<^, *'..s* ,0^ •!>* ** ■* ^ > '0 . V ^° ■'*. •• <^^ .. '^^^ ^V . I ' « , f^Q V^ ° " = -» '<^. ^' G^ ^o^ '„ . . * ^ .^' ^ G^ ^o • A. The Underwriters' Bureau of New England 93 WATER STREET, - - BOSTON Gorham Dana, Manager REPORT No. 118 ON THE Chelsea Conflagration OF APRIL 12, 1908 I PRICE 50 CENTS 1 THE UNDERWRITERS' BUREAU OF NEW ENGLAND 9 3 WATER STREET, BOSTON RFPOR'l' No. 118 ON The Chelsea Conflagration of April 1^, 1908 Report b}- Winthrop P. Tenney, Benjamin Richards, John W. Chapman and Gorham Dana Photographs by W. P. Tenney, (t. Dana, J. Dana Plan drawn bv Isabel Worthington Itafeebicta Brcg8 Boston and South Framingham May, 1908 tuBHARY of OONUkESS^ I wo OoplBl riecuivLx: MAY 14 1^08 0UA8ikV4 XXc, No -206 V6/ I COPY 8^ CONTENTS Description of tlie City 4« Character and Occupancy of the Buildings . 5 Fire Department and Water Supphes 7 Causes of the Conflagration 8 Story of the Fire 9 Details of the Chelsea Water Supply 13 Report of the National Board of Fire Underwriters 15 Sprinklered Buildings 16 General Remarks and Data on Other Buildings 18 Insurance Loss 25 Conclusions 28 Recommendations Pertaining to the Rebuilding of Chelsea 30 Copyright, 1908, by the Underwriters' Bureau of New England Fig. 1. General view of conflagration from the northwest, about 11.30 A. M. ^^^^•r^m#.^ The Chelsea Conflagration ON Sunday, April 1^, 1908, Chelsea, Mass., was visited by a conflagration which destroyed approximately one- half the improved area of the City. About thirty-five hundred buildings were burned, covering an area of nearly two hundred and seventy-five acres. Up to the present time, eighteen persons are known to have perished and it is believed that the total loss will prove to be over twenty lives. The monetary loss was some twelve millions of dollars and the insurance loss was a little over nine millions. 3 This report seeks to give an accurate account of the underlying causes that made such a catastrophe possible, to trace the development of the fire from inception to control and to draw conclusions which it is hoped will be of value. Students of fire protection engineering will find in the Chelsefi, fire little of scientific interest but municipal author- ities might profit by the lessons it teaches. Description of the City At the time of the fire, Chelsea was a city of about thirty-eight thousaind inhabitants of which probably one-third were of foreign extraction. It! had the regular city form of government, mayor, aldermen and the various municipal departments. During recent years, many influential citizens of means had moved away and the foreign element of low moral stamina and small earning capacity had steadily increased. Property had decreased in valuation. The city had been loaded down with heavy municipal expenses and tax returns were decreasing. The tax rate had increased. Chelsea had slowly deteri- orated. A policy of the utmost economy was required. The municipal departments most necessary for protection against the danger of con- flagration, the Fire, Building and Water Departments, were handi- capped. Money actually needed for improvements was diverted to other channels. The maintenance and organization of these departments had not kept pace with the growth of the city- All this time, the "rag district" had been increasing rapidly in area, number of buildings and population. Prominent rag dealers from all sections of the country were attracted to Chelsea until at the time of the conflagration it was the rag centre of this part of the coun- try. There were in this "rag district," bounded by the railroad, Arling- ton and Williams Streets, about two hundred rag and junk collectors and dealers. There were probably at least fifty rag shops. Rag and junk collectors and dealers were required to-have licenses but none were required for rag shops. In certain streets, nearly every shed, stable and yard contained rags. Vacant stretches of land were utilized for drying purposes, the rags being spread out all over the ground. Rags were even dried on lines in back yards. It seems as if little serious attempt was made to properly supervise these rag dealers in their pursuit of a livelihood, and by playing the game of politics they did 4 about as they chose. The consequence was that the district was a con- flagration breeder of the worst kind. That these conditions were fully understood by the City officials and department heads it is only neces- sary to quote Mayor Willard's reference to the "rag district" in a report as long ago as January 1, 1907. He said, "When we consider that at any time with a high wind prevailing, a fire might gain such headway as to get beyond control and would destroy property worth many thousands of dollars, we realize that the cost does not enter into it as much as the protection of the property." Chelsea openly acknowledged a deplorable condition of affairs and yet nothing was done to improve it. Character and Occupancy of the Buildings. The "rag district" where the fire obtained its tremendous start was covered with small one to three-story frame buildings and shanties occupied principally as dwellings, stables and sheds, interspersed with two and three-story rag shops, tenements and junk shops. Here and there long rows of brick and frame dwellings extended up into the heart of the city. A large part of the buildings were of the cheapest and flimsiest construction. Approaching the business section, brick buildings predominated and on Broadway, the business centre, the buildings averaged higher and the construction, while better than in the outlying districts, was, on the whole, rather poor. These buildings were mostly two and three stories in height, very few being as high as four stories. Sheds and other frame structures extended close up to the rear of the unprotected Broadway buildings. Brick churches, schools, city buildings and frame synagogues were located throughout the entire area, some with considerable open space about them. This space proved entirely inefl'ective in stopping the progress of the fire. The centre of the city was, as a whole, closely built up and frame buildings predominated. There