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J, 
 
 A TREATISE 
 
 ox Till-; 
 
 LAW OF EVIDENCE 
 
 Ay ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND ; 
 
 WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM SCOTCH, INDIAN, AMERICAN, 
 AND OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS. 
 
 BY HIS HONOUR 
 
 THE LATE JUDGE PHT TAYLOR. 
 
 Ilinth (Ebition 
 
 (in I'ART BK-WBITTK.n) 
 
 By G. PITT-LEWIS, Q.C. 
 
 Mitlj ilotfs as to Amrrican ICalrr 
 By CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNE. 
 
 in two \()lu.mks. 
 Vol. 1. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 SWEET AND MAXWELL, Ln.., :{, CHANCERY LANE. 
 
 P.OSTON, MASS. : 
 THE BOSTON BOOK COMl'ANY. 
 
 TORONTO : 
 THE CARSWELL Co. Ltd., LAW ITTHLISIIERS, Etc 
 
 IH97. 
 
TAVLO^^K-, 
 
 N( 
 
 Copyriijht, 1897, 
 By The Boston Book Company. 
 
 Entered according to Act of the Parliament of Cabida, in the year one 
 ttiousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, by Swzet & Max- 
 well, Ltd., in the Office of the Minister of Agr.'ulture. 
 
 wark (€'iiniuliiin KtlitloiO by tli«^ <'iirHW<*ll «'«>. Mil., .lit A<li-lnl<l«' Hi. r.. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The text of the last Edition of Taylor on Evidence 
 consisted of 1,600 pages; the present Edition has been 
 
 ::»riiirtr»rl l-v»-» 
 
 i?._. 
 
 Note to Canadian Edition . 
 
 Owing to some omissions of the London Edition, 
 from the Boston Edition, the paghiation in this 
 Edition is, in some cases, duplicated, as follows : — 
 
 Mr. G. Pitt-Lewis' Preface and Contents to London Edition, 
 pages i-xiv. 
 
 Table of Statutes Cited, Rules and Forms of Supreme Court, 
 1883, Cited, Addenda and Errata, pages ccxviiccxliii. 
 
 The above are inserted at the beginning of First Volume, 
 
 Appendix pages i-xi in Second Volume before the Index. 
 
 The CARSWELL CO., Ltd., Printers. 
 
 \^»-t'i»J ** AiiV^lJ. 
 
 f 
 
 '^X 
 
 have elapsed since the last Edition have, it is hoped, all 
 been noted up in their respective places. Moreover, it 
 is believed that no legal proposition, which is still accu- 
 rate, haa been excised. 
 
 In consequence of the great use which is made of tlie 
 Work in the United States and in Canada, and of the 
 growing importance of the decisions in the Courts of 
 those countries which are required for citation in the 
 Courts there, but are not expected to be cited in England 
 
TAYLOR 
 
 Entered according to Act of the Parliament of Canada, in Uie year one 
 tliousand eigbt liundred end ninety-seven, by Sw2et & Max- 
 well, Ltd., in tliG Oillcnof the Minister of Agriuiture, 
 
 PrrHMvorkMnniuliaii Kdilioiit b> the « nrHwt'lTT <t. l.l.lT^so AdHI^- hi. 
 
f 
 
 PEEFACE. 
 
 The text of the last Edition of Taylor on Evidence 
 consisted of 1,600 pages; the present Edition has been 
 reduced by nearly one fourth of this bulk, and only 
 contains 1,234 pages of Text. The general arrange- 
 ment of the Work and Index has not been altered. 
 
 The Editor has, however, in one solitary instance, 
 ventured to throw two chapters into one (the chapters 
 contained in former Editions on the Best Evidence and 
 on Secondary Evidence now forming only one chapter, 
 treating of the general rule that the best evidence of 
 which a case is capable must always be produced) ; and 
 he has also amplified the "Summary" into an Analysis 
 which clearly brings out the completeness with which 
 the Author mapped out in this Work the whole of the 
 Law of Evidence. 
 
 The decisions and enactments of the ten years which 
 have elapsed since the last Edition have, it is hoped, all 
 been noted up in their respective places. Moreover, it 
 is believed that no legal proposition, which is still accu- 
 rate, has been excised. 
 
 In consequence of the great use which is made of the 
 Work in the United States and in Canada, and of the 
 growing importance of the decisions in the Courts of 
 those countries which are required for citation in the 
 Courts there, but are not expected to be cited in England 
 
IV 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 (seo per C. A., 33 S. J. at p. 419), it is proposed to pub- 
 lish an American Edition of the Work corresponding to 
 the present (9th) Edition, and containing, in addition, 
 notes by an American Editor. American decisions have 
 accordingly been more sparingly cited in the present 
 Edition of the Work than they would otherwise have 
 been, and, in fact, few now American cases have been 
 cited at all, except when they oitlicr are rulings of the 
 Sm)reme Court of New York, or are of value to com- 
 parative jurisprudence by containing the present view in 
 America on points which have been (and therefore may 
 be again) on subjects on which English decisions have not 
 always been the same, or relate to matters of import- 
 ance which appear to be likely to arise in actual practice, 
 but are not yet covered by any English authority. 
 
 The principal Irish decisions have, it is believed, been 
 referred to. At the same time, in citing in England 
 the decisions of Irish Courts, it must be kept in mind 
 that these, though entitled to the highest respect, are 
 not binding on English Judges, as was pointed out 
 by Kay, J., in Re Parsons, 45 Ch. D, at p. 62. 
 
 The necessity for the amendment of the Law of 
 Evidence in Criminal Cases, by permitting accused 
 persons and their wives and husbands to give evidence, 
 has, for some time past, been a matter upon which the 
 great body of English lawyers have been h& much agreed 
 as it was, subsequently to the writings of Bentham, with 
 regard to the propriety of that corresponding amendment 
 in the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, which has long 
 ago been made, and has of late years been so greatly 
 developed. In the event of an identical, or similar, 
 and much-needed reformation of the Law of Evidence 
 
 f 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 in Criminal Cases hcln^ effected by any Act of Parlia- 
 ment dealing exclusively with the su))ject, and passed 
 before the present Edition of tliis Work becomes sub- 
 stantially exhausted, a Supplement to this Edition will be 
 published containing such Act, with appropriate explana- 
 tions and notes, and so written that it can be interleaved 
 in copies of this Edition in its proper place (between 
 pages 894 and 895) without in any way making the 
 present text either inconsistent or incoherent. 
 
 It has been thought well to make the Work one only 
 dealing with the substantive Law of Evidence, and to 
 eliminate so much of it as related to mere details of 
 practice. The long intervals which, of necessity, elapse 
 between the various Editions of such a Work, alone 
 appear to call for, and to justify, this course. 
 
 y 
 
 te 
 
 In the Table of Cases referenros have, at a great 
 expenditure of labour, been, for the tirst time, furnished 
 to evert/ Report of each case which c; j ascertained to 
 exist, including the first 20 vols, of evised Reports; 
 
 to give all these references in the fooiuote, each time 
 a case is cited, makes a very serious demand upon 
 space, the extent of which will be realised by supposing 
 the not improbable case of a modern decision of import- 
 ance being reported in six different Reports, and being 
 cited six times. For these reasons, in the citation of 
 cases in the footnotes no references have been given to 
 those Reports in which they are to be found. An addi- 
 tional reason for this course is, that a footnote, in which 
 Reports are referred to, is, if it omits a reference to the 
 particular Reports which the reader chances to possess 
 (an omission especially likely to occur in the case of a 
 
▼1 PREFACE, 
 
 country practitioner), of little use. To enable a reader, 
 however, to weif^li tlie value of each decision at a j^lance, 
 he has been supplied in the footnotes with its date — (a 
 very important factor in determining- its value, since few 
 decisions of a date prior to the Revolution of 1G68 are 
 of any value, while the Law of Evidence is chiefly 
 founded upon decislcms given within the last 150 years), 
 — with its nationality, and (where tlie case is English) 
 also with the name of the Court, or of the particular 
 Judge, responsible for the decision or dictum. As the 
 plan thus adopted is a new one, it may perhaps be 
 usefully mentioned that a complete Table of all Cases 
 refeired to throughout the Work is j)refixed to each 
 Volume, so that, if it be required to examine in an 
 original Report the cases cited in any passage, the reader 
 may o\)cn the one volume at the required passage and 
 obtain the references from the Table of Cases prefixed 
 to the other Volume, and in this way be saved having to 
 lose his place while turning over pages. 
 
 It has also been endeavoured to obtain some saving 
 of space, as well as additional clearness of style, by 
 the removal of some matters (especially in the Second 
 Volume, which followed Professor Greenleafs work less 
 closely than Volume I.) that were formerly mentioned 
 in the Text as examples of principles there stated, but 
 which were necessarily inserted there at some length, 
 from the Text (which they tended to somewhat obscure 
 to an ordinary reader) to footnotes, where they have 
 been condensed as far as possible, and in general re- 
 arranged in alphabetical order. Specimens of this may 
 be found throughout the work; but, taking some 
 examples at random, they will be found in the notes 
 to § 1107, to § 1108, to § 1592, and to § IGll. 
 
 (( 
 
 .-1^ 
 
 'kfr 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Vll 
 
 it(» 
 
 In addition to the large saving of space effected by 
 the several means which have been mentioned, a fui-ther 
 largo saving in this direction has been made by remorse- 
 lessly pruning all exuberance of expression, even some- 
 times, it may be, at a sacrifice of style and rhetorical 
 effect. Some Editors, indeed, consider the text of their 
 Author to be so absolutely sacred that not a word of it 
 ought to be touched. The present Editor, however, 
 tl links that the true duty of the Editor of a Law Book 
 is to strive his best to render the Work which he is 
 editing one that the Author would have produced if 
 writing at the present day ; and that, in carrying out 
 this task, the Editor of such a Book must be bold, and 
 must not shrink from responsibility. 
 
 Moreover, the tendency of every legal Author naturally 
 18 to "note up" new decisions, but to omit to excise 
 cases which have, by the lapse of time, become of 
 comparatively little importance, or which have even 
 been actually overruled. A work of long standing has 
 a tendency, in short, to grow into stating the history of 
 the law in more detail than is at all necessary. 
 
 The warmest acknowledgments are due to Mr. Arthur 
 May, of the Inner Temple, for having, with much 
 accuracy and diligence, verified every reference, and 
 supplied the date to it ; to Mr. J. J. Button, of the 
 Inner Temple, for most carefully revising the proofs, 
 and for assisting in the irksome task of prepai*rng the 
 Index, Table of Statutes, and Table of Rules, &c., 
 referred to ; to Mr. J. A. Hawke, of the Middle 
 Temple, for kind assistance in preparing the Index ; 
 to Mr. R. Riches, the excellent Librarian of the 
 " Bar Library " at the Royal Courts of Justice, for 
 
• •• 
 
 VIH 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 preparing the exhaustive references contained in the 
 Table of Cases; and to friends, too numerous to 
 mention, both at the Bar, and occupying official 
 positions, for most kind assistance in editing portions 
 of the Work dealing with subjects of which they, 
 respectively, are acknowledged masters. 
 
 In a word, it has been endeavoured to bring this 
 standard English text book of the Law of Evidence 
 into an "up-to-date" shape, of which its Author, if yet 
 living, would not be ashamed. Whether this has been 
 done with any succesb, or not, will be determined by a 
 profession which has, on previous occasions, extended 
 great indulgence to the Editor for the many errors and 
 omissions which, in spife of every care, will inevitably 
 creep into a work of magnitude. Plowever inadequately 
 the task of the present Editor may have been performed, 
 the great Work of the Author will, in future Editions, 
 and in spite of any defects in the present one, secure 
 for him the realisation of his hope that, to use the words 
 in which he concluded his Preface to the last Edition 
 published under his own supervision — 
 
 " Unthought of by man in rewards or in praises- 
 May I be remembered hj wbat I have done." 
 
 G. PITT-LEWIS. 
 
 4, Paper Btjilutnos, Tehplb, 
 Itt August, 1895. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The American editor is completely excused from the 
 necessity of saying anything concerning the merits of 
 Judge Taylor's original work. A treatise which in Eng- 
 land and America has so long and so admirably stood tlie 
 tests of time and daily use among an exacting profession, 
 critical as to correctness of statement and fullness of 
 research, speaks for itself with sufficient distinctness. 
 
 The ninth English edition embodies many extensive 
 and painstaking improvements by G. Pitt Lewis, Esq., 
 Q. C. Among others, mention may be made of the facts 
 that the original work, while benefited by many additional 
 cases, has been condensed, without sacrifice of essential 
 value; and that the range of citation for English and 
 Irish cases and for English legislation has been carried 
 down to a late day. The condensation referred to has 
 added clearness to the text. Many illustrations of prin- 
 ciple, which, though valuable in themselves, in earlier 
 editions somewhat impeded the flow of thought, have been 
 judiciously reduced to a proper position as foot-notes, in 
 condensed form and, so far as possible, in alphabetical 
 order. The English editor, thinking, to use his own lan- 
 guage, " that the true work of the editor of a law book is 
 to strive his best to render the work which he is editing 
 one that the author would have produced if writing at the 
 
 U 
 
IV 
 
 PUErACE. 
 
 present day," has industriously and successfully labored to 
 that end. 
 
 The American editor, while not, it is hoped, neglecling 
 the valuable consideration suggested by his learned coad- 
 jutor, has proposed, as his primary object, a somewhat 
 different result : — namely, to give to the profession, so 
 far as conveniently possible within the limitations imposed 
 by the form of notes, such a statement of the modern law 
 of evidence as might be practically useful to the active 
 practitioner, and yet possess value to those who were 
 desirous of acquainting themselves with the fundamental 
 principles of the subject. 
 
 It has seemed necessary, in pursuing this object, that 
 many inviting by-paths of antiquarian research should 
 consciously be neglected, and the desire to follow the cur- 
 rent of authority up among the headsprings of our juris- 
 prudence should be repressed. The historical development 
 of the present rules of evidence has been noted only so far 
 as seemed fairly needed for a clear conception of the rules 
 themselves. The feeling has been strong that the clianged 
 conditions of modern life have not failed to affect also the 
 development of this branch of the law, and that it there- 
 fore yearly grows more essential that, as the intricacy and 
 magnitude of matters submitted to judicial investigation 
 continues to increase, the rules of evidence under which 
 they must be determined should be simplified, both in 
 number and through being formulated with precision. In 
 many ways, statutory and judicial, it is fairly to be said 
 that the law of evidence is tending in this direction. 
 Tlie present work is intended as a contribution to the 
 same end. 
 
 The range of citation has necessaril}' embraced the entire 
 United States and the Province of Canada. So far as 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 possible, leading cases have been cited in each jurisdiction. 
 But to many a practitioner without ready access to a large 
 law library such bountiful citations merely furnish a "feast 
 of Tantalus." To remedy this ditiiculty, so far as possible, 
 the point of the case cited has been given in the exact 
 language of the court. This not only furnishes a quotable 
 statement, but possesses the additional advantage that the 
 reader is not forced to rely wholly upon the ability of an 
 editor to catch and paraphrase the precise shade of mean- 
 ing intended by the court. 
 
 The plan of putting the entire collection of American 
 law relating to a particidar topic at the end of the Englisli 
 chapters on the same subject has been found acceptable in 
 practical use, and is continued in the present international 
 work. To afford still further opportunity for ready ref- 
 erence to American and Canadian law, a separate index 
 to subjects treated in the American notes and a separate 
 tabulation of cases therein cited have been prepared. 
 
 AVhile it has not proved possible to embrace within the 
 present compass certain topics covered by well accepted 
 separate treatises, or by the statutes of the several juris- 
 dictions, it is hoped that the present work will prove of 
 material assistance to our busy profession in the prepara- 
 tion and trial of causes, and also be of value to those who 
 arc interested in a consideration of the underlying prin- 
 ciples which affect the larger aspects of the subject. 
 
 CllARLE^i F CIIAMBEllLAYNE. 
 
 Boston, January 19, 1897. 
 
 Ire 
 
 (13 
 
analvJ^tji* 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Nature and Principles of Evidence. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Preliminary Observations 
 
 American Note : Defiiiitions. 
 
 Evidence — Pact — Proof — Testimony — Cumula- 
 tive Evidence — Competent Evidence — Rele- 
 vancy-^ Legal Relevancy 
 
 FAOK 
 
 1-2 
 
 2i_2» 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Matters Judicially noticed without Proof . . . . 
 American Note : Judicial Notice. 
 
 Required Cognizance — Instances — Optional Cog- 
 nizance — Instances 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 How Questions of Fact Tried — Functions of Judge 
 
 in Jury Trials 
 
 American Note : Law and Pact. 
 , Function of the Court — Construction of Writ- 
 
 ings — Negligence — Due Diligence — Probable 
 Cause— Preliminary Facts — Foreign Laws . 
 
 3-21 
 
 21i_21« 
 
 22-52 
 
 52'-52" 
 
i'i 
 
 ('■■ 
 
 ANALYSIS. VU 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Grounds of Belief 63-68 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Presumptive Evidence 69-183 
 
 American Note: Presumptions. 
 
 Conclusive Presumptions — Instances .... 183^-183'' 
 Presumptions Proper — Instances .183^^-183'' 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Rules Governing the Production of Testimony. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Production of Evidence governed by Four Great Rules. 
 
 Rule I. — Evidence must correspond with Issues ; Vari- 
 ances ; Amendments 184-218 
 
 American Xote : Relation of Pleading to Evidence. 
 
 Evidence de Bene — Relevancy — Auxiliary Facts 218^-218* 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Rule II. — Evidence must be confined to Points in Issue 219-257 
 
 American Note : Res inter Alios Actse. 
 
 Instances 257^-257* 
 
 Relaxation of Rule — Mental State — Tracing a 
 
 Constant Cause — Instances — Railroad Cases . 25 7^^-25 7^ 
 
 Character Evidence. 
 
 Civil and Criminal Cases — Exceptions — Charac- 
 ter of Witness — Proof 257''«-257" 
 
iii 
 
 Viii ANALYSIS. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 RcLE III. — Burthen of Proof lies on Party who sub- 
 stantially ASSEKTS THE AkFIKMATIVE : — RiGHT TO 
 
 Begix asd to Reply 258-276 
 
 American Note -■ Burden of Proof. 
 
 Double Meaning — Instances 276^-276" 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 RcTLE IV. — The Best Evidence must always be pro- 
 duced; Secondary Evidence (1) As to Documents, 
 Notices to Produce, &c. ; (2) As to Oral Evidence, 
 Depositions, «&c 277-3.58 
 
 American Note: Best Evidence. 
 
 Early Rale — Modern Statement — Application to 
 
 Written Instmments 358'-358" 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Certain Particular Descriptions of Evidence. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Evidence Addressed to the Sknses 359-36o 
 
 American Note : Real Evidence. 
 
 Mixed Real Evidence — Instances — Personal In- 
 juries — Compulsory Exhibition — Experiments 
 in and out of Court 365^-305*' 
 
 CHAFFER II. 
 Hearsay is, as a General Rule, rejected 
 
 366-391 
 
ANALYSIS. 
 
 IX 
 
 American Note : Bes Gostse, 
 
 Declarations Constituting — Declarations, Facts in 
 the Res Gestae — Declarations, Part of a Res 
 GestsB Fact — Instances — Spontaneity as a 
 Test — Narrative — Differences in American 
 
 Decisions — Privity 391^-391-» 
 
 Hearsay. 
 
 Objections — Reported Statements zs Facts — 
 
 Instances Sn^^-SdV^ 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 First Exception to General Rule rejecting Hearsay- 
 Evidence AS to Matters of Public and General 
 Interest 392-412 
 
 American Note: Matters of Public and General 
 Interest. 
 
 Boundaries, Public and Private — Reputation . . 412^-412''^ 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Second Exception to General Rule rejecting Hear- 
 say-Evidence AS TO Matters ok Pedigree .... 413-427 
 American Note : Hearsay concerning Pedigree . 427^-427" 
 
 CHAFPER V. 
 
 Third Exception to General Rule rejecting Hear- 
 say-Evidence AS to Ancient Possession 428-433 
 
 American Note : Hearsay concerning Ancient Pos- 
 session. 
 
 Corroboration 433M33* 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Fourth Exception to General Rule rejecting Hearsay- 
 
 JiVIDENCE afforded HY DECLARATIONS BY DECEASED 
 PeRS )NS AGAINST THEIR PECUNIARY OR PROPRIETARY 
 
 Interests 434-452 
 
 American Note : Declarations against Interest. 
 
 Not Admissions 452>-4.02"' 
 
 ||! .» 
 
,^l! 
 
 ANALYSIS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Fifth ExcEirriON to Glnerali Rule hejectino Heab- 
 
 SAy-£viDENCE AKFOHDED BY DECLARATIONS IN THE 
 
 CouusE ov Office ok Business 453-463 
 
 American Note; Shop Books 4631-463* 
 
 Books of Account 463»-463''< 
 
 Entries in Course of Business. 
 
 An Extended Development 463^-463" 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Sixth Exception to Genekal Rule rejecting Hear- 
 say-Evidence afforded by Dying Declarations . . 464-470 
 
 American Note: Dying Declarations. 
 
 Modem Restrictions 470M70'*' 
 
 f 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Admissions 471-554 
 
 American Note: Admissions. 
 
 Silence — Compromise 554^-554^' 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Confessions 555-588 
 
 American Note: Confessions. 
 
 Corroboration — Undue Influence — Instances . . 588^-588" 
 
 Pi 
 
 Cei 
 
 G 
 
ANALYSIS. 
 
 Zl 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 M 
 
 Special Rules of .Law as to the Evidence in Certain 
 
 Particular Cases. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 FA OB 
 
 Public Policy requires the Exclusion of Evidence on 
 Certain Matters, viz. : 
 
 (1) Communications during Marriage between 
 Husband and Wife: (2) Communications 
 witli Professional Adv isers : (3) Evidence of 
 Judicial Personages and of Counsel : (4) Mat- 
 ters which are State Secrets : (5) Indecent 
 Matters 
 
 589-622 
 
 American Note: Privileged Matters. 
 
 Marital Confidence — Communications between 
 Attorney and Client — Secrets of State — Pub- 
 lic Justice — Grand and Petty Jurors — Sources 
 of Information — Matters against Decency . . 622^22" 
 
 CHAFFER II. 
 
 Certain Matters which are not Provable by a Sin- 
 gle Witness, viz. : 
 
 (1) Treason: (2) Perjury: (3) Affiliation: (4) 
 Breach of Promise to Marry : (5) The Evi- 
 dence of Accomplices in Crime 623-635 
 
 American Note : Corroboration. 
 
 Treason — Perjury — Accomplices — Bastardy 
 
 and Seduction 635^-635* 
 
 ■Ai 
 
xii 
 
 ANALYSIS. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Certmn Matters wiiicii are required to be Evidenced 
 
 BY Writing, viz.: 637-738 
 
 (1) At Coinmon Law : ' 
 
 (2) By Certain Statutes. » 
 
 American Note : Statutory Writings 738^ 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The AoMissiBiLiTr ov Parol Evidence to affect 
 
 Written Instrument.s 739-808 
 
 American Note : Parol Evidence Rule. 
 
 Limitations applied — Receipts — Bills of Lading 
 — Bills of Parcels — Collateral Agreements — 
 Scope misunderstood — Mortgages and Trusts 
 — Duress — Illegality — Incapacity — Fraud — 
 Consideration — Mistake — Incomplete Deliv- 
 ery — Discharge, Waiver, Modification, etc. . 808M08" 
 
 ^ By Common Law, " writing " wa.s, iii general, etiuivalont to a deed. The prin- 
 cipal matters required l)y the Common Law to he " in writing " (tliat is hy deed) are : 
 — (a) Grants or Demises of Incorporeal Rights: (1)) (iifts of Personalty unaccom- 
 panied by delivery, whether inter vicos or mortis causa: (c) Appointments of Agents 
 to execute Deeds : (d) Contracts with Corporations : and (e) I'uwcrs of Attorney 
 for the Execution of Deeds. 
 
 2 The principal matters required by Statute to be evidenced by writing are aa 
 follows: — (a) Sales of Ships or Shares in Ships: (b) Certain dealings with Real 
 Property (including Leases for more than Three Years) : (c) Or niattei's falling 
 within the Statute of Frauds, such as Assignments or Surrenders of Realty, Special 
 Promises by Executors or Administrators, Guarantees, Agreements in consideration 
 of Marriage, Contracts for Interests in Lands, Agreements not to be performed within 
 a Year, and Sales of Goods for CIO, or upwards : (d) AVills and Codicils and Revo- 
 cations or Revivals thereof : (e) Acknowledgments (other than hy part payment) of 
 Debts or Incorporeal Rights which have become Statute-barred: (f) Acceptances: 
 (g) Contracts under the Truck Act: (h) Or under the Merchant Shipping Act: 
 (i) Documents governed by various other Acts : Or (j) Documents requiring Inrol- 
 ment or Registration, such as Warrants of Attorney or Cognovits, Bills of Sale, 
 Grants of Annuities, &c. 
 
ANALYSIS. 
 
 XUl 
 
 PART V. 
 
 Instruments of Evidence. 
 
 •!> ,• 
 
 ■ J I 
 
 CIIAFrER I. 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Witnesses, and the Means of Procuring their At- 
 tendance 809-873 
 
 CHAFrp:R II. 
 
 The Competency of Witnesses . 874-910 
 
 American Note : Competency of Witnesses. 
 Mental Derangement — Youth — Tntoxication — 
 Atheism — Policy of Law — Judges — Attor- 
 ney taking the Stand — Husband and Wife — 
 Infamous Crime — Testamentary Witnesses — 
 Functions of Court and Jury 910^-910^ 
 
 CHAFfER III. 
 
 The Examination of Witnesses — inoluding the tak- 
 ing OK Affidavits — befoke an Examiner, or on 
 Commission 911-978 
 
 American Note : Memoranda refreshing Memory. 
 
 Primary Recollection — Secondary Recollection . 978'-978''' 
 
 Separation of Witnesses. 
 Consequences of Disobedience 978^-978" 
 
 Examination of Witnesses. 
 
 Direct Examination — Scope 978^^^-978'^ 
 
 Cross Examination — Scope — Impeachment 
 
 — Contradictory Statements 978'M78'''' 
 
 Subsequent Fxaminations 978'^^-978''''"' 
 
f" 
 
 XIV 
 
 ANALYSIS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Matters EviDENCEn by Public Documents , 
 American Note : Public Documents. 
 Proof — Relevancy 
 
 PAQB 
 
 979-1179 
 
 1179>-1179» 
 
 CHAFfER V. 
 Matters Evidenced by Private Writings 
 
 1180-1229 
 
 American Note: Private Writings. 
 
 Frodaction — Proof of Execution — Attested 
 Writings — Exceptions — Unavailable Wit- 
 ness — " Own Claim " — Ancient Documents 
 — Proof of Contents 1229M220^« 
 
 Proof of Handwriting. 
 
 Witnesses — Correspondence, etc. — " Com- 
 parison of Hands" — Conflict of Authority 
 — Ancient Documents — Documents in the 
 Case — Province of Court and Jury — Let- 
 ters in Reply 1229'"-1229'" 
 
 PART VI. 
 
 Some General Rules as to the Admission 
 or Rejection of Evidence at the Trial, 
 and as to the Admissibility of Further 
 Evidence on Appeal 1230-1234 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Preface ---------- Pagea iii — viii 
 
 Analysis of Work -------- x— xiy 
 
 List of Abbreviations refeurinq to American, Irish, or 
 Scotch Authorities -------- xv — xix 
 
 Table of Cases cited -------- xx— ccxvi 
 
 Table of Statutes cited ------ ccxvii— ccxxxiv 
 
 Tables of Rules and Forms of Supreme Court cited ccxxxv— ccxxxvi 
 
 Table of Rules and Forms of County Courts cited - - ccxxxvi 
 
 Addenda and Errata ------- ccxxxvii — ccxlii 
 
 TEXT 1—1234 
 
 Appendix ---------- App, i— xi 
 
 .f 
 
 INDEX (Ee/erencea are to the Paragraphs (§§), and not to the Pagea). 
 
 jl 
 
< I 
 
 ANALYSIS OF WORK. 
 
 w 
 
 ■t:i* ■' 
 
 ^ttalfisfljBf of movk. 
 
 PART I. 
 Nature and Principles of Evidence. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Peeliminabt Observations 
 
 FAOB 
 
 1—2 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Matters Judicially noticed without Proof 
 
 8—21 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 How Questions of Fact Tried-Functions of Judge in Jury 
 Trials - - _ . 
 
 22—62 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Grounds of Belief 
 
 fi3— 68 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Pbbsumpiive Evidence 
 
 J-183 
 
ANALYSIS OF WOBE. 
 
 Zl 
 
 PART n. 
 
 Rules Governing the Production of Testimony. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Production of Evidence governed by Fonr Great Rules. 
 
 PAQB 
 
 Rule I.— Evidence must correspond with Issues; Vari- 
 ances; Amendments --.---_ 184 — 218 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 
 Rui-E n.— Evidence must be confined to Points in Issue - 219—257 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Rule III. — Burthen of Proof lies on Party who substan- 
 tially ASSERTS THE AFFIRMATIVE :— RiGHT TO BeQIN AND 
 
 TO Reply ---------- 258—276 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Rule IV.— The Best Evidence must always be produced ; 
 Secondary Evidence (1) As to Documents, Notices to 
 Produce, &c.; (2) As to Oral Evidence, Depositions, &o. 277 — 368 
 
I' 
 
 xu 
 
 ANALYSIS OF 'VOR^. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Certain Particular Descriptions of Evidence. 
 
 ♦ 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Evidence Addressed to the Senses . - _ - - 359 — 365 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 HeauSay is, as a General Eule, rejected - - [] - 366 — 391 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 FiusT Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — 
 Evidence as to Matters of Public and General 
 Interest ..-- 392—412 
 
 • CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 Second Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — 
 
 Evidence as to Matters of Pedigree - - - - 413—427 
 
 CHAPTEE V. 
 
 Third Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — 
 
 Evidence as to Ancient Possession - - . - 428—433 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 Fourth Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — 
 Evidence afforded by Declarations by Deceased 
 Persons against their Pecuniary or Proprietary 
 Interests -.-----_. 434—452 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 Fifth Exception to General Eule rejecting Hearsay — 
 Evidence afforded by Declarations in the course of 
 Office or Business -------- 453- 4C3 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 Sixth Excbption to General Eule rejecting Hearsay- 
 Evidence AFFORDED BY DYING DECLARATIONS - - - 464—470 
 
 CHAraEE IX. 
 Admissions ----- .-.-- 471—554 
 
 CHAPTEE X. 
 Confessions ---------- 555—588 
 
ANALYSIS OF WORK. 
 
 xui. 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 Special Rules of Law as to the Evidence in certain 
 Particular Cases. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 Public Policy kequires the Exclusion of Evidence on 
 
 OEKTAIN MaTTEBS, VIZ. : 
 
 (1) Comiimnications during Marriage between Husband 
 and Wife : (2) Communications with Professional 
 Advisers : (:3) Evidence of Judicial Personages and 
 of Counsel : (4) Matters which are State Secrets : 
 (6) Indecent Matters - - . . - - 
 
 FAOB 
 
 589—622 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Certain Matters which are not Provable by a Single 
 Witness, viz. : 
 
 (1) Treason : (2) Perjury : (3) Affiliation : (4) Breach of 
 Promise to Marry : (5) The Evidence of Accomplices 
 in Crime 623—635 
 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Certain Matters which are required to be Evidenced by 
 Writing, viz. : .-_.-*■- 
 
 (1) At Common Law : ' 
 
 (2) By certain Statutes.* 
 
 637—738 
 
 CHAPTER rV. 
 
 The Admissibility of Parol Evidence to affect Written 
 
 Instruments __. 739—808 
 
 ' By Common Law, "writing" was, in general, equivalent to a deed. The 
 principal matters required by the Common Law to be "in writing" (that is by deed) 
 are; — (a) Grants or Demises of Incoqioreal Rights: (b) Gifts of Personalty un- 
 accompanied by delivery, whether inter vivos or mortis causa : (c) Appointments of 
 Agents to execute Deeds : (d) Contracts with Corporations : and (e) Powers of 
 Attorney for the Execution of Deeds. 
 
 * The principal matters requh-ed by Statrtte to be evidenced by writing are as 
 follow ; — (a) Sales of Ships or Shares in Ships : (b) Certain dealings with Real 
 Property (including Leases for more than Three Years) : (c) Or matters falling 
 within the Statute of Frauds, such as Assignments or Surrenders of Realty, Special 
 Promises by Executors or Administrators, Guarantees, Agreements in consiilcration 
 of Marriage, Contracts for Interests in Lands, Agreements not to be performed 
 within a Year, and .Sales of Goods for £10, or upwards: (d) Wills and Codicils 
 and Revocations or Revivals thereof : (e) Acknowledgments (other than by ^art 
 payment) of Debts or Incorporeal Rights which have iKX'omo Statute-barred : 
 (f) Acceptances : (g) Contracts under the Tru(^k Art : (h) Or under the Merchant 
 Shipping Act : (i) Documents governed by various other Acts: Or (j) Documents 
 retiuiring rnrolnient or Registration, such as Warrants of Attorney or Cognovits, 
 Bills of Sale, Grants of Aimuities, &o. 
 
!i 
 
 i'r 
 
 3UV 
 
 ANALYSIS OF WOBK. 
 
 PART V. 
 Instruments of Evidence. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Witnesses, asv the Means of Pbocuring theib Attend- 
 ance --_.-----» 
 
 PAOB 
 
 809—873 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 The Competency of Witnesses - 
 
 CHAPTER ni. 
 
 - 874—910 
 
 The Examination of Witnesses — including the taking of 
 
 Affidavits— befobe an Examiner, or on Commission - 911 — 978 
 
 ■ CHAPTER rV. 
 Matters Evidenced by Public Documents - 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Matters Evidenced by Private Writings - 
 
 979—1179 
 
 1180—1229 
 
 PART VI. 
 
 Some General Rules as to the Admission or 
 Rejection of Evidence at the Trial, and 
 as to the Admissibility of Further Evi- 
 dence on Appeal ...... 1230—1234 
 
( XV , 
 
 BY WHICH VARIOUS IRISH, SCOTCH, AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES 
 ARE CITED IN THIS TRI^ATISE.' 
 
 y 
 
 I 
 
 •V 
 
 \^ 
 
 .Mil 
 
 Note. — Most of the American Reports are to he found in the respective Libraries 
 of the Inner and Middle. Temples. But some few of them are only to be 
 obtained at the British Museum. The letters A., B., C, D., np/iended to the 
 American Reports, denote the relative estimation in which those Reports are 
 held by the prtfeaaion in general, out of the particular State where the decixiona 
 were pronounced : A. marking the highest degree of excellence. A very eminent 
 American jurist kindly furnished the Author with this guide. 
 
 ABBBGYIATIONS. KAlfE OF WORK, BTO. 
 
 Addis Addison's Reports, Pennsylvania, 179' — 1799. 1 vol. (0.) 
 
 Aik Aiken's Reports, Vermont, 1826— 1827. 2 vols. (B.) 
 
 A. K. Mamh A. K. Marshall's Rep., Keumoky, 1817—1821. 3 vols. (D.) 
 
 Ale. & Nap Aloock & Napier's Reports, icing's Bench, Ireland. 1 voL 
 
 Alisou, Cr. L Alison's Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland. 
 
 Alison, Pra';t. of 1 Alison's Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland. 
 Cr. L ) 
 
 Am. Dec American Deoisious (Select Cases from various American State 
 
 Courts), San Francisco, 1700—1344. 40 vols. 
 
 Am. Ed American edition. 
 
 Am. Jur American Jurist. Boston. 
 
 Am. Rep American Reports (Selected from the Decisions of the Courts 
 
 of lust resort in the several States of America), Albany, 
 1869—1887. 60 vols. 
 
 Am. St. Rep American State Reports (a rontinuation of Anierican Reports), 
 
 188V— 1896. 42 vols. (Series still current.) 
 
 Anthon Anthon's Nisi Pr. Rep., New York, 1808—1818. 1 vol. (D.) 
 
 Applet Appleton's Reports, Miiine, from 1841. 1 vol. (C.) 
 
 Arm. M. & Armstrong', Macartney & Ogle's Rep., Nisi Pr., Irel. 1 vol. 
 
 Arm. & T Armstrong & Trevor's Rep. of R. v. O'Connell, Dub., 1844. 
 
 Bail Bailey's Reports, South Carolina, 1828—1832. 2 vols. (B.) 
 
 Ball & B ; . Ball & Beatty's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 2 vols. 
 
 Batty Batty's Reports, King's Bench, Ireland. 1vol. 
 
 Bay Bay's Reports, South Carolina, 1783— 1804. 2 vols. (B.C.) 
 
 Bell, Dig Bell's Digest of the Laws of Scotland. 
 
 Bibb Bibb's Reports, Kentucky, 1808-1817. 4 vols. (D.) 
 
 Binn Biimey's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1799 — 1814. 6 vols. (A.) 
 
 Bland, Ch Bland's Chancery Rep., Maryland, 1811— 1830. 2 vols. (0.) 
 
 Blackf Blackford's Reports, Indiana, 1817—1838. 4 vols. (CD.) 
 
 Bi"owne Browne's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1806 — 1814. 2 vols. (G.) 
 
 Burnet, Cr. L. . . Burnet on Criminal Law of Scotland. 
 
 ' A list of the ordinary abbreviations u.sed in En<rlish law is cominoiJy known, 
 and can, at any rate, be found in the catalogues of many law publishors. 
 
 ii^ 
 
 id 
 
 t 
 
 I' 
 
I 
 
 XVI 
 
 ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. 
 
 NAUE OF WORE, ETO. 
 
 CaineB Gaines's Reports, New York, 1803—1805. 3 vols. (A.) 
 
 dtj Hall Bee . . New York Recorder, contaiDing Reports of Cases in City Gaorts 
 from IS16 to 1821. 6 vols. 
 
 Com. Commonwealth. 
 
 Conklin'e Pi. .... Conklin's Practice of Cts. of United States, New York, 1842. 
 
 Conn. Connecticut Reports, by T. Day, 1814— 1848. 15 vols. (B.) 
 
 Const. R. Constitutional Rep., 8. Carolina, 1812—1816. 2 vols. (B.C.) 
 
 Const.U.S. Amend. Amended Constitution of the United States. 
 
 Cooke & Ale .... Cooke and Alcock's Rep., King's Bench, Ireland. 1vol. 
 
 Cocke Cooke's Reports, Tennessee, 1811— 1814. 1 vol. (D.) 
 
 Cowen Cowen's Reports, New York, 1823—1828. 9 vols. (A.) 
 
 Coxe Coxe's Reports, New Jersey, 1790—1795. 1 vol. (0.) 
 
 Cnmch Cranch's Rep., Sup. Ct. of U.S., 1800—1815. 9 vols. (A.) 
 
 Crawf.&D.,Abr.C. Crawford and Dix's Abridged Cades in Ireland. 1 vol. 
 
 Crawf . & D., C C. Crawford and Dix, Irish Circuit Reports. 3 vols. 
 
 Cush. ...,,,,,„. Cnshing's Rep. Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 9 vols. 
 
 DalL ..., Dallas's Reports. Supreme Courts of United States, and 
 
 Pennsylvania, 1790—1806. 4 vols. (A.) 
 
 Dane, Abr Dane's Abridgment, United States. 
 
 Day Day's Reports, Connecticut, 1802—1810. 5 vols. (B.) 
 
 Deane, Vom. B. . . Deane's Reports, Supreme Court of Vermont. 3 vols. 
 
 Dev Devereux's Rep., North Carolina, 1826—1834. 4 vols. (B.) 
 
 Dev. &B Devereux and Battle's Rep., North Carolina, 1834—1840. 
 
 4 vols. (B.) 
 
 Dicbon, Ev Dickson on Evidence in Scotland. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1855. 
 
 Drury. Ch-K Drury's Irish Chancery Rep., temp. Sugden, Ch. 1vol. 
 
 Dm. k War. .... Drury and Warren's Reports, Chancery, Ireland, 4 vols. 
 
 Ersk. Inst. ...... Erskine's Institutes of the Law of Scotland. 
 
 Fairf Fairfield's Reports, Maine, 1833— 1835. 3 vols. (B.) 
 
 Fox & Sm. ...... Fox and Smith's Reports, King's Bench, Ireland. 2 vols. 
 
 Gall Gallison's Reports, United States, Ist Circuit Court, 1812 — 
 
 1815. 2 vols. (A.). Judge Story's Decisions. 
 
 Gill, ft J Gill and Johnson's Rep., Maryland, 1829—1840. 10 vols. (B.) 
 
 Glassf . Ev Glaasford ou Evidence, Edinburgh, 1820. 
 
 Gr. Ef Grecnleaf on Evidence. 
 
 Gray Gray's Reports, Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 2 vols. 
 
 GreenL Greenleaf's Reports, Maine, 1820—1832. 9 vols, (B.) 
 
 Hal»t Ralstead's Reports, New Jersey, 1821— 1831. 7 vols. (0.) 
 
 Har. & G Harris and Gill's Rep., Maryland, 1826—1829. 2 vols. (B.) 
 
 Har. ic M'Hen. .. Harris and MHenry's Rep., Maryland, 1790-1799. 4 vols. 
 
 (D.) 
 
 Hardin Hardin's Reports, Kentucky, 1805-1808. 1 vol. (D.) 
 
 Harr. ft J Harris and Johnson's Reports, Maryland, 1800 — 1826. 7 vols. 
 
 (B.) 
 
 Hawks Hawks' Reports, North Carolina, 1820— 1 820. 4 vols. (0.^ 
 
 HHyes Hayes' Reports, Exchequer, Ireland. 1 vol. 
 
 Hayes 6l Jon Hayes and Jones' Reports, Exchequer, Ireland. 1 voL 
 
. ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. 
 
 ifVU 
 
 :it| 
 
 |12— 
 
 1(B.) 
 
 ItoIs. 
 
 ABBREVIATIONS. NAME OF WOKE, ETC. 
 
 Hayw Haywood's Reports, North Carolina, 1789—1806. (C.) 
 
 Hen. & Munf Henning and Munford's Rep., Virginia, 1806—1809. 4 vols. (C.) 
 
 Heisk Heiskell, Tennessee, 1870 - 1874. 12 vols. 
 
 Hill, S. Car. R. . . Hill's Reports, South Carolina, 1833-1835. 2 vols. (B.C.) 
 
 nm, N. Y. R. . . Hill's Reports, Now York, 1841—1842. 3 vols. (B.) 
 
 Howard, S. Ct. R. Howard's Rep., United States, Sup. Ct., from 1843. (A.) 
 
 Hume, Com Hume's Commentaries on Criminal Law of Scotland. 
 
 Humph Humphrey's Reports, Tennessee, 1839 — 1841. 2 vols. (D.) 
 
 Iredell Iredell's Reports, North Carolina, 1840—1841. 1 vol. (C.) 
 
 Ii. C. L. R Irish Common Law Reports, 1849 — 1866. 17 vols. Formerly 
 
 cited by Author as " Jr. Law R. N. S." 
 
 Ir. Ch Irish Chancery Reports, 1850 — 1866. 17 vols. Formerly cited 
 
 by Author as " Ir. Eq. R. N. S." 
 
 Ir. Cir. R Irish Circuit Reports. 1 vol. 
 
 Ir. Eq. I*ep Irish Equity Reports. 1838—1850. 13 vols. 
 
 Ir. L. T. Rep. . . Irish Law Times Reports. 
 
 Ir. L. R Irish Law Reports (i. e., Reports at Common Law), 1838 — 1850. 
 
 13 vols. 
 
 I. R. C. L Irish Reports, Common Law, 1807 — 1877. 
 
 I. R. Eq Irish Reports, Equity, 1867—1877. 
 
 J. J. Marsh J. J. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1829—1832. 7 vols. (D.) 
 
 Jebb, C. C Jebb's Crown Cases Reserved, Ireland. 1 vol. 
 
 Jebb & B Jebb and Bourke's Rep., Queen's Bench, Ireland. 1 vol. 
 
 Jebb & Sy Jebb and Symes' Rep., Queen's Bench, Ireland. 2 vols. 
 
 Johns Johnson's Reports, New York, 1806—1823. 20 vols. (A.) 
 
 Johns. Ch. R Johnson's Chan. Rep., New York, 1814—1823. 7 vols. (A.) 
 
 Jones Jones' Exchequer Reports, Ireland. 2 vols. 
 
 Jones & Lat Jones and Latouche's Rep., Chancery, Ireland. 3 vols. 
 
 Joy on Conf Joy on Confession in Criminal Cases, Dublin, 1842. 
 
 Kent, Com Kent's Commentaries, Boston, 1840. 
 
 Kirby Kirby's Reports, Connecticut, 1786— 1788. 1 vol. (D.) 
 
 L. R. (Ir.) Law Reports for Ireland, 1878—1894. 33 vols. (vol. 33 cnrrent 
 
 to end of 1894). Formerly cited by Author as "Ir. Law R." 
 
 LL., U. S Laws of the United States. 
 
 Lans. (N. Y.) .... Lansing, Reports of Decisions in the Supreme Court of the 
 State of New York. New York and Albany, 1869—1873. 
 7 vols. 
 
 Law Rec. Ist Ser. \ ^^^ Recorder, Ist and 2nd Series. Irish. 10 vols. 
 or 2nd feer ) 
 
 Leigh, R Leigh's Reports, Virginia, 1829—1839. 9 vols. (B.) 
 
 Lloyd & G Lloyd and Gookl's Ir. Chan. Rep., temp. Sugden, Ch. 1 vol. 
 
 Long. & T Longfifc.d and Townsend's Rep. Exchequer, Ireland. 1 vol. 
 
 Louis Reports of Louisiana, 1830 — 1840. 16 vols. (B.) 
 
 McC MoCord . Rep., South Carolina, 1820—1828. 4 vols. (B.C.) 
 
 MoC, Ch. R McCord's Chancery Reports, South Carolina, 1825—1827. 
 
 2 vols. (B.C.) 
 
 McDouall, Inst. . . McDouall's (Ld. Bankton) Institutes of Law of Scotland. 
 
 McNuUy, Ev McNally on Evidence, Ireland. 
 
 A. K. Marsh A. K. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1817—1821. 3 vols. (D.) 
 
 J. J. Marsh J. J. Marshall's Rep., Kentucky, 1829— 1832. 7 vols. (D.) 
 
 i 
 
 ill 
 
xyiu 
 
 ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. 
 
 ABBBEVUTIOm. HAXB OF WOBX, ETC. 
 
 Mart Martin's Reports, Louisiana, 1809—1823. 12 vols. (B.) 
 
 Mart., N. S Martin's Reports, New Series, Loniiiiana, 1823 — 1830. 8 yola. 
 
 (B.) 
 
 Mart., N. Car. R.. Martin's North Carolina Reports, 1778—1797. 1 vol. (D.) 
 
 Mart. & Y Martin and Yerger's Rep., Tennessoe, 182i— 1828. I vol. (D.) 
 
 Mason Masou's RoportH, United Stittes, l8t Cirouit <§ourt, 1816 — 
 
 18;iO. 5 vols. (A.) Judge Story's Decisions. 
 
 Mass RejKirts of Mussaohimetts, 1804 — 1822. (A.) 
 
 Meto Metualf 8 Reports. MiiHsiohusetta, 1840 -18 IP. (A.) 
 
 Milw. £o. Ir. R. . . Mil ward's E ules. Iii^h Rep., temp. Dr. Radoliffe. 
 
 Mo Missouri, 1821— 1881, 74 vols. 
 
 Moll Mulluy's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 3 vols. 
 
 Monroe Monroe's Reports, Kentucky, 1824 — 1828. 7 vols. (D.) 
 
 Morison Morison's Scotch Reports. 
 
 Munf Munford's R^-ports, Virginia, 1810-1820. 6 vols. (C.) 
 
 Murph Murphey's Reports, North Caroliua, 1804—1819. (0.) 
 
 N. York Civ. Code The Code of Civil Procedure of New York, 1850. 
 
 N. York Cr. Code The Code of Criminal Procedure of New York, 1850. 
 
 New Hiiinp Reports of New Himpnhire, 18IC -1843. (B.) 
 
 Nott&M'C NottandM'Cord'sRep., S.Carolina, 1817— 1820. 2 vols. (B.) 
 
 Ohio R Hammond's Ohio Reports, Ohio, 1821—1839. 9 vols. (D.) 
 
 Fa. St Pennsylvania State Reports, New York and Albany, 1815— i 
 
 1S95. 16 j vols. (."Series still curreut.) 
 Paige PaiLfe'.s Chan. Rep.. New York, 1828— 1814. 10 vols. (B.) 
 
 Paine Paine's Rep . United States, 2nd Circuit Court, 1810 — 1826. 
 
 1 vol. (B.) 
 
 Paine & D. Pr. . , P.iine an 1 Ducr's Practice of the Courts of the United States, 
 Ntw Yoik, 1830. 
 
 Peck Peck's Report.^, Tennessee, 1822—1824. 1 vol. (D.) 
 
 Penning Penniiijrtou's Rep., New Jersey, 1800 — 1813. 2 vols. (0.) 
 
 Pennsylv Report't of Pennsylvania, 1829— 1.'<32. 3 vols. (B.) 
 
 Pet Peters' Rep., Supreme Courts of United States, 1827—1843. 
 
 (A.) 
 
 Pet. C. C. R Peters' Circmit Courts Reports, United States, 3rd Circuit Court, 
 
 I80.S-1S18. 1 vol. (B.) 
 
 Pick Pickering's liep., Massachusetts, 1 823— 1 S40. 24 vols. (A.) 
 
 Porter Porter's Rejorts, Alabama, 1«34— 18*9. 9 vols. (D.) 
 
 Poth. Ohl Pothier on Obligations, by Evans, Philadelphia ed., 1826. 
 
 R The Reports. 
 
 R. R Revised Reports. 
 
 Rimd Randolph's Reports, Virginia, 1821—1828. 6 vols. (B.) 
 
 Rawle Rawle's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1S28 — 18;J5. 6 vols. (A.) 
 
 Rev. St Revised Statutes of different Stiites in Americ*. 
 
 Ri'lg. L. & 8 Ridi^way, Lapp and Sohoalos' Rep., King's Bench, Irel. 1 vol, 
 
 Riilg. P. C Riclgway's Parliamentary Cases, Irish Parliament. 
 
 Riley Riley's Law Cases, South Caroliua, 1836—1837. 1 vol. (B.) 
 
 Sob. & Lpf Schoales and Lefroy's Reports, Chancery, Ireland. 2 vols. 
 
 Serg. & R Sergeant and Rawle's Rep., Peunsylv., 1818— 29. 17 vols. (A.) 
 
ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. 
 
 XIX 
 
 ABBBBTUTIONS. NAXE OF VOBK, BTO. 
 
 Shepl Shepley's Reportg, Maine, 1836—1841. 6 vols. (0.) 
 
 South Southard's Reports, New Jersey, 1816—1820. 2 vols. (0.) 
 
 Stiiir Inst Stair's Institutes of the Law of Scotland. 
 
 Story, B Story's Reports, United States, Ist Circuit, 1839—1846. t 
 
 vols (A.) Judge Story's Decisions. 
 
 Sumn Sumner's Ri^ports, Ist Circuit Court of United States. Judge 
 
 IStory's Decisions. 1830—1839. 3 vols. (A.) 
 
 Swift, Dig Swift's American Digest. 
 
 Swift, £v Swift's American Law of Evidence. Hartfcid. 
 
 Tuit, Ev Tait on Evidence. Edinburgh, 1834. 
 
 U. S United States. 
 
 Verm Vermont's Reports, Vermont, 1826—1837. 9 vols. (B.) 
 
 Virg. Cas Virginia Cases, Virginia, 1789—1826. 2 vols. (D.) 
 
 Wall Wallis's Irish Chancery Reports, 1766—1791, 1 vol.; or in 
 
 refHreuces to American Reports, either Wallace's United 
 Stiites Supreme Court Reports, Washingtfni, 1803—1874. 
 23 vols. ; or else Wallace's Circuit Court Reports, Phila- 
 delphia, 1801. 1 vol. 
 
 Wall, Jr Philadelphia. 1842—1862. 3 vols. 
 
 Wash Washington's Reports, Virginia, 1790—1790. 2 vols. (C.) 
 
 Wash. C. C. B. . . Washiiipton's Ciniuit Court Reports, United States, 3rd Circuit 
 Court, 1803—1827. 4 vols. (B.) 
 
 Watts Watts' Reports, Peunsylvania, 1832—1840. 10 vols. (A.) 
 
 Wtttts&S Wutts and Sergeant's Rep., Pennsylv., 1811—1842. 3vol8.(A.) 
 
 Wend Wendall's Reports, New York, 1828— 181 1. (A.) 
 
 Whart Wharton's Reports, Pennsylvania, 1835—1840. 6 vols. (A.) 
 
 Wheat Wheaton's Rep., Superior Ct. of Un. States, 1816—1827. (A.) 
 
 Wheel. C. C Wheeler's Criminal Cases, New York. 3 vols. (D.) 
 
 Woodb. & M Woodbury and Minot's Reports, United States, Ist Circuit, 
 
 1845-1847. 2 vols. (A.) 
 
 Wright, R V/right's Reports, Ohio, 1831—1834, 1 vol. (D.) 
 
 Teates Teates' Reports, Pennsylvania, 1791 — 1808. 4 vols (B.) 
 
 Yerg. Yerger'ii Reports, Tennessee, 1832—1837. 10 vols. (D.) 
 
 '■ i ■ J, 
 
 i!li 
 
( ^^i ) 
 
 htl 
 
 '1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 FAoa 
 
 Aaronv. Aaron(1849). 3DeG. &Sm. 47S; 14 Jur. 126 7C1 
 
 Abbey V. Lill (1829), 2 M. & P. 534; 5 Bing. 299 932 
 
 Abbeyleix Gardens v. Sutcliffe (1890), 26 L. R. Ir. 332 608 
 
 Abbot V. Hermon (1830), 7 Groenl. 118 624 
 
 Abbot V. Plumbe (1779), 1 Doug. 216 1208 
 
 Abbot V. WolKoy (1895), 14 R. (July) 211 ; (1895), 2 Q. B. 97 ; 72 L. T. 681 ; 
 
 43W. R. 513 yWrf. [689, 690] 
 
 Abbott V. Abbott and Godoy (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 57 ; 4 S. & T. 254 . . 1048, 
 
 1054 
 Abbott V. Bates (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 117 ; 33 L. T. 491 ; 24 "W. R. 101 . .748, 766 
 Abbott V. Hendricks (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 791 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 183 ; 1 Drink. 
 
 31; 4 Jur. 1113 758 
 
 Abbott v. Mnssie (1796). 3 Ves. 148 ; 3 R. R. 79 796 
 
 Abbott V. Middleton (1868), 7 H. L. Gas. 68 ; 28 L. J. Oh. 110 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 60; 21 Beav. 143; 6 Jur. N. S. 717 741 
 
 Abbotun v. Dunsford (1699), 2 Bott, 80 465 
 
 Abeel v. Radoliff (1816), 13 Johns. 297 673 
 
 Abel v. Potts (1800), 3 Esp. 242; 6 R. R. 826 1048 
 
 Abignyer. Clifton (1612), Hob. 213 901 
 
 Abley v. Dale (1860), 10 C. B. 62 ; 1 L. M. & P. 626 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 33 ; 
 
 U Jur. 1069 1148 
 
 Abouloff t'. Oppenheimer (1882), 62 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 10 Q. B. D. 296; 47 
 
 L. T. 325 ; 31 W. R. 57 1142 
 
 Abrath v. North East. Ry. Co. (1886), 11 App. Cas. 247 ; 65 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 457; 65L. T. 63; 16 Cox, C. C. 364 30, 31, 110, 643 
 
 Abrey v. Crux (1869), L. R. 5 C. P. 37 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 9 ; 21 L. T. 327 . . 767 
 
 Accero v. Petroni (1815), 1 Stark. 100 922 
 
 Accidental and Mar. Ins. Co., Re (1867), 37 L. J. Ch. 66 ; L. R. 5 Eq. 22: 
 
 17 L. T. 308 846 
 
 Acebal V. Levy (1834), 10 Bing. 384; 4 M. & Sc. 217 689, 691 
 
 Ackary, Re, Ex parte BoUand (1876), 45 L. J. Bank. 133 ; 3 Ch. D. 126 ; 
 
 34 L. T. 666 ; 24 W. R. 932 861 
 
 Ackland v. Pearce (181i), 2 Camp. 601 317 
 
 Ackworth, Ex parte (1843), 3 Q. B. 397 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 718 ; 1 New SesB. 
 
 Cas. 64 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 38 ; 18 Jur. 291 1139 
 
 A'Court V. Cross (1825), 3 Bing. 329 ; 1 1 Moore, C. P. 198 712 
 
 Acramanf. Hemiman(1851),16Q.B. 998; 20L. J. Q. B. 355; 15Jur.l008 736 
 Acraman v. Morrice (1849), 8 C. B. 449 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 67 ; 14 Jur. 69 . . 690 
 
 Adam v. Kerr (1798), 1 Bos. & P. 360 1213, 1216 
 
 Adams v. Angell (1876), 6 Ch. D. 634 ; 36 L. T. 334 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 352 . . 163 
 
 Adams v. Balch (1827), 5 Greenl. 188 1098 
 
 Adams V. Barnes (1821), 17 Mass. 365 , 1114 
 
 Adams V. Barry (1843), 2 Y. & C. (Ch.) 167 601 
 
 Adams v. Dansey (1830), 6 Bing. 506 ; 4 M. & P. 245 678 
 
 Adams v. Frye (1841), 3 Mete. 103 1201 
 
 Adamaw. Gibney (1830), 6 Bing. 666; 4 M. & P. 491 773 
 
 Adams v. Jones (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 352 797 
 
 Adams v. Lloyd (1858), 3 H. & N. 351 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 499 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 590 964 
 
 Adams v. Sanders (1829), M. & M. 373 ; 4 C. & P. 25 652 
 
 Adams v. Wordley (1836), 1 M. & W. 374 ; 2 Gale, 29 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 158 ; 
 
 IT. &G. 620 743,757 
 
 Adamson, Re (1876), L. R. 3 P. & D. 263 146 
 
 Vol. I. end* with page 635. 
 
xxu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITKD. 
 
 Adiimthwaite r. Synpfo (1816), 1 Stark. 183 
 
 AddiiiKton f. Clofle (1774-5), '2 Win. Bl. 1030 
 
 ArtdinKtonr. Ma^an (1851), IOC. B 576; 20 L. J. C. P. 82 
 
 Adelaide, Tho (179 t). 2 Ri)bertHon. Oil 
 
 Admiral Austen, Ro (18VJ), 2 C. Rob. 112, n 
 
 Admiral Bojtor, Tho (1857), Swab. 193 
 
 Aflnlo V. rourdrinif'r(18>9), M. & M. 334, n 
 
 AKnew v. Jobson (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 67 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 625 
 
 Agra Bk. v. Barry (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 155 ; Ir. R. 8 Eq. 325 
 
 AKTioultural Cattle Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald (1851), 14 Q. B. 432 ; 20 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 244 ; lo Jur. 489 294, 
 
 Aheam v. Bellman (1879), L. S. 4 Ex. D. 201 ; 40 L. T. 771 ; 27 W. R. 
 
 928 
 
 1018 
 904 
 192 
 
 1095 
 192 
 178 
 314 
 226 
 737 
 
 1197 
 
 523 
 
 Ahearnev. M'Guire (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 437 867 
 
 AinHworth, Re (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 151 699 
 
 Airth Peer. (1839). Part. Min. 105 423 
 
 Aitken, Ex parte (1820), 4 B. & Aid. 49 594 
 
 Alban v. Pritohett (1796), 6 T. R. 680 604 
 
 Albert v. The Grosvenor Invest. Co. (1867), L. R. 3 Q. B. 123 ; 37 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 24 ; 8 B. & S. 604 761 
 
 Alohini;. Hopkins (1834), 1 Binpr. N. C. 99 ; 4 M. & So. 615 682 
 
 Alcookr. Cook (1829), 1 Ph. Evid. 251, n. 1 404, 1040 
 
 Alcock V. The Roy. Exch. Ins. Co. (1849), 13 Q. B. 292; 18 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 121 ; 13 Jur. 446 924, 926, 949 
 
 Alcook V. Whatmore (1840), 8 Dowl. 615 15 
 
 Alcorn v. Larkin (1842), Arm. M. & O. 367 1023 
 
 Alder V. Savill (1814), 5 Taun. 464; 15 R. R. 651 1160 
 
 Alderson v. Clay (1816), 1 Stark. R. 405 169, 288, 526 
 
 Alderson v. Langdale (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 660 1194 
 
 Alderson v. Mnddison (1877), 8 App. Cas. 467 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 737 ; 49 L. 
 
 T. 303 ; 31 W. R. 820 ; 47 J. P. 821 639, 688 
 
 Aldous V. CornweU (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 673 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 9 B. 
 
 & 8. 607 1 195, 1201 
 
 Aldridge v. Gt. W. Ry. Co. (1864), 15 C. B. N. S. 682; 33 L. J. C. P. 
 
 161 729 
 
 Aldridge v. Haines (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 395 1099 
 
 Aldridge v. Johnson (1857), 7 E. & B. 885; 26 L. J. Q. B. 296; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 913 690 
 
 Alexander ». Burchfield (1842), 7 M. & Gr. 1066; 3 Scott, N. R. 656; 
 
 Car. & M. 75 ; 1 1 L, J. C. P. 253 32, 33 
 
 Alexander v. Calder (1885), 64 L. J. Ch. 487 ; 28 Ch. D. 457 ; 33 W. R. 579 912 
 
 Alexander v. Crosbie (1835), Lloyd & G. (temp. Sugden) 145 749 
 
 Alexander v. Dixon (1823), 1 Bing. 366 ; 8 Moore, 387 816 
 
 Alexander v. Strong (1842), 9 M. & W. 733 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 316 ; 2 Dowl. 
 
 P. C. 256 307 
 
 Alexander v. Vanderzee (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 530 ; 20 W. R. 871 42 
 
 Alexandria, Mechanics' Bk. of, t'. Bk. of Columbia (1820), 6 Wheat. 336. . 388 
 
 Alfonso t). U. 8. (1843), 2 Story R. 421 ... 278 
 
 Alford V. Clay (1875), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 216 462 
 
 Alivon V. Fumival (1834), I C. M. & R. 277, 296 ; 3 L. J. Ex, 241 ; 4 
 
 Tyr. 751 278. 306, 309, 1024 
 
 Allan's Patent, Re (1867), L. R. 1 P. C. 507 ; 36 L. J. P. C. 76 129 
 
 Allen, Re '1839). 2 Curt. 331 694 
 
 Allen i>. Bennet (1810), 3 Taun. 169; 12 R. R. 633 ,.672, 675 
 
 Allen ». Cameron (1833), 3 Tyr. 907 : 1 C. & M. 832 223 
 
 Allen V. Denstone (1839), 8 C. & P. 760 388 
 
 Alien*. Duncan (1831), 11 Pick. 309 376 
 
 Allen ». Dundas (1789), 3 T. R. 126; 1 R. R. 666 1045,1103, 1133, 1161 
 
 Allen ». D. of Hamilton (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 630 ; 16 W. R. 866 829 
 
 Allen V. Maddoek (18 18), 11 Moo. P. C. 0. 427 70', 785 
 
 Allen ','. M'Keen (1833), 1 Sumn. 314 623 
 
 Allen V. Pink (1818), 4 M. & W. 140 ; 6 Dowl. 668 ; 1 H. & H. 207 ; 7 L. 
 J. Ex. 206 746 
 
 TA« references are to pages, not to paragrapht. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xxin 
 
 PAOB 
 
 All-nP Snywnnl (1S28), 5 Oreenl. 227 90 
 
 Allonr YcfxalKlHU), 1 C. & Kir. aifi 819 
 
 AlliHTio'' Hunk of Simla v. Carey (1870), 6 0. P. D. 249 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 
 
 -Hi ■ "!) W. R. 306 76 
 
 AllM.t't, IJc (l«(i»). 33 L. J. r. & M. H6 701 
 
 \ll, ,„f r. Mi'fk (1830), 4 U. & P. 207 1224 
 
 Aliiin-i.iiKi. Ke (I860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 46 ; 39 L. T. 19 ; 8 W. R. 29; 6 
 
 Jur. N. S. 302 701 , 785 
 
 AliKT i: (J.orge (1808), 1 Camp. 392 662, 744 
 
 ANti.n. In tlio OoodH of (1892), P. 142 ; 61 L. J. P. 92 ; 66 L. T. 691 ... . 174 
 
 \lv„ra / . B«ker (1832). 9 Wend. 323 154 
 
 Amiilia, The (1804), Brown & L. Adm. 311 185 
 
 Aitibroso Rookwood'H Cano (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 139 236 
 
 Aiiieii.aii l'"iir Co. v. U. S. (1829), 2 PeU'rs, 358 382 
 
 Aimy '■■ I-niig (1808). 9 East, 473; 6 Esp. 110 ; 1 Camp. 14 ; 9 R. R. 580 814 
 
 AniturHt. Ld v. Ld. SoinerH (1788), 2 T. R. 372 ; 1 R. R. 497 1101 
 
 AmiKH, Kc (1849), 2 RobertH. 116 700 
 
 AmoH r. IIiiKhcs (1835), 1 M. & Rob. 464 258, 259 
 
 Amos t: Smith (1867, should be 1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 423 ; 1 H. & C. 238. . 715 
 
 Anchor Milling Co. v. Wulsh (1^91), 32 Am. St. R. 600 ^M. [460] 
 
 Anderson v. Anderson (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 247 ; L. R. 13 Eq. 381 ; 26 
 
 L. T. 12; 20W R. 31H 701 
 
 Anderson v. Gill (1858), 3 Miicq. 180 ; 1 PMterson. 738 170 262 
 
 Anderson v. Gorrie, 14 R. (Feb.) 283 ; 71 L. T. 382 1099 
 
 Anilerson v. Hamilton (1816), 8 Price, 244 ; 4 Moore, C. P. 693, n. ; 2 
 
 Bio. & B. 156, n 618 
 
 Anderson V. Hayman (1789), 1 H. Bl. 120 ; 2 R. R. 734 678 
 
 Anderson v. Long (1823). 10 Serg. & R. 55 252 
 
 Anderson r. Pitcher (ISOO), 2 Bob. & P. 164 ; 3 Esp. 134 ; 1 Stark. 202 ; 
 
 6 R. R. 665 783 
 
 Anderson v. Sanderson (1817), 2 Stark. R. 204 ; Holt, 691 ; 17 R. R. 681 . 603 
 
 Anderson v. Scot (1806), 1 Camp. 235, n C90 
 
 Anderson ». Thornton (1853), 8 Ex. 425 201. 542 
 
 Anderson t>. Weston (1840). 6 Biug. N. C. 296 146, 451 
 
 Anderson v. Whalley (1852), 3 C. & K. 64 926 
 
 Anderstonr Magawlev (17^6). 2 Bro. P. C. 688 , 1040 
 
 Andrew v. Motley (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 626 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 128. .278, 431, 1215 
 
 Andrews r. Andrews (1881-6), 15 L. R. Ir. 199, 211 793, 797 
 
 Andrews v. Andrews {nee Re D'Angibau). 
 
 Andrews v. Askey (1837), 8 C. & P. 7 253, 254. 257. 951, 954 
 
 Andrews v. Elliot (1856), 6 E. & B. 602; 6 E. & B. 338; 25 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 330 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 663 643 
 
 Andrews v. Hailes (1853), 2 E. & B. 349 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 409 ; 17 Jur. 761 116 
 
 Andrews v. Martin (1862), 12 C. B. N. S. 371 ; 6 L. T. 433 869, 871 
 
 Andrews V. Pabner (1812). 1 Ves. & B. 22 329 
 
 Andrews v. Solomon (1816), 1 Peters C. C. Rep. 356 598 
 
 Andrews v. Turner (1842), 3 Q. B. 177 708, 709 
 
 Andrews v. Vandiizer (1814), 1 1 Johns. 38 266 
 
 Angell V. Duke (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 174 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 78 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 26 ; 23 W. R. 307 683, 764 
 
 Angell V. Worsley (1849). 2 Ex. 196. n 146 
 
 Anglesey (M. of) v. Ld. Hatherton (1842), 10 M. & W. 218 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 
 
 67 231. 232, 402, 403 
 
 Anglo-French Co-operative Soc, Re (1380), 14 Ch. D. 633 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 
 
 388 ; 28 W. R. 580 36 
 
 Angus t'. Dalton (1881), 3 Q. B. D. 85 ; 6 App. Cas. 740 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 689; 44 L. T. 844; 30 W. R. 196 115 
 
 Angus «. Smith (1829), M. & M. 473 954 
 
 Ann, The (1860), Lush. Adm. R. 55 186 
 
 Annapolis, The (I860), Lush. Adm. R. 295 ; 30 L. J. Adm. 201 ; 4 L. T. 
 
 417 178, 976, 977 
 
 Annesley v. Ld. Anglesea (1743), 17 How. St. Tr. 1430 . .65, 81, 108, 368, 592, 
 
 606, 610, 892, 976, 977 
 
 Vol. I. mdt uith page 636. 
 
i 
 
 XXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Annett r. Osborne (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy, 376 31 
 
 Anon, (undated), cited 3 Esp. 115 645 
 
 Auon. (undated), Ry. & M. 143 1227 
 
 Anon, (undated), 1 Ph. Ev. 406 5ij9 
 
 Anon, (undated), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 523 976 
 
 Anon, (undated), cited 6 East, 195 ; 8 R. R. 455 464 
 
 Anon. (1623), 2 Rolle R. 255 1 14 
 
 Anon. (1670), 11 Mod. 79 9 
 
 Anon. (1693), Skin. 404 592, 596 
 
 Anon. (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 731 108 
 
 Anon. (1748), 3 Atk. 644 612 
 
 Anon. (1753J, 1 Lew. 101 923 
 
 Anon. (1764), cited 5 B. & Aid. 939, 940, n 629 
 
 Anon. (1799), 12 Mod. 345 9 
 
 Anon. (1807, Burr's Trial), Evid. for Deft., 2 616 
 
 Anon. (1808), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 29 1117 
 
 Anon (1810), cited 2 Camp. 390 n 1161 
 
 Anon. (1811), 8 Mass. 370 604 
 
 Anon. (1827), 1 Moo. C. C. 101 924 
 
 Anon. (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 382 1100 
 
 Anon. (Ia32), 1 Dowl. 157 870, 872 
 
 Anon. (1833), 1 Lew. C. C. 128, 133, 134 824, 825 
 
 Anon. (1833), 1 Hill, S. C. 251 972, 973 
 
 Anon. (1841), Ir. C. R. 165, 167, n. (a) 238 
 
 Anon. (1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 301 871 
 
 Anon. (1841), Ir. C. R. 374 165 
 
 Anon. (1846), cited Bull. N. P. 236 b 1228 
 
 Anon. (1878), cited Campbell v. 'i' wemlow, 1 Price, 88 890 
 
 Anon. V. Anon. (1856), 22 Beav. 481 ; 23 Beav. 273 021 
 
 An8teer.Nelmes(1853), 1H.&N.225; 26L.J.Ex.6; 27L.T.190; 4W.R.612 787 
 
 Anstey v. Dowsing (1745-6), 2 Str. 1253 ; Bull. N. P. 264 279 
 
 Antram v. Chace (1812), 15 East, 209 ; 1 Rose, 344 1038 
 
 Apoth. Co. V. Bentley (1824), Ry. & M. 159 ; 1 C. & P. 538 267 
 
 Appleton V. Ld. Braybrook (1817), 6 M. & S. 34 ; 2 Stark. R. 6 ; 18 R. R. 294 52 
 
 Appotens v. Dunswell (1699), 2 Bott, 80 466 
 
 Aranguerin v. Scholfield (1856), 1 H. & N. 494 ; 28 L. T. O. S. 105 308 
 
 Arbon v. Fussell (1862), 1 N. R. 31 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 753 ; 11 W. R. 26 ; 7 
 
 L. T. 718 133 
 
 Archangelo v. Thomson (181 1), 2 Camp. 620 ; 12 R. R. 758 154 
 
 Archer, Re (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 252 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 80 ; 19 "W. R. 785 699 
 
 Archer v. Baynes (1850), 5 Ex. 626 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 54 670, 172 
 
 Archer V. Leonard (1863), 15 Ir. Ch. R. 267 710, 711 
 
 Arden v. Sullivan (1850), 14 Q. B. 832 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 268 ; 14 Jur. 712. . 654 
 
 Ardingv. Flower (1800), 8 T. R. 536; 3 Esp. 117 866, 869 
 
 ArgoU, Ly. f. Cheney (1624), Pabner, 402 1200 
 
 Arklow, The {see Emery v. Cichero). 
 
 Arlctt V. Ellis (or Sheftord) (1827), 7 B. & C. 346 ; 9 D. & R. 897 ; 9 B. & 
 
 C. 671 116 
 
 Arniistead v. Wilde (1851), 17 Q. B. 261 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 524 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 1010 162 
 
 Armory f). Delamirie (1721), 1 Str. 605; 1 Sm. L. C. 385 108, 117, 361 
 
 Armstrong, Re, Ex parte Lindsay, (1892) 1 Q. B. 327 ; 65 L. T. 464 ; 40 
 
 W. R. 159; 17Cox, C. C. 349; 8M. B. R. 271 36 
 
 Armstrong V. Hewett (1817), 4 Price, 216; 18 R. R. 707 430, 1050 
 
 Armstrong V. Norton (1839), 2 Ir. L. R. 96 1113 
 
 Armstrong f. Stockham (1835), 24 L. J. Ch. 176 ; 3 Eq. Rep. 130 1030 
 
 Aniit's Trusts, Re (1868), Ir. Rep. 5 Eq. 352 100 
 
 Arnold V. Bp. of Bath & W. (1829), 5 Bing. 316 ; 2 M. & P. 650 1050 
 
 Arnold v. Blaker (1871), 40 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; L. R. 6Q. B. 433 ; 19 W. R. 
 
 1090 124 
 
 Arnold v. Hamel (1854), I) Ex. 404 ; 2 C. L. R. 499 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 137 . .40, 226, 227 
 / ajlJ V. Holbrook (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 96 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 80 ; 28 L. T. 
 
 io • 21 W. R. 330 124 
 
 The re/eiencet are to pages, not to paragrapht. 
 
'm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XXV 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Arnold V. May. oi Poole (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 860 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 7 Jur. 
 
 653 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 741 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 574 639, 640, 644, 645 
 
 Arnott V. Hayes (1887), 36 Oh. D. 731; 66 L. J. Ch. 844; 57 L.T. 299; 36 
 
 W. R. 246 1062 
 
 Arnott V. Redfem (1826), 3 Bing. 353 ; 2 C. & P. 88; 11 Moore, C. P. 
 
 209 1 163, 1 154 
 
 Amsby v. Woodward (1827), 6 B. & C. 519 : 9 Dowl. & R. 536 622 
 
 Aronegary v. Lambonade (1881), 50 L. J. P. C. 28 ; 6 App. Cas". 3G4 ; 44 
 
 L. T. 895 149 
 
 Arundell v. Ld. Falmouth (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 440 ; 15 R. R. 305 404 
 
 Arundell v. White (1811), 14 East, 218 1033 
 
 Ash, Re (1856), Deane's Ecc. R. 181 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 526 701 
 
 Ashby V. Bates (1846), 15 M. & W. 589 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 33 259 
 
 Ashbyr. James (1843), 11 M. &W. 542; 12 L. J. Ex. 295 716 
 
 Ashcroft V. Morrin (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 450 ; 6 Jur. 783 671, 075 
 
 Asher v. Whitelock (1865), 35 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. 1 ; 13 L. T. 
 
 254; 11 Jur. N. S. 925 118 
 
 Ashforth v. Redford (1873), L. R. 9 C. P. 20 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 57 42 
 
 Ashhurst f. Mill (1848), 7 Hare, 502 ; 12 Jur. 693, 1035 749 
 
 Ashlin V. Lee (1875). 44 L. J. Ch. 376 ; 32 L. T. 348 ; 23 W. R. 458 .... 721 
 Ashling V. Boon, (1891), 1 Ch. 568 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 306 ; 64 L. T. 193 ; 39 
 
 W. R. 298 281 
 
 Ashmore, Re (1843), 3 Curt. 758 696 
 
 A.shmore v. Hardy (1836), 7 C. & P. 601 617 
 
 Ashpitel V. Bryan (1864), 32 L. J. Q. B. 91 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 328 ; 3 B. & 
 
 S. 474 ; 5 B. & S. 723 ; 3 F. & F. 183 ; 11 L. T. 221 ; 12 W. R. 1082. . 548 
 Ashpitel V. Sercoi.ibe (1850), 5 Ex. 147 ; 6 Rjiil. C. 224 : 19 L.J. Ex. 82. .44, 526 
 Ashrufood Dowlah Ahmed v. Hyder Hosseiu Khan (1885), 11 Moore, lud. 
 
 App. C. 94 101 
 
 Ashton, In goods of, (1892) P. 83 ; 61 L. J. P. 85 ; 67 L. T. 325 739, 740 
 
 Ashton V. Ld. Langdale (1851), 4 De Gex & Sm. 402, n 684 
 
 Ashton's case (1845), 7 Q. B. 169 811 
 
 Ashwell V. Lomi (1850), L. R. 2 P. & D. 477 136 
 
 Ashworth v. Munn (1878). 15 Ch. D. 363 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 747 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 
 
 107 ; 43 L. T. 653 ; 28 W. R. 965 683 
 
 Ashworth v. Outram (1877), 5 Ch. D. 923 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 687 ; 25 W. R. 
 
 896 ; 37 L. T. 85 ; 36 L. T. 400 663 
 
 Aslin f. Parkin (1758), 2 Burr. 065 1113 
 
 Aspden v. Scddon (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 359 ; L. R. 10 Ch. App. 391 ; 31 
 
 L. T. 626 ; 32 L. T. 415; 20 W. R. 580 114 
 
 Astbury v. Belbin (1850), 3 K. & C. 20 871 
 
 Aste v. Stumcre (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 82 ; 13 Q. B. D. 326 ; 49 L. T. 742 ; 
 
 .32 W. R. 219 ; 6 Asp. M. C. 175 769 
 
 Aston, Ex parte (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 631 ; 4 De Gex & J. 220; 27 Beav. 
 
 474 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 779 !»65 
 
 Astor V. Union Ins. Co. (1827), 7 Cowen, 202 763 
 
 Atalanta, The (1808), 6 Co. Rob. Adm. 440, 454 102 
 
 Atchinson t\ Baker (1797), Peake, Add. Cas. 103 153 
 
 Atchley r. Spngg (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 345 ; 10 L. T. 16 ; 12 W. R 364 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 144 101, 422, 621 
 
 .A -henrv Peer. (1836), Pari. Miu. 45 426 
 
 Atherfold v. Beard (1788), 2 T. R. 610 ; 1 R. R. 556 996 
 
 Athcrley t'. Hurvey (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 518 ; 2 Q. B. D. 524 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 551 ; 25 W. R. 727 , 961, 1182 
 
 AthlonePccr (1841), 8 CI. & Fin. 262 1048 
 
 Atkins t'. Cir. wood (1837), 7 C 4: P. 757 166 
 
 Atkins f. Hiitton (1794), 2 Anst. 386 ; 3 Gwill. 1406 ; 4 Wood's Decrees, 
 
 410 ; 2 Eag. & Y. 403 ; 3 R. R. 689 430, 1050 
 
 Atkins V. M.Tedith (1836), 4 Dowl. P. C. 658 314 
 
 Atkins f. P'llnicr (1821), 4 B. & Ad. 377 347, 348 
 
 Atkins V. Trci'^-old (1823), 2 B. & C. 23 ; 3 D. & R. 200 492, 493 
 
 Atkins t\ Ld. Willoughbyde Broke (1794), 4 Wood's Decrees, 424 ; 2 Anst. 
 
 397; 3R. R. 691 " 430 
 
 Vol. I. endt with page 036. 
 
 .|| 
 
 I 
 
XXVI 
 
 TABLE or GASES CITED. 
 
 I 
 
 : i 
 
 Atkinson v. Littlowoi)d (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. S95 ; 31 L. T. 225 806 
 
 Atlniitio Milt. Ins. Co. v. Hiith (1880), 10 Ch. D. 474; 44 L. T. 67; 29 
 
 VV. U. ;'H7 179 
 
 Attrr V. AtkiiiHoii (18(9), L. R. IP. & D. Clio; 20 L. T. 404 141 
 
 An.-Gen. r. Asho (18.M)), 10 Ir. Cli. R. 309 320 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Bond (183i»), 9 C. & P. 1H9 956 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Boston (1K47), 1 Do G. & Sm. 619 791 
 
 Ait.-Gen. f. B»>wmau (1791), 2 B. & P. 632, n. (a) ' 252 
 
 Att.-Gen. t'. BnwllniKh (1885), 14 Q. B, D. 667; 64 L. J. Q. B. 205 ; 62 
 
 L. T. 689 ; 33 "W '^,. 673 ; 49 J. P. 500 899, 901, 903 
 
 Att.-Gon. V. Bmzouoso Coll. (1834), 2 CI. & Fin. 295 ; 8 Bligh, N. S. 377 ; 
 
 1 L. J. Ch. 6(! 791 
 
 Att.-Gen. f. Briunt (1846). 15 M. & W. 169; 15 L. J. Ex. 265 613, 614 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. May. of Bristol (1820). 2 Jac. & W. 294 790 
 
 Att.-Gen. f . Bulpit (ISil), 9 Price. 4 918 
 
 Att.-Gen. f.Bunce (1868). L.R. 6 Eq. 563; 37 L. J. Ch. 697; 18L.T. 742 77 
 Att.-Gon. v. Calvert (1857), 23 Beav. 248; 26L. J.Ch. 682; 3 Jur. N. S.600 138 
 
 Att.-(Jen. r. Cast Plate Glass Co. (1792), 1 Austr. 39 ; 3 Rev. R. 51S 766 
 
 Att.-Geu. V. thamhers (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 662; 4 Do G. M. & G. 206 ; 
 
 2 Eq. Rep. 1195; 2 W. R. 036 112 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Clapham (1854), 4 Do G. M. & G. 691 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 177; 
 
 1 Jur. N. S. 505 791 
 
 Att.-Gen. r. Clero (1844). 12 M. & W. 640 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 82 201 
 
 Att.-Gen. f. Dakin (1869), 36 L. J. Ex. 167 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 160 ; 39 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 113 ; L. R. 4 E. & I. App. 338 4 
 
 Att.-Gcn. f. Davison (1825). MClel. & Y. 160 325 
 
 Att.-Gen. f. Donaldson (I8li), HI M. & W. 117; 11 L. J. Ex. 338 4 
 
 Att.-(}eu. V. Drumniond (1842, should bo 1849). 2 H. of L. Cas. 862 . .784, 791 
 
 At^-(}en. V. DiMinimond (1842), 1 Dr. & War. 3.^3 786 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Einerson (18s2), 62 L. J. Q. B. 07; 10 Q. B. D. 191; 48 
 
 L. T. 18; 31 W. R. 191 1183 
 
 Alt -Gen. r. Ewehne Hospital (1853), 17 Beav. 366 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 846 . . 123 
 
 Att.-Gen. f. Fadden (1815), 1 Price, 403 837 
 
 Att.-Gon. f. Gaskill (1882), 20 Ch. D. 519 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 870; 46 L. T. 
 
 180 ; 30 W. R. 658 660 
 
 Att.-Gen. f. Grote (1827), 2 Russ. & My. 699 785 
 
 Att.-Gcn. r. Il.iwkes (l«:iO). 1 Tyr. 3; 1 Cr. & J. 121 216 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Hitchei ok (1847), lEx. 93 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 259 ; 11 Jur. 478.. 949, 
 
 950, 952, 953 
 
 Att.-O-'n. f. Kohler(1861), 9H. of L. Cas. 660; 8 Jur. N. S. 467 416 
 
 Af.-Gon. V. Lambe (1838), 3 Y. & C. (Ex.) 162 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 323 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 6'j8 1183 
 
 Ati.-Geu. r. Le Menhant (1772), 2 T. R. 201, n 310 
 
 Att.-Gen. V. Corp. of London (1850), 2 Hall & T. 1 : 2 Mao. & G. 247 ; 19 
 
 L. J. Ch. 314 ; 14 Jur. 205 1183 
 
 Att.-Gen. r. Metrop. Dist. Ry. Co. (1883), L. R. 6 Ex. D. 218 ; 42 L. T. 
 
 342; 28W.R.376 911 
 
 Att.-Gen. r. Murdoeh (1852). 1 De O. M. & G. 86 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 694 .... 791 
 
 Att.-(Jen. f. Nayior (1864), 33 L. J.Ch. 151 ; 1 H. & M. 809 538 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. North Metropolitan Tram. Co. (189,5), 72 L. T. 340 ..Add. [1182] 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Parker (1747), 3 Atk. 577 791 
 
 Att.-(Jen. r. Panitber (1 ;921, 3 Brown, C. C. 413 170 
 
 Att.-Gen t'. Earl of Powis (1853), Kay, 186 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 218 784 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Radloff (1854), 10 Ex. 84; 23 L. J. Ex. 240; 10 Jur. 656; 
 
 2 0. L. R. 1110 262, 884,970 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Ray (1843), 2 Haio, 518 353 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Riddle (1832), 2 C. * J. 493 : 2 Tyr. 523 107 
 
 Alt -Gen. r. St. Cross. Hosp. (1853). 17 Beiiv. 435 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 793 . . . . 791 
 
 Att.-( Jen. I'. Sidney Sussex Coll. (18(i9). 38 L. J. Ch. 657 790 
 
 Att.-Geu. r. Sitwe'll (183,5), '. Y. Hl C. Ex. 559 ; 5 L. J. Ex. Eq. 80 780 
 
 Att.-{Jeu. r. Skinners' Co (1837;. Cooper C. P. 1 870, 871 
 
 Att -Gen. v. Stephens (1855), 6 De O. M. & G. 141 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 888 ; 
 
 2 Jur. N. S. 51 99, 442, 443, 637 
 
 The re/eretieea art to paget, i»»< to paragraphi. 
 
TABLE OF CASiiJS CITED. 
 
 KXVU 
 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Att. -Gen. «. Sullivan (1842), 1 Arm. M. & O. t!94 919 
 
 Alt -Gen. f. Theakstone (1820), 8 Prico, 89 18, 1093 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Thompson (1849), 8 Hare, 106 1 183 
 
 Att.-Gen v. Tomlhie (1877), 6 Ch. D. 750; 46 L. J. Ch. 654; 36 L. T. 
 
 684 : 25 W. R. 802 ; 15 Ch. D. 150 ; 43 L. T. 486 116 
 
 Att.-Gen. f.Whitwood Local Bd. (1S70), 40 L. J.Ch. 692; 19W.R. 1107.. 1189 
 
 Att.-Gen. v. Wilson (1839), 9 Sim. 526; S L. J. Ch. 119 813 
 
 Att.-Gen. of Prince of Wales v. Cio8«man (1866), 4 H. & C. 568 ; L. R. 
 
 1 Ex. 381 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 215; 14 L. T. 856 ; 14 W. R. i)96 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 N. S 712 276 
 
 Attn-e V. Hawe (1878), 9 Ch. D. 337 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 863 ; 26 \V. R. 871 ; 
 
 38 L. T. 733 684 
 
 Attridgo, Re (1848). 6 Notes of Cases (Ecc. & Mar.), 597 698 
 
 Aitwood V. Small (1838), 6 CI. & Fin. 234 486 
 
 Attwood V. Taylor (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 289 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 01 1 10;S5 
 
 Attwood V. Welton (1828), 7 Conn. 66 950 
 
 Aiibfrt V. Walsh (1812). 4 Taun. 293 164 
 
 Auckland, The Earl of (1861), 30 L. J. P. M. & A. 121 ; Lush. Adm. 164 ; 
 
 {nom. Maloomson v. Baldock) 16 Moo. P. C. C. 304 ; 5 L. T. 558 ; 10 
 
 W. R. 124 178 
 
 Auckland, Maid of, Re (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Ecc. & M.) 240 1122 
 
 Audley, Ld., case of (1631), 3 How. St. Tr. 402 893 
 
 Au(^u.sta, Bk. of v. Earlo (1839), 13 Pet. 590 16 
 
 Auj,'ustien f. Challis (1847), 1 Ex. 280; 17 L. J. Ex. 73 285, 288 
 
 Austee (should be Anstce) v. Nelma (1853), 1 H. & N. 225 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 6 ; 
 
 27 L. T. 190 ; 4 W. R. 612 787 
 
 Austen, Admiral, Re ( 1 8.)2), 3 Kobcrts. 611 702 
 
 Austin, Ex parte (1870), 4 Ch. D. 13 ; 46 L. J. Bky. 1 ; 35 L. T. 629 ; 25 
 
 W. R. 61 849 
 
 Austin V. Buuyard (1865), 4 F. & F. 253 ; 6 B. & S. 687; 34 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 217 646 
 
 Au.stin «. Chambers (1837-8), 6 CI. & Fin. 1 486 
 
 Au.stinr. Evans (1841). 2 M. & Gr. 430 814 
 
 Austin V. Guard, of Bethnal Green (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 91 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 
 
 100 ; 29 L. T. HO? ; 22 W. R. 406 642 
 
 Austin V. Mead (1880), 16 Ch. D. 651 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 30; 43 L. T. 117 ; 28 
 
 W. R. 891 638 
 
 Austin r. Olsen (1868), 37 L. J. M. C. 34 ; L. R. 3 Q. B. 208 ; 9 B. & S. 461 ; 
 
 16 W. R. 426 77 
 
 Austin V. Rumsey (IS 19), 2 C. & Kir. 736 329, 1216 
 
 Australasia, Bk. of, • . Breillat (1847), 6 Moore, P. C. R. 152 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 189 160 
 
 Auutralasia, Bk. of, v. Harding (1850), 19 L. J. C. P. 315 ; 9 C. B. 661 .. 1165 
 Australasia. Uk. of, v. Nias (1851), 16 Q. B. 717 : 20 L. J. Q. B. 281 .... 1154 
 Australian Roy. Mail St. Nav. Co. v. Marzetti (1855), 11 Ex. 228 ; 24 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 273 642, 645 
 
 Aveline v. AVlii.sson (1842), 4 M. & Gr, 801 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 168 664 
 
 Avory v. Pixloy (1808), 4 Mass 462 706 
 
 Avoson f. Ld. Kinnaird (1806), East, 188; 2 Smith, 286; 8 R. R. 455. .374, 
 
 464, 691 
 
 Awdloy V. Awdley (1690), 2 Vcm. 194 482 
 
 Avkroyd. Re (1847). 1 Ex 479; 17 L. J. Ex. 157 ; 5 Dowl. & L. 701.. .. 1126 
 Aylosford. Ld., v. Morris (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. App. 4'JO , 42 L. J. Ch. 540 ; 
 
 28L. T. 5U; 21 W. R. 424 137 
 
 Aylosford Peer. (1885), 11 App. Cas. 1 415, 621 
 
 Aylitfe V. Tracy (1722), 2 P. Wms. 66 680 
 
 Aynsloy v. Glover (1876), 44 L. J. Ch. 623 ; L. R. 10 Ch. App. 283 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 345 ; 23 W. R. 457 76 
 
 Ayrey v. Davenport (1807), 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 474 1031 
 
 Ayroyr. Hill(1824), 2 Add. 209 170 
 
 Ayrton v. Abbott (1849), 14 Q. B. 1 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 314 ; 14 Jur. 314 . . 1099, 
 
 1136 
 Ay ton V. Bolt (1827), 4 Bing, 106 713 
 
 Vol. I. ends with page 636. 
 
 '■rf 
 
 < : I 
 
XXVlll TABI<E OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAQK 
 
 B., falsely called B. ». B. (1875), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 551 167 
 
 Babbr. ClemBon (1825), 12 Serg. & R. 328 514. 
 
 Babbape v. Babbage (1870). L. R. 2 P. & D. 222 881 
 
 Babington v. Mahony f 1837), 5 Law Kec. 2nd Ser. 232, n 870 
 
 Backhouse, Inre(1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 301 871 
 
 BackhouHC v. Alcock (1885), 28 Cli. D. 669 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 842 ; 52 L. T. 
 
 342 ; 33 W. R. 407 913 
 
 Backhouse v. Bonomi (1861), 28 L. J. Q. B. 3/8 ; 1 E. B. & E. 622, 654; 
 6 Jur. N. S. 1345 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1 182 ; 32 L. T. 156 ; 9 H. of L. C. 503 ; 
 
 34 L. J. Q. B. 181; 9 W. R. 769 114 
 
 Backhouse f. Jones (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 65; 8 Scott, 148 230, 369 
 
 Bacon v. Bacon (1876), 34 L. T. 349 602 
 
 Bacon v. Chesney (1816). 1 Stark. N. P. Rep. 192 608, 552 
 
 Baddeley v. Mortlock (1816), Holt, N. P. Rep. 151 ; 17 R. R. 626 266 
 
 Bagot V. Bagot (1878), 1 L. R. Ir. 308 240, 349 
 
 Bagot V. Easton (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 225 ; 7 Ch. D. 1 ; 37 L. T. 369 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 66 187 
 
 Bagot, Ld., V. Williams (1824), 3 B. & C. 235 ; 6 D. & Ry. 87 1123, 1124 
 
 Bagueley v. Hawley (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 625 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 328 ; 17 
 
 L. T. 116 776 
 
 Bahia, The (1865), L. R. 1 Adm. cfe Ecc. 15; 11 Jur. N. S. 1008; 14 
 
 W. R. 411 818 
 
 Bahia & Francisco Ry. Co., Re r. Tritten (1368), 37 L. J. Q. B. 176; L. R. 
 
 3 Q. B. 584 ; 9 B. & S. 844 ; 18 L. T. 467 ; 16 W. R. 802 641 
 
 Baildon v. Walton (1847), 1 Ex. 617 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 357 480, 717 
 
 Bailey, Ex parte, and Ex parte Collier (1854), 23 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 3 E. & 
 
 B. 607 132, 1 136 
 
 Bailey, Ex parte. In re Barrell (1852), 22 L. J. Bank. 45 ; 1 W. R. 343. . 83 
 
 Bailey, Re (li>3S), 1 Curteis, 914 700 
 
 Bailey v. Applevard (1838), 8 A. & E. 161 ; 3 N. & P. 257 ; 1 W. W. & H. 
 
 208 ; 2 Jur. 872 207 
 
 Bailey V. Bellamy (1841), 9 Dowl. 507; 10 L. J. Q. B. 41 733 
 
 Bailey I'. Bidwell (1844), 13 M. & W. 73 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 264 262, 1210 
 
 Bailey v. Bodenham (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 288 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 252; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 821 ; 10 L. T. 422 ; 12 W. R. 865 32 
 
 Bailey f. Edwards (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 41 ; 4 B. & S. 761 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 134 758 
 
 Bailey V. Harris (1849), 12 Q. B. 905 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 115 1104 
 
 Bailey v. Hyde (1820), 3 Conn. 463 255 
 
 Bailey v. Macaulay (1849), 13Q. B. 816; 19 L. J.Q. B. 73; 14 Jur. 80.... 541, 
 
 617 
 Bailey v. Sweeting (1861), 30 L. J. C. P. 150 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 843 ; 9 W. R. 
 
 273 673 
 
 Baillie i'. Jackson (18")3), 3 De G. M. & G. 38 ; 10 Hare (Appendix) xlvi ; 
 
 22 L.J. Ch. 753; 1 W. R. 196; 19 Jur. 170 13 
 
 Baillie v. Kell (1858), 4 Bing. N. C. 638 ; 6 Scott, 379 ; 1 Am. 246 223 
 
 Baillie v. Ld. Inchiquin (1796), 1 Esp. 435 712 
 
 Baillie's case (1778), 21 How. ^t, Tr. 358 603, 612 
 
 Bain V. Case (1829), 3 C. & P. 196; M. & M. 262 1048 
 
 Bain f. Fothergill (1874), L. R. 6 Ex. 69 ; L. R. 7 H. L. 158 ; 40 L. J. 
 Ex. 34 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 243 ; 23 L. T. 670 ; 31 L. T. 387 ; 19 W. R. 134. . 773 
 
 Bainr. Mason (1824), 1 C. & P. 202, 203, n 1172,1173 
 
 Bain 1'. Whitehaven andFurness Junc.Rail.Co. (1850),3 H. L.Cas. 19. .61,1176, 
 
 1231 
 Bainbridge v. Wade (1860), 16 Q. B. 89 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 7 ; 16 Jur. 672. . 786 
 
 Baiubrigge v. Baddeley (1847), 2 Phillips, 705 1117 
 
 Bainbrigge v. Browne (1881), L. R. 18 Ch. D. 188 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 522 ; 44 
 
 L. T. 706 ; 29 W. R. 782 136 
 
 Baines t. Swainson (1863), 4 B. & S. 270 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 8 L. T. 536 ; 
 
 11 W. R. 945 116 
 
 Baird v. Cochran (1818), 4 Serg. & R. 397 969 
 
 Baker, Re, Collins c. Rhodes (1882), 20 Ch. D. 230; 61 L. J. Ch. 316; 45 
 L. T. 658 ; 30 W. R. 858 76 
 
 The n/ertncM are to pages, not to paragraph*. 
 
^i 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XXIX 
 
 FAQB 
 
 Baker v. Baker (1863), 32 L. J. Pr. & Mat. 145 ; 3 Swab. & Triat. 213 ; 11 
 
 W. R. 602 947, 949 
 
 Baker v. Bradley (1856), 2.5 L. J. Ch. 7 : 4 Do G. M. & G. 697 1.36 
 
 Brtker v. Cave (1857), 1 H. & N. 674 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 190 107« 
 
 Baker v. Dening (1838), 8 A. & E. 94 ; 3 N. & P. 228 700 
 
 Baker r. Dewey (1823), 1 B. & C. 704 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 99 92 
 
 Baker v. Keen (1819), 2 Starkie, N. P. .501 168 
 
 Baker v. Lond. and S. W. Ry. Co. (1867), 37 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; L. R. 3 
 
 Q B. 91; 8B. &S. 645; 16 L. T. 126 1186 
 
 Baker v. Monk (1864), 33 Boav. 419 ; 4 De G. J. & S. 388 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 
 
 624,691; 10 L. T. N. S. 86, 630 ; 12 W. R. 521, 779 136 
 
 Baker r. Ray (1826), 2 Ru-^s. 73 108 
 
 Baker v. Sampson (1863). 14 C. B. N. S. 383 166 
 
 Bakewell's Patent, Re (1802). 15 Moo. P. C. 385 129 
 
 Balcetti v. Seraui (1792), Peake, N. P. 142 231 
 
 Baldey v. Parker (1823), 2 B. & C. 37 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 220 689, 690 
 
 Baldney v. Ritohie (1824), 1 Starkie, N. P. 338 311 
 
 Balkis Co. Re (1888), 58 L. T. 300 ; 36 W. R. 392 134 
 
 Ball, Re (1890), 25 Ir. L. R. 556 790 
 
 Ballard v. Way (18361. 1 M. & W. 52G : 2 Gale, 61 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 207 .... 1092 
 Balls and Met. Bd. Works. Re (1866), 7 B. & 8. 177 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. 337 ; 
 
 35 L. J. Q. B. 101 ; 13 L. T. 702 ; 14 W. R. 370 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 183 . . 728 
 Balme v. Hutton (undated), 2 Lew. C. C. 162 (dted) ; 3 Moo. & Sc. 1 . . . . 926 
 
 Baltazzi v. Ryder (1808), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 168 ; 31 L. T. O. S. 373 102 
 
 Bamfield v. Massey (1808), 1 Camp. 460 256 
 
 Bamfield v. Tapper (1851), 7 Ex. 27 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 6 716 
 
 Bamford, Ex parte (1809), 15 Ves. 449 379 
 
 Banbury Peer. (1809), Le Marchant's Gardner's Peerage; Selwyn's Nisi 
 
 Prius, 748-750 101,416, 422, 423, 424 
 
 Banbury's Trusts, Re (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. 408 144 
 
 Bancroft v. Bancroft and Rumney (186.5), 34 L. J. Pr. & Mat. 14 ; 13 
 
 W. R. 506 1110 
 
 Bandy v. Cartwright (1819), 8 Ex. 913 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 285 773, 774 
 
 Bank Prosecutions (1819), R. & R. 378 278 
 
 Bank of Augusta V. Earle (1839), 13 Pet. 619, 689 16, 181 
 
 Bank of Columbia v. Patterson (1813), 7 Cranch, 299 640 
 
 Rank -f Monroe v. Field (18421. 2 Hill R. 445 388 
 
 Bank of New South Wales v. Owston (1879), L. R. 4 App. Cas. 270 ; 14 
 
 Cox C. C. 267 ; 48 L. J. Pr. C. 25 ; 40 L. T. 500 343 
 
 Banks v. Crossland (1874), 44 L. J. M. C. 8 ; L. R. 10 Q. B. 97 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 226 ; 23 W. R. 414 681 
 
 Banly, R« (1849), 1 Roberts. 710 698 
 
 Biinnatyue v. Bannatyne (1852), 2 Roberts. 475 ; 16 Jur. 864 1102 
 
 Banner v. Jackson (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 472 609 
 
 Bar V. Gratz (1819). 4 Wheat. 213 429, 433 
 
 Barbat v. Allen (1852), 7 Ex. 609 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 156 879, 887, 891, 910 
 
 Barber, Re (1806), 36 L. J. P. D. & Mat. 19 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 267 ; 15 
 
 L. T. 192 ; 15 W. R. 231 307 
 
 Barber v. Holmes (1800), 3 Esp. 190 1049, 1172, 1173 
 
 Barber v. Houston (1885), 18 L. R. Ir. 475 71 
 
 Barber v. Liimb (1860), 29 L. J. C. P. 234 ; 8 C. B. N. S. 95 ; 8 W. R. 
 
 461 ; 6 .lur. N. S. 981 1153 
 
 Barber r. Wood (1877), 4 Ch. D. 885; 46 L. J. Ch. 728 ; 36 L. T. N. S. 
 
 373 801 
 
 Barber v. Wood (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 172 814, 815, 816 
 
 Barclay v. Bailey (1810), 2 Camp. 527 ; 11 R. R. 787 33 
 
 Barclay v. Maskelyne (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 115; 1 Johns. 124; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1293 704 
 
 Barclay f. Parrott (1856), 1 C. B. N. S. 49 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 77; 3 Jur.N.S. 
 
 072 726 
 
 Barden r. Keverberg (1837), 2 M. & W. 61 ; 2 Gale, 201 231 
 
 Bartraddie Coal Co. v. Wark (1859), 3 Macq. H. of L. Cas. (Sc.) 468 ; 1 
 
 Paterson, 814 592, 761 
 
 Vo\. /. ends with page 635. 
 
 'ii' 
 
 ■. i ( 
 
 . ^ 
 
xyx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Baring r. Clagett (1802), 3 B. 4 P. 215 ; 6 R. R. 759 
 
 Bariujr v. CUrk (1837). 12 Pi..k. 220 
 
 Barker r. Buttnax (18l5j, 7 Beav. 134 ; 13 L. J. Ch 
 Barker v. Davia (ISM). 34 L. J. M. C. 140 ; 11 Jur. 
 Barker r. Dixie (17:*6), Cisew temp Hardw. 264 
 
 PAOS 
 1146,1149 
 
 388 
 
 VsTsJur! 89 !!!!'.! 74 
 
 N. S. 651 638 
 
 891 
 
 Barker r. Rav (1826), 2 Rniw. 7H 433 
 
 Barker r. Richardison (1827), 1 Y. & J. 362 487 
 
 Barker r. Stead (1817), :» C. B. 946 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 160 1219 
 
 Barker's Estatr, Be '187!»), 10 Ch. D. 162 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 171 ; 27 W. R. 
 
 393 534 
 
 Barkw-orth r. Y.iung (185:), 26 L. J. Ch. 153 ; 4 Drew. 1 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 34 680 
 
 Barnard, Re (186.'). 31 L. J. Pr. & Mat. S:> ; 2 Swab. & Trist. 4S9 1031 
 
 Bumed's Baukinir Co.. Re (PeelV Ca.sf) (1867). 36 L. J. Ch. 757 ; L. R. 
 
 2 Ch. 674 ; 15 W. R. 110«; 16 L. T. N. 8. 780 1076 
 
 Barnes, Ex parte (1812), 2 Dowl. N. S. 20 ; 7 Jur. 217 994 
 
 Barnes v. KetUe (1766) 2 Wils. 314 932 
 
 Barnes r. Lu(a« (182>). Ry. A- M. 264 1213 
 
 Barnes r. Mawsoo !1813), 1 M. & Sel. 81 397, 403 
 
 Barnes r. Pendrey (183 'I. 7 Dowl. 747 733 
 
 Barnes r. To?e (1884f. 13 Q. B. D. 410 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 567 ; 61 L. T. 292 ; 
 
 33 \V. R. io ; 4« J. P «)64 48 
 
 Barnes t. Trompowrskr (1797), 7 T. R. 265 12l3 
 
 Barnes r. Vincent 'lM6i. 5 Moo. P. C. C. 201 1045, 1 132 
 
 Bamett r. Rrand»o a843). 6 M. & Gr. 6:<0 6 
 
 Burnett i. Cox (1847;, 9 Q B. 617; 4 New Sess. Cas. 487 ; 16 L. J. M. C. 
 
 27 ; II Jur. 118 228 
 
 Bamett r. Gloaop a8;<5j. 1 Bing;. N. C. 636 ; 3 Dowl. 625 220 
 
 Baruttt f. Lucas il«7i). L R. 6 C. L 24, 1 120 
 
 Bam.tt r. Tugwell as6-'), 31 Beav. 23> ; 31 L. J. Ch. 6''.9; 8 Jur. N. S. 
 
 787: 10 W. R. 679; 7 L.T.N. S. 121 174 
 
 Barnstal.le r. Lathev .1789). 3 T. R. :<0.t !'95 
 
 BaruNiaple Second Annuity Society (1884), 50 L. T. 424 74S 
 
 Barough r. White (182-1 . 4 B. 4 C. 328 487, 512 
 
 B<trr .•: Gratz (1819;, 4 Wheat. 213 429, 433, 1U98 
 
 Barracloujrh r. Grernhoujrh (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 26, 251 ; 7 B. & 8. 17u ; 
 
 8 B. \- 8 623 ; L R. 2 Q. B. 1 1 163 
 
 Barraclough r. Johnson (.838), 8 A. & E. 99 ; 3 N. & P. 233 ; 1 W. W. & 
 
 H. 162 : 2 Jur. 8 >9 402 
 
 BaiTell, Re [nee Bailer. Ex parte). 
 
 Barrel! f. TrusseU (1811;. 4Ttunt. 121 653 
 
 Barrett v. Buxton {1826). i Aik. (Vermont) 167 747 
 
 Barrett v. Uyndmau 1840;, 3 Ir. L H. 109 676 
 
 Barrett v. L<.ii}r {l.s56j. 8 Ir. L. B. 331 ; 3 H. L. Cas. 395 46, 24 { 
 
 Barrett t'. Rolfe (1845). 14 M. & W. 348 : 14 L. J. Ex. 308 656 
 
 Barrett v. WiWn (1834), 1 C. M. & R 586 ; 3 Dowl. P. C. 220 ; 5 Tyr. 
 
 218 IKiO 
 
 Barron r. Daniel ^1838,. Crawf. & Dix. Abrid. C. 283 1015 
 
 Barronet's Caae (ISo-t,, 1 EI. & Bl. 1 ; Dears. (Peaice's Report) ol : 22 L. 
 
 J. M. C. 25 ; 17 Jur. 1H4 79 
 
 Barrow f. Dvster '1884;. H Q. B. D. 635 ; 51 L. T. 673 ; 33 W. R. 199. . 769 
 
 Barrow t'. Huinphn-vs J82(i). 3 B. & A. 598 831, 832 
 
 Barrs r. Fewkes (iS65/. M L. J. Ch. 522 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 669 ; 13 W. R. 
 
 987 ; 12 L. T. N. 8. 727 808 
 
 Barr«f.Ja>k--*on(l8l5 , 1 Piiillip.s. .582; 14L.J.Ch.43:i: 9Jur. 609.. 1105, 1 106. li:V2 
 
 Barry v. Bebbiugt'.n (I7»2). 4 T. R. 514 ; 2 R. R 450 27?, 437 
 
 Barry f. Butliu (18 (8 . 1 Curt. 638 ; 2 Moo. P. C. K. 482 142 
 
 Barrymore. Ld., r. Tavlor (1795), 1 Esp. 326 484 
 
 Barstow's case (1831;. 'l LewinC C. 110 662 
 
 Birtheiemy r. The People, k, . (1842), 2 Hill, N. Y. Rep. 248 378 
 
 Bartholomew r. St.-phen-« (1.S30), 8 C. & P. 728 308, 30n, 319 
 
 Baitlett V. Delprat (18i»S), 4 Matw. 702 371, 514 
 
 Bartlett v. Downes (182aj, :< B. & C. 616 ; 6 Dowl. & R. 526 ; 1 C. & P. 
 
 622 12G 
 
 The Tt/eriHct* urt to pages, not to paruyrapht. 
 
TABLE OF CASIW IUKD. 
 
 XXM 
 
 PAttK 
 
 I3arH.-tt». Oillanl (1826), 3 Rush. 156; 6 L. J. Ch. 19 4S:{, NO>i 
 
 KHrtlett. f. Pentlaiid (1830), 10 B. 4: C. 7ii'> l.iS 
 
 Birtlettv. riiker-.>fill (175!).G0), 4 I'^.sr, 577. n. ; I V>,x, 5; 1 U. li. 1 ., i.U7 
 Biiitlett I.'. Smith (1843), U M. vV VV. 18 ; I'i L. J. Ex. -.'87 ; 7 Jur. 4l8. .25, 26 
 Banlett i: Wells (1861), 31 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; 1 B. & S. 8 6 ; 5 L. T. 007 ; 
 
 111 \V. R '229 541 
 
 Barton v. Bank of New South Wales (1^9.l), 15 A p. Cas. 37i* So. 748 
 
 Barton v. Diwes (1850). 10 C. B. 261 ; 19 L. J. C. l\ 302 758. 304 
 
 Barton (»hould be Harlow) i>. Dupuy (1S23), 1 Mart. N. S. 442 1034 
 
 Barton (should be Barstow) v. Palm-s (17o4), Preu. in Ch. 233 327 
 
 Barton V. Robins (1769), 3 Pliillim. 445. u. (A.) 140 
 
 Barwell e. Adkiiis (1810), 1 M. & Gr. "07 : 2 Scott, N. R. 1 1 1^43 
 
 Barwiok v. Enirlish Joint Stock Bin.. (1867), L. U. 2 Ex. 259 ; 36 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 147; 16L. T. 461; l.S W. li. 877 686 
 
 Baseley c. Fordor {nee Bazelev v. Fordor). 
 
 Bass i>. Clive (I8I0), 4 M. & Sel. 13 ; 4 Camp. 78 647 
 
 Bastard v. Smith (18 i9), 10 A. & E. 213 ; 2 P. & D 453 476, i'.56, 1014 
 
 B.istar I V. Trutch (1836), 3 A. & E. 451 ; 6 N. & M. 1()9 ; 4 Dowl. 6 ; 1 H. 
 
 & W. 32 1 130 
 
 Basten v. Carew (1825), 3 B. & C. 652 ; 6 D. & R. 558 10i>8, 1 1' 
 
 Bastint). Carew (1824). Ry. & M. 127 917 
 
 Batchelor v. Ho .ey wood (1799), 2 Esp. 714 r222 
 
 Biter. Hill (1823). 1 C. & P. 100 257 
 
 Batew. Kiuspy (1835), 1 C. M. & R. 41; 4 Tyr. 662 109, 319, 6'i3 
 
 Bateraan f. Bailey (1794), 5 T. R. 512 377, 38i). 381. 514 
 
 Bateman v. Phillips (1812), 15 East, 272 ; 4 Taun. 157 G70, 759 
 
 Bateman i-. Binder (1842), 3 Q. B. 574 ; 2 G. & D. 790; 11 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 281 714 
 
 Bateman w. Ld. Roden (1844), 1 Jones & Lat. 356 739 
 
 Bates I'. Barber (1849), 4 Cush. (Mass), lii7 974 
 
 Bates i: Dun Pablo Sora (1856), 10 Moo. P. C. R. 467 178 
 
 Biites V. Townlev (I8I8), 2 Ex. 156 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 399 517, 1161 
 
 B.itesoii V. Hart>irik (1801), 4 Esp. 43 598 
 
 Bath, Ld. v. Bathersea (1695), 6 Mod. 10 480 
 
 Bathui>t r. Erinifton (1877), L. R. 2 App. Cas. 698 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 748 , 
 
 37 L. T. :i38 ; 25 W. R. 908 741 
 
 Batley v Kynock (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 632 ; 44 L.J. Ch. 565 ; 33 L. T. 45. . 818 
 
 Batten. Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cu.ses (Eccil. & M ) 2h8 6M 
 
 Battbews v. Galindo (1828), 4 Bing. 613 ; 1 M. & P. 665 ; 3 C. & P 
 
 238 539, 890 
 
 Batthyany f. Bouch (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 421 ; 44 L. T. 177 ; 29 W. R. 
 
 665 651 
 
 Battursp. Sellers (1820), 6 Har. & J. 117 628 
 
 Baugh V. Cradouke (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 182 602 
 
 Bauiuann r. James (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 508 ; 18 L. T. 421 ; 16 W. R. 877. 672 
 Baxendale v. Bennett (1878), 3 Q B. D. 525 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 624 ; 26 W. 
 
 R 899 ... . 647 
 
 Baxendale v. De Valmer (1887), 57 L. T. 556 697 
 
 Baxter v. Brown (1845), 7 M. & Gr. 215 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 1019 . . . J3G6, 683, 084 
 Baxter f. Nurse (1844), 6 M. & Ur. 935 ; 
 
 10; 13 L. J. C. P. 82; 8 Jur. '^73 .. 
 Bayard c. Malcolm (I8116), 1 Johns. 467 , 
 B.iyli-y V. Ashton (I81O), 12 A. A: K. 493 
 
 7 Scott, N. R. 8ul ; 1 C. A: K. 
 
 153 
 
 713 
 
 4 P. & D. 204 717 
 
 16 L.J. C. P. 206 93. 98 
 
 Biiylcy V. Bradley (1848). 6 Com. B. 396 
 
 Bajley ». Buckland (1847), 1 Ex. 1 ; 16 L. J. Ex.204 Ill I 
 
 Bavley v. M. of Conyngham (1n63), 15 Ir. C. L. Hop. 406 654 
 
 Bayleyr. Overseers of Nantwich (If 16), 2 C. B. 118; 1 Lutw. Reg. C. 
 
 363 156 
 
 Bayley v. Wilkins (1849), 7 C. B. 886 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 13 Jur. 883 . . 158 
 
 Bayley f. Wylie(l807), 6 Esp. 85 ...U).i7. lOlO 
 
 Baylitfo V. Biitterworth (18l7), 1 Ex. 429 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 18 ; 11 Jur. lilO ; 
 
 6 Railw. Cas. 2'>3 157. 168 
 
 Bay lis v. Lawrence (1840), 11 A. & E. 926 ; 3 P. & D. o26 ; 4 Jur. 652 .46, 46, 82 
 
 f 
 
 I 
 
 t-.il 
 
 Val. J, ends withpaye 636. 
 
xxxu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Baynton's case (1702), 14 How. St. Tr. 630 359 
 
 Bazeley v. Forder (186S), L. R. 3 Q. B. 662 ; 9 B. & S. 602 ; 37 L. J. Q. 
 
 B. 240 ; 18 L. T. 756 166, 168 
 
 Beadle, Ro (1849), 1 Roberts. 749 ; 7 Notes of Caees (Euol. & M.) 43 698 
 
 Bcadon V. King (1849), 17 Sim. 34 601 
 
 Beal V. 8. Dev. Ry. Co. (1864), 6 H. & N. 875 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 441 723 
 
 Beale v. Suiulers (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 8 oO ; 6 Scott, 58 654 
 
 Beall V. Beuk (1 794), 3 Hard. & McHen. 242 508 
 
 Bealy «. Greenslade (1831), 2 C. & J. 61 716 
 
 Beamish ». Beamish (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. 413 1071 
 
 Beamon v. EUioe (1831), 4 C. & P. 585 918 
 
 Bean v. Quimby (1829), 6 New Hamps. 94 600 
 
 Beardroan v. Wilson (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 57 ; sub nom. Beardmore v. 
 
 "Wilson, 38 L. J. 0. P. 91 ; 19 L. T. 282 ; 17 W. R. 54 656 
 
 Beardslee v. Richardson (1833), 11 "Wend. 25 378 
 
 Beasley v. Magrath (1804), 2 Sch. & Lef. 34 496 
 
 Beasnej's Trusts, Re (186i/), 38 L. J. Ch. 169 ; L. R. 7 Eq. 498 173 
 
 Beatson v. Skene (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 430 ; 5 H. & N. 838 618, 619 
 
 Beattie v. Ld. Ebury (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. App. 777, 800—803 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 
 
 804 7»0, 781 
 
 Beauchamp v. Cash (1822), Dowl. & Ry. N. P. 3 1223 
 
 Beauchamp ". Parry (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 89 611, 612 
 
 Beaufort, D. of v. Ashburnham (1863), 32 L. J. C. P. 97 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 
 
 698 818 
 
 Beaufort, D. of r. Crawshay (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 699; 35 L. J. C. P. 
 
 342; 1 H. &R. 638 25, 349 
 
 Beaufort, I>. of v. Neald ^1844), 12 CI. & Fin. 249 638 
 
 Beaufort, D. of v. Smith (1849, 4 Ex. 450 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 97 124, 396, 397, 
 
 403, 404, 1040, 1092 
 
 Beaufort, D. of v. May. of Swansea (1849), 3 Ex. 413 124, 791, 792 
 
 Beaumont v. Breugeri (1847), 6 C. B. 301 690 
 
 Beaumont v. Fell (1723), 2 P. "Wms. 141 795 
 
 Beaumont v. Field (1818), 2 Chittv R. 275 789 
 
 Beaumont V. Mountain (1834) lOBing. 404 1006 
 
 Beaumont v. Perkins (1809), 1 Phillim. 78 1223 
 
 Beiura.^ ". Sir "W. Scott (not dated). Lord Eldon's Life by Twiss, Vol. II. 
 
 pp. 233—236 616 
 
 Beavan«. M'Dounell(1854), 23L. J. Ex. 326; 10 Ex. 184 243 
 
 Beck and Jackson, Re (1857), 1 C. B. N. S. 695 1039 
 
 Beckett v. Howe (1869), 39 L. J. P. & M. 1 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 1 697 
 
 Beckett v. Corp. of Leeds. (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. App. 421 ; 26 L. T. 375 ; 
 
 20 "W. R. 454 112 
 
 666 
 
 664 
 
 Beckford v. Beckford (1774), Lofft, 490 
 
 Beckham v. Drake (1847-9), 2 H. L. C. 579 , 
 
 Beckham t». Osborne (1843), 6 M. & Gr. 771 486 
 
 Beckton v. Barton (1859). 27 Beav. 99 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 673 806 
 
 Beckwith V. Benner (1834), 6C. &P. 681 610 
 
 Beckwith v. Sydebotham (1807), 1 Camp. 117 ; 10 R. R. 652 934, 935 
 
 Becquetv. MiicCarthy (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 95'. 1146, 1147, 1154 
 
 Bedford, E. of r. Exeter, Bp. of (1616-17), Hob. 137 1115 
 
 Bedford, D. of r. Lopes (1838), cited Doe v. Pulman, 3 Q. B. 623 .. ..301, 433 
 
 Bedfordshire cane (1785), 2 Luders, 411 497 
 
 Beech V. Jones (1848), 5 C. B. 696 924,927 
 
 Beecher t: Major ( 1 865), 2 Dr. & Sm. 431 667 
 
 Beechingv. Gowor (1816), Holt, N. P. Rep. 314; 17 R. R. 644 909 
 
 Beemant'. Duck (1843), 11 M. & "W. 251 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 198 547, 548 
 
 Beer v. "Walker (1877), 46 L. J. C. P. 677 ; 25 W. R. 880 776 
 
 Beer v. "Ward (1821), cited 2 Ph. Ev. 258 1227 
 
 Bees V. "Williams (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 581 ; 1 T. & G. 23 660 
 
 BecHton v. Collyer (1827), 4 Bing. 313 • 12 Moore, 552 ; 2 C. & P. 607. . . . 163 
 
 Belbin v. Skeats (1857), 27 L. J. P. & M. 56 ; 1 Sw. & Tr. 148 278, 1215 
 
 Belcher v. M'Intosh (1839), 8 C. & P. 721 258, 269 
 
 The references are to pages, not to paragraphs. 
 

 TABLE OF CASES CITED 
 
 XXXlll 
 
 FAOK 
 
 BoWon f. Campbell (1851), 6 Ex. 886 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 32'- 179 
 
 Bulfn>t Dock A.!t, Ro (1860-7), Ir. Rep. 1 Eq. I'i8, 14". 234 
 
 Belf.Ht, The (1884), 9 P. D. 215 ; 63 L. J. P. 88 ; 51 L. T. 271 ; 33 W. R. 
 
 171; 6 Asp. M. 0. 291 282 
 
 Bell r. AtiHley (1812), 16 East, 143 ; 14 R. R. 322 490 
 
 Brll r. HruHi (1840), 17 Peters, 161 755 
 
 ];ill r. Cliiivtc,r(1843\ 1 C. & Kir. 162 12H 
 
 Bell r. I'otherg-ill (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 148 ; 23 L. T. 323 ; 18 W. R. 
 
 1040 H3 
 
 Bell V. Fraiikis (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 446 ; 11 L. J. C. P. 300 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 
 
 460 520, 521 
 
 Bill i: Hottiml (1741), 9 Mod. 305 752 
 
 Brll i: Kennwlv (1868). L. R. 1 H. L. (So. & D.) 307 17S 
 
 Bell r. Love (18«4), 10 Q. B. D. 547 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 290 ; 48 L. T. 592 ; 
 
 17 J. P. 41.8 115 
 
 ]^11 /■. Mor.i>oii (1828), 1 Peters, 371 386 
 
 Bill r. I'arke (1860), 11 Ir. C. L. Rep. 413 255, 256 
 
 B.il r. Simpsuii (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 363; 2 H. & N. 410 83 
 
 ]<, 11 r. Stewart (1842), Arm. M. .t 0. 401 977 
 
 Bill r. Wardcll (1740), Willes, 202 39 
 
 Hi II r. AVil.sdii (INi.O), 2 Dr. & Sm. 395 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 337 50 
 
 Bi U's case (1800), eited in Joy ou Couf. 71 ; (iiid in 1 McNally, Ev. 43 . , 560 
 Brllaiiiv r. lAbcnham (1891), 45 Ch. D. 481 ; 00 L. J. Ch. 166; 64 L. T. 
 
 ■178 ;' 39 AV. H. 257 672 
 
 Bcllaiiiv V. Junes (1802), 8 Vos. 31 ; 6 R. R. 20.) 342 
 
 BiUerophon, H.M.S. (1874), 44 L. J. Adm. 5 ; 31 L. T. 756 ; 23 AV. R. 
 
 •J4S 618 
 
 Brlliiifrer r. The People (1832), 8 Weud. 595 962 
 
 Bellinger's ease (1832), 8 Wend. 595, 599 674 
 
 Belt r. Lawes (IS83), "Time,«," 1SK3 932 
 
 B.inpde r. Johnstone (1790), 3 Ves. 198 179 
 
 Beud r. Georgia Ins. Co. (1842), Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1842, cited in Gr. Ev. 
 
 s. 292 706 
 
 Benesh v. Booth (1864), 18 C. B. N. S. HI ; 34 L. J. C. P. 99; 11 L. T. 
 
 479; 13W. R. 271 726 
 
 Bengal, The a.s59). Swab. Adm. 408 1120 
 
 Benham's Trust.^ Re (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 205 ; 16 W. R. 180; reversing 
 
 36 L. J. Ch. 502 ; L. R. 4 Eq. 416 173 
 
 Benhain r. Newell (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 424 ; S. C, sub nom. Palmer v. 
 
 Xewall, 20 Beav. 32 807 
 
 Benmore, The (1873), L. R. 4 Adm. i Ecc. 132 ; 43 L. J. Adm. 5 260 
 
 Beniiet ••. Bennet (1879), 10 Ch. D. 474 ; 40 L. T. 378 ; 27 W. R. 573. . . . 666 
 
 Benuet v. Hartford (1650), Sty. 333 899 
 
 Bennet v. Watson (1814), 3 M. & Sel. 1 ; 15 R. R. 373 811 
 
 Bennett r. Blain (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 518 ; 1 H. A: P. 36 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 
 
 6:i ; 10 Jur. N. S. 130 ; 9 L. T. 506 ; 12 AV. R. 175 684 
 
 Bennett v. Brmntitt (1867). L. R. 3 C. P. 28 : 37 L. J. C. P. 35 ; 17 L. T. 
 
 213 ; 16 AV. R. l;jl ; 1 II. & P. 407 700 
 
 Bennett v. Ganigee (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 33, 204 ; 35 L. T. 764 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 48 : 23 AV. 11. SI, 293 92 
 
 Bennett A: Ghive, Re (1877), 46 L. J. Bunk. 81 ; L. R. 5 Ch. D. 145 ; 25 
 
 AV. R. 504 847 
 
 Bennett r. Crittiths (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 98 ; 3 L. T. 735 ; 9 AV. R. 332 ; 
 
 7 Jur. N. S. 284 364 
 
 Bennett r. Houldsworth (1877 , 40 L. J. Ch. 646; L. R. 6 Ch. D. 671; 
 
 3'i L. T. 648 806 
 
 Bennett v. Hyde (1825), 6 Conn. 24 265 
 
 Bennett r. Jfarshall (1856), 2 K. & J. 740 793 
 
 Biiinett r. Sharpo (1892), eited Greeuleaf ou Evid., 15th ed. 309 698 
 
 Bennett v. The State of Teunes.see (1826), Mart. & Y. 133 18 
 
 Bennion i>. Davison (1838), 3 M. & AV. 179 ; 1 H. & H. 46 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 
 
 1'*^ 533 
 
 m 
 
 Vol. 1. ends uith page 635. 
 
XXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Benson v. Benson (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 172 ; 40 L. J. P. & D. 1 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 709 ; 19 W . R. 190 705 
 
 BeuHon V. Chapman (1848), 2 H. L. Cds. 696, 722 ; 8 C. B. 950 ; 13 Jur. 
 
 969 207 
 
 Benson v. Marshal (undated), cited Shaw Broom, 4 Dowl. & \y. 731 .. 511 
 
 Benson r. Olive (1781, should be 1732), 2 Su-. 919 171, 328 
 
 Benson v. Post (1718), 1 Wils. 240 996 
 
 Bentall V Buru (1824), 5 D. & R. 284 ; 3 B. & C. 423 ; R. & M. 107 .... 091 
 
 Bentall f. Sidney (1H39). 10 A. & E. 164 1014 
 
 Benthani v. Wilson {see Re Parker). 
 
 Bentley 4'. Cooke (1784). 3 Doutf. 424 892 
 
 Bentley, Dr., case of (173i)-6), Fortesc. 202; 1 Str. 557; Andr. 176; 2 Ld. 
 
 Raym. 1334 1148 
 
 Bentley V. Maci.'iy (1802). 31 Bi-av. 155; 31 L. J. Ch. 697 539, 749 
 
 Benton v. Snttou (17!»7), 1 Bos. & P. 24 37 
 
 Beuyon v. Crosswell (1818). 12 Q. B. 899; 18 L. .T. Q. B. 1 : 12 Jur. 1036 652 
 
 Beuyon v. Nettlefold (1850), 3 Mac. & G. 94 ; 20 L. .7. Ch. 186 91 
 
 Beniau v. Greenwood (1878). 20 Ch. D. 767, n. ; 46 L. T. 524, n 536 
 
 Bere v. Ward (1821), 2 Ph. Ev. 246 87 
 
 BerKheim v. Gt. East. Ry. Co. (1878), 3 C. P. D. 221 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 318 ; 
 
 38 L. T. 160 ; 26 W. R. 301 161 
 
 Berkeley, Peerage (1811), 4 Camp. 415; 14 R. R. 782, vi. ..307, 393, 408, 416, 
 
 418, 419, 422, 435, 976 
 Berkeley, Peerage (1853-61), 8 H. L. 0. 21 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 21 ; 4 L. T. 686. .309, 
 
 411, 412, 423 
 
 Berkeley v. Hardy (1826), 5 B. & C. 355 ; 8 D. & R. 102 645 
 
 B -rmon v. Woodbridge (1781), 2 Doug. 788 479, 480 
 
 Bemardi r. Motteu.x (1781), 2 Doug. 575 1149 
 
 Bernasconi v. Atkiiisou (1853), 10 Hare, 345 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 184 ; 1 W R. 
 
 152; 17 Jur. 12S 798, 799 
 
 Bernasconi r. Farel)rother (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 372 498 
 
 Bei-ne, City of v. Bk. of England (1804), 9 Ves. 347 ; 7 R. R. 218 S 
 
 Bemett v. Taylor (1801), 9 Ves. 381 1213 
 
 Berney v. Bp. of Norwich (1860), 36 L. J. Ecc. 10 032, 884 
 
 Berneyt'. Read (1845), 7 Q. B. 79- 14 L. J. Q. B. 247 1038 
 
 Berrev v. Liudley (1841), 3 M. & G. 512 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 01 ; 5 Jur. 1001 ; 
 
 11 ii. J. C. P. 27 654, 655 
 
 Berridge r. Ward (18G1), 30 L. J. C. P. 218 ; 10 C. B. N. S. 400; 7 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 876; 2 F. & F. 208 112 
 
 Berry, E.\ parte (1872. should be 1812), 19 Ves. 218 824 
 
 Berry v. Alderman (18.-)3), 14 C. B. 95 : 2 C. L. R. 691 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 34 202 
 
 Berry v. Banner (1792), Ptake, 157 ; 3 R. R. 674 397, 1 109 
 
 Berry v. Pratt (1823), 1 B. \- C. 276 ; 2 Dowl. & R. 424 818 
 
 Berryman v. Wise (1792), 4 T. R. 366; 2 R. R. 413 148, 150, 519 
 
 Bertbim r. Loughman (1817). 2 Stark. 258 934 
 
 Bertie r. Beaumont (1816), 2 Price, 308 87, 431 
 
 Berwick i: Horsfall (1858), 27 L. J. C. P. 193 : 4 C. B. N. S. 450; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 615 44, 45 
 
 Berwick- upon-'iVccd, May. & Corp. of v. Murray (1850), 10 L. J. Ch. 
 
 281, 286 945 
 
 Berwick, May. of, v. Oswald (18.j3), 1 E. & B. 295 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 
 
 17 Jur. 1148 750 
 
 Berwick's case (1716), Fost. C. L. 10 ; 18 How. St. Tr. 370 658 
 
 Besaut v. Cross (1851), 10 C. B. 895 ; 2 L. M. & P. 351 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 
 
 173 ; 15 Jur. 828 756 
 
 Besley, Ex parte (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 176 ; 2 H. & Tw. 375 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 
 
 382 ; 14 Jur. 704 64X 
 
 Bessela v. Stem (1877), 2 C. P. D. 266 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 467 ; 37 L. T. 88 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 661 631, 881 
 
 Bessey v. Windham (1844), 6 Q. B. 172 ; 14 L.J. Q. B. 7 ; 8 Jur. 824. .481, 1133 
 Bethara v. Benson (1818), Gow, R. 45 388 
 
 The rtferencea are to payet, not to paragraphs. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXXV 
 
 PAUU 
 
 Bethell f. Bkncowe (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 119 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 668 ; 10 L. J. 
 
 C.P. 243 288,291 
 
 Betttley f. McL.vd (1837),. 3 Bing. N. C. 405; 6 L. J. 0. P. Ill ; 4 So. 
 
 IJl; 5Dowl. 481 819 
 
 Betuloy 1. Koid (1843), 4 Q. B. 511 ; 3 G. & D. 561 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 172 ; 
 
 7 Jur. 507 6^i> 
 
 Belts V. UiiKley (1832), 12 Pick. 572, 582 1098 
 
 Beits V. De Vitre (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. 429 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 325; 18 L.T. 165; 
 
 16 AV. R. 529 107 
 
 Betts f. Menzies (1859), 1 E. & E. 990, 1020 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 301 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 1164; lOH. L. Gas. 117; 31 L. J Q. B. 233; 7 L. T. 110; 11 
 
 W. R. 1 : 9 Jur. N. S. 29 43, 599 
 
 Betty r. Niiil ^1856), 6 Ir. C. L. R. 17 417 
 
 Beviin V. Bevan (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 45 1138 
 
 Beviiu V. Gething (1842), 3 Q. B. 740 ; 3 G. & D. 59 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 37 ; 
 
 Jur. 971 717 
 
 Buvau v. Hill (1810), 2 Camp. 381 ; 11 R. R. 741 307 
 
 Bevan r. McMalion (185U), 2 S. & T. 55 ; 28 L. J. P. & M. 40 977 
 
 Bevuii V. Waters (18L'8). M. & M. 235 ; 3 0. & P. iVJO 609 
 
 Bevan v. WilliainH (1775-1776), 3 T. R. 635, n. («) 15U, 518 
 
 Beveri(lf,'o i . Miutur (1824), 1 C. & P. 364 691 
 
 Bevi y r. Beverley (1690), 2 Vern. 131 171 
 
 ]?everlev, JLiy. of t'. Craven (1838), 2 M. & Rnli. 140 1040 
 
 BeverleV v. Liucoln Gas Liglit and Coko Co. (1837), 2 N. & P. 283 ; 6 A. 
 
 i: E. 829 640, 641, 644 
 
 Beverley's ease (1603-4), 4 Co. Rep. 123, 124 5u9 
 
 Bewlev V. Atkinson (1880), 13 Ch. D. 283 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 6 ; 41 L. T. 603; 
 
 2SW. R. 638 76, 437 
 
 Bu.vley f. Power (1833), Hayes & J. 368 711, 713 
 
 Bevnon v. Cook (1«7.)), L. R. 10 Ch. 389 ; 23 W. R. 531 ; 3;) L. T. 353. . 137, 138 
 
 Bevuon r. Garrat (1824), 1 C. & P. 154 649 
 
 Bhearf. Harradine (1852), 7 E. . 269; 21 L. J. Ex. 127 1160 
 
 Bibb V. Thomas (1770-7), 2 W. Bl. 1043 705, 706 
 
 Bieeard i: She])herd (1«61), 14 Moore, P. C. C. 471 ; o L. T. N. S. 504 ; 
 
 10 W. R. 136 770, 771 
 
 Bickett V. Monis (1806), L. R. 1 H. L. 47 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 803 ; 14 L. T. 
 
 835 1 1 1 , 523 
 
 Bidder v. Bridges (1884), 37 Ch. D. 406 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 300 ; 68 L. T. 666. . 342, 
 
 343, 349, 430, 914, 1168 
 Biddle v. Bond (I860). 6 B. & S. 225 ; 34 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 12 L. T. 178 ; 
 
 13 W. R. 501 ; 11 Jur. N. 8. 426 645 
 
 Bie), Do r. Thomson (1844), 3 Beav. 475, 476 680 
 
 Biffin c. Bignell (1S62), 7 H. & N. 877 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 189 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 
 
 647 ; 6 L. T. 248 ; 10 W. R. 322 167 
 
 Bigg V. Strong (1857), 3 Sm. & G. 592 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 108, 983 ; 6 W. R. 
 
 173 -iiif, 523 
 
 Bigg r. Whisking (1853), 14 C. B. 195 689 
 
 Bigge V. Parkinson (1862), 7 H. & N. 955 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 301 ; 8 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 1014 ; 7 L. T 92 ; 10 W. R. 349 776, 777 
 
 Biggs V. Lawrence (1789), 3 T. R. 454 ; 1 R. R. 740 747 
 
 Bignell V. Clarke (1860), 5 H. & N. 485; 29 L. J. Ex. 257 ; 2 L. T. 189. . 201 
 Bigsby V. Dickinson (1877), 46 L.J. Ch. 280 ; 4 Ch. D. 24 ; 35 L. T. 679; 
 
 2i W. R. 89 1233, 1234 
 
 Bilbie V. Lumley (1802), 2 East. 469, 472 : 6 R. R. 479 79 
 
 Bill f. Banient (1841), 9 M. & W. 36; 10 L. J. Ex. 302 674, 690 
 
 Billage v. Southee (1852), 9 Hare, 634 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 472 137 
 
 Billing v. Welch (1871), Ir. R. 6 C. L. 88 86 
 
 Billiugshurst r. Vickers (1810), 1 Phillim. 191 140 
 
 Bills V. Smith (1863), 6 B. & 8. 214 ; 04 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; 12 L. T. 22 ; 13 
 
 W R. 407; 11 Jur. N. S. \H 83 
 
 Bingham r. Stanley (1841), 2 Q. B. 117 ; 1 G. & D. 237 ; 6 Jur. 389 ; 9C. 
 
 ^^' ^^^ 262, 533 
 
 Vol. I. ends with page 636. 
 
 'I!ll 
 
 ft r i ■ 
 
 ■'i' 
 
 Hi" 
 
 ifsji 
 
XXX VI 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 PAOR 
 
 Binrti, Ro (t8')3), 17 Beav. ;W,H 129 
 
 Birch V. Bircli (IHIS), (! Notrs of Ca^. (Kcc. * M-ir ) 142 
 
 Biichr. DciM'VMtiT (ISUi), 1 Sliirk. 210; I Cariii). liSo 733 
 
 Birch V. Edwi'mlM (18»7), 6C. B. 45; 2 Lutw. (Reg. Can.) S7; 17 L.J. 0. P. 
 
 32 ; 12 Jur. IH 726 
 
 Birch V. lA. Livoriiool (1S2'J), 9 B. & C. 392, 395 ; 4 M. & R. 380 (iHl 
 
 Birch V. RiJ^wav (1858), 1 F. A: F. 270 1224 
 
 Birch V. Hoim-rvillc (1852), 2 Ir. C. L. R. 243 900, 90G, 910 
 
 Bird L\ Adcock (1878), 47 L. J. M. C. 123 ; 26 W. R. 034 132 
 
 Bird r. Boulter (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 443 730 
 
 Birdf. Uaiiimon (1837), 0Sc()tt,213; 3 Bing. N. C. 883; 3 Uodjres, 224. .077, 711 
 
 Bird V. HiKffiusou (1834), 2 A. & E. 090 ; 4 N. & M. 505 ; 1 II. & W. 01 . . 272, 
 
 637. 038 
 
 Bird r. Randall (1762), 3 Burr. 1345 ; 1 W. Bl. 373, 387 1115 
 
 Birkenhead, Laiio. & Cheshire June. Rail. Co. r. Brownrigg (1849), CRailw. 
 
 Cas. 47 ; 4 Ex. 420 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 27 ; 13 Jur. 943 1176 
 
 Birkenhead. Lane, ii Clieshiro June. Rail. Co. v. rileher (1850), 5 Ex. 121 ; 
 
 6 Raihv. Cas. 604 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 207 ; 14 Jur. 297 100 
 
 Birkinyr r. Darnell (1704). Salk. 27 ; 1 Smith L. C. 3.59, 302 076 
 
 Birks r. Birks (1805), 34 L. J. P. & M. 90 ; 4 S. & T. 23 ; 13 L. T. 193; 
 
 13 W. R. 038 704 
 
 Birnig., May of, v. .Vlleu (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. 073 ; Ch. D. 284 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 207 ; 25 W. R. 810 114 
 
 Binng., Brist. & Thames Juno. Ry. Co. v. White (1841). 1 Q. B. 282 ; 4 P. 
 
 & D. 049 ; 2 Railw Cas. 803 ; 5 Jur. 800 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 121 995, 998 
 
 Birrell r. Drvcr (1881), 9 App. Cus. 345 ; 51 L. T. 130 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 207 17 
 Birt, R(! (187 1), L. R. 2 P. & D. 214 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 26 ; 24 L. T. 142 ; 
 
 19 W H. 51 1 699 
 
 Birt V. Barlow (1779). 1 Dcmg. 171. 174 150, 295, 373, 1172 
 
 Birt V. Rothwell (1097), 1 Ld. Raym. 210, 343 18 
 
 Bishopc. Chanit)ro(1827), 3C. &P. 65; M. &M. 116 1193 
 
 BLshopf. Hclps(1845),2C. B. 45; 15L. J. C.P. 43; 1 Lutw. (Reg. Cas.) 
 
 353 156 
 
 Bisliop r. Howard (1823), 2 B. & C. 100 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 293 152 
 
 Bishop r. Countess of Jersey (1854), 2 Drew. 143 ; 2 Eq. R. 545 ; 23 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 483 ; 18 Jur. 705 101 
 
 Bittle.stou V. Cooper (1845), 14 M. & AV. 399 474 
 
 Bittlestone r. Cooke (1850), E. & B. 296 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 7')8 83 
 
 Black V. Lonl Bravbrook (1810). 2 Stark. 7 ; 6 M. & Sel. 39 62 
 
 Black V. Holmes (1822), 1 Fox & Sm. 28 618 
 
 Black V. Jobling (1809). L. R. 1 P. & D. 085 ; 38 L. J. P. ic M. 74 ; 21 
 
 L. T. 298; 17 W. R. 1108 143 
 
 Elackbmn v. Hargroave (1828), 2 Lew. C. C. 259 816 
 
 Blackburn v. Mackoy (1823), 1 C. & P. 1 108 
 
 Blackburn Guard, r. Brooks (1877). 25 "W. R. 57 912 
 
 Blackett v. Lowes (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 494 ; 15 R. R. 324 398 
 
 Blaokett V. Roy. Ex. Ass. Co. (1832). 2 C. & J. 244 ; 2 Tyr. 206 765, 766 
 
 Blackball r. Gibson (1878), 2 Ir. L. R. 49 94 
 
 Blackham's case (1708), 1 Salk. 290, 291 1132 
 
 Blackie v. Bidding (1848), 6 C. B. 196 , 307 
 
 Blacquiere v. Hawkins (1780), 1 Doug. 380 7 
 
 BlagTttve V. Blagrave (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 262 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 346 ; H 
 
 Jur. 744 327 
 
 Blague V. Gold (1635), Cro. Car. 4*7 802 
 
 Blair, Re (1848), Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & M.) 528 701 
 
 Blair v. Ormond (1851), 17 Q. B. 423 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 444 716 
 
 Blake v. Albion Life Ass. Co. (1878), 45 L. J. C. P. 663 ; 36 L. T. 269 ; 
 
 24 W. R. 677 243 
 
 Blake v. Blake (1882), 61 L. J. P. D. & A. 36 ; 7 P. Div. 102 ; 46 L. T. 
 
 641 ; 30 W. R. 505 695, 697 
 
 Blake v. Concannon (1870), 4 Ir. R. C. L. 323 100 
 
 The references are to pages, not to paragraph*. 
 
&I 
 
 TABLK OF CASES CITKD. 
 
 XXXVll 
 
 243 
 
 b, 697 
 100 
 
 VXdK 
 
 Bliiker. .Tfimini?H(lsni), I'J Ir. C. L. R. 45S lior. 
 
 Bliikr r. Jnlinson (1H19), Milw. KU 1.0 
 
 nii.ke r. K.iiKlit (ISt.'t), :< ('"rt. Mii O!"'-, t'!)? 
 
 Uliik.. r. l'ilf..i<l (l.s;i2), 1 M. .S: Rob. 198 (il8, OlIO 
 
 Bliiktiiidrc r. lUaiiiortraunliiri; Cau. Co. (KSSo), 2 C. M. & R. I.'i.'i; 1 (Julc, 
 
 7S- 5Tvr <ii':' ""- ""'■'• l"''"' 1^^^ 
 
 El'ih.'l i\ Hhi'iid (lH(i(i), b6 L. J. P. & M. 1U4 ; L. R. 1 1'. & D. '237 ; 16 
 
 W. 11. !) 
 
 Bl.niil r. Swiittonl (1791), IVake, CO 831 
 
 Uliiiidy r Dc Kiirtfli (1K48). (i C. B. 023; D. & L. 412; 6 Railw. Cas. 
 
 ;i(il ; IH L. J. U. P. 2 ; 12 Jur. lOOo l(i» 
 
 Blaiiklcvr. WiiiHtiuilcy (17S9), 3T. R. 2.9; 1 R. R. 704 791 
 
 BImvii.'j-'h Tni>ts, Ro (187.')), Ir. R. 9Eq. 413 7'.'H 
 
 Bl.'iikl.'y V. J^inith ; 1840), 1 1 Sim. 1.50 070, (,7 ' 
 
 Blciikiim r. Lonjfstart'o (188.^)), 51 L. J. Ch. 510 ; .52 L. T. 081 91 
 
 Bliiikinsop r. Blcnkiiisop (1848), 17 L. J. Cli. 343 ; 2 Pliill. 007 
 
 Bi.'wett V. Tiegonning (1835), .5 N. & M. 308 ; 3 A. & E. 654 ; 1 H. & W 
 
 H 
 4 
 
 15 
 003 
 
 432 
 
 BlcNvitt, In re (1880), 49 L. J. P. D. & A. 31; 5P. D. 116; 42L.T.329; 
 
 2S W. 11. 520 700 
 
 Bl.'witt c. HolitTts (1841), Cr. k Ph. 274 ; 10 L. J. Ch. 342 ; 5 Jur. 979. . 144 
 Bl..« itt r. Trittou, (1892) 2 Q. B. 327 ; 01 L. J. Q. B. 773 ; 67 L. T. 72 ; 
 
 •11 W. II. 30 282 
 
 Blijfh r. Umit (1836-7), 2 Y. & 0. Ex. 968 ; 6 L. J. Ex. Eq. .58 683 
 
 Bliu'li c. Hiewpr (18;i4), 3 D. P. C. 206 ; 1 C. M. & R. 051 ; 6 Tyr. 222 . . 732 
 
 Blisrh r. WcUcnIcv (1826), 2 C. & P. 400 305 
 
 Bliffht r. Fixli.T ("1809). 1 Pet. C. C. R. 41 873 
 
 Bloinintftoii r. Lckk (1894), 42 Am. St. R. 210 AM. [220] 
 
 BlcmuT r. Si)ittie (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 427 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 309; 26 L. T. 
 
 272 : 20 W. H. 435 749 
 
 Bloomfitld r. \Vhiitt.)n(1867), Ir. R. 8 C. L. 08 Ill 
 
 BlosMum V. Cuniioii (1817), 14 Mass. 177 122 
 
 Blount r. Hnrrow (1792), 5 Brown. C. C. 75 480, 482 
 
 Blount r. HiiriiH (18;9\ 47 L. .1. Q. B. 596 ; 4S L. J. Q. B. 159 ; 39 L. T. 
 
 405 ; 27 W. R. 202 736 
 
 Blount r. Kinq)ton, (1S92) 31 Am. St. R. 554 692 
 
 Blow.r'.s TiustM (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 97 ; Ch. 351 ; 23 L. T. 548; 26 
 
 L. T. 181; 19 W. R. 121. 066 740 
 
 Blow.r r. G. W. Kv. Co. (1872\ 41 L. J. C. P. 268 ; L. R. 7 C. P. 655 ; 
 
 27 L. T. 883 ; 20 W. R. 770 771 
 
 Blowerr. Hollis [IXXi], 3 Tyr. 356; 1 C. & J. 393 1035, 1036 
 
 Bloxam r. Klsce (1825), 1 C. &P. 558; Rv. & M. 187 291 
 
 Bloxiim r. Favre (1.S84), 8 P. D. 101 ; 62 "L. J. P. 42; 31 W. R. 610; 47 
 
 J. P 377 703 
 
 Bluuk f. Gonipertz (1852), 7 Ex. 67 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 25 1195 
 
 Bluok r. RHckuian i 1846), 6 Moo. P. C. R. 308 16, 267 
 
 Bhuidollf). Catterall(182l), 5 B. & A. 293, 298 112 
 
 Bhuidell r. Gladstone (1841), U Sim. 486; 1 Phillips, 279, 283, 289; 12 
 
 L. J. Ch. 225 739, 784 
 
 Blunt f. Lack (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 148; 3 Jjir. N. S. 195 7 
 
 Elyth V. Archhold (1 835), Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. (A) 147 
 
 Blyth r. Dennett (18.53), 13 C. B. 178; 22 L. J. C. P. 79 623 
 
 Boardmau v. Jackson (1813), 2 Ball & B. 382 527 
 
 Buardman v. Reed and Ford's Lessees (1832), 6 Pet. 328, 345 801 
 
 Boast V. Firth (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 1 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 19 L. T. N. S. 
 
 204 ; 17 W. R. 29 780 
 
 Boddington v. Schlencker (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 572 ; 1 N. & M. 641 ; 2 L. 
 
 J. K. B. 138 32 
 
 Boddy T. Boddy (I860), 30 L. J. P. & M. 23 243 
 
 Boddv V. Wall (1877), 7 Ch. Div. 104 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 112 ; 26 W. R. 343.. 187 
 Bndarer v. Arch (1854), 10 Ex. 333 ; 2 C. L. R. 1491 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 19. .714, 716 
 Bodmin United Mines Co., Re (1856), 23 Beav. 370 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 
 
 3Jur. N. S. 360 7 
 
 Vol. I. ends with page 635. 
 
 i'li 
 
 m 
 
 i'-iir 
 
f 
 
 xxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Bodv, Re(n6»), 34 L. J. T. & M. 5a ; 4 S. & T. 9 307 
 
 B.>ehtlinck r. Schneider (1799). 3 Fsp. .VS ; 3 East, 381 ; 7 R. R. 490 . . . , 936 
 
 Bogert K. OHuman (181)7-51), Anthon R. 70 743 
 
 Bohuu V. Delesxert (1813). 2 Coop. 21 129, 424 
 
 Boiloauv. Rutlm(1848), 2 Ex, C78 50(1, 531, f52, 1158 
 
 Bolokow V. Seymour (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 107 44 
 
 Bold r. Hutchinson (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 285 ; 20 Beav. 250 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 365 ; 3 Eq. Rep. 743 539, 679, 749 
 
 Bold V. Ravner (1836), 1 M. & \V. 343 ; 2 Gale, 44 : 5 L. J. Ex. 172 . .299, 763 
 Bolding t'. Lane (1863), 1 De G. J. & 8. 122 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 219 ; 11 W. R. 
 
 386 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 506 720 
 
 BoMron v. Wid.lows (1824). 1 C. & P. 65 219, 230 
 
 Bolinfrbroke, I,d. v. Local Board of Swindon (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 287 ; 
 
 L. R. 9 C. P. 575 ; 30 L. T. 72;. 587 
 
 Bolingbroke. Ld. v. Towimend (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 045 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 
 
 255 ; 29 L. T. 430 191 
 
 BoUand, Ex parte. Re Ackary (1876), 45 L. J. Bank. 133 ; 3 Ch. D. 125 ; 
 
 34 L. T. 666 ; 24 W. R 932 851 
 
 Bolland, Ex parte. Bo Holdcu (1874), L. R. 19 Eq. 131 ; 44 L. J. Bk. 9; 
 
 31 L. T. 445 ; 24 W. R. 24 849 
 
 Bolton V. Bolton (1876), 2 Ch. D. 217 ; 34 L. T. 123 ; 24 \V. R. 426 1036 
 
 Bolton V. Bp. of Carlisle (1793), 2 H. Bl. 263 659, 1 198 
 
 Bolton r. Gladstone (1804), 5 EnA !65 ; 1 Smith, 372; 2 Taun. 85 ; 7 R. 
 
 R. 674 1149 
 
 Bolton c. Corp. of Liverpool (18^.:;, 1 Myl. & K. 94 ; Cooper, 19 ; 1 i-i. J. 
 
 Ch. 166 ..593, 601, 606, 1183 
 
 Bolton r. Corp. of Liveriio. ' (1831), 1 Myl. & K. 88 ; 3 Sim. 467 995 
 
 Bolton f. Lanjbert (1889;, 41 Ch. D. 295; 68 L.J. Ch. 425 ; 60 L. T. 687; 
 
 37 W. R. 434 672 
 
 Bolton V. London School Board (1878), 7 Ch. D. 76G ; 47 L. J. Ch. 461 ; 
 
 38 L. T. 277; 26 W. R. 549 123 
 
 Bolton f. O'Brien (1885), 16 L. R. Ir. 97 46, 243 
 
 Bolton r. Sherman 1837), 2 M. & W. 403 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 147 507 
 
 Bolton, Ld. r. Tcmiiin (1836), 1 N. & P. 247 ; 6 A. & E. 856 ; 1 C. & J. 391 926 
 
 Bond f. Douglas (1836), 7 C. & P. 626 245 
 
 Bond V. Evans (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 249; £', h. J. M. C. 105; 69 L. T. 
 
 411; 36 W. R. 767; 52 J. P. f' . 107 
 
 Bond V. Rosling (1861), 1 B. .«: S. 371 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 227 ; 4 L. T. 442 ; 
 
 9W.R. 740 049 
 
 Bonelli, Re (1875), L. R. 1 P. Div. 69 ; 45 I ■. J. P. D. & A. 42 ; 34 L. T. 
 
 32 ; 24 W. R. 255 938 
 
 Bonfield v. Smith (1844). 2 M. & Roll 519 270, 929 
 
 Bonner, Re, Tucker v. Good (1881), 1;! Ch. D. 201 ; U L. J. Ch. 83 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 470 ; 30 W. R. 58 145 
 
 Bonnewell v. Jenkins (1878), 8 Ch. D. 70 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 758 ; 38 L. T. 81 ; 
 
 26 "W. R. 294 673 
 
 Bonzi V. Stewart (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 295 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 1 634 
 
 Booker «>. Allen (1831), 2 Ru.ss. & M. 270; 9 L. J. Ch. 130 807 
 
 Boorman v. Johnston (1834). 12 Wend. 573 741 
 
 Boom's Case (1S19), »ite<l Greenleif cm Evid. 290 656 
 
 Boosey V. Davidson (1S19), 13 (J. B. 257 ; IS L. J. Q. B. 174 ; 13 Jur. 678 290 
 
 Booth V. Briscoe (1877), 2 Q. B. D. 496 ; 25 W. R. 83S 187 
 
 Booth V. Clivo (1851), 10 C. B. 827 ; 2 L. M. & P. 283; 20 L. J. C. P. 
 
 151 ; 15 Jur. 563 227 
 
 Booth r. Keunard (1858). 2 H. & N. 84 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 305 43 
 
 Boothf.Millns(1816),4 Dowl.i: L.52; 15M.&W.669; 15 L.J. Ex. 3f4. .271, 272 
 
 Booth V. Turle (1S73), L. R. 16 Eq. 182 ; 21 W. R. 721 665 
 
 Bootle I'. Blundell (1815). 19 V'es. 494 ; 13 R. R. 254 1215 
 
 Porthwiok P. cr, (1812), Pari. Min. 62 423 
 
 Bogimquet, Ro (1852), 2 Rolicrts. 577 696 
 
 B iHBnipiet I'. Anderson (IHDi)). 6 E-ip. 44 647 
 
 Bosville r. Aff..niev(ieneral (1««7), 12 P. D. 177; 66 L. J. P. 97; 57 L. 
 
 T. 88 : 36 \V. R. 79 101 
 
 The ri'fi ii'iiirf hit Io piije; not to pariigriiphi. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XXXIX 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Boswell f. Smith (1833), 6 C. & P. 60 154 
 
 Bosworth V. Crotchett (18'J4), 1 Ph. Ev. 300 447, 4ol 
 
 Botham r. Swingler (1794). 1 E»p. 104 ; 1 Pea. 285 910 
 
 Bothe'8 case (1G02), Moo. (F.) 000 DS5 
 
 Bothnia, The (1800), Lu»h. 5J ; "JO L. J. P. M. & A. 05 ; 30 L. T. O. S. 
 
