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Europe and the United States
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Europe and the United States:

Elements in Their Relationship

Rev. R. A. McGowan


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The Europe Committee

AMERICAN GROWTH	AMERICAN POLICY
EUROPEAN BACKGROUND	FEAR OF AMERICA
THE HERITAGE OF THE WAR	POSSIBILITIES
EUROPEAN RIVALRIES	THE BASIC PRINCIPLE
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EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION	CONCLUSION

A Report of the Europe Committee

PRICE 10 CENTS



THE CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION FOR
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THANKS for the issuance of this Report are due to the College of New Rochelle, New Rochelle, New York, in response to the Holy Father's recent appeal, "May they all unite in the peace of Christ in a full concord of thoughts and emotions, of desires and prayers, of deeds and words—the spoken word, the written word, the printed word—and then an atmosphere of genuine peace, warming and beneficent, will envelop all the world."

EUROPE *and the* UNITED STATES:
ELEMENTS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP

Study Presented

to

The Catholic Association *for* International Peace

by

The Europe Committee

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THE CATHOLIC ASSOCIATION FOR
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THIS is a Report of the Committee on Europe of the Catholic Association for International Peace and is being issued as a Study from this Committee. It was presented and discussed at the regular annual meeting of the organization. The Committee cooperated in the final form of the Report and the passages involving moral judgments were presented to the members of the Ethics Committee for its consideration. It was presented to the Executive Committee which ordered it published. As the process indicates, this Report, being the report only of a Committee, is not a statement from the whole Association.

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EUROPE *and the* UNITED STATES:

Elements in Their Relationship

THE most important set of international relations in the world today seems to be those between the United States and Europe. All other world relations however much they have a separate existence merge into these at one or other point. The immediate future of world war or world peace depends on their right fashioning.

Here is attempted a summary of certain main elements in these relations.

I

AMERICAN GROWTH

The central fact is the new importance of the United States. During the nineteenth century the world had its axis in Europe. The European countries had projected themselves into every corner of the world. Their political empires were world wide. Their industrial system and their trading and money methods had gone everywhere. In their own colonies and spheres of influence and even in many politically sovereign countries their citizens were the chief owners of industry and the chief bankers and traders. Their cultural influence was unevenly widespread; sometimes it preceded, sometimes it followed, sometimes it was independent of, sometimes it clashed with Europe's foreign political power and wealth; and yet withal it was an element always in Europe's world position.

The remarkable fact now is that, at the time that more and more areas have successfully rid themselves of, or are now revolting against, the political, economic and cultural domination of Europe, the United States has become in its own right one of the political, economic and cultural powers of the earth and indeed in wealth the strongest of all. This change and its meaning merit close study for many reasons, and for hardly any reason more pressing than that such a change is an explosive. The rivalries of Rome and Greece, Spain and England, France and Germany, and England and Germany and their earth-shaking wars will indicate the seriousness of the present growth of the United States in economic, political and

cultural influence. The growth of the United States and the decline of Europe, not only as against the United States but also in relation to its own colonies, protectorates and spheres of influence, mark an epoch. In the past such new epochs have been marked also by wars.

Indeed, if the ocean did not lie between us like a moat guarding two strong continents, one might under the normal rule be reasonably sure of an attack by us or by them. Our growth in investment and trade in places they once dominated, their debts to us, our investments and trade in Europe itself, our demand for naval parity with the greatest of their naval powers, our immigration and tariff walls, our enormous wealth, our growing power while their strength declines, combine to make up many of the elements of a classic war situation.

Perhaps though, as some hold, there is no longer any possibility of a classic case of war arising between the United States and Europe. Two considerations bear this out. One is the securing through investments of American economic control in Europe uncomplicated by political sovereignty, and the alliances of European and American bankers, traders and industrialists. Another is the growth in means of communication. Tariffs and prejudices stand in the way and yet the North Atlantic is becoming a lake around which cluster in a single market and single intellectual forum a family of peoples to whose existence and development peace is imperative.

Yet the delicacy of the situation no one denies, now that the impressive growth of the United States to a towering place in the world while Europe declines is the central fact in the relations of peoples. What we do in the normal life of the nations, what we do to settle peacefully the world's complicated problems, what we do when war threatens, what we do when war comes is of key importance in Europe and everywhere. By our investments and loans we have become a European power in all but territory and political sovereignty. By our tariffs and immigration laws we restrict her markets and close a great area of settlement to her people, and thus mark every phase of her life. By our action or inaction in relation to Europe's efforts to settle her internal problems we deflect her policy, or ruin or weaken or buoy her hopes. By our action in war time with credits, goods and influence and, as in the last war, with men we turn the balance of European history. We are no longer on the margin of the world. We

are not splendidly isolated. Europeans know this more than we because what we do to them is more important now than what they do to us.

See Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (Macmillan, 1926); Mazur, *America Looks Abroad* (Viking Press, 1930); Denny, *America Conquers Britain* (Knopf, 1930); Murray, *The Ordeal of This Generation* (Harper and Bros., 1929); and MacLaughlin, *Newest Europe* (Longmans, Green, 1931).

II

EUROPEAN BACKGROUND

Two facts of Europe's life and three ruling ideas of both the United States and the European countries need to be stated immediately to bring out certain of the main bearings and modifications of this situation. One is that though Europe is rich and varied, it has far more people than we, it has to support them on fewer resources within Europe itself, and its internal and foreign debt is immense. Consequently, more urgently than we, it requires freedom of access to foreign raw materials, to foreign markets for its finished goods, and to territories to which its people may migrate. This does not mean that Europeans necessarily require political empires but simply that they require, more vitally than we, access on reasonable terms and in some form to outside raw materials, markets and places of settlement.

A second fact is that Europe is a babel of tongues, a lattice-work of nationalities, and a patch work of cultures fermenting within a continent of extremely varied resources, a continent that is itself a peninsula which juts forth from another continent and then is divided again and again by lesser peninsulas, islands, mountain chains, rivers flowing at divergent angles, by seas and bays widely separated and widely different, and by climate ranging from sub-arctic to sub-tropic. Hence, geographically, economically, racially, linguistically and culturally Europe tends always towards disunion. Europeans now are coming somewhat to think of themselves as Europeans; but for a long time they thought of themselves solely as Englishmen or Frenchmen or Germans.

In the realm of ideas three are worth noting beyond all the rest. One is that Europe, once a united Christendom, has long been divided. The Eastern Church separated first, to be-

come after a time a series of state-controlled national churches. In the West several of the Northern peoples abandoned a part of the Faith, separated, and formed state-controlled or independent churches. Then, first in the Orthodox and Protestant countries and later in the Catholic countries, there grew up the belief or practice that life was divided into compartments and that in only a few of the compartments did religion and the moral law have anything to say. Many everywhere, as would be assumed, have come to deny all validity to religion and even to most of the moral law. The chief differences in these respects in our own country are also a part of the picture. Our religions are not concentrated so much in certain districts and we have not a well-remembered tradition of state churches. But our early and reigning tradition was Protestant and it has been easier therefore for religion and the moral law to have been thrust out of certain parts of life without open conflict.

Two specific results loom large, results wherein we and Europeans are close to identical except that we are remembering less the centuries when men thought otherwise. Both results are rooted in the division of Christendom and in the relegation of religion and morals to a narrowing field of life.

One result goes often by the name of nationalism. It is the belief that the union of people in a nation is by far the most important form of human unity. To decide what a nation is, is difficult; but for practical purposes at any one time governments assume that all their subjects or citizens are to become uniformly loyal to their government above everything else including morals; and that the government in its dealings with other nationalities may seize territory, exploit resources and peoples, carry on war at will, be the judge always in its own case and do in general whatever it may have the power to do. This means the divorce of governments from morals. Normally it results in one or more political and economic empires which are then considered the great nations.

There is a similar divorce of economics from morals. In property and its use and in work the rule, now somewhat modified, is that everyone is to do as he wills and can in competition with others. This is considered wise and holy though selfish. Those who gain most wealth in practicing it are considered eminently worthy. Being wealthy they are also politically powerful. Like the divorce of government from morals, the di-

voice of economics from morals or the tenuous hold of morals upon economics is sheer paganism. It works tremendous wrong upon the propertyless and upon those less able, or less interested, in the particular qualities which under the rule make for financial success.

Upon Europe's crowded millions, paucity of resources and varied peoples as a background, a divided Christendom, anti-religion, secularism, glorification of the nation, and glorification of private business make Europe a cockpit. Our nation is a political unity, while Europe numbers about thirty governments, and our country is so new, sparsely settled, large and rich that the dire social results are not yet so clear or grave among us. But Europe, led on by this triple evil, long since became a maelstrom of nations and classes, and a continent wherein ravaging economic and political imperialism has reigned.

See Department of Commerce reports; Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (Macmillan, 1926); Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (Harcourt, Brace, 1922); Jarret, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages* (Little, Brown, 1926); Husslein, *Democratic Industry* (Kenedy, 1919); Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe* (Macmillan, 1924); Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (Macmillan, 1926); *A Code of Social Principles* (The Catholic Social Guild, Oxford, 1929); Fenwick, *International Law* (Century, 1924); Murray, *The Ordeal of This Generation* (Harper, 1929), and Fleure, *Peoples of Europe* (Oxford Press, 1922).

III

THE HERITAGE OF THE WAR

There is the temptation to ascribe to the last war of Europe's centuries of wars both more evil and less evil than it caused, less because its horrors no one can grasp, and more because the war was the racking fever and the suppuration of a deeply rooted and still uncured disease. When we in the United States in our daily conversation date events and changes from the period of the World War, we confess its tremendous impact upon us and reflect in miniature its meaning to a continent which the war engulfed deeply and for years. Europe is still suffering from the moral, intellectual and physical tragedies of the war period; it bears the heritage of a defeated central Europe; it wears the marks of the peace treaties; it

has not recovered from the unspeakable miseries which victors and conquered underwent in the years following the Armistice.