were no fire resisting buildings throughout the burned area. The nearest approach to this seen was the building occupied by the Chelsea Trust Co. While not in any sense fire resisting, its walls were very nearly blank toward the conflagration and the bricks well laid and bonded. This building received a heavy part of the conflagration and although the interior was completely burned, the walls successfully withstood the flames, doubtless serving to some extent to prevent further progress of the fire to the southeast. Beyond Broadway, on BelHnghani Hill and vicinity, many of the dwellings, which occupied this section almost exclusively, were of an old type of two and one-half-story cottage house. The frame ones had pitch shingle roofs while many of the brick ones had outside accessory woodwork. Probably seventy-five per cent, of this section was of frame construction. On the outskirts of this' part but more widely separated and skirting the water front were several specially hazardous occu- pancies such as oil and varnish works and a lampblack and stain factory. Viewed as a whole, structural conditions in the conflagration area were very poor, the buildings being mostly of wood with many con- cealed spaces, inflammable roofs, boxed cornices and a notable lack of parapet walls and protected w^indows. Fig. 2. The Chelsea Trust Co. building Fire Department and Water Supply The Chelsea Fire Department consisted of twenty-one permanent and fifty-seven call men divided into seven companies. There were three steamers and one chemical engine with hose and the ordinary equipment. All the apparatus responded to a second alarm. There were numerous cities and towns within a radius of ten miles that could give aid in case of a serious fire. There had been numerous fires in the "rag district" and the dangers of the locality were well understood. Soon after the fire was discovered, aid was summoned from Boston, Somerville, Cambridge, Maiden, Melrose, Everett, Wakefield, Quincy, Newton, Revere and Lynn. In all, about thirty engines were in service during the fire. The water supply was quite satisfactory for a city of this size. The normal pressure was about fifty pounds in the business section and the feed mains were of liberal size. There was a fair supply of hydrants, generally four to six hundred feet apart. Some of the newer portions of the "rag district" lacked hydrants but in other por- tions, hydrants were two hundred feet apart. The details of the water supply will be described under a separate headino-. ^ li^^lH HIH^HI 1 HHl . y /I^^H_^ ^ ..^**»S'^ - mj^^m^StomMj^l' : m ^^F ^f^^ k'-'M^'" -w^n^^l Fig. 3. Rag- pile where fire started, in foreground Boston Blacking Co. buildings at left, Hecla Compress Gas Co. on right. Looking east Causes of the Conflagration The ignition of rags and waste in the rear of Second Street near the corner of Carter Street first started the fire. Tliis section of the town at the extreme west was mostly open wet land in process of filling. The usual dumps and numerous rag shops were in evidence. There were great piles of cotton and yarn waste, also woolen rags spread over the ground to dry. In some way unknown, these were ignited, causing a smouldering fire which had probably been burning some time. The wind, which was very high, was unusually severe in this locality owing to the open stretch of flat country extending over the marshes toward Everett. The burning rags were blown against the "McKay" wax shop of the Boston Blacking Co. about two hundred feet distant, and set fire to it. Rags drying in the vacant space east of the Hecla Com- press Gas Co.'s buildings next took fire and ten or fifteen minutes later the fire broke out in a large pile of rags inside Lewitsky's rag yard about nine hundred feet to the southeast of the blacking factory. It was at Lewitsky's and Rosenfield's rag shops adjoining each other on Third, Elm and Maple Streets, that the conflagration really started. The fires in the Boston Blacking Co.'s building and in the vacant space east of the Hecla Compressed Gas Co.'s factory undoubtedly were due to rags or sparks from the original fire but there is some doubt as to whether the fire in Lewitsky's yard and building can be attributed to this cause. Incendiarisni is openly charged and there are too many of these reports to doubt that in part they have some real foundation. The State Police are now investigating the matter. Burning rags may have been blown by the wind to Lewitsky's yard, if so, they must have passed over? an enclosure containing tar paper storage and a two-story frame laundry on INIaple Street. The wind was very severe on this day ; were it not for this fact the fire undoubtedly would have been controlled in its early stages. The maximum velocity of the wind at 9 o'clock was twenty-six miles an hour as recorded by the U. S. Weather Bureau at Boston. This had increased to thirty-six miles as a maximum at 1 o'clock. It is pos- sible that on account of the configuration of the land on each side of Chelsea the severity may have been somewhat greater here, for a wind of twenty-six to thirty-six miles an hour is not extraordinary for this section. These conditions, together with the poor construction and hazardous occupancy of this section of the city were the principal causes for the fire getting beyond control. 