 100 1 "8 
 
 Bottinir V. Martin (1808), 1 Camp. 317 656 
 
 Bottomley v. Forbes (1838), Scott, 816 ; 6 Bin^. N. C. 121 ; i Arn. 481 ; 
 
 2 Jur. 1010 782 
 
 Boucher r. Lawson (undated), Cas. temp. Hard. 9 1 160 
 
 Bdmher r. Murray (1844), Q. B. 362 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 278 192 
 
 Bouchierf. T.ylor (1770), 4 Bro. P. C. 708 1103, 1105 
 
 Bouillon r. Lupton (1803), 15 C. B. N. S. 113 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 37 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N S 422 : 8 L. T. N. S. 575 ; 1 1 W. R. 900 770 
 
 Bouiter v. Peplow (1850), 9 C. B. 493 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 191 ; 14 Jur. 248..291, 292, 
 
 298 
 
 Boulton's case (1835), Milw. 30 502 
 
 Bourd r. Lawrence. (1892) 1 Q. B. 226 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 21 ; 65 L. T. 844; 
 
 40 AV. R. 1 ; 50 J. P. 118 779 
 
 Bourdin f. Greenwood (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 281 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 73 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 782 ; 20 W. R. 100 713 
 
 Bourke v. Davis (1890), 44 Ch. D. 110 ; 62 L. T. 34 ; 38 W. R. 167 915 
 
 Bourne v. Coulter (1884), 53 L. J. Ch. 699 ; 50 L. T. 321 186 
 
 Bourne «•. F<isbrooke (1805), 18 C. B. N. S. 515 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 164 039 
 
 Bourne f. Gatlifte (1811), 3 M. & Gr. 613, 689, 690; 3 Scott, N. R. 1 ..43, 782 
 
 Bours V. Tuckennau (1811). 7 Johns. 538 870 
 
 Boustieldr. Mould (1S47), 1 DeG. &Sm. 347; 11 Jur. 902 910 
 
 Bovillc. Pimm (1850), 11 Ex. 718 ; 26 L. T. O. S. 312 43 
 
 Bowdcu 1'. Henderson (18.i4). 2 Sm. & G. 360 172 
 
 Bowdcnr. Home (1831), 7 Binj?. 716 1124 
 
 Bowcn V. Owen (1847), 11 Q. B. 130; 17 L. J. Q. B. 5 ; 11 Jur. 972 .... 48 
 
 Bowerbank c. Monteiro (1813), 4 Tauu. 844 ; 14 R. R. 679 755 
 
 Bowers I'. Bowers (IS.iO), 1 Abb. (N. Y.) App. Dec. 214 76') 
 
 Bowers r. Nizon (1847), 2 C. & Kir. 372 189, 192 
 
 Bowes t'. Foster (18.58), 2 H. & N. 779; 26 L. J. Ex. 262 91, 481, 562 
 
 Bowes ■ . P<mtifex (1803), 3 F. & F. 739 6t.2 
 
 Bowes r. Shand (1877), 2 App. Cas. 465 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 561 ; 36 L. T. 857; 
 
 25 W. R. 730 42 
 
 Bowey V. Bell (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 95 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 101 ; 39 L. T. 607 ; 
 
 27 W. R. 247 41 
 
 Bowker r. Burdekin (1843), 1 1 M. & W. 128 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 329 1204 
 
 Bowlby !•. Hell (1840), 3 C. B. 284 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 18 685 
 
 Bowles V. Jackson (1854), 1 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. i: M.) 294 702 
 
 Bowles f. Jolins.m (1748), 1 W. Bl. 36 815, 819 
 
 Bowles f. Lan>rworthy (1793), 5 T. R. 300 ; 1 Doug. 216, n. (/) 1208 
 
 Bowman, Ke (1834), 5 B. ic Ad. 1 1 13 988 
 
 Bowman v. Bowman (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 501 921, 1209, 1215 
 
 Bowman f. Hodgson (1807), L. R. 1 P. 302; 36 L. J. P. 124; 16 L. T. 392 278 
 
 Bowman r. Horsey (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 8') 704 
 
 Bowman r. Manz.'lnmn (1809), 2 Camp. 315; 11 R. R. 716 319 
 
 Bowman r. Nichol (1794), 5 T. R. 537: 1 Esp. 81 1194 
 
 Bowman «•. Norton (1831), 5 C. & P. 177 699, 003 
 
 Bowman v. Rostnm (1835), 2 A. & rl. 295 ; 4 N. & M. 452 89. 552 
 
 Bowman r. Tavlor (IS.'i,-)), 4 N. & M. 2(i4 ; 2 A. & E. 278, 279 88, 93 
 
 Bowring i: bhJ'pherd (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 309 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 721 ; 19 W. R. 852 158 
 
 Bowshcr V. Calley (1808), 1 Camp. 391, n. ; 10 R. R. 71 1, n 3S5 
 
 Boycc*. Douglas (1807), 1 Camp. 00 1115 
 
 Bovcc f. arceu (1820), Batty. 0u8 071, 084 
 
 Bovd f, Ifolton (\HU), 8 Ir. Eq. K. 113 623, 627, 528 
 
 Bovd ,. M'Lean (181.i), 1 Johns. Ch. (Am.) 582 007 
 
 Boyd I. lVtrie(l«08), 19 W. R. 221 1189 
 
 Boyd I'. The State (undated , 2 Humph. 37 671 
 
 Vet. I. tnth with puj/t 036. 
 
 I 
 
 t:i 
 
 m 
 
d TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Boydell «. Drummond 0809). 11 East, 142; 10 R. R. 450 G73, 681 
 
 Boydell's chso (18:iO), Macq. 11. of L. Practice, 6.51 502 
 
 BoycH V. Bedale (186.5), 1 H. & M. 708 ; 10 L. T. 131 ; 12 W. R. 232 ; 33 
 
 t,. J. Ch. 233 145 
 
 Boyle v. MiiUioUand (1860), 10 Ir. C. L. R. ISO 803 
 
 Bi)ylet'. AViHomim (18.').-)), 11 Ex. 360; 24 L. J. Ex. 281 26, 300, !tfi4 
 
 Boyntoii f. Kello^r>r (181)7), 3 Mass. 189 255, 973 
 
 BcyH •. Willianm flM3i;. 2 Rush. & My. 689 78.". 
 
 Boyso r. Cololoujfh (1,S.>1), 1 K. & J. 124 ; 2 W. R. 354 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 7. . 1145 
 
 Bracei-'irdlo v. llcald (1818), 1 H. k Aid. 722 681 
 
 Briw.rirdle v. ilinks (1854), 9 Ex. 361 ; 2 C. L. R. 991 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 128; 
 
 18 Jur. 70 222 
 
 Bradford v. Romney MS02), 30 Beav. 431, 438 ; .11 L. .T. Ch. 497 749 
 
 Bradford v. Youii-,' (1884), 29 Ch. D. 617 ; 53 L. T. 407 ; 33 W. R. 860 ; 
 
 54 L. J. Ch. 96 1105 
 
 Bradliiujrh r. GosM<.tt fl8«4), 12 Q. B. D. 271; 53 L. J. Q. B. 209; 53 
 
 L. T. 620 ; :i2 W. R. .^)')2 4 
 
 Bnullaujrh r. R. (WH,. 3 Q. B. D. 607 ; 38 L. T. 118 : 26 W. R. 410 .. 85 
 
 Bradley f. Arthur (1825), 6 Howl. & R. 4 13 ; 4 B. & C. 292 932 
 
 liradlfy v. B.ckctt (1844), 7 M. & (Jr. 99 1 89 
 
 Bradley r. Bradloy (18;i4), 2 Fairf. 367 1117 
 
 Biadl.yr.HoIdswortli(I«3H),lH.A:lI.15G; 3M.\\V.422; 7L. J.Ex. 153. . 6S3 
 
 Bradley v. Jiiiiips (l«5;i), 13 C. B. 822 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 193 412, 448 
 
 Bradloy v. Pilots of Newcastle (1853), 2 E. & B. 427 : 23 L. J. Q. B. 35. . 792 
 
 Bradshaw v. Bennett (1831), 5 C. & P. 48 ; 1 M. ic liob. 143 1211 
 
 Bradshaw r. Murphv (ISIUI), 7 C. & P. 612 969, 997 
 
 Bradstreet ;■. Nept. Ins. Co. (183S!, 3 Humn. 600 1142, 1147, 1150 
 
 Br;idy v. Cubitt (1778), 1 Doujf. 31, 39 667 
 
 Brady f. (Jurran flHii«), 2 Ir. R. C. L. 314; 16 W. R. 514.. 508 
 
 Brady v. Oa.Mtler (1864), 3 II. & C. 112 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 300; 11 Jur. N. S. 
 
 22 ; 1 1 L. T. N. fS. 6,S1 745 
 
 Brady v. Tod (;n61 ), 30 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 592 ; 4 L. T. 212 ; 
 
 9 W. R. 483 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 827 388 
 
 Brain r. Preece (1843), 1 1 M. & W. 773 4.55 
 
 Braitli>vaiter. Gardiner (1845), 8Q. B.473; 15L. .T.Q. B. 187; 10 Jur. 591 546 
 Brake. Re (1881), 50 L. J. P. D. & A. 43; 6 P. Div. 217; 45 L. T. 191 ; 
 
 29 VV. R. 744 798 
 
 Bramble, Ex partr'. In re Toleman, &c. (1880), 13 Ch. D. 885; 42 L. T. 
 
 413; 28 W. R. 676 321 
 
 Braniwell v. Lucas (1824). 4 Dowl. & R. 367 ; 2 B. & C. 745 608 
 
 Branilao v. Burnett (1816), 6 M. & (ir. 630 5 
 
 Brandford i'. Freeman (1850), 2 Ex. 734 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 36 272 
 
 Branford r. Branford (1879), 4 P. D. 72 ; 48 L. J. Mat. 40 ; 40 L. T. 059 ; 
 
 27 \V. R. 6<J1 604 
 
 Brantr.n r. Grittits (1877). 2 C. P. D. 212 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 408 ; 36 L. T. 4 ; 
 
 29 \V. II. 313 736 
 
 Bianwell v. Pennectk (1827), 7 B. & C 530 1 136 
 
 Bru.shi.r v. Jackson (1840), 6 M. & W. 649; 8 D. P. C. "84 ; 9 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 313 192, 193, 194 
 
 Brassin^toii v. Brassinirton 0823). 1 S. i St. 455 321 
 
 Bray r. Hadwen (1816). 5 M. \- Sel. 68 32 
 
 Brave Peer. (18;t6-39). 6 CI. Ac Fin. 7')7 403 
 
 Bra/ier r. Jones (1828 , 8 B. & C. 124 1038 
 
 BreiMlalbane Can.. (1866). L. R. I H. L. (Sc.) 182 106, 149 
 
 Breadalbane. M. of. r. M. of Chandos (1837), 2 My. & Cr. 732 ; 4 CI. & F. 
 
 43; 7 L. J. Cli. 28 1124 
 
 Breadalbane i'ei'r. (1872), L. R. 2 II. L. (Sc.) 269 181 
 
 Brcckon r. Smith (18:i4), 1 A. & E. 488 517 
 
 Breech LoadR. Arm. Co., R.' (1867). L. R. 4 Eq. 463 ; 15 W. R. 1007 .. 845 
 
 Bree/er. Hawker (1844), 14 Sim. 350 1054 
 
 Bremhridjre t. G.slMprne (I816j, I Hiark. R. 374; 18 R. R. 784 154 
 
 Bremer v. BVeeman (18,'i7j, 1 Deane, Eec. R. 192 9.36, 937 
 
 Brunan's case (1847), 10 Q. B 498; 16 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 11 Jur. 775 7,83 
 
 Th0 r^erentet art to pag**, not to pttiaympht. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xli 
 
 PA(1R 
 
 Brenchley r. Still (18.i0), 2 Roberts. 162 697 
 
 Brcnnan i'. Dillane (1843), Ir. Cir. 0. 853 1035 
 
 Brennan v. Howard (1856), 1 H. & N. 138 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 289 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 546 192, 194 
 
 Brcnnan (Hhould be Breenan) v. Moran (1857), 6 Ir. Ch. R. 126 80.5 
 
 Brrat V Lever (1841), 7 M. & W. 593 ; 9 D. P. C. 246 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 337.. 1 18 
 Breton's Estate, In ro (1881), 17 Ch. D. 416 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 369; 44 L. T. 
 
 3:i7 ; 29 W. R. 777 630 
 
 Breton v. Cope 0791), Fcako, 31 154, 1054, 1092, 1173, liOS 
 
 Br<tt V Beales ( j29), 10 B. & C. 508 ; M. & M. 416 397, 403, 433, 10(16 
 
 Brettel v. Williams (1849), 4 Ex. 623 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 123 161 
 
 ]!rettonr. I'rettiman (100.;),T. Ray. 153 498 
 
 Brew f. Hiiren (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. L. 29 1116, 1161 
 
 Biewerf. Kuapp (18J31, 1 Tick. 337 154 
 
 Brewer r. Palmer (ISOO), 3 Eap. 213 285 
 
 BrewiuK Co. r. Beaner (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 686 AM. [220] 
 
 BnwiN, Ro (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 124 ; 3 S. & T. 473 701 
 
 Brewster, Rt* (1800), 3 S. & T. 473 ; 33 L. J. P. 124 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 593. . 706 
 
 Brewster v. Sewell (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 296 277, 302, ."03, 3(15, 323 
 
 Briee f. Bannister (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 569 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 722 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 7:ti) ; 2G W. R. 670 513, 651 
 
 Bri.kell V. Hiilso (1837), 7 A. & E. 456 ; 2 N. & P. 426 500 
 
 Uii.lgo r. E-rjrleston (1817), 14 Mass. 245 514 
 
 Bri.l^'e V. Gray (1833). M Piek. 55 1 123 
 
 Bri.ljfe r. Sumner (1823), 1 Piek. 371 1139 
 
 Bri.l!.'es r. N. Lond. Ry. (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 213 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 151 ; 
 
 30 L. T. 844 ; 23 W. R. (i2 38 
 
 Brid^'es r. Potts (18(11), 17 C. B. N. S. 314 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 338 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1049; 11 L. T. 373 35 
 
 BiiilKet Feltham, Ro (1855), 1 K. & J. 528 798 
 
 ]!iiili;ewuter, Ld., ease of (undat(>d), cited Skin. 15 1 1 79 
 
 Briil^cnian c. .lenninfrs (1699), 1 Ld. Ruym. 731 ; B. N. P. 2S;!a 510 
 
 Brid^rwater Trust r. Bontlc-cum-Linaere (1860), L. R. 2 Q. B. 4 ; 36 L. .1. 
 
 ii. B. 41 : 7 B. & S. 348 HI, 112 
 
 Bridscin v. Smith (1H76), 24 W. R. 392 53 1 
 
 Brien v. Swainson (1877), 1 L. R. Ir. 135 (i73 
 
 Brifrtfs, Ex parte (1859), 28 L. .1. Q. B. 272 ; 1 E. & E. 881 903 
 
 Bri^:^'8 v. Avnsworth (1838). 2 M. A: Rob. 168 274 
 
 Biitf^'H V. lirijf^s (1880), 5 P. D. 163 ; 19 L. J. P. 38 ; 28 W. R. 702 1 143 
 
 W\i!t:H V. Wilson (1853), 5 De G. M & G. 12 ; 17 Bcav. 330 448, 451, 712 
 
 Bii^diiim I-. Rip^rers (1822), 17 Mass. 571 757 
 
 Biisfht r. lluttou (1851-2), 2 H. L. Cas. 341 ; i8 Jur. 695 510, 541 
 
 Biicht r. Legerton (1860-1), 30 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 2 Do G. & J. 421 ; 8 W. R. 
 
 678 455 
 
 Britflitr. Walker (183 1 ' 0. M. &R. 222; 3L. J. Ex. 250; 4 Tyr. 502. . 110, 125 
 BrigHtoeko i: Smith (18o , 1 C. M. & R. 483; 3Tyr.445; 2 L. J. Ex. 187. .710, 
 
 712 
 
 Brine r. Bazal^rette (1849). 3 Ex. 692 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 348 252, 253 
 
 Briiigloo V. Goodson (1839), 8 Seott, 71 ; 5 Bing. N. C. 738 ; 1 Am. 322. . 1208, 
 
 1213 
 Brinsmoad v. Harrison (1871), L. R. 7 C. P. 517 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 190; 27 
 
 L. T. 99; 20 W. R. 781 UU 
 
 Bri.sco r. Lomax (1838). 3 N. & P. 308 ; 8 A. & E. 198 ; 2 Jur. 682 . .233, 396, 
 
 398,404, 405, 1109 
 
 Briscoo V. Stephens (1824), 9 Moore (C. P.) 413 ; 2 Bin^. 213 1133 
 
 Bristol Aerated Bread Co. r. Magjfs (1890), 44 Ch. D. 616; 59 L. J. Ch. 
 
 472; tVi L. T. 11(1; 38 W. R. 303 672 
 
 Bristol, Citv of, r. Wait (1834). 3 N. & M. 359 ; 1 A. & E. 204 303 
 
 Bristol, May. "f. >'. Cox (1884), 26 Ch. D. 678; 53 L. J. Ch. 1144; 50 
 
 L. T. 719; 33 W. R. 255 1182, 1183 
 
 Bristow V. Brown (18(i'.'), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 201 77.3 
 
 Brist.iw r. Corniieiin (187H). 3 App. Cas. 641, 667 Ill, SOI, 432 
 
 Bristiiwr. Miller (1818), 11 Ir. L, R. 461 387, 716 
 
 m 
 
 Vol, I. ttuh uilh paye 635. 
 
xlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Bri«tow V. Sequeville (1850), 6 Ex. 276 ; 3 C. & K. 64 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 289; 
 
 14 Jur. 674 61, 938 
 
 Pristowr. Wri>rht (1781), 2Doup, 6fi6; IT R. 225, n 187 
 
 Britain v. Rossiter (1879), 11 Q. B. D. 123 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 362 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 240 ; 27 W. R. 482 681 
 
 British Empire Ass. Co. v. Browne (1852), 12 C. B. 723 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 49; 
 
 16 Jur. 1157 676 
 
 British Farmers' Pure Lins. Cake Co., Re (1878), 7 Ch. D. 633; 47 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 415 ; 38 L. T. 45 : 26 W. R. 334 1076 
 
 British Linen Co. v. Drumraond (1835). 10 B. & C. 903 62 
 
 British Prov. Life and Fire Aas. Co., Re {see Grrdy's Case). 
 Biittain v. Kiuuaird (1849), 4 Moore, C. P. 50; 1 B. & B. 432; Gow, 164. .1098, 
 
 1099, 1108, 1136 
 
 Britten, Ex parte (1840), 3 Deac. & Chit. 35 865 
 
 Brittlebauk v. Smith (1884), 50 L. T. 491 1031 
 
 Broad v. Ham (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 722 ; 8 Soott, 40 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 357 . . 30 
 
 Broad v. Pitt (1828). 3 C. & P. 618 693, 694, 596 
 
 Brooas v. Lloyd (1857) 23 Beav. 129; 26 L. J. Ch. 758; 4 W. R. 540; 2 
 
 Jur. N. S. 555 819, 832 
 
 Bro.;k V. Kent (1807), 1 Camp. 306. n. ; 10 R. R. 706. n 498 
 
 Brockbank v. Anderson (1844), 7 M. & G. 295 ; 13 L. J. C. P. 102 910 
 
 Brodio r. Brodio (1861), 2 S. Ac T. 259 ; 30 L. J. Mat. 185 ; 4 L. T. 307 ; 
 
 9 W. R. 815 377 
 
 Brodie r. Howard (1856), 17 C. B. 109; 25 L. J. C. P. 57 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1209 179, 492 
 
 Brogan's case (undated). 2 Russ. Cr. & M. 874 (4th ed.) 585 
 
 Bromagof. Prosser (1825), 4 B. & C. 247 ; 6 D. ot'R. 296; 1 C. & P. 
 
 475 110 
 
 Bromley v. Smith (1859), 26 Beav. 644, 665; 29 L. J. Ch. 18; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 833 137 
 
 Bromley f. Wallace (1803), 4 Esp. 237 254 
 
 Bromwich's case (1060), 1 Lev. 180 340 
 
 BrookandDelcomyu, Re(1864), 16C. B. N. S. 403; 33 L.J. C. P. 246 .. 1147 
 Brook r. Hook (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 89 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 50 ; 24 L. T. 34 ; 19 
 
 W. R. 508 44 
 
 Brook r. Jonuey (1841), 2 Q^B. 273; 1 G. & D. 667 ; 11 L. J. M. C. 10 , . 132 
 
 Brooke, Re, (sen Brooke v. Kent). 
 
 Brooke v. Brooke (1881), 17 Ch. D. 833 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 628; 44 L T. 612 ; 
 
 30 AV. R. 45 
 
 Brooke r. Havmes (1808), L. R. 6 Eq. 25 
 
 Brooke r. Kent (1840), 3 Moo. P. C. C. 334 ; 2 Curt. 343 
 
 Brooker r. Hcott (1843), 1 1 M. & W. 67 
 
 Brooks V. Mitchell (1841), 9 M. & W. 15; 11 L. J. Ex.61 
 
 Broom r. Biitchelor (1856), 1 H. & N. 255; 25 L. J. Ex. 299 
 
 Broome r. Wootton (1606), Yolv. 67 ; Cro. Jac. 73 ; Moo. (F.) 762 
 
 Broomfiold r. Smith (1836), 2 Gale, 114 ; 1 M. & W. 642 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 155. . 
 
 Brough ('. Parkings (1703), 2 Ld. Ravm. 994 
 
 Brouukcr, Ld. r. Atkvns (16S2), Skiii. 14 
 
 Brown, Ex parte (18.V1), 19 Beav. 97 
 
 Brown, Re (1849), 1 Rob. 710 
 
 Brown, Re (18.')8^ 27 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; 1 Sw. & Tr. 32 ; 30 L. T. 353 : 
 
 2 Jur. N. S. 244 143, 356, 705 
 
 Brown, Re (1881)^. 61 L. T. 463 
 
 Brown and Cr(i\d. Ciin. Co., Ro (1839), 9 A. & E. 526 
 
 Brown V. Aokroyd (1856), 5 E. & B. 819 ; 2J L. J. Q. B. 193 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 283 
 
 7 Ir. C. L. R. 130 . 
 
 Batchelor (1856), 1 
 
 H. &N. 258; 25 L.J. Ex. 
 
 Brown t'. Annstrong (1873) 
 Brown (should bo Broom) ) 
 299 
 
 Brown V. iirown (183()) 1 Keen, 275 
 
 Brown V. Brown (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 173 ; 8 E. & B. 876 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 163 ; 1 a. & T. 32 ; 27 li. J. P. 20 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 244 143, 356, 705 
 
 Brown f. Brown (1869), 38 L. J. P. & M. 78 ; L. R. 1 P. cfe D. 720 
 
 13 
 
 93 
 708 
 
 49 
 
 512 
 
 787 
 
 1115 
 
 222 
 
 16 
 
 1179 
 
 626 
 
 698 
 
 , 708 
 
 793 
 
 1160 
 
 166 
 296 
 
 787 
 114 
 
 , 709 
 
 360 
 
 The r^erencet art to pag**, not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xl 
 
 111 
 
 PAOB 
 
 881 
 
 768 
 S06 
 
 82 
 
 755 
 
 Brown v. Brown and Paget (1874). 33 L. J. P. 198 ; 43 L. J. Mat. 33 ; 
 
 30 L. T. N. S. 7(i7 : 22 W. R. 759 .... 
 
 Brown r. Bvnie (1854), 3 El. & B. 703 ; 2 C L. R. 1599 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 313 , '.8 iar. 700 
 
 Brown V. Dawson (1705), Free, in Cli. 240 
 
 Brown r. Ettstem Counties Ry. Co. (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 391 ; 58 L. J. 
 
 Q B. 212 231, AM. [220] 
 
 Brown V Edgiugton (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 279 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 496 ; 1 Drink. 
 
 100 ; iO L. J. C. P. 60 777 
 
 Brown v. Foster (1857), 1 H. & N. 736 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 249 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 .)45 005, 609, 611 
 
 Brown's." Get'cheil (1814), 11 Mass. 11 871 
 
 Brown V. Goodwin (1841), )r. Oir. Rep. 61 257 
 
 Urown V. Kompton (1850), 19 L J. C. P. 169 «•> 
 
 Brown V. Liingley (1842;, 5 Scott, N. R. 249 ; 4 M. & Gr. 400 ; 12 L. J 
 
 C. P. 02 
 
 Brownr. Loeson (1792). 2H. Bl. 4.5; 3R. R. 341 621 
 
 Brown v. M'Dermott (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 438 809 
 
 Brown V. I'ayson (1833), 6 New Hamp. 443 609, Oil 
 
 Brown V. I'eHrson (1882), 21 Ch. D. 716 ; 46 L. T. 411 ; 30 W. R. 436 .-. . 5:-t 
 
 Brown ('. Perkins (1843), 2 Hare, 540 ; 1 1 L. J. Ch. 307 005 
 
 Uiottu V. Philpot (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 285 201 
 
 Bro»n V. Pinkham (1836), 18 Pick. 172 1196 
 
 Brown r. Robins (1859), 4 H. & N. 186 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 250 114 
 
 lirown r. Symons aSOO), 29 L. J. C. P. 251 ; 8 C. B. N. 8. 208 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1079 ; 8 W. R. 460 152 
 
 Brown f. Thornton (1837), 1 N. & P. 339 ; 6 A. & E. 185 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 82 52 
 
 Brown r. Wood (1820), 17 Mass. 68 122 
 
 Brown f. Woodman (1834), C. & P. 206 300, 356 
 
 Brown r. Wren, 15 R. (Feb.)281 ; (1895) 1 Q. B. 390; 43 W. R. 351 ..Adl. [169] 
 Brown's case (1673), 1 Vent. 243; I Russ. C. &M. 709; 2 Russ. C. & M. 984 893 
 
 Browne r Gumming (1829), 10 B. & C. 70 ; 5 M. & R. 1 18 986 
 
 Browne f. Gisbonie (1843), 2 Dowl. N. S. 903 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 2il7 ; 
 
 7 Jur. 328 836 
 
 Browne i. Murray (1825), Ry. & M. 254 272 
 
 Brownell r. Bonney (1841), 4 P. & D. 623 ; 1 Q. B. 39 ; 6 Jur. 6 621 
 
 Browning v. Budd (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 430 140 
 
 Browning r. Paris (1839), 6 M. & W. 117 ; 7 Dowl. 398 ; 2 H. & H. e.-^ ; 
 
 8 L. J. Ex. 222 714 
 
 Browning v. Sabiu (1877), 5 Ch. D. 511 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 728 ; 25 W. R. 602 834 
 
 Brownsword v. Edwards (1751), 2 Ves. sen. 245 960, 961, 1110, 1132 
 
 Bruce r. Bruce ^1790), 2 Bos. & P. 230, u 179 
 
 Bruce f. Nicolopulo (1855), 11 Ex. 129 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 321 129, 309 
 
 Bruce v. Wait (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 39 : 1 Scott, N. R. 81 ; 9li. J. C. P. 237 7 
 
 Brum f. Knott (1842), 12 Sim. 452-456 ; 6 Jur. 885 7 
 
 Biuner. Thompson (1842), 2 Q. B. 789: 2 G. & D. 110; Car. & M. 34; 
 
 11 L.J. Q. B. 131 17, 443, 792 
 
 Bninner. In re (1887), 10 Q. B. D. 572 ; .56 L. J. Q. B. 606 ; 57 L. T. 
 
 418; 3.5 W. R. 719; 4 Morr. B. R. 255 340 
 
 Bruiisd.ii r. Humphrey (1884), 11 Q. B. D. 712 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 766 .... 1120 
 
 Bnniswi.k, D. of, v. Harmer (1850), 3 C. & K. 10 929 
 
 Brun>«\vi.k Gas Co. v. United Gas Co. (1893], 35 Am. St. R. 385 Adj. [169] 
 
 Brutt r. I'irard (1824), R. & M. 37 1196 
 
 Bivan t . Child (18.50), 6 Ex. 368 ; 1 L. M. & P. 429 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 264 ; 
 
 i I Jur. 510 735 
 
 Brvan r. Wagstuff (1825), 8 Dowl. & R. 208 ; f B. & C. 314 ; B,. & M. 329 ; 
 
 2 C. & P. 126 315 
 
 Bryan v. WHiite (1850), 2 Roberts. 31 "i ,, 700 
 
 Bryan v. Wiiiwootl (1808), 1 Taun. 208 ; R. R. 751 1 10, 233 
 
 B.yan Reynolds, Ro(1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 20; L. R. 3 P. & D. 35; 
 
 28 L. T. 144 ; 21 W. R. 512 709 
 
 Bryant r. Foot (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 497 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 217 ; 9 B. & 8. 
 
 411; 18L. T. 687; 16 W. R. 808 10, 12? 
 
 Vol. I. ends with page 635, 
 
xliv 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Bnant, c. Herbert (187?;. 3 C. P. D. 189, 389 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 670 ; 39 
 
 L. T. 17 ; 26 W. K. 898 40 
 
 Brvant v. Lefever '1879 , 4 C. P. D. 172; 48 L. J. C. P. 380 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 57!» : 27 W. R. 592 76, 125 
 
 Prvce, Re (183'J;. 2 Curt. 3-'.i 700 
 
 Brydpes v. BnmfiU flS41 . 12 Sim. 334 ; 11 L. J. Ch. 12 348 
 
 Bryd^es i-. Walford 1817 . •! M. & Hel. 42 ; 1 Stark. 389 ; 18 R. R. 787, n. 549 
 Bucclemh. D. of, r. Met. Bd. of Works (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 418; 41 
 
 L. J. Ex. 137: 27L T. 1 612 
 
 Buchanan t. Rutker ISOSi. 1 Camp. 63 ; 9 East, 192 ; 9 R. R. 531 . .1147, 1 l'i4 
 
 Budier r. Jan-dt! '180.',. 3 Bos. & P. 143 289, 290, 318 
 
 Buck r. RoljNon 1878;, 3 Q. B. D. 686 ; 39 L. T. 325 ; 26 W. R. 804 ; 48 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 250 651 
 
 Buekell v. Blenkhom '1846 . 5 Hare. 131 693 
 
 Bucket r. Church (1840;. 9 C. i P. 209 44, 710 
 
 Buckhonse v. Crossbv 1737i, 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 32, pi. 44 752 
 
 Buckin^'ham, D. of,"r. Com. of Inl. Rev. (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 311 ; 6 Ex. 
 
 404 : JO L. J. Ex. 2'59 277 
 
 Bmkhiud r. Johnson 1854], 15 C. B. 145 ; 2 C. L. R. 784 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 
 
 •J(U; IS.Iur. 775 191, 1115, 1118, 1120 
 
 Buckle r. Kn.Kip 1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 33? ; 36 L. J. Ex. 49, 223 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 571: 15 W. K.999 157, 781 
 
 Buckler f. Jlillt rtl : 1689). 2 Ventr. 107 746 
 
 Buckley f. Bcardi<lce fl819;. 2 South. 570 669 
 
 Buckley f. C«K)ke ,1854,, 1 K. & J. 29 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 24 ; 3 Eq. Rep. 138 ; 
 
 3 W. R. 33 940 
 
 Buckley r. Littlcburr 1711 . 3 Bro. P. C. 43 805 
 
 Buckley r. U. 8. '1S46 . 4 How. Snp. Ct. Rep. 258 1050 
 
 Euckmaster r. Meikk-john (1851), 8 Ex. 634 : 22 L. J. Ex. 242 531 
 
 Buckniastcr (. Ru.**U '1>61). 10 C. B. N. S. 745 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 155 712 
 
 Bu<kma.ster8 t . Cox 18.39^ 2 Ir. L. R. 101 870 
 
 Buckminster r. Perry 1S0^\ 4 Ma-ss. 593 931 
 
 Buckton r. Hipjn. (1879 . 4 Ex, D. 174 ; 40 L. T. 755 ; 27 W. R. 803 536 
 
 Bull r. Loveland (1830,. 10 Pick. 9, 14 593, 969 
 
 Bullf. 0"Sulliyanfl871;.L. R. 6Q. B.209; 40L. .T. Q. B. 141; 24L. T. 130 546 
 Bull V. Pc^rker (1843). 2 Dowl. N. S. 345 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 93 ; 7 Jur. 282. . 48 
 Bullen r. Michel (1816), 4 Dowl. 297; 2 Price, 399; 16 R. R. 77.. 430, 431, 
 
 441 
 Bullev V. BuUey (1875), L. R. 9 Ch. 739 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 79 ; 30 L. T. 848 ; 
 
 22 \V. R. 779 93 
 
 Bullock r. Corrie 'or Corrv) (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 356; 47 L. J. Q. B. 352; 
 
 38 L. T. 102 ; 26 W. R." 330 599, 602 
 
 Bulmer v. Norris f|860t, K. & G. 321 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 19 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 
 
 25 ; 7 Jur N. S. 342 : 3 L. T. 470 : 9 W. R. 122 683 
 
 Buubury r. Bunbury (1833*, 2 Beav. 173 ; 8 L. J. Ch. 297 • 3 Jur. 644 .. 599 
 
 Bunbury r. Matthews 1814), 1 C. & K. 382 147 
 
 Bunn r. Bunn (1864), 4 De G. J. & S. 316 ; 10 L. T. 211 : 3 N. R. 679 ; 
 
 12 W. R 561 965 
 
 Bunn V. Markham (1841), 2 Marsh. 532 ; 7 Taunt. 224 ; Holt, 3.' ; 17 R. 
 
 R. 497 638 
 
 Bunsby r. Bailly {ft Bnmaby r. Riillie). 
 
 Buntinie's ca«* ('lo85\ 4 Co. Rep. 29 1103 
 
 Burchar.1 i . Macfarlane, (1891; 1 Q. B. 408 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 587 ; 65 L. T. 
 
 282 ; 39 W. R. 094 856, 857 
 
 Burchell r. Clark (1876), 2 C. P. D. 88 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 115 ; 36 L. T. 690 ; 
 
 25 W. R, 334 300 
 
 Bunhfield r. Moore (1854), 3 E. 4 B. 683 ; 2 C. L. R. 1308 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 261: 18Jur.727 1194 
 
 Burderf. O'Neill (1863), 9 Jur. N. S. 1109; 9 L. T. 232 632, 884 
 
 Burdickr. Hunt (1873). 43 Ind. 38 616 
 
 Burgess c. Burtress (1817). 2 Hagfc. Con. 227 503 
 
 Burpeiwc. ClemenU(1815),4M. &S. 306; Holt, 211, n.; 1 Stark. 261, n.; 
 
 16 R. R. 473 162 
 
 TJtt rtftftMt* are to page*, not to pmayraphl. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xlv 
 
 FAOB 
 
 494 
 
 Riirn-css «'. Laue (1824), 3 Greeul. 105 
 
 Bm-ess r. Langley (181X), 5 M. & G. 722 ; 1 D. & L. 21 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 
 
 ofs: 12L. J. C. r. 2.i7 
 
 nun'i'xs r. Wickliam {18f)4). 3 B. & S. 669 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 17 
 
 Bur-hart t . An-erstein (18;i4), 6 C. & P. 690 5CG, 
 
 Bi.i^'liart r. Hall (1839), 4 M. & W. 727 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 235 
 
 Buirfoyue r. ShowliT (1844), 1 Roberts. 6 
 
 B.irke r. Mooro (1875), 9 Ir. R. Eq. 609 
 
 Biiilriirh c. Stil.bs (1793), 5 T. R. 465 
 
 JluiliiiLr i: Tatorson, 1792 (.should be 1840), 9 C. & P. 570 134 
 
 Bi.rlinson r. Hall (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 347; 53 L. J. Q. B. 222 ; 50 L. T. 
 
 7j:i ; ;i2 W. R. 492 ; 48 J. P. 210 
 
 Burls r. Burls (180S), L. R. 1 P. & D. 472 ; 36 L. J. P. & M. 125 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 677 ; 1.) \V. K. 1090 
 
 Burmah Trading Corp. Lim. v. Mirza Mahomed Ally, iio. (1878), L. R. 
 
 T Iiid. App. 130 586 
 
 Bunni'stcT'-. N.rri8(1851), 6 Ex. 796; 21 L. J. Ex. 43 160 
 
 Burn r. Boulton (1846), 2 0. B. 476; 15 L. J. C. P. 97 714, 717 
 
 Buruiil>v r. Biillie (18>S9), 42 Ch. D. 282 ; 58 L. J. Ch. 842 ; 61 L. T. 631 : 
 
 :iH W. H. 125 309, 621, 1054 
 
 Burnby ). R(illitt(1847), 16M. &W. 644; 17 L. J. Ex. 190 ; 11 Jur. 827.. 776 
 
 Buruluiui r. Binm-tt (1817), 1 Dt' G. i: Sm 513 ; 2 Colly. 260 134 
 
 Buruliain c. WVbstt-r (lf<40), 1 Woodb. A: M. 170 1145, 1148, 1150, 1155 
 
 Burnsidf r. Dayrell (1849), 3 Ex. 224 ; Kailw. Cas. 67 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 46.. 541 
 
 Burr" I- la-c (l.Su7), Eviileiice for Defi'udant, p. 2 616, 619 
 
 Burr r.JIarpor(l.SlO), Holt, 420; 17 R. R. 656 1220,1221 
 
 BurruU r. Nichols.m (1832), 1 I^Iyl. .V: Iv. 6S0 906 
 
 617 
 770 
 1170 
 48 
 697 
 697 
 300 
 
 651 
 
 307 
 
 306 ; 6 C. & P. 202 . . 
 
 996, 1183 
 
 Burrell i: Nimolson (1833), 1 M. & R 
 
 Burroui.'li . . Ifartiu (1809), 2 Camp . 12 ; 1 1 R. R. 679 923, 925 
 
 Burrows - . liakor (1S69), I. R. 3 Eq. 596 711 
 
 Bursill . . Tanner (1885), 16 Q. B. 1). 1 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 53 ; 63 L. T. 445 ; 
 
 ;,4 W. R. 35 321, 592, 598, 609, 610 
 
 Burstall I. Bovfu.s (1S84), 26 Ch. D. 35 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 566 ; 50 L. T. 542 ; 
 
 32 AV. R. 418 535 
 
 Burt. Kx parte (1842), 2 Mont. D. & De G. 666 .' 869, 870 
 
 Burt r. Hurt (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 133 ; 2 S. & T. 88 ; 2 L. T. 439 ; 
 
 8 W. K. .^52 149 
 
 Bua r. Palmer (1803), 5 Esp. 145 ; 10 R. R. 707, n. ... 498 
 
 Burtr. AValktr (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 697 328, 329, 1214, 1216 
 
 Burteiishaw v. Gilbert (1774\ 1 Cowp. 52 708 
 
 Burton and Saddlers' Co., Ro (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; 10 W. R. 87 . . . . 994 
 
 Burtcu V. hil. Darulev (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 576, n 510 
 
 Burton c. Griffiths (1843). 11 M. Ac W. 817 38 
 
 Burton t: ': -sitt (1821), 5 B. A: Aid. 267 386 
 
 Burton r. Uowbery (1875), 1 Ch. D. 234 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 202 ; 34 L. T. 15 ; 
 
 2 » W. K. 388 701 
 
 Burton r. Payne (1827), 2 C. & P. 520 311 
 
 Burtc n r. Plunimer (1834), 4 N. & M. 315 ; 2 A. & E. 3 U 924, 926, 927 
 
 Buia.n r. Reevell (1«47), 16 M. A: W. ;i07 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 85 ; llJur. 71 . . 048 
 
 Bury c. Bloirg M81S1, 12 Q. B. 877, 882; 18 L. J. Q. B. 85 15, 192 
 
 Burv r. Oppenheini (18.')9), 26 Beav. 594 136 
 
 2') L. J. Ex. 251 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1029 
 4 Biiig. N. C. 41 ; 3 Hodges, 265 ; 
 
 43 
 
 33L. J.Ex. 17; lOJur. N. S. 347; 
 
 227 
 713 
 
 Bush r. Pox (185(!\ 5 H. L. Cas. 7iJ7 
 Bush r. Green (1837), 1 Seott, 289 ; 
 
 1 Jur. 814; 7 L.J. C. P. 38 
 
 Bush r. Martin (1863), 2 H. & C. 311 
 
 9L. T. N. S. 510; 12 W. R. 204 . 
 
 Bushel r. Wheeler (1844), 15 Q. B. 543, n. ; 8 Jur. 532 689, 092 
 
 Bushell's ease (1670), 6 How. St. Tr. 9!i9, 1008, 1013, 1014 25 
 
 liussard r. Levering (1821), Wheat. 102 165 
 
 Bussey c. Barnett (1842), 9 M. & W. 312 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 646 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 
 
 211 222 
 
 Bustros r. White (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 423 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 642 ; 3! L. T. 
 
 SOJ; 24 W. R. 721 4, 698, 1182, 1187 
 
 VcL I. ends with page 635. 
 
 !<tl 
 
 ! I' 
 
 t . ■ i 
 
 1- t 
 
 ! 
 ! 
 
 '■ 
 
 
it 
 
 xlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 
 Butcher ». Jarratt (1802), 3 Bos. & P. 146 289, 290, 318 
 
 Butcher t>. Nash (1889), 61 L. T. 72 671 
 
 Butcher v. Steuart (1843), 11 M. & W. 857 ; 1 D. & L. 503 ; 12 L. J. £x. 
 
 391 ; 7 Jur. 774 677 
 
 Butcher's case (1601), Cro. Eliz. 821 1019 
 
 Butchers' Co. v. Jones (1794), 1 Esp. 160 910 
 
 Bute V. James (1886), 33 Ch. D. 157 , 65 L. J. Ch. 658 ; 56 L. T. 133 ; 34 
 
 W. R. 754 363 
 
 Butler*. Allnutt(1816), 1 Stark. 222 167 
 
 Butler V. Carver (1818). 2 Stark. 433 910 
 
 Butler V. Ford (1833), 1 C. & M. 662 ; 3 Tyr. 677; 2 L. J. Ex. 286 ; M. 0. 
 
 109 148 
 
 Butler V. Gale (1855), 27 Vem. 739 741 
 
 Butler V. Moore (1802), MacNally, 253 696 
 
 Butler V. Mountgarret (1859). 7 H. L. Cas. 646, 647 .... 146, 154. 409, 417, 423 
 
 Butler V. Wrijrht (1829). 2 Wend. 369 454 
 
 Butteraeret'. Hayos(1839), 6M. &W. 466; 7Dowl. 489; 9L. J.Ex.44 .. 682 
 Buttcrworth, Re {see Ex parte Russell). 
 
 Butts t'. Swartwood (1823), 2 Cowen, 431 903 
 
 Buxton V. Cornish (1844), 1 Dowl. & L. 586 ; 12 M. & W. 426 ; 13 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 91 286 
 
 Buxton V. North East. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 3 Q. B. 549 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 258 ; 18 L. T. 795 ; 16 W. R 1124 ; 9 B. & 8. 824 772 
 
 Buxton V. Ruht (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 279 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 173 ; 27 L, T. 210 ; 
 
 20 W. R. 1014 673 
 
 Byam v. Booth (1814), 2 Price, 234, n 1040 
 
 Byne, Ex parte (1813), 1 V. & B. 320 866 
 
 Byrd, Re (1842). 3 Curt. 117 697 
 
 Byrd V. Nunn (1877), 5 Ch. D. 781 ; 7 Ch. D. 284 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 1 ; 37 
 
 L. T. 585 ; 2G W. R 101 224 
 
 Byrne v. Boadle (1863), 2 H. & C. 722 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 13 163 
 
 Bvme V. Frere (18 J8), 2 Moll. 157 327 
 
 Byrne v. Harvey (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 89 314 
 
 Byrom V. Thompson (1839). 3 P. A: D. 71 ; 11 A. & E. 31 ; 3 Jur. 1121. .1193, 11!)6 
 
 Bywater v. Richardson (1834), 3 N. & M. 748 ; 1 A. & E. 508 769 
 
 Caballkbo v. Slater (1854), 14 C. B. 300 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 67 669 
 
 Caddiokr. Skidmore (1858). 3 Jur. N. S. 1185 673, 682 
 
 Cadpe, Re (1808), 37 L. J. P. & M. 16; L. R. 1 P. & D. 643; 17 L. T. 
 
 484 ; 16 W. R. 406 142 
 
 Cadogun. Re, Cadogan r. Palagi (1883), 26 Ch. D. 154; 63 L.J. Ch. 207; 
 
 49L. T. 606; a2 W. R. 57 146 
 
 Cahu Re (1877), 3 Redf. (N. Y.) 81 766 
 
 Caldbeck f. Boon (1872), 7 Ir. R. C. L. 32 611 
 
 Caldcr f. Dobell (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 486 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 \2\): I'J AV. R. 409, 978 768 
 
 Caldcr r. Halket (1839), 3 Moo. P. C. C. 28 1099 
 
 Caldwell f. Hunter (1848), 10 Q. B. 85, 86 19 
 
 Caldwell f. Parker (180!»), Ir. R. 3 Eq. 619 1 194 
 
 Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Sprot (1856), 2 Macq. 449 ; 1 Paterson, 663 1 14 
 
 Call c. Dunning (180:i), 4 East, 53; 5 Esp. 16 1208 
 
 Callaghan v. Pepper (1840), 2 Ir. Eq. R. 399 645 
 
 Calliin, Re (1874), Ir. R. 9 Eq. 484 307 
 
 Callans v. Sherry (1832), Ale. & Nap. 126 870 
 
 Calley v. Richard,'. (1854), 19 Bcav. 401 600, 602, 607 
 
 Callow 1'. Howie (1847). 1 DeG. & Sin. 531 ; 17L. J. Ch. 71 ; 11 Jur. 984.. 495 
 
 Calinady t'. Rowe (1848), 6 C. B. 801, 878, 879 112, 124 
 
 Calvert f. Bovill (1798), 7 T. R. 523; 4 R. R. 517 1147, 1149 
 
 Calvert v. Flower (1 836), 7 C & P. 386 956, 1191 
 
 Calvert t\ Seinde Ry. Co. (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 306 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 245 ; 
 
 13 W. R. 430 C19 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xlvii 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Calye'8 case (15fi3), 8 Rep. 32a ; 1 Smith, L. C. 132 162 
 
 Calypso, The (185G), Swabey, 28 1122 
 
 Cambrian Miniug Co., Re (1881), 20 Ch. D. 37b ; 61 L. J. Ch. 221 ; 30 
 
 W. R. 2N3 ■ 8(8 
 
 Camen)u'8 Coalbrnok Ry. Co., Re (1858), 25 Beav. 1 320, 321 
 
 CameTOD v. Li^liifoot (1777), 2 W. Bl. 1190 Sil, 872, 873 
 
 Camfteld v. Bird (1852), 3 C. & K. 66 244 
 
 CainmeU f. Sewell (1860), 3 H. & N. 646 ; 5 H. & N. 728 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 
 
 350 1101, 1103, 1149 
 
 Camoys,* Lord i'. Blundell (1848), 1 H. L. Cas. 786 79t, 797, 798 
 
 Cumors Peerage (1839), 6 C. & F. 789 424, 425, 426 
 
 CaDipbell, Ex parts, Cathcart, In re (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 703; 18 \V. R. 
 
 1056 692, 610 
 
 Campbell v. Mt.-Gen. (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 671 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 600 ; 15 W. 
 
 R. 915 858 
 
 Campbell v. Campbell (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 241 ; L. R. 1 Eq. 383 ; 13 L. T. 
 
 667; 14 W. R. 327; 12 Jur. 118 806 
 
 Campbellr. Christie (1817), 2 Stark. 64 1193 
 
 Campbell r. Dalhousie, Earl of (1869), L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 462 ; 22 L. T. 879 352 
 
 Campbell f. Hodgson (1819), Gow, 74 757 
 
 Campbell v. MoConaghey (1870), L. R. 6 Eq. 20 144 
 
 Campbell r. Kickards (1833), 6 B. & Ad. 840 ; 2 N. & M. 642 933, 934 
 
 (Dumpbell r. Twemlow (1814), 1 Price, 88 890 
 
 Campbell v. Webster (1845), 2 C. B. 258 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 4 ; 9 Jur. 992 . . 521 
 
 Campion's case (1578), cited 7 Howell, St. Tr. 1205 (R. v. Cellier) 573 
 
 Canada's Appeal (1880), 47 Conn. 450 696 
 
 Canada, AVcst of, OU Co., Re (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 683 ; 6 Ch. Div. 103 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 787 345, 917 
 
 Canal Bk. r. Bk. of Albany (1841J, 1 Hill, N. Y. R. 287 641 
 
 Caunr. Clipperton(l839), 10 A. &E. 582; 2 P. & D. 560 226 
 
 Cannam v. Farmer (1849), 2 C. & K. 746 ; 3 Ex. 698 271 
 
 Cannan v. Hartley (1850), 9 C. B. 634 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 323 ; 14 Jur. 577. . 660 
 
 Canning's, Kliz., case (1754), 19 How. St. Tr. 632 877 
 
 Cannon v. People (1893), 36 Am. St. R. 295 Add. [635] 
 
 Cape Copper Co. v. Cuinptoir d'Escompte (1890), 38 W. R. 763 243 
 
 Capital Fire Ins. Assoc, Re (1883), 24 Ch. 1). 408 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 71 ; 32 
 
 W. R. 260 321 
 
 Caprou V. Capron (1874), L. R. 17 Eq. 288 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 677 ; 22 W. R. 
 
 347; 29 L. T. 826 139 
 
 Cardwell f. Martin (1808), 9 East, 190 ; 1 Camp. 79, 180 1 194, 1203 
 
 Carcw f. White (1842), 6 Beav. 172 1184 
 
 Carey v. Adkins (1814), 4 Camp. 92 603 
 
 Carey v. Pitt (1797), Pea. Add. Cas. 130 1221, 1222 
 
 Cargill V. Bower (1878), 10 Ch. D. 502 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 649 : 38 L. T. 779 ; 
 
 20 W. R. 716 192 
 
 Cariss t. Tattersall (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 890 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 257 1193 
 
 Carlisle, Mayor of v. Blamire (1807), 8 East, 487 ; 9 R. R. 4C1 300, 552 
 
 Cariisler. Eady (1824). 1 C. & P. 234 910 
 
 Cariisle t'. Whaley (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 391 ; 13 W. R. 229 738 
 
 Carlos V. Brook (1804), 10 Vea. 49 974 
 
 Carmalt f. Post (1837), 8 Watts, 411 930 
 
 Cannarthen, Mayor of v. Lewis (1834), 6 C. & P. 608 190, 643 
 
 Caniarvon, Lord v. Villebois (1844), 13 M. & W. 313 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 233. . 397, 
 
 405, 406 
 
 Came V. Nicholl (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 430; 1 Scott, 466 443, 444 
 
 Caruev. Stf ?r (18G0), 5 H. & N. 628; 29 L. J. Ex. 281 526 
 
 Carpenter v. BuUer (1841), 8 M. & W. 212 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 393 89, 93, 94 
 
 Carpenter V. Provid. Wash. Ins. Co. (1846), 4 How. Sup. Ct. R. 222 .... 750 
 
 Carpenter v. Wall (1840), 3 P. & D. 4.)7 ; 11 A. & E. 803 254, 969, 973 
 
 Carpenters' Co. v. Hayward (1780), 1 Dougl. 374 2 
 
 Carpniail v. Powis (1845-6), 1 Ph. 687 : 16 L. J. Ch. 275 692, 693, 699 
 
 Carrv.Burdiss (1835), 1 C. M. &R. 782; 6Tyr. 309; 4 L. J. Ex. 60. .1211, 1213 
 
 m 
 
 Vol. I. «nd» with page 636. 
 
1 1 
 
 xlvlil 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 \\\ 
 
 FADE 
 
 Carr v. Oriffith {tee Ro Griffith). 
 
 Carr r. JiickMon {185-'), 'Jl L. J. Ex. 137; 7 Ex. 3S2 7o'J 
 
 Ciirr t. Lond. k N. W. Kv. Co. (lS7o), L. 11. 10 C. P. 307 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 
 
 109; 31 L. T. 7S5; 2J W. R. 747 648 
 
 Carrr. Moafl (18.^8), 12 Gniv, 106 610 
 
 Carr r. MoiitcHoro (1804), f> B & S. 408 : 33 L. J. Q. H. 2o(i 741 
 
 Cai/ I'. Mostyn (18.V)), h Ex. 09 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 249 397, 510, 1109 
 
 CaiiierDovf, Tlie (18(i3), n. Ac L. 113; 2 Moure, P. C. C. (N. 8.) 201.... 178 
 
 CarriKV i: Brock (1871), 5 Ir. R. C. L. ."jOI 730 
 
 Carviiilrton r. Comoc'k ( 1 829). 2 Sim. 567 327 
 
 Carrinjfton r. Jones (1824), 2 Sim. & St. 135, 140 417 
 
 Carriiij,'ton r. Roots (1837), 2 M. & W. 248 ; L. J. Ex. 95 GH7 
 
 Carroll r. Cow.-li (1838), 1 Jebb & Sy. 43 070 
 
 Carroll r. Tliu State (1893'i, 40 Am. St. R. 786 Adil. [908] 
 
 Carrutli.T.H r. Graham (184 1). 9 Dowl. 94'/ ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 304 328,' 319 
 
 Car.skiidduii r. roormnii (1840), 10 Watts, 82 422 
 
 Carstuir.s r. Stewart (1734), Morison's Pre.-iiimptions, XVI 170 
 
 Carter v. Uochm (1700), 1 W. Bl. 593 ; 3 Burr. 190.^ 931, 93:!, 934 
 
 Carter r. Carter (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 74, 84, 85; 3 K. ife J. 018; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 03 94 
 
 Carter v. Leeds Daily News (1370\ W. N. 1870, at j). 11 9o3 
 
 Carter v. Ld. Coleniiiie (1740), cited 2 Ball & B. 38 4 ; Barnard, Ch. R. 12i).. 482 
 
 Carter f. Downish (1058), Ciirth. 83 5 
 
 Carter v. James (1844), 13 M. k W. 137 ; 2 Dowl. ic L. 230 ; 13 L. .L Ex. 
 
 373; 8 Jur. 912 532, 534, 1132 
 
 Carter v. .Tones (1833), 1 M. A: Rob. 281 271 
 
 Carter v. llurcot ( 1 7(:8) 4 Burr. 2 1 03 1 1 1 
 
 Carter v. Prvke (1791), Peake, 95 230 
 
 Carter v. Toussiiint (1S22), 1 Dowl. & R. 515 ; 5 B. & A. 855 089, 090 
 
 Carter r. White (1882), 20 Ch. D. 225; 51 L. J. Ch. 4G5 ; 46 L. T. 236; 
 
 30 vV. R. 400 1205 
 
 Ca* ter and Crost's case (l5S.'i). Godb. 33 1151 
 
 Cartwri^Jit r. Cartwriulit (1878), 20 Vr R 084 938 
 
 Cartwrifrlit r. (inrn (1803), 2 Leach, C. C. 9.32 ; 8 Ves. 405 ; 7 R. R. 99. .<592, 900 
 
 Carver, Re (181J), 3 Curt. 29 098 
 
 Carver r. Jack-on (1830), 4 Pet. 83 88, 509 
 
 Cary v. Gcrrish (1801), 4 Esp. 9 154 
 
 Caser. Reeve (1817), 14 Johns. 81 1112 
 
 Casement v. Fulton (1845), 5 .Moore, P. C. C. 140 ; 3 Moore, In, App. 395 . . 093, 094 
 
 Cashill r. Wrisrlit, (1850), 6 E. A: B 891 ; 2 Jur. In. S. 1072 102 
 
 Casmore, Re ("l809), L. R. 1 P. 053 ; 38 L. J. P. 54 ; 2 J L. T. N. S. 497; 
 
 17 W. R. 027 699 
 
 Cas.sidy t: Finnan (1867), Ir. R. 1 C. L. 8 712 
 
 Cassidy v. SU'iuirt (1841), 2 Scott, N. R. 432 ; 2 M. & Gr. 437 ; 9 DowL 
 
 P. C. 300 ; 5 Jur. 25 4 
 
 Casson V. Chutrhley (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 335 ; 50 L. T. 508 731 
 
 Ca.sson v. O'Brien (1842), Arm. M, & O. 263 977 
 
 Cast t!. Povser (1850), 2 Sin. A: G. 309 ; 3 Jur. N. 8. 38 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 93, 353 831 
 Castle r. Downton (1879), 5 C. P. D. 56 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 6 ; 41 L. T. 528 ; 
 
 28 AV. R. 257 736 
 
 Castle r. Fox (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. .542 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 302 ; 24 L. T. 536 ; 
 
 19 W. R. 840 784, 786 
 
 Castle f. Sworder (1801). H. & N. 828 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 8 Jiir. N. S. 
 
 233 ; 4 L. T. 805 : 9 W. R. 097 690 
 
 Castlebar Guard, v. Ld. Luc., a (1849), 13 Ir. I,. R. 44 1173 
 
 Castleden r. Castleden (1801), 9 H. L. C. 180 ; 4 Macq. 159 ; 31 L. J. Mat. 
 
 103 : 5 L. T. 104 129 
 
 Castrique v. Imrie{1800), 8 C. B N. S. 405; 30 L.J. Q. B. 163; 30 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 177: 4L. T. 143; 9 W. R. !55 1103 
 
 Castrique r. Imrie (1809), 39 L. J. C. P. 350 ; L. R. 4 H. of L. 414 ; 23 
 
 L. T. 48; 19 W. R. 1 1103, 1147 
 
 Cates V. Hardacre (18U). 3 Taun. 424 ; 12 R. R. 078 962 
 
 Gates f. Winter (1789), 3 T. R. 300 310, 312 
 
 The references are to pagei, not to paragrapht. 
 
 ri 
 
 if 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, xllx 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Catherina Miiris, The (1866), L. R. 1 Adm. 83 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 380 1049 
 
 Cutlu'iwood f. Caslon (1844), 13 M. & "W. 261, 265 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 433 ; 
 
 H.Iur. 1076 149 
 
 Catliiiif r. SkoiiIdiiiK (1795). 6 T. R. 189 715 
 
 Ciitlinir r. Kiug (1877), S Ch. D. 660 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 384 ; 36 L. T. 526 ; 25 
 
 W. R. 5:.() 671 
 
 Caton ('. Catnii (1849), 7 Notes of Cuh. (Ecc. & Mar.) 28 185, 503 
 
 Catou f. Catoii (1867), L. R. 2 II. L. 1J7; 3(1 L. J. Ch. «HG ; 16 W. R. 1 . .674, 
 
 679, 080 
 
 Caton r. Hamilton (1889), 53 J. P. 504 1108 
 
 Ciildu r. U'uox (1827), 5 Rimd. 31, 36 3,54 
 
 Catt r. Howard (1820), 3 Sturk. 3 483, 494, 926 
 
 CattcU r. lre^ou (1858), E. B. & E. 91 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 107 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 m) 884 
 
 Citton V. Siiti|i8oii (1855), 8 A. & E. 136 ; 3 N. & P. 248 1194 
 
 Cattrall, Ro (lS(i3), 3 S. & T. 419 ; 33 L. J. P. 100 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 136 . . 141 
 
 Caunce t'. Spautou (1844), 7 M. & (ir. 903 152 
 
 Cavanr. Stewart (1816), 1 Stark. 5>5 1147 
 
 Cavev. Hastiii!,"- (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 125; 50 L. J. Q. B. 575; 45 L. T. 
 
 318 ; 40 .J. P. 50 072, 673 
 
 Cave V. Mackenzie (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. 504 ; 37 L. T. 218 729 
 
 Cave V. Mills (1S02), 7 H. & N. 913 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 265 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 363 ; 
 
 L. T. ti.iO 642 
 
 Caver. Mountain (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 200; 1 Scott, N. R. 132; 9 L.J. 
 
 M. C. 91) 36, 1 100 
 
 Cawley i: iMirnell (1852), 12 C. B. 291 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 197 ; 15 Jur. 908. . 712 
 
 Cawthorne '•. Cordrev (1803), 13 C. B. N. S. 400 ; 32 L. J. 0. P. 152 081 
 
 C:izenove r. Vuuifhan (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 4 ; 14 R. R. 377 325 
 
 Central News Co. r. Eu.st. New» Tel. Co. (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 230; 50 
 
 L. T. 235 ; 32 W. R. 493 346, 855 
 
 Clinbbock'.s case (1804), 1 Mass. 144 602 
 
 Chad r. Til,-ed (1821), 2 B. & B. 403 ; 5 Moore (C. P.), 185 791 
 
 Ctiadwick r. Chadwick (1853), L. R. 8 Ch. 926 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 805 ; 29 L. T. 
 
 284 901, 970 
 
 Cliadwick r. City of Hub. St. Pack. Co. (1850), 6 El. & Bl. 771 ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 207 6 
 
 Cliadwick v. Turner (1800), 34 Beav. 034 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 356 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 
 
 349 ; 1 1 Jur. N. S. 333 738 
 
 Chalmers r. Shackell (1834), 6 C. & P. 475 105 
 
 Chambcrhiin r. King {or Kinjr r. Chamherh in) (1871). L. R. C. P. 474 ; 
 
 40 L. J. C. P. -273 ; 24 L. T. N. S. 730 ; .'9 W. R. 9.11 22S 
 
 Chamberlain v. Stimeham (18)-9), 61 L. T. 5f;>'^ : 38 W. R. 107 817 
 
 Cliamber» v. Benia.seoni (1831), 1 C. M. 4: R. 347 ; 4 Tyr. 531 ; 3 L. J. 
 
 K.x. 373 444, 4.58 
 
 Chamlicrs r. Kelly (1873), 7 Ir. C. L. B. 231 
 
 Chambers i . Ma^o« (1858), 5 C. B. N. S. 59 ; 28 L. J. C. P. 10 ; 4 Jur. N. 
 S. 1 037 
 
 784 
 
 507 
 
 Cliambcrs r. Wood (1848), 2 Notes of Cases (lieo. & Mar.), 485 UO 
 
 Chamley r. Lord Dunsauy (i8ii7j. 2 Sch. & Lef. 718 1123 
 
 Chamney, Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cases (Ecc. & Mar.), 70 099 
 
 Chanii)ian c. Atkin.sou (l'i"2), 3 Keb. 9(i 232 
 
 Cbiimiiiou V. Plummet (ISO-i), 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 252 ; 5 Ksp. 240; 8 liev. 
 
 R. 7!)5 071 
 
 Chfimiiion r. Terry (1 822), 3 B. & B. 295 ; 7 Moore, C. P. 130 ;j07 
 
 Cliamimeys r. Peek (1810), 1 Stark. 404 157, 454 
 
 Chandler r. Grieves (1812). 2 11. Bl. 000, n. ; 6 T. R. 325, n. ; 3 R. R. 525. . 4,21 
 
 Chandler t'. Home (1812), 2 M. Ac Rob. 423 918 
 
 Cliandler v. Howell (1877 , 4 Ch. D. 651 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 25 ; 35 L. T. 692 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 55 684 
 
 Chmdus, Marquis of, v. Corns, of Inl. Rev. (1851), 6 Ex. 464 ; 20 L. J. 
 
 Kx. 209 ; 2 L. M. & P. 311 277 
 
 Cliandos Peerage (1791), Pari. Min. 27 423, 424, 425, 420, 427 
 
 Chant r. Brown (1851-2), 9 Hare, 790 692, 699, 608 
 
 Vol, .!.'. end* with page 635. 
 
 m 
 
 'i^ii \\ 
 
 .1 h 
 
 ill 
 
 ' 1 -' 
 
 I 
 , 1 
 
 ■ .1 
 
 1 \' 
 
 ', rjiil 
 
 ! 
 
 
 1 
 
 III 
 
Il ) 
 
 1 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 rAOB 
 Chanter r. Hopking (18381, 4 M. & W. 399 ; 1 H. & H. 377 ; 3 Jnr. 58 . . 777 
 
 Chapel V. HickH (1833), 2 C. & M. 214 ; 4 Tyr. 43 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 38 223 
 
 Chaplin v. Levy (1854), 2 C. L. R. 666 ; 9 Ex. 631 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 117. .318, 47r. 
 
 Chaplin v. Rogers (1800), 1 Eant, 192 ; 6 R. R. 249 (191 
 
 Chapman, Re-, Ex parte Johiison (I884\ 26 Ch. D. 338 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 703 ; 
 
 50 L. T. 214 ; 32 W. R. 693 129 
 
 Chapman v. Beard (1797), 2 Anst. 942 ; 4 R. R. 875 621 
 
 Chapman r. CalliH (18(il), 9 C. B. N. S. 709 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 211 ; 3 L. T. 
 
 890 ; a W. R. 375 ; 7 Jnr. N. 8. 995 631 
 
 Chapman v. Chapman (1817), 2 Conn. 347 413 
 
 Chapman t'. Coffin (1800), 14 Gray, 454 954 
 
 Chapman v. Cowlan (1810), 13 Ea.st, 10 ; 12 R. R. 294 395 
 
 Chapman v. Bavin (1841), 1 Dowl. N. S. 239 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 319 ; 3 M. & 
 
 Or. 009 817, 832 
 
 Chapman «». Emden (1841), 9C. &P. 717 272 
 
 Cha])man v. Keano (183.-)), 3 A. & E. 193 : 4 N. & M. 007 32 
 
 Chapman v. Monm. Ry. & Can. Co. (1857), 2 H. & N. 207 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 97 1 1 02 
 
 Chapman t'. Rawson (1815), 8 Q. B. 073; 16 L. J. Q. B. 225 271 
 
 Chapman v. Seark- (1825), 3 Pick. 38. 44 544 
 
 Chapman r. Spuller (1850), 14 Q. B. 621 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 239 ; 14 Jur. 052. 775 
 
 Chapman v. Walton (1833), 10 Bing. 57 ; 3 M. & Scott, 389 934 
 
 Chappell V. Piirday (1845), 14 M. & W. 30.) ; 14 L. J. Ex. 258 1030 
 
 Chappie V. Cooper (1811), 13 M. & W. 252 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 280 49 
 
 Charkieh, Tho(1878),42L. J. Adm. 17: L. R. 4 A. & E. 69; 28L.T. 513.. 21 
 
 Charlotta, The (1814), 1 Dods. Adm. 392 79 
 
 Charlter v. Barret (1790), Peake, 32 244 
 
 Charlton t'. CoombeH (1803), 32 L. J. Ch. 284 ; 4 Giff. 372; 8 L. T. 81 ; 
 
 11 "W. R. 504 ; 1 New R. 547 ; 9 Jur. N. 8. 534 592, 003, 605 
 
 Charlton r. Hiiidmarsh (ISGl), 1 S. & T. 619; 8 W. R. 259 ; 8 H. L. Ca». 
 
 100 695, 700 
 
 Charlton v. "VVatton (1S34), 6 C. & P. 385 246 
 
 Cb-imley r. Grundy (1854), 14 C. B. 008 ; 2 C. L. R. 822 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 
 
 1 18 Jur. 053 307 
 
 Char, .ek r. Uewinjrs (185.3), 3 C. & K. 378 918 
 
 Charter v. Charter (1874), L. R. 2 P. 315; 41 L. J, P. 10 ; 20 W. R. 212. .792, 798 
 
 Chart. Mer. Bauk of India r. Diek-:<m (1871), L. R. 3 P. C. 574 38 
 
 Cha.se V. Lincoln (1807), 3 Ma.ss. 237 931 
 
 Chaseraore v. Richards (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 349 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 81 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 873 ; 7 W. R. 085 125 
 
 Chasemore v. Tumor (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 500 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 06; 33 
 
 L T. 3J3: 24 W. R. 70 711 
 
 Chatelain »'. Pnntigny (1859). 1 S. & T. 411 1 132 
 
 Chater r. B-ckett (1797), 7 T. R. 201 ; 4 R. R. 418 678 
 
 Chatfield v. Fryer (1815), 1 Price, 253 401 
 
 Chatland v. Thonilev (1810), 12 East, 644 19 
 
 Chaurand r. A.iifr(.r»tein (1 79 1 ), Pea. 43 764 
 
 Cheese v. Lovejoy, Re Harris (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 10 1 ; 25 W. li. 453 . . 7o5, 
 
 700, 1231 
 Cheescbrough, Re (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 358 ; 40 L. J. Bank. 79 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 70 ; 19 W. R. 973 82 
 
 Cheesman r. Exall (1851), 6 Ex. 341 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 209 645 
 
 Cheltenham aud Gt. West Union Ry. Co. v. Daniel (1841), 2 Q. B. 281, 
 
 292 ; 2 Kaihv. Cas. 728 641 
 
 Chemical Electric Light, &c. Co. v. Howard (1890), 150 Mass. 496 741 
 
 Cheney v. Courtois (I8B3), 13 C. B. N. S. 634 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 116 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1057 ; 7 L. T. 080 129, 915 
 
 Cheunell, In re, Jones v. Chenuell (1877), 8 Ch. D. 492 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 
 
 38 L. T. 494 ; 26 W. R. 595 1233 
 
 Chfirry v. Colonial Bk. of Australasia (1869), 38 L. J. P. C. 49 ; 21 L. T. 
 
 356; 17 W. R. 1031 781 
 
 Cherry V. Homing (1819), 4 Ex. 19; 19 L. J. Ex. 63 135, 654, 667, 680 
 
 Cheslyn V. Dalby (1H46), 4 Y. & C. Ex. R. 238 713 
 
 The references an to paget, not to paragraphs. 
 
TAULE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 li 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Chwter r. WortW (1850), 18 0. B. 239 «60 
 
 ChTZrUm V. vM (1838), 7 A. & E. 713 ; 3 N. & P. 16 ; 1 W. W. & II. 
 
 10 ; •.' .Iiir. ;il)4 I'^a 
 
 Cli. twvn.l r. Lindon (1752), 2 Vph. non. 450 «0O 
 
 n,i.lM"-UT r. M. of Donegul (1870), 39 L. J. Oh. 0U4 ; 5 L. It. Ch. 497 ; 22 
 
 J, T. laS ; 18 W. R. 631 321, 697 
 
 Cliirli.Htpr, L(l. Jn., f. Coventry (ise"), 36 L. J. Ch. 673 ; L. R. 2 H. L. 
 
 71 • 1,-) W. R. 849 800 
 
 Cliitlrri.l ' . AVatson (1889), 58 L. J. Ch. 137 ; 68 L. T. 877 ; 30 W. R. 806. 912 
 
 ChiM r. (iriKC (1825), 2 C. & P. 193 527, 528 
 
 Cliilili rstoii r. JJurrett (1809). 1 1 East, 439 806 
 
 ChiiiH .^t. Ship Co. f. Com. Ahs. Co. (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 142 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 ];)'• 15 L. T. 041 ; 30 W. R. 224 1180 
 
 Chiiiii<M k f. Ly. Ely (1805), 2 H. & M. 220 ; 4 Do G. J. A: 8. 038 ; 34 L. J. 
 
 Di ii'.i',) ". 673 
 
 Cliipnr Harris (1839), 5 M. & W. 430 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 64 734 
 
 Clii . HTfiild '•. Carter (1895), 72 L. T. 487 A,M. [073] 
 
 Chirac r. Ueiiiioker (1826), 11 Wheat. 280, 295 610 
 
 Chismim v. fount (1H41), 2 M. & G. 317 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 669 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 
 
 124 6'-2i 
 
 Chitty V. Deiidy (1835), 3 A. & E. 324 ; 4 N. & M. 842 ; 1 H. & W. 169. . 20 
 
 Choilwiek v. riilmir (1851), unreported 094 
 
 Ch..hmmdclry, Ld. v. Ld. Clinton (1815), 19 Ves. 208; 2 Voh. & B. 113; 
 
 &. Coop. SO ; 13 R. R. 183 ; 14 R. R. 219 003 
 
 Chrintiun, Re (1849), 2 Rob. Eco. Rep. 110; 7 Notes of Caa. (Eco. & Mar.) 265 700 
 
 Christian r. (Jooinbe (1790), 2 Esp. 489 SVi 
 
 Christie r. Richard.son (1842), 10 M. & W. 688 ; 2 D. N. 8. 503 ; 12 L, J. 
 
 Ex. 8G; (i.Iur. 1009 1073 
 
 Christie r. Unwiu (1840), 3 P. & D. 204 ; 1 1 A. & E. 373 ; 4 Jur. 303. . 131, 132, 1 137 
 CiiristmiiH r. Whinyates (1863), 32 L.,J. P. & M. 73 ; 3 S. & T. 81 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 283 ; 8 L. T. 801 ; 11 W. R. 371 142 
 
 Chul)l> r. Solomons (1852), 3 C. & K. 76 617 
 
 Clnirth r. Imp. Gun Light and Coke Co. (1838), C A. & E. 846 ; 3 N. & P. 
 
 35; 1 W. W. &H. 137 639, 640, 641, 642, 614 
 
 Churrhward r. Palmer (1856), 10 Moo. P. C. C. 472 6 
 
 Churtun i: Frewen (1805), 2 Dr. & Sm. 390 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 660 ; 12 L. T. 
 
 105; 13 W. R. 490 599 
 
 Churton r. Frowen (1877, should bo 1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 060 ; 15 W. R. 659; 
 
 16L.T. 171 818 
 
 Chute r. Bustecd (1802-3), 15 Ir. Law R. N. S. 115 054 
 
 Ciocci f. Ciom (1800), 29 L. J. P. & M. 60 1119 
 
 Citv of H(-rne r. Bk. of England (^1804), 9 Ves. 347; 7 R. R. 218 3 
 
 City of Hristol r. Wait (1834), 6 C. & P. 591 303 
 
 City of Cambridge, Re, Wood v. Smith (1874), 43 L. J. Adm. 11 ; 6 L. R. 
 
 P, C. 451; 30L. T. 439; 22 W. R. 678 178 
 
 City of London v. Clerke (1690), Cartli. 181 397 
 
 City of London r. Perkins (1734), 3 Bro. P. C. 602 327 
 
 Citv of London Gaa Light and Coke Co. v. Niobolk (1820), 2 C. & P. 365.. 611 
 Citv of Mecca (1880), 5 P. D. 28; 49L.J.P. 17; 41L.T.444; 28W.R.200 1103 
 
 Clagctt V. Phillips (1842), 2 Y. & C. Ch. 82 601 
 
 Clan Gordon, The (1882), 7 P. Div. 190; 4 Asp. M. C. 613 ; 46 L. T. 490; 
 
 30 W. R. 691 178 
 
 Clanmorris, Ld. v. Mullen (1837), C. & D. Abr. Ca.s. 8 1214 
 
 Clapham v. Cologan (1813), 3 Camp. 382 1 195 
 
 Clapham r. Langton (1865), 34 L. J. Q. B. 46 ; 6 B. & S. 729 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 H75; IJ W. R. 1011 770 
 
 Clarapedor. Commercial Union Assoc, (1893) 32 W. R. 262 188 
 
 Clargfts I'. Sherwin (1698-9), 12 Mod. 343 1097 
 
 Claridgo V. Hoare (1807), 14 Ves. 59 961 
 
 Clarid^'.' r. Mackenzie (1842), 4 M. & Or. 143 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 726 98, 99 
 
 Claridge r. South Staffordshire Ry. Co., (1892) 1 Q. B. 422 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 603 ; 66 L. T. 055 ; 66 J. P. 408 117 
 
 ;,1 
 
 ! I 
 
 ■i: : V 
 
 Vol. I. tnds with page 635. 
 
 :!i t; 
 
Ill 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 J 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Clark's Ex. r. Van Reimsdyk (ISir)), 9 Crunch, l/JS 495, 627 
 
 Clark, Ro (lai'J). -2 Q. 11. U;t() ; 'J G. & I). Tlil) ; 1 1 L. J. Q. D 75 132 
 
 Clark i: A<lio (1877), 2 App. Cas. 423; 46 L. J. Ch. 5i)S : A' L. T. 1 ; '26 
 
 W. R. 4 ') 544 
 
 Clark r. Alexander (1844), 8 Seott, N. R. Kil ; 13 L. J. C. P. 133 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 498 Ki'J, 387, 716 
 
 Clark .'. Riu'flow (1839). 4 Slicpl. '24(5 930 
 
 Clark c. ( 'lark /18;i0), 1 M. A: Hob. 3 i-.!)3 
 
 Clark v. Uitford (1833), It; Wend. 310 748 
 
 Clark c. Iloopur (1834), 10 Bing. 481 ; 3 L. J. C. P. 159; 4 M. & So. 
 
 353 713 
 
 Clark V. HouKliani (1823), 2 B. & C. Mi) , 3 Dowl. A: R. 322 '219 
 
 Clark V. L.-ach (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 290 ; I DeU. J. & 8. 409 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 610 ; 32 Bcav. 14 169 
 
 Clark r. Molyncux (1«76), 14 Cox, C. C. 10 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230 ; 3 Q. B. 
 
 1). 237 : 37 L. T. 694 ; 26 \V. R. 104 Ill 
 
 Clark v. MuUick (1840), 3 Mim. T. C. C. 279 51, 62 
 
 Clark r. Vorce (18:i6), 15 W.iid. 193 927 
 
 Clark r. Waito (181.".), 12 M . «. 439 614 
 
 Clark r. Wilmnt (1S41), 1 Y. \- C. C. C. :>:i 437 
 
 Clark i: Wrav (1885), 31 Ch. D. 68; 65 L. J. Ch. 119; 53 L. T. 485; 34 
 
 W. U. H!i.." 192 
 
 Clark I'. Wright (I860), 11 Ir. C. L. R. 402 48 
 
 Clark r. York (18S2), 47 L. T. 3S1 , 31 W. R. 62 192 
 
 Clarkf, Ex parte (1832). 2 l>ea. & C. 99 866, 869, 870 
 
 Clarke, Ko (1812), 2 (i. B. 6)0 ; 1 1 L. J. Q. B. 75; 2 G. & D. 7H0. . 132, 1100, 11 ;iO 
 
 Clarke, He ( 1 831)), 2 Curt. 329 701 
 
 Clarke, He 1S58.. 1 S. A: T. 22 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 18 700 
 
 Clarke r. Bradlauifh (18,S1), 8 Q. B. J). 63; 51 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 411 ; 31) W. R. 53 . 4(i J. P. 278, affrf. 7 Q. B. D. 151 84 
 
 Clarke r. Cullow 1S76), 46 L. J. Q. 15. 53 224 
 
 Clarke r. Clarke >lSlt6), 6 Esp. 61 512 
 
 Clarke r. Clarke (1868) 1. U. 2 C. L. 395 700 
 
 Clarke v. Clarke (1879), 3 L. R. Ir. 306 700 
 
 Clarke c. Courtney (1831), 5 Pet. 319, 344 429 
 
 Clarke r. Cuekfiold i:ui..n (1S51-2), 1 Bail Ct. C. 81 (Lowndes, M. & P.) ; 
 
 21 L. J. (i. B. 349; 16 Jur. 686 641, 644 
 
 Clarke r Dickson (1858), C. B. N. S. 463; 28 L. J. C. P. 225; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1027 746 
 
 darker. Fuller (186»), 16 C. B. N. S. 21 ; 12 W. R. 671 073 
 
 darker. Hall (18,S,s). 2« L. R. Ir. 316 93 
 
 Clarko r. Itoehe (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 372 ; 25 W. R. 309 281 
 
 darker. Kovstone ,1815), 13 M. & W. 752; 14 L. J. Ex. 143 781 
 
 darker. Satierv (1824), liv. i M. 126 921 
 
 Clarke r. Scripps (1852), 2 RoK ts. 568 706 
 
 Clarkson r. Clarkson (1.S62), 2 S. & T. 497 ; 31 L. J. P. 143 ; 6 L. T. 506 ; 
 
 10 \V. R. 78 1 703 
 
 Clarkw.ii r. Woodhouse (1782), 5 T. R. 412, n. ; 3 Doug. 189 301, 433 
 
 Clary r. Clarv (U IP, 2 Iredell. 78 931 
 
 Clay's rase (l""' l)i - ^''-'^U P. C. 580 148 
 
 Clay r. ( 'n.we (1853), 8 Ex. 295 ; 9 Ex. 604 308 
 
 day f. St.'pheiison 1837), 3 A. & E. 807 ; 5 N. \- M. 318 347 
 
 Clay c. Thiiekrah (IHll'.l;, '.» C. & P. .'i3 ; 2 M. 4c Rob. 214 475 
 
 Clay r. Yates (18.'.6), 25 1.. J. Ex. 237 ; 1 11. A: N. 73 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 908.. 6S8 
 
 Clayton r. Hlakey (1798). 8 T. R. 3 ; 4 Rev. R. 575 654 
 
 Clavfon t'. (irejfson (18:!6), 5 A. i E. 302 ; 6 N. Ac M. 694 763 
 
 Clayton v. Ld. Nugent (1844), 13 M. i^ \V. 205 744, 784, 796, 790 
 
 Cloare v. Clearo (1869), I. R. 1 P. & D. 655; 38 L. J. P. & M. 31 : 
 
 01 
 
 Clonienshaw r. Corp. of D-iblin (1875), 10 Ir. R. 0. L. 1 
 
 ••••^••••••••» 
 
 646 
 
 Th* r^erencu or* to pagei, not to parugrapht. 
 
 m^t 
 
19'2 
 48 
 
 192 
 ), «70 
 ,IVM> 
 
 701 
 
 700 
 
 84 
 2-24 
 642 
 700 
 700 
 429 
 
 746 
 073 
 di 
 281 
 781 
 021 
 "Oli 
 
 703 
 
 , ni 
 <,tni 
 
 148 
 308 
 3»7 
 475 
 (iS8 
 054 
 7(i:{ 
 |fi, 7U6 
 
 HO 
 
 |0. 717 
 !i:»t 
 046 
 
 4 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 ini 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Clement's case ( 1 808), 37 L.J. Ch. 296; L. B. 13 Eq. 179; 18L.T. 690.. 84 J 
 
 Clcn.'iit, Ex parte (18i2). 11 Price, 08 9^0 
 
 Clfiii.'iiti V. Goldinff (1809), 2 Camp. 20 ; 11 Eiwt, 244 16, 20 
 
 'JU'iulou r. Diuiiffonl (1831). 6 C. iV P. 18 ; 3 Stark. Ev. 1 IGO 13, 152 
 
 f'U-Tnv Sdcictv, Re (IH.^6). 2 K. & J. 615 TOO 
 
 Clerk'r. Mdi/i.ux (HOI). T Rav. 100 ; 1 Lev. 160 ; 1 Sid. 2t.8; 1 Keb. 84.') 871 
 
 Clever. Pi.wel (18.(2), 1 M. A: Rob. 228 CO.', 1119 
 
 Clev.liiiid, IJuoh. Dow. of, v. Meyriek (18C8), 37 L. J. Ch. 126 ; 17 L. T. 
 
 2:m 50 
 
 Cli«nr<l f. Hiirtou (1823), 1 Hiiijf. 199; 8 MiM)re. C. P. IC 390, 604 
 
 i;i:ft..nl !. Hunter (1827), 3 C. & P. 10 ; M. & M. 103 48, 942 
 
 Clittord r. Parker (1811), 2 M. & Gr. 909 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 233; 10 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 227 1 102, 1193 
 
 Clitlord f. Turrell (1841), 1 Y. & C. C. C. 138; 9 Jur. 633; 14 L. J. Ch. 
 
 390 748 
 
 Clifton f.U. S. (1846), 4 How. S. Ct. R. 242 109, 277, 520 
 
 Cliiian f. C(H)ko 11802), 1 Seh. & Lef. 41 ; 9 U. R. 3 679, G88, 750 
 
 Ciine's eane (1«70), L. R. 18 E.|. 213 ; 22 W. R. 512 ; 30 L. T. 249 139 
 
 diver. Carew(1859), 1 J. k U. 199, 207; 28 L. J. CIi. OH.'.; 5 Jur. N. S.487. . 495 
 
 ClojfMowii c. Walcot (1847), 5 Notes of CawH (Kec. \- Miir.), 523 143 
 
 Clou, urry, Ld., ease of (1811), Macci. H. of L. Pnietiee, 606 602 
 
 Clo>e, i;.\ parte (Ex parte Kirk. Re Beiinett) (1877), 40 L. J. Bk. 1 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 42:i ; 25 W. R. 504 ; 6 Ch ]). 145 847 
 
 Closmiulem! r. Carrol (1856), 18 C. B. 36 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 216 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 474 133 
 
 Clothierr. Clmimian (1H0.5), 14 EaHt, 331; 12 R. R. 543 398 
 
 Clowes r. lliK'^riiihon (1813), 1 Ves. A: B. 375 ; 12 R. R. 284 750 
 
 Clowes I . lliUianl (1876), 4 Ch. D. 413; 40 L. J. Ch. 271 ; 25 W. R. 224. . 187, 192 
 
 CliinueH r. l'r//.'v 1 1807), 1 Camp. 8 108 
 
 Cly.le Nav. Co. r. Biirclay (1876). 1 Apj). Cas. 790 ; 36 L. T. 379 178 
 
 Coal CoiisuiMiii)jr Gas Co., Re, Ex i>arte Gover (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 96; 
 
 1 Ch. I). lo2.- 33 h. T. 619; 24 W. R. !25 1233 
 
 CoHtes r. HaiuliriilKe (1828 . 5 Binjf. 58 ; 2 M. & P. 142 388 
 
 Coates r. liirih (1841), 2 U. B. 252 ; 1 G. Ac I). 647 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 640 ; 
 
 6 Jur. 540 609 
 
 Couts r. fliaplin (1842), 3 Q. B. 486 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 315 ; 2 G. & D. 6.52 ; 
 
 6 .Fur. 1123 670, 692 
 
 CoMiett, Kx parte (1.S5H), 4 Jur. N. H. 146 837, 869, 870 
 
 Cohliett r. (Jrey (1H|9), 4 Ex. 729 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 137 ; 1 L. M. & P. 383. . 479 
 Cobbett (. lIuasoii(18.VJ), 22 L. J. Q. B. 11; 1 E. & B. 11; 17 Jur. 
 
 4H8 , 909, 918 
 
 Cobliett f. Kihiiiuhter (186.i), 4 F. A: F. 490 1224, 1226 
 
 Col.lM.ld I. Castoii (1824), 1 BinK. 399 ; I C. & P. 51 ; 8 Mooro (C. P.) 466.. 688 
 
 Colslen I-. Keudric k (1791). 4 T. R. 431 ; 2 R. R. 424 607, 610 
 
 Cot'hrau i. RetU'rjf (1800), 3 E.Mp. 121 768 
 
 CiKhrane <. Moore y\H\M), 26 y. B. 1). 67; 59 L. J. Q. B. 377 ; 63 L. T. 
 
 153 ; 38 W. R. 5H8 ; 64 J. P. 804 639 
 
 Gnk c. Gent (1813), 12 M. At W. 231; 13 L. J. Ex. 24; 1 D. 4 L. 
 
 413 227, 228 
 
 705, 708 
 682 
 
 490 
 697 
 936 
 
 Cmkayue, Ro (185i>i, Deaiie, Ew. R. 177 
 
 ^MikiiiK r. Ward ^1M45), 1 C. B. 858 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 246 
 
 CoekriU V. Sparkes ^1862), 32 L. J. Ex. 118 ; 1 H. A: C. 699; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 307 ; 7 L. T. 752 
 
 Corks r. Nash (lH33i, 6 C. & P. 154 
 
 CiH'ks I . Purday ^1816;, 1 C. At K. 2(>9 
 
 Cm- c ("lay (1829), 5 Bin^. 440 ; 3 M. Ac P. 57 773 
 
 VKtuiH I . Bernard ^1704). 2 Ld. Ravm. 9IH ; 1 Smith, L. C. 201 161, 102 
 
 Cohen r. Davidson (1877), 46 L. J.'y. B. 305 ; 2 Q B. D. 466; 36 L. T. 
 
 244 ; 25 W. R, 369 771 
 
 Cohen V. Hinkley (1809), 2 Camp. 61 ; 1 Taun. 249 ; 11 R. U. 680 
 
 Cohen r. Templar (1817), 2 SUirk. 260 
 
 Cohn r. Davidson («r ("ohen r. DttvidiMm). 
 
 Coil V. Tracy (1830), 8 Conn. 268 
 
 175 
 
 698 
 
 88« 
 
 ;i 
 
 y«l, I. end* with pag* 636. 
 
II 
 
 ir 
 
 TABLE OF CA81-:S CITED. 
 
 PAOH 
 
 O.IIktii'h catio (lS-'3), 1 Whnel. C. C. 479 8'Jl 
 
 Colb<.urn v. Diiwsou (I8.M;, 10 C. B. 70'> ; '20 L. J. C. P. 154; 15 Jur. 
 
 6«0 "86 
 
 ColuloiiKli t •«"'>'>' {1 **•*•')• 15 Ir. Ch. R. 347; 10 L. T. Uls 7'JS 
 
 Cole V. Iladk-y (IHUt), 1 1 A. & E. 807 ; 4 Jur. 183 ; 3 1'. i D. 458 6u0 
 
 Colo f. Uiiwkiim (I73H), Amir. 275 ; 2 Str. 1091 873 
 
 Cole V. MiinniiiK (1877), 40 L. J. M. C. 175; 2 Q. D. D. Bll ; 35 L. T. 
 
 UU C31 
 
 Cole r. Slurard (185.)), 11 Ex. 482; 25 L. J. Kx. 59 9 
 
 Colemun'n ciihi- (1718), ••itiHl in Joy on Conf('.'*»ioii 655 
 
 Colemmi v. (Jibsou (1N32), 1 M. & Rob. 108 092 
 
 Coleman v. Southwirk (1812), 9 Johns. 45 372 
 
 Coles V. m. of EntflanJ (1839), 10 A. & E. 437 : 2 P. & 1). 521 542 
 
 Coles t'. BriHtowe (1808), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 3 ; 38 L. J Ch. 81 : 19 L. T. 
 
 403; 17 W. R. 105 158 
 
 Coles V. Coles and Brown (I8GG), 35 L. J. P. & M. 40 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 
 
 70 939 
 
 Collard v. Sainpson (1853). 10 Bwiv. 543; 4 Do G. M. & G. 224 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 041 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 729 ; 1 Eq. Rep. 202 093 
 
 Colledge V. Horn (1825), 3 Bing 1 1'J ; I'l Moore (J B.) 431 507. 711 
 
 Colleu V. Wright (1857), 20 L. J. Q. B. 147 ; 7 E. c& B. 301 ; 27 L. J. Q. 
 
 B. 215; 8 E. Jt; B. 047; 3 Jur. N. .S. 3C3 780 
 
 Collett V. Collett (183H). 1 Curt. 087 931, 934 
 
 Collett p. Hubbard (ISK!). 2 Coop. 94, 99 544 
 
 Collett ». Ul. Keith (1803;, 4 Esp. 212 517, 1144 
 
 CoUette V. (J.KHle (1877j, 7 Ch. D. 842; 47 L. J. Ch. 370 ; 38 L. T. 504 . . 224 
 Collier, Ex parte {.ire Ex parte Bailey). 
 
 Collier f. Nok.'s(I8l<t), 2 C. & Kir. 1012 15,900 
 
 Collier t). Simj)»on (1831), 5 0. i P. M 935, 930 
 
 Colling V. Trewwk (1827\ 6 B. & C. 398 300, 310, 317 
 
 Collins f. B irrow (1831). 1 M. i Rob. 112 774 
 
 Collins f. Bavntun (1841), 1 Q. B. 1 17 ; 4 P. & D. 6-U ; 5 Jur. 530 1211 
 
 Collins c. Bishop (1879), 48 L J. Ch. 31 149, 373 
 
 Collins r. Blantern (1707), 2 Wils. 341 ; 1 Sin. L. C. 310 91, 740, 747 
 
 Collins v. (;aniegi<^ (1834), I A. & E. 095, 703; 3 N. & M. 703 151, 519 
 
 Colliiw*. (JaHhon (iMiO), 2 F. 4 F. 47 1192 
 
 Collins «'. (Jodefroy (1831), 1 B. & Ad. 950; 1 D. P. C. 320 819, 820 
 
 Collins V. Jaoksou (1802), 31 Beav. 646 , 100 
 
 Collins V. Martin (1797;, 1 B. & P. 051 ; 2 E»p. 250 ; 4 R. R. 752 133 
 
 Collins f. Maide(1838), 8 C. & P. 502 297, 1054 
 
 CoUiuBf. PnwwT (1823), 1 B & C. 082 ; 3D. &R. 112 1194 
 
 Collins V. Rliodes {nrr |{c Biker). 
 
 Collins c. Wel.ih (1879), 5 C. P. D. 27 ; 49 L. J. 0. P. 200 ; 41 L. T. 786 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 208 41, 4a 
 
 Collinson i. Margesson (1858). 27 L. J. Ex. 305 712 
 
 Collisr. Em.tt (1790), I H. Bl. 313 1205 
 
 CoUisf. Stark (1857;, 1 H. A: N. 005; 20 L. J. Ex. 138 711 
 
 Collyer v. Will.Hrk (lMJ7i, 12 M.H.re (C. P.), 567; 4 Ling. 313 716 
 
 Coliuan f. Auderwm ( 1.S13), 10 Maws. 105 122 
 
 Colt V. Nelt.rvill (172..), 2 P. Wnis. 308 085 
 
 Coltn.an p. (ingory (1871). 40 L. J. Ch. 362; 19 W. R. 571 80U 
 
 Coltman v. Marsh "(1811), 3 Taun. 380 712 
 
 Colvin t. PrcHi. (Jen. (1827), 1 llagg. Ecc. R. 02 174 
 
 Com. V. Boviiton (1871), IIO Mush. 313 035 
 
 Com. V. Bulhird (1812 , 9 Muhn. 27o 740 
 
 Com. I'. VhU'V (1823). 2 I'l.k. 47 1221, 1228 
 
 Com. «'. Dana (1841;. 2 .Mitc 329, 337 000 
 
 Com. V. Downing ( 1855,, I ( iray. 29 035 
 
 Com V. Drake (181H), 15 Mass, 101 607, 590 
 
 Com. V. Ebi'ile (1817). 3 .STg. & R. 9 382 
 
 Com. •'. Ki.ly (I7M9.1820:, 2 Vjrg. ('as. 1 873 
 
 Com. V. (itc'ii (|N22), 17 Mass. 538 910 
 
 Com. V. Uriftlii (1872), 110 Mass. 181 6U0 
 
 Th* rrj'inncet art /« puyn, nut to parai/rap/ti. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 I- ! 
 
 FAoa 
 
 Com. f. ITill(1817), 14 Mass. 207 897 
 
 Com r. Kuapp (1H30). 9 Pick. o07 651,568,585,632 
 
 Com.i'. Kiittaaiid (1838), 20 Pick. 229 16 
 
 Cora r. LviiPH (ISHfi), 142 Mass. 577 898 
 
 Cora. V. NorcTOBH (1813), 9 Mass. l92 295 
 
 roin. ('. r.ilhird (1847), 12 Mete. 225 630 
 
 Com. V. RirharJs (1836), 18 Pick. 434 354 
 
 Cora. V. Sapt) (1 890), 29 Amer. St. R. 405 590, 691 
 
 Com. e.Slupherd (1814). 6 Binn. 283 621 
 
 Com. V. Smith (1812), 9 Miuw. 107 615 
 
 ( om. f. Tilik-n (iiiulated), cited 2 Stark. Ev. 232, n. 1 615 
 
 Com. «. VaHH (1831), 3 Leigh, R. 786 4C9 
 
 torn. r. Woelpcr (1817), 3 Serg. & R. 29 1175 
 
 Com. V. Wood (18.5s), 11 Gray, 85 635 
 
 Combe r. Corp. of Lomlon (1842), 2 Y. & C. C. C. 631 601, 1183 
 
 Combo V. Pitt (1704), 3 Burr. 1586 ; 1 Wm. Bl. 524 550 
 
 Coram, of Li'ith Har. A: 1). r. Iiispe<!. of Poor (1860), L. R. 1 H. L. (Sc.) 17 1139 
 
 Comm. f. White (1888), 147 Mass. 76 617 
 
 Commeniul Bk. of Scotl v. Rhind (1860), 3 Macq. 643 ; 1 Paterson, 903 . . 652 
 ComminjTH .-. Heanl (1809), 10 B. & S. 606 ; L. R. 4 Q. B. 669 ; 39 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 9 ; 20 L. T. 975 ; 18 W. R. 16 1160 
 
 Commins v. Scott (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 11 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 503; 32 L. T. 
 
 420 ; 23 W. R. 498 671 
 
 Compton f. Chandless (1801), 4 Esp. 19 1081, 1165 
 
 Concha r. Concha (1886), 11 App. Cas. 541 ; 56 L. J. Ch. 257 ; 55 L. T. 
 
 622 ; 35 W. R. 477 012 
 
 Concha r. Miirrietta (1889). 40 Ch. D. 543 ; 60 L. T. 798 937 
 
 Concordia, The (1860), L. U. 1 Adm. 93 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 771 ; 14 L. T. 896. . 6 
 Conflann «iu!irry Co. i. Parker (1867), L. K. 3 C. P. 1 ; 37 L. J. C. P. 51 ; 
 
 17 L. T. 283 ; 16 W. R. 127 308 
 
 Coulon.. M(K)re (1875), 9 I. R. C. L. 190 1114 
 
 Connelly i'. Connelly (1850), 2 Robert*. 202 1144, 1 145 
 
 Omnor, In the goods of, (1892) .£9 L. R. Ir. 201 172, Add. [181] 
 
 Conmr v. (1842), tr. Cir. R. 610 832 
 
 Connor c. Cronin (1858), 17 Ir. L. R. 480 133 
 
 Connybeare v. Farries (1869), L. R. 5 Eq. 16; 39 L. J. Ex. 26; 21 L. T. 
 
 497 313 
 
 Conradi v. Conradi (1868), L. R. 1 P. A: D. 614 ; 18 L. T. 659 ; 16 W. R. 
 
 1023 353, 1103 
 
 Conronr. Conron (1858), 7 H. L. C. 168 144 
 
 CoHHorv. of Uiv. Thames v. Hall (1868), 37 L. J. C. P. 163 ; L. R. 3 C. P. 
 
 416; 18 L. T. 361 ; 16 W. R. 971 178 
 
 Conhtable f. Constable (1879), 11 Ch. D. 681 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 621 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 616 140 
 
 Contrail Corp., Ho (1871), 40 L. J. Ch. 351 ; L. R. 6 Ch. App. 146 846 
 
 Conway r. Biazley (1831), 3 Ilagg. Ecc. R, 639 1144 
 
 Cooch V. O.K>dman (1842), 2 Q. B. 580 ; 2 O. * D. 159 ; 6 Jur. 779 .. . .653, 654 
 
 Co<Kle «'. CoiMle (1838), 1 Curt. 755 1048 
 
 C<H.k, He (1846), 7 Q. B. 653; 14 L. J. Q. B. 188; 9 Jur. 869 837 
 
 Cook I'. Hearu (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 20 319 
 
 Cook .•. LamlHTt (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 93 ; 3 S. & T. 46 ; 9 L. T. 211 ; 
 
 1 1 W. H. 401 ; Jur. N. 8. 258 699 
 
 C«Mik I . Lnmanl (1827), 6 B. & C 351 ; 9 Dowl. & R. 339 226 
 
 CiMik I . Nuth'Tcote (18;),')), C. & P. 743 918 
 
 Cook 1'. North Metroinditan Tramways Co. (1887), 18 ti. B. D. 683; 56 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 3U9; 66 L. T. 448; 57 L. T. 746; 35 W. R. 677 ; 61 J. P. 
 
 6.10 779 
 
 Cook I . Stearns (1814), 1 1 Mass. 533 683 
 
 Cook I'. Tlie State (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 756 Add. [568] 
 
 C.Hik I. Tondinwm (1876), 24 W. R. 851 912 
 
 Cnker. Hanks(l8'.!6),2 C. & P. 478 401. 1174 
 
 C.K.ku V. Butler (1872). 2 Hop. & Colt. 22 ; 21 W. R. 73 ; 27 L. T. 648 ; 42 
 
 L. J.C. P. 26; L. R. 9C. P. 2.56 1173 
 
 I 
 
 t'i 
 
 Vol. I, tndt with payt 03j. 
 
lyi TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 J>AOK 
 
 Cooke f. Orenn (1823), 11 Priro, 736 112 
 
 Owkof. LaiiKift" (1 «.')!), lo Hi uv. 234; 21 L. J. Cli. 371 136 
 
 Cooko V. Lloyd (1803), I'cako, Evid. Ajipcndix xxviii 414 
 
 f ;o..ko V. Loxlev (1 7i)2). T) T. H 4 ; 2 R. It. .521 96 
 
 C(i.)k.( r. Maxwell (1817). 2 Stark. N. P. 183 ; 19 R. R. 700 018, 620, 1031 
 
 CcM)k(M'. Shoil n7!l3), oT. R. 25.') U03, 1141 
 
 C.H.kcr. TaiiHw.'ll(lsi8), 2 MoDfo (0. P.), .')13; 8Tauii.l31 1210 
 
 CokfT. Wilby (1881), 25 Ch. D. 7GU ; 53 L. J. fli. 592; 50 L. T. 152; 
 
 32 W. K. 379 13, 1030 
 
 Cooko V. Wildi-.s (1856). 5 E. A: B. 328 ; 3 C. L. R. 1090 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 ;i(i7; 1 Jur. N. S. 610 47, 111 
 
 C(M.kPH v. C(H>kfH (I86;«), 3 N. R. 97 ; 11 W. R. 871 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 813 .... 462 
 
 Cook.'H r. Masortll {Um), 2 Vorn. 200 639 
 
 Cool.' r. Braliam (1848), a Ex. 186; 18 L. J. Ex. 105 498,609,612 
 
 Coombs, llr (1806), 36 L. J. P. & M. 25 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. :t02 698 
 
 CoomliH r. BrisU)! and Exoter Rv. Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 401 ; 3 H. & 
 
 N. 510 ' 692 
 
 CoonibH !•. (Jocthrr (1829), M. & M. 398 1050 
 
 CooinbH V. WilkH, (1891) 3 Ch. 77 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 42 ; 65 L. T. 66 ; 40 W. 
 
 R. 77 071 
 
 C(M>p.> r. CroHswcll (1806), L. R. 2 Ch. 112 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 114 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 42 ; 15 W. R. 2 12 449 
 
 Coopor, In re. Cooper v. Vesoy (1882), 20 Ch. D. 611, «'.;9 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 
 
 862 ; 47 L. T. 89 : 30 W. R. 018 135 
 
 Cooper r. Rlardv (1839), 1 HinK- N. C. 45 99 
 
 CfM.jM-ri'. Boik.it (18(i3, r(hould be 1844), 4 Moo. P. C. C. 419; 4 Not in 
 
 of CaweH (Ere. & Mar.), 685 ; 10 Jur. 931 142, 097, 707 
 
 CooiMT r. Uibl«)iin (1813), 3 Camp. 363 109 
 
 Cooper r. Grant (18,V2), 12 C. B. 154 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 197 732 
 
 CooiK-r f. Ilardin^r (1845), 7 Q. B. 928; 9 Jur. 777 818 
 
 Cooi)erf. Lloyd (1859), C. B. N. 8. 519 622 
 
 Cooper <•. MaiMlonald (1807), 30 I.. J. E(i. 304 1030 
 
 Coiiper r. Macdonald (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 533, 638 ; L. R. 16 E.i- 258 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 693 806 
 
 Cooper I'. Marxdeu (1 i . 3), 1 Esp. 1 457 
 
 CooiM-r r. Metrop. Board of Works (1883), 26 Ch. D. 472 ; 50 L. T. 602 . . /)97 
 
 CoojM-r f. Mever (1831)), 10 B. & C. 468 .547, 548 
 
 Cooper c. Robinson (1842), 10 M. & W. 09 J ; 12 L. J. Ex. 48 750 
 
 Cooper t. Shepherd (1840), 3 C. P. 272 ; 4 U. & L. 218; i5 L. J. C. P. 
 
 237; 10 Jur. 7.58 1115 
 
 Cooper t: Slado (1858), 6 E. & B. 447 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 324 ; 2 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 1016 104, 106,686 
 
 Cooi>er r. Smith (1812), 16 East, l(t3; 13 R. R. 397 672 
 
 Cooper f. Taylor il844), M. & Or. 989 ; 7 Scott, M. R. 950; 13 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 92 ; 8 Jur. 150 632 
 
 Cooper r. Wands. Board of Works (1863)^ 32 L. J. C. P. 185; 14 C. B. 
 
 N. S. 180; 9 Jur. N. S. 1155; 1 1 W. R. 046 1118 
 
 Coo|Mr r. Woolfitt (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 2 H. & N. 122 ; 3 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 870 146 
 
 CoorK, Rajah of r. East India Co. (18.56), 25 L. J. Ch. 346 6 IK 
 
 Cooto r. Boyd ( 1 789), 2 Bro. C. C. 521 807, 808 
 
 Coote e. Leitrhworth (1590), Mooro (F.), 467 543 
 
 Cope, Re (1850), 2 R.(bprts. 335 701 
 
 CoiM. I'. (;oiH' (1H33), 5 C. & P. 604 ; 1 M. & R«ib. 209, 27 . .101, 621, 622, 1170 
 
 Copo V. Mooney (1802), 14 Ir. C. li. R. 250 ; 10 L. T. 8.54 1163 
 
 Copo V. Rowlands (1830). 2 M. & W. 160 ; 2 dale, 231 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 63. . 1.50 
 
 CoiM! I'. Thames Haven Dock Vo. (1848), 2 C. & Kir. 757 929, 900 
 
 CojMj V. Thames Haven Dock & Rail. Co. (1849), 3 Ex. 841 ; Railw. Ciw. 
 
 83 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 345 642 
 
 CoiHhindc. Watts (1815), 1 .Stark. 95 698 
 
 Copin V. Adamsoii (1875), L. R. 9 Ex. 346; 43 L. J. Ex. 161 ; 31 L. T. 
 
 242; 22 W. R. 058 1147 
 
 Copland v. Toulmin (1840), 7 CI. & Fin. 360 486 
 
 /%(• ye/erencu »r* to page$, not to para/raph§. 
 
TAHLE OF CASES CITED. Ivii 
 
 rxait 
 Copley r. Burton (1870), L. B. 6 C. P. 489; 39 L. J. M. C. 141; 22 
 
 f.. T. has 213 
 
 Copp V. rplmm (1825), 3 New Hamp. 169 9Q9 
 
 Copper Miutre" Co. v. Fox (1851), 16 Q. B. 229 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 174 ; Ifi 
 
 .fur. 703 531, 042 
 
 CorU'tt V. Corbctt (1813), 1 Ves. & B. 335 329 
 
 Corl.ishU'v'B Trusts, Re (1880), 14 Ch. Div. 840; 49 L J. Ch. 200; 28 
 
 W. li. 530 172 
 
 Cordi'r, Uv II8I8). Notos of Ciis. {Eiw. & Mar), 550 098 
 
 C.nl.TV r. Colvillo (or Colvin) (1803), 14 C. B. N. S. 374 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 
 
 •Jll);" 'J Jur. N. S. 1?00; 8 L. T. 245 521 
 
 ('..rdwriit r. Ilunt(l»;i8), S Tuun. 5!I0 750 
 
 Cork, Hp. of, V. Poru'r(1877). Ir. U C. L. 94 901 
 
 Cork uml Uiindoii Ky. Co. v. Ca/.eiiovo (1847), 10 Q. B. 935 ; 1 1 Jur. 802.. lUO 
 Cork ami Haiulou Uy. Co. v. OikkIo (1853), 13 C. B. 826; 22 L. J. C. P. 
 
 HIS ; 17 .Tur. 555 76 
 
 Corn.litis Rctraii, U<' (1838), 1 Curt. 908 096 
 
 Cormll I. Hak.r (1885), 29 Ch. I). 711 : 54 L. J. Ch. 814; 52 L. T. 421.. 913 
 
 Conirll r. Gr.'«!ii (1823). 10 Scrir. & H. 14, 10 3.54 
 
 (•,.riif.«)t I. Fowkf (ISIO), M. & W. 377 ; 4 Jur. 919 ; 9 L. J. Kx. 297. . 200 
 
 Cornforth r. Smithard (I8')U), 5 II. & N. 13 ; 29 L. J. Kx. 228 • W. R. 8 711 
 
 C.niish r. AMii^'toii (1S5!>), 4 II. & N. 519 ; 2S L. J. Kx. 202 538 
 
 CoriiiHh r. Clark (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 1S4 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 14 ; 26 L. T. 494 ; 
 
 •JO \V. U. 897 135 
 
 Coniish r. llotkin (1853), 1 E. & B. 002; 22 L. J. Q. B. 142; 17 Jur. 
 
 1049 186 
 
 Cornwall r. Hirhanlson (182.5^, Ky. A: M. 305 219, 252, 255, 2.'ia 
 
 G)rs.'ii I. Dubois (ISIO), Holt, N. V. U. 239 698 
 
 Cort r. Aiuli.ixalc, iir. Uy. Co. (1851;, 17 Q. B. 127 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 460 ; 
 
 !•') Jur. S77 751 
 
 C.rtis c. Ktiit Watt'rworkH Co. (1827), 7 B. it C. 314 151 
 
 C.irv I'. Brittou ^1S30), 4 C. Ac P. 40J 514 
 
 Coryr. Davis (1SG3 , 14 C. B. N. S. 370 '2H2 
 
 CoHMioiMilitaii, Itc ( S48), Notes of Can. (Kcc. & Mar.), Supji. xxviii 177 
 
 Cwiialian r. Criou i V.'), 15 M«h). P. C. C. 215 (VM 
 
 ( (issciiB, Kx partf, >V^arrall, Ho (1820), Buck, 531, 5li 970 
 
 ("osscns 1'. Cossi'MH (1737), WillcH, 25 92 
 
 ( oHMsy ) . Loud. & HriKht. Ry. Co. (1870), L. R. 5 C. I'. 140 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 
 
 174 ; 22 L. T. 19 ; 18 W. K. 493 599, 1 186 
 
 Costa Rioa, Hep. of v. Erlanger (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 281 ; L. R. 19 
 
 Eq. 33 321 
 
 Coster*, lletheritifrton (1859), 8 Cox, 0. C. 175 ; 1 E. & E. 8u2; 28 L. J. 
 
 M. C. I'.i.! 1073 
 
 ( Mtchinif I. I5a»st.t (IS02), 32 L. J. Ch. 286 ; 32 Bcav. 101 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 5!iO ; 1 1 \V. K. 197 •. 623 
 
 Cotes r. Davis (1S08), 1 (?rtiiip. 4S5 504 
 
 (ot.sworth r. Sp<,kes (IC il i. 30 L. J. C. P. 220; IOC. B.N. 8 103; 7 Jur. 
 
 N. S. Sii;{ ft23 
 
 C..tt«m r. Parlridjfe (1842), 4 M. & Ur. 271 ; 4 Seott, N R. 819; 11 L. J. 
 
 <'. 1'. Mil 715 
 
 ( oil, rill V. Ifnl.l.y (1S25), 4 B. & C 405 ; I). & R. .561 286 
 
 CottiuK"!", Kx jiarte ( I07S), 2 Swans. 320 1 150 
 
 tMiil,., Kx parte ^1S50), 2 Mae. & (J. 1S5 ; 2 H. & T. 382 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 
 
 ■"i» 640 
 
 <'"tton, Re(lR4S), 6 Not«'H of Can. (Kco. & Mar.) ;»(I7 098 
 
 f.ittrell r. Hughes (IS.Vi), 16 C. B. /..32; 3 C. L. R. 490; 24 L. J. C. P. 
 
 107; 1 Jur. N. S. 44S 120, 127 
 
 Cnttrill r. Myri.k (1s:(5). 3 Fairf. 222 03i 
 
 • uuih V. Meeker (1S17), 2 Conn. 302 765 
 
 Cnulinjf t. Coxe (184S), 6 C. B. 703 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 399 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 100 ; 
 
 1 ' •''"■ 101 836 
 
 (•■Mt.lnve ({,. (1S73), L. R. 8Q. B. 410; 42 L. J. Q. B. 217 ; 38L.T. 701 ; 
 
 2\ W.U. 8N3 1028 
 
 rW. I, tndi with pagt 035. 
 
 
 
ivm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 TAOI 
 
 Courti'cn r. Touse (1807), 1 Camp. 43; 10 R. R. 6'J7 'Jtl 
 
 CoiisiuHc. Paddon (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 547; 5 L. J. Ex. 49; 6 Tyr. 
 
 n'A^ 222 
 
 CoutU r." Acworth (1869 , -iS^L. J. Ch. 694 ; L. R. 8 Eq. 668 ; 21 L. T. 
 
 J24 ; 17 W. R. 1 121 . ; 136 
 
 Couturier r. Hiu«tie IS.J2). 8 Es. 40 : 22 L. J. Ex. 97 677 
 
 Coventry v. tireat Ea.-»ttni Ky. Co. (1883), 11 Q. B. 1). 776 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 694; 49 L. T. 641 648 
 
 Cowi-n t . AbrahaniH M793). 1 Esp. .50 289, 318 
 
 Cowan «•. Braidwood (1840,, 1 M. i Gr. 882 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 138; 9 D. 
 
 P. C. 27 1142, 1143, 1146, 1147, 1154 
 
 Cowbum, Re [tre Ex parte Firth). 
 
 Cowell r. Chambers ;i»o6), 21 Beav. 619 1092 
 
 Cowie V. HaUall (1821;, 4 B. 4 Ad. 197 ; 3 Stark. N. P. 36 1194 
 
 Cowie V. Remfry (1846), 5 Moo. P. C. C. 232 ; 3 Moo. Ind. App. 448 ; 10 
 
 Jur. 789 298 
 
 Cowley f. Knapp(1886), 42 N. J. L. 297 693 
 
 Cowling f. Ely (1818), 2 Stark. R. 366 ; 20 R. R. 694 488 
 
 Cowper r. Lord 0.w|>er ;17:»4), 2 P. Wms. 720, 748. 749, 750. 751, 752 .. 108 
 Cox's Trusts, Re il878), 47 L. J. Ch. 735 ; 9 Ch. D. 159 ; 27 ^V. R. 53 . . 139 
 
 Cox V. Allinufham (1822), Jac. 514 1045 
 
 Cox r. Cannon (1838;, 4 Bing. N. C. 453;. 6 Dowl. 625 732 
 
 Cox f. Hill, (18H2; 36Sol. J. 446 193 
 
 Cox I. Knight (18-36;. 18 C. B. X. S. 645 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 314 99 
 
 Cox r. Middleton (1855), 2 Drew. 209 ; 2 Eq. Rep. 631 ; 23 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 61S 673 
 
 Cox r. Midi. Ry. Co. (1849), 3 Ex. 268 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 65 ; 14 Jur. 65 ; 6 
 
 Railw. Can. 583 641 
 
 Cox r. Newman (1813). 2 Ve«. & B. 168 1037 
 
 Coxf. Reid (1849), 13 Q. B. 858; 18 L. J. Q. B. 216; 13 Jur. 563 ....39, 227 
 
 Cox V. Walter i»hould bo Walker) (undated), cited 9 C. & P. 339 259 
 
 Cox V. Willoughby il8»0], 13 Ch. D. 863 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 237 ; 42 L. T. 125 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 503 169 
 
 Coxhcad r. Mullia (1878), 3 C. P. D. 439 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 701 ; 39 L. T. 
 
 349; 27 W. R. 136 718 
 
 Coxhcad t. Richards (1846), 2 C. B. 584 ; In L. J. C. P. 278 ; 10 Jur. 984. . 39, 
 
 47, 111 
 
 Coyle V. Great North of IreUnd Ry. Co. (1887), 20 L. R. Ir. 409 163 
 
 Cruigf. Fenn (1841;, C. A Man«h. 43 259 
 
 Crane v. London Dm\ Co. (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 224 ; 6 B. & 8. 313 ; 
 
 L. T. 372: 12W. R. 745; 10 Jur. N. S. 984 
 
 10 
 
 Crane i . Man«hall (1839). 4 Shepl. 27 443 
 
 Crane t . Powell ;1h68/, 38 L. J. C. P. 43 ; L. R. 4 0. P. 123 ; 20 L. T. 
 
 703; 17 W R. 161 672 
 
 Craven, Ex parte (1870). 39 L. J. Bank. 33 ; L. R. 10 Eq. 648 ; 23 L. T. 
 
 663 ; 18 W. R. 1022 : atfd. 8ub nom. Craven, Ex parte, TempcHt, In re, 
 
 L. R. 6 Ch. 70 ; 40 L. J. Bank. 22 ; 23 L. T. 650 ; 19 W. R. 137 .... 82 
 
 Craven r. llalliley (1838,. cited Thomas v. Connell, 4 M. & W. 270 379 
 
 Crawcour f. Salter (1881,, 18 Ch. D. 30 ; 45 L. T. 62 6, 61 1 
 
 Cruwfonl f. Crawford (1867), Ir. R. 2 Eq. 166 710, 711 
 
 Crawford and Lindsay Peer. (1848), 2 U. L. G. 634, 650 ; 2 Marq. 479 . . 134, 
 
 423, 1018, 1227 
 
 Crawford i . Spencer (1851), 62 Mass. 418 757 
 
 Cray t: HallK liS25;, cited Smith r. Blandy, Ry. & M. 259 479 
 
 Crcagh r. BliHid (1845/, 3 J ' La T. 133. 161 660 
 
 Creude v. Barrett (1835), It M. i R. 919 ; 5 Tyr. 458 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 297. . 393,' 
 
 395, 396, 397, 401, 404, 413, 435. 444, 445, 510 
 Credland v. Potter (1874), 10 L. R. Ch. 8 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 169 ; 31 L. T. 
 
 522 : 23 W. R. 36 738 
 
 Creen r. Wright (1877), 2 C. P. D. 354 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 427 ; 36 L. T. 356 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 502 42 
 
 Crcevy i. Carr(1835\ 7 C. 4 P. 64 245, 942 
 
 Cruppsf. Durden (1776-7), 2 Cowp. 140; 1 Sm. L. C. 092 1130 
 
 Th4 Ttfertnttt art to pages, not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixit 
 
 I 82 
 379 
 311 
 
 ni 
 
 m 
 
 42 
 
 FAaa 
 
 Creror r. S()do (1827), M. & M. 8.5 ; 3 C. & P. 10 j;* 
 
 Cn-HHwell r. Jiickhon (I860), 2 F. & r. 24 V2U 
 
 CiTWf. Sai.iKltTH (1734-5), 2Str. 1008 993, 996, 997 
 
 CriDiwr. Diivw (1843), 12 M. & W. 159; 13 L. J. Ex. 217 713, 714 
 
 Cri ) )N r. nnrliioll (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 381 ; 10 .Tur. N. 8. 300; 8 L. T. 
 
 7ii,^ ; 1 1 W. R. 953 678 
 
 Crippsr. HillH(1844), 5 Q. B. 606; 1 Uav, Jc M. 644; 8 Jur. 466; 13 
 
 L. J. Q H. 130 49 
 
 Criuiw V. WoUh (1S43), C. & Mar. 489 271 
 
 CriwlcM'. Bolton (1827), 3 C. & P. 240 44 
 
 CrHii r Aiidernou (1816), 1 Stark. R. 35 ; 18 K. II. 744 lOi), 133 
 
 Cii-pin r. Doglioni (1862), 32 L. J. P. & M. 109; 3 S. v% T. 44 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 91 ; II W. R. 600 309, 414 
 
 Croft r. Croft (1863), 4 S. & T. 10 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 44 , 11 Jur. N. S. 
 
 183; llL.T.781; 13 W. R. 526 967 
 
 Croft V. Grnham (186.1), 2 De G. J. & Sm. 155 ; 9 L. T. 589 137 
 
 Croft ». Lmiiley (1867-8), 5 E. & B. 648 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 223 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 H21 ; 6 H. L. Cas. 672 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 903 522 
 
 Cr)ft I'. Ri(to\answorth Highway BoHrd(1888), 67 L. J. Ch. 589 121 
 
 Cn.ftonf. Poole (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 608 519 
 
 Crofts V. Marshall (1836), 7 C. & P. 507 765 
 
 CroktT V. M. of Hertford (1844), 4 Moo. P. C. C. 339 702, 703 
 
 CroniHck V. Hoathcote (1820), 4 Moore (C. P.) 357 ; 2 B. & B. 4 591, .')92 
 
 Croiiii)tou r. Butler (1790), 1 HagK- Coiih. 460 632 
 
 Croiik •-•. Frith (1839), 9 C. & P. 197 ; 2 M. & Rob. 262 1209 
 
 CnH.kf. DowliiiK (1782), 3 Doug. 77 1013, 1014 
 
 Cr(K)k V. Hill (1876), 3 Ch. D. 773 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 119 ; 24 W. R. 786 ... . 145 
 Cr.K)k <■. Seaford (Corpn. of) (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 651 ; 25 L. T. 1 ; 19 
 
 W. R. 9:!8 645 
 
 Crookt-nden v. Fuller (1859), 29 L. J. P. & M. 1 ; 1 S. & T. 441 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1222; 1 L. T. 70 179, 180 
 
 Crook.wit I . Fletcher (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 153 ; 1 H. & N. 893 1198 
 
 CropiHT r. Smith (1884), 26 Ch. D. 710 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 891 ; 61 L. T. 733 ; 
 
 33 W. R. 60 187 
 
 Crodhief. Thompson (1847), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 404 487 
 
 Crosby r. Iletherington (1842), 4 M. & Or. »33 ; Scott, N. R. 637 ; 12 
 
 L. J. C. P. 261 6, 7 
 
 Crosby v. Percy (1808), 1 Taun. 364 372, 1214 
 
 CroHby V. Wadsworth (1805), 6 East, 602 ; 2 Smith, 559 ; 8 R. R. 566 687 
 
 Ci-oNH f. Kuyc (1796), 6 T. R. 663 518 
 
 Crosse r. Pediugfield (1821), 12 Sim. 36 488 
 
 CrosHley, Ex parte, Re Taylor (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 409 ; 41 L. J. Bank. 
 
 35 848 
 
 Crosslty V. Dixon (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 617 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 293 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 K. 8. 607; 8L. T. 260; 11 W. R. 716 644 
 
 Crosslcy r. Elworthv (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 158 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 480 ; 24 L. T. 
 
 607 ; 19 W, R. 842 135 
 
 Cros.'^lev r Lightowler (1867), L. R. 3 Eq. 279 ; 2 Ch. App. 478 ; 36 L. J. 
 
 Cli. 5S4; 15 W. R. 801 HI 
 
 Cro^sliy r. Maycock (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 180; 43 L. J. Ch. 379; 22 
 
 AV. R. 387 673 
 
 Crottv V. HodgcH (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 561 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 221 1194 
 
 Cniurh r. Cred. Fon. of England (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 374 ; 42 L. J. 
 
 y. ». 1S3; 29L. T. 259; 21 W. R. 946 960 
 
 Crouch I'. H<iopor (1852), 16 Bcav. i82 421 
 
 Cniudson v. Leonard (1808), 4 Crauch, 434 1 150 
 
 Ciou)fhton r. Blake (1843), 12 M. & W. 206 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 78 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 275 1050, 1 109, 1 169 
 
 Cn)wder v. Hopkins (1843), 10 Paige, 190 433, 514 
 
 Crowe f. Clay (1854), 9 Ex. 604 • 23 L. J. Ex. 160 ; 18 Jur. 654 307 
 
 Crowley v. Page (1837), 7 C. & P. 789 954 
 
 Crowley «•. Vitty (1852), 7 Ex. 319 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 135 667 
 
 Cniwiiiushield'B case (1830), 10 Pick. 497 382 
 
 Vol. I. tnd* with paye 635. 
 
 i^iil 
 
 
 ■iiii 
 
u 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS CirKD. 
 
 J ; 
 
 PAOK 
 
 CrowtiinHhiold v. CrowninshioM (18r)4), 2 Gray, 624 170, 262 
 
 CrowthLT r. Appleby (1873), L. li. C. P. 23 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 7 ; 29 L. T. 
 
 •iSO ; 22 W. K. 2().'. 814 
 
 Ciowther v. SolomoiiH (1848), 6 C. R. 758 ; 18 L. .T. C. P. 92 \M 
 
 <ti.xt..ii I'. May (187G), 'J L'li. D. 3hH ; 39 L. T. 401 ; 27 W. K. 327 101 
 
 CniiNO f. Clunoy {\HU\ (i Ir. Eq. 11. -iW 30), 1223 
 
 Ctil.itt V. Port.r (1^28). 8 U. & V. 257 ; 2 M. & U. 207 1 13 
 
 Cuff V. I'.iin (IHKt), 1 M. A- Hul. 21 ; 14 R. It. 384 762 
 
 CmnbiTlaiid c. Ccim land (1801), 1 II. Si C. 194 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 3.')3 ; 9 Jiir. 
 
 N. H. 2.13 ; 7 L. 'i'. 334 730 
 
 Cimiinff c. FrciiiJi (180!)), 2 Camp. 100, n filo 
 
 fninmin r. Siiiifli (1810), 2 Mit)? A: |{. 440 620 
 
 fuinmiiiKf. lt<)et'u.^k (1810), Holt, N. 1". K. 172 297 
 
 CuiidcU r. I'ratt (1827), M. A: M. 108 907, 908 
 
 Timliffe r. Seftoii (1802), 2 Ka^-t, is;{ 328, 1214, 1210 
 
 ('iiiiiiiii>?luiiii, Ke(1800), 29L. J. I Ac M. 71 ; » S. li T. 194 704 
 
 (' iiiiiiif^liani r. Ciniiiiii^'haiii (1814 . Div, 48 i 149 
 
 ( .rl.!wi« f. Corfii'ld (1811), 1 (J. & '' ; ! Q. B. 811; Jur. 269 ..620, 521 
 
 ('iirliii;jr«'. IVrriiiK (183.')), 2Myl. i . ;5 ; ' J. Cli. 80 OOI 
 
 Currciif. Crawford (181S), 4 StTjr. A. ' .,6 468 
 
 Ciirrio r. A:id.-rw.ii (18,V.)), 2 E. Ac E. 6. ; 29 L. ,< (' B. 87 ; Jur. N. S. 
 
 442 ; 8 \V. H. 274 089, 092 
 
 Ciirrio v. Cliild and Brown (1812), 3 (Tamp. 283 1207, 1213 
 
 Curry r. Wallir (1790), 1 E.sp. 450; 5 K. R. 743; 1 Bos. & P. 626; 
 
 4 H. It. 717 012 
 
 Curtiii V. Kvans (1872), Jr. R. 9 Eq. 653 800 
 
 CiirtiH r. Hunt (1821), 1 C. & P. 180 663 
 
 CurtiH c. Jlarkt-nzi.' (1877). W. N. No. 45 of 1N77, Ch. D. 213 800 
 
 Curtid r. Mandi (1868), 3 II. & N. 80G ; 28 L. J. E.x. 30; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1112 16 
 
 Curti.t f. M'Sweoncy (1841), Ir. C;r. K 343 1211 
 
 Curtis f. Pn^li (1847), 10 Q. B. HI ; U' L. J. Q. B. 199 090 
 
 Curtis V. Ri(!kard8 (1840), 1 M. i: Gr. 47 ; 1 Scott, N. It. 166 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 608 118 
 
 Curzon t'. Loinux (1803), 6 East, 00 397, 403 
 
 Cuwick r. Farrrll (18,S7), 18 L. V.. Ir. 494 ; 20 L. It Ir 60 162 
 
 Cunackf. Itobinwrn (1«01), 1 B. .V S. 299; 30 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; 7 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 642 ; 4 L. T. 600 ; 9 W. R. 736 089, 690 
 
 Cutbimh v. GiUuTt (18Jh;, 4 Scr-.f. & R. .655 279 
 
 Cufhliert r. Cuinmiug (1855), U Ex. 405 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 310 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 080 7"8 
 
 CutliTt'. Ni'wlin (1819), Mann. Dig. N. P. 137 608 
 
 Cutler I'. PoiH.' (1830), 1 Shcpl. 337 080 
 
 CutUi r. Gilbert (18,64), 9 M)o. P. C. C. 143 143, 706 
 
 Cutis V. rickering (1072). 1 Ventr. 197 000 
 
 Cuttsr. U. 8. (1812), 1 Gall. 09 1199 
 
 CuttH V. Ward (1807), L. R. 2 Q. B. 367 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 101 ; 8 B. & S. 
 
 277; 16L. T. 614; 16 W. R. 446 723 
 
 15. falsely nailed F. v. F. n804), 34 L. J. P. & M. 60 167 
 
 Dabbsf. Itunipliries (18.14), 10 Bing. HO; 4 M. & Se. 286 711 
 
 Da CostJi t . Edmunds (1816). 4 Camp. 143 ; 2 Chitty, 227 ; 10 It. It. 703.. 765 
 
 Da (^ostJt r. Jones ( 1 "H), 2 Cowp. 729 620 
 
 DaCoHtae. Pym (1797), Peake, Add. Can. 144 1221 
 
 DaCostuP. Villa Real (1734), 2 Str. 901 1103, 1107 
 
 Dagleish v. Dwld (1832), 6 C. & P. 238 484 
 
 Daines r. Hartley (1818), 3 Ex. 200; 18 L. J. Ex. 81 929 
 
 Daines v. Heatli (1847), 3 C. B. 938 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 117; 11 Jur. 185 1200 
 
 Daintry »'. Broekleliurst (1818), 3 Ex. 207; 18 L. J. Ex. 67 117 
 
 Daioz, Tliu (1878), 47 L. J. Adm. 1; 37 L. T. 137 178 
 
 Dalby V. Hirst (1819), 1 B. & B. 224 ; 3 Mooro (C. P.), 636 732 
 
 The rtferenen ar* to pagti, not to parayrnpht. 
 
 \% 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. Ixi 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Dale's .use (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 474 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; 43 L. T. 785 : 
 
 4") I P ''HI '" 
 
 I),l'..V' IlaM.ilton flSIO), 5 Ilaro, 369 ; 2 PhillipH, 208 ; 1(5 L. J. Oh. V>C>, 
 
 ■M- ; 1 1 .I.ir. l(l:i. ^^74 V,' '.• ' "^ •-•; ' ' V ^'^^ 
 
 Daler. Hu.nfiev (IS'-S). 20 L. J. Q. B. 137; 7 E. & B. 2«(i ; 2. L. J. 
 
 (J H :tiii) : K. H. A: K. UMU ; fl Jur. N. S. 101 7fi9 
 
 DiilkHeisl. r. ll.KlifHon (ISHl). 7 Bill^. IK.'); fl M. & P. 407 1 UO 
 
 Daliwm IV Stiiik(l«"3). 4 Esp. I(i3 2h'.t 
 
 Ji.ll,.vv.Ue(lHliil), 3,-. L. J. I'. \ M. HI; L. R. 1 T. & D. 189 701 
 
 Dalivnu.le t: Diilryinple (IHl I), 2 Hit).'?.'. Cons. i>l 7. 9.10 
 
 l>,.lrvin pie r. Hull (ISM). Hi Ch. D. 71o ; oO L. J. Oh. 302 ; 29 W. U. 421 HO 
 
 Diilstou c. Oiutsworth (1721), 1 P. \Viii«. 731 ; 3 Bn.wu, P. (;. .JJlt 108 
 
 Iialic.ii c. Anjriis (IHSl), App. Cum. 1740; 50 L. J. Q. B. 089 ; II L. T. 
 
 fi4J; ;!li \V. K. 191 : 40 J. p. 13.> 115 
 
 DalvV Scttl.iiieiiis, Ro (18.^)fS), 20 ISmv. 4.00 ; 27 L. J. Ch. ? ol ; 31 L. T. 
 
 •i;,S C, W. H. •');<3 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 52') 1 144 
 
 Daly r. Att.-Oeli. (IH70). I. H. H I'^l- MS 130 
 
 i)aly r. Wilwrn (ISfJ). Milw. (u'tX. 43;'), 1 10 
 
 Dal/.U r. Mair 1 1808), 1 Camp. ;">;i2 o42 
 
 Daiiitivll I. l'n.theroe(1847), 10 Q. B. 20; 16 L. J. Q. B. 170; 11 Jur. 
 
 ;(31 397, 404 
 
 Dun V. lirtiwii (182.')). 4 Cowoii. 483, 492 493, 705 
 
 j)am'e r. Uolwi.n (1829), M. .V- M. 29.-) 20, 1045 
 
 Dannrr. (Vabb (1873), 42 L. .J. P. & M. M ; L. 11. 3 P. A: D. 98; 28 
 
 L T. 91 1 703 
 
 Dati.lvi.l;.'.' c. Cor(len(1827). 3 C. & P. U 960 
 
 Dan- '. KiikwHll (ISIiH), 8 C. & P. 0S3 1102 
 
 Dunfotil r. Ml Amiltv (IHSIl), 8 App. Cus. 456; 62 L. J. (i. B. 652; 49 
 
 L. T. ■-'iiT ; :U W.'B. 817 221 
 
 !>• \ii.'iliau. Ill re. Aii.lrewH c. An.lrews (18.10), 15 Ch. D. 228 ; 49 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 7.iti ; r.i I-. T. 13.-) ; 28 W. H. 9.!0 100 
 
 Dai.iil r. Hun.l (IS61), 9C. B. N. S. 716: 3 L. T. 700; 9 W. R. 313 .... 1186 
 
 Daiii.l i: Luker (1571), 3 Dver. 30i)A, pi. 68 1151 
 
 Daniel r. North (1809). 11 East, 375 446 
 
 Duiiiel r. Pitt (180S), IVake, Add. Ciw. 238; 6 Esp. 74; 1 Camp. 366, n. ; 
 
 10 K. H. 706, n 498 
 
 Duiiiel r. Tlinmpsoii (1812). 15 Fjist, 78 837 
 
 Dunielf. AVilkiii (1852), 7 Ex. 429; 21 L. J. Ex. 230 .■?96. 404 
 
 Duiiiell r.llaiiiel! (1NI0\4 DeO. J.4:Sm.337; 18 L. J. Ch. 157; 13 Jur. 164 803 
 
 Daniels r. ('..iirud (18.i;<), 4 Lei^fh R. 401, 405 954 
 
 Daniels r. Harris (1874), 4 1 L. J. C. P. 1 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 1 ; 31 L. T. 408 ; 
 
 ■j:( \V. R. 86 770 
 
 Daniels r. .''utter (1830). M. & M. f-01 385, 386, 493 
 
 Dansrv r. hl-liardsou (1S.)4), 3 E. & B. 144 ; 2 C. L. R. 1442; 23 L. J. 
 
 <i. 11. 217; i.Mur. 721 102 
 
 Darby r. Ousoley (1856), 1 IL. & N. 1 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 227 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 497.. 46, 
 
 213, 291, 483, 93 i 
 
 Dareys, Re (1800). 1 1 Ir. C. L. R. 2-:)R 021 
 
 Darlev r. Martin (1853), 13 Q. B. 684 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 249 ; 17 Jur. 1125.. 740 
 
 Darliiijrton. \cv Bank. Co., Ex jiarte ^1864).4 1). J.vVS. 5H1 ; 34l<.J.Bk.lO 160 
 Darnll v. Kvans (lS62'i. 30 L. J. Ex. 251; 6 11. A N. 660; 1 II. & C. 174; 
 
 31 I,. J. Mx. 337; 9 Jur. N. S. 104; 7 L. T. 97; 10 \V. R. 665 730 
 
 Dartnioutli. I.V., «'. Roberts (1812), 16 East, 334 610, 1013 
 
 Darvill r. Hojirr (1855), 3 Drew. 294 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 779 50 
 
 Da^liwood r. Jennvn (1879), 12 Ch. 1). 776; 27 W. R. 868 680 
 
 Davinport i: The Uueen (1877), 3 App. Ciis. 115 ; 47 L. J. P. C. 8 ; 37 
 
 I.. T. 727 622 
 
 Duvev r. Sliannou (1879), 4 Ex. D. 81 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 459 ; 40 L. T. 628 ; 
 
 27 \V. R. 599 682 
 
 David r. Privro (18J3), 5 (J. B. 440 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 88 192 
 
 D.ivul.snn i: Coop.-r (1813^. 11 M. & W. 784 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 467 ; 13 M. & 
 
 \V. 313 : 13 L. J. Ex. 276 134, 1193, 1194, 1195, 119H. 1200, IJOl, 1202 
 
 Davidson r. Kiniptoii (ISSl), 18 Ch. D. 213 ; 45 L. 1. 132 ; 29 W. R. 912.. 101 
 
 t'ot. I. etitU with page 635, 
 
 . 1 
 
 1 '• ' 
 
 : i 
 
 
Ixii 
 
 TABT E OF CASES CTTED. 
 
 110 
 
 Co. (1883), 12 Q. B. 
 
 279 
 
 86 ; 46 L. T. 632 ; 
 
 D. 
 
 30 
 
 163 
 
 645 
 
 Davidson v. Smyth (1887), 20 L. R. Ir. 326 ... 
 
 Diividnon r. Wood {see Wood's EHtate). 
 
 Davie (should be Uavey) v. London & S. W. Ry. 
 
 70 . 63 L. J. Q. B. 68 : 49 L. T. 739 ; 48 J. P. 
 Davies, Ex pirte, Ro Sadler (1881), 19 Ch. D. 
 
 W. R. 237 
 
 Davipfl, Rp(1849), 2 Roberts. 377 fidO 
 
 Davies f. Brown (1N24), 9 Moore (C. P.), 778 998 
 
 Davi.s f. Campbell (1841), 1 Iredell. 482 443 
 
 Davies v. Davies (1840), 9 C. & P. 262 956, 957, 1013 
 
 Davies V. Davies (1863), 2 New R 384 ; 4 Giff. 417 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1002 ; 
 
 11 W. R. 1040; 9L. T. 161 136 
 
 Davies f. Dodd (1817). Wils. Ex. 110 308 
 
 Davies v. Edwards (1851), 7 Ex. 22 ; 21 L. J. Ex 4 ; 15 Jur. 1014 716 
 
 Davies f. Fitton (1842), 2 Dr. & War. 232 749, 760 
 
 Davies v. Humphreys (1840), 6 M. & W. 153, 166 : 9 L J. Ex. 263 .... 410 
 Davies v. Lowndes (1843), 7 Scott, N. R. 214 ; 6 M. & Or. 527 ; 12 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 506 146, 408, 409, 414, 416, 424, 426 
 
 Davies f D. of Marlborough (1818), 2 Swans. 108 137 
 
 Davies t'. Marnhall (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 697 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 61 ; 7 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1247 ; 4 L. T. 681 ; 9 W. R. 806 623 
 
 Davies v. Morgan (1831), 1 C. & J. 5S7 ; 1 Tyr. 457 396, 410. 416, 442 
 
 Davies v. Nicholas (1836), 7 C. & P. 339 162 
 
 Davies v. Otty (1865), 35 Bcav. 208 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 252 ; 13 W. R. 484 ; 
 
 12 L. T. 789; 6N. R. 391 971 
 
 Davies w. Pierre (1787), 2 T. R. 63; 1 R. R. 419 444, 446, 610 
 
 Davies 0. Ridgn (1802). 3 Esp. 101 ; 6 R. R 817 493 
 
 Davies v. Stuinbank (1865), 6 De G. M. & G 679 768 
 
 Davies v. Waters (1842), 9 M. & W. 608; 1 Dowl. N. S. 651 ; 11 L.J. Ex. 
 
 214 697, 607 
 
 Davies V. White (1884). 63 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; 60 L. T. 327 ; 32 W. R. 620.. 1002 
 
 Davis's Trusts, I5(? ( 18G9), L. R. 8 Eq. 98 ; 21 L. T. 137 9 
 
 Davis f. Blaek (1811), 1 Q. B. 911, 912 ; 1 G. & D. 432 ; 6 Jur. 65 ; 10 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 338 86 
 
 Davis V. Capper (1829), 4 C. & P. 134a, 138; 10 B. & C. 33 ; 5 M. & Ry. 63. .36, 37 
 
 Davis V. Curling (ISt.'i), 8 Q. B. 2H" ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 56 ; 10 Jur. 69 227 
 
 Davis V. Dale (1830). M. & M. 614 ; 4 C. & P. 335 942 
 
 Davis V.Davis (1880), 13 Ch. Div. 861 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 241 ; 41 L. T. 790; 
 
 28 W. R. 345 508 
 
 Davis >: Dodd (1812), 4 Taun. 602 307 
 
 Davis f. Hedges (1871), L. R. G Q. B. 687; 40 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 165; 20 W. R. 60 1122 
 
 Davis V. Jmes {I860), 17 C. B. 026 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 91 746 
 
 Davis V. Lloyd (1844). 1 C. & K. 276 436, 456. 1048 
 
 Davis V. Lovell (183!)). 7 Dowl. 178 ; 4 M. & W. (i79 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 152. .816, 835 
 Davis V. Lowndes (1835), 6 Scott, 738 ; 1 Am. 379 ; 7 Dowl. P. C. 101 ; 2 
 
 Jur. 946 1098, 1227 
 
 Davis f. Macon (182f>). 4 Piek. 166 931 
 
 Davis V. liuinsford (1821). 17 Mass. 210 802 
 
 Davis V. Ueid (1832). 6 Sim. 443 965 
 
 Davis r. Scraco {or St^rase) (1869), 4 L. R. C. P. 172 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 79; 
 
 19L. T. 7«9; 17W. R. 411 263 
 
 Davis V. Spiirling ( KSJ!)), 1 Russ. & M. 68 482 
 
 Davis r. Treharne (ISHl), 60 L. J. Ch. 666 ; 6 App. Cns. 460 ; 29 W. R. 869. 1 14 
 Davis V. Trevanion (1846). 2 D. & L. 743 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 138; 9 Jur. 492. . 734 
 
 Davis V. VasH (1812), 16 East. 97 1039 
 
 Davis V. Wuddington (1814), 7 M. & Gr. 44 : 8 Suott, N. R. 807 ; 1 Lutw. 
 
 Reg. Cas. 169 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 45 ; 8 Jur. 1 142 791 
 
 Davis ». Williams (1811). 13East,232; 1 Smith, 5 1045,1046,1064 
 
 Davis V. Wocjd (1816), 1 Wheat. 6 368 
 
 Davison c. Cent (1866), 26L. J. Ex. 122; 1H.&N.744; 3 Jur. N. S. 342.660, 061 
 
 Davison f. Stanley a768). 4 Burr. 2213 6.58 
 
 Davliu V, Hill (1834). 2 Fairf. 434 766 
 
 The rej'ereftcet are to page; not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixiii 
 
 FAOI 
 
 Davy f. Garrett (1877), 7 Ch. D. 473 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 218 ; 38 L. T. 77 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 225 187 
 
 Diiwrg V. Peck (1799), 8 T. R. 330 ; 3 EHp. 12 ; 4 R. R. C75 691 
 
 Dttwkins ». Antrobus (1879), 17 Ch. D. 616 ; 44 L. T. 5S7 : 29 W. R. 51 1 . . 1147 
 Dawking v. Puulet (1809), L. R. 6 Q. B. 94 ; 9 B. & 8. 7«8 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 53: 21 L. T. 584; 18 W. R. 336 46 
 
 DttwkinH f. Rokeby. Ld. (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 266 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. G3 ; 28 
 
 L T. 134; 21 W. R. 644 618, 619, 865 
 
 DiiwB V. Shed (1818), 16 Mans. 6 608 
 
 DaWHon v. Clmmnoy (1843), 5 Q. B. 164 ; D. & M. 348; 13 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 33 ; 7 Jur. 1037 162 
 
 DawHon V. Dawson (18(57), L. R. 4 Eq. 604 806 
 
 DawKou V. GreK'Ty (1845), 7 Q. B. 766; 14 L. J. Q. B. 286 ; 9 Jur. 688. . 1033 
 DawHour. Jay (1854), 2 Hm. & O. 199; 22 L. T. 345; 23 L. T. 36; 
 
 2 W. R. 311 1160 
 
 DawHonr. Macdonald (1836), 2 M. & W. 26 ; 2 Gale, 216; 6 L. J. Ex. 
 
 10 225 
 
 Dawson t\ Remnant (1806), 6 Eap. 24 662 
 
 Day ('. Bather (180.3), 2 H. & C. 14 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 171 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 440 ; 
 
 8 L. T. 205 ; 1 1 W. R. 675 162 
 
 Day V. KinK(1830), 6 A. & E. 359; 6 N. & M. 816; 2 H. & W. 178.. 132. 1137 
 
 Dayt). Spread (1842), Jebb & B. 163 1103, 1141 
 
 Day r.Tri>r (1715). 1 P. Wins. 286 801 
 
 Day r.W'illimns (1832), 2 C. & J. 461 ; 1 L. J. E». 168 125 
 
 Deaclo r. Hancock (1824). McCleland, 85 ; 13 Price, 220 401, 410 
 
 Deacon's case (1740), 18 How. St. Tr. 365 236 
 
 Deady t'. Harrison (1815). 1 Stark. 60 614 
 
 Dean ». Green (1882). 8 P. D. 79 ; 40 J. P. 742 846 
 
 Deune V. PackwcMid (1846). 4 D. & L. 395, n. (A) 9ii9 
 
 Dear v. Knight (1869). 1 F. & F. 433 938 
 
 Debenham r. Mellon (1880). 6 App. Gas. 24 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 155 ; 43 L. T. 
 
 673 ; 29 W. R. 141 ; 45 J. P. 252 166 
 
 DeBiclr. Thomson (1844), 3 Beav. 475 080 
 
 De Bode, Baron, Ciwe of (1845). 8 Q. B. 245 444, 936 
 
 De Caen, General, The (1855), Swa. 9 178 
 
 Decamp v. Arohibald (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 622 246 
 
 De Cosse Brissao v. Rathbono (1863), 6 H. & N. 301 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 238 . . 1154 
 
 Dceblo p. Linehara (1860). 12 Ir. C. L. R. 1 126 
 
 Defreeze v. Trumwr (1806), 1 Johns. 274 776 
 
 Dcfriesf. Davis (1835). 7 C. & P. 112 246 
 
 Do Gaminde r. Pigou (1812), 4 Taunt. 246 642 
 
 De Grave v. May. of Monmouth (1830), 4 C. & P. Ill 640, 644 
 
 Delamere, LJ. f. The Queen (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 419; 36 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 313 : 17 L. T. 1 85 
 
 Delamotte v. Lane (1840), 9 C. & P. 261 231 
 
 Delaueyi. Fox (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 708; 26 L. J. C. P. 248 97 
 
 Delarue». Church (1833), 2L. J. Ch. 113 123 
 
 Do la Rue v. Dickenson (1«57). 7 E. & B, 738 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 841 47 
 
 De la S.ussaye, Re (1873), L. R. 3 P. & D. 42 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 47 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 308 ; 21 AV. R. 549 705 
 
 Dcl.galiv Highlej (1837), 8 C. & P. 444; 6 Scott, 154; 3 Bing. N. C. 
 
 95U ; 3 flodges, 158 244 
 
 Dcli'!*line v. (Jrecnlaud (1 705), 1 Bay, 458 499 
 
 DtlliMNse, Ex parte, He Megevand (1807), 7 Ch D. 611 ; 47 L. J. Bk. 06 ; 
 
 3.S L. T. 100 ; 20 W. R. 338 159 
 
 De L'IhIo, I'eer. (1820), House of Lords Minutes of Evidence, 12 1167 
 
 D.lmcgor. Miillins(lS75), 9 Ir. R. 0. L 209 98 
 
 Del.iu'ny r. Rcntoul (1812). 2 Mart. 175 615 
 
 De Medina e. Norman (1842), 9 M. & W. 827 ; 2 D. N. S. 239; 11 L. J. 
 
 l'.\. 320 774 
 
 De M.dina r. Owen (1H.',0), 3 C. & K. 77 484 
 
 Df .M„ni V. Concha (1H85), 29 Ch. D. 281 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 632 ; 62 L. T. 
 
 282; 33 W. R. 840 , 1118 
 
 Vol. I. mdt with page 635. 
 
 m 
 
 
Il ' 
 
 N 
 
 Ixiv 
 
 TAni-K OP CA«ES CITKD. 
 
 PAoa 
 
 Domiwoy V. LiiWN.m (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 98; 40 L. J. F. 23 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 .IIS ; 2r» W. n. (iJ!) 704 
 
 l>.Mi f. Cluik (ISiM), .1 lIulHt. '.'17 1102 
 
 JJiii I. Fulfi.rd (I7(il). 2 Hurr. 117!) 1015 
 
 luuih V. Doiifh (1(17H), 4ti L. J. P. ]). & A. 13; 2 P. Div. 60; *.>■') W. II. 
 
 114 112, 747 
 
 Dnidy v. Nirhol! (IHoS), 4 C. U. N. S. ;<70 ; 27 L. J. O. P. 220 C>i2 
 
 J)fii.ly »•. SiinpMMi (IS,V,j, IHC H. H:il ; 2 Jiir. N. S. or^ 2:W 
 
 J><'iiiH<>n I'. I>ililiir (ls.'i7), I)t'iiiii' iSc Swiilx'y, Ki c. II. .'llil 77 
 
 Ilciiii V. S|,MV (17H0) 1 T. II. 4110 ;!".>.) 
 
 Dwmr. Wliii.. (17'J7i. 7 '1'. II. 112 , 
 
 Ihnn r. Wilfc.nl (1820). 1 C. \- I'. 2S 1 ; Ry. & ,M. 88 
 
 Dfiinctt r. ( •ro.kcr (ls:i.';, 8 (ir.'ciil. L'TO 
 
 ])(nt r. H.iiiicU (18,Vi). 4 .Mvl. Ac Cr. 20!l. 
 
 787 
 288 
 
 i;io 
 
 1),- pDiitcH (. Kitidiill (|H(;jj, ;il L. J.Ch. I8.j, 8 Jur. N..S. 323; 10 W. 11. 
 
 (i'.t ; ft L. T. i')!;') ; :iO llciiv. 572 702 
 
 Dc I'riiHliii, i)w., ciisi! (if, liiiw llcviow. Art. 7 (No. xiii.) ;')74 
 
 Derby, Ld., ciihc .if (\r>'rl). Littlitmi. II. .'i70 170 
 
 Dcriii/y v. Turnrr (18.-il), 1 Ir. (Jh. R. ;141 OOS 
 
 Dtrixlry r. Ciistiiiicc M7'."0), 4 T. U. Tf> 0(i:; 
 
 l)v Unr, ,: KoNt.r (I8(i'.'j, , 2 (.'. H. N. .S. 272 .')tl 
 
 ]).. Jl<ioM I'rir. (ISDI-.'i), V C.ioii.T, '>4i 422. I'.'.'t, 421. 427, 1100 
 
 l)f Kcisjiz KniiiniiH, III ir(MKidH.,f (1877), 40 L. .1. p. & M. 0; 2 P. I>. 
 
 lit; ; ;iO L. T. 203 ; 2:') \V . II. 3iV.i 798 
 
 !)<• Kiitzen, Huron, r. F.fr (18:{.-)), 4 A. & K. .'J3 ; 5 N. & M. 017 ; 1 II. & 
 
 \V. 7;i.'> 442 
 
 I)..hIhipiiik1i v. UiiwliiiH (1838), 3 Myl. & Cr. mn ; 7 L. J. Ch. 171 ; 2 .Iiir. 
 
 rj;') .')93, 000, 008 
 
 DcHbrow V. Wi'tlii-rlcv (1834), 1 M. .V Roll, 4:18 ; C. & P. 7f)8 1 l'J4 
 
 l)(.H]iiiu V. .Swiiidiir ('\Hi-)), ;) Mint N. H. 70.» 'JO 
 
 DcNWiu r. Jicwin (1S87), iVi L. T. 00!) 912 
 
 J).' Thorcii r. Alt.-<i.ii. (187.')), 1 A\>\>. Cus. 080 M'J 
 
 Di'viiiu IVov. (!.iM Mill. (;.i., R<- (l.'-8:t,, 'J'J Ch. Div, £93; ,V2 L. .1. Ch. 
 
 •«:M ; 48 li. T. 2.011 ; 31 W. R. 42i'i 388 
 
 Di. Vimx V. .SleiiikclkT (183!)), IJiiiK. N. C. 81 ; 8 Seott, 202 ; 8 D. P, C. 
 
 :);i ; 3 .lur. Ut.y.i 719 
 
 !)«• Visiii.', Inre(1804), 2 DoO. J. .Sl- S. 17; 33 L. J. Ch. 332 000 
 
 ])uvoii PiMT. (1832). Kc](oit, liy NifoliiH, App. 41, 40 423 
 
 Dov.iii Wi».rlics (1082), 8 Ilovv. St. Tr. 1017, 1037 5.')7 
 
 l.».voiiHhiris Diikc of, v. Noill (1877). 2 Ir. L. R. 132, 110; 8 Ajip. Cih. 
 
 147 42, 2i)0, ;)!)«, 403, 40.^, 407. 411, 42.'), 791, 1007 
 
 Devoy f. I)(!V<iv (18.'i8,, 2 Sm. & (J. 403; 3 Jur. N. .S. 79 ; 20 L. .1. Ch. 290 000 
 
 IJow.lni.y f. PahiiiT (is:{!)), 4 M. \- W. 004 ; 7 Dowl. 177; 8L. J. Kx. 148.. 909 
 
 Do Wh.lpdul.' I. Miibiirii (1818), C} Priro, 48;') .OlO, 6i')l 
 
 DcwN r. Ryl.y (18.)l), 2 L. M. A: P. 544 ; 11 C. B. 434 ; 20 L. J. C. P. '204 ; 
 
 IT) .lur. 1 159 1023 
 
 Doxtcr r. lliiyiH («'c IIiiycH r. Di-xter). 
 
 Dfyl)urs<us("(lHJl). 4 H. k Aid. 243 17 
 
 J)iuim, Tlir 'I ho:!;, 5 C. Koli. (Adiii.) GO 179 
 
 Dianu, The fI840), 1 VV. Hob. 1. 1 ; 4 Afoo. P. 0. 1 1 178 
 
 Dions t'. LiiwHoii (18:f5), 1 C. M. & R. 934 ; 3 Dowl. 427 ; 5 Tyr. 235 ; ■< 
 
 ].. ,1. Kx. 80 832 
 
 DickoiiHoii V. DickciiHoii (1814), '2 Phillini. Ivo. II. 173 083 
 
 DiokoiiHoii »•. 'IViiHdalo fl8fi2), 1 Do (i. J. i .S. 52 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 37 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. '.'37 ; 7 L. T. 055 449 
 
 Diokiim, Ko (1842j, 3 Curt,. 00 701 
 
 Di.kiiiHoii r. Cowiird (1818,, 1 n. & Aid. 077 518, 519 
 
 Di<:kiiisoii «'. I'lotohcr (1874), 43 h. J. M. C. 25 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 1 ; '29 L. T. 
 
 540 107 
 
 DiokitiKon v. llaMi.ld (I8;il). 5 C. i: P. 40; 1 M. & Rob. 141 713 
 
 DiokiiiKou r. Shrc (ISOI), 4 Ksp. 07 945 
 
 DiokiiiHoti V. iStidolph (1801), 11 C. H. N. 8. 341, 357 143, 701, 705 
 
 Dickinsou v. Swiitmau (ISOl), 4 8. & T. '206 ; 30 L. J. P. & M. 84 703 
 
 3'he references are to pages, not to paragraph*. 
 
 li' 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixv 
 
 Dirkiiidon r. Vulpy (1829), 10 B. & 0. 128 ; fl Af . & R. 126 
 Di.kHc. Hro..kHtl»SO), 15 Ch. D. 22; 49 L. J. (Jh. 812 ; 4! 
 
 W. 11. 87 
 
 DirkHoiir. Kviiim flTOn, OT. R. 80: 3R. R. 119 
 
 Di.kMon r. K. -.f Wilton' (l«.')i)), 1 F. & F. 42.') 
 
 Dit'liv r. AtkiiiHon (181;')), 4 Ciimi). 27o ; Hi R. R. 702 
 
 TAOU 
 
 .ir.O, 640 
 
 D 
 
 1 
 
 J)i.xoii r. «ini-lnir (l!<;ij), 4 Venn. ,Ul li;i» 
 
 Dix.iii I'. Viilc (IS-.'I). 1 C. & r. 278 970 
 
 Dixdii f. Wliilc (IHSi), 8 App. CiiH. 8;i;{ 114 
 
 i)nl)cll r. llut<liius(.u (183.')), 3 A. & E. 371 ; 1 H. & \V. 391 ; 5 N. & M. 
 
 •J.'il G71, 672 
 
 Piilxll v. StcphiMiK (1825), 3 B. & C. 623 ; 6 D. & R. 490 747 
 
 l»(il)ir.M'. Kiistwnoil (1827). 3 C. & r. 2.')0 32, 48, 1.').5 
 
 DmIiwpii r. H.Il (ICiTC.^, 2 Li'V. 17() 19 
 
 DoLson r. ('(.IliH ,\HM), I H. & N. 81 ; 2.') L. J. Ex. 2(57 681 
 
 J)(«lil I. Arklnm 08i:i), <■' M. & Or. 072 ; 7 SiH)tt. N. K. 41.5; 7 Jur. 1017; 
 
 13 L. .r. (\ r. n ecio, 002 
 
 T)o(l.l ,: Nciriis ;\HU\. 3 Cainp. ,VJ() ; M R. R. 832 253, 2.';6, 9.il, !lti7 
 
 Doiliiii^'foii'N (MM,. (l.VJl). 2 Co. Rop. 33 92 
 
 D.iilds r. Kivkf friikf) (1884), 25 <'h. 1). 017 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 598 ; 5 1 L. T. 
 
