b'A. LEVER \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\n\nMount Parnassus. \n\n\n\nCHAPTER I. \n\nGEOGRAPHY OF GREECE. \n\nGreece is the southern portion of a great peninsula of Europe, \nwashed on three sides by the Mediterranean Sea. It is bounded \non the north by the Cambunian mountains, which separate it \nfrom Macedonia. It extends from the fortieth degree of latitude \nto the thirty-sixth, its greatest length being not more than 250 \nEnglish miles, and its greatest breadth only 180. Its surface is \nconsiderably less than that of Portugal. This small area was \ndivided among a number of independent states, many of them con- \ntaining a territory of only a few square miles, and none of them \nlarger than an English county. But the heroism and genius of the \nGreeks have given an interest to the insignificant spot of earth \nbearing their name, which the vastest empires have never equalled. \nThe name of Greece was not used by the inhabitants of the \n\nB \n\n\n\n2 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nCkap. L \n\n\n\ncountry. They called their land Hellas, and themselves Hellenes. \nAt first the word Hellas signified only a small district in Thessaly, \nfrom which the Hellenes gradually spread oyer the whole country. \nThe names of Greece and Greeks come to us from the Eomans, who \ngaye the name of Grsecia to the country and of Grseci to the \ninhabitants. \n\nThe two northerly provinces of Greece are Thessaly and Epirus, \nseparated from each other by Mount Pindus. Thessaly is a fertile \nplain enclosed by lofty mountains, and drained by the river Peneus, \nwhich finds its way into the sea through the celebrated Vale of \nTempe. Epirus is covered by rugged ranges of mountains running \nfrom north to south, through which the Achelous, the largest river \nof Greece, flows towards the Corinthian gulf. \n\nIn entering central Greece from Thessaly the road runs along \nthe coast through the narrow pass of Thermopylae, between the \nsea and a lofty range of mountains. The district along the coast \nwas inhabited by the eastern Locrians, while to their west were \nDoris and Phocis, the greater part of the latter being occupied \nby Mount Parnassus, the abode of the Muses, upon the slopes of which \nlay the town of Delphi, with its celebrated oracle of Apollo. South \nof Phocis is Boeotia, which is a large hollow basin, enclosed on every \nside by mountains, which prevent the waters from flowing into the \nsea. Hence the atmosphere was damp and thick, to which circum- \nstance the witty Athenians attributed the dulness of the inhabitants. \nThebes was the chief city of Bceotia. South of Bceotia lies Attica, \nwhich is in the form of a triangle, having two of its sides washed \nby the sea and its base united to the land. Its soil is light and dry, \nand is\' better adapted for the growth of fruit than of corn. It \nwas particularly celebrated for its olives, which were regarded as \nthe gift of Athena (Minerva), and were always under the care of \nthat goddess. Athens was on the western coast, between four and \nfive miles from its port, Piraeus. West of Attica, towards the \nisthmus, is the small district of Megaris. \n\nThe western half of central Greece consists of western Locris, \nJEtolia, and Acarhania. These districts were less civilised than \nthe other countries of GreeGe, and were the haunts of rude robber \ntribes even as late as the Peloponnesian war. \n\nCentral Greece is connected with the southern peninsula by a \nnarrow isthmus, on which stood the city of Corinth. So narrow is \nthis isthmus that the ancients regarded the peninsula as an island, \nand gave to it the name of Peloponnesus, or the island of Pelops, \nfrom the mythical hero of this name. Its modern name, the Morea, \nwas bestowed upon it from its resemblance to the leaf of the \nmulberry. \n\n\n\nChap. I. \n\n\n\nMOUNTAINS AND RIVERS. \n\n\n\nThe mountains of Peloponnesus have their roots in the centre of \nthe country, from which they branch out towards the sea. This \ncentral region, called Arcadia, is the Switzerland of the peninsula. \nIt is surrounded by a ring of mountains, forming a kind of natural \nwall, which separates it from the remaining Peloponnesian states. \nThe other chief divisions of Peloponnesus were Achaia, Argolis, La- \nconia, Messenia, and Elis. Achaia is a narrow slip of country lying \nbetween the northern barrier of Arcadia and the Corinthian gulf. \nArgolis, on the east, contained several independent states, of which \nthe most important was Argos. Laconia and Messenia occupied \nthe whole of the south of the peninsula from sea to sea : these two \ncountries were separated by the lofty range of Taygetus, running from \nnorth to south, and terminating in the promontory of Tsenarum \n(now Cape Matapan), the southernmost point of Greece and Europe. \nSparta, the chief town of Laconia, stood in the valley of the \nEurotas, which opens out into a plain of considerable extent \ntowards the Laconian gulf. Messenia, in like manner, was drained \nby the Pamisus, whose plain is still more extensive and fertile than \nthat of the Eurotas. Elis, on the west of Arcadia, contains the \nmemorable plain of Olympia, through which the Alpheus flows, and \nin which the city of Pisa stood. \n\nOf the numerous islands which line the Grecian shores, the most \nimportant was Euboea, stretching along the coasts of Boeotia and \nAttica. South of Eubcea was the group of islands called the \nCyclades, lying around Delos as a centre ; and east of these were \nthe Sporades, near the Asiatic coast. South of these groups are \nthe large islands of Crete and Bhodes. \n\nThe physical features of the country exercised an important \ninfluence upon the political destinies of the people. Greece is one \nof the most mountainous countries of Europe. Its surface is \noccupied by a number of small plains, either entirely surrounded by \nlimestone mountains or open only to the sea. Each of the prin- \ncipal Grecian cities was founded in one of these small plains ; and, \nas the mountains which separated it from its neighbours were lofty \nand rugged, each city grew up in solitary independence. But at the \nsame time it had ready and easy access to the sea, and Arcadia was \nalmost the only political division that did not possess some territory \nupon the coast. Thus shut out from their neighbours by moun- \ntains, the Greeks were naturally attracted to the sea, and became a \nmaritime people. Hence they possessed the love of freedom and \nthe spirit of adventure, which have always characterized, more or \nless, the inhabitants of maritime districts. \n\n\n\nb 2 \n\n\n\n\nAthena (Minerva) superintending the building of the Argo. \n\n\n\nCHAPTEE II. \n\nORIGIN OF THE GREEKS AXD THE HEROIC AGE. \n\nXo nation possesses a history till events are recorded in written \ndocuments ; and it was not till the epoch known by the name of the \nFirst Olympiad, corresponding to the year 776 B.C., that the Greeks \nbegan to employ writing as a means for perpetuating the memory \nof any historical facts. Before that - period everything is vague \nand uncertain ; and the exploits of the heroes related by the poets \nmust not be regarded as historical facts. \n\nThe Pelasgians are universally represented as the most ancient \ninhabitants of Greece. They were spread over the Italian as \nwell as the Grecian peninsula ; and the Pelasgic language thus \nformed the basis of the Latin as well as of the Greek. They were \ndivided into several tribes, of which the Hellenes were probably \none : at any rate, this people, who originally dwelt in the south of \nTliessaly. gradually spread over the rest of Greece. The Pelasgians \ndisappeared before them, or were incorporated with them, and their \ndialect became the language of Greece. The Hellenes considered \nthemselves the descendants of one common ancestor, Hellen, the \nson of Deucalion and Pyrrha. To Hellen were ascribed three sons, \nDorus, Xuthus. and JEolus. Of these Dorus and iEolus gave their \n\n\n\nChap. II. \n\n\n\nCECROPS AND CADMUS. \n\n\n\n5 \n\n\n\nnames to the Dorians and Molians ; and Xutlius, through his two \nsons, Ion and Achseus, became the forefather of the Ionians and \nAchceans. Thus the Greeks accounted for the origin of the four \ngreat divisions of their race. The descent of the Hellenes from \nla common ancestor, Hellen, was a fundamental article in the \npopular faith. It was a general practice in antiquity to invent \nfictitious persons for the purpose of explaining names of which the \norigin was buried in obscurity. It was in this way that Hellen and \nhis sons came into being ; but though they never had any real \nexistence, the tales about them may be regarded as the traditional \nhistory of the races to whom they gave their names. \n\nThe civilization of the Greeks and the development of their \nlanguage bear all the marks of home growth, and probably were \nlittle affected by foreign influence. The traditions, however, of the \nGreeks would point to a contrary conclusion. It was a general \nbelief among them that the Pelasgians were reclaimed from \nbarbarism by Oriental strangers, who settled in the country and \nintroduced among the rude inhabitants the first elements of civi- \nlization. Attica is said to have been indebted for the arts of \ncivilized life to Cecrops, a native of Sais in Egypt. To him is \nascribed the foundation of the city of Athens, the institution of \nmarriage, and the introduction of religious rites and ceremonies. \nArgos, in like manner, is said to have been founded by the Egyptian \nDanaus, who fled to Greece with his fifty daughters, to escape from \nthe persecution of their suitors, the fifty sons of his brother \niEgyptus. The Egyptian stranger was elected king by the natives, \nand from him the tribe of the Danai derived their name, which \nHomer frequently uses as a general appellation for the Greeks. \nAnother colony was the one led from Asia by Pelops, from whom \nthe southern peninsula of Greece derived its name of Peloponnesus. \nPelops is represented as a Phrygian, and the son of the wealthy \nking Tantalus. He became king of Mycenae, and the founder of a \npowerful dynasty, one of the most renowned in the Heroic age of \nGreece. From him was descended Agamemnon, who led the \nGrecian host against Troy. \n\nThe tale of the Phoenician colony, conducted by Cadmus, and \nwhich founded Thebes in Boeotia, rests upon a different basis. Whe- \nther there was such a person as the Phoenician Cadmus, and whether \nhe built the town called Cadinea, which afterwards became the cita- \ndel of Thebes, as the ancient legends relate, cannot be determined ; \nbut it is certain that the Greeks were indebted to the Phoenicians \nfor the art of writing ; for both the names and the forms of the \nletters in the Greek alphabet are evidently derived from the \nPhoenician. With this exception the Oriental strangers left no \n\n\n\n6 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF \'GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. II. \n\n\n\npermanent traces of their settlements in Greece ; and the population \nof the country continued to be essentially Grecian, uncontanrinated \nby any foreign elements. \n\nThe age of the heroes, from the first appearance of the Hellenes \nin Thessaly to the return of the Greeks from Troy, was supposed to \nbe a period of about two hundred years. These heroes were \nbelieved to be a noble race of beings, possessing a superhuman \nthough not a divine nature, and superior to ordinary men in strength \nof body and greatness of soul. \n\nAmong the heroes three stand conspicuously forth : Hercules, the \nnational hero of Greece ; Theseus, the hero of Attica ; and Minos, \nking of Crete, the principal founder of Grecian law and civilization. \n\nHercules was the son of Zeus (Jupiter) and Alcmena ; but the \njealous anger of Hera (Juno) raised up against him an opponent \nand a master in the person of Eurystheus, at whose bidding the \ngreatest of all heroes was to achieve those wonderful labours which \nfilled the whole world with his fame. In these are realized, on \na magnificent scale, the two great objects of ancient heroism, the \ndestruction of physical and moral evil, and the acquisition of wealth \nand power. Such, for instance, are the labours in which he \ndestroys the terrible Nemean Hon and Lernean hydra, carries \noff the girdle of Ares from Hippolyte, queen of the Amazons, \nand seizes the golden apples of the Hesperides, guarded by a \nhundred-headed dragon. \n\nTheseus was a son of JEgeus, king of Athens, and of iEthra, \ndaughter of Pittheus, king of Trcezen. Among his many memo- \nrable achievements the most famous was his deliverance of Athens \nfrom the frightful tribute imposed upon it by Minos for the murder \nof his son. This consisted of seven youths and seven maidens \nwhom the Athenians were compelled to send every nine years to \nCrete, there to be devoured by the Minotaur, a monster with a \nhuman body and a bull\'s head, which Minos kept concealed in \nan inextricable labyrinth. The third ship was already on the point \nof sailing with its cargo of innocent victims, when Theseus offered \nto go with them, hoping to put an end for ever to the horrible \ntribute. Ariadne, the daughter of Minos, became enamoured of \nthe hero, and having supplied him with a clue to trace the windings \nof the labyrinth, Theseus succeeded in killing the monster, \nand in tracking his way out of the mazy lair. Theseus, on his \nreturn, became king of Attica, and proceeded to lay the founda- \ntions of the future greatness of the country. He united into one \npolitical body the twelve independent states into which Cecrops \nhad divided Attica, and made Athens the capital of the new king- \ndom. He then divided the citizens into three classes, namely. \n\n\n\nChap. II. \n\n\n\nTHE ARGONAUTS. \n\n\n\n7 \n\n\n\nEupatridze, or nobles ; Geomori, or husbandmen ; and Demiurgi, or \nartisans. \n\nMinos, king of Crete, whose history is connected with that of \nTheseus, appears, like him, the representative of an historical and \ncivil state of life. Minos is said to have received the laws of Crete \nimmediately from Zeus ; and traditions uniformly present him \nas king of the sea. Possessing a numerous fleet, he reduced the \nsurrounding islands, especially the Cyclades, under his dominion s \nand cleared the sea of pirates. \n\nThe voyage of the Argonauts and the Trojan war were the \nmost memorable enterprises undertaken by collective bodies of \nheroes. \n\nThe Argonauts derived their name from the Argo, a ship built \nfor the adventurers by Jason, under the superintendence of Athena \n(Minerva). They embarked in the harbour of lolcus in Thessaly \nfor the purpose of obtaining the golden fleece which was preserved \nin Msl in Colchis, on the eastern shores of the Black Sea, under the \nguardianship of a sleepless dragon. The most renowned heroes of \nthe age took part in the expedition. Among them were Hercules \nand Theseus, as well as the principal leaders in the Trojan war ; \nbut Jason is the central figure and the real hero of the enterprise. \nUpon arriving at vEa, after many adventures, king iEetes promised \nto deliver to Jason the golden fleece, provided he yoked two fire- \nbreathing oxen with brazen feet, and performed other wonderful \ndeeds. Here, also, as in the legend of Theseus, love played a pro- \nminent part. Medea, the daughter of iEetes, who was skilled in \nmagic and supernatural arts, furnished Jason with the means of \naccomplishing the labours imposed upon him ; and as her father \nstill delayed to surrender the fleece, she cast the dragon asleep \nduring the night, seized the fleece, and sailed away in the Argo \nwith her beloved Jason. \n\nThe Trojan war was the greatest of all the heroic achievements. \nIt formed the subject of innumerable epic poems, and has been \nimmortalised by the genius of Homer. Paris, son of Priam, king of \nTroy, abused the hospitality of Menelaus, king of Sparta, by \ncarrying off his wife Helen, the most beautiful woman of the age. \nAll the Grecian princes looked upon the outrage as one committed \nagainst themselves. Responding to the call of Menelaus, they \nassembled in arms, elected his brother Agamemnon, king of \nMycenae, leader of the expedition, and sailed across the -ZEgean \nin nearly 1200 ships to recover the faithless fair one. Several \nof the confederate heroes excelled Agamemnon in fame. Among \nthem Achilles, chief of the Thessalian Myrmidons, stood pre- \neminent in strength, beauty, and valour ; whilst Ulysses, king of \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. II. \n\n\n\nIthaca, surpassed ail the rest in the mental qualities of counsel and \neloquence. Among the Trojans, Hector, one of the sons of Priam, \nwas most distinguished for heroic qualities, and formed a striking \ncontrast to his handsome but effeminate brother Paris. Next to \nHector in valour stood -ZEneas, son of Anchises and Aphrodite \n(Venus). Even the gods took part in the contest, encouraging \ntheir favourite heroes, and sometimes fighting by their side or in \ntheir stead. \n\nIt was not till the tenth year of the war that Troy yielded to the \ninevitable decree of fate ; and it is this year which forms the \nsubject of the Iliad. Achilles, offended by Agamemnon, abstains \nfrom the war ; and in his absence the Greeks are no match for \nHector. The Trojans drive them back into their camp, and are \nalready setting fire to their ships, when Achilles gives his armour \nto his friend Patroclus, and allows him to charge at the head of the \nMyrmidons. Patroclus repulses the Trojans from the ships, but the \ngod Apollo is against him, and he falls under the spear of Hector. \nDesire to avenge the death of his friend proves more powerful in \nthe breast of Achilles than anger against Agamemnon. He appears \nagain in the field in new and gorgeous armour, forged for him \nby the god Hephaestus (Vulcan) at the prayer of Thetis. The \nTrojans fly before him, and, although Achilles is aware that his own \ndeath must speedily follow that of the Trojan hero, he slays Hector \nin single combat. \n\nThe Iliad closes with the burial of Hector. The death of \nAchilles and the capture of Troy were related in later poems. The \nhero of so many achievements perishes by an arrow shot by the \nunwarlike Paris, but directed by the hand of Apollo. The noblest \ncombatants had now fallen on either side, and force of arms had \nproved unable to accomplish what stratagem at length effects. It \nis Ulysses who now steps into the foreground and becomes the real \nconqueror of Troy. By his advice a wooden horse is built, in \nwhose inside he and other heroes conceal themselves. The infatu- \nated Trojans admit the horse within their walls. In the dead \nof night the Greeks rush out and open the gates to their comrades. \nTroy is delivered over to the sword, and its glory sinks in ashes. \nThe fall of Troy is placed in the year 1184 b.c. \n\nThe return of the Grecian leaders from Troy forms another series \nof poetical legends. Several meet with tragical ends. Agamemnon \nis murdered, on his arrival at Mycenae, by his wife Clytaemnestra \nand her paramour JEgisthus. But of these wanderings the most \ncelebrated and interesting are those of Ulysses, which form the \nsubject of the Odyssey. After twenty years\' absence he arrives \nat length in Ithaca, where he slays the numerous suitors who \n\n\n\nChap. II. \n\n\n\nSOCIETY OF THE HEROIC AGE. \n\n\n\n9 \n\n\n\ndevoured his substance and contended for the hand of his wife \nPenelope. \n\nThe Homeric poems must not be regarded as a record of his- \ntorical persons and events, but, at the same time, they present a \nvaluable picture of the institutions and manners of the earliest \nknown state of Grecian society. \n\nIn the Heroic age Greece was already divided into a number \nof independent states, each governed by its own king. The \nauthority of the king was not limited by any laws ; his power \nresembled that of the patriarchs in the Old Testament ; and for the \nexercise of it he was responsible only to Zeus, and not to his people. \nBut though the king was not restrained in the exercise of his power \nby any positive laws, his authority was practically limited by the \nBoule, or council of chiefs, and the Agora, or general assembly \nof freemen. These two bodies, of little account in the Heroic \nage, became in the Republican age the sole depositories of political \npower. \n\nThe Greeks in the Heroic age were divided into the three classes \nof nobles, common freemen, and slaves. The nobles were raised \nfar above the rest of the community in honour, power, and wealth. \nThey were distinguished by their warlike prowess, their large \nestates, and their numerous slaves. The condition of the general \nmass of freemen is rarely mentioned. They possessed portions \nof land as their own property, which they cultivated themselves ; \nbut there was another class of poor freemen, called Thetes, who \nhad no land of their own, and who worked for hire on the estates \nof others. Slavery was not so prevalent in the Heroic age as at a \nlater time, and appears in a less odious aspect. The nobles alone \npossessed slaves, and they treated them with a degree of kindness \nwhich frequently secured for the masters their affectionate attach- \nment. \n\nSociety was marked by simplicity of manners. The kings and \nnobles did not consider it derogatory to their dignity to acquire skill \nin the manual arts. Ulysses is represented as building his own bed- \nchamber and constructing his own raft, and he boasts of being \nan excellent mower and ploughman. Like Esau, who made savoury \nmeat for his father Isaac, the Heroic chiefs prepared their own \nmeals and prided themselves on their skill in cookery. Kings and \nprivate persons partook of the same food, which was of the simplest \nkind. Beef, mutton, and goat\'s flesh were the ordinary meats, and \ncheese, flour, and sometimes fruits, also formed part of the banquet ; \nwine was drunk diluted with water, and the entertainments were \nnever disgraced by intemperance, like those of our northern ances- \ntors. The enjoyment of the banquet was heightened by the song \n\n\n\n10 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. II. \n\n\n\nand the dance, and the chiefs took more delight in the lays of the \nminstrel than in the exciting influence of the wine. \n\nThe wives and daughters of the chiefs, in like manner, did not \ndeem it beneath them to discharge various duties which were \nafterwards regarded as menial. Xot only do we find them con- \nstantly employed in weaving, spinning, and embroidery, but like \nthe daughters of the patriarchs they fetch water from the well and \nassist their slaves in washing garments in the river. \n\nEven at this early age the Greeks had made considerable \nadvances in civilization. They were collected in fortified towns, \nwhich were surrounded by walls and adorned with palaces and \ntemples. The massive ruins of Myceme and the sculptured lions \non the gate of this city belong to the Heroic age, and still excite \nthe wonder of the beholder. Commerce, however, was little cul- \ntivated, and was not much esteemed. It was deemed more honour- \nable for a man to enrich himself by robbery and piracy than by \nthe arts of peace. Coined money is not mentioned in the poems \nof Homer. Whether the Greeks were acquainted at this early \nperiod with the art of writing is a question which has given rise \nto much dispute, and must remain undetermined ; but poetry was \ncultivated with success, though yet confined to epic strains, or the \nnarration of the exploits and adventures of the Heroic chiefs. The \nbard sung his own song, and was always received with welcome \nand honour in the palaces of the nobles. \n\nIn the battles, as depicted by Homer, the chiefs are the only \nimportant combatants, while the people are an almost useless mass, \nfrequently put to rout by the prowess of a single hero. The chief \nis mounted in a war chariot, and stands by the side of his charioteer, \nwho is frequently a friend. \n\n\n\n\nGreek chariot \n\n\n\nHead of Olympian Zeus (Jupiter) \n\n\n\nCHAPTER III. \n\nGENERAL SURVEY OF THE GREEK PEOPLE NATIONAL \n\nINSTITUTIONS. \n\nThe Greeks, as we have already seen, were divided into many \nindependent communities, but several causes bound them together \nas one people. Of these the most important were community of \nblood and language \xe2\x80\x94 community of religious rites and festivals \xe2\x80\x94 \nand community of manners and character. \n\nAll the Greeks were descended from the same ancestor and \nspoke the same language. They all described men and cities \nwhich were not Grecian by the term Barbarian. This word has \npassed into our own language, but with a very different idea ; for \nthe Greeks applied it indiscriminately to every foreigner, to the \ncivilized inhabitants of Egypt and Persia, as well as to the rude \ntribes of Scythia and Gaul. \n\nThe second bond of union was a community of religious rites and \nfestivals. From the earliest times the Greeks appear to have \nworshipped the same gods ; but originally there were no religious \nmeetings common to the whole nation. Such meetings were of \ngradual growth, being formed by a number of neighbouring towns, \nwhich entered into an association for the periodical celebration \n\n\n\nJ2 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. III. \n\n\n\nof certain religious sites. Of these the most celebrated was the \nAmpltictyonic Council. It acquired its superiority oyer other \nsimilar associations by the wealth and grandeur of the Delphian \ntemple, of which it was the appointed guardian. It held two \nmeetings every year, one in the spring at the temple of Apollo \nat Delphi, and the other in the autumn at the temple of Demeter \n(Ceres; at Thermopylae. Its members, who were called the \nAmphictyons, consisted of sacred deputies sent from twelve tribes, \neach of which contained several independent cities or states. But \nthe Council was never considered as a national congress, whose duty \nit was to protect and defend the common interests of Greece ; and \nit was only when the rights of the Delphian god had been violated \nthat it invoked the aid of the various members of the league. \n\n\n\n\nThe foot-race. \n\n\n\nThe Olympic Games were of greater efficacy than the Amphic- \ntyonic Council in promoting a spirit of union among the various \n\n\n\n\nWresiiiug. \n\n\n\nChap. III. \n\n\n\nNATIONAL FESTIVALS. \n\n\n\n13 \n\n\n\nbranches of the Greek race, and in keeping alive a feeling of their \ncommon origin. They were open to all persons who could prove \ntheir Hellenic blood, and \nwere frequented by spec- \ntators from all parts of the \nGrecian world. They were \ncelebrated at Olympia, on \nthe banks of the Alpheus, \nin the territory of Elis. \nThe origin of the festival \nis lost in obscurity; but \nit is said to have been \nrevived by Iphitus, king \nof Elis, and Lycurgus the \nSpartan legislator, in the \nyear 776 b.c. \xe2\x80\xa2 and, accord- \ningly, when the Greeks at Hurling the javelin, \na later time began to use the Olympic contest as a chronological era, \nthis year was regarded as the first Olympiad. It was celebrated at \nthe end of every four years, and the interval which elapsed between \neach celebration was called an Olympiad. The whole festival was \nunder the management of the Eleans, who appointed some of \ntheir own number to preside as judges, under the name of the \nHellanodicse. During the month in which it was celebrated all \nhostilities were suspended throughout Greece. At first the festival \nwas confined to a single day, and consisted of nothing more \nthan a match of runners in the stadium .; but in course of time \nso many other contests were introduced, that the games occupied \nfive clays. They comprised various trials of strength and skill, \n\n\n\n\nBoxing. \n\n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. III. \n\n\n\nsuch as wrestling, boxing, the Pancratium (boxing and wrestling \ncombined), and the complicated Pentathlirm (including jumping, \nrunning, the quoit, the javelin, and wrestling), but no combats with \nany kind of weapons. There were also horse-races and chariot- \nraces ; and the chariot-race, with four full-grown horses, became \none of the most popular and celebrated of all the matches. \n\nThe only prize given to the conqueror was a garland of wild \nolive : but this was valued as one of the dearest distinctions in life. \nTo have his name proclaimed as victor before assembled Hellas \nwas an object of ambition with the noblest and the wealthiest \nof the Greeks. Such a person was considered to have conferred \neverlasting glory upon his family and his country, and was rewarded \noy his fellow-citizens with distinguished honours. \n\n\n\n\nIsthmian crowns. \n\n\n\nDuring the sixth century before the Christian era three other \nnational festivals \xe2\x80\x94 the Pythian, Xeniean, and Isthmian games \xe2\x80\x94 \nwhich were at first only local, became open to the whole nation. \nThe Pythian games were celebrated in every third Olympic year, \non the Cirrhsean plain in Phocis, under the superintendence of the \nAmphictyons. The games consisted not only of matches in gym- \nnastics and of horse and chariot races, but also of contests in music \nand poetry. - They soon acquired celebrity, and became second \nonly to the great Olympic festival. The Nemean and Isthmian \ngames occurred more frequently than the Olympic and Pythian. \nThey were celebrated once in two years\xe2\x80\x94 the Nemean in the valley \nof Nemea between Phlius and Cleonse \xe2\x80\x94 and the Isthmian by the \nCorinthians, on their isthmus, in honour of Poseidon (XeptuneC \nAs in the Pythian festival, contests in music and in poetry, as well \nas gymnastics and chariot-races, formed part of these games. Al- \nthough the four great festivals of which we have been speaking \nhad no influence in promoting the political union of Greece, they \nnevertheless were of great importance in making the various \nsections of the race feel that they were all members of one family, \n\n\n\nChap. III. \n\n\n\nTHE DELPHIAN ORACLE. \n\n\n\n15 \n\n\n\nand in cementing them together by common sympathies and the \nenjoyment of common pleasures. The frequent occurrence of these \nfestivals, for one was celebrated every year, tended to the same result. \n\nThe Greeks were thus annually reminded of their common \norigin, and of the great distinction which existed between them \nand barbarians. Nor must we forget the incidental advantages \nwhich attended them. The concourse of so large a number of \npersons from every part of the Grecian world afforded to the \nmerchant opportunities for traffic, and to the artist and the literary \nman the best means of making their works known. During the \ntime of the games a busy commerce was carried on ; and in a \nspacious hall appropriated for the purpose, the poets, philosophers, \nand historians were accustomed to read their most recent works. \n\nThe habit of consulting the same oracles in order to ascertain \nthe will of the gods was another bond of union. It was the \nuniversal practice of the Greeks to undertake no matter of import- \nance without first asking the advice of the gods ; and there were \nmany sacred spots in which the gods were always ready to give an \nanswer to pious worshippers. The oracle of Apollo at Delphi \nsurpassed all the rest in importance, and was regarded with venera- \ntion in every part of the Grecian world. In the centre of the \ntemple of Delphi there was a small opening in the ground, from \nwhich it was said that a certain gas or vapour \nascended. Whenever the oracle was to be con- \nsulted, a virgin priestess called PytMa took her \nseat upon a tripod which was placed over the \nchasm. The ascending vapour affected her \nbrain, and the words which she uttered in this \nexcited condition were believed to be the answer \nof Apollo to his worshippers. They were always \nin hexameter verse, and were reverently taken \ndown by the attendant priests. Most of the \nanswers were equivocal or obscure ; but the \ncredit of the oracle continued unimpaired long \nafter the downfall of Grecian independence. \n\nA further element of union among the Greeks \nwas the similarity of manners and character. \nIt is true the difference in this respect between \nthe polished inhabitants of Athens and the rude \nmountaineers of Acarnania was marked and \nstriking; but if we compare the two with foreign contemporaries, \nthe contrast between them and the latter is still more striking. \nAbsolute despotism, human sacrifices, polygamy, deliberate mutila- \ntion of the person as a punishment, and selling of children into \n\n\n\n\nJ \n\n\n\ni \n\nTripod of ApolLo \nat Delphi. \n\n\n\n(6 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. III. \n\n\n\nslavery, existed in some part or other of the barbarian world, but \nare not found in any city of Greece in the historical times. \n\nThe elements of union of which we have been speaking only \n\nbound the Greeks \nj-^g \xe2\x80\x94 1 ] together in com- \nmon feelings and \nI sentiments : they" \nnever produced \nany political union. \nThe independent \nsovereignty of each \ncity was a funda-\' \nmental notion in \nthe Greek mind. \nThis strongly root- \ned feeling deserves \nparticular notice. \nCareless readers \nof history are \ntempted to sup- \npose that the ter- \nritory of Greece \nwas divided among \na comparatively \nsmall number of in- \ndependent states, \nsuch as Attica. \nArcadia, Boeotia, \nPhocis, Locris. and \nthe like ; but this \nis a most serious \nmistake, and leads \nto a total misappre- \nhension of Greek \nhistory. Every se- \nparate city was \nusually an inde- \npendent state, and \nconsequently each \nof the territories \ndescribed under the general names of Arcadia, Boeotia, Phocis, and \nLocris, contained numerous political communities independent of \none another. Attica, it is true, formed a single state, and its dif- \nferent towns recognised Athens as their capital and the source of \nsupreme power ; but this is an exception to the general rule. \n\n\n\n\n\nApollo, the principal deity of the Dorians. \n\n\n\nCHAPTEE IV. \n\nEARLY HISTORY OF PELOPONNESUS AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE \nEND OF THE MESSENIAN WARS, B.C. 668. \n\nIn the heroic age Peloponnesus was occupied by tribes of Dorian \nconquerors. They had no share in the glories of the Heroic age ; \ntheir name does not occur in the Iliad, and they are only once \nmentioned in the Odyssey; but they were destined to form in \niiistorical times one of the most important elements of the Greek \nnation. Issuing from their mountain district between Thessaly, \nLocris and Phocis, they overran the greater part of Peloponnesus, \ndestroyed the ancient Achaean monarchies, and expelled or reduced \nto subjection the original inhabitants of the land, of which they \nbecame the undisputed masters. This brief statement contains \nall that we know for certain respecting this celebrated event, \nwhich the ancient writers placed eighty years after the Trojan war \n(b.c. 1104). The legendary account of the conquest of Pelopon- \nnesus ran as follows :\xe2\x80\x94 The Dorians were led by the Heraclidae, \nor descendants of the mighty hero Hercules. Hence this migration \nis called the Return of the Heraclidse. The children of Hercules \nhad long been fugitives upon the face of the earth. They had \n\nc \n\n\n\n1 8 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IV. \n\n\n\nmade many attempts to regain possession of the dominions in the \nPeloponnesus, of which their great sire had been deprived by \nEiirysthens, but hitherto without success. In their last attempt \nHyllus, the son of Hercules, had perished in single combat with \nEchemus of Tegea; and the Heraclidae had become bound by \na solemn compact to renounce their enterprise for a hundred years. \nThis period had now expired; and the great-grandsons of Hyllus \xe2\x80\x94 \nTemenus, Cresphontes, and Aristodemus \xe2\x80\x94 resolved to make a fresh \nattempt to recover their birthright. They were assisted in the \nenterprise by the Dorians. This people espoused their cause in \nconsequence of the aid which Hercules himself had rendered to the \nDorian king, iEgimius, when the latter was hard pressed in a \ncontest with the Lapithae. The invaders were warned by an \noracle not to enter Peloponnesus by the Isthmus of Corinth, but \nacross the mouth of the Corinthian gulf. The inhabitants of the \nnorthern coast of the gulf were favourable to their enterprise. \nOxylus, king of the iEtolians, became their guide ; and from \nXaupactus they crossed over to Peloponnesus. A single battle \ndecided the contest. Tisamenus, the son of Orestes, was defeated \nand retired with a portion of his Achaean subjects to the northern \ncoast of Peloponnesus, then occupied by the Ionians. He expelled \nthe Ionians, and took possession of the country, which continued \nhenceforth to be inhabited by the Achaeans, and to be called after \nthem. The Ionians withdrew to Attica, and the greater part of \nthem afterwards emigrated to Asia Minor. \n\nThe Heraclidae and the Dorians now divided between them \nthe dominions of Tisamenus and of the other Achaean princes. \nThe kingdom of Elis was given to Oxylus as a recompense for \nhis services as their guide; and it was agreed that Temenus, \nCresphontes, and Eurysthenes and Procles, the infant sons of \nAristodemus (who had died at Naupactus), should draw lots for \nArgos, Sparta, and Messenia. Argos fell to Temenus, Sparta to \nEurysthenes and Procles, and Messenia to Cresphontes. \n\nSuch are the main features of the legend of the Eeturn of the \nHeraclidae. In order to make the story more striking and impres- \nsive, it compresses into a single epoch events which probably \noccupied several generations. It is in itself improbable that the \nbrave Achaeans quietly submitted to the Dorian invaders after a \nmomentary struggle. We have, moreover, many indications that \nsuch was not the fact, and that it was only gradually and after a \nlong protracted contest that the Dorians became undisputed \nmasters of the greater part of Peloponnesus. \n\nArgos was originally the chief Dorian state in Peloponnesus, but \nat the time of the first Olympiad its power had been supplanted b) \n\n\n\nB.C. 776. \n\n\n\nREFORMS OF LYCURGUS. \n\n\n\n19 \n\n\n\nthat of Sparta. The progress of Sparta from the second to the first \nplace among the states in the peninsula was mainly owing to the \nmilitary discipline and rigorous training of its citizens. The \nsingular constitution of Sparta was unanimously ascribed by the \nancients to the legislator Lycurgus, but there were different stories \nrespecting his date, birth, travels, legislation, and death. His most \nprobable date however is B.C. 776, in which year he is said to have \nassisted Iphitus in restoring the Olympic games. He was the \nson of Eunomus, one of the two kings who reigned together in \nSparta. On the death of his father, his elder brother, Polydectes, \nsucceeded to the crown, but died soon afterwards, leaving his \nqueen with child. The ambitious woman offered to destroy \nthe child, if Lycurgus would share the throne with her. Ly- \ncurgus pretended to consent ; but as soon as she had given birth \nto a son, he presented him in the market-place as the future king \nof Sparta. The young king\'s mother took revenge upon Lycurgus \nby accusing him of entertaining designs against his nephew\'s life. \nHereupon he resolved to withdraw from his native country, and to \nvisit foreign lands. He was absent many years, and is said to have \nemployed his time in studying the institutions of other nations, \nin order to devise a system of laws and regulations which might \ndeliver Sparta from the evils under which it had long been \nsuffering. During his absence the young king had grown up, and \nassumed the reins of government ; but the disorders of the state \nhad meantime become worse than ever, and all parties longed for a \ntermination to their present sufferings. Accordingly the return of \nLycurgus was hailed with delight, and he found the people both \nready and willing to submit to an entire change in their government \nand institutions. He now set himself to work to carry his long \nprojected reforms into effect; but before he commenced his \narduous task he consulted the Delphian oracle, from which he \nreceived strong assurances of divine support. Thus encouraged by \nthe god, he suddenly presented himself in the market-place, \nsurrounded by thirty of the most distinguished Spartans in arms. \nHis reforms were not carried into effect without violent opposition, \nand in one of the tumults which they excited, his eye is said to \nhave been struck out by a passionate youth. But he finally \ntriumphed over all obstacles, and succeeded in obtaining the \nsubmission of all classes in the community to his new constitution. \nHis last act was to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his country. \nHaving obtained from the people a solemn oath to make no \nalterations in his laws before his return, he quitted Sparta for ever. \nHe set out on a journey to Delphi, where he obtained an oracle \nfrom the god, approving of all he had done, and promising \n\nc 2 \n\n\n\n20 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IV. \n\n\n\nprosperity to the Spartans so long as they preserved his laws. \nWhither lie went afterwards, and \'how and where he died, no- \nbody could tell. He vanished from earth like a god, leaving no \ntraces behind him but his spirit : and his grateful conntrymen \nhonoured him with a temple, and worshipped him with annual \nsacrifices down to the latest times. \n\nThe population of Laeonia was divided into the three classes of \nSpartans, Perieeci, arid Helots. \n\nI. The Spartans were the descendants of the leading Dorian \nconquerors. They formed the sovereign power of the state; and \nthey alone were eligible to honours and pnblic offices. They lived \nin Sparta itself, and were all subject to the discipline of Lyeurgus. \nThey were divided into three tribes, \xe2\x80\x94 the Hylleis, the Fampliyli, \nand the Dymanes, \xe2\x80\x94 which were not, however, peculiar to Sparta, \nbut existed in all the Dorian states. \n\nII. The Periosci * were personally free, but politically subject to \nthe Spartans. They possessed no share in the government, and \nwere bound to obey the commands of the Spartan magistrates. \nThey appear to have been the descendants of the old Achsean \npopulation of the country, and they were distributed into a hundred \ntownships, which were spread through, the whole of Laeonia. \n\nIII. The Helots were serfs bound to the soil, which they tilled \nfor the benefit of the Spartan proprietors. Their condition was \nvery different from that of the ordinary slaves in antiquity, and \nmore similar to the villanage of the middle ages. They lived \nin the rural villages, as the Perioeci did in the towns, cultivating \nthe lands and paying over the rent to their masters in Sparta, \nbut enjoying their homes, wives, and families, apart from their \nmaster\'s personal superintendence. They appear to have been \nnever sold, and they accompanied the Spartans to the field as light- \naimed troops. But while their condition was in these respects \nsuperior to that of the ordinary slaves in other parts of Greece, \nit was embittered by the fact that they were not strangers like the \nlatter, but were of the same race and spoke the same language as \ntheir masters, being probably the descendants of the old inha- \nbitants, who had offered the most obstinate resistance to the \nDorians, and had therefore been reduced to slavery. As their \nnumbers increased, they became objects of suspicion to their \nmasters, and were subjected to the most wanton and oppressive \ncruelty. \n\nThe functions of the Spartan government were distributed \n\n* This word signifies literally Dwellers around the city, and -was generally \nused to indicate tlie inhabitants in the country districts, -who possessed in- \nferior political privileges to the citizens who lired in the city. \n\n\n\nB.C. 776. \n\n\n\nTHE SPARTAN GOVERNMENT. \n\n\n\n21 \n\n\n\namong two kings, a senate of thirty members, a popular assembly, \nand an executive directory of Jive men called the Ephors. \n\nAt the head of the state were the two hereditary kings. The \nexistence of a pair of kings was peculiar to Sparta, and is said \nto have arisen from the accidental circumstance of Aristodemus \nhaving left twin sons, Eurysthenes and Procles. This division \nof the royal power naturally tended to weaken its influence and to \nproduce jealousies and dissensions between the two kings. The \nroyal power was on the decline during the whole historical period, \nand the authority of the kings was gradually usurped by the \nEphors, who at length obtained the entire control of the govern- \nment, and reduced the kings to a state of humiliation and de- \npendence. \n\nThe Senate, called Gerusia, or the Council of Elders, consisted \nof thirty members, among whom the two kings were included. \nThey were obliged to be upwards of sixty years of age, and they \nheld their office for life. They possessed considerable power, \nand were the only real check upon the authority of the Ephors. \nThey discussed and prepared all measures which were to be \nbrought before the popular assembly, and they had some share in \nthe general administration of the state. But the most important \nof their functions was, that they were judges in all criminal cases \naffecting the life of a Spartan citizen. \n\nThe Popular Assembly was of little importance, and appears \nto have been usually summoned only as a matter of form for the \nelection of certain magistrates, for passing laws, and for deter- \nmining upon peace and war. It would appear that open discussion \nwas not allowed, and that the assembly rarely came to a division. \n\nThe Ephors were of later .origin, and did not exist in the \noriginal constitution of Lycurgus. They may be regarded as the \nrepresentatives of the popular assembly. They were elected \nannually from the general body of Spartan citizens, and seem to \nhave been originally appointed to protect the interests and liberties \nof the people against the encroachments of the kings and the \nsenate. They correspond in many respects to the tribunes of the \npeople at Koine. Their functions were at first limited and of small \nimportance; but in the end the whole political power became \ncentred in their hands. \n\nThe Spartan government was in reality a close oligarchy, in \nwhich the kings and the senate, as well as the people, were alike \nsubject to the irresponsible authority of the five Ephors. \n\nThe most important part of the legislation of Lycurgus did not \nrelate to the political constitution of Sparta, but to the discipline \nand education of the citizens. It was these which gave Sparta her \n\n\n\n22 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IV. \n\n\n\npeculiar character, arid distinguished her in so striking a manner \nfrom all the other states of Greece. The position of the Spartans \nsurrounded by numerous enemies, whom they held in subjection \nby the sword alone, compelled them to be a nation of soldiers. \nLycurgus determined that they should be nothing else; and the \ngreat object of his whole system was to cultivate a martial spirit, \nand to give them a training which would make them invincible in \nbattle. To accomplish this the education of a Spartan was placed \nunder the control of the state from his earliest boyhood. Every \nchild after birth was exhibited to public view, and, if deemed \ndeformed and weakly, was exposed to perish on Mount Taygetus. \nAt the age of seven he was taken from his mother\'s care, and \nhanded over to the public classes. He was not only taught \ngymnastic games and military exercises, but he was also subjected \nto severe bodily discipline, and was compelled to submit to hard- \nships and suffering without repining or complaint. One of the \ntests to which he was subjected was a cruel scourging at the altar \nof Artemis (Diana), until his blood gushed forth and covered the \naltar of the goddess. It was inflicted publicly before the eyes \nof his parents and in the presence of the whole city ; and many \nSpartan youths were known to have died under the lash without \nuttering a complaining murmur. Xo means were neglected to \nprepare them for the hardships and stratagems of war. They were \nobliged to wear the same garment winter and summer, and to \nendure hunger and thirst, heat and cold. They were purposely \nallowed an insufficient quantity of food, but were permitted to \nmake up the deficiency by hunting in the woods and mountains of \nLaconia. They were even encouraged to steal whatever they \ncould; but if they were caught in the fact, they were severely \npunished for their want of dexterity. Plutarch tells us of a boy, \nwho, having stolen a fox, and hid it under his garment, chose \nrather to let it tear out his very bowels than be detected in the \ntheft. \n\nThe literary education of a Spartan youth was of a most re- \nstricted kind. He was taught to despise literature as unworthy \nof a warrior, while the study of eloquence and philosophy, which \nwere cultivated at Athens with such extraordinary success, was \nregarded at Sparta with contempt. Long speeches were a Spartan\'s \nabhorrence, and he was trained to express himself with sententious \nbrevity. \n\nA Spartan was not considered to have reached the full age of \nmanhood till he had completed his thirtieth year. He was then \nallowed to marry, to take part in the public assembly, and was \neligible to the offices of the state. But he still continued under \n\n\n\nB.C. 776. \n\n\n\nTHE SPARTAN WOMEN. \n\n\n\n23 \n\n\n\nthe public discipline, and was not permitted even to reside and \ntake his meals with his wife. It was not till he had reached his \nsixtieth year that he was released from the public discipline and \nfrom military service. \n\nThe public mess\xe2\x80\x94 called Syssitia\xe2\x80\x94is said to have been instituted \nby Lycurgus to prevent all indulgence of the appetite. Public \ntables were provided, at which every male citizen was obliged \nto take his meals. Each table accommodated fifteen persons, who \nformed a separate mess, into which no new member was admitted, \nexcept by the unanimous consent of the whole company. Each \nsent monthly to the common stock a specified quantity of barley- \nmeal, wine, cheese, and figs, and a little money to buy flesh and \nfish. No distinction of any kind was allowed at these frugal meals. \nMeat was only eaten occasionally ; and one of the principal dishes \nwas black broth. Of what it consisted we do not know. The \ntyrant Dionysius found it very unpalatable ; but, as the cook told \nhim, the broth was nothing without the seasoning of fatigue and \nhunger. \n\nThe Spartan women in their earlier years were subjected to \na course of training almost as rigorous as that of the men, and \ncontended with each other in running, wrestling, and boxing. At \nthe age of twenty a Spartan woman usually married, and she was \nno longer subjected to the public discipline. Although she \nenjoyed little of her husband s society, she was treated by him with \ndeep respect, and was allowed a greater degree of liberty than was \ntolerated in other Grecian states. Hence she took a lively interest \nin the welfare and glory of her native land, and was animated by \nan earnest and lofty spirit of patriotism. The Spartan mother had \nreason to be proud of herself and of her children. When a woman \nof another country said to Gorgo, the wife of Leonidas, " The \nSpartan women alone rule the men," she replied, "The Spartan \nwomen alone bring forth men." Their husbands and their sons \nwere fired by their sympathy to deeds of heroism. " Beturn either \nwith your shield, or upon it," was their exhortation to their sons \nwhen going to battle. \n\nLycurgus is said to have divided the land belonging to the Spar- \ntans into 9000 equal lots, and the remainder of Laconia into 30,000 \nequal lots, and to have assigned to each Spartan citizen one of the \nformer of these lots, and to each Pericecus one of the latter. \n\nNeither gold nor silver money was allowed in Sparta, and \nnothing but bars of iron passed in exchange for every commodity \nAs the Spartans were not permitted to engage in commerce, and \nall luxury and display in dress, furniture, and food was forbidden, \nthey had very little occasion for a circulating medium, and iron \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IV. \n\n\n\nmoney was found sufficient for their few wants. But this prohibi- \ntion of the precious metals only made the Spartans more anxious to \nobtain them ; and even in the times of their greatest glory the \nSpartans were the most venal of the Greeks, and could rarely resist \nthe temptation of a bribe. \n\nThe legislation of Lyeurgus was followed, by important results. \nIt made the Spartans a body of professional soldiers, well trained \nand well disciplined, at a time when military training and chscipline \nwere little known, and almost unpractised in the other states of \nGreece. The consequence was the rapid growth of the political \npower of Sparta, and the subjugation of the neighbouring states. \nAt the time of Lyeurgus the Spartans held only a small portion \nof Laconia : they were merely a garrison in the heart of an enemy\'s \ncountry. Their first object was to make themselves masters of \nLaconia, in which they finally succeeded after a severe struggle. \nThey next turned their arms against the Messenians, Arcadians, \nand Argives. Of these wars the two waged against\' Messenia \nwere the most celebrated and the most important. They were \nboth long protracted and obstinately contested. They both ended \nin the victory of Sparta, and in the subjugation of Messenia. \nThese facts are beyond dispute ; but of the details we have no \ntrustworthy narrative. \n\nThe First Messenian War lasted from B.C. 743 to 724. During \nthe first four- years the Lacedaemonians made little progress; but \nin the fifth a great battle was fought, and although its result was \nindecisive, the Messenians did not venture to risk another engage- \nment, and retired to the strongly fortified mountain of Ithonie. In \ntheir distress they sent to consult the oracle at Delphi, and \nreceived the appalling answer that the salvation of Messenia \nrequired the sacrifice of a virgin of the royal house to the gods \nof the lower world. Aristodemus, who is the Messenian hero of \nthe first war, slew his own daughter, which so disheartened the \nSpartans, that they abstained from attacking the Messenians for \nsome years. In the thirteenth year of the war the Spartan king \nmarched against Ithome, and a second great battle was fought, but \nthe result was again indecisive. The Messenian king fell in the \naction ; and Aristodemus, who was chosen king in his place, \nprosecuted the war with vigour. In the fifth year of his reign \na third great battle was fought. This time the Messenians gained \na decisive victor}*, and the Lacedaemonians were driven back into \ntheir own territory. They now sent to ask advice of the Delphian \noracle, and were promised success upon using stratagem. They \ntherefore had recourse to fraud : and at the same time various \nprodigies dismayed the bold spirit of Aristodemus. His daughter \n\n\n\nB.C. 668. \n\n\n\nTHE SECOND MESSENIAN WAR. \n\n\n\n25 \n\n\n\ntoo appeared to liim in a dream, showed him her wounds, and \nbeckoned him away. Seeing that his country was doomed to \ndestruction, Aristodemus slew himself on his daughter\'s tomb. \nShortly afterwards, in the twentieth year of the war, the Messenians \nabandoned Ithome, which the Lacedaemonians razed to the ground, \nand the whole country became subject to Sparta. Many of the \ninhabitants tied into other countries ; but those who remained were \nreduced to the condition of Helots, and were compelled to pay \nto their masters half of the produce of their lands. \n\nFor thirty-nine years the Messenians endured this degrading \nyoke. At the end of this time they took up arms against their \noppressors. The Second Messenian War lasted from b.c. 685 to 668. \nIts hero is Aristomenes, whose wonderful exploits form the great \nsubject of this war. It would appear that most of the states in \nPeloponnesus took part in the struggle. The first battle was \nfought before the arrival of the allies on either side, and, though \nit was indecisive, the valour of Aristomenes struck fear into the \nhearts of the Spartans. To frighten the enemy still more, the hero \ncrossed the frontier, entered Sparta by night, and affixed a shield to \nthe temple of Athena (Minerva), with the inscription, " Dedicated \nby Aristomenes to the goddess from the Spartan spoils." The \nSpartans in alarm sent to Delphi for advice. The god bade them \napply to Athens for a leader. Fearing to disobey the oracle, but \nwith the view of rendering no real assistance, the Athenians sent \nTyrtseus, a lame man and a schoolmaster. The Spartans received \ntheir new leader with due honour ; and he was not long in justi- \nfying the credit of the oracle. His martial songs roused their \nfainting courage ; and so efficacious were his poems, that to them \nis mainly ascribed the final success of the Spartan arms. \n\nEncouraged by the strains of Tyrtasus, the Spartans again \nmarched against the Messenians. But they were not at first \nsuccessful. A great battle was fought at the Boar\'s Grave in \nthe plain of Stenyclerus, in which they were defeated with great \nloss. In the third year of the war another great battle was \nfought, in which the Messenians suffered a signal defeat. So great \nwas their loss, that Aristomenes no longer ventured to meet the \nSpartans in the open field. Following the example of the Mes- \nsenian leaders in the former war, he retired to the mountain \nfortress of Ira. The Spartans encamped at the foot of the moun- \ntain ; but Aristomenes frequently sallied from the fortress, and \nravaged the lands of Laconia with fire and sword. It is unneces- \nsary to relate all the wonderful exploits of this hero in his various \nincursions. Thrice was he taken prisoner ; on two occasions he \nburst his bonds, but on the third he was carried to Sparta, and \n\n\n\n26 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IV. \n\n\n\nthrown with his fifty companions into a deep pit, called Ceadas. \nHis comrades were all killed by the fall ; bnt Aristomenes reached \nthe bottom nnhnrt. He saw, however, no means of escape, and had \nresigned himself to death ; but on the third day perceiving a fox \ncreeping among the bodies, he grasped its tail, and, following the \nanimal as it struggled to escape, discovered an opening in the rock, \nand on the next day was at Ira to the surprise alike of friends and \nfoes. But his single prowess was not sufficient to avert the ruin of \nhis country. One night the Spartans surprised Ira, while Aristo- \nmenes was disabled by a wound ; but he collected the bravest of \nhis followers, and forced his way through the enemy. Many of the \nMessenians went to Ehegium, in Italy, under the sons of Aristo- \nmenes, but the hero himself finished his days in Ehodes. \n\nThe second Messenian war was terminated by the complete \nsubjugation of the Messenians, who again became the serfs of their \nconquerors. In this condition they remained till the restoration of \ntheir independence by Epaminondas, in the year 369 b.c. During \nthe whole of the intervening period the Messenians disappear from \nhistory. The country called Messenia in the map became a portion \nof Laconia, which thus extended across the south of Peloponnesus \nfrom the eastern to the western sea. \n\n\n\n\nAncient Bridge in Laconia. \n\n\n\nAthena (Minerva), the national deity of the Athenians \n\n\n\nCHAPTER V. \n\nEARLY HISTORY OF ATHENS, DOWN TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF \nDEMOCRACY BY CLISTHENES, B.C. 510. \n\nSparta was the only state in Greece which continued to retain the \nkingly form of government during the brilliant period of Grecian \nhistory. In all other parts of Greece royalty had been abolished \nat an early age, and various forms of republican government estab- \nlished in its stead. The abolition of royalty was first followed by \nan Oligarchy, or the government of the Few. Democracy, or the \ngovernment of the Many, was of later growth. It was not from the \npeople that the oligarchies received their first and greatest blow. \n\n\n\n2S \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. V. \n\n\n\nThey were generally overthrown by the usurpers, to whom the \nGreeks gave the name of Tyrants* \n\nThe rise of the Tyrants seems to have taken place about the \nsame time in a large number of the Greek cities. In most cases \nthey belonged to the nobles, and they generally became masters of \nthe state by espousing the cause of the commonalty, and using the \nstrength of the people to put down the oligarchy by force. At first \nthey were popular with the general body of the citizens, who were \nglad to see the humiliation of their former masters. But dis- \ncontent soon began to arise ; the tyrant had recourse to violence to \nquell disaffection ; and the government became in reality a tyranny \nin the modern sense of the word. \n\nMany of the tyrants in Greece were put down by the Lacedaemo- \nnians. The Spartan government was essentially an oligarchy, and \nthe Spartans were always ready to lend their powerful aid in \nfavour of the government of the Few. Hence they took an active \npart in the overthrow of the despots, with the intention of estab- \nlishing the ancient oligarchy in then* place. But this rarely \nhappened ; and they found it impossible in most cases to reinstate \nthe former body "of nobles in their ancient privileges. The latter, \nit is true, attempted to regain them, and were supported in their \nattempts by Sparta. Hence arose a new struggle. The first contest \nafter the abolition of royalty was between oligarchy and the despot, \nthe next was between oligarchy and democracy. \n\nThe history of Athens affords the most striking illustration of \nthe different revolutions of which we have been speaking. \n\nLittle is known of Athens before the age of Solon. Its legendary \ntales are few, its historical facts still fewer. Cecrops, the first ruler \nof Attica, is said to have divided the country into twelve districts, \nwhich are represented as independent communities, each governed \nby a separate king. They were afterwards united into a single \nstate, having Athens as its capital and the seat of government. \nAt what time this important union was effected cannot be de- \ntermined ; but it is ascribed to Theseus, as the national hero of the \nAthenian people. \n\nA few generations after Theseus, the Dorians are said to have \ninvaded Attica. An oracle declared that they would be victorious \nif they spared the life of the Athenian king ; whereupon Codrus, \nwho then reigned at Athens, resolved to sacrifice himself for the \nwelfare of his country. Accordingly he went into the invaders\' \ncamp in disguise, provoked a quarrel with one of the Dorian \n\n* The Greek Tvord Tyrant does not correspond in meaning to the same \n\xe2\x96\xa0srord in the English language. It signifies simply an irresponsible ruler, and \nmay, therefore, be more correctly rendered by the term Despot. \n\n\n\nB.C. 624. \n\n\n\nTHE ATHENIAN GOVERNMENT. \n\n\n\n29 \n\n\n\nsoldiers, and was killed by the latter. Upon learning the death of \nthe Athenian king, the Dorians retired from Attica without striking \na blow : and the Athenians, from respect to the memory of Codros, \nabolished the title of king, and substituted for it that of Archon or \nKuler. The office, however, was held for life, and was confined to \nthe family of Codrus. His son Medon was the first archon, and he \nwas followed in the dignity by eleven members of the family in \nsuccession. But soon after the accession of Alcniseon, the thirteenth \nin descent from Medon, another change was introduced, and the \nduration of the archonship was limited to ten years (b.c. 752). The \ndignity was still confined to the descendants of Medon ; but in the \ntime of Hippomenes (b.c. 714) this restriction was removed, and the \noffice was thrown open to all the nobles in the state. In B.C. 683 a \nstill more important change took place. The archonship was now \nmade annual, and its duties were distributed among nine persons, \nall of whom bore the title. The last of the decennial archons \nwas Eryxias, the first of the nine annual archons Creon. \n\nSuch is the legendary account of the change of government \nat Athens, from royalty to an oligarchy. It appears to have taken \nplace peaceably and gradually, as in most other Greek states. The \nwhole political power was vested in the nobles ; from them the \nnine annual archons were taken, and to them alone these magis- \ntrates were responsible. The people, or general body of freemen, \nhad no share in the government. \n\nThe Athenian nobles were called Eupatridse, the two other \nclasses in the state being the Geomori or husbandmen, and Demi- \nurgi or artisans. This arrangement is ascribed to Theseus ; but \nthere was another division of the people of still greater antiquity. \nAs the Dorians were divided into three tribes, so the lonians \nwere usually distributed into four tribes. The latter division \nalso existed among the Athenians, who were lonians, and it con- \ntinued in full vigour down to the great revolution of Clisthenes \n(b.c. 509)o These tribes were distinguished by the names of \nGeleontes (or Teleontes) "cultivators," Hopletes "warriors," Mgi- \ncores "goat-herds," and A rgades "artisans." Each tribe contained \nthree Phratrise, each Phratry thirty Gentes, and each Gens thirty \nheads of families. \n\nThe first date in Athenian history on which certain reliance can \nbe placed is the institution of annual archons, in the year 683 B.C. \nThe duties of the government were distributed among the nine \narchons, in the following manner. The first was called The Archon \nby way of pre-eminence, and sometimes the Archon Eponymus, \nbecause the year was distinguished by his name. The second \narchon was called The Basileus or The King, because he repre- \n\n\n\n30 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. V. \n\n\n\nsented the king in his capacity as high-priest of the nation. The \nthird archon bore the title of Tlie Polemarch. or Commander-in- \nchief, and was, down to the time of Clisthenes, the commander \nof the troops. The remaining six had the common title of Thes- \nmothetx, or Legislators. Then- duties seem to have been almost \nexclusively judicial. \n\nThe government of the Eupatrids was oppressive ; and the \ndiscontent of the people at length became so serious, that Draco \nwas appointed in 624 B.C. to draw up a written code of laws. They \nwere marked by extreme severity. He affixed the penalty of death \nto all crimes alike ; to petty thefts, for instance, as well as to \nsacrilege and murder. Hence they were said to have been written \nnot in ink but in blood ; and we are told that he justified this \nextreme harshness by saying, that small offences deserved death, \nand that he knew no severer punishment for great ones. \n\nThe legislation of Draco failed to calm the prevailing discontent. \nThe people gained nothing by the written code, except a more \nperfect knowledge of its severity ; and civil dissensions prevailed \nas extensively as before. The general dissatisfaction with the \ngovernment was favourable to revolutionary projects ; and accord- \ningly, twelve years after Draco\'s legislation (b.c. 612), Cylon, one \nof the nobles, conceived the design of depriving his brother \nEupatrids of their power, and making himself tyrant of Athens. \nHaving collected a considerable force, he seized the Acropolis ; but \nhe did not meet with support from the great mass of the people, \nand he soon found himself closely blockaded by the forces of the \nEupatrids. Cylon and his brother made their escape, but the \nremainder of his associates, hard pressed by hunger, abandoned \nthe defence of the walls, and took refuge at the altar of Athena \n(Minerva). They were induced by the archon Megacles, one \nof the illustrious family of the Alcinseonidse, to quit the altar on \nthe promise that their lives should be spared; but directly they \nhad left the temple they were put to death, and some of them were \nmurdered even at the altar of the Eumenides or Furies, \n\nThe conspiracy thus failed ; but its suppression was attended \nwith a long train of melancholy consequences. The whole family \nof the AlcmseonidsB was believed to have become tainted by the \ndaring act of sacrilege committed by Megacles; and the friends \nand partisans of the murdered conspirators were not slow in \ndemanding vengeance upon the accursed race. Thus a new \nelement of discord was introduced into the state. In the midst \nof these dissensions there was one man who enjoyed a distinguished \nreputation at Athens, and to whom his fellow-citizens looked up as \nthe only person in the state who could deliver them from their \n\n\n\nB.C. 594. \n\n\n\nLEGISLATION OF SOLON. \n\n\n\n31 \n\n\n\npolitical and social dissensions, and secure them from such mis- \nfortunes for the future. This man was Solon, the son of Exece- \nstides, and a descendant of Codrus. He had travelled through \nmany parts of Greece and Asia, and had formed acquaintance with \nmany of the most eminent men of his time. On his return to \nhis native country he distinguished himself by recovering the \nisland of Salamis, which had revolted to Megara (b.c. 600). Three \nyears afterwards he persuaded the Alcmseonidse to submit their \ncase to the judgment of three hundred Eupatridse, by whom they \nwere adjudged guilty of sacrilege, and were expelled from Attica \nThe banishment of the guilty race did not, however, deliver the \nAthenians from their religious fears. A pestilential disease with \nwhich they were visited was regarded as an unerring sign of the \ndivine wrath. Upon the advice of the Delphic oracle, they invited \nthe celebrated Cretan prophet and sage, Epimenides, to visit \nAthens, and purify their city from pollution and sacrilege. By \nperforming certain sacrifices and expiatory acts, Epimenides suc- \nceeded in staying the plague. \n\nThe civil dissensions however still continued. The population of \nAttica was now divided into three hostile factions, consisting of \nthe Pedieis or wealthy Eupatrid inhabitants of the plains ; of the \nDiacrii, or poor inhabitants of the hilly districts in the north and \neast of Attica ; and of the Parali, or mercantile inhabitants of the \ncoasts, who held an intermediate position between the other two. \nTheir disputes were aggravated by the miserable condition of the \npoorer population. The latter were in a state ^ of abject poverty \nThey had borrowed money from the wealthy at exorbitant rates \nof interest upon the security of their property and their persons. \nIf the principal and interest of the debt were not paid, the creditor \nhad the power of seizing the person as well as the land of his \ndebtor, and of using him as a slave. Many had thus been torn \nfrom their homes and sold to barbarian masters, while others were \ncultivating as slaves the lands of their wealthy creditors in Attica \nMatters had at length reached a crisis; the existing laws could \nno longer be enforced; and the poor were ready to rise in open \ninsurrection against the rich. \n\nIn these alarming circumstances the ruling oligarchy were \nobliged to have recourse to Solon; and they therefore chose \nhim Archon in B.C. 594, investing him under that title with un- \nlimited powers to effect any changes he might consider bene- \nficial to the state. His appointment was hailed with satisfaction \nby the poor ; and all parties were willing to accept his mediation \nand reforms. \n\nSolon commenced his undertaking by relieving the poorer class \n\n\n\n32 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. V. \n\n\n\nof debtors from their existing distress. He cancelled all contracts \nby which the land or person of a debtor had been given as \nsecurity ; and he forbad for the future all loans in which the person \nof the debtor was pledged. He next proceeded to draw up a new \nconstitution and a new code of laws. As a preliminary step he \nrepealed all the laws of Draco, except those relating to murder. \nHe then made a new classification of the citizens, distributing them \ninto four classes according to the amount of their property, thus \nmaking wealth and not birth the title to the honours and offices of \nthe state. The first class consisted of those whose annual income \nwas equal to 500 medium i * of corn and upwards, and were called \nPentacosiomedimni. The second class consisted of those whose \nincomes ranged between 300 and 500 medimni, and were called \nKnights, from their being able to furnish a war-horse. The third \nclass consisted of those who received between 200 and 300 me- \ndimni, and were called Zeugitse, from their being able to keep \na yoke of oxen for the plough. The fourth class, called Thetes, \nincluded all whose property fell short of 200 medimni. The first \nclass were alone eligible to the archonship and the higher offices \nof the state. The second and third classes filled inferior posts, and \nwere liable to military service, the former as horsemen, and the \nlatter as heavy-armed soldiers on foot. The fourth class were \nexcluded from all public offices, and served in the array only as \nlight-armed troops. Solon, however, allowed them to vote in the \npublic assembly, where they must have constituted by far the \nlargest number. He gave the assembly the right of electing \nthe archons and the other officers of the state ; and he also made \nthe archons accountable to the assembly at the expiration of their \nyear of office. \n\nThis extension of the duties of the public assembly led to the \ninstitution of a new body. Solon created the Senate, or Council of \nFour Hundred, with the special object of preparing all matters for \nthe discussion of the public assembly, of presiding at its meetings, \nand of carrying its resolutions into effect. No subject could be \nintroduced before the people, except by a previous resolution of the \nSenate. The members of the Senate were elected by the public \nassembly, one hundred from each of the four ancient tribes, which \nwere left untouched by Solon. They held their office for a year, \nand were accountable at its expiration to the public assembly for \nthe manner in which they had discharged their duties. \n\nThe Senate of the Areopagus f is said by some writers to have \n\n* The medimnus was one bushel and a half. \n\nf It received its name from its place of meeting, which was a rocky emi- \nnence opposite the Acropolis, called the hill of Ares (Mars\' Hill). \n\n\n\nB.C. 560. \n\n\n\nUSURPATION OF PISISTRATUS. \n\n\n\n33 \n\n\n\nbeen instituted by Solon ; but it existed long before his time, and \nmay be regarded as the representative of the Council of Chiefs \nin the Heroic age. Solon enlarged its powers, and intrusted \nit with the general supervision of the institutions and laws of the \nstate, and imposed upon it the duty of inspecting the lives and \noccupations of the citizens. All archons became members of it \nat the expiration of their year of office. \n\nSolon laid only the foundation of the Athenian democracy \nby giving the poorer classes a vote in the popular assembly, and by \nenlarging the power of the latter; but he left the government \nexclusively in the hands of the wealthy. For many years after \nhis time the government continued to be an oligarchy, but was \nexercised with more moderation and justice than formerly. \n\nSolon enacted numerous laws, containing regulations on almost \nall subjects connected with the public and private life of the \ncitizens. He encouraged trade and manufactures, and invited \nforeigners to settle in Athens by the promise of protection and \nby valuable privileges. To discourage idleness a son was not \nobliged to support his father in old age, if the latter had neglected \nto teach him some trade or occupation. \n\nSolon punished theft by compelling the guilty party to restore \ndouble the value of the property stolen. He forbade speaking evil \neither of the dead or of the living. \n\nSolon is said to have been aware that he had left many imper- \nfections in his laws. He described them not as the best laws \nwhich he could devise, but as the best which the Athenians could \nreceive. Having bound the government and people of Athens by \na solemn oath to observe his institutions for at least ten years, \nhe left Athens and travelled in foreign lands. During his absence \nthe old dissensions between the Plain, the Shore, and the Mountain \nbroke out afresh with more violence than ever. The first was \nheaded by Lycurgus, the second by Megacles, an Alcmseonid, and \nthe third by Pisistratus, the cousin of Solon. Of these leaders, \nPisistratus was the ablest and the most dangerous. He had \nespoused the cause of the poorest of the three classes, in order \nto gain popularity, and to make himself master of Athens. Solon \non his return to Athens detected the ambitious designs of his \nkinsman, and attempted to dissuade him from them. Finding his \nremonstrances fruitless, he next denounced his projects in verses \naddressed to the people. Few, however, gave any heed to his \nwarnings : and Pisistratus, at length finding his schemes ripe for \naction, had recourse to a memorable stratagem to secure his object. \nOne day he appeared in the market-place in a chariot, his mules \nand his own person bleeding with wounds inflicted with his own \n\n\n\n34 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. V. \n\n\n\nhands. These he