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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A CRITIQUE FROM CATHOLIC TRADITION

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
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*Submitted to the
Senate Foreign Relations
Committee by
Peter L. Gerety
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*United States - Foreign
Relations*



I am Peter Gerety, archbishop of Newark, N.J., and chairman of the justice subcommittee of the U.S. Catholic bishops' bicentennial committee. As chairman of the bicentennial subcommittee I have heard the views of hundreds of Americans in the past year, and I appreciate your invitation to appear before this committee to discuss the goals and values of American foreign policy.

In appearing before you as a bishop of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, I speak out of a specific and substantially articulated transnational religious-moral tradition concerning the ethics of international relations. This tradition can be traced from the Old and the New Testaments through Augustine's *City of God* and Aquinas' *Summa Theologica* to the Spanish contributors to international law, Vitoria and Suarez, and finally to modern documents of papal teaching on international relations.

In the years since World War II the problems of justice and peace in international affairs have assumed an increasingly visible role in the official teaching of the Roman Catholic Church as they have for other religious bodies nationally and internationally.

The contemporary Catholic perspective on these questions is to be found principally in a series of documents which includes the Christmas addresses of Pius XII (1940-1957); the encyclicals of Pope John XXIII: *Mater et Magistra* (1961) and *Pacem In Terris* (1963); the writings of Pope Paul VI: *Populorum Progressio* (1967) and *Octagesima Adveniens* (1971); Vatican II's document *Gaudium et Spes* (1965) and the statement of the III International Synod of Bishops: *Justitia In Mundo* (1971).

The fundamental perspective of this body of doctrine is that the human community should be understood primarily as a family bound together by ties of mutual responsibility and respect for each person's human dignity. This perspective is rooted in a belief that we share a common origin in the creative act of God, and a common destiny of eternal life.

These assertions of faith are not shared universally in the global community, but they are widely held in our national community. Moreover, the political-ethical implications of this basically religious vision are open to rational analysis and can be shared even if the faith premises are not.

The structural character of the political-moral vision in Catholic teaching is that of a community of nations organized as sovereign states. In the Catholic tradition, the sovereign state is to provide the

conditions and content of a decent human existence for its citizens and to cooperate with other states in building an international community with justice as the ruling norm and peace as the fruit of justice.

The primary characteristic of this Catholic conception is that it is internationalist rather than nationalist in its basic structure; it affirms the reality of an international community, with consequent obligations, beneath the empirical manifestations of a globe divided into competing sovereign units. Hence in Catholic teaching the concept of the national interest is a limited one; the national interest should be conceived and understood in light of the developing international interest.

In summary the Catholic tradition does not deny either the reality or the validity of the state, but it affirms that the sovereign state must constantly be subjected to political and moral critique by its own citizens and others. The purpose of the critique is to test whether the policies and practices of the state do in fact serve the legitimate needs and aspirations of the people in the international community.

The substantive norms which are offered in the literature to be used in this critique of foreign policy are articulated in some detail in the documents I have enumerated. An exegesis of these norms is impossible in this presentation; a sense of the content of Catholic teaching may be grasped in the following assertions:

- *Politically*: it affirms the imperative of an international order articulated in terms of rights and responsibilities among states; the order is designed to produce an international political community governed by the values of justice, truth, charity and freedom.

- *Strategically*: it acknowledges a right of defense in an imperfectly organized world, but in recent years it has systematically restricted the scope of this right to the use of force to the point where today it is recognized as legitimate only for defense, then within defined limits and always as a last resort.

- *Economically*: it asserts that the existing maldistribution of wealth in the international system is an indictment of the existing system and an imperative for those with substantial control of the political-economic power to take specific steps to allocate "the global product" in a more rational and equitable fashion.

My purpose in this testimony is to provide an illustration of how these general substantive norms take shape in the context of assessing the foreign policy of specific states. The illustration is meant also to be an indication of how I think U.S. policy

should be directed in light of the present structure of the international system. Accordingly, I will now discuss three topics: U.S. strategic and military policy; the United States and the less-developed countries; and human rights and U.S. foreign policy.