 3J((; 32 \V. H. 124 473 
 
 r)i>'ip' r. M Ii ^18jsn 1 Uaffn. Eoc. 1)20 140 
 
 Dcdsl.y r. Viirl.'V (181(1^, 12 A. & E. 632 ; 4 I*. \- D. 148 ; 5 '.ir. 316 690 
 
 11.h1si.ii r. Markry (1831), 8 A. & E. 225 11. ; 4 N. A: M. 327 711 
 
 DcM' r. Alliii il7'.i',(), 8 T. K. 147, 407 747 
 
 Dor r. All.'ii (IMd), 3 Tauii. 78 2 R. R. 597 522, 52.1, 524 
 
 Duo V. Alli'ii 1 18 1(0, 12 A. & E. H ' ; 4 r. & I"). 220 793, 794 
 
 DcKT. Ancln'WN (1778), 2 Oowp. S4- ; cited 1 Myl. & K. 108 ....610, 611, 815 
 
 l>(H'f. Aiiilii'WN (1S51(), 15 Q. H. 75ti 171, 1049 
 
 ]»..,. c. Aikwiiffht (1833), 5C. vt P. 57.'. 377, 445, 1173 
 
 Dcei, Ahblry 1,1847), 10 (J. B. (')«3 ; li. L. J. Q. B. 356 803, 1050 
 
 !).«. r. Askrw (1809), 10 East, 620 ; 10 R. R. 366 1060 
 
 'I 
 
 i 
 
 
 'i- 1 ii 
 
 ihi 
 
 Vol. 1. etidi with page 635. 
 
 
 " il 
 
Ixvi 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 Doe f. 
 
 AuHiin (IR3 
 
 Doi) V. 
 
 niinmnl (IH 
 
 1)(X) V. 
 
 BuriioH (IK.'t 
 
 Doo I'. 
 
 HimioH (!H4 
 
 IJCHJ 1. 
 
 Uiirt4.li (18'. 
 
 Drx? r. 
 
 Hiirt<iii ( 1 SI 
 
 Dm. v. 
 
 HiiUcn (177 
 
 1> ..t V. 
 
 Kitvtiip HH 
 
 !)(..• f. 
 
 h,;\iAt(lH 
 
 1)(M! 1 . 
 
 \M\ (I "!».() 
 
 !)(«! C. 
 
 Hciijiiiiiiii ( 
 
 D<K' r. 
 
 KcllHOIl ( 1 H 
 
 Doc r. 
 
 HcviMN MK4 
 
 ])»•' r. 
 
 Itcyiioii flH 
 
 Doc I'. 
 
 l«iK'!^x(lKO' 
 
 D<M> f. 
 
 l<iii)fl:iiiii ( 
 
 Don r. 
 
 Itin.h (Ih;<( 
 
 Doe r. 
 
 liirchiriorc 
 
 Do(! C. 
 
 Hir.1 l\HV,) 
 
 J)oc r. 
 
 Hoia (1H17 
 
 D.H- 1. 
 
 Itowcr (IH:t 
 
 Dim. I'. 
 
 ll..rtcr (IH,- 
 
 D.M! . 
 
 hniwti fis: 
 
 Dot! r. 
 
 Mriiv (IN'JK 
 
 D.M. •. 
 
 Hriiyiic (\H 
 
 ])iM> r 
 
 Hri.lKcH(l^ 
 
 D(M'r 
 
 hiottti MK 
 
 D<M- 1 
 
 lliinl.tt (It 
 
 Dot- 1' 
 
 Hurl. (17H7 
 
 D<M- 1' 
 
 Ulli-toll (is 
 
 Dim) r 
 
 Culvert. (M 
 
 D<M' V 
 
 (''t)«T»OII ( 
 
 Dim V 
 
 l'i4r|M "cr 
 
 DiK! •' 
 
 Ciirtwri^lil 
 
 Dm! V 
 
 Ciirtwrij^lil 
 
 DiMl t' 
 
 ('iktoinoro ( 
 
 D<m' r 
 
 CliiilIiH (!H 
 
 i>.M- )' 
 
 (IIiiiimIm'Tn 
 
 D<IU<1 
 
 . «'liiM r. It 
 
 D«Mi r 
 
 ,,i oft 'lev 
 
 Door 
 
 Clillonl (II' 
 
 Doo r 
 
 ('...•loll 'IH 
 
 DtM) V 
 
 CoIiiiiIiIk ■ 
 
 Doo V 
 
 Cole (IHItl 
 
 DfMi r 
 
 . ('.MlkcflSJ 
 
 D<Hi r 
 
 . Cooke {is: 
 
 1 )(M( t' 
 
 . Corlu'ti (1» 
 
 Doo 1' 
 
 , ('oiilthriil 
 
 Doo i> 
 
 . (Niiirlciiiiv 
 
 Dooi' 
 
 . Vox (\lWf\ 
 
 D"ii V 
 
 . ('thu« (1«I 
 
 ; o r 
 
 . CniiiHtoiiii 
 
 DlMI I' 
 
 . Dlltc (IHI. 
 
 ]>oo )' 
 
 . DiivicN (17 
 
 Doo 1 
 
 . DiivicM (IS 
 
 Doo < 
 
 . D»vioM(tH 
 
 ] )oo 1' 
 
 . Dciikiii fU 
 
 Doo 1 
 
 . D.rl.y, v.. 
 
 Doo • 
 
 . 1 ((Vine r. 
 
 Doc 1 
 
 . Diiriifxiil 
 
 Doo 1 
 
 . jivcliitll ri 
 
 D<M! r 
 
 I'^liii.iii.l'* ( 
 
 9BinK. 41 ; 2 Moo. & Sc. 107. 
 
 • •t**C ••••#•• 
 
 FAOa 
 
 .443, AlO 
 
 849), 13 Q. B. 04.'> 118 
 
 (4), 1 W. ic Kol.. 380 104!), 10.54, 1I7<» 
 
 118, '.'09 
 
 (1), 8 il H. 1037 
 
 17), '/ M. & Uol>. '28 .ili 
 
 .!»«. ifS, !•» 
 
 ...til, .V22 
 
 U7 
 
 721 
 
 VIM 
 
 III), 11 A. & K. :)ll ; 3 P. & D. lOJ ; 4 .Fur. 4.12 
 '.). I Cowp. 243 ; KiiMt., 314, n.; i) II. K. .'>70. 
 
 .i.^ 
 
 2 N. & M. M.t7 ; 3 A. tc K. 1M8; 1 H. A: W. 270 
 
 t3), 4 Q H. C.Ol ; 12 L. J. Q. n. 230 
 fiT. R. 471 ; 2 K. U. 042 
 
 is;t((), !i A. & K. 044 
 
 21), 4 H. & Al.l. .'.H8 706 
 
 411), 18 I,. .1. C. I'. 128; 7 C. H. 4.'.0 ., 
 40), 12 \. kV.. 431 ; 4 V. & D. I'.i:i 
 
 •;, 1 r, 
 
 317; 2TU11I1. 107; 11 U. K. :>33 
 
 .441, 4r.7, 791, 1231 
 .87, 788 
 
 r>24 
 
 IS2I1, 1 It. ic AM. 072 1202 
 
 Cii 
 
 97 
 
 /)l)6 
 
 04 ;i 
 
 804 
 
 273 
 
 14H 
 
 104!. 
 
 1), 1 M. & W. 402; 1 T. & Gr. 709; 6 li. .1. Kx. 18.1 
 
 (|8:t!i), 1 I*. Ac 1). 448 ; 9 A. & K. 002 
 
 ), 7 C. 4: 1'. 
 ). 11 (i. H. 12; 
 t.'), 3 H. A: Ad 
 ■.1), 11; (i. H, 8 
 •J I). .". n. fc A. 
 .M. \ M. 101 
 
 IS 
 
 ('. II. 
 
 s.ti). I H. iV A 
 r A A: 1;. 
 8.(0), 4 A. A- I' 
 I, I T. R. 701 
 III., !l C. A: r. 2.'il 
 
 7 ; 12 Jnts 'AM 
 
 . 4.VJ 
 
 
 ...8i);i. 
 
 (1.) 
 
 243 
 
 0; 3 M. A: R. 428; 
 ■;:,■ 17 L. .I.e. I'. 
 
 .1. 817 
 
 8 n. A:C. 813 .. 
 127 
 
 ..270, 
 
 . . . 2ti9, 
 
 417 
 
 . 19; N. * .U 2. 
 , 1 R. R. 307 . . . 
 
 i9 
 
 ....80, 
 . . . 780, 
 
 99 
 
 13t 
 
 787 
 
 4 18 
 
 .022, .'121, 1101 
 
 III). 2 CHmp. .38S; 11 R. R. 7l.''> 
 
 is:i!ii, 9 C. A: I'. 110 IM, 1213 
 
 800 
 
 28H 
 
 (is.io.. 10 i). M. I'll ; 20 L. .1. Q. H 70 
 I (isjii), ;j H. .V Aid. 320 
 
 t (1821;, R. A- M. ii2; I (!. k V. 2IS, 
 18.'.h, IK Q. It. 746; 20 L. J. H. U. 728 
 
 , Ki.Vi, 1173 
 .14.' 1192 
 
 17 it H. 100 1113 
 
 .h::,). 4 a. A: K. 410; N. k M. r.;t9 
 
 1214 
 
 ;H,V.'), I K. .V M 279; 22 I.. .1. W It. 102; 17 .Iiir. 130 M)7 
 
 clutid (182!l . !l M. .*!: C. 804 
 8t7l, 2 C. .V 
 
 .11., C. A: 
 IKII), <;. A: 
 
 Kir 118 .... 
 
 1'. /.27 
 
 
 290 
 
 321 
 
 . .Miindi l.'),') 
 
 ;i.''o ;ioi' 
 
 lull 
 
 MO; r> M. Ac 1' 
 
 IHI 
 
 
 
 |. llllH 
 
 
 
 
 . iV K. 23.-. .... 
 
 
 
 .111 
 
 j, c. .1: r. 
 
 i!i), Itiiitr. 
 il), 7 Itiii^-. 
 S|;fl, ;t Cnni 
 
 (18.17). 7 A, 
 
 (IsiN), 11 Q. II, 702; 17 L.J. Q. B. l.'il 
 
 \ 0(!. & I'. 713, II. 
 
 |8|, 01;. |« !I0; 17 L. .1. 'J. r. 20.1 
 
 (isiii), 7 M. * W. 1 
 
 119, 1211 
 
 I. Ml 
 
 1191 
 
 411 
 
 t, .510 
 
 12,5 
 
 118 
 
 20J 
 
 0, 444 
 
 0.5H 
 
 U18 
 
 I. 52 
 
 8111 
 
 i), 3 ^^ It, 009 ;tJ2, 000, 909, 970, 979. 987 
 
 ■95), I i:-\, 401 ; ft R. R. 71.5 110 
 
 137), 2 .M . A- \V. .503 ; li. .1. Kx. 170 1 19 
 
 147), 10 (J. It, III . 10 I.. J. il U. 218 ..20, 27, 171, 409, 411, 
 
 097, 1227 
 402 ; 8 n. ft C. 2i 1 70, 1 72 
 
 828h 3 a. k 
 of 1 811), 1 A. A- K 
 
 !m , 
 
 W 
 
 1111111 
 
 1 s,-,, 
 
 10 .M. 
 
 I'. C. H. fl27 
 
 320, 327, 1112, 1114 
 123, 1221 
 
 (|SH). 2 M, A- S..1, lij 1207 
 
 8.",l , :i C .V 1' 1110; M. ft M. 340 118 
 
 ISIOj, 1; M .t \V. 30;. 44, 721 
 
 The ri/er*Heet »t* to pugti, not to pitiUj/iaji/u, 
 
>i:i 
 
 I17:» 
 W'.'i 
 1113 
 
 .Ml" 
 
 r.Mi 
 ;t,!l 
 
 111 
 
 •jii-j 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CUED. Ixvii 
 
 PA OK 
 
 Pnr r. E.l«iir<l« {>«3<). 1 M- & Ko»>. 321 1«.J 
 
 I)„..|. F-!w;inl.i (IR.r)), 1 r. « I). 40H: 9 A. & E. 654 8,0 
 
 D.H. r. U. Kifnin.iiit(l841), -2 M. & Iti.b. m\ OCO, 070 
 
 I).... r F.rriii,ft.m (1H:I4). 1 A. & K. T.'X) ; 3 S. & M. ftIO ; I M. & Rob. 344 ii. 1U4 
 I),,.. I KiriiiKt"" (1N40). G Biiig. N. ('. 7'J ; « H<:<»lt, '.ilO ; a Jur. n.!0..«.'V, lion 
 
 I>.N. . . Kviii.H (1S-J7), :t (J. &. P. 219 ».'0 
 
 ]»..,.,. KvanH(IH;i.'). !<;. A: M. 42: 3Tyr. .'i(i 7ni 
 
 !).«■ r. E\T«' (IH.'il). 17 (i. B. ;t(i(i ; JO L. J. U. B. 431 ; 1.') Jur. 1031 .... 7fi 
 
 1),H. .. ri.miiip (IHi7), 4 BiiiK- -'<''<1 '^^i 373 
 
 I)<«. r. Fonl (1H3A). 3 A. 4: K. 040 ; 4 L. J. {N. S.) K. H. ■.MiS : ft N. & M. 
 
 •m "0, 01 , 747 
 
 Do.' r. F-mifor (ISl 1). 13 Ea«f. 40.'i ; \2 U. U. 383 6'.'4 
 
 ]),,.. I. Foiw<K.<l (IHI'2), 3 (.1. M. f.J7; 11 Ii. .1. Q- B. 321 t.')S 
 
 Dm... F.mt.r (1834), I A. At E. 7UI. n. (A) 3.'tt 
 
 Dmr. F<.wl.r(18.'i0). lUL. .f. (i. B. 1.1; 14 Q. B. 700 430 
 
 I ).H. . . FntiiriH v!H37), 2 M. * I^.^. h: ilO 
 
 D,... r. FniiikiH (1840), II A. iV E. 7lt.') ; 3 V. & D. -IC..'. .'•-•0. .''20 
 
 D.«.r. (Jallc.wiiy {1H33), h I!. .^ A<1. 43; 2 N. & M. 240 HOO, Hdl 
 
 DcH. f. (!iinliii..r(lS.V.>), 12C. B. 31'.l; 21 L. J. C 1*. •J22 11» 
 
 1).H. ... (Jiilii.r.' (1S3H), H (!. \- I'. .'>78 1017 
 
 Do.) r. (ilii.lwiii (IHir>). 'i «^ B. 0''3; 14 L. J. v^. B. Ihl) ^22, 544, 7.'«0 
 
 I r. (il.Miii (IK3(), I A. \- K. 4ii ; 3 N. * M. N37 l»2 
 
 D.M. .■. <!<ir.' II.S37I. 2 M. \ W . 321 103!» 
 
 D.«.i. lionhv (lK3<t). 2 M. .V \M>. 213; d C. .^: I'. 4(1 274 
 
 l).iii i. (ir..ii (lK2ih, (i..w, K. 227 4l.\ 
 
 D.M. r. (iiiV IMii), I Stiirk. Wi 3H> 
 
 Dm... (irilliii >1SI2). I.-. Fii-t. 203 ; 13 |{. |{. 474 171, 41.^ 
 
 D..«.f. (in.v.H IM47), 10 ii. II. 4H(! ; II .Fur. .V.K ; l(i I,. ,1. (^ B. •.".i;,... .112 
 licH. I. (iiiiiniiijf (1N37), 3.N. .V 1'. 2(1(1; 7 A. \- E. 240, \V. \V. .V D. Kio.. U)Ui 
 
 D.M. r. <i«illiiii 'IS33;, .'. II. .V A.l. 1211 78S 
 
 D<M. I'. Mull (1S12), 1(1 F.ii»t, 20K 11(10 
 
 D.-«M'. lliimpH.iinlH(7 , I f B. 2(17; 17 L. J. C. 1'. 22.1 Ii2 
 
 D<H. r. Hinlv (IS((l\ I M >v Uoh. .12.1 747 
 
 DiH. ... Hiin..i(IH33i, 1 B. \- A.l. 110; I N. & M. 237 01 
 
 1).K» r. IIi.rriH (lK33j, .1 ('. A: IV .102 Ml 
 
 D.H. f. llarriH (IS37 , (1 A. .V E. 211; I N. 4 1'. 40.» (LVI 
 
 D(H. r. lliiiTi»(ls3s , H A. \- E 12 70(l 
 
 D.m i: ll.iv.v (IH2.1;, Kv. .V M. 207 ^Ift 
 
 !)<)<• r. Miirv.V (1S32',. K llin^. 230 ; 1 M.i,.. \ H,'. 374 2M.1, 288 
 
 ])....(' Ilii»kiim (1X41 , 2U- B. 212; Hl.\. I), /i.il : (l.lur 2!.'>; 10 L. J. 
 
 W. B. 2H,-. 3H7, 442 
 
 Dn. .1, H.iirl.. .. IliikM (1H3I-2), « I).iwl. A U 1.1 704 
 
 l»... .. Il.iniiiiinf ;lM2(i , !i Dowl. * U. l.'i 1211 
 
 I I. M uf llMtfonI IH.Vl , 111 I,. ,1. il 11. ,12(1 003, liOa 
 
 Dmi I. Ilirki. iiii.l.ititl , .IIimI DiMt .. Wiilkcr, 4 i;"]!. AO ; Bull. N. 1'. 2ml 
 
 imm. (iiMiiliiiflit I'. Hi. km 2A2, 2ftS 
 
 D.M. .. Ilil.l.r ISI',1), J II ,V ,\l.l. 700, 7U3 fl, 120 
 
 D.M. r. Uimi \\h-:\], 3 .Siark.dO UOH 
 
 l)m> r. Ilim.H'kN (I.S30), 6 M. ii W. 3(10; L. .1. Ex. 27 . . . .744, 784, 703, 704. 
 
 70.1, 7117, 7UN, 7i»0. H02, 804, «Oft 
 D.... .• llmltfM,,, (1810), 12 A. & E. V\f> ; 2 M. * H<.b. 283 ; 4 I'. * D. 142 ; 
 
 4 Jur 12(12 IIOJ 
 
 D.«. .-. Ilnltom {\h:\>), 4 A. .V- E. 7« '. 7fiO 
 
 Dm., l|..ri...(I.Hi:i , 3ii. B. 7.i:, 70(1. 707; 3 U. ic D. 230; 12 L. J. 
 
 W. B 721 ; 7 Jur. 38 01 
 
 D Ilciw.nil84ii , 12 A. I'c E. (10(1 734 
 
 Dm. I. II.. Mill. (In;i2), 2 B .V A.l. 747 91 
 
 I ' llul.l.iii,MH.-.(H, 1.-, (^ B. 227 ; 20 I. ,1 ii B. (II 7no, 794, 800 
 
 l)i. . Iliicl.lm. (lH;t.1), 2 0. M. & Ii. 31(1; ft Tyr. H4U ; I (Uli>, 2(10; 
 
 . ' ""»' '^'7 1.9. 1113 
 
 !)'■>■ I. llii(liwiii(.. (18201, 2 M .V B.il.. 18 7tm 
 
 !)...' . .hiiiio IHiVj, 2 .M .V ll.ll>. 4 7 321, 322, flOl 
 
 D... . Ju..iii..j 0817), 8 c;. .V I*, lol AD9 
 
 HI 
 
 i 
 
Ixvui 
 
 TAULK OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 rknn 
 
 Doo r. J A. Jonwy (18:25). 1 B. & AM. 580 7«tj 
 
 I)<M' r. .fcsMon (1 SO.'i), C, Kiisf , 85 172 
 
 ])...• r. .jMhiiHiiii (IHl't), <J"w. N. I'. 17» 117 
 
 ])(M. r. JoliiiHoii (IHU). 7 M. H (Jr. 1017; K H<m.u, N. R. 7<il : H L. J. 
 
 C. r. 17 269 
 
 Door. .I.ihiixtr . MSJ.'i). M.CI. * Y. Ill fi«i 
 
 Dop r. .Ic.iiosiiHdS), I (fillip. :t(i7 Hi, ur>, fllO 
 
 DiM) r. .Fiiii.H {IHTJ), !» M. \ VV. :t7'.' ; 1 1)..»1. N. S. .ViJ (i04 
 
 1)(H- r. .r.iii.s iHlii), 1.1 .M. .V: \V. 580; 1(1 [>. .1. IW. .Vs IKl 
 
 1).M» •■. Jc.ii.K (isiii), i:j (J. n. 771 : 18 I,. .1. «i. H. v!tio IJ7 
 
 1)(M) c. Jiin.H (IS.'.il;, 5 K-c. lim; l'.» K. ,F. Kx i»:> 622 
 
 Uiio ('. Ki-oling (1848), 11 Q. U. H8<J ; 17 L. J. Q. X. ID!) ; 12 Jur. 433 . . 2(i, 
 
 HOi'i, 4:t2 
 
 n.ii' r. Komp (1831), 7 Hiinr. .1.30 26, n2, 233, 234 
 
 ]).«• ( K.'iiip (IN3.". , J liiuit. N. C. 102; 2 Scott, 9 112 
 
 I)...' . . Kiliiir IN'.'(i), 2 C. .V P. 28!) 297, 1054 
 
 Dim. r. Kiinr-t.m (1841). I I)..wl. N. H. 2ii3 734 
 
 J).M. r. KniKl.t fI8'.'(>). 8 I). A: R. 348; 5 U. Ac <'. 471 1204 
 
 !).)f r. I.tikiii (183ti), 7 ('. >Vi 1'. 4S1 lli;8 
 
 l)(Ki r. LiimiiiK (IHM). 4 Ciiiiip 7(1; 15 R R 728 1(12 
 
 Doo V. l^»iiK<l<>ii (IHIH;, 12 ii. R. 711 ; 18 I.. J Q. H. 17 ; 13 Jur. '.HI, .08. 1'.'7, 
 
 3'.M. 322, 508 
 
 I)..<> r. LiiiiKft'l'l lis 17', 10 M. & W. 497 ... 294, 443, 414, 454 
 
 DiM' r. Lni (lH(l!t . II Kii-I. n\> 7'>« 
 
 Dim' r. l,.wli (1811), ;j M. \ (ir. 230; lO L. ,1. C. 1'. 289 192 
 
 !)iH» r. I.cwi« ;i8;i0i, 7 <". .^ I'. 574 134 
 
 Door. Irf'wiH (I8»:i , 1 <;. \ K. 122 20!) 
 
 Door. liilliiTlim.l (|h:;(.), (i N. Ac M. 313; 4 A. & K. 7H4 511 
 
 Dmi i'. IJnvd (iM.li), i'lii. Kv. A|>p. 41 12(i 
 
 Dmi r. l<lov«l (183i"„ 5 IliiiK. N C. 741 ; 8 S. )tt. 93 ■ 3 Jur. 751 89, 1214 
 
 Dim. c. l.l.ivfl (1840), 1 M. * Or. 085 ; 1 SiM.tf, N. M. 505 ; 10 L. .1. C. 1'. 
 
 128.. ..." 21, 1081, 1083 
 
 Dim- c. I^mIc (18:t.-.), 4 N. & M. 807; 2 A. A: K. 705 03H 
 
 n.M. c. Lnii,^ (1811 , iMV & 1', 777 19:i 
 
 D.M- r. I-viii- (1822), lii.-.! 2 I'h. Kv. 258, n. 1 1227 
 
 Do., r. Nlunifol.l 1811;, 1 M. \- .S,.l. 291 Ill 
 
 Dim' I'. Miirtin (18:12), I M. .\: Rot). 212 31J 
 
 Dim. r. Miirtin (18:i,l), i H. Ac Ail. 771, 785; I N. At M. 512 7«4, 7U(;, 7«H 
 
 Dim' r. .\[ii«m (1793), I KMp. 53 « 
 
 Dim* r. Mii»«7 ils5l . 17 «i. ». 373 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 4:'» ; 16 Jur. 1031.. ".>, IIH 
 
 Dm«c. MiH' (18:i3,. 4 M. & Ail. (117 Il(i! 
 
 DiHi r. Miw (is:i7). 7 A. tc K 24(t lOi^ 
 
 Do«f. MiiliiK'l >l8.il), 17 y. H. 270 171, 4!;i 
 
 DiMM'. Millitt (isi.s , 11 {). \\. 1036, 17 I- J <i H 2(2 125, 4il 
 
 Dmi r, MilU (18.15 . 2 A. >v. *J. 17 ; I M. .V Ri-I.. 3S-) 
 
 Dim. r. Milwunl (183^), 3 .M .k W. 328 ; I H. \ M. 79; 7 L. J. V,x. 6 
 
 Doo r. MoI.In. (1811), Cur. Ai M. I 
 
 Dim. i: Molfutt ,lN.-,(r, |.'. H. H. 257 ; 19 L. J. U. B. 438 ; 14 Jur. 935. , 
 
 Dim) r. M..i»f«li ln:i2 . I C. It M. 235 
 
 Dim. r. .MoiriH (1835), 3 A. \ K. 4'i ; 4 N. At .M. 59,1 
 
 Di>« !'. MorriM (I8|0), 12 VM-t, 237 . 2 Tiiuii. 52 
 
 Dim. v. .Mii-tvii (185.' , 12 ('. H. 208 ; 21 l...}.V..V. I'H 
 
 DiM>r MouImIiiIi. (1SI7 , k; .M. & \V. 08H; 10 L. J. Kx. 109 
 
 Dim. r. MiilliiitT (1795 , I Kmp 400 ; 5 R. U. 74£ 
 
 Dim. r. Murl.'(w(l8l7), M. \ Sil. 110 I 
 
 Dim) r. .Murri'll (I8;i7), 8 <". \ I'. |;it 
 
 Doo r. N.iiU (183(1), 2 M. A: W. I. :» ; 6 L. J. Kx. 69 
 
 DiM'r. N.|M.iui (1833), 5 II, A; Ail. 80 
 
 Dim. r. Olli'v il8|0), 12 A. At K. 481 ; 4 P. ft D. 276, 4 Jur. 1084 
 
 !)...• r. Owiii (I8;i7), Hi', k V no 
 
 Dim. r. I'lilimr Is.'.l), 10 (^ H. 717: 20 I,. J. (J. B. 307; 15 Jur. 836. 
 
 Dim. I. t'liNniiitfliiiiii (1820 , 2 (!. \. V. 444 
 
 D(K) V. I'liul (isj'.t;, :u!. ft P. iii:t , 
 
 Til* rr/errHc»t iir* to pngtt, ntt to paraj/mjihi. 
 
 r, J9 
 
 HOO 
 442 
 
 056 
 
 793 
 319 
 
 39 
 
 110 
 100 
 110 
 V93 
 174 
 109 
 320 
 747 
 (33 
 31« 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixix 
 
 Door. Ppan-o (1S30), 2 M. & 
 
 I).. 
 
 c I-. I'fiirscy i 
 
 IS'J 
 
 li. ic 
 
 Dorr. \wk {mo). I n. & A<1 
 
 l).,tr. IVw ('"«'). I T. R. 7 
 
 I r. l'..ml.r..kc (ISO!)). 11 Ki 
 
 I).«T. r.'iif..l<i (IN.IH;. NC. \- 
 |)n.. ). IVrkoH ;iHiOj. 3 n. ic <1 
 !),...(. IVikinH(17i)l»), 3 T. U. 
 I).«. r. IVrnitt (1S43), 6 M. & 
 ])...•(■. rrttrft (IHJl), 5 n. \- ; 
 !).«• r. PliillipH (lH4o). H Q. I«, 
 1)(H. r. I'lowiimn IHlil), 2 H. t 
 ])„,•,: l'(K.|f(l«l«), 11 Q- "• ' 
 |).H. r. P.,w.ll (1H34), 1 A. & 1 
 ]».«• r. IV.wvll (1N3()), 7 ('. i 1 
 
 i»c«. ., r.)«tii (iH.vj), 3 <;. &• y 
 
 J).Mr. IVir.. (1847,, 16 M. A: V 
 1).M. r. Pulniiiii (l«4'i). 3 Ki. H. 
 Dm. I. Pyu (i:i»'>). 1 Kep. 36ii 
 Dnrn. Hiimlnll (1H28), 2 M. & 
 Dc». I. H.rN(lH34), I. <". i^ P. 
 Dwi. H.vh(IH38;, 4 Hill..'. N 
 D.Mr.Kl.iHl.«(18^3:, II M.\- 
 Ri.lmnl, (IHl.')). -2 ( *. \ 
 
 Dc. 
 
 D,... f. Ki.ki.rl.v (IH((3). .'> Kh| 
 Docf. Ridtfwav (IH.'O , 4 B. >^ 
 Dui-r. Hif« ,\M-2), H Hiiiir. 17 
 
 ]).«.!■. U..t).Tt-»(IHl'.t). 3 H. & 
 
 Dooc. R..l»rt.-.;IS44), l.< Ji. i' 
 
 D(M( r. 'H<ilHTtH (l,st7). HI M. i 
 
 DiM' r. HiiliMili IKl'J), 1/5 Kii.it 
 
 DiH' r. K.ifCK'.'iV,. A Ddwl. 4: 
 
 D.K ,: HnJi.iiijfN 1847), 4 ('. 1«. IS8 ; 17 L. J. V. P. -'CH 
 
 C 301 9 D. & U 
 
 'J08 . 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 1 428 
 
 
 
 
 7(io 
 
 iiNt .')(I4 • 1 1 K U. 
 
 2(10 . 
 
 
 
 
 1'. '.37 
 
 V 48U 
 
 
 
 116, 
 
 749 U2; 
 
 (ir. 343 
 
 A 'i2;"i 
 
 
 
 .441 
 
 1, 44^ 
 
 . I'.l; If. L. J. Q 
 V All .'.77 
 
 n. 201) 
 
 
 
 713: 17 L. J. a I 
 K .'iSl : 3 N. lie M. 
 
 ^ !43; 
 (jltl . 
 
 12 Jur. 
 
 ■^0 
 
 .... 
 
 \ (ii7 
 
 
 
 nn 
 
 K. 323 
 
 V. (i03; IS 1.. J. y 
 . 622; b Jur. 1122 
 
 ix. i.'.!) 
 ; U L. 
 
 ;"ll'jur 
 J. U. H. 
 
 131' 
 3111 
 
 '."36 
 
 P. 20 
 
 
 
 
 4li 
 
 (ill) 
 
 (". 384 ; () Si'iitt, 
 
 Ifil ; 1 Am. 15U 
 (.382; 1 Diiwl.^ 
 
 
 
 W.liOO; ViL. J.Ej 
 >: Kir 2 1 C . ..... 
 
 L.2 
 
 93.. 
 
 1. 4 
 
 V Alil ft3 
 
 
 
 .43f 
 ".90. 
 
 1, 40 
 
 8 ; 1 M.K). & So. 1 
 
 ^'■■\. 3ii7 
 
 .'!9 ... 
 
 
 3(17 
 
 .V W. .'.20, f.33 . . . 
 i^ W. 778 
 
 
 
 1U40 
 31) 
 
 , 32; 13 11. U. 3(il 
 
 !0 
 
 PAOR 
 431 
 112 
 522 
 96 
 424 
 1208 
 706 
 ), 924 
 741 
 I, filO 
 429 
 6 
 6.')8 
 98 
 1216 
 326 
 127 
 I, 433 
 623 
 6, 41« 
 116 
 622 
 36 
 606 
 444 
 , 466 
 318 
 1133 
 10.04 
 I, 488 
 43« 
 644 
 606 
 
 DiH 
 
 Do 
 Dii 
 
 Ki. 
 
 (IMC . 7 M & W. 102 ; 10 L. J. Kx. 201 ..300, 320, 321, 366, 367 
 
 HiihKtr .isii'.i), 3 K'iMt, 1.'). 
 
 1848), 6 (;. n. 422 : 17 L. J. C. P. 108 
 
 IK.O 
 707 
 
 l!c.wi. (M2i'>i. 2C. ic P. 246; K, & M. 343 644 
 
 D.I.' r. H..»lnii<U , I8I(»). 9 C. & P. 73S 248, 269, 273 
 
 ])..«• .. Saiiiplir ^\8:il<), 8 A. 4: K. l-'-l ; 1 W. W. & II. 228 ; 2 Jur. 841 ; 
 ,t N. .^ P. 2.')» 87. 429, 431 
 
 D.KM'. S.ii.)iimi,r.' (170.i), 2 JA. Uiivm. 1026 
 
 Dot 
 
 Snil.i 
 
 ISM). 2 A. At Iv iTS 
 
 Do.. I. Siai.,n (183.^), 2 C. M. A: K. 732 ; 1 Tyr. i (Jr. 1!) : 1 (Jiilr, 303 
 
 6 
 
 1060 
 
 89, 
 
 !I0. '.18, ,'.10, (102, 1113, 1173 
 
 D.H. f. Ki*«m (1810). 12 KhmI, 62 231, 396 
 
 D.H- r Skiii'i.r (18»8), 3 K- . 84 ; 18 L. J. Kx. 107 .....403, 466, 457 
 
 807 
 163 
 268 
 
 Dot- r. SIfiiimii (1816), H. B. 298 ; l.'i L. J. (^ IV 338 ; 10 Jur. ,V<H . 
 Dm- 1. Hiniiri.lKc (1H4."'), 7 <J H. 9.'.7 : 14 L .1. t^ II. 327 ; 9 Jur. 781 . 
 
 DiH' r. Sii.irt [VMi,), 1 M. Ac Itiil.. 476 
 
 .Sinilli ^1838;, H A. & K. 266; ,1 N. & P. 336; 2 M. & Kob. 7 
 
 »•••••••• 
 
 I W. W. At II. 429; 2 Jur. 864 474,476 
 
 1166 
 
 30 
 
 97 
 
 36 
 
 I1.H. V. H..iii..rt<.ii 1I.S461, 7 W. H. :>i*; 14 L. J. y. H 210 ; II Jur. 776 .... 817 
 
 D.H. V. S] .ii.T ( IHO.')). (1 KhM, 123 ; 2 Hmitli, 266 ; 8 K. K. 422 36 
 
 DiH. I. 8|.itlv(l832), 3 11. .V All. 182 316, 319 
 
 1). 
 
 D.K' 1. Smith il817), 2 Hliirk. 109; Ml It. R. 7.)'i 
 Dur il Smith r. Jorwv (1819), 1 U. At M. 07, 160; 2 B. k P. .692 
 D-K- I. Liuly Siiiylhr "1816. , 4 M. i S.-!. 348; 16 R. R. 480 .. . 
 I1..C I. .Sii.,wih.n"(l7(i!»i, 2 W. !«l. 1224. 
 
 Slar.'y (1833). n C. » P. i;i9 44'J 
 
 I)i«.. StHiiioii(l836),l M.* W.(1«S; 6 L.J Kx.263; 1 F.*0. 1066. .668, 6.'i0, 773 
 DcM' I. Stiipli. (178HI, 2T. R. (184 ; 1 R. R. 1.96 127 
 
 D.HM. Sl.,1 (1811). 3('Hni|.. 116; 13 R. R. 708 
 Due I'. »l> {.hvDiioii (18U1), 3 Enp. 284 ; 4 Enp. 60 
 
 661 
 976 
 
 t 
 
 ii;'ii ■ 
 
 Mlt! 
 
 r»/. /. mJi ttili p»ge 635. 
 
l!< I 
 
 ! 
 
 h 
 
 XX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Doo r vuilwoU fl'- i.i), 8 A & J., 'il'; 3 N. & P. 701 ; 1 W. W. ft H. 
 I)3'i; -Uvf. ''Jl 
 
 TkOM 
 
 146 
 
 Dot' V. iiuc'korinorf (iN.iiij, •) A. ic r.. iu,i; -i n. x r. in; >v. »> . « u. iu,i . ij.'u, 
 
 1221, 1222, 122:1, 12i0, 1228 
 
 I loo V. .'ut»<>'- (1841). \> C. & P. 7<»fi M4 
 
 ]).«. V. Sylxiimi ' IT'.lfi), ■ T. U. 2 ; 2 Ek|). 499 ; 4 II. U. .mi . . Vlft. 12(1. Hr,-!. 1 158 
 J»uo f. f.iiii<'r«- flSIH), 12 ii. R. 99M ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 13 Jur. 119 . .1V2, (145 
 
 Doo .'. Tiirv.T (IHit), \iv. A: M. 141 410, 1227 
 
 Do.. (1. Tiithiim r. Wiight (IHUTi, 2 Uiihm. & Mvl. 1 ; 1 A. 4: E. ;t ; H N. & M. 
 260; 7 A.iE.313; 6N.&iI. 1.12; 4 Bin(f.'N. U. 489: .'jL. J Q. B, 124. .309, 
 
 370, 371. 410 
 
 Doo V. Tnvlor (1K19), 1 Allmi. 144 (N. BrmiH.) 766 
 
 Doo V. TliomiiH (IHl 1). 11 EuHt. ;123 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 432 :i!t8 
 
 Doo f. TlioiiiiiM (1S29 , 9 B. \- C. 299 12H, ,V,)8, (l.-i9 
 
 Doe r. ThnniHoii (IK II). 9 Dowl, 948 816 
 
 Doei'. Thviiiit' (1808;. 1(1 EiiHt. 20(i ; 10 U. It. 280 443 
 
 Doo r. Tidlmry (18.VI). 14 C. B. 304 ; 2 C. L. U. 347 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 67 ; 
 
 18 Jiir. 4(iS 116 
 
 Dood. Tiii<!al r. U(»- fl8:«i), f> Dowl. 420 475 
 
 Doo V. Tn.k.T (l«;i(),. .M. & M. .'>:ifl 269 
 
 Doo r Tiirfonl 1h:12). :t 11. & A<1. 890. 89,') l.')7, 43.), 437. 4ft4, 4.')7, 4/i9 
 
 Door. Tvl«T{18:i(i . (I Minif. .'Xll ; 4 M. & P. 377 1113 
 
 Doo I'. VowloM (18,).t), 1 M. ic Kol). 201 438 
 
 Doo r. WHiiiwri>flif (lH:i(i\ :) A. A: E. .V20 1211 
 
 Door. W.iiiiwrifflil (1838,. 8 A. & E. "00 444, 407 
 
 Door. Wiilk.r (isoi), 4 Enp. oO ; Hull N. P. 29(1 2o2, 2a3 
 
 Doe V Wiinl ;I8.VJ , 18 U. B. 197 ; 21 E. J. il. B. 1 1') ; Id .lur. 709 .... 704 
 
 Doe r. Wiitkiim (180(i), 7 EiimI. .l-ll ; 3 Smitli. .117 ; H U. K. (170 3« 
 
 Doo c. WiitkiiiH (18:t7i, 3 Biii^f. N. ('. 421 ; 4 Scott. 15.) OO'J 
 
 Doe f. Wii'Hoii (1H17U 2 Sturk. 2.10 08 
 
 Doe V. W.blxT (18;i4), 3 N. A: M. 58(1; 1 A. & E. 733 513, 514, 1114 
 
 Door. Wi>hM«r (IHMI), 12 A. & E. 442; 4 P. At I). 270 759 
 
 D«:o V. WclJH (18:i9 . 10 A. A: E. 435, 437 6.58 
 
 Doe V. \VVll«miiii (IH48). 2 Ex. 3(18 ; (i I). & L. 170 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 277. .. . 1113 
 
 Doo r. Wliit.-fcM.t (1838). 8 V. ic P. 270 :tO« 
 
 Doe V. Whit.'h. iicl (1838), 8 A. & E. 671 ; 1 W. W. & H. .')2I ; 2 Jur. 403. .260, 
 
 267, 306 
 
 Doo r. WhitriK. (18221. I). & R. N. P. C. 1 08 
 
 Doo f. WiKKii'H f 18|;t). 4 Q. B. 3(17, 375 ; 3 (J. & D. 604 ; 7 Jur. 529 .... 96 
 
 Doer. Wilforil (i8.'4), 1 (". .t P. 284; U. & M. 88 7«7 
 
 WilliHiii»(ls:t(l). 7 ('. & P. 332 lift, lift 
 
 WiUon (1809V 1 1 Eu»t. 5(1 39 
 
 WitUMiml) (1851), 1 H. I,, fas. 425; Ex. 601 3(i ' " 467, 460 
 
 Wciltrv il8J9). 8 B iV ('. 22 ; 2 M. & . . (05 . 3 C. 4 P ( ' ..80, 170 
 
 Woinr.w..ll (IMII). 2 Ciiin|). 5.*)9 CrH 
 
 W.Miil iilMiut 182H , 5 Hiiiif. 439 977 
 
 WckI 1845). 14 M. & W. (1S2; 15 E. J. Ex. 41 ; 9 Jur. 10(10 .... 060 
 
 W.M..n>riilt^i. ,lH.'9i. M. A; U. :(02 ; 9 II \- ('. :i7(l ftij 
 
 WriKlit (I8:t9 . 10 A. & E. 703. 2 P. .V I>. (172 80, 1140 
 
 Vountf (1845;. 8 (j. B. 03; 15 L. J. (^ It. 9 ; 9 Jur. 911 148 
 
 .iii r. CriKiiiii (IHOO), 35 h. J. P. & M. 12U ; Ij It. 1 11. L. 301 ; Ift 
 
 .'.44 1 106, 1 145 
 
 ty .'. Dv.r (1890). 25 L. It Ir. 297 Hi 
 
 f. IIiikLt (1821). Ity. At M. 198 691 
 
 r. Il.-M (IHIO), II A. Ac E. 335 ; 4 Jur 432 07, 09 
 
 • r. Bk. of EiiKliiiiil ( 180.5), 10 V(«H. 285, 352 3 
 
 ■V. L<l. IIuiiliiiuHi'ia (1805), n ViiN. 202; 8 It. R. 160 18 
 
 H r. Evniin(1807), 30 L. J. Ch. 474 673 
 
 ill r AvKviinl (|,<(l|l. 15 Ir. Ch. R. 5s;i 1117,1123 
 
 ; r. It..l.inHilH5:i). 7 11. li <'iiH. 390; 3 Miicij. 603; 20 I,. 3. P. II , 
 
 r. N. B. 1271 ; 7 W. R. 074 180, 1144 
 
 Tk* r-/i , fHctt art to page*, not to parafrupkt. 
 
 D 
 
 iK' 
 

 XABLE OF CA8E8 CITED. 
 
 1 
 
 XXI 
 
 :'AiiR 
 
 flMii r T,ii.i.miM)n(1837). 6C1. *Fin. 1. U 17 6 , IM? IHO, 11.15 
 
 l).,i..i(rh I . I»<rt,iu (ISI'J). Ai-m. M. & O. .I.ir 1023 
 
 Dmml.l r. SuckliiiK ,iH(iii), ;J6 L. J. Q. R 'JMi ; 7 B. 4 8. 783; J li. 
 
 1 (J H. isft ; li Jur. N, H. 7U6 ; H L. T. 772 ; !•'> W. R. K* 781 
 
 Doiml.lM.ii r. Tlioiiiiw.n (1H()8\ I {'iiini). •»'.•(•; 10 K. H. 717 IHM. I U9 
 
 Dot. ii-t.r, Miiv. c.f. I. Diiv I^IO). u'lWi. •J(1J: 12 K. U. O.'.O WU, :».>:« 
 
 l).>i,.>f.ill r. Trini.l«>ni(.ro (IH.IH). » Ir. 'J. L. H. ;t7» '^M. 7!ll 
 
 DoiK'llaii (. Dciiulluii (17^), 2 HiiKtr. K<«'. Ill t'.ii 
 
 l)..i..llHn I. H.'ii.l (1K;)21. 3 M. & Ad. '.106 li.'iU, <i80 
 
 J)..i.i'lw.ii r. Taylor (lH2!t), 8 rick, .imi 009 
 
 I»onKrrtii.iH<o,Tlii';l8(12M IiUrtJi.»G8; 31 L. J. A(lin.20,'i; 6 L.T. 133. . 1 182, 1189 
 
 I)..iiiiiHoii r. KUlrv (1821), 3 KukI"' ^» Y. liCXl. ii 3'.m 
 
 IKm.I.v r. Million ■;1877;. Ir. 11. 11 K^i. 29!) 7im 
 
 J).«.nr"mii r. J.nkiiiH (1831), 2 A. Hi K. 260, 2(10 ; 4 N. & M. 170 38. 39 
 
 Doriiii'K ciiHi. 1838), 2 Moo. ('.('. 37 1>07 
 
 l)..r.'(i.ill«ry. In re. (18!I0), r.2 I-. T. 7''>8 ; 38 \V. R. 4!)1 {tl3 
 
 Dorin r. ItoVi-i (I87'<), L. U. 7 H. L. 6ti8 ; 4« L. J. Cli. ".Vi ll.i, 7'.'3 
 
 Dorr f. MiniMcll M81)i), 13 John». 431 74« 
 
 Dorr.tt .. M.ux ,18/il), 23 L.J. C. P. 221 ; ISC. B. 142 104.-|, 10.-.4 
 
 Dorw V r. DorMcy (1838). 7 Wiittn, 3.')0 1 14t 
 
 DoHi Aly Kliiin. In tfoiMln of (1880). (J P. D. ; 4U L. J. P. 78 ; 2U W. U. 8it 1)37 
 Dour.., ]{,' (1S(12), 2 8 & T. fi03; 31 L. J. P. 172; 8 Jur. N. 8. 723; (1 
 
 L. T. 78l» 700 
 
 Dnmot I. (i..o(flir>f'»" (1H78), 9 Cli. I>. 441 ; 2«i W. K. 82ft 378 
 
 Doi.kIiih, U.. ;1812,, 3 Q. U. 837 i 12 L. J. Q. II. 4U; 3 O. 4 D. 509 ; 7 
 
 .lur. 31t 808, 870 
 
 DoiiKliiHr. CorlK'tt (185(1), K. 4 H. 514; 2 Jur. N. 8. 1247 30 
 
 Do.i^liiH r Di.iiKliiH (1871), L. K. 12 l-:*!. 017 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 74 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 .13(1 ; 2(1 \v. ]<.:>:> 180 
 
 Doii)^l.i» r. Kwinir (18.'i7), Ir. C. ].. R. MOft 39 
 
 DoiijfiiiMi. IMl.iw»(1853), I Kiiy, 114; 2 W. R.ii54 ; 23 L.J. Ch. 107. .792,798, 7l»9 
 
 DoMirliiMi. Forn-Ht (1828), 4 Uiutt. 080; 1 M. ic V. 0'13 114(1 
 
 Doiiffliwr. Ilohni. (1840), 12 A. A: K. 041 ; 4 P. Jt I). 085 117 
 
 DoiikIiiht. SiiunilrrHon (1701), 2 Dnil. 110 42^ 
 
 D<ntKl»ti''. Touwv (182!)), 2 Wfuil. ;t.)2 2.V), 117 1 
 
 Dour r. Child (1870), 1 E«. Div. 172 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 402 ; 34 L. T. .'37 ; 
 
 24 W. R. 537 1 159 
 
 Dover t . Miu'HtuiT ( 1804), 5 K»\y. 00 . 4 KitM, 43.1 ; 1 .Smith, 123 273 
 
 Dowdril r. Auhtriiliiin Roynl Muil Co. (1854), 3 K. & H. '.M)2 ; 2 C. L. U. 
 
 Ili5«; 23 l<. .1. (^ U. 309; 18 .lur 579 819 
 
 Dow.l.ii V. Fowl.' (1814), 4 Cimiii. 38 498 
 
 D..wlin)f t. Dowlintr (1800), 10 Ir. ('. L. R. 244 229 
 
 Dowlinif t . Finijfim (1824), 1 C. * P. 587 273 
 
 Dor I, ( . KlliH isii5). ;15 Btiiv. 578 031 
 
 Downi... t. (iiirhuti (l8|3).2Dowl.N.8. 045; 14 L. J. Q. W. 210; 9 Jur. 090 734 
 
 Downt-M t. Ri<')iiirdi«<n (1822), 5 H. 4 A. 075; 1 D. 4 Ii, 332 1203 
 
 Downing r. Hiit.hi-r (1811), 2 M. & R<di. 374 25a 
 
 Dowuiiitf .. CitiMl (1807), 36 L. J. M. C. 07 ; L. R. 2 0. P. 401 ; ifl I,. T. 
 
 323 ; 1,1 W. K. 745 22C, 499 
 
 DownHr.Coo|«.r(|841 ,2Q.B. 250; 10.4D.673; 11 L.J.Q.B.2; OJur.022 98 
 
 Dowt4in r. (VwK (1794). 1 KnJ). 108 , 498 
 
 Ii.ivly'HiiiH.. ilN30!, .Miici. Pi4f. H. L. 054 50'i 
 
 Dnil.l.lr I. Donncr '1M2I . Re. .V M. 47 ; 1 ('. \- P. 188 31A 
 
 Diiik.r. Dr.ikrtlMtiir, Hll.i;, CiiH. 172; 29 L J.("h. 8,Mi. 3 L T. 193, ,707, 708,790 
 
 l.'iiki. I. MiirrvHt (1823), I H. A; C, 473. 2 D. 4 R. 000 1178 
 
 ihiikr . Syk.H il7'.)7/, 7 T, ii. 113 490 
 
 Drati.(uit r. i'rudhonimc (1831), 3 I<(iuii«. H3, 8ft 218 
 
 Drunl I, llrown (1825', 5 I). 4 R, 582; 3 B, 4 C. 005... 288 
 
 Driiytim r. DiiIj. (1823), 3 D. 4 R. 534 ; 2 H. .V C. 293 117, 546 
 
 DpHMiri. SlunH«..ld (i845). 14 M 4 \V. 828 ; 15 L. .'. Kk. "74 1030 
 
 Dr.w I Nuun (1870), 4 y. B. D. 001 ; 48 L. J. il B. .101 ; 40 L. T 071 ; 
 
 JT \V. R. 810 107 
 
 Diiw I. Trior (1843), 6 M. A « Jr. 2(54 1222 
 
 Voi, /. tHilt U■tt^ /Mj/t 03d. 
 
 1 1 
 
 ffij 
 
 ^^P! 
 
 'i 
 
Ixxii 
 
 TAHLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 VAOII 
 
 J)rinkwater r. Vnrtrr (IMH), 7 C A P. 181 397, 399, 402 
 
 Droitwjih raw ' 1 H.J.V . Kimpji i O. r.4 497 
 
 Dr.Aii r. Smith 1H2'>), 3 Now Hump 299 r,U 
 
 l>riiift'H >«•■<• 1N7J>. L. K II l-J|. t) «45 
 
 Diuinmon i, K.- IK«0. nhouia U- ISO"), 2 S. & T. 8 ; 8 W. K. 470 701 
 
 Drimimi.iKl r. Att.-Oen. IS49 . I Dr. & War. 353 703, 784, 791 
 
 DrummoiKl r I'Hri.h 1843 . 3 CJnrt. Mi, ftVl 702 
 
 JJniry'" <"»•*«' »"■ MhIium' r. O'Cuniiori, Drtirv (tomp. N.ipifr), 644 79 
 
 Druryr. M.i<t.«mani Is.Vi .5E. A. B.(il2; 2/)!,. J.Q B.fy. 1 Jur. N. S. 1163 773 
 
 Drydeii r. Allix (IK»i;i,. I M.)o. 1'. C. N. 8. .')28 e 
 
 Duanc, U«- (1862), 31 L. J. P. 4 M. 173 ; 2 S. & T. 590 ; 8 Jur. N. 8. T.VJ ; 
 
 6 L. T. 788 140 
 
 Dii Barri- r. Livottp '17911. P.-n. K. 77 : 3 R. Tl. GSo S9.5, f)98 
 
 Duhliii, Al.p. off. I>ml Trimli*t<.ii (I84!i), 12 Ir. Eq. R. 2i'>l ..1133, 1167, 1168 
 
 Dublin, C.rp. i.f r. Juil^e ;I8I7 , 1 1 Fr. L. R. 8 729 
 
 Dublin, W .V W. Rv Co. r. Slatt.rv 1878). 3 App. Cum. 1155; 39 L. T. 
 
 30o : 27 \V. R. \'J\ : 10 Ir. C. L.'Rip. 2ri(i 28 
 
 Du n.wt 1 . 15. r.ff.inl I8H» , 2 Camp. aI2 : 1 1 K. R. 782 371, 374 
 
 Duckftt r. (iov.r ,is:7 . >; Ch. D. 82 ; 40 L. J. C\\. 1(17 ; 25 W. R. 6)4 .. 187 
 
 Diick.lt r. William* IH.-.P. 1 1'. 4 J. 510; 1 Dowl. 291 347 
 
 I>ml)^.Mm f . l'.iiil.r.k.- '1877;. L. R. 2 App. Cnx. 284 ; 1 (^ B. D. 96 ; 46 
 
 L. .1. H. B. 40!» ; 30 I,. T. 382 ; 2.') W. R. 499 771 
 
 Dudlry I . Sumner ■ i 809'. 5 Miuw. 444 372 
 
 Dudlcv t. V'.M«- (1873, 114 Mii.Hr'. 31 7fi3 
 
 Dufau'r r. Cri.ft ISIU). 3 M.*.. P. C. R. 1 17 140 
 
 DuH.rin'H, Ul.. chm- {I8S7,. 4 CI. & I'in. .')(i8 1093 
 
 Dutfirin P.HT. 1H48 . 2 H. of L ("m.. 47 1018 
 
 Duttin ( . ;smitli 1792 . P«a. R. 1(18 (.00 
 
 Duflv Itf (1871). .'i Ir. R. F:<iuitv, 500 142, 747 
 
 DujfdMlr .. R„l».rt!wn (18:17 . .{ K kj. C!»5 , 3 Jur. N. 8. 0S7 114 
 
 DujfjriiH. Rf ;lN7ii,. 39 L. J. P. 21 ; 22 L. T. 182 701 
 
 Duk. r. Anhiiy M862), 7 U. 4 N. tJOO . 31 L. J. Ex. 168; « Jur. N. 8 
 
 •>M, : low. R 273 97 
 
 Duki'H (. OoHtlinK (183.5 . I a,.:-^. N. C. 588 ; 1 Srott. 570 ; 1 H.)dKo», 120; 
 
 4 L. J. C. P. 21 1 202 
 
 Dumfri.i*. VmtI of. The (1885). 10 P. D. 31 , 64 L. J. P. 7 ; 61 L. T. 906 ; 
 
 :U \V. R. 568; 5 A»p. M. C. 3«2 388 
 
 Dumper r. D'lmpir dv/J,. A 'iitf. 583 606 
 
 Dunh.viic, ]a\. r. BranUer ■ :;«.'<4). 18 B.av. 313 144 
 
 Dunoaiir. B.i.rd (1820). 2 Nott ft .*!C. 4iii) 429 
 
 Duncan r. Bntdr a86f)'. 12 Ir. C. /.. R. 171 1085 
 
 Duiuan r. Hill '1871), 40 L. J. Ex. 137 ; L. P 6 Ex 265 ; 26 L. T. 59 ; 
 
 lU W. R. su» 158 
 
 Dun.an r. H.mIitpii (1827). 4 Mc-0. 239 1200 
 
 Duncan i. I^.uch VHh,, « Q. H. 901; 14 L J. Q. P. 135; » Jur.346.... 207 
 
 Duncan I. I>i»ndi-H (1813 . 3 Camp. 478; 14 R R. 815 IttI 
 
 Dunran i. S<!..ll il8(»; , I Camp. I(!0 1013, 1044 
 
 Duncan v. Tiiidal :x:,.i . 1.1 (.'. ». 257 , 21 L J. C V. 137 ; 17 Jur 347. . Oil 
 
 Dun-ombc r Danicll (Ih:{7;, 1 W. W k II. 101 ; 2 Jur. .'f.' ; 8 V. ic V. 222 007 
 
 Duncuft ('. Albwbt :l84tj. 12.Hi,;. 1H9 fi85 
 
 Dundan'M riwM' (1814 , M.i«| H. L. Pmc. 610 , 602 
 
 Dund.iKv. DuK-UH (179't,. 1 V.-« jun 199; 2Coji,240; 1 R. R. 112 679 
 
 Dunfor.1 r. Tmttka ,1844), 2 II. * SV .>29 ; 1 D. & L. 581 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 
 
 124; 8 Jur. 180 533 
 
 DunSop r. Hijfifin. 1848\ I H. o* L. C. 381 ; 12 Jur 295 166 
 
 ■)umi V. Devon, kr. Newupa, or C" . (1H9J) 10 R. 107; (1896) 1 Q. B. 
 
 211, ti. ; 03 L. J. ti. B. .H^ , 70 L. " 593 6.36 
 
 Dunn V. Murray 1829). ♦ M * R. .iST . . (' iJ. 4 C. 780 1 124 
 
 Dunn r. 81ee 1810,. 1 Mt^^-e. C. '.' ; H.,h, V. P. 401 ; 17 R. R. 061 608 
 
 Dunn .. Snowden (1863,, S; f-.J-Cb. 10* ; .' Dr. &8ra.201 ; 7 L. T. 668; 
 
 UW.R 160 173 
 
 DunnBc. EntjUiih (1874). L. R. 18 E.;, '24; H L. T. 75., 324, 971 
 
 Dunnu e. Fertruaon > 1832). Ksyeti, :«•»;; ,, 686, 686 
 
 Tkt rtftrtntn art U jxi^ts, tnt t» p^> vfrapKt, 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
 ri.am 
 
 DunniiKr ». Robertu (1862), 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 463 i.,4 
 
 iMiinivrii, Ld. V. LleweUyn (1850), 15 Q. B. 791 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 3S8 .3!)*. 30C, 
 
 397 398 402 
 
 I)ut.8ford r. Ciirlowis (1859), 1 F. & F. 702 !... ' 26 
 
 Diiiiston V. PaUTson (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 495 ; 26 L. J. 0. P. 287 643 
 
 DupavHt'. ShephtTd(16!»8), 12 Mix! . 216 4 
 
 Diipiiyr. Trumau(1843), 2 Y. & C. 341 927 
 
 Dtiriinoc, It^s (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. 406 ; 41 L. J. P. & M. 60 ; 26 L. T. 
 
 <m : JO V,'. R. 759 703 
 
 Durham. Lady, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 67 701 
 
 Durlmm Bp. of, v. Beaumont {1808), 1 Camp. 207 4(i4, 976, 977 
 
 Kurhai.i .11.(1 Suiulerl. Rv. Co. v. W.ilkiT (1842), 2 O. & D. 320; 2 (i. B. 940 638 
 
 D.irlinif v. Luveland (1839), 2 Curt. 220, 227 140 
 
 D.irrHi.t i'.Frioud(1857),5Do(J.&Sm.ai3; 21 L. J. Ch. 353; 16Jur.709 174 
 
 Durnll r. Btilerloy (1810), Holt, 283 ; 17 R. U. (i39 934 
 
 Diirnll 'kI.ouUI 1«' Darrell) r. Evans (1861), I II. \- C. 174 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 
 
 ;t:i7 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 104 ; 7 L. T. 97 : 10 W. R. 6(15 297, 674 
 
 Dutton, Re 18(12), 32 L. J. 1'. & M. 137 ; 3 S. A: T. (if. 143 
 
 Di.ttdnr. SdomoiiHon (1803). 3 Bos. & P. 582; 7 R. R. 883 691 
 
 |).ilton r. Wocdman (1852), 9 Cush. 255 491. .526 
 
 l)» vcr I. Cu\\\ux (IH.VJ). 7 Ex. 639 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 225 ; 16 Jur. ,569. .318, 3I'J. 609 
 
 Dwverr. Rich (1871), 6 I. R. (J. L. 144 Ill 
 
 l)v.'e.S,,ml.r.'f. Troup ( 18.>6). Deune, Eoc.R. 38; 26L.T.(0.8.)288. . 169, 170,262 
 
 Dye r. Dye (1884), 47 J. P. 520 666 
 
 Dvir. H." (182HI, ! lluftn. Eee. It. 219 693 
 
 DVer I , HeMt (1866), L. R. 1 E.x. 152 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 105 ; 4 H. & C. 189. . 76 
 Dv.ri. Dyer 1788 .lWhite\T.L. C. 236; Wiitk.C.pyh. 214-228 (3rd ed.).. 665, 666 
 
 Dv.Ti. (irecii i,18l7). 10 L. J. Ex. 239; 1 E.\. 71 1206 
 
 Dyer r. Mimiiay 189.5). 14 R (^fiiy) 266; (1895) 1 Q. B. 742; 64 L. J.Q. B. 
 
 418; 7 J L T. IIS; 43 VV. R. 440 Adil. [1073] 
 
 Dvko r. AMrM^'o ( 1 798). eitwl 7 T. R. 665 ; 1 1 Eiiit. 5«< | 49b 
 
 Dvke r. WillmiiiH (1861 1. 2 8. & T. 491 ; 31 L. J. I*. \- M. 157 414, 416 
 
 DviiicKh .. W.iikiiiM (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 431 ; 31 W. It 331 ; 48 L. T. 393 944 
 
 Dyne r. Niillry (1853), M C. B. 122 801 
 
 DvH.irt IV.r. IHM), 6 App. Can. 48',l 149, 367 
 
 Dj*.u I'. Wo<xl (1824), iti. k C. 449 1033 
 
 Vkvon V. .TeffeiKk (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 379 ; 42 L. J. Ex. 36; 28 L. T. 273; 
 
 •2(1 W. H. 1033 
 
 KilIh r. WillianiN (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 531 ; 4 I)e (J. M. A: (}. 674 
 
 Kat.'l.-t..ii r. (iiitteri<lKo (1843), 11 M. Ac W. 460; 12 L. J. Ex. 3.59; 2 
 
 Do«l. N S. 1053 2i7, 1I9(!. 
 
 Eaifleton I . KinK'-ton (1803), 8 VoH. 438 , 1220, 
 
 Kair.iT ''. Merle i^lSOJ-!)), i',ite«l 2 ("amp. 253 
 
 Kiirl'» Trust. Ru ^1H.',8,. 4 K. At J. 300 9, 
 
 Eurl (if Auekland, The (1861 1, 30 L. .7. P. M. .V A. 121 ; LunH. Adm. 164; 
 
 15 MiMv i'. ('. C. 304 ; 5 L. T. .V)8 ; 10 \V. R. 124 
 
 Earl of DuuifrieH, The (18851. |0 P. D. 31 ; 54 L. J. P. 7 ; 51 L. T. 906 ; 
 
 31 W. H. ..(iS ; 5 Af.p. M. C. 342 
 
 Karl I. UwiH (1801), 4 Vm>. 1 4.32, 
 
 Karh. r. Tick^n (1833), 5 (i. A; P. 542 291, 292, 
 
 Karp r. H.-nderwrn (1876), 3 Ch. 1). 254 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 738 ; 34 L. T. 844.. 
 
 Eaq. r. Lloyd (1857 i. 3 Kav (S: .f. 549 
 
 Ea.-! t (niajmian ^^1827), 2 C. & P. 570 ; M Ac M. 46 245, 
 
 Eaxt bind Waterw. IVi. v. Bailey (1827), 4 Bin^. 283 ; 12Mim). (C. P.)5:e2 
 EaM. C(m. Ky. Co. t: Broom (1851), 6 Ex. 614 ; L. J. Ex. 196; 6 Rail*-. 
 
 Cai.. 578 
 
 F*»t. Union Ry. Co. r. Ea«t.Ct». Ry. Co. (185.3), 2 R.& B.640; 22L,.r.'i.B.371 
 Kant. I'nion Ily. Co. r. Hymonda (18.iO), 5 Ex. 237 ; 6 R^ilw. tJiw. 678. .454, 
 EMtlmd I'. Bunhell (1870), 3 Q. B. D. 432 ; 47 L. .7. Q. B. 600; 38 L. T. 
 
 56H ; 27 W. K. 200 , 
 
 114 
 1039 
 
 1206 
 
 1223 
 
 256 
 
 1030 
 
 178 
 
 388 
 1168 
 555 
 221 
 PH3 
 970 
 642 
 
 648 
 
 1160 
 
 468 
 
 167 
 
 4 
 
 '■'^m 
 
 Vol, I, mdi *oitk p»ii$ 636, 
 
 
V ' I'i 
 
 Ixxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CA.SES CITED. 
 
 PAOI 
 
 EiiMtniiin r. Tattle (1823), 1 Coweii. 248 644 
 
 EiiMliiiuio r. LiiWM (lH.t!i), fl lUiiK. N. C. 444 ; 7 Scott, 4(51 ; 7 Dowl. 431 ; 
 
 •2 Am. 54 ; .J Jur. lnn 1121 
 
 EiiKtoii c. CarU'T (IH!H)].:> Kx. S; lU L. J. Ex. i::i 1133 
 
 EuNtw<x)d f. Kciiyou (1840), U L. J. Q. U. 4(IU; 4 J«r. 1081 ; 3 P. iD.270; 
 
 11 A. & E. 4.18 079 
 
 EiiHtw(KHl V. Siivillw (1812). 11 L. J. Ex. 383 : M. & W. (il.") 717 
 
 E»t<m r. HiiKkcr (ISSl). tl Q. B. 1). 201 ; 7 Q. »(. D. o2'J ; M L. J. Q. B. 
 
 444; 44 L. T. 70;i; •-",) W. It. f)'J7; 45 J. r (ilti 050 
 
 Err\ea r. lliirrimm (!HI«), ti Nott-n of Cas. (Kvr. \- Mar.) 204 488 
 
 EimIoh. ConiiniHM. v. iMi-rrul (186U), L. K. 4 Kx. 102; 3H L. J. Ex. 93; 17 
 
 W. H.67C 07. 152, 644 
 
 EcIuM. ConimiKM. i. Uo»o (1S80), 6 Api). Cm. 730; 4!1 L. J. Q. B. 771 ; 
 
 43 L. T. 353 ; 2'J U'. !^. 159 ; 46 J. V. 30 74 
 
 EecleHtou V. Siiikr (KiH!)), tJirth. 79 : 3 M<k1. •■!58; (%.iiil>. 150 488, 496 
 
 Eik.rt.l«y i». I'iiitt (IHOii), L. R. 1 P. & H. 2S1 ; 30 L. J. P. 7 ; 14 L. T. 
 
 800 ; 16 E. T. 327 ; 15 W. R. 232 143, 703 
 
 E< k.Htoiii •'. Hrynol.lH (1837). 7 A. & E, 80 ; 2 N. \- P. 25(1 48 
 
 Ediin V. Di'«itt.ia (1841), 1 Q. B. 302, 307 ; 4 P. i D. 050 ; 5 Jur. 317. .48, 091, 
 
 717 
 E«liir)wo« f. ArjiOHtino Land Co (18!)0), 69 L. J. Ch. 392 ; 02 L. T. 514 ; 
 
 38 W. K. 029 915 
 
 E<l<'ii I. Hlak<^ (1845), 13 M. .V W. 014; 14 L. J. Ex. 104; Jur. 213. . . . 745 
 
 Edjfi) r. Hilliiry (1862). 3 C & K. 43 271 
 
 ¥.<\t(o V. Sulihlmrv {\U\)), Ami.. 70 7S9 
 
 Kiljfcr. Siriittoia (18:il). 1 Tvr. 2'.3; I C. vt J. .391 082 
 
 EdKfWortli V. .lohnMton (l^*";. I. U. 11 E«i, 320 800 
 
 Eilie V. EiiMt IikHh Co. (I70n, 2 Burr. 1220 : 1 W. HI. 295 6 
 
 Etlio V. KiiiKHford (1854), 14 C. B. 7.)9 ; 2 C. L. K. 832 ; 23 L. .1. C. P. 
 
 123 280 
 
 Edim-. Ex imrto (1822), 9 Serjr. \- R. 147 H09 
 
 EiIiiu.ikIhi. CliiilliH(1849),7C. B. 413; (i Dowl. & I,. 58 1: is L. .I.e. P. Idi.. U9l 
 E<ltiioiidH 1'. FoMtor (1870), 45 L. J. C. P. 41; 33 L. T. OUO ; 24 W. R. 
 
 ■MH 109, 620 
 
 E.<liiiomlH »•• Uoat«>r (1852), 15 Boav. 415 ; 21 L. .1. Ch. 290 711 
 
 E.lmoiHlNf. lIiirriM (1834), 2 A. A: E. 414; 4 N. & M. 18i 222 
 
 E.IiiioikIh r. WiiIUT (1820), 3 SUrk. 8 922 
 
 EdmondMon r. .SU-vciiMon (1705). Bull. N. P. 8 110 
 
 Edniuiidfi. l)owncN(1834),2C.A: M.45U; 4 Tvr. 173: 3 L. J. Ex. 98. .073,712,713 
 
 Ea.nuinlHi'. I-<.w (1857), 3 K. A: J. 318; 20 1,. J. Cli. 432 800 
 
 EdmuiidN I . Nfwmun (1823). R. & M. 5 .'.OO 
 
 EdwiirilH, Re (1848), 6 Not«» of Ciw. (Ecc, & Mar.) 300 70l 
 
 EdwardH i. liattn (1844K " M. & U. OOO 754 
 
 EdwardHi'. Burlmnan (18;, ' 3 B. & Ad. 788 1019, 1174 
 
 EdwardH r. Cr<Kk (1801). 4 hM), .19 370 
 
 EdwardH I . EilwanU (l«3(i), 2 Y. »^l- C. Ex. 123 fl(!7 
 
 EdwariJH r. Etlirriii>ftou (I825i. Kv. \ M. 2(>8 "74 
 
 E<lwardH r. Hall (1M5.-.). Do (J. M, A: (J. 71 ; 25 L. .1. Ch. 82 083 
 
 Ed«ardH r. Ilavtil (1853), 14 C. B. 107 ; 2 C. L. R. 1313 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 
 
 7; 17 Jur. 1103 179 
 
 EdwaitU r. IIodjeiH (1855), 15 C. B. 477 ; 3 C. L. R. 472; 24 L. J, M. C. 
 
 81; 1 Jur. N. S. 91 101 
 
 EdwanUi'. Juikm (185.V,. 1 Kuv & J. 534 717 
 
 E<lwardHf, J.'voiiH (1849), 8 C! B. 430; 19 L. J. C. P. 60 780 
 
 l-Mwiirdsr. Johoh (1837). 7 C. .V P. (133 208 
 
 Edwards «. MatthuwH (1817). 10 L. J. Ex. 291 ; 4 D. & L. 721 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 398 272 
 
 EdwardH r. Midi. Ry. Co. (1880). 9 Q. B. D. 287 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 43 
 
 L. T. 004: 20 W. R. OOU ; 45 J. P. 374 043 
 
 JMwardBi'. H. (1854), 9 Ex. 028 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 166 84 
 
 K«ran ('. Cowan (1858), 30 L. T. 223 1224 
 
 E^aii r. Earkiii (1842), 1 Arm. M. & (). 403 20, 330. 1214 
 
 EgiTtoii V. MatlmwH (1805), 2 Smith, 389 ; Eant, 307 ; 8 R. R. 489 . .008, 074 
 
 I'Ji* n/ereiieri ait to piiytt, nvl to jtiirnyrapht. 
 
TAHI.K OF CASES CITED. 
 
 1 
 
 XXV 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Ekk v. Barnett (1800), 3 Enn. 196 154 
 
 K»f«'nioiit Hiiriiil n<mrd r. KK«"»'niinit Iron Ore Co. (1880), 14 Ch. D. 158 ; 
 
 49 L. .1. Ch. 62:\ ; »2 L T. 17i» ; .'S W. it. 594 321 
 
 EhrviiMiMTiien r. Aml.TH<m (1842), 3 Ex. 148 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 132 315 
 
 Ei.lmlz .. Hiii.niHN'r (18(i4). 17 C. B. N. S. 708; 34 L. J. C. P. 105; 11 
 
 •li.r. N. S, 15; 12 L. T. 70; 13 W. R. 96 775 
 
 Ei.kor. NokoH (I8.'l)). M. & M. 30:j 009, 713 
 
 Klcl.ii V. KiMM (1807), 9 11. K. 404 ; 8 Eant, 187 1040 
 
 Elilor V. Ciiitrr (18!)0). 25 Q. H. I). 194 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 02 L. T. 
 
 510 ; .SH W. K. 012 ; 64 J. P. 092 343 
 
 i:Mri.l>f.> r. Khott (1774). 1 Cowp. 214 119, 123, 125 
 
 Kliit. Teh'K. Co., Uo, Ex purfti Hiiiin (1857), 24 Bcuv. 137 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 
 
 tiI4 844 
 
 KI.'V «'. PoNitivo Oovt. &o. Co. (1875), 46 L. J. Ex. 68 ; 1 Ex. D. 20 ; 33 
 
 li. T. 143 ; 24 W. R. 252 048, 081 
 
 Klfi.nl r. Tvoi\ (1813), 1 M. & H«>1. 28 33 
 
 KliiiM ,. ftriftith (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. 800 ; 8Ch. 1). 521 ; 38 L. T, 871 ; 26 
 
 W K. S(,9 971 
 
 Kliut.'. Albn (1845), 1 C. n. 18; 14 L. J. C. P. 1.30 227 
 
 Klkiii V. Jaiiwm (1846), 13 M. & W. 085 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 9 Jur. 35.). . .201, 
 
 202, 200, 207 
 
 Klkin>rt<)n r. nollimd (1845), 9 M. & W. 059 ; I Dowl. N. 8. 013 733 
 
 i:ilrnlH.r.mtfh'H. 1a\., vumi (1830), Miic<|. II. L. Pnirt. 055 502 
 
 EllcTHhiiw I . liobiiiBou (1810-28), Stjirk. Ev. 04 1 . (142 255 
 
 Klh.f. It.' (1804), 33 L. J. P. A: M. 27 ; 12 W. U 353 143 
 
 Klli... . . Koupi-U (1803), 2 Now R. 3 ; 11 W. R. 579 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 503 ; 9 
 
 .Jur. N. S. 533 353 
 
 Elliott r. I>miii (1884), C. & E. 283 673 
 
 Ellii.tt. I. i:iliott(1841), 9M. ^ W. 27; 111*. J. Ex.3 '7 
 
 Ellinit.'. K.iiip (^1840). 7 M. & W. 300; 10 L. .1. Ex. 321 116, 117 
 
 Ellidtl r. North Eiitit. Rv. Co. (1803), :)2 L. J. Ch. 402; 10 II. L. C. 333; 
 
 s L. T. 3:i7 : 114 
 
 Elliott r. South Devon Ry. Co. (1848), 2 Ex. 725 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 202 ....60, 763 
 
 Elliott r.ThomaM(I8;i8), 3 M. & W. 170; 7 L. J. Ex. 129 089 
 
 Elliott r. TutiiiM Union (1893). 57 J. P. 151 ; 9 T. L. R, 35 373 
 
 Ellin r.('..wmi (1849), 2 0. & K. 719 480 
 
 KlliH I. 1). Mlvii (1881), Q. B. D. 621 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 328; 4 I L. T. 209; 
 
 2'J \V. K. 493 42 
 
 i:iii«f. ElliM (1814), 11 MiiKH. 92 295 
 
 Ellin f. HouHtoun (1878), 10 Ch. D. 230; 27 W. R. 501 146, 706 
 
 Ellin r. Siiltuu (1808), 4 C. 4 P. 327, n. («) 6H 
 
 Ellin r. Thonipnon (1838), 3 M. * W. 450 ; 1 H. & H. 131 164 
 
 Ellin ... Wiitnon (1818), 2 Sliirk. R. 453 ; 20 U. R. 725 49.5, 551 
 
 Elli«.in V. Kllihoii (1802), 6 Vch. 050 ; R. R. 19 ; 1 WhiUi & T. L. C. 291. 005 
 
 Klliimk.r .•. Bii.kloy (1827), 10 ik-rtt. & U. 77 945 
 
 Elni..r.' . . KiiiKm.t.! (1820). 8 Dowl. i R. 343 ; 5 B. & C. 683 071 
 
 Eliiion I , St.Mio (1809;, 1 Tiiun. 458 ; 10 R. R. 678 090 
 
 Elniiiii c. Kiiucott (1797), 2 EHp. 503 253, 254 
 
 ENtoii ,, WihhI (183,1), 2 My. & K. 078 496 
 
 Elton I. Liirkinn (1832), 1 M. & Rob. 190; 6 C. & P. 385 605, 954 
 
 Elw.'Hf. E1w..h(18«1), 2 011!. 545 749 
 
 Elw.nxl .•. Bnllock (1844). Q. B. 384 ; 13 L. J. (J. B. 330 1091 
 
 Elworthv I. Siin.lfonl (18<i»). '^* ^'- J- '-«■ *'- '• 3 U. ii C. 330 304 
 
 Einami.l r. Rolmrtn (1808), 6 B. & H. 687 ; 34 L. .1. Q. B. 217 646 
 
 Kn.M.-t.m i: Bwwn (1800), 3 E. & K. 234 ; 30 L. J. M. C. 1 ; Jur. N. 8. 
 
 '■»'« 112 
 
 Em.mou r. lUim ■..•u (1791), 1 E»p. 142 ; 5 R. K 725 603 
 
 EiM.ry I. Ilarm.tt (1858), 27 L. J. C. P. 216 ; 4 '). B. N. 8. 423; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. s. «;u OS 
 
 El... TV .. Chi.iluTo (Tho Arklow) ^1883), 63 L. J. P. C. 9; Apu. Cm. 136 ; 
 
 •.M.. T. ;t05; 6Ahp. 219 177 
 
 iM..<ry .. (Jroiink (1821), 6 Madd. 64 126 
 
 Eiu«rjr 1. TwomUy (1840), 5 MhopL 05 ,.,.,..,.. 121S 
 
 Vol. J. eiidt with pay* 636. 
 
 ■I 
 
 li! 
 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 
 ilii 
 
1 
 
 XXVI 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 9kan 
 
 Eramonioiiti. HocH« (1809). 2 Tauii. 38; 11 R. R. MO 6Sfl, 7aO 
 
 Kmmirton v. MiUUicwh (IHftJ), Ml L. J. Ex. 13U; 7 H. & N. 6H6 ; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. S. «1 ; S I.. T. tiHl ; 10 W. R. ii-ld 776 
 
 Emiiift r. I).whir«t (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 497 ; 3 Mao. & O. 687 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 111,'. 762 
 
 Einiii-.tt r. Vsimlmiit, IlBlkctt, Cliiiiiit. (1878), 3 Q. H. D. 666; 3H L. T. 
 
 .'.(IS ; 17 L. .1. U. M. i:iU ; Jti W. U. (!32 1088 
 
 EiiiHl.'y. Miirv, It.- (18021, 2 S. \ T. 4iil 414, 416 
 
 EiiKfll I'. Fitlli I IK6U), 10 H. & M. 738 ; 17 W. H. 894 ; L. R. 4 Q. U. (iM ; 
 
 37 L. J. (J. M 146 773 
 
 EiikIiukI <•. Dowim (1810), 2 Bfuv. 623 ; 6 Bcuv. 2(19 786 
 
 Eiik'""'! • • i^'ii'l" (I7'.<2). 4 T. K. (iH2 ; 2 R. K. 4!m 12(1 
 
 EnjfliHh Jt. St.prk Hk., Ui. (lS(ifl>. L. li. 3 E(|. 203 816 
 
 EiitfliHli I'. Tcitli.. (1H7.')), 1 U. U. i). 141; 46 L. J. Q. M. 13H; 33 L. T. 
 
 724; 21 W. |{, .i'.M 1187 
 
 KiijfliHhiimii, Tlu- (1877), 3 P. I). 18; 47 L. J. Adra. 9; 37 L. T. 412.... 177 
 
 I'.niiiM'M ciiBf (lH;t.'>). Kimpp A: (). 436 497 
 
 Kiinhin V. Wvlir (ISti-'i, 10 H. of L. C)in. 1 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 402 ; (i li. T. N. 8. 
 
 «o;j; 10 W. U. 407 1161 
 
 Emm c. Tiittlo (1H20), 3 Conn. 2,"i0 .'IHO 
 
 Eiii-'irii r. Wi'I.Mt(T (I7!'0). 1 ,T'>liiiH. ll,'> .'i,'i2 
 
 Eiiti. .,,1111. r, Wire (INii.'.l, 4 S. & T. 13(1 ; l.'iL. T. 211; 34 T<. .1. P. 110. . 978 
 
 EntwiHtlf r. DaviH (1S07), L. K. 4 K<|. 272 ; 30 L. J. Ch. H2,'( 6S4 
 
 KntwiHtlo r. D.iit (1840), 11 <^ h. 1002 1037 
 
 Env-.n, llo (lt*7.l), 42 L. J. P. & M. .V2 ; L. K. 3 P. & D. 92 ; 21 W. R. 
 
 H.JO 096 
 
 Erinkiiii' r. Miirniy (1728), 2 I A. HiiMii. 1A42 6 
 
 Erm«t I . Niihdlls ( 1H67), II. of L.'Ciih. 401 042 
 
 Erhkiiu' r. A<lfam' (1873), 42 L. .1. Ch .Ht.') ; 3 Jur. N. 8. 919 774 
 
 Erwiii r. S.iumliTN (1823), 1 (N.w.'ii. 2I!» 7.'>7 
 
 EHchi'miiiiii, In re, (IS93) 9 TimcH L. U. 420 179 
 
 E»cott r. MiiHtin (1HI2), 4 M.m.. P. C. l:tO 101!) 
 
 EH|)cy I . Liiko (1862). 10 Hiirc, 20o ; 10 Jor. 1 107 ; 22 L J. Ch. 330 .... I;i7 
 
 Ehscx, CountpsH (if, ciiw (10i;t), 2 How. St. Tr. 802 3,'.9 
 
 E..H.X WitchcM (104,'.), 4 Ili.w. St. Tr. 817 fi,')7 
 
 KiiKton, L(l., t . 1,(1. lly. SiTniour (1802), nUd 2 Curt. 3311 702 
 
 EvHiiH 1'. An^i'll ( 18;'iH), 20 \U'iiv. 202 H04 
 
 Evimn r. P.attiu (1H03), 6 E«p. 20 '(.8 
 
 Evium r. Dallow (1802), 31 L. J. P. 128 700, 707 
 
 Evans r. DavipH (IHUO), 2 H. & W. 16 ; » N. \' P. 404 ; 4 A. & E. 840 .. 717 
 
 Evans . EvanH und Hol.inm.n (1H68), 27 L. J. P ,'.7 1119 
 
 EvuiiH .. Ervcr (18:t9 , lOA. AtE. 016; 2 P. & 1). 601 187,190 
 
 Evans r. (Ji'ttinK (18:M;, C. & P. AHO H73 
 
 Evans r. loarc, (IS92) 1 Q. R. d!i3 ; Ul L. J. Q. B. 470 ; 6U L. T. 346 ; 
 
 40 W. 1.. 442 ; 60 J. P. 004 074 
 
 Evans V. MnrMTHU (1832), 2 C. & J. 46;{ 296, 373 
 
 EvimM «•. Niohol (1841), 3 M. & (Jr. 014; 4 Scott, N. R. 43; 6 Jur. 
 
 1110 646 
 
 Evans r. PhillipN (1703), 2 .Sclw. N. P. 1072 9H7 
 
 Evans c. PowiH(lH47), 1 Ex. 001 ; 11 Jur. 1013 1!»2 
 
 Eviins .. R<-c>8 (18,19), 2 P. k D. 627 ; 10 A. & E. 161 ..39«, 4(I4, 40.\ 400, 432, 
 
 811, 1109, 1101, 1207 
 
 Evans I . Rolxrts (IH20), 8 D. & It. 01 1 ; 6 H. & C. 832 086, 086 
 
 Evans c. Roc (1H72), I.. U. 7 C P. \M ; 20 L. T. 70 763 
 
 Evans I . Simon (1H,'..1), 9 Ex. 2H2 ; 2 C. L. R. 416 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 10 .... 711 
 
 Evans.. SwiM-t (1K24), Ry. A: M. 83; IC 4 P. 277 311,312 
 
 EvmiH V. Taylor (1h:ih), 7 A. & E. 017 ; 3 N. cic P. 174 396, 404. lo;J8, 1040 
 
 Evans f. Wntson (1840), 3 C. H. 327 ; 4 D. & L. 193 ; 16 L. J. C. P, 260 ; 
 
 10 Jur. 81H ;{06, 818 
 
 Evans r. Williamson (i8Kl), 60 L. J. Ch. 197; 17 Ch. I). 090; 43 L. T. 
 
 719; 29 W. R. 2,30 UA 
 
 Evflyu «'. HaynoN (1782), uitvd Uutraiu c. Morewood, 3 Eutit, 306 ; 7 R. R. 
 
 473 1120 
 
 jf'A* re/rfHief «r* to pagM, not to yaragnij>k$. 
 
TABLE OP CASra CITED. 
 
 Ixxvi 
 
 11 
 
 rAnR 
 
 710 
 1 1 mi 
 
 Everaid r. Topi loton (t8i;<), A Q. B. 181 ; Duv. & M. :I22 : 13 L. J. Q, R. 1 : 
 
 7 Jur. !'!)! 73:J, 734 
 
 EviiMt .. Kurett (1877), 7 ('h. D. •I'28 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 307 ; 3« L. T, 013 ; 
 
 ■IS W. K. "(•)•. 8(18 
 
 KviTifit V. I^.w.llmiii (IHIIl). fiC. & P. Ul UI8 
 
 Evirctt f. KoUrUon (IH.Mt). 28 L. J. Q. B. 23; 1 E. & E. Iti ; I Jur. 
 
 N. S. lOHl 
 
 Kvmtt r. YniulU ^IH:12), U H. & Ad. ;U1) 
 
 r,v.riti(rhiim r. iOmmlcll (IHtH), 2 M. & Hoi). MM; 2 I,fwiii. C. C. liT.M.tl, H.W 
 
 K«iiii .. .Icm-H (lH^.5), llM. AliW. 771: 2 Dnvvl. .V I,. J.V-' 872 
 
 Kwiirtr. WilliiiniHilSftA), .1 Drew. 21 ; 7 I)'<i. M. Ac (J. (iS 402 
 
 Kw.r .. Amliniwi (182i), 4 H. \- C 21 ; (i DmwI. 4 K. 127 086, 1013 
 
 Kwinjf (■ (MiiililiHtoii (ls;U), (i Sim. (108 1)7(> 
 
 i;<iill r. I'lrlii.ltfc 'uii.lutwl,, cIUhI 1 Stiirkin, 284 .119 
 
 Ex.ttT, Miiv. of, V. Wiimii (1844), 6 U. B. 801 ; 1). Jc M. .VJ4 ; H Jur. 
 
 Ill ' 123. IK), 442, 443 
 
 Kvnon, In c I H7;i), 42 L. .1. I", k M. ,')2 ; L. R. .t I' & I). 02 ; 2 1 W. K. Hod. (i'.<.5 
 
 Evrc, ll«! [\s:i:>), 72 L. T. 68S ; 1.1 NV. K. .')38 •/</</. [(170] 
 
 Ejrrer. Smith 1877), 2C. P. D. 436; 37L.T.417; 25\V.K.871 1132 
 
 •I'll 
 
 .1 
 
 F., fal-cly ihII.mI I)., r D. (ISO.'i), 4 S. * T. 81 ; 34 L. J. P. & M. 60; 11 
 
 .Fur N. S. (07; 12 li. T. 81 : 13 \V. K. ..tu 107 
 
 FulihKu-. I. MiHivii [ni(>), 211 |[ow. St. I'r. Hi ; 2 W. Bl. 020 ftOO 
 
 hVi'V r. Ilm.loiii (1S24), 3 H. \- 0. 213 37 
 
 Kairlir ,■. CliriMi.' (1817), 7 Ticiii. IK! ; Holt, 3)1 ; 1 M.m.po, C. P. 114 .. 1103 
 
 Fairli.r. Il.tiluii (1828), 3 C &. P. 1(13 f>->r, 
 
 Fiiiilii- r. lla-liii;fH (18114). 10 Vch. 123 388, 380 
 
 Fiiiriimii r. o.ikford (IH'W, fi H. & N. f)3.) ; 20 L. J. Ex. 4.')9 l.'>3 
 
 Fwirtitl.' c. (iillnrt (1787', 2 T. K. UiO ; 1 11. |{. 4.).') 01 
 
 Fiiilh I. Mliiiviv,lS3.-i), 7('. * P. 44 271, 274 
 
 FiilroiMT. MiiiiHon (IMOH), 1 Cimip. 171; 10 H. It. 003 328,485 
 
 Fallot, r. Ii..l)iiis(l8(l.')), 10 Ir. Ch. H. 422 749 
 
 Kalii'.oiitli, K. of, r Mos« (IH22), II Pric!.', 455 .505 
 
 FHlitioiitli, K of, r. Kol«Tti»(18l2), M. & W. lUO; 11 L. .1. Ex. 180; 
 
 1 Dowl. N. S. i;;i3 328, 1102. 1107, 1214, 1218 
 
 Faliii.aitli. !•;. of, V. ThmiiUM ilH32), 1 C. k M. 80; 2 L..I. Ex. 67; 3Tyr. 28 687 
 
 Fatmy Carvill, 'I'liii {art Tin- Ma^iittt). 
 
 Fatinliawc I'. loiiil. and Pruv. l)iiiry ('o. («r TiiiiHoii v. Wilwiii). 
 
 Fiiritm f. Ilottii' M810), 10 M. & W. 119; 10 L. .f. Ex. 73 091 
 
 Far.;iilmr r. Soiilhry (182(1). 1 M. .& M. 14 1100, 1201 
 
 Fatiiiiliarxoii r. S'toii (1828), ft Uuhh. 45 1123 
 
 Far,|iiliar»oti Tw.'..,hil.., In ro (1875), 44 L. J. P. i M. 35 ; 1„ U. 3 P. & I). 
 
 ■-MM ; 31 I,. T. 70!( 142, 702 
 
 F.irrah r. K. it ( 1h38), Dowl. 470 833 
 
 1 1'. * I). 437 
 
 2 W. \V. At 
 
 ...487, .'i.VJ, 
 
 Kattur r. H.'..wi.'k (1830). 1 M A: Hol>. ,')27. 
 Famir r. lliitchiliHon (18;10), A. & E. 041 
 
 II. 1(10 
 
 Furtar i. .Stufk|iolo (1820). (In-ciii. 154. . . 
 
 Faii-rr, .St. Citli.rino'H Coll.^fr (1873). L. H. 10 F-<|. 21 ; 42 L. .F. 
 
 Ml!) ; -iH L. T. ."^OO ; 21 W. K. 013 , 
 
 Farriii^doii v. r|,.rk (1782). 3 Donj?. 121 ; 2 (^hitty. 120 
 
 Fairiti({t4iti I. DoiiohiMt (18(i0\ Ir. R. 1 C. L. 07.'>'; 14 W. R. 022.. . 
 
 Fi.in.w r. MavcM (IH.V2). 18 (J. B. 510 : 17 .Fur. 132 
 
 I'.M ..'V , \V,'l»,„- (|S(191. Ah ],. .1. (;. P. 320; I,. R. 4 ('. P. 74 1 
 
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 Fii"ii c. Hmwii (lnoi), Pi'ikc, R 23 
 
 l'',iuiaer .'. Silk ^ISU), :t Canm. 120 ; 13 It. R, 771 
 
 Fit.ililM r. .iHikNoii (1845), 6 Ni.t.'M .,f Can. [Vaw. & Miir.1, Sujn). i 004, OOfl 
 
 FiiiilktiiT r, Itiiiii' (185H), 1 F. A: F. 254 0.39 
 
 Fauwitt r. FaiiHW'tt (1840), 7 NotoH of Cmm. (hxjo. jc Miir.), 93 380, .50« 
 
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 Ixxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 rAQB 
 
 Faviell v. East. Count. Ey. Co. (1848), 2 Ex. 344 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 54; 17 
 
 L. J. Ex. 223, 297 543 
 
 Fawcettv. Cash (1834), 6 B. & Ad. 904 ; 3 N. & M. 177 36, 153 
 
 Fawcett V. Jones (1810), 3 Phillim. 476 140 
 
 Fawcus, In the goods of (1884), 9 P. D. 241 ; 54 L. J. P. 47 ; 33 W. R. 323 ; 
 
 48 J. P. 743 1031 
 
 Fawcus V. Sarsfield (186G), 25 L. J. Q. B. 249 ; 6 E. & B. 192 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 666 771 
 
 Fawkesr. Lamb (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 98; 8 Jur. N. S. 385 756,782 
 
 Fazakerley v. Wiltshire (1720), 1 Str. 1720 17 
 
 Fearn v. Lewis (1830), 6 Bing. 349 ; 1 M. & P 1 712 
 
 Fearnside v. Flint (1882), 22 Ch. D. 579 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 479 : 48 L. T. 154 ; 
 
 31 W. R. 318 721 
 
 Feaubert v. Turst (1702), Preo. Ch. 207 938 
 
 Fellowes v. Clay (1842), 4 Q. B. 313 ; 3 G. & D. 407 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 202. . 76 
 
 Fellowes v. "Williamson (1829), M. & M. 306 378 
 
 Feltham's Trusts, Re (1855), 1 K. & J. 528 798 
 
 Fenn v. Griffith (1830), 6 Bing. 533 ; 4 M. & P. 299 285 
 
 Fennell v. Tait (1834), I C. M. & R. 584 ; 5 Tyr. 218 837 
 
 Fenner v. Lend. & S. E. Ry. Co. (1872). 41 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; L. R. 7 
 
 Q. B. 767 ; 26 L. T. 971 ; 20 W. R. 830 1186 
 
 Fenton v. Emblers (1762), 3 Burr. 1278 ; 1 W. Bl. 353 682 
 
 Fenwick, Re (1 867), L. R. 1 P. & D. 319 ; 36 L. J. P. 54 ; 16 L. T. 124 . . 704 
 
 Fenwick v. Bell (1844), 1 C. & K. 312 934, 935 
 
 Fenwick v. Laycock (1841), 2 Q. B. 108 ; 1 G. & D. 532 ; 6 Jur. 341 ; 11 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 146 650 
 
 Fenwick v. Reed (1816), 1 Meriv. 114 600 
 
 Fenwick v. Thornton (1827), M. & M. 51 495 
 
 Ferguson t). Mahon (1839), 11 A.&E. 179; 3P.&D. 143..8, 1142, 1147, 1148, 1154 
 
 Fernandey v. Glynn (1807), 1 Camp. 426 1200 
 
 Fernandez, Ex parte (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 3; 30 L. J. C. P. 321 920,962, 
 
 964 
 Femley v. Worthington (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 491; 1 Scott, N. R. 432; 
 
 4 Jur. 918 304, 1101 
 
 Ferrand v. Milligan (1845), 7 Q. B. 730 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 103 ; 10 Jur. 6 . . 1231 
 
 Ferrer V. Oven (1827), 7 B. & C. 427; 1 M. & R. 222 1038 
 
 Ferrers V. Arden (1599), 6 Co. Rep. 7; Cro. Eliz. 668 1110 
 
 Ferrers, Ld., v. Shirley (1730), Fitz-G. 195; Bull. N. P. 236 1221 
 
 Ferris*. Goodbum (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 574: 6 W. R. 485 763,807 
 
 Fesenmayer v. Adcock (1847), 16 M. & AV. 449 117 
 
 Fevershani, Ld., v. Emerson (1856), 11 Ex. 385 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 254 ; 26 L. 
 
 T. (O. S.) 28 ; 3 C. L. R. 1379 89 
 
 Fewr. Guppy (1830), lOBeav. 281, n. (i); 13 Beav. 457 597 
 
 Ffinoh V. Combe, (1894) 6 R. 545; (1894) P. 191 ; 63 L. J. P. 113; 70 
 
 L. T. 160 ; 42 W. R. 377 142, 708 
 
 Fielder, Re, Jones v. Frost 872), L. R. 7 Ch. 773 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 47 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 465 ; 20 W. R. 1025 93 
 
 Field V. Flemming (1836), 7 C. & P. 619; 6 Dowl. 460 ; 1 M. & H. 21 ; 
 
 1 Jur. 24 474 
 
 Field V. Gt. North. Ry. Co. (1878), 3 Ex. D. 261 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 662 ; 39 
 
 L.T.80; 26W.R.817 42 
 
 Field V. Hemming {ace Field v. Flemming). 
 
 Field V. Holland (1810), 6 Cranch, 8, 24 495 
 
 Field V. Lelean (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 170; 6 H. & N. 627; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 
 918; 4L T. 121; 9W. R. 387 756, 769 
 
 Field f. Woods (1837), 7 A. & E. 114 ; 2 N. & P. 117 226, 646 
 
 FiggP. Wedderbume (1842), 6 Jur. 218 419 
 
 Filipowskir. Merry weather (1860), 2 F. & F. 286 162 
 
 Filmerv. Gott(1774), 4 Brown. P. C. 230 746, 748 
 
 Financial Ins. Co., Re (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 687 845 
 
 Finch V. Finch (1752), 2 Ves. sen. 493 960 
 
 Finch V. Finch (1807), 36 L. J. P. & M. 78 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 371 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 268; 15 W. R. 797 143, 307 
 
 The r^erences art to pages, not to paragraph*. 
 
 I 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Fmch V. Finch (1882), 23 Ch. D. 267 ; 48 L. T. 129 ; 31 "W. R. 526 631 
 
 Finlay v. Bristol & Ex. Ry. Co. (1852), 7 Ex. 409 ; 7 Railw. Cas. 449 ; 21 
 
 L.J. Ex. 117 643 
 
 Finlay f. Finlay (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 149 62 
 
 Finn's case (1827), 5 Rand. 701 328 
 
 Finnerty v. Tipper (1809), 2 Camp. 72 245, 246 
 
 Finney v. Finney (1868), L. R. 1 P. & D. 483 ; 37 L. J. P. & M. 43 ; 18 
 
 L. T. 489 1106 
 
 Finney v. Grice (1878), 10 Ch. D. 13 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 247 ; 27 W. R. 147 . . 146 
 
 Firkin v. Edwards (1840), 9 C. & P. 478 314 
 
 Firth, Ex parte. Re Cowburn (1882), 19 Ch. D. 419 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 473 ; 45 
 
 L. T. 120 ; 30 W. R. 529 136 
 
 Firth, In re. Ex part* Schofield (1877), 12 Ch. D. 337; 48 L. J. Bank. 
 
 122 ; 40 L. T. 823 ; 27 W. R. 925 966 
 
 Fischer v. Popham (1875), L. R. 3 P. & D. 246 ; 44 L. J. P. 47 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 231 ; 23 W. R. 683 697 
 
 Fischer p. Szataray (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 239; E. B. & E. 321 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 632 347 
 
 Fish, Re, Ingham v. Rayner, (1894) 7 R. 434 ; (1894) 2 Ch. 83 ; 63 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 437 ; 70 L. T. 826 ; 24 W. R. 620 793 
 
 Fisher v. Clement (1830), 10 E. & 0. 475 82 
 
 Fisherv. Duddiug(1841), 9DowI. 872; 3M. &Gr. 238; 3 Scott, N. R. 516.. 1031 
 
 Fisher v. Heming (1809), cited 1 Ph. Evid. 170 600 
 
 Fisher v. Joyce (1839), cited 9 C. & P. 338 259 
 
 Fisher t). Keane (1880), 11 Ch. D. 353; 49 L. J. Ch. 11 ; 41 L. T. 335 .. 1147 
 
 Fisher v. IGtchingman (1742), Willes, 3f)7 1031 
 
 Fisher v. Lane (1771), 2 W. Bl. 834 ; 3 Wils. 297 1033, 1034 
 
 Fisher v. Magnay (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 787 ; 1 D. & L. 40 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 
 
 588 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 276 643 
 
 Fisher v. Ogle (1808), 1 Camp. 419 1149 
 
 Fisher v. Owen (1878), 8 Ch. D. 645 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 38 L. T. 577 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 581 961, 964 
 
 Fisher V. Ronalds fl852). II C. B. 762; 22 L. J. C. P. 62; 17 Jur. 393; 
 
 20L. T. O. S. 1!0: 1 W. R. 54 964, 970 
 
 Fisher v. Samuda (1808), 1 Camp. 193 357 
 
 Fisher f. Thames June. Ry. Co. (1837), 5 Dowl. 773 .227, 357 
 
 Fishmongers' Co. v. Dimsdale (1852), 6 C. B. 896 ; 12 C. B. 557 ; 22 L. J. 
 
 0. P. 44 ; 16 Jur. 799 1213 
 
 Fishmongers' Co. v. Robertson (1845), 5 M. & Gr. 194; 12 L. J. C. P. 
 
 185 ; 6 Scott. N. R. 56 97, 531, 552 
 
 Fishmongers' Co. v. Robertson (1845), 1 C. B. 67 1213 
 
 Fitch V. Jones (1865), 6 E. & B. 238 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 854 201, 262 
 
 Fitch V. Smallbrook (1661), T. Raym. 32 l(J3i 
 
 Fitz r. Rabbits (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 60 306 
 
 Fitzgerald t'. Dressier (1859), 29 L. J. C. P. 113; 7 C. B. N. S. 374; 6 
 
 Jur. N. S. 593 676 
 
 Fitzgerald r. Elsee (1811), 2 Camp. 635 1209 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (1849), 8 Com. B. 492 1069 
 
 Fitzgeraldw.Fitzgerald(18G3),3S.&T. 397; 33L. J.P.&M. 39; llW.R.85 325 
 
 Fitzgerald v. O'Flaherty (1827), 2 Moll. 394, n 487 
 
 Fitz- James v. Moys (1003), 1 Sid. 133 ; Audr. 321 899 
 
 Fitzmaurice, Re (1864), 15 Ir. Ec]. R. 445 720 
 
 Fitzmaurice v. Bayley (1857), 8 E. & B. 064 ; 9 H. L. Cas. 78 673, 729 
 
 Fitzpatriok v. Dunphy (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 306 117 
 
 Fitzroy, Sir C, Re (1858), 1 S. & T. 133 702 
 
 Fitzwalter Peer. (1842). Pari. Min. 34, 91 425, 426, 1226, 1227, 1228 
 
 Fladoyen, The (1799), 8 T. R. 270, n 1143 
 
 Flaggr. Mann (1837), 2 Sumn. 487 909 
 
 Flannery's case (1832), I Lew. C. C. 133 824 
 
 Flannerv v. Wuterford & C. Rv. Co. (1877), I. R. 1 1 C. L. 30 103 
 
 Fleet t). 'Murtou (1871), 41 L. J. Q. B. 49; L. R. 7 Q. B. 126; 26L. T. 181 ; 
 
 20 W. R. 97 232, 764, 769 
 
 m 
 
 Vol, I. tnd* teithpagt 636, 
 
Ixxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Fleet V. Perrius (1868), 37 L. J. Q. B. 233 ; L. R. 3 Q. B. 536 ; 9 B. & S. 
 
 675 ; 19 L. T. 147 103G, 1037 
 
 Flemings. Flemiug (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 419; 1 H. & C. 242 793 
 
 Fleming v. Newton (1848), 1 H. of L. Cas. 363 1005 
 
 Fletcher v. Braddyll (1821), 3 Stark. R. 64 154, 932 
 
 Fletcher v. Calthrop (1840), 6 Q. B. 880, 891 ; 1 Now Sosb. Cas. 529 ; 14 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; 9 Jur. 205 131 
 
 Fletcher v. Fro-gatt (1827), 2 C. & P. 569 479 
 
 Fletcher v. Gillespie (1826), 3 Binjr. 035 ; 11 Moore, C. P 5 17 754 
 
 Fletcher v. Gt. West. Rv. Co. (1859), 4 H. & N. 242 ; 29 L. J. E.x. 253 ; 
 
 6 Jur. N. S. 961 ; 8 W. R. 501 114 
 
 Fletcher v. L. & N. W. R. Co. (1892), 1 Q. B. 122 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 324 ; 
 
 65 L. T. 606; 40 W. R. 182 1138 
 
 Flinn v. Calow (1840\ 1 M. & Gr. 589 758 
 
 Flitters V. Allfrey (1874), 44 L. J. C. P. 73 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 29 ; 31 L. T. 
 
 881 1117, 1119 
 
 Flood V. Russell, (1892) 29 L. R. Ir. 91 436 
 
 Flory V. Denny (1852), 7 Ex. 581 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 223 639 
 
 Flower v. Herbert (1851), 2 Ves. son. 326 542 
 
 Flovd V. Barker (1607), 12 Co. Rep. 25 1099 
 
 Flureau v. Thombill (1775-6), 2 \V. Rl. 1078 773 
 
 Fogarty r. Smith (1836), 4 Dowl. o'JS, n 15 
 
 Foggassa's ca.se (1349), Y. B. 24 Edw. 3, 23, cited in Olive r. Guin, 2 Sid. 146 8 
 
 Foley t'. Tabor (1861), 2 F. & F. 663 270 
 
 Folkes V. Cbadd (1782), 3 Doug. 157 240, 930, 932 
 
 FoUettt'. Jefferyes(isr;0), 1 Sim. N. S. 17; 20L. J. Ch. 65; 15 Jur. 118. ..592,605 
 
 Fonsick v. Agar (1807), 6 E.sp. 92 328 
 
 Foot V. Clarke (1826), 1 Ruj^s. 604 423 
 
 Foot V. Stanton (1856), Dwino, Ecc. R. 19 697 
 
 Foot V. Tracy (1806), 1 Johns. 45 255 
 
 Foote V. Hayne (1824), 1 C. & P. 545 : Ry. & M. 165 699 
 
 Foquet v. Moor (1852), 7 Ex. 870 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 35 657 
 
 Forbes' case (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 467 ; 20 W. R. 585 ; 26 L. T. 680 845 
 
 Forbesf.Forbes(1854),Kay,364; 2Eq. R. 178; 23L. J.Ch. 724; 18Jur.642. 179 
 Ford V. Ager (1863), 2 H. & C. 279 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 138 ; 7 L. T. 795 ; 11 
 
 W. R. 429 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 416 75 
 
 Ford V. Batley (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 225 ; 17 Beav. 303 800 
 
 Ford V. Coteswoilh (1870), 9 B. & S. 559 ; 10 B. & S. 991 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 
 
 544; 39L. J. Q. B. 188; 23L. T. 165; 18 W. R. 1169 154 
 
 Ford V. Elliott (1849), 4 Ex. 78 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 447 382 
 
 Ford V. Ford (1848), 6 Hare. 490 741 
 
 Ford V. Tennant (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 466 ; 32 Beav. 162 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 292 ; 
 
 7 L. T. 732 ; 1 1 W. R. 324 608 
 
 Ford i\ Yates (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 549 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 645 757 
 
 Fordham v. Wallis (1852-3), 10 Hare, 217 ; 17 Jur. 228 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 548 493 
 
 Forman v. Free Fishers of Whitstable (1869), L. R. 4 11. L. 266 ; 21 L. T. 804 123 
 
 Forinanf. Wright (1851), 11 C. B. 481 ; 20 L.J. C. P. 145; 15 Jur. 706.. 201 
 
 Forrest v. Fon-est (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 428 666 
 
 Forshaw v. Chabert (1821), 3 B. & B. 158; 6 Moore (C. P.), 369 1193 
 
 Forshawt). Lewis (1855), 10 Ex. 716; 1 Jiir. N. S. 263 1184 
 
 Forster v. Clements (1809), 2 Camp. 17 : 1 1 R. R. 650 647 
 
 Forster v. Farquhar, (1893) 1 Q. B. 564 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 296 ; 68 L. T. 
 
 308; 41 W. R. 425 42 
 
 Forster v. Forster (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 1 1:< 1215 
 
 Forster v. Hale (179H), 3 Ves. 696 ; 6 Ves. 308 ; 4 R. R. 128 665 
 
 Forster v. Mackreth (1867), 22 L. J. Ch. 926 160 
 
 Forster v. Rowland (1H61), 30 L. J. Ex. 396 ; 7 H. & N. 103 676 
 
 Forsyth v. Bristowe (1853), 8 Ex. 716 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 255 ; 17 Jur. 675 . . 722 
 
 Forsythe v. Norcross (1836), 6 Watts, 432 458 
 
 Forth V. Stanton (1668), 1 Wms. Saunders, 21 la, 21 le 676 
 
 Foster v. Allansou (1788), 2 T. R. 479 754 
 
 Foster V. Bank of England (1846), 8 Q. B. 689 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 212 ; 10 
 
 Jur. 372 997 
 
 TAt referencM art to paget, not io paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 1 
 
 XXXI 
 
 FADE 
 
 Foster v. Blakelock (1826), 6 B. & C. 328 ; 8 D. & R. 48 653 
 
 Foster V. Charles (1S30), 6 Bing. 396 ; 7 Bing. 105 ; 4 M. & P. 61, 741 .. 82 
 
 Foster v. Comptoii (1818), 2 Stark. 364 1032 
 
 FoNter V. Hall (1831), 12 Pick. 89 599, 600 
 
 Foster V. Jolly (1835), 1 C. M. k R. 707 ; 5 Tyr. i;39 ; 4 L. J. Ex. 65. .748, 757 
 Foster v. Mentor Life Ass. Co. (1854), 3 E. & B. 48 ; 2 0. L. R. 1404 ; 23 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 145 ; 18 Jur. 828 44, 538, 548, 7'''9 
 
 Foster V. M'Mahon (1847), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 287 437, 5j3 
 
 Fosters. Pointer (1840), 9 C. & P. 718 189, 315, 319 
 
 Foster V. Shaw (1821), 7 Serg. & R. 163 353, 354, 1097 
 
 Foster V. Steele (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 892 ; 5 Scott, 25 ; 3 Hedges, 231 . . 176 
 
 Foulkes V. Sellway (IHOO). 3 Esp. 236 255, 373 
 
 Fountain f. Boodle (1842), 3 Q. B. 5 ; 2 G. & D. 455 Ill, 253 
 
 Fountain v. Young (1807), 6 Esp. 113 GOO 
 
 Fowell V. Forreist (1609-70), 2 Wms. Saund. 47 ft, 47 gg 750 
 
 Fowkes V. Pascoe (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 307 ; L. R. 10 Ch. 343 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 545 ; 23 W. R. 538 667, 806 
 
 Fowler f. Coster (1828), M. & M. 241 ; 3 C. & P. 463 270 
 
 Fowler V. Fowler (1735), 3 P. Wms. 353 806 
 
 Fowler V. Fowler (1859), 4 De G. & J. 2.i0 749 
 
 Fowler r. Fowler (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 680 ; 44 L. T. 799 ; 29 W. R. 800. . 321 
 
 Fowler V. Sa\ ,ige (1819), 3 Conn. 90 1098 
 
 Fowlis r. Davidson (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 473 263 
 
 Fox V. Clifton (1830). 6 Bing. 792 3S6, 640 
 
 Foxf. Fox (lS6:i), 15 Ir. Eq. N. S. 89 '66 
 
 Fox V. Jones (182S), 7 B. & C. 732 ; 1 M. •& R. 670 998 
 
 Fox V. Waters (1840), 12 A. & E. 43 291 , 492 
 
 Fox's case (1863), 3 Dc G. J. & S. 405 1176 
 
 Foxcroft V. Nevens (1826), 4 Greenl. 72 508 
 
 France v. Lucy (1826), Ry. & M. 341 313 
 
 Frauchot v. Leach (1H26), 5 Cowen, 508 746 
 
 Francis v. Cockrell (1870), L. R. 5 Q. B. 184 ; o9 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; L. R. 
 
 5 Q. B. 5M1 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 291 : 10 B. & S. 950 772 
 
 Francis t>. Dichfield (1742), 2 Cc.op. 631 760, 805 
 
 Francis v. Hawkesley (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 370 ; 1 E. & E. 1052 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1391 710 
 
 Francisco r. Gilmore (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 177 341 
 
 Francklin's case (1731), 17 How. St. Tr. 025 25 
 
 Frank v. Frank (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 315 1102 
 
 Franklin v. Baker (1893, should be "1891"), 29 Am. St. Rep. 547; 48 
 
 Ohio, 296 1192 
 
 Frankum v. Ld. Falmo th (1835), 6 C. & P. 529 ; 2 A. & E. 452 192 
 
 Fraser. Re (1869), 39 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 40 703 
 
 Eraser t'. Burrows (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 601 ; 2 Q. B. D. 624 11«6 
 
 Eraser v. Hill (1853), 1 Macq. 398 ; 1 Paterson, 232 30 
 
 Fraser v. Pondlebury (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 1 ; 10 W. R. 104 94 
 
 Fray v. Blackburn (1863), 3 B. & S. 576 1099 
 
 Frayes v. Worms (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 149 1152 
 
 Frederick v. Att.-Gen. (1874), 44 L. J. P. & M. 11 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 270 ; 
 
 32 L. T. 39 409 
 
 Free v. Hawkins (1817), Holt, N. P. R. 650 648, 767 
 
 Free Fishers of Wliitstiiblc ». Foreman (1869), L. R. 2 C. P. 688 ; 37 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 305 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 346 ; L. R. 4 H. 266 ; 21 L. T. 804 123 
 
 Free Fishers of Whitstablc v. Gann (1863), 11 C. B. N. S. 387 ; 13 C. B. 
 
 N. S. 859 123 
 
 Freeman v. Arkell (1824), 2 B. & C. 494 ; 3 D. & R. 669; 1 C. & P. 135, 
 
 3'J6 303, 616 
 
 Freeman v. Baker (1833), 6 C. & P. 482 ; 6 B. & Ad. 797 ; 2 N. & M. 446 1047 
 Freeman v. Cooke (1848), 2 Ex. 662 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 189 ; 18 L, J. Ex. 1 14. .89, 
 
 90, 538, 543, 660 
 Freema-.i v. Cox (1878), 8 Ch. D. 148 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 660 ; 26 W. R. 689 . . 624 
 Freeman v. Freeman (1864), 23 L. J. Ch. 838; 6 De G. M. & G. 704; 
 
 Kay, 479 704 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 ,1" I-;;! 
 
 
 Vol, I. end* with page 636. 
 
Ixxxii 
 
 TABLE OP CASKS CITKD. 
 
 PAOH 
 
 Prooman v. OalnHford (1805), 3t L. J. 0. P. 95; 18 0. B. N. 8. 185; 1 
 
 H. & P. 255 ; 1 1 Jiir. N. H. 1 Hi ; 11 L. T. 075 ; Hi W. R. lUH 684 
 
 Frociimii V. I'liillipim (IHKi). \ M. & HA. 48(1; 1(1 U. II. 524.,;i'J5, ■»()4, HO, 411 
 FriM'iiiiiii r. l'<>i)i) (1S7(I), Fi. K. i) Kt{. 20(1 ; L. 11. 5 Oh. 5;{8 ; 39 L. J. Cli. 
 
 14«, (iS9; 21 L. T. 81(1 ; IH W. li. !)()(! 136 
 
 Frooiimn v. R.'iid (IHOli), 3> I,. J. M. V,. 220; 4 U.&H. 174; 10 Jiir. N. 8. 
 
 1 19 : 8 L. T. 458 ; 11 VV. R. 802 ; 95 :i9(i, 1010 
 
 Fri'omiui V. Htx'jfKiil (1849), 14 (i. H. 202; 19 L.J. Q B. 18; 13jur. ../tn.. 474, 
 
 1192, 1212 
 Fmrnian v. Tiitlmm (IHKi), 5 Hans 329 ; 15 L. J. Oli. ;i23 ; 10 Jiir. 08,i. , 482 
 
 Frcmrmn r. Wiilkcr (1829), (I (Jrcciil. (18 551 
 
 Frcciiioiiit r. l)(!(liro (1718), 1 I' Wiiih. 431 930 
 
 FrccHtotio /'. But(!lii!r (1840), 9 (!. & I'. (i47 100 
 
 Frctich r. Vrrurh fl7')5), 1 Diitk. 208 1 104 
 
 Fpjstoti, In r.i (1883).52L..1.(M1. 515; II (J. B. 1). 545: 31 W. R. 804 . . 808 
 Fri<'k.T's .•iiHc, R«( Blink of lliiidustan (1871), L. R. 13 Kq. 178; 41 L. J. 
 
 <!li. 278 815 
 
 Friend v. I><.nd. <!lmt,. & I). Ry. (1877), I.. H,2 Kx.437; 40 Fi..!. Kx. 090. .597, 1 180 
 FrniHc]) (hIiouM lie rrinHcp) anil 10. India Oo. v. Dycc Honibru (1832 Hlmnld 
 
 he 1850), I.) Mod. I". (!.(!. 28'> 140 
 
 Frith, Re (1858), 27 L. J. I'. A: M. ; I 8. & T. 8 ; 4 Jar. N. S. 288 700 
 
 Frith i;. Uiirker (1807), 2 .lohnH. 335 705 
 
 Frost f. Holloway (1818), cited 1 Stark. Kvid. 212 ; 2 I'h. Kvid. 500 .... 907 
 Front V. Oliver (1853), 2 E. & B. 301 ; 1 C. L. R. 1003 ; 22 I,. .1. il. U. 
 
 3.)3 ; 18 Jiir. 100 17s 
 
 Fronde r. Ilohim (1859), 1 Kont. & Fin. 012 20 
 
 Fry I'. (;hai>niaii (1830), 5 Dowl. T. C. 2(i5 2S7 
 
 Fry r. Hill (1817), 7 Taiin. 397; 18 R. R. 512 37 
 
 Fry V. Wood (17.il), 1 Atk. II') 328, 329 
 
 Fryer v. WiHcniiin (1870), 15 L, J. ('At. 199 ; 24 W. R.. 205 ; 33 L. T. 779. . 910 
 FuentcM f>. Montis (18(;8), L. R. 4 ('. 1'. 93 ; 38 L. .). (;. I'. 95 ; 19 li. T. 
 
 304 ; 17 \V. R. 208 110 
 
 Fuller V. ( Vitti iiden (1832), 9 Conn. 401 552. 744 
 
 Fuller «. F.iiwiek (lH|i.), 3 C. B. 705; 10 L. J. (.'. 1". 79; lO.liir. 1().)7 .. 1100 
 
 Fuller I). Kotch (1095). ('arth. 311) 1050, 1051, 1059, 1103 
 
 Fuller t). Hamilton (1824), 5 Conn. 110 515 
 
 Fulhirr. I'attri.k (1849), 18 I,. ,1. Q. B, 230 1211 
 
 FuUer r. IVentire (1788), I ||. B|. 49; 2 R. R. 715 819 
 
 Fuller '•. Rc^dnian (1859), 20 Beuv. 014 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 321 ; 5 ,Ti,r. N. H. 
 
 1045 713 
 
 FuliiierNlon /'. Steward (1551), I'lowden, 107a 
 
 Fulton r. Andrew (1875), I/. R. 7 11. L. 401 ; 44 li. J. I'. & M. 23; 32 
 
 L. T. 209 : 23 W. R. 500 
 
 Fulwood'H, Latly, rase (1037), Cm. Car. 483; 1 Chit. (V. L. 40J 
 
 Furl.y r. Wooil (1791), 1 Ksp 198 
 
 Furlong t;. Howard (1801), 2 Sirh. i^; I,..f. 115 
 
 Fiirly »'. Newnliiim (I7H0I, 2 Hoii)<. 4 19 
 
 Furni'aux v. llutehiriH (1778), 2 ( lowp. 8;)7 
 
 Fnrnell v. Stm l<|)oole (182!)), Millwurd, 485 9, 
 
 Furne.HMf). Meek (18.-)7), 27 1-. .1. K\ :il 44, 17, 
 
 FurHilon V. CIokr (1842), 10 M. Ac VV. 572 
 
 Fut(dier )'. l<'ut<!her (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 735; 45 L. T. 300; 29 W. R. 
 
 884 
 
 Fyler V. (liveuM (183.5), Riley, \.. V>ih. 50 
 
 FyHon r. ChaniherH (1842). 9 M. >t W. 400; 11 L. .1. Kx. 190 
 Fyson 1'. Kemp (1833), C. &, 1'. 71 
 
 058 
 
 140 
 
 980 
 700 
 321 
 837 
 231 
 1024 
 1204 
 437 
 
 224 
 
 009 
 
 117 
 
 1018 
 
 Pi 
 
 OAiiAYr. Lloyd (1825), 3 B. * (!. 703 IfiR 
 
 tJalibett r. Claney (1814-5), 8 Ir. L. R. 299 1040 
 
 Oadil I'. Honj^htr)!! (1877). 40 I,. .1. Kx. 71 ; 1 Kx. I). 357 758 
 
 OaiuNford i>. (Irainniar (1809), 2 Cam]). 9; II R. R. 018 500, 007 
 
 The rf/creticci t:re to payei, not to pmuytaplu. 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CrPED. 
 
 hx 
 
 MU 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Giilliriiith r. Ncvillo (ITTfl-fi), 1 Douj?. 0, n 1164, ii.-.» 
 
 (Jnl(. c. I.iiido (1SH7, Nlitmld h<^ 10H7), 1 V.-rii. 175 5»'» 
 
 GuIm I'. Willimiiwm (1841), K M. & W. 4(IS ; 10 L. J. Ex. 44(i 748, 7Al 
 
 (iiilMWOrthy r. Nornmii (IHAI), 21 h. ,h il H. 70 llBr) 
 
 {iiiimiKXiiic, Tim (18()'2), Lusli. 448 1P8 
 
 (iimcrr. I.iiiii'HlKiniiiKli (IT'.)"). ' l'<'iiki'. 18; H R. U. (il7 938 
 
 (iaiiii r. En-o l-mhfiM of VVliitHtiiM.. (18(1'2), 20 O. H. N. S. 1 ; lift L. J. C. 
 
 1'. 2i) : r2 L. T. \M) ; i;t W. K. M\) ; II ILL. Cum. llfJ 123 
 
 Oimn ('. OiTjrnrv {\XM), '22 L. .1. Cli. lO.V.); 3 1). M. & (1. 777 ; 18 Jur. 
 
 l(Mi;t; 2 Ki{. \l. 484 ; 2 W. H. 484 142 
 
 Ouiiii r. .ToliiiNoii (18(i;i), 11 (!. H. N. S. ;iH7; 13(!. H. N. S. 8.V.) 123 
 
 (iiii-liuH r. Siii.i)'..iii (18t);i), ;i2 L. J. M. U. I8(i ; 2 Ni'w U. 27(1 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 42.t ; 1 1 W. R. 7r>l 951 
 
 (liiiviiiN r. Ri' iirdi. (1844), 14 Him. 2(i5 ; 12 (U. & Eiii. ;t(i8 1 142 
 
 (iiinlni r. Cir.xHWi'll (1837), 2 M.«t W. 31U; 6 DdwI. 4til ; M. & H. 44 . . 810, 832 
 
 (JiinlciuT r. I'liiiKir (18(l(i), 3,') Rciiv. 54!) 130 
 
 (iiiidiicr, R.^ (18.'.8), 27 L. J. 1'. & M. S,-) ; 1 8. & T. 109 356 
 
 (Jiinlii.rlVcr. (1727), Lc MaroIiiiiit'H R.'i).389, 4 32; SrUv. N. P. (i72— 074 . . 101 
 
 (iiirdmirf. ('nmHdiil.i (17(10), 2 Hurr. 904 207 
 
 (iardiuir r. Onuit (1857), 2 C. H. N. S. 340 (190 
 
 Uaidnur r. M.Miilioii (1812), 3 Q. H. 501; 2 O. & I). 593; Jur. 712; 
 
 11 li. J. U. M. 297 710, 711 
 
 (iiirdiMT r. Moult, (1839), 10 A. »^i K. 4(14 ; 2 P. & I). 403 500 
 
 Gnrdiiurr. WmImIi (1855), i) K. & U. H". ; 24 L. .1. Q. V 28r) ; 1 .lur. N. S. 
 
 828 1194 
 
 Oimloin, Kx piirt.o (1808), 15 Vch. 28(i Kil 
 
 Garoy v. NIcIioInoii (1810), 24 Wriid. 350 222, 479 
 
 Garcy r. I'vkc (I8:tii), 10 A. \- K. 512 ; 2 P. \- I). 127 222 
 
 (iarlaiul. Re, (iarland v. Itcvciloy (1878), 47 L. J. Oil. 71 1 ; 9 Cli. I). 213 ; 
 
 3S I,. T. 91 1 ; 20 W. R. 718 798 
 
 Garland v. ("o|>o (1848), II Ir. L. R. 514 444 
 
 Giiilaiid r. J»(M>iid) (1873), L. R 8 Kx. 21(1; 28 L. T. 877 ; 21 VV. U. 8(18 547 
 
 Garland r. HcoonoM (l7!'8), 2 Ksi). 048 1032 
 
 (Jarlorh r. (Jcortiirr (181(1), 7 Wfiid. 198 l.')4 
 
 (ianicr r. (iarniT (18(10), 29 Hcav. 11(1; 7 L. T. 182 708 
 
 Gariiot, r. Hall (1822), 3 Stark. R. 1(10 49<» 
 
 (ianictt, IiL re, (landv I'. Macaulay (1885), ;tl Cli. I). 1 (i;U 
 
 (iariH'tt. f. Konaiid (1827). H. \-"(". Oil ; 8 I). \ R.. (157 1099 
 
 Gani.'lt c. \V Icofk (1817), (1 M. & S. 44 ; 1 Stark. R. 475 113 
 
 (iariii.T, Ro (1872), L. R. 13 I'^i. 532 ; 41 T,. .1. Cli. 419 ; 20 W. R. 288 . . 1150 
 
 GariioriH r. Maniard (1791). 1 An«t,r. 298; 3 Kajrli- \- V. 3S0 401 
 
 Garrurd r. Lcwin (1882), 10 Q. R. I). 30; 47 L. T. 408 120.5 
 
 (iarrard i: Tuck (1840), 8 (!. H. 231 ; 18 li. .1. (;. P. 338 ; 13 .lur. 871 127 
 
 (ianvllH V. Alcxaii.lcr (1801), 4 Ksp. 37 1220, 1223 
 
 (iarrct.t. r. llandl.'V (1825), 4 11. \- (!. (1(11 ; 7 D. .V R. 144 : I C. & I'. 483. 759 
 (iartli r. Howard '(18;!2), 8 Ring. 451 ; 5 0. it P. 31(1; 1 Moo. & Sc. 028.. 888. 
 
 ;I90 
 
 GartNido r. Outram (185vl), 20 L. J. Cli. llfl ; 3 .Tur. N. S. 39 592 
 
 (iarLsidiM'. Sdk.'^tou.., \-.r. (^). (1882), 21 Cli. I). 702; 51 L. .F.Ch. 828; 47 
 
 L. 'V. 70; 31 \V. R. 3(1 133 
 
 (iarviii r. Carroll fl847), U) Ir. L. R. 330 957, 1013 
 
 (ias l.iKlit and Coko Co. r. Turner (18,10-40), 5 HiuK. N. C. 000 ; Ring. 
 
 N. C. 324 ; 7 Scc.ii, 779 ; 8 Scott,. 009 01 
 
 Gaskill r. Skcrnc (1857). 19 L. ,1. U. R. 275 ; 1 1 (i. R. (i04 ; 14 Jur. 507.. 525 
 
 GaHMC. Stiiimm (1837). 2 Suniii. (110 972 
 
 GatluTtiolo I'. Miull (184(1), 15 M. .V W. 319; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 
 
 337 303 
 
 Gatty V. Erv (1877), L. K. 2 Ex. Div. 205; 4(1 J^. J. Ex. 005 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 182 ; 25 \V. R. 305 540 
 
 Gaunt r. Jolnwon (1848), Rcuv. 551 819 
 
 Gaunt f. VVainnian (183(1), 3 IliiiK. N. (!. 09; 3 Scott, 413; 2 HodKOH. 
 
 180 95, 1 109 
 
 Vol. I. ciuh with poji* 036. 
 
Ixxxiy 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOI 
 
 Gitusdmi, Ro (1862), 2 S. & T. 362 ; 31 L. J. P. 53 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 180 ; 6 
 
 L. T. 767 699 
 
 Grty V. Hill (1819). 18 L. J. Q. B. 12; 5 Dowl. & L. 122 734 
 
 Gazo V. Giizo (ISi;!), 3 Curt. 4.')1 696 
 
 G*ach V. Ingall (1845), 14 M. & W. 96 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 37; 9 Jur. 691. .258, 259, 
 
 273 
 
 Geary v. Hopkins (1702), 2 Lfl. Riivm. 8,-)l 997 
 
 Goaves r. Price (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 113 : 3 S. & T. 71 "04 
 
 Gee v. Wurd (1857), 7 E, & B. 509; 3 Jur. N. S. 692 404, 411 
 
 Geill V. .Toremy (1827), M. & M. 61 32 
 
 Geils r. Geils ■^852), 1 Miicq. 36, 255 ; 1 Paterson, 1 1 144 
 
 General De Caen, the (1855), Swa. 9 178 
 
 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Brit, and Col. St. Nav. Co. (1869), L. R. 3 E.x. 330; 
 
 L. R. 4 Ex. 238 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 194 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 97 ; 20 L. T. 581 ; 17 
 
 W. R. 741 178 
 
 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Guillou (1843), 11 M. & W. 877 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 
 
 168 1143, 1146, 1152 
 
 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Hedlcy (1869), L. R. 3 P. 0. 44 ; 39 L. J. Adm. 
 
 2U ; 21 L. r. 086 ; 18 W. R. 264 ; 6 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 263 6 
 
 Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Lond. and Ed. Ship. Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 467 ; 47 
 
 L. J. Ex. 77 ; 36 L. T. 743 ; 25 W. R. 694 41 
 
 Gen. Stcum Nav. Co. v. Mann (1855), 14 C. B. 127 ; 22 L. T. (0. 8.) 223 ; 
 
 2 W. R. 154 6 
 
 Gen. Stciim Nav. Co. v. Morrison (1856), 13 C. B. 581 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 179. . 6 
 
 Genese, In re, Ex parte Gilbert (1885). 3 Morrell, B. R. 223 964, 966 
 
 Goniug V. The State (1822), 1 McC. 573 267 
 
 George's Estate, Re, King v. George (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 759 ; 25 W. R. 038 ; 808 
 
 George v. Pritchard (1826). Ry. & M. 417 773 
 
 George v. Surrey (1830), 1 M. & M. 516 1220 
 
 George v. Tliompson (1836). 4 Dowl. 656 314 
 
 Geralopulo v. Wieler (1851), 10 C. B. 712; 20 L. J. C. P. 105 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 316 290, 299 
 
 Gerish v. Chartier (1845), 1 C. B. 13 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 84 ; 9 Jur. 69 242 
 
 German Mining Co., Re (1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 926 ; 4 De G. M. & G. 19 . . 160 
 Germania, The (1868), 37 L. J. Adm. 59 ; 19 L. T. 20 ; 21 L. T. 44 .... 364 
 
 Gervis v. Grand West. Canal Co. (1816), 5 M. & Sel. 76 1165 
 
 Ger- V. Redman (1875), L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 161 ; 45 l,. J. Q. B. 267 ; 24 
 
 \V. R. 270 112,444 
 
 Geyer v. Aquilar (1798), 7 T. R. 636 ; 4 R. R. 543 1103 
 
 Geyi^r v. Irwin (1790), 4 Dall. 107 871 
 
 Gib'jlehouse v. Strong (1832), 3 Rawle, 437 443, 5 U 
 
 Gibbon r. Budd (186.3), 32 L. J. Ex. 182 ; 2 H. & C. 92 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 525 ; 8 L. T. 321 620 
 
 Gibbon v. Featherst(jnhaugh (1816), 1 Stark. R. 225 154 
 
 Gibbon «;. Young (1818), 2 Moore (C. P.), 224 763 
 
 Gibbon's case (1734), 17 How. St. Tr. 810 1176 
 
 Gibbons v. PoweU (1840), 9 C. & P. 634 314 
 
 Gibbons v. Wilcox (1817), 2 Stark. R. 43 494 
 
 Gibbs V. Cruikshank (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 451 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 273 ; 28 
 
 L. T. 735 ; 21 W. R. 734 1118 
 
 Gibbs V. Fremont (1853), 9 Ex. 25 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 302 ; 17 Jur. 820 48 
 
 Gibbs V. Guild (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 69 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; 46 L. T. 248 ; 
 
 30 W. R. 591 71 
 
 Gibbs V. Phillipson (1829), 1 Russ. & My. 19 867 
 
 Gibbs V. Pike (1842), 9 M. & W. 351, 360, 361 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 409; 12 
 
 L. J. Ex. 257; 6 Jur. 465 85, 111, 1231 
 
 Gibbs V. Ralph (1845), 14 M. & W. 804; 15 L. J. Ex. 7 1139 
 
 Gibson v. Doeg (otherwise Doey) (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 37 ; 2 H. & N. 615. . 128 
 Gibson v. Fast India Co. (1839), 6 .'^ing. N. 0. 269 ; 1 Am. 493 ; V Scott, 
 
 74; 3 Jur. 66 640,642, 644 
 
 Gibson v. Holland (1865), 35 L. J. C. P. 6 ; 1 H. & R. 1 ; L. R. 1 0. P. 
 
 1; 11 Jur. N. S. 1022 ; 13L.T.293; 14 W. R. 86 672,673 
 
 The references are to paget, not to paragraph$. 
 
 r^ 
 
 i;. -1 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxv 
 
 763 
 
 175 
 iU 
 194 
 
 [IS 
 48 
 
 71 
 
 !67 
 
 l23 
 I44 
 I73 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Gibson t> Huntor (1794), 2 H. Bl. 288 ; G Bro. P. C. 235, 255 242 
 
 Gibson V. M'Cnrty (173G), Gas. temp. Hardwicke, 311 1116 
 
 Gibson V. Small (1863), 4 H. L. Gas. 39G ; 1 C. L. R. 363; 17 Jur. 
 
 1131 770, 771 
 
 Gilbert 0. Endean (1878), 9 Ch. D. 259 ; 39 L. T. 404 ; 27 W. R. 252. . . . 914 
 Gilbert f. Smith (1876), 2 Ch. D. 686 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 514 ; 35 L. T. 43 ; 24 
 
 W. R. 568 634 
 
 Gilbert v. Svkes (1812), 16 East, 151 ; 14 R. R. 327 682 
 
 Gilchrist r. "Bale (1839), 8 Wutts, 355 374, 375 
 
 GiUlea v. Brieu (1821), 10 Ir. C. L. R. 230 865 
 
 Giles V. Dyson (1815), 1 Stark. R. 32 ; 18 R. R. 743 553 
 
 Giles r. Sinev (1864), 3 New R. 78 ; 11 L. T. 310 ; 13 W. R. 92 1032 
 
 Giles V. Warren (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. 401 ; 41 L. J. P. 69; 26 L. T. 
 
 780 ; 21) W. R. 827 703, 705 
 
 Gillaiiders r. Ld. Rossmore (1835), Joues, 504 683 
 
 Gillardt!. Bates (1840), 6 M. & \V. 547 ; 8 Dowl. 774; 9 L. J. Ex. 171 .. 611 
 
 Gillespie v. Gumming' (1841), Long. & T. 181 1031 
 
 Gillespie v. Moon (1817), 2 Johng. Ch. (Am.), 585 749 
 
 Gillespie v. Riissel (1859), 3 Maccj. 757 ; 1 Paterson, 877 1139 
 
 Gillett V. Abbott (1862), 3 N. & P. 24 ; 7 A. & E. 783 ; 2 Jur. 300 ; 1 \V. 
 
 W. &H. 89 95 
 
 Gillett V. Gane (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 29 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 818 ; 18 \V. R. 423 ; 
 
 2 ! L. T. 5S 798 
 
 Gihiatr. Gilliat (1860), 28 Beav. 481 804 
 
 Gillies r. Smither (1819), 2 Stiirk. R. 528 1208 
 
 Gillis V. Gillis (1874). I. R. 8 Eq. 597 179 
 
 Gillman v. Connor (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 210 36 
 
 Gilpin V. Fowler (1854), 9 Ex. 615 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 152 ; 18 Jur. 292 Ill 
 
 Giraud v. Richmond (1846), 2 C. B. 835 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 180 681, 753 
 
 Gisbome v. Hart (1839), 5 M. & W. 50 ; 7 Dowl. 402 ; 3 Jur. 536; 8 
 
 L. J. Ex. 197 1038 
 
 Giveus V. Bradley (1813), 3 Bibb, 192 252 
 
 GladwelU'. Turner (1869), 39 L. J. Ex. 31; 5 L. R. Ex. 59; 21 L. T. 
 
 674 ; IS W. R. 317 32 
 
 Glannibanta, The (1876). 1 P. Div. 283 ; 34 L. T. 934 ; 24 W. R. 1033 . . 1234 
 
 Glass V. Beach (1833), 5 Verm. 172 324 
 
 Glave r. Wentworth (1844), 6 Q. B. 173, n 481 
 
 Gleadow v. Atkin (1833), 1 C. & M. 424 ; 3 Tyr. 289 ; 2 L. J. Ex. 153 . , 435, 
 
 445, 451, 452 
 
 Glencaim Peer. (1796). 1 Macq. 444 180 
 
 Glengall, E. of, t'. Barnard (1836), i Keen, 769 ; 6 L. J. Ch. 25 806 
 
 Glenister r. Harding, In re Turner (1885), 29 Ch. D. 985 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 
 
 1089; 53 L. T. 628 420, 1170 
 
 Glenorchy i\ Bosville (1733), Cas. temp. Talbot, 3 ; 1 Wliite & T. L. C. 1 665 
 
 Glerawley's, Ld., case (1821), Macq. Prao. H. L. 629 603 
 
 Glossop V. Heston and Isleworth Local Board (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 536 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 433 911 
 
 Glossop V. Jacob (1816), 1 Stark. N. P. R. 69 ; 4 Camp. 227 16 
 
 Glossop f. Pole (1814), 3 M. & Sel. 175 1102 
 
 Glover v. Hall (1848), 2 Phillips, 484 1183 
 
 Glubb V. Edwards (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 300 1213 
 
 Glyn V. Caulfield (1851), 3 Mac. & G. 463 ; 15 Jur. 807 699 
 
 Glyn V. Houston (1836), 1 Keen, 329 ; 6 L. J. Ch. 129 997 
 
 Glynn f. Bk. of England (1 750), 2 Vea. sen. 38 435, 448 
 
 Goate V. Goate (1866), 1 H. & N. 29 710 
 
 Goblet V. Beechey (1829), 3 Sim. 24 ; Wigr. "Wills, 187 762, 785, 786 
 
 Godard •. Gray (1870), 40 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; L. R. 6 Q. B. 139 ; 24 L. T. 
 
 89 ; 19 W. R. 348 1147 
 
 Goddaxd's case (1584), 4 Co. Rep. 44 95 
 
 Gcddardv. Parr (1856), 24 L. J. Ch. 783 948, 949 
 
 Godefroy v. DaUon (1330), 6 Bing. 460 39 
 
 Godefroy v. Jay (1827), 3 C. & P. 192 ....,.;...... 1031 
 
 Godfrey v. Macaulay (1796), Pea. R. 166, li. ; 3 R. R. 672, n. ; 1096 
 
 m 
 
 
 Vol. I. end* with page 633. 
 
Ixxxvi 
 
 TAMLK OF CAHK8 CITKI). 
 
 VAoa 
 
 (i(.<lfr<7 r. Tiirnlmll (171l.'>). ' I'^hji. :i7l lOBft 
 
 OoiIhom r. Hmilli flHlH), 'I Mcinri', C. P. 1J7 ; IK If. U. rM\ 1115 
 
 (JihIIk v. Uowi finr.f)). 17 <!. II. ■i'.^K; 'i:< I/. .1. <;. I", tn ; l .lur. N. S. 117:1. 7(ll) 
 
 (iiHlwin V. Oiilli.y {\M'.\), I II. .V N. :i7:i 711, TIU 
 
 (lo(Uiii r. FruiiriM (1H7U), 111) li. J. C I'. \l\ ; I-. 11. /if'. I'. I'^l ; 22 I,. 'I'. 
 
 ;);iH (171, 77H 
 
 (Jcir I'. (It, NorUi. Hy. «!<>. (IHfili), .'Id L. .1. (J. II. IIH; ;( K & K. (17'i ; 7 
 
 Jiir. N. H. 'JHd ; .'I I,. 'I'. H/iO (Ii;i 
 
 (Ji.ir V. MillH(lHilj, 2 Dc.wl. & I-. 'i:\\ i;i I,. .1. (i. II. '^-'7; H .hir. 7'>H .. Hill, 
 
 H.'l2, H3U 
 OoHin r. Dniii'lly (IHHI), C, (^ It l>. ;i()7 ; 1(1 I,. ,1. (i. II. :t()',l ; 11 L. 'I'. 
 
 I'll ; '.» VV. It 11(1; UtA. V. III!) Sd.'i, H(19 
 
 (l.iid Co., !(.'•, 'I'liii (1HV!»), \2i'\\. I). 77; IH li. .1. Oil. (iftO; 40 L. T. H(i.-| ; 
 
 21 W. R. 7'.7 Hl/i 
 
 Uiiiil I'. IJiiiilmiii (|(l7H-tl), I'ili'il ill iiiil.!^ 1^) Ki'iitiiiily V. (!ti~NilliN, 2 Hwiiiih. 
 
 •.vi:> I Ifil 
 
 OoMcii r. (iilliini (IHH'2), /il I,. .1. Cli. I .VI ; Hi I,. T. 'JJi ; 'Jd Cji. I). IIMII ; 
 
 ftl li. .1. cii. m:\ i;i'> 
 
 (idldirilU V. TowiiwikI (IHUM), 'IH IIpiiv, 1 ITi (1711 
 
 (tiijijidf. H»iiiUl(>wc.rt.li flHOT), iCiiiiiii. 70 ■17.') 
 
 (JnliliiiK r. Wliitil.nii Hull. VV.iiku (1870;, 1 (^ II. 1). :t74 I M I-. T. 171 ; 2\ 
 
 \{..\i:\ n);i 
 
 w. 
 
 7H(I 
 
 1(1 
 
 M 
 1IH3 
 
 adl.lHli.MJi, ,.. Hwiiii (IH17), I Kx. l/)4 ; 1(1 I,. .1. V.%. 2M 
 
 (I(.l(l«l,.iiii r. I''.MM (IH'J7j. (i II. .V O. Kil ; I M. iV I'. W2 ; 2 Y. *. J. 11(1 ; 
 
 I) k \i. 107 ; I ItiiiK- l»<0 ; 2 (^ \. I'. 2.V2 
 
 aoMflioriiK r. Miinliiiiiii (IHIA), l.'l M. iV VV. .177; 2 Dnwl, k L. 112; 11 
 
 li. .1 V.%. 01 
 
 (Ji.iiim I'. I'limiU, {lK.'i7), 20 L. J. ('. I'. 270; :i (J. II. N. H. 47; ;t Jiir. 
 
 N. H. II .'.0 
 
 <J..ui|i.Tt/ .'. Hiiit,l..a {\M:\), 2 K. >V It. HIO; 2 <!. L. II. iior) ; 2:i li. .1. (i. II. 
 
 05; IM .lur. 2'10 222, 770 
 
 (J.Hi.iiill (>. Ijt.tin (IH''il), 20 I,. .(. Cli. i;i2; I Him. N. H. I,'..') r.ilO, 001 , 000 
 
 U..o.|nr. .I.il. MH.'.M), 2H L.J. (i. II. I; 1 K. & K. 0; o .Jur. N. H. li:., .721, 1)0(1 
 (iooili'ivil V. AriiH>iir(iHI2), It <|. II. '.)M\; It (1. & I). 200; 12 L. .1. (^ II. 50 IIIH 
 
 (loiMlinr V. Liil<.. (17.'I7), I Al.k. 110 IIOO 
 
 (;<iiMliii >■. Hiiiit.li (IHIfl), Milw. 2i:i IIO.'I 
 
 (loodiii^f.^ V. (J.hmIImk" (I71U;, I V.'M. HCli. 2.'ll 7K1) 
 
 (l(m<iiiiiiirH'rni»U(IHH()), 11 Cli. I). OIU ; 11) li. J. (Jh. HO.'i ; 111 L.'l'. 11; 
 
 2H VV. It. 002 lift 
 
 O.xhIiuhii f. CImmi (IHIH), I II. .V Al.l. 207; 10 It. II. 1122 077 
 
 OiHMlmiiii r. (Jri.Mliimii (IHftOJ, 2H \,. .1. Cli. 71.'i ; .'i .lur. N. H. 002 ....Ml), II7U 
 
 (Joo'lmiiii V. (JrifllMiM (1H,'.7), I II. * N. 571 ; 20 L. .1. Kx. 415 071, 072 
 
 • JiMKlrrimi v. Iliirvcy MS01), 11 New |{,, 512 llHft 
 
 OikmIiiiiiii V Hiiltiml'i, Miiyorof f 1HH2), 7 <i. M. D. lOO; 50 \,. .1. Q. II. 508; 
 
 4a I,. T 120; 20 VV. (t. 0)0; L'l .1. I'. K11 12:1 
 
 <lo.«lric,li K. Ht..-v..iiH (1H7I), 5 [,t.iiH. fN. Y.) 2110 7011 
 
 OiKxlriKlit ". (loriiwi'iit, (17115;, (1 T. If.. 211); It It. It. 101 522 
 
 (JiMMlrijflit, (. Diivi.iH (I77H), 2 (li.wp. HOIt 522 
 
 (JiMvlriKlit. " lliirwoii.1 (1771-5), 2 VV. III. 0117; II VVilM, 407 704 
 
 (>(io(lri(^lit r. IlidkM (IHOl), lluliiir N. 1'. 20(1; (mim. Dcmic. VViilkiT, 4 Km|». 
 
 N. 1'. 50) 252 
 
 Ooddritclil. V. Ilod)^.. (17711), VViit.kliiM on (;ci|.yli..ldH, 227 ; 2 Kiim),, 5111, n.. 007 
 
 (loodriKlit'". M<.MM (.777), 2 (.'owp. 501 10H, Hit, 411, 11H, 424, 021 
 
 (irmdriKlit. ". Hiiiil (1701), 1 T. It, 1150; 2 II. R. 100 122 
 
 (JooilriKlit. I'. Htriiiiliiiii (1774), I (lowp. 201, 201 ; Hhcp. Tnui^Ji. 5S 120(1 
 
 (ioodUtl.) «. Ifiildwiii (IHOO), II KiiHt,, 4HH; 11 II. It. 210; IV.ifiKin, v, yl,. 12;t, 
 
 2(il) 
 
 (Jood(,il,l(i V. RriiliiiiM (1702), 1 T. It. 4I)H 031, 122H 
 
 (J(.(idt,it,l<) V. Dnw (IH02), I'.'ii. Add. (!iih. 204 .'107 
 
 (loo<lt,it.lo »'. .lomm (1700), 7 T. It. 47 127 
 
 (IfiodLillii t;. Mill.uni (IH:i"), 2 M. k W. H5;i; M. k II. 207; fl li. .1. Kx. 
 
 200 14(1 
 
 (io.xltit,l<i V. H(.ut,lM.rri (IHII), I M. k Hrl. 201) «0l 
 
 The rijcnnctit am lu yityc; nut to }>tt>Uj/iuji/u, 
 
TAHI.K OI' CASKS (;iTKI). 
 
 Ixxxvii 
 
 OimhIwIii c. lliil.lmnl (IHIH), K) Muhm. ■i\H. ii 
 
 CiMiilwiii r. liciclciii (IKM;.), 1 A. & !•;. :i"H: ;; Howl. r. a. ft()4 ; 3 N. St M, 
 
 607 
 
 870 
 
 (liimlwin V. UolmrtH (1H7I1), I A|)|>. Cum. 17(1; l.'t Ij. J. Kx. 7IH; .'iri Fi. T. 
 
 1711 ; 'it NV. I{. '.IS7 fl, .'>i:« 
 
 <|.«iUviii I'. VVrHt, (I(i;i7), »'ro. Ciir. T.'i'^ Nl!», H'2(l 
 
 H71.' 
 
 U Iwyii r. Clirvrlry (IMM)), 4 II. .V N. (llll ; W I,. .1. Kx. WH; :i;i I,. T. 
 
 iXi 
 
 W. K,. (i;il ; 1 V.Hi I- 
 
 llnulil r. VVliiti- ('«'>•). Kiiy, im 
 
 <l II r, Allulo (IH'JC), (i H. .V- ( 
 
 (Idnli.ii'HCMw (IHll), '^ M. \ Hf 
 (iiimIiiii'h, liiiril Ociir^i', Iriiil (1 
 (iiiriloii I'. Ooi'iloii (IN7I), I.. I{. 
 1. union I'. Liii'il Kniy (IN:I.!), 
 
 (lol'tll 
 
 H. 
 
 ni'liiii 
 
 :iKM7), H K 
 
 ;i ; 2 I'll 
 
 . U. 1 1(1(1 
 I) 1). .V K. 
 
 • 1 t 
 
 
 ' 117 ; 
 
 I'lN 
 
 
 •1. /iHi 
 
 
 7«l). '21 
 
 /j II. 1 
 
 Niiii. '27 
 
 How. 
 
 . -2^1 . 
 1 
 
 St.. 
 
 Tr. 
 
 r,v> 
 
 
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 ('. IHO 
 
 
 
 
 Oc.n-, Ho (IMi:i), :i <'iiW. 7."pH . 
 doroi'. Ki'ilii'l (iH.'iH). I'J Mniin 
 (Inm V. lldWHT (IN.M), :> \U' (i. iV Shi. ;I(» ; S.('., mili iikiii. (imc r. MiirfiM, 
 
 •21 I.. .1. ell. 1(1; \(> .liir. IKiH 
 (inrxf. (liiliiiKiiii (IHl'.l), Milw. '2'.>( 
 (Jipinr. lliirriH (.«'(' (Iiini ('. IIiiwm<i 
 (l..r.« I'. HftUHry (1H(1'2), ;i V. Si V. 
 doitx'. NViiKlit{lH;tK), H A. & K. 
 (iorliiiiii )'. CmiiIoii (IH'.'H), r> (iii'i'ii 
 CniiiHHri) c. I'nriii (lHr.7), '27 I/. .». (• 1'. '^!i ; '2 (". H. N. S. (;«l ; ;i .Inr. 
 
 1 
 
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 IIH; ;i N. 
 1. '2(1(1 .... 
 
 vt r. 
 
 ;m:i 
 
 117 
 
 IHO 
 
 '2117 
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 :i77 
 711 
 7(11 
 
 r2ii 
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 177 
 
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 MO 
 
 f)2(l 
 (1(11 
 :i77 
 
 N . S. .S(i7 7(i;« 
 
 1(11(1 
 7'21> 
 
 Oortnii V. Dyw.ii (IHlli), I M. & II. '2111; ;i M.H.ro ((!. V.], /■>.■.« 
 (ioHlM'll r. A'itIht (1 «;».'-.). '2 A. \ K. :.(i(l 
 
 (iipHfdnl, l.il., •'. K-.lil. (IHI/.), H Ir. Ii. K. '217 'i'.*'^, (M(l 
 
 (ioHJiii r. (N.i-ry (IHIl). 7 M. * dr. :i42 ; H Hrott, N. U. '21 r2:il 
 
 lliniir(IH:tl), 7 l»iii>f. nid; T) M. \- P. KiO !>\e> 
 
 Uim\ 
 
 luH 
 
 V. \A. NiiKi'iil. (IH;t:i), f> H. & Ad. (II ; '2 N. & M. '2H; WiK"'. 'WillH, fi ; 
 '2 I'll. Kv. :t:tii 7 i;i, 7r)l. 7W, 7^3 
 
 UoNiir. (Clinton (IHI'2), ;i M. iSc Or. H'2.''i ; 4 Snoll, N. h. 171; l'2 li. .1. 
 
 c. I*. 17:1. 
 
 OoHHf. WulliiiKloii (IN'2I). :t n. * M. i:i'2; (I M.iorr, (!. V. ;i.'..'> 
 
 (JoHNi't, I'. Iliiwiml (IN'I7). 1(1 Q. n. 'K>:i; l(i I.. .1. (^ II. ■.U(y ; II .Iiir. 
 
 ■IHl 
 
 ■1:17, ft(18 
 
 7/)0. 
 
 (UM V. (liiii.ly (IHr.:", '2 K. & H. HU) ; '2 (I. I,. K. :ill'2 ; '2:1 L. .1. (^ II. I 
 
 .h;i, i;i2, 811 
 
 IH ,liir. :iio 
 
 Omul 
 
 1)11 
 
 iiilh IHr 1 Kx. ■i;iO; C l>. & li. '2(111; 17 l<. .1. Kx. 7(1. 
 
 Oiiiilil r. ('otiiiilm (Ih 
 Oniilil r. 0<iiilil (in:: 
 Oimld «'. Liild'H (IHh 
 OiiiiM V. Sliii'li'y (IH 
 
 II. rii;i; II li. ,1. (!. I*. 176 ; 11 .liir. 101. 
 
 11(1. '2(i;i 1(10 
 
 774 
 :t(t 
 
 1104 
 
 .1. V. Si M. .Ml; i:. It. (1 r. DIv. I, 
 
 700 
 
 \- r. r.Hl 71'2 
 
 OiiiiM (nIioiiIiI lin Ooolil) ,. \\liit4t (lHri4), Kiiy, (IHII ; '2 I'lij. Kt'p. 11(10..., IHO 
 
 OiiiiIiIIk v. OiiiiHtoii (IHHl). I (!miii), IIHI ft4'2 
 
 OniiiiiHwortii r. KiiiKlitH (iHiit), II M. .t \v. ;i;i7 : r2l,. .1. Kx.'2h;i uh 
 
 Oiiiilliwiiid', Kn |iiirlt' [nrf lt<< Niirtli of l'',iijfliiiHl .loiiil Slnck < 'o.). 
 
 0..vrr, Kx imrlr (IH7(1), 4.'. I,. J. Cli. O.'i ; I (;ii. I). IH'2 ; ;i;i I.. T. (110 ; '24 
 
 W, u. i'2A r2;i;« 
 
 Oovi'iiior r. Iloll (IHIO), :i Miiiiili. ;i;il I17H 
 
 Oovcnior ('. .IcII'ifyM (IH'.'O), 1 lliiwkM. '207 1178 
 
 Oowiili V. K.mtrr (■ih:I'2), It II. \ A<l. f)(17 717 
 
 Omily'H niNii, Ho IIiiIIhIi I'luvidilit l.il'o Ahh. Sooy. (1H(1;I), :I2 I.. J. (Ii. 
 
 :i2(i; I DoO. .1. * S. 4HH i;i4 
 
 704 
 
 Oriilmm, Ho (IHd.'l), .'fj I,. .1. P. & M. Il.'l; M S. * T. (10. 
 
 Oriiliiim I'. Iliiki'iilinid Ity. Co. (IH.'iO), '2 Miin. & O. 14(1; l'2 lloiiv. 4110; 
 
 ■2 II. & T. 4, Ml. 
 
 a:i8 
 
 Ondmiii c. Cox (IH4H). '2 C. * K. 7(1'2 I.'.4 
 
 OmImiii V. DvHlor (IHKl), '2 Mtiirk. I{. '2:1 Oftd, IHM 
 
 Oiiiliiim ('. Olovor (IHM), '2.') I,. .1. Q. II. 10; [, K. \ II. ,M1I ; '2 .liir. N. S. 
 
 1(10 
 
 H,18 
 
 r<'/. /. etiili with pagf (l.'J5, 
 
 iifui 
 
Ixxxviii TAHLK OK v\H\:n < irKI). 
 
 PAOH 
 
 Onilmmr. Hoim (I7!»:>), Pen. R. 1M ; U R. U. 071 Kl'Jft 
 
 Uriitmm r. OIiIIh (IH,')H), 1 K. * I'". 'Jdi :U2 
 
 (Jriiliiim V. Wliiiihclo (1H:I2), 1 C. & M. IHH; 11 Tyr. 201 ; 2 L. J. Kx. 
 
 70 (1(^0 
 
 (Iriitminn r. (iriiliiiinn (ISS7), 1!) I,. R. Ir. '210 73!), 7114 
 
 (iiiiiid .hint!. Can. Co. r. Dinii'H (|H.'>0), 1'^ IImiiv. (Ill ; 2 \l.& T. 92 ; 2 Miiu. 
 
