

Montcheuil, Yves de

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GUIDE for SOCIAL ACTION

Yves de Montcheuil

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Yves de Montcheuil, S.J.

Those who found Father de Montcheuil's first book, *FOR MEN OF ACTION*, so helpful in the lay apostolate will welcome this second collection of his essays, entitled, *GUIDE FOR SOCIAL ACTION*. Short, penetrating and thought-provoking, these essays will serve as guideposts to all Christians who are engaged in any kind of social action.

What recommends Father de Montcheuil is his strength of ideas and his ability to apply them to the present situation. He dodged none of the problems which our generation must solve, but he faced them as a theologian.

These essays were selected and edited after Father de Montcheuil's death, which occurred in 1944 at the hands of the Gestapo on the eve of the liberation of Paris. *Fides* has translated and edited them; the editors have left out those chapters which applied strictly to the situation in France during World War II and the Resistance Movement, of which Father de Montcheuil was a leader. In *GUIDE FOR SOCIAL ACTION*, the reader will find the perspectives Christians must have if they are to bring about Christian social reform.

The chapter titles of the essays are as follows: *The Church Faces the Modern World*, *the Idea of a Christian Civilization*, *the Social Problem*, *Community*, *Civic Education*, *the Use of Force*, *Anti-Semitism*, *the Christian and Temporal Affairs*, *Church and State*, *Morals and Politics*, *the Church and Liberty*, *the Church and Political Power*.

Father Yves de Montcheuil, S.J., at the time of his death, was spiritual advisor for students at the Sorbonne and for Catholic Action groups. He taught *Dogma* at the Catholic Institute of Paris and was one of the most promising young theologians and philosophers of France. Although under constant threat of his life, he took part in the underground work of *Temoignage Chretien* during World War II; he was one of the editors, and in the Paris regions, one of its most active distributors.

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Yves de Montcheuil, S.J.

Fides Publishers Association
Chicago 10, Illinois

NIHIL OBSTAT

Leo R. Ward, C.S.C.

University of Notre Dame

IMPRIMATUR:

✠ John F. Noll, D.D.

Archbishop of Fort Wayne, Indiana

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Introduction

THE FIRST four chapters of this book are lectures which were given by the author to public audiences. The following four chapters are lectures which were given to private audiences. The last five chapters, more detailed, were presented as a course in the Spring of 1942 to students at the *Ecole des Sciences Morales et Politiques* on "The Church and Politics."

Whatever the difference in audience or in purpose, all the chapters bear the same stamp of the times and reflect one spirit. Only occasionally does the author express some personal ideas. For the most part, the lectures in the French edition were assembled without efforts at style, and often in great haste. They were intended merely to recall some essential truths. The author himself would not have considered their formal publication, yet the reader will discover at once their permanent value. They offer a perfect example of a robust theology, at once classical and modern.

What recommends Father Yves de Montcheuil, S.J., who was a professor of theology at the Catholic Institute of Paris, is the strength of his ideas and his ability to apply them to the present situation. For him Catholic doctrine was truly the light of life: *lumen vitae*. He dodged none of the problems which our present generation must solve. The study of theology for him was not a refuge from reality, nor a pretext for speculation in a closed world, nor an escape from human responsibility. Along with teaching a regular course in theology, he was active in the apostolate. What is more, he engaged in action as a theologian, in order to clarify and guide his theological thinking.

The present volume gives testimony to this spirit. Almost always these lectures are addressed without pretensions to youth. They are a sample of many others he gave, of which no manuscripts have been found. Nevertheless, these suffice to demonstrate how a priest who knew the doctrine of the Church was able to sustain the courage and faith of his young friends in the course of the dark years of France.

Let us simply add that Father de Montcheuil was not one who said without doing. He gave his life to the same spirit in which he taught his doctrine. This spirit led him to martyrdom.

The *Editions de Temoignage Chretien* is grateful to the confreres of Father de Montcheuil for giving us these pages.

Those who followed the underground work of *Temoignage Chretien* during the war will recognize the same spirit in these writings. It will not surprise them to know that from its first hours, Father de Montcheuil was one of the most respected counsellors of the resistance movement. He became one of the editors, and in the Paris regions he was one of its hardest distributors.

The English translation of this volume, titled in French *L'Eglise et le Monde Actuel*, was done by a group of translators at the University of Notre Dame. The final editing, deletions, revisions in view of an American audience, and organization of material were done by Vincent J. Giese, Editorial Director of Fides. The attempt has been to present to an American audience only those ideas of Father de Montcheuil which might have meaning to those engaging in social action in the United States.

CHAPTER I

The Church Faces the Modern World

THE UPHEAVAL which we are now witnessing has changed the character of the problems which we face. Solutions once thought applicable are now outdated. We are passing through a period of groping, experimentation, and uncertainty. We do not seem to know quite where to go. The attempted solutions of some people appear doubtful. Yet, whether on the plane of the family, the professions, the state, or international affairs, the problems are urgent and broad. Men of good will, consequently, are often confused; their disquietude sometimes shakes their confidence in the Catholic Church.

If the solutions which seemed valid yesterday do not fit today, is it because the Church has not shown us the right course? Is the Church herself somewhat misdirected in face of the present situation? If so, while continuing to ask her for spiritual life, should we turn elsewhere for answers to the burning questions of the day? Quite diverse ideologies, which seem to have unhesitating answers and indicate a way out of the difficulties, present themselves to us. Although we realize through a kind of Christian premonition that they are not acceptable, it would be useful for us to know from whence our difficulty comes, so that we may see that it is unreal. Perhaps we shall then find some valid reasons for retaining our confidence in the Church, and for discovering in her—in her doctrine and in her decisions—the light needed to resolve the problems of the present and the future. Perhaps we shall then give to her the same answer St. Peter, in the name of the Apostles and of the faithful, gave to Christ when He asked: "And will you also go away?" Peter replied: "To whom shall we go, Lord? Thou hast the words of eternal life."

First of all, we should not regret having followed the directives of the Catholic Church. We should not regret having obeyed anyone who has commanded in God's name. In so doing, we are certainly on the right path. Furthermore, neither the directives of the Church nor the solutions she recommended to us were the cause of the evil, even though they are no longer applicable. Yesterday the Church faced a situation

for which she cannot be held responsible: deChristianization, demoralization, class antagonisms, self-seeking and grasping nations, worship of force, desire to exploit and refusal to do the necessary work. Such a state of affairs did not come from advice given by the Church.

Faced with this tragic situation, the Church indicated a way out of the chaos by calling for a Christian community. She encouraged those who were trying to inject a little more justice and love into the world. Instead of remaining aloof and satisfied with condemnations or predictions of doom, she tried to prevent the collapse, to show the way to safety, to guide in the right direction against excesses from every side. When the blow from without came, the ground caved in.

The malady was too far advanced. We could no longer avoid the tremors which made everything collapse. Yet, let us not say that had it not been for these tremors, everything could have been saved. On the contrary, the disintegration was too far along for us to avoid the worst, under one form or another. This, however, is only a hypothesis. Let us remain realistic. Though they failed, the efforts of the Church were reasonable. Her duty was to make the efforts. If the patient refuses the prescriptions, we do not blame the doctor for the failure.

Neither must we linger over the past. We must face the future and its new difficulties courageously. Let us not be tempted to think that the Church is at a loss what to do, that she is seemingly hesitating more than the others, for the Church does not have ready-made solutions to be pulled out of a drawer on the right occasion. In many areas, it is not her affair to dictate solutions to us. But she always possesses the principles, the guiding ideas which should make it possible for us to find a Christian and a human solution to all difficulties, a doctrine by which we can judge the value of various proposals of men, or eliminate or reject those solutions which fail to recognize our true nature. The Church is always ready to help us find a true solution, but we ourselves must discover it, create it, by taking into account present conditions. She does not present us with something ready-made, but with something we must adapt.

It is certainly incumbent on the Church to find the Christian solution to the problems of our times, but by the Church we mean the whole Church. All of her members must contribute according to their rank. We are not to await passively for everything to come down from the hierarchy, for the faithful are also an essential part of the Church. While the faithful must not usurp the place of the hierarchy, nor seek to free themselves from it, nor obstinately go their own way, they

must, according to their means, be active, invent and propose solutions which the Church shall judge. If the Church judges that these solutions do not take Christian preoccupations sufficiently into account, she will say so. The faithful, lay Christian then yields and sets once more to work. If the Church judges the solutions acceptable, she will let them stand and perhaps, after they have been tried, she may recommend them. The important point is that the whole Church must seek.

Never say, "We are not big enough to solve such formidable problems, so numerous and complicated. They are beyond us. We must only remain quiet and wait." True, each individual is not required to solve everything. Neither must each make his contribution. Yet each should express his point of view, tell the needs, desires and aspirations of the group to which he belongs. He should make known the practical repercussions of the solutions which are proposed and which are tried. He should make his own suggestions. None of this is to be neglected, so long as none of it springs from a lack of thought or from prejudice, but instead is calm and considered.

Each of us is in contact with a certain group which has its importance in the community. We must make our reactions known, for if one wishes to accomplish something sound and durable, everything must be calculated. Even the greatest inventive genius does not create from nothing. While it is true that in the end, genius must take all the scattered findings and reduce them to order, genius cannot do everything. Genius could do nothing if something had not been discovered previously.

In our field of exploration, fruitful solutions will be the result of an immense collective labor. It is not very important who perfects or discovers, so long as all have helped make the end result possible. Neither can we complain about the hierarchy, if we fail to do our own work. Let us, therefore, constantly keep in view—along with our daily worries—the present-day problems of our world. If we fail in our duty as Christians, how can we blame the Church?

The Church offers considerable aid for the work in which every Christian has a stake. She furnishes us with a teaching, which enables us to judge the doctrines proposed, the applications attempted. She reminds us of the conditions which must prevail if we are to attain an acceptable result. This is of utmost importance, for false solutions do not arise from any inability to find answers, but rather from the fact that the problems are poorly stated or are unjustifiably simplified. When not aimed at the right problem, solutions miss their mark. They are useless. The teachings of the Church take into account all the necessary elements, so that a problem, once

properly posed, may receive a truly human solution. This is an immense advantage.

Indeed, the Church never forgets either the eternal or the temporal point of view. She reminds us that we are working for beings whose destiny is eternal, although they must prepare for it through the temporal. We are not working for beings whose whole life is spent here below, even though we recognize the validity of existence on earth. The Church, thus, insists on the temporal organization at all levels—family, economics, national, international. She does not permit us in time of trial to become discouraged and say, "After all, what is the use." No, the Church urges us incessantly to return to work, to try again to do something. In some circumstances, we may find in her exhortations the courage to stay on the job, for the duty of organizing the temporal order according to justice and charity is not simply a human duty. It is a Christian obligation, to which the Christian gives all of his love of Christ. He feels that in order to remain faithful to the name of *Christian*, no sacrifice is too great. By showing us the infinite value of such tasks, the Church gives us the strength to devote ourselves to them in spite of all obstacles. At the same time, she reminds us that these tasks have no meaning except in terms of eternity.

The temporal organization which Christians seek has no meaning if we lose sight of the eternal destiny of man. It must be such that it helps man acquire true greatness. And the Church alone teaches us what true greatness is. Outside the light shed by Christian doctrine, man never knows completely what he is or what he is worth. He is not capable of discerning exactly and without error what inside him merits encouragement and what must be combatted. If we seek our inspiration in the Church, we avoid the risk of encouraging solutions which encourage evil in man by making the good more difficult of achievement.

For example, in family matters, the acceptance of divorce, or an organization of labor which, under the pretense of production, upsets home life. Or measures which make the education of youth difficult; or youth movements which, in order to create national unity, take the child away from his parents and the Church. We need a world organized in such a way that it offers no obstacle to man's pursuit of his eternal end. While the end may always be pursued freely, man often finds himself in conditions which make the pursuit difficult: poverty or luxury or oppression which leads to revolt.

We are enlightened by the doctrine of the Church on the aim of earthly organization, namely, to make the earth through justice and charity a less imperfect image of the kingdom of

heaven. *Ut sint unum*: that they may be one does not apply only to the religious life. It is to be extended to all human domains. The unity which is sought after is not a fusion of all into one. A large group of people is not *one* in a unitary sense. We want harmony, an effort on the part of each individual to understand and to love the others who always remain themselves. Today many people think they are audacious because they constantly repeat that it is time to unify Europe. Yet anyone who follows the thought of the Church will have a wider vision. Let us never forget that it is the entire world which must be unified and organized, and that no member of the human family can be left out.

The Church also gives us the knowledge of the fundamental conditions under which success is possible in the human domain. Among those who wish to do something, we find two types of minds, two conflicting temperaments: the Utopians, who see the ideal (sometimes the true one and sometimes a deformed one) and who want to inject it into the present situation, without delay, without preparation. The Realists (wrongly called) who consider the world as a play of forces whose equilibrium they are seeking. According to the Realists, it is vain to speak of working out an ideal in society through social organization. Man is always the toy of certain pressures and of certain sentiments, which must be known in order to utilize them in establishing "an order." The dominating passion, the essential feeling, is egoism, a seeking after self-interest. Therefore, the only social organization worth while is the one in which there is an equilibrium of forces. A kind of "social physics."

Both attitudes are monstrous. By neglecting the necessary steps, the Utopians compromise through their omissions the very ideal they want to establish, for they blame the ideal when imprudence and haste cause catastrophes. The so-called Realists hinder all social progress through their maneuvers. They anchor man in his egoism. They make him live in an atmosphere of egoism. Even if they should succeed in establishing an order, that order would not be favorable to moral progress, for experience confirms that an order founded on egoism is unstable. It would not, therefore, be a truly human order.

In teaching us the necessity of seeking an ideal of justice and charity in social organization, Christianity also teaches the reality of sin and the power of grace which succeeds little by little in transforming humanity. Although the possibilities for evil may be aggravated by certain social conditions, evil actions are not derived from these conditions. The whole prob-

lem is not, therefore, one of transforming the conditions. The problem is larger.

Because of his fallen nature, man opposes transformations. Evil institutions are as much the product of man's proneness to evil as its source. We cannot say, for example, that nations would live in harmony if no one were interested in causing misunderstanding. There are deep antagonisms—mostly irrational and difficult to overcome—which can be overcome only if we redirect their violence towards internal, domestic struggles, and this is certainly not a step forward. In every nation, egoism is mingled with legitimate desires and more or less corrupts them. There is also the temptation of vengeance, a denial of justice to others, a desire to dominate when the right moment comes. Real and powerful obstacles, therefore, lie in the way of the establishment of justice and charity in human relationships. If we fail to recognize them, we will achieve nothing lasting. We must face them squarely, without exaggerating or minimizing.

Christianity, thus, does not allow us to harbor any illusions. Instead, it teaches us that grace is a reality and that man is not totally evil. It teaches us that while it is impossible to transform man suddenly and completely, nonetheless it is possible to obtain from him gradually more justice and more charity, to introduce little by little better institutions which will become the starting point for further progress.

This is so, providing Christians are willing to pay the price. Progress is not inevitable, but it is possible if we are willing to meet the requirements. Christ did not introduce into the world a new leaven destined to split the framework of the past into pieces. While we have not yet seen a community built entirely on the Gospels, we have seen certain abuses disappear; we have seen institutions more human come into being. Such a movement can stop, slip backwards, or continue. The Grace which Christ brought and which the Church has kept is still a real force. We need only let ourselves be inspired by it. We see, therefore, that the Church is not satisfied with affirming that something is possible. She guarantees it with her life. This is not the time to turn back on her, but it is the moment to attach ourselves to her more than ever before, if we want the courage and the means of doing something which will have an effect on the entire world.

Faced with the perpetual temptation to oscillate between the disunion of anarchic liberalism and the oppression of totalitarianism, Christianity has always reminded us of the value of the individual and the value of the community. Both values must be saved. Every human being is created in the image of God, Whom he resembles in his reason and liberty. Thence

stems his vocation, his calling to a transcendental destiny, a divine destiny which exceeds earthly limits. Thence arises that sacred part of every human being which escapes any attempt at monopolization or enslavement. Man cannot be considered as a means to an end either of another man or of a group.

Human beings do not exist independently of one another. They cannot develop and live alone. If it is true that their existence depends first of all upon God, in another sense their existence depends upon one another. That is why each belongs to a series of societies (such as family or state) which are required for his full development. Yet many who mouth these words get nowhere, for they always come back to an opposition between the individualistic spirit and the community spirit. The individual whom they wish to safeguard is not a spiritual person, but a bundle of egoistic appetites; or the community they wish to establish is not a part of an universal community which communicates with the beyond. Only in the Christian view do man and society, the individual and the community imply each other, rather than exclude each other. Outside the Christian view, solutions are only verbal, and one falls back again into individualism or totalitarianism.

Humanity does not lack intelligence to solve the crushing problems of the hour; it has always demonstrated untiring ingenuity. Rather, true facts are needed, and thanks to the Church we have them; we grasp them almost instinctively. Christianity demands that we give up the egoistic point of view—individual selfishness, class egoism, professional or national egoism. The solutions we seek cannot be based on the ego.

CHAPTER II

The Idea of a Christian Civilization

RATHER THAN examine the idea of a Christian civilization, would it not be more rewarding to study its manifestations in history? Perhaps not, for any descriptions of Christian civilizations presuppose that there is such a civilization. They presuppose that there is an ideal state of humanity which deserves both the name "civilization" and the adjective "Christian," and which can guide us in discovering what can be called Christian in any state of humanity.

If it is true that a Christian civilization can be perceived only in a more or a less perfect state of becoming and never completely achieved in any given historical period (Christian elements are always mixed with non-Christian and even anti-Christian elements) then surely we need a norm by which we can measure various stages of civilization.

We could admit that the historian of Christian civilization simply studies in the development of humanity what is explainable by the influence of Christianity, but in so doing we shift the meaning of civilization from a norm, by which we make value judgments, to a complex ensemble of social phenomena, whose real value we refuse to judge.

There are, therefore, two different meanings of the word "civilization." Let us remember that when we describe the Christian civilization of a certain historical period, or when we compare Christian civilization to other human civilizations, our purpose is not to study a civilization derived from Christianity, but rather a state of humanity of interest to us because of its intrinsic value which, in our eyes, represents an ideal, or at least a partial working-out of an ideal. Our concern is with *the idea of what the perfect Christian civilization would be*; we believe that this idea does have reality, and that there is nothing contradictory about it.

The problem of "Christian civilization" is posed the moment we join the two words. Civilization, in our judgment, is something terrestrial, something human. No one would call heaven—the perfection of heaven—a civilization, nor even an ab-

sence of civilization, because heaven denotes a place beyond the earthly state of humanity.

Even to say that civilization is impossible without religion, or that it affects the forms of religious life, is not to call civilization a religious state, for civilization remains something human, a part of temporal existence—which, incidentally, does not mean that it includes only material elements. To identify “temporal” and “human” is deadly, for it makes any solution to human problems impossible.