As the years have passed, the war has moved into the memory, sometimes as a thing of horror, at other times as the regretted or welcomed end of an era, and at still other times as somehow only a glorious panorama of bravery and human sacrifice. The war and the peace treaties left in their train disillusionment and even cynicism. The draining of life, the deflection of human effort, the long paroxysm of hatred, the sapping of wealth in countries that live close to the margin of existence, the mountain of debt pressing down upon the survivors, the dislocation of life for four long years still torture the peoples of Europe, and to a lesser degree, ourselves. France, Britain and Italy won, but they are marked so deeply by the wounds of the war that victory to them is in part a negative solace. Their internal and foreign debt, their loss of life, their ever-pressing internal problems and the burden of the new world problems, both those the war created and those it revealed, have made victory bitter. And this is true even though the war gave self-government to peoples long deprived of it and tended to make all governments more responsive to the needs of the people they governed and more alive to the duty of warding off another war from a crowded and chaotic continent struggling with spiritual disunity, nationalism and capitalism.

Fortunately, the bitterness of the war enmities have to some extent disappeared. What has not disappeared is a widespread sense of injustice, or sometimes simply disappointment, over the results of the peace treaties. The centers of conflict are these: the peace treaties' compulsory confession of sole war guilt by the conquered; reparations; the treatment of minorities; certain of the boundary lines of the new Europe and its possessions; and the distribution of its mandated territories. Certain of these issues were somewhat in eclipse in the very unsettled conditions immediately after the war, but all of them are looming larger all the time.

The whole world knows now what the victors must have always known, that no one government or group of governments was solely guilty of the catastrophe of 1914-18. The only question now is the order of guilt; savants, studying the records so far made public, differ considerably. Yet the written admission of sole guilt forced upon the defeated nations

has not been canceled and its ignominy and injustice bear heavily on the minds of certain groups in Germany, Austria and Hungary. As long as it stands unerased, it is a source of European division and discord.

Upon the legal basis of an admission of sole war guilt, vast annual reparations for war damage have been levied on the defeated nations. This practical consequence of the fiction of sole war guilt keeps the issue alive. Actually, though, reparations arise directly from the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary, even though some amount for war damages might, apart from the war guilt issue, have been affixed upon the defeated. The legal fiction of sole war guilt is a mere interpolation to reinforce with moral arguments the imposition upon the vanquished of a vast money penalty. It is this penalty and certain of the boundary lines which the peace treaty drew that cause trouble. The money burden falls greatest upon Germany; the burden of loss of territory falls greatest upon Austria and Hungary; all three suffer from both.

Under the last revision of the reparations payment, Germany from 1929 on is to pay over two billion marks a year for thirty-seven years and thereafter for twenty-two years the annual amount of the war debt payments of the Allies to the United States. Temporarily there is a moratorium. Such a burden falls upon all classes of the German people. They live under a mortgage laid upon them because of their defeat. To meet the payments they stint themselves. Some starve. The burden falls heavily on the wage and lesser salaried workers while the owners of the pre-war or war-time government bonds have long since been dispossessed by the indirect repudiation of those bonds through inflation of the currency. At the same time foreigners have increased their holdings in German corporations partly because Germans have been paying foreigners the annual sums of the reparations settlement.

The United States is involved not alone because she helped to write the peace treaties but also because two of her citizens, Dawes and Young, have been the chief figures in the two successive revisions. Moreover, during the final twenty-two years contemplated by the Young Plan, German reparation payments to the Allies and the latter's debt payments to the United States will be almost equal. Furthermore, in the first thirty-seven years, apart from the fact that an increasingly

large part of German reparations are paid to the United States on the war debts, any reductions in debt payments by the Allies will reduce the German payments by two-thirds of such reductions. Two facts emerge clearly. One is the staggering money burden Germany must pay to other countries; the other is the hold of the United States upon Europe.

Germany has chosen the Polish corridor, which runs to the sea between Prussia proper and East Prussia, as the symbol of her territorial losses. Germany seems content to consider Alsace and Lorraine as forever French and she speaks little of her other losses to Poland or the losses to Czechoslovakia. There is some desire expressed, though not clamorously nor uniformly, for the return in the form of a mandate of one or more of her former colonies. Austria is left with a shadow capital and forbidden, though German, to unite with Germany because of the fear in France and in the new countries of eastern and southeastern Europe of a stronger Germany, she turns hither and thither for friends; her proposed customs union with Germany threw Europe into turmoil over the fear that it might be a prelude to political amalgamation and more so over the possible effects of so large a free trade unit in the center of a tariff-ridden continent. Hungary bemoans her former provinces, now parts of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, and calls more insistently than does Germany for a revision of boundary lines that would return, in part at least, the rich eastern and southern lands of the Hungarian plain and the settlements of Hungarians that lie now far over her borders.

The new and enlarged states stand firm for the *status quo*. Poland would keep her corridor. Czechoslovakia would give up none of her territory save perhaps the poor lands of the Ruthenians on her far eastern border and then only to a new buffer state of the Ukraine. Rumania would not change her Hungarian border and Yugoslavia is firm for the letter of the treaties. Italy would keep the German-Austrians of her northern mountains and the Slavs of the western shore of the Adriatic. As will be noted later, Italy is also dissatisfied with the share she won out of the war. Bulgaria feels herself wronged.

The case on grounds of national self-government was so overwhelming against Germany, Austria and Hungary; the boundaries of the new Europe were drawn so hurriedly; and

emotions then ran so high; hopes of crippling the conquered were so strong; and agreements made to change neutrals into allies had been so freely engaged in that the new boundaries are in places clearly unjust. But whether they are just, or not, Europe is divided into two camps, one in favor of the present boundaries and the other in favor of more or less revision. In general, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy and Bulgaria seek a revision of the treaties. The rest are either neutral or like France and the new or enlarged countries of east Europe are definitely pro-treaty.

In this situation enters also the question of armaments. Under the treaties Germany was to disarm and it was promised that the other countries would not simply limit but also reduce their armaments. Yet in spite of a succession of disarmament conferences, nothing has been done to reduce land armaments and little to reduce navies. In fact armament budgets are greater than before the World War. Now they have finally agreed upon a general conference in 1932 to deal with all armaments and Europe, preparing for the conference, is rife with plans and counter-plans.

Germany and France are the chief protagonists on either side. At one time they seem to be approaching agreement and settled friendship. At another time, often as not because of a minor matter, they appear as enemies. Boundary lines, armaments, mandates, reparations, tariff agreements, loans, cartels in the Rhine valley and in the agricultural southeast, special treaties, traditions, and efforts at cooperation in the League or outside of it are the coinage of their goodwill or ill will.

On these, and on still other grounds yet to be mentioned, there is restlessness in Europe and a fear that war may come again. The nations that won feel themselves insecure in their victory. The Great War taught them the futility of trusting in war to make a European settlement. They see more clearly than in many generations the cause of their sorrow. They sense themselves slipping from their world position as the United States grows in wealth and power. Yet they will not disarm until they have set up a means of ensuring peace, while peace sometimes becomes confused with the peace treaties and justice with the *status quo*. Nevertheless the victors are attacking with impressive zeal the gigantic task of making Europe a safe place to live in. Likewise among the defeated

nations the strongest sentiment is towards peaceful correction of their foreign troubles. Yet both among the defeated and the victors certain groups sometimes quite large look solely to the force of arms, the one to keep what they have won and the other to wrest it from the conquerors. Hitler's party in Germany is an example among the conquered; the followers of L'Action Française are an example among the victors. Month by month and year by year in Europe the balance turns, now in favor of peaceful settlement, now less strongly and hopefully so, again in favor of war.

See Muir, *The Political Consequences of the Great War* (Henry Holt and Co., 1931); Gibbs, *Since Then; Disturbing Story of the World at Peace* (Harper and Bros., 1930); Buell, *Europe: A History of Ten Years* (Macmillan, 1929); Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (Oxford University Press, 1925); Howland, *Survey of American Foreign Relations, Section III* (Yale University Press, 1930); and *Britain's Industrial Future*—The Report of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry (Benn, London, 1928).

IV

EUROPEAN RIVALRIES

As if these were not enough to plague Europe, further lines of disunion cross her life to complicate the immediate heritage of the war.

Usually one thinks of Russia as standing against the world. More immediately it is Russia against the rest of Europe. Europe, a small peninsula stretching forth from Asia, seems to begin only at the western boundary of Russia. If geographically the Union of Soviet-Socialist Republics seems apart from the rest of Europe, stretching to the Pacific across the vast plains of eastern Europe and northern Asia, these last years have so separated it that it seems another world. Yet it stands neighbor to all the countries of eastern Europe, neighbor once removed from the countries of the West, and a European bridge to all the Far East. Russia with its state church of the Byzantine line was always remote from the life of Europe. Now it seeks to cut itself off from the institutions of Europe. Moreover it throws out the challenge that the countries of Europe and of the whole world must inevitably follow its example, that it will help Europe to change by revolution into societies committed to Communism, and that it will

help colonies, protectorates and spheres of influence in Europe's vast empires to revolt. The challenge is unmistakable and vital. The United States with its new interest in Europe and in the world meets the same challenge and contest.

Europe and ourselves have derided religion and morals by divorcing them from government, work and property. Russia would destroy religion itself both in Russia and, by a Communist revolution, throughout the world. Europe and ourselves, by becoming imperialist, have denied openly or covertly the rights of the lesser peoples of the earth. Russia proclaims the end of imperialism, although some indeed ask whether the federalized soviet system of republics, federated republics, autonomous republics and autonomous areas is not itself a new imperialism. Europe and ourselves have distorted private ownership by making it predominantly the privilege of the few and by declaring its rights almost unlimited in morals and law. Russia would overturn private ownership itself both in Russia and, by a Communist revolution, throughout the world. The challenge and conflict are thoroughgoing.

So great is the toll taken from industrial and agricultural efficiency and income by the combination of extreme nationalism and well-nigh unlimited private ownership, that the challenge of Russia from the East, rich in endless acres of farm lands and becoming now a new industrial country, may strike Europe with an impact as great as that of our own from the West. This is an element in our relations with Europe well worth watching. The next ten years, perhaps the next five, will be decisive.