I. U.S. STRATEGIC AND MILITARY POLICY

Perhaps the oldest and most refined ethical issue in Christian political morality is the morality of the use of force. Living in one of the two strategic superpowers makes this issue of prime importance for the religious communities. I will point toward two examples which manifest the nature of the moral question in U.S. strategic policy.



A. The Possession and Use of Nuclear Weapons

We live in the nuclear age; at the heart of the military question is the fact of nuclear weapons. A representative and authoritative Catholic statement on the morality of nuclear weapons is found in the document *Gaudium et Spes* of Vatican II.

Synthetically stated, the conciliar text lays down three principles regarding nuclear weapons: *first*, use of these weapons against cities and populated areas is prohibited in a special way because of their destructive capacity; *second*, while use is prohibited, the possession of these weapons for deterrence may possibly be legitimated as the lesser of two evils; *third*, even deterrence is questionable unless it is conceived as an interim expedient accompanied by extraordinary efforts to negotiate their limitation and reduction.

These three principles direct our attention toward three areas of U.S. strategic policy: the possible use of nuclear weapons; the posture of our deterrent; and the policy of arms limitation. My purpose here is to comment on the state of these questions, not to provide a final moral judgment on them.

First, on the basis of statements of our government officials, it is clear that we are prepared

to use nuclear weapons which are presently targeted against cities. This policy has been developed in tandem with a similarly declared policy on the part of the Soviet Union. In technical terms we both rely upon a counter-city strategy. The paradox of this position, as the Vatican Council noted, is that it preserves a "kind of peace" at the cost of threatening to perform mass murder. The rationale of the policy seems to be to make the threat of nuclear war so devastating that it will keep either side from initiating it.

A moral reflection grounded in the Vatican Council's position can acknowledge the utility of the deterrence function of nuclear weapons but cannot legitimate their counter-city use. Indeed the following text of the Council's document seems directed precisely at the intended use of most of our nuclear weapons:

"Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation." (*Gaudium et Spes*)

The Council explicitly condemned the use of weapons of mass destruction, but refrained from condemning the possession of such weapons as a deterrent. The Council did not pass direct judgment on the strategy of nuclear deterrence, but it is clear that its tolerance for deterrent strategies is conditional on the desire to keep the barrier between possession and actual use as high as possible. This raises certain questions about the use of tactical or other nuclear weapons which may, in themselves, or in their intended use, escape the condemnation of the Council as weapons of lesser destructiveness to cities and populations.

In recent years a strategic concept known as "counterforce strategy" has emerged which envisages the use of strategic nuclear weapons primarily on military targets as preferable to targeting them on cities and large populated areas. An objection to this strategy (which has not yet been officially adopted) is that such use of nuclear weapons tends to break down the barrier between possession and use of weapons of mass destructiveness, i.e., makes nuclear war more likely. A similar objection attaches to the use of tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons in Central Europe or (perhaps in lesser measure in Korea) where the "first use" of such weapons appears to be part of approved strategy.

I do not seek to adjudicate the details,

ethically or empirically, of this complex strategic discussion, but I would personally be of the opinion that moves to erode the barrier against use of nuclear weapons, whether of the tactical or strategic variety, are not in the best interests of maintaining peace.

As I have indicated already, the other condition placed upon a deterrence strategy by the Council is that efforts must continually be made to reduce the level of armaments. In hearings such as these our attention should be directed toward the question whether our efforts of arms limitation and reduction are commensurate with the dangers with which we and others are constantly threatened.

The results of our efforts thus far are not strikingly successful. The presently agreed upon levels of nuclear parity are set far above the capabilities now possessed by either of the superpowers. Admittedly, the responsibility here does not rest upon the United States alone or even principally with us; it is shared by both superpowers.

The point to be made, however, is that the treacherous trap of the arms race continues vertically between the superpowers and horizontally through proliferation of nuclear weapons to third countries. Admittedly, arms limitation in either of these categories even with the best of intentions on all sides is not easily achieved. After surveying the evidence of past and present policies, however, one is left with the uneasy feeling that a policy which is designated to protect our survival by correlating survival with nuclear security may unwittingly be risking the survival of ourselves and others.