If civilization is achieved in the temporal order, does Christianity have any effect on it? Is not civilization developed on the very fringe of religious life? Many think so. If human nature is essentially bad and corrupt, if man’s only motivation is egoism—if the stability of human relationships is derived from an equilibrium of egoisms—then most certainly Christianity cannot be a source of inspiration for civilization; Christianity cannot be mixed up with it without risking its purity. Even more than this, Christianity must then condemn what is called civilization, and condemn it even more strongly than barbarianism, for here we have a refined egoism which, by disguising itself, may fool people.

Others, who insist less on the corruption of nature than on the absolute transcendancy of Christianity, think that the only means of preserving Christianity is to oppose it to everything human. We must see Christianity, they argue, as something completely different from that which is human. The two orders can only develop along parallel lines, without influencing each other. To those who defend the possibility of a Christian civilization, they no longer reply, “What concord has Christ with Belial?” but instead, “My kingdom is not of this world.” Both these currents of thought are joined in their negation by other currents of an entirely different nature. One of them, of which Nietzsche is the forerunner, says there is no Christian civilization, because Christianity is the negation of man.

Still others place their emphasis, not on the harmfulness of Christianity but on the competence of man. While the Christian era may have been useful at one time to help man find himself, it is necessary to move ahead. Man must free himself from his Christian swaddling clothes. For some people religion can play a role as a kind of personal consolation; but it is in the pure man, freed from all transcendental influence, where we must find the norms of civilization and the motivation to translate them into reality. This approach has been called “closed humanism.” The Church must not overstep her boundaries; priests must remain in their sacristies.

This is not the time to analyze each of these various currents of thought. What we have said about them so far is

sufficient to demonstrate the real question: "Is there a Christian idea of the terrestrial and human destiny of man?" "Can Christianity make a contribution to civilization, or is its message foreign to it?" Finally, "Does Christianity contain a force under the influence of which the Christian idea of the temporal destiny of man will become—or begin to become—a reality?" To these questions the Catholic Church firmly answers, Yes.

Certainly, the Church does not forget the words of her Founder: "My Kingdom is not of this world." If by *world* we mean a force which opposes the Gospel, an evil force from which Christ came to snatch His disciples, then Christianity evidently has nothing in common with it. But if *world* means everything that is sane and well-ordered in human relationships, Christianity still is not of it, for it has neither beginning nor end in it. The source of Christianity is not the same as the source of man, and its aim is not limited to giving man a life on earth worthy of him. Christianity aims to lead man to a state of being in which the contingencies of earthly life are abolished and which is beyond civilization.

Any attempt to demonstrate the value of Christianity, then have that value accepted on the basis that this is the way to lead humanity on earth to live a human life, fails to recognize the essence of Christianity. Even if such an attempt would bring one to adopt the letter of Christianity, it would not bring him to real Christianity. Withal this, it does not follow that Christianity is indifferent to the temporal fate of man. Quite the contrary, for through his temporal life, man prepares his eternal life.

To come closer to the heart of the problem, let us say that everywhere moral values are concerned, the Church affirms that Christianity has a word to say and contributes a sovereign force to carry them into effect. Outside the Church, it is certainly possible to attain the knowledge of moral values, but it is impossible, without her influence, to preserve them intact and to maintain their exacting hierarchy.

If civilization were only of the material order, if to achieve it we needed only progress in technical inventions and an accumulation of riches, certainly Christianity would have nothing to do with it. To adopt a hierarchy of values according to which the material good is the only good is to base oneself on a false notion of man, and, therefore, arrive at a false idea of civilization. We cannot describe a state of civilization without referring to a norm which is essentially moral. If civilization is the fulfillment of man on a human plane, if it is a state of humanity in which man is truly a man, and not a perfected animal, if it is a state in which men behave as men in rela-

tion to one another and in conformity to their true nature, then it follows that errors of judgment on human moral values lead humanity to a state which could not be called civilization.

If civilization—temporal in its nature—can be called Christian, it is because Christianity has a doctrine which pertains both to the supernatural and the natural destiny of man. To illustrate, Christianity knows that science has a value and is an element of civilization. It knows that the application of science makes a higher standard of living possible, which is also an element of civilization. But Christianity adds that an improved material condition—humanizing when it aims at freeing man from poverty and from immediate material cares—becomes a corrupting agent, and therefore contrary to civilization, when it no longer seeks anything but itself, when it becomes a means of satisfying all of man's caprices and all his appetites. Christianity recognizes that culture, with all its refinements, is an important element of civilization, but on the condition that it does not turn into dilettantism, idolatry of mind, a despoliation of those who, for some reason or another, lack it, and provided that it does not become a jealously guarded privilege of a caste.

Christianity teaches that the desire for justice, fidelity to one's word in society and in international life as well as in personal life, are indispensable elements of civilization, since they relate to something fundamental in man or to something which is higher in the hierarchy of human values. Christianity teaches that kindness and pity for the weak and sick, strength and energy, are also elements of civilization. Above all, it teaches that even in the order of human relationships, the finest flower of civilization is the establishment of relationships founded not only on justice and respect for the individual but also on charity. In short, Christianity knows what man is in his very nature; and it is through Christianity that man learned his true nature.

We can note that outside of Christianity, man has never known his true nature perfectly; he has been gravely mistaken concerning it. When he departs from Christianity, man in the end forgets the lesson of his true nature.

The errors of ancient and of modern paganism involve not only the supernatural and eternal destiny of man, but also his nature and his temporal destiny; and consequently, neither form of paganism has an exact idea of civilization. It is Christianity which has taught humanity how the individual should be treated in social relationships, and is this not the main element of civilization? How mistaken they are who consider the Church as a teacher who, once having taught humanity

what civilization is, has made itself useless, as though man could ever be the recipient of such an heritage, then walk alone thereafter. Experience reveals the results of such an emancipation, for the heritage is soon squandered. Cut off from the Christian sources from which it stems, civilization becomes deformed and corrupted. Outside the influence of Christianity, man does not know himself or doubts himself, and henceforth, he lacks the first requisite for progress.

We have noticed this vagueness, this uncertainty and lack of precision as to what civilization is, in our contemporaries. Without the Christian light, one does not know what can humanize man. The destiny of man becomes, if not a mystery, at least an enigma: like a text which he can decipher only in parts, without any coherent meaning.

More and more we find students changing the meaning of civilization from a norm to a description of human achievements. In this reserved attitude, there is a spirit which should be praised, a desire to avoid narrowness by not canonizing one particular civilization and thereby not misjudging true values when they have been realized outside one's own group. But is this not an admission that there is no longer an absolute and indubitable norm?

There is, therefore, a Christian civilization, because there is a state of humanity which corresponds to the idea which Christianity gives us concerning the temporal destiny of man, based on the Christian idea of human nature. If this idea is the only true one; if, when one departs from it, he makes man less human, then it follows that a civilization does not really merit the name except insofar as it is Christian. Civilizations prior to Christianity are civilizations only insofar as they anticipated the Christian civilization, insofar as the idea of man on which they were founded anticipated something of the idea of man which Christianity came later to teach. A civilization which has separated itself from Christianity continues to be worthy of the name only to the extent that it retains some Christian values.

Under these conditions, however, do we not exclude those outside the faith from working towards a Christian civilization? Certainly not, for we can still bring them to an appreciation of human values as Christianity presents them. They can accept these as values and recognize their true hierarchy without yet discerning their source. Insofar as they work to carry them into effect, they collaborate in the movement towards a Christian civilization. If they can thus recognize them and appreciate them, it is because these values were proposed by and are still maintained by Christianity and because they are living in an atmosphere which continues to be Christian.

These values find an echo in such people because in every man there is a natural moral sense. Left on their own, they could not preserve the exact and complete knowledge of these values. When the influence of the Church decreases, civilization goes astray; it gradually ceases to be civilization. Non-believers can, therefore, in fact work for a Christian civilization, but each time man strays from the Christian idea of man, he works against civilization.

Having asked ourselves if there was a Christian civilization, we then conclude that there can be no true civilization outside of Christianity, since a civilization must be based on an idea of human nature which remains intact only under Christian influence.

In consequence, civilization will not be the exclusive work of the Church. Even if the Church provides the idea, the form, so to speak, how these values will be expressed, realized and defended in concrete historical conditions must still be discovered. Man must do this work. For example, how is culture to develop? How is it to be made available to all for whom it is good? The Church does not tell us this. What are the institutions which, in a given state of evolution, achieve just relationships and favor harmony instead of opposition, discord or hatred? Man must discover these.

Clearly, a perfect Christian civilization, in our sense, is an historically unrealizable ideal. During those times when the influence of the Church was most profound, defects were easily discernible; one could see how far man was from the Christian ideal of human relationships. Christianity is not, therefore, civilization. It contains no ready-made plan for civilization, but it is a great civilizing force. When we study Christian civilizations of the past, we perceive that the full expression of Christianity was far from achievement.

Our task, then, is to make civilization bear finer fruit in the future. Christian civilization is always in the future. In times like ours, we may sound ironical in talking about a Christian civilization, but irony would be only the reaction of men of little faith. We are being Christian when we think that the present crisis, if only we make use of it, offers us an opportunity for progress by shedding more light on what a Christian civilization should be. The present crisis is of inestimable worth to present-day humanity.

CHAPTER III

The Social Problem

POPE PIUS XII has often shown his concern for a reconstruction of society along Christian lines. In his 1942 Christmas message he urges Christians to crusade for a Christian social order. In itself, an appeal by the Sovereign Pontiff should develop in us a concern for the social problem. We have no right to consider papal pronouncements as ritualistic phrases to which we listen respectfully, but are in no way bound or in no way constrained to modify our conduct.

We need only to take an honest view of the world in order to see that the Holy Father dealt with a question whose study is mandatory and whose solution is urgent. The social problem did not arise today or yesterday, but it is one of the essential elements of the history of the second half of the nineteenth century. The rise of Communism, not only as a doctrine but also as a concrete manifestation, has made the social problem even more acute.

The present world turmoil, with all its suffering, is as always more burdensome to the underprivileged and will inevitably make them impatient with injustice and eager to share the goods they have produced. Their reaction may sometimes be warped; it will inevitably be influenced by man's weaknesses. Yet no deaf ear can be turned to their requests, nor can force be used to keep them purely and simply in their place.

Could we, in fact, find many today who would defend the old state of affairs? The upheaval caused by World War II and the readjustment it has required has given to those people with ideas an opportunity to bring about social transformations. In the decisive moments at hand, when orientations are being determined which will long shape life in society, Christians must not be caught unprepared. Because they have not thought or have not been able to take a stand, Christians must not be reduced to sterile opposition nor be followers of a mixed ideology. Both attitudes would be disastrous. It is imperative, therefore, that those who want to be ready to play a role tomorrow must set to work today.

We cannot hope that a state of affairs consonant with Christian requirements will arise of itself, as a sort of equilibrium resulting from forces at play. Justice will always be the victory

over oppression, anarchy and disorder. It is vain to dream of a spontaneous accord of self-interests which need only to be enlightened. People will always be tempted to succeed through force or ruse in going beyond their right to assure themselves of a privileged situation. The beneficiaries will not always be the same, but if we give free play to "natural forces," there will inevitably be oppressors and the oppressed. A just order can only come as a result of the efforts of a moral will.

Let us suppose that a just order may be established someday. It will still always be threatened and must always be reconstructed. A simple change of economic conditions alone would suffice to require transformations, for what is acceptable and desirable in a given state can thereafter become a factor of injustice. On the other hand, the tendency to reverse the situation to one's own advantage will always remain alive and will always need to be checked. The Christian, therefore, will always be obliged to work in this domain of making what should be win out over what is. He should not be deluded into thinking that a momentary effort can bring about peace and lasting stability.

The social problem must be considered as a whole. By the expression "social question" we have become too accustomed to meaning the question of the working class. This has not been arbitrary, for indeed the problem of the working class is the one question which the development of industry and capitalism brought into existence in the nineteenth century. The working class in Europe has been the class least integrated into the nation, and among the workers the most dire poverty has been found.

For a clear vision, we must consider the social problem as a whole, without neglecting the problem of the farmer, for example, or the Negro, or the middle classes. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the place, function and rights of any one social group if we do not know those of the other social groups. Here we deal with the inner relationships within the whole, and we use the image of the limbs and body.

Furthermore, through an understandable but nonetheless ill-founded reaction, those who have long been victims of an injustice, even though they do not yield to their desire for vengeance, easily fail to recognize the rights of those against whom they complain. Not satisfied with putting the oppressors back in their place, the oppressed tend to impose on them a fate similar to their own. Whereas we should support the oppressed in their efforts for liberation, we should not abet their abuses, nor take their rancors as our own. We must be inspired by true charity, which will lead us to do justice to all.

While we shall not discuss these problems in detail, we do

want to distinguish between the doctrine of the Church in social matters (what she teaches in the name of authority received from Christ and binding on all) and what each Christian, in light of the Church's teaching, must seek on his own responsibility. Here we shall dwell on the common teachings of the Catholic Church.

The Church teaches, first of all, that the Christian has a duty to be interested in the social problem, even though it be of the temporal order. She teaches us what goal must be set forth for the organization of relationships between social groups. She lays down the requirements which an acceptable solution must meet; she sets forth the ideas which must guide the search for these solutions. She does not dictate concrete solutions, although she can condemn those solutions which do not meet her requirements.

The social problem is of an essentially temporal order. It is an organization of life on this earth, an order destined to pass away and which will not remain unto eternity. Not only is the Christian duty-bound to take an interest in the social problem, but he is duty-bound because he is a Christian and because of the requirements of his Christian faith. Briefly, there are two reasons for this. First of all, *social conditions*, the state of social relationships, react on the life of the individual and condition, for good or bad, the birth, development and practice of his moral and religious life.

That man is still free and even in the most favorable conditions can refuse to live morally and religiously is true. That the moral and religious life can be lived under any and all conditions (because the grace of God can transform all obstacles into means) is also true. For the average man, however (and this is our point), either destitution or super-abundance, either the feeling of being a victim of injustice or the feeling of being able to dispose of others according to his wishes, are in reality stumbling blocks. The Christian must eliminate them so far as is possible. Leo XIII, in particular in his *Rerum Novarum*, has reminded us of this duty.

There is a second and more fundamental reason why a Christian must take an interest in the social problem. What we seek for all eternity is communion with God and communion of human beings among themselves. The two are inseparable, just as love of God and love of neighbor are inseparable. If we truly love God, we shall not wait for heaven to begin our communion with Him, although it can only be complete there. We shall, instead, strive to make this communion as complete as possible on earth, in a life of grace. Likewise, if we sincerely love our neighbors, we should do everything possible for them right now to help them become

aware of their worth as individuals, to make the respect for the individual certain, to bring men together in unity. This presupposes certain social conditions.

There are forms of government which either hinder or favor the awareness of the individual person of his own worth, which either guarantee or subjugate his rights. There are institutions which express or abet union; others are forces of separation, or opposition, which tend to breed misunderstanding, envy, hatred, for of these such institutions were born. The communion of individuals will be perfectly achieved only in heaven, but the Christian who sincerely desires communion with God cannot fail to begin to desire it on earth and to work for it as much as possible. Looking at all institutions, he asks himself whether or not they hinder the communion of individual men, a communion which he will never really find perfect enough either in depth or breadth. Therein lies a principle for action for the Christian, for, although only a miserable, rough outline of the heavenly city can be achieved here below, the Christian never wearies of trying to make it less imperfect.

Such necessary action in the temporal order, particularly in the social order, can be considered under the aspect of justice and under the aspect of charity, both of which must never be disassociated, because even if their inner requirements are different, inner connections do exist between them.

We must strive, first of all, for an order of justice based on law. The notion of law is primary in the social order, for it shows that our relationships with others are not founded simply on a free generosity. Mutual requirements must be met and must be sanctioned by law. These mutual requirements aim to guarantee the existence and development of the individual; they include a material aspect because man also has a body. They are not alms overflowing from the superfluity of others, but are a just distribution of material goods, guided not by envious equalitarianism, but according to what is necessary for the exercise of the functions which each has in respect to the welfare of the group.

We must remember, moreover, that when those in high places engage in the race for wealth and luxury, they create beneath them a similar greed which will likewise be insatiable and which will make the problem of the distribution of wealth in peace and justice insoluble and a matter of force. These requirements of justice are not limited to the material situation, even if this is generously provided for, because a person is quite different than a well-fed animal.

It is in the name of charity that a Christian seeks an order of justice. Because he loves his neighbor, he wants to guar-

antee him his full rights and prevent an encroachment of them. The Christian must be convinced that the first form of charity towards neighbor is justice towards him. If one becomes resigned to injustice, without making an effort to right it, then no gift, not even that which is duty-bound, can have any value.

An arrangement which guarantees the rights of each individual must never lead to an isolated enjoyment of such rights in peace and quiet, with a minimum of contacts, each individual remaining enclosed in his own separated domain. There must be other social relationships in addition to the exchange of services regulated by justice. A society in which justice alone reigned, in which each gave to others only what the law required, would not be the Christian ideal in the temporal order. Such a restriction is unacceptable, not only between individuals but also between groups. A work of charity must go beyond relationships of justice. While it is through charity that a Christian practices justice, justice may be required of others who do not want to submit to it. It is important that justice create and organize the means of constraining those who wish to avoid justice. Charity, on the other hand, can never be required, not only because the person who is its object has no right to require it, but also because what charity gives has worth only if it is given freely, i.e., if in giving, one gave something of himself. Everything connected with *friendship* in its broadest sense is connected with charity, for friendship has no meaning if it is not a gift of oneself.

Various forms of socialism frequently err in seeking to build a human society solely on justice. Too often they place more into the idea of justice than it really contains, while the charity they cast over is only a caricature of true charity. We must always reproach ourselves if we vilify or disfigure charity; we must restore a true understanding of it. Nevertheless, outside of Christianity, the role of charity in social relations is inadequately understood. Let us try to clarify it.

Let us first of all consider what may be called the *secondary functions of charity*, those which are temporary or, if they are permanent, only meet a deficiency. First of all, charity paves the way for justice. We cannot succeed in having rights recognized immediately. In fact, it is possible to show that almost everything we now recognize as rights was first given in the name of charity. That is, so to speak, a necessary transition. By going beyond the justice of the moment, we prepare for the coming of a more perfect justice in the future. Charity thus serves the discovery of justice and even makes it possible by the transformation it achieves in man's judgments. We must be aware of the transition from the order of charity to the

order of justice, transition which is not necessarily finished; we must accept the fact that what we first gave freely may thereafter be required of us.

Secondly, charity must strive to compensate for the deficiencies of justice. First, those which are in themselves avoidable, but which blindness or egoism (more often both at the same time) of a given society still tolerate. Charity has the duty of attenuating the sufferings which result therefrom. In its struggle against the sufferings brought about by injustice, charity must also struggle against the injustice itself and never be a substitution for injustice. To forget this truth would bring disrepute to charity.

Charity must also fight against the unavoidable deficiencies of justice. No society can be perfectly organized, completely free from injustice. The unforeseeable mishaps in social life can never be totally repaired by general measures. Men, too, make mistakes which bring suffering to themselves and for which they have no one to blame but themselves. Charity must not remain indifferent to sufferings caused by our own guilt. Were it not for charity, many people would have no way of rising up again.

