

Catholic Association for Int'l Peace
Committee on Sources of Int'l Enmity
Causes of War
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Causes of War

A Preliminary Report of the Committee
on Sources of International Enmity

PARKER THOMAS MOON, *Chairman*


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Security, Old and New

A Preliminary Report of the Europe
Committee

REVEREND JOSEPH F. THORNING, S.J., *Chairman*

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CAUSES OF WAR
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to
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and
The Europe Committee

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Causes of War

PARKER THOMAS MOON

OUTLINE

- A. Fundamental Moral Causes of International Enmity:
- In general;
 - Individual actions;
 - Moral errors:
 - (1) The Machiavellian conception of the unmoral state;
 - (2) The cult of national power;
 - (3) The prevalence of materialism.
- B. Political and Economic Causes of International Enmity:
- (1) Imperialism, causing:
 - (a) Wars of conquest;
 - (b) International rivalry, crises, and war among Great Powers;
 - (c) Colonial rebellions.
 - (2) Immoderate territorial nationalism.
 - (3) Conflicts of economic interest:
 - (a) Reparations;
 - (b) War Debts;
 - (c) Foreign investments in backward or turbulent countries;
 - (d) Tariffs and trade barriers;
 - (e) Raw Materials;
 - (f) Immigration.
 - (4) Armaments:
 - (a) As a cause of fear and hostility;
 - (b) In time of crisis;
 - (c) As a temptation to the strong.
 - (5) Propaganda tending to promote international antipathies.
 - (6) Bureaucratic methods of foreign offices, tending to obstruct solution of international problems.
 - (7) The pressure of politics, constraining politicians to present only one side of any international conflict.
- C. The Negative Source of International Enmity—the non-existence of agencies for the settlement of international disputes, a condition remedied in considerable part by the establishment of the League of Nations and the World Court and by treaties of arbitration and conciliation.
- D. Conclusion.

A. Fundamental Moral Causes of International Enmity.

In a general way, all international enmity may be said to spring from human ignorance or defiance of moral law. If all men were fully aware of and faithfully obedient to the teachings of the Christian religion, there would be no problem of international war. Individual lapses from this high standard, either on the part of public officials who have been led into wars by their own ambition or greed, or on the part of citizens who have not scrupled to promote their own selfish interests by provoking international antagonism, may certainly be regarded collectively as a prolific source of international conflicts, but they do not seem appropriate for detailed consideration in this general report. Attention should be drawn, however, to three moral errors which have a wider application in the modern world.

(1) *The idea that the actions of a government are not subject to the ethical standards of individual conduct*, although far from being universally accepted either by political scientists or by public opinion, is nevertheless sufficiently widespread to be influential at times in critical matters. Doubtless the diversity of religious and ethical teachings in the modern world has afforded conditions favorable to the development of this Machiavellian idea. The argument that the State has the right to violate treaties, to practice what one modern statesman has styled "sacred selfishness," to engage in deliberate and malicious deception, to exploit the weak, and to violate international law for the furtherance of "national interests," would be shocking if openly avowed in all its implications, but it has been too often tacitly assumed as a valid premise in the attempt to justify specific actions, especially in time of war.

(2) *The worship of power* as the supreme end and justification of national policies is closely associated with the foregoing Machiavellian doctrine, and is likewise an influential factor in modern international affairs, although it may be consciously and candidly avowed only by a relatively small number of "jingo" militarists. It is not by accident that in diplomacy nations are referred to as "Powers" and the most heavily armed nations distinguished as "Great Powers," regardless of comparative areas or populations. The mistaken belief that the first essential of national greatness is military or naval power, and the kindred notion that "national honor" consists in using such power whenever the government's policies, right or wrong, are questioned by another nation, can make only for rivalry in armaments, international crises, and wars of aggrandizement. In so far as the peoples of the earth can be brought to realize that true national greatness consists in moral integrity and in contributions to the progress of civilization, and that national honor, like private honor, means adherence to a high standard of honorable conduct, one of the fundamental causes of international enmity will be diminished.

(3) The prevalence of *materialism* leads many to take a distorted view of the significance of economic wealth and prosperity in

national policy. While it may be freely admitted that one of the functions of the modern State is to foster by all legitimate methods the economic well-being of its human constituents, it must also be remembered that economic wealth is not an end in itself, but only one of the means, and not the most important, to the achievement of a virtuous and happy life. Nor should it be forgotten that pursuit of material gain, whether by an individual or by a nation collectively, does not justify violations of the moral law. It is often taken for granted that the supreme end of the government in international relations is to acquire economic resources, to secure foreign markets, and to promote investment, and that in order to achieve these ends it is necessary to regard foreign nations as economic rivals. It is a truism, in the present age, that economic interests or rather, popular conceptions and misconceptions of economic interests, constitute one of the most potent factors in creating international antagonism.

B. Political and Economic Sources of International Enmity.

In passing from these general moral considerations to specific political and economic sources of international enmity, we may observe that the application of Christian moral principles to concrete political and economic problems is a matter of individual conscience, requiring accurate information as well as sound judgment. As individuals differ in the extent of their information, in the quality of their judgments, and in their points of view, no attempt may appropriately be made here to prescribe "the Catholic attitude" toward these matters. What seem to be the most important conditions or policies giving rise to international enmity are here stated without condemnation or condonation, as circumstances to which all intelligent citizens, of whatever religious affiliation, should properly give thoughtful consideration. If any special obligation rests upon Catholics in this connection, it is the duty of attempting, with the utmost sincerity, to apply to these problems the principles of justice and charity, the love of peace, the exaltation of right above might and of things of the spirit above material possessions, which have so long been taught by the Catholic Church and so often emphasized in the utterances of successive Popes.

(1) Contemporary imperialism, taking the form of a tendency on the part of industrial nations, and particularly on the part of the Great Powers, to acquire colonies, protectorates, spheres of interest, concessions, leased territories, or other forms of domination over the so-called backward regions of the earth (that is to say, over regions having undeveloped economic resources and weak or unstable governments), has been and is one of the most active causes of international rivalry, conflict and war. The hitherto secret diplomatic documents published during the past few years give such ample proof of this statement, that only a few illustrative instances need be adduced here.

(a) Imperialism has inspired numerous wars of conquest, such as the Tripolitan War of 1911-1912, whereby Italy conquered Libya; the Boer War of 1899-1902, whereby Great Britain conquered and definitely annexed the Boer Republics; the Moroccan expeditions, which, while not legally designated as wars, were military campaigns designed to extend French rule over Morocco. A complete list of such colonial wars and campaigns of conquest would comprise scores of major items, and hundreds of minor conflicts.

(b) Imperialism also has caused continuous and serious rivalry among the Great Powers, because so often their colonial aspirations have been in conflict. Occasionally such imperialist rivalry has caused war, as, for example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 arose specifically from rival imperialist designs in Korea and Manchuria. More often this rivalry has occasioned grave international crises, such as the Morocco Crises of 1905-1906 and 1911, which not only endangered world peace at the time, but left in their train a dangerous amount of antagonism, suspicion, and fear. Such factors as these may be regarded as significant causes of war in general, and as a very important contributing factor in the outbreak of the Great War of 1914.

(c) Imperialism leads also to rebelliousness, and often to armed insurrection, on the part of the peoples which have been subjected to imperialist domination. The revolt against French rule in Syria, the Riffian outbreak in Morocco, Sandino's warfare against the Marines in Nicaragua, and the outbreak in Palestine are only four of the most recent and well-known among the very large number of similar conflicts.

These historical facts are set forth without any implication that they constitute a comprehensive verdict upon the righteousness or the expediency of imperialism. The intention here is merely to consider imperialism as a source of international enmity. That it is such, no serious historian denies.