 * U. 'JH.-i; 10 L. J. Cli. ;tir) 1117 
 
 (Jriuitr. Miij^K"' (lH"'-!\ •'! I'liiHt, 128; (i R. R. .Mil IH 
 
 (iniMt, r. KIctflHir (IH20), ■) IJ. & (! i;)!! ; S I). .V R. .'lO 207 
 
 (Iriiiit, r. OniiM (1702). 2 H. HI. 100; ;t R R. :)l2 1103 
 
 (Iriirit. V. (iriint. (I«;t0), 2 (!urt.. 10 603 
 
 (Iriiiit, r. Umnt, 'JHd,'.), 31 Ui^iiv. 023; 31 L. J. C'h. (Ill ; 12 I,. T. 721 ; 13 
 
 VV. R. 1 o:.7 031 
 
 Orimt r. Onml, (1H(I!I), L. R. 2 1'. & I). H ; 30 li. .f. T. At M. 17 ; 21 li. 'I'. 
 
 r)'J7 ; IH W. R. 230 739, 710 
 
 (Jraiit V. (Sniiit, (1H70), li. R. r, (,'. I'. 727; 39 L. .f. O, 1'. 272; 22 L. T. 
 
 K21 ; IH VV. R. 0.^1 784 
 
 (;niiit. r. .Iii.kHMii (1703). 1'"" •<■. 201 103, 404, /)17, fi'il 
 
 Oriiiit I'. M'Liichliii (I800J, 4 .loliiis. :il llrto 
 
 Onint c. Maiidox (1810), 1;'. M. k W. "37 ; Hi li. .1. Kx. 227 7«3 
 
 (Irimt, r. Mow, r (1813), f. M. * (Jr. 120; (! H<v>tt., N. R. 1(1 ; 2 Di.wl. N.H. 
 
 023; 12 li. .1. (J. V. 11(1; 7 .Iiir. 8.VI 17 
 
 (Jraiit I'. '^l(.Ill|>^uIl (1822), 4 (!i)im. 203 031 
 
 (Iravciior r. VVikhHhhihi, (1821), 1 ItiiiK. .'W ; 7 Mcmro, 289 90 
 
 ( Jrav<'H c. Ivi-y (I«:i2), 2 H. \. A<1. 313 552 
 
 (Jrav(,H V. li.'KK (1857), II Kx. 042; 2 l[. & N. 210 ; 2(1 I,, .1. Kx. lilC. ; 3 
 
 Jur. N. S. 510 157 
 
 <lniv(wi). lVr'(^iriliv (18:i8), Crawf. He I). Alir. ('. 127 HdS, 8(i9 
 
 (ImvoH V. VVrld (1833), 5 H. iVc Ail. 105 ; 2 N. H M. 725 (;8(i, (187 
 
 Gray r. HaiMiolomcw, (1801) 11 R. [Voh.) 251; (1^95) 1 Q. 11.209; 71 
 
 li. T. 8(17 ; 13 W. R. 177 ; (H L. J. <f. H. 125 530 
 
 Oray f. Ilimwiill (1802), 13 Ir. Ch. R. 77 719 
 
 Gray v. Coi.kMon (1812), 1(1 KaHt, 13 1100 
 
 (Jray v. Diniii'ii (1810), 2 Joldi & Hy. 205 39 
 
 (Jray v. (ianhu,!- (1807), 3 MawN. 390 122 
 
 (Jray v. Wiiig (1855), 20 IWv. 219 108 
 
 (Jray v. ]Iar|Kr (1811), 1 Htory, R. 574 783 
 
 (Jray r. I'altinTH (1791), 1 Km|.. 135 194 
 
 (Jray v. Pcarwrn (1851), H. L. Cm. 100 741 
 
 (Jray v. iV'nUaiid (1815), 2 Hcrj?. & R. 23 010 
 
 (Jray r. Smith (1800), 43 Ch. I). 208 ; 50 L. .T. Ch. 115 ; 02 L. T. 335 ; 38 
 
 W. R. 310 072, 082 
 
 Oray v. Warner (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 550; L. R. 10 Kq. 577 ; 28 L. T. 835 ; 
 
 2 1 VV. R. 808 1.3G 
 
 Oray r. Yoinij? (1823), 1 M'C. 31 374 
 
 OrayHon »-. AfkinHon (1752). 2 Voh. hcu. 459 ; Dirk. 158 700, 1215 
 
 (ircMit KaHt.'rii, Th(, (18(18). ],. R. 2 Adm. 88 ; 17 L. T. 007 179 
 
 (JrfNit North. Ry. Co. v. Hh(ij)i)ard (1852), 8 Ex. 30 ; 7 Railw. CaH. 310; 21 
 
 L. .1. Kx. 280 102 
 
 (Jn.at, VV(!Mt,. Ry. Co. v. H.-iuictl, (1807), 36 L. J. (i. U. 133 ; L. R. 2 H. L. 
 
 27 ; 10 L. T. 180; 15 W. R. 017 114 
 
 Onat, WoHt. Ry. Co. v. WilliH (1805), 34 L. J. C. V. 195 ; 18 0. B. N. H. 
 
 748 388 
 
 Or<!HV(>Hi\ AMhlin (1813), 3(^aini). 420; 11 R. R. 771 767 
 
 (IrcavoH .'. Morning (1879), 48 L. J. il B. 335 ; 4 Q. B. D. 220; 27 W. R. 
 
 458 636 
 
 Oniav(« t>. Greenwood (1877), 40 L. J. Ex. 262; 2 Ex. D. 289; 30 L. T. 
 
 1 ; 25 W. R. 039 171 
 
 (JroavoH t'. Hunter (1820), 2 0. & P. 477 1222 
 
 GriMivoH V. Lngt^ (1857), 11 Ex. 042 ; 2 II. & N. 210; 20 L. J. Ex. 310; 3 
 
 .Jur. N. 8. 519 167 
 
 GrmivcH r. Tofield (1880), 14 (^h. I). 603 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 118 ; 43 L. T. 100; 
 
 28 W. R. 840 131 
 
 The references are to paget, not to paragraphi. 
 
TAHI.i: OF CASKS t'lTKI). 
 
 1x 
 
 XXIX 
 
 rAOR 
 
 nrrolvr. Binitli (IHJfi), 1 W.mmU.. & M. 181 , O'.t, 1 1 :»H 
 
 (Jrrfi! I'. Uniwii (1711), 2H(.r. ll(ll» I7.> 
 
 «lr.i'ii v. CriHHW.'ll (IH;ii)), 10 A. & K. (fill ; 2 1". & F). ■430 fJH 
 
 dr.-*-!!!'. (Jiitt'wiik {\(\TXi, Hull. N. I'. '21;! ;mi( 
 
 • JriTin'. Uir.m (IH7H). ri I.. .1. IV * M (i ; I,. It. H T. & I). 121 lll!» 
 
 (ir.'.ii I'. Howiiril {I77'J), 1 Fir... (!.('. Ill 7H!» 
 
 <)r<-«'ii r. FFuiiiplircyH (1H8I), fiU L. J. Ch. 02ri ; 20 CFi. F). 474: '>! L. T. 
 
 42 711 
 
 Orc'ii V. Jiirkwrn (IS(l.-i), IN-ii. \l. 'iM I.'.O 
 
 Uni.ti V. K.ii.ki- (IH/i(i), IH (!. M. r.l!t; ir) I,. J. < !. p. •.'!»7 Hll 
 
 (Jr.'.-ii •'. F^.mli.n (J.ii. Oinii. (!o. (l«.V.i), J't !.. J ( '. 1'. 13; 7 C. F». N. H. 
 
 21)11 ; « .Fiir. N. S. T>» ; 2 F,. T. !>.. ; H W. I{. KH 043 
 
 (JrtH'ii r. \A. I'cii/'inir (ISHI), (i Apn. Cum. (i.'>7 ; .'>1 I,. J. U. FJ. 2.'> ; ».'» 
 
 Fi. T. 3r.:i; ;io \V, It. 21H; Id. I. I'. Il''> HJO 
 
 Cnrii r. Nnw FHv.t ( !... ( 1 7!l'.') I 'I'. 11. .VIO Fl)U6 
 
 (Irrni V Tiil... (1N7H), i) (Jli. I). 2:11 ; 17 I-. .F. Ch. 7H3 ; 3M F.. T. '.Hi ; 27 
 
 VV. Fl. :iH 701 
 
 Cncii r. Waiirr ll7«3). 2 \A. lUym. Hil.l K 
 
 I in. 11 r. W.'iivcr (1827), 1 Him lill .'.II 
 
 (;r.'.'iii.wiiy. V.x imrld (1802), (i Vch. 812 308 
 
 (ir.-.'iiiNli r. Wliito (18(JI), ;tl Fi. .F. C. F'. '.);i ; II <!. H. N. H. 2n<.t ; 8 .Fur. 
 
 N. H. fMi /»»» 
 
 <!r.-«-nlliw f. FCiiiK (1838), 3 Fl.-iiv. 4\) fiOl 
 
 (!r.'.'ii<.iiKl' '. V,rr\m (18f.!»), f. (!. Fl. N. .S. 78(1; 28 I,. .T. U. F'. 100; ft Jur. 
 
 N . H. 7<;r. !)38 
 
 (irf('ii..ii>?li I'. (liiHkcU (lh;t3), 1 My. iV Iv. 10(1; C....i>.'r (toriij.. llr.>ii);liHiii), 
 
 <l(i .' .'"iKI. '■.'.13, .'.'.M, Cilll!, (i(l8, 010 
 
 (}rc«'n..uK»i V. M-(n<'lluii(l (18(il), 3(1 I,. .F. <i. B. If); 2 K. >V !•;. 424; 2 
 
 Fi. T. r>l\ ; 8 \V. Fl. (112; (t.lur. N. H. 772 7.»8 
 
 (Jrc.iiMFiicl.l II. FVitdliiinl (1811), 8 M. .V \V. 148; 10 I,. .1. K\. 2!t,'i 872 
 
 (Jriii'MHliifl.lH r. Criiwf..ril (1812), 1 l)..\vl. N. ,S. I.'t'.t ; !) M. Ar W. 311 : fi 
 
 .Fur. 3113 121C.. I2F!» 
 
 (Jninwi.ili F$il. <.f W.nkH f. Muu.IhIiiv (1870), F.. II. r, (^ l». 307 ; 3'J Fi. .F. 
 
 (i. n. 20::; 23 li. T. 121 ; 18 W. II !M8 124 
 
 (In'tfK't'''""' (1708), 14 IF..W. Ht. Ti'. 1370 .V.8 
 
 *'>rvKf( r. W.'IIh (18;|0), 10 A. \- K. 08 ; 2 P. *, It. 20(i .''.37, r,ti 
 
 (in'K'Ty'M .Sfttliu.. U.1 (I8(i.'^i). 3( lli-av. (iOO ; 13 VV. U 828 7!iH 
 
 iir<'K..iy f. l).)i.lKn (1827), 3 HiiiK.I7l; U Mi.i.rc (C. F'.), 3<)4 '.lit 
 
 ^iTl^^tl,^y V. FF.iwiir.1 (1800), 3 I';m|i. 113 .'ilO 
 
 (Inxory f. Miirycliur.!!! (18,'iO), 12 Hciiv. 3!)8 ; ID L. J. Ch. 280; 13 Jur. 
 
 1010 . 920 
 
 <Jr«>«..ry r. F'urknr (1808), I Ctiiiii.. 301 ; 10 U. Fl. 712 fi04 
 
 «!ri'Ki>ry r. Qucim'n FV.M'tur (181(1), 4 Ncit^'H .if Ciiwm (F'ah;. & Mar.), 020 . . 141 
 
 ( JrcK.)ry v. Tiivcnior (18.33), C. «c P. 281 027, '.l-'B 
 
 Cnt^i.ry r. ThonuiN (181 1), 2 Hil.li, 280 2.V2 
 
 (Jn^ory r. WoHt Mid. Kv C... (1801), 33 L. J. Kx. 15.1; 2 FF. & C. 914 ; 
 
 10 .Fur. N. H. 243 ; 12 'VV. Fl. .V28 722 
 
 (Jnxw.n r. Fliirk (1843), 4 U. H. 737 208 
 
 (Jri'llior I'. Nciiln (1700), 1 Peak.-, 108; 3 II. Fl. 0(10 134 
 
 (Jri'Uiairor. liO oWk Hf.iH Val.iii (1800), 2 Chiii|). 144 I.'.O 
 
 (Imifcll r. Oir(lloHt(.iuW1837), 2 Y. Ac C. lOx. (170 71.3 
 
 (InHhiiui IF<.t«aC<>. r. Mimninjr (1807), Fr. Fl. 1 C. Fi. 12.'> 3(1!) 
 
 (Jrcshy r. M.iUHloy (1801), 3 D.M). F'\ & .1. 433 ; 31 Fi. ,F. Cii. .137 »2 
 
 (IrcMlj.y r. M.umloy (1869), 28 Fi. J. Ch. 020 ; 1 tJitt'. 4.''.0 ; 4 Do O. & .1. 
 
 78 13« 
 
 (in-voH, Ke (18.V.)), 28 L. .F. P. k M. 28 ; \ H. it V. 2.10 ; 7 VV. R. 80 .... 701 
 
 (Srcvilb V. Chaimmu M814). f) d. H. 731 ; F). He M. .'ii">3 034 
 
 ♦ Jroviilo I'. Hfulz (1847), 11 Q. F«. 1004 ; 17 Fi. J. Q. B. F4; F2,Fur. 40 .347, 1037 
 
 (Jrfvillo V. Tylfo (18,11). 7 M..<.. P. (7. <3. 320 140, 142, 707 
 
 (Jrcw V. Hill (1840), 3 Kx. 801 ; F)..wl. * Fi. 004 ; 18 L. J. Kx. 317 />.3.3 
 
 (Irpy (HhnuUF bo(}ray) r. YoiitiK (182.3), 4 M'C. 31 374 
 
 Grioo V. KidhanlHon (1877), 47 L. .1. P. C. 48 ; 3 App. Chm. 319 ; 37 Iv. T. 
 
 677 ; 20 W. K. 358 689 
 
 y«t. I. ttidt with page 635. 
 
 m 
 
 liiii 
 
 ! , 1. 
 
xc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAaa 
 
 Griffin i: Brinvn (1821), 2 Tiik. 'MH 10»7 
 
 Griffith, In re, Ciirr f. Griffith (1879), 12 Ch. D. Cii); 41 L. T. fltO 1H9 
 
 Griffith V. DavioM (1«:{;{), 5 B. & Ad. 502 602, 007 
 
 Griffith r. liicketts (1H49), 7 Hare, ;«)3 ; 19 L. J. Ch. .'599 ; 14 Jur. 325. .o2I, 942 
 
 GriftithH, Kx part.) (IS22), 6 B. & AM. 730 837 
 
 GriffithH r. OriffithH (1871), L. R. 2 1'. & D. 300; 41 L.J. P. 14 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 574 ; 20 V/. K. 192 700 
 
 Griffiths v. Jenkins (1864), 3 Now R. 489 683 
 
 GriffithH V. Lond. & St. Kath. Dncks Co. (1884), i:i Q. B. D. 259; 53 \..J. 
 
 ii. B. 604; 51 L. T. 533; 33 W. R. 36; 49 J. P. 100 778 
 
 Griffiths v. Rijrhy (1856), 1 IL & N. 237 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 284 43 
 
 Grttithsr. Williams (1787), 1 T. R. 710 600 
 
 Griffits v. Ivory (1840), 11 A. & E. 322; 3 P. & 1). 179 1226 
 
 tJrittitsv. Paynt)(1839), 11 A. & E. 131 ; 3 P. & I). 1079 231 
 
 Grieg's casu (1672), T. Raym. 1 ; 1 Hale, 693; 3 Riiss. C. & M. 315, 
 
 621 888, 889, 8t 3 
 
 Grill V. (Jen. Iron Screw Collier Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 600 ; 35 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 321 : 1 II. & R. 054 ; 14 L. T. 711 ; 14 W. R. 893 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 
 
 727 347 
 
 Grinmni v. IViiper (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Kcc. & M.) 421, 441 170, 263 
 
 (irimiiian v. Le^jre (1828), 8 B. & C. 324 ; 2 M. & R. 438 660 
 
 Grimwood v. Hartels (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 788 ; 25 W. R. 143 1150 
 
 Grim wood r. Cozens (I860), 2 S. & T. 364 : 6 Jur. N. S. 497 143 
 
 Grimwood v. Mo's (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 3(i0 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 239 ; 27 L. T. 
 
 268 ; 20 W. R. 972 622 
 
 Grindell r. Godmond (1836), 6 A. & E. 756 ; 1 N. & P. 168 ; 2 II. & W. 
 
 339 166 
 
 GrinnoU v. Wells (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 1033 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 741 ; 2 Dowl. & 
 
 L. 610; 40 L. J. C. P. 19; 8 Jur. 1101 253 
 
 Grippor I). Bristow (1840), 6 M. & W. 807; 8 Dowl. 797; 9 L. J. Ex. 
 
 324 733 
 
 Grissell v. Bristow.! (1868), L. R. 4 C. P. 36 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 10 ; 19 L. T. 
 
 N. S. 390; 17 W. R. 123 168 
 
 Groenvelt i: Burrell (1696-7), 1 Ld. Raym. 253 ; Cartli. 421 987 
 
 Grose f. West (1816), 7 Taun. 39; 17 R. R. 437 112 
 
 arosvouor v. Sherratt (1860). 28 Beav. 659 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1228 137 
 
 Grounsell r. Lamf) (1836), 1 M. & W. 362 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 154 222 
 
 (Jrovo V. Ware (1817), 2 Stark. R. 174 317 
 
 Groves v. Groves (1829), 3 Y. & J. 170 606 
 
 Gucnllumse r. Blackburn (1866), L. R. 1 P. & I). 109 ; 36 L. J. P. & M. 
 
 116; 12 Jur. N. S. 278; 14 L. T. 69 ; 14 W. R. 463 140,141 
 
 Gudgen V. Bessot (1850), 26 L. J. Q. B. 36 ; E. & B. 986 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 212 746, 1204 
 
 Guest r. Elwes (1836), 6 A. & E. 120 104 
 
 Gu<!st I'. Warren (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 121 ; 9 Ex. 379; 2 C. L. R. 979 ; 18 
 
 Jur. 133 1120 
 
 Guidon V. Bobson (18()'.)), 2 Camp. 302 ; 11 R. R. 713 640 
 
 (Juier V. (*'l)aniel (180(1), 1 Binn. 349, n 179 
 
 (iuihl's use (1828), 5 Halst. 168 660, 503, 604. 666, 671 
 
 Guilt'. Lindsay (1849), 4 Ex. 46; 18 L. J. Ex. 356 192, 677 
 
 (Jully «'. Bp. of Exet^T (1828), 4 Bing. 298 ; 12 Mooro, C. P. 491 302, 614 
 
 Gumm I'. 'I'yrie (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 108; 4 B. & S. 680 741 
 
 Gun IK Mc(;arthy (1884), 13 L, U. Ir. 304 746, 760 
 
 Gunn f. Koherts (1S74), L. R. 9 C. P. 331 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 233 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 424 ; 22 \V. R. 652 178 
 
 Gurford r. Bi.yh'y (1842), 3 M. k Gr. 781 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 398 ; 1 Dowl. 
 
 N. H. 519; 11 L. J. (^ P. 105 190, 192 
 
 Ou» ney <•. Lanjflands (1822), 5 B. & A. 330 1228 
 
 Gurr .'. RuUon (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 327 373 
 
 Gutsole r. Mathers (1836), 1 M. & W. 602; 2 Gale, 64 ; 5 Dowl. P. C. 69; 
 
 1 T. & G. 694 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 274 , 220 
 
 Guy V. Sharp(( (1833), 1 Myl. & K. 602 784 
 
 Quyv. West (18i,8), 2 S(a. N. P. 1244 113 
 
 2'he refti-enc*i are to pagei, not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLK OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XCl 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Guy ManncrinMT, Tho (1882), 7 P. D. 132 ; 61 L. J. Adm. 57 ; 46 L. T. 
 
 906 ; 30 W. R. 8;)6 ; i A^p. M. C. !}fy,i 178 
 
 Gwillim V. Gwillim flSGO). 29 L. J. P. & M. 31 ; 3 S. & T. 200 6!r8 
 
 ( Jwy iiuo r. Davy (1840). 1 M. & Gr. 867 751 
 
 Gyles f. Hill (1809), 1 Camp. 471, n 1018 
 
 H, fulsfily callcdC. f. C. (18G2), 31 L. J. P. & M. 103 128 
 
 II ijrluim V. Vinrciit (1793), 2 Vcs. 201 ; 5 T. R. 92 701 
 
 I.,, kwood f. Lyall (1855), 17 C. JJ. 124; 25 L J. C. P. 44, n. ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 44, 11 179 
 
 Huddrick v. Hoslop (1848), 12 Q. B. 274—277 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 GOO : aft'. Hiib nom. Hoslop v. Chapman, 2 C. L. R. 139 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 49 ; 18 Jiir. 348 30 
 
 Iladley v. Carter (1835). 8 Now Hamp. 40 375 
 
 Il.idley V. Gmm (1S32), 2 Tyr. 390 ; 1 J. J. Ex. 137 ; 2 C. & J. 374 1123 
 
 Ha^'edorn «'. Rcid (1813), 3 Camp. 305 ; 1 M. & Sol. 567 454 
 
 JlHKgitt V. Iiiftf (1854), 24 L. J. Ch. 120 ; 5 Do G. M. & G. 910 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 49; 3 W. R. 141; 3 Eq. 144 1030 
 
 Hiiif?i'. Ni'wtcm (1817). 1 Mill, R. 423 927 
 
 1 Inigli V. Belchei- (1830), 7 C & P. 389 946 
 
 llaiKli «. Kayo (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 567 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 469 ; 26 L. T. 675 ; 
 
 20 W. R. 597 688 
 
 Hui^h )'. Nortli Biorlcy Union (1858), E. B. & E. 873 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 62 . . 641 
 HaiKh v. West, (1S93) 2 Q. B. 19; 62 L. J. Q. B. 532 ; 68 L. T. 531 ; 09 
 
 L. T. 165 ; 57 J. P. 358, 630 125 
 
 iriiilfH V. Marks (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 389 ; 7 H. & N. 66 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 
 851 30, 189 
 
 Haiuo f. Davey (1836). 4 A. & E. 892 ; 6 N. & M. 356 ; 2 II. & W. 30 . . 227 
 
 HaiiicH t'. East India Co. (1866), (i M(H)rc, Ind. App. 467 543 
 
 Haines r. Giithrio (1884), 13 Q. B. 1). 818 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 621 ; 51 L. T. 
 
 (i45 ; 33 W. R. 99 ; 48 J. P. 756 419, 645 
 
 Hiiines f. RolxTts (1857), 25 L. J. Q. B. 353 ; 7 El. & BI. 625 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 
 
 49 ; 3 Jur. N. S 886 114 
 
 Hairor. Wilson (1820). 9 B. & C. 643; 4 M. & Ry. 606 82 
 
 lliildano V. P^i^kford (1869), L. R. 8 Eii. 631 378 
 
 Hale r. Russ (1821), 1 Greenl. 335 1190 
 
 Halkett v. Eminott (1878), 47 L. J. Q. B. 436 ; 3 Q. B. D. 555 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 508 ; 26 W. R. 632 1088 
 
 Hall's Estate, Re (1852), 22 L. J. Ch. 177 ; 2 Do G. M. & G. 748 ; 9 Hare, 
 
 App. xvi 1054 
 
 Hall, Ex parte. Re WhittiuK (1878), 10 Ch. D. 615; 48 L.J. Bank. 79 ; 40 
 
 L. T. 179 ; 27 \V. R. 385 651, 682 
 
 Hall, Re (1871), L. R. 2 P. & T). 256; 40 I,. J. P. & M. 37 671 
 
 HalU. Bainl)ridKe(1848), 12 Q B. 699; 17 L. J. Q. B. 317 134 
 
 HalU. Ball (1841), 3 M. & Cr. 242; 10 L. J. C. P. 285 300, 305, 350 
 
 Hall c, Betty (1842), 4 M. & Gr. UO; 6 S.'ott, N. R. 508; 11 L. J. C. P. 256. 773 
 HhU v. Brand (18H3), 12 Q. B. D. 39; 53 L. J. Q. B, 19; 49 L. T. 492; 
 
 32 W. R. 133 829, 830 
 
 Hall v. Burgess ():;26), 6 B. & C. 332 ; 8 I). & R. 67 660 
 
 Hall V. Butler (1839), 10 A. & E. 206 ; 2 P. & 1). 374 99 
 
 Hall V. Byron (1876), 4 Ch. 1). 667, 680 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 297 ; 30 L. T. 367 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 317 115 
 
 Hall V. Cazenovo (1801), 4 East, 477 ; 1 Smith, 272 ; 7 U. R. 61 1 750 
 
 Hall r. City of London Brewery Co. (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 257 ; 2 B. & S. 
 
 737 ; 9 .lur. N. S. 18 773 
 
 Hall t'. Condor (1867), 2 C. B. N. S. 40 ; 26 L. ,1. C. P. 251 776, 777, 778 
 
 Hall V. Eve (1876), 4 Ch. D. 341 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 140 ; 35 L. T. 920 ; 25 
 
 \V. R. 177 221, 224 
 
 Hall c. Eeatherntone (1868), 3 H. & N. 284 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 308 262 
 
 Hall r. Fisher (1844), 1 Coll. 47 ; 8 Jur. 119 804 
 
 \lail i: Hall (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 444 ; L. R. » Ch. 430 ; 28 L. T. 283 ; 21 
 
 W, R. 373 189 
 
 Vol. I. tndi with pagt 036. 
 
 - i 
 
 ^! -il 
 
Hi8f 
 
 X(.'ll 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. 
 
 PAUR 
 
 lull V. Hill (rr);), '2Str. 109J 604 
 
 lull r. Hill (IHIl), 1 Dr. ft. War. 116 ROr). HOfi, 807, 808 
 
 lull V. JiiiiHoii (IS.'j.'i), 4 E. & H. 600 ; 3 0. L. R. 7»7 ; 24 h.J.ii. B. 97 ; 
 
 I .lur. N. H. 671 760 
 
 lull r. Lew (1876), 44 L. J. V. V. 8'J ; L. li. 10 C. V. 164 ; HI L. T. 727 ; 
 
 ■r.i \V. H.'vxi 1120 
 
 lull r. Lund (lH(i;i), 32 L. J. Kx. li;i; 1 H. & O. 070; 9 Jur. N. 8. 206; 
 
 II W. U. 271 116 
 
 hill .■. Miiulo (18;i8), 7 A. & E. 721 ; H N. vt P. 46'J ; 1 W. W. & IL U!)!) ; 
 
 ■.' .lur. 8K7 132 
 
 lull /. Mayor of HwaiiMca (1811), 6 il U 620; 1 I), k M. 476; 13 L. J. 
 
 (^ M. 107 ... 043 
 
 lull r. OdI.cr (IHOO). 11 KaMt, 118; 10 K. K. 113 1162, 1165 
 
 tail V. Warr.li (1801), i» Vch. twr, : 7 K. H. 300 170 
 
 lalhurk fi. U. of Cainbri.lKc (1841), I il U. 6!)3 ; 1 (1. & J). 100; I). T. 
 
 C. 683 ; (i .lur. 10 132 
 
 liill.i. r. Uunchir (1834), 1 C. M. & li. 20(1; 3 'J'yr. i)6i) ; 3 L. J. Kx. 
 
 iilO (j83 
 
 lallcr r. Woniiiiii (1800). 2 K. & I''. 106 607 
 
 lallct. f. McarH (1810), 13 KaNt, 16; I2U.U.200 820 
 
 liilNit r. (loUHciiH (1830), 2 M. &. Huh. 238 022 
 
 lall.y. The (I8(i8), L. U. 2 A.l. * Kvv.. 3 ; 37 L. J. A.ltii. I ; L. R. 2 1'. (.!. 
 
 103; 37 L. .1. A.liii. 33; 18 L. T. 870; 10 W. R. Oim 178 
 
 lalliday v. Iloljfal.^ (1801), L. If.. 3 Kx. 200; 37 L. .1. Kx. 174 78 1 
 
 lalliday r. MartiiifU (I8'J'J), 20 .IoIiiih. (Am.) 108 464 
 
 lallifax r. Lyl(. (1840), 3 Kx. 44(i ; Dowl. i*i L. 421 00, 647 
 
 iallinark'M <W) (1878), 47 li. J. Ch. 808 ; Ch. 1). 320 ; 38 L. T. 000 ; 2<i 
 
 W. R. 8'.JI 620 
 
 laly V. Lane (1741), 2 Atk. 182 640 
 
 laiiilxT »•. KolirrtH (1840). 7 (!. B. 801 ; 18 L. J. ("!. 1*. 260 1219 
 
 Ininla-ook r. Siriltli (1862), 17 Sim. 200 001 
 
 laimliiii. Hruck (1817), (i. B. 300 ; 16L. .I.(i. B. 343 ; 10 .lur. 1004 . . 1100 
 
 lam.rton v. llam.Tl.oii (I8'28), 2 lla^f^'. K.'.'. It. 8 603 
 
 liiiii(Tt,(m r. Hlciid (1824), 6 Dowl. tV R. 200; 2 H. iV <!. 478 067, 068, 000 
 
 lamiltcm v. VAmUw (1881), 60 L. J. Q. B. 460 ; 7 ^. B. D. 1, 319; 29 
 
 VV. R. 070; 44 L. '1'. 704 130 
 
 lamiltoii r. Nott. (1873), 42 L. .1. <;ii. 612; L. K. 10 K<|. I 12 609 
 
 lamilt,)u f. Terry (1862), IIC. B. 064 ; 21 l/..l.«:. I'. 132 712 
 
 lainlyu r. BrUelcy (1880), 6 C. 1'. D. 327; 49 L. .». (!. 1'. 406 ; 42 L. T. 
 
 373; 28 W. R. 060; 44 J. 1'. 411 130 
 
 lamiiiiTHlcy r. do Bid, Biirou (IS46), 12 01. .V Kin. 46 .WO, 074, 070, <i80 
 
 lammick v. BroiiKon (\H12), 6 Day, 200, 203 373 
 
 lammond'M caM' (1822), 2 (ircrn'. 33 1223, 1228 
 
 lamniond, He (1803), 3 S. >V T. 90 ; 32 L. .F. I'. 201 ; 8 I,. T. 610; 9. lur. 
 
 N. .S. 6,S1 , il W. R. 030 090 
 
 lanimoiid r. BradHtrect (1864). 23 L. .1. Kx. 332 ; 10 Kx. 300 403 
 
 lammonil r. Uiikivh (I860), 7 Moo. I'. C. C. 100 178 
 
 lammond r. Hinitli (1801), 33 Bcav. 462 712 
 
 lammoad c. Stewart, (1734-6), 1 Sir. 610 816 
 
 IiiiMpdeu V. WalliM (1884), 27 Ch. D. 261 ; 64 L. J. Cli. 1176 ; 61 L. T. 
 
 3'-.7 ; 32 W. R. 077 624 
 
 lam|>deii c. WalHli (1870), 1 il B. D. 189 ; 43 L. .1. <l B. 238 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 862 ; 24 W. It. 007 : 020 
 
 lampHliirn «'. J'eircie (1760), 2 Vch. Hen. 210 7o7 
 
 laMi|.loii v. Silencer (1003), 2 Vern. 288 482 
 
 liint.iiry „. lolla (1834), 1 A. & K. 01 ; 3 N. & M. 438 190 
 
 liineoek v. SomeH (I860), 8 (Jox, (J. C. 172 ; 1 K. it K. 706 ; 28 L. .1. M. 
 
 <;. 108; 6. lur. N, S. 086 1073 
 
 fiiMcoek v. WcIhIi (1810), 1 Stark. 347 1113, 1110 
 
 liind V. Hall (1877), 2 Kx. I). 366; 40 li. J. Kx. 003 040 
 
 landley r. .loiieN (18.30), eiled Moiyan v. BoyH, 7 A. & E. 337 371 
 
 landley v. Ward (1818), riled 1 SInrk, Kv. 188, n.(»() 021, J44 
 
 uniiiurv. Clmiiee (1806), 4 l)e(l..l.\S 020,031; .34 L. .F. <;h. 413. . I lU, 722 
 
 'J'/ie mjeinnceii are to jiiit/ei, not to jiuiuj/i njj/u. 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. 
 
 XCIU 
 
 Himnii, Till) (lS{i(i), 30 L. J. Adin. I ; L. R. 1 A. & K. iS:} ; lo L. T. li.il ; 
 
 16 W. It. ,;<>;{ 17S 
 
 ]Iiiiiiiiifor<l r. lliiim (IS.T)), 2 0. & 1'. \hr, 1101, 11():{ 
 
 Haiiimfonl r. Whilcway {\HM>). 1 (!. H. N. H. fl.'t ; li] h. J. V. V. T". ; :t 
 
 Jur. N. H. T);) l.^ii 
 
 Hiimiiiy r. Stewart. {1S;(7), (i WatfH, IH" .'ISS 
 
 HaiiHanl v. KobiiiHim (ISiT), 7 It. \- (Vi/O ; i) 1). & U. KiiO ; U. & M. KU, ii. :t07 
 
 HaiiHoin f. Arinit.a>r<^ (l«'i'^), C) H. iV A. f}M ; 1 I). \ H. TiS tisri 
 
 II iiLsouV case (ISil), I'alry <m Coiiv. '282, '^S,'! ; 1 H. k Aid. tyU Ml 
 
 llaiiNiiii r. I'arkcr {nv.i), l" \Vil«. 'Ifu I'.lii 
 
 IlaiiMonr. ShiirUcltoii (1H;<.'>), t l).)wl. 'IH ; 1 II. & \V. ;ir2 IC 
 
 IlaiLsoii r. Sti'tsoti (1H27), .') I'ick. 6()(> TAH 
 
 Ihinli'ti c. (ic.nloii (lS2;i), 2 Mhmdii, T)!!, .Illl .'^i.V2 
 
 llanliiiif r. (iri'i'riiii^r (IM7), H 'rami. -12 107 
 
 JIariliiiK '■. I'cini's (IH.t.')), Tyr. iV (Jr. l:(i") :>IC> 
 
 llanliiitf «. Kiiijir (IHMI), (I ('. i: V. 127 107U 
 
 llartliiijr r. WiiliaiiLs (ISSO), 11 Cli. I). 1!)7 ; •!!• L. J. Ch. CCl ; -12 L. T. 
 
 MH : 2H \V. H. (llfi lOfri 
 
 Ilanlmim r. Willcock (lH:t2), !) liiiijr. ;iS2, ii .11.') 
 
 llardwiikr, ^^^(ISHlt), <» I'. I). ;i2; .Mt L. J. I'. I). \ A. 2:i -i;:!, .^i^ 
 
 llanlwick r. Ilardwick (lS7;i), I-. U- Hi K(|. IC.S; ri L. ,1. Cli. o:i(i ; 21 W. 
 
 It. 7I!» HOI 
 
 llarilv'H <•.!».• fl7ft4), 21 Hdw. St.. 'IV. lol l.l.'! lilU 
 
 Hardy, Km (IMII), HO I,. .1. I'. .V M. 1 12 112, 717 
 
 Hardy r. Ali'Xaiidi'r (1S;!7), 2 Sunk. I'lv. (ill, 012, n. (/•) 2.").i 
 
 llaru'r. Ilciitv (IHOl), KM'. Ii N. S. (;,) ; M) L. ■!.<!. I'. :i02 ; 7 .hir. N. S. 
 
 .')2;t ; I ].. '\\ .iO.'t ; !1 \V. It. TM 32 
 
 Harof. Ilvd'' (IMAl). \*iii. H. itHI : 20 I,. J. Q. IJ. 185; 16 Jur. 3lo . . . . 870 
 
 Harffcst. c." I'"ollH'rKill (1832), 5 C. \- I'. 303 314 
 
 HarKniviw. Ilarirravc (18181, >.» Kcav. .'■).V2 ; 1!) Ii. J.Cii.'iOl ; 14. Fur. 2 12. .101,422 
 
 llHrKravnr. HiirKravr (18.)0), 12 Ilrav. 108 .•)«)0, ilo.'i 
 
 llur>{riMivi> c. Kvoiard (18.)0), i; Ir. <'li. It. 278 137 
 
 Harjfroavo c. Si.ink, (1802) 1 (^ H. 2.); 01 Ji. J. Q. H. 318; Oft L. 'l'. CM; 
 
 40 VV. It. 2.VI 7 
 
 Ilar^frcavrM v. I'arHonH (1814), 13 M. & W. fiOl ; 14 L. J. Ex. 'iitO 07U 
 
 Harlaiid v. Morlcy {sir Morli'V c Moricy). 
 
 Harlddk v. Anlilirrry (1882), MM 'li. I). fi30 ; 51 L. J. Cii. 304; 40 L. T. 
 
 ■M)(S ; 30 W. It. 327 Vft 
 
 Hariiiaii v. AndtTHoii (1800), 2 ("ami>. 243; 11 It. It. 70(1 oiri 
 
 Hariiiaii v. (iiirnnr (18(10), .Ift Hcav. 748 702 
 
 Hariiian r. It.rv.. (IH.IO), 2') I,. J. (!. I'. 2r)7 ; 18 C. M. .''.87 088 
 
 Haniiarr. Davin (1817), 7 'ra-iii. .'")77 ; 1 Moon', 0. 1'. 300 518, ;V»2 
 
 Harm.T v. Kcaii ( : 8,5.3), 3 ( '. \ K. 307 2y i 
 
 Hanii.T r. M.'ll (1851), 7 Mn,). I'. (;. C. 207 1103, 1120 
 
 HariiiiT f. Cnni.liuM (18.".8j, 28 I,. J. C. V. 88 ; 5 C. M. N. S. 240; 4 .lur. 
 
 N. H. 1110 780 
 
 HariiK.nv, Tim (1800), 2 I!. Itoh. Adm. 322 179 
 
 Uarii.'Iti liiro, I-cal.y c. O'drady (188(;), 17 I.. It. Ir. 5|3 031 
 
 Hariiftt. r. VIh.- (1880), 5 Kx. I). '307 ; 43 L. T. 045 ; 20 W. It. 7 41 
 
 Hanior r. (Jr<iv.'H(lK55), 15 C. 11.007; 3 (\ I,. It. 400 757 
 
 HariHT, lt«' (1810), 7 NotcMof Can. {Km. \- Mar.) 44 700 
 
 Harrall, r. Wmo (18.30), H. \ V,. 712 ; 4 M. \- It. 521 3a, 1095 
 
 Harriiijrtciii r. Fry (1824), Ity. iV M. 00 ; M.H.rc, 344 ; I C. & l\ 289; 2 
 
 IJiiiT. 17it 1218, 1221 
 
 HarriM, U.I (1800), 2!) I,. J. I'. >% M. 7!»; I H. & T. 530 70H 
 
 HarriM, It., ^"'i!'^ 33 I,. .1. I'. \ M. 181 ; 3 S. \- T. 485 TOO, 707 
 
 HarriH, He, CIucho v. J.ovij.iy (1877), 40 L. .1. 1'. I). \ A. 00 ; L. It. 2 1'. 
 
 Div. 251 ; 37 1,. T. 204 ; 25 \V. It. 85,1 70(5 
 
 HarriH fi. It.Trall (1858), 1 S. & T. 153 705 
 
 HarriH v. Oiintar (1825), 1 0. & I'. 037 102 
 
 HarriH v. OainM.^ (1878), 7 ('li. I). 877 ; 47 L. J. ('li. 344 ; 38 L. T. 253. . 221 
 HarriH «•. Ooodwyn (1H41), 2 M. & Or. 405; 2 Soott, N. 11. 459; 9 l)owl. 
 
 4(tO H5, 750 
 
 > I 
 
 Vol, I. tiidi with pagt 035. 
 
X<;lV TABLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 HarriH V. IIiiniH (1H2I)). 2 \ln)t\^. V.va'.. U. 400 ftArt 
 
 lliimHi'. Hill (IH'iJ), .iSliirlc. IK); I). & U. N. 1'. K. 17 '-m 
 
 IliiriiH f. Miiiitl.'dTHll), It 'I'. R. ;107 TU) 
 
 llim-iHU. ()'l,..Klil<'n (IH7I), T) Ir. U. K(|. />14, WO 17 
 
 JlarriNi'. I'.|.|«rfll (lH(i7). I,, li. .'. K.|. I ; 1(1 VV. It. OS, 17 I,. .1. <!li. liM 7l!l 
 lIiiiriMC. I'.llK.rirU (IH7i)), 1 Q. H. I>. (Ill ; 4S Ji. J. (i. II. Wn ; 41 h. T. 
 
 14(1 4'i 
 
 lIurriHi'. kirkcl.t. (IH.'iit), 4 II. & N. (1; 'iK I,. J. Kx. 47 62!) 
 
 IliimHi'. Kydiiij^ {IH;»!)), T) M. & VV. (10 114 
 
 lliirriMi'. Hiiim.lriM (IH-'ft), 4 H. & (!. 411 ; (I I). & U. 471 1142, IIM 
 
 IlurriH V. 'r.M|.iiiiv (IHH;{), 1 C. & K. (ir. 1 ll)(i, Vm\ 
 
 llaiTiMD. 'riiom|)H(.n (IHft;)), l.'t (J. I». :);i;t HI 
 
 lliiiriHi'. TipiM'tt. (IHll), '2 (!aiii|). (I.IK ; 11 11. It. 707 1)47, !)/»(>, i)«7 
 
 lliirrlHt'. WilMi.ii (IH;11), 7 VVcli.l. :.7 4!)4 
 
 llanim.ii, Kx pailii (lMf)'2), Id Jiir. 72(1; !'.» L. T. IM 1100 
 
 llaiiiHcii r. Itaildii (IH(ll), .'10 I/. J. Cli. 2lf. ; 7 .lur. N. H. 11»; it W. U. 
 
 177 I ai), 7H7 
 
 IlairiNon »'. HIadoM (IHl.'l), 'A (.'amp. 4r)H WiX), 120!) 
 
 Ilarrlwiii r. Corp. of H(>iiUiainj>l.<>ii (IHr);i), 22 L. .). V,\\. 722; 4 l>«<). M. 
 
 & (1. I, ■17 MO, 2!i.'>, I lo:i, II. '12 
 
 JlHiriHOTi V. (JrcHwic.k {\M\\), Kl (J. H. It!)!), 410; 21 I/. .1. (). I'. Il.t; !0 
 
 .1 iir. :t 1 .1 K5 
 
 JlaiTiHciii r. Klviii {1H42), ;tQ. II. 117; ^w. HID; 2 (i. k I). 7(1!); 11 
 
 I,. ,1. (^ II. I!I7 700 
 
 IlaniHon v. Kaiio (IH40), 1 M. * dr. UM) 48, 41) 
 
 llaniMi.ii V. (Jiiidoii (I HUH), 2 l,i>w. <;.<,'. 1,111 WA 
 
 llaifiMi.ii V. Ilcallioin (lH4;t), (1 M. * (ir. HI ; Sim.II, N. It. 7:i.'i ; 12 I/. .1. 
 
 (!. r. 20:t M» 
 
 IlarriMoii r. Ilyiln {l«''!'). -^ "• ''' N. HO.'. ; 'i'i. \,. .) . V.n. I|<) HOI 
 
 llairiH.iii w. .I.ickw.ti (IH77), 7 <:ii. I>. ;i:i!l; 47 I-. .1. (!li. 142 7.'>:i 
 
 llarriHoii r. Luk.i (IK4.'i), 14 M..V VV. I.ll); 14 I,. .1. I'',x. 24H 222 
 
 llaniMim v. Iti.waii (IH2(I), 11 VVaHli. .'.HO i)4.''i 
 
 llarriH.iii )). Unwlry (l7!iH), 4 V..h. 1'I2; 4 It. It. 1!!!) 144 
 
 llaniHiin c. Siiiil.li(':i.ti. (I7.'>l). 1 Alk, fi2H !)(;2 
 
 llarriMoii v. Taylor (IH(IO), T.) L. .1. Kx. It ; 4 II. .t N. HI.'. ; ,'. .I.ir. N. H. 
 
 1211) 47 
 
 llarriHi.ii r. TiinKT (1H47), 10 (^ It. 4H2 ; 1(1 h. .1. () \\. 2!».'i ; II .liir. H17 4H0 
 
 llarriHi.ii f. Vallniirfi (ih22), 1 IliiiH-. 4.'. ; 7 Mcnir, (1. I'.. '(01 41)(i, f.ll 
 
 JIaniHc.ii (.. VVilliaiiiM (IH'J4), 11 It. .V ( !. Ki'i 1))),'. 
 
 JliirrlMon v. VVri>(lit (IH I.'.;, l.'t M. .V VV. H20 ; 2 I). & L. (iO.'i ; 14 I,. .1. 
 
 Kx. 100 lt\M, fi44 
 
 Ilain.<l !■. Ilarrcl (lHr.4), 1 K. * .1. 4 ; IH .lur. H.'i.'l 140, H(»7 
 
 Harry i'. Itn.ail (1704), 2 S.ilk. 02(1 10 
 
 llarl V. Alrxaiiilcr (Ih:I7), 7 »'. ft I'. 740 ; 2 M. & VV. 4H1 ; M. & II. (i;i ..lOOo, 
 
 1000 
 
 Hart. c. IIiihIi (IH.'.H), '^7 I.. .1. <i. It. 271 ; K. II. \ K. 4 04 (i!)2 
 
 Hart, II. |)..aiiirr (IK.'tl;, Wrml. 407 1102 
 
 lliirl.r. Krondti'i, \i'., (iolil Min. Co. (IH70), I.. It .'. Kx. Ill; Itl I,. .1. 
 
 Kx. Oil ; 22 lj. T. :io r.4 1 
 
 llart.fi. llarl. (IH42), I liar.', I ; fi .Jiir. 1007 ; 11 I.. .1. Cli. ....i;(l, ;I02, ;t(),'. 
 
 ]|art. V. Iliirii (IHOll), 2 Camp. 1)2 40(1 
 
 Hurl, r. NaMh (ih:!..), 2 1). M, .Sc It. ;i:t7 : 1 <ial.s 171 ; '> Tyr. ii.'..'. 715 
 
 llarl, ('. Niiwmaii (IHI I), :t Cami.. l.'t ' [,'IK) 
 
 Jlarii). l'Mii..l..rKaHt, flHl.'.), 14 M. .V VV. 74 1 ; If) K. .1. Kx. 22;t ..710, 711, 712 
 
 llarl, t). Hal.lloy (IHI 4), :i Camp. .'.2H (till 
 
 llarl, r. Tiilk (IH,'.2), 22 I,. .1. «:li. (1111; 2 l»o (1. M. & (1. .'lOO . H02 
 
 llarl, w. WilliamM {IH2I(), 2 W.'riil. .'ii;i 4f)l 
 
 llarl. r. Wiii.lMcr flHl.'l), V>. M. .V VV. OH; Kt I,. .1. Kx. 120; H .lur. IW).. 774 
 llarl. .rr. I larl.T (1H72), 42 \,. J. I'. .V M. I ; I-. It. .'I I'. Ik. U. li; 21 
 
 I ,. T. Hi-.H , J\ VV . It. ;i4 I 141 
 
 llarlf.iril c, ralriwr flHIO), IH .InliriN. fAm.) I4.'t H'lO 
 
 llHrll'iiril V. I'owiT (IHdO), I. It. ;t Ki|. (102 (lltl 
 
 liurtliiy ti. Cook (IH,l2j, 6 (J. ,Sc l>. 4 1 1 1171 
 
 Till' rr/'irrtiirii iiif to pagm, tint to piiriii/riijih^. 
 
TAHLK 01'' CASKS CI IKI). 
 
 XCV 
 
 m 
 'i 
 
 rm 
 
 vknn 
 ITarlloT V. IlindmarHJi (lH(i(i), L. U. 1 O. P. ChVi ; 35 L. J. C. V. 'l.Vt ; 14 
 
 W. k.Mi W'Vi 
 
 iriirUoy V. Wharton (IHIO). 1 1 A. & K. it.H ; :i P. & P. M!); 1 Jiir. f>7«..07:<, 7i:« 
 
 llartli'V »'. WilkiiiMoii (1HI.'>), I Cam|>. 127 ; J M. * S. -2^ 7.'>.'> 
 
 iriirtiMi. Tilt' (IHHI), it P. I). 4« ; M L. J. P. I). & A. JA ; M L. T. UTO; 
 
 ■Vi W. K. ;)!»7 ; f) Ah|). M. C. 'illl 177 
 
 llartopji f. Ilart(.iip (IHr).'.), '21 Moav. "iftO ; '2 Jiir. N. H. 71>« ; 2r> \,. .1. (Mi. 
 
 ■J71 i;i« 
 
 lliirtMhonid f. Watwm (IHHO), 5 Hiiijf. N. C. 477 ; 7 Him)U, HU ; '2 Am 70 imi> 
 
 lliirty c. DaviN (IS.'iO), 111 Ir. L. K. •r.\ 7'2(> 
 
 llamw'M raw (ISOO), '2 KaHt., P. (/'. (\!>H fiH". 
 
 llarvi/y c (laytoii (KwA), '2 Hwhiih. ^^I, ii. ; 11) H. H. (Ki fill-2 
 
 llarvry r. Ccii"'''""!. ("<'•'-) •'<> •'• H. Ir. iVl .'iri 
 
 llarvoy c. Croydoii Hiiiitn, Aid. (IHHI), ('diirt i)f Alijii'al, "TiiiioH," It 
 
 Kdh., ov.TniiiiiK M Ii. J. (;ii. ;t;ir> r.07 
 
 Harvey «'. DivurM (m>!>), IC. C. H. Ii)7 HISI 
 
 llarv.'y v. Kiirnid (1HH((), f. P. Div. I.'.H ; lU L. J. P. I). & A. Xi IM.t 
 
 Harvey r. I'Mniie (lHh'2), H App. Cum. 1:1 IMt 
 
 Harvey »'. (Iraliliaiii (lH;i(i), ft A. & K. (U ; (I N. * IVT. Ifll "M 
 
 Harvey r. Iliirvev ('.«HI), 2(i Cli. I), till ; [<\ Ii. T. M)H ; ;{;t W. II. 7(1. .. . Hl\H 
 
 Harvey f. MilrlKill (IHll), 2 M. & Kob. ;i(i(l 2(i, 271), ;ilO 
 
 Harvey v. MorRaii (ISIO), 2 Hl.ark. 17 ;U;i 
 
 Harvey e. M.m. Perm. Invest. Iliiilil. Hoe. (IHMl), 2(! Cli. O. 2711 ; tfl Ii. J. 
 
 Ch. '.'Mil ; .'i.'t Ii. .1. di. 1 12(i ; ftl I,. T. Ids ; ;)•.; \V. K. r>,%l (iou 
 
 Harvey v. TowerM (IHAl). (i Kx. K. (i.'.(i ; 20 L. J. Kx. ;UH ; U. .Iiir. .'ilJ . . 2(12 
 Hiirw.xMl r. (i(H«lriKlit. (1T7I), 1 Cowp. 91. il2 ; liotl't, CM); ;t Wiln. Iil7 ; 
 
 2 W. HI. !t:t- 2i) 
 
 Harw I V. Keys (lH.r2), 1 M. .t Hcilt. 201 4!l(!, ."ill 
 
 Hiirwood ('. HiiuH (IHlO), WiRlilw. 112 101, 410 
 
 IhiHeldine »'. drove (1KV2), 3 (1. & I). 210; 3 H. M. !lil7 ; 12 I,. .1. M. (;. 
 
 10 ; 7 .Tur. :t(! 39 
 
 IhiHleliainr. YounK(IHIl).''Q- It. H;t:i; 13 Ii. .1. (i. M. 20.'".; 1 I). \- M. 70(1 1(11 
 
 llMsloek V. KerKUHNon (1H:17), 7 A. \- K. HO ; 2 N. \- P. 209 ; 1 .liir (iS9 . . 719 
 HaHliiek r. Pe(ilev(lH7.i). II I'-.I-<'1>- li;i: I-. It. 19 Kti. 271 ; 23 \V. It. I.^.") I.i!» 
 
 llasNaril r. Sini'li (IH72), I. It. (i Ki|. 129 170, 2(i3, 1102 
 
 llaHtie r. IhiNtie {1S7(>), I Cli. I>. f)(i2; I.'. I,, .T. Cli. 2.SH 1234 
 
 HaH(,il<.w r. Stoltie (IKO.'.), '.\r> }.. .1. P. .V: M. IH ; Ii. It. 1 P. & I). (14 ; 14 
 
 \V. It. 211; 13li. T. 173; 1 1 .Tiir. N. .S. 10.19 140 
 
 IhiMtinKH P •• (IHIO), Pari. M. 200 423, 42.'5, 42(1 
 
 IJHHwell, 'I'lie (IH(il), llrown. \' I,uh1i. 247 IS."! 
 
 Hatch r. MeiiniN (lH:t3), I Pairf. 211 ,'.ll 
 
 llateli c. Ilatrh (1812), 9 Mann. 311 1201 
 
 Hateh r. .MearleH (IH.'') I). 2 Sni. \(1. 117; 23 L. J. Ch. 4(17 ; 24 l,..I. ("!h. 22. . r2(l.-> 
 
 Hat.luiwav i: Harrow {1H07). 1 <'ain|), l.M 1102, 1109, 111(1 
 
 llaUiaway v. HaHkell (1H2!0. 9 Pick. 42 493 
 
 Hatliorn v. I\in>f (IHll), M MaMH. 371 931 
 
 llatton r. Ituyle (IH,')H), 27 Ii. .1. I'lx. IH(1 ; 3 1[. *. N. <^00 101 
 
 llavelock r. IJockwooil il799), S T. It. 2(iH 1M3 
 
 Hawanlen r. Dunlop (IHC.l), 2 H. \. T. 310; 31 \j. J. P. 17; t> Ii. T. 
 
 7(i.') 104ft 
 
 llawcH V. AriMNtronnr {IH3.'>), I IHnur. N. O. 7(1') (109 
 
 llawcM r. IhneKer (1HH3), 23 Ch. I). 173; 52 li. J. Ch. 449; 48 Ii. T. 51H; 
 
 31 VV. It. 570 t< 
 
 HitweHC. PorHter (1H3I), 1 M. .V Wol>. ;!(iS 297, I'ilH 
 
 llaweN r. WiilNon (l,S2l), 2 It. .V C .'.10; 4 I). * It. 22 545 
 
 Hawk V. I'Vi'iincI (IHVI), I K. \ V. 291 474 
 
 HawkeM c. linker (IH'.lin, (Ireenl. 72 90(1 
 
 llawkcM e. .Suiter (IH30), 4 ItinK- 71.'> ; 1 M..VP.750 32 
 
 HuwkeHley r. llnMlNliaw (I.SMll), 49 L. .1. (^ II. 3.13 ; ft il. It. I). 302 ; 42 
 
 li. T. 2H5 ; 2H \V. It. 557 535, 53(1 
 
 llawkimworth c. Hhowler (IH43). 12 M. & W. 49 ; 13 Ii. .1. Kx. H(t H89 
 
 HawkiiiMf. (iathercole (IH.'iO-l), I Him. N. S. 150; 20 I,. .1. (!li. 303 (101 
 
 llawkinMi'. Ilowar.l (IH2I), Ity. \ M (14 ; I C. \ P. 222 fil»8 
 
 yi)!. I. m>d* With jtmit t)30. 
 
; ■*.% .. 
 
 ^: 
 
 XCVl 
 
 TAI'MC OK CA8KH v.'! Kl), 
 
 ilnwkliiH V. TiiiHCdinlin (1R18), 2 Swiiim. ;i'.)2 . 
 
 nan 
 
 H..(Ik.,h I'. Tiij^K (l«7'^), I' K. 7 Kx. v'H;i ; 't I I,. .1. Kx, Kilt ; '^(1 VV. K. »V\ W.i 
 
 ](<ulli'yt;. lliiiMl>ii<l)f<'flHr/),;i(/. Il.;ili); II L.J.W. II. 'Jd.'l ; '.Mi. ,V I). 4H;| HXI 
 
 llncimii f>. (Mi.iiir'iilH (IH,')(l), I Ir. <:. Ii. II,. 11 fil'2 
 
 M.lll..l(l (.. McmrloWM (IHliDj, I,. It. I ( !. I'. .Mill; '.id I,. T. 7U\ VHll 
 
 JlriiiiM'HriiHi', |{<. M<.l.r<>|i<iliiiiii lliuik (JKHII), li'iOli. I). I lltl ; '!<,> I,. .1. Oil. 
 
 fif.i ; 111 I,. T. y:»i) Hia 
 
 ^^l^\>y v. MuUh.wh, (ih'/i) 2 g. n. wi; (la 1,. .l.(^ ii./i77; 70 1,. r. h.iv; 
 
 ri W. U,. f.l4; f.H.;. r. 7Hr.. 11 I,. : II K. (Auk) I ; 'M I.. ./. (/. It. 
 
 4(1/) ; •»;( W. U. ftdl Iilil. ( lun 
 
 ll.'llliiKH, II... (I8l!»), I KolpitrU. 70;t m»M 
 
 ll.l|iH.;. Oliivl"" MHill), 17 <!. M. N. H. fiM; :t4 I,. .1. (!. I'. I; II 1,. T. 
 
 47'!; 1.1 VV. II. nil 49 
 
 IIkIhIiiiiii f>. lllurkMooil (IH/)|), II r. II. Ill ; W \,. J. C. I>. IH7 IIIO 
 
 llnlycur I). Iliiwkn (|H{(;|;, (, Km|i. Ti IIHH 
 
 JlftiliriillKf. HI'li'l""' (l«7;ii, 4'^ Ii. .1. <!. I'. I'lM; '.^1 W.ll,. (i;t(l lt> 
 
 lli'inriiliiK r. MiMlilii'k (IK7'/), 41 I.. .1. Cli. titl ; I.. 11. 7 <''li. -W^' ; W l<. 'I'. 
 
 r,iu> , vu VV . II,. 4a;t 1K.4 
 
 llniiimiiig V. I'liriy (IH:t4), (1(3. & l'.,ftHO lUO 
 
 'J'ht mftittwri an Id pni/m, mil to )iuriiijrii/i/ii. 
 
TAHLE OF CASKS CITKn. 
 
 XCVU 
 
 H(«nimin>rH r. Omhhoii (18.18), K. T\. & l). ;il(! ; i!7 T-. J. (^ H. -'.IJ ; t .Im-. 
 
 II 
 
 Jj. s. h;ii 
 
 pAoa 
 
 2U 
 
 I'lniiiiiiu'H I' 
 
 •IS I,. T. ;i!ij 
 
 Willi 
 
 II (lH8;t), 10 Q. It. I). •J.V.I; fi'i I,. J. a. It. '-'T:!; 
 
 :ti W. U. ;i:i(; 1177 
 
 Hniil.liill r. M'K.'iiim (IM !,'>), H Ir. I,. H. I.'l IIO'.I 
 
 II.'iii|ihIi.ii c. Iliiiii|ilin>.i ilSl'.T), li-. |{,. 1 (". I,. '.'71 .Sll'i 
 
 llcMili'iMiii I'. AiiNlniliiiii Koval Mail .Stciiiii Niivij^. (.'<>. (1H;").')1, .'1 M. & It. 
 
 •Illil ; 'Jl I.. .1. <^ It. '.i-l-i ; '1 .liir. N. H. n:10 OIJ, (M.'i 
 
 lli'iuliTHoii r. Iliinu'Wi'll (1H!7), 1 V. .V .1. ;tS7 -".17 
 
 liciiil.'rHoii r Itnmmlii'ail (IH.V.l), \ II. & N. .1(1:1; 'JS I,. .1. I''.x. iiCid ; .'i.liir. 
 
 N. S. 117.' 
 
 ;;;i I,. T. o. s. ;io2 
 
 HM 
 
 lltiiil.THon c. ll.'inliTHim (IKI.!). .'I llaro, ll.'i I I'J:), 11.1.1, 11.11 
 
 II.Miilciw.ii r. Il.'-i.lcrwpii (ISI.S). (i l^ It. JSS I I I'i, 11 17 
 
 ll.n.l.TM.ii r. S,|uin< (IN(l'.i), I.. U. I Q. It. 17(1; 'Mi \,. .1. l^. H. 7:i; 1(» It. 
 
 .V .S. l.SH; 111 I,. T. 1.01 ; 17 \V. II. i.ll) 774 
 
 ll.'ii.lorwiii r. William.M, (l.S'.l.l) 1 i). It. ,1.;i ; 111 I,. .1. {.). It. lidS ; 7- l<. '!'. 
 
 1)8; 4;i W. II. '^71 If/./. |,>I1| 
 
 llriifnio «'. Itriiinii'v (I.SdS), 11 j'lisl, liOlt ; •_• Sniilli, KMl; S U. U. I'.M l'.!()(l 
 
 il.iirroy «'. Ilfiiriv'y (ISli), I Muc. I'. (\ (V '.I!! : 'J ('ml. KIS 701 
 
 liciikin V. (I.T.SH (181(1), 'J (',iiii|i. lOS ; I'J I'la.sl., '.' 17 ; 11 U.K. 7.11 (I'.'l 
 
 lliiilcy r. So|«T (iHv'Hl, 8 It. .V ( '. Hi ; -J l\l. \- It. l.i:t ll.i;i 
 
 ll.iiinim f. Iiicl(iiis.,ii (i.sj.s), .1 Itinir. 1^:1; 'J M..V r. ".isj w;. iiiij 
 
 lic'iiiiiaii r. I,..,^lrr (I.Sil'J), :tl I,. .!.('. I'. :!7(» ; liC. It. N.S. 7SI; ll.lur 
 
 N. S. (101 '•■>:<, '.ill8 
 
 llriiia'NNjr.\VriKlil(188H), ;iii\V. |{.. 870 ; .17 l,..1.Q.n. AO I ; 10 I,. T. 701.. (11 ;t, (.18 
 ll.iirv c. (i..l.lii(.v (181(1), 1.1 IM. \- W. 101 ; 1 |)..wl. \ L. (1; M I,. .1. l\\. 
 
 '.'118 ; 10 .liir. r:iO 1111 
 
 lli'iiry «'. I"'!' (^181 l\ ',! ('Iiit. I!. I.'l 0'.'(1 
 
 II. iiry f. I.<'ijfli (ISI.!), .1 ('Mni|). 100 lilO, 1017 
 
 lliiiiy '•. lii^'ti (.1 ."8^<K 1 l>all. '.'■>'•■'< 7(1.1 
 
 lli'iiiy '■. Mill]. 1)1' W.-tiiirnlli il8i:!), If. Cir. U 800 •J8i1 
 
 ll.iir'v (1p.\im, 'rii(Ml8;8), 17 I.. .1. Adiii. s:t , :i 1', Div. 1.1(1 ; lis I,. T. 810. . Ill, 
 
 lis, 1171 
 
 IIiiinIiuxv v. IMia.saiici' (1777), 'J \V. It!. 1171 ll(i:i 
 
 18 
 
 ll.iiwoiiii c. Olivrr (ISI I), 1 {). It. 100 ; 1 11. \ l>. 'Jl 
 
 Il.i.worlli I'. Il.'i.woilli (1870), I,. K. II \''.i\. 10; 10 li. .1. Ch. Ill ; 'J.i I.. 
 'l\ .188 ; 10 W. |{. Id (1(1(1 
 
 Ilrrlirrt, f. ANliliiiiiit'r (17.10), 1 \VII«. •J07 
 III rlicrt, »■. II. 'iIkmI (181.1), Dran.., \'W. I 
 llnlii'tt. c. Hji.. (ISIi'J), 1:1 Ir. Ki|. It. 'Jl 
 lliilint. r. .Say..|- (1811), ft il. Jt. 0(1.1; 2 
 
 :'(.»; 8 .lur. 81'. 
 
 Ili'vhirl. V. 'I'diKnl (l(lli:i), 'I'. Itiiym. 81 
 
 It. 1(1 
 
 
 
 
 TC 
 
 
 
 
 
 III 
 
 Dowl. 
 
 * 1,. 1 
 
 ; III 1,. 
 
 .1. (^ It, 
 
 111' 
 
 
 
 
 117. 
 
 •1'.' 
 
 ill 
 
 llcivtl 
 
 It 
 
 1'. ('. N. .S. lis,'. 
 
 lnllii|l III, I' 
 
 r 
 
 (18,111), 
 
 l{llll|.«lH. 1'! 
 
 H. .101 ; I M<M>r< 
 
 llrniiami r. SnirNilial (IS(l'J), If,! \.. ,1. (!. I'. 411; 111 ('. II. N. 8. Ml 
 
 (I I.. T. (11(1; II \V. It. \Hi. 
 
 J'.'d, 
 
 ISO 
 
 lIcnni'H r. ('liii'aK') Hay Cn (IS'.U), '.'7 Am. .S|. It. (10 
 
 lli.llirM rrcniK-i' (18 18), ;i Mari|. .18.1; '< I,. It. II. I,. (So ) .MS 
 
 lli'iTiiiK »'. ItiiNlon Inm ('11. (IS.in, I (liay (Miin.h.), i;il 78lt 
 
 lli'ifiiiK I'. rliili..ry (18 I'J), 1 I'liill >,l| .. .'. .101, .ion, (iOO 
 
 llriv.-v «'. lli'rv.iv"{lV7llV 'i \V, 111. 877 11711, IVd 
 
 lli'Ht.ltinn I'. HiffgiTH (1818), I Kx. 81(1 ; 18 I,. .1. Kx. 1(1(1 ( S,1 
 
 IIi'nIii|i I'. Cliapiiiaii {.in- llail.liii'K r. llt'Nln|0. 
 
 Ili.hloii r. HI. Iliiil.i (1 8111), •.'■' I,. .1. M. ('. (11; 1 K. ,V II. .1811 nil 
 
 llfllicriii^flim 1'. llillii'iiiiKlim (IS87), I'J I'. D. I I'J ; M I,. .1. I'. 7S ; 
 
 Kl'J 
 
 1.18 
 
 /i7 li. T. ft.'ill; lid W. It. I'J; Al .1. 
 
 no 
 
 lli'tlii'i'iiiKliiii «'. Ki'iiip (ISIfi), I ('aiii|i. 1011 ; Id It. It. 7711 
 
 llrllii'iiiiKloii <'. liOiiKTiRK (1870), 18 li. J. I'll. 171 ; 10 Cli. D. Id' 
 
 'J7 W. k, IIO.'I 
 
 rax 
 
 lli'dtfli I', (laiwll, (187.1). -ll li. .1. I'll. liO.I; ;t'J li. 'r. 11 IISII 
 
 1 1. 'Will, c. l'iK>f..U (18111), ft ('.\ P, 7.1 IS., .'.Jd 
 
 Jli.wlolt, r. (!...<k (I8;il), 7 Woii.l, ;t71 4'JO, laii 
 
 yol, 1, 0HiU U'ilh /Kiyc (Klft. 
 
 i!^ 
 
 ^ 
 
xcvm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 H 
 
 4S7 
 
 , 8S1 
 
 663 
 
 rxoR 
 
 Hewlins v. Shippsm (1826), 5 B. & C. 229 ; 7 Dowl. & R. 783 637 
 
 HewHOii r. Brown (1700), 2 Burr. 1034 1014 
 
 Iloxt, 1'. Gill (1872), L. K. 7 Cli. 099 ; 41 L. J. Oh. 761 ; 27 L. T. 291 ; 
 
 •20 W. It. 957 114 
 
 Hoy V. Moorhouse (1HH9), 6 Biiijr. N. O. 62 ; 8 S<!ott, 160 2.^8 
 
 HcyoN V. Ilindlo (1803), in Q. B. M. T. 1803, MS 010 
 
 Iloynmn «'. Fluwkor (1863). 13 C. H. N. S. 619 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 132 ; 9 Jar. 
 
 N. 8. 896 110 
 
 Hoyman v. Noalo (1809), 2 Uamp. 337 297 
 
 Hcviminn v. R. (1873), L. R. 8 <i. B. 102 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 383 ; 28 L. T. 
 
 102 ; 21 W. R. 367 84 
 
 HcyHliam v. FoMter (1829). 6 M. & R. 277 1039 
 
 Hcywood f. Piekoiinf? (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 428 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 145 ... , 33 
 
 Hcyworth i>. KiiiKlit (1804^, 17 C. B. N. 8. 298 : 10 Jiir. N. 8. 806 298 
 
 JUbbiTil V. Knight (lHi8), 2 Ex. 1 1 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 119 ; 12 Jur. 102 . .321, 698 
 
 Hibbcrt V. Barton (1842), 10 M. & W. 0S3 ; 2 Dowl. N. 8. 434 ; 12 L.J. Ex, 70 733 
 
 Hibbliiwhito v. M'Morino (1840), 6 M. & W. 214 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 217 . >83, 084, 
 
 120;, 1204, 1206 
 HibbH V. Ro88 (1800), L. R. 1 Q. B. 631 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 193; 12 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 812; 16 L. T. 07; 14 W. R. 914 178, 1176 
 
 Ilickcy, In ro (1876), Ir. R. 10 Ecj. 117 166 
 
 lliokcy r. Birt (1810), 7Tami. 48; 17 R. It. 440 , 
 
 Ilickcy V. Campion (1872). Ir. R. C. L. 6i7 631 
 
 Hic'.ccv r. llavter (1796), 1 Esp. 313 ; T. R. 384 ; 3 R. R. 213 
 
 Hicknum v. Ilayiics (1876), L. R. 10 C. P. 698; 44 L J. C. P. 368; 32 
 
 L. T. 873 ; 23 \V. R. 872 762 
 
 liii'.kinan v. Maobin (1869), 4 II. & N. 710; 28 L. J. Ex. 310; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 670 98 
 
 Hickman v. Upsall (1877), 4 Ch. D. 144 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 245 ; 35 L. T. 919 ; 
 
 26 VV. R. 176 172 
 
 Hick«, Ro (1809), 38 L. J. P. & M. 65; L. R. 1 P. & D. 683; 21 L. T. 
 
 300 702 
 
 Hi(;ks r. Duko of Beaufort (1838), 4 Bing. N. C. 229; 6 Scott, 698; 
 
 1 Arn. 66 ; 2 Jur. 266 621 
 
 Hickw r. Faulkner (18S1), 8 Q. B. D. 167 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 208; 30 W. R. 
 
 646 ; affiit. 40 I.. T. 127 ; 40 J. P. 420 29 
 
 Hicks r. Sallitt (18,64), 23 L. J. Ch. 671 ; 3 Do C. M. & 0. 782 741, 789 
 
 Hickton r. AntrobuH (1840), 2 C. B. 82; I Lutw . Rog. Ca.-. 303 166 
 
 Hide, Ro (1871). L. R. 7 Ch. 28; 41 L. J. Banl:. 6 002 
 
 Hide i>. TiioniborouKh (1840), 2 C. & Kir. 260 114 
 
 Hi^ririuH' Trusts, Ro (1801), '.> i'.in. 662 ; 30 L. J Ch. 405 632 
 
 Hi>rifinH V. Hopkins (1818). 3Ex. 163; Railw. Caa. 75; 18L. J. Ex. 113 611 
 
 HiKlfins V. Scott (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 413 79 
 
 Hifr^nns i'. Senior (1841). 8 M. & W. 814 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 199 768, 769 
 
 Hi!,'Ki"w>" '•• Clowes (1808), 16 Ves. 610 ; 10 R. R. 112 760 
 
 Hitf^iiiHo" "• Siinpaon (1877\ 40 L. J. C. P. 192; 2 C. P. D. 76; 36 
 
 1,. T. 17; 26 W. U. 303 620 
 
 HiffRHV. Dixon (1817), 2 Stark. 180 1207 
 
 Hiwst'. Maynard (1866), 1 II. & R. 681; 12 Jur. N. 8. 706; 14 L. T. 
 
 332 ; 14 W. R. 610 163 
 
 Hiyham v. Ridgway (1808), 10 East, 109 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 270 ; 10 R. R. 
 
 236 ; Preface, v 434, 436, 437. 438. 439, 441 
 
 HiKhlield r. Peako (1827), M. & M. 109 960, 1013, 1030 
 
 Hi^rhland Turnp. Co. v. M(d(<'an (1813), 10 Johns. 164 1176 
 
 Hiliard v. Phaley (1723), 8 M.)d. 180 496 
 
 Hill, Ro (1849), 1 Roberts. 270 698, 702 
 
 Hill t'. Camj)bell (1872), 44 L. J. C. P. 97 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 222 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 69 ; 23 W. R. 330 1 182 
 
 Hill c. C.>onibo(1818), cUM 1 Stark. Ev. 188, u. (ii) 921, 944 
 
 Hill V. Crook (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 702 ; L. R. II. L. 206 ; 22 W. B.. 137 ; 
 
 24 L. T. 488 739 
 
 Hill f. Dolt (1867), 7 Do O. M. & (4. 397 812 
 
 Hill r. Hart-Davis (1881), 20 (!h. D. 470 ; 63 L. J. Ch. 1012 ; 61 L.T. ->79 914 
 
 Hill V. Ilennigan (1877), I. R. 1 1 C. L. 622 130 
 
 The referenccn are to pages, nnt lit paragrapht. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XCIX 
 
 I'AdK 
 
 Hill V. Maiichcstor Waterw. Co. (18:!1), 2 B. & Ad. flfl'i, 55a ; '2 N. & M. 
 
 573 91, i>'i, M 
 
 Hill r. Piickiml (1830), 5 Wond. 387 1018 
 
 }lillr. rtiilp (18.-)2). 7 Ex. 'J3'2: '21 L. J. Ex. 8'2 ; Ul.Tur. 'JO 1187 
 
 Hill f. Rutloy (180'2), 31 L. J. Cli. 380 ; 2 J. & U. (531 \H 
 
 Hill V. Salt (1831), 2 O. & M. 120 ; 4 Tyr. 271 ; 3 L. .1 Ex. 84 103 
 
 Hill r. TboiinwDu (1817). 3 Mor. (i3() ; 2 Mdoro, 424 ; 8 Taiin. 375 : Holt, 
 
 (i;t(! 43 
 
 Hillary v. Waller (1805). 12 Von. 230, 252 126 
 
 Hills V. EvaiiH (18(i2), 31 L. J. Ch. 401, 402 ; 4 DoO. F. & J. 28S ; L. T. 
 
 90 : 8 Jur. N. S. 525 43 
 
 Hills V. I;aiiiinff (1854), 9 Ex. 250 ; 23 L. J. Ex. (iO 93 
 
 Hills r. Loiulim Oas Co. (1858), 27 L. .T. Ex. 60 ; (1860), 5 H. & N. 312 ; 
 
 20 L. .1. Ex. 409 43 
 
 Hillvard v. Grauthiiin (1750), cited 2 Vcs. son. 240 1116 
 
 Hilton V. i'ainaouKh (1811), 2 Camp. 633 : 12 K. H. 76(i 32 
 
 Hilton V. (lii'aud (1847), 1 DoG. & Sin. 187 ; 16 L. ,1 . Ch. 285 ; 11 Jur. 838 693 
 
 ] I iiuli-koptT V. Cotton (1834), 3 Watts, 56 616 
 
 Hindlfy*'- Ilaslam (1878), 3 Q. B. n. 481; 27 W. R. 61 1119 
 
 llindmiirsh, Ud (1860), 1 Drew. & 8m. 129 713 
 
 Hindmiir.sh r. Charlton (1861), 8 H. L. Cas. 160 095. 700 
 
 Jlindos. China and .Tajmn, Bk. of, v. Smith (1867). 36 L. J. C. 1'. 241 1198 
 
 J'.ind.s(m v. Korsoy (1765), 4 Burn, Ecu. L. 118 1215- 
 
 llindustan, Bk. of, Ro, Frickor's ca.so (1871), L. R. 13 E(i. 178 ; 41 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 278 845 
 
 Hiiiton r. Heather (1845), 14 M. & W. 134 ; 15 L. .T. Ex, 39 ;U) 
 
 HipKravo v. Case (188.5), 28 Ch. I). 356; 54 L. .1. (^h. 399 ; 52 L. T. 242 192 
 Hirs(^litield r. Smith (1841), 1 H. & R. 284, 288; L. R. 1 C. V. 310; 35 
 
 L.J. C r. 177; 12 Jur. N. S. 5-'3 31 
 
 Hirst, V. Hannah (1851), 17 Q. B. 383 732 
 
 Jlileh r. Wells (1816), 10 Beav. 84 607 
 
 Hitcliinv. Campbell (1771-2), 2 W. Bl. 827; 3 VVils. 304 ....1118, 1120, 1122. 
 
 1 1 39 
 
 Hitehin v. Groom (1848), 2 M. & W. 816 801 
 
 Hitchings v. Thompson (18,^0), 5 Ex. 60 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 146 99 
 
 Hitehins v. Eardley (1871). L. R. 2 P. & H, 248 ; 40 L. J. P. & M. 70. .20, 414 
 
 Hitchins v. Hivehins (1866), L. R. 1 P. & I). 15,5 ; 35 L. J. P. & M. 62 .... 347 
 
 Hoad V. Grace (1H62), 31 L. J. Ex. 98 ; 7 H & N. 494 786 
 
 Hoaro V. Corvtou (1812), 4 Taun. 560 147, 408 
 
 J loaro V. Graham (181 1), 3 Camp. 57 : 13 R. R. 75 J 756 
 
 Hoare v. Johnstone (1838), 2 Keen, 55;i ; 7 L. J. Ch. 207 495 
 
 Holihsr. Henning (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 791; 34 L. J. C. P. 117 1149 
 
 Hobbs t'. Knight (1838), 1 Curt. 768 706, 707, 708 
 
 ][obhou80 I'. Hamiltcm (1803), 1 Seh. & Lef. 207 ; 2 Si'h. &- Lef. 28 1009 
 
 Holwon f. Parker (1 753-4), Banies, 237; cited in 3 T. R. 142 ; 1 R. R. 673.. 994 
 
 Holwrn r. Thellusson (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 302 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 642 .... 639 
 
 If.obv V. Roebuck (1816), 7 Taun. 157 (iH2 
 
 Ho<kin V. Cooke (1791), 4 T. R. 314 16, 765 
 
 Ho.leni)yl r. Vingerhoed (1818), Chitty on Bills, 627, n. (y) 386 
 
 Hodgens V. Graham (1831), Ale. & Nap. 49 712 
 
 ] lodges V. Anenim (1855), 1 1 Ex. 214 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 257 944 
 
 Hodges f. Bennett (I860), 5 H. & N. 625 ; 29 I,. J. M. C. 224 630 
 
 Hodges »'. Cobb (1867), 36 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 652 ; 8 B. & S. 
 
 583 ; 16 L. T. 792 ; 15 W. R. 1038 .347 
 
 ITodges ('. Holder (1813), 3 Camp. 366 270 
 
 Hodgkinson v. Fletcher (1781), 3 Doug. 31 118 
 
 Hodgkinson v. Kelly (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 837 ; L. R. 6 E<i. 496 ; Ki W. R. 
 
 1078 158 
 
 Hodgson's case (1830), 1 Lew. C. C. 102-104 246 
 
 Hodgson, In re, Beckett v. Ramsdalo (1885), 31 Ch. D. 177; 55 L. J. Ch. 
 
 24 1 ; 54 L. T. 222 ; 34 W. R. 127 631 
 
 Hodgson e. Clarke (1860), 1 Do G. F. & J. 394 ; 1 Giff. 139 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1024 798 
 
 Vol. J. inda with pag» 636. 
 
 n 
 
 n 
 
 r 
 
 ' I 
 
 . : ;i 
 
 I 
 
i 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 j 
 
 1 
 
 ' " 
 
 if 
 
 
 «f 
 
 i 
 
 TA15LE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 VAca 
 
 Hods^sdu f. DaviiiM (IHIO), 2 Ciiinp. 832 ; IIR. R. 789 d.' 
 
 jriMljfMon )'. ])f ncaiich.'SMc (IHaS), 12 Afoo. P. C. C. 2S,'), 317 I7!>, 378 
 
 HoiIk-mihi v. lliitclifiison (1712), '') Vin. Abr. iVii '>'M, OHO 
 
 Hfidj^Non )'. JoliiiHon (18:)!)), 28 L. J. Q. U. 88; K. B. & E. 08:); 6 Jur. 
 
 N. H. 2',)() 082 
 
 IFodKN'm V. Ln Brot. (1S(I8), 1 Ciiinp. 223 (iiiO 
 
 1Iim1),'s()Ii v. Mor.'Nt, (1821), '.) rn(M', .')(i3 VM 
 
 H.)(lK*m f. H(^iirl(^U (1S13), 1 B. >'i AI<1. 232, 245, 21(; Ill 
 
 lliiiltu^tt I). Fonnim (181')), I Stark. !i() 1213 
 
 Hndsim »'. M='i •"• '»^ Ry. (!o. (1H77), r. K. II 0. L. 101) 1232 
 
 Hoc r. Niitli Ihorpc) (1(;()7), 3 Hiilk. IT)! ; I LA. Ray. ITil ..101(1, 10.')2 
 
 llollinim r. J io3), I (jaiiics, l.')7 rm 
 
 Iloviirth r. Lutlmin flH78), 3 Q. B. I). 013 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 330 ; 39 L. T. 
 
 ICy ; 2(i W. R. 3S8 120.') 
 
 Ilojrv: '•• <iarroU (181!)), 12 Ir. Eij. R. T).-)!) 38i) 
 
 llcijj^r V. Hk(!cn (18(1.')), 31 L. J. ('.. V. 1.53 ; 18 C. B. N. H. Vin-, II Jur. 
 
 N. S. 2M ; 12 L. T. 709 ; 13 W. R. 383 202 
 
 IIoKliton V. Hoghton (1872), IT) Beiiv. 27« ; 21 L. J. Ch. 482; 17 Jur. 99. .137, 
 
 .OOO, 5U 
 
 ir<.ll)ii-.(l V. StcplioiiH (1811), r, .Tur. 71 280 
 
 lIollM'ck r.I[.)liiock (1819), 7 NotcHof OaN. 291 (Ecu. & Mar.); 2 RoIktIh. 120 (198 
 
 n(illir<r)k V. Tirroll (1829i, 9 I'idk. 109 0;')9 
 
 Ilolcoinhu f. HcwHoii (1810). 2 (Janip. 291 ; UR. R. 710 230 
 
 IIol<Tc>tt'.s aiso (l,')77-8), 4 Co. Rop. 40 b 1129 
 
 IloWoft V. Harbor (1813), 1 C. & K. 4 1 -13 
 
 llolcroft, Liulv, V. Smith (1702), 2 Frocm. 2.')9 1214 
 
 Iloldcii, Re, Ex parte Holland (1871), L. R. 19 Eq. 131 ; 43 L. J. Bk. 9 ; 
 
 3 1 L. T. 44."> ; 23 W. R. 24 849 
 
 Holdim V. Ballantyiio (1800), 29 L. J. Q. B. 148 : Jur. N. S. 451 194 
 
 IT.ddnn r. lloldcn (Hill r. Dolt.) (1857), 7 Do O. M. & (1. 397 812 
 
 Holdon I. Kin« (1870), 40 L. J. Ex. 75 ; 35 L. T. 497 ; 25 W. R. 02 .... 1073 
 
 H(ddor V. Coatns (1827), M. & M. 112 114 
 
 Holder v. S.mlby (1800), 29 L. J. C. P. 246 ; 8 C. B. N. S. 254 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1031 ; 8 W. R. 438 102 
 
 HoldtuHt V. DowsinjT (1740), 2 Str. 1254 ; Bull. N. P. 204 1215 
 
 Holdiuf,' V. Elliott (18.')0), 39 L. J. Ex. 134 ; 5 H. & N. 117 520, 7o8 
 
 IIoldiiiK ''. Pi^ott (1831), 7 Binj,'. 405 ; 5 M. & P. 427 781 
 
 Holdsworth V. Davenport (1870), 40 L. J. Ch. 20 ; 3 Ch. D. 185 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 319 ; 25 W. R. 20 084 
 
 Holford V. Bailoy (1850), 13 Q. B. 427 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 109 ; 13 Jur. 278.. HI 
 Holnato, Re (18.')9), 1 S. & T. 201 ; 29 L. J. P. 101 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 251 ; 17 
 
 W. R. 19 097 
 
 HolKiite V. Slight (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 602 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 74 732 
 
 Holiday v. l»itt (1814), 2 Str. 986 ; Gilb. R. 308 807 
 
 Ho!l V. Griffin (1833), 10 Binjr. 240 ; 3 M. & 8c. 732 515 
 
 IfoUand V. Roovcs (1835), 7 C. & P. 705 485, 929 
 
 HoUiday v. Atkinson (1820), 5 B. & C. 501 ; 8 D. & R. 103 133 
 
 HolUngham v. Head (18.58), 27 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 4 C. B. N. 8. 388 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 379 230, 241 
 
 IIollinB V. Vorney (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 301 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 430 ; 51 L. T. 
 
 753 ; 33 W. R. 5 ; 48 J. P. 580 76 
 
 TIolliH V. Goldfineh (1823), 2 D. & R. 316 ; 1 B. & C. 205 235 
 
 Holloway V. Rakos (1772), cited Davies r. Piorco, 2 T. R. 55; 1 R. R. 419 445 
 
 Holman v. Burrow (1702), 2 Ld. Raym. 795 16, 18 
 
 Holman v. Pullin (1884), C. & E. 254 780 
 
 Holmo V. BrunHkill (1877), 3 Q. B. D. 495 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 610 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 Q'jQ 523 
 
 H .lines V. Badd'oloy (I'sVtV Y iphiil.476 V UL. J. Ch." iii? ;' 9 Jur." ij'sb" ." .' 601 
 Holmas r. BoUingham (1859), 7 C. B. N. S. 329 ; 29 L. J. M. C. 132 ; 6 
 
 Jur. N. 8. 534 112 
 
 Holmes V. Clifton (1839), 10 A. & E. 673 649 
 
 Holmes V. Ho.Hkius (1854), 9 Ex. 753 689, 690 
 
 Holmes «. MackrcU (1858), 3 C. B. N. 8. 789; 30 L. T. (O. 8.) 243.... 674, 713 
 
 The references are to pages, not to paragraphs. 
 
 I 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. 
 
 d 
 
 r*OK 
 Holmes V. Milwaid (1878), 47 L. J. Cli. 522 ; US L. T. .181 ; 20 W. R. MH.. i;j;{ 
 IIi.lm.-H r. Milchfll (186!)), 48 L. J. C. P. liOl ; 7 C. H. N. H. -.m ; (i Jiir. 
 
 N. H. 7;J (i7(t, ()76 
 
 HdIui.h r. Stiiim h (IsriO), U C. .V Kir. It) fi2l 
 
 licit -•. Cnllvcr (IHHl), l(i till. D. 718 ; flO L. J. Ch. .VA : 41 L. T. 214 ; 
 
 •J!) W. It. ViD'J 7 1 1 
 
 Holt V. JcHMi) (lH7(i), 3 Ch. I). 177 : 40 L. J. Cli. 2.')l ; 24 W. 11. 87!) .'•)(>8 
 
 Ilolt V. MioFH (18;(<)), !) (J. A: P. 11),-) ;u I, 1();12 
 
 lloltt'. rio(1888). 120 Ph. St. 4;)!) 741 
 
 Holt r. Squini (182i')), Ky- & M. 2H2 rtOfl 
 
 Hoiiiiin r. ThoiniiMon (IMIil), (iC. \- P. 717 271 
 
 llcmiof. n.'iitiiK^k (1820), 2 H. & IV 102 014, 018 
 
 lloiiuT V. lloimr (1878), 47 L. J. Cli. OliS ; 8 Ch. 1). 7.)8 ; 3!) L. T. 3, 27 8(13 
 
 JlointTf. Wallis (1814). 11 Mums. 3((',» 1223 
 
 llotiKTHlmiii »'. Wolvurhainpton WiitcrworkH Co. (IS.'il), C Ex. 137 ; 
 
 K.iilw. C. 7!I0 042, 045 
 
 Iloiiiball I'. Uloonicr (1854), 10 Ex. 538 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 11 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 188 1008 
 
 Hooilc. L(l. HiimiiKtoi) (1808), L. K. Eq. 218 071. 1045 
 
 Iliio.lt'. Lady Hc'iiiirhum|> (1830), U\iUh. Ev. of Slice. 408 420, 423 
 
 Hood V. Kccvc (1828), 3 C. & P. 532 4i)8 
 
 ]lo(.p(T r. (iiiiiiiii (1802), 2 J. & H. 002 ; 10 W. R. 014 : L. T. HUl 5!)!) 
 
 Hooper V. StoplioiiH (1835), 4 A. \- E. 71 : 7 C, k P. 2(iO 715 
 
 ]i(.p.:iuft i\ KcyH (1833), i) Biiitf. 013 ; 2 M. * Scott, 700 im 
 
 ]Iopc r. Pciidoi'i (1851), 2 L. M. A: P. 5i»3 ; 17 Q. B. 50!) ; 21 L. .1. Q. h. 
 
 25 ; 10 .Jur. 80 315 
 
 ] lope V. 1 lopo, ( 1 H'.)3) W.N. 1 8i)3. at p. 20 453, 4 55 
 
 Hopor. Liddcll (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 01)4; 7 Do (J. M. & G. 338 321 
 
 Hoiicwellr. Dc Pinna (180!)), 2 Ciinip. 113 172 
 
 Hoi)kiiiHr. Crowo (IK30), 4 A. iV: E. 774; 2 H. .V W 21 227 
 
 Hopkins r. Gni/cbrook (1820), H. & C. 31 ; !) Dowl. & B. 22 773 
 
 Hoi>kinsr. Logim (1839), 5 M. & W. 248; 7 Howl. 360; 8 L. J. Ex. 
 
 2 IS 3S7, 710 
 
 Hopkins V. "Waro (ISO;)), li. K. 4 Ex. 20S : 3S I>. .T. Ex. 147 ; 20 L. T. 147 32 
 Hopper V. Warburton (1803), 32 L. J. Q. B. 104 ; 7 L. T. 722; 11 \V. K. 
 
 3vl 191, 196 
 
 Hopwood r. Hopwood (1800), 20 I,. J. Ch. 292 ; 22 Boav. 4»8 ; 29 L. .T. Ch. 
 
 717 ; 7 H. L. Cas. 728 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 897 800 
 
 Honlcrn r. Coniinorcial Union (1887), 50 L. J. P. C. 78 ; 50 L. T 210 48 
 
 Horn V. Thoniborough (1849), 3 Ex. 840 ; Howl. & L. 061 ; 18 L.J. Ex. 
 
 349 39, 227 
 
 H.rnor. Mackenzie (1839), 6 CI. & Fin. 028 924 
 
 Honii^ V. Smith (1815), 6 Taun. 9; 1 Marsh. 410 ; 3 East, 10, n. (a) ; 10 
 
 K. R. 658 819, 832 
 
 Iforno v. Swinford (1822), 1 D. & R. Mag. Cas. 301 8(i8 
 
 Horner v. Horner (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. 017: 47 L. J. Ch. 036; 8 Ch. D. 75S.. 803 
 Hornsby v. Kobsou (should bo Bolton) (1850), 1 C. B. N. S. 03 ; 20 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 55 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 074 156 
 
 Horrouks v. Metrop. Ry. Co. (1803), 4 B. & S. 315 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 307 ; 10 
 
 Jur. N. S. 204; 8 L. T. 003: 11 W. R. 910 1102 
 
 Horsefall r. Ilodtfos (1824). 2 Coop. 116 673 
 
 Horsey v. Graham (1809), L. R. 6 C. P. 9 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 68 ; 21 L. T. 
 
 5,39 ; 18 W. R. 141 682 
 
 Horsfall V. Hey (1818), 2 Ex. 778 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 200 088 
 
 Horsford, Re (1874), 44 L. J. P. & M. 9 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 211 ; 31 L. T. 
 
 553 ; 23 W. R. 211 707 
 
 Hort(m V. M'Murtry (1800), 29 L. J. Ex. 265 ; 6 II. & N. 007 ; 8 W. R. 285 202 
 Horton r. Westminster Improvement Comrs. (1852), 7 Ex. 780; 21 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 297 91, 93 
 
 Horwood, In ro (1880), 55 L. T. 373 914 
 
 Horwood V. Griffith (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 466 ; 4 He G. M & G. 700 . .785, 789 
 
 Hospital for Incurables, In re (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 301 1012 
 
 Hotson V. Browne (1860), 30 L. J. C. P. 100 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 442 747 
 
 Voi. I. tudi with page 636. 
 
 ;!■ si 
 
 t: ill 
 
oil 
 
 TAHr.K OF CAKKH Ciri',!). 
 
 !i 
 
 PAIIN 
 
 IImij^Ii r. MiiTiziiliim riHTOj, IH I,, J. I'W. ;illM ; I l\%. I). Kll 7M 
 
 ll..iiKli(.,n, Kx imrhi flHIO), 17 V.'«. '.','.1 ; II If. It. "M <1'1*1 
 
 lli.iitfliloli f. K.riiix (|H.')(1|, IH«: II. •.'.'l.'i; LT. I.. .1. ( !. I'. '.^IM 'MW 
 
 lloiiMi'M <'. Hinitli (IH.'iOj, II <^ II. Mil : I!) I,. J. {). M. 170; II Jul'. .'>'IH.. KIW'.I 
 lioiilditrh V. M. of l)i)iii'Kiil (IH.'II;, H llliKli, N. It. ;t;t7 ; 2 «'l. \ I'in. 
 
 ■17'l III.!, IIK;, 1117, ll.'.M, IKi.'i 
 
 IldiiliNtoii V. Hiiiyt.li (1820), 'Ji (',. A I'.'^l ; U IliiiK. r^7 ; H> Mooic, ( 1. I'. {Hi 1 17, 
 
 ;i7.'i, loii'i 
 
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 llMiiw'tiiiiii (. lti.lMr(.H (IH:t2), :> (!. A I". .■I!tl .'112 
 
 lloimliiii I. Hli(/.., M(ii(|iiiM.if (IHH.'.j, 'ilirii. I). IIH; f,2\,.'\'.m I I Id, 1117 
 
 II. .w (. Hull MHlli, II I'liiMi.. 271 ; 12 If. It >>\:> 2H!i. ;iiH, :iiu 
 
 ilouiinl / . Il.iil (IHH'.lj, 2;t <i. II. I). I ; 'iH I,. .1. II II. ;iHI ; (10 I,. 'I'. (l.'JV ; 
 
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 ll.iwiir.l i'. N.-wl.iii MHi;i , 2 M .V It.ili. fiWt '.'.'17 
 
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 JI..WCIIII, r. |t..iiM<T flMlll). ;) \;%. l!)l ; IH r*. .1. Kx. 202 7^1, I'i'^i 
 
 Il.,w<! r. Mall 'IH70j, I. It. 4 K.]. 212 OHH 
 
 M..WH r. I'alrii.r nH20), ;t It. \ ALL .'121 0H1» 
 
 Mow.! 0. H..air..t,l. MH.'.!);, I II.A(N.72;i; 2H I,. .J. Kx . ;i2.'i im 
 
 11. iw.. I. Walk.T llHMj, 70 MiiHM. (1 (Jray; .IIH 7.''7 
 
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 lliil.liiir.l V. AI.'xaii.ii.r(IH70/,.'l(;ii. I). 7;iH ; If. L. J. Cli. 710; ;tf) l,.'V. [,2; 
 
 21 VV. It. lO.'.H mt, 
 
 iliililiar.l I'. .(..liiiMloii.. MHIOi, .'I Taiiii. 20!) 29 
 
 IliiMiar.l > l,.^.'H MH'ld;. :t.'> I,. J. Kx. KIO ; I, It. I Kx. 'IM ; 4 il.Ar. C. 
 
 IIH; 12 .liir. N. H. l:!.'. ; I :i I,. T. .".(17 ; 11 W. It. (101 12:t, (lO.'l 
 
 Iliit.l.art, .'. I'(.illi|.« flHI,'>;, I.I M. Ac W. 70.) ; 2 Dowl, Sc \.. 707 ; 11 I.. .1. 
 
 Kx . I (CI 1112 
 
 Jliil..r V. Hl.in.'r MH.'lOj, 2 Hi...l,(,, :i()1 ; 2 IliiiK. N. C 202; 2 l)..wl. I'. (). 
 
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 Jliil...rl,». M..r.'aii flH2(l;. 2«;. * I'. tiW ; 12 M.iori' (<!. I'.). 210 (\7t, 
 
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 ,M. .'l.'il ; II I, .1. »;. I'. 7H 071 
 
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 7 I- .1. Kx. I'i:t 272 
 
 H.i.Jival.!, It.. MH(17^ ;i(l I,. .;. I'. At M. HI ; I,. It. I !'. \. D.Mr,; Id I,. T. 
 
 i;il ; Id W. It. 01 dllH 
 
 IIii.|h..ii /'. (Jii.'Mlii.r MHIH^, 1 daii.Ji, 21)11 I I .'.0 
 
 J|ii.|«..ii );. I'ark.-r HHII), I lf..l,.rf,«. 21 OD.O, (llHl, (107 
 
 J|ii(|m..ii .'. lt..v..U, IIHV.U), r, lUiitr. .'IdH ; 2 M. * I*, dd.'l 1201 
 
 1Iii.Im..ii r. 't'.iiinr 'lHV7j, 2 <^ li. l>. 'Am, Id I.. J. Q H- 10:1; .'Id I-. 'I'. 
 
 11)2 ; 2.'/ W. It. 710 :i'.'7 
 
 ilii'lw.i. V. 'r..<.l,li (\HT7i, 2 r. I). 12.'. ; Hr. I,, T. H20 Mil) 
 
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TAIIM', OF CAHKH CITI'.I). 
 
 oitt 
 
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 IIiikIk'n' riiMt. (INO-'j, .! KhmI , I'. ( !, KKI'J •J7H 
 
 (!. J(»; I App. CiiN. 171 ; l'? W. K. 
 
 \i9 
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 nil 
 
 ii^Id'm r. Iliililiilpli (IH'J7), I UiiNN, Hill 
 
 IIiikIh'n c. Illiiko (IHIK). I MiiNoii, l,\:, II III 
 
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 TM. Ill .liir. KM I ;ii. ;iii. j'27 
 
 IIiiviImn r. Itiiilil (IHKI), H Di.wl. .'ICi; I .liir. I.M) .ill', :il I 
 
 IIiikIk'n r. Mi.tii.p. My. Co (IH77), 1.' [,. .1 •'. I'. fi7H ; -10 I...F.('. I*. fiKM . 
 
 ■i App. < 'iiH. I.'lll ; .'111 li. T. li;i'J ; 'Jfi W. H. (iHO /iU 
 
 litiKlK'h I. MoiiiH (IN.'i.!), 21 I,. J. Ch. 7111 ; '/ l>i' O. M. & O.llili; lU Jnr 
 
 iiii.'i 
 
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 lliiiflK'H r. I'nriiiniirii (IHri.'i), '^1 I,. ,1. (Ui. IIHI ; 7 l><'li M ^ <l '.!'J»; I 
 
 N. .s. mil 710, 7lft 
 
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 lliiiiirri'. Kitiiiiiitiiii'l (inrii), \r,i'. Ii. .mh); 21 I,. .I.e. I', id m)0 
 
 MiiiiUt r. I,i'iillil..y (IH.KI), Ml II. .V ( !. H.'iH :;2l 
 
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W' 
 
 CIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Hnnterr. Parker (1840), 7 M. & W. 343; 10 L. J. Ex. 281 ....645, 646, 6ft 1, 
 
 652, 7:iO 
 Hunter V. Stewart (1861), 31 L. J. Ch.346; 4 De G. F. & J. 168. . . .1117, 1123 
 
 Hunter v. "Walters (1870), L. R. 11 Eq. 292 ; 24 L. T. 276 642 
 
 Huntingdon Peerage (1818), Report by Bell, 3J7 ; Att.-Gen.'s Report, 
 
 357 423, 426 
 
 Huntingford v. Ma.saev (1859). 1 F. & F. 690 243 
 
 Huutley r. Donovan (1850), 15 Q. B. 96 1047 
 
 Huntley Peerage (1818), Pari. Miu. 15 423 
 
 Hurd V. Moring (ltt24), 1 C. & P. 872 609 
 
 Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dval (1870), L. R. 3 Ind. App. 259, 286 899 
 
 Hurat'f casw (1804), 4 ball. 387 866 
 
 Hurst V. Beach (1821), 5 Madd. 351 805, 808 
 
 Hussey v. Crickott (1811), 3 Camp. 168 621 
 
 Hussoyr. Horne-Payne (1878), 4 App. Cas. 311; 48 L. J. Ch. 816; 47 
 
 L. J. Ch. 751 ; 8 Ch. D. 670 672 
 
 Hutcheon t'. Mauuington (1802). 6 Ves. 823 9 
 
 Hutchins v. Denziloe (1792). 1 Hagg. Cons. R. 181 632 
 
 Hutchinsv. Soott (1837),2 M.& W.816; M.&H. 194; 6L.J.Ex. 186. .801, 1197, 
 
 1199 
 
 Hutchinson v. Bernard (1836), 2 M. & Rob. 1 355 
 
 Hutchinson v. Glover (1876), 46 L. J. Q. B. 120; 1 Q. B. D. 138; 33 
 
 L. T. OO.-i ; 24 W. R. 185 1187 
 
 Hutchinson v. Tatham (1873), 42 L. J. C. P. 260 ; L. R. 8 C. P. 482 . .764, 769 
 
 Hutchison v. Bowker (1839), 5 M. & W. 535 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 24 43 
 
 Huthwaite v. Phaire (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 159 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 43 ; 8 Dowl. 
 
 641 1133 
 
 Hutt, Ex parte (1839), 7 Dowl. 690; 3 Jur. 1105 994, 99S 
 
 Hutt V. Mon-ell (1849), 3 Ex. 241 532 
 
 Hutton, Re (1837), 1 Curt. 595 173 
 
 Hutton t'. Bright (1851-7), 3 H. L. Cas. 341 ; 16 Jur. 695 540, .541 
 
 Hutton 1'. Ro.«siter (1854-5), 7 De G. M. & G. 9; 24 L. J. Ch. 106 . . . .539, 553 
 
 Hutton V. Upfill (1850), 2 H. L. Cas. 674 ; 14 Jur. 843 540 
 
 Hutton V. Ward (1850), 15 Q. B. 26 : 19 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 14 Jur. 372. . . . 318 
 Hutton V. Warren (1836), 1 M. & W. 466 ; 2 Gale, 71 ; IT. & G. 646 ; 
 
 5 L. J. Ex. 234 169, 768, 770, 781, 783 
 
 Hux, Re (1877), 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 39 ; 35 L. T. 909 ; 25 W. R. 273 . . 1214 
 Huxley v. East Loudon Ry. Co. (1889), 14 App. Cas. 26; 5f L. J. Q. B. 
 
 o'05 ; 60 L. T. 642 ; 37 W. R. 625 41 
 
 Hycknian v. Shotbolt (1567), 3 Dyer, 279 b 643 
 
 Hyde v. Hyde (1889), 59 L. T. 623 914 
 
 Hyde v. Palmer (1862), 3 B. & S. 667 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 126 ; 11 W. R. 
 
 433 380 
 
 Hyde v'. WaV(s'(i8i3)," I2M.& W. 254";"l Dowl.' '&' L.'479 '; 13 L.'j." Ex.'ii 522 
 
 Hvman v. Nye (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 685 ; 44 L. T. 919 : 45 J. P. 654 772 
 
 Hynde's case (1592-3), 4 Rep. 71 b: cited in Doer. Wright, 10 A. \- E. 
 
 775 1140 
 
 
 
 hi' 
 
 InnoTT V. Boll (1865), 34 Beav. 395 708 
 
 Illingworth v. Leigh (1800), 4 Gwillim, 1615 ; 3 Eag. & Y. 1385 611 
 
 Ilott V. Gcnge (1846), 3 Curt. 174 696, 697 
 
 Imperial Bank v. Lond. & St. Catherine Dock Co, (1876), 46 L.J. Ch. 337; 
 
 5 Ch. D. 195; 36L. T. 233 6, 769 
 
 Imperial Gas Co. v. Clarke (1830), 7 Bing. 95 ; 4 M. & P. 727 995 
 
 Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, (1892) 1 Q. B. 699 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 449 ; 
 
 66 L. T. 5.i6 ; 56 J. P. 436 242 
 
 Imrie v. Castrique (1S60), 8 C. B. N. S. 405 1103 
 
 Inca, The (1858), 12 Moore, P. C. C. 189 ; Swab. 370 177 
 
 Incledon v. Berry (1805), 1 Camp. 203, n. («) 1096 
 
 Indian Zoedone Co., Re {\HSi), 53 L. J. Ch. 468 ; 26 Ch. D. 70 1022 
 
 Ingallsv. Bills (1845), 9 Mete. 1 772 
 
 Ingilby v. Shafto (1803), 32 L. J. Ch. 807 ; 33 Beav. 31 1183 
 
 T/ie re/crcneet are to pages, not to paragraphs. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CV 
 
 PA03 
 
 Inglesant v. Inglesant (1874), L. R. 3 P. & D. 172 ; 43 L. J. P. & M. 43 . . ti9t^ 
 
 Inglis V. Buttery (1878), 3 App. Cas. 652 74:J 
 
 Inglis V. GreatNorth. Ry. Co. (1852), 1 Macq. 112; 1 Paterson, 78. .294, 1176, 1177 
 
 Inglis V. Inglis and Allen (1867), 16 L. T. 775 ; 15 "W. R. 1093 621 
 
 Inglis f. Spence (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 436; 4 L. J. Ex. 11 ; 3 Tyr. 8 518, 519 
 
 Ingraham v. Bockius (1823), 9 Serg. & R. 285 45S 
 
 Ingram v. Lea (1810), 2 Camp. 521 '^89 
 
 Ingram v. Wyatt (1828), 1 Hagg. Eco. 384 140 
 
 Inman v. Foster (1832), 8 Wend. 602 255 
 
 Inman v. Stamp (1815), 1 Stark. 12 ; 18 R. R. 740 082 
 
 Innell v. Newman (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 419 487 
 
 Innis V. Campbell (1829), 1 Riiwle, 373 172 
 
 Interleaf Publishing Co. v. Phillips (1885), C. & E. 315 281 
 
 International Ry. Co. v. Anderson (1891). 27 Amer. St. R. 907 377 
 
 lona. The (1867\ L. R. 1 P. C. 426 ; 4 Moo. P. C. C. N. 8. 336 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 158 178 
 
 Ipswich case (1835), Knapp & Ombler, 387 497 
 
 Ipswich Dock Commiss. v. St. Peter, Ipswich (1867), 7 B. & S. 310 112 
 
 Ireland f. Powell (1802), cited Pea. Ev. 16 396, 400 
 
 Irish Society v. Bp. of Derry (1846), 12 CI. & Fin. 666 1 102, 1230 
 
 Irons V. Smallpiece (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 551 639 
 
 Irving V. Greenwood (1824), 1 C. * P. 350 255 
 
 Irving V. Veitch (1837), 3 M. & W. 90 ; Mur. & H. 313 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 25. . 717 
 
 Irwin v. Callwell (1800). 12 Ir. C. L. R. 144 1163 
 
 Isaaci;.Farrer(1836),lM.&W.70; 4Dowl.755; 5L. J.E.x.04; 1T.&G.2S1 220 
 
 Isaac V. Gompertz (1837). cited Hubback on Ev. of Succ. 650 418 
 
 Isaacs v. Hardy (1884), C. & E. 287 Add. [688] 
 
 Isabella, The (1799), 2 C. Rob. Adm. 241 757 
 
 Isquierdo r. Forbes (1760-51), cited 1 Douff. 6 1 155 
 
 Israel v. Argent (1834), Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. (i) 147 
 
 Israel v. Clark (103, should be 1803), 4 Ksp. 259 550 
 
 Issard v. Lambert, In re Davies (18'J0), 44 Ch. D. 253 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 516 ; 
 
 02L. T. 715; 38 W. R. 634 013 
 
 Ivat V. Finch (1808), 1 Taun. 141 ; 9 R. R. 716 612 
 
 Ivey f. Young (1836), 1 M. & Rob. 545 192 
 
 Ivy, Lady, and Neal's case (1684), cited Skin. 623; ISalk. 281; 12 Mod. 86 1179 
 
 Jackd. Kiernan (1840), 2 Jebb & Sy. 231 1015, 1017, lOU 
 
 Jackson, Re, Ex parte Bk. of Manchester (1871), 40 L. J. Bk. 57 ; L. R. 
 
 12 Eq. 354 ; 19 W. R. 872 ; 24 L. T. 951 685 
 
 Jackson, Re. In re "Walker (1885), 53 L. T. 660 ; 34 W. R. 95 621 
 
 Jackson v. Adams (1835), 2 Scott, 599 ; 2 Bing. N. C. 402 ; 1 Hodges, 339 244 
 Jackson v. Allaway (1844), 6 M. & Gr. 942 ; 7 Scott, N. R. 875 ; 13 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 84 ; 8 Jur 63 201 
 
 Jackson v. Allen (1822), 3 Stark. R. 74 1191 
 
 Jackson v. Bailey (1806), 2 Johns. 17 354 
 
 Jackson f. Bard (1809), 4 Johns. 230 443, 510 
 
 Jackson v. Blanshan (1808), 3 Johns. 292 86, 433 
 
 Jackson v. Browner (1820), 18 Johns. 37 413 
 
 Jackson v. Bumham (1852), 8 E.'c. 173 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 13 604 
 
 Jackson v. Christman (1830). 4 Wend. 277 927 
 
 Jackson v. Cooley (1811), 8 Johns. 128 422 
 
 Jackson v. French (1829), 3 Wend. 337 598, 599 
 
 Jackson v. Frier (1819), 16 Johns. 196 306 
 
 Jackson v. Gridley (1820), 18 Johns. 98 898 
 
 Jackson v. Hesketh (1819), 2 Stark. R. 518 270 
 
 Jackson v. Hill (18,i9), 10 A. & E. 477 ; 2 P. cfe T). 455 ; 3 Jur. 970 6»9 
 
 Jackson v. Irviu (1809), 2 Camp. 60 ; 1 1 R. R. 658 169 
 
 Jackson v. Jackson (1825), 5 Cowen, 173 909 
 
 Jackson v. Jackson (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 409 1102 
 
 Jackson v. Knitten (1806), 2 Johns. 31 466, 470 
 
 Jackson t>. Lamb (1827), 7 Cowen, 431 433 
 
 Vol, I. ends with page 636, 
 
CVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAoa 
 
 Jackson v. Lowe (IS?""), 1 Bin«. 9; 7 Mooro, 219 672 
 
 JatO son V. Luquere (l.S'2o). o Cowen, 221 433 
 
 Jaikson v. M'Call (18i:<), 10 Johns. 377 124, 433 
 
 Jackson «. Malin (1818), 15 Johns. 297 1199 
 
 Jackson v. Marsh (1826), 6 Coweu, 281 802 
 
 Jackson v. Miitsdoi-f (1814), 11 Johns. 97 90 
 
 Jackson v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1877), 3 App. Cas. 193; 47 L. J. C. P. 
 
 303 : 37 L. T. 679 ; 26 W. R. 175 23, 28, 38 
 
 Jackson v. Miller (1827), 6 Cowen, 751 11/8 
 
 Jackson v. Oglander (1865), 2 H. & M. 465 : 13 L. T. 16 ; 13 W. R. 936. . 672 
 
 Jackson V. Pesked (1813), 1 M. &Sel. 237; 14 R. R. 417 86 
 
 Jackson v. Seagar (1844), 2 Dowl. & L. 13 815, 832 
 
 Jackson v. Thomason (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 11 ; 1 B. & S. 745 ; 8 Jtir. 
 
 N. S. 134 ; 6 L. T. 104 ; 10 W. R. 42 939 
 
 Jackson t). Waldron (1834), 12 Wend. 178-197 1219 
 
 Jackson v. Williamson (1788), 2 T. R. 281 816 
 
 Jackson f. Winchester (1800), 4 Dall. 206 327 
 
 Jackson t-. Woorl (1829), 3 Wend. 27 1098 
 
 Jackson v. Woolley (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; 8 E. & B. 778 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 656 490 
 
 Jackson v. Wrij^ht (1817), 11 Johns. 193 90 
 
 Jacob V. Hunjyate (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 445 261, 816, 832 
 
 Jacob t>. Loo (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 33 313 
 
 Jacob V. Lindsjiy (IHOl), 1 East, 4(10 293, 485, 926 
 
 Jacobs, Ro (18:!5), 1 Har. & W. 123 833 
 
 Jacobs f. Hart (1817), 6 M. & Sel. 142; 2 Stark. R. 45 1195, 1196 
 
 Jacobs V. Humphrey (1834), 2 C. & M. 413 ; 4 Tyr. 272; 3 L. J. Ex. 82. . 496 
 
 Jacobs V. Jacobs (1834), 3 Dowl. 677 870 
 
 Jacobs V. Layborn (1843), 11 M.&W. 685; 1 Dowl. & L. 352 ; 12 L.J. Ex. 
 
 427; 7 Jur. 562 909, 910 
 
 Jacobs V. Seward (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 464 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 221 ; 27 L.T. 
 
 185 192 
 
 Jacobs V. Tarleton (1848), 11 Q. B. 421 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 194 ; 12 Jur. 617 272 
 
 Jacomb v. Turner, (1892) 1 Q. B. 47 1040 
 
 Jagrgers v. Binnings (1815), 1 Stark. R. 64 ; 19 R. R. 746 492 
 
 Jakeman v. Cook (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 165 ; 4 Ex. D. 26 ; 27 W. R. 171 . . 1157 
 
 James v. Biou (1826), 2 Sim. & St. 606 620, 521 
 
 James v. Cohen (1844), 3 Curt. 782 709 
 
 James f. Hatfield (1734), I Str. 548 488 
 
 James v. Salter (1837), 3 Binj?- N. C. 544 74 
 
 James v. Smith (1890), 63 L. T. 524 665 
 
 James c. Williams (1H34), 5 B. & Ad. 1109 ; 3 N. & M. 196 ; 2 Dowl. 481 669 
 
 Jameson v. Drinkald (1826), 12 Moore (C. P.), U8 935 
 
 Jameson*). Leitch (1842), Milw. 688 1031, 1116 
 
 Jamewm v. Stein (1855). 21 Brav. 5 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 41 679 
 
 Jamewm v. Swinton (1810), 2 Taun. 224 ; 2 Ciimp. 373 33 
 
 Janaway, Re (1S75), 44 L. J. P. & M. 6 ; 31 L. T. SOO ; 23 W. R. 385 . . 697 
 
 J' Atis<m V. Stuart (1796), 1 T. R. 754 ; 1 R. R. 392 249 
 
 Janliiie v. Sheridan (1846), 2 C. & K. 24 606, 514 
 
 Jarmain .•. Hooper (1843), C M. & Or. 827 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 769; 13 L. J. 
 
 C P. 63; 8 Jur. 127 168 
 
 Jarrett v. Leonard (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 265 498 
 
 Javiie r. Vtuo (1814), 5 Taun. 326 ; 1 Marsh. 68 ; 15 R. R. 518 110 
 
 Jeiikes f. White (1851), 6 Ex. 873 ; 'M L. J. Ex. 265 682 
 
 J.'itns r. Cooke (1857), 24 Beav. 513 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 67 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 202. . 066 
 
 Jeans <•. Wheedon (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 480 294, 356 
 
 Jeffcott f. North Brit. Oil Co. (1873), I. R. 8 C. L. 17 671 
 
 JeHerson Ins. Co. c. Cofh<'al (1831), 7 Wend. 72 934 
 
 J<.tferv V. Walton (1816), 1 Stark. R. 267 745 
 
 JetF.Tvs f BooHov {l»<yi), 4 H. L. Cas. 815 ; 3 C. L. R. 625 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 
 
 HI ;' 1 Jur. N. S, 615 731 
 
 Jeffries r. Great Western Ry. Co. (1856), 6 El. & Bl. 802 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 107 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 230 117 
 
 tm 
 
 Tht rtfereneei are to pagen, not to paragrapht. 
 
 I'i : 
 
tjm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CVU 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Jeffries v. Williams (1850), 5 Ex. 792; 20 L. J. Ex. 14 114, 115 
 
 Jenkius r. Bt-thttm (1854), 16 C. B. 188 ; 3 0. L. R. 373 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 
 
 94 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 237 "80 
 
 Jenkins V. Blizard (1816), 1 Stark. R. 419; 19 R. R. 792 1096 
 
 Jeiikiiis V. BuHhby (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 400, 820 ; L. R. 2 Eq. 647 ; 14 W. R. 
 
 031 ; 34 L. T. 431 692, 59!), 1183 
 
 Jenkins r. Bushby, (1891) 1 Ch. 484 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 264 ; 64 L. T. 213 ; 39 
 
 W. R. 321 23 
 
 Jenkins f. Davies (1876), 1 Ch. D. 696 ; 24 W. R. 690 534 
 
 Jenkins v. (Jai-sford (1863), 37 L. J. V. & M. 122 ; 3 S. & T. 93 700 
 
 Jenkins r. Harvey (1835), 1 C. M. & R. 877 ; 2 C. M. & R. 393 ; 1 Gale, 
 
 23 ; 5 Tvr. 326 792 
 
 Jenkins r.'Heycock (1853), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 361 ; 1 C. L. R. 406; 6 Moo. 
 
 Ind. App. 3G1 771 
 
 Jenkins v. Morris (1847), 16 M. & W. 877, 880 160 
 
 Jenkins v. PhiUips (1841), 9 C. & P. 766 ; 6 J;ir. 252 189, 194 
 
 Jenkins t>. Reynolds (1821), 3 B. & B. 21 ; 6 Mooro (C. P.), 86 668 
 
 Jeuner v. Ffinch (1879), 49 L. J. P. & M. 26 ; 5 P. Div. 106 ; 42 L. T. 327 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 520 704 
 
 Jenner v. Joliffe (1810), 6 Johns. 9 293 
 
 Jenncrv. Morris (1861), 30 L.J. Ch. 361; 2DoG. F. & J. 45 ; 7Jur.N. S. 
 
 375; 3L. T. 871 ; 9 W. R. 391 167 
 
 JcnniugH, Re (1851), 1 Ir. Ch. R. 236 '. 1177 
 
 Jenninr - v. Johnson (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 425 724 
 
 Jennings v. Whittaker (1826), 4 T. B. Monroe, 60 529 
 
 Jeshcl i: Bath (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 149; L. R. 2 Ex. 267 ; 15 W. R. 1041 ..85, 
 
 741 
 
 Jesus Coll. V. Gibbs (1834), 1 Y. & C. Ex. 156 ; 4 L. J. Ex. Eq. 42 320 
 
 Jetley v. Hill (1884), C. & E. 239 166 
 
 Jewell V. Christie (1867), 36 L. J. C. P. 168 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 296 ; 15 L. T. 
 
 580 85 
 
 Jewell r. Jewell (1843), 1 Howard, Sup. Ct. R. 231 413 
 
 Jewettw. Torry (1814), 11 Mass. 219 644 
 
 Jewis t'. Lawrence (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 345 144 
 
 Jewison v. Dyson (1842), 9 M. & W. 640 ; 2 M. & R. 377 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 
 
 401 232 
 
 Jewitt, Re (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 730 ; 33 Beav. 559 869 
 
 Jewittf. Eckhardt (1878), 8 Ch. D. 404 ; 26 W. R. 416 651 
 
 Jewsbury v. Newbold (1867), 26 L. J. Ex. 247 166 
 
 Jeycs V. Booth (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 97 ; 4 R. R. 771 732 
 
 Jinks r. Edwards (1856). 11 Ex. 775 773 
 
 Joel V. Dicker (1847), 5 Dowl. & L. 1 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 369 732, 733 
 
 Jolin and Mary, The (1859), Swab. Adm. R. 471 1 120 
 
 John V. Bacon (1870), L. R. 6 C. P. 437 ; 39 L. J. C. P. 3!)5 772 
 
 Johnson, Ex parte, Ro Chapman (1884), 26 Ch. D. 338 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 763 ; 
 
 32 W. R. 693 915 
 
 Johnson c. Appleby (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 146 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 158 743 
 
 Johnson v. Baker (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 440 1203 
 
 lohnson V. Ball (1851), 5 De G. & Sm. 85 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 210 701 
 
 Johnson v. Barnes (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 627 ; 42 L. J. C. P. 259 ; 29 L. T. 
 
 65 122 
 
 Johnson f. Blane (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 457, 461 170 
 
 Johnson v. Caulkins (1799), 1 Johns. 116 266 
 
 Johnson v. Credit Lyonnais Co. (1877), 3 C. P. D. 32 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 
 
 37 L. T. 657 ; 26 W. R. 195 116 
 
 Johnson v. Davenio (1821), 19 Johns. 134 609, 1221 
 
 Jolinson c. Dodgson (1837), 2 M. & W. 659 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 185 674 
 
 Johnson r. Duke of Marlborough (1818), 2 Stark. R. 378 1193 
 
 Johnson v. Durant (1831), 4 C. & P. 327 ; 2 B. Ac Ad. 925 012, 1160 
 
 Johnson v. Hooker (1789), 1 Dall. 406 1 178 
 
 Johnnou t'. Holdsworth (1836). 4 Dowl. 63 487 
 
 Johnson v. Jolinson (1832), 2 L. J. Ex. 73 ; 1 C. & M. 140 ; 3 Tyr. 
 
 73 696 
 
 Vol. I. end* with page 636. 
 
CVIU 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS CITKI-). 
 
 PAdB 
 
 Joliiiwiii V. KcrHhaw (18.J7), 1 V'' • O. & Sni. 2fi0 ; 11 .Tur. ftfi^, TOri a2.J 
 
 Jnliiiwm V. LawHOii (IH'21), 2 IMun. H(i ; 9 Mimiic, IH;t 4i;{, •lift 
 
 JolitiHoii V. Liii()Mny (IHHU), r.i Q. H. I). /JOH ; M h. .1. (i. H. f.Sl ; ;« 
 
 w. u. 11!) m 
 
 JohiiHoii V. Lyfoid (i808), 37 L. J. 1'. & M. Oft; L. 11. 1 V. & IJ. /iiC,. . li;i, :i,'.il, 
 
 717 
 
 JoliiiHoii V. MiiiininK (IHdO), 12 Ir. (J. L. U. 148 1(17 
 
 Johimoii V. MiiNoii (17!M). 1 Khii. S!) 1208 
 
 .I..li!iM<iii «. Kavlldii (IHSI), 111. n. I). IMS; /iO I,. .1. (i. H. 7.');t 777 
 
 Joliiiwin V. K<'i<l (IHKI), M. & W. 124 ; i) li. J. M. (). 2.') i;i2 
 
 JoliiiHiin »'. Ht. I'.^tcr, Il.acford (IMC), 4 A. & K. 620; 4 N. vt M. 18(1; 
 
 1 II. & W. 720 1(1!) 
 
 .TiiliiiHon V. SIcar (18(1.1), lA (!. H. N. H. .'iiid 781 
 
 JciliiiMiiii V. W'linl (is(i(l), (1 V.H\). 17 f)()(), IO.jO 
 
 JiilinHon V. VVarwiik {I8.'i(l), 2;'. I,. .J. (J. I'. 102; 17 (!. H. :)1(1 (*2 
 
 .iDlinHton r. <Miiil(,ti ns41), Ann. M. <t-. (). I2;t 1)77 
 
 .l(ilinHl.«iii V. Majipin, (IHi)l) (10 I,. .1. Ch. 241 ; (11 I,. T. 48 (171) 
 
 JnlitiMloii r. JSumimr (18r)H), :t H. & N. 201 ; 27 I. J. Kx. ;fll ; 4 Jiir. 
 
 N.H.4(12 KUl, 1(17 
 
 .T.pliiist,(.ii V. llHliiirtK' (1810), 11 A. ti !•;. .'^14!); .') I'. Ki 1). 2;t(l 704, 78;l 
 
 .IdliliHtDiK! T'. lliKllrstciiic (182.1), 4 II. \' (',. !i.'12 ; 7 l>. .V 11 411 1(1, (KiO 
 
 .Iciliimtonc .'. Hutt.m n;8(l), [T.H.fyiC; I U. H. 2.)7, 2(i'.» 110 
 
 .Jd'iit, V. Mnriyri ( lH'.i:t), '2 |>ox .t Hiii. 4 (Id!) 
 
 Jo !(!V '■. Tayiiir (I807j, I (laiiip. Mli 289, ;tlH 
 
 Jolly r. Ui'fH (18(14), li.'t L. .1. (). I'. 177 ; K) (;. I). N. H. (128 1(1(( 
 
 Joll'y ('. Yomi),' (If'O"), 1 \''.n]i. 18(1 7(i:l 
 
 Joly r. Hwift, (1817), 11 Ir. K(|. It. 410 1110, 11:18 
 
 JoiiiM, Iti r<' (IH.'j.'i), Dcaiic, I'lcrt. It. .') (;'.)(! 
 
 Joni'H, In re n8(;4,, 4(1 I;. J. T. I). \' A. 80 (H)!) 
 
 JoncM, |{<-, Kx |.ait,(! .JonitM (1881;, 18 Cli. I). 10!) ; 2'.) W. It. 717; M ],. J. 
 
 (;ii.07;i 100 
 
 J'lni'H anil lioavor'H caHo (\i>(\C>), KcIvuh'c, .02 1 12') 
 
 Jon.-M V. H..laini n840), 2 Jf^lil) * Hy. 2.S1) 47 
 
 Joni'M f. It<)y<:<' (181(1;, 1 .Stark. 4!):t Kl.'l 
 
 Joniw V. Urcwcr (1811), 4 Tauii. 47 .'(29, 1209 
 
 JonrH V. CarriiiKt'in (1824), 1 C. & I'. .'129 f.|| 
 
 Joni^HV. Cc.wliy (182.'>), 4 H. (fe C. 4 1.') 18.'i 
 
 JoMi'M.;. OurlihR (1881), 111 Q. 11. I). 2(12; .'i.'l K. J. (i. H. ;i7.'t ; l>n K. T. 
 
 .'ilO; ;)2 VV. It. (1.11 41 
 
 JoiicH »'. «;winorllMn Hlal.ii Co. (187!*), f, Kx. Div. 9.'1 ; 49 K. .1. Kx. 110; 
 
 4 I L. T. .17.1 ; 28 W. k. 2.'I7 ; 44 .1. I'. 1(18 M 
 
 -Toni« V. KdwanlM (182.1), M'(;l. .V V. i:i'.l a I. J 
 
 JoiicHti. Kiilit (lH:i9j, 10 A. it K. 768; 9 I,. J. (l II. 2.12; 2 1*. .V I). 
 
 Mli (18,'), (18(1 
 
 JorifHW. T-'ort, (1828), M. * M 19(1 '.^(1 
 
 JoniM r. Koxall (1861!;, 16 llrav. .'188; 21 K. J. (!li. 726 [,[{ 
 
 Jon<« D. KroMt, In ro V'uMij (187'i), K. K. 7 <'li. A|i|p. 77;i ; 42 K. J. <;ii. 
 
 47 ; 27 K. T. 4(16 ; 20 W. It. 1026 (i.l 
 
 Joni'H i>. ,'lalti'H KnorH. (18 1 7), 4 Mart,. (l.'!6 \i 
 
 JoiicM »i. (Jalway Town (/'oniniiMMicincrH (1847), Ir. K. H. 4;t.1 i:u 
 
 JoiHw f). (Jooilay (1H42), !t M. Si. VV. 7i:f I 1 Dowl. N. H. 911 22(i, 227 
 
 JoncM 1). (looilriili (181 I;, 6 Moo. I'. (,'. (J. Kl 010, 1(»I6 
 
 .fi,wnv. llarriM (1H71), 41 I.. .1. (|. H. «; K. It. 7 </. It. 1.17 7:i(l 
 
 JoncHi'. Ilocy (IHHO;, 1 JH MaMM. 681 7H2 
 
 JoncH »). Ilowill (18:tr,). 4 Dowl. 17(1 280 
 
 Joii'.- «. lliil<;liinHon (1861), lOO. 11.616; 20ri.J. C.I'. 114 1 9:t 
 
 J>)MCM r. .loni'H (1786), I Cox, ( ill. 184 ;)K9 
 
 JoiiiH I'. .lon.'H fl8llj, 9 M *VV. 76; 1 1 K J. Kx. 2(16 |tl(l 
 
 JoiiOH t>. JiiMt, (IHdH;, :i7 I,. J. (^. It 8!); I,. It. .') (^ If. 197; 9ll. .V.S. 141 7?7 
 
 Joiicn .1. I.itl.liilali' M8:i7), (1 A. \- v.. 48(1; I N. iV I'. 077 7*8 
 
 Joni.Hr. Mill« (18(11;, IOC. II. N. H. 788; .'li I,. J. C. I'. 0(1: 8 .liir. N. H. 
 
 ;(^ oil 
 
 JuuuH ».' Morriili (4 844), I C'. A K . Wli '. '. '. .' .' .' ." .' .'.'.'...!!.*.!.!.*.'.'!!!!!!!! W8 
 
 2'h4 rej'trninrii urr to juti/ff, nut tti puKiyriiphi. 
 
TAnLE OF CASKS OITKI). 
 
 (MX 
 
 I'AOK 
 
 .loiii-H r. N.wmiin (1760-1). 1 W. HI. Oil ;i»a 
 
 .loiiiw c. OrI'i (1«7;J), 41 li. J. (111. <i:i.t: 1' I. J. CU. XU ■ \,. U. 11 V.<[. 
 ;1»; I;. II. soil. H)2; '20 VV. R. 7'.»l: 21 \V U. TM) : 27 \,. T. iiiiT ; 
 
 •2H I,. T. 'JIT) 1 :i!) 
 
 JoticH I'. PrpiMTcoriKi (IHf)!)), US li. J. Ch. i:.S; JoliiiH. JHO ; fi .lur. N. .S. 
 
 1 10 5 
 
 ,I(MH'H V. I'.Tiv ( 1 7!t«), -2 Khj>. 4^2 
 
 .Ic.ii.'MC. rii^ii (1SI2), I I'hill. i»l 
 
 •lunc'sr. Itaiidiill (1771), 1 <''>w|) 17; I-o(l(, .tSIt, i'.'H I(i;f2, lOlto. 1 
 
 KyiU'f (IS.tH), 1 M. \- \V. ;f2 ; 1 II. & II. L'M ;iN7, 
 
 ,S|',.v.'iiM (1H22), 1 1 I'ri.ic, Tit) •>!,■>, 
 
 Sinm.l (ISJ.'))! 2 C. \ V. \M !I2:!, 
 
 'I'lirlclcm {1NI2), ".) M. \- \V. Hli> ; 1 Dowl. N. S. (i2.". ; C. Jiir. 
 
 ;)7:i 
 71(1 
 
 .llllll'N I' 
 
 .loiicM r 
 ■llllll'N r 
 JiinrH f 
 
 :(»s :iii<) 
 
 .Ii.iii'M (I. TiirliiTvilld {17'.>2), '2 V(iM. jiiii. 11 nCi 
 
 .rnlll'SC. 'I'iininm-(l.s,t(i), I (1. >t I'. '201 /).|7 
 
 .liiMi'H r. 'riirpiii (lH7n, t\ IIi'IhU. Cl'iMiii.) ISl (il(i 
 
 .IniH'M r. Vii'l...ri« (IniviiiK HorkCo. (1S77), IC li. .1. Q. IV 21il ; 2 Q. It. 
 
 1). :il I ; :iii ly. T. Ill ; 2.-. W. R. IMS 072, (17J 
 
 .Iniii'M r. WiilliT (17.^:1). •■( <!williiii, HI7 171, l.'U 
 
 .li.iii'H r. VViilliTM (lH:t.')). I I,. J. Kx. 10!); 1 (). M. & R. 7l:t, f) Tvr. 
 
 ;ii;i i2o:t, i 
 
 204 
 
 1102, uk; 
 
 ■>:\A 
 
 .... fi7;i 
 
 .Iniii'sc. \Vlii(.i< (1717). 1 Htr. (!H ; Hull. N. I'. 2:t:t 
 
 .IiiMi'H r. \VimiiiiiH(l.s;)7), 2 M. X- W. :i27 
 
 .Iniiiiiiix. M.iiliinn", i'iimi" nf, " 'I'Iiih'm." K .liiii., 4 l''ol). IH',1.') 
 
 .lupp ,■. Wii.hI (1S().')), 4 l>« (.'. .1 .V S. (iPi; ;t4 li. ,1. Ch, 211 ; U .lur. 
 
 N. S. 212; 12 li. T. 41 ; l.'l \V. R, ISI 
 
 .li.rilMiiH- r. li;iNlil.riiiik«. (170S), 7'!'. R. <i01 
 
 .Ii.riliin i\ Li'wIh (17:10), 14 KiihI, .'to,'), ii. ; 12 R. R. fi20, n (100, 
 
 ,Ii.nli.|i /■. Mimry (IHf>4), '', II. I,. (!iis. LS.'); 2:1 I,.. I. ('\\. .Sll.") ....'"i:)!t, 
 
 ,I.M-v c. Oiv.liimi (1770), 2 Hum. ^V: I'. :tO; fi R. R. .V(7 
 
 .InsiiiiKt-. KiiiKNl'oi'il (IHO;t), :t2 li. .1. (!. P. !»4 ; i;! (). H. N. ' 447; 11 
 
 W. R. .177 
 
 ,Iiiiiriiu f. Ilimrilii'ii (17S7), I'lirU im IiiHiiriiiKic, 2ir) 
 
 .Iiiilil r. (Iririi (1H7C>), 4:i ).. ,1. Cli. lOH ; ;t;) L. T. Ml 
 
 .Iiiiltfn r. Ili'rk.'i.'y (lH2rO, rili'il 7 (!. \' P. :i71, ii. («) 
 
 .lii^Lriiiiiiiliiiii OliiiM' r. Miiiiii'lo'liiiiKl (ISTiO), 7 Moo. Iiiil. A|)|i. (^iiH. '2(l.'l .. 
 
 ,lu«li«^«ir. KIhI,oIi (IH.'iH), 1 I'. \ I''. 2/".(i 200, ;U2, I 
 
 .liiMtirn r. (iimliiiK (IN )2), 12(1. |l. ;tO ; 21 L. ,1. C. P. 01 ; U! .Fur. 420 . . 1 
 .IuhUi!!! r. Mrrufy SlrrUJo. (lH7i''>), 24 W. R. 100 1 
 
 170 
 N77 
 0H7 
 027 
 :U7 
 
 77(1 
 7(i:t 
 
 /.t7 
 24(1 
 :,S2 
 o.'iri 
 11(1 
 2;t4 
 
 Kai.ihii f. (Iiinlrii City. .Vo.. (1S04) 4'2 Am. 8t. R. 2.'.(1 tdil. !(!(4| 
 
 Kiilil f. .liuiHi'ii (1H12)', 4 'I'liiin. /■•(!■'• .■IHH, IH(I 
 
 Kiiiii f. I Mil (1S2I). 2 11, .V (!. 0;t4 747 
 
 Kiiini-H r. Kiiijflitlv (l(iH2t, Hl<iii. /i4 7^(1 
 
 Knrlii, 'l'li.'(lS(il),' II. .V liiisli. A.lm. ;t(l7; lit W. R. 20.'> HIH 
 
 KhviiiiiikIi r. < Jiilhlinrl. (lH74-r.), I. R. (1. Ii. l.'Kl 770 
 
 Kiiy r. Ilronldiiiin (1H2S), :t ( '. .Sr P. 656 .'riS. 12 IC. 
 
 Kii'v <'. <'r<">li (1H''7), .'I .Sni. \ <1. 407 070 
 
 Kay r. DiicIii'nhi. do Piniii.. (IHIl), H (!iiiii|>. 12:t ;t7;» 
 
 K.iil.lor. Piiyiin (1H;W), H A. .t K. 600; 7 li. .1. Q. U.21H, a N. & 1'. 6;tl.. 1 102. 
 
 111(1 
 
 Ki'iily .'. 'I'i'iiiiiil. (IH(ll), la Ir. I,. R. aO| (iOO 
 
 Ki'iiiiK V. Siimlllioii,. (IH,'..'.), 17 r.. n. 170; 26 li. .1. C. P. 7'2 1106 
 
 Kf'iirin'y V. (Irniil, Hoiittii'iii luiil VVi'Nl.ini Ry. ('o. (IHS(i). 18 I,. R. Ir. ao;i. . Kia 
 
 Kfiinii.y V. KiuK (IHIO). 2 H. \- AM. aoi 1(1, IH 
 
 K.'imiry .'. lioiiil. Miiil HriKli Hv. Co. (1H71), 1j. R. 6Q. 11. 411 ; ao 1,. .r. 
 
 (^ II. 200; 2'2 Ii. T. MHO; IH W. R 1000; Ii. R. 'IQ. H. 760 ; 40 li. J. 
 
 W. H. 2Hrt; 24 Ii. T. 01, t ; 20 \V. R. 24 loa 
 
 KiMil.iiiK I'. lloiilloM (lHa7), 22 li. R. Ir. 14a 6'24 
 
 KuM'h V. HHiKlford (1770), 1 WhiUi & T., Ii. U, 6a ; Udlwl Oiim. in Oluiii. Ill 6(10 
 
 Vol. I. frnl-i u.'itft pitfo (136. 
 
 Mil 
 
 .li 
 
ox 
 
 TABLE Oi" CASES CITED. 
 
 FAOR 
 
 Keeling f. Ball (1796), Toako, Add. Cus. 88 1214 
 
 Keen v. Batshoro (17U4), 1 EHp. 11)4 1 Kil 
 
 Ko<'n V. Keen (1«7;«), 4'2 L. J. P. & M. 61 ; L. R. 3 V. & 1). 105 143 
 
 Ki>on f. PrieHt (IHoH), 1 F. & F. 314 526 
 
 Keene r. BIhooo (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 8 Ch. D. 201 ; 3S L. T. 286 ; 
 
 26 W. U. 552 522 
 
 Kehoo, Re (1884), 13 L. R. Ir. 13 701 
 
 Keiffwiii V. Keigwin (1843), 3 Curt. 607 6!)(i 
 
 Keonnn v. Boylaii (1803), 1 Sell. & L('f. 232 1014 
 
 KeiHHeH)ra(!k v. Livingxtono (1810), 4 JohnH. (Am.) 114 75(t 
 
 Koith V. BurroWH (1876), 1 ('.. V. 1). 722 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 876 6U 
 
 Kell V. Channer (1H56), 23 lirav. 105 761, 786, 706 
 
 Kell V. Nainby (1820), 10 B. & C. 20 540 
 
 Keller, In goodM of (1801), 61 L. J. P. 30 ; 65 L. T. 763 702 
 
 Keller v. Blood (1K61), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 10 'Zu'Z 
 
 Kellington, Vioar of. v. Trin. Coll. (1747), 1 WUh. 170 1010 
 
 Kelly r. Bamewall (1834), Cooke & Ale. 94 870 
 
 Kelly V. JavkHon (1849), 13 Ir. V.q. R. 129 502, 605 
 
 Kelly r. Keatirige (1S71), I. R. 5 Kii. 174 607 
 
 Kelly V. Lawrenee (1804), 33 L. J. Kx. 197; 3 H. & C. 1 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 
 
 637 ; 12 W. R. 4 13 543 
 
 Kelly r. Mid. (1. W. Ry. Co. (1872), I. R. 7 C L. 8 613 
 
 Kelly V. Powlet. (1763), Amb. 605 ; J)iek. 550 780 
 
 Kelly V. Small (1700), 2 Khj). 716 504 
 
 Kelly r. Hmitli (1841), Ami. M. & (). 130 077 
 
 Kelly r. Webster (1852), 12 C. B. 283 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 1(!3 ; 16 Jur. 838 . . 682 
 KelHall V. MarHliall (1856), 10 C. B. N. H. 266 ; 26 Ij. .). C. P. 10 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 1142 341, 1155 
 
 Kelsev v. Bush (1842), 2 Hill. S. Car. R. 440 470 
 
 Kel.soii V. Kelmin (18-)3), 10 Hare, 385 ; 17 Jur. 129 ; 22 L. J. Cli. 745 . . 748 
 
 Keinble v. Farren ( 1 820), 3 C. & P. 623 488 
 
 Kemp I'. Herrett (1814), 3 (?amp. 510 ; 14 R. It. 820 , 35 
 
 Kempr. King (1842), 2 M. & Rob. 437 321 
 
 Kempland v. Maeaulev (1701). Peake, R. ()6 ; 4 T. R. 436 514 
 
 Kempson v. Boyle (186.-)), 34 L. J. Kx. 191 ; 3 II. & C. 763 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 
 
 832 209 
 
 Kempston v. Butler (1861), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 516 115 
 
 Kemptxm v. Cross (1735), Cas. temp. Ilardw. 108 8, 1015, 1046 
 
 Kendall r. Hamilt<m (1870), 4 App. Cas. 504 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 705 ; 41 L. T. 
 
 418; 28 W. R. 97 1115 
 
 Kmdall r. Lond. & S. W. Ry. Co. (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 373 ; 41 L. J. Kx. 
 
 184 ; 26 L. T. 735 ; 20 W. R. 886 771 
 
 Keim's case f 1607), 7 Co. liep. 42 1 103 
 
 Keiinaw. Nugent (1873), I. R. 7 C. L. 464 1119 
 
 KtnniMly r. Karl of Essex, (1801) 28 L. R. Ir. 586 544 
 
 Ken ly r. Hilliard (1850), 10 Ir. L. H. N. S. 106 865 
 
 Kenneriy r. Nasb (1816), 1 Htark. R. 452 1203 
 
 Kennette. Milbank(l83l), 8 Bing. 38; 1 Moo. & He. 102 713 
 
 Kensington, Ld., v. Bimverie (1850), 7 Jl. L. C. 557; 6 Jur. N. 8. 106; 
 
 20 L. J. Cli. 537 138 
 
 Kensington v. Inglis (1807), 8 East, 273 ; 9 R. R. 438 .303, 027 
 
 Kent V. Courage (.\: Co., (1801) 55 J. P. 264 ; 7 T. L. K. 50 643 
 
 Kent f. Jackson (1851), 14 Beav. 384 ; 2 I)e O. M. & U. 49 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 
 
 438 638 
 
 K<>nt ». Rih^y (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 190 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 569 ; 27 L. T. 263 ; 
 
 20 W. K. 852 135 
 
 Kenworthy v. Hcliofield (1824), 2 B. & C. 947; 4 Dowl. & R. 556 6()8, 730 
 
 Keogh V. keogh (1874), I. R. 8 V.q. 170, 449 801 
 
 Keogh V. Lwmaril (1877), I. R. 11 Kcj. 365 012 
 
 Kepp V. Wiggett (1K51), 10 C. B. 53; 20 L. J. C. P. 49: 14 Jur. 1137 ..88, 04 
 
 Kerin v. Dav.iri.'ii (1861), 12 Tr. Ch. R. 352 455 
 
 Keniot V. PittiH (18.^3), 2 K. & B. 425 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 17 Jur. 932 . . 887 
 
 Kerrti. Shedden (1831), 4 C. & P. 531, n. («) 1048 
 
 The re/creiieei are to payet, not to purayrapht. 
 
TABLE OP CASKS CITED. 
 
 CXI 
 
 I 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Ki'whaw V. Cox (1800), 3 Ewp. 240 IVM 
 
 Ktmhiiw «'. KorHhiiw (187.5), 1 li) Miihh. 110 744 
 
 KtTHhiiw r. O^rdim (IHC).")), 34 L. J. Ex. 159; 3 H. & C. 717; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. H. r. 12 ; 12 L. T. fi;:! : 1 3 W. B. 7.')') ((«i), 01)0 
 
 K.'strel, Tho ll»«l). P- " IM'^ ; * Anp. M. C. 433; 45 L. T. Ill; 30 
 
 W. H. 182 936 
 
 KBttlcwdl r. RarHtow (1872), 41 L. J. Ch. 718; L. R. 7 Ch. 080; 27 L. T. 
 
 258 ; 20 W. It. 917 1184 
 
 Kovati I'. Cmwford (187()). 45 L. J. Ch. 658 1031 
 
 Ktivil r. Lynch (1873), I. R. 8 Eq. 244 G'>» 
 
 Key V. Cotiwworth (1852), 7 Ex. 595 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 4 42 
 
 K.'y r. Slmw (1832), 8 Hingr. 320 ; 1 Moo. & Sr. 4(i2 372, 524 
 
 KcynoH (sliould bo RyvcH) v. I), of "WolliiiKtou (184('>), 9 Hcav. 579; 16 
 
 L. J. Oil. nn 1045 
 
 KcyHor. TowoU (1853), 2 E. & B. 132; 22 L. .J. Q. H. 305; 17 Jur. 1052.. 118 
 Kibblo, Ex imite, Ro OiihIow (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 373; 44 L. J. Hunk. 
 
 {i3 ; 32 L. T. 138 ; 23 W. R. 433 718 
 
 Ki.hk'nninstcr. Mayor of, v. Hanlwitiko (1873), 43 L. J. Ex. 9 ; L. R. 9 
 
 Ex. 13 ; 29 L. T. 612 ; 22 W. R. ItiO 531 
 
 Kidgill r. Moor (1850), 9 C. B. 304; 19 L. J. C. P. 177; 14 .Jur. 790; 1 
 
 L. M. & 1'. 131 85 
 
 Ki.lnor v. Krith (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 35 l?().t 
 
 Kiilnoy »'. Cm'.kburn (1831), 2 Rush. & Myl. 168 417, 423 
 
 IvidHton t'. Euip. Mar. InH. Co. (1866), 35 L. .1. C. V. 250; li. R. 1 C. V. 
 
 535 ; 1 H. & R. 433 ; 12 Jur. N. H. 665 ; 15 L. T. 12 ; 15 W. R. 63 . . 764 
 
 Kioran v. HandarH (1837), 6 A. & E. 515 ; 1 N. & P. 625 546 
 
 Kilbfo V. Sncyd (3 828), 2 M.dl. 193 527 
 
 KilKourv. Aloxiiudor (1860), 14 Moo. P. C. 0. 173; 4 L. T. 487 185 
 
 KilKour r. Einlyson (1789), I H. »1. 155 ;iS6 
 
 Killby V. RoiOuLsNon (1865), 18 C. B. N. S. 357 521 
 
 Killick, R«> (1865), 3 8. & T. 578 ; 34 L. J. P. 2 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1083 .... 695 
 Kilpin r. Ratluy, (1892) 1 Q. B. 682 ; 66 L. T. 797 ; 40 W. R. 479; 56 
 
 J. P. 5(55 039 
 
 Kilvirt'H TruHtH, Ro (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 170 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 361 ; L. R. 12 
 
 E(l. 183 ; 26 L. T. 221 ; 20 W. R. 226 798 
 
 Kind)all v. Morroll (1826), 4 (Jrocnl. 368 306 
 
 ICininiol v. Kinmu'l (1817J, 3 ScrK- & R- 330 972, 973 
 
 Kinipton, Ro (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 153 ; 3 S. & T. 427 699 
 
 Kii>ii)ton V. Loud. & N. WoHt. Ry. Co. (1864), 9 Ex. 766 ; 2 C. L. R. 1026 ; 
 
 23 L. J. Ex. 232 868, 870 
 
 Kindurshiy r. ChaHO (undated), 2 Park, Lm. 743 1149 
 
 Kino V. Balfo (1813), 2 Hall & B. 347 679 
 
 Kine v. Beaumont (1822), 3 B. \- B. 291 ; 7 Moore, C. P. 112 310, 317 
 
 Kine V. EverHhed (1847), 10 Q. B. 1 13 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 271 ; 11 Jur. 673. . 220 
 
 KinK'H Coll. lfotti)ital v. Wlieildon (1854), 18 Hoav. 30 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 5:i7. , 784 
 King'n ('oiinty (Hliould be Knox County) v. Neath National Bank (nhould 
 
 be Ninth National Bank) (1893), 147 U. S. 91 133 
 
 King, Ex parte (1802), 7 VeH. 312 869 
 
 King, In ru, Unity Joint Stock, iVrc. Amhii., Ex parte ^1858), 3 Do G. & J. 
 
 63; 27 L. J. Bunk. 33; 4 Jur. N. H. 1257 641 
 
 Kingc. Andermin (1874), 8 [. U E.i. 147 136, 137 
 
 Kingf. BoiU)rd (1863), 1 II. & M. 343 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 040 ; 8 L. T. 033 ; 11 
 
 W. R. 900 ; 2 N. R. 442 100 
 
 King V. Chamberlain (1871), L. R. C. P. 474 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 273 226 
 
 King r. Clerk (1695), 1 Hulk. 349 7 
 
 King V. Colo (1848), 2 Ex, 632 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 283 291 
 
 King r. Eoxwell (1876), 3 CA\. I). 618 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 093 ; 24 \V. R. 629. . 179 
 
 King V. FranciH (1800), 3 Ksp. 116 250 
 
 King c. Ceorge, (leorgeV KHtate, Bo (1877), 46 L. J. CJh. 670 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 759 ; 5 Ch. I). 627 ; 25 W. R. 638 808 
 
 King V. Il.iwkesworth (1879), 4 Q. B. I). 371 ; 48 L.J. Q. B. 484 ; 41 L. T. 
 
 411 ; 27 W. II. 660 41 
 
 King V. Hoaro (1844), 13 M. & W. 494 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 382 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 29 1116 
 
 Vol. I. endi with page 036. 
 
 : 1 
 
 1 
 
 ■ ■ i 
 
 ' r 
 
cxu 
 
 TAULK OF CAKIiS CMFJ), 
 
 ■| 
 
 PAoa 
 
 IfiiiK*'. KiM)f (IHflO), '2 Koh.TtM. I.IM Oftl, 11(12 
 
 Kint^r. Nonimri (IHIV), I (I. It. SHI ; 17 L. J. 0. I'. '2;i ; I! Jiir. H2\.J)m, 1()!>7 
 
 KitiK •'. I'liclilo.ik (IH-'(i), IH .IntiriM. Ill 172 
 
 KiiiK •'. Wulk.T (iH(i;i), 2 11. \ ('.. :wi ; ;t;) ij. j. Kx. 1117 '-!(>7 
 
 \ih\n r. WiinuK {IHdlt), r, Km|., \\ 2M 
 
 KiiiK-c. /imiiH'imiiii (IH7I), ID I,. J. C. I'. '27H ; !<. It. (1 <!. I'. KIC ; '21 
 
 L. T. il^;i; l!» W. It. lOii!) ;t0H 
 
 KiiiKof 'I'wi) Hinili.iH r. VVIII.cx (IH:)!), 1 Him. N S. .((il l)(|(i, (t70 
 
 KitiK«ii>ill >'. Milliir.1 (IK.'),-.), llKx. ;tl:t; :t<;. I,. It I()"J III! 
 
 KiiiKHton'M {Duc.Ih'mh of) CiiMct (17711), '20 llnw. Hi. 'I'r, ,')!((; 2 Hni. 1,. (!. 
 
 <H'2 fi'.d, i)'2 1, 'ri:>, 1107, 1 I li», II II 
 
 Kin^Htoii V. (Jiiin (l(!7<i), lii')!. fi'iiip. I''iii<!li, '2.V.) (lll'i 
 
 KiiiKHtoin'. Kiiililm (IH(I!(), I Cniiip. ftOS, n. ; 10 it. It. 7I2, 11 Turi 
 
 KiiiKHtoll f. l,cMl"y (IML'I), III HiTK. .t U. .'m;! lOI.S 
 
 KiiiMiTHlcy r. ()r|Mi (177;)), I Dim^. fiH jOHl, |(H:t, lll'2, II.VI 
 
 KiriHiiiiiiii'. ItmiH.) (IHMl), 17 (Jh. I). 101 ; 50 Ti. J. Cli. ■IKd ; •! I ],.T MH ; 
 
 '20 VV. R. (127 7.') 
 
 Kiiil.n^ii V. I'liiHloii (IH'id), I II. & N. •■ir,7- 'lU \,. ,1. Kx. 2H7 77:1 
 
 Kip r. Ilrijfliimi (IHIO), d .l..liim. I.IK; 7 JoliriM. HIH 1(107 
 
 Ki|)pi'ii f). Diirlfy (IH/')M), ;i M.ii(|. 2o;t; I I'lttcrMoii, 702 Hor. 
 
 Kirliy V. IlickHoii (!«•'>"), 1 I.. M. 'V I'. 'MM 17 
 
 Kirl.y f>. Hiiiipm.ii (IHril), 2;t I,. J. M. C Kir); 10 V.\. WhH; '>. (!. I,. It. 
 
 i'2Hn ; IH .liir. im;t 10, '.".'d, 22H 
 
 Kir.rlmiT r. VonuM (IHftO), 12 Muoic, I'. V.. C. lidl ; 7 W. It. I.'..'.; (i.liir. 
 
 N. H. 7;!2 16K 
 
 Kirk, Kx |>iirt.«, Iti'iiiirllitiKl (iliivc, Itc (IK77), ') < li. D.NIIO; 411 L .1. Itiiiik. 
 
 101 ; :)d li. T. 'lid ; 2.'. W. It. .V.lH H03 
 
 Kirk V. Kililowi'H (IHIl), I) Ifan', r.l7; l.'t I- .1. (Hi. •102; H.lur. 1021 . .7.'<;i, WHl, 
 
 S07, HOH 
 
 Kirkliimi V. M.irl.r (IHIO), 2 II. A A. di;i; ICIiiMy, It. :|H'2 077, d7H 
 
 Kirkliiiid f). NiMlii't, (IH.'.O), ;t Miicij. 7dd, 1 I'litcrHoii, H7d .i;) 
 
 Kirkitian v. Oxlc>y (IHIl -Id), cited 2 Hi.iirk. Kv. ;;0d, 11. (/) 2'>.'i 
 
 Kiikpat.ri.k r. (Jinvun (IK7.0), Ir. It. !» ( :. I,, f.'l 770 
 
 KiikMUll Hniwi'iy Co. r. I'uiIM'Mm Ity. < '... (IH7 I), I,. It. (^ ll.IdH; •i;ir,.,r. 
 
 (i M. H2; .'toL. T. 7H:t; '22 VV. It. H7d .'IHH 
 
 Kirkw(>(«rHriiMi. (IHltd), I l,.,w. (). <!, 102 21'! 
 
 Kirwun'M TriiHlM, Itii (IHH.')), 2/)(;ii. I). :t7;i ; W I.. .1. Cli. !).'V2 ; 10 I,.'!'. 
 
 292 ; ;t2 VV. II. fiHl 702, 7(';i 
 
 Kirwim v. (Jor.kl.urii (IKOf,), 5 Knp. 2;t;i ; H !l. II. HID 100:1 
 
 Kirwitii V. (lonimii (IHld), If. K.|. It. Kil 1)2 
 
 Kiln mill LiiiKi'MeiiHr (IH'22), 1 II. .V (1. Mil 11:17 
 
 KlitiK'Uiiiii, <i(MHlH.,f, It.. (IHd2j, :i H. ,^i T. IH; Wl \,. .1. I'. M. & A. Id .. II7H 
 Kiiiipp V. Miiiihy (IH.t.'ij, i;{ VV.'ii.l. r)S7 Iiod 
 
 KimppV ciiMi! ( 1 h:tO i, I \'uV . IHO .')d2, fid I 
 
 Ktml<:lil.iill r. I''..wl«i (IH7d), I oil. I). diH ; 21 VV. It. d'JO Oil 
 
 KiiiKlit «'. Iliirlier (I Kid), Id M. & VV. «d ; 2 C. .V K, :i:i:i ; Id I,. .1. Kx. 
 
 IH ; 10 .(iir. OJO dH4, dHO 
 
 KriiKht v. (/'iiiiiplMill (IHIS), ((iiiil.lf.,nl Hiiimiiiit AMMi/,..H MH.) :ilO 
 
 Kiiixlit t). <;i»'Mimit^ (iK.'iHj, H A. * K. 2l/i; ;i N. \- I'. :i7.'. llo;i 
 
 KniKlit ». <!ox (1H,V1), IH V,. II. Mt> ; 2o I;. .1. (!. \' . :'.ll 00 
 
 l<iii«»il, f). Oorkford (I70I), I Knp. 100; .O It. It 7'20 (171 
 
 Ki.i(<lit,, 10', Kiiij^lif, r. (iiinlfi.T (IHH;)), 'i.h (;h. I). 207 ; M li. .1. V,\\. Ih:1 ; 
 
 4!» lj. T. f.tr. ; ;i2 VV. It. ido oi:t 
 
 KiiiRlit, I'. Mimty (lHi:i), 12 I-. .1, (|. H. '.'o:) 7:11 
 
 KniKlifc*'. KihkM. (IHdl), :iO li. ,1. (;li. dll ; 2 Oill'. (11(1 7H0 
 
 Knight V. Miirliii (IHIO), (low, 2d ;ilO, 1212 
 
 Kiiixli*. «'. M. of VViit.irfonl (lH;id), 2 V. & 0. Kx. :iH dill 
 
 KniKlif. V. M. of Wiitrcfoid (IHIO), 1 V. & 0. '201 ; 10 li. S. Kx. Kq. f)7 ; 
 
 ,') .liir. HIH; II CI. Hi K. d.);t IIO, 'HI 
 
 KiiitfhtN r. Wiir.^ii (IS70), li. It. ft (i. H. (1(10; 10 I.. .1. </. H. M | 2:) I,. T. 
 
 dlO; 10 W. II. '2'l'l fdfi 
 
 Ktiill V. llo.ip<ir(IH,'.7), 2 II. A N. 277 ; 20 li. .1. Kx. ;t(7 770 
 
 Kiiill V. WilliiirnN(IHOO), 10 KiiM, 4.11 ; 10 It. It. :HU llUi 
 
 'I'h* r^tretuxi art to pagei, twl to parai/riij)/i». 
 
