EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

AND

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY IN

THE UNIVERSITY OF TORO TO

ALBERT H. ABBOTT, BA.

''/

Instructor in I'hilosophy and Assistant in the Psychological Laboratory
in the University of Toronto.

(Reprinted from the "University of Toronto Monthly,
Vol. I., No. 3)

TORONTO :

THE PUHLISHKKS' SYNDICATE, Limitkd.
1900.

Experimental Psychology and the Laboratory rn

Toronto.

THE justification of the existence of any Science is complete when it
has been shown that it investigates facts which are not investigated
by any other Science. There may still be a difference of opinion with
regard to the name whicii should be applied to the Science in question,
but there can be no doubt that it has a field of inquiry essentially its
own, and, this having been ascertained, the name is of very secondary
importance.

1 am led to make these preliminary remarks by two phases of criti-
cism which are at times offered when one speaks of Experimental
Psychology : the first phase is completely destructive of the so-called
Science, because it co. '.tends that Experimental Psychology I as no
subject-matter for investigation, since it is impossible to experimentally
examine mental states ; the second phase arises only when one has been
assured that Expcriinental Psychology investigates something, and the
criticism is, briefly stated, " You shouldn't call it 'Psychology!''

I am not sure whether or not I should regard my task as covering the
justification for the name of the Science as well as for the existence of
it. If it does include it, I am disposed to waive the right of discussing
this question at present (for, after all, it is a broader question than the
one I am called upon to discuss), and to confine my attention rather to
an attempt to show that what is at present called Experimental
Psychology has a legitimate subject-matter which it endeavours to
investigate — that it may at some future day be called by another
name need not trouble us in the least. (It may be worth while noticing
that Thomas Hobbes wrote his Psychology under the title of Physics,
but that neither detracts nor adds to its value.) AU that I ask is that
my readers accept the name which is given to this investigation to-day,
even if it be a misnomer, and leave the future to pass the verdict on the
question of nomenclature.

In a short article, such as the present one must be, it is impossible to
discuss every phase of the subject which suggests itself as appropriate
and significant. I am, therefore, led to select for mgre exhaustive dis-
cussion some particular points and to merely refer to others. One of
this latter class I shall touch upon at this point in the discussion as
introductory to my special subject, and I hope my statements regard-
ing it will not be taken as dogmatic and unsound merely because I do
not discuss them. 1 premise as a fact which ought not to need discus-
sion, that we know but one Nature, and that every Science which inves-
tigates natural phenomena deals with the same objects which all other

Sciences investigate. Manifestly I do not mean that in any one object
there must be found a field for every Science, but I do mean that any
object }niiy be investigated by all the Sciences, each from its own staiul-
poiut. From this I believe that the fallowing statement ought to be
evident: — // is the peculiar standpoint of each xvhich distinguishes the
Sciences, and not the specific objects they investigate. I deem this fact of
nmch importance, because a consideration of it ought to make clear to
any on-: that it is utterly illogical to demand of a Psychologist that he
produce a world of reality which is not touched at all by other Sciences.
On that same ground, probably no I'liysical Science but Physics could
justify its existence ; at all events, if that be the test applied to Psychol-
ogy, it may very well deny its ability to produce another Nature in
which it may find some work to do. Hut it does not need to accept such
a task as a justifiable one. It may very well claim that it has ecpial right
with the Physical Sciences to exist, provided it can show that it investi-
gates Nature from a standpoint peculiar to itself, and to the justification
of the Science on this ground I now turn my attention.

Jicfore, however, I take up the immediate discussion of this problem,
I may refer briefly to Feeling and Volition, which, probably, would not be
considered as falling under the term " Nature " which I have used. Per-
sonally, I should U'.^t exclude them from Nature, but any justification of
that standpoint might take us too far aueld, and, therefore, I shall merely
mention, in passing, that the investigation of Feeling and Volition by
means of experimental methods is a very necessary task before the Psy-
chologist; and, further, it is one from which he does not shrink. As one
problem in Volition which has received a good deal of attention in Ex-
perimental Psychology, I may mention the investigation of the so-called
Reaction Time, a problem ceded to Psychology by the astronomers, under
the head of " The Personal Eciuation." Then, under the head of P'eeling,
I may call attention to the problems of Aesthetics, which have been left
until the present almost wholly without experimental research, but which
are gradually being investigated by P^xperimental Psychology, with, I
think I may say, gratifying results. The need for such work as this justi-
fies the existence of any Science which will undertake it, and hence, if we
go no farthf r we have shewn the need of, and hence justification for, the
Science which is called to-day " Experimental Psychology."

