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BALANCE SHEET 
 
 OP TUB 
 
 WASHINGTON TREATY 
 
 OF 1872, 
 
 IN ACCOUNT WITH THE 
 
 PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
 HER COLONIES. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 EIGHT HON. VISCOUNT BUBY, BIP., KCM.G. 
 
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 Hontion: 
 
 EDWARD STANFORD, 
 
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 1873. 
 
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CONTENTS. 
 
 M 
 
 Balance Sheet ''''^^ 
 
 Questions submitted to the Joint Ili.rrh Comnmsion ...."..."!'.. V 
 
 Substitution of Alabama Claims for the Original Subject .........". ..',...,.. 6 
 
 Articles I. to XL 
 
 Meeting of the Joint High Commission, 27 Februarv, 1871 - 
 
 The Alabama Claims 
 
 The New Rules ^ 
 
 Submission of Alabama Claims to Arbitration ' g 
 
 The British Apology 
 
 Articles i to u agreed to, 27 t'ebruary. 
 
 Articles XII. to XVII. 
 
 Claims, not being Alabama Claims, arising out of the Civil War, referred 
 
 to a Commission 
 
 10 
 
 Articles 12 to 17 agreed to, 15 April. 
 
 Articles XVIII to XXV. 
 The Fisheries , 
 
 Assessment of the Value of Canadian Territorial Righis" referred 't'o'a Com"- '° 
 mission 
 
 Opinions in Canada ^^ 
 
 Lord Kimberley's Answer . . ^^ 
 
 12 
 
 Articles 18 to 25 agreed to, 15 April. 
 
 Fenian Claims. 
 
 Fenian Raids of 1865, 1866, and 18 70 
 
 Exclusion of Fenian Claims from Discussion, 3 May [l 
 
 Articles XXVL to XXXIII. 
 
 Art. 26— Free Navigation of the St. Lawrence ,6 
 
 The Canadian Canals, the American Canals, and Lake Michigan .7." '.7." .*.'.' 16 
 
 Articles 26 to 33 agreed to, 3 May. 
 a2 
 
PAGE 
 
 Articles XXXIV to XLII. 
 
 The San Juan Boundary — Map showing Award of the Emperor of Germany 17 
 
 Articles 34 to 42 agreed to, 22 April. 
 
 Complete Treaty Signed, 8 May 19 
 
 Prospective Value of the Three New Rules 20 
 
 Present State of Intci national Law 21 
 
 Alteration made by New Rules 21 
 
 American View of their own Conduct with Regard to Neutrality 24 
 
 Sir Alexander Cockburn's Opinion 25 
 
 Decision with Respect to the Fisheries 26 
 
17 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 21 
 21 
 24 
 
 25 
 26 
 
 iHERE 18 a Class Of questions, which, belonging emphatically to 
 politics m the highest sense of the word, he outside tho range of 
 party disputes, and are judged by aU good citizens on grounds 
 al o^^ether separate from their party predilections. To this class 
 belongs the treaty lately concluded with the United States of 
 America. 
 
 I propose to submit to the Eoyal Colonial Institute a balance- 
 sheet, showing on one side the profit, and on the other the loss 
 accruing from this Treaty to the people of Great Britain and of her 
 I'opendencies. 
 
 It cannot be wise, it cannot be patriotic, to exaggerate any ad- 
 vantages we may have obtained, or to extenuate concessions we 
 ii.ve been obliged to make-we should try to strike an honest 
 balanc^ between the two. Allow me, having said so much by way 
 of preface, to take the protocols of the conferences of the Joint 
 High Commission as my text, and to make a running commentary 
 on the various clauses of the Treaty. 
 
 The questions placed before the Joint High Commission were- 
 (1.) I he Fisheries. 
 (2.) The Navigation of the St. Lawrence, and privilege of 
 
 passing through the Canadian Canals. 
 (3.) The Alabama Claims. 
 (4.) Claims of British subjects arising out of the War but 
 
 having no reference to the Alabama Claims. 
 (5.) The claims of the people of Canada on account of the 
 
 -t enian raids. 
 (6.) The revision of the Rules of Maritime Neutrality 
 
 ment o? thrJ^^^' correspondence which preceded the appoint- 
 ment of the Joint High C.)mmission, we shall see that the Enghsh 
 Cxovernment did not at first propose to include the Alabama Claims 
 among the matters to be referr^ ^ ^0 the Commission. Our Minister 
 at Washington, Sir Edward Thornton, in his letter to Mr. Fish, with 26 Ja. 1871 
 
6 
 
 30 Jan. 1871. 
 
 1 Feb. 1871. 
 
 3 Feb. 1871. 
 
 which the correspontlence commcncotl, proposed that a Joint High 
 Commission should be appointed, " to treat of and discuss the mode 
 of setthng the different questions whicli have arisen out of the 
 Fisheries, as well as those which affect the relations of the United 
 States towards Her Majesty's possessions in North America." 
 
 This sentence, very cautiously worded, is obviously intended to 
 mean the Canadian Claims for Fenian raids, and the disputes 
 which had arisen respecting Canadian Fisheries ; and it was these 
 questions alone that the British Government was in January, 1871, 
 prepared to discuss. 
 
 Mr. Fish, in his reply, shows plainly that this was the im- 
 pression left upon his mind by Sir Edwnrd Thornton's letter. 
 He saw that a discussion of the Fenian Claims was by no means to 
 be desired by the United States ; he therefore evaded the attack, 
 and while he agreed to the appointment of a Commission, ho took 
 occasion to add that the main subject in dispute between England 
 and America was the Alabama Claims. 
 
 Sir Edward Thornton answered in effect — " Very well, we will 
 agree that the Alabama Claims shall be discussed ; but do not 
 forget that it is part of the bargain that the Canadian grievances 
 shall bo adjudicated upon." Mr. Fish saw his advantage : Sir 
 Edward Thornton had been induced to treat the Alabama Claims 
 as the principal subject to be submitted to the Commission. Mr. 
 Fish was therefore careful to do the same. It was only parenthe- 
 tically, at the end of his reply, that Mr. Fish says, "' With reference 
 to the remaimler of your Note, the President desires me to say that 
 if there be other and fnrthrr claims of British subjects or of American 
 citizens, .... he (the President) assents to the propriety 
 of their reference to the same Commission." 
 
 Thus, at the very outset of the discussion, we were diverted from 
 our purpose. We proposed a Commission to decide Canadian 
 grievances, and it was straightway settled that the main subject of 
 discussion should be the Alabama Claims ; and, further, Mr. Fish 
 successfully paved the way for a refusal on the part of America to 
 discuss the Fenian Claims at all. No reply was sent to Mr. Fish, 
 ,11 Feb. 1871 his view was taken for granted, and within a week Lord de Grey 
 and Mr. Bernard were on board the Cunard steamer bound for New 
 York, to deal as they best might with the diplomatists of Washing- 
 ton, leaving Sir Stafford Northcote to follow by the next steamer. 
 
