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THE PAPACY  
AND  
NATIONAL LIFE.

*Off. note to the original work*

BY  
A GERMAN CATHOLIC  
(PROFESSOR FROHSCHAMMER, OF MUNICH.)

REPRINTED FROM THE "CONTEMPORARY REVIEW."

Melbourne :  
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## P R E F A C E.

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So much turgid nonsense has been written upon the Roman question, by the enemies of political freedom and human progress, both in Europe and Australia, that it appears desirable to make the public acquainted with the views entertained by *enlightened* Catholics concerning the abrogation of the Pope's temporal authority. Hence the republication of Professor Frohschammer's able and unanswerable article on the subject, contributed to the October number of the *Contemporary Review*. While papers like the *Dublin Nation*, which advocates liberal principles in Ireland and is the slavish partisan of spiritual despotism and priestly misrule in Italy, are exhausting the vocabulary of abuse upon His Majesty King Victor Emanuel, and while its example is being feebly copied by lecturers and pamphleteers in Victoria and Tasmania, it is refreshing to find a distinguished Catholic writer, like Professor Frohschammer, exposing with masterly vigour and irresistible logic, the irreconcilable hostility which exists between the spirit and policy of the Papacy, and the national life of modern Europe.

Perhaps the most emphatic condemnation of the temporal authority of the Pope is to be found in the fact that, with the exception of a few foreign mercenaries, not a hand was raised in Rome to avert the overthrow of his rule. If it had been the benign and blessed thing which its indiscreet eulogists at this end of the world pronounce it to have been, a pious and grateful people would have rallied round the venerable Pontiff, and would have defended his earthly throne with a courage and determination animated by the warmest affection, and inflamed with the most fervid piety. Surely no people were so well qualified to appreciate the advantages of Papal government as those who lived under the shadow of St. Peter's; and, inasmuch as the



Pope's own subjects hailed his deposition with rapture, we may legitimately conclude that the tree was rotten, and that its removal was universally regarded as a great gain to the cause of popular freedom and the spread of true religion.

“The middle ages,” it has been well said, “terminated on the 20th of September, 1870;” and no clear-sighted and unprejudiced Catholic can read Professor Frohschammer's essay on the Papacy and National Life, without coming to the conclusion that the divorce of the Pope's spiritual from his temporal authority marks the commencement of a new and brighter era in the history of the Church and in the history of Christendom.

## THE PAPACY AND NATIONAL LIFE.

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We are accustomed to regard as one of the most prominent and significant characteristics of educated men in the present day, the desire to be free, as far as possible, from ecclesiastical laws and restrictions. Especially is there a desire to emancipate political life and scientific inquiry from the authority of the Church and of dogmas, to make them altogether independent of religion, and, we may say, to secularize them. In fact, since the middle of the last century there has been a powerful and successful movement in this direction. It would, however be an error to suppose that it is altogether a new movement, belonging only to our age, and never heard of before. The liberation of science and civil life from the authority of religion began in antiquity. It began at the moment when science recognised and contemplated nature as a natural region under the dominion of fixed laws, and not as a region of continual miracle, where every phenomenon was the immediate result of the divine working. It began when human actions, and especially political questions and public undertakings, were no longer determined by oracles, by the flight of birds, or by inspecting the entrails of the victims offered in sacrifice; but by the intelligent deliberation and judgment of enlightened and experienced men. From that time began the liberation of human thought and political life from the dominion of religion, and so far, in some measure, their secularization. The process, indeed, has been slow and difficult, and not without interruption and retrogression; but in our day the question has become pressing, and has reached a crisis. This is true of science, and still more of the relation of the Church or religion to the State. The present seems a proper time to devote to the subject a closer inquiry. In its most direct form it appears in the conduct of the Papacy towards the civil government in the middle ages, and in the attitude it has assumed towards the governments of the present day. The general bearing of the question, as it relates to other forms of religion, will be manifest as we proceed.

### I.

The Catholic Church, or rather the hierarchy which centres in the Papacy, had suffered great defeats, especially in the second half of the last century. It had lost much of its power and influence, whilst the emancipation and secularization of science and civil life had made important progress. But in our century, as most people know, there has been a reaction. The civil governments came

again into closer relations with the Church. By means of these relations the Papacy has acquired greater power, and now it contemplates bringing science also under its dominion. The resuscitated order of the Jesuits has been working specially in this direction. Catholic authors of liberal tendencies have been kept down by Church censures and every possible form of persecution. The old science of scholasticism, subject to Church authority, has been inculcated as the only science permitted by the Church. After the people had again become accustomed to the old ecclesiasticism it was thought by the Roman Curia that the time had arrived to make war in the name of the Church against the modern development of national life, and to renew the old ecclesiastical claims of the middle ages. In the Encyclica of December 8, 1864, and in the more recent so-called Syllabus of Errors, this is done in the widest sense, and in a manner not to be misunderstood. This Syllabus formed the programme of the General Council summoned to meet at Rome on December 8, 1869. The essential business of this Council was the annihilation of all the rights of science, the complete deification of the Pope, and an aggressive warfare against national life. Its object was entirely to bind the faith and knowledge of the people to the will of the Bishop of Rome, and to give them a place in his warfare against temporal governments with all their rights and liberties.