TABLK OF CASKS CITICP. (!Xm 
 
 I'AIIK 
 
 Kiinlirll «'. Fiillrr (171)7), r«'ii. A.M. CiiH. I.f!) : i U. U. H'.m •.','>.'> 
 
 KnowlrH, III IT (IMHO), I!) I,. J. CU. (>'2.'> ■ i;i L.T. I If-'; 'JH \V. It. '.>7.'> ll,'. 
 
 KiK.wliiiiiii r. niii.U (lH7lt), 4;» li. J. Kx. 'JD; li. U. It Kx. 1 ; '.".• I,. T. 
 
 •JO'i ; '.i'J \V. U. 77 MM, (iKO. (182 
 
 Knox i: HiinIi.H (I.s:i7. nIm.uM Ii« 1H.'.7), Hd. H. N. H. Illll I(i7 
 
 Kui.x V. I..1. Mmvo (IS,-iS), 7 Ir. (^li. H. .'>(i:i IKIH 
 
 Knox r. Wiililc.lM.nmKJi ( 1H'.!7). .'' ( iiiriil. IH.'i ll.'tH 
 
 Knox (ioiiiilv f. Nintli Niitioiml Hunk (IHWl), 117 U. M. !i| I.^S 
 
 Koi'lirl r. SMiiii.lrrM (IHill), ;i;i I,. .1, (I. 1'. IIKI ; 1 7 < '. I». N . S. 7 1 ; 10 .liir. 
 
 N. S. :y>n -. l'.' VV. It. I Kic 771 
 
 Kopiicir (. Wilw.n (iH7i;), ir. l,. .1. ^^ 11. i;i(i; 1,. it. 1 (^ n. D. ;i77; ;u 
 
 I,, 'r. (.77; 'J I W. It. 7(1(1 771 
 
 K.iHtcr c. IniHN (IH'J.'i), Ity. .V M. .'I.l.'t 17f> 
 
 KnHt.T /■. Krnl (IH'J(l), (1 It. \- C. 11); !l D.iwl. * It. 2 17'') 
 
 Knifl, r. Wii'k.'v (IH:fJ), I Hill. * .1. Ilt'i l\M) 
 
 Jvi'i.xliiiii lli'liiin Itoy ('. lliciJi'Hwiiiii ( 'iiowilijinci' (IS76), I.. It. 'J Imliiin 
 
 A|i)., 'JMI .' Illh 
 
 Kionlii'iiii c .loliMHiii (1S77), 7 <'li. I), (ill; 17 I-. .1. VU. i;tJ; ;i7 I-. 'r. 
 
 7fil ; 2(i W. It. 1 1'2 (!(ir. 
 
 Kiifh <•. W.'hioii (I7!)!l), :i I'lHp. ,'il 1,'.,'> 
 
 Kiiriz r. H\H-uii' (IS.SH), f>7 I.. .1. <'li. 'JMM ; .'.s I,. T. lil.S fiOC. 
 
 KvIk »'. .li'MicvH (lH:t!i), ;i Mii(<|. ;tl7 ; 1 rnti'iMni, H.'io 7.'i() 
 
 KyniiHlon /•. Mu.'liiinl.T ( 1.S7II), 17 L. .1. il H. 7('> ; H7 1.. T. :i'.)il 41 
 
 Imckinoton v. AlliiTloii (1811), 7 M. .t (ir. liCO ; 8 Him.M, N. It. ;is ; M .liir. 
 
 1(1(1; i:i I,. .I.e. I'. 1 10 nio 
 
 l.lirloiijfli r, 'I'owli' (IKdO), ;i K.xii, 111 t>\!\ 
 
 J.iicM.n r. IliwKii'N (l«'.!-'), •■! >^Ui\-\i. 178 ; Dowl. \- It. N. I'. «'. :t8 '.III? 
 
 ],Mlnii.> r. FiilkliiiKl IsIiiihIh Co. (M>1), 27 I-. .1. Cli. '.!,'> ; 4 K. .V .1. I! I ; (1 
 
 W. It. •! M»!» 
 
 JmMH V. Iliurliiy (1821), .t Stark. 42; 2 Dowl. \ It. I'l.iO ; 1 It. \- C. 
 
 ;iim f)!l8, !1(1H 
 
 }.n^w^fv. Kiiim- (18()((), 2 Mom. ,V I'. 8,^^ 1212 
 
 JmiiiNoii c. 'I'lviiHTo (1k;II). I A. \ K. 71)2; It N. * M. (lOU 88, !)« 
 
 l,Minl r. lliiirKM (IM«I). H* <"'■ !>• -~- •'■'' ''• '''• '■-''<•'< H''^ 
 
 l.iiko »'. Diikoof Aiyyil (IMII), (1 i). II. 177; II I.. .1. <|. It. 7:1 fill 
 
 ].iiK(i c Ilill.CM (1(1118), I I,<1. Itiiyni. 7:i:t 481 
 
 Jiiiktu'. KiiiK (Hi'i"), 1 WiiiH. Siiiinilt'iN, lllla; 2 Ki'lili>, ;i(il, 4(i2, 4!M1, (I.)!), 
 
 801, 8:t2 ; 1 Li'V. 210 ; I Si.l. 414 4 
 
 Liikniiiiii r. MoiiiitNli'plii'ii (1874), 111) I;. .1. (^ It. 27'> ; l<. •.. (> Q- K. mil ; 
 
 4 1 li. .1. (^ It. (17 ; I.. It. 7 (|. It l!i(i; I,. II. 7 II. li. 17; 22 \V. It. 
 
 (ii7 ; 4;i I,. .1. Q. It. 188 ; ;io l,. 'I'. 4;t7 (177 
 
 Liikof r. Iloi'ili't'ii (187(1), 1 Cii. I). (144; 24 W. It. (tV.i ; 4.'i li. ,1. CU. 
 
 Illft ; ;i4 L. 'I'. 88 14f. 
 
 I,iilor V. I.iiloi- (18711), 4 li. It. Ir. (17H ,')i;t 
 
 Liiml. r. Orion (18(1(1), 2!) li. .1. Cli. 28(1 ; (! Jur. (II ; 1 I.. T. 21)0 17'.i 
 
 liiiiiibf. MiiimliT (1882), r}2 I.. .1. (^ H. 4(1; 10 (^ II. I). 110; 47 I.. T. 
 
 412; .'tl W. It. 117 Dill, »II4 
 
 IjiiiiIh.'h.wiw (17111). 2 Lea. .'.,'.4 ; 1 MrNully, I'lv. 42 f>;.8 
 
 ],iiinlM«i(.'M KHtuto, III r« 088(.), Ill I,. It. Ir. 2114 424, f)42, 7:11) 
 
 J.iiinl>ort., Iti< (180(1), ;IA li. .1. I'. \ M. (14 ; li. It. I I', ^f l>. 1:18; 14 I,. T. 
 
 227; 14 \V. It. (117 lo;ii 
 
 LimilHTl. f. NorriH (I8;i7), 2 M. \ W. .•i;t.'i ; (1 I,. .1. Kx. 101) (l.M) 
 
 I.Miiioiiil «'. Daviill (1847), 1) (^ It. lO.'lO; Id I.. .1. i). It. l.'KI ; II .liir. 200. 222 
 
 J.:iinonl. c. (^rook (18l(>), (I M. .V W, 02/); 8 Dowl. 7:i7 ; 4 .liir. 481) H;I1, H;t4 
 
 J,iiin|iliiKli I'. Luiii|iIuk1i (1701)). 1 I'. Wiim. 112 (I(l(i 
 
 ].iiiii|>oii <'. <'orkn (18114, nIkiiiIiI Iio 1822), h It. i<i(; Alil. (10(1; I Dowl. .Mc 
 
 It. 2 1 1 1):t, Mi 
 
 Iminpivll V. Itilloi'iimy Union (1840), It Kx. 2811; 18 ]i. .1. Kx. 282 . .Oil!), (142, (I4A 
 
 J,iiiian/,n|.. I'alliirr (1827), M. .V M. Ill ;il<t 
 
 l.iiiM'aHl.(ii- Cunal Cii.'m kiihk (18112), Mini. & II. 114 ; I Dnio. iV (^li. 411 ; 1 
 
 Moul. IIU 603 
 
 t'vl, I, tttdt wUh ftuyt OJO, 
 
 W'\ 
 
CXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 LiiiKlfTH and Bngley'H Contradt, (1802) 3 Cli. 41 ; 01 L. J. Oh. 707 ; 07 
 
 li. T. r.2l (170 
 
 Liuhi'h (iiiHo (l/)H7), '2 <>'i>. Il<-I>- '"'• K, 10, '20 
 
 Liirin'H riwo (IH(i;»), 1 Do (». J. & H. 50J ; 'M L. J. Ch. H4 ; 10 Jiir. N. H. 
 
 2.') M4 
 
 Liiiii., Ill n. MHHO), It Oh. J). H.IO; 40 h. J. Ch. 70H ; lU L. T. H7 ; '2H 
 
 W. K. 7(11 110 
 
 Liimi ('. Miirnhiirt (IHII), 1 (i. H. O.'IH ; 1 (J. & I). ;U2; Jur. 16,'i 077, 07H 
 
 IiUii.li'. (Jmy (lH7;i), li. It. 10 E(i. ■'i.'i2; 4;Ui. .1. (!h. 1H7 11H2 
 
 liiUK. II. llarriMoii (1H2()), C. Muiif. .')7;i li;W 
 
 Liiiio I'. IroiiiiK.nt^rr {1HI4), lit M. & \V. aOH ; 1 i L. J. Kx. K.l 100 
 
 Liiiii. r. Nixon (lS(i(i), li. K. 1 (!. I'. 412; iiCt I,. J. (,'. I'. 24.H; 12 Jur. 
 
 N. S. ;i!)2; 14 VV. It. Oil 771 
 
 Liiiifriiiiiilii V. Afiuk.'ii/io {\Hr,^), HO I,. J. Ch. f)18 ; L. It. 4 Kii. 421 ; 16 
 
 VV.It.(il4; KlIi.T.llI 70 
 
 liiiiiK I'. Hulo (IHIH). I M. & H. Ill 710 
 
 Jiiiiij^ V. Hiiiilh (1S;)H, nIioiiIiI ho IH;(I), 7 Hin^. 2H4 ; C) M. &. I'. "H 42 
 
 LiiiiKiliilo r. 'rriiiiiiur (IKl'i), IT) KiimI,, 2iM ;J2 
 
 Lim>f.liilo .-. WhIUiolil (IH.-)H), ;{ K. & J. 420, 4;t2 ; 4 .lur. N. H. 700; 27 
 
 li. J. Oil. 7!t.') ; W. It. H(12 140 
 
 liiiiij^ilon .'. IIiiIIh (IKOI), 4 (i. U. I). a:t7 ; 4H li. J. M. 0. li;i; 40 li. T. 
 
 HHO; 27 W. It. 0,'i7 ;il7 
 
 liiiiiK-foril »'. HoiiiHm (IH'i7), .'i IC. & J. 220 ; '.] Jur. N. H. HM ilH 
 
 liiiiiKfonl <•. W.mkIh (1H) I). H HooU, N. It. :((;!) ; 7 M. tt (ir. 02.') 227 
 
 liiiiiKhoni r. .\llnuU (IH12). 4 'riiiiii Oil; lit It. It. OOlt IISS 
 
 Jiim^rloy »'. K of Oxfonl (ISHO), I M. & \V. flOK ; 2 Oiiio, (i;» ; 1 T. it (1. 
 
 KOH ; ri li. .1. Kx. 100 rtO,-) 
 
 LiiiiKtiioimI r. Munlo I'lKO.')), IH 0. H. N. S. 2.').') ; 12 L. T. Ml) ; lit W. It. 
 
 4(1!»; llJiir. N. H. 177 1117, IIHH 
 
 I,iiii>^ii(lKo V. Ciiiiipholl (IS7;), 2 Ex. I). 281 ; 40 L. J. Kx. 277 ; liO I,. T. 
 
 04 ; 2.') VV. It. H.ll ,^.;i(i 
 
 TiiiiiKHtcii ''. rioUoii (17!(:i), I'oiikc, Add. Cum. 21 .S:i7 
 
 iMMKUm V. Ciirh^toii (l«7;t), Ij. It. !) Kx. .07 ; 4;t L. .1. Kx. .'>4 ; 21) K. T. 
 
 O.OO 1 .V2 
 
 liiiiiKloJi V. Ili^'KiiiH (IH.'i!)), 4 II. *. N. 402 ; 2H li. .1. Kx. 2.''i2 '1!I0 
 
 liiiiivoii t). Miirlin (1HS4), l.'J K. It. Ir. 207 OMH 
 
 liii /'lata (IH.O,')), 1 Hwal). Adiii. It. 2!IH (1 
 
 liUlmlov V. (iriiTHon (1K4H), 1 II, K. Cim. 4i)S 100, 111) 
 
 LiiNoolfoM r. li.l. OiimIow (IH77), 2 (i H. I). 4;!:), 4.00 ; 40 ].. .1. ^l. H. lillj ; 
 
 DO li. T. 4.V.) ; 20 VV. It. 4W0 110 
 
 TiiiHMcii.io r. Tioriicy (IHID), 1 Mao. & U "01 ; 2 II. & 'I'. 1 10 ; II .lur. 1H2 o;i» 
 
 JiUNwiir V. 'ryr<:otiiii'l (IHIO), 10 lloav. 2H 1101 
 
 liiiKdi V. VVoillak.' (IHIOj, ;t I'. & I). 4!)i) ; 1 1 A. & K. 00!) :iS() 
 
 ],alkow r. Kaiiior (1700), 2 II. HI. 4;t7 1102 
 
 I.a Tourho ».. lluUoii (IK70), Ir. It. Kc]. 100 440 
 
 Jiittlcr r. (Jooliloii, (IHDI) 10 Nov. (iiol, roiioHcd) fljH, Oli), 020 
 
 l,au.lordalo, \',;'riiK<- (ISSO). 10 \\>\k Cas. iil)2 1 I 77 
 
 KavcT r. Kirldrr (lHii2), II VV. It. 240; 7 Ii. T. 002; O.liir. N S. 1110 .. 0;tO 
 Jjavoiry <•. I'lirHoll (1HH«), HO (Jli. I). OOM ; 07 K. .1. (Jh. 070; OS K. T. 8411; 
 
 ;t7 VV. It. 10:t 0H7 
 
 liiivioi). I'liillipM (170.'.), :i Hiirr. 1770; I VV. HI. 700 7 
 
 LavioM, In r..', Kx i.ait,.' Hl.oplioiiH (1H77), 7 <!li. D. 127 ; 47 Ii. .1. Uk. 22 ; 
 
 ;i7 li. T. 01 li ; 20 VV. It. |:tO 002 
 
 Law r. Wilkin (1M:<7), A. & K. 7IH ; 1 N. «t I*. 007 ; W, VV. .fe I). 2:10. . KlH 
 
 Lawdon r. KaWilon (IHHO), Ir. It. 27 022 
 
 Tiawo«, In ro (1HH2), 20(:ii. D.HI; 40L. T. 4H0; ;J0 VV. It. ICt HOO 
 
 TiawoM V. Rood (ISIIO), 2 Lowin, (J. (J. 102 020 
 
 Lawl.;r»». liindon (1870), Ir. It. 10 (!. L. 188 ;i(i 
 
 LawloHMi'. (^loalo (1840), H Ir. I,. It. .■182 202 
 
 Lawlry'H, Ka.ly, cam! (undated) Hull. N. V. 287 HOI? 
 
 Lawronco v. Hakor ( 18;il)), VVond. HOO 040 
 
 JiUWifiKio.;. Oainpl.oll (1800), 4 Drew. 480; 28 L. J. ('At. 780; 7 W. It. 
 
 aaO; Jur. N. H. 1071 600 
 
 Tito refereneei art to pa(je», not to parayrapht. 
 
TABLK OF CASr.S CITHD. Cxv 
 
 I'AdlC 
 
 I,awronoo r. Cliirk (IHI,-)), U l)<.wl. & I.. 87 ; 14 M. & W. '2fiO ; 1ft L. J. 
 
 Kx. 10 :<l 1, 31H 
 
 I,,iw ivi.r.- r. llitrli (IHC.H), li. R. » W. «. ft'21 ; 37 L. J. (i. H. '201); 1) B. & 
 
 S. 1(17; IH I', 'r. IHI ; Kl W. H. Hl.i 
 
 LiiwifiMii r. Ilniif,'ht(iii (IHOil), Ti .loliiiH. r2t» 
 
 Ijiiwiiiicc r. LuwK'iKO (IHHI), '20 (!h. I). 'M ; 63 L. J. (Jh. im'2 ; fto L. T. 
 
 71.'>; 32 \V. K. 7l»l 
 
 I,iiwri'ii(«» r. Miiiil«< (IH.Ilt), •! Divw. 472; 7 W. K. 311 
 
 Liiwiciini r. Wiilii.Hlry (1H112), 31 L. J. C. I'. 113; 12 V. H. N. 8. 7!l» ; 
 
 f) I,. T. 71IS ; 10 VV. H. 311 
 
 LiiwmiMoii r. nmliT (1H(I2), 1 Sell. & Li-f. 13 
 
 LuwM f. lUii.l (inr);), '27 L. J. (!. r. 70 ; 3 (J. U. N. 8. 112 ; 4 Jur. N. H. 
 
 ■•1 
 
 1'23 
 !()(> 
 
 140 
 
 326 
 
 7.'.S 
 (176 
 
 32 
 6 
 
 Lawwiii f. Ciirr (IH.'X'.), 10 Mno. P. 0. 0. 102 
 
 J,a\vw.ii r. Ht.xl.lait (IH,'-)3), 3 Now U. 241 ; 1» L. T. filili ; 12 W. It. 2H0 ; 
 
 1(1 .liir. N. S. 33 844 
 
 I.iivlHmni.M'. CriHj. (1838), 4 M. & W. 320; 8 C. & J'. 3!»7 ; 1 11. * H. 
 
 ■.m 3',I7, 405, 4(iO, 103^1, 1030 
 
 1-avrr'M niNo (1722), 10 How. Ht. Tr. 03 2;iil, :U8, 026 
 
 l-HJI'iii'l «». Htrwurt (1870), 40 L. J. VA\. 103; 4 CM. I). 410; 26 W. H. 
 
 •226 061 
 
 I>ii,Vt.lioari) r. Hrjant. (1830), 3 Hn.tt, 238; 2 HiiiK. N ('. 736; 2 ILkI^th, 
 
 ■1^, ■ 070, 676 
 
 l.a/.niil.y r. IfawNon (1864), 4 Do ii. M. & (J. 660; 24 li .1. {'h. 4Hi; 1 .lur. 
 
 N . H. 2.S0 663 
 
 Lea ('. WliraMcy (1078), oili'd in 20 Mow. Hi. Tr. 674 0(13 
 
 lifiicli, III k"'"1m cf (1«'»0), 1 li. T. 101 706 
 
 lii'adi, \<v (1818), N..ICM c.f ra.s. (Ki'n. & M.) O-,! 007 
 
 ],.'arl. ,. Iliiirljanaii (18(i;t), 4 Msp. 228 640 
 
 li^aiili r. SiiiiiiKi.ii (ls;i!l), 6 M. .V \V. :100 ; Duvl. I'. (!. 13 , 3 Jur. 0.'>4.. 283 
 
 JiiMulir, lii'NNci) of .'. Dii^rRini (1841), Ir. Oir. H. 124 314 
 
 ],ra.li'i-r. Itiiny (1706), 1 Ksp. 3,-.3 373, 1018 
 
 L.'iif r. Iliilt (1812), <!. i^ Mmi-mIi. 461 311 
 
 ],i>ako r. M. of WiHtiiicalli (1H41), 2 M. \- Kol). .^Ol 1036 
 
 lifaiiior. limy (1814), 3 KiimI,603; 6 Km|>. 18; 7 H. H. IVrfaci- vii 
 
 liiariiioiitli, K.\ iHiilr (1H21), Madd. 113 363 
 
 Lcaroytl, Kx paito, l<<i I''oiiI<1h (1878), 10 Cli. I>. 3; 48 L. .1. Ilmik. 17; 
 
 27 \V. U. 277 ; 30 li, T. 626 1 167 
 
 Li'Mi-v r. liloy.l (1800), 3 K. & i<). 178; 2i» L. .1. M. V. 104 ; .lur. N. 8. 
 
 I'.'io 1 176 
 
 licallirr f^lolli Co. r. IlirroiiiiiniH (1876), li. U. 10 (j. H. 140; .( I h. ,1. 
 
 U It. 64 ; 32 li. T. 307 ; 23 W. K. 603 073, 762 
 
 liC Cuiix V. I'Mcii (1781), 2 DuMH. 604 1103 
 
 L.rlitiirr« I'. I''l.'(.(^lii-r (18;t3), 1 C. \- M. 023; 3 'I'yr- 460 711, 713, 1116 
 
 Ji.dl)..U<.r r. 8all (1828), l ItihK. 023; 1M.&1'."607 618 
 
 ],(<iKar«l f. 'riioiii]iNoii (1843), II M. & W. 40 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 700; 12 
 
 li. ,1. K.\. 220 ; 7 .lur. 2 :<0 734 
 
 liCC I'cfiiiKo (wliould lin LriKli), (undated). Mill. Kv. 1.66, I'l.. 2 117S> 
 
 liC.) V. AiiRaH (1800). 36 I,. .1. (Jli. 373 ; 14 L. T. 324 ; 14 \V. |{. 007 .... «13 
 
 lici V. Jlinvll (18i;i), 3 (;aiii|i. 337 ; 1 M. & 8ul. 482 606, 017 
 
 licn r. Dick (1830), 10 I'rt. 182 766 
 
 ],.'.« V. I'lvcri'Nt ( 1 867), 2 1 1 . \ N . 286 ; 20 I .. .1 . K\. .,:: ! 820 
 
 ].(•(! r. (iiiiiNol (1774), 1 Cowp. I ; l.oll't,, 374 1031 
 
 Lvov. (!aHk;'ll (1870), 1 (i. 11. I). "00; 46 L. .F. (j. H. 640; 34 li. T. 760; 
 
 24 V/. H. 824 083 
 
 Low. Crilllii (IHOI), 1 II. \ 8. 272; 30 L. .1. U. H- 2 J2 ; 7 .lur. N. 8. 
 
 1302; 4 I,. T. 640; \V. U. 702 088 
 
 licur. lliiHoii (1701), I'cakc, KiO 244 
 
 lico •'. .lohiiHtouii (18(i0), li. li. I II. li. (,S(i.) |J(i I'Ji) 
 
 Leo V. liaiKi. A Yorkn. Hail. Co. (1871), Ji. It. Cli. 627 ; 26 li. T. 77 ; 
 
 10 W. It. 720 662, 744 
 
 liCc r. Miccui^k (1806), 6 Kmii. 177 1031 
 
 Luo V. Mvnmi (18701. 30 L. .1. Ki^i. 03 ; 22 L. T. 420 322 
 
 ^ 
 
 i :l 
 
 'ipi 
 
 !p In,.'? 
 
 yul. 1. mida with pui/e 036. 
 
 I 
 
cxvi 
 
 TAMLK OF CASKS CITKD. 
 
 TAOB 
 
 Li-o P. Pain (1814), 4 TTiiro, W\ ; 14 L. J. Cli. 310 ; 9 Jiir. 127 ..740, 70',, ,s(),t, 
 
 I,.'n r. Mmitli flH'.l), I-. H. () K«. 002 ; 2M L. J. Kx. lim 
 
 ] 
 
 VViliiint, {]HtW]. ],. II. I Kx. H(it ; MA I,. ,r. Kn. ITo ; 14 L. T. 027 
 II VV. It. iiD.t; I II \ (^ Ki!); 12 , fur. N. H. 702 
 
 HOH 
 OiU 
 
 711 
 
 Lrfcvri- r. Mc.y.l (IKH), 5'l'.iiin. 740; I MiirHli. ;ilH ; 15 U. R. 044 7.'>S 
 
 l,rfroy .•. \Val«li (IS;".!), I Ir. (J. T,. 11. ;tl 1 128 
 
 LcKiyt, V. O'HriMii (1h:1I), Milw. ;i;t4 170 
 
 LcKk'att, r. TolliTVov (ISll). 14 KiiMt, UOl ; 12 H. U. .OIH 000, !)7',), OS", KMIO 
 
 L.'KK'' '•■ KiIiik.imIm (lS;-,(!), 2') L. .1. Ch. Vir, ■ 4 W. \l. 71 ....101, 4'.»."), 021, 022 
 l;iVK"tt '•. <irciit, Nortli. Kv. <-<>. (1H70), 1 Q. H. I). 509; 4.5 L. J. (i. H. 
 
 .1:57 ; :tr. li. T. ;t:tl ; 24 W. 11. 7H4 02 
 
 Li^jfli v. Hewitt (lKo;i), 4 KiiHt, l.'i4; 7 11. U. .'il.') 7H2 
 
 li.-Kli ('. L.-i^h (l,S20), 1 lloH. & 1'. 447 4S7 
 
 T,«.i.!(.Mt..T, Karl of, v. WiiltiT (IHOO), 2 Camp. 251 ; 3 Camp. 211, n 255 
 
 Ldid.'inanii c. Hcliultz (lH5;i), 14 C. 11. 38 ; 2 0. L. 11. 87 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 
 
 1 7 ; 1 8 .Fur. 42 703 
 
 Lcif(^liil.rH ciiHo (1805), L. U. 1 E<i. 231 ; 13 L. T. 267 ; 14 W. R. 22 ; 
 
 1 1 .Tiir. Oil 748 
 
 LcIkIi'm KHtato, III re, Kowdiffu v. Imgh (1877), Ch. Div. 250 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 557 ; 25 W. R. 783 1 189 
 
 Jioiffh riiiniHIo (1828-9), Turl. Min. .307; Purl. Min. (Vt. 2), 145.. 410, 422, 423, 
 
 1107 
 LeiKh r. Hakcr (1857), 2 C. B. N. 8. 307 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 220 ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. H. 008 186 
 
 L.i^rh r. .Tank (1879), 49 L. J. Ex. 220; 6 Kx. I). 201; 42 L. T. 403; 
 
 28 VV. R. 452 ; 44 J. P. 488 112 
 
 LoiKh V. IJ^iyd (1865), 35 Boav. 455 ; 34 L. J. Ch. 040 ; 2 Do O. J. & S. 
 
 330 1208 
 
 I,oiKlit<m V. Loitrhtou (1720), 1 Htr. 308 ; Ifiibb. Ev. of Hucio. 590 1040 
 
 LciKhtoiiD. Leiffhton (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 594; L. R. 18 Eq. 458; 22 
 
 W. R. 727 806 
 
 Lolaml V. Murphy (1805), 10 Ir. Ch. R. 500 710 
 
 LcmaKu V. (Joodhaii (1805), 35 L. J. P. & M. 28 ; L. R. 1 P. & 1). 57. .704, 711 
 Lmnaitro v. Davis (1881). 19 Ch. D. 281 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 173 ; 46 L. T. 407 ; 
 
 30 W. R. 300 . 40 .1. P. 324 114 
 
 Lo Marc.hant'H Gai 's Pecraffo caHO (naiibiiry Poc^rago, 1727), Solw. 
 
 N. P. 072-071 101 
 
 Le Marchaiit v. Lv Marcihaiit and RadolilF (1870), 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 43 ; 
 
 ,34 L. T. 307; 24 W. R. 374 502 
 
 L('mayiio r. Htaiiky (1081), 3 Lov. 1 074 
 
 Limu^re i'. Elliott (1801), 30 L. J. Ex. 350 ; H. & N. 050 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1200 ; 4 L. T. .304 117 
 
 Lomon v. Diwii (1810), 2 Camp. 030, n 1209 
 
 Lomprioro v. Lango (1879), 12 Ch. D. 075; 41 L. T. 378; 27 W. R. 
 
 870 100 
 
 Lonc.h V. liOiioh (1805), 10 Vim. 511 564, 656, 607 
 
 Lo Nouvillo r. Nourw) (1813K 3 Camp. 351 776 
 
 L(x)iiard V. SimpHon (1835), '^ HiiiK. N- C. 170 ; 2 S(H)tt, 336 ; 1 Hodgos, 261 632 
 Leonard v. Taylor (1874), L R. 8 0. L. 300 774 
 
 Th« re/«rmM$ an to pagw, not to paragraph*. 
 
..m- 
 
 TAHLK OF CASKS CUKI). 
 
 CXVIl 
 
 PAoa 
 
 I^piotf. Brnwno (170,1), 1 Sulk 7 ••■■'t 
 
 LinniiiK f. Kr.lRi'will (1G7.'.). 1 Moil. '.M)? li;tJ 
 
 L.1.IIIX r. Hrown (1«.V2), VI V,. H. HOI ; 'i'i L. J. (!. I*. 1 : \(i .liir. IOJl../»2, (iHI 
 
 L.Mli.. r. ]).• Ill Torrr il7!i.')), nli'il \2 MiiHt, .Wa ; U It. U. fi7H 'fill 
 
 I-i«liiT. I,<Hlic(is7J), I. R. r. K.|. ;t;t2 "oj 
 
 IrfHHii.of l,.ii.l.i- c. l)ii>rKiii" (imij. Ir. Cir. It. I'.'t 314 
 
 I..M^r.. c.f I'liuyitic. I'aliy (IS.f.!), Iliiy. .V .Ion. IJ8 47 
 
 Lr StruiiKt' '■• Itowo (l«ii:)), I K. & l'\ lOIH 124 
 
 LcSiicur r. LoHii.ur (l,s7(l), 1 1'. 1). i;t!»; 4,') L. J. 1'. 1). At A. T.i ; iil 
 
 L. T. :)11 ; i!l VV. It. (ill! 1144 
 
 I^alMili.T'MciiH.'(lll'.»'.;), -Z Sulk. 44H _. 704 
 
 Lo 'rriiiiilail v. Ilr^wiic (1HH7), 'M't \V. 11. lUH; rcixirti'd <m uiiiithtT imiiit, 
 
 ;t7 Oil. l>iv. 1 ; 67 L. J. (.'li. 87 VVi 
 
 Lcttc. Kiiiiiliill (IHCO). '2 Hill. iV (litr. SM; '2 !)i, (1. V. Ac J. ;WS ; (i Jur. 
 
 N. s. lariii; !t W. 11. DO; ;j L. T. ir.,-) ; ;io L. j. ch. no 144 
 
 I,iviTi'. (J.MMlwiii (1HH7), ;t(i(Jli. I). I; ill \.. T. /■)«;(; HO \V It. 177 .... l/:ii> 
 Jji'viy anil UkIimoii, Ud, Kx partu T(i|i]iiiig' (ISti/)), 3t L.J. Hank. 41; 1*2 
 
 I,. T. 7N7: 1:1 W. U, I02r) 71') 
 
 I,.vin f. Li'vin (IHN!)), (iO f,. T. ai7 ; 37 W. It. 3l)(i 1M4 
 
 l,.nMH<.n r. Sv<r(lN.>2),'2l L. J. il ». 10; '2 L. M. & l'.Cy.>7: lAJur. 10.. 1173.1 
 
 J,rvilt c. Levitt (IKIi.'t), 2 II. A M. (i2(i 1030 
 
 J-.VV r. llul.' (IHI'J), 2<J L. J. C. r. 127 ; Jur. N. S. 702 ; 1 L. T. 132 ; 
 
 H\V. K. 12;) .110 
 
 Levy r. Miriill (IHili), 4 Ori'inl. 180 IM'.t 
 
 I,.'vv r. r<>|>«> {182")), M. & M. 4 10 t;o'J 
 
 Lcwcm' TriiNtM, Hi) (1871). L. It. 11 V.i\. 23(1; h. U. Cli. Apj). 3.10; 40 
 
 L. J. «!li. (102 ; 24 L. T. i)33 ; 1!) W. It. lit."), (il7 172 
 
 L<'wiN, It.'. Kx part.' Miinin (1870), 1 Q. h. D. 724 ; 4,') L. J. U. H. 810 ; 
 
 3.0 L. T. 8.17 ; 24 W. It. 1017 724 
 
 IjI'wIh, He («r L('wi» r, Lowis). 
 
 LcwiM, fiiU'ly .allcil H., r. JIavwi.nl (18(i.1), 3.') li. J. P. & M. 10.) 107 
 
 Lewis r. HraN.s (1878), 3 Q. H. I). 0(17 ; 37 L. T. 738 ; 2(1 \V. It. 1.12 .... 073 
 I^ttiH 1-. KvHiiH (1874), 44 L. J. (J. r. 41 ; L. Jt. 10 C. 1*. 207 ; 31 L. T. 
 
 487 ; 23 W. It. 24 I ; 2 I lopw. Ai O. 271) IflO 
 
 LewiH !■. (it. Went Ity. Co. (18(iO), Jl. iV N. H(i7 ; 20 L. J. Kx. 42i) .... 723 
 LfwiM r. (Jt. Went. Itv. Co. (1877), 3 <4. U. 1). 106 ; 47 L. J. (i. B. 131 ; 
 
 37 L. T. 774; 20 W. It. 2.14 723 
 
 liOwiK r. Ilanloy (183.1), 7 C. & J'. 40,1 ll'JZ 
 
 LewiM 1: Jaini'M (1880), 64 L. T. 2(.0 ViZ 
 
 LewiHf. Ia\. Kcnhingtou (1810), 2 C. B. 403; 3 Dowl. & L. 037 ; 16 L.J. 
 
 C I'. 100 734 
 
 Lewis r. Lewis (1802), 2 S. & T. 1.13; 4 L. T. 68.1; 31 L. J. 1*. 153; 7 
 
 .Iiir. N. S. (i88 700 
 
 Lewis r. Marsl.all (1814), 7 M. & Ur. 713; 8 Scott, N. K. 720; 13 L. J. 
 
 C. 1'. 1!I3; « Jur. 818 20, 703, 78'i 
 
 Lewis r. Parker (1830), 4 A. & K. 838 201 
 
 Liwisp. Payn (1827), « Coweii, 71 1108, 11U9 
 
 Lewi.s r. Penuingtou (1800), 20 L. J. Ch. 670 ; 8 W. R. 405 ; Jur. N. 8. 
 
 478 605 
 
 Lewis f. Rok-rtH (1801), 11 C. 11. N. S. 23; K. & C. 402; 31 L. J. C. P. 
 
 61 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 485; 6 L. T. 351 ; 10 W. It. 80 726 
 
 Lewis r. Sapio (lw27), 1 M. & M. 610 1220 
 
 Lewis V. Simpson (1848), 2 Kx. l!Ki, n 140 
 
 Lexington v. (Jlaik (1000), 2 Vent. 223 078 
 
 Ley V. Ballard (1700), 3 Ksp. 173, n 1200 
 
 Lev r. Barlow (1848), 1 Kx. 801 ; 6 Hailw. Cas. 1 ; 5 Dowl. & L. 376 ; 17 
 
 L. J. Kx. 10.) 321 
 
 Leyfield's, Dr., casts (1010), 10 Co. Itep. 88 1108 
 
 Leylaud r. SUswart (1870). 4(> L. J. Cli. 103 ; 4 Ch. D. 419 ; 25 W. R. 226 051 
 
 Lidstj-r V. Borrow ( 1 83:i), A. & K. 05 » 227 
 
 Liebinant'. Pooley (1810), I Stark. K. 107; 18 It. R. 766 .'.'.278, 358 
 
 Lightfoott'. Biekley (1830), 2 Jtawle, 431 " 1161 
 
 Lightfootti. Cainerou (1776), 2 W. Bl. 1113 \ ()6» 
 
 Vol. I. endt tiith page 635. 
 
 I I 
 
 i ^h 
 
CXVIU TADLK OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 PiOIl 
 
 T.iirhtiHir V Wilco (ISl 8), 1 Sarn;. & R. 20;j 'AH 
 
 Lik.) V. ir<)W(( (1H()()), Km|). '20 642 
 
 Lilli-y V. Klwin (1843, Hhould bo 18IH), 11 Q. Ji. 742; 17 L. J. Q. B. 132; 
 
 12 .Iiir ()i3 30, 1(»3 
 
 Liil/ & Co. V. Smiiies, (1892) 1 Q. H. i.W ; 10 W. U. 544 7G4 
 
 Lillywliit.) )'. I).!vor.mx (181(1), 16 M. >V; W. 2!)1 48, 091 
 
 Limi^liouso Board <.f VVorkN, Ex piirtc Vullimc.' (18S3), 24 (!li. I). 177; iV2 
 
 li. J. Oh. 791 ; 48 L. T. 941 ; 32 \V. R. 287 1151 
 
 Liincriok V. Liinoii.k (1803), 32L.J.P. &M.22; 4 S. & T 252; llW.H, 
 
 503 1 30, 294 
 
 Liiii;(iln'n ciiHo, Kiirl of (l(i20), 1 Rl. Com. 402 ; 3 l?iU!. Abr. 202 900 
 
 liiticolii r. Wri^bt, (18.V.»), 28 L. .1. Cb. 70") : 4 Do U. & J. 10 (hS8, ii20 
 
 Lindcimii v. Dosboroiijfli (182H), 8 11. it (!. 580 934 
 
 LindcnbiTKiT v. Ili'iil (1821), Wbciit. 101 155 
 
 LiiidKiMui 1'. liiiidKmi (1810), 9 '.\nv. 358 ; 15 L. ,1 . Cb. 428 ; 10 Jiir. 074 802 
 I.iiidli-y V. (JirdbT (1843), 1 Dowl. it I,. 099 ; 13 L..T. <i. M 53 ; 8 .liir. 01 734 
 Liiidb'v V. Liiooy (1804), 17 C U N. S. 578; 34 L. J. (;. I". 7; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. H. 1103; il L. T. 273; 13 \V. U. 80 745, 740 
 
 Lindo V. Rodney (1782), 2 Doiij?. 014 1103 
 
 Liiidon V. Hhiirp (1843), (! M. & Gr. 898 ; 7 Scott, N. R. 730 ; 13 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 07 130 
 
 LindHiiy v. Wi(;klow, Karl of (1873), Ir. R. 7 Kq. 192 93 
 
 Liiiticli and Walker v. Uunn (1807), L. R. 1 Adni. & Ecn. 303; 30 L. J. 
 
 ]<:,:<:. 23 1 133 
 
 I>inH..ll »'. H(>n«or(1835). 2 HinK- N. C. 241 ; 2 Scroti, 399 ; 1 Hod^^cH, 305. .44, 712 
 Lion, Tbo, Owners i: York Town Owners (1809), 38 L. J. Adui. 51 ; L. R. 
 
 2 1*. C. 525 ; 21 I.. T. 41 ; 17 W. R. 993 ; Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 103 . . 178 
 
 Lipseombe v. IIc>1im(w (1810), 2 Camp. 441 620 
 
 Lisbon Steam Tramways Co., Ro (1870), 2 Ch. D. 575 ; 34 li. T. 209 ; 25 
 
 W. H. 510 845 
 
 Lislmnie, Lord r. Davies M800), L. li. 1 C. P. 259; 35 L. .T. (5. P. 193 ; 12 
 
 Jnr. N. H. 340; 13 L. T. 795 ; 1 I W. R. 333 ; 1 H. .fe R. 172 110 
 
 Lisbman r. Cbristio (1887), 19 Q. II. I). 333; 60 L. J. Q. B. 5;i8 ; 57 L. T. 
 
 552 ; 35 W. R. 744 ; Asj). M. <!. 180 700 
 
 I/Isb> Peer. (1825), Pari. Min. 110 423 
 
 List's case (1811), 2 Ves. & B. 371 809 
 
 Lister «'. lieatber (185S), 27 L. J. Q. H. 295; 8 K. & B. 1004; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. H. 947 47 
 
 List<!r V. Perryman (1870), L. R. 4 H. L. 521 ; 39 L. J. Ex. 177 ; 23 L. T. 
 
 N. n. 209 ; 'l9 W. R. 9 29 
 
 Lister V. Priestly (1810), WiKlitw. 07. 405 518 
 
 Lister «. Hmitb '(1803), 33 L. .1. P. & M. 29 ; 3 8. & T. 282 740 
 
 Litebfield v. Jieiuly (1H50), 5 Kx. 9;i9 ; 20 L. J. Kx. 51 98, 1 113 
 
 Littin r. TmrralH'e'(1822), 2 (Jreenl. 37, 41, n 010 
 
 Little V. Mbby (1823), 2 (Jreenl. 212 443 
 
 Littlo V. WiiiKfield (1859), 1 1 Ir. C. I,. R. 03 123, 124, 125 
 
 Litfbxdiild r. Hanks (1845), 7 il H. T^t'-' I H L. J, (J. M. 35(i ; 9 Jur. 1090 222 
 
 Littler r. Holland (I7!M)), 3 T. R .590 751, 752 
 
 Litton r. Murpby (1878), 1 L, li. Ir. 301 ;)53 
 
 Liver Alkali (Jo. f. Jobnson (1871), L. R. 9 Kx. 338; 43 L. J. Kx. 210; 31 
 
 L. T. 95 771 
 
 Livermorer. Hersebell (1825), 3 Piek. 33 1118 
 
 liiverpool Adelj)lii Loan Asso(>. r. Kairburst (1851), 9 Kx. 423; 2 C. L. II. 
 
 512 ; 23 L. J. Kx. 103 ; 18 Jur. 191 6(1 
 
 Liverpool I!oroii»;b Hank r. Kreles (1859), 4 II. & N. 1;I9 ; 28 L.J. Kx. 122 076 
 Liverpool lloron^'b Hank r. Turner (18(iO), 1 J. & II. 159; 2 l)e (1. F. & 
 
 J. 502 ; 30 li. J . (;b. 379 051 
 
 Llanover v. Ilomfray (1880), 19 Cb. I). 224 ; 30 \V. U. 557 320 
 
 Liowr'llyn V. Jersey, Karl of (1813), 1 1 M. He W 189 ; 12 L. J. Kx. 243. .072, 758 
 
 Llewellyn V. Winckworib (1815), 13 M. \- \V. 598 ; 1 1 L. J. Kx. 329 241 
 
 Lloyd V. Klimiin^r (1872). W. N. 18-'2, at p. 052 
 
 Lloyil V. (JreKoi-y (I03M), Crn. C!ar. 51)1 (i68 
 
 LUi'yd V, Harvey (1832), 2 Russ. I't My. 310 807 
 
 Thf rrfoviicn <ire la puf/rs, nut lo jmraijraph!*. 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. 
 
 CXIX 
 
 FAOH 
 
 Lloyd V. Minmd (1788), 2 T. R. 700 U 
 
 I^loyd V. Mostyii (IHI'2), 10 M. & W. 481 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 470; 12 L. J. Ex. 1 000 
 
 Lloyd r. I'asHiiiKlmm (180!)), 10 Voh. 01 970 
 
 J,l..yd V. KolxTtH (1S,-.H), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 1(58 007 
 
 Lloyd r. f^iHiililuiul (181S), (!ow, R. 13, 10 lot 
 
 LioVd V. Si.ill.'t (1710), 2 Atk. I-'jO 600 
 
 Lloyd I'. Watcrford & Lini. Ky. Co. (1802), 16 Ir. C. L. R. 37 72;i 
 
 Lloyd f. \Villiin(17i)l), 1 Ksp. 178 •10!) 
 
 I.ol.bf. Stiinlcy (18-14), 6 Q. H. r.74 : Ki L. J. C^ IV 117 07;i. 071, 713 
 
 Lock r. Furze (I SCO), L. R. 1 C. T. 441 ; ;i,') L. J. C. T. 141 ; H. iV U. 37!) ; 
 
 14 W. It. 403 773 
 
 Lock V. Norlxinio (1087), 3 Mod. 141 1113 
 
 Lockor. JiiiiicH (1843), 11 M. & W. !10I ; 13 L .T. Ex. 180 708 
 
 Loc^kcttc. Cary (18(14). 3Ncw R. 40.'); 10 .Tur. N. S. 144 3'.'1. 1184 
 
 Lockcttr. Nirkliii (1848), 2 Kx. 93; 19 L. J. Ex. 403 744, 7.')7 
 
 Lockwood r. Smith (1812), fl Day, 309 493 
 
 L(MiK'« V. riiiplicr (1824). 1 1 S.tk. & R. ■'■» 1228 
 
 liodK^ t'. I'n(!lmid (18r);;), 3 Do G. M. \ O. 900; 1 Hiii. & U. Aj)!!. viii..402, Ci'll 
 
 LoffiiH I'. Maw (1802), 3 Gifl". .'■)92 ; 32 L. J. Cli. 49 8;i9 
 
 LoK'iii »'• ri-iii. "i (^ooiK (18()2), 30 Ui-iiv. (;;(2 8 
 
 JiOtidtwborouKli'N, Lord, caso (18.'>3), 4 Do (i. M. & G. 41 1 ; 22 L. .1. Cli. 730 629 
 LondoHboroiiKli. Lord r. Eo^to^ (1803), 3 11. & S. 805 ; 32 L. J. Q. R. 225 ; 
 
 9 .Tur. N. S. 1173 ; 8 L. T. 240 ; 1 1 W. R. 693 629 
 
 London f. I-ynn (178!'), 1 H. Bl. 214, n. (.s) 1176 
 
 Jiond. & Itirm. By. Co.'h case (1838), 3 M. & W. 422 ; 1 H. & II. I'lO 083 
 
 Lond. & BriKh. iW. (-o. •'. FairclouKli (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 706; 2 Railw. 
 
 CnH. .VI4 ; 3 H(u,U, N. B,. 08 ; 10 L. .1. 0. V. 133 1 192, 1204 
 
 Lond. Chart. Bk. of AiiHtralia v. Whito (1878), L. R. 4 App. (^aw. 413 ; 48 
 
 L. .T. P. (;. 76 6 
 
 Lond., City off. (Ilorko (1090), Carth. 181 397 
 
 Jiond., City of r. PorkinH (1734), 3 Bro. P. C. 002 327 
 
 I;oiid., City of, GaH Light and (Joko Company r. Nicliols (1820), 2 C. & P. 
 
 306 041 
 
 Lond. Comni. of Howors r. Gclhitly (1870), 46 L. J. Ch. 7«8 ; 3 Ch. D. 
 
 010; 24 W. R. 34(i, lO.V.) 1113 
 
 Lond. (^onini. of Hcwors f. GhiHHo (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 346 1183 
 
 Lond. (should 1)0 Dublin), Corp. off. .ludiro (1817), 11 Ir. I,. R. 8 729 
 
 Lond. Dock Co. v. Sinnott (1867), 8 E. (i B. 347 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 129 ; 4 
 
 Jur. N. S. 70 042 
 
 Loud. (JaH I.. Co. V. Ch(>lm>a Vch. (1869), 28 L. .T. C. P. 276 ; (i C. B. N. 8. 
 
 411 1186 
 
 Loud. GaN Meter Co., Re, The (1872), 41 L. .). Ch. 146 ; 20 AV. R. 394 . . 846 
 
 Loud., Mayor of v. Lonjf (1807), 1 Camp. 22 ; 10 B. M. 018 791 
 
 Lond. H,'hi>i>\ Board f. llarv(>y (1879), 4 U. B. D. 461; 48 L. J. M. C. 
 
 130 ; 27 W. B. 780 1033, 1072 
 
 Lond. a N. \V. Ry. Co. r. Durham (1860). 18 (;. B. 820; 4 \V. R. 063 .. 723 
 
 Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. t'. M'Michael (I860), 6 Ex. 866; 14 Jur. 987 .... 100, 
 
 1170 
 Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. r. Wont (1807), L. R. 2 C. P. 663; 30 L. J. C. P. 
 
 246 97, 98 
 
 Lond. & a. WeHt. Bk. f. VVentwortli (1880), 6 Ex. D. 90; 49 L. J. Ex. 
 
 067 ; 42 li. T. 188 ; 28 W. B. 610 647, 1206 
 
 Lon.'rKan r. Roy. K\. Anh. (1831), 7 Bing. 726, 729 ; 1 Dowl. P. C. 233 ; 
 
 6 M . & P. 806 818 
 
 I/ong'H (^iimi (17!)7), 1 Ilayw. 624 (466) 600 
 
 Longf. Barrett (1846), 7 Ir. L. R. 439; 8 Ir. L. R. 331 ; 3 II. L. (^ih. 
 
 ;196 40, 242 
 
 Longf. Ghamjiion (1831), 2 B. .V Ad 284 486 
 
 Long f. DonoKan (1880), I. R. 7 Ivj. 194 1234 
 
 liongf. llilel,<M.ck (1840), 9(!. \- P. 019 964 
 
 Longf. Keiglith'V (1877), 11 Ir. B. G. L. 221 263 
 
 Longf. Liinikin (l862), \} V\in\\. 301, 306 »74 
 
 t i 
 
 11 
 
 ]'ul, J. eiiih with piij/r 035. 
 
I 
 
 cxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 pi.ai 
 
 Long V. Millar (1878), 4 C. P. D. 450 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 596 ; 41 L. T. 306 ; 
 
 27 W. R. 720 672 
 
 Longchamp v. Fish (1807), 2 Bds. & P. N. R. 41.') ; 9 R. R. 670 140 
 
 Longeuecker v. Hyde (1813), 6 Binn. 1 608 
 
 Longfellow V. Williams (1804), Peake, Add. C. 225 673 
 
 Loiigworth r. Yelverton (1867), L. R. 1 H. L. (Sc.) 218; 4 Msicq. 746; 
 
 10 Jur. N S. 1209 ; 1 1 L. T. 1 18 ; 13 W. R. 235 876 
 
 Loomis V. Green (1831), 7 Greenl. 386 1118 
 
 Loomis V. Jackson (1822), 19 Johns. 449 802 
 
 Loomis and Jaokson v. Loomis (1854). 3 Deane, Verm. R. 198 386 
 
 Lopez V. Andrew (1826), 3 M. & R. 329 a 112, 123 
 
 Lord V. Colvin (1854), 2 Drew. 205 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 469 ; 5 De G. M. k G. 
 
 27 927 
 
 Lord V. Colvin (1855), 3 Drew. 222 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 517 ; 4 W. R. 455 . .943, 946 
 
 Lord V. Colvin (1857). 4 Drew. 366 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 361 377 
 
 Lord V. Colvin (1859-1860), 28 L. J. Ch. 361; 1 Drew. & Sm. 24 : 29 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 297 : 8 W. R. 254 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 189 8, 179, 180, 377 
 
 Lord V. Commiss. for City of Sydney (1859), 12 Moo. P. C. R. 473 Ill 
 
 Lord V. Lord (1855), 5 E. & B. 404 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 34 1039 
 
 Loring V. Steineman (1840), 1 Mete. 204 172 
 
 Lothian v. Henderson (1803), 3 Bos. & P. 499, 517 ; 7 R. R. 829 1149 
 
 Lovat's, Ld., ease (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 590 909, 910 
 
 Lovat Peerage (1826-57), Pari. Min. 89 416, 419, 424, 425 
 
 Lovat Peerage case (1885), 10 App. Cas. 763 421 
 
 Love, In re, Green v. Tribe (1878), 9 Ch. 1^. 231 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 7s3 701 
 
 Lovell V. Wallis (1884), 63 L. J. Ch. 495 ; 49 L. T. 593 911 
 
 Loveridge v. Bntham (1797), 1 Bos. & P. 49 552 
 
 Lovesy V. Smith (1880), 15 Ch. D. 655 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 809 ; 43 L. T. 240 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 979 749 
 
 Low's case (1827), 4 Greenl. 439 615, 616 
 
 Lowe V. Carpenter (1851). 6 Ex. 825 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 374 ; 15 Jur. 883 . .76, 119 
 
 Lowe f. Govett (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 862 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 224 112 
 
 Lowe V. London & N. \V. Ry. Co. (1S52), 7 Railw. Cas. 524 ; 18 Q. B. 
 
 632 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 301 ; 17 Jur. 375 6'.3 
 
 Lowe V. Peers (1768), 4 Burr. 2225 S6 
 
 Lowick's case (1696), 13 How. St. Tr. 267 236 
 
 Lowrey v. Barker (1880), 5 Ex. D. 170 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 433 ; 42 L. T. 215 ; 
 
 28 \V. R. 559 662 
 
 Loyd V. Freshfield (1826). 2 C. & P. 325 695, 927 
 
 Lubbock V. Tribe (1838), 3 M. & W. 607 ; 1 H. & H. 160 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 
 
 158 
 
 Lucas V. 
 Lucus 1". 
 
 S. 68 
 Lucas r. 
 Lucas f. 
 Lucas »'. 
 Lucas V. 
 Lucas V. 
 
 706 ., 
 
 Beale (1851), 10 C. B. 739; 20 L. J. C. P. 134 
 
 Biistow (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 364 ; E. B. & E. 907 ; 5 Jur. N. 
 
 763 
 
 Ccoko (1880). 13 Ch. D. 872 ; 42 L. T. 180 ; 28 W. R. 439 . . . . 
 
 De la Cour (1813), 1 M. & Sel, 249 ; 14 R. R. 426 
 
 Groning (1816), 7 Taan. 164 
 
 Tarlcton (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 246 ; 3 H. & N. 116 
 
 Williams, (1892) 2 Q. B. 113; 61 L. J. Q. B. 695; 66 L. T. 
 
 Lucey v. Murphy (1873), 7 Ir. R. C. L. 494 
 
 Lucker, Ex parte {see lie Wood). 
 
 Luckie V. Bushby (1853), 13 C. B. 864 ; 1 C. L. R. 686; 22 L. J. C. P. 
 
 220 
 
 Lucy V. Mouflet(1860), 6 H. & N. 22C ; 29 L. J. Ex. 110 
 
 Luders r. Anstey (1799), 4 Ves. 601 ; 6 Ves. 217 ; 4 R. R. 276 
 
 Ludford r. Gretton (1676), Plow. 490 
 
 Ludlow, May. of, t>. Charlton (1840), 9 C. & P. 242 639, 640, 645, 
 
 Luff I'. Lord (I86t), 34 Beav. 220 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1248 ; II L. T. 650 . . . . 
 
 Luke, R« (1805\ 34 L. J. P. & M. 105 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 397 
 
 Lumlcy r. Gyeil854), 3 E. & B. 114 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 112 
 
 Lund V. Tyngsboro (1851), 9 Cush. 37, 43 377 
 
 Lundy V. lieilly (1858), 30 L. T. 223 
 
 307 
 194 
 
 , 768 
 
 1002 
 
 488 
 
 763 
 
 191 
 
 310 
 733 
 
 552 
 
 626 
 
 639 
 
 84 
 
 1044 
 136 
 701 
 347 
 
 , 379 
 768 
 
 The re/ireiicci are to pagea, not to paragraph). 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXl 
 
 Lnnnis v. Row (1839), 10 A. & E. fi06 ; 8 L. J. Q. B. 264 ; 2 P. & D. 
 
 638 910 
 
 Luntly V. (1833), 1 0. & M. 579 867 
 
 Luscombe r. Steer (1867). 37 L. J. Oh. 119 ; 17 L. T. 370 118* 
 
 Lush V. Druse (1830), 4 "Wend. 313 802 
 
 Lush V. Russell (1860), 1 L. M. & P. 369 ; 5 Ex. 203 ; 7 Dowl. & L. 228 ; 
 
 19 L. J. Ex. 214 ; 14 Jur. 435 202 
 
 Lushiugton v. Onslow (1848), 6 Notes of Cases (Eoc. & Mar.) 183, 18S . . 142 
 Lutscher, In re. Ex parte Waddell (1877), 6 Ch. D. 328 ; 26 W. R. 9 ; 36 
 
 L. T. 345 848 
 
 Lutterell v. Revnell (1677), 1 Mod. 284 329, 976 
 
 Lyde v. Barnard (1830), 1 M. & W. 101 ; Tyr. & Gr. 250; 5 L. J. Ex. 
 
 117 718, 729 
 
 Lyell V. Kennedy (1884), 27 Ch. D. 1 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 937 ; 60 L. T. 730. . 352, 
 
 424, 001, 1170 
 Lyell V. Kennedy (1889), 27 Ch. D. 1 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 937 ; 60 L. T. 730. . 424, 
 
 1049 
 
 Lygon V. Strutt (1795), 2 Anst. 601 ; 3 R. R. 631 430 
 
 Lylo r. Ellwood (1872), L. R. 15 Eq. 67 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 27 L. T. 671 : 
 
 21 W. R. 69 1030 
 
 Lyle V. Ellwood (1874), 44 L. J. Ch. 104 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 98 ; 23 W. R. 
 
 157 149, 373 
 
 Lyle V. Richards (1866), 35 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; L. R. 1 H. L. 222 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 947 ; 15 L. T. 1 42, 44 
 
 Lyman v. Lymun (1814), U Mass. 317 514 
 
 Lyu V. Miller (1855), 24 Pa. St 392 757 
 
 Lynch f. Gierke (1696), 3 Salk. 154 4f-0, 1052 
 
 Lynch v. Lynch (1843), 6 Jr. L. R. 142 657, 658, 660, 661 
 
 Lynde «. Judd (1807), 3 Day, 499 1018 
 
 Lyne, Ex parte (1822), 3 Stark. R. N. P. 132 h68 
 
 Lynn, Mayor of, v. Denton (1787), 1 T. R. 689 ; 1 R. R. 359 995 
 
 Lynn v. Robertson (1823), 2 Coop. 217 : 1 L. J. Ch. 88 330 
 
 Lyon's Trusts, In re (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 245 798 
 
 Lyon r. Home (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 674 ; L. R. 6 Eq. 655 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 
 
 674 ; 18 L. T. 461 ; 16 W. R. 824 136 
 
 Lyon t'. Lyman (1831), 9 Conn. 55 1223, I2J8 
 
 Lyon V. Molls (1802), 5 East, 428 ; 1 Smith, 478 ; 7 R. R 726 771 
 
 Lyon V. Reed (1844), 13 M. & \V. 303 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 377 ; 8 Jur. 762. .637, 656, 
 
 657, 661, 662 
 Lyons v. De Pass (1840), 11 A. & E. 326 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 51 ; 3 P. & 
 
 D. 177 7 
 
 Lyons V. Mulderry (1832), Hayes, R. 530 92 
 
 M., falsely called H. v. H. (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 159 ; 3 S. & T. 517, 
 
 592 167 
 
 Maber v. Maber (1S67), 36 L. J. Ex. 70 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 153 715 
 
 Maherley v. Sheppard (1833), 10 Bing'. 101 ; 3 M. & Scott, 436 ; 2 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 181 689, 090 
 
 Maby t'. Shepherd (1023), Cro. Jac. 640 543 
 
 Macallumr. Turton (1828). 2 Y. & J. 183 961, 962 
 
 Macartney v. Graham ( 1 828), 2 Sim. 285 308 
 
 Macbeath v. Haldimand (1786), 1 T. R. 172 ; 1 R. R. 177 44 
 
 Mucbride v. Macbrido (1802), 4 Esp. 242 947, 967, 9C8 
 
 M'Ardle v. Irish Iodine Co. (1864), 15 Ir. C. L. R. 146 646 
 
 M'Cabe, Re (1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 7ii ; L. R. i P. ct D. 94 707, 7(»3 
 
 M'Calmont v. Rankin (1852), 2 De G. M. & G. 403 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 554. . . . 651 
 M'Cance v. Lond. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1864), 34 L. J. Ex. 39 ; 3 H. & C. 343 54i» 
 
 Macaulay v. Robertson (1886), 18 L. R. Ir. 483 524 
 
 Maocann v. Maccann (1862), 3 S. & T. 142 ; 32 L. J. P. & M. 29 601 
 
 M'Cannon v. Sinclair (1859), 2 E. & E. 63 ; 28 L. J. M. C. 247 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1302 Ill 
 
 M'Carthy v. Do Caix (1834), 2 Russ. & My. 614 ; 3 Hagg. Ecc. 642, n. . . 1144 
 
 Vol. I. tndt with page 636. 
 
 M^ 
 
 \ ■ 
 
 i 
 
Caa.1 
 
 TAULi: OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 PAna 
 
 In 
 
 ill! 
 
 it 
 
 'I : 
 
 MTiirthy ». O'llrirn (is;i!)), 2 Ir. L. U. 67 713 
 
 M'<;i<.ry V. WiiKlit. {\HM)), 10 Ir. 0. L. R. T)!! ClU 
 
 M(^<;.)lliii V. (Jiljiiii (IKHl), (1 {i B. Div. /)l(i ; 44 L. T. 914 : '2!) W. H. 40H 7K4 
 
 M-(!<>Mil)i(( fi. Anton (lH4.'t), (i M. & (ir. 27 ; (> SimiU, N. I{. !)2;1 ;i26 
 
 ink (lH"(i), I. K. 11 Kc|. i:i(); 1 I, K. Ir. I19..749, 7'")() 
 
 MiicrC 
 
 MnrC, 
 
 M'Cormiiik r. Uiiri!<4.t (1S,')4), r.i L. ,1. (.'h. 717 ; 5 I)., (i. M. & (}. 278 
 
 MiC 
 
 Jorquni 
 
 Mf 
 
 Hell (IH-(i), 4.') L. J. C. 1'. ;t29 ; 1 V,. I'. 1). 471 
 
 50 
 
 .597, 11 HO 
 
 M'(/iilli)(!li i;. Diiwi'H (lH2(i), 9 Dowl. & H. 40 492 
 
 M'Doimldf. Lon>rlH)U(.m (IHliO), 1 K. & K. 977; 28 L. J. Q. U. 29;i ; 29 
 
 L. J. (i. IJ. 2.^(> 784 
 
 M'Doiiiilil t. Kiiiiior (IKll), 8 JoliiiH. 442 Ii;i9 
 
 M<!r)oiiall V. Alciorii, (1894) 1 I. U 274, 278 ■1M. [IIOM] 
 
 IM'Donnoll v. Coiiry (184;i), Ir. C. Ur]}. 807 (UW 
 
 Muwlonnoll v. Evhiih (1852), 1 1 C. It. 930 ; 21 L. J. C. 1'. II 1 ; Ul Jiir. lo;j 955, 
 
 956, 908 
 
 H08 
 
 (i()0 
 
 ;i57 
 
 M'noimoll V. Mumiy (1859), 9 Ir. C. L. R. 495 
 
 W'Ddnnoll V. Poih' (M52). 9 irims 705 ; 16 .Jnr. 771 , 
 MiinlouKiil V. Yoiiuf? (1826), Ry. & M. .'{92 ; 1 Voiit. 257 
 
 McDouj^iillt'. Finld (1872), I. R. 6 (!. L. 185 757 
 
 M'Dowiil! r. Lyntcr (18:t(;), 2 M. & W. 52 ; L. J. Kx. 11 225 
 
 M.K'ow. Cadrll (1774), 1 (Jdwj). 2;!;{ 5;)9 
 
 Ivl'Klvt: 
 
 iioy 
 
 v. (^oimcllitii 
 
 (1H6I), 17 Ir. C. L. U. 55 
 
 618 
 
 M'Kwan v. Cfiiiiidwll (1H57), 2 Uiuii. 499 ; 1 I'litrrKon, 676 540 
 
 M'Kwim V. Smith (1849), 2 II. L. Vmh. ;i09 ; i;» Jiir. 265 691 
 
 M'Ku(l(l«!ii r. Murdofk (1867), I. R. 1 C. h. 211 240, 9;t;j 
 
 MiKtfarlim v. Huh (1872), L. R. 14 Kcj. 680; 41 L. J. Ch. 619; 27 L. T. 
 
 ;>05 ; 20 W. R. 915 602 
 
 M irfiirlaiKi, Rt( (18H4), 11! L. R. Ir. 264 704 
 
 MacfcrHon r. Tlioyt.cH ( 1 790), I'ciikc, 20 547 
 
 M'Gahfiy v. AlHton (IHliO), 2 M. & W. 206 ; 2 (Jalc, 2;i8 ; 6 L. .7. Kx. 29.. 148, 
 
 ;i02, ;t04, 508 
 
 M'OimiKiU V. Miirpliy (1869), T. R. 3 Kii. 460 6;iH, 6;{U 
 
 M'OrcKor v. UninbriKK'' (1848), 7 lla-o, 161 ii. ('() 160 
 
 Mllc^K'■<•^r<>^r. Ki'ily (IH49), ;i Kx. 794 ; 18 L. .1. Kx. ;i91 ; 2I).&L. 635.. 158 
 
 AI (ircKori). Topliaiii (1H50), 3 II. Ii. (Jaw. 155; I! Iliirc, 48S 1215 
 
 M(Jn^K'>r I'aird, Tlui (1867), 36 L. J. Adiii. iO; L. R. I A. & K. 307 ; 15 
 
 \V. R. 262 1 189 
 
 nawi (IHOl), 2 KaHt, I'. C. 1002 278 
 
 MaclKill V. KiliH (1845), 1 (J. & K. 682 507 
 
 Miiiiliiu V. (Jriiidoii (1756), 2 Lm-, 335 ; 2 Add. 91 1223 
 
 Mac.hu V. lioiid. ti: H. W. Ry. Vai. (1848), 2 Kx. 415 ; 17 L. .1. Kx. 271 549 
 
 ]Ma<inl.)Mh r. Iluydon (I826\ Ry. tic M. 362 1 194 
 
 M<liityrof. MaiiciiiK (1819), 16 .loliim. 592 961 
 
 WflviT f. Walker (1815), 9 Craiicli, 178 802 
 
 Mackay v. (Jom. Bank of Kiw UrunHwick (1874), 43 L. J. 1'. C. 31 ; I,. R 
 
 I'. C. 394 
 
 M'Kay V. Riitli.irfoi'd (1848), 6 Moo. I'. «!.(!. 413, 
 
 586 
 (180 
 
 WrKcchnic .'. Vautrlian (1873^ L. R. 15 K(|. 289 803 
 
 M.KiN! V. KiirnaiM (1811), 2 (jiawf. & 1). (J. C. 209 1035 
 
 M'KiHi V. NcIhom (1825), 4 (!owrn, 355 9.30 
 
 McKmiini v. FraHcr (1803), 9 Vi'h. 5 4 33 
 
 M.K - 
 
 f.uwiv. KaK<T (1875), 9 I. U. (',. K. 79 128, 1046 
 
 MrKcn/io c. Hrilihli Kincii Co. (1881), 6 A pp. Cim. 82 538 
 
 Miick<ui/io V. Diiiilop (1856), 3 MaiMj. 26 763 
 
 Ma-kcTizio V. I'oi.h'y (1856), 11 Kx. 638; 25 L.J. Kx, 124 179 
 
 Mackcn/i.i v. Vim. ('1841), 2 (iurt.. 866 60S 
 
 M'K-y, R.^ (1H7I1), I. R. 11 K(|. 220 699 
 
 " " ■ " ..47, 157 
 
 ... 818 
 ,866, 809 
 
 MiickintoMh f. Min>*hiill (1813), 11 M. & W. 126; 12 I,. .1. Kx. 337 
 Marklcy r Chilliiitfworlli (1877), 46 L. .1. (!. I'. 484 ; 2 C. T. I), 273 
 
 M'Koiio, |{.' (I8llj, Ir. Cir. R. 05, 
 
 M'K'liio r. MiithrrliiiKl (1854), 3 K, Ac Ii. I ; 2 C. K. R. i:i20; 23 L. .1. Q. H. 
 
 229; IH.Iiir. 942 160, 161 
 
 M.iLaron f. Iloiius or lloriic (1881), 7 Q. H. I). 477; 50 L. ,1. (i.R. 658. . HIS 
 
 I'he rcfwmcn an to p(iij$; twt to jmrdijrupht. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CX M 1 1 
 
 TACIR 
 
 Miidoiui V. nunn (1828), 4 Biiijf. 72.! ; 1 M. & P. 701 ";;'.» 
 
 M'Lciiii ('. Jrcrt.zoK (1820), (i Sim-^. »; H. l.Vl 289 
 
 M'firllim r. IliiihimlHoii (lS:t(i), 1 Hlic|)l. 82 015, (il(i 
 
 M.K'l.'od V. Wakloy (1S28), ;M!. & I', .'m 'IVi 
 
 McMahou » . Hiirtilicll (I8l(i), 2 I'l,. 127 ; 1 Coop. 475 -187 
 
 RI-MnhoMW. Elli.s(18r)i)), 10 Ir. I,. It. N. H. 120 'MVi 
 
 ArMMh.mr. KIHh (18(i:{), 10 Ir. (!. \,. It. I'.tO, .50'.l 148 
 
 M Millions. L.liimrd (18,'j8), 11. L. C. 970 148 
 
 JP Million V. M-KIroy (lH(i9), I. R. .'. K(|. I 172 
 
 Jl .Million V. UawliiiKM (18 IS), 1(1 Sim. 420 11.01 
 
 M'.MiinnHi'. LiuiciiM. & Vorks. liy. Co. (IH;')!)), 2 II. & N. (iO:t ; 4 II. A N. 
 
 ;{27 ; 28 I,. .1. Ex. ;!,');<; ;j;) L.'T. O. S. 2.'')0 ; ;". ,Iiir. N. S. {!.-il 72;(, 771 
 
 M'MiVHior and HovIi>'h <'aso (18 Hi), Ir. Cir. II. 7ti8 314 
 
 M'Miirdo. Ko (IkV>7), 37 L. J. 1'. & M. 14 ; L. R. I P. & I). CAO; 17 L. T. 
 
 ■MV.i ; 10 W. li. 28;t 702 
 
 MNaghtwi'H cttKO (1843), 10 CI. & F. 200 ; 1 C. & K. ViR ; 8 Scott, N. R. 
 
 695 9;)4, 9.15 
 
 M'NanKhtcn'H trial, Lrj^al Olw., May 27, I8i;i 104 
 
 M'Ni'il r. I'.rc.liurd (1795), 1 Enp. 204 1018 
 
 W'N.-il V. I'liilip (1821), 1 mr,. (South Car.), ;192 544 
 
 M.l'liorwm V. Watt (1877), :t App. Cas. 251 VMi 
 
 Ma(^rory r. Scott (1850), 5 Kk. 907 ; 20 L. J. I'ix. 90 072, 077 
 
 M'Vicar. Ro (1809), L. R. 1 P. 071; MS L. J. P. «; '>0 L. T. lOlU; 
 
 7 \V. H. 8;i2 703 
 
 M'VVilliiiniH r. NiMhy (1810), 2 Sor^. & R. 515 90 
 
 M.iddison ('. AldorHon (lHS:t), 8 App. Cas. 473 ; 52 L. J. Q. R. ■;)7 ; 49 
 
 li. T. :iO:t ; ;H W. K. 820 ; 47 J. P. 821 5;t9, 088 
 
 IMaddiHon r. Niittall (1829), RiiiK. 220 ; :( M. it P. 544 510 
 
 Maddock, Ro (1874), L. R. ;J P. 109; 4;i L J. I'. 109; HO L. T. 090; 
 
 22 VV. R. 74 1 700 
 
 Maddox f. FiHlicr (1S51), 14 Moo. P. C. O. lOH 6 
 
 Madoii r. (Jatanach ('.802), 7 11. & N. ItOO ; 31 L. .1. lOx. 118 ; 5 h. T. 2«8; 
 
 10 VV. 11. 112; 7 .lur. N. S. 1 107 902, 904 
 
 Magdalen Colicfri' ''. Alt. -Con. (1857), 20 L. J. Cli. 020 ; H. L. Cas. 189 ; 
 
 ;t Jur. N. S. 075 74, 125 
 
 Ma^dali-n ItoHpital, CovcriiorH of, »>. Knott (1877\ 47 E. J. Cii. 720; 
 
 8 (Jli. I). 709 ; 38 L. T. 024 ; 20 VV. R. 040 301 
 
 MaK<'0 V. AtkinHon (1837), 2 M. & VV. 440 ; L. J. Ex. 1 15 758 
 
 Alajji'O r. Mark (18(i0), 11 Ir. V,. ],. R. 449 105, 0;t4 
 
 Miin:rniiiH r. MiU'.C'iillounfli (undulfd), Cill). (Kq. R ) 230 059 
 
 MaKliooc. O'Noil (1H41), 7 M. & \V. 531 ; 10 E. . I. Ex. 320 717 
 
 MaKniiy «•. Hurt (1843\ I>av. & M. 0,')2 ; 5 Q. H. 381 ; 7 Jur. 1 1 10. . . .800, 872, 
 
 873 
 
 Mavrnay v. VMxcr (1813), 5 M. & dr. 778 ; Soott, N. R. 588 543 
 
 MiiKimv I'. KiiiKht (1840), 2 Scott, N. R. 04 ; 1 M. & Or. 944 ; i Drink. 
 
 13 ; I .Iiir. 1088 2B7 
 
 MiiKiict. Tim (The Fanny (Jarvill) (1875), 44 L. J. Adni. 34; 32 E. T. 
 
 040 ; 24 VV. R. 02 ; 5 ANp. M. (!. 5(;9 177 
 
 MiiK lun V. N. En^l. InH. Co. (1810), I Story, R. 157 1142, 1148 
 
 Maj^rath i'. Itrowno (1841), Arm. M. & O. 133 954 
 
 Miitfratli f. Hardy (I83H), 4 Wuxg. N. C. 782 ; Scott, 027 ; Dowl. P. C. 
 
 749 ; 1 Arn. :152 ; 2 .Inr. 591 89, 1101 
 
 Miilialcn I'. Dublin Dintillcrv Co. (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. E. 83 672 
 
 Mahalm c. MrCuU.iKh. (1891) 27 I-. R. Ir. 431 031 
 
 Maliarajali I'crtah Niirain Sin>?li v. Maliarancc Siilihao Koocr (1877), li. R. 
 
 4 Ind. App. 228 703 
 
 MahoiiV TniMt, Ro (1852), Hare, 459 ; 22 E. J. Ch. 75 1020 
 
 Malion »'. Million (1340). 2 Ir. E(|. R,. 440 H07 
 
 Malioncy v. Kcknio (1854), 14 C. II. 390; 23 E. J. C. P. 54; 18 .Inr. 
 
 313 101 
 
 Miihnny r. VVi.loW Eifo Amh. Fund (1.S71), E. R. 0. P. 252; 40 E. ,1. 
 
 C. p. 203 ; 24 L. T. 548 ; 19 W. R. 722 1 180 
 
 Muhood V. Muhood (1874), I. R. 8 K.i. 359 30? 
 
 Vui. I. ftitli ivith page 0;<6. 
 
 I I- 
 
 , l!,lit 
 
CXXIT 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 : f 
 
 Mn 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Miid of Auckland, The (1848), C Notes of Gas. (Eoo. & Mar.), 240 1122 
 
 Mainijav v. Gahaii (1793), Ridg. L. & S. 1, 79 ; 1 Ridg. P. 0. 43, 44. n. . 1103 
 Mair's Estate, Re (1873), 42 L. J. Oh. 882 ; 28 L. T. 760 ; 21 W. R. 749. . 1208 
 
 Major r. Williams (1843). 3 Curt. 432 709 
 
 Malcolm v. Ray (1819), 3 Moore, C. P. 222 MU 
 
 Malcolm v. Scott (1843, should bo 18A()), ,5 Ex. 601 487 
 
 Malcolmsou v. Morton (1847), 1 1 Ir. L. R. 230 766 
 
 Malcomson t'. Baldock {see Auckland, Eiirl of). 
 
 Malcorasou v. Chiyton (lS6u). 13 Mi>o. P. C. C. 198 186 
 
 Malcomson v. O'Doa (1862), 10 H. of L. Cas. 693, 614, 616 ; 9 L. T. 93 ; 
 
 12 W. R. 178; 9 Jur. N. S. U3.i 87, 111, 124, 432 
 
 Maiden v. Great North. Ry. Co. (1874). L. R. 9 Ex. 300 1186 
 
 ]\Iaie V. Roberts (1800), 3 Esp. 1S3 ; 6 R. R. 823 7 
 
 Mallalieu v. Hodgson (1852), 16 Q. B. 689 ; 20 L. J. Q B. 339 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 817 91 
 
 Mallan v. May (1844), 13 M. & W. 517 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 4S 741 
 
 Mallau r. Radcliff (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 588 ; 11 L. T. 381 ; 13 W. R. 
 
 139; 10 Jur. N. S. 1132 777 
 
 Milhtt r. Bateman (1865), L. R. 1 C. P. 163; 35 L. J. C. P. 40; 13 L. T. 
 
 410 ; 14 \V. R. 225 ; 1 H. & R. 109 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 122 ; 16 C. B. N. S. 
 
 530 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 243 076 
 
 Mallison, Re (1832), 1 L.-w. C. C. 132 824 
 
 Muloue V. O'Connor (1859), Drury, temp. Napier, 644 79 
 
 MaUme v. Spillessy (1847), Ir. Cir. R. 504 946 
 
 Malouey v. Bartley (1M12), 3 Camp. 210 900, 961 
 
 Miilpas V. Clements (1850), 19 L. J. Q. B. 435 146 
 
 Malpas V. London & South West. Ry. Co. (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 336 ; 
 
 35 L. J. C. P. 166 ; 13 L. T. 710 ; 14 W. R. 391 ; 1 H. & R. 227 ; 12 
 
 Jur. N. S. 271 745 
 
 Maltby V. Christie (1795), 1 Esp. 340 618 
 
 M.-lton V. Nesbit (1824), 1 C. & P. 70 935 
 
 Man V. T ketts (1815), 2 Coop. (C. P.) 21 ; 14 L. J. Ch 255 16, lz9 
 
 Manby ''urtis (1816), 1 Price, 225 171, 430, 443 
 
 Manby t. S)oott (1660), 2 Smith's L. C. 4G6 ; 1 Lev. 4 166, 107 
 
 Manchester, Bank of. Ex parte, Re Jackson (1871), 40 L. J. Bank. 67; 
 
 L. R. 12 Eq. 354 085 
 
 Manchester Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Carr (1880), 5 C. P. D 607; 49 
 
 L. J. C. P. 809 ; 43 L. T. 476 ; 29 W. R. 354 ; 45 J. P. 7 774 
 
 Manchester, May. of, v. Williams, (1891^ 1 Q. B. 94; 60 L. J. Q. B. 23; 
 
 63 L. T. 805; 39 W. R. 302 ; 64 J. P. 712 643 
 
 Mandevillt v. Welch (1820), 1 Wheat. 233 488 
 
 Mangles v. Dixon (1849), 1 Mac. & G. 446 ; 1 H. & T. 660 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 
 
 240 638 
 
 Mauley v. Boycot (1853). 2 E. & B. 46 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 205 ; 17 Jur. 1118. 758 
 
 Mauley v. Shaw (1840), Car. & M. 361 899 
 
 Maun, Rb (1859), 28 L. J. P. & M. 19 69 J 
 
 Mann v. Lang (1835), 3 A. & E. 702 ; 6 N. & M. 202 ; 1 H. & W. 441 . . 553 
 
 Manne. Nunn (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 241 ; 30 L. T. 626 683, 754 
 
 Manur. Owen (1829), 9 B. & C. ii5 ; 4 M. & R. 449 1133 
 
 Manners!). Postan (1803), 4 Esp. 239; 3 Bos. & P. 343 1209 
 
 Manning v. Cox (1823), 7 Moore, C. P. 617 487 
 
 Manning V. East. Cos. Ry. Co. (1843), 12 M. & W. 237; 3 Railw. Cas. 
 
 637 ; 13 L. J. Ex. 265 1033, 1039 
 
 Mansel f. Clauricarde (1885), 54 L. J Ch. 982 ; 63 L. T. 496 913 
 
 Mausell V. Clements (1874). L. R. 9 C. P. 139 9(0 
 
 Mauser v. Back (1848), 6 Hare, 443 760 
 
 Mauser v. Dix (1856), 1 K. ■': 3. 451 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 497 602 
 
 Marathon, The (1879), 48 L. J. Adm. 17; 40 L. T. 163 178 
 
 Marbury v. Madison (1803), 1 Cranch, 144 618 
 
 Marchmont Peer. (1840), Pari. Min. 345, 353 423, 1179 
 
 Mare v. Charles (1866), 6 E. & B. 978 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 119 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 234 787 
 
 Margareson v. Saxton (1835), 1 Y. & C. Ex. 629 487 
 
 T/i» refireueea are tu pages, not to pai nyniphs. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXY 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Maria das Donas, or Dores, The (18G3), 32 L. J. P. & M. 163 ; Brown & 
 
 L. 27; 7L. T. 838; IIW. R. 500 1172 
 
 M-iriiiiiski t. Ciiims (18ol-2), 1 Macq. 212 ; 1 raterNon, 416 480 
 
 Murine Investment Co. v. Havisido (1872), L. K. 5 H. L. 621 ; 42 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 173 133 
 
 Markham ';. Gonaston (1688), Cro. Eliz. fi26 1200, 1205 
 
 Markiiam v. Statirtford n863), 14 C. B. N. S. 380 ; 8 L. T. 277 649 
 
 Marksf. Bevfu«(1890), 25Q. B. D. 494; SDL. J. Q. B. 479; 38W. R. 705.. 613 
 
 Murks r. Liihoe (1837), 3 Binjr. N. C. 419 ; 4 S^jott, 137 435, 440 
 
 Marmyon Peer. (1818), Pari. Min. Ill 423 
 
 Marriage r. Linvreuce (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 412 1050, 1 175 
 
 Miirriotf. Marriot( 1725-6), 1 Sir. 671 1105, 1133 
 
 Marsden r. Coode (1845), 2 C. & Kir. 133 48 
 
 Marsden r. Lane. & York. Ry. Co. (1881), 7 Q. B. D. (Ml ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 318 ; 44 L. T. 239 ; 29 W. R. 580 41 
 
 Marsden r. Ovorbury (1856). 18 C. P. 34 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 200 838 
 
 Marsli V. CoUnott (1798). 2 Esp. 606 ; 5 R. R. 76.5 86, 105,3, 10.54, 1173 
 
 Marsh r. Keith (18h0). 30 L. .1. Ch. 127 ; 1 Dr. & Sin. 342 605 
 
 Marsh V. Loader (1863), 14 C. B. N. S. 535 ; 2 New R. 280 ; 11 W. R. 784. 99 
 Marsh 1'. Marsh (1858, should be 1860), 1 S. & T. 628; 30 L. J. P. & M. 
 
 77 ; 6 Jiir. N. S. 380 141, 709 
 
 Marshal r. Crutwell (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 328 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 504 667 
 
 Marshall v. Berridjro (1882), 51 L. J. Cli. 329 ; 19 Ch. D. 2J;i ; 45 L. T. 
 
 599 ; 30 W . R. 94 ; 670 
 
 Marshall r. Clitt' (1815), 4 Camp. 133 506 
 
 Marshall v. G()u<,'ler (1823), 10 Serf,'. & R. 164 1199 
 
 Marshall r. (Jreen (1875), 1 C. P. D. 35 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 153. .685. 686, 687, 690 
 MarshaU v. Lamb (1843), 5 Q. B. 113 ; D. & M. 315 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 75 : 
 
 7 Jur. 850 147, 148 
 
 Marshall v. Lvun (1840), M. & W. 116 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 126 762 
 
 Marshall r. Smith (1865), 34 L. J. Ch. 189 ; 11 L. T. 443 ; 13 W. R. 198 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 1 174 74 
 
 Marshall v. Taylor. (1895) 1 Ch. 641 ; 64 L. J. Ch. 416 Jdd. [113] 
 
 Marshall v. The Ulleswater St. Na. Co. (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 139 ; 3 B. 
 
 &S. 732; 9 Jur. N. S. 988; 8L. T. 416; 11 W. R. 489 Ill 
 
 Marshall v. The York, Newcastle, k Berwick Ry. Co. (1851), 11 C. B. 398 832 
 
 Marston v. Dean (1835). 7 C. & P. T3 2S7 
 
 Marston v. Downes (1834), 1 A. & E. 31 ; 4 N. & M. 861 ; 6 C. & P. 381 . . 320, 
 
 321, 597, 969 
 
 Martin's case (1830), 1 Lew. C. C. 104 246 
 
 Martin, Re (188;i), 13 L. R. Ir. 312 321 
 
 Martin v. Andrews (1856), 26 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 7 E. & B. 1 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1121 820 
 
 Martin r. Gale (1867), 4 Ch. D. 428 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 84 ; 36 L. T. 357 ; 25 
 
 W. R. 406 100 
 
 Martin v. Geoghejjran (1850), 13 Ir. I^. R. 403 710 
 
 Martin v. Kennedy (180(i), 2 Bos. & P. 71 1 122 
 
 Martin v. Nicolls (1830), 3 Sim. 458 1 154 
 
 Martin f . Podfrer (1770), 5 Burr. 2631 481 
 
 Martin v. Smith (1874), 43 L. J. Ex. 42; L. R. 9 Ex. 50 660, 654 
 
 Martin r. Thornton (1796), 4 Esp. 181 612 
 
 Martindale v. Booth (1832). 3 B. & Ad. 498 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 15 136 
 
 Martindale v. Falkner (1846), 2 C. B. 719, 720; 16 L. J. C. P. 91 ; 3 Dowl. 
 
 & L. P. C. 600 79 
 
 Manyn V.Williams (1857), 26 L.J. Ex. 117; 1 H. & N. 817 .., 192 
 
 Marvin v. "Wallace (1856), 25 ''.. J. Q. B. 369 ; 6 E. & B. 726 690 
 
 Mary, Tlie (1878), 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 66 ; 6 P. D. 14 ; 41 L. T. 351 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 95 178 
 
 Mary, The, or Alexandra (1868), 38 L. J. Adm. 29 ; L. R. 2 Adm. & Eco. 
 
 319; 18L.T «01 964,1189 
 
 Mary, The (1815), 9 Cranch, 126 11.50 
 
 Marzetti v. Smith (1883), 49 L. T. 580 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 166 ; 1 C. & E. 6 . . 769 
 Mash V. Deiisham (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 442 190 
 
 Vol. I, mit with page C3fi. 
 
 I 
 
CXXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Miwon and Btirry v. Comptoir d'Emiompto (1800), 38 W. R. 6R/5 343 
 
 MiiHoii V. Hmdlcy (1HI3), 1 1 M. & W. MH) ; 1 DcwI. & L. MHO ; 12 L. J. Ex. 
 
 I'if) ; 7 .Tiir. 4!)(i 1194 
 
 MiiHon V. l''ariioll (1811), 1'2 M. & W. 074 ; 1 Dowl. & li. /i70 ; V.i L. J. Ex. 
 
 142 47 
 
 Miimm V. Kiildlo (!H;t!»), /i M. & W. fiKl; 8 Dowl. '207 ; L. J. Ex. 37 .. 732 
 
 MiiHim V. MiiHoii (181(1), 1 M(^riv. 308 174 
 
 MiiHou V. Hkunny M780), I'lirk, liw. 240 703 
 
 MiiHon f.. Wooil (187.'>), 46 L. J. U. 1'. 70; 1 C J'. J). 03 ; 33 L. T. fi71 ; 
 
 •24 W. K. 40 1088 
 
 MiiMpor and Wifn v. Ilrown (1875), 46 L. J. 0. 1'. 203 ; 1 C. 1'. I). 97 ; 34 
 
 li. T. 264 ; 24 VV. It. 309 1130 
 
 WiiNMiiv V. Allen (1879), 13 Ch. I>. 668 ; 49 L. J. Cli. 70 ; 41 L. T. 788 ; 
 
 28 W. K. 212 436, 466, 816 
 
 MiiHMoy V. Ji.luiHon (1847), 1 Ex. 266 ; 17 1.. .1. Ex. 182 082 
 
 MiMtiir V. Mlllor (1791), 4 T. K. 330 ; 6 T. II. 307 ; 2 11. I'.l. 1 10 ; i AnHtr. 
 
 226 ; 2 U. K. 3!)'J I 193, 1 IDI, 1200, 1201 
 
 Miiht.IT I'ilotH k Seamen of NowciiHtlo v. llradlry (1861), 2 K. & U. 428, n. ; 
 
 23 1. ,J. Q. U. 36 791 
 
 MaHtciH r. HarrctH (1849), 2 C. & K. 716 202 
 
 MaHtoFM V. AlaHtiTN (1718), 1 r. WniH. 426 702 
 
 W..Ht(TH V. I'.illic (1020), 2 Uollc R. 141 114 
 
 Wutlicrv. L<ird MaidHlxmo (1860), 20 L. J. (I V. 68; 1 C. II. N. H. 273; 
 
 3 Jur. N. H. 1 12 • 2(52 
 
 Matlior V. 'IViiiity (Jlmrcli (1877), 3 SiTt^. & H. 6011 123 
 
 JIiilhewH f. MiitlKrWH (1807), I,. It 4 K(i. 278; 16 W. It. 701 80» 
 
 MiiUicwM.'. Ov.^y f|H8t), 13 (i, H. I). 4113; 63 L. .1. (i. M. 439; 60 li. T. 770. . 12;i2 
 
 WaMiiaM, lt(!(lH<13;, 32 Ji. J. I*. * M. 116; 3 H. \- T. 100 7ol 
 
 l^latwm II. linctli (1810), 6 M. .V S.'l. '223 1203 
 
 Watwnu). Wlianiiri (1787y, 2T. It. 80; 1 It. It. 429 078 
 
 ]VliiH.li.!wt'. ()Hl.c,in(^(18.')6), 130. H. 919; 22 L.. 1.0. I'. 211; 17.liir. 000. .89, 1113 
 
 Wal.l.h<;WH v. Mal.llifWH (176.6), 2 Vt;H. wn. 030 KIO 
 
 AlaUhdWH V. I'orl, (10K7), Oonil). 03 1107 
 
 MaUlmwH r. WliiUlo (1880), 13 (Jli. I>. 81 1 ; 49 L. J. (jli. 369 ; 43 L. T. 
 
 114; 28 \V. It. 822 636 
 
 MaUhcy V. Wiwinan (IHCr,), IH C. W. N. H. 067; 31 L. ,1. (!. ]'. 210; U 
 
 .liir. N. H. 0(;3; 12 1,. T. h.|0 ; |;) \V. It. 914 1110 
 
 MattM r. llawkiiiH (1813), 6 Taiiii. 20; 1 1 It. It. 0!)6 113 
 
 Alaul.(mr.|n.l, r. Wyse (|K07), I. It. 1 O. I,. 171 1140, 1148 
 
 Miiudd r. Ilaiidon IaxmI Jli.ard (1883), 10 il li. I). 391 ; 48 h. T. 874 ; 47 
 
 .1. r. 014 48 
 
 MaiiKliain »'• lluldjanl (I8'28), 8 H. .t O. 14 ; 2 M. & It. 6 920, 927 
 
 Mamid r. AIoiumouUi Oaii. Oo. (1812), 0. \- MmthIi. 000; 2 Dowl. N. S. 113; 
 
 4M.*<i.462; 6 HcoU, N. It. 467 ; 3 Itiiilw Cas. l.V.I; Jur. 932. . . . 227 
 
 Maunm'll V. AinHWorlli (1810), N Dowl. 80!) ; 1 11.^, \V. 6 816 
 
 WaiinMfill V. llodK<T (1861), 2 Ir. <!. I*. It. 88 712 
 
 Miiunw'll «.. Wliit,.i (1864;, 4 II. li. OaH. 103!) 639, 079 
 
 Mavor )). I'ayiKi (182.1), 3 HiiiK. 28.-^1; 1 1 Moon^ O. I'. 2 082 
 
 Mawliy r. Iliitliir (1820), '2 St,. Kv. Oil, (142 266 
 
 MawHoii V. llailHiiik (18fl'2), 4 KHp. 103 ; It. It. 811 1)72, !<74 
 
 Maxwrll ... rarncll (1800-7), I. It. 1 <;. L. 234 780 
 
 May, It.. (1808;, 37 L. .). I'. & M. (i8; li. It. I I'. iV D. 676 70() 
 
 May V. Ill-own (1821), 3 l(. & (!. 113; 4 I). &. It. 070 246, 240 
 
 May f. E<.ot.nt)r (1866), 6 E. & \i. 606 ; "6 L. J. (i. H. 32 ; 1 Jur. N. H. 
 
 1010 188 
 
 May V. (Iwyniic (1821), 4 It. A Al.l. 301 900 
 
 Alay V. H<.|l')y (I842), 4 M, cV Or, 112; 4 SroU, N. It. 727; 1 D. N. H. 702; 
 
 (i'Jur. 62 ; 111,. J. O. I'. 223 818 
 
 May V. Taylor (1843), M. & Or. 200 ; Hrott, N. It. 974 ; 12 li. J. C. I'. 
 
 ;il4 ; 7 Jur. 616 490, 407 
 
 Mavflf^ld f. Itoliiimon (1846;, 7 Q. U. 480; <) Jur. 820 01(7 
 
 Mayli.'ld r. WadHli^y (18'21), 3 H. Ac (',. 300; 6 D. A- It. 224 087 
 
 Mayhow v. Ni'Imou (I83;i), O. & T. 68 378 
 
 3'he re/er«neei art to ynyei, not to paniyrnphi. 
 
TAHLE OF CASKS CI'IKD. 
 
 CXXVll 
 
 ■AOH 
 
 ;iti7 
 •2\i 
 til 7 
 If.',') 
 tldO 
 
 :)<.m 
 
 (\H2 
 
 Mayor r. .Tolinnoii (18i:i), 3 Ciiiiii). :12« 
 
 Mond V. DiiubiKiiy (17U2), I'.'ii. IJ.'i 
 
 M.'iide f. Hinitli (1814), 1(1 Conn. IMO 
 
 Mi-iiK'>" » • Hiiiiii'oi'H (if^'^"). 3 c. & r. Tr) 
 
 JVIrurHr. lA. Htonrton (1711), 1 I'. WniH. 140 
 
 M.-iith, »i>. of V. L.I. Ui'MMA (174H), 7 WUh. 2 IT. ; 2 Stilk. ft 12 
 
 Mi'iitli, Up. of V. M. of WinohoHtiT (IHUd), U HinK- N. <;. IHH; ;i H.^ 
 
 ftfll 2(i, 87, 421), 4:n, ,')l(l, 
 
 Mrolmiiinr Hk. of Aloxiindria v. Hk. of ColuniMii (1H20), C> Wlicut. .'I.'KI ., 
 Mcdioli-n r. Wiilliuui (18;)7), 7 A. & K. 40; (i li. J. IC. 11. 217 ; 2 N. .& I'. 
 
 224 (i"«, 
 
 Mcrrcdy v. Taylor (187:)), I. It. 7 O. h. 2f)(i Klii 
 
 Mid.lowrroft c. Ilujrii.nin (1814). 4 AIoo. 1'. (!. C. ;t8(; 1 i;t2 
 
 Mi'dlyiMitt. r. AnhIu'Idii nH24), 2 Add. 22!) 14;» 
 
 Aim ('. Koid (17itl), IN'ii. K. 2;i ; :» K. li. 048 W)r> 
 
 M<-.'kiiiH (I. Smith (17!)1), 1 H. III. (•.;t7 8(ift, 800 
 
 McRfvand, Hf, K\ parto DoHuin-.o (18(17), ;{7 h. T. 440 ; 20 W. It. 20 ; 7 
 
 ( :li. I). 611; 47 L. .1. Ch. 06 ; ;t8 L. V. 100 ; 20 VV. It. :i.')8 l.V.) 
 
 McKKO" »'. Hindi" (1880), 16 Ch. 1). I!)8 ; 4:» L. T. 661 ; 28 W. It. 800 . . 146 
 
 Mrli^iv. AIl<l^^•w^4 (1820), M. .V M. MHO 62;l, 62S, 687 
 
 M.41iuiHhv. (\.llior(186()), 16 (i. U.878; l!)Tj..T.(i. H.4!i:t; 14 .liir. 021 . .242, !);tS> 
 
 MrlliNh V. Itawdon (18;i2), i) Hiiijf. 41(i ; 2 M. & H.Mit.t. 670. :t8 
 
 Mcilor v. Sidrhott^mi (1877), 40 L. J. Ch. ;ii)8 ; 6 Cli. I). I'.i.; ; ;t7 L. T. '. ; 
 
 26 W. It. 4 10 6!) t 
 
 M.'iiow r. May (1601), Moo. (K.) (i;iO 067 
 
 AIclvilln'H, l,d'., raN(i(1800), 2!) Il<.w. Ht. Tr. 707 8, 14, 108, 472, .')87, i)0!» 
 
 Molviiif. Whit,iiit^(1828),7 I'i.'k. 70 ;127 
 
 Mi^rraiit. ("iM'dit, AMHociat., Jtn, Clcniciil's (lai'o (18(;8), 37 Ij. .1. Cli. 206 ; l.'l 
 
 L. It. Kq. 179, n. 1 846 
 
 Mcm-r f. ChcrNo (1842V 4 M. & Gr. 804 ; 6 Hoott, N. It. 004 ; 2 Dow!. N. 
 
 H. (>1!) ; 12 li. J. C. l*. 60 108 
 
 MiMwr V. H]iaikn ( 16H0), Owon, 61 ; Noy, ;t6 110 
 
 MciiKT t'. Whall (1846), 6 Q. 11. 402 ; 14 L. J. Q. 1$. 207 ; .Inr. 670. .270, 27;! 
 
 Mcroor v. WIho (1800), ;i Knj>. 210 642 
 
 JW.-rcr V. WooilKat,o (1870), 10 H. & H. 8:!;t ; Ml) h. J. M. C. 21 ; L. It. 6 
 
 «i. n. 20 ; 21 L. T. 468 ; IH VV. It. 1 10 124 
 
 Merchant IViiK^o, Th.', (1802) T. !l, 170 ; 07 L. T. 261 200 
 
 MiTohantH' Co., Ito (1 (07), Ji. It. 4 Kii. 46;t ,S|6 
 
 Ali'i-fditli V. KootniT (184;t), 11 Af. it W. 202 ; 12 L. J. Kx. I8;i 6t);i, 606 
 
 Alcn-ditli r. Ar.'iRli (186;!), 2 I'!. \- H. a(i4 ; 22 L. J. Q. U. 401 01)2 
 
 Alcrlo r. Alor.. (1820), Ity. & AI. 3!)t) 003 
 
 Merrick r. Waklcy (18.)8), 8 A. & K 170; 3 N. & 1'. 284 ; 1 VV. W. & II. 
 
 208; 2jiir. 838 1()4H 
 
 Merrill v. Mort..iM (1881), 60 L. J. Ch. 241); 17 Ch. 1). 382 ; 43 L. 'l'. 760 ; 
 
 20 VV. It. 3114 741 
 
 Alorritl, llo( 1868), 1 S. &T. 112; 4 Jur. N. 8. 1102 706 
 
 Alrrry v. Nirkalls (1876), L. 11. 7 Ch. 733; 41 L. J. Ch. 707 ; 20 L. T. 
 
 40(1; 20 VV. It. 631 168 
 
 MiiMHin V. lid. AlaMMarceno (1701), 4 T. It. 403 1 166 
 
 AI.'HHiiia V. IVilroiMicchino (1872), Ji. 11. 4 1'. C. 144 ; 8 Moo. P. C. C. N. H. 
 
 376 1147 
 
 Motoor, 'I'ho (1876), I. It. i! Kq. 607 178 
 
 Mftroiiol. Uv. Co. r. DcfrirH (1877), 2 U. 11. I). 18!), 387 ; 30 L. T. 160, 
 
 40 1 ; 26 W*. It. 27 1 , 8 II .',35 
 
 ATctropol. Itv. (!o. «•. .lac'kHoi; (1877), 3 Ajip. Chh. 11)3 ; 47 L. J. C. 1*. 303 ; 
 
 37 li. T. (i70 ; 20 W. It. 176 23, 2S, 38 
 
 MeUtTM r. Hrowii (1802), 32 li. .1. I'lx. I3S; 1 H. \- C. (,80 92, 110, 106 
 
 M.nvH V. Cur (1860), 1 II. & N. 481 ; 20 li .1. Kx. 20 730 
 
 Mi'xiiiin \- H. Anicricaii Co., Ite, Kx parto AHton (I8,M)), 28 L. J. Ch. 034 ; 
 
 4 l)o(). .V[ .T. 220; 27 Heav. 471 1)04 
 
 A%.T«'. I>rrHH(,r (1801), l(i C. H. N. H. 040; 33 L. J. C. P. 289 ; 10 li. T. 
 
 012 : 12 VV. It. 1)83 8/5 
 
 Moyor •». Moutriou (1840), 9 !?,,av. 621 496 
 
 t 
 
 Vol. J. rmh with pa^0 036, 
 
 
CXXVlil 
 
 TABLE OF CA3i:S CITP^D, 
 
 i; 
 
 \l\ 
 
 Moyer t-. Ralli (187fi), 1 C. P. D. 358 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 741 ; 24 W. R. 963. . 
 
 Meyer v. Softoii (1817), 2 Stark. R. 274 ; 19 R. R. 720 
 
 Meyerhoff r. Froehli<;li (1878). 3 C. P. D. 3;« ; 4 C. P. D. 63 ; 48 L. J. C. 
 
 P. 43 ; 39 L. T. 620 ; 27 W. R. 258 
 
 MeyuoU'a case (1831). 2 Low. C. C. 122 
 
 Moyriokf. Janics (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 579 32 
 
 Meyrick r. Woods (1812), C. & MiiFMh. 452 
 
 Michiiol V. Scookwith (1587), Cro. Kliz. 120 
 
 Michiiel t'. Trer -iu (1856), 17 C. B. 551 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 83 
 
 Michell t'. RiibbettH (1810), cited 3 Taun. 91 
 
 Michell V. "Williams (1843), 11 M. & W. 205 ; 12 L. .T. Ex. 193 
 
 Middleditch v. Ellis (1848). 2 Ex. 623 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 365 
 
 Middlchurst r. JohnHon (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 14 
 
 Middlesex Sheriffs, case of (18 lO), 11 A. & E. 273 
 
 Middletoix's case (1603). 5 Co. Rep. 21 
 
 Middlotou, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 16 ; 3 S. & T. 583 ; 10 Jur. N. S 
 
 1109 
 
 vxoa 
 
 1147 
 323 
 
 712 
 
 500 
 
 4, 920 
 
 314 
 
 1200 
 
 771 
 
 430 
 
 30, ,U 
 
 754 
 
 140 
 
 4 
 
 92 
 
 '. 708 
 
 Middloton r. Barned (1849), 4 Ex. 241 : 18 L. J. Ex. 433 106, 977 
 
 Middleton r. Croft (1736), Str. 1056 79 
 
 Middloton r. Mass (1819), 2 Nott. & M C. 55 429 
 
 Middleton v. Melton (1829), 10 B. & C. 322 ; 5 M. & R. 264. .279, 437.441, 508 
 Middleton v. Pollock, Ex parte Wethcrall (1876), 4 Ch. D. 49 : 46 L. J. Ch 
 
 39 ; 35 L. T. 608 ; 25 W. R. 94 639 
 
 Midland Ry. Co. r. Hunchwood Brick and Tile Co. (1882), 20 Ch. D. 662 ; 
 
 51 L. J. Ch. 778 ; 46 L. T. 301 ; 30 W. R. 610 60 
 
 Midland Rv. Co. v. WithinKton Local Board (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 788; 6" 
 
 L. J. Q.'B. 689 ; 49 L. T. 489 ; 47 J. P. 789 226 
 
 Miwhell V. Sultan of Johore, (1893) 9 R. 447 ; (1894) 1 Q. B. 149 ; 63 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 593 ; 70 L. T. 64 ; 58 J. P. 244 
 
 Mig-otti V. Cclville (1879), 4 C. P. D. 233 ; 48 L. J. C. P. (;95 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 747 ; 27 W. R. 744 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 305 
 
 Milan, The (1861), Lnsh. 388 ; 31 L. J. Adm. 105 ; 5 L. T. 590 
 
 Mildrone's case (1786), 1 Lea. C. C. 412 
 
 Miles V. Bough (1842), 3 Q. B. 845; 3 Railw. Cas. 668; 3 G. & D. 119 ; 
 
 12 L. J. Q. B. 74 294, 1177 
 
 Miles f. Dawson (1796), 1 Esp. 4»o ; 2 Pcake, 54 969 
 
 Miles V. M'CuUoukIi (1803). 1 Binn. 77 873 
 
 Miles v. O'Hrra (1811), 4 Biun. 108 353, 354 
 
 Millar v. Heinrick (1815), 4 Camp. 115 936 
 
 Millard v. Bailey (1866), L. R. 1 Eq. 378 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 312 ; 13 L. T. 751 ; 
 
 14 W. R. 385 
 
 Miller's case (1772-3), 3 Wilson, 427 : 2 W. Bl. 886 
 
 Miller's ca. , (1817), Macq. Pia(!. H. L. 620 
 
 MiUerv. Cook (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 641 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 11 ; 18 W. R. 1061; 
 
 22 L. J. Ch. 740 
 
 Miller V. Covert (1828), 1 Wend. 487 1124 
 
 Miller V. Huddlestone (1851), 3 Mae. & G. 613, 623, 524 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 1 ; 
 
 15 Jut. 1043 144 
 
 Miller V. Irvine (1834), 1 Dev. & B. 103 669 
 
 Miller v. James (1872), L. R. 3 P. & D. 4 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 21 ; 27 L. T. 
 
 862 ; 21 W. R. 272 1151 
 
 MiUer V. Lawtou (1861), 2 New R. 430 ; 15 C. B N. S. 834 388 
 
 Miller V. Salomons (1852), 7 Ex. 534 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 161 905 
 
 Miller v. Stevens (1868). 100 Mass. 518 763 
 
 Miller v. Tetherington (1861), 6 H. & N. 278 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 217 ; 7 H. & 
 
 N. 954: 3 L. T. 893 ; 9 W. R. 437 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 214 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 
 
 363; 10 W. R. 356 764, 765 
 
 Miller f. Travers (1832), 8 Ring. 250 744, 760, 761, 801,802 
 
 Miller v. Wheatley (1890), 28 L. R. Ir. 144 305, 431, 460, 1210 
 
 Milligan, Re (184!t), 2 Rol)eit8. 108 702 
 
 Millington r. Loring (1880), 6 Q. B. D. 190 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 214 ; 43 L. T. 
 
 657 ; 29 W. R. 207 : 45 J. P. 268 220 
 
 Millman f. Tucker (1803), Pea. Add. Cas. 222 967, 970 
 
 The rcftrencu or* to pages, not to paragrnphe. 
 
 14 
 
 16 
 
 1122 
 
 905 
 
 789 
 930 
 603 
 
 137 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXIX 
 
 FAOE 
 
 MiUnerV Estate, Ro (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 246 ; 42 L. J. Cli. 44 ; 26 L. T. 
 
 820 ; 20 AV . R. 823 101 
 
 MillH r. Biirbor (ISHO), 1 M. & W. 427 ; 5 Dowl. P. C. 77 ; 2 Gale, 6 . .258, 2(il 
 
 Mills V. DeniiiN (1818), 3 Johus. 3G7 496 
 
 MilU v. FowkoH (1839), 5 Bing. N. 0. 455 ; 7 Soott, 444 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 
 
 270 715, 716 
 
 MillH V. Mayor of ColoheHtcr (18G7), L. R. 2 C. P. 476 ; 36 L. J. 0. P. 216; 
 
 16 L. T. fiJC) : 15 W. R. (i.?5 123, 124, 1092 
 
 Mill« V. Mills (18(>1), 30 L. J. P. & M. 183 ; 2 S. & T. 310 ; 4 L. T. 479. . 348 
 
 Mills V. Mihviinl (1890), 15 P. I). 20 ; 59 L. J. P. 23 ; 61 L. T. 051 703 
 
 Mills 1'. (Wilv (183»), 6 C. & P. 72S 271. 3'.>0, -)99 
 
 Mills V. Scott (1873), 42 L. J. Q. B. 234 ; L. R. 8 Q. B. 496 ; 29 L. T. 90 ; 
 
 21 W. 11. iil5 Ifll, 195 
 
 Miliio r. Leislcr (1802), 31 L. .T. Ex. 257 ; 7 11. & N. 786 ; 6 L. T. 802 ; 10 
 
 W. R. 2.iO ; 8 .Jur. N. S. 121 378 
 
 Milroy v. Lord (1862), 4 De G. F. & J. 264 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 798 639 
 
 Milsoij r. I),iy (1829), 3 M. & P. 333 817 
 
 Milward r. Forhes (180.S), 4 Esp. 171 517 
 
 Milward v. Hibbert (1N42), 3 Q. B. 135 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 137 ; 2G. & D. 142 765 
 
 Alilwavd V. Ti'tnple (1808), 1 Ciiinp. 375 
 
 Mima Queen r. Hepbuni (1813), 7 Cranch, 290 368, 506 
 
 Minet v. MorKnn (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. App. 361 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 627 ; 28 L. T. 
 
 N. 8. 673 ; 21 VV. R. 467 321, 601, 602 
 
 Miuna, The (1808), L. R. 2 A. & E. 97 178 
 
 Minor r. Tillotsou (1833), 7 Pet. 100 277 
 
 Minshnll )'. Lloyd (1837). 2 M. & W. 450 ; 6 L. 7 Ex. 1 15 304 
 
 Mints V. Bcthill (1601), Cro. Eliz. 749 323 
 
 Minty, Re (1S.")0), 7 Notes of Ca.ses (Ecc. iit Mar.) 374 698 
 
 Mires r. Solcbay (1()78), 2 Mod. 244, 245 29 
 
 Mit(^hell f. Cnissweller (1853), 13 C. B. 237; 22 L. J. C. P. 100; 17 Jur. 
 
 716 193 
 
 Mitchell t>. Darley Main Coll. Co. (1886), 11 App. Cas. 127 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 529; 54L. T. 882; 51 J. P. 148 114 
 
 Mitehell v. Ilomfray (1881), 50 L. J. Q. B. 460 ; 8 Q. B. D. 587 ; 45 L. T. 
 
 694 ; 29 W. R. 5.')8 136 
 
 Mitchell t: Jenkins (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 594-596 ; 2 N. & M. 301 . . . .30, 39, 110 
 
 Mitchell V. Lapage (1816), Holt, N. P. R. 253 ; 17 R. E, 633 299 
 
 Mitchell V. Thomas (1847), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 137 140, 141 
 
 Mitcheson r. Oliver (1865), 5 E. & B. 419; 25 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 900 i7d 
 
 Mobile, The (1856), Swa. Adm. 69, 127 178 
 
 Mody V. Gregson (1868), 38 L. J. Ex. 12 ; L. R. 4 Ex. 49 ; 19 L. T. 458 ; 
 
 17 W. R 1 76 776 
 
 Moti'att V. Biiteman (1869), L. R. 3 P. C. 115 ; 22 L. T. 140 ; 6 Moore, 
 
 P. C. C. N. S. 369 163 
 
 Mohesh Lai v. Mohunt Bawan Das (1883), L. R. 10 Ind. App. 62, 70, 71.. 153 
 
 Moises V. Thonitoti (1799), 8 T. R. 307 ; 3 Esp. 4 1214 
 
 Mollett V. Brayne (1809), 2 Camp. 103 ; 1 1 R. R. 676 650, 660 
 
 Mollettv. Wackerbath(lS47), 5 C. B. 181; 17 L. J. C. P. 47; 11 Jur. 
 
 1065 1193, 1195 
 
 Mollwo, March & Co. v. Ct. of Wards (1872), L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 435 159 
 
 Molton r. Camroux (1849), 2 Ex. 487 ; 4 Ex. 17 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 356; 18 
 
 L. J. Ex. 58 ; 12 Jur. 800 542 
 
 Molton V. Harris (1797), 2 Esp. 549 296 
 
 Monaghan v. Cox (1892), 31 Am. St. R. 555 372 
 
 Moncrieff v. Reade (1848), 2 C. & K. 705 192 
 
 Mondelt'. Steele (1841), 8 M. & W. 300; 9 Dowl. 812; 6 Jur. 611; 10 
 
 L. J. Ex. 314 1122 
 
 Mone' V. Jorden (1852), 15 Beav. 372 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 174 5'?9 
 
 Monk m*. Att.-Gen. (1831), 2 Russ. & My. 161.. 408, 409, 410, 413, 415, 416, 
 
 418, 421, 423, 424 
 
 Monroe, Bank of , t». Field (1842), 2 Hill, R. 445 388 
 
 Monroe v. Twistleton (1802), Pea. Add. Cas. 221 691 
 
 Vol. I. tndt with pagt 636. 
 
 -*;|i! 1 i'lll 
 
cxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 
 il 
 
 PAoa 
 
 MonUoute v. Maxwell (1720), 1 P. WmH. 619 679, ti80 
 
 Monteprue «. Harrison (1867), 3 0. B. N. 8. 292 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 24 ; 4 
 
 Jur. N. 8. 29 86<) 
 
 MontH«ue, Ld., i>. Diidman ('."51), 2 Ves. son. 397 997 
 
 Montague t'. Montague (ISSi), 15 Beav. 505 805 
 
 Montague v. PerkiuH 0853), 22 L. J. C. P. 187 ; 17 Jur. 577 38, 1205 
 
 Mouteflore v. OuedHllii (1800), 29 L. J. Cli. 05 ; i De G. F. & J. 93 .... 806 
 
 Monteflori v. Montefiori (1702), 1 \V. 81. 303 639 
 
 Montgomery v. Middleton (1802), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 173 43 
 
 Montreal, Hank of. r. Munttter Bunk (1876), I. K. 1 1 C. L. 47 44 
 
 Montrose, Poor. (1853), 1 Macc|. 401 180, 792 
 
 Moodie V. BiiuniBter (1859), 4 Drew. 432 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 881 ; 5 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 402 722 
 
 Moody V. Rowcll (1835). 17 Pii^k. 490 922, 945, 1220, 1223, 1228 
 
 Moody V. SurridgH (1798), Park, InH. 245 703 
 
 Moons V. De BernalcH (1856), 1 Russ. 301 1104 
 
 Moor p. (1813), 1 M. & Sul. 284 255 
 
 Moore V. Booth (1797). 3 Ves. 350 869 
 
 Moore V. Campbell (1854), 10 Ex. .323 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 310 298, 752 
 
 Moore V. Culverhoiise (1860), 27 Bca>. 639; 29 L. J. Ch. 419; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 1 1 5 738 
 
 Moore V. Garwood (1849). 4 Ex. 081 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 15 44 
 
 Moore v. King (1842), 3 Curt. 243 694 
 
 Moore t>. Mot. Ry. Co. (1872), L. R. 8 Q. B. 36 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 23 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 679; 21 W. R. 145 586, 643 
 
 Moore v. Moore (1755), 2 Ves. sen. 696, 603 180 
 
 Moore V. Moore (1871), 6 Ir. R. Eq. 166 142 
 
 Moore v. Moore (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 617; L. R. 18 Eq. 474; 30 L. T. 752; 
 
 22 W. R. 729 638 
 
 Moore V. Mourgue (1770), 2 Cowp. 470 . 39 
 
 Mooro V. Oastlor (1830), St. Ev. 041, 642 255 
 
 Moore V. Peaohey, (1891) 2 Q. B. 707 ; 39 W. R. 592 1181 
 
 Mooro V. Smith (1826), 14 Serg. & R. 393 627 
 
 Mooro V. Terrell (1833). 4 B. & Ad. 870 ; 1 N. & M. 559 591 
 
 Moore v. Wliitehouso (1804), 34 L. J. P. & M. 31 ; 3 S. & T. 507; 11 L T. 
 
 468 307 
 
 Moorhouse v. Newton (1849), 3 De G. & Sm. 307 480 
 
 More (should be Moor) v. Salter (1015), 3 Buls. 79 1 198 
 
 Moreau and Ciirloton's Trial (1820), 200 900 
 
 Morewood v. Wilkes (1833), 6 C. & P. 144 135 
 
 Morewood v. Wood (1792), 14 East, 327, n. ; 12 R. R. 637. .393, 399, 401, 1220, 
 
 1227 
 
 Morgan v. Boys (1836), cited 7 A. & E. 337 371 
 
 Morgan v. Brydges (1818), 2 Stark. R. 314 945 
 
 Morgan v. Chctwynd (1805), 4 F. & F. 451 160 
 
 Morgan v. Couchman (1853), 14 C. B. 100; 2 0. L. R. 53; 23 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 36 629 
 
 Morgan v. Davios (1878), 3 C. P. D. 200 ; 39 L. T. tU) ; 2<i W. R. 810 . . 35 
 Morgan r. Griffith (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 70 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 46 ; 23 L. T. 783 ; 
 
 19 W. R. 957 745 
 
 Morgan v. Hatchell (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 135 ; 19 Beav. 96 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 125 731 
 
 Morgan v. Hodger (1870). L. R. 5 C. P. 485 ; 40 L. J. M. C. 13 263 
 
 Morgan r. Lond. Gon. Omnibus Co. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 203; 63 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 352 : 50 L. T. 687 ; 32 W. R. 416 779 
 
 Morgan r. Morgan (1832), 9 Bing. 359; 2 L. J. C. P. 27; 2 Moo. & So. 
 
 490 ] 372, 1216 
 
 Morgan r. Nicholl (1860), 30 L. J. C. P. 86 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 117 ; 15 L. T. 
 
 184 ; 15 V/. R. 110 ; 12 ,Tur. N. 8. 903 327 
 
 Morgan v. Pike (I8;)4), It C. B. 473; 2 C. L. R. 096; 23 L. J. C. P. 64.. 676 
 Morgan v. Ravey (1801), 6 11. & N. 265; 30 L. J. Ex. 131 ; 3 L. T. 784; 
 
 9W.R.376; 2 F. & F. 283 182 
 
 Hu re/«r*nee$ mrttopagu, not to paragraphs. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXl 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Morgan r. Rowlands (1872), 41 L. J. Q. B. 187; L. R. 7 Q. B. 493; 20 
 
 L. T. SfiS : 20 W. R. 726 715, 1125 
 
 Morgan v. Sim (1868), U Moo. P. C. C. 307 6 
 
 Moivuii V. Svki'H (1842), cited Coats v. Chiiplin, 3 Q. B. 480 670 
 
 MoiKuu r. flir.rne (1841), 7 M. & W. 408; 9 D. P. C. 228 ; 5 Jur. 2'JI ; 
 
 ", L.J. Ex. 125 488, nil 
 
 Mori^iinf. Whitmore (1852), 6 Ex. 710; 20 L.J. Ex. 289 146 
 
 Morgan's ciiHo (1764), 1 Leo. C. C. 54 9(H 
 
 Moi^uns V. Bridgei) (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 650 543 
 
 Morittrty r. Grey (1860), 12 Ir. C. L. R. 129 302 
 
 Moriarty f. Loud. Chat. & D. Ry. Co. (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 109; L. R. 
 
 5 Q. B. 314 : 22 L. T. 163 ; 18 W. R. 625 620 
 
 MorW «'. Attenborous:h (4849), 3 Ex. 500 ; 18 L. J. Ex. HS ; li Jur. 282 775 
 M..rlcy f. Morley (1855), 5 De G. M. & G. 010; 1 Jur. N. S. 10'J7 ; 25 
 
 L. j. Ch. ) 1 38, 720 
 
 Miirley's, Ld., case (1666), Kd. (J.) 55; 6 How. St. Tr. 771 ....328, 330, 340 
 
 MoriiinKtoa v. Moniington (^1801), 2 J. & H. 097 , 692 
 
 MoiroU r. D'Ckey (1814), 1 Johns. (Ch. Am.) 153 1160 
 
 Moirell f. Eisher(1849), 4 Ex. 604; 19 L. J. Ex.273 803, 804 
 
 Moirell V. Frith (1838), 3 M. & "W. 402 ; 8 C. & P. 240 ; 1 11. & 11. 100 ; 
 
 2 Jur. 619; 7 L, J. Ex. 172 44, 710, 712 
 
 Morrcll V. Martin (1841). 3 M. & Gr. 693 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 3()0 1101 
 
 Morrell v. Morrell (1882), 7 P. Div. 68 ; 61 L. J. P. & M. 49 ; 46 L. T. 
 
 485 ; 30 W. R. 491 ; 40 J. P. 328 141 
 
 Morris v. Bethell (18()9), L. R. 4 C. P. 7C6 ; L. R. 6 C. P. 47 ; 38 L. J. 
 
 C. P, 379; 17 W. R. 730 241 
 
 Morris V. Burdett (1808), 1 Camp. 218 ; 10 R. R. 067 524 
 
 Morris v. Davies (1806, should be 1827), 3 C. & P. 216, 427 ; 5 CI. & Fin. 
 
 163; 1 M. iR. 271, n 101, 422 
 
 Morris ». Glyun (185'j), 27 Beav. 218; 6 Jur. N. S. 1047 084 
 
 Morris t). Hurmcr (1K33), 7 Pet. 564 1179 
 
 Morris V. HauKcr (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 392 ; Car. & M. 29 313 
 
 Morris v. Miller (1707), 4 Burr. 2067 ; 1 W. BI. 032 U9, 295, 649 
 
 Morrison v. Arnold (1817), 19 Ve,s. 670 363 
 
 Morrison v. Gen. St. Navig. Co. (1862), 8 Ex. 733 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 233 .. .. 6 
 
 Morrison v. Kelly (1762), 1 W. BI. 385 9S7 
 
 Morrison v. Leonard (1827), 3 C. & P. 127 897 
 
 Morrison v. Martin (1846), 5 Hare, 507 803 
 
 Morrison V. Univ. Marine Ins. Co. (1872), 42 L. J. Ex. 17, 115; L. R. 
 
 8 Ex. 40, 197 ; 27 L. T. 791 ; 21 W. R. 190 156 
 
 Morritt V. DouKlass (1872), 42 L. J. P. cS: M. 10 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 1 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 591; 21 \V. R. 102 694 
 
 Morrogh v. Power (1842), 5 Ir. L. R. 494 713 
 
 Morse V. Royal (1806), 12 Ves. 362 ; 8 R. R. 338 493, 494 
 
 Mortimer v. M-Callan (1840), 6 M. & W. 68 ; 4 Jur. 172 . . .308, 309, 388, 1049, 
 
 1052, 1054, 1069 
 
 Mortimer v. Mortimer (1820), 2 Hagg. Cons. 310 503, 558 
 
 Mortimer v. Sbortall (1842). 2 Dru. & War. 371 749 
 
 Mortimore D. Wright (1840), 6 M. & W. 482 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 158 168 
 
 Morton V. Chandler (1831), 8 Greenl. 9 746 
 
 Morton v. Copeland (1856), 16 Com. 517; 24 L. J. C. P. 517; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 979 207, 729 
 
 Morton V. Tibbett (18.J0), 15 Q. B. 434 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 382 ; 14 Jur. 
 
 669 689, 692 
 
 Morton V. Woods (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 658 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 242 ; L. E. 
 
 4Q. B. 293; 38 L. J. Q. B. 81; 17 W. R. 411 ; 9 B. A: S. 669 97 
 
 Moseley f. Davies (1822), 11 Price, 102 396, 401, 410 
 
 Moseley v. Haiiford (18301, 10 B. & C. 729 ; 5 M. & R. 607 757 
 
 Moseley v. M'Mulleu ( 1850), Ir. C. L. R. 09 222 
 
 Moss .'. Ang. Egyp. Nav. Co. (1805), L. R. 1 Ch. lOS ; 36 L. J. Ch. 179 ; 
 
 14 W. R. 150 1117 
 
 Mossr. Russell (1884), 1 Times L. R. 13 162 
 
 Mossom ». Ivy (1684), 10 How. St. Tr. 602 362, 1179 
 
 Vol. I. end* with pag$ 635. 
 
 
 i I 
 
 i^^ 
 
 \ 
 
CXXXll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOS 
 
 MoHsopt). Eiulon (1810), 16 Von. 430 308 
 
 Mcmtyn r. Fiil.rijfiiM (1771). 1 ('"wp. 171 ; 1 Sni. L. O. (\>H 7, 51, 62, 938 
 
 MoHtyu V. MoHtyii (IH.Vl), 3 Do G. M. ic U. 140 ; 23 L. J. (Jli. ilLT) ; d 11. L. 
 
 Cas. 1/55 796 
 
 MoNlyii V. WfHt MoMtyn Coal & Inm Co. (lH7fl), 31 L. T. 531 602 
 
 MotttTiiin r. KiiMt. Cos. Uy. Co. (IS.M)), '29 L. J. M. C. 57; 7 C. B. N. S. 
 
 58 : r. Jur. N. S 759 . ." 10.-)1, 1089 
 
 Moiifl.-t r. (Join (1872), L. U. 7 Ex. 70 ; I,. U. 8 Ex. 32 ; 41 L. .T. Ex. 28 ; 
 
 42 L. J. Ex. 8 : 27 L. T. r.78 : 21 W. 11. 1 75 16 
 
 Mould ». WilliiiitiH (IHU), .') (i. n.47i; !).&M.(i31 109:), 1100, IKll 
 
 Moulet'. Brown (1838), 4 HiiiK'. N. C. 2(i() ; 5 Scott, (i9l ; 1 Am. 79; 2 Jur. 
 
 277 
 
 32 
 
 , 120S 
 
 19 
 
 Mount f. Boircrt (ISKi), Antlion, 190 515 
 
 Mt.unt V. LiirkiiiH (1831), H Binj,'. 108 ; 1 M. &- Scott, 1(15 38, 818 
 
 MouHHpy V. Burnliiirri (1811), 1 ITiiro, 15 
 MouiiHon r. Bourn (KilS), Cro. (^iir. 520 
 
 M. 
 
 luntiif^uc )'. 
 
 Hi 
 
 4 Jur. N. S. 29 
 
 (1857), 27 L. J. C. r. 2»; 3 C. B N. H. 292; 
 
 809 
 Mo.ntford V. Hiirpor (1847), Hi M. & VV. 825 ; Hi L. J. Ex. 182 154 
 
 444, 415 
 
 Mountnoyi'. Colliur(1853), 22L.J.Q. B. 124; 4 E. & B.fi30; 17Jur.503. 
 
 Mountstophcn v. Brooko (1819), 1 Cliitty, H. 390 487, 713 
 
 Mountstcphcn V. Liikimmn (1874), 39 L. J. Q. B. 275 ; L. R. T) Q. B. 013 ; 
 
 41 L. J. Q. B. 07 ; L. II. 7 <i. B. I'M) ; L. R. 7 H. L. 17 ; 43 L. J. Q B. 
 
 188; 30 L. T. 437; 22 W. R. 017 G78 
 
 Moylii 
 
 Nolan (1801), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 427 106 
 
 Moyjot'. JcnkiiiH (18.S1). 8 Q. B. 1>. 110; .Tl L. J. (i. B. 112; 40 L. T. 
 472 ; 30 W. R. 32 1 156 
 
 Muilii 
 
 v. l)'E(|uiiio (1795), 2 H. Bl. 504 , 
 
 37 
 
 Mulhollaiid r. Ki;.cn (187 I), I. R. 9 ]■)<[. 471 1109 
 
 Mullaly r. Walsh (1872), I. R. C. L. 314 , 
 Mullon, R(( (1871), I. R. 5 V.i\. ;i(i9 
 
 171 
 
 .095, 096 
 
 Mulk'tt V. Hunt (1833), Car. & M. 752 831, 835 
 
 Mulli 
 107 
 
 Kin 
 
 1878), 3 Q. B. i). 484 ; 47 L. J. (J. B. 700 ; ;18 L. T. 
 
 20 W R. :t85 5, 781 
 
 Muliins V. Collins (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 292 ; 43 L. J. M. C. 07 ; 29 L. T. 
 
 838 ; 
 
 22 \V. R. 297 107 
 
 Muniford r. (;otliiiiK (18:.9), 29 L. J. C. P. 105 ; 7 C. B. N. S. 305 
 
 M 
 
 uncHiv V. Dt'nnis ( 
 
 1850), 1 H. & N. 210 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 0(! 
 
 Munday v. Asprcy (1880), 13 Ch. I). 8.-)5 ; 49 L. J.Ch. 
 
 Ml 
 
 Bak.T(1817), 2 Stark. R. 255 ; Holt. N V. OKI 
 
 210; 
 
 28 \V 
 
 R 
 
 347 . 
 
 , n. ; 
 
 19 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 71P.. 
 
 . 49 
 
 
 
 
 Munii f. (Jodl)old (1825), 3 Binjf. 292 ; 11 Moore, C. I' 
 
 Munro, Kx j)arto (1870), 1 il B. I). 724 ■ 45 L. J. Q. B. 810; 35 L. T. 
 
 784 
 781 
 073 
 1096 
 300 
 
 857 ; 24 \V. R. 1017 724 
 
 Munro ('. I).! Chomant (181,-)), 4 (Xinip •»15. 
 
 Mu 
 
 Mil 
 
 539 
 
 (1840), 7 CI. >»;: Fin. 842 179 
 
 ■ 176 
 
 Munro •'. Vaiidani (1791), <iit<!d I Park, Ins. 409 
 
 Miinr o f. Pilkin>?ton (1802), 31 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 2 B. & S. 11 ; G L. T. 
 
 N. S. 21 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 557 1140, 1154 
 
 MiinHtnrr. F-aint) (1883), 1 1 Q. B. 1). 588; 52 L.J. Q. B 720; 49 L. T. 
 
 32 \V. R. 248; 47 J. P. 805 
 
 869 
 
 Miirclim c. Blank (180.')). 31 L. J. V,. P. 337 ; 19 C. B. N. S. 190; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 008; 12 L. T. 735; 13 W. R. 890 114, 115 
 
 Murjratroyd >\ Mur^^atroyd (1828), oitnd 2 St. Ev. 307, n. (o) 267 
 
 Miiri..ta:. \V..lflia>?oii (1819), 2 C. & K. 744 1219 
 
 Murly I'. M-|)..riiiott (1838), 8 A. & E. 138 ; 3 N. & P. 250; I W. W. 
 
 * II. 220 lis 
 
 Miirpliv ('. Bo.'si! (1875), 44 L. J. Ex. 40; L. R. 10 Ex. 126 ; 32 L. T. 122; 
 
 23 W. R. 174 
 
 668 
 
 Miirpliv »'. Mirndith (1812), 5 Ir. L. R. 120 711 
 
 Murpliv r. Ncdan (187t), I. R. 7 K<|. 49S 818 
 
 " 682 
 
 Miirpliy V. Sullivan (180ii), 11 Ir. Jur. N. S. Ill 
 Murruy, lu tliu goiHU of ( 18;i7),l Curt. 596 
 
 174 
 
 Tit rrftrntM* art to pag**, ml to paragraph*. 
 
Jill 
 
 iiw 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. CXXXIU 
 
 r-AOK 
 
 Mnrray f. Ccmtcr (18'25), 4 Cowcii, 635 f)\:> 
 
 Muiiiiy 1'. Sheriffs of Dublin (1841). Arm. M. & <). I'M) 'J77 
 
 Alumiy c. (iri'Kory (1850), f) Ex. 4(i8 ; I'J L. J. Kx. :i:>r> ; 14 Jur. M'i '.'«:$ 
 
 Wurmy v. Maci; (1H74), Ir. S C. L. :mi 774 
 
 Wuiiiiy !•. Alackiiizi.' (18701. L. K. 10 0. P. CJ.'i ; 44 L. J. C, P. 313; 
 
 3'2 L. T. 777 ; '23 W. U. r.<)5 736 
 
 Murmy r. Milnur (187'J), 48 L. J. Cli. 775 ; I'i Cli. D. 849 ; 41 L. T. 213; 
 
 •J7 W. U. 881 415 
 
 Mmniy r. I'lirkiT (1K54), 10 Bciiv. 305 749 
 
 Miirriiy r. K. of Stiiir (1S23), •> B. k C. 82 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 278 74C>, 1203 
 
 MuHuriivo 1'. Kiii.TNoii (1817), 10 Q. JJ. 320 ; 1(1 L. J. Q. M. 174 440 
 
 MiiMsiiiiuit Clici'tliu t'. lliiboo Milu'eu Lull (18(17), 11 Moore, Indiiin App. C 
 
 3(iit, 3S0 1C)9 
 
 Miitiml Life, \e. v. Ilillman, (1892), 145 U. S. 28.') 377, 7'.f4 
 
 Mutual Loan Kuiid Ahh. v. 8udlow (18ii8), 28 L. J. C. P. 108 ; 6 C. li. N. S. 
 
 449 ; 5 Jur. N. H. 338 758 
 
 MvtTH r. DefricH (1879), 4 Ex. D. 170 ; 40 L. T. 795 ; 27 W. R. 791 ; 48 
 
 L. J. Ex. 4«0 41, 42 
 
 Mvirs »'. Perigal (1851-2), 2 De O. M. & U. .599; 11 C. B. 90; 21 L. J. 
 
 C. v. 217 ; 10 Jur. 1118 084 
 
 Mver« r. Sari (1800), ;U) J.. J. Q. B. 9 ; 3 E. & E. 300 : 7 Jur. N.S. 97.. 704, 700 
 J>\y-rs r. AVillis (1855), 17 C. B. 77 ; 18 C. B. 880 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 39, 255 ; 
 
 2 Jur. N. S. 4 1 1 79, 1 1 75 
 
 MyleH V. Burton (1S84), 14 L. B. Ir. 258 539 
 
 Myriek r. Dame (1852), 9 (^unIi. 218 758 
 
 Mywiri', &e.., Co., Re (1889), 42 Ch. D. .535 ; 68 L. J. Cli. 731 ; 01 L. T. 
 
 453 ; 37 W. li. 79 1 ; 1 Meg. 347 346 
 
 Nadin r. BuHHett (1883), 25 Cli. D. 21 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 253; 49 L. T. 4fi4 ; 
 
 32 W. R. 70 349 
 
 Nanle V. Sli.'it (1875), I. R. 9 C. L. ;i89 293, 1213 
 
 Nui.sli r. Brown (1840), 2 C. A: K. 219 274 
 
 Nuppur f. SanderH (1028). Iluttun, 119 170 
 
 JfuMi r. ArniHtronfif (1801), ;t0 L. J. C. P. 280; 10 C. B. N. S. 259; 9 
 
 W. R. 782 ; 7 Jur. N. S. KIOO 751 
 
 Na.xli c. (iilkehou (1819), 5 Ser>^. A: R. ;152 252 
 
 NaHh r. llodKNoi^ (1850), 25 L. J. Cli. 180; De (i. M. \- (i. 471 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 94ti 714, 710 
 
 Nash r. Turner (17!'5), 1 Enj). 217 1213 
 
 Natehholt. v. Porter (1089), 2 Verii. 112 059 
 
 N'ate'H («)• Nute'N) cunh (1800) Peters, Aliridj;. 82 ; 3 Runs. C. A: M. 458 
 
 (5t.h ed.) 502 
 
 JJavlor f. SeiniiieM (1829), 4 (Jill. \: J. 273 909 
 
 Neal r. Jay (1084),eited 12 Mod. 80 ; 1 .Salk. 281 1179 
 
 Meal c. WihliiiK (1740), 2 Str. 1151 423 
 
 Neulor. Ery (1081), (Mted 1 Salk. 281 ; 12 Mod. 80 1179 
 
 Meale r. Parkin (1 795), 1 Ksp. 229 523 
 
 Medhy f. N.flby (1852), 21 I,. J. < 'li. 440 ; 5 De U. & Sin. 377 137 
 
 Needham r Itreinner (1800), L. R. 1 C. P. 583; 35 L. J. C. P. 313; 1 
 
 II. & It. 731 1103 
 
 Neeilhani v. I'Vamr (1845), 1 C. B. 815; 3 D. & L. 190; 14 L. J. C. P. 
 
 250 ; 9 Jur. 734 835 
 
 Keedham r. Smith (1704), 2 Vem. 403 900, 910 
 
 Neeley c. Loek (1838), 8 C. & i". 532 106 
 
 Neil r. Neil (1829. 18;i9), 1 l.eigh, R. 0, 10, 21 M"- 
 
 Neiler. Jakl.' (181!)), 2 C. & K. 709 528 
 
 Neill r. D. of Devoimhire (1870 82), 2 I,. R. Ir. 154 ; 8 App. ('as. 1 17. .42, 290, 
 
 3!iO, 103, 4(t5, 400 
 Neilwm V. Harford (1841), 8 M. & W. 800,818, 8l'i ; VVelm. PhI. Rep. 295, 
 
 328; II I,. J. Kx. 20 43 
 
 NeiHon f. Walters (1890), 03 L. T. 328 531 
 
 Nulsoii, Re (1872), 1. U. Ecj. 509 708 
 
 Fol. I, tndt with pagi iiiii. 
 
CXXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 li!! 
 
 jfl 
 
 ■I 
 
 * 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 1 1 
 
 
 • 
 
 J 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Nelson, Ld.v.L(l.Bri(lport(1844, should bo 181C), 8 Boav. 547: 10 Jur. !043.. 51,936 
 Nelson V. Couoh (IHC3), 15 C. B. N. 8. 99 ; 8 L. T. 577 ; 11 W. R. 9C4 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 366 1120 
 
 NolHon V. Stockcr (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 7(iO ; 4 De G. & J. 758 54 1 
 
 Nelson V. "Whittall(1817), 1 B. & Aid. 19 1216 
 
 Nopcan V. Doo d. Knight (1847), 2 M. & W. 894 ; 2 Sm. L. C. 610, 629, 729. 173 
 
 N(!ptunu8, The (1799), 2 C. Rob. 110 1096 
 
 Nosham v. Selby (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 191 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 400 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 
 
 551 ; 26 L. T. M5, 568 673 
 
 NethcrlaudH Steam Boat Co. v. Styles (1854), 9 Moo. P. C. 0. 286 178 
 
 Nethorwood f). Wilkinson (1855), 17 C. B. 226 832 
 
 Neve V. Tennell (1863), 2 Now R. 508 ; 1 1 W. R. 980 738 
 
 Nevil V. Johnson (1703), 2 Vorn. 447 327 
 
 Novill V. Snolling (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 777 ; 15 Ch. D. 679 ; 43 L. T. 244 ; 
 
 29 W. R. 375 138 
 
 Neville f. Fino ArtsCo., (1805) 2 Q. B. 156; 72 L. T. 725 IM. [47,643] 
 
 Neville v. Wilkinson (1782), 1 Bro. C. C. 543 539 
 
 Novin V. Drysdalo (1867), 30 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 15 W. R. 980 753, 806 
 
 Newall »>. Elliott (1803), 1 II. & G. 797 ; 32 L. J. Ex. 120; 7 L. T. 758; 
 
 11 W. R. 438; 9 Jur. N. S. 359 1160 
 
 Newberry v. Benson (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 1003 462 
 
 Newboul'd v. Coltmiin (1851), 6 Ex. 189 ; 20 L. J. M. C. 149 1101 
 
 Newbould r. Smith (188U), 14 App. Cas. 423 ; 65 L. J. Ch. 788 ; 55 L. T. 
 
 194; 34 W. R. 6i)0 447, 452 
 
 Newburph r. Newburgh (1712), 3 Bro. P. C. 553 1038 
 
 Newby I'. Reed (1763), cited 1 Park, Ins. 148 175 
 
 Newbv r. Sharpo (1877), 8 Ch. D. 39; 47 L. J. Ch. 617 ; 38 L. T. 583; 
 
 26 W. R. 685 192 
 
 NewoH.sllo, I), of, V. Broxtowo (1832). 4 B. & Ad. 273 394 
 
 Now.iastlo, 1). of, V. Clark (1818), 8 Taun. 027, 628 ; 2 Moore (C. P.) 666 ; 
 
 20 R. R. 583 113 
 
 NewcHNtlo, I), of, V. Kinderley (1803), 8 Vcs. 363, 375 ; 7 R. R. 71 108 
 
 Newcastle. Muster Pilots and Seamen of, v. Bradley (1851), 2 E. & B. 
 
 42S, u. ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 35 791 
 
 Newell r. Radford (1867), 37 L. J. C. P. 1 ; L. R. 3 C. P. 52 ; 17 L. T. 
 
 118; 16 W. R. 97 671 
 
 Newell I'. Simpkin (1830), 6 Bing. 565 ; 4 M. & P. 395 996 
 
 New England Bank v. Lewis (1829), 8 Pirk. 113 1 139 
 
 Newenham v. Smith (18591, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 245 788 
 
 Newhallf. Holt (1840), 6 M. & W. 662; 4 Jur. 610 291 
 
 Nowham c. Raithby (1811), I Phillim. 315 1047 
 
 Newington f. Levy (1870), 40 L. J. C. P. 29; L. R. 6 C. P. 180; 23 L. 
 
 T. 595; 19 W. R. 473 1119 
 
 Newman r. Jinkins (1830), 10 Piek. 515 172 
 
 Newman v. Piercy (1876), 4 Ch. 1). 41 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 36 ; 35 L. T. 461 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 317 803 
 
 Newman v. Strot(!h (1829). M. & M. 338 379 
 
 Now Romiicv, Alayor, &c.. v. New Romnoy Commissioners of Si'wers, (1892) 
 
 1 Q. B. 84"0 ; (11 L. J. Q. B. 55S ; 56 J. P. 756 404 
 
 Newrv and Ennisk. Rv. Co. v. Combe (1849), 5 Railw. Cas. 633; 3 Ex. 
 
 665"; 18 L. J. Ex. 325 100 
 
 Newsam v. Curr (1817), 2 Stark. R. 6<J ; 19 R. R. 675 252, 256 
 
 Newsomo ti. Coles (1811), 2 {'amp. 617 ; 12 R. R. 756 1096 
 
 Newton c. Askew (1848), 6 Hare, 319 869 
 
 N<-wton I'. Boh her (1848), 1 Q. B. 921 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 38 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 53 ; 13 Jur. 253 530 
 
 Newton ('. Boresford (1831), Younge, Ex. R. 376 601 
 
 Newton V. Blunt (1846), 3 C. B. 676 ; 4 D. & L. 674 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 29 ; 
 
 16 L. J. C. P. 121 1116 
 
 Newton r. Chaplin (1850), 10 (!. B. 356 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 374 ; 14 Jur. 1121. 320 
 
 Newton c. Cliirke (18;i9), 2 Curt. 320 696 
 
 Nowton 0. Constable (1841), 2 Q. B. 162; 1 (J. \- 1). 408 ; 9 D. P. C. 933; 
 
 6 Jur. 317 869, «70, 871 
 
 Th* rej'$r$ncei ar* to paga, not to purayrapht. 
 
TABLl OF CASES CITED, 
 
 cxxxv 
 
 Newton r. Ellis (1855), 6 E. & B. 115 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 337 ; 1 Jnr. N. S. 
 
 860 227 
 
 Newton V. Harland (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 956 ; 1 Scott, N. R. 602 ; 9 Dowl. 
 
 16 ; 1 W. P. C. 63 ; 4 Jur. 992 819 
 
 Newton r. Liddiiird (181S), 12 Q. B. 927; 6 Railw. Cas. 42; 18 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 53 530 
 
 NowUm V. RickettH (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Krc. & M.) 35 942 
 
 Newton V. Rickctts (1861), 8 II. L. C. 260 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 247 131 
 
 New WiiidMor caso (1H35), Knapp & O. 173 497 
 
 NiHs V. North. & East. Ry. Co. (1838), 3 My. & Cr. 355; 7 L. J. Ch. 142 ; 
 
 2 K. 76 601 , 995 
 
 Nichol r. Godts (1854), 10 Fix. 191 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 314 776 
 
 Nicholas and Freeman v. Binns (1858), 1 S. & T. 243 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 6 170 
 
 Nichollo 1'. Pluino (1824), 1 C. & P. 272 691 
 
 Nicholls r. Dowding (1815), 1 Stark. R. 81 ; 18 R. R. 746 . .386, 488, 494, 921 
 
 Nicholls •;. Downes (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 13 520 
 
 Nicholls V. GoUlsniith (1831), 7 Wend. 160 454 
 
 Nicholls V. O.sbom (1727), 2 P. Wms. 419 789 
 
 Nicholls V. Parker (1811), 14 East, 331, n. ; 12 R. R. 542 3:'6, 410 
 
 Nicholls V. Walker (1634), Cro. Car. ;i94 1101 
 
 Nichols, III re (1872), 41 L. J. P. & M. 88 ; L. R. 2 P. ic M. 461 ; 27 L. 
 
 T. 323; 21 AV. R. 161 173 
 
 Nichols V. Johnson (1834), 10 Conn. 192 1 199 
 
 Nichols v. Wehb (1823), 8 Wheat. 326 454 
 
 Nicholson, Ex part.% Re Willson (1880), 14 Ch. D. 243 ; 49 L. J. Bk. 68 ; 
 
 43 L. T. 266 ; 28 W. R. 936 849 
 
 Nicholson v. Bower (1858), 1 E. & E. 172 ; 28 L. J. Q. B. 97 ; 6 Jur. N. 
 
 8. 246 689, 692 
 
 Nicholson t>. Brad«eld Union (1866), 35 L. J. Q. B. 176; L. R. 1 Q. B. 
 
 620 ; 7 B. & S. 744 641 
 
 Nicholson v. Mullijjan (1868), I. R. 3 Eij. 308 806 
 
 Nicholson v. Revill (1836), 4 A. & E. 675 ; 6 N. & M. 192 1 194 
 
 Nicholson f. Smith (1822), 3 Stark. R. 129 515 
 
 Nickalls v. Merry (1876), L. R. 7 H. L. 630 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 575 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 623 ; 23 W. R. 063 158 
 
 Nickells V. Atherstone (1847), 10 Q. B. 944 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 371 ; 11 Jnr. 
 
 778 660, 661 
 
 Nickolson r. Knowles (1820), 5 Madd. 47 645 
 
 Niooll V. Greaves (1864), 33 L. J. C. P. 259 ; 17 C. B. N. 8. 27 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 631 ; 12 W. R. 961 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 919 36 
 
 Nifa, The, (1892) 1 R. 540; (1892) P. 411; 62 L. J. P. 12; 69 L. T. 66. .740, 766 
 
 Nightinjral f. Devismo (1770), 5 Burr. 2594 1036 
 
 Niles f. Brackett (1819), 15 Mass. 378 910 
 
 Noblo'8 Trusts, Re (187 1), I. R. 6 Vai. 140 798 
 
 Noble V. Chapman (1854), 14 C. B. 400 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 50 ; 18 Jur. 44 . . 190 
 
 Nohio t'. Durcll (1789), 3 T. R. 271 766 
 
 Noble V. Kennoway (1780), 2 Doug. 513 157, 232, 766, 782 
 
 Noble V. Wanl (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 81 ; L. R. 1 Ex. 117 ; 4 H. & C. 149 ; 
 
 36 L. J. Ex. 91 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 135 762 
 
 NoUe V. WiUoek and Phelps (1871), 40 L. J. P. & M. 60 ; L. R. 2 P. & 
 
 D. 276; 25 L. T. 65; 19 W. R. 1115 1132 
 
 Nodin V. Murray (1812), 3 Camp. 228 : 13 R. R. 796 , 296 
 
 Noding r. Alleston (1892), cited Greenleaf on Ev. 15th edit. 369 698 
 
 Noel f. Wells ( 16(i9), 1 Lev. 235 1 103, 1 105 
 
 Nolan t'. Copenian (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 84 ; 42 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 27 L. T. 
 
 789; 21 W. R. 263 818 
 
 Nolan V. Gumley (1863), 14 Ir. C. L. R. 301 732, 734 
 
 Norden v. Wiliiamwm (ISi(S), 1 Taun. 377 891 
 
 Nordone'.Defries(1882),8(i.B.l).5()8; 5lL.J.(i. B. 415; 30W. R. 612.. 1186 
 
 Norman v. Colo (180(1), 3 Esp. 253 747 
 
 Normiin r. Morrell (1799), 4 Ves. 769 ; 4 K. R. 317 762 
 
 Norman r. Phillips (1S45), 14M.& W.283; 14 L. J. Ex. ;106; 9 Jur. 832. .689, 692 
 Norruya t'. Franks (1874), I. R. 9 Eq. 18 801 
 
 Vol. I. tnd* tvith pagt OSS. 
 
 
iii 
 
 CXXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Norris v. Beach (1807), 2 Johns. 29 1 866 
 
 Norris V. Cooke (18o7), 30 L. T. (Ir.) 22 1 667 
 
 Norris v. Cottle (1850), 2 H. L. Cas. 647 ; 14 Jur. 703 640 
 
 Norris I'. Miles (I80S), 1 Camp. 389 ; 10 R. R. 710 385, 496 
 
 North of EuK- Joint Stock Bk. Co., Re, Ex parte Gauthwaitc (18;)1), 20 
 
 L. J. Ch. 182, 192, 193 ; 3 Mac. & G. 187 74 
 
 North of EiiK. Joint-Stook Bk. Co.. Re, Ex parte StraflPon's Exors. (1853), 
 
 22 L. J. Ch. 194 ; 1 Do tt. M. & G. 576 : 4 DeG. *: Sm. 250 541 
 
 North German Lloyd St. Ship. Co. v. Elder (The Schwablc) (IfiGl), 1 Lush. 
 
 239 ; 14 M<K). P. C. C. 241 ; 4 L. T. KiO 178 
 
 North-West. Ry. Co. t'. MoMichael (1850), 5 Ex. 855 ; 14 Jur. 987 ; 20 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 6 ; 100 
 
 Northam v. Latouche (1829), 4 C. & P. 140 1019 
 
 Northcote v. Doughty (1879), 4 C. P. D. 385 ; 24 Sol. J. 77ii 718 
 
 Northumberiand, D. of, r. Todd (1878), 7 Ch. D. 777 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 343; 
 
 38 L. T. 746 ; 28 W. B. 350 914 
 
 Norton V. Bazett (1856), Deane, Ecc. R. 259 695 
 
 Norton v. Pettibone (1S29), 7 Conn. 319 610 
 
 ^.' Twich & Lowestoft Nav. Co. t Tlicobald (1828), M. & M. 153 109fl 
 
 JNorwich, Bishop of, r. Pear8c(18r 37 L.J. Ecc. 90; L.R.2 A.&E. 281 . .884,885 
 
 Notor r. Brooks (1861). 7 H. & N. -i99 778 
 
 Nottidg-o V. Prince (1858), 2 Giff. 246 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 857 136 
 
 Nottingham, Guard, of, r. Tomkinson (1879), 4 C. P. D. 343 ; 48 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 171 ; 28 W. R. 151 621 
 
 Novellif. Rossi (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 757; 9 L. J. K. B. O. S. 307 1147, 1200 
 
 Nowlan r. Ablett (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 54 ; 1 Gale, 72 ; 5 Tyr. 709 ; 4 
 
 L. J. Ex. 155 36 
 
 Nowlan f. Gibson (1847), 12 Ir. L. R. 5, 8—12 89, 1110. 11 13, 1140 
 
 Nugent r. Smith (1876), 1 0. P. D. 423 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 697 ; 34 L. T. 827 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 117 771 
 
 N; .:n's Will, Re (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 255 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 331 7!"8 
 
 Nunn r. Fabian (1866), 35 L. J. Ch. 140 ; L. R. 1 Cli. 35 631, 688 
 
 Nye r. Macdoniild (1870), 39 L. J. P. C. 34 ; L. R. 3 P. C. 331 ; 23 L. T. 
 
 220; 18 W. R. 1075 9 
 
 325 
 ; 35 
 
 : 36 L. J. 
 L. J. Ex. 
 
 Ch. 
 
 87; 
 
 919 
 
 14 L. T. 20; 
 
 Oakapple t'. Copous (1791), 4 T. R. 361 , 
 Oakeley r. Ooddeen (1861), 2 F. & F. 651 
 
 Oakes r. Hill (1833), 14 Pick. 442 
 
 Oakcs r. Turquand (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. 
 Oaklcv «•. Monck (1S05), L. R. 1 Ex. 159 
 
 14 W. R. 406 ; \ H. & C. 251 
 
 Oastler v. Hcnderwm (18771, 2 Q. B. D. 575 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 007 ; 37 L. T. 22 
 
 Obicini r. Bligh (1H32), 8 King. 335 : 1 Moo. & S. 477 1 
 
 O'Brien r. Lewis (1863), 32 L. J. Ch. 569 ; 4 Giff. 221 ; 8 L. T. 380; 
 
 11 W. R. 716; 9 Jur. N. S. 620 
 
 O'Brien r. R. (1849). 2 II. F^. Cas. 465 
 O'Brien r. Slieil (1873), I. R. 7 Eq. 255 
 
 Ocean, The (1801). 5 C. Rob. Adm. 90 
 
 Ochsenlwin c. Pape'.ier (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. 695 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 861 ; 28 L T. 
 
 459 ; 21 W. R. 516 1 132, 1 
 
 O'Connell'H case (18 J3-4), Arm. & T. 275 
 
 0'C<miiell t. Butler (1819), Milw. (Ir. Ecc.) 102 
 
 O'Conuell v. The Queen (1844), 11 CI. & Fin. 373 
 
 O'Cmnor «•. Majoribanks (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 435 ; 11 L J. C. P. 267. .590. 
 
 O'tJonnor r. Hpaight (1804). 1 Sch. & Lef. 300 
 
 Odell, Re (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 207 435, 
 
 O'Donnellt'. O'Donell (1882), 13 L. R. Ir. 226 
 
 O'Donnell f. O'DonnoU (I87H), 1 L. R. Ir. 284 
 
 O' Flanagan r. Oeoghcgan (1864). 16 C. B. N. 8. 636 
 
 Ogden r. Heskcth (1849), 2 C. & K. 772 
 
 Ogilvio V. Currie (1868), 27 L. J. Ch. 641 ; 16 W. R. 709 ; 18 L. T. 593 . . 
 Ogilviev. Foljamlw (1817), 3 Mor. 63; 17 R. R. 13 
 
 52. 
 271 
 
 rs 
 
 076 
 
 16T 
 660 
 147 
 
 136 
 
 895 
 665 
 J 79 
 
 142 
 383 
 140 
 435 
 591 
 682 
 698 
 765 
 10 
 830 
 481 
 129 
 674 
 
 The reftvencM are to pagei, not to parngraphi. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxxxvii 
 
 IB 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Ogle*. Cook (1748), 1 Ves. sen. 177 1215 
 
 Ogle V. Norcliffe (1708), 2 Ld. Raym. 869 19 
 
 Ogle V. Ld. Vane (1868), L. R. 2 Q. B. 275 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 175 ; 7 B. & S. 
 
 855 752 
 
 O'Grady v. Corr (1876), I. R. 10 Eq. Ill 462 
 
 Ohlsenf. Ter,jro (1874), 44 L. J. Ch. 155; L. R. 10 Ch. 127; 31 L. T. 
 
 811 ; 23W. R. 196 922 
 
 O'Kane v. O'Kane (1892), 30 L. R. Ir. 489 Adtl. [125] 
 
 Okcden v. Clifden (1826), 2 Russ. 309 786 
 
 Olding, Re (1841), 2 Curt. 8G5 697 
 
 O'Leary v. Douglass (1878), 1 Ir. L. R. 45 704 
 
 Olive V. Guin (l(i53), 2 Sid. 146 8, 283 
 
 Oliver t: Bartlett (1819), 1 B. & B. 209 373 
 
 Oliver r. Hunting (1890), 44 Ch. D. 205 ; 59 L. J. Ch. 255 ; 62 L. T. 108 ; 
 
 38 W. R. 618 672 
 
 Oliver f.Woodroffe (1839), 4 M.&W. 650; 7 Dowl. 166; 1 H. & II. 474. .732, 733 
 Ollivant V. Bayley (1843), 5 Q. B. 288 ; D. & M. 373 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 34 ; 
 
 7 Jur. 1 1 30 777 
 
 Olvcr 1'. Johns (1870), 39 L. J. P. & M. 7 't? 
 
