b'Author. \n\n\n\n\nClass \xe2\x80\x9et\xe2\x80\x94 713. \n\n\n\nTitle \n\n\n\nImprint \n\n\n\nBook \n\n\n\nS^S^E- \n\n\n\nJO\xe2\x80\x94 30299-1 8PO \n\n\n\n\nIII. CRIMINAL AGGRESSION!: BY WHOM \n\nCOMMITTED ? \n\n\n\n" Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." \n\n\n\nAN INQUIRY \n\nII V \n\nEDWARD ATKINSON, LLD., PH.D., \n\nBROOKLINE, MASS., FEBRUARY 22, 1899. \n\n\n\nA SEQUEL TO \n\nI. THE COST OF A NATIONAL CRIME. \nII. THE HELL OF WAR AND ITS PENALTIES. \n\n\n\nFourth Edition, making Five Thousand Copies. \n\n\n\n[Funds art- wanted to pay for printing, stamping, and mailing future editions of \nthis pamphlet III., at four dollars per hundred. Without postage it will be sent at \ntwo dollars per hundred by express. \n\nThe first pamphlet, containing I. The Cost of a National Crime, II. The Hell of \nWar and its Penalties, eighth edition, making 20,000, will also be supplied without \nstamps at two dollars per hundred and express charges; or, if mailing lists are sent, \nit will be mailed at four dollars per hundred. \n\nRemit to Edward Atkinson, Box 112, Boston. Mass.] \n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. \n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. \nThe Commercial Aspect. \nThe remarks of Benjamin Franklin upon the burning of the coast towns of the \nAmerican Colonies in the War of the Revolution may be read in connection with the \nburning and destruction of towns and cities in the Philippine Islands : \n\n" Britain must certainly be distracted. No tradesman out of Bedlam ever thought \nof increasing the number of his customers by knocking them on the head, or of \nenabling them to pay their debts by burning their houses." \n\nMissionary Aspect. \nThe attention of the clergy and of others who advocate the enforcement of Chris- \ntianity at the point of the bayonet is called to the following extract from a letter of a \ncorrespondent of the " Evening Post" : \n\nThe country between Marilao and Manila presents a picture of desolation. Smoke is curling \nfrom hundreds of ash heaps, and the remains of trees and fences torn by shrapnel are to be seen everj \nwhere. The general appearance of the country is as if it had been swept by a cyclone. The roads are \nstrewn with furniture and clothing dropped in Might by the Filipinos. The only persons remaining \nbehind are a few aged persons, too infirm to escape. They camp beside the ruins of their former homes \nand beg passers-by for any kind of assistance. The majority of them are living on the generosity of our \nsoldiers, who give them portions of their rations. The dogs of the Filipinos cower in the bushes, still \nterrified and barking, while hundreds of pigs are to be seen busily searching for food. \n\nBodies of dead Filipinos are stranded in the shallows of the river, or are lying in the jungle \nwhere they crawied to die, or were left in the wake of the hurriedly retreating army. These bodies give \nforth a horrible stench, but there is no time now to bury them. \n\nThe inhabitants who fled from Marilao and Meycauayan left in such a panic that on the tables \nour soldiers found money and valuables, and in the rooms were trunks containing property of value. \nThis was the case in most of the houses deserted. They were not molested by our soldiers, but the \nChinese, who slip in between the armies, are looting when they can, and have taken possession of sev- \neral houses, over which they raised Chinese flags, some of which were afterwards torn down. \n\nAn old woman was found hidden in a house at Meycauayan yesterday, just dead, apparently \nfrom fright and hunger. \n\nThe old woman named in the last paragraph may be cited as one converted in this \nmissionary enterprise. \n\nSanitary Aspect. \n\nGeneral Otis reports that only eight to nine per cent, of the army was in hospital \nor on the sick list in March, before the hot season or the aggressive campaign had \nbeen entered upon. Only ! The navy has lent several naval surgeons to the army to \nassist in the care of the sick and wounded. The medical authorities have ordered that \nall soldiers attacked with dysentery and rheumatism, two of the most common causes \nof disease in the tropics, must be immediately removed from the Philippine Islands, as \nthey cannot be cured in that climate. \n\nNine per cent, on 40,000 comes to " only " 3,600 sick, to whom may be added over \n1,000 wounded. When the hot and then the wet season, the malarial air of the jungle, \nand the bad water outside of camp begin to exert their malignant influence, how many \nwill then become the victims of the criminal aggression now being directed by Presi- \ndent McKinley, who, having asserted that the responsibility rests with Congress and \nwith the American people, now fails to call Congress together, and continues the car- \nnage of the Filipinos and the ghastly sacrifice of American soldiers in a bad cause to \nthem repulsive, on his sole responsibility. \n\nRepulsive and Ghastly - Aspect of Burning and Slaughter. \n\nPrivate letters from officers and their wives, from which extracts have been printed , \ncoupled with numerous private letters from volunteers in the army which cannot be \nprinted without danger to them, have fully disclosed the shocking atrocity now being \ncommitted in the slaughter of the Filipinos. Their accounts of disease and death also \nconvey the truth to the people of this country, while the telegraph is not free, such \ncommunications being under censorship. \n\nIt does not yet appear by whom the fighting was begun. It does appear, however, \nin the latest reports, that the lines of the Philippine army were forced by troops of the \nUnited States before any attack of any organized force had been made upon the lines of \nour troops. How this happened may perhaps be explained by the following abstract \nfrom a private letter from a very acute American observer now in Japan, which was \nwritten after the army officers who had placed Aguinaldo in command of the Philippine \nforces had been superseded by the general now in chief command : \n\n" I left before actual fighting began, but I saw a condition of things that was as \nmuch like war as it could be when war was not; and now the terrible result of the \nignorance, incompetence, and unhappy temperament of our Manila commander has \ncome. The Administration put the general in command in the way of emphasizing his \nown unfortunate method of managing things. Chiefly is the American direction of affairs \nat Manila to blame for the fact that the insurgents changed from friends to being our \nfoes." \n\nWere this correspondent here his name would carry authority. Not being here I \ncannot give it, but I vouch for his capacity as an observer. \n\nEDWARD ATKINSON. \n\nBrookline, March 31,1899. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nin. \n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION : \n\nBY WHOM COMMITTED? \n\nIn November, 1898, a danger became dimly foreseen that this country \nmight be committed to acts of criminal aggression which the President had \ndenounced in April in his message to Congress giving the reasons why the \noppressive rule of Spain should be removed by force from the Island of Cuba. \n\nMany persons who had believed and who still believe that the rule of Spain \ncould have been removed without resort to war, yet when war was declared gave \ntheir support to the Government and their approval to every measure deemed \nnecessary to the conduct of the war. \n\nA few distrusted the sincerity of the President and anticipated the evil events \nthat have ensued. The writer was not then one of those who shared in the dis- \ntrust of the Executive, although he feared the influence of those by whom he \nthen believed and still believes the President had been forced to a premature \nand unseasonable exercise of force. Is there not sufficient proof of a combina- \ntion organized for the purpose of criminal aggression which the President had \ndenounced, but to which he has for the time submitted ? \n\nWith the purpose of sustaining the President and to aid him in suppressing \nthese malignant influences the writer prepared two treatises upon \n\nI. The Cost of a National Crime. \nII. The Hell of War and its Penalties. \n\nWhen the forecast of a deficiency of $150,000,000 in the next fiscal year was \nfirst published in November the estimate was received with derision by thought- \nless persons. Many times the writer was asked why the revenues of the tropical \nislands falling into our possession on which Spain had battened should not suffice \nto sustain their government. \n\nThe venal yellow press not only derided this estimate, but attempted to dis- \ncredit the writer by gibes and sneers which simply increased the contempt in \nwhich such papers are held. \n\nHow stands the case in February, 1890, four months later? 1 The representa- \ntives of the Government in the House of Representatives now forecast a deficiency \nin the next fiscal year of much greater amount than the writer\'s guarded estimate, \nwhile the deficiency of the present year will exceed the estimate of the Secretary \nof the Treasury given in his annual report by at least forty per cent. \n\nIn order to sustain the President in avoiding criminal aggression, the writer \nalso secured from abroad the ghastly evidence of the penalties of the Hell of War \ncontained in the second treatise. \n\nIt is not a pleasant duty to prepare this third treatise showing how public \ntrust has been betrayed and by whom. It will again invoke obloquy and abuse, \nbut to any one who was bred in the time when resistance to the national crime of \nslavery brought out similar abuse, and even personal danger, these attacks but \ngive support to the opponents of criminal aggression as they did fifty years a\xc2\xab>"0 \nto the agitation against slavery then represented by Garrison and Sumner, by \nGiddings of Ohio and Hale of New Hampshire, by John Quincy Adams of Massa- \n\n\n\n1 Note to Third Edition, March 30, 18D9. \xe2\x80\x94 This warning was sufficient, and some of the \ngrossest measures of eyces:-ive appropriations were stopped. Whether the actual appropriations made \nfor the conduct of the war will suffice is very doubtful. Time only will suffice to determine the fact. \n\n\n\n4 CRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED? \n\nchusetts, and by Seward of New York. These personal attacks are but evi- \ndence of the tribute that unscrupulous and depraved men have always paid to \nthose who have defended the honor and integrity of the nation ; this tribute \nwas rendered to the men who redeemed it from the crime of shivery, so it \nwill be to the men who hope and expect now to redeem it from criminal \naggression. \n\nIt was assumed that President MoKinley would avail himself of the opportu- \nnity given at the dinner of the Home Market Club to announce a positive policy. \nYet we find in that speech but two positive statements. \n\nThe first is in the following words : " Every present obligation has been met \nand fulfilled in the expulsion of Spanish sovereignty from the islands. 