The formulated claims of the Pope in relation to civil government are fundamentally the same as in the middle ages, only increased by circumstances peculiar to our times. In fact, so little has any one single mediæval claim of the Pope been given up, that it is even expressly rejected as an error and anti-Catholic, to say that the Popes have ever at any time gone beyond their lawful rights. By this it is intended expressly to justify all the political arrogance and all the assumptions of dominion over temporal States of which the Popes have ever been guilty. And thus all the acts of the Bishops of Rome as to the crowning or deposing of kings, as to the things which people have seized in their revolt against their rulers, or again, as to the kingdoms and peoples sold or given to princes, without or against the will of the people, and all the attempts to bring princes as such, because of their temporal government, before the judgment-seat of the Popes, are now to be regarded by the Bishop of Rome as nothing more than as the exercise of his legitimate right, which any moment may be exercised again. Whoever does not admit this, is to be regarded as a bad Catholic. On the other hand, the Encyclica denies to any State the right to influence in any way the Papal government of the Church. The Pope declares with blunt vehemence that it is a "notable impudence" (*insignis impudentia*) to maintain the "wicked and oft condemned" position that the highest power of the Church and the Apostle's chair is subject to the judgment (*arbitrio*) of the civil government in the exercise of rights which relate to external order. This refers to those who are so "shameless" (*non pudet*) as to maintain that "the laws of the Church are binding in conscience only when they have been ratified by the State, that the indulgences and decrees of the Bishop of Rome

which relate to religion and the Church require the sanction and approval, or at least the assent, of the civil power." To discover the significance of the condemnation of this principle is not difficult. If the laws of the Church, the Pope's indulgences to the faithful, are binding in conscience without the consent of the civil ruler, perhaps even against his will, then is the Pope unquestionably the sovereign ruler over the nations and their governments, and not merely as some suppose a co-partner in the government of every State. By the expressions of his will, or by his indulgences to the faithful, he can remove or hinder the execution of civil laws. On the other hand, he can free the people from the duty of obedience, and demand submission to his own laws in place of those of the State. It depends on his pleasure to require of Catholic subjects under any civil government which may be in conflict with him, that they "obey God rather than man;" while he, according to the universal custom, and as the people are taught to do even from their youth, understands by "God" himself, and by "man" the princes or the civil government. It must then be in the plenitude of the power of the Pope to recognise or to refuse to recognise any government or constitution as it seems to him to be or not to be in accordance with ecclesiastical laws and Papal supremacy.

Of the exercise of this plenitude of power, not the middle ages only, but recent, even the most recent, times furnish examples. Entirely corresponding to this assumed sovereignty, the Pope claims the power of inflicting external punishments in ecclesiastical cases, and wishes the power of the State to be at his disposal for the execution of the sentences pronounced by the Church—to perform, as it were, the office of a policeman or a hangman. In the Encyclica the position is expressly renounced that "the best condition of society is that in which it is reckoned the duty of the government to keep in check, by lawfully determined punishments, the adversaries of the Catholic religion, only so far as public safety demands it." This position is also condemned, "that it is not the duty of the Church to keep in check by temporal punishments the transgressors of its laws." The condemnation of these two positions, sufficiently shows the sorrowful demand of the Papacy on the State. In relation to this, the bishops are strongly admonished by the Pope constantly to teach "that the power of kings is not bestowed merely for the government of the world, but chiefly for the protection of the Church, and that nothing conduces more to the advantage and renown of princes than for them to allow the Catholic Church to exist according to its own laws, and not to suffer any one to hinder its freedom; that it is to their interest to study, when it is a question concerning the things of God, to give by their royal will the precedence to the priests of Christ, appointed in His place." The meaning of this is sufficiently manifest, and scarcely requires any further explanation. God, Pope, and priests are continually used as equivalents or substitutes. This is the great trick of the hierarchy. All that belongs to God is transferred to the Pope. He claims in this way the obedience of princes and the subjection of States to the Church—that is, to

himself. The Church is regarded as a united ecclesiastical government, standing over against all States, but altogether independent of every one of them. They are condemned who say that "the ecclesiastical power is not by divine appointment, separate from the civil, and independent of it; nor can such a separation and independence be admitted without the Church usurping to itself the essential rights of the civil power." But the separation of the Church from the State is nevertheless rejected. It is found advantageous to ecclesiastical authority, and the Church would not willingly lose its old obedient servant. The State has nothing to teach the Church, but the Church has everything to teach the State. This union of priest and king the Pope declares to have been at all times rich in health and blessing to the civil, as well as to the religious, community—a declaration which openly scorns the facts of history, for out of this union have sprung great evils, both to religion and the State. The pure genuine essence of each has been troubled, and, in consequence, there has arisen much hatred, strife, and persecution.

We have seen what are the chief features of the relation of the Church to civil States as the Catholic Church or hierarchy wishes it to be. We have also seen what are the chief points, the inventory, so to speak, of the Papal claims, the programme which the Jesuits in the name of the Church, by command of the Pope, and under his protection, are seeking to realize. They are striving, again, to reach the point, which, expressed in a few words, means that the Church—that is to say, the Pope—commands, and the State—that is to say, the Prince—obeys. In order perfectly and decidedly to maintain this dominion, the organs of the Pope—that is, the members of the hierarchy, the whole clergy—are to be independent of the laws of the State, to be free in every way to obtain property, and to use it for the objects of the hierarchy, as the Syllabus expressly desires. Schools, and the instruction of youth, are to be given over entirely to the Church, that the next generation may be educated as good Churchmen, and the mind of the people made familiar with the supremacy of the Church—that is, the Pope—over the State. For this object the Church is to have a veto on the educational schemes of the State, but the State is to have no veto on the doings of the Church. And so God is to persuade men, to give them laws and restrictions, but men are not to claim to be able to do these things for "God!"

## II.

It has been the cause of great and universal amazement and indignation that the Catholic hierarchy, or rather the Papacy, should ever have made such demands as to science and civil government. Still greater have been the amazement and indignation that they should have been made in the presence of modern science and civilization, announced in an aggressive form, and that efforts should have been made in every possible way to establish them. The amazement, however, as well as the indignation, will decrease when

we consider out of what historical foundation this ecclesiastical domination arose, and on what particular ecclesiastical principles, or premisses, it is built. These premisses are universally received as correct by Catholics, and partly, also, by Protestants. This inquiry is essentially necessary both to estimate the things rightly in themselves, and to determine in what way in our time these Papal pretensions and assaults on the mental progress of the people are to be met as they ought to be.

