OPINION 

OF 

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel 
OF 

The City of Chicago, 

Rendered September 18, 1917, 

Regarding the action of 

Mayor William Hale Thompson 

In permitting the meeting of the People’s Council 
of America for Democracy and Terms of Peace. 


CHAMPLIN LAW PRINTING CO. 






OPINION 





OF 

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel 
OF 

The City of Chicago, 

Rendered September 18, 1917, 

Regarding the action of 

Mayor William Hale Thompson 

In permitting the meeting of the People’s Council 
of America for Democracy and Terms of Peace. 

September 18, 1917, 

Hon. William Hale Thompson, 

Mayor, 

Chicago, Illinois. 

Dear Sir: 

In response to your request for an opinion as to 
the law relating to the public meeting recently held 
in the City of Chicago by the People’s Council of 
America for Democracy and Terms of Peace, and 
especially with respect to your right to prevent the 
holding of such meeting, we beg to say: 

Your request involves the broad question of the 
right of the Mayor of Chicago to anticipate that 


2 


any proposed public meeting of citizens will not be 
a peaceable meeting and that the citizens there as¬ 
sembled will indulge in unlawful speech or acts and 
on that ground to prevent the meeting from being 
held. 

As Mayor of the City of Chicago you were re¬ 
quired to and did take an oath of office as follows: 

William Hale Thompson, do solemnly 
swear that I will support the Constitution of 
the United States and the Constitution of the 
State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully dis¬ 
charge the duties of the office of Mayor of the 
City of Chicago according to the best of my 
ability/’ 

At the time the meeting referred to was held, our 
country was at war with the German Empire; but 
this did not operate to suspend the Constitution of 
the United States or of the State of Illinois. 

In Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U. S.), 2, the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in considering 
the securities for personal liberty embodied in the 
Constitution of the United States, used the follow¬ 
ing language at pages 120 and 121: 

‘‘Time has proven the discernment of our 
ancestors; for even these provisions, expressed 
in such plain English words, that it would seem 
the ingenuity of man could not evade them, are 
now, after the lapse of more than seventy years, 
sought to be avoided. Those great and good 
men foresaw that troublous times would arise, 
when ruldrs and people would become restive 
under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive 
measures to accomplish ends deemed just and 
proper; and that the principles of constitutional 
liberty would be in peril, unless established by 
irrepealable law. The history of the world had 
taught them that what was done in the past 
might be attempted in the future. The Consti- 


3 


tution of the United States is a law for rulers 
and people, equally in war and in peace, and 
covers with the shield of its protection all 
classes of men, at all times, and under all cir¬ 
cumstances. No doctrine, involving more per¬ 
nicious consequences, was ever invented by the 
wit of man than that any of its provisions can 
be suspended during any of the great exigen¬ 
cies of government. Such a doctrine leads di¬ 
rectly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory, 
of necessity on which it is based is false; for 
the government, within the Constitution, has all 
the powers granted to it, which are necessary 
to preserve its existence; as has been happily 
proved by the result of the great effort to throw 
off its just authority,^’ referring to the Civil 
War. 

Our constitutions. Federal and State, and the 
guarantees therein contained, are not mere ‘‘scraps 
of paper’’ which may, under any circumstances 
whatever, be ignored or disregarded. On the con¬ 
trary, they are the charters of our rights as free 
men. They express the essentials of liberty finally 
established in America as the culmination of the 
struggle therefor through the centuries. 

So the Constitution of the United States begins 
as follows: 

“Pkeamble. We, the people of the United 
States, in order to form a more perfect union, 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, 
provide for the common defense, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessings of 
liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain 
and'establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.” 

And the Constitution of the State of Illinois be¬ 
gins as follows: 

“Peeamble. We, the people of the State of 
Illinois—grateful to Almighty God for the civil. 


4 


political and religious liberty which He hath so 
long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to Him 
for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and 
transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding 
generations—in order to form a more perfect 
government, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, provide for the common defense, 
promote the general welfare, and secure the 
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos¬ 
terity, do ordain and establish this constitution 
for the State of Illinois. 