11 \n\nThe second declaration is in these terms: " Xo imperial designs lurk in the \nAmerican mind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought, and purpose." \n\nIn these words the President adopts the principles of the Anti-Imperialist \nLeague and justifies all that has been done or said by that league. It becomes \nnecessary, however, to review the rest of the speech. Respect for the office of \nPresident may not release the humblest citizens from the duty of bringing its \nincumbent before the bar of public opinion when he transgresses. Having been \ncalled upon to address a club of clergymen, I have recast my address to them in \nthis treatise, No. 3, under the title, " Criminal Aggression, by Whom Com- \nmitted? 11 \n\nGentlemen : I was very glad to receive the invitation to address members of \nthe clergy in this emergency, for it seems to me that a duty has come upon the \nclergy of this country corresponding to that which led to the protest of the three \nthousand ministers against the crime of slavery a few years before the Civil War \nensued in which slavery destro} T ed itself. \n\nWe are in an emergency to-day as serious as that which then threatened \nthe life of this nation. The honor of this nation is now compromised by an \naggressive war of forcible annexation under the lead of a President who attained \nthe confidence of this country a short year since by declaring that he then spoke \nnot " of forcible annexation, for that, by our code of morality, would be criminal \naggression. 11 Have we changed our code? If not, who is responsible for the \ncriminal aggressions upon and the slaughter of the people of the Philippine \nislands by thousands ? \n\nI was reading last evening Trevelyan\\s " History of the American Revolu- \ntion, 11 and I came across this report. In one of the great debates of 1774 Stephen \nFox, the brother of Charles James Fox, speaking of the condition of affairs in \nthis country, said: " I rise, Sir, with an utter detestation and abhorrence of the \npresent measures. We are either to treat the Americans (read, if you please, \n\' Filipinos \') as subjects or as rebels. If we treat them as subjects the bill goes \ntoo far; if as rebels, it does not go far enough. We have refused to hear the \nparties in their defence, and we are going to destroy their charter (read deprive \nthem of their rights) without knowing the constitution of their Government. 1 \' \n< !ould a closer parallel be brought between the conditions of 1774 when we were \nthe rebels and the conditions of the Filipinos to-day in their resistance to the \neffort to put a foreign rule upon them, in their refusal to be deprived of their \nrights, and in their objection to accept the gospel of peace at the point of the bay- \nonet with the slaughter of thousands under the rapid-fire guns ? \n\nNow, I propose to deal with this question consecutively. We were driven \nprematurely into a war which may have been necessary for the removal of Span- \nish oppression from the Island of Cuba. It is useless now to discuss the question \nwhether that war was necessary or not. \n\n\n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION : J\'.V WHOM COMMITTED? 5 \n\nWe entered into what one may at least declare was an unseasonable dec- \nlaration of war before we were prepared and at the time when the utmost \nhazard of the tropical climate was upon us. But even if that war was inevitable \ndoes any one suppose that the war would have occurred had Lincoln been Presi- \ndent, who resisted even the moral purpose of this country for two years until lie \nknew the country would support him in emancipation ? Does any one suppose \nthat if he had been the President of the United States any men of the char- \nacter and quality of the jingo Senators could have forced his hand? Does any \none suppose that Grant would have submitted to such dictation? Does any one \nsuppose that if Cleveland had been there, even though he himself had declared \nthat it might become necessary to deal with Cuba by force, he would have \nallowed his hand to be forced by the venal pressure of the yellow press and its \nSenatorial emissaries to Cuba? Is it not our misfortune to have had in the chair \nof the President of the United States a man of weak and uncertain purpose with- \nout convictions and unequal to the emergency : who, having declared that an act \ndf aggression would be a national crime, has trifled with the question ? Did lie \nnot in his recent apologetic speech before the Home Market Club seek to find a \nway out of the evil conditions into which he has led the country by divesting \nhimself of the responsibility and trying to throw it all on the Congress of the \nUnited States? I think it is time to speak and to speak plainly. William \nMcKinley is the President of the United States. He was treated with respect in \nBoston as the President of the United States, but it was a great misfortune that \neven the members of the Home Market Club who utterly oppose expansion were \nunder such obligation that none were able, owing to the courtesy of the occasion, \nto say one word in resistance to expansion or to the apparent policy of the Presi- \ndent. Therefore the President may have returned under the impression that he \nis sustained in acts of criminal aggression here in Boston when we know that the \nmoral sense of the community \xe2\x80\x94 the conscience of the community \xe2\x80\x94 is being \naroused day by day against the policy which he represents. \n\nLet us look a little into the history of this matter. \n\nIn a speech, Dec. 15, 1898, when the President was swinging around the \ncircle, dealing with audiences from the rear end of a railway train and taking the \nshouts of the crowd as an indication of public sentiment, he reached Atlanta, \nand there he used these words : \n\n" That flag has been planted in two hemispheres and there it remains, the \nsymbol of liberty and law, of jieace and progress. Who will withdraw from the \npeople over whom it floats its protecting folds ? Who will pull it down ? " \n\nIf that is not a declaration of imperialism, what is it ? \n\nWho took down the flag in Mexico and gave back to the Mexicans the control \nof their own affairs after we had made conquest of their country? There is no \nsuch word in the President\'s speech to the Home Market Club. Since the date of \nthe Atlanta speech he has had cause to change his tone. Under the brave lead of \nour Senator Hoar, supported by Senators Jones, of Arkansas, and Caffery, of \nLouisiana, and by many others too numerous to be named here, it has been made \napparent that neither the common sense nor the conscience of this country will \npermit criminal aggression. We have failed in defeating cession under the \ntreaty because there were many true men who are with the opponents of ex- \npansion absolutely, who thought it best that the treaty should be sustained in \norder that Spain might be divested of any further word to say on this matter. \nThe opponents of imperialism, of expansion, and of criminal aggression who \nvoted for the treaty joined with the opponents of the treaty are a majority of the \npresent Senate ; many of them feeling indignant because they have been forced \n\n\n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED .\' \n\n\n\nby the false conditions into which we had been brought by the President to \naccept the treaty. Though there are grave dangers growing out of the accept- \nance of the cession of the Philippines, they are not insurmountable, and when \nthe will of the country is exerted, as it is now being manifested, the Executive \nwill be compelled to take the country out of the false position in which we now \nare. \n\nNow then, gentlemen, as to this speech of the President of the United States. \nIs it not an adroit rhetorical evasion of the pending question ? Does it not show \nthat he is still waiting to find out what will be popular rather than what will be \nright ? Or what will control the future politics of this country rather than what \nwill be for the true interest and honor of the nation ? When before in the history \nof this country has a treaty been sent into the Senate of the United States by the \nPresident without a message giving the views of the Executive, or the grounds \nand reasons on which such a treaty should be sustained ? Was not that evasion \nNumber One ? Or rather, was it not one evasion among many ? \n\nThe President says : " Many who were impatient for the conflict a year ago, \napparently heedless of its larger results, are the first to cry out against the far- \nreaching consequences of their own act." Against whom does he make that insinu- \nation ? Does he not attempt to put discredit, without naming them, upon Senators \nwho voted unwillingly for war, unwillingly for the treaty, and who are now try- \ning to avoid the evil consequences of the conditions in which he and his adminis- \ntration have put them ? \n\nAgain the President says: "The evolution of events, which no man could \ncontrol, has brought these problems upon us. Certain it is that they have not \ncome through any fault on our own part." Had there been a man with any \npower of will to direct that evolution it would have been directed as human evo- \nlution may always be \xe2\x80\x94 by mental energy, in the right and not in the wrong direc- \ntion. It is easy to quote evolution in evasion of duty ; easy to talk about manifest \ndestiny to cover a crime. It is the weak man who says " I couldn\'t help it." \n\nAgain the President says: "In its prosecution and conclusion the great \nmajority of our countrymen of every section believed they were fighting in a just \ncause." This it true ; they were fighting in the cause of liberty, and the} 7 had \nconfidence in the declaration of the President that to let the war go beyond, the \nrestoration of liberty to an oppressed people would be an act of criminal aggres- \nsion. \n\nThe President says: "The Philippines, like Cuba and Porto Rico, were \nintrusted to our hands by the war, and to that great trust, under the providence \nof God, and in the name of human progress and civilization, we are committed." \nIntrusted to our hands ? By whom ? How did we get possession of an area of \nabout ten square miles or less which was all there was in the possession of Spain \nand which is all there is to-day in our possession ? We secured it because the \npeople trusted us. We found in the Philippine islands an organized army \nwhich had driven the Spaniards from every part of the islands except one or two \ncities where, through their navy, the Spaniards were enabled to sustain them- \nselves. We called them to our aid, Admiral Dewey promoting the return of their \nchosen leader, Aguinaldo, to take the command and aid in the removal of the \noppression of Spain from that little corner which was all that was not then in the \npossession of the inhabitants of those islands. That city of Manila and the terri- \ntory within range of our guns have become " intrusted to our hands" with one \ncity, Iloilo, since added. All the rest is intrusted to the inhabitants themselves. \nThe Island of Luzon possesses large numbers of men of intelligence who have \nproven their capacity. It is under a constitution of which Senator Hoar says : \n\n\n\nCHIMIN AL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED.\' \n\n\n\n" There are not ten men on the planet who could have made one better." They \nhave an organized army. They have rightfully supplied themselves with arms. \nYet these people who trusted us have been slaughtered by thousands by American \ntroops acting under the orders of President McKinley. \n\nIn apology and excuse for his previous course the President says : " Congress \ncan declare war, but a higher power decrees its bounds and fixes its relations and \nresponsibilities. The President can direct the movements of soldiers upon the \nfield, and the fleets upon the sea, but he cannot foresee the close of such move- \nments or prescribe their limits." Perhaps he could not prescribe the limits \xe2\x80\x94 the \nmore reason to count the cost in blood and treasure. The very moment this war \nwas entered upon I sent to Europe for the sick and death rates of the British \narmies in India, of the French army in the tropics, and of the Dutch army in their \ncolonies. In the treatise on the Hell of War may be found the whole ghastly \nrecord to which for want of foresight we are about to expose the young men of \nthis country unless we stop this national crime where it is. One example may \nhere be given : \n\nA few years ago France undertook the conquest of Madagascar, and to carry \nChristian civilization to the inhabitants at the point of the bayonet. They landed \n12,800 troops, men from the army and navy, 2,000 of whom were in colonial \nregiments and were acclimated. Madagascar is a healthier island than Luzon, \nnot as near the equator. In ten months 4,200 of these men died. The rest were \nso disabled that in one regiment, of which sixty per cent. died, not one single man \nreached the objective point. In Madagascar the French are now tr}*ing to main- \ntain troops under a sick and death rate that they are afraid to have published \neven in their own country. \n\nAgain, witness the condition of the white troops in India. There were \n70,000 British troops in India in 1896. In that year the admissions to hospital \nwere nearly fourteen hundred men to each thousand on the average ; that is to \nsay, the whole force admitted once, nearly four hundred twice ; the average term \nof each stay in hospital, thirty-five days. That average includes the health stations \non the hills. There were 40,000 men on the plains, where it is hot and mostly dry. \nAt some of these stations admission to hospitals ranged from 2,000 to 3,400 for \nevery thousand men. The conditions in India are not nearly as bad as the \nmalarious conditions in the Philippines described by Professor Worcester. In \nsuch hot climates, where every thought of morality and self-restraint is lost, 550 \nin every 1,000 in India, and in some stations 850 and 1,015, are infected with \nvenereal diseases, of which the details are given in my treatise on the Hell of \nWar. The accounts of the Surgeon-General of the United States have been \ndemanded so that the people of this country may learn what the hell of war \nreally is even when no shot or shell is fired. \n\n1 claim no more foresight than any other man of common sense, but when \nthe danger of war was disclosed I sent for these documents and I have secured \nthe printing of these details in a Senate document which Senator Lodge tried to \nstop on the ground of saving the expense of printing treatises by private persons. \nHe was obliged to withdraw his objection when Senator Jones, of Arkansas, \ninsisted on the record being made. You may contrast, if you please, the elements \nof politics and patriotism in the acts and speeches of the senior and the junior \nSenators of Massachusetts. Choose then who honors and who dishonors the State. \n\nAgain the President says : " We cannot anticipate or avoid the consequences, \nbut we must meet them." No, President McKinley was neither capable of fore- \nseeing or avoiding the consequences of his act. He now declares himself to be \nincapable of meeting the consequences, and attempts to throw the whole burden \nupon the Congress of the United States. \n\n\n\n8 CRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMUTED? \n\n\n\nAgain he says: " There was but one alternative, and that was either Spain \nor the United States in the Philippines." Was there no other alternative? If \nthere was no other why did Admiral Dewey bring Aguinaldo back to take the \nlead of the Filipinos? Why did he accejit the aid of the organized forces which \nhave now invested our army in Manila as it invested it when we were engaged in \nremoving the oppressive forces of Spain from there ? Did not Admiral Dewey \nforesee the need of a land force to cooperate with the navy in removing the \noppression of Spain when he promoted the return of Aguinaldo to Manila to \ncommand that force? Who is yet entitled to pass judgment upon Aguinaldo? \nOur own officials have promoted his movements and perhaps unwisely made \npromises of support. What if he should prove to be a born leader of men ? \nWho will then be shamed? When shall we know the truth in this matter? \nWhen will the evidence of United States Consul-General Pratt, of Singapore, and \nof Consul Wildman on this matter belaid before Congress? We have as yet but \nindirect evidence of their interviews with Aguinaldo. What purports to be an \nauthentic statement published by a friend and correspondent of Consul-General \nPratt in Birmingham, Ala., is as follows: \n\n"Alluding to the first conference, the writer says: \'There were present \nGeneral Emilio Aguinaldo y Femi ; E. Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United \nStates; Howard II. Bray; J. Leyba, Aguinaldo\'s private secretary; Colonel \nMarcelo del Pilar; and M. Santos.\' \n\n"During the conference, at which Bray acted as interpreter, Aguinaldo \nexplained to Consul-General Pratt incidents and objects of the late rebellion, and \ndescribed the then disturbed state of the country. He then proceeded to detail \nthe nature of the cooperation he would give, in which he, in the event of the \nAmerican forces from the squadron landing and taking possession of Manila, \nwould guarantee to maintain order and discipline among the native troops and \ninhabitants in the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted war, and \nprevent them from committing outrages on defenceless Spaniards beyond the \ninevitable in fair and honorable war. \n\n" He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible gov- \nernment on liberal principles, and would be willing to accept the same terms \nfor the country as the United States intended giving Cuba. The Consul-General \nof the United States, coinciding with the general views expressed during the dis- \ncussion, placed himself at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral \nDewey at Hong Kong. As a result, another private interview was arranged at \nthe American consular residence, between Aguinaldo, Pratt, Bray, and Leyba. \nAs a sequel to this interview, and in response to the urgent request of Admiral \nDewey, Aguinaldo left Singapore at once for Hong Kong, and accompanied \nDewey with the fleet to Manila. \n\n" General Aguinaldo\'s policy, as clearly stated in his interviews at Singa- \npore, embraced the independence of the Philippines. American protection \nwould be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might there- \nafter be instituted in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the \ntrade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens \nwho would compete with the industrious population of the country. The entire \nfreedom of the press would be established, as well as of thought and public meet- \nings. There would be general religious toleration, and steps would be taken for \nthe expulsion of the religious fraternities who had a strong hand on every branch \nof the civil administration. \n\n" These promises Avere made, as stated, in the interviews with Consul-General \nPratt at Singapore, telegraphed to Dewey at Hong Kong only a few days before \n\n\n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED f 9 \n\nthe fleet sailed, and Aguinaldo accompanied the fleet at Dewey\'s urgent request \n\non receipt of Pratt\'s telegrams. Subsequent events proved that Aguinaldo kept \nall of his promises, but the interesting feature of this incident is that no official \nannouncements or publications of the facts have emanated from the Government \nat Washington.