In the nuclear age there are risks inherent in seeking too much security as well as in possessing too little. Some questions seem legitimate in the debate about what constitutes real security: could our security be as well assured with a lesser deterrent capability? Would it be unreasonably hazardous to experiment with some unilateral reduction in U.S. capabilities? I believe these are real, not rhetorical, questions. I offer them as a contribution from recent Catholic teaching to the resolution of complex policy issues.

B. U.S. Military Assistance and Arms Sales

A second issue, closely related to the first, is U.S. arms sales and military assistance programs. Mr. Chairman, the administration request this fiscal year for so-called security assistance programs comes to \$2.8 billion; this is more than will be provided for economic development assistance.

The bulk of this (\$1.5 billion) is for Israel, with which I will not quarrel, since we are plausibly

assured it is essential to Israel's security. A modest amount is provided for other Near Eastern countries, mainly Egypt. Another \$534 million is provided to Europe primarily to Greece and Turkey, who, one might suppose, could be supplied by their more prosperous NATO European neighbors. Africa is to receive \$68.0 million and this item has already received sufficient attention in Congress.

But in a discussion of the moral foundations of foreign policy, can one ignore almost \$200 million for Latin America and almost \$450 million for East Asia?

We are told that the bulk of the funds for Latin America is for training. The administration's position before the Senate Appropriations Committee speaks of "remaining responsive to Latin America's reasonable military needs within a framework of cooperation and growing economic self-sufficiency." I would be inclined to question the need for such programs until it was demonstrated that they are not associated with domestic security measures or the result of bureaucratic pressures from U.S. military agencies that wish to perpetuate a *raison d'être* for the U.S. military presence in those countries.

The almost half billion dollars provided for East Asia is, I suppose, at least partially related to legitimate U.S. security concerns, especially in Korea. The other recipients are Thailand (border problems and internal subversion), the Philippines (internal security problems) and Indonesia (to patrol and protect its extensive archipelago).

I would question whether we have an obligation to help such countries with their internal security problems when our domestic program needs in the field of housing or welfare are being slighted because of budgetary stringency. Moreover, such assistance tends to identify the United States with the measures employed by those regimes in the name of internal security which are, in the case of Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, measures of severe repression and maltreatment which violate the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.

Substantial as are U.S. military assistance programs (including military sales on credit) total U.S. arms sales to the rest of the world are vastly greater, amounting to about \$11 billion in FY 1975. The United States has shipped \$100 billion worth of weapons to 136 nations since the end of World War II, an amount equal to arms sales by all countries. As with nuclear weapons, here too the lay critic with an eye to the moral aspect of U.S. policy has the suspicion that the United States is fueling the arms

race rather than containing it.

Such arms sales are justified with a variety of reasons: commercial, technical and political depending on whether the salesman is the corporate producer, the military forces or the Department of State. Often one hears that old argument which is the bane of every moralist, "if we don't sell them, someone else will." Very often one has the impression that arms sales are an important tool of U.S. diplomacy, serving, it is said, to "revitalize our bond to allies who share our values, institutions and interests."

U.S. sales have increased from \$2 billion a year in 1967 and seem likely to go on increasing unless some restraints are imposed. It seems to me that if U.S. credibility is to be based on a genuine long-range commitment to peace rather than on the credibility of power, the United States should exercise tighter controls on these transactions.



II. THE LESS-DEVELOPED NATIONS

The relationship between the United States and the less-developed countries raises two problems for policy makers: economic development and agricultural production.

In 1967, Pope Paul issued his encyclical letter "On the Development of Peoples" (*Populorum Progressio*). This remarkable document anticipated the demands that the less industrialized world presented in the last two special sessions of the UN General Assembly.

It described the effect of colonial and mercantilist policies in shaping the economies of the non-European areas. It pointed out that the rules of a liberal international trading system worked to the disadvantage of the poorer countries, just as unrestricted economic individualism exploited the wage earners in the new industrial countries of the 19th century. It advocated massive capital transfers to the poor nations, "regional agreements among weak nations for mutual support," and new institutions for "international collaboration on a

worldwide scale” to assist in the development of the poorer nations.

Since 1967, the gap between rich and poor countries has grown wider and the poor countries, having observed the success of the oil producing-exporting countries in organizing to raise the price of their exports, concluded that this could be done with other basic commodities as well, and that such actions or other actions to control commodity prices would give them the resources they need for their own development. This conclusion may well be unrealistic but it should come as no surprise or shock to the leaders of the industrialized countries.