The Constitution of the United States also con¬ 
tains the following provision: 

‘ ‘ This constitution and the laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, 
and all treaties made, or which shall be made 
under authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme law of the land; and the judges in 
every state shall be bound thereby; anything 
in the constitution or laws of any state to the 
contrary notwithstanding. ^ ^ 

Hence, if there were any conflict between these 
constitutions the state constitution would have to 
give way to the National constitution. But there 
is no such conflict. Together they embody the fun¬ 
damental rights of our people. 

It is the whole constitution, and not any particu¬ 
lar part thereof, which is made the supreme law of 
the land and which must be supported; and it is 
important to take care that, in our zeal to support 
certain provisions of the constitution, we do not 
ignore or fail to give sufficient importance to others. 

As before observed at the time the particular 
meeting under consideration was held, this country 
was at war with the German Empire. Such war was 
not declared by the City of Chicago; or by the State 
of Illinois; but by the government of the United 
States of America. 


5 


The Constitution of the United States confers 
upon the Congress the following, among other, pow¬ 
ers : 

“Tenth. To declare war, grant letters of 
marque and reprisal, and make rules concern¬ 
ing captures on land and water: 

“Eleventh. To raise and support armies; 
but no appropriation of money to that use shall 
be for a longer term than two years: 

“Twelfth. To provide and maintain a navy: 

“Thirteenth. To make rules for the govern¬ 
ment and regulation of the land and naval 
forces: 

“Fourteenth. To provide for calling forth 
the militia to execute the laws of the Union, 
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions: 

“Fifteenth. To provide for organizing, arm¬ 
ing and disciplining the militia, and for govern¬ 
ing such part of them as may be employed 
in the service of the United States, reserving 
to the states respectively the appointment of 
the officers, and the authority of training the 
militia according to the discipline prescribed 
by congress.’’ 

Such constitution also vests the President with 
the following, among other, powers: 

“The president shall be commander-in-chief 
of the army and navy of the United States, and 
of the militia of the several states, when called 
into the actual service of the United States.” 

Thus, the People have delegated to the Congress 
the power to declare war; to raise and support 
armies; to provide and maintain a navy; and to 
make rules for the government and regulation of 
the land and naval forces. And the Congress hav¬ 
ing, in the exercise of the powers so delegated, de¬ 
clared war and determined how the army and navy 
shall be raised and where the war shall be con¬ 
ducted, its action must be accepted and acquiesced 
in as final; the resulting state of war must be fully 


6 


recognized; and we must support tlie government 
to the extent of all that we have and are in prose¬ 
cuting this war until it culminates in a proper and 
satisfactory peace. 

But while thus recognizing and giving full effect 
to the constitutional provisions last above quoted, 
we must not overlook, ignore or disregard other 
constitutional provisions which are absolutely essen¬ 
tial to our liberties. 

The first amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States is as follows: 

‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the peo¬ 
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances. 

The Constitution of the State of Illinois, in the 
Bill of Eights, contains two provisions as follows: 
“Every person may freely speak, write and 
publish on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, 
both civil and criminal, the truth, when pub¬ 
lished with good motives and for justifiable 
ends, shall be a sufficient defense.’^ 

“The people have the right to assemble in a 
peaceable manner to consult for the common 
good, to make known their opinions to their 
representatives, and to apply for redress of 
grievances. ^ ^ 

The nature and importance of the constitutional 
guarantees last above quoted is clearly set forth 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
United States v. CruiksJiank, 92 U. S. 542, beginning 
at page 551, as follows: 

“We now proceed to an examination of the 
indictment, to ascertain whether the several 


7 


rights, which it is alleged the defendants in¬ 
tended to interfere with, are such as had been 
in law and in fact granted or secured by the 
constitution or laws of the United States. 