The question to which I devote myself in the greater part of this
essay is the following: In the investigation of Nature is there room and
tvork for such a Science as Experimental Psychology ?

The reader will not fail to notice, after reading the preceding para-
graph, that in thus stating the question, 1 recognize that I am unneces-
sarily restricting myself, but I do this because it is evident that if Experi-
mental i'.sychology can be justified on this ground it will need no word of
justification on any other; and, because, I may frankly state, I am
desirous of showing that Psychology has a right to be regarded not only
as a Science, and as a " Mental Scieiice," but al.so, in the strictest .sen.se,
as a "Natural" Science.

All the facts which Physical Science investigates in Nature are expres-
sed, or can be expressed, in terms of motion ; light, heat, sound, elec-
tricity, cliemical action, the processes in living organisms, etc., are all
alike phenomena of motion as they are considered and studied by a Phy-
sical Scientist. He has his facts, he takes a certain point of view from
which to regard them, and in the light of which he investigates them, and
as a result we have the magnificent achievements of Physical Science
ever since the days of Galileo. Let us not fail to observe that this
advance began with the adoption of motion as the pass- word through
which entrance was to be had to the Physical Scientists' world. Indeed,
some would say that this latter statement should not be limited at all,
for they contend that all facts whatsoever are to be regarded as nothing
but motion. This contention, however, cannot be allowed, as we shall
see later.

In order to liiirt the subject somewhat, I shall refer now to certain par-
ticular phenomena in Nature in which there seems room, and, indeed,
need, for an investigation other than those undertaken by the Physical
Sciences, and which, as a matter of fact, is being carried on to-day by
the Science which is called " Experimental Psychology."

It cannot be denied that if there had never been Sensations of Sight
and of Sound, there would never have been the Sciences of Optics and
Acoustics. The movements of ether and of air might have been as
active as possible, and yet, unless colour had been seen, and sound heard,
no one could have thought of them except as heat, or as more or less
gentle pressures. And yet, let us not forget that the Scientist who
investigates these motions of ether and of air could writt a complete
text-book on Optics or Acoustics and never use the name of a colour or
of a tone ; all he needs for colour is a certain designation of the position
in the spectrum and the frequency of the vibration of the ether particles,
and for tone similarly, the frequency of the vibration of the air particles.
That all comes to this — a physicist investigates the motions which occur
where \vc experience, for example, a colour, but he does not investigate
the seeing of colour, or the colour sensations whici. we experience, and
which, after all, contain the fundamental possibility of this Science
(Optics).

Hut I am reminded that this is the task of the Physiologist; he it is
who investigates the seeing of colour and the colour sensations. Let us
glance for a moment, then, at the work of the Physiologist to see if this
be true. A Physiologist deals with those processes which take place in
the human body, but he finds there nothing but cTiemical processes,
physical processes of pressure, of heat, etc. With the possible exception
of nervous transmission he finds no process not common to bodies in
general ; and even nervous t' ismission he conceives as a movement of
the particles of a nerve, and as akin to the transmission of electrical
force. He, loo, could express all the facts of his Science in terms of
motion and position, and, so far as the seeing of colour is concerned, he
can only tell us what processes take place in the retina, the optic nerve

and the visual centre in the brain, when wc sec such and such a colour,
but he makes no attempt to discuss the sensations of light and colour as
they are actually experienced, as red, orange, yellow, green, etc. Let us,
then, at this point attempt a brief summary of the relations of Physics
and Physiology to the facts of Light and Colour: Physics attempts to
tell us what vibrations of ether take place xvhere we sec a certain colour ;
Physiology attempts to tell us what processes take place in retina, nerve
and brain xvhcn we see a certain colour, but neither of these sciences
investigates the colour as seen, which is of a certain quality or tone (red,
orange, yellow, etc.), and is not in any sense motion, no matter hovv
much it may depend upon motion. Now, this colour certainly belongs
to Nature, and therefore in the facts of light anu colour in Nature there is
room for an investigation not carried on by any Physical Science. This
investigation may include several definite questions :

(i) What are the facts of light and colour as they are seen or experi-
enced ?

(2) Upon what do these facts depend ?

(3) Under what conditions do they combine with one another?