For years the United States has advocated economic development aid, while insisting that a liberal world trading system was best for all concerned. The conviction, supported by a collection of mutually reinforcing conclusions of economists, sociologists and foreign policy bureaucrats, seems to have been that economic growth led to political stability and the rejection of Marxist alternatives — hence a “more congenial world environment” for the United States.

When it gradually became clear to the Third World that the level of aid was not only less than was promised, but far from being adequate, their leaders decided to do what wage earners have been doing for decades in almost all industrialized capitalist countries: change the contract through collective bargaining.

The United States has taken the lead in responding to this tack, and has developed a long list of specific proposals with which members of the committee are familiar. All of these proposals seem reasonable and they were well received in the United Nations.

On closer examination, the U.S. proposals may leave something to be desired from the viewpoint of the less-developed countries. It is estimated that some \$40 billion of outside capital a year will be required by the year 1980 to bring about a modest acceleration of recent growth rates, whereas total bilateral concessional assistance last year from the industrialized nations amounted to only \$7.2 billion. However, as U.S. spokesmen have pointed out, the political climate for bilateral aid has deteriorated, and political leaders do not seem inclined to attempt to reverse this trend.

Where, then, is the required capital to come from? The U.S. proposes an increase in the capital of the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation from the present \$100 million to at least \$400 million. The balance of the required capital will

presumably have to come from private foreign investment; i.e., the developing countries are on notice to help themselves by creating a favorable climate for new investment.

Administration spokesmen advise developing countries to move away from dependence on foreign aid to greater reliance on private capital flows. It thus seems fairly clear that the United States' position is that developing countries must look to private investment to finance their development, and the implication of this is, better not tinker with the existing system. A minimal concession is the expressed willingness of the United States to join in the establishment of an international code of conduct to regulate affairs between multinational companies and governments.

In the face of the need for extensive capital in many Third/Fourth World countries for industrialization and infrastructures (e.g. schools, roads, hospitals, utilities), to suggest that foreign private investments — either in terms of quantity or in direction — will be sufficient is to offer a delusion. Poorer nations' development will be vulnerable to a system characterized by Pope Paul as one which "considers profit as the key motive for economic progress, competition as the supreme law of economics, and private ownership of the means of production as an absolute right."

Foreign private capital investment in poorer countries is not necessarily an agent of desirable development any more than is such investment in highly industrialized areas. When the poorest nations require large sums of outside capital assistance, to advocate reliance upon private foreign investment is to offer them a weak reed.

In the world food problem, the United States has a unique role of leadership. I need not review the various courses of action being pursued. The United States is providing this fiscal year more than 6 million tons of cereal grains, an impressive 60% of the target for emergency food aid set by the World Food Conference.

Current legislation provides that 80% of food aid under PL 480 must go to the most severely affected countries. Having just read of the establishment in the State Department of an office to review the UN voting records of aid recipients and administer a "carrot and stick" policy of rewarding or punishing the recipients by giving or withholding aid, I am skeptical that the objective of a depoliticized aid policy — at least toward the most severely affected nations — is fully supported by the administration.

I am also disturbed by the lack of a larger long-term commitment to emergency food aid. The only one I know of is Secretary Kissinger's promise to try to keep it at 4 million tons. One sometimes gets the impression that U.S. policy in this area is committed to selling every possible bit of surplus to cash foreign customers and letting PL 480 dispose of the rest.

This brief and admittedly cursory review leaves me disquieted. I see no prospect of an effective U.S. initiative to bring about what Kissinger called a just share in global prosperity for the developing countries. Perhaps this committee could ask administration spokesmen to spell out what is meant by this and how the measures proposed in the UN address will help to bring it about. Without such a demonstration, I am left with the fear that economic growth in many poor countries will continue to be too slow and if that happens, no one can say that the response of the industrialized countries has been adequate.

Today we find that income in the world is unequally distributed with a few people in the rich countries overconsuming, and at least a fourth to a third of the world population lacking necessities. Spokesmen for the United States and other industrialized countries try to justify this by pointing out that the rich countries produce more, and more efficiently, while the poor countries have themselves to blame for producing too little. While this thesis may find support in some circles, it is not acceptable in a Christian critique.