A second major case of disunion is the rivalry between Great Britain and the continent. England is somehow not Europe at all. Men from the continent find it more foreign in its ways of thought than they find, for example, Germany and France foreign to each other. It is an island apart. Once the victim of continental invasions, by the good luck of continental wars, a steady policy of helping the next strongest but one of the continental countries and its sea-power, it has kept itself free from invasions for centuries. It is the greatest of the political empires, it was long the business center of the world, and though parity with the United States is accepted, its naval strength is still the greatest in the world and far larger than that of any other European country. The rivalry between England and the continent, and France, in particular,

now the strongest continental power, is intense though veiled. The situation is changing, however, because in addition to the defeated nations and the victors, Great Britain lost most heavily during the war. Her pre-war position compared with her post-war internal debts, her debt payments to the United States, the rise of new industrial districts the world over, the economic growth of France, the use of plane and submarine, the almost complete independence of her dominions, the trouble in India, the revolution in China and, finally though not at all last in importance, the growth as a world power of the United States, show the shift in England's position. Indeed it is not unlikely that Britain, which has since the war thrown in more of her lot with Europe, may come closer to Europe in the next few years. Now she is wavering, at one time Europeward, at another time towards her empire. Just now she is drawing closer to the Dominions. Her waverings and her future decision, perhaps one to be thrust upon her, are fateful in Europe's life.

A third major division lies between countries that own non-European territory and countries that own none, or almost none, or less than they actively desire. Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Italy, Russia and Spain have outside possessions. Russia's outside territory touches its European area; in the other cases the lands lie overseas. Since colonies, protectorates, mandates and spheres of influence are in theory and sometimes in fact a profitable source of raw materials, a profitable outlet for goods, a refuge for crowded peoples, and a jewel of national glory, there is rivalry, often serious, between the imperial and the non-imperial governments and between one imperial government and another. Examples are Germany bemoaning her lost colonies and Italy searching for a larger empire.

Another division is the difference between the agricultural east and southeast and the industrial and commercial west. With the directions reversed the United States has a similar situation. But we are one country and the European continent is not; in Europe there are tariff barriers between the different sections and between parts of one section as, for example, the Danube states; and most of the countries, afraid of a war from their neighbor or perhaps simply pushed on by their own business men, wish to establish or have safe access to the industry and agriculture which they need in war time. Since

war is waged with manufactured weapons and since safe sources of food and industrial resources are needed should war come, and since industry and trade bring the largest profits, the trend is for the non-industrial countries to emphasize industrial growth, and for the industrial countries to emphasize access to agricultural products and industrial raw materials. Examples are industrial Belgium and agricultural Bulgaria; industrially ambitious Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland and Spain; Britain's anxiety for her sea lanes to import raw materials and food; Franco-German understandings on raw materials and markets; industrial Europe's disappointment that Italy and the new governments of eastern Europe are bent on industrial development; Austria's grief that a great banking and trading city has been left with only a poor farming country to support it.

Finally, there is rivalry between France and Italy. Italy except in Yugoslavia is gaining political and economic influence in the Balkans, where a few years ago France was alone; it is reaching out towards understandings with Hungary and Austria; it is ambitious for more colonies; it contemplates predominance at least in the eastern Mediterranean; and it speaks of the Italians who long ago or recently have taken up their abode in French Tunis. France is the richest and strongest of the continental powers, now that Germany lacks colonies and is shouldering so large a part of the war debts. Italy is crowded and poor. Italy wants to grow. Its growth would be at the expense largely of France or Britain and Great Britain would be more difficult for her to war with. Here both in itself and in its repercussions throughout Europe is one of the most serious of the present national rivalries in Europe. It showed itself clearly in the London Naval Conference both in France's demand for a big navy to be compromised on only should England go security for France and for a peaceful negotiated re-ordering of European affairs, and in Italy's steady declaration that she would build a navy as large as any France will build. It showed itself again in the announcement of a truce between them in their naval rivalry and in the misunderstandings over the terms of the truce followed by efforts thus far futile to clear up the differences.

These and other rivalries within Europe, accentuated and complicated every one by the heritage of the war and by age-old rivalries, are so serious that another war may break out

there as it did in 1914 unless efforts now being made or planned succeed. Europe is still tinder.

Yet this Europe with former colonies that want now to walk alone such as Australia and Canada; domains in revolt such as India; former spheres of influence in anarchy such as China; this Europe torn asunder by irreligion, nationalism and capitalism; struggling with debt and boundary quarrels; burdened with armaments and the fears they give rise to; menaced by the rivalry of the United States now proficient at its own game and enormously wealthy; threatened by the new system of Russia and the appeal to revolution; divided within itself in countless ways and in none more dangerous than in its long effort both to divide Christ and keep Him in the sanctuary or in a distant heaven; this Europe is at least trying desperately to meet its four-square problem of American competition, Russian threat, dissolving empires and internal disunion.

See Miller, *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism* (Knopf, 1928); Feiler, *The Russian Experiment* (Harcourt, Brace, 1930); *Soviet's Twelve Years*, in *Current History*, July, 1930; *Britain's Industrial Future*—the Report of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry (Benn, London, 1928); Denny, *America Conquers Britain* (Knopf, 1930); Roosevelt, *America and England* (Cape and Smith, 1930); Delaisi, *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (Viking Press, 1927); Haas, *American Agriculture and International Affairs* (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 1930); Lowell and Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1927); *The London Naval Conference* (Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. VI, No. 6, 1930); *France and Italy in the Mediterranean* (Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1930); and *Proceedings of the London Naval Conference and Supplementary Documents* (U. S. Department of State, 1931).

V

EUROPEAN-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP

Europe seems to show signs of realizing that religious apostasy, open or masked, full or partial, is in the last analysis the cause of all her woes. The Catholic Church is the Church of traditional European unity, a unity which was broken finally but not forever by the Reformation, a unity politically disavowed for the first time consciously in the Peace of Westphalia that ended the first cycle of post-Reformation wars. The Catholic Church in Europe is stronger in numbers, in the

devotion of its followers and in the consciousness that religion embraces all life than at any time since the unity both of the Faith and of Europe was broken. Non-Catholic churches, sensing the falsity of assuming a divided Church, are struggling for union even though as yet union means minimizing the content of Christ's teaching. Yet the new spring of true religious unity is still far away from tortured Europe and the summer of living membership in the Mystical Body of Christ wherein men and institutions will worship Christ and His law in word and practice seems remote. Like ourselves, Europe is far from becoming a living part of the Kingdom of Christ.

Europe is, though, learning anew and under stress of trouble the lesson it learned once before in the Middle Ages that patriotism is a virtue to be trained and checked and that private ownership is a power to be diffused, democratized and regulated. Indeed these are phases of European life that are definitely broadening and deepening and that fact may prove the beginning of a new era of Europe's greatness.

We Americans should want Europe always great and not alone for Europe's sake, but for our own. The economic element is present here; our trade to and from Europe is an element in our strength. But that is not the most important item. We Americans are no longer simply transplanted Europeans; we are definitely a new people. Yet we cannot and should not shake off wholly our European traditions. The head and font of Christian unity is in Europe. There is in Europe a vitality of the body, the mind and the soul, a healthy variety along with its unhealthy disunity, and a savor of the well-rounded life which, if lost or weakened, will mean immeasurable loss to us. We are sharing more and more in Europe's culture just as Europe is sharing more and more in ours. Europeans lament that we are changing her whole civilization. If we are changing her life, she is changing ours. We may lament over some of her influence as much as she mourns some of ours, but we receive good from her in abundance.

Indeed it is one of the remarkable facts of the twentieth century that European culture and American culture, partly through ease of communication but more largely because both confront an identical political, business and machine system, are more alike today than they were a hundred years ago. We continually listen to European religious leaders, philosophers,

statesmen, scientists, novelists, poets and musicians. We continually borrow from the fruits of European dignified leisure and unceasing toil. We continually sample a form of life which will make our material greatness more worthwhile. And like Europe, though less strenuously so, we are wondering how to change our course away from irreligion, blatant nationalism, and a triumphant plutocracy. In all these we can learn from Europe. It seems in fact that Europeans and ourselves must learn together.

See Zimmern, *America and Europe* (Oxford University Press, 1929); *L'Oeuvre de l'Internationale Syndicale Chretienne dans les Années 1925-1928* (Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Chrétiens, Drift 12, Utrecht, Holland, 1929); *International Industrial Agreements* (Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. V, No. 24, 1930); Roosevelt, *America and England* (Cape and Smith, 1930); and Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents on International Affairs* (Oxford University Press, 1930).

VI

EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION

Europe is experimenting with remedies for her evils. The League of Nations is one experiment. When Europe saw her world tottering and sensed that perhaps her empires and world influence might slip away, she helped to form a league of all countries to keep the peace and work out the solution of problems which normally lead to war. The League is not a European institution, but it grew largely out of the needs of Europe as they reacted and would react upon the world. Probably even if we were a member of the League (and certainly since inter-American relations have been exempted from its decisions), the League would spend most of its time upon the thorny problems of the European continent and its empires. As it is, the League's chief concern is with Europe and Europe's dependencies. It works through an assembly of the nations, a council of fourteen nations acting as an executive, a permanent staff or Secretariat, special committees on a multitude of subjects including armaments, economic questions, and intellectual cooperation. It is trying in a world of irreligion, nationalism and capitalism to keep the peace, even to modify nationalism and the economic system, and to compose by agreement and judicial decision the particular conflicts which arise throughout the world, particularly in Europe and its colonies. Two

autonomous organizations, the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, and the International Labor Office at Geneva act as adjuncts to the League. The former seeks to settle disputes submitted to it. The latter seeks to improve world labor conditions by cooperation between representatives of governments, employers and labor.

The whole plan is two-fold. One is to have a continuing organization and frequent conferences of the nations to attack peacefully their joint problems and particularly those that normally lead to war. The other, and this is problematical, is to provide for joint sanctions, first, boycott, and second, armed force, against any nation that breaks the peace. It is a limping organization and necessarily so in the world in which it works. Neither the world nor Europe itself is yet ready for the full plan either of peaceful and just settlement of disputes or of joint action against a recalcitrant nation. The League works in a world that has not avowed its allegiance to the principles of justice and charity between and within nations, or to Him whose Kingship alone assures men the source of knowledge and the strength they need both to know and practice justice and charity. Yet within the limits which confine the League and the nations that compose it, it is doing good work and it is undoubtedly moving, painfully enough and hesitatingly, in the right direction. It has settled a considerable number of grave disputes and averted upon several occasions what seemed to be inevitable war.