‘^The first and ninth counts state the intent 
of the defendants to have been to hinder and 
prevent the citizens named in the free exercise 
and enjoyment of their Uawful right and privi¬ 
lege to peaceably assemble together with each 
other and with other citizens of the United 
States for a peaceful and lawful purpose. ’ The 
right of the people peaceably to assemble for 
lawful purposes existed long before the adoption 
of the Constitution of the United States. In 
fact, it is, and always has been, one of the at¬ 
tributes of citizenship under a free government. 
It ^derives its source,’ to use the language of 
Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 
Wheat. 211, ^from those laws whose authority 
is acknowledged by civilized man throughout the 
world. ’ It is found wherever civilization exists. 
It was not, therefore, a right granted to the 
people by the Constitution. The government of 
the United States when established found it in 
existence, with the obligation on the part of 
the States to afford it protection. As no direct 
power over it was granted to Congress, it re¬ 
mains, according to the ruling in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, id. 203, subject to State jurisdiction. 
Only such existing rights were committed by 
the people to the protection of Congress as 
came within the general scope of the authority 
granted to the national government. 

^^The first amendment to the Constitution 
prohibits Congress from abridging Uhe right 
of the people to assemble and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances. ’ This, 
like the other amendments proposed and 
adopted at the same time, was not intended to 
limit the powers of the State governments in 
respect to their own citizens, but to operate 
upon the National government alone. Barron 
V. The City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 250; Lessee of 
Livingston v. Moore, id. 551; Fox v. Ohio, 5 


8 


How. 434; Smith v. Maryland, 18 id, 75; With¬ 
ers V. Buckley, 20 id. 90 ; Fervear v. The Com¬ 
monwealth, 5 Wall. 479; Twitchell v. The Com¬ 
monwealth, 7 id. 321; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 
557. It is now too late to question the correct¬ 
ness of this construction. As was said by the 
late Chief Justice, in Twitchell v. The Common¬ 
wealth, 7 Wall. 325, ‘the scope and application 
of these amendments are no longer subjects of 
discussion here.’ They left the authority of 
the States just where they found it, and added 
nothing to the already existing powers of the 
United States. 

“The particular amendment now under con¬ 
sideration assumes the existence of the right of 
the people to assemble for lawful purposes, and 
protects it against encroachment by Congress. 
The right was not created by the amendment; 
neither was its continuance guaranteed, except 
as against congressional interference. For their 
protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the peo¬ 
ple must look to the States. The power for that 
purpose was originally placed there, and it has 
never been surrendered to the United States. 

“The right of the people peaceably to as¬ 
semble for the purpose of petitioning Congress 
for a redress of grievances, or for anything 
else connected with the powers or the duties of 
the national government, is an attribute of na¬ 
tional citizenship, and, as such, under the pro¬ 
tection of, and guaranteed l)y, the United 
States. The very idea of a government, repub¬ 
lican in form, implies a right on the part of its 
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in 
respect to public affairs and to petition for a 
redress of grievances. If it had been alleged in 
these counts that the object of the defendants 
was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, 
the case would have been within the statute, 
and within the scope of the sovereignty of the 
United States. Such, however, is not the case. 
The offense, as stated in the indictment, will be 
made out, if it be shown that the object of the 
conspiracy was to prevent a meeting for any 
lawful purpose whatever.” 


9 


A court—and much less an executive officer like 
the Mayor—has no right to prevent in advance a 
meeting of citizens on the ground that it is antici¬ 
pated that they may not assemble in a peaceable 
manner, or that, when assembled, they may engage 
in doing something unlawful. The purpose of the 
constitutional guarantees, relating to free speech 
and peaceable assembly, were designed and intended 
to prevent any such ‘^star chamber’’ practice. 

The Supreme Court of California discusses this 
subject with clearness in its opinion in Dailey v. 
Superior Courty 32 Lawyer’s Reports Annotated, 
273, beginning on page 274, as follows: 

