η,ο' restraint must be prescribed to their desires, no bojzncls to their injustice, else they would retain no sense of that safety which we gave them. Let it then be sup- posed that our forming an alliance with the Arcadians be ever so repugnant to the views of the Lacedaemo- nians, still that gratitude which they owe to this state for their preservation at a time when they were threat- ened with the utmost dangers, should far outweigh any resentment they may conceive from our opposing their injustice. And can they then deny us their assistance to regain Oropus ? This would prove them the most abandoned of mankind. No ! by the gods, I cannot suspect them of such baseness ! I hear it also urged, and am surprised at the objec- tion, That by this alliance with the Arcadians, and by the measures now proposed, the state must contradict its former conduct, and thus lose its credit. To me, Athenians, the very contrary seems manifest : and why ? Because it cannot be denied that, in defending the Lacedaemonians, in granting the like defence to Thebes in former times, and lately in saving the Eu- boeans, 1 and then admitting them to an alliance, we have uniformly pursued one and the same design. And what is this ? The protection of the injured. And if this be so, the charge of inconsistency must be urged not against us, but those who refuse to adhere to jus- tice. Aifairs have changed by means of those whose ambition is unbounded: this state hath not changed. It appears to me that the Lacedaemonians are now acting a subtle and insidious part : they say that the Eleans 2 ought to have a portion of Triphylia ; the 1 In saving the Euboeans.] At the time when the Thebans bad gained possession of a part of the island, with an intent of destroying the Athenian power in Euboea. See note ύ ζ p. 30. 2 That the Eleans, &c] Triphylia was a district on the sea- coast, situate between Elis and Messene. Certain Arcadian DEM. R 258 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. Phliasians, Tricaraims; some others of the Arcadians, the territories which are theirs ; and we, Oropus : not that they wish to see each of us in possession of our rightful dominions : far from it ! Such public- spirited sentiments are new to them : they but aifect this zeal for the support of all in the recovery of their several interests, that, when they themselves march against Messene, all may arm in their cause, and cheerfully unite with them ; or else appear to act unjustly, who had their concurrence in regaining their particular claims, and yet refuse to grant them the like returns of friendship. It is my opinion, in the first place, that, without subjecting any part of Arcadia to the power of the Lacedaemonians, Athens will regain Oropus : that these people will themselves support our claim if they have the least regard to justice ; and that there are others 1 to support it who think that Thebes should not be suffered to possess the rights of others. But were it evident that unless we permit the Lacedaemo- nians to overturn all Peloponnesus, we never can be able to obtain this city, I should think it more eligible (if I may so speak) absolutely to resign our pretensions to Oropus, than to abandon Messene and Peloponne- sus to the Lacedaemonians. It is not in this particular alone tha,t we are to attend to the conduct of Lacedae- mon. — But I suppress those thoughts which are now starting. I only say, we are in many instances exposed to danger. As to the actions of the Megalopolitans against this state during their connexion with the Thebans, it is exiles had seized Lassio its principal city, and delivered it to the Eleans. This produced a war, in which Triphylia so often changed its masters, that the right to it became doubtful. The Arcadians, however, prevailed at length, and now pos- sessed several cities in this district. — Tricaranus had been taken from the Phliasians by the Argives, some time after the battle of Leuctra. 1 There are others, &c] The Phocians, Thessalians, and Corinthians, who were now engaged against the Thebans in the sacred war. ORATION FOR THE Μ EGALOPOLITANS. 259 absurd to urge these now as criminal. It is absurd, I say, when they are inclined to form a strict union with us, that so they may redeem their former conduct, by doing us effectual service, maliciously to seek for all pretences to defeat such favorable intentions ; and not to consider, that the greater zeal and ardor they are proved to have discovered for the interest of Thebes, the greater and the juster should be your resentment against those who deprived the state of such confe- derates (for your protection they first solicited, be- fore their application to the Thebans). These are the wretched arguments of men who wish that these people should unite with other states. 1 From all the judgment I can form, on the most ma- ture reflection, I am persuaded (and there are many here who agree with me in this opinion) that, if the Lacedaemonians are once masters of Megalopolis, Mes- sene must certainly be in danger. Should they gain this city also, I say, we must form an alliance with the Thebans. And it will be much more noble, much more advantageous, at once to take those allies of the Thebans to our protection, and vigorously to oppose the ambition of Lacedaemon, than to refuse them that protection because allies to the Thebans : to abandon them to their oppressors ; and thus be forced to save Thebes itself from ruin ; nay, to involve this our own state in danger. For I cannot think it a matter of no consequence to Athens that the Lacedaemonians should be masters of Megalopolis, and resume their ancient greatness ; while, even now, I see them draw the sword, not to defend their state from wrong, but to 1 The objections on the other side were : ' Shall we arm against the Lacedaemonians, our fellow-soldiers in the Theban warV and, ' Shall we assist the Arcadians, who drew their swords against us at MantineaV Both very popular, and likely to influence the assembly. The speaker seems parti- cularly to dread the latter : he states it in gentle and extenu- ating terms : his answer has as much art and liveliness as force ; and he appears not at all inclined to dwell long, or particularly, on this point. 260 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. regain that sovereign power which they formerly en- joyed. And what were their designs, when they en- joyed this power, you can better say than I, and must therefore feel the juster and the stronger apprehen- sions. 1 I would gladly ask our speakers, those who express such aversion to Thebes, and those who declare them- selves the enemies of Lacedaemon, whether in these their particular resentments they be actuated by a regard to you and to your interests ; or, whether they severally hate the Thebans, for the sake of the Lace- daemonians ; and the Lacedaemonians, from their affec- tion to the Thebans. If for their sakes, they have lost their reason, and are each unworthy of our attention : if for our interest, whence this unnecessary zeal for their favorite states ? It is possible, very possible, to humble the Thebans without aggrandising the Lace- daemonians. This may be easily effected, as I shall now endeavor to convince you. It is well known that men are, to a certain degree, obliged by shame to adhere to justice, even where their inclinations are averse. They aifect to appear strenuous against every injurious attempt ; especially when, in any instance, they have suffered by such at- tempt. Here we find the great cause of all disorders, the origin of all calamities, in this want of a sincere, disinterested regard to justice. To avoid this danger, therefore, in our attempts to reduce the power of Thebes, let us declare that Thespia, and Orchomenus, and Plataea, must be restored : let us exert ourselves for this purpose, and call on others to assist us. Thus shall our true regard to equity, our real patriotic spirit, be displayed in this generous concern for the restora- tion of ancient cities : but, at the same time, let us 1 The sovereignty of Lacedsemon is to be dated from the destruction of Athens by Lysander, in the first year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad, a considerable time before the birth of Demosthenes, but within the memory of some citizens ; at least the consequences of this important event must have been remembered by numbers in the assembly. . ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 261 not abandon Messene and Megalopolis to the power of their oppressors. Let us not, under the pretence of serving- the Thespians and Plataeans, look on with un- concern whilst cities, now in being, already tilled with inhabitants, are rased to their foundations. If we show this equal regard to justice, there is not a state in Greece but will readily unite with us to wrest from the Thebans their unjust acquisition. If not, this people must necessarily oppose our endeavors to restore the cities ; an event which they must justly regard as their own destruction : and, in our own aiFair, ' the attempt must prove ineffectual. And what in truth can be expected, if we are ever suffering cities now in being to be destroyed, and demanding that cities long since ruined should be restored ? It hath been urged in this debate, by those who have spoken with the greatest appearance of reason, that these people should take down the public monuments 2 1 Our own affair.] That is, the recovery of Oropus. 2 The public monuments, &c] In the original, Tas 2ΤΗΛΑ2 καθςλςιν ras προς Θηβαίους. It was the custom of Greece that the treaties of the several states, and the conditions of these treaties, should be inscribed on columns, which were erected, and, while the treaties subsisted, were preserved, in the most public and frequented places ; as in the scenes of their great games, where the whole nation was collected at particular seasons, and there had an opportunity of being witnesses of the terms agreed on. The observance of these was, in some sort, a matter of national concern, and came under the cog- nisance of the great council of amphictyons. That the con- tracting powers themselves might have the monuments of their public acts continually in view, the like columns were erected in the most conspicuous places of their cities. Thus we learn from Thucydides that when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians had concluded a truce for fifty years, in the tenth year of the famous Peloponnesian war, it was pro- vided that the columns on which the treaty was inscribed should be erected in such places as have been mentioned. ^,τηΧας de στησαι Ολυμπιασι, και Πυθοι, και Ισθμφ, και ev Αθήναις ev πο\€ΐ, και ev Αακεΰαιμονι ev Αμυκλαιφ. Pausanias observes that in his days many of these columns were preserved in the Olympian temple, and particularly that which was the monu- 262 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. of their treaty with Thebes, if they mean to be real allies to this state. On the other side, it is alleged that it is not such monuments, but interest, which they regard as the essential cause of friendship ; that they must look on those as their real allies who will grant them their assistance. But, however sincerely they may thus profess, this is my opinion ; that you should demand both that these monuments be taken down, and that Lacedaemon be obliged to peace. If either of these demands be rejected, we should then unite with that party which hath acquiesced : for, if when they are allowed to live unmolested the Megalopolitans should still adhere to their connexions with the Thebans, they must then discover to the world that they were influenced by the hopes conceived from the superiority of Thebes, not by motives of equity. If, on the other hand, when the Megalopolitans have, with real faith and sincerity, formed an alliance with us, the Lacedaemonians should still refuse to live in peace, it must be manifest that all this their solicitude is not that Thespia may be restored, but that, while the Thebans are embroiled in this war, they may seize the opportunity of reducing all Peloponnesus. I am surprised at some persons, who express dread- ful apprehensions at the allies of Thebes becoming enemies to Lacedaemon ; yet, should Lacedaemon sub- due these people, see no danger in such an event ; especially when we have the experience of past times to assure us that the Thebans have ever used those al- lies 1 against the Lacedaemonians ; the Lacedaemonians, ment of the treaty concluded between the Athenians, Argians, and Mantineans, in the twelfth year of the Peloponnesian war. 1 By those allies, the orator undoubtedly means, not the Ar- cadians only, but the whole body of the Peloponnesian states. And what he observes of these states is fully confirmed by history. To mention only the more famous battles fought be- tween the Thebans and Athenians, it appears that the former were not assisted by the Peloponnesians in their first unsuc- cessful engagement at Tanagra (An. 4. 01. 80.) ; in the se- ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 263 when their masters, have ever employed them against lis. It is therefore seriously to be considered, that should you now refuse to admit the Megalopolitans to your alliance, they must either be subverted and dis- persed, and then the Lacedaemonians at once become powerful ; or, they must escape the danger (as we sometimes see strange and unexpected events) ; and then, with good reason, they must become firm asso- ciates to the Thebans : but, if we accept of these their overtures, they must then owe and acknowlege their preservation to this state. But let us turn our thoughts from their fortunes and their dangers, and fix our attention on the Thebans and Lacedaemonians. Should this war prove fatal to the Thebans (as our interest requires), still the power of the Lacedaemonians will be duly circumscribed, whilst they have the Arcadians on their borders, ever ready to arm against them. But, suppose the Thebans should cond, when they were victorious (An. 2. 01. 83.) ; or in the third, when they were again conquered (An. 1. 01. 89.) ; or in their victory at Delium, in the following year. On the other hand, after the battle of Leuctra the Thebans were joined by the Arcadians in their invasion of Sparta (An. 3. 01. 102.), and the next year entered the territory of Lacedae- mon, in conjunction with the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans. But the Lacedaemonians were assisted by their Peloponne- sian allies in all their wars with the Athenians. In the great Peloponnesian war ' the confederates of the Lacedae- monians were (says Thucydides) all the Peloponnesians that dwelt within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achaeans, who had attachments to each of the contending parties.' — Λακεδαιμονίων μεν ol ξνμμαχοι, Πελοποννησιοι μεν ol εντός Ισθ- μού πάντες, πλην ΑρΎειων και Αχαιών, Τούτοις Βε ες αμφότε- ρους φίλια ην. Many other instances to the same purpose might be pro- duced from history. But should it be objected to the asser- tion of the orator that, at the battle of Mantinea, some of the Peloponnesians united with the Thebans against the Athe- nian powers, the answer is obvious, that the Athenians were not the objects of this confederacy ; that it was formed against the Spartans, to whom Athens served but as an auxiliary. — Lucchesini, 264 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. prove superior to their dangers, should still defend their country, and should not fall before their ene- mies ; yet, must they be the less powerful, if on our side we be strengthened by allies to whom we ourselves gave being ? At all events, therefore, the interest of the state demands that we should not abandon the Arcadians ; that, if preserved, they should not seem to owe their preservation to themselves ; that they should not owe it to any others ; but that it should be the act of the Athenians. And now, my fellow-citizens, I call the gods to wit- ness, that I have spoken, not from private affection, not from particular resentment to either party, but from a regard to what I deem the real interest of my country ! This then is my opinion ; that you should not abandon the people of Megalopolis ; no, nor any weaker state, to the power of the stronger. 1 1 It does not appear from history that this oration had the due effect. Whether the prospect of recovering Oropus had greater influence than the more liberal and less confined po- licy of Demosthenes ; or, whether the present circumstances and connexions of the Athenians prevented them from acting in favor of the Megalopolitans ; certain it is, that the^y did not exert themselves on this occasion in defence of the li- berty of Peloponnesus. The quarrel was carried on for some short time. The Lacedaemonians had generally the advan- tage ; hut soon found it necessary to end the war by a truce with the people of Megalopolis. THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS : PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF THESSALUS, THE SECOND YEAR OF THE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH OLYMPIAD. INTRODUCTION. An attempt made (in the hundred and fifth olympiad) to re- duce the states of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, to a dependency on Athens, produced the war, well known by the name of 1 The Social War ;' which was for three years supported by the Athenians on one side ; and, on the other, by the Chians, Coans, and Rhodians, assisted by the Byzantines, and by Mausolus, king of Caria ; which prince (or rather his wife Artemisia, who governed in his name) was the principal agent in fomenting this quarrel. Their fears of the Persian arms obliged. the Athenians to give a peace to the confede- rates, in which it was expressly stipulated that they should be free and independent. So that, in effect, these states triumphed over their adversary, whose concessions were ex- torted by necessity, and who, of consequence, harbored all the resentment of disappointed ambition against their op- ponents. The people of Rhodes, who had engaged warmly in this confederacy, had formerly been indebted to Athens for assist- ance in defence of their popular form of government against the favorers of aristocracy, who, on their part, had been sup- ported by the Lacedaemonians. The peace now concluded promised to put an end to those civil commotions and revolu- tions to which the state of Rhodes had been exposed. But the enterprising genius of Artemisia, who now reigned in Caria, prompted her to attempt the conquest of Rhodes. The king of Persia favored her design against an island which, by its situation, commanded the Egean sea, and rendered the passage into Greece secure and easy ; and which he justly expected to gain from the Carian princess by treaty, or by arms, with less umbrage to the Greeks than any direct attack would give. 266 INTRODUCTION. As a step previously necessary to this design, the aristo- cratical faction was, partly by the gradual influence of secret practices, and partly by force, established in the government of Rhodes, which they proceeded to exercise in an oppres- sive and tyrannical manner. The people, whose liberties were thus overturned, saw no resource in their distress but to apply to the generosity of Athens, their ancient protector. Ambassadors were despatched to implore the assistance of the great defenders of liberty ; and in the assembly convened on this occasion the following oration w T as delivered in favor of the people of Rhodes. Their cause labored under many difficulties. They had de- fied the people whose protection they were soliciting, and were now the objects of their resentment. Their late opposi- tion was considered at Athens as the effect, not of a zeal for liberty, but of ingratitude and pride, of perverseness and insolence, which were represented as a part of their national character. No speaker could venture to oppose these senti- ments, which afforded those who spoke against the Rhodians ample matter for invective. It was well known that the Per- sian king interested himself in favor of the reigning party at Rhodes. The danger of irritating this prince had been, by Demosthenes himself, strongly urged upon other occasions. So that not only the passions and prejudices of the assembly, but policy also pleaded powerfully against the present de- mand of the Rhodians. In these circumstances they required an able, artful, and insinuating advocate ; and such they found in our orator. THE ORATION FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS. When affairs like these become the subject of our debates, it is my opinion, Athenians, that a general liberty of speech should be allowed to all in this as- sembly. 1 Not that I have ever thought it difficult to point out the measures fittest to be pursued ; for (to speak my thoughts plainly) you seem of yourselves sufficiently apprised of these. But to prevail on you to pursue them : — there is the difficulty : for, when 1 This exordium seems to have been founded on some par- ticular circumstances of the assembly, or some difficulties which Demosthenes was obliged to encounter before he could obtain an audience : the assembly of the people at Athens was necessarily subject to the inconveniences attending all popular meetings. Clamor, tumult and contention frequently disturbed it ; especially when the point in debate was of an important kind, or the popular leaders divided, and by in- terest or principle prompted to support their different opi- nions and parties with zeal and ardor. Sometimes (as we learn from some passages in iEschines) the leaders on one side took care to seize the gallery, from whence the speakers addressed themselves to the people, and by open violence prevented any one from taking his place there who was not a friend to the measures which they recommended. Sometimes the magistrates, who presided in the assembly, either thought it necessary for the preservation of peace and order, or were induced by private motives, to exert their authority, and to circumscribe that liberty of speech for which the constitution of Athens had so scrupulously provided. Hence frequently arose a tumultuous mixture of acclamation, opposition, loud and vehement commanding, and earnest expostulation, which formed a scene fitted to discourage and terrify an inexperi- enced or dastardly speaker ; a scene for which Demosthenes prepared himself by declaiming on the sea-shore amidst the roaring of the waves. 