Yet Europe's rival to the East, Russia, and its rival to the West, the United States, are for divergent reasons not members of the League.

Whatever one may think of our cooperation with the League or our entrance into it, it exists and it is the chief agency at the present working for the peace of Europe and the world. Moreover, whatever it does, either to keep the peace or, should war begin, to crush it by boycott or armed force, is of interest to us.

The problems of Europe are grave and they are caused so often by the rigidity of its own frontiers that many in Europe have come to the conclusion that in addition to the world League Europe needs a European league. There is a decided move towards a United States of Europe. In September, 1930, a committee was formed from the representatives of twenty-three European states to consider its possibili-

ties. Problematical as are its prospects, the inclusion of Great Britain is still more problematical and that of Russia most problematical of all. But if it is formed, can we then look forward to a United States of continental Europe, a United States of Great Britain and the Dominions, a United States of the communist republics, the United States of America, and perhaps the United States of India, of China, and of Latin America? And if so, is each group to be a rival in a narrowing world of every other group? Yet at the same time that they seek a way of making the European Union in form and reality not a rival bloc to anyone else, the problems of Europe are so strained that the continental countries seem willing to risk it.

Moreover there are special treaties and understandings which link together several of the European countries. Some of these are in the spirit of the old pre-war treaties, providing for action under certain conditions by one group of allies against another and based upon the old idea of a balance of power. The Locarno Treaty is a sample of a new form of treaty under which several nations that under normal circumstances would be preparing to attack one another in allied groups have banded together to assist one another against aggression.

Special economic agreements are common in Europe and the effort is made to extend them. They take the form of international agreements, called cartels, among industrialists in the same line looking to the ratio of production allotted to each and the share of certain markets each national group is to have. In all they number nearly twenty. But they are largely in force in the new partnership of France, Germany and Belgium in the Rhine valley. In agriculture the effort is halting, though under serious consideration. The day of a federalized European industry and agriculture that some men envisage seems still remote. If what others say is true that a federalized industry is a prerequisite of much tariff reduction, to say nothing of free trade within the European continent, and if free trade is necessary before a United States of Europe is created, then indeed a federalized Europe is distant. Here again the search for a united Europe is hampered by the very nationalism and capitalism of some who speak in its favor; for they wish a united Europe on terms that would prevent much industrialization in other countries as well as

much freedom of trade in their own markets for the agricultural products of other countries. Yet the effort towards a continental economic system including, if possible, Great Britain, as contrasted with a series of national economic systems, continues.

The old imperialism is also meeting a change. Under the system of mandates, the new territories of the European powers over which they have tutelage under the peace treaties are subject to the criticism of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League. The League has not effectively exercised this power; yet it appears certain that the fact that there is a commission of the League on mandated territories and the further fact that there is always the danger, occasionally made actual, of a country that possesses a mandate and misuses its power being publicly called to task soften somewhat the rigors and selfishness of imperialism. What it has done about Syria, Palestine and a rebellion in an African mandate are examples in point. The mandate system may even develop into an entirely new method of holding, administering and apportioning raw materials, trade opportunities and opportunity of settlement in undeveloped areas generally.

Moreover, in the peace treaties following the World War the new or enlarged countries of eastern and southeastern Europe were constrained to agree that minority peoples, living under their government, of other nationalities and religions than the dominant one, would have their rights to language, education, religion and civic equality respected. Again the League has been hampered not only by the nationalism of these governments but also by the nationalism of certain of the great European powers such as France and Italy. Yet the new minorities have a ground for appeal, and a consciousness that it is their right to appeal to the world when the nationalism of a government is crushing their culture and religion. And herein, as in the case of mandates, lies probably one avenue towards settling justly and without further war those vexed questions of boundaries and human rights in eastern and central Europe where languages and nationalities are a patch quilt.

Europe is striving also for intellectual internationalization and understanding. Bound together once by one Church under one Head, Europe had a common language of culture, a common educational system, a common outlook upon this

world and the next, a common fund of principles, in some respects a common body of law, and a common store of knowledge. It had local divergencies in abundance, but its common treasure was its prize. Now after centuries of emphasis upon national qualities and achievements, it is building less slowly than is realized a university of intellect. The committees on intellectual cooperation and the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation under the auspices of the League and numerous international associations approach every conceivable subject from almost every angle. Language barriers are being, to a degree, overcome by the use of artificial languages and far more so by the quite general use of French and English, and to a lesser extent, German.

There is much travel from one country to another in Europe by persons on pilgrimages, or simply touring in groups or as individuals, or upon business, or to attend the numerous international meetings. Geneva is a forum and sounding-board of Europe and to a less degree of the world. The peoples of all the countries of Europe are meeting each other oftener to discuss plans, exchange information, become acquainted with each other, learn each other's ideas and emotions. Old local peculiarities of dress and dialect are being submerged and though European states have their passport regulations and still treasure their national animosities, travel and familiarity with one another are breaking down the traditional hatred of the foreigner and the suspicion of the man in the next province.

Throughout Europe, too, there are national and international bodies to subject ownership of property, buying and selling, hiring and being hired, loaning and borrowing to rough rules of justice. Not all of them speak in terms of justice, so long have the old moral rules of the fair price and the old moral law against usury been submerged. But through labor unions, cooperative consumers' organizations, credit unions, political parties and laws, they try to stem the domination of property owners and the rule of selfishness. In their work they cross national lines. Though hampered and often defeated and struggling against countless difficulties, they are making progress.

Moreover, Europe and, in this case, the United States also are seeking to establish limits and ratios to sea and land armament. That the search is being made is a sign not alone, as some would have it, that governments and peoples are appalled

at the costs, but also that they dread the international ill will and the danger to peace of a world competing in arms. The fact, though, that even an established ratio and limit of sea arms alone are as yet a mirage and the actual reduction of armaments is interminably delayed shows the danger that underlying conflicts, fears, jealousies and injustices may launch the world into another war again.

It is perhaps accurate to say in rapid résumé that Europe confronts its own internal and imperial rivalries and is conscious of its declining world strength as against the United States, Russia and its former subject areas; that it is torn among three desires,—peace, power, and the easing of its nationalist, imperialist and capitalist burden; but that it is making progress towards the formation of an international spirit and organization centering in Europe with which to settle by agreement problems that in the past have provoked war, and progress also towards an international agreement centering thus far in non-Russian Europe to take some form of joint action against any nation that would take up arms.

See Carroll, *The League of Nations in Its First Decade* (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 1930); Eppstein, *Ten Years' Life of the League of Nations* (May Fair Press, London, 1930); Hutchinson, *The United States of Europe* (Willetts, Clark and Colby, 1930); Buell, *Europe*, ch. VI (Macmillan, 1929); Divine, *The World Economic Conference* (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 1929); *International Industrial Agreements* (Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. V, No. 24, 1930); Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Catholic Social Movement in France* (Macmillan, 1929); *A Code of Social Principles* (The Catholic Social Guild, Oxford, 1929); *The Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, Paris, 1930* (World Peace Foundation, Boston); Myers, *Industry, Government and Labor* (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1928); *Work of the International Labor Organization* (Industrial Conference Board, New York, 1928); Harriman, *The Constitution at the Crossroads* (Doran, 1925); Spaight, *Pseudo-Security* (Longmans, Green, 1928); Lorwin, *Labor and Internationalism* (Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1929); Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan Europa*, a monthly periodical; *Ten Years of World Cooperation*—Official Publication of the League of Nations (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1930); and *L'Oeuvre de l'Internationale Syndicale Chretienne dans les Années 1925-1928* (Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Chrétiens, Drift 12, Utrecht, Holland, 1929); and Pope Pius XI, *Forty Years After—Reconstructing the Social Order* (National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C., 1931).

VII

AMERICAN POLICY

Our position is peculiar in the face of all this. We have remained nationalist and capitalist. We have vastly extended our economic power and we have solidified our control of the Caribbean area without however occupying new territory since the war. Through our Monroe Doctrine, we warn Europe and the world to advance no farther in the Western Hemisphere. We have entered a naval and political understanding regarding our interests in the Pacific. We have led in forming Latin American conciliation treaties. We have demanded and received the status of naval equality with Great Britain and have worked to establish ratios and tonnages for all the navies. We are to join in a consideration of land armaments. Should we have a serious dispute with almost any European country, we and they must delay for an attempted conciliation of the difficulty. We have advanced toward but not actually entered the World Court under a provision that we have the right to veto the Court's delivering advisory opinions in any case clearly of interest to us, while in border-line cases we may withdraw from the Court when we wish to remove ourselves from its jurisdiction. In many of the *ad hoc* committees and conferences of the League we are represented, but we do not initiate such committees formed for the solution of problems that are either simply serious on an international scale or may, if left unsettled, lead to war. Our citizens have taken a prominent part in the actual agreements over the amount of reparations and the method of payment. In the Briand-Kellogg Pact we have joined with France to sponsor an international agreement in which nearly all governments reject war as an instrument of national policy and agree to use none but peaceful means to settle their disputes. When a Russian-Chinese war threatened, we immediately consulted with the other Powers, with China and indirectly with Russia, to stop a violation of that treaty. To accord it with the Kellogg Treaty, the Covenant of the League is in the difficult process of revision.

In the case of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria our government made a great departure. It notified the League

that through independent diplomatic representatives it would reinforce the League's efforts to keep the peace. Here are consultation and cooperation with the League itself in a matter of trying directly to prevent war. The scene, though, is in the Pacific.

But we have not taken steps to provide formally, and this need not mean League membership, for a general means of our consultation in case a war threatens in Europe, though this we have done in Latin America and the Pacific. Though we helped organize the League and our representatives were probably its chief sponsors, we have steadfastly refused thus far to enter it and, while we may join the World Court under stiff reservations, we have not yet ratified the signature which our representatives attached to the revised form of its statute. Thus except upon specific committees and conferences we thus far refuse to cooperate formally with Europe and the world in a continuing organization that will try to settle in time of peace problems that may lead to war; we refuse to promise in case a war threatens (except it be in the Pacific area) to consult with them regarding it, though in the event of a threat we may do so; we refuse to promise beforehand what we will do in case a war actually breaks out or a boycott is laid.