‘^The production of a tragedy or comedy 
upon the theatrical stage is a publication to the 
world by word of mouth of the text of the au¬ 
thor, and, as to the question here presented for 
our consideration, it is immaterial whether the 
words be publicly spoken from the stage or 
upon the hustings, or go out to the world 
through the channels of the printing press. By 
the constitutional provisions we are about to 
invoke, a citizen may speak, write, or publish 
his sentiments with equal freedom, and this case 
now stands before us exactly as though one of 
the daily journals was threatening to publish 
its sentiments pertaining to the conduct of a 
criminal trial then pending, and the court 
where such trial was pending and in progress, 
believing such publication would interfere with 
the due administration of justice, had issued an 
order restraining and prohibiting the threat¬ 
ened action of the paper. We are entirely clear 
that the court had no jurisdiction to make the 
order which forms the basis of this proceeding, 
for such order was an attempted infringement 
upon rights guaranteed to every citizen by Sec. 
9, Art. 1, of the Constitution of this state. That 
section provides: ^Every citizen may freely 
speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the use and 
abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed 


10 


to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or 
of the press/ The wording of this section is 
terse and vigorous, and its meaning so plain 
that construction is not needed. The right of 
the citizen to freely speak, write, and publish 
his sentiments is unlimited, but he is respon¬ 
sible at the hands of the law for an abuse of that 
right. He shall have no censor over him to 
whom he must apply for permission to speak, 
write, or publish, but he shall be held account¬ 
able to the law for what he speaks, what he 
writes, and what he publishes. It is patent 
that this right to speak, write, and publish can¬ 
not be abused until it is exercised, and before 
it is exercised there can be no responsibility. 
The purpose of this provision of the Constitu¬ 
tion was the abolishment of censorship, and for 
courts to act as censors is directly violative of 
that purpose. This provision of the Constitu¬ 
tion as to freedom of speech varies somewhat 
from that of the Constitution of the United 
States, and also more or less from the provi¬ 
sions of many state Constitutions treating of 
this question; but, if there is a material differ¬ 
ence in the various provisions, it works no harm 
to this petitioner, for the provision here con¬ 
sidered is the broader, and gives him greater 
liberty in the exercise of the right granted. The 
meaning of this provision, or others of similar 
import, has been declared with unanimity by 
all commentators upon the law. Blackstone de¬ 
clares that the liberty of the press consists in 
laying no previous restraints upon publications, 
and not in freedom from censure for criminal 
matters when published. He says: ‘Every 
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what 
sentiments he pleases before the public. To for¬ 
bid this is to destroy the freedom of the press. 
But if he publishes what is improper, mischiev¬ 
ous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of 
his own temerity. To subject the press to the 
restricted power of a licensor, as was formerly 
done before and since the Revolution of 1688, 
is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the 
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbi¬ 
trary and infallible judge of all controverted 


11 


points in learning, religion, and government. 

* * * Thus the will of individuals is still left ' 
free. The abuse only of that free will is the 
object of legal punishment.’ Story, in his work 
upon the Constitution (Sec. 1885) declares: 
‘Indeed, the liberty of the press, as understood 
by all England, is the right to publish without 
any previous restraint, or license; so that 
neither the courts of justice, nor other persons, 
are authorized to take notice of writings in¬ 
tended for the press, but are confined to those 
which are printed. ’ De Lolme, in his Constitu¬ 
tion of England (page 872), declares: ‘Liberty 
of the press consists in this: that neither courts 
of justice nor any other judges whatever are 
authorized to take notice of writings intended 
for the press, but are confined to those which 
are actually printed.’ In Ex parte Barry, 85 
Calif. 607, the foregoing doctrine is reiterated 
and approved. 

“It would seem that the jurisdiction here at¬ 
tempted to be exercised would essentially be¬ 
long to a court of equity. Yet, even if this pro¬ 
ceeding for a restraining order had been inaug¬ 
urated in such a forum, it would have signally 
failed. In Story, Eq. Jur., Sec. 948a, the au¬ 
thor says: ‘But the utmost extent to which 
courts of equity have gone in restraining any 
publication by injunction has been upon the 
principle of protecting the rights of property 
in the books or letters sought to be published. 
They have never assumed, at least since the 
destruction of the court star chamber, to re¬ 
strain any publication which purports to be a 
literary work upon the mere ground that it is 
of a libelous character, and tends to the degra¬ 
dation or injury of the reputation or business 
of the plaintiff who seeks relief against such 
publication.’ And this principle was declared 
by the learned chancellor in Brandreth v. Lance, 