268 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. any thing hath been resolved, when it hath been con- firmed by your voices, we are just as far from carrying it into execution as if it had never been resolved. One particular there is eminently distinguishable amongst all those favors which we owe to Heaven. I mean that they who, not long since, prompted by their insolence, appeared in arms against us, now rest all their hopes of safety on this state ; an event which should inspire us with the greatest satisfaction : for by a just and proper conduct on this occasion, we shall by our actions gloriously and nobly refute the calumnies of our traducers. The Chians, and the Byzantines, and the Rhodians, accused us of dangerous designs against them, and from this pretence con- spired to raise the late war against us. But it will now appear that Mausolus, 1 the great author and conductor of this war — he who affected such zeal for the interest of the Rhodians, is the very person who deprived them of their freedom: that the Chians and the Byzantines, 2 who then professed to be their allies, have refused to assist them when distressed : but that you, the great objects of their apprehensions, prove to be the people of all others to whom alone they are indebted for protection. When this is once made manifest to the world, such must be the sentiments with which you shall inspire the people of every community, that they will regard your friendship as the pledge of their security. And surely you cannot enjoy greater hap- piness than such a universal confidence and affection. 1 This passage seems to intimate that measures had been taken to establish the aristocracy at Rhodes during the life- time of Mausolus. The queen, who is said to have directed and governed her husband, probably recommended, and made some progress in the execution of a design, which was crowned with complete success in her own reign. 2 It was probably the fear of Artemisia's power which pre- vented the Chians and Byzantines from assisting their friends the Rhodians to overturn the usurpation. Otherwise the Chians, whose government was republican, must have ex- erted themselves to secure the like constitution to their allies. — Lucchesini. ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 269 It is with surprise I find the very persons who urged us to oppose the king ί in defence of the Egyptians now deterring us, by the apprehensions of his dis- pleasure, from engaging in the affairs of Rhodes ; and this when it is well known that the Rhodians are really Greeks ; the others of the number of this prince's subjects. There are some among you who may remember that at the time when the aifairs of Persia were the subject of our consultations I was the first, I think the only, or almost the only one, to recommend it as the wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the king as the motive of your armament : to make your preparations against your avowed adversaries ; but to employ them even against him should he attempt to injure you. Nor did I urge these things without your full con- currence. You received them with applause. 2 On 1 When Artaxerxes engaged in the war with Nectanebus, king of Egypt, both parties applied to the Greeks for assist- ance. The Persian was refused ; but such numbers of Grecian mercenaries engaged in the service of Nectanebus, that he was enabled to detach four thousand of these to the assistance of the Sidonians : and probably the greater part of these forces were Athenians, as the inveterate resentment of this people to the Persians prompted them to take all means of opposing them which were not absolutely inconsistent with treaties. — Luccliesini. 2 The approbation of the people he affects to consider as a full proof of the justness of these his sentiments. 'If they be then just, the king must adopt them ; no other can be re- commended to him. And if his conduct is to be guided by such principles, he cannot be provoked to take up arms against the Athenians by their interposition in favor of the liberty of Rhodes (a Grecian state). It must be equally his interest not to oppose the Athenians, where his own kingdom is not immediately attacked, as it is for the Athenians not to give unnecessary umbrage to him. Such delicacy and caution must be acknowleged just and necessary, but are quite dif- ferent from a supine inattention to all his motions, and an abject concession of all the conquests he maybe prompted to make, however injurious to Greece. Such conduct would not only be dishonorable but impolitic. While, on the con- trary, vigor and resolution prudently directed, instead of 270 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. this present occasion my sentiments are exactly con- sonant to what I then proposed : and were I a sub- ject to the king, were I called to be his counsellor, to him I should suggest the very measures I now recom- mend to you ; to fight for his own dominions if at- tacked by any of the Greeks ; never to indulge an ex- travagant ambition of making foreign conquests. If, on your part, ye men of Athens, it be resolved to give up all those cities to the king which he may reduce to his obedience, by surprising and deceiving some members of the several cities, it is a resolution I can by no means praise. But if ye be persuaded that in the cause of justice ye should on all occasions boldly draw the sword, and encounter every difficulty ; in the first place, such occasions will occur more rarely the more you are possessed with this persuasion ; and then, it must be acknowleged that such sentiments are worthy of this state. That I recommend nothing new in moving you to give liberty to the Rhodians, that you will do nothing new if my counsels should prevail, may appear from one instance of our former conduct, which proved of important service. It may be remembered, Athenians, that you once sent out Timotheus to assist Ariobar- zanes. 1 It was expressly prescribed in his commission involving them in war, must awe their enemies, and pre- serve them in peace and security.' — This seems to be the sum of the present argument ; and the judicious will pro- bably forgive the attempt to open and illustrate particular passages, as the sentiments, in this oration especially, are de- livered with such liveliness and rapidity, that a reader, not strictly attentive, is oftentimes in danger of losing the full view of our orator. 1 The time and circumstances of this expedition do not seem necessary for illustrating the argument of Demosthenes, as he himself has distinctly explained the particulars necessary for his purpose. However, the reader whose curiosity may prompt him to seek for farther information, has here a fuller account from the Italian commentator. — There is no doubt but that Ti- motheus was sent on this expedition in the second, or in the be- ginning of the third year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad ; ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 271 that he should not proceed to any infringement of our treaty with the king. He saw that Ariobarzanes had openly revolted from his master. He saw that Samos was held by Cyprothemes and his Persian garrison ; and that Tigranes, the king's own lieutenant, had placed them in this city. To Ariobarzanes therefore he refused assistance: Samos he invested, and restored to freedom : and to this day we never were involved in any war on this account. For there is a material difference between these two motives for war — the en- largement of dominion, and the defence of rightful possessions. When an invasion is to be repelled the contest is supported to the utmost ; not so for the ob- jects of ambition. Men will, indeed, attempt to gratify this passion if permitted; but, if opposed, they do not charge the opposition as injurious. Nor do I think that Artemisia will act contrary to these principles if the state should interpose in the affairs of Rhodes. Hear me for a moment, and judge whether my reasons be well-founded or invalid. I think, then, that if all the king's attempts in Egypt had been crowned with effectual success, Artemisia because in this year Ariobarzanes, together with some other satraps on the sea-coast, Mausolus, andTachus, king of Egypt, revolted from Artaxerxes. The rebellion of Ariobarzanes was probably unknown to the Athenians at this time. The design of the expedition was to establish this satrap in the govern- ment of Phrygia, which he had seized on the death of Mithri- dates by his own authority ; though possibly he might have assured the Athenians that he had acted by the king's com- mission. Hence was Timotheus sent to support him, with in- structions, however, to commit no infringement of the treaties subsisting between Athens and the Persian : and as this general could not, consistently with these instructions, pur- sue the intended expedition in favor of Ariobarzanes, it was not without good reason that he chose to employ his forces in the relief of Samos, which was under the jurisdiction of Athens, and unjustly seized by the king's lieutenants, in order to facilitate his operations against the rebels on the sea-coast. Nor was it at all prudent for the Athenians to suffer the Persians to possess an island from whence they might readily pass over into Greece. 272 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. would have exerted her utmost efforts to reduce Rhodes to his subjection: not from an affection to the king, but in order to bind him by a signal favor, should he extend his dominions to her neighborhood ; that, in return, he might admit her to the strictest connexions of friendship. But since he hath acted — as fame re- ports ; l since he hath been unsuccessful in all his at- tempts, she must suppose (and it is in fact the case) that this island can be of no other use to him but as a citadel to awe her kingdom, and to control her mo- tions. So that in my opinion she would rather that we were in possession of the island (provided that this did not appear to be the act of Artemisia) than that he should gain it. Nor would she assist him in such an attempt, at least not with sincerity and vigor. As to the king, how he may act on any emergency, I do not pretend to say. But, that it highly imports this state to have it known explicitly whether he means to assert any claim to Rhodes or no — this I firmly maintain. If he should, our consultations are not to be confined to the Rhodians ; our concern must be for ourselves, and for all the Greeks. 1 We learn from Diodorus (1. xvi.), that, in the present year, when, this oration was delivered, Ochus had not pene- trated as far as Egypt, but led his army against Sidon ; which city being betrayed by Mentor, and Tennes its king, was set on fire, and reduced to ashes by the inhabitants. From hence the Persians marched the next year into Egypt, where they at first met with some sinister accidents (a considerable part of the army being lost in morasses), though in the conclusion they were enabled to conquer Nectanebus at Pelusium, and to reduce him to the utmost extremity. Thus the assertion of Demosthenes seems not reconcilable to history. But it must not be forgotten that a passionate eagerness for intelligence was a distinguishing part of the character of the Athenians ; which, we must suppose, was frequently gratified by rumors and advices invented to please them, and artfully or credu- lously propagated. Something of this kind might have hap- pened at present ; and agreeable news from the Persian camp, whether believed by the orator or no, might have been as- sumed as certain, without any scruple, to answer the present purpose. ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 273 Yet, were these Rhodians, who now possess the city, strong enough to maintain their possessions, I should not have advised you to grant them aid : no, though they should make you the most magnificent promises. For I find that, in order to dissolve the free govern- ment, they first seduced some citizens to their party ; and then, the moment they had gained their purpose, they drove out those very citizens. And they who have been false to both parties cannot, I presume, prove faithful allies to this state. 1 These things I never should have urged had I only considered the interest of Rhodes. I have no public 2 attachment to that state ; no particular connexion with 1 At first glance, it may occur to the reader to ask how it comes that Demosthenes, who pleads for the restoration of the popular state, here seems to speak in favor of the reigning party. And though the commentators, &c. take no notice of any difficulty in this passage, it may not he deemed imperti- nent to endeavor to illustrate its purport and connexion. — Demosthenes has endeavored to prove that the king, how ever he may favor or support the aristocracy at Rhodes, yet will not consider the interposition of the Athenians in de- fence of the liberty of that island as an act of hostility against him ; and that neither he nor Artemisia will oppose them. * Not that I pretend,' says the orator, ' to ascertain what the king's designs are, or what measures he may pursue. But if he should assert any direct claim to the dominion of Rhodes, his treaty with the Greeks is broken : we and all Greece are threatened. The question is no longer how the Rhodians shall be governed : the island must be defended for our own sake, whatever party may prevail there. But in such a case, it is the interest of Greece, not that of the aristocratical fac- tion at Rhodes, which should be considered ; and however warrantable and just and prudent a vigorous defence of the island would then be ; yet still, nothing but necessity, no- thing but the certainty of its falling into the power of the Persian, without our assistance, could induce me to recom- mend the granting that assistance. If the reigning party could by themselves defend the island, they do not merit, nor should they be favored with, our interposition : but if not, our own and our nation's interests require that we should defeat the designs of the Persian against Rhodes, even though this party should reap the immediate advantage.' 2 I have no public, &c] The citizens of the more eminent DEM. S 274 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. any of i«ts citizens ; or, were I engaged by both these ties, in this assembly I should be influenced only by the interest of my country. As to these Rhodians (if one may so speak who pleads for their protection), I rejoice at what hath happened ; that the men who could not bear that we should regain our just rights have now lost their own liberty ; that they who might have united on terms of equality with the Greeks, and with us, the best of Greeks, chose to admit bar- barians and slaves l into their citadel, and to become their abject vassals. I had almost said that these things must prove of use to them, if you vouchsafe states in Greece had it sometimes in their power to confer favors on inferior communities ; and these in return ex- pressed their gratitude by declaring that such persons should, at any time during their residence among them, be intitled to entertainment at the public expense. In. like manner favors conferred and received by particular persons intitled them to the rights of private hospitality from each other. These were declarations of the most strict, and inviolable friend- ship ; and the least neglect or violation of this hospitality was accounted a crime of the most heinous nature. — The expres- sions in the original are founded on these customs. 1 By barbarians and slaves he means the forces of Artemi- sia, which she sent to the assistance of the aristocratical fac- tion, and which they kept in the citadel for their defence. — Lucchesini. — The admission of these forces into Rhodes is ascribed by Vitruvius to a stratagem of an extraordinary na- ture. He tells us the Rhodians held a private intelligence in Halicarnassus, the capital of Caria, and hoped that the inhabi- tants would willingly unite with them, in order to shake off the yoke of a woman. In these expectations they sent a fleet thither. But Artemisia, having discovered the plot, ordered the inhabitants to range themselves under their walls, and to receive the Rhodians as their expected deliverers. Deceived by this appearance, the Rhodians landed, and left their ships deserted. They were surrounded, and cut to pieces. Ar- temisia, who had ordered her gallies to fall down some canals which communicated with the port, and to seize their ships, now set sail in the Rhodian fleet, and appeared before their island. It was supposed by the people of Rhodes that their own army was returned victorious ; and the Carians were masters of their fortress before the fatal mistake was per- ceived. ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 275 your aid. In a course of prosperity, I know not whether they would ever have returned to reason ; for they are Rhodians. 1 But now, taught by experience that perverse folly is the cause of numberless calami- ties, they may possibly entertain sentiments more just and prudent for the future. And this, I apprehend, would be no small advantage' to them. Let us then endeavor to avert their ruin : let us not harbor ancient resentments : let it be remembered that you yourselves have oftentimes been deceived by those who enter- tained designs against the state ; and yet on none, of these will you confess that punishment should be in- flicted. Let it also be considered that you, my fellow- citizens, have waged many wars against states both of popular and oligarchical government. Of this you are not to be informed : but perhaps you have never once reflected what were the causes of your several wars with each. With popular states 2 your Avars arose from particular complaints, which could not be decided in a national council ; or from disputes about districts and boundaries ; or from the love of glory or pre-eminence. But, of your wars with oligarchies, 3 there were different causes : with these you fought for your constitution, for your liberty. So that I should not scruple to avow my opinion that it would be better for us to be at war with all the states of Greece, pro- 1 They are Rhodians.] Homer calls the Rhodians υπερήφα- νους, insolent. And to this day they are said to be distin- guished by the same fault, though now reduced to the ex- tremity of slavery. — Lucchesini. 2 I imagine that the orator had here in view the expedi- tions against the Corinthians and Syracusans. With the former the Athenians contended about boundaries and terri- tory ; particular causes of complaint, but especially ambition, prompted them to wage war against the latter. And the government both of Corinth and Syracuse was regularly de- mocratical. — Lucchesini. 3 By oligarchies the orator means the Boeotians and Me- gareans, but principally the Lacedaemonians. — Lucchesini, 276 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. vided 1 that they enjoyed a popular government, than to be in friendship with them all, if commanded by oligarchies ; for with free states I should not think 1 With all the states of Greece, provided, &c] To jthis the orator subjoins a reason, which makes the assertion appear less extraordinary : ' If attacked by all, it is true, the con- test could not be supported, yet no terms of accommodation would be imposed that would alter or destroy our constitu- tion. But no peace could secure the freedom of the only de- mocratical state. The enemies of liberty, however apparently reconciled, must ever hate and fear, and at length destroy it.' —As I have taken the liberty to translate this passage in a manner different from that of the commentators and interpre- ters, it will be necessary fairly to quote the original at large : Ήστ6 eyarye ουκ αν οκνησαιμι αττειν μάλλον ηγεισθαι συμφέρον, δημοκρατουμςνους τους 'Ελληνας απαντάς πολεμειν υμιν η ολί'γαρ- χουμενους φίλους €Lvai. — Δημοπρατούμενους τους Έλληνας hath been generally taken as equivalent to τους των 'Ελλήνων δήμο- κρατουμένους, &c. ; and the original understood as containing this assertion, ' It would be more eligible that all the republics in Greece should be at war with us, than that we should be in alliance with all the oligarchies.' The learned in the Greek language will determine whether, in order to warrant this in- terpretation, the form of the sentence in the original should not have been τους Βημοκρατουμςνυυς Έλληνας, instead of δη- μοπρατούμενους τους, &c. But, not to insist on grammatical niceties, it is submitted to the reader, who attends to the his- tory and circumstances of Greece, whether to be at war with the free states, that is, the states of Peloponnesus, or to be in alliance with the oligarchies, that is, (principally) the states of Lacedaemon and Boeotia, be two particulars so ne- cessarily incompatible as to oblige the Athenians to choose one or the other. If it be said that it is sufficient to sup- pose that particular quarrels might arise, in which a union with Sparta and Boeotia would prevent the free states from attacking the Athenians, and the rejecting this union might encourage them to the attack ; in such case I suspect that the orator never could have advised his countrymen to engage singly in a war, as the most eligible measure, which, by weakening each party, would render both an easier prey to those who are supposed (from the nature of their constitution) to be their common enemies. And such advice would still be more unaccountable should it be supposed that, in conse- quence of rejecting the alliance of Sparta and Boeotia, these states would unite with the enemies of Athens. ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 277 it difficult to conclude a peace whenever you were in- clined ; but with oligarchical governments Ave could not even form a union to be relied on : for it is not pos- sible that the few can entertain a sincere aifection for the many ; or the friends of arbitrary power for the men who choose to live in free equality. I am surprised that none among you should con- ceive, that if the Chians, and the Mityleneans, and now the Rhodians, are to be subjected to a few ; l I had almost said, if all mankind are to be thus enslaved, our constitution must be threatened with danger. It is surprising that none among you should reflect, that if this form of polity be established in every place, it is not possible that our free government should be suffered to continue : for it must then be certain that none others but the Athenians can arise to restore affairs to their original state of freedom ; and those whom men regard as dangerous they must ever labor to destroy. In every other case they who act un- justly are enemies only to those whom their injustice hath immediately aifected ; but they who subvert free states, and reduce them to the power of a few, are to be deemed the common enemies of all the zealous friends of liberty. And justice too demands, ye men of Athens, that you, who enjoy a popular government, should discover the same concern for the misfortunes of other free states which you yourselves would ex- pect from them, if at any time (which Heaven avert !) the like misfortunes should oppress you. It may be said, indeed, that the Rhodians are deservedly dis- tressed : but this is not a time for such objections. Let the prosperous ever show the tenderest solicitude 1 From this passage it seems not improbable that the de- signs of the Persian had extended farther than to Rhodes, and that he had by his power or influence lately made altera- tions in the state and government of these inferior islands which the embarrassed condition of the Athenians, and their attention to the motions of the Macedonian king, might have prevented them from opposing. 278 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. for the unhappy, since none can say what may he their own future fortune. I have heard it frequently observed in this assembly, that when the state was in its deepest distress, there were not wanting friends to concert measures for its restoration. Of this I shall at present briefly men- tion but one instance — I mean that of the Argives. 1 And I should be sorry that we, whose distinguished character it is to protect the wretched, should appear inferior to the Argives in this particular. They, though seated on the borders of Lacedasmon, witnesses of the uncontrolled power of this city, both by sea and land, yet could not be diverted, could not be deterred from expressing their aifection to the Athenians. When ambassadors came from Lacedaemon to demand some Athenian exiles who had taken refuge at Argos, they declared by a decree, that unless these ambassadors departed from their city before the setting sun they should be accounted enemies. And would it not be shameful, my countrymen, that the populace of Argos should, in such times as these, defy the terror of the Lacedaemonian power and sovereignty, and yet that you, who are Athenians, should be terrified by a bar- barian ; nay, by a woman ? The Argives might have justly pleaded that they had oftentimes been con- quered by the Lacedaemonians. But you have fre- quently proved victorious over the king ; never were once defeated, either by his slaves or by himself. Or, if the Persian boasts to have obtained any advantage over us, he owes it to those treasures which he lavished on the corrupt traitors and hirelings of Greece. If ever he hath prevailed, by these means hath he pre- 1 This instance of the magnanimity of the Argives must have been particularly agreeable to the assembly , as the form of government at Argos was, like that of Athens, republican. The memory of this noble and generous act has been passed over by historians : but we have it here preserved, enlivened, and enforced by the most vivid coloring and the utmost strength of expression. — Lucchesini. ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 279 vailed. Nor have such successes proved of real use. No : we find that, at the very time when he was en- deavoring to depress this state, by the help of Lace- da3mon, his own dominions were exposed to the dan- gerous attempts of Clearchus and Cyrus. ! Thus were his avowed attacks ever unsuccessful, his secret prac- tices attended with no real advantage* There are men among you who frequently affect a disregard of Philip, as if beneath their attention ; but of the king express the most terrible apprehensions, as of an enemy truly dangerous to those whom he may determine to attack. If then we are never to op- pose the one, because weak, and to make unbounded concessions to the other, because formidable, against whom, my countrymen, are we to draw our swords ? There are men too most powerful in pleading for the rights of others in opposition to your demands. To these I would make one request ; that they should en- deavor to display an equal zeal in the defence of your rights against your adversaries. Thus shall they be the first to show a real regard to justice. It is absurd to urge its precepts to you if they themselves pay no deference to its authority. And surely a member of this state cannot pretend to a regard for justice, who seeks industriously for every argument against us, ne- ver for those which may be urged in our favor. Con- sider, I conjure you, why, among the Byzantines, there is no man to inform them that they are not to seize Chalcedon, 2 which is really the king's ; which you 1 In the first year of the ninety-fourth olympiad the Lacedaemonians became masters of Athens, and there esta- blished the thirty tyrants. In the fourth year of the same olympiad Cyrus took up arms against his brother Artaxerxes. So that between these two events but a small interval of time intervened ; which sufficiently warrants the assertion of the orator. — Lucchesini. 2 Chalcedon.] This city of Bithynia, after various vicissi- tudes of fortune, had been given up to the king of Persia by the peace of Antalcidas. But now it appears to have been ex- posed in the invasions of the Byzantines as well as Sylem- 280 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. some time possessed ; but to which they have no sort of claim : that they should not attempt to reduce Sy- lembria to their subjection, a city once united in alli- ance with us : that in assuming a power of determining the boundaries of the Sylembrian territory, the By- zantines violate their oaths, they infringe those treaties which say expressly that this people shall be governed by their own laws. Why, during the life of Mauso- lus, or since his death, hath no one been found to in- form Artemisia that she is not to possess herself of Cos, of Rhodes, of many other Grecian states, which the king, who was master of them, ceded by treaty to the Greeks, and for which the Greeks of those days encountered many dangers, supported many noble contests ? Or, were these things thus urged to both, that they would have any influence, is by no means probable. — I, on my part, see no injustice in reinstating the people of Rhodes ; but, even if it were not strictly just, yet when I view the actions of others, 1 think it my duty to recommend this measure. And why? Because, if all others confined themselves within the bounds of justice, it would be shameful that you, Athenians, should be the only people to transgress. But, when every other state seeks all opportunities of acting injuriously, that you alone should give up every advantage, from pretended scruples, and nice distinc- tions of right, this is not justice but cowardice. In eflfect, indeed, we find men proportion their claims of right to their present power. Of this I shall men- tion one example well known to all. There are two treaties 1 on record between the Greeks and the king ; bria, ά maritime town in the neighborhood of Byzantium. — Lucchesini. 1 The passage, as here translated, plainly points out the two most famous treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians ; the one by Cimon the Athenian (An. 3. Olymp. 77,) ; the other by Antalcidas the Lacedaemonian (An. 2. Olymp. 98.) : the first was made immediately after the final overthrow of the Persian forces both by sea and land. By this treaty it was provided that all the Grecian cities in Asia should be free ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 281 that which our state concluded, which is the subject of universal praise ; and this latter made by the Lacedae- monians, which was condemned as odious and dis- honorable. In these treaties the rights of either party- were by no means defined in the same manner ; and no wonder, for in civil society the rights of individuals are determined by the laws, with the same equal and common regard to the weak and to the strong; but, in political and national transactions, the powerful ever prescribe the bounds of right to the weaker. You assume the character of arbitrators and defenders of justice : be careful then to preserve such power as may give due weight and effect to your determinations : and this will be done by showing that the Athenians are the general patrons and protectors of liberty. Sensible, indeed, I am, and with good reason, that it is not without the utmost difficulty that you can exe- cute any purposes of moment. All others have but one contest to maintain, that against their avowed ene- mies : when they have once conquered these, they en- and independent, and that no Persian ship of war should pre- sume to sail to the westward of the Cyanaean and Chelidonian islands ; that is, to approach so near as to give the least um- brage or alarm to the Greeks ; terms which plainly supposed the superiority of Greece, and are accordingly represented by historians as highly honorable to this nation. The latter treaty, on the contrary, was dictated by the Persians, and the weakness and disorders of the Greeks obliged them to accept of it. By this the Grecian colonies of Asia, together with some of the islands, were formally given up to the power and jurisdiction of the Persian king : and historians have not re- strained their indignation at the meanness and ignominy of these concessions. The interpreters and commentators have indeed rendered this passage in another manner. But, without entering into controversy, the translator submits the pertinency and pro- priety of the present interpretation to the judgment of the learned reader ; by no means confident, yet not without hopes of his concurrence. And should he happen to be more fortu- nate, in some particular instance, than his predecessors or associates in the same labor, he esteems it a matter which warrants no sort of triumph or exultation. 282 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. joy the fruits of their conquest without farther oppo- sition. But you, Athenians, have a double contest to support. Like others, you have your open enemies ; but you have enemies still more dangerous and alarm- ing: you have those of your own citizens to subdue, who in this assembly are engaged against the interests of their country : and, as they are ever strenuous in their opposition to all useful measures, it is no wonder that many of our designs are frustrated. Perhaps those emoluments which their corrupters hold forth to tempt them may be the inducement to many boldly to aspire to the rank of ministers and public counsel- lors. But still you yourselves may be justly blamed : for it is your part, Athenians, to entertain the same sentiments with regard to the rank of civil duty as to that of battle. And what are these sentiments ? He who deserts the post assigned him by the general you pronounce infamous, 1 and unworthy to share the com- mon rights of an Athenian citizen. In like manner he who, in our civil polity, abandons the station as- signed by our ancestors, and attempts to establish the power of the few, should be declared unworthy to speak in this assembly. Do you think it necessary to bind our allies by an oath to have the same friends and the same enemies with us, in order to be assured of their attachment ? And shall those ministers be deemed truly loyal who are certainly and evidently devoted to the service of our enemies ? But what might be urged in accusation against them, what might be urged with severity against you, it is by no means difficult to find. By what counsels, by 1 In the Olynthiac orations we find Demosthenes com- plaining that the severity of the ancient military laws had been considerably relaxed : and this passage furnishes us with a remarkable instance of such relaxation ; for, by the original laws and constitutions of Athens, it was declared a capital offence for any citizen to fly, or to desert from his post. Even he who cast away his shield was punished with death. If any man lost it by accidental neglect he was bound to pay a fine of five hundred drachmae. — Lucchesini. ORATION FOR THE RHODIANS. 283 what conduct the present disorders of our state may be removed — this is the great point of difficulty. Nor is this perhaps the time to enlarge on every particu- lar. Exert yourselves on the present occasion ; en- deavor to render your designs effectual by an advan- tageous execution ; and then your other interests may, perhaps, gradually wear a fairer aspect. It is therefore my opinion that you should engage in the affairs of this people with the utmost vigor, and act as becomes the dignity of Athens. Think with what joy you attend to those who praise your ancestors, who display their achievements, and recount their tro- phies ; and think that your ancestors erected these trophies, not that the view might barely strike you with admiration, but that you might imitate the vir- tues of the men who raised them. 1 1 From the succeeding oration we learn that the address and energy which Demosthenes exerted in favor of the peo- ple of Rhodes were by no„ means effectual. The times in which he lived were distracted and corrupted ; his country not well disposed, nor indeed possessed of force sufficient to support the general cause of liberty. The assembly in which he spoke was (if we except some extraordinary cases of im- mediate danger) ever governed by party. The citizens came together, not to deliberate on the public interests, but to sup- port a faction already determined, and resolved in what man- ner to give their voices, and armed against the power of truth. It is no wonder therefore that we find the most con- summate eloquence, the justest, the strongest, and the most animated representations in so many instances unsuccessful. THE ORATION ON THE REGULATION OF THE STATE : PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF THEOPHRASTUS, THE FIRST YEAR OF THE HUNDRED AND TENTH OLYMPIAD. INTRODUCTION. The contests between the Macedonians and Athenians (to which we owe the most valuable remains of Demosthenes) have been explained in the Notes and Introductions to the Phi- lippic orations. The reader is not now to be informed at what time, and with what success, King Philip attempted to re- duce Perinthus and Byzantium. When he found himself obliged to raise the siege of Byzantium he is said to have turned his arms against Scythia. The Athenians, who were elated by the least appearance of good fortune, considered this as a flight. They were fired with the imagination of an enemy, that had so long proved formidable and successful, defeated in his designs, and this principally by the coun- sels and arms of Athens, retiring before their general Pho- cion, and forced from all attempts on Greece to retrieve the honor of his arms in parts remote and barbarous. This they considered as the happy moment for pursuing their advan- tages, and for reducing that ambition to just and equitable bounds, which was now, for the first time, severely mortified and disappointed. In order to render the hostilities now meditated more for- . midable and effectual, the Athenians began seriously to re- flect on the causes of past misfortunes, and seemed resolved to reform those corruptions and abuses which had disgraced their constitution and weakened their power. The oppressions and severe exactions of which their allies and dependent states had lately found particular occasion to complain, and to which the necessity of their affairs had con- tributed, as well as the avarice of their commanders, naturally determined them to reflect on the necessity of making some effectual provision for the payment of their armies ; and this INTRODUCTION. 285 as naturally determined the honest and faithful counsellors to resume the consideration of that old scandalous abuse, the Theatrical Distributions. Of these the reader has been sufficiently informed in the Notes and Introductions to the Olynthiac orations. An assembly was therefore convened to consider of the most eligible methods to provide for the public exigences, in the least burdensome and most effectual manner; and particularly to consider of the _ expediency of restoring their theatrical funds to the service of the army ; a point which their misguided decrees had rendered so dangerous to be proposed. On this occasion was the following oration delivered ; in which the orator resumes his favorite subject with his usual spirit, yet with sufficient caution : points out the corruptions of his countrymen, with their causes and con- sequences, and describes both the ancient and present state of Athens — Athens uncorrupted, illustrious, and fortunate, and the same state degenerated and disgraced, with all the honest severity and indignation of a patriot. In this oration no mention is made of Philip or his designs, of the late transactions in Greece, of the late advantages or disgraces of the Athenian arms. The orator confines himself intirely, and directs the attention of his hearers to the points immediately under consideration ; and we find that these afforded him sufficient room for the exertion of his abilities. THE ORATION ON THE REGULATION OF THE STATE. Men of Athens !— As to this money, and the affairs at this time proposed to the assembly, it appears to me that a speaker may, without danger, espouse either side. 1 By condemning those who thus distribute and exhaust the public treasure, he may gain their esteem who regard this custom as injurious to the public ; or, by assenting and encouraging these distributions, he may recommend himself to their favor whose neces- sities prompt them to demand these public aids. By 1 The fatal consequences of lavishing the public revenues on spectacles and entertainments had been long and severely experienced. Yet still numbers were found in the assembly who, from private motives, either of interest, or to recom- mend themselves to the lower part of the citizens, pleaded in favor of this abuse, and found plausible arguments to urge in its favor. These, and their opposers, seem to have already debated the present point with considerable heat and vio- lence, and to have been supported by their respective parti- sans, not with that decorum or temper which, perhaps, are sometimes found in less numerous assemblies. Hence the appearance of moderation in this exordium; which, in the present disposition of the people, was probably necessary in order to obtain the orator an audience. And it may in general be observed, that although the eloquence of Demosthenes be commonly, and very justly, compared to the irresistible light- ning, storm, or torrent ; yet such similitudes are not to be understood too strictly ; for, on all necessary occasions, he appears a consummate master of the gentle arts of insinua- tion. He thunders and lightens indeed ; yet sometimes (if the allusion be warrantable), * half his strength he puts not forth. 7 Nor, in effect, does he ever give a free and full course to his energy until he has prepared his hearers to receive the impression. ORATION FOR THE STATE. 287 neither party is the interest of the state considered. Their approbation or their condemnation of this cus- tom is influenced intirely by their several circum- stances, of indigence, or affluence. I, on my part, shall neither oppose nor recommend it. But this I would intreat you seriously and maturely to consider, that the money, now the subject of debate, is of little moment ; but the custom which it hath produced, of great consequence. If then these distributions l be established for those who have first respectively discharged their public offices ; far from injuring, you will do the most essential service both to your country and to yourselves. But if a feast, or any other like pretence be sufficient for demanding these sums ; if the mention of any farther conditions be rejected with impatience, beware lest all your regulations, how spe- cious, how promising soever, may hereafter prove er- roneous. This I now declare as my opinion (let me not be in- terrupted by clamor ; but hear, and then determine) — That as we are now convened about receiving these distributions, so should an assembly be appointed to consider of a general regulation of the state, and par- ticularly of a provision for our military affairs ; and every citizen should discover, not only a just atten- 1 I have here endeavored to express what I take to be the intent and meaning of the orator, from comparing the passage with others of the like import in the Olynthiac orations. To propose to the assembly that the theatrical money (as it was called) should be applied to other purposes, was, by the law of Eubulus, declared a capital offence. Demosthenes there- fore advises, not that this money should be alienated to the payment of their armies, but that all citizens should receive their distributions as usual ; yet, at the same time, discharge all their respective offices whether civil or military, without farther salary or pay ; and that such only as had thus dis- charged, or were ready to discharge these offices, should be intitled to the public distributions. The two proposals are, in effect and reality, the same, but different in form ; and this difference was sufficient for eluding the severity of the law. — See note 2 p. 65. 