 I have insisted upon this point — the change of the subject origin- 
 ally proposed — because it is one of much interest to the Colonial 
 Institute. The original subject proposed for consideration was a 
 Canadian grievance. Far from obtaining satisfac^jion for that 
 
t,n-ievari('0, it was not even discussed, and in ilie end Canada was 
 called upon to pay the principal part of the price demanded for 
 such advantages as were gamed by England under the Treaty. 
 
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 The Alabama Claims. 
 
 The liistory of the question which thus hecame the main topic 
 of discussion by the Joint Commission will be fresh in the minds of 
 every member of the Colonial Institute. The American Civil War 
 broke out in 1861, and lasted four years. The victorious Nortli 
 and tJie conquered South had no sooner made up their quarrel and 
 become once more the United States of America, than they cried 
 loudly before the world that they had been aggrieved by England. 
 The reality of the grievance was at first denied, and redress was Lord Russell, 
 somewhat haughtily refused but as time wore on the attitude of '^^ •'^^S- '■^^5' 
 refusal gave -phwe to one of at( 'ution, and attention was succeeded 
 by an intimation that we wrc willing to negotiate. 
 
 Successive British Ministries tried their hands at negotiation. 
 A Treaty was concluded, w^hich was known as tli3 Clarendon- 
 JoliJison Treaty, but the American people indignantly refused to 
 ratiiy it. Mr. Reverdy Johnson, then Minister of the United States 
 at tJie English Court, was rt'^-alled, and the Treal^y itself was re- 
 jected by the Senate with every mark of scorn. England having 
 once changed her tone, quickly ran through the whole descending 
 gamut from arrogance to the extreme of conciliation ; and when 
 the Embassy of Lord de Grey was despatched, the English people 
 were heartily tired of the Alabama Claims, and were prepared to 
 submit to g' jat sacrifices rather than leave a matter so troublesome 
 in abeyance any longer. 
 
 Perhaps Lord Derby was too severe in saying, as he did in the 
 House of Lords, that " a mission so sent out, wdth such unusual 
 pomp and ceremony, was bound, under penalty of making itself 
 ridiculous, to conclude a Treaty of some sort." Without going so ^- ^J^f^Sf'' 
 far, the Treaty itself and the text of Lord Granville's Despatch 
 clearly show the nature of the Instructions given to the High 
 Commissioners. 
 
 From the first meeting of the High Commissioners it became 
 apparent that all other matters referred to the Commission were 
 considered by both parties subordinate in importance to the 
 Alabama Claims. 
 
 The High Commissioners met on the 27th February, 1871, and 
 sat almost daily until the 14th March, when they adjourned for 
 three weeks, in order to allow the British Commissioners to com- 
 
8 
 
 N. America, 
 No. 3, 1871, 
 p. 4. 
 
 '7. America 
 •To. 3, 1871 
 ►. 10. 
 
 municate with their Government on a question of the greatest 
 importance ; it was as follows : — 
 
 Lord Granville, in his Instructions, had told the Commissioners 
 that " it would be desirable to take this opportunity to consider 
 whether it might not be the interest of both Great Britain and the 
 United States to lay down certain rules of international comity in 
 regard to the obligations of maritime neutrality, not only to be 
 acknowledged for observance in their future relatijus, but to be 
 recommended for adoption to the other maritime Powers," 
 
 The American Commissioners were not, however, satisfied with 
 this concession. They insisted that certain new rules of Inter- 
 national Law should be agreed to by both parties, and made retro- 
 spectively applicable to the facts in respect of the Alabama Claims. 
 A demand so startling was necessarily referred to the English 
 Cabinet. Events have proved that the results of the whole arbi- 
 tration depended upon the decision arrived at by that body ; and, 
 indeed, it is not easy to avoid the influence that the Cabinet, in 
 acceding to the American demand, rather courted than endeavoured 
 to avert an adverse decision of the Arbitrators. If, as is very 
 generally supposed, the main object of the Commission was to 
 invent a graceful pretext for terminating a wearisome dispute by 
 a moderate money payment, the reason of tlie concession was 
 sufficiently obvious, and, indeed, if that had been its only result, 
 few Englishmen would have refused their assent to it. Be that as 
 it may, on the 5th April, when the High Commission re-assembled, 
 the plenipotentiaries were able to announce that Her Majesty's Go- 
 vernment would accept the new rules, and would agree that they 
 should be retrospective in their action, adding, by way of protest, 
 that Her Majesty's Government could not admit that the now 
 rules correctly stated the principles of international law which 
 were in force when the Alabama Claims arose. 
 
 The American negotiators had one more point to insist upon . 
 They had obtained the postponement of the subject which was 
 originally to have been the main subject of the Commission. 
 They had obtained a Declaration that their new rules (which no one 
 pretended to be in accordance with international law) should be 
 held good international law both in the future and in the past ; it 
 was now absolutely certain that by their aid arbitration would 
 go against Great Britain. It only remained to reiterate their 
 demand for an apology. Accordingly on the following day " The 
 American Commissioners, referring to the hope which they had 
 expressed on the 8th March, inquired whether the British Com- 
 missioners were prepared to place upon record an expression of 
 
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 regret by Her Majesty's Government for tlio depredations com- 
 mitted l)y the vessels whoso acts were now under discussion ; and 
 the Britisli Commissioners repUed that they were authorised to 
 ex])ress, in a friendly spirit, the regret felt by Her Majesty's 
 Government for the escape under whatever circumstances of the 
 'AluJioina,' and other vessels from British ports, and for the de- 
 predation-^ committed by tliosn vessels." This apology was forth- 
 with embodied in the Treaty, where it occupies the post of honour 
 at the beginning oi" Article 1. 
 
 It is a disagreeable task to dwell upon this point. On the 8th 
 March the Britisli Commissioners stated that " Her Majesty's 
 Government could not admit that Great Britain had failed to dis- 
 charge towards the United States the duties imposed on her by the 
 rules of international law, or that she was justly lia1)lo to make 
 good to the Unit(}d States the losses occasioned l)y the acts of 
 cruisers to which the American Coin;uissionors had rofci-red." 
 
 Surely tlie position of England had not changed for the worst 
 between the Btli March and the 13tii April. If the refusal 
 of an apology on the 8th March was right, it was wrong to make 
 an apology on the 13th April. 
 
 A national expression of regret is an act of tlie gravest im2)ort- 
 ance. If England had been clearly in the wrong, an expression of 
 regret would have been consistent with her dignity ; but it has 
 not Idtherto been usual for nations of tlie highest rank to apolo- 
 gise for acts which thuy never committed. The same Englishman 
 who ottered the apology framed the British case : the case is an 
 elaborate stateuient that England was in the right. It is hard to 
 escape from this dilemma : either the apology was unnecessary, 
 or the English case was a tissue of mis-statements. It is beside 
 the question to say that the Award has proved us to be in the 
 WTong— the Award did no such thing — we w^ere tried by the three 
 new rules, and not by international law, the Geneva Arbitrators 
 expressly said so. 
 