In connection with the second question it must be noticed that it is
purely gratuitous to assume, even when we have discovered that definite
sensations of light and colour depend upon so and so many vibrations of
ether, and such and such a chemical process in the retina, etc., that they
depend upon these alon..*, for it can easily be shown that we have these
sensations when that definite vibration of ether, and that specific process
in the retina, are not pres-Mit.

There is room, then, in the investigation of the facts of colour, for a
science whicH will carry on research on the lines of the questions above
suggested, and, as a matter of fact, that Science is called to-day " Experi-
mental Psychology;" as I have said before, it is entirely irrelevant for
my purpose whether or not the name be appropriate , it at least has a
standpoint peculiar to itself from which it investigates Nature, and as
such its right to a place among the sciences cannot be seriously questioned.

What I have here said regarding light and colour is equall)- applicable
to other sensations also, such as sound, heat, cold, pressure, taste, smell,
etc. No Physical Science investigates these, as we actually experience
them, for the very basis of all such sciences to-day is motion, and this
standpoint does not include colour, or any sense quality, as experienced.
It is manifest that red, yellow, violet, hot, cold, hard, soft, sweet, bitter,
etc., etc., are not motion, and it is absolutely meaningless to say that,
e.g., the sensation red is 330,000,000,000 vibrations per second or any
such — the sensation red is red, and not movement.

What I have already said ought to convince, at least, the careful reader
that there is work for Experimental Psychology to do in the investiga-
tion of the sense qualities and their relation.s. There are, however, even
wider fields of work for the Psychologist to attempt by the aid of experi-
mental methods.

The Science of Geology, as we know it to-day, has much to do with

time ; in fact, were it not for our sense of time, Geolo{.'y could not
exist in its present state. It uses time with perfect assurante, and yet it
docs not in any way investigate man's sense of time, as i-ome call it.
The same is equally true of all the Physical Sciences. A.l Nature is
studied as motion or change, and yet the basal fact which alone renders
such a conception as chan^'e possible; in fact, which is, in one sense,
simply another word for change, is not studied at all. Were time not
a necessary form of human experience there could not be the Physical
Science which we know to-day. Any research, then, which adds to our
knowledj^e of time as a form of experience is valuable, since it thereby
adds directly to our knowledge of Nature. Experimental Psychology
carries on th's investigation ; and. indeed, the Psychological T.aboratory
of the University of Toronto has contributed .somewhat largely to this
p.-oblem in recent years.

Then there are the various investigations with regard to localization
in space which are not touched by any Science but Psychology. As all
Nature is iw sj , :c, any information we may gain with regard to our
localization in space is directly applicable to our knowledge of Nature,
and is an addition to it.

It would seem to mc that those considerations amply justify the exist-
ence of the Science w lich investigotes the.se fact'3, and, as it is evident
that these investigations cannot be carried on except by the application
of experimental methods, I presume I need not say a single word by
way of justification for the use of experiment in such research. One
might still be in doubt as to whether such a Science ought to be called
Psychology, but, as I have already intimated, I do not intend to discuss
that question further than I have done ; that is, further than showing that
it cannot be called Physics or Physiology, as we understand these
Sciences to-day.

Even at the risk of making this discussion somewhat tedious I shall
mention what seems to me the fundamental justification of the Science
of Experimental Psychology, as it was the first investigation which was
actually carried on by it. I refer to the problem of Quantity, as it is
considered in Physics, or of Intensity, as it is considered in Psychology.

It is a well-known fact that increments can be added to any quantity
without any change being noticed. That is, a stimulus may be increased
by certain definitely known quantities and yet no change occur in our
experience or consciousness of that quantity. For example, in a room
lighted by lOO gas flames, the addition or subtraction of one or two
flames would not be noticed from any change in the amount'of light ; or,
the full electric illuminating power in a city may be turned on at noon-
da\', and yet the streets be not noticeably one bit better lighted ; and so
o; , examples might easily be multiplied, but each one may do that for
himself Now, if I ask the question : "Just how much would I have to
add in any particular case in order that 1 may just notice a difference ?"
I have clearly a problem which demands experimental research for its
solution, and yet I have a question which cannot be answered by either

I'hysics or Physiology, the two Sciences most immediately concerned with
It. When the question is investigated, a remarkable fact is discovered,
viz., it is found that that amount which must be added before a difference
can be noticed bears a constant relation to the stimulus to which it is
added ; that is, the same (juantity is not always noticed as a cliange, as it
ought to be if the question were solely one of the sensitiveness of the sense
organs, for, physically, if the sense organs can just discrimii' '^e the differ-
ence between lo and 1 1, surely they ought to do likewise bet* :en 20 and
21, but they cannot — it must in that case be between 20 and 22 — that is,
t( toil I he the same relation as forunrly, which must be added or taken
away, but not the same quantity.