 O'Meagher v. O'Meagher (188,3), 11 L. R. Ir. 117 6i»7 
 
 Omi ..mdr. Barker (1744-5), Willes, 550 901,903,905,11(8 
 
 Omiimney r. Stilwell (1856), 23 Beav. 328 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1058 173 
 
 O'Neill V. Allen (1859). 9 Ir. L. R. N. S. 132, 141 123 
 
 O'Neill c. Bell (1866), I. R. 2 C. L. 68 768 
 
 O'Neill f. Read (1845), 7 Ir. L. R. 434 487 
 
 Onions i'. Tyrer (1716). I T. V.'ms. 43 708 
 
 Onslow, Rp. Ex parte Kibble (1875), L. R. 10 Ch. 373 ; 44 L. J. Bk. 63 ; 
 
 32 L. T. 138 ; 23 W. R. 433 718 
 
 Oppenheim v. AVlnte Lion Hotel Co. (1871), 6 L. R. C. P. 515 ; 40 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 231 : 25 L. T. 93 162 
 
 Ord. In re (1878). 9 Ch. D. 667 80S 
 
 O'R'illv, Re (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 5 ; 2!) L. T. 516 ; 22 W. R. 224 . . 793 
 
 Orine-od v. Chadwiek (1847), 16 M. & AV. 307 ; 16 L J. M. C. 143 131 
 
 Ormrod r. Huth (1815), 14 M. & W. 664 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 366 775 
 
 O'Rorke r. Bolingbroke (1877), 2 App. 0<i«. 8M ; 26 W. R. 239 138 
 
 O'Rourke v. P ••eval (1811), 2 Ball & B. 58 ; 12 R. R. 68 G76 
 
 Orr t'. Diekension (185H). Jolms. 1 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 516 : 5 Jur. N. S. 672 . . 652 
 
 Orr V. Morico (1821), 3 B. & B. 139 ; 6 Moore, C. P. 347 1211 
 
 Onvll Colliery Co., Re (1879), 12 Ch. D. 681 : 48 L. J. Ch. 655 1138 
 
 Orrell v. Coppock (1857), 2() L. J. Ch. 269 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1244 . . 67* 
 
 Orrett v. Corser (1855), 21 B.'av. 52 436 
 
 0.sborn v. Lond. Doek Co. (1855), 10 Ex. 698 ; 3 C. L. R. 313 ; 24 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 140 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 93 964 
 
 Osbom V. Thompson (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 256 ; 9 C. & P. 337 268, 259, 27* 
 
 Osgathorpe r. Diseworth (1745-6), 2 Str. 1256 ; Burr. 261 1 139 
 
 Osgood r. Manhattan Co. (1824), 3 Cowen. 612 493 
 
 O'Sullivau f. Burke (1875), I. R. 9 C. L. 105 444 
 
 Oswild, In re (1874^, 43 L. J. P. & M. 24 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 162 141 
 
 OHwell c. Shepherd (xfe Re Smith). 
 
 Ottuway V. Hamilton (1878), 47 L. J. C P 725 ; 3 C. P. D. 393 ; 38 L. T. 
 
 925 ; 26 \V. R. 783 16« 
 
 Otter, The (1874), L. R. 4 Adm. 203 • 30 L. T. 43 ; 22 W. R. 557 260 
 
 Oiigier «'. Jeunings (1800), 1 Camp. 5(.i", 506, n. ; 10 R. R. 739, n 766 
 
 Outhwaiter. Luntley (1815), 4 Camp. 179; 16 R. R. 771 1191, 1203 
 
 Outram v. Morewood (1803), 3 East, 34t. ; 6 T. R. 121 ; 7 R. R. 473. . . .88, 89, 
 
 446, 1110, 1112. 1113, 1114, 1120 
 Overend, Gumey & Co r. Oriental Finiii ce Corp. (1874), L. R. 7 H. L. 
 
 348 ; 31 L. T. 322 ; 21 W. II. 501 ; 4/ ^ J. Ch. 502 758 
 
 Owei; V. Flack (1826), 2 Sim. & St. 600 620 
 
 Owen V. Warburton (1805). 1 Boh. & P. N. R. 326 ; 8 R. R. 817 616 
 
 Owen r. Wynn (1878). 9 Ch. I). 29 ; 38 L. T. 623 ; 26 W. R. 644.. ..994, 1183 
 
 Owing* r. Wvaut (179.5), 1 Har. & M'H. 393 '295 
 
 Oxford Circuit case (Spring, 1833), 6 C. & P. 642, n 188 
 
 5 i 
 
 - I 
 
 Vol. I. end* with pagi 63w. 
 
cxxxvin 
 
 TABLE or CASES CITED. 
 
 m 
 
 p ft i ; 
 
 FAOfl 
 
 Oxford, Worcester, and Wolverhampton Ry. Co. v. Scudamore (1857), 1 
 H. &N. 666 474 
 
 Paget v. Lond. Tramways Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 440, n., 698 1186 
 
 Paoifio St. N.IV. Co. v. Lewis (1847), 16 M. & W. 792 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 212 ; 
 
 4 Dowl. & L. 681 187, 190 
 
 Packard v. Richardson (1821), 17 Mass. 122 669 
 
 Paddock v. Forrester (1842), 2 Scott, N. R. 731 ; 3 M. & Gr. 903 506, 514 
 
 Paddon v. Winch (1870), 39 L. J. Ch. 627 ; L. R. 9 Eq. 666 ; 22 L. T. 403 608 
 
 Padgett V. Lawrence (1843), 10 Paige, IHO 514 
 
 Pager. Carew(1831), 1 C. & J. 514 817 
 
 Page V. Faucet (1591), Cro. Eliz. 2i7 16, 20 
 
 Page V. Homans (1837), 2 Shepl. 478 1221 
 
 Pain i>. Beeston (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 20 954 
 
 Paine & Layton, Ex parte, (1809), 4 Ch. App. 215 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 305. .321, 845 
 
 Paine v. Hall (1812), 18 Ves. 476 140 
 
 Paine v. M'Intier (1804), 1 Mass. 69 ; 10 Maws. 461 759 
 
 Paine V. Strand Union (1846), 8 Q.B. .'520; 15L. J. M. C. 89; 10 Jur. 308. .639, 642 
 
 Painter ». Abel (1862), 3 F. & F. 518 529 
 
 Palermo, The (1883), 9 P. D. 6 ; 63 L. J. P. D. & A. 6 1186 
 
 Palethorp v. Furnish (1783), 2 Esi>. 511, n 604 
 
 Pallikelagatha Marcar '•. Sigg (1880), L. R. 7 Ind. App. 83, 100 740 
 
 Palmer v. Maclear (1858), 1 S. & T. 149 929 
 
 Palmerv.Newhall(1855),30Beav.32; 8DeG.M.&G. 74; 24L. J. Ch. 424. .806,807 
 
 Palmer f. Palmer (1885), 18 L. R. Ir. 1»2 i, 419, 420 
 
 Panton v. Holland (1819), 17 Johns. 92 201 
 
 Panton v. Williams (1841), 2 Q. B. 192 ; 1 G. "• D. 504 ; 10 L. J. Ex. Ch. o45 . . 25, 30 
 Papendick v. Bridgwater (1855), 5 E. & B. 166; 24 L. J. Q. B. 289 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 657 444, ■«46, 511 
 
 Pardington v. South Wales Ry. Co. (1856), 1 H. & N. 392 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 105 723 
 
 Pardoe v. O'Connor (1848), 12 Ir. L. R. 63 621 
 
 Pardoet). Price (1844), 13 M. & W. 267; 14 L. J. Ex. 212 302 
 
 Parfltt V. Lawless 0872), 41 L. J. P. & M. 68 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 462 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 215 ; 21 W. R. 200 136 
 
 Pargeter v. Harris (1845), 7 Q B. 708 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 10 Jur. 260.. 93 
 Parker, In re, Bentham v. Wilson (1881), 15 Ch. D. 628 ; 17 Ch. D. 262 ; 
 
 60 L. J. Ch. 639 ; 44 L. T. 885 ; 29 W. R. 855 146 
 
 Parker v. Carter (1818), 4 Munf. 273 598 
 
 Parker v. Gordon (1808), 7 East, 385 ; 3 Smith, 368 ; 6 Esp. 41 ; 8 R. R. 646 33 
 
 Parker v. Hoskins (1810), 2 Taun. 223 328, 1214 
 
 Parker v. Ibbetson (1858), 4 C. B. N. 8. 348 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 236 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 6^6 1 53, 768 
 
 Parker ». M'Keiina (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 802 ; 30 L. T. 807 324 
 
 Parker v. M-WilUam (1830), 6 Bing. 683 ; 4 M. & P. 480 918 
 
 Parker v. Morrell (1848), 2 Phill. 453 495 
 
 Parker v. Palmer (1821), 4 B. & Aid, 387 37 
 
 Parker ». Potts (1815), 3 Dow, 2J; 15 R. R. 1 17a 
 
 Parker v. Stuniland (1809), 1 1 East, 362 ; 10 R. R. 521 68a 
 
 Parker v. Taswell (1858), 2 De G. & J. 659 ; 27 L. J. Ch. 812 04!/ 
 
 Parker ' Wallis (185.')), 5 E. & B. 21 689 
 
 Parker V.Wells (1881), 18 Ch. D. 477; 45 L. T. 617 ; 30 W. R. 392 118H 
 
 Parker v. Yates (1827), 12 Moore, C. P. 520 603 
 
 Parkhurst ». L'>wten (1816), 1 Mer. 401 ; 2 Swanst. 194 ; 15 R. R. 140 . . 960, 
 
 961, 962, 965, 967, 968, 969 
 
 Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt (1814), 1 Johns. 280 673 
 
 Parkin e. Moon (1836), 7 0. & P. 409 921, 944 
 
 Parkins f. Hawkshaw (1817), 2 Stark. R. 239; 19 R. R. 711 506, 599 
 
 Parkinson v. Lee (1802), 2 f:ii«t, 314 ; 6 R. R 429 776 
 
 Parkinson i. Townsend (1875), 44 L. J. P. & M. 32 ; 33 L. T. 232 ; 23 W. 
 
 R. 656 1 132 
 
 Parmenter v. Webber (1818), 8 Tauu. 593 656 
 
 Parmiter v. Coupland (1840), 6 M. & W. 107, 108 ; 4 Jur. 701 46, 46 
 
 The refermcet ar» to paffe$, not to paragraphs. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXIX 
 
 I 
 
 FAOa 
 
 Panniter v. Parmiter (1860), IJ. & H. 135 ; 3 De G. F. & J. 461 ; 30 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 508 : 3 L. T. 799 712 
 
 Parnt'll V. "Wood, (1892) P. 137; 66L. T. 670; 40W. R. 664 1062 
 
 Parr, Re (1860), 29 L. J. P. & M. 70 708 
 
 Parr lor Bosworth) v. Cotchett (1824), 1 Ph. Ev. 333 ; 3 St. Ev. 824 .... 451 
 
 Parrott v. Watts (1877), 47 L. J. C. P. 79 ; 37 L. T. 755 377 
 
 Parry «. FairhurBt (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 190 187, 190, 194 
 
 Parry r. May (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 279; 5 Tyr. 685 311 
 
 Parry v. Nicholson (1845), 13 M. & W. 779 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 119; 2 Dowl. 
 
 & L. 640 1192 
 
 Parsons v. Brown (1852), 3 C. & K. 295 284 
 
 Parsons v. Hancock (1829), M. & M. 330 653 
 
 Parsons v. Hayward (1862), 31 L. J. Ch. 666 ; 4 De G. F. & J. 474; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 924 169 
 
 Parsons v. Loyd (1772), 3 Wils. 341 83 
 
 Parsons i'. PurcoU (1849), 12 Ir. L. R. 90 292 
 
 Parsons r. Sexton (1847), 4 C. B. 908 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 181 777 
 
 Parteriche r. Powlet (1742), 2 Atk. 383 743 
 
 Parton v. Cole (1842), 6 Jur. 370 286, 287 
 
 Parton v. Crofts (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 11 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 189 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 34 ; 12 W. R. 653 297 
 
 Partridge p. Coates (1824), Ry. &M. 156; 1 C. & P. 534 311 
 
 Partridge f. Scott (1838), 3 M. & W. 220 ; 1 H. & H. 31 114, 116 
 
 Partridge v. Usbome (1828), 5 Russ. 196 1 123 
 
 Pasker. Ollat (1815), 2 Phillim. 324 140 
 
 Pauley v. Freeman (1789), 3 T. R. 51 ; 2 Sra. L. C. 74 ; 1 R. R. 034 .... 718 
 Pdter V. Baker (1847), 3 C. B. 831 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 124 ; 11 Jur. 370 .... 189 
 Patersonv. Ganda8equi(1812), 15East, 62; 2Sra. L. C.378; 13R.R. 368.. 758 
 
 Paterson V. Hardacre (1811), 4 Tauu. 114 262 
 
 Paton V. Sheppard (1839), 10 Sim. 186 146 
 
 Patrick t-. Sheclden (1853), 2 E. & B. 14 1153 
 
 Patrickson v. Patrickson (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 48 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 86; 
 
 12 Jur. N. S. 30 ; 13 L. T. 667 ; 14 W. R. 212 150 
 
 Patten v. Poulton (1858), 1 S. & T. 65 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 341 ; 27 L. J. P. 41 . . 143 
 
 Patterson v. Becher (1821), 6 Moore, C. P. 319 521 
 
 Patterson f. Black (1780), cited 2 Park, Ins. 919, 920 173 
 
 Pattinsou v. Luokley (1876), L. R. 10 Ex. 330 ; 44 L. J. Ex. 180; 33 L. T. 
 
 360; 24W.R.224 1197 
 
 Pattonv. Ash (1821), 7 Serg. &R. 116, 125 1.54 
 
 Patton V. Goldsborough (1822), 9 Serg. & R. 47 614 
 
 Paul V. Cleaver (1810), 2 Taun. 360; UR. R. 608 732 
 
 Paulv. Meek (1828), 2 Y. & J. 116 300 
 
 Paul«. Roy (1862), 21 L. J. Ch. 361; 15 Beav. 433 1163 
 
 Pauling V. London & North Western Ry. Co. (1853), 8 Ex. 867 ; 23 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 106 ; 7 Railw. Cas. 816 641, 644, 647 
 
 Paull V. Simpson (1846), 9 Q. B. 365 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 382 663 
 
 Pawseyt). Armstrong (1881), 18Ch.D.698; 60L. J. Ch. 683; 30W.R.469. 159 
 
 Paxton f . Douglas (1809), 16 Ves. 242 970 
 
 Paxtonv. Douglas (1812), 19 "Ves. 225; 12 R. R. 176 , 961, 962 
 
 Paxton V. Popham(1814), 9 East, 419 91, 746 
 
 Payne r. Barker (1659), Bridg. 18, 23, 26 6, 83 
 
 Payne v. Ibbotson (1859), 27 L. J. Ex. 341 926, 927 
 
 Payne v. Rogers (1785), 1 Doug. 407 487 
 
 Payne v. Wilson (1895), 16 R. (April) 275 ; (1895) 1 Q. B. 653 ; 64 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 328; 72L. T. 110; 43 W. R. 250 Add. [116] 
 
 Peaceable v. Watson (1811), 4 Taun. 16 ; 13 R. R. 552 444, 445 
 
 Peaoham's case (1616), 2 How. St. Tr. 870 573 
 
 Peacock's Estate, Re (1872), L. R. 14 ^q. 236 806 
 
 Peacock t'. Bell (1667), 1 Wms. Saunders, 75 20, 83 
 
 Peacock v. Harper (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 238 ; 7 Ch. D. 048 ; 38 L. T. 143 ; 
 
 26 W. R. 109 274 
 
 Peacock V. Harris (1808), 10 East, 104 ; 10 R. R. 231 619 
 
 Peacock V. Harris (1830), 6 A. & E. 449 619 
 
 Vol, 1. ends with page 636. 
 
cxl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 w 
 
 n 
 
 Jjrt; 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Peacock V. Monk {174S), 1 Vos. sen. 128 748 
 
 iVacock V. Peacock (1809), IG Ves. 49, 56; lOR. R. 138 IGO 
 
 iVaoock V. Peacock (1859), 1 Sw. & Tr. 183 ; 27 L. J. Mat. 71 48 
 
 Pcarcev. Hooper (1810), 3 Taun. 60 1211 
 
 Ptarce f. Morrice (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 396 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 21 ; 4 N. & M. 48 30(» 
 
 Pcarce v. Ornsby (1835), 1 M. & Rob. 455 244 
 
 Poardonv. Underhill(1850). 16Q.B. 120; 20L. J.Q. B. 133; 16Jur.465.. 234 
 Poarn, Re (1875), 45 L. J. P. D. & A. 31 ; 1 P. D. 70 ; 33 L. T. 705; 
 
 24 W. R. 143 698 
 
 Pearn r. Liiing (1871), 40 L. J. Ch. 225 ; L. R. 12 Eq. 41 ; 24 L. T. 19; 
 
 19 W. R. 653 449, 720 
 
 Pcarso V. Coaker (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 92 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 82 ; 20 L. T. 82 . . 1119 
 
 Pearse v. Grove (1747), 3 Atk. 623 537 
 
 Pcarse v. Pear8o(lS46), 1 DeG.&Sin.25; IGL. J. Ch. 153. .592, 693, .594, 601, 602 
 Pcurnon v. Att.-Gen. {"re Ro Peiton). 
 
 I'.arson r. Eletclier (1803), 5 Esp. 90 598 
 
 Pearson t-. Isles (1781), 2 Doujf. 556 834 
 
 Pearson v. Le Muitre (1843), 6 Scott, N. R. 607 ; 5 M. & Gr. 700 ; 12 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 253; 7 Jur. 748 243, 244,246 
 
 Pearson f. Pearson (1872), 40 L. J. P. & M. 53 ; L. R. 2 P. & D. 451 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 917; 19 W. R. 1014 698 
 
 Pearson c Pearson (1884), 27 Ch. D. 149 ; 54 L. J. Ch. 37 ; ■■<2 W. R. 1006 754 
 Pearson r. Scott (1878), 47 L. J. Cli. 705; 9 Ch. D. 198 ; 38 L. T. 717 ; 
 
 26 ^V. R. 796 167 
 
 Pearson v. Shaw (1844), 7 Ir. L. R. 1 16 
 
 Pearson r. Spencer (1863), 3 B. i S. 761 ; 8 L. T. 166 ; 11 W. R. 471.. .. 115 
 
 Pearsons. Re (1864). 33 L. J. P. & M. 177 697 
 
 Pease r. Wells (1840), 8 Dowl. 626 732 
 
 Peck, Re (1860), :V L. J. P. & M. 95 : 2 S. & T. 506 173 
 
 Peck V. Peck (1870), 21 L. T. 670 ; 18 \V. R. 295 929, 9()0 
 
 Peckhamf. Potter (1824), 1 C. & P. 232 511 
 
 Pedlar v. Paige (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 258 1209 
 
 Pedley v. Dodds (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 819 ; 14 L. T. 823 ; 14 V.'. R. 884 . . 803 
 
 Pedley v. Wellesley (1829), 3 C. & P. 558 891 
 
 Pet^k V. North Staliord Ry. Co. (1849, should be 1860), 29 L. J. Q. Ji. 97 ; 
 
 35 L. T. O. S. 407 ; 8 W. R. 364 675 
 
 Peek V. North Stafford Ry. Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 469 ; E. B. & E. 958.. 755 
 
 Peek V. North Statl'ord Ry. Co. (1863), 10 H. L. Cus. 473 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 241 ?J3 
 
 Peel's case {see Re Barned's Banking Co.). 
 
 Peel, Re (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 46; 39 L. J. P. & M. 36; 22 L. T. 417.. 789 
 
 Peerless, The {see Prowse f. European, &c. Shipping Co.). 
 
 Pcirce v. Corf (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 210 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; 29 L. T. 919 ; 
 
 22W. R. 299 673, 730 
 
 Peisch V. Dixon (1816), 1 Mason, 11 763 
 
 Pejepscot Prop's v. Ransom (1817), 14 Mass. 145 122 
 
 Pelham v. Pickersgill (1787), 1 T. R. 660 ; 1 R. R. 348 1:;4 
 
 Pell f. Daubeny (1850), 3 Ex. 955 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 44 820 
 
 Pelletreau v. Jackson (1833), 11 Wend. 117 88 
 
 Pembroke, Lady, Re (1856), Deane, Ecc. R. 182 ; 20 Jur. 626 701 
 
 Pender f. FoIkss (1838), 1 Dev. & B. 250 767 
 
 Pendleton v. Rootli (1859), 1 Giff. 45 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 265 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 840 4C7 
 
 Peudrcll v. Pendrell (1731), 2 Sir. 924 417 
 
 Penfold V. Abbott (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 67 ; 7 L. T. 384 ; 11 W. R. 169 ; 
 
 9 Jur. N. S. 517 773 
 
 Penn c.Bibby (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 465 ; L. R. 2 CL. 127 ; 15 L. T. 399; 
 
 15 W. R. 208 12.32 
 
 Penn v. Jack (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 314 ; 14 W. R. 76C ; 14 L. T. 495 272 
 
 Pennefather v. Pennefather (1872), Ir. 6 Eq. 171 172 
 
 Pennell v. Meyer (1838), 2 M. & Rob. 98 ; 8 C. & P. 470 481 
 
 Penuiman f. Hill (1875), 24 W. R. 245 917 
 
 Penny v. Watts (1848-,50), 2 De G. & Sm. 601 971 
 
 Penrioev. Williams (1883), 23 Ch. D. 353; 62 L. J. Ch. 693; 48 L. T. 
 
 868 ; 31 W. R. 496 1188 
 
 The rtjeimoen are to page», not to puruyia^ht. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxli 
 
 PAoa 
 
 Ponniddook «. Hammond (1817), 11 Buav. 59 601 
 
 Ppntre^uinea Coal Co., Re (1862), 4 Do G. F. & .T. all ; 31 L. J. Ch. 741 ; 
 
 7 L. T. 84 ; 10 W. R. 660 ; 8 .Tur. N. S. 70(> 681 
 
 People, The, ». Holbrook (1H16), 13. Tohns. UU 283 
 
 People, The, t'. Matlier (1830), 4 "Wend. 22f», 2.'52— 254 . .962, 904, 905, 968, 9;2 
 
 People, The, v. Matte.son (1827), 2 Cowen, 433, 573, n 903 
 
 People, The, ex. rel. Ordroiiaux v. Choguray (1836), 18 Wend. 642 893 
 
 People t'. Bill (lav-i), 10 Johns. 9.i 883 
 
 People V. Cannon (1893), 36 Am. St. R. 689 AiM. [70] 
 
 People V. Carlion (Ki94). 40 Am. St. R. 346 AM. [68] 
 
 People V. Whipple (1827), 9 Cowen, 707 6:>2 
 
 Perchard v. Tindall (1795), 1 Esp. 394 50!) 
 
 Pereival v. Cauey (1851), 4 De G. & Sm. 623 480 
 
 Periival v. Nanson (1851), 7 Ex. 3 ; 21 L. J. Ex 1 4-i5, 440, 458 
 
 Perfeft v. Lime (1861), 3 De G. F. & J. 369 ; 31 L. J, Ch. 489 ; 6L. T. 8 ; 
 
 10 W. R. 197 , 30 Beav. 187 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 547 137 
 
 Peri^al v. Nicholson (1810), Wightw. 63 447 
 
 Perkins v. Bradley (1842), 1 Hare, 219 ; 6 Jur. 254 135 
 
 Perkin.s v. Vuu^'han (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 988 ; 5 Scott, N, R. 881 ; 12 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 38 ; 6 Jur. 1114 243, •44 
 
 Perriiig v. Hone (1826), 4 Binp. 28 ; 12 Moore, C. P. 135 ; 2 C. & P. 401 . . 1194 
 
 Perry v. Davis (185S), 3 C. B. N. S. 769 524 
 
 Perry v. Fisher (1846), Spring Assize, Surrey, 1816 194 
 
 Perry y. Fitzhowe (1846), 8 Q. B. 757.778: 15 L. J. Q. B.239; 10 Jur. 799.. 038 
 
 Perry v. Gibson (1834), 1 A. & E. 48 ; 3 N. & M. 462 942 
 
 Perry «. Moalowcroft (1846), 10 Boav. 122 1103, 1104, 11,32 
 
 Perry v. Phosphor Bronze Co. (1894). 71 L. T. 854 1062 
 
 Perry V. Smith (1842), 9 M. & W. 682; 11 L. J. Ex. 269 602, 603 
 
 Perry c. Watts (1842), 3 M & Gr. 775 ; 11 L. J. C. P. 97 , 192 
 
 Porsse V. Persse (1856), 5 H. L. Cas. 671 867 
 
 Perth Peerajre (1846-8), 2 H. L. Cas. 265 .' 403, 425, 1043 
 
 Perton, Re. Pearson r. Att.-Gen. (1885), 53 L. T. 707 413. 415, 421, 436 
 
 Peruvian Ry. Co. v. Thames and Mersey Marine Ins. Co. (1867), L. R. 
 
 2Ch. 617; 36 L.J. Ch. 864; 15 W. R. 1002 648 
 
 Fetch 1). Lyon (1846), 9 Q. B. 147 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 393 506 
 
 Petchell. Re (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 22 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 153 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 74; 22W.R.353 704 
 
 Peter v. Compton (1693), Skin. 353 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 359 682 
 
 Peters ». Brown (1801), 4 Esp. 46 713 
 
 Peters v. Fleming (1840), 6 M. & W. 42 ; 9 L. J. Ex. 81 48, 49 
 
 Petersfield case (1833), Cock. & Arm. 34 ; Perry & K. 49 497 
 
 Petherbridge v. Ash (1846). 4 C. B. 74 ; 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 507 ; 10 Jur. 950 726 
 
 Petheriok v. Turner (1802), cited 1 Taun. 105 ; 9 R. R. 712 386, 495 
 
 Peto V. Hague (1804), 5 Esp. 134 ; 1 Smith, 417 388 
 
 Petrie v. Nuttall (1855), 1 1 Ex. 569 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 200 95, 406, 1116 
 
 Potty V. Anderson (1825), 3 Bing. 170 504 
 
 Petty V. Styward (1632), 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 290 ; 1 Ch. Rep. 67 139 
 
 Peyton v. M'Dermott (1837), 1 Dr. & Wal. 198 297 
 
 Phayre, Lessee of, I'. Fahy (1832), Hayes & Jon. 128 47 
 
 Phelan v. Slattery (1887). 19 L R. Ir. 177 793 
 
 Plielps V. Foot (1815), 1 Conn. 387 /. 372 
 
 Phelps V. Prew (1854), 3 E. & B. 430 ; 2 0. L. R. 1422 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 140 ; 
 
 18 Jur. 249 321 
 
 Phene's Trusts (1869), L. R. 5 Ch. App. 139 ; 39 L. J. Ch. 316 ; 22 L. T. 
 
 Ill; 18W. R. 303 172 
 
 Phen6 v. Popplewoll (1862), 31 L. J. C. P. 235; 12 0. B. N. S. 334; 
 
 6 L. T. 247 ; 10 W. R. 523 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 1104 SCO 
 
 Phenix v. Ingraham (18091, 5 Johns. 412 5 14 
 
 Philadelphia and Trenton Ry. Co. v. Stimpson (1840), 14 Pet. 448 945 
 
 Philiraore v. Barry (1808), 1 Camp. 513 ; 10 R. R. 742 672 
 
 Philips V. Hunter (1795), 2 H. Bl. 402 ; 4 T. R. 182 : 2 R. R. 353 . .1152, 1155 
 Philips V. Philips (1878), 48 L. J. Q. B. 135; 4 Q. B. D. 127 ; 39 L. T. 
 
 656; 27 W. R. 436 187, 220 
 
 Vol. I. mdi with pagt 636. 
 
 liil 
 
 1 I'll 
 
cxlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 I Tf! 
 
 Plan 
 
 Philipson V. Chase (1809), 2 Camp. HI 316 
 
 Philipson v. Earl of Egromont (1844), 6 Q. B. 005 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 26; 
 
 8,Tur. 1164 1132 
 
 Phillips V. Barker (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 44 ; 1 Sm. & G. 583 788 
 
 Phillips r. Berricit (1819), 16 Johns. 136 1123 
 
 Phillips f. Bistolli (1824), 2 B. & C. 514 ; 3 Dowl. & U. 822 fi89 
 
 Phillips V. Briard (1856), 25 L. J. Kx. 233 ; 1 H. & N. 21 765 
 
 Phillips V. Bury (1788), 2 T. R. 346 IIOJ 
 
 Phillips V. Olagett (184;5), 11 M. & W. 84 ; 2 Dowl. 1004 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 275 492 
 Phillips V. Cole (1839), 10 A. & E. 106 ; 2 P. & D. 289 ; 4 Jur. 83. .435, 444, 512 
 
 Phillips V. Earner (1795), 1 Esp. 357 942 
 
 Phillips f\ Evans (1843), 12 M. &A\. 309; 1 I). & L. 463 ; 13 L.J. Ex. 80.. 1160 
 Phillips V. Gibbs (1846), 4 Dowl. & L. 275 ; 10 M. & W. 208 ; 16 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 48 733 
 
 Phillips r. Hall (1832), 8 "VVeud. 610 644 
 
 Phillips V. Hallidav, (1891) A. C. 301 ; 64 L. T. 745 ; 65 J. P. 741 121 
 
 PhUlips V. Hen8on'(1877), 3 C. P. D. 26 ; 47 '-.. J. C. P. 273 ; 37 L.T. 432; 
 
 26 W. E. 214 723 
 
 Phillips V. Iin Thum (1866), 18 C. B. N, S. 400, 691 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 220 ; 
 
 L. R. 1 C. P. 463 : 1 H. & R. 499 648 
 
 PhiUipsr. Irving (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 325; 8 Scott, N. R. 3 ; 13 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 145 38 
 
 Phillips V. Kiugfield (1841), 1 Applet. 375 972 
 
 Phillips f. Mullings (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 244 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 211 ; 20 W. R. 
 
 29 137, 139 
 
 Phillips V. Phillips (1864), 34 Beav. 19 806 
 
 Phillips V. Pound (18.i2), 7 Ex. 881 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 277 ; 16 Jur. 645 866 
 
 Phillips V. Ward (1863). 16 i B. N. S. 717 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 7 ; 9 L. T 345; 
 
 12 W. R. 106; 9 Jur. N. S. "82 1116 
 
 Phillips V. Winbum (1830), 4 C. ^.273 679 
 
 Phillipson v. Hayter (1870), 40 L. J. C. P. 14 ; L. R. 6 C. P. 38 ; 23 L. T. 
 
 556 ; 19 W. R. 130 166 
 
 Phillpotts V. Phillpotts (1851), IOC. B. 85 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 11 90 
 
 Phipps V. Hale (1874), L. R. 3 P. & D. 160 700 
 
 Phipps V. Parker (1808) 1 Camp. 412 1209 
 
 Pickardt). Sears (1837), 6 A. ic E. 174 537, 542 
 
 Pickering V. Appleby (1720-1), Com. R. 354 685 
 
 Pickering v. Dowson (1813), 4 Taun. 779 757 
 
 Pickering t-. Noyes (1823), 1 B. & C. 263 ; 2 D. & R. 386 321, 969 
 
 Pickett V. Packham (1809), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 190 169 
 
 Pickford v. Giiteh (1787), 8 T. R. 305, ti. (a) 161 
 
 Pickup V. Thames lus. Co. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 504 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 749 ; 
 
 39 L. T. 341 ; 26 W. R. 689 176 
 
 Picton'scase (1806), 30 How. St. Tr. 493 1093, 1179 
 
 Piercy'rtoa8e(1682), T. Jones, R. 164 1179 
 
 Piei-8». Piers (1849), 2 H. L. C. 331 ; 13 Jur. 509 149 
 
 Pierson v. Hutchinson (1809). 2 Camp. 211; 6 Esp. 126 307 
 
 Tiggv. Clarke (1876), 45 L. J. Ch. 849; 3 Ch. D. 672; 24 W. R. 1014 .. 146 
 
 Piggott V. Green (1833), 6 Sim. 72 144 
 
 Pigot's case (1611), 11 Co. Rep. 27 1193, 1200, 12U1 
 
 Pigot V. Cubley (1864), 16 C. B. N. 8. 701 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 134 ; 9 L. T. 
 
 804; 12 W. R. 467; 10 Jur. N. S. 318 781 
 
 Pigott V. HoUoway (1808), 1 Binn. 436 927 
 
 Pike's case (1829), 3 C. & P. 698 898 
 
 Pike V. Ongley (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 708 ; 66 L. J. Q. B. 373 ; 35 W. R. 
 
 634 769 
 
 Pilgrim, Re (1835), 3 A. & E. 485 ; 4 Dowl. 89 ; 4 L. J. M. C. 120. . . .838, 842 
 Pilt^rim v. Southampton & Dorchester Ry. Co. (1835), 18 L. J. C. P. 330 ; 
 
 8 C. B. 25 476 
 
 Pllkington v. Riley (1849), 6 Dowl. & L. 628 ; 3 Ex. 739 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 323 228 
 Pillar V. Llynvi Coal Co. (1809), T.. R. 4 C. P. 752 ; 38 L. J. 0. P. 294 ; 
 
 20 L. T. 923 ; 17 W. R. 1123 728 
 
 Pilsworth V. Mosse (1802), 14 Ir. Ch. R. 163 704 
 
 The referencei are to pages, not to paragraphs. 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 cxliii 
 
 FAOB 
 
 40J, 4n"), 4()n, iio'j 
 J. Q. B. ;u().. 7:t4 
 
 Km 9. CurreU (184(»), 6 M. & "W. 234 393, 397, 
 
 Pinches V. Harvey (1841), 1 Q. B. 869 ; 1 G. & D. 'J3G; 10 L. 
 
 Pipiiey V. Jones (1894), 42 Am. St. R. 209 
 
 rinney v. Piuney (1828), 8 B. & C. 335 10 
 
 Pipe «. Fiilcher (18.W, 28 L. J. Q. B. 12 ; 1 E. & E. Ill 403 
 
 Piper V. Chappell (1815). U M. & W. 649 ; 9 Jur. 601 7 
 
 Pitcher v. KiuK(1845), 2 Dowl. & L. 755 815, 816 
 
 . Add. [376] 
 046 
 
 Pitman v. .Maddox (1098), 2 8»lk. 690 
 Pitman v. 'V/oodbury (1848), 3 Ex. 4 
 
 2 Ld. Raym. 73i 
 
 454 
 
 675 
 
 Pitt V. Chappelow (1841), 8 M. & W. 616 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 487 546 
 
 Pitt V. Coomes (1834), 6 B. Ai Ad. 1078 ; 3 N. & M. 212 867 
 
 Pitt V. Shew (1821), 4 B. & Aid. 206 37 
 
 Pittonv. Walter (1718), 1 Str. 162 1031, 1034, 116? 
 
 Pitts f. Beckett (1845), 13 M. & W. 746; U L. J. Ex. 358 297 
 
 Pizarro, The (1817), 2 Wheat. 227, 241, 242, n. (e) 102, 108 
 
 Plaoker v. Gonsaliis (1815), 1 Serf,'. & R. 526 614 
 
 Planch6 (Packer) v. Braham (1837), 8 C. & ?. 68 ; 6 Scott, 242 ; 4 Bing. 
 
 N. C. 17 ; 3 Hodges, 288 ; 1 Jur. 823 50 
 
 Plant V. M'Ewen (1823), 4 Conn. 544 495 
 
 Plant V. Taylor (1863), 7 H. & N. 211 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 289 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 140 127 
 
 416, 418 
 Piatt V. Att.-Gen. of N. S. Wales (1878), 3 App. Cas. 336 ; 47 L. J. P. C. 
 
 26 ; 38 L. T. 74 ; 26 W. R. 516 179 
 
 Plaxton V. Dare (1829), 10 B. & C. 17 ; 5 M. & R. 1 305, 396, 403 
 
 Playne v. Snriven (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecu. & Mar.) 122 ; 1 Roberts. 772 694 
 
 Plenty v. West (1845), 1 Roberts. 264 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 185 704 
 
 Plevins v. Downing (1876), 1 C. P. D. 220; 45 L. J. C. P. 695; 35 L. T. 263 752 
 
 Plimmer v. Sells (1834), 3 N. & M. 422 604 
 
 Plowes V. Bossey (1862), 2 Dr. & Sm. 145 ; 31 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 10 W. R. 
 
 332 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 352 101, 621 
 
 Plnmerw. Brisco (1847), H Q. B. 46 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 158; 12 Jur. 351. .148, 1213 
 Plummer v. Woodbume (1825), 4 B. & C. 625 ; 7 Dowl. & R. 25 . . . .1142, 1152 
 
 Pluukett'8 Estate, Re (1861), 11 Ir. Ch. R, 361 798 
 
 Plunkett V. Cobbett (1804), 6 Esp. 136 243, 617 
 
 Pooook V. Billing (1824), 2 Bing. 269 613 
 
 Pocock V. Pickering (1852). 18 Q. B. 789 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 365 733 
 
 Podmore v. Whatton (1864), 3 S, & T. 449 ; 33 L. J. P. 143 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 764 ; 13 W. R. 106 143, 307 
 
 Pogson V. Thomas (1840), 6 Bing. N. C. 337 803 
 
 Polden f. Bastard (1865), 4 B. & S. 258 ; 8 L. T. 635 ; 11 W. R. 778 ; 7 
 
 B.&S.130; 13L.T.441 115 
 
 Pole V. Leask (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 155 638 
 
 Pole V. Rogers (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 287 259 
 
 Polini V. Gray (1881), 12 Ch. D. 411 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 41 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 80 ; 
 
 6 App. Cas. 623 ; 43 L. T. 209 ; 29 W. R. 217 ; 44 L. J. 812 458, 1092 
 
 Pollack V. Pollaek (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 183 ; 2 S. .& T. 310; 4 L. T. 
 
 N. S. 479 348 
 
 Pollard t>. BeU(1800), 8 T. R. 434; 5 R. R. 404 1147, 1149 
 
 Pollard V. Scott (1790), Pea. R. 19 404, 1168 
 
 Pollock V. Pollock (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 329 ; 22 W. R. 724 ; 30 L. T. 779 ; 
 
 44L. J. Ch. 168 139 
 
 Pollock V. Stables (1848), 12 Q. B. 765 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 352 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 352 ; 12 Jur. 1043 157, 158 
 
 Pollock V. Stacy (1847), 9 Q. B. 1033 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 11 Jur. 267 . . 656 
 
 Pollok i>. M'Alpin (1851), 7 Moo. P. C. C. 427 178 
 
 Pomeroy t'. Baddeley (1826), Ry. & M. 430 918 
 
 Ponsfordv. Swaine (1861), 1 J. & H. 433; 4 L. T. 15 612 
 
 Pontefraot, Ex parte (1843), 3 Q. B. 391 ; 7 Jur. 1086 1139 
 
 Pontifex v. Bignold (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 63 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 390 ; 9 Dowl. 
 
 P. C. 860 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 259 82 
 
 Pool V. Bridges (1826), 4 Pick. 379 376 
 
 Poole V. Dicas (1835), 1 Bing. N. C. 663 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 47 ; 1 Sc. 600. .453, 454, 
 
 457, 458, 469, 460 
 
 Vol. I. ettdt with page 636. 
 
 
 111 
 
 
\h 
 
 cxiiv 
 
 TAni-E OF f;Asi:s crri:D. 
 
 PAOV. 
 
 I'oolfl V. Could (Iflftfi), 2S L. J. Ex. 'irOO ; 1 II. & N. 09 873 
 
 Pooler. nrittiUi (imd), Ift Ir. C. I^. H. '2:i9 IKiS 
 
 Pooloi'. Ilol.l)H (IHU'.I), 8 Dowl. 11.) 733 
 
 Tool.) ». Ilu«kiiiw)ii (1813), II M. i- W. 827 \H 
 
 I'ooli) V. I'lilmcr (1812). (Jar. & M. 0!t 171 
 
 Poolo f. Ki.liiirdHnii (1807), 3 Miihh. 330 931 
 
 Poolo V. Wamm (18;»8), 8 A. it K. MH ; 3 N. & P. (!!)3 1210 
 
 Pooliiy V. Driver (187<i), 6 Cli. 1). -J-ia ; 40 L. J. Cli. 4(i(i ; 3(1 L. T. TO ; 25 
 
 W. R. 1(12 1ft!) 
 
 Pooloy V. <»oi>(lwiii (is;).')), 4 A. & K. 94 ; ft N. k iM. 400 133 
 
 Poolcy f. Jlanailiiic (18;^7), 7 K. & Jl. 431 ; 26 L. .1 . Q. H. 1,^0 ; h W. H. 
 
 40)) ; 3 .liir. N. S. 488 7.')8 
 
 Popofi. AndruwH (1810), 9 (I & P. fi«4 fiOfi 
 
 PopiM'. Askew (1840). 1 Iredell, 10 1221 
 
 Poplo, Ko, Kx parte Hiiker (1889), 40 Ch. D. 589; ftS L. J. Cli. 372; GO 
 
 L. T. 008 ; 37 VV. U. rm 172 
 
 Porter'H TniHU, Uo (18.').')), 2.') L. J. Cli. 088 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 349 1054 
 
 Porter, Ro, PeurNon r. Att.-Coii. (1885), 53 L. T. 707 421 
 
 Porter v. Cooper (1H34), C. & P. 364 1031 
 
 Porter v. WeHtoii (18:t9), 5 HiiiK- N. C. 715 ; 8 H.'ott, 25 ; ;» ,7iir. 507 110 
 
 Portland, 1). of, v. Hill (I8(;(l), L. 11. 2 K«i. 705 ; 35 L. .1. Ch. 4H9 ; 12 .Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 280 ; 15 "W. K. 38 40:' 
 
 Portmore, Ld. r. Taylor (18;il), 4 Him. 182 ; 9 L. J. Ch. 20;) 137 
 
 PoHtlethwaite f. Freelaiid (1880), 5 App. Can. 599; 49 L. J. Ex. 030; 42 
 
 L. T. 845 ; •;8 W. U. 833 163 
 
 Postlethwaito v. Iliekiium (1889), 00 L. T. 514 ; 37 W. R. 200 ; 53 J. P. 357. 121 
 
 Potez V. GloNKop (1848), 2 V.x. 191 140, 450 
 
 Pothonierr. DawMoii (1810), II(dt, N. P. K. 383; 17 R. K. 047 781 
 
 Pott V. Kytoii (1840), ;{ C. B. 32 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 257 159 
 
 Pott V. TodhuntcT (1845), 2 Coll. 70 748 
 
 Potter V. Baker (1850), 13 Beav. 273 ; 21 L. Ch. 11 ; 15 Beuv. 489 144 
 
 Potter V. I)elK)oH (1815), 1 Stark. R. 82 15,3 
 
 Potter V. Diiffield (1874), L. R. 18 K<i. 4 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 472 ; 22 \V. R. 585. 071 
 Potter f. Nicholson (1841), 8 M. A: W. 294 ; 9 Dowl. 808; 10 L. J. Ex. 
 
 311 733 
 
 Potter V. Rankin (1870), L. R. 6 C. P. 518 ; 18 W. R. 808 818 
 
 Potter V. Webb (1829), Creenl. 44 252 
 
 PottH V. Diirant (1795), 3 Anstr. 789, 795 ; 2 Eag. & Y. 432 ; 3 (iwill. 1450; 
 
 4 R. R. 804 430 
 
 PottH V. Nixon (1870), 6 Ir. R. 0. L. 45 89, 92 
 
 PottH e. Smith (1809), 38 L. J. Ch. 68 ; L. R. Eq. 311 ; 18 L. T. 029 ; 
 
 10 "W. R. 891 78 
 
 PottH V. Surr (1806), 34 Bcav. 543 ; 13 W. R. 909 13i» 
 
 PoulBiim V. Thirst (1807), L. R. 2 C. P. 449 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 225 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 324 ; 15 W. R. 700 227 
 
 Poultney v. Holmes (1 733-4), 1 Str. 405 050 
 
 Poulton V. Lond. & S. West. Ry. Co. (1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 634 ; 30 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 294; 8 B. & S. 016 043 
 
 Pound t>. Wilson (1806), 4 F. & F. 301 9 (8 
 
 Pounsott V. Fuller (1850), 17 C. B. 000 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 145 773 
 
 Pountney v. Clayton (1883). 11 Q. B. D. 820 ; 52 L. J. Q. B. 506 ; 49 L. T. 
 
 283 ; 31 W. R. 664 : 47 J. P. 788 114 
 
 Powell, Re (1864), 34 L. J. P. & M. 107 ; 4 S. & T. 34 099 
 
 Powell V. Bradbiny (1849), 7 C. B. 201 ; 18 L. J. C. P. UO ; 13 Jur. 3«9. '.^02 
 
 Powell ». Dillon (1814), 2 Bull & B. 420 071 
 
 Powell ». Divett (1812), 16 East, 29; 13 R. R. 358 1193, 1195 
 
 PoweU p. Edmunds (1810), 12 East, 6 ; 13 R. R. 785 767 
 
 Powell V. Ford (1817), 2 Stark. R. 164 . 1220 
 
 Powell ». Hellicur (1858), 26 Beav. 201 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 255 ; 6 Jur. N. 8. 232. 038 
 
 Powell V. Hodgetts (1820), 2 C. & P. 432 385 
 
 Powell V. Jessop (1856), 18 C. B. 330 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 199 083 
 
 Powellr. Lavton(l806), 2B<>8. &P. 371; 9 R. R. 660 1097 
 
 PoweU ». Miibum (1772), 3 Wils. 365, 366 105 
 
 The re/ereneen art to pages, not to paragraphi. 
 
TADLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 cxlv 
 
 PAoa 
 Powell r rowoll (18f.fi), 3,'. L. J. V. & M. 100; L. R. 1 P. & D. 209 ; 14 
 
 L. T. 8(10 "03 
 
 Powoll V. Smith (1872), 41 L. J. Cli. 734 ; L. H. 14 E<i. 85 ; '10 W. K. (102. 71> 
 
 Power r. Il.'.vrH(l8«4), 10 If. of L. Vm. (H5 86 
 
 Power r. \Vel.l.er (IH70), I. K. 10 Ku. 1^8 830 
 
 Powers c. MnihurNt (1880). I!) L. ,1. Oli. ■>'.){ ; 4i L. T. 1'.'3 ; '28 W. It. 31)0. 1J4 
 
 Powii* Hiiioiiy (1731), rittKl CriiiHe, 1)1^". >•■ '', f<. (iO 1040 
 
 I'owiH V. Smith (18'22), 5 H. A: A. 850 ; 1 1). & U. A'M) 39 
 
 PowyHt'. Miiii-field (18MC.-7). 3 My. \ (V. 3,V.) ; 7 li. J. Oh. 9 000 
 
 I'riineo »'. Symi'toii (I8.'i4), Kiiy, 078 710, 711 
 
 PriiMliri, DiiV lie, rii»e of, 7 Law Hev. Art. vii .174 
 
 Piatt, Kx imrte, He Ifiivmim (1882), 21 Ch. J). 403; .'.2 L. Ch. 120; 47 
 
 L. T. 308 ; 31 \V. It. 18i) 848 
 
 Priittf. lliii.l.iirv (1849), 14 Q. U. 190; 11) I. .1. I). H 17; I3.)iir. 10ii;j.. 1N9 
 I'riitt f. Prutt (IS82), 61 L. J. Ch. 83S ; 47 L. T. 219 , 30 W. H. 8,i7. .321, } 182, 
 
 1184 
 
 ProNcottf. Biitfery (18JS), 1 C. B. 41 1174 
 
 I'reHi.K-nt, The (1804), Ct C Roh. A.liii. 277 179 
 
 ProMtoii f. Ciirr (1820), 1 Y. A J. H.') 001 
 
 PreMtoii V. Mereeau (1775), 2 W. HI. 1219 743, 7.'>7 
 
 PreHton V. Peeko (18.1S), 27 L. J. Q. H. 124 ; K. B. & K. 330 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 013 84, 1 123 
 
 Prentwick v. Poloy (1805), 31 L. J. C. P. 189 ; 18 C. U. N. S. 80C ; 12 L. T. 
 
 390 ; 13 \V. R. 753 ; 1 1 Jur. N. S. .183 508 
 
 Priec, Rn (1804), 4 Ku«t, 587 ; 1 Smith, 284 ; 7 R. R. 037 8:t8. S42 
 
 Price V. Carter (1845), 7 Q. B. 838 732, 734 
 
 Prioo f. DewhurHt (1838), 8 Sim. 302 1112, 1 147, 1 151 
 
 Prioo r. Dvnr (1810), 17 Ves. 350 ; 1 1 U. R. 102 7.12 
 
 Price r. ]rarwo<Kl (1811), 3 Ciimp. 108 ,143 
 
 Price f. llewett (1852), 8 Ex. 110; 17 Jur. 4 511 
 
 Price v. lIolliK (1813), 1 M. * Sil. 105 499 
 
 Price V. Ley (1803), 4 Gift'. 235 ; ,32 L. J. Ch. 530 748 
 
 Price V. Littlewood (1812), 3 Camp. 288 1 174 
 
 Price V. Manning (1889), 42 Ch. D. 372 ; 68 L. J. Ch. 049 ; 01 I.. T. 5.37 ; 
 
 37 W. R. 785 921, 9.39 
 
 Price V. Powell (1858), 3 H. & N. 341 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 400 706 
 
 Price f. Price (1852), 1 Do <1. M. & (4. 308 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 53 i;»7 
 
 Price V. Price (1847), 16 M. & W. 2.30 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 537 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 99. . 108 
 
 Price V. RaniHay (1840), 2 Jet.b & Sy. ;!38 526 
 
 Price f. RichardKon (1845), 15 M. & W. 540 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 315 (!fi9 
 
 Price V. Torrington (1703), 1 Salk. 285 ; 2 Ld. Riiym. S73 ; 1 Sm. L. C. 352.. 451, 
 
 458 
 
 Price V. Woodhouso (1849), 3 Ex. 010 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 271 407 
 
 Price V. Worwood (18.19), 4 II. & N. 512 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 329 522 
 
 Price V. Wright (1779), 1 Dougl. 241 096 
 
 Prichard v. Powell (1845), 10 Q. B. 589 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 10'^ :i9ii, 3!i8, :}99 
 
 Prideaux v. Bunnett (18.>7), 1 C. B. N. S. 613 777 
 
 Prideaux v. Criddle (1809), L. R. 4 (J. B. 45.1 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 232 ; 20 L. T. 
 
 695 ; 10 B. & S. 615 32 
 
 PrieHtley v. Fowler (1837), 3 M. & W. 1 ; M. & II. 306 ; 1 Jur. 987 778 
 
 Priextman v. Thomas (1884), 9 P. D. 70 ; 53 L. J. P. 1). & A. 58; 32 W. R. 
 
 842 1118 
 
 Prince v. Blackburn (1802), 2 East, 250 1213 
 
 Prince v. Sumo (1838), 7 A. & E. 030; 7 L.J. Q. B. 123 ; 3 N. & P. 1.39. . 480, 
 
 484, 501, 970 
 Prince Peter Oldenburg, Re (1884), 63 L. J. P. D. & A. 46 ; 9 P. D. 234 ; 
 
 .32 W. R. 724 ; 49 J. P. 104 1178 
 
 Prince of WalcH Life Ash. Co. v. Harding (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 297 ; E. B. 
 
 & E. 183 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 851 042 
 
 PrinccHH Chariotto, The (1803), Brown. & L. 75 1 176 
 
 IVimcton, The (1878), 47 L. J. Adm. 33 ; 3 P. D. 90 ; .38 L. T. 200 .... 178 
 PrinBep & E. India Co. v. Dyce Sombre (1832, bhould be 1866), 10 Moo. 
 
 P. C. C. 286 140, 170, 203, 1 102 
 
 Vol. I. end* with pagt 036. 
 
cxlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PA08 
 
 Pristwici P. Foley (1866), 34 L. J. 0. P. 189 ; 18 0. B. N. S. 806 ; 12 L. T. 
 
 300 ; 13 W. R. 753 ; 1 1 Jiir. N. S. 583 608 
 
 Pritchard». Rii>,'Hhawo (1851), 11 C. B. 459; 20 L. J. 0. P. 101 500 
 
 Pritchurd v. Hrowii (1828), 4 New HiitnpH. 397 607 
 
 Pritchard r. Dnipor (1830-31), 1 Ruhh. & Mv. 191 386, 49.5 
 
 Pritchard v. roulkcs (1S37), Coop. (C. P.) 14 607 
 
 Pritchard v. IliMirock (18J3). 6 M. & Or. 165; 12 L. J. C. P. 322 ..1096, 1097 
 
 Pritchard v. Walk.-r (ISi?), 3 C. & P. 212 148, 519 
 
 Pritt V. Fairolo.ijrh (1812), 3 Camp. 305 ; 13 Fi. R. 81 1 157, 454 
 
 Proc.-Gen. »•. WilliamH (1861), 31 L. .1. P. & M. 157 ; 2 8. & T. 491 ..414, 416 
 
 Proctor f. JoiioN (18.'6^ 2 C. & V. 532 690 
 
 ProcU)r r. Lainwni (183(1). 7 C & P. 631 329, 498 
 
 Prolo f . Wi^'-rins {18:>7), 3 HiiiK. N. C. 235 ; 3 Scott, 607 ; 2 Hodgus, 204 . .90, 91 
 
 Prossor r. (iwillim (1S43), 1 C. & K. 95 512 
 
 ProHsiT c. \\'.i>ni«'r(1856). 1 C. B. N. S. 289; 26 L. J. C. P. 81 1103 
 
 Protector, The (1839), I \V. Roh. Adm. 45 178 
 
 Proudfoot r. Montofiore (1867). L. R 2 Q. B. 511 ; 8 B. & 8. 510 ; 16 L. T. 
 
 585 ; 15 W. R. 920 ; 36 L. J. Q. B. 225 686, 770 
 
 Provis I'. R.i'd (1829), 5 Bin^. 435 ; 3 M. & P. 4 977 
 
 ProwHo r. The Kuropean iV: Anicricaii Steam Sliippiiig Co. (IS'iO), 13 Moo. 
 
 P. C. R. 481, Hubiiom. The PccrleHt* ; Lush. Adm. R. 103; 30 L. J. 
 
 Adm. 89 7, 178 
 
 Priidoiitial Ahn. Co. f. Edmonds (1877), 2 Ajip. OaH. 487 172 
 
 Prudential Mutual Ass. Co. v. Cur/.on (1852), 8 Kx. 97; 22 L. J. Ex S.').. IHU 
 Prudhamr. Phillips (1737), 2 Amb. 703; 20 How. St. Tr. 479, 48i), u. .. IKHi. 
 
 1133 
 
 Prudliommo v. Frasur (1834), 1 M. & Roh. 435 192 
 
 Prueii r. (N.x (18I.V, 2 C. B. 1 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 17 ; I Rarr. & Ar. 514 726 
 
 Pryor v. Prvor ( 1 HiiO). 29 L. J. P. & M. 114 700 
 
 Pryor r. Swaiue 1SJ4), 2 Dowl. & L. 37 732 
 
 I'u.l.lephatt, Re (1870), L R. 2 P. & 1). 97 ; 39 L. J. P. it M. 8» 699 
 
 Pujfh A: Shariimu's cas»' (1872). L. R. 13 E.j. 5611; 41 L. J. Cli. 580; 
 
 26 L. T. 27 1 816 
 
 Pugh v. R(pl)iiis(m (1786), I T. R. 118 19 
 
 Pujoias i: Holland (1811), Ir. Cir. R. 19 -J.V. 
 
 I'uil.HM.k r. Liiwesfl8:6). I.") [,..F. (i. H. 178 ; 1 Q. B. D. 284; 3| L. T. 95.. (.(,S 
 I'ulh'u r. Sn.'lus (187!)^, 18 I,. .1. C. 1*. :!9I ; 40 L. T. 363 ; 27 \V. R. 534. . 224 
 
 J'ullen r White (1828), 3 C. * P. 431 '273 
 
 .'•ulley r. Hilton (1823,. 12 IVice. ti25 lO.iO 
 
 Pulsford r. Rielnrds (18.Vt), 17 B.mv. 87 ; 22 L. J. Ch 559 M't 
 
 Pureell r Maenamara (1«08), 1 Camp. 200 ; 9 Eii.st, 157, 361 ; 9 R. R. 578. .1013, 
 
 1096 
 
 Pnrdon r. Ld. Longford (1877,, 11 Tr. R. C. L. 267 48 
 
 Punh.n c I'urdon ,1812), 10 M. & W. 562 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 3 716 
 
 Putnam r. Lewis (1811), 8 .Johns. 3,S9 552 
 
 Pye .-. Iliittiilield (1865). 31 !.. .1. (J. B. 17; 5 B. & S. 829 960 
 
 I'Ver i\ < '.liter (IS.Vl), 1 II. \- N. OU; ; 26 L. .T. Ex. 258 11,5 
 
 Pyke V. Cronrh (1696). 1 Ld. Raym. 730 321. 328, 1113 
 
 Pym r. Campl.rll (l8.-.(i), 25 L. .T. (i. B. 277; 6 E.&U. 370; 27L.T. 122; 
 
 4 \V. n. 528 ; 20 .»ur. 611 746 
 
 Pym r. Lockver (1840), 5 My. & (>. M ; 10 L. .T. Ch. 153 806 
 
 Pyno, Re (1843), 1 Dowl. A: L. 703; 13 L. .1. (J. B. 37 816 
 
 QrAiiTr.iiMAN P. Cox (1837), 8 C. & P. 07 910 
 
 Quart/ Hill Co.. Ite. Ex parte Young (1882), 21 Ch. D. 642 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 
 
 94(t; 31 \V. R. 173 912, 042 
 
 QuelMi- Marine Ins. Co. v. ("oinmer. Bk. of Canadu (1870), L. R. 3 P.O. 231 ; 
 
 39 L .1.1'. ('.53 770 
 
 Mwru, The (18t;9i, L. R. 2 .Vdm. 354 ; 38 L. J. Adm. 39 ; 4 Moo. P. C. C. 
 
 N. S. 3 16 177 
 
 Queen, The, r. Flavell (1881), 14 Q. B. D. 364 ; 52 L. T. 133 ; 33 W. K. 
 
 343 ; 49 .1. P. 406 696 
 
 I'hii n/cntuMi an to pagei, not to p>ira^iiijjhs. 
 
 u 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 exl 
 
 VI 1 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Queen's, The, oaao (1820), 2 B. & B. 287 . . . .280, 281, 484, 661, 587, 901, U(H, 
 
 90(1, 950, 9,')4, 9oo, 959, 974. 975, 977 
 Queen's Proctor*. Fry (1879), 4 P. D. 230 ; 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 68..10.')0, 10.54 
 
 Qiii-niiell c. TurmT (l»ai), 13 Beuv. 240 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 2;i7 802, 801 
 
 Quick I-. Quick (18r.4\ 33 L. J. P. & M. 1J6 ; 2 S. & T. 442 ; 12 W. R. 
 
 119; 10 Jur. N. S. «82 1 I'l 
 
 Qui.k V. Staines (1798), 1 Bos. & P. 20H ; 4 H. K. 801 6.i.t 
 
 Quilter «'. Jor«. (18,')3, Hhould be 18(13), 14 C. B. N. 8. 747 ; 11 W. R. 888 ; 
 
 3 F.& F. 644 309 
 
 Qiiincov f Slmrpe (187G), 1 Ex. D. 72 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 347 ; 34 L. T. ii>,. ; 
 
 24 W. R. 373 Til 
 
 Quinuf. Butler (1808), L. R. 6 Eq. 223 7()» 
 
 R 'h TruHtH. Re (1870), 39 L. J. Ch. 192 021 
 
 R. V. (1S2(1), 2C. &P. 4.'j<) 120 
 
 R. i>. (1834), 60. & P. 408 21(i. 
 
 R. ,.. (1S3H), 3 N. & P. 627 ; 8 A. & E. 689 824 
 
 R. V. AlMTKUvennv Union (1880), 6 Q. B. I), .il ; .10 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 43 
 
 L. T. (102 ; 29 \V. R. 303 631 
 
 R. r. AlKTKwilly (1807, Hhould be 1801), 2 Ea«t, 03 3(i8, 420, 4(15 
 
 R. r. Abin^rdon (1794), Pea. R. 23(1 274 
 
 R. ,•. A.krnyd (1824), 1 Lew. C. O. 49 671 
 
 R. r. Aaiinis(l,S28), 3C. & P. 600 120 
 
 R r. AdderlMiry East (18431, 6 <i. B. 187, 189, n. (n) ; 13 L. .1. M. C. 9; 
 
 ]). vV M. 324 ; 7 Jur. 1036 494 
 
 R. r. Addis(lH:i4), 6(5. & P. 3H,S (i34 
 
 R, r. Ad.v (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 94 'MW) 
 
 R. V. AiclileH (1781), 1 Lea. 294, 297, t.., 300, u. (-/) ; 2 Lust, P. C. 9(18 .. 2>'.». 
 
 318, lO.iO, 1172 
 R. r. Allen (1826), 1 Den. C. C. 364 ; T. & M. 56 ; 2 C. & K. 86!) ; 3 (.'ox, 
 
 C. C. 270 ; 18 L. J. M. C. 72 ; Vi Jur. 108 100, 2(13, 278 
 
 R. »•• Allen (1872), L. R. 1 C. C. 367 ; 41 L. J. M. C. 97 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 
 
 1!)3 149 
 
 R. r. Alltfood (17*^8), 7 T. R. 746 ; 4 R. R. 674 99 1 
 
 R. f. Allison (18(((11, R. & R. 109 130, 29> 
 
 R. r. All Saints (1828!, 7 B. & (!. 789 416 
 
 R. r All .Siints, Snutbanipton (1828). 7 B. & C. 790 132, 1137 
 
 R. r. All 8,iints, Worcester (1817), 6 M. ic Sel. 194 891, 892, 960 
 
 R. c. Almon (1770), 6 Burr. 26S6 107 
 
 R. r. Amb.TKate. \c. Rv. Co. (18,'>2). 17 Q. B. 957 ; 16 Jur. 777 998 
 
 R. f. Aniburv (1862), 6 Cox, C. O. 79 826 
 
 R. c. Anderson (KIMO), 7 How. St. Tr. 874 H'A) 
 
 R. V. Anderson (18(iS), 11 Cox, C. C. 164 1029 
 
 R. ('. Andrews (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 37 209 
 
 R. ». Antrobus (1836), 2 A. & E. 793; 1 IL & \V. 96 ; 6 C. A: P. 784 ; 
 
 4 N. \- M. 666 397 
 
 R. r. Ajiplrbv (1821). 3. Stark. R 33 628, 687 
 
 R. V. Arclier'( 182(1), 1 M.w>. (\ C. 143 166 
 
 R. V. AnnitaKe ( 1 872), L. R. 7 «^ B. 773 ; 42 L. J. M. C. 16 630 
 
 R. c. Arnold (1H3.S1. H C. & 1'. 622 570, 676 
 
 R. f. Aniiidel (,1721), Hob. Ki'.l KiH 
 
 R. V. Asbburton (1816). 8 il H. S76 133 
 
 R. r. Ashton (18.17), 2 Lew. V. V. 147 470 
 
 R. V. Asi.inall (1S27), eidil 3 St. Evid. 962 257 
 
 R. V. Aspiiiall (1876), 40 L. J. M. C. 146; 2 Q. B. D. 48; 30 L. T. 297 ; 
 
 26 W. H. 283 84 
 
 R. r. Aston (ls:m), 2 Runs. C. ti M. 732 246 
 
 R. e. Atkins (l(i7!i). 7 How. St. Tr. 728 518 
 
 R. e. AtwiKMl (178!i), 1 Lea. C!. C. 464 633 
 
 R. f. Austin (18.)tl), Dears. C. O. 612 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 56 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 
 
 48 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 95 328 
 
 R. f. Avery (18;18), 8 C. & V. 5i)6 692, 602, 604 
 
 R. V. A/.ire (1737-1'), 1 Str. 633 893 
 
 f'ol, I, mih with page C39. 
 
 '^ 
 
 "11 
 
 > 
 
 i 
 
cxlviii 
 
 TAIILK OF CASES CITKD. 
 
 v\nv. 
 
 R. 1'. Biibb (1790), 3 T. R. o8l 09 (., 'JO: 
 
 R. V. BairHliiiw (1797), 7 T. R. 303 1137 
 
 R. V. UiiiiifH (17061, 2 LA. Riivm. 1199, r.'O'i 131 
 
 R. V. Bukor (1837). 'i M. & Rob. fi3 4(i5 
 
 R. r. Bilker (189Ai. 15 R. (May), 380; (1895) 1 Q. B. 797 ; (U L. J. M. C. 
 
 177 ; 7J L. T. 631 IM. [17, 948] 
 
 R. V. Baldry (185.2), 2 Den. C. C. 430 603, 67i 
 
 R. V. Bull (1807), 1 Ciimp. 321 ; R. & R. 132 ; 10 R. R. f>9.i 24S 
 
 R. V. Ball (1837), 8 C. & P. 745 921 
 
 R. r. Bulls (1871), 40 L. J. M. C. 1 18 ; L. R. 1 f. C. 328 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 
 
 90 ; 24 L. T. 760 ; 19 W. U. 876 239 
 
 R. f. Banks (1791), 1 Esp. 146; 5 R. R. 720 204 
 
 R. r. Biiiiniim (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 117 214 
 
 R. e. Barker (1829), 3 C. & P. 589 257 
 
 R. V. Barker (1858). 1 F. & F. 326 312 
 
 R. 1'. Barnard (1823), 1 C. & P. 88 633. 917 
 
 R. f. Barnes (1816), 1 Stark. 243 520, 1040 
 
 R. V. Banies (1835). 7 C. & P. 166 826 
 
 R. «. Barnes (1860), L. R. 1 C. C. 45 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 204 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 
 
 549 : 14 L T. 001 ; 14 W. R. 805 198 
 
 R. r. BarMett(1829), 3 C. & P. 000 829 
 
 R. f. Bamsley (1813), 1 M. & Sel. .!77 521 
 
 R. f. Barrett (1833), C. & P. 121 118, 518 
 
 R. V. Barrett (1852), 6 Cox, C. V. 78 826 
 
 R. V. Barrow (1800), 10 Cox, C. C. 4o7 275 
 
 R. V. Barry (1865), 4 F. & F. 392 238 
 
 R. f. Bartiett (1837), 7 C. & P. 832 509, 587 
 
 R. V. riarton (1854), Deam. 284 121 
 
 R. V. Basin«Htoko (1851). 14 Q. B. 611 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 28 ; 3 Now Sess. 
 
 Cas. 093 ; 6 1). & L. 303 291 
 
 R. V. Bate (18/1). 1 1 Cox, C. C. 086 572 
 
 R. I'. Batenian (1800). 4 F. & F. 1068 583 
 
 R. V. Bates (1800). 2 F. & F. 317 335 
 
 R. V. Bathwiek (1832). 2 B. & Ad. 048 87. 890, 891, 892 
 
 R. V. Bayloy (1835), 7 C. & P. 204 217 
 
 R. V. Beule (1860), L. R. 1 C. C. 10 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 60 : 12 Jur. N. 8. 12 ; 
 
 13L.T.335; 14 W. R. 57 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 157 100 
 
 R. V. Beauoy (1820), R. & R. 416 16, 205 
 
 R. v. Beard (1837), 8 C. & P. 143. 148, 149 80, 110 
 
 R. *. Beardsall (1876), 1 Q. B. I). 452 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 157 1 173 
 
 R. V. B.'ckwith (18.58). 7 Cox. C. C. 505 275 
 
 R. V. Bwlfonlshiro (18.55), 4 E. & B. 542 39.3, .39U 
 
 R. V. BedinKtteld (1879), 14 Cox, C. 0. 341 377, 467 
 
 R. V. BedinKham (1844), 1 New Sew). Ciw. 144 621 
 
 R. V. Becston (1865), 24 L. J. M. C. 6 ; Dears. C. 0. 405 ; 3 C. L. R. 82 ; 
 
 18 Jwr. 1058 326, 327, 335, 337 
 
 R. I'. Beet^m (1849), 1 Den. 414 239 
 
 R. «'. Beezliy (1830), 4 C. & P. 220 943 
 
 R. «-. Bell (r831), 5 C. & P. 162 .580 
 
 R. t-. Bellamy (18U), Ry. & M. 171 1031 
 
 R. V. Benson (1810), 2 Camp 508 129, 278, 10i;i 
 
 R. V. Bentley (1833), 6 C. & P. 148 580 
 
 R. V. BerenKer (1817), 2 Stark. R. 129, n 921 
 
 R. V. B.'rijfan(1841). Ir. Cir. R. 177 669, 1130 
 
 R. V. Beniadotti (1H69), 1 1 Cox, C. 0. 316 408 
 
 R. V. Rerriman (1833), 5 C. & P. 601 216 
 
 R. I'. B.rry (1859). Bell, C. C. 46 884 
 
 R. V. Berry (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 447 ; 45 L. J. M. C. 123 897 
 
 R. I'. BottM(1850). 10 (J. B. 1022; 4 Cox, C. C. 211 ; 19 L. .1. Q. B. 601.. 47 
 
 R. !'. Beverley (1839). 8 Dowl. 140 994 
 
 R. I'. BiffK(l"717), 3 P. Wms. 423 640 
 
 R. r. BiKnold(1824), Dowl. & R. N. P. 59 ; 4 Dowl. 4 R. 70 274 
 
 R. v. BinRbam (1829), 3 Y. & J. 109 1013 
 
 R. ♦>. BinKley (1833), 6 C. 4 P. 602 211 
 
 E. V. Birch (1842), 3 Q. B. 431 1031 
 
 I'A* r*/«rtnM* art to pagei, not to paragrapht. 
 
 fl 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxilx 
 
 PAOIS 
 
 R. V. Binl (1851), 2 Den. 94 ; T. \: M. 437; 5 Cox, C. C. 11 ; 20 L. J. 
 
 M. C. "0; 15 Jur. 11)3 206 
 
 R. f. Bii(l«?ye(183(i), 4 C. & P. 380 238 
 
 E. f. BiriuinKl""" (uudiited), citt d in Ilubb. on Ev. of Sik^o. 660 417 
 
 R. r. HiriiiiiiKlniin (!>*<' 1). ■*• L. J. M. C. 63 ; 1 B. & S. 763 436, 444, 445 
 
 R. t'. Hi«< (in.ihj, 8C. & P. 773 216 
 
 R. (. Bionmin (1865,, 1 L. & C. 545; 10 Cox, C. C. 74 ; 34 L. J. M. C. 
 
 180 ; 12 L. T. 473 ; 13 W. R. 664 ; 1 1 Jur. N. S. 58!) 106, 129, 1175 
 
 R. r. Bliukbiirn (1853), 6 Cox, C. C. 339 ; 3 C. & K. 330 273, 569, 672 
 
 R. ,: BlnkL" (183J), 4 B. & Ad. 355 : 2 N. \- M. 312 870 
 
 R. f. Blake (1844), 6 Q B. 126 ; 13 L. J. M. C;. 131 ; 8 Jur. 666 382,384 
 
 R. r. Blukimoro(1852), 2Den. 410; 21 L. J. M. C. 60 ; 16 Jur. 154. .80, 1102, 
 
 1110, 1114 
 
 R. V. Bland (1832\ 1 Lew. C. C. MO 217 
 
 R. r. Bliindy (1752), 18 How. St. Tr. 1187 65, 374, 4(i9 
 
 R. i: Bl.'ii»dttl.! (1848), 2 C. & K. 765 236 
 
 R. r. BIiKH(l837), 7 A. & £.555; 7 L. J. Q. B. 4. .. .396, 397, 400, 401, 402, 446 
 
 R. r. Bodle(18;(3), OC. & P. 186 943 
 
 R. r. Bodmin, JJ. of, (1892) 2 Q. B. 21 ; 61 L. J. M. C. 151 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 562 : 40 AV. R. 606 ; 56 J. P. 501 998 
 
 R. (. Bolton (1841), 1 Q. B. 74 ; 4 P. & 1). 679 ; 5 Jur. 1 154 1 100. 1136 
 
 It. f. Bond '185(1), 4 Cox. C.C.23ii; 10 L. J. M.C. 1;«. 1 Den. C.C. ^17. .578.579 
 
 R. r. Bonner (1834), 6 C. \: P. 386 467, 468 
 
 R. r. Borrett (1833). 6 C. ic P. 124 148, 518 
 
 R. «•. BoKwell (1812), C. ii Miirsli. 581 569, 572 
 
 R. V. Boucher (18.')y), 1 F. & F. 486 312 
 
 R. r B<.u!tA;r (1852), 2 Den. C. C. :W6 ; 3 C. & K. 2;«i; 21 Ji. J. M. C. 57. . 627 
 R. «'. Bowdeu (IS.VJ), LiverjxM)! Amtizes. Dee. MS. (Mr. V. 11. llopwood). 568 
 
 R. r. Bowen (1841), C. & M.irMh. 149 82 
 
 R. V. Bowen (1849), 13 (J. B. 790 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 65; 13 Jur. lt,45 ; 3 
 
 Cox, C. C. 483 84 
 
 R. f. Bowmim (1834), 6 C. & P. ;U2 1133, 1140 
 
 R. I . Bojes (1860), 2 F. & F. 158 070 
 
 R. «•. BoyeH (1861), 30 L. J. (J. B. ;102 : 1 B. .V S. 3! 1 . . . .633, 960, 061, 965, 966 
 
 R. <•. BradlHunh (1883), 47 L. T. 477; 31 W. R. JJli; 15 Cox, C. C. 217 884 
 
 R. r. Bruintree (18.)9), 28 L. J. M. C. 1 ; 1 E. \: E, 51 304 
 
 R. r. Bniithwaite (1859), 8 Cox, C. C. 254. 4 14 : 1 F. & F. 638 627 
 
 R. V. Biaitliwaite(l864). 8 Cox. C. C. 254, 414 627 
 
 R. f. Brandey (17!<5), 6 T. R. 330 621, HOC 
 
 R. V. Brandreth (1817), 32 How. St. Tr. 867 383 
 
 R. f. Brunjran (1712), 1 Lea. C. C. 27 987 
 
 R. r. BraHier (1779), 1 Lea. 199 : 1 East, P. C. 443 367, 898 
 
 R. V. Brayuell (18.)0), 4 Cox, C. C. 404 683 
 
 R. V. Breekumik and Aber^. <'"n. Co. (1 8:t5\ 3 A. & E. 222 998 
 
 R. r. Breiinun (1813). 3 Craw. A: D. C. C. 109 . 31H 
 
 R. r. Brettell(l«.t2), 3 B. & Ad. 424; 1 L. J. M. C. 46 60 
 
 R. V. Brewer (1834), C. & P. 363 601 
 
 R. f. Brewer (1863), 9 Cox. (\ C. 409 968 
 
 R. f. Brie* (18191, 2 B. Ac Aid. 606 909 
 
 R. I'. Bri^rKM (1830), 2 M. & Kob. 199 241 
 
 R. r. BrijfhtHide Bicrlow (1849), 13 Q. B. 933 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 60; 4 New 
 
 ScHH. (;. 47; 14 Jur. 174 2:i4, 405 
 
 R. I-. BiiKby(184y), 1 Den. C. C. 416; 2 Car. & K. 962 ; 18 L J. M. (". 157. . 1160 
 R. r. Brixtol Aj Exeter By. Co. (1843\4 W B. 162; 12 L. J. W. B. 106,. . . e«j8 
 R. V. Brittleton and Bntew (1881). 12 Q. B. D. 2( 6 ; 53 L. J. M. C. 83 ; 60 
 
 L. T. 276 ; 32 W. R. 463 ; 48 J. P. 295 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 431 . . 165, 894, i"3l 
 
 R. V. Britton (1833). I M. Ac Rob. 297 683 
 
 R. V. BroadhenipHton (1859), 28 L. J. M. C. 18 ; 1 E. & E. 154 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 N. 8. 267 131 
 
 R. I'. BroKHU (1834). 3 Ruhh. C. & M. (4tli ml.) 463; Rowioo, Cr. Ev. 60 . . 677 
 
 R. c. Hnininiich (1679), 7 How. St. Tr. 722 618 
 
 R. r. Br.H)ke (1810), 2 Stark. R. 472; 20 R. R. 723 94i 
 
 R. f. BriKikcM (1847), C. i Marxh. 5i:; 205 
 
 K. r. BrookB(1847), 2 0. & K. 402; 1 Den. C. C. 217 78 
 
 y'et. I, *mU with jiag* 636. 
 
tl ! 
 
 mv 
 
 cl 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 R. r. Br.ic)l<H (1553), Dears. C. C. 184 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 1 18 : 22 L. J. M. C. 
 lil ; 17 Jiir. 4(M» 
 
 PAOB 
 
 16,-. 
 
 K. V. llrown (18()1 1, i v. & V. ii.v.t -m 
 
 R. r. Brown ( ISfii), 9 Cox. C. C. 'iSl 6(1 i 
 
 R. r. Browu (18(i7). ;t(J L. J. M. (;. o9: L. R. 1 C. C. 70 !>7i 
 
 K. I'. Browiio (18 JO). M. & M. :U!» ; ;i C. * V. .'.Ti 'iSiJ, 10;{3, 10.14 
 
 U. r, Browiioll (1S:U i, 1 A. & K. rm ; 3 L. J . M. C. 1 18 833 
 
 R. r. Brviin /!8:t4 . .J.l.l., C. C. I.'i7 /iO? 
 
 K. r. Miif'kiiiKlmm, .1.1. (18J8). 8 B. & C. 37') 900. 907 
 
 R. r. Bii<'kiiiKhitiii»liiri> JJ. (1843<, 3 Q. B. 800; 2 U. & D. .OGO ; 12 L. J. 
 
 M. r. JO 1 100, 1 130 
 
 R. r. Bii.kU-y (1873^. 13 Cox. C. C. 293 326, 436, 4.i.i 
 
 R. I . Biiiia (1805), ;■) Esp. 230 108 
 
 R. r. Bull {18.301, 9 C. & P. 22 913 
 
 R. r. Bull (1871), 12 Cox, C. C. 31 329 
 
 R. V. Bi:lliir(l(1872), 12 Cox, C. C. '.'.M 016 
 
 R. r. Bullock (182>), 1 M(KKly, (". C. 324, n. («) 205, 209 
 
 R. r. Burbiijro (1703), 3 Burr. 1440 8.37 
 
 R. f. Bunltlt (18.'-..')), Donrn. C. C. 431 ; 6 Cox, C. C. lr>» 9»3 
 
 R. V. BurjrisN (1830). 7 C & P. 488 . 829 
 
 R, V. Burk.. (18.-.0), 8 Cox, C. C. 44, 47 •''8. 953 
 
 R. r. Buriev (1818,. 2 Stiirk. Kv. 13, n. («) 608, 600, 032 
 
 R. r. Burridjrc (17:t.'>). 3 P. Wihh. 4»7 17 
 
 R. c. Burt (1851). 5 Cx. C. C. 284 251 
 
 R. r. Burton (1853), D.-iirs. 284 121 
 
 R. r. Burv «t. E<lmuml» (1784), Cald. 480 465 
 
 R. 1'. Bu4i (I8IH), II. & K. 372 216 
 
 R. r. But«lifr(l798\ I Loa. 205. n 58.5 
 
 R. r. Butt.rwi.k(1830), 2 M. & Rob. 196 824 
 
 R. r. Butt TV 0818 , n. k R. 342 1105, 1107 
 
 R. r. Buttlf(r870). 30 L. .1. M. C. 115; 11 Cox, C. C. .'Uifl ; L. R. 1 C. C. 
 
 248 : 22 L. T 728 ; 18 W. R. 050 962 
 
 R. V. Buttipt'Mi («r K c. Brittk'ton). 
 
 R. t . C«(loK«". E. of (1822). 5 B. & A. 902 ; 1 Dowl. 4 R. 650 998 
 
 R. V. Cain (1839). 1 Cniw. & D. C. C. 37 668, 585 
 
 R. V. CiillHKhaii (1793), McNally, Evid. 385 470 
 
 R. V. Culver' (1818.. 2 Cox, C. C. 491 336 
 
 R. V. (-aniliri.!i<.>. V. of (1730), 2 Ia\. Rayin. 1331 20 
 
 R. V. CaniplM'll (1813), 1 C. & K. 82 216 
 
 R. !•. Cavit^-rlmry, Al.p. of (1848), 18 Q. B. 581 792 
 
 R. ••. CanU-rbu-v, Al.p. of (IS.W), 28 L. J. Q. B. 154 ; 7 W. R. 212 ; 1 E. 
 
 a. K. 31.. ,...■ 1147 
 
 R. V. Canw.'ll (1809), 11 Cox, C. C. 203 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 194 ; 20 L. T.402; 
 
 17 W. R. 023 206 
 
 R. V. Ciirow (18.-.0), 1 I,. M. & P. 020, n 727 
 
 R. r. Cari'v (184.'.), 7 «i B. 120; 1 1 L. J. M. C. ISO 814 
 
 R. r. Carlili«(l832) 2 B. A: Ad. 307 -:J69 84 
 
 R. V. Cutlilo (1834), (;. & P. 013 274 
 
 R. I. ('HriiarvoiiKliiro(l8U).2<i. B.325: llL J. H. G. 3; H». & D. 423.. 521 
 
 R. «•. Carr (1000), 1 Sill. 418; Bull. N. P. 237 480 
 
 R. V. Carn.l (1800). II Cox, C. «'. 3-.!2 3.30 
 
 R. •■. Cart (I8:i8), Mai<iHtoni> Sum. A-w. MS 570 
 
 R. r. Cart.T (18I.S), 1 Den. <;. C 05 1019, 1174 
 
 R. r. (;art.r fl88t\ 12 i). B. I). 522 ; 53 L. .1. M. C 06 ; 50 L. T. 4o2, 
 
 .'lOO; 32 W. R. 003; 48 J. P. 45(1; 15 (.'..x, (!. C. 418 247 
 
 R. r. Carty (1707). cihid Joy (.u (V.nf , 07 ; MiiNally, Evid. 45 579 
 
 R. V. < 'iiHuv (1837), .Fol.h, C. O. 203 034 
 
 R. »•. <;.iHs (1784), 1 I^>a. 20:;. n. (rt) 503, 571 
 
 R. V. CaMi.iv (18581, I F. * E. 70 043 
 
 R. I', rami. 'Morton (|820i, 3 B. * Aid. .V.IO 28J 
 
 R. I. <;aMliton (170.*.), T. R. 230 303, .100 
 
 B. V. CtttfMby (1824), 2 B. ft C. 814 130, 131 
 
 The rf/crcneti are to pojfin, not to parnj/raphi. 
 

 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cli 
 
 R. V. 
 li. •'. 
 K. 1. 
 It. f. 
 R. V. 
 R .. 
 R. t. 
 R. t: 
 R. f. 
 R. r. 
 R. f. 
 U. V. 
 R. I . 
 R. V. 
 R. «'. 
 R. r. 
 R. t. 
 R. .'. 
 R. I . 
 R. r. 
 R. V. 
 R.V. 
 
 R. r. 
 R. «. 
 R. . 
 R. r. 
 R. f. 
 R. f. 
 R. f. 
 R. t'. 
 R. r. 
 R.I. 
 i!0 
 R. . 
 R. f. 
 R. r. 
 R. .. 
 R. V. 
 R. « . 
 R. r. 
 R. I . 
 M. 
 R. f. 
 R. •'. 
 
 «'. 
 
 »'. 
 
 •'. 
 
 V. 
 
 r. 
 r. 
 
 R 
 R 
 R 
 R 
 R 
 R 
 
 I'J 
 R. I. 
 R. I . 
 R. r. 
 R. .. 
 R. r. 
 
 13 
 R. V. 
 R. •'. 
 
 4« 
 R. I . 
 R. V. 
 R. < 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Cafor (1802), 4 T.n\i. 1 17, 145 ; 2 E.iHt, 3G1 1228 
 
 C.iv™(li»h|18-M). S Ir. R. C. L. 178 106 
 
 OlliiT (1680). 7 How. St. Tr. 1205 673 
 
 Chml.lirtoii ( 181)1 ), 2 Eiwt, 20 420 
 
 Clminpiify (18;tt)), 2 Li-wiii, C. (;. 2.'>!) 626, 627 
 
 (^hninimcvH {18;<7). i M. & Rob. 20 1127 
 
 ChttjMimn (18;t8), 8 C. & P. ft.VJ 921. iH3 
 
 r» ..rlhiiry (1843), 3 Q. H. 378 ; 13 L. J. M. C. 19 ; 3 (J. & D. 177. . 113!) 
 
 (niurlcNWoitli (1860). 2 F. & F. 32G 062, 066 
 
 Chatlmiii (1807), 8 Eiwt, 408 <)21 
 
 Chiiwton (1841), Hi. B. 247: 10 L. J. M. C. 5.) 740 
 
 Clieudlu (1832). 3 B. & A<1. 838 7A5 
 
 Clicm- ^1871). 12 Cox, C. «'. 32 583, 1)66 
 
 Clu:.tfr (IHIO), 1 Cliitty, H. 207 002 
 
 Cl.CHttr. Pp. of (1747). 1 W. Bl. 25 1133 
 
 CliPMtcr, Sli.'riff of (IHIO). 1 CliiUy, R. 477 008 
 
 Choverton (1862), 2 F. A: F. 833 ft(i(i, 571 
 
 Chidlfv (1860), 8 Vox, C. C. 365 5H0, 583 
 
 ChriHtiMii (1842), Car. i M. 38H 196, 1018 
 
 ChriHtic (1821), 3 Kuhh. O. it M. 355 468 
 
 Cllri^»it! (1858), 1 F. & F. 75 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 506 276 
 
 ClirUonher (1849), 2 C. & K. 994 ; 1 Den. 636 ; 4 Cox, C. C. 76. . . . 283, 
 
 281,291,335.356, 950 
 
 Cliiph..m (1829), 4 C. & 1". 20 1 170 
 
 (■Inn!(1803), 28 How. St. Tr. 887, 924 623 
 
 '^liirk (1810), R. & U. 181 211 
 
 v.'lark (1818), R. At K. 3.58 216 
 
 Clarkf (1700), 8 T. K. 220 651 
 
 Clarke (18171, 2 Sfark. R. 241 257,375, 976 
 
 Clarke (18.59), 2 F. \- F. 2 337 
 
 Cleury (1^62), 2 F. Ac F. 850 339, 467 
 
 CKinent (1821), 4 D. A: Aid. 218 833 
 
 CleimiitM (1851), 2 J)eu. 251 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 191 ; T. & M. 579; 
 
 L. .1. M. C. 103 ; 15 .Iiir. 407 336 
 
 Ck'WOH (1830), 4 C. & 1'. 221 561, 562, 666, 570 
 
 Clint (1841), 11 A. & E. 624; 10 L. J. M. C. 151 1139 
 
 Clivij^er (1788). 2 T. R. 263 8<ti 
 
 Cliitleroy 1840), .. C. 4 K 205 821, S24 
 
 Clim!(1841), Ir. Cir. R. : 75 257 
 
 CcMidy (1882), 15 Cox, C C. S9 46 
 
 CoIkU'ii (1862), 3 F. ic F. 833 237 
 
 C.Hkbum (1857), Dcani. &. Bell, 203; 7 Cox, C. C. 265; 19 L.J. 
 
 C. no 320, .3.32 
 
 (loekeroft (1870), 11 Cox. C. C. 410 257, 951 
 
 CoekiiiK (1836). 2 L.'wiii, C. C. 235 120 
 
 Colien (18.^8), 8 Cox. C. C. 41 264 
 
 , Coleloujrli (1882), 15Cox, C. C. 92; 10 L. R. Ir. 241 246 
 
 Cold (1810), 1 Ph. Ev. .508 235 
 
 , Coleiimii 1 1852), 6 Cox, C. <;. 163 1228 
 
 . Coleortoii (1830). 1 B. & Afl. 25 521 
 
 , Colenie (18.50), 11 Q. B. 900; 3 New Sew. Can. 143; 17 L. J. M. C. 
 
 1 ; 12 Jiir. 699 727 
 
 . Coll (18H9), 24 L. R. Ir. 622 28.3, 284, 975 
 
 . Collev (1827). M. A: M. 320 918 
 
 . Collier (1831), fiC. & r. 160 23H 
 
 . Coltner (1864). 9 iUtx, C. C. 506 683 
 
 . Com. of Si'wern for T. Hamlet« (1812), 3 Q. B. 670; 3 (}. & D. 92; 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 12 ; 6 .Iiir. 1050 997 
 
 ComjiUm (1828). 3 C. Ac P. 418 205, 1120 
 
 Coney (1882) 8 Q. B. 1). 53 » ; 16 Cox. C. C. 46; 61 L. J. M. C. 06; 
 
 L. T. 307 ; 30 W. R. 678 ; 46 J. P. 404 633 
 
 . Connell (I8.)3), 6 Cox, C. C. 178 1126 
 
 . Coiiiiin(< (1868), 11 Cox. C. C. 134 1029 
 
 . Com.lly (1829), 2 U-* . (5. C. 229 106 
 
 Fol. I, tnd* witk piigt C3A. 
 
 J 
 
 .. 11 
 
clii 
 
 TAHLK OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOR 
 
 R. V. Cook (If.90), 13 Tfow. Hi. Tr. 318 017, 967 
 
 R. V. CM.ko (lH2t), I C. & P. ;iii 
 R. V. C.iokc (is:t(i). 7 C. & P. .vv.) 
 
 820 
 
 1U6 
 
 R. V. C«K.k<T (1H:1S), 8 <;. & P. r.Ki 80, 247, fil5 
 
 R. w. Cojior (IHIil), ft (!. & P. M:t 
 
 .66;;, 086. 607 
 120 
 
 R. I'. CoojMT ( ISfti), 3 C. & K. 318 : 10 .Tnr. 7.V) 
 
 R r. dmU: (1873). L. R. I I'. C. (ili:. ; 12 L. J. M. C. 45; 29 L. T. Ill 
 
 21 \V. H. 5.53: 9 M.io. P. ('. C. 403 , 
 
 , f)82. 583 
 
 R. c. V,i>\w (18:i;-.). 7 '.;. & p. 7'.'0 4.')4, 4.VJ 
 
 R. V. (^oppiiril (1827/. M. & M 118 1034 
 
 R. r. C.)|.|)ull (18(11), 2 K.i«l, 2,') 290 
 
 R. r. Cordcn (1709), 4 Uurr. 2281 131 
 
 R. V. ConuiliuH (1743-4), 2 Htr. 1210; 1 WiN. 142 
 
 R. V. CottiiiKliiim (1834), 2 A. & K. 250 
 
 R. V. Cotton (1813), 3 Ciiliiji. 444 
 
 997 
 
 1139 
 
 399, 400, 408, 1101 
 
 U. «•. Cotton (1873). 12 C„\, C. C. 400 237 
 
 R. r. Court (1830), 7 C. & P. 487 505, 572 
 
 _ _ ~ " 47 
 
 670 
 820 
 
 U. V. Courtfimy (I85(!), 7 Cox. C. C. HI ; 5 Ir. C. L. R. 431. 
 R. I'. Courtney (1840), 2 Criiwf. & D. C. (J. 03 
 
 R. V. CouMcnH (I8.')()), 3 Runs. C. it M. 599 
 
 R. t>. Cox and Itiiilton (18S4), 14 (i 11. I). 153; 54 L. .T. M. C. 41 ; 52 
 
 L. T. 25 ; 33 \V. P.. 390 ; 4!i .1. P. 374 ; 15 Cox, C. C. Oil 
 
 . 592, 004, 006 
 
 R. r. ("oylf (1855), 7 Cox, C. C. 74 507, 527 
 
 R. r. ( 'nKlock (1803). 3 F. & F. 837 129 
 
 R. r. (;niMi|) (1880). 5 Q. M. 1). 307 ; 49 I.. .1. M. C. 44 ; 42 L. T. 442 ; 28 
 
 W. U. 701 ; 44 .T. P. 4 1 1 ; 14 Cox. C. (\ 390. 401 635 
 
 R. «■. Crc<lit.in (1858). 27 L. J. M. C. 205 ; K. H. v% E. 231 1170 
 
 R. r. Cn-fvi-y (1813). 1 M. & H. 273 ; 14 II. ]{.. 427 109 
 
 R. r. Crcaswell (1870), 45 L. J. M. C. 77 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 120 ; 1 Q. B. D. 
 
 440 ; 3;l L. T. 700 ; 24 W. U. 281 130 
 
 R. f. (!rink (1832). 6 C. & P. 5((8 209 
 
 R. r. (JrockcU (1831), 4 C. & P. 541 408 
 
 R. V. Croko (1774), I Cowp. 30 1137 
 
 R. V. Cron.liill (1817), 2 Ni«w Schh. Ciih. 667 ; 10 Q. B. 812 5^1 
 
 R. V. ("roi 
 
 (1850), DciirH. \- Boll. 08 906 
 
 R. 
 R. 
 
 CnmNtifU (1 790), 20 How. St. Tr. 109 550, 559 
 
 C 
 
 c'.lltT (1802), 3 F. & V 
 
 130 
 
 R. ». Crowth.r (1780), 1 T. R. 125; 1 R. R. '02 335 
 
 R. V. Ouim- (1842), Ir. Cir. II. 074 986 
 
 R. V. CniM.' (1838), 8 C. «.- F. 515 81, 165, 160 
 
 R. c. Culkin (1812), 5 (;. At P. 121 213 
 
 R. V. Cul|M.i)pcr (1090), Skin. 073 300 
 
 R. .'. Curjr.tiwcn (1H(;5), 35 L. .1. M. C. 58 ; L II. I C. C. I ; llJur. N. 8. 
 
 984 ; 13 L. T. 383 ; 14 \V. R. 55 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 152 172 
 
 R. V. t'urtitt (1818), 2 ('. & K. 703 958 
 
 R. V. nunmn (1819), 2 H. * AM. 378 131 
 
 U. «'. Dunn (18 '5), 1 Moo. l\ I'. 424 1127 
 
 7M 
 
 U. r. Diivio (1837), A. \: K. 380 
 
 . 580, 582 
 
 R. I'. I)iivin(l833), OC. & P. 177 
 
 R. r. DiiviH (1870). L. !l. 1 ('. C. 272; 39 L. J. M. C. 135; 11 Cox, C. C. 678 251 
 
 R. I'. DiiwUt (1821). 3 .Stiiik. R. 34 
 
 0:(3 
 
 R. I'. MiiWKon (1821). 3.Sli»rk. 02 204 
 
 R. I'. Day (1H.V2). 6 Cox. C. C. 55 335, 330 
 
 R. V. D.ii.on (1740), Fowt. C. L. 9 625 
 
 R. V. D.-an (1852), Cox, C. C. 23; 18 How. St. Tr. 306 
 R. r. Di-an of St. Aniiph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 1033. , 
 R. V. Do B.trii>fi'r (1814). 3 M. & S, 07 ; 15 R. R. 415 
 
 R. V. Do la Motti' (1781), 1 Kiwt, P. C. 124 
 
 1«. f. Donio (1827). 7 H. & C. 020 ; 1 M. & R. 291 . . . 
 R. r. Dimt (1813). 1 <;. \- K. 97 
 
 267 
 .23,46 
 
 ,18. 1092 
 ,318, 972 
 . . . 303 
 . . . 938 
 . . . 727 
 
 R. f. Derby (18,50). 1 I,. M. & P. 000 
 
 R. V. Derl.y»liirii (1837), A. \- F. 885 727 
 
 R. V. Derrini^ton (1820), 2 C. & P. 418 608 
 
 R. e. DoSalvi (1857). C. C. C. Sens. Pup. vol. 46. p. 881 1120 
 
 TAi rc/ertncet art to pagtt, not to par<t4/rapht. 
 
TABLE or CASES CITED. 
 
 cllii 
 
 TAUK 
 
 R. r. DoHpnnl (1801), 28 How. St. 'V. 489 (l.'Jft 
 
 B. V. Devlin (1841), 2 Cniwf. & D. O. C. 162 6(19 
 
 R. V. DfwhurNt (1825), 1 Low. 0. C. 47 680 
 
 R. V. Dillon (1877), 14 Cox, C. C. 4 28;J 
 
 R. V. Dilnioro (186'J), Cox, C. C. 52 ;i2(j, :{:»7 
 
 R. r. DinKliT (1 791), 2 lii-ii. .'iOl 3.'»'1 
 
 R. i: Dintfl.'V (1845), 1 C. & K. 637 60(i. .'i(!9, 672 
 
 R. .'. Dixon ■( I7(>ri), 3 Burr. 087 G(t4, !i(i9 
 
 R. r Dixon (1814), 3 M. & Stl. 15; 4 Camp. 12; 16 R. R. 381 80, 107 
 
 R. V. Dohfrty (1810), 13 Kiist, 171 ; 12 R. R. 315 893 
 
 R. V. Dohorty (1874), 13 Cox, C. C. 23 6<i6 
 
 R. V. Doolin (1832), 1 .Tebb, C. C. 123 971 
 
 R. V. Doran (1791), 1 Esp. 127 290 
 
 R. V. Do.HKoit (184(i). 2 C. & K. 3()ii 248 
 
 R.v. Douglas (1824), 2 Dowl. N. S. 416 341 
 
 R. V. Douglas (1816). 1 C. & K. 070 318 
 
 R. V. Dougltt.s (1840), 13 Q. B. 42; 16 L. J. Q. B. 417; 11 Jiir. 811. .,341, 348, 
 
 l(t2<> 
 
 R. V. Dowlin (1792), P.-a. R. 170 ; 3 R. R. 679 3,>l 
 
 K. I'. Dowling 1H20), Rv. & M. 433 209 
 
 R. f. Down.T (18S0), 14 Cox, C. C. 480 604 
 
 K. V. Dowuliani (1868), 1 F. & V- 380 312 
 
 II. r. DowiiinK: (1840), Chclni.'*fortl Spring AKni/ift, MS RGl 
 
 K. r. DowiiNJiiiv, Dow. March, of (1836), 4 A. & E. 232 ; 6 N. & M. COJ ; 
 
 6 .M. At \V. 002 209 
 
 U. r. Doyle (ISIli), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 390 609 
 
 R. r. Draifi" (1876), 14 Cox, C. C. 85 247 
 
 K. r. Drew (1S37), 8 (!. Ac 1". 140 603, 672 
 
 K. f. Drununond (1781), 1 I''''i. C. C. 338 404, 407 
 
 R. «•. Driirv (1819), 3 C. & K. I'i3 1140 
 
 K. V. DulHii (1818), R. & R. 306 81 
 
 R. r. DukinHfld (1848), 11 Q. B. 078; 17 L. .T. M. C. 113 464 
 
 R. r. Diilwiiili Colli'gf (1861), 17 Q. B. 000 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 30 ; 16 Jiir. 064 791 
 
 R. I'. Dunboyni', Ld. (1S60), 3 C. & Kir. 1 77 
 
 R. V. Dun(!omlH)(1838), 8 C. & T. 309 929 
 
 R. V. Diingpy (1804), 4 F. & F. 99 1127 
 
 R. t'. Diinnmrry (1841), Ir. Cir. R. 312 210 
 
 R. V. Dunn (1820), 1 Moo. C. C. 140 238, 247 
 
 R. V. Dunn (1831), 4 C. & I'. 643 504 
 
 R. r. Duiini! (1838), Ir. Cir. R. 407 980 
 
 R. V. DunHforcl (1836). 2 A. * K. 608 ; 4 N. & M. 349 ; 1 II. * \V. 93 .. .6t> 
 
 R. t'. DmrnUn (1824), Ry. & M. 109 47 
 
 R. V. Durham (1787), 1 Lna. C. C. 478 033 
 
 R. t'. Durkin (1837), 2 I.K-W. C. C. 1(W 8.'6 
 
 R. r, Durort M7SI), 1 L.a. 361; 1 Eaut. P. C. 46 202 
 
 R. V. DwyiTN (1843), 1 Ruhh. C. & M. 797 677 
 
 R. V. Eanf. Count. Rv. Co. (1839), 10 A. A: E. 631 99H 
 
 R. V. EaMt Fiiirl.'v (r8-'6), Dowl. & R. 163 303 
 
 R. r. Kant Murk 'I'ything (1848), 1 1 Q. B. 887 ; 3 Cox, C. C. 00 ; 17 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 877 : 12 Jur. 3.)2 124 
 
 R. f. EaHt Winch (18 10), 12 A. & E. 09/ 621 
 
 R. .•. Eaton (1861), 2 Den. C. C. 274 ; uoni. R. r. U.-z/oli, 3 C. & IC. 160; 
 
 T. & M. 698 209 
 
 R. r. Edgar (1831). 3 Rush. C. * M. 411 660 
 
 R. V. Edmonton (1831), 1 M. At Rob. 32 • li;j 
 
 R. V. EdmundH (1833). 6 C. & P. IOl 326, 329, 628 
 
 R. V. Edmundwrn (1869), 28 L. J. M. C. 213 ; 2 E. & E. 77 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 
 
 212; 6.1ur. N. 8. 1361 264 
 
 R. V. E<lwurd« (1791), 4 T. R. 440 917, 907 
 
 R. V. 10<lwanlH (1837 , 8 C. & P. 20 9.'i9 
 
 R. V. EdwanlH a872), 12 Cox. C. C. 230 377 
 
 R. V. I'MwinHtowo (1828). 8 B. & C. 071 621 
 
 R. V. Egort«m (1819), R. & R. 376 ; oitwl in R. v. Ellin, 6 R. & C. 148. .. . 241 
 
 rv. /. end4 with payt 035, 
 
l!^ 
 
 c 
 
 ;liv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOK 
 
 R. V. Elderslmw (1828), 3 C. * P. ;{<.)« 100 
 
 R. t . Elili-rtoii (I 70:«), 2 Ld. Uiivm. i)HO 4 
 
 R. f. EUiruliTf (IS21), R. & It 4 10 600 
 
 R. v. Ellol (IHJ.J), 7 «i. B. .VW; 2 Now Sew*. Ca«. 3U li:i» 
 
 R. «•. Kllicomlx! (lH;{;t). 5 0. (V P. 522 21)0, 314, a 18 
 
 R. V. Elliott (1S3!0. « (". & P. 772 210 
 
 R. V. KIliH (1802), Mc^Niilly, Kv. .'if) 8H3 
 
 R. «■. ElliH (1824, Nlnmld Im^ 1S20), B. & C. 147 230, 241, 609 
 
 R. V. KliiiiKton (1802), 1 B. & S. 088 : 31 L. .1. M. C. 14; 90ox. C. V. 8(i. . 1131 
 R. r. Klworthy (18(i7), L. R. 1 C. 0. 103 ; 37 L. J. M. C. 3 ; 17 L. T. 2'J3 : 
 
 low. R. 207; 10 Cox, C. C. r>7'J 318 
 
 R. r. Ely, Hi., of (1828), 8 B. & C. 112; 2 M. & R. 127 U97 
 
 R. V. EminoiiM (1810), 2 M. & Rob. 279 826 
 
 R. f. Eiiorh (IH33). .') C. & P. r,Mi 503, 572 
 
 R. V. Eiifrflinmn (1842), C. & MiirHli. 218 105 
 
 R. r. Eri.Mwi'll (1790), 3 T. R. 721 325, 329, 333, 340, 308, 398, 420 
 
 R. t'. Erith (1807). 8 EiiHt,. 539 420 
 
 R. V. Errinjfton (18.(8), 2 Lew. 0. C. 142 333, 408 
 
 R. r. EHdiiilo (1858), 1 F. & F. 213 1231 
 
 R. V. Esop (183(i), 7 C. & P. 450 80 
 
 n. r. EviiUM (1821), 3 Stiirk. 35 204 
 
 K. V. Eviiim (1839), 8 C. & P. 7Ci 215 
 
 R. V. Evi'iiwood Barony (1843), 3 Q. B. 370 li:)9 
 
 R. f. ExhU (1800), 4 F. & F. 922 120 
 
 R. V. Exotc;r(18(i9), L. R. 4U. B. 341; 38L. J. M. C. 127 ; lOB. &S. 433., 4.(4, 
 
 445 
 T f. Exeter, TiwiMnrer of (1829). 5 M. & R. 167 ; and see 8 A. & E. 690. . S24 
 
 r '. FHKont(1835), 7 C. & P. 23S 408, 409 
 
 R. r. Fiiirie (1857), 8 E. & B. 480 247, 1121 
 
 R. r. Fiilkiier mid Bond (1822), R. & R. 481 600 
 
 R. r. Fanning (1805), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 289 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 411 ; 14 W. R. 
 
 701 149 
 
 R. V. Farler (1837), 8 C. & P. 100 033, 034 
 
 R. I-. Farley (1840), 2 C. & K. 313 .592, 001, 605 
 
 R. f. Farrell (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 94 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 605 ; L. R. 2 C. C. 
 
 110: 29 L. T. 404 : 22 W. R. 678 3.V2 
 
 R. V. Farrington (1811), R. & R. 207 80 
 
 R. I'. FearKiw O'Connor (1843), 5 Q. B. 16 OOO 
 
 R. V. Fearshiro (1779), 1 Lea. 202 283, 679 
 
 R. r. Felton (l(i28), 3 How. St. Tr. 371 673 
 
 R. c. Fennell (1881), 7 Q. B. I). 147; .'>0 L. J. M. C. 120; 44 L. T. 087 ; 
 
 29 W. R. 742 ; 45 J. P. 000 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 007 671 
 
 R. (. FerrerH. E. of (17.58), 1 Burr. 035 893 
 
 R. f. Ferry FryHtone ( 1801 ), 2 Eaut, 64 308, 420 
 
 R. r. Finiieane (18.13), 5 C. & P. 551 238 
 
 R. r. Firth (1.S09), 38 L. J. M. C. 54 ; U Cox, C. C. 234 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 
 
 172: 19L. T. 740; 17 W. R. .327 230 
 
 R. V. FiHlier (1786). eiUnl 1 Ltu. 310, 311, n 679 
 
 R. t'. Filzgerald (1741), 1 Lea. C. C. 20 1049, 1172 
 
 R. r. Fit/K<'rald (1811), Ir. Cir. R. 108 409 
 
 R. f. Fitzgerald (188»), nnrei»orti-d 877 
 
 R. V. FitZHinioiiH (1809), L R. 4 C. L. 1 289 
 
 R. V. Flaherty (1817), 2 C. it K. 782 293 
 
 R. r. Flannagan (I8H2), 15 Cox, C. C. 403 237, 247 
 
 R. V. Flutley (1842), Ir. (Jir. II. 445 912 
 
 R. V. Flavell (1884), 14 Q. B. I). 304; 62 L. T. 133 ; 33 \V. R. 343; 49 
 
 .1. P. 400 695 
 
 R. V. Fleming (1842), 1 Ann. M. & O. .330 603, 671 
 
 R. f. Fleniniing ( 1 799), 2 Leu. 854 334, 338 
 
 R. I. Fl.'t.Oier il8i>9), I C. \- P. 250 fS2 
 
 R. I). Flint-ihire (1K40). 3 Dowl. & L. 53? 768, 788 
 
 R. V. FolkeH(1832), 1 MiMt. U. U. 3.i4 238 
 
 TTiD n/irencea an to ^xye*, not to puriii/nijjht. 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. clv 
 
 PAOR 
 
 R. V. Fontftino Moroau (1848), 11 Q. B. 1028 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 187 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 02(i 1 1 10, 1 1 1 7 
 
 R. r. ForU'H(18U). H.tlt, N. P. R. f>9!), ii :V.iii 
 
 R, V. Forl..'H ( ISa,) , 7 C. ^ P. 224 247 
 
 R. ». Fonl {\HC)l), 2 Den. C. C. 245 ; 2 C. & K. I Vi ; ft Cox, C. C. 18» . .i)2/>, 'J.)8 
 R. f. F(.r<liiijfl>ridift) (1858), E. B. & E. 085, G78 ; 27 L. J. M. C. 290 ; 4 
 
 Jur. N. S. 051 149, 303 
 
 U. r. F..i.'sl.-r (I8(lf;), 4 F. & F. 857 408 
 
 It. r. KoiNttT ( 1 855), r "iirM. 450 210 
 
 K. r. l''nrsvHi (1814), iv. & R. 271 15, 21 1 
 
 R. V. F.mti'r (1827), 1 lK.<wiii, C. C. 40 5;0 
 
 R. V. FohUt (I8H4), OC. & P. ;i25 ;J77, 5(i2 
 
 K. r. Fox Maulu (1839), 7 Dowl. 00;i 8:t2 
 
 R. V. Friim-t. ( 1 839), 2 M. & Rob. 207 330 
 
 R. ••. Fruii.iw (1874), 43 L. J. M. C. 97 ; L. R. 2 C. C. 128 ; 12 Co.x, C. C. 
 
 612 ; 30 L. T. 503 ; 22 W. R. 003 . . 217 
 
 R. V. Frniicklin (1731), 17 How. St. Tr. 038 1093 
 
 R. V. FriiMcr (1797), 1 McNiilly, Ev. 50 8,S3 
 
 R. V. Fmli-rick (1738), 2 Str. 1095 S88 
 
 R. V. Ficfiimn (1S75). I. R. 9 C. L. 527 :< 5 
 
 R. V. Frc-iml (10!)0).13 How. St. Tr. 10 837. 900, 901, 907 
 
 Ii. V. IVftwoll (1804), 1 L. & C. 443 ; 9 Cox, C. C. 471 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 
 
 145 : 6 L. T. 333 : 10 W. R. 545 80 
 
 R. V. Frost (1839), 9 C. & P. 131 829. 895, 890, 909 
 
 K. V. Frost (1855), Dl-ufh. C. C. 474 ; Cox, C. C. 520 ; 3 C. L. R. 005 ; 
 
 24 L.J. M. C. 110; 1 Jur. N. S 400 198, 216 
 
 R. V. Fulliirton (1853), Cox. C. 19J 198 
 
 R. V. Fullnr(1810), R. & R. C. C ,08 121 
 
 R. V. Fullford (1801), 1 L. & Cave, 401 9 Cox, C. C. 453 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 
 
 122 : 10 Jur. N. H. 522 ; 10 T T. 34«. ; 12 VV. R 715 47 
 
 R. V. Fumival (1821), H. & R. . :5 205 
 
 R. V. Fursey (1833). 6 C. & 1*. 81 21 1, 308 
 
 R. V. Gadlmry (1838), 8 C. & P. 070 251 
 
 R. ». (;ullaKlier (1875), 15 Cox, C .*. 291 883 
 
 R. V. (lallaKhi'r(l883). 13 Cox, C. C. 01 033 
 
 R. V. Galvin (1805), 16 Ir. ' L. R. 452 335 
 
 R. V. OuHZ (1882). 9 Q. B. 93 ; 51 L. J. (J. B. 419 ; 40 L. T. 592 .... 1028 
 
 R. V. Uartett (1847), I Den. O. C. 230 ; 2 C. & K. 474 584, 900, 905, 970 
 
 R. V. Oardiuer (1839), 8 C. & P. 737 ; 2 Moo. C. C. 95 027 
 
 R. V. Ounlner (1810), 2 Camp. 613 ; 11 R. R. 784 518, 1093 
 
 R. V. Guriicr (1848), 1 Don. 329 ; 3 Now Sens. Can. 329; 2 C. & K. 920. .503, 571 
 
 R. V. Ganior (1804), 3 F. & F. 681 237 
 
 R. V. Oanit (1807), 30 L. J. M. C. 89 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 400 ; 8 B. & S. 305. . 1 100 
 
 R. r. Gay (18:»5), 7 C & P. 230 470 
 
 R. V. Grtvnor (1839), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 142 ; Jobb, C. C. 202 627, 029 
 
 R. V. Gazard (1838), 8 C. & P. 595 612, 899 
 
 R. V. Gi'Utjh (1840), 9 C. & P. 499 80 
 
 R. V. Oo.'riuK (1849). 18 L. J. M. C. 215 237, 247 
 
 R. V. OfUKo (1774), 1 Cowp. 10 00 
 
 R. V. Gibbons (1823), 1 C. & P. 98. n. (A) 501, 500, 594 
 
 R. r. Gibney (1822), Jebb, C. C. 15 507, .50!i, 570 
 
 R. «'. Gibnon(1802), R. & R. 343 1105. 1107 
 
 R. r. GiliHon (1887), 18 (J. B. D. 537; 56 L. J. M. C. 49; .50 L. T. 307; 
 
 35 \V. R. 411; 51 J. P. 742; 10 Cox, C. C. 181 1231 
 
 R. V. GiddinH(18»2), C. & Marxh. 034 238 
 
 R. V. GilbrnHH (1830), 7 C. & P. 444 820 
 
 R. V. Gilham (1795), 1 Esp. 285 ; T. R. 205 905 
 
 It. r. Gilham (1828), 1 Moo. C. C. 180; Joy on Con f. 52-.50.... 607, 583, 5ii». 
 
 595. 5',I0 
 
 R. ('. Gillis (1800), 1 1 Cox, C. C. 09 869, 582, 584 
 
 R. I'. Gillow (1825), 1 Moody, C. C. 85 ; 1 Lowin, C. C. 57 82 
 
 R. V. Gllmoro (1882), 15 Vaix, C. C. 85 1120 
 
 R. V. GilHon (1807), R. & R. 138 290 
 
 Vol. I. *Hdt with page 6»6. 
 
 :« t 
 
 m 
 
 w 
 
! 
 
 clvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAnK 
 
 R. f.Oi«lwoo<l (1770), 1 Leaoh, C. 0. 142; 2 Eiwt, P. C. 1120 ,. 46 
 
 11. «'. (SiHlmrn (IH12), 15 KiiHt, 67 910 
 
 K. V. OiMHoii (1847), 2 C. & K. 7H1 U'iO 
 
 K. f. (J1hhmi<i(1Ho4). 7 Cox, C. O. 1 «88 
 
 11. r. (ilc«(il ( I8:f.'), ;j UuHH. C. & M. (523 802 
 
 II. V. (Ilymu) (1871), L. K. 7 U. U. 10; 41 L. J. M. C. 58; 20 L. T. 01 ; 
 
 20 W K. i»4 1 160 
 
 R. f. (J.HMiird (1882), lo (J.ix, C. C. 7 41.8 
 
 11. r. (JoMmIkkIo (1811), 1 (!. & K. (i.51 M:i 
 
 K. «'. Ooldmiiith (IH7:»), 12 Ci.x, C. C. 470 84 
 
 li. r. (J.Mxhio (1741). 17 How. St. Tr. 1()1.'» 017 
 
 11. r. (}i..)(ltVli«)w (18Vi)), 14 Cox, C. (!. ;i2(i 3;t2 
 
 It. r. (SooiUiii (1828), I L<.w. (;. C. 100 148 
 
 11. 1'. Oonloii (178'.>), 1 Lfii. r,ir> 148 
 
 It. f. (lordoii (1842), (^iir. * M. 410 10;i4 
 
 It. V. Cordon (18.'-)5;, 2;') I,. .1. M. ('. 10; DniiH. C. C r>m 1(02, 110:1 
 
 11. r. Cordon, 1^1. (J. (1781), 21 How. St. Tr. ■''i.i.). ..-177, '-i'lii, 383, 80.'), 000, 001 
 
 It. c. Could (1840), (; \- 1*. 3(11 121, MCi 
 
 It. c. (Jriidy (1830), 7 <!. & 1'. 0;')0 331 
 
 It. V. tJriiliiiin (1701), 2 Liiirli, .')47 217 
 
 It. V. (iriiy (1^3'>), 7 ('. A: 1*. 101 238 
 
 (Iruy (1811), Ir. Cir. K. 73 405, 400 
 
 (Jrity (18(10), 4 V. Hi V. 1102 247 
 
 (Iniit Moltoii (181.')}, 7 »i II 387; 14 Ij. .1. M. C. 122 1139 
 
 (Irciit CaiiHcld (1810^. K«p. 130 200 
 
 (Jrcon (1832), Ct V,. it V. 312 570, 570 
 
 (Jrofii (1834), C. & r. 0.'^i5 508 
 
 Crccii (1852), 3 C. iV K 200 240 
 
 , (Srei'iiuwiiy (1845), 7 H. H. 120 814, 8.33 
 
 I?. (Irc'iU! (1837). A. & K. 548 .• 1002 
 
 V. (Iri'Kory (1840), 8 Q. B. 508; 2 N«,'w Soh'*. Chh. 220; 15 L. J. M. C. 
 
 ; 10 .Jur. 387 216 
 
 Grittin (1800), It. & It. 151 58,'5 
 
 It. V. Criffln (1853), Cox, C C. 210 507, 500 
 
 R. f. Griffin (1879), 14 Cox, C. C. :i08 ; 4 L. It. Jr. 407 140 
 
 It. f. GriffiHiH(l832), 3 Uiihh. C. & M. 450, 403 571 
 
 H. f. Griffiths (1841), C. & 1'. 740 0.-.8 
 
 It. I'. Grimwood (1815), 1 IVico, 309 1050 
 
 11. V. Groonil.ridKu (1830), T C. & V. Ml 09 
 
 11. f. Grov.!(1833), 7 C. & 1'. 0;i.); 1 Moo. C. C. 447 212 
 
 R. V. Gnindon (1775), 1 Cown. 322 1103, 11'8 
 
 R. V. GuiniMi(18ll), Ir. Cir. H 107 027 
 
 R. «•. Gully (1773), I L<>.irh, 08 14 
 
 R. r. Guniblf! (1872), 42 L. J. M. C. 7; L. It. 2 C. H 1 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 
 
 248 ; 27 L. T. 092 : 21 W. It. 299 198, 212 
 
 R. V. Gimn-y (1800). 11 Gox, (J. C. 414 0(9 
 
 R. r. Gut<h (1820), M. * M. 433 107, 587 
 
 R. f. Giitlirif (1870). H <''X, G.G.522; L. 11. I C.C.241; 39 L. J. M. C. 
 
 95; 22L. T. 485; 18 W. It. 702 206 
 
 R. V. Guttridjyo (1840), 9 C. Ac P. 473 330, 376 
 
 R. r. HiiK»"OH!»"). »C. & r. 107 328 
 
 R. f. Hhkiiii(1873), 12 Cox, (! C. 357 248 
 
 R. r. HiiMics (18;iO), 2 HiiHH. C. & M. (4tli ihI.) 8,S(1 578 
 
 R. V. lliiinB (1005). Gonil). 337 lolO, 1032, 1033, l(t46, 10.V2 
 
 R. r. Hule(1778), 2 Cowp. 728 120 
 
 R. r. Hall (1700), 1 L.-win, C. ". 110 .-iOO, 579 
 
 It. r. Hall (1838), 8 G. & V. MH 388, 5(i2 
 
 11. V. Hiilliday (18(10), 29 L. .1. M. C. 148; 8Cox,C. C. 298; IWl, C. C. 257.. 891 
 
 R. i.. IIaini)(l8,Vj), Cox, C. C. 107 314 
 
 R. V. Iliindroi^k (1811), Ir. Gir. It. 229 901 
 
 It. r. HunkinN(l840), 2 V. & K. 823 314, 604 
 
 R. r. HanHon (1811). <;.& Mari^li. 3.34 : 2 Mim). C. C. 246 80 
 
 H. t>. IlapgiMKl and Wyatt (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 471 206 
 
 R. 
 
 1'. 
 
 It. 
 
 I'. 
 
 It. 
 
 r. 
 
 It. 
 
 r. 
 
 It. 
 
 V. 
 
 It. 
 
 r. 
 
 It. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 It. 
 
 V. 
 
 R 
 
 V. 
 
 
 iH 
 
 R. 
 
 r. 
 
 The ri/ircticet aro to pagat, not to parayrophi. 
 
 £> 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. 
 
 C'lvli 
 
 TAilR 
 
 R. f 
 
 n.v 
 
 H. 
 K. 
 R 
 R. 
 R. 
 
 n. 
 
 R. 
 It. 
 
 TTiirbome (Ifi.l.')), 2 N. & M. 341 ; 2 A. & K. r,U) ; 1 If. 4 W. M',.. 100, ITU 
 
 lliiiiliiiK(lH4'J). 1 Ann. M. & (). ;M0 oTi 
 
 ~ 4110 
 
 'Kid 
 114 
 
 Hani wick (IHllD), 11 Kiist. 
 Ilimlwi.k (IHU), 1 O. & r 
 HiirilvdTiH). 24 How. St. 
 
 lliiin(l«7(l). KlCox, 
 
 c. c 
 
 llar»friivf (IHMI), T. C. & P. 
 IliiniiijrworHi (IHIT)), 4 M. 
 r. lliirriH(lOHO), 7 How. St. ' 
 r. HiirriH(ls;f.'), 1 Moo. C. C 
 K. r. HarriH(IH:iO), 7 ('. & V. 4'i 
 U. V. HamM(lH,-.0), 4 0ox, O. C, 
 
 K. f. 
 U. .'. 
 It. r. 
 R. t. 
 R. r. 
 11. r. 
 R. V. 
 h. r. 
 U. r. 
 R. r. 
 19 
 R. f. 
 R. I' 
 R. r. 
 
 n. r. 
 
 R. r. 
 80; 
 R. V. 
 It. r. 
 R. :•. 
 R. V. 
 R. .'. 
 R. .>. 
 R. V. 
 R. V. 
 R. V. 
 R. .'. 
 R. r. 
 R. r. 
 R. r. 
 R. f. 
 R. f. 
 R. V. 
 R. I . 
 R. f. 
 R. r. 
 R. r. 
 R. V. 
 
 n. V. 
 
 II. V. 
 
 1 I 
 
 R. ». 
 
 R. f. 
 R. f. 
 R. V. 
 R. V. 
 R. f. 
 R. .'. 
 R. .'. 
 R. I . 
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 Mf, . . . 
 !)H II 
 
 U) ' * 
 
 
 • • ■ < 
 
 ':m. 
 
 38(1* 
 
 Vo'i, 
 
 494, 4 
 
 Tr. 704 
 174 .. 
 170 .. 
 
 ..248 
 
 ,383 
 
 384 
 
 386, 
 
 013, 
 
 UI4, 
 
 9J7, ! 
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 & S..I. 
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 !) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 440 
 
 33.1 I 
 
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 ^t. Ti'. 8 
 
 51 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 330, ; 
 
 (!. 118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 920 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . .. < 
 
 *sH. (*afl. 
 
 490 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 n. 7.S0 
 
 
 
 
 
 . .1100. I 
 
 ) (l«-'7), 
 
 ;. 441 .. 
 
 2B. 
 
 & f!. 
 
 2,'i7 ; 
 
 3 D 
 
 & R. 4(H 
 
 ^ .. 
 
 133 
 !ll8 
 
 llarriH(IS(iO), 8 Cox, C. (J. 
 1 1 arris (1804), 4 F. & F. 34 
 HarriNon (101)2), 12 How. t' 
 HanUon (1831). 2 Low. C. 
 llarriNH(1822). 5 H. & AM. 
 llarriMHoii (1S40), 2 Now Sc 
 llartiiiKton (IH.I.-i), 4 K. & 1 
 Harvey (mIiouIcI Im Hanioy) 
 Harvey ( I S.-iO), 4 (Jox, (;. C 
 llarvov (1871), L. It. 1 C. C. 284; 40 L. J. M. (). 03; 23 L. T. HM; 
 
 \V. It. '440; 11 Cox. C. C. 002 
 
 Ilarv.y (1874), 44 L. J. M. O. 1 ; L. R. 10 i) U 40 1137 
 
 " 1039 
 
 033 
 
 113 
 130 
 I ■.'(» 
 -MS 
 
 tto 
 
 .'4 S 
 129 
 190 
 131 
 109 
 i32 
 
 26 1 
 
 HasliiiKtii'l'l (1814), 2 M. & Sel. .'i.-)8 ; IT) It. R. 3i>0 
 
 IhtMli 
 
 lllfH 
 
 (I83.-)), 7 c. & 1*. i.n. 
 
 llatHoM (1830). 4 A. & K. IM 1 12, 1 13 
 
 Haiurlitoii (18r)3), 1 E. & B. 612 ; 6 Cox, C. C. 101 ; 22 L. .1. M. C. 
 
 17Jiir. 4.^ 89, 1109, 1141 
 
 HawcH(18l7), 1 Di'ii. C. C. 270 1170 
 
 HawkiiiH(1808), 10 KiiHt, 211 ; 2 Dow, 124 ; 14 R. R. 129 10.5 
 
 Hiiworth (1830), 4 C. & V. 2.54 289, 318, 319, .')83 
 
 ' "" 98 
 
 Hay (1800), 2 F. & F 
 Hay, Dr., Staiiwix'n 
 HaycM(1838), 2 M. & 
 Ha>nfH( 181.5), 4 M. 
 Havwanl (1833), G (; 
 Hayward(lH4fl), 2C 
 Ha/oll (1810), 13 Ea.. 
 Hazv(182(i),2(;. & I 
 Healoy (1824), 1 Mooi 
 Hearii (1841), C. & M 
 H.-arno (1830), 4 C. * 
 Heath (1744), 18 Hoi 
 Heliden (1738), Aiulr 
 lle<lue.s (1707), 28 H< 
 H.H'Mom (1878). 14 C. 
 Helling (I7I'> 10), 1 
 
 eil«o(1767), 1 AV. 
 c Rob. 166 
 
 Bl. 
 
 040.. 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 27 
 
 & S. 214 2(1 
 
 . & P. 157 4fi 
 
 . & Kir. 234 ; 1 I 
 
 tun. 
 
 C. C. 
 
 IGO . . . 
 
 OC 
 
 »t, 1 4 1 
 
 
 i; 
 
 P 4.58 
 
 
 
 
 203 27 
 
 ..Iv. C. C. 1 
 
 larHli. 109 
 
 V: P. 215 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 ■ •>•*•*• 
 
 2( 
 
 .....503, 508, .57 
 5( 
 
 w. At. Tr. 123 8i 
 
 . 389 
 
 
 
 
 88, 1 1 1 
 
 iw. St. Tr. 13(i7 
 
 
 
 
 9'. 
 
 i.\, C. C. 14, 40 . 
 
 
 
 
 237, 3; 
 
 Str. 8 
 
 
 
 
 131, l: 
 
 u 
 
 78 
 02 
 
 14 
 
 24 
 32 
 
 12 
 
 Henderwm (1841), 2 M<io. C. C. 192 1 120 
 
 JIunilon (undated), eittsl arguendo, 9 C. & P. 2.5.5 438 
 
 " ~ 230 
 
 986 
 
 HouwcmmI (1870), 1 1 Cox, C. C. 626 ; 22 L. T. 486 
 
 HerefordHliirn, J,J., Ex parte HuniiihreyM (186"), 19 L. J. M. C. 189; 
 
 ,. M. & P. ,323 
 
 Jlerrington (1804), 3 Now R. 4(58 11.59 
 
 HerHtinoncouux (1827), 7 C. * B. 6.56 081 
 
 H.!WPtt(1842), C. & MarHh. 634 563, 606, 667 
 
 Heyd 
 
 Hi.^kling (1845), 7 Q. B. 880; 16 L. J. M. C. 23 
 
 Hioknmn (1784), 2 Eiutt, P. C. 593 
 
 (1841), 9 C. & P. 780 196 
 
 (1762), 1 W. HI. 361 ..... .^ 997 
 
 ,1100, 1103, 1108 
 
 202 
 
 601 
 
 683 
 
 IIitfginM(1829). 2 C. & P. 003 
 
 Higlifli>ld (1828), nitod 3 Ruhh. 0. & M. 479 
 
 HigHon (1849), 2 C. & K. 769 677 
 
 Vol. J. md* with pag* «W». 
 
 mi 
 
 
clviii 
 
 TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 \h 
 
 PAOB 
 
 B. V. Hill (1838), 8C. 4 r. 276 80 
 
 R. (. Hill (18ftl), 2 Den. C. C. 254; 20 L. J, M. C. 222 26. 896 
 
 R. I'. HillHiii (1H72), 12 Cox, C. C. 174 683, DOrt 
 
 R. V. Iliucklcy (IHIO), 12 Kwit, 3«1 130 
 
 R. r. liiiioklcy (IH(i3), 32 L. J. M. C. 168; 3 B. & S. HHr) ; 8 L. T. 270; 
 
 II W. R. 0«3; d.hir. N. S. 10.54 306 
 
 R. r. Himl (1H()(I). 29 L. J. M. C. 147; 8 Cox, C. C. 300 4(<6 
 
 R. V. lliiiluy (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 524 238 
 
 R. f. Ilinxman (1701), citwl 1 Leufih, C. C. 310, 311, n 670 
 
 R. I. Hinit (182H), 1 Low. C. C. 40 676, 680 
 
 R. r. Hod^^o (1838), 2 Lowiii, C. C. 227 68 
 
 R. V. HoiljykiHs (1830), 7 C. & P. 208 260, 042 
 
 R r. HodKion (1812), R. & R. 211 257, 951, 907 
 
 R. r. HddgHoii (1831), 1 Lcwin. 236 217 
 
 R. f. HoKK (1833), OC. & r. 176 329 
 
 R. <•. n«w(IH*l). 2 M. & Kob. 380 216 
 
 K. V. Holbrook (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 60 ; 4 Q. B. D. 42 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 650 ; 
 
 14 Cox, C. C. 1H,5; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 37 L. T. 
 
 530 ; 30 L. T. 530 ; 26 W. U. 144 ; 27 \V. R. 313 107, 687 
 
 R. r. Holilen (1838), 8 C. & P. 609 913, 958 
 
 R. r. HoU (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 675 ; 80 L. J. Q. B. 763 ; 45 L. T. 69 ; 46 
 
 J. P. 53 962 
 
 R. i: IIoUinKbcrry (1825), 4 B. & C. S'.'O ; 6 Dowl. & R. 346 203 
 
 R. I. Ilollond (17!»4). 6 T. R. 607 ; 2 R. R. 078 208 
 
 R c. HoliiieH ( 1S43), 1 C. & Kir. 248 572 
 
 R. c. Holmes (IS(il), 2 F. &F. 788 897 
 
 R. V. Holmt-H iiud FurncHH (1871), 41 L. J. M. C. 12 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 137 : 
 
 L. R. IC. C. 334 257, 950, 961, 967 
 
 R. c. Holt (1703), 5T. R. 430 15, 20, 1093 
 
 R. V. Holt (1830), 7 C. & P. 518 81 
 
 R. r. Holt (1800), 30 L. J. M. C. 11 ; B.ll, C. C. 280; 8 Cox, C. C. 411 ; 
 
 6 Jur. N. 8. 1121 ; 3 L. T. 310 ; 9 W. K. 74 247 
 
 R. r. Holy Trinity, Hull (1827), 7 B. & C. Oil ; 1 M. & R. 444 288 
 
 R. r. Hood (1S30), 1 Moo. C. (;. 281 888 
 
 R. r. HiK)k {18.')7) Deiiw. & Bull, 600 ; 8 (.'ox. C. C. 6 629 
 
 R. V. Hoopor (1812), cited 3 Kiwa. C. ii M. 501) 670 
 
 R. r. HopoM (1835), 7 C. & P. 136 : 1 M. & Rob. 396 678 
 
 R. I'. Homo (1777), 20 How. St. Tr. 6(il 274, 275, 276 
 
 R. r. Home Tooke (1794), 25 How. St. Tr. 120 526, 923, 1220 
 
 R. f. HoHtmon of NewciiHtle (1744-5), 2 Str. 1223 1»94, 997 
 
 R. f. HouKh (180ii), R. & R. 122 246 
 
 R. V. Houlton (1823), 1 Jebb, C. C. 24 8S9, 892 
 
 R. V. Howard (1832), I M. & Rob. 187 147 
 
 R. r. Howell (ISI.'i), 1 C. & K. 080; 1 Den. C. C. 1 468 
 
 R. f. Howes (1834), 6 C. & P. 404 5(i7 
 
 R. r. Hubbard (1881), 14 Cox. C. C. 506 408 
 
 R. r. Hu(!ks (1810), 1 Stark. N. P. R. 823 25. 5i) 
 
 R. r. Huot (1798), 2 Lea. 821 579 
 
 R. I'. HujrJios (1813), 2 Lew. C. C. 229; 1 Rush. C. & M. 147 165 
 
 R. V. Hujfhes(1832), 6 C. & P. 126 213 
 
 R. I'. Hujjrhes(18.t9), 1 Crawf. & D. C. C. 13 1018 
 
 It. r. HuKlies(1814), 1 C. & K. 510 015 
 
 ]i V. Hughes (1800), 29 L. J. AL C. 71 239 
 
 R. r. Huluott (1790), 6T. R. 583 132, 1137 
 
 R. r. Hull (1800), 2F. &F. 10 78 
 
 R. ( . Hulmo (1870), L. T,. 5 Q. B. 377 ; 39 L. J. Q B. 149 962 
 
 R. f. Humphries (1829), cited 3 Rus«. C. & M. 344 318 
 
 R. r. Hunt (1811), 2 Camp. 583; 31 How. St. 'IV. 408 203 
 
 R. V. Hunt (1820), 3 B. A: Aid. 560 248, 296, 383 
 
 R. r. Hunt (1825). 1 Moo. C. C. 93 80 
 
 R. V. Hunt (1881), 6 Q. B. D. .".OO ; 60 L. J. M. C. 35 1140 
 
 R. r. Hunter (1829), 3 C. & P. 691 698 
 
 The references are to paget, not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clix 
 
 r.'.oB 
 R. ». Huiitlev (1860), 29 L. J. M. C. 70 ; IM\, C. C. 238 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 
 
 260: 1 L. i!. 38J ; 8 W. R. is;»; 6 Jur. N. S. 80 1127 
 
 R. f. Hurley (ISD), 2 M. & R<»b. 473 278 
 
 R, V. Hut.-hin« (1880), ft Q. n. D. .l.Vt ; 6 Q. B. D. 300 ; 4!) L. J M. C. 
 
 64; 42 L. T. 760; 28 W. R. flu:) 8a, I07;(, 1131, 1140 
 
 R. r. niiKhiiiHon (1822), 2 B. & C. 008, n 46') 
 
 R. V. Hy(ln(l8l8), ;iCox, C. C. 00 3;i5 
 
 R. V. lughHin (Ih64), fl B. & S. 257 : 3:j L. .1. W- B. 183; Cox, C. C. 
 
 608 : 10 Jur. N. S. 908 ; 10 L. T. i.W> ; 12 VV. U. 703 210, 213 
 
 R. ». InKrani (170.')), I Siilk. 384 16.') 
 
 R. r. Iiit^H (18.>0), 33 Uiivf. St. Tr. 7")7 310 
 
 R. r. Mo of Ely (18:)0;, 15 Q. B. 827 ; 4 New Sohh. Cm. 222; 19 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 223 ; U Jur. 056 17 
 
 R. r. .THckmrn (1842), oittnl 3 Ruh.h. C. & M. 404 20.5 
 
 R. V. .Tu(^km)ii (18.-)ij), 6 Cox, C. C. 625 8S3 
 
 R. f. .Ia<!ob* (1781), 1 Lt'ti. 309 283, .')7'J 
 
 R. V. JiiKK'T (l"i'7), nited 3 Ruhh. C. & M. 625 803 
 
 K. V. JaiiifH (1823), cited 1 C. & P. 86 <JJ7 
 
 R. r. .Jiirralil (1«6:»), L. & C. 301 ; Cox, C. C. 307 ; 32 L. J. M. C. 258 ; 
 
 9 Jur. N. 8. 629; 8 L. T. 515; 11 \V. R. 787 209 
 
 R. r. JarviH (1756), 1 EaHt, 644. n 2<>3 
 
 R. V. JarviM (1837), 2 M. & Rob. 40 81, (i;{3, 636 
 
 K. r. JarviH (1855), 25 L. J. M. C. 30 ; Dears. C. C. 652 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 532 ; 
 
 1 Jur. N. S. 1114 121 
 
 R. V. JarvJM (18671, L. R. 1 C. C. 06 572 
 
 R. V. .I<tfrifH(l722), 1 Str. 446 20, 1(106 
 
 R. V. J.'licote (1810), 2 Stark. R. 483 576 
 
 R. V. Jflljnmu (18;!8), 8C. & 1'. 001 8!t3 
 
 R. r. JeiikiiiH (1822), R. & R. 492 563, 586 
 
 B. V. Jenkins (1869), L. R. 1 C. C. 187 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 82 ; 11 Cox, C. C. 
 
 250 468 
 
 R. r. JonningH (1858), DoarH. & B. C. C. 447 ; 7 Cox, C. C. 397 ; 4 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 146 205, 1129 
 
 R. r. JevcH (1835), 3 A. & E. 416 821, li22, 824 
 
 R. f. John (1790), 1 EiiMt, r. C. 357 467 
 
 R. ». JohnHon (1805), 7 Eart, 65; 3 Smith, 91; 29 How. St. Tr. 103; 
 
 8 R. R. 597, and Profaeo viii 154, 302 
 
 R.r.. Johnson (1827), 1 Moo. C. C. 173 824 
 
 R. V. John(tou(l820), 2 C. & K. 3.55 57'J 
 
 R. f. .Iohn»..>n(1840), 2 C. & K. 394 335, 374 
 
 R. r. JohnHon (1847), 2 C. & K. 355 336, 578 
 
 R. V. JohuHtou (1864), 16 Ir. C. L. R. 60 .WJ 
 
 R. D. .Tohnntono (1793), 2 Eu»t, P. C. 786 202 
 
 R. r. Jolitre(1791), 4 T. R. 290; 2 R. R. 383 321, ;i5.3, 351 
 
 R. p. JoneH (1774), 1 L»'a. 174 151, 1209 
 
 R. r. Jones (1791), Pea. R. 38 3.54 
 
 R. r. Jones (1896), 8 East, 31, 451 ; 9 R. R. 368 342 
 
 R. V. Jones (1809), 2 Camp. 131 ; 11 Rev. R. 680 15, 18, 67, 147, 237, .085, 
 
 633 
 
 R. V. Jones (1809), R. & R 1.52 663, 571 
 
 R. V. Jones (1827), 2 C. & P. 629 561 
 
 R. V. JoncM (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 61 1 203 
 
 R. V. Jones (18;U), 7 C. & P. 167 826, 820 
 
 R. r. Jones (1840). 9 C. & P. 260 81, 822 
 
 R. V. .'ones (1846), 1 Den. C. C. 166 ; 2 C. & K. 234 , 604 
 
 R. t' Jones (1868^ 11 Cox, C. C. 358 106 
 
 R. . Jones (1872), 12 Cox, C C. 211 572 
 
 r . V. Jones (18S3), 52 L. J. M. C. 96 ; 15 Cox, C. C. 281 106, 172 
 
 A. V. Jones (1887), 14 Cox, C. C. 3 247 
 
 R. V. .Tordttn (18;>8), 9 C. & P. 118 99, 273, 274 
 
 R. V. Kaiu (1883), 15 Cox, C. C. 388 274 
 
 B. u. Kea( 1809), 11 East, 132; 10 R. R. 448 . 621 
 
 Vol. .1. *nd* with piu/c Oafi. 
 
 n 
 
clx 
 
 TAHI.K or CASKS CITKD. 
 
 R. I'. Koul.'y (IS,')1), 2 Di-ii. 08 ; T. & M. 406 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 193 ; 20 L. J. 
 
 M. C. /)7 ; i:* .lur. no 
 
 R. t'. K.-lly (lH.!;'i), I M<M). C. C. lia; I Low. C. C. iu:i 
 
 R. "" 
 
 R. 
 
 PAoa 
 
 202 
 213 
 
 . K.aH4"y (\h:U), 1 I)..wl. 4H1 824 
 
 ilh (I7«H). 2T. U. Mill 1103 
 
 ill 
 R. r. K-iiilw..nli (IH4,')), '.' S.^hw. Cum. 72 ; 7 <i. H. tW2 ; 14 L. J. A. C. 100 ; 
 
 9 Jiir. Slis 
 
 R. r. Kenny (1H77). Mi I,. J. M. C. ISO; 13 Co(, C. C. M97 ; 2Q. H. I). 307; 
 
 30 li. T. :tti; 'Jfi W. K. (i7!». 
 
 304 
 
 105 
 
 R. V. J.T. of Ki lit (1H73), I.. R. 8 Q. B. 30/) ; 42 L. J. M. C. 112 726 
 
 R. r. Ktnif (lfi7!i'. 7 How. St. Tr. 714 f;18 
 
 R. r. K.rr (1H37).'8(!. Hi V. 17(i /iiiO 
 
 R. ». Kicl.lv nH2l), 4 I). * H. 734 33.5 
 
 R. .. Killniiim».T(lN3;i). 7 «'. & P. 228 78 
 
 R. r. KinilKT (INI'.t), 3 Cox, (!. C. 223 ,'.77 
 
 R. r. Kiuit (17HH), 2 T. 11. 23;) <.i'i7, IC'.d, l<iA4 
 
 R. r. KiiiKliikf (l«7il\ 11 <'ox. (-. ('. 4^19 !i(l!) 
 
 R. r. KiiiK-il'Tc (IHI3). 3 Q. M. 388 : 13 L. ,!. M. C 
 
 3 c. \ I), i; 
 
 1139 
 
 R. r. KitiK"!"". Diirli. of (177<i), 20 How. St. 'IV. .'.:iH, n. ; 1 Smitli's I,. C. 
 
 812 1103, 1104. Ulli, 1131. Il:i2. 1133 
 
 Kiii>fNt<m ( 1K::!(i, 4 < '. * 1'. 387 .'i<i3. .'.(14, 
 
 R. 
 
 R. V. KinHTMlon (ISiKi', H KiiHt, 41 ; !t H. I!. 373. 
 
 |{. r. Kiiilo.li, Sir A. Cor.!..!! (179.). JA II. .w. St. Tr. 937 
 
 U. r. Kiiil.Kh (174(1). 18 II. .w. St. IV. 492 
 
 il 
 
 2:17 
 923 
 8!»7 
 
 R. I. Kiiiwv (I83.i). 7 r. .V I'. 447 K.'9 
 
 R. I'. KitHon"(1832.Mli.ml.lU'18.'>3).22li..J.M.C. 118; I (.iirHCC. 187. .•-'9(1,314,318 
 
 R. r. Kiii.|.t..ft ilH.'l). 2 H. * «' 883 1131 
 
 R. r. Kliill (I822K .'> ». \- * 1.1. 929, 9.19. 11 (129 
 
 R r. KhiillvM (1(191). I l,.l. lluviii. 10, l.'i IH 
 
 (1837). (1 A. .V K. 198 104ft 
 
 U. 
 
 .J). 
 
 i9 , 
 
 It. t . Liiiiiiloii (1799), 8 T. K. 379 IM 
 
 R. V. LiilliiiH-nt (IS.-.;)), (i C.x. C. C. 294 198 
 
 f.79 
 
 .'.76 
 
 R. •>. IminlM'tli (1N4.'.). .'. «^ H. .')13 727 
 
 R. «•. Imn.iiHliirc (isct), 3 (^ M. 3(17; 12 I,. .J. M. C. 70; 2 (J. & U. 714.. 11.J9 
 
 ]{. «'. Tiiin.liilpli (18.111. 1 M. & K..I.. 393 Ill 
 
 R. I. I,iiinlH- (17h4^. 2 L. 
 
 R. V. I,imil.<' (1791). 2 I..'i.. fi.Vi 
 
 R. r. Liinjfl.ri.lK" ("*''•'). ' "'■"• ^l** 1 -' <'• * K. 97.'. ; T. * M 140 ; 3 Cox, 
 
 C. <;. 40.-. . 3 N<»w S.'HH. CiiN. M.)-, )8 I,, .r. M. C. 198; 13.riir. .'i4.'».... 
 
 R. r. Imiijrini'iul (1804), I,. \- C 427 ; 9 ('(.•i, (.'. I'. 4(14 ; 19 I^. T. 3,'»0 .. 
 
 K. r. Iiiin){ti>ii (1877), 2 (j. K. 1). 2UU ; 40 L. J. M. C. 130; 36 L. T. 627; 
 
 3.3,5 
 120 
 
 13 (• 
 
 ('. ('. 349 1,'>9, 294, 926 
 
 R. f. Liirkin (is.-.i), (1 «'.,x. <". i\ 377 ; Doarn. C. (^ 306; 2 C. L. R. 776; 
 
 !3 I. 
 
 M. r. ]•. 
 
 is .Il 
 
 .39 
 
 R. f. LuiikIkt ( 1 8 10), 2 C. .V K . 226 
 
 R. r. liiiv.'v (IS.-.(I), 3 C. .V K. 2(1 
 
 R. r. Liiviii (1813), Ir. i'W. I{. 813 
 
 R. f. LiiViT (1722). !'l How St. Tr. 214 68(1, 020. 907, 971 
 
 R. r. IrfMttl.iiii isdl ), 3 K. \ Iv (i'lS it(i2, 90U 
 
 108 
 
 .603, 672 
 ... 17 
 
 .f(19, 918 
 
 R. r. Ii<M|I.Ht.r I8,-.(I), 3 (;. * K. 108 
 R. ('. I.if (17(1)1). .'IiihI 3 UiiNN. ('. \' M. 
 R. V. !..•<' (»838i, 2 l,<w. C. ('. 164 
 
 327 
 02a 
 960 
 
 R. I'. Ii<i' (18(14), 4 K .V F. 03 320, 330, 337 
 
 R. f. Immh1m(1H47 , »<i H 910 1140 
 
 R. r I,ei.'.'Mt.T .1,1. (18.',-.), 4 l«. k C. 892 992, 993 
 
 R. I'. \a-\u\\ (18»(l). 10 A. * K. 398 ,307, 404, 400, I10» 
 
 . 728 
 . 204 
 
 R. I'. Iw>..MiinN|<>r 1 1816), 6 (j. II. 040 ; 13 I,. .1. M. ('. 6( 
 
 R. p. I.i>oniir.l (IsiHi, I H.'ii. 394 ; 3 Vox, C. C. 284; 2 (V & K. A14 
 
 R. r. Ii«.vy (1819 , 2 Si.irk. H. 468 210, 237, 238 
 
 R. I'. I,nvv (1868;, 8 C.x, C. C. 73 
 R. V. I/«.wcn (IHtO), 2 I^-w C. a. 101 
 R. t. I. 
 
 1071 
 
 824 
 
 (18(121, 4 Kh|.. 226; 2 T. R. 017 947, 90? 
 
 U. r. IiOwiii(183:t), U C. ii P. 101 KI, ,'.H2, 683 
 
 Th» rtjeirnefi art to pagt*, not to pai ayrapht. 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 clxi 
 
 H. V. 
 
 H. V. 
 K. r. 
 R. . . 
 R. r. 
 R. r. 
 R. r. 
 R. «•. 
 It. r. 
 R. r. 
 R. . . 
 R. r. 
 II. r. 
 R. r. 
 R. r. 
 
 2;« 
 K. .'. 
 
 R. f . 
 R, I . 
 R. (. 
 R. I . 
 R. r 
 
 • ••• •••#•) 
 
 rpwfd (1S40), Arch. Cr. PI. Ml 
 
 LcwiH (IHiT). Di'iirn. & H. .TJO 
 
 l.i>rlitf<M.t (IS,-)til, (i E. & H. HJ'J ; 'ifl L. J. M. ('. II.-) . 
 I.illf.sliiill (lKi.->), 7 «i. R. 1''>H; 14 L. J. M. (". !t7 ... 
 
 MliKiil"' (IKl.'i). 1 I'll- Kv ■♦"* 
 
 Liltl.' (17')S). 1 HiiiT. (ii:< 
 
 I,iv.i| 1, Mayor i.f {l7(iS). •» Hiirr. TIH 
 
 Uiiiifa.ihlv (IH.iU). J E. iV n. iiio 
 
 l,luiiKiiiiii"r(lH:tlj. •! II. A: Atl. (iiti 
 
 r.liivd MS;i(i), I ('. A: 1'. •2.i:i 
 
 EidVa i is.ti). (i V. \- r. :!'.•;( 
 
 Eurkliiiil (17H.')). 1 l..'a. t". C. -Mi; 
 
 Enllry INIJ , U. \ li. •.•;)7 ; 1;'> l{. R. 7M7 
 
 EoikI. \ Ni ilh-W.M. Uv. i\>. {1«V|), ••! E. \- n. ii;i. 
 
 I .1. \ SI. Ktiili. Doikt'o. (1H7I), i\ I.. .1. (^ H I ; 
 
 W. I{. l.iC. 
 
 Loiiil. A: Sdiitli ('..iiht lly. Co. (IH.'.l), '20 L. ,1. M C 
 
 ,821 
 
 .■)SS ; 
 
 ;ii L. T. 
 
 II.'. ; I'. (^ iV. 
 
 I'AdK 
 •JIti 
 
 , H'2i 
 
 SSI 
 
 ii;h 
 
 .'id 7 
 
 i:il 
 
 !i:t7 
 
 •.iH> 
 
 7:1.'. 
 
 •I Hi) 
 
 .'i(l8 
 iiH.'i 
 
 lit:; 
 
 10(11 
 
 R 
 R. 
 R. 
 K. 
 R. 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 R 
 
 R. 
 
 U. 
 
 H. 
 
 H. 
 
 R 
 
 K. 
 
 n. 
 n. 
 
 R. 
 R 
 
 It. 
 It. 
 
 R. 
 
 R 
 R 
 K 
 R. 
 
 It. 
 R. 
 R 
 
 R 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 708 
 I'. 
 
 I'. 
 r. 
 
 V. 
 
 r, 
 r. 
 c. 
 r. 
 101 
 r. 
 I' 
 
 \ I 
 
 . ('. 
 
 I,onK (l.f:i:n, c. c. & P. 17'.> '.'.•17, fiW) 
 
 L.PI.K Hiiikl.y (I80.V, 7 EiiM, l.'> ; 3 Smilh, 'J2 ; H R. R. ft'.i.'i i;tl, \M 
 
 I Ill (1S'J7), 1 Moo. «'. (". HiO L'l 1 
 
 Eoiiiflniiii (18;t!i), 1 Cniwr. & I). C. C. 7!t 87:! 
 
 Low«nl8;<.t), l.j Cox, (.'. (". J8C. ; .')2 L. J. M. V. IJ.'; IS L. T. 
 
 1 008 
 
 Lowir ll.vford (IS 101, .itinl •> Stiiilh L. C. :w:\ CtH 
 
 l.illilH'iiliiim (18:i|i. .) II. .V All. IMiH 1170 
 
 EilfiiM J.S118). 10 Eioil, L'lf.'i ; 10 It. I{. ■>X.\ llll.'i, OiH 
 
 l.uikliurj.1 (I8.'..n. 1 DntrM. «'. C. Jl.) ; '.'.1 h. .1. M. <". 18 '.(;;t, ,'.(i^*, o71 
 
 Lullc (1807). 8 EiiHt , 'JOJ ; il It. |{. lili; ; I'r.fi vii 1.'., 101, ('.•Jl.O'Ji 
 
 I.imilrv (IHCii), L. U. 1 C. C. I'.MI; ;i8 I.. .1. M. C. 80; It Cox.C. ('. 
 
 ; JO li. T. I.'il ; 17 W. It. (.s.-i 10(1, 170 
 
 Liimiy (IS.ti), C.ix, «". (' ^77 ;I7.'> 
 
 I-vc.ii ,1824), Rv. A: M. I'>l Joit 
 
 M'AiiiiiKv (1811). Ir. Cir It. '.'70 •.'Hi 
 
 MiHcKhfi..).! (17-'.">). 1(1 How. .S|. Tr. ]i:>>, \M)\ '.100 
 
 Mii<il..-.li.l<l (18101, 1:M^ li. S81 II III 
 
 Mill, iofirld. I..i. (I7.'.'.i, Id lli.w. St. Tr lUd 1010 
 
 M'CiittVrty (l.S(id-71. I. It. I ('. I,. ;td3 .w.'. 
 
 M'lNmkfv (1811). Ir. (ir. R. 77 2i:i 
 
 M"«'ur liH'M), .l..|)I., r. i\ I'.'O 1117 
 
 M'Ciiliiv (I8:i8). '.' McH. (;. C. .11 ; •_> U'\^. ('.(". •J7i '.'I I 
 
 M'DoMiii.l I'.sil. ,\iiii. M. «r (). ir.' 1018 
 
 M'tiovcrii (I8.VJ . .'i ('o\. C. <'. .'lOd .>:<.> 
 
 MailirM jl8<!ii, H (^ II. 71 ; 18 E. ,1. M. C. 21:1 llio, ll.V.i, II do 
 
 M'lliijfli (IH.>7). 7 Cox, C (;. 18.1 .'.82 
 
 Mil.kav (I81I8). 11 i'ox, r. ('. 118 4118 
 
 MiKrnim (1812). Ir. Tir. It. IK! 202, :i82 
 
 Ma. pliciwiu n8d!i), HO I,. J. r. C. ,')» ; E. It. .1 V. C. 2dH ; 2:i L. T. 
 
 ; 18 \y. R, i(i.->:i 'jo;! 
 
 M'I'Ihtm.ii (18..7). Jd E. .1. M. C. l.'U ; Di-arn. & H. 1'.I7 20« 
 
 .MaKlll (I 70'.'). filnl MrNallv. Ev. 118 ,'idU 
 
 Majrill ilsiJ), Ir. Cir. II. lis oaft 
 
 Miiiii»ariii>{ ^18.■|71, 2(1 E. .1. M. C. 10; 10 Cox, C. C. 102; l>rani. 
 
 I. 1.12 ; 2 .Iiir. N. S. 12:1(1 120. 2'.»fl, 10.'i:i, lo.'.d 
 
 Maiiiw.irlii;^ {1S.'.8), E. H. k K. 474 ; 27 E. J. M. C. 27S 78 
 
 ^I.ili.ll (18.10), (•iti.<l .) K11.N. C. & M. 402 .'.7(1 
 
 Mallorv (18811, i:i li II l> .1.1 ; .'.,( E. .1. M. C. 134 ; 60 L. T. 4'20 ; 
 
 W. It. 721 ; 48.;. I'. |s7 ; 1.. (\.x. C. (5. 4Ad 41)8 
 
 MiiiiiiiiiK (ISIO), 2 t;. \ K. 887, Ol'l Idft 
 
 MniiNltciil (IH4I), 1 Q. It. 444 ; Mi. & I). 7 I A Jur. .'lO.'i ... 101, KKt, 4'2'2, 
 
 621 
 MuhhHcKI (1881), U Cox, 639 671 
 
 ^! ^ "I'n 
 
 r*/. /. tHiU uitk ptk/gt (J35. 
 
IN 
 
 Clxii TABLE 01? CASES CITED. 
 
 R. t'. Mariqiiite 4 Now Granada Miniiifr ('o. (18.58), 28 L. J. Q. n. 07 ; 1 
 
 KI. iV Kl. W\) ; 6 Jur. N. H. 72? 1001 
 
 H. r. Martcy ( 1H4',!), oit,<-<l '> Riikm. C. & M. 289 2;i3 
 
 K. «•. Marwk'ii (182!)), M. & M i:i'J 27ft 
 
 R. V. MarHli (18;»7). « A. & K. TMi ; I N. & P. 187; 2 H. & W. U(18 ...Olfl, (117 
 
 R. r. M-.rMlmll (1841), C. & M.irHti. 147 .TiO 
 
 R. v. M.irliii (I8(ii»). 2 ("uin|>. HHI ; 11 R. R. (174 UiM. 1174 
 
 R. c. Miirtin (IH.12), r> C. ti V. 128 2 CI, 257 
 
 R. r. Miirliii (I8:M), (1 (; & I' :i(i2 O.IO 
 
 R. r. Maniii (IHhit). L. li. 1 (!. (.". 214 ; 11 Cnx. C. i'. M4:! 261 
 
 R. I'. Martin (1872), L. R. 1 ('. C. ;)78 ; r.'C.x, (;.(;. 204; 41 I,. J. M.C. 
 
 1 1 ;t 365 
 
 R. f. Miisliit.r (I8:»7), fi A. & K. 15;i; I N. \- I'. .114 763 
 
 R. r. Mullirws (17!):t), fi T. U. 1(12 20;j 
 
 R. (. May (INHO), 4i) L. .1. M. C (17; !> il. H. 1). :m2 lldO 
 
 R I. Muyh.w (18:14), V>('. .V V. Ml;") (127 
 
 R. I. Miiziii/c.nt (l81o), R. it R. 2'.»1 80 
 
 R. I . Mfa<l (1 7.')S), 1 Hurr. .'142 8!i:j 
 
 U r. M.'ikI (1824). 2 H. & C. (.(18; 4 Dowl. iV K. 120 40/) 
 
 R. I. M.Mllrv (I8;M), (K;. & P. 2!>2 107 
 
 R. f. M.^-.nn(lS40). •) C. tc V. 420 :J7/), 4(18 
 
 R. (. Mnvrrnii (18ISj,2 Stnrk. U. :i(lii r>8;{ 
 
 R. I. M.ivli, TiiilorH' Co. (18 Ml, 2 H. At Ail. 128 !t!M, DIM, ilil.i 
 
 ]{. r. .Mirll.vr'ri.lvil fl8:i0). 1 1«. * A»l. 20 285 
 
 R. r. Micl.Il.tiurM '17.'>7), i Fliirr. 4(10 20.1 
 
 R. r. Mi.l.li.^rx (is.-.(r, 1 L. M. it I'. (121 727 
 
 R. r. Mnl.ll.w.x .1.1. , Uv HowniJiii (IHIII), .-i H. \- Ail. lli;i '.»s8 
 
 R. I. Mi.llarii (I7(l.'>), .'I Hurr. 1720 iMt2 
 
 R. - , .Millanl (IHl.t). |{. \- It. 24.1 24(1. 247 
 
 R. 1. Mill.T (1772), 2 W. HI. 707 14 
 
 R. r. .Mill.T (i8,'i0), 4 (;ox,(V ('. 1(1(1 ;m\ 
 
 R. r. .Mill.r '18TU), 14 Cox, C. C. :t.'>(l 1120 
 
 R. r. MilU(18.i:)), (;<;. \ v. nil .'.(i:!, ri7l 
 
 R. . . MiliK' (uiiclii(<'<l). I'itisl 2 It \: Aid. (lOU, li. (>i) OoO 
 
 R. r. MiliHH (ISdO), 2 K ..V F. 10 1014 
 
 R. I. .Milioii (I84:i), 1 C \ K. M 40.1 
 
 R. r. .Minion (178:i), 2 KmhI, P. C. 1021 202, 4(18 
 
 R. .. Mi(.h.!l (1818). 2 Siuik. Kv. :io7, n. (c) 148 
 
 1{. .. .Mi(.li,.ll (I.S.'iJ), 2 !>.ii. 4(iM ; :iC. .V K. 181 ; 21 \...1 M. C. i;!.'). .20(1, 112!» 
 