8 Story of the Fire The first fire started sometime after 10.30. First alarm was sounded at 10. -15. The lire Department on arriving proceeded lei- sureh' to put a stream on the waste which was burning slowly, for the fire was then not at all serious. In about five minutes they noticed that the side of the Boston Blacking Co.'s building was also on fire and a second alarm was sounded at 10.55. This was more as a precau- tionary measure because of the high wind and the knowledge of the large amount of naphtha and rosin stored inside the yard. The Chief went at once to the Blacking Co.'s buildings and in about ten minutes had the fire well in hand- Some one then came to him with the story that the rags in Lewitsky's yard on the corner of ]Maple and Elm Streets, about nina hundred feet from the Boston Blacking Co.'s build- ings were on fire. He despatched his chemical engine to this new fire. On arriving, the chemical man saw a brisk blaze in these rags, which were heaped up beside the rag shop. He was making progress and just considered that the blaze was practically under control when to his surprise, the fire flashed through the office inside the main building. Understanding the seriousness of this, he sent word to the Chief that this building was on fire inside and without waiting to investigate, the Chief sent a special call to Boston for two steamers. This was received at 11.25. Then rapidly followed telephone calls to Boston and neigh- boring towns for all the help possible. About twenty-five engines responded up to 1 o'clock. ^Meanwhile, driven by the high wind, the fire rapidly spread throughout Lewitsky's and Rosenfield's rag shops, both three-story frame structures, and by the time the first Boston engine arrived, pos- sibly 11.30, was well on its way to Arlington Street. It swept through the small frame buildings in these blocks with extraordinary rapidity passing onward by leaps and bounds, picking out shingle roofs and obtaining a foothold on porches and buildings far ahead. The panic of the inhabitants who sought to remove their furniture and bedding to places of safety also helped in no small degree the spread of the fire. Many loads of furniture took fire in the streets as did that stored on sidewalks and parks. The Chief had requested the Boston engines on arriving to rally on Arlington Street where he hoped that several brick buildings would serve to check the flames. When the engines arrived, the fire had already passed the street in places and was making great strides toward 9 Broadway. It seemed impossible to stay its progress and the engines no sooner got in front of it than their position became untenable. By 12 o'clock it was passing Broadway near the junction of Washington Avenue and here a partial rally was made but nothing was gained and an engine had to be abandoned. By 12.30 it had crossed Broadway in Fig. 4. View across Broadway Sq. about 4 P. M. during- fire many places and frame houses and sheds even as far in advance as Shawmut and Congress Avenues were on fire- It leaped whole blocks, reaching the American Circular Loom Co. at 12A5 and while it had not yet reached Bellingham Hill it was rapidly encircling the Garden Cemetery on both sides. The fire was beyond control. From then on, it was a continual falling back by the fighters on the flanks, to Marl- boro and Sixth Streets, and finally to the railroad gap on the north; and to Third, Congress, Essex and Suffolk Streets on the south. The fire extended so rapidly that many of the buildings in the residential ;section burned without any effort being made to save them. The 10 extreme easterly section was sparsely covered and it was hoped for this reason that the specially hazardous buildings on lower jMarginal Street and Eastern Avenue could be saved. The shower of sparks, pieces of wood, parts of buildings and the contents, all blazing, were carried by the wind far ahead. They settled down on the manufactur- ing plants, oil plants and East Boston buildings setting fire wherever they struck. Six Boston engines and the fire boat fell back on the East Boston shore and succeeded in putting out many roof fires. The Valvoline Oil Works in Chelsea caught about 1 o'clock. This plant contained kerosene oil, naphtha and machine oils ; several explosions took place. The Stickney Tirrell Co. burned about 2 o'clock and the Fig. 5. View in Marginal St. opposite Magee Furnace Co. showing smoke from oil plants 11 Tide Water Oil Co. about 2.30. Soon one of the tanks belonging to the latter company exploded, throwing a shower of burning oil over to the East Boston side of the trolley and railroad bridges and the Metro- politan Sewerage Pumping Station. These immediately took fire. In the meantime, a creosote oil barge near Green's ship yard and the Samuel Cabot Co. factory became ignited. The burning oil passed under the wharf of the Samuel Cabot Co. Works and ignited it but the factory already had caught at the front, about 2 o'clock, from flying embers. Chelsea Creek was now covered with burning oil which was carried by an incoming tide up to the bridges and over to the wharves of the Standard Oil Co. on the East Boston side. The fire boat was hennned in by burning oil but passed through it by directing its streams on the oil and making a passage for itself. The main buildings of the Standard Oil Co. caught from its wharves about 6 p. m. and were totally destroyed. Fig. 6. View from Meridian St. Bridge, looking east, about 6 P. M. 12 Thus in seven hours a stretch of land a mile and a half long and half a mile wide had been completel}'^ burned over. On the whole, the fire seems to have been fairly well fought espec- ially in certain sections. It is not strange that under the stress and excitement of a large conflagration that many mistakes were made. If the entire energies of the department had been transferred to Lewit- sky's rag shop after it was discovered to be on fire the results might have been different, for the Blacking factory was so isolated that the fire there could hardly have menaced the city as a whole. A better trained and better managed department would have undoubtedly pre- vented much damage and might have saved the city in the, early stages of the fire ; but no department could probably have prevented the fire spreading to the water front after it had once attained the proportions of a conflagration. Details of the Chelsea Water Supply Chelsea is in the Metropolitan water district, receiving its water from the same source as does Boston. The city owns and maintains its own mains, the' ^Metropolitan water being delivered into their system througli several connections, some of which are ordinarily kept shut. The system is divided into two levels, a high and a low, the former supplying mostly the residential district in the easterly part of the city. There is a high service reservoir, capacity one million gallons, kept full by automatic valves