 I am aware that this matter presents itself in a ditferent form 
 to some minds. The destruction of American commerce, which 
 undoubtedly took place during the w:ir, is in fact a matter of regret 
 to all Englisliinen ; and it is s;iid tliat the expression of a regret 
 so generally felt could not be inijiroper. We canniU, however, 
 forgot that the destruction of that commerce was the work 
 of enemies with whom the United States were at war, and 
 that the unfair complicity of England with those enemies was 
 actually the very matter which was to be referred to arbitration. 
 The past history of the question must also be borne in mind. It 
 
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 10 
 
 must be remembered that it had been persistently said in America 
 that no settlement of the Alabama Claims would ever be satis- 
 factory which did not include an ample apology from England. 
 The way iu which the American High Commissioners returned to 
 the subject, when the main points had been decided according to 
 their views, shows that mortification to the pride of England was 
 the object aimed at. 
 
 Keferrino to Claims both of British and American Citizens 
 
 (not being Alabama Claims). 
 
 On the 15th April, two days after the conclusion of the 
 Alabama Articles of the Treaty, the High Commission agreed 
 upon the manner in which " other claims arising out of acts com- 
 mitted during the Civil War and not referable to the cruisers." A 
 Commission for the consideration of these claims was appointed, 
 and it was agreed that the Convention of 1853 should be followed 
 as a precedent. These Articles, from 12 to 17, do not call for any 
 remark at present, except that the P'enian Claims, which, would 
 have here come in in logical sequence, were not brought forward 
 by the British Commissioners. 
 
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 The Fisheeies. Articles 18 to 25. 
 
 The subject dealt with by these Articles has long been a matter 
 of dispute. Fourteen years ago I brought it before the House of 
 Ooinmons. It had then been a matter of controversy for nearly 
 150 years — siuce the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713— and when tlie 
 High Commission met at Washington, we Wv >*e wrangling over it 
 more fiercely than ever. Our quarrels used p. icipally to be with 
 the French— of late vears thov have been -with .^'C Americans. 
 G Jan. 1871. We have already seen that wlien tliis Commission was proposed 
 by Sir Edward Thornton to Mr. Fish, the larger question of the 
 Alabama Claims was substituted for the original subject, and the 
 Fisheries assumed in the minds of the Joint High Commission a 
 position of secondary importance. 
 
 The matter in dispute is shortly this : — When Lord Elgin 
 concluded the Reciprocity Treaty in 1854, the American fishermen 
 obtahiod leave to fish iu some parts of the British-American 
 waters from wliich they had before been excluded by Treaty. For 
 several years they enjoyed this advantage, and naturally came to 
 look upon it as a right. Every one who lias seen the rough fisher- 
 men of Connecticut, of Maine, of New Brunswick, and Newfound- 
 land at their w^ork, must know that they are a class of men with 
 
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 whom abstract rights would liave very little weight, unless they 
 were hacked by physical force. Tlie employment of physical force 
 means quarrels and collision, wJiich could not fail ultimately to 
 produce bad blood, and possibly involve the Governments concerned 
 in hostilities. The enjoyment of the Fisheries by the Americans 
 under tJie Reciprocity Treaty was balanced by certain tariff con- 
 cessions of which British North America had the advantaw. 
 But whea *-he fiscal necessities or the prejudices of the Americans 
 caused the n to put an end to the Reciprocity Treaty, their fislier- 
 niLUi wore deprived of a riu:ht of lishing to wliich tliey had become 
 accListomed, and wjro composed, as far as law could compel 
 them, to content themselves witli rights acquired under former 
 Treaties, The disagreeable but almost inevitable consequence 
 was that the Americans began to strain the Treaty of 1818, and 
 to discover that under it they had rightK to which the British were 
 by no means prepared to admit. Certain arrangements were made 
 by Canada by which license to fisli was granted to American vessels, 
 but it was obvious that this could only be a temporary expedient. 
 The matter was more pressing every year, and at last it became abso- 
 lutely necessary to effect the settlement of a question which might 
 at any moment involve tlje two nations in war. This was the 
 condition of affairs in June, 1870 — about a year before the appoint- 
 ment of the High Commission. The Canadian Government then 
 despatched to England the lion. jMr. Campbell, Postmaster-General 
 of the Dominion, and leader of the Senate, in order to press on 
 Her Majesty's Government the necessity of securing, with as little 
 delay as possible, the restoration to Canada of the rights wdiich she 
 enjoyed prior to the Reciprocity Treaty. The Canadian Committee 
 of Council, in writing to Lord Kiml)erley, say that they "cannot con- 
 ceal their apprehension that if the citizens of the United States are 
 any longer permitted, as they have been doing for the last four 
 years, to fish iji waters where, according to our interpretation of 
 the Treaty of 1818, they are trespassers, it may be difficult to 
 obtain an amicable solution of the point in dispute." L"rd 
 Kimberley at once promised that they would propose a joint 
 British and American Commission, on which the Dominion should 
 be represented, to settle the geographical limits of the exclusive 
 fishing rights of Canada under the Treaty of 1818. 
 
 Before the Joint Commission commenced its labours, Lord is Feb. 1871. 
 Kinil)erley wrote as follows to the Governor-General of Canada: — 
 "As at present advised. Her Majesty's Governmert are of 
 opinion tliat the right of Canada to exclude the Americans 
 from fishing in the waters within the limit of three marine 
 
12 
 
 •; I 
 
 % 
 
 miles of the Coast is beyond dispute, and can only be ceded 
 for an adequate consideration. Should this take the form of a 
 money payment, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that 
 such an arrangement would be more likely to work well than if any 
 conditions were annexed to the exercise of the privilege of fishing 
 within the Canadian waters. The pre.ience of a considerable 
 number of cruisers would always be necessary to secure the per- 
 formance of such conditions, and the enforcement of penalties for 
 the non-observance of them would be certain to lead to disputes 
 with the United States." The position taken up by Lord Kimber- 
 ley was, as we see by this letter, a very intelligible one. He was 
 of opinion that riglit was on the side of the Canadians, but that it 
 was a right very difficult of assertion. 
 
 Wliou the Joint Commission took up the subject of the Fisheries, 
 the British Commissioners proposed that the Eociprocity Treaty of 
 5tli June, 1854, sliouldbe restored. This proposal was peremptorily 
 declined, and an American counter proposal was made, that the 
 value of the inshore fisheries should be ascertained, and the right 
 to use them in common witli the British fishermen purchased by 
 tlie United States. Failing all attempts to persuade the American 
 Commissioners to modify their tariff arrangements, it was ulti- 
 mately decided that free fish and fish oil were to be admitted 
 fi-ee of duty in the American ports, and that a Commission was to 
 be appointed to determine the amount, if any, to be paid by the 
 Americans for joint proprietary rights in the inshore fisheries of 
 Canada. 
 