Once we have pointed out that there is suffering which does not depend on the organization of society, but on the inevitabilities of human nature, we find ourselves more fully in the domain of charity. It is up to charity to give comfort. A human society in which man would be left to himself in his moral suffering would be untenable. To call this the only role of charity, however, would make charity dependent on human suffering and consequently would admit that charity has no reason for existence outside the realm of suffering. This is to base charity on pity and to consider it as a relationship between a superior and an inferior.

The charity between equals has an important place in the life of society. It consists of a mutual enrichment through an exchange of what one possesses rather than an exchange of measurable services. Charity must be exchanged between groups as well as between individuals. In each social group, by reason of its type of life, there is a particular form of human experience (it may even have the form of a religious experience) which makes it possible for the members to enrich one another.

Yet charity does not stop here, for it presupposes a communion sought after for itself which, in a broad sense, we might call simply *friendship*. Relationships of friendship are not only a means of mutual enrichment but also a means towards union, one of whose essential factors will be participation in tasks which reach outside the individuals or groups.

Thus, the social problem, when considered from the Christian standpoint, i.e., an effort to work out on the temporal plane a human order which corresponds to Christian requirements, demands the establishment of a social order which guarantees the person a respect for his rights, but which nevertheless goes far beyond this through charity.

CHAPTER IV

Community

WE UNDERSTAND by "community" a form of life desirable for any and all groups which men establish among themselves. We are seeking a way of life, whether it be family, work, national or religious, which conforms with human and Christian requirements and which implies both a structure and a spirit, neither of which can be separated from the other. Some social structures encourage divisions and strife and are, therefore, opposed to a community spirit; whereas community spirit is not sincere if it does not seek to create structures which enable it to develop fully.

Our task is to discover how groups can be transformed into communities. Community life will always be lived differently by different groups, depending on their aims, size, structure, etc. Yet a few essential traits to be found in all groups can be pointed out. Clearly, there is no community in a simple group, like a crowd touching elbows, nor in a simple coming together, like students in a classroom. Even if the members be bound together by the same goal, they constitute no community if they are not united by the search for the goal. An interdependence which will create a kind of unity will exist between them; but never a community. Workmen on the same production line are closely united; but they are not therefore a community. Nor does a community exist where a group works for the interest of the few, the remainder being in fact or in theory simple instruments. The union must be for the good of all.

Nor would there be a community if some members had only to give and others only to receive, because community presupposes true exchange; and exchange not only in the realm of material or spiritual goods (teaching, for example). There must be the reciprocal gift of oneself, for which other exchanges are only the means or occasion. Community, therefore, can be reconciled with a diversity of functions and a hierarchy, so long as it posits a fundamental equality, in virtue of which each can give and receive; give not only what is his but also of himself; and enrich and be enriched by others, not only in the realm of "having" but also in the realm of "being." In

the community, the source of exchange can be found only in mutual love.

To say that there must be communion between the members of community (that is, mutual enrichment, a communication between souls which has value in itself) is not to add something new to our discussion, but rather to go deeper. Men are not made only to help one another, but also to unite through what is deepest in them, both of which are essential to true love. No community may be achieved where one does not feel *quam bonum et quam jucundum habitare fratres in unum*.

This amounts to saying that there is a community only where each man is treated as a person. One could, by starting with the needs of the person, discover the traits of a community, since the community is the society which is suitable to persons. Any human group which does not serve as the framework for a community is, therefore, to be changed. When men enter into contact with one another, it should be to enrich themselves through a mutual gift and to achieve communion.

Let us draw from these remarks a few conclusions on the requirements for creating a community. A community does not permit the distinction between "Thine" and "Mine." This is not to be confused with a communism (even one freed from a materialistic philosophy), for by taking away a possession, communism takes away the possibility of giving. Envy and pride, under the appearance of justice, are the beneficiary. Community says man should possess, but in order to give rather than to enjoy; either to give everything at once, as in certain vocations, or to give continuously all through life. This "giving" cannot be haphazardly done. Each of us belongs to various groups and may have particular responsibilities towards certain people, although each individual has responsibilities towards all. There is, therefore, a normal order in the act of giving, dictated by responsibilities, but there are also urgent cases which sometimes require us to be able to upset the usual order.

This holds true not only in the giving of material goods, but also for the gift of intelligence and the most spiritual gifts. We have a duty to others to give something to them, but let us not give our wheat to be eaten before it has ripened. We must have the patience to let our harvest ripen, not that we can then put it in our barn for our own profit, but so that we can distribute it to others. In short, we must come back to the Christian idea according to which we possess only in order to become a giver. Possession in a community is not a privilege but rather a responsibility.

Since the community demands a personal exchange, mem-

bership must not be compulsory. While one may belong to a group, whether he wishes to or not, he must freely join a community. A membership which is interior cannot be forced. Nor can it be extorted by propaganda. There is no true community where the union is achieved only under the influence of propaganda which usually does away with freedom. A true community can be formed only where refusal to join is risked. Members must be attracted to the community; the problem is to know how to attract others while respecting their freedom.

The community is not exclusive; if it fails to integrate all the members, it destroys itself. Even more so, a particular community must never be closed within itself. The members participate in other groups where they also must live a community life (for example, one must not close himself within his family). Each limited community must be integrated into a broader community, in which it has a particular role.

The first obstacle to a community is individual egoism, which divides the members and causes opposition. Once this is overcome, and the joy of union is established, a second danger arises, even more difficult to deal with, for here the members are so content together they refuse to broaden. The result is group egoism, not community.

Each community, therefore, should look upon itself as a person with certain characteristics, who must give to others and receive from them. The broadest community is humanity, out of which we must strive to make a true community, perhaps the most difficult task of all. But to lose hope *a priori* and be satisfied with making a lesser community the highest community (whether it be nation, state, race, or a part of the world) is not only to limit ourselves but also to corrupt all the subordinate communities. If the family community, the working community, the professional community, for example, are related only to the state or to a race, they are no longer what they should be. The highest community, humanity itself, aims at developing individuals and their communion. But a person can develop only if he is open to all other men, if he aspires to give to all and receive from all; he can commune fully with another only if he aspires to commune with all. To introduce a limitation voluntarily not only prevents humanity from being a community but it also prevents the subordinate communities and each individual from having true existence. While communities which are large, in which all who are members share a community life (humanity, for example), are not always possible, there must still be a union of "heart" which will be expressed by a real union just as often as circumstances permit.

Only the Church teaches what we should help each other to

become. Only God's grace, normally communicated through the sacraments, can give us the love which must be the soul of this mutual devotion. Only by communing in God can men commune perfectly with each other. If men should unite, it should not be for profit nor to savor the pride of the strength of their union, but rather it should be to give themselves all together to God. The Church, therefore, is the only complete community in which human individuals can find their fulfillment by participating through Christ in the life of the Blessed Trinity.

The Holy Trinity, perfect unity with absolute distinction, living reality of infinite Love, is both the model and also the source of any true community. The more deeply we comprehend this mystery, the better we will understand what we must achieve. Taken collectively, the human race bears the indelible mark of the Trinity. That is why each of its members bears within himself, in spite of all the divisions and strife, this deep tendency to live united with the others in love, this need to base all his relations with others on love, this propensity towards total unity: one shepherd and one flock. In the exact measure in which they do not resist what God has placed in them, men tend to love each other with a love which is part of that love with which the Divine Persons love each other. Sin alone divides. Conjugal, fraternal or filial love, the love which one has for his fellow workers, fellow citizens, for all men, are refractions of the one and only Love.

The Church is the organ through which the love which creates communities is introduced and propagated in the world. She is the life of the Trinity extended to the earth and shared by men. Thus she is not just one community among others, no more than the Christian life is merely a part of our life. All others live by it, moreover sometimes without realizing it. Her ambition is to group them all in her unity. The Christian should therefore be a community builder, no matter where he lives. But in order that the creative community love should live again in our world, in order that divisive egoism (the root and fruit of sin) might be overcome, the tragedy of Calvary was necessary. Only to the extent that the Christian is willing to share in the Cross of Christ will he be a community builder.

CHAPTER V

Problems of the State

WHEN WE try, as Christians, to discover what our attitudes should be towards the changes now taking place in society, we must bear in mind that our goal is to create conditions in the world favorable for man to march onward to his eternal destiny.

In the few pages of this chapter, we cannot draw up a detailed plan of action for Christians. Nor can we content ourselves with a statement of a few general ethical principles valid in any and all historical circumstances. Rather, our aim is to sketch a kind of dynamic schema, which will keep us from walking blindly, at the mercy of expediency.

Today's crisis is one of humanity, not just of one nation. Although we cannot date the beginnings of it, we can pinpoint certain revealing events which, to be sure, are end results but nonetheless starting points.

Such an event, for example, was the rise of Lenin to power in 1917. We could talk at length on the almost fortuitous nature of the event, noting the ineptitude of the government which was overthrown. We could discuss the objective meaning of the event: did Lenin represent the proletariat? Was his *coup d'etat* the same as seizures of power through insurrection recorded in other periods of history? Interesting as these discussions might be, the overwhelming fact remains that the event itself was the source of a movement, of a series of disturbances, actions and reactions which continue yet today under our eyes and which are now determining factors in our own action.

The changes taking place today have disconcerted those who had been accustomed to slow modifications of history and who had regarded any violent efforts simply as a squall whose destruction might be widespread but in the end superficial, the ground remaining solid on which to reconstruct the same model as before. The situation is quite the contrary. To understand such changes, we must compare them to geological phenomena which modify the deep structures of the earth. It is quite possible, in our human organization of life, that alongside the slow and continuous evolutions, there exist moments of change which are both sudden and deep, which are linked to the past

as well as determined by it, but in which the accumulated forces cause an explosion in history.

The Christian has an obligation to keep in touch with the world-in-the-making. To remain inert, either from timidity or indifference, is to make the problems more formidable. Sooner or later we must face the problems of our age, if we do not want humanity to be developed completely outside the influence of Christianity. Let us, therefore, not complain about the present situation. Let us not look for an alibi in recriminations against past responsibilities. Let us not pass on to our successors a still heavier burden.

Let us note a few characteristics of our times. First of all, we are dealing with a crisis of civilization. It is not simply a question of readapting techniques or inventing new ones in order to attain an end which remains unchanged. Rather, we must reclassify the values which are a guide to action. The very concept of man, which guided us in the past, is now being questioned. There is a current conviction today that until now no one has really understood the true nature of man, that the traditional human ideal has in reality given us only a mutilated, disfigured image of what man really is.

In the background of a great many plans for reform today we can find a protest against the idea of man which has guided life until now. In reality, these new reforms seek to create a new humanity. Hence, the popularity of such thinkers as Nietzsche and Marx who, until now, had remained outside the stream of current ideas. Marx, indeed had been studied seriously, especially his economic theories. But the basic criticism was always made that Marxist economy was not suited to the achievement of what was considered an ideal of human life. Much less attention was given to the new concept of man which Marx presented. Few critics pointed out that Marxist economics had no meaning without a Marxist man, that Marx wanted his new economy for his new man. Today, however, people are interested in the new man of Marx. They realize that the main question up for debate is whether or not we can accept the Marxist idea of man. Did Marx really understand the true nature of man, they are asking.

We must pose the same question of the various totalitarian movements which have arisen in our age. Can we accept their idea of man? The discussion cannot be limited to economic reforms, political reforms or social reforms. These are but the consequences or the means. The pertinent question is: *What is their concept of man?*

This is the crux of the present crisis of civilization. According to what concept of man are we going to live? At the service of what ideal of human life shall we place the immense tech-

nical advances of our age? We cannot accept just any idea of man.

Let us repeat, there is a new notion of man spreading throughout the world today, and not merely an economic or social or political change. We cannot understand the reforms proposed in these areas unless we know the idea of man which explains them. If it is true that politics, economics and sociology derive their significance through the human element they express, then they are determined by the idea of man which they try to translate into reality.

What are the characteristics of the new human ideal which is gaining currency? First of all, one of its most visible traits is the awakening of a community spirit. We must clarify this, because totalitarianism does not reflect a true community spirit but instead a false enjoyment of it. We are witnessing today a clear rejection of individualism, explainable in part by the gregariousness of man, but also in part by the fact that the relinquishment of personal thought and will within a collectivity frees man from personal responsibility to think and will for himself. This is a serious phenomenon.

Another factor is the feeling of the inhuman quality of an isolated individualism and the solitude to which it has condemned man, and all this in spite of the large number of apparent relationships with other men. Once individualism had dissolved the human community and prevented it from rebuilding, man became the victim of collective movements. As it so often happens, the reaction has been ill-formed. As Father de Lubac remarked, "Rationalism chased away mystery; myth has taken its place." Man was not made to live in the atmosphere of the purely rational, in which individualism placed him. Lacking mystery, he fell victim to the myth of the collectivity.

We cannot, therefore, condemn either individualism or the reactions against it, without reservations. The notion of the individual is not primitive in society, for in the earliest times we find groups in which the individual has no value. The individual is first submerged in the group, which does not represent a human community, because the personal value of each is not recognized. The individual must free himself from the group; he must become aware of what differentiates him from the others.

Such an awareness may result in individualism, according to which each individual makes himself the center and the final end, whereas he should realize that he cannot achieve full development except through and for others. If he understands this, then he lives as a "person," neither lost in the group nor isolated as an individual, neither the means to an end which is beyond him nor an end unto himself apart from other men.

“Sub-personal” unity must be torn down in order that unity may be built on a higher plane where the individualities may find their deeper bond. The error of the current anti-individualism is that it would destroy the individual in its very attempt to remove the danger of individualism.

There is a second characteristic of the new human ideal, undoubtedly connected with the first one. It is a reaction against any form of 19th century liberalism, i.e., against a certain tendency to trust the individual and to rely on a spontaneous harmony among human activities, especially in economics and culture. Few today hold this theory of liberalism, i.e., the creation of an atmosphere which offers favorable conditions under which an individual may flower freely, each in his own way. According to this notion, the collectivity, the government, merely furnishes the means, extends to the greatest number possible those conditions necessary for a full development, as each individual understands full development, intervenes only to prevent individuals from harming one another, and forbids encroachments and oppressions.

Totalitarianism rejects this viewpoint completely. It believes that a collective end must be obtained, and each individual must strive for it. Individuals are not to develop according to their own fancy, but they must join collective movements which will work out the human ideal decided upon by the group. The consequence is the disappearance of the “category of the private.” Public life and private life can still be distinguished from each other, according to the activities pursued, but not as though public life were a loan to the whole group, while private life is the domain of the individual, he being the lord in his own home, free to establish himself, act and think as he sees fit.

In seeking to create a new man, totalitarianism fashions him as much in his private life as in his public life. It pursues man not only in his outward gestures but in his inner thoughts. It aims at creating in man new ways of judging and feeling, which apply even to artistic matters. It penetrates man’s mind in order to model it according to one type. Since it does not trust the individual to create this single type mind, the collectivity must do it. Since force is required to constrain man, the State must assume the task.

Hence, an enormous role is assigned to the State, no matter what its ideology be. Its form must be dictatorial, not temporarily in order to lead the nation out of a difficulty, but essentially by its very function. The State can play its role only if it has all the powers. Since its aim is not only administration but also the creation of a new humanity, the State prefers not to rule by force. It wants the people to love and desire what

the State prescribes. It seeks to identify the will of the individual with the will of the State. Not satisfied with forcing the citizen to submit, it attempts to transform him inwardly, in order that he judge everything according to the ideas of the State.

This is why, according to totalitarianism, man becomes what he should be only when he identifies himself with the aims of the State. The totalitarian State claims to be the highest achievement of democracy: it obtains, so it says, freely consented obedience. This is not mere witticism or a propaganda slogan; it is a definition of the State's goal. The individual is to become so permeated with the State that he spontaneously agrees with it in all matters. Would this not be the full flowering of democracy?

Such is the process by which the individual is to be molded even in his spiritual being. Let us repeat, the totalitarian State does not wish to be obeyed like the old-fashioned tyrannies, but its ambition is to be "total." It wants to win over, persuade, but at the same time it will not permit any one to refuse joining with it. Since an individual left free to himself might reject the State, free choice must be eliminated.

The Totalitarian State needs slaves, but slaves who are convinced they are free. It wants to seize the spontaneity, kindle the enthusiasm, profit by the impetus which exists among those who *think* they are giving themselves freely. How succeed in this? How enslave while giving the illusion of freedom? Propaganda is an essential element of the totalitarian State. If we understand exactly what totalitarianism expects of propaganda, we will fear the propaganda technique. By propaganda is not meant information or education, nor even lies. Propaganda is deceitful not only in what it says but also in its principle, for it means domination and enslavement of man's entire being, all the while leading him to think he is free and attaining full development.

Since the State has the mission to create a new humanity, we can understand why it must integrate within itself all of man's activities, from the production and distribution of wealth to culture. Man is not only a producer and a consumer; he also lives by the spirit. No part of him must escape the State, especially not his economic life.

The State, therefore, is the antithesis of individualistic economics. In certain respects this is a step forward, for no one any longer believes in the free operation of economic laws; no one any longer believes in an economic order in and for itself. Rather, the new man believes that the economic order has value only within the larger order it must serve. This could be excellent, except that, unfortunately, the human order which it

serves under totalitarian auspices is far from a true order. Once again the reaction against an inhuman situation leads to a situation equally inhuman.

Under these conditions, the State, which bends everything to itself, does not itself bend to any authority. If it is to achieve its highest value of a "new man," it must have free play. Nothing must hinder it. Let no one seek to subject it to rules which can really only be prejudices, since they hinder the achievement of what should be—the end and reason for everything. Anything that impedes the State is immoral. No longer is the State a simple safeguard of an interest; it is now backed by an ideal which has an absolute value. While it may, in a sense, become less base and sordid, it is in reality more imperious and devouring.

Such is the role of the State according to totalitarianism. True enough, its theorists sometimes allow a certain pluralism. They will admit, for example, that the ideal of the "new man" may vary from country to country. They will say that the ideal of Italian Fascism was not exactly the same as that of National Socialism. Yet we never get away from the idea of totalitarianism. In working a national type out, no freedom is left to the individual or to subordinate communities. The State, as a result, becomes identified with the Fatherland. Even if the identification is not always formally expressed, the fact remains that the State alone is the interpreter of the national values. The co-existence of diverse spiritual families, each of which emphasizing one aspect of the national heritage, is not permitted. The State alone decides the ideal of the nation. All those who oppose the State are excluded from the country.

There is, therefore, no longer a distinction between State, Nation, and Country. The State is no longer an independent entity which groups under its sovereign authority individuals or groups for their natural common good. All the emotional forces which the idea of "country" awakens are transferred to the State and to the man in whom the State is incarnated. It is essential to totalitarian movements that the State be incarnated in a man.

The fact that the State takes charge of everything explains its hostility to other communities. Inevitably it is opposed to them. Yet every true community does, in fact, develop its own ideal, which in turn gives a certain coloring to the national ideal. These community ideals can and should converge. If need be, individual communities should give up their own private interest in favor of the country: one of their requirements for existence is that they live off the country as branches live off the sap of the trunk of a tree. Yet each does have its role to play. This is precisely what the totalitarian State refuses to accept,

for it not only fears the limiting effects of these individual communities on the State omnipotence, but also it wishes to decide by itself what the ideal is to be. The fault of the totalitarian State lies not in the desire to be strong in its own domain, but in its desire to absorb everything, to become the source of everything, to be the unique creator of the "new man."