*\' \n\nThe President says: \xe2\x80\xa2\xe2\x80\xa2The second alternative was that the}- be left to the \nanarchy and chaos of no protectorate at all." The common sense of this country \nwill reject that statement. There existed a protectorate capable of protecting \npersons and property. Under that protectorate the Philippine forces held Uoilo, \nwhere they committed no looting, no interference with persons or property, no \nmeddling with the foreigners. There they maintained their rights until we attacked \nthem, and then they retired. \n\nBy whom was this attack authorized? What induced the Filipinos to re- \nsist the forces of the United States ? Who began that tight ? As yet we have no \nevidence. Who is responsible? Aguinaldo says: "The President of the United \nStates is responsible," and I think he goes far to prove it. What order did the \nPresident of the United States utter December 27 before the treaty had been rati- \nfied, either by the United States or Spain, without authority of law, usurping power \nnot then vested in him ? He ordered General Otis to take possession of the Philip- \npine islands. He says : " The actual occupation and administration of the entire \ngroup of the Philippine islands becomes immediately necessary and a military gov- \nernment heretofore maintained in the United States, in the city, harbor, and bay \nof Manila and the whole of the ceded territory."\' Mark the words, " the whole of \nthe ceded territory" from which Spain had already been expelled by the Fili- \npinos themselves, with the exception of ports under the control of the Spanish \nnavy. The advocates of expansion and of continuous possession assume that \nthere are no Filipinos who have a sense of their own rights or any power to \nmaintain them. What says your coadjutor, Rev. Clay MacCauley, on this matter F \nIs he a competent witness? Visiting these islands with a feeling bred of the \nmissionary spirit that it was our duty to retain them, he found evidence on the \nspot which wholly change his opinion. He says : \n\n\'\xe2\x80\xa2 It should be known, to begin with, that the people of the Philippines are \nopposed to such annexation. By the Philippine \' people\' I do not mean the savage \nti-ibes of the hills of Luzon and of the remote islands. These tribes have always \nignored or antagonized every other than their own inherited governments. They \nwould, for an indefinite time, be as hostile to the rule of the United States as the \nNorth American Indians ever were. Constantly recurring conflicts with them \nwould await us in our government of the islands, even were all other sources of \nopposition removed. The Philippine \' people \' are the hundreds of thousands of \nChristianized natives and persons of half or mixed caste who now occupy numerous \ncities, towns, and plantations ; who possess accumulated wealth ; conduct agricult- \nure, own factories, and direct foreign commerce ; and who have attained to a consid- \nerable degree of education and culture in the arts and in the learned professions. \nThese people have developed in large measure a political consciousness and \nambition, and are now represented in the \' Philippine Republic.\' The proposed \nassumption of political sovereignty over them by the United States has recently \nbecome magnified to them as their greatest danger. By common impulse they \nare throughout united to oppose it, and unless their fear can be quieted, or their \nallegiance to American sovereignty secured by persuasion or reward, the}* will \ncarry their opposition into open warfare. Above all, they demand that the \nGovernment that directs their affairs shall have place through their own consent. \nThey resent the agreements of Spain and the United States, or the acts of the \n\n\n\n1<\xc2\xbb CRIMINAL AGGRESSION : BY WHOM COMMITTED ? \n\nAmerican Congress, that dispose of them politically like so many pieces of chat- \ntel property. They claim to have now an established and systematized govern- \nment, self chosen ; and evidently they have a large and well-armed army gathered \nto defend what they claim to be their freedom and independence. I have been \ninformed on good authority that more than eighty thousand rifles have been im- \nported by the Philippine insurgents during the past few months. Whatever \nmight be done to win the Filipinos from allegiance to their \' republic, 1 certain \nit is that an arbitrary act of annexation now would only arouse them to a struggle \nfor freedom and national autonomy." \n\nEdifying spectacle it would be, that of this new republic of the far East \nstriving to the death to defend itself from a greed of conquest satiating itself \nupon it in the old republic of the West, "the land of the free and the home of \nthe brave." \n\n"And next, the people of the United States should know that their fellow-citi- \nzens now in the Philippines, the soldiers and sailors of the American army and \nnavy there, are generally opposed to or indifferent to the proposed annexation. \nWith the most intelligent and thoughtful among them, antagonism is supported \nby judgment drawn from many considerations, some of which are here sum- \nmarized. Surely it is worth the attention of the people at home who are \nwilling to commit our Government to an attempt at the annexation of the \nPhilippine islands, the fact that most of their fellow-citizens who have for months \nbeen dwellers in the islands, in contact with the native people there, and who \nhave learned much of the various conditions there, \xe2\x80\x94 physical, social, and commer- \ncial, \xe2\x80\x94 should have grown increasingly opposed to the proposition to incorporate \nthe Philippine people into the American body politic." \n\nAguinaldo lias uttered a protest. He gives the reason why the confidence of \nthe Filipinos was destroyed by this unwarranted and unlawful order of the \nPresident of the United States before the treat)\' had been accepted, to take pos- \nsession and administer the whole islands. Now, let any American put himself in \nthe place of an intelligent citizen of the Island of Luzon, what would be his con- \nception of such an assumption of power over him backed by military force ? \nWould he not protest ? Witness the simple dignity of Aguinaldo\'s words : \n\n" I solemnly protest in the name of God, the root and fountain of all justice \nand of all right, and who lias given to me the power to direct my dear brothers \nin the difficult work of regeneration, against this intrusion of the Government of \nthe United States in the sovereignty of the islands. Equally I protest in the name \nof the Philippine people against this intrusion, because when they gave me their \nvote of confidence, electing me, though unworthy, as President of the nation, \nwhen they did this they imposed on me the duty to sustain to death their liberty \nand independence."" \n\nThat is the answer of the man whom Admiral Dewey found lit to place where \nhe could assume the responsibility with which he is charged, and on whichever \nside the first shot was fired in the slaughter of these people the sole responsibility \nfor this act of criminal aggression rests upon the President of the United States. \n\nYet the President says: "The treaty gave them to the United States. \nCould we have required less and done our duty? Could we, after freeing the \nFilipinos from the dominion of Spain, have left them without Government and \nwithout power to protect life and property, or to perform the international obliga- \ntions essential to an independent State; 1 " This question rests on false premises. \nThey had a government. They had power to protect property. They have the \npower to enter into international relations, and they may yet be recognized and \nrightly recognized by other powers. \n\n\n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED f 11 \n\n\n\nThe President says in speaking of other nations : " Did we ask their consent \nto liberate them from Spanish sovereignty or to enter Manila bay and destroy the \nSpanish sea power there ? We did not ask these ; we were obeying a higher moral \nobligation which rested on us, and which did not require anybody\'s consent. We \nwere doino- our duty by them with the consent of our own consciences and with the \napproval of civilization." Are we now doing our duty by them by slaughtering \nthem by the thousands, and by burning and shelling their villages without giving \nthe women and children a chance to escape ? What sort of a conscience warrants \nsuch acts \xe2\x80\x94 what civilized man approves? \n\nBut witness the inconsistency in this speech. The President says: "Every \npresent obligation has been met and fulfilled in the expulsion of Spanish sov- \nereignty from their islands." True, and nearly the only simple and plain state- \nment of a fact to be found in the whole speech. Then why not withdraw? \n" Durino- the progress of the war with Spain we could not ask their views. Nor \ncan we now ask their consent." Why not? Are not the people of the Island of \nLuzon entitled to be consulted ? Are they to be governed by military force under \nan arbitrary order from a foreign ruler ? They have an established form of gov- \nernment. They have presented state papers of unequalled excellence and force \nwhich have been refused by the State Department, and rejected in terms of con- \ntempt by the military officers of the United States. \n\nThe President says in excuse or palliation of this offence: "It is not a \no-ood time for the liberator to submit important questions