The heart of the facts seems to be this: We, newcomers, stand now along side of Europe and its chief powers in the economic, political and cultural rule of the world; Europe is tortured by religious disunity and irreligion, by confusion and immorality in governmental policies, by nationalism, by imperialism and imperialistic ambitions, and by confusion and immorality in economic policies; Europe moves upon a background of poverty, of physical, linguistic, national and cultural differences, and recent war; Europe and the rest of the world, save Russia, are joining together with some degree of zeal and honesty to clean up this mess; Russia has seceded from Europe and stands as a third great unit in the world; we have the same general ideas that Europe has, yet on a background of newness, sparse population, greater wealth and far greater internal unity; but we refuse to take a full part in settling world problems and preventing war, and we most emphatically decline to make any commitments regarding what we will do in case war or boycott threatens in Europe. Our guiding policy is to have the world formally eschew war by the Kellogg Pact and then for ourselves, except in Latin America and the

Pacific, do nothing directly to prevent war or stop it once it begins.

See Fchahaski, *The Washington Conference and After; An Historical Review* (Stanford University Press); Jessup, *The United States and the World Court* (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1929); *London Naval Conference—Digest of the London Naval Treaty of 1930* (Publication No. 85, Department of State, Washington, D. C.); *Treaties and Resolutions* (67th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document 124); Wright, *Interpretation of American Foreign Policy* (University of Chicago Press, 1930).

VIII

FEAR OF AMERICA

Our attitude is ominous. Europe and the world realize its seriousness. We ourselves know the gravity of the decision. We give implicit notice to Europe that thus far we are of the mind that, in case war comes in Europe, the wealth of our resources is to be sold and the money of our citizens lent at the best terms possible in the open market to any and every government to which the goods can be delivered. The presumption is that our government will protect our traders. This may not be our actual intention nor may it be our actual practice in case of another war. But we act as if this is our mind and as if this is what we will do. If this policy is not definitely changed, in the normal course of events and unless immediately upon the outbreak of another war a vast and overwhelming movement rises in the United States against the policy, we shall be in trouble.

Indeed even without open war we might be in trouble. Should the League lay a boycott (something far more probable than a League war) upon one country to force it, by means short of war, to come to terms, our situation, if we tried to break through the boycott, would be the same as during a war itself.

The most serious effect of this policy on Europe comes from the fear of defeat in the countries of the North Sea and the Mediterranean, to which it is geographically difficult for us to ship goods, and the hope in the Atlantic countries that in case of war our great resources may be relied on. Geography and not justice will decide. Because of our great wealth this cuts directly across all efforts Europe is making to settle its

problems peacefully or, failing that, to outlaw the recalcitrant nation. They ask us what we can mean by a pact to outlaw war when we will neither become a member of a permanent League to build up a settlement or negotiate a settlement or boycott the outlaws, nor even agree to consult regarding means of deciding which country is an outlaw and how it will be proceeded against for breaking the peace. There is no question but that our policy retards Europe's wavering determination to set straight peacefully its own household and those of its empires. Our shadow falls heavy across the map of Europe, the minds of Europeans and the future of Europe.

Two questions face us. One concerns joint action in case of serious trouble and the other concerns a permanent continuing organization and conference to settle the problems themselves. And back of both there is still another set of questions. Does either consultation or League membership or both look only to our joining actively a boycott or merely to our consenting to a boycott? Does either League membership or agreement to consult or both imply or obligate our use of arms to back decisions we shall have helped to make?

Yet it remains true that any of these alternatives might be taken without either League membership or the agreement to consult. During the last European war we found ourselves, as it seemed, unable to stay out of the War precisely because, while the Atlantic group of combatants did indeed contest our shipping, the North Sea group was contesting it more seriously and by violence. The same thing can happen again and this possibility is well known in the United States. If our shadow hangs over Europe, her shadow hangs over us.

If our strength is the first fact in our relations with Europe, the second fact is a question: What will we do with our strength? It is not primarily what we will do in time of peace, i. e., not our entrance into the League. It is what we will do with our strength in case of boycott or war in Europe. It is the question of "the freedom of the seas" except now there is an international organization committed, and struggling to live up to its plan, to join forces against a nation that breaks the peace. In this the ruling powers of the League may work injustice, may merely use the strength of the League to perpetuate present injustices, may throw their power against a justly recalcitrant nation. That is not only possible but probable. But since we are not in the League and do not join in

the decision, there is before us the question either of accepting the decision of the Powers made in the League or of defying them.

The first means that we will not ship to the recalcitrant. The second means that we will try to send merchant vessels and cargoes through a line of ships. This almost certainly will mean war against the Powers of the League. And if we ask why we should be compelled to accept decisions which we have not ourselves made, they tell us that this is one world and that the way is open to us to join the League and help in forming the decisions. Short of that the way is open to an agreement to keep in continuous touch with the League, to hold continuous informal and unofficial conversations with the League, to hold continuous informal and unofficial conversations with the League officials and members, and finally to consult publicly and officially with League powers, either as such or in their individual capacity, in case the peace of Europe is threatened. Then we shall know what they are doing and are to do and why, and they will know our plans and the reasons for them.

Confer *The League of Nations and Prevention of War* (Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. VI, No. 11, 1930); *American Aversion to Consultative Pact* (Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. VI, No. 6, p. 107, 1930); *Proceedings of International Conference for Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions*, League of Nations Publication (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1930); *International Conference with a View to Concerted Economic Action*, Geneva (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1930).

IX

POSSIBILITIES

At this point in a consideration of the relations of the United States and Europe there usually comes the warning that we must keep our hands clean of all the treachery, selfishness, imperialism and internal squabbles of Europe, a warning reinforced by a further warning that we who know nothing of Europe cannot expect to deal wisely with Europe's problems. One hears, too, the voice of the cynics whispering that we can make the most money and gain the most power by going alone. And finally, one hears it said that the Pacific and Latin America are the regions of our greatest foreign in-

terest and that we have more than enough to do to care properly for them. As for Europe, have we not joined with the leading country of the continent to sponsor a world-wide pledge against war which we for one shall never break?

The warnings come out of our tradition and our geographical position. Memories are still strong among us of our ancestors fleeing kings, wars, and landlords to a world of fair opportunity, popular rule and surcease from Europe's quarrels. And so long have we been away and so far and so much has Europe changed that post-war Europe is difficult for us to visualize. Our contacts with Europe in time of crisis have strengthened the convictions upon which these warnings are based, and the War and the Versailles Treaty have confirmed our belief that Europe has changed enough to put the details of its problems beyond us and not enough to make our ancestors' memories wholly false. As for Latin America, through the Conciliation Treaty and the Arbitration Treaty, should the latter be adopted and adhered to, we shall be relieved of much if not all of the task of policing the western hemisphere; and in the Pacific we deal directly with the two strongest of the European powers, England and France, and indirectly with Russia. The word of the cynic that going it alone will give us most wealth and power bears strongly upon the problem and comes from as deep a tradition as any we have. But it is an ignoble tradition and it cancels much if not all that Americans say in condemnation of similar policies in Europe.

The boasts for the Kellogg Pact reach the root of the matter. Is it enough in our relations with Europe merely to disavow war? It is not enough, our government has decided, in the Latin American area and in the Pacific. If the foregoing analysis of our relations with Europe and the situation in Europe itself is correct, then neither in Europe is mere disavowal of war enough to prevent it. If that is so then the conclusion is certain that we must do much more. How much more, this report does not attempt to say.

These questions, nevertheless, need to be answered: In the case of a threat of war or boycott in Europe, should we agree to consult with the Powers or also with the League, and if the latter, formally or informally, upon their attitude towards an approaching war? Or should we refuse to consult with anyone.

Should we be prepared to accept a boycott laid by the

League upon one of its recalcitrant members? Or should we decide to oppose and try to break through any such boycott?

Should we make it a matter of policy to boycott all belligerents on both sides in a war? Or should we sell to all?

Should we go beyond a policy that looks only to consultation when threat of war is at hand, and join formally and actively with other nations in time of peace to settle the problems which normally lead to war? Or should we refuse to do this or should we do it only occasionally?

In all this what should be our attitude towards Russia, which though in part European stands geographically and institutionally apart?

And if we join with Europe by continuous conference to settle European problems peacefully, should we continue our present policy towards disputes in Latin America?

In any circumstances what should be done apart from governments to bring to Americans and Europeans a better knowledge of each other and a closer year by year cooperation in religious, cultural and economic relations?

See Jessup, *American Neutrality and International Police* (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1928); Pitney, *Pan American Treaties of 1929* (National League of Women Voters, New York, 1929); Paish, *The Way to Recovery* (Putnam, 1931); *Latin America and the United States* (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 1929); Herriot, *The United States of Europe* (Viking Press, 1930); Martin, *Europe as I See It Today* (International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931).

X

THE BASIC PRINCIPLE

The general rule to be followed is that the United States must take its full part to help establish peace with justice for its own good, the good of Europe and the good of the world.

The following passages from *International Ethics*, a report of the Ethics Committee, which we consider almost the ruling charter of our Association, are directly to the point:

"These are the five conditions necessary and sufficient to justify a state in entering upon war: actual or certainly imminent violation of rights; moral certainty that this is the situation; a degree of evil in the injury proportionate to the evils involved in war; inefficiency of peaceful means; and a well-grounded hope of bringing about better conditions. The

sovereign authority must also declare the war and it must possess the right intention."

The keystone is "inefficiency of peaceful means" which amplified earlier include: "Direct negotiation, diplomatic pressure of various kinds, such as trade embargoes, boycotts and ruptures of normal international intercourse, and mediation and arbitration and judicial settlement," and when all these fail, "the calm, deliberate judgment of the people."

"Justice requires a state to promote peace for the sake of its own members, while charity obliges it to pursue the same end for the welfare of both itself and other nations. These duties rest not only upon governments, but upon peoples, particularly upon those persons and organizations which can exert influence upon public opinion and upon political rulers.

"The first and most generally obligatory means of action is education.

"The second great duty in fulfilling our obligation of promoting world peace is to consider fairly and to support, so far as our abilities and conscience permit, practical proposals and arrangements for preventing war and making peace secure.