from a sixteen-inch pipe, supplied by the ]Met- ropolitan twenty-inch main, entering the city by the north. This reser- voir was formerly kept full by pumps located near the centre of the city draugliting from the low service, but this station had not been used for several years and it was destroyed by tlie fire. Pressures on the high service system run from fifteen to seventy-five pounds. The low service district includes about two-thirds of the city- It is supplied directly from the Metropolitan feeders at a pressure averaging about fifty pounds. A forty-two-inch main enters the city from the northwest and connects to the Chelsea mains near the city line and also In Broadway. The first connection Is ordinarily kept closed. The Broadway connection is through a ten-Inch Venturl meter with an extra twenty-inch connection kept shut off. Water also Is available from closed connections in ^Marginal Street and a connection from the twenty-Inch main to Charlestown ; but ordinarily, to equalize the pres- sures, the current of water is from Chelsea into Charlestown. During 13 tlie heavy draught of this fire, however, this current was reversed and C'lielsea was fed also from C'harlestown through the twenty-inch main supphed farther back by twenty-four and thirty-inch pipes. No water is avaihible from East Boston, the current in their mains being ahvays from Chelsea. There are also four connections between the high and low services which are ordinarily kept shut. Early in the fire, as an extra precaution, the Superintendent of the Water Works opened the twelve-inch valve in the connection from the forty-two-inch ^Metropolitan main near the city line on the north- west. This was not long after 11 o'clock. He then opened the sixtecn-inch valve near the reservoir, letting the Metropolitan high service directly into the Chelsea high service. He shut off the reservoir thinking that it might overflow, as normally the Metropolitan high service gives thirty pounds at the reservoir level. The eight-inch valve in Broadway separating the high from the low and also a similar six- inch valve, corner of Crescent Avenue and Washington Avenue were opened. Thus early in the fire, the Chelsea mains were well supplied, the high and low services working together and both backed up by liberal sized Metropolitan mains. The officials of the Metropolitan Board were in touch with the conditions and by 2 o'clock had opened the connection in Broadway letting in the full capacity of the twenty- inch main from Charlestown. The twenty-four-inch connection to the East Boston supplies was also opened. The records of the Metropolitan Water Board show that the pres- sure in their main feeders in Chelsea did not drop more than twenty pounds below normal during the fire. We also find that no steamers in East Boston were in distress for lack of water and East Boston is entirely supplied from Chelsea. Any shortage of water occurring must have been due entirely to the heavy draught placed on the Chelsea pipes. We find a few cases where a steamer was temporarily unable to obtain water and several engineers report that the flexible suctions had to be replaced with stiff ones, the water being taken under a slight lift. Occasionally, steamers raced or were otherwise troubled with air in the suction but these cases are probably due entirely to local condi- tions. Steamers located on the principal streets found the supply ade- quate although the waste must have been large. The Chief Engineer of the Metropolitan Water Board estimates the consumption of water during the fire to be about twenty million gallons. This estimate is based on the pump and meter records. 14 In general, good judgment was shown b}^ those in charge of the water supplies. There was no need of shutting off the reservoir as tlie demand for water was so great that it could not have overflowed hut as this would probably have made no difference in the final result, this error of judgment is noti important. Fig. 7. General view of Beliingham Hill showing ruins of Highland School Report of National Board of Fire Underwriters In November, 1906, the National Board of Fire Underwriters issued a report on the City of Chelsea. This report dealt in detail with the usual features covered by these reports but did not dwell particu- larly on the "rag district" which proved to be so serious a feature. Their recommendations covered improvements in water supplies, fire alarm system, fire department auxiliaries, building ordinances, care of explosives and inflammables, and electrical installations. Under Con- flagration Hazard, the Board suggested : 15 ^^66. That prompt measures be taken to relieve hazard- ous conditions in narrow streets by widening the streets, by enforcing adequate window protection, oi'< by combining both methods. 67. That automatic sprinkler equipments be required in all buildings which, by reason of their size, con- struction or occupancy, singly or combined, might act as conflagration breeders." None' of the reconnnendations had, apparently, been complied with although both the Watc^r Department and Fire Department had asked the City Government for appropriation to carry out certain improve- ments. Sprinklered Buildings There were only two sprinklered plants that were in the direct path of the conflagration and both were practically destroyed. The sprinklered box shop of the WALTON & LOGAN CO. on Spruce Street, corner Beach Street was somewhat scorched on the front side but no sprinklers were opened. TKe exposure was principally from a one-story frame livery stable across the street, about fifty feet distant at nearest point and the wind was such that it carried the heat almost directly away from the box factory. The W. A. SNOW IRON CO. was located on W. Third Street, near Spruce Street, on the westerly edge of the burned district. The main building was two stories, brick about forty-two by one hundred feet, with open joisted floors and roofs. At the rear was a one-story addition about sixteen by forty-two cut off with fair two-inch fire door and used for boiler room. At the rear of the main building were several one-story