 As soon as this arrangement was known in Canada, it produced 
 great excitement. The Canadians pointed out that the cession of 
 territorial rights involved in the Treaty had never been contempla- 
 ted by Canada, and would never be conceded by her Legislature. 
 They declared that even the widest American interpretation of the 
 Treaty of 1818 would not have placed them in such a forlorn 
 position as that which wa;; absolutely accepted by the Treaty, and 
 they plainly intimated tliat the clauses of the Treaty affecti 
 Canada were too distasteful to the great body of the people to afford 
 any ground of hope that they would be accepted. The Earl of 
 Kiuibcrley could only reply that, "looked at as a whole, Her 
 Majesty's Government considered the Treaty as beneficial to the 
 interests of the Dominion ; " and he contended that free fish and 
 fish oil, together with a money payment, to be assessed by the 
 Convention, would, in fact, ho an equitable solution of the difficulty. 
 
 The real point, however, was that however just the Canadian 
 position might bo, the British Governmcut could not under- 
 
1:3 
 
 tiike to maintain it. As Lord Kiniberley liad in'cviously said, 
 on tlio ITtli Juno, " the causes of tlio dilHculty lay deeper 
 than any question of the interpretation of Treaties, and the 
 mere discussion of such points as the correct definition of 
 Bii} couhl not lead to a really friendly agreement with the 
 United States;" and again, on the 2Gth of February, 1871, 
 " The exclusion of American tishormen from resorting to Canadian 
 ports, ex('0])t for the purpose of shelter and of repairing damages 
 thoi-i'in of purchiising wood and of obtaining water, might be 
 warranted by the letter of the Treaty of 1818, and by the terms of 
 the Imperial Act, 50 George III. cap. 38 ; but Her Majesty's 
 Government feel bound to state that it is inconsistent with the 
 general policy of the Empire." 
 
 In fact, to put the matter into plain language, the Imperial 
 Government were constrained to appeal to the loyalty and self- 
 devotion of the Canadians to sacrifice their wishes and their rights 
 to the necessities of Imperial policy. 
 
 The Canadians nobly responded to the appeal. Whatever, as 
 citizens of the great Empire to which the inhabitants of these 
 islands and of the Dominion alike belong, we may think of the 
 reasoning of Lord Kiniberley (and I am bound to say that it is 
 difficult altogether to withhold one's assent to it), it is impossible 
 to look without admiration at the self restraint exhibited by our 
 Transatlantic fellow subjects, and at the cheerful way in which 
 they accept a heavy share of the burden imposed by our joint 
 nationality. 
 
 But this was not the only sacrifice imx:)osed upon the Canadians. 
 
 Canadian Claims on Account of thp: Fknian Kaids. 
 
 It was not till the !2Gth April that the British Commissioners 
 found themselves at liberty to bring before the High Commission 
 the claims of the people of Canada for injuries suffered from the 
 Fenian raids. The Americans having ah'eady obtained all they 
 wanted, peremptorily refused to enter upon the subject. Upon 
 this the British Commissioners referred the matter to their Govern- 
 ment, and on the 3rd May the British Commissioners gave up the 
 point. 
 
 It might not unnaturally be supposed that the claims thus easily 
 given up by the British Plenipotentiaries came within the scope of 
 the new rules devised by tlie Americans, and applied at their 
 instance to the conduct of England. It was but three weeks since 13 April 
 tlie new rules had been solemnly embodied in the Treaty. Were 
 the new principles of international law to be good only as against 
 
14 
 
 England, and not good as against the United States ? A short sur- 
 vey of the facts will eua])le us to answer the question. 
 British Conn- Several societies of Irishmen, based upon the sentiment of 
 I ^^er Case, p. 10. iiQj.t.ility to England, were formed in America. The earliest was 
 
 ijj called the " Irish Republican Union," but we need not notice any 
 
 other until the " Fenian Brotlierhood " was established at Chicago 
 in November, 1805. The Chicago meeting was attended by 300 
 
 {Ij delegates representing " circles," including twelve from military 
 
 and naval circles. At the second annual congress of this society 
 the President declared that they were " virtually at war with 
 
 ' 1 , England." In October of the same year Fenian Bonds were issued, 
 
 '; and an " Irish Republic " was established at New York, with a 
 
 President, Senators, a Secretary of the Treasury, a Secretary of 
 
 • War, and other officials. 
 
 As a measure of precaution against the constantly-expressed 
 
 threats of this body, the Canadian Government were obliged to call 
 
 out nine companies of Militia, and to station them on the Frontier. 
 
 i Early in 1800, meetings were held at which it became evident 
 
 I , that the Fenians-: were on the eve of some great aggression. War- 
 
 , * like stores were purchased, and large contracts made. The 
 
 American papers reported the proceedings at the meetings, and 
 1866. the Xciv York Wurld, of March 5, concluded an article with the 
 
 * plain words, " if they really moan war, if, as is given out, they 
 contemplate the invasion of Canada, this is a serious business, 
 which challenges the thoughtful attention of all Irishmen and all 
 
 ; American citizens." On the 7th March the Canadian Executive 
 
 ' called out 10,000 Canadian Volunteers, but it was not till the end 
 
 of May that the Fenian preparations were complete. On Friday, 
 1st June, a body of Fenians, between 800 and 900 strong, crossed 
 the frontier from Buffalo to Fort Erie, and on the following day 
 came into collision with the Canadian Volunteers from Fort Col- 
 borne. Reinforcements soon arrived to the assistance of the 
 Canadians. Sixty-five prisoners were taken, and the remainder 
 recrossed the Frontier, where they were taken prisoners with 
 O'Neill, their leader, by the United States authorities. The stores 
 of arms which the Fenians had provided were also seized by the 
 Americans. Here was a hostile force fitted out on American soil 
 for the invasion of a friendly State. Their leader, with his stores 
 and many of his men, were in the hands of the American authorities. 
 What did they do ? The President iss ed a proclamation against 
 similar expeditions in future, but on the very day that the procla- 
 mation was issued, the Fenian leader, O'Neill, was released from 
 custody, and before the end of the year, the arms and other war- 
 
 I 
 
i 
 
 and 
 
 i 
 
 war- 
 
 16 
 
 like stores were restored by the Ainerieaus to the Fenians. In 
 addition to this the House of Representatives passed resohitions 
 urging the United States authorities to demand the release of the 
 men wlio were taken by the Canadians, and to stop all prosecutions 
 pending in the United States Courts against Fenians. 
 
 In this raid one officer and six privates of the Queen's Own 
 Volunteer Rifles were killed, and four officers and twenty-seven 
 men were wounded. 
 