There is another phase of the problem of Intensity, which is, I think I
may say, startlingly instructive. We not only estimate quantities to be
greater, equal or less than others, but we also estimate the difference
between two quantities to be greater, equal or less than the difference
between two other quantities ; that is, if we are shown three lights of
somewhat widely different intensities we can judge when one is midway
in brightness between the other two, or, differently stated, we can tell
when the difference between the lights "a" and "^" is equal to the
difference between "^" and 'V." Now, when this is carefully done an
astonishing result is found, viz., when we make the judgment b — a = c — b,
it is found that according to physical measurement the lights stand in
the following relation : —

a b

or b- ■=■ ac
i.e. b = v^af

Supposing now that "rt" and "f" be respectively 10 and 1,000, "^" will
be 100 when wc estim'xte the lights as being .separated by equal differ-
ences. Throwing the conclusion in one sentence we may say : We
estimate differences as equal ivhen physically the ratios are the same.
The relation of this to the foregoing statement is evident.

This principle has had such ample verification that a " Law " has been
formulated which embodies and expresses it. The .so-called " Law of
Weber" is the fundamental fact which was at once the origin and the
inspiration in F.sychology of the Science of Psycho- Physics, which is a
strong sub-department of E.xperimental Psychology. This Law of
Weber holds practically true (so far as the matter has been investigated)
in tl.e case of all the ordinary Senses, and for the extensive range of
medium intensities, and its expression brings out the characteristic
of experience which it represents, viz., the relativity of our estimation of
quantity or intensity. (All physical quantities are experienced as inten-
sities.) There are several statements of this Psycho-Physical Law, but
the following will answer our purpose here : — " In order to increase .sen-
sations by just noticeable quantities, the quantity of the stimulus must

be increased by i datively the same quantity " ; or, " In order to estimate
differences as equal, the relation of the stimuli must be the same" ; or.

iigain, Fechner's concise expression of the Law — "The intensity of

sensation is proportionate to the logarithm of the quantity of the
stimulus." Now, it is through that research known as Kxpcrimental
I'sychology that this principle has been discovered, and since there can
never be a quality which has not some quantity, we are compelled to
admit that Psychology, in this case, has discovered a problem which bears
on all our experience of Nature, and, therefore, which ought to be known
by all who investigate Nature. Here, again. Experimental I'sychology
justifies its existence as a Natural Science, or as a Science of Nature.

I consider that I have already said quite (Miough by way of showing
the nature of the problems which an Experimental Psychologist has to
investigate, and I now proceed, therefore, to the second part of my essay,
which is more closely occupied with the Laboratory in Toronto. Before,
however, I say a few words with regard to the Psychological Laboratory
in the University of Toronto and the work being carried on there, I wish
to make one or two pointed statements with regard to the attitude of
the Department of Psychology, under the direction of Professor Kirsch-
maiin, to some much discussed topics.

The first of these topics is the relation of Psychology to Hypnotism,
Telepathy, and such phenomena. In one word, we do not devote much
attention to the.se phenomena, because they do not yet seem ripe for
experimental investigation, at least, as yet, no exact experimental methods
have been found generally practi.- \ble for si- jh a research. (We leave out
of account here the fimdamental question : Is it justifiable for any man
to hypnotise another, especially for amusement or experiment ?)

The second of these topics is the relation of Psychology to Physiology.
In the first place we do not regard it as justifiable to attempt to do what
a Physiologist can do far better ; i.e., investigate the proce.'^os taking
place in the human body, and especially in sense organ, nerve and brain.
That work belongs distinctly to Physiology, and we are quite content to
keep it out of our Laboratory and to accept the Physiologist's results as
we do the verified conclusions of any other Scientist. (It must ever be
the aim of Experimental Psychology to work hand in hand with all ot'^er
sciences, and especially with its nearest sister sciences, Physics and
Physiology, in solving the problems of Nature. There are problems
which they, in accordance with the character of their subject, caimot
solve, and we should like to aid in the solution of these, and thus return, so
far as possible, the help which Psychology has always received from them.)
In the second place, if the reader has caught «"he spirit of my justifica-
tion for Experimental Psychology, he will not have failed to observe
that I do not regard it as more necessary for a Psychologist to be an
expert Physiologist than it is for a Physicist or Chemist to be such. This
is the unhesitating stand of our Department on the subject, and this alone
ought to be sufficient to clear from people's minds the still too often
heard, but nevertheless nonsensical opinion, that an Experimental Psy-