 R. . . .Mii.li.'ll, (1802) 17 Cox, (!. C. Ao.'i (./,/, f.i:!.'.). :i;»9, 4(i.'», 4ii«, r.2:i 
 
 R. . . Mo.kfor.1 (18)18), 1 1 Cox, C. C. 1(1 ; 17 I-. T. .•.s2 ; Hi \V. It. .•»7.') . . 121 
 
 R. r. Miiutt (18.10), 4 <^ .V I'. :i(ll 248 
 
 It. r. Moon- (I8:il), ritcl :i Kuxx. C. A: M. .loit .-.TU 
 
 It. r. Moor.' (18.i2), :M'. .V K I.', t ; 2 D.n. «!. (!. ,V.'2 ; 21 I,. .». M. C. l!l!». . ft03 
 R. .. Mo.r.-, (1802) (II Fi. .r. M. C. 80; (1(1 I,. T. 12.'); 40 W. R. :I04; 
 
 M\ .1, P. ;il.'. ; 17 Cox. (;. C. 4.)8 002, U03 
 
 R (. Mo.,r.M I8t(,), 7 (V .V P. 270 ti;U 
 
 It. .. .McMirn (IHOI), (1 Kiist, 421, 11 20.'i 
 
 R. .. Mortr.iii (18,-.J), (1 Cox, <V C. 107 204 
 
 It. I. M.irk'iin (IHT.'i). 14 Cox, C. C. :i:i7 4(17 
 
 R. . Morrif. (17(11), 2 Hnrr. MM!) loi;i 
 
 It. • Morrii. (1702), 4 T. It .'i^2 l.tl 
 
 R. I. MorriH (H40), 0(! A: 1'. .147 211 
 
 Jt. I . Morris (18(17). .'l') li. .1. M. C. 85 ; L. R. I C. (5. OH 1 12(1. I l.U 
 
 R. r. Morw (lN,t8), 8 C. .V P. (10.') fi78 
 
 R. r.' MorlliM'k (1S|.-)), 7 U. M. 4.)0 ; 2 N.-w H.HH.Cai.. 108 ; 14 I.. J. M. C. 
 
 l,').l : .lur. (121 M' 
 
 R. <. Morton (IHl.'i), I M. .V' S.'l. 48 110.1 
 
 R. r. Morion (I8»;i), 2 M. .V Hot). ftU 6(13, 672 
 
 R. .. Mowy ("7Mi. I I.<'a. 2ii.'>, n 68,1 
 
 R. .. MoHJ.'y (IS2.)), 1 M.M.. C. (;. 07 21 M, KIT, 4(18 
 
 R r. .MotlnT».ll (1707), I .Sir. 0:i I0.)0, 117.5 
 
 R. r. Mii.lio (In:II), I M. & lioli. ViH (12*i 
 
 Tht rrffiturf are lu piiyrn, uol In juinijfriifi/i$. 
 
TAHI.K or CASKS CirKD. 
 
 clx 
 
 111 
 
 1*4 UH 
 
 R. I-. MuiihIow (IH!).')), l.'i R. (Mar.) '.Wi ; {180A) 1 Q. B. IM ; 72 L.T. 301 ; 
 
 4H W. It. 4!'.') yIM [Hl>] 
 
 It. I'. MiiiliH (IHi'it). M. & M. .'il.') iHl 
 
 H. I. .Muri.liv (17.W), ItUow. St. 'IV "'.J I !174 
 
 U. «. Miiipli'v (iH:t;), HC. \ 1'. ;tio IIH. :<h;i, 384, 'J17, IC'l, 12-.'(> 
 
 U. •'. Mnr)>liy (1«11), 1 Arm. M. \- O. Jod 4ti><, !H.'. 
 
 11. (. Miirphv (1»''»). '•'» •'• •'• <- !*• •''•* •'-' 
 
 H. t. Miirphv (IH7.'>), 13 i'«x, (". C. JUS HO 
 
 II. C. MllKrnt (1713), 10 Mo.1. 1!I4 «'J7 
 
 It. r MiiwM.ii (IH.'iN), ii7 li. J. M. C. 100; 8 K. ti H. !I00; 4 Jiir. N. !*. 
 
 Ill Wi 
 
 It. r. MmIoii (IS(iO), 2 K. & E. fift"; 29 L. J. M. C. 10!) 3'.tl, 410 
 
 It. »• Nai>i»r (1><24), 1 Moo. (!. C. 44 •.'0<» 
 
 It. >• N.iil (IHiA). 7 ('. .V: 1'. 1<!8 (,;t.-, 
 
 U. r. N.lli.r llalliim (IH.'>I), C.x. C. C. 435 1141 
 
 1{. r. N.tli.rtlioi.jf (IHI3), 2 M. & St-l. 337 87. 432 
 
 K. r. N. villi' il7'.M), IVii. It. 01 ftlO, fi.Vi 
 
 U. r. N.vill.' (IH.Vi), <i Cox, 0. O. CO 1118 
 
 U. .. Nrwliniilt (18721, 41 L. J. M. <;. 03; L. It. 1 ('. C 344 ; 2:> h T. 
 
 NN3; W \V It. 3^3; 12 Cox, (t. C. 148 217 
 
 ]{. c. N.wiiiim (|H'.!J, hIioiiIiI Ihi 1853), 1 K. & H. JiiS ; :» C. Jt Kir. 2.')2 ; 
 
 22 L. .1. ^^ H. li'xl />87 
 
 It. .. N.HiMiiii (18.VJ), J I>..|i. 300; 3 C. & K. 2«0 .•>.!;{, 018, 1034 
 
 It. r. N. wt.Hi (181,)), 2 M. A: l{ol>. i'i03 joa 
 
 It. r. N.wloii {\Hi\\ I C. \ K. ifii) 117 
 
 It. I. N. wtoii ^I8.v.t), 1 V. \ F. liu ;i;i.-, 
 
 It. r Ni.liola-. (I.Slii), 2 C. .V K. 24(1 3t.7, 8!iH 
 
 It. r. NiilinllH (I8,IN), I F. A: I-'. M 217 
 
 It. c. Nic'oliiH (is^rj), Cox, ('. C. \>\ 4(iH 
 
 It. I'. NiMM'it (IS,">.l), 1) Cox, (' i'. 3J0 :'i(i 
 
 11. r. Noiik.'M ( I8;i.!), ;• ( '. \- I'. II.'C. !,;»,'> 
 
 It. V. Ndilliltiich aiitlWiliii'v |{..ml«TniHt«MH(|H14V 3 A.* K.477; A N. A: 
 
 M. 314 .' !t!i« 
 
 U. f. Noitli I'.Unrfon (I82(i), fi II. * C. /)08 ; 8 I). A: H. 32.'i 1170 
 
 It. c. Nortli Kcillmrii (1784), Calil. 4')2 ,lo.( 
 
 n. f. Norton (isj:!), It. \ It. .'iio vio 
 
 It . . Noiwiili Koiul TriiHtr.'H (l,^3G), 6 A. & K. r.(!3 ; 1 N. & V. ;f2 ; 2 II. 
 
 Ac \V. :iK.-. 1 1;{7 
 
 It. r. NiimKaiii Cniirliicy (1801), 1 Ka»l, 373 . ;t(,S 
 
 It. r. Nut.' (IS42). 3 ItiiHH. <;. A: M. I.'.H ; (i IM.th, Al>r. 82 ,',07 
 
 It. r. O'C.ijfly (I7'.i8), JC. II. iw. St. Tr. I,l.')l IMi? 
 
 It. r. O'Coiimll (1843-4), Arm. A- T. 103 200. W't, :ih;|. 384, )IU 
 
 It. ». Oil.lv (I8.'-|1), 2 D.ii. 204 ; T. A:. M. 6'J3 ; /) Cox, C. C. 210, 20 I,.. I. 
 
 M. (.' liiH; I'l.liir. fil7 247 
 
 It. r. (t'Uoiiiii-ll (IH.I,-;), 7 C. * I*. 138 h:\t 
 
 It. )•. (I'D ii'll il.S,')T), 7 C..X, (!. C. 337 883 
 
 |{. c. Olixir (l.'siiO), I l«4'll. 218, H Cnx, C. <'. .181 ; .30 I,. .1. M. C. li ; 
 
 .lur. N. S. IJ14 , 3 I,. I". 311 ; W. It. (10 20rt 
 
 U. I. «)lmv. (1813), I M. A S,l. 3S7 7V» 
 
 It. r Oiiiaiit (I8.ll). Cox, C. C 4110 ;i (2 
 
 11. .. (fN.ill (1871), I. U.(\l'. I.. 1 '.'10 
 
 It. r. OiiMnw a:i<l Vviiallcv (is7;i). 12 Cox, C. V. 3,'.N H73 
 
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 ■n:i 1071 
 
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 TARLK OF CASKS ( imD. 
 
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 r. R>lM<rU(lSIH), 2 C. & Kir. CK (i:il» 
 
 r. R..lN.rtM (1871), 14 (.'ox. C C. 101 117, H)J:» 
 
 r. R..l>fv (IH Clj, r>C fc V. Ml S.'.-i 
 
 r lluhiliH (IH t.tl, i M. \- R:>1.. fill 2.'i7, '••■l 
 
 /■. Iliiliiiiwiii ('7'.»(1). 2 li'iiih. (). C 7.')."i, 7<!.'> •lli, -'IK 
 
 I. It.l.inwm (1H17), Holt, N. V. R. .'•!).') nh 
 
 r. \Mmm,n (IH.'S), 1 Low. (!. C. IJ!) 82(1 
 
 I. RMimiK<m(i«;j!t), I (Viiwf. * I). ('. c;. :ii'.) i(i:ii. lo;i3, kkh 
 
 r. I^)l)inH.m (181(1). 12 A. A: !•;. (172: I I*. & I). .TM id?:! 
 
 r. K..l.iiiH.m (18(17). L. R. 1 <;. C. NO; .td L. J. M. (.'. 78 UdO 
 
 r. II.kIiiM177.i). I L.II. l.H ; B. N. 1'. 21i) ll.V! 
 
 r. K.mIi.. (1811). (.'. & Miir. :tll .17(1, .'>8.-. 
 
 r. K.idiltim (1777). 2 Cowp, (172 8:i8 
 
 c lt«l.n (1871). 12 (ox. (J. (!, (i:iO 2;i7 
 
 r. I^M•lml•lc (I8.V>), D.arH * H. 21 ; 7 Cox, (!. C. 12(1 ; 2') L. .1. M. C. 
 
 101 : 2 .Iiir. N. H. ft!i7 247 
 
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 t: l{.M.k«<MMl (Kiitilj. 1,1 ir.iw. St. Tr. 211 1»71. !I7.I 
 
 .. K.H.ii.-v (18:i(l., 7 (!. * 1". .117 211, S2!i 
 
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 r. UmfWdll (11181), 10 How. St. Tr. 1!)0 il20, Wt) 
 
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 r. UoHwr (18.t(l), 7 ('. At r 018 8!t!t 
 
 I. II..W (I8'l!(i. It. iV It. l.'i.l i'lOd 
 
 r. Itowliiliil (182(1), Uv. \- .M. 101 88,1 
 
 . Howl4-y (I82.M. 1 Moo. C. (!. Ill ;U)4 
 
 r. Itowloii (18(1.)). Ml L. .1. .M. C. r>l : L. & O'V.', WO; 10 C.x, C. C. 
 
 2.'i ; 1 1 L. T. 74,5 ; 1,1 W. R. 4.K1 ; 1 1 .Iiir. N H. :I2.') 2 19. 2'.| 
 
 .". Ru.lil fl77.">), 1 licii. (• C. 127 88!) 
 
 , i'. Itiiilvo (I80.'i). l'..ii. Add. (;iiH. 2:»2; 4 R. R. 000 !>18 
 
 V. HiiilKc (18711, I.K^ox. C. C. 17 112H 
 
 r ItiiKMril (IN27'. (1 H. \- ('. am 47 
 
 I. HiiHwli. 1^1. .1 (I8:!'.i). 7 Dowl. 7i);i 8112 
 
 r, ItiiHtoli (178(1), 1 Irf.u. «;. (.'. 408 807 
 
 , r. lt\Mii (18,101, ■> M. ti Itol.. 2i;i 81 
 
 V. RyliilKl (18(18). 11 (Jox, ('. V,. 101 ; 18 L. T. AllH ; 1(1 W. R. Oil..,. 20(1 
 
 V. llVlo (1811 \ M. * \V. 227 ; 1 I). N. S. till ; (l.Fiir. 2:t8 :il!) 
 
 , r. ll'viiKT (187.). 2 (i. II. I), l.id ; 4d \j. .1. M. C 108 ; ,|.) L. T. 774 ; 
 
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 . r. ltviii<H(l8.i:i), :i(". A K. :i2d 108 
 
 , r Itvloii (1702), /)T. It. 2.V.I 87, 4112 
 
 V. H.iil!.T (18(0). ■!<;.*: r. 218 81Ji 
 
 , r. Matln.n Hill (;8,V.'). 22 L. .1. .M . C. 22 ; 1 K. Ai l\. Oli ,'102, IIO.I 
 
 , . M». Aiiilnw. rtrKhorr (I8j8). 8 II. & (!. (17!) IM 
 
 . . Hi. Ami". W.-Htmii.Hl.T (1817), 2 New Schh. (.'«h. ft2I) ; Q, H. 884 ; 
 
 1(5 L. .1. M. I'. :i:i Ii;i8. 1140 
 
 . w. St. Awiiih. l).-uii of (178:i). 21 How. St. Tr. lo;n), loio 2:), 45 
 
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 . V. Ht. <liltHil8,-i,l), 22 L. .1. M. ('. fil; 1 V. He H. (112 1214, 121!) 
 
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 020. !t27 
 
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 , r. Ht, Mur>;.'lHini'(l82)), 4 Howl, & H. 47.1 140 
 
 TA* riftitHttt art la piifr; »<il I" /"i'i(yi"<(^A». 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 cl 
 
 K. r. St. MuryUlM.iio(183«). r, A. & K. 2(JS 
 
 K. V. St. Miiry Miwlulen (ISi);)), 2 E. & H. 801) ; 23 L. J. M. 0. 1 ; 17 
 
 Jiir. 
 
 xvn 
 
 PAOIC 
 
 093 
 131 
 
 R. r. St. Miin-, Warwick (isri;!), TI L. J. M. C. 1011 ; 1 El. & HI. 810; I 
 
 C. L. K. 1!)'2 ; 17 .Iiir. Ml 4.11 
 
 R. .. St. MiiiiriM. (1k:.1). Ki Q. H. 1)08 ; 20 L. .1. M. (!. 221 ; 16 Jur. :>.')!>. . 17 
 
 R. f. St. Miclm.'rH(18l8), 12 Q. 11. IKi ; :» NfW S.>«h. Cum. 200 fi78 
 
 R. .. St. PiiiiniiM (171) I). •''•II- H. 22(1 1109, 11 II 
 
 R. r. St. I'.iiil. Cov.nt (Jiinli'ii (18 lA), 7 »i. H. 2.J2 lltl 
 
 K. i: St. WtnimnrM (1831), (H;. A: I'. ,'.82 209 
 
 R. <■. SiiliMl.iiiv (1838). 8 A. & E. 710; 3 N. & V. 170; 7 L. J. M. C. 110.. 083 
 
 R. r. Suit (1802). 3 V. ii h\ 831 210 
 
 R i: Sult.T (1801), 6 Eh|>. llf} 218 
 
 R r. SifiiNdiiif (I8i')0), 1 Di'ii. .'iiri 677, 680 
 
 R. .. S,iviiK<' (1831), 6 C. A: P. 113 329 
 
 R. r. S;lViiK<- (1870). 13(;..x. ('. (.'. 178 293, 037 
 
 R. r. S.tailV (1861). 17 U. H. 212 ; 2 Den. 281 ; 6 Cx, C. V. 213 ; 20 L.J. 
 
 M. ('. 2211 ; 16 .Fur. 007 3J8, ;i30, 332. 109 
 
 R. r. .Sciilliiii (18.iK), Cniw. & D. Alir. fax. 310 KiK, 170 
 
 R. f. SiumiiKMiilpii (1789), 3 T. R. 17'> ; 1 11. R. 762 718, 766 
 
 R. r. .S.Iil.Hiiijft.r (1817), 10 Q. 11. 070; 2 Cox, C. C. 200 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 
 
 29 ; 12 Jlir 283 930 
 
 R. r. Scott (17!»(»), 3T. R. 001 7'J2 
 
 R. c. Scott (18.10), 25 L. J. M. C. 128 ; Dean*. & B. C. 0. il ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1090 683, 968 
 
 R. I. S-ott (1877), L. R. 2 Q. B. 1). 116; 10 L. J. M. C. 269; 13 Cox, 
 
 694 1041, 1042, 1097 
 
 . V. Soarli- (1831), 1 M. iV Uoli. 76 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 «'. 
 
 R. 
 
 r. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 v. 
 
 R. 
 
 f. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 K. 
 
 V. 
 
 R. 
 
 V. 
 
 S.Ml>f..|cy IH31), 2 II. \ A<1. 0.').., 
 S«-ll«'rH (179(;), Carr. Cr. L. 233 ., 
 S«'rj"aiit (1820), Rv. & M. 362 .. 
 
 SiTva (1846), 2 V.'ii K. 60 
 
 Stmcll (184,6), 8 (j. K. 101 ; 16 L. 
 
 9.34 
 
 60 
 
 , 109 
 
 888, 889, 893 
 
 900 
 
 .T. Q. B. 49; 10.1ur. 48 1178 
 
 Sexton (1822), riU-d in .lov on ( 'oiif. 17 19 608, 670 
 
 Sliafti'Hlmry (l(i81), 8 How. St. Tr. 817. !'ti6 
 
 Slmw (1823), R. tc H. 620 1032. 1097 
 
 Shaw (1831), C. \- I'. 372 608, 6r,9 
 
 Shaw (18(i7), L. \- Cave, 679 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 00; 34 ],. J. M. C. 109. . 027 
 
 Slii-j-han (1820), .Ichl., <;. C. 64 .633, 034 
 
 Hhii'ii (1837). 2 C. ic V. 706 216 
 
 Sh.-criiw (I8,l(i). 7 C. i V. 440 821 
 
 R. r. »h«-ll»ra (1810), 9i'. .V V. 279 960, 968 
 
 R. r. Sli..|l..y (17891. 3 T. R. 142 ; 1 R. R. 07'' 9ii3, 997 
 
 R. V. Sli.'i.li.nl (1830), 7 C. & V. 679 ,603, 672 
 
 R. r. SIhiiIi.H (1808), 37 \.. J M.C 46- L. R. 1 C. C. 118; 11 Cnx, 
 
 C. C. 119; 17 L. T. 482; Iti W. R. 373 211 
 
 R. V. Sli.pjmnl(180(; , U. & R 109 80 
 
 R. I'. Sliinnan (1730). Ciimn icinp. 1 1 aril w. 303 883 
 
 R f. Sliij.lcv (1784). 4 Doii^. 7:1, 177 H2 
 
 R. c. Sliott (■l8.-.l). 3C. & K. 200 1128 
 
 It. V. Stirinii.lon (1861), 2 Din. 319 ; 3 C. & Kir. 373; T. t M. 028; 21 
 
 L. J. M. C. 37; 6 Cox. ('.<;. 387 261 
 
 R. r. Stiurni.r (188li), 17 (J II. I). 323 ; .66 L. .1. M. C. 163 ; ,66 I.. T. 120; 
 
 ,14 W. R. i;,'.0 ; .'.0 .1. I', 743 .138 
 
 R. •'. Sidney WvHtli-y (IKON , H Cox, C. C. 139 1073 
 
 R. r. SininioiiilH (1823), 1 C it P. 84 043 
 
 I'. SinionK (|s;i4). C. \' P. 641 
 
 183, ft66, 600 
 
 R. V. Hiniiwon (1738). 2 I A. Wayni. 1 179 17 
 
 R. 
 R. 
 R. 
 R 
 
 V. BiinpMm (18.11). 1 Moo. i'C 110 
 
 V. Siiijwt (1839), Maiiiftoiii' A-hI/ch 
 
 II. Sirri.ll (18,60). citc.1 2 l>cn. 2C: 
 
 r. Skcin and IVi- min ( 18.M»). 28 L. .T. M. 
 
 <•. 91 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 143; 
 
 Bell, C. C. 97 ; 7 W. R 2.66 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 161 . . . 
 rw. /. tnJ* with payt 636. 
 
 603 
 608 
 247 
 
 903 
 
 
Clxviii TABLE OF CASKS CITED, 
 
 R. <•. Skinner (1772), Lofft, flS 8(i9 
 
 R. r. Slanoy (183.!) , S C. * 1\ '213 UOO 
 
 R. ••. Sinter (1881). 8 Q. H. D. 267 ; 61 L. J. Q. H. 210 ; 30 AV. R. 410 ; 
 
 4r. J. P. fi»j 003 
 
 R. r. Sliiutrlitpr (IS.Jl). » C. ft P. ,54 1, n. (A) 604 
 
 U. I. SliiwHtonc a8V.>^. IS Q. n. ;t88; 21 L. J. M. C. 145 ; Iti Jiir. 1000.. 727 
 
 K. V. .Sl.t-iiiun (18.i3). Dciirs. & nrll, 249 ftti:t. r^M, .')«7 
 
 R. r. Mtt-ii (18(11), L. ic Ciivc, 14 ; 8 C.x, C. 0. 472 : 30 L. J. M. C. 170; 
 
 7 Jur. N. S. 97!» : I L. T. r>>ry ■ 9 W. K. 709 204 
 
 R. c. Slogget (18)0), DourH. A: Boll, 056 ; 25 L. J. M. C. 93 ; 2 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 l(i'.;« 583 
 
 R. /•. Sl.mmn (1812), 1 Dcwl. 618 832 
 
 U. r. Smiillimio (1821 ), 2 (niitty, K. 288 990 
 
 R. r. Smart (1811), Ir. Cir. K.'p. 15 240 
 
 R. r. Smith (1783), 1 I-oii. 2K8 IIIH 
 
 R. i: Smith (IHIO), 1 Htiirk. K. 242 580 
 
 R. V. Smith (1817). R & H. 339 ; 2 Stiirk. R. 208 ; Holt, N. P. It. C.l 1..320, 339 
 
 R. I. Smith (1H.'2), rit.d 1 I'h. Kv. 171 001 
 
 U. v. Smith ;18'J0), 1 Moo. ('. C. 289 888 
 
 R. I'. Smith (1827), 2 ( '. A: P. 033 246 
 
 R. V. Smith ISJS), 8 II. \- C. 311 1031, 1033 
 
 R. r. Smith 1833), 1 M<h> C. C 402; 6 C. & P. l.')l 215 
 
 R. c. Smith (IHIJi, Ir. C. R. 1,V.) 105 
 
 R. r. Smith (18|.')). 2 <!. & K. 207 334 
 
 U. r. Smith (\MU), 1 Dvii. 510, 512 ; 2 C. \ Kir. 882, 881 10 
 
 R. r. Smith (ISVi), DciirH. 5.-.9 ; 7 Cox, C. <" 5 8i) 
 
 R. r. Smith (18,-i8). DenrH. \- Holl, 553 ; H Cox. ('.(!. 27 105 
 
 R. r. Smith (180,-|), L. k (^uvo, tio7 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 82 ; 34 L. J. M. «!. 
 
 163 409 
 
 R. r. Smithi.'H (1832). 5 C. & P. 332 .^87 
 
 R. V. Soiii.Twt^hina .J.J. (1820. 5 H. k C. 810 1 130 
 
 R. I'. Sourtoii 1830). 5 A. A: E. 180 ; N. \- M 575 ; 2 |[. & W. 209 621 
 
 R. r. South IIollau<l I)riiin,ige (1841), 8 A. 4: E. 437 ; 1 1*. & I). 79 ; 1 W. 
 
 W. & H. 047 1137 
 
 R. f. Southiim|.toii(18l,')), 5 Q. H. ."ilS 727 
 
 R. r. Sow 18I3\ 4 Q H. 93 525, 1131 
 
 R. t. SpiiKPr (1824), Rv. A: M. 97 1013, lol4 
 
 R. r. SpciHfr (1837), 7 C. & P. 770 .'i64 
 
 R. I'. Sjiict-r (18|.Vj, 1 C *K. 699; 1 Don. C. C. ;;2 214 
 
 R. II. SpilHhiirv (1835). 7 C. & P. 187 408. 508, 579 
 
 R. r, Stattonl (108(1). 7 How. St. Tr. 1378 920 
 
 R. i: .StnffordHhir.' J.l. (1837), 6 A. & E. 99 981. 992, 993 
 
 R. V. Stiijnforth (1815), 11 Q. H. 60 ; 3 New .Sewt. Ctix. 63; 17 L. J. M. C. 
 
 26 ; U .lur. 95 1,30, 131 
 
 R. r. StumiMir (1841). 1 Q B. 123: 10 L. J. M. C. 73 93 
 
 R f. Stimli-vrum Wn-iithoqM- (1812). 15 Eiixt, 3,50 621 
 
 R. c. Stiuitoii M851), 5 Cox. C. C. 324 1131 
 
 R. V. St.ipU»Fit/piiiiio(l8l2), 2 Q. B. 494 290 
 
 R. r. Stiiplot<m (1828). Ji-hh, C. C. 93 16.'i 
 
 R. V. Sttfi (1787). 1 I^'ii. 462 897 
 
 R. V. »U-]Am\H (1800). L. R. 1 Q. B. 702 ; .35 L. .1. Q. B. 251 ; 10 Cox, 
 
 C. C. 340 ; 7 H. & S. 710 ; 14 L. T. 693 ; 14 \V. R. 8.59 ; 12 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 901 107 
 
 R, r. Stq.honmm (1802), 31 L. J. M. C. 147 , L. & Cavo, 165 ; 9 Cox, 
 
 C. C. 150 .332, 3.38 
 
 R. V. St».pt(H- (1830). 4 C. * P. 397 501 
 
 R r. Stovc-nmm utid C.nlt.'r (1851). MS., 4th Mitrch, Ir.l.ind 883 
 
 R. I'. Stevmiton (1813). 1 (J. Ac K. .55 209 
 
 R. (• St4"WHrt (1870), 13 «\>x, 0. C. 296 1030 
 
 R. r. Stokf (loUlinir (1817^, 1 B. & A. IT'! 306 
 
 R. f. Sloki-uixHi-Trunt (1843), 5 Q, B. 308 ; 1>. k M. 357 ; 13 L J. Q. B. 
 
 4 1 ; 8 .lur. 34 766, 768 
 
 R. V. StukoM (18,50), 4 Cox, 0. C. 461 ....»«. .^ 9M 
 
 JA* ruferaiiti art to p«gu, mat to parayr,tphi. 
 
TABLE OF CASE8 CITED. 
 
 clxix 
 
 r.<nii 
 
 R. r. Stone (1796), 6 T. R. MR :»H2 
 
 K. f. StoiiviT (I8J3), 3 KuMii. C. & M, 371 '.•;»7 
 
 K r. Htoirr».riiU«' (l«W). 8 B. & C. 00 ; 2 M & It. 43 304 
 
 K. r. Stourton (IH.tO), fi A. & E. 180 415 
 
 11. V. Stmlmt. f IM.Vi). 7 Cox, C. C. 8.', 903 
 
 R. ,: Strand ILmnl of WorlcH (1801), 4 B. 4 S. MO ; 33 L. J. M. C. 3:i ; 
 
 \Z \V. K. 8Jli 1 1 1, 112 
 
 K r. Stn'fch (IS;!.-)). 4 Howl. 30 ; 3 A. & E. MY.i 8.11, 832 
 
 K. r. StrippllH'ili). 7 C'-x, C. C. !)7 ; Dciin'. C. C. fl»8 .'.77, .ITO 
 
 U. , . .Stn>ii<-r IHI.')), 1 <;. A: IC. Ck.O i»43 
 
 R. I. Stn.ml (IHIJ), 1 C. & K. 187; 2 M.m.. f!. C. 270 21.'> 
 
 R (• Stul.lw (18.">.')), 26 L. J. M. C. 10; Dmrn. C. C. ft.W ; 1 Jiir. N. S. 
 
 1 1 l.-i 03.3, 034 
 
 R. r. Stiim<! flS.'Jl). 3 E. Ac B. 73J ; 23 L. J. M. C. 172 ; 18 .Iiir. 10.V2 . . 1'I8 
 
 R I. Hu.lcliH ISOll, 1 I'jiHt, 300 no:; 
 
 R. I. SuUivHi. '1H7I\ I. U. HC. L. 401 H84 
 
 R. r. SiiUiviiM ; 1S.S7 . 20 L. It. Ir. .').'.0 .'..')1 
 
 R. r. SiiIIh (IHOO , 2 Lciirh, 801 217 
 
 R. I . Summ.TH ■ 1 70.'>). 2 EiiMt, P. C. 78.') 202 
 
 R. .'. Hiirr. V aHll). o «i. B. .'tOO 727 
 
 R. c. Sutrlilf.- ( 18.')0), 4 Cox, 0. O. 270 fiOO 
 
 R. r. Sutton (1817), 4 M. & .S. .^12 3, HO', 1(H»2 
 
 R c. Sutton (18i.'.), 3 A. iV E. M>7. 012 : .'> \ .V .M. 3.'j3 ; 1 H, .V W. I2S 101 
 
 R. r. .Sutton (18;is , 8 A. * E. .'ilO ; 3 N. i 1'. .'.li!* ;<!»;, 402 
 
 R. .. Sw.itkiuH 1M31), 4 C. 4: P. 018 10, f.03, f)70 
 
 R. (. Sw.rn.y (1811). Ir C. Hi-p. 300 21.'» 
 
 U. r SwrMilHcn (1702), 14 IIow St. Tr. 400 2.->0 
 
 R. r. Tiiit (18011, 2 !•' \ V. .'..Vi 332 
 
 R, r. TiintcH-k 1870 , 1.1 Cox, (". C. 217 IIJ".* 
 
 R. r. Tiinnrr . KO.'.,, 1 Enp. 300 108 
 
 R. f. Turriint ^1833 , < '. \- P. 1H2 .')78, .'iHO 
 
 R. r. TiivirniT < 180',»), ("arr. Supp. 11).') ; 4 C. A: 1'. 113, n. ,./i 21(1 
 
 R. r. Tiivlor il7i>0;, IVit. K. 11 01)4 
 
 R. ,: Tiivlor (1823), 1 C. *: P. 81 n 013 
 
 R. r. Tiivlor ^1812,, .'. C. \. V. 301 821 
 
 }<. r. T.ivlor ;lSfii , 8 C. \- 1'. 731 .^03, .'lO.'i 
 
 R. V. Tiivlor 180H , L. R. I C. C. 104 ; 38 L. J. M. C. 100; 11 (^.x, (' <". 
 
 201 ; i V. ti. V. i'll 1 200 
 
 R. r. Trill (1800,, 1 1 l-MHt, 300 ; 13 Eiiitt, 4 ; 10 R. R. ,'.10 877 
 
 R. I'. Tfw (18.V.), I)i'iir«. V. C. 120 010 
 
 R. r. Tli.imt, Eiirlof (17H0), 27 IIow. St. Tr. 84.') '112. 800 
 
 1{. V. Thihll.'WiMMl (1820), 33 How. St T.-. 001 207, 201, 310 
 
 R. r. Thoniim (1871), 12 (.'ox, ('. C fil 211 
 
 R. r. ThoniiiH (1704), 2 Loii. CC. 037 .'>7fl 
 
 R. r. ThoHiiiH (1834). 2 liCH. 877 : 2 Eimt, P. C, 034 230, .Vil, .'.Tl 
 
 H. r. TlioniiiH (1837), 7 (-'. * P. 817 3:^4 
 
 R, r. ThoimiH ilH70), 11 ("ox, C. C. 63.') H.'l, lo.'O 
 
 R r. TlioiniiH (l8T.'t). 13 Cox, C. C. 62 1120 
 
 R. . . Thompnon (1783). 1 Lou. C. C. 2'M 603, 471 
 
 R. r. 'HioinpHon (1820), 1 M(Mt. (;. C. i;{>j ; 1 I^-w. U. C. 104 213 
 
 U. r. ThonipMon (1HI61, Oil B. 721 bl»8 
 
 R. r. Tl.onvpHon (1870), 13 (;ox, C t). 181 962 
 
 U. I . ThonipKon, fl803) 2 Q. B. 12 ; 02 L J. M. C. 03 ; 00 L. T. 22 : 41 
 
 W. R. .V2.') ; 67 .1. P. 312 ; ') R. 302 .'.02, 603, .nl, 673 
 
 R. r. TliompH.n hihI otliors (1872), 41 L. J. M. C. 112 ; L. R. 1. ('. C. 377 : 
 
 12 Tox, d. (;. 202 888 
 
 R. I . Tlionii.«o!i mill SiinpMon (1803), 3 F. & F. 824 880 
 
 R. r. Thornton ilM24), 1 M.m.. C, (!. 27 .'.08, .600, 671 
 
 R. I. ThrinK (1832), 6 C. .V P. 607 10:U 
 
 R. V. Thun«<roHM ;183»). 1 A. & E. 120 1109 
 
 R. r. Thurii-ll (1822), Aliiw.n, Vme. 6H I ; Joy on ("onf. 8t ,'.8,'. 
 
 R. f. Tinikl«r(l78l). 1 Eiwl, P. C. 354 . . . ." 407, 408 
 
 R. r. Tipi)tt (1823). R. & R. 600 669 
 
 Vtl. I. iiuls with pf0 636, 
 
 itl 
 
clxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 PAOII 
 
 R. V. Tonkliiy (IftflO), 10 Cox. C. C. •100 27S 
 
 R. c. Ti.Imoii ( IHill). 4 K. & F 73 1071 
 
 U i: T.milinw.ii (1H;J4). (). & I' 370 213 
 
 U. r. TiH.ko (17iM), •.'.I IIow. St. Tr. 4 •« 1033 
 
 It. r. I'cK.I.) (lH.'i7). Diiirn. \: n. 101 ; 7 Uox, C. C. 200: 20 L. J. M. C. 70 ; 
 
 :iJiir. N. H. 420 216, fi72 
 
 R. r TorjK'y (1871), II Cox, C. C. 4/5 105 
 
 H. I'. T..tiicBH(18l9). 11 (J. n. 80; 18 L. J. M. (\ 40 132 
 
 R. I'. Tower {\H\r>), 4 M. & Sol. 102 ; 10 U. H. 4JH 003, iUH 
 
 R. r. Towcy (18(1(»), 8 Cox, C. C. 328 027 
 
 R. r. TowiiiM'ii.l (1H41), C. & Mttrnh. 178 148 
 
 R. f. Tn-l)l«»(1810). 2T«uii. 320 1194 
 
 R. r. Trchurno (IHIll), 1 Mno. C. C. 298 210 
 
 K. r. Troiiwvtli;i841), Ir. C. R. 172 US 
 
 R. V. Trovolii (1882), Li Cox, C. C. 2S0 274 
 
 R. r. Trowbridjrt' (1827). 7 n. & 0. 2.V2 .'rJl 
 
 R. r. Trufiimii (18,19), 8 C. * P. 727 2.38 
 
 R. V. Tiililiy (IH.I.l), 6 C. & V. MO RH2 
 
 R. r TulHjrHold (1804), 34 L. J. M. C. 20; L. & C. 49.1; 10 Cox, 
 
 C. ('. 1 2.'50 
 
 R «'. TiitfH (1848) 1 Don. C. C. 324 004 
 
 R. I'. Tumor (1004), How. St. Tr. 013 249, 250. 2V2 
 
 R f. TuriiiT (1810), /> M. A: S.^!. 200 200, 207 
 
 R. V. Turner (IHDO), 1 I^-w. C. C. 177 213 
 
 R V. Turner (1832), 1 M(K). 1». C. 347 ; 1 Luw. C. C. 110 628, .'.80, 1 102, 
 
 1110 
 
 R r. Tunier (1818), 2 C. & K. 732 1014 
 
 R r. Turwewton (I8.'!0. nIiiuiIiI Im> I8.')0), 10 Q. li. 100 ; 4 Cox, C. C. 349 ; 
 
 20 L. J. M. C. 40 ; \h .lur. 0,10 203 
 
 R V. Tutohin (1701). 14 Mow. Si Tr. 1128 45 
 
 R. I'. TwviiiiiK (1810). 2 H. & A. 380 108 
 
 R. V. Tyler (182;»), 1 C. & P. 129 fiflfl 
 
 R. r. Tvlney (1849), 18 L. J. M. C. 37; 1 Don. C. C. 319 004 
 
 R. V. TyniHiM (1870), 11 Cox, C. C. 615 108 
 
 R. V. VAM (1590), 1 How. St. Tr. 1289 45 
 
 R. f. Uezzoll («r R. r. Eiiton). 
 
 R. V. Vhwr (18.10), 4 Cox, 0. C. 442 3,30 
 
 R V. UnkleH(1873). I. R. 8 ,^. L. 60 619 
 
 R. r. Uixhunh (1830), 1 Moo. C. C. 40.1 503, .171 
 
 R. V. UpiM'r nod(lin>rt<m (182il), 8 D. & R. 720 321, 507, .199 
 
 R. V. Upton (iruy (1830), 10 B. &C. 812 127, I.'IO 
 
 It. V. lJpt<Hi-on-.' -oni (1833), fi C. & P. 133 202, 209 
 
 It. V. V»n MuKhoU (lh25, nhould \x> 1820), 3 C. & P. 0:U 407, 108 
 
 R. V. Vantleroomb '1706), 2 Kant, P. C. 514 : 2 I<oii. 708 ...20.1, 235, 985, 1120 
 
 R. V. Vnne (l(i02), 6 How. St. Tr. 123 ; 1 Eiwt, P. C. 125 026 
 
 R. f. Viiilo (1771). 1 Cowp. 248 701 
 
 R. r. Viiujrlmn (1090), 13 How. St. Tr. 5.35 024, 625, 017 
 
 R. r. VirelHt (181,1), 3Ciimp. 432; 14 R. R. 775 U7 
 
 R. r. V.mon (1872), 12 Cox. C. C. 153 503 
 
 R .•. Virkery (1S18). 12 Q. B. 478 ; 3 New Sohm. Ciih. 193 ; 17 L. J. M. C. 
 
 129; 12Jur .181 833 
 
 R. V. Vidil (lrt<il). 9 Cox. C. C. 4 3,32, 333 
 
 R .. Vincent (1771-2). 1 Sir. 481 1105, 1107 
 
 R. r Vii.eent (1830). 9 C. & P. 01 013 
 
 R. r. Vincent (1840). 9 C. & P. 275 373 
 
 R. I'. Vincent (18.12). 2 Dtn. C. V 404 ; 5 Cox, C. C. 537 ; 3C. & K. 240; 
 
 21 L. J. M. ('. 109: lOJur. 457 108 
 
 R. r. Virri.r (1810). 12 A. * E. 324 627 
 
 R. f. Voke (1823), R. ft R. 5.U 248 
 
 R r. Wu.le (182.1). 1 M.«), C. C. 80 ..807, 898 
 
 R. r. W.iinwrij^ht (1870). 13 Cox, C. 0. 171 378 
 
 R. r. Wnite, fl892) 2 «. B. 000; 01 L. J. M. C. 187; 67 L. T. 308; 
 
 41 \V. R. 80 100 
 
 The reftftnett art to pagti, not to paragraph*. 
 
 4 
 I 
 
TABLH OF CAsr.S CITKD. clxxi 
 
 I'AOB 
 
 R. •>. Wiikrflflfl (IflOi), 5 KiiMt, 3;j.'): 1 Smith, .') 12 :>n 
 
 R. t. WiiktH.'l.l (1HJ7], 'i Lt'w. C. (;. 27'J 890, HD.J 
 
 R. c. Wiilktr(IHiiti),<it.'<jOC. & P. lOi M:i 
 
 n. I. WiiiktT iHii). :n^imi). in* •.'!« 
 
 U. r. VViilk.T (I8:twj, 1 M. A: Uoli. iVl MS 
 
 R. r. Wulk.T(lHi;i), 2 M. i Ii<.l>. :i.)7 1100, 11:11 
 
 R. r. Wiilk.T (IKoO), 1 F. & F. iV) I ;(,I2 
 
 K r. Walkl.-y (1H33), 6 C. 4 1'. 17/5 Mi, MM 
 
 It. V. Wall (18:«l). 3 Rutw. C. & M. .■)•.'■'), ■'):i I tl-'O. ;i 10 
 
 l;. r. WuUiue f IS.VI), H Ir. C. L. R. 38 lOK, 1 1 1 
 
 R. f. W.illiiw (ISiifi). 17 Ir. 0. L. R. 200 15 
 
 R. r. Walnh (1843), Ir. Cir. R. 800 SOU, .')71 
 
 It. V. w.ii»ii (isflo), f, Cox, ecu:) 33-) 
 
 R. f. Walter (li!3tl), 3 Kmji. 21 ; R. R. 808 ; Prefnuo vi /)78 
 
 It. V. Ward (1811), OO. & r. 300 1032 
 
 R. r. Wsnl (1830 , 4 A. & E. 38» 47 
 
 R. V. Ward (1804), 10 Cox. C. C. 42 238 
 
 R. f. Wanll.) (1800), R. & R. il 202 
 
 It ", WanlroiHT (1800), 1 JWl, C. C. 249 ; 8 Cox, C. C. 284 ; 2!» L. J. 
 
 M. 0. 116 105 
 
 R. r. Wai iiikHhall 1 783), 1 Lfii. C. (I 203 .')8.i 
 
 R. V. Warmaii (Is Hi), 1 Don. 183 ; 2 Car. & K. iu:i 213 
 
 R. r. Wariior (1832), <'it(<<l 3 Riihm. C. & M. 4.')2, 408 AOH 
 
 R. V. Warrintfhain (ISftl), 2 Don. C. C. 447 602, .WA 
 
 R V. WarwiokHliirc (1837), A. & K. 873 ; 2 N. & P. lo3 727 
 
 R. r. WiiNlibnM.k (182")), 4 B. & C. 732 1 133 
 
 R V. Wali'rH (1832), 7 C & P. 260 ; 1 Moo. C. C. 4r)7 213. 210 
 
 R. r. WatiTi»(l8l8). 1 Di>n. Am ; 2 C. & K. 808 ; 18 L. J. M. C. .03 ... .84, 21.i 
 
 R. f. WatkinH (1831), oit.xi 4 C. & P. 650, n. (A) '.80 
 
 R. V. Watkinw.n (1730-40), 2 Str. 1122 010 
 
 R. V. Watj«m (1T8S), 2 T. R. 201 ; 1 R, R. 461 310 
 
 R. V. VVntKon 1808), 1 Cunip. 216 164 
 
 R. V. Watson (1817), 2 Stark. R. 13'.l ; 32 How. St. Tr. 82 121, 248, -JDO, 
 
 382, 381, 38.'), 620, 013, 010, 020, H'X), 800, 90'J, 1)21, 017, 018, 
 
 970, 072 
 
 R. V. WatMon (1834), 6 C. & P. 663 960, 977 
 
 R f. WafMon (1861). 3 C. & Kir. Ill 580 
 
 R. V. Watt* (1804), . New R. 177 ; 33 L. J. M. C. 63 ; L. & Cuvo, 339 ; 
 
 9 Cox, C. C. 396 L. T. 463 ; 12 W. R. 112 33a 
 
 R. V. Waverton (1861), 17 Q. H. 502 ; 2 Den. C. C. 340; 21 L. J. M. C. 
 
 7 ; 10 Jiir. 6 209 
 
 R. r. Wavertreo (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 263 399 
 
 R. r. Weaver (1873), 43 L J. M. C. 13; L. R. 2 C. C. 85 ; 12 Cox, C. ('. 
 
 527 lOS.i. 1060 
 
 R. V. Wi'hb(1819), ;i Rniw. C. & M. 622 918 
 
 R. V. AVebb (1831 , 4 C. & P. 50 1 682, 889 
 
 H. V. Webb (1807). 11 Cox, C. C. 133 877 
 
 R. r. WebHti-r (1801). L. &C. 77; 31 L. J. M. O. 17 199 
 
 R. V. Wi'd.UTbiini (1740), Font. C. L. 22 ; 18 How. St. Tr. 425 626 
 
 R. r. WtfkK (1801), b Cox, C. C. 4.'."> ; L. & C. 18; 30 L. ,1. M. C. 141 ; 
 
 7 Jiir. y. 8. 472 ; 4 L. T. 373 ; W. R. 653 240 
 
 R. V. Welbom (1792), 1 Eawt, P. <". 358 408 
 
 R. r. Welch (1840), 2 C. & K. 200 ; 1 Deii. C. C. 199 291 
 
 R. r. Welland (1S.'2). R. & R. 401 216 
 
 It. I'. Weller (1810), 2 0. & K. 223 334, 579 
 
 R. r. WellitiKH (1S78), 3 Q. H. D. 426 ; 47 L. J. M. C. 100 -. 38 L. T. 652 ; 
 
 26 W. R. 592 332 
 
 R. r. 'V,.1Ih (1820), M. &M. 320 634 
 
 R. I . Weltou (1802), 9 Cox, C. C. 297 198, 210, XHi 
 
 R. !■. Weiihain (1800), 10 Cox, C. C. 222 1079 
 
 R. I . Weht, Dr. (uiidate<l), rited 2 Wiln. 240 ; 6 Mod. ;!95 990 
 
 R. f. WeHtbury (1844), 6 Q II. 600; 1 New SeHM. Cu». 33; D. & M. 
 
 006 727 
 
 Vol. J. *nd$ with pagt 636. 
 
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 clxxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 R. V. 
 
 93 
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 PAOK 
 
 Western (1868), 37 L. J. M. C. 81 ; L. R. 1 C. C. 122; 11 (.'ox, C. C. 
 
 18 L. T. 299 ; 16 W. R. 730 198 
 
 Wt'stley (18.i9),Bell, C. C. 193; 29L. J. M. C. 35 ; ft.Tur. N. S. 1362. . 198 
 
 \Mieater (1838), 2 Moo. C. C. 45 ; 2 Lew. C. C. 157 583, 584 
 
 Wheatland (1838), 8 C. & P. 238 629 
 
 Whceley (1838), 8 C. & T. 250 ;i83, 580 
 
 Wheeling (1789), 1 Lea. C. C. 311, n 5G0 
 
 Wheelook (1826), 5B. &C. 511 788, 1139 
 
 Whelau (1881), 8 L. R. Ir. 314 ; 14 Cox. C. C. 595 954 
 
 Winston (1836), 4 A. & E. 607 ; 6 N. & M. 65 131 
 
 Whitbread (182;<), 1 C. & P. 8t, n 943 
 
 Whitchurch (1827), 7 B. & C. 573 130 
 
 White (1786), 3 Bar. Ab. 202, n. ; 1 Lea. C. C. 430, n. («) . .896, 898, 901, 904 
 
 White (1823), R. & R. 508 560 
 
 White (1843), 4 Q. B. 111. 112 91 
 
 White (1865), 4 F. k F. 383 104 
 
 AVhitehead (1866). 35 L. J. M. C. 186; L. R. 1 C. C. 33 ; 10 Cox, 
 
 C. 34; 14L. T. 189; 14AV. R. 677 910 
 
 Wliiteliouse (undated), cited 3 Russ. C. & M. 625 893 
 
 Whith'v Lower (1813). 1 M. & S. 636 491, 496 
 
 Whitworth (1858), 1 F. & F. 382 468, 469 
 
 , Wick St. Lawrence (183;j), 5 B. & Ad. 526 .. 788, 1103, 1139, 1140, 1141 
 
 , Wickham (18:i5), 3 A. & E. 517 755 
 
 Wickham (183!)), 10 A. & E. 34 ; 2 P. & D. 333 204 
 
 , Widdop (1872), 42 L. J. M. C. 9 ; L. R. 2 C. C. 3 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 
 
 1 ; 27 L. T. 693 ; 21 W. R. 176 583 
 
 , Wideconibe in the Moor (1847), 2 New Soss. Cas. 539 ; 9 Q. B. 894 ; 
 
 L. J. M. C. 44; 11 Jur. 227 1139 
 
 , Wigiin (1849), 14 Q. B. 287 ; 3 New Sews. Cas. 670 ; 19 L. J. M. C. 
 
 ; 13 Jul-. 1052 521 
 
 . Wi.rley (1 835), 2 Lew. C. C. 258, 259, n 627 
 
 , Wild (1835), 1 Moo. C. C. 452 567, 569 
 
 . Wilde (1669), 1 Lev. 396 ; 1 Doug. 97, n. 41 18 
 
 . Wilkes (1836), 7 C. & P. 273 633, 634 
 
 . Wilkinson (1838). 8 C. & P. 662 281, 579 
 
 . AVillans (should be Williams) (1835), 7 C. i- P. 320 898 
 
 . Williams (1710), 10 Mod. 63 ; 4 Bl. Com. 29 165 
 
 . Williams (1811), 2 Camp. 646; 11 R. R. 781 203 
 
 . Williams (1826), 1 Moodv. C. C. 107 204 
 
 Williams (1834), 6 C. Ac 1*. 626 239 
 
 Williams (1836), 7 C. & P. 298 216 
 
 . Williams (1838), 8 C. i; P. 284, 434 889, 932 
 
 . Williams (1850), 2 Den. 61 202 
 
 . Williams (185;i), 6 Cox, C. C. 343 925 
 
 . Williams (1862). 3 New R. 338, per Ir. C. C. ; 9 Cox, C. C. 338. . . . 211 
 
 Williams (18(i5;, 4 F. & F. 515 336 
 
 Williams (1871). 11 Cox, C. C. 684; 12 Cox, C. C. 101 .... 121,326,337 
 Williams, (18!/3) 1 Q. B. 320 ; 62 L. J. M C. 69 ; 41 W. R. 332 . . 100 
 
 Willis (1710), 15 How. St. Tr. 624 658, 559 
 
 . Willis (1845). 1 Den. C. C. 80 ; 1 0. & K. 722 216 
 
 . AVillshiie (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 366 ; 50 L. J. M. C. 57 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 
 
 1 ; 44 L. T. 222 ; 29 W. R. 473 ; 45 J. P. 375 106 
 
 . Wilmett (184S), 3 Cox, C. C. 281 264 
 
 . Wilshaw (1841), C. & Marsh. 145 329, 336, 339, 577 
 
 . Wilson (1817), Holt, N. P. R 597 569 
 
 . Wilson (1861), 8 Cox, C. C. 453 332 
 
 . Wilson (1874), 12 Cox, C. C. 622 322, 336 
 
 . Wilton (1858), 1 F. A: F. 309 332 
 
 . Wilts. & Berks. Can. Co. (183.5), 3 A. & E. 47 992, 998 
 
 . Windsor '.864), 4 F. \: F. 366 563 
 
 . Wink (.S<34). 6 C. & P. 397 367 
 
 . Winkworth (1830). 4 C. A: P. 444 248, 375 
 
 . Winslow (I860;. 8 Cox, C. C. 397 237, 247 
 
 T/ie rq/Wencea «)•# to pages, ttol to pttrayraphi. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clxx 
 
 111 
 
 PAOR 
 
 R V AVithers (1811), cited B. f. Holt, 5 T. R. 446 20, .098 
 
 R I' Witney (lH:i<',). 5 A. & E. 191; 6 N. & M. 5o2 131 
 
 R. r. Woburii (18IIH), 10 East, 3!)o 494 
 
 R. (• AVoiiieislv (1830), 2 Lew. C. C. 1(12 S'.'G 
 
 R. V. Wood (1S;S2), 1 Oowl. ")09 816 
 
 R ,-, Woud (18U), Jebb & B. vii. ; 7 M. & W. ;)73 ; 9Dowl.310; lOL.J. 
 
 Ex. 168 3 12, 906 
 
 R. V. AVond (1842), Ir. Cir. R. 597 .■)72 
 
 R. V. A\'o()d (1860), .-) Tur. 22;') 2.)0 
 
 R. V. Wood (1877) 14 Cox, C. C. 46 375 
 
 R. f. AVoodohcster(1742-3), Burr. S. C. 191 ; 2 Str. 1 172 1 106 
 
 R. V. AVoodcoi'k (17S7), 1 Leach, 504 'Ai, 333, 464, 4G7, 468, 470 
 
 R. V. AVoodfiill (1770), o Burr. 2661 ; 20 How. St. Tr. 913.918, 920.. 20, 45, 109 
 
 R. r. AVoodlmll (1872), 12 Cox. C. C. 240 206 
 
 R. V. AVondlioad (1817), 2 C. A: K. .520 942, 943 
 
 R. r. AVondky (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 390 322 
 
 R. V. AVoods (1840), 1 Crawf. 4: D. C. C. 439 974 
 
 R. V. AVoodward (1831), 1 Moody, C. C. 323 16, 209 
 
 R. r. AVooldale (1844), 6 Q. B. 549 ; 1 New Ses.s. Cm. ill ; 14 L. J. M. C. 
 
 13 ; 9 .Jur. 83 543, 784, 795 
 
 R. c. AVoolford (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 384 1127 
 
 R. r. Worotster (1838), 5 Q. B. 508, u 727 
 
 R. r. AVoicestershire .JJ. (1854), 3 E. & B. 477 ; 2 C. L. R. 1333 ; 23 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 113; IS .Tur. 424 *. 1137 
 
 R. V. AVorfield (1794), 5 T. R. 508 153 
 
 R. V. AVorth (1843), 4 Q. B. 132 ; 12 L. J. AI. C. 47 ; 3 G. & D. 376 . .436, 437. 
 
 46« 
 R. r. AVniiigle (1835), 2 A. & E. 514 ; 4 N. & M. 375 ; 1 H. & VV. 41 . . . . -if^M 
 
 R. V. AViiirht (1821), R. & R. 456 931, 934, 935 
 
 R. V. AV right (1860), 2 F. & F. ,320 199 
 
 R. r. AVycherlev (1838), 8 C. & P. 262 ;i59 
 
 11. r. AVye (18.38), 7 A. & E. 770 ; 3 N. & P. 6 1 Hlii 
 
 R. V. AVylde (1834), 6 C. & P. 380 357, 918 
 
 R. V. Wylie (1804), 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 94 ; 2 Lea. C. C. 983 237, 246 
 
 R. V. Yiirwell (1829), 9 B. & C. 894 ; 4 M. & Ry. 685 521 
 
 R. V. Yates (1841), C. & Mar. 139 624 
 
 R. 1'. Yeadoii (1861), L. & Cave, 81 ; 9 Cox. C. C. 91 ; 31 L. J. M. C. 70; 
 
 7 Jur. N. 8. 1 128 ; 5 L. T. 329 ; 10 AV. R. 64 206 
 
 R. f. Yeoveley (1838), 8 A. & E. 818; 1 P. & D. CO 788, 1032, 1140 
 
 R. I'. Yewiu (1811), 2 Camp. 639 947, 950, 951 
 
 R. V. Yore (1839), 1 Jebb & Sy. 463 893 
 
 R. f. Y^irk, Mayor of (1792), o T. R. 66 1114 
 
 R. V. Young (1850), 3 C. A: K. 106 336, 578 
 
 R. V. Young (1866), 10 Cox, C. C. 371 633 
 
 Rabey v. Gilbert (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 170 ; 6 H. & N. 536 ; 3 L. T. 752 ; 
 
 9 AV. R. 386 621 
 
 Raekhftin v. Marriott (18-)7), 1 H. & N. 234 ; 2 H. & N. 196 ; 26 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 315 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 495 712 
 
 Rttdoliffe V. Fur.sraan (1730). 2 Bro. P. C. 514 601 
 
 Radclitfe v. Un. Ins Co (1810), 7 Johns. 38 1093 
 
 Radford r. M'lntoch (1790), 3 T. R. 632 150, 519 
 
 Radford v. AVilson (1754), 3 Atk. 815 180 
 
 Rae, In Goods of (1892), 27 L. R. Ir. 116 702 
 
 Raggett r. Mu.sgravo (1827), 2 C. & P. 556 520 
 
 Riiikos V. Todd (1838). S A. & E. 855 ; 1 P. & D. 138 ; 8 L. J. Q. B. 35. . 669 
 
 Rainforth, Re (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 5 716 
 
 Ruiusford v. Smith (1563), Dyer, 196a 94 
 
 Ra,jah, The (1872), L. R. 3 Ad. & Ecc. 639 ; 41 L. J. Adm. 97 ; 27 L. T. 
 
 102 ; 21 W. R. 14 178 
 
 Rajah of Coorg r. E. India Co. (1856), 29 Boav. 300 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 226 . . 618 
 
 Riimadge v. Ryan (1832), 9 Bing. 333 ; 2 Moo. & Sc. 421 933 
 
 Rjimbertr. Cohen (1803), 4 Esp. 213; 6 R. R. 864 293, 926 
 
 Rambler v. Tryaou (1821), 7 Serg. & R. 90 931 
 
 Vol. I. melt with pag» 636. 
 
 ii 
 
clxxlv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ramchum Mullick v. Luckmeechund Riidakissen (1851), Moo. P. ( 
 Ramsbotham v. Senior (1869). L. R. 8 Eq. o7o ; 17 W. R 1057 . . 
 Ramsbottom v. Buckhurst (1814), 2 Maule & S. 567 ; 15 R. R. 352 
 Rsmsbottom v. Mortley (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 445 ; 15 R. R. 304 
 
 FAOB 
 
 0.40.. 38 
 
 610 
 
 81 
 
 .286, 289 
 
 Ramsbottom v. Tunbridge (1814), 2 M. & Sel. 434 ; 15 R. R. 302 .... 286, 289 
 Ramsden v. Dyson (1865), L. R. 1 H. L. 129; 12 Jur. N. S. 506; 14 
 
 W. R. 926 538, 542 
 
 Ramuz v. Crowe (1847), 1 Ex. 167 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 280 ; 11 Jur. 715. . . .307, 308 
 
 Rancljffe v. Parkyns (1818), 6 Dow. 202 433 
 
 Randall v. Gurney (1819), 3 B. & Aid. 252 ; 1 Chitty, 679 868. 869, 870 
 
 Randall v. Lithgow (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 525 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 518 ; 50 L. T. 
 
 587; 32W.R.79t 1116 
 
 Riindallt). Lynch (1810), 2 Camp. 357 ; 11 R. R. 727 1212 
 
 Randall v. Morgan (1805), 12 Ves. 67 ; 8 R. R. 289 665, 680 
 
 RandaU v. Newson (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 259 ; 2 Q. B. D. 102 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 164 ; 25 W. R. 313 777 
 
 Randall's case (1820), 5 City Hall Rue. 141 891 
 
 Randell v. Trimen (1856), 18 C. B. 786 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 307 780 
 
 Randle v. Blackburn (1813), 5 Taun. 2 15 479 
 
 Randolph v. Gordon (1815), 6 Price, 312 ; 19 R. R. 633 4;i() 
 
 Rands v. Thomas (1816), 5 M. & Sel. 244 877 
 
 Ranee Khujooroonissa f. Mussainat Roushun Jehan (1876), L. R. 3 Ind. 
 
 App. 291, r,ll 149 
 
 Rangeloy v. Webstw (1840), 1 1 New Hamps. 299 1148 
 
 Rmken v. M'Murphy (1889), 24 L. R. Ir. 290 542 
 
 Rjinkini'. Hoimr (1812), 16 Ea'^t, 193 518 
 
 Rankin r. Tonbrook (1837), Watts, 388 443 
 
 Rann v. Hughes (between 1764— 1 797), 7 T. R. 350, n 653 
 
 Kansley, Ex parte (1823), 3 D. & R. 572 120 
 
 Riper V. Birkbeck (1812), 15 East, 17 ; 13 R. R. 354 1200 
 
 33, 
 
 617 
 488 
 
 Mat. 
 . 1050, 
 
 Raphael v. Bk. of England (1855), 17 C. B. 161 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 
 
 Rapp V. Latham (1819), 2 B. & A. 795 
 
 Rashdall v. Ford (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 750 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 769 ; 14 L. T. 790 
 
 14 W. R. 950 
 
 Ratcliff V. Ratcliff and Anderson (1859), 1 S. & T. 467; 29 L. 
 
 171 
 
 Ravee r. Fanner (1791), 4 T. R. 146 ; 2 R. R. 347 
 
 Raveuga v. Mackintosli (18;>4), 2 B. & C. 693 ; 1 C. & P. 204 ; 4 Dowl. & 
 
 R. 107 
 
 Ravenscroft v. Jones (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 482 ; 32 Beav. 669 
 
 Rawley v. Rawley (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 460 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 075 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 191 ; 24W. R. 995 718 
 
 Rawlins v. D^sborough (1810), 2 M. & Rob. 328 ; 8 C. & P. 321 ..48, 250, 271 
 
 Rawlins v. Rickards (1860), 28 Beav. 370 455, 708 
 
 Rjiwlins V. Turner (1699), 1 Ld. Raym. 736 
 
 Rawlins v. West Dei-by (1816), 2 C. B. 72 ; 1 Lutw. 373 
 Rawliuson v. Clarke (1845), 14 M. & W. 187 ; 14 L. J, 
 Rawlinson v. Oriel (1688), 1 Show. 75 ; Carth. 96 .... 
 
 Rawurth v. Marriott (1833), 1 My. & K. 643 
 
 Rawson v. Haigh (1824), 2 Bing. 104 370, 377, 381 
 
 Rawsont). Walker (1816), 1 Stark. 301 767 
 
 Rawstome v. Gandell (1846), 15 M. & W. 304 ; 4 Railw. Cas. 295 ; 3 
 
 Dowl. &L. 682; 15 L. J. Ex. 291; 10 Jur. 291 492 
 
 Ray V. Jones (1836), 2 Gale, 220 458 
 
 Raymond, Ex parte (1874), I. R. 8 Eq. 231 128 
 
 Rayner v. AUhusen (1851), 2 L. M. & P. 605 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 68 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 1060 1183 
 
 ; 15L. J. C.P. 70. 
 Ex. 304 
 
 780 
 
 1054 
 1124 
 
 372 
 806 
 
 655 
 726 
 7J0 
 1115 
 140 
 
 Read v. Anderson (1884), 10 Q. B. D. 100 ; 62 L. J. 
 
 74 ; 31 W. R. 453 
 
 Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, (1892) A. C. 644 ; 62 L 
 
 128 ; 56 J. P. 725 
 
 Read v. Coker (1853), 13 C. B. 850 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 201 
 Read v. Dunsmore (1840), 9 0. & P. 588 
 
 Q. B. 214 
 
 J.'p'.c'i 
 
 48 L. T. 
 
 620 
 
 67 L. T. 
 
 16, 1179 
 
 17 Jur. 990 .... 227 
 190 
 
 The re/ereticei are to pages, nol to purmjvaphs. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 ClxXY 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Reade. Gamble (1839), 10 A. t E. 597, n 289, 318 
 
 Read v. Nash (1751), 1 "Wik. 305 677 
 
 Read v. Passer (1794), 1 Esp. 214 373, lu47 
 
 Read v. Victoria St. and Pimlico Rv. Co. (1863), 1 H. & C. 82(3 ; 32 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 127 '. 1 102 
 
 Readers case (1604-5), 5 Co. Rep. 33 660 
 
 Reader r. Kingham (1862). 13 C. B. X. S. 344 ; 32 L. J. C. P. 108 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 797; 7L. T. 789; 11 W. R. 366 677, 679 
 
 Readhead v. Midi. Rv. Co. (1869), 36 L. J. Q. B. 181 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 412 ; 
 
 8B. &S. 371: 16L. T. 485; 15 W. R. 831 772 
 
 Reardeu r. Minter (1843). 5 M. & Gr. 204 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 139 1211 
 
 Reay'8 estate (1855), 1 Jur. X. S. 222 1208 
 
 Redding v. Wilks (1845), 3 Bro. C. C. 401 679 
 
 Rcdford V. Birlev (1822), 3 Stark. 88 373, 383 
 
 Rcdiiigton c. Rediiigton (1734). 3 Ridg. P. C. 106 666 
 
 Reece v. Rigby (1821). 4 B. & AH. 202 39 
 
 Reecei). Trje (1846), 9 Bear. 316 601 
 
 Reed v. Deere (1827), 7 B. & C. 261 ; 2 C. & P. 624 287 
 
 Reed V. Devavncs (1791), 2 Cox, 285 ; 3 Br. C. C. 95 ; 2 R. R. 48 144 
 
 Reed v. Fenn'(186G), 35 L. J. Ch. 464 721 
 
 Reed t'. Jackson (1801), 1 East, 355 ; 6 R. R. 283 84, 397, 398, 405, 1109 
 
 Reed v. James (1815), 1 Stark. R. 132 942 
 
 Reed r. King (1858), 30 L. T. 290 939 
 
 Reed f. Lamb (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 4.32 ; 6H. &N. 75; 6 Jur. N. S. 828. .1050, 
 
 1230 
 
 Reed v. Passer (1791). Pea. R. 232 ; 3 R. R. 696 29-5 
 
 Reed v. Woodward (1877). 11 Phila. (Pa.) 54, 541 693 
 
 Rees, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 56 697 
 
 Rees V. Bowen (1825), MCI. & T. 383 957 
 
 Rees V. Lloyd (1811), Wightw. 1811 119 
 
 E«e8 V. Overbaugh (1827), 6 Cowen. 746 1 1'J9 
 
 Rees r. Rees (1S73). L. R. 3 P. A: D. 84 : 29 L. T. 375 141 
 
 Rees V. Smith (1816) 2 Stark. R. 30 272 
 
 Rees V. Walters (183S), 3 M. & W. 527 ; 2 Jur. 378 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 138 431, 
 
 1116 
 
 Ressi'. Williams (1847), 1 De G. & Sm. 314 1209 
 
 Reeside, Schooner, The (1837). 2 Sumn. 567 766, 783 
 
 Reeve's Trusts, Re (1879), 4 Ch. D. 841 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 412 144 
 
 Reeve v. Bird (1831), 1 C. M. Ac R. 31 : 4 Tyr. 612 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 282 .... 660 
 
 Reeve v. Hodson (1853), 10 Hare, App. xix 1037, 1053 
 
 Reeve v. Whitmore (1865). 2 Dr. k Sm. 446 483 
 
 Reeve v. Wood (1865), 34 L. J. M. C. 15 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 58 ; 5 B. & S. 364 894 
 Reeves v. Hearue (18:J6), 1 M. & iV. 323 ; 2 Gale, 4 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 156 . . 716 
 
 Reeves v. Lindsay (18(i9j. I. R. 3 E<i. 509 
 
 Reeves v. Slater (1827), 7 B. i C. 486 : 1 M. & R. 265 
 
 Reffell V. Retfell (1866), L. R. 1 P. & D. 139 ; 35 L. J. P. & M. 121 
 
 697 
 543 
 756 
 899 
 746 
 599 
 
 Regicides, Trial of the (1660), Kel. J. 12 ; 6 How. St. Tr. 1181 
 
 Reidf. Batte(1829), M. & M. 414 281, 286, 287, 
 
 Reidi). Langlois (1849), 1 Ma^. & G. 627; 19 L. J. Ch. 337 ; 2H. &T. 59.. 
 
 Reid V. Margisoii (1SU8), 1 Camp. 469 1018 
 
 Reid V. Teakle (1853). 13 C. B. 627 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 17 Jur. 841 .... 
 Reidpiith's oa.*e (1870), 40 L. J. Ch. 39 ; 11 L. R. Eq. 86 ; 23 L. T. 834 ; 
 
 19 W. R. 219 
 
 Reidy v. Pierce (1861). 11 Ir. C. L. R. 374 
 
 Reilly v. Fitagerald (1843), 6 Ir. E. R. 335 409, 
 
 Reimers v. Druce (1857), 26 L. J. Ch. 196 ; 23 Beav. 145 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 147.. 
 Remmett r. Lawrence (1850), 15 Q. B. 1004 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; 14 Jur. 
 
 1067 
 
 106 
 
 155 
 
 19 
 
 1105 
 
 1147 
 
 549 
 
 Rendles, Re, Rhodes v. Rhodes (see Rhodes, Re, &c.). 
 
 Reneaux v. Teakle (1853), 8 Ex. 680; 22 L. J. Ex. 241 ; 17 Jur. 351 .... 166 
 
 Renner v. Bank of Columbia (1824), 9 ^Vheat. 581 767 
 
 Reunie V. Clarke (1850, 5 Ex. 292; 19 L. J. Ex. 278 541 
 
 Renuie v. Wynn (1849), 4 Ex. 691 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 2 641 
 
 Vol. I. end* with page 635. 
 
clxxvi 
 
 TABLK OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAaE 
 UeuniKon v. Walker (1872), L. R. 7 Ex. 143 ; 41 L. J. Ex. 43 ; 26 L. T. 
 
 1G7; 20 W. R. 471 187 
 
 Rosp. V. Fi.l.l.s (182-.'-4), Peck, R. 140 655 
 
 Re.sp. V. MoCurty (1781), 2 Dull. 8(i 561, 574 
 
 Reu».s V. Pick>lcv (1860), L. R. 1 E.x. 342; 35 L. J. Ex. ■>]»; 4 II. & C. 
 
 588 ; 15 L T" 25 ; 14 VV. R. !2» : 12 Jnr. N. S. 628 675 
 
 Renter v. Elccitrio Telegr. Co. (1856), 6 E. & B. 346 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 46 ; 
 
 2 Jnr. N. S. 1215 642, 645 
 
 Rovell, Ex parte, Tollemnche. In re (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 720, 727 ; 64 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 80, 92 : 51 L. T. 376, 379 ; 33 W. R. 288, 289 629 
 
 Revell r. Blake (1873), 41 L. J. C. P. 129; 42 L. J. C. P. 165; L. R. 
 
 8 C. P. 533; 29 L. T. 67 ; 22 W. R. 96 1157 
 
 R«vis V. Smith (1856), 18 C. B. 126 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 195; 2 Jur. N. S. 614. . 865 
 
 Rew V. Barber (1824), 3 Cowon, 272 775 
 
 Rew V. Hutchins (1861), 10 C. B. N. S. 829 230 
 
 Reynell v. Lewis (1846), 15 M. & W. 517 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 25 540, 541 
 
 Reynell v. Sprye (1846), 10 Beav. 51; 16 L. J. Ch. 117 602, 603, 607 
 
 Rcyner v. Hall (1813), 4 Tauu.-725 ; 14 R. R. 650 552 
 
 Reyner v. Pearson (1812), 4 Taun. 662 ; 13 R. R. 723 388 
 
 Royiiold.s, Ex parte ' :83). 52 L. J. Ch. 223 ; 21 Ch. D. 601 ; 47 L. T. 495 ; 
 
 31 W. R. 187 . 849 
 
 Reynolds, Ex parte, ..teynolds, Re (1882), 20 Ch. D. 294 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 
 
 756 ; 46 L. T. 508 ; 30 W. R. 651 ; 46 J. P. 533 964 
 
 Reynolds, Re (1873), L. R. 3 P. & D. 35 ; 42 L. J. P. & M. 20 ; 28 L. T. 
 
 144; 21 W. R. 512 709 
 
 Reynolds v. Feuton (1846), 3 C. B. 194 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 16 ; 10 Jur. 668 . . 8, 
 
 1146, 1148 
 
 Reynolds t>. Reynolds (1848), 12 Ir. Ch. R. 172, 181 117 
 
 Reynolds v. Staines (1849), 2 C. & K. 745 1219 
 
 Reynoldson r. Perkins (1 769), Anib. '163 497 
 
 Rhodes, Re, Rhodes v. Rhodes (1887), 36 Ch. D. 686; 56 L. J. Ch. 825 ; 
 
 57 L. T. 652 172 
 
 Rhodes v. Airdale Drain. Com. (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 337 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 
 
 508; 31 L. T. 69 1160 
 
 Rhodes f. Rhodes (1889), 7 App. Cas. 112; 46L. T. 463; SOW. R. 709.. 741 
 Rioardo v. Garcias (1845), 12 CI. & Fin. 368; 9Jur. 1019. .1117, 1142, 1143, 1152 
 Riccardf. Inclosure Conimiss. (1854), 4 E. & B. 329; 3 C. L. R. 119; 
 
 24 L. J. Q. B. 49 ; iJur. N. S. 496 Ii85 
 
 Rice, In re (1886), 32 Ch. D. 35 ; 66 L. J. Ch. 709 ; 64 L. T. 689 ; 34 W. R. 
 
 747 1208 
 
 Rice, Re (1870), Ir. R. 5 Eq. 176 690 
 
 Rice V. Howard (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 681 ; 55 L. J. Q. B. 311 ; 34 W. R. 532. 939 
 
 Rice r. Rice (1853), 2 Drew. 73 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 289 542 
 
 Richf). Jackson (1794), 4 Bro. C. C. 619 743, 750, 757 
 
 Richards v. Bassett (1830), 10 B. & C. 633 398, 408 
 
 Richards v. Bliick (1848), 6 Dowl. & L. 325 ; 6 B. 437 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 17 . 192 
 Richards v. Easto (1846), 15 M. & W. 244 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 616 ; 16 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 163 ; 10 J<ir. 696 227 
 
 Richards 1'. Gellatly (1872), L. R. 7 C P. 127; 26L.T. 435; 20W. R. 630.. 1186 
 
 Richards v. Gofyarty (1870), I. R. 4 C. L. 300 436 
 
 Richards r. Hough (1882), 51 L. J. Q. B. 361 ; 30 W. R. 676 900, 906 
 
 Richards v. Johnston (1859), 4 H. & N. 660 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 322 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 520 629 
 
 Richards t>. Lewis (1852), 11 C. B. 1054; 20 L. J. C. P. 177; 16 Jur. 612.. 303, 
 
 305, 1204 
 Richards v. Lond. & S. Coast Ry. Co. (1849;, 7 C. B. 839 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 
 
 49; 18 L. J. C. P. 251 ; 13 Jur. 986 201 
 
 Richards f. Porter (1827), 6 B. & C. 437 672 
 
 Richards «. Richards (1731), 16 East, 294, n. (rt); 13 R. R. 475, n 171 
 
 Richards v. Richards (1844), 2 M. & Rob. 567 246, 255 
 
 Richards f. Rose (1852), 9 Ex. 218; 2 C. L. R. 311: 23 L. J. Ex. 3 115 
 
 Richardson v. Anderson (1805), 1 Camp. 65, n. (<i) ; 10 R. R. 028, n 1011 
 
 Richardson v. Barry (1860), 29 Beav. 22 712 
 
 The rcjtrencet an to page», not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clxxvii 
 
 PAOB 
 
 EicTiardson v. Dubois (1869), L. R. 5 Q. B. 61 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 69 ; 21 L. T. 
 
 6.i5; 18W. R. 62; 10 B. & S. 830 167 
 
 Richardson v. Gittord(1834), 1 A. &E.r)0; 8Dowl.&R.643; 2Sm.L. C. 112. 654 
 
 Richardson v. Mellinh (18i4), 2 Bin<r. 241 1048, 1049, lO.iO 
 
 Richardson v. Nowcomb (1838), 21 Pick. 315 1223 
 
 Richardson v. Watson (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 737 ; 1 N. & M. 567; 2 L. J. 
 
 K. B. 134 740, 789 
 
 Richardson r. Williamson (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 276 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 145 . 780 
 Richardson r. Willis (1872), 42 L. R. Ex. 15 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 2fi8 ; 27 L. T. 
 
 828; L. R. 8 Ex. 69 190, 1071 
 
 Richardson r. Younge (1871), L. R. 10 Eq. 275 ; L. R. 6 Ch. 478 ; 39 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 475 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 25 L. T. 230 ; 19 W. B. 012 491 
 
 Riches and Marshall's Trnst Deed, Rp (18()4), 4 De G. J. & S. 581 ; 11 
 
 L. T. 651 ; 34 L. J. Bank. 10 ; 13 W. K. 353 160 
 
 Richey f. Garvcy (1817), 10 Ir. L. R. 514 298 
 
 Ridiniond r. Smith (1830\ 8 B. & C. 9 ; 2 M. & R. 235 102 
 
 Rickards r. Murdock (1830). 10 B. & C. 627 934 
 
 Ri(^kotts V. Bennett (1847), 4 C. B. 686 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 17 ; 11 Jur. 1002. . 160 
 
 Ricketts r. Gumey (181(1), 7 Pri.'e, 699 866, 8(18 
 
 Ricketts c. Tnrqiiand (1848), 1 11. L. Cas. 472 784 
 
 Rickford v. Ridjre (1810), 2 Camp. 539 32 
 
 Rickman r. Carstairs (1833), 5 B. & Ad. 602 789 
 
 Rideout's Trusts, Ru (1870), L. R. 10 Eq 41: 39 L. .T. Cli. 102 021 
 
 Rider v. Wood (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 737 ; 1 K. & J. 644 6 
 
 Ridgeway r. Darwin (1802), 7 Ves. 404 ; 8 Vcs. 65 ; 6 R. R. 227 482 
 
 Ridsjway v. Ewbaiik (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 218 258, 259 
 
 Ridgway v. Wharton (1856-7), 3 De G. M. & G. 677 ; II. L. Cas. 238 ; 
 
 24 L. J. Ch. 46 672, 673 
 
 Ridlcr, Re, Ridlor t'. Ridler (1882), 22 Ch. D. 74 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 343 135 
 
 Ridley V. Gyde (1832), 9 Bing. 349 ; 2 Moo. & So. 448 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 25 . . 376, 380 
 RidU>y r. Ridley (1805), 34 L. J. Ch. 462 ; 34 Bcav. 478 ; 12 L. T. 481 ; 
 
 13 W. R. 763; 11 Jur. N. S. 475 682 
 
 Rigden v. Vallier (1751), 2 Ves. sen. 252 ; 3 Atk. 731 139 
 
 Rigg V. Curgenven (1769), 2 Wils. 39!) 519, 550, 554 
 
 Rigge V. Burbidge (1816). 15 M. & W. 598 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 309 ; 4 Dowl. & 
 
 L. 1 532, 1122 
 
 Bight, on d. of Flower, r. Darby (1786), 1 T. R. 162 ; 1 R. R. 169 35 
 
 Right V. Price (1770), 1 Doug. 241 696 
 
 Riley V. GerrLsb (18.)1), 9 Cash. 1 "4 758, 1205 
 
 Rilev V. Home (1828), 5 Bing. 217; 2 M. & P. 331 771 
 
 Ripley, Re (1858), 1 S. & T. 08 747 
 
 Ripley v. Warren (1824), 2 Pick. 592 20 
 
 Bipon case (1833), Cock. & R. 301 ; Per. & K. 211 496, 4i)7 
 
 Ripon V. Davies (1833), 2 N. & M. 310 607 
 
 Rippon V. Prie.'^t (1863), 3 F. & F. 644 1163 
 
 Rishton V. Nesbitt (1844), 2 M. & Rob. 554 421 
 
 Rishton r. Nisbett (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 347 866, 869 
 
 Rishton V. Whatmore (1878), 8 Ch. D. 467 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 629; 26 W. K. 
 
 827 073, 730 
 
 Rising )'. Dolphin (1840), 8 Dowl. 309 732 
 
 Rist f. Faux (1863), 4 B. & S. 409; 32 L. J. Q. B. 386 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 202 ; 
 
 8 L. T. 737; 11 W. R. 918 253 
 
 Ritchie «'. Van Geldt. (1854), 9 Ex. 762: 18 Jur. 385 193 
 
 River Steam Co., Re (Mitchell's Claim) (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. 822 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 319; :j W. R. 1130 710 
 
 Roach V. Garvan (1748), 1 Ves. sen. 159 1150 
 
 Robarts v. Tucker (1851), 16 Q. B. 560 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 270 547 
 
 Robbr. Connor (1874), Ir. 9 Eq. 373 818 
 
 Robb V. Starkey (1845), 2 C. & K. 143 310 
 
 Roberts, Ex parte (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 192 ; 2 H. & T. 391 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 
 
 368 : 3 De G. & 8m. 205 540 
 
 Roberts, ^e. Ex p. Brook (18"9). 10 Ch. D. 100; 48 L. J. Bank. 22; 
 
 39 L. ' . 458 ; 27 W. R. 255 662 
 
 Vol. J. *nds with page 636. 
 
 V 
 
 i il i . 
 
clxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 pAes 
 
 Roberts v. AUatt (1828), M. & M. 192 965, 967 
 
 Roberts V. Bethell (1852), 12 0. B. 778 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 69 ; 16 Jar. 1087. . 147 
 
 Roberts v. Bradshaw (1815), 1 Stark. 28 317 
 
 Roberts V. Doxon (1791), Pea. K. 85; 3 R. R. 660 323 
 
 Roberta v. Eddington (1801), 4 Esp. 88 1178 
 
 Roberts v. Fortune (1742), HarK. Law Tracts, 468, n 1 1U3 
 
 Roberts v. Humphreys (188>), L. R. 8 Q. B, 483 ; 42 L. J. M. 0. 147 ; 
 
 29 L. T. 387 ; 21 W. R. 8So 266 
 
 Roberts i: Justice (1843), 1 C. & K. 93 613 
 
 Roberts v. Ogilby (1821), 9 Price, 269 546 
 
 Roberts v. Orchard (1833), 2 H. & C. 769 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 65 ; 9 L. T. 727 ; 
 
 12 W. R. 253 226 
 
 Roberts r. Phillips (1855), 4 E. & B. 450 ; 3 C. L. R. 513 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 171; 1 Jnr. N. S. 444 700 
 
 Roberts v. Roberts (1862), 2 8. & T. 337 ; 31 L. J. P. M. & A. 46 ; 5 L. T. 
 
 689 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 220 709 
 
 Roberts V. Snell (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 577 194 
 
 Roberts v. Tucker (1849\ 3 Ex. 632 681 
 
 Roberts' case (1827). 1 Dev. 259 566 
 
 Robertson t'. French (1803), 4Ea8t,130; 4 Esp. 246 ; 7 R. R. 535. .116, 740, 741 
 Robertson v. Jackson (1845), 2 C. B. 412 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 28 ; 10 Jur. 98. . 763, 
 
 764, 782 
 Robertson v. Powell (1864), 2 H. & C. 762 ; 33 L. J. Ex. 34 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 
 
 442 ; 12 W. R. 623 704 
 
 Robertson K. Struth (1813), 5 Q. B. 942; Dav. & M. 773; 8 Jur. 404.. 83, 1143, 
 
 1154 
 Robins v. Bridge (1837), 3 M. & W. 114 ; 6 Dowl. 140 : M. & H. 357. . . . 820 
 Robins V. Dolphin (1858), 29 L. J. P. & M. 11, 138 ; 7 H. L. Gas. 390; 
 
 3 Mauq. 563; 1 S. & T. 518; 8 W. R. 177 1144 
 
 Robinson r. Anderson (1855), 20 Beav. 98 : 7 De G. M. & G. 239 160 
 
 Robinson t'. Brown (1845), 3 C. B. 754; 10 L. J. C. P. 46 316, 317 
 
 Robinson v. Collingwood (1865), 17 C. B N. S. 777 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 18; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 1080; 11 L. T. 313; 13 W. R. 84 148 
 
 il. . inson v. Curry (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 465 ; 50 L. J. Q. B. 561 ; 45 L. T. 
 
 .8 ; 30 W. R. 39 ; 46 J. P. 148 76 
 
 i' ibiuson V. Davies (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 26; 49 L. J. Q. B. 218; 28 W. R. 255 . 347 
 Ivobiuson v. Davison (1871), L. R. 6 Ex. 269 ; 40 L. J. Ex. 172 ; 'M L. T. 
 
 755 ; 19 W. R. 1036 780 
 
 Robinson v. Harman (1818), 1 Ex. 850 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 202 773 
 
 Robinson v. Hawksford (1846), 9 Q. B. 52; 15 L. J. Q. B. 377; 10 Jur. 964.. 32 
 Robinson v. liitchin (1856), 21 Beav. 365 ; 8 De G. M. & G. 88 ; 26 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 44 1 MI 
 
 Robinson v. Local Board of Barton (1882), 8 App. Cas. 798 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 
 
 226 ; 50 L. T. 57 ; 32 W. R. 249 47, 48 
 
 Robinson v. Markis (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 375 329, 349 
 
 Robinson «;. MoUett (1875), L. R. 7H. L. 802; 41 L. J. C. P. 302; 33L.T. 
 
 544 158 
 
 Robinson v. Nahon (1808), 1 Camp. 245 639 
 
 Robinson f. Robinson (1 879), L. R. 2 P. Div. 76 ; 46 L. J. P. 47 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 414; 25 VV. R. 376 89 
 
 Robinson v. Robinson and Lane (1858), 1 S. & T. 362 ; 27 L. J. P. & M. 91 ; 
 
 5 Jur. N. 8. 3f 2 502, 562 
 
 Robinson v. Sco',ney (1816), 19 Ves. 684 482 
 
 Robinson v. Swett (1825),3 Grecnl. 316 377, 1117 
 
 Robinson v. Touray (1813), 1 M. & Sol. 217 ; 3 Camp. 158 ; 13 R. R. 781. . 1196 
 
 Robinson v. United States (1871), 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 363 782 
 
 Robinson v. Vaughton (1838), 8 0. i P. 262 294 
 
 Robinson v. Vernon, Ld. (1859), 7 C. B. N. S. 235 ; 29 L. J. C. P. 310. .281, 746 
 
 Robinson v. Wakefield, (1892), 30 L. R. Ir. 547 644 
 
 Robinson v. Yarrow (1817), 7 Taun. 455 ; 1 Moore, C. P. 150 ; 18 R. R. 
 
 637 547, 548 
 
 Robinson's case (1603), 5 Rep. 32 b 92 
 
 Robson V. Alexander (1828), 1 M. & P. 448 517 
 
 The references are to pages, not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 clxxix 
 
 i 
 
 PA»H 
 
 Rohson ». Att.-Gen. (:843), 10 CI. & Fin. 500 416, 422 
 
 RobHou V. Eaton (1785), 1 T. R. 62 1112 
 
 Eobsonv. Kem()(1803), 4 P'lp. 234 498, 611 
 
 Ellison V. N. East. Ry. Co. (1876), 46 L. J. Q. B. 60 ; 2 Q. B. D. 85; 
 
 35 L. T. o3.i ; Jd W. R. 418 38 
 
 Robson V. Rolls (1833), 9 Bing. 648 ; 2 M. & Sc. 786 ; 2 L. J. C. P. 80 . . 379 
 
 Ro<:h V. Callen (1847). 6 Hare, 531 ; 17 L. J. Ch. 144 ; 12 Jur. 112 808 
 
 Rocliester, Dean and C. of, v. Pierce (1808\ 1 Canxp. 466 97, 643 
 
 Rochfort V. Sedley (Irtfil), 12 Ir. C. L. R. App. iv 476 
 
 Roddam v. Morley (1857), 25 L. J. Ch. 329 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 438 ; 1 De G. 
 
 6 J. 1 ; 3 Jut. N. 8. 449 i:<8, 448, 497, 720 
 
 Roden V. Lond. Small Arms Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 213 ; 35 L. T. 505 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 269 784 
 
 Rodpn V. Rvde (1843), 4 Q. B. 626 ; 3 G. & D. 604 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 276 ; 
 
 7 Jur. 213 1218 
 
 Rodriques v. Mclhuihh (1854), 10 Ex. 110 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 26 178 
 
 Rodriquez f. Tadmire (1799), 2 Eep. 721 252 
 
 Rodwell V. Osjrood (1825), 3 Peck. 379 82 
 
 Rodwell V. Phillips (1842), 9 M. & W. 505 ; 1 Do^vl. N. S. 885 ; 11 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 217 685, 686, 687 
 
 Rodwell V. Hedge (1824), 1 C. & P. 220 105 
 
 Roe f. Birkenhead, Lane, & Ches. Junct. Ry. Co. (1851), 7 Ex. 36; 
 
 6 Railw. Caw. 795 ; 21 L. J. Ex. 9 643 
 
 Roe V. Davis (1806), 7 East. 303 300 
 
 Roe V. Day (1830), 7 C. & P. 705 484 
 
 Roe V. Fcrrars (1801), 2 Bos. & P. 548 ' 48'', 
 
 Roe V. Harrison (1788), 2 T. R. 430 ; 1 R. R. 513 522 
 
 Roev. Harvey (1769), 4 Burr. 2084 109 
 
 RoBf. Horsey (1771), 3 Wile. 174 84 
 
 Roev. Ireland (1809), 11 East, 280; 10 R. R. 504 123 
 
 Roe V. Minshal (1759), cited B. N. P. 96 522 
 
 Roe V. Nix, (1892), Times Newspaper, 2 December, 1892, and following days. 1102 
 
 Roe V. Parker (1792). 5 T. R. 32 402, 403 
 
 Roe V. Rawlings (1815), 7 East, 291 ; 3 Smith, 254 ; 8 R. R. 632 87, 417. 
 
 436, 437, 1227 
 
 Roe V. Reade (1799), 8 T. R. 1 18 127 
 
 Roe V. Wilkins (1835), 4 A. & E. 86 ; 5 N. & M. 434 1212 
 
 Roev. York, Archb. of (1805), 6 East, 86; 2 Smith, 166; 8R. R.413..128, 658,659 
 
 Roffey V. Henderson (1851), 17 Q. B. 674 637 
 
 Roffey i> Smith (1834), 6 C. & P. 622 223 
 
 Rogei.i V. Allen (1808). 1 Camp. 309 ; 10 R. R. 689 432 
 
 Rogers t'. Custance (1839), 2 M. & Rob. 181 313 
 
 Rogers v. Goodenough (1862), 2 S. & T. 342 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 49 709 
 
 Rogers 1). Hadley (1863), 32 L. J. Ex. 241 ; 2 H. & C. 227 746 
 
 Rogers v. Payne (1768), 2 Wils. 276 750 
 
 Rogers «). Pitcher (1818), 6 Taun. 202; 1 Marsh. 541 99 
 
 Rogers v. Powell (1869), 38 L. J. Ch. 648 ; 18 W. R. 282 631 
 
 Rogers f. Spence(I846), 12 CI. & Fin. 700 (■64 
 
 Rogers f. Taylor ( 1858), 2 H. & N. 828; 27 L. J. Ex. 173 114, 115 
 
 Rogers v. Wood (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 245 395, 406 
 
 Rohan V. Hanson (1853), 11 Cush. (Mass.), 446 745 
 
 Rokoby Peerage (IK::), Pari. Miu. 4 424 
 
 Roles V. Davis (1859), 4 H. & N. 484 ; 1 F. & F. 563 ; 28 L. .T Ex. 287 ; 
 
 33 L. T. 166 186, 191 
 
 Rolf V. Dart (1800), 2 Taunt. 51 1018 
 
 Rolfe, Ex parte. Re Spindler (1881), 19 Ch. D. 98; 61 L. J. Ch. 88; 
 
 45L. T. 482; 30 W. R. 52; 46 J. ":>, 181 136 
 
 Rolls V. Pearce (1877), 5 Ch. D. 730 ; 36 L. T. 438 ; 25 W. R. 899 6.^8 
 
 RoUason v. Leon (1862), 7 H. & N. (3 : 31 L. J. Ex. 96 649 
 
 Roltv. White (1802), 3 De G. J. & S. 360 538 
 
 Ronaynet'. Sherr.ard (1877), 11 Ir. R. C. L. 146 682 
 
 Ronkendorff v. Taylor (1830), 4 Pet. 349, 360 1173 
 
 Rooke V. Ld. Kensington (1856), 2 Kay & J. 753 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 795 749 
 
 Vol. I, ends tvith page 636. 
 
 .1 
 
 m, 
 
I 
 
 clxxx 
 
 TAHI.K OF CASKS CI'IKD. 
 
 Hooker )'. Tl.H.kcr iiml Nrwfoii ^lH(il), 3:1 L..I. P. & M. 12; 3 S. & T. r>'>r, 
 
 O.Tur. N. S. lii'Jll; 12 \V. U. 81)7 
 
 nil, l/SO 
 
 Kowot). J'lirkor (IT'.i.!), !> I. H. ;il LM'i 
 
 ]i()wo r. Rdwo (INIM), 2 I)e (i. it Hin. '-J'.»7; 17 L. J. Cli. 3i)7 «()(; 
 
 Ilowo r. Tipixr (IH.'),!), i:{ C. U. 211) ; 22 L. J. C. T. 136; 17 Jur. 410. . .. :i2 
 
 Jtowliiiid V. AHlihy (1K2.')), Uy. & M. 2:t2 679 
 
 llowliimlH w. ])<( V»!(M;hi (1SH2), Cub. & K. 10 l.W, •l.Vl 
 
 JlowliiiidH r. Siiinud (IH.IO), 11 Q. 15. H, ii. ; 17 L. .1. Q. 15. <!•'> 30 
 
 llowloy V. Uortw. (1826), 3 HiiiK. 2 1096 
 
 Rowloy V. Loud. & N. \V. Ky. Co. (1H73), 42 L. J. Kx. 163 ; L. II. 8 Kx. 
 
 221 m, 035 
 
 Kowntroo v. Juoob (1809), 2 Tauti. 141 1)2 
 
 lloyiil A(iuariiim r. I'arkiiiwm, (1802) 1 Q. T5. 431 ; 01 L. J. Q. B. 409; 
 
 U(i L. T. 613 ; 40 W. K. 460 ; 60 .1. V. 404 809 
 
 Koyal Hunk, &<•.. v. Tottoiiluim (181)1), R. 601) ; (18!)4) 2 Q. B. 716 ; 04 
 
 L. J. Q. 15. 1)1) ; 61 L. T. 622 ; 43 W. R. 22 yIM. [540] 
 
 RoyalKx. Ahh. Co.f. Mo()re(1803),2Now.Cii.(i3; 8L.T.242; 11W.R.602. 758 
 Koylo V. llarriM, (181)6) P. 103 ; 04 L. J. P. 06 ; 43 W. R. 362 ; 72 L. T. 
 
 474 Adi/. [090] 
 
 Riidd V. "Wright (1832), 1 Ph. Kv. 240 390, 440 
 
 Ruild(K!k V. MiirHh (1867), 1 II. & N, 001 106 
 
 Th« refereticet are to paget, not to paragraph4. 
 
i m 
 
 TAHLE OF CAoiiS CITIOD. 
 
 clxxxi 
 
 PwIko I'. M'CartJiv (ISll), I Tr. L. Tl. IC.l 
 
 FAOB 
 
 '28ft 
 
 KnsNcll r. Killer ( iM.ll). (>(... iV l'. lUi Mzn, !n>(( 
 
 KiisMc'll c. Ht. Aul)vn(lS7(i),'J(Ui.I).:i!iH; Id L.,1. Cli.Oil ;;(."> L. T. ;!'jr>.S(i(;, 1!.>3 
 KiiswU c. Smyth (181'J), i) M. & W. SIO; 1 Dowl. N. S. '.I'J'J ; II I,.. I, Kx. 
 
 ;ii)H lll'J. 111(1, l'J17 
 
 UiiHtr. linker (1H;!7), S Sim. •ll;l 172 
 
 Itii.stell r. Miie(|iiiNter (LSOil), 1 Cimi]). I'.), ii 214 
 
 Jlutlierl'circl, We (IHSO), 11 Cli. 1). ()«7 ; 111 1-. .1. Cli. d.VI ; II! I,. '1'. Kiri ; 
 
 ■IH W. R. 802 7 1« 
 
 KiitliitMrM, CouiitcsM (if, eiiHd (KiO;')), (! (!i). Kej). filii S3, 7111 
 
 Kiitlerr. (!lmi>miiii (1811), 8'M. & W. liSH ; 1 Dowl. N. 8. '8; i") .lur. 
 
 (ilO; 11 L. .r. Kx. 178 476 
 
 Butler I'. Treureiit (187!>), '18 L. J. Cli. 7'.ll ; 12 <'li. I). 7.'>8 : II L. 'I'. l(i : 
 
 27 \V. li. i)()2 221 
 
 PyilU f. lliiiiniim (1817), 1(1 lleiiv. .■);!(; ; 1(> I,. .1 . Cli. CM ; ll.lur. 7(il .. 7!I8 
 
 Ityan v. D.ilmi (1S72), I. I{. 7 Iv]. '.12 818 
 
 liyiiii V. Nolini (iK(;i-,')), I. |{. ;t ('. L. ;!H) l(>(> 
 
 Kyim r. UiiiK (18i)()), ^Ci I.. U. Ir. ISl 1170 
 
 Ifyiiii r. Kyuii (I8l(i), 2 I'liill. Kee. L. ;i;i2 11 14 
 
 llviiii r. Uyiiii (l8Si)), 2i") Ii. U. Ir 18;") 4i")i'), 4o7 
 
 Kvmi r. HimiH (1818), 12 Q. H. ICO ; 17 L. J. <i I!. 271 : 12 .Tiir. 74.') Hi!) 
 
 ]<yl)eix '•• Wvlier^ (I8(i;i), ;!2 L. J. P. & M. Hi ; 1 1 W. K. .')()2 !»;ti) 
 
 liVder f. IMii'lhonie (18;n). eitod 2 Rush. \- Mv. IC'.I 418 
 
 Ityder c. Woinluvell (18(18), 118 L. J. Kx. 8 ; L. 11. 4 Kx. :)2 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 491; 17 VV. 11. 107 28,48, 49 
 
 SAPi.KKf. RdbiiiH (1808), 1 Camp. U'> 1142, lir):t, lir.4 
 
 Hadlier r. IIIkrh (18.'-):!), 4 H. L. Cut*. 4;i5 ; 10 Ir. V.t[. R. fy>2 2!)7, 7!»2 
 
 Sa^re r. Wileox (1820), (i Conn. 81 (>(!!) 
 
 SiiiiiHluiry r. AlaUliowH (18;)8), 4 M. & W. ;il7 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 7 Dnwl. 2;i. . 1K7, 
 
 nil, (;8() 
 
 St. Oatlierino'H Hospital nnw (1(172), 1 Vent. Iftl 1 17<.» 
 
 St.. Devereux r. Much Dew <;hur<'li (17(11-2). 1 W. HI. 11(17 2!i.'> 
 
 St. OeorKo v. St. Maixaret (17()<>), I Salk. 12;i 102 
 
 St. I,OHky I'. Green (18(10), <J V,. U. N. S. ;!70 ; 2 K. \- I"'. 100 ; aoL. .1. O. J". 
 
 101 ; 7 .Tiir. N. S. ;104 ; 3 L. T. 207 ; W. R. 110 188, 194 
 
 Sainter v. i'VrKUson (1840), 7 C. 11. 727 ; 18 L. J. C. 1'. 217 44 
 
 Saint-liill v. Hoiiml (1802), 4 K^p. 74 9.)7 
 
 Halo V. Laml)ert (1874), L. R. 18 K<|. 1 ; 4;i L. J. Ch. 470 ; 22 W. R. 478. . 071 
 
 SuliMlmry v. Marwliull (1820), 4 (\ & T. Ofi 774 
 
 Salislmry, M. of v. Ut. North. Ky. Co. (18f)8), (i C. U. N. 8. 174 ; 28 L. J. 
 
 C. 1'. 40 ; T) Jiir. N. S. 70 112 
 
 Salkeldr. .loluiHon (1841), 1 llaro, 180 ; 11 L. J. Cli. 201 7> 
 
 Salkeld I). JohiiMon (1810), 2 C. H. 740 7i) 
 
 Salkeld V. JohuHon (1840, Hhould bo 1848), 2 Kx. 250 ; 18 L. J. Kx 80 . . 76 
 
 I'ol. I, etuis with page 035, 
 
 !i 
 
clxxxii 
 
 TAliLK OF CASKS CITKI). 
 
 F40S 
 
 Hiilmkvrl.urj^ v. r«)mmiHky (1HS4), V> Q. B. D. 'ilH ; .i;) L. J. Q. B. IJH ; 
 
 ;J2 W. U. 7M 834 
 
 Salmon r. VV.a.l) (IH'>2), 3 II. li. C.iH. /-.lO ; i;Ui. II. HS(J If,! 
 
 S:tloui'L'i V. WcHxlimisH (uiidiitrd), 2 Turk. liiN. 721 1 1 l!> 
 
 .SiilU) r. ThomiiH (ISOJ), 3 15. & P. IHH JCWd, 1051, 1 172 
 
 SttltmarNli v. lliinly (lH7;i\ 42 Ti. J. Ch. 42'i VXi 
 
 SiiinmoriHi'. niiil<'y(lH'J(t),2»(i. H 1). 727; MJj.JM. l!.:tli; ;m W. ll.lior).. i)(il 
 
 Saiiipwrn f. Yurillcy (l()(i7), 2 Kol). '223, jd. 71, I!) Car. 2 3(17 
 
 HanlM.ni v. Noilwiii (IH2H), •» New. llaiii|iH. i')()l 515 
 
 Saiidertt v. Mac l.iiii (18M3), 11 (i. B. D. ,327 ; f)2 L. J. Q. B. IHl ; I'J L. T. 
 
 4t)2 ; 31 W. U. (I'JH 6 
 
 Sttiident f. MtTtdith (1H2H), 3 M. \: Uy. 110 461 
 
 HaiidfT!. r. St. Neot'a Union (IHIli), 8 Q. B. 810; l.'i L. J. M. (,*. 101 ; 10 
 
 Jur. .'.t;ti (! 1 1 , 044 
 
 Sandcrx .. SaudiTH (1882), I'J C'h. 1). 380; Til L. J. C.'li. 271) ; 4.'> L. T. 037; 
 
 30 W. K. 281 721 
 
 Saudcrwm r. Odlnian (1813), 4 M. & Or. 209 ; 1 Snott, N. H. 038; 11 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 270 •. !)0, 547 
 
 Sanderson v. (iravtH (1875), L. R. 10 Kx. 234 ; 44 L. .1. Kx. 210; 3;( L. T. 
 
 209 ; 1 1 L. J. P. 270 ; 33 W. U. 7i»7 752 
 
 Sanderson v. Ni'slor (182(1), Ky. iV M. 402 1 139 
 
 Sandcrwin r. Svmondu (1819), I B. & H. 430 ; 4 Mooro (C. P.)42..119t, 1195, liOl 
 Saudcrw.n r. WfHtlry (1810), M. & VV. 98; 8 Dowl. 412; 9 L. J. Kx. 204 732 
 
 Sandford r. RcniinKtou (179;t), 2 Vns. 189 ; 2 K. 11. 19.) Oil 
 
 SandilandN, R.' (1871), L. R. C. P. 411 ; 24 L. T. 273; 19 W. R. 041 .. 134 
 
 Sandiiands r. MarHh (1819), 2 B. & Aid. (173 101, 380 
 
 Sandys r. IIod^fHon (i839), 10 A. & E. 472 ; 2 P. &D. 435 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 31 . .5J2, 549 
 
 Sanford r. Cliasi; (1824), 3 Cowcn, 381 809 
 
 Sanford v. RaiktH (1810), 1 Mer. 053 781 
 
 SanKMttT r. Mazarreilo (1810), 1 Stark. 101 495 
 
 Saph r. Atkin.'wm (18J2), 1 Add. 215 1223 
 
 Sarell r. Wine (1803), 3 Kawt, 409 714 
 
 Sar^cwju r. Sealy (1742), 2 Atk. 412 1102 
 
 Sari r. Bourdillon (18.50), 20 L. J. C. P. 78 ; 1 C. B. N. S. 188 ; 2 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1208 070, 071, 672 
 
 8a..*try Velaider v. Sembecutty (1881), 6 App. Cas. 304 ; 60 L. J. P. C. 28 ; 
 
 44 L. T. 895 149 
 
 Satterthwaite r. Powell (1838), I Curt. 705 174 
 
 SaunderM, Re (1805), 35 L. J. P. & M. 26; L. R. 1 P. & 1). 16 ; 11 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1027 ; 14 W. R. 148 702 
 
 Saundera f. Bates (1857), 1 H. & N. 402 189 
 
 Saunders f. Cramer (1812), 3 Dr. & War. 187 <;09 
 
 Saunders v. Mills (1829), 3 M. & P. 520 ; BinK- 213 245 
 
 Saanderat'. Saunders (1818), 6 Notes of Cases, 518 143 
 
 Saunders r. Topp (1849), 4 Kx. 390 ; 18 'j. J. Kx. 374 089, 090 
 
 Saunderson v. .Jackson (18(10), 2 B. & P. '238 ; 3 Ksp. 180 ; 5 R. R. 580.. 074, 075 
 
 Sauudorson v. Jud^e (1795), 2 H. Bl. 509 ; 3 R. R. 492 155 
 
 Savage f. (1780). 1 Doug. 350, n. 4 151 
 
 Savage v. Binney (1834), 2 Dowl. 043 34 1 
 
 Savage r. Canning (1807), I. R. 1 C. L. 434 188 
 
 Savage r. Ilutehinson (185.5), 24 L. J. Cli. 232 ; 2 Eq R. 308 1030 
 
 Savery r. King (1850), 5 H. L. C. 02 (, 0.55, 050; 2 Jur. N. S. 503; 25 
 
 L.J. Ch. 482 137 
 
 Sawyer v. Birchmore (1835), 3 My. & K 672 593, 608 
 
 Sawver v. Kifert (1820), 2 Nott. & M'C. 511 250 
 
 Sawyer v. Maine Fire and Mar. Ins. Co. (1839), 12 Mass. 291 1147 
 
 Save and Sele Peer. (1840), 1 II. of L. Cas. 607 101, 109:1 
 
 Sayer r. Olossop (1848), 2Ex. 409; 17 L. J. Kx. 300 1229 
 
 Sayer v. Kitehen (1791), 1 Ksp. 200 1191 
 
 Sayer v. Wagstaff (1842), 5 Beav. 402 ; 13 L. J. Ch. 161 ; 3 Jur. 1083 . . 9i3 
 
 Sayers v. Walsh (18 18), 12 Ir. L. R. 435 615 
 
 Sayre v. Hnghes (1808), L. R. 6 Eq. 370 ; 37 L. J. Ch. 401 ; 10 W. R. 
 
 002 ; 18 L. T. 347 ; : 008 
 
 Bayward v. Stevens (1854), 69 Mass. (3 Gray), 97—102 757 
 
 The referenceit are to paye», not to paragraph), ' — 
 
TABLE OF CASKS CITKD. 
 
 clxxxiii 
 
 PAUB 
 
 Siiiiifo V. Farraiit (187.)), 44 L. J. Kx. .'iO, 230 ; L. R. 10 Ex. 338 ; 33 L. T. 
 
 •278 ; 23 W. U H »() 772 
 
 S<!(ilim .'. Ki'y (18 10), II A. & K. HI!) ; 3 P. & I). 605 108 
 
 Sciiriiirmii^fii v. HUi\n\) (1880), i> C. 1'. D. 29i) ; 40 L. J. U. T. 074 ; 42 L. T. 
 
 804 ; 28 \V. It. (11) 1 770 
 
 K(!li(>ilii«l c. Kiiirlmini (170!»)- 1 Boh. & P. 388 37 
 
 SiiliiUl.y r. VVchU'iiIk.Iz (1870), 40 L. J. Q. U. 73 ; L. K. 6 Q. B. 160; 24 
 
 L. T. i)3; 19 W. H. .')87 1M7 
 
 H<hmfUz V. Avery (18,'il), 1(1 Q. B. nr>'> ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 228 ; 15 Jiir. 201.. 759 
 
 S<ihii<'i(l(T r. NorriH (1814). 2 M. ic Sri. 2H(i ; 15 It. It. 250 67*^ 
 
 8<ili<>li(l(l, Kx luiito, In r.) Firth (1877), (i Ch. D. 230 ; 40 L. J. Bauk. 112 ; 
 
 37 K. T. 2H I ; 20 W. H.. 9 900 
 
 8«ai(ifii'lcl r. HcHj) (1859), 28 L. J. Cti. 104; 27 B.'iiv. 93; 1 Jiir. N. S. 10(17.. 800 
 Schi.ticlil r. LnmlcHloroutrh (Lord), (1895) 14 11. (Murcli), 233; (1H95) 1 (i. B. 
 
 5;i0 ; 04 L. J. Q. B. 293 ; 72 L. T. Ki ; 43 \V. R. 331 i,U. [1205] 
 
 iSclioloK I'. Chndwirk (1813), 2 M. & Bob. ,507 140, 511 
 
 SdholoH r. Hilton (1842), 10 M. Ac W. 16 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 229; II L. J. 
 
 Kx. 332 832, 833 
 
 Schohiy f. (}(M).lnmn (1823), 1 Binff. 349 : 8 Moon-, C. P. 350; 1 C. \: P. 30.. 501 
 
 Scilioli'y r. Wiilton (1S44). I2M. & W. 514; 13 L. J. Kx. 122 492 
 
 8(!liultz r. AHtloy (1830), 2 Bing. N. C. 544 ; 2 Scott, 816 ; 1 1Io(1ki'h, 642; 
 
 7 C. & P. 99 547, 1205 
 
 Sfihwiillx', Till) (1801), LiiHh. 239 ; 14 Moo. P. 0. C. 241 ; 4 L. T. 100. .. . 178 
 
 8(ioont'H V. Murrcll (1839), 1 Bi-iiv. 251 112 
 
 Soorcll V. Boxall (1827), 1 Y. & J. 390 (>87 
 
 8wtt V. Bcntl.-y (1855), 24 L. J. Ch. 244 ; 1 K. & .T. 281 ; 1 .Tur. N. S. 394.. 1150 
 
 S(!ott V. BourdillioM (1800), 2 Boh. ic P. N. R. 213 ; 9 R. R. 014 703 
 
 Scott r. Brown (1892). 4 R. 42; 'Hi. B. 724; 01 L. J. Q. B. 738; 41 
 
 W. R. 110; 07 L. T. 782; 67 J. P. 213 ... 7 
 
 Scott V. Claro (1812), 3 Ciiinp. 230 293 
 
 Scott V. CoMinionwoiilth (1893), 42 Am. St. R. 371 AM. [5(i9] 
 
 Scott f. Crawford (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 1031 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 781 645 
 
 Scott V. Fcnoulhctt (1784), 1 Cox, (^i. R. 79 803 
 
 Soott V. Irving (1830), 1 U. & Ad. 005 158 
 
 Scott V. Joni'H (1813), 4Taun. 805; 14 R. R. 080 289, 318 
 
 Scott V. Lifford (1808), 9 Kust, 347 ; 1 Canii). 2Ui 32 
 
 Scott V. Loud. Dock Co. (1805), 34 L. J.Kx. 220; 3 H.& C. 590; 13 L.T. 148 103 
 
 Scott V. Marshall (1832), 2 C. & J. 238 ; 2 Tyr. 257 ; 1 h. J. Kx. 97 496 
 
 Suott V. Miller (1859), 1 JolniH. 328 966 
 
 Scott V. Oxford, Ld. (1808), Pcako, 1 70, n. a ; Bull, N. P. 7 244 
 
 Soott V. Pilkiiigton (1802), 31 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 2 B. & 8. 11 ; L. T. 
 
 21 1140, 1164 
 
 Scott V. SainpNon (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 491 ; 51 L. J. Q. B. 380; 40 L. T. 
 
 412; 30 W. R. 541 ; 40 J. P. 408 256 
 
 S(!ott V. Scott (1859), 1 8. & T. 258 703 
 
 Scott V. Shearman (1775), 2 W. Bl. 977 1103 
 
 Scott V. Stannliuld (1808), L. R, 3 Ex. 220 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 155 ; 18 L. T. 
 
 672; low. R. 911 1099 
 
 Scott V. Waithnian (1822), 3 Stark. 108 1213 
 
 Soott V. Walker (1853), 2 K. & B. 555 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 404 ; 17 Jiir. 916. . 1185 
 
 Scoulerv. Plowright (1850), 10 Moo. P. C. R. 440, 444-440.. 140 
 
 Scruttonv. Childs (1877), 30 L. T. 212 740, 700 
 
 Sea Nymph, The (1800), LiiHh. Adm. R. 23 176 
 
 Soago V. Deano (1828), 4 Biiig. 469 ; 1 M. & P. 227 ; 3 C. & P. 170 754 
 
 Sealo-Hayno f. Jodrell, (1891) A. C. 304 ; 05 L. T. 57 740 
 
 Seaman v. Netherclift (1876), 1 C. P. D. 540 ; 45 L. J. C. 1'. 798 ; 34 L. 
 
 T. 878 ; 24 W. R. 884 865 
 
 Soarlo V. Barrington, Ld. (1728), 2 Str. 826; 8 Mod. 278 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 
 
 1370; 3 Bro. P. C. 593 447, 451 
 
 Searle v. Keevcw (1797), 2 E«p. 598 091 
 
 Searlo r. I.averick (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 122 ; 43 L. J. Q. B. 43 ; 30 L. T. 
 
 89; 22 W. R. 307 772 
 
 Searlo v. Prieo (1810), 2 Ilagg. Conn. 189 603 
 
 Searlo V. RcynoldH (1800), 7 B. & 8. 704 ; 14 L. T. 618 107 
 
 Vol. I, end* with page 636. 
 
 n 
 
clxxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Soarles v. Scurlett, (1802) 2 Q. B. 56 ; 61 L. J. Q. E. o73 ; 60 L. T. 837 ; 
 
 40 W. R. fiiKi ; 56 J. P. 789 1005 
 
 Seddonf. Tutop (1796), 6T. R. 607; 1 Esp. 401 ; 3 R. R. 274 1123 
 
 Seod f. Higs'ina (I860), 8 H. L. Cus. 550, 561, 565 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 314 ; 
 
 6 Jur. N. S. 1264 43, 47 
 
 Selhy !■. Harris (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 745 lOlM, 1(144 
 
 Selby V. Hills (1832), 8 Bing. 166 ; 1 Dowl. 257 ; 1 M. & So. 253 ; 1 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 55 866, 870 
 
 Salby V. Selby (1817). 3 Mer. 2 ; 17 R. R. 1 
 
 Seldon v. Williams (1839), 9 Watts, 9 
 
 Selfe V. Isaacson (1858), 1 F. & F. 194 9i; 
 
 Sellers r. Till (1825). 4 B. & C. 855 
 
 Sells V. Hoiire (1822), 3 B. & B. 232 ; 7 Mooro (O. P.), 36 
 
 Soils V. Sells (1860), 29 L. J. Ch. 500 ; 1 IJr. & Sm. 42 ; 8 W. R. 327 .... 
 Selraea v. Judge (1871), L. E. 6 Q. B. 724 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 287 ; 24 L. T. 
 
 905; 19 W. R. 1110 
 
 Selway r. Clwppell (IS4I), 12 Sim. 113 : 10 L. J. Ch. 323 
 
 Solwood r. Mildmay (1797), 3 Ves. 306 ; 4 R, R. 1 
 
 Selwyu's case (1831), 3 Hiigg. Ecc. 748 
 
 Senior r. Arinytage (1816). Holt, N. P. R. 197 ; 
 Serle v. Norton (1S41). 2 M. & Rob. 401, 401, n 
 Sct(m V. Slade (1802), 7 Ves. 275 ; 3 R. R. 124 
 
 Sewell V. Corp (1824), 1 C. & P. 392 
 
 Sewell V. Evans (1843), 4 Q. B. 626; 12 L. J. Q 
 
 604 
 
 17 R. R. 627 
 ['/) 
 
 B. 276; 3G. \ 0. 
 1218, 
 
 Seymour c. Maddox (18 U), 16 Q.-B. 326 : 20 L. .T. Q. B. 327 
 
 Shiiftesbury, Ld. v. Digliy, Ld. (1676), 3 Kcb. i,:n 
 
 Shall Mukhmn Lall v. Nawab Im. Dowlah (IS65), 10 Moo. Ind. App. C. 
 362 
 
 Shand v. Bowes (1877), 1 Q. B. D. 470 : 45 L. J. 0. B. 507 ; 2 
 455 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 561 ; 36 L. T. 857 ; 25 W. K. 730 
 
 Shankland r. City of Washington (1831). 5 Pet. 394 
 
 Shannon v. Biadstreet (1S03). 1 Sch. & Let". 73 ; 9 R. R. 11 . . 
 
 Shapcott V. Chappcll (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 58 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 77 
 183 
 
 App. Cas. 
 
 32 W. R. 
 
 Shardlow v. Cotterill (1881), 20 Ch. D. 90; 51 L. J. Ch. 353; 45 L. T. 
 
 572; 30 W. R. 143 670 
 
 Sharman v. Brandt (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 720 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 312 ; 19 W. 
 
 R. 950 
 
 Sharp V. Carter (1735), 3 P. Wms. 375 
 
 Sharj) V. Leaidi (1862), 31 Beav. 491 ; 10 W. R. 878 ... 
 
 Sharn v. Newshohnc (1839), 5 Bing. N. C. 713 ; 8 Scott, 23; 3 Jur. 581 ; 
 
 9 L. J. C. P. 211 
 
 Sharp V. Scosfing (1817), Holt. N. P. R. 541 
 
 Sharper. Bingley (1817), 1 Mill. R. 373 
 
 Sharpe <-. Lamb (1840), 11 A. & E. S05 ; 3 P. & D. 451 ; 4 Jur. 905 . .SIO, 
 Shatwell v. Hall (1842), 10 M. & W. 523 ; 2 Dowl. N. 8. 567 ; 12 L. J. 
 
 E.K. 74 
 
 Shaw, Ex parte (1821), Jao. 270 
 
 Shaw V. Att.-Gen. (1870), L. R. 2 P. & D. 156; 39 L. J. P. 81 ; 23 L. T. 
 
 322; 18 W. R. 1145 
 
 Shawr. Bwk (1853), .S F.x. 392 
 
 Shaw V. Bran (1816). 1 Stark. R. 319 ; 18 R. R. 772 
 
 Shaw V. Broom (1824), 4 Dowl cfe R. 731 511 
 
 Shawt'. Gould (186S), L. R. 3 H. L. 55; 37L. J.Ch. 433; 18 L. T.833., 
 
 Shaw V. Markham (1791), Pea. R. 165 
 
 Shaw r. Neville, cif 'd Grecnleaf on Ev. 15th ed 369 
 
 Shavf. Pioton (1825), 7 Dowl. & R. 201 ; 4 B. & C. 715 
 
 Shaw V. Port Philip Gold Mining Co. (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 103 ; 53 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 369 ; 60 L. T. 685 ; 32 W. R. 77 1 
 
 Shaw r. Shaw (1802). 3 1 L. J. P. & M. 95 : 2 S. & T. 6i2 
 
 Slieiirman i'. Pvkt (1 724), cited 3 Curtcis, 539-542 
 
 Sheari In go<ids of (1881'), 60 L. J. P. 15 ; 43 L. T. 730 ; 29 W. R. 445 ; 
 
 45 J. P. 308 
 
 (^74 
 7S;' 
 ,918 
 151 
 906 
 749 
 
 226 
 910 
 S02 
 174 
 708 
 32 
 
 o;5 
 
 1178 
 
 1219 
 778 
 900 
 
 711 
 
 42 
 
 758 
 670 
 
 1232 
 
 (.72 
 
 608 
 901 
 137 
 
 377 
 973 
 927 
 475 
 
 227 
 321 
 
 1143 
 
 272 
 135 
 ,513 
 1144 
 317 
 098 
 542 
 
 587 
 873 
 
 7oa 
 
 707 
 
 The re/i-reneet are to pages, not to partigrapht. 
 
TAHLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 clxxxv 
 
 FAQB 
 
 Shedden v. Att.-Gen. and Patrick (1861), 30 J . J. P. & M. 217 ; 2 S. & T. 
 
 170 408, 409,412, 41.'), 1103, 1109 
 
 Shodden v. Patrick (1854), 1 Macq. 535 ; 1 Patersou, 332 1132, 1133 
 
 Bheehy f. The Profess. Life Assur. Co. (1853), 13 C. B. 787; 22 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 244 1148 
 
 Sheen V. Bunipstead (1863), 2 H. & C. 193; 32 L. J. Ex. 2" 8 L. T. 
 
 832 ; 11 W. R. 734 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 242 242 
 
 Sheffield & Manch. Ey. Co. v. Woodcock (1841), 7 M. & W. 574 ; 2 liailw. 
 
 C. 522; llL. J. Ex. 26 541 
 
 Sheldon v. Clark (1806), 1 Johns. 513 267 
 
 Shelly V. Wright (1737). Willes, 9 9i 
 
 Shelton v. Braithwaite (1841), 7 M. & \V, 436 ; 5 Jur. 28 32, 671 
 
 Shelton .'. 8prinj<ett (1851), 1 1 C. B. 452 108 
 
 Shephard v. V. viie (lS63i, .i N. R. 580 ; 16 C. B. N. S. 132 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 
 
 l.')8; lOL. T. 193; 12 W. R. 5Sl ; 10 Jur. N. S. 540 124,791 
 
 Shepheard v. Beetlmm (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. 384 ; 41 L. J. P. 44 844 
 
 Slu'i.hcrd r. Chewter (1808), 1 Camj). 274 ; 10 R. R. r.!U 552 
 
 Shepherd v. Currie (1816), 1 Stark. R. 454 154 
 
 Shepherd v. Hills (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 6 ; 11 Ex. 55 76 
 
 Shepherd v. liodsinan (1852), 18 Q. B. 316 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 263 : 16 Jur. 948 649 
 
 Shepherd v. Maekoul (1813), 3 Camp. 32(i ; 14 11. R. 752 166 
 
 Shepherd r. Pyhus (1842), 3 M. & Gr. 880 ; 4 Scott, N. R. 434 ; 1 1 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 101 776, 777 
 
 Shepherd f. Sharp (1856). 25 L. J. E.\. 254 ; 1 H. & N. 1 15 228 
 
 Sheplierd v. Shorthoso (1719), I Str. 412 10 JO 
 
 Sheppard v. Gosnold (i673), Vaufrh. Kill 792 
 
 Sliei'iduu and Kirwau'-s case (1811), 31 How. St. Tr. 673 295 
 
 Sheridan r. The New Quay Co. (1858), 28 L. J. C. 1*. 58 ; 4 C. B. N. S. 
 
 618 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 248 546 
 
 Sherlock v. Passman (;83(i), 7 C & P. 292. 293 ;i9, 259 
 
 Sliernian r. Sherman (1787). 2 Veru. 276 526 
 
 Sherratt v. Montford (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 688 ; L. R. 8 Cli. 928 ; 'Jl \V. R. 
 
 719 7:'3 
 
 Sheiriufrton's ea-so (1S3M). 2 Lew. CO. 123 5'16 
 
 Sherrin','t(m r. Jeruiyn (182^), 3 C. & P. 37 1 1203 
 
 Shickeruell r. Hotham (1854), 1 Kav, 6(i9 713 
 
 Shiel V. O'Brien (1872), 1. R. 7 E(i."64 704 
 
 Shields V. Boucher (1847), 1 Ue G. i Sm. 51 418, 419, 420, 421 
 
 Shiells V. Blackburne (1789), 1 H. Bl. 158 ; 2 R. R. 750 39 
 
 Sliiels V. Cannon (1865), 16 Ir. C. L. R. 588 777 
 
 Shileoek (should be Sherlock) v. Passnuiu (1836), 7 G. & V. 292, 293 . . . .39, 259 
 
 Shipworth r. Green (1725), 8 Mod. 311; 1 Str. 610 92 
 
 Shirley v. Todd (1832), 9 Green!. 83 511 
 
 Shore v. Bedford (1843), 5 M. A: Gr. 271 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 138 602, 607 
 
 Shore v Wilson (l8l2). b CI. & Fin. 355, 525 741, 744, 761, 76.', 763, 764, 
 
 784, 788, 789, 790 
 Short V. Lee (1821), 2 Jac. & W. 464 . . . .,396, 434, 435, 437, 441, 442, 443, 447 
 
 Short I'. Stov (1836), cited Ro,Meoe. N. P. Evid. 65, 80 628 
 
 Short V. WiilianiH (1835), 4 Dowl. 357 16 
 
 Shortredec. Cheek (1834), 1 A. & E. 57; 3N.&M. 866; 3 L.J. K.B. 125. .670,671 
 
 Shott V. Strealtield (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 8 372 
 
 Shower «•. Pilek (1849), 4 Ex. 478 ; 19 L.J. Ex. 113 ... 639 
 
 Shrewsbury's (Lady) case (l(il2), 2 How. St. Tr. 773 573 
 
 Shrewsbury Peer. (1857), 7 H. L. C. 1 3uu, 4uo, 414, 425, 426, 1047, 1092, 
 
 ua, 1C24 
 Shropshire Union Ry. & Canal Co. r. R. (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 496; 4S 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 31 ; 32 L. T. 283 ; 23 W. R. 7ii9 1076 
 
 Slnittleworth v. Le FlemirK (1865), 19 C. B. N. S. 687 ; 34 L. J. 0. P. 309 ; 
 
 1 1 Jur. N. S. 840 : 14 W. R. 13 76, 722 
 
 SibberinK v. Balcarras (1860), 3 De G. & Sm. 735 ; 19 L. J. Ch. 262 ; 14 
 
 Jur. 753 128 
 
 Sichel I'. Lambert (1864), 16 C. B. N. 8. 781 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 137 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 617; 12 W. R. 312 129, 149 
 
 Vtl. J. tndi with page 636t 
 
 t'i 
 
 4 
 
 
clxxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 riaa 
 
 Siddonsw. Lawrence (1879), 4 Ex. D. 176; 48 L. J. Ex. 446; 40 L. T. 
 
 796 ; 27 W. R. 791 41 
 
 SiddoiiHw. 8hoit(1877), '2C. P. D. 572; 46 L. J. C. P. 795 ; 37L.T. 230.. 114 
 Sidobottom V. Adkiiis (1858), 27 L. J. Ch. 152; 30 L. T. 163; 6 W. R. 
 
 97 964 
 
 Sideways V. DyNon (1817), 2 Stark. 49 956, 1191 
 
 Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (1840), 2 Beav. 447 ; 9 L. J. Ch. 282 666, 806 
 
 Sidney, Algernon, cane of (1683), 9 How. St. Tr. 854 385 
 
 Sidwell V. MaHon (1857), 2 H. & N. 306 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 407 ; 3 .Tiir. N. 8. 
 
 649 711 
 
 SJevewright v. Archibald (1851), 17 Q. B. 115 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 529 ; 15 
 
 Jur. 947 297 299 
 
 Siggers V. Evans (1855),' SE*. & b! 307 ; 3 C. L.' R. 1209";' 24*1". J.' Q.' B. ' 
 
 706 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 851 639 
 
 Sikes V. Wild (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 325 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 375 ; 1 B. & S. 
 
 .■iS? ; 4 B. & S. 421 ; 8 L. T. 652 ; 1 1 W. R. 954 773 
 
 Silberman t'. Clark (1884), 96 N. Y. 524 763 
 
 Silkstone and Dodsworth Coal and Iron Co., Rt Whitworth'H case (1881), 
 
 19 Ch. D. 118 ; 51 L. J. Ch. 71 ; 45 L. T. 449 ; 30 W. R, 33 845 
 
 Sillickf. Booth (1841), 1 Y. & C. C. C. 117; 11 L. J. Ch. 41 173, 175 
 
 Sills «. Browp (1840), 9 C. & P. 601 340, 935 
 
 Silver v. Stein (1852), 21 L. J. Ch. 312 ; 1 Drew. 29.) 1151 
 
 Siinmc. Anglo-Amer. Tel. Co. (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 188; 49 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 392 ; 42 L. T. 37 ; 28 W. R. 290 ; 44 J. P. 280 541 
 
 Siminond.s, Ro (1842), 3 Curt. 79 094 
 
 Siminonds r. Andrew.s ( 1 839), 1 Jebh & Sy. 53 1 7 
 
 Siinmondst'. Huniblo (1862). 13 C. B. N. S. 258 : 9 L. T. 108 690 
 
 SimmondR v. Simnionds (1847' 5 Notes of Can. (Ecc. & Mar.) 324 631 
 
 SimmonH v. London Joint Stock Bank, (1891) 1 Ch. 270 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 313 ; 
 
 62 L. T. 427 ; 03 L. T. 789: 39 W. R 449 ; (L«92) A. C. 201 ; 61 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 723 ; 66 L. T. 625 : 41 W. R. 108 ; 56 J. P. 044 390 
 
 SimmonH v. Mitchell (1881), 6 App. Ca«. 156 ; 60 L. J. P. C. 11 ; 43 L. T. 
 
 710; 29 W. R. 401 ; 45 J. P. 237 929 
 
 SimmonHv. Rudall (1850), 1 Sim. N.S. 115. 136, 137; 15 Jur. N. S. 162. .142, 1192 
 
 SimmonH v. Simmonn (1847), 1 Roberta. 566 502 
 
 Simms v. IlenderHon fl848), 11 Q. B. 1015 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 209 348, 1037 
 
 Simons r. Great West. Ry. Co. (1857), 18 C. B. N. 8. 805 ; 2 C. B. N. S. 
 
 620 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 25 722 
 
 Simons v. Patchett (1857), 26 L. J. Q. B. 195 ; 7 E. & B. 508 ; 3 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 742 780 
 
 Simpson r..Dendy (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 433; 6 Jur. N. 8. 1197 112 
 
 Simpson v. Dismore (1841), 9 M. & W. 47 ; 1 Dowl. N. 8. 357 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 1012; 11 L. J. Ex. 137 1217 
 
 Simpson v. Flamank (1807). L. R. 1 P. C. 463 ; 36 L. J. Eec. 28 77 
 
 Simpwm f. Fogo (1800), 1 J. & H. 18 ; 1 II. & M. 195 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 403 ; 
 
 32 L. J. Ch. 249; 11 W. R. 418; 8 L. T. 01 1103, 1146, 1147 
 
 Simpson v. Grayson (1892), 26 Amer. St. R. 52 254 
 
 Simpson f. Lond. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1873), 42 L. J. C. P. 112 ; L. R. 8 
 
 C. P. 390 : 38 L. T. 560 ; 21 W. R. 505 771 
 
 Simpson v. Margitson (1847), 11 Q. B. 23 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 81 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 166 16. 741, 763, 784 
 
 Simpson v. Pickering (1H34), 1 C. M. & R. 529; 5Tyr. 143; 4 L. J. Ex. 20. 1112 
 Simpson V. Robinson (1848), 12 Q. B, 511 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 73; 13 J'ir. 
 
 187 245, 523, 5i7 
 
 Simpson v. Smith (I822), 2 Ph. Ev. 397 942 
 
 Sims f. Marryat (1851), 17 Q. B. 281 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 454 4, 775 
 
 Simsf. Tlionias (1841). 3 Ir. L. R. 417 1147, 1154 
 
 Sinclair v. Baggaloy (1838), 4 M. & W. 312 ; 1 H. & H. 294 ; 2 Jur. 683 ; 
 
 7 L.J. Ex. 305 146, 147 
 
 Sinclair r. Eraser (1771), cited 20 How. St. Tr. 468 ; 1 Doug. 4, n 1154 
 
 Sinchiirf. Sinclair (1798), 1 Hiigg. ("oust. 297 ,. 1145, 1150 
 
 Sinclair V. Sinclair (1845), 13 M. & W. 040; 14 L. J. Ex. 109 48^, llll 
 
 The refm-encu are to paget, not to parofrapht. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. clxxxvii 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Sinclair r. Stevcnsou (1824), 1 C. & P. 585; 2 Biug. 514 ....310, 311, 747, 1)27, 
 
 9J8, 900 
 
 Singleton v. Barrett (1832), 2 C. & J. 368; 2 Tyr. 409; 1 L. J. Ex. 134 293 
 
 Singleton v. St. Louis, &c. (1877), 66 Mo. 63 763 
 
 Singleton v. Tomliusou (1878), 3 App. Cas. 404 ; 38 L. T. 653 ; 26 W. R. 
 
 722 701 
 
 Sinquasi, The (1880), 6 P. D. 241 ; 50 L. J. P. D. & A. 5 ; 43 L. T. 768. . 178 
 
 Sioidet V. Kuezinski (1855), 17 C. B. 25' ; 25 L. J. C. P. 2 282 
 
 SiHHonH V. Dixon (1826), 5 B. & C. 758 ; 8 D. & R. 526 105 
 
 Skaife V. Jackson (1824), 3 B. & C. '21 ; 5 Dowl. & R. 290 487, 5r;2, 744 
 
 Skeet t'. Lindsay (1877), 46 L. J. Ex. 249 ; 2 Ex. D. 314 ; 36 L. T. 98 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 322 711 
 
 Skeltonv. Cole (1857). 4 De G. & J. 587 671, 672 
 
 Skelton v. Hawling (1749), 1 Wils. 'i58 5:52 
 
 Skilbeck v. Garbott (1845), 7 Q. B. ;i46; 14 L. J. Q. B. 338; 9 Jur. 939. . 155, 158 
 Skinner V. Great North. Ry. Co. (1874), 43 L. J. Ex. 150 ; L. R. 9 Ex. 
 
 298 ; 32 L. T. 223 ; 23 W. P. 7 1186 
 
 Skinner v. Lond. & Bright. Ry. Co. (1850), 5 Ex. 787; 16 Jur. 299 163 
 
 Skipworth v. Green (1725), 8 Mod. 311 ; 1 Str. 610 92 
 
 Skrine v. Gordon (1875), Ir. R. 9 C. L. 479 49 
 
 Skuse V. Davis (1839), 10 A. & E. 635; 2 P. & D. 550; 7 Dowl. 774 ; 8 L. J. 
 
 M. C. 75 1073 
 
 Skyring v. Greenwood (1825), 4 B. & C. 281 ; 6 Dowl. & R. 401 ; I C. & 
 
 P. 517 542 
 
 Slack «. Buchannan (1790). Pea. R. 5 510 
 
 Slack V. Bustocd (1850), 6 Ir. Ch. R. 1 694 
 
 Slade V. Tucker (1880), 14 Ch. D. 824 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 644 ; 43 L. T. 49 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 807 695 
 
 Slane Peerage (1855), Pari. Min. Pt. 2, p. 49 ; 5 CI. & Fin. 41 422 
 
 Slaney v. Wade (18;!6). 1 My. & C. 338 ; 7 Sim. 595 409, 416, 423, 424, 425 
 
 Slater v. Hodgson (1846), 9 Q. B. 727 : 2 Now Sess. Cas. 488 430 
 
 Slater v. Lawson (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 396 493 
 
 Slatori'. Nolan (1870), I. R. 11 Eq. 307 137 
 
 Slatterio r. Pooley (1840), 6 M. & W. 664 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 8 ; 1 H. & W. 
 
 16; 4 Jur. 1038 291, 292, 486 
 
 Slaymakor c. Gundacker's Ex. (1823), 10 Serg. & R. 75 493 
 
 Slaymakor i'. Wilson (1829), 1 Penrose & Watts, 216 1220 
 
 Sleght r. Rhinelauder (1806), 1 Johns. 192 765 
 
 Slingsby v. (Jrainger (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 283 ; 28 L. J. Ch. 616 741, 801 
 
 Sly f. Sly (1877), L. R. 2 P. D. 91; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 03 444, 445 
 
 Small V. Nairne (1849), 13 Q. B. 840 ,355 
 
 Smallcombe r. Bruges (1824), M'Cl. 45 ; 13 Price, 136 498 
 
 Smart r. Harding (1855), 15 C. B. 652 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 76 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 311 682 
 
 Smart v. Hyde (1841), 8 M. & W. 723 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 60; 10 L. J. Ex. 
 
 479 769 
 
 Smart v. Morton (1855), 6 E. & B. 30 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 260 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 
 
 826 114 
 
 Smart r. Rnyner (1834), 6 C. & P. 721 271 
 
 Smart r. West Ham Union (1855), 10 Ex. 8U7 ; 3 C. L. R. CMO ; 24 L, J. 
 
 Ex. 201 041 
 
 Smartlo i'. Williams (1695), 3 Lev. 387 ; 1 Salk. 280 1214 
 
 Smeo V. Bryer (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 604 ; 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & iSur.) 
 
 406 P'^P 
 
 Smeo i>. Smee (1879), 6 P. Div. 84 ; 49 L. J. P. 8 ; 28 W. R. 703 ; 44 J. 
 
 P. 220 262, 263 
 
 Smith's Estate, Uo, Brids(m v. Smith (1870), 24 W. R. 392 534 
 
 Smith, lie, OswoU v. Shepliord, (1892) 67 L. T. 04 134 
 
 Smitli and xioddard v. Ridgway (1806), 2 H. & C. 37 ; 4 H. & C. 577 ; 35 
 
 L. J. Ex. 198; L. R. 1 Ex. 331 803 
 
 Smith, Knight & Co., Re (1809), L. R. 4 Ch. 421 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 710 .... 815 
 
 Smith, Mary, case of (1010), 2 How. St. Tr. 1049 557 
 
 Smith ». Ad'kins (1H72), L. R. 14 Eq. 402 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 628 093 
 
 Vol. I. ends with page 036. 
 
 ' I 
 
 mm 
 
 i '■••ft 
 
 hi 
 
 
clxxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAnE 
 
 Smith V. Andrews, (1891) 2 Ch. fi78 : f)5 L. T. 176 70, 1173 
 
 Smith V. l?iit,tiimM (18r)7), 2(i L. J. Ex. 2;!2 92 
 
 Smith V. niittoiiH (18;M), 1 M. ic Rob. 311 140, *t>l 
 
 Smith V. Bt»(liirll (1807), 1 Oamp. M) 517 
 
 Smith 1'. 1)1<. of Hoiiufoit (!8.12), 1 Hiud, MO; i;5 L. J. Ch. 33; 1 I'hill. 20!).. 1183 
 
 Smith r. «iK^'H (I8:i2), T) Sim. 31)1 ; 2 L. J. Ch. 101 482 
 
 Smith f. Hird (1839), 3 Howl. Oil 476 
 
 Smith V. niakcy (1807), 8 H. & S. 101 ; L. R. 2 Q. B. 320 ; 30 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 ir)0 ; \fi W. K. 4il2 : 13.'), 4:i7, 4.55 
 
 Smith t'. Hliiiidy (18J!»), Uv. .V M. 2.VJ 479 
 
 Smith V. Brain (18r)l), 1(1 Q. B. 21 1 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 201 ; If) ,Iur. 287 .... 202 
 Smith V. Braiidram (l84I), 2 M. & Gr. 2.'.0 ; 2 Suott, N. II. SS!) ; i) Dowl. 
 
 HI; .5 Jur. 1 73 194 
 
 Smith r. Brownl<)w,Ld.(18()9), L. R. 9 E(i. 241 ; 21 L.T. 739 ; 18 W. R. 271 390 
 Smith i: Biillcr (18,,')), L. R. 19 Ecj. 173 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 09 ; 31 L. T. 873 ; 
 
 23 VV. R. 332 
 
 Smith V. Burnham (1838), 3 Siniiii. 438 
 
 818 
 
 82 
 148 
 ,'548 
 785 
 
 Smith r. Caiiiiaii (18;)1), 2 K. & B. 35; 22 L. J. Q. B. 291 ; 17 Jur. 911.. 
 
 Smith r. CartwriKlit M851), Ex. 927 ; 20 E. ,1. Kx. 101 
 
 Smith V. Chester (1787), 1 T. R. 051 ; 1 R. R. lil-') 517. 
 
 Smith V. Vuiuhr (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 878 ; 9 Ch. I). 1 70 , 27 W. R. 1 19. . 
 Smith r. (;ramer(18;)5), 1 Bin;,'. N. (/'. i'85; 1 Scott, 54 1 ; 1 noilf,'es, 124.. 377, 381 
 
 Smith V. Crooker (1^09), 5 Mass. 538 1196 
 
 Smith V. Dauiell (1875), 44 L. J. Cli. 189; L. R. 18 Ecj. 049 ; 30Ji.T. 762.. 699 
 
 Smith )'. Davies (18:10), 7 C. & P. 307 2.59 
 
 Smith V. Do Wruitz (1825), Ry. & M. 212 512 
 
 Smith V. Doe d. Jersey (1819). 2 B. Ac I'. 592 ; 1 It. & B. 97, 100 39 
 
 Smith r. Diiidiam (1829;, 8 ri(^k. 240 1201 
 
 Smith V. East India Co. (1811), 1 I'liill. 50 018 
 
 Smith r. Evans (1851), 1 Wils. 313 700 
 
 Smith r. Eell (1841), 2 Curt. 007 000 
 
 Smith r. Flanders (1880), 129 Mass. 322 711 
 
 Smitli r. Eorty (1829), 4 C. & 1". 120 710 
 
 Smitli V. Harris (1845), 1 Roberts. 202 7(iO 
 
 Smith r. Hayes (1807), I. R. 1 C. L. ;;33 523 
 
 Smith r. H.'ndersou (1842), 9 M. & VV. 798 ; 11 I,. J. Ex. 315 ; 2 Dowl. 
 
 N. S. 245 1217, 1218 
 
 Smith v. Ilowdeii(1803),2 N(!W R. 30; 14 C. Jl N. S. 398 113 
 
 Smith .'. Hudson (1«05), 31 L. J. (i. B. 1.45 ; B. & S. 431 ; 12 L. T. 377; 
 
 13 W. R. 083 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 022 092 
 
 Bmitli V. HuKhes (1871), L. R. Q. B. 597 ; 40 L. J. Q. B. 221 ; 25 L. T. 
 
 329 ; 19 W. R. lO.V.) 770 
 
 Smith ('. Husim (1811), 1 rhillln.<ire, 291 37;i 
 
 Smith V. James (18(il), 1 1 C. B. N. S. 02 ; 5 L. T. 525 ; 10 VV. R. 131 . . 72(i 
 
 Smith r. .Tettries (1821), 9 IViee, 257 2(i7 
 
 Smith V. J.tlVyes (1810), 15 M. *c VV. 501 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 325 783 
 
 Smith V. Jolms.m (1812), 15 Kas(, 213; 13 R. R. 449 1124 
 
 Smitli r. Keal (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 340; 47 L. T. 142; 31 VV. R. 70 390 
 
 Smith V. Keating (1849), C. B. 130 85 
 
 Smith f. King, (1892) 2 Q. R. 643; 07 L. T. 420; 40 W. R. 642; 60 
 
 J. r. 775 718 
 
 Smith r. Knowoldun (1841), 2 M. & dr. 501 ; 9 Dowl. 402; 10 L. J. C. P. 
 
 120 187, 188 
 
 Smith t). Eaiie (1821), 12 Serg. & R. 81 927 
 
 Smith V. List<T (1895), 15 R. (.Mar.), 410; 04 L. J. Q. B. 154 ; 72 E. T. 20 . . 1001 
 Smith V. Lloyd (1854), 9 Ex. 502, 674; 2 C. L. R. 1008; 23 li. J. Ex. 
 
 191 118 
 
 Smith r. Lovell (1850), 10 C. B. 0; 1 L. M. & P. 794 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 67 ; 
 
 1 5 Jur. 250 202 
 
 Smith r. Ly(m (1813), 3 Camp. 405; 14 R. R. 810 49ti 
 
 Smith r. ^IaIllelHlek (1780), 1 T. R. 441 ; 1 R. R. 247 050 
 
 Smith V. Marrable (1812), C. & Marsh. 479; 11 M. & VV. 6; 12 L. J. Ex. 
 223 273, 776 
 
 Li '" 7 
 
 The refereiicei art to pages, not to parayraphi. 
 
TABLE OF CASi:S CITED. 
 
 clxj 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 I'AOB 
 
 Smith r. Maraack (181S), a C. B. J86 : 6 Dowl. & L. 363 ; 18 L. .T. C. P. 
 
 (),") ; 12 .lur. 1CV)0 r)4" 
 
 Smith i: Martin (1S41), 0. Ac Marsh. oS ; 9 M. * W. 301 ; 1 Dowl. N. S. 
 
 4 1 S 'J (> 1 
 
 Sinitli r. Mattiiows (IS(il), 30 L. J. Ch. 445 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 378 ; 4 L. T. 'iCd; 
 
 9 W. U. (i 1 1 0(i5 
 
 Smitli V. Morgan ( I SS9). -J M. 4 ]{..!.. '.il 495, 9'J3, 9J.'i 
 
 Smith i'. Mullctt (1S(I9) 2 Camp. -JoS ; UK. U. (!<) I 31 
 
 Smitli i: N.-alo (1H.')7), 2 C. B. X. S. 67 ; 'M> L. J. C. P. 143 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 old 07') (ISO, 778 
 
 Smitli r. Nicolls (1839), 5 Bliijr- N. C. 222; 7 Scott, 147; 7 Dowl. JS'J ; 
 
 1 Am. 474 1 142, 1 1:.2, 1 l/iri 
 
 Smith r. To..!.' (IHiri. 12 Sim. 17: 10 L. J. (1i. 192 713 
 
 Smith r. Ilnvstdii (ISll), 8 M. & W. 3S(> ; 1 I),>\vl. N. M. 121 ; 10 L. J. K.\. 
 
 437 ....". 1121 
 
 Smith 1'. Kiimm.'iis (isn7). 1 Camp. 9 1102, 1109, 1110 
 
 Smith V. SiiiiiKlMiry (18321. .'. C. A: P. 19(! 1222 
 
 Siiiilh r. S. udd.T (1824\ 1 1 Sit^;. \- K. 32'> .')04 
 
 Smith V. Shaw (1829). 10 B. At C. 277 ; o M. & H. 22.') 227 
 
 Smith /'. Simmi's (179.")), 1 Ksp. 330 iMl 
 
 Smith V. Slcaj) (1813). 1 C. 4 K. 48 310 
 
 Smith r. Smitli (1733- 1), 2 Str. O.VJ (538 
 
 Smith r. Smith (lliisoii (ISIP, 1 Phillimcrc 294 373 
 
 Smith r. Smith (lH:!(i), ;j Hinjr. X. C 29; 7 C. & P. 101 AlO 
 
 Smith c. Smith (18C.0), 35 L. J. P. 4 M. 0.') ; L. U. 1 P. & 1). 143 ; 14 L.T. 
 
 147; 14 W. 11. (118 (i9.-), 097 
 
 Smith r. Smith (187ii)„ I. R. 10 Vai. 273 304, 419 
 
 Smith r. Suiiiiaii (1829), 9 B. & O. 501 ; 4 M. A: U. 45.). C80, 087, 089, 090, 091 
 
 Smith r. Suiii(lK<' (1801). 4 Ksp. 20; K. K, 837 1143 
 
 Smith i\ Tayhir (ISO,-)), 1 Hos. 4 P. N. U. 190 151,519 
 
 Smith f. Tciil.itt (1807), L. R. 1 P. i 1). 398, 434; 30 L. J. P. 97 ; 10 L.T. 
 
 841; 10 W. K. 18 170, 410, 423 
 
 Smith t'. Thai;krmy (ISOO). L. R. 1 C. P. 504 ; 35 L. J. C. P. 270 ; 12 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 545 ; 14 L. T. 701 ; 14 W. R. 8:}2 114 
 
 Smith V. Thomas (1835), 2 Bing. N. C. :J80; 1 Ilodjros, 355 . 4 Dowl. P. 0. . 
 
 333 207 
 
 Smith V. Thimipson (1840), 8 C. B. 4 1 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 314 44 
 
 Smith r. Thorn.; (1852), 21 I.. J. Q. B. 199; 18 Q. B. 134; 10 Jur. 332. .710,712 
 
 Smith V. Tomhs (18;i9). 3 Jiir. 72 082 
 
 Smith f. TruNcott (1843), I Dowl. & L. 530 ; 6 M. & Gr. 267; 12 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 330 832 
 
 Smith r. Vosh (1857). 2 H. \- N. 97 ; 26 1.. J. Kx. 233 6 
 
 Smith r. W.-h.ster (1870), 45 L. J. Ch. 528 ; 3 Ch. 1). 49 ; 35 L. T. 44 ; 24 
 
 W. U. 89 I 067 
 
 Smith V. Whittinfrham (18:t3), C. & P. 78 435, 508 
 
 Smith r. Wilkiiis (1833), C. A: P. 180 231 
 
 iSmith V. Wilson (18:(21, 3 B. & .Vd. 729 704, 705 
 
 Smith r. Wint<T (1852), 12 C. B. 487 ; 21 L. J. C. P. l.VS ; 16 .Tiir. 908 . . 222 
 
 Smith V. YomiK (1808). 1 Camp. 439 293 
 
 Smithson's, Sir lIuKh, riM" (umlat«-<l), citcl Hull. N. P. 2-'S lo: 8 
 
 Smyth 1. AniliTNon (1819), 7 C B. 21 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 109; 13 Jiir. 21 1 . .222. 
 
 400 
 
 Smyth V. Wilson (1841), 2 .l<-hb & Sy. 660 89, 92 
 
 Smythor. Ba.iks (1797), 4 Dall. 329 800 
 
 Snt'ljfrovo r. Martin (1822), 2 M'C. 24 1 511 
 
 Sii.ll c. Finch (1803), 32 L. J. C. P. 117 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 651 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 
 
 333 ; 7 L. T. 747 152 
 
 Siidlin^jT V. lIuntiuKHcld (1834), I C. M. & R. 20; 4 Tyr. 606; 4 L. J. 
 
 Kx . 232 681 
 
 SiiowluiU r. U(MHlri()kc (1833), 4 B. A Ail. 511 490 
 
 Siiowdon f. Smith (1811 ), cito«l 1 M. Ac Sd. 286 >)r>r> 
 
 Soar r. Foster (1758, should bo 1858), 4 K. & J. 152 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 400 . . 006 
 Houicty, &c. «•. Whoclcr (1814), 1 New Hamp. 310 122 
 
 V»i. J. muU with pag* 636. 
 
 1 i 
 
w 
 
 cxc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAoa 
 
 Solicitor, In re, A (1880), 14 Cli. D. 162 834 
 
 Solicitor to the Treasury v. White (1886), 55 L. J. P. 79 12 (2 
 
 Solly V. Hinde (1834), 2 C. & M. 616 ; 4 Tyr. 305 748 
 
 Solomon, Re, Ex parte Dressier (1878), 9 Oh. D. 252; 48 L. J. Bank. 20; 
 
 39 L. T. 377 662 
 
 Solomon V. Vintners' Co. (1859), 4 H. & N. 585 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 370 ; 5 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1177 115 
 
 Solomons v. Campbell (1822), cited 1 St. Ev. 177 924 
 
 Solway, The (1885), 10 P. D. 137 ; 64 L. J. P. 83 ; 53 L. T. 680 ; 34 "W. R. 
 
 232 ; 5 Asp. M. C. 482 388 
 
 Somerset, D. of, v. Fogwell (1826), 5 B. & C. 876 ; 1 D. & R. 747 1 1 1 
 
 Somerset, D. of, v. France (1727), 1 Str. 662 232 
 
 Somerset f). Hart (1884), 12Q. B. D. 360; 53 L. J. M. C. 77: 48.T. P. 327.. 107 
 Somerville v. Hawkins (1861), 10 C. B. 683 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 131 ; 15 Jur. 
 
 4.50 46, 1 1 1 
 
 Somerville v. Somerville (1801), 5 Ves. 750 , 5 R. R. 155 17!) 
 
 Somes V. Skinner (1825), 3 Pick. 52 90 
 
 Soper V. Dibble (1690), 1 Ld. Raym. 175 6 
 
 Sopwith V. Sopwith (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 131 ; 2 S. & T. 100 ; 7 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 554; 4 L. T. 256 1110 
 
 Sotheran v. Deuing (1881), 20 Ch. D. 99 70ft 
 
 Sotilichos V. Kemp (1848), 3 Ex. 105 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 36 766 
 
 Souchr. Strawbridge(1846),2 C. B. 814; 15 L. J. 0. P. 170; 10 Jur. 367.. 681, 
 
 682 
 
 Soule's case (1828), 5 Greenl. 407 893 
 
 Souter 1-. Drake (1834), 2 B. & Ad. C92 ; 3 N. & M. 40 773 
 
 South-Eastom Ry. Co. v. Warton (1802), 31 L. J. Ex. 515 ; 6 H. & N. 520 94 
 South of Ireland ColUery Co. v. Waddle (1869), L. R. 4 0. P. 618 
 
 L. J. C. P. 338 
 
 Southall V. Rigfr (1851), 11 C. B. 481 ; 20 L. J. C. P. 145 ; 15 . 
 
 Southampton case (1833), Cock. & R. 1 13 ; Per. & K. 225 
 
 Southampton Dock Co. v. Richards (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 418 ; 1 Scott, N. R, 
 
 219 
 
 38 
 
 ...640, 641 
 706.. 201 
 496 
 
 1177 
 
 Southampton. Mayor of, v. Graves (1800), 8 T. R. 690 ; 6 R. R. 480 .... 995 
 
 Southard v. Wrexford ( 1 826) , 6 Cowen , 254 962 
 
 Southeei'. Denny (1817), 1 Ex. 196; 17 L.J. Ex. 151 189 
 
 Southey v. Nnsh (1837), 7 C & P. 632 917 
 
 Southwark Bridge Co. r. Sills (1826), 2 C. & P. 371 643 
 
 Soiithwark Water Co. v. Qui'ik (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 315 ; 47 L.J. Q. B. 
 
 258 ; 26 W. R. 341 595, 1186 
 
 Southwell r. Bowditch (1876), 1 C. P. D. 100. 374; 45 L. J. C. P. 630; 
 
 34 L. T. 133 ; 35 L. T. 196 ; 24 W. R. 275, 838 769 
 
 Southwick V. Southwick (1870), 2 Sweeney, 234 589 
 
 Soward v. Leggatt (1836). 7 C. & P. 615 258, 259 
 
 Sowerby v. Butiaior (1834), 2 C. & M. 371 ; 4 Tyr. 320 758 
 
 Spadducini v. Koary (18S9), 21 L. R. Ir. 553 914 
 
 Spadwell V. (1730), cited Berke? j Peerage, 4 Camp. 410 419 
 
 Spaight V. Tedcastlo (1881), 6 App. Cas. 217 ; 44 L. T. 589 ; 29 W. R. 
 
 761; 4 Asp. M. C. 400 178 
 
 Spaight f. Twins (1868), 13 Ir. C. L. R. 416 116S 
 
 Spargo V. Brown (1 ^29). 9 B. & C. 935 435, 487 
 
 Sparrow v. Farrant ( 1819), 2 St. Ev. 517, n 1227 
 
 Sparrow v. Hill (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 362 ; 8 Q. B. D. 479 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 675 ; 44 L. T. 917 ; 29 W. R. 705 42 
 
 Spartali t'. Bonetike (1850), 10 C. B. 212 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 293 756, 769 
 
 Spears v. Hartly (1857), 3 Esp. 81 ; 6 R. R. 814 79 
 
 Spcnoo V. Dodsworth (1891), 60 L. J. Ch. 708 ; (1891) 1 Ch. 657 ; 64 L. T. 
 