Faced with the contending positions between the nations of the North and those of the South and the marked contrast in the life styles of peoples of the two regions, U.S. policy makers must accept the task of mobilizing public opinion to accept the necessary increases in taxes to fund multilateral assistance programs for economic development.

Admittedly, this task can be distasteful and politically unpopular. However, I believe that other sectors of American society, including the churches, share this responsibility with leaders of government. Certainly in times like these in which domestic conditions are seriously strained, the instinctive reactions of many Americans is to reject talk about the needs of others overseas. But it is necessary, nevertheless, to present in as forceful a way as is possible, the concrete facts of absolute need abroad versus relative poverty at home.

The point is not to gloss over the real needs of many Americans or to pit them against Third Worlders. Rather, it is to suggest, that perhaps the

erosion of public will, referred to earlier, to support overseas programs, is in no small measure due to failure to inform the American electorate about the pressing need to share the world's scarce resources in an interdependent world.

The Congress, the administration, churches and other concerned agents are obliged to bring this case to the American constituency to provide them the means of moving from instinctive reaction to informed response. To do less, I believe, is to underestimate the latent potential of the American people for justice.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

The defense and promotion of human rights continue to take on an increasing importance in world affairs. In Pope John's encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*, he described the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the U.N. General Assembly (1948) as an "act of highest importance."

The protection of human rights is especially vulnerable because of two distinguishing elements of the international system: a lack of moral consensus and the absence of centralized authority, both of which are presumed in domestic societies. At the



same time, the international community is committed in principle to human rights standards as these are expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Since no centralized authority exists to implement the principles of the document, the burden falls primarily on individual states which remain the principal agents of authority and action in world politics. To pose the issue of human rights in the context of foreign policy inevitably raises the question: What responsibility does one state have concerning the violation of basic human rights in another sovereign state?

Responses to this question reflect two distinct and opposing conceptions of political and moral

responsibility in international relations. On the one hand, in terms of classic diplomacy, the sovereign state is the basic unit of international politics and the conduct of its internal affairs is beyond the purview or the criticism of other states. Complementing this perspective is the assertion that a sovereign state's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility, hence the domestic affairs of another state are only brought into the matrix of foreign policy calculations if they threaten the first nation's security.

On the other hand, Catholic theory as expressed, for example, in *Pacem in Terris*, places the nation within a framework of moral and legal restraints. The sovereign state in this conception is not seen as immune from criticism by its own citizens or by other agents in the international community. Violations of basic human rights within one nation, therefore, are the legitimate concern of outsiders. This concern is especially compelling for us when it is provoked by the oppressive conduct of nations with whom the United States is closely allied.

Recently, the American Catholic bishops in commenting on the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights stated that "the pervasive presence of American power creates a responsibility of using that power in the service of human rights." The exercise of this responsibility, the bishops state, raises a question of conscience for the United States and for each of its citizens.

In the conduct of foreign affairs it is simplistic to suggest that the United States either has no influence on the conduct of internal affairs of allies or that it has no business in these affairs. The reality is that the United States' relationships with many nations in the world are an intricate web of associations involving trade negotiations, banking interests, foreign and military assistance, political, social and cultural ties.

It is encouraging to note the recent appearance of an increasing awareness among citizens and a growing consensus within the Congress that human rights be given greater weight in U.S. foreign policy.

When the internal conduct of a nation with whom the United States has a significant association becomes blatantly and seriously restrictive of human rights, the moral integrity of the United States is challenged. The basis of America's domestic commitment to human rights is a belief in the dignity of the human person. The affirmation of that belief is universal in its intent and implication; this means that to affirm the rights and dignity of the person

here in fact, is to be committed to affirm it in other places in principle.

To put the same case from another perspective, there is contained in our belief about human dignity and human rights the idea that when rights are violated with impunity somewhere, they are implicitly threatened everywhere.

Every human community, including political society, is held together by bonds of trust and respect which are made visible and tangible in the exercise of responsibility for one another. When we refuse to acknowledge responsibility for the life and dignity of others, then the road is open for rule by terrorism, torture and brute force.