chologist must be a Materialist in Philosophy. On the contrary, we
hold that psychical facts cannot be " explained " by bodily processes.
Physiological Psychology is really two distinct Sciences, viz.. Physiology
and Psychology, and all that is done in it is to correlate bodily processes
with conscious facts ; that is, to attempt to discover what bodily pro-
cesses are occurring when we experience or are conscious of certain facts.
Even this work, important as it may be, has not the prominence in
Toronto which it has in many laboratories Experimental Psychology and
Physiological Psychology are by no means synonymous terms, c en if we
are indebted to books bearing the title "Physiological Psycholcgy" for
some of the most important work in the literature of the suljcct.

Several other interesting points which might be discussed are omitted
as unessential, and because the limits set for this article have already
been e.\ceeded.

My concluding subject is an interesting one to all lovers of the Uni-
versity of Toronto, and I trust it will not be found uninteresting even to
those who do not call her "Alma Mater" — it is "The Psychological
Laboratory of the University of Toronto."

The Psychological Laboratory in Toronto was established, through the
liberality of the Ontario Government, by Professor J. Mark Baldwin, in
1 89 1,* and three rooms and a private room, were at that time set apart
and fitted up for the work. These rooms, i, 2, 3, 4, in the following plan,
were used at first chiefiy for demonstrations. Actual research work by
students, however, really began with the installation of Ur. A.
Kirschmann as head of the Department of Psychology in 1894. Dr.
Kirschmann had been trained in Germany and had been Professor
VVundt's assistant in Leipzig for some time ; he, therefore, came to
Toronto with a thorough knowledge of what the then best Psychological
Laboratory in the world was. From the very first year actual research
work has been done by the men in the Senior year in the Department of
Honour Philosophy, and by numerous graduates, and the comparatively
large number of published reports of our work bear witness to the fact
that this research has always been along lines calculated to advance our
knowledge of the facts of consciousness. If the people of Toronto or of
Canada do not know of our work it is to be regretted, but whether the
reports of the work done are read here or not, we have the satisfaction oi
knowing that they are well known, and, in practically every case, very
favourably reviewed in Germany, France, Switzerland, England and
elsewhere.

The first publication from the Laboratory was made in 1895, and
it appeared, as did also several subsequent articles, in The American
Journal of Psychology.

* It may not be generally known that the late Professor George Paxton Young had desire)'
to have a F'sychological Laboratory opened in Toronto, and that he had, some time befori
I'rofessor Baldwin was appointed, urged one of his students, J. (». Hume (now Professoi
Hume), to study under some of the prominent Psychologists in preparation for such work.
Professor Young's death and Professor Baldwin's appointment simply hastened matters
therefore ; they did not fundamentally change the plans of the Department in this regard.

With the expansion of the University, and the growing spirit of research
on the part of Faculty and Senior students, it was felt that we ought to
have a publication for such work in connection with the University,
and, as a result of this feeling, The University of Toronto Studies, was
begun. The first publications were along historical lines, but soon a
i "Psychological Series," among others, was started, and in the present
month there will appear the last number of Volume I. of this series.
This volume is composed of three numbers : the first, which appeared
in the spring of 1898, reports research carried on regarding the Space-
Threshold of Colours and its dependence upon contrast, — a very inter-
esting case of colour-blindness is also reported in this number ; the
second number reports work done on certain Time relations of experi-
ence, and on the Time relations of EnglisTi poetical metres ; and number
three, contains reports of an admirable piece of research work on Colour-
yEsthetics, and of an investigation of the colour-sense of school children.
Perhaps I cannot bring the idea of the Department, in the publication
of this Psychological Series, before the reader, better than by quoting a
few words from Professor Kirschmann's introduction to Volume I., the
last number of which is, as I have already intimated, at present in process
of publication. He says: — "With the present volume we do not so
mucli desire to augment the number of psychological periodicals as to
inaugurate an exponent of psychological research in Canada, which has
hitherto been without a representative publication. The Psychological
Series of The University of Toronto Studies will appear at irregular
intervals, and will represent, for the most part, the results of research in
the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Toronto, although
contributions from elsewhere may be accepted."