We have already said that the striving of science and civil government to be independent and free from the control of religion and the priesthood, is a thing which began in antiquity in relation to the so-called heathen religions. It is universal, and not a mere temporary opposition to the authority of the Christian or Catholic faith. On the other hand, the striving of the Papacy to hinder this emancipation is not one isolated and peculiar to the Catholic priesthood. It has found a place more or less in all religions, and with every religious authority, or community of priests. But it has entered with all its concentrated power and phenomena into the Catholic priesthood, and especially into the Pope, who is the head of that priesthood. Science and philosophy in classical antiquity had to sacrifice their objects; natural knowledge, its development and furtherance, to the dominion of religion or superstition, in the same way as the system of Copernicus had to bow before Catholic authority. And the old zealots of the religions indigenious to their fatherlands and their religious customs, wished to hold the State, and its conduct in political matters, under the power of superstitions and incantations, instead of natural knowledge and the guidance of reason, in the same way as the Popes did in old times, and as the Papacy is striving to do now. In the course of the development of Christianity to an external organization and a visible Church, there came moments which favoured in an extraordinary way the formation of an elevated, and very intensified, sacerdotal power. One, before all, of these favourable circumstances, was that in Rome, the centre at that time of the Roman world-dominion, there arose very early a Christian community. Of this community, tradition pointed out as the founder and head the apostle Peter. There were also other favourable circumstances, particularly through the seat of government being transferred to Constantinople. The bishop of this Roman community soon succeeded in obtaining a greater authority in the West than all other bishops. He also profited by the reverence and obedience of the people towards imperial Rome, which he succeeded in passing over to the spiritual head of this city, the bishop of the Roman Church. Christianity with its new world-moving ideas, was thus in a measure conquered by Rome. These ideas were used for the interest of Roman dominion, and were shaped so as to serve this object. On the other hand, Christianity early obtained an important, influential, and fixed centre for the formation of a settled ecclesiastical organization, which received at the same time the unmistakeable impression of the Roman genius for business and government, and which adopted the rich external cere-

monial of the old Roman religion—partly with some changes, and partly imitated. But, on the other side, the dignity and authority of the Bishop of Rome, as head of the Christian Church, depended chiefly on the credit which was obtained for the tradition that Peter once lived at Rome, and presided for a long time as head of the Christian community. There was but little foundation for the tradition, but it came to be universally received. By means of it, the Bishop of Rome succeeded by degrees in making himself pass for the successor of St. Peter, the head of all other churches, and the special Vicar of Christ. By means of it he transferred to himself all that importance, and that plenitude of power and right, which the dogmatical development of Christian tradition attributed to Christ. The power and dominion of the Roman priesthood, of the hierarchy, and especially of the absolute Roman Papacy, are essentially grounded, in union with the circumstances mentioned, on principles that belong to dogmatical Christology. They rest on the belief that Jesus being God as well as man, did not merely preach absolute truth, but also possessed absolute divine power, and left these to his successors and Vicars. It belongs therefore to them to give out their doctrine as absolute truth, to claim for it unconditional faith, even to govern absolutely, and to demand unlimited obedience. The Bishops soon made this demand, not indeed individually, yet collectively, for their decrees in their Synods, and gradually the Pope, as universal heir, concentrated in himself all the plenitude of power and all the claims which flow from his office as Vicar of Christ. When once the Bishop of Rome possessed superior authority in the Church, he was soon able to put himself above both tradition and Scripture. When he once passed for the successor of Peter and chief Vicar of Christ, he soon succeeded without much difficulty in laying claim to all the powers of the Christ of dogma, as well as those which Christ ascribed to Himself, and those which He communicated to His apostles and disciples. In the full feeling of Divine Vicarship what claims may not arise in the mind of an energetic and ambitious man! From such assumptions and such premisses what could not be deduced and justified by a subtle logic and dialectic! Christ says, according to the Gospel, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." Let us only think of a man who regards himself as the Vicar of Him who spoke these words, and who understands them not in a religious or ethical sense of pure religious life, but in an earthly and literal sense, as meaning that there was committed to him a juridical, and so far along with that in a measure, a physical dominion as well as a spiritual! He will find no end to his claims. He will come to regard himself as God, or as a representative of God upon earth, and make himself pass for such. Or "I give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." When it has been once received that these words are applicable to the Bishop of Rome as the successor of St. Peter, to whom they were spoken, it was scarcely to be expected but that people in Rome,

accustomed to earthly dominion, would understand them in a sense altogether juridical, not religious; and that they were used to obtain spiritual or rather ecclesiastical dominion. They were understood as intended to persuade men that their weal or woe depended on the decrees of the Pope, and that in this temporal life unconditional obedience was to be yielded to him in all things. It is also to be remembered that it was prescribed and enforced that this hierarchical kingdom was identical with the kingdom of God, of which Christ so often speaks, and which He places in such sharp opposition to the kingdoms of the world, which were immediately identified with the State, or the temporal rule of princes. We can now understand how the priests were able to make the Church and ecclesiastical government to prevail over the State and civil governments. And no one who has once received or acknowledged the ecclesiastical stand-point which grants the fundamental assumptions, can rightly reject the hierarchical claims. The hierarchy was the keeper of the Holy Scriptures, and determined their meaning. It prescribed, and had the right to prescribe, a meaning favourable to itself. From the assumptions made by the Papacy, and granted by all Catholics, the Papal claims are deduced consistently and logically.