288 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. tion to all useful measures, but a just alacrity to carry them into execution ; that so, my countrymen, our hopes of good success may depend on ourselves, in- stead of being amused with reports of this or that man's exploits. Let all the public treasures ; let all the funds for which private fortunes are now so use- lessly exhausted ; let all those resources which our allies aiFord be equitably distributed, and eifectually applied ; by the soldier, to his support in time of ac- tion ; by the man who hath passed the age of military duty, as a recompense for his services in the adminis- tration of justice. Let the duties of the field be dis- charged by yourselves, duties too important to be in- trusted to others ; let your armies be composed of citi- zens: thus let them be paid and provided. So shall they go on with vigor and success : so shall your gene- ral really command his forces ;* and so shall your oc- cupation be no longer to conduct the trials of your officers, nor the result of all your measures prove but this — an accuser, 2 an impeachment, and a criminal. What then may be expected from the measures now proposed ? First, that the attachment of our allies will be secured, not by garrisons, but by making their and our interests the same ; then, that our generals, at- tended by their troops of foreigners, will no longer 1 In the Philippic orations we find notice frequently taken of the misconduct of the Athenian generals, in employing their forces not conformably to their instructions, hut in ex- peditions neither appointed nor approved by their country. This Demosthenes ever affects to ascribe principally to dis- obedience and want of discipline in the foreign forces, and to the necessities of the general ; which obliged him to procure, by arms, that provision for his soldiers which the state ne- glected to supply. — See note 2 p. 34. 2 An accuser, &c] In the original, Such a man, the son of such a man, hath impeached such a person : — e O Bsipa του ΰζινοε, τον δβίί'α eunyyyeiKw. Alluding to the usual form of the hill or motion preferred to the assembly, or to the judges, on such occasions.— I have here chosen to adhere to the interpre- tation of Wolfius, as sufficiently warranted by the original, as most pertinent, and certainly most spirited. ORATION FOR THE STATE. 289 harass our confederates ! by their depredations, with- out once daring to face the enemy (a conduct by which all emoluments have centred in these generals, but which hath loaded the state with odium and dis- grace). On the contrary, by leading out an army com- posed of citizens, they shall inflict that severity on our enemies hitherto directed against our friends and allies. But, besides these, there are other affairs which de- mand your personal service. A war in our own coun- try must certainly be better supported by an army of our own citizens ; and for other purposes such an army is absolutely necessary. Were it consistent with your character to sit down inactive, without the least con- cern or interest in the aifairs of Greece, I should then use a different language. But now you affect the dig- nity of supreme commanders and umpires in Greece : but yet the forces to defend and to preserve this supe- riority you have not yet prepared, nor are solicitous to prepare. No : by your indolence and insensibility the people of Mitylene have lost their liberty: 2 by 1 When the Athenians sent to collect their tribute from the dependent islands they frequently employed an admiral, at- tended with such a navy as proved both a burden and a ter- ror to the islanders. When Phocion was appointed to sail with twenty ships on such an occasion — ' Why such a force V said this humane Athenian. ' If I am to meet enemies, it is insufficient ; if I am sent to friends, a single vessel will serve.' And even those allies who found themselves obliged to im- plore the assistance of the Athenians against their enemies, frequently experienced more miserable effects from the op- pression and rapine of their auxiliaries than from the arms of their assailants. So notorious and odious was the avarice of Chares, that when he led an army to the relief of Byzantium (a little before the date of this oration) the Byzantines shut their gates against him. 2 This change of the government at Mitylene, as it could not convey any instruction to posterity, has been passed over in silence by all the ancients except Demosthenes : so that we are ignorant of the manner in which it was effected (and how far the Athenians were really to blame in not pre- venting it). — Lucchesini. DEM. Τ 290 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. your indolence and insensibility the people of Rhodes have lost their liberty. — But these, it may be said, were our enemies. Yet we should regard oligarchies as much more the objects of our aversion (merely on account of their constitution) than free states can be from any cause. But I have wandered from my purpose. My advice is this : that you should be arranged in your Classes ; and that, by one and the same regulation, you should be intitled to receive, and obliged to act. Of these things I have spoken on former occasions, and ex- plained the manner in which our infantry, our cavalry, in which those who are exempt from military service may be all duly regulated, and all receive their sti- pends fully. But that which of all things gives me the most melancholy apprehensions I shall here declare without disguise. Many and noble and important are the objects which should command your attention : yet no man hath the least respect to any one of them ; all attend solely to the wretched pittance * you distribute. Such a pittance then, they must confess, is adequate to their desert : but a just attention to the objects I have mentioned must have consequences more valuable than all the wealth of Persia — the exact regulation and ap- pointment of a state like this, possessed of so great an infantry, of such a navy, of such a cavalry, of such revenues. But wherefore do I mention these things ? For this reason. There are men shocked at the thoughts of obliging all our citizens to serve in war ; but there are 1 To the wretched pittance, &c] Literally, to the twooboli ; that is, c 2\d., the sum distributed to the poorer citizens for their support, and for the purchase of their seats in the theatre ; and, small as this largess was, yet, as the number of such citizens was great, and as the distribution seems to have been made daily, the treasury must have been consider- ably exhausted by it. Nor are we warranted to suppose that the people always confined their demands to this sum. En- tertainments, processions, and religious ceremonies, afforded pretences for still farther demands. ORATION FOR THE STATE. 2<>1 none who do not readily acknowlege that it is of the utmost moment to the state to be duly regulated and perfectly provided. It is your part, therefore, to begin here, and to allow a full freedom of speech to those who would urge the importance of this point in its full force. If you be convinced that this is the proper time for considering of the necessary provisions, you may command them when called to action : but should you imagine that such considerations may more pro- perly be deferred to some future occasion, then must you be reduced to give up the time of execution to the necessary preparations. It may have been already asked, Athenians, (not by the majority of this assembly, but by certain per- sons who would burst with vexation should these mea- sures be pursued,) ' What real advantage have we derived from the speeches of Demosthenes ? He rises when he thinks proper : he deafens us with his ha- rangues : he declaims against the degeneracy of pre- sent times : he tells us of the virtues of our ancestors : he transports us by his airy extravagance : he puffs up our vanity ; and then sits down/ — But could these my speeches once gain an effectual influence on your minds, so great would be the advantages conferred on my coun- try, that were I to attempt to speak them they would appear to many as visionary. Yet still I must assume the merit of doing some service by accustoming you to hear salutary truths : and if your counsellors be solicitous for any point of moment to their country, let them first cure your ears ; for they are distempered : and this, from the inveterate habit of listening to false- hoods, to every thing rather than your real interests. Thus it lately happened — let no man interrupt me ; let me have a patient hearing — that some persons broke into the treasury. The speakers all instantly exclaimed, ' Our free constitution is overturned : our laws are no more/ And now, ye men of Athens, judge if I speak with reason. They who are guilty of this crime justly deserve to die ; but by such offenders 292 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. our constitution is not overturned. Again, some oars * have been stolen from our arsenal. — 4 Stripes and tor- tures for the villain! Our constitution is subverted V This is the general cry. But what is my opinion 1 This criminal, like the others, hath deserved to die : but, if some are criminal, our constitution is not there- fore subverted. There is no man who dares openly and boldly to declare in what case our constitution is 1 Some oars, &c] We cannot well suppose that the depre- dations made in their naval stores were really so slight and inconsiderable as they are represented in these extenuating terms. A design had lately been concerted of a very momen- tous and alarming nature, and an attempt made on the naval stores at Athens, which Demosthenes himself labored with the almost zeal to detect and punish. A man named Antipho had been for some time considered as an Athenian citizen; till, by an examination of the registers, he was found to be really a foreigner ; was accordingly deprived of all the privileges of a native, and driven with some ignominy from the city. En- raged at this disgrace, he went off to Philip, and to him pro- posed to steal privately into Athens, and to set fire to the arsenal. The Macedonian, who was neither delicate in the choice of his instruments, nor in the means of distressing his enemies, listened readily to the proposal of this hireling, and by bribes and promises encouraged him to the attempt. An- tipho repaired to Athens, and was lodged in the port, ready to put his enterprise in execution, when Demosthenes, who received timely intimation of this black design, flew to the Piraeus, and seized, and dragged the delinquent before an assembly of the people. Here the clamors of the Macedo- nian party were so violent, that the accusation was slighted, and Antipho dismissed without the formality of a trial. He departed, triumphing in his escape, to pursue his designs witli greater confidence and security. But the court of areo- pagus, whose peculiar province it was to take the cognisance of all matters of treason against the state, caused him to be again seized and examined. Torture forced from him a full confession of his guilt, and sentence of death was passed, and executed on him. This account we have from the ora- tion on the Crown. And the detection of so dangerous a de- sign might have quickened the vigilance of the people, and exasperated their resentment against any the least attempts made on their military stores. ORATION FOR THE STATE. 293 subverted. But I shall declare it. When you, Athe- nians, become an helpless rabble, without conduct, without property, without arms, without order, with- out unanimity ; when neither general nor any other per- son hath the least respect for your decrees. When no man dares to inform you of this your condition, to urge the necessary reformation, much less to exert his efforts to effect it, then is your constitution subverted : and this is now the case. But, Ο my fellow-citizens ! a language of a different nature hath poured in on us, false and highly dangerous to the state. Such is that assertion that in your tribu- nals is your great security ; that your right of suffrage is the real bulwark of the constitution. That these tribunals are our common resource in all private con- tests, I acknowlege : but it is by arms we are to subdue our enemies ; by arms we are to defend our state. It is not by our decrees that we can conquer. To those on the contrary who fight our battles with success, to those we owe the power of decreeing, of transacting all our affairs, without control or danger. In arms then let us be terrible ; in our judicial transactions humane. If it be observed that these sentiments are more ele- vated than might be expected from my character, the observation I confess is just. Whatever is said about a state of such dignity on affairs of such importance should appear more elevated than any character. To your worth should it correspond, not to that of the speaker. And now I shall inform you why none of those who stand high in your esteem speak in the same manner. The candidates for office and employment go about soliciting your voices, the slaves of popular favor : to gain the rank of general is each man's great concern ; not to fill this station with true manlike intrepidity. Courage, if he possesses it, he deems un- necessary ; for thus he reasons : he has the honor, the renown of this city to support him ; he finds himself free from oppression and control ; he needs but to amuse you with fair hopes ; and thus he secures a kind 294 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. of inheritance in your emoluments. And he reasons truly. But do you yourselves once assume the con- duct of your own affairs, and then, as you take an equal share of duty, so shall you acquire an equal share of glory. Now your ministers and public speak- ers, without one thought of directing you faithfully to your true interest, resign themselves intirely to these generals. Formerly you divided 1 into classes, in order to raise the supplies : now the business of the classes is to gain the management of public affairs. The orator is the leader ; the general seconds his attempts ; the Three Hundred are the assistants on each side ; and all others take their parties and serve to fill up the several factions. And you see the consequences : this man gains a statue ; this amasses a fortune : one or two command the state ; while you sit down uncon- cerned witnesses of their success ; and, for an uninter- rupted course of ease and indolence, give them up those great and glorious advantages which really belong- to you. And now consider what was the conduct of our an- cestors in these particulars (for if we would be taught how to act with dignity, we need not look to other countries for examples ; we have had them in our own state) to Themistocles, who commanded in the sea- fight at Salamis f to Miltiades, the general at Mara- thon ; to many others, who surely never did such ser- vices as our present generals. They never once erected a brazen statue. These men never were such darling 1- Formerly you divided, &c] See note °2 p. 57. 2 Who commanded in the sea-fight at Salamis, &c] These are the very expressions of the original : and although the common metonymical phrase, who gained the victory at Sala- mis, might appear less uncouth, and he more familiar to a modern ear, yet I should have thought it. unpardonable in the translation, as it is a mode of speaking which Demosthenes studiously avoids : and, indeed, had he been betrayed into it, he must have exposed himself to all the ridicule of his acute and observant audience ; for, in the very next sen- tence, he condemns it as highly derogatory to the honor of his country. ORATION FOR THE STATE. 295 favorites : never were deemed superior to their fellow- citizens. No, by the gods ! the Athenians of those days never would give up their share in the honor of any noble action : nor is there a man that will say, the sea-fight of Themistocles, at Salamis, but of the Athe- nians : not the engagement at Marathon, by Miltiades, but by the state. But now we are perpetually told that Timotheus took Corcyra ; that Iphicrates cut off the detachment ; that Chabrias gained the naval vic- tory at Naxos : thus you seem to resign all your share in these actions by those extravagant honors which you heap on your generals. Such was the noble conduct of our ancestors in re- warding citizens, and such is your mistaken conduct ! But of honoring foreigners, what have been the me- thods ? To Menon the Pharsalian, who supplied us with twelve talents of silver in our war at Eion, near Amphipolis, 1 and reinforced us with two hundred horsemen of his own dependents, our ancestors never voted the freedom of our city, but only granted certain immunities. 2 And in earlier times Perdiccas, who 1 This war at Eion, near Amphipolis, I am bold to assert was the same with that so particularly described by Thucydi- des, in the eighth, ninth, and tenth years of the Peloponne- sian war, when the Lacedaemonians, under the command of Brasidas, opposed the Athenians in this country, although the historian, who confined himself to the transactions of greatest importance, makes no mention of this assistance afforded to the Athenians by Menon the Pharsalian. This Menon I take to be the same with the Thessalian of that name, who, in the fourth year of the ninety-fourth olympiad, led a body of forces to the assistance of Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes, according to Diodorus and Xenophon. The cir- cumstances of his supplying the Athenians with money, and giving them a body of horse, exactly agree to two particulars in the character of that Menon whom Xenophon describes ; that it was his custom to court the friendship of the powerful, that they might screen him from the punishment due to his infa- mous practices ; and that he constantly kept in his service a large body of forces ready to act as he directed. — Lucchesini. 2 Certain immunities, &c] A manner of doing honor to these men which, at the same time, expressed a high sense 296 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. reigned in Macedon * at the time of the barbarian's in- vasion, who fell on the barbarians in their retreat from of the dignity of their own city : for it supposed that these eminent personages might find it necessary to take up their residence for some considerable time at Athens, as sojourners: and, in order to understand the nature of these immunities, we must attend to the situation of those μέτοικοι, or sojourners ; so were these foreigners called who settled at Athens by per- mission of the areopagus. Here they were allowed to follow their occupations without disturbance ; but had no share in the government ; were not intrusted with public offices, nor voted in the assembly. They were obliged to the perform- ance of certain duties ; as in the festival celebrated in honor of Minerva, called Panathenaea, the men were obliged to carry the σκαφαι, or little ships, which were the signs of their foreign extraction, while the women bore the ύδριαι, vessels of water, and the σκιαδεια, umbrellas, to defend the free women from the weather. This last custom, indeed, was introduced in the insolence of the Athenian prosperity, after the defeat of the Persians. Besides this the men paid an annual tribute of twelve drachmae. The women who had no sons paid six. Such as had sons that paid were excused. And this tribute was exacted not only of those that dwelt in Athens, but of all that settled themselves in any town of Attica. This tribute, by the interposition of Themistocles, was for a time remitted, but seems to have been restored in consequence of his dis- grace ; and, on any failure of payment, the delinquent was liable to be seized and sold as a slave. — Such of these so- journers as had been remarkably serviceable to the public were honored, by edict, with an immunity from all imposi- tions and duties, except such as were required of the free- born citizens. Hence this honor was called ισοτελςια, and ατ€λ€ία (the expression of the text). To foreigners of emi- nence such immunities might have extended even to an ex- emption from certain duties to which citizens themselves were obliged : for immunities of this kind were frequently granted, so as to occasion complaints and remonstrances. 1 Perdiccas, who reigned in Macedon, &c. J According to He- rodotus, Alexander, the son of Amyntas, was king of Macedon at the time of the Persian war : and therefore we may suppose, with the Italian commentator, that this Perdiccas was one of the royal family, and governed one of those districts into which Macedon was divided in the earlier times. Nor are we to wonder that this action of the Macedonian has been passed over in silence by the historians, as it was not very consider- ORATION FOR THE STATE. 297 the slaughter of Plateea, and completed the ruin of the king, they never voted the freedom of the city ; they but granted him immunities ; thoroughly persuaded that the honor of being a citizen of Athens was too exalted, too illustrious, to be purchased by any ser- vices. But now, my countrymen, it is exposed to com- mon sale : the most abandoned of mankind, the slaves l of slaves are admitted to pay down the price, and at once obtain it. And such difference of conduct doth not arise from this, that you are naturally less excel- lent than your ancestors ; but from those truly noble sentiments which they were accustomed to entertain, and which you have lost : for it is not possible that men engaged in low and groveling pursuits can be possessed with great and generous thoughts : just as those who act with dignity and honor cannot harbor any mean and abject thought. Whatever be their course of conduct, such must men's sentiments ever prove. And now let us take one general view of the actions performed by our ancestors and by ourselves, that by such comparison we may learn to excel ourselves. Five-and-forty years did they govern Greece with general consent : more than ten thousand talents did they collect into our treasury : many and noble monu- able, when compared with the great events of the Persian war. 1 The slaves, &c] The freedom of the city was, by the con- stitution of Athens, conferred only by the voices of the peo- ple ; nor was their act valid unless confirmed in a subsequent assembly by the votes of more than six thousand Athenians, by ballot (as we learn from the oration of Demosthenes against Neaera) ; but now their poverty had made them much less delicate. And we learn from Athenreus that they had about this time conferred the freedom of their city (this compliment, in former times, scarcely vouchsafed to kings and potentates) on two men, whose only pretence of merit was, that their father had been famous for improving the art of cookery. Such a scandalous prostitution of their honors fully justifies all the severity of Demosthenes. 