In referring to the publications from the Laboratory, I have not
referred to the articles, etc., of Professor Kirschmann, because I wished to
emphasize especially the fact that our students, undergraduate as well
as post-graduate, are carrying on the research work to which I have
referred. That the undergraduates in their advanced work participate in
actual research is only the carrying out of the Director's opinion that no
experimental work of advanced students should be done for the mere
.sake of practice, but that it should contribute to the solution of some
problem. Of Professor Kirschmann's own writings since he has been at
the head of the Toronto Laboratory, I need only say that they are some-
what numerous, and that they have commanded the most respectful
attention

It will thus be seen that during recent years our Laboratory has been

doing work of worth, and I am not speaking whereof I do not know^

when I say that the Psychological Laboratory of the University of

Toronto is recognized abroad as, at least in point of research work, of no

.second-rate importance.

At pre.sent there are approximately one hundred students taking lectures
ai>d doing work in Honour Psychology. If we deduct from this number
probably forty, who are taking the Honour work of the Second year but

who are not registered in the department of Honour Philosophy, we have
still sixty students regularly engaged in the study of Scientific Psychol-
ogy. When this is taken into account it will not be surprising that,
recognizing the needs of the department, more space has been provided
for its use. In this coimection we arc deeply indebted, as is every
department in the University, to the foresight and interest of President
Loudon, who has done so much during the years .of his Presidency to
foster and advance the highc .t academic work possible. Some years agi
the use of the Ethnological Museum and adjoining rooms was securcii,
and the.se have been constantly used since 1896-97. Last year it was
decided to utilize the Inrst House of the Old University Residence for
scientific purposes, and it was accordingly divided between the Depart-
ments of Physics (Electricity) and Psychology. All the rooms at our
disposal are being used this session, and they arc being fitted up as
rapidly as possible for the research which is to be carried on in them.
Most of these rooms are, indeed, fully occupied at present.

The accompanying ground-plan shows the rooms which are at the dis-
posal of the Laboratory, and the following Index will tell to wiiat
purpose they are at present being put : —

No. I. 01(1 Leciiire KoOm, at present usoil for Uese:>rcli iii Psyohological ()p:io8.

No. 2. 01(1 Laboratory Room, at preHent used for Ula-s* Demonstrations and for IJesearcli
in Time and Spaco Relations of \(<>iital I'lieiioiuuua.

No. 3. Director's Private Rcwin.

No. 4. Dark Room, used for Pliolographical purpoBes, etc. , ^

No. 5. New Ijccturc Room. i% ^ •

No 6. Store Room for Deinonsi rat ion Apparatus. "„,««V ." ■_

No 7. Library and lieaJin^ lioom. 'I, ^* . «- v"** '.

No. 8. AsHiktant's Private Room.

No. 9. Kesearch Room, at present used for the itivostisiation of Colour-Saturation.

Nog. ion. Research Rooms, at jiresent used for o.vperiinents on Phot<jmetry, etc.

No. 12. Temj)orarily loaned as a Private tJoom for a I.,et!tiirer ii» anothi'r l)upartmont.

No. 13. Research Room, at present usol for the investigation of the Intluence of tho
Souse of Sight oa the estimation of Lifted Weights.

No. 14. Kthuological Museum, used nt present for Resu'^rch in Colour .Ksthelics.

No. 15. Acoustical Research Room.

No. 16. Used for Research in Psychological Optics (with annexes).

It should not be inferred from the comparativ cly large nmnber of rooms

in use that the Laboratory has great space at its disposal, for six of the.sc

njoms (Nos. 8 to 13) arc but small attics, and No.s. 15 and 16 are ver)-

small and out of the way. Our equipment is still very modest, and

leaves much to be desired. -,• «♦•';• .

* .^ 9 ^* \

[It may not be <juite superfluous to refer very briefly to the relation of the work in
Experimental Psychology to tlie Honour course (for Ji. A.) in Philosophy.

The Honour Course in Philosophy includes Psychology, Logic, Theory of Knowledge,
Ethics, History of Philosophy au(l Metaphysics. This work is trranged to cover three
yeaisof the Undergraduate course. Psychology, Kxpoririiental and (ieneral, covers about
one third of the work in Philosophy ; and in Psyoliology the Experimental part of the
work is about one- third in the first year (.Sophomore students), and tuo thirds in the second
year, while iit the final year all the Psychology takes the form of research work.]

OVER. 5,^ by

- -

— -»

^^ _J

) is

First Floor

Second Floor.

Plan or the Psycholoerlcal Laboratory of the University of Toronto.

Scale 1 : 300.