We come now to the historical development of the Papacy, and the relation of the Church—that is, the hierarchy—to civil governments. When this has been considered we shall be able to judge rightly the conduct of the hierarchy and especially of the Pope. In the boundless claims of the Papacy, both as to science and national life, we perceive less personal usurpation, or a merely usurped authority, than the necessary working out of what was, and still is, the foundation of all ecclesiastical organization, and its absolute authority in matters of faith. We shall therefore be tender towards the persons, but only in order to be more resolute in our judgment of the system. We shall also find that but little can be done by merely opposing the personal claims of this or that Pope, or rejecting individual usurpations which we may consider excessive or illegal; and that the problems for science and national life are to conquer this Roman hierarchical system, fully to root it out of the consciousness and faith of the people through education and enlightenment, to refuse unconditionally every help for furthering it by force, and as far as possible to take all precautions against spiritual usurpations by securing full and free toleration in religion. If only individual demands of the absolute Papacy are rejected and not the whole system itself, these will ever be returning as they find opportunity. No satisfactory results can follow from merely opposing individual claims. For so long as the direct divine authority of the Papacy is allowed to stand, scarcely anywhere can a claim or a fact be shown which is an illegal transgression of the rights belonging to it. We must demand earnestly that in this respect the roots be torn up, or otherwise the overgrown branches that have been cut down will sprout and grow again.

When Gregory VII., for example, with such great decision asserted the supremacy of the Pope over princes, and demanded obedience

from them in all things which he chose to explain as Church matters, he did so because he regarded himself, and was acknowledged by all the faithful of the whole Church, as the actual Vicar and plenipotentiary of God. At the same time he regarded the world and the kingdoms of the world, with their princes, as a region of sin and the devil, which could only be sanctified and saved by the Pope. He looked on princes as only a necessary evil, established by force. They were the consequence of the temptation of Satan and of sin, so that in a measure they must be superfluous when the direct divine dominion of the Pope universally prevails. In fact, from the stand-point of the hierarchy and the foundation principles of the Catholic Church, this doctrine is perfectly just and logical. Whoever condemns the claim of this Pope, if he has any real foundation for his condemnation, and thinks out the matter logically, must reject the whole Catholic system, and chief of all, the foundation or premisses on which it rests. But this supposes an interpretation of the whole of Christianity entirely different from that in which the ecclesiastical system originated. It supposes, too, an entirely different meaning of the places of Scripture on which the power and right of the hierarchy are supposed to be established—yea, an entire modification of the interpretation of dogmas which are received as the essence of Christianity. We must no longer grant that the world in itself is a kingdom of sin and the devil, over against which the Church is to stand as an immediate juridical and externally organised kingdom of God. As little can we admit that Christ is to be regarded as an earthly God-king, into whose place the apostles and their successors entered. Even the doctrine of God must undergo a purification, for so long as the Pope is regarded as the immediate Vicar of God, who interferes in all civil matters, gives temporal laws, inflicts physical punishments, and commands entire nations to be rooted out by the sword: in short, so long as the Popes, with the hierarchy, claim to be the Vicars of the Old Testament God, and are acknowledged as such by the faithful, their claims and interferences in the temporal and political region, even if combined with the exercise of force, can scarcely be rejected as illegal. All this is only the logical consequence of the theocratic idea and its realization. Whoever—as was the case universally in the middle ages, and must in modern times be the case with all Catholics—whoever believes in the absolute divinity of the Church, and the immediate Vicarship of Christ and God through the Pope, or holds fast to obedience from a submissive sense of duty—whoever, I say, allows the ground principles to be valid, and accepts the premisses, commits a logical, and from his stand-point a moral, offence if he rejects the great, even if unwarrantable and altogether illegal pretensions of the Pope, as they have been put forward from the earliest middle ages. He alone thinks and acts consistently and rationally who rejects, along with the consequences and the pretensions, the ground principles and premisses. The so-called Liberal theologians and statesmen among Catholics should consider this well, that they may come out of the halfness and uncertainty of thought

and action in which they are bound, and which greatly hinder them from doing anything really useful for religious reform, and the spiritual development of the people.

If we are justly to estimate the views and pretensions of other Popes these considerations must be our guide. Innocent III. says, "The Roman high priest takes upon earth, not the place of a mere man, but of the true God." This was, in fact, the universal belief at that time, and is to-day with all strong Roman Catholics; and, indeed, it must be with all who regard the Pope as the Vicar of Christ, and Christ as God. Innocent III. avowedly was led entirely by the theocratic idea; only instead of the Jewish national theocracy, a universal one was to be established. The Pope was to be the universal ruler over all kingdoms, princes, and nations of the earth. To us this seems an adventurous thought and a chimerical effort, but well-grounded and legitimate for him who regards himself as the plenipotentiary, vicar, and representative of God upon earth, to whom is committed all power in heaven and on earth, and who can believe that God is so created in the image of man that a man may be His Vicar for all other men; and whose government of this world, at least in its relation to the spiritual life of humanity, is of that kind that it can be transferred to a man as *locum tenens*, and to whom the theocratic endeavours of this Vicar, or Vice-God, upon earth after universal dominion do not appear unreasonable or unwarrantable. What bounds, then, can be put to such a representative of God upon earth? What demands for unconditional subjection and service from men can be regarded as too great or as unlawful by those who once believe this authority and plenitude of power as belonging to the immediate Vicar of God; a being supernatural, endowed with gifts of incantation, and now also declared infallible! Pope Boniface VIII. maintained that God had placed him over kings and kingdoms, and charged him with the duty of destroying and building, of rooting out and planting again. Kings were made subject to him because of their sins, and he was able to depose them. The Bull "Unam Sanctam" maintains that the temporal sword is subject to the spiritual, and must be drawn by the king for the Church at the will and nod of the priest; that the spiritual power has to sit in judgment on the temporal, if it does wrong, but that the spiritual is responsible to none but God. Whoever denies this power is declared to be a Manichæan. It is said that for every creature there is a necessary condition of salvation laid down by the Pope. This Pope, then, expresses himself with the utmost decision; and who can fairly deny that he only drew the extreme consequences from principles, or premisses, which even now are received, and which, if rightly believed and earnestly carried out, would necessarily lead to the immense pretensions of the Papacy which we have just mentioned.