(2) Immoderate territorial nationalism is a second great cause of war. Whether there is some justification for the efforts of nationalists to include within their nation's frontiers all areas inhabited by people speaking that nation's mother-tongue, and whether it is wise for nationalists to demand for their country more extensive "historic frontiers," "strategic frontiers," or "geographic boundaries," need not be considered in this report. What is pertinent here is that such efforts and such demands are extremely provocative of enmity and war. The territorial unification of the German-speaking people as a nation, in the nineteenth century, involved a war against Denmark, a war between Prussia and Austria, and a war with France. The territorial unification of the Italian nation was accomplished, likewise, by a series of wars in the nineteenth century, and completed by Italy's participation in the Great War in the years 1915 to 1918. The over-lapping nationalistic claims of France and Germany made Alsace-Lorraine one of the most dangerous "sore spots"

in Europe. We fought Mexico in 1846 for Texas and California. The conflicting claims of Chile, Peru and Bolivia made the Tacna-Arica district a notable arena of conflict in South America. A boundary dispute in the Gran Chaco brought Bolivia and Paraguay close to war in 1928. There are at least a score of important and menacing sore spots in the world today, where nationalistic claims overlap and conflict, as in the "Danzig Corridor," the disputed part of South Tyrol, the Vilna region, the Macedonian complex, the Saar Basin, Bessarabia, Albania, Mosul. These conflicts of territorial nationalism may appear, superficially, to be of only remote concern to the United States. Nevertheless, in so far as they provoke enmity and endanger peace, they vitally affect the security of all great nations. The war into which the United States entered ten years ago grew out of one of these nationalistic conflicts—the opposition of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to the claims of Yugoslav nationalism.

It may be added that immoderate nationalism in other and more subtle forms may be regarded as a cause of war. For convenience of exposition, these forms of nationalism are dealt with in other sections of this report.

(3) *Economic causes* of enmity are so numerous that it is well to concentrate attention on their general source (see Section A, item 3 above) and a few outstanding issues.

(a) The attempts of the Allies to impose upon Germany very large *Reparation* payments engendered the most intense hostility during the years 1919-1923, and still cause a certain amount of resentment, even though the situation has been vastly improved by the adoption of the Dawes Plan, in 1924, and the Young Plan in 1929. The ill-will arising from the economic difficulties attending Reparation payments has been aggravated by the fact that in the Treaty of Versailles, Article 231, Germany's obligation to pay Reparations was coupled with and grounded on an assumption that the war was caused "by the aggression of Germany and her allies"—an assumption which German public men have denounced as an unproved indictment.

(b) The efforts of the United States Government to negotiate funding agreements for the repayment of loans advanced to European governments during and immediately after the World War have inspired a considerable amount of ill-will. The justice and wisdom of attempting to collect these *War Debts* is not in question here. What is in question is the effect on international concord. The immediate effect has indisputably been an outburst of criticism, ranging from quite temperate disapproval to unrestrained resentment, against the United States. The cumulative effect of continuing to collect the War Debts in installments stretching over sixty-two years, as provided in the Funding Agreements, cannot now be foreseen with certainty, but there is at least some reason to mention it among the potential sources of international enmity.

(c) *Foreign investments* may sometimes cement international good will, as they did for a time between Russia and France, but

under certain circumstances they become sources of enmity, particularly where they affect the relations between a strong and a weak country. Thus German investments in Turkey, before 1914, caused difficulties with Russia, France and England. American investments in Mexico became a source of antagonism when they were endangered by Mexican civil wars or by Mexican legislation. Generally speaking, investments in backward or turbulent countries often give rise to diplomatic conflicts and occasionally to armed interventions, because when the interests of the investors are championed by the government to which the investors owe allegiance, the economic grievances of private citizens become international stakes of diplomacy.

(d) *Tariffs and trade barriers* frequently cause international enmity. The Russo-German "tariff war" of 1893, the German-Spanish tariff war of 1894, the German-Canadian tariff war of 1897-1910, the Franco-Italian tariff war of 1888-1899, and the Franco-Swiss tariff war of 1893-1895 are cases in point. The nationalistic conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, which precipitated the Great War, was in part caused, or at least aggravated, by Austro-Hungarian tariff barriers to Serbian exports. These occasional acute situations arise in the course of what is known as "tariff bargaining," when one nation by levying high duties on another's goods provokes that other to retaliation.

Tariffs, however, have a more general and more continuous effect on international relations. Especially since the 1880's, one of the leading arguments used by European statesmen to justify imperialist conquests has been the alleged need of colonial markets to compensate for the barring of foreign markets by high protective tariffs. Furthermore, unreasonably high duties and irritating trade barriers unquestionably tend to interfere with the development of international commerce. They promote the development of a spirit of economic antagonism among nations. They obscure the economic fact that nations are dependent upon one another and that the prosperity of commercial nations depends upon the prosperity of other commercial nations.

(e) Attempts to establish monopolistic controls of *raw materials* have recently caused much international enmity. The development of this practice, in the words of Mr. Hoover, "involves great dangers to international good will." The difficulty is that when one government adopts official measures to raise or to stabilize the price of a commodity that is largely exported, the citizens and the government of the countries consuming that commodity are quick to feel a grievance. Cases in point are the attempt of Great Britain to stabilize crude rubber prices through the Stevenson scheme, the attempt of Brazil to control coffee prices by the "valorization" plan, and suggestions that the United States government should lend aid to cotton growers in regulating the export of cotton, so as to diminish price fluctuations. Another difficulty is the popular fear, often expressed, that a country not controlling adequate supplies of vital raw materials may not only be mulcted by foreign producers, but may find itself short of war materials in case of conflict.

Popular expressions of this fear, and pleas for a policy of national self-sufficiency, often betray a singular ignorance of economic and geographical facts. There is no need to argue the fact, so obvious to well-informed students of the world's resources, that no nation can achieve self-sufficiency except by doing without many commodities now considered very desirable; nor is there need to point out the fact, so obvious to business men, that even when a commodity can be produced at home it may, in some cases, be procured more cheaply from a region better suited to its production. The points to be emphasized are: (1) that the natural distribution of the world's resources compels every existing nation to depend upon others for some of its raw materials; (2) that attempts to restrict the free flow of such raw materials provoke antagonism; and (3) that the hope of achieving national self-sufficiency is illusory.

(f) *Immigration* is often coupled with the problem of raw materials as one of the two most dangerous economic causes of international enmity. Under existing international law and practice, each nation asserts the right at will to welcome, to restrict, or to bar immigration. When immigration is drastically restricted or barred by such countries as the United States, Canada, and Australia, which have relatively sparse populations, complaint arises in countries of denser population. In some cases, as in the exclusion of Japanese immigrants by the United States (or the restrictions imposed upon Indian immigrants by British Dominions), the most significant element in the situation is doubtless the injury to the national pride of the excluded nation. But in a more general way the immigration problem has an economic basis. It is not a simple matter of "density of population." Tibet, the Gobi Desert, and the Sahara are more sparsely populated than the United States, but they do not attract many immigrants. Immigrants leave countries where economic, political, or religious conditions are unfavorable, and seek admission to lands in which they expect to find greater opportunities. In the present age, the sought-for opportunities are to a very large extent, though not exclusively, economic opportunities. When it is said that Italy or Japan is "over-populated," it should be understood that while these countries are in reality less densely populated than Holland, Belgium, England, or Massachusetts, they have not yet achieved an industrial development sufficient to provide employment and a comfortable livelihood for their populations. So long as a very wide disparity exists between economic opportunities and standards of living, as among the nations of the world, it is probable that the less prosperous will claim the right of immigration, and will resent attempts, on the part of the more favored countries, to restrict immigration.

(4) *Armaments* are often intended to preserve peace by preventing attack, yet excessive armaments contribute to international enmity in the following ways:

(a) They breed fear and hostility. Before the Great War, German armaments aroused fear in France, while French army laws in turn caused alarm in Germany. Whenever one nation increases

its navy, its army, or its air force, the nations against which these armaments might conceivably be used naturally feel more or less apprehension, and are tempted if not impelled to reply with counter-increases which in turn provoke new increases on the part of the first nation. When such rivalry becomes intense, as it did in Europe between 1904 and 1914, its psychological effect is extremely dangerous.