exhibited to the people, telling them that he had \nbeen nearly murdered in consequence of defending their rights. \nThe popular indignation was excited ; and a guard of fifty club- \nmen was granted him for his future security. He gradually \nincreased the number of his guard, and soon found himself strong \nenough to throw off the mask and seize the Acropolis (b.c. 560). \nMegacles and the AlcniaBonidse left the city. Solon alone had the \ncoinage to oppose the usurpation, and upbraided the people with \ntheir cowardice and their treachery. "You might/" said he, "with \nease have crushed the tyrant in the bud ; but nothing now remains \nbut to pluck him up by the roots." But no one responded to his \nappeal. He refused to fly ; and when his friends asked him on \nwhat he relied for protection, " On my old age," was his reply. It \nis creditable to Pisistratus that he left his aged relative unmolested, \nand even asked his advice in the administration of the government. \nSolon did not long survive the overthrow of the constitution. He \ndied a year or two afterwards at the advanced age of eighty. His \nashes are said to have been scattered by his own direction round \nthe island of Salamis, which he had won for the Athenian people. \n\nPisistratus however did not retain his power long. The leaders \nof the factions of the Shore and the Plain combined and drove the \nusurper into exile. But the Shore and the Plain having quarrelled, \nPisistratus was recalled and again became master of Athens. \nAnother revolution shortly afterwards drove him into exile a \nsecond time, and he remained abroad ten years. At length, with \nthe assistance of mercenaries from other Grecian states and with \nthe aid of his partisans in Athens, he became master of Athens for \nthe third time, and henceforth continued in possession of the \nsupreme power till the day of his death. As soon as he was firmly \nestablished in the government, his administration was marked \nby mildness and equity. He maintained the institutions of Solon, \ntaking care, however, that the highest offices should always be held \nby some members of his own family. He not only enforced strict \nobedience to the laws, but himself set the example of submitting to \nthem. Being accused of murder, he disdained to take advantage \nof his authority, and went in person to plead his cause before the \nAreopagus, where his accuser did not venture to appear. He \ncourted popularity by largesses to the citizens and by throwing \nopen his gardens to the poor. He adorned Athens with many \npublic buildings. He commenced on a stupendous scale a temple \nto the Olympian Zeus, which remained unfinished for centuries, \nand was at length completed by the emperor Hadrian. He was a \npatron of literature, as well as of the arts. He is said to have been \nthe first person in Greece who collected a library, which he threw \n\n\n\nB.C. 514. ASSASSINATION OF HIPPARCHUS. \n\n\n\n35 \n\n\n\nopen to the public; and to him posterity is indebted for the \ncollection of the Homeric poems. On the whole it cannot be \ndenied that he made a wise and noble use of his power. \n\nPisistratus died at an advanced age in 527 B.C., thirty-three years \nafter his first usurpation. He transmitted the sovereign power to \nMs sons, Hippias and Hipparchus, who conducted the government \non the same principles as their father. Hipparchus inherited his \nfather\'s literary tastes. He invited several distinguished poets, \nsuch as Anacreon and Simonides, to his court. The people appear \nto have been contented with their rule; and it was only an \naccidental circumstance which led to their overthrow and to a \nchange in the government. \n\nTheir fall was occasioned by the conspiracy of Harmodius and \nAristogiton, who were attached to each other by a most intimate \nfriendship. Harmodius having given offence to Hippias, the despot \nrevenged himself by putting a public affront upon his sister. This \nindignity excited the resentment of the two friends, and they now \nresolved to slay the despots at the festival of the Great Pana- \nthensea, when all the citizens were required to attend in arms. \nHaving communicated their design to a few associates, the conspi- \nrators appeared armed at the appointed time like the rest of the \ncitizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides. Harmodius and \nAristogiton had planned to kill Hippias first as he was arranging \nthe order of the procession outside the city, but, upon approaching \nthe spot where he was standing, they were thunderstruck at \nbeholding one of the conspirators in close conversation with the \ndespot. Believing that they were betrayed, they rushed back into \nthe city with their daggers hid in the myrtle boughs which they \nwere to have carried in the procession, and killed Hipparchus. \nHarmodius was immediately cut down by the guards. Aristogiton \ndied under the tortures to which he was subjected in order to \ncompel him to disclose his accomplices. \n\nHipparchus was assassinated in B.C. 514, the fourteenth year \nafter the death of Pisistratus. From this time the character of the \ngovernment became entirely changed. His brother\'s murder con- \nverted Hippias into a cruel and suspicious tyrant. He put to death \nnumbers of the citizens, and raised large sums of money by \nextraordinary taxes. \n\nThe Alcmseonidse, who had lived in exile ever since the third \nand final restoration of Pisistratus to Athens, now began to form \nschemes to expel the tyrant. Clisthenes, the son of Megacles, who \nwas the head of the family, secured the Delphian oracle by \npecuniary presents to the Pythia, or priestess. Henceforth, when- \never the Spartans came to consult the oracle, the answer of the \n\nd 2 \n\n\n\n3-3 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GKEECE. \n\n\n\nChap. V. \n\n\n\npriestess was always the same, "Athens must be liberated." This \norder was so often repeated, that the Spartans at last resolved to \nobey. Cleomenes, king of Sparta, defeated the Thessalian allies of \nHippias ; and the tyrant, unable to meet his enemies in the field, \ntook refuge in the Acropolis. Here he might have maintained \nhimself in safety, had not his children been made prisoners as they \nwere being secretly carried out of the country. To procure their \nrestoration, he consented to quit Attica in the space of five days. \nHe sailed to Asia, and took up his residence at Sigeum in the \nTroad, which his father had wrested from the Mytilenseans in war. \n\nHippias was expelled in b.c. 510, four years after the assassination \nof Hipparchus. These four years had been a time of suffering and \noppression for the Athenians, and had effaced from their minds all \nrecollection of the former mild rule of Pisistratus and his sons. \nHence the expulsion of the family was hailed with delight. The \nmemory of Harmodius and Aristogiton was cherished with the \nfondest reverence ; and the Athenians of a later age, overlooking \nthe four years which had elapsed from their death to the overthrow \nof the despotism, represented them as the liberators of their \ncountry and the first martyrs for its liberty. Their statues were \nerected in the market-place soon after the expulsion of Hippias ; \ntheir descendants enjoyed immunity from all taxes and public \nburdens ; and their deed of vengeance formed the favourite subject \nof drinking songs. \n\nThe Lacedemonians quitted Athens soon after Hippias had \nsailed away, leaving the Athenians to settle then- own affairs. \nClisthenes, to whom Athens was mainly indebted for its liberation \nfrom the despotism, aspired to be the political leader of the state, \nbut he was opposed by Isagoras, the leader of the party of the \nnobles. By the Solonian constitution, the whole political power \nwas vested in the hands of the nobles ; and Clisthenes soon found \nthat it was hopeless to contend against his rival under the existing \norder of things. For this reason he resolved to introduce an \nimportant change in the constitution, and to give to the people an \nequal share in the government. \n\nThe reforms of Clisthenes gave birth to the Athenian democracy, \nwhich can hardly be said to have existed before this time. His \nfirst and most important measure was a redistribution of the whole \npopulation of Attica into ten new tribes. He abolished the four \nancient Ionic tribes, and enrolled in the ten new tribes all the free \ninhabitants of Attica, including both resident aliens and even \nemancipated slaves. He divided the tribes into a certain number \nof cantons or townships, called demi, which at a later time were \n171 in number. Every Athenian citizen was obliged to be enrolled \n\n\n\nB.C. 510. \n\n\n\nREFORMS OF CLISTHENES. \n\n\n\n37 \n\n\n\nin a decerns, each of which, like a parish in England, administered \nits own affairs. It had its public meetings, it levied rates, and was \nunder the superintendence of an officer called Demarchus. \n\nThe establishment of the ten new tribes led to a change in the \nnumber of the Senate. It had previously consisted of 400 members, \nbut it was now enlarged to 500, fifty being selected from each of the \nten new tribes. The Ecclesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, \nwas now summoned at certain fixed periods ; and Clisthenes \ntransferred the government of the state, which had hitherto been \nin the hands of the archons, to the senate and the ecclesia. He also \nincreased the judicial as well as the political power of the people ; \nand enacted that all public crimes should be tried by the whole \nbody of citizens above thirty years of age, specially convoked and \nsworn for the purpose. The assembly thus convened was called \nHelisea and its members Heliasts. Clisthenes also introduced \nthe Ostracism, by which an Athenian citizen might be banished \nwithout special accusation, trial, or defence for ten years, which \nterm was subsequently reduced to five. It must be recollected \nthat the force which a Greek government had at its disposal was \nvery small ; and that it was comparatively easy for an ambitious \ncitizen, supported by a numerous body of partisans, to overthrow \nthe constitution and make himself despot. The Ostracism was the \nmeans devised by Clisthenes for removing quietly from the state a \npowerful party leader before he could carry into execution any \nviolent schemes for the subversion of the government. Every \nprecaution was taken to guard this institution from abuse. The \nsenate and the ecclesia had first to determine by a special vote \nwhether the safety of the state required such a step to be taken. \nIf they decided in the affirmative, a day was fixed for the voting, \nand each citizen wrote upon a tile or oyster-shell * the name of the \nperson whom he wished to banish. The votes were then collected, \nand if it was found that 6000 had been recorded against any one \nperson, he was obliged to withdraw from the city within ten days ; \nif the number of votes did not amount to 6000, nothing was done. \n\nThe aristocratical party, enraged at these reforms, called in the \nassistance of Cleomenes, king of the Lacedssmonians. Athens was \nmenaced by foreign enemies and distracted by party struggles. Clis- \nthenes was at first compelled to retire from Athens ; but the people \nrose in arms against Cleomenes, expelled the Lacedaemonians, who \nhad taken possession of the city, and recalled Clisthenes. There- \nupon Cleomenes collected a Peloponnesian army in order to establish \nIsagoras as a tyrant over the Athenians, and at the same time he \nconcerted measures with the Thebans and the Chalcidians of \n* Osfraenn, whence the name Ostracism. \n\n\n\n38 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. V, \n\n\n\nEubcea for a simultaneous attack upon Attica. The Peloponnesian \narmy, commanded by the two kings, Cleomenes and Deinaratus, \nentered Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis ; but when the allies \nbecame aware of the object for which they had been summoned, \nthey refused to march farther, and strongly protested against the \nattempt to establish a tyranny at Athens. Their remonstrances \nbeing seconded by Demaratus, Cleomenes found it necessary to \nabandon the expedition and return home. At a later period (b.c. \n491) Cleomenes took revenge upon Demaratus by persuading the \nSpartans to depose him upon the ground of illegitimacy. The \nexiled king took refuge at the Persian court. \n\nThe unexpected retreat of the Peloponnesian army delivered the \nAthenians from their most formidable enemy, and they lost no time \nin turning their arms against their other foes. Marching into \nBceotia, they defeated the Thebans, and then crossed over into \nEubcea, where they gained a decisive victory over the Chalcidians. \nIn order to secure their dominion in Eubcea, and at the same time \nto provide for their poorer citizens, the Athenians distributed the \nestates of the wealthy Chalcidian landowners among 4000 of their \ncitizens, who settled in the country under the name of Cleruchi. \n\nThe successes of Athens excited the jealousy of the Spartans, \nand they now resolved to make a third attempt to overthrow the \nAthenian democracy. They had meantime discovered the decep- \ntion w r hich had been practised upon them by the Delphic oracle ; \nand they invited Hippias to come from Sigeum to Sparta, in order \nto restore him to Athens. The experience of the last campaign \nhad taught them that they could not calculate upon the co-opera- \ntion of their allies without first obtaining their approval of the \nproject ; and they therefore summoned deputies from all their \nallies to meet at Sparta, in order to determine respecting the \nrestoration of Hippias. But the proposal was received with \nuniversal repugnance ; and the Spartans found it necessary to \nabandon their project. Hippias returned to Sigeiun, and after- \nwards proceeded to the court of Darius. \n\nAthens had now entered upon her glorious career. The institu- \ntions of Clisthenes had given her citizens a personal interest in the \nwelfare and the grandeur of their country. A spirit of the warmest \npatriotism rapidly sprang up among them ; and the history of \nthe Persian wars, which followed almost immediately, exhibits \na striking proof of the heroic sacrifices which they were prepared \nto make for the liberty and independence of their state. \n\n\n\nSite of Kphesus. \n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI. \n\nTHE GEEEK COLONIES. \n\nThe vast number of the Greek colonies, their wide-spread dif- \nfusion over all parts of the Mediterranean, which thus became a \nkind of Grecian lake, and their rapid growth in wealth, power, \nand intelligence, afford the most striking proofs of the greatness \nof this wonderful people. Civil dissensions and a redundant \npopulation were the chief causes of the origin of most of the \nGreek colonies. They were usually undertaken with the appro- \nbation of the cities from which they issued, and under the ma- \nnagement of leaders appointed by them. But a Greek colony was \nalways considered politically independent of the mother-city and \nemancipated from its control. The only connexion between them \nwas one of filial affection and of common religious ties. Almost \nevery colonial Greek city was built upon the sea-coast, and the \nsite usually selected contained a hill sufficiently lofty to form an \nacropolis. \n\nThe Grecian colonies may be arranged in four groups : 1. Those \nfounded in Asia Minor and the adjoining islands ; 2. Those in the \nwestern parts of the Mediterranean, in Italy, Sicily, Gaul, and \nSpain; 3. Those in Africa; 4. Those in Epirus, Macedonia, and \nThrace. \n\n\n\n40 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VI. \n\n\n\n1. The eailiest Greek colonies were those founded on the \nwestern shores of Asia Minor. They "were divided into three \ngreat masses, each bearing the name of that section of the Greek \nrace with which they claimed affinity. The iEolic cities covered \nthe northern part of this coast, together with the islands of Lesbos \nand Tenedos ; the Ionians occupied the centre, with the islands \nof Chios and Samos ; and the Dorians the southern portion, with \n\n\n\n\nMap of the chief Greek Colonies in Asia Minor. \n\n\n\nB.C. 735-600. \n\n\n\nTHE GREEK COLONIES. \n\n\n\n41 \n\n\n\nthe islands of Khodes and Cos. Most of these colonies were \nfounded in consequence of the changes in the population of \nGreece which attended the conquest of Peloponnesus by the \nDorians. The Ionic cities were early distinguished by a spirit of \ncommercial enterprise, and soon rose superior in wealth and in \npower to their iEolian and Dorian neighbours. Among the Ionic \ncities themselves Miletus and Ephesus were the most nourishing. \nGrecian literature took its rise in the iEolic and Ionic cities of \nAsia Minor. Homer was probably a native of Smyrna. Lyric \npoetry flourished in the island of Lesbos, where Sappho and \nAlcseus were born. The Ionic cities were also the seats of the \nearliest schools of Grecian philosophy. Thales, who founded the \nIonic school of philosophy, was a native of Miletus. Halicarnassus \nwas one of the most important of the Doric cities, of which Hero- \ndotus was a native, though he wrote in the Ionic dialect. \n\n2. The earliest Grecian settlement in Italy was Cuma3 in Cam- \npania, situated near Cape Misenum, on the Tyrrhenian sea. It \nis said to have been a joint colony from the iEolic Cyme in Asia \nand from Chalcis in Euboea, and to have been founded, according \nto the common chronology, in B.C. 1050. Cuma3 was for a long \ntime the most flourishing city in Campania ; and it was not till its \ndecline in the fifth century before the Christian era that Capua \nrose into importance. \n\n\n\n\nMap of the chief Greek Colonies in Sicily. \n\n\n\n4-: \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VI. \n\n\n\nThe earliest Grecian settlement in Sicily was founded in B.C. \n735. The extraordinary fertility of the land soon attracted nu- \nmerous colonists from various parts of Greece, and there arose on \nthe coasts of Sicily a succession of flourishing cities. Of these, \nSyracuse and Agrigentuni, Loth Dorian colonies, became the most \npowerful. The former was founded by the Corinthians in b.c. 734, \nand at the time of its greatest prosperity contained a population \nof 500,000 souls, and was surrounded by walls twenty-two miles \nin circuit. Its greatness, however, belongs to a later period of \nGrecian history. \n\nThe Grecian colonies in southern Italy began to be planted at \nnearly the same time as in Sicily. They eventually lined the whole \nsouthern coast, as far as Cumse on the one sea and Tarentnm on the \nother. They even surpassed those in Sicily in number and import- \nance ; and so numerous and nourishing did they become, that the \nsouth of Italy received the name of Magna Graecia. Of these, two of \nthe earliest and most prosperous were Sybaris and Croton, both \nsituated upon the gulf of Tarentum, and both of Achaean origin. \nSybaris was planted in B.C. 720 and Croton in b.c. 710. For two \ncenturies they seem to have lived in harmony, and we know \nscarcely anything of their history till their fatal contest in b.c. 510, \nwhich ended in the ruin of Sybaris. During the whole of this \nperiod they were two of the most flourishing cities in all Hellas. \nSybaris in particular attained to an extraordinary degree of wealth, \nand its inhabitants were so notorious for their luxury, effeminacy, \nand debauchery, that their name has become proverbial for a \nvoluptuary in ancient and modern times. Croton was the chief \nseat of the Pythagorean philosophy. Pythagoras was a native of \nSamos, but emigrated to Croton, where he met with the most \nwonderful success in the propagation of his views. He established \na kind of religious brotherhood, closely united by a sacred vow. \nThey believed in the transmigration of souls, and their whole \ntraining was designed to make them temperate and self-denying. \nThe doctrines of Pythagoras spread through many of the other \ncities of Magna Graecia. \n\nOf the numerous other Greek settlements in the south of Italy, \nthose of Locri, Ehegium, and Tarentum were the most important. \nLocri was founded by the Locrians from the mother-country in \nb.c. 683. The laws of this city were drawn up by one of its \ncitizens, named Zaleucus, and so averse were the Locrians to any \nchange in them, that whoever proposed a new law had to appear \nin the public assembly with a rope round his neck, which was \nimmediately tightened if he failed to convince his fellow-citizens \nof the necessity of the alteration. Rhegium, situated on the straits \n\n\n\nB.C. 735-600. \n\n\n\nTHE GREEK COLONIES. \n\n\n\n43 \n\n\n\nof Messina, opposite Sicily, was colonised by the Chalcidians, but \nreceived a large body of Messenians, who settled here at the close \nof the Messenian war. Anaxilas, tyrant of Ehegium about b.c. 500, \nwas of Messenian descent. He seized the Sicilian Zancle on the \nopposite coast, and changed its name into Messana, which it still \nbears. Tarentum was a colony from Sparta and was founded about \nb.c. 708. After the destruction of Sybaris it was the most powerful \nand flourishing city in Magna Greecia, and continued to enjoy great \nprosperity till its subjugation by the Eomans. Although of Spartan \norigin, it did not maintain Spartan habits, and its citizens were \nnoted at a later time for their love of luxury and pleasure. \n\n\n\n\nMap of the chief Greek Colonies in Southern Italy. \n\n\n\n44 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. YL \n\n\n\nThe Grecian settlements in the distant conn tries of Gaul and \nSpain were not numerous. The most celebrated was Massalia, the \nmodern Marseilles, founded by the Ionic Phocfeans in B.C. 600. \n\n3. The northern coast of Africa, between the territories of Car- \nthage and Egypt, was also occupied by Greek colonists. The city \nof Gyrene was founded about B.C. 630. It was a colony\' from the \nisland of Thera in the JEgean, which was itself a colony from \nSparta. The situation of Cyrene was well chosen. It stood on \nthe edge of a range of hills, at the distance of ten miles from the \nMediterranean, of which it commanded a fine view. These hills \ndescended by a succession of terraces to the port of the town, \ncalled Apollonia. The climate was most salubrious, and the soil \nwas distinguished by extraordinary fertility. AYith these advan- \ntages Cyrene rapidly grew in wealth and power ; and its greatness \nis attested by the immense remains which still mark its desolate \nsite. Cyrene planted several colonies in the adjoining district, of \nwhich Barca, founded about B.C. 560, was the most important. \n\n4. There were several Grecian colonies situated on the eastern \nside of the Ionian sea, in Epirus and its immediate neighbour- \nhood. Of these the island of Corcyra, now called Corfu, was the \nmost wealthy and powerful. It was founded by the Corinthians \nabout B.C. 700, and in consequence of its commercial activity it \nsoon became a formidable rival to the mother-city. Hence a war \nbroke out between these two states at an early period ; and the \nmost ancient naval battle on record was the one fought between \ntheir fleets in b.c. 664. The dissensions between the mother-city \nand her colony are frequently mentioned in Grecian history, and \nwere one of the immediate causes of the Peloponnesian war. Xot- \nwithstanding their quarrels they joined in planting four Grecian \ncolonies upon the same line of coast \xe2\x80\x94 Leucas, Anactorium, Apol- \nlonia, and Epidamnus. \n\nThe colonies in Macedonia and Thrace were very numerous, \nand extended all along the coast of the ^Egean, of the Hellespont, \nof the Propontis, and of the Euxine, from the borders of Thessaly \nto the mouth of the Danube. Of these we can only glance at \nthe most important. The colonies on the coast of Macedonia \nwere chiefly founded by Chalcis and Eretria in Eubcea ; and the \npeninsula of Chalcidice, with its three projecting headlands, was \ncovered with their settlements, and derived its name from the \nformer city. The Corinthians likewise planted a few colonies on \nthis coast, of which Potidsea, on the narrow isthmus of Pallene, \nmost deserves mention. \n\nOf the colonies in Thrace, the most nourishing were Selymbria \nand Byzantium, both founded by the Megarians, who appear as an \nenterprising maritime people at an early period. \n\n\n\nTomb of Cyrus. \nCHAPTEB VII. \n\nTHE PERSIAN WARS. \xe2\x80\x94 FROM THE IONIC REVOLT TO THE BATTLE \nOF MARATHON, B.C. 500-490. \n\nThe Grecian cities on the coast of Asia Minor were the neigh- \nbours of an Asiatic power which finally reduced them to sub- \njection. This was the kingdom of Lydia, of which Sardis was the \ncapital. Croesus, the last and most powerful of the Lydian kings, \nwho ascended the throne B.C. 560, conquered in succession all the \nGrecian cities on the coast. His rule, however, was not oppres- \nsive, and he permitted the cities to regulate their own affairs. \nHe spoke the Greek language, welcomed Greek guests, and re- \nverenced the Greek oracles, which he enriched with the most \nmunificent offerings. He extended his dominions in Asia Minor as \nfar as the river Halys, and he formed a close alliance with Asty- \nages, king of the Medes, who were then the ruling race in Asia. \nEverything seemed to betoken uninterrupted prosperity, when a \npeople hitherto almost unknown suddenly became masters of the \nwhole of western Asia. \n\n\n\n46 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VII. \n\n\n\nThe Persians were of the same race as the Medes and spoke a \ndialect of the same language. They inhabited the mountainous \nregion south of Media, which slopes gradually down to the low \ngrounds on the coast of the Persian gulf. While the Medes \nbecame enervated by the corrupting influences to which they were \nexposed, the Persians preserved in their native mountains their \nsimple and warlike habits. They were a brave and hardy nation, \nclothed in skins, drinking only water, and ignorant of the com- \nmonest luxuries of life. Cyrus led these fierce warriors from their \nmountain fastnesses, defeated the Medes in battle, took Astyages \nprisoner, and deprived him of his throne. The other nations \nincluded in the Median empire submitted to the conqueror, and \nthe sovereignty of Upper Asia thus passed from the Medes to \nthe Persians. The accession of Cyrus to the empire is placed in \nb.c. 559. A few years afterwards Cyrus turned his arms against \nthe Lydians. took Sard is, and deprived Croesus of his throne \n(b.c. 546). The fall of Croesus was followed by the subjection of \nthe Greek cities in Asia to the Persian yoke. They ofYered a \nbrave but ineffectual resistance, and were taken one after the \nother by Harpagus the Persian general. Even the islands of \nLesbos and Chios sent in their submission to Harpagus, although \nthe Persians then possessed no fleet to force them to obedience. \nSamoa, on the other hand, maintained its independence, and \nappears soon afterwards one of the most powerful of the Grecian \nstates. \n\nDuring the reign of Gambyses b.c. 529-521), the son and suc- \ncessor of Cyrus, the Greek cities of Asia remained obedient to their \nPersian governors. It was during this reign that Polycrates. tyrant \nof Samos, became the master of the Grecian seas. The ambition \nand good fortune of this enterprising tyrant were alike remarkable. \nHe possessed a hundred ships of war. with which he conquered \nseveral of the islands ; and he aspired to nothing less than the \ndominion of Ionia, as well as of the islands in the iEgean. The \nLacedaemonians, who had invaded the island at the invitation of \nthe Samian exiles, for the purpose of overthrowing his government, \nwere obliged to retire, after besieging Ms city in vain for forty \ndays. Everything which he undertook seemed to prosper ; but his \nOfiinterrnpted good fortune at length excited the alarm of his ally \nAmasis. the king of Egypt. According to the tale related by \nHerodotus, the Egyptian king, convinced that such amazing good \nfortune would sooner or later incur the envy of the gods, wrote to \nPolycrates, advising him to throw away one of his most valuable \npossessions, and thus inflict some injury upon himself. Thinking \nthe advice to be good. Polycrates threw into the sea a favourite \n\n\n\nB.C. 559-510. CYRUS, CAMBYSES, DARIUS. \n\n\n\n47 \n\n\n\nring of matchless price and beauty ; but unfortunately it was found \na few days afterwards in the belly of a fine fish which a fisherman \nhad sent him as a present. Amasis now foresaw that the ruin of \nPolycrates was inevitable, and sent a herald to Samos to renounce \nhis alliance. The gloomy anticipations of the Egyptian monarch \nproved well founded. In the midst of all his prosperity Polycrates \nfell by a most ignominious fate. Oroetes, the satrap of Sardis, had \nfor some unknown cause conceived a deadly hatred against the \nSamian despot. By a cunning stratagem the satrap allured him \nto the mainland, where he was immediately arrested and hanged \nupon a cross (b.c. 522). \n\nThe reign of Darius, the third king of Persia (b.c. 521-485), is \nmemorable in Grecian history. In his invasion of Scythia, his fleet, \nwhich was furnished by the Asiatic Greeks, was ordered to sail up the \nDanube and throw a bridge of boats across the river. The king him- \nself, with his land forces, marched through Thrace ; and, crossing the \nbridge, placed it under the care of the Greeks, telling them that, if \nhe did not return within sixty days, they might break it down, and \nsail home. He then left them, and penetrated into the Scythian ter- \nritory. The sixty days had already passed away, and there was yet \nno sign of the Persian army ; but shortly afterwards the Greeks \nwere astonished by the appearance of a body of Scythians, who in- \nformed them that Darius was in full retreat, pursued by the whole \nScythian nation, and that his only hope of safety depended upon \nthat bridge. They urged the Greeks to seize this opportunity of \ndestroying the Persian army, and of recovering their own liberty, \nby breaking down the bridge. Their exhortations were warmly \nseconded by the Athenian Miltiades, the tyrant of the Thra- \ncian Chersonesus, and the future conqueror of Marathon. The \nother rulers of the Ionian cities were at first disposed to follow \nhis suggestion ; but as soon as Histiseus of Miletus reminded them \nthat their sovereignty depended upon the support of the Persian \nking, and that his ruin would involve their own, they changed \ntheir minds and resolved to await the Persians. After enduring \ngreat privations and sufferings, Darius and his army at length \nreached the Danube and crossed the bridge in safety. Thus the \nselfishness of these Grecian despots threw away the most favour- \nable opportunity that ever presented itself of delivering their \nnative cities from the Persian yoke. To reward the services of \nHistiseus, Darius gave him the town of Myrcinus, near the Strymon. \nDarius, on his return to Asia, left Megabazus in Europe with an \narmy of 80,000 men to complete the subjugation of Thrace and of \nthe Greek cities upon the Hellespont. Megabazus not only sub- \ndued the Thracians, but crossed the Strymon, conquered the \n\n\n\n43 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VII. \n\n\n\nPseonians, and penetrated as far as the frontiers of Macedonia. \nHe then sent heralds into the latter country to demand earth and \nwater, the customary symhols of submission. These were imme- \ndiately granted by Amyntas, the reigning monarch (b.c. 510) ; and \nthus the Persian dominions were extended to the borders of \nThessaly. Megabazus, on his return to Sardis, where Darius \nawaited him, informed the Persian monarch that Histiseus was \ncollecting the elements of a power which might hereafter prove \nformidable to the Persian sovereignty, since Myrcinus commanded \nthe navigation of the Strymon, and consequently the commerce \nwith the interior of Thrace. Darius, perceiving that the appre- \nhensions of his general were not without foundation, summoned \nHistiasus to his presence, and, under the pretext that he could not \nbear to be deprived of the company of his friend, carried him with \nthe rest of the court to Susa. This apparently trivial circumstance \nwas attended with important consequences to the Persian empire \nand to the whole Grecian race. \n\nFor the next few years everything remained quiet in the Greek \ncities of Asia ; but about b.c. 502 a revolution in Naxos, one of the \nislands in the iEgean Sea, first disturbed the general repose, and \noccasioned the war between Greece and Asia. The aristocratical \nexiles, who had been driven out of Naxos by a rising of the people, \napplied for aid to Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus and the son- \nin-law of Histiseus. Aristagoras readily promised his assistance, \nknowing that, if they were restored by his means, he should be- \ncome master of the island. He obtained the co-operation of Arta- \nphernes, the satrap of western Asia, by holding out to him the \nprospect of annexing not only Naxos, but all the islands of the \niEgean sea, to the Persian empire. He offered at the same time \nto defray the expense of the armament. Artaphernes placed at his \ndisposal a fleet of 200 ships under the command of Megabates, a \nPersian of high rank ; but Aristagoras having affronted the \nPersian admiral, the latter revenged himself by privately informing \nthe Naxians of the object of the expedition, which had hitherto \nbeen kept a secret. When the Persian fleet reached Naxos they \nexperienced a vigorous resistance ; and at the end of four months \nthey were compelled to abandon the enterprise and return to \nMiletus. Aristagoras was now threatened with utter ruin. Having \ndeceived Artaphernes, and incurred the enmity of Megabates, \nhe could expect no favour from the Persian government, and \nmight be called upon at any moment to defray the expenses of \nthe armament. In these difficulties he began to think of exciting \na revolt of Ms countrymen ; and while revolving the project he \nreceived a message from his father-in-law, Histiseus, urging him to \n\n\n\nB.C. 499. \n\n\n\nBURNING OF SARDIS. \n\n\n\n49 \n\n\n\nthis very step. Afraid of trusting any one with so dangerous a \nmessage, Histiseus had shaved the head of a trusty slave, branded \nupon it the necessary words, and as soon as the hair had grown \nagain sent him off to Miletus. His only motive for urging the \nlonians to revolt was the desire of escaping from captivity at Susa, \nthinking that Darius would set him at liberty in order to put down \nan insurrection of his countrymen. The message from Histiseus \nfixed the wavering resolution of Aristagoras. He forthwith called \ntogether the leading citizens of Miletus, laid before them the pro- \nject of revolt, and asked them for advice. They all approved of \nthe scheme, with the exception of Hecatseus, one of the earliest \nGreek historians. Aristagoras laid down the supreme power in \nMiletus, and nominally resigned to the people the management of \ntheir own affairs. A democratical form of government was esta- \nblished in the other Greek cities of Asia, which thereupon openly \nrevolted from Persia (b.c. 500). \n\nAristagoras now resolved to cross over to Greece, in order to \nsolicit assistance. The Spartans, to whom he first applied, refused \nto take any part in the war ; but at Athens he met with a very dif- \nferent reception. The Athenians sympathised with the lonians as \ntheir kinsmen and colonists, and were incensed against the satrap \nArtaphernes, who had recently commanded them to recall Hippias. \nAccordingly they voted to send a squadron of twenty ships to the \nassistance of the lonians ; and in the following year (b.c. 499) this \nfleet, accompanied by five ships from Eretria in Euboea, crossed \nthe iEgean. The troops landed at Ephesus, and, being reinforced \nby a strong body of lonians, marched upon Sardis. Artaphernes \nwas taken unprepared ; and not having sufficient troops to man the \nwalls, he retired into the citadel, leaving the town a prey to the \ninvaders. Accordingly they entered it unopposed ; and while en- \ngaged in pillage, one of the soldiers set fire to a house. As most \nof the houses were built of wickerwork and thatched with straw, \nthe flames rapidly spread, and in a short time the whole city was \nin flames. The Greeks, on their return to the coast, were overtaken \nby a large Persian force and defeated with great slaughter. The \nAthenians hastened on board their ships and sailed home. \n\nWhen Darius heard of the burning of Sardis, he burst into a \nparoxysm of rage. It was against the obscure strangers who had \ndared to burn one of his capitals that his wrath was chiefly directed. \n" The Athenians!" he exclaimed, "who are tliey^ ,% Upon being \ninformed, he took his bow, shot an arrow high into the air, saying, \n" Grant me, Jove, to take vengeance upon the Athenians!" And \nhe charged one of his attendants to remind him thrice eveiy day at \ndinner, " Sire, remember the Athenians." Meantime the insurrec- \n\nE \n\n\n\n50 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VII. \n\n\n\ntion spread to the Greek cities in Cyprus, as well as to those on \nthe Hellespont and the Propontis, and seemed to promise perma- \nnent independence to the Asiatic Greeks 5 but they were no match \nfor the whole power of the Persian empire, which was soon brought \nagainst them. Cyprus was subdued, and siege laid to the cities \nupon the coast of Asia. Aristagoras now began to despair, and \nbasely deserted his countrymen, whom he had led into peril. Col- \nlecting a large body of Milesians, he set sail for the Thracian \ncoast, where he was slain under the walls of a town to which \nhe had laid siege. Soon after his departure, his father-in-law, \nHistiaeus, came down to the coast. The. artful Greek not only suc- \nceeded in removing the suspicions which Darius first entertained \nrespecting him, but he persuaded the king to send him into Ionia, \nin order to assist the Persian generals in suppressing the rebellion. \nArtaphernes, however, was not so easily deceived as his master, \nand plainly accused Histiseus of treachery when the latter arrived \nat Sardis. " I will tell you how the facts stand," said Artaphernes \nto Histiteus ; " it was you who made the shoe, and Aristagoras has \nput it on." : Finding himself unsafe at Sardis, he escaped to the \nisland of Chios ; but he was regarded with suspicion by all parties. \nAt length he obtained eight galleys from Lesbos, with which he \nsailed towards Byzantium, and carried on piracies as well against \nthe Grecian as the barbarian vessels. This unprincipled adven- \nturer met with a traitor\'s death. Having landed on the coast of \nMysia, he was surprised by a Persian force and made prisoner. \nBeing carried to Sardis, Artaphernes at once caused him to be \ncrucified, and sent his head to Darius, who ordered it to be honour- \nably buried, condemning the ignominious execution of the man \nwho had once saved the life of the Great King. \n\nIn the sixth year of the revolt (b.c. 495), when several Grecian \ncities had already been taken by the Persians, Artaphernes laid \nsiege to Miletus by sea and by land. A naval engagement took \nplace at Lade, a small island off Miletus, which decided the fate of \nthe war. The Samians deserted at the commencement of the \nbattle, and the Ionian fleet was completely defeated. Miletus \nwas soon afterwards taken, and was treated with signal severity. \nMost of the males were slain ; and the few who escaped the sword \nwere carried with the women and children into captivity (b.c. 494). \nThe other Greek cities in Asia and the neighbouring islands were \ntreated with the same cruelty. The islands of Chios, Lesbos, and \nTenedos were swept of their inhabitants ; and the Persian fleet \nsailed up to the Hellespont and Propontis, carrying with it fire \nand sword. The Athenian Miltiades only escaped falling into the \npower of the Persians by a rapid flight to Athens. \n\n\n\nB.C. 490. \n\n\n\nINVASION OF GREECE. \n\n\n\n51 \n\n\n\nThe subjugation of Ionia was now complete. This was the third \ntime that the Asiatic Greeks had been conquered by a foreign \npower : first by the Lydian Crcesus ; secondly by the generals of \nCyrus ; and lastly by those of Darius. It was from the last that \nthey suffered most, and they never fully recovered their former \nprosperity. \n\nDarius was now at liberty to take vengeance upon the Athenians. \nHe appointed Mardonius to succeed Artaphernes as satrap in \nwestern Asia, and he placed under his command a large arma- \nment, with injunctions to bring to Susa those Athenians and \nEretrians who had insulted the authority of the Great King. Mar- \ndonius, after crossing the Hellespont, commenced his march \nthrough Thrace and Macedonia, subduing, as he went along, the \ntribes which had not yet submitted to the Persian power. He \nordered the fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and \njoin the land forces at the head of the gulf of Therma ; but one of \nthe hurricanes which frequently blow off this dangerous coast \novertook the Persian fleet, destroyed 300 vessels, and drowned or \ndashed upon the rocks 20,000 men. Meantime the land forces of \nMardonius had suffered so much from an attack made upon them \nby a Thracian tribe, that he could not proceed farther. He led \nhis army back across the Hellespont, and returned to the Persian \ncourt covered with shame and grief (b.c. 492). \n\nThe failure of this expedition did not shake the resolution of \nDarius. He began to make preparations for another attempt on a \nstill larger scale, and meantime sent heralds to most of the Grecian \nstates to demand from each earth and water as the symbol of sub- \nmission. Such terror had the Persians inspired by their recent \nconquest of Ionia, that a large number of the Grecian cities at once \ncomplied with the demand ; but the Athenians cast the herald into \na deep pit, and the Spartans threw him into a well, bidding him \ntake earth and water from thence. \n\nIn the spring of B.C. 490 a large army and fleet were assembled \nin Cilicia, and the command was given to Datis, a Median, and \nArtaphernes, son of the satrap of Sardis of that name. Warned \nby the recent disaster of Mardonius in doubling the promontory \nof Mount Athos, they resolved to sail straight across the JEgean \nto Eubcea, subduing on their way the Gyclades. These islands \nyielded a ready submission; and it was not till Datis and Arta- \nphernes reached Eubcea that they encountered any resistance. \nEretria defended itself gallantly for six days, and repulsed the \nPersians with loss; but on the seventh the gates were opened \nto the besiegers by the treachery of two of its leading citizens. \nThe city was razed to the ground, and the inhabitants were put in \n\ne 2 \n\n\n\n52 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VII. \n\n\n\nchains. From Eretria the Persians crossed over to Attica, and \nlanded on the ever memorable plain of Marathon, a spot which had \nbeen pointed out to them by the despot Hippias, who accompanied \nthe army. \n\nAs soon as the news of the fall of Eretria reached Athens, \na cornier had been sent to Sparta to solicit assistance. This was \npromised; bnt the superstition of the Spartans prevented them \nfrom setting out immediately, since it wanted a few days to the full \nmoon, and it was contrary to their religions customs to commence \na march during this interval. Meantime the Athenians had \nmarched to Marathon, and were encamped upon the mountains \nwhich surrounded the plain. They were commanded, according to \nthe regular custom, by ten generals, one for each tribe, and by the \nPolemarch, or third Archon, who down to this time continued to \nbe a colleague of the generals. Among these the most distin- \nguished was Miltiades, who, though but lately a tyrant in the Cher- \nsonesus, had shown such energy and ability, that the Athenians \nhad elected him one of their commanders upon the approach of \nthe Persian fleet. Upon learning the answer which the courier \nbrought from Sparta, the ten generals were divided in opinion. \nFive of them were opposed to an immediate engagement with the \noverwhelming number of Persians, and urged the importance \nof waiting for the arrival of the Lacedaemonian succours. Mil- \ntiades and the remaining four contended that not a moment should \nbe lost in fighting the Persians, not only in order to avail them- \nselves of the present enthusiasm of the people, but still more \nto prevent treachery from spreading among then ranks. Calli- \nmachus, the Polemarch, yielded to the arguments of Miltiades, and \ngave his vote for the battle. The ten generals commanded then \narmy in rotation, each for one day ; but they now agreed to sur- \nrender to Miltiades their days of command, in order to invest the \nwhole power in a single person. While the Athenians were \npreparing for battle, they received unexpected assistance from the \nlittle town of Platsea, in Bceotia. Grateful to the Athenians \nfor the assistance which they had rendered them against the \nThebans, the whole force of Platsea, amounting to 1000 heavy- \narmed men, marched to the assistance of their allies and joined \nthem at Marathon. The Athenian army numbered only 10,000 \nhoplites, or heavy-armed soldiers : there were no archers or \ncavalry, and only some slaves as light-armed attendants. Of the \nnumber of the Persian army we have no trustworthy account, but \nthe lowest estimate makes it consist of 110,000 men. \n\nThe plain of Marathon lies on the eastern coast of Attica, at the \ndistance of twenty-two miles from Athens by the shortest road. \n\n\n\nB.C. 490. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF MARATHON. \n\n\n\n53 \n\n\n\nIt is in the form of a crescent, the horns of which consist of two \npromontories running into the sea, and forming a semicircular bay. \nThis plain is about six miles in length, and in its widest or central \npart about two in breadth. On the day of battle the Persian army \nwas drawn up along the plain about a mile from the sea, and their \nfleet was ranged behind them on the beach. The Athenians \noccupied the rising ground above the plain, and extended from one \nside of the plain to the other. This arrangement was necessary in \n\n\n\n\nPlan of the Battle of Marathon. \n\n\n\norder to protect their flanks by the mountains on each side, and to \nprevent the cavalry from passing round to attack them in rear. \nBut so large a breadth of ground could not be occupied with so \nsmall a number of men without weakening some portion of the \nline. Miltiades, therefore, drew up the troops in the centre \nin shallow files, and resolved to rely for success upon the stronger \nand deeper masses of his wings. The right wing, which was the \npost of honour in a Grecian army, was commanded by the Pole- \nmarch Callimachus ; the hoplites were arranged in the order \n\n\n\n51 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GEEEfCE. \n\n\n\nChap. VII. \n\n\n\nof their tribes, so that the members of the same tribe fought \nby each other\'s side ; and at the extreme left stood the Plateeans. \n\nMiltiades, anxious to come to close quarters as speedily as \npossible, ordered his soldiers to advance at a running step over the \nmile of ground which separated them from the foe. Both the \nAthenian wings were successful, and drove the enemy before them \ntowards the shore and the marshes. But the Athenian centre was \nbroken by the Persians, and compelled to take to flight. Mil- \ntiades thereupon recalled his wings from pursuit, and charged the \nPersian centre. The latter could not withstand this combined \nattack. The rout now became general along the whole Persian \nline ; and they fled to their ships, pursued by the Athenians. \n\nThe Persians lost 6400 men in this memorable engagement : \nof the Athenians only 192 fell. The aged tyrant Hippias is said \nto have perished in the battle, and the brave Polemarch Calli- \nmachus was also one of the slain. The Persians embarked and \nsailed away to Asia. Their departure was hailed at Athens with \none unanimous burst of heartfelt joy. Marathon became a magic \nword at Athens. The Athenian people in succeeding ages always \nlooked back upon this day as the most glorious in their annals, \nand never tired of hearing its praises sounded by their orators and \npoets. And they had reason to be proud of it. It was the first \ntime that the Greeks had ever defeated the Persians in the field. \nIt was the exploit of the Athenians alone. It had saved not only \nAthens but all Greece. If the Persians had conquered at Mara- \nthon, Greece must, in all likelihood, have become a Persian \nprovince ; the destinies of the world would have been changed ; \nand oriental despotism might still have brooded over the fairest \ncountries of Europe. \n\nThe one hundred and ninety-two Athenians who had perished \nin the battle were buried on the field, and over their remains \na tumulus or mound was erected, which may still be seen about \nhalf a mile from the sea. \n\nShortly after the battle Miltiades requested of the Athenians \na fleet of seventy ships, without telling them the object of his \nexpedition, but only promising to enrich the state. Such un- \nbounded confidence did the Athenians repose in the hero of \nMarathon, that they at once complied with his demand. This \nconfidence Miltiades abused. In order to gratify a private ani- \nmosity against one of the leading citizens of Paros, he sailed to \nthis island and laid siege to the town. The citizens repelled^ all \nhis attacks J and having received a dangerous injury on his thigh, \nhe was compelled to raise the siege and return to Athens. Loud \nwas the indignation against Miltiades on his return. He was \n\n\n\nB.C. 483. BANISHMENT OF ARISTIDES. \n\n\n\n55 \n\n\n\naccused by Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, of having deceived \nthe people, and was brought to trial. His wound had already \nbegun to show symptoms of gangrene. He was carried into court \non a couch, and there lay before the assembled judges, while his \nfriends pleaded on his behalf. They could offer no excuse for his \nrecent conduct, but they reminded the Athenians of the services \nhe had rendered, and begged them to spare the victor of Marathon. \nThe judges were not insensible to this appeal; and instead \nof condemning him to death, as the accuser had demanded, \nthey commuted the penalty to a fine of fifty talents. Miltiades was \nunable immediately to raise this sum and died soon afterwards \nof his wound. The fine was subsequently paid by his son Cimon. \nThe melancholy end of Miltiades must not blind us to his offence. \nHe had grossly abused the public confidence, and deserved his \npunishment. The Athenians did not forget his services at Mara- \nthon, and it was their gratitude towards him which alone saved \nhim from death. \n\nSoon after the battle of Marathon a war broke out between \nAthens and iEgina. This war is of great importance in Grecian \nhistory, since to it the Athenians were indebted for their navy, \nwhich -enabled them to save Greece at Salamis as they had already \ndone at Marathon. iEgina was one of the chief maritime powers \nin Greece ; and accordingly Themistocles urged the Athenians \nto build and equip a large and powerful fleet, without which \nit was impossible for them to humble their rival. There was at \nthis time a large surplus in the public treasury, arising from the \nproduce of the silver-mines at Laurium. It had been recently \nproposed to distribute this surplus among the Athenian citizens ; \nbut Themistocles persuaded them to sacrifice their private advan- \ntage to the public good, and to appropriate this money to building \na fleet of 200 ships. \n\nThe two leading citizens of Athens at this period were The- \nmistocles and Aristides. These two eminent men formed a \nstriking contrast to each other. Themistocles possessed abilities \nof the most extraordinary kind ; but they were marred by a want \nof honesty. Aristides was inferior to Themistocles in ability, but \nwas incomparably superior to him in honesty and integrity. His \nuprightness and justice were so universally acknowledged that \nhe received the surname of the "Just." Themistocles was the \nleader of the democratical, and Aristides of the conservative party \nat Athens. After three or four years of bitter rivalry, the two \nchiefs appealed to the ostracism, and Aristides was banished (b.c. \n483). We are told that an unlettered countryman gave his vote \nagainst Aristides at the ostracism, because he was tired of hearing \nhim always called the Just. \n\n\n\n\nGreek Soulier (From an ancient Vase.) \n\n\n\nCHAPTEE Till. \n\nTHE PERSIAN WARS. \xe2\x80\x94 THE BATTLES OF THERMCPYLE, BALAMIR, \nAND PLAT-EA, B.C. 480-479. \n\nThe defeat of the Persians at Marathon served only to increase \nthe resentment of Paring. He now resolved to collect the whole \nforces of his empire, and to lead them in person against Athens. \nFor three years busy preparations were made throughout his vast \ndominions. In the fourth year his attention was distracted by a \nrevolt of the Egyptians ; and before he could reduce them to \nsubjection he was surprised by death, after a reign of 37 years \n(b.c. 485;. Xerxes, the son and successor of Darius, had received \nthe education of an eastern despot, and been surrounded with \nslaves from his cradle. In person he was the tallest and hand- \nsomest man amidst the vast hosts which he led against Greece ; \nbut there was nothing in his mind to correspond to this fair \nexterior. His character was marked by faint-hearted timidity and \nchildish vanity. Xerxes had not inherited his father\'s animosity \nagainst Greece ; but he was surrounded by men who urged him to \ncontinue the enterprise. Foremost among these was Alardonius, \n\n\n\nB.C. 480. \n\n\n\nINVASION OF XERXES. \n\n\n\n57 \n\n\n\nwho was eager to retrieve his reputation, and to obtain the \nconquered country as a satrapy for himself. After subduing \nEgypt (b.c. 484), Xerxes began to make preparations for the \ninvasion of Greece. For four years the din of preparation sounded \nthroughout Asia. Troops were collected from every quarter of \nthe Persian empire, and were ordered to assemble in Cappadocia. \nAs many as forty-six different nations composed the land-force, \nof various complexions, languages, dresses, and arms. Meantime \nXerxes ordered a bridge to be thrown across the Hellespont, that \nhis army might march from Asia into Europe : and he likewise \ngave directions that a canal should be cut through the isthmus of \nMount Athos, in order to avoid the necessity of doubling this \ndangerous promontory, where the fleet of Mardonius had suffered \nshipwreck. The making of this canal, which was about a mile \nand a half long, employed a number of men for three years. \n\nIn the spring of b.c. 480 Xerxes set out from Sardis with his \nvast host. Upon reaching Abydos on the Hellespont the army \ncrossed over to Europe by the bridge of boats. Xerxes surveyed the \nscene from a marble throne. His heart swelled within him at the \nsight of such a vast assemblage of human beings ; but his feelings \nof pride and pleasure soon gave way to sadness, and he burst into \ntears at the reflection that in a hundred years not one of them \nwould be alive. Xerxes continued his march through Europe \nalong the coast of Thrace. Upon arriving at the spacious plain of \nDoriscus, which is traversed by the river Hebrus, he resolved to \nnumber his forces. He found that the whole armament, both \nmilitary and naval, consisted of 2,317,610 men. In his march \nfrom Doriscus to Thermopylae he received a still further accession \nof strength; and accordingly when he reached Thermopylae the \nland and sea forces amounted to 2,641,610 fighting men. The \nattendants are said to have been more in number than the fighting \nmen; but if they were only equal, the number of persons who \naccompanied Xerxes to Thermopylae reaches the astounding figure \nof 5,283,220 ! This number is quite incredible ; but though the \nexact number of the invading army cannot be determined, we may \nsafely conclude, from all the circumstances of the case, that it was \nthe largest ever assembled at any period of history. \n\nFrom Doriscus Xerxes continued his march along the coast \nthrough Thrace and Macedonia. The principal cities through \nwhich he passed had to furnish a day\'s meal for the immense host, \nand for this purpose had made preparations many months before- \nhand. The cost of feeding such a multitude brought many cities \nto the brink of ruin. At Acanthus his fleet sailed through the \nisthmus of Athos, and after doubling the promontories of Sithonia \n\n\n\n53 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. VIII. \n\n\n\nand Pallene joined him at the city of Therma, better known by its \nlater name of Thessalonica. Thence he continued his march through \nthe southern part of Macedonia and Thessaly, meeting with no op- \nposition till he reached the celebrated pass of Thermopyla3. \n\nThe mighty preparations of Xerxes had been no secret in Greece \xe2\x80\xa2 \nand during the preceding winter a congress of the Grecian states \nhad been summoned by the Spartans and Athenians to meet at the \nisthmus of Corinth. But so great was the terror inspired by the \ncountless hosts of Xerxes that many of the Grecian states at once \ntendered their submission to him, and others refused to take any \npart in the congress. The only people, north of the isthmus of \nCorinth, who remained faithful to the cause of Grecian liberty, \nwere the Athenians and Phocians, and the inhabitants of the small \nBoeotian towns of Plataea and Thespise. The other people in \nnorthern Greece were either partisans of the Persians, like the \nThebans, or were unwilling to make any great sacrifices for the \npreservation of their independence. In Peloponnesus, the powerful \ncity of Argos and the Achseans stood aloof. From the more \ndistant members of the Hellenic race no assistance was obtained. \nGelon, the ruler of Syracuse, offered to send a powerful armament, \nprovided the command of the allied forces was intrusted to him ; \nbut the envoys did not venture to accept a proposal which \nwould have placed both Sparta and Athens under the control of a \nSicilian tyrant. \n\nThe desertion of the cause of Grecian independence by so many \nof the Greeks did not shake the resolution of Sparta and of Athens. \nThe Athenians, especially, set a noble example of an enlarged \npatriotism. They became reconciled to the iEginetans, and thus \ngained for the common cause the powerful navy of their rival. \nThey readily granted to the Spartans the supreme command of the \nforces by sea as well as by land, although they furnished two- \nthirds of the vessels of the entire fleet. Then- illustrious citizen \nThemistocles was the soul of the congress. He sought to enkindle \nin the other Greeks some portion of the ardour and energy which \nhe had succeeded in breathing into the Athenians. \n\nThe Greeks determined to make a stand at the pass of Thermo- \npylae, which forms the entrance from northern into southern \nGreece. This pass lies between Mount CEta and the sea. It is \nabout a mile in length. At each of its extremities the mountains \napproach so near the sea as to leave barely room for the passage of \na single carriage. The northern, or, to speak more properly, the \nwestern Gate, was close to the town of Anthela, where the Am- \nphictyonic council held its autumnal meetings ; while the southern, \nor the eastern Gate, was near the Locrian town of Alpeni. These \n\n\n\nB.C. 480. \n\n\n\nTHE PASS OF THERMOPYLAE. \n\n\n\n59 \n\n\n\nnarrow entrances were called Pylse, or the Gates. The space \nbetween the gates was wider and more open, and was distinguished \nby its hot springs, from which the pass derived the name of Ther- \nmopylae, or the "Hot-Gates." The island of Euboea is here sepa- \nrated from the mainland by a narrow strait, which in one part is \nonly two miles and a half in breadth ; and accordingly it is easy, \nby defending this part of the sea with a fleet, to prevent an enemy \nfrom landing troops at the southern end of the pass. \n\n\n\n\nPlan of Thermopylae. \n\n\n\nThe Grecian fleet, under the command of the Spartan Eury- \nbiades, took up its station off that portion of the northern coast of \nEuboea which faces Magnesia and the entrance to the Thessalian \ngulf, and which was called Artemisium, from a neighbouring \ntemple of Artemis (Diana). It was, however, only a small land- \nforce that was sent to the defence of Thermopylae. When the \narrival of Xerxes at Therma became known, the Greeks were upon \nthe point of celebrating the Olympic games, and the festival of the \nCarnean Apollo, which was observed with great solemnity at \nSparta and in other Doric states. The Peloponnesians therefore \nsent forward only 300 Spartans and 3000 hoplites from other Pelo- \nponnesian states, under the command of the Spartan king Leonidas, \na force which they thought would be sufficient to maintain the \npass till the festivals were over. In his march northwards Leonidas \nreceived additions from the Thespians, Phocians, and Locrians, so \nthat he had under his command at Thermopylse about 7000 men. \n\nMeanwhile Xerxes had arrived within sight of Thermopylae. \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. Y.III. \n\n\n\nHe had heard that a handful of desperate men, commanded by a \nSpartan, had determined to dispute his passage, but he refused \nto believe the news. He was still more astonished when a horse- \nman, whom he had sent to reconnoitre, brought back word that \nhe had seen several Spartans outside the wall in front of the pass, \nsome amusing themselves with gymnastic exercises, and others \ncombing their long hair. In great perplexity, he sent for the \nexiled Spartan king Demaratus, who had accompanied him from \nPersia, and asked him the meaning of such madness. Demaratus \nreplied, that the Spartans would defend the pass to the death, and \nthat it was their practice to dress their heads with peculiar care \nwhen they were going to battle. Later writers relate that Xeixes \nsent to them to deliver up their arms. Leonidas desired him \nt! to come and take them." One of the Spartans being told that \n" the Persian host was so prodigious that their arrows would \nconceal the sun : " \xe2\x80\x94 " So much the better " (he replied), " we shall \nthen fight in the shade." \n\nAt length, upon the fifth day, Xerxes ordered a chosen body \nof Medes to advance against the presumptuous foes and bring them \ninto his presence. But their superior numbers were of no avail in \nsuch a narrow space, and they were kept at bay by the long spears \nand steady ranks of the Greeks. After the combat had lasted a \nlong time with heavy loss to the Medes, Xerxes ordered his ten \nthousand "Immortals," the flower of the Persian army, to advance. \nBut they were as unsuccessful as the Medes. Xerxes beheld the \nrepulse of his troops from a lofty throne which had been provided \nfor him, and was seen to leap thrice from his seat in an agony of \nfear or rage. \n\nOn the following day the attack was renewed, but with no better \nsuccess : and Xerxes was beginning to despair of forcing his \nway through the pass, when a Malian, of the name of Ephialtes, \nbetrayed to the Persian king that there was an unfrequented path \nacross Mount (Eta, ascending on the northern side of the mountain \nand descending on the southern side near the termination of the \npass. Overjoyed at this discovery, a strong detachment of Persians \nwas ordered to follow the traitor. Meantime Leonidas and his \ntroops had received ample notice of the impending danger. \nDuring the night deserters from the enemy had brought him the \nnews ; and their intelligence was confirmed by his own scouts on \nthe hills. His resolution was at once taken. As a Spartan he was \nbound to conquer or to die in the post assigned to him ; and he was \nthe more ready to sacrifice his life, since an oracle had declared \nthat either Sparta itself or a Spartan king must perish by the \nPersian arms. His three hundred comrades were fully equal to the \n\n\n\nB.C. 480. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF ARTEMISIUM. \n\n\n\n61 \n\n\n\nsame heroism which actuated their king ; and the seven hundred \nThespians resolved to share the fate of this gallant band. He \nallowed the rest of the allies to retire, with the exception of four \nhundred Boeotians, whom he retained as hostages. Xerxes delayed \nhis attack till the middle of the day, when it was expected that the \ndetachment sent across the mountain would arrive at the rear \nof the pass. But Leonidas and his comrades, only anxious to \nsell their lives as dearly as possible, did not wait to receive the \nattack of the Persians, but advanced into the open space in front of \nthe pass, and charged the enemy with desperate valour. Numbers \nof the Persians were slain ; many were driven into the neighbouring \nsea ; and others again were trampled to death by the vast hosts \nbehind them. As long as the Greeks could maintain their ranks \nthey repelled every attack ; but when their spears were broken, and \nthey had only their swords left, the enemy began to press in \nbetween them. Leonidas was one of the first that fell, and around \nhis body the battle raged fiercer than ever. The Persians made \nthe greatest efforts to obtain possession of it ; but four times they \nwere driven back by the Greeks with great slaughter. At length, \nthinned in numbers, and exhausted by fatigue and wounds, this \nnoble band retired within the pass, and seated themselves on a \nhillock. Meanwhile the Persian detachment, which had been sent \nacross the mountains, began to enter the pass from the south. The \nSpartan heroes were now surrounded on every side, overwhelmed \nwith a shower of missiles, and killed to a man. \n\nOn the hillock, where the Greeks made their last stand, a marble \nlion was set up in honour of Leonidas. Another monument, erected \nnear the spot, contained the memorable inscription : \xe2\x80\x94 \n\n" Go, tell the Spartans, thou that passest by, \nThat here obedient to their laws we lie." \n\nWhile Leonidas had been fighting at Thermopylae, the Greek \nfleet had also been engaged with the Persians at Artemisimn. \nThe Persian fleet set sail from the gulf of Therma, and arrived \nin one day at almost the southern corner of Magnesia. In this \nposition they were overtaken by a sudden hurricane, which blew \nupon the shore with irresistible fury. For three days and three \nnights the tempest raged without intermission ; and when calm at \nlength returned, the shore was seen strewed for many miles with \nwrecks and corpses. At least four hundred ships of war were \ndestroyed, together with a countless number of transports, stores, \nand treasures. The Greek fleet had been seized with a panic \nterror at the approach of the Persians, and retreated to Chalcis \nin the narrowest part of the Eubcean straits ; but upon hearing \n\n\n\n62 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VIII. \n\n\n\nof the disaster of the Persian fleet, they took courage, and sailed \nback with the utmost speed to their former station at Artemisium. \nBeing now encouraged to attack the enemy, they gained some \nsuccess. On the following night another terrific storm burst upon \nthe Persians. All night long it blew upon the Thessalian coast at \nAphetae, where the Persian ships were stationed, thus causing little \ninconvenience to the Greeks upon the opposite shore. Notwith- \nstanding these losses, the Persian fleet still had a vast superiority of \nnumbers, and determined to offer battle to the Greeks. Quitting \nthe Thessalian coast, they sailed towards Artemisium in the form \nof a crescent. The Greeks kept near the shore, to prevent the \nPersians from bringing their whole fleet into action. The battle \nraged furiously the whole day, and each side fought with deter- \nmined valour. Both parties suffered severely; and though the \nPersians lost a greater number of ships and men, yet so many \nof the Greek vessels were disabled that they found it would be \nimpossible to renew the combat. Under these circumstances the \nGreek commanders saw that it would be necessary to retreat ; \nand their determination was hastened by the news which they \nnow received, that Leonidas and his companions had fallen, and \nthat Xerxes was master of the pass of Thermopylae. Having \nsailed through, the Eubcean strait, the fleet doubled the pro- \nmontory of Sunium, and did not stop till it reached the island of \nSal amis. \n\nMeanwhile the Peloponnesians had abandoned Attica and the \nadjoining states to their fate, whilst they strained every nerve \nto secure themselves by fortifying the isthmus of Corinth. The \nAthenians, relying upon the march of a Peloponnesian army into \nBceotia, had taken no measures for the security of their families \nand property, and beheld with terror and dismay the barbarian host \nin full march towards their city. In six days it was calculated \nXerxes would be at Athens \xe2\x80\x94 a short space to remove the popu- \nlation of a whole city : but fear and necessity work wonders. \nBefore the six days had elapsed, all who were willing to abandon \ntheir homes had been safely transported, some to JEgina, and \nothers to Trcezen in Peloponnesus ; but many could not be induced \nto proceed farther than Salamis. It was necessary for Themistocles \nto use all his art and all his eloquence on this occasion. The \noracle at Delphi had told the Athenians that "the divine Salamis \nwould make women childless," \xe2\x80\x94 yet, "when all was lost, a wooden \nwall should still shelter the Athenians." Themistocles told his \ncountrymen that these words clearly indicated a fleet and a naval \nvictory .as the only means of safety. Some however gave to the \nwords another meaning ; and a few, especially among the aged and \n\n\n\nB.C. 480. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF SALAMIb. \n\n\n\n63 \n\n\n\nthe poor, resolved to shut themselves up in the Acropolis, and to \nfortify its accessible or western front with barricades of timber. \n\nOn his march towards Athens, Xerxes sent a detachment of \nhis army to take and plunder Delphi. But this attempt proved \nunsuccessful. The god of the most renowned oracle of the Gre- \ncian world vindicated at once the majesty of his sanctuary and the \ntruth of his predictions. As the Persians climbed the rugged path \nat the foot of Mount Parnassus, leading up to the shrine, thunder \nwas heard to roll, and two crags, suddenly detaching themselves \nfrom the mountain, rolled down upon the Persians, and spread \ndismay and destruction in their ranks. Seized with a sudden \npanic, they turned and fled, pursued, as they said, by two warriors \nof superhuman size and prowess, who had assisted the Delphians in \ndefending their temple. \n\nOn arriving before Athens, Xerxes found the Acropolis occupied \nby a handful of desperate citizens, who made a brave resistance : \nbut they were overpowered and put to the sword. The temples \nand houses on the Acropolis were pillaged and burnt ; and Xerxes \nthus became undisputed master of Athens. \n\nAbout the same time the Persian fleet arrived in the bay of \nPhalerum. Its strength is not accurately known, but it must have \nexceeded 1000 vessels. The combined Grecian fleet at Salamis \nconsisted of 366 ships, of which 200 were Athenian. \n\nAt this critical juncture dissension reigned in the Grecian fleet. \nIn the council of war which had been summoned by Eurybiades, \nthe Spartan commander, Themistocles urged the assembled chiefs \nto remain at Salamis, and give battle to the Persians in the narrow \nstraits, where the superior numbers of the Persians would be of less \nconsequence. The Peloponnesian commanders, on the other hand, \nwere anxious that the fleet shoidd be removed to the isthmus of \nCorinth, and thus be put in communication with their land-forces. \nThe council came to a vote in favour of retreat ; but Themistocles \nprevailed upon Eurybiades to convene another assembly upon the \nfollowing day. When the council met, the Peloponnesian com- \nmanders loudly expressed their dissatisfaction at seeing a debate \nre-opened which they had deemed concluded. Adimantus, the \nCorinthian admiral, broke out into open rebukes and menaces. \n*\' Themistocles," he exclaimed, "those who rise at the public games \nbefore the signal are whipped." "True," replied Themistocles; \n"but they who ; lag behind it never win a crown." Another \nincident in this discussion has been immortalized by Plutarch. \nEurybiades, incensed by the language of Themistocles, lifted up \nhis stick to strike him, whereupon the Athenian exclaimed, \n" Strike, but hear me ! " Themistocles repeated his arguments and \n\n\n\n64 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VIII. \n\n\n\nentreaties; and at length threatened that lie and the Athenians \nwould sail away to Italy and there found a new city, if the \nPeloponnesians still determined to retreat. Eurybiades now gave \nway and issued orders for the fleet to remain and fight at Salamis ; \nbut the Peloponnesians obeyed the order with reluctance. A \nthird council was summoned : and Themistocles, perceiving that \nthe decision of the assembly would be against Mm, determined to \neffect his object by stratagem. He secretly despatched a trusty \nslPvve with a message to Xerxes, representing the dissensions which \nprevailed in the Grecian fleet, and how easy a matter it would be \nto surround and vanquish an armament both small and disunited. \nXerxes readily adopted the suggestion, and ordered his captains \nto close up the straits of Salamis at both ends during the night. \nOn the council assembling in the morning, Aristides arrived with \nthe news that the Grecian fleet was completely surrounded by \nthat of the Persians, and that retreat was no longer possible. \nAs the veil of night rolled gradually away, the Persian fleet was \ndiscovered stretching as far as the eye could reach along the coast \nof Attica. The Grecian fleet, being concentrated in the harbour \nof Salamis, was thus surrounded by the Persians. Xerxes had \ncaused a lofty throne to be erected upon one of the projecting \ndeclivities of Mount iEgaleos, opposite the harbour of Salamis, \nwhence he could survey the combat, and stimulate by his presence \nthe courage of his men. \n\nAs a battle was now inevitable the Grecian commanders lost no \ntime in making preparations for the encounter. The Greek \nseamen embarked with alacrity, encouraging one another to deliver \ntheir country, their wives, and children, and the temples of their \ngods, from the grasp of the barbarians. History has preserved \nto us but few details of the engagement. The Persian fleet, \nwith the exception of some of the Ionic contingents, fought with \ncourage. But the very numbers on which they so confidently \nrelied, proved one of the chief causes of their defeat. Too \ncrowded either to advance or to retreat, their oars broken or \nimpeded by collision with one another, their fleet lay like an inert \nand lifeless mass upon the water, and fell an easy prey to the \nGreeks. A single incident will illustrate the terror and confusion \nwinch reigned among the Persians. Artemisia, queen of Hali- \ncarnassus in Caria, distinguished herself in it by deeds of daring \nbravery. At length she turned and fled, pursued by an Athenian \ngalley. Full in her course lay the vessel of a Carian prince. \nInstead of avoiding, she struck and sunk it, sending her country- \nman and all his crew to the bottom . The captain of the Athenian \ngalley, believing from this act that she was a deserter from the \n\n\n\nB C. 480. \n\n\n\nRETREAT OF XERXES. \n\n\n\n65 \n\n\n\nPersian cause, suffered her to escape. Xerxes, who from his lofty \nthrone beheld the feat of the Halicarnassian queen, but who \nimagined that the sunken ship belonged to the Greeks, was filled \nwith admiration at her courage, and exclaimed \xe2\x80\x94 "My men are \nbecome women, my women men ! " \n\nTwo hundred of the Persian ships were destroyed and sunk, \nwhen night put an end to the engagement. But notwithstanding \nthis loss the fleet was still formidable by its numbers. The \nGreeks themselves did not regard the victory as decisive, and \nprepared to renew the combat. But the pusillanimity of Xerxes \nrelieved them from all further anxiety. He became alarmed \nfor his own personal safety ; and his whole care was now centred \non securing his retreat by land. The best troops were disembarked \nfrom the ships, and marched towards the Hellespont, in order to \nsecure the bridge, whilst the fleet itself was ordered to make \nfor Asia. These dispositions of Xerxes were prompted by Mar- \ndonius. He represented to his master that the defeat, after ail, \nwas but slight ; that having attained one of the great objects of the \nexpedition by the capture of Athens, he might now retire with \nhonour, and even with glory ; and that for the rest he (Mardonius) \nwould undertake to complete the conquest of Greece with 300,000 \nmen. "While the Persian fleet sailed towards Asia, Xerxes set out \n\n\n\n\nPlan or the Battle of Snlainfs \n\nF \n\n\n\n66 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VIII \n\n\n\non his homeward march. In Thessaly Mardonius selected the \n300,000 men with whom he proposed to conclude the war ; but as \nautumn was now approaching, he resolved to postpone all further \noperations till the spring. \n\nAfter forty-five days\' march from Attica, Xerxes again reached \nthe shores of the Hellespont, with a force greatly diminished by \nfamine and pestilence. On the Hellespont he found his fleet, but \nthe bridge had been washed away by storms. Landed on the \nshores of Asia, the Persian army at length obtained abundance \nof provisions, and contracted new maladies by the sudden change \nfrom privation to excess. Thus terminated this mighty but \nunsuccessful expedition. \n\nGreece owed its salvation to one man \xe2\x80\x94 Themistocles. This was \nvirtually admitted by the leaders of the other Grecian states, when \nthey assembled to assign the prizes of wisdom and couduct. Upon \nthe altar of Poseidon, at the isthmus of Corinth, each chief \ndeposited a ticket inscribed with two names, of those whom \nhe considered entitled to the first and second prizes. But in this \nadjudication vanity and self-love defeated their own objects. Each \ncommander had put down his own name for the first prize : for the \nsecond, a great majority preponderated in favour of Themistocles. \nFrom the Spartans, also, Themistocles received the honours due to \nhis merit. A crown of olive was conferred upon him, together with \none of the most splendid chariots which the city could produce. \n\nOn the very same day on which the Persians were defeated \nat Salatnis the Sicilian Greeks also obtained a victory over \nthe Carthaginians. There is reason to believe that the invasion of \nSicily by the Carthaginians was concerted with Xerxes, and that \nthe simultaneous attack on two distinct Grecian peoples, by two \nimmense armaments, was not merely the result of chance. Gelon, \nthe powerful ruler of Syracuse, defeated Hamilcar, the Carthagi- \nnian general, with the loss it is said of 150,000 men. \n\nIn the spring of b.c. 479 Mardonius prepared to open the cam- \npaign. He was not without hopes of inducing the Athenians to \njoin the Persian alliance, and he despatched Alexander, king of \nMacedon. to conciliate the Athenians, now partially re-established \nin their dilapidated city. His offers on the part of the Persians \nwere of the most seductive kind ; but the Athenians dismissed \nirim with a positive refusal, whilst to the Lacedaemonians they \nprotested that no temptations, however great, should ever induce \nthem to desert the common cause of Greece and freedom. In \nreturn for this disinterested conduct all they asked was that a \nPeloponnesian army should be sent into Bceotia for the defence \ncf the Attic frontier : a request which the Spartan envoys promised \n\n\n\nB.C. 479. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF PLATM. \n\n\n\n67 \n\n\n\nto fulfil. No sooner, however, had they returned into their own \ncountry than this promise was completely forgotten. \n\nWhen Mardonius was informed that the Athenians had rejected \nhis proposal, he immediately marched against Athens, accompanied \nby all his Grecian allies j and in May or June, B.C. 479, about ten \nmonths after the retreat of Xerxes, the Persians again occupied \nthat city. With feelings of bitter indignation against their faith- \nless allies, the Athenians saw themselves once more compelled \nto remove to Salamis. Mardonius took: advantage of his situation \nto endeavour once more to win them to his alliance. Through a \nHellespontine Greek, the same favourable conditions were again \noffered to them, but were again refused. One voice alone, that of \nthe senator Lycidas, broke the unanimity of the assembly. But \nhis opposition cost him his life. He and his family were stoned to \ndeath by the excited populace. In this desperate condition the \nAthenians sent ambassadors to the Spartans to remonstrate \nagainst their breach of faith, and to intimate that necessity might \nat length compel them to listen to the proposals of the enemy. \nThe Spartans became alarmed. That very night 5000 citizens, \neach attended by seven Helots, were despatched to the frontiers ; \nand Ihese were shortly followed by 5000 Lacedaemonian Periceei, \neach attended by one light-armed Helot. Never before had the \nSpartans sent so large a force into the field. Their example was \nfollowed by other Peloponnesian cities ; and the Athenian envoys \nreturned to Salamis with the joyful news that a large army was \npreparing to march against the enemy, under the command of \nPausanias, who acted as regent for the infant son of Leonidas. \n\nMardonius, on learning the approach of the Lacedaemonians, \nabandoned Attica and crossed into Boeotia. He finally took up a \nposition on the left bank of the Asopus, and not far from the town \nof Plataea. Here he caused a camp to be constructed of ten fur- \nlongs square, and fortified with barricades and towers. Meanwhile \nthe Grecian army continued to receive reinforcements from the \ndifferent states, and by the time it reached Boeotia it formed a \ngrand total of about 110,000 men. After several days\' manoeuvring \na general battle took place near Plataea. The light-armed undis- \nciplined Persians, whose bodies were unprotected by armour, main- \ntained a very unequal combat against the serried ranks, the long \nspears, and the mailed bodies of the Spartan phalanx. Mardonius, \nat the head of his body-guard of 1000 picked men, and conspicuous \nby his white charger, was among the foremost in the fight, till \nstruck down by the hand of a Spartan. The fall of their general \nwas the signal for flight to the Persians, already wearied and dis- \nheartened by the fruitless contest ; nor did they once stop till \n\nF 2 \n\n\n\n63 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. VIII. \n\n\n\ntliey had again crossed the Asopus and reached their fortified \ncamp. The glory of having defeated the Persians at Platsea rests \nwith the Lacedaemonians, since the Athenians were engaged in \nanother part of the field with the Thebans. After repulsing the \nThebans, the Athenians joined the Lacedaemonians, who had pur- \nsued the Persians as far as their fortified camp. Upon the arrival \nof the Athenians the barricades were stormed and carried, after a \ngallant resistance on the part of the Persians. The camp became \na scene of the most horrible carnage. The Persian loss was im- \nmense, while that of the Greeks seems not to have exceeded 1300 \nor 1400 men. \n\nIt remained to bury the dead and divide the booty, and so great \nwas the task that ten days were consumed in it. The booty was \nample and magnificent. Gold and silver coined, as well as in plate \nand trinkets, rich vests and carpets, ornamented arms, horses, \ncamels \xe2\x80\x94 in a word, all the magnificence of Eastern luxury. The \nfailure of the Persian expedition was completed by the destruction \nof their naval armament. Leotychides, the Spartan admiral, having \nsailed across the ^Egean, found the Persian fleet at Mycale, a pro- \nmontory of Asia Minor near Miletus. Their former reverses seem \ncompletely to have discouraged the Persians from hazarding \nanother naval engagement. The ships were hauled ashore and \nsurrounded with a rampart, whilst an army of 60,000 Persians lined \nthe coast for their defence. The Greeks landed on the very day \non which the battle of Plataea was fought. A supernatural pre- \nsentiment of that decisive victory, conveyed by a herald\'s stafi; \nwhich floated over \'the iEgean from the shores of Greece, is said \nto have pervaded the Grecian ranks at Mycale as they marched to \nthe attack. The Persians did not long resist : they turned their \nbacks and fled to their fortifications, pursued by the Greeks, who \nentered them almost simultaneously. A large number of the \nPersians perished ; and the victory was rendered still more de- \ncisive by the burning of the fleet. \n\nThe Grecian fleet now sailed towards the Hellespont with the \nview of destroying the bridge ; but hearing that it no longer ex- \nisted, Leotychides departed homewards with the Peloponnesian \nvessels. Xanthippus, however, the Athenian commander, seized \nthe opportunity to recover from the Persians the Thracian Cher- \nsonese, which had long been an Athenian possession ; and proceeded \nto blockade Sestos, the key of the strait. This city surrendered in \nthe autumn, after a protracted siege, whereupon the Athenians \nreturned home, carrying with them the cables of the bridge across \nthe Hellespont, which were afterwards preserved in the Acropolis \nas a trophy. \n\n\n\nThe Parthenon in its present state \n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX. \n\nFROM THE END OF THE PERSIAN WARS TO THE BEGINNING OF \nTHE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, B.C. 479-431. \n\nThe Athenians, on their return to Attica, after the defeat of the \nPersians, found their city ruined and their country desolate. They \nbegan to rebuild their city on a larger scale than before, and to \nfortify it with a wall. Those allies to whom the increasing mari- \ntime power of Athens was an object of suspicion, and especially \nthe iEginetans, to whom it was more particularly formidable, be- \nheld her rising fortifications with dismay. They endeavoured to \ninspire the Lacedemonians with their fears, and urged them to \narrest the work. But though Sparta shared the jealousy of the \nallies, she could not with any decency interfere by force to prevent \na friendly city from exercising a right inherent in all independent \nstates. She assumed therefore the hypocritical garb of an adviser \nand counsellor. Concealing her jealousy under the pretence of \nzeal for the common interests of Greece, she represented to the \nAthenians that, in the event of another Persian invasion, fortified \ntowns would serve the enemy for camps and strongholds, as Thebes \nhad done in the last war ; and proposed that the Athenians should \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IX. \n\n\n\nnot only desist from completing their own fortifications, but help \nto demolish those which already existed in other towns. \n\nThe object of the proposal was too transparent to deceive so \nacute a statesman as Themistocles. Athens was not yet, however, \nin a condition to incur the danger of openly rejecting it ; and he \ntherefore advised the Athenians to dismiss the Spartan envoys \nwith the assurance that they would send ambassadors to Sparta to \nexplain their views. He then caused himself to be appointed one \nof these ambassadors ; and setting off straightway for Sparta, di- \nrected his colleagues to linger behind as long as possible. At Sparta, \nthe absence of his colleagues, at which he affected to be surprised, \nafforded him an excuse for not demanding an audience of the \nephors. During the interval thus gained, the whole population of \nAthens, of both sexes and every age, worked day and night at the \nwalls, which, when the other ambassadors at length arrived at \nSparta, had attained a height sufficient to afford a tolerable de- \nfence. Meanwhile the suspicions of the Spartans had been more \nthan once aroused by messages from the iEginetans respecting the \nprogress of the walls. Themistocles, however, positively denied \ntheir statements ; and urged the Spartans to send messengers of \ntheir own to Athens in order to learn the true state of affairs, at \nthe same time instructing the Athenians to detain them as hostages \nfor the safety of himself and colleagues. When there was no \nlonger any motive for concealment, Themistocles openly avowed \nthe progress of the works, and his intention of securing the inde- \npendence of Athens, and enabling her to act for herself. The walls \nbeing now too far advanced to be easily taken, the Spartans found \nthemselves compelled to acquiesce, and the works were completed \nwithout further hindrance. \n\nHaving thus secured the city from all danger of an immediate \nattack, Themistocles pursued his favourite project of rendering \nAthens the greatest maritime and commercial power of Greece. \nHe erected a town round the harbour of Piraeus, distant between \nfour and five miles from Athens, and enclosed it with a wall as large \nin extent as the city itself, but of vastly greater height and thick- \nness. Meanwhile an event occurred which secured more firmly \nthan ever the maritime supremacy of Athens, by transferring to \nher the command of the allied fleet. \n\nIn the year after the battle of Platsea a fleet had been fitted out \nand placed under the command of the Spartan regent* Pausanias, \nin order to carry on the war against the Persians. After delivering \nmost of the Grecian towns in Cyprus from the Persians, this arma- \nment sailed up the Bosporus and laid siege to Byzantium, which \nwas garrisoned by a large Persian force. The town surrendered \n\n\n\nB.C. 478. \n\n\n\nCONFEDERACY OF DEL OS. \n\n\n\n71 \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0after a protracted siege ; but it was during this expedition that \nthe conduct of the Spartan commander struck a fatal blow at the \ninterests of his country. \n\nThe immense booty, as well as the renown, which Pausanias had \nacquired at Platsea, had filled him with pride and ambition. Aftes \nthe capture of Byzantium he despatched a letter to Xerxes, offering \nto marry the king\'s daughter, and to bring Sparta and the rest of \nGreece under his dominion. Xerxes was highly delighted with \nthis letter, and sent a reply in which he urged Pausanias to pur- \nsue his project night and day, and promised to supply him with all \nthe money and troops that might be needful for its execution. \nBut the childish vanity of Pausanias betrayed his plot before it \nwas ripe for execution. Elated by the confidence of Xerxes, and \nby the money with which he was lavishly supplied, he acted as if \nhe had already married the Great King\'s daughter. He assumed \nthe Persian dress ; he made a progress through Thrace, attended \nby Persian and Egyptian guards ; and copied, in the luxury of his \ntable and the dissoluteness of his manners, the example of his \nadopted country. Above all, he offended the allies by his haughty \nreserve and imperiousness. His designs were now too manifest to \nescape attention. His proceedings reached the ears of the Spar- \ntans, who sent out Doreis to supersede him. Disgusted by the in- \nsolence of Pausanias, the Ionians serving in the combined Grecian \nfleet addressed themselves to Aristides, whose manners formed a \nstriking contrast to those of the Spartan leader, and begged him \nto assume the command. This request was made precisely at \nthe time when Pausanias was recalled ; and accordingly, when \nDorcis arrived, he found Aristides in command of the combined \nfleet (b.c. 478). \n\nThis event was not a mere empty question about a point of \nhonour. It was a real revolution, terminated by a solemn league, \nof which Athens was to be the head. Aristides took the lead in \nthe matter, for which his proverbial justice and probity eminently \nqualified him. The league obtained the name of " the Confederacy \nof Delos," from its being arranged that deputies of the allies be- \nlonging to it should meet periodically for deliberation in the temple \nof Apollo and Artemis (Diana) in that island. Each state was \nassessed in a certain contribution, either of money or ships, as pro- \nposed by the Athenians and ratified by the synod. The assessment \nwas intrusted to Aristides, whose impartiality was universally ap- \nplauded. Of the details, however, we only know that the first \nassessment amounted to 460 talents (about 106,000Z. sterling), \nthat certain officers called Hellenotamise were appointed by the \n\n\n\n72 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. IX. \n\n\n\nAthenians to collect and administer the contributions, and that \nBelos was the treasury. \n\nSuch was the origin of the Confederacy of Delos. Soon after its \nfoimation Aristides was succeeded in the command of the com- \nbined tleet by Cimon, the son of Miltiades. \n\nPausanias, on his return to Sparta, seems to have been acquitted \nof any definite charges ; but he continued his correspondence with \nPersia, and an accident at length afforded convincing proofs of his \nguilt. A favourite slave, to whom he had intrusted a letter to the \nPersian satrap at Sardis, observed with dismay that none of the \nmessengers employed in this service bad ever returned. Gloved \nby these fears, he broke the seal and read the letter, and finding \nIns suspicions of the fate that awaited him confirmed, he carried \nthe document to the ephors. But in ancient states the testimony \nof a slave was always regarded with suspicion. The ephors re- \nfused to believe the evidence offered to them unless confirmed by \ntheir own ears. For this purpose they directed him to plant him- \nself as a suppliant in a sacred grove near Cape Tsenarus, in a hut \nbehind which two of their body might conceal themselves. Pau- \nsanias, as they had expected, anxious at the step taken by his \nslave, hastened to the spot to question him about it. The con- \nversation which ensued, and which was overheard by the ephors, \nrendered the guilt of Pausanias no longer doubtful. They now \ndetermined to arrest him on his return to Sparta. They met him \nin the street near the temple of Athena Chalcicecus (of the Brazen \nHouse), when Pausanias, either alarmed by his guilty conscience, \nor put on his .guard by a secret signal from one of the ephors, \nturned and fled to the temple, where he took refuge in a small \nchamber belonging to the building. From this sanctuary it was \nunlawful to drag him ; but the ephors caused the doors to be built \nup and the roof to be removed, and his own mother is said to have \nplaced the first stone at the doors. When at the point of death \nfrom starvation, he was carried from the sanctuary before he pol- \nluted it with his corpse. Such was the end of the victor of Plataca. \nAfter his death proofs were discovered among his papers that The- \nmistocles was implicated in his guilt. But in order to follow the \nfortunes of the Athenian statesman, it is necessary to take a glance \nat the internal history of Athens. \n\nThe ancient rivalry between Themistocles and Aristides had \nbeen in a good degree extinguished by the danger which threat- \nened their common country during the Persian wars. Aristides \nhad since abandoned his former prejudices, and was willing to \nconform to many of the democratical innovations of tea rival. The \n\n\n\nB.C. 471. BANISHMENT OF THEMISTOCLES. \n\n\n\n73 \n\n\n\neffect of this was to produce, soon after their return to Attica, a \nstill further modification of the constitution of Clisthenes. The \nThetes, the lowest of the four classes of Athenian citizens, were \ndeclared eligible for the magistracy, from which they had been \nexcluded by the laws of Solon. Thus not only the archonship, \nbut consequently the Council of Areopagus, was thrown open to \nthem ; and, strange to say, this reform was proposed by Aristides \nhimself. \n\nNevertheless party spirit still ran high at Athens. Cimon and \nAlcmseon were violent opponents of Themistocles, and of their \nparty Aristides was still the head. The popularity of Aristides \nwas never greater than at the present time, owing not only to the \nmore liberal spirit which he exhibited, but also to his great services \nin establishing the Confederacy of Delos. Themistocles had \noffended the Athenians by his ostentation and vanity. He was \ncontinually boasting of his services to the state ; but worse than \nall this, his conduct was stained with positive guilt. Whilst, at the \nhead of an Athenian squadron, he was sailing among the Greek \nislands for the ostensible purpose of executing justice, there is \nlittle room to doubt that he corrupted its very source by accepting \nlarge sums of money from the cities which he visited. Party spirit \nat length reached such a height that it was found necessary to \nresort to ostracism, and Themistocles was condemned to a tem- \nporary banishment (b.c. 471). He retired to Argos, where he was \nresiding when the Spartans called upon the Athenians to prosecute \ntheir great statesman before a synod of the allies assembled at \nSparta, on the ground of treasonable correspondence with Persia. \nAccordingly joint envoys were sent from Athens and Sparta to \narrest him (b.c. 466). Themistocles avoided the impending danger \nby flying from Argos to Corcyra. The Corcyrseans, however, not \ndaring to shelter him, he passed over to the continent ; where, being \nstill pursued, he was forced to seek refuge at the court of Admetus, \nking of the Molossians, though the latter was his personal enemy. \nFortunately, Admetus happened to be from home. The forlorn \ncondition of Themistocles excited the compassion of the wife of \nthe Molossian king, who placed her child in his arms, and bade \nhim seat himself on the hearth as a suppliant. As soon as the \nking arrived, Themistocles explained his peril, and adjured him \nby the sacred laws of hospitality not to take vengeance upon a \nfallen foe. Admetus accepted his appeal, and raised him from the \nhearth ; he refused to deliver him up to his pursuers, and at last \nonly dismissed him on his own expressed desire to proceed to \nPersia. After many perils, Themistocles succeeded in reaching in \nsafety the coast of Asia. Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, was now \n\n\n\n74 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IX. \n\n\n\nupon the throne of Persia, and to him Theniistocles hastened to \nannounce himself. The king was delighted at his arrival, and \ntreated him with the greatest distinction. In a year\'s time, The- \nniistocles, having acquired a sufficient knowledge of the Persian \nlanguage to be able to converse in it, entertained Artaxerxes with \nmagnificent schemes for the subjugation of Greece. Artaxerxes \nloaded him with presents, gave him a Persian wife, and appointed \nMagnesia, a town not far from the Ionian coast, as his place of \nresidence. After living there some time he was carried off by dis- \nease at the age of sixty-five, without having realised, or apparently \nattempted, any of those plans with which he had dazzled the Persian \nmonarch. Eumour ascribed his death to poison, which he took of \nhis own accord, from a consciousness of his inability to perform his \npromises I but this report, which was current in the time of Thu- \ncydides, is rejected by that historian. \n\nAristides died about four years after the banishment of The- \nmistocles. The common accounts of his poverty are probably ex- \naggerated, and seem to have been founded on the circumstances \nof a public funeral, and of handsome donations made to his three \nchildren by the state. But whatever his property may have been, \nit is at least certain that he did not acquire or increase it by un- \nlawful means ; and not even calumny has ventured to assail his \nwell-earned title of the Just. \n\nOn the death of Aristides, Chnon became the undisputed leader \nof the conservative party at Athens. Cimon was generous, affable, \nmagnificent ; and, notwithstanding his political views, of exceedingly \npopular manners. He had inherited the military genius of his \nfather, and was undoubtedly the greatest commander of his time. \nHe employed the vast wealth acquired in his expeditions in \nadorning Athens and gratifying his fellow-citizens. It has been \nalready mentioned that he succeeded Aristides in the command of \nthe allied fleet. His first exploits were the capture of Eion on \nthe Strymon, and the reduction of the island of Scyros \'b.c. 476). \nA few years afterwards we find the first symptoms of discontent \namong the members of the Confederacy of Delos. Xaxos, one of \nthe confederate islands, and the largest of the Cyclades, revolted \nin e.g. 466, probably from a feeling of the growing oppressiveness \nof the Athenian headship. It was immediately invested by the \nconfederate fleet, reduced, and made tributary to Athens. This \nwas another step towards dominion gained by the Athenians, whose \npretensions were assisted by the imprudence of the allies. Many \nof the smaller states belonging to the confederacy, wearied with \nperpetual hostilities, commuted for a money payment the ships \nwhich they were bound to supply ; and thus, by depriving them- \n\n\n\nB.C. 464. \n\n\n\nTHIRD MESSEMAN WAR. \n\n\n\n75 \n\n\n\nselves of a navy, lost the only means by which they could assert \ntheir independence. \n\nThe same year was marked by a memorable action against the \nPersians. Cimon, at the head of 200 Atlienian triremes, and \n100 furnished by the allies, proceeded to the coast of Asia Minor. \nThe Persians had assembled a large fleet and army at the mouth of \nthe river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. After speedily defeating the \nfleet, Cimon landed his men and marched against the Persian \narmy, which was drawn up on the shore to protect the fleet. The \nland-force fought with bravery, but was at length put to the rout. \n\nThe island of Thasos was the next member of the confederacy \nagainst which the Athenians directed their arms. After a siege of \nmore than two years that island surrendered, when its fortifications \nwere razed, and it was condemned to pay tribute (b.c. 463). \n\nThe expedition to Thasos was attended with a circumstance \nwhich first gives token of the coming hostilities between Sparta \nand Athens. At an early period of the blockade the Thasians \nsecretly applied to the Lacedaemonians to make a diversion in their \nfavour by invading Attica : and though the Lacedaemonians were \nstill ostensibly allied with Athens, they were base enough to comply \nwith this request. Their treachery, however, was prevented by a \nterrible calamity which befel themselves. In the year b.c. 464 their \ncapital was visited by an earthquake which laid it in ruins and \nkilled 20,000 of the citizens. But this was only part of the calamity. \nThe earthquake was immediately followed by a revolt of the Helots, \nwho were always ready to avail themselves of the weakness of their \ntyrants. Being joined by the Messenians, they fortified themselves \nin Mount Ithome in Messenia. Hence this revolt is sometimes \ncalled the Third Messenian War (b.c. 464). After two or three \nyears spent in a vain attempt to dislodge them from this position, \nthe Lacedaemonians found themselves obliged to call in the assist- \nance of their allies, and, among the rest, of the Athenians. It was \nwith great difficulty that Cimon persuaded the Athenians to com- \nply with this request ; but he was at length despatched to La- \nconia with a force of 4000 hoplites. The aid of the Athenians \nhad been requested by the Lacedaemonians on account of their ac- \nknowledged superiority in the art of attacking fortified places. As, \nhowever, Cimon did not succeed in dislodging the Helots from \nIthome, the Lacedaemonians, probably from a consciousness of their \nown treachery in the affair of Thasos, suspected that the Athenians \nwere playing them false, and abruptly dismissed them, saying that \nthey had no longer any occasion for their services. This rude dis- \nmissal gave great offence at Athens, and annihilated for a time the \npolitical influence of Cimon. The democratical party had from the \n\n\n\n7 6 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IX. \n\n\n\nfirst opposed the expedition ; and it afforded them a great triumph \nto be able to point to Cimon returning not only unsuccessful but \ninsulted. That party was now led by Pericles. A sort of hereditary \nfeud existed between Pericles and Cimon ; for it was Xanthippus, \nthe father of Pericles, who had impeached Miltiades, the father of \nCimon. The character of Pericles was almost the reverse of Cimon\'s. \nAlthough the leader of the popular party, his manners were reserved. \nHe appeared but little in society, and only in public upon great \noccasions. His mind had received the highest polish which that \nperiod was capable of giving. He constantly conversed with Anax- \nagoras, Protagoras, Zeno, and other eminent philosophers. To oratory \nin particular he had devoted much attention, as an indispensable \ninstrument for swaying the public assemblies of Athens. \n\nPericles seized the occasion presented by the ill success of Cimon, \nboth to ruin that leader and to strike a fatal blow at the aristo- \ncratieal party. He deprived the Areopagus of its chief functions, \nand left it a mere shadow of its former influence and power. He \nrendered the election to magistracies dependent simply upon lot, so \nthat every citizen, however poor, had an equal chance of obtaining \nthe honours of the state. Other changes which accompanied this \nrevolution \xe2\x80\x94 for such it must be called \xe2\x80\x94 were the institution of paid \ndicasteries or jury-courts, and the almost entire abrogation of the \njudicial power of the Senate of Five Hundred. It cannot be sup- \nposed that such fundamental changes were effected without violent \nparty strife. The poet JEschylus, in the tragedy of the Eumenides, \nin vain exerted all the powers of his genius in support of the aris- \ntocratical party and of the tottering Areopagus ; his exertions on \nthis occasion resulted only in his own flight from Athens. The \nsame fate attended Cimon himself; and he was condemned b> \nostracism (b.c. 461) to a ten years\' banishment. Kay, party vio- \nlence even went the length of assassination. Ephialtes, who had \ntaken the lead in the attacks upon the Areopagus, fell beneath \nthe dagger of a Boeotian, hired by the conservative party to de- \nspatch him. \n\nIt was from this period (b.c. 461) that the long administration of \nPericles maybe said to have commenced. The effects of his acces- \nsion to power soon became visible in the foreign relations of Athens. \nPericles had succeeded to the political principles of Themistocles, \nand his aim was to render Athens the leading power of Greece. \nThe Confederacy of Delos had already secured her maritime \nascendency ; Pericles directed his policy to the extension of her \ninfluence in continental Greece. She formed an alliance with the \nThessalians, Argos, and Megara. The possession of Megara was \nof great importance, as it enabled the Athenians to arrest the pro- \n\n\n\nB.C. 448. \n\n\n\nPREDOMINANCE OF ATHENS. \n\n\n\n77 \n\n\n\ngress of an invading army from Peloponnesus. iEgina, so long the \nmaritime rival of Athens, was subdued and made tributary. The \nAthenians marched with rapid steps to the dominion of Greece. \nShortly afterwards the battle of (Enophyta (b.c. 456), in which \nthe Athenians defeated the Boeotians, gave Athens the command of \nThebes, and of all the other Boeotian towns. From the gulf of \nCorinth to the straits of Thermopylae Athenian influence was now \npredominant. During these events the Athenians had continued to \nprosecute the war against Persia. In the year b.c. 460 they sent a \npowerful fleet to Egypt to assist Inarus, who had revolted against \nPersia ; but this expedition proved a complete failure, for at the \nend of six years the revolt was put down by the Persians, and the \nAthenian fleet destroyed (b.c. 455). At a later period (b.c. 449) \nCimon, who had been recalled from exile, sailed to Cyprus with a \nfleet of 200 ships. He undertook the siege of Citium in that island ; \nbut died during the progress of it, either from disease or from the \neffects of a wound. Shortly afterwards a pacification was concluded \nwith Persia, which is sometimes, but erroneously, called " the peace \nof Cimon." It is stated that by this compact the Persian monarch \nagreed not to tax or molest the Greek colonies on the coast of Asia \nMinor, nor to send any vessels of war westward of Phaselis in Lycia, \nor within the Cyanean rocks at the junction of the Euxine with \nthe Thracian Bosporus ; the Athenians on their side undertaking to \nleave the Persians in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. \nDuring the progress of these events, the states which formed the \nConfederacy of Delos, with the exception of Chios, Lesbos, and \nSamos, had gradually become, instead of the active allies of Athens, \nher disarmed and passive tributaries. Even the custody of the fund \nhad been transferred from Delos to Athens. The purpose for which \nthe confederacy had been originally organised disappeared with the \nPersian peace ; yet what may now be called Imperial Athens con- \ntinued, for her own ends, to exercise her prerogatives as head of \nthe league. Her alliances, as we have seen, had likewise been ex- \ntended in continental Greece, where they embraced Megara, Boeotia, \nPhocis, Locris ; together with Troezen and Achaia in Peloponnesus. \nSuch was the position of Athens in the year 448 B.C., the period of \nher greatest power and prosperity. From this time her empire \nbegan to decline ; whilst Sparta, and other watchful and jealous \nenemies, stood ever ready to strike a blow. \n\nIn the following year (b.c. 447) a revolution in Boeotia deprived \nAthens of her ascendency in that country. With an overweening \ncontempt of their enemies, a small band of 1000 Athenian hoplites, \nchiefly composed of youthful volunteers belonging to the best \nAthenian families, together with a few auxiliaries, marched under \n\n\n\n78 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IX. \n\n\n\nthe command of Tolmides to put down the revolt, in direct oppo- \nsition to the advice of Pericles, who adjured them to wait and col- \nlect a more numerous force. The enterprise proved disastrous in \nthe extreme. Tolmides was defeated and slain near Chseronea ; a \nlarge number of the hoplites also fell in the engagement, whilst a \nstill larger number were taken prisoners. This last circumstance \nproved fatal to the interests of Athens in Bceotia. In order to re- \ncover these prisoners, she agreed to evacuate Bceotia, and to permit \nthe re-establishment of the aristocracies which she had formerly \noverthrown. But the Athenian reverses did not end here. The ex- \npulsion of the partisans of Athens from the government of Phocis and \nLocris, and the revolt of Eubcea and Megara, were announced in \nquick succession. The youthful Pleistoanax, king of Sparta, actually \npenetrated, with an army of Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesian \nallies, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis ; and the capital itself, \nit is said, was saved only by Pericles having bribed the Spartan mon- \narch. Pericles reconquered Eubcea; but this was the only possession \nwhich the Athenians succeeded in recovering. Their empire on \nland had vanished more speedily than it had been acquired ; and \nthey were therefore induced to conclude, at the beginning of B.C. 445, \na Thirty - Years\' Truce with Sparta and her allies, by which they \nconsented to abandon all the acquisitions which they had made in \nPeloponnesus, and to leave Megara to be included among the Pelo- \nponnesian allies of Sparta. \n\nFrom the Thirty Years\' Truce to the commencement of the Pelo- \nponnesian war, few political events of any importance occurred. \nDuring these fourteen years (b.c. 445-431) Pericles continued to \nenjoy the sole direction of affairs. His views were of the most \nlofty kind. Athens was to become the capital of Greece, and the \ncentre of art and refinement. In her external appearance the \ncity was to be rendered worthy of the high position to which she \naspired, by the beauty and splendour of her public buildings, by \nher works of art in sculpture, architecture, and painting, and by \nthe pomp and magnificence of her religious festivals. All these \nobjects Athens was enabled to attain in an incredibly short space \nof time, through the genius and energy of her citizens and the \nvast resources at her command. No state has ever exhibited so \nmuch intellectual activity and so great a progress in art as was \ndisplayed by Athens in the period which elapsed between the \nThirty Years\' Truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian \nwar. She was the seat and centre of Grecian literature. The \nthree great tragic poets of Greece were natives of Attica. iEschyius, \nthe earliest of the three, had recently died in Sicily; but Sophocles \nwas now at the full height of his reputation, and Euripides \n\n\n\nB.C. 440. \n\n\n\nPERICLES. \n\n\n\n79 \n\n\n\nwas rapidly rising into notice. Aristophanes, the greatest of the \nGrecian comic poets, was also born in Attica, and exhibited plays \nsoon after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Herodotus, \nthe Father of History, though a native of Halicarnassus in Asia \nMinor, resided some time at Athens, and accompanied a colony \nwhich the Athenians sent to Thurii in Italy. Thucydides, the \ngreatest of Greek historians, was an Athenian, and was a young \nman at this period. \n\nColonization, for which the genius and inclination of the \nAthenians had always been suited, was another method adopted \nby Pericles for extending the influence and empire of Athens \nThe settlements made under his auspices were of two kinds. \nClerucMes, and regular colonies. The former mode was exclusively \nAthenian. It consisted in the allotment of land in conquered or \nsubject countries to certain bodies of Athenians, who continued to \nretain all then- original rights of citizenship. This circumstance, \nas well as the convenience of entering upon land already in a state \nof cultivation, instead of having to reclaim it from the rude condi- \ntion of nature, seems to have rendered such a mode of settlement \nmuch preferred by the Athenians. The earliest instance which we \nfind of it is in the year B.C. 506, when four thousand Athenians \nentered upon the domains of the Chalcidian knights (see p. 38), \nBut it was under Pericles that this system was most extensively \nadopted. During his administration 1000 Athenian citizens were \nsettled in the Thracian Chersonese, 500 in Naxos, and 250 in \nAndros. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, as well as a \nlarge tract in the north of Euboea, were also completely occupied \nby Athenian proprietors. \n\nThe most important colonies settled by Pericles were those of \nThurii and Amphipolis. Since the destruction of Sybaris by the \nCrotoniates, in b.c. 509, the former inhabitants had lived dispersed \nin the adjoining territory along the gulf of Tarentum. In b.c. 443 \nPericles sent out a colony to found Thurii, near the site of the \nancient Sybaris. The colony of Amphipolis was founded some \nyears later (b.c. 437), under the conduct of Agnon. \n\nBut Pericles, notwithstanding his influence and power, had still \nmany bitter and active enemies, who assailed him through his \nprivate connections, and even endeavoured to wound his honour by \na charge of peculation. Pericles, after divorcing a wife with whom \nhe had lived unhappily, took his mistress Aspasia to his house, and \ndwelt with her till his death on terms of the greatest affection. \nShe was distinguished not only for her beauty, but also for her \nlearning and accomplishments. Her intimacy with Anaxagoras, \nthe celebrated Ionic philosopher, was made a handle for wounding \n\n\n\n80 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IX. \n\n\n\nPericles in his tenderest relations. Paganism, notwithstanding its \nlicence, was capable of producing bigots : and even at Athens the \nman who ventured to dispute the existence of a hundred gods with \nmorals and passions somewhat worse than those of ordinary human \nnature, did so at the risk of his life. Anaxagoras was indicted for \nimpiety. Aspasia was included in the same charge, and dragged \nbefore the courts of justice. Anaxagoras prudently fled from \nAthens, and thus probably avoided a fate which in consequence of \na similar accusation afterwards overtook Socrates. Pericles him- \nself pleaded the cause of Aspasia. He was indeed indirectly im- \nplicated in the indictmont ; but he felt no concern except for his \nbeloved Aspasia, and on this occasion the cold and somewhat \nhaughty statesman, whom the most violent storms of the assembly \ncould not deprive of his self-possession, was for once seen to weep. \nHis appeal to the jury was successful, but another trial still awaited \nhim. An indictment was preferred against his friend, the great \nsculptor Phidias, for embezzlement of the gold intended to adorn \nthe celebrated ivory statue of Athena; and according to some, \nPericles himself was included in the charge of peculation. Whether \nPericles was ever actually tried on this accusation is uncertain ; \nbut at all events, if he was, there can be no doubt that he was \nhonourably acquitted. The gold employed in the statue had been \nfixed in such a manner that it could be detached and weighed, and \nPericles challenged his accusers to the proof. But Phidias did not \nescape so fortunately. There were other circumstances which \nrendered him unpopular, and amongst them the fact that he had \nintroduced portraits both of himself and Pericles in the sculptures \nwhich adorned the frieze of the Parthenon. Phidias died in prison \nbefore the day of trial. \n\nThe Athenian empire, since the conclusion of the Thirty Years\' \nTruce, had again become exclusively maritime. Yet even among \nthe subjects and allies united with Athens by the Confederacy of \nDelos, her sway was borne with growing discontent. One of the \nchief causes of this dissatisfaction was the amount of the tribute \nexacted by the Athenians, as well as their misapplication of the \nproceeds. In the time of Aristides and Cimon, when an active war \nwas carrying on against the Persians, the sum annually collected \namounted to 460 talents. In the time of Pericles, although that \nwar had been brought to a close, the tribute had nevertheless in- \ncreased to the annual sum of 600 talents. Another grievance was \nthe transference to Athens of all lawsuits, at least of all public \nsuits ; for on this subject we are unable to draw the line distinctly. \nIn criminal cases, at all events, the allies seem to have been de- \nprived of the power to inflict capital punishment. Besides all these \n\n\n\nB.C. 435. \n\n\n\nCORCYRA AISD CORINTH. \n\n\n\ncauses of complaint, the allies had often to endure the oppressions \nand exactions of Athenian officers, both military and naval, as well \nas of the rich and powerful Athenian citizens settled among them. \n\nIn b.c. 440 Samos, one of the three independent allies already \nmentioned, revolted from Athens ; but even this island was no match \nfor the Athenian power. Pericles, who sailed against the Samians \nin person, defeated their fleet in several engagements, and forced \nthe city to capitulate. The Samians were compelled to raze their \nfortifications, to surrender their fleet, to give hostages for their \nfuture conduct, and to pay the expenses of the war. \n\nThe triumphs and the power of Athens were regarded with fear \nand jealousy by her rivals ; and the quarrel between Corinth and \nCorcyra lighted the spark which was to produce the conflagration. \nOn the coast of Illyria, near the site of the modern Durazzo, the \nCorcyraeans had founded the city of Epidamnus. Corcyra (now \nCorfu) was itself a colony of Corinth ; and though long at enmity \nwith its mother country, was forced, according to the time-hallowed \ncustom of the Greeks in such matters, to select the founder of \nEpidamnus from the Corinthians. Accordingly Corinth became \nthe metropolis of Epidamnus as well as of Corcyra. At the time \nof which we speak, the Epidamnians, being hard pressed by the \nIllyrians, led by some oligarchical exiles of their own city, applied \nto Corcyra for assistance, which the Corcyrseans, being connected \nwith the Epidamnian oligarchy, refused. The Epidamnians then \nsought help from the Corinthians, who undertook to assist them. The \nCorcyrseans, highly resenting this interference, attacked the Corin- \nthian fleet off Cape Actium, and gained a signal victory (b.c. 435). \n\nDeeply humbled by this defeat, the Corinthians spent the two \nfollowing years in active preparations for retrieving it. The Cor- \ncyrseans, who had not enrolled themselves either in the Lacedae- \nmonian or Athenian alliance, and therefore stood alone, were greatly \nalarmed at these preparations. They now resolved to remedy this \ndeficiency ; and as Corinth belonged to the Lacedaemonian alliance, \nthe Corcyrseans had no option, and were obliged to apply to Athens. \nThe majority of the Athenians were ready to comply with their re- \nquest ; but in order to avoid an open infringement of the Thirty \nYears\' Truce, it was resolved to conclude only a defensive alliance \nwith Corcyra : that is, to defend the Corcyraeans in case their terri- \ntories were actually invaded by the Corinthians, but beyond that \nnot to lend them any active assistance. A small Athenian squadron \nof only 10 triremes was despatched to the assistance of the Cor- \ncyraeans. Soon after their arrival a battle ensued off the coast of \nEpirus, between the Corinthian and Corcyraean fleets. After a \nhard-fought day, victory finally declared in favour of the Corinthians. \n\nG \n\n\n\n82 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. IX. \n\n\n\nThe Athenians now abandoned their neutrality, and did all in their \npower to save the flying Corcyrseans from their pursuers. This \naction took place early in the morning ; and the Corinthians prepared \nto renew the attack in the afternoon, when they saw in the distance \n20 Athenian vessels, which they believed to be the advanced guard \nof a still larger fleet. They accordingly sailed away to the coast of \nEpirus ; but rinding that the Athenians did not mean to undertake \noffensive operations against them, they departed homewards with \ntheir whole fleet. These events took place in the year B.C. 432. \n\nThe Corinthians were naturally incensed at the conduct of \nAthens ; and it is not surprising that they should have watched \nfor an opportunity of revenge. This was soon afforded them by the \nenmity of the Macedonian prince Perdiccas towards the Athenians. \nHe incited her tributaries upon the coast of Macedonia to revolt, \nincluding Potidsea, a town seated on the isthmus of Pallene. \nPotidaea, though now a tributary of Athens, was originally a colony \nof the Corinthians, aDd received from them certain annual magis- \ntrates. Being urged as well by the Corinthians as by Perdiccas, \nthe Potidaeans openly raised the standard of revolt (b.c. 432). A \npowerful Athenian armament was despatched to the coast of Mace- \ndonia and laid siege to Potidaea. \n\nMeanwhile the Lacedaemonians, urged on all sides by the com- \nplaints of their allies against Athens, summoned a general meeting \nof the Peloponnesian confederacy at Sparta. The Corinthians took \nthe most prominent part in the debate ; but other members of the \nconfederacy had also heavy grievances to allege against Athens. \nForemost among these were the Megarians, who complained that \ntheir commerce had been ruined by a recent decree of the Athe- \nnians which excluded them from every port within the Athenian \njurisdiction. It was generally felt that the time had now arrived \nfor checking the power of Athens. Influenced by these feelings, \nthe Lacedaemonians decided upon war ; and the congress passed a \nresolution to the same effect, thus binding the whole Peloponnesian \nconfederacy to the same policy. This important resolution was \nadopted towards the close of b.c. 432, or early in the following \nyear. Before any actual declaration of war, hostilities were begun \nin the spring of b.c. 431 by a treacherous attack of the Thebans \nupon Plataea. Though Boeotians by descent, the Plataeans did not \nbelong to the Boeotian league, but had long been in close alliance \nwith the Athenians. Hence they were regarded with hatred and \njealousy by the Thebans, which sentiments were also shared by a \nsmall oligarchical faction in Plataea itself. The Plataean oligarchs \nsecretly admitted a body of 300 Thebans into the town at night ; \nbut the attempt proved a failure ; the citizens flew to arms, and in \nthe morning all the Thebans were either slam or taken prisoners. \n\n\n\nimsft m If & Lib ba& t \\Hlsi.ium \n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 jm OTarns-rrrrr tfo f+ mA A D \n\n\n\nTemple of Nike Apteros (the Wingless Victory), on the Acropolis at Athens. \n\nCHAPTEE X. \n\nATHENS IN THE TIME OF PERICLES. \n\nAt the commencement of the Peloponnesian war Athens was at \nthe height of its glory under the brilliant administration of Pericles. \nWe may therefore here pause to take a brief survey of the city and \nof its most important buildings. Athens is situated about three miles \nfrom the sea-coast, in the central plain of Attica. In this plain rise \nseveral eminences. Of these the most prominent is a lofty insulated \nmountain, with a conical peaked summit, now called the Hill of St. \nGeorge, and which bore in ancient times the name of Lycabettus. \nThis mountain, which was not included within the ancient walls, \nlies to the north-east of Athens, and forms the most striking feature \nin the environs of the city. It is to Athens what Vesuvius is to \nNaples, or Arthur\'s Seat to Edinburgh. South-west of Lycabettus \nthere are four hills of moderate height, all of which formed part of \nthe city. Of these the nearest to Lycabettus, and at the distance of \na mile from the latter, was the Acropolis, or citadel of Athens, a \nsquare craggy rock rising abrutly about 150 feet, with a flat summit \nof about 1000 feet long from east to west, by 500 feet broad from \nnorth to south. Immediately west of the Acropolis is a second hill \nof irregular form, the Areopagus. To the south-west there rises a \nthird hill, the Pnyx, on which the assemblies of the citizens were \nheld ; and to the south of the latter is a fourth hill, known as the \n\n\n\n86 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. X. \n\n\n\nMuseu m. On the eastern and western sides of the city there ran two \nsmall streams, which are nearly exhausted before they reach the \nsea, by the heats of summer and by the channels for artificial irri- \ngation. That on the east is the Ilissu3, which flowed through the \n\n\n\n\nPlan of Athens. \n\n\n\n1. Pnyx Ecclesia. 4. Odeum of Pericles. \n\n2. Theseum. 5. Temple of the Olympian \na. Theatre of Dionysus. Zeus. \n\nsouthern quarter of the city : that on the west is the Cephissus. \nSouth of the city was seen the Saronic gulf, with the harbours of \nAthens. \n\nAthens is said to have derived its name from the prominence \ngiven to the worship of Athena by its king Erechtheus. The inha- \nbitants were previously called Cranai and CecropidsB, from Cecrops, \nwho, according to tradition, was the original founder of the city. \nThis at first occupied only the hill or rock which afterwards became \nthe Acropolis : but gradually the buildings began to spread over \nthe ground at the southern foot of this hill. It was not till the \ntime of Pisistratus and his sons (b.c. 560-514) that the city began \nto assume any degree of splendour. The most remarkable building \nof these despots was the gigantic temple of the Olympian Zeus, \n\n\n\nChap. X. \n\n\n\nCITY OF ATHENS. \n\n\n\n87 \n\n\n\nwhich, however, was not finished till many centuries later. In \nb.c. 500 the theatre of Dionysus was commenced on the south- \neastern slope of the Acropolis, but was not completed till b.c. 340 ; \nthough it must have been used for the representation of plays long \nbefore that period. \n\n\n\n\nRuins of the Temple of the Olympian Zeus. \n\n\n\nXerxes reduced the ancient city almost to a heap of ashes. \nAfter the departure of the Persians, its reconstruction on a much \nlarger scale was commenced under the superintendence of The- \nmistocles, whose first care was to provide for its safety by the erec- \ntion of walls. The Acropolis now formed the centre of the city, \nround which the new walls described an irregular circle of about \n60 stadia or 1\\ miles in circumference. The space thus enclosed \nformed the A sty, or city, properly so called. But the views of \nThemistocles were not confined to the mere defence of Athens : he \ncontemplated making her a great naval power, and for this pur- \npose adequate docks and arsenals were required. Previously the \n\n\n\nss \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. X. \n\n\n\nAthenians had used as their only harbour the open roadstead of \nPhalerum on the eastern side of the Phaleric bay. where the sea- \nshore is nearest to Athens. But Theniistocles transferred the \nnaval station of the Athenians to the peninsula of Piraeus, which \nis distant about 4^ miles from Athens, and contains three natural \nharbours, \xe2\x80\x94 a large one on the western side, called simply Tirseus or \nThe Harbour, and two smaller ones on the eastern side, called \nrespectively Zto. and Munijcliia, the latter being nearest to the city. \nIt was not till the administration of Pericles that the walls were \nbuilt which connected Athens with her ports. These were at first \nthe outer ur northern Long Wall, which ran from Athens to Piraeus, \nand the Phaleric wall connecting the city with Phalerum. These \nwere commenced in B.C. 457. and finished in the following year. \nIt was soon found, however, that the space thus enclosed was too \nvast to be easily defended ; and as the port of Phaleruni was small \nand insignificant in comparison with the Piraeus, amd soon ceased \nto be used by the Athenian ships of war, its wall was abandoned \nand probably allowed to fall into decay. Its place was supplied \nby another Long Wall, which was built parallel to the first at a \ndistance of only 550 feet, thus rendering both capable of being \ndefended by the same body of men. Their height in all proba- \nbility was not less than 60 feet. In process of time the space be- \ntween the two Long Walls was occupied on each side by houses. \n\nIt will be seen from the preceding description that Athens, in \nits larger acceptation, and including its port, consisted of two cir- \ncular cities, the Asty and Piraeus, each of about 7^ miles in circum- \nference, and joined together by a broad street of between four and \nfive miles long. \n\nSuch was the outward and material form of that city, which \nduring the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars \nreached the highest pitch of military, artistic, and literary glory. \nThe latter portion of this period, or that comprised under the \nascendency of Pericles, exhibits Athenian art in its highest state of \nperfection, and is therefore by way of excellence commonly desig- \nnated as the age of Pericles. The great sculptor of this period \xe2\x80\x94 \nperhaps the greatest the world has ever seen \xe2\x80\x94 was Phidias, to whom \nPericles intrusted the superintendence of all the works executed in \nhis administration. \n\nThe first public monuments that arose after the Persian wars \nwere erected under the auspices of Cimon, who was, like Pericles, \na lover and patron of the arts. The principal of these were the \nsmall Ionic temple of Nike Apteros (Wingless Victory\';*, and the \nThese am, or temple of Theseus. The temple of Nike\' Apteros was \nonly 27 feet in length by IS in breadth, and was erected on the \n\n\n\nChap. X. \n\n\n\nMONUMENTS OF CIMON. \n\n\n\n89 \n\n\n\nAcropolis in commemoration of Cimon\'s victory at the Eurymedon. \nA view of it is given at the beginning of this chapter, and its posi- \ntion on the Acropolis, on one side of the Propylaea, is seen in the \n\n\n\n\nThe Theseum restored. \n\n\n\nThe Theseum is situated on a height to the north of the Areo- \npagus, and was built to receive the bones of Theseus, which Cimon \nbrought from Scyros in b.c. 469. It was probably finished about \n465, and is the best preserved of all the monuments of ancient \nAthens. It was at once a tomb and temple, and possessed the pri- \nvileges of an asylum. It is of the Doric order, 104 feet in length \nby 45 feet broad, and surrounded with columns. \n\nBut it was the Acropolis which was the chief centre of the archi- \ntectural splendour of Athens. After the Persian wars the Acro- \npolis had ceased to be inhabited, and was appropriated to the \nworship of Athena and to the other guardian deities of the city. It \nwas covered with the temples of gods and heroes ; and thus its \nplatform presented not only a sanctuary, but a museum, containing \nthe finest productions of the architect and the sculptor, in which \nthe whiteness of the marble was relieved by brilliant colours, and \nrendered still more dazzling by the transparent clearness of the \n\n\n\n90 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. X \n\n\n\nAthenian atmosphere. It was surrounded with walls, and the \nsurface seems to have been divided into terraces communicating \nwith one another by steps. The only approach to it was from the \nAgora on its western side. At the top of a magnificent flight of \nmarble steps, 70 feet broad, stood the Propylsea, constructed under \n\n\n\n\nPlan of the Acropolis. \n\n1. Parthenon. 3. Propviaea. \n\n2. Ereehtheum. 4. Temple of Nike Apteros. \n\n5. Statue of Athena Fromachus. \n\n\n\nthe auspices of Pericles, and which served as a suitable entrance \nto the exquisite works within. The Propylsea were themselves one \nof the masterpieces of Athenian art. They were entirely of Pen- \ntelic marble, and covered the whole of the western end of the \nAcropolis, having a breadth of 168 feet, The central portion of \nthem consisted of two porticoes, of which the western one faced the \ncity, and the eastern one the interior of the Acropolis, each con- \nsisting of a front of six fluted Doric columns. This central part of \nthe building was 58 feet in breadth, but the remaining breadth of \nthe rock at this point was covered by two wings, which projected \n26 feet in front of the western portico. Each of these wings was \nin the form of a Doric temple. The northern one, or that on the \nleft of a person ascending the Acropolis, was called the Pinacotheca, \nfrom its walls being covered with paintings. The southern wing \nconsisted only of a porch or open gallery. Immediately before \nits western front stood the little temple of Xike Apteros already \nmentioned. \n\nOn passing through the Propylsea all the glories of the Acropolis \nbecame visible. The chief building was the Parthenon (t. e. House \n\n\n\nChap. X. \n\n\n\nTHE PROPYLiEA \xe2\x80\x94 THE PARTHENON. \n\n\n\n91 \n\n\n\nof the Virgin), the most perfect production of Grecian architecture. \nIt derived its name from its being the temple of Athena Parthenos, \nor Athena the Virgin, the invincible goddess of war. It was also \ncalled Hecatompedon, from its breadth of 100 feet. It was built \nunder the administration of Pericles, and was completed in e.g. 438. \nThe Parthenon stood on the highest part of the Acropolis, near \nits centre, and probably occupied the site of an earlier temple \ndestroyed by the Persians. It was entirely of Pentelic marble, on \na rustic basement of ordinary limestone, and its architecture, which \nwas of the Doric order, was of the purest kind. Its dimensions \nwere about 228 feet in length, 101 feet in breadth, and 66 feet in \nheight to the top of the pediment. It consisted of a cella, sur- \nrounded by a peristyle. The cella was divided into two chambers \nof unequal size, the eastern one of which was about 98 feet long, \nand the western one about 43 feet. The ceiling of both these \nchambers was supported by rows of columns. The whole building \nwas adorned with the most exquisite sculptures, executed by \n\n\n\n\nThe Propylsea restored. \n\nA. Pinacotheca. D. Road lending to the centra, entrance. \n\nB. Temple of Nike - Aptero9. E. Central entrance. \n\nC. Pedestal of Agnppa. F. Hall corresponding to the Pinacotheca. \n\nvarious artists under the direction of Phidias. These consisted \nof, 1. The sculptures in the tympana of the pediments (i. e. the \ninner portion of the triangular gable ends of the roof above the \ntwo porticoes), each of which was filled with about 24 colossal \nfigures. The group in the eastern or principal front represented \n\n\n\n92 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. X. \n\n\n\nthe birth of Athena from the head of Zeus, ana the western the \ncontest between Athena and Poseidon (Xeptune) for the land of \nAttica. 2. The metopes between the triglyphs in the frieze of \nthe entablature (i. e. the upper of the tvro portions into which \nthe space between the columns and the roof is divided) were filled \nwith sculp tivres in high relief, representing a variety of subjects \nrelating to Athena herself, or to the indigenous heroes of Attica. \nEach tablet was 4 feet 3 inches square. Those on the south side \nrelated to the battle of the Athenians with the Centaurs. One of \nthe metopes is figured below. 3. The frieze which ran along out- \nside the wall of the cella, and within the external columns which \nsurround the building, at the same height and parallel with the \n\n\n\n\nThe Parthenon restored. \n\n\n\nmetopes, was sculptured with a representation of the Panathenaic \nfestival in very low relief. This frieze was 3 feet 4 inches in height, \nand 520 feet in length. A small portion of the frieze is also figured \nbelow. A large number of the slabs of the frieze, together with \nsixteen metopes from the south side, and several of the statues of \nthe pediments, were brought to England by Lord Elgin, of whom \nthey were purchased by the nation and deposited in the British \nMuseum. \n\nBut the chief wonder of the Parthenon was the colossal statue \nof the Virgin Goddess executed by Phidias himself, which stood in \nthe eastern or principal chamber of the cella. It was of the sort \ncalled cliryselepltantine. a kind of work said to have been invented \nby Phidias, in which ivory was substituted for marble in those \n\n\n\nChap. X, \n\n\n\nTHE ERECHTHEUM. \n\n\n\n93 \n\n\n\nparts which were uncovered, while the place of the real drapery \nwas supplied with robes and other ornaments of solid gold. Its \nheight, including the base, was nearly 40 feet. It represented the \ngoddess standing, clothed with a tunic reaching to the ankles, with \na spear in her left hand, and an image of Victory in her right. \n\nThe Acropolis was adorned with another colossal figure of Athena, \nin bronze, also the work of Phidias. It stood in the open air, \nnearly opposite the Propylsea, and was one of the first objects seen \nafter passing through the gates of the latter. With its pedestal it \nmust have stood about 70 feet high, and consequently towered \nabove the roof of the Parthenon, so that the point of its spear and \nthe crest of its helmet were visible off the promontory of Sunium \nto ships approaching Athens. It was called the "Athena Pro- \nmachus," because it represented the goddess armed, and in the \nvery attitude of battle. \n\n\n\n\nCentaur, from the Metopes of the Parthenon. \n\nThe only other monument on the summit of the Acropolis which \nit is necessary to describe is the Erechtheum, or temple of Erech- \ntheus. The traditions respecting Erechtheus vary, but according to \none set of them he was identical with the god Poseidon. He was \nworshipped in his temple under the name of Poseidon Erechtheus, \nand from the earliest times was associated with Athena as one of \n\n\n\n94 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. X. \n\n\n\nthe two protecting deities of Athens. The original Erechtheum \nwas burnt by the Persians, but the new temple was erected on the \nancient site. This could not have been otherwise ; for on this \nspot was the sacred olive-tree which Athena evoked from the earth \nin her contest with Poseidon, and also the well of salt-water which \nPoseidon produced by a stroke of his trident, the impression of \nwhich was seen upon the rock. The building was also called the \ntemple of Athena Polias, because it contained a separate sanctuary \nof the goddess, as well as her most ancient statue. The building \n\n\n\n\nFrom the Frieze of the Parthenon. Panathenaic Procession. \n\n\n\nof the new Erechtheum was not commenced till the Parthenon and \nPropyltea were finished, and probably not before the year preceding \nthe breaking out of the Peloponnesian war. Its progress was no \ndoubt delayed by that event, and it was probably not completed \nbefore 393 B.C. TThen finished it presented one of the finest models \nof the Ionic order, as the Parthenon was of the Doric. It stood tc \nthe north of the latter building, and close to the northern wall of \nthe Acropolis. The form of the Erechtheum differs from every \nknown example of a Grecian temple. Usually a Grecian temple \nwas an oblong figure with a portico at each extremity. The Erech- \ntheum. on the contrary, though oblong in shape, and having a \nportico at the eastern or principal front, had none at its western \nend, where, however, a portico projected north and south from \neither side, thus forming a kind of transept. This irregularity \nseems to have been chiefly owing to the necessity of preserving the \ndifferent sanctuaries and religious objects belonging to the ancient \ntemple. A view of it is given opposite. The roof of the southern \nportico, as shown in the view, was supported by six Caryatides. \n\n\n\nChap. X. THE DIONYSIAC THEATRE. 95 \n\n\n\n\nThe Erechtheum restored. \n\n\n\nSuch were the principal objects which adorned the Acropolis at \nthe time of which we are now speaking. Their general appearance \nwill be best gathered from the engraving on the Frontispiece. \n\nBefore quitting the city of Athens, there are two or three other \nobjects of interest which must be briefly described. First, the \nDionysiac theatre, which occupied the slope at the south-eastern \nextremity of the Acropolis. The middle of it was excavated out \nof the rock, and the rows of seats ascended in curves one above \nanother, the diameter increasing with the height. It was no doubt \nsufficiently large to accommodate the whole body of Athenian citi- \nzens, as well as the strangers who nocked to Athens during the \nDionysiac festival, but its dimensions cannot now be accurately \nascertained. It had no roof, but the spectators were probably pro- \ntected from the sun by an awning, and from their elevated seats \nthey had a distinct view of the sea, and of the peaked hills of \nSalamis in the horizon. Above them rose the Parthenon and the \nother buildings of the Acropolis, so that they sat under the shadow \nof the ancestral gods of the country. \n\n\n\n96 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. X. \n\n\n\nThe Areopagus, or Hill of Ares (Mars), was a rocky height oppo- \nsite the western end of the Acropolis, from which it was separated \nonly by some hollow ground. It derived its name from the tradi- \ntion that Ares (Mars) was brought to trial here before the assem- \nbled gods, by Poseidon (Xeptune), for murdering Halirrhothius \nthe son of the latter. It was here that the Council of Areopagus \nmet, frequently called the Upper Council, to distinguish it from \nthe Council of Five Hundred, which assembled in the valley below. \nThe Areopagites sat as judges in the open air, and two blocks of \nstone are still to be seen, probably those which were occupied \nrespectively by the accuser and the accused. The Areopagus was \nthe spot where the Apostle Paul preached to the men of Athens. \n\nThe Pnyx, or place for holding the public assemblies of the \nAthenians, stood on the side of a low rocky hill, at the distance of \nabout a quarter of a mile from the Areopagus. Projecting from \nthe hill, and hewn out of it, still stands a solid rectangular block, \ncalled the Bema or pulpit, from whence the orators addressed the \nmultitude in the area before them. The position of the Bema \ncommanded a view of the Propyl^ea and the other magnificent edi- \nfices of the Acropolis, while beneath it was the city itself studded \nwith monuments of Athenian glory. The Athenian orators fre- \nquently roused the national feelings of their audience by pointing \nto the Propylsea and to the other splendid buildings before them. \nBetween the Pnyx on the west, the Areopagus on the north, and \nthe Acropolis on the east, and closely adjoining the base of these \nhills, stood the Agora (or market-place). In a direction from \nnorth-west to south-east a street called the Ceramicus ran diagon- \nally through the Agora, entering it through the valley between \nthe Pnyx and the Areopagus. The street was named after a dis- \ntrict of the city, which was divided into two parts, the Inner and \nOuter Ceramicus. The former lay within the city walls, and \nincluded the Agora. The Outer Ceramicus, which formed a hand- \nsome suburb on the north-west of the city, was the burial-place of \nall persons honoured with a public funeral. Through it ran the \nroad to the gymnasium and gardens of the Academy, which were \nsituated about a mile from the walls. The Academy was the place \nwhere Plato and his disciples taught. On each side of this road \nwere monuments to illustrious Athenians, especially those who had \nfallen in battle. \n\nEast of the city, and outside the walls, was the Lyceum, a gym- \nnasium dedicated to Apollo Lyceus, and celebrated as the place in \nwhich Aristotle taught. \n\n\n\n\nPericles and Aspasia. \n\n\n\nCHAPTER XL \n\nTHE PE LOPONNE SI AN WAR. \xe2\x80\x94 FIRST PERIOD, FROM THE COMMENCE- \nMENT OF THE WAR TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS, B.C. 431-421. \n\nWar was now fairly kindled. All Greece looked on in suspense \nas its two leading cities were about to engage in a strife of which \nno man could foresee the end ; but the youth, with which both \nAthens and Peloponnesus then abounded, having had no expe- \nrience of the bitter calamities of war, rushed into it with ardour. \nIt was a war of principles and races. Athens was a champion of \ndemocracy, Sparta of aristocracy ; Athens represented the Ionic \ntribes, Sparta the Dorian ; the former were fond of novelty, the \nlatter were conservative and stationary ; Athens had the command \nof the sea, Sparta was stronger upon land. On the side of Sparta \nwas ranged the whole of Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achaia, \ntogether with the Megarians, Boeotians, Phocians, Opuntian Lo- \ncrians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. The allies of \nAthens, with the exception of the Thessalians, Acarnanians, Mes- \nsenians at Naupactus, and Platseans, were all insular, and consisted \nof the Chians, Lesbians, Corcyrteans, and Zacynthians, and shortly \nafterwards of the Cephallenians. To these must be added her \n\nh 2 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XI. \n\n\n\ntributary towns on the coast;* of Thrace and Asia Minor, together \nwith all the islands north of Crete, except Alelos and Thera. \n\nThe Peloponnesians commenced the war by an invasion of \nAttica, with a large army, under the command of the Spartan king \nArchidamus (b.c. \xc2\xb131]. Pericles had instructed the inhabitants \nof Attica to secure themselves and their property within the walls \nof Athens. They obeyed his injunctions with reluctance, for \nthe Attic population had from the earliest times been strongly \nattached to a rural life. But the circumstances admitted of no \nalternative. Archidamus advanced as far as Acharnas, a flourishing \nAttic borough situated only about seven miles from Athens. Here \nhe encamped on a rising ground, within sight of the metropolis, and \nbegan to lay waste the country around, expecting probably by that \nmeans to provoke the Athenians to battle. But in this he was \ndisappointed. Notwithstanding the murmurs and clamours of the \ncitizens Pericles remained firm, and steadily refused to venture an \nengagement in the open field. The Peloponnesians retired from \nAttica after still further ravaging the country ; and the Athenians \nretaliated by making descents upon various parts of the coasts of \nPeloponnesus, and ravaging the territory of Megara. \n\nSuch were the results of the first campaign. From the method \nin which the war was conducted it had become pretty evident that \nit would prove of long duration : and the Athenians now proceeded \nto provide for this contingency. It was agreed that a reserve fond \nof 1000 talents should be set apart, which was not to be touched in \nany other case than an attack upon Athens by sea. Any citizen \nwho proposed to make a different use of the fund incurred thereby \nthe punishment of death. With the same view it was resolved to \nreserve every year 100 of their best triremes, fully manned and \nequipped. \n\nTowards the winter Pericles delivered, from a lofty platform \nerected in the Ceramicus, the funeral oration of those who had \nfallen in the war. This speech, or at all events the substance of it, \nhas been preserved by Thucydides, who may possibly have heard it \npronounced. It is a valuable monument of eloquence and patriotism, \nand particularly interesting for the sketch which it contains of \nAthenian manners as well as of the Athenian constitution. \n\nIn the following year r B.c. 130) the Peloponnesians, under \nArchidarnus, renewed their invasion of Attica. At the same time \nthe Athenians were attacked by a more insidious and a more \nformidable enemy. The plague broke out in the crowded city. \nThis terrible disorder, which was supposed to have originated in \n./Ethiopia, had already desolated Asia and many of the countries \naround the Mediterranean. A great proportion of those who were \n\n\n\nB.C. 430. \n\n\n\nTHE PLAGUE AT ATHENS. \n\n\n\n101 \n\n\n\nseized perished in from seven to nine days. It frequently attacked \nthe mental faculties, and left even those who recovered from it so \nentirely deprived of memory that they could recognise neither \nthemselves nor others. The disorder being new, the physicians \ncould find no remedy in the resources of their art. Despair now \nbegan to take possession of the Athenians. Some suspected that \nthe Peloponnesians had poisoned the wells ; others attributed the \npestilence to the anger of Apollo. A dreadful state of moral disso- \nlution followed. The sick were seized with unconquerable des- \npondency ; whilst a great part of the population who had hitherto \nescaped the disorder, expecting soon to be attacked in turn, aban- \ndoned themselves to all manner of excess, debauchery, and crime. \nThe numbers carried off by the pestilence can hardly be estimated \nat less than a fourth of the whole population. \n\nOppressed at once by war and pestilence, their lands desolated, \ntheir homes filled with mourning, it is not surprising that the \nAthenians were seized with rage and despair, or that they vented \ntheir anger on Pericles, whom they deemed the author of their \nmisfortunes. But that statesman still adhered to his plans with \nunshaken firmness. Though the Lacedaemonians were in Attica, \nthough the plague had already seized on Athens, he was vigorously \npushing his schemes of offensive operations. A foreign expedition \nmight not only divert the popular mind, but would prove beneficial \nby relieving the crowded city of part of its population ; and \naccordingly a fleet was fitted out, of which Pericles himself took \nthe command, and which committed devastations upon various parts \nof the Peloponnesian coast. But, upon returning from this expe- \ndition, Pericles found the public feeling more exasperated than \nbefore. Envoys had even been despatched to Sparta to sue for \npeace, but had been dismissed without a hearing ; a disappointment \nwhich had rendered the populace still more furious. Pericles now \nfound it necessary to call a public assembly in order to vindicate \nhis conduct, and to encourage the desponding citizens to persevere. \nBut though he succeeded in persuading them to prosecute the war \nwith vigour, they still continued to nourish their feelings of hatred \nagainst the great statesman. His political enemies, of whom Cleon \nwas the chief, took advantage of this state of the public mind to \nbring against him a charge of peculation. The main object of this \naccusation was to incapacitate him for the office of Strategus, or \ngeneral.