concerning liberty and \ngovernment to the liberated while they are engaged in shooting down their res- \ncuers." Surely it may not be a good time to deal with them when they are being \nliberated by death and when our forces are rescuing them with repeating rifles, \nbut why were these important questions not submitted to them before the Pres- \nident on his own authority asserted an unlawful dominion over them ? \n\nThe President having brought this shame upon us; having said that the \nHag should not come down; having asserted possession before the cession from \nSpain had been accepted by the Senate and before he had any rightful authority, \nthus inciting the Filipinos to resistance, now declares: "I do not intend to \nobtrude upon the duties of Congress or seek to anticipate or forestall its action. \nI only say that the treaty of peace, honorably secured, having been ratified by \nthe United States, and, as we confidently expect, shortly to be ratified in Spain, \nCongress will have the power, and I am sure the purpose, to do what in good \nmorals is right and just and humane for these peoples in distant seas." Having \nfound himself incapable of meeting the duties and responsibilities of his posi- \ntion, he is now shifting upon Congress the dreadful penalties of his own inca- \npacity. Again : " Until the treaty was ratified or rejected the Executive \nDepartment of this Government could only preserve the peace and protect life \nand property. That treaty now commits the free and enfranchised Filipinos \nto the guiding hand and the liberalizing influences, the generous sympathies, the \nuplifting education, not of their American masters, but of their American \nemancipators." \n\nWhy did he assert dominion before the treaty was ratified ? Why oppress in \nthe name of enfranchisement ? \n\nEnfranchised, indeed, under the guiding hand and liberalizing influences of \nrepeating rifles, the uplifting education of dynamite guns, turned against them \nby armed forces ordered to govern them without their consent. \n\nAgain the President says : " I know no one at this hour who is wise enough \nor sufficiently informed to determine what form of government will best subserve \ntheir interests and our interests, their and our well-being," thus admitting inca- \npacity. \n\n\n\n12 CRIMINAL AGGRESSION: nv WHOM COMMITTED? \n\n\n\nHe goes on to declare : "Until Congress shall direct otherwise it will be the \nduty of the Executive to possess and hold the Philippines\'" (we hold ten miles \nsquare, or less, from a part of which we have retreated), "giving to the people \nthereof peace and order, and beneficent government, affording them every \nopportunity to prosecute their lawful pursuits, encouraging them in thrift and \nindustry, making them feel and know that we are their friends, not their enemies, \nthat their good is our aim, that their welfare is our welfare, but that neither their \naspirations nor ours can be realized until our authority is acknowledged and \nunquestioned.\'\' \n\nIf it were not for the atrocities which have been committed in the name of \nduty, peace, and order, there would be something grotesque in the absurdity of \nsuch platitudes spoken by the President before the reverberation of the guns dis- \ncharged in the slaughter of the Filipinos have ceased to echo around the world to \nthe dishonor of this country. \n\nBut still we will welcome the President to the ranks of the Anti-Imperialist \nLeague if we can trust his words: " No imperial designs lurk in the American \nmind. They are alien to American sentiment, thought, and purpose. Our \npriceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with \nthe flag. If in the years of the future they are established in government under \nlaw and liberty, who will regret our perils and sacrifices ? " But if these people \nare now in the present established in law and capable of maintaining liberty, as \nthey have proved themselves to be, who will not regret the slaughter which we \nhave inflicted upon them ? Will not the mothers of the land regret the loss of \ntheir sons, now on the way to or now in Manila, only beginning to be exposed to \nworse dangers than the resistance of the Filipinos under the ghastly conditions \nof the worst of tropical climates in the rainy season ? In an aggressive cam- \npaign away from the sea we may fear that of the 25,000 men who have been \ndespatched to Manila, if kept there three or four months longer, not one-half will \never see their native land again; we may fear that nearly all of the other half \nwho may return will come back impaired in health and strength. The evidence \nof these dangers is conclusive. The facts disclosed by the records of the British, \nFrench, and Dutch armies almost prove that such will be the fate that we arc \nbringing upon the children of Americans. I know no men whose names will \ngo down among the mothers of the land, even in the near future, subject to \ngreater execration than the names of the men who have brought this act of crim- \ninal aggression upon the nation. \n\nProfessor Worcester states the only conditions under which white men may \nbe able to retain their health and strength in the Philippine islands in the follow- \ning terms: " Briefly stated the facts are as follows: If one is permanently situ- \nated in a good locality where he can secure suitable food and good drinking \nwater; if he is scrupulously careful as to his diet, avoids excesses of all kinds, \nkeeps out of the sun in the middle of the day, and refrains from severe and \nlong continued physical exertion, he is likely to remain well, always supposing \nthat he is fortunate enough to escape malarial infection. " \n\nIf the regular army of the United States is stationed in the Philippine \nislands or in Cuba, and kept there six months, it is practically certain that after \nthat term has elapsed there will be no regular army of the United States in exist- \nence capable of any effectual service even on the part of the survivors. When \nthe facts become known voluntary enlistments will cease, and the act of criminal \naggression can only be continued by a forced enlistment under a draft. \n\nLet there be no misappi-ehension in this matter. We can extend our admira- \ntion to our army and navy ; to the privates and most of the officers of our \narmy and to the officers of the navy as well as the privates. War has not ceased \n\n\n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED/ 13 \n\namong men and how soon it will cease none can tell. Even President Cleveland \nthought it might become necessary to make forceful intervention in the Island \nof Cuba. When the war was prematurely entered upon it found our navy \ngoverned by the civil-service rules, thoroughly well organized, the right men \nin the right places and no power or inlluence of any Representative or Senator \ncapable of moving the authorities of the navy, or of putting men in their places \nunqualified for the positions. \n\nAt the Navy Department there were no Senators or Representatives in the \nlobby, no seekers for place and position around the doors. Everything was done \nwith effective energy, and the work of the navy bears witness to the civil-service \nrules by which it has been governed. But when we give regard to the War De- \npartment, there the lobbies were filled ; there political inlluence was paramount. \nThere men who were wanted to take important places in the Commissary De- \npartment, fully qualified, were rejected, and incapable persons put in at the \ninstance of politicians. And what did we get? We brought together an army \nunder conditions winch rendered it almost incapable of effective service. One of \nthe members of the Commission on the conduct of the war said to me that the \nconditions at Tampa were almost those of a mob without head or leader. In \nsome way the line officers got the troops over the sea. There they blundered into \na direct attack upon Santiago, where the bravery of the troops and the incapacity \nof the enemy saved them from a great disaster. Men who knew the conditions \nallege that had the officers in command been willing to wait for the cooperation \nof the navy there was an easy place to land a few miles away, free of fortifica- \ntion, from which a railway leads, by which all our troops could have moved to \nthe rear of the Santiago forts where, under the protection of the navy, the defences \ncould have been turned, and a large part of the risk might have been avoided. \n\nAlthough giving credit to the Navy Department and its chief, when I read \nthe following paragraph closing the speech of the Secretary in support of the \naction of his chief: "Is not that the statesmanship of the great Master who \nlimited not His mission or that of His disciples to His own chosen people, but \nproclaimed that His gospel should be preached in all the world unto all nations, \nthat greatest Statesman of all time, Jesus Christ," it seemed to me blasphemy \nto cite the authority of Jesus Christ in justification of the slaughter of the Fili- \npinos. I can conceive of nothing more sacrilegious than that citation. When \nI was speaking the other night to the chiefs of the labor organizations who are \nmoved most deeply in this matter I said, If that is Christianity you may call me \nInfidel or call me Pagan, but it is not; it is servile adulation in profane terms. \n\nThe advocates of aggressive expansion tell us that we have no alternative, \nbut when our alternative is presented he who presents it is called a visionary. \nThere is an alternative and everything is propitious for its adoption. The effort \nhas been made by the jingoes to get up public demand for maintaining possession \nor annexing these islands by alleging danger of seizure by Germany or France. \nThey do not dare to impute such purpose to Great Britain. Any such intention \nhas been repudiated by the Ministry of Germany. It is denied by our ambassa- \ndor, Andrew D. White, and it is a false imputation made for an evil purpose. \nFrance is struggling to surmount the cost of lives and money in the tropical \ncolonies