We are not, therefore, dealing with some irrational and chance phenomenon, engendered by the needs of the economic situation. Certain difficulties of life in society require a stronger power which can take everything in hand during a certain crisis. But the totalitarian enterprise is a permanent one. It consists of creating a "new man," in substituting the so-called "true" man for the lie that man was in the liberal age.

Forces of opposition have arisen against the totalitarian revolution, all of them varying in value. In the reaction, there have been two component parts: on the one hand, the reaction of a disturbed egoism, i.e., the reaction of people who, shaken in their habits of thought and life, refused to yield their dear conveniences and looked with irony at all attempts to do something new. On the other hand, there has been the feeling that in the new ideal of human existence now proposed, something essential has been forgotten or sacrificed.

Among those reacting are the "personalists" who clearly see that a new notion of man must be worked out, but one which does not sacrifice either liberty or community, which does not make anarchy out of liberty and oppression out of community. Personalism tries to balance the tension between both elements in its concept of man. It is in constant danger of becoming either individualism or a transposed Communism. Personalists have fully understood the total unity of the human order, in that the "new man" can be achieved only in community institutions in the social, political and economic orders.

To resist the invasion of the State, we must create new communities. We must transform into organized communities those natural groups which form spontaneously, for these natural groups keep the State within its bounds, without reducing its strength in its rightful domain. They act as counter-weights. By destroying man's isolation, these communities satisfy man's thirst for communion. He is no longer tempted by the massive fusion which totalitarianism offers him. We dare not return to the crumbling of community life and the isolation which the age of excessive liberalism inflicted on humanity; we must make some kind of community effort.

If our intermediary communities are really alive, their members will be deeply attached to them, and they will feel that they really have something to defend against the excesses of State control. Not only do community organizations counter-

balance the State, but community spirit creates inner centers of resistance against totalitarian claims.

The State must be strong to be an arbiter able to impose decisions, but a strong State is always dangerous, because it has the tendency to seize everything for itself. Power maddens. Hence, the tendency must be counter-balanced, although no matter how well organized these community organizations might be, their role will not be effective if we do not take an active interest in them. When the citizens no longer know why they should oppose the dissolution by the State of the intermediate communities, these communities will not hold up, no matter how legally solid they might be. But if, on the contrary, we are attached to them, the danger can be met. Our conclusion, then, is that in order to maintain a strong, healthy State, we must create real communities which are not mere frameworks or administrative units, but living units, within which a powerful community spirit can be developed. There is no true community where there is no true feeling of attachment to it.

On this level, we are in a better position to work than the others. Our Christianity, even on the temporal plane, is not resolved into legal situations. It communicates to us a feeling of a collective life which is inner and deep. We know by experience that the ecclesiastical institutions would be nothing if there were not, within the Church, Christians who love her and who love one another. What gives the Church strength and force is not the exterior perfection of her institutions; but our attachment to her. Wherever this attachment weakens, even if the façade is still strong, when a hard blow comes, the Church falls. When Christians are really attached to the Church with their hearts, she resists all attacks, even if her institutions are not too well developed or if she is in a situation which does not appear too promising.

CHAPTER VI

Civic Education

CIVIC EDUCATION aims at developing an attitude towards the State and an attitude towards the Country. Both must be treated separately.

The State is an organization of a legal and social nature and a necessary agent of political life, which operates within well defined areas. Between the State and its citizens, there is a relationship of reciprocal rights and duties. On the other hand, the Country, which is the extension of a family, retains the concrete, living nature of a family. It is a spiritual reality (carnal in its roots, it has no value except through its soul, even though it cannot exist without a body); it is an object of love. The citizen, therefore, not only has duties to his State, but he must love his Country, just as a family is not a group of beings faithful to certain duties, but supposes an intimacy, a family feeling. When dealing with the Country, civic education will not consist merely in convincing us that we have certain duties, but it will develop our love for our Country, so that we will give it vigor and warmth while preserving it from errors.

Let us, then, discuss civic education, first as regards the State, then as regards the Country.

The tradition of the Church bases the duty of obeying political power on the principle that political authority, in its own domain, is representative of God. The Church does not base the duty on the qualities of those possessing the authority. When the Catholic participates in political campaigns, he may proclaim the special gifts of his candidate, but the Catholic Church makes no such calculations when she faces an established power. No matter what the personal qualities of those governing might be, the Church asks the same obedience to them. Even on the natural level, a good government desires obedience on the basis of its authority rather than on the value of its members. The first consideration is universally valid and not subject to debate, whereas the second is the cause of innumerable contentions.

During times of transition from one government to another, we risk crises which are inevitable. Therefore, besides the religious idea of obedience to God, we must insist on the human

idea of the necessity for a supreme authority in a Nation. In the national interest, this consideration must be primary, whereas the consideration of personal qualities as a basis for allegiance brings it with all kinds of serious consequences. Citizens must learn to obey governmental power not because they have chosen the leaders or because the leaders please them, but because these leaders are legitimately in power.

Yet we cannot neglect to teach young Catholics that governmental authority, even when legitimate, cannot be obeyed if it orders something contrary to religion or ethics. Obedience does not mean yielding personal conscience. The Catholic must judge the authority from the moral aspect before joining with it. He knows that in so doing he is still serving his country, for in any case of immoral action, the country is the loser. Governmental authority is angered by such an attitude only when, unwittingly or not, it prefers itself to the interests it is supposed to serve. The Catholic should try to create around him a public opinion which requires government to respect ethics in domestic and foreign politics. The action of public opinion, even when diffused in its application, is always effective.

Neither must we confuse a strong State with a State which intervenes in everything. To strengthen the State is not identical with allowing it to extend itself to everything. We should show how the rights of the State are limited by the rights of the Church, the family, natural associations and the individual. We do this not to harass the State but for the common welfare. To refuse to accept the State's rejection of Ethics is not insubordination.

Obedience and approval, however, are not identical. We must obey even when we do not approve (providing our disapproval is not the result of a moral judgment). We do not need to approve everything we are obliged to obey. We need only be certain that our disapproval is based on serious considerations, not on egoistic motives or prejudices. To require approval under the pretext of making obedience easier instead makes it more difficult, for it requires that the citizen give up that which he has a right to keep.

Moreover, it is legitimate to try to have a measure modified or rescinded when we think it is not the best. But in so doing, we must not use means contrary to ethics, i.e., violence, lies, corruption. Since we aim to aid the common good with our proposed change, we must be careful that our efforts do not bring about greater damage through reaction. Either in the choice of men to whom we express our criticism or in our manner of expression, we must look to the common good. Fundamentally, it is merely the application of the same principle which the Church applies in the case of insurrection, only

in a more limited field. The judgment must be made in terms of the common good, which always must be served by the existence of the government and by each governmental decision. It is, therefore, morally right, under any form of government to try to modify a governmental decision. Until the decision is modified, however, we must obey it, so long as it is not immoral.

What about paying taxes? Taxes are designed to give the State the means of fulfilling its function of serving the common good. They should not be viewed *a priori* with suspicion. To pay our taxes is a serious obligation. Under present circumstances, when the burdens of State are so heavy, we could say that taxes are due in justice whenever they do not deprive us of the necessities of life.

To strengthen the State, therefore, we must resist the current trend which justifies any means to attain the end. We must not gloss over the rights of the individual. In short, we must trace the limits of both the individual and the State. This is the way to impart a solid civic education.

The second object of civic education is concerned with the Country.

There is a Catholic doctrine on patriotism. Patriotism is not just a blind sentiment, although it is primarily a sentiment. Like any individual community, a Country has its own unity which makes it a whole unto itself; but it also plays a role in a worldwide ensemble of countries, which is greater than itself. In attacking the unity and cohesion of a Country, therefore, we damage the larger ensemble. Conversely, in attacking the world ensemble, our Country suffers, no matter what temporary advantages we might gain. Different countries exist so that they might mutually enrich one another.

This concern for the ensemble must never be forgotten. Especially today we must make certain that our renewal of patriotic feelings is not based on selfish retreat. We must remember that while some countries have attained their stature, still others are either still beginning or trying to come back to life. Whence arises a whole series of critical problems.

While not losing our broader vision, we dare not place ourselves outside our own Country. We belong to a Country, not by chance but by providential arrangement. Our Country leaves its mark on us through our language, culture, and countless spontaneous reactions. The adolescent must be made aware of this. It is within our Country and through it that we should work for the whole world. Such action presupposes that our Country exists and that it be strong.

We all want a strong Country, which supposes moral disciplines, for we cannot make a strong Country with corrupted

individuals. Even this is not sufficient, however, for a Country is not strong if it is not loved. Our love for the United States is not real if it does not result in a love for all Americans, no matter who they might be. We too frequently witness a form of patriotism which grandly displays its admiration of the past, but which would eliminate from the national community those Americans whose ideas or color of skin we dislike. A concrete love of Country requires that we know its history and its present facets, its qualities and its weaknesses, not in order to disguise them but to remedy them. If we love our country, we want it to play a worthy role. This does not mean that we subordinate it to an ideology, but that we expect it to be faithful to its vocation. Such an attitude is contrary to that which consists in taking no further interest in our country, or even in betraying it, if it ceases to serve the ideology which we have adopted.

If our love should be catholic, i.e., include all peoples and everything, how can we reconcile this with the love of our Country? Does the latter not imply a partiality and deny the idea of an "open society" which englobes the world and which Christianity is always trying to establish more completely?

First of all, the Church makes love of country a virtue and a duty. We need no longer establish that patriotism is compatible with a universal love. But we do need to understand better their compatibility. An accord between love of country and a universal love is only a particular aspect of the accord between universal love and individual bonds. If, for example, love of family does not prevent us from loving all men, why should love of country be an obstacle? Our deepest friendships are different from each other, and this does not mean "more or less" but different. If a country has its own personality which can be only understood by one who lives in communion with it, then our love for it will have its own tonality. There is a love for America which is qualitatively irreducible to our love for our family or for humanity, or to the love which we should have for other countries. Not to love our Country with an unique love is to go counter to the reality willed by God. It is to make unreal the charity which reaches out to each being according to his nature. Christian universalism has nothing in common with cosmopolitanism or with an abstract humanitarianism, which would strip individuals of their differences.

We sometimes ask ourselves why we should love one country instead of another. The question arises because we somehow consider ourselves unattached. We forget that we are born, grow up in a concrete framework, not by chance but because of God's will. We are marked in the innermost part of our spiritual being by belonging to our Country. If we are indiffer-

ent to our Country, if we refuse to serve it, we repudiate the debt we owe it. Our revolt is in fact implemented by the very things we have received from our Country. We can break our bonds, but we cannot remove the imprint of our Country upon us.

True, a missionary ceases to work for his Country in order to answer the call of a higher vocation. He does not seek to increase the power or influence of the foreign country, but to further the Kingdom of God. This is similar to a religious ceasing to work for his family. Except in the case of an exceptional vocation, we owe our duty first to our Country. While charity is universal, there is a priority to be observed in expressing it.

If we understand well what we owe our Country, we see that it is not a question of limitation, but rather one of order. Countries exist for what they should give to humanity and for mutual enrichment. To serve one's Country means to fulfill its end. If we defend its existence, its material interests, its reputation, its prestige, we do so because these are necessary or useful to our Country in fulfilling its mission. We also have the duty of holding our Country to its true vocation, should it ever stray from it.

A Country must live and protect itself from dangers to the exercise of its influence. If it is to shine forth, it must have cultural, spiritual and moral capital. In fulfilling our duties to it, we help assure all this, each in our own way. Only a pagan love of country is contrary to universal love. Christian service to our Country is at the same time service to all humanity, and most often, it is the most concrete way of serving all humanity.

Our Country, to which we are bound by many more ties than we sometimes think, should not appear to us as an instrument at the service of some cause, but as a person having a private and inner life. We love it with a love unique in nature, but we want it to be faithful to its human and Christian vocation.

CHAPTER VII

The Use of Force

FORCE IS an energy which manifests itself in tangible results. On the purely physical plane, forces are at work in the material world, and even within man himself, without which he could not have an effect on the world.

Man's action on the world, however, is not proportionate to his physical force, for unlike the inanimate world, man has an intelligence by which he can dominate and utilize immense physical forces. Influence, cleverness, the gift of persuasion make it possible for man to manipulate the force of another man or of a group.

Man himself is above nature, not only because he can know the play of forces at work in the world, but also because he can judge them and intervene in them. Without this, civilization could not have begun and humanity could not have developed. Whenever man becomes the plaything of the forces which act upon him, either within or without, he loses his awareness of what distinguishes him from them. He tends to forget what he is.

Force itself is only an instrument. It is evil when it is used for egoism, hatred or pride. The exercise of force should never become an end in itself. The "will for power," for example, is an evil force, for it is basically at the service of egoism. It consists of an enjoyment of the exercise of force, no matter how lofty the objective. Force, on the contrary, should always be subordinate to the aim which is sought through its use. The aim gives force a moral value.

The use of force, therefore, should be governed by rules. Force must always respect individual rights, even when it is used to obtain a good and desirable result. No aim can justify a discounting of a real right, whether we deal with brute physical force or the force of intelligence, cleverness or persuasion. Force cannot be used to gain a consent which is not freely given.

Force, furthermore, should defend rights when they are violated by another force. Any manipulator of force who allows rights to be abridged without remedying the situation becomes an accomplice to the oppression. The use of force against another unjust force is a duty, albeit at times fraught with the

temptation of going beyond the point of re-establishing justice. Nonetheless, the temptation does not eliminate the duty.

Another force, manifesting itself as "energy," is the self-mastery or endurance in face of obstacles. The strong man gives himself entirely to his work, to the pursuit of his goal, whereas the weak man lacks such a unification or concentration of his energies. He is divided.

True force must be distinguished from passion. Both unify and concentrate energies, but passion drains one of man's energies for the sake of a tendency, an attraction to which he is subjected and which is not of his own choosing. The passionate person is a slave to his passions; he is carried along by them, whereas the strong man utilizes all the energy expended in his passion, always remaining the master of it. True force has a sense of direction; passion lacks one.

Force does not mean violence to oneself. Violence against oneself is a burst of passion which indicates weakness. A person cannot withstand his deficiencies and weakness; he is irritated by them. He is not patient in the face of inner conflicts, but wants to smash them. In the struggle against deficiencies, force does not exclude but implies patience with oneself, which is something quite different from inertia or submission to one's faults. We must be able to take ourselves as we are, then little by little master ourselves, use methods which require time, practice, patience, in order to improve ourselves.

There are not different virtues for the strong and for the weak. Properly understood, all virtues require force. Virtues practiced as a refuge for the weak would be a caricature of true virtues. For example, an obedience incapable of initiative, a humility incapable of responsibility, both show that our force is incomplete. To lack obedience when it is necessary, to lack humility, is to lack force. It is also to lack the courage to submit to the goal we seek. It is to prefer our whims or ego.

When we revolt we reveal weakness. Instead of accepting the situation and transforming it as soon as possible, instead of making it the basis for action, of enduring it insofar as it cannot be changed, we yield to the desire for revolt. When faced with a task which is too large for us, we fall into a disorderly and unfruitful agitation. The strong man does not waste his energy revolting. He uses his energy to fulfill his tasks under those circumstances in which he finds himself.

Finally, we must see the role of force in love. True love is not a weak man's feeling. It is not a satisfaction with everything in the beloved, nor a refusal to make the beloved suffer. Force in love seeks the good of the beloved; therefore, his grandeur and perfection. It accepts nothing imperfect as permanent in the beloved. A forceful man will suffer when his be-

loved suffers. In this manner let us contemplate the love of God. *True force is in reality a characteristic of love.* Only when force is rooted in love is it kept from digression. It does not degenerate into brutality or tyranny, for love respects the freedom of the beloved. A force rooted in love sustains freedom and always points to the perfection to be attained. Force inspired by love helps us overcome obstacles, accept solitude, and all this without violence or pride, without ceasing to be human in the full meaning of the word.

If love is the source of force, the primary source is God. Let us, in conclusion, compare the hero with the saint. There is no less force in one than in the other, but the saint knows that his force has been received from without, that it is derived from a divine force, to which he opens his heart. The saint who has all the virility and maturity of a man remains nonetheless a child before God.

Christian Force

There is a Christian force.

Because he is clear-sighted, the strong soul demands the same of others that he demands of himself. He knows no complacency in face of their weaknesses, imperfections, blindness. He does not despair of leading others to total perfection nor does he abandon them half way. Such a force is not expressed through indiscretion; it is not a brutality which strikes in haste, rushes ahead of the call of grace in the divine soul. Impatience and haste, even when they seek to serve the highest ends, are signs of weakness. Christian force is calm and serene but implacable.

The source of Christian force is love. More precisely, force is only one of love's qualities. Love alone is capable of unifying our soul and concentrating our energies in the service of God. It alone can give us that energy which is neither unbending nor violent and which obtains from others everything God asks of them. Not without reason is Christian force considered a gift of the Spirit of love.

The strong soul looks clearly both at himself and at the world, unafraid of the work required to bring everything into accord with the Christian ideal. He does not fear labor, either to tear down when the situation requires or to rebuild according to new plans. The strong soul calls a spade a spade, fearing neither the contradictions encountered by Christian daring nor the solitude of those who wish to go too far. He does not try to give a Christian coating to inner tendencies, ways of living, institutions which, because they are contrary to the Christian spirit, are incapable of any deep Christianization. The

clearness of our vision depends on the force of our soul. "Be ye therefore simple as doves," Our Lord said. We must not cheat with reality, but look at it squarely. What are our opinions and our attitudes? What is the world around us?

Heroic Requirements of Christianity

Some accuse Christianity of being a school of weakness and of having de-civilized man. While this is calumny, we must not, in rejecting it, present Christianity as a purely human heroism, an effort of the will.

Christianity, properly understood, is not a consolation for weak souls who lack the courage to look reality in the face. Far from nurturing souls with consoling illusions, Christianity asks them to realize their true situation and the situation of the world. It requires that we face the fundamental choice in the drama of every life—the tragic choice between salvation and total loss. Christianity does not hide the suffering which is in the world nor the trials which fall upon those who trust most in God. The certainty given by faith, and by faith alone, that these trials can always turn into a final good, does not stop us from feeling, as Christ did, anxiety even unto agony. A view of the universe in which the Cross of Christ stands is not at all a pleasant scene on which to rest tired eyes.

Christianity is not a call to a life of ease, an organization for spiritual comfort. It demands that every man live as a son of God, a witness to Christ. It calls him to uplift himself to his highest grandeur and not to trample in satisfied mediocrity. It asks him to outdo himself constantly, for to be perfect even as our heavenly Father is perfect, we must always climb higher; we must always tear ourselves from the forces which pull us down.