In like manner the following Popes; Leo. X. confirmed the Bull "Unam Sanctam," at the Lateran Council, in 1517. In the Bull against Luther, this Pope says expressly that it is a work of the Holy Ghost to burn heretics. Since the Pope regarded this as good,

it must follow that it was also willed by the Holy Ghost, whose organ the Pope is. Paul III., with a lofty sense of his authority as Divine Vicar, and, consequent on this, of his sovereignty over princes and peoples, sent out a Bull against Henry VIII. of England, which freed his subjects from the oath of allegiance, and instigated them to open war against him; offered England to any one who could conquer it, and promised all the goods, movable and immovable, of heretical England to the conqueror. Pope Paul IV. appealed to the decree of the Council of Florence that all power in Christendom belonged to him, that all imperial and temporal power belonged to him. "The Pope," he said, "has two swords in his hand. He created and creates kings every day, and transfers kingdoms as he wills. Since God appoints that the Apostles and their successors shall judge angels, how much more are they able to judge men?" This is spoken plainly and decidedly. But considering the assumptions with which the Popes started, it was impossible to escape going so far in a time when mental scientific activity consisted essentially in drawing with scholastic subtlety the proper consequences from given premisses. But even in the present time, in writings and edifying discourses, this pious insanity concerning the authority and importance of the priesthood comes to light. It is even maintained that the priest has a certain power over God, especially in the Eucharist; that at the word of the priest, God must come with all His essence into the transubstantiated bread. How then could a limit be set to the power or the right of the Pope, the priest of all priests? The same Pope Paul explained in the presence of the royal ambassadors, in a full consistory, that he was the successor of the high priests who had deposed kings and emperors; that he would sooner set fire to the corners of the world than forego that right. In 1558, he sent out the Bull "Ex Apostolatus Officio," in which he, as Vicar on earth of God and Christ, out of the fulness of his apostolical power, solemnly sanctions all the most extreme doctrines concerning the universal dominion of the Pope; and curses all his enemies. Pope Pius V. was penetrated by the same consciousness of his absolute fulness of power. In the Bull against Elizabeth, Queen of England, "Regnans in Excelsis," he said that God had set him over all nations and kingdoms. By this power he was "to tear up, to overthrow, to scatter, and lay waste, to build, or plant again," and in virtue of it he orders the excommunication and deposition of the Queen. There is a suspicion, apparently not without foundation, that he hired assassins to attempt her life. By a like spirit almost all the Popes were animated, even to the present time. They never gave up their pretensions and their principles, though they have not always been able to enforce them. Pius IX. believed that in consequence of the resuscitated faith of the people and the powerful influence of the Jesuits, the time had come and the circumstances were again favourable for putting forth these claims, and ratifying them in a General Council. That he has the right to set up and put down kings he does not say expressly either in the Encyclica or the Syllabus; yet it will

be easy, when the circumstances are again favourable, to infer this right from the office of divine Vicarship, and to find it contained both in the Encyclica and the Syllabus. It is clearly maintained in them both that, in the rising conflicts between the authority of the State and that of the Church, it is the duty of all Catholic nations to obey the Church, and to prefer its authority to that of the State. The Papal privileges appear also to extend even to the forms of the constitution of States. The Pope certainly in the Encyclica strongly condemns those who "with entire misapprehension and neglect of the most certain principles of sound reason, dare to maintain that the will of the people, through so-called public opinion, or in any other way, constitutes the highest law, independent of all divine and human law." In like manner the Pope rejects the kind of governments which secure freedom in religion, or make no distinction between the true and the false religion. In this it is implied that from him alone can they learn the true religion. He complains that "people dare apply to the civil community the godless and absurd principle of so-called Naturalism, and to teach that the best kind of government and civil progress to be desired is, that human society be guided and governed without any reference to religion, as if it did not exist, or at least without making any difference between the true religion and the false." There is, then, nothing given up of all the pretensions to the highest universal sovereignty, and nothing ever will or can be consistently given up so long as the already mentioned assumptions concerning the office, authority, and power of the hierarchy, and especially of the Pope, are rightly held and believingly received in the Catholic world.

Catholic theologians have not omitted to teach and establish with all earnestness, with scholastic subtlety and pious unction, the rights and pretensions which the Popes inferred from their authority and assumed functions. They have also caused these doctrines and the proofs of them, with their scholastic subtleties, to be set forth as the genuine "Church science," which no good Catholic is to oppose. This was done with every circumstance of ecclesiastical authority, and before all by the Pope himself. It was in this business that the Jesuits in particular led the way with the greatest audacity, as, we might say, the logical *enfants terribles*. The Jesuit Molina says, "The spiritual dominion of the Pope, because of its supernatural object, embraces also the highest, most extended power of temporal jurisdiction over all princes and all persons belonging to the Church. So far as this object requires it the Pope can depose kings, and deprive them of their kingdoms; can judge between them concerning temporal things, annul their laws, and perform among Christians all other things which he, according to his wise will, because of the supernatural object and common spiritual salvation, reckons to belong to him. And this he can do, not merely through censures, that is, spiritual penalties, but also by force and arms, the same as any other temporal power; but it is most becoming that the Pope should not do this himself, but cause it to be done by temporal princes. On this account it is said that the Pope has two