(b) In time of crisis large armaments interfere with diplomacy, and tend to precipitate conflict. In 1914, for instance, as soon as war appeared probable, the military authorities urged mobilization, on the ground that if war came, it would be well to be prepared. But mobilization on the part of any one Great Power necessarily alarms its potential enemy, as Russian mobilization in 1914 alarmed Germany. Military measures in 1914 cut diplomatic negotiations short, and transferred the concern of statesmen from the political issues at stake to the military peril of delaying mobilization.

(c) Large armaments tempt strong nations to deal unjustly with weaker States. The error of contending that "might makes right" is not committed by unarmed nations. Force and the threat of force have been so much employed by Great Powers to promote their own interests at the expense of less puissant neighbors and in disregard of equity, that only a firm and alert insistence upon the moral supremacy of right over might can prevent armaments from continuing to be a source of enmity and injustice.

(5) *Propaganda* tending to promote hostility toward foreign nations, or to stimulate militarism and imperialism, or to glorify war, is conducted by a host of organizations and individuals in every important nation. Some of these propagandists may be actuated by private interest and the hope of business profits. Others are doubtless motivated by the most disinterested, if not the most judicious, spirit of patriotism. It is, therefore, no simple matter to condemn such propaganda wholesale, and to prevent it is impossible in a free country. At most it can only be counteracted by the teaching of international justice and tolerance.

In every country there are certain newspapers which deal with foreign affairs in a prejudiced and inflammatory spirit, presenting to their readers sensational news of a type which feeds international enmity, and often suppressing facts which might promote international cooperation. Newspaper editors, of course, are justified in having editorial opinions and policies, but when they go so far as to distort, garble or suppress facts, they sin against truth as well as against international amity. Fortunately there are certain great newspapers which present the facts with a high degree of accuracy, and by so doing perform a valuable service toward the elimination of international misunderstanding.

Propaganda in the schools and in textbooks may be regarded as a peculiarly delicate and difficult problem. While on one hand instances of "pacifist propaganda" in the schools call forth occasional outbursts of patriotic indignation, on the other hand a great deal of warlike propaganda passes almost unnoticed, save for occasional

investigations and reports. The tendency of certain textbooks and the manner of teaching history in many schools—not in the United States alone but in other countries as well—is to increase, however unintentionally, the international misunderstandings and antipathies which make for enmity and war. If conquerors are exalted as heroes and men of peace given scant notice; if the Napoleons and Bismarcks and Cavours of history are glorified, as they so often are, the effect is to train young minds to follow future Napoleons, Bismarcks and Cavours into new military adventures. If history touches on foreign nations only where they have been encountered as foes in past wars, or if alien races are described as inferior and backward, or if the rankling memory is perpetuated of excesses and aggressions committed by foreigners without an impartial weighing of such excesses—if education follows these lines, the mind of youth is prepared for international enmity. Only by giving due attention to the dependence of nations upon one another, and to the contributions of various nations and different races to human progress, can education create the depth of sympathy and breadth of understanding so necessary if international hatreds are to be avoided.

(6) The *bureaucratic methods* of foreign offices often tend to obstruct the solution of international problems and to perpetuate international conflicts. The pre-war European alliances and ententes, which divided Europe into two menacing armed coalitions, were negotiated in secret by foreign ministries and were not submitted to the respective parliaments for approval. In a large part the imperialist aggressions of European powers in Asia and Africa were undertaken by permanent foreign office officials acting under the cover of secrecy and with arbitrary authority. The notorious "secret treaties" made by the Allies during the World War, providing for division of the anticipated spoils, were flagrant instances of bureaucratic blundering. Our own State Department officials have evoked criticism in Congress and antagonism in Latin America by using secret "dollar diplomacy" and armed "interventions" to establish financial control over certain Latin American republics in the Caribbean, to acquire naval bases, and to serve various other purposes.

(7) The *pressure of politics* indirectly aggravates international enmity. In a dispute between France and Germany, for instance, French politicians seeking popularity and votes are tempted, if not constrained, to show their patriotism by presenting to the public only the French side of the case, by denouncing Germany, by posing as courageous defenders of French national interests. Meanwhile, German politicians present only the German side of the case to the German public. Under such circumstances, it is exceedingly difficult for the public in either country to have a fair, impartial view of the dispute. Conciliation and compromise become almost impossible. Any French statesman, who should publicly declare that in this particular dispute his own country was wrong, would be in danger of sacrificing his own political career. Occasionally, a courageous statesman does dare to take such a stand. Lloyd George, for instance, during the Boer War denounced the imperialistic aims of

the government; but his friends warned him that he was committing political suicide. Woodrow Wilson dared to oppose legislation regarding Panama Canal tolls on the ground that tolls discrimination in favor of American shipping would be a violation of a treaty. Notwithstanding such exceptions, it remains true that in general the vote-seeking politician is under a pressure which makes international justice more difficult, international conflicts more acute.

C. The Negative Source of International Enmity.

In the past one of the principal reasons for international conflict has been the non-existence of adequate international courts and other agencies for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Hague Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and numerous treaties of arbitration and conciliation have in considerable part supplied this want. Discussion of these constructive efforts toward peace may be left to the report of the Committee on International Law and Organization. It may be noted here, however, that the existing agencies for the peaceful settlement of international disputes are by no means complete.

D. Conclusion:

In a very general sense, all enmity, among nations as among individuals, springs from a single source, the failure of mankind to obey the laws of God. In a more specific sense, moral errors such as the divorce of public from private morality, the worship of national power, and the unrestrained materialistic pursuit of national wealth may be regarded as sources of international injustice, and, therefore, of enmity. It is peculiarly incumbent upon Catholics, in so far as their knowledge and station in life permit, to controvert these errors. Catholics cannot consistently condone national policies or national acts which are in violation of the moral law. It is their duty to insist that national pride shall not be exalted above justice, that military might shall not overrule right, that material wealth shall not be sought at the cost of violating moral law.

On the other hand, it is to be noted that the political and economic sources of international enmity as enumerated above are complex and very controversial matters, upon which the verdict of Christian morality is not easily or lightly to be pronounced. Sweeping ethical judgments will not solve these problems. Only by careful study and wise statesmanship can the policies of nations as regards such matters as imperialism, nationalism, armaments, and economic conflicts be so adjusted to the spirit of Christianity that peace may be made secure. Catholic doctrine does not pretend to prescribe in detail the proper relations between industrial empires and undeveloped territories, or the just boundaries between overlapping nationalities, or the equitable ratios for military, naval and air strength, or the wisest arrangements regarding raw materials, tariffs, reparations and international debts. If, therefore, Catholic citizens are to trans-

late into specific and effective action the general moral principles in which they believe and the love of peace and justice which they are bound as Christians to profess, they must endeavor to inform themselves regarding these problems and, following their individual consciences in all sincerity and candor, they must strive to secure in actual practice the international application of justice, charity, and law.

APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A complete bibliography on this subject would fill several large volumes. The following brief list is given for the use of study clubs. The books and pamphlets listed are selected because they give the facts in readable form and because they can be procured easily by the general reader. The committee assumes no responsibility for the opinions expressed in these works. On the contrary, care has been taken to include expressions of several different viewpoints. Additional bibliographies may be found in "A Syllabus on International Relations" (Macmillan) by Parker Thomas Moon; "Between War and Peace" (Macmillan) by Florence Brewer Boeckel; *Foreign Affairs* (quarterly review published by the Council on Foreign Relations), and in several of the other books listed below. An excellent descriptive bibliography is published by the New Jersey Federation of Women's Clubs, 44 Crescent Road, Madison, N. J.

1. "War: Its Causes, Consequences and Cure," by Kirby Page. (Doran, \$1.50.)
2. "Imperialism and World Politics," by Parker Thomas Moon. (Macmillan, \$3.50.)
3. "Essays on Nationalism," by Carlton J. H. Hayes. (Macmillan, \$3.00.)
4. "International Relations," by Raymond Leslie Buell. (Holt, \$5.00.)
5. "Back of War," by H. K. Norton. (Doubleday, \$2.50.)
6. "The International Anarchy, 1904-1914," by G. Lowes Dickinson. (Century, \$4.00.)
7. "Between War and Peace," by Florence Brewer Boeckel. (Macmillan, \$2.00.)
8. "Man Is War," by J. F. Carter. (Bobbs, \$3.50.)
9. "War as an Instrument of National Policy," by James T. Shotwell. (Harcourt, \$3.50.)
10. "The Genesis of the World War," by Harry Elmer Barnes. (Knopf, \$5.00.)
11. "The Origins of the World War," two volumes, by Sidney B. Fay. (Macmillan, \$8.00.)
12. Foreign Policy Association Information Service, periodical bulletins giving reliable information on special topics. Address Foreign Policy Association, 18 East 41st St., New York City.