More concretely, our upward climb demands a complete break with sin. Sin pulls us down, decreases us, tears us apart, no matter what the appearances are. The Christian cannot compromise, either in the social order or in the personal order, with anything that is the consequence of sin, the result of sin, the expression of sin. To be faithful to this requirement, how much courage is needed in a world which has so many institutions, traditions, customs and manners based on complicity with sin! If one is to have the courage to face the opposition brought about by the necessary breaks with sin, he certainly cannot lack virility.

Christianity asks constant courage of us. It is not a question of straining ourselves in a violent action at certain moments, then yielding at other moments to what appeals to us, to our

instincts and passions. At every instant we must strive to go higher. Few things are more difficult for us than this consistency of effort, this universality of effort which prevents us from compensating in some areas for what we sacrifice in others.

Christianity does not only ask for the spectacular effort, the effort which others see, in which we are sustained by what they will think; but also for the secret effort which is not seen by men, the struggle against inner weaknesses and mediocrities, against what harms the very intentions which determine our acts. Does not the courage which God alone will see, does not this constant uprightness of conduct require a rather rare quality of energy?

Christianity asks an effort which is applied to all the virtues. Nothing is more natural for us than to choose the virtues we want to practice. Our choice is determined either by our natural bents or by our temperaments, or by the judgments of our times and our group. This deficiency, which excludes part of what we should strive towards because it seems difficult or because we have less exterior stimulation, will always exist. Yet a Christian should practice not only varied virtues, but also those virtues which seem opposed. A difficult equilibrium must be achieved because if the virtues are isolated, separated from their complements, they harden or soften, lose their value, cease to be virtues. We must be kind without ceasing to be energetic, patient without lacking initiative; we must have a taste for action without losing our love for prayer.

CHAPTER VIII

Anti-Semitism

LET US first of all discuss that form of anti-Semitism which affirms that the Jewish people have brought into the world, from all times, something harmful to humanity. Christianity wholly rejects this.

The most illustrious representative of this form undoubtedly is Nietzsche. His criticism of Christianity, of the Christian moral ideal, is well known. He calls it slave morality, an ideal for the weak, contrary to an heroic morality. According to Nietzsche, the Christian canonizes kindness, pity, humility, love; he fears those virtues which promise domination; he can live only in a world in which the strong virtues are not allowed; and he tries to make the strong believe that they have no right to use force; thus does the Christian disarm those against whom he does not have the courage to struggle. Now, Christianity derived all these ideas from Judaism. This is the Jewish heritage in the Christian tradition. Thus, according to Nietzsche, the Jewish spirit is poisonous for humanity; it is a poison which must be eliminated if one desires to give vigor and strength back to humanity.

Such anti-Semitism is unacceptable to Christianity. It strikes at Christianity in the same way that it strikes at Judaism. The Old Testament prepares the New Testament, which is its fulfillment, not abolition. The Jewish religion is a revealed religion; the Bible is the holy writ of the Church. Moral values introduced by Israel were adopted and perfected by Christianity, and not denied. In an audience with a group of Belgian pilgrims shortly before Christmas, 1938, Pope Pius XI said: "We are spiritually Semites." Having just received a missal from the pilgrims, His Holiness read the following words from the Mass: "*Supra quae propitio ac sereno vultu . . . et munera tui Abel, et sacrificium Patriarchae nostri Abrahae.*" Abraham, the father of the Jews, is still our patriarch.

The Jewish people never created a great empire or a Code of Law like Rome. They created no science like Greece. But we cannot say that they were inferior from a literary point of view: many of the passages of the Bible are master works of universal literature. In the moral and religious realms, however, Israel appears in all its grandeur and incontestably sur-

passes all the other people of antiquity. One does not have to be a Christian to sense this grandeur; he need only have an ideal of justice and of generosity, a mind which is not closed to the moral sense.

This religious ideal, which was especially expressed during the great age of the prophets; this ideal of a religion which does not consist in exterior rites, but is founded on real relationships with God, which requires justice and mercy in our relations with others, which condemns social iniquity, the oppression of the poor by the rich (not from the point of view of a human ideal but from a religious point of view, for the God of Israel is holy; sin cannot be tolerated among His people; if the people persist in sin, they will be chastised and destroyed)—all of this represents something which has no equivalent in any other people of antiquity. For any man in whose eyes justice and morality are not vain words, who does not judge the importance of a people only by its material power, Israel is a great nation, whose civilizing influence was considerable.

Some speak of the "Greek miracle," and the term is too strong. Let us not forget the Jewish miracle, which is a miracle in the true sense of the term. The contribution of the Jewish people is not a simple relic of the past. Even non-believers recognize the great role of Christian influence in our present civilization; but let us remember that the great geniuses who have given our civilization its spiritual principles were nurtured by the Bible. For example, St. Augustine, and for that matter, all the Fathers of the Church, who developed Christian thought, drew upon the Old Testament. Thus the present world lives much more by Judaism than it thinks.

Certainly our way of looking at concrete Jewish problems would be different if we had an exact idea of what the Jewish people has been. We must change the atmosphere of blind passion in which Jewish problems are generally posed. It is impossible for Christians not to experience for the Jewish people that same painful feeling which we always have in the presence of an unfaithful brother whose return to the fold we desire and await. Nothing is less Christian than a self-satisfied sneer at the sight of a Jew whose mind is closed to Christ. Because the Jewish people were the object of a divine elevation and a divine choice, because they are destined to return to God some day as a whole people, they should be an object of Christian respect, in spite of their fundamental error in refusing Christ and in spite of whatever mistakes they may have since made. Nothing is less Christian than a feeling of scorn or of hatred of this people, who have a particular right to Christian respect. Any problem involving the Jewish race

has by that very fact a serious and painful nature for the Christian.

Vulgar anti-Semitism

If we consider once again a vulgar anti-Semitism, by which we understand a hatred of the Jews, a tendency to hold them responsible, in a vague way and often exclusively so, for a host of evils, a desire to cast them out of national society, then we shall understand how anti-Christian this kind of anti-Semitism really is. The presence of Jews within a given country may create a problem, but a Christian may never study this problem with an anti-Semitic mentality. Any man, as a matter of fact, who has a feel for humanity, will have a natural friendship for anyone possessing a human soul.

There exists in every man, even in the civilized man, a tendency towards violence and the use of brute force, a taste for destruction, and even a certain instinctive cruelty (very visible in the way a neglected child left to his own devices treats animals). Ordinarily, these tendencies are restrained and inhibited by religious and moral education, which not only considers their expression as sins, but endeavors to develop the opposite feelings. They are also inhibited by the fear of legal punishment, the disapproval of public opinion, which punishes or stigmatizes violence. We must not minimize the importance of these factors, which act as a necessary safety stop.

Collective excitement against a particular class of men, when it takes on a certain intensity, awakens these instincts; and when it is thought that law or public opinion no longer protect the class of men under public attack, violence and cruelty break out. We need only observe the example of the liquidations in Russia. Let us not speak here of the atrocious injustices committed against the victims, but only of the demoralization which infects those who allow themselves to commit them.

Anti-Semitism is allegedly unleashed in the name of the common good, but its end result is corruption, the abasement of those who are a part of it, because the lowest and most immoral instincts, those most contrary to human life in society, triumph. Let us also remark that not only those who are actively engaged in the brutalities are debased. Many who are not actively engaged, either because of fear of physical action or because of a more refined education, are also debased by what they read, see, say or feel. Underlying all these verbal violences is the satisfaction of very low, inhuman and anti-Christian instincts, a satisfaction which is sufficiently refined and sublimated not to be too shocking. But the person none-

theless is poisoned inwardly. We must rid ourselves of such a state of mind, if we sincerely desire to study the Jewish problem as reasonable men and as Christians.

Nature of the Jewish Problem

Quite apart from any anti-Semitism, we can ask ourselves if there is really a Jewish problem? Does the presence of Jews scattered throughout all different countries pose a problem? And cannot public interest, considered in all fairness, quite apart from any spirit of scorn, vengeance or hatred, require certain measures concerning the Jews? Let us see how each question is posed for the Christian.

If we look at the matter as a whole, we must first recognize that there is a Jewish problem. A real "Jewish community" exists. That is, except for a few individual exceptions, the Jews are more or less conscious of the ties which unite them together—those of one nation with those of other nations. They do not constitute a race in the biological sense, however (many of them are Aryans), nor a nation, nor a people. Their case is special. Not even religion forms their bond. Their bond is of the spiritual order. Never able to group itself together, not even under a common oppressor, but nevertheless never dissolved, this Jewish community has a unique character. It presents a case without analogy. There is no human group which has resisted total assimilation or disappearance as a unity under such conditions as the Jews have, and this probably defies any natural explanation.

The trait of persistence in the Jewish community, in spite of dispersion and even in spite of the incorporation of various Jewish groups in other nations, makes Israel "a thorn in the flesh of the nations." Hence, the inevitable feeling of uneasiness. The weakness of the Jews, especially when favorable circumstances flatter them, changes the uneasiness into suspicion, then into hostility. This latter is then exploited by the professional advocates of anti-Semitism.

We must guard ourselves. The feeling of the existence of a Jewish community, while it may lead the Jews to excesses, is not evil in itself. It is based on something real, and we have no right to require that it disappear. The state, however, the guardian of public interest, has the right to watch it, so that the feeling does not become harmful to the country. The duty of vigilance is not equivalent to a right of preventive repression. When there is reason to fear abuses, the state must exercise special vigilance over the Jewish community, just as it must over national minorities, large associations, international cartels, etc.

This international "community" formed by the Jews is the deep reason why there is distrust of them on the part of the- orists of nationalism, those who favor closed and delimited states, merely juxtaposed one to another. The existence of Israel upsets all the frameworks. By its very presence, one feels that humanity cannot be sealed off into air-tight compartments, into groups which communicate with others only exteriorly.

It may be said with good reason that the Catholic Church poses a similar problem. While there is a tendency to national- ize the Church, the Church has a less disturbing nature, be- cause she is more tangible. She is visible, an organized so- ciety; she has a hierarchy which directs her and with which one can deal. She has a precise doctrine on the duties of Catholics towards her and towards the state. The Jews lack all this. They are an unique phenomenon, and that is why the problem of what attitude to take towards them arises. The very nature of the problem denies the validity of the solutions suggested by anti-Semitism.

Christian Approach to the Jewish Problem

Practically speaking, there is not so much a Jewish problem as various Jewish problems. In different countries, the number of Jews, their history, proportion of population, exercise of leadership vary. Each case has different data. Nor should we confuse the Jewish problem with the alien problem. The prob- lem involving the foreign Jews must of itself be solved by Christians. But there are American Jews, for example, who are subject to all the burdens of American citizenship. Here we must ask by what right can we refuse them what is granted to all other citizens, so long as they have not proven themselves personally unworthy?

We also must avoid the sophism of beginning with a list of real damages caused by Jews guilty of misdemeanors, then proceeding to propose general measures against a whole cate- gory of persons, guilty or not guilty. For example, some people use Jewish favoritism as an argument to exclude all Jews from certain offices. But the Jew is not the only one who prac- tices favoritism. We must outlaw favoritism of all kinds.

Some complain about the pernicious role played by certain large Jewish banks. If we exclude the Jews from financial life, do we think we will solve the problems of capitalism? Would not the non-Jews carry on the work? Rather, we are obliged to attack capitalistic usury itself. Such an undertaking undoubt- edly involves a whole economic and financial structure. Instead of striking will-nilly at both the guilty and the innocent Jews,

while ignoring the guilty non-Jews, let us prosecute all the guilty parties.

Some people advance the theory that the *Jewish spirit is a dissolving factor*. They claim an incompatibility between the Jew, who is an oriental, and the Western man. For proof, they cite the large number of Jews in revolutionary parties. Let us note, first of all, that the fact that the "conservative" party often is anti-Semitic very naturally drives many Jews into opposing parties. We would be naïve to be surprised at this. Having said this much, we must next ask, "Exactly what in our civilization does the Jewish spirit dissolve?" We err in setting forth all the ideas and institutions which constitute what is often arbitrarily called "Western Civilization" as models which merit only admiration and respect, without any discrimination. This would be an over-simplification.

Good minds, not at all anti-Semitic, think that the influence of Israel, all due allowances being made for exceptions, is pointed in a specific direction. They assign reasons which are not so much racial as religious, derived from the fact that Israel was God's chosen people and they refused Him. We may also think that Israel's Messianism, once having been secularized and temporalized, has created a tendency towards uneasiness among the Jewish people, an instability, a drive towards something constantly different, which therefore disposes them towards reform and revolution. Just as the Roman, the Latin, had a natural bent towards law and legal systems, so the Jew might have had a bent towards revolution. But we must not jump to the conclusion that such a tendency must therefore be rooted out through violence.

These people argue that Karl Marx, the founder of Marxism, from which stems the most powerful revolutionary movement in existence, was a Jew. Certainly, he was, but let us leave aside the possible objection that it still must be proved that Marx created Marxism because he was a Jew. Rather, let us see in his work the effect of a temporalized Messianism. Can we say that the regime against which Marx protested did not deserve protest and did not need change? Even if Karl Marx went too far, even if he created a counter-Capitalism, would he have fallen to such excesses had not the abuses of the capitalistic system provoked him? Furthermore, it would not be too difficult to show that Marx uses his adversary's weapons in the attack. Economic materialism was posited by Liberalism long before it was postulated by Marx. Without the social injustices and the false ideologies which Marx encountered, Marxism might never have existed. At any rate, it would not have been successful. Furthermore, if Marxism has conquered large masses of people, if it has become a powerful revolu-

tionary movement, rather than remain an ineffective ideology, it certainly would be a gross over-simplification to blame Jewish intrigues, as some people would do.

Can we not hold that the presence of individuals with revolutionary tendencies might have a simple and beneficial effect of a stimulant for the whole social body by preventing it from going to sleep and forcing it to think of new progress? Those who dream of a static society will not understand this. But those who desire constant progress toward higher ideals will understand the utility of such a stimulant, such a goad. If society would eliminate the conditions which breed revolution, it would need not fear the presence of individual revolutionary tendencies and it would not be obliged to suppress them in order to save itself.

Can We Eliminate the Jewish Problem?

Is there another way to eliminate the Jewish problem? Let us not talk about the rebuilding of the Jewish State in Palestine, which at best is only a partial solution. In the nineteenth century, many "liberal" minds approved granting the Jews the same rights as all other citizens. They thought that the special problem of the Jews came only from the fact that they had been isolated, set apart from the others. Treated the same as the others, the Jews would become like the others and be entirely assimilated in the country in which they lived, with the result that the feeling of racial solidarity would disappear. In other words, the Jews are like the others. If they are treated like the others, the Jewish problem will disappear.

Experience does not seem to confirm this view. Moreover, many Jews protest against the idea that they "are like the others" and that they should be completely assimilated. They do not contest that they should be loyal towards the country in which they live, but they do not think they should forego the feeling of their Jewish community and their mission. Now, some Christians, who are not at all anti-Semitic, do not agree with the assimilation answer to the Jewish problem. They view it as a misunderstanding which comes from eliminating the religious element from history.

Israel is the chosen people who refused to recognize Christ and is now bearing the punishment for its sin. (This does not give one the right to persecute these people, since this is a matter of Divine punishment. We are not able to judge in advance the value of a Jew as an individual.) Condemned to a tragic situation, unable to die as a people or as a community (unable to lose the feeling for its existence as community) and unable to be united (thus cease to suffer from dispersion), the

Jewish people are consigned to life among others, without becoming like them. The Jewish people are, as it were, the visible mark of God's intervention in history. This is a painful situation for the Jews and somewhat difficult for the others. They will always be the thorn in the flesh of nations.

Yet even this can be turned into a benefit for the world. Israel is one of the elements which prevents the world from going to sleep in a stable situation. The punishment of Israel is not a complete and final malediction, since, as St. Paul teaches (Rom. 9), Israel has not lost all its role in the divine plan.

The presence of Israel among the nations is not, therefore, a human problem but rather a divine mystery. It is impossible to find a solution to this mystery which would suppress Israel. We can only find partial and provisional arrangements, in accord with time and place, to prevent the resultant difficulties from harming a higher common good. Anything done under the influence of anti-Semitism will fail. We must act in the spirit of universal charity. As in all else, the common good must be alone considered, not the satisfaction of grudges and prejudices. We have no right to use unjust means for a good result. We must revolt against everything that hurts man, whoever he may be.

CHAPTER IX

The Christian and Temporal Affairs

IN ANCIENT society, religion and the city-state were closely united; we could say they were one, for the city-state had a religious character, while religion had a political character. Irreligion, therefore, was a crime. A person belonged to a cult just as he belonged to a state. No church was necessary, for the state regulated public worship. Conflict, therefore, between church and state, between the spiritual needs of the individual and the requirements of the state, was impossible.

Without a doubt, whatever hold the state had on the individual, a certain small margin of his life escaped that hold. Into that fraction of life, there entered, not a personal religion, as we say today, but rather a religion which allowed for private, individual and family preoccupations and interests.

Towards the beginning of the Christian era, this phenomenon became more widespread. Some sought in the mystic religions current at that time the guarantee of a personal salvation, of immortality. By that time, the religion of the city-state no longer satisfied man's spiritual needs. Nevertheless, a religious organization as such, which could oppose its rights to those rights of the state, had never been accepted.

Neither was the temporal and the religious element ever separated among the Jews, although here the fusion had altogether different consequences: the religious power absorbed the political. This is because the chosen people were wholly defined by their function to prepare the coming of Christ. Properly speaking, the Jews had no temporal destiny, but instead served God's plan for humanity. Political authority was entirely subordinated to religious authority. It was theocracy. (The pagan city-state, in which the political absorbed the religious element, where religion was subservient to the human aims of the state, was not theocratic).

Nonetheless, the greater part of the Jewish nation was far from always understanding its divine mission. It dreamed of political grandeur and saw in its religion the pledge of supremacy on the human level. The Bible testifies to the long struggle between those who diverted the Jewish people from

their vocation and those who wished to bring them back to their true vocation. But the task of the Jewish nation was not to distinguish between church and state, temporal and religious orders, anymore than it was the task of the pagan times. Christianity introduced the distinction.

Jesus Christ came to affirm the transcendent character of religion, which must never be bent to the service of human aims; and Christ founded a Church which would have charge of the religious life. Rejecting past errors and putting an end to the provisional forms of government of the Old Testament, Christ established the relationship of Church and state. His attitude is expressed in the oft-quoted answer, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." There exists, thus, an order in which Caesar, that is to say human authority, has the right to command and exact obedience. But Caesar is not God, and all mankind does not depend on Caesar. Let us be on guard not to give Christ's phrase a false interpretation.

Let us make no inference from it of an absolute separation of the two orders, which allows no connections between them. To so understand the separation would be to err, since God is not to be placed side by side with Caesar. The religious order and the temporal order, therefore, could not be simply coordinated as two distinct fields in which two different authorities exert their power without interposing on each other's domain. That indeed is the situation of Caesar before God, but not of God confronting Caesar.

To understand the relationship, we must go back further. We must consider the connection of religious activity to temporal activity, in order to see of what the intervention of the Church into that temporal activity consists.