now held, and wants no more. \n\nWhat, then, are the facts about the Philippine islands. No one wants them. \nNo one wants to assume the expense, danger, and cost of subduing and governing \nthem. But no one nation wants the other to make a base of offence against any \nother nation. Then why not neutralize them? We can lend the Filipinos men \nlike Sir Robert Hart of England, or my former townsman, E. B. Drew, who was \nformerly a high-school teacher in Brookline. These two men are now adminis- \n\n\n\n14 CRIMINAL AGGRESSION : BY WHOM COMMITTED/ \n\ntering the customs of China. Lord Cromer administers the affairs of Egypt under \nthe Khedive. The Philippines may be neutralized as Belgium is neutralized ; as \nSwitzerland is neutralized ; as the Congo Free State is neutralized. Is not every- \nthing propitious? President McKinley has the opportunity to make himself a \nrecord in history as the great man of the century could he comprehend his true \nmission and take advantage of the existing conditions. All nations to have their \ncoaling stations; all nations to land their cables; all to have equal rights and \nno hostile shots to be fired upon the land, and no contest upon the waters thereof. \nWe can make the Philippine islands the sanctuary of commerce ; we can aid \nthe inhabitants to bring order out of chaos ; we can help them work out their own \nnational salvation ; and joined with the Czar we can take the first measures for \nabating the hell of Avar upon the earth. \n\n" Can these tiling\'s come to pass ? \nNay, if it lie, alas, a vision ! \nStill let us sleep and dream it true ; \nOr, sane and broad awake, \nFor its great sound and sake \nTake it and make it earth\'s, \nAnd peace ensue." \n\n1 have remarked that whenever right-minded men make an effort to establish \npeace upon earth and good-will among nations those who are imbued with the \nmilitary spirit or with the survival of the brute element in man cry, Visionary ! \nThese are the men who to-day, on this twenty-second of February, the birthday of \nWashington, are trying to put him in contempt by casting ridicule on his farewell \naddress as having no relation to present times. Was he not a soldier? Did he \nnot fight to redeem his countrymen from oppression, and did he not show when \nthe conflict was ended that in him there was no survival of the brute element, \nwhich actuates many of the advocates of expansion ? Did he not declare and \nenforce the. principles of peace? It is not only expansion, but militarism that is \nupon us, but that evil once recognized has already been suppressed. The rising \ntide of popular opinion among workingmen, among farmers, among clergymen, \nand among all thoughtful men who can rightfully claim to be good citizens, will \nresist criminal aggression and will yet compel the Congress and the Executive \nof the nation to remedy the wrongs which have been inflicted upon these people. \nThen will be found the easy way to do right; then the present Executive may \nopen that way by neutralizing the Philippine islands and making them the \nsanctuary of commerce. The opjionents of criminal aggression will then join \nin saving the President from the execration which may rest upon him and his \nsupporters when the death rate in our arm}\' in the tropics begins to be recorded, \nunless this great wrong is quickly righted. If that right way is taken then \nthe name of William McKinley may yet go down in history, when all the evils \nof the present have been buried in the remote past, among the great names of \nthe benefactors of the world. \n\nI have thus endeavored to put before you, members of the clergy, a full and \nfrank statement of our present conditions, without fear or favor. When the \nopponents of expansion first entered upon the work they seemed to be few. \nMany now active and earnestly working with us then seemed to fear that the \nnation had been so far committed that there was no way out. All that has \nchanged. Congress has refused to warrant a permanently large standing army, \nand is beginning to feel the influence of the sober second thought of the people \ngiving them a warning no longer to commit criminal aggression. We now \ncall upon the clergy to join in this righteous cause, and to aid us with their \nearnest work. \n\nEDWARD ATKINSON. \n\n\n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED.\' 15 \n\n\n\nAPPENDIX. \n\n\n\nIn order to support the statements submitted in the foregoing treatise by \nadequate proofs I have endeavored to get a copy of Senate Document No. 62, \ncontaining the evidence and information submitted by the President with the \ntreaty of peace, \xe2\x80\x94a document of five hundred pages. But having as yet failed \nto secure a copy, I may rightly make citations from this document which were \nsubmitted by Hon. Henry U. Johnson and by Hon. Mice A. Pierce in their \nspeeches in the House of Representatives. \n\nIn support of the right of the Filipinos to self-government Mr. Johnson said, \n" Are you aware that Admiral Dewey made use of this language in his communication \nto the Secretary of the Navy on the 29th of last August ? \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n" The population of Luzon is reported to be something over 3,000,000, mostly natives. These \nare gentle, docile, and, under just laws and with the benefits of popular education, would soou \nmake good citizens. \n\n" In a telegram sent to the department June 23 I expressed the opinion that these people \nare far superior in their intelligence, and more capable of self-government, than the natives of \nCuba, and I am familiar with both races. Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in \nthis opinion." \n\nMr. Johnson \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nHas it escaped your notice that the United States Consul-General at Hong Kong, \nChina, made use of the following language in his communication to Mr. Moore of the \nDepartment of State? \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nI consider the forty or fifty Philippine leaders, with whose fortunes I haye been very \nclosely connected, both the superiors of the Malays and the Cubans. Aguinaldo, Agoncilla, \nand Saudico are all men who would all be leaders in their separate departments in any country. \n\nIn conclusion I wish to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of \nthe Philippine islands cannot be dealt with as though they were North American Indians, will- \ning to be moved from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the United \nStates decides not to retain the Philippine islands its 10,000,000 people will demand indepen- \ndence, and the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be \nresisted with the same spirit with which they fought the Spaniards. \n\nIn the very able speech of Hon. Rice A. Pierce many citations are given. \nHe said, "And now we come to the consideration of the permanent holding of \nthe Philippine islands, to do which General Whittier, in his testimony before \nthe Paris Commission, said : \n\n,; If we attempt the unwise thing of ignoring the natives an army of 50,000 men will be none \ntoo small. \xe2\x80\x94 Senate Doc., No. 62, part 1, page 508." \n\nIn reply to the charge that Senor Aguinaldo had been bribed by Spain to \nleave the islands and had appropriated the money Mr. Pierce refers to the fact \nthat on the 24th day of May, 1898, Mr. Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul \nto Manila, telegraphed to the Secretary of State, as follows : \n\nTo-day I executed a power of attorney whereby Aguinaldo releases to his attorneys, in \nfact $400,000 now in bank in Hong Kong, so that the money can pay for 3,000 stands of arms \nbought there and expected here to-morrow. \n\nAgain Mr. Pierce recites from Document 62 : \n\nOn the 4th of July, 1898, Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, commanding the United \nStates troops at Cavite, addressed a letter to Senor Don Emilo Aguinaldo, commanding \nthe Philippine forces at the same place, in which he said (page 390J : \n\nGeneral : I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land \nforces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of Spain, \nhas entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine islands. \n\n\n\n16 CHIMIN AL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED? \n\nFor these reasons I desire to have most amicable relations with you, and to have you and \nyour people cooperate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces. \n\nTo this Aguinaldo made an earnest and instant response, which was acknowledged \nby General Anderson in a note dated July 6, in which, after informing Aguinaldo that \nlarge reinforcements were expected from the United States, for whom more space \nwould be required for camps and storehouses, he said (page 391) : \n\nFor this I would like to have your Excellency\'s advice and cooperation, :i- yon are best \nacquainted with the resources of this country. \n\nHe added that they did not intend to remain inactive, but to move promptly \n\n" against our common enemy." \n\nReferring to the Spaniards\' fear of the Filipinos, General Whittier said (page 491) : \nI think the Captain-General was much frightened. He reported in great trepidation that \n\nthe insurgents were coming into the city, and I said that I knew that that was impossible, \n\nbecause such precautions had been taken as rendered it so. \n\nGeneral Whittier said, in answer to a question put by Senator Gray (page 492) : \nThey are somewhat undersized, are fairly good in appearance, are brave, will stand anv \namount of hunger and hardship, and, well led, would be very good soldiers. \n\nSpeaking of their services in " driving the Spaniards from Cavite, twenty odd \nmiles into the defences of Manila," General Whittier said (page 499) : \n\nAll the success was on the natives\' side, and the Spaniards surrendered between 7,000 \nand 8,0 p men well armed, plenty of ammunition, and in good physical condition. The excuse \nof the latter may be that their enemy was in small bands; but they never captured one of these, \nand the small hands drove them to their walls. \n\nThe most conclusive evidence, however, of a complete understanding of the \nseveral military and naval officers of the United States in this matter is to be found \nin the report of Consul Wildman, which was brought into the debate as follows : \n\nMr. Pierce, of Tennessee \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nConsul Wildman states, and the records show it, that openly in the Spanish Cortes \nGeneral Rivera, who was the Spanish Governor-General, stated that of the money that \nwas to be paid only .