CAUSES OF WAR

APPENDIX B

N. C. W. C. STUDY CLUB OUTLINE ON "CAUSES OF WAR"

(Printed by Permission of the N. C. W. C. Study Club Committee)

Lesson I: MORAL CAUSES OF WAR

BACKGROUND (Section A of this Report)

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Is it ever justifiable for a nation to violate treaties which it has signed and ratified?
2. What nations would be included among the Great Powers if size and population, or civilization, rather than military and naval strength, were considered?
3. How do popular conceptions of "national honor" differ from our ideas of personal honor?
4. Is war for economic purposes justified?
5. Is armed intervention in a weak country like Nicaragua for the protection of vested business interests justifiable?
6. What ethical distinction do you make between the gunman who kills for profit or pay and the nation which uses force for economic aims?
7. Does international law provide an adequate standard of right and wrong?

PAPERS

1. Machiavelli and the freedom of government from moral restraints. Consult:

Any good encyclopedia.

W. A. Dunning, "History of Political Theories."

C. A. I. P., Report on "International Ethics."

2. What is "National Honor"?

C. J. Hayes, "Essays on Nationalism," pp. 183-7.

L. Perla, "What Is National Honor"?

Lesson II: IMPERIALISM

BACKGROUND (Section B-1 of this Report)

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What nations are most imperialistic? May the United States be accused of imperialism?
2. Is it the duty of the civilized nations to conquer and rule the backward races?
3. How many of the wars and crises in recent history have been caused by imperialism?
4. What kind of imperialist conflicts will the Kellogg Pact prevent? What kind remains outside the scope of the Pact?

5. Is it possible to divorce imperialism from war?
6. Do the benefits conferred upon the backward races by imperialism justify the wars caused by imperialism?
7. Is self-interest or altruism the mainspring of imperialism?
8. Have subject nationalities such as the Arabs, the Moroccans, the Egyptians and the Filipinos a moral right to seek independence by means of armed revolt?
9. Does imperialism pay, from the point of view of the nation? If it pays, is it therefore justified?

PAPERS

1. What is imperialism?
Parker Thomas Moon, "Imperialism and World Politics."
2. How does imperialism cause war?
Parker Thomas Moon, "Imperialism and World Politics," especially pp. 151-3, 37-8, 413, 451, 337-8, 197-214, 249-51, 283, 416-8, 218-21, 177-81, 344, 444, 352-3, and index under "war."
3. Can imperialism continue?
N. Peffer, "The White Man's Dilemma."

Lesson III: NATIONALISM

BACKGROUND (Section B-2 of this Report)

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is a nation?
2. Is the "right of self-determination" a right, and if so, has it any limits?
3. Would it be desirable or possible to redraw the map of Europe so as to give each nation its rightful territory and prevent future boundary conflicts?
4. Why does nationalism create "sore spots"?
5. Are boundary disputes confined to Europe? What recent controversies show that nationalism causes conflict in the New World as well as in the Old?
6. Why is a boundary dispute in any part of the world a matter of concern to all the rest of the world?
7. Is immoderate territorial nationalism still a cause of conflict, or has it been sufficiently satisfied by the peace settlement and restrained by the Anti-War Pact?
8. Is there any way of taking the perilous soreness out of "sore spots" and boundary disputes?

PAPERS

1. The causes of nationalism.
C. J. H. Hayes, "Essays on Nationalism."
2. Nationalism as a cause of war.
C. J. H. Hayes, "Essays on Nationalism."

Lesson IV: ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR

BACKGROUND (Section B-3 of this Report)

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How much have the Allies reduced their reparations claims against Germany since 1919? Why did years of diplomatic conflict, military occupation of German territory, and military threats lead in the end to a scaling down of reparations?

2. In what way does the reparation problem now hinge upon the attitude of the United States?

3. Why is it folly for any nation to attempt to make itself independent of foreign raw materials?

4. Do the protests of foreign nations against the increase of our tariff in the year 1929 suggest how protective tariffs cause international enmity?

5. How do you explain the fact that the United States sent marines to Nicaragua to protect American property, but did not send marines to Russia to protect the more valuable property confiscated there? Does this question lead to any fundamental principle regarding the use of force in international economic issues?

6. Admitting that the recently revealed diplomatic documents of various Great Powers prove the very marked importance of the economic causes of war, do you think that any civilized government could fight a war avowedly for economic purposes?

7. If the United States could be entirely isolated from the rest of the world, how would it affect your community as regards: (a) the food, clothes, minerals, etc., which come to you from abroad; (b) the business interests depending upon exports or imports; (c) the prices of farm products?

8. A distinguished authority has said that one of the chief tasks before the world, if peace is to be preserved, is the working out and establishment of rules of fair play in international economic affairs. What is your opinion?

PAPERS

1. Reparations and War Debts.

F. B. Boeckel, "Between War and Peace," ch. 23.

R. L. Buell, "International Relations," ch. 22.

Current History, July, 1929.

Foreign Policy Association bulletin on "The Financial Liquidation of the War."

2. The world struggle for raw materials.

"International Conciliation," No. 226, pamphlet on Raw Materials (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 405 West 117th St., N. Y.)

3. Do we fight for oil?

Ludwell Denny, "We Fight for Oil."

Lesson V: ARMAMENTS

BACKGROUND (Section B-4 of this Report)

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Have militarism and navalism decreased since 1914?
2. What nation now spends most on armaments?
3. How did the nations involved in the Great War compare with the neutrals as regards preparedness? Does preparedness for war in fact protect a nation against war?
4. In view of the cost of modern warfare, is it more important to be protected against war or against defeat?
5. Why do you think President Coolidge said that "competitive augmentation of naval armament has been one of the principal causes of international suspicion and ill-will, leading to war"?
6. What private business interests profit by increases of armament? Do these same interests profit by war?
7. What are the chief obstacles of disarmament? On the other hand, what would be gained by disarmament?

PAPERS

1. The world's armies.
R. L. Buell, "International Relations," p. 490;
F. B. Boeckel, "Between War and Peace," ch. 18;
World Almanac;
Armaments Year Book (League of Nations).
2. The world's navies.
R. L. Buell, "International Relations," pp. 490-5;
International Conciliation, No. 245;
Foreign Policy Association, bulletins on naval situation.
3. Chemical warfare and "the next war."
International Conciliation, No. 248.

Security, Old and New*

JOSEPH F. THORNING, S.J., M.A.

WHEN we speak of security there is summoned to the mind a notion, vague yet comprehensive, of "freedom from danger." To remove the vagueness and introduce precision we must ask a question. From danger from what? The interests of man embrace a multitude of activities. There are his domestic, his economic, his cultural, and his moral, or religious, life. There are the political and social interests he shares with his fellow men, racial or national interests, considerations which bear on the preservation of racial ideals and homogeneity, or are concerned with frontiers, military, naval and aeronautical strength. To menace any one of these is to destroy the security of an individual or of a nation in that regard. To be secure in them is to be free from apprehension or fear; to be immune from molestation from within or from without. It is to be at peace with the world; to be so strong physically by reason of armies and fleets, or so well situated between mountains and oceans, or so thoroughly fortified by law before the courts, or by right and justice before the tribunal of world opinion as to render anxiety or further efforts at defense unreasonable and unnecessary.