W Mankind was created for a supernatural end, which is the possession of God in love. Humanity did not choose this end, nor can humanity attain it on its own. The end can be attained only with the gratuitous aid of God, which we call grace. This presupposes that we have received a revelation of the destination to which God has called us, of the distance separating us from it (our state of imperfection), and of the means which God has given us to make the pilgrimage possible. The end also presupposes a teaching on the means of going to God and of being united with Him (Christian morality) and a teaching on the means of acquiring the life of grace and sustaining it within us (sacraments and worship). These different ways of knowing do not come to each of us by an interior revelation; they come to us through Jesus Christ. But what Jesus has revealed, He did not entrust to a text to which we would refer as a last resort, leaving us the

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task of organizing our religious life by ourselves, individually or in groups. He founded a Church wherein He still lives, and which counsels and guides us in view of our supernatural end.

Mankind's supernatural vocation, however, does not destroy natural life. Baptism, which implants the seed of divine life in us, does not transport us into another world. Man remains prey to impervious material needs. Besides, man's intelligence goes beyond the boundary of the immediate. He is not limited like the animal to what concerns the maintenance of individual life and the preservation of the species. He feels again and again positive attractions: search for truth, beauty, social relations beyond those dictated by necessity. Thus, the whole order of culture and civilization is constituted. All of that, let us note, is incorporated in the plan of God. For God has created a world, unfinished, subject to change; He has created man, endowed with intelligence and a will, who is capable of acting on this world. The man created by God is equal to or is progressively becoming equal to the forces he must manipulate; he will, as it were, create a new world added to the one he received from God.

We see, then, that there is an entirely temporal order, which is not the eternal order; an entirely secular order which is not the religious order. The Church is not charged with constructing the temporal order. Does it follow, then, that she has nothing to say about it? This would be too hasty a conclusion.

The Church governs the Christian directly. But, as we have said before, the Christian remains human. He is the same being who leads a supernatural life and at the same time a human life, and, if one may so speak, by means of the same instruments. Faith does not have as its end the attainment of scientific knowledge, which only reason can acquire, but it nevertheless implies an element of knowledge. It is the same will that loves God and proposes to itself human ends. It is impossible to lead a Christian life and a human life at the same time without some interrelationships.

We want to see the principal points of contact between the two activities, Christian and temporal, and exactly how they justify the intervention of the Church in the temporal order. We will find a parallel in the points of contact between Church and state.

First of all, we must preserve Christian life from the danger of being completely absorbed in temporal activity. The Church will here intervene to recall for us that while it is legitimate to work for the conquest of the world, mankind, nevertheless, will find its perfection and stability only in the hereafter. The Church will invite man to remember that he is not simply an incomplete being developing in the world, but also a sinful

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being who must purify himself. This statement is not without consequences in Christian asceticism. The "question of sin" provokes the intervention of the Church.

Our temporal activity (industrial, diplomatic, family, athletic, etc.) is a free activity, in which we determine both ends and means. By that fact, it belongs to the sphere of morality; the laws of God must be observed, for God does not permit us to advance towards Him through disobedience. Family life, economic activities, national and international relations are natural activities, not directly religious, but they always have repercussions in the religious life of the one who participates in them. Thus, in the concrete, they cannot be separated from the religious order.

Inasmuch as the Church is the mistress of religious life, she is supposed to instruct us with the requirements for the preservation of our religious life. She will tell us, then, what is sinful in the exercise of temporal activities. She will forbid certain acts of the temporal order, for example, certain ways of leading family life, certain business or banking practices, certain aesthetic practices, etc. Theft, dueling, divorce, sterilization, abortion are acts placed in the order of temporal activity, but because they are sinful and destroy supernatural life, the Church forbids them.

Temporal and religious life also contact each other in the sphere of natural learning. Natural truth is dependent on the intelligence. The Church does not teach natural truth; she has not been instituted for that purpose. The intelligence, however, is fallible; it can be mistaken in whatever comes within its province. The Church has no call to rectify it. She neither can nor wishes to do so, for she is no specialist in the field. Although infallible in matters of faith and morals, the Pope is left to his own resources in all questions which involve human knowledge. But it can happen that the intelligence, mistaken with regard to its proper limits, presumes to solve a question regarding faith. The Church will then intervene, because she knows that she must teach what she alone can teach. Then she will say, "You have ventured on a ground where you are incompetent, because that ground belongs to the Church."

There is another area where the Church must intervene. Certain truths of the natural order are at the same time the necessary basis of truths of the supernatural order. If one denies them, religion disintegrates. For example, the reality of the soul, the historical existence of Jesus Christ. The Church defends these in order to protect the truth over which she has direct custody. Notice, she does not undertake a refutation of the arguments which those who deny these truths use. Leaving that task to individual initiatives, she simply says: "Such an

affirmation cannot be true because it compromises the truth of which I am the trustee." Here we see that the Church makes no encroachments on the terrain where she has no competence, but she places in security that which is confided to her.

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Granting that man is an imperfect being, there are social situations which offer conditions favorable or unfavorable to religious life. Without a doubt, it is possible to live a true Christian life in all types of society. Nothing can impede him who is determined to be a martyr. For the "perfect" every obstacle becomes a means. But the ordinary man doesn't usually rise above obstacles. Leo XIII recalled in his *Rerum Novarum* that a certain well-being is the normal condition for the practice of religion and virtue; like misery, great wealth is a danger. The Church has often repeated this theme.

Similarly, either the absence of sanctions or, on the other hand, too severe an authority in the state, professions, or family frequently leads to sin. Although these are elements of the temporal order, they have grave repercussions in the religious order. There is, then, a Christian duty to remedy these evils, according to our capacity. It belongs to the Church to remind us of this duty. She may never permit us to forget that the temporal order must not disturb the supernatural order, because the purpose of the world is the supernatural end of humanity. The temporal order must serve the supernatural order.

Because the Church knows the end of man, what his nature is, how and in what way he is tainted by sin, she must tell man what favorable conditions he must seek in the temporal order and she must trace their principal traits. For example, the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI do precisely this in regard to the social order. But in so acting, the Church does not fix by authority the concrete means of achieving favorable conditions under present circumstances. She does not possess special insights regarding these means of a technical nature. Enlightened by the Church on the goals to be attained, the Christian must study the ends and take the initiative in reaching them. The Christian must seek to the last detail a satisfactory political, juridical and economic organization. Opinions may differ in the evaluation of variable factual data, but the goal is the same: to bring about a state of affairs favorable to the development of religious life, that is to say, above all the human development. Without being guided step by step in all his actions by the Church's authority, the Christian must always act as a Christian in all his temporal activities.

Between the temporal and the supernatural, there is a rela-

tion still more intimate, because of the unity of the Divine plan. The possession of God in heaven will be the expansion of the life of grace which animates us here on earth. What we do in this life, therefore, is but a rough sketch of what we are to be someday. Now, our interior dispositions are authentic only if they are translated into acts. We cannot tolerate within ourselves contradictory dispositions which would inspire, on the plane of activity, an opposite line of conduct. Grace, therefore, which is in our souls, must inspire our entire life. We must do nothing contrary to its nature; grace must harmonize everything within us.

Grace is the possession of charity, that is, an indissoluble love of God and our neighbor; and life in heaven, where grace is expanded, will be at one and the same time union with God and union among men. We should thus try, as a rule of action in all of life, to make the earth an image as closely resembling the celestial city as possible. This should be done, not only in our individual life, but also in public life as well. In all its structures, our world should be organized in such a way that the image of the Christian ideal is reflected more perfectly. In other words, the life of charity must dominate the life of the world.

This is not utopian in meaning. The Christian must desire that all human relations and the institutions which express them reveal the greatest possible charity. So long as violence and injustice exist (that is, until the end of time), charity will require the use of force and restraint to protect rights that are menaced and to defend victims. We can neither permit the unjust and the violent to triumph, nor anarchy to rule. In certain cases, charity requires resistance to evil and punishment of the wicked. The Church never makes light of justice. Instead of resigning himself to a given state of affairs, the Christian will always try to introduce more charity into the world. He does not know how successful he will be, but he is duty-bound to work in that direction.

We could say the same thing by starting with the ideal of friendship, or better still, with the idea of communion which Our Lord conceived for His disciples—that *they be one*. Christians are not to unite only at certain times but rather in their whole life: and all organizations and all institutions which concern Christians must make this communion possible and promote it. This does not imply the abolition of any kind of hierarchy, for nothing is less “one” than a multitude with uncontrolled interests. It implies only that a Christian does not give a definitive value to any particular temporal order. He questions it, not in a spirit of anarchy, but in order to adapt it better for the goal of communion. An institution which, under

certain circumstances might have been indispensable, could become under different circumstances an obstacle to communion.

What, then, will be the intervention of the Church at this point? She recalls to us the law of charity, but she does not apply it to our life in a detailed way. This depends on too many points of fact which are not within her competency. Christians have to seek their own ways of placing charity at the service of the world. Everything which is not intrinsically evil—science, culture, industry, politics, etc.—must work towards the idea of communion in the world.

Christianity, therefore, should penetrate all temporal activity. It should orient our whole life. "Whether you eat, whether you drink, do all for the glory of God." This is the triumph of charity. A Christian, therefore, has not fulfilled his Christian duty once he has observed all the prohibitions or met all the prescriptions of the Church. He must work, according to his reason and strength, to bring about on the temporal plane the ideal of charity and community, the knowledge of which he has received from the Church.

CHAPTER X

Church and State

THE RELATIONSHIP of Church and State, a particular relationship of the spiritual and temporal orders, is all the more delicate because both powers have in one respect the same end, which is to bring to man the possession of God in love.

By State we mean a political power and authority bound up with the existence of a political society. Because it is above them, the State encompasses the family society, economic societies, regional societies, and all the others. It organizes all of them into a whole. As a natural and necessary society, the State is not something arbitrary, conventional or even optional. It corresponds with God's intention for humanity. It has, therefore, a value in the eyes of the Christian.

As we shall see in more detail, the State is of the temporal and human order, not of the religious and supernatural order, although it is a necessary condition for mankind's progress towards its eternal destiny. If this were not so, the State would be of no interest to the Christian.

On the one hand, Christianity teaches that the end of mankind does not lie in the organization of an order which finds its completion in this world. On the other hand, Christianity does not want man to think that he can possess God only by despising the temporal order and humanity. It does not ask man to be concerned exclusively in this life with his interior perfection, as though the development of humanity had no worth in the eyes of God. Mankind must tend towards God, Who will be attained only in the next life, and to attain God, man must seek his own perfection on all levels.

To leave man in ignorance, without culture, in disorder, in slavery at the hands of material forces, is not compatible with an enlightened pursuit of the Last End. This is the paradox of man, understood in a Christian manner: he must pass through the temporal order and, in part, by means of the temporal order, pursue an end which can be attained only outside the temporal order; while perfecting himself and the world, he must keep in mind an end which is not attained by his own efforts alone but with help from heaven with which he must cooperate.

With the end of man so understood, we can see why a so-

ciety which encompasses family and profession is necessary and why man himself must be organized in a political society. We cannot dispense with a political authority which is charged with sustaining and coordinating political life, demanding of the individual that he make his contribution to the whole, and preventing anyone from harming the common assembly. It would be visionary to rely on a vast, spontaneous cooperation which would need no direction or definition of obligations. A power must exist which gives orders and sees that they are executed.

Yet we have also seen that there is another society, an organization of salvation, the Church, which has charge of revealing to us our transcendent end, towards which we must tend, and of leading us there. All men are, at the same time, submitted to two powers, one political, the other religious. It is necessary to explain the relationship between these through a definition of their proper functions. (It is better to speak of *functions* rather than *domain*, for the latter gives the impression that a line of demarcation can be drawn between the two, placing on one side those acts within the jurisdiction of the Church, and on the other side, those acts relevant to the State. This is impossible.)

First, let us state the problem correctly. In the progression of man towards God, that is, in man's search for his last end, what is the function of the Church, and what is the function of the State? For the Christian, nothing has meaning or value except in relation to his last end, provided that he has concern for all that this implies. Now, the pursuit of the last end requires a specifically supernatural activity: faith in revealed truth; hope in a future life; a love of God which participates in the love God has for Himself; a love of neighbor, which participates in the love God has for us; reception of the sacraments; and observance of the laws of the Church. All of this is evidently dependent upon the Church.

Pursuit of the last end also comprises acts of the temporal order, different according to the circumstances of each: justice in transactions, fulfillment of social obligations, observance of the laws of marriage, duties towards oneself . . . These acts can be performed with a supernatural intention, as they must be, but only if they are good in themselves and conform to natural morality. It still belongs to the Church to point out those acts which can be supernaturalized and those which cannot be, and also to recall to us the intention for which they must be performed.

If we move next to the social plane, leaving aside the area of individual acts, we will find an order of human relations, determined by the laws which the political power must estab-

lish so that mankind can progress towards its last end. It belongs to the Church to say what this orientation of the temporal order must be and also what the temporal order itself must be in order that it be able to be oriented towards God. But the Church is not concerned with the details of this organization. She demands, for example, that there be an authority, but she leaves it to men to decide whether it is better to constitute this authority through a democracy rather than a dictatorship, through a republic rather than a monarchy.

The Church demands social peace, which implies accord between employers and workers, but she does not say, "You must realize peace through a labor union or a management association." The concretizing of the ideal of social peace depends, in part, upon the State, which has the obligation. (We do not say that the State must do it all itself). The power which the State has for this purpose comes from God, as does all power.

The order in society which the State establishes must assure the development of mankind according to all its virtual powers. It must aid man in his progress towards his last end by eliminating those temporal obstacles which clutter up the way. To sum up, the State must assure the common good, which is a true good and the good of all. In this way, all the people are assured of the temporal conditions necessary for their full development: human and religious, natural and supernatural.

We must insist on two points. While the State assures conditions for man's total development, these conditions are only of a temporal nature. When the country is unjustly attacked, the individual citizen must be ready to risk and even sacrifice his own life for the common good. To allow the citizen to prefer enslavement to sacrifice is to act contrary to the common good, because it is not for the good of man that he succumb to cowardice.

In the mind of the Church, the State has a temporal function but a supernatural fulfillment. It is occupied with the temporal order—which is not entirely material; yet it is necessary and legitimate that the State be so occupied, because the temporal order itself has a supernatural value which is indispensable to the end of man as Christianity understands him.

The Church has no jurisdiction over the organization of the temporal order; she does not dispose of the power necessary for this organization. God has not confided this power to her, which in no way makes her inferior, because her work is higher. The State receives its power from God. Its power has not been delegated by it to the Church. "The Prince" does not receive his mandate from the Church. The Church merely ascertains the existence or non-existence of political power; she does not confer it.

But the Church does fix limits to the power of the State, because she alone comprehends the total order, since she knows the final end. It is the Church, consequently, who determines the respective place of each of those who work to this end. When we say "The Church," we mean her doctrine, the teachings of those who interpret her doctrine authoritatively. We do not mean those men of the Church whose pretensions can be and often have been exaggerated. The State can and must defend its rights against the illegitimate interventions of certain men of the Church. In such cases, the State defends the true doctrine of the Church.

Having fixed the true limits of the State, the Church must remind the State that it does not have power over the whole of man. It must not make of itself an absolute end. It must never forget the relative and subordinate character of the order which it represents. *A fortiori*, the roles must never be reversed, nor must the Church, its doctrines and its influence be considered as means for the State to use in accomplishing its own ends.

All strong authority—and that of the State must be strong—tends to become total, to dominate entirely those who are under it in one way or another. We will not, therefore, say that the State will always consider the Church as an adversary, but it is difficult for the State not to experience a certain impatience or suspicion of the Church. The situation becomes still more delicate when men of the Church overstep their bounds and provoke the State to defend itself. Little wonder that reactions exceed their rightful limits and tempt the State to infringe upon the rights of the Church.

More particularly, the Church has charge of the religious and moral education of her members. She possesses the discernment of moral values on all subjects. She cannot allow herself to be driven back into a private life. She gives principles of social and civic morality as well as of individual morality. One of the precise teachings is that the citizen must obey the legitimate orders of the State. From this principle, the State itself has the right to fix civic responsibilities, at least in good part.

By reason of its general jurisdiction over the moral order, the Church makes judgments on certain acts of the State, but not from a technical point of view. (Is a system of taxes fitted to bring in the required resources? Is the army large enough to defend a certain area?) Her questions, rather, are of a moral nature. Is a particular ordinance of the State contrary to the moral law? This is how certain temporal acts fall within her jurisdiction.

To those citizens under her jurisdiction, namely, the baptized, the Church forbids those acts which she declares are

illicit. If any of her baptized constitute a governing body, she forbids them to command illicit actions. If they are the governed, she forbids them to carry the actions out. The Church does not address herself to the government or the governed as such, in virtue of a sort of political jurisdiction, but she addresses herself to man—to *his conscience*. She does not give man a political order, but she reminds him of a moral law. Let us not say, therefore, that the political end is attained by the Church inasmuch as it is tied to the moral end, but let us say, more correctly, that political values are attained through moral values.

The Church does not have power *over* temporal affairs, even when morality or religion are concerned, for in exercising such power, she would substitute herself for the State. She would be a kind of super-State. But the Church does have power *in* temporal matters because religious and moral values are involved. The power of the Church is exclusively spiritual and moral. There are, however, repercussions in the temporal order just because the temporal and the spiritual are not separate orders. It is always from the moral point of view that the Church approaches a question. It is not she who intertwines the spiritual and the temporal; they are necessarily intertwined in the measure that a temporal act is also a human act, and, therefore, a free act to be submitted to the moral law.

Thus the Church does not remove from power those who misuse it; she does not claim this right. We do not approve today, for example, of Pius V freeing the subjects of Elizabeth from their oath of fidelity, not simply because of the resulting evils, but because such conduct is outside the province of the Church. At the very most, we explain these acts by historical circumstances. The Church says this: "You have no right to do or command any anti-religious or immoral measures or anything that is contrary to justice or humanity." Like all citizens, Christians can try to change the existing rulers, so long as no immoral means are used. If they are unsuccessful in changing the ruling party, they must obey it in everything that is not contrary to the law of God. While the Church demands that the faithful repulse all unjust legislation and work for the substitution of just legislation, she never requires men to try to change the government itself.

How can we identify the power of the Church which we have thus far described? Generally, it is called "indirect power," which is a good expression to the extent that it rejects what is called "direct power" over the temporal, for "direct power" implies that the State is merely a delegate of the Church in temporal affairs. True, it implies that the State is a necessary delegate, but it errs in saying that the State

holds all its authority from the Church or from God through the Church.

On the other hand, the expression "indirect power" is equivocal; it has served to designate two very different theories. One of these attributes a certain temporal jurisdiction to the Church in matters where temporal and spiritual values are intertwined. We have already rejected this theory. The other theory acknowledges the power of the Church to judge, condemn and forbid to the conscience certain acts bearing on the temporal, insofar as they are sinful. This theory we hold, but because of the two confusing theories, we have not used the expression "indirect power." We must, however, recognize the ambiguity.

Should we use the term "directive power" in our explanation? This isn't a good solution, either. A "directive" is not an order. In the case just mentioned, the Church gives orders to the faithful, which are supported by the need for spiritual sanctions. They are not simply directives. Let us never confuse the exercise of the power of the Church with her "directive" power. One is a question of obedience demanded; the other, of prudence. While a directive dictated by reasons of prudence carries a true obligation, and is not something optional, still it implies a more limited obligation than an order, which demands obedience.