$400,000 of it, and that in Mexican dollars, was paid, when they \nhad to pay over $1,000,000; that he did not propose to carry out what was stipulated \nat the time. \n\nIn 1897 Aguinaldo, Agoncillo, and other leaders of the Philippines agreed to leave \nthe island, and that certain civil reforms were to be entered upon, but as Rivera says \nhimself, he did not propose to carry them out, and he did not propose to pay any \nof the money ; and this is what the Consul at Hong Kong says, and I will read what he \nsays, as I do not wish to state it myself. Here is what Consul Wildman says : \n\nConsulate of the United States, \n\nHong Kong, July 18, 1898. \n\nThere has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Aguinaldo and his cabinet on \naccount of the questionable terms of their surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month. It has \nbeen said that they sold their country for gold ; but this has been conclusively disproved, not only \nby their own statements, but by the speech of the late Governor-General Rivera in the Spanish \nSenate, June 11, 1898. He said that Aguinaldo undertook to submit if the Spanish government \nwould give a certain sum to the widows and orphans of the insurgents. He then admits that \nonly a tenth part of this sum was ever given to Aguinaldo, and that the other promises made he \ndid not find it expedient to keep. \n\nI was in Hong Kong September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under con- \ntract with the Spanish Government. They waited until the first of November for the payment \nof the promised money and the fulfilment of the promised reforms. Only $400,000, Mexican, \nwas ever placed to their credit in the banks, and on the third of November Mr. F. Agoncillo, \nlate minister of foreign affairs in Aguinaldo\'s cabinet, called upon me and made a proposal, \nwhich I transmitted to the State Department in my despatch No. 19, dated Nov. 3, 1897. \n\nIn reply the State Department instructed me " to courteously decline to communicate with \nthe department further regarding the alleged mission." 1 obeyed these instructions to the letter \n\n\n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION : BY WHOM COMMITTED.\' 17 \n\nuntil the breaking out of the war, when, after consultation with Admiral Dewey, I received a \ndelegation from the insurgent junta, and they bound themselves to obey all laws of civilized \nwarfare, and to place themselves absolutely under the orders of Admiral Dewey if they were \npermitted to return to Manila. At this time their president, Aguinaldo, was in Singapore \nnegotiating, through Consul-General Pratt, with Admiral Dewey for his return. \n\nOn April 27, in company with Consul O. F. Williams, we received another delegation, com- \nposed of Senor Sandico, Jose Maria Basa, Tomas Mascardo, Lorenzo L. Zialcita, Andres E. \nGarchitorena, Manuel Malvar, Mariano Llanza, Salvatore Estrclla. We agreed, on behalf of \nDewey, to allow two of their number to accompany the fleet to Manila. Consequently, on the \nsame day, I took in the tug " Fame "Alizandrino and Garchitorena, accompanied by Mr. Sandico, \nto the "Olympia," in Mir\'s Bay. On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in I long Kong and immediately \ncalled on me. \n\nIt was May 16th before I could obtain permission from Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo \nto go by the United States ship " McCulloch," and I put him aboard in the night so as to save \nany complications with the local government. Immediately on the arrival of Aguinaldo at \nCavite he issued a proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left, forbidding pillage, \nand making it a criminal offence to maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government \nof which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he hoped to maintain control over the \nnatives, and from that date until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful in the \nfield, and dignified and just at the head of his government. \n\nIn conclusion, I wish to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of \nthe Philippine islands cannot be dealt with as though the}\' were North American Indians, willing \nto be moved from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the United States \ndecides not to retain the Philippine islands its 10.000,000 people will demand independence, and \nthe attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the \nsame spirit with which they fought the Spaniards. \n\nI have the honor, etc. \n\nPiOUXSEVELLE WlLDMAN, \n\n( \'onsul-Gent ml . \nMr. Pierce \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nAnd that money Aguinaldo, as shown by Mr. Williams, Consul of the United \nStates, has turned over to buy arms. He executed a power of attorney and turned \nit over to him, that he might pay for the arms that had been purchased. I repeat \nhere that the arms came under American control, and were turned over through Araer- \ncan officials to Aguinaldo to arm the natives in their fight against the Spaniards, to aid \nthe Americans in the capture of Manila. (Applause.) We have this plain letter. It \nis not manufactured by me. We see here the same policy pursued by gentlemen on \nthe other side of the House to carry out the policy of Mr. McKinley. \n\nFinally, in support of the right of the Filipinos Mr. Pierce quotes Admiral \nDewey in the following terms : \n\nThese people, the Filipinos, are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of \nself-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. \n\nClosing as follows : \n\nAnd yet we propose to give a free government to the Island of Cuba, to the \nnatives of Cuba; and George Dewey, a man soon to become an Admiral, a title which \nhe richly merits and deserves, says these natives of the Philippine islands are superior \nto the natives of Cuba. Congress has said that the natives of Cuba should be free. \nWhat the President said to the Filipinos was given to them through their press. \n\nThe Filipinos rendered every assistance that they could to aid the United States. \nThey drove the Spaniards into their walled city of Manila, held all the outer lines and \nfortifications, cut off the supplies, cut off the food and water, and rendered assistance \nto the American army which would have made it impossible for them without that assist- \nance to have taken the Spanish army, for if it had not been for Aguinaldo\'s army the \nSpaniards could have retreated from the city of Manila and beyond the reach of \nDewey\'s guns. \n\nThese citations are from the official document prepared in the office of the \nSecretary of State and submitted to Congress by President William McKinley \n\n\n\n18 CRIMINAL AGGRESSION : BY WHOM COMMITTED:\' \n\n\n\nwith the treaty of peace. It is apparent that the several military and naval \nofficers of the United .States acted upon their faith on the declaration of the Presi- \ndent when he announced that he did not contemplate " forcible annexation, "which \nby our code of morality he declared would be "criminal aggression." \n\nIt, therefore, appears that carefully refraining from any act outside their law- \nful functions, Commodore Dewey, General Anderson, Consul-General Smith \nof Singapore, and Consul Wildman of Hong Kong, secured the cooperation of \nAguinaldo, promoted his return in a government vessel to Manila, supplied him \nami his forces with arms taken from the Spaniards, and invited his cooperation \nin the common undertaking to remove the oppressive rule of Spain from the \nPhilippine islands in order that the people might enjoy liberty. The President \nof the United States, having knowledge of all these facts, then turns back on his \ndeclaration, gives orders without authority of law, under an assumed power, to \nGeneral Otis to take possession and administer the government of the Philippine \nislands. \n\nThis bald statement of the facts of the case calls for no words. The question \nbefore the country now is how to remedy this wrong and how to remove from \nthe Philippine islands the oppression which has been substituted for that of Spain \nwith the least delay and the least humiliation. \n\nAt the very time when the foregoing text was being put in type comes the \nfirst information yet received by mail of which the public has any knowledge, in \nregard to the condition of affairs at the time and in the weeks preceding the \nslaughter of the Filipinos by our army, from a competent observer who was on \nthe spot. \n\nMany rumors have been in circulation, based on private letters in regard to \nthe origin of that attack, but in the following letter of Rev. Clay MacCauley, \nwhose evidence has been cited in the body of this pamphlet, we begin to get evi- \ndence from an independent source not like that over the telegraph line under \nGovernment censorship : \n\n[Special Correspondence of the Transcript.