swords, and the highest temporal and spiritual power." So far this Jesuit. In fact, when it is once admitted that to the Pope belongs the highest spiritual dominion, an actual spiritual imperium ; that it is his function, and that he has power to rule the world by means of a juridical organization and canon laws, in order thereby to promote truth and morality in the world ; to establish and build up a theocratic kingdom in the world ; then it can scarcely be otherwise but that he will also claim the temporal power, since it has the means at command to further and put in force the spiritual power. And as to the physical weapons themselves, how can they be better used than for the furtherance of the kingdom of God, for the propagation of truth, as well as for the extirpation of heretics ; the adversaries and enemies of God, who, as destroyers of the Church and kingdom of God, and as offenders against the divine majesty, deserve not merely chastisement, but death ? Like all other transgressors, they must be rooted out, even as the Israelites destroyed the inhabitants of Canaan. It is not, then, amazing that Salmeron, another Jesuit, says that the Pope can command the execution of a heretical prince ; for, according to the Scriptures, entire nations with their princes had to be destroyed, because of the chosen people, and to promote the erection of a perfect theocracy ; much more must the same be done for the furtherance and protection of the Christian Church, which is a much higher theocracy ! The logic is formidable and inexorable, if once the premisses are admitted. Most scholastic theologians of later times, especially those of the order of Jesuits, maintain a direct power of the Pope over states, princes, and nations as to their temporal affairs. The people are reckoned the source of the power of princes, to whom they transfer it. But the institution of princely power in this way by the sovereignty of the people, can only be valid through the confirmation of the Pope. According to this the Pope is the ultimate or true ground of all legitimate dominion ; and it belongs, therefore, to him to crown princes, and to depose them again. The Jesuit Bellarmine avowedly modifies this doctrine. He does not recognise in the Pope a direct, but only an indirect, power over temporal princes ; yet with such explanations that the Papal privileges remain fundamentally the same as if the power were direct. But so decidedly is the direct power over princes received at Rome, that by the command of the Pope at that time, the furious Sixtus V., Bellarmine's work was put in the index of books forbidden. It was not till the reign of the next Pope that the Jesuits succeeded in getting it out of the Index. Afterwards, in the seventeenth century, with all possible decision, the doctrine of the direct spiritual-temporal universal dominion of the Pope was restored. By it princes themselves, because of their sins, their religious belief, or their incapacity, might be deposed, their subjects freed from the oath of allegiance, their lands given to others, and even the princes themselves punished with imprisonment and death. This was the Roman theological doctrine of Papal power, a doctrine which agreed entirely with the Papal exercise of it. According to the theory of Catholic theologians it must accord with the will of the Pope ; for,

in the Syllabus, as we have already remarked, it is declared to be un-Catholic and an error to say that the Popes have ever at any time exceeded their legitimate power and authority.

### III.

It is impossible that modern States can endure such an ecclesiastical authority, or enter into union with it, if they are to execute their own functions and be true to their mission of culture. These functions are, to bring the entire being of humanity to its highest development and perfection in matters spiritual as well as material. Even if they agree to the most extreme concessions as to the absolute power of the hierarchy, which claims an unlimited plenitude of divine power, yet they will not satisfy the Pope so long as they do not renounce their sovereignty, acknowledge Papal supremacy, and regard its highest privileges as a gift of grace. Unless this is done, they will find the Papacy and the Jesuits always aggressive, and always ready, as far as possible, to excite the ignorant and credulous people against the civil governments in favour of Church domination. This will be done by the watch-word that "we are to obey God rather than man." Under these circumstances there is no other way for the State to secure its independence and to render possible the execution of its functions than the perfect severance of the union with the Church; the most complete liberation from its influence as a hierarchical organization and system of government. This is what we call the complete secularization of the State. If the civil power does not do this, if it remains in union or in contract with the Church as a kind of spiritual government, then, to be consistent, it must acknowledge the higher authority of the Church over itself, and for the most part be subject to it, waiting the privileges which the Pope will be pleased to confer. But if, notwithstanding this recognition of the Church, and of the absolute Papacy as a legal power and as a direct divine authority,—that which it claims to be; if the State does not seriously regard the Church as altogether divine, but in part limits and opposes it in its claims, not merely provoking its opposition, but treating it with halfness and inconsistency, then the reproach of injustice towards the authority of the Church is not undeserved. For, in this case, the State has placed itself on the same ground with the absolute Papacy, and, notwithstanding its superhuman and supernatural pretensions, has recognised it as a power with which terms may be made. It appears then to us, that the only right and consistent thing which the State can do, is not to acknowledge the direct divine foundation which the Church maintains for itself, that is to say, to let it rest on itself in the same way as with all other religions and denominations. The State should ignore the premisses, and then it will have a right, logically and juridically, entirely to ignore the consequences. But it is altogether inadmissible, yea, irrational and illogical, to yield the premisses, and yet, arbitrarily or according to human law, to judge,

limit, partly or even entirely to remove that which has been acknowledged as divine. It is not to be wondered at, if the advocates of the ecclesiastical claims say that the State and human law in this set themselves above God, and constitute themselves judges of God, since they wish to judge and limit by human measures that authority with which, notwithstanding its claims to an immediate Divinity, they have entered into a union which presupposes an admission that these claims are valid. Such a proceeding must be dangerous to the State itself. On the one side it is granted that to the people this authority, recognised by the State, is announced as divine, supernatural, above all other, and the recognition of it to be enforced even by physical means. On the other side, the civil governments themselves limit the claims of this divine power, oppose and thwart it, so that by the people it may easily be suspected as wicked and godless.