298 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. ments did they erect, of victories by land and sea, which are yet the objects of our applause : and be assured, that they erected these, not to be viewed in silent wonder, but that you might be excited to emu- late the virtues of those who raised them. Such was their conduct. Say, then, can we, though seated thus securely above all opposition, boast of any actions like these ? Have we not lavished more than one thousand five hundred talents on every Grecian state that pleaded their distress? — and all to no purpose. Have we not exhausted all our private fortune s> all the revenues of our state, all we could exact from our confederates ? The allies which we gained by arms, have they not been given up in our treaties ? — Yes ; in these particu- lars it is granted that our ancestors excelled us ; but there are others in which we are superior. — Far from it ! — Shall we pursue the comparison ? The edifices they have left to us, their decorations of our city, of our temples, of our harbors, of all our public struc- tures, are so numerous and so magnificent, that their successors can make no addition. Look round you, to their vestibules, their arsenals, their porticos, and all those honors of our city which they transmitted to us : yet were the private habitations of the men of emi- nence in those times so moderate, so consonant to that equality, the characteristic of our constitution, that if any one of you knows the house of Themistocles, of Cimon, of Aristides, of Miltiades, or of any of the then illustrious personages, he knows that it is not distinguished by the least mark of grandeur. But now, ye men of Athens, as to public works, the state is satisfied if roads be repaired, if water be supplied, if walls be whitened, if any trifle be provided. Not that I blame those who have executed such works. No : I blame you, who can think so meanly as to be satisfied with such fruits of their administration. Then, in private life, of the men who have conducted our aifairs, some have built houses not only more magnifi- cent than those of other citizens, but superior to our ORATION FOR THE STATE. 299 public edifices ; others have purchased and improved an extent of land greater than all their dreams of riches ever presented to their fancies. And here lies the great source of these errors. For- merly, all power and authority were in the people. Happy was it for any individual if they vouchsafed him a share of honors, employments, or emoluments. But now, on the contrary, individuals are the masters of all advantages, the directors of all affairs ; whilst the people stand in the mean rank of their servants and assistants, fully satisfied if these men vouchsafe to grant them some small share of their abundance. To such a state have we been reduced by these means, that if a man were to peruse your decrees, and then distinctly to examine your actions, he could not persuade himself that the same people had been authors of both. Witness the decrees you made against the accursed Megareans, 1 who had possessed themselves of the consecrated ground ; that you would march out ; that you would oppose them ; that you would not per- mit such sacrilege : witness your decrees about the Phliasian exiles ; 2 that you would support them ; that 1 This instance of the impiety of the Megareans, of whom Demosthenes here affects to speak with so much detestation, probably happened about the time, and was the occasion of the embassy of Anthemocritus, of whom mention is made in Philip's Letter to the Athenians. — Lucchesini. 2 As this affair is not mentioned in history, and but slightly hinted at by Demosthenes, it requires some pains to investi- gate it. The Phliasians had ever been in open or secret en- mity with the Argives ; while the one endeavored to support their independency, the other, to reduce their city, which they regarded as part of their own territory. In the third year of the hundred and first olympiad certain Phliasians who had been banished, formed a conspiracy with some kins- men, who still continued in the city, in order to betray it to the Argives. It was attacked vigorously by night, and the enemy, with the utmost difficulty, repelled. This attempt exasperated each party, and produced various quarrels and hostilities. And wdiether these were suspended, or conti- nued down to the date of this oration, it seems to admit of no doubt that the Argives and Arcadians, supported by the 300 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. you would not abandon them to their assassins ; that you would call on those of the Peloponnesians who were inclined to unite with you in their cause. These were all noble declarations; these were just; these were worthy of our state. Not so the execution. Thus your decrees serve but to discover your hostile dispo- sitions ; your enemies never feel their effects. The resolutions of your assemblies fully express the dig- nity of your country ; but that force which should attend these resolutions you do not possess. It is in my opinion your only alternative (and let it not raise your indignation), either to entertain sentiments less elevated, and to confine your attention to your own affairs, or to arm y ourselves - with greater force. If this assembly were composed of the inhabitants of some obscure and contemptible islands, I should advise you to think less highly. But as you are Athenians, I must urge you to increase your force : for it is shame- ful, Ο my countrymen ! it is shameful to desert that rank of magnanimity in which our ancestors have placed us. Could we descend to such a thought it would be impossible to withdraw our attention from the affairs of Greece. We have ever acted greatly and nobly : those who are our friends it would be scandalous to desert : our enemies we cannot trust ; nor must we suffer them to become powerful. In a word, we see in this city that the men who have en- gaged in the public administration, even when they wish to retire, cannot resign their charge. This is your case : you are the ministers in Greece. This then is the sum of what hath now been offered. Your speakers never can make you either bad or good : you can make them whatever you please. You are not directed by their opinions ; for they have no opi- king of Macedon, made war on the Phliasians, restored the exiles, and drove out those citizens who had opposed their interest ; and that these citizens, thus oppressed and ex- pelled, implored the assistance of the Athenians, and re- ceived those magnificent promises and decrees, which the orator here mentions. — Lucchesini, ORATION FOR THE STATE. 301 nion but what your inclinations dictate. It is your part therefore to he careful that your inclinations be good and honorable : then shall all be well. Your speakers either must never give pernicious counsels, or must give them to no purpose, when such counsels have no longer any influence in this assembly. 1 1 These representations of Demosthenes were so far suc- cessful that, early in the following year, the assembly re- pealed that scandalous law of Eubulus, which denounced death against any person who should propose the alienation of the theatrical appointments; and the orator himself had the honor of introducing a decree for applying them to the military service : to which the people consented, when it was too late to derive any considerable advantages from this reformation. THE FIRST OF THE SUSPECTED ORATIONS, INTITLED, ON THE HALONESTJS: PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF SOSIGENES, THE THIRD YEAR OF THE HUNDRED AND NINTH OLYMPIAD. INTRODUCTION. It was not originally my intention to have translated either of the following orations : nor is it from any alteration in my opinion, but from a deference to that of others, that I have presented this on the Halonesns to the English reader; in order to give him an opportunity of comparing it with the others, and of judging for himself whether it is to be ad- mitted among the genuine remains of our orator ; or to be rejected as unworthy of his abilities, although apparently received and quoted by the ancient critics. This oration takes its title from an island called Halonesus, which one Sostratus, a pirate, had some time since taken from the Athenians, and which Philip, having driven out this pirate, now claimed as his property. This was regarded at Athens as an infraction of the treaty lately concluded (of which some account has been given in the Introduction to the Oration on the Peace) ; and, together with some other transactions of the Macedonian prince, produced complaints and jealousies amongst the Athenians, which were deemed by their rival of too much consequence to be neglected. Python, one of his most able partisans, was despatched to Athens, to obviate all objections to the sincerity and inte- grity of his conduct. In order to corroborate the representations of this ambassa- dor, Philip found it expedient to write a letter to the Athe- nians ; which, although addressed immediately to this people, was intended as a kind of manifesto to all Greece. This let- ter, among other pieces of the same kind, which might have done honor to the abilities of the Macedonian, is unhappily lost to posterity ; but the general contents of it are distinctly pointed out in the following oration, which contains a regu- lar and methodical answer to it. THE ORATION ON THE HALONESUS. Men of Athens ! — It is by no means reasonable that the complaints which Philip urges against those speakers who assert your rights should deprive us of the liberty of enforcing the true interests of our country. Griev- ous, indeed, would be the case if the freedom of our public debates were to be at once destroyed by a letter sent from him. It is my present purpose, first, to exa- mine the several allegations mentioned in this letter ; then shall we proceed to the other particulars urged by his ambassadors. 1 Philip begins with speaking of the Halonesus : this island, he declares, is his ; that he presents it to us as a free gift ; that we have no rightful claim to it ; nor hath he injured our property either in acquiring or in keeping possession of it. Such were his professions at the time when we were sent on our embassy to Mace- don : that he had won this island from the pirates who had seized it, and was therefore justified in keeping his acquisition. But, as this plea hath no support from 1 The oration, as has been already observed, plainly points out to us the several allegations and apologies for Philip's conduct contained in the letter which occasioned the present debate. And this exordium as plainly shows that, to these allegations, the writer added some strong remonstrances against the severity and indecency with which some speakers in the assembly had, on many occasions, treated the character of the king of Macedon ; and demanded that some restraint should be laid on their insolence. The author of the oration, artfully enough, considers this as an attempt to control that freedom of speech and debate which was the sacred right of every, even the meanest citizen. It was the privilege, as we may call it, of the assembly ; and therefore is with propriety asserted previous to the consideration of any other particular. 304 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. truth and justice, it is not difficult to deprive him of it The places seized hy pirates are ever the property of some others : these they fortify, and from thence make their excursions. But the man who punishes their outrages and drives them out, cannot reasonably allege that the possessions which these pirates unjustly wrested from the rightful proprietors must instantly devolve to him. If this he suffered, then, if some pirates should seize a part of Attica, or of Lemnos, or of Imbros, or of Scyros, and if any power should cut them oif, the places which they had seized, though our undoubted property, must continue in his possession whose arms chastised these pirates. Philip is himself sensible of the weakness of this plea. There are others equally sensible of this ; but it is imagined easy to impose on you by means of those who are administering our affairs agreeably to the wishes of the Macedonian ; who promised him, and are now performing this ser- vice. Yet he cannot but know that we must come into possession of this island, in whatever terms our transaction may be expressed, whether you accept it or resume it. 1 Why then should he not use the fair 1 Accept it or resume it.]' kv τ€ λαβητε, αν τ' απο\αβ-ητ€. This was a distinction suggested and asserted by Demosthenes, as we learn from a passage in the oration of iEschines against Ctesiphon, where it is ridiculed as frivolous and litigious. But (as M. Tourreil observes on that passage) the Athenians had most important reasons to examine which of these two terms they used in their convention with Philip ; for ac- cording to the choice of one or the other term their right to the Halonesus was established or destroyed. The king of Macedon consented to put them in possession of the island ; he declared that he would give it to them. If then the Athe- nians were to answer that they accepted of it (as a gift or fa- vor), by this they must acknowlege that Philip was the right- ful proprietor of the island. It was therefore insisted that this prince should declare that he restored it ; while the Athe- nians on their part declared that they resumed it : which plainly implied that the Macedonian had usurped their right, and that they were truly and justly intitled to the Halonesus. Yet however reasonable and necessary such precision may ap- pear, and particularly in transactions with a prince of so much ORATION ON THE HALONESUS. 305 and equitable term, and restore it, rather than adhere to that word which proves his injustice, and pretend to present it as a gift ? Not that he may be supposed to confer a benefit on us (such benefits are ridiculous) ; but that he may demonstrate to all Greece that the Athenians think themselves happy in owing' their ma- ritime dominions to the favor of the Macedonian. Ο my countrymen ! let us not descend to this. As to his proposal of submitting this contest to um- pires, it is the language of derision and mockery. It supposes, in the first place, that we, who are Athe- nians, could, in our disputes with one sprung from Pella, descend to have our title to the islands deter- mined by arbitration. And, if our own power, that power to which Greece owes its liberty, cannot secure us the possession of these places ; if umpires are to be appointed ; if we are to commit our cause to them ; if their votes are absolutely to decide our rights ; and, if they are to secure to us these islands (provided l that they be influenced by Philip's gold) ; — if such, I say, be your conduct, do ye not declare that ye have re- signed all your power on the continent ? do ye not dis- cover to the world that no attempt can possibly pro- voke you to oppose him, when for your maritime address and artifice as Philip, yet the ridicule of iEschines had some effect ; and, a man ivho disputes about the words giving or restoring, became a proverbial phrase to express a person of an obstinate adherence to nice and frivolous dis- tinctions. The comic poets did not a little contribute to in- troduce this proverb into fashion. Athenaeus quotes a num- ber of fragments, in which we find that Alexis, Anaxilas, and Timocles, employed it to heighten the humor and pleasantry of their performances ; and Athenieus himself makes use of it in the beginning of the sixth book. 1 Provided, &c] iEschines asserts in the oration against Ctesiphon that, in the present debate, Demosthenes declared that no impartial arbitrators could be found in Greece, so general had been the influence of corruption. If Demosthe- nes was really the author of this oration we must suppose that the assertion of his rival was founded on the insinuation contained in the passage here quoted. DEM. U 306 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES, dominions, whence Athens derives its greatest power, you have not recourse to arms, but submit to um- pires ? He farther observes, that his commissioners have been sent hither to settle a cartel of commerce ; l and that this shall be confirmed, not when it hath received the sanction of your tribunal, as the law directs, but when it hath been returned to him. Thus would he assume a power over your judicature. His intention is to betray you into unguarded concessions, to have it expressly acknowleged in this cartel that you do not accuse him of injuring the state by his outrageous conduct with respect to Potidaea ; that you confirm his right both of seizing and possessing this city. And yet those Athenians who had settled in Potidaea, at a time when they were not at war with Philip ; when they were united with him in alliance ; when the most solemn engagements subsisted between them ; when they had the utmost reliance on Philip's oaths, were yet despoiled by this prince of all their possessions. And now, he would have you ratify this his iniquitous procedure, and declare that you have suffered no in- jury, that you have no complaints to urge against him : for, that the Macedonians have no need of any cartels in their commerce with the Athenians, former times afford sufficient proof. Neither Amyntas, the father of Philip, nor any of the other kings of Macedon ever made these cartels with our state, although our inter- course was much greater in those days than now : for Macedon was then subject to us; it paid us tribute ; 2 1 A cartel of commerce.] The word thus rendered (σύμβολα) is explained by lexicographers as denoting, among many other particulars, certain conventions (συνθηκας) settled be- tween two states, as a rule for the decision of all differences which might arise in their commercial intercourse with each other. The particular nature, force, effects, and conse- quences of such conventions the translator cannot take on him to explain distinctly ; nor, of consequence, the force and propriety of the speaker's argument in this passage. 2 I do not remember to have met with any particular ac- ORATION ON THE HALONESUS. 307 and then, much more than now, did we frequent their markets, and they enjoy the advantages of ours : nor were the tribunals to which affairs of commerce might be brought settled in so regular a manner as at pre- sent. As these are opened once in each month, they make all cartels between two countries, so far removed from each other, quite unnecessary. And, as these were not agreeable to ancient usage, it is by no means prudent to establish them now, and thus to subject men to the inconvenience of a voyage from Mace don to Athens, or from us to Macedon, in order to obtain justice. The laws of each country are open ; and they are sufficient for the decision of all controversies. Be assured, therefore, that by this cartel he means but to betray you into a resignation of all your pretensions to Potidaea. As to the pirates, he observes, that justice requires that we should act in concert with him, in order to guard against those who infest the seas. By this he in eiFect desires that we should resign to him the sovereignty of the seas, and acknowlege that, without Philip's aid, we are not able to secure a navigation free and unmolested. Nor is this his only scheme. He would have an uncontrolled liberty of sailing- round and visiting the several islands, under the pre- tence of defending them from pirates ; that so he may corrupt the inhabitants, and seduce them from their count of Macedon being at any time tributary to Athens hut in Demosthenes. Eurydice, the mother of Philip, was indeed obliged to implore the protection of Iphicrates the Athenian. — Wolfius. Tourreil, in his notes on the second Olynthiac oration, dates the period of the Macedonians being in this tributary state from the establishment of the Athenian colony at Am• phipolis, under Agnon the son of Nicias (about forty -eight years before the Peloponnesian war), to the fifth or sixth year of this war, when Brasidas, the Lacedaemonian, drove the Athenians from tbe frontiers of Macedon. But this is no more than the conjecture of the critic, founded on the authority of the present passage. 