\'] \n\nTokyo, Japan, February 9. \n\nIf it be true, as telegraphed by " Reuter" this morning, that " the Washington \ncabinet has decided on a vigorous offensive attack on Iloilo and on an endeavor to cap- \nture the Filipino government of Mololos," then, so it seems to me, the greatest mistake \nyet made by the present Administration and one of the least justifiable wrongs in \nAmerican political history have been committed and have brought with them their \npenalty. It may be, now that the Filipino insurgents have attacked our army and \nkilled some of our soldiers, that there is no way left for our Government but that of \noffensive war and an attempted conquest of the Philippine islands. But, even under \nthis necessity, I cannot help remembering that had the American Government been \ngenerous or wise through the months just passed no assault by a Filipino army would \nhave been made upon the soldiers of the United States, and no such dreadful future \nas that now probably awaiting these people would have confronted them. Ignorance \nand reckless aggressiveness in high places in America and too prosaic an obedience, a \ntemperamental fault and mingled timidity and inability in the administrative authorities \nat Manila, will in time be known as the chief occasions of this terrible calamity. I do \nnot accuse without reasons. \n\nAt the first, in May last, the Filipino insurgents were encouraged by the American \nauthorities in their renewed hostility to the Spaniards. They were ready then to give \nany and full allegiance to the United States. At the downfall of Manila no enthusiasm \ncould be greater from a people than that of the Filipinos for the Americans. What at \nthat time were the supreme directions from Washington? " Have no embarrassing re- \nlations with the insurgents; make no compromising promises; be careful that the way \n\n\n\nCRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED? 19 \n\n\n\nfor the United States be clear into the future." Regulations that Avere doubtless \nwise and, under the circumstances, imperative. But how were tbey applied? In the \nanswer to this question lies in largest part the explanation of the struggle just begun. \nSome evil fate seems to have guided the movement step by step from its insignificant \nbeginnings to its present portentous issues. Clearly the United States authorities had \nno right in August last or since then, even to to-day, to offer to the eager Filipinos \nany definite policy for the direction of their mutual relations. But, clearly, too, \nthese authorities had not only right, but they were in duty bound not to let the Filipinos \nmisunderstand them or their country during the critical progress of events. Under the \ncircumstances mutual confidence, sympathy, and patience were imperative. It was \nabove all needed that the representatives in Manila of the United States Government \nshould go to these people, just emancipated from Spanish rule, and with kind sympathy \ntell them until they understood the facts without doubt that, more than anything else, \nboth peoples must wait for the law\'s delays, for a treaty of peace, for ratification of the \ntreaty, and then for a definite policy that should direct them in the future. In a way \nthese things were known by and made known to the Filipinos. But that was not enough. \nSo fearful were the American authorities that the future might be embarrassed by their \nwords or acts that very soon after the capture of Manila not only had official inter- \ncourse with the insurgent leaders become almost nil, and what there was of it almost \nwholly mandatory on the part of the Americans, but the social intercourse also that had \nbegun in the most cordial ways was rapidly lessened and constrained. Then, it is true \nthat so far as movements were made by the Americans either in America or the Philip- \npines appearances more and more indicated that the United States Government was more \nand more tending to assume the sovereignty of the islands. Whether this assumption \nwas to be for a protectorate or for incorporation of the Philippines into the American \nbody politic was not evident, and no one responsible for his opinions offered to talk the \nmatter over with the leaders of the Philippine republic, then coming into life. \n\nThrough the summer and the early autumn the Filipino leaders were not averse \nto annexation to the United States. Indeed, I am under the impression that they at the \nfirst looked for and wished for union with the American republic. And though I am \nnot in favor of the annexation of these far-away lands to the United States, I am confi- \ndent that until towards the close of the year any politic representative of our govern- \nment at Manila could have enrolled Aguinaldo and his friends among the most ardent \nsupporters of the proposed annexation. Our whole attitude and action, however, seemed \ndetermined towards alienation and not friendship. The Filipino leaders were, from \nalmost the first, repelled and ignored. Hardly could men have set about in a better \nway to arouse resentment, suspicion, anger, and rebellion than the men in charge of \nthe administration of American interests in Manila. \n\nThe Filipinos were made to feel that Americans considered them not worth either \npolitical or social consideration. Driven back upon themselves, their soldiers treated \nwith contempt, their wishes not listened to or respected, if heard, told nothing of our \nGovernment\'s ultimate desires or purposes, or, if tol&, left without judicious, sympa- \nthetic explanations of the course of events in Washington, \xe2\x80\x94 the Filipinos graduallv \naccepted their isolation, organized their government more and more thoroughly, and \nbegan to import arms and ammunition for their own support and defence. I cannot \nblame them for having done this. They could so easily have been retained as our allies \nand friends. A sympathizer, a conciliator, a politician, in the good sense of the word, \ncould have kept them with him step by step, while the administration at Washington \nwas coming to a consciousness of its own wishes and aims. But we let them go; we let \nthem misunderstand us, or we did not try to keep them with us as we came to under- \nstand ourselves better. On our own authorities, not on the Filipinos, falls the blame \nthat the Filipinos changed from friends to enemies, and at last turned towards us in the \ntrenches at Manila a hostile front. A more lamentable series of lost opportunities, of \nneglected openings for having one\'s own way, of deliberate manufacture of enemies, it \nwould be difficult to find in the history of nations. I am not alone in this judgment. \nCould impartial observers from among foreigners, long resident in Manila, be heard, \n\n\n\n20 CRIMINAL AGGRESSION: BY WHOM COMMITTED .\' \n\ndared intelligent American officers and soldiers at Manila speak, could Aguinaldo and \nhis friends be believed, my charge would not stand without ample support. \n\nOur own Government and the administrative authorities at Manila who acted for \nthe home Government, both in ignorance and with recklessness, cast aside again and \nagain the very agencies that would have brought about the end that the annexationists \nhave most sought. Through the mistake of not having had the right men in the re- \nsponsible places, and through the excessive caution attending a policy in the process of \nformation at Washington, the Americans have lostthe allegiance and incurred the hostil- \nity of a whole people. The Filipinos once idealized the United States. They were \nready to do our bidding to the utmost, had we but used the wands of sympathy and \nconfidence. And now here we are at bayonet points, and the American Government has \ndecided to attempt the " capture of the Filipinos\' government at Malolos." It will be \ndoubtless the policy of the imperialist press now to tell the American people that the \nFilipinos are false to their promises of last year ; are treacherous ; not fit for self-gov- \nernment and should be suppressed, and that this war should be carried to its deadly end. \nVery well ! Let all the charges of this kind be true, the fact yet remains that our own \nbungling rule in Manila has impelled them to treachery and rebellion. But the pity of \nit, when another record was so easy to make ! Had a man of the President\'s own \ntemperament been in command at Manila, notwithstanding the caution of the uncertain \nyet aggressive Washington Administration, the new year, I feel sure, would have opened \nwith the " Filipino Republic," anxious to be made an integral part of the great republic \nof the West. \n\nWere nations amenable to repentance and reform, something might yet be done to \nremedy this great mistake and wrong. But history, I fear, justifies no hope for such \nchange. Bather does the present calamity, if this morning\'s telegram tells the truth, \ntempt one to say : Let us as a nation let allpretence at philanthropy and national justice \ngo. Let us admit that the Anglo-Saxon in America as well as in Europe is a ravening \nbeast still. He fought for liberty and independence a hundred years ago, but he fought \nnot for the " glittering generalities " of the Declaration of Independence, \xe2\x80\x94 the prin- \nciple of human freedom, \xe2\x80\x94 but for his own life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. \nShall this new war in the Philippines be proclaimed a war of righteousness, a war for \nthe sake of humanity? No! it is the penalty of our own incompetence and folly. I \nwould not if I could, make the Philippines a part of the United States. Sooner or \nlater out of such union would come resentment, revenge, and rebellion, even could it \nhave been brought about in peace and of good will. But now, to make of this people \nour conquered subjects when they might at least have been made friendly fellow-citi- \nzens, what shame to America, what a penalty to pay for ignorance and impotence ! \n\nClay MacCacley. \n\nWith this, the case as it now stands is submitted to the people of this \ncountry. \n\nThe first edition of my treatise on The Cost of a National Crime and \nTin; Hell of War was dedicated to the President of the United States, in the \nhope that he would meet the responsibility so as to justify the quotation from \nMilton : \n\n"Ob, yet a nobler task awaits thy hand \n(For what can war but endless war still breed?) \nTill truth and right from violence be freed, \nAnd public faith clear\'d from the shameful brand \nOf public fraud ! " \n\nThe President has failed. It now remains for every citizen to demand that \nour public faith shall be cleared from the shameful brand of public fraud. \n\nEDWARD ATKINSON. \n\nMarch 8, 1899. \n\n\n\n'