"The substitution of moral right for material force, general disarmament, compulsory arbitration of disputes among states, the codification of international law, an international tribunal of justice and an association of nations, such is a complete and coherent summary of the practical methods available and necessary for preventing war and assuring peace. In the present condition of international affairs they all seem to be not only in harmony with, but demanded by, the principles of international right.

"World peace seems to be unattainable unless every one of these proposals and devices is somehow made to function. As sincere lovers of peace, it is our duty to consider them sympathetically and adequately, and in the light of that examination to support any of them that wins our approval. Unless we strive for peace by specific and practical methods, all our pacific professions are hollow and futile. The obligation to attain an end implies an obligation to use the appropriate means."

See *International Ethics* (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 1928); Stratmann, *Church and War* (Macmillan, 1928); Sturzo, *The International Community and the Right of War* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1929).

XI

ARMAMENTS, DEBTS, TARIFFS

Europe delays reduction of armaments fearing that political and economic negotiations and agreements will at any time collapse and that war, or at the least boycott, will immediately follow. This situation is of interest to the United States. What will happen in the event of war or boycott has already been discussed. If the economic and political negotiations and agreements succeed and international war is avoided in Europe, then the situation will be so much different that the effects upon the United States and the world cannot be hazarded. Peace in Europe would mean a new kind of world.

Yet both war in Europe and endless peace in Europe are of the future. There are here and now other questions. There is the question of European armaments and the relations of those armaments to the United States. That the size and range of their navies and of ours is of mutual interest is clear now that successive treaties have dramatized the relationship. The Franco-Italian differences regarding naval parity and the threat of a navy race between them, probably resulting, should it occur, in new construction by Britain and the inevitable agitation thereafter in this country to have it build at least up to Britain's increasing strength, show still more clearly that our navy and its costs are an incident in the international scene. We build and pay because of the international disorder, at the same time that with more zeal and sincerity than ourselves they of Europe work for international order. The essential connection between armaments on the one hand and security and justice in Europe is one we try to overlook in our efforts at international disarmament. Yet they are linked together so closely they cannot be separated.

Moreover, should we begin to build to the extent of our resources, the European naval powers would take the signal to mean a threat from us, or at least the belief here that war in Europe was inevitable. They would act on the signal. Britain, France and Italy would build more and more. Germany would clamor for a great navy and in the general European fear a new alignment of forces would come about or would be attempted. And there would probably be war again.

What was not clear for a long time to the United States was that the other armaments of Europe are on the same planet as ourselves and that land and air arms bear a relationship not alone to the general European trepidation but also to navies, their own navies first of all, but also to our own. Or rather, we knew the fact but we put it to one side; we knew that armaments, land, air and sea, are a unit but that since sea armaments are the ones which we, upon a continent an ocean away from Europe, would rely on most in case of a war in Europe, we mentally separated navies from airships, forts, land cannon and standing armies. In 1932 Europe is taking up again the whole question of armaments. Our government has decided to take part in the whole conference, shifting its position and opening the way for still further cooperation.

Americans seem now to realize that European armaments of all kinds are important to us. We know of their importance to us in the case of a future war or boycott. More clearly we know that they are the symbol of European conflicts. Still more clearly now we see armaments united to European governmental expenses resulting in the inability to pay the debt instalments and in the decline of their demand for our goods. Both debts and European inability to buy our goods have loomed larger ever since the world slump and unemployment began.

When the European speaks of debt reduction or cancellation, the American replies that the debts are honest debts and could be paid easily if it were not for the cost of Europe's army, navy and air force. And when an American, such as Edward N. Hurley, links the two together and advocates reduction of debts on the condition of a reduction in armaments, the French, English and Italians resent the implication that they can be bought to disarm while the average American probably wonders why Europe will not disarm anyway and why he should have to pay Europe to do it. Yet debt costs and armament costs both arise out of the European scene and in part out of our relation to it; both are heritages of the war; both costs are borne by the same peoples; and the capacity to pay, which guided both debt and reparation revisions, is influenced by the costs of armament. At the same time the costs of armaments, the withdrawal of so many in Europe from work to army or navy service, the continuous flow of wealth (now interrupted for a time) from Europe to the United States to

pay instalments on debts, cripple Europe's economic life and plunge it further into poverty. As Europeans particularly, but Americans also, have pointed out the debt payments retarded European economic recovery and reduced American opportunity to sell the goods of its mass production factories and machine farms.

There are wheels within wheels and in every wheel the United States is one or more cogs. Europe has delayed disarming because it is not sure its peace efforts will succeed. One cause of unassured peace is the constant fear among some, and hope among others, of what we shall do with our wealth in case of war or boycott while we on our side make no commitments nor even agree to consult in time of danger. We will not disarm further until Europe disarms further. Neither will we help Europe to establish peace. We join now in general plans of disarmament but not in the underlying plans to keep the peace. Germany's economic life, politics and social life were dislocated by having to pay to outsiders large amounts annually to other European countries. Their life was in turn dislocated by having to pay us who, to protect our trade, fought along side of them against Germany. They will not reduce German payments without reducing their payments to us. To this we will not consent beyond a temporary moratorium. We grow in relative wealth and power. We remain the great question mark of the world. And then, certainly due in part to this however much our failure to distribute income properly within the country was also a cause, there came a world-wide crash of business and values, vast unemployment and misery here at home and everywhere.

At the same time we take our stand with European countries, excepting only traditionally free trade England with its export interest, to try by still higher tariffs to keep as much of the domestic market as possible for domestic producers and prevent the competition of foreign made goods. Yet if they are to pay us their debts, they must pay finally in goods. They retaliate by putting more rows of bricks on their tariff walls. Moreover, we erect immigration barriers so that few Europeans may take the traditional flight from poverty to America.

As the world crisis deepens, our interest in the European economic situation grows. Shall France and Germany reach an economic understanding? Shall there be a tariff union among the states of the old Austria-Hungarian empire? Shall

there be a slash in armaments? Shall England be further helped financially? Shall Germany be saved from economic ruin? Shall debts and reparations be reconsidered? What of Russian competition? And what elements of the political situation have a bearing on these?

Not on these points, any more than on the matter of our entrance into the League or Court, or of our trade policy in case war or boycott is declared in Europe, does this report presume to give an answer. Yet these questions have to be decided: (1) Should we join actively and openly now to further a Franco-Italian naval agreement? (2) What should be our policies in the general disarmament conference of 1932? (3) Should we join together the reduction of arms and the reduction or cancellation of debts—if not formally and openly at least by simultaneous consideration? (4) Should we reduce or cancel the debts on condition that the German and Austrian reparations be also similarly reduced or cancelled? (5) Should we seek to extend the debt and reparations moratorium? (6) Should we strive for tariff reduction throughout the world? (7) What of our immigration restrictions?

And more searchingly: (8) What are the moral principles applicable and how should they be applied in the European-American world to the distribution of raw materials, the distribution of agricultural lands, the distribution of credit, the distribution of markets, the distribution of wealth and income and in general the internal and international organization of economic life?

See Harris, *Naval Disarmament* (Allen and Unwin, 1930); Latimer, *Naval Disarmament* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1930); Stone, *The Draft Treaty for the World Disarmament Conference* (Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, Vol. VI, No. 25, 1931); Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (Macmillan, 1926); *Causes of War* (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 1930); Patterson, *The World's Economic Dilemma* (McGraw-Hill, 1930); LeFebure, *Scientific Disarmament* (Macmillan, 1931); and Pope Pius XI, *Forty Years After—Reconstructing the Social Order* (National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C., 1931).

XII

CONCLUSION

There is in this European-American situation mutual ill will even at a time when there are greater mutual dependence, interest and even friendship. We of the United States are often termed good-natured barbarians, parvenus, standardized sons of the machine, arrogant, provincial, a nation of gamblers, prodigal conquerors indifferent to the fate of the conquered, possessors of an insufferable sense of superiority, a nation of slackers in the cause of peace of the world. The bad will towards us is greater than ours toward them. Europeans think oftener of us than we do of them; we are more pressingly important in their lives than they are in ours; our ascendancy is recent and has come quickly and we are careless of our obligations and indeed ignorant of our own vast strength. Moreover more Americans have travelled in Europe than have Europeans in the United States. We have memories of Europe in our tradition; probably to most Europeans the United States, their reputed child, is a changeling, a son that lies outside their tradition save as a crude and distant land where men grow rich. To us Europe is an ancestral land; to Europe, the United States is a new country peopled by her wandering and errant sons.

The ill will is not surprising. There is so much ill will between countries in Europe that now when we are so close to Europe and so important to her, we are by the laws of the modern western world drawn also into the orbit of international ill will. The ill will flourishes because of Europe's poverty and our wealth, because of the social conflicts in Europe, because of Europe's debts to the United States, because of the tariff and immigration barriers, because of the doubt and uncertainty that we cast over her life and over every effort of hers to settle her problems in peace, because of our refusal to cooperate. Yet the soil in which thrive these specific causes of ill will between them and us is the soil of internal European ill will.

Europe lost its spiritual unity by the Eastern schism and the Protestant Reformation. It lost its restraint upon patriotism and national rights when it divorced politics from morality. It lost its ability to establish a social system, nationally and

internationally, that would provide everyone with a worthy living, when it divorced economics from morality. Thence arise Europe's cultural and spiritual disunion, its gross nationalism, its gross capitalism, its world-wide depredations, all of which under the pressure of its poverty and in its fear of suicide by another war it is trying to meet, sometimes thoroughly, sometimes half-heartedly. We are Europe's children. Europe taught us. We suffer from the same evils and inflict the same evils. Yet living in a prodigally rich continent in a compact area, and striving in our memory of the bitterness of Europe's life to avoid in a new land some of the more palpable of Europe's excesses, we have been saved thus far from certain of Europe's ignominies. But we are spiritually and therefore culturally disunited not only within our own country but in our relations with the rest of the world and specifically with Europe. We are guilty of gross nationalism; our political and economic policy in relation to other nations is based on selfishness even when it is an enlightened selfishness. We are guilty of capitalism both within the United States and in our dealings with the peoples of other countries.