The issue properly stated, then, is not whether the United States should respond to violations of human rights by another nation; rather, the point for examination is what are the standards for a nation's behavior in human rights, and what should be the U.S. response to their violation. Two measures are evident for a positive and public expression of the U.S. commitment to human rights.

First, in U.S. bilateral relations: the standards to which we as a nation are committed domestically on human rights set a correspondingly high standard for our foreign policy. If we cannot maintain a certain consistency between our national ideals and our international behavior, we weaken the moral claim upon which our own rights are based.

Minimum standards in the protection of human rights, below which no nation's conduct may fall without incurring the ire of outsiders, are part of the fabric of international affairs, for example in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the numerous U.N. resolutions. Therefore, blatant policies/practices of nations which, for example, deny legal protection to citizens, detain political prisoners without due process, utilize torture, and impose restrictions upon citizens' participation in society based on religious, ethnic and/or racial standards, cannot go unchallenged in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, especially when, as Kissinger has noted, we have the latitude to "seize the moral opportunity," and have the capacity "to influence events, often decisively."

It is incumbent upon U.S. foreign policy makers that ways be found to factor specific human rights concerns into the foreign policy, as they have learned to do with a variety of other concrete issues, such as our commercial, labor, agricultural and fisheries interests.

The second method by which the United States can positively manifest its commitment to

human rights is in its support of the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. While it must be admitted that these efforts at the international level are imperfect, often severely flawed, they are also, it may be hoped as Pope John suggested, important steps "on the path toward the juridical-political organization of the world community."

There is, therefore, a pressing need for the U.S. to pursue a double task: to strengthen and expand international mechanisms by which human rights can be protected and promoted, and to take seriously in this "interim period" the human rights dimension of our own foreign policy.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I note in your invitation you mentioned an "overriding question that must be answered, 'What kind of a nation do we want to be among the family of nations?'"

This is a question that cannot be answered fully or mainly in the context of foreign policy. We would all like to be seen as a nation conscious and respectful of its moral and political heritage of law and free institutions, preserving of our rich bounty of resources and natural beauty, living in harmony with one another, and caring lovingly for the poor, the aged and the handicapped.

Our success in presenting that image has been marred recently; God willing we will recover our balance. The bishops' bicentennial committee, to which I referred earlier, has held a series of hearings around the country, the results of which we think will enable us to contribute to the national effort to set new directions and infuse a new moral purpose in national life and policy.

In the area of foreign policy, the national leadership has a more direct and decisive impact on the kind of nation we are and are seen to be. It goes without saying that most of the world expects us to continue to be strong, militarily, economically and technologically. But it also looks to the United States for moral purpose and inspiration, to be assured that we avoid the temptations of power and the abuses which come so easily to the powerful. This means, I think, that we need to act with more restraint, to avoid intervention in marginal situations, to act calmly and deliberately and with the understanding that we don't have the solution to every problem.

Our greatest challenge is to learn to live in a world in which many are still obsessed with power but in which power is not always the ultimate arbiter.

The political and economic shape of the world at the end of the 19th century was determined by the power of the great European states (Great Britain,

France, Germany) Russia and the United States. Three-quarters of a century later, only two great powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., have great military power and their relations to each other are dominated by considerations of power. But events today in many parts of the world are not susceptible to control by these two powers.

Many new nations have a different approach to the solution of their problems: their criteria are public opinion, the appeal to nationalism and the drive for modernization. In such a world, we must accept the limits to the utility of sheer power and recognize that it may not be effectual in establishing or restoring order and peace in every situation, especially those of internal political and social conflict.

And, there are many evils in the world whose eradication requires our compassion, not our force, our resources and technology, not our political dictation. The challenge in short is, to avoid dignifying the use of force and, where possible, to discredit the resort to violence, while retaining the ability to use force when absolutely necessary.

Our greatest opportunity, it seems to me, will lie increasingly in our response to Third/Fourth World countries, in our willingness and ability to provide capital and technical assistance without dictating the modalities of their particular economic and social development.

We should be willing to some extent, to share our abundance with them, and in the process, at least for some of us, to experience some of their suffering. Only in this way can we help make the family of nations a real family, based not on national egotism and striving for power, but on a shared and living commitment to the international common good.

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