8 Paige, 26, 34 Am. Dec. 368, wherein he said: 

‘It is very evident that this court cannot as¬ 
sume jurisdiction of the case presented by the 
complainant’s bill, or of any other case of the 
like nature, without infringing upon the liberty 
of the press, and attempting to exercise a power 


12 


of preventive justice which, as the legislature 
has decided, cannot safely be intrusted to any 
tribunal, consistently with the principles of a 
free government/ After referring to the court 
of star chamber, he proceeds: ‘ Since that court 
was abolished, however, I believe that there is 
but one case upon record in which any court, 
either in this country or in England, has at¬ 
tempted, by an injunction or order of the court, 
to prohibit or restrain the publication of a libel, 
as such, in anticipation.’ In effect, the order 
made by the trial court in this case was one 
commanding the petitioner not to commit a con¬ 
tempt of court, and such a practice is novel in 
the extreme. The court had ample power to 
protect itself in the administration of justice 
after the contempt was committed. As to the 
offender, it could punish him; as to the de¬ 
fendant on trial, he could be deprived of no 
rights by any act of this petitioner. If the pub¬ 
lication deprived him of a fair and impartial 
trial at that time, a second trial would have 
been awarded him. 

^‘We conclude that the order made by the 
trial court was an attempted restraint upon 
the right of free speech, as guaranteed by the 
Constitution of this state, and that petitioner’s 
mouth could not be closed in advance for the 
purpose of preventing an utterance of his sen¬ 
timents, however mischievous the prospective 
results of such utterance. He had the right of 
free speech, but at all times was responsible to 
the law for an abuse of that right.” 

The doctrine announced in the foregoing opinion 
of the Supreme Court of California is in accord with 
the law as laid down by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 

Thus in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, the 
Supreme Court of the United States used the fol¬ 
lowing language on page 462: 

^Hn the first place, the main purpose of such 
constitutional provisions is Ho prevent all such 


13 


previous restraints upon publications as had 
been practiced by other governments,’ and they 
do not prevent the subsequent punishment of 
such as may be deemed contrary to the public 
welfare. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 
304, 313-314; Respuhica v. Osivald, 1 Dallas, 
319, 325. The preliminary freedom extends as 
well to the false as to the true; the subsequent 
punishment may extend as well to the true as 
to the false. This was the law of criminal libel 
apart from statute in most cases, if not in all. 
Commonwealth v. Blanding, uhi sup.; 4 Bl. Com 
150.” 

It will be observed that the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in its opinion last above quoted from, 
cites with approval Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 
Pick, 304, and particularly refers to pages 313 and 
314, where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa¬ 
chusetts used the following language: 

“Besides, it is well understood, and received 
as a commentary on this provision for the lib¬ 
erty of the press, that it was intended to pre¬ 
vent all such previous restraints upon publica¬ 
tions as had been practiced by other govern¬ 
ments, and in early times here, to stifle the ef¬ 
forts of patriots towards enlightening their 
fellow subjects upon their rights and the duties 
of rulers. The liberty of the press was to be 
unrestrained, but he who used it was to be re¬ 
sponsible in case of its abuse; like the right to 
keep fire arms, which does not protect him who 
uses them for annoyance or destruction 

“The common law therefore is left unim¬ 
paired by the constitution, except as will here¬ 
after be stated, and by that law, unquestionably, 
the propagator of written or printed tales to 
the essential prejudice of anyone in his estate 
or reputation, is a public offender, and is not 
allowed to excuse himself by the additional 
wrong of proving in a court of justice, in a col¬ 
lateral way, the facts which he has unwarrant¬ 
ably promulgated.” 


14 


That the Supreme Court of Illinois concurs in the 
views above expressed, appears from the language 
used by it in Storey v. The People, 79 Ill. 45, at 
pages 51, 52 and 53, as follows: 

^‘The theory of government requiring roy¬ 
alty to be invested with an imaginary perfec¬ 
tion, which forbids question or discussion, is 
diametrically opposed to our theory of popular 
government, in which the utmost latitude and 
freedom in the discussion of business affecting 
the public and the conduct of those who fill posi¬ 
tions of public trust, that is consistent with truth 
and decency, is not only allowable but essential 
to the public welfare. 