frame buildings used for forge shop, iron storage, etc. They were two to forty feet from main building and not sprin- klered. There were also several other frame buildings nearb}'. The main building was equipped with Walworth sprinklers, one supply, fed by four-inch connection from six-inch street main. There was a low vacant space under building not sprinklered. There was no watch- man or alarm service. The unsprinklered frame buildings at the rear apparently caught first, thus causing a hot fire which exposed the rear end of the main building. One of the East Boston engines was located on Third Street near this plant and the District Chief stated that the 16 Ruins of Snow Iron Works Plant box cornice caught fire first and that he was unable to get a stream on it on account of the wind and the difiiculty of approaching the rear of the building. The fire worked in from the cornice and burned off the roof timbers, letting the roof fall and carrying the sprinkler piping with it. The roof of the Boiler House' did not fall and some of the joists are not cliarred, which showed that sprinklers were of some eft'ect. The building was practically destroyed although there is some woodwork left that shows the effect of the water from the sprinklers. A frame shed ten feet west and a frame tenement forty feet cast of the building were saved. It would seem that with even a little assist- ance from the Fire Department, this building should have been saved. The insurance on this plant was $23,900. Loss settled for $J23,000. THE AMERICAN CIRCULAR LOOM CO. was located at the corner of Suffolk Street and Highland Avenue on the southeasterly edge of the burned area. The main building was three stories, about ninety by ninety. About one-third was brick with plank and timber floors and roofs, the remainder being wood open joist construction and having a ^Mansard roof with attic. There was also a two-story brick machine shop and storehouse about one hundred and twenty by forty, located thirty-five feet north of main shop. This latter building had no sprinklers. The main building was equipped with Grinnell Glass Disc sprinklers supplied by six-inch pipe from six-inch city main and a ten thousand gallon gravity tank on brick tower, bottom twelve feet above sprinklers. There was an alarm valve and standard watchman's 17 Fig. 9. Ruins of American Circular Loom Plant, from the south. Sprinkler tank was on top of brick tower service. The exposure was light in the rear but across the street on the side from which the conflagration approached, there was a three- story wood tenement block, a three-story wood curry shop and also various wood dwellings and sheds. The curry shop became ignited from sparks before 1 o'clock, much in advance of the main line of fire, and burned rapidly setting fire to the tenement block which in turn ignited the Circular Loom Co. Fire first caught on the sprinkler tank house and wood cornices and worked into main roof. Several em- ployees fought the fire with chemicals and small hose but without effect. Sprinklers opened properly but the tank was quickly drained and city pressure at that time and place was insufficient to supply the upper lines. No hose streams were available and the risk therefore quickly burned. The unsprinklered building burned afterward. The loss is practically total, the only portions standing being the brick elevator tower and the boiler room. Insurance Building and Contents Insurance U. & 0. $169,000. 75,000. The loss on building and contents has been settled as a total loss but, that on U. & O. has not yet been adjusted. 18 THE MAGEE FURNACE CO. This is a large brick and frame foundry plant valued at about a half million of dollars. It is located on ^Marginal Street south of the burned area. The conflagration came within three hundred feet of the property. There is a complete sprin- kler system fed by city water and a fire pump. On the approach of the fire, the shutters on the brick buildings were closed with the assistance of representatives from this Bureau, and the roof kept wet down by streams from the fire pump. The pump was kept running nearly all the afternoon and pres- sure was maintained on sprinkler system. After the fire, we found two of the three six-inch sprinkler supplies from the city water shut off in the street. These were shut off by the order of the Water Works Superintendent, probably between 5 and 6 P. ]M. when the conflagration was still uncontrolled and was threaten- ing the plant. The Superintendent is entirely frank and states that in his judgment his action was proper, he evidently concluding that the plant was going to burn anyway and that he might as well save a waste of water by shutting off the sprinklers beforehand. However absurd such a point of view may appear to well informed fire protec- tion engineers, still in the light of this and other recent experiences, it would appear that, at least for some years, this attitude of thq officials must be taken into account when considering sprinklered risks. This Superintendent is a good water works man and his action can only be explained by pointing out that of late the general tendency of water works officials is toward requiring meters in fire pipes, limit- ing the size of sprinkler connections to four-inch and a general preju- dice against sprinklers as a form of fire protection. B. FEINBERG & SONS' rag shop, located on Fifth Street near Spruce Street was a three-story frame building. This was being equipped with sprinklers but the water supply had not been turned on. This plant was completely destroyed. THE CHELSEA CORDAGE plant at the northwest edge of the fire area consisted o^ a two-story brick building of good mill construc- tion with some frame out buildings. The property had been idle for several years and in October last a fire destroyed part of the frame buildings and damaged the main building. jNIost of the plant was 19 originally equipped with sprinklers but these had not been in commis- sion since the last fire. The fire here is said to have caught late in the day in the frame section and worked back against the wind into the main