These are the causes of Europe's woes and of its internal ill will. From these, too, springs Russia's uprooting of both the good and the evil of Europe. These are the sources of Europe's complaint against us and our complaint against Europe. Nothing will save the western world short of a return to the Faith and an intelligent determination to apply to cultural life, political life and economic life the principles which the Faith teaches. Every effort at peace and every effort to solve problems before they reach the stage of international conflict limps until the western world becomes Catholic again and makes the Faith and its moral code pervade all life and be the soul of all institutions. This is not to condemn as futile every effort now at cultural unity, an international political federalism, at world-wide economic reorganization. It is simply to say that unless God build these houses they will be rickety and awry.

James Brown Scott in his presidential address at the 1931 meeting of the American Society of International Law advocated that the Pope be called upon to act as a conciliator and arbitrator in international quarrels. Speaking of a role as arbitrator, he said: "A dispute laid before the State of the Vatican for decision would be free from the suggestion of ma-

terial force to compel its acceptance, would be disconnected from any idea of territorial aggrandizement, would have a presumption of justice in its behalf, because the State itself is a recognition of justice, and the decision, whatever it may be, is bound to be in conformity with the moral code of the centuries and to be dominated by a spiritual conception of things which temporal judges may sometimes be without."

Vatican membership in the League of Nations would possess similar advantages except that the representative of the Holy Father would be one of many. Not acting as arbiter he could not bring to bear the full influence of what Scott calls "the moral code of the centuries." Yet, lacking representation of the Vatican, the League lacks the presence of one who would help to mould its proceedings to that code and typify the necessary subordination of its judgments to the law of God. For, as Scott went on to say, the Vatican "has a conscience and law under the control of a moral and spiritual conception." Because of the total lack of this or its tenuous hold upon Europe and the United States, the nations find themselves in their present physical and moral misery and the League of the Nations struggles unavailingly as yet to lift them to international concord.

Vatican representation in the League and Vatican conciliation and arbitration would help to restore the old code disrupted centuries ago. More important though is it to extend the unity of the Kingdom of Christ itself and for that unity to flower in national and international cultural, political and economic brotherhoods based upon justice and charity. For not Vatican representation for its own sake but the substance of world unity, world justice and world charity is the chief desideratum. The chief leadership towards this must be found in this generation and, if anywhere, in Europe and the United States.

See *Encyclopaedia of Europe, Directory of League of Nations and International Organization, Etc.* (Europa Publications, Ltd., London, 1930); Publications of the International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues, Utrecht, Holland.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

N. C. W. C. Study Club Outline

on

EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP

(Printed by Permission of the N. C. W. C. Study Club Committee)

Lesson I

AMERICAN GROWTH

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The nineteenth century British Empire as an example of European world-wide control.
2. The growth of missions and the martyrdoms as an example of the mixed influence of Europe on cultural life.
3. Chinese opposition to foreign economic and political control as an example of a sphere of influence in revolt.
4. The foreign debts of the United States.
5. Growth in foreign trade of the United States.
6. Foreign debts as an example of our influence on Europe.
7. Our action in the last war another example.

PAPERS

1. The Growth of the United States in World Importance in the Past Generation.
2. A Review of Romier's "Who Will Be the Master?"

Lesson II

EUROPEAN BACKGROUND

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Any European country's population, resources and markets as an example of need for outside markets and settlement.
2. Number of European languages.
3. Secure relief map of Europe and note geographical diversity.
4. Does tendency toward disunion compel disunion?
5. Protestant Reformation as one example of disuniting Europe.
6. Rationalism as a further example.
7. Nationalism in a crowded and varied continent.
8. How nationalism makes a transition to imperialism.
9. Conscienceless economic life in a crowded continent.
10. Nationalism and conscienceless economics as consequences of disuniting Europe.

PAPERS

1. A Review of Hayes' "Essays on Nationalism." 2. A Review of Tawney's "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism."

Lesson III

THE HERITAGE OF THE WAR

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The disease of Europe as a cause of the War. 2. The effects of the War upon the victors. 3. Sole War guilt. 4. Reparations and the German crisis. 5. The relation of the United States to reparations via the War debts. 6. The conflict over the new boundaries. 7. Importance of German-French friendship. 8. War fear in Europe. 9. France as the patron of the peace treaties. 10. Division in Germany between a change attained through negotiation and through repudiation and violence. 11. Division in France between change by negotiation and agreement and no change. 12. Present situation.

PAPERS

1. The Past Six Months in Franco-German Relations. 2. A Review of a Selected Novel of the War.

Lesson IV

EUROPEAN RIVALRIES

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Russian importance to the world. 2. Russia's challenge if Europe and the United States were Catholic and obeyed moral law in patriotism and economic life. 3. Russia's challenge now. 4. Britain's decline. 5. Her rivalry with France. 6. Her present relation to the League. 7. The attempt at a tariff union in the states of the old Austria-Hungarian empire. 8. Present Franco-Italian lessening of rivalry. 9. French loans on continent as a means of helping countries and binding them to policy of settlement by negotiation. 10. Europe's efforts to meet problems of American competition, Russian threat, dissolving empires and internal disunion.

PAPERS

1. Russia's Economic Challenge to Europe and the United States. 2. A Review of Miller's "The Mind and Face of Bolshevism." 3. European significance of Austro-German Tariff Union. 4. France's Position in European Economic Life. 5. New Phases of Franco-British Rivalry.

Lesson V

EUROPEAN-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Relation of European religious disunity to her economic and political life. 2. Vitality of Catholic teaching in Europe today. 3. Patriotism and private ownership in old and new light in Europe's history. 4. Ef-

fects of disappearance of European traditions upon us. 5. European-American relations in light of international cultural influence. 6. European and American cultural and religious cooperation. 7. European and American similarities today. 8. Europe's attempts to disregard nationalism. 9. Similarities in breakdown of plutocracy in Europe and America.

PAPERS

1. The Present Status of Irreligion in Europe and in America; its Relation to all Phases of Life. 2. Racial Composition of European and American Peoples—Comparison and Contrast. 3. European Culture as Exemplified in American Life. 4. Compare Zimmern's "America and Europe" with Roosevelt's "America and England" and Denny's "America Conquers Britain" in the light of American political and economic influence on Europe and vice versa.

Lesson VI

EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Europe's experiment with the League. 2. The World Court. 3. The International Labor Office. 4. The United States of Europe. 5. The Locarno Treaty. 6. Economic agreements, cartels, etc. 7. Nationalism and capitalism in the path of European reconstruction. 8. Efforts toward intellectual internationalization and understanding. 9. Growth of international economic unions in Europe. 10. Europe's consciousness of increasing importance of Russia and the United States in world affairs.

PAPERS

1. The League of Nations in Europe's Reconstruction Program. 2. Labor and Internationalism. 3. The United States and the World Court. 4. Application of Catholic Social Principles to Current International Problems. 5. The Intellectual Cooperation Movement in Europe. 6. The Encyclical "Forty Years After—Reconstructing the Social Order."

Lesson VII

AMERICAN POLICY

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The United States policy in Latin America; in the Pacific; and in Great Britain. 2. Our advancement toward the World Court. 3. The Kellogg-Briand Pact. 4. Representation on committees and conferences of the League. 5. The United States in relation to the League in dealing with the Sino-Japanese question. 6. The United States participation in the general Disarmament Conference in 1932. 7. The United States position in case of war or boycott. 8. Our economic policy toward Russia.

PAPERS

1. United States Imperialism in Latin America. 2. A Review of Jessup's "United States and the World Court." 3. American Cooperation and Non-Cooperation in European Affairs. 4. Significance of Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United States-European Questions.

Lesson VIII

FEAR OF AMERICA

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Disposition of American wealth in case of European war. 2. America's attitude in case of boycott by the League. 3. League membership or agreement to consult. 4. Consultation and cooperation with the League in the Japanese-Chinese dispute as a possible precedent for such action in a European dispute. 5. The Freedom of the Seas by the United States if war threatens in Europe. 6. United States acceptance or defiance of the League's decisions. 7. Cause of American participation in the World War. 8. American investments and financial interests in Europe as cause of irritation.

PAPERS

1. America's Efforts to Keep Peace in Europe. 2. Protection of American Wealth and Trade in European Wars. 3. Effect of the American Policy on Europe's Plans. 4. The changes in the American Isolation Theory. 5. Summary of the League of Nations for Prevention of War. (Foreign Policy Association.)

Lesson IX

POSSIBILITIES

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Contrast of America's participation in Latin American and Pacific problems with that of Europe's. 2. Causes underlying America's aloofness in European political affairs. 3. Effects of Latin American Conciliation and Arbitration Treaty (if latter is adopted) on the United States; on American-European relations. 4. Consultation with European powers in case of war. 5. Acceptance or denial of boycott laid by the League. 6. Our relation to Russia when European war threatens. 7. Ways and means of uniting Europe and America religiously, economically and culturally in peace times.

PAPERS

1. American Cooperation with the League of Nations. 2. America's Position in Case of War in Europe. 3. The Boycott Policy in War. 4. A Review of "Latin America and the United States" (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C.).

Lesson X

THE BASIC PRINCIPLES

Attempt answers to questions at close of Section IX in the light of the quotations in Section X.

Lesson XI

ARMAMENTS, DEBTS, TARIFFS

Topics for Discussion

1. The statement on disarmament published in Appendix B in this report. 2. Joint reduction of armaments without bringing up the question of international guarantees of security. 3. Relation of United States willingness to consult with the League and disarmament. 4. Relation of armaments to depression. 5. Debt reductions and armaments. 6. Debt reductions and reparation reductions. 7. Debts and reparations in relation to our tariffs. 8. World crisis and European internal economic policies.

PAPERS

1. The 1932 Disarmament Conference. 2. America's Policy Toward Disarmament. 3. A Review of Thorning's "Security, Old and New" (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C.).

Lesson XII

CONCLUSION

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. European realization of America's importance. 2. Bases of European and American similarity. 3. European-American attitudes. 4. Reasons for European attitude toward the United States. 5. Basic reason in the loss of unity in Christ. 6. Effects of a nationalism and capitalism common to both. 7. Importance of fundamental changes. 8. The Vatican in the League as the voice of justice. 9. World unity in the Kingdom of Christ. 10. Prospects of European-American leadership.