The sense in which security is discussed in the present paper, however, is the sense of national security, or the freedom of a nation from the danger of foreign warlike aggression, as well as from the fear of such aggression. Not that the discussion shall be confined to a consideration simply of the immediate factors of war such as armaments or so-called defensive alliances, for that would be to overlook the less immediate factors, those deep, swift, hidden currents of international relations, that most effectively influence the tides of war. Economic, industrial, geographic, social and racial

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factors may be of vast importance as elements in national security, and insofar they come within the scope of this paper. Thus some nations actually enjoy, in a high degree, national security of every kind, whereas for another people a single mode of security may have to serve the purposes of all the rest. A remote position on the globe or a sound economic situation may take the place of forts or trained reserves. Great dye or chemical works, capable of turning to over-night production of poison gas or munitions, may afford as robust protection as naval bases scattered throughout the seven seas. The lack of light cruisers or combat planes may be compensated for by a healthy merchant marine or the development of commercial aviation. Demographically, the teeming millions of Russia or China offer a powerful impact to foreign penetration. Twice, in the case of Russia, were the best-trained legions of Europe sent reeling from Moscow. For Italy, Spain and Germany the Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine have stood for centuries as barriers against attack. What conscription gives one country by way of protection may be done for another by a tradition of peace and friendly social, cultural, racial, political or trade relationships. An international bridge may well be a measure of security far better calculated to attain its end than battlements bristling with machine guns and bayonets, while the guarantees of safety which nations try to build up for themselves in battle fleets and expeditionary forces may be no more effective than bilateral or multilateral treaties of non-aggression, arbitration, and judicial settlement. Security, or what is thought to be security, has challenged the resources of human ingenuity and expresses itself in a wide variety of forms.

Before proceeding further, it may be desirable, with a view to simplifying the consideration of this highly complicated question, to draw a distinction between absolute ideal security and that relative security which is practically within reach at the present time. Nothing would be more disheartening, depressing, and so surely doomed to disillusionment, as to strive for an Utopian security which would disregard the limitations of human nature mirrored in society. Whatever is suggested in this paper is said with reference to a security which is necessarily relative.

In passing, it may be noted that relative, unlike ideal, security will be established by no drastic, revolutionary, or radical measures. Only the ignorant who gather around the tents of the medicine vendor at a fair are persuaded of the efficacy of elixirs and magical remedies. On the other hand, intelligent and experienced people know that if they are suffering from a chronic disease—and there is no more painful disease among the nations than war or the insecurity which springs from the threat of war—it can be cured only by long, systematic, and carefully graduated treatment. Relative security, like peace, is to be sought in her ordinary haunts, and won by a moderate and reasonable wooing.

More important perhaps—and for that reason it is made a matter of separate treatment—is the psychological phase of this problem. Security, in its broad, general aspect, consists in the absence of any danger of aggression. It may be regarded, specifically, from a twofold point of view: the one objective, concerning the reality or unreality of the danger; the other subjective, that is, the feeling of the country which believes itself to be or not to be secure. Now it is not sufficient for third parties to realize that the circumstances of a certain country are such that no real danger threatens it. It is not enough, for example, that England regard France's situation as secure. That country itself must feel the same; from its point of view security is life; it cannot be expected to disarm if it feels exposed to a threat of aggression. Of course, the ideal situation would consist in having the subjective feeling of security conformed at least approximately to objective reality.

I

With these general notions clear we may consider the evolution of thought regarding the nexus between security and disarmament. In this year of grace no one would dream of discussing disarmament apart from security. A few years ago the connection was not so thoroughly understood. In fact the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference summoned by the League of Nations stumbled through several sessions before it realized that security was

the rock that made shipwreck of all their intensely technical debates about armaments, land, air and sea. What in itself was a preparatory commission had to call for the establishment of another commission of preparation to deal specifically and exclusively with the complicated question of security. The latter group was organized as the Committee on Arbitration and Security in order to attack the problem which proved too much for the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. Three sessions of its members have already been held and four memoranda submitted on Arbitration, Security and the Mutual Assistance Articles of the Covenant.

The difficulty of the task confronting this Committee may be inferred from the following statements by some of its members. The first is the dilemma proposed by Lord Cushendun:¹

The Preparatory Commission, whose aim was to prepare the way for a definite scheme of disarmament in accordance with the obligations of the Covenant, found itself confronted with very great difficulties in arriving at an international agreement, and it was in order to smooth the way for the work of the Preparatory Commission that we were charged with the duty of investigating the cognate question of security, which we all recognize as being very closely linked with that of disarmament, so much so that it is sometimes very difficult to decide in one's own mind which of these two is cause and which is effect. We ask ourselves: Does disarmament depend entirely upon security, or does security depend upon disarmament?

Here is the eternal question: Which comes first, security or disarmament? Or, as it was put by M. Sandler, the representative of Sweden: "If there can be no disarmament without security and no security without disarmament, how is it possible to escape from the vicious circle?" He answered his own question as follows:

In view of the complexity of the problem, it must be attacked from several sides at once, and, according to circumstances, the most practicable way must be followed in the conviction that each step forward in one direction will facilitate progress in another direction, and the most certain way of putting this idea into action is to take, in the first place, a firm, though perhaps modest, step forward along the path of disarmament.

¹ All quotations are made from the official documents of the Committee on Arbitration and Security appointed by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference to be held under the auspices of the League of Nations.

Commenting on this statement M. Hennings, also of Sweden, declared:

This, gentlemen, is the gradual parallel scheme of advance with a view to the solution of the problems of security and disarmament which I would once more recommend on behalf of my Government, while stressing the fact that one of the essential conditions to enable us to take such a step is that the principal military and naval Powers, whose divergence of view with regard to certain questions of primary importance necessitated the adjournment of our work in April last, should consent to those mutual concessions without which any agreement in regard to disarmament appears quite impossible. . . . However, although there may be differences of opinion as regards the nature of the interdependence which exists between disarmament and security and the conclusions to be drawn from it, when we consider the practical steps for the solution of these problems everybody is agreed, so far as I have been able to ascertain, in recognizing that this interdependence does exist.

M. Hennings goes on to describe the two divergent opinions expressed in the Committee and indicates his solution in line with that of his colleague:

Some have maintained that the present position as regards security is not sufficiently stable to admit of any measure of disarmament and that consequently the first step must be to strengthen the international system of security.

Others, including the Government which I have the honor to represent, have held that the first step in reducing the international standard of armaments and the national burdens resulting therefrom could be taken on the basis of existing security, which in its turn would thereby be strengthened and might be still further strengthened by the gradual development of the pacific settlement of international disputes.

It is gratifying to observe how the Committee as a whole settled the problem. The summing up is by M. Politis (Greece), reporting the memorandum on Security: "It is more and more clearly recognized that the relation between disarmament and security is not one of subordination, but of coordination; neither is less important than the other and their progress must be equal and simultaneous."

II

Granted the vital interdependence of security and disarmament as well as the parallel method of approach desir-

able, the next logical step is to determine what practical measures may be devised to establish such security as will automatically and simultaneously bring about a gradual, progressive reduction of armaments. What, in other words, are the guarantees of security?

Here, again, there are two main streams of thought. According to the view of most continental countries led by France, security consists in a reliance on treaties of non-aggression, arbitration, conciliation, and mutual assistance, preferably multilateral in character such as the 1924 Geneva Protocol, but by no means excluding such as are bilateral or regional after the pattern of Locarno. According to the thesis laid down by this group, it is not sufficient merely to provide for the peaceful settlement of all possible disputes but also to set in motion some machinery of penalties and sanctions for nations which refuse to accept a pacific settlement or are found in the attitude of an unjust aggressor. There bulks large in the mind of this continental group the necessity of organizing economic, financial and military assistance to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of victims of aggression. The danger of a crisis requiring such action springs, they contend, from deep-lying causes of hostility, which, for historic or other reasons, divide great and powerful States. These fears (the *raison d'être* of huge armaments) may be groundless; but if they exist, they cannot be effectually laid, so it is claimed, by even the most perfect method of dealing with particular disputes by the machinery of inquiry and arbitration. For what is feared in such cases is not injustice, but war—war deliberately undertaken for purposes of conquest and revenge. And if so, could there be a better way of allaying fears like these than by adopting some scheme which would prove to all the world that such a war would fail?