 In 18GG a renewal of the attack was threatened, and a cam^, of 
 Volunteers was formed in Canada at an expense of Ji?80,000. In 
 18(37 the Fenians were engaged in promoting disturbances in 
 England and Ireland ; it was therefore not till 1870 that they were 
 ready to undertake a new invasion. O'Neill was again at their 
 head ; arming and drilling went on openly in the United States ; 
 and so iunninent was the dimger that the Canadian Executive 
 obtained leave to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, and to call out 
 a force for the defence of the Frontier. The attack was made on 
 two points at once, but the Fenians, who uniformly wore as 
 cowardly as they were mischievous, fled in disorder as soon as tlioy 
 were confronted. They crossed the American Frontier, and were 
 taken by the United States authorities. Thirteen tons of arms are 
 said to have been seized, and the prisoners were tried in the United 
 States Courts and condemned. Tliev all, however, two months 
 later, received an unconditional pardon from the President. 
 
 Within a year after his release O'Neill made another raid across 
 the Frontier, but was this time stopped by the United States 
 troops. He received no punishment, as he was said not to have 
 committed any overt act. 
 
 Thus in the four years preceding 1871 the Canadian Government 
 was three times obliged to call out its troops. Besides maintaining 
 camps for months at a time, there was a heavy expense to the 
 country in pens.ons, gratuities, and payments of claims arising out 
 of the raids, as well as a serious charge on the Treasury for sum- 
 moning the Volunteers, and the hindrance to industry, especially 
 in 180G, by disturbance of the country at a season of the year when 
 agricultural pursuits were in full operation. 
 
 It was only natural that the Canadian Government should be Enclosure in 
 liitierly disappointed at the non-settlement of these claims. They N0.8.C. April, 
 pointed out that the Fenian organisation was still in full vigour, 
 and that there was no reason to suppose that the American 
 Government will do its duty better in the future than in the past. 
 They state that Her Majesty's Government had never energetically 
 pressed the Government of the United States to perform its duty ; 
 
li! 
 
 h.i I 
 
 16 
 
 " on the contrary," they say, " while in tlie opinion of the Govern- 
 ment and of the entire people of Canada, the Government of the 
 United States nef^lected, till much too late, to take the necessary 
 measures to prevent the Fenian invasion of 1870, Her Majesty's 
 Government hastened to acknowlodife by cable telegram the prompt 
 action of the President, and to thank him for it." 
 
 To this Lord Kimborley's answer was that they had no choice, 
 but either to abandon the Treaty or relinquish the claims ; the 
 Americans declined even to discuss the question " and," writes 
 Lord Kimberley, " when the choice lay betw^een the settlement of 
 all the other differences between the two countries on terms which 
 Her Majesty's Government believed to be honourable to both, and 
 beneficial alike to Canada and the rest of the Empire, and the 
 frustration of all hope of bringing the negotiations to a satisfactory 
 issue, they could not hesitate as to the course which it was their 
 duty to take." 
 
 Free Navigation of the St. Lawrence, of the Canadian and 
 American Canals, and of Lake Michigan. 
 
 The Fenian Claims were surrendered, as I said, on the 3rd May, 
 but before that time the Articles 2G to 33 of the Treaty were under 
 discussion. Those Articles referred to the navigation of the St. 
 Lawrence and of the Canadian and American canals which connect 
 t]ie great lakes with the sea. Failing to obtain the restoration of 
 the Reciprocity Treaty (which the Americans refused on grounds 
 which we cannot quarrel with, however much we may disagree with 
 them), the Articles 26 to 83 call for no especial remark. There is, 
 however, in the Protocols a paragraph which any one who is duly 
 imbued with tlie traditional policy of American diplomacy may well 
 regard with dismay. 
 
 " The British Commissioners stated that they regarded the con- 
 cession of the navigation of Lake Michigan as an equivalent for the 
 concession of the navigation of the St. Lawrence ; " and the Ameri- 
 cans replied that in their opimou " the citizens of the United 
 States could now justly claim to navigate the river St. Lawrence 
 in its natural state, and they could not concede that the navigation 
 of Lake Michigan should be taken as an equivalent of that right." 
 Now this is a new assumption altogether on the part of the Ameri- 
 cans, as may be easily seen by the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. 
 Article 3 of that Treaty admitted certain products of Canada and 
 the United States reciprocally free. Article 4 conceded on the part 
 of the Americans the rigjit to Great Britain to navigate Lake 
 Michigan as long as the free navigation of the St. Lawrence should 
 
 1 
 
 A. 
 
17 
 
 continue, and Great Britain on her part conceded the free naviga- 
 tion of the St. Lawrence. It was further decided that if Great 
 Britain should suspend this privilege, the Americans should stop 
 uot only the navigation of Lake Michigan but th'j Free Trade 
 Article No. 3 as well. Not only then in 1854 the exclusive right of 
 Great Britain to navigate the St. Lawrence was exiilicitlij acknow- 
 ledged, but as tliJit right was balanced against the navigation of 
 Lake Michigan and the Free Trade Article No. 3, the British right 
 of exclusive navigation was implicith/ valued at a very high price. 
 The Article 20 of the Washington Treaty, therefore, ceding to 
 the United States the joint right to navigate the St. Lawrence, 
 
 ■^ with no other equivaleat than the tree navigation of three rivers in 
 Alaska — which few persons have even so much as heard of — may 
 fairly be put down on the debtor side of the account between the 
 Treaty and the people of Great Britain. 
 
 ji| The remaining Articles with regard to internal navigation do 
 
 " not call for special remark. 
 
 Articles 34 fo 42 (agreed to 22nd April). 
 The San Juan Boundaey. 
 
 I now come to the San Juan Boundary. This matter haa been 
 for many years in dispute, and, as we all know, has unfortunately 
 been settled against us by the Arbitrator appointed under the 
 Treaty. But whether the decision be or be not satisfactory to us 
 it cannot be laid to the j,ccount of the Treaty now under discus- 
 Bion. The San Juan Water Boundary was agreed upon by the 
 first Article of a Treaty made in Jime, 1846, but the British and 
 American Commissioners appointed for its demarcation differed, 
 and it was never decided. The decision of the dispute was pro- 
 posed by Lord Russell as a fit subject for arbitration in 1859, but, 
 owing to the Civil War, the negotiations were not brought to a 
 conclusion, and it was not until 1869 that a convention was signed 
 by Lord Clarendon and Mr. Reverdy Johnson for referring the 
 matter to an arbitrator. That Treaty was, however, never ratified, 
 and the true interpretation of the Treaty of 1846 still remained in 
 dispute when the High Commissioners assembled at Washington, 
 
 The Treaty of 1846 defined the boundary on the West Coast as 
 follows : — 
 
 •* The line shall be continued westward along the said 49th 
 parallel of north latitude to the middle of the Channel which 
 separates the Continent from Vancouver Island, and thenoe 
 southerly through the middle of the said Channel and of Fuoa 
 Straits to the Pacific Ocean." 
 