‘‘In this State, however, our constitution 
guarantees ‘that every person may freely 
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and 
in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, 
the truth, when published with good motives 
and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient de¬ 
fense.’ 

“This language, plain and explicit as it is, 
can not be held to have no application to courts, 
or those by whom they are conducted. The ju¬ 
diciary is elective, and the jurors, although ap¬ 
pointed, are, in general, appointed by a board 
whose members are elected by popular vote. 
There is, therefore, the same responsibility, in 
theory, in the judicial department, that exists 
in the legislative and executive departments to 
the people, for the diligent and faithful dis¬ 
charge of all duties enjoined on it; and the 
same necessity exists, for public information, 
with regard to the conduct and character of 
those intrusted to discharge those duties, in 
order that the elective franchise shall be intel¬ 
ligently exercised, as obtains in regard to the 
other departments of the government. 

“^Vben it is conceded that the guaranty of 
this clause of the constitution extends to words 
spoken or published in regard to judicial con- 


15 


duct and character, it would seem necessarily 
to follow that the defendant has the right to 
make a defense which can only he properly 
tried by a jury, and which the judge of a court, 
especially if he is himself the subject of the 
publication, is unfitted to try.’’ 

It seems clear from the foregoing provisions of 
the Constitutions and the authorities to which we 
have referred that you could not, lawfully, have 
prevented in advance the holding of the meeting of 
the People’s Council of America for Democracy and 
Terms of Peace. 

Nevertheless, you had the right, and it was your 
duty, to see to it that such meeting was a peaceable 
assembly and that nothing illegal occurred there. 
We understand that, in the case of this meeting, as 
of every public meeting regarding the lawful pur¬ 
pose of which some question has been raised, the 
necessary precautions in this respect were taken; 
that is to say, representatives of the city govern¬ 
ment attended the meeting with instructions to pre¬ 
vent any seditious or otherwise illegal talk or pro¬ 
ceeding from taking place; but it turned out that 
there was no seditious or otherwise illegal talk or 
proceeding at the meeting. 

In making our last statement, we have in mind 
that the subject of peace was discussed at this 
meeting. But we think that citizens have the right 
to meet and discuss the question of peace; in other 
words, that citizens, so long as they do not inter¬ 
fere with or obstruct the raising and equipping of 
the armies and navy and the due prosecution of 
the war pursuant to the declaration of war by Con¬ 
gress, have the right to assemble in a peaceable 
manner to consider how and upon what terms the 
war can be best terminated. 


16 


The end of the war is peace; not any kind of peace 
to end the war, hut such a peace as will be satis¬ 
factory to and will vindicate and protect the rights 
and interests of the people of this country. 

It is the duty of the people to and we have no 
doubt that they will unhesitatingly do everything 
and make every sacrifice that is necessary to con¬ 
duct the war to a successful conclusion and to ac¬ 
complish such a peace as we have mentioned. But 
it seems to us that no reasonable person can, on 
reflection, take the position that the people have not 
the right, while the war is being so prosecuted, to 
meet peaceably and discuss what will be proper 
terms of peace and communicate their views regard¬ 
ing the same to their representatives. 

Hence, it is our opinion that the mere fact that 
the subject of peace was discussed at the meeting 
of the People’s Council of America for Democracy 
and Terms of Peace would not have warranted you 
or the representatives of the city in holding that 
such meeting was seditious or otherwise unlawful. 

Therefore, we conclude, that the conduct of the 
representatives of the city in permitting such meet¬ 
ing to be held was proper. Indeed, if you, as Mayor, 
had forbidden in advance the holding of such meet¬ 
ing, your action, in our opinion, would have been 
unjustifiable and in plain violation of your oath of 
office. 

Respectfullv submitted, 

Chester E. Cleveland, 
First Assistant Corporation Counsel, 

Approved: 

Samuel A. Ettelson, 

Corporation Counsel, 



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