* He was brought before the dicastery on this charge, and \n\n* The Strategi, or Generals, were ten in number, elected annually, and were \nintrusted not only with the command on military expeditions, but with the \nsuperintendence of all warlike preparations, and with the regulation of al] \nmatters in any way connected with the war department of the state. \n\n\n\nK>2 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XI. \n\n\n\nsentenced to pay a considerable fine; but eventually a strong re- \naction occurred in his favour. He was re-elected general, and \napparently regained all the influence he had ever possessed. \n\nBut he was not destined long to enjoy this return of popularity. \nHis life vras now closing in. and its end was clouded by a long \ntrain of domestic misfortunes. The epidemic deprived him not \nonly of many personal and political friends, but also of several near \nrelations, amongst whom were his sister and his two legitimate sons, \nXanthippus and Paralus. The death of the latter was a severe \nblow to him. During the funeral ceremonies, as he placed a garland \non the body of this his favourite son, he was completely overpowered \nby his feelings and wept aloud. His ancient house was now left \nwithout an heir. By Aspasia, however, he had an illegitimate son \nwho bore his own name, and whom the Athenians now legitimised, \nand thus alleviated, as far as lay in their power, the misfortunes of \nthen: great leader. \n\nAfter this period it was with difficulty that Pericles was per- \nsuaded by his friends to take any active part in public affairs ; nor \ndid he survive more than a twelvemonth. An attack of the pre- \nvailing epidemic was succeeded by a low and lingering fever, \nwhich undermined both his strength of body and vigour of in- \ntellect. As Pericles lay apparently unconscious on his death- \nbed, the friends who stood around it were engaged in recalling \nhis exploits. The dying man interrupted them by remarking : \n" What you praise in me is partly the result of good fortune, and \nat all events common to me with many other commanders. What \nI chiefly pride myself upon you have not noticed \xe2\x80\x94 no Athenian \never wore mourning through me." \n\nThe enormous influence which Pericles exercised for so long a \nperiod over an ingenious but fickle people like the Athenians-, is an \nunquestionable proof of his intellectual superiority. This hold on \nthe public affection is to be attributed to a great extent to his \nextraordinary eloquence. Cicero regards him as the first example \nof an almost perfect orator, at once delighting the Athenians with \nhis copiousness and grace, and overawing them by the force and \ncogency of his diction and arguments. He seems, indeed, to have \nsingularly combined the power of persuasion with that more rapid \nand abrupt style of oratory which takes an audience by storm and \ndefies all resistance. As the accomplished man of genius and the \nliberal patron of literature and art, Pericles is worthy of the highest \nadmiration. By these qualities he has justly given name to the \nmost brilliant intellectual epoch that the world has ever seen. But \non this point we have already touched, and shall have occasion to \nrefer hereafter in the sketch of Grecian literature. \n\n\n\nB.C. 429. \n\n\n\nSIEGE OF PLATTE A. \n\n\n\n103 \n\n\n\nIn the third year of the war (b.c. 429) Archidamus directed his \nwhole force against the ill-fated town of Platsea. The siege that \nensued is one of the most memorable in the annals of Grecian \nwarfare. Platsea was but a small city, and its garrison consisted \nof only 400 citizens and 80 Athenians, together with 110 women to \nmanage their household affairs. Yet this small force set at defiance \nthe whole army of the Peloponnesians. The latter, being repulsed \nin all their attempts to take the place by storm, resolved to turn \nthe siege into a blockade, and reduce the city by famine. The \nPlatseans endured a blockade of two years, during which the \nAthenians attempted nothing for their relief. In the second year, \nhowever, about half the garrison effected their escape ; but the rest \nwere obliged to surrender shortly afterwards (b.c. 427). The \nwhole garrison, consisting of 200 Platseans and 25 Athenians, were \nnow arraigned before five judges sent from Sparta. Their indict- \nment was framed in a way which precluded the possibility of \nescape. They were simply asked "Whether, during the present \nwar, they had rendered any assistance to the Lacedaemonians and \ntheir allies?" Each man was called up separately before the \njudgment-seat, and the same question having been put to him \nand of course answered in the negative, he was immediately led \naway to execution. The town of Platsea was transferred to the \nThebans, who a few months afterwards levelled all the private \nbuildings to the ground. Thus was Platsea blotted out from the \nmap of Greece (b.c. 427). In recording the fall of Platsea we \nhave anticipated the order of chronology. \n\nThe most important event in the fourth year of the war (b.c. \n428) was the revolt of Mytilene, the capital of Lesbos, and of the \ngreater part of that island. The Athenians sent out a fleet which \nblockaded Mytilene both by sea and land. The Peloponnesians \npromised their assistance ; but from various causes their fleet was \nunable to reach the place. Meanwhile the provisions of the town \nwere exhausted, and it was therefore resolved, as a last desperate \nexpedient, to make a sally, and endeavour to raise the blockade. \nWith this view even the men of the lower classes were armed \nwith the full armour of the hoplites. But this step produced a \nvery different result from what had been expected or intended. \nThe great mass of the Mytileneans regarded their own oligarchical \ngovernment with suspicion, and now threatened that, unless their \ndemands were complied with, they would surrender the city to the \nAthenians. In this desperate emergency the Mytilenean government \nperceived that their only chance of safety lay in anticipating the \npeople in this step. They accordingly opened a negociation with \nPaches, the Athenian commander, and a capitulation was agreed \n\n\n\n104 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XI. \n\n\n\nupon by which the city was to be surrendered and the fate of its \ninhabitants to be decided by the Athenian Assembly. \n\nAt Athens the disposal of the prisoners caused great debate. \nIt was on this occasion that the leather-seller Cleon first comes \nprominently forward in Athenian affairs. If we may trust the \npicture drawn by the comic poet Aristophanes, Cleon was a per- \nfect model of a low-born demagogue; a noisy brawler, insolent \nin his gestures, corrupt and venal in his principles. Much \nallowance innst no doubt be made for comic licence and exag- \ngeration in this portrait, but even a caricature must have some \ngrounds of truth for its basis, It was this man who took the lead \nin the debate respecting the disposal of the Mytileneans, and \nmade the savage and horrible proposal to put to death the icliole \nmale population of Mytilene of military age, and to sell the \nwomen and children into slavery. This motion he succeeded \niu carrying, and a trireme was immediately despatched to \nMytilene, conveying orders to Paches to carry the bloody decree \ninto execution. This barbarous decree made no discrimination \nbetween the innocent and the guilty ; and on the morrow so \ngeneral a feeling prevailed of the horrible injustice that had been \ncommitted, that the magistrates acceded to the prayer of the \nMytilenean envoys and called a fresh assembly. Notwithstanding \nthe violent opposition of Cleon, the majority of the assembly \nreversed their former decree and resolved that the Mytileneans \nalready in custody should be put upon their trial, hut that \nthe remainder of the population should be spared. A second \ntrireme was immediately despatched to Mytilene, with orders \nto Paches to arrest the execution. The utmost diligence was \nneedful. The former trireme had a start of four-and-twenty \nhours, and nothing but exertions almost superhuman would \nenable the second to reach Mytilene early enough to avert the \ntragical catastrophe. The oarsmen were allowed by turns only \nshort intervals of rest, and took their food, consisting of barley- \nmeal steeped in wine and oil, as they sat at the oar. Happily the \nweather proved favourable ; and the crew, who had been promised \nlarge rewards in case they arrived in time, exerted themselves \nto deliver the reprieve, whilst the crew of the preceding vessel \nhad conveyed the order for execution with slowness and reluc- \ntance. Yet even so the countermand came only just in time. \nThe mandate was already in the hands of Paches, who was \ntaking measures for its execution. The fortifications of Mytilene\' \nwere razed, and her fleet delivered up to the Athenians. \n\nThe fate of the Plateaus and Mytileneans affords a fearful \nillustration of the manners of the age ; but these horrors soon \n\n\n\nB.C. 428. \n\n\n\nCONQUEST OF MYTILENE. \n\n\n\n105 \n\n\n\nfound a parallel in Corcyra. A fearful struggle took place in \nthis island between the aristocratical and democratical parties. \nThe people at length obtained the mastery, and the vengeance \nwhich they took on their opponents was fearful. The most sacred \nsanctuaries afforded no protection ; the nearest ties of blood and \nkindred were sacrificed to civil hatred. In one case a father slew \neven his own son. These scenes of horror lasted for seven days, \nduring which death in every conceivable form was busily at work. \nThe seventh year of the war (b.c. 425) was marked by an \nimportant event. An Athenian fleet was detained by bad weather \nat Pylus in Messenia, on the modern bay of Navarino. Demo- \n\n\n\n\nBay of Pylus. \n\nA. Island of Sphactcria. B. Pylus. C. The modern Navarmo. D D. Bay ol Pylus.\' \nE. Promontory of Coryphasium. \n\nsthenes, an active Athenian officer, who was on board the fleet, \nthought it an eligible spot on which to establish some of the \nMessenians from Naupactus, since it was a strong position, from \n\n\n\n106 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChai. XI. \n\n\n\nwhich they might annoy the Lacedemonians, and excite revolt \namong their Helot kinsmen. As the had weather continued for \nsome time, the soldiers on board amused themselves, under \nthe directions of Demosthenes, in constructing a sort of rude \nfortification. The nature of the ground was favourable for the \nwork, and in rive or six days a wall was thrown up sufficient \nfor the purposes of defence. Demosthenes undertook to garrison \nthe place ; and five ships and 200 hoplites were left behind with \nhim. \n\nThis insult to the Lacedaemonian territory caused great alarm \nand indignation at Sparta. The Peloponnesian fleet was ordered \nto Pylus ; and the Lacedaemonian commander, on arming with \nthe fleet, immediately occupied the small uninhabited and densely \nwooded island of Sphacteria, which, with the exception of two \nnarrow channels on the north and south, almost blocked up \nthe entrance of the bay. Between the island and the mainland \nwas a spacious basin, in which the fleet took up its station. The \nLacedaemonians lost no time in attacking the fortress : but not- \nwithstanding their repeated attempts they were unable to effect \na landing. \n\nWhilst they were preparing for another assault, they were \nsurprised by the appearance of the Athenian fleet. They had \nstrangely neglected to secure the entrances into the bay : and, \nwhen the Athenian ships came sailing through both the un- \ndefended channels, many of their triremes were still moored, \nand part of their crews ashore. The battle which ensued was \ndesperate. Both sides fought with extraordinary valour ; but \nvictory at length declared for the Athenians. Five Peloponnesian \nships were captured ; the rest were saved only by running them \nashore, where they were protected by the Lacedaemonian army. \n\nThe Athenians, thus masters of the sea, were enabled to \nblockade the island of Sphacteria, in which the flower of the \nLacedaemonian army was shut up, many of them native Spartans \nof the highest families. In so grave an emergency messengers \nwere sent to Sparta for advice. The Ephors themselves inline - \ndiately repaired to the snot: and so desponding was then view \nof the matter, that they saw no issue from it but a peace. They \ntherefore proposed and obtained an armistice for the purpose \nof opening negotiations at Athens. But the Athenians, at the \ninstigation of Cleori, insisted upon the most extravagant demands, \nand hostilities were accordingly resumed. They were not \nhowever attended with any decisive result. The blockade of \nSphacteria began to grow tedious and harassing. The force \nupon it continually received supplies of provisions either from \n\n\n\nB.C. 425. \n\n\n\nBLOCKADE OF SPHACTERIA. \n\n\n\n107 \n\n\n\nswimmers, who towed skins filled with linseed and poppy-seed \nmixed with honey, or from Helots, who, induced by the promise of \nlarge rewards, eluded the blockading squadron during dark and \nstormy nights, and landed cargoes on the back of the island. The \nsummer, moreover, was fast wearing away, and the storms of winter \nmight probably necessitate the raising of the blockade altogether. \nUnder these circumstances, Demosthenes began to contemplate \na descent upon the island ; with which view he sent a message to \nAthens to explain the unfavourable state of the blockade, and to \nrequest further assistance. \n\nThese tidings were very distasteful to the Athenians, who \nhad looked upon Sphacteria as their certain prey. They began \nto regret having let slip the favourable opportunity for making \na peace, and to vent their displeasure upon Cleon, the director \nof their conduct on that occasion. But Cleon put on a face of \nbrass. He abused the Strategi. His political opponent, Nicias, \nwas then one of those officers, a man of quiet disposition and \nmoderate abilities, but thoroughly honest and incorruptible. Him \nCleon now singled out for his vituperation, and, pointing at \nhim with his finger, exclaimed \xe2\x80\x94 " It would be easy enough to take \nthe island if our generals were men. If I were General, I would \ndo it at once ! " This burst of the tanner made the assembly \nlaugh. He was saluted with cries of "Why don\'t you go, then? " \nand Nicias, thinking probably to catch his opponent in his own \ntrap, seconded the voice of the assembly by offering to place at his \ndisposal whatever force he might deem necessary for the enter- \nprise. Cleon at first endeavoured to avoid the dangerous honour \nthus thrust upon him. But the more he drew back the louder \nwere the assembly in calling upon him to accept the office ; and \nas Nicias seriously repeated his proposition, he adopted with a \ngood grace what there was no longer any possibility of evading, \nand asserted that he would take Sphacteria within twenty days, \nand either kill all the Lacedaemonians upon it, or bring them \nprisoners to Athens. \n\nNever did general set out upon an enterprise under circum- \nstances more singular ; but, what was still more extraordinary, \nfortune enabled him to make his promise good. In fact, as \nwe have seen, Demosthenes had already resolved on attacking \nthe island ; and when Cleon arrived at Pylus he found everything \nprepared for the assault. Accident favoured the enterprise. A \nfire kindled by some Athenian sailors, who had landed for the \npurpose of cooking their dinner, caught and destroyed the woods \nwith which the island was overgrown, and thus deprived the \nLacedaemonians of one of their principal defences. Nevertheless, \n\n\n\n103 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XI. \n\n\n\nsuch was the awe inspired by the reputation of the Spartan arms, \nthat Demosthenes considered it necessary to land about 10,000 \nsoldiers of different descriptions, although the Lacedaemonian force \nconsisted of only about 420 men. But this small force for a long- \nwhile kept their assailants at bay ; till some Messenians, stealing \nround by the sea-shore, over crags and cliffs which the Lace- \ndaemonians had deemed impracticable, suddenly appeared on the \nhigh ground which overhung their rear. They now began to give \nway. and would soon have been all slain ; but Cleon and Demo- \nsthenes, being anxious to carry them prisoners to Athens, sent \na herald to summon them to surrender. The latter, in token \nof compliance, dropped their shields, and waved their hands above \nthen heads. They requested, however, permission to communicate \nwith their countrymen on the mainland ; who, after two or three \ncommunications, sent them a final message \xe2\x80\x94 " to take counsel for \nthemselves, but to do nothing disgraceful."\' The survivors then \nsurrendered. They were 292 in number, 120 of whom were native \nSpartans belonging to the first families. By this surrender the \nprestige of the Spartan arms was in a great degree destroyed. The \nSpartans were not, indeed, deemed invincible ; but their previous \nfeats, especially at Thermopylae, had inspired the notion that they \nwould rather die than yield; an opinion which could now no \nlonger be entertained. \n\nCleon had thus performed his promise. On the day after \nthe victory he and Demosthenes started with the prisoners for \nAthens, where they arrived within 20 days from the time of \nCleon" s departure. Altogether, this affair was one of the most \nfavourable for the Athenians that had occurred during the war. \nThe prisoners would serve not only for a guarantee against future \ninvasions, which might be averted by threatening to put them to \ndeath, but also as a means for extorting advantageous conditions \nwhenever a peace should be concluded. Xay, the victory itself \nwas of considerable importance, since it enabled the Athenians \nto place Pylus in a better posture of defence, and, by garrisoning it \nwith Messenians from Naupactus, to create a stronghold whence \nLaconia might be overrun and ravaged at pleasure. The Lacedas- \nmonians themselves were so sensible of these things, that they sent \nrepeated messages to Athens to propose a peace, but which the \nAthenians altogether disregarded. \n\nThe eighth year of the war (B.C. 424) opened with brilliant \nprospects for the Athenians. Elate with their continued good \nfortune, they aimed at nothing less than the recovery of all the \npossessions which they had held before the Thirty Years" Truce. \nFor this purpose they planned an expedition against Bceotia. But \n\n\n\nB.C. 424. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF DELIUM. \n\n\n\n109 \n\n\n\ntheir good fortune had now reached its culminating point. They \nwere defeated by the Boeotians with great loss at the battle \nof Delium, which was the greatest and most decisive engagement \nfought during the first period of the war. An interesting feature \nof the battle is that both Socrates and his pupil Alcibiades were \nengaged in it, the fomrer among the hoplites, the latter in the \ncavalry. Socrates distinguished himself by his bravery, and was \none of those who, instead of throwing down their arms, kept \ntogether in a compact body, and repulsed the attacks of the \npursuing horse. His retreat was also protected by Alcibiades. \n\nThis disastrous battle was speedily followed by the overthrow \nof the Athenian empire in Thrace. At the request of Perdiccas, \nking of Macedonia, and of the Chalcidian towns, who had sued for \nhelp against the Athenians, Brasidas was sent by the Lacedsemonian \ngovernment into Macedonia, at the head of a small body of troops. \nOn his arrival in Macedonia he proclaimed that he was come \nto deliver the Grecian cities from the tyrannous yoke of Athens. \nHis bravery, his kind and conciliating demeanour, his probity, \nmoderation, and good faith, soon gained him the respect and love \nof the allies of Athens in that quarter. Acanthus and Stagirus \nhastened to open their gates to him ; and early in the ensuing \nwinter, by means of forced marches, he suddenly and unexpectedly \nappeared before the important Athenian colony of Amphipolis \non the Strymon. In that town the Athenian party sent a message \nfor assistance to Thucydides, the historian, who was then general \nin those parts. Thucydides hastened with seven ships from \nThasos, and succeeded in securing Eion at the mouth of the \nStrymon ; but Amphipolis, which lay a little higher up the river, \nallured by the favourable terms offered, had already surrendered to \nBrasidas. For his want of vigilance on this occasion, Thucydides \nwas, on the motion of Cleon, sentenced to banishment, and spent \nthe following twenty years of his life in exile. Torone, Scione, and \nother towns also revolted from Athens. \n\nIn the following year (b.c. 422) Cleon was sent to Macedonia \nto recover the Athenian dependencies, and especially Amphipolis. \nHe encamped on a rising ground on the eastern side of the town. \nHaving deserted the peaceful art of dressing hides for the more \nhazardous trade of war, in which he was almost totally inex- \nperienced, and having now no Demosthenes to direct his move- \nments, Cleon was thrown completely off his guard by a very \nordinary stratagem on the part of Brasidas, who contrived to give \nthe town quite a deserted and peaceful appearance. Cleon suffered \nhis troops to fall into disorder, till he was suddenly surprised by \nthe astounding news that Brasidas was preparing for a sally. Cleon \n\n\n\n110 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XI. \n\n\n\nat once resolved to retreat. But his skill was equal to his valour. \nHe conducted his retreat in the most disorderly manner. His left \nwing had already filed of\xc2\xa3 and his centre with straggling ranks was \nin the act of following, when Brasidas ordered the gates of the \ntown to be flung open, and, rushing out at the head of only 150 \nchosen soldiers, charged the retreating columns in flank. They \nwere immediately routed ; hut Brasidas received a mortal wound \nand was carried off the field. Though his men were forming on \nthe hill, Cleon fled as fast as he could on the approach of the \nenemy, but was pursued and slain by a Thracian peltast. In spite, \nhowever, of the disgraceful flight of their general, the right wing \nmaintained their ground for a considerable time, till some cavalry \nand peltasts issuing from Amphipolis attacked them in flank and \nrear, and compelled them to fly. On assembling again at Eion it \nwas found that half the Athenian hoplites had been slain. Brasidas \nwas carried into Amphipolis, and lived long enough to receive the \ntidings of his victory. He was interred within the walls with great \nmilitary pomp in the centre of what thenceforth became the chief \nagora ; he was proclaimed cecist, or founder of the town ; and was \nworshipped as a hero with annual games and sacrifices. \n\nBy the death of Brasidas and Cleon the two chief obstacles \nto a peace were removed ; for the former loved war for the \nsake of its glory, the latter for the handle which it afforded for \nagitation and for attacking his political opponents. The Athenian \nXicias, and the Spartan king Pleistoanax, zealously forwarded \nthe negotiations, and in the spring of the year B.C. 421 a peace \nfor 50 years, commonly called the Peace of Xicias, was concluded \non the basis of a mutual restitution of prisoners and places captured \nduring the war. \n\n\n\nView of the Fort Euryalus at Syracuse \n\n\n\nCHAPTEK XII. \n\nTHE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. \xe2\x80\x94 SECOND PERIOD, FROM THE PEACE OF \nNICIAS TO THE DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY, B.C. \n421-413. \n\nSeveral of the allies of Sparta were dissatisfied with the peace \nwhich she had concluded; and soon afterwards some of them \ndetermined to revive the ancient pretensions of Argos, and to make \nher the head of a new confederacy, which should include all \nGreece, with the exception of Sparta and Athens. The movement \nwas begun by the Corinthians, and the league was soon joined by \nthe Eleans, the Mantineans, and the Chalcidians. \n\nBetween Sparta and Athens themselves matters were far from \nbeing on a satisfactory footing. Sparta confessed her inability \nto compel the Boeotians and Corinthians to accede to the peace, \nor even to restore the town of Amphipolis. Athens consequently \nrefused to evacuate Pylus, though she removed the Helots and \nMessenians from it. In the negotiations which ensued respecting \nthe surrender of Pylus, Alcibiades took a prominent part. This \nextraordinary man had already obtained immense influence at \nAthens. Young, rich, handsome, profligate, and clever, Alci- \nbiades was the very model of an Athenian man of fashion. In \nlineage he was a striking contrast to the plebeian orators of the \nday. He traced his paternal descent from Ajax, whilst on his \nmother\'s side he claimed relationship with the Alcmssonidae, \nand consequently with Pericles. On the death of his father \n\n\n\n112 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XII \n\n\n\nCiinias, Pericles had become his guardian. From early youth \nthe conduct of Alcibiades was marked by violence, recklessness, \nand vanity. He delighted in astonishing the more sober portion \nof the citizens by his capricious and extravagant feats. He was \nutterly destitute of morality, whether public or private. But \nhis vices were partly redeemed by some brilliant qualities. He \npossessed both boldness of design and vigour of action ; and, though \nscarcely more than thirty at the time of which we are now \nspeaking, lie had already on several occasions distinguished himself \nby his bravery. His more serious studies were made subservient to \nthe purposes of his ambition, for which some skill as an orator was \nnecessary. In order to attain it he frequented the schools of the \nsophists, and exercised himself in the dialectics of Prodicus, \nProtagoras, and above all of Socrates. \n\nSuch was the man who now opposed the application of the \nLacedaemonian ambassadors. Then- reception had been so favour- \nable, that Alcibiades, alarmed at the prospect of their success, \nresorted to a trick in order to defeat it. He called upon the \nLacedaemonian envoys, one of whom happened to be his personal \nfriend ; and he advised them not to tell the Assembly that they \nwere furnished with full powers, as in that case the people \nwould bully them into extravagant concessions, but rather to say \nthat they were merely come to discuss and report. He promised, \nif they did so, to speak in their favour, and induce the Assembly \nto grant the restitution of Pylus, to which he himself had hitherto \nbeen the chief obstacle. Accordingly on the next day, when \nthe ambassadors were introduced into the Assembly, Alcibiades, \nassuming his blandest tone and most winning smile, asked them \non what footing they came and what were their powers ? In reply \nto these questions, the ambassadors, who only a day or two before \nhad told Xicias and the Senate that they were come as plenipo- \ntentiaries, now publicly declared, in the face of the Assembly, \nthat they were not authorized to conclude, but only to negotiate \nand discuss. At this announcement, those who had heard their \nprevious declaration could scarcely believe their ears. A universal \nburst of indignation broke forth at this exhibition of Spartan \nduplicity: whilst, to wind up the scene, Alcibiades, affecting \nto be more surprised than any, distinguished himself by being \nthe loudest and bitterest in his invectives against the perfidy of the \nLacedaemonians. \n\nShortly afterwards Alcibiades procured the completion of a treaty \nof alliance for 100 years with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea (b.c. 420). \nThus were the Grecian states involved in a complicity of separate \nand often apparently opposite alliances. It was evident that allies \n\n\n\nB.C. 416. \n\n\n\nCAPTURE OF MELOS. \n\n\n\n113 \n\n\n\nso heterogeneous could not long hold together ; nevertheless, \nnominally at least, peace was at first observed. \n\nIn the July which followed the treaty with Argos, the Olympic \ngames, which recurred every fourth year, were to be celebrated. \nThe Athenians had been shut out by the war from the two previous \ncelebrations ; and curiosity was excited throughout Greece to see \nwhat figure Athens would make at this great Pan-Hellenic festival. \nWar, it was surmised, must have exhausted her resources, and \nwould thus prevent her from appearing with becoming splendour. \nBut from this reproach she was rescued by the wealth and vanity, \nif not by the patriotism, of Alcibiades. By his care, the Athenian \ndeputies exhibited the richest display of golden ewers, censers, and \nother plate to be used in the public sacrifice and procession; \nwhilst for the games he entered in his own name no fewer than the \nunheard-of number of seven four-horsed chariots, of which one \ngained the first, and another the second prize. Alcibiades was \nconsequently twice crowned with the olive, and twice proclaimed \nvictor by the herald. \n\nThe growing ambition and success of Alcibiades prompted \nhim to carry his schemes against Sparta into the very heart \nof Peloponnesus, without, however, openly violating the peace. \n\nThe Lacedaemonians now found it necessary to act with more \nvigour; and accordingly in B.C. 418 they assembled a very large \narmy, under the command of the Spartan king, Agis. A decisive \nbattle was fought near Mantinea, in which Agis gained a brilliant \nvictory over the Argives and their allies. This battle and that \nof Delium were the two most important engagements that had \nyet been fought in the Peloponnesian war. Although the Athenians \nhad fought on the side of the Argives at Mantinea, the peace \nbetween Sparta and Athens continued to be nominally observed. \n\nIn B.C. 416 the Athenians attacked and conquered Melos, which \nisland and Thera were the only islands in the iEgean not subject to \nthe Athenian supremacy. The Melians having rejected all the \nAthenian overtures for a voluntary submission, their capital was \nblockaded by sea and land, and after a siege of some months \nsurrendered. On the proposal, as it appears, of Alcibiades, all \nthe adult males were put to death, the women and children \nsold into slavery, and the island colonized afresh by 500 Athenians. \nThis horrible proceeding was the more indefensible, as the \nAthenians, having attacked the Melians in full peace, could \nnot pretend that they were justified by the custom of war in slaying \nthe prisoners. It was the crowning act of insolence and cruelty \ndisplayed during their empire, which from this period began \nrapidly to decline. \n\n\n\n114 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XII. \n\n\n\nThe event destined to produce that catastrophe \xe2\x80\x94 the inter- \nvention of the Athenians in the affairs of Sicily \xe2\x80\x94 was already \nin progress. A quarrel had broken out between Egesta and \nSelinus, both which cities were seated near the western extremity \nof Sicily; and Selinus, having obtained the aid of Syracuse, \nwas pressing very hard upon the Egestaeans. The latter appealed \nto the interests of the Athenians rather than to then sympathies. \nThey represented how great a blow it would be to Athens if \nthe Dorians became predominant in Sicily, and joined the Pelo- \nponnesian confederacy ; and they undertook, if the Athenians would \nsend an armament to their assistance, to provide the necessaiy funds \nfor the prosecution of the war. Their most powerful advocate was \nAlcibiades, whose ambitious views are said to have extended even \nto the conquest of Carthage. The quieter and more prudent Xieias \nand his party threw their weight into the opposite scale. But \nthe Athenian assembly, dazzled by the idea of so splendid an \nenterprise, decided on despatching a large fleet under Kicias, \nAlcibiades, and Lamachus, with the design of assisting Egesta, and \nof establishing the influence of Athens throughout Sicily, by \nwhatever means might be found practicable. \n\nFor the next three months the preparations for the undertaking \nwere pressed on with the greatest ardour. Young and old, rich and \npoor, all vied with one another to obtain a share in the expedition. \nFive years of comparative peace had accumulated a fresh supply \nboth of men and money ; and the merchants of Athens embarked \nin the enterprise as in a trading expedition. It was only a few \nof the wisest heads that escaped the general fever of excitement. \nThe expedition was on the point of sailing, when a sudden \nand mysterious event converted all these exulting feelings into \ngloomy foreboding. \n\nAt every door in Athens, at the corners of streets, in the market- \nplace, before temples, gymnasia, and other public places, stood \nHerinae, or statues of the god Hermes, consisting of a bust \nof that deity surmounting a quadrangular pillar of marble about \nthe height of the human figure. When the Athenians rose \none morning towards the end of M&j a 415 B.C., it was found \nthat all these figures had been mutilated during the night, and \nreduced by unknown hands to a shapeless mass. The act inspired \npolitical, as well as religious, alarm. It seemed to indicate a wide- \nspread conspiracy, for so sudden and general a mutilation must \nhave been the work of many hands. The sacrilege might only \nbe a preliminary attempt of some powerful citizen to seize the \ndespotism, and suspicion pointed its finger at Alcibiades. Active \nmeasures were taken and large rewards offered for the discovery of \n\n\n\nB.C. 415. CONDEMNATION OF ALCIBIADES. \n\n\n\nthe perpetrators. A public board was appointed to examine \nwitnesses, which did not, indeed, succeed in eliciting any facts \nbearing on the actual subject of inquiry, but which obtained \nevidence respecting similar acts of impiety committed at previous \ntimes in drunken frolics. In these Alcibiades himself was impli- \ncated; and though the fleet was on the very eve of departure, \na citizen rose in the assembly and accused Alcibiades of having \nprofaned the Eleusinian mysteries by giving a representation \nof them in a private house, producing in evidence the testimony \nof a slave. Alcibiades denied the accusation, and implored the \npeople to have it investigated at once. His enemies, however, had \nsufficient influence to get the inquiry postponed till his return; \nthus keeping the charge hanging over his head, and gaining time \nto poison the public mind against him. \n\nThe Athenian fleet, consisting of 100 triremes, and having \non board 1500 chosen Athenian hoplites, as well as auxiliaries, \nat length set sail, and proceeded to Corcyra, where it was joined by \nthe other allies in the month of July, 415 B.C. Upon arriving \nat Ehegium the generals received the discouraging news that \nEgesta was unable to contribute more than thirty talents. A \ncouncil of war was now held ; and it was finally resolved to gain as \nmany allies as they could among the Greek cities in Sicily, and, \nhaving thus ascertained what assistance they could rely upon, to \nattack Syracuse and Selinus. \n\nNaxos joined the Athenians, and shortly afterwards they \nobtained possession by surprise of the important city of Catana, \nwhich was now made the head-quarters of the armament. Here an \nunwelcome message greeted Alcibiades. After his departure from \nAthens, Thessalus, the son of Oimon, preferred an indictment against \nhim in consequence of his profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries. \nThe Salaminian, or state, trireme was despatched to Sicily, car- \nrying the decree of the assembly for Alcibiades to come home and \ntake his trial. The commander of the Salaminia was, however, \ninstructed not to seize his person, but to allow him to sail in \nhis own trireme. Alcibiades availed himself of this privilege \nto effect his escape. When the ships arrived at Thurii in Italy, he \nabsconded, and contrived to elude the search that was made afte v \nhim. Nevertheless, though absent, he was arraigned at Athens., \nand condemned to death ; his property was confiscated ; and the \nEumolpidae, who presided over the celebration of the Eleusinian \nmysteries, pronounced upon him the curses of the god3. On hearing\' \nof his sentence Alcibiades is said to have exclaimed, " I will show \nthem that I am still alive." \n\nThree months had now been frittered away in Sicily, during \n\ni 2 \n\n\n\n116 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XII. \n\n\n\nwhich the Athenians had done little or nothing, if we except \nthe acquisition of Naxos and Catana. Nicias now resolved to \nmake an attempt upon Syracuse. By a false message that the \nCatanasans were ready to assist in expelling the Athenians, he \ninduced the Syracusans to proceed thither in great force, and \nhe availed himself of their absence to sail with his whole fleet into \nthe Great Harbour of Syracuse, where he landed near the mouth of \nthe Anapus. The Syracusans, when they found that they had been \ndeceived at Catana, marched back and offered Nicias battle in \nhis new position. The latter accepted it, and gained the victory ; \nafter which he retired to Catana, and subsequently to Naxos \ninto winter quarters. \n\nThe Syracusans employed the winter in preparations for defence. \nThey also despatched envoys to Corinth and Sparta to solicit \nassistance, in the latter of which towns they found an un- \nexpected advocate. Alcibiades, having crossed from Thurii \nto Cyllene in Peloponnesus, received a special invitation to \nproceed to Sparta. Here he revealed all the plans of Athens, \nand exhorted the Lacedaemonians to frustrate them. For this \npurpose he advised them to send an army into Sicily, under \nthe command of a Spartan general, and, by way of causing \na diversion, to establish a fortified post at Decelea in the Attic \nterritory. The Spartans fell in with these views, and resolved to \nsend a force to the assistance of Syracuse in the spring, under the \ncommand of Gylippus. \n\nNicias, having received reinforcements from Athens, recom- \nmenced hostilities as soon as the season allowed of it, and resolved \non besieging Syracuse. That town consisted of two parts \xe2\x80\x94 the \ninner and the outer city. The former of these \xe2\x80\x94 the original \nsettlement \xe2\x80\x94 was comprised in the island of Ortygia; the latter, \nafterwards known by the name of Achradina, covered the high \nground of the peninsula north of Ortygia, and was completely \nseparate from the inner city. The island of Ortygia, to which the \nmodern city is now confined, is of an oblong shape, about two miles \nin circumference, lying between the Great Harbour on the \nwest, and the Little Harbour on the east, and separated from the \nmainland by a narrow channel. The Great Harbour is a splendid \nbay, about five miles in circumference, and the Little Harbour was \nspacious enough to receive a large fleet of ships of war. The \nouter city was surrounded on the north and east by the sea, \nand by sea-walls which rendered an assault on that side almost \nimpracticable. On the land side it was defended by a wall, \nand partly also by the nature of the ground, which in some parts \nwas very steep. West and north-west of the wall of the outer city \n\n\n\nB.C. 415. \n\n\n\nATHENIANS IN SICILY. \n\n\n\n117 \n\n\n\nstood two unfortified suburbs, which were at a later time included \nwithin the walls of Syracuse under the names of Tyche and \nNeapolis. Between these two suburbs the ground rose in a \ngentle acclivity to the summit of the ranges of hills called \nEpipolse. \n\nIt was from the high ground of Epipolse that Syracuse was most \nexposed to attack. Nicias landed at Leon, a place upon the bay \nof Thapsus, at the distance of only six or seven stadia from \n\n\n\n\nMap of Syracuse \n\n\n\nEpipolse, took possession of Epipolse, and erected on the summit \na fort called Labdalum. Then coming farther down the hill \ntowards Syracuse, he built another fort of a circular form and \nof considerable size at a place called Syke. From the latter point \nlie commenced his line of circumvallation, one wall extending \nsouthwards from Syke to the Great Harbour, and the other \n\n\n\n118 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XII. \n\n\n\nwall running northwards to the outer sea. The Athenians \nsucceeded in completing the circurnvallation towards the south, \nbut hi one of their many engagements with the Syracusans \nthey lost the gallant Lamachus. At the same time, the \nAthenian fleet entered the Great Harbour, where it was hence- \nforth permanently established. The northern wall was never \ncompleted, and through the passage thus left open the besieged \ncontinued to obtain provisions. Xicias, who, by the death of \nLamachus. had become sole commander, seemed now on the \npoint of succeeding. The Syracusans were so sensible of their \ninferiority in the field that they no longer ventured to show \nthemselves outside the walls. They began to contemplate sur- \nrender, and even sent messages to Xicias to treat of the terms. \nThis caused the Athenian commander to indulge in a false \nconfidence of success, and consequent apathy ; and the army \nhaving lost the active and energetic Lamachus, operations \nwere no longer carried on with the requisite activity. \n\nIt was in this state of affairs that the Spartan commander, \nGylippus, passed over into Italy with a little squadron of \nfour ships, with the view merely of preserving the Greek cities \nin that country, supposing that Syracuse, and, with her, the other \nGreek cities in Sicily, were irretrievably lost. At Tarentum \nhe learned to his great surprise and satisfaction that the Athenian \nwall of circumvallation at Syracuse had not yet been completed \non the northern side. He now sailed through the straits of \nMessana, which were left completely unguarded, and arrived \nsafely at Himera on the north coast of Sicily. Here he announced \nhimself as the forerunner of larger succours, and began to levy an \narmy, which the magic of the Spartan name soon enabled him \nto effect ; and in a few days he was in a condition to march \ntowards Syracuse with about 3000 men. The Syracusans now \ndismissed all thoughts of surrender, and went out boldly to meet \nGylippus. who marched into Syracuse over the heights of Epipqlse, \nwhich the supineness of Xicias had left unguarded. Upon arriving \nin the city, Gylippus sent a message to the Athenians allowing \nthem a five days\' truce to collect their effects and evacuate \nthe island. Xicias returned no answer to this insulting proposal ; \nbut the operations of Gylippus soon showed that the tide of \naffairs was really turned. His first exploit was to capture \nthe Athenian fort at Labdalum, which made him master of \nEpipolae. He next commenced constructing a counter-wall to \nintersect the Athenian Hues on the northern side. This turn \nof affairs induced those Sicilian cities which had hitherto \nhesitated to embrace the side of Syracuse. Gylippus was also \n\n\n\nB.C. 413. \n\n\n\nATHENIANS IN SICILY. \n\n\n\n119 \n\n\n\nreinforced by the arrival of thirty triremes from Corinth, Leucas, \nand Ambracia. Nicias now felt that the attempt to blockade \nSyracnse with his present force was hopeless. He therefore \nresolved to occupy the headland of Plemmyrium, the southernmost \npoint of the entrance to the Great Harbour, which would be \na convenient station for watching the enemy, as well as for \nfacilitating the introduction of supplies. Here he accordingly \nerected three forts and formed a naval station. Some slight affairs \noccurred in which the balance of advantage was in favour \nof the Syracusans. By their change of station the Athenians were \n. now a besieged rather than a besieging force. Their triremes \nwere becoming leaky, and their soldiers and sailors were constantly \ndeserting. Nicias himself had fallen into a bad state of health ; \nand in this discouraging posture of affairs he wrote to Athens \nrequesting to be recalled, and insisting strongly on the necessity \nof sending reinforcements. \n\nThe Athenians refused to recall Nicias, but they determined on \nsending a large reinforcement to Sicily, under the joint command \nof Demosthenes and Eurymedon. The news of these fresh and \nextensive preparations incited the Lacedaemonians to more vigorous \naction. The peace, if such it can be called, was now openly \nbroken; and in the spring of 413 b.c. the Lacedaemonians, \nunder king Agis, invaded Attica itself, and, following the advice of \nAlcibiades, established themselves permanently at Decelea, a place \nsituated on the ridge of Mount Parnes, about 14 miles north \nof Athens, and commanding the Athenian plain. The city was \nthus placed in a state of siege. Scarcity began to be felt within \nthe walls ; the revenues were falling off, whilst on the other hand \nexpenses were increasing. \n\nMeanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans had gained such confidence \nthat they even ventured on a naval engagement with the \nAthenians. In the first battle the Athenians were victorious, \nbut the second battle, which lasted two days, ended in their \ndefeat. They were now obliged to haul up their ships in the \ninnermost part of the Great Harbour, under the lines of their \nfortified camp. A still more serious disaster than the loss of \nthe battle was the loss of their naval reputation. It was evident \nthat the Athenians had ceased to be invincible on the sea ; and \nthe Syracusans no longer despaired of overcoming them on their \nown element. \n\nSuch was the state of affairs when, to the astonishment of \nthe Syracusans, a fresh Athenian fleet of 75 triremes, under \nDemosthenes and Eurymedon, entered the Great Harbour with \nall the pomp and circumstance of war. It had on board a force \n\n\n\n120 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GEEECE. Chap. XII. \n\n\n\nof 5000 hoplites, of whom about a quarter were Athenians, and \na great number of light-armed troops. The active and enter- \nprising character of Demosthenes led him to adopt more vigorous \nmeasures than those which had been hitherto pursued. He \nsaw at once that whilst Epipolse remained in the possession of \nthe Syracusans there was no hope of taking then* city, and he \ntherefore directed all his efforts to the recapture of that position. \nBut his attempts were unavailing. He was defeated not only \nin an open assault upon the Syracusan wall, but in a nocturnal \nattempt to carry it by surprise. These reverses were aggravated \nby the breaking out of sickness among the troops. Demosthenes \nnow proposed to return home and assist in expelling the Lacedae- \nmonians from Attica, instead of pursuing an enterprise which \nseemed to be hopeless. But Nicias, who feared to return to \nAthens with the stigma of failure, refused to give his consent \nto this step. Demosthenes then urged Nicias at least to sail \nimmediately out of the Great Harbour, and take up their position \neither at Thapsus or Catana, where they could obtain abundant \nsupplies of provisions, and would have an open sea for the \nmanoeuvres of their fleet. But even to this proposal Nicias would \nnot consent; and the army and navy remained in their former \nposition. Soon afterwards, however, Gylippus received such large \nreinforcements, that Xicias found it necessary to adopt the advice \nof his colleague. Preparations were secretly made for their \ndeparture, the enemy appear to have had no suspicion of their \nintention and they were on the point of quitting their ill-fated \nquarters on the following morning, when on the very night before \n(27 Aug. 413 B.C.) an eclipse of the moon took place. The sooth- \nsayers who were consulted said that the army must wait thrice \nnine days, a full circle of the moon, before it could quit its present \nposition ; and the devout and superstitious Nicias forthwith \nresolved to abide by this decision. \n\nMeanwhile the intention of the Athenians became known to \nthe Syracusans, who determined to strike a blow before their \nenemy escaped. They accordingly attacked the Athenian station \nboth by sea and land. On land the attack of Gylippus was \nrepulsed ; but at sea the Athenian fleet was completely defeated, \nand Eurymedon, who commanded the right division, was slain. \nThe spirits of the Syracusans rose with their victories; and \nthough they would fornferly have been content with the mere \nretreat of the Athenians, they now resolved on effecting their \nutter destruction. With this view they blocked up the entrance \nof the Great Harbour with a line of vessels moored across it. All \nhope seemed now to be cut off from the Athenians, unless \n\n\n\nB.C. 413. \n\n\n\nFIGHT IN THE GREAT HARBOUR. \n\n\n\n121 \n\n\n\nthey could succeed in forcing this line and thus effecting their \nescape. The Athenian fleet still numbered 110 triremes, which \nNicias furnished with grappling-irons, in order to bring the enemy \nto close quarters, and then caused a large proportion of his land- \nforce to embark. \n\nNever perhaps was a battle fought under circumstances of such \nintense interest, or witnessed by so many spectators vitally \nconcerned in the result. The basin of the Great Harbour, \nabout 5 miles in circumference, in which nearly 200 ships, \neach with crews of more than 200 men, were about to engage, was \nlined with spectators. The Syracusan fleet was the first to leave \nthe shore. A considerable portion was detached to guard \nthe barrier at the mouth of the harbour. Hither the first \nand most impetuous attack of the Athenians was directed, who \nsought to break through the narrow opening which had been left \nfor the passage of merchant vessels. Their onset was repulsed, \nand the battle then became general. The shouts of the com- \nbatants, and the crash of the iron heads of the vessels as they \nwere driven together, resounded over the water, and were \nanswered on shore by the cheers or wailings of the spectators \nas their friends were victorious or vanquished. For a long time \nthe battle was maintained with heroic courage and dubious \nresult. At length, as the Athenian vessels began to yield and \nmake back towards the shore, a universal shriek of horror and \ndespair arose from the Athenian army, whilst shouts of joy \nand victory were raised from the pursuing vessels, and were \nechoed back from the Syracusans on land. As the Athenian \nvessels neared the shore their crews leaped out, and made for the \ncamp, whilst the boldest of the land army rushed forward to \nprotect the ships from being seized by the enemy. The Athenians \nsucceeded in saving only 60 ships, or about half their fleet. The \nSyracusan fleet, however, had been reduced to 50 ships ; and on \nthe same afternoon, Nicias and Demosthenes, as a last hope of \nescape, exhorted their men to make another attempt to break the \nenemy\'s line, and force their way out of the harbour. But the \ncourage of the crews was so completely damped that they positively \nrefused to re-embark. \n\nThe Athenian army still numbered 40,000 men; and as all \nchance of escape by sea was now hopeless, it was resolved to \nretreat by land to some friendly city, and there defend themselves \nagainst the attacks of the Syracusans. As the soldiers turned \nto quit that fatal encampment, the sense of their own woes \nwas for a moment suspended by the sight of their unburied \ncomrades, who seemed to reproach them with the neglect of a \n\n\n\n122 \n\n\n\nHISTORY" OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XII. \n\n\n\nsacred duty; but still more by the waitings and entreaties of \nthe wounded, who clung around their knees, and implored not \nto be abandoned to certain destruction. Amid this scene of \nuniversal woe and dejection, a fresh and unwonted spirit of energy \nand heroism seemed to be infused into Nicias. Though suffering \nunder an incurable complaint, he was everywhere seen marshalling \nhis troops, and encouraging them by his exhortations. The march \nwas directed towards the territory of the Sicels in the interior \nof the island. The army was formed into a hollow square with \nthe baggage in the middle; Nicias leading the van, and Demo- \nsthenes bringing up the rear. The road ascended by a sort \nof ravine over a steep hill called the Acrsean cliff, on which \nthe Syracusans had fortified themselves. After spending two \ndays in vain attempts to force this position, Nicias and Demosthenes \nresolved during the night to strike off to the left towards the \nsea. But they were overtaken, surrounded by superior forces, and \ncompelled to surrender at discretion. Out of the 40,000 who \nstarted from the camp only 10,000 at the utmost were left at \nthe end of the sixth day\'s march, the rest had either deserted \nor been slain. The prisoners were sent to work in the stone- \nquarries of Achradina and Epipoice* Here they were crowded \ntogether without any shelter, and with scarcely provisions enough \nto sustain life. The numerous bodies of those who died were \nleft to putrify where they had fallen, till at length the place \nbecame such an intolerable centre of stench and infection that, at \nthe end of seventy days, the Syracusans, for their own comfort \nand safety, were obliged to remove the survivors, who were sold \nas slaves. Nicias and Demosthenes were condemned to death in \nspite of all the efforts of Gylippus and Hermocrates to save them. \n\nSuch was the end of two of the largest and best appointed arma- \nments that had ever gone forth from Athens. Nicias, as we have \nseen, was from the first opposed to the expedition in which they \nwere employed, as pregnant with the most dangerous consequences \nto Athens ; and, though it must be admitted that in this respect \nhis views were sound, it cannot at the same time be concealed that \nhis own want of energy, and his incompetence as a general, were \nthe chief causes of the failure of the undertaking. His mistakes \ninvolved the fall of Demosthenes, an officer of far greater resolution \nand ability than himself, and who, had his counsels been followed, \nwould in all probability have conducted the enterprise to a safe \ntermination, though there was no longer room to hope for success. \n\n\n\nView, of the Theatre at Ephesus. \n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII. \n\nTHE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. \xe2\x80\x94 THIRD PERIOD, FROM THE SICILIAN \nEXPEDITION TO THE END OF THE WAR, B.C. 413-404. \n\nThe destruction of the Sicilian armament was a fatal blow to the \npower of Athens. It is astonishing that she was able to protract \nthe war so long with diminished strength and resources. Her situ- \nation inspired her enemies with new vigour ; states hitherto neutral \ndeclared against her ; her subject-allies prepared to throw off the \nyoke; even the Persian satraps and the court of Susa bestirred \nthemselves against her. The first blow to her empire was struck \nby the wealthy and populous island of Chios. This again was the \nwork of Alcibiades, the implacable enemy of his native land, at \nwhose advice a Lacedaemonian fleet was sent to the assistance of \nthe Chians. Their example was followed by all the other Athenian \nallies in Asia, with the exception of Samos, in which the demo- \ncratical party gained the upper hand. In the midst of this general \ndefection the Athenians did not give way to despair. Pericles had \nset apart a reserve of 1000 talents to meet the contingency of an \n\n\n\n124 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII. \n\n\n\nactual invasion. This still remained untouched, and now by an \nunanimous vote the penalty of death, which forbad its appropria- \ntion to any other purpose, was abolished, and the fund applied in \nfitting out a fleet against Chios. Samos became the head-quarters \nof the fie et. and the base of their operations during the remainder \nof the war. \n\nAfter a time the tide of success began to turn in favour of the \nAthenians. They recovered Lesbos and Clazoniense, defeated the \nChians. and laid waste then- territory. They also gained a victory \nover the Peloponnesians at Miletus ; while the Peloponnesian fleet \nhad lost the assistance of Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap, \nthrough the intrigues of Alcibiades. In the course of a few months \nAlcibiades had completely forfeited the confidence of the Lace- \ndaemonians. The Spartan king Agis, whose wife he had seduced, \nwas his personal enemy ; and after the defeat of the Peloponnesians \nat Miletus. Agis denounced him as a traitor, and persuaded the \nnew Ephors to send out instructions to put him to death. Of this, \nhowever, he was informed time enough to make his escape to \nTissaphernes at Magnesia. Here he ingratiated liimself into the \nconfidence of the satrap, and persuaded him that it was not for the \ninterest of Persia that either of the Grecian parties should be suc- \ncessful, but rather that they should wear each other out in their \nmutual struggles, when Persia would in the end succeed in expel- \nling both. This advice was adopted by the satrap ; and in order to \ncarry it into execution, steps were taken to secure the inactivity of \nthe Peloponnesian armament, which, if vigorously employed, was \npowerful enough to put a speedy end to the war. In order to \nsecure his return to Athens, Alcibiades now endeavoured to per- \nsuade Tissaphernes that it was more for the Persian interest to \nconclude a league with Athens than with Sparta ; but the only \npart of his advice which the satrap seems to have sincerely \nadopted was that of playing off one party against the other. \nAbout this, however, Alcibiades did not at all concern himself. It \nwas enough for his views, which had merely the selfish aim of his \nown restoration to Athens, if he could make it appear that he pos- \nsessed sufficient influence with Tissaphernes to procure his assist- \nance for the Athenians. He therefore began to communicate with \nthe Athenian generals at Samos, and held out the hope of a Persian \nalliance as the price of his restoration to his country. But as he \nboth hated and feared the Athenian democracy, he coupled his \noffer with the condition that a revolution should be effected at \nAthens, and an oligarchy established. The Athenian generals \ngreedily caught at the proposal : and though the great mass of \nthe soldiery were violently opposed to it, they were silenced, if not \n\n\n\nB.C. 412. \n\n\n\nREVOLUTION AT ATHENS. \n\n\n\n125 \n\n\n\nsatisfied, when told that Athens could be saved only by means of \nPersia. The oligarchical conspirators formed themselves into a \nconfederacy, and Pisander was sent to Athens to lay the proposal \nbefore the Athenian assembly. It met, as it might be supposed, \nwith the most determined opposition. The single but unanswerable \nreply of Pisander was, the necessities of the republic ; and at length \na reluctant vote for a change of constitution was extorted from the \npeople. Pisander and ten others were despatched to treat with \nAlcibiades and Tissaphernes. \n\nUpon their arrival in Ionia they informed Alcibiades that \nmeasures had been taken for establishing an oligarchical form of \ngovernment at Athens, and required him to fulfil his part of the \nengagement by procuring the aid and alliance of Persia. But Alci- \nbiades knew that he had undertaken what he could not perform, \nand he now resolved to escape from the dilemma by one of his \nhabitual artifices. He received the Athenian deputation in the pre* \nsence of Tissaphernes himself, and made such extravagant demands \non behalf of the satrap that Pisander and his colleagues indignantly \nbroke off the conference. \n\nNotwithstanding the conduct of Alcibiades the oligarchical con- \nspirators proceeded with the revolution at Athens, in which they \nhad gone too far to recede. Pisander, with five of the envoys, re- \nturned to Athens to complete the work they had begun. \n\nPisander proposed in the assembly, and carried a resolution, that \na committee of ten should be appointed to prepare a new constitu- \ntion, which was to be submitted to the approbation of the people. \nBut when the day appointed for that purpose arrived, the assembly \nwas not convened in the Pnyx, but in the temple of Poseidon at \nColonus, a village upwards of a mile from Athens. Here the con- \nspirators could plant their own partisans, and were less liable to be \noverawed by superior numbers. Pisander obtained the assent of \nthe meeting to the following revolutionary changes : \xe2\x80\x94 U The aboli- \ntion of all the existing magistracies ; 2. The cessation of all pay- \nments for the discharge of civil functions ; 3. The appointment of a \ncommittee of five persons, who were to name ninety-five more ; \neach of the hundred thus constituted to choose three persons ; the \nbody of Four Hundred thus formed to be an irresponsible govern- \nment, holding its sittings in the senate house. The four hundred \nwere to convene a select body of five thousand citizens whenever \nthey thought proper. Nobody knew who these five thousand were, \nbut they answered two purposes, namely, to give an air of greater \npopularity to the government, as well as to overawe the people by \nan exaggerated notion of its strength. \n\nThus perished the Athenian democracy, after an existence of \n\n\n\n126 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIII. \n\n\n\nnearly a century since its establishment by Clisthenes. The revolu- \ntion was begun from despair of the foreign relations of Athens, and \nfrom the hope of assistance from Persia ; but it wa3 carried out \n. the machinations of the conspirators after that delusion \n\nhad ceased. \n\nAt .Samos the Athenian army refused to recognise the new \ngovernment. At the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasylrus, a \nmeeting was called in which the soldiers pledged themselves to \nmaintain the democracy, to continue the war against Peloponnesus, \nand to put down the usurpers at Athens. The soldiers, laying aside \nfor awhile their mili tary character, constituted themselves into an \nassembly of the people, deposed several of their officers, and ap- \npointed others whom they could better trust. Thrasybulus pro- \nposed the recall of Alcibiades, notwithstanding his connection with \nthe oligarchical conspiracy, because it was believed that he was \nnow able and willing to aid the democratic cause with the gold \nand forces of Persia. After considerable opposition the proposal \nwas agreed to ; Alcibiades was brought to Samos and introduced \nto the assembly, where by his magnificent promises, and extra- \nvagant boasts respecting his influence with Tissaphernes, he once \nmore succeeded in deceiving the Athenians. The accomplished \ntraitor vas elected one of the generals, and, in pursuance of his \nartful policy, began to pass backwards and forwards between \nSamos and 3Iagnesia, with the view of inspiring both the satrap \nand the Athenians with a reciprocal idea of his influence with \neither, and of instilling distrust of Tissaphernes into the minds of \nthe Peloponnesians. \n\nAt the first news of the re-establishment of democracy at Samos, \ndistrust and discord had broken out among the Four Hundred. \nAntiphon and Phrynichus, at the head of the extreme section of \nthe oligarchical party, were for admitting a Lacedaemonian garrison. \nBut others, discontented with their share of power, began to affect \nmore popular sentiments, among whom were Theramenes and Aris- \ntocrates. Meantime Eubcea, supported by the Lacedaemonians and \nBoeotians, revolted from Athens. The loss of this island seemed a \ndeath-blow. The Lacedaemonians might now easily blockade the \n[ of Athens and starve her into surrender : whilst the partisans \nof the Pour Hundred would doubtless co-operate with the enemy. \nBut from this fate they were saved by the characteristic slowness \nof the Lacedaemonians, who confined themselves to securing the \nconquest of Eubcea. Thus left unmolested, the Athenians convened \nan assembly in the Pnyx. Votes were passed for deposing the \nFour Hundred, and placing the government in the hands of the \n5000, of whom every citizen who could furnish a panoply might be \n\n\n\nB.C. 411. NAVAL VICTORY AT CYNOSSEMA. \n\n\n\n127 \n\n\n\na member. In short, the old constitution was restored, except that \nthe franchise was restricted to 5000 citizens, and payment for the \ndischarge of civil functions abolished. In subsequent assemblies, \nthe Archons, the Senate, and other institutions were revived ; and \na vote was passed to recall Alcibiades and some of his friends. The \nnumber of the 5000 was never exactly observed, and was soon en- \nlarged into universal citizenship. Thus the Four Hundred were \noverthrown after a reign of four months, B.C. 411. \n\nWhile these things were going on at Athens, the war was \nprosecuted with vigour on the coast of Asia Minor. Mindarus, \nwho now commanded the Peloponnesian fleet, disgusted at length \nby the often-broken promises of Tissaphernes, and the scanty \nand irregular pay which he furnished, set sail from Miletus and \nproceeded to the Hellespont, with the intention of assisting the \nsatrap Pharnabazus, and of effecting, if possible, the revolt of the \nAthenian dependencies in that quarter. Hither he was pursued by \nthe Athenian fleet under Thrasyllus. In a few days an engagement \nensued (in August, 411 B.C.), in the famous straits between Sestos \nand Abydos, in which the Athenians, though with a smaller force, \ngained the victory, and erected a trophy on the promontory of \nCynossema, near the tomb and chapel of the Trojan queen \nHecuba. The Athenians followed up their victory by the reduc- \ntion of Cyzicus, which had revolted from them. A month or \ntwo afterwards another obstinate engagement took place between \nthe Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets near Abydos, which lasted \na whole day, and was at length decided in favour of the Athenians \nby the arrival of Alcibiades with his squadron of eighteen ships \nfrom Samos. \n\nShortly after this battle Tissaphernes arrived at the Hellespont \nwith the view of conciliating the offended Peloponnesians. He \nwas not only jealous of the assistance which the latter were now \nrendering to Pharnabazus, but it is also evident that his temporiz- \ning policy had displeased the Persian court. This appears from \nhis conduct on the present occasion, as well as from the subsequent \nappointment of Cyrus to the supreme command on the Asiatic \ncoast, as we shall presently have to relate. When Alcibiades, \nwho imagined that Tissaphernes was still favourable to the Athe- \nnian cause, waited on him with the customary presents, he was \narrested by order of the satrap, and sent in custody to Sardis. At \nthe end of a month, however, he contrived to escape to Clazomenae, \nand again joined the Athenian fleet early in the spring of 410 b.c. \nIMindarus, with the assistance of Pharnabazus on the land side, \nwas now engaged in the siege of Cyzicus, which the Athenian \nadmirals determined to relieve. Here a battle ensued, in which \n\n\n\n128 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIII. \n\n\n\nMindarus was slain, the Lacedaemonians and Persians routed, and \nalmost the whole Peloponnesian fleet captured. The severity of \nthis blow was pictured in the laconic epistle in which Hippocrates, \nthe second in command,* announced it to the Ephors : "Our good \nluck is gone ; Mindarus is slain ; the men are starving ; we know \nnot what to do." \n\nThe results of this victory were most important. Perinthus and \nSelymbria, as well as Cyzicus, were recovered ; and the Athenians, \nonce more masters of the Propontis, fortified the town of Chryso- \npolis, over against Byzantium, at the entrance of the Bosporus ; \nre-established their toll of ten per cent, on all vessels passing from \nthe Euxine ; and left a squadron to guard the strait and collect \nthe dues. So great was the discouragement of the Lacedaemonians \nat the loss of their fleet that the Ephor Enclius proceeded to Athens \nto treat for peace on the basis of both parties standing just as they \nwere. The Athenian assembly was at this time led by the dema- \ngogue Cleophon, a lamp-maker, known to us by the later comedies \nof Aristophanes. Cleophon appears to have been a man of con- \nsiderable ability ; but the late victories had inspired him with too \nsanguine hopes, and he advised the Athenians to reject the terms \nproposed by Endius. Athens thus threw away the golden oppor- \ntunity of recruiting her shattered forces of which she stood so \nmuch in need ; and to this unfortunate advice must be ascribed \nthe calamities which subsequently overtook her. \n\nThe possession of the Bosporus reopened to the Athenians the \ntrade of the Euxine. From his lofty fortress at Decelea the \nSpartan king Agis could descry the corn-ships from the Euxine \nsailing into the harbour of the Piraeus, and felt how fruitless it was \nto occupy the fields of Attica whilst such abundant supplies of \nprovisions were continually finding their way to the city. \n\nIn b.c. 408 the important towns of Chalcedon, Selymbria, and \nByzantium fell into the hands of the Athenians, thus leaving them \nundisputed masters of the Propontis. \n\nThese great achievements of Alcibiades naturally paved the way \nfor his return to Athens. In the spring of 407 B.C. he proceeded \nwith the fleet to Samos, and from thence sailed to Piraeus. His \nreception was far more favourable than he had ventured to antici- \npate. The whole population of Athens flocked down to Piraeus to \nwelcome him, and escorted him to the city. He seemed to be in \nthe present juncture the only man capable of restoring the grandeur \nand the empire of Athens : he was accordingly named general with \nunlimited powers, and a force of 100 triremes, 1500 hoplites, and \n\n* Called Epistoleus or " Secretary " in the Lacedaemonian fleet. The com- \nmander of the fleet had the title of Xavarchm. \n\n\n\nB.C. 407. \n\n\n\nPROCEEDINGS OF LYSANDER. \n\n\n\n129 \n\n\n\n150 cavalry placed at Lis disposal. Before Lis departure Le took \nan opportunity to atone for tLe impiety of wLicL Le Lad been \nsuspected. AltLougli Lis armament was in perfect readiness, Le \ndelayed its sailing till after tLe celebration of tLe Eleusinian \nmysteries at tLe beginning of September. For seven years the \ncustomary procession across the TLriasian plain Lad been suspended, \nowing to tLe occupation of Decelea by tLe enemy, wLicL com- \npelled tLe sacred troop to proceed by sea. Alcibiades now escorted \ntliem on tlieir progress and return with Lis forces, and tLus suc- \nceeded in reconciling himself with the offended goddesses and with \ntheir holy priests, the Eumolpidse. \n\nMeanwhile a great change Lad been going on in the state of \naffairs in the East. We have already seen that the Great King- \nwas displeased with the vacillating policy of Tissaphernes, and \nhad determined to adopt more energetic measures against the \nAthenians. During the absence of Alcibiades, C} r rus, the younger \nson of Darius, a prince of a bold and enterprising spirit, and \nanimated with a lively hatred of Athens, had arrived at the coast \nfor the purpose of carrying out the altered policy of the Persian \ncourt ; and with that view he had been invested with the \nsatrapies of Lydia, the Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia. The \narrival of Cyrus opens the last phase of the Peloponnesian war. \nAnother event, in the highest degree unfavourable to the Athenian \ncause, was the accession of Lysander, as Navarchus, to the ^com- \nmand of the Peloponnesian fleet. Lysander was the third of the \nremarkable men whom Sparta produced during the war. In ability, \nenergy, and success he may be compared with Brasidas and Gy- \nlippus, though immeasurably inferior to the former in every moral \nquality. He was born of poor parents, and was by descent one of \nthose Lacedaemonians who could never enjoy the full rights of \nSpartan citizenship. His ambition was boundless, and he was \nwholly unscrupulous about the means which he employed to gratify \nit. In pursuit of his objects he hesitated at neither deceit, nor \nperjury, nor cruelty, and he is reported to have laid it down as one \nof his maxims in life to avail himself of the fox\'s skin where the \nlion\'s failed. \n\nLysander had taken up his station at Ephesus, with the Lace- \ndaemonian fleet of 70 triremes ; and when Cyrus arrived at Sardis, \nin the spring of 407 B.C., he hastened to pay his court to the young- \nprince, and was received with every mark of favour. A vigorous \nline of action was resolved on. Cyrus at once offered 500 talents, \nand affirmed that, if more were needed, he was prepared even to \ncoin into money the very throne of gold and silver on which he \nsat. In a banquet which ensued Cyrus drank to the health of \n\n\n\n130 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIII. \n\n\n\nLysander, and desired him to name any wish which he could \ngratify. Lysander immediately requested an addition of an obolus \nto the daily pay of the seamen. Cyrus was surprised at so disinter- \nested a demand, and from that day conceived a high degree of \nrespect and confidence for the Spartan commander. Lysander on \nhis return to Ephesus employed himself in refitting his fleet, and in \norganising clubs in the Spartan interest in the cities of Asia. \n\nAleibiades set sail from Athens in September. Being ill pro- \nvided with funds for carrying on the war, he was driven to make \npredatory excursions for the purpose of raising money. During his \nbsence he intrusted the bulk of the fleet at Samos to his pilot, \nAntiochus, with strict injunctions not to venture on an action. \nNotwithstanding these orders, however. Antiochus sailed out and \nbrought the Peloponnesian fleet to an engagement off Xotiurn, in \nwhich the Athenians were defeated with the loss of 15 ships, and \nAntiochus himself was slain. Among the Athenian armament \nitself great dissatisfaction was growing up against Aleibiades \nThough at the head of a splendid force, he had in three months \ntime accomplished literally nothing. His debaucheries and dis- \nsolute conduct on shore were charged against him, as well as his \nselecting for confidential posts not the men best fitted for them, \nbut those who, like Antiochus. were the boon companions and the \nchosen associates of his revels. These accusations forwarded to \nAthens, and fomented by his secret enemies, soon produced an \nentire revulsion in the public feeling towards Aleibiades. The \nAthenians voted that he should be dismissed from his command, \nand they appointed in his place ten new generals, with Conon at \ntheir head. \n\nThe year of Lysander \'s command expired about the same time as \nthe appointmerit of Conon to the Athenian fleet. Through the \nintrigues of Lysander, his successor Callicratidas was received with \ndissatisfaction both by the Lacedaemonian seamen and by Cyrus. \nLend complaints were raised of the impolicy of an annual change \nof commander. Lysander threw all sorts of difficulties into the \nway of his successor, to whom he handed over an empty chest, \nhaving first repaid to Gyres all the money in his possession under \nthe pretence that it was a private loan. The straightforward con- \nduct of Callicratidas, however, who summoned the Lacedaemonian \ncommanders, and after a dignified remonstrance, plainly put the \nquestion whether he should return home or remain, silenced all \nopposition. But he was sorely embarrassed for funds. Cyrus \ntreated him with haughtiness : and when he waited on that prince \nat Sardis, he was dismissed not only without money, but even with- \nout an audience. Callicratidas, however, had too much energy to \n\n\n\nB.C. 400. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF ARGINUSiE. \n\n\n\n131 \n\n\n\nbe daunted by such obstacles. Sailing with his fleet from Ephesus \nto Miletus, he laid before the assembly of that city, in a spirited \naddress, all the ills they had suffered at the hands of the Persians, and \nexhorted them to bestir themselves and dispense with the Persian \nalliance. He succeeded in persuading the Milesians to make him \na large grant of money, whilst the leading men even came forward \nwith private subscriptions. By means of this assistance he was \nenabled to add 50 triremes to the 90 delivered to him by Lysander ; \nand the Chians further provided him with ten days\' pay for the \nseamen. \n\nThe fleet of Callicratidas was now double that of Conon. The \nlatter was compelled to run before the superior force of Callicra- \ntidas. Both fleets entered the harbour of Mytilene at the same \ntime, where a battle ensued in which Conon lost 30 ships, but lie \nsaved the remaining 40 by hauling them ashore under the walls of \nthe town. Callicratidas then blockaded Mytilene both by sea \nand land ; but Conon contrived to despatch a trireme to Athens \nwith the news of his desperate position. \n\nAs soon as the Athenians received intelligence of the blockade \nof Mytilene, vast efforts were made for its relief ; and we learn \nwith surprise that in thirty days a fleet of 110 triremes was \nequipped and despatched from Piraeus. The armament assembled \nat Samos, where it was reinforced by scattered Athenian ships, \nand by contingents from the allies, to the extent of 40 vessels. \nThe whole fleet of 150 sail then proceeded to the small islands of \nArginusse, near the coast of Asia, and facing Malea, the south- \neastern cape of Lesbos. Callicratidas, who went out to meet them, \ntook up his station at the latter point, leaving a squadron of 50 \nships to maintain the blockade of Mytilene. He had thus only 120 \nships to oppose to the 150 of the Athenians, and his pilot advised \nliim to retire before the superior force of the enemy. But Calli- \ncratidas replied that he would not disgrace himself by flight, and \nthat if he should perish Sparta would not feel his loss. The battle \nwas long and obstinate. All order was speedily lost, and the ships \nfought singly with one another. In one of these contests, Callicra- \ntidas, who stood on the prow of his vessel ready to board the enemy, \nwas thrown overboard by the shock of the vessels as they met, and \nperished. At length victory began to declare for the Athenians. \nThe Lacedaemonians, after losing 77 vessels, retreated with the re- \nmainder to Chios and Phocsea. The loss of the Athenians was 25 \nvessels. \n\nThe battle of Arginusse led to a deplorable event, which has for \never sullied the pages of Athenian history. At least a dozen Athe- \nnian vessels were left floating about in a disabled condition after \n\n\n\n132 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XIII, \n\nthe battle ; but, owing to a violent storm that ensued, no attempt \nwas made to rescue the survivors, or to collect the bodies of the \ndead for burial. Eight of the ten generals were summoned home \nto answer for this conduct ; Gonon, by his situation at Mytilene\', \nwas of course exculpated, and Archestratus had died. Six of the \ngenerals obeyed the summons, and were denounced in the As- \nsembly by Theramenes, formerly one of the Four Hundred, for \nneglect of duty. The generals replied that they had commissioned \nTheramenes himself and Thrasybulus, each of whom commanded \na trireme in the engagement, to undertake the duty, and had assigned \n48 ships to them for that purpose. This, however, was denied by \nTheramenes. There are discrepancies in the evidence, and we have \ndo materials for deciding positively which statement was true; \nbut probability inclines to the side of the generals. Public feeling, \nhowever, ran very strongly against them, and was increased by an \nincident which occurred during their trial. After a day\'s debate \nthe question was adjourned ; and in the interval the festival of the \nApaturia was celebrated, in which, according to annual custom, \nthe citizens met together according to their families and phratries. \nThose who had perished at Arginusse were naturally missed on \nsuch an occasion ; and the usually cheerful character of the festival \nwas deformed and rendered melancholy by the relatives of the \ndeceased appearing in black clothes and with shaven heads. The \npassions of the people were violently roused. At the next meeting \nof the Assembly, Callixenus, a senator, proposed that the people \nshould at once proceed to pass its verdict on the generals, though \nthey had been only partially heard in their defence ; and, more- \nover, that they should all be included in one sentence, though it \nwas contrary to a rule of Attic law, known as the psephisma of \nCanonus, to indict citizens otherwise than individually. The \nPrytanes, or senators of the presiding tribe, at first refused to put \nthe question to the Assembly in this illegal way ; but their oppo- \nsition was at length overawed by clamour and violence. There \nwas, however, one honourable exception. The philosopher Socrates, \nwho was one of the Prytanes, refused to withdraw his protest. But \nhis opposition was disregarded, and the proposal of Callixenus was \ncarried. The generals were condemned, delivered over to the \nEleven for execution, and compelled to drink the fatal hemlock. \nAmong them was Pericles, the son of the celebrated statesman. \n\nIn the following year (b.c. 405), through the influence of Cyrus \nand the other allies of Sparta, Lysander again obtained the com- \nmand of the Peloponnesian fleet, though nominally under Aracus \nas admiral; since it was contrary to Spartan usage that the same \nman should be twice Navarchus. His return to power was marked \n\n\n\nB.C. 405. CAPTURE OF THE ATHENIAN FLEET. \n\n\n\n133 \n\n\n\nby more vigorous measures. He sailed to the Hellespont, and laid \nsiege to Lampsacus. The Athenian fleet arrived too late to save \nthe town, but they proceeded up the strait and took post at iEgos- \npotami, or the "Goat\'s River ;" a place which had nothing to re- \ncommend it, except its vicinity to Lampsacus, from which it was \nseparated by a channel somewhat less than two miles broad. It \nwas a mere desolate beach, without houses or inhabitants, so that \nall the supplies had to be fetched from Sestos, or from the sur- \nrounding country, and the seamen were compelled to leave their \nships in order to obtain their meals. Under these circumstances \nthe Athenians were very desirous of bringing Lysander to an en- \ngagement. But the Spartan commander, who was in a strong \nposition, and abundantly furnished with provisions, was in no hurry \nto run any risks. In vain did the Athenians sail over several days \nin succession to offer him battle ; they always found his ships ready \nmanned, and drawn up in too strong a position to warrant an \nattack ; nor could they by all their manoeuvres succeed in enticing \nhim out to combat. This cowardice, as they deemed it, on the \npart of the Lacedsemonians, begat a corresponding negligence on \ntheirs ; discipline was neglected and the men allowed to straggle \nalmost at will. It was in vain that Alcibiades, who since his dis- \nmissal resided in a fortress in that neighbourhood, remonstrated \nwith the Athenian generals on the exposed nature of the station \nthey had chosen, and advised them to proceed to Sestos. His \ncounsels were received with taunts\' and insults. At length, on the \nfifth day, Lysander, having watched an opportunity when the \nAthenian seamen had gone on shore and were dispersed over the \ncountry, rowed swiftly across the strait with all his ships. He found \nthe Athenian fleet, with the exception of 10 or 12 vessels, totally \nunprepared, and he captured nearly the whole of it, without having \noccasion to strike a single blow. Of the 180 ships which composed \nthe fleet, only the trireme of Conon himself, the Paralus, and 8 \nor 10 other vessels, succeeded in escaping. Conon was afraid to \nreturn to Athens after so signal a disaster, and took refuge with \nEvagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus. \n\nBy this momentous victory (September, B.C. 405) the Pelo- \nponnesian war was virtually brought to an end. Lysander, secure \nof an easy triumph, was in no haste to gather it by force. The \ncommand of the Euxine enabled him to control the supplies of \nAthens ; and sooner or later, a few weeks of famine must decide \nher fall. He now sailed forth to take possession of the Athenian \ntowns, which fell one after another into his power as soon as \nhe appeared before them. About November he arrived at JEgina, \nwith an overwhelming fleet of 150 triremes, and proceeded to \n\n\n\n134 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIII. \n\n\n\ndevastate Salamis and blockade Piraeus. At the same time \nthe whole Peloponnesian army was marched into Attica, and \nencamped in the precincts of the Academns, at the very gates of \nAthens. Famine soon began to be felt within the walls, and at \nthe end of three months it became so dreadful, that the Athenians \nsaw themselves compelled to submit to the terms of the conqueror. \nThese terms were : That the long walls and the fortifications of \nPiraeus should be demolished : that the Athenians should give up \nall their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own \nterritory ; that they should surrender all their ships of war ; that \nthey should readmit all their exiles ; and that they should become \nallies of Sparta. \n\nIt was about the middle or end of March, b.c. 404, that Lysander \nsailed into Piraeus, and took formal possession of Athens ; the war, \nin singular conformity with the prophecies current at the beginning \nof it, having lasted for a period of thrice nine, or 27 years. The \ninsolence of the victors added another blow to the feelings of the \nconquered. The work of destruction, at which Lysander presided, \nwas converted into a sort of festival. Female flute-players and \nwreathed dancers inaugurated the demolition of the strong and \nproud bulwarks of Athens ; and as the massive walls fell piece by \npiece exclamations arose from the ranks of the Peloponnesians that \nfreedom had at length begun to dawn upon Greece. \n\n\n\n\nCoin of Athens \n\n\n\n\nthe thirty tyrants, and the death of socrates, \nb.c. 404-399. \n\n\n\nThe fall of Athens brought back a host of exiles, all of them the \nenemies of her democratical constitution. Of these the most dis- \ntinguished was Critias, a man of wealth and family, the uncle of \nPlato, and once the intimate friend of Socrates, distinguished both \nfor his literary and political talents, but of unmeasured ambition \nand unscrupulous conscience. Critias and his companions soon \nfound a party with which they could co-operate ; and supported by \nLysander they proposed in the Assembly that a committee of thirty \nshould be named to draw up laws for the future government of the \ncity, and to undertake its temporary administration. Among the \nmost prominent of the thirty names were those of Critias and \nTheramenes. The proposal was of course carried. Lysander him- \nself addressed the Assembly, and contemptuously told them that \nthey had better take thought for their personal safety, which now \nlay at his mercy, than for their political constitution. The com- \nmittee thus appointed soon obtained the title of the Thirty Tyrants, \nthe name by which they have become known in all subsequent \ntime. After naming an entirely new Senate, and appointing fresh \nmagistrates, they proceeded to exterminate their most obnoxious \nopponents. But Critias, and the more violent party among them, \nstill called for more blood ; and with the view of obtaining it, pro- \ncured a Spartan garrison, under the harmost Callibius, to be in- \n\n\n\n136 \n\n\n\nBISTORT OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIV. \n\n\n\nstalled in the Acropolis. Besides this force, they had an organized \nband of assassins at their disposal. Blood now flowed on all sides. \nMany of the leading men of Athens fell, others took to flight. \n\nThus the reign of terror was completely established. In the \nbosom of the Thirty, however, there was a party, headed by Thera- \nnienes, who disapproved of these proceedings. But his moderation \ncost him his life. One day as he entered the Senate-house, Critias \nrose and denounced him as a public enemy, and ordered him to be \ncarried off to instant death. Upon hearing these words Thera- \nmenes sprang for refuge to the altar in the Senate-house ; but he \nwas dragged away by Satyrus, the cruel and unscrupulous head of \nthe "Eleven," a body of officers who carried into execution the \npenal sentence of the law. Being conveyed to prison, he was com- \npelled to drink the fatal hemlock. The constancy of his end might \nhave adorned a better life. After swallowing the draught, he \njerked on the floor a drop which remained in the cup, according to \nthe custom of the game called cottabos, exclaiming, " This to the \nhealth of the gentle Critias ! " \n\nAlcibiades had been included by the Thirty in the list of \nexiles; but the fate which now overtook him seems to have \nsprung from the fears of the Lacedsenionians, or perhaps from \nthe personal hatred of Agis. After\' the battle of iEgospotami, \nPharnabazus permitted the Athenian exile to live in Phrygia, and \nassigned him a revenue for his maintenance. But a despatch \ncame out from Sparta to Lysander, directing that Alcibiades \nshould be put to death. Lysander communicated the order \nto Pharnabazus, who arranged for carrying it into execution. The \nhouse of Alcibiades was surrounded with a band of assassins, \nand set on fire. He rushed out with drawn sword upon his assail- \nants, who shrank from the attack, but who slew him from a \ndistance with their javelins and arrows. Timandra, a female with \nwhom he lived, performed towards his body the last offices of \nduty and affection. Thus perished miserably, in the vigour \nof his age, one of the most remarkable, but not one of the \ngreatest, characters in Grecian history. With qualities which, \nproperly applied, might have rendered him the greatest bene- \nfactor of Athens, he contrived to attain the infamous distinction of \nbeing that citizen who had inflicted upon her the most signal \namount of damage. \n\nMeantime an altered state of feeling was springing up in \nGreece. Athens had ceased to be an object of fear or jealousy, \nand those ^elings began now to be directed towards Sparta. \nLysander had risen to a height of unparalleled power. He \nwas in a manner idolized. Poets showered their praises on \n\n\n\nB.C. 404. \n\n\n\nTHE THIRTY DEPOSED. \n\n\n\n137 \n\n\n\nhim, and even altars were raised in his honour by the Asiatic \nGreeks. In the name of Sparta he exercised almost uncontrolled \nauthority in the cities he had reduced, including Athens itself. \nBut it was soon discovered that, instead of the freedom promised \nby the Spartans, only another empire had been established, whilst \nLysander was even meditating to extort from the subject cities a \nyearly tribute of one thousand talents. And all these oppressions \nwere rendered still more intolerable by the overweening pride and \nharshness of Lysander\'s demeanour. \n\nEven in Sparta itself the conduct of Lysander was beginning to \ninspire disgust and jealousy. Pausanias, son of Plistoanax, who \nwas now king with Agis, as well as the new Ephors appointed in \nSeptember, b.c. 404, disapproved of his proceedings. The Thebans \nand Corinthians themselves were beginning to sympathise with \nAthens, and to regard the Thirty as mere instruments for sup- \nporting the Spartan dominion; whilst Sparta in her turn looked \nupon them as the tools of Lysander\'s ambition. Many of the \nAthenian exiles had found refuge in Boeotia : and one of them, \nThrasybulus, with the aid of Ismenias and other Theban citizens, \nstarting from Thebes at the head of a small band of exiles, seized \nthe fortress of Phyle, in the passes of Mount Parnes and on the" \ndirect road to Athens. The Thirty marched out to attack Thrasy- \nbulus, at the head of the Lacedaemonian garrison and a strong \nAthenian force. But their attack was repulsed with considerable \nloss. \n\nShortly afterwards Thrasybulus marched from Phyle to Piraeus, \nwhich was now an open town, and seized upon it without opposi- \ntion. When the whole force of the Thirty, including the Lacedae- \nmonians, marched on the following day to attack him, he retired \nto the hill of Munychia, the citadel of Piraeus, the only approach \nto which was by a steep ascent. Here he drew up his hoplites in \nfiles of ten deep, posting behind them his slingers and dartmen. \nHe exhorted his men to stand patiently till the enemy came within \nreach of the missiles. At the first discharge the assailing column \nseemed to waver ; and Thrasybulus, taking advantage of their con- \nfusion, charged down the hill, and completely routed them, killing \nseventy, among whom was Critias himself. The loss of their leader \nhad thrown the majority into the hands of the party formerly led \nby Theramenes, who resolved to depose the Thirty and constitute \na new oligarchy of Ten. Some of the Thirty were re-elected into \nthis body ; but the more violent colleagues of Critias were deposed, \nand retired for safety to Eleusis. The new government of the Ten \nsent to Sparta to solicit further aid ; and a similar application was \nmade at the same time from the section of the Thirty at Eleusis. \n\n\n\njag \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIV. \n\n\n\nTheir request was complied with : and Lysander once more entered \nAthens at the head of a Lacedaemonian force. Fortunately, how- \never, the jealousy of the Lacedaemonians towards Lysander led \nthem at this critical juncture to supersede him in the command. \nKing Pausanias was appointed to conduct an army into Attica, and \nwhen he encamped in the Academus he was joined by Lysander \nand his forces. It was known at Athens that the views of Pausa- \nnias were unfavourable to the proceedings of Lysander ; and the \npresence of the Spartan king elicited a vehement reaction against \nthe oligarchy, which fear had liitherto suppressed. All parties \nsent envoys to Sparta. The Ephors and the Lacedaemonian \nAssembly referred the question to a committee of fifteen, of whom \nPausanias was one. The decision of this board was : That the \nexiles in Piraeus should be readmitted to Athens, and that there \nshould be an amnesty for all that had passed, except as regarded \nthe Thirty and the Ten. \n\nWhen these terms were settled and sworn to. the Peloponnesians \nquitted Attica ; and Tkrasybulus and the exiles, marching in solemn \nprocfeasioH from Piraeus to Athens, ascended to the Acropolis and \noffered up a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving. An assembly of \nthe people was then held, and, after Tkrasybulus had addressed \nan animated reproof to the oligarchical party, the democracy was \nunanimously restored. This important counter-revolution took \nplace in the spring of 403 B.C. The archons, the senate of \n500, the public assembly, and the dicasteries seem to have \nbeen reconstituted in the same form as before the capture of the \ncity. \n\nThus was terminated, after a sway of eight months, the despotism \nof the Thirty. The year which contained their rule was not named \nafter the archon, but was termed "the year of anarchy." The \nfirst archon drawn after their fall was Euclides, who gave his \nnanie to a year ever afterwards memorable among the Athenians. \n\nFor the next few years the only memorable event in the history \nof Athens is the death of Socrates. This celebrated philosopher \nwas born in the year 468 B.C., in the immediate neighbourhood of \nAthens. His father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor, and Socrates \nwas brought up to, and for some time practised, the same profes- \nsion. He was married to Xanthippe\', by whom he had three sons: \nbut her bad temper has rendered her name proverbial for a con- \njugal scold. His physical constitution was healthy, robust, and \nwonderfully enduring. Indifferent alike to heat and cold, the \nsame scanty and homely clothing sufficed him both in .summer and \nwinter ; and even in the campaign of Potidsea, amidst the snows \nof a Tm-acian winter, he went barefooted. But though thus gifted \n\n\n\nBX\\ 399. \n\n\n\nCONDEMNATION OF SOCRATES. \n\n\n\n139 \n\n\n\nwith strength of body and of mind, he was far from being endowed \nwith personal beauty. His thick lips, flat nose, and prominent \neyes, gave him the appearance of a Silenus, or satyr. He served \nwith credit as an hoplite at Potidsea (b.c. 432), Delium (b.c. 424), \nand Amphipolis (b.c. 422) ; but it was not till late in life, in the \nyear 406 b.c, that he filled any political office. He was one of the \nPrytanes when, after the battle of Arginusse, Callixenus submitted \nhis proposition respecting the six generals to the public Assembly, \nand his refusal on that occasion to put an unconstitutional question \nto the vote has been already recorded. He had a strong persua- \nsion that he was intrusted with a divine mission, and he believed \nhimself to be attended by a daemon, or genius, whose admonitions \nhe frequently heard, not, however, in the way of excitement, but of \nrestraint. He never wrote anything, but he made oral instruction \nthe great business of his life. Early in the morning he frequented \nthe public walks, the gymnasia, and the schools; whence he ad- \njourned to the market-place at its most crowded hours, and thus \nspent the whole day in conversing with young and old, rich and \npoor, \xe2\x80\x94 with all in short who felt any desire for his instructions. \n\nThat a reformer and destroyer, like Socrates, of ancient preju- \ndices and fallacies which passed current under the name of wisdom \nshould have raised up a host of enemies is only what might be \nexpected ; but in his case this feeling was increased by the manner \nin which he fulfilled his mission. The oracle of Delphi, in response \nto a question put by his friend Chserephon, had affirmed that no \nman was wiser than Socrates. No one was more perplexed at \nthis declaration than Socrates himself, since he was conscious \nof possessing no wisdom at all. However, he determined to test \nthe accuracy of the priestess, for, though he had little wisdom, \nothers might have still less. He therefore selected an eminent \npolitician who enjoyed a high reputation for wisdom, and soon \nelicited, by his scrutinising method of cross-examination, that this \nstatesman\'s reputed wisdom was no wisdom at all. But of this he \ncould not convince the subject of his examination; whence Socrates \nconcluded that lie was wiser than this politican, inasmuch as he \nwas conscious of his own ignorance, and therefore exempt from the \nerror of believing himself wise when in reality he was not so. The \nsame experiment was tried witli the same result on various classes \nof men ; on poets, mechanics, and especially on the rhetors and \nsophists, the chief of all the pretenders to wisdom. \n\nThe first indication of the unpopularity which he had incurred \nis the attack made upon him by Aristophanes in the \' Clouds \' \nin the year 423 B.C. That attack, however, seems to have \nevaporated with the laugh, and for many years Socrates con- \n\n\n\n140 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIV \n\n\n\ntirmed his teaching without molestation, It was not till B.C. 399 \nthat the indictment was preferred against him which cost him his \nlife. In that year, Meletus, a leather-seller, seconded by Anyfcis, \na poet, and Lycon, a rhetor, accused him of impiety in not wor- \nshipping the gods of the city, and in introducing new deities, and \nalso of being a corrupter of youth. With respect to the latter \ncharge, his former intimacy with Alcibiades and Critias may have \nweighed against him. Socrates made no preparations for his de- \nfence, and seems, indeed, not to have desired an acquittal. But \nalthough he addressed the dicasts in a bold uncompromising tone, \nhe was condemned only by a small majority of five or six in. a court \ncomposed of between five and six hundred dicasts. After the ver- \ndict was pronounced, he was entitled, according to the practice of \nthe Athenian courts, to make some counter-proposition in place of \nthe penalty of death, which the accusers had demanded, and if he \nhad done so with any show of submission it is probable that the \nsentence would have been mitigated. But his tone after the ver- \ndict was higher than before. Instead of a fine, he asserted that \nhe ought to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the public ex- \npense, as a public benefactor. This seems to have enraged the \ndicasts, and he was condemned to death. \n\nIt happened that the vessel which proceeded to Helos on the \nannual deputation to the festival had sailed the day before his \ncondemnation ; and during its absence it was unlawful to put any \none to death. Socrates was thus kept in prison during thirty days, \ntill the return of the vessel. He spent the interval in philoso- \nphical conversations with his friends. Crito, one of these, arranged \na scheme for his escape by bribing the gaoler; but Socrates, as \nmight be expected from the tone of his defence, resolutely refused \nto save his life by a breach of the law. His last discourse, on the \nday of his death, turned on the immortality of the soul. With a \nfirm and cheerful countenance he drank the cup of hemlock amidst \nhis sorrowing and weeping friends. His last words were addressed \nto Crito : \xe2\x80\x94 " Crito, we owe a cock to JEsculapius ; discharge the \ndebt, and by no means omit it." \n\nThus perished the greatest and most original of the Grecian \nphilosophers, whose uninspired wisdom made the nearest approach \nto the divine morality of the Gospel. His teaching forms an epoch \nin the history of philosophy. From his school sprang Plato, the \nfounder of the Academic philosophy ; Eu elides, the founder of the \nMegaric school ; Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school ; \nand many other philosophers of eminence. \n\n\n\nRuins of Sarais. \n\n\n\nCHAPTEK XY. \n\nTHE EXPEDITION OF THE GKEEKS UNDER CYRUS, AND RETREAT \nOF THE TEN THOUSAND, B.C. 401-400. \n\nThe assistance which Cyras had rendered to the Lacedaemonians \nin the Peloponnesian war led to a remarkable episode in Grecian \nhistory. This was the celebrated expedition of Cyras against his \nbrother Artaxerxes, in which the superiority of Grecian to Asiatic \nsoldiers was so strikingly shown. \n\nThe death of Darius Nothus, king of Persia, took place B.C. 404, \nshortly before the battle of JEgospotami. Cyras, who was present \nat his father\'s death, was charged by Tissaph ernes with plotting \nagainst his elder brother Artaxerxes, who succeeded to the throne. \nThe accusation was believed by Artaxerxes, who seized his brother, \nand would have put him to death, but for the intercession of their \nmother, Parysatis. who persuaded him not only to spare Cyrus, \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XV. \n\n\n\nbut to confirm him in his former government. Cyrus returned to \nSardis burning with revenge, and fully resolved to make an effort \nto dethrone his brother. \n\nFrom his Intercourse with the Greeks Cyrus had become aware \nof their superiority to the Asiatics, and of then usefulness in such \nan enterprise as he now contemplated. The peace which followed \nthe capture of Athens seemed favourable to his projects. Many \nGreeks, bred up in the practice of war during the long struggle \nbetween that city and Sparta, were now deprived of their employ- \nment, whilst many more had been driven into exile by the esta- \nblishment of the Spartan oligarchies in the various conquered \ncities. "Under the pretence of a private war with the satrap Tis- \nsaphernes. Cyrus enlisted large numbers of them in his service. \nThe Greek in whom he placed most confidence was Clearchus, a \nLacedaemonian, and formerly harmost of Byzantium, who had been \ncondemned to death by the Spartan authorities for disobedience to \nthen orders. \n\nIt was not, however, till the beginning of the year B.C. 401 that \nthe enterprise of Cyrus was ripe for execution. The Greek levies \nwere then withdrawn from the various towns in which they were \ndistributed, and concentrated in Sardis, to the number of about \n8000 ; and in March or April of this year Cyrus marched from \nSardis with them, and with an army of 100,000 Asiatics. The \nobject of the expedition was proclaimed to be an attack upon the \nmountain-freebooters of Pisidia ; its real destination was a secret to \nevery one except Cyrus himself and Clearchus. Among the Greek \nsoldiers was Xenophon, an Athenian knight, to whom we owe a \nnarrative of the expedition. He went as a volunteer, at the invi- \ntation of his friend Proxenus, a Boeotian, and one of the generals \nof Cyrus. \n\nThe march of Cyrus was directed through Lydia and Phrygia. \nAfter passing Colossal he arrived at Cehenae, where he was joined \nby more Greek troops, the number of whom now amounted to \n11,000 hoplites and 2000 peltasts. The line of march, which had \nbeen hitherto straight upon Pisidia, was now directed northwards. \nCyrus passed in succession the Phrygian towns of Peltae, Ceramon \nAgora, the Plain of Cayster, Thymbrium, Tyriseum, and Iconium. \nthe last city in Phrygia. Thence he proceeded through Lycaonia \nto Dana, and across Mount Taurus into Cilicia. \n\nOn arriving at Tarsus, a city on the coast of Cilicia, the Greeks \nplainly saw that they had been deceived, and that the expedition \nwas designed against the Persian king. Seized with alarm at the \nprospect of so long a march, they sent a deputation to Cyrus to ask \nhim what his real intentions were. Cyrus replied that his design \n\n\n\n144 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XV, \n\n\n\nwas to inarch against his enemy, Abrocomas, satrap of Syria, who \nwas encamped on the banks of the Euphrates. The Greeks, \nthough they still suspected a delusion, contented themselves with \nthis answer in the face of their present difficulties, especially as \nCyrus promised to raise their pay from one Daric to one Daric \nand a half a month. The whole army then marched forwards \nto Issus, the last town in Cilicia, seated on the gulf of the same \nname. Here they met the fleet, which brought them a reinforce- \nment of 1100 Greek soldiers, thus raising the Grecian force to \nabout 14,000 men. \n\nAbrocomas, who commanded for the Great King in Syria and \nPhoenicia, alarmed at the rapid progress of Cyrus, fled before him \nwith all his army, reported as 300,000 strong; abandoning the im- \npregnable pass situated one day\'s march from Issus, and known as \nthe Gates of Cilicia and Syria. Marching in safety through this \npass, the army next reached Myriandrus, a seaport of Phoenicia. \nFrom this place Cyrus struck off into the interior, over Mount \nAmanus. Twelve days\' march brought him to Thapsacus on the \nEuphrates, where for the first time he formally notified to the array \nthat he was marching to Babylon against his brother Artaxerxes. \nThe water happened to be very low, scarcely reaching to the \nbreast ; and Abrocomas made no attempt to dispute the passage. \nTne army now entered upon the desert, where the Greeks were \nstruck with the novel sights which met their view, and at once \namused and exhausted themselves in the chase of the wild ass and \nthe antelope, or in the vain pursuit of the scudding ostrich. After \nseveral days of toilsome march the army at leugth reached Pylas, \nthe entrance into the cultivated plains of Babylonia, where they \nhalted a few days to refresh themselves. \n\nSoon after leaving that place symptoms became perceptible of a \nvast hostile force moving in their front. The exaggerated reports \nof deserters stated it at 1,200,000 men ; its real strength was about \n900,000. In a characteristic address Cyrus exhorted the Greeks to \ntake no heed of the multitude of their enemies ; they would find \nin them, he affirmed, nothing but numbers and noise, and, if they \ncould bring themselves to despise these, they would soon find of \nwhat worthless stuff the natives were composed. The army then \nmarched cautiously forwards, in order of battle, along the left \nbank of the Euphrates. They soon came upon a huge trench, \n30 feet broad and 18 deep, which Artaxerxes had caused to be dug \nacross the plain for a length of about 42 English miles, reachiug \nfrom the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between it and the \nriver was left only a narrow passage about 20 feet broad ; yet \nCyrus and his army found with surprise that this pass was left \n\n\n\nB.C. 401. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF CUNAXA. \n\n\n\n145 \n\n\n\nentirely undefended. This circumstance inspired them with a \ncontempt of the enemy, and induced them to proceed in careless \narray ; but on the next day but one after passhig the trench, on \narriving at a place called Gunaxa, they were surprised with the \nintelligence that Artaxerxes was approaching with all his forces. \nCyrus immediately drew up his army in order of battle. The \nGreeks were posted on the right, whilst Cyrus himself, surrounded \nby a picked body-guard of 600 Persian cuirassiers, took up his sta- \ntion in the centre. When the enemy were about half a mile \ndistant, the Greeks charged them with the usual war-shout. The \nPersians did not await their onset, but turned and fled. Tissa- \np hemes and his cavalry alone offered any resistance ; the remainder \nof the Persian left was routed without a blow. As Cyrus was con- \ntemplating the easy victory of the Greeks, his followers surrounded \nhim, and already saluted him with the title of king. But the \ncentre and right of Artaxerxes still remained unbroken ; and that \nmonarch, unaware of the defeat of his left wing, ordered the right \nto wheel and encompass the army of Cyrus. No sooner did Cyrus \nperceive this movement than with his body-guard he impetuously \ncharged the enemy\'s centre, where Artaxerxes himself stood, sur- \nrounded with 6000 horse. The latter were routed and dispersed, \nand were followed so eagerly by the guards of Cyrus, that he was \nleft almost alone with the select few called his " Table Compa- \nnions." In this situation he caught sight of his brother Arta- \nxerxes, whose person was revealed by the flight of his troops, \nwhen, maddened at once by rage and ambition, he shouted out, \n"I see the man!" and rushed at him with his handful of compa- \nnions. Hurling his javelin at his brother, he wounded him in the \nbreast, but was himself speedily overborne by superior numbers \nand slain on the spot. \n\nMeanwhile Clearchus had pursued the flying enemy upwards of \nthree miles ; but hearing that the king\'s troops were victorious on \nthe left and centre, he retraced his steps, again routing the Per- \nsians who endeavoured to intercept him. When the Greeks regained \ntheir camp they found that it had been completely plundered, and \nwere consequently obliged to go supperless to rest. It was not till \nthe following day that they learned the death of Cyrus ; tidings \nwhich converted their triumph into sorrow and dismay. They \nwere desirous that Ariseus, who now commanded the army of \nCyrus, should lay claim to the Persian crown, and offered to \nsupport his pretensions; but Ariseus answered that the Persian \ngrandees would not tolerate such a claim ; that he intended imme- \ndiately to retreat ; and that, if the Greeks wished to accompany \nhim, they must join him during the following night. This was \n\nL \n\n\n\n146 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XV. \n\n\n\naccordingly done ; when oaths of reciprocal fidelity were inter- \nchanged between the Grecian generals and Ariaeus, and sanctified \nby a solemn sacrifice. \n\nOn the following day a message arrived from the Persian king, \nwith a proposal to treat for peace on equal terms. Clearchus \naffected to treat the offer with great indifference, and made it an \nopportunity for procuring provisions. 44 Tell your king," said he to \nthe envoys, 44 that we must first fight ; for we have had no break- \nfast, nor will any man presume to talk to the Greeks about a truce \nwithout first providing for them a breakfast.*\' This was agreed \nto, and guides were sent to conduct the Greeks to some villages \nwhere they might obtain food. Here they received a visit from \nTissapliernes, who pretended much friendship towards them, and \nsaid that he had come from the Great King to inquire the reason \nof their expedition. Clearchus replied \xe2\x80\x94 what was indeed true of \nthe greater part of the army \xe2\x80\x94 that they had not come hither with \nany design to attack the king, but had been enticed forwards by \nCyrus under false pretences ; that their only desire at present was \nto return home ; but that, if any obstacle was offered, they were pre- \npared to repel hostilities. In a day or two Tissaphernes returned, \nand with some parade stated that he had with great difficulty \nobtained permission to save the Greek army ; that he was ready to \nconduct them in person into Greece ; and to supply them with pro- \nvisions, for which, however, they were to pay. An agreement was \naccordingly entered into to this effect ; and after many days\' delay \nthey commenced the homeward march. After marching three days \nthey passed through the wall of Media, which was 100 feet high \nand 20 feet broad. Two days more brought them to the Tigris, \nwhich they crossed on the following morning by a bridge of boats. \nThey then marched northward, arriving in four days at the river \nPhyscus and a large city called Opis. Six days\' further march \nthrough a deserted part of "Media brought them to some villages \nbelonging to queen Parysatis, which, out of enmity to her as the \npatron of Cyrus, Tissaphernes abandoned to be plundered by the \nGreeks. From thence they proceeded in five days to the river \nZabatus, or Greater Zab, having previously crossed the Lesser Zab, \nwhich Xenophon neglects to mention. In the first of these five \ndays they saw on the opposite side of the Tigris a large city called \nfeme, the inhabitants of which brought over provisions to them. \nAt the Greater Zab they halted three days. Mistrust, and even \nslight hostilities, had been already manifested between the Greeks \nand Persians, but they now became so serious that Clearchus de- \nmanded an interview with Tissaphernes. The latter protested the \ngreatest fidelity and friendship towards the Greeks, and promised \n\n\n\nB.C. 401. \n\n\n\nRETREAT OF THE GREEKS. \n\n\n\n147 \n\n\n\nto deliver to the Greek generals, on the following day, the calum- \nniators who had set the two armies at variance. But when Cle- \narchus, with four other generals, accompanied by some lochages, or \ncaptains, and 200 soldiers, entered the Persian camp, according to \nappointment, the captains and soldiers were immediately cut down ; \nwhilst the five generals were seized, put into irons, and sent to the \nPersian court. After a short imprisonment, four of them were \nbeheaded ; the fifth, Menon, who pretended that he had betrayed \nhis colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes, was at first spared ; \nbut after a year\'s detention was put to death with tortures. \n\nApprehension and dismay reigned among the Greeks. Their \nsituation was, indeed, appalling. They were considerably more \nthan a thousand miles from home, in a hostile and unknown \ncountry, hemmed in on all sides by impassable rivers and moun- \ntain s, without generals, without guides, without provisions. Xeno- \nphon was the first to rouse the captains to the necessity for taking- \nimmediate precautions. Though young, he possessed as an Athe- \nnian citizen some claim to distinction ; and his animated address \nshowed him fitted for command. He was saluted general on the \nspot ; and in a subsequent assembly was, with four others, formally \nelected to that office. \n\nThe Greeks, having first destroyed their superfluous baggage, \ncrossed the Greater Zab, and pursued their march on the other \nbank. They passed by the ruined cities of Larissa and Mespila on \nthe Tigris, in the neighbourhood of the ancient Nineveh. The \nmarch from Mespila to the mountainous country of the Carduchi \noccupied several days, in which the Greeks suffered much from the \nattacks of the enemy. \n\nTheir future route was now a matter of serious perplexity. On \ntheir left lay the Tigris, so deep that they could not fathom it with \ntheir spears ; while in their front rose the steep and lofty mountains \nof the Carduchi, which came so near the river as hardly to leave \na passage for its waters. As all other roads seemed barred, they \nformed the resolution of striking into these mountains, on the \nfarther side of which lay Armenia, where both the Tigris and \nthe Euphrates might be forded near their sources. After a difficult \nand dangerous march of seven days, during which their sufferings \nwere far greater than any they had experienced from the Persians, \nthe army at length emerged into Armenia. It was now the month \nof December, and Armenia was cold and exposed, being a table- \nland raised high above the level of the sea. Whilst halting near \nsome well-supplied villages, the Greeks were overtaken by two \ndeep falls of snow, which almost buried them in their open \nbivouacs. Hence a five days\' march brought them to the eastern \n\nl 2 \n\n\n\n148 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XV. \n\n\n\nbranch of the Euphrates. Crossing the river, they proceeded \non the other side of it over plains covered with a deep snow, \nand in the face of a biting north wind. Here many of the slaves \nand beasts of burthen, and even a few of the soldiers, fell victims \nto the cold. Some had then feet frost-bitten; some were blinded \nby the snow ; whilst others, exhausted with cold and hunger, \nsunk down and died. On the eighth day they proceeded on their \nway, ascending the banks of the Phasis, not the celebrated river of \nthat name, bnt probably the one usually called Araxes. \n\nFrom thence they fought their way through the country of the \nTaochi and Chalybes. They next reached the country of the \nScythini, in whose territory they found abundance in a large and \npopulous city called Gymnias. The chief of this place having \nengaged to conduct them within sight of the Euxine, they pro- \nceeded for five days under his guidance ; when, after ascending a \nmountain, the sea suddenly burst on the view of the vanguard. \nThe men proclaimed their joy by loud shouts of " The sea ! the \nsea !" The rest of the army hurried to the summit, and gave vent \nto their joy and exultation in tears and mutual embraces. A few \ndays\' march through the country of the Macrones and Colchians \nat length brought them to the objects for which they had so often \npined, and which many at one time had never hoped to see again \n\xe2\x80\x94 a Grecian city and the sea. By the inhabitants of Trapezus or \nTrebizond, on the Euxine, where they had now arrived, they were \nhospitably received, and, being cantoned in some Colchian villages \nnear the town, refreshed themselves after the hardships they had \nundergone by a repose of thirty days. \n\nThe most difficult part of the return of the Ten Thousand was \nnow accomplished, and it is unnecessary to trace the remainder of \ntheir route. After many adventures they succeeded in reaching \nByzantium, and they subsequently engaged to serve the Lace- \ndsemonians in a war which Sparta had just declared against the \nsatraps Tissaphemes and Pharnabazus. \n\nIn the spring of b.c. 399, Thimbron, the Lacedaemonian com- \nmander, arrived at Pergamus, and the remainder of the Ten Thou- \nsand Greeks became incorporated with his army. Xenophon now \nreturned to Athens, where he must have arrived shortly after the \nexecution of his master Socrates. Disgusted probably by that \nevent, he rejoined his old comrades in Asia, and subsequently \nreturned to Greece along with Agesilaus. \n\n\n\n\nCHAPTEE XVI. \n\nTHE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA, B.C. 404-371. \n\nAfter the fall of Athens Sparta stood without a rival in Greece. \nIn the various cities which had belonged to the Athenian empire \nLysander established an oligarchical Council of Ten, called a \nDecarchy or Decern virate, subject to the control of a Spartan \nHarmost or governor. The Decarchies, however, remained only a \nshort time in power, since the Spartan government regarded them \nwith jealousy as the partisans of Lysander ; but harmosts continued \nto be placed in every state subject to their empire. The govern- \nment of the harmosts was corrupt and oppressive ; no justice could \nbe obtained against them by an appeal to the Spartan authorities \nat home; and the Grecian cities soon had cause to regret the \nmilder and more equitable sway of Athens. \n\nOn the death of Agis in b.c. 398, his half-brother Agesilaus was \nappointed king, to the exclusion of Leotychides, the son of Agis. \nThis was mainly effected by the powerful influence of Lysander, \nwho erroneously considered Agesilaus to be of a yielding and \nmanageable disposition, and hoped by a skilful use of those qua- \n\n\n\n150 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GKEECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVI. \n\n\n\nlities to extend his own influence, and under the name of another \nto be in reality king himself. \n\nAgesilaus was now forty years of age, and esteemed a model of \nthose virtues more peculiarly deemed Spartan. He was obedient \nto the constituted authorities, emulous to excel, courageous, ener- \ngetic, capable of bearing all sorts of hardship and fatigue, simple \nand frugal in his mode of life. To these severer qualities he added \nthe popular attractions of an agreeable countenance and pleasing \naddress. His personal defects at first stood in the way of his pro- \nmotion. He was not only low in stature, but also lame of one leg ; \nand there was an ancient oracle which warned the Spartans to \nbeware of <; a lame reign." The ingenuity of Lysander, assistec 1 \nprobabiy by the popular qualities of Agesilaus, contrived to ovei \ncome this objection by interpreting a lame reign to mean not any \nbodily defect in the king, but the reign of one who was not a \ngenuine descendant of Hercules. Once possessed of power, Age- \nsilaus supplied any defect in his title by the prudence and policy \n"f his conduct ; and, by the marked deference which he paid both \nto the Ephors and the senators, he succeeded in gaining for him- \nself more real power than had been enjoyed by any of his pre- \ndecessors. \n\nThe affairs of Asia Minor soon began to draw the attention of \nAgesilaus to that quarter. The assistance lent to Cyrus by the \nSpartans was no secret at the Persian court ; and Tissaphernes, who \nhad been rewarded for his fidelity with the satrapy of Cyrus in \naddition to his own, no sooner returned to his government than he \nattacked the Ionian cities, then under the protection of Sparta. A \nconsiderable Lacedaemonian force under Thimbron was despatched \nto their assistance, and which, as related in the preceding chapter, \nwas joined by the remnant of the Greeks who had served under \nCyrus. Thimbron, however, proved so inefficient a commander, \nthat he was superseded at the end of 399 or beginning of 398 B.C., \nand Dercyllidas appointed in his place. But though at first suc- \ncessful against Pharnabazus in iEolis, Dercyllidas was subsequently \nsurprised in Caria in such an unfavourable position that he would \nhave suffered severely but for the timidity of Tissaphernes, who \nwas afraid to venture upon an action. Under these circumstances \nan armistice was agTeed to for the purpose of treating for a peace \n397 B.C.). \n\nPharnabazus availed himself of this armistice to make active pre- \nparations for a renewal of the war. He obtained large reinforce- \nments of Persian troops, and began to organize a fleet in Phoenicia \nand Cilicia. This was intrusted to the Athenian admiral Conon, \nof whom we now first hear again after a lapse of seven years since \n\n\n\nB.C. 397. \n\n\n\nWAR IN ASIA MINOR. \n\n\n\n151 \n\n\n\nhis defeat at iEgospotarni. After that disastrous battle Conon fled \nwith nine triremes to Cyprus, where he was now living under the \nprotection of Evagoras, prince of Salamis. \n\nIt was the news of these extensive preparations that induced \nAgesilaus, on the suggestion of Lysander, to volunteer his services \nagainst the Persians. He proposed to take with him only 30 full \nSpartan citizens, or peers, to act as a sort of council, together with \n2000 Neodamodes, or enfranchised Helots, and 6000 hoplites of the \nallies. Lysander intended to be the leader of the 30 Spartans, and \nexpected through them to be the virtual commander of the expe- \ndition of which Agesilaus was nominally the head. \n\nSince the time of Agamemnon no Grecian king had led an army \ninto Asia ; and Agesilaus studiously availed himself of the prestige \nof that precedent in order to attract recruits to his standard. The \nSpartan kings claimed to inherit the sceptre of Agamemnon ; and \nto render the parallel more complete, Agesilaus proceeded with a \ndivision of his fleet to Aulis, intending there to imitate the me- \nmorable sacrifice of the Homeric hero. But as he had neglected \nto ask the permission of the Thebans, and conducted the sacrifice \nand solemnities by means of his own prophets and ministers, and \nin a manner at variance with the usual rites of the temple, the \nThebans were offended, and expelled him by armed force : \xe2\x80\x94 an \ninsult which he never forgave. \n\nIt was in 396 B.C. that Agesilaus arrived at Ephesus, and took \nthe command in Asia. He demanded of the Persians the complete \nindependence of the Greek cities in Asia ; and in order that there \nmight be time to communicate with the Persian court, the armistice \nwas renewed for three months. During this interval of repose, \nLysander, by his arrogance and pretensions, offended both Agesilaus \nand the Thirty Spartans. Agesilaus, determined to uphold his \ndignity, subjected Lysander to so many humiliations that he was at \nlast fain to request his dismissal from Ephesus, and was accordingly \nsent to the Hellespont, where he did good service to the Spartan \ninterests. \n\nMeanwhile Tissaphernes, having received large reinforcements, \nsent a message to Agesilaus before the armistice had expired, \nordering him to quit Asia. Agesilaus immediately made prepara- \ntions as if he would attack Tissaphernes in Caria ; but having thus \nput the enemy on a false scent, he suddenly turned northwards into \nPhrygia, the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and marched without oppo- \nsition to the neighbourhood of Dascylium, the residence of the \nsatrap himself. Here, however, he was repulsed by the Persian \ncavalry. He now proceeded into winter quarters at Ephesus, where \nhe employed himself in organizing a body of cavalry to compete \n\n\n\n152 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVI. \n\n\n\nwith the Persians. During the winter the army was brought into \nexcellent condition ; and Agesilaus gave out early in the spring of \n395 b.c. that he should march direct upon Sardis. Tissaphernes, \nsuspecting another feint, now dispersed his cavalry in the plain \nof the Mseander. But this time Agesilaus marched as he had an- \nnounced, and in three days arrived unopposed on the banks of the \nPactolus, before the Persian cavalry could be recalled. When they \nat last came up, the newly raised Grecian horse, assisted by the \npeltasts, and some of the younger and more active hoplites, soon \nsucceeded in putting them to night. Many of the Persians were \ndrowned in the Pactolus, and their camp, containing much booty \nand several camels, was taken. \n\nAgesilaus now pushed his ravages up to the very gates of Sardis, \nthe residence of Tissaphernes. But the career of that timid and \ntreacherous satrap was drawing to a close. The queen-mother, \nParysatis, who had succeeded in regaining her influence over \nArtaxerxes, caused an order to be sent down from Susa for his exe- \ncution ; in pursuance of which he was seized in a bath at Golossse, \nand beheaded. Tithraustes, who had been intrusted with the exe- \ncution of this order, succeeded Tissaphernes in the satrapy, and \nimmediately reopened negotiations with Agesilaus. An armistice \nof six months was concluded ; and meanwhile Tithraustes, by a \nsubsidy of 30 talents, induced Agesilaus to move out of his satrapy \ninto that of Pharnabazus. \n\nDuring this march into Phrygia Agesilaus received a new com- \nmission from home, appointing him the head of the naval as well \nas of the land force \xe2\x80\x94 two commands never before united in a single \nSpartan. He named his brother-in-law, Pisander, commander of \nthe fleet. But in the following year (b.c. 394), whilst he was \npreparing an expedition on a grand scale into the interior of Asia \nMinor, he was suddenly recalled home to avert the dangers which \nthreatened his native country. \n\nThe jealousy and ill-will with which the newly acquired empire \nof the Spartans was regarded by the other Grecian states had not \nescaped the notice of the Persians ; and when Tithraustes suc- \nceeded to the satrapy of Tissaphernes he resolved to avail himself \nof this feeling by exciting a war against Sparta in the heart of \nGreece itself. With this view he despatched one Timocrates, a \nRhodian, to the leading Grecian cities which appeared hostile to \nSparta, carrying with him a sum of 50 talents to be distributed \namong the chief men in each for the purpose of bringing them \nover to the views of Persia. Timocrates was successful iu Thebes, \nCorinth, and Argos ; but he appears not to have visited Athens. \n\nHostilities were at first confined to Sparta and Thebes. A quarrel \n\n\n\nB.C. 394. \n\n\n\nDEATH OF LYSANDER. \n\n\n\n153 \n\n\n\nhaving arisen between the Opuntian Locrians and the Phocians \nrespecting a strip of border land, the former people appealed to the \nThebans, who invaded Phocis. The Phocians on their side invoked \nthe aid of the Lacedaemonians, who, elated with the prosperous \nstate of their affairs in Asia, and moreover desirous of avenging the \naffronts they had received from the Thebans, readily listened to \nthe appeal. Lysander, who took an active part in promoting the \nwar, was directed to attack the town of Haliartus ; and it was \narranged that king Pausanias should join him on a fixed day under \nthe walls of that town, w T ith the main body of the Lacedaemonians \nand their Peloponnesian allies. \n\nNothing could more strikingly denote the altered state of feeling \nin Greece than the request for assistance which the Thebans, thus \nmenaced, made to their ancient enemies and rivals the Athenians. \nNor were the Athenians backward in responding to the appeal. \nLysander arrived at Haliartus before Pausanias. Here, in a sally \nmade by the citizens, opportunely supported by the unexpected \narrival of a body of Thebans, the army of Lysander was routed, and \nhimself slain. His troops disbanded and dispersed themselves in \nthe night time. Thus, when Pausanias at last came up, he found \nno army to unite with; and as an imposing Athenian force had \narrived, he now, with the advice of his council, took the humiliating \nstep \xe2\x80\x94 always deemed a confession of inferiority \xe2\x80\x94 of requesting a \ntruce in order to bury the dead who had fallen in the preceding \nbattle. Even this, however, the Thebans would not grant except \non the condition that the Lacedsemonians should immediately quit \ntheir territory. With these terms Pausanias was forced to comply ; \nand after duly interring the bodies of Lysander and his fallen com- \nrades, the Lacedaemonians dejectedly pursued their homeward \nmarch. Pausanias, afraid to face the public indignation of the \nSpartans, took refuge in the temple of Athena Alea at Tegea ; and \nbeing condemned to death in his absence, only escaped that fate \nby remaining in the sanctuary. He was succeeded by his son \nAgesipolis. \n\nThe enemies of Sparta took fresh courage from this disaster to \nher arms. Athens, Corinth, and Argos now formed with Thebes \na solemn alliance against her. The league was soon joined by the \nEubceans, the Acarnanians, and other Grecian states. In the \nspring of 394 B.C. the allies assembled at Corinth, and the war, \nwhich had been hitherto regarded as merely Boeotian, was now \ncalled the Corinthian, by which name it is known in history. \nThis threatening aspect of affairs determined the Ephors to \nrecall Agesilaus, as already related. \n\nThe allies were soon in a condition to take the field with a force \n\n\n\n154 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVI, \n\n\n\nof 24.000 hoplites, of whom, one-fourth were Athenians, together \nwith a considerable body of light troops and cavalry. The Lace- \ndaemonians had also made the most active preparations. In the \nneighbourhood of Corinth a battle was fought, in which the Lace- \ndaemonians gained the victory, thongh then* allied troops were put \nto the ront. This battle, called the battle of Corinth, was fonght \nin July 394 B.C. \n\nAgesilaus. who had relinquished with a heavy heart his projected \nexpedition into Asia, was now on his homeward march. By the \npromise of rewards he had persuaded the bravest and most efficient \nsoldiers in his army to accompany him, amongst whom were many \nof the Ten Thousand, with Xenophon at then- head. The route of \nA gesilaus was much the same as the one formerly traversed by \nXerxes, and the camels "which accompanied the army gave it some- \nwhat of an oriental aspect. At Aniphipolis he received the news \nof the victory at Corinth : but his heart was so full of schemes \nagainst Persia, that the feeling which it awakened in his bosom \nwas rather one of regret that so many Greeks had fallen, whose \nunited efforts might have emancipated Asia Minor, than of joy at \nthe success of his countrymen. Having forced his way through a \ndesultory opposition offered by the Thessalian cavalry, he crossed \nMount Othrys, and marched unopposed the rest of the way through \nthe straits of Thermopylae to the frontiers of Phocis and Bceotia. Here \nthe evil tidings reached him of the defeat and death of his brother- \nin-law, Pisander, in a great sea-fight off C nidus in Caria \'August 394 \nB.C.) Conon, with the assistance of Pharnabazus, had succeeded \nin raising a powerful fleet, partly Phoenician and partly Grecian, \nwith which he either destroyed or captured more than half of the \nLacedaemonian fleet. Agesilaus. fearing the impression which such \nsad news might produce upon his men, gave out that the Lace- \ndemonian fleet had gained a victory ; and, having offered sacrifice \nas if for a victory, he ordered an advance. \n\nAgesilaus soon came up with the confederate army, which had \nprepared to oppose him in the plain of Coronea. The Thebans \nsucceeded in driving in the Orchomenians, who formed the left \nwing of the army of Agesilaus, and penetrated as far as the baggage \nin the rear. But on the remainder of the line Agesilaus was vic- \ntorious, and the Thebans now saw themselves cut off from their \ncompanions, who had retreated and taken up a position on Mount \nHelicon. Facing about and forming in deep and compact order, \nthe Thebans sought to rejoin the main body, but they were opposed \nby Agesilaus and his troops. The shock of the conflicting masses \nwhich ensued was one of the most terrible recorded in the annals \nof Grecian warfare. The shields of the foremost ranks were \n\n\n\nB.C. 394. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF CORONEA. \n\n\n\n157 \n\n\n\nshattered, and their spears broken, so that daggers became the only \navailable arm. Agesilaus, who was in the front ranks, unequal by \nhis size and strength to sustain so furious an onset, was flung down, \ntrodden on, and covered with wounds ; but the devoted courage of \nthe 50 Spartans forming his body-guard rescued him from death. \nThe Thebans finally forced their way through, but not without \nsevere loss. The victory of Agesilaus was not very decisive ; but \nthe Thebans tacitly acknowledged their defeat by soliciting the \ncustomary truce for the burial of their dead. \n\nAgesilaus, on his arrival at Sparta, was received with the most \nlively demonstrations of gratitude and esteem, and became hence- \nforward the sole director of Spartan policy. \n\nThus in less than two months the Lacedaemonians had fought \ntwo battles on land, and one at sea ; namely, those of Corinth, \nCoronea, and Cnidus. But, though they had been victorious in the \nland engagements, they were so little decisive as to lead to no im- \nportant result ; whilst their defeat at Cnidus produced the most \ndisastrous consequences. It was followed by the loss of nearly all \ntheir maritime empire, even faster than they had acquired it after \nthe battle of iEgospotami. For as Conon and Phamabazus sailed \nwith their victorious fleet from island to island, and from port to \nport, their approach was everywhere the signal for the flight or \nexpulsion of the Spartan harmosts. \n\nIn the spring of the following year (b.c. 393) Conon and Phama- \nbazus sailed to the isthmus of Corinth, then occupied as a central \npost by the allies. The appearance of a Persian fleet in the Saronic \ngulf was a strange sight to Grecian eyes, and one which might have \nserved as a severe comment on the effect of their suicidal wars. \nConon dexterously availed himself of the hatred of Phamabazus \ntowards Sparta to procure a boon for his native city. As the satrap \nwas on the point of proceeding homewards, Conon obtained leave \nto employ the seamen in rebuilding the fortifications of Piraeus and \nthe long walls of Athens. Phamabazus also granted a large sum \nfor the same purpose ; and Conon had thus the glory of appearing, \nlike a second Themistocles, the deliverer and restorer of his country. \nBefore the end of autumn the walls were rebuilt. Having thus, as \nit were, founded Athens a second time, Conon sailed to the islands \nto lay again the foundations of an Athenian maritime empire. \n\nDuring the remainder of this and the whole of the following year \n(b.c. 392) the war was earned on in the Corinthian territory. \n\nOne of the most important events at this time was the destruction \nof a whole Lacedaemonian mora, or battalion, by the light-armed \nmercenaries of the Athenian Iphicrates. For the preceding two \nyears Iphicrates had commanded a body of mercenaries, consisting \n\n\n\n158 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVI. \n\n\n\nof peltasts,* who had been first organised by Conon after rebuilding \nthe walls of Atliens. For this force Iphicrates introduced those \nimproved arms and tactics which form an epoch in the Grecian art \nof -war. His object was to combine as far as possible the peculiar \nadvantages of the hoplites and light-armed troops. He substituted \na linen corslet for the coat of mail worn by the hoplites, and less- \nened the shield, while he rendered the light javelin and short sword \nof the peltasts more effective by lengthening them both one-half. \nThese troops soon proved very effective. After gaining several \nvictories he ventured to make a sally from Corinth, and attacked \na Lacedaemonian mora in flank and rear. So many fell under the \ndarts and arrows of the peltasts that the Lacedaemonian captain \ncalled a halt, and ordered the youngest and most active of his hop- \nlites to rush forward and drive off the assailants. But their heavy \narms rendered them quite unequal to such a mode of fighting ; nor \ndid the Lacedaemonian cavalry, which now came up, but which \nacted with very little vigour and courage, produce any better effect. \nAt length the Lacedaemonians succeeded in reaching an eminence, \nwhere they endeavoured to make a stand ; but at this moment \nCallias arrived with some Athenian hoplites from Corinth, where- \nupon the already disheartened Lacedaemonians broke and fled in \nconfusion, pursued by the peltasts, who committed such havoc, \nchasing and killing some of them even in the sea, that but very \nfew of the whole body succeeded in effecting their escape. \n\nThe maritime war was prosecuted with vigour. Thrasybulus, \nand after his death Iphicrates, were successful upon the coast of \nAsia Minor, and made the Athenians again masters of the Helles- \npont. Under these circumstances the Lacedaemonians resolved to \nspare no efforts to regain the good will of the Persians. Antalcidas, \nthe Lacedaemonian commander on the Asiatic coast, entered into \nnegociations with Tiribazus, who had succeeded Tithraustes in the \nsatrapy of Ionia, in order to bring about a general peace under the \nmediation of Persia, Conducted by Tiribazus, Antalcidas repaired \nto the Persian court, and prevailed on the Persian monarch both \nto adopt the peace, and to declare war against those who should \nreject it. Antalcidas and Tiribazus returned to the coasts of Asia \nMinor, not only armed with these powers, but provided with an \nample force to carry them into execution. In addition to the \nentire fleet of Persia, Dionysius of Syracuse had placed 20 triremes \nat the service of the Lacedaemonians ; and Antalcidas now sailed \nwith a large fleet to the Hellespont, where Iphicrates and the \nAthenians were still predominant. The overwhelming force of \n\n* So called from the pelta, or kind of shield which they carried. \n\n\n\nB.C. 387. \n\n\n\nPEACE OF ANTALCIDAS. \n\n\n\n159 \n\n\n\nAntalcidas, the largest that had been seen in the Hellespont since \nthe battle of iEgospotami, rendered all resistance hopeless. The \nsupplies of corn from the Euxine no longer found their way to \nAthens ; and the Athenians, depressed at once both by what they \nfelt and by what they anticipated, began to long for peace. As \nwithout the assistance of Athens it seemed hopeless for the other \nallies to struggle against Sparta, all Greece was inclined to listen \nto an accommodation. \n\nUnder these circumstances deputies from the Grecian states \nwere summoned to meet Tiribazus ; who, after exhibiting to them \nthe royal seal of Persia, read to them the following terms of a \npeace : " King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia and \nthe islands of Clazomense and Cyprus should belong to him. He \nalso thinks it just to leave all the other Grecian cities, both small \nand great, independent \xe2\x80\x94 except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, \nwhich are to belong to Athens, as of old. Should any parties \nrefuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with \nthose who are of the same mind, both by land and sea, with ships \nand with money." All the Grecian states accepted these terms. \n\nThis disgraceful peace, called the Peace of Antalcidas, was \nconcluded in the year B.C. 387. By it Greece seemed prostrated at \nthe feet of the barbarians ; for its very terms, engraven on stone \nand set up in the sanctuaries of Greece, recognised the Persian \nking as the arbiter of her destinies. Although Athens cannot be \nentirely exonerated from the blame of this transaction, the chief \nguilt rests upon Sparta, whose designs were far deeper and more \nhypocritical than they appeared. Under the specious pretext of \nsecuring the independence of the Grecian cities, her only object \nwas to break up the confederacies under Athens and Thebes, and, \nwith the assistance of Persia, to pave the way for her own absolute \ndominion in Greece. \n\nNo sooner was the peace of Antalcidas concluded than Sparta, \ndirected by Agesilaus, the ever-active enemy of Thebes, exerted all \nher power to weaken that city. She began by proclaiming the \nindependence of the various Boeotian cities, and by organizing in \neach a local oligarchy, adverse to Thebes and favourable to herself. \nLacedaemonian garrisons were placed in Orchomenus and Thespiae, \nand Plataea was restored in order to annoy and weaken Thebes. \nShortly afterwards the Lacedsemonians obtained possession of \nThebes itself by an act of shameful treachery. They had declared \nwar against Olynthus, a town situated at the head of the Toronaic \ngulf, in the peninsula of the Macedonian Ghalcidice, the head of a \npowerful confederation, which included several of the adjacent \nGrecian cities. The Thebans had entered into an alliance with \n\n\n\n160 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVI. \n\n\n\nOlynthus, and had forbidden any of their citizens to join the \nLacedaemonian army destined to act against it ; but they were \nnot strong enough to prevent its marching through their terri- \ntory. Phcebidas, who was conducting a Lacedaemonian force \nagainst Olynthus, halted on his way through Bceotia not far \nfrom Thebes ; where he was visited by Leontiades, one of the \npolemarchs of the city, and two or three other leaders of the \nLacedaemonian party in Thebes. It happened that the festival \nof the Thesmophoria was on the point of being celebrated, during \nwhich the Cadmea, or Theban Acropolis, was given up for the \nexclusive use of the women. The opportunity seemed favour- \nable for a surprise ; and Leontiades and Phcebidas concerted a \nplot to seize it. Whilst the festival was celebrating, Phcebidas \npretended to resume his march, but only made a circuit round \nthe city walls ; whilst Leontiades, stealing out of the senate, \nmounted his horse, and, joiiiing the Lacedaemonian troops, con- \nducted them towards the Cadmea. It was a sultry summer\'s after- \nnoon, so that the very streets were deserted ; and Phcebidas, with- \nout encountering any opposition, seized the citadel and all the \nwomen in it, to serve as hostages for the quiet submission of the \nThebans (b.c. 382). This treacherous act during a period of pro- \nfound peace awakened the liveliest indignation throughout Greece. \nSparta herself could not venture to justify it openly, and Phcebidas \nwas made the scape-goat of her affected displeasure. As a sort \nof atonement to the violated feeling of Greece, he was censured, \nfined, and dismissed. But that this was a mere farce is evident \nfrom the fact of his subsequent restoration to command; and, \nhowever indignant the Lacedaemonians affected to appear at the \nact of Phcebidas, they took care to reap the fruits of it by retaining \ntheir garrison in the Cadmea. \n\nThe once haughty Thebes was now enrolled a member of the \nLacedaemonian alliance, and furnished her contingent \xe2\x80\x94 the grateful \noffering of the new Theban government \xe2\x80\x94 for the war which Sparta, \nwas prosecuting with redoubled vigour against Olynthus. This city \nwas taken by the Lacedaemonians in b.c. 379 ; the Olynthian con- \nfederacy was dissolved; the Grecian cities belonging to it were \ncompelled to join the Lacedaemonian alliance ; whilst the maritime \ntowns of Macedonia were reduced under the dominion of Amyntas, \nthe king of Macedon. \n\nThe power of Sparta on land had now attained its greatest height. \nHer unpopularity in Greece was commensurate with the extent of \nher harshly administered dominion. She was leagued on all sides \nwith the enemies of Grecian freedom \xe2\x80\x94 with the Persians, with \nAmyntas of Macedon, and with Dionysius of Syracuse. But she \n\n\n\nB.C. 379. \n\n\n\nLIBERATION OF THEBES. \n\n\n\n161 \n\n\n\nhad now reached the turning-point of her fortunes, and her suc- \ncesses, which had been earned without scruple, were soon to be \nfollowed by misfortunes and disgrace. The first blow came from \nThebes, where she had perpetrated her most signal injustice. \n\nThat city had been for three years in the hands of Leontiades \nand the Spartan party. During this time great discontent had \ngrown up among the resident citizens ; and there was also the party \nof exasperated exiles, who had taken refuge at Athens. Among \nthese exiles was Pelopidas, a young man of birth and fortune, who \nhad already distinguished himself by his disinterested patriotism \nand ardent character. He now took the lead in the plans formed \nfor the liberation of his country, and was the heart and soul of \nthe enterprise. His warm and generous heart was irresistibly \nattracted by everything great and noble ; and hence he was led to \nform a close and intimate friendship with Epaminondas, who was \nseveral years older than himself and of a still loftier character. \nTheir friendship is said to have originated in a campaign in which \nthey served together, when, Pelopidas having fallen in battle ap- \nparently dead, Epaminondas protected his body at the imminent risk \nof his own life. Pelopidas afterwards endeavoured to persuade \nEpaminondas to share his riches with him ; and when he did not \nsucceed, he resolved to live on the same frugal fare as his great \nfriend. A secret correspondence was opened with his friends at \nThebes, the chief of whom were Phyllidas, secretary to the pole- \nmarchs, and Charon. The dominant faction, besides the advantage \nof the actual possession of power, was supported by a garrison of \n1500 Lacedemonians. The enterprise, therefore, was one of con- \nsiderable difficulty and danger. In the execution of it Phyllidas \ntook a leading part. It was arranged that he should give a supper \nto Archias and Philippus, the two polemarchs, and after they had \npartaken freely of wine the conspirators were to be introduced, dis- \nguised as women, and to complete their work by the assassination \nof the polemarchs. On the day before the banquet, Pelopidas, with \nsix other exiles, arrived at Thebes from Athens, and, straggling- \nthrough the gates towards dusk in the disguise of rustics and hunts- \nmen, arrived safely at the house of Charon, where they remained \nconcealed till the appointed hour. While the polemarchs were at \ntable a messenger arrived from Athens with a letter for Archias, in \nwhich the whole plot was accurately detailed. The messenger, in \naccordance with his instructions, informed Archias that the letter \nrelated to matters of serious importance. But the polemarch, com- \npletely engrossed by the pleasures of the table, thrust the letter \nunder the pillow of his couch, exclaiming, " Serious matters to- \nmorrow." \n\n\n\n162 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XVI \n\n\n\nThe hour of their fate was now ripe. The conspirators, disguised \nwith veils, and in the ample folds of female attire, were ushered \ninto the room. For men in the state of the revellers the deception \nwas complete ; but when they attempted to lift the veils from the \nwomen, their passion was rewarded by the mortal thrust of a dagger. \nAfter thus slaying the two polemarchs, the conspirators went to the \nhouse of Leontiades, whom they also despatched. \n\nThe news of the revolution soon spread abroad. Proclamations \nwere issued announcing that Thebes was free, and calling upon all \ncitizens who valued their liberty to muster in the market-place. \nAs soon as day dawned, and the citizens became aware that they \nwere summoned to vindicate their liberty, their joy and enthusiasm \nwere unbounded. For the first time since the seizure of their \ncitadel they met in public assembly ; the conspirators, being intro- \nduced, were crooned by the priests with wreaths, and thanked in \nthe name of their country\'s gods ; whilst the assembly, with grate- \nful acclamation, unanimously nominated Pelopidas, Charon, and \nMellon as the first restored Bceotarchs. \n\nMeanwhile the remainder of the Theban exiles, accompanied \nby a body of Athenian volunteers, assembled on the frontiers of \nBoeotia ; and, at the first news of the success of the conspiracy, \nhastened to Thebes to complete the revolution. The Thebans, \nunder their new Bceotarchs, were already mounting to the assault \nof the Cadniea, when the Lacedeenionians capitulated, and were \nallowed to march out with the honours of war. The Athenians \nformed an alliance with the Thebans, and declared war against \nSparta. \n\nFrom this time must be dated the ssra of a new political combi- \nnation in Greece. Athens strained every nerve to organize a fresh \nconfederacy. Thebes did not scruple to enrol herself as one of its \nearliest members. The basis on which the confederacy was formed \nclosely resembled that of Delos. The cities composing it were to \nbe independent, and to send deputies to a congress at Athens, for \nthe purpose of raising a common fund for the support of a naval \nforce. Care was taken to banish all recollections connected with \nthe former unpopularity of the Athenian empire. The name of \nthe tribute was no longer plwros, but syntaxis, or " contribution." \nThe confederacy, which ultimately numbered 70 cities, was chiefly \norganised through the exertions of Chabrias, and of Timotheus the \nson of Conon. Nor were the Thebans less zealous, amongst whom the \nSpartan government had left a lively feeling of antipathy. ,The \nmilitary force was put in the best training, and the famous " Sacred \nBand ?! was now for the first time instituted. This band was a \nregiment of 300 hoplites. It was supported at the public expense, \n\n\n\nB.C. 378. ALLIANCE OF ATHENS AND THEBES. \n\n\n\n163 \n\n\n\nand kept constantly under arms. It was composed of young and \nchosen citizens of the best families, and organized in such a manner \nthat each man had at his side a dear and intimate friend. Its \nspecial duty was the defence of the Cadmea. \n\nThe Thebans had always been excellent soldiers ; but their good \nfortune now gave them the greatest general that Greece had \nhitherto seen. Epaminondas, who now appears conspicuously in \npublic life, deserves the reputation not merely of a Theban but of \na Grecian hero. Sprung from a poor but ancient family, Epami- \nnondas possessed all the best qualities of his nation without that \nheaviness, either of body or of mind, which characterized and de- \nteriorated the Theban people. By the study of philosophy and by \nother intellectual pursuits his mind was enlarged beyond the sphere \nof vulgar superstition, and emancipated from that timorous inter- \npretation of nature which caused even some of the leading men of \nthose days to behold a portent in the most ordinary phenomenon. \nA still rarer accomplishment for a Theban was that of eloquence, \nwhich he possessed in no ordinary degree. These intellectual \nqualities were matched with moral virtues worthy to consort with \nthem. Though eloquent, he was discreet ; though poor, he was \nneither avaricious nor corrupt; though naturally firm and cou- \nrageous, he was averse to cruelty, violence, and bloodshed ; though \na patriot, he was a stranger to personal ambition, and scorned the \nlittle arts by which popularity is too often courted. Pelopidas, as \nwe have already said, was his bosom friend. It was natural, there- \nfore, that, when Pelopidas was named Bceotarch, Epaminondas \nshould be prominently employed in organizing the means of war ; but \nit was not till some years later that his military genius shone forth \nin its full lustre. \n\nThe Spartans were resolved to avenge the repulse they had re- \nceived ; and in the summer of B.C. 378 Agesilaus marched with a \nlarge army into Bceotia. He was unable, however, to effect any- \nthing decisive, and subsequent invasions were attended with the \nlike result. The Athenians created a diversion in their favour by \na maritime war, and thus for two years Bceotia was free from \nSpartan invasion. Thebes employed this time in extending her \ndominion over the neighbouring cities. One of her most important \nsuccesses during this period was the victory gained by Pelopidas \nover a Lacedaemonian force near Tegyra, a village dependent upon \nOrchomenus (b.c. 375). Pelopidas had with him only the Sacred \nBand and a small body of cavalry when he fell in with the Lace- \ndaemonians, who were nearly twice as numerous. He did not, how- \never, shrink from the conflict on this account ; and when one of his \nmen, running up to him, exclaimed, " We are fallen into the midst \n\n\n\n164 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVI. \n\n\n\nof the enemy," he replied, " Why so. more than they into the midst \nof us?" In the battle which ensued the two Spartan commanders \nfell at the first charge, and their men were put to the rout. So \nsignal a victory inspired the Thebans with new confidence and \nvigour, as it showed that Sparta was not invincible even in a pitched \nbattle, and with the advantage of numbers on her side. By the \nyear 374 b.c. the Thebans had succeeded in expelling the Lacedae- \nmonians from Boeotia, and revived the Boeotian confederacy. They \nalso destroyed the restored city of Platsea, and obliged its inhabit- \nants once more to seek refuge at Athens. \n\nThe successes of the Thebans revived the jealousy and distrust of \nAthens. Prompted by these feelings, the Athenians opened nego- \nciations for a peace with Sparta ; a resolution which was also \nadopted by the majority of the allies. \n\nA congress was accordingly opened in Sparta in the spring of \n371 b.c. The Athenians were represented by Callias and two \nother envoys ; the Thebans by Epaminondas, then one of the pole- \nmarchs. The terms of a peace were agreed upon, by which the \nindependence of the various Grecian cities was to be recognised ; \nand the Spartan harmosts and garrisons everywhere dismissed. \nSparta ratified the treaty for herself and her allies ; but Athens \ntook the oaths only for herself, and was followed separately by her \nallies. As Epaminondas refused to sign except in the name of \nthe Boeotian confederation, Agesilaus directed the name of the \nThebans to be struck out of the treaty, and proclaimed them \nexcluded from it. \n\nThe peace concluded between Sparta, Athens, and their respec- \ntive allies, was called the Peace of Callias. The result with \nregard to Thebes and Sparta will appear in the following chapter. \n\n\n\nOcrece, Greaves. (From the JEgiuetan Marbles.) \n\n\n\nCHAPTEE XVII. \n\nTHE SUPREMACY OF THEBES, B.C. 371-361. \n\nIx pursuance of the treaty, the Lacedaemonians withdrew theii \nharmosts and garrisons, whilst the Athenians recalled their fleet \nfrom the Ionian sea. Only one feeling prevailed at Sparta \xe2\x80\x94 a \ndesire to crush Thebes. This city was regarded as doomed to \ndestruction ; and it was not for a moment imagined that, single- \nhanded, she would be able to resist the might of Sparta. At the \ntime when the peace was concluded Cleombrotus happened to be \nin Phocis at the head of a Lacedaemonian army ; and he now \nreceived orders to invade Boeotia without delay. The Thebans, \non their side, were equally determined on resistance. The two \narmies met on the memorable plain of Leuctra, near Thespiae. \nThe forces on each side are not accurately known, but it seems \nprobable that the Thebans were outnumbered by the Lacedaemo- \nnians. The military genius of Epaminondas, however, compen- \nsated any inferiority of numbers by novelty of tactics. Up to this \ntime Grecian battles had been uniformly conducted by a general \nattack in line. Epaminondas now first adopted the manoeuvre, \nused with such success by Napoleon in modern times, of concen- \ntrating heavy masses on a given point of the enemy\'s array. Having \nformed his left wing into a dense column of 50 deep, so that its \ndepth was greater than its front, he directed it against the Lacedae- \nmonian right, containing the best troops in their army, drawn up \n12 deep, and led by Cleombrotus in person. The shock was ter \nrible. Cleombrotus himself was mortally wounded in the onset. \n\n\n\n166 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVII \n\n\n\nand with difficulty carried off by his comrades. Numbers of his \nofficers, as well as of his men, were slain, and the whole wing was \nbroken and driven back to their camp. The loss of the Thebans \nwas small compared with that of the Lacedaemonians. Out of 700 \nSpartans in the army of the latter, 400 had fallen ; and their king \nalso had been slain, an event which had not occurred since the \nfatal day of Thermopylae. \n\nThe victory of Leuctra was gained within three weeks after the \nexclusion of the Thebans from the peace of Callias. The effect of \nit throughout Greece was electrical. It was everywhere felt that \na new military power had arisen \xe2\x80\x94 that the prestige of the old \nSpartan discipline and tactics had departed. Yet at Sparta itself, \nthough the reverse was the greatest that her arms had ever sus- \ntained, the news of it was received with an assumption of indif- \nference characteristic of the people. The Ephors forbade the chorus \nof men, who were celebrating in the theatre the festival of the \nGyranopaedia, to be interrupted. They contented themselves with \ndirecting the names of the slain to be communicated to their rela- \ntives, and with issuing an order forbidding the women to wail and \nmourn. Those whose friends had fallen appeared abroad on the \nmorrow with joyful countenances, whilst the relatives of the sur- \nvivors seemed overwhelmed with grief and shame. \n\nImmediately after the battle the Thebans had sent to Jason of \nPherae in Thessaly to solicit his aid against the Lacedaemonians. \nThis despot was one of the most remarkable men of the period. \nHe was Tagus, or Generalissimo, of all Thessaly ; and Macedonia \nwas partially dependent on him. He was a man of boundless \nambition, and meditated nothing less than extending his dominion \nover the whole of Greece, for which his central situation seemed to \noffer many facilities. Upon receiving the invitation of the Thebans, \nJason i mm ediately resolved to join them. When he arrived the \nThebans were anxious that he should unite with them in an attack \nupon the Lacedaemonian camp ; but Jason dissuaded them from \nthe enterprise, advising them not to drive the Lacedaemonians to \ndespair, and offering his mediation. He accordingly succeeded in \neffecting a truce, by which the Lacedaemonians were allowed to \ndepart from Bceotia unmolested. \n\nAccording to Spartan custom, the survivors of a defeat were \nlooked upon as degraded men, and subjected to the penalties of \ncivil infamy. No allowance was made for circumstances. But \nthose who had fled at Leuctra were three hundred in number ; an \nattempt to enforce against them the usual penalties might prove \nnot only inconvenient, but even dangerous; and on the proposal \nof Agesilaus, they were, for this occasion only, suspended. The \n\n\n\nB.C. 370. EPAMINONDAS INVADES LACONIA. \n\n\n\n167 \n\n\n\nloss of material power which Sparta sustained by the defeat was \ngreat. The ascendency she had hitherto enjoyed in parts north of \nthe Corinthian gulf fell from her at once, and was divided between \nJason of Pherse and the Thebans. Jason was shortly afterwards \nassassinated. His death was felt as a relief by Greece, and espe- \ncially by Thebes. He was succeeded by his two brothers, Poly- \nphron and Polydorus ; but they possessed neither his ability nor \nhis power. \n\nThe Athenians stood aloof from the contending parties. They \nhad not received the news of the battle of Leuctra with any plea- \nsure, for they now dreaded Thebes more than Sparta. But instead \nof helping the latter, they endeavoured to prevent either from \nobtaining the supremacy in Greece, and for this purpose called \nupon the other states to form a new alliance upon the terms of the \npeace of Antalcidas. Most of the Peloponnesian states joined this \nnew league. Thus even the Peloponnesian cities became in- \ndependent of Sparta. But this was not all. Never did any state \nfall with greater rapidity. She not only lost the dominion over \nstates which she had exercised for centuries ; but two new political \npowers sprang up in the peninsula, which threatened her own \nindependence. \n\nIn the following year (b.c. 370) Epaminondas marched into \nLaconia, and threatened Sparta itself. The city, which was wholly \nunfortified, was filled with confusion and alarm. The women, who \nhad never yet seen the face of an enemy, gave vent to their fears \nin wailing and lamentation. Agesilaus, however, was undismayed, \nand saved the state by his vigilance and energy. He repulsed the \ncavalry of Epaminondas as they advanced towards Sparta ; and so \nvigorous were his measures of defence, that the Theban general \nabandoned all further attempt upon the city, and proceeded south- \nwards as far as Helos and Gythium on the coast, the latter the \nport and arsenal of Sparta. After laying waste with fire and \nsword the valley of the Eurotas, he retraced his steps to the fron- \ntiers of Arcadia. \n\nEpaminondas now proceeded to carry out the two objects for \nwhich his march had been undertaken ; namely, the consolidation \nof the Arcadian confederation, and the establishment of the Mes- \nsenians as an independent community. In the prosecution of the \nformer of these designs the mutual jealousy of the various Arca- \ndian cities rendered it necessary that a new one should be founded, \nwhich should be regarded as the capital of the confederation. \nConsequently, a new city was built on the banks of the Helisson, \ncalled Megalopolis, and peopled by the inhabitants of forty distinct \nArcadian townships. Here a synod of deputies from the towns \n\n\n\n168 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVII. \n\n\n\ncomposing the confederation, called s; The Ten Thousand," was \nto meet periodically for the despatch of business. Epaminondas \nnext proceeded to re-establish the Messenian state. The Messenians \nhad formerly lived under a dynasty of their own kings ; but for \nthe last three centuries their land had been in the possession of \nthe Lacedtemonians, and they had been fugitives upon the face \nof the earth. The restoration of these exiles, dispersed in \nvarious Hellenic colonies, to their former rights, would plant a \nbitterly hostile neighbour on the very borders of Laconia. Epami- \nnondas accordingly opened communications with them, and numbers \nof them nocked to his standard during his march into Pelopon- \nnesus. He now founded the town of Messene\'. Its citadel was \nplaced on the summit of Mount Ithome, which had three centuries \nbefore been so bravely defended by the Messenians against the \nSpartans. The strength of its fortifications was long afterwards a \nsubject of admiration. The territory attached to the new city \nextended southwards to the Messenian gulf, and northwards to the \nborders of Arcadia, comprising some of the most fertile land in \nPeloponnesus. \n\nSo low had Sparta sunk, that she was fain to send envoys to \nbeg the assistance of the Athenians. This request was acceded \nto ; and shortly afterwards an alliance was formed between the \ntwo states, in which Sparta waived all her claims to superiority \nand headship. During the next two years the Thebans continued \nsteadily to increase their power and influence in Greece, though no \ngreat battle was fought. In b.c. 368 Pelopidas conducted a Theban \nforce into Thessaly and Macedonia. In Thessaly he compelled \nAlexander, who, by the murder of his two brothers, had become \ndespot of Phera? and Tagus of Thessaly. to relinquish his designs \nagainst the independence of Larissa and other Thessalian cities, \nand to solicit peace. In Macedonia he formed an alliance with \nthe regent Ptolemy : and amongst the hostages given for the \nobservance of this treaty was the youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, \nafterwards the celebrated king of Macedom who remained for some \nyears at Thebes. \n\nIn the following year Pelopidas and Ismenias proceeded on an \nembassy to Persia. Ever since the peace of Antalcidas the Great \nKing had become the recognised mediator between the states of \nGreece ; and his fiat seemed indispensable to stamp the claims of \nthat city which pretended to the headship. The recent achieve- \nments of Thebes might entitle her to aspire to that position : and \nat all events the alterations which she had produced in the internal \nstate of Greece, by the establishment of Megalopolis and Messene, \nseemed to require for their stability the sanction of a Persian \n\n\n\nB.C. 364. \n\n\n\nDEATH OF PELOPIDAS. \n\n\n\n169 \n\n\n\nrescript. This was obtained without difficulty, as Thebes was now \nthe strongest state in Greece ; and it was evidently easier to exer- \ncise Persian ascendency there by her means, than through a weaker \npower. The Persian rescript pronounced the independence of \nMessene and Amphipolis ; the Athenians were directed to lay up \ntheir ships of war in ordinary ; and Thebes was declared the head \nof Greece. \n\nIt was, in all probability, during a mission undertaken by Pelo- \npidas and Ismenias, for the purpose of procuring the acknowledg- \nment of the rescript in Thessaly and the northern parts of* Greece, \nthat they were seized and imprisoned by Alexander of Pherse. \nThe Thebans immediately despatched an army of 8000 hoplites \nand 600 cavalry to recover or avenge their favourite citizen. \nUnfortunately, however, they were no longer commanded by Epa- \nminondas. Their present commanders were utterly incompetent. \nThey were beaten and forced to retreat, and the army was in such \ndanger from the active pursuit of the Thessalians and Athenians, \nthat its destruction seemed inevitable. Luckily, however, Epami- \nnondas was serving as a hoplite in the ranks. By the unanimous \nvoice of the troops he was now called to the command, and suc- \nceeded in conducting the army safely back to Thebes. Here the \nunsuccessful Boeotarchs were disgraced ; Epaminondas was restored \nto the command, and placed at the head of a second Theban army \ndestined to attempt the release of Pelopidas. Directed by his \nsuperior skill, the enterprise proved successful, and Pelopidas \n(b.c. 367) returned in safety to Thebes. \n\nIn b.c. 364 Pelopidas again marched into Thessaly against Alex- \nander of Pherse. Strong complaints of the tyranny of that despot \narrived at Thebes, and Pelopidas, who probably also burned to \navenge his private wrongs, prevailed upon the Thebans to send \nhim into Thessaly to punish the tyrant. The battle was fought on \nthe hills of Cynoscephalse ; the troops of Alexander were routed ; \nand Pelopidas, observing his hated enemy endeavouring to rally \nthem, was seized with such a transport of rage that, regardless of \nhis duties as a general, he rushed impetuously forwards and chal- \nlenged him to single combat. Alexander shrunk back within the \nranks of his guards, followed impetuously by Pelopidas, who was \nsoon slain, fighting with desperate bravery. Although the army \nof Alexander was defeated with severe loss, the news of the death \nof Pelopidas deprived the Thebans and their Thessalian allies \nof all the joy which they would otherwise have felt at their \nvictory. \n\nMeantime a war had been carried on between Elis and Arcadia, \nwhich had led to disunion among the Arcadians themselves. The \n\n\n\n170 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVII. \n\n\n\nMantineans supported the Eleans, who were also assisted by the \nSpartans ; whilst the rest of the Arcadians, and especially the \nTegeans, favoured Thebes. In B.C. 362 Epaminondas marched \ninto Peloponnesns to support the Theban party in Arcadia. \nThe Spartans sent a powerful force to the assistance of the Man- \ntineans, in whose territory the hostile armies met. In the battle \nwhich ensued Epaminondas formed his Boeotian troops into a \ncolumn of extraordinary depth, with which he bore down all \nbefore them. The Mantineans and Lacedaemonians turned and \nfled, and the rest followed their example. The day was won; \nbut Epaminondas, who fought in the foremost ranks, fell pierced \nwith a mortal wound. His fall occasioned such consternation \namong his troops, that, although the enemy were in full flight, \nthey did not know how to use their advantage, and remained \nrooted to the spot. Epaminondas was carried off the field with \nthe spear-head still fixed in his breast. Having satisfied himself \nthat his shield was safe, and that the victory was gained, he \ninquired for Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to suc- \nceed him in the command. Being informed that both were slain : \n"Then," he observed, "you must make peace." After this he \nordered the spear-head to be withdrawn ; when the gush of blood \nwliich followed soon terminated his life. Thus died this truly \ngreat man ; and never was there one whose title to that epithet \nhas been less disputed. Antiquity is unanimous in his praise, and \nsome of the first men of Greece subsequently took him for their \nmodel. "With him the commanding influence of Thebes began \nand ended. His last advice was adopted, and peace was concluded \nprobably before the Theban army quitted Peloponnesus. Its basis \nwas a recognition of the status quo \xe2\x80\x94 to leave everything as it was, \nto acknowledge the Arcadian constitution and the independence of \nMessene. Sparta alone refused to join it on account of the last \narticle, but she was not supported by her allies. \n\nAgesilaus had lived to see the empire of Sparta extinguished by \nher hated rival. Thus curiously had the prophecy been fulfilled \nwhich warned Sparta of the evils awaiting her under a "lame \nsovereignty." But Agesilaus had not yet abandoned all hope ; \nand he now directed his views towards the east as the quarter from \nwhich Spartan power might still be resuscitated. At the age of \n80 the indomitable old man proceeded with a force of 1000 hoplites \nto assist Tachos, king of Egypt, in his revolt against Persia. He \ndied at Cyrene on his return to Greece. His body was embalmed \nin wax, and splendidly buried in Sparta. \n\n\n\nCoin of Syracuse. \n\n\n\nCHAPTEE XVIII. \n\nHISTORY OF THE SICILIAN GREEKS FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF \nTHE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT TO THE DEATH OF TIMOLEON. \n\nThe affairs of the Sicilian Greeks, an important branch of the \nHellenic race, deserve a passing notice. A few years after the \ndestruction of the Athenian armament, Dionysius made himself \nmaster of Syracuse, and openly seized upon the supreme power \n(b.c. 405). His reign as tyrant or despot was long and prosperous. \nAfter conquering the Carthaginians, who more than once invaded \nSicily, he extended his dominion over a great part of the island, \nand over a considerable portion of Magna Grsecia. He raised Syra- \ncuse to be one of the chief Grecian states, second in influence, if \nindeed second, to Sparta alone. Under his sway Syracuse was \nstrengthened and embellished with new fortifications, docks, arsenals, \nand other public buildings, and became superior even to Athens in \nextent and population, \n\n\n\n172 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVIII. \n\n\n\nDionysius was a warm patron of literature, and was anxious to \ngain distinction by his literary compositions. In the midst of his \npolitical and military cares he devoted himself assiduously to \npoetry, and not only caused his poems to be publicly recited at the \nOlympic games, but repeatedly contended for the prize of tragedy \nat Athens. In accordance with the same spirit we find him seeking \nthe society of men distinguished in literature and philosophy. \nPlato, who visited Sicily about the year 389 from a curiosity to see \nMount iEtua, was introduced to Dionysius by Dion. The high \nmoral tone of Plato\'s conversation did not however prove so at- \ntractive to Dionysius as it had done to Dion ; and the philosopher \nwas not only dismissed with aversion and dislike, but even, it seems, \nthrough the machinations of Dionysius, seized, bound, and sold for \na slave in the island of JEgina. He was, however, repurchased by \nAnnie eris of Gyrene, and sent back to Athens. \n\nDionysius died in b.c. 367, and was succeeded by his eldest son, \ncommonly called the younger Dionysius, who was about 25 years \nof age at the time of Ms father\'s death. At first he listened to the \ncounsels of Dion, who had always enjoyed the respect and con- \nfidence of his father. At the advice of Dion he invited Plato to \nSyracuse, where the philosopher was received with the greatest \nhonour. His illustrious pupil immediately began to take lessons in \ngeometry ; superfluous dishes disappeared from the royal table ; \nand Dionysius even betrayed some symptoms of a wish to mitigate \nthe former rigours of the despotism. But now the old courtiers \ntook the alarm. It was whispered to Dionysius that the whole was \na deep-laid scheme on the part of Dion for the purpose of effecting \na revolution and placing his own nephews on the throne.* These \naccusations had the desired effect on the mind of Dionysius, who \nshortly afterwards expelled Dion from Sicily. Plato with difficulty \nobtained permission to return to Greece (b.c. 360). Dionysius now \ngave way to his vices without restraint, and became an object of \ncontempt to the Syracusans. Dion saw that the time had come \nfor avenging his own wrongs as well as those of his country. Col- \nlecting a small force, he sailed to Sicily, and suddenly appeared \nbefore the gates of Syracuse during the absence of Dionysius on an \nexpedition to the coasts of Italy. The inhabitants, filled with joy, \nwelcomed Dion as their deliverer; and Dionysius on his return \nfrom Italy found himself compelled to quit Syracuse (b.c. 356), \nleaving Dion undisputed master of the city. The latter was now in \n\n* The elder Dionysius had married two wives at the same time : one of \nthese was a Locrian woman named Doris ; the other, Aristomache, was a \nSyracusan, and the sister of Dion. The younger Dionysius was his eldest \nson by Doris ; hut he also had children by Aristomache. \n\n\n\nB.C. 344. \n\n\n\nTIMOLEON INVADES SILICY. \n\n\n\n173 \n\n\n\na condition to carry out all those exalted notions of political life \nwhich he had sought to instil into the mind of Dionysius. He \nseems to have contemplated some political changes ; but his imme- \ndiate and practical acts were tyrannical, and were rendered still \nmore unpopular by his overbearing manners. His unpopularity \ncontinued to increase, till at length one of his bosom friends \xe2\x80\x94 the \nAthenian Callippus \xe2\x80\x94 seized the opportunity to mount to power by \nhis murder, and caused him to be assassinated in his own house. \nThis event took place in 353, about three years after the expulsion \nof the Dionysian dynasty. Callippus contrived to retain the sove- \nreign power only a twelvemonth. A period of anarchy followed, \nduring which Dionysius made himself master of the city by \ntreachery, about B.C. 346. Dionysius, however, was not able to re- \nestablish himself firmly in his former power. Most of the other \ncities of Sicily had shaken off the yoke of Syracuse, and were \ngoverned by petty despots. Meantime the Carthaginians prepared \nto take advantage of the distracted condition of Sicily. In the \nextremity of their sufferings, several of the Syracusan exiles ap- \npealed for aid to Corinth, their mother-city. The application was \ngranted, and Timoleon was appointed to command an expedition \ndestined for the relief of Syracuse. \n\nTimoleon was distinguished for gentleness as well as for courage, \nbut towards traitors and despots his hatred was intense. He had \nonce saved the life of his elder brother Timophanes in battle at the \nimminent peril of his own ; but when Timophanes, availing himself \nof his situation as commander of the garrison in the Acrocorinthus, \nendeavoured to enslave his country, Timoleon did not hesitate to \nconsent to his death. Twice before had Timoleon pleaded with \nhis brother, beseeching him not to destroy the liberties of his \ncountry ; but when Timophanes turned a deaf ear to thcoe appeals, \nTimoleon connived at the action of his friends, who put him to \ndeath, whilst he himself, bathed in a flood of tears, stood a little \nway aloof. The great body of the citizens regarded the conduct \nof Timoleon with love and admiration. In the mind of Timoleon, \nhowever, their approving verdict was far more than outweighed \nby the reproaches and execrations of his mother. For many years \nnothing could prevail upon him to return to public life. He buried \nhimself in the country far from the haunts of men, till a chance \nvoice in the Corinthian assembly nominated him as the leader of \nthe expedition against Dionysius. \n\nRoused by the nature of the cause, and the exhortations of his \nfriends, Timoleon accepted the post thus offered to him. His suc- \ncess exceeded his hopes. As soon as he appeared before Syracuse, \nDionysius, who appears to have abandoned all hope of ultimate \n\n\n\n174 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XVIII. \n\n\n\nsuccess, surrendered the citadel into Ms hands, on condition of \nbeing allowed to depart in safety to Corinth (b.c. 343). Dionysius \npassed the remainder of his life at Corinth, where he is said to have \ndisplayed some remnants of Ms former luxury by the fastidious \ntaste wMch he showed in the choice of Ms viands, unguents, dress, \nand furMture ; wMlst his literary inclinations manifested themselves \nin teaching the public singers and actors, and in opemng a school \nfor boys. \n\nTimoleon also expelled the other tyrants from the Sicilian cities, \nand gained a great victory over the Carthagimans at the river \nCrimesus (or Crimissus). He restored a republican constitution to \nSyracuse ; and Ms first public act was to destroy the impregnable \nfortifications of the citadel of Ortygia, the stronghold of the elder \nand the younger Dionysius. All the rewards wMch Timoleon \nreceived for his great services were a house in Syracuse, and some \nlanded property in the neighbourhood of the city. He now sent \nfor Ms family from Corinth, and became a Syracusan citizen. He \ncontinued, however, to retain, though in a private station, the \ngreatest influence in the state. During the latter part of Ms life, \nthough he was totally deprived of sight, yet, when important affairs \nwere discussed in the assembly, it was customary to send for \nTimoleon, who was drawn in a car into the middle of the theatre \namid the shouts and affectionate greetings of the assembled citi- \nzens. When the tumult of Ms reception had subsided he listened \npatiently to the debate. The opiMon which he pronounced was \nusually ratified by the vote of the assembly ; and he then left the \ntheatre amidst the same cheers which had greeted Ms arrival. In \ntMs happy and honoured condition he breathed Ms last in B.C. 336, \na few years after the battle of Crimesus. He was splendidly in- \nterred at the public cost, wMlst the tears of the whole SyracusaD \npopulation followed him to the grave. \n\n\n\n\nPlato. \n\n\n\n\nDemosthenes. \n\n\n\nCHAPTEE XIX. \n\nPHILIP OF MACEDON, B.C. 359-336. \n\nThe internal dissensions of Greece produced their natural fruits ; \nand we shall have now to relate the downfall of her independence \nand her subjugation by a foreign power. This power was Mace- \ndonia, an obscure state to the north of Thessaly, hitherto over- \nlooked and despised, and considered as altogether barbarous, and \nwithout the pale of Grecian civilization. But though the Mace- \ndonians were not Greeks, their sovereigns claimed to be descended \nfrom an Hellenic race, namely, that of Temenus of Argos ; and it \nis said that Alexander I. proved his Argive descent previously to \ncontending at the Olympic games. Perdiccas is commonly regarded \nas the founder of the monarchy ; of the history of which, however, \nlittle is known till the reign of Amyntas I., his fifth successor, \nwho was contemporary with the Pisistratidse at Athens. Under \nAmyntas, who submitted to the satrap Megabyzus, Macedonia be- \ncame subject to Persia, and remained so till after the battle of \nPlataea. The reigns of the succeeding sovereigns present little that \nm remarkable, with the exception of that of Archelaus (b.c. 413). \nThis monarch transferred his residence from Mgse to Pella, which \nthus became the capital. He entertained many literary men at his \ncourt, such as Euripides, who ended his days at Pella. Archelaus \nwas assassinated in b.c. 399, and the crown devolved upon Amyn- \ntas II., a representative of the ancient line. Amyntas left three \nsons, the youngest being the celebrated Philip, of whom we have \nnow to speak. \n\nIt has been already mentioned that the youthful Philip was one \nof the hostages delivered to the Thebans as security for the peace \n\n\n\n176 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIX. \n\n\n\neffected by Pelopidas. His residence at Thebes gave him some \ntincture of Grecian philosophy and literature; but the most im- \nportant lesson which he learned at that city was the art of war, \nwith all the improved tactics introduced by Epaminondas. Philip \nsucceeded to the throne at the age of 23 (b.c. 359), and displayed \nat the beginning of his reign his extraordinary energy and abilities. \nAfter defeating the Illyrians he established a standing army, in \nwhich discipline was preserved by the severest punishments. He \nintroduced the far-famed Macedonian phalanx, which was 16 men \ndeep, armed with long projecting spears. \n\nPliilip\'s views were first turned towards the eastern frontiers of \nhis dominions, where his interests clashed with those of the Athe- \nnians. A few years before the Athenians had made various un- \navailing attempts to obtain possession of Amphipolis, once the \njewel of their empire, but which they had never recovered since its \ncapture by Brasidas in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. \nIts situation at the mouth of the Strymon rendered it also valuable \nto Macedonia, not only as a commercial port, but as opening a \npassage into Thrace. The Olynthians were likewise anxious to \nenrol Amphipolis as a member of their confederacy, and accordingly \nproposed to the Athenians to form an alliance for the purpose of \ndefending Amphipolis against their mutual enemy. An alliance \nbetween these two powerful states would have proved an insur- \nmountable obstacle to Philip\'s views : and it was therefore abso- \nlutely necessary to prevent this coalition. Here we have the first \ninstance of Philip\'s skill and duplicity in negotiation. By secretly \npromising the Athenians that he would put Amphipolis into their \nhands if they would give him possession of Pydna, he induced \nthem to reject the overtures of the Olynthians ; and by ceding to \nthe latter the town of Anthemus, he bought off their opposition. \nHe now laid siege to Amphipolis, which, being thus left unaided, \nfell into his hands (b.c. 358). He then forthwith marched against \nPydna, which surrendered to him ; but on the ground that it was \nnot the Athenians who had put him in possession of this town, he \nrefused to give up Amphipolis to them. \n\nPhilip had now just reason to dread the enmity of the Athenians, \nand accordingly it was his policy to court the favour of the Olyn- \nthians, and to prevent them from renewing their negotiations with \nthe Athenians. In order to separate them more effectually, he \nassisted the Olynthians in recovering Potidsea, which had formerly \nbelonged to their confederacy, but was now in the hands of the \nAthenians. On the capture of the town he handed it over to the \nOlynthians. Plutarch relates that the capture of Potidsea was ac- \ncompanied with three other fortunate events in the life of Philip ; \n\n\n\nB.C. 357. \n\n\n\nSOCIAL AND SACRED WARS. \n\n\n\n177 \n\n\n\nnamely, the prize gained by his chariot at the Olympic games, a \nvictory of his general Parmenio over the Illyrians, and the birth of \nhis son Alexander. These events happened in b.c. 356. \n\nPhilip now crossed the Strymon, on the left bank of which lay \nPanga3us, a range of mountains abounding in gold-mines. He \nconquered the district, and founded there a new town called \nPhilippi, on the site of the ancient Thracian town of Crenides. By \nimproved methods of working the mines he made them yield an \nannual revenue of 1000 talents, nearly 250,000Z. \n\nMeanwhile Athens was engaged in a war with her allies, which \nhas been called the Social War ; and which was, perhaps, the rea- \nson why she was obliged to look quietly on whilst Philip was thus \naggrandizing himself at her expense. This war broke out in \nB.C. 357. The chief causes of it seem to have been the contri- \nbutions levied upon the allies by the Athenian generals. The war \nlasted three years ; and as Artaxerxes, the Persian king, threatened \nto support the allies with a fleet of 300 ships, the Athenians were \nobliged to consent to a disadvantageous peace, which secured the \nindependence of the more important allies (b.c. 355). \n\nAnother war, which had been raging during the same time, \ntended still further to exhaust the Grecian states, and thus pave \nthe way for Philip\'s progress to the supremacy. This was the \nSacred War, which broke out between Thebes and Phocis in the \nsame year as the Social War (b.c. 357). An ill-feeling had long \nsubsisted between those two countries. The Thebans now availed \nthemselves of the influence which they possessed in the Amphicty- \nonic council to take vengeance upon the Phocians, and accordingly \ninduced this body to impose a heavy fine upon the latter people, \nbecause they had cultivated a portion of the Cirrhsean plain, which \nhad been consecrated to the Delphian god, and was to lie waste for \never. The Phocians pleaded that the payment of the fine would \nruin them ; but instead of listening to their remonstrances, the \nAmphictyons doubled the amount, and threatened, in case of their \ncontinued refusal, to reduce them to the condition of serfs. Thus \ndriven to desperation, the Phocians resolved to complete the sacri- \nlege with which they had been branded, by seizing the very temple \nof Delphi itself. The leader and counsellor of this enterprise was \nPhilomelus, who, with a force of no more than 2000 men, surprised \nand took Delphi. At first, however, he carefully abstained from \ntouching the sacred treasure ; but being hard pressed by the Thebans \nand their allies, he threw off the scruples which he had hitherto \nassumed, and announced that the sacred treasures should be con- \nverted into a fund for the payment of mercenaries. On the death \nof Philomelus, who fell in battle, the command was assumed by his \n\nN \n\n\n\n173 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIX. \n\n\n\nbrother Ononiarchus, who carried on the war with vigour and suc- \ncess. But he was checked in his career by Philip, who had pre- \nviously been extending his dominion over Thessaly, and who now \nassumed the character of a champion of the Delphic god, and made \nhis soldiers wear wreaths of laurel plucked in the groves of Tempe. \nHe penetrated into Thessaly, and encountered the Phocians near \nthe gulf of Pagasse. In the battle which ensued, Onomarchus was \nslain, and his army totally defeated (b.c. 352). This victory made \nPhilip master of Thessaly. He now directed his march southwards \nwith the view of subduing the Phocians ; but upon reaching Ther- \nmopylae he found the pass guarded by a strong Athenian force, and \nwas compelled, or considered it more prudent, to retreat. \n\nAfter his return from Thessaly Philip\'s views were directed \ntowards Tlrrace and the Chersonese. It was at this juncture that \nDemosthenes stepped forwards as the proclaimed opponent of \nPhilip, and delivered the first of those celebrated orations which from \ntheir subject have been called " the Philippics." This most famous \nof all the Grecian orators was born in b.c. 382-381. Having lost \nhis father at the early age of seven, his guardians abused their \ntrust, and defrauded him of the greater part of his paternal inherit- \nance. This misfortune, however, proved one of the causes which \ntended to make him an orator. Demosthenes, as he advanced \ntowards manhood, perceived with indignation the conduct of his \nguardians, for which he resolved to make them answerable when \nthe proper opportunity should arrive, by accusing them himself. \nHis first attempt to speak in public proved a failure, and he retired \nfrom the bema amidst the hootings and laughter of the citizens. \nThe more judicious and candid among his auditors perceived, how- \never, marks of genius in his speech, and rightly attributed his \nfailure to timidity and want of due preparation. Eunomus, an aged \ncitizen, who met him wandering about the Piraeus in a state of \ndejection at his ill success, bade him take courage and persevere. \nDemosthenes now withdrew awhile from public life, and devoted \nhimself perseveringly to remedy his defects. They were such as \nmight be lessened, if not removed, by practice, and consisted chiefly \nof a weak voice, imperfect articulation, and ungraceful and inap- \npropriate action. He derived much assistance from Satyrus the \nactor, who exercised him in reciting passages froni Sophocles and \nEuripides. He studied the best rhetorical treatises and orations, \nand is said to have copied the work of Thucydides with his own \nhand no fewer than eight times. He shut himself up for two or \nthree months together in a subterranean chamber in order to prac- \ntise composition and declamation. His perseverance was crowned \nwith success ; and he who on the first attempt had descended from \n\n\n\nB.C. 352. \n\n\n\nDEMOSTHENES\xe2\x80\x94 FIRST PHILIPPIC. \n\n\n\n179 \n\n\n\nthe bema amid the ridicule of the crowd, became at last the most \nperfect orator the world has ever seen. \n\nDemosthenes had established himself as a public speaker before \nthe period which we have now reached ; but it is chiefly in con- \nnexion with Philip that we are to view him as a statesman as well \nas an orator. Philip had shown his ambition by the conquest of \nThessaly, and by the part he had taken in the Sacred War ; and \nDemosthenes now began to regard him as the enemy of the liberties \nof Athens and of Greece. In his first " Philippic " Demosthenes \ntried to rouse his countrymen to energetic measures against this \nformidable enemy; but his warnings and exhortations produced \nlittle effect, for the Athenians were no longer distinguished by the \nsame spirit of enterprise which had characterized them in the days \nof their supremacy. No important step was taken to curb the \ngrowing power of Philip ; and it was the danger of Olynthus which \nfirst induced the Athenians to prosecute the war with a little more \nenergy. In 350 B.C., Philip having captured a town in Chalcidice, \nOlynthus began to tremble for her own safety, and sent envoys to \nAthens to crave assistance. Olynthus was still at the head of thirty- \ntwo Greek towns, and the confederacy was a sort of counterpoise to \nthe power of Philip. It was on this occasion that Demosthenes de- \nlivered his three Olynthaic orations, in which he warmly advocated \nan alliance with Olynthus. \n\nDemosthenes was opposed by a strong party, with which Phocion \ncommonly acted. Phocion is one of the most singular and original \ncharacters in Grecian history. He viewed the multitude and their \naffairs with a scorn which he was at no pains to disguise ; receiving \ntheir anger with indifference, and their praises with contempt. His \nknown probity also gave him weight with the assembly. He was \nthe only statesman of whom Demosthenes stood in awe ; who was \naccustomed to say, when Phocion rose, " Here comes the pruner of \nmy periods." But Phocion\'s desponding views, and his mistrust of \nthe Athenian people, made him an ill statesman at a period which \ndemanded the most active patriotism. He doubtless injured his \ncountry by contributing to check the more enlarged and patriotic \nviews of Demosthenes ; and though his own conduct was pure and \ndisinterested, he unintentionally threw his weight on the side of \nthose who, like Demades and others, were actuated by the basest \nmotives. This division of opinion rendered the operations of the \nAthenians for the aid of the Olynthians languid and desultory. \nTown after town of the confederacy fell before Philip ; and in 347 \nOlynthus itself was taken. The whole of the Chalciclian peninsula \nthus became a Macedonian province. \n\nThe prospects of Athens now became alarming. Her possessions \n\nN 2 \n\n\n\n180 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIX. \n\n\n\nin the Chersonese were threatened, as well as the freedom of the \nGreek towns upon the Hellespont. The Athenians had supported \nthe Phocians in the Sacred War, and were thus at war with Thebes. \nIn order to resist Philip the attention of the Athenians was now \ndirected towards a reconciliation with Thebes, especially since the \ntreasures of Delphi were nearly exhausted, and on the other hand \nthe war was becoming every year more and more burthensome to \nthe Thebans. Xor did it seem improbable that a peace might be \nconcluded not only between those two cities, but among the Grecian \nstates generally. It seems to have been this aspect of affairs that \ninduced Philip to make several indirect overtures to the Athenians \nin the summer of b.c. 347. In spite of subsidies from Delphi the \nwar had been very onerous to them, and they received these ad- \nvances with joy, and eventually agreed to the terms of a peace. \nHaving thus gained over the Athenians, Philip marched through \nThermopylae, and entered Phocis, which surrendered uncondition- \nally at his approach. He then occupied Delphi, where he assembled \nthe Amphictyons to pronounce sentence upon those who had been \nconcerned in the sacrilege committed there. The council decreed \nthat all the cities of Phocis, except Abse, should be destroyed, and \ntheir inhabitants scattered into villages containing not more than \nfifty houses each. Sparta was deprived of her share in the Amphic- \ntyonic privileges ; the two votes in the council possessed by the \nPhocians were transferred to the kings of Macedonia ; and Philip \nwas to share with the Thebans and Thessalians the honour of pre- \nsiding at the Pythian games (b.c. 346). \n\nThe result of the Sacred War rendered Macedon the leading state \nin Greece. Philip at once acquried by it military glory, a reputation \nfor piety, and an accession of power. His ambitious designs were \nnow too plain to be mistaken. The eyes of the blindest among the \nAthenians were at last opened ; the promoters of the peace which \nhad been concluded with Philip incurred the hatred and suspicion \nof the people ; whilst on the other hand Demosthenes rose higher \nthan ever in public favour. \n\nPhilip was now busy with preparations for the vast projects which \nhe contemplated, and which embraced an attack upon the Athenian \ncolonies, as well as upon the Persian empire. For this purpose he \nhad organized a considerable naval force as well as an army ; and \nin the spring of 342 B.C. he set out on an expedition against Thrace. \nHis progress soon appeared to menace the Chersonese and the \nAthenian possessions in that quarter ; and at length the Athenian \ntroops under Diopithes came into actual collision with the Mace- \ndonians. In the following year Philip began to attack the Greek \ncities north of the Hellespont. He first besieged and captured \n\n\n\nB.C. 338. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF CH^RONEA. \n\n\n\n181 \n\n\n\nSelymbria on the Propontis, and then turned his arms against \nPerinthus and Byzantium. This roused the Athenians to more \nvigorous action. War was formally declared against Philip, and a \nfleet equipped for the immediate relief of Byzantium. Philip was \nforced to raise the siege not only of that town, but of Perinthus \nalso, and finally to evacuate the Chersonesus altogether. For these \nacceptable services the grateful Byzantians erected a colossal statue \nin honour of Athens. \n\nAfter this check Philip undertook an expedition against the \nThracians ; but meantime his partisans procured for him an oppor- \ntunity of marching again into the very heart of Greece. \n\nAmphissa, a Locrian town, having been declared by the Amphic- \ntyonic council guilty of sacrilege, Philip was appointed by the \ncouncil as their general to inflict punishment on the inhabitants of \nthe guilty town. Accordingly he marched southwards early in \nB.C. 338 ; but instead of proceeding in the direction of Amphissa, he \nsuddenly seized Elatea, the chief town in the eastern part of Phocis, \nthus showing clearly enough that his real design was against \nBceotia and Attica. Intelligence of this event reached Athens at \nnight, and caused extraordinary alarm. In the following morning \nDemosthenes pressed upon the assembly the necessity for making \nthe most vigorous preparations for defence, and especially recom- \nmended them to send an embassy to Thebes, in order to persuade \nthe Thebans to unite with them against the common enemy. \n\nThe details of the war that followed are exceedingly obscure. \nPhilip appears to have again opened negotiations with the Thebans, \nwhich failed ; and we then find the combined Theban and Athenian \narmies marching out to meet the Macedonians. The decisive battle \nwas fought on the 7th of August, in the plain of Chseronea in \nBoeotia, near the frontier of Phocis (B.C. 338). In the Macedonian \narmy was Philip\'s son, the youthful Alexander, who was intrusted \nwith the command of one of the wings ; and it was a charge made \nby him on the Theban sacred band that decided the fortune of the \nday. The sacred band was cut to pieces, without flinching from \nthe ground which it occupied, and the remainder of the combined \narmy was completely routed. Demosthenes, who was serving as a \nfoot-soldier in the Athenian ranks, has been absurdly reproached \nwith cowardice because he participated in the general flight. \n\nThe battle of Chseronea crushed the liberties of Greece, and \nmade it in reality a province of the Macedonian monarchy. To \nAthens herself the blow was almost as fatal as that of iEgospotami. \nBut the manner in which Philip used his victory excited universal \nsurprise. He dismissed the Athenian prisoners without ransom, \nand voluntarily offered a peace on terms more advantageous than \n\n\n\n182 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XIX. \n\n\n\nthe Athenians themselves would have ventured to propose. Philip, \nindeed, seems to have regarded Athens with a sort of love and \nrespect, as the centre of art and refinement, for his treatment of the \nThehans was very different, and marked by great harshness and \nseverity. They were compelled to recall their exiles, in whose \nhands the government was placed, whilst a Macedonian garrison \nwas established in the Cadmea. \n\nA congress of the Grecian states was now summoned at Corinth, \nin which war was declared against Persia, and Philip was appointed \ngeneralissimo of the expedition. \n\nIn the spring of b.c. 336 Philip sent some forces into Asia, under \nthe command of Attalus, Parmenio, and Amyntas, which were \ndesigned to engage the Greek cities of Asia in the expedition. But \nbefore quitting Macedonia, Philip determined to provide for the \nsafety of his dominions by celebrating the marriage of his daughter \nwith Alexander of Epirus. It was solemnized at iEgse, the ancient \ncapital of Macedonia, with much pomp, including banquets, and \nmusical and theatrical entertainments. The day after the nuptials \nwas dedicated to theatrical entertainments. The festival was \nopened with a procession of the images of the twelve Olympian \ndeities, with which was associated that of Philip himself. The \nmonarch took part in the procession, dressed in white robes, and \ncrowned with a chaplet. Whilst thus proceeding through the city, \na youth suddenly rushed out of the crowd, and, drawing a long \nsword which he had concealed under his clothes, plunged it into \nPhilip\'s side, who fell dead upon the spot. The assassin was pur- \nsued by some of the royal guards, and, having stumbled in his flight, \nwas despatched before he could reach the place where horses had \nbeen provided for his escape. His name was Pausauias. He was a \nyouth of noble birth, and we are told that his motive for taking \nPhilip\'s life was that the king had refused to punish an outrage \nwhich Attalus had committed against him. \n\nThus fell Philip of Macedon in the twenty-fourth year of his \nreign and forty-seventh of his age (b.c. 336). When we reflect \nupon his achievements, and how, partly by policy and partly by \narms, he converted his originally poor and distracted kingdom into \nthe mistress of Greece, we must acknowledge him to have been an \nextraordinary, if not a great man, in the better sense of that term. \nHis views and his ambition were certainly a3 large as those of his \nson Alexander, but he was prevented by a premature death from \ncarrying them out ; nor would Alexander himself have been able \nto perform his great achievements had not Philip handed down to \nhim all the means and instruments which they required. \n\n\n\nCoin of Alexander the Great. \n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX. \n\nALEXANDER THE GREAT. B.C. 336-323. \n\nAlexander, at the time of his father\'s death, was in his twentieth \nyear, having been born in B.C. 356. His early education was en- \ntrusted to Leonidas, a kinsman of his mother, a man of severe and \nparsimonious character, who trained him with Spartan simplicity \nand hardihood ; whilst Lysimachus, a sort of under-governor, early \ninspired the young prince with ambitious notions, by teaching him \nto love and emulate the heroes of the Iliad. According to the \ntraditions of his family, the blood of Achilles actually ran in the \nveins of Alexander ;* and Lysimachus nourished the feeling which \nthat circumstance was calculated to awaken by giving him the \nname of that hero, whilst he called Philip Peleus, and himself \nPhoenix. But the most striking feature in Alexander\'s education \nwas, that he had Aristotle for his teacher, and that thus the greatest \nconqueror of the material world received the instructions of him \nwho has exercised the most extensive empire over the human in- \ntellect. It was probably at about the age of thirteen that he first \nreceived the lessons of Aristotle, and they can hardly have con- \ntinued more than three years, for Alexander soon left the schools \nfor the employments of active life. At the age of sixteen we find \nhim regent of Macedonia during Philip\'s absence ; and at eighteen \nwe have seen him filling a prominent military post at the battle of \nChseronea. \n\nOn succeeding to the throne Alexander announced his intention \nof prosecuting his father\'s expedition into Asia ; but it was first \n\n* His mother Olympias was the daughter of Neoptolemus, king- of Epirus\' \nwho claimed descent from Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles. \n\n\n\n18-i \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XX. \n\n\n\nnecessary for him to settle the affairs of Greece, where the news of \nPhilip\'s assassination, and the accession of so young a prince, had \nexcited in several states a hope of shaking off the Macedonian yoke. \nAthens was the centre of these movements. Demosthenes, although \nin monrning for the recent loss of an only daughter, now came \nabroad dressed in white, and crowned with a chaplet, in which \nattire he was seen sacrificing at one of the public altars. He also \nmoved a decree that Philip\'s death should be celebrated by a public \nthanksgiving, and that religious honours should be paid to the \nmemory of Pausanias. At the same time he made vigorous pre- \nparations for action. He despatched envoys to the principal \nGrecian states for the purpose of inciting them against Macedon. \nSparta, and the whole Peloponnesus, with the exception of Megalo- \npolis and Messenia, seemed inclined to shake off their compulsory \nalliance. Even the Thebans rose against the dominant oligarchy, \nalthough the Cadraea was in the hands of the Macedonians. \n\nThe activity of Alexander disconcerted all these movements. \nHaving marched through Thessaly, he assembled the Amphictyonic \ncouncil at Thermopylae, who conferred upon him the command \nwith which they had invested his father during the Sacred War. \nHe then advanced rapidly upon Thebes, and thus prevented the \nmeditated revolution. The Athenians sent ambassadors to depre- \ncate his wrath, who were graciously accepted. He then convened \na general congress at Corinth, where he was appointed general- \nissimo for the Persian war in place of his father. Most of the \nphilosophers and persons of note near Corinth came to congratulate \nhim on this occasion ; but Diogenes of Sinope, who was then living \nin one of the suburbs of Corinth, did not make hi3 appearance. \nAlexander therefore resolved to pay a visit to the eccentric cynic, \nwhom he found basking in the sun. On the approach of Alexander \nwith a numerous retinue, Diogenes raised himself up a little, and \nthe monarch affably inquired how he could serve him? "By \nstanding out of my sunshine," replied the churlish philosopher. \nAlexander was struck with surprise at a behaviour to which he was \nso little accustomed ; but whilst his courtiers were ridiculing the \nmanners of the cynic, he turned to them and said, " Were I not \nAlexander, I should like to be Diogenes." \n\nThe result of the Congress might be considered a settlement of \nthe affairs of Greece. Alexander then returned to Macedonia in \nthe hope of being able to begin his Persian expedition in the spring \nof B.C. 335 ; but reports of disturbances among the Thracians and \nTriballians diverted his attention to that quarter. He therefore \ncrossed Mount Haemus the Balkan) and marched into the territory \nof the Triballians, defeated their forces, and pursued them to the \n\n\n\nB.C. 335. \n\n\n\nCAPTURE OF THEBES. \n\n\n\n185 \n\n\n\nDanube, which he crossed. After acquiring a large booty he \nregained the banks of the Danube, and thence marched against \nthe Illyrians and Taulantians, whom he speedily reduced to \nobedience. \n\nDuring Alexander\'s absence on these expeditions no tidings were \nheard of him for a considerable time, and a report of his death was \nimdustriously spread in Southern Greece. The Thebans rose and \nbesieged the Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, at the same time \ninviting other states to declare their independence. Demosthenes \nwas active in aiding the movement. He persuaded the Athenians \nto furnish the Thebans with subsidies, and to assure them of their \nsupport and alliance. But the rapidity of Alexander again crushed \nthe insurrection in the bud. Before the Thebans discovered that \nthe report of his death was false he had already arrived at On- \nchestus in Bceotia. Alexander was willing to afford them an oppor- \ntunity for repentance, and marched slowly to the foot of the Cad- \nmea. But the leaders of the insurrection, believing themselves \nirretrievably compromised, replied with taunts to Alexander\'s \nproposals for peace, and excited the people to the most desperate \nresistance. An engagement was prematurely brought on by one of \nthe generals of Alexander, in which some of the Macedonian troops \nwere put to the rout ; but Alexander, coming up with the phalanx, \nwhilst the Thebans were in the disorder of pursuit, drove them back \nin turn and entered the gates along with them, when a fearful \nmassacre ensued, committed principally by the Thracians in \nAlexander\'s service. Six thousand Thebans are said to have been \nslain, and thirty thousand were made prisoners. The doom of the \nconquered city was referred to the allies, who decreed her destruc- \ntion. The grounds of the verdict bear the impress of a tyrannical \nhypocrisy. They rested on the conduct of the Thebans during the \nPersian war, on their treatment of Platsea, and on their enmity to \nAthens. The inhabitants were sold as slaves, and all the houses, \nexcept that of Pindar, were levelled with the ground. The Cadmea \nwas preserved to be occupied by a Macedonian garrison, Thebes \nseems to have been thus harshly treated as an example to the rest \nof Greece, for towards the other states, which were now eager to \nmake their excuses and submission, Alexander showed much for- \nbearance and lenity. The conduct of the Athenians exhibits them \ndeeply sunk in degradation. When they heard of the chastisement \ninflicted upon Thebes, they immediately voted, on the motion of \nDemosthenes, that ambassadors should be sent to congratulate \nAlexander on his safe return from his northern expeditions, and on \nhis recent success. Alexander in reply wrote a letter, demanding \nthat eight or ten of the leading Athenian orators should be de- \n\n\n\n186 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XX. \n\n\n\nlivered up to him. At the head of the list was Demosthenes. In \nthis dilemma, Phocion, who did not wish to speak upon such a \nquestion, was loudly called upon by the people for his opinion ; \nwhen he rose and said that the persons whom Alexander demanded \nhad brought the state into such a miserable plight that they de- \nserved to be surrendered, and that for his own part he should be \nvery happy to die for the commonwealth. At the same time he \nadvised them to try the effect of intercession with Alexander ; and \nit was at last only by his own personal application to that monarch, \nwith whom he was a great favourite, that the orators were spared. \nAccording to another account, however, the wrath of Alexander \nwas appeased by the orator Demades, who received from the \nAthenians a reward of five talents for his services. It was at this \ntime that Alexander is said to have sent a present of 100 talents to \nPhocion. But Phocion asked the persons who brought the money \n\xe2\x80\x94 " Why he should be selected for such a bounty?" " Because," \nthey replied, " Alexander considers you the only just and honest \nman." " Then," said Phocion, " let him suffer me to be what I \nseem, and to retain that character." And when the envoys went \nto his house and beheld the frugality with which he lived, they \nperceived that the man who refused such a gift was wealthier than \nhe who offered it. \n\nHaving thus put the affairs of Greece on a satisfactory footing, \nAlexander marched for the Hellespont in the spring of B.C. 334, \nleaving Antipater regent of Macedonia in his absence, with a force \nof 12,000 foot and 1500 horse. Alexander\'s own army consisted \nof only about 30,000 foot and 5000 horse. Of the infantry about \n12.000 were Macedonians, and these composed the pith of the cele- \nbrated Macedonian phalanx. Such was the force with which he \nproposed to attack the immense but ill-cemented empire of Persia, \nwhich, like the empires of Turkey or Austria in modern times, con- \nsisted of various nations and races with different religions and man- \nners, and speaking different languages; the only bond of union \nbeing the dominant military power of the ruling nation, which itself \nformed only a small numerical portion of the empire. The remote \nprovinces, like those of Asia Minor, were administered by satraps \nand military governors who enjoyed an almost independent au- \nthority. Before Alexander departed he distributed most of the \ncrown property among his Mends, and when Perdiccas asked him \nwhat he had reserved for himself he replied, " My hopes." \n\nA march of sixteen days brought Alexander to Sestos, where \na large fleet and a number of transports had been collected for \nthe embarkation of his army. He steered with his own hand \nthe vessel in which he sailed towards the very spot where the \n\n\n\nB.C. 334. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF THE GRANICUS. \n\n\n\n187 \n\n\n\nAchseans were said to have landed when proceeding to the Trojan \nwar. He was, as we have said, a great admirer of Homer, a copy \nof whose works he always carried with him ; and on landing on the \nAsiatic coast he made it his first business to visit the plain of Troy. \nHe then proceeded to Sigeum, where he crowned with a garland \nthe pillar said to mark the tumulus of his mythical ancestor \nAchilles, and, according to custom, ran round it naked with his \nfriends. \n\nAlexander then marched northwards along the coast of the \nPropontis. The satraps of Lydia and Ionia, together with other \nPersian generals, were encamped on the river Granicus, with a \nforce of 20,000 Greek mercenaries, and about an equal number of \nnative cavalry, with which they prepared to dispute the passage \nof the river. A Ehodian, named Memnon, had the chief command. \nThe veteran general Parmenio advised Alexander to delay the \nattack till the following morning; to which he replied, that it \nwould be a bad omen at the beginning of his expedition, if, after \npassing the Hellespont, he should be stopped by a paltry stream. \nThereupon he directed his cavalry to cross the river, and followed \nhimself at the head of the phalanx. The passage, however, was by \nno means easy. The stream was in many parts so deep as to be \nhardly fordable, and the opposite bank was steep and rugged. \nThe cavalry had great difficulty in maintaining their ground till \nAlexander came up to their relief. He immediately charged into \nthe thickest of the fray, and exposed himself so much that his life \nwas often in imminent danger, and on one occasion was saved only \nby the interposition of his friend Olitus. Having routed the Per- \nsians, he next attacked the Greek mercenaries, 2000 of whom were \nmade prisoners, and the rest nearly all cut to pieces. In this \nengagement he killed two Persian officers with his own hand. \n\nAlexander now marched southwards towards Sardis, which sur- \nrendered before he came within sight of its walls. Having left a \ngarrison in that city, he arrived after a four days\' march before \nEphesus, which likewise capitulated on his approach. Magnesia, \nTralles, and Miletus next fell into his hands, the last after a short \nsiege. Halicarnassus made more resistance. It was obliged to be \nregularly approached ; but at length Memnon, finding it no longer \ntenable, set fire to it in the night, and crossed over to Cos. \nAlexander caused it to be razed to the ground, and pursued his \nmarch along the southern coast of Asia Minor, with the view of \nseizing those towns which might afford shelter to a Persian fleet. \nThe winter was now approaching, and Alexander sent a consider- \nable part of his army under Parmenio into winter-quarters at Sardis. \nHe also sent back to Macedonia such officers and soldiers as had \n\n\n\n188 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XX \n\n\n\nbeen recently married, on condition thai they should return in the \nspring with what reinforcements they could raise ; and with the \nsame view he despatched an officer to recruit in the Peloponnesus. \nMeanwhile he himself with a chosen body proceeded along the \ncoasts of Lycia and Pamphylia, having instructed Parmenio to \nrejoin him in Phrygia in the spring, with the main body. After he \nhad crossed the Xanthus most of the Lycian towns tendered their \nsubmission. On the borders of Lycia and Pamphylia, Mount Climax, \na branch of the Taurus range, runs abruptly into the sea, leaving \nonly a narrow passage at its foot, which is frequently overflowed. \nThis was the case at the time of Alexander\'s approach. He there- \nfore sent his main body by a long and difficult road across the \nmountains to Peige ; but he himself, who loved danger for its .own \nsake, proceeded with a chosen band along the shore, wading \nthrough water that was breast-high for nearly a whole day. Then \nforcing his way northwards through the barbarous tribes which \ninhabited the mountains of Pisidia, he encamped in the neighbour- \nhood of Gordium in Phrygia. Here he was rejoined by Parmenio \nand by the new levies from Greece. Gordium had been the capital \nof the early Phrygian kings, and in it was preserved with super- \nstitious veneration the chariot or waggon in which the celebrated \nMidas, the son of Gordius, together with his parents, had entered \nthe town, and in conformity with an oracle had been elevated to \nthe monarchy. An ancient prophecy promised the sovereignty ot \nAsia to him who should untie the knot of bark which fastened the \nyoke of the waggon to the pole. Alexander repaired to the Acro- \npolis, where the waggon was preserved, to attempt this adventure. \nWhether he undid the knot by drawing out a peg, or cut it through \nwith his sword, is a matter of doubt ; but that he had fulfilled the \nprediction was placed beyond dispute that veiy night by a great \nstorm of thunder and hghtning. \n\nIn the spring of 333 Alexander pursued his march eastwards, \nand on arriving at Ancyra received the submission of the Paphla- \ngonians. He then advanced through Cappadocia without resist- \nance : and forcing his way through the passes of Mount Taurus \n(the PylsB GUicise , he descended into the plains of Cilicia. Hence \nhe pushed on rapidly to Tarsus, which he found abandoned by the \nenemy. Whilst still heated with the march Alexander plunged \ninto the clear but cold stream of the Cydnus. which runs by the \ntown. The result was a fever, which soon became so violent as \nto threaten his life. An Acarnanian physician, named Philip, who \naccompanied him, prescribed a remedy; but at the same time \nAlexander received a letter informing him that Philip had been \nbribed by Darius, the Persian king, to poison him. He had, how- \n\n\n\nB.C. 333. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF ISSUS. \n\n\n\n189 \n\n\n\never, too much confidence in the trusty Philip to believe the accu- \nsation, and handed him the letter whilst he drank the draught. \nEither the medicine, or Alexander\'s youthful constitution, at length \ntriumphed over the disorder. After remaining some time at Tarsus, \nhe continued his march along the coast to Mallus, where he first \nreceived certain tidings of the great Persian army, commanded by \nDarius in person. It is said to have consisted of 600,000 fighting \nmen, besides all that train of attendants which usually accompanied \nthe march of a Persian monarch. Alexander found Darius en- \ncamped near Issus on the right bank of the little river Pinarus. \nThe Persian king could hardly have been caught in a more \nunfavourable position, since the narrow and rugged plain between \nMount Amanus and the sea afforded no scope for the evolutions \nof large bodies, and thus entirely deprived him of the advantage \nof his numerical superiority. Alexander occupied the pass be- \ntween Syria and Cilicia at midnight, and at daybreak began to \ndescend into the plain of the Pinarus, ordering his troops to deploy \ninto line as the ground expanded, and thus to arrive in battle-array \nbefore the Persians. Darius had thrown 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 \ninfantry across the river, to check the advance of the Macedonians ; \nwhilst on the right bank were drawn up his choicest Persian troops \nto the number of 60,000, together with 30,000 Greek mercenaries, \nwho formed the centre, and on whom he chiefly relied. These, it \nappears, were all that the breadth of the plain allowed to be drawn \nup in line. The remainder of the vast host were posted in separate \nbodies in the farther parts of the plain, and were unable to take \nany share in the combat. Darius placed himself in the centre of \nthe line in a magnificent state chariot. The banks of the Pinarus \nwere in many parts steep, and where they were level Darius had \ncaused them to be intrenched. As Alexander advanced, the Per- \nsian cavalry which had been thrown across the river were recalled ; \nbut the 20,000 infantry had been driven into the mountains, where \nAlexander held them in check with a small body of horse. The \nleft wing of the Macedonians, under the command of Parmenio, \nwas ordered to keep near the sea to prevent being outflanked. \nThe right wing was led by Alexander in person, who rushed im- \npetuously into the water, and was soon engaged in close combat \nwith the Persians. The latter were immediately routed ; but what \nchiefly decided the fortune of the day was the timidity of Darius \nhimself, who, on beholding the defeat of his left wing, immediately \ntook to flight. His example was followed by his whole army. \nOne hundred thousand Persians are said to have been left upon the \nfield. On reaching the hills Darius threw aside his royal robes, \nhis bow and shield, and, mounting a fleet courser, was soon out \n\n\n\n190 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XX. \n\n\n\nof reach, of pursuit. The Persian camp became the spoil of the \nMacedonians; but the tent of Darius, together with his chariot, \nrobes, and arms, was reserved for Alexander himself. It was now \nthat the Macedonian king first had ocular proof of the nature of \nEastern royalty. One compartment of the tent of Darius had been \nfitted up as a bath, which steamed with the richest odours ; whilst \nanother presented a magnificent pavilion, containing a table richly \nspread for the banquet of Darius. But from an adjoining tent \nissued the wail of female voices, where Sisygambis the mother, \nand Statira the wife of Darius, were lamenting the supposed death \nof the Persian monarch. Alexander sent to assure them of his \nsafety, and ordered them to be treated with the most delicate and \nrespectful attention. \n\nSuch was the memorable battle of Issus, fought in November, \nB.c. 333. A large treasure which Parmenio was sent forward with \na detachment to seize, fell into the hands of the Macedonians at \nDamascus. Another favourable result of the victory was that it \nsuppressed some attempts at revolt from the Macedonian power, \nwhich, with the support of Persia, had been manifested in Greece. \nBut, in order to put a complete stop to all such intrigues; which \nchiefly depended on the assistance of a Persian fleet, Alexander \nresolved to seize Phoenicia and Egypt, and thus to strike at the \nroot of the Persian maritime power. \n\nMeanwhile, Darius, attended by a body of only 4000 fugitives, \nhad crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus. Before he had set out \nfrom Babylon the whole forces of the empire had been summoned ; \nbut he had not thought it worth while to wait for what he deemed \na merely useless encumbrance ; and the more distant levies, which \ncomprised some of the best troops of the empire, were still hasten- \ning towards Babylon. In a short time, therefore, he would be at \nthe head of a still more numerous host than that which had fought \nat Issus ; yet he thought it safer to open negotiations with Alex- \nander than to trust to the chance of arms. With this view he sent \na letter to Alexander, who was now at Mara thus in Phoenicia, pro- \nposing to become his friend and ally; but Alexander rejected al \nhis overtures, and told him that he must in future be addressed \nnot in the language of an equal, but of a subject. \n\nAs Alexander advanced southwards, all the towns of Phoenicia \nhastened to open their gates ; the inhabitants of Sidon even hailed \nhim as their deliverer. Tyre, also, sent to tender her submission ; \nbut coupled with reservations by no means acceptable to a youth- \nful conqueror in the full tide of success. Alexander affected to \nreceive their offer as an unconditional surrender, and told them \nthat he would visit their city and offer sacrifices to Melcart, a \n\n\n\nB.C. 332. \n\n\n\nSIEGE OF TYRE. \n\n\n\n191 \n\n\n\nTyrian deity, who was considered as identical with the Grecian \nHercules. This brought the matter to an issue. The Tyrians now \ninformed him that they could not admit any foreigners within \ntheir walls, and that, if he wished to sacrifice to Melcart, he \nwould find another and more ancient shrine in Old Tyre, on the \nmainland. Alexander indignantly dismissed the Tyrian ambas- \nsadors, and announced his intention of laying siege to their \ncity. The Tyrians probably deemed it impregnable. It was by \nnature a place of great strength, and had been rendered still \nstronger by art. The island on which it stood was half a mile \ndistant from the mainland; and though the channel was shallow \nnear the coast, it deepened to three fathoms near the island. The \nshores of the island were rocky and precipitous, and the walls rose \nfrom the cliffs to the height of 150 feet in solid masonry. As \nAlexander possessed no ships, the only method by which he could \napproach the town was by constructing a causeway, the materials \nfor which were collected from the forests of Libanus and the ruins \nof Old Tyre. After overcoming many difficulties the mole was at \nlength pushed to the foot of the walls ; and as soon as Alexander \nhad effected a practicable breach, he ordered a general assault \nboth by land and sea. The breach was stormed under the imme- \ndiate inspection of Alexander himself; and though the Tyrians \nmade a desperate resistance, they were at length overpowered, \nwhen the city became one wide scene of indiscriminate carnage \nand plunder. The siege had lasted seven months, and the Mace- \ndonians were so exasperated by the difficulties and dangers they \nhad undergone that they granted no quarter. Eight thousand of \nthe citizens are said to have been massacred ; and the remainder, \nwith the exception of the king and some of the principal men, who \nhad taken refuge in the temple of Melcart, were sold into slavery \nto the number of 30,000. Tyre was taken in the month of July \nin 332. \n\nWhilst Alexander was engaged in the siege of Tyre, Darius made \nhim further and more advantageous proposals. He now offered \n10,000 talents as the ransom of his family, together with all the \nprovinces west of the Euphrates, and his daughter JBarsine in marri- \nage, as the conditions of a peace. When these offers were submitted \nto the council, Parmenio was not unnaturally struck with their \nmagnificence, and observed, that were he Alexander he would \naccept them. "And so would I," replied the king, "were I Par- \nmenio." Darius, therefore, prepared himself for a desperate resist- \nance. \n\nAfter the fall of Tyre, Alexander marched with his army towards \nEgypt, whilst his fleet proceeded along the coast. Gaza, a strong \n\n\n\n192 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XX. \n\n\n\nfortress on the sea-shore, obstinately held out, and delayed his pro- \ngress three or four months. After the capture of this city Alex- \nander met his fleet at Pelusium, and ordered it to sail up the Xile \nas far as Memphis, whither he himself marched with his army \nacross the desert. He conciliated the affection of the Egyptians \nby the respect with which he treated their national superstitions, \nwhilst the Persians by an opposite line of conduct had incurred \ntheir deadliest hatred. He then sailed down the western branch of \nthe Nile, and at its mouth traced the plan of the new city of \nAlexandria, which for many centuries continued to be not only the \ngrand emporium of Europe, Africa, and India, but also the principal \ncentre of intellectual life. Being now on the confines of Libya, \nAlexander resolved to visit the celebrated oracle of Zeus Jupiter) \nAmnion, which lay in the bosom of the Libyan wilderness. The \nconqueror was received by the priests with all the honours of sacred \npomp. He consulted the oracle in secret, and is said never to have \ndisclosed the answer which he received ; though that it was an \nanswer that contented him appeared from the magnificence of the \nofferings which he made to the god. Some say that Amnion saluted \nhim as the son of Zeus. \n\nAlexander returned to Phoenicia in the spring of 331. He then \ndirected his march through Samaria, and arrived at Thapsacus on \nthe Euphrates about the end of August. After crossing the \nriver he struck to the north-east through a fertile and well-supplied \ncountry. On his march he was told that Darius was posted with \nan immense force on the left bank of the Tigris ; but on arriving \nat that river he found nobody to dispute his passage. He then \nproceeded southwards along its banks, and after four days\' march \nfell in with a few squadrons of the enemy\'s cavalry. From some of \nthese who were made prisoners Alexander learned that Darius was \nencamped with his host on one of the extensive plains between the \nTigris and the mountains of Kurdistan, near a village called Gau- \ngaraela (the Camel\'s House). The town of Arbela, after which the \nbattle that ensued is commonly named, lay at about twenty miles \ndistance, and there Darius had deposited his baggage and treasure. \nThat monarch had been easily persuaded that his former defeat \nwas owing solely to the nature of the ground ; and, therefore, he \nnow selected a wide plain for an engagement, where there was \nabundant room for Ms multitudinous infantry, and for the evolutions \nof his horsemen and charioteers. Alexander, after giving his army \na few days\' rest, set out to meet the enemy soon after midnight, in \norder that he might come up with them about daybreak. On \nascending some sand-hills the whole array of the Persians suddenly \nburst upon the view of the Macedonians, at the distance of three or \n\n\n\nB.C. 331. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF ARBELA. \n\n\n\n193 \n\n\n\nfour miles. Darius, as usual, occupied the centre, surrounded by \nhis body-guard and chosen troops. In front of the royal position \nwere ranged the war-chariots and elephants, and on either side the \nGreek mercenaries, to the number, it is said, of 50,000. Alexander \nspent the first day in surveying the ground and preparing for the \nattack ; he also addressed his troops, pointing out to them that the \nprize of victory would not be a mere province, but the dominion of \nall Asia. Yet so great was the tranquillity with which he contem- \nplated the result, that at daybreak on the following morning, when \nthe officers came to receive his final instructions, they found him in \na deep slumber. His army, which consisted only of 40,000 foot and \n7000 horse, was drawn up in the order which he usually observed, \nnamely, with the phalanx in the centre in six divisions, and the \nMacedonian cavalry on the right, where Alexander himself took \nhis station. The Persians, fearful of being surprised, had stood \nunder arms the whole night, so that the morning found them ex- \nhausted and dispirited. Some of them, however, fought with con- \nsiderable bravery ; but when Alexander had succeeded in breaking \ntheir line by an impetuous charge, Darius mounted a fleet horse \nand took to flight, as at Issus, though the fortune of the day was yet \nfar from having been decided. At length, however, the rout \nbecame general. Whilst daylight lasted Alexander pursued the \nflying enemy as far as the banks of the Lycus, or Greater Zab, \nwhere thousands of the Persians perished in the attempt to pass the \nriver. After resting his men a few hours Alexander continued the \npursuit at midnight in the hope of overtaking Darius at Arbela. \nThe Persian monarch, however, had continued his flight without \nstopping ; but the whole of the royal baggage and treasure was \ncaptured. \n\nFinding any further pursuit of Darius hopeless, Alexander now \ndirected his march towards Babylon. At a little distance from the \ncity the greater part of the population came out to meet him, \nheaded by their priests and magistrates, tendering their submission, \nand bearing with them magnificent presents. Alexander then \nmade his triumphant entry into Babylon, riding in a chariot at the \nhead of his army. The streets were strewed with flowers, incense \nsmoked on either hand on silver altars, and the priests celebrated \nhis entry with hymns. Nor was this the mere display of a com- \npulsory obedience. Under the Persian sway the Chaldsean religion \nhad been oppressed and persecuted ; the temple of Belus had been \ndestroyed and still lay in ruins ; and both priests and people conse- \nquently rejoiced at the downfall of a dynasty from which they had \nsuffered so much wrong. Alexander observed here the same politic \nconduct which he had adopted in Egypt. He caused the ruined \n\no \n\n\n\n194 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XX. \n\n\n\ntemples to be restored, and proposed to offer personally, but under \nthe direction of the priests, a sacrifice to Belus. Alexander contem- \nplated making Babylon the capital of. his future empire. His army \nwas rewarded with a large donative from the Persian treasury ; and \nafter being allowed to indulge for some time in the luxury of \nBabylon, was again put in motion, towards the middle of November, \nfor Susa. It was there that the Persian treasures were chiefly accu- \nmulated, and Alexander had despatched one of his generals to take \npossession of the city immediately after the battle of Arbela. It was \nsurrendered without a blow by the satrap Abulites. The treasure \nfound there amounted to 40,000 talents in gold and silver bullion, \nand 9000 in gold Darics. But among all these riches the interest of \nthe Greeks must have been excited in a lively manner by the dis- \ncovery of the spoils carried off from Greece by Xerxes. Among \nthem were the bronze statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton, which \nAlexander now sent back to Athens, and which were long after- \nwards preserved in the Oeramicus. \n\nAt Susa Alexander received reinforcements of about 15,000 men \nfrom Greece. He then directed his march south-eastwards towards \nPersepolis. His road lay through the mountainous territory of the \nUxians, who refused him a passage unless he paid the usual tribute \nwhich they were in the habit of extorting even from the Persian \nkings. But Alexander routed them with great slaughter. He then \nadvanced rapidly to Persepolis, whose magnificent ruins still attest \nits ancient splendour. It was the real capital of the Persian kings, \nthough they generally resided at Susa during the winter, and at \nEcbatana in summer. The treasure found there exceeded that \nboth of Babylon and Susa, and is said to have amounted to 120,000 \ntalents, or nearly 30,000,000?. sterling. It was here that Alexander \nis related to have committed an act of senseless folly, by firing with \nhis own hand the ancient and magnificent palace of the Persian \nkings ; of which the most charitable version is that he committed \nthe act when heated with wine at the instigation of Thais, an \nAthenian courtezan. By some writers, however, the story is alto- \ngether disbelieved, and the real destruction of Persepolis referred \nto the Mahommedan epoch. Whilst at Persepolis, Alexander \nvisited the tomb of Cyrus, the founder of the Persian monarchy, \nwhich was situated at a little distance, at a city called Pasargadge. \n\nThus in between three and four years after crossing the Helles- \npont Alexander had established himself on the Persian throne. \nBut Darius was not yet in his power. After the battle of Arbela \nthat monarch had fled to Ecbatana. It was not till about four \nmonths after the battle of Arbela, and consequently early in 330, \nthat Alexander quitted Persepolis to resume the pursuit of Darius. \n\n\n\nB.C. 330. \n\n\n\nDEATH OF DARIUS. \n\n\n\n195 \n\n\n\nOn approaching Ecbatana he learned that the Persian monarch \nhad already tied with the little army which still adhered to him. \nAlexander, with his main body, then pursued Darius through Media \nby forced marches, and reached Rhagse, a distance of three hundred \nmiles from Ecbatana, in eleven days. Such was the rapidity of \nthe march that many men and horses died of fatigue. At Bhagse \nhe heard that Darius had already passed the defile called the \n" Caspian Gates," leading into the Bactrian provinces ; and, as that \npass was fifty miles distant, urgent pursuit was evidently useless. \nHe therefore allowed his troops five days\' rest, and then resumed \nhis march. Soon after passing the Gates he learned that Darius \nhad been seized and loaded with chains by his own satrap Bessus, \nwho entertained the design of establishing himself in Bactria as an \nindependent sovereign. This intelligence stimulated Alexander to \nmake still further haste with part of his cavalry and a chosen body \nof foot. On the fourth day he succeeded in overtaking the fugitives \nwith his cavalry, having been obliged to leave the infantry behind, \nwith directions to follow more at leisure. The enemy, who did \nnot know his real strength, were struck with consternation at his \nappearance, and fled precipitately. Bessus and his adherents now \nendeavoured to persuade Darius to fly with them, and provided a \nfleet horse for that purpose. But the Persian monarch, who had \nalready experienced the generosity of Alexander in the treatment \nof his captive family, preferred to fall into his hands, whereupon \nthe conspirators mortally wounded him in the chariot in which they \nkept him confined, and then took to flight. Darius expired before \nAlexander could come up, who threw his own cloak over the body. \nHe then ordered him to be magnificently buried in the tomb of his \nancestors, and provided for the fitting education of his children. \n\nThe next three years were employed by Alexander in subduing \nHyrcania, Drangiana, Bactria, and Sogdiana, and the other north- \nern provinces of the Persian empire. In these distant regions he \nfounded several cities, one of which in Aria, called after him \n(Alexandria Ariorum), is still, under the name of Herat, one of the \nchief cities in central Asia. Alexander\'s stay in Prophthasia, the \ncapital of Drangiana, was signalized by a supposed conspiracy \nagainst his life, formed by Philotas, the son of Parmenio. Alex- \nander had long entertained suspicions of Philotas. But the im- \nmediate subject of accusation against him was that he had not \nrevealed a conspiracy which was reported to be forming against \nAlexander\'s life, and which he had deemed too contemptible to \nnotice. He was consequently suspected of being implicated in it ; \nand on being put to the torture he not only confessed his own \nguilt in his agonies, but also implicated his father. Philotas was \n\no 2 \n\n\n\n196 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap XX. \n\n\n\nexecuted, and an order was sent to Ecbatana, where Paraienio then \nwas, directing that veteran general to be put to death. A letter, \npurporting to be from his son, was handed to him ; and whilst the \nold man was engaged in reading it, Polydamus, his intimate friend, \ntogether with some others of Alexander\'s principal officers, fell \nupon and slew him. His head was carried to Alexander. \n\nMeantime Bessus had assumed the royal dignity in Bactria : but \nupon Alexander s approach he lied across the Oxus into Sogdiana, \nEarly in the summer of 329 Alexander followed him across the \nOxus ; and shortly afterwards Bessus was betrayed by two of his \nown officers into the hands of Alexander. Bessus was carried to \nZariaspa, the capital of Bactria, where he was brought before a \nPersian court, and put to death in a cruel and barbarous manner. \n\nAlexander even crossed the river Jaxartes (Sir]\\ and defeated \nthe Scythians. Sogdiana alone of the northern provinces offered \nany serious resistance to his arms. Accordingly in 328 he again \ncrossed the Oxus. He divided his army into five bodies, ordering \nthem to scour the country in difrerent directions. With the troops \nunder his own command he marched against the fortress called the \nSogdian Bock, seated on an isolated hill, so precipitous as to be \ndeemed inaccessible, and so well supplied with provisions as to \ndefy a blockade. The summons to surrender was treated with \nderision by the commander, who inquired whether the Mace- \ndonians had wings? But a small body of Macedonians having \nsucceeded in scaling some heights which overhung the fortress, \nthe garrison became so alarmed that they immediately surrendered. \nTo this place a Bactrian named Oxyartes, an adherent of Bessus, \nhad sent his daughters for safety. One of them, named Boxana, was \nof surpassing beauty, and Alexander made her the partner of his \nthrone (b.c 328). \n\nAt Maracanda (now Samarcand) he appointed his friend Clitus \nsatrap of Bactria. On the eve of the parting of the two friends \nAlexander celebrated a festival in honour of the Dioscuri (Castor \nand Pollux), though the day was sacred to Dionysus Bacchus). \nThe banquet was attended by several parasites and literary \nflatterers, who magnified the praises of Alexander with extravagant \nand nauseous flattery. Clitus, whom wine had released from all \nprudent reserve, sternly rebuked their fulsome adulation ; and, as \nthe conversation turned on the comparative merits of the exploits \nof Alexander and his father Philip, he did not hesitate to prefer the \nexploits of the latter. He reminded Alexander of his former ser- \nvices, and, stretching forth his hand, exclaimed, " It was this hand, \nAlexander, which saved your life at the battle of the Granicus ! \' \nThe king, who was also flushed with wine, was so enraged by these \n\n\n\nB.C. 327. \n\n\n\nINVASION OF INDIA. \n\n\n\n197 \n\n\n\nremarks, that lie rushed at Clitus with the intention of killing him \non the spot, but he was held back by his friends, whilst Glitus was \nat the same time hurried out of the room. Alexander, however, \nwas no sooner released than, snatching a spear, he sprang to the \ndoor, and meeting Clitus, who was returning in equal fury to brave \nhis anger, ran him through the body. But when the deed was \ndone he was seized with repentance and remorse. He flung him- \nself on his couch and remained for three whole days in an agony of \ngrief, refusing all sustenance, and calling on the names of Clitus \nand of his sister Lanice, who had been his nurse. It was not till \nhis bodily strength began to fail through protracted abstinence that \nhe at last became more composed, and consented to listen to the \nconsolations of his friends, and the words of the soothsayers, who \nascribed the murder of Clitus to a temporary frenzy with which \nDionysus had visited him as a punishment for neglecting the cele- \nbration of his festival. \n\nAfter reducing Sogdiana, Alexander returned into Bactria in \n327, and began to prepare for his projected expedition into India, \nWhilst he was thus employed, a plot was formed against his life \nby the royal pages, incited by Hermolaus, one of their number, \nwho had been punished with stripes for anticipating the king \nduring a hunting party in slaying a wild boar. Hermolaus and his \nassociates, among whom was Callisthenes, a pupil of Aristotle, were \nfirst tortured, and then put to death. It seems certain that a con- \nspiracy existed; but no less certain that the growing pride and \nhaughtiness of Alexander were gradually alienating from him the \nhearts of his followers. \n\nAlexander did not leave Bactria till late in the spring. He \ncrossed the Indus by a bridge of boats near Taxila, the present \nAttock, where the river is about 1000 feet broad, and very deep. \nHe now found himself in the district at present called the Penj-db \n(or the Five Rivers). Taxiles, the sovereign of the district, at once \nsurrendered Taxila, his capital, and joined the Macedonian force \nwith 5000 men. Hence Alexander proceeded with little resistance \nto the river Hydaspes (Beliut or Jelum). On the opposite bank, \nPorus, a powerful Indian king, prepared to dispute his progress \nwith a numerous and well-appointed force. Alexander, however, \nby a skilful stratagem conveyed his army safely across the river. \nAn obstinate battle then ensued. In the army of Porus were many \nelephants, the sight and smell of which frightened the horses of \nAlexander\'s cavalry. But these unwieldy animals ultimately proved \nas dangerous to the Indians as to the Greeks ; for when driven \ninto a narrow space they became unmanageable, and created great, \nconfusion in the ranks of Porus. By a few vigorous charges the \n\n\n\n198 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XX. \n\n\n\nIndians were completely routed, with the loss of 12,000 slain and \n9000 prisoners. Among the latter was Porus himself, who was con- \nducted into the presence of Alexander. The courage which he \nhad displayed in the battle had excited the admiration of the \nMacedonian king. Mounted on an enormous elephant, he retreated \nleisurely when the day was lost, and long rejected every summons \nto surrender ; till at length, overcome by thirst and fatigue, he per- \nmitted himself to be taken. Even in this situation Porus still \nretained his majestic bearing, the effect of which was increased by \nthe extraordinary height of his stature. On Alexander\'s inquiring \nhow he wished to be treated, he replied, " Like a king." " And \nhave you no other request?\'\' asked Alexander. " No," answered \nPorus ; " everything is comprehended in the word king." Struck by \nhis magnanimity, Alexander not only restored him to his dominions, \nbut also considerably enlarged them ; seeking by these means to \nretain him as an obedient and faithful vassal. \n\nAlexander rested a month on the banks of the Hydaspes, where \nhe celebrated his victory by games and sacrifices, and founded two \ntowns, one of which he named Nicsea, and the other Bucephala, in \nhonour of his gallant charger Bucephalus, which is said to have \ndied there. He then overran the whole of the Penj-ab, as far as \nthe Hyphasis (Gharra), its southern boundary. Upon reaching this \nriver, the army, worn out by fatigues and dangers, positively re- \nfused to proceed any farther ; although Alexander passionately \ndesired to attack a monarch still more powerful than Porus, whose \ndominions lay beyond the Hyphasis. All his attempts to induce \nhis soldiers to proceed proving ineffectual, he returned to the Hy- \ndaspes, when he ordered part of his army to descend the river on \nits opposite banks ; whilst he himself, at the head of 8000 men, \nembarked on board a fleet of about 2000 vessels, which he had \nordered to be prepared with the view of sailing down the Indus to \nits mouth. \n\nThe army began to move in November 327. The navigation \nlasted several months, but was accomplished without any serious \nopposition, except from the tribe of the Malli, who are conjectured \nto have occupied the site of the present Mooltan. At the storming \nof their town the life of Alexander was exposed to imminent danger. \nHe was the first to scale the walls of the citadel, and was followed \nby four officers ; but before a fifth man could mount, the ladder \nbroke, and Alexander was left exposed on the wall to the missiles \nof the enemy. Leaping down into the citadel among the enemy, \nhe placed his back to the wall, where he succeeded in keeping the \nenemy at bay, and slew two of their chiefs who had ventured within \nreach of his sword. But an arrow which pierced his corslet brought \n\n\n\nB.C. 325. \n\n\n\nMUTINY OF ALEXANDER\'S ARMY. \n\n\n\n199 \n\n\n\nhim to the ground, fainting with loss of blood. Two of his followers, \nwho had jumped down after him, now stood over and defended \nhim ; till at length, more soldiers having scaled the walls and \nopened one of the gates, sufficient numbers poured in not only to \nrescue their monarch, but to capture the citadel ; when every living \nbeing within the place was put to the sword. Upon arriving at the \nmouth of the Indus, Nearchus with the fleet was directed to explore \nthe Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the mouths of the Tigris \nand Euphrates, with the view of establishing a maritime communi- \ncation between India and Persia. Alexander himself proceeded \nwith his army, in the autumn of 326, through the burning deserts \nof Gedrosia towards Persepolis ; marching himself on foot, and \nsharing the privations and fatigues of the meanest soldier. In \nthese regions the very atmosphere seems to be composed of a fine \ndust, which, on the slightest wind, penetrates into the mouth and \nnose, whilst the soil affords no firm footing to the traveller. The \nmarch through this inhospitable region lasted 60 days, during which \nnumbers of the soldiers perished from fatigue or disease. At length \nthey emerged into the fertile province of Carmania. Whilst in this \ncountry Alexander was rejoined by Nearchus, .who had arrived \nwith his fleet at Harmozia (Ormuz) ; but who subsequently prose- \ncuted his voyage to the head of the Persian Gulf. \n\nUpon reaching Susa (b.c. 325) Alexander allowed his soldiers to \nrepose from their fatigues, and amused them with a series of brilliant \nfestivities. It was here that he adopted various measures with the \nview of consolidating his empire. One of the most important was \nto form the Greeks and Persians into one people by means of inter- \nmarriages. He himself celebrated his nuptials with Statira, the \neldest daughter of Darius, and bestowed the hand of her sister, \nDrypetis, on Hephsostion. Other marriages were made between \nAlexander\'s officers and Asiatic women, to the number, it is said, \nof about a hundred ; whilst no fewer than 10,000 of the common \nsoldiers followed their example and took native wives. As another \nmeans of amalgamating the Europeans and Asiatics, lie caused \nnumbers of the latter to be admitted into the army, and to be armed \nand trained in the Macedonian fashion. But these innovations \nwere regarded with a jealous eye by most of the Macedonian \nveterans ; and this feeling was increased by the conduct of Alex^ \nander himself, who assumed every day more and;.more of the state \nand manners of an eastern despot. Their long-stifled dissatisfaction \nbroke out into open mutiny and rebellion at a review which took \nplace at Opis on the Tigris. But the mutiny was quelled by the \ndecisive conduct of Alexander. He immediately ordered thirteen \nof the ringleaders to be seized and executed, and then, addressing \n\n\n\n200 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XX, \n\n\n\nthe remainder, pointed out to them how, by his own and his \nfather\'s exertions, they had been raised from the condition of \nscattered herdsmen to be the masters of Greece and the lords of \nAsia ; and that, whilst he had abandoned to them the richest and \nmost valuable fruits of his conquest, he had reserved nothing but \nthe diadem for himself, as the mark of his superior labours and \nmore imminent perils. He then secluded himself for two whole \ndays, during which his Macedonian guard was exchanged for a \nPersian one, whilst nobles of the same nation were appointed to \nthe most confidential posts about his person. Overcome by these \nmarks of alienation on the part of their sovereign, the Macedonians \nnow supplicated with tears to be restored to favour. A solemn \nreconciliation was effected, and 10.000 veterans were dismissed to \ntheir homes under the conduct of Craterus. That general was also \nappointed to the government of Macedonia in place of Antipater, \nwho was ordered to repair to Asia with fresh reinforcements. \n\nSoon after these occurrences Alexander proceeded to Ecba- \ntana, where during the autumn he solemnized the festival of \nDionysus with extraordinary splendour. But his enjoyment was \nsuddenly converted into bitterness by the death of his friend \nHephasstion, who was carried off by a fever. This event threw \nAlexander into a deep melancholy, from which he never entirely \nrecovered. The memory of Hepheestion was honoured by ex- \ntravagant marks of public mourning, and his body was conveyed to \nBabylon, to be there interred with the utmost magnificence. \n\nAlexander entered Babylon in the spring of 324, notwithstand- \ning the warnings of the priests of Belus, who predicted some seri- \nous evil to him if he entered the city at that time. Babylon was \nnow to witness the consummation of his triumphs and of his life. \nAmbassadors from all parts of Greece, from Libya, Italy, and pro- \nbably from still more distant regions, were waiting to salute him, \nand to do homage to him as the conqueror of Asia ; the fleet under \nXearchus had arrived after its long and enterprising voyage ; whilst \nfor the reception of this navy, which seemed to ton the inland \ncapital of his empire into a port, a magnificent harbour was in pro- \ncess of construction. The mind of Alexander was still occupied \nwith plans of conquest and ambition ; his next design was the \nsubjugation of Arabia ; which, however, was to be only the stepping- \nstone to the conquest of the whole known world. He despatched \nthree expeditions to survey the coast of Arabia ; ordered a fleet to \nbe built to explore the Caspian sea ; and engaged himself in \nsurveying the course of the Euphrates, and in devising improve- \nments of its navigation. The period for commencing the Arabian \ncampaign had already arrived ; solemn sacrifices were offered up \n\n\n\nB.C. 323. \n\n\n\nDEATH OF ALEXANDER. \n\n\n\n201 \n\n\n\nfor its success, and grand banquets were given previous to departure. \nAt these carousals Alexander drank deep ; and at the termination \nof the one given by his favourite, Medius, he was seized with un- \nequivocal symptoms of fever. For some days, however, he neglected \nthe disorder, and continued to occupy himself with the necessary \npreparations for the march. But in eleven days the malady had \ngained a fatal strength, and terminated his life on the 28th of June, \nE.c. 323, at the early age of 32. Whilst he lay speechless on his \ndeathbed his favourite troops were admitted to see him ; but he \ncould offer them no other token of recognition than by stretching \nout his hand. \n\nFew of the great characters of history have been so differently \njudged as Alexander. Of the magnitude of his exploits, indeed, \nand of the justice with which, according to the usual sentiments of \nmankind, they confer upon him the title of " Great," there can be \nbut one opinion. His military renown, however, consists more in \nthe seemingly extravagant boldness of his enterprises than in the \nreal power of the foes whom he overcame. The resistance he met \nwith was not greater than that which a European army experiences \nin the present day from one composed of Asiatics ; and the empire \nof the East was decided by the two battles of Issus and Arbela. \nHis chief difficulties were the geographical difficulties of distance, \nclimate, and the nature of the ground traversed. But this is no \nproof that he was incompetent to meet a foe more worthy of his \nmilitary skill ; and his proceedings in Greece before his departure \nshow the reverse. His motives, it must be allowed, seem rather \nto have sprung from the love of personal glory and the excitement \nof conquest, than from any wish to benefit his subjects. Yet on the \nwhole his achievements, though they undoubtedly occasioned great \npartial misery, must be regarded as beneficial to the human race. \nBy his conquests the two continents were put into closer communi- \ncation with one another ; and both, but particularly Asia, were the \ngainers. The language, the arts, and the literature of Greece were \nintroduced into the East ; and after the death of Alexander Greek \nkingdoms were formed in the western parts of Asia, which con- \ntinued to exist for many generations. \n\n\n\nCoin of ^Macedonia, \n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI. \n\nFROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT TO THE CONQUEST \nOF GBEECE BY THE ROMANS. B.C. 323-126. \n\nThe vast empire of Alexander the Great was divided, at his death, \namong his generals; but, before relating their history, it is \nnecessary to take a brief retrospective glance at the affairs of \nGreece. Three years after Alexander had quitted Europe the \nSpartans made a vigorous effort to throw off the Macedonian yoke. \nThey were joined by most of the Peloponnesian states ; but though \nthey met with some success at first, they were finally defeated with \ngreat slaughter by Antipater near Megalopolis. Agis fell in the \nbattle, and the chains of Greece were riveted more firmly than \never. This victory, and the successes of Alexander in the East, \nencouraged the Macedonian party in Athens to take active mea- \nsures against Demosthenes ; and iEschines revived an old charge \nagainst him which had lain dormant for several years. Soon after \nthe battle of Chseronea, Ctesiphon had proposed that Demosthenes \nshould be presented with a golden crown in the theatre during the \ngreat Dionysiac festival, on account of the services he had conferred \nupon his country. For proposing this decree iEschines indicted \nCtesiphon ; but though the latter was the nominal defendant, it was \nDemosthenes who was really put upon his trial. The case was \ndecided in 330 B.C., and has been immortalized by the memorable \nand still extant speeches of iEschines \'Against Ctesiphon,\' and \nof Demosthenes \'On the Crown.\' iEschines, who did not obtain \na fifth part of the votes, and consequently became himself liable \nto a penalty, was so chagrined at Ms defeat that he retired to \nRhodes. \n\nIn B.C. 325 Harpalus arrived in Athens. He had been left \n\n\n\nB.C. 325. \n\n\n\nCONDEMNATION OF DEMOSTHENES. \n\n\n\n203 \n\n\n\nby Alexander at Ecbatana in charge of the royal treasures, and \nappears also to have held the important satrapy of Babylon. \nDuring the absence of Alexander in India he gave himself up \nto the most extravagant luxury and profusion, squandering the \ntreasures intrusted to him, at the same time that he alienated the \npeople subject to his rule by his lustful excesses and extortions. \nHe had probably thought that Alexander would never return from \nthe remote regions of the East into which he had penetrated; \nbut when he at length learnt that the king was on his march back \nto Susa, and had visited with unsparing rigour those of his officers \nwho had been guilty of any excesses during his absence, he at once \nsaw that his only resource was in flight. Collecting together all \nthe treasures which he could, and assembling a body of 6000 \nmercenaries, he hastened to the coast of Asia, and from thence \ncrossed over to Attica, At first the Athenians refused to receive \nhim; but bribes administered to some of the principal orators \ninduced them to alter their determination. Such a step was \ntantamount to an act of hostility against Macedonia itself; and \naccordingly Antipater called upon the Athenians to deliver up \nHarpalus, and to bring to trial those who had accepted his bribes. \nThe Athenians did not venture to disobey these demands. Harpalus \nwas put into confinement, but succeeded in making his escape from \nprison. Demosthenes was among the orators who were brought \nto trial for corruption. He was declared to be guilty, and was con- \ndemned to pay a fine of 50 talents. Not being able to raise that \nsum, he was thrown into prison ; but he contrived to make his \nescape, and went into exile. There are, however, good grounds for \ndoubting his guilt ; and it is more probable that he fell a victim to \nthe implacable hatred of the Macedonian party. Upon quitting \nAthens Demosthenes resided chiefly at iEgina or Trcezen, in sight \nof his native land, and whenever he looked towards her shores it \nwas observed that he shed tears. \n\nWhen the news of Alexander\'s death reached Athens, the \nanti-Macedonian party, which, since the exile of Demosthenes, \nwa3 led by Hyperides, carried all before it. The people in a \ndecree declared their determination to support the liberty of \nGreece. Envoys were despatched to all the Grecian states to \nannounce the determination of Athens, and to exhort them to \nstruggle with her for their independence. This call was responded \nto in the Peloponnesus only by the smaller states, whilst Sparta, \nArcadia, and Achaia kept aloof. In northern Greece the con- \nfederacy was joined by most of the states except the Boeotians ; \nand Leosthenes was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied \nforces. \n\n\n\n204 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXI. \n\n\n\nThe allied army assembled in the neighbourhood of Thermopylae. \nAntipater now advanced from the north, and offered battle in the \nvale of the Spercheus ; but being deserted by his Thessalian \ncavalry, who went over to his opponents during the heat of the \nengagement, he was obliged to retreat, and threw himself into \nLamia, a strong fortress on the Malian gulf. Leosthenes, desirous \nto finish the war at a blow, pressed the siege with the utmost \nvigour: but his assaults were repulsed, and he was compelled to \nresort -to the slower method of a blockade. From this town \nthe contest between Antipater and the allied Greeks has been \ncalled the Lamian War. \n\nThe novelty of a victory over the Macedonian arms was received \nwith boundless exultation at Athens, and this feeling was raised \nto a still higher pitch by the arrival of an embassy from Antipater \nto sue for peace. But the Athenians were so elated with their \ngood fortune, that they would listen to no terms but the uncondi- \ntional surrender of Antipater. Meantime Demosthenes, though \nstill an exile, exerted himself in various parts of the Peloponnesus \nin counteracting the envoys of Antipater, and in endeavouring \nto gain adherents to the cause of Athens and the allies. The \nAthenians in return invited Demosthenes back to his native country, \nand a ship was sent to convey him to Pirfeus, where he was \nreceived with extraordinary honours. \n\n3Ieanwhile Leonnatus, governor of the Hellespontine Phrygia, \nhad appeared on the theatre of war with an army of 20.000 foot \nand 2500 horse. Leosthenes had been slain at Lamia in a sally \nof the besieged; and Antiphilus, on whom the command of the \nallied army devolved, hastened to offer battle to Leonnatus \nbefore he could arrive at Lamia. The hostile armies met in one \nof the plains of Thessaly, where Leonnatus was killed and \nhis troops defeated. Antipater, as soon as the blockade of \nLamia was raised, had pursued Antiphilus, and on the day \nafter the battle he effected a junction with the beaten army of \nLeonnatus. \n\nShortly afterwards Antipater was still further reinforced by the \narrival of Craterus with a considerable force from Asia ; and being \nnow at the head of an army which outnumbered the forces of the \nallies, he marched against them, and gained a decisive victory over \nthem near Crannon in Thessaly, on the 7th of August, B.C. 322. \nThe allies were now compelled to sue for peace ; but Antipater \nrefused to treat with them except as separate states, foreseeing that \nby this means many would be detached from the confederacy. \nThe result answered his expectations. One by one the various \nstates submitted, till at length all had laid down their arma. \n\n\n\nB.C. 322. \n\n\n\nTHE LAMIAN WAR. \n\n\n\n205 \n\n\n\nAthens, the original instigator of the insurrection, now lay at \nthe mercy of the conqueror. As Antipater advanced, Phocion \nused all the influence which he possessed with the Macedonians \nin favour of his countrymen ; but he could obtain no other terms \nthan an unconditional surrender. On a second mission Phocion \nreceived the final demands of Antipater ; which were, that the \nAthenians should deliver up a certain number of their orators, \namong whom were Demosthenes and Hyperides ; that their political \nfranchise should be limited by a property qualification ; that \nthey should receive a Macedonian garrison in Munychia; and \nthat they should defray the expenses of the war. Such was \nthe result of the Lamian war, which riveted the Macedonian fetters \nmore firmly than ever. \n\nAfter the return of the envoys bringing the ultimatum of \nAntipater, the sycophant Demades procured a decree for the death \nof the denounced orators. Demosthenes, and the other persons \ncompromised, made their escape from Athens before the Mace- \ndonian garrison arrived. iEgina was their first place of refuge, but \nthey soon parted in different directions. Hyperides fled . to the \ntemple of Demeter (Ceres) at Hermione in Peloponnesus, whilst \nDemosthenes took refuge in that of Poseidon (Neptune) in the isle \nof Calaurea, near Trcezen. But the satellites of Antipater, under \nthe guidance of a Thurian named Archias, who had formerly been \nan actor, tore them from their sanctuaries. Hyperides was carried \nto Athens, and it is said that Antipater took the brutal and \ncowardly revenge of ordering his tongue to be cut out, and his \nremains to be thrown to the dogs. Demosthenes contrived at least \nto escape the insults of the tyrannical conqueror. Archias at first \nendeavoured to entice him from his sanctuary by the blandest \npromises. But Demosthenes, forewarned, it is said, by a dream, \nfixing his eyes intently on him, exclaimed, " Your acting, Archias, \nnever touched me formerly, nor do your promises now." And when \nArchias began to employ threats, "Good," said Demosthenes; \n* now you speak as from the Macedonian tripod ; before you were \nonly playing a part. But wait awhile, and let me write my last \ndirections to my family." So taking his writing materials, he put \nthe reed into his mouth, and bit it for some time, as was his custom \nwhen composing ; after which he covered his head with Ins garment \nand reclined against a pillar. The guards who accompanied \nArchias, imagining this to be a mere trick, laughed and called him \ncoward, whilst Archias began to renew his false persuasions, \nDemosthenes, feeling the poison work \xe2\x80\x94 for such it was that he had \nconcealed in the reed \xe2\x80\x94 now bade him lead on. "You may now," \nsaid he, " enact the part of Creon, and cast me out unburied ; but \n\n\n\n206 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXI. \n\n\n\nat least, O gracious Poseidon, I have not polluted thy temple by my \ndeath, which. Antipater and his Macedonians would not have \nscrupled at." But whilst he was endeavouring to walk out, he fell \ndown by the altar and expired. \ny The history of Alexander\'s successors is marked from first \nto last by dissensions, crimes, and unscrupulous ambition. It \nis only necessary for the purpose of the present work to mention \nvery briefly the most important events. \n\nAlexander on his death-bed is said to have given his signet-ring \nto Perdiccas, but he had left no legitimate heir to his throne- \nthough his wife Eoxana was pregnant. On the day after Alex- \nander\'s death a military council was assembled, in which Perdiccas \nassumed a leading part ; and in which, after much debate, an \narrangement was at length effected on the following basis : That \nPhilip Arrhidaeus, a young man of weak intellect, the half-brother \nof Alexander (being the son of Philip by a Thessalian woman \nnamea Philinna), should be declared king, reserving however \nto the child of Eoxana, if a son should be born, a share in the \nsovereignty : that the government of Macedonia and Greece should \nbe divided between Antipater and Craterus : that Ptolemy should \npreside over Egypt and the adjacent countries : that Antigonus \nshould have Phrygia Proper, Lycia, and Pamphylia : that the \nHellespontine Phrygia should be assigned to Leonnatus : that \nEumenes should have the satrapy of Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, \nwhich countries, however, still remained to be subdued : and that \nThrace should be committed to Lysimachus. Perdiccas reserved \nfor himself the command of the horse-guards, the post before held \nby Hephaestion, in virtue of which he became the guardian of \nPhilip Arrhidseus. the nominal sovereign. It was not for some \ntime after these arrangements had been completed that the last \nrites were paid to Alexander\'s remains. They were conveyed \nto Alexandria, and deposited in a cemetery which afterwards \nbecame the burial-place of the Ptolemies. Nothing could exceed \nthe magnificence of the funeral car, which was adorned with \nornaments of massive gold, and was so heavy, that it was more than \na year in being conveyed from Babylon to Syria, though drawn \nby 84 mules. In due time Eoxana was delivered of a son, to whom \nthe name of Alexander was given, and who was declared the \npartner of Arrhidseus in the empire. Eoxana had previously \ninveigled Statira and her sister Drypetis to Babylon, where she \ncaused them to be secretly assassinatecL \n\nPerdiccas possessed more power than any of Alexander\'s gene- \nrals, and he now aspired to the Macedonian throne. His designs, \nhowever, were not unknown to Antigonus and Ptolemy ; and when \n\n\n\nB.C. 318. \n\n\n\nDEATH OF ANTIPATER. \n\n\n\n207 \n\n\n\nhe attempted to bring Antigonus to trial for some offence in the \ngovernment of his satrapy, that general made his escape to Mace- \ndonia, where he revealed to Antipater the full extent of the \nambitious schemes of Perdiccas, and thus at once induced Antipater \nand Craterus to unite in a league with him and Ptolemy, and \nopenly declare war against the regent. Thus assailed on all sides, \nPerdiccas resolved to direct his arms in the first instance against \nPtolemy. In the spring of B.C. 321 he accordingly set out on \nhis march against Egypt, at the head of a formidable army, \nand accompanied by Philip Arrhidgeus, and Eoxana and her \ninfant son. He advanced without opposition as far as Pelusium, \nbut he found the banks of the Nile strongly fortified and guarded \nby Ptolemy, and was repulsed in repeated attempts to force the \npassage of the river ; in the last of which, near Memphis, he \nlost-great numbers of men by the depth and rapidity of the current. \nPerdiccas had never been popular with the soldiery, and these \ndisasters completely alienated their affections. A conspiracy was \nformed against him, and some of his chief officers murdered him in \nhis tent. \n\nThe death of Perdiccas was followed by a fresh distribution \nof the provinces of the empire. At a meeting of the generals held \nat Triparadisus in Syria, towards the end of the year 321 B.C., \nAntipater was declared regent, retaining the government of Mace- \ndonia and Greece ; Ptolemy was continued in the government \nof Egypt ; Seleucus received the satrapy of Babylon ; whilst \nAntigonus not only retained his old province, but was rewarded \nwith that of Susiana. \n\nAntipater did not long survive these events. He died in the \nyear 318, at the advanced age of 80, leaving Polysperchon, one of \nAlexander\'s oldest generals, regent ; much to the surprise and \nmortification of his son Cassander, who received only the secondary \ndignity of Chiliarch, or commander of the cavalry. Cassander was \nnow bent on obtaining the regency ; but seeing no hope of success \nin Macedonia, he went over to Asia to solicit the assistance of \nAntigonus. \n\nPolysperchon, on his side, sought to conciliate the friendship \nof the Grecian states, by proclaiming them all free and independent, \nand by abolishing the oligarchies which had been set up by \nAntipater. In order to enforce these measures, Polysperchon \nprepared to march into Greece, whilst his son Alexander was \ndespatched beforehand with an army towards Athens, to compel \nthe Macedonian garrison under the command of Nicanor to \nevacuate Munychia. Nicanor, however, refused to move without \norders from Cassander, whose general he declared himself to be. \n\n\n\n208 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXI. \n\n\n\nPliocion was suspected of intriguing in favour of Xicanor, and, \nbeing accused of treason, fled to Alexander, now encamped before \nthe walls of Athens. Alexander sent Phocion to his father, who \nsent him back to Athens in chains, to be tried by the Athenian \npeople. The theatre, where his trial was to take place, was soon \nfull to overflowing. Phocion was assailed on every side by the \nclamours of his enemies, which prevented his defence from being \nheard, and he was condemned to death by a show of hands. \nTo the last Phocion maintained his calm and dignified, but \nsomewhat contemptuous bearing. When some wretched man \nspat upon him as he passed to the prison, <; Will no one," said \nhe, *\' check this fellow\'s indecency?" To one who asked him \nwhether he had any message to leave for his son Phocus, he \nanswered, " Only that he bear no grudge against the Athenians." \nAnd when the hemlock which had been prepared was found \ninsufficient for all the condemned, and the jailer would not furnish \nmore unless he was paid for it, " Give the man his money," said \nPhocion to one of his friends, " since at Athens one cannot even die \nfor nothing." He died in B.C. 317, at the age of So. The Athe- \nnians afterwards repented of their conduct towards Phocion. His \nbones, which had been cast out on the frontiers of Megara, were \nbrought back to Athens, and a bronze statue was erected to his \nmemory. \n\nWhilst Alexander was negotiating with Xicanor about the \nsurrender of Alimyclna. Cassandei arrived in the Piraeus with a \nconsiderable army, with which Antigonus had supplied him. Poly- \nsperchon was obliged to retire from Athens, and Cassander estab- \nlished an oligarchical government in the city under the presidency \nof Demetrius of Phalerus. \n\nAlthough Polysperchon was supported by Olyrnpias, the mother \nof Alexander the Great, he proved no match for Cassander, who \nbecame master of Macedonia after the fall of Pydna in B.C. 316. \nIn this city Olyrnpias had taken refuge together with Koxana and \nher son ; but after a blockade of some months it was obliged \nto surrender. Olyrnpias had stipulated that her life should be \nspared, but Cassander soon afterwards caused her to be murdered, \nand kept Eoxana and her son in custody in the citadel of Amphi- \npofis. Shortly afterwards Cassander began the restoration of \nThebes (b.c. 315), in the twentieth year after its destruction by \nAlexander, a measure highly popular with the Greeks. \n\nA new war now broke out in the East. Antigonus had become \nthe most powerful of Alexander\'s successors. He had conquered \nEumenes, who had long defied his arms, and he now began to \ndispose of the provinces as he thought fit. His increasing power \n\n\n\nB.C. 307. \n\n\n\nEXPEDITION OF DEMETRIUS. \n\n\n\n209 \n\n\n\nand ambitious projects led to a general coalition against him, con- \nsisting of Ptolemy, Seleucus, Cassander, and Lysirnachus, the \ngovernor of Thrace. The war began in the year 315, and was \ncarried on with great vehemence and alternate success in Syria, \nPhoenicia, Asia Minor, and Greece. After four years all parties \nbecame exhausted with the struggle, and peace was accordingly \nconcluded in 311, on condition that the Greek cities should be free, \nthat Cassander should retain his authority in Europe till Alexander \ncame of age, that Ptolemy and Lysimachus should keep possession \nof Egypt and Thrace respectively, and that Antigonus should have \nthe government of all Asia. This hollow peace, which had been \nmerely patched up for the convenience of the parties concerned, \nwas not of long duration. \' It seems to have been the immediate \ncause of another of those crimes which disgrace the history of \nAlexander\'s successors. His son, Alexander, who had now attained \nthe age of sixteen, was still shut up with Ms mother Koxana in \nAmphipolis; and his partisans, with injudicious zeal, loudly ex- \npressed their wish that he should be released and placed upon the \nthrone. In order to avert this event Cassander contrived the secret \nmurder both of the mother and the son. \n\nThis- abominable act, however, does not appear to have caused a \nbreach of the peace. Ptolemy was the first to break it (b.c. 310), \nunder the pretext that Antigonus, by keeping his garrisons in the \nGreek cities of Asia .and the islands, had not respected that article \nof the treaty which guaranteed Grecian freedom. After the war \nhad lasted three years Antigonus resolved to make a vigorous effort \nto wrest Greece from the hands of Cassander and Ptolemy, who \nheld all the principal towns in it. Accordingly, in the summer of \n307 b.c. he despatched his son Demetrius from Ephesus to Athens, \nwith a fleet of 250 sail, and 5000 talents in money. Demetrius, who \nafterwards obtained the surname of " Poliorcetes," or " Besieger of \nCities," was a young man of ardent temperament and great abilities. \nUpon arriving at the Piraeus he immediately proclaimed the object \nof his expedition to be the liberation of Athens and the expulsion of \nthe Macedonian garrison. Supported by the Macedonians, Deme- \ntrius the Phalerean had now ruled Athens for a period of more than \nten \' years. Of mean birth, Demetrius the Phalerean owed his \nelevation entirely to his talents and perseverance. His skill as an \norator raised him to distinction among his countrymen ; and his \npolitics, which led him to embrace the party of Phocion, recom- \nmended him to Cassander and the Macedonians. He cultivated \nmany branches of literature, and was at once an historian, *a philo- \nsopher, and a poet ; but none of his works have come down to us. \nThe Athenians heard with pleasure the proclamations of the son of \n\np \n\n\n\n210 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXL \n\n\n\nAntigoims \xe2\x80\xa2 Ms namesake, the Phalerean, was obliged to surrender \nthe city to him, and to close his political career by retiring to \nThebes. The Macedonian garrison in Munychia offered a slight \nresistance, which was soon overcome. Demetrius Poliorcetes then \nfonnally announced to the Athenian assembly the restoration of \ntheir ancient constitution, and promised them a large donative of \ncorn and ship-timber. This munificence was repaid by the Athenians \nwith the basest and most abject flattery. Both Demetrius and his \nfather were deified, and two new tribes, those of Antigonias and \nDemetrias, were added to the existing ten which derived their \nnames from the ancient heroes of Attica. \\ \n\nDemetrius Poliorcetes did not, however, remain long at Athens, \nEarly in 306 B.C. he was recalled by his father, and, sailing \nto Cyprus, undertook the siege of Salamis. Ptolemy hastened \nto its relief with 140 vessels and 10,000 troops. The battle that \nensued was one of the most memorable in the annals of ancient \nnaval warfare, more particularly on account of the vast size of \nthe vessels engaged. Ptolemy was completely defeated ; and so \nimportant was the victory deemed by Antigonus, that on the \ntetrength of it he assumed the title of king, which he also conferred \nupon his son. This example was followed by Ptolemy, Seleucus, \nand Lysimachus. \n\nDemetrius now undertook an expedition against Ehodes, which \nhad refused its aid in the attack upon Ptolemy. It was from the \nmemorable siege of Ehodes that Demetrius obtained his name of \n"Poliorcetes." After in vain attempting to take the town from the \nsea-side, by means of floating batteries, from which stones of \nenormous weight were hurled from engines with incredible force \nagainst the walls, he determined to alter his plan and invest \nit on the land-side. With the assistance of Epimachus, an Athe- \nnian engineer, he constructed a machine which, in anticipation of \nits effect, was called Helepolis, or " the city-taker." This was a \nsquare wooden tower, 150 feet high, and divided into nine stories, \nfilled with armed men, who discharged missiles through apertures \nin the sides. When armed and prepared for attack, it required the \nstrength of 2300 men to set this enormous machine in motion. But \nthough it was assisted by the operation of two battering-rams, each \n150 feet long and propelled by the labour of 1000 men, the \nEhodians were so active in repairing the breaches made in their \nwalls, that, after a year spent in the vain attempt to take the town, \nDemetrius was forced to retire and grant the Ehodians peace. \n\nIn 301 B.C. the struggle between Antigonus and his rivals \nwas brought to a close by the battle of Ipsus in Phrygia, in which \nAntigonus was killed, and his army completely defeated. He had \n\n\n\nB.C. 294. CONQUESTS OF DEMETRIUS\xe2\x80\x94 PYRRHUS. \n\n\n\n211 \n\n\n\nattained the age of 81 at the time of his death. A third partition \nof the empire of Alexander was now made. Seleucus and \nLysimachus shared between them the possessions of Antigonus. \nLysimachns seems to have had the greater part of Asia Minor, \nwhilst the whole country from the coast of Syria to the Euphrates, \nas well as a part of Phrygia and Cappadocia, fell to the share of \nSeleucus. The latter founded on the Orontes a new capital of his \nempire, which he named Antioch, after his father Antiochus, and \nwhich long continued to be one of the most important Greek cities \nin Asia. The fall of Antigonus secured Cassander in the possession \nof Greece. \n\nDemetrius was now a fugitive, but in the following year he was \nagreeably surprised by receiving an embassy from Seleucus, by \nwhich that monarch solicited his daughter Stratonice in marriage; \nDemetrius gladly granted the request, and found himself so much \nstrengthened by this alliance, that in the spring of the year 296 he \nwas in a condition to attack Athens, which he captured after a long \nsiege, and drove out the bloodthirsty tyrant Lachares, who had \nbeen established there by Cassander. \n\nMeanwhile Cassander had died shortly before the siege of \nAthens, and was succeeded on the throne of Macedon by his eldest \nson, Philip IV.* But that young prince died in 295, and the \nsuccession was disputed between his two brothers, Antipater and \nAlexander. Demetrius availed himself of the distracted state of \nMacedonia to make himself master of that country (b.c. 294). He \nreigned over Macedonia, and the greater part of Greece, about \nseven years. He aimed at recovering the whole of his father\'s \ndominions in Asia ; but before he was ready to take the field, his \nadversaries, alarmed at his preparations, determined to forestall \nhim. In the spring of b.c. 287 Ptolemy sent a powerful fleet \nagainst Greece, while Pyrrhus on the one side and Lysimachus \non the other simultaneously invaded Macedonia. Demetrius had \ncompletely alienated his own subjects by his proud and haughty \nbearing, and by his lavish expenditure on his own luxuries ; \nwhile Pyrrhus by his generosity, affability, and daring courage, \nhad become the hero of the Macedonians, who looked upon him \nas a second Alexander. The appearance of Pyrrhus was the \nsignal for revolt : the Macedonian troops flocked to his standard, \nand Demetrius was compelled to fly. Pyrrhus now ascended the \nthrone of Macedonia ; but his reign was of brief duration ; and \nat the end of seven months he was in turn driven out by Lysi- \nmachus. Demetrius made several attempts to regain his power \n\n* Philip Arrhidceus is called Philip III. \n\np 2 \n\n\n\n212 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXI. \n\n\n\nin Greece, and then set sail for Asia, where he successively \nendeavoured to establish hi ni self in the territories of Lysimachus, \nand of his son-in-law Seleucus. Falling at length into the hands \nof the latter, he was kept in a kind of magnificent captivity in \na royal residence in Syria ; where, in 283, at the early age of 55, \nhis chequered career was brought to a close, partly by chagrin, and \npartly by the sensual indulgences with winch he endeavomed to \ndivert it. \n\n\n\n\nCoin of Demetrius Poliorcetes. \n\n\n\nLysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy now divided the empire of \nAlexander between them. In Egypt the aged Ptolemy had abdi- \ncated in 285 in favour of his son by Berenice, afterwards known as \nPtolemy Philadelphus, and to the exclusion of his eldest son, \nPtolemy Ceraunus, by his wife Eurydice. Ptolemy Ceraunus \nquitted Egypt in disgust, and fled to the court of Lysimachus ; and \nArsinoe, the wife of Lysimachus, jealous of her stepson Agathocles, \n\n\n\n\nCoin of Ptolemy I., Soter. \n\n\n\nthe heir apparent to the throne, and desirous of securing the \nsuccession for her own children, conspired with Ptolemy Ceraunus \nagainst the life of Agathocles. She even procured the consent of \nLysimachus to his murder ; and after some vain attempts to make \naway with him by poison, he was flung into prison, where Ptolemy \nCeraunus despatched him with his own hand. Lysandra, the mother \nof Agathocles, fled with the rest of her family to Seleucus, to demand \n\n\n\nB.C. 280. \n\n\n\nASSASSINATION OF SELEUCUS. \n\n\n\n213 \n\n\n\nfrom him protection and vengeance ; and Seleucus, induced by \nthe hopes of success, inspired by the discontent and dissensions \nwhich so foul an act had excited among the subjects of Lysi- \nmachus, espoused her cause. The hostilities which ensued between \nhim and Lysimachus were brought to a termination by the \nbattle of Corupedion, fought near Sardis in 281, in which Lysi- \nmachus was defeated and slain. By this victory, Macedonia, and \nthe whole of Alexander\'s empire, with the exception of Egypt, \nsouthern Syria, Cyprus, and part of Phoenicia, fell under the sceptre \nof Seleucus. \n\n\n\n\nCoin of Seleucus. \n\n\n\nThat monarch, who had not beheld his native land since \nhe first joined the expedition of Alexander, now crossed the \nHellespont to take possession of Macedonia. Ptolemy Ceraunus, \nwho after the battle of Corupedion had thrown himself on the \nmercy of Seleucus, and had been received with forgiveness and \nfavour, accompanied him on this journey. The murder of Aga- \nthocles had not been committed by Ptolemy merely to oblige \nArsinoe. He had even then designs upon the supreme power, \nwhich he now completed by another crime. As Seleucus stopped \nto sacrifice at a celebrated altar near Lysimachia in Thrace, \nPtolemy treacherously assassinated him by stabbing him in the \nback (280). After this base and cowardly act, Ptolemy Ceraunus, \nwho gave himself out as the avenger of Lysimachus, was, by one \nof those movements wholly inexplicable to our modern notions, \nsaluted king by the army ; but the Asiatic dominions of Seleucus \nfell to his son Antiochus, surnamed Soter. The crime of Ptolemy, \nhowever, was speedily overtaken by a just punishment. In the \nvery same year his kingdom of Macedonia and Thrace was invaded \nby an immense host of Celts, and Ptolemy fell at the head \nof the forces which he led against them. A second invasion \nof the same barbarians compelled the Greeks to raise a force \nfor their defence, which was intrusted to the command of the \nAthenian Callippus (b.c. 279). On this occasion the Celts, \n\n\n\n2U \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXI. \n\n\n\nattracted by the report of treasures which, were now perhaps \nlittle more than an empty name, penetrated as far southwards as \nDelphi, with the view of plundering the temple. The god, it is \nsaid, vindicated his sanctuary on this occasion in the same \nsupernatural manner as when it was attacked by the Persians : it \nis at all events certain that the Celts were repidsed with great loss, \nincluding that of their leader Brennus. Nevertheless some of their \ntribes succeeded in establishing themselves near the Danube ; \nothers settled on the sea-coast of Thrace ; whilst a third portion \npassed over into Asia, and gave their name to the country called \nG-alatia. \n\nAfter the death of Ptolemy Ceraunus, Macedonia fell for some \ntime into a state of anarchy and confusion, and the crown was dis- \nputed by several pretenders. At length, in 278, Antigonus Gonatas, \nson of Demetrius Poliorcetes, succeeded in establishing himself on \nthe throne of Macedonia ; and, with the exception of two or three \nyears (274-272) during which he was temporarily expelled by \nPyrrhus, he continued to retain possession of it till his death in 239. \nThe struggle between Antigonus and Pyrrhus was brought to a \nclose at Argos in 272. Pyrrhus had marched into the Peloponnesus \nwith a large force in order to make war upon Sparta, but with the \ncollateral design of reducing the places which still held out for \nAntigonus. Pyrrhus, having failed in an attempt to take Sparta, \nmarched against Argos, where Antigonus also arrived with his \nforces. Both armies entered the city by opposite gates ; and in a \nbattle which ensued in the streets Pyrrhus was struck from his \nhorse by a tile hurled by a woman from a house-top, and was then \ndespatched by some soldiers of Antigonus. Such was the inglo- \nrious end of one of the bravest and most warlike monarchs of \nantiquity ; whose character for moral virtue, though it would not \nstand the test of modern scrutiny, shone out conspicuously in com- \nparison with that of contemporary sovereigns. \n\nAntigonus Gonatas now made himself master of the greater part \nof Peloponnesus, which he governed by means of tyrants whom he \nestablished in various cities. \n\nWhile all Greece, with the exception of Sparta, seemed hopelessly \nprostrate at the feet of Macedonia, a new political power, which \nsheds a lustre on the declining period of Grecian history, arose in a \nsmall province in Peloponnesus, of which the very name has been \nhitherto rarely mentioned since the heroic age. In Achaia, a \nnarrow slip of country upon the shores of the Corinthian gulf, a \nleague, chiefly for religious purposes, had existed from a very early \nperiod among the twelve chief cities of the province. This league, \nhowever, had never possessed much political importance, and it had \n\n\n\nB.C. 251. \n\n\n\nTHE ACHiEAN LEAGUE. \n\n\n\n215 \n\n\n\nbeen suppressed by the Macedonians. At the time of which we \nare speaking Antigomis Gonatas was in possession of all the \ncities formerly belonging to the league, either by means of his \ngarrisons or of the tyrants who were subservient to him. It \nwas, however, this very oppression that led to a revival of the \nleague. The Achaean towns, now only ten in number, as two \nhad been destroyed by earthquakes, began gradually to coalesce \nagain ; but Aratus of Sicyon, one of the most remarkable characters \nof this period of Grecian history, was the man who, about the year \n251 B.C., first called the new league into active political existence. \nHe had long lived in exile at Argos, whilst his native city groaned \nunder the dominion of a succession of tyrants. Having collected a \nband of exiles, he surprised Sicyon in the night time, and drove out \nthe last and most unpopular of these tyrants. Instead of seizing \nthe tyranny for himself, as he might easily have done, Aratus con- \nsulted only the advantage of his country, and with this view united \nSicyon with the Achaean league. The accession of so important a \ntown does not appear to have altered the constitution of the con- \nfederacy. The league was governed by a Strategus, or general, \nwhose functions were both military and civil ; a Grammateus, or \nsecretary ; and a council of ten Demiurgi. The sovereignty, however, \nresided in the general assembly, which met twice a year in a sacred \ngrove near iEgium. It was composed of every Achaean who had \nattained the age of thirty, and possessed the right of electing the \nofficers of the league, and of deciding all questions of war, peace, \nforeign alliances, and the like. In the year 245 b.c. Aratus was \nelected Strategus of the league, and again in 243. In the latter of \nthese years he succeeded in wresting Corinth from the Macedonians \nby another nocturnal surprise, and uniting it to the league. The \nconfederacy now spread with wonderful rapidity. It was soon \njoined by Troezen, Epidaurus, Hermione, and other cities; "and \nultimately embraced Athens, Megara, iEgina, Salamis, and the \nwhole Peloponnesus, with the exception of Sparta, Elis, and some \nof the Arcadian towns. \n\nSparta, it is true, still continued to retain her independence, but \nwithout a shadow of her former greatness and power. The primitive \nsimplicity of Spartan manners had been completely destroyed by \nthe collection of wealth into a few hands, and by the consequent \nprogress of luxury. The number of Spartan citizens had been \nreduced to 700 ; but even of these there were not above a hundred \nwho possessed a sufficient quantity of land to maintain themselves \nin independence. The young king, Agis IV., who succeeded to the \ncrown in 244, attempted to revive the ancient Spartan virtue, by \nrestoring the institutions of Lycurgus, by cancelling all debts, and \n\n\n\n216 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XZvI. \n\n\n\nby making a new distribution of lands ; and with this view he \nrelinquished all his own property, as well as that of his family, for \nthe public good. But Agis perished in this attempt, and was put \nto death as a traitor to Ms order. A few years afterwards, however, \nCieomenes, the son of Leonidas, succeeded in effecting the reforms \nwhich had been contemplated by Agis, as well as several others \nwhich regarded military discipline. The effect of these new mea- \nsures soon became visible in the increased success of the Spartan \narms. Aratus was so hard pressed that he was compelled to solicit \nthe assistance of the Macedonians. Both Antigonus Gonatas and \nhis son Demetrius II. \xe2\x80\x94 who had reigned in Macedonia from 239 to \n229 B.C. \xe2\x80\x94 were now dead, and the government was administered by \nAntigonus Doson, as guardian of Philip, the youthful son of Deme- \ntrius II. Antigonus Doson was the grandson of Demetrius Polior- \ncetes, and the nephew of Antigonus Gonatas. The Macedonians \ncompelled him to accept the crown ; but he remained faithful to \nhis trust as guardian of Philip, whose mother he married ; and \nthough he had children of his own by her, yet Philip succeeded him \non his death.* It was to Antigonus Doson that Aratus applied for \nassistance ; and though Cieomenes maintained his ground for some \ntime, he was finally defeated by Antigonus Doson in the fatal \nbattle of Sellasia in Laconia\'B.c. 221 . The army of Cieomenes was \nalmost totally annihilated ; he himself was obliged to fly to Egypt ; \nand Sparta, which for many centuries had remained unconquered, \nfell into the hands of the victor. \n\nIn the following year Antigonus was succeeded by Philip V., \nthe son of Demetrius II., who was then about sixteen or seventeen \nyears of age. His youth encouraged the JEtolians to make preda- \ntory incursions into the Peloponnesus. That people were a species \nof freebooters, and the terror of their neighbours ; yet they were \nunited, like the Achseans, in a confederacy or league. The JEtolian \n\n* The succession of Macedonian kings from Alexander the Great to the \nextinction of the monarchy -will he seen from the following table : \xe2\x80\x94 \n\nB.C. \n\nPhilip ni. Arrhidaeus -. 323-316 \n\nCassander 316-296 \n\nPhilip IV 296-295 \n\nDemetrius I. Poliorcetes 294-287 \n\nPyrrhus 287-286 \n\nLysimachus 286-280 \n\nPtolemy Ceraunus and others 280-277 \n\nAntigonus Gonatas 27 7-239 \n\nDemetrius II 239-229 \n\nAntigonus Doson 229-220 \n\nPhilip Y 220-178 \n\n\n\nB.C. 220. \n\n\n\nTHE JETOLIAN LEAGUE. \n\n\n\n217 \n\n\n\nLeague was a confederation of tribes instead of cities, like the \nAchaean. The diet or council of the league, called the Panaetolicum, \nassembled every autumn, generally at Thermon, to elect the stra- \ntegus and other officers ; but the details of its affairs were conducted \nby a committee called Apocleti, who seem to have formed a sort of \npermanent council. The iEtolians had availed themselves of the dis- \norganised state of Greece consequent upon the death of Alexander \nto extend their power, and had gradually made themselves masters \nofLocris, Phocis, Bceotia, together with portions of Acarnania, \nThessaly, and Epirus. Thus both the Amphictyonic Council and \nthe oracle of Delphi were in their power. They had early wrested \nNaupactus from the Achaeans, and had subsequently acquired \nseveral Peloponnesian cities. \n\n\n\n\nCoin of Philip V., king of Macedonia. \n\n\n\nSuch was the condition of the iEtolians at the time of Philip\'s \naccession. Soon after that event we find them, under the leadership \nof Dorimachus, engaged in a series of freebooting expeditions in \nMessenia, and other parts of Peloponnesus. Aratus marched to the \nassistance of the Messenians at the head of the Achaean forces, but \nwas totally defeated in a battle near Caphyae. The Achaeans now \nsaw no hope of safety except through the assistance of Philip. \nThat young monarch was ambitious and enterprising, possessing \nconsiderable military ability and much political sagacity. He \nreadily listened to the application of the Achaeans, and in 220 \nentered into an alliance with them. The war which ensued \nbetween the iEtolians on the one side, and the Achaeans, assisted \nby Philip, on the other, and which lasted about three years, has \nbeen called the Social War, Philip gained several victories over \nthe iEtolians, but he concluded a treaty of peace with them in 217, \nbecause he was anxious to turn his arms against another and more \nformidable power. \n\nThe great struggle now going on between Eome and Carthage \nattracted the attention of the whole civilized world. It was evident \nthat Greece, distracted by intestine quarrels, must be soon swal- \n\n\n\n218 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXI. \n\n\n\nlowed up by whichever of those great states might prove successful; \nand of the two, the ambition of the Eomans. who had already \ngained a footing on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, was by far \nthe more formidable to Greece. After the conclnsion of the peace \nwith the iEtolians Philip prepared a large fleet, which lie employed \nto watch the movements of the Eomans, and in the following year \n(216 he concluded a treaty with Hannibal, which, among other \nclauses, provided that the Eomans should not be allowed to retain \ntheir conquests on the eastern side of the Adriatic. He even medi- \ntated an invasion of Italy, and with that view endeavoured to make \nhimself master of Apollonia and Orieuni. But though he suc- \nceeded in taking the latter city, the Eomans surprised his camp \nwhilst he was besieging Apollonia, and compelled him to burn his \nships and retire. Meanwhile Philip had acted in a most arbitrary \nmanner in the affairs of Greece ; and when Aratus remonstrated \nwith him respecting his proceedings, he got rid of his former \nfriend and counsellor by means of a slow and secret poison (b.c. \n213. \n\nIn b.c. 209 the Achteans, being hard pressed by the JEtolians, \nwere again induced to call in the aid of Philip. The spirit of the \nAchaeans was at this time revived by Philopcemen, one of the few \nnoble characters of the period, and who has been styled by Plutarch \n"the last of the Greeks." He was a native of Megalopolis in Ar- \ncadia, and in 208 was elected Strategus of the league. In both \nthese posts Philopcemen made great alterations and improvements \nin the arms and discipline of the Achaean forces, which he assimi- \nlated to those of the Macedonian phalanx. These reforms, as well \nas the public spirit with which he had inspired the Achaaans, were \nattended with the most beneficial results. In 207 Philopcemen \ngained at Mantinea a signal victory over the Lacedsemonians, who \nhad joined the Eoman alliance ; 4000 of them were left upon the \nfield, and among them Machanidas, who had made himself tyrant \nof Sparta. This decisive battle, combined with the withdrawal of \nthe Eomans, who, being desirous of turning their undivided \nattention towards Carthage, had made peace with Philip v 205), \nsecured for a few years the tranquillity of Greece. It also raised \nthe fame of Philopcemen to its highest point ; and in the next \nXemean festival, being a second time general of the league, he \nwas hailed by the assembled Greeks as the liberator of their \ncountry. \n\nUpon the conclusion of the second Punic war the Eomans re- \nnewed their enterprises in Greece, and declared war against Philip \n(b.c. 200). For some time the war lingered on without any decided \nsuccess on either side : but in 198 the consul T. Quinctius Flami- \n\n\n\nB.C. 197. \n\n\n\nBATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALiE. \n\n\n\n219 \n\n\n\nninus succeeded in gaining over the Achaean league to the Eoman \nalliance ; and as the JEtolians had previously deserted Philip, both \nthose powers fought for a short time on the same side. In 197 the \nstruggle was brought to a termination by the battle of Cynoscephalae, \nnear Scotussa, in Thessaly, which decided the fate of the Macedo- \nnian monarchy. Philip was obliged to sue for peace, and in the \nfollowing year (196) a treaty was ratified by which the Macedonians \nwere compelled to renounce their supremacy, to withdraw their \ngarrisons from the Grecian towns, to surrender their fleet, and to \npay 1000 talents for the expenses of the war. At the ensuing \nIsthmian games Flaminmus solemnly proclaimed the freedom of \nthe Greeks, and was received by them with overwhelming joy and \ngratitude. \n\nThe iEtolians, dissatisfied with these arrangements, persuaded \nAntiochus III., king of Syria, .to enter into a league against the \nEomans. He passed over into Greece with a wholly inadequate \nforce, and was defeated by the Eomans at Thermopylae (b.c. 191). \nThe iEtolians were now compelled to make head against the \nEomans by themselves. After some ineffectual attempts at resist- \nance they were reduced to sue for peace, which they at length \nobtained, but on the most humiliating conditions (b.c. 189). They \nwere required to acknowledge the supremacy of Eome, to renounce \nall the conquests they had recently made, to pay an indemnity of \n500 talents, and to engage in future to aid the Eomans in their wars. \nThe power of the JEtolian league was thus for ever crushed, \nthough it seems to have existed, in name at least, till a much later \nperiod. \n\nThe Achaean league still subsisted, but was destined before long \nto experience the same fate as its rival. At first, indeed, it enjoyed \nthe protection of the Eomans, and even acquired an extension of \nmembers through their influence, but this protectorate involved a \nstate of almost absolute dependence. Philopoemen also had suc- \nceeded, in the year 192, in adding Sparta to the league, which now \nembraced the whole of Peloponnesus. But Sparta having displayed \nsymptoms of insubordination, Philopoemen marched against it in \n188, and captured the city ; when he put to death eighty of the \nleading men, razed the walls and fortifications, abolished the insti- \ntutions of Lycurgus, and compelled the citizens to adopt the demo- \ncratic constitution of the Achaeans. Meanwhile the Eomans \nregarded with satisfaction the internal dissensions of Greece, which \nthey foresaw would only render her an easier prey, and neglected \nto answer the appeals of the Spartans for protection. In 183 the \nMessenians, under the leadership of Dinocrates, having revolted \nfrom the league, Philopoemen, who had now attained the age \n\n\n\n220 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap XXI. \n\n\n\nof 70, led an expedition against them ; but having fallen from \nhis horse in a skirmish of cavalry, he was captured, and conveyed \nwith many circumstances of ignominy to Messene, where, after a \nsort of mock trial, he was executed. His fate was avenged by \nLycortas, the commander of the Achaean cavalry, the father of the \nhistorian Polybins. \n\nIn b.c. 179 Philip died, and was succeeded by his son Perseus, \nthe last monarch of Macedonia. The latter years of the reign of \nPhilip had been spent in preparations for a renewal of the war, \nwhich he foresaw to be inevitable ; yet a period of seven years \nelapsed after the accession of Perseus before the mutual enmity of \nthe two powers broke out into open hostilities. The war was \nprotracted three years without any decisive result ; but was \nbrought to a conclusion in 168 by the consul L. ^Emilius \nPaulus, who defeated Perseus with great loss near Pydna. Perseus \nwas carried to Eome to adorn the triumph of Paulus (167), and was \npermitted to spend the remainder of his life in a sort of honourable \ncaptivity at Alba. Such was the end of the Macedonian empire, \nwhich was now divided into four districts, each under the juris- \ndiction of an oligarchical council. \n\n\n\n\nCoin of Perseus, king of Hacedonia \n\n\n\nThe Eoman commissioners deputed to arrange the affairs of \n-Macedonia did not confine their attention to that province, but \nevinced then design of bringing all Greece under the Eoman \nsway. In these views they were assisted by various despots and \ntraitors in different Grecian cities, and especially by Callicrates. a \nman of great influence among the Achaeans, and who for many \nyears lent himself as the base tool of the Eomans to effect the \nenslavement of his country. After the fall of Macedonia, Calli- \ncrates denounced more than a thousand leading Achaeans who \nhad favoured the cause of Perseus. These, among whom was \nPolybins the historian, were apprehended and sent to Eome for \ntrial. A still harder fate was experienced by iEtolia, Bceotia, \nAcarnania, and Epirus. In the last-named country, especially, no \n\n\n\nB.C. 146. \n\n\n\nGREECE A ROMAN PROVINCE. \n\n\n\n221 \n\n\n\nfewer than seventy of the principal towns were abandoned by Paulus \nto his soldiers for pillage, and 150,000 persons are said to have been \nsold into slavery. \n\nA quarrel between the Achaeans and Sparta afforded the Eomans \na pretence for crashing the small remains of Grecian independence \nby the destruction of the Achaean league. \n\nThe Spartans, feeling themselves incompetent to resist the \nAchseans, appealed to the Eomans for assistance ; and in 147 two \nEoman commissioners were sent to Greece to settle the disputes \nbetween the two states. These commissioners decided that not \nonly Sparta, but Corinth, and all the other cities, except those \nof Achaia, should be restored to their independence. This decision \noccasioned serious riots at Corinth, the most important city of the \nleague. All the Spartans in the town were seized, and even the \nEoman commissioners narrowly escaped violence. On their return \nto Eome a fresh embassy was despatched to demand satisfaction for \nthese outrages. But the violent and impolitic conduct of Critolaiis, \nthen Strategus of the league, rendered all attempts at accom- \nmodation fruitless, and after the return of the ambassadors the \nSenate declared war against the league. The cowardice and \nincompetence of Critolaiis as a general were only equalled by \nhis previous insolence. On the approach of the Eomans under \nMetellus from Macedonia he did not even venture to make a \nstand at Thermopylae ; and being overtaken by them near Scarphea \nin Locris, he was totally defeated, and never again heard of. \nDiaeus, who succeeded him as Strategus, displayed rather more \nenergy and courage. But a fresh Eoman force under Mummius \nhaving landed on the isthmus, Diaeus was overthrown in a battle \nnear Corinth ; and that city was immediately evacuated not only by \nthe troops of the league, but also by the greater part of the \ninhabitants. On entering it Mummius put the few males who \nremained to the sword ; sold the women and children as slaves ; \nand having carried away all its treasures, consigned it to the flames \n(b.c. 146). Corinth was filled with masterpieces of ancient art ; \nbut Mummius was so insensible to their surpassing excellence as \nto stipulate with those who contracted to convey them to Italy, \nthat, if any were lost in the passage, they should be replaced by \nothers of equal value ! Mummius then employed himself in \nchastising and regulating the whole of Greece ; and ten commis- \nsioners were sent from Eome to settle its future condition. The \nwhole country, to the borders of Macedonia and Epirus, was formed \ninto a Eoman province, under the name of Achaia, derived from \nthat confederacy which had made the last struggle for its political \nexistence. \n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII. \n\nSKETCH OF THE HISTOEY OF GREEK LITEBATUBE FROM THE \nEARLIEST TIMES TO THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GEE AT. \n\nThe Greeks possessed two large eollections of epic poetry. The \none comprised poems relating to the great events and enterprises \nof the Heroic age, and characterised by a certain poetical unity ; \nthe other included works tamer in character and more desultory \nin then mode of treatment, containing the genealogies of men and \ngods, narratives of the exploits of separate heroes, and descriptions \nof the ordinary pursuits of life. The poems of the former class \npassed under the name of Homer; while those of the latter \nwere in the same general >vay ascribed to Hesiod. The former \nwere the productions of the Ionic and JEolic minstrels in Asia \nMinor, among whom Homer stood pre-eminent and eclipsed the \nbrightness of the rest : the latter were the compositions of a school \nof bards in the neighbourhood of Mount Helicon in Beeotia, among \nwhom in like manner Hesiod enjoyed the greatest celebrity. The \npoems of both schools were composed in the hexameter metre and \nin a similar dialect; but they differed widely in almost every \nother feature. \n\nOf the Homeric poems the Iliad and the Odyssey vere the most \ndistinguished and have alone come down to us. The subject of the \nIliad was the exploits of Achilles and of the other Grecian heroes \nbefore Ilium or Troy: that of the Odyssey was the wanderings and \nadventures of Odysseus or Ulysses after the capture of Troy on his \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\nPOEMS OF HOMER. \n\n\n\n223 \n\n\n\n\nreturn to his native island. Throughout the flourishing period of \nGreek literature these unrivalled works were universally regarded \nas the productions of a single mind ; but there was very little agree- \nment respecting the place of the poet\'s birth, the details of his life, \nor the time in which he lived. Seven cities laid claim to Homer\'s \nbirth, and most of them had legends to tell \nrespecting his romantic parentage, his alleged \nblindness, and his life of an itinerant bard ac- \nquainted with poverty and sorrow. It cannot be \ndisputed that he was an Asiatic Greek ; but this \nis the only fact in his life which can be regarded \nas certain. Several of the best writers of antiquity \nsupposed him to have been a native of the island \nof Chios ; but most modern scholars believe \nSmyrna to have been his birthplace. His most \nprobable date is about B.C. 850. \n\nThe mode in which these poems were preserved Homer, \nhas occasioned great controversy in modern times. \nEven if they were committed to writing by the poet himself, and were \nhanded down to posterity in this manner, it is certain that they were \nrarely read. We must endeavour to realise the difference between \nancient Greece and our own times. During the most flourishing \nperiod of Athenian literature manuscripts were indifferently written, \nwithout division into parts, and without marks of punctuation. They \nwere scarce and costly, could be obtained only by the wealthy, and \nread only by those who had had considerable literary training. Under \nthese circumstances the Greeks could never become a reading people ; \nand thus the great mass even of the Athenians became acquainted \nwith the productions of the leading poets of Greece only by \nhearing them recited at their solemn festivals and on other public \noccasions. This was more strikingly the case at an earlier period. \nThe Iliad and the Odyssey were not read by individuals in private^ \nbut were sung or recited at festivals or to assembled companies. \nThe bard originally sung his own lays to the accompaniment of his \nlyre. He was succeeded by a body of professional reciters, called \nKhapsodists, who rehearsed the poems of others, and who appear at \nearly times to have had exclusive possession of the Homeric poems. \nBut in the seventh century before the Christian era literary culture \nbegan to prevail among the Greeks; and men of education and \nwealth were naturally desirous of obtaining copies of the great poet \nof the nation. From this cause copies came to be circulated \namong the Greeks ; but most of them contained only separate \nportions of the poems, or single rhapsodes, as they were called. \nPisistratus, the tyrant or despot of Athens, is said to have been the \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\nfirst person who collected and arranged the poems in their present \nform, in order that they might be recited at the great Panathenaic \nfestival at Athens. \n\nThree works have come down to us hearing the name of Hesiod \n\xe2\x80\x94 the \'Works and Days,\' the \'Theogony,\' and a description of \nthe \xe2\x80\xa2 Shield of Hercules.