In our judgment, the only way out of these difficulties is in the dissolution of the connection of the State and the Church, especially the Catholic Church, or the absolute Papacy. The middle age connection must be thoroughly removed, since all the grounds which gave it meaning and made it useful are now gone. The State as such can no longer believe in an immediate direct divine power in the Church or the Papacy, and yet not believingly be subject to it. On the one side, if it did this, it would illegally overstep its own province, and interfere in ecclesiastical and religious matters without either right or competency. Whilst on the other side its own sovereignty must lie in submissive obedience to that of the Church, that is, at the feet of the Pope. But again the old idea of the State as a temporal kingdom, a profane world, the special region of sin and the devil, standing over against the Church as the kingdom of God and redemption, must be regarded as an idea of the past. It can never again exercise that influence on the relation of Church and State which for centuries hitherto it has exercised, to the setting up of the authority of the Church, and the putting down of that of the State. So also every mean or superficial view of the constitution of the State must be overcome. Such as that its only duty is to take care of bodies, but that souls are the property of the Church, to be placed under its spiritual jurisdiction. The functions of the State, as we understand them now, are to form and nourish the entire human life, chiefly indeed through the furtherance of the spiritual development, but to raise also the physical material well-being, to beautify and ennoble the external as well as the spiritual existence. The State has also an ethical and intellectual function to fulfil. It is a kingdom of right, of truth, and of morality. The right ordering of human relations, and the furtherance of science and humanity in all their relations, is the goal of its endeavours. On the other hand, in regard to religion, especially the Christian religion, we are irresistibly driven to the conviction that it was not intended to be, and cannot be, an external spiritual dominion. Christ Himself expressly forbade His disciples to seek

after the manner of earthly kings to rule over the faithful in his kingdom.

The relations of Church and State will have been duly considered if we can show that the objections usually brought against the separation of this union are of no weight. The objections which chiefly concern the State are that through this separation it will be perfectly "godless," that the secularization will be a profanation. This can only be maintained according to the old way of seeing in nature and the natural formations of history a kingdom of the wicked or the devil, and only recognising something divine in miracles and in the so-called supernatural region of the Church. This view—in fact a remnant of the old Manichæan dualism—must be regarded as a stand-point which has been conquered. Nature, even matter itself in its essence and operations, is no longer regarded as a reasonless region of darkness and a kingdom of the wicked, as formerly it was, especially in the east. In consequence of scientific enquiry, it is discovered even in its minutest parts to be a kingdom of law and order, a region of rational phenomena, and so far a divine revelation. So also is it with the state. It is indeed a natural work of man, created and formed in all its relations through the natural powers of man, and yet not to be considered as a bad, profane kingdom of the world, and region of ungodliness and anti-godliness. On the contrary, it is to be regarded as the expression of the legal rational striving of the spirit, an effort continually perfecting itself, to bring the being of humanity to an expression of the full measure of reason, and to realize in it divine ideas. And therefore the State in its way is divine as well as the Church. It is at length time to admit that reason, order, and law, are the proper expressions of the divine existence and government; not that which wants order, and cannot be comprehended; not that which appears lawless and marvellous. It is for the protection and furtherance of religion itself that we desire earnestly to acknowledge, and to lead the people to acknowledge, that the highest and most manifest revelation of the Godhead is to be found in the known, the clear, the rational, and the orderly; not in the dark, the inconceivable, the incomprehensible, and what is called the miraculous. Hitherto religion and faith in God have been grounded on miracles and incomprehensibles. By these the truth of religion and the existence of God have been proved. So now every incomprehensibility explained, every law of nature or history disclosed and divested of its miraculous character, removes a pillar from religious belief, gives it a shock, or annihilates it altogether. It is then no marvel that the authority of faith and the positive theology are unfriendly to science, that they treat it with distrust, and in every way try to hinder it. The blame, however, of injuring religion does not fall fairly on science, but on the misunderstanding of religious faith, and the resting it on a wrong foundation. By the believers in positive theology the present age is charged with the worship of reason, which puts itself in the place of the worship of

God ; with "Rationalism," which takes the place of faith, and renders it unnecessary. But even if this were the case, which we do not for a moment admit, it would probably be better, more worthy of man, and more pleasing to God, to reverence the divine in reason and in law, than in the inconceivable, the accidental, and the miraculous. Reason and the rational is ever the expression of the Eternal. It is the divine, that in which God is revealed, manifests Himself, works, and is. The consciousness of the divine, and the reverence of it, which are grounded in science, are firm, sure, and unchangeable ; as reasonable as the religious faith commonly is, which rests only on miracles, darkness, and incomprehensibility. Morality also has a firm foundation in rational convictions, so that it cannot in any case come into collision with science.

The State then can no longer be regarded as something merely worldly, profane, or directly undivine. It appears rather as the stamp of the divine, because in it reason, right, morality, humanity, ever find their highest representation. An era therefore may begin in which again, as in the earlier times of the human race, all that happens and all that is will be regarded as the continual moving and working of God. Not merely, as in former times, that all phenomena and all the operations of nature be fantastically personified and divinized, but that through the active understanding of the orderly and rational course of existence the divine will be seen in the reign of law rather than in the miraculous. The Bible as well as Homer, ascribes great thoughts, wise counsels, and good resolutions to the influence of the Deity agreeably to the religious mode of contemplating the world in these early times. Would it not be admissible even now to maintain this, only not in the sense of a supernatural divine development or miraculous inspiration, but in the sense that the natural powers of the mind and the exercise of them is a proof or proclamation of the divine in the present constitution of the world.

With this view of the State and its functions we are, however, far from putting it in the place of religion, or from wishing to concede to it the dominion over religion and the Church. We wish rather that religion and all the forms of religion be altogether separated from the State and from civil governments. It is entirely consistent with our view that the State and religion become uniform and homogeneous, that thereby more unity and harmony come into the spiritual life of the people, and that every remnant of the Manichæan dualism should disappear ; yet the State and religion are entirely distinct regions, and have very different functions to perform. The State, with all its strivings, is contained purely within the temporal, the mere earthly stream of the transient. The goal which waves before it and towards which it aims, is only the ideal and the realization of the ideas of perfection in their earthly relations. Religion, on the other hand, in accordance with its nature, presses out continually beyond this earthly being, seeks to determine and to realize first the relation of the soul, and then of

the whole of the earthly life, to the divine and eternal, to the absolute first ground and essence. Its tendency ever is to turn away from the world-striving and to sink into its divine Original.\*