308 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. allegiance to us. Not contented with transporting his exiles to Thasus, 1 under the conduct of our com- manders, he would gain possession of the other islands by sending out his fleets to sail in company with our admirals, as if united with us in the defence of the seas. There are some who say that he hath no occasion for a maritime power : yet he who hath no occasion to secure such a power prepares his ships for war, erects his arsenals, concerts his naval expeditions, and, by the vast expense bestowed on his marine, plainly shows that it is the grand object of his attention. And can you think, ye men of Athens ! that Philip could desire you to yield to him this sovereignty of the seas unless he held you in contempt? unless he had firm reliance on the men whose services he de- termined to purchase? the men who, insensible to shame, live for Philip, not for their country ; who vainly fancy they have enriched their families hj the bribes received from him, when these bribes are really the prices for which they have sold their families. And now, with respect to the explanation of the articles of the peace, which the ambassadors commis- sioned by him submitted to our determination (as we insisted only on a point universally acknowleged to be just, that each party should enjoy their own domi- nions), he denies that ever his ambassadors were com- missioned to make, or ever did make such a conces- sion ; so that his partisans must have persuaded him that you have utterly forgotten the declarations made publicly in the assembly. But these of all things can- not possibly be forgotten : for in the very same as- sembly his ambassadors rose, and made these declara- tions ; and, in consequence of them, the decree was instantly drawn up. As then the recital of the decree immediately succeeded the speeches of the ambassa- dors it is not possible that you could have recited 1 This must have happened immediately after their treaty with Macedon, before they found any reason to complain of the insidious conduct of Philip with respect to this treaty. ORATION ON THE HALONESUS. 309 their declarations falsely. This then is an insinuation not against me, but against the assembly ; as if you had transmitted a decree containing an answer to points never once mentioned. But these ambassadors, whose declarations were thus falsified, at the time when we returned our answer in form, and invited them to a public entertainment, never once rose up, never once ventured to say, 4 Men of Athens, we have been misrepresented ; you have made us say what we never said ;' but acquiesced, and departed. Recollect, I intreat you, the declarations of Python, who was at the head of this embassy, the man who then received the public thanks of the assembly. They cannot, I presume, have escaped your memory ; and they were exactly consonant to Philip's present letter. He accused us of calumniating Philip ; he declared that you yourselves were to be blamed ; for, when his master was endeavoring to do you service, when he preferred your alliance to that of any other of the Grecian states, you defeated his kind intentions by listening to sycophants, who wished to receive his money, and yet loaded him with invectives : that when those speeches were repeated to him, in which his repu- tation was so severely treated, and which you heard with such satisfaction, he naturally changed his de- termination, as he found that he was regarded as devoid of faith by those whom he had resolved to oblige. He desired that the men who spoke in this assembly should not declaim against the peace, which certainly was not to be broken ; but that, if any article was amiss, it should be amended, in which we might be assured of Philip's intire concurrence. But that, if they con- tinued their invectives, without proposing any thing by which the treaty might be confirmed, and all suspi- cions of his master removed, then no attention should be given to such men. You heard these declarations of Python ; you assented ; you said that they were just ; and just they certainly were. But by these profes- sions it was by no means intended to give up an 310 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. article l of the treaty so essential to his interest ; to give up what all his treasures had been expended to obtain : no ; he had been taught by his instructors of this place that not a man would dare to propose any thing contradictory to that decree of Philocrates by which we lost Amphipolis. I, on my part, Athenians, never have presumed to propose any thing illegal. I have indeed ventured to speak against the decree of Philocrates, because it was illegal. For this decree, by which Amphipolis was lost, contradicted former decrees, by which our right to this territory was as- serted. This then was an illegal decree which Philo- crates proposed ; and, therefore, he who had the due regard to our laws in all that he proposed could not but contradict a decree so inconsistent with our laws. By conforming to the ancient legal acts of this assem- bly, I showed the due attention to the laws, and, at the same time, proved that Philip was deceiving you ; that he had no intention of amending any article of the treaty ; that his sole purpose was to destroy the credit of those speakers who asserted the rights of their country. It is then manifest that, having first consented to this amendment of the treaty, he now recals his con- cession. He insists that Amphipolis is his ; that you have acknowleged it to be his by the very words of your decree, which declare that he shall enjoy his own possessions. Such was, indeed, your declaration : 1 An article, &c] That is, to give up Amphipolis, which was claimed on each side by virtue of that clause which de- clared that the contracting powers should keep all their se- veral dominions. Philip was now in possession of this city, The right of the Athenians had been at first asserted in the congress held for settling the terms of the peace : hut this point was afterwards given up. Yet now we find it was re- vived ; at least that the speakers who opposed the Macedo- nian interest endeavored to persuade the people that the ces- sion lately made was illegal, and that the general clause should be explained in favor of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. ORATION ON THE HALONESUS. 311 but not that Amphipolis was Philip's : for a man may possess the property of others ; nor can possession infer a right, since it is frequently acquired by unjust usurpation. So that his argument is no more than an idle sophistical equivocation. He insists particularly on the decree of Philocrates ; but he forgets his letter to this state at the time when he laid siege to Amphi- polis ; in which he directly acknowleged that Amphi- polis belonged to you, and declared that his intention in attacking this city was to wrest it from the then possessors, who had no claim to it, and to vest it in the Athenians, who were the rightful sovereigns. Well, then ! the men who were in possession of this city before Philip's conquest usurped our right ; but, when Philip had reduced it, did our right cease at once .' Did he but recover his own dominions ? When he re- duced Olynthus also, when he subdued Apollonia, when he gained Pallene, did he but recover his own domi- nions? — When he makes use of such evasion, can you think that he is at all solicitous to preserve a decent semblance of reason and justice ? No : he treats you with contempt in presuming to dispute your title to a city which the whole nation of Greece, which the Per- sian king himself, by the most authentic declarations, acknowleged to be ours. Another amendment of the treaty which we con- tended for was this ; that all the Greeks not included in the peace should enjoy their liberty and their laws ; and that, if invaded, they should be defended by all the confederating parties. For this, I say, we con- tended ; sensible that justice and humanity required, not only that we and our allies, and Philip and his allies, should enjoy the advantages of the peace, but that those who were neither allies to Athens nor to Macedon should by no means lie exposed to the op- pression of any powerful invader : that they also should derive security from the peace ; and that we should in reality lay down our arms and live in general friendship and tranquillity. This amendment his letter confesses to be just : you hear that he accepts it. And 312 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. yet hath he overturned the state of the Pherseans : he hath introduced his garrison into the citadel ; certainly, that they may enjoy their own laws. His arms are directed against Ambracia. Three cities in Cassopia, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elatia, all Elean colonies, hath he invaded with fire and sword, and reduced to the vassalage of his kinsman Alexander ;* glorious proofs of his concern for the liberty and independence of the Greeks ! As to those promises of great and important service, which he was perpetually lavishing on the state, he now asserts that I have belied and abused him to the Greeks, for that he never once made such promises ; so devoid of shame is he, who declared in his letter, which still remains on record, that he would effectually silence his revilers when an accommodation was once ob- tained, by the number of good offices he would confer on us, and which should be particularly specified when- ever he was assured of such an accommodation ! These his favors, then, were all provided, and ready to be granted to us when the peace should be concluded ; but, when this peace was once concluded, all his favors vanished. How great havoc hath been made in Greece you need not be informed. His letters assure us of his gracious intentions to bestow large benefits on us : and now, see the effect of his promises. He refuses to restore our dominions ; he claims them as his own. And, as to granting us any new dominions, they must not be in this country. No ; the Greeks might else be offended. Some other country must be sought for, some foreign land must furnish such grants. As to these places which he seized in time of peace, in open violation of his engagements, as he hath no pretence to urge, as he stands convicted manifestly of 1 This Alexander was the brother of Olympias, Philip's wife, and had been placed on the throne of Epirus by the in- terest and power of the Macedonian. The three cities here called Elean colonies might have possibly been thus disposed of with the consent of Elis, where the power and influence of Philip were in effect absolute. ORATION ON THE HALONESUS. 313 injustice, lie says that he is ready to submit these points to the decision of an equal and common tribunal. But they are points which, of all others, need no de- cision. A fair computation of time determines the cause at once. We all know in what month and on what day the peace was made. We all know too in what month and on what day Serrium, Ergiske, and the Sacred Mount were taken. The nature and man- ner of these transactions are no secret. Nor is there need of a tribunal in a point so evident as this, that the peace was made one month before these places were seized. He asserts that he hath returned all your prisoners that were taken. Yet there was one prisoner, a man of Carystus, 1 bound to this city by all the strictest ties, for whose liberty we sent no less than three deputa- tions. Such was Philip's desire to oblige us, that he put this man to death ; nay, refused to restore his body for interment. It is also worthy of attention to consider what was the language of his letters with respect to the Cherso- nesus, and to compare it with his present actions. All that district which lies beyond the forum he claims as his own, in defiance of our pretensions, and hath given the possession to Apollonides the Cardian. And yet the Chersonesus is bounded not by the forum, but by the altar of Jupiter of the Mountain, which lies in midway between the elm and the chalky shore, where the line was traced for cutting through the Cherso- nesus. 2 This is evident from the inscription on the 1 Wolfius is inclined to think that this was the name of the prisoner. But I have chosen to translate the passage in this manner, as there was a town in the island of Eubcea known by the name of Carystus. The name or the country of this man are indeed circumstances of no moment ; and, should there be a mistake in the translation, the learned reader can scarcely find it worth while to detect or to censure it. 2 A work which Philip had promised to execute at his own expense (as is mentioned in the second Philippic), for the convenience and expedition of commerce, which was fre- quently interrupted by the length of time spent in doubling 314 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. altar of Jupiter of the Mountain, which is in these terms : Here, Jove's fair altar, raised hy pious hands, Adorns, at once, and marks the neighboring lands : On this side, lo, yon chalky cliffs display'd ! On that, the elm extends its awful shade ; Whilst, in midway, even Heaven's great monarch deigns To point the bound'ries, and divide the plains. This district, then, whose extent is known to many in this assembly, he claims as his property : part of it he himself enjoys, the rest he gives to his creatures; and thus he deprives us of our most valuable possessions. But he is not content with wresting from us all the lands which lie beyond the forum : his letter directs us to come to a judicial decision of any controversy we may have with the Cardians who lie on this side of the forum ; with the Cardians, I say, who have pre- sumed to settle in our lands. We have, indeed, a con- troversy with these men ; and judge ye whether the subject be inconsiderable. The lands where they have settled they claim as their just property, and deny our title. The lands that we enjoy they declare are unlaw- fully usurped ; that they themselves are the rightful proprietors ; and that their right was acknowleged by a decree proposed by your own citizen Calippus, of the Paeanean tribe. He did indeed propose such a de- cree, for which he was by me impeached of an illegal proceeding ;* but you suffered him to escape ; and thus was your title to these lands rendered disputable and precarious. — But, if you can submit to a judicial de- cision of your disputes with the Cardians, what should prevent the other inhabitants of the Chersonesus from demanding the like trial ? With such insolence doth he treat you, that he pre- Mount Athos, and sailing round the Chersonesus, or hy con- trary winds. 1 The author of this oration affirms that Calippus was im- peached by him of violating the laws. But it is certain that Hegesippus, and not Demosthenes, was the author of this im- peachment. — Libanius• ORATION .ON THE HALONESUS. 315 sumes to say, that if the Cardians refuse to be de- termined by a judicial process, he will compel them ; as if we were not able to compel even the Cardians to do us justice ; — an extraordinary instance this of his regard to Athens ! Yet there are men among you who declare that this letter is very reasonable ; men much more deserving of your abhorrence than Philip. His opposition to this state is actuated by the love of glory and power ; but citizens of Athens, who devote themselves not to their country, but to Philip, should feel that vengeance, which it must be your part to inflict with all severity, unless your brains have forsaken your heads and de- scended to your heels. 1 — It remains that I propose such an answer to this so reasonable letter, and to the declarations of the ambassadors, as may be just and advantageous to the state. 2 1 This remarkable passage, which has been so much cen- sured by critics, is here translated pretty exactly, without any attempt to soften the boldness and severity of the original ; and it is left to the reader to compare with the expressions of greatest freedom in those remains of Demosthenes which are confessedly genuine. iEschines has indeed recorded some expressions of our author equally rude and disgusting : such was his threat, that he would sew up Philip's mouth with a hull- rush, <3fc. But it is certain, that in all his addresses to the assembly, even where he censures and inveighs with the greatest freedom and severity, he still discovers a remarkable attention to decorum ; and sometimes tempers his reproof with the most artful and delicate flattery. 2 The deputies who presented Philip's letter seem to have been dismissed without any satisfactory answer ; and by the eagerness with which the people now listened to the leaders who opposed the Macedonian interest, it appeared plainly that the influence of Philip's partisans was declining. So that Demosthenes judged it a favorable opportunity to prefer an accusation against his rival iEschines for fraud and cor- ruption in his late conduct of the treaty concluded with Phi- lip ; which produced the two orations on the subject of their embassy. THE SECOND OF THE SUSPECTED ORATIONS, INTITLED, ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER. INTRODUCTION. The death of Philip, king of Macedon, was an event, at first, judged fatal to the interest of that kingdom ; which gave the Athenians hopes of recovering their superiority, and en- couraged them to form some confederacies against his succes- sor, whose spirit and abilities were not yet completely dis- covered. It is not here necessary to recount the actions of this prince on his accession to the throne ; it may be sufficient to ob- serve, that a treaty had been concluded by his father with the Greeks, and was by him confirmed ; in which it was pro- vided that the laws, privileges and liberties of the several states should be secured and confirmed. But such engage- ments are seldom found sufficient to restrain a violent youth- ful ambition. The Macedonian was soon emboldened to dis- cover his contempt of this treaty by acting in several in- stances contrary to its articles. The Athenians, who still re- tained some remains of their ancient spirit, resented these his infractions. An assembly was convened to take the treaty into consideration, and to determine on the proper method of procedure in consequence of Alexander's conduct. On this occasion was the following oration delivered, which contains a distinct specification of the several instances of violation now complained of. Critics seem willing to ascribe this oration to Hegesippus, or to Hyperides. It is observed, that the style is diffuse, languid, and disgraced by some affected phrases ; and, that the whole composition by no means breathes that spirit of bold- ness and freedom which appears in the orations of Demo- sthenes. But these differences may possibly be accounted for without ascribing it to another author. Dejection and INTRODUCTION. 317 vexation, a consciousness of the fallen condition of his country, despair and terror at the view of the Macedonian power, might have naturally produced an alteration in the style and manner of the orator's address. A great epic genius, when in its decline, is said by Longinus to fall naturally into the fabulous. In like manner, a great popular speaker, when hopeless and desponding, checked and controlled by his fears, may find leisure to coin words, and naturally recur to affected expressions, when the torrent of his native eloquence is stopped. Nor is the oration now before us intirely destitute offeree and spirit. It appears strong and vehement, but em- barrassed. The fire of Demosthenes sometimes breaks forth through all obstacles, but is instantly allayed and suppressed, as if by fear and caution. The author, as Ulpian expresses it, speaks freely, and not freely ; he encourages the citizens to war, and yet scruples to move for war in form; as if his mind was distracted between fear and confidence. In a word, I regard the oration on the Treaty with Alex- ander as the real work of Demosthenes, but of Demosthenes dejected and terrified, willing to speak consistently with him- self, yet not daring to speak all that he feels. It may be com- pared to the performance of an eminent painter, necessarily executed at a time when his hands or eyes labored under some disorder, in which we find the traces of his genius and abili- ties obscured by many marks of his present infirmity. ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER. We should by all means, Athenians ! concur with those who so strenuously recommend an exact adhe- rence to our oaths and treaties, if they really speak their sentiments ; for nothing is so becoming the cha- racter of free states as a strict attention to honesty and justice. Let not these men therefore who urge the necessity of this attention embarrass our councils by harangues which their own actions contradict : let them submit to an examination ; if their sentiments are ap- proved, they will for the future influence the assembly ; if not, let them give place to those whose opinions of our rights may seem more consonant to truth. Thus shall you determine, either to submit quietly to your wrongs, and esteem their author as your friend, or to prefer the cause of justice to all other considerations, and to make such provisions for your interest with speed and vigor as none can possibly condemn. The very terms of our treaty, and of those oaths by which the general peace was ratified, must on the first in- spection show who are the transgressors : this I shall briefly prove in the most essential articles. Suppose this question asked, What event, Athenians ! could most effectually excite your resentment ? You would answer, an attempt to destroy your liberty. Should the family of Pisistratus now revive, and should any man attempt to reinstate them in their former power, ye would at once take up arms and brave all dangers rather than submit to these masters : or if you should submit, you would be reduced to the condition of purchased slaves ; nay, to a worse condition ; for no master wantonly kills his slaves ; but those who are under the power of tyrants we see every day destroyed ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER. 319 without the shadow of law, and exposed to insults still worse than death, in the persons of their wives and children. Well, then, in open violation of his oaths, of the express terms of the general peace, hath Alexander reinstated the family of Philiades in Messene. In this hath he acted from a regard to justice ; or from his own arbitrary principles, in open contempt of you and of his engagements with the Greeks ? — If then an at- tempt to introduce arbitrary power into Athens would excite your utmost indignation, would rouse you to maintain the treaty, you ought not to be indifferent, you ought not to neglect this treaty, when in equal violation of its sacred purport other states are oppressed by the like power : nor should they who so strenuously recommend to you to adhere to your engagements leave those uncontrolled who have on their part violated them in a manner so notorious. Such violation cannot be suffered, if you have the due regard to justice : for it is expressly declared in our treaty, that he who should act as Alexander hath now done, should be deemed an enemy to all included in the peace ; that all should take up arms against him and against his dominions. If then we have the least regard to these our declarations we are to consider him as our enemy who hath restored this family. But, say the favorers of these tyrants, ' the sons of Philiades governed in Messene before this treaty was concluded, and there- fore were they restored by Alexander/ This is a ridi- culous allegation ; the tyrants of Sestos, established long before our treaty, were expelled from Antissa and Eresus, and this form of government declared to be in itself unjust and oppressive. It cannot then be a matter of indifference that Messene be exposed to the like oppression. Besides, it is provided in the very first article of the treaty that the Greeks shall enjoy their freedom and their laws. And if their freedom and their laws were the first points secured, what assertion can be conceived more absurd than that he who reduces them to slavery 320 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. is not guilty of any violation of this treaty? If, then, Athenians ! you would adhere to your oaths and your engagements, if you have a regard to justice (and this, as I have observed, is the advice of your speakers), it is incumbent on you to take up arms, to collect your allies, and to declare hostilities against those who have really violated the peace. Have you, when some fair occasion offered, pursued your interest with vigor, even though not induced by the motive of supporting justice? and now, when justice and a fair occasion, and your own interest, all conspire to rouse you, what other season do you wait for to assert your own liberty and that of Greece ? I am now come to another point of right resulting from this treaty. It is expressly provided, that if any persons should subvert the constitutions subsisting in each state at the time of ratifying the peace, they should be deemed enemies to all included in the treaty. Consider, then, Athenians ! that the Achaeans of Pelo- ponnesus at that time enjoyed democratical govern- ments : yet of these the Macedonian hath subverted the constitution of Pellsene by expelling most of its citizens : their fortunes he distributed among his do- mestics ; and Chasron the wrestler he established ty- rant of the city. In this treaty were we included, which thus directs that they who act in this manner shall be regarded as enemies. Shall we not then regard them as enemies, pursuant to the tenor of those en- gagements, by which we are all equally obliged ? Or can any of those hirelings of the Macedonian, those whose riches are the wages of their treason, be so abandoned as to forbid it ? They cannot plead igno- rance of these things ; but to such a pitch of insolence have they arrived that, guarded as it were by the armies of the tyrant, they dare to call on us to adhere to oaths already violated, as if perjury were his prero- gative : they force you to subvert your laws by releasing those who stood condemned at our tribunals, and in various other instances drive you to illegal measures. Nor is this surprising: for they who have sold them- ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER. 321 selves to the enemies of their country cannot have the least regard to law, the least reverence for oaths. The names of these, and but the names, serve them to im- pose on men who come to this assembly for amusement, not for business ; and never once reflect that their pre- sent indolence must prove the cause of some strange and terrible disorders. Here then I repeat what I at first asserted, *that w r e should agree with those who recommend an adherence to the general treaty: unless they suppose that in re- commending this adherence they do not of consequence declare that no act of injustice should be committed, or imagine it yet a secret that arbitrary power hath been established in the place of popular governments, and that many free constitutions have been subverted. But such a supposition is utterly ridiculous : for these are the very terms of the treaty : ' The directors and guarantees appointed for the general security shall take care that, in the several states included in this peace, there shall be no deaths or banishments con- trary to the laws established in each society, no con- fiscations, no new divisions of land, no abolition of debts, no granting freedom to slaves, for the purposes of innovation/ But far from preventing these things, these men themselves contribute to introduce them : and what punishment can be equal to their guilt who are the contrivers of these evils in the several states, which were deemed of such consequence as to demand the united care of the whole body to prevent them ? I shall now mention another point in which this treaty is infringed. It is expressly provided, that ' no flying parties shall make excursions from any of the cities included in the treaty, and commit hostilities on any other of the confederated cities ; and that whatever people should thus offend are to be excluded from the alliance/ But so little doth the Macedonian scruple to commit hostilities, that his hostilities are never sus- pended ; nor are any free from them that he can pos- sibly infest. And much more flagrant are his later hostilities, as he hath by his edict established tyrants DEM. X $22 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. in different places ; in Sicyon, his master of exercises. If then we should conform to the treaty, as these men insist, the cities guilty of these actions should be ex- cluded from the confederacy. If the truth must be concealed, I am not to declare that these are the Ma- cedonian cities : but if, in defiance of the truth, those traitorous partisans of Macedon persevere in urging us to observe the general treaty, let us concur with them (their advice is just and equitable) ; and, as this treaty directs, let us exclude those from the alliance who have been thus guilty, and consider of the measures neces- sary to be pursued against people so insolent and aspiring, whose schemes and actions are thus invari- ably criminal, and who treat their solemn engagements with contempt and ridicule. Why will they not ac- knowlege that these consequences are just ? Would they have every article that opposes our interest con- firmed ? every article that favors us erased ? Are these their notions of justice ? If any part of our en- gagements provides for the interest of our enemies, in opposition to this state, are they to contend for that ? but if by any other part our rights and interests are secured against our enemies, are all their utmost efforts to be directed against this ? To convince you still more clearly that none of the Greeks will accuse you of infringing this treaty, but will acknowlege it as an obligation that you have arisen singly to detect those who really infringed it, I shall run over a few of its numerous articles. One article is thus expressed : - the uniting parties shall all have the full liberty of the seas : none shall molest them or seize their vessels on pain of being regarded as the common enemy/ And now, my fellow-citizens, it is notoriously evident to you all that the Macedonians have done these things. To such a pitch of lawless insolence have they proceeded, as to seize the ships of Pontus and send them into Tenedos. Every pretence was invented to detain them ; nor were they at last released before we had decreed to equip one hundred ships, to send them instantly to sea, and had actually appointed Menestheus to command them. ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER. 323 W\en such and so many are the outrages committed by others, is it not absurd that their friends in this assembly should not endeavor to prevail on them to change their conduct, instead of advising us to adhere to engagements so totally neglected on the other side ? as if it were expressly provided that one party might transgress when they pleased, and that the other should not resist. And could the Macedonians have acted a more lawless and a more senseless part than to have so far abandoned all regard to their oaths that they had well nigh forfeited their sovereignty of the seas ? * Nay, they have indisputably forfeited this right to us, whenever we are disposed to assert it : for they are not to expect that no penalty is to be incurred from iolating the treaty because they have for some time past discontinued their violations. No ; they should rather be well pleased that they have hitherto enjoyed the advantage of our indolence and total aversion to maintain our rights. Can any thing be conceived more mortifying than that all other people, Greeks and barbarians, should dread our enmity ; but that these men of sudden afflu- ence should make us contemptible, even to ourselves, by seducing and forcing us to their purposes ? as if they had the conduct of affairs at Abdera or Marona?a, 2 1 The maritime force of Macedon seems to have been, even l^ — In the other case — bu + I what we must have su-" protected by the favv sition of this allianc of your clamoroi : All this parti ye judges, and 512 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. tribunal. As to this miscreant, he needs but one short and plain reply. If you, iEschines, were the only man among us who foresaw the issue, it was your duty to have foretold it to your countrymen : if you did not foresee it, you are as accountable for such ignorance as any other citizen. What better right then have you to urge this as a crime against me, than I, to accuse you on the same occasion ? When, at this juncture, not to mention others, I approved myself so far a better citizen than you, as I was intirely devoted to what ap- peared the true interest of my country ; not nicely weighing, not once considering my private danger: while you never proposed any better measures ; else we had not adopted these : nor, in the prosecution of these, were we assisted by any services of yours. No, the event discovered that your conduct had been such as the basest, the most inveterate enemy to this state must have pursued. — And, observable indeed it is, that at the very time when Aristratus at Naxos, and Ari- stolaus at Thassus, equally the avowed foes of Athens, are harassing the Athenian partisans by prosecutions, here ^Eschines hath brought his accusation against Demosthenes. But the man who derives his conse- quence from the calamities of Greece should rather meet his own just punishment, than stand up to prose- cute another : the man whose interests are advanced by the conjunctures most favorable to those of our public enemies can never, surely, be a friend to our country. And, that this is your case, your life, your actions, the measures you have pursued, the measures 1 all demonstrate. Is there any thing- advantage to the state ? Ms- —*d by an untoward acci- ^ur old sprains and < any malady hath on the event, I the name of • let it be 2 we all ORATION ON THE CROWN. 513 known what fortune was to attend our efforts ; had we all foreseen the final issue ; had you foretold it, JSs- chines ; had you bellowed out your terrible denuncia- tions (you whose voice was never heard) ; yet, even in such a case, must this city have pursued the very same conduct, if she had retained a thought of glory, of her ancestors, or of future times : for, thus, she could only have been deemed unfortunate in her at- tempts : and misfortunes are the lot of all men, when- ever it may please Heaven to inflict them. But if that state which once claimed the first rank in Greece had resigned this rank in time of danger, she had incurred the censure of betraying the whole nation to the ene- my. If we had indeed given up those points, without one blow, for w r hich our fathers encountered every peril, who would not have spurned you with scorn ? — you, the author of such conduct, not the state, or me ? In the name of Heaven ! say, with what face could we have met those foreigners who sometimes visit us, if such scandalous supineness on our part had brought affairs to their present situation? if Philip had been chosen general of the Grecian army, and some other state had drawn the sword against this insidious no- mination? and fought the battle, unassisted by the Athenians, that people who, in ancient times, never preferred inglorious security to honorable danger ? What part of Greece, what part of the barbarian world has not heard, that the Thebans in their period of suc- cess, that the Lacedaemonians whose power was older and more extensive, that the king of Persia would have cheerfully and joyfully consented that this state should enjoy her own dominions, together with an ac- cession of territory ample as her wishes, on this con- dition, that she should receive la * r , and suffer another state to preside in Greece ? But, to Athenians, this was a condition unbecoming their descent, intolerable to their spirit, repugnant to their nature. Athens never was once known to live in a slavish, though a secure obedience to unjust and arbitrary power. No : our whole history is one series of noble contests for dem. 2 κ 514 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. pre-eminence ; the whole period of our existence hath been spent in braving dangers, for the sake of glory and renown. And so highly do you esteem such con- duct, so consonant to the Athenian character, that those of your ancestors who were most distinguished in the pursuit of it are ever the most favorite objects of your praise. And with reason: for who can reflect without astonishment on the magnanimity of those men who resigned their lands, gave up their city, and em- barked in their ships, to avoid the odious state of sub- jection? who chose Themistocles, the adviser of this conduct, to command their forces ; and, when Cyrsilus proposed that they should yield to the terms prescribed, stoned him to death ? Nay, the public indignation was not yet allayed. Your very wives inflicted the same vengeance on his wife : for the Athenians of that day looked out for no speaker, no general to procure them a state of prosperous slavery. They had the spirit to reject even life, unless they were allowed to enjoy that life in freedom. For it was a principle fixed deeply in every breast, that man was not born to his parents only, but to his country. And mark the distinc- tion. He who regards himself as born only to his parents, waits in passive submission for the hour of his natural dissolution. He who considers that he is the child of his country also, is prepared to meet his fate freely, rather than behold that country reduced to vas- salage ; and thinks those insults and disgraces which he must meet, in a state enslaved, much more terrible than death. Should I then attempt to assert that it was I who inspired you with sentiments worthy of your ancestors, I should meet the just resentment of every hearer. No : it is my point to show that such senti- ments are properly your own ; that they were the senti- ments of my country long before my days. I claim but my share of merit, in having acted on such principlei in every part of my administration. He then who con- demns every part of my administration, he who directs you to treat me with severity, as one who hath involved the state in terrors and dangers, while he labors to de- ORATION ON THE CROWN. 515 prive me of present honor, robs you of the applause of all posterity. For if you now pronounce, that as my public conduct hath not been right, Ctesiphon must stand condemned, it must be thought that you yourselves have acted wrong, not that you owe your present state to the caprice of fortune. — But it cannot be ! No, my countrymen, it cannot be that you have acted wrong in encountering danger bravely for the liberty and the safety of all Greece. No ! by those generous souls of ancient times who were exposed at Marathon ! by those who stood arrayed at Platea ! by those who encoun- tered the Persian fleet at Salamis, who fought at Arte- misium ! by all those illustrious sons of Athens, w r hose remains lie deposited in the public monuments ! all of whom received the same honorable interment from their country : not those only who prevailed, not those only who were victorious. — And with reason. What was the part of gallant men they all performed : their success was such as the supreme director of the world dispensed to each. Well, then, thou miscreant ! thou abject scrivener ! thou wiio, to rob me of the honors and the affections of these my countrymen, talkest of battles, of trophies, of brave deeds of old. And what are these*, or any of these to the present cause ? Say, thou vile player ! when I assumed the character of a public counsellor, and on an object so important as the natural pre-emi- nence of my country, with what principles should I have arisen to speak ? Those of suggesting measures unworthy of my countrymen ? Then must I have met that death I merited. And when the interests of the state come before you, your minds, my fellow-citizens, should be possessed with an extraordinary degree of elevation, oeyond what is necessary in private causes. When these are to be decided, you have only to con- sider the ordinary transactions of the world, the tenor of your laws, and the nature of private facts. But, in questions of state, you are to look up to your illus- trious ancestors; and every judge is to suppose that, with the symbols of his authority, he is also invested 516 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. with the high character of his country. Thus, and thus only shall he determine on such questions in a manner worthy of these his ancestors. But I have been so transported by mentioning the acts of your predecessors, that there are some decrees and some transactions that have escaped me. I return, then, to the points from whence I thus digressed. — On our arrival at Thebes, we there found the ambas- sadors of Philip, those of the Thessalians and the other confederates, all assembled : our friends in terror, his party elevated. That this is not asserted merely to serve my present purpose, I appeal to that letter which we the ambassadors instantly despatched on this oc- casion. — Yet, so transcendent is the virulence of this man, that if in any instance our designs have been effectual, he ascribes it to the juncture of affairs, not to me ; in every instance where they have been de- feated, he charges all to me and to my evil genius. It seems, then, that I, the speaker and counsellor, can claim no share of merit in such advantages as have been gained by speaking and by counsel ; but where our arms have been unsuccessful, where the conduct of a war hath been unfortunate, I am loaded with the whole blame. Can we conceive a temper more cruel, more execrable in its malice? — Read the letter. [The letter is here read.] The assembly was now convened. The deputies of Macedon were first admitted to an audience, as they appeared in the character of allies. They rose up and addressed themselves to the people ; lavishing their praises on Philip, urging many articles of accusation against you, and dwelling on every act of opposition which you had ever made to Thebes. This was the sum of all. They called on the Thebans to make the due return to the benefits conferred by Philip, and to inflict due vengeance for the injuries received from you. And for this they had their option, either to allow the Macedonian a free passage through their territory, or to unite with him in the invasion of Attica. It was clearly proved, as they affected to suppose, that if ORATION ON THE CROWN. 517 their counsels were embraced, the cattle, slaves, and all the wealth of Attica must be transferred to Boeotia ; but that our overtures tended to expose Bceotia to all the havoc of the war. To these they added many other particulars, all tending to the same purpose. — And, now, I should esteem it my greatest happiness to lay before you the whole detail of what we urged in reply. But you, I fear, are too sensible that these things are past, that the torrent hath since broken in, and, as it were, overwhelmed all our affairs ; and there- fore must think it useless and odious to speak of these things at all. I shall therefore confine myself to the resolutions we obtained, and the answ r er returned to you. Take them : — read. [The answer of the Thebans is here read.] In consequence of these their resolutions they called you forth ; they invited you in due form. You marched ; you came to their support : and with such affectionate confidence were you received (for I pass over the intermediate transactions) that, w r hile their army, both infantry and cavalry, were stationed with- out the Avails, your forces were admitted into their city, were received into their houses, amidst their children, their wives — all that they held most dear. And thus, in one day, did the Thebans give three the most public and most honorable testimonies to your merit : one to your valor, another to your justice, and a third to your continence : for by determining to unite their arms with yours, rather than to fight against you, they declared their sense of your superior valor, as well as the superior justice of your cause ; and by intrusting to your disposal what they and all mankind are most solicitous to protect, their children and their wives, they demonstrated an absolute reliance on your strict continence. And your conduct confirmed these their sentiments in every particular ; for, from the moment that our army appeared within their walls, no man ever could complain of any one instance of your injurious demeanor ; such purity of manners did you 518 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. display. And in the two first engagements, 1 that of the river, and that fought in winter, you approved yourselves not blameless only, but worthy of admira- tion — in discipline, in judgment, in alacrity. Hence, other states were engaged in praises of your conduct, ours in sacrifices and religious processions. And here I would gladly ask ^Eschines this question — whether, in the course of these events, when the city was one scene of unbounded joy and acclamation, he took his part in our religious rites, and shared in the general festivity, or shut himself in his chamber, grieved, afflicted, and provoked at the successes of his country ? If he appeared, if he was then found among his fellow- citizens, what injustice — nay, what impiety is this, when he had solemnly called Heaven to witness that he approved these measures, to desire that you should condemn them by your present sentence ; you, who by your oath have made as solemn an appeal to Heaven ? If he did not appear, is not that man worthy of a thousand deaths who looks with grief on those events which fill his countrymen with joy? — Read these de- crees. [The decrees relative to the sacrifices are here read.] Thus were we, then, engaged in sacrificing to the gods ; the' Thebans, in acknowleging that we had been their deliverers. Thus, the people who had been re- duced by the machinations of my adversary and his faction to the condition of seeking assistance, were raised by my counsels to that of granting it to others : and what the style was which Philip then adopted, what his confusion at these events, you may learn from his own letters sent to Peloponnesus. Take them: read : thus shall you see that my perseverance, my journies, my fatigues, as well as my various decrees, now the object of his malice, were by no means inef- 1 And in the two first engagements.] These, wherever fought, have been considered by historians as of too little consequence to he recorded. And the extravagance of joy with which the accounts of them were received strongly mark the levity of the Athenian character. ORATION OX THE CROWN. 