building. This plant was well isolated and not in the direct path of the conflagration. It might easily have been saved had there been a hose stream there at the right time. It was not insured. THE W. Y. RUSSELL & SON CO. building, close to the rail- road, off Matthews Street, was formerly partially sprinklered but the equipment was not in use. This was completely destroyed. General Remarks and Data on Other Buildings The fire reached conflagration proportions very quickly and as quickly subsided. As the buildings were comparatively low and the wind strong, the hot gases and flame were held close to the ground burning everything in the direct path. For tliis reason, very little of a combustible nature is left. Especially is this true in the mercantile and dwelling section. Twelve hours after the fire started there was scarcely anything left burning in the fire area. Except in a few spec- ial cases, buildings, both brick and frame easily succumbed. In passing- Broadway, the conflagration has been likened to a blow pipe flame, the wind causing this effect by sweeping through the buildings on fire and forcing the flames far in advance. The temperature of the con- flagration wave probably did not reach much above fifteen hundred to two thousand degrees. In the oil works and lamp-black factory this figure was considerably exceeded, bricks in the walls having been fused. There was but little stone work in the district but the granite curb stones were badly spalled on many streets. Only a few buildings directly in the path of the flames escaped. This was probably due to the protection afforded by other buildings, or to chance. Two small buildings on either side of the Snow Iron Works escaped, also a corrugated iron oil house and the wooden pest house at the extreme easterly end of the burned district. SAMUEL CABOT CO.'S lampblack and stain factory furnishes more interesting data than any other building in the district as some effort had been made to protect it against fire. It was completely burned out but practically all the brick walls are standing, showing good construction. Many of the roofs were of hollow tile, supported 20 by steel beams spaced one foot on centre but unprotected. Where there was heavy fire, the roofs fell owing to the collapse of the beams but those buildings, in which there was little combustible material stood up well. There were some fair tin covered shutters on part of the buildings. Some of them were completely destroyed but two which were barred closed, stood the test well, although the wood inside the shutters was practically all destroyed. There was also a one-eighth- inch iron door reinforced with strips at the edges. It was badly warped, one corner being at least two feet out of true. The yard contained many tanks of creosote, benzol and coal tar pitch. All the tanks which had wooden covers soon took fire. Some of the benzol tanks had heavy iron roofs with a man-hole cemented closed. The Fig. 10. Westerly group of tanks at plant of Samuel Cabot Co. ?overs were blown off and the contents burned like a torch. There wass no explosion in any case and the tanks are mostly in good condition. There were a large number of full benzol drums in the yard. The sides of these are bulged and cracked, and the contents burned. Some 21 of the benzol tanks between these drums and two large benzol tanks at the east end of the yard were not burned. Tanks which stood on wharves and bulkheads supported by wooden piles toppled over. Those on concrete and brick piers remained in position. The concrete piers withstood the heat with little damage. Photograph shows the west group of tanks as they appeared after the fire. The numbers cor- respond to the numbers on ground plan and tables. Further data in regard to the tanks is given in the following tables. MARGINAL ST. Entiteuy destroyed Fig. 11. Sketch of Samuel Cabot Co. Plant, showing location of tanks Tanks in Yard of Samuel Cabot Co. WEST GROUP. Cap. bbls. Conts. 1 1600 Creosote 350 350 •240 65 350 Not used 110 630 110 Very large Amt. before fire. 1200 Creosote Benzol Creosote Creosote Benzol Coal tar pitch Coal tar pitch Coal tar pitch Creosote full 110 full full full unknown 3(1 Condition after fire. Contents completely destroyed. Tank melted to within 3 ft. of bottom. 70 bbls. left; tank in good condition. 140 1)bls. left; tank in good condition. Contents completely destroyed. Tank melted around the top. Contents burned; tank on brick piers, one of which gave way. 100 bbls. left. Tank in good condition. Not burned. 40 bbls. left. Not burned. All burned. Not burned. Tank in good condition. 1. Of c. EAST GROUP. 500 500 70 100 120 350 Crude benzol nearly full Contents all burned. Tank in fair condition. Crude Ijeuzol nearly full Contents all burned. Tank in fair condition. Light naphtha from coal tar; called red naphtha. All|partly full. Not Ijurned at all. 90% benzol / f ^ [ Refined benzol < All partly full [ 90% benzol 1st distilate benzol Not burned at all. Fig. 12. View of Valvoline Oil Co. Plant, showing remains of tanks and pcsition of wall "A" THE ^'ALVOLINE OIL CO. was the worst damaged of any of the oil works. There were several buildings, partly brick and wood covering the oil tanks, in which was stored naphtha, kerosene oil and various machine oils in large quantities. Many of these tanks had no covers and the contents easily ignited as soon as the buildings were on fire. The naphtha was in covered horizontal tanks. Very soon these exploded and great havoc was created. Half of one of the tanks was hurled a hundred feet away and the remainder of it was forced into a nearby tank crumpling it up like so much tissue paper and throwing the contents all around the yard. The heat was intense. Some of the tanks were melted and many of the bricks on one wall of the building fused. .5 ^Q .i 23 Fig. 13. Brick wall "A" at Valvoline Oil Co. Plant, showing fused bricks THE TIDEWATER OIL CO. also fared badly. Some of the tanks stood in buildings and others on the wharf. Only one out of six or eight is in good condition. 