As a matter of fact, when an order is given by a legitimate authority, the only thing that authorizes disobedience is if the act commanded is sinful. But when it is a directive binding in the name of prudence, we are not obliged to follow it if we find good reason for thinking that the spiritual inconveniences dreaded by the spiritual authority do not exist. Such considerations are not, then, inspired by prudence, but based on facts. Even if we do not follow the directive, we must respect the authority from which it came.

It is the duty of the State to assure the common good, that is, those conditions favorable to the harmonious development of mankind and favorable, in the final analysis, to the development of religious life. This is not to say that the State must make Christians, but that the State must provide such conditions for mankind that the Church can make good Christians.

Order is a favorable and necessary condition for the orientation of man towards his last end and to the work of Christianization which the Church undertakes. Disorder cannot orientate man towards God. In a materialistic society violently divided, for example, in which injustice reigns, the work of Christianity is made difficult. The State must remove disorder, not only because of man's last end, but also because the nature of man requires it.

It is a truism that man can never be correctly understood without the help of revelation. Apart from revelation, the nature of man is misunderstood, as demonstrated by those societies which developed outside of Christian influence. In order to be guided by an authentic idea of man, statesmen must know the requirements of natural morality as the Church reveals them, for the Church is the guardian of natural morality.

Yet those statesmen and citizens who reject the authority of the Church nevertheless retain in a greater or lesser degree the idea of man which the Church has disseminated. Christianity, in this sense, has acted as a leaven which penetrates everywhere. In the measure that the doctrine of the Church penetrates society and bears fruit outside the Church does the true idea of man grow deeper and assert itself. We know that Christianity succeeded in bringing society to reject the notion of slavery. By revealing the supernatural dignity of man, the Church has led society to recognize more and more the natural dignity of man. The same holds true for the acceptance of the natural unity of mankind by society, for the Church revealed mankind's supernatural unity and its destiny to possess God in common.

Thus it is that the Church animates the work of the State by revealing new and higher demands of a human order and insisting that the State sanction them by law and assure them. Without dictating anything to the State, the Church diffuses its influence. There is no direct power here, but a leavening, Christianizing influence of the Church on the State. It brings into play no power of the Church, and yet it is the most powerful influence of all.

CHAPTER XI

Morals and Politics

ARE SOME actions bad morally but good politically? One reply links the absolute good with concern for a political organization. Thus, whatever contributes to the success of the political organization is good in an absolute sense, therefore, in a moral sense. Morality is determined by politics. For example, all that tends to establish and defend the true American order is good and praiseworthy. If the good of the State is used as a measure of the value of an act, it is because there is no value which can be opposed to the State and no value outside the State.

Let no one, therefore, ever object that "This measure, although useful to the State, is contrary to the rights of individuals," for the individual, having no human existence outside the framework of the State, cannot oppose his rights to those of the State. True, he may seek his own gain; he may progress within limits compatible with the good of the State, but he may not ask for more.

Furthermore, let no one ever object that an action, favorable to the State, is contrary to the development of civilization, for there is no civilization except in a State. Hence, no one can oppose the rights of civilization to the rights of the State. Nor may that same act be condemned in the name of religion, for the aim of religion is simply to inspire simple souls with attitudes and virtues which are useful to the State. By disciplining anarchical tendencies, religion helps make good citizens. Religion has no right to incite opposition to whatever is good for the State.

Finally, let no one bring forth the objection of a contrary right of other States. Our own country has an absolute value, because we have the means and mission to bring man to his fulfillment. If our State becomes weak or disappears, mankind is lost.

Such a theory of the absolute right of our country eliminates the possibility of a universal rule. Instead, it defines and protects the enclosure wherein true civilization flourishes. It is vain to hope to see it flourish elsewhere. The State is the protective frame which will allow for a fruition of good works.

Anything that serves to protect this framework and ward off exterior threats must be called good from every point of view, because this is the basis for the true good.

Racism gives the same answer, only from different motives. Here the supreme good is the flowering forth of the race in all its potentialities. The State is only the servant of the race. But it is the peerless servant, for the State, in the long run, forges the weapons of the triumph of the race. Whatever enables the State to serve the aims of the race is good, not only politically but simply, without restriction. Such an idea, combined with the absolute superiority of one race because of its right to command and organize the world, is the source of unlimited imperialism.

From the point of view of doctrine alone, Communism is different, since in practice the same identification of the moral and the political is professed. This is so, because it is necessary, in order to create a "state-less, class-less society," to pass first of all through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Here, anything that prepares for the triumph of the proletariat is declared absolutely good. This is the criterion of morality. Lying, terrorism, propaganda—all this is good if it leads to the desired goal. Those who perform such acts need feel no guilt, because they are making themselves useful to the cause.

As we can see, all these replies to our original question have one principle in common: absolute good, supreme value, are placed on the fulfillment of a political organization, in the broad sense of organizing the terrestrial city. The conflict between morals and politics is suppressed by re-absorbing morals into politics. All three theories—totalitarianism, racism, Communism—judge the moral value of an act according to political utility.

Because all three disregard morality, they are unacceptable for a Christian. All three contrive to command acts which we know are bad. They reduce man to a political being; they see him only as a member of a terrestrial city. Yet, if man is something more, if he has a personal destiny, a personal value, then he must perform some acts and avoid others regardless of what repercussions they have here below.

Among those who believe in an absolute moral law which binds man, whose destiny extends beyond the framework of the temporal State, some will argue that "there are some acts morally bad, because they are sins, but they nonetheless are politically good, because they are useful to the State." Hence, such things as use of fraudulent means to liquidate a debt, breaking promises, treason in foreign affairs, police action against political opponents are justified. At first glance, their answer looks obvious and reasonable. But we must go deeper;

we must discover precisely what is good politically. What is our idea of politics?

Some say that politics consists of controlling men, whether in parliamentary assemblies or in mob scenes, in order to attain desired ends, no matter what they be. Just as there are scientific techniques for handling inanimate objects, so there are techniques for handling people. When these techniques are used on the State level, we call them politics.

We reject this notion of politics. Without a doubt there is a political technique, indeed a science, or rather, an art of pulling strings, but this is secondary. It has value only when we understand the true meaning of politics.

Since the State has for its end the temporal common good, political science is above all the recognition of this common good. Political science determines what type of organization best suits mankind, all the while taking into consideration his destiny. To this idea we must add that political science is also the knowledge of how much of the ideal and perfect well-being of man is possible in given circumstances of time and place. For example, in our society monogamy can and ought to be imposed by civil law; but in the colonies of dark Africa, this could not be imposed in one fell swoop. Some measures could be adopted gradually which would safeguard the freedom of woman, defend her against certain despotic actions, and thus gradually prepare the day when monogamy could become a law. Perhaps after a great upheaval, certain radical reforms can be attempted which, in a normal period, would be more difficult. True politics will know how to profit at the propitious hour.

Thus, there are several kinds of politicians. There is the politician in the bad sense, who is prepared to control men in order to lead them to whatever he wills. There is the doctrinaire politician who wants to introduce the ideal into laws and deed without delay or preparation and who, in so doing, compromises the ideal. Finally, there is the true politician who is inspired by the true ideal of the human State as it appears at the present moment and who is aware of just what can be achieved for the time being. His gains are incomplete and temporary, but not final.

Can we say that politics, then, is the science of compromise? If we mean by compromise a search for a balance between forces and interests, the definition is not exact. Politics is not a matter of finding a solution amid the forces that are operative, but it is a question of orienting forces. But if we mean by compromise the act of searching for that ideal of human society which can be in fact fulfilled, then politics is really the science of compromise, provided that these compromises are

not considered as permanent conditions, beyond which there is no further hope.

In the political order there is a double relativity: the relativity of the ideal, which is always open to become more deep and real; and the relativity of the fulfillment of the ideal, which never quite measures up to the preconceived ideal. When the ideal becomes better known, it is more forcefully sought.

Even when the possible has been seen, the task still remains of finding the means to achieve it. This is where political technique can be applied. In this context, the technique no longer seems like an end or a means of realizing just anything at all; it now has direction; it serves to fulfill the common good, to make the ideal penetrate reality.

Under these conditions, the problem of a politically good and morally bad act is presented in an entirely different way. What the State must pursue is the common good, that is, those conditions which will permit those who depend on the State to continue their human development, conditions which, by that very fact, will be favorable to religious life. Thus, we cannot consider politically good whatever favors some to the serious detriment of others, nor whatever demands a sacrifice which is not really a sacrifice for a superior value, nor whatever flatters lower tendencies at the expense of others. For example, a work schedule which increases industrial production at the expense of the worker's health is not a political good. The true good of the State requires that man be preferred to production.

On the other hand, in the time of war or threat of war, it is politically good to ask even a painful sacrifice of the worker, just as a soldier is asked to sacrifice his life. Here, the well-being of some is not subordinated to the good of others, but the worker is asked to sacrifice his health, as the soldier sacrifices his life, for a superior value.

It is not a politically good act to flatter the indolent, to favor alcoholism or immorality in order to assure the success of a political party, even if one were certain that his party was right, politically and economically speaking. A situation would be created favorable neither to human development nor consequently to religious life.

Those acts which are classified as politically good though morally bad are in fact bad politically as well as morally, because they place the common good where it does not belong. It is always bad for a political society to be founded on injustice, violence or corruption, even if it seems to derive some glittering advantages from it.

No one benefits, not even the few in a particular way. The encouragement of selfishness in some people, the satisfaction of their ambitions, is not a real good for even the people in-

volved. To concede to some an excess of power, at the expense of others, which permits them to dominate and to enjoy a pleasure which destroys them morally, is never a real good for them. It is, likewise, an illusion on the part of a certain socialism to believe that the life of the State is improved by giving the mass of people access to all its caprices. The State will surely not thereby be more harmonious, because disorder will have become the benifice of all, if we may even dare call it a benifice. All these things are bad politically as well as morally. Whatever makes a State unjust, whatever sacrifices man to the masses, or one party to another party, whatever favors anything of an inferior order is bad politically. Let us not be deceived. All actions which are bad morally are bad politically.

CHAPTER XII

The Church and Liberty

LOUIS VEUILLOT, French Catholic writer of the nineteenth century, has been accredited with this statement: "So long as you are in power, we demand freedom from you in the name of your principles; when we are in power, we shall refuse it to you in the name of ours." No proof exists that Veuillot actually said this, but it has the merit of expressing the charge often directed against Catholics, that claiming for themselves freedom of religion and thriving in it, they are thought to be ready, on the day they feel themselves powerful enough, to deprive others of it. There would seem to be in this attitude a sort of double-dealing, i.e., the success of their cause having been brought about through freedom would mark the downfall of freedom. This duplicity is thought to be exacted by our very Catholic doctrine.

Therefore, we phrase the question in the following manner: may a Catholic who desires to be completely faithful to the Church, honestly promise that he will never do anything, even when he is able, to curtail, in a religious matter, the liberty of those who do not think as he does? May he promise it, not only for the times when the latter are strong enough to defend themselves against oppression, but even for those times when their weakness would oblige them to submit to it? This is a serious question, for if the reply is not in the affirmative, suspicion will always surround Catholics, hindering others from working with them on terms of mutual confidence; the others would always have to be prepared to balk at the enterprises of Catholics, if circumstances should seem to favor us.

Now, we are sometimes told that we cannot reply affirmatively if we wish to remain Catholics of integrity. In fact, the Syllabus of Errors, or collection of modern fallacies, which has as much as codified the doctrine of the Church on this point, forbids the affirmative reply. Do we not read in the encyclical *Quanta Cura*, which accompanies the Syllabus, that it is necessary to reject the assertion that freedom of conscience and religion is a right proper to each man, a right which should be declared and secured in every well-ordered State? And among the propositions which the Syllabus rejects, is not the following listed: "A State religion is not possible in our day." "Is this not

definite?" we are asked. "A Catholic desiring to be completely faithful to the Church cannot accept freedom of conscience; he must be partisan of a State religion, which manifestly can be only the Catholic religion."

Ecclesiastical documents, however, must be "understood." I shall not say "interpreted," for we sometimes understand by this a process which consists in ridding ourselves of an awkward text by turning it from its true sense. Let us remember, first of all, that the Syllabus is a document which assembles, under the form of propositions, a great number of condemned errors. It was sent by Pius IX to the bishops of the entire world, along with the encyclical *Quanta Cura* on December 8, 1864. It summarizes the condemnations already stated in the preceding decisions of Pius IX. It touches upon many other errors besides those which concern the relation of Church and State. Those which treated freedom of conscience, however, have been, since then, most emphasized.

To be more exact, let us say, furthermore, that the Syllabus does not present itself as an infallible document or as the equivalent of an article of faith. This means that the propositions which it contains are not heretical from the sole fact that they are listed. But it is evidently not in that direction that we shall look for a solution, for, on the one hand, the doctrine retains a great authority, and, on the other, in many points and in particular on the question which occupies us, it does no more than re-state the traditional doctrine of the Church. For us, the only question is to discover exactly what the Syllabus purports.

The problem of its real significance is not a new one. In our attempt to justify it better than others have done, we have only to take up the solution which does not betray the thought of the Church. This solution consists essentially in the distinction between what is called "thesis" and "hypothesis." The thesis is what the Church considers as the ideal situation; this would be a state of things in which a single religion is shared by all. Such a religion would be, in the sense we shall define later, a State religion. All the propositions which occupy us here develop from the *thesis*.

As for the *hypothesis*, it is an imperfect situation which we may accept and which, perhaps, we even ought to accept, given concrete circumstances. In the state of divided minds, which characterizes our modern society, we accept the situation that there is no State religion, and that the power exercised by Catholics accords freedom of conscience to all.

Since this distinction of *thesis* and *hypothesis* is accepted by the Church, a Catholic has the right to say that he does not seek to establish a State religion nor to suppress freedom of con-

science. But it still remains for us to understand the motives which inspire this attitude. We must not let it be said, in effect, that we reject what is in the thesis, or that if we believe in the principles, we do so lukewarmly, or that in practice we are guided by an opportunism designed to ward off suspicion.

If the Catholic Church distinguishes between a theory, on the one hand, in which freedom of conscience is condemned and by which a State religion is called for, and a practice, on the other hand, by which the contrary position is adopted, is she not guilty of double-talk and hypocrisy? Does she mean that her theory is for those on the inside, while the practice is addressed to those on the outside as a reassurance dictated by circumstances?

Is the Church motivated by expediency? Does she accept freedom of conscience because she herself lacks the power to do anything else? In other words, do Catholics accept the hypothesis as a necessary evil so long as they are not strong enough to do anything about it? Without hesitation, we must answer No to all these questions.

Adherence to a theory based on the existence of an ideal of truth, of an ideal which ought to be sought, and which has a value in itself, should not result in a denial of the value of the ideal. The very first requisite of our hypothesis is that, in a religious matter, nothing has value except what is free. A religious attitude cannot be imposed on a mature man because nothing would be gained except an external assent, which is not what God demands. The essential idea of Christianity (which is not found outside it) is that God asks for the heart of man, his interior obedience and his love, all of which are essentially free. Christianity has good reason for never forgetting this, for Christianity itself introduced this idea into the world and has done so precisely by separating the requirements of religion from the requirements of the State. Christianity has affirmed the freedom of the act of faith which is the basis and the foundation of religious life. It is the Christian concept of religion which is the source of the idea of a tolerance which is not based on skepticism.

Consequently, respect for the freedom of the non-Catholic is not founded on the force which the latter is capable of using against any attempt at oppression, nor on any contingent circumstances. It is founded on the very notion of religion, and therefore, on something permanent, something valuable everywhere and always, whatever the relative strength of Catholics and non-Catholics.

Perhaps we can now comprehend more clearly the following statement, which sometimes gives so much scandal: "There is no freedom of conscience." This means, first of all, that if there

is an absolute religious truth, which every Catholic admits, and if there is a revelation coming from God and a Church founded by Him, man is not free to adopt it as he pleases or where or when he pleases. It is his duty to welcome divine revelation and to enter into the scheme of salvation which God has ordained for him. In other words, man is bound in conscience to regulate his life according to truth and according to God. How could we question it if we know that there is an absolute truth, that there is a God, and that this God reveals Himself to us? So long as we do not make man the measure of truth and goodness, so long as we admit something above him, it is impossible to hold an absolute freedom of conscience. In other words, it is impossible to adopt in religious and moral life an attitude of our own choice.

Doubtlessly, everyone would agree with this. There is here, however, only a matter of freedom or of obligation of conscience towards God, whereas what is under discussion is the issue of freedom of conscience in regard to the State and the attitudes of the State towards different religions. Ought the State to ban such and such a religion, whatever happens? Should it suppress it if it can without inconvenience? The question is more delicate, but what we have already said outlines a solution.

In order to arrange the question in its proper order, let us say first of all that the State ought not to tolerate, at least absolutely and in a definitive manner, a religion which prescribes acts contrary to natural morality, for example, polygamy. Here, the State intervenes in the name of the duty which it has to make human life or the dignity of woman respected.

Beyond this, we also recognize that the division of minds in a society is in itself an evil, not only because of the different inconveniences which result from it, but also because this division, testifying in itself that a certain number are in error, is a disorder. Contrary to absolute liberalism, we must hold that this division of minds on the most vital points of life is not in itself a good. Rather, the unity of minds in the truth is the goal towards which we should work and the establishment of which we should desire.¹ If we believe, as Catholics do, that

¹ Cf. A. Vermeersch, *La Tolerance* (1912): "The thesis . . . is verified in a fully Christian society. Does that mean that it takes place more often than the hypothesis? By no means! We could even compare the thesis to an ideal whose perfect fulfillment is not of this world. But then, why speak of thesis and hypothesis? Why not simply say that it is necessary to leave it to one's circumstances to determine his attitude towards religion? This reasoning would be faulty, because we do not ac-

religious truth is in Catholicism, the ideal state of union could only be that in which all minds adhere to the religious truth of Catholicism. We are thereby led to reject that other form of liberalism which pretends that unity of minds ought to be made on a purely rational plane and that unity of wills ought to operate in the pursuit of a purely temporal good of mankind and which would create religion according to man's fancy. Here, some would seek personal consolation in religion or would find in religion the strength to accomplish their duties towards humanity; others, not feeling the need of religion, would stay away from it. These different attitudes are considered equally worthwhile and legitimate. Thus, freedom of conscience is founded on the principle that these different attitudes, religious or anti-religious, are of equal good, so long as they permit man to fulfill his temporal tasks, which fundamentally is all that really matters. There is here a profound lack of discernment.

So far as Catholics are concerned, the ideal will never be realized so long as all minds are not re-united by an adherence to the faith of the Church, so long as all wills are not united in the charity of Christ. We Catholics, therefore, consider as an evil such division, that is to say, the fact that some men are outside the Church. We believe that the Church alone can gather mankind together. If this could be achieved, there would no longer be a need for "freedom of conscience." No one would demand it, for all would accept freely to submit to God by submitting to God's sole religious authority on earth, the Catholic Church.