Concerted action alone, the argument continues, would afford such a guarantee. The Geneva Protocol of 1924 embodied the highest hopes of those who felt the commonwealth of nations should make common cause against an aggressor. When this general agreement failed largely due to British unwillingness to undertake such wide commitments, efforts were made with more conspicuous success to

conclude regional pacts engaging the signatories in no circumstances again to resort to war among themselves and a reciprocal guarantee by all of them for the maintenance of that engagement. The treaty of Locarno is the model for such security pacts.

The treaty of Locarno is no mere alliance between a group of friendly States with a community of interests. The treaty of Locarno is a bond between nations which were recently at war with one another. It is directed solely to prevent a recurrence of that calamity and to preserve the peace within a group of States whose interests have often conflicted and whose territories have frequently been the theater of war. Under its terms, all disputes are referred to the Council of the League of Nations, by whose decisions the parties undertake to abide. Even in the event of a deliberate act of aggression—the one case in which the signatories are bound to come to the immediate aid of the injured party—the Council is apprized of the matter and the parties undertake to act in accordance with its recommendations. It is the ideal form of a treaty of non-aggression, arbitration, conciliation and mutual assistance. Although envisaging the remote possibility of war, it provides such specific procedure and such concerted action that this possibility is reduced to a minimum.

The second view with respect to the guarantees of security, that championed by Germany and her spokesman, Count von Bernstorff, differs from the first only in this that it places the crux of the security problem in the avoidance of armed conflicts, with little or no emphasis on agreements for mutual assistance. According to this view, it would be well to concentrate on the pacific settlement of international differences. The idea is succinctly expressed in the following observations of the German Government on the program of the Committee on Arbitration and Security:

It will only be possible to prevent war if a method can be found of dealing with all disputes that have led to wars in the past, which will provide a fair prospect of a peaceful solution. In the opinion of the German Government, this idea must constitute the starting point of the entire work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security and the main subject of its discussions. Until this central problem is solved, all other measures merely represent an artificial system without

a foundation, and one which is therefore not calculated to give practical effect to the idea of a genuine and durable international legal regime. . . .

The more the system of measures to prevent war is developed, the smaller becomes the need for measures to be applied in the case of an actual breach of the peace. Common action on the part of all the Members of the League in the event of a breach of the peace is, at the present moment, not possible, since general disarmament is not yet a reality. . . .

In conclusion, the German Government desires to repeat that, in its opinion, it is important, in dealing with the problem of security, to concentrate on the crux of the question: the pacific settlement of all kinds of international disputes. If, instead of doing this, an attempt were made to take the outbreak of war and the provision of military sanctions as the point of departure, it would be like trying to build a house from the roof downwards. War cannot be prevented by preparing for a war against war, but only by removing its causes. . . .

Comparing these two views I think we may say that they differ, not in principle, but in the matter of emphasis. The points on which they agree are of far greater importance and form a solid basis for a reasonable measure of security. Both premise that arbitration is an essential factor in security and parallel to it in much the same way as security is parallel to disarmament. Thus every advance in arbitration is an increase in security and in the possibility of limiting and reducing armaments. This proposal, as a comprehensive and consistent scheme, was first recommended by Benedict XV in his August 1917 letter to the belligerent powers. The Holy Father then urged that

the nations enter upon a just agreement for the simultaneous and reciprocal reduction of armaments; that armed force be replaced by the noble and peaceful instrument of arbitration, with the provision that penalties be imposed upon any State which should refuse either to submit a national question to such a tribunal or to accept the arbitral decision.

This recommendation of the Sovereign Pontiff was embodied in the report of the Committee on International Ethics prepared for the Catholic Association for International Peace, and justifies us in accepting the twofold axiom of M. Politis in his memorandum on Security Questions that: (1) there can be no disarmament without security, and (2) there can be no security without arbitration.

In this direction it is gratifying to report that rapid

progress has been made. Besides the Briand-Kellogg multilateral treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and pledging its signatories to a peaceful settlement of all disputes (without, however, determining what specific methods must be employed, or how a war of self-defense might be differentiated from one of aggression), there are now in force 125 treaties of conciliation or arbitration, or conciliation and arbitration combined. Among these there is one collective treaty binding on 4 States. These treaties engage 38 countries, 24 of which are in Europe. Moreover, 17 States (14 in Europe) are bound by the optional clause concerning compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice. There are 12 separate treaties of non-aggression, 3 agreements embodying unilateral guarantees, and 3 agreements regarding unilateral respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of certain countries; most of these treaties are collective. There are 15 treaties of political cooperation not amounting to alliances or guarantees; again, there are 3 agreements establishing neutral zones; and there are 15 separate treaties of guarantee in the form of alliances, military agreements, or pacts of friendship and cooperation, and one collective treaty of non-aggression and guarantee among 5 States.

III

For the sake of clearness some reference should here be made to the difference between arbitration and judicial settlement. Judicial settlement regards a court of law, involves a judicial process, the application of legal principles solely, and a decision based on the law in each particular case. It would be the task of the Permanent Court of International Justice to ascertain and apply the appropriate rule of law, say in the case of any alleged violation of the Locarno treaty. In arbitration, the disputants appeal to one, three or five arbiters who make the arbitral award, as in the case of the Alabama claims, not so much according to rules of law as in the light of the principles of equity (*ex aequo et bono*). Such an award may often represent a compromise between conflicting claims (e. g., settlement of the Oregon boundary

dispute), yielding to one side on certain points and deciding for the opposing claim in others. The codification and development of international law should increase the scope and efficacy of both arbitration and judicial settlement, removing many questions from the realm of non-justiciable to that of justiciable disputes.

This distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes is, likewise, a matter of prime importance. Justiciable disputes are those in which—to use the phraseology of the Locarno treaty—the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, as was the case in the Oregon boundary dispute, whereas non-justiciable disputes concern questions where there is a divergence of view as to the political interests and aspirations of the respective parties, as is the matter of German reparations. These form two distinct classes of differences and are naturally subject to different modes of treatment.

Justiciable disputes, obviously, are susceptible to a judicial or arbitral process according to the will of the contending parties and the nature of the case. At times a combination of both arbitration and judicial settlement is suitable. In the field of arbitration special prominence should be given to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague and in the sphere of judicial settlement more attention may profitably be directed to Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, an arrangement by which any State which has accepted the Statute establishing the Court may accept as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court in cases relating to:

- (a) The interpretation of a treaty.
- (b) Any question of international law.
- (c) The existence of any fact, which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation.
- (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

By ratification of this optional clause, as the German Government has well observed, the problem of justiciable disputes may be regarded, in principle at least, as adequately solved. All disputes of a justiciable nature may be settled in this way.

IV

On the other hand, no correspondingly general procedure in disputes which are not of a justiciable character, but are exclusively political in complexion, has so far been arrived at. From the point of view of the problem of security, however, the amicable settlement of such disputes is of the utmost importance. Much may be accomplished by further perfecting that technique of diplomacy on the lines of the various conferences taking place at Geneva where the discussion of "vital questions has been lifted out of the frigid atmosphere of written notes into the warm, clear air of personal conversations."

The resources, too, of direct negotiation with a view to compromise have scarcely been tapped by statesmen of either ancient or modern times. The action of the Sovereign Pontiff, Pius XI, subordinating territorial claims to spiritual advantages in the recent treaty and concordat negotiated between the Italian Government and the Vatican, furnishes an admirable example of how long-standing disputes, not unmingled with bitterness on both sides, may be adjusted by the process of direct negotiation and a willingness to work out a formula of mutual understanding on the basis of mutual concessions.