24 Insurance Loss It is cstimHtod that the total insurance loss is about $9,000,000. The following table shows the net losses sustained by the various companies, as reported officially to the Massachusetts insurance depart- ment, together with ^Massachusetts fire premiums for 1907 and surplus to policy holders. The figures marked thus * are not official returns but were compiled by the Standard Publishing Co. of Boston. Name of Company Aachen & Muiiioh Adirondack .Etna Agricultural Albany Alliance, Eng Alliance, Pa American, X. J American Central American Lloyds Assurance Atlas Ben Franklin Boston British America, Can.... Buffalo Conmiercial .... Buffalo German Caledonian Caledonian American . . . Calumet Camden Capital Citizens, Mo City of New York Cologne Columbia (Marine) Commerce Connnercial L'nion, P^ng. . Commercial L'nion, X. Y. Commonwealth Concordia Connecticut Continental Cosmopolitan County, Pa Delaware, Pa Detroit F. & M Dixie Dutchess Eastern, X. J Empire City ii,quitable 25 Net Loss at Chelsea Fire Premiums in Mass. in 1907 Surplus to Policy Holders Jan 1, 1908 $31,650 $49,544 $844,645 19,L'00 7,743 281,603 153,6:30 336,010 7,754,606 75,000 90,597 1,011,617 5,-'00 40,741 520,753 *35;000 Retired 3,h25 55,30,5 697,031 45,045 95, J -'3 2,351,615 214,386 147,300 2,830,877 4,000 28,048 552,336 13,150 4,125 266,557 11,000 6S,652 587,590 5,454 20,470 370,258 104,415 202,673 3,371,760 11,100 37,139 481,771 :36,391 16,416 335,123 75,000 32.571 1,700,800 4T,100 101,575 466,658 1,540 8,443 225,099 200 14,534 366,747 14,917 71,692 691,791 30,515 53,534 331,361 11,851 47,687 343,339 49,000 22,440 357,704 9,101 58,158 178,581 225 9,306 497,610 3,500 23.911 366,658 45,000 169,352 1,885,166 1,000 26,674 286,551 5,250 44,373 1,163,727 29,125 39,038 490,620 101,519 137,897 2,118,394 146,441 229,519 8,503,591 5,000 26,830 353,303 14,400 43,885 561,940 56,309 56,641 541,724 14,;200 44,586 1,339,408 7,050 23,349 663,622 5,225 25,911 245,173 3,225 19,735 289,547 19,552 28,092 316,931 11,100 71,259 484,437 Farmers, Pa Fidelity Fire Association, Pa Firemans Fund Fireniens, X. J Franiilin, Pa German Alliance German American, Md.... German American, N. Y. . German, Peoria German, Pitts Germanla Girard Glens Falls Granite State Hamburg Bremen Hanover Hartford Home, N. Y Ins. Co. of N. A ins. Co. State of Pa Jeffersoni Law Union & Crown .... i>iv. & Lon. & Globe, Eng. London London & Lancashire .... Lumber Mechanics Mechanics & Traders Mercantile Michigan Commercial .... Milwaukee Milwaukee Mechanics .... Munich Nassau National, Conn National, Pa National Limiber National Union Newark New Brunswick New Hampsiiire Niagara North B. & M., Eng North B. & M., N. Y Northern, Eng Northern, N. Y North River Northwestern National . . Norwich L^nion Ohio German Old Colony Orient Pacific Palatine Pelican Pennsylvania Peter Cooper Phenix, N. Y Phoenix, Conn Phoenix, Eng 8;3,000 71,735 488,713 39,937 56,383 1,801,676 95,853 317,510 3,554,033 91,835 115,693 3,406,933 75,000 105,786 3,166,304 4.r),.'W3 54,936 815,750 .5,765 31,645 744,591 373 13,075 356,188 198,585 366,165 5,915,353 8,500 13,455 335,131 44,117 50,963 533,346 165,785 106,057 1,949,361 8,000 48,563 805,710 65,900 58,348 3,380,893 13,350 67,091 443,693 33,345 71,365 393,048 315,000 99,043 1,854,091 376,170 377,760 5,361,450 350,600 406,410 10,303,311 160,040 .331,637 4,067,941 3,917 36,060 358,805 44,685 59,433 365,886 1,000 10,760 350,736 98,350 374,438 4,431,815 100,000 100,147 618,474 81,410 135,343 783,636 16,800 9,389 311,035 3,350 31,376 498,479 14,074 33,949 565,498 33,071 39,900 317,906 3,000 51,516 410,393 1,350 6,937 .343,933 30,100 .38,515 1,047,171 13,376 386,.391 745,594 13,950 40,690 335,406 69,375 309,637 3,503,661 1,000 36,746 961,154 300 7,031 335,333 147,900 73,831 1,033,746 4,800 15,191 603,994 10,000 5,531 356,833 67,489 163,155 3,433,978 344,698 354,513 1 ,,5.35,091 71,786 335,460 3,698,689 3,130 33,038 696,363 150,861 137,877 1,190,900 5,037 41,171 453,543 83,395 90,635 580,059 33,000 36,415 3,154,186 303,334 104,894 538,461 300 360,193 1,350 44,554 510,884 95,700 63,918 879,834 * 1,000 388,474 73,600 159,338 1,049,546 5,050 11,015 384,695 100,000 186,813 3,365,384 *750 311,899 316,500 178,048 3,449,463 330,935 338,076 3,431,848 51,476 103,673 993,151 26 Providence Washington 51,025 Prussian National 49,500 Queen 1 1:2,550 Reliance 10,000 Rhode Island 100 Richmond 1,7:25 Rochester German 46,938 Rossia 34,806 Royal 34-',500 Royal Exchang-e 8x2,057 St." Paul 1 10,000 Salamandra :27,450 Scottish U. & XatM x?9,150 Security, Conn 18,500 Shawnee 55,000 Skandia 6,750 Southern, La ' 5,000 Springfield 109,850 Spring Garden 3:2,4:25 Stuvvesant 1,000 Sun 91,766 Svea ^^9,450 Teutonia, La 8,075 Union, Eng 16,900 Union, X. Y 19,516 Union, Pa 15,540 United Fireniens 360,085 United States *750 United States Llovds (Marine) *10,000 Virginia F. & M.'. 1,500 \\'estchester 165,033 Western, Can 114,450 Western, Pa 10,049 Western Reserve 1,500 Williamshurg City 33,300 Winona 580 MuTUAi, Companies. Ahington 4,600 Berkshire 4.900 Cambridge 68,5:2:2 Citizens 199,670 Dedham 9,400 Dorciiester 59,150 Fitchhurg ■20,5-25 Hingham :29,550 Holyoke 113,950 India 2,750 Lowell 50,000 -Merchants & Farmers 35,-250 Merrimack 67,7:25 Middlesex, Mass 65,000 Mutual Protection 16,150 Norfolk 30,000 Pawtucket 11,500 Providence 3,300 Quincv 74,500 Salem" 5,80:2 Traders cS: Mechanics 140,000 Worcester 75,000 130,40-> 7:20,550 48,786 600,842 164,538 ;2,96 1,539 41,691 488,425 18,069 602,723 5,047 246,043 83,5i0 1,074,824 117,758 389,576 4:23,186 3,094,131 73,094 926,643 73,^47 1,126,653 107,801 314,875 9:2,419 2,347,685 7:2,1:23 762,754 49,506 404,539 59,441 481,956 :2:2,743 292,974 :215,75:2 2,910,588 78,953 546,324 264,166 167,657 1,051,988 19,318 439,523 43,749 373,076 Retired ;24,43() 280,978 39,890 275,000 58,975 488,677 288,417 58,750 963,960 30,54J 634,662 105,758 1,207,460 63,996 584,136 31,970 436,030 13,871 313,255 57,0i9 705,686 1J,569 361,734 44,490 66,044 46,390 ()4,738 68,263 37,337 85,630 143,890 39,518 101,609 176,641 80,286 77,697 45,576 112,378 97,332 133,475 670,933 26,724 189,906 68,287 126,363 65,588 104,304 98,255 62,623 175,950 334,366 40,850 62,321 89,821 449,330 42,167 244,900 