"t" 
 
 1 
 
 I' 
 
 ll I' 
 
 li 
 
 t . 
 ' I 
 
 IS 
 
 Unfortunately, the "middle" of the said channel is filled by 
 small islands, so that instead of one channel down the middle of 
 which the boundary mit^ht run, there were several channels, 
 neither of which could bo called tif cliannol, because tlicre were 
 other channels : and the channel which most nearly corresponded 
 geographically to the words of the Treaty was obviously not the 
 channel, for no navigator who had his choice ever used it. The 
 plain fact was that the negotiators of the Treaty of 181G had either 
 imperfect maps or no maps at all, and their agreement could not 
 be literally carried out. 
 
 The Americans claimed to iiave the lino run through the Western 
 or Haro Channel, which would give to them the Island of San 
 Juan. The British contended that tlie possession of Vancouver 
 Island carried with it the possession of the adjacent islands, and 
 80 claimed to have the Eosario Channel declared the channel under 
 the Treaty. They also contended, with perfect accuracy, that the 
 Haro Channel was not known at the time the Treaty was made ; 
 therefore, the Rosario Channel was thu channel under the Treaty. 
 
 The American negotiators led off with a bold shot — one whose 
 magnificent audacity has really not been properly appreciated. 
 They proposed to abrogate the whole of the Treaty in so far as it 
 related to boundaries between the United States and British 
 America, and re-arrange the bound^.ry line which was in dispute 
 before that Treaty was concluded. 
 
 Imagination pauses aghast before the magnificent spectacle : 
 Over four thousand miles of coterminous frontier between Great 
 Britain and the United States, without a landmark or a Treaty 
 definition ! One involuntarily recalls the exclamation of President 
 Polk, when he came into office in 1845, that if he had not been 
 embarrassed by the offers of liis predecessors he would, as he 
 called it, "have gone for the whole of Oregon." Fancy an American 
 President unembarrassed by former negotiations, and empowered 
 to re-arrange with a Joint High Commission, such as lately sat in 
 Washington, the whole boundary from the Atlantic to the Pacific ! 
 
 The British Commissioners answered, as well they might, that 
 the proposal to abrogate a Treaty was one of a serious character, 
 and that tliev had no instructions which would enable them to 
 entertain it. It would appear that they did submit the matter to 
 their Government, for it was not, as we learn from the protocol, 
 till the Conference of the 20th March, that they declined the 
 proposal. 
 
 Several attempts were made to procure a settlement, but the 
 Amencans world be satisfied with none that did not give them the 
 
19 
 
 Haro Channel. They made oue proposition, which, looking at it 
 by the liglit of after events, we should have been wise to accept. 
 It was that the Joint Ilit^h Commission should recognise the 
 Haro Channel as the channel intended by the Treaty of loth Juno, 
 1840, with a mutual agreement that no fortifications should be 
 erected by cither party to obstruct or command it, and witli proper 
 provisions as to any cx.isting proprietary riglits of British subjects 
 in tJie [sland of San Juan, [t was ultimately decided that the mat- 
 ter should be referred to arbitration. 
 
 Serious as must be the results to the Dominion of the Award 
 
 ^1 given by the Emperor of Germany, it must, I think, be conceded 
 
 that the fortune of the question was neither made nor marred by 
 
 the Treaty of Washington. The High Commissioners did nothing 
 
 more than refer the meaning of a former Treaty to arbitration. 
 
 WJien we remember that the alternative was to re-open the 
 whole question of houndary between British America and the 
 United States, we can hardly regret the decision of our Commis- 
 sioners, and, indeed, it is impossible, without impugning the award 
 given by the Emperor of Germany (which would not be consistent 
 with the honour of this country, and ought not to be done by any 
 of her citizens), to state in their full force all the reasons which 
 justified a confident hope that the award would be in our favour. 
 However, we have lost, and must acquiesce. Still the loss is another 
 g| heavy item of that ])art of the cost of the Treaty w^iich has fallen 
 upon the Dominion of Canada. Articles 34 to 42, which have 
 reference to this subject, were completed on the 22nd of April. 
 The completed Treaty was signed on the 8th May. 
 
 Having pursued, in rapid review, the various Articles of the 
 Treaty, it remains to estimate the value of the results obtained. 
 Foremost among the advantages claimed for the Treaty is the re- 
 newal of a thorough good understanding with the United States. 
 Every true Englishman must contemplate with satisfaction a 
 result so advantageous to both parties. To some it will appear 
 equivalent to a receipt in full for all concessions made under the 
 Treaty ; others will attach more importance to the fear that a policy 
 of concession such as w^e have uniformly pursued towards the 
 Americans since the peace of 1814, may be more likely to induce 
 further demands, than to be a continued source of good understand- 
 ing. Both opinions are speculative, and I desire to confine myself 
 to-night strictly to facts. I merely point out that opinions repre- 
 sent unknown quantities, which every man must fill up on the 
 balance-sheet according to his own judgment. 
 
•20 
 
 '^ 
 
 \ 
 
 I 
 
 The next important argument, that the new rulea, as between 
 as and America, are likely to be greatly in our favour in future 
 years, demands a little more examination. It is said that Great 
 Britain is at war a dozen times to the United States once ; that 
 any agreement explaining and extending the obligations of 
 neutrals, would be much more likely to tell in our favour than 
 against us. That is true as far as it goes ; or, rather, it would be 
 true if it were in any degree probable that we should ever enjoy 
 the advantages of the new rules. American diplomacy is not 
 conciliatory, and no one, with the experience of the Washington 
 Treaty before him, can suppose that if a future war should leave 
 us with a new Alabama Claim against the United States, it would 
 be treated in the spirit which our negotiators displayed at 
 Washington. It has been abundantly proved that the traditions 
 of American diplomacy in such cases has been invariably to refuse 
 redress, and to assert to the fullest extent the rights of neutral 
 commerce. Yet their new rules impose upon neutral commerce 
 restrictions never heard of before, and, in fact, place neutrals in 
 such a position that either a great portion of their trade will be 
 crippled, or that they will unavoidably incur heavy damages to 
 one or other of the belligerents. This is a positi(m which has 
 hitherto been strongly repudiated by the Americans, and it is 
 difficult to believe that the propositions invented by them, when 
 they were ])elligerents, would appear to them so just when applied 
 against themselves as neutrals. 
 
 It must be remembered that the new rules are loosely worded. 
 We have already, by our Counsel at Geneva, argued that the 
 phrase " duo diligence" means something quite distinct from the 
 meaning we should have to affix to it in order to obtain an 
 award if we quoted it in our favour, and no one can suppose 
 that our own arguments would not be skilfully turned against us. 
 
 Again, the new rules have not the force of international law. 
 At present they are in force only as between England and America. 
 Those two nations undertook ".^o bring them to the notice of other 
 maritime powers, with a view to their adoption as part of inter- 
 national law, but they do not seem in a hurry to do so, and the 
 only foreign jurist, as far as I can remember, who has expressed 
 any opinion upon them — I mean Count Benst. in the latest 
 Austrian Red-book — recommends their determinate rejection, and 
 devotes a long pnpcr to prove that they are entirely prepos- 
 terous. 
 