519 fectual. And, permit me to observe, that this state afforded numbers of able and illustrious speakers be- fore my time. Such were Callistratus, Aristophon, Cephalus, Thrasybulus, and a thousand others : and yet, of all these, not one ever devoted his whole powers on all occasions to the service of his country. He who moved the decree did not charge himself with the embassy ; he who went ambassador was not author of the decree. Each reserved to himself a respite from business ; and, in case of accident, a resource. But I may be asked, ' What ! are you so superior to other men in powers and confidence that you can do all yourself V I say not so. But such and so alarming was my sense of the danger then impending over us, that I thought it no time for private considerations, for entertaining any thought of personal security, for conceiving any better hopes than that all the powers of every citizen might possibly effect the necessary service. As to myself, I was persuaded, not perhaps on solid grounds, yet I was persuaded that no mover of decrees could frame more useful decrees than I ; no agent, in the execution of them, could execute them more effectually ; no ambassador could proceed on his embassy with greater vigor and integrity. And hence did I assume all these functions. — Read Philip's let- ters. [The letters are read.] To such condescension did I reduce this prince. Yes, ^Eschines, by me was he obliged to use such language ; he who, on all former occasions, treated this state with so much insolence and arrogance. — And my fellow-citizens repaid these my services with the honor of a crown, You were present, yet acquiesced. Diondas, who traversed this grant, could not obtain a fifth of the suffrages. — Read the decrees. [The decrees are read.] Here are decrees framed literally in the same terms with those which Aristonicus had before proposed, and that which Ctesiphon hath now moved ; decrees, which iEseiUiies h a *k neither impeached, nor united in the 520 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. impeachment brought against their author. And surely + if this his present accusation be justly founded, he might have prosecuted Demomeles who proposed them, and Hyperides, with much more reason than Ctesi- phon. And why? Because Ctesiphon can appeal to these men, and the decisions of your courts in their case. He can plead that iEschines never attempted to accuse them, though their decrees were conceived in the same terms with his. He can urge the illegality of commencing a prosecution on a case already decided ; not to mention other reasons. Whereas, in the former suit, the cause was to be supported only by its merits, without any previous considerations in its favor. But he could not then have pursued his present method. He could not have searched old chronicles to support his malicions charge ; he could not have ransacked our archives for scraps of obsolete decrees, never once thought of, never once conceived as in any degree applicable to the present case ; he could not have made up a plausible harangue, by confounding dates and disguising facts with all the arts of falsehood, in- stead of stating them fairly. No ; he must have deduced all his arguments from truths recent, from facts well remembered ; all lying as it were before you. Hence did he decline the immediate discussion of these transactions ; but brings his charge now, after so long an interval ; as if this were a contest in a school of rhetoric, not a real inquiry into public aifairs. Yes ; he must suppose that you are now to judge of speeches, not of political transactions. — Then, observe his so- phistical craft. He tells you that whatever opinions you had formed of us both on coming hither, they must be forgotten ; that you are to judge of what ap- pears on this examination like men settling an account of money. You may have conceived that a balance is yet due ; but when you find the accounts cleared, and that nothing remains, you must acquiesce. — And here you may observe how dangerous it is to rely on any argument not founded in truth ; for by this subtle si- militude he hath confessed that you came hither firmly ORATION ON THE CROWN. 521 persuaded that I have ever spoken for my country ; he, for Philip : for he could not have attempted to alter your persuasion, unless you had been thus per- suaded, with respect to each. And, that he is not justly warranted to demand such alteration, I shall now demonstrate, not by the help of figures (for we are not counting money) ; but by a short summary of my services, which I shall submit to you, my hearers, both as examiners and as vouchers of my account. By my conduct, then, which he treats with such severity, the Thebans, instead of joining with the Macedonian in an invasion of our territory, as we all expected, united with us, and prevented that invasion. — The war, instead of raging here in Attica, was con- fined to the district of Bceotia, at a distance of seventy stadia from the city. — Our coast, instead of being ex- posed to all the rapine of the Euboean corsairs, was preserved in tranquillity during the whole war. In- stead of Philip's becoming master of the Hellespont by the possession of Byzantium, the Byzantines joined with us, and turned their arms against him. Are we then to use figures and accounts in examining trans- actions, and shall these articles be erased from the account? Shall we not rather labor to perpetuate their remembrance ? — I do not set it down as an ad- ditional article, that the cruelty which Philip was known to exercise towards those he had reduced, was all felt by other states ; while we happily reaped all the fruit of that humaneness which he well knew how to assume, when some future schemes were to be ad- vanced. I do not insist on this. But one thing I shall assert with less reserve : that he who enters on a fair inquiry into the conduct of any minister, without descending to a malicious prosecu- tion, must scorn the mean arts vvhich you have prac- tised of inventing metaphors, and mimicking phrases and gestures. It essentially concerns the interests of Greece, no doubt, that I should use this, and reject that phrase ; that I should move my arm this way, and not to that side. No : the fair inquirer would con- 522 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. sider the state of facts; would examine what resources, what powers we possessed, when I first entered on affairs ; what accessions I procured to these ; and what were the circumstances of our enemies. If I had really weakened the powers of my country, such iniquitous conduct should be detected : if I had considerably in- creased them, your malice should not have pursued me. But, as you have avoided this method, I shall adopt it. And to you, my hearers, I appeal for the truth of what I now deliver. First, then, as to our powers at this juncture : we commanded but the islands ; and not all of these ; only the weakest of them. Neither Chios, nor Rhodes, nor Corcyra were then ours. Of our finances, the amount was forty-five talents ; and even this sum had been anticipated. Of infantry and cavalry, except those within our walls, we had not any : and, what was the circumstance most alarming, and most favorable to our enemies, their artifices had been so effectual, that the adjacent states, Megara, Thebes, Eubcea, were all in- clined to hostilities rather than an alliance with us• Such was the situation of our affairs. It cannot be denied; it cannot be at all controverted. And now consider those of Philip our antagonist. In the first place, his power over all his followers was absolute and uncontrolled ; the first great necessary article in war. Then, their arms were ever in their hands. Again, his finances were in the most florishing con- dition. In all his motions he consulted only with him- self: he did not announce them by decrees; he did not concert them in a public assembly ; he was not ex- posed to false accusers ; he was not to guard against impeachments ; he was not to submit his conduct to examination ; but was in all things absolutely lord, leader, and governor. To this man was I opposed. It is but just that you consider my circumstances. What did I command ? Nothing. I had but the right of audience in our assemblies ; a right which you granted to his hirelings equally with me : and, as often as they prevailed against my remonstrances (and ORATION ON THE CROWN, 523 oftentimes did they thus prevail, on various pretences), were you driven to resolutions highly favorable to the enemy. Loaded with all these difficulties, I yet brought over to your alliance the Eubceans, Achaeans, Corin- thians, Thebans, Megareans, Leucadians, Corcyreans. And thus did we collect fifteen hundred foot, and two thousand horse, exclusive of our own citizens. And thus were our finances enlarged by as ample subsidies as I could raise. If you insist on what contingents should strictly have been required from the Thebans, or from the Byzantines, or from the Eubceans ; if you talk of di- viding the burden of the war in exact proportion ; I must in the first place inform you, that, when the united fleet was drawn out to defend the interests of Greece, the whole number of ships amounted to three hundred ; and of these two hundred were supplied by Athens. Nor did we think ourselves aggrieved ; nor did we prosecute those who had advised it ; nor did we discover any marks of discontent. That would have been shameful. No : we thanked the gods that, when all Greece was threatened with imminent dan- ger, we were enabled to give twice as much assistance to the common cause as any other state. And then — little is the public favor which your malicious invec- tives against me can gain. For why do you now tell us what we should have done ? Were you not then in the city ? Were you not in the assembly ? Why did you not propose your scheme, if it suited the circum- stances of affairs ? For here was the point to be con- sidered ; what these circumstances admitted, not what our wishes might suggest. Had we once rejected the alliance of any people, there was one ready to pur- chase them — to bid much higher for them — to receive them with open arms. And, if my conduct is now questioned, what if, by any exact and scrupulous de- mands, in my stipulations with the several states, they had withdrawn their forces, and united with our ene- my ; and thus Philip had been master of Euboea, Thebes, and Byzantium ? — how busy would these im- 524 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. pious men have then been — how violent in their cla- mors ! Must they not have cried out, that we had rejected these states? That we had driven them from us, when they were courting our alliance ? That Phi- lip was confirmed sovereign of the Hellespont by the Byzantines? That the whole corn trade of Greece was at his disposal ? That Thebes had enabled him to push the war to our very confines ? That it had fallen with all its weight on Attica? That the sea was impassable ; for that corsairs were perpetually issuing from Eu- boea ? — Should we not have heard all this and more ? — A false accuser, my countrymen, is a monster, a dangerous monster, querulous, and industrious in seeking pretences of complaint. And such is the very nature of this fox in human shape, a stranger to every thing good and liberal ; this theatrical ape, this strol- ling player, this blundering haranguer ! — For, of what use is this your vehemence to the public ? — do you waste it on transactions long since past ?- — Just as if a physician should visit his infirm and distempered patients, should never speak, never prescribe the means of expelling their disorders ; but when one of them had died, and the last offices were performing to his remains, to march after to the grave, and there pronounce with all solemnity, ' if this man had pro- ceeded thus, and thus, he would not have died/ In- fatuated wretch ! and dost thou vouchsafe to speak at last? As to the defeat, that incident in which you so exult ! (accursed wretch! who should rather mourn for it.) Look through my whole conduct, and you shall find nothing there that brought down this calamity on my country. Let it be considered that there is no one in- stance in which the ambassadors of Macedon ever pre- vailed against me, in any of those states where I ap- peared as the ambassador of Athens : not in Thessaly, nor in Ambracia, nor in Illyria, nor among the Thra- cian princes, nor in Byzantium ; in no one place ; no, nor in the last debate at Thebes. But whatever was thus acquired by my superiority over the ambassadors ORATION ON THE CROWN. 525 of Philip, their master soon recovered by force of arms. And this is urged as my offence. My adver- sary, even at the very time that he affects to ridicule my weakness, is so shameless as to require, that I in my single person should conquer all the powers of the Macedonian, and conquer them by words. What else could I command ? I had no power over the life of any one citizen, over the fortune of our soldiers, or the conduct of our armies, for which thou art so ab- surd as to call me to account. In every particular where a minister is accountable, there let your scrutiny be strict and severe. I never shall decline it. And what are the duties of a minister ? To watch the first rise of every incident ; to foresee, to forewarn his fellow- citizens. And this did I perform. To confine those evils within the narrowest bounds, which are natural and necessary to be encountered in every state ; to restrain the fatal influence of irresolution, supineness, prejudice, and animosity ; and, on the other hand, to dispose the minds of men to concord and unanimity, to rouse them to a vigorous defence of their just rights. All this did I perform ; nor can an instance be pro- duced in which I proved deficient. If a man were asked what were the means by which Philip effected most of his designs ; the answer is obvious : It was by his armies, by his bribes, by corrupting those who were at the head of affairs. As to his armies, I neither commanded, nor directed them. I am not therefore to account for any of their motions. As to his bribes, I rejected them. And, in this, I conquered Philip: for, as the purchaser conquers when a man accepts his price, and sells himself; so, the man who will not be sold, who disdains to be corrupted, conquers the purchaser. — Well, then, with respect to me, this state remains still unconquered. Thus have I produced such instances of my conduct as (not to mention many others) justly authorise this decree of Ctesiphon in my favor. And now I pro* ceed to facts well known to all who hear me. — No sooner had the battle been decided, than the people (and they had known and seen all my actions), in the 526 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. midst of public consternation and distress, when it could not be surprising* if the multitude had made me feel some marks of their resentment, were directed by my counsels in every measure taken for the defence of the city. Whatever was done to guard against a siege, the disposition of our garrison, our works, the repair of our walls, the money to be raised for this purpose, all was determined by decrees framed by me. Then, when they were to appoint a commissioner for providing corn, the people elected me from their whole body. Again, when persons bent on my destruction had conspired against me, when they had commenced pro- secutions, inquiries, impeachments, and I know not what, at first not in their own names, but by such agents as they thought best fitted to conceal the real authors ; — yes, you all know, you all remember that at the beginning of this period I was every daj r ex- posed to some judicial process ; nor was the despair of Sosicles, nor the malice of Philocrates,,nor the mad- ness of Diondas and Melanus, nor any other engine left untried for my destruction. I say, then, that at the time when I was thus exposed to various assaults, next to the gods, my first and great defenders, I owed my deliverance to you and all my countrymen. And justice required that you should support my cause ; for it was the cause of truth, a cause which could never fail of due regard from judges bound by solemn oaths, and sensible of their sacred obligation. — As you then gave sentence in my favor, on all occasions where I had been impeached, as my prosecutor could not ob- tain a fifth part of the voices, you, in eiFect, pronounced that my actions had been excellent : as I was acquitted on every trial for an infringement of the laws, it was evident that my counsels and decrees had ever been consonant to law; and, as you ever passed and ap- proved my accounts, you declared authentically that I had transacted all your affairs with strict and uncor^ rupted integrity. In what terms, then, could Ctesi- phon have described my conduct, agreeably to decency and justice 1 Was he not to use those, which he found his country had employed — which the sworn judges ORATION ON THE CROWN• 527 had employed — which truth itself had warranted on all occasions ? — Yes ! but I am told that it is the glory of Cephalus, that he never had occasion to be acquitted on a public trial. True ! and it is his good fortune also. But where is the justice of regarding that man as a more exceptionable character, who was oftentimes brought to trial, and as often was acquitted ; never once condemned ? — Yet, let it be observed, Athenians, that with respect to ^Eschines, I stand in the very Same point of glory with Cephalus ; for he never ac- cused, never prosecuted me. Here, then, is a con- fession of your own, that I am a citizen of no less worth than Cephalus. Among the various instances in which he hath dis- played his absurdity and malice, that part of his harangue which contains his sentiments on fortune is not the least glaring. That a mortal should insult his fellow-mortal on account of fortune is, in my opinion, an absurdity the most extravagant. He w r hose condi- tion is most prosperous, whose fortune seems most fa- vorable, knows not whether it is to remain unchanged even for a day. How then can he mention this sub- ject ? How can he urge it against any man as his re- proach ? But since my adversary hath on this occa- sion, as on many others, given a free scope to his inso- lence, hear what I shall oiFer on the same subject, and judge whether it be not more consonant to truth, as well as to that moderation which becomes humanity. As to the fortune of this state, I must pronounce it good. And this, I find, hath been the sentence, both of the Dodonean Jove, and of the Pythian Apollo. As to that of individuals, such as all experience at this day, it is grievous and distressful. Look through all Greece, through all the barbarian world ; and where can we find the man who doth not feel many calamities in this present juncture? But this I take to be the hap- piness of our fortune as a state, that we have pursued such measures as are most honorable ; that we have been more prosperous than those states of Greece who vainly hoped to secure their own happiness by desert- 528 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES. ing us. — That we have encountered difficulties, that events have not always corresponded with our wishes ? - in this We have but shared that common lot which other mortals have equally experienced. As to the fortune of an individual, mine and that of any other must he determined, I presume, by the particular incidents of. our lives. Such are my sentiments on this subject ; and I think you must agree with me that they are founded on truth and equity. But my adversary de- clares that my fortune hath been greater than that of the whole community. What ! a poor and humble for- tune superior to one of excellence and elevation ! How can this be ? No, iEschines, if you are determined to examine into my fortune, compare it with your own : and if you find mine superior, let it be no longer the subject of your reproach. Let us trace this matter fully. And here, in the name of all the gods ! let me not be censured as betraying any indication of a low mind. No man can be more sensible than I, that he who insults poverty, and he who, because he hath been bred in affluence, assumes an air of pride and conse- quence, are equally devoid of understanding. But the virulence and restless malice of an inveterate adver- sary hath forced me on this topic, where I shall study to confine myself within as strict bounds as the case