Should disputes reach a more acute stage, a sincere and disinterested attempt at mediation on the part of some third party putting its good offices at the disposal of the litigants might head off further trouble—trouble which is bound to be serious if both sides, as so often happens, resort to threats, a rupture of diplomatic relations, or orders for mobilization. The machinery of the League of Nations has thus been employed to ward off dangerous disputes, notably in the recent threat of war between Paraguay and Bolivia. Finally, much may be done in this field of non-justiciable disputes by treaties erecting special or permanent Commissions of Conciliation whose composition should be such as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the objective and impartial nature of its findings. It is interesting to note in this connection that every one of the differences between the United States and Canada since 1909 has been settled by the Permanent Com-

mission of Conciliation appointed for that purpose, and that in all cases except one they arrived at an opinion by a unanimous vote. The process of conference and conciliation, though marvelously adapted to promote the purposes of security, has been all too little utilized up to the present time.

To sum up, then, it may be said that arbitration is usually suitable for the adjudication of justiciable disputes and that conciliation gives promise of developing into a just and convenient process to settle all disputes of a non-justiciable character, with which the ordinary forms of diplomacy are unable to cope. Neither should it be overlooked that many disputes now non-justiciable in character may, with the gradual development of international law, be brought within the scope of judicial or arbitral settlement.

In spite of the distinctly noticeable tendency among nations to conclude treaties among themselves relative to the arbitration and conciliation of every conceivable kind of dispute, it would be misleading to suggest that this attitude is as general among the Great Powers as it is among the smaller countries. Neither would it be true to assert that arbitration has proved as practicable a measure for the adjustment of great issues—such as, for example, led up to the World War—as it unquestionably has been efficacious in the settlement of a host of less vital and more specific difficulties. The reason for this is not far to seek. Nations, like individuals, are very slow to surrender real advantages, say, in the matter of political influence, trade, the control of raw materials and markets. Public opinion, it is alleged by way of excuse, will not allow certain questions (namely, the questions which most often lead to war) to be referred to arbitration. As an instance of how strongly this view persists we may take the recent observations of the British Government on the program of the Committee on Arbitration and Security. This reads:

Arbitration treaties impliedly, if not explicitly, impose upon the parties the obligation loyally to accept the decision of the tribunal. An arbitration treaty which goes beyond what the public opinion of a country can be counted on to support when the interests of that country are in question and when a decision unfavorable to those interests is pronounced is a treaty which is useless. It is merely calculated to deceive the public. In a moment of grave importance

it may fail to achieve a solution of a dispute even if the dispute is arbitrated in accordance with its terms. It would embitter relations between two countries instead of improving them, and would cause a setback to the movement now so steadily advancing in favor of the pacific settlement of justiciable disputes by means of arbitration.

It is because it is so generally felt that there are some questions, justiciable in their nature, which no country could safely submit to arbitration that it has been usual to make reservations limiting the extent of the obligation to arbitrate. These limitations may vary in form, but their existence indicates the consciousness on the part of Governments that there is a point beyond which they cannot count on their peoples giving effect to the obligations of the treaty. That there are limits beyond which a State cannot go in accepting binding obligations to arbitrate justiciable questions in all cases, is recognized in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By that provision the members of the League accept in principle but not definitely the obligation to arbitrate justiciable disputes. The framers of the Covenant realized that it was not feasible to embody in the Covenant a definite and comprehensive obligation to arbitrate all justiciable disputes.

Mere omission of the limitations on the obligation to arbitrate justiciable disputes which now figure in arbitration treaties would not promote the progress of arbitration. What is necessary is to overcome the difficulties which have caused the insertion of these limitations, and for this time is necessary. As nations get to understand each other better, as the respect for international law grows stronger, and as a sense of security increases, it will become more easy for States—even for those whose interests are world-wide—to accept comprehensive engagements to arbitrate justiciable disputes. Some States are already in that fortunate position. Others less fortunate must approach thereto by degrees.

Nevertheless with the installation of the Labor Government in Great Britain there has been noticed a greater willingness to assume world obligations. On September 19 the Optional Clause to the World Court agreement had been signed by Britain, India, South Africa and New Zealand, while the adhesion of Canada, Australia and the Irish Free State was expected hourly. Other signatories were France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Peru. In the meantime a conference of World Court members unanimously accepted the Root Formula governing America's adhesion to the Court. These developments together with Premier MacDonal'd's visit to this country in preparation for the proposed naval conference have rendered the case for security better than at any time since the War. It should be noted, however,

that whereas forty-three members have signed the Optional Clause of the World Court only eighteen have ratified the same. A campaign for ratification in several states is clearly in order.

Moreover, if there is to be an attempt loyally to follow the admonition contained in Benedict XV's letter to the belligerents, it is necessary not only to accept arbitration in theory but also, and most particularly, in practice. It is questionable whether public opinion is as far in the rear of enlightened principles in this regard as statesmen would sometimes have us believe. Undoubtedly there is a reluctance to jeopardize real or fancied national interests but there is a greater reluctance among the masses of the people to appeal once more to the bloody arbitrament of the sword. With this receptive state of public opinion to start with, it should not be impossible to educate the individual citizens to the necessity, as well as the desirability, of allowing their respective governments to conclude and, what is far more important, religiously to abide by treaties of non-aggression, arbitration and conciliation. There is reason to believe that public opinion, once it sees that arbitration is synonymous with peace, and that exceptions or reservations are inseparable from war, will permit the submission of even vital questions to the decision of a fair, impartial tribunal. In fact, notable advance has been made in this sphere by eliminating the two conventional exceptions to the process of arbitration known as questions of "national honor" and "vital interests." The tendency to substitute for these, equally vague and elastic phrases should be carefully scrutinized.

It is perfectly true that a treaty of arbitration is worth only so much as the people themselves want it to be worth. For that reason, security based on such agreements is, in the last analysis, the measure of the moral and religious sense of the men and women whose will they represent. International Catholic Action should have a hand in shaping this spirit of justice and friendship, always insisting on the absolute need for Catholic unity among the members of Christ's Mystical Body and on the moral as well as legal obligation faithfully to conclude and fulfil treaties of arbitration and

conciliation. Neither duty nor conscience should be bywords in the conduct of international relations, but take their place and exert their influence in the hearts of people who, by democratic government, control the actions of those they have elected to rule them. Then, and only then, will there reign that security which has its basic guarantee in God's eternal law.

V

It must be clear from what has been said that there are two general factors which make for international security. The first are those upon which the nations have leaned so heavily in the past, namely, standing armies, bombing planes, and ships-of-the-line. Under the same heading of physical factors fall all natural barriers, economic resources, the availability of men and supplies, convertibility of peacetime industries, alliances, ententes, pledges of mutual assistance, and military or naval "conversations" looking to collaboration in the event of war. These undeniably form a large part of what is called security today.

The second group is that of legal principles and moral factors, comprising treaties of non-aggression, arbitration and conciliation, backed by a conscientious determination of men and women to yield to others what is their due and prepared to make genuine sacrifices in the common interests of humanity.

Neither the physical nor the legal and moral factors of security are without their influence in the modern world. Their proportion, one to the other, may be left to reflection and discussion. For the present paper it is sufficient to note that undue emphasis on the physical factors mentioned has harmed, not helped, the cause of peace, so that it is high time to devote greater and more detailed attention to the organization of peaceful procedure in international affairs.

An analogy may help to illustrate this point. Every nation in the world may be pictured in the imagination as surrounded by two walls, one of flesh and one of spirit. The weaker the wall of spirit, the higher must rise the wall of flesh. The stronger the wall of spirit, the more easily and securely may it dispense with the outlying wall of steel.

Between many countries of the world there have been erected military, naval and economic barriers which testify to the instability of the moral factors of security. Between others there are miles and miles of unguarded frontier. Here moral security is the wall of spirit. Fearless and far-sighted statesmanship, for example, negotiated the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1818 dismantling the gunboats which had begun to be launched on the Great Lakes and providing that the continental boundary of the United States and Canada, which is now more than 3,000 miles in length, should henceforth be undefended by frontiers, fortresses, garrisons or guns. We have had many disputes since that time with our British and Canadian neighbors, and we have had many attempts on the part of militarists and shipbuilders to annul the agreement; but the two nations have adhered loyally to it and, in the absence of preparations to settle their disputes by war, they have succeeded in settling them all by the peaceful process of arbitration. The part played by the Permanent Commission of Conciliation in bringing about this happy result has already been alluded to.