 The peculiar action of the three new rules may be easily seen if 
 we examine where, in the laiG Geneva Arbitration, they hit us on 
 
21 
 
 I 
 
 poiuta which iutornational law without their aitl wouhl have 
 passed by. 
 
 KeutraHty, under international law, is the position of a State 
 wliicli remains at peace, with reference to two belligerent States 
 with both of which it remains in friendly relations. The neutral 
 State is behind to help neither combatant cither with money or 
 material, and to prevent; its territory from being made a base of 
 military operations by cither. Wo were held liable because we 
 did not use ** due diligence " to prevent the outfit and escape of 
 the " .I/<//>^/»m." ]Jy international law wo should have been held 
 harmless. We should have discharged our international obliga- 
 tions by stopping the ship on receiving duo evidence of her 
 character. Such evidence not having been tendered, by inter- 
 national law wo were blameless, even though the •* Alabama " did 
 escape. 
 
 If the new rules had been in force, it would have boon our 
 business to get evidence for ourselves, and as, for the purposes 
 of arbitration, the new rules were in force, we were held liable 
 accordingly. 
 
 Tho now rules only increase the responsibility of a neutral 
 Govcrnmont in its governmental capacity ; the subjects of a neu- 
 tral Government are in tlic same position as they were before the 
 now rules. They owe no deference to international law as such; 
 they need obey only their own municipal law. It was lawful for 
 them to soil arms or to build ships before the war broke out, and 
 the breaking out of war does not alter that right. They owe no 
 allegiance to either belligerent, possibly they care about neither. 
 They would as soon trade with the one as with the other, and the 
 stoppage of such trade might ruin them. All they have to do, 
 therefore, is to observe the law in their own country; it is tho duty 
 of that country to see that its laws are such as will enable it to 
 perform its international obligations, and it is, further, the duty of 
 that country to see that its subjects obey the laws so made. But 
 such laws are in their nature only measures of police. Belligerents 
 care notJiing what may be the state of tho law in a neutral 
 country ; the law may be sufficient or insufficient, that is nothing 
 to tliem, provided the requirements of international law are com- 
 plied with. If those requirements arc not complied with, the 
 belligerent is justly aggrieved, and may demand reparation. 
 
 But although the subjects of a neutral may lawfully deal in 
 articles contraband of war, they must do so at their own risk. 
 The belligerent may capture such goods in transitu if he can, and 
 the neutral merchant has no claim on his own Government for 
 
 b2 
 
22 
 
 Kent's Com- 
 rnentariea, 
 Vol. I. page 
 142. 
 
 1 
 
 i: 
 
 
 protection, or on tlie belligerent who captures his goods, for 
 damages. War is, as regards n neutral, an invasion of his rights. 
 If no war existed, the neutral might trade with whom he would. 
 Any restriction imposed upon him in the interest of a belligerent 
 is an injury to the neutral. In fact, as the American Chancellor, 
 Kent, says, '* The right of a neutral to transport, and that of a 
 behigerent to sieze, are conflicting rights, and neither party can 
 charge the other with a criminal act." 
 
 There are, then, tliree classes of rights and duties : 
 
 1. The duty of a neutral State to afford no assistance to a 
 belligerent, and not to allow its territory to become a base of war- 
 like operations. 
 
 2. The duty of a neutral subject to obey such laws as his 
 Government may have framed to enable it to perform its inter- 
 national obligations. 
 
 3. The right of belligerent Government to seize contraband of 
 war in transitu, if he can. 
 
 Now let us go a step further. War being an accidental disloca- 
 tion of the relations which ought to subsist between nations, and 
 entailing per force a restriction on neutral rights, all nations have 
 been very chary of unnecessarily restricting those rights ; in fact 
 what are called belligerent rights have been conceded more as a 
 necessary evil than from any abstract sympathy with them. Three 
 short passages, all from American authorities, will prove not only 
 the teaching of international law on this point, but (what is of 
 more importance to our purpose just now), the construction which the 
 Americans have put upon international law from the earliest times. 
 The first is in 1793, a little after the declaration of American In- 
 dependence ; the second in 1862 ; and the third in 1863. A crowd 
 of witnesses might be cited to fill up the interval with an uniform 
 and unbroken tradition. 
 
 On the breaking out of the war between France and England 
 in 1793, Mr. Jefferson, the American Secretary of State, thus 
 writes : — 
 
 •* Our citizens have been always free to make, vend, and export 
 arms, It is the constant occupation and hvelihood of some of 
 them. To suppress their callings, the only means perhaps of their 
 subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant countries 
 in which wo have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It 
 would be hard in principle and impossible in practice. The law of 
 nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those at peace, does not 
 require from them such an internal derangement of their occupa- 
 tions." 
 
 'H 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 ■■X 
 
 23 
 
 The second authority is Mr. Seward, who, when complaint was 
 made that the French were allowed to purchase horses and mules 
 in the United States for the war in Mexico, writes to maintain 
 what he calls the settled and traditionary policy of the United 
 States. He says that if the Mexicans were allowed to dictate to a 
 neutral State what commerce should be allowed, all neutral com- 
 merce would be destroyed. If Mexico, he says, were allowed to do 
 this, " every other nation which is at war would have a similar 
 right, and every other commercial nation would be bound to respect 
 it as much as the United States. Commerce in that case instead 
 of being free or independent, would exist only at the caprice of 
 war." 
 
 The third is Mr. Adams, one of the Geneva arbitrators, who, 
 WTiting to Lord Russell on the 6th of April, 1863, states as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 " The sale and transfer by a neutral of arms, of munitions 
 of war, and even of vessels of ivar, to a belligerent country, not subject 
 to blockade at the time, as a purely commercial transaction, is 
 decided by these authorities not to be unlawful. They go not a 
 step further, and precisely to that extent I have myself taken no 
 exception to the doctrine." 
 
 We thus see that the law of nations treats the sale and purchase 
 of contraband of war as a matter entirely conventional, and nut 
 arising out of any of the obligations of neutrality. Ships, like 
 other articles contraband of war, may be therefore built and sold in 
 the neutrals own ports ; but they must not be armed or fitted for war 
 there, because, if the ship be sent to sea with officers and a fighting 
 crew for the purpose of immediate warfare, the transaction ceases 
 to be one of mere commerce, and assumes the form of a hostile 
 exjiedition sent forth from the territory of the neutral. Such an 
 expedition is plainly a violation of neutrality, according to inter- 
 national law, and one which the neutral Government is bound to 
 do its best to prevent. 
 
 The case is not altered if the vessel is sent out without its arma- 
 ment or its war crew, and these are put on board at some place 
 beyond the jui'isdiction of the neutral. The ship, armament, and 
 crew, form part of one enterprise and undertaking. 
 