But, so long as this ideal to which we aspire is not realized, are we to then call upon the State to install our Church and to forbid all other religions except the Catholic religion? Please, God forbid! For what counts in religious matters, what God demands, is the homage of a free heart. Compulsion is powerless here. It would produce only a farce, which would become harmful because of the reaction it would provoke, as history offers so many examples. The demands of God and the dignity of men are completely in agreement. It is by the apostolate which addresses itself to freedom by respecting it that we seek to promote the ideal of an integrally Christian society, and we shall never use other means. If individuals, here or there,

cept with the same feeling unity in religious truth and division which keeps so many of our brethren outside the way of salvation, because compromise would not have the same value and the advantages of a peace founded on true concord, and because communion in truth is an end towards which we must tend, with prudence, without doubt, and without violent movements, but yet with consistency."

seek to use some brutal means, they are not faithful to the demands of their faith, but rather they are yielding to temptation.

It is also by proceeding from this that we shall understand the true sense of the expression which so often shocks us, "State Religion." The State religion is not only the one which would have a full juridical existence, but also one which would be officially professed by the State, which would render worship to God under the form of Catholicism. Were there ever such a nation completely rallied to Catholicism, it would instinctively demand that the State which represents her render this public worship to God. Such would indeed be an ideal situation. And in this sense, State religion is desirable. But not so today, in nations divided in their beliefs. The Catholic must not try to exact from the State a practice of such public worship. Such a worship has value only if, in accomplishing it, the State represent at least in a general sense the unanimity of the nation. In the measure in which that homage would be rendered in the name of men who disavowed it or refused to take part in it would it be worthless before God. The religion of the statesman who tries to govern according to the spirit of Christianity has value, but it is in his own name that he practices his religion, not in the name of those whom he governs and of whom a part would disavow his actions.

In this sense, again, it is necessary to understand the condemnation of the following proposition: "A State religion is not possible in our day." We must not interpret it to mean: "Despite the diversity of creeds which exists in our day, it is necessary just the same to institute a State religion." Rather, we should interpret it: "This ideal of a completely Christian society, which would demand of the State representing it a rendering in its name a public worship, is still a worthy ideal and therefore of value to our societies today." The fact that the ideal is not immediately realizable, inasmuch as conditions are not favorable, is an imperfection of our societies.

Let us note here that the idea of a State religion is worthwhile in a conception according to which the State is not only considered as a technical organization of government but also as a moral person representing the whole of the citizenry and, consequently, able and obligated to speak in their name.

In summary, in the different cases which we have envisaged, what is necessary is not to demand that the State use force to realize religious unity, but it is to work much more indirectly than directly to bring about real unity, which will express itself upon occasion in the State. This expression, to repeat once again, has value only if it is, indeed, the expression of real

unity, and it is by an apostolate exclusive of all compulsion that any real unity can be attained.

We see, then, what the Catholic can accept of the current trend of ideas which is called "Pluralism." (Only moral and religious pluralism interests us here.)

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Another question which we ought to discuss is *concordats*. The Church considers it normal today that its relations with the State be regulated by a concordat negotiated between the two parties. It condemns on principle the situation which is called "separation of Church and State," a situation in which the existence of the Church is not officially recognized, the status of the Church being at least unofficially regulated unilaterally by the State. Does this show her desire to intrude in politics? From this point of view, the expression, "separation of Church and State" is perhaps unfortunate, for it can lead us to believe that the question is solely one of separating the political domain from the religion domain.

As a power in the spiritual order, the Church has a spiritual end. But, because of the union of the spiritual and temporal in man, the spiritual action itself has a need of temporal conditions. In order to exercise her spiritual ministry, the Church has need of certain material possessions, places of worship, schools, money. . . . Obviously, it does not suffice that Catholics or members of the clergy own property merely as private individuals, but there must also be goods which belong to the diocese, the parish, the religious community, the mission. . . . There is a necessary reason, therefore, for ecclesiastical property, and it must be legally recognized and sanctioned by the State. On the other hand, while it reverts to the Church to judge what is most suitable for its mission, the State has the right and duty to see that ecclesiastical property not give away to abuses, as so often has happened in history, e.g., the wealth of the clergy in France before the Revolution, in Austria before the first World War, and in Spain before the establishment of the Republic.

There is also the School Question. The Church affirms its right to establish Catholic schools, colleges and universities. It follows that the State has a right of control on certain points, i.e., premises, hygienic conditions, civic loyalty, competence of teachers . . . There is the question of marriage which, though a religious act and a sacrament, involves civil consequences. In brief, there is a whole series of questions of interest both to Church and State.

The concordat is an agreement concluded between the State and the Holy See to regulate all these questions. (We here

take the word "concordat" in a wide sense; in reality, the concordat, properly speaking, is only the principal type of these agreements. The Holy See has also signed a different type of agreement with different States, less inclusive, which can in certain cases permit a "separation" to subsist officially. We are here only trying to set out clearly the main doctrinal lines of a subject whose details are canonical). A concordat implies, at least in a certain measure, the recognition of the existence of and the hierarchical organization of the Church. It can happen that in countries where prejudices against the Church are met, the inference of a concordat has the nature of raising hostility. The Church prefers, then, to exist precariously without a concordat. It can happen also, and it has happened, that in the hands of a distrusting or ill-disposed State, the concordat becomes an instrument turned against the Church; therefore, a breach of it could be regarded as a deliverance for the Church, so long as the Church never takes the initial step to break it. But these are accidental circumstances.

In practice, we can see rather clearly what an enlightened Catholic would demand of the State today. In the United States, of course, there is nothing that resembles a State Religion, nor is there a force being exercised in any way for the benefit of the Church. But we would demand, first of all, that there be no persecuting legislation. Above all, we must demand of the State strong and just measures which would help create an atmosphere of moral health throughout the country, in order to eliminate some of the obstacles to the spiritual life. This is not asking the State for a favor; it is a question of its duty and proper function.

We cannot demand that the State sanction at every moment the integral respect of the natural moral law, but the State should aim, by improving mores, to make this respect possible. Let us demand of the State, for example, an efficacious and prudent but energetic and sustained struggle against alcoholism, pornographic literature, prostitution, and immoral working conditions. Thus we have an immense program for action, much more useful for the good of religion than direct action in favor of the Church. The State ought to create truly human conditions of life, and thus create without ever seeking to do so a favorable field for religious action.

CHAPTER XIII

The Church and Political Power

LET US state exactly what attitude the Church asks a Christian to adopt towards political power and what attitude she herself takes as dictated by her doctrine. Without attempting either too facile a presentation or too subtle an interpretation, let us nevertheless not fail to take into account certain necessary shades of meaning.

The Church recognizes the legitimacy and necessity of political power. Seeing in it, when political power performs its duty, a means of expressing the divine will in regard to man, the Church indeed sanctions political power. Man has a social nature, which means he can attain his end only in social life. On the other hand, social life supposes authority.

Rather than say that authority is something religious, since this causes confusion, let us say it is something sacred, which demands respect. That should make us feel that the abuse of power is profanity and that disobedience is a grave matter. The Christian knows that he is obliged in conscience by the orders of legitimate authority, so long as its power remains within the limits of its proper functions. Disobedience can, without doubt, be serious or slight according to the importance of the command in question, but we must never presume *a priori* that resistance to legitimate authority is only a slight matter.

The person holding authority possesses his power only in view of assuring the common good, not for himself as his own good in order to derive benefits, honors, riches. He has authority and power to rule only in view of the common good, which is the very purpose of society. Authority is not domination over people considered as chattel. It is the power of ordering what is necessary or useful for the well-being of the very persons who are to obey. Let us reflect on the double meaning of the words "to order," which means at the same time to command and to arrange. The similarity is significant, for there is no real command unless it establish some sort of arrangement which places each person and each thing in its niche in society and which, by so doing, makes for a well-ordered society. Outside of that, there is caprice, arbitrariness, disorganization, the be-

ginnings of disorder; and the will of the one holding the power is no longer the expression of the divine Will. We can sum up by saying that the person holding power is at the service of others. His authority ought to be his means of expressing charity towards them. Like the Pope, he is "the servant of the servants of God."

This idea of power, founded on God, is most important, for it is necessary to the common good but only to the extent that it seeks the common good. It clarifies the entire conduct of the Christian in respect to power. From it we are going to draw some conclusions.

First of all, true Christian liberty derives its meaning from a notion of power based on God. True Christian liberty is not anarchy. It is not a pretext to be directly responsible to God alone, in the sense that we eliminate all human intermediaries. We do not obey a command of man as coming from man but from God Whose will is thus manifested. A human command is a symbol. True liberty destroys enslavement to caprice or egoism and follows what is deepest and most real in man. It makes man live in the image of God by conforming his will to God's, even in the realm of public life.

Hence, our first conclusion. The duty of obedience is not founded on the personal qualities of the one who commands but on his function. *A fortiori* it does not depend on any personal sympathy we may have for the man, nor on the fact that he shares our personal preferences or belongs to our political party. All the same, it is true that we should try to elect to office men who will assure moral and technical guarantees to all. Moral guarantees enable us to suppose that a person concerned with government will not use his power for himself but for the end which God has instituted for government; that he will not be blinded by his personal interest or grant reprehensible favors toward his family or friends. As for technical guarantees, they are equally indispensable, for they imply technical competence in working for the common good and understanding what is possible. There are special gifts for politicians, just as there are special gifts for artists, scholars or craftsmen. Good will is not sufficient, for we have had ample experience with men of good will who lacked competence.

It is this same idea of power founded on God, with the common good in view, which helps us understand in what sense the Church condemned popular sovereignty in the *Syllabus*. The Church does not accept the idea of a popular sovereignty which places in the people the source of authority, rather than in a man or in a party or group of men. According to this idea, whatever the people approve is good, no matter how their approbation is determined. This denies the Christian doctrine

concerning society. But the Church accepts a regime in which those who hold authority are designated by the people. She finds nothing contrary to Christian principles in this. Catholics can rally to such a democratic process if they find it more apt to assure an exercise of authority in conformity to the common good.¹

In the final analysis, the people must indeed select their leaders but not retain the authority in their own possession. They should choose whomever seems the most capable of governing for the common good. When power has once been conferred, the leader ought not consider himself a simple delegate of the people, obliged to satisfy their desires. He ought to govern for the common good.²

"I have done nothing but execute the will of the people." Is authority established only for this? Has it not also a function to guide the country? Indeed, it does, and we understand why we should not obey a government, even a legitimate one, which commands something contrary to the law of God, for it holds its authority from God, in the last analysis. To the extent that government revolts against God it loses its authority.

On the other hand, let us not oversimplify, as some do when

¹ Cf. Chastel, S.J., *Of Authority and Respect Due to It*, (1851).

"The true source, the only human source of power is the will of the nation, the formal or virtual contract between the people and the person who receives the power . . . But since all power regularly coming from that source is a laudable, useful or even necessary thing, it must come originally from God, the first Author of all that is good and useful . . . God is the first principle and the mainspring of the authority which results from it, as He is the principle and author of the rights that every legitimate contract confers. It is in this sense that theologians mean that 'all power is from God,' that the depository of power is 'the minister of God,' and that he commands in the name of God Himself. Authority, then, comes at the same time from God and men; from God originally, fundamentally; but as theologians say, mediately; from men and their assembly, immediately and formally."

² Chastel, *Op. Cit.* "The contract between the nation and the leaders is not just a vain formality nor an act without value. It creates rights for the governed: it creates some for the governors. The nation does not at all delegate the power, but it transfers and directs it to some extent, and for a stipulated length of time. The nation does not delegate assistants; she is obligated towards them as they are towards her."

they reason this way: the government is legitimate; therefore we owe it obedience in everything, without discussion. Some go so far as to say that the contrary opinion would be tainted with Protestantism. No. We must not obey any government blindly, whatever may be its form and whoever be its titular head.³ We must always be sure that what authority prescribes is not contrary to the divine law.

With regard to criticism of government, what obligations does the Church impose on the conscience of the Christian? There is a duty of criticism, but it does not have as its end to disparage those who have authored imperfect measures. Its end is to help them perfect their work of government.

In our criticism, then, we ought not judge according to our sympathies or antipathies. Nor should we take as our criterion the repercussions of the matters under consideration on our own personal interests. We shall judge only to the extent that we are ourselves competent. While it may be very easy to see how such or such a provision goes against the moral law, violates respect due to the dignity of the individual, honesty, etc., it is something much more difficult to evaluate it, especially to foresee technical repercussions. It will be useful, moreover, to recall that, to judge well, we must be impartial. Our judgment must not be influenced by passion or by any considerations other than the public welfare. If we have the duty to criticize what is bad, we must do so sanely. This is a serious and difficult obligation.

It presupposes that we rid ourselves sufficiently of egoism. We also ought to be prudent: it would be more worthwhile to refrain from criticism, even from well-founded criticism, in certain circumstances or before certain personages, if these criticisms would thereby be turned to the detriment of the common good. This is the rule to which we must always return. It requires that we do not give in to impulses but that we remain in control of ourselves.

From these remarks, it follows that obedience to authority

³ Cf. Leo. XIII, encyclical *Dieuturnum*, June 29, 1881. "If, therefore, we find ourselves reduced to this alternative, of violating either the laws of God or those of rulers . . . according to the example of the Apostles, we ought to reply: 'We must obey God rather than men.' And it would not be just to accuse those who act thus of misunderstanding the duty of submission. For the princes, whose wills are in opposition to the will and laws of God, exceed in this the limits of their power and upset the order of justice. Consequently, their authority loses its force, for where there is no longer justice, there is no longer authority."

is far from being servility. We ought to have the courage to criticize, if in our minds and consciences we judge it useful and beneficial, even though our personal interests might suffer. Nothing is more opposed to the Christian spirit and the virtue of obedience than flattery and obsequiousness.

Criticism and efforts to improve conditions affect not only law or government personnel but also changes in forms of government. While the Church does not pronounce on the comparative value of different forms of government, either in themselves or in determined circumstances of time and place, each Christian ought to form his opinion on such questions. He not only can but he has the duty to do so, for he has a responsible part in the life of his country. Moreover, he will be able to reach this conclusion—that all forms are appreciably worthwhile, but that everything depends on those who exercise authority.

The Church, however, does indicate the spirit in which criticism should be made. Here, as everywhere, the same rule of fidelity to the common good holds. We ought not to prefer a special regime because of personal advantages which we ourselves or families can draw from it. We ought not, furthermore, let ourselves be guided by mere family traditions, which may be a precious good on more than one score but which have no role to play here. Given all the concrete circumstances, it is important to see which form of government offers the most possibilities to the governing to acquit themselves well of their functions. If we conclude that the best form is other than the one now ruling, we should work for its establishment.

This is true, however, only under certain conditions. We must be sure that the upheaval which will be brought about, at least temporarily, in a change in the form of government will not work more evil than advantages. Also, immoral means, such as lying, calumny in press campaigns or violence must not be used. But we have a right to build a public opinion, as a means of rallying others to our ideas and to secure a peaceful transition from one regime to another.

True enough, Christian doctrine imposes burdensome conditions on our political action to bring a new regime into power, but its concern is morality and the public welfare only. The principles of action are the same, whether the regime be a monarchy or a republic.

The problem of insurrection is a ticklish one, much more so in its application than in its principles, which, in themselves, are simple enough. Had not Spain, in 1938, given the problem a cruel reality, insurrection would almost seem an imaginary question today.

For an insurrection to be legitimate, it is necessary, first of all, that the power against which one revolts has become what theologians say "tyrannical." That is, instead of working for the common good, the existing power acts habitually and gravely against it. Secondly, there must be no other means of remedy open than force to suppress the existing power. If other means, such as forming public opinion or passive resistance, have a chance of success, they must be used. Recourse to insurrection is an extreme measure. Also, the insurrection must offer the chance to establish a new government which will work for the common good. Insurrections are not lawful as mere reflexes of exasperation, so long as they bring merely negative results. They must not run the risk of producing evils greater than those they try to correct.

All these precautions are dictated by the demands of the common good. Everything must be weighed with prudence, and we will not entrust our interests to political intuitions, personal judgment or to the judgment of those who think as we do. Finally, it is necessary that the tyrannical character of the government and the impossibility of changing through any other means than force be recognized by different minds and not just be the opinion of one clan or party.

Nor dare we minimize the risk of the evils caused by the insurrection; they are always considerable. Certainly, it is better to bear with grave evils for some time—if that will bring the existing government to change its ways—than to resort to insurrection in an immature manner and without discretion.

The evaluation of churchmen concerning the legitimacy of insurrection in a given case does not bind the Church nor the consciences of the faithful. The Church has a doctrine which lays down in a general way the conditions for a legitimate insurrection. But to know whether or not the conditions are realized in this or that case does not come within the competence of the Church.

What Churchmen say about it, according to what information they might have, must be received with respect, even when we do not agree with it. Their attitude merits particular attention, for in their situation and given their responsibilities and position outside of any party, they have a better possibility to be impartial. Because of their religious character, we attach unrivaled importance to the opinions of Churchmen; yet it is by reason of the guarantees of the human order which accompany this religious character and not by reason of their authority that we do so.

In practice, in the face of a government capable of truly governing, whatever its origin is, one will not assume an atti-

tude of rejection and insurrection. Starting from a basic acceptance of it, we should work, if we think it necessary for the common good, to transform it from within by peaceful means. If the government decides to oppose all desired changes with violence—whether the whole of the nation or at least its most important part proposes them—then it will be difficult to avoid open conflict. To the extent that the desired changes are legitimate, the existing government will be in the wrong in opposing them. The government deviates from right order, if not legally, when it opposes such changes.

* * *

We will end our discussion with a short reflection on the attitude of the Church towards governments.


The Church, as we have said, accepts all governments which are worthy of the name, without quibbling about their origin and without scrutinizing their worth too closely. If she leaves to her children all liberty of seeking governmental changes, she does not associate herself with such attempts. She does not pledge herself to this, and she does not wish to be compromised in it. Fallen governments and their partisans feel at times some bitterness and irritation at the ease with which the Church accepts those who succeed them. They accuse her of opportunism, nay, even servility. In justice, at least to the Church herself, let us say that she does not subject herself to all regimes in succession. She remains independent of them all. She is devoted to her spiritual task and demands only of the government in power that she be left the liberty to accomplish her mission.

In regard to existing governments, they sometimes demand of the Church in exchange for liberty a measure of political support. The Church must not accept this condition. Her efforts can, without a doubt, coincide with those of the government, although on another plane she cannot place herself at its service. And if the government assures her the liberty she needs, it merely fulfills one of its essential obligations. It need not be paid for.

It does not follow from this that the Church does not render service to the government. She renders it first of all the incomparable service of forming obedient citizens, disengaged from egoism, who, even if they should some day seek to transform the existing power, will not employ disloyal means, such as lying or calumny or violence. The influence of the Church will aid all the good which the government does, but, on the other hand, it will oppose everything evil, arbitrary, unjust.

Let us repeat, the role of the Church is not to take sides with or against existing governments. It is to fulfill a spiritual

and moral task. By the same fact, without intrusion, she will help or oppose the efforts of legitimate government, and she will do this with disregard of what the government would like her to do.



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