But religion will reform itself in accordance with this, its true essential being, and as the result of the interpretation of the State which we have given, when the State, on its side, has been put right. And Christianity must especially be made conformable to the mind and will of its author. It must, as we have already said, cease to be a region of earthly dominion, and must at the same time cease to influence earthly relations by incantations and by means of the supernatural. It must not seek to rule over or hinder the activity and development of earthly powers, whether they be physical or mental. It must become a purely spiritual, purely inward disposition of the heart or mind, and must have for its objects only piety and morality. No more must it seek to change the course of nature through direct divine working, arbitrarily and in the way of miracle, at any moment, according to the wishes or necessities of men. Its only aim must be the disinterested worship and glory of God, the purification and elevation of the human soul, the working in it of higher feelings, of a humble resigned disposition, of a pure mind and moral rectitude of will. But this inward ennobling and sanctifying of the human soul must no more be carried on in an arbitrary and accidental way, by magic and incantations, but through the individual activity of men under the intelligible influence of the universal divine government. Christ nowhere attaches importance to a magical, mysterious divine favour, communicated as an especial gift. He everywhere teaches that men, through ethical striving, through fulfilling the will of the "Heavenly Father," shall make themselves well-pleasing to God, and obtain everlasting life. If the "Christianity of Christ" seems on the one side too much to favour fleeing from the world, this is yet more than counterbalanced by the express command of practical love to our neighbour, which is equally enforced with the command for the perfect love of God. It is to be ascribed to the influence of the old religions, which chiefly consisted of magic and theurgy, that ceremonies and worship of this kind were introduced into the Christian Church, and with the same object. It may have been that, in the centuries that are past, these correspond to the circumstances of men and nations, and so were in some sense necessary. But now that the orderly and necessary course of nature has been clearly understood, and since, through inquiries of all kinds, the old idea of God has become in part untenable, has undergone, and must still undergo purification, such religious ceremonials and continuous miracles are no more to be received. How could it accord with our idea of the all-good and all-just God, that arbitrarily, through easy

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\* These ideas are brought out more fully in the author's work "Das Christenthum und die moderne Naturwissenschaft," in the section "Das Christenthum und die moderne Civilization."

and partly external mechanical means, the divine displeasure could be removed from men, or the divine favour obtained? How could God, if He can help all men by a miracle, not be willing to help all men? If He can help some without this co-operation, how can He not be able to help all? Or how can He only help half, when it is possible for Him to help all together? If he has resolved, in consequence of His power and might to help them by miracles, how is it that He leaves this help to the accident of the earthly course of this world, and to the uncertainty and weakness of human endeavours?

When these things are duly weighed, it will be admitted that the old ideas are as untenable with the course of nature as they are irreconcilable with the idea of God. In connection with this is the necessity to free the conception of divine "revelation" from the narrowness and narrow-heartedness which have been attached to it by positive theology and the Church, and to understand it in a wider and fuller sense. It is impossible to believe concerning such a God as Christ taught and science requires, that He could arbitrarily give or promise a revelation as a special privilege, that He could give it only to this or that people, preserve to them truth and law whilst He refuses these to all other men and nations, although it would have been easy for Him to communicate it also to them, and thus to free them from error, sin, and everlasting destruction. So, likewise, it is not reconcilable with the higher idea of God, and with an actual divine revelation, that it should be given to mankind, and yet committed only as a peculiar inheritance to a few men who are to administer it at their will or according to their capacity. How could the Christian's God have given up the salvation of men, "His children," to the power and arbitrary will of a few weak men, if according to His goodness and justice He wills all men to be saved, is impartially disposed towards all, and has had the same object in the creation of all? The idea of revelation must then be taken in a wider sense. In reality all religion, all religious consciousness rests on revelation, on that universal and natural revelation which is given in and with the spirit of man by means of its capacity to have a God-consciousness, and thereby a religion. Hence this revelation is the ground of all religions, and the truth or essence of religion is in all so far as they are, more or less a perfect, often, indeed, a very perverted, activity of the revelation talent of human nature. Judaism and Christianity are not separated by an absolute cleft from all other religions, nor is their essence so different that they alone and expressly are absolutely divine, true, and perfect, while all others are undivine, false, and wicked. Even the highest pride of the orthodox might be satisfied that in Christianity they consciously recognise and practise the relatively best religion. But this will not satisfy them: they find it agreeable to Christian modesty, humility, and the belief that God is the Father of all men, to think that they and they only possess the absolute, true, and perfect religion, but that all other men are bound in chains of error and consigned to destruction! It is really time, especially for Christians, to give up this foolish imagination.

In any case we are to believe that religion, with all its forms in time and space, is under definite laws of nature and history. It must follow a certain historical course of development which cannot be changed at the desire of man, and will not be changed by the power of God. We may assume that but for this, salvation would have come long ago to the human race. To learn something concerning this dark law is one of the problems of science. It must be learned ere we can understand human existence, or be able "to justify the ways of God to man."

To these remarks we only wish to add a few explanations in reference to the religious reform which out of the present crisis has arisen in the Catholic Church, and more or less also in all Christian Churches. It is highly probable that many will not be friendly to our views, that they may appear strange and contrary to their own, perhaps, also unchristian according to their views of Christianity. But we do not ask a blind assent without examination. We do not set forth these views as propositions of faith. Let them be earnestly and freely examined, and let them find as much assent or consent as the reasons we have brought forward have weight and significance. If the religious change in relation to faith and the essence of the Church which at the present time seems offered, is to be great and thorough, we must reflect that never in the course of human history has there been a period in which the views of nature and of the historical, political, and social relations, have experienced so thorough a change, on sure scientific grounds, as at present; and, moreover, that there has arisen the pressing necessity in the interests of religion itself to undertake a decided reform for the preservation and furtherance of its true essence, and in order so to set it forth that it may be in harmony with the certain results of science and with all other human culture; and that the people remain or again become partakers of its blessings.

J. FROHSCHAMMER.