 Sir Alexander Cockburn quotes with approval an article in the 
 American Law Review , which contains the following passage : — 
 
 •* It was not because Messrs. Laird sold a war-ship to the Con- 
 federates that we have a claim against England for a breach of 
 international law ; it was because collateral arrangements for 
 completing the ec^uipment and armament of the ship so sold, by 
 
24 
 
 
 m 
 
 I !1 
 
 placing on board officers and crew, gims and provisions, rendered 
 tlio entire proceeding, in fact, tlie incei3tion of a hostile undertaking 
 from the confines of a neutral territory." Such being the case 
 under the old rules of international law, how is the case altered by 
 the new rules ? 
 
 The alteration appears to be one of degree rather than of 
 character. No absolutely new obligation is imposed by the new 
 rules ; we should have been liable under the old rules if it could bo 
 shown that we knew of the building, equipment, and destination 
 of a ship of war in our ports ; that is, that we had such legal 
 evidence of the fact as to enable us legally to stop such vessel. The 
 now rules imposed no more, except in one respect ; formerly the 
 building, tlio equipping, and the sale of a vessel, would have been 
 no breach of neutrality, provided we had stopped the escape of the 
 vessel on receiving legal evidence of its destination. By the new 
 rules, we were bound to use due diligence to prevent even the equip- 
 ment of such a vessel ; and it further appears that the term due 
 diligence was held by the arbitrators to transfer the unus prohandi 
 which formerly lay upon the shoulders of the belligerent who 
 considered himself aggrieved, to those of tne neutral Government. 
 
 Perhaps lawj^ers would object to my definition, but it seems to 
 mo to amount to this : — Formerly the x3resumptiou of international 
 law was in favour of the neutral, now it is to be in favour of the 
 belligerent. 
 
 In any future war, therefore, we may call on the United States 
 to use '' due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equip- 
 ping, within its jurisdiction, of an}- vessel, &c." 
 
 Tliat is to be our gain obtained under the new rules. 
 
 But the Americans declare that they have, from the very begin- 
 ning, given to the world an example of most strict adherence to the 
 principles now embodied in the Treaty. 
 I. d states" " Q^^^^'li^ ^^ inccpto talis ad finem," they write ; with con- 
 iiirunioiit, sistency unwavering, and at whatever hazard of domestic or 
 foreign inconvenience, even if it were friendly powers like France 
 and Great Britain, vvitli wliich we were brought into conten- 
 tion, the United States have steadily adhered to principles of 
 intcvnational neutrality ; and we may well, therefore, demand 
 the observance of those principles, or reparation for their non- 
 observance on the part of Great Britain." Such is the American 
 view of tli_ir own conduct: liut it follows that they have really 
 observed international neutrality as strictly as is her(^ alleged, 
 they can do no more under the new rales ; and the new rules will 
 do us no good- But there are two opinions as to the conduct of 
 
 !M 
 
'25 
 
 the Americans. Sir Alexander Cockourn thus sums up au exhaus- 
 tive review of the conduct of the Americans in the cases of Spain, 
 of Portugal, of Cuba, of Mexico, of Central America, and of the 
 Fenians in Canada, from 1794 to 1872 : — 
 
 *• The story of these expeditions, as told in a great part in the 
 proclamations of the different Presidents, is pretty much the same. 
 Some scheme of annexation, or other form of invasion is started, 
 public meetings of sympathisers are held, a reckless soldier of 
 fortune is selected for chief, funds are raised by bonds issued on the 
 security of the public lands of the country which it is proposed to 
 conquer, arms are collected, recruits advertised for under some 
 transparent verbal concealment of the object, and at length a 
 certain number of men are got together and embark, or otherwise 
 set forth. If the country against which the attack is directed is 
 feeble and unprepared, scenes of outrage and bloodshed follow until 
 the marauders are driven to the coast, where they find refuge on 
 board American vessels (in some cases it has been on board ships 
 of war), and return to the protection of the United States to pre- 
 pare a fresh attack. If the country is able vigorously to repel 
 them, as in the case of the Fenian raids, they content themselves 
 with a demonstration on the frontier, seek at once an asylum, are 
 disarmed, and the ringleaders perhaps tried. Those who are con- 
 victed are almost certain of an immediate pardon, After an interval 
 the arms are restored, and unless the scheme has been so discre- 
 dited by failure as to be incapable of revival, preparations are 
 forthwith recommenced for another attempt, and everything goes 
 on as before." 
 
 If in the face of facts like these, which we have been able to- 
 night to verify, as regards the Fenian raids, the Americans can 
 contend that the new rules only embody the maxims upon which 
 the United States have habitually acted, does it not seem rather 
 sanguine to imagine that the new rules will be practically of much 
 use to us ? Even as I write, the newspapers of the day furnish 
 yet another instance of the manner in which citizens of the United 
 States construe international obligations. We read in the Pall 
 Mall Gazette of Jan. 17 — " The New York papers of yesterday state 
 that the filibustering steamer ' Eihjar Stuart' has landed at Sino, 
 in Cuba, large quantities of arms and ammunition, as well as sixty 
 volunteers." It is not pretented that these marauders have any 
 countenance from the Government : no such countenance was 
 given in the cases cited by Chief Justice Cockburn. But if former 
 precedents be followed, the marauders will, after scenes of outrage 
 and bloodshed, be driven back to the coast, or to their own country 
 
I I 
 
 26 
 
 where the ringleaders will perhaps be tried, but will most certainly 
 be pardoned. The words of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn will pro- 
 bably be again justified by the facts. But at any rate it is hard 
 to agree with the sentence, I have quoted from the United States 
 argument, that "with consistency unwavering, and at whatever 
 hazard of domestic or foreign inconvenience, the United States 
 have steadily adhered to principles of international neutrality." 
 
 With regard to the Fisheries, we have without doubt made a 
 concession" the plain truth is tliis-riglit is on the side of 
 the EngUsh, that is, right by Treaty. The Amenc-ms can be 
 excluded, as the Canadians maintain they ought to be, if only 
 there were force constantly available to doit. But the persons 
 upon whom practically it devolves to assert American rights— I 
 mean the fishermen— care very little for rights, and public opinion 
 in America would back them up if the assertion of the.r pre- 
 tensions involved their Government in war. We, rightly or 
 wrongly, shrink from war in such a cause. It is fair to say that 
 the Americans could not concede on the subject of the fisheries; if 
 they had conceded, their fishermen would have infringed the 
 Treaty by common consent, and public opinion would not back 
 up their Government in punishing them. 
 
 I now submit the balance-sheet to your consideration. It can- 
 not be wise nor patriotic to exaggerate either the advantages we 
 have obtained, or the concessions ,ve have been obliged to make ; 
 I have earnestly tried to estimate both impartially. Different 
 minds will fill up with various amounts the blanks which I have 
 left. I have honestly tried to state facts, leaving it to others to 
 draw conclusions. 
 
 
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