A European object lesson of a similar nature has been furnished in recent times by Norway and Sweden. These two nations rejected a revolutionary war, agreed upon a peaceful separation after a century of political union, adopted a treaty for the arbitration of all future differences, and provided that their common frontier should remain forever unfortified. To celebrate this great triumph of the moral factors in security the two peoples contributed to the building of a peace memorial which has been erected on the border line, one-half of it in each country, with the figures of a Norseman and a Swede on top of it joining hands in friendship.

So too, in South America, Argentine and Chile, after a series of wars, threats of war and actual preparation for war, in 1902, by the disarmament of a thousand miles of their mutual frontier and the adoption of universal arbitration, showed that for every increase of moral protection it was possible to dispense with a proportionate amount of physical security. Instead of stocking the mountain heights with howitzers and machine-gun posts, they made from their

discarded cannon a colossal statue of the Prince of Peace and erected it upon a snow-capped border peak of the Andes, 13,000 feet above sea level, to remind the two nations of their agreement, and to declare that "sooner shall these mountains crumble into dust than the people of Argentine and Chile break the peace which they have sworn to maintain at the feet of Christ the Redeemer."

When the other nations of the earth have likewise plighted their faith to peace at the feet of the Saviour, security will no longer be a myth but a reality. If, then, in multiplying treaties of arbitration and conciliation, statesmen, following the example of Argentine and Chile, remember that the most important single factor in moral security is sincere acceptance of the teachings of the Divine Founder of Christianity, they, too, will be able to raze fortresses and scuttle navies, because where issues are studied under the flood lights of Christian justice and charity there will be no danger of an outbreak of armed hostilities. For the Redeemer is not only the Christ of the Andes, but also the Christ of the Alps, the Pyrenees and the Himalayas, the Rhine, the Ganges and the Nile. With Him and by Him alone will there be security worthy of the name. Any other assurances, however naturally sound and juridically established, are incomplete, inadequate and short of the ideal.

Security in the full sense of the term must be builded on the firm basis of supernatural religion, knowing absolutely no frontiers and uniting peoples of the most diverse race, condition and temperament by the inward bonds of sacramental grace, indivisible truth and obedience to the same spiritual authority. Statesmen whose efforts were in a contrary direction, whose boast it was that they "had put out the lights of heaven" did nothing but prepare their people for a catastrophic world war. The secular State can never provide, and is not intended to provide, that indispensable, transcendent, spiritual element of security which flows from religious principles firmly imbedded in the hearts and minds of the people.

VI

Not that the trilogy of arbitration, security and disarmament is shattered in consequence or in any wise impaired. Security is still the one thing necessary in the corporate life of nations, but it is security of a fuller, higher order. By all means increase the legal mechanism of international treaties, laws and courts, but let them be vivified and sacramentalized by the moral sense of the people. Arbitration and conciliation animated by such a spirit may be made to cover the whole range of human disputes; without the sanction of the individual conscience they are so much gossamer thread entwining, but not binding, the Moloch of war. Give to security its true meaning; only then will it prepare the way for disarmament.

APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX B

N. C. W. C. STUDY CLUB OUTLINE ON "SECURITY, OLD AND NEW"

(Printed by Permission of the N. C. W. C. Study Club Committee)

Lesson I

NATIONAL SECURITY (Text—Section I)

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Secure two maps, one of Europe before the war and the other of Europe after the Treaties. Note:

(a) Changes in national boundary lines.

(b) The natural protection afforded by rivers, oceans and mountains.

(c) Size of countries in relation to one another and to the United States.

2. Discuss national security as defined here.

3. Discuss the relatively high security of Europe from armed attack on land by the United States and vice versa.

QUESTIONS

1. How do natural barriers affect international relations? Cite examples.

2. Explain how economic, industrial, geographic, social and racial factors influence national security.

3. List six nations—three of which have national security and three national insecurity. Tell specifically the causes in each case.

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Lesson II

IDEAL AND RELATIVE SECURITY (Text—Section II)

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Ideal and relative security; objective and subjective security.
2. The relation of security to the reduction and limitation of
armaments.
3. The "guarantee of security" as considered by French and Ger-
man statesmen.
4. Benedict XV's proposal on arbitration and disarmament.

QUESTIONS

1. Wherein are the ideas of security of French and German leaders
similar and different?
2. When, according to Benedict XV's Letter, are penalties to be
imposed? Give examples. (See Lesson V, Paper 4.)
3. What is meant by the two fold axiom of M. Politis in this
section?

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Lesson III

SETTLEMENTS (Text—Section III)

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The Briand-Kellogg Pact in relation to arbitration; other recent pacts favoring peace.
2. Significance of Briand-Kellogg Pact in London Naval Conference.
3. Arbitration and judicial settlement.
4. Settlement of Oregon boundary dispute; Paraguay-Bolivia trouble; German reparations question.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the difference between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes? Cite examples.
2. Explain Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and list the four kinds of cases affected by it.
3. What was the settlement in the recent Concordat between the Vatican and the Italian Government?
4. How are differences between the United States and Canada adjusted?

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Lesson IV

ARBITRATION (Text—Section IV)

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Slowness of nations in accepting arbitration.
2. The British Commission's statement on arbitration.
3. The Pan-American Arbitration Treaty—its proposals and possible passage in the Senate.

4. The Root Formula governing America's adhesion to the World Court.
5. Examples in history of Church of settlements by arbitration.

QUESTIONS

1. What recent events show advance in arbitration as a settlement of national and civil disputes?
2. What is the relation of the Pan-American Conciliation Treaty and the Arbitration Treaty, if adopted, to inter-American security?
3. Explain the historical significance of "The Truce of God."
4. What are the essential difficulties likely to arise in the London Naval Conference? Why?
5. What were the results of the Washington Conference? Why?

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Lesson V

ARBITRATION—continued (Text—Section V)

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Necessity of recourse to peaceful means.
2. Admonition regarding arbitration in Benedict XV's Letter to belligerents.
3. Moral obligation of international treaties.
4. Special obligations in a democratic society regarding arbitration.
5. Need of Catholic unity among members of Christ's Mystical Body.

QUESTIONS

1. What is meant by "national honor" and "vital interests" as used in text?
2. What are the main proposals in Benedict XV's Letter to the belligerents?
3. Why ought peace treaties be arbitrated rather than imposed or negotiated?
4. What can Catholics do in the promotion of international peace?

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Lesson VI

CONCLUSION (Text—Section VI)

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Two general factors making for international security.
2. The Canadian-United States boundary question.
3. The Catholic press and peace.
4. The possibility of permanent peace.
5. Reasons for reliance on supernatural motives in furtherance of peace.

QUESTIONS

1. How has "the organization of peace procedure in international affairs" developed since the World War?
2. What caused the erection of peace memorials between Argentine and Chile: between Norway and Sweden?
3. What can Catholic lay organizations do to further peace?

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THE CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE came into existence as a result of a series of meetings during 1926-1927. The initial step was taken immediately following the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, June, 1926, where representatives of a dozen nations met informally with Americans for discussion. A second meeting followed in October of the same year in Cleveland. At this meeting a temporary organization known as the Catholic Committee on International Relations was formed. In April, 1927, at a two day conference in Washington the permanent name, the Catholic Association for International Peace, was adopted. Two conferences were held in the same city in 1928 and 1929, and another one is being planned there for 1930.

It is a membership organization.

Its objects and purposes are:

- To study, disseminate and apply the principles of natural law and Christian charity to international problems of the day;
 - To consider the moral and legal aspects of any action which may be proposed or advocated in the international sphere;
 - To examine and consider issues which bear upon international good will;
 - To encourage the formation of conferences, lectures and study circles;
 - To issue reports on questions of international importance;
 - To further, in cooperation with similar Catholic organizations in other countries, in accord with the teachings of the Church, the object and purposes of world peace and happiness.
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The present plan is to bring together in committees persons acquainted with a particular question. These committees prepare reports. The reports are discussed in the meetings of the organization. In the light of this discussion, they are then revised. Thereafter, they are presented to the executive committee, which makes them public.

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