13,855 417,495 117,893 530,809 43,541 38,051 136,280 327,018 134.104 554,366 27 The stock insurance companies met this great loss without serious impairment of their capital. The United Firemen's of Philadelphia suffered severely but steps were taken at once to reduce the capital of the company and meet all obligations. Several dwelling house Mutuals lost heavily and at least three will be forced partially or entirely out of business. The Citizens of Boston has already reinsured about three- quarters of its business in the Royal and the Merrimac of A'ndover reinsured about $5,000,000 of its liability in the Traders & Mechanics. The Cambridge Mutual has reinsured its entire business in the Royal and will retire from business. Adjustments are being made with commendable rapidity and three weeks after the fire, very few losses remain unsettled. The larger com- panies at once opened offices in Chelsea where the adjusters were on hand as long as necessai'y. A very efficient bureau of information was opened by companies represented in the New England Insurance Exchange. This all goes to show the great strength of the larger stock insurance companies and their ability to withstand the heavy drain of any ordinary conflagration. Conclusions The most notable facts which this fire emphasizes are as follows : 1. The dangerous nature of pitch or mansard shingle roofs, frame porches, piazzas and accessory woodwork in spreading a con- flagration. 2. The complete failure of any roof supported by unprotected steel or iron to withstand any but the smallest fire. 3. The need of good window protection where the sweep of the flames is parallel to division walls and the necessity of blank walls or properly protected window openings and parapet walls at right angles to prevailing winds. 4. The vulnerability of any ordinary buildings to sparks and embers, provided the bombardment be long enough, even though the space separating them from the burning buildings is great. 5. The slight value of streets of ordinary widths in holding a fire when there is strong wind blowing and the fighting force is scat- tered. 28 6- That the safest way to store oil in large quantities is in well made boiler iron riveted tanks having covers of the same material with large automatic relief valve, all well supported on brick or concrete piers. 7. That Municipalities cannot violate the laws of good con- struction and fire protection without inviting conflagration. 8. That the Metropolitan Water Works system is shown to be exceedingly valuable for cities which it serves as it successfully with- stood the extraordinary draught caused b}' this conflagration, although the Chelsea mains were not adequate in size nor properly gridironcd. 9. That more co-operation is needed between city officials and insurance interests in regard to protection against fire. Chelsea cannot be considered blameless for this conflagration. The officials fully realized the conditioftis. Both water board and fire department had asked for improvements but the Aldermen refused to grant appropriations. Fire protection that is originally ample should keep pace with changed conditions in cities and almost invari- ably cities fail to recognize these changed conditions. In the case of Chelsea, however, it proved to be not so much defective water works and fire department as inadequate building laws poorly enforced, and the admittance of an irresponsible foreign population supposed to be favorably inclined to incendiarism. The attitude adopted by water boards, not only of Chelsea but of other cities, should not be passed over. We refer to the constant combating of advanced fire protection ideas affecting private fire service pipe, and the requiring of meters on fire service connections, thus discouraging automatic sprinkler protection. Economy in the use of water is their one cry and they bend every effort in that direc- tion. No argument is necessary beyond pointing out our enormous annual fire losses to show both the weakness of their position and the falseness of their economy. It is the insurance companies who pay the bills in case of a conflagration and it is the duty of officials to recognize and follow the rules and suggestions made by fire protection engineers who are impartially endeavoring to decrease the fire waste of the country. Automatic sprinklers are well known to be the cheap- est method of extinguishing fires and in ninety-three per cent, of the cases they are successful. Any policy of water works officials which discourages sprinkler equipments should be strongly condemned. Recommendations Pertaining to the Rebuilding of Chelsea 1. Set apart a certain section of Chelsea as a "rag district" and segregate all rag shops in this section. Formulate a special code of building laws for application to this district dealing particularly with types of buildings, distances apart, height, partiwalls, cornices, roofs, areas, window protection and making compulsory the installation of automatic sprinklers where area is over a certain amount. 2. Require licenses for all rag shops and formulate rules regu- lating the rag shop business, also provide for regular inspection with power to revoke licenses. 3. Enlarge present fire limits and revise building laws in the light of modern fire protection. 4. Require that all buildings on both east and west sides of Broadway shall have self sustaining rear walls of brick or equally good fireproof material of proper thickness parapeted above roof; or provided with fireproof cornice. All floor and roof timbers to be self releasing. Limit the number of openings and require all openings to have standard fire shutters. 5. Gridiron principal mains in east and west section ; remove all four-inch pipe and require water works department to adopt a more favorable attitude toward sprinkler equipments. 6. Establish a new engine company in the "rag district." 30 ^""^'^"^y^ <'. > ^^. c^ ^' . -n^-o^ ° " ° -» ^O ^"^ <. -J.' -0.' ^ - » « ^ O,^ <'. c .^^ .-\o^ ^ '^0^ 4 o .0 .<&- "v*^ ^ .^' 0' . > c 0' -N .^'^^^ '-^^0^ P /•"? i::^llllllll!lllfe=>'*' 'V YV ' (\\\ >^t< //h o vP /-^ i==fl fflfe?? "V VV ^^-n^ A