\' Many ancient critics believed the \n* Works and Days \' to be the only genuine work of Hesiod, and \ntheir opinion has been adopted by most modern scholars. We \nlearn from this work that Hesiod was a native of Ascra, a village \nat the foot of Mount Helicon, to which his father had migrated \nfrom the ^Eolian Cyme in Asia Minor. He further tells us that he \ngained the prize at Chalcis in a poetical contest ; and that he was \nrobbed of a fair share of his heritage by the unrighteous decision \nof judges who had been bribed by his brother Perses. The latter \nbecame afterwards reduced in circumstances, and applied to his \nbrother for relief ; and it is to him that Hesiod addresses his \ndidactic poem of the \' Works and Days,\' in which he lays down \nvarious moral and social maxims for the regulation of his conduct \nand his life. It contains an interesting representation of the \nfeelings, habits, and superstitions of the rural population of Greece \nin the earlier ages. Respecting the . date of Hesiod nothing \ncertain can be affirmed. Modern writers usually suppose liini to \nhave flourished two or three generations later than Homer. \n\nThe commencement of Greek lyric poetry as a cultivated species \nof composition dates from the middle of the seventh century before \nthe Christian era. Xo important event either in the public or \nprivate life of a Greek could dispense with this accompaniment ; \nand the lyric song was equally needed to solemnize the worship of \nthe gods, to cheer the march to battle, or to enliven the festive \nboard. The lyric poetry, with the exception of that of Pindar, has \nalmost entirely perished, and all that we possess of it consists of a \nfew songs and isolated fragments. \n\nThe great satirist Aechilochus was one of the earliest and most \ncelebrated of all the lyric poets. He was a native of the island of \nPares, and flourished about the year 700 B.C. His fame rests \nchiefly on his terrible satires, composed in the Iambic metre, \nin which he gave vent to the bitterness of a disappointed man. \n\nTyrt^eus and Aloiax were the two great lyric poets of Sparta, \nthough neither of them was a native of Lacedaeinon. The personal \nhistory of Tyrtaeus, and his warlike songs, which roused the \nfainting courage of the Spartans during the second Messenian war, \nhave already been mentioned (p. 25). Alcman was originally \na Lydian slave in a Spartan family, and was emancipated by \nhis master. He lived shortly after the second Messenian war His \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. ARION \xe2\x80\x94 ALCjEUS \xe2\x80\x94 SAPPHO. \n\n\n\n225 \n\n\n\npoems partake of the character of this period, which was one of \nrepose and enjoyment after the fatigues and perils of war. Many \nof his songs celebrate the pleasures of good eating and drinking ; \nbut the more important were intended to be sung by a chorus at \nthe public festivals of Sparta. \n\nArion was a native of Methymna in Lesbos, and lived some \ntime at the court of Periander, tyrant of Corinth, who began to \nreign B.C. 625. Nothing is known of his life beyond the beautiful \nstory of his escape from the sailors with whom he sailed from \nSicily to Corinth. On one occasion, thus runs the story, Arion \nwent to Sicily to take part in a musical contest. He won the prize, \nand, laden with presents, he embarked in a Corinthian ship to \nreturn to his friend Periander. The rude sailors coveted his trea- \nsures, and meditated his murder. After imploring them in vain to \nspare his life, he obtained permission to play for the last time on \nhis beloved lyre. In festal attire he placed himself on the prow of \nthe vessel, invoked the gods in inspired strains, and then threw \nhimself into the sea. But many song-loving dolphins had assembled \nround the vessel, and one of them now took the bard on its back, \nand carried Mm to Tsenarum, from whence he returned to Corinth \nin safety, and related his adventure to Periander. Upon the arrival \nof the Corinthian vessel , Periander inquired of the sailors after \nArion, who replied that he had remained behind at Tarentum ; but \nwhen Arion, at the bidding of Periander, came forward, the sailors \nowned their guilt, and were punished according to their desert. \nThe great improvement in lyric poetry ascribed to Arion is the \ninvention of the Dithyramb. This was a choral song and dance in \nhonour of the god Dionysus, and is of great interest in the history \nof poetry, since it was the germ from which sprung at a later time \nthe magnificent productions of the tragic Muse at Athens. \n\nAlc^us and Sappho were both natives of Mytilene, in the island \nof Lesbos, and flourished about b.c. 610-580. Their songs were \ncomposed for a single voice, and not for the chorus, and they were \neach the inventor of a new metre, which bears their name, and is \nfamiliar to us by the well-known odes of Horace. Their poetry was \nthe warm outpouring of the writers\' inmost feelings, and presents \nthe ly$ic poetry of the JEolians at its highest point. \n\nAlcseus took an active part in the civil dissensions of his native \nstate, and warmly espoused the cause of the aristocratical party, to \nwhich he belonged by birth. When the nobles were driven into \nexile, he endeavoured to cheer their spirits by a number of most \nanimated odes, full of invectives against the popular party and its \nleaders. \n\nOf the events of Sappho\'s life we have scarcely any information ; \n\nQ \n\n\n\n226 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\nand the common story that, being in love with Phaon and finding \nher love unrequited, she leaped down from the Leucadian rock, \nseems to have been an invention of later times. \n\nAxacreox was a native of the Ionian city of Teos. He spent \npart of his life at Samos, under the patronage of Polycrates \xc2\xab and \nafter the death of this despot he went to Athens at the invitation \nof Hipparchus. The universal tradition of antiquity represents \nAnacreon as a consummate voluptuary ; and his poems prove the \ntruth of the tradition. His death was worthy of his life, if we may \nbelieve the account that he was choked by a grape- stone. \n\nSmoxiDES, of the island of Ceos, was born b.c. 556, and reached a \ngreat age. He lived many years at Athens, both at the court of \nHipparchus, together with Anacreon, and subsequently under the \ndemocracy during the Persian wars. The struggles of Greece for \nher independence furnished him with a noble subject for his muse. \nHe carried away the prize from JEschylus with an elegy upon the \nwarriors who had fallen at the battle of Marathon. Subsequently \nwe find him celebrating the heroes of Thermopylae, Artemisium, \nSalamis, and Plataea. He was upwards of 80 when his long poetical \ncareer at Athens was closed with the victory which he gained with \nthe dithyrambic chorus in B.C. 477, making the 56th prize that \nhe had carried oft. Shortly after this event he repaired to Syracuse \nat the invitation of Hiero. Here he spent the remaining ten years \nof his life, not only entertaining Hiero with his poetry, but in- \nstructing him by his wisdom ; for Simonides was a philosopher as \nwell as a poet, and is reckoned amongst the sophists. \n\nPindar, though the contemporary of Simonides, was considerably \njtg^^ his junior. He was born either at, or in the \n^(^fTp^^, neighbourhood of, Thebes in Boeotia, about \n\n\n\n\xc2\xa3r - \xe2\x96\xa0 . ^ states and princes of the Hellenic race to com- \n\nPindar P ose cnora ^ \xc2\xa3on o s - 2e was courted especially \n\nby Alexander, king of Macedonia, and by \nHiero, despot of Syracuse. The praises which he bestowed upon \nAlexander are said to have been the chief reason which led his \ndescendant, Alexander the Great, to spare the house of the poet \nwhen he destroyed the rest of Thebes. The estimation in which \n\n\n\n/ \n\n\n\n\nChap. XXI] . PINDAR \xe2\x80\x94 HERODOTUS. 227 \n\n\n\nPindar -was held is also shown by the honours conferred upon \nhim by the free states of Greece. Although a Theban, he was \nalways a great favourite with the Athenians, whom he fre- \nquently praised in his poems, and who testified their gratitude by \nmaking him their public guest, and by giving him 10,000 drachmas. \nThe only poems of Pindar which have come down to us entire \nare his Epinicia or triumphal odes, composed in commemoration of \nvictories gained in the great public games. But these were only \na small portion of his works. He also wrote hymns, paeans, dithy- \nrambs, odes for processions, songs of maidens, mimic dancing \nsongs, drinking songs, dirges, and encomia, or panegyrics on \nprinces. \n\nThe Greeks had arrived at a high pitch of civilization before \nthey can be said to have possessed a History, The \nfirst essays in literary prose cannot be placed earlier \nthan the sixth century before the Christian sera ; \nbut the first writer who deserves the name of an \nhistorian is Herodotus, hence called the Father \nof History. Herodotus was born in the Dorian \ncolony of Halicarnassus in Caria, in the year 484 \nB.C., and accordingly about the time of the Persian \nexpeditions into Greece. He resided some years \nin Samos, and also undertook extensive travels, of \nwinch he speaks in his work. There was scarcely \na town in Greece or on the coasts of Asia Minor with \nwhich he was not acquainted ; he had explored \nThrace and the coasts of the Black Sea ; in Egypt he had penetrated \nas far south as Elephantine ; and in Asia he had visited the cities of \nBabylon, Ecbatana, and Susa. The latter part of his life was spent \nat Thurii, a colony founded by the Athenians in Italy in- b.c. 443. \nAccording to a well-known story in Lucian, Herodotus, when he \nhad completed his work, recited it publicly at the great Olympic \nfestival, as the best means of procuring for it that celebrity to which \nhe felt that it was entitled. The effect is described as immediate \nand complete. The delighted audience at once assigned the names of \nthe nine Muses to the nine books into which it is divided. A still \nlater author (Suidas) adds, that Thucydides, then a boy, was present \nat the festival with his father Olorus, and was so affected by the \nrecital as to shed tears ; upon which Herodotus congratulated \nOlorus on having a son who possessed so early such a zeal for \nknowledge. But there are many objections to the probability of \nthese tales. \n\nHerodotus interwove into his history all the varied and extensive \nknowledge acquired in his travels, and by his own personal re- \n\nQ 2 \n\n\n\n\nHPo^otoC \n\n\n\n228 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXIi. \n\n\n\n\nsearches. But the real subject of the work is the conflict between \nthe Greek race, in the widest sense of the term, and including the \nGreeks of Asia Minor, with the Asiatics. Thus the historian had \na vast epic subject presented to him, which was brought to a \nnatural and glorious termination by the defeat of the Persians in \ntheir attempts upon Greece. The work concludes with the reduc- \ntion of Sestos by the Athenians, b.c. 478. Herodotus wrote in the \nIonic dialect, and his style is marked by an ease and simplicity \nwhich lend it an indescribable charm. \n\nThucydides, the greatest of the Greek historians, was an Athe- \nnian, and was bom in the year 471 B.C. His family \nwas connected with that of Miltiades and Cimon. \nHe possessed gold-mines in Thrace, and enjoyed \ngreat influence in that country. He commanded \nan Athenian squadron of seven ships at Thasos, in \n424 b.c, at the time when Brasidas was besieging \nAinphipoHs ; and having failed to relieve that city \nin time, he went into a voluntary exile, in order \nprobably to avoid the punishment of death. He \nappears to have spent 20 years in banishment, \nprincipally in the Peloponnesus, or in places under \nthe dominion or influence of Sparta. He perhaps \nrtracydides. returned to Athens in b.c. 403, the date of its libera- \ntion by Thrasybulus. According to the unanimous testimony of anti- \nquity he met with a violent end, and it seems probable that he was \nassassinated at Athens, since it cannot be doubted that his tomb \nexisted there. From the beginning of the Peloponnesian war he had \ndesigned to write its history, and he employed himself in collecting \nmaterials for that purpose during its continuance ; but it is most \nlikely that the work was not actually composed till after the \nconclusion of the war, and that he was engaged upon it at the time \nof his death. The first book of his History is introductory, and \ncontains a rapid sketch of Grecian history from the remotest times \nto the breaking out of the war. The remaining seven books are \nfilled with the details of the war, related according to the division \ninto summers and winters, into which all campaigns naturally fall ; \nand the work breaks off abruptly in the middle of the 21st year of \nthe war (b.c. 411). The materials of Thucydides were collected \nwith the most scrupulous care; the events are related with the \nstrictest impartiality ; and the work probably offers a more exact \naccount of a long and eventful period than any other contemporary \nhistory, whether ancient or modern, of an equally long and important \nsera. The style of Thucydides is brief and sententious, and whether \nin moral or political reasoning, or in description, gains wonderful \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. THUCYDIDES \xe2\x80\x94 XENOPHON. \n\n\n\n229 \n\n\n\nforce from its condensation. But this characteristic is sometimes \ncarried to a faulty extent, so as to render his style harsh, and his \nmeaning obscure. \n\nXenophon, the son of Gryllus, was also an Athenian, and was \nprobably born about b.c. 444. He was a pupil of Socrates, who \nsaved his life at the battle of Delium (b.c. 424). His accompanying \nCyrus the younger in his expedition against his brother Artaxerxes, \nking of Persia, formed a striking episode in his life, and has been \nrecorded by himself in his Anabasis. He seems to have been still \nin Asia at the time of the death of Socrates in 399 b.c, and was \nprobably banished from Athens soon after that period, in conse- \nquence of his close connexion with the Lacedaemonians. He ac- \ncompanied Agesilaus, the Spartan king, on the return of the latter \nfrom Asia to Greece ; and he fought along with the Lacedemo- \nnians against his own countrymen at the battle of Coronea in \n394 b.c. After this battle he went with Agesilaus to Sparta, and \nsoon afterwards settled at Scillus in Elis, near Olympia. He is \nsaid to have lived to more than 90 years of age, and he mentions an \nevent which occurred as late as 357 b.c. \n\nProbably all the works of Xenophon are still extant. The \nAnabasis is the work on which his fame as an historian chiefly rests. \nIt is written in a simple and agreeable style, and conveys much \ncurious and striking information. The Hellenica is a continuation \nof the history of Thucydides, and comprehends in seven books a \nspace of about 48 years ; namely, from the time when Thucydides \nbreaks orT, B.C. 411, to the battle of Mantinea in 362. The subject \nis treated in a very dry and uninteresting style ; and his evident \npartiality to Sparta, and dislike of Athens, have frequently warped \nhis judgment, and must cause his statements to be received with \nsome suspicion. The Cyropsedia, one of the most pleasing and \npopular of his works, professes to be a history of Gyrus, the founder \nof the Persian monarchy, but is in reality a kind of political romance, \nand possesses no authority whatever as an historical work. The \ndesign of the author seems to have been to draw a picture of a \nperfect state ; and though the scene is laid in Persia, the materials \nof the work are derived from his own philosophical notions and the \nusages of Sparta, engrafted on the popularly current stories re- \nspecting Cyrus. Xenophon displays in this work his dislike of \ndemocratic institutions like those of Athens, and his preference for \nan aristocracy, or even a monarchy. Xenophon was also the author \nof several minor works ; but the only other treatise which we need \nmention is the Memorabilia of Socrates, in four books, intended as a \ndefence of his master against the charges which occasioned his \ndeath, and which undoubtedly contains a genuine picture of Socrates \n\n\n\n230 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\nand his philosophy. The genius of Xenophon was not of the highest \norder ; it was practical rather than speculative ; hut he is distin- \nguished for Ms good sense, his moderate views, his humane temper, \nand his earnest piety. \n\nThe Drama pre-eminently distinguished Athenian literature. \nThe democracy demanded a literature of a popular kind, the \nvivacity of the people a literature that made a lively impression ; \nand both these conditions were fulfilled by the drama. But \nthough brought to perfection among the Athenians, tragedy \nand comedy, in then- rude and early origin, were Dorian inven- \ntions. Both arose out of the worship of DionJ\'sus. There was \nat first but little distinction between these two species of the \ndrama, except that comedy belonged more to the rural cele- \nbration of the Dionysiac festivals, and tragedy to that in cities. \nThe name of tragedy was far from signifying any thing mournful, \nbeing derived from the goat-like appearance of those who, disguised \nas Satyrs, performed the old Dionysiac songs and dances. In like \nmanner, comedy was called after the song of the band of revellers \nwho celebrated the vintage festivals of Dionysus, and vented the \nrude merriment inspired by the occasion in jibes and extempore \nwitticisms levelled at the spectators. Tragedy, in its more perfect \nform, was the offspring of the dithyrambic odes with which that \nworship was celebrated. These were not always of a joyous cast. \nSome of them expressed the sufferings of Dionysus ; and it was \nfrom this more mournful species of dithyramb that tragedy, properly \nso called, arose. The dithyrambic odes formed a kind of lyrical \ntragedy, and were sung by a chorus of fifty men, dancing round \nthe altar of Dionysus. The improvements in the dithyramb \nwere introduced by Arion at Corinth ; and it was chiefly among \nthe Dorian states of the Peloponnesus that these choral dithy- \nrambic songs prevailed. Hence, even in Attic tragedy, the chorus, \nwhich was the foundation of the drama, was written in the Doric \ndialect, thus clearly betraying the source from which the Athenians \nderived it. \n\nIn Attica an important alteration was made in the old tragedy in \nthe time of Pisistratus, in consequence of which it obtained a new \nand dramatic character. This innovation is ascribed to Thespis, a \nnative of the Attic village of Icaria, B.C. 535. It consisted in the \nintroduction of an actor for the purpose of giving rest to the chorus. \nThespis was succeeded by Chcerilus and Phrynichiis, the latter of \nwhom gained his first prize in the dramatic contests in 511 B.C. \nThe Dorian Pratinas, a native of Phlius, but who exhibited \nhis tragedies at Athens, introduced an improvement in tragedy \nby separating the Satyric from the tragic drama. As neither the \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\n.ESCHYLUS. \n\n\n\n231 \n\n\n\npopular taste nor the ancient religious associations connected witb \nthe festivals of Dionysus would have permitted the chorus of \nSatyrs to be entirely banished from the tragic representations, \nPratinas avoided this by the invention of what is called the Satyric \ndrama \xe2\x80\xa2 that is, a species of play in which the ordinary subjects of \ntragedy were treated in a lively and farcical manner, and in which \nthe chorus consisted of a band of Satyrs in appropriate dresses \nand masks. After this period it became customary to exhibit \ndramas in tetralogies, or sets of four; namely, a tragic trilogy, \nor series of three tragedies, followed by a Satyric play. These \nwere often on connected subjects ; and the Satyric drama at \nthe end served like a merry after-piece to relieve the minds of the \nspectators. \n\nThe subjects of Greek tragedy were taken, with few exceptions, \nfrom the national mythology. Hence the plot and story were of \nnecessity known to the spectators, a circumstance which strongly \ndistinguishes the ancient tragedy from the modern. It must also \nbe recollected that the representation of tragedies did not take \nplace every day, but only, after certain fixed intervals, at the \nfestivals of Dionysus, of which they formed one of the greatest \nattractions. During the whole day the Athenian public sat in the \ntheatre witnessing tragedy after tragedy ; and a prize was awarded \nby judges appointed for the purpose to the poet who produced the \nbest set of dramas. \n\nSuch was Attic tragedy when it came into the hands of JEschy- \nlus, who, from the great improvements which he introduced, was \nregarded by the Athenians as its father or founder, just as Homer \nwas of Epic poetry, and Herodotus of History. iEschylus was born \nat Eleusis in Attica in B.C. 525, and was thus contemporary with \nSimonides and Pindar. He fought with his brother Cynsegirus at \nthe battle of Marathon, and also at those of Artemisium, Salamis, \nand Platsea. In B.C. 484 he gained his first tragic prize. In 468 he \nwas defeated in a tragic contest by his younger rival Sophocles ; \nshortly afterwards he retired to the court of king Hiero, at Syracuse. \nHe died at Gela, in Sicily, in 456, in the 69th year of his age. It is \nunanimously related that an eagle, mistaking the poet\'s bald head \nfor a stone, let a tortoise fall upon it in order to break the shell, \nthus fulfilling an oracle predicting that he was to die by a blow \nfrom heaven. The improvements introduced into tragedy by \niEschylus concerned both its form and composition, and its manner \nof representation. In the former his principal innovation was the \nintroduction of a second actor ; whence arose the dialogue, properly \nso called, and the limitation of the choral parts, which now became \n\n\n\n232 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\nsubsidiary. His improvements in the manner of representing \ntragedy consisted in the introduction of painted scenes, drawn \naccording to the rules of perspective. He furnished the actors with \nmore appropriate and more magnificent dresses, invented for them \nmore various and expressive masks, and raised their stature to the \nheroic size by providing them with thick-soled cothurni or buskins. \niEschylus excels in representing the superhuman, in depicting \ndemigods and heroes, and in tracing the irresistible march of \nfate. His style resembles the ideas which it clothes : it is bold, \nsublime, and full of gorgeous imagery, but sometimes borders on \nthe turgid. \n\nSophocles, the younger rival and immediate successor of iEschy- \nlus in the tragic art, was born at Colonus, \na village about a mile from Athens, in B.C. \n495. We have already adverted to his wrest- \ning the tragic prize from iEschylus in 468, \nfrom which time he seems to have retained \nthe almost undisputed possession of the Athe- \nnian stage, until a young but formidable rival \narose in the person of Euripides. The close \nof his life was troubled with family dissen- \nsions. Iophon, his son by an Athenian wife* \nand therefore his legitimate heir, was jealous \nof the affection manifested by his father for his \ngrandson Sophocles, the offspring of another \nson, Ariston, whom he had had by a Sicyonian woman. Fearing \nlest his father should bestow a great part of his property upon his \nfavourite, Iophon summoned him before the Phratores, or tribesmen, \non the ground that his mind was affected. The old man\'s only \nreply was \xe2\x80\x94 " If I am Sophocles I am not beside myself ; and if I \nam beside myself I am not Sophocles." Then taking up his \nCSdipus at Colonus, which he had lately written, but had not yet \nbrought out, he read from it a beautiful passage, with which \nthe judges were so struck that they at once dismissed the case. He \ndied shortly afterwards, in B.C. 406, in his 90th year. As a poet \nSophocles is universally allowed to have brought the drama to the \ngreatest perfection of which it is susceptible. His plays stand in \nthe just medium between the sublime but unregulated flights \nof iEschylus, and the too familiar scenes and rhetorical decla- \nmations of Euripides. His plots are worked up with more skill and \ncare than the plots of either of his great rivals. Sophocles added \nthe last improvement to the form of the drama by the introduction^ \nof a third actor ; a change which greatly enlarged the scope of the \n\n\n\n\nChap. XXII. SOPHOCLES\xe2\x80\x94 EURIPIDES \xe2\x80\x94 ARISTOPHANES. 233 \n\n\n\naction. The improvement was so obvious that it was adopted by \niEschylus in his later plays ; but the number of three actors seems \nto have been seldom or never exceeded. \n\nEuripides was born in the island of Salamis, in e.g. 480 his \nparents having been among those who fled thither \nat the time of the invasion of Attica by Xerxes. ^^Plfe^ \nHe studied rhetoric under Prodicus, and physics J)fP 7 ij&i \nunder Anaxagoras, and he also lived on intimate \nterms with Socrates. In 441 he gained his first W^i&MW \nprize, and he continued to exhibit plays until ^^M^SS^ \n408, the date of his Orestes. Soon after this he "\xe2\x9c\x93V^^^^re^ \nrepaired to the court of Macedonia, at the in vita- \\ ^y-m\\ \ntion of king Archelaus, where he died two years V \xc2\xa3Y?ir ,iAiir jptl \n\nafterwards at the age of 74 (b.c. 40G). Common ^ : \n\nreport relates that he was torn to pieces by the Euripides, \nking\'s dogs, which, according to some accounts, \nwere set upon him by two rival poets out of envy. In treating his \ncharacters and subjects Euripides often arbitrarily departed from \nthe received legends, and diminished the dignity of tragedy by \ndepriving it of its ideal character, and by bringing it down to the \nlevel of every-day life. His dialogue was garrulous and colloquial, \nwanting in heroic dignity, and frequently frigid through misplaced \nphilosophical disquisitions. 5Tet in spite of all these faults Euripides \nhas many beauties, and is particularly remarkable for pathos, so \nthat Aristotle calls him "the most tragic of poets." \n\nComedy received its full development at Athens from Cratinus, \nwho lived in the age of Pericles. Cratinus, and his younger \ncontemporaries, Eupolis and Aristophanes, were the three great \npoets of what is called the Old Attic Comedy. The comedies \nof Cratinus and Eupolis are lost ; but of Aristophanes, who was the \ngreatest of the three, we have eleven dramas extant. Aristophanes \nwas born about 444 b.c. Of his private life we know positively \nnothing. He exhibited his first comedy in 427, and from that time \ntill near his death, which probably happened about 380, he was a \nfrequent contributor to the Attic stage. The Old Attic Comedy was \na powerful vehicle for the expression of opinion ; and most of the \ncomedies of Aristophanes turned either upon political occurrences, \nor upon some subject which excited the interest of the Athenian \npublic. Their chief object was to excite laughter by the boldest \nand most ludicrous caricature ; and provided that end was attained \nthe poet seems to have cared but little about the justice of the \npicture. Towards the end of the career of Aristophanes the \nunrestricted licence and libellous personality of comedy began \ngradually to disappear. The chorus was first curtailed and then \n\n\n\n234 HISTORY OF GREECE. Chap. XXII. \n\nentirely suppressed, and thus made way for what is called the \nMiddle Comedy, which had no chorus at all. The latter still \ncontinued to be in some degree political ; but persons were no \nlonger introduced upon the stage under their real names, and the \noffice of the chorus was very much curtailed. It was, in fact, the \nconnecting link between the Old Comedy and the New, or the \nComedy of Manners. The New Comedy arose after Athens had \nbecome subject to the Macedonians. Politics were now excluded \nfrom the stage, and the materials of the dramatic poet were \nderived entirely from the fictitious adventures of persons in private \nlife. The two most distinguished writers of this school were \nPhilemon and Mexander. Philemon was probably bom about the \nyear 360 B.C., and was either a Cilician or Syracusan, but came at \nan early age to Athens. He is considered as the founder of the \nNew Comedy, which was soon afterwards \nbrought to perfection by his younger con- \ntemporary Menander. The latter was an \nAthenian, and was born in B.C. 342. He \nwas drowned at the age of 52, whilst \nswimming in the harbour of Piraeus. He \nwrote upwards of 100 comedies, of which \nonly fragments remain ; and the unani- \nmous praise of posterity awakens our \nregret for the loss of one of the most \nelegant writers of antiquity. The come- \ndies, indeed, of Plautus and Terence may \ngive us a general notion of the New \nMenander. Comedy of the Greeks, from which they \n\nwere confessedly drawn ; but there iff \ngood reason to suppose that the works even of the latter Roman \nwriter fell far short of the wit and elegance of Menander. \n\nThe latter days of literary Athens were chiefly distinguished by \nthe genius of her Orators and Philosophers. There were ten Attic \norators, whose works were collected by the Greek grammarians, \nand many of whose orations have come down to us. Their names \nare Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Isseus, iEschines, Ly- \ncurgus, Demosthenes, Hyperides, and Dinarchus. Axtiphon, the \nearliest of the ten, was born b.c. 480. He opened a school of \nrhetoric, and numbered among his pupils the historian Thucydides. \nAntiphon was put to death in 411 b.c. for the part which he took \nin establishing the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. \n\nAndocides, who was concerned with Alcibiades in the affair of \nthe Hermae, was bom at Athens in b.c. 467, and died probably \nabout 391. \n\n\n\n\nChap. XXII. ISOCRATES \xe2\x80\x94 JSSCH1NES \xe2\x80\x94 DEMOSTHENES. 235 \n\n\n\nLysias, also born at Athens in 458, was much superior to Ando- \ncides as an orator, but being a metic, or resident alien, he was not \nallowed to speak in the assemblies or courts of justice, and therefore \nwrote orations for others to deliver. \n\nIsocrates was born in 436. After receiving the instructions of \nsome of the most celebrated sophists of the day, he became himself \na speech-writer and professor of rhetoric ; his weakly constitution \nand natural timidity preventing him from taking a part in public \nlife. He made away with himself in 338, after the fatal battle \nof Chaeronea, in despair, it is said, of his country\'s fate. He \ntook great pains with his compositions, and is reported to have \nspent ten, or, according to others, fifteen years over his Panegyric \noration. \n\nIs^us flourished between the end of the Peloponnesian war aud \nthe accession of Philip of Macedon. He opened a school of \nrhetoric at Athens, and is said to have numbered Demosthenes \namong his pupils. The orations of Isseus were exclusively judicial, \nand the whole of the eleven which have come down to us turn on \nthe subject of inheritances. \n\niEscmNES was born in the year 389, and he was at first a violent \nanti-Macedonian ; but after his embassy along with Demosthenes \nand others to Philip\'s court, he was the constant advocate of \npeace. Demosthenes and iEschines now became the leading \nspeakers on their respective sides, and the heat of political \nanimosity soon degenerated into personal hatred. In 343 Demo- \nsthenes charged iEschines with having received bribes from Philip \nduring a second embassy; and the speech in which he brought \nforward this accusation was answered in another by iEschines. \nThe result of this charge is unknown, but it seems to have \ndetracted from the popularity of iEschines. We have already \nadverted to his impeachment of Ctesiphon, and the celebrated reply \nof Demosthenes in his speech de Corona (p. 202). After the \nbanishment of iEschines on this occasion (b.c. 330), he employed \nhimself in teaching rhetoric at Ehodes. He died in Samos in 314. \nAs an orator he was second only to Demosthenes. \n\nOf the life of his great rival, Demosthenes, we have already \ngiven some account (p. 178). The verdict of his contemporaries, \nratified by posterity, has pronounced Demosthenes the greatest \norator that ever lived. The principal element of his success must \nbe traced in his purity of purpose, which gave to his arguments all \nthe force of conscientious conviction. The effect of his speeches \nwas still further heightened by a wonderful and almost magic \nforce of diction. The grace and vivacity of his delivery are attested \nby the well-known anecdote of iEschines, when he read at Ehodes \n\n\n\n236 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXII \n\n\n\nhis speech against Ctesiphon. His audience having expressed their \nsurprise that he should have been defeated after such an oration : \n"You would cease to wonder," he remarked, "if you had heard \nDemosthenes." \n\nThe remaining three Attic orators, viz. Lycurgus, Hyperides, \nand Dinarchus, were contemporaries of Demosthenes. Lyeurgus \nand Hyperides both belonged to the anti-Macedonian party, and \nwere warm supporters of the policy of Demosthenes, pinarchus, \nwho is the least important of the Attic orators, survived Demo- \nsthenes, and was a friend of Demetrius Phalereus. \n\nThe history of Greek Philosophy, like that of Greek poetry and \nhistory, began in Asia Minor. The earliest philosopher of dis- \ntinction was Thales of Miletus, who was born about b.c. 640, and \ndied in 550, at the age of 90. He was the founder of the Ionic \nschool of philosophy, and to him were traced the first beginnings of \ngeometry and astronomy. The main doctrine of his philosophical \nsystem was, that water, or fluid substance, was the single original \nelement from which everything came and into which everything \nreturned. Anaximander, the successor of Thales in the Ionic \nschool, lived from B.C. 610 to 547. He was distinguished for his \nknowledge of astronomy and geography, and is said to have been \nthe first to introduce the use of the sun-dial into Greece. Anaxi- \nmenes, the third in the series of the Ionian philosophers, lived a \nlittle later than Anaximander. He endeavoured, like Thales, to \nderive the origin of all material things from a single element ; and, \naccording to his theory, air was the source of life. \n\nA new path was struck out by Anaxagoras of Clazomense, the \nmost illustrious of the Ionic philosophers. He came to Athens in \n480 b.c, where he continued to teach for thirty years, numbering \namong his hearers Pericles, Socrates, and Euripides. He abandoned \nthe system of his predecessors, and, instead of regarding some \nelementary form of matter as the origin of all things, he conceived \na supreme mind or intelligence, distinct from the visible world, to \nhave imparted form and order to the chaos of nature. These \ninnovations afforded the Athenians a pretext for indicting Anaxa- \ngoras of impiety, though it is probable that his connexion with \nPericles was the real cause of that proceeding (see p. 80). It was \nonly through the influence, and eloquence of Pericles that he was \nnot put to death ; but he was sentenced to pay a fine of five talents \nand quit Athens. The philosopher retired to Lampsacus, where he \ndied at the age of 72. \n\nThe second school of Greek philosophy was the Eleatic, which \nderived its name from Elea or Yelia, a Greek colony on the \nwestern coast of Southern Italy. It was founded by Xeno- \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\nPYTHAGORAS \xe2\x80\x94 PLATO. \n\n\n\n237 \n\n\n\nphanes of Colophon, who fled to Elea on the conquest of his \nnative land by the Persians. He conceived the whole of nature to \nbe God. \n\nThe third school of philosophy was the Pythagorean, founded by \nPythagoras. He was a native of Samos, and was born about B.C. \n580. His father was an opulent merchant, and Pythagoras himself \ntravelled extensively in the East. He believed in the transmigra- \ntion of souls ; and later writers relate that Pythagoras asserted that \nhis own soul had formerly dwelt in the body of the Trojan Euphor- \nbus, the son of Panthous, who was slain by Menelaus, and that \niu proof of his assertion he took down, at first sight, the shield \nof Euphorbus from the temple of Hera (Juno) at Argos, where \nit had been dedicated by Menelaus. Pythagoras was distinguished \nby his knowledge of geometry and arithmetic ; and it was probably \nfrom his teaching that the Pythagoreans were led to regard \nnumbers in some mysterious manner as the basis and essence of all \nthings. He was however more of the religious teacher than of the \nphilosopher ; and he looked upon himself as a being destined by \nthe gods to reveal to his disciples a new and a purer mode of life. \nHe founded at Croton in Italy a kind of religious brotherhood, the \nmembers of which were bound together by peculiar rites and \nobservances. Everything done and taught in the fraternity was \nkept a profound secret from all without its pale. It appears that \nthe members had some private signs, like Freemasons, by which \nthey could recognise each other, even if they had never met before. \nHis doctrines spread rapidly over Magna Grsecia, and clubs of a \nsimilar character were established at Sybaris, Metapontum, Taren- \ntum, and other cities. \n\nAt Athens a new direction was given to the study of philosophy \nby Socrates, of whom an account has been already given (pp. 138- \n140). To his teaching either directly or indirectly may be traced \nthe origin of the four principal Grecian schools : the Academicians, \nestablished by Plato ; the Peripatetics, founded by his pupil Ari- \nstotle ; the Epicureans, so named from their master Epicurus ; and \nthe Stoics, founded by Zeno. \n\nPlato was born at Athens in 429 B.C., the year in which Pericles \ndied. His first literary attempts were in poetry; but his atten- \ntion was soon turned to philosophy by the teaching of Socrates, \nwhose lectures he began to frequent at about the age of twenty. \nFrom that time till the death of Socrates he appears to have \nlived in the closest intimacy with that philosopher. After that \nevent Plato withdrew to Megara, and subsequently undertook \nsome extensive travels, in the course of which he visited Cyrene, \nEgypt, Sicily, and Magna Grsecia. His intercourse with the elder \n\n\n\n238 \n\n\n\nHISTORY OF GREECE. \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\nand the younger Dionysius at Syracuse has been already related \n(p. 172). His absence from Athens lasted about twelve years; \non his return, being then upwards of forty, he began to teach in \nthe gymnasium of the Academy. His doctrines were too recondite \nfor the popular ear, and his lectures were not very numerously \nattended. But he had a narrower circle of devoted admirers and \ndisciples, consisting of about twenty-eight persons, who met in his \nprivate house; over the vestibule of which was inscribed \xe2\x80\x94 "Let \nno one enter who is ignorant of geometry." The most distin- \nguished of this little band of auditors were Speusippus, his nephew \nand successor, and Aristotle. He died in 347, at the age of 81 or \n82, and bequeathed his garden to his school. \n\nAristotle was born in 384 B.C., at Staglra, a seaport town \nof Chalcidice, whence he is frequently called the Stagirite. At the \nage of 17, Aristotle, who had then lost both father and mother, \nrepaired to Athens. Plato considered him his best scholar, and \ncalled him "the intellect of his school." Aristotle spent twenty \nyears at Athens, during the last ten of which he established \na school of his own. In 342 he accepted the invitation of Philip of \nMacedon to undertake the instruction of his son Alexander. In \n335, after Alexander had ascended the throne, Aristotle quitted \nMacedonia, to which he never returned. He again took up Ins \nabode at Athens, where the Athenians assigned him the gymnasium \ncalled the Lyceum; and from his habit of delivering his lectures \nwhilst walking up and down in the shady walks of this place, his \nschool was called the peripatetic. In the morning he lectured \nonly to a select class of pupils, called esoteric. His afternoon \nlectures were delivered to a wider circle, and were therefore called \nexoteric. It was during the thirteen years in which he presided \nover the Lyceum that he composed the greater part of his works, \nand prosecuted his researches in natural history, in which he was \nmost liberally assisted by the munificence of Alexander. The \nlatter portion of Aristotle\'s life was unfortunate. He appears to \nhave lost from some unknown cause the friendship of Alexander ; \nand, after the death of that monarch, the disturbances whicli \nensued in Greece proved unfavourable to his peace and security. \nBeing threatened with a prosecution for impiety, he escaped from \nAthens and retired to Chalcis ; but he was condemned to death in \nhis absence, and deprived of all the rights and honours which \nhe had previously enjoyed. He died at Chalcis in 322, in the 63rd \nyear of his age. \n\nOf all the philosophical systems of antiquity, that of Aristotle \nwas best adapted to the practical wants of mankind. It was \nfounded on a close and accurate observation of human nature \n\n\n\nChap. XXII. \n\n\n\nARISTOTLE \xe2\x80\x94 EPICURUS \xe2\x80\x94 ZENO. \n\n\n\n239 \n\n\n\nand of the external world ; but whilst it sought the practical \nand useful, it did not neglect the beautiful and noble. His \nworks consisted of treatises on natural, moral, and political philo- \nsophy, history, rhetoric, criticism, &c. ; indeed there is scarcely a \nbranch of knowledge which his vast and comprehensive genius did \nnot embrace. \n\nEpicurus was born at Samos in 342, and settled at Athens at \nabout the age of 35. Here he purchased a garden, where he \nestablished his philosophical school. He taught that pleasure \nis the highest good; a tenet, however, which he explained and \ndignified by showing that it was mental pleasure that he intended. \nThe ideas of atheism and sensual degradation with which the name \nof Epicurus has been so frequently coupled are founded on igno- \nrance of his real teaching. But as he denied the immortality of \nthe soul, and the interference of the gods in human affairs, \xe2\x80\x94 though \nhe held their existence, \xe2\x80\x94 his tenets were very liable to be abused \nby those who had not sufficient elevation of mind to love virtue for \nits own sake. \n\nZeno was a native of Citium in the island of Cyprus, and settled \nat Athens about b.c. 299. Here he opened a school in the Poacile \nStoa, or painted porch, whence the name of his sect. He inculcated \ntemperance and self-denial, and his practice was in accordance with \nhis precepts. \n\n\n\n\nAPIZT" \n\n\n\nAristotle \n\n\n\n\' 240 \n\n\n\nINDEX. \n\n\n\nABEOCOMAS. \n\nA. \n\nAbrocomas, 144. \nAcademy, the, 96, 23Z. \nAcarnania, 2. \nAcha?ans, 5. \nAchaean league, 214. \nAchaeus, 5. \nAchaia, 3, 18. \n, a Soman province, \n\n221. \nAcharnse, ico. \nAchelous, 2. \nAchilles.. 7. \nAchradina, 122. \nAcropolis, Athenian, 85, \n\n89. \n\nAdimantus. 03. \nAdrnetus, 73. \nAeetes. 7. \n\njEgaleos, Mt., Xerxes at, \n\n64. \nJEgeus, 6. \n\n^Egina described, 55. \n^Egospotami, battle of, 133. \niEgyptus, 5. \niEolians, 5. \niEolns, 4. \n\niEschines accuses Demo- \nsthenes. 232; retires to \nRhodes, ib. ; account of \nhis life, 23$. \n\nJEschvlus, account of, 23 r. \n\nJEtolia, 2. \n\n.Etolians reduced, 219. \n\nAgamemnon, 5, 7. \n\nAgesilaus becomes king j \nof Sparta, 149 : charac- \nter. \\b. ; his expedition 1 \nagainst the Persians. \n151; attacks Ph:>roaba- j \nzns, ib. ; routs the Per- \nsians on the Pactolus, \n152 ; recalled, ib. ; home- \nward march, 154; in- \nvades Boeotia, 163 ; saves : \nSparta. 167 ; expedition j \nto Egypt, 170; death, ib. ; \n\nAeesipolis, 153 ; death, 459. \' \n\nAgis, IX}, 149- \n\nIV., 215. \n\n\n\nALEXANDER. \n\nAgnon, 79. \nAgora, 9. \n\n, Athenian, 96. \n\nAgagentum, 42. \nAleaeus, 225. \n\nAlcibiades, character of, \n112 : deceives the Spar- \ntan ambassadors, ib. ; at \nOlympia, 113 ; in Sicily, \n114; accused of mutilat- \ning the Hernia?, 115 ; ar- \nrest and escape of, ib. ; \ncondemned, ib. ; goes to \nSparta, 116: excites a re- \nvolt of the Chians, 123 ; \ndismissed by the Spar- \ntans, 124; flies to Tissa- j \nphernes, ib. ; intrigues \nof, ib. ; proceedings at \nSamos, 126; arrested by \nTissaphemes, 127 ; de- \nfeats the Peloponnesians , \nat Cyzicus, ib. ; returns j \nto Athens, 128: dis- j \nmissed from the com- | \nmand of the Athenian \\ \nfleet, 1 30; flies to Phar- j \nnabazus, murdered, 136. j \n\nAlcmasonidaB banished, 31. \n\nAlcman, 224. \n\nAlexander of Pbera?. i63 ; \ndefeated by Pelopidas, \n169 ; subdued, ib. \n\nAlexander the Great, 182 ; \neducation, i3;: acces- \nsion, ib. ; overawes the \nThebans and Athenians, \n184; generalissimo a- \ngainst Persia, ib. ; inter- \nview with Diogenes, 10. ; \nexpedition against the \nThracians, &rc, ib. ; re- \nduces the Thebans to \nobedience, 185; demands \nthe Athenian orators, \nib. ; crosses to Asia, \n186 ; forces the passage \nof the Granicus, 187 ; \nprogress through Asia \nElinor,?\'?).; cuts the Gor- \ndian knot, 188: danger- \nous illness, ib. ; defeats \n\n\n\nAMYKTAS. \n\nthe Persians at Issus. \n189 ; march through \nPhoenicia, 190; besieges \nTyre, 191 ; answer to \nParmenio, proceeds \nto Egypt, ib. ; visits the \ntemple of Amnion, 192 ; \ndefeats Darius in the \nbattle of Arbela, 193 ; \nenters Babylon, ib. : \nseizes Susa, 19*4 ; marches \nto Persepolis, ib. : pur- \nsues Darius, 195; in- \nvades Hyrcania, ib. ; en- \nters Bactria, 196; de- \nfeats the Scythians, ib. ; \nmarries Roxana, ib. ; \nkills Clitus, 197; plot of \nthe pages against his life, \nib. ; crosses the Indus, \nib. ; vanquishes Poms, \nib. ; marches homewards, \n198; peril among the \n]\\Iaili, ib. : arrives at \nthe Indian Ocean, 199 ; \nmarch through Gedro- \nsia, ib. ; marries Statira, \nib. ; quells a mutiny at \nOpis, ib. ; solemnises \nthe festival of Diony- \nsus at Ecbatana, 200; \nhis ambitious projects, \nib. ; death, 201 ; charac- \nter, ib. ; estimate of his \nexploits, ib. ; funeral, \n206. \n\nAlexander, son of Alexan- \nder the Great, 206, 209 \n\nAlexandria Ariorum, 195. \n\nAlexandria in Egypt, \nfounded, 192 ; descrip- \ntion of, ib. \n\nAlpheus, 3. \n\nAmnion, Jove, 192. \n\nAmphipolis, 79, 176. \n\nAmphictyonic council, itf. \norigin and constitution, \n12. \n\nAmphictyons, decree of \nthe, at the end of the \nsacred war, 180. \n\nAmyntas, 160. \n\n\n\nINDEX. \n\n\n\n241 \n\n\n\nANACREON. \n\nAnacreon, 226. \nAnactorium, 44. \nAnaxagoras, 236 ; charged \n\nwith impiety, 80. \nAnaximander, 236. \nAnaximenes, 236. \nAndocides, 234. \nAniceris, 172. \nAntalcidas, peace of, 159. \nAntigonias, Athenian tribe, \n\n210. \n\nAntigonus, 206 ; coalition \nagainst, 209; assumes \nthe title of king, 210; \nslain, 211. \n\nAntigonus Doson, 216. \n\nAntigonus Gonatas, 214. \n\nAntioch, founded by Se- \nleucus, 211. \n\nAntiochus, 130. \n\nAntiochus Soter, 213. \n\nAntiochus III., 219. \n\nAntipater defeats the Spar- \ntans, 202 ; defeated at \nthe Spercheus, 204 ; \noverthrows the allied \nGreeks at Crannon, ib. ; \ndemands the Athenian \norators, 205 ; declared \nregent, 207 ; death, ib. \n\nAntiphon, orator, 234. \n\nAnytus, 140. \n\nApaturia, festival of, 132. \nApollonia, 44. \nAratus, 215. \nArbela, battle of, 193. \nArcadia, 3. \n\nArcadian confederation, \n\n167. \nArchelaus, 175. \nArchias, 161. \n\nArchidamus, 100 ; besieges \nPlatsea, 103. \n\nArchilochus, 224. \n\nArchon, Athenian, 29, 30. \n\nAreopagus reformed by Pe- \nricles, 76 ; hill of, 96. \n\nArginusae, battle of, 131. \n\nArgolis, 3. \n\nArgonauts, 7. \n\nArgos, 3, 5, 18; head of a \nnew confederacy, 1 1 1 . \n\nAriadne, 6. \n\nArieeus, 145. \n\nArion, 225. \n\nAristagoras,48. \n\nAristides, character of, 55 ; \norganizes tbe confede- \nracy of Delos, 71 ; change \nin his views, 72; death, \n74- \n\n\n\nATHENIANS. \nAristodemus of Messenia, \n24- \n\nAristophanes, account of, \n233. \n\nAristomenes of Messenia, \n25. \n\nAristotle, 183 ; account of, \n238. \n\nArsinoe, 212. \n\nArtaphernes, 48, 51. \n\nArtaxerxes, 74, i4i. \n\nArtemisia, her prowess, 64. \n\nArtemisium, battle of, 62. \n\nAsia Minor, Greek colo- \nnies in, 18. \n\nAspasia, 79. \n\nAsty, the, 87. \n\nAthena, 2 ; statue of, 92. \n\nAthenians, divided into \nfour classes, 32; assist \nthe Ionians, 49 ; war \nwith iEgina, 55 ; aban- \ndon Athens, 62 ; con- \nstitution more demo- \ncratic, 72 ; form an alli- \nance with Argos, 76; \nassist Inarus, 77 ; con- \nquer Boeotia, ib. ; reduce \niEgina, ib. ; lose their \npower in Bceotia, ib. ; \ndespotic power of, ib. ; \nmake peace with Persia, \nib. ; conclude a thirty \nyears\' truce with Sparta, \n78 ; subjugate Samos, \n81 ; form an alliance with \nCorcyra, ib. ; their allies \nand resources in the Pe- \nloponnesian war, 99 ; \ntheir fleet annoys the \nPeloponnesus, 100 ; their \ndecree against the Myti- \nleneans, 104 ; take Pylus, \n106; expedition against \nBceotia, 1 08 ; peace of Ni- \ncias, 110; refuse to eva- \ncuate Pylus, in ; treaty \nwith Argos, 112 ; con- \nquer Melos, 113 ; mas- \nsacre the inhabitants, \nib. ; interfere in Sicilian \naffairs, 114; expedition \nto Sicily, 115 ; send a \nfresh fleet to Sicily, 119 ; \ndefeated at sea by the \nSyracusans, 121 ; retreat \nfrom Syracuse, ib. \xe2\x80\xa2 gain \na naval victory at Cy- \nnossema, 127 ; at Aby- \ndus, ib. ; at Cyzicus, 1 28 ; \ntotally defeated at iEgos- \n\n\n\nBOULE. \n\npotami, 133 ; ally them- \nselves with Thebes, 153 ; \nform a league with Co- \nrinth and Argos against \nSparta, ib. ; head of a new \nconfederacy, 162 ; declare \nwar against Sparta, ib. ; \npeace with Sparta, 164 ; \nform an alliance with \nthe Peloponnesian states, \n167 ; send an embassy \nto Persia, 168; deceived \nby Philip, 176; send a \nfleet to relieve Byzan- \ntium, 181 ; their alarm \nat the approach of Philip, \nib. ; prostrated by the \nbattle of Chasronea, ib. \n\nAthens, its origin, 5, 6; \nearly constitution of, 29 ; \ntaken by the Persians, \n63 ; second occupation \nof, by the Persians, 67 ; \nrebuilding of, 69 ; inci- \npient decline of, 77 ; \ncrowded state of, during \nthe Peloponnesian war, \n100 ; plague at, 101 ; \ninvested by the Pelo- \nponnesians, 134 ; sur- \nrender of, ib. ; demo- \ncracy restored at, 138; \ndescription of the city, \n85; origin of its name, \n86; rebuilt, 87; walls, \nib. ; harbours, 88 ; \nstreets, &c, ib . ; long \nwalls rebuilt, 157; cap- \ntured by Demetrius, 211. \n\nAthos, Mount, canal at, 57. \n\nAttic tribes, four, 29 ; in- \ncreased to ten, 36. \n\nAttica, 2 ; early history of, \n28 ; three factions in, 31. \n\n\n\nB. \n\nBabylon submits to Alex \n\nander, 194. \nBarbarian, meaning of the \n\nterm, 11. \nBarca, 44. \n\nBelus, temple of, 193. \nBessus, 195 ; put to death, \n196. \n\nBceotarchs restored, 162. \nBceotia, description of, 2. \nBosporus, Athenian toll at \n\nthe, 128. \nBoule, 9. \n\nK \n\n\n\n242 \n\n\n\nINDEX. \n\n\n\nBRASIDAS. \n\nBrasidas, 109 ; his expe- \ndition into Thrace, ib. ; \ndeath, no. \n\nBrennus, 214. \n\nBucephala, fonnded by \nAlexander. 198. \n\nByzantines, erect a statue \nin honour of Athens, 181. \n\nByzantium, 44 ; taken by \nthe Athenians, 70; be- \nsieged by Philip, 181. \n\n\n\nc. \n\nCadmea, or Theban citadel, \nseized by the Spartans, \n160; recovered, 162. \n\nCadmus, 5. \n\nCallias, peace of, 164. \n\nCaliicrates, 220. \n\nCallicratidas, 130. \n\nCallippus, 173. \n\nCallixenus, 132. \n\nCambunian mountains, 1. \n\nCambyses, 46. \n\nCarduchi, 147. \n\nCaryatides, 94. \n\nCarthaginians invade Si- \ncily, 66, 171. \n\nCaspian gates, 195. \n\nCassander, 208 ; establishes \nan oligarchy at Athens, \nib. ; takes "Pydna, ib. ; \nkills Eoxana and her son, \n209. \n\nCatana, surprised by the \n\nAthenians, 115. \nCecropidas, 36. \nCecrops, 5. \n\nCelts invade Macedonia, \n213. \n\nCephissus, the, 86. \n\nCeramicus, the, 96. \n\nChabrias, 162. \n\nChaerephon, 139. \n\nChferonea, second battle \nof, i3i. \n\nChalybes, the, 148. \n\nCharon of Thebes, 161. \n\nChryselephantine statu- \nary, 92. \n\nCimon, son of Miltiades, \n72 ; assists the Lacedae- \nmonians, 75 ; banished, \n76; his sentence revoked, \n77; expedition to Cy- \nprus and death, ib. ; his \npatronage of art, 88. \n\nCirrhaean plain, 14. \n\nClearchus, 142, 145. \n\n\n\nCRETE. \n\nCleombrotus invades Boe- \notia, 165 ; slain, ib. \n\nCleomenes, 36, 37. \n\nCleon, 101 : character of, \n104 ; his violence, 107 ; \nhis expedition against \nSphacteria, ib. ; to \nThrace, 109 ; flight and \ndeath, no. \n\nCleophon, 128. \n\nCierueM, 38, 79. \n\nClisthenes, 35 ; his re- \nforms, 36 ; their effect, 38. \n\nClitus, saves Alexander\'s \nlife, 187; killed by Alex- \nander, 197. \n\nCodras, death of, 29. \n\nColchians, the, 148. \n\nColonies, G-reek, 39 ; rela- \ntion to the mother coun- \ntry, ib. ; how founded, \nib. ; mostly democratic, \nib. ; in Asia Minor, 40 ; \nin Sicily, 42 ; in Italy, \nib. ; in Gaul and Spain, \n44 ; in Africa, ib. ; in \nthe Ionian Sea, ib. ; in \nMacedonia and Thrace, \nib. ; progress of, 79. \n\nComedy, old Attic, 233 ; \nnew, 234- \n\nConon, supersedes Alcibi- \nades, 130 ; defeated by \nCallicratidas, 131; ac- \ncepts the command of \nthe Persian fleet, 150; \ndefeats the Spartan fleet \nat Cnidus, 1 54 ; reduces \nthe Spartan colonies, \n157 ; rebuilds the long- \nwalls of Athens, ib. \n\nCorcyra, 44; troubles in, \n105. \n\nCoreyraeans, quarrel with \nCorinth, 8r ; send an em- \nbassy to Athens, ib. \n\nCorinth, battle of, 154; \ncongress at, 184 ; de- \nstroyed by Mummius, \n221. \n\nCorinthian gulf, 2. \n. Corinthian war, 153. \nCorinthians assist the Epi- \n\ndamnians, 81. \nCoronea, battle of, 154. \nCorupedion, battle of, 213. \nCranai, 86. \n\nCrannon, battle of, 204. \nCraterus, 200. \nCratinus, 233. \nCrete, 3. \n\n\n\nDEMETRIUS. \n\nCrimesus, battle of, 174. \nCritias, 135; slain, 1 ? 7. \nCrito, 140. \nCritolaus, 221. \nCroesus, 45 ; fall of, 46. \nCroton, 42. \nCumae, 41. \nCyclades, 3. \n\nCylon, conspiracy of, 30. \nCynoscephalae, battle of, \n\n169. \nCyrene, 44. \n\nCyrus, empire of, 46 ; cap- \ntures Sardis, ib. \n\nCyrus the younger, arrives \non the coast, 129; his \nexpedition against his \nbrother Artaxerxes, 141 ; \nmarch, 142 ; slain, 145. \n\nCyzicus, 127 ; recovered by \nthe Athenians, 128. \' \n\n\n\nD. \n\nDanae, 5. \nDan\'ai, 5. \nDanaus, 5. \n\nDarius, 47 ; Thracian ex- \npedition of, ib. ; extorts \nthe submission of the \nMacedonians, 43 ; death, \n56. \n\nDarius Codomanus, de- \nfeated by Alexander at \nIssus, 189; overthrown \nby Alexander at Arbela, \n193 ; murdered, 195. \n\nDatis, 51. \n\nDecarchies, Spartan, 149. \nDecelea, 119. \n\nDelium, Athenian expedi- \ntion against, 109; battle \nof, ib. \n\nDelos, confederacy of, 71. \nDelphi, temple of, 12; \n\noracle, 15 ; taken by the \n\nPhocians, 177. \nDemades, 205. \nDemaratus, 60. \nDemetrias, Athenian tribe, \n\n210. \n\nDemetrius of Phalerus, \n208 ; character of, 209 : \nretires to Thebes, 2ro. \n\nDemetrius Poliorcetes, 209; \nbesieges Salamis, 210; \nbesieges Rhodes, ib. ; \ntakes Athens, 211 ; king \nof Macedon, ib. ; death, \n212 \n\n\n\nINDEX. * \n\n\n\n243 \n\n\n\nDEMIURGI. \nDemiurgi, 7. \n\nDemosthenes, general, 105, \n108. \n\nDemosthenes, orator, ac- \ncount of, 178 ; Philippics, \nfirst, 179; Olynthiacs, \nib. ; fights at Chaaronea, \n181 ; his conduct after \nPhilip\'s death, 184 ; pro- \nposes religious honours \nfor Philip\'s assassin, \nib. ; exertions to rouse \nGreece, 185 ; embassy to \nAlexander, ib. ; accused \nby iEschines\xe2\x80\x94 speech on \nthe Crown, 202 ; con- \ndemned of corruption, \n203 ; recalled from exile, \n204; demanded by An- \ntipater, 205 ; escapes to \nCalaurea, ib. ; death, ib. ; \ncharacter as an orator, \n235- \n\nDercyllidas, 150. \n\nDiacrii, 31. \n\nDiasus, 221. \n\nDicasteries, 76. \n\nDinarchus, 236. \n\nDiogenes, his interview \nwith Alexander, 184. \n\nDion, exiled, 172; takes \nSyracuse, ib. ; assassin- \nated, 173. \n\nDionysius the elder, tyrant \nof Syracuse, 171 ; death \nand character, 172. \n\nDionysius the younger, \n172; expelled by Dion, \nib. ; retires to Corinth, \n174. \n\nDionysus, theatre of, at \n\nAthens, 95. \nDiopithes, 180. \nDithyramb, invention of \n\nthe, 22 5 ; the source of \n\ntragedy, ib. \nDorcis, 71. \n\nDorians, 5 ; in Pelopon- \nnesus, 17 ; migrations of \nthe, ib. ; three tribes of, \n20. \n\nDoris, 2. \n\nDorus, 4. \n\nDraco, laws of, 30. \nE. \n\nEcclesia, the, 37. \n\n-^gypt> its influence on \n\nGreece, 5. \nElis, 3. \n\n\n\nGORDIAN. \n\nEpaminondas, 161 ; his \ncharacter, 163 ; embassy \nto Sparta, 164 ; military \ngenius of, 165; defeats \nthe Spartans at Leuctra, \n\n166 ; invades Laconia, \n\n167 ; establishes the Ar- \ncadian confederation, and \nrestores the Messenians, \n167-8 ; saves the Theban \narmy, 169; rescues Pe- \nlopidas, ib.; last inva- \nsion of Peloponnesus, \n1 70 ; death of, ib. \n\nEphesus, 41. \n\nEphialtes, 60. \n\nEphialtes (the friend of \nPericles), 76. \n\nEphors, 21; power of the, ib. \n\nEpicurean sect, 237. \n\nEpicurus, 239. \n\nEpidamnus, 44, 81. \n\nEpimenides, 31. \n\nEpipolaa, 117. \n\nEpirus, 2. \n\nErechtheum, 93. \n\nEubosa, 3 ; revolt from \nAthens, 78 ; second re- \nvolt of, 126. \n\nEuclides, archon, 138. \n\nEumenes, 206. \n\nEumenides ofiEschylus,76. \n\nEumolpidae, 115. \n\nJSupatridce, 7 ; nature of \ntheir government, 30. \n\nEuphrates, surveyed by \norder of Alexander, 200. \n\nEuripides, account of, 233 ; \ncharacter as a poet, ib. \n\nEurybiades, 59. \n\nEurotas, 3. \n\nEurystheus, 6. \n\nEvagoras, 151. \n\nF. \n\nFlaminius, T. Q., 219. \n\n\' Four Hundred,\' conspi- \nracy of the, 125; put \ndown, 127. \n\n\n\nG. \n\nGalaiia, 214. \n\nGaugamela, battle of (v. \n\nArbela). \nGelon of Syracuse, 58, 66. \nGeomori, 7, 29. \nGevusia, Spartan, 21. \nGordian knot, the, 188. \n\n\n\nHIPPARCHUS. \n\nGranTcus, battle of the, \n187. \n\nGreece, form of, 1 ; physi- \ncal features, 3 ; reduced \nto a Koman province, \n221. \n\nGreek language, 1 1 ; his- \ntory, early, ib. \n\nGreeks, character of the, \n3 ; causes which united \nthem, 11 ; disunion of, \non the approach of \nXerxes, 58 ; celebrate \nthe battle of Salamis, \n64; expedition of the \nTen Thousand, 142 ; re- \ntreat of, 147; arrive at \nthe Euxine, 148 ; at By- \nzantium, ib. \n\nGylippus arrives in Sicily, \n118 ; captures the fort of \nLabdalum, ib. \n\n\n\nH. \n\nHamilcar, 66. \nHannibal, 218. \nHarmodius and Aristogi- \n\nton, conspiracy of, 35, \nHarmosts, Spartan, 149, \nHarpagus, 46. \nHarpalus, 202. \nHecataeus, 49. \nHelen, 7. \nHeliaea, 37. \nHellanodicoa, 13 \nHellas, 2. \nHellen, 4. \nHellenes, 2. \nHellenotamiae, 71. \nHellespont, bridge over \n\nthe, 57. \nHelots, condition of, 20 \n\nrevolt of, 75. \nHephaestion, marries Dry- \n\npetis, 199 ; death, 200. \nHeraclidse, return of the, \n\n17. \n\nHercules, 6. \n\nHerman, mutilated, 114. \nHermolaus, 197. \nHerodotus, 227 ; account of \n\nhis work, ib. \nHeroes, 6. \n\nHeroic age, 9 ; manners \n\nof, ib. \nHesiod, 222. \nHiero of Syracuse, 226. \nHipparchus, assassinated, \n\n35- \n\nR 2 \n\n\n\n244 \n\n\n\nINDEX \n\n\n\nHIPPIAS. \n\nHippias, 35 : expelled from \n\nAthens, 36. \nHistia?us of Miletus, 48 ; \n\ncrucified, 50. \n\n\xe2\x80\xa2 - rise of, 22". \nHomer, 222 ; his identity, \n\n223; date, ib. \nHomeric poems, their va- \n\nx .ue, 9 ; preservation of, \n\n223 ; arranged by Pisis- \n\ntratus, ib. \nHyperides, 203, 236. \nHyphasis, the, 198. \n\n\n\nIlissus, 85. \nIon, 5. \n\nIonia, subjugated by the \nPersians, 51. \n\nIonians, 5 ; four tribes 0?, \n29 ; revolt of the, 49 ; de- \nfection from Sparta, 71. \n\nIonic migration, 18. \n\nIophon, 232. \n\nIphitus, 13. \n\nIpMcrates, tactics of, 1 58 ; \n\nsuccesses of, ib. \nIpsus, battle of, 210. \nIra, fortress of, 25. \nIsaus, 235. \nIsagoras, 36. \nEsmenias, t63, 169. \nIsocrates, 235. \nIssus, battle of, 189. \nIsthmian games, 14. \nIthome, Mount, 25, i63. \n\n\n\nJason, 7. \n\nJason of Pheras, 166; as- \nsassinated, 167. \n\nK \n\nKnigbts, Athenian, 32. \nL. \n\nLacedgemonians(i\\ Sparta). \n\nLachares, 211. \n\nLaconia, 3 ; reduced by the \n\nSpartans, 24; northern \n\nfrontier of, 26. \nLade, battle of, 50. \nLamaohus, 1 14. \nLamian war, 204. \nLarnpsacus, t j j. \nLarissa. 14-. \n\n\n\nMARATHON. \n\nLaurium, silver-mines at, \n55- \n\nL^onidas, 59 ; his death, 61. \nLeonnatus, 204. \nLeontiades, 160. \nLeotychides, 63. \nLeosthenes, 203. \nLeucas, 44. \n\nLeuctra. battle of, 165. \n\n\n\nNEODAMODES. \n\nMardonius, 51 ; adroit flat- \ntery of, 65 ; negotiations \nwith the Athenians, 66; \nmarches against Athens, \n67; retreats, ib.; death, \n68. \n\nMassalia, 44. \nMedea, 7. \nMedes, the, 45. \n\n\n\nLiterature, Greek, history Medon, first Athenian ar- \n\n\n\nof, 222. \nLocrians, 2. \nLocris, 2. \n\nLong walls, Athenian, 83 ; \n\nrebuilt, 157. \nLycabettus, 85. \nLyceum, 96. \nLyeon. 140. \n\nLycurgus (legislator), 19. \nLycurgus (orator), 236. \nLydian monarchy, 45. \nLyric poetry, 224 ; occa- \nsions of, ib. ; develop- \nment of, 226. \nLy sander, appointed Xa- \nvarchus, 129; intrusted \nby Cyrus with his sa- \ntrapy, 132 ; his proceed- \nings after the victory of \n^gospotami, 133 ; block- \nades Piraeus, 134; takes \npossession of Athens, \nib. ; establishes the \nThirty Tyrants, 135 \n\n\n\nchon, 29. \nMegabazus, 47, 48. \nMegacles. 32. \n\nMegalopolis founded, 167; \n\nbattle of, 202. \nMegara revolts from \n\nAthens, 78; complains \n\nof Athens, 82. \nMegaris, 2. \nMeicart, 190. \nMeletus, 140. \nMelos, 113. \nMenander, 234. \nMenelaus, 7. \nMenon, 147. \nMessene founded, 168. \nMessenia, 3. \n\nMessenian war, first, 24; \nsecond, 25; third, 75. \n\nMesseiiians conquered by \nthe Spartans, 24; sub- \njugated, 26. \n\nMespila, 147. \n\nMetellus, 221. \n\n\n\ntriumph, ib. ; honours, I Miletus, fall of, 5c. \n137 ; re-enters Athens, \' Miltiades, 52 ; accusation \n13 3 ; his ambitious and death of, 55 \nschemes, 150 ; despatched ; Mindarus, 127. \nto the Hellespont, 151; j Minos, 6. 7. \nexpedition into Bceotia, J Minotaur, 6. \n\n\n\nslain, ib. \nLysias, 255. \n\n. ; :iiUS, 2c6, \n\nslain, 213. \n\n\n\nM. \n\n\n\nMacedonia, description of, \ni-5. \n\nMacedonian empire, parti- \ntion of, 206 ; overthrow, \n\n220. \n\nMacedonians, their origin, \n175- \n\nMacrones, the, 148. \nMagna Gracia, 42. \nMalli. the, 198. \nMantinea, battle of, 113; \n\nthird battle of, 218. \nMarathon, battle of, 53. \n\n\n\nMorea, 2. \nMummius, 221 ; his igno- \nrance of art, ib. \nMunychia, 88. \nMuseum, 86. \nMycale, battle of, 63. \nMycenae, 5 ; ruins of, 10. \nMytilene\', naval engage- \nment at, 131. \nMytileneans, revolt of the, \nI03 ; capitulate, ib. \n\nN. \n\nXaxos, Spartan expedition \n\nagainst, 48. \nXeapolis, 117. \nXearchus, voyage of, 199. \nXemean games, 14. \nXeodani\'xles, 151. \n\n\n\nINDEX. \n\n\n\n245 \n\n\n\nNICvEA; \n\nNicasa, founded by Alex- \nander, 198. \n\nNicias, 107; concludes a \npeace with Sparta, no ; \nappointed commander in \nSicily, 114; his dilatory \nproceedings there, 118; \ndesponding situation of, \n119; indecision, ib. ; \nsurrender, 122 ; death, \nib. ; character, ib. \n\nNike Apteros, temple of, \n88. \n\nNineveh, 147. \nNobles, 9. \n\n0. \n\nGEnophyta, battle of, 77. \n\nOligarchy, 27. \n\nOlympia, 3. \n\nOlympiad, first, 4. \n\nOlympias murdered, 208. \n\nOlympic games, 12. \n\nOlynthiac orations of De- \nmosthenes, 179. \n\nOlynthian confederacy dis- \nsolved, 160. \n\nOlynthus, 159 ; taken by the \nSpartans, 160. \n\nOnomarchus, 178. \n\nOpuntian Locrians, 153. \n\nOrators, Athenian, de- \nmanded by Alexander, \n185 ; ten Attic, 234. \n\nOratory, Greek, rise and \nprogress of, 234. \n\nOrchomenos, 163. \n\nOrtygia, 116. \n\nOstracism, introduced by \n\nClisthenes, 37. \nOxyartes, 196. \n\n\n\nP. \n\nPaches, 103, 104. \nPamisus, river, 3. \nPancratium, 14. \nPangaeus, 177. \nParali, 31. \nParis, 7. \n\nParmenio, 187 ; put to \ndeath by Alexander, \n196. \n\nParnassus, Mount, 2. \nParthenon, 90. \nParysatis, queen, 146, 152. \nPasargadae, 194. \nPaulus, Li. Mm., 220. \nPausanias; king of Sparta, \n\n\n\nPERSIANS. \n\nvanity and treason of, \n71 ; recall and impeach- \nment of, 72; conviction \nand death, ib. \nPausanias (second), 137; \nexpedition into Bceotia, \n153; condemned to death, \nib. \n\nPausanias assassinates Phi- \nlip, 182. \n\nPedieis, 31. \n\nPelasgians, 4. \n\nPelopidas, character of, \n161 ; gains a victory at \nTegyra, 163 ; subdues \nAlexander of Pherae, 168; \nimprisoned by Alexan- \nder, 169; defeats Alexan- \nder, ib. ; slain, ib. \n\nPeloponnesian confede- \nracy, meeting of, 82 ; \ndecides for war against \nAthens, ib. ; war, com- \nmencement of, ib. ; in- \nvasion of Attica, 100; \nThucydides\' character of \nthe war, 228. \n\nPeloponnesus, 2. \n\nPelops, 5. \n\nPeneus, 2. \n\nPenj-ab, the, 197. \n\nPentacosiomedimni, 32. \n\nPentathlum, 14. \n\nPerdiccas, 82. \n\nPerdiccas (Alexander\'s ge- \nneral), 206; marches \nagainst Ptolemy, 207 ; \nassassinated, ib. \n\nPericLes, character of, 76; \ninnovations of, ib. ; his \nadministration, ib. ; re- \nduces Eubcea, 78 ; plans \nfor adorning Athens, ib. ; \npleads for Aspasia, 80; \nfuneral oration by, 100 ; \naccused of peculation, \n1 01 ; death and character, \n102. \n\nPericles, age of, character \nof art in, 88. \n\nPerinthus, siege of, 181. \n\nPericeci, 20. \n\nPeripatetics, 237. \n\nPersepolis, taken and burnt \nby Alexander, 194. \n\nPerseus, 220; defeated by \nthe Romans, ib. \n\nPersians, 46 ; their cruel- \nties towards the Ionic \nGreeks, 50 ; invade \nG reecc, 5 1 ; demand ! \n\n\n\nPHOCIANS. \n\nearth and water from \nthe Grecian states, ib. ; \nsecond invasion of \nGreece, ib. ; land at \nMarathon, 52 ; third in- \nvasion of Greece, 57 ; \ntheir number under Xer- \nxes, ib. ; destruction of \ntheir fleet by a storm, \n61 ; their progress, 62 ; \nattack Delphi, 63 ; take \nAthens, ib. : retreat of, \n66. \n\nPhalanx, Macedonian, 176. \n\nPhalerum, 88. \n\nPhidias accused of pecula- \ntion, 80. \n\nPhilemon, 234. \n\nPhilip of Macedon, carried \nto Thebes as a hostage, \n168; education of, i76; \ncharacter, ib.\\ defeats the \nIllyrians, ib. ; takes Am- \nphipolis and Pydna, ib. ; \ntakes part in the sacred \nwar, 178 ; reduces Thes- \nsaly, ib. ; expedition into \nThrace, 180; takes Olyn- \nthus, 179; occupies Del- \nphi, 180; second expe- \ndition into Thrace, 181 ; \ncompelled to evacuate \nthe Chersonese, ib. ; de- \nfeats the Thebans and \nAthenians at Chaeronea, \nib. ; his conduct after \nthe battle, 182 ; clemency \ntowards Athens, ib. ; ap- \npointed generalissimo \nagainst Persia, ib. ; assas- \nsinated, ib. ; character, ib. \n\nPhilip IV., 211. \n\nPhilip V., 216; assists the \nAchaians, 217 ; forms an \nalliance with Hannibal, \n218 ; defeated by the \nRomans, 219. \n\nPhilip Arrhidagus, 206. \n\nPhilippi founded, 177. \n\nPhilippics of Demosthenes, \n178 ; first, 179. \n\nPhilomelus, 177 ; slain, ib. \n\nPhilopcemen, 218; takes \nSparta, 219 ; taken and \nput to death, 220. \n\nPhilosophy, Greek, origin \nof, 236 ; Ionic school of, \nib. ; Eleatic school, ib. ; \nPythagorean school, 237 \\ \nvarious schools, ib. \n\nPhocians, 177. \n\n\n\n246 \n\n\n\nINDEX. \n\n\n\nPHOCIOX. \n\nPhocion. 1 79 ; refuses Alex- \nander\'s presents, i86; ac- \ncusation and death, 208. \n\nPhocis, 2. \n\nPhaebidas, i6d. \n\nPhoenicians, 5. \n\nPmynichus, 126. \n\nPhrynichns (dramatist), \naccount of, 230. \n\nPhyUidas, 161. \n\nPinacotheca. 93. \n\nPindar, account of, 226 ; \nhis house spared by \nAlexander, 185, \n\nPindus, Mount, 2. \n\nPiraeus fortified, 70. \n\nPisa, 3. \n\nPisander, 152. \n\nPisisiraius, usurpation of, \n3 3 ; his stratagem, 34 ; \ndeath and character, 35. \n\nPlague at Athens, 101. \n\nPlaiiea, battle of, 67 : sur- \nprised, 82; besieged by \nthe Peloponnesians, 103 ; \nsurrenders, ib. ; destroy- \ned, ib.; restored by the \nLacedaemonians, 1 59 ; \nagain destroyed by the \nThebans, 164. \n\nPlataeans join the Athe- \nnians, 52. \n\nPlato visits Sicily, 172; \nsold as a slave, ib. ; \nsecond visit to Sicily, \nib. ; Jife of, 237; phiio- \n\n\n\nPleistt \nPnvx. \n\n\n\n35, 9^- \n\n\n\n239- \n\n\n\nPolv \nPo\'.V \n\n\n\nof Samos, 46. \non, 207 : expe- \ndition to Peloponnesus, \nib. \n\nPorus, 197. \n\nPotidsea, 176. \n\nPratinas, 230. \n\nPropylaea, 90. \n\nPrytanies, 132. \n\nPtolemy, 206 ; defeated at ; \n\nSalamis, 210. \nPtolemy Ceraunus, 212, 213. | \nPtolemy Philadelphus, 212. j \nPydna,*2c8; battle of, 220. 1 \nPylon, ioit 1 \nPyrrhus, 211 ; becomes \n\nking of Macedonia, ib. \nPythagoras, 42, 237. \n\n\n\nPythia, 15. \nPythian games, 14. \n\nB. \n\nRhapsodists, 223. \n\nEhegium, 42. \n\nRhodes, 3 ; siege of, 210. \n\nRomans, direct their atten- \ntion towards Greece, 21 8 ; \ndeclare war against Phi- \nlip V., ib. ; proclaim the \nfreedom of Greece, ib. ; \ndeclare war against Per- \nseus, 220. \n\nRoxana, married by Alex- \nander, 196 ; murdered, \n209. \n\ns. \n\nSacred Band, Theban, 162. \nSacred war, 17-. \nSalamis, acquired by the \nAthenians, 31 : battle of, \n\nSalamis (in Cyprus), battle \nof, 210. \n\nSamos, revolt of, 81 ; sub- \ndued, xb. : its importance \nto Athens, 124; revolu- \ntions at, 126. \n\nSappho, 225. \n\nSardis, 45 ; burnt, 49. \n\nScarphea, battle of, 221. \n\nScione, 109. \n\nScythini, the, 148. \n\nSeieucns, 207 ; founds An- \ntioch, 211; succeeds to \nthe greater part of the \nMacedonian empire, 213 ; \nassassinated, ib. \n\nSellasia, battle of, 216. \n\nSeiymbria, 44. \n\nSestos, reduced by the \nAthenians, 68. \n\nSicilian expedition, 114; \ntermination of, 1 22. \n\nSimonides of Ceos, 226 \n\nSisygambis, 190. \n\nSlaves, 9. \n\nSocial war, 177, ill effects \nof the, ib.; second, 217. \n\nSocrates, at Delium, 109 ; \nopposes the condemna- \ntion of the ten generals, \n132 ; sketch of his life, \n139; his teaching and \nmethod, ib. ; wisdom of, \nib. ; unpopularity and \nindictment of, 140 ; con- \n\n\n\nSPORADES. \n\ndemned, ib.\\ refuses to \nescape, ib. ; death, ib. \nSogdiana, fortress of, taken, \n196. \n\nSolon, 31 ; legislation of, \n\xe2\x80\x9e 32. \n\nSophocles, account of, 232 ; \ncharacter as a poet, ib. \n\nSparta, 1 8 ; landed pro- \nperty in, 23 ; earthquake \nat, 75 ; allies of in the \nPeioponnesian war, 99 ; \nleague against, 1 53 : con- \ngress at, 164; rapid fall \nof, 167 ; taken by Anti- \ngonus I)o son, 216\'; taken \nby Philopoemen, 219. \n\nSpartan constitution, 20 ; \ntribes, ib. ; education, 22 ; \nwomen, 23 ; money, ib. \n\nSpartans, make war on \nArcadia, 24; alone re- \ntain their kings, 2*] ; \noverthrow the despots, \n28 ; conduct of, at Ther- \nmopylae, 6o ; selfish con- \nduct of, 62; dismiss the \nAthenians, 75 ; oppose \nthe Athenians in Boeotia, \n7 7 ; invade Attica, 100 ; \nsend an embassy to \nAthens, ib. : invade Ar- \ngos, 113 ; force the Ar- \ngives to an alliance, ib.; \nestablish themselves at \nDecelea, 119; assist the \nPhocians against the \nThebans, 15?; defeated \nat Haliartus, ib. ; pro- \nclaim the independence \nof the Boeotian cities, \n159; garrison Orchome- \nnus and Thespia?, ib. ; \nassist Aniyntas against \nthe Olynihians, 160 ; \nheight of their power, \nib. ; expelled from Boe- \notia, 164; solicit the aid \nof the Athenians, 168; \nsend an embassy to Per- \nsia, ib. ; excluded from \nthe Amphictyonic coun- \ncil. 180 : attempt to throw \noff the Macedonian yoke, \n202 ; their decline and \ndegradation, 215 ; call in \nthe Romans, 221. \n\nSpeusippus, 238. \n\nSpbacteria, blockaded, 106 ; \ncaptured, ic8. \n\nSporades, 3. \n\n\n\nINDEX. \n\n\n\n247 \n\n\n\nSTATIRA. \n\nStatira, 190, 199 ; mur- \ndered by Roxana, 206. \nStoics, 237. \n\nStrategi, Athenian, 101. \n\nStratoniee, 211. \n\nSusa, treasures at, 194. \n\nSybaris, its luxury, 42 ; \ndestroyed, ib. \n\nSybarites, 79. \n\nSyntaxis, the, 162. \n\nSyracusans, their vigorous \ndefence, 116. \n\nSyracuse, 42 ; descrip- \ntion of, 117 ; naval battle \nat, 118 ; engagement in \nthe Great Harbour of, \n121; constitution of, 171. \n\nSyssitia, 23. \n\n\n\nT. \n\n\'Table Companions,\' the, \n\n145. \nTaenarum, 3. \nTarentum, 43. \nTaygetus, Mount, 3. \nTempe, 2. \n\n"Ten Thousand," expedi- \ntion and retreat of the, \n142. \n\n"Ten Thousand," the Ar- \ncadian, 1 63. \nThais, 194. \n\nThales of Miletus, 236. \n\nThasos, reduced, 75. \n\nThebans, surprise Plataea, \n32 ; expel king Agis \nfrom Aulis, 151 ; invade \nPhocis, 153 ; form an \nalliance with Athens, \nib. ; forced into the \nLacedaemonian alliance, \n160 ; rise of their ascen- \ndency, 166 ; defeated by \nAlexander of Pherae, \n169 ; ally themselves \nwith the Athenians \nagainst Philip, 181 ; \nhumbled by Philip, 182 ; \nrise agai nst the Macedo- \nnians, 185. \n\nThebes, 2 ; liberated from \nthe Spartans, 162 ; de- \nclared head of Greece by \n\n\n\nTISSAPHERNES. \n\nthe Persians, 169 ; de- \nstroyed, 185 ; restored \nby Cassander, 208. \n\nThemistocles, proposes a \nfleet, 55 ; his character, \nib. ; his advice to fight \nat Salamis, 63 ; his stra- \ntagem to bring on an \nengagement, 64; his \nmessage to Xerxes, ib. ; \nrewarded by the Spar- \ntans, 66; his -views, 70; \ngoes ambassador to \nSparta, ib. ; corruption \nof, 73 ; ostracised, ib. ; \nflight, ib. ; reception in \nPersia, 74 ; death, ib. \n\nTheramenes, 126, 132, 135; \nhis death, 136. \n\nThermopylae, 2 ; pass of, \n58 ; battle of, 60. \n\nThespis, 230. \n\nTheseum, the, 83. \n\nTheseus, 28. \n\nThessaly, 2. \n\nThesmothetae, 30. \n\nThessalus, 115. \n\nThetes, 9, 32, 73. \n\nThimbron, 148, 150. \n\nThirty years\' truce, 78. \n\nThirty Tyrants at Athens, \n\n135 ; proscription of the, \n\n1 36 ; defeated by Thra- \nsybulus, 137 ; deposed \nby the Spartans, 138. \n\nThrasybulus, 126; takes \nPhyld, 137 ; seizes Pi- \nraeus, ib. ; defeats the \nThirty, ib. \n\nThrasyllus, 126. \n\nThucydides (the histo- \nrian), in Thrace, 109 ; \nbanished, ib. ; account \nof, 228 ; his history, ib. \n\nThurii, 79. \n\nTimocrates, 152. \n\nTimoleon, character of, \n173 ; expedition to Si- \ncily, ib. ; defeats the \nCarthaginians, 174; be- \ncomes a Syracusan citi- \nzen, ib. \n\nTimotheus, 162. \n\nTiribazus, 158. \n\nTissaphernes, 124, 1 27, 146 ; \n\n\n\nTHE END. \n\n\n\nZETJGIT.E. \n\nattacks the Ionian cities, \n150 ; beheaded, 152. \n\nTithraustes, 152. \n\nTolmides, 78. \n\nTorone, 109. \n\nTragedy, Greek, origin of, \n\n230. \nTrapezus, 148. \nTriparadisus, treaty of, \n\n207. \nTrilogies, 231". \nTrojan expedition, 7. \nTroy captured, 8. \nTyrant, value of the term, \n\n28. \n\nTyre, besieged by Alex- \nander, 191. \nTyrtaeus, 25, 224. \n\nTJ. \n\nUlysses, 7. \nUxians, the, 194. \n\nX. \n\nXanthippus, 55; recovers \nthe Thracian Chersonese, \n68. \n\nXenophanes, 237. \n\nXenophon, account of, 229 ; \nhis works, ib. ; accom- \npanies Cyrus, 142 ; sa- \nluted General of the Ten \nThousand, 147 ; returns \nto Athens, 148 ; joins \nAgesilaus, ib. \n\nXerxes, character of, 56 ; \nsubdues Egypt, ib. ; \nmarches towards Greece, \n57 ; reviews his troops, \nib. ; crosses the Helles- \npont, ib. ; number of his \nhost, ib. ; takes Athens, \n63; his alarm and re- \ntreat, 65. \n\nXuthus, 4. \n\nz. \n\nZaleucus, laws of, 42. \nZea, 88. \nZeno, 239. \nZeugitce, 3 2. \n\n\n\nLONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET, \nAND CHARING CROSS. \n\n\n\nUNIFORM \nFor the \n\n\n\nA SMALLER HISTORY OF ROME. \n\nBY WILLIAM SMITH, LL.D. \n79 Illustrations, fcap. 8to. 3s. 6d. \n\nA SMALLER HISTORY OP ENGLAND. \n\nEDITED BY WILLIAM SMITH, LL.D. \n68 Illustrations, fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6(2. \n\n\n\nr \n\n\n\n\xe2\x96\xa0 \n\n\n\nNH , n^i A M Y .,. l ? F C \xc2\xb0NGRESS4 \n\n\n\n027 584 406 8 \n\n\n\n\n\n'