PAPERS

1. A Review of "Peace Statements of Recent Popes" and "Appeals for Peace of Pope Benedict XV and Pope Pius XI" (Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C.). 2. International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues, Utrecht, Holland. 3. Similarities and Dissimilarities in Europe's and America's Trends Toward Union and Disunion.

APPENDIX B

STATEMENT ON DISARMAMENT

Issued by the Committees on Ethics and on International Law and Organization of the Catholic Association for International Peace, Washington, D. C., October 29, 1931

In his latest Apostolic Letter the Pope points out that "since the unbridled race for armaments is on the one hand the effect of the rivalry among nations and on the other the cause of the withdrawal of enormous sums from the public wealth and hence not the smallest of contributors to the current extraordinary crisis, We can not refrain from renewing on this subject the wise admonitions of Our predecessors which thus far have not been heard.

"We exhort you all, Venerable Brethren, that with all the means at your disposal, both by preaching and by the press, you seek to illumine minds and open hearts on this matter according to the solid dictates of right reason and of the Christian law."

The leading statesmen of the world have, with practically unanimous voice, declared that the limitation of armaments, popularly called "disarmament," is the most vital political problem of this generation. The President of the United States has stated that of all the proposals for economic rehabilitation he knows of none that compares in necessity or importance with the successful result of the coming disarmament conference. The governments of the great powers are weighed down by their armaments more than ever before and would welcome relief from the burden.

Until recently the race for armaments had been pretty generally ignored as a cause of the present "extraordinary crisis," to use Pius XI's words again. Men did not seem to realize that the billions of dollars annually spent on monstrous armies and navies might have provided the necessities of life for millions of the unemployed or might have been expended upon beneficent public works, such as hospitals for the moneyless sick or decent dwellings for the homeless. The bounden duty of the nations to disburse the public funds through such works of genuine charity, rather than to squander them upon instruments of mutual slaughter, is too plain to require more than the barest mention.

What His Holiness calls the "unbridled race for armaments" is well known to be a continuous and powerful incitation to war. Far from preventing war, competitive armaments bring it nearer and make it more probable, indeed, inevitable. Hence the grave and urgent obligation of all the great states to discontinue this suicidal competition.

The meeting of the governments in Geneva next February presents an opportunity to reduce armaments the world over. The peoples of the world, overburdened during these years of burdens by the tremendous cost of the machinery of war, will turn towards this meeting in the hope that it will reduce all round the costs of war preparation and that in a mutual goodwill it will advance the general cause of world peace. If this conference succeeds, it will be because of a growth in the mutual confidence of the nations that they need not dread war soon.

Yet in the process of seeking progressive world disarmament the

American people will more and more hear the appeal of nations that demand a guarantee of the security of what they hold are their vital interests. The American people will meet more and more the demand for international consultation and cooperation in the face of the fears of many of the countries that should they reduce their arms they will be attacked by nations more advantageously situated.

Each nation proclaims that its armaments are intended only for defensive purposes, that it has no designs upon its neighbor, but that it must be prepared against the danger of attack by others. But as the attack can only come from another state which is itself asserting its desire to disarm if it were not for its own need of protection, the excuse seems somewhat paradoxical. The nations seem caught within a vicious circle; each arms against the other and the resulting competition merely adds to mutual suspicion of each other's motives; each alleges defense as its object and transfers to some other nation the designs of aggression without which defense is meaningless.

Some reduction of armaments is possible even in the face of these fears. Clearly the limitation of armaments can proceed only by degrees; and as each successive reduction is made it is reasonable to hope for a greater degree of confidence between the nations which in turn may make the next reduction easier. Yet disarmament is finally bound up with mutual confidence in international security.

The two ideals of peace and justice are correlative and each is a condition of the attainment of the other. What the world must come to see is that a settlement by some form of conciliation or arbitration is infinitely to be preferred to war, that existing wrongs should find a hearing and redress be obtained before a common forum of the nations, that national security should be guaranteed by that concerted action of one and all against the aggressor, and that the individual welfare of each state is closely related to the welfare of other states. Then disarmament conferences will consist not in a struggle over ratios of individual armament but in a decision how each may use its limited forces to uphold the authority of the community as a whole.

It is an elementary moral principle that obligations are in proportion to capacity. The United States is in a position to do more toward reduction of world armaments than any other nation, perhaps more than all other nations combined. Our country is uniquely powerful, industrially, financially and politically. It is morally obliged to use these resources of leadership. In the second place, our nation is in a position to set the example of reduction with less risk than faces any other nation. We are in less danger and less likelihood of armed attack. Hence our obligation is exceptional in its depth and urgency.

The appeals for reduction of armaments which were made by Pope Benedict XV in August, 1917, and December, 1918, went unheeded by the nations. Now his great successor issues a similar appeal, but addresses it primarily to the Bishops of the Catholic Church. "We exhort you all, Venerable Brethren, that with all the means at your disposal, both by preaching and by the press, you seek to illumine minds and open hearts on this matter, according to the solid dictates of right reason and the Christian law."

The duty of American Catholics to promote disarmament, "accord-

ing to the solid dictates of right reason and of the Christian law," is now beyond question, or hesitation, or controversy. They have before their eyes the authoritative judgment and the binding command of the Vicar of Christ.

APPENDIX C

RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT

WHEREAS, The race for armament among nations endangers the peace of the world,

WHEREAS, The support of these armaments is causing the withdrawal of enormous sums of money from the public wealth, thus contributing to the present crisis, and,

WHEREAS, These convictions are in accordance with the declarations of the Holy Father in his recent Letter on Unemployment and Relief,

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, That the National Board of Directors, of the National Council of Catholic Women go on record as approving at the Disarmament Conference in February the hearty co-operation of our Government with the Governments of other countries in bringing about universal disarmament.

* * *

*Adopted by the National Board of Directors,
National Council of Catholic Women, October 8, 1931.*

The National Council of Catholic Men not only believes in every measure that will prevent war and promote world-wide peace, but it also believes and hereby recommends that its affiliated organizations labor for the ending of rivalry in armament between nations and particularly so because "the unbridled race for armaments is causing the withdrawal of enormous sums from the public wealth and is therefore not the smallest of contributors to the current extraordinary crisis." (Pius XI.)

* * *

*Adopted by the National Council of Catholic Men,
Annual Convention, Rochester, New York, October 11-13, 1931.*

APPENDIX D

STATEMENTS FROM RECENT PONTIFFS

"This accumulation of power, the characteristic note of the modern economic order, is a natural result of limitless free competition which permits the survival of those only who are the strongest, which often

means those who fight most relentlessly, who pay least heed to the dictates of conscience.

"This concentration of power has led to a threefold struggle for domination. First, there is the struggle for dictatorship in the economic sphere itself; then, the fierce battle to acquire control of the State, so that its resources and authority may be abused in the economic struggles. Finally, the clash between states themselves.

"This latter arises from two causes: Because the nations apply their power and political influence, regardless of circumstances, to promote the economic advantages of their citizens; and because, vice versa, economic forces and economic domination are used to decide political controversies between peoples. . . .

"As regards the relations of peoples among themselves, a double stream has issued forth from this one fountainhead on the one hand, economic nationalism or even economic imperialism; on the other, a not less noxious and detestable internationalism or international imperialism in financial affairs, which holds that where a man's fortune is, there is his country. . . .

"It would be well if the various nations in common counsel and endeavor strove to promote a healthy economic cooperation by prudent pacts and institutions, since in economic matters they are largely dependent one upon the other, and need one another's help."—PRUS XI—*Forty Years After—Reconstructing the Social Order.*

"Love of country becomes merely an occasion, an added incentive to grave injustice when true love of country is debased to the condition of an extreme nationalism, when we forget that all men are our brothers and members of the same great human family, that other nations have an equal right with us both to life and to prosperity."—PRUS XI—*Ubi Arcano Dei.*

"Even more difficult—not to say impossible—is it for peace to last between peoples and states if in the place of true and genuine love of country there rules and abounds a hard and selfish nationalism, which is the same as saying hatred and envy in place of mutual desire for the good, distrust and suspicion in place of the confidence of brothers, competition and struggle in place of willing cooperation, ambition for hegemony and mastery in place of respect and care for the rights of all, even those of the weak and small."—PRUS XI—Christmas Allocution, December 24, 1930.

"Whoever thinks that he owes charity only to those with whom he is united by blood and by race fails in this duty. . . . The characteristic of Christian charity is that it is all inclusive."—LEO XIII—*Reputantibus.*

The Catholic Association for International Peace

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THE Catholic Association for International Peace has grown out of a series of meetings during 1926-1927. Following the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago in 1926, representatives of a dozen nations met with Americans for discussion. In October of the same year a meeting was held in Cleveland where a temporary organization called The Catholic Committee on International Relations was formed. The permanent name, The Catholic Association for International Peace, was adopted at a two-day Conference in Washington in 1927. Three similar conferences were held in the same city in 1928, 1929, and 1930. An all day regional Conference was held in Chicago on Armistice Day, 1930. The Fifth Annual Meeting was held in New York City in April, 1931.

Its objects and purposes are:

- To study, disseminate and apply the principles of natural law and Christian charity to international problems of the day;
 - To consider the moral and legal aspects of any action which may be proposed or advocated in the international sphere;
 - To examine and consider issues which bear upon international goodwill;
 - To encourage the formation of conferences, lectures and study circles;
 - To issue reports on questions of international importance;
 - To further, in cooperation with similar Catholic organizations in other countries, in accord with the teachings of the Church, the object and purposes of world peace and happiness.
- The ultimate purpose is to promote, in conformity with the mind of the Church, "the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ."*

The Association works through the preparation of Committee reports. Following careful preparation, these are discussed both publicly and privately in order to secure able revision and they are then published by the organization. Additional committees will be created from time to time. The Association solicits the membership and cooperation of Catholics of like mind. It is seeking especially the membership and cooperation of those whose experience and studies are such that they can take part in the preparation of committee reports.

The Committees on Ethics, Law and Organization, and Economic Relations serve as a guiding committee on the particular questions for all other committees. Questions involving moral judgments must be submitted to the Committee on Ethics.

Publications of the Catholic Association for International Peace

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- No. 3—Causes of War, and Security, Old and New
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REPORTS IN PREPARATION —

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- Catholicism—the Keynote of Pan-Americanism
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