 282 ; 39 W. R. 302 
 
 Spenco r. Healey (1853), 8 Ex. 668 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 249 
 
 Spenco t>. Stewart (1802), 3 East, 89 ; 6 R. R. 549 
 
 Spenceley, In the goods of, (1892) P. 255 ; 61 L. J. P. 133 
 
 Spenceley r. Do Willott (1806), 7 East, 108; 3 Smith, 289 947 
 
 Spenceley v. Schulenburgh (1806), 7 East, 357 007, 608 
 
 914 
 
 750 
 
 869 
 
 1104 
 
 Tht refertneu art to pages, not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXCl 
 
 PAOH 
 
 Spencer «'. Rnrough (1842), 9 M. &W.42S; 6Jur. 154; 11 L.J. Ex. 378.. 476, 476 
 
 SpeiK^ert'. Hilling (1812), 3 Camp. 310 323 
 
 Hpencer v. Newton (1837), 6 A. & E. 623 ; 1 N. & P. 818 ; 1 Jur. 52 . .867, 8ti8 
 
 Spencer r. Thompson (18.')6), 6 Ir. C. L. R. 537, 565 158, 243, 1 111 
 
 Spencer v. Williams (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 230; 40 L. J. P. & M. 45 ; 
 
 24L.T.5I3; 19 W. R. 703 1106 
 
 Sperling, Re (1864), 33 L. J. P. & M. 25 ; 9 L. T. N. S. 348 ; 12 W. R. 
 
 i554 ; 3 S. & T. 272 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1205 700 
 
 Spice V. Bacon (1877), 2 Ex. D. 463 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 713 ; 36 L. T. 896 ; 25 
 
 W. R. 840 '..; . : 162 
 
 Spicer v. Burg-^ss (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 129 ; 4 Tyr. 598 1203 
 
 Spicerf. Coop?r',i341), 1 Q. B. 424; 1 G. & D. 52 ; 5 Jur. 1036 763 
 
 Spiol-rnell v. Hotham (1854), 1 Kay, 669 671 
 
 Spieresv. Parker (1780), 1 T.R. 141 ; 1 R. R. 165 85 
 
 Spiers v. WilUson (1808), 4 Cranch, 398 288 
 
 Spill V. Maule (1869), L. R. 4 Ex. 232 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 138 ; 20 L. T. 675 ; 
 
 17 W. R. 805 Ill 
 
 Spindler, Re, »<< Ex parte Rolfe. 
 
 Spittle V. "Walton (1851), L. R. 11 Eq. 420 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 368 ; 24 L. T. 
 
 18 ; 19 W. R. 405 896 
 
 Spollan V. Majrau (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 700 710, 713 
 
 Spong V. Wright (1842), 9 M. & W. 629 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 144 712, 713 
 
 Spoouer V. Juddow (1848-50), 6 Moo. P. C. R. 257 19, 225, 227 
 
 Spooner v. Payne (1847), 4 0. B. 328 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 225 328, 1214, 1216 
 
 Spragge's case (undated), cited 14 East, 276 318 
 
 Spratt V. Harris (1833), 4 Hagg. Ecc. 405 1161 
 
 Sprigge V. Sprigge (1868), 38 L. J. P. & M. 4 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 608 ; 19 
 
 L. T. 462; 17 W. R. 8 143 
 
 Spring, The (186b), L. R. 1 Adm. 99 ; 14 W. R. 975 6 
 
 Spring V. Eve (1677\ 2 Mod. 240 20 
 
 Spring V. Lovett (1831), 11 Pick. 417 757 
 
 Spurr V. Trimble (1818), 1 A. K. Marsh. 271 172 
 
 Squire f. Campbell (1836), 2 Cooper, 114 750 
 
 Srimut Rajah v. Katama Natchiar (1866), 11 Moo. lud. App. 50 1123 
 
 Stace V. Griffith (1869), 6 Moo. P. C. N. 8. 18 ; L. R. 2 P. C. 420 ; 20 L. T. 
 
 197 47, 618, 619 
 
 Stackpole v. Arnold (1814), 1 1 Mass. 27 652, 744, 758 
 
 Stackpole v. Howell (1807), 13 Ve«. 417 ; 9 R. R. 200 144 
 
 Stackpoole v. The Queen (1875), I. R. 9 Eq. 619 398 
 
 Stafford's, Ld., case (1680), 7 How. St. Tr. .459 624, 973, 974 
 
 Stafford Peer. (1825), Pari. Min. 4 413, 416, 423 
 
 Stafford v Clark (1824), 2 Bing. 382 ; 9 Moore, C. P. 724 ; 1 C. & P. 24, 
 
 403 1 124 
 
 Stafford, Mayor of, v. Till (1829), 4 Bing. 76 ; 12 Moore, 260 97, 643 
 
 Staines v. Stewart (1862), 31 L. J. P. & M. 10 ; 2 S. & T. 320 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 
 
 440 705, 747, 950 
 
 Staintonw. Chadwick (1851), 3M. &G. 575; 13Beav. 320; 16 Jur. 1539.. 1183 
 
 Stainton and Wife v. Jones (1779), 1 Doug. 380, n. 96 7 
 
 Stalworth v. Inns (1844), 13 M. & W. 466 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 428 ; 14 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 81 ; 9 Jur. 285 1039 
 
 Stamford Bank v. Smith, (1892) 1 Q. B. 765 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 405 ; 66 L. T. 
 
 306 ; 40 W. R. 355 ; 56 J. P. 229 713 
 
 Stamford, Ld. v. Dunbar (1845), 13 M. & W. 822, 827 119 
 
 Stammers t: Dixon (1806), 7 Ea.st, 200 ; 3 Smith, 261 ; 8 R. R. 612 791 
 
 Star.cliff v. Hardwicke (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 1, 12 ; 3 Dowl. P. C. 762 ; 5 
 
 Tyr. 551; 1 Gale, 127 152 
 
 Standago v. Croighton (1832), 5 '~'. & P. 406 606 
 
 Standard v. Baker (1785-6), cited Tidd's Prao. 858 836 
 
 Standeuf. Chrismas (1847), 10 Q. B. 135; 16 L. J. Q. B. 265 ; 11 Jur. 694 1169 
 Standen v. Standen (1791), Pea. R. ■* " ; 4 T. R. 469, n. ; 6 T. R. 331, n. .436, 621 
 
 Standish v. Ross (1849). 3 Ex. 52'* . 19 L. J. Ex. 185 649 
 
 Standley, Re (1849). 1 Roberts. 755 ; 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 69 . . 698 
 Stanger v. Searle (1793), 1 Esp. 15 1221 
 
 Vol. I. ends with page 635. 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 ; IV 
 
cxcu 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 PACK 
 
 Stanhope v. Nott (undated), 2 Swans. 221, n 609 
 
 Stanley v. Dowdeswell (18741, L. R. 10 0. P. 102 ; 23 W. R. ;;89 672 
 
 Stanley v. Stanley (1862), 2 J. & H. 491 , 10 AV. K. «67 801 
 
 Stanley v. White (181 !), 14 East, 338 ; 12 E. R. 514 232, 234, 623 
 
 Stunsfield v. Hobson (ISiVi). 10 Beav. ''36 ; 3 Dd G. M. & G. 620 ; 22 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 4r)7 ; 20 L. T. 301 ; 1 W. R. 21G 720 
 
 Stanton r.Collior (1854), 3 E. &T5.274; 23L. J.Q.B. llfi; IS.Tur.N. S. 050.. 664 
 
 Stanton v. I'ercival (1854), o H. L. Cas, 257 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 3(i'.) 492 
 
 Stanton v. Styles (1850), 1 L. M. & P. 575 ; 5 Ex. 578 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 33G. . 1121 
 Stanwix's, Gen., case (nee R. v. Hay, Dr.). 
 
 Stapleton r. Oofts (1852), 18 Q. B. 367 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 246 879, 887, 892 
 
 Stapleton v. Ilaymen (180.5), 33 L. J. Ex. IVD, 2 11. & C. 918; 12 W. R. 
 
 317; 10 Jur. iST. S. 417 651 
 
 Stapylton v. Clonffh (1853), 2 E. & B. 933 ; 2 C. L. R. 26G ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 5; 18 Jur. 00 437, 151, 4G0 
 
 dtartup V. Maodonald (1841), 2M. & Gr. 395; 2 Scott, N. R. 485 ; (1843), 
 
 6M. &Gr. 619; 7 Scott, N. R. 209 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 477 33,34 
 
 Stat«, The, v. Adams (1789- 180G^ 1 Hayw. 403 120 
 
 State, The, v. Atkinson (1894), 42 Am. St. R. 877 t'l,/. [r.S] 
 
 State, The, v. Boswoll ( 1 S20), 2 Dov. 209 972, 973 
 
 State, The, t'. Buio (1875), 43 Tex. 532 027 
 
 State, The, f. Center (1802), 35 Veni. 378 590 
 
 State, The, v. Clifford flHO.'), 42 Am. St. R. 518 yhM. [GS, 580] 
 
 State, The, r. Do Wolf (1830), 8 Conn. 93 897 
 
 State, The, v. Freeman (1824), 5 Conn. 348 017 
 
 State, The, v. Ilayward (1819). 1 Nott & M'C. 547 627 
 
 State, The, r. Heid (1874), 57 Mo. 252 027 
 
 State, The, v. Johnson (1893), 40 Am. St. R. 105 Jf/</. [408] 
 
 State, The, v. Mc.Ke.in ( 1 873), lUi Io\,a, 349 635 
 
 State, The, v. Holier (1820-34), 1 Dry. 26:' 627 
 
 State, The, v. Rawls (1820), 2 Nott & M-C. 331 528 
 
 State, The, v. Stinson (1844), 7 Law l.'eporter. 383 169, 903 
 
 State, The, v. Whisenhurst (1823), 2 Hawks. 458 906 
 
 State, The, v. Wood (1873). 53 New Kami). 484 616 
 
 Stattuck . The State (1858), 11 Iiid. 473 616 
 
 Staverton v. Ashburtou (1855), 4 E. & B. 52G; 24 L. J. M. C. 53; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 233 1136 
 
 Stead V. Dawber (1839), 10 A. & E. 57 ; 2 P. & D. 447 752 
 
 Stead i>. Heaton (1792), 4 T. R. 669 440, 441 
 
 Steadman v. Duhamel (1845), 1 C. B. 892 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 270 646 
 
 Steamship Co. "Norden" i-.Dempsey (1876), 45 L. J. C. P. 764 ; 1 C. P. D. 
 
 654 ; 24 W. R. 984 158, 763 
 
 Stearine, &c. Co. v. Heintzmann (1864), 17 C. B. N. S. 60 ; 11 L. T. 272 ; 
 
 10 Jur. N. S. 881 937 
 
 Steam v. Mills (1833). 4 B. & Ad. 657 ; 1 N. & M. 434 653 
 
 Stebbingf. Spicer(lS49), 8C. B. 827; 19 L. J. C. P. 24 168 
 
 Stedman v. Gooch (1793), 1 Esp. 6 1035 
 
 Steel V. Prickett (181<t), 2 Stark. B. 463 112, 397, 402 
 
 Steel V. State Line Steamship Co. (1877), 3 App. Cas. 72 ; 37 L. T. 333 . . 771 
 Steele, Re, May v. Wilson (1868), 37 L. J. P. & M. 68 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 
 
 575; 19L. T. 91 ; 17 W. R. 15 709 
 
 Steele v. Howe (1849), 14 Q. B. 431 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 89 ; 14 Jur. 147 ... . 787 
 
 Steele v. Mart (1825), 4 B. & C. 273 756 
 
 Steele v. Stewart (1843-4), I Phill. 471 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 34 ; 9 Jur. 121 .... 699 
 
 Steevens's Ho.sp. v. Dyas (1863), 15 Ir. Ch. R. 405, 420 142 
 
 Steiglitz V. Egginton (1815), Holt, N. P. R. 141 ; 17 R. R. 622 645 
 
 Steinkeller v. Newton (1840), 1 Scott, N, R. 148 ; 8 Dowl. 579 ; 9 C. & P. 
 
 313 325, 355, 356, 923 
 
 Stephen V. Gwenap (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 120 435 
 
 Stephens v. Foster (1833), 6 C. & P. 289 928 
 
 Stephens v. Heathcote (1860), 1 Dr. & Sm. 138 ; 29 L. J. Ch. 529 495 
 
 Stephens v. Pinney (1818), 8 Taun. 327 ; 2 Mo„ro. 0. P. 349 287 
 
 Stephens (should be Stevens) v. Webb (1835), 7 C. & P. 60 274 
 
 Tht reference* art to pages, not t) paragrapli*. 
 
 S 
 
 S 
 S 
 
 s 
 s 
 s 
 s 
 s 
 s 
 
 S' 
 Si 
 Si 
 Si 
 SI 
 S( 
 St 
 St 
 St 
 St 
 St 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 cxcm 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Steuart v. Gladstone (1878), 7 Ch. D. 394 ; 47 L, J. Ch. 154 ; 37 L. T. 575 ; 
 
 '20 W. R. 277 487 
 
 Steveu8 V. Clark (1842), 2 M. & B jb. 435 481 
 
 Stevens v. Lloyd (1829), 1 M. & M. 292 1195 
 
 SteveiiB V. Midi. Ry. Co. and Lander (1854), 23 L. J. Ex. 328 ; 10 Ex. 352 ; 
 
 2 C. L. R. 13U0 ; 18 Jur. 932 643 
 
 Stevens v. Thiiuker (1793), Pea. R. 187 499 
 
 Steward v. Eddowes (1874), 43 L. J. C. P. 204 ; L. R. 9 C. P. 311 ; 30 
 
 L. T. 333 ; 22 W. R. 534 668 
 
 Steward v. North Metropolitan Tram Co. (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 556 ; 55 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 157; 54L. T. 35; 34 W. R. 316 ; 50 J. P. 324 191, 192 
 
 Stev *rt. Re (180;i), 3 S. & T. 192 ; 4 S. & T. 211 ; 32 L. J. P. & M. 94 . . 701 
 
 St wart V. Alison ^1821), 6 Sorg. & R. 324 1178 
 
 Strwart V. Anfe'lo-Califor. Gold Min. Co. (1852), 18 Q. B. 730 ; 21 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 393 643 
 
 Stewart v. Bulkis Co. (1883;, 53 L. J. Ch. 760 ; 60 L T. 479 ; 32 W. R. 
 
 676 347, 845 
 
 Stewart V. Cauty (1841), 8 M. & W. 160; 2 Railway & C. Oas. 616; 10 
 
 L. J. Ex. 348 37 
 
 Stewart v. Forbes (1849). 1 H. & T. 461, 472 ; 1 Mac. & G. 137 ; 19 L.J. 
 
 Ch. 133 160 
 
 Stewart t'. Steele (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 609 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 517 ; il L. J. 
 
 C. P. 155 818 
 
 Stewartson v. Watts < 1839), 8 Watts, 392 388 
 
 Steyner v. Droitwich '1690j, Skin. 023 ; 1 Salk. 281 ; 12 Mod. 85 1179 
 
 Still V. Halford (1S14), 4 Camp. 19 1039 
 
 Stimson v. Farnham (1871), 41 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; L. R. 7 Q. B. 175 ; 25 
 
 L. T. 747 ; 20 W. R. 183 549 
 
 Stoate V. Stoate (1861), 30 L. J. P. & M. 102 ; 2 S. & T. 223; 3 L. T 756. . 1110 
 Stobart V. Dryden (1836), 1 M. & W. 615 ; 2 Gale, 146 ; 1 T. & G. 899 ; 5 
 
 L. J. Ex. 218 3fpS, 446, 465 
 
 Stobart v. Todd (1854), 23 L. J. Ch. 956 ; 2 W. R. 617 ; 2 Eq. 1144 ; 18 Jur. 
 
 618 1036 
 
 Stobell (should be Stokell) v. Niveu (1889), 61 L. T. 18 671 
 
 Stock V. M-Avoy (1872), L. R. 15 Eq. 55 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 230 ; 21 W. R. 
 
 620 ; 27 L. T. 441 666 
 
 Stockbridge v. Qui..ke (1853), 3 C. & K. 3U5 1047 
 
 Stockdale f. Hansard (1839), 2 P. & D. 1 ; 9 A. & E. 1 ; 3 Jur. 905 4 
 
 Stocken w. Collin (1841), 7M. & W. 515; 9 C. & P. 653 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 227.. 31, 
 
 154 
 
 Stockfleth V. De Tastet (1814), 4 Camp. 11 ; 15 R. R. 720 516, 517 
 
 Stuckil V. Punshon (1880), (i P. D. 9 ; 60 L. J. P. 14 ; 44 L. T. 280 ; 29 
 
 W. R. '2:4; 45 J. P. 159 701 
 
 Siockton V. iJemuth (1838), 7 Watts, 39 388 
 
 Stockwell V. Ritherdou (1848), 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 409 705 
 
 Stoddart v. Grant (1851-2), 1 Macq. 171 ; 1 Paterson, 122 704 
 
 Stoddart. v. Manning (1828), 2 Har. & G. 147 909 
 
 Steer, In re (1884), 9 P. D. 120 ; 51 L T. 141 ; 32 W. R. 1005 ;<52 
 
 Stoever v. Whitman (1814), 6 Binn. 417 705 
 
 Stokehill ('. Pettiugell (1852), 21 L. J. Q. B. 2J9, n 879 
 
 Stokes V. Bate (U.2ti), 5 B. ic C. 491 ; 3 Dowl. & R. 247 113.) 
 
 Stokes V. Dawes (1826), 4 Mason, 268 423, 1 102 
 
 StokFs V. Grant (1878), 4 C. P. D. 25 ; 40 L. T. 36 ; 27 W. R. 397 187 
 
 Stokes e. Heron (1845), 12 0. & F. 161; 9 Jur. 563 144 
 
 Stokes V. Mason (l808), 9 East, 426 19 
 
 Stoker V. Salomons (1851), 9 Hare, 79; 20 L. J. Ch. 343 79 
 
 Stokes V. White (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 223 ; 4 Tyr. 786 872 
 
 Stonard •. Dunkin (1810), 2 Camp. 344; 11 R. R. 724 545 
 
 Stone's case (1661), Dyer, 216, pi. 50 560 
 
 Stone, Jemes, Re (186«), 1 S. & T. 238 142 
 
 Stone V. Blackburn (1793), 1 Esp. 37 909 
 
 Stone V. Forsyth (1781), 2 Doug. 707 1046 
 
 Stone V. Greening (184»), 13 Sim. 390 804 
 
 Vol, I. tftd* with page 636. 
 
 
 ■!l 
 
 1 -J ■ 
 
 • • it! 
 
CXCIV 
 
 TABLE OF CA«E8 CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Stone*. Motcalf (1816), 1 Stark. 63 765 
 
 Stone V. Whiting (1817), 2 vSt<irk. R. 2.3.') ; 19 R. R. 710 660 
 
 Stones V. Byron (1846), 4 Dowl. & L. 393 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 32 ; 1 Bivil Ct. 
 
 R. 248 ; 11 Jur. 44 909 
 
 Stones V. Monhem (1848), 2 Ex. 382 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 21.') 303 
 
 Stooinvoart v. Ponin.miliir and Oiiontal Steam Nav. Co. (1880), 6 App. Cas. 
 
 a76 ; 52 L. J. Adm. 1 ; 43 L. T. 610 ; 29 W. R. 173 , 
 
 Sttiop's ease (17fl9), Addis. 381 
 
 Sto-r V. Scott (1833). 6 C. & P 241 «iO 
 
 Stoihert r. James (1843), 1 C. & K. 121 612 
 
 Stott V. Fairlamb (1883), 53 L. J. Q. B. 47 : 49 L. T. 525 767 
 
 Stoveld V. Hugh-i (1811), 14 East, 308 ; 12 R. R. 523 691 
 
 Stowo V. Querner (1870), L. R. 5 Ex. 155 ; 3U L. J. Ex. 60 ; 22 L. T. 29 ; 
 
 18 W. R. 466 26 
 
 StowoU V. Robinson (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 928 ; G L. J. C. P. 326 ; 6 Scott, 
 
 196 763 
 
 Stracey v. Blake (1835), 7 0. & P. 404 474 
 
 Straoy v. Blake (1836), 1 M. & W. 168 ; Tyr. & G. 528 607 
 
 Stratt'on's Exors., Ex parte. North of England Joint Stock Bunk. Co., Re 
 
 (1853), 22 L. J. Ch. 194 ; 1 De G. M. & (J. 57(! ; Ifi .Iiir. 43:. 541 
 
 Straker v. Graham (1839), 4 M. & W. 721 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 86 ; 7 Dowl. 223 . . 617 
 Straker v. Reynolds (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 262; 58 L. J. Q. B. 180; 60 
 
 L. T. 107 ; 37 W. R. 379 855 
 
 Stranks v. St. John (1867), 36 L. J. C. P. 118 ; L. R. 2 C. P. 370 . . . .619, 773 
 
 Stratford v. Greene (1810), 1 Ball & B. 296 1013, 1014 
 
 Stratford and Morton Rail. Co. r. Stratton (1832), 2 B. & Ad. 518 91 
 
 Stratton v. Rastall (1788), 2 T. R. 366 93, 552, 744 
 
 Stranss v. County Hotel Co. (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 27 ; 53 L. J. Q. B. 25 ; 
 
 49 L. T. 601 ; 32 W. R. 170 162 
 
 Strauss t'. Francis (1860), L. R. 1 Q. B. 379 ; 35 L. J. Q. B. 133 ; 7 B. & 
 
 S. 365 608 
 
 Streathley, In the goods of, (1891) P. 172; 60 L. J. P. 56; 39 W. R. 
 
 432 
 
 Streoter v. Bartlett (1848), 5 C. B. 5(>2 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 1 10 
 Stringer v. Gardiner (1859), 27 Beav. 35; 4 De G. & J. 468 ; 
 758 
 
 28 L, 
 
 700 
 
 ..1044, 1210 
 J. Ch. 
 799,800 
 
 Strode v. Russel (1708), 2 Vern. 621 789, 794 
 
 Strong r. Dickenson (1836), 1 M. & W. 490 ; 2 Gale, 83 ; 5 Dowl. 99 ; 1 
 
 T. & G. 683 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 231 806, 867 
 
 Strong V. Fo.ster (1855), 25 L. J. C. P. 106 ; 17 C. B. 201 758 
 
 Stronghill v. Buck (1850), 14 Q. B. 787 ; 14 Jur. 741 94 
 
 Strother v. Barr (1828), 2 M. & P. 207 : 5 Bing. 136 277, 280, 286, 288 
 
 Stroud, Re (1849), 8 C. B. 518 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 117 1160 
 
 Strutt V. Bovingdon (1803), 5 Esp. 50 ; 8 R. R. 834 324, 353, 1114 
 
 Stuart t>. Balkis Co. (1883), 63 L. J. Ch. 790 ; 50 L. T. 479; 32 W. R. 
 
 676 .347, 845 
 
 Stuart V. Lovell (1817). 2 Sta.k. R. 94 ; 19 R. R. 688 219, 245 
 
 Stuclcy V. Baily (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 483; 1 H. & C. 405; 10 W. R. 
 
 720 
 
 757 
 
 Studdy V. Sanders (1823), 2 Dowl. & R. 347 551, 610 
 
 Stukcley v. Butler (1615), Hob. 171 800 
 
 Sturgo I'. Buchanan (1839), 2 P. & D. 573 ; 10 A. & E. 598 ; 2 M. & Rob. 
 
 90 315, 483, 485, 975 
 
 Sturgeon v. Wingfleld (1846), 15 M. & W. 224 ; 15 L. J. Ex. 212 96 
 
 Sturla V. Freccia (1879), 12 Ch. D. 411 ; 5 App. Cas. 623 : .50 L. J. Ch. 
 
 86 ; 43 L. T. 209 ; 29 \V. R. 217 ; 44 J. P. 812 458, 1092, 1167, 1174 
 
 Sturm V. Jeffreo (1S47), 2 C. & K. 442 314 
 
 Sturt V. Blagg (1847), 10 Q. B. 906, 008 46 
 
 Suffell V. Bank of England (1882). 9 Q. B. D. 655; 61 L. J. Q. B. 401 , 
 
 47 L. T. 146; 30 W. R. 932; 46 J. P. 500 1194, 1195 
 
 Suffield V. Brown (1804), 3 New R. 343, 344 ; 33 L. J. Ch. 259 ; 4 De G. 
 
 J. &S. 185 115 
 
 Suffolk Witches (1665), 6 How. St. Tr. 647 657 
 
 Tlie references are to pages, not to paragraphs. 
 
TAULl' OP CASKS CITED. 
 
 cxcv 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Suirden v. Lord St. LeonardH (1870), 45 L. J. P. D. & A. I : 1 P. Div. 
 
 154 ; 34 L. T. 309 ; 24 W. K. 479 143, 307, 356, 790 
 
 SuKK «'• Bray (1885), 54 L. J. Ch. 132 ; 51 L. T. 194 314 
 
 SuiHHCv. Lowthcr(1843). 2 Hare, 424; 12 L. J. Ch. 315 806, 808 
 
 Sullivan v. Galbraith (1870). 4 Ir. Eq. 582 144 
 
 Sullivan v. Sullivau (1870), Ir. ]l. 4 P^q. 457 789 
 
 Summers, Re (1850), 7 Notes of Cas. (Eccl. & Mar.). 562; 2 Roberts. 
 
 295 697 
 
 Summers r. Griffiths (1860), 35 Bnav. 27 137 
 
 Summers (Mhoiild be Simmons) v. London Joint Stock Bank, fl891) 1 Ch. 
 
 270 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 313 ; 62 L. T. 427 : 63 L. T. 789 ; 39' W. R. 449 ; 
 
 fl892) A. C. 201 ; 61 L. J. Cli. 723; 60 L. T. 025; 41 W. R. 108; 66 
 
 J. P. 044 390 
 
 Summers r. Moorhouse (188J), 13 Q. B. D. 388 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 5b4 ; 51 
 
 L. T. 290 ; 32 W. R. 826 ; 48 J. P. 424 756 
 
 Summers v. Moseley (1834), 2 C. & M. 477 ; 4 Tyr. 158 ; 3 L. J. Ex. 128. . 942 
 
 Sunimersett v. Adamson (1822), 1 Bing. 73 293 
 
 Sumner r. AVilliams (Dudley v. Sumner) (1809), 5 Mass. 444 372 
 
 Sunderland, Re (1800), 35 L. J. P. & M. 82 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 198 ; 14 
 
 L. T. 741 ; 14 \V. R 971 701 
 
 SunderlaTid'.s, Hodgson's, Kirkwood's, and Martin's cases (1830), 1 Lew. 
 
 C. C. 102 248 
 
 Suroome r. Pinnigor (1853), 3 De G. M. & G. 571 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 419 ; 17 
 
 Jur. 196 679 
 
 Surplioof. Farnsworth (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 676; 8 Scott, N. R. 306; 13 
 
 L. J. C. P. 215 774 
 
 Suse V. Pompe (1860), 8 C. B. N. S. 638 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 75 ; 7 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 106 I 9 W. R 15 781 
 
 Sussex Peerage case (1844), 11 CI. & Fin. 114-117 ; 8 Jur. 793 ... .7, 51, 411. 
 
 422, 434, 435, 430. 437, 407, 936, 937, 958 
 
 Suter V. Burrell (1857), 2 H. & N. 807 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 193 311 
 
 Sutton V. Ainslie (1852), 1 Maeq. 299 ; 1 Paterson. 72 348 
 
 Sutton ». Buck (1810), 2 Taunt. 302; 11 R. R. 585 110, 117 
 
 Sutton i>. Ciceri (1890), 15 App. Cas. 144 ; 02 L. T. 742 742 
 
 Sutton V. Devonport (1858). 27 L. J. C. P. 54 109, 520 
 
 Sutton t'. Gi-egory (1797), Peako. Ad. C. 160 ; 4 R. R. 899 464 
 
 Sutton V. Johnstone (1787), 1 T. R. 493, 784 ; 1 Br. P. C. 76 ; 1 R. R. 257 . . 30 
 Sutton r. Sadler (1857), 26 L. J. C. P. 284 ; 3 C. B. N. S. 87 ... .10!), 170, 262 
 Sutton r. Suttxm (1882), 22 Ch. D. 611 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 338 ; 48 L. T. 98 ; 
 
 31 W. R. 372 721 
 
 Sutton V. Tatham (1839), 10 A. & E. 27 ; 2 P. & D. 308 ; 8 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 210 158 
 
 Sutton V. Temple (1843), 12 M. & W. 64 ; 30 L. J. Ex. 17 774, 776, 776, 777 
 
 Swain v. Lewis (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 261 ; 5 Tyr. 998 317 
 
 Swan V. N. Brit. Austral. Co. (1863), 2 H. & C. 175; 32 L. J. Ex. 273; 2 
 
 NewR. 621: 11 W. R. 802; 10 Jur. N. S. 102 641, 1205 
 
 Swan's case (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 075 ; 18 W. R. 447 843 
 
 Swann v. Phillips (1838), 8 A. & E. 457 ; 3 N. & P. 1017 ; 22 L. T. 854 . . 719 
 
 Swanne v. Taatt'e (1845), 8 Ir. L. R. 101 817 
 
 Swansea Bk. v. Thomas (1879), 48 L. J. Ex. 344 ; 4 Ex. D. 94 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 658 ; 27 W. R. 491 139 
 
 Swansea v. Ry. Co.m'. Budd (1800), L. R. 2 Eq. 274 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 031 ; 
 
 14 W. R. 663 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 501 1189 
 
 Swatman v. Ambler (1852), 8 Ex. 72 : 22 L. J. Ex. 81 C76 
 
 Sweeney v Spoouer (1863), 32 L. J. M. C. 82 ; 3 B. & S. 329 ; 7 L. T. 023; 
 
 11 W. R. 204 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 091 894 
 
 Sweeny v. Promoter Life Ass. Co. (1863), 14 Ir. C. L. R. 476 638, 639 
 
 Sweet r. Lee (1841), 3 M. & Gr. 452 673, 075, 783, 784 
 
 Sweeting v. Fowler (1815), 1 Stark. R. 106 1(38, 217 
 
 Sweeting v. Pcarce (1861), 7 C. B. N. S. 449 ; 9 C. B. N. S. 634 ; 30 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 109 ; 6 L. T. 79 ; 9 W. R. 343 168 
 
 Sweetland v. Sweetland (1805). 4 S. & T. 6 ; 24 L. J. P. 42 ; 11 Jur. N. S. 
 
 182; 11 L. T. 749; 13 W. R. 604 699 
 
 Vol. I. ends with page 635. 
 
 iiir ■ i 
 
Is 
 
 cxcvi 
 
 T\m.V. OF CASKS (ITKD. 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Hwi'maH r. Berk flfl22), R Hitk. & R. 305 ll;ti» 
 
 8*ift r. J)..aii (IHIO), (l.IdliiiM. 5'i.l (>10 
 
 Bwift r. Kynw (KiHd). Oro. Ciip. ftlH 80'2 
 
 Swift 1'. JfWfHhiiry (1H7 1). 4:1 I- .1. Q. B. 60 ; L. U. !) Q. H .101 ; 43 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. ftC, ; ;{0 L. T. 31 ; 22 VV. R liUi 71» 
 
 Swift V. MTi.Timn {I8IH), 11 Fr. K.]. R. OOi 1H7, UiM. 1051. lUiH, 1173 
 
 Swift r. I'amicl! (1HH3), M Oh. 1). 21(1 ; IH L. T. 351 ; 31 \V. R. ')J3 731 
 
 Swift V. Swift (1H32), 4 }\'>Hif. (K<c.) LVl 901, 'MVl 
 
 Swift r. Wiiit.rhoMmni (1S73), 12 ]j. J. U. H. Ill ; L. R. 8 Q. H. 2JJ 71H 
 
 Swiiicy c Barry (183.i), Joiicn, lOU 11!I9 
 
 Kwiiifon r. L(l. ChcltiiNfonl (18(10), fi IT. & N. 800; 2!) L. J. Kx. 382; (! Jiir. 
 
 N. S. 103.'); 2 L. T. 40(i ; HW.R. r,\r, 201, /J08 
 
 Swliifi'ti V. Swiiif.ti (I8,')7), 2r, h. J. C. r. 303; 20 L. J. C. P. 97; 1 C. B. 
 
 X. S. 301 ; 3 Jiir. N. S 85 .107 
 
 HwiniKTtoii r. Staflnnl, M. of (1810), 3 Tiiun. 91 430, lor.O 
 
 Swir.; >: Vthumh (1877). 3 App. Cum. 100 ; 47 h J. P. 0. 18 ; 37 L. T. .■).')4 .'•.80 
 Syl.rav f. Whito (1830), 1 M. & W. 43.'); Tyr. He (Jr. 740 ; 2 Oali". 08 ; r, 
 
 L. .1. Kx. 173 499 
 
 Sydi'iihamr. Rami (1784), 3 DouK. 429 814 
 
 SV<TH r. .ToiiuH (1818). 2 Kx. Ill 7()8 
 
 HykiM. R.^ 1873), 42 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; L. R. 3 P. & D. 20 ; 28 L. T. 142; 
 
 21 \V. R. 410 142 
 
 Syk»« V. Dixoii (1839), 9 A. * 1'). 093 ; 1 P. & I). 403; 1 W. W. & H. 120. 009 
 
 Syk.M r. Diuibiir (1800), 2 Scilw. N. P. 1081 016 
 
 Sylpli, Tho 1 1 843-4), 2 NotoH of (!aH. {Kvr.. & Mar.) 80 1 122 
 
 Sylv.'HtfT V. Jlall (1825), Ry. & M. 255, ii 272 
 
 SymmoiiH r. Blako (1835), 1 M. & Rob. 477 244 
 
 SymoiidH V. (JaMlij^ht and Cokn Co. f IH 18), 1 1 Bcav. 283 52(1 
 
 SymoiiilH V. Lloyd (1859), C. B. N. H. OlJl 704 
 
 SyinoiiB f. Rt-oH (1870), 1 Kx. D. 410 1118 
 
 T. V. D. (faWly cnllod D.) (1800), L. R. 1 P. & D. 127 128 
 
 Talbot, Lxl. f. CiiHack (1804), 17 Ir. (J. L. R. 21 3 924, 925 
 
 Talljot t'. HodKMon (1810), 7 Tuun. 251 ; 2 MaPHb. 527 134 
 
 TallM.t I. lIodMoii f 1810), 7 Taiin. 2.;, ; 2 M.r "i. 527 1209 
 
 Talbot V. I>!wiH (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 495 ; 5 Jyr. 1 398 
 
 TttUx.t f. S.K'inan (1801), 1 (Jran.ib. 1 1093 
 
 Talbiitt V. Chirk M840), 2 M. & liob. 312 246 
 
 Tumvttco V. LiicaH (1802), 1 B. & H. 185 ; 3 B. (fie H. 89 ; 30 I,. .1. il B. 234; 
 
 31 L. J. Q. B. 290; 4 L. T. 400; I.. T. 0!)7 ; 10 W. R. 733 ; 7 .Jur. 
 
 N. H. 1 100 42 
 
 TancriKl v. DolaKoa Bay Ry. Co. (1889), 23 <i. B. I). 239; 58 L. .7. «i. B. 
 
 .549; 01 L. T. 229 ; 38 W. R. 15 (iSl 
 
 Tanbutn v. NicbolHon (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 501 ; 1. R. C. L. 188 158 
 
 Tarin v. Taiiii (1803), 2 N«!W R. 4 12 802 
 
 Tnnn.rt;. Smart (1827), B. & 0. 009; 9 I). & R. 549 710, 712, 714 
 
 Tanner v. Taylor ( 1 750), .;it<^l 3 T. R. 754 924 
 
 Taplin v. Atty (1825), 3 BImj^. 104 ; 10 Mooro (C. I*.), 504 311 
 
 Taj.lin f. Fh.rcnrf) (1851), 10 C. B. 744 ; 20 L. .1. C. I'. 137 ; 15 .Jur. 402. 038 
 Taplin« v. .fouim (1805), 11 H. L. Can. 290 ; 20 <;. B, N. H. 100 ; 34 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 342 ; 1 1 .Tur. N. S. 309 ; 12 L. T. 555 ; 13 W. R. 017 76 
 
 Tapp V. !>•., (1803), 3 B. & P. 371 82 
 
 Tarhitoii v. Sbin>fl.;r (1819), 7 C B. 812 1203 
 
 Tarleton r. Tarhttoii (1815), 4 M. & Sol. 20 1142, 1154, 11515 
 
 Tarltoii V. FiMbor (1781), 2 Doii^. 071 872 
 
 Tarjih-y v. BlaUiy (1830), 2 Binj^. N. C. 437 ; 2 Srott, 042 ; 7 C & P. 396 ; 
 
 Hf)«lK'-«, 414 24S 
 
 Tarti! V. Darby (1810), 15 M. & W. 001 ; 15 L. .1. Kx. 320 0.58 
 
 TathaiM >'. I)riun?Mond (1804), 33 L. .1. Ch. 438 ; 2 II. & M. 202 HM 
 
 TatUTMiilI V. Koarnley ( 1 850), 1 7 C. B. 308 282 
 
 TatUrnthall v. Nat. SloainMhip Co. (1884), 12 (i. B. I). 297 : 53 L. .1. Q. B. 
 
 332 ; 50 L. T. 299 ; 32 W. R. 500 ; 5 AHp. M. C. 200 771 
 
 Tht refereneet art to paff0>, not to parngrapht> 
 
TABLE 01^ CASKS CITED. 
 
 Tiitltiti, Ex imrto, Ro Tliorp (1881), 17 Ch. D. 612; m L. J. Hi. 702 ; 4.') 
 L. T. HI) 
 
 TiivliT r. VViif.TH (IH17), 7 Tiiuii. :t7t : ■> MarHli. .'),'.! : IH K. U. VM 
 
 TuVlciir r. Wil.liii (1808), L. H. a Kx. :)()H ; ;i7 I-. .1. Ex. 17a ; 18 L. T. 
 (if).'i ; 1(1 W. K. 1018 
 
 TavltxM'. llW'<(18-''<). 1 !'«'»• 61" 
 
 'lujlor, Ex i-iiit.' ( I8.'()), 1 Jiio. A: W. 48a 1 
 
 Tiivlor, K.' (1812), '.> I'liiK". t'H 
 
 TiiVl'ir, Kf (18i)l). 2 HolicrtH. 711 
 
 Tnyic.f, |{.', Climk c. lliminioiul (1887), a» Ch. D. 2.'),') ; M\ F.. .1 Ch. 171 
 
 ,^(1 1,. T. (ii'.> : a;) W. li. I8ti 
 
 Tiivlor, In triioiiH (if (1S!)0). (la L. T. 2ao 
 
 Taylor r. Hanl.iy (1828), 2 Him. 2ia ; 7 L. J. Ch. ((). 8.) 0.5 a, 18 
 
 Tajlor c. Ihv'vh (17r.»). 1 Yen. hcii. 2'J7 ('nil, 
 
 Tayl.ir v. lUackhiw (18a(i), a Hiii^f. N. C. 2ar) ; a Scott, (ill ; 2 lIodjfi'N, 
 
 221 
 
 Taylor r. HowcrH (1S77), Ui L. J. Q. B. au ; I Q H. I). 21)1 ; a4 L. T. 
 
 !)MS ; 21 VV. K. 111!) 
 
 Taylor c. BriKK« (1827), 2 C. & V.Mr>- M. \- M. 28 
 
 TaVlor i: Hiny.'Hn (18.)'.)), r> H. \- N. 1 ; 22 L. .1. Ex. 7 
 
 Taylor r. Cariu'iitcr (ISI(i), 2 Wooill). & M. r, 
 
 Taylor v. tnciUMoii (1811), 2 Q. It. loai ; a Kailw. CaH. (lo ; 2 U. Ac 1). atC. ; 
 
 II (!1. & Kin. (ilO ; N .Tnr 8aa 10'..8, 
 
 Taylor r. Colo (I7!M»\ 7 T. U. a, n. ; J 11. K. aoa 4 24, 
 
 Taylor v. Vtwh (1820), 8 IVifi", (:.V2 122(!, 
 
 Taylor r. Croki-r (ISoa), 4 Esp. 187 
 
 Taylor v. D.'vcy (18a7), 7 A. & E. 4()i) ; 2 N. & 1". 4(i!) ; VV. W. \- 1). 04(5 ; 
 
 1 .Iiir. 8.12 
 
 Taylor f. Dii.lork (181.')), 2 I'hillini. 2(il 
 
 Taylor v. Eorstfr (182.')), 2 C. \- 1'. IH-') .'iOO, 
 
 Taylor v. tit. Intl. IVii. Ky. Co. (18iV.)), 4 Do (1. & J. iuM) ; 28 L. J. Ch. 
 
 7(li) 
 
 Taylor r. llawkina (18,')1), 1(1 Q. It. a()8 ; 20 L. J. Q. It. aia; 15 .Tiir. 
 
 74(1 4(1 
 
 CXOVll 
 
 I'AOK 
 
 848 
 (i3h 
 
 MA 
 
 277 
 047 
 
 a7a 
 
 (1U9 
 
 7i)3 
 70.5 
 , 21 
 080 
 
 (100 
 
 01 
 
 7()a 
 
 7.-.8 
 a24 
 
 74(1 
 
 iia7 
 
 11. ")H 
 
 1227 
 .V17 
 
 401 
 
 174 
 
 , 1)09 
 
 111 
 
 Taylor r. llor.lo (17.')7). 1 Burr. 107 laa 
 
 Ta'vlor r. lIuKh.'H (1844), 2 .lonos \- Ea T. 24 .'>41 
 
 Taylor v. llnmiihri.n (1H(14), 17 ('. M. N. S. Aao ; a4 E. .1. M. C. 1 ; 10 
 
 ■tur. N. H. 1 IM ; 111,. T. a7(i ; la \V. K. 1.1(1 '263 
 
 Tpylor .'. .lohiwton (1882), .ll E. J. Ch. 870; 10 Ch. D. 4(ia ; 4(1 E. T. 219; 
 
 :')() \V. I{. MH 137 
 
 Taylor r. Kinlo.'h (181(1), 1 Stark. U. 17i") 147, 498 
 
 Tavlur r. Eaxyson (182S), a C. & V. iVia 'jlO 
 
 Taylor r. EinU-y (18(10), 2 J)o (1. E. & J. 84 ; 20 E. .1. Ch. .)a4 : 8 W. K. 
 
 7ai) 683 
 
 Taylor r. Jl.mdH (ISd.l), 34 L. J. Ch. 203; 4 Do U.J. & S. Ml ; 13 W. U. 
 
 304 ; 1 1 .lur. N. S. 1(10 (193 
 
 Tiivlor r. MoH.Oy (18.13), (1 V. & V. 273 1103,111)4 
 
 Ta'ylorr. Nfotlhani (1811), 2 Taiin. 278; 11 K. It. .'■)72 Htl, 97 
 
 Taylor r. Nicholln (1840), (1 AE \- \V. 0.^ ; 8 Dowl. 242 ; E. J. Ex. 78. .732. 733 
 
 Taylor f. I'arry (1840), I M. & (ir. (104 ; 1 Scott, N. K. 570 234, 803, 1002 
 
 Taylor v. Kichanlmm (1853), 2 Drew. 1(1 7(t 
 
 Ta'vlor v. Kohh (1832), 3 Yorker, 330 (109 
 
 Taylor «•. Smith (1802), (U E. ,1. i.i. It. 331 ; 07 E. T. 30 ; 40 W. E. 4,S0. . (172 
 Taylor •-. Stray (18.')7), 2 C. It. N. S. 17.^, 107 ; 20 E. .1. C. V. 287 ; 3 .Iiir. 
 
 N. 8. 9(14 l/)8 
 
 Taylor v. Wakclidd (IS.IO), K. & It. 7(1.') 090 
 
 Taylor v. Weld (18001, 5 Mmhn. 1 1(1 740 
 
 Taylor v. Williiim (WilliauiH) (1830.31), 4 M. & l\ M ; 2 It. & Aid. 84.') . . 372, 
 
 500, 832 
 
 Taylor v. Witluun (1870), 3 Ch. D. 005 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 708 438 
 
 Teal .'. Aiity (1820), 2 It. & It. 99 ; 4 Mooro (C. 1'.), 542 087 
 
 TcmiuTli'y r. Scott (1832), 8 ItinK- 392 ; 1 M. & Sc. (101 818, lO.tO 
 
 Vol. I. tndt with pag* (136. 
 
 iiiit'illl 
 
i I 
 
 CXCVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Tempest, Ex parte, Ro Craven (1870), 40 L. J. Bank. 22 ; L. R. 6 Ch. 70 ; 
 
 23 L. T. G50 ; 19 W. R. 137 , 
 
 Tempest v. Fitzgerald (1820' , C B. & Aid. 680 
 
 Tempest v. Kiluer (1845), 2 C. 3. 300; 15 L. J. C. P. 101 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 
 
 407 201 
 
 82 
 G89 
 
 , osri 
 
 , 809 
 1205 
 
 159 
 1004 
 
 1004 
 
 947 
 
 128 
 
 189 
 
 GO 
 
 1103 
 
 253 
 
 1205 
 
 750 
 1107 
 1221 
 
 Temple, Ex parte (1H14), 2 Ves. & B. 395 806 
 
 Temple v. Tullen (1853), 8 Kx. 3S9 : :'2 L. J. Kx. 151 38, 
 
 Teiinaiit, Ex parte, Re Howard (1877j, 6 Ch. D. 303 ; 37 L. T. 284; 25 
 
 W R 854 
 Tcnnant v. Boll (1816')", 9 Q.' B.684'; ioL. J." M." oVlii "; ' io'jur.' Dili' .'.37, 
 Tennant i'. Creston (Overton) (1840), 2 New S-8.s. Cas. 425 ; 8 Q. B. 707 ; 
 
 15 L. J. M. C. 105 ; 10 Jur. fiOO 
 
 Tcnnant v. Hamilton (1839), 7 CI. & Fin. 122 ; McL. & R. 821 
 
 T.-nnent i'. Noil (1870), I. R. o C. L. 418 
 
 Tennyson v. O'Brien (1855), 5 E. & B. 497 
 
 Terrett v. Taylor (1815). 9 Cnmoli, 43 
 
 Terry v. Huntington (10()9), Hardr. 480 
 
 Terry v. Hutchinson (1808). 37 L. J. Q. B. 257 : 9 B. & S. 487 ; L. R. 3 
 
 Q. B. 699 ; 18 L. T. 521 ; 16 W. R. 932 
 
 Texira v. Evans (undated), cited 1 Anst. 228 ; 2 H. Bl. 140 ; 4 T. R. 320 ; 
 
 2 R. R. 399 
 
 Thames Iron Works Co. v. The Royal Mail St. ['aoket Co. (1862), 13 C. B. 
 
 N. S. 358 ; 31 L. J. C. F. 169 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 100 
 
 Thanct, E. of v. Forstrr (1683), T. .Tones, 224 
 
 Tnarpe v. Gisbunie (1825), 2 C. & P. 21 
 
 Tharpe v. Stallwood (1843), 5 M. & Or. 768 ; 6 Seott, N. R. 715 ; 12 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 241 ; 1 Dowl & L. 24 ; 7 Jur. 492 227 
 
 That(!her v. Waller (1675), T. Jones, 53 340 
 
 ThelluHon v. Cosling (1803), 4 Esp. 266 1093 
 
 Theobald v. Criohmore (1818), 1 B. & Aid. 227 227 
 
 Theodor Komor, The (1878), 3 P. Div. 162 ; 47 L. J. Adm. 85 ; 3S L. T. 
 
 818 ; 27 W. R. 307 1186 
 
 Thotford V. Tyler (1845), 8 Q. B. 95 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 33 ; 10 Jur. 68 .... 169 
 
 Thotford's case (1719), 12 Vin. Abr. 90, pi. 16 1050, 1175 
 
 Thin r. Richards (1892), 2 Q. B. 141 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 39 ; 66 L. T. 327 ; 
 
 56 J. P. 596 770 
 
 Thorn V. Bigland (1853). 8 Ex. 726 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 243 201 
 
 Thomas, In the goods of (1871), 41 L. J. P. & M. 32 ; 25 L. T. 509 ; 20 
 
 W. R. 149 439 
 
 Thomas, Re (1859), 1 S & T. 255 ; 28 L. J. Prob. 33 69H 
 
 Thomas Blyth, The (1860), L\ish. A<lni. 16 177 
 
 Thomas v. An-loy (IS116), 6 E.sp. 8(1 84, 283 
 
 Thomas r. Bro^n (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 714 ; 46 L. J. Q. B. 811 ; 35 L. T. 
 
 237 : 24 AV. R. 821 538, 671 
 
 Tliomasf. CliurUm (1H62), '2 B. & S. 475; 31 L. J. Q. B. 139; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. H. 795 ; (i L. T. 320 869 
 
 Thomas v. Council (183S). 4 M. & W. 267 ; 1 H. & H. 189 ; 7 L. J. Ex. 
 
 306 379 
 
 Tliomast). Cook (1818), 2 Stark. (N. P.) 408; 2 B. & A. 119; 20 R. R. 
 
 374 128, 660, 661 
 
 Thomas ». Cooke (1828), 8 B. & C. 728 ; 3 M. & Rv. 444 678, 679 
 
 Thomas v. David (1836), 7 C & P. 350 918, 950 
 
 Thomas v. JOvans (1802), 2 Kast, 488 705 
 
 Thomas v. Foylo (1803), 5 Esp. 8S 116 
 
 Thomas V. Fredericks (1847), 10 Q. B. 775; 16 L. J. Q. B. 393; 11 Jur. 
 
 942 638 
 
 ThomiiH V. .Tonkins (1837). 6 A. & E. 825 ; 1 N. & P. 587 ; 1 Jur. 261. .396, 398 
 
 Thomas v. Kot.toric'.lie (1749), 1 Ves. sen. 333 1106 
 
 Thomas v. liowis (1878), 4 Ex. D. 18 ; 48 L. J. Ex. 7 ; 39 L. T. 669 ; 27 
 
 W. R. Ill 173 
 
 Thomas «>. Morgan (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 496 ; 4 Dowl. 2J3 ; 1 Uale, 172 ; 
 
 5 Tyr. 1085 515 
 
 Thomas v. Newton (1826), M. & M. 4H, n 969 
 
 Th* rt/ertnee.1 are to pni/es, not lo pariijrapha. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXCIX 
 
 FAQB 
 
 Thomas «. Packer (1857), 1 H. & N. 669 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 207 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 143 o 169 
 
 Thomas v. Rawlings (1859), 27 Beav. 110 697, 598 
 
 Thomas v. Sorrcll (uiidiited), Vau«h. 351 C38 
 
 Thomas v. Stephenson (1853), 2 E. & B. 108 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 17 Jur. 
 
 5!»7 227 
 
 Thomas v. Thomas (1796), 6 T. R. 671 ; 3 R. R. 306 794, 799 
 
 Thomas v. Thomas (1811), 2 Camp. 647 524 
 
 Thomas v. Thomas (1860), 2 Dr. & Sm. 298 173 
 
 Thomas r. Williams (1830), 10 B. &C. 604 678 
 
 Thompson, Ex piirto (184.>). 6 Q. B. 721 998 
 
 Thompson, Goods iif, Ro (1887), 12 P. D. 100; 56 L. J. P. D. & A. 40; 57 
 
 L. T. 373 ; 35 W. R. 384 413 
 
 Thompsons. Bowyer (1863), 2 Now R. 604; 11 W. R 97.); 9 Jur. N. S. 863. . 720 
 
 Thompson v. IJonaldsou (1800), 3 Esp. 63 ; 6 R. R. 812 1 104 
 
 Thompson v. Fiilk (1852). 1 Drew. 21 601 
 
 Thompson «'. Gardiner (1876), 1 C. P. D. 777 297 
 
 Thompson 0. Gibson (1841). 8 M.&W. 285; lOL. J.Ex. 21 1 ; 9lJortl.717 .. 1073 
 
 Thompson v. Hopper (1856), 25 L. J. Q. B. 240 ; 6 E. & B. 172 771 
 
 Thompson v. Uiv.y (1820), 3 B. & Aid. 283 162 
 
 Thompson v. Lambe (1802), 7 Ves. 588 482 
 
 Thompson v. Mosely (1833), 5 C. & P. 502 231, 321 
 
 Tliompson v. Nye (1850), 16 Q. B. 175 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 85 ; 15 Jur. 285. . 256 
 Thompson v. Ro.ss (1858), 29 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 6 II. «& N. 16; 5 Jur. N. S. 
 
 1133; 1 L. T. 43 253 
 
 Thompson v. Small (1845), 1 C. B. 328 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 157 152 
 
 Thompson t'. Trail (1826), 2 C. & P. 334 ; B. & 0. 36 ; 9 D. & R. 31 .. 152 
 
 Thompson v. Troviiuiou,( 1691). Skin. 402 377 
 
 Thompson v. Waithman ( i856), 3 Drew. 028 ; 26 L. J. Ch. 134 490 
 
 Thomson v. Austen (18231. 2 Dowl. & Ry. 361 479, 614 
 
 Thomson r. Davenport (1829), 9 B. & C. 78 ; 4 M. & R. 110 520 
 
 Thomson f. Hull (1852). 2 Robertson, 426 097 
 
 Thomson v. Harding (1853), 2 E. & B. 630 ; 22 L. J. Q. B. 448 510 
 
 Thomson v. Hompjnstall (1849), 7 Notes of Gas. (Ece. & Mar.) 141 ; 1 
 
 Roberts. 783 798 
 
 Tliomsou V. Wilson (1818). 2 Stark. 379 656 
 
 Thorington v. Smith (1868). 8 Wall. (U. S.) 1 763 
 
 Thomdike v. City of Boston (1810), 1 Meto. 242 377 
 
 Thome v. Jackson (1846), 3 C. B. 661 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 87 ; 4 Dowl. & L. 
 
 478 17 
 
 Thome v. Tilbury (1858), 27 L. J. Ex. 407 ; 3 H. & N. 534 645 
 
 Thomos V. White (18;i5), Tyr. \; «ir. 1 10 531 
 
 Thornhill v. ThornhiU (1820), 2 Jae. & W. 347 814 
 
 Thornton v. Clharles (1836), 2 M. & W. 809 298 
 
 Thornton v. Kempstur (1814), 6 Taun. 786 : 1 Marsh. 355 ; 15 R. R. 658 . .297, 
 
 299 
 
 Thomt<m f. Moux (1827), M. & M. 43 297 
 
 Thornton r. Place (1832). 1 M. & Rob. 218 1122 
 
 Thornton t'. Roy. Ex. Ass. Co. (1791). P.ia. R. 25 935 
 
 Thorp. Re, Ex parte Tatton (1881), 17 Ch. D. 512 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 792 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 89 84S 
 
 Thorp V. Holdsworth (1876). 45 L. J. Ch. 406 ; 3 Ch. 1). 637 224 
 
 Thorpe «•. C<inpcr (1828), 5 BiiiMf. 129 ; > M. k P. 245 ; 2 Y. & J. 445 1123 
 
 Thorpe V. Mii.wiulay (1820). 5 Madd. 229 961 
 
 Thresh v. Rake (1794), 1 Esp. 53 752 
 
 Thunder «'. Warren (1845). 8 Ir. Law R. 181 285 
 
 Thurbaine et al. (1664), llardr. 323 543 
 
 Thurlo V. Miidis<m (1655). Sty. 462 1214 
 
 Thurston v. Slatford (1700), 1 Salk. 284, 285 357 
 
 Thurtell's case (tindatod). cited 8 C. & P. 284 8,S9 
 
 Thurtell ♦>. Beaumont (1823), S Moore, C. V. 612 ; 1 Hintf. 339 105 
 
 Thwaites fi. Foreman (1844), 1 Coll. 409, 414; 10 .Tur. 183 144 
 
 Thwttites V. Richardson (1790), Pea. R. 16 ; 3 R. !i. 645 488 
 
 Vol. J. *nd» with pagt 636. 
 
cc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAQX 
 
 Thwaites v. WUding (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 4 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 49 L. T. 
 
 396 ; 32 W. R. 80 723 
 
 Thynne, Lady E., v. Ld. Glengall (1847-8), 2 H. L. Cas. 131 679, 806 
 
 Tichborne case (1871-2). MS. 28th Feb. 18V2 55, 608 
 
 Tickel V. Short (1750), 2 Ves. sen. 239 1525 
 
 Tickle V. Brown (1836), 4 A. & E. 378 ; 6 N. & M. 230 ; 1 H. & W. 769 . .446. 
 
 5\n 
 Tidey v. Mollett (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 298 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 235 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 380 ; 12 W. R. 802 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 800 619 
 
 Tidmarsh v. Grover (1813). 1 M. & Sel. 735 ; 14 R. R. 563 1194 
 
 Tiemey v. Wood (1854j. 19 Beav. 330 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 895 ; 2 W. R. 677 . . ^65 
 
 Tiprhe v. Tighe (1877), I. R. 11 Eq. 203 1151 
 
 Tildesley v. Harper (1876-78), 7 Ch. D. 403 ; 10 Ch. D. 393 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 
 
 495 ; 39 L. T. 552 ; 27 W. R. 249 186, 188, 221, 224 
 
 Tiley v. Cowling (1701), 1 Ld. Raym. 744 1117 
 
 Tilghman v. Fisher (1840), 9 "Watts, 441 520 
 
 Tillotson, Ex parte (1816), 1 Stark. 470 871 
 
 Timson v. Wilson (1888), 38 Ch. D. 72 ; 69 L. T. 76; 36 W. R. 418 .... 22 
 
 Tindall v. Baskett (1801), 2 F. & F. 664 270 
 
 Tinley v. Porter (1837), 6 Dowl. 744 ; 2 M. & W. 822 832 
 
 Tinn v. Billingsley (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 253 ; 3 Dowl. 810 474 
 
 Tippet's ca.se (R. v. Tippet) (1823), R. & R. 509 560 
 
 Tippets V. Heane (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 252 ; 4 Tyr. 772 714 
 
 Tippins V. Coates (1847), 6 Hare, 16 971 
 
 Tirzah, The (1878), 48 L. J. P. D. & A. 15 ; 4 P. D. 33 177 
 
 Tisdall V. Pamell (1863), 14 Ir. C. L. R. 1. 27, 28 433, 1167, 1168 
 
 Titus Gates' case (1685), 10 How. St. Tr. 1185 877 
 
 Tobacco-pipe Makers' Co. v. Loder (1851), 14 Q. B. 765 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 414 ; 15 Jur. 1194 71 
 
 Toby V. Lovibond (1848), 6 C. B. 784 ; 6 Dowl. & L. 769 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 
 
 201 ; 12 Jur. 436 1160 
 
 Tod f. E. of Winchelsea (1828), 3 C. & P. 387 141, 284, 353 
 
 Todd V. Kerrich (1852), 8 Ex. 161 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 17 Jur. 119 36, 1 53 
 
 Toddf. Reid(1821), 4 B. & Aid. 210 158 
 
 Todd V. Winchelsea, Ld. (1826), 2 C. & P. 488 ; M & M. 12 141 
 
 Toft V. Stephenson (1851), 1 De G. M. & G. 28 ; 21 L. J. Ch. 129 ; 16 Jur. 
 
 1187 720 
 
 Toker v. Toker (1863). 31 Beav. 629 ; 3 De G. & 8m. 487 ; 8 L. T. 525, 
 
 777 ; 32 L. J. Ch. 322 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 370 137 
 
 Toleman v. Portbury (1869), 39 L. J. Q. B. 136 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 288 ; 22 
 
 L. T. 33 ; 18 W. R. 579 260, 622 
 
 Toleman, Re, Ex parte Bramble (1880), 13 Ch. D. 885 ; 42 L. T. 413 ; 28 
 
 W. R. 676 321 
 
 Tollemache, Re, Anderson, Ex parte (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 606 ; 54 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 383 ; 52 L. T. 786 1013, 1110, 1114 
 
 Tollemache, Re, Ex parte Edwards (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 415 435, 629 
 
 Tollemache V. Tollemache (1861), 30 L J. P. &M. 113; I S. & T. 667 .. 1144 
 
 Tolman and Ux v. Johnstone (1860), 2 F. & F. 66 949 
 
 Tomkins v. Att.-Gen. (1813), 1 Dow, 404 1050 
 
 Tomkins Saltmarsh (1826), 14 Serg. & R. 276 378 
 
 Tomkins v. Tomkins (1859), 1 8w. & Tr. 168 48 
 
 Tomkinson v. Staight (1856), 26 L. J. C. P. 85 ; 17 C. B. 697 ; 2 Jur. 354. . 690 
 Tomlinson v. Gell (1837), 6 A. & E. 564 ; 1 N. & P. 588 ; W. W. & D. 229 678 
 
 Tompson v. Williamson (1831), 7 Bligh, 432 160 
 
 Toms t'. Cuming (1865), 7 M. & Gr. 88 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 910 ; 1 Lut. Reg. 
 
 Cas. 269; 14 L. J. C. P. 58; 9 Jur. 91 711, 726 
 
 Tomsou ti. Judge (1855). 3 Drew. 306 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 929 ; 2 Eq. R. 1141 . . 137 
 
 Toogood i'. Spyring (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193 ; 4 Tyr. 582 Ill 
 
 T<x)kert). Smith (1857), 1 H. & N. 732 654 
 
 Topham v. M'Gregor (1844), 1 C. & K. 320 324, 925 
 
 Toppiu 1'. Lomas (1855), 16 C. B. 145 ; 24 L. J. C. P. 144 682 
 
 Topping, Ex parte. Re Levy and Robson (1865), 34 L. J. Bank. 44; 12 
 L. T. 787 ; 13 W. R. 1026 715 
 
 The re/erencet are to ptyet, not to paragrapht. 
 
J*,# '- 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CCl 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Torriano ». Young (1833), 6 C. & P. 8 169 
 
 Tottenham's Estate, Re (1869), Ir. E. 3 Eq. 628 86 
 
 Toulmin v. Copland (1848), 2 PhiU. 711 1117 
 
 Toulmin v. Price (1800), 5 Ves. 238 308 
 
 Touixet V. Cripps (1879), 48 L. J. Ch. 667 ; 27 W. R. 706 675 
 
 Tovey, In re (1878), 1 P. Div. 150 ; 45 L. J. P. 78 ; 34 L. T. 856 ; 24 
 
 W. R. 539 701 
 
 Tovey v. Lindsay (1813), 1 Dow, 117 1143, 1144 
 
 Towers v. Newton (1841), 1 Q. B. 319 ; 10 L. J. Q. B. 106 ; 9 Dowl. 576. . 871 
 
 Town of Union v. Bermes (1882), 44 New Jersey Reports (Law), 269 508 
 
 Towne v. Campbell (1847), 3 C. B. 921 ; 16 L. J. C. P. 104 35 
 
 Towno V. Lewis (1849), 7 C. B. 608 152 
 
 Towne v. Smith (1845), 1 Woodb. & M. 116 1151 
 
 Townend v. Drakeford (1843), 1 C. & K. 20 297, 298, 299 
 
 Townley v. Watson (1844), 3 Curt. 761 ; 3 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & M.) 17. . 707 
 
 Townsend v. Ives (1748), 1 Wils. 216 1215 
 
 Townsend, M. of v. Strangroom (1801), 6 Ves. 339 ; 5 R. R. 312 749, 750 
 
 Townsend v. Weld (1811), 8 Mass. 146 759 
 
 Townshend Peer. (1843), 10 01. & Fin. 289 422 
 
 Toymbeev. Brown (1849), 3 Ex. 117; 18 L. J. Ex. 99 76 
 
 Tracy Peer. (1839), Min. Ev. 18 1167 
 
 Traoy Peer. (1843), 10 CI. & Fin. 191 422, 423, 425, 931, .226, 1228 
 
 Trattord v. Blanc (see In re Truefort). 
 
 Trail V. Baring (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 521 ; 4 GifF. ^85 559 
 
 Trasher v. Everhart (1831), 3 Gill & John. 234, 242 61 
 
 Traversf. Blundell (1877), 6Ch. D. 436; 36 L. T. 341 801 
 
 Treacy v. Corcoran (1874), I. R. 8 C. L. 40 139 
 
 Treeby, Re (1875), L. R. 3 P. & D. 242 ; 44 L. J. P. & M. 44 706 
 
 Tregany v. Fletcher (1696), 1 Ld. Raym. 154 19 
 
 Trelawney v. Colman (1817), 2 Stark. 193 147, 375, 376, 930 
 
 Treraain v. Barrett (1816), 6 Taun. 88 ; 1 Marsh. 463 ; 16 R R. 584 .... 818 
 
 Trench v. Doran (1887), 20 L. R. Ir. 338 746, 784 
 
 Trent v. Hunt (18 i3), 9 Ex. 14 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 318 ; 17 Jur. 899 98, 152 
 
 Tress v. Savage (1854), 23 L. J. Q. B. 339 ; 4 E. & B. H6 ; 2 C. L. R. 1315 ; 
 
 18 Jur. 680 655 
 
 Trevanion, Re (1850), 2 Roberts. 311 700 
 
 Trevivan t-. Lawrence (1704), 1 Salk. 276 ; 2 Smith, L. C. 664 89 
 
 Trewhitt v. Lambert (1839), 10 A. & E. 470 ; 3 P. & D. 676 588 
 
 Tribe v. Tribe (1849), 7 Notes of Cas. 132 ; 1 Roberts. 775 6:)o 
 
 Trickett v. Tomlinson (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 663 ; 7 L. T. 678 538 
 
 Trimbey v. Vignier (1834), 1 Bing. N. C. 151 ; 4 M. & Soott, 695 : 6 C. & P. 25 62 
 Trimble v. Hill (1879), 5 App. Cas. 342 ; 49 L. J. P. C. 49 ; 42 L. T. 103 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 479 620 
 
 Trimlestown, Ld. v. Kerarais (1843), 9 CI. & Fin. 763 . .431, 435, 443, 445, 486, 
 
 1207 
 
 Trimmer v. Bayne (1802), 7 Ves. 518 ; 6 R. R. 173 794, 805, 806 
 
 Trist V. Johnson (1833), 1 M. & Rob. 250 ;U4 
 
 Tronson v. Dent (1863), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 419 179 
 
 Trotman v Wood (1804), 16 C. B. N. S. 479 778 
 
 Trott V. Skidmore (18t0), 2 S. & T. 12 ; 29 L. J. P. 166 ; 8 W. R. 690 ; 
 
 6 Jur. N. 8. 760 698 
 
 Trotter v. Maclean (1875), 13 Ch. D. 6H0 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 256 ; 42 L. T. 118 : 
 
 28 W. R. 244 168, 460 
 
 Trowbridge v. Baker (1823), 1 Cowen, 261 618 
 
 Trowel t-. Castle (1661), 1 Keb. 22 1192 
 
 Trowell v. Shonton (1878), 8 Ch. D. 318 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 738; 38 L. T. 369; 26 
 
 W. R. 837 680 
 
 Trower acd Lawson's case (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 8 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 468 845 
 
 Truefort, In re, Trafford v. Blano (1885), 34 W. R. 66 ; 63 L. T. 498 . . 188 
 Trueman r. Loder (1840), 11 A. & E. 6U0 ; 3 P. & D. 567. . . .765, 767, 781, 783 
 
 Trulook f. Robey (1841), 12 Sim. 402 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 343 72O 
 
 Truro, Lady, Re (1806), 35 L. J. P. & M. 89 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 201 ; 14 
 
 L. T. N. 8. 893 ; 14 W. R. 976 70I 
 
 Fel, I. end* with page 636. 
 
 .;t 
 
ceil TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAa9 
 
 Trudcve v. Burton (1824), 9 Moore, C. P. 64 606 
 
 Trustee Relief Act, Re, Higgins' Trusts (1861), 2 GiflP. 562 ; 30 L. J. Ch. 
 
 405 632 
 
 Tucker f>. Barrow (1828), 7 B. & C. 625 ; 3 C. & P. 90 ; 1 M. & R. 618 ; 
 
 M. &M 137 517 
 
 Tucker v. Burrow (18G5), 34 L. J. Ch. 478 ; 2 H. & M. 515 ; 13 W. R. 
 
 771 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 485 666 
 
 Tucker v. Good {see Re Bonner) . 
 
 Tucker v. Maxwell (1814), 11 Mass. 143 552 
 
 Tuckey v. Henderson (1863), 33 Beav. 174 805 
 
 Tuff V. Warman (1857), 2 C. B. N. S. 740 ; '26 L. J. C. P. 263 : attd. 5 C, 
 
 B. N. S. 573 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 322 ; 6 J.ir. N. S. 222 6 
 
 Tuftonv. Whitmore (1840), 12 A. & E. 370 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 405 355 
 
 Tugwell V. Hooper (1847), 10 Bea\. 348 ; 16 L. J. Ch. 171 607 
 
 TuU V. Parlett (1829), M. & M. 472 748 
 
 Tuiiock t'. Dunn (1826), Ry. & M. 416 492 
 
 Tunnicliffe v. Tedd (1848), 6 C. B. 553 ; 17 L. J. M C. 67 1073 
 
 Tupling V. Ward (1861;, 30 L. J. Ex. 222; 6 H. & N. 749 ; 4 L. T. 20; 
 
 9 W. R. 482 964 
 
 Tupper V. Foulkes (i861), 30 L. J. C. P. 214 ; 9 C. B. 797 ; 3 \. T. 741 ; 
 
 9 W. R. 340 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 7(i9 645, 646, 1206 
 
 Tupper V. Tupper (1855), 1 K. & J. 06.5 ; 1 Jur. N. 8. 917 708 
 
 Turley v. Thomas (1837), 8 C. & P. 104 6 
 
 TumbiiU V. Janson (1878), 3 C. P. D. 264 ; 47 L J. C. P. 384 : 26 W. R. 
 
 8;- 818 
 
 Turner's oase (1664), Kel. (J.) 30 1126 
 
 Turner, Re (1872), L. R. 2 P. & D. Wi ; 27 L. T. 322 ; 21 W. R. 38 . . . . 143 
 Turner, Ee, Glenistor v. Harding (1885), 29 Ch. D. 985 ; 53 L. T. 528 . .421, 1170 
 Turner v. Ambler (1847), 10 Q. B. 262 ; 11 L. J. Q. B. 158 ; 6 Jur. 346.. 30, 703 
 
 Turner v. Barlow (1863), 3 F. & F. 946 16 
 
 Turner v. Cameron's Coalbrook Steam Coal Co. (1850), 5 Ex. 932 ; 20 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 71 98 
 
 Turner v. Collins (1871), L. R. 7 Ch. 329 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 558 ; 25 L. T. 374 136 
 
 Turner v. Crisp (1728), 2 Str. 827 448 
 
 Turner v. HeyUnd (1879), 4 C. P. D. 432 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 635 ; 41 L. T. 
 
 556 41 
 
 Turner V. Mason (1845), 11 M. & W. 116 ; 2 D. & L. 898; 14 L. J. Ex. 
 
 311 153 
 
 Turner ». Pearte (1787), 1 T. R. 717 910 
 
 Turner v. Power (1828), 7 B. & C. 626 ; M. & M. 131 285 
 
 Turner v. Walsh (1881), 6 App. Cas. 636 ; 60 L. J. P. C. 55; 45 L. T. 50.. 124 
 Turney v. Dodwell (1854), 3 E. & B. 136 ; 2 C. L. R. 666 ; 23 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 137 ; 18 Jur. 787 717 
 
 Turquand v. Fearon (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 280; 48 L. J. Q. B. 341 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 191 ; 27 W. R. r,96 187. 220 
 
 Turquand v. Knight (1836), 2 M. & W. 100 ; 2 Gale, 192 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 4. 691, 
 
 692, 59 », 695, 611 
 
 Turquand r. Wilson (1875), 1 Ch. D. 85 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 104 : 24 W. R. 66.. 534 
 
 Turrill V. Crawley (1849), l.i Q. B. 197 : 18 L. J. Q. B. 156 : 13 Jur. H78.. 162 
 Turton r. Barber (1874), L. R. 17 Eq. 329 ; 43 L. J. Ch. 468 ; 22 W. R. 
 
 438 602 
 
 Tussaud, Re, Tussaud v. Tussaud (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 849 ; 9 Ch. D. 363 ; 
 
 26 W. R. 874; 39L. T. 113 805,806 
 
 Tutton t'. Darke (1860), 6 H. & N. 649, 650 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 271 ; 6 Jur. N. 
 
 S. 983 ; 2 L. T. 361 16, 20 
 
 Tweedale, Re (1874),L. R. 3 P. & D. 204; 44 L. J. P. 35; 31 L. T. 799. . 142, 702 
 
 Twemlow v. Oswin (1809), 2 Camp. K5 ; 11 R. R. 670 175 
 
 Twiss V. Baldwin (1832), 9 Conn. 291 201 
 
 Twyman v. Kuowles (1863), 13 C. B. 222 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 143 ; 17 Jur. 238 277, 
 
 288 
 
 Twyno's caKe (1602), 3 Co. Rep. 80 ; 1 Smith, L. C. 1 136 
 
 Tverman v. Smith (1866), 26 L. J. Q. B. 359; 6 E. & B. 719; 2 Jur. N. 
 
 S. 860 , 643 
 
 The refeienett ar* to paget, not to paragraph*. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CCIU 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Tyers v. Eosedale and Ferry Hill Iron Co. (1875), 42 L. J. Ex. 185 ; L. E. 
 
 8 Ex. 30.T ; 29 L. T. 751 : 21 W. R. 793 7o2 
 
 Tyler v. Uliner (1815), 12 Mass. 166 1096 
 
 Tyler r. Yates (1871), L. E. 11 Eq. 265; 19 W. R. 118 : 23 L. T. 447 ; 40 
 
 L. J. Ch. 768 ; 6 L. R. Ch. 665 ; 25 L. T. 284 ; 19 W. E. 909 137 
 
 Tyrer t). Henry (1860), 14 Moo. P. C. C. 83 ; 3 L. T. 219 185 
 
 Tyrwhitt v. Wynne (1819), 2 B. & A. 554 235 
 
 U., ffllsely called J. v. J. (1867), L. E. 1 P. & 15 461 ; 16 "W. E. 518 ; 37 
 
 L. J. P. &M. 7 631 
 
 TJdnv r. Udny (1869). L. E. 1 H. L. fSc.), 441 179 
 
 Ulverstone Union v. Park (1889). 53 J. P. 629 621 
 
 Underwood v. T^rd Conrtown (1804), 2 Sch. & Lef . 67 616 
 
 Underwood v. Wing (1854), 19 Beav. 459 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 159 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 
 
 293 174 
 
 Unffley v. Ungley (1877), 4 Ch. D. 73 ; 6 Ch. D. 887 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 189, 
 
 854 679 
 
 Union Bank of London v. Lenandon (1878), 3 C. P. D. 343 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 
 
 409 651 
 
 Unity Jt. St. Mutual Banking Assoc., Ex p.irte. Re King (1858), 3 De G. 
 
 & J. 63 : 27 L. J. Bank. 33 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 1257 541 
 
 Upton V. Hume (1893). 41 Am. St. E. 863 245 
 
 Urquhart v. Butterfield (1888), 37 Ch. D. 357 ; 67 L. J. Ch. 521 ; 67 L. T. 
 
 T80 ; 36 W. E. 376 7, 173, 507 
 
 Urquhart t . Macpherson (1878) , 3 App. Cas. 831 746 
 
 U.S. V. Battiste (1835), 2 Sumn. 243 25 
 
 U.S.*. Breed (1832), 1 Sumn. 1.59 764 
 
 U.S. V. Buford (18.i0), 3 Pet. 12 1178 
 
 U.S. V. Cushman (1836), 2 Sumn. 426 1115 
 
 U.S. V. Gibert (1818), 2 Sumn. 19. 80. 81 279 
 
 U.S. V. Gooding (1827), 12 Wheat. 469 382 
 
 U.S. V. Hanaway (1851), 2 Wall. .Tr. 139 626 
 
 U.S. V. Havward (1815), 2 Gall. 485 , 267 
 
 U.S. V. Leffler ^1837), 11 Pet. S6 748 
 
 U.S. f. MR«e (1867), 37 L. J. Ch. 129 ; L. E. 3 Ch. 79 ; IS W. E. 377; 
 
 17L. r. 428 966 
 
 U.S. V. Moses (1827). 4 Wash. 726 614 
 
 U.S. V. Eeybum (1832), 6 Pet. 352 277 
 
 U.S. t'. Spalding (1822), 2 Mason, 478 1199 
 
 U.S. V. Wasrner (1867), 36 L. J. Ch. 634 ; L. E. 2 Ch. 585 ; 15 W. E. 
 
 1026 ; 1() L. T. 646 3 
 
 U.S. V. Wood (1818), 3 Wash. 440 354 
 
 U.S. V. Wood (1840). 14 Peters. 430 628 
 
 Usticke V. Bawden (1824), 2 Add. 125 709 
 
 Utterton v. Robins (1834), 1 A. & E. 423 701 
 
 Uxbridge, Lord, v. Staveland (1747), 1 Ves. sen. 56 961 
 
 Vachee v. Cocks (1829), M. & M. 353 377, 379 
 
 Vacherr. Cocks (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 147 1212 
 
 Vail V. Rice (1851), 1 Seld. (N. Y.), 155 782 
 
 Vaillant v. Dodemcad (1792), 2 Atk. 524 595, 603, 965 
 
 Vale r. Oppert (1875), 10 Ch. App. 340 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 579 ; 33 L. T. 41 ; 
 
 23 W. E. 780 321 
 
 Valentine v. Piper (1839), 22 Pick. 90 1219 
 
 Vallanoe v. Dewar (1808), 1 Camp. 503 ; 10 E. E. 738 : 66, 782 
 
 Valleer. Dumergue (1849). 4 Ex.290; 18 L. J. Ex. 398 1147 
 
 Valpy V. Gibson (1847). 4 C. B. 864 ; 10 L. J. C. P. 241 671 
 
 Vance v. Lowther(1876), 45 L. J. Ex. 200 ; i Ex. D. 176 ; 34 L. T. 286 ; 
 
 24 W. E. 372 1 194 
 
 Vance v. Vance (1871), I. E. 6 C. L. 363 523 
 
 Vandenburgh v. Spooner (1866), L. E. 1 Ex. 316; 35 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 4 
 
 H. &C. 619; 14 W. E. 843 671 
 
 Vol. I. end* with page 635. 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
CCIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 VAOB 
 
 Vander Donokt v. Thellusson (1849), 8 0. B. 812 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 12 938 
 
 Vandevelde f . Lluellin (1661), 1 Keb. 220 872, 873 
 
 Van Dieraen's Land Bank v. Victoria Bank (1871), 40 L. J. P. C. 28; 
 
 L. R. 3 P. C. 526 ; 19 W. R. 857 38 
 
 Vane's, Lord, case (1743-4), 13 East, 171, n. (a) ; 1 T. R. 697; 12 R. R, 
 
 317 ; Preface, vi 893 
 
 Van Omeron v. Dowiolt (1809). 2 Camp. 44 ; 11 R. R. 656 4, 20, 157, 1093 
 
 Vanquelin v. Bouard (1803), 15 C. B. N. S. 341 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 78; 9 L. T. 
 
 582; 12 W. R. 128; 10 Jur. N. li.SGO 1151, 1154 
 
 Van Reimsdyk v. Kane (1813), 1 Gall. 630 380, 494, 496 
 
 Van Sandau v. Turner (1845), 6 Q. B. 773, 786 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 154 ; 9 Jur. 
 
 296 20, 533 
 
 Van Straubenzee f. Monok (1863), 32 L. J. P. & M. 21 ; 3 S. & T. 6 .... 701 
 
 Van Wart v. Wolley (1823), Ry. & M. 4 606 
 
 Varicas v. French (1819), 2 C. & K. 1008 328 
 
 Vasier. Delaval (1785), 1 T. R. 11 616, 617 
 
 Vater's Trusts, Re (1887) W. N. 1887, at p. 128 1171 
 
 Viiughan's cane (16'J6), 13 How. St. Tr. 485 ; Post. C. L. 246 236 
 
 Vaughan v. Hancock (184G), 3 C. B. 706; 16 L. J. 0. P. 1 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 926 682 
 
 Vaughan v. Martin (1796), 1 Esp. 440 925, 926 
 
 Vaughau v. Worrall (1817), 2 Madd. 322 ; 2 Swans. 400 910 
 
 Vaughtoii r. Bradsliaw (1H6()), 9 C B. N. S. 103; 30 L. J. C. P. 93 ; 3 
 
 L. T. 373 ; 9 W. R. 120 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 468 1073 
 
 Vaux Barony (1836), Min. Ev. 67 1040 
 
 Vaux Peerage (1824), Pari. Min. 44 423, 425 
 
 Vaux V. Sheffer (1852), 8 Moo. P. C. C. 75 1122 
 
 Velasquez, The (18()7), L. R. 1 P. C. 491 ; 1 Moo. P. C. C. 426 ; 36 L. J. 
 
 Adra. 19 ; 4 Moo. P. C. C. (N. S.), 426 ; 16 W. R. 89 178 
 
 Vonables v. Schweitzer (1873), L. R. 10 Eq. 76 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 389 ; 28 
 
 L T. 462 844 
 
 Venafra v. John.wn (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 316 57t* 
 
 Vent V. Pacey (1830), 4 Russ. 193 601 
 
 Vernon, Ewens & Co., In re (1886), 32 Ch. D. 165; 54 L. T. 365; 34 
 
 W. R. 606 665 
 
 Verry r. Watkins (1836), 7 C. & P. 30S 254, 257, 951 
 
 Vice V. Lsdy Anson (1827), M. & M. 97 ; 7 B. & C. 409 ; 1 M. & R. 113 ; 
 
 3C. &P. 19 314 
 
 Vickersv. Hertz (1871), L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.) 113 116 
 
 Victoria, The (1867), 1 Ir. R. Eq. 336 ; 37 L. J. Adm. 12 178 
 
 Vincent v. Bp. of Sodor cfe Man (1851), 4 De G. & Sm. 294 ; 20 L. J. Ch. 
 
 433 ; 15 Jur. 365 ; 5 Ex. 683 ,^ C!'3 
 
 Vincent v. Cole (1S28), M. & M. 258 ; 3 C. & P. 481 280, 286, 287 
 
 Vines v. Arnold (1849), 8 C. B. 638 1124 
 
 Viney v. Barss (1796), 1 Esp. 293 231 
 
 Vinnicombe f. Butler (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 18 ; 3 S. & T. 580 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1109 ; 13 W. R. 392 697, 698 
 
 Violett t'. Patton (1809), 5 Cranch, 142 069 
 
 Viret V. Viret (1880), 50 L. J. Ch. 69 ; 43 L. T. 493 680 
 
 Vivian v. Little (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 370; 62 L. J. Q. B. 771 ; 48 L. T. 
 
 793; 31 "W. R. 891 ; 47 J. P. 566 1111 
 
 Volant r. Soyer (1853), 13 C. B. 231 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 83 321, 598 
 
 Von Stentz v. Comyn (1848), 12 Ir. E. R. 622, 642—645 140 
 
 Vooght V. Winch (1832), 2 B. & Aid. 602 89 
 
 Vowlesw. Young (180G), 13Vc8. 147; 9 R. R. 154 413, 415, 416, 424, 425 
 
 Vulliamy v. Huskisson (1838), 3 Y. & C. Ex. 82 ; 2 Jur. 6)6 418, 423 
 
 WArDEL, Ex parte. In re Lutscher (1877), 6 Ch. D. 328 ; 36 L. T. 345 ; 26 
 
 W. R. 9 848 
 
 Waddington v. Bristow (1801), 2 B. & P. 452 686 
 
 Wade V. Nazer (1848). 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 46 705 
 
 Wad« V. Simeon (1845), 2 C. B. 342 910 
 
 The refermeet art to pagti, not to paragri'pht. 
 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CCV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Wade V. Tatton (1856), 25 L. J. C ^ 240 ; 18 C. B. 371 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 491 . . 719 
 WHdeer v. llast India Co. (ISSG), 8 De C . M. & G. 182 ; 2 Jur. N. 8. 407. 618 
 
 Wadley v. Baylisa (1814), 5 Taun. 752 ; 15 Rev. R. 615 791 
 
 Wadsworth v. Bentley (1854), 23 L. J. Q. B. 3 ; 1 L. & M. (Bail Court), 
 
 203 ; 17 Jur. 1077 1122 
 
 Wadsworth v. Harashaw (1819), 2 B. & B. 5. n 593 
 
 WadHWorth v. Marshall (183J), 1 0. & M. 87 : 3 Tyr. 223 816 
 
 Wagstaff r. Wilson (1832), 4- B. & Ad. 339 ; 1 N. & M. 1 606 
 
 Wiiini'. Bailev(1839), 10 A. & E. 616 ; 2 P. & D. 507 308 
 
 Wainmanf. Kvnman (1847), 1 Ex. 118 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 232 715 
 
 Waithmau v. \Vakefield (1807), 1 Camp. 120 ; 10 R. R. 654 160 
 
 Waithman f. Weaver (1822), D. & R. N. P. 10 ; 11 Price. 267 255 
 
 Wakefield v. D. of Buccleuoh (1866), L. R. 4 Eq. 613 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 763. . 114 
 
 Wakefield v. Ross (1827), 5 Mason, 18 ; 9 Dane, Abr. 317 903 
 
 Wakeman r. West (1836), 7 C. & P. 479 1108 
 
 Wakley v. Johnson (1826), R. fr M. 422 246 
 
 Walcot V. Alleyu (1819), Milw. Ecc. R. (Ir.) 69 170 
 
 Walcott V. Amerioan Life, &c. Soc. (1891), 33 Am. St. R. 923 Add. [105 
 
 Walcott V. Hall (1810), 6 Ma.s8. 514 25 
 
 Waldridge v. Kennison (1794) 1 Eap. 144 515 
 
 Waldrouf. Coombe(1810), 3Taun. 162; 12 R. R. 629 1178 
 
 Waldron t). Jacob (1871), I. R. 5 Eq. 131 673 
 
 Waldron v. Tuttle (1828), 4 New Hainp. 371 413 
 
 Waldron v. Ward (1654), Sty. 449 603 
 
 Waldy V. Gray (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 238 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 394 ; 32 L. T. 531 ; 
 
 23 W. R. 676 357 
 
 Walford V. Fleetwood (1845), 14 M. & W. 449 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 271 19 
 
 Walker's case (1586), 3 Co. Rep. 23 509 
 
 Walker's case (1788), 1 Lea. 498 906 
 
 Walker, In re. In re Jackson (1885), 53 L. T. 660 ; 3t W. R. 95 621 
 
 Walker v. Bartlett (1856), 18 C. B. 845 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 643 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 
 
 263 684 
 
 Walker v. Beauchamp, Lady (1834), 6 C. & P. 652 303, 409 
 
 Walker v. Bradford Old Bk. (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 511 ; 63 L. J. Q. B. 280; 
 
 32 W. R. 645 651 
 
 Walker v. Broadstock (1795), 1 Esp. 458 444 
 
 Walker v. Butler (1856), 26 L. J. Q. B. 377 ; 6 E. & B. 506 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 687 714 
 
 Walker v. Gardner (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 371 733 
 
 Walker v. Gode (1861), 30 L. J. Ex. 172 ; 6 H. & N. 594 524 
 
 Walker v. G. W. Ry. Co. (1867), 36 L. J. Ex. 123 ; L. R. 2 Ex. 228 ; 16 
 
 W. R. 769 641 
 
 Walker v. Milne (18491, 11 Beav. 607 ; 18 L. J. Ch. 288 684 
 
 Walker v. Moore (1829), 10 B. & C. 416 773 
 
 Walker v. Poole (1882), 21 Ch. D. 835 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 840 914 
 
 Walker v. Richardson (1837), 2 M. & W. 882 ; M. & H. 251 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 
 
 229 128, 669, 660, 662 
 
 Walker v. Webb (1797), 3 Anst. 941 870 
 
 Walker v. Wildman (1821), 6 Madd. 47 599, COl 
 
 Walker v. Wilsher (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 335 ; 68 L. J. Q. B. 501 ; 37 W. R. 
 
 723 42, 506, 514 
 
 Walker v. Wingfield (1812), 18 Ves. 443 ; 11 R. R. 232 1049 
 
 Walker v. Witter (1778), 1 Doug. 1 1166 
 
 Wall's case (1872), L. R. 16 Eq. 18; 42 L. J. Ch. 372 166 
 
 Wallace v. Brookley (1837), 5 Dowl. 6P' 732 
 
 Wallace t). Cook (1804), 5 Esp. U7 1049, 1172 
 
 Wallace v. Fielden (1851), 7 Moo. P. 0. C. 398 179 
 
 Wallace v. Kelsall (1840), 7 M. & W. 2"' ; 8 Dowl. 841 ; 4 Jur. 1064 ; 10 
 
 L. J. Ex. 12 487, 552, 744 
 
 Wallace v. Pomfret (1805), 11 Ves. 647 ; 8 R. R. 241 806, 807 
 
 Wallace V. Seymour (1871), Ir. R. 6 C. L. 196, 219, 343 704 
 
 Wallace V. Small (1830), M. & M. 446 615, 711 
 
 i M t 
 
 Vol, I. *nd* with page 636. 
 
 ijliil' ' 
 
CCVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 m 
 
 vAoa 
 
 WaUer v. Lacy (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 54, 71 ; 8 Dowl. 663 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 
 
 186; 4 Jur. 435; 9 L. J. C. P. 217 71:), 71* 
 
 Wallis V. Littell (1861), 31 L. J. C. P. 100; 11 C. B. N. S. 369; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 745 ; 10 W. R. 192 746 
 
 Wallis V. Smith (1882), 21 Ch. D. 243 ; 47 L. T. 389 ; 52 L. J. Ch. 146 ; 
 
 31 W. R. 214 44 
 
 Walpole V. Alexander (1782), 3 Doug. 45 865, 866, 867 
 
 Walroud v. Hawkins (1876), 44 L. J. C. P. 116 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 342 .... 622 
 
 Walsh V. Nally (1877), I. R. 11 O. L. 337 732 
 
 Walsh V. Trevanion (1850), 15 Q. B. 733 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 458 740 
 
 Walsh V. Wilson (1851), 1 Ir. Eq. R. 610 867 
 
 Walsham v. Stainton (1863), 2 H. & M. 1 599 
 
 Walsingham, Ld. v. Goodricke (1843), 3 Hare, 124 693, 601. 602 
 
 Walter v. BoUman (1839), 8 Watt», 544 468 
 
 Walter v. Cubley (1833), 2 C. & M. 151 1195 
 
 Walter p. Haynes (1824), Ry. & M. 149 156 
 
 Walters v. Morgan (1792), 2 Cox, Ch. 369 682 
 
 Walters v. Rees (1819), 4 Moore, C. P. 34 869, 871 
 
 Walton, Ex parte. Re Levy (1881), 17 Ch. D. 756 ; 50 L. J. Ch. 662; 45 
 
 L. T. 1 ; 3U W. R. 395 662, 741 
 
 Walton V. Chandler (1845), 1 C. B. 307 ; 2 Dowl. & L. 802 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 
 
 149 ; 9 Jur. 257 732 
 
 Walton V. Green (1825), 1 C. & P. 621 500, 501 
 
 Walton V. Hastings (1816), 4 Camp. 223 ; 1 Stark. 216 1194, 1203 
 
 Walton V. Shelley (1786), 1 T. R. 296 877 
 
 Walton V. Waterhouse (1672), 3 Wins. Saunders, 417a 96 
 
 Wambough v. Schank (1807), 1 Penningt. 229 172 
 
 Wankford v. Fotherley (1694), 2 Vern. 322 539 
 
 Ward V. Day (1864), 7 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & Mar.) 96, 101 522 
 
 Ward V. Dey (1849), 33 L. J. Q. B. 3, 2.54 ; 4 B. & S. 337 ; 6 B. & S. 359 ; 
 
 10 L. T. 578 ; 12 W. R. 829 937 
 
 Wardr. Gamgee (1891), 66L. T. 610; 40 W. R. .S9 915 
 
 Ward V. Hobbs (1878), 4 App. Cas. 13 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 281 ; 40 L. T. 73 ; 
 
 27 W. R. 114 777 
 
 Ward V. Johnson (1807), 13 Mass. 148 1115 
 
 Ward V. Londesborough, Ld. (1852), 12 C. B. 252 158 
 
 Ward, Ld. v. Lumley (1860), 29 L. J. Ex. 322 ; 6 H. & N. 87 059, 1197 
 
 Ward V. Pearson (1839), 5 M. & W. 18 ; 8 L. J. Ex. 163 ; 7 Dowl. 382 . . 187 
 
 Ward V. Pomfret (1832), 6 Sim. 475 ; 2 L. J. Ch. 22 447 
 
 Ward V. Ryan (1875), 10 Ir. R. C. L. 17 97 
 
 Ward V. Sinfield (1880), 49 L. J. C. P. 696 ; 43 L. T. 252 948 
 
 Ward f. Ward (1848), 11 Beav. 377 1045, 1132 
 
 Ward V. Wells (1809), 1 Taun. 461 ; 10 R. R. 581 328, 1213 
 
 Warden. Warde(1851), 3Mac. &G. 305; 21 L. J. Ch. 90 602 
 
 Warden v. Fermor (1809), 2 Camp. 282 1216 
 
 Warden v. Jones (1867), 2 De G. & J. 76; 27 L. J. Ch. 190 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 
 
 26f '3 Beav. 487 679, 680 
 
 War Juraberlege(18.55), 20Beav. 503; 24L.J. Ch. 630; 1 Jur. N. S. 745 683 
 
 Warickshall's case (1783), 1 Lea. 263 ; 2 East, P. C. 658 557, 558, 662 
 
 Waring r. Waring (1848), 6 Moo. P. C. C. 341 ; 6 Notes of Cas. (Ecc. & 
 
 Mar.) 394 263 
 
 Warmsley v. Child (1749), 1 Ves. sen. 141 308 
 
 Warner v. Mosses (1881), 50 L. J. Ch. 28 ; 43 L. T. 401 ; 29 W. R. 201 . . 349 
 Warner v. Willington (1856), 3 Drew. 523 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 662 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 
 
 433 671, 672, 675 
 
 WarraU, Re, Ex parte Cossens (1820), Buck. 531 970 
 
 Warren v. Anderson (1839), 8 Scott, 384 1218. 1220 
 
 Warren v. Stagg (1787), cited 3 T. R. 591 752 
 
 Warren r. Warren (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 250 ; 4 Tyr. 850 155 
 
 Warren Hastings' case (1788), cited 30 How. St. tr. 492 ; 2 Ph. Ev. 451. . 1179 
 
 Warrender v. Warreuder (1834), 9 Bli. N. S. 89 ; 2 CI. & Fin. 488 1144 
 
 Warrick V. Queen's Coll., Ox. (Betts v. Thompson) (1867), 40 L. J. Ch. 
 
 785 ; L. R. 6 Ch. 732 ; 25 L. T. 254 ; 19 W. R. 1098 994 
 
 27i« references are to pages, not to paragraphs. 
 
 I 1 
 
 ' J 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CCVU 
 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Warriner v. Giles (1734), 2 Str. 954, 1223, n. 1 1080 
 
 Warrington v. Early (1853\ 2 E. & B. 763 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 47 ; 18 Jur. 42. 1194 
 Warwick v. Bruce (1813), 2 M. & Sel. 205 : 6 Taun. 118 ; 14 R. R. 634 . . 686 
 Warwick v. Foulkea (1844), 12 M. & W. 607 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 638 ; 13 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 109 ; 8 Jur. 85 244 
 
 Warwick v. Hooper (1850), 2 Mac. & G. 60 622 
 
 Warwick v. Queen's CoU. (1871), L. R. 3 Eq. 683 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 505 ; 18 
 
 W. R. 19 ; 23 L. T. 63 394, 398 
 
 Warwick v. Rogers (1843), 5 M. & Gr. 340 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 1 ; 12 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 113 1200 
 
 Waaon v. Walter (1869), 8 B. & 8. 671 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34 ; L. R. 4 Q. r,. 
 
 73 ; 19 L. T. 409 ; 17 W. R. 169 4 
 
 Waterford, Estate of M. of, Re (1871), Ir. R. 6 Eq. 434 768 
 
 Waterford, Corp. of v. Price (1846), 9 Ir. L. R. 310 1175 
 
 Waterford Ry. Co. v. Wolsely (1851), 1 Ir. C. L. R. 444 1176 
 
 Wfiterford, Wexford, Wicklow and Dublin Ry. Co. v. Pidcock (1853), 8 
 
 Ex. 279 ; 7 RaUw. Cas. 439 ; 22 L. J. Ex. 146 ; 17 Jur. 26 1176 
 
 Waterloo Bridge Co, v. Cull (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 75 ; 1 E. & E. 213 ; 6 
 
 Jur. N. S. 464 112 
 
 Waterman v. Soper (1697), 1 Ld. Ray. 737 114 
 
 Waterpark v. Fennell (1859), 7 H. L. Cas. 650 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1135 ; 7 W. 
 
 R. 634 791, 792 
 
 Waters v. Earl of Thanet (1842), 2 Q. B. 757 ; 2 G. & D. 166 ; 6 Jur. 
 
 708 712 
 
 Waters V. Howlett (1831), cited 1 A. & E. 8 371 
 
 Wdi-rs V. Thorn (1856), 22 Beav. 547, 556, 557 68 
 
 Waters v. Tomkins (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 723 ; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 137 714, 717 
 
 Watkins, Ex parte (1762), 2 Ves. sen. 470a 1150 
 
 Watkins, Re (1865), 35 L. J. P. & M. 14 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 19 701 
 
 Watkins v. Morgan (1834), 6 C. & P. 661 191 
 
 Watkins v. Na8h'(1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 262 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 505 1204 
 
 Watkins v. Rymill (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 178 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 121 ; 48 L. T. 
 
 426 ; 31 W. R. 337 86 
 
 Watson V. Clark (1813), 1 Dow, 336 ; 14 R. R. 73 176 
 
 Watson V. Gray (1880), 14 Ch. D. 192 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 243 ; 42 L. T. 294 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 438 ; 44 J. P. 537 113 
 
 Watson «. King (1815), 1 Stark. R. 121; 4 Camp. 272 173, 1049, 1172 
 
 Watson ti. King (1846), 3 C. B. 608 506 
 
 Watson r. Lane (1856), 11 Ex. 769 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 101 97, 98 
 
 Watson V. Little (I860), 29 L. J. Ex, 267 ; 5 H. & N. 472 1097 
 
 Watson V. Spratley (1854), 10 Ex. 237 ; 24 L. J. Ex. 63 683, 684, 685 
 
 Watson V. Threlkeld (1798). 2 Esp. 637 ; 5 R. R. 760 589 
 
 Watson V. Wace (1826), 6 B. & C. 153 642 
 
 Watson V. Watson (1864), 33 Beav. 574 806 
 
 Watson V. Woodman (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 721 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 57 ; 24 W. 
 
 R. 47 387 
 
 Watters v. Smith (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 892 1115 
 
 Watts V. Ainsworth (1862), 3 F. & F. 12; 1 H. & C. 83; 31 L.J. Ex. 
 
 448 ; 6 L. T. 252 675 
 
 Watts V. Fraser (1837), 7 A. & E. 323 ; 1 M. & Rob. 449 ; 7 C. & P. 369. .245, 
 
 246 
 Watts v. Kelson (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 166 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 126 ; 24 L. T. 209 ; 
 
 19 W. R. 338 115 
 
 Watts V. Lawson (1830), M. & M. 447, n 515 
 
 Watts V. Thorpe (1808), 1 Camp. 376 498 
 
 Waughr. Bus8ell(1814), 6Taun. 707; 1 Marsh. 214, 311 ; 15R. R. 024. 1196 
 
 Waugh V. Carver (1793), 2 H. Bl. 235 ; 14 R. R. 845 Ihd 
 
 Waugh V. Cope (1840). 6 M. & W. 824 714 
 
 Waymaut). Hilliard (1830), 7 Bing. 101; 4 M. .& P. 729 515 
 
 Waymell v. Reed (1794), 5 T. R. 600 ; 2 R. R. 675 747 
 
 Weale v. Lower (1672), PoUexfen, 67 170 
 
 Weallt). Rice (1831), 2 Russ. & My. 251; 9 L. J. Ch. 116 806, 807 
 
 Weaver v. Price (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 409 UOl 
 
 Vol, I. tndt with page 635. 
 
. .» 
 
 CCVIU 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Woibb' 8 Estate, Re (1870), Ir. R. 5 Eq. 236 171 
 
 Webb, Re (1856), 1 Deane, Eco. R. 1 694 
 
 WeVb V. Austiu (1844), 7 M. & Gr. 701 ; 8 Scott, N. R. 419 ; 13 L. J. C. 
 
 P 203 98 
 
 Weab V. Bird (1863), 13 C. B. N. S. 841 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 335 ; 8 Jur. N. 
 
 S 621 125 
 
 Webb V. Byng (1855), 1 K. & J. 580 786 
 
 Webb V. East (1880), 5 Ex. D. 23 964, 1182 
 
 Webb r. Fox (1797), 7 Tr. 391 ; 4 R. R. 472 116, 117 
 
 Webb V. Haycock (1854), 19 Beav. 342 421 
 
 Webb 1'. Heme Bay Improvement Com. (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 221 ; L. R. 
 
 5 Q. B. 642 ; 22 L. T. 715 5-11 
 
 Webb V. Manch. and Leeds Ry. Co. (1839), 4 My. & Cr. 120; 1 Railw. 
 
 Cas. 576 932 
 
 Webbt). Paternoster (1620), Palm. 71; Rolle, R. 143; Noy, 98; Poph. 
 
 151 ; Godb. 282 638 
 
 Webb V. Petts (undated), Noy, 44 398 
 
 Webb V. Plummer (1819), 2 6. & Aid. 746 781 
 
 Webb V. Smith (1824), 1 C. & P. 337 488, ,i95 
 
 Webb V. Taylor (1843), 1 Dowl. & L. 684 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 24 ; 8 Jur. 39 . .869, 
 
 871 
 Webber v. Corbett (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 164 ; 16 L. R. Eq. 515 ; 29 L. T. 
 
 365 793 
 
 Webber v. East. Ry. Co. (1840), 2 Mete. 147 932 
 
 Webber v. Lee (1882), 61 L. J. Q. B. 1/4, 485 ; 9 Q. B. D. 315 682 
 
 Webber v. Stanley (1864), 16 C. B. N. S. 698 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 217 803 
 
 Webster v. Bray (1848), 7 Hare, 159 160 
 
 Webster v. Cecil (1861), 30 Beav. 62 760 
 
 Webster v. Cook (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. 542 ; 36 L. J. Ch. 753 ; 13 W. R. 1001 137 
 
 Webster v. Lee (1809), 6 Mass. 334 1123 
 
 Wedderbume's case (1746), 18 How. St. Tr. 425 ; Post. C. L.-246 236 
 
 Wedge V. Berkeley (1837), 6 A. & E. 663 ; 1 N. & P. 665 ; W. W. & D. 
 
 271 31, 39 
 
 Wedgwood's case (1831), 8 Greenl. 75 1173 
 
 Weeks v. Argent (1847), 16 M. & W. 817 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 209 ; 11 Jur. 525. .602, 
 
 607 
 
 Weeks v. Maillardet (1811), 14 East, 568 1205, 1206 
 
 Weeks V. Propert (1873), 4? T .. J. 0. P. 129 ; L. R. 8 C. P. 427 ; 21 W. R. 
 
 676 780 
 
 Weeks V. Sparke (1813), 1 M. & Sel. 686 ; 14 R. R. 646 .... 391, 396, 398, 401 
 
 Weidman r. Kohr (1818), 4 Serg. & R. 174 4»3, 610 
 
 Weidner t\ Schweigart (1823), 9 Serg. & R. 385 154 
 
 Welch V. Barrett ( 1819), 15 Mass. 380 464 
 
 Welch V. Mandeville (1816), I Wheat. 233 488 
 
 Welch V. Nash (1807), 8 East, 394 ; 9 R. R. 478 1136 
 
 Welch V. Phillips (1856), 1 Moo. P. C. R. 299, 302 143 
 
 Welch V. Seaborn (1816), 1 Stark. R. 474 154 
 
 Weld V. Hornby (1806), 7 Ea«t, 199 ; 3 Smith, 244 ; 8 R. R. 608 :9J, 792 
 
 Welfare v. Lond. & Biigh. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 1,93 ; 38 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 241; 20L. T. 743; 17 W. R. 1065 16b 
 
 Welford v. Beezely (1747), 1 Ves. sen. 6 ; 1 Wils. 118 674 
 
 WeUand Can. Co. v. Hathaway (1832), 8 Wend. 480 293, 529 
 
 Welland v Ld. Middleton (1844), 11 Ir. Eq. R. 003 1050, 1054, 1173 
 
 Wells V. Fisher (1831), 5 C. & P. 12 ; 1 M. & Rob. 99, and n 890 
 
 WeUs V. Fletcher (1831), 5 C. & P. 12 ; 1 M. & Rob. 99. and n 890 
 
 Wells V. Horton (1826), 4 Bing. 40 ; 12 Moore, C. P. 176 682 
 
 WeUs V. Jesus College (1836), 7 C. & P. 284 398, 401 
 
 Wells V. Kingston-upon-Hull (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 402 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 
 
 257 ; 32 L. T. 615 ; 23 W. R. 662 641, 683 
 
 WeUs V. Wells (1874), 43 L. J. Ch. 681 ; L. R. 18 Eq. 604 ; 31 L. T. 16 ; 
 
 22 "W R 893 . 741 793 
 
 Welman t. Welman' (ISSo/.'isCh.D.' 67b; 49 L. J. Ch. 736; 43 L.T. ' 
 
 U6 139, 749 
 
 The re/erenoea are to page*, not to paragraphs. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 CCIX 
 
 PAOB 
 
 ■VTelstead r. Lew (1831), 1 M. & Rob. 139 27, 496, 511, 614 
 
 Wfimyss V. Hopkins (1875), 44 L. J. M. C. 101 ; L. R. 10 Q. B. 378 ; 32 
 
 L. T. 9 ; '23 W. R. 691 1131 
 
 Wenman v. Miiokonzie (1855), 5 E. & B. 447 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 44 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1015, 1019, n 406, 1116, 1161 
 
 Wentworth v. Lloyd (1864), 33 L. J. Oh. 088 ; 10 H. L. Cas. 689 ; 10 L. T. 
 
 767 ; 10 Jur. N. 8. 961 109 
 
 Woquclin r. Wequolin (1830), 2 Curt. 263 353 
 
 WcNt, Re (18U2), 32 L. J. P. & M. 182 ; 12 W. R. 89 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1168 699 
 
 West V. Buxendale (1850), 9 C. B. 141 ; 19 L. J. C. P. 149 30, 189 
 
 West f. Blukewiiy (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 729; 9 Dowl. 816 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 
 
 199; 15 Jur. 451 : 10 L. J. C. P. 173 644, 750, 751 
 
 WcHt V. LawJay (1805), 2 Ir. R. Eq. 517 801 
 
 West V. Moore (1807), 8 East, 343 ; 9 R. R. 460 145 
 
 \Ve.st V. Kay (1854), 1 Kay, 385 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 44V ; 2 Eq. R. 431 ; 2 W. 
 
 R. 319 693 
 
 West V. Steward (1845), 14 M. & W. 47 1202, 1204, 1205, 1206 
 
 West Cambridcre v. LexinKton (1824), 2 Pick. 536 443 
 
 West of Canada Oil, &c. Co., Re (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 683 ; 6 Ch. D. 109 ; 
 
 25 W. R. 787 345, 917 
 
 We,st Cornwall Ry. Co. v. Mowatt (1850), 15 Q. B. 521 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 478 : 15 Jur. 101 ; 1 Drew. 247 1176 
 
 West Jewell Tin Mining Co., In re (1879), 10 Ch. D. 579 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 425 ; 
 
 40 L. T. 43; 27 AV. R. 310 1233 
 
 West of Eng. Bk. v. Canton Ins. Co. (1877), 2 Ex. D. 472 1 180 
 
 West London Com. Bk. v. Kitson (1884), 53 L. J. Q. B. 2i8, 345 ; 13 Q. B. D. 
 
 360 ; 50 L. T. 656 ; 32 W. R. 757 780 
 
 Westoby v. Day (1853). 2 E. & B. 605; 22 L. J. Q.. B. 418; 18 Jur. 10. .7, 11 16 
 
 Weston, Re (1869), L. R. 1 P. & D. 633 ; 38 L. J. P. & M. 53 703 
 
 Weston's case. In re (1879), 10 Ch. D. 579 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 425 ; 40 L. T. 
 
 43 ; 27 W. R. 310 1233 
 
 We-ston V. Ernes (1808), 1 Taun. 115 756 
 
 Wetherall, Ex parte, Middleton v. Pollock (1876), 4 Ch. D. 49 ; 46 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 39 ; 35 L. T. 608 ; 26 W. R. 94 539 
 
 Wetherell v. Langston (1847), 1 Ex. 634 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 338 675 
 
 Wey V. Yally (1704). 6 Mod. 194 8 
 
 Wlialey v. Carlisle (1866), 17 Ir. C. L. R. 792 18, 441 
 
 Whalley r. Pepper (1836), 7 C. & P. 506 872 
 
 '.VTiaram v. Routledge (1805), 5 Esp. 235 ; 8 R. R. 851 1 191 
 
 W;iarram v Wharram (1863), 33 L. J. P. & M. 75 ; 3 S. & T. 301 ; 10 Jur. 
 
 K S. 499 ; 10 L. T. 163 ; 12 W. R. 889 307 
 
 Wharton Peer. (1845), 12 CI. & Fin. 301 1035, 1092 
 
 Wharton v. Mackenzie (1844;, 5 Q. B. 606 ; 1 Dav. & M. 544 ; 8 Jur. 466; 
 
 13 L.J. Q. B. 130 49 
 
 Wliateley v. Spooner (1857), 3 K. & J. 642 786, 796 
 
 Whatman, Re (1805), 34 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1242 801 
 
 Wheatcroft's case (1873), 42 L. J. Ch. 853 ; 29 L. T. 324 626 
 
 Wheatley v. Williams (1836), 1 M. & W. 533; 2 Gale, 140; 1 T. & G. 
 
 1043; 5L. J. Ex. 237 609,611 
 
 Wneaton v. Maple (1893), 3 Ch. 48 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 963 ; 68 L. T. 641 ; 69 
 
 L. T. 208; 41 W. R. 677 119 
 
 Wheeldon r. Burrows (1878), 12 Ch. D. 31 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 863 ; 41 L. T. 
 
 327 ; 28 W. R. 196 116 
 
 Wheeler. In re (1880), 49 L. J. P. D. & A. 29 ; 42 L. T. 60 ; 28 W. R. 476; 
 
 44 J. P. 285 706 
 
 Wheeler v. Alderson (1831), 3 Hagg. Ecc. 687 140, 371, 930 
 
 Wlieeler v. Atkins (1805), 5 Esp. 246 365 
 
 Wheeler v. Collier (1827), M. & M. 125 671 
 
 ■\Vheeler v. Fox (1841), 3 Ir. L. R. 302, n 869 
 
 Wheeler v. Lp Itarohant (1881), 17 Ch. D. 681 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 795 ; 44 L. T. 
 
 632; 46 J. P. 728 694, 1183 
 
 Wheeler V. Lowth (1710), Comyn's Dig. tit. "Evid.,"c. 1 1035 
 
 Wheeling's case (17G9), 1 Lea. 311, n , 560 
 
 Vol. I. endi wiih page 635. 
 
 il 
 
 ^■•ti 
 
 1 I 
 
 ■ : .! 
 
 til 
 
ccx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 I'«* 
 
 PAOH 
 
 Whicher, Re. Stevens, Ex parte (1888), 6 M. B. R. 173 84'J 
 
 Wbicker v. Humo (1859), 28 L. J. Oh. 396 ; 7 H. L. Cus. 124 ; 4 Jur. N. 8. 
 
 933 179, 180, 1105 
 
 Whiffen v. Hardwright (1848), 11 Beav. Ill 614 
 
 Whippy V. Hillary (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 399 ; fi C. & P. 209 712 
 
 Whitrtler v. Foreter (1833), 32 L. J. C. P. 161; 14 C. B. N. S. 248; 8 L. T. 
 
 317: 1 1 W. R. 648 fi46 
 
 Whitaker v. Izod (1809), 2 Taun. 115 321, 969 
 
 Whitaker r. Tatham (1831), 7 Bing. 628 ; 6 M. & P. 628 794 
 
 Whitaktri'.WiHbey(1852),12C.B. 56,69; 21L. J. C. P. 116; 16 Jur. 411.. 19, 
 
 84, 136, 283 
 
 Whitcomb v. Whiting (1781), 2 Doug. 652 ; 1 8m. L. C. 555 488 
 
 White, Re (1850), 2 Roberts. 194 698 
 
 White, Re (1861). 30 L. J. P. & M. 56 142 
 
 White f. Birch '1867). 36 L. J. Ch. 174 : 15 W. R. 305 ; 16 L. T. 605 . . 801 
 
 Whiter. Cuyler( 1795). 6 T. R. 176; 1 Ewp. 200 ; 3 R. R. 147 646 
 
 White V. Dowling (1845), 8 Ir. L. R. 128 600 
 
 Whiter. GreeniHh (1861), 11 C. B. N. S. 209; 8 Jiir. N. S. 563 648 
 
 White r. Hawn (1810), 5 Johns. 351 906 
 
 Whiter. Lisle (1819), 4 Madd. 214 396, 398 
 
 Whiter. M'Dermott (1872), I. R. 7 C L. 1 144 
 
 White p. Morris (1852), 11 C. B. 1015; 21 L. J. C. P. 185; 16 Jur. 500 .. 481 
 
 Whiter. Parkin (1810), 12 East, 578; 11 R. R. 488 754 
 
 Whiter. Proctor (1811), 4 Tauii. 209; 13 R. R, 680 730 
 
 White V. Rcpton (1844), 3 Curt. 818 702 
 
 White r. Sayer (1622). Palm. 211 708 
 
 Whiter. Sharp (1844). 12 M. &W. 712; 13 L. J. Ex. 215 ; 1 Dowl. & L. 
 
 10.".9 ; 1 C. & K. 348 ; 8 Jur. 344 1039 
 
 Whiter. Smith (1841), Arm. M. & O. 171 977 
 
 White, Ex parte. White r. Tommoy (1853), 4 H. L. Cas. MA 11.13 
 
 White r. Trustees of the British Museum (1829), 6 Bing. 310 »i9G 
 
 White r. Wils<,a (1800), 2 Bos. & P. 116 757 
 
 ■\Vhite r. Wilson (1806), 13 Ves. 87 ; 14 Ves. 151 170 
 
 White's case, R. v. White (1823), R. & R. 508 560 
 
 Whiteacre r. Symonds (1808), 10 East, 13 ; 10 R. R. 224 47 
 
 ■VVliitehead r. Clifford (1814), 5 Taun. 518 660 
 
 Whitehead r. Scott (1830), 1 M. & Rob. 2 289, 318, 372 
 
 Whitehead r. Tattersall (1834), 1 A. & E. 491 499 
 
 Whitehouse r. Hemmant (1858). 27 L. J. Ex. 295 1231, 1232 
 
 Whiteleyr. King (1854), 17 C. B.N. S. 756; 10 Jur. N. S. 1079; 11 L.T. 
 
 342 : 13 W. R. 83 143 
 
 Whitelocke v. Baker (1807). 13 Ves. 514 ; 9 R. R. 210 408, 4i;{ 
 
 Whitelock V. Musgrove (1833), 1 C. & M. 611 ; 3 Tyr. 641 1216, 1219 
 
 Whitffleldr. Brand (1847), 16 M. &W. 282; 16 L. J. Ex. 103 288 
 
 Whitfieldr. South East. Ry. Co. (1858), 27 L. J. Q. B. 229 ; 1 E. B. & E. 1 16.. 1 1 1, 643 
 Whitford v. Tutin (1834). 10 Bing. 395 ; 4 M. & Sc. 166 ; 4 L. J. K. B. 53 286 
 
 Whitlev r. Gou-rh (15.JG-7). Dyer, 140 658 
 
 Whitmbre v. Humphries (1871), L. R. 7 C. P. 1 ; 41 L. J. C. P. 43; 25 
 
 L. T. 496 ; 20 W. R. 79 116 
 
 Whitnash v. George (1828). 8 B. & f!. 556 437, 608 
 
 Whitney v. Boordman (1875) , 1 IS M.is.s. 242 763 
 
 Whittaker r. Edmunds (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 366 ; i A. & E. 6;}8 261 
 
 Whittaker v. Jackson (1864), 33 L. J. Ex. 181 ; 2 H. & C. 926 ; 11 L. T. 
 
 155 , 1 1 13, 1 1 19, 1120 
 
 Whitting. Re, Ex parte Hall (1878), 10 Ch. D. 815; 48 L. J. Bank. 79; 
 
 40 L.T. 179; 27 W. R. 385 651, 6.52 
 
 Whittuck r. Waters (1830), 4 C. & P. 376 419, 424, 1047 
 
 Whitwell V. Perrin (1858), 4 C. B. N. S. 412 179 
 
 Whitwell r. Wyer (1814), 11 Mass. 6 479 
 
 Whitwill r. Scheer (1838), 8 A. & E. 301 ; 3 N. & P. 391 ; 7 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 244 189, 192, 194 
 
 Whitworth's case (1881), 19 Ch. D. 118 ; 61 L. J. Ch. 71 ; 45 L. T. 449 ; 
 
 30 W. R. 33 845 
 
 The references are to pages, not to paragraphs. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. CCXl 
 
 VKOH 
 
 Whyman r. Garth (1853), 8 Ex. 803 ; 2'2 L. J. Kx. 316 1208 
 
 Whyto V. AhrenH (1884), 26 Cli. D. 717 ; 50 L. T. 344 ; 32 W. R. 049. . . . 1188 
 
 Whyte V. Rose (1842), 4 P. & D. 199 ; .t Q. B. 495 ; 2 O. & D. 312 17, 19. 
 
 1133, 1151 
 Wiokens v. Goatloy (1851), 11 C. B. 666 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 50 ; 2 L. K. & P. 
 
 572 18 
 
 Wickham f. M. of Hiith (18(5), 35 L. J. Ch. 5 ; L. R. 1 Eq. 17 ; 35 Beav. 
 
 69; 13L. T. 313; 14 W. R. 21 ; llJiir. N. 8. 988 "31 
 
 Wickham V. Hawker (1840), 7 M. & W. 03; lOL. J.Ex. 153 038 
 
 Wickham v. Loe (1848), 12 Q. B. 620 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 21 ; 12 Jur. 628 . . 1 125 
 
 Wickham v. Wickham (1855), 2 K. & J. 478 077 
 
 Widdows' TruHts. Ro (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 408 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 380 ; 24 L. 
 
 T. 87 ; 19 W. R. 468 101 
 
 Wiedcman v. Walpole, (1891) 2 Q. B. 534 ; 60 L. J. Q. B. 702 ; 40 W. R. 
 
 114 525, 881 
 
 Wider v. Schillizzi (1850), 17 C. B. 619 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 89 776 
 
 Wigglcsworth v. Dallison (1778), 1 Doug. 201 ; 1 Blij,'li, 287 ; 1 Smith. L. C. . 763 
 Wi>,'ht's Mortgage Trusts, Re (1873), 43 L. J. Ch. 00; L. R. 10 Eq. 41 ; 
 
 28 L. T. 491 738 
 
 Wihonr. Law (1821), 3 Stark. 03 1170 
 
 Wiko r. Lightucr (1824), 11 Serg. & R. 198; Swift, Ev. 143 972, 973 
 
 Wilbur V. Seidell (1820), 6 Cowon, 162 328, 364 
 
 Wilby V. Elgeo (1875), L. R. 10 C. P. 497 ; 44 L. J. C. P. 254 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 310 711, 722 
 
 Wilby V. ElHton (1849), 7 Dowl. & L. 143 ; 8 C. B. 142 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 
 
 320 ; 13 Jur. 706 223 
 
 Wildes V. Dudlow (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 341 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 198 ; 23 W. R. 
 
 435 679 
 
 Wiles V. Woodward (1851), 5 Ex. 557 ; 20 L. J. Ex. 201 94 
 
 Wilkes V. Hopkins (1845), 1 C. B. 737 ; 3 Dowl. & L. 181 ; 14 L. J. C. P. 
 
 225 476 
 
 Wilkin V. Reed (1854), 15 C. B. 192, 19S, 205 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 193 ; 18 Jur. 
 
 1081 40, 191, 193 
 
 Wilkins v. Jadis (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 188 ; 1 M. & Rob. 41 33, 521 
 
 Wilkins v. Stephens (1842), 1 Y. & C. (Ch.) 431 006 
 
 Wilkinson, In ro (1881), 6 P. Div. 100 ; 29 W. R. 890 ; 45 J. P. 710 707 
 
 Wilkinson v. Evans (1806), 35 L. J. C. P. 224 ; L. R. 1 C. P. 407 ; H. & R. 
 
 622 ; 14 W. R. 963 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 600 673 
 
 Wilkinson v. Gordon (1824), 2 Add. (Ece.) 152 1116 
 
 Wilkinson v. Johnston (1824), 3 B. & C. 428 ; 6 D. & R. 403 1200 
 
 Wilkin.son v. Kirby (1864), 23 L. J. C. P. 224 ; 15 C. B. 430 ; 2 C. L. R. 
 
 1387; 1 Jur. N. 8. 164 1119 
 
 Wilkinson v. Storey (1839), 1 Jebb & Sy. 509 44 
 
 Wilkin.son v. Verity (1871), L. R. 6 C. P. 206 ; 40 L. J. C. P. 141 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 32 ; 19 W. R. 004 71 
 
 Willesford, Re (1842), 3 Curt. 77 701 
 
 William.s, Ex parte (1824), 13 Price, 673; M'Clel. 493 811 
 
 Williams, Re (1865), 36 L. J. P. & M. 2 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 4 698 
 
 Williams V. Armroyd (1813), 7 Cranch, 423 1150 
 
 Williams v. Ashton (1800), 1 J. & H. 115 142 
 
 Williams v. Bryant (1839). 5 M. & W. 447 ; 7 Dowl. P. C. 602 ; 9 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 47 216, 543 
 
 Williams v. Byrnes (1863), 2 New R. 47 ; 1 Moo. P. C. C. 154 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 69 ; 11 W. R. 487 671 
 
 Williams v. Callender (1810), Holt, N. P. 307 255 
 
 Williams v. Comm. (1879), 91 Pa. St. 493 627 
 
 WiUiams v. Davies (1833), 11 Q. B. D. 74 ; 52 L. J. M. C. 87 ; 47 J. P. 
 
 581 272, 273 
 
 Williams v. E. Ind. Co. (1802), 3 East, 192, 201 ; 6 R. R. 589 ; Bull. N. P. 
 
 298 105, 260 
 
 Williams ». Evans (1853), 2 H. & N. 771 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 176; 1 E. &B. 727.. 704 
 Williams v. Evans (1875), 44 L. J. Ch. 319 ; L. R. 19 Eq. 547 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 359 ; 23 W. R. 460 688 
 
 Vol. I. ends with page 636. 
 
 .! 
 
 II 
 
 Av 
 
 ;ti' 
 
 
 t i) 
 
ccxu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Williams f. Evton (1859), 4 H. & N. 357: 27 L. J. Ex. 176 .. ,,....122, 1039 
 
 Williums r. Farriiijrton (1789). 2 Cox (Cli.) 202 965 
 
 Williams f. Geaves (1838), 8 C. & P. 592 437, 438 
 
 Williams r. Urifflth (1849), 3 Ex. 335; 18 L.J. Ex.210 711 
 
 Williams v. GriffitbR (1839), 2 C. M. & R. 4(i ; 1 Gale, 65 ; 5 Tyr. 748. . .. 715 
 
 Williams v. Gutuli (1857), 14 Moo. P. C. C. 202 6 
 
 Williams v. Hulie (1663), 1 Sid. 131 ; Swift, Evid. 512 919 
 
 AVilliams v. Inncs (1808), 1 Ciimp. 364 ; 10 R. R. 702 498 
 
 Williams t'. Jones (1841), 11 A. & E. 643 227 
 
 Williams v. Jones (1849), 7 Notes of Cases, 106 143 
 
 Williams v. .Jones (1887), 30 W. R. 573 754 
 
 Williams v. Jordan (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 681 ; 6 Ch. D. 517 ; 26 W. R. 230. 671 
 Williams v. Lake (1859), 29 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 2 E. & E. 349 ; 1 L. T. 56 ; 6 
 
 Jnr. N. S. 45 671 
 
 Williams v. Lucas, (1892) 2 Q. B. 113 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 595 ; 66 L. T. 706. 310 
 
 Williams «'. Morgan (18.50), 15 Q. B. 782 277, 398 
 
 Williams v. Morris (1841),' 8 M. & W. 488 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 126 638 
 
 Williams v. Mudie (1824), 1 C. & P. 158 : Ry. & M. 34 593 
 
 Williams v. Pigott (IS48), 2 Ex. 201 ; 17 L. J. Ex. 196 ; 6 Railw. Cas. 544 ; 
 
 12 Jur. 313 641 
 
 Williams r. Scottish Widows' Fund (1888), 52 J. P. 471 ; 4 Times L. R. 
 
 489 172 
 
 Williams v. Smith (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 496 32 
 
 Williams v. Steele (1835), 4 La-w Roc. (1st Scries) 169 870 
 
 Williams r. Stern (1879), 5 Q. B. D. 409; 49 L. J. Q. B. 663 ; 42 L. T. 
 
 719 ; 28 W. R. 901 751 
 
 Williams v. Swansea Canal Navig. Co. (1S68), L. R. 3 Ex. 158 1068 
 
 Williams v. Thomas (1862), 2 Dr. & Sm. 29 ; 31 L J. Ch. 674 ; 7 L. T. 184; 
 
 a Jur. N. S. 250 506 
 
 Williams v. Tyley (1858), Johns. 530 706 
 
 Williams t>. Walsby (1803), 4 Esp. 220 645 
 
 Williams v. AVheeler (I860), 8 C. B. N. S. 316 681 
 
 Williams v. Wilcox (1838), 8 A. & E. 314 ; 3 N. & P. 606 ; 1 W. W. & H. 
 
 477 1231 
 
 Williams t'. Williams (1693), Carth. 269 5 
 
 Williams t\ Williams (1798), 1 Hagg. Cons. 304 183, 502, 656 
 
 Williams V. Williams (1863), 32 Beav. 370 606, 806 
 
 Williams t'. Williams (1868), 37 L. J. Ch. 854 679 
 
 Williams v. Williams (1877), 8 Ch. D. 789, 793 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 857 ; 27 
 
 W. R. 100 ; 39 L. T. 180 146, 704 
 
 Williams v. Williams (1806), L. R. 2 Ch. 15 268 
 
 Williams v. Williams and Padfield (1866), 35 L. J. P. & M. 8 ; L. R. 1 P, 
 
 & D. 29 ; 13 L. T. 610 501 
 
 Williams v. Wilson (1853), 9 Ex. 90 ; 1 C. L. R. 921 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 17 . . 1160 
 
 Williams v. Younghusband (1815), 1 Stark. R. 139 303 
 
 Williamson v. Allison (1802), 2 East, 446 200, 201 
 
 Williamson v. Barton (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 170; 7 H. & N. 899; 8 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 341 ; ,-) L. T. 800 758 
 
 Williamson (Wilkinson) v. Scott (1821), 17 Mass. 249 552 
 
 Willingham v. Matthews (1815), 6 Taun. 358 ; 2 Marsh. 57 866, 869 
 
 Willius V. Smith (1854), 4 E. & B. 180 ; 3 C. L. R. 16 ; 24 L. J. Q. B. 62 ; 
 
 I Jur. N. 8. 163 713 
 
 Willis f. Bernard (1832), 8 Bing. 376; iMo. &Sc. 684; 1 L. J. C. P. 118.. 375 
 
 Willis t'. Jemegan (1741), 2 Atk. 252 625 
 
 Willis «. Newham (1830), Y. & J. 518 717 
 
 Willis V. Peckham (1820), 1 B. & B. 515 ; 4 Moore (C. P.) 300 820 
 
 Willmanf. WorraU (1838), 8 C. & P. 380 1216, 1220 
 
 Willmett V. Harmer (1839), 8 0. & P. 696 105 
 
 Willock V. Noble (1875), L. R. 7 H. L. 680 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 345 ; 32 L. T. 
 
 419; 23W. R. 809 709 
 
 WilloMg .ny V. Willoughby (1787), 1 T. R. 772 ; 1 R. R. 397 6, 21 
 
 Wilk.on, h , Nicholson, Ex parte (1880), 14 Ch. D. 243 ; 49 L. J. Bank. 
 
 68 849 
 
 The reference* are to pages, not to paragraphi. 
 
511 ? 
 
 TABLE OF CASKS CITED. 
 
 CCXIU 
 
 i 
 
 Wilson r. Allen (1820), iJac. & W. 611,620 126 
 
 Wilson V. Beddard (1846), 12 Sim. 28 ;oi) 
 
 Wilson V. Boerein (1818), 15 Johns. 286 465 
 
 Wilson v. Bowie (1823), 1 C. & P. 10 2b9, 1191 
 
 Wilson V. Butler (18:J8), 4 Bing. N. C. 748 ; 6 Scott, 540 ; 8 L. J. C. P. 143. . 89 
 
 Wilson t». CoUum (1881), 9 L. R. Ir. 150 • 1213 
 
 WUson V. Do Coulon (1883), 22 Ch. D. 841 ; 53 L. J. Ch. 248; 48 L. T. 
 
 514 ; 31 W. R. 839 347 
 
 Wilson V. Lady Dunsany (1854), 18 Beav. 293 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 492 ; 18 Jur. 
 
 762 1152 
 
 Wilson V. Finch-Hiitton (1877), 2 Ex. D. 336 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 489 ; 36 L. T. 
 
 473 ; 25 W. R. 537 776 
 
 Wilson V. Ford (1868), L. R. 3 Ex. 63 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 60 ; 17 L. T. 605 ; 
 
 16 W. R. 482 166 
 
 Wilson V. Hoaro (183!)), 10 A. & E. 236 39 
 
 Wilson V. Mitchell (1813), 3 Camp. 393 600 
 
 Wilson V. N. & Banb. Ry. (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 477 ; 20 W. R. 938 ; 27 
 
 L. T. 507 602 
 
 Wilson V. O'Leary (1872), L. R. 12 Eq. 525 ; 40 L. J. Ch. 709 805 
 
 Wilson V. Rastall (1792), 4 T. R. 460 ; 2 R. R. 515 594, 595, 598, 603, 607 
 
 Wilson V. Robinson (1845), 7 Q. B. 68 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 196 ; 9 Jur. 726 . . 245 
 
 Wilson V. Rogers (1745-6), 2 Str. 1242 992 
 
 Wilson i). Sewell (1766), 4 Burr. 1980 658 
 
 Wilson V. Sheriffs of London (1620), Brownl. 15 871 
 
 Wilson V. Turner (1808), 1 Taun. 398 : 9 R. R. 797 506 
 
 Wilson V. Wallani (1880), 6 Ex. D. 155 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 437 ; 42 L. T. 375 ; 
 
 28 W. R. 597 ; 44 J. P. 475 662 
 
 Wilson V. Wilson (1883), 6 P. Div. 8 ; 49 L. T. 430 : 32 W. R. 282. . . .341, 348 
 
 Wilson's Trusts (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 247 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 243 1143 
 
 Wilton V. Dunn (1851), 17 Q. B. 294 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 60; 15 Jur. 1104 .. 98 
 
 Wilton V. Webster (1839), 7 C. & P. 198 376 
 
 Wiltshire v. Sidford (1827), 1 M. & R. 404 ; 8 B. & C. 259, n 113 
 
 Wilt/ief. Adamson (1789), 1 Ph. Ev. 357 526 
 
 Windle v. Andrews (1819), 2 B. & Aid. 690 ; 2 Stark. 425 731 
 
 Wing V. Augrave (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 183 30 L. J. Ch. 65 174, 741 
 
 Winn V. Bull (1877), 47 L. J. Ch. 139 ; 7 Ch. D. 29 ; 26 W. R. 230 673 
 
 Winn V. Patterson (1835), 9 Pet. 663 429 
 
 Winsor v. Durnford (1848), 12 Q. B. 603 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 14 ; 12 Jur. 629 lOU 
 Winsorv. R. (1866), 35 L. J. M. C. 161 ; 7 B. & S. 490 ; L. R. 1 Q. B. 
 
 390 ; 10 Cox, C. C. 276 ; 12 Jur. N. 8. 561 ; 14 L. T. 567 ; 14 W. R. 
 
 696 883 
 
 Winter v. Miles (1808), 10 East, 578 ; 1 Camp. 475, n. ; 10 R. R. 391 4 
 
 Winter v. Wroot (1834), 1 M. & Rob. 404 376 
 
 Winterbottom v. Ld. Derby (1867), L. R. 2 Ex. 316 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 194 ; 16 
 
 L. T. 771 ; 16 W. R. 15 125 
 
 Wintle, Re (1870),L. R. 9 Eq. 373; 21 L. T. 781; 18 W. R. 394 1171 
 
 Wisden v. Wisden (1849), 6 Beav. 649 816 
 
 Wise V. Great West. Ry. Co. (1856), 26 L. J. Ex. 258 ; 1 H. & N. 63 722 
 
 Wiseman's case (1824), Macq. H. L. Prac. 631 502 
 
 Wishart v. Wyllie (1853), 1 Macq. 389 Ill 
 
 Witham v. Tii> lor 0876), 3 Ch. 1). 605 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 798 ; 24 W. R. S77. . 438 
 Withnell v. Giirtham (1796), 6 T. R. 388 ; 1 Esp. 324 ; 3 R. R. 218. . . , 397, 792 
 
 Witmer v. Schlatter (1830), 2 Rawle. 359 1098 
 
 Witt t>. Witt and Klindworth (1862), 3 S. & T. 143 ; 32 L. J. Mat. 179 ; 
 
 8 L. T. 175 ; 11 W. R. 154 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 207 374 
 
 Woganr. Small (1824), 11 Sorg. & R. 141 931 
 
 Wolf V. Wveth (1824), 1 1 Serg. & R. 149 354 
 
 Wolfe v. ■V\''ashburn (1826), 6 Cowen, 261 1178 
 
 Wolff V. Koppol (1843), 6 Hill, N. Y. R. 458 6" 7 
 
 Wolff V. Oxholm (1817), 6 M. & Sel. 92 1146 
 
 WoUastou «'. Hakowill (1841), 3 M. & Or. 297 ; 3 Scott, N. R. 593 ; 10 
 
 L. J. 0. P. 303 296, 909 
 
 Wolton*. Gavin (1860), 16 Q. B. 48; 20 L. J. Q. B. 73; 15 Jur. 329.... 148 
 
 Fol. 1. *ndt with page 636. 
 
 •u 
 
 '. H 
 
 i 
 
CCXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAoa 
 
 Wolverton Mortgaged Estates, Re (1877), 7 Ch. D. 197; 47 L. J. Ch. 127; 
 
 37 L. T. 673 ; 26 W. R. 138 798 
 
 Womersley v. Dally (1857), 26 L. J. Ex. 219 230 
 
 Wood, Re, Ex parte Luckes (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. 302 ; 41 L. J. Bank. 21 ; 
 
 26L. T. 113 82 
 
 Wood V. Anglo-Italian Bk. (1^76), 34 L. T. 2.').') 1189 
 
 Wood V. Duke of Argyll (ISiS^. " M. & Gr. 932 ; 7 Suott, N. R. 885 ; 13 
 
 L. J. C. P. 96 640 
 
 Wood V. Beard (1876), 2 Ex. D. 30 ; 46 L. J. Ex. 100 ; 35 L. T. 866 .... 649 
 
 Wood V. Braddick (1808), 1 Taun. 105 ; 9 R. R. 711 386, 488 
 
 Wood V. Cooper (1845), 1 C. & K. 645 923, 925 
 
 Wood V. Drury (1099), 1 Ld. Raym. 734 ; Holt, 731 1209 
 
 Wood V. Fitz (1820), 10 Mart. 196 14 
 
 Wood V. Jackson (1831), 8 Wond. 9 1140 
 
 Wood V. Lake (1751), Sayer, 3 638 
 
 Wood V. Leadbitter (1845), 13 M. & W. 843 ; 14 L. J. Ex. 101 637, 638 
 
 Wood V. Mackinson (1840), 2 M. & Rob. 273 942 
 
 Wood V. Manley (1839), 11 A. & E. 34 ; 3 P. & D. 5 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 27 . . 638 
 Wood V. Midgley (1854), 5 De G. M. & G. 41 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 553 ; 2 Eq. 
 
 Rep. 729; 2 Sm. & G. 121 670, 730 
 
 Wood ti. Peel (1844), Ex. Midd. Sitt. T. T. 1844 361 
 
 Wood V. Priestner (1866), 4 H. & C. 681 ; L. R. 1 Ex. Ch. 66 ; 36 L. J. 
 
 Ex. 42 786 
 
 Woodv. Rowcliffe(1851), 6Ex. 407; 20 L. J. Ex. 285 804 
 
 Wood V. Scarth (1856), 2 Kay & J. 33 749 
 
 Wood V. Smith, Re City of Cambridge (1874), 43 L. J. Adm. 11 ; L. R. 6 
 
 P. C. 451 ; 30L. T. 439; 22 W. R. 678 178 
 
 Wood V. Underbill (1847), 6 How. S. Ct. R. 1, 4 43 
 
 Wood V. Wood (1867), L. R. 1 P. & D. 309; 36 L. J. P. 34 ; 15 L. T. 
 
 593 143, 307, 709 
 
 Woods V. Woods (1844), 4 Hare, 83 ; 14 L. J. Ch. 9 601 
 
 Wood's Estate, Re (1863), 2 New R. 16 ; 1 Do G. J. & S. 465 ; 32 L. J. 
 
 Ch. 400 167 
 
 Woodbeck v. Keller (1826), 6 Cowen, 120 623, 627 
 
 Woodbridge v. Spooncr (1819). 3 B. & A. 233 ; 1 Chit. R. 661 767 
 
 Woodcock V. Houldsworth (1846), 16 M. & W. 124 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 49 ..155, 932 
 
 Woodcraft v. Kinaston (1742), 2 Atk. 317 1019 
 
 Woodfiue, Re (1878), 47 L. J. Ch. 832; 38 L. T. 753; 26 W. R. 678.... 945 
 
 Woodford V. Whiteloy (1830), M. & M. 617 307 
 
 Woodgate V. Potts (1847), 2 C. & K. 457 270 
 
 Woodham v. Edwards (1836), 6 A. & E. 771 ; 1 N. & P. 207 ; 2 H. & W. 
 
 443 ; 6 L. J. K. B. 38 7,8 
 
 Woodley, Re(1864), 3S. &T. 429; 33L. J. P. 154 699 
 
 Woodley v. Coventry (18631, 32 L. J. Ex. 185 ; 2 H. & C. 164 ; 8 L. T. 
 
 249 ; 11 AV. R. 699 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 648 646 
 
 Woods V. Dean (1862), 32 L. J. Q. B. 1 ; 3 B. & S. 101 ; 7 L. T. 661 ; 11 
 
 W. R. 22 521 
 
 Woods V. Lamb (1806), 36 L. J. Ch. 309 109 
 
 Woods t'. Woods (1802), 2 Bay. 476 172 
 
 Woodward, Re (1871), L. R. 2 P. & D. 206; 40 L. J. P. & M. 17 ; 24 
 
 L. T. 40 ; 19 W. R. 418 706 
 
 Woodward v. Buchanan (1870), 39 L. J. Q. B. 71 ; L. R. 5 Q. B. 285; 
 
 22 L. T. 123 229 
 
 Woodward v. Catton (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 44 ; 6 C. & P. 489 ; 4 Tyr. 689 1006 
 
 Woodward*. Larking (IHOI), 3 Enp. 286 652 
 
 Woodward f. Leavitt (1871), 107 Mass. 463 616 
 
 Woolamw. Heam (1802), 7 Ves. 218 ; 6 R. R. 113 744, 760 
 
 WooUey V. N. Lond. Ry. Co. (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 602 ; 38 L. J. C. P. 
 
 317; 20L. T. 813; 17 W. R. 650, 797 1186 
 
 Woolway V. Rowe (1834), 1 A. & E. 114 ; 3 N. & M. 849; 3 L. J. K. B. 
 
 121 610, 612, 513 
 
 Wootluy V. Gregory (182H), 2 Y. & J. 636 069 
 
 Worcester's, L'Kvesque do, case (1694), Moore, F. 300; Poph. 81 6 
 
 2'lie re/cicnccn ar« to pagva, not tu panujiaphi. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CCXV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Worlichv. Massey (1605), Cro. Jac. 67 19 
 
 Woreley f. Filisker (1620), 2 Eoll. Rep. 119 21 
 
 WorthinKton v. Grimsditch (1845), 7 Q. B. 479 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 52 ; 10 
 
 Jur. 26 714 
 
 Worthington v. Hylyer (1808), 4 Mass. 196 802 
 
 Wortliington v. Moore (1891), 64 L. T. 338 1211 
 
 Worthington v. Sudlow (1862), 31 h. J. Q. B. 131 ; 2 B. & 8. 508 ; 6 L. T. 
 
 283 ; 10 W. R. 621 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 668 780 
 
 Worthington v. Warrington (1848). 8 C. B. 134 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 350 .... 773 
 
 Wotton, Re (1874), 43 L. J. P. & M. 14 ; L. R. 3 B. & D. 159 699 
 
 Wrayv. Steele (1814), 2 Ves. &B. 388; 13 R. R. 124 666 
 
 Wray, In re (1769, should be 1876), Ir. R. 10 Eq. 266 140 
 
 Wright, Re (1865), 34 L. J. P. & M. 104; 4 S. & T. 35 699 
 
 Wrightv. CoU8(1849),8 0. B. 150; 19L. J. C. P. 60 1165 
 
 Wright «. Court (1825), ,2 C. & P. 232 385 
 
 Wright V. Crookes (1840), 1 Scott, N. R. 685 747, 757 
 
 Wright V. Doe d. Tatham (1834), 1 A. & E. 22 . . . .278. 279, 324, 326, 369-371, 
 
 379, 380, 392, 1113, 1216 
 Wright V. GofE (1856), 22 Beav. 207 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 803 ; 4 W. R. 522 ; 2 
 
 Jur. N. S. 481 749 
 
 Wright V. Graham (1848), 3 Ex. 131 ; 18 L. J. Ex. 29 1039 
 
 Wright V. Holdgate (1850), 3 C. & K. 158 101, 621 
 
 Wright V. Lainson (1837), 2 M. & W. 739, 743 ; M. & H. 202 ; 6 Dowl. 
 
 146 ; 6 L. J. Ex. 197 147 
 
 Wright V. Littler (1761), 3 Burr. 1255 ; 1 W. BI. 349 464 
 
 Wright V. Lond. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1877), 46 L. J. Q. B. 429 ; 2 Q. B. D. 
 
 271; 36L. T. 590; 25 W. R. 647 1130 
 
 Wright V. Ld. Maidstone (1856), 1 K. & J. 701 ; 24 L. J. Ch. 623 ; 1 Jur. 
 
 N. S. 1013 308 
 
 Wright V. Mills (1859), 4 H. & N. 488 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 223 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 771 84 
 
 Wrightv. Netherwood (1793), 2 Salk. 593. n. (n); 2 Phillim. 266-277, n. (c) . . 174 
 Wright V. Pearson (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 582; 38 L. J. Q. B. 312; 10 
 
 B. & 8. 723 ; 20 L. T. 849 ; 17 W. R. 1099 • 516 
 
 Wright V. Pulham (1810), 2 Chitty. R. 121 1095 
 
 Wright V. Rogers (1869), 38 L. J. P. & M. 67 ; L. R. 1 P. & D. 678 ; 21 
 
 L. T. 156 ; 17 W. R. 833 697 
 
 Wright V. Rudd (1832), cited 1 Ph. Ev. 172 398 
 
 Wright V. Sanderson, "Times" 28 Feb. 1884 (C. A.) 697 
 
 Wriglit V. Sarmuda (see Wriji ( r. Netherwood). 
 
 Wright V. Shawcross (1819). '^ H. & Aid. 501, n 32 
 
 Wright V. Snowe (1848), 2 De G. & Sm. 321 539 
 
 Wright V. Stavert (1850), 29 L. J. Q. B. 161 ; 2 E. & E. 721 ; 8 W. R. 
 
 413 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 867 682 
 
 Wright ti. Vanderplank (1856), 2 K. & J. 1 ; 25 L. J. Ch. 753 ; 8 Do G. 
 
 M. & O. 133 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 599 136 
 
 Wright V. Wilcox (1850), 19 L. J. C. P. 333 ; 9 C. B. 650 ; 14 Jur. 
 
 746 272, 274 
 
 Wright V. Woodgate (1835), 2 C. M. & R. 573 ; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 12 ; 1 Sale, 329 . . Ill 
 
 Wright V. Wright (1831), 7 Bing. 457 696 
 
 Wrightson t'. Calvert (1860), 1 J. & H. 250 803 
 
 Wyatt, Re (1862), 2 S. & T. 494 ; 31 L. J. P. & M. 197 701 
 
 Wyatt V. Batemau (1836), 7 C. & P. 5H6 329, 1210 
 
 Wyatt V. Gore {1816), Holt, N. P. R. 299 618 
 
 Wyatt V. Harrison (1832), 3 B. & Ad. 871 ; 1 L. J. K. B. 237 114 
 
 Wych V. Meal (1734), 3 P. Wms. 311 495 
 
 Wyldt). Hopkins (1846), 15 M. & W. 617; 16 L. J. Ex. 25 540, 541 
 
 Wyllie V. Mott (1827), 1 Hagg. (Eco.) 34 846 
 
 Wyndham's Divorce bill (1855), 3 Macq. 64 376 
 
 Wynne v. Tyrwhitt (1833), 4 B. & Ad. 370 87, 442 
 
 XKNOsr. Wickham (1866), L. R. 2 H. L. 296; 36 L. J. C. P. 313; 16 
 
 L. T. 880 1204 
 
 Vol. I. ends u:\th page 035. 
 
 t ■■ ■ 
 > . t 
 
iWlt>t^ 
 
 ccxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 ui 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Tabsley v. Noble (1697), 1 Ld. Ravm. 190 496 
 
 Yarborough v. Bk. of England (isi'i), 16 East, 6 ; 14 Rev. R. 272 ; do. 
 
 Troface v 643 
 
 Yardley v. Arnold (1842), 10 M. & W. 145 ; 2 Dowl. N. 8. 311 ; Car. & M. 
 
 434 ; 6 Jur. 718 909 
 
 YatoH, Ex parte, Ro Smith (Isr.S), 27 L. J. Bank. 9 ; 2 Do G. & J. 191 . . 1194 
 
 Yatort V. Ciinisew (1828), 3 C. & P. 99 485 
 
 Yatos V. Muddan (1851), 3 Mao. & G. 632 : 21 L. J. Ch. 24 ; 16 Jur. 45. . 144 
 YateH V. Pym (18I(i), 6 Taun. 446 : 2 Marsh. 141 ; Holt, N. P. 95 .. ..766, 781 
 
 Yates V. Thomson (1835), 3 CI. & Fin. 677, 580 62 
 
 Yeav. Fouraker (17C0-1), 2 Burr. 1099 714 
 
 Yearsley v. Heane (1845), 14 M. & W. 322 : 3 Dowl. & L. 265 872 
 
 Yearwood'.s Trusts, Ro (1877), 46 L. J. Ch. 488 ; 5 Ch. D. 545 ; 26 W. R. 461 621 
 
 Yeatman, Ex parte (1835). 4 Dowl. 309 694 
 
 Yeatmau v. Dempcey (1861), 7 C. B. N. S. 628 ; 9C. B. N. S. 881 ; 9W. R. 
 
 743; 7 Jur. N. S. 1245; 29 L.J. C. P. 177 836 
 
 Yeats V. Yeats (1852), 16 Beav. 170 803 
 
 Yelverton i'. Yelverton (1867), L. R. 1 H. L. (So.) 218; 4 Macq. 746; 10 
 
 .Tur. N. S. 1209 ; 11 L. T. 118 ; 13 W. R. 235 876 
 
 Yeomans v. Williams (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 184 ; 35 L. J. Ch. 283 639 
 
 Yorke v. Brown (1842), 10 M. & W. 78 ; 2 Dowl. N. S. 283 ; 11 L. J. Ex. 
 
 410 1165 
 
 Yoter V. Sanno (1837), 6 Watts, 166 619 
 
 Young, Ex parte. Re Kitchin (1881), 17 Ch. D. 608 ; 60 L. J. Ch. 824 ; 46 
 
 L. T. 90 608 
 
 Young t'. Black (1813), 7 Craneh, 605 1118 
 
 Young V. Cawdroy (1819), 8 Taun. 734 653 
 
 Young f. Clare Hall (1851), 17 Q. B. ,529 ; 21 L. J. Q. B. 12 ; 16 Jur. 81 . . 446 
 
 Young V. Cole (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 724 ; 4 Scott, 489 ; 6 L. J. C. P. 201.. 776 
 
 Young V. Honner (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 537 ; 1 C. & K. 51 1226 
 
 Young V. Corp. of Leamington (1883), 8 Q. B. D. 597 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 292 ; 
 
 8 App. Cas. 517 ; 62 L. J. Q. B. 713 ; 49 L. T. 1 ; 31 W. R. 925 ; 47 
 
 J. P. 660 650 
 
 Young V. Holloway (1895), 11 R. (April) 59 ; (1895) P. 87 ; 64 L. J. P. D. 
 
 & A. 65 ; 72 L. T. 1 18 ; 43 W. R. 429 .Jdd. [230] 
 
 Young V. Lynch (1747), 1 W. Bl. 27 997 
 
 Young r. Murphy (1836), 3 Bing. N. C. 64 ; 3 Scott, 379 ; 2 Hodges, 144 ; 
 
 6 L. J. C. P. 180 255 
 
 Young V. R. (1789), 3 T. R. 98 ; 1 R. R. 060 237, 238 
 
 Young V. Raincock (1847), 7 C. B. 310 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 193 ; 13 Jur. 539. . 89, 
 
 93, 94 
 
 Young V. Schulor(1883), 11 Q. B. D. 671 ; 49 L. T. 646 730, 758 
 
 Young V. Smith (1808), 6 Esp. 121 490 
 
 Young V. Turing (1841), 2 M. & Gr. 603 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 752 167 
 
 Young V. Wright (1807), 1 Camp. 141 505, 606 
 
 Youngo V. Honner (1843), 2 M. & Rob. 637 ; 1 C. & K. 51 1226 
 
 Yrisari v. Clement (1826), 3 Bing. 432 ; 1 1 Moore (C. P.) 308 ; 2 C. & P. 223 3 
 Ystalyfera Iron Co. v. Neath and Breison Ry. ("o. (1873), 43 L. J. Ch. 476 ; 
 
 L. R. 17 Eq. 142 ; 29 L. T. 662 ; 22 W. R 149 1073 
 
 ZACitAniAS V. Collis (1820), 3 Phillim. 202 140 
 
 Zichy Ferraris, Countess de v. M. of Hertford (1843), 3 Curt. 479. .097, 701, 708 
 
 /ouch Peer. (1807), Pari. Min. 207 409, 423 
 
 Zouohti. Clay (1671), 1 Ventr. 186; 2 Keb. 872; 2 Lev. 36 1203, 1206 
 
 Zouoh V. Willingalo (1790), 1 H. Bl. 312 ; 2 R. R. 770 39, 622 
 
 Zugasti V. Lamer (1858), 12 Moo. P. C. C. 331 6 
 
 Zuluota V. Vinent (1851-2), 1 De G. M. & G. 315 644 
 
 2'h» references art to page*, not to paragraph*. 
 
[REFEKESCtS ARE TO I'AliEi<.] 
 
 AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 
 AimoT V. Plumbe 1220'^ 122018 
 
 Abbott /•• ColL'iuaii 122'J*", l:i2'J'-' 
 
 Abiii<{tun ('. Nortli liridgewatcr 412' 
 
 Ackk'ii V. Hickman 'Jib-, '.t78'' 
 
 A(bmi c. Korr 122'.)'9 
 
 Ailams r. (Mark IM" 
 
 V. Davis 8<)8" 
 
 i\ Kielil 1229*', 122'j'\ 122'.M'' 
 
 ('. Groenwich Ins. Co. 
 
 2.-)7<' 
 
 r. Harrison 
 
 
 f,22< 
 
 /'. .Jont's 
 
 
 IS.J'4 
 
 r. Ki'iinoy 
 
 
 2.'i7'- 
 
 r. Lawsoii 
 
 
 2.-.7" 
 
 i: LesbtT 
 
 
 Wl'M' 
 
 r. State 
 
 301»\ 
 
 U7ii'9 
 
 r. Swansea 
 
 
 427* 
 
 ('. Watkins 
 
 
 8(»H-^' 
 
 r. Way 
 
 2 1-', 
 
 II7'.ti'-' 
 
 r. Wbet-ItT 
 
 'J78- 
 
 ', '.t78-:7 
 
 AiManis r. Si-itzinger 
 
 
 4r)2' 
 
 Ailkins r. Galbraitii 
 
 
 3r.H" 
 
 Adior V. State 
 
 
 21-» 
 
 Abern r. ( looilspccd 
 
 
 ;5!ii-' 
 
 Aiken r. Keniiison 
 
 
 2.")7< 
 
 Alabama, &c;. Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Cobl> 
 
 2iii 
 
 Alabama, .<i;. I{. H. r. Hill .%ii' 
 
 , :!().-)':< 
 
 iMabania Stale Lil. Co. i- 
 
 . Kvie 
 
 18:{" 
 
 Albrittin r. llimtsville 
 
 ■ 
 
 21" 
 
 Ablerman r. IVople 
 
 
 <;22'' 
 
 AliliTinan and Council r 
 
 Finlpy 
 
 ._>IW 
 
 Alexander r. Hiirnliani 
 
 
 2 I'- 
 
 r. Foreman 
 
 
 ll 7'.»" 
 
 r. Kaiser 
 
 
 {•78<-> 
 
 I'. Milvvankee 
 
 
 21'^ 
 
 r. Smoot 
 
 •103 
 
 '. Ill:;--' 
 
 r. U.S. 
 
 
 ;!.'.8J' 
 
 Alexander's Succession 
 
 
 ]x:i^> 
 
 Allc^luiny r. Nelson 
 
 
 21' 
 
 Allen /'. Frost 
 
 
 ■>2', '>•!' 
 
 c. Thaxter 
 
 
 1I70'H 
 
 i: Watson 
 
 52>-. 
 
 1I7!)'-: 
 
 i\ Veater 
 
 
 808-» 
 
 Allesbrook r. Hoaoh 
 
 
 122'.»« 
 
 Allison r. Harrow 
 
 
 (i22^' 
 
 Alston V. State 
 
 
 f)K8-' 
 
 Amer. &c. Ass'n v. Palil 
 
 
 SOH" 
 
 American Fire In>. Co. i 
 
 . Hazen 
 
 267-w 
 
 Amer. &c. Ins. Co. r. Kosenaple 62i', 
 
 'V2r\ 117'.)», 117'Ji» 
 
 Amer. Nat. Hk. r. Husliey 218 
 
 Ames v. McCambcr 62i'', ."j'^'s 
 
 r. Snider 270' 
 
 Amey r. Lonjj ]22i>* 
 
 Amidon r. Hoslcy 2o7'''- 
 
 Anderson r. Ames 4ti;!'* 
 
 r. Fetzer 3'Jl-", :!!»l''t» 
 
 v. Lonjr 257-"* 
 
 r. Parl.er 427* 
 
 r. State 4706, 470l^ 588^ C88»', 588'^ 
 
 Andrews r. Heck 
 
 
 
 l8;v-!+ 
 
 r. Hoxie 
 
 
 
 '2\^' 
 
 V. Solomon 
 
 
 
 t)22'-> 
 
 Aneals r. People 
 
 
 
 078"'J 
 
 Annus r. Smitli 
 
 
 
 078«'> 
 
 Anbeuser-Bnscli Brew 
 
 np 
 
 Ass. /'. 
 
 
 Hutmacber 
 
 
 
 .■^.ISi'i 
 
 Annapolis, &c. I{. 11. i>. 
 
 Gantt 
 
 2.-)7-< 
 
 Anon. 
 
 
 
 2r)7«* 
 
 Apollon, Tlie 
 
 
 
 lil'" 
 
 Appeal of Hartranft 
 
 
 
 C22''> 
 
 Application of .Ia<!ob8 
 
 
 
 21»7 
 
 Arayo r. Currel 
 
 
 
 21» 
 
 Arbuckle r. 'I'emplefon 
 
 
 183W, (!22' 
 
 Arcber r. Helm 
 
 
 39r 
 
 aoi-7 
 
 Arcbibald r. State 
 
 
 
 470' 
 
 Armil r. Cbicajfo 
 
 
 
 H'.d'""' 
 
 Armor r. Stale 
 
 
 
 2.-.7^" 
 
 Armstroni; r. IT. S. 
 
 
 
 2P 
 
 Arnold r. Arnolil 
 
 
 910" 
 
 oini'i 
 
 r. .Jones 
 
 
 
 80H" 
 
 Artbiir r. .Fames 
 
 
 554' 
 
 f).54i-' 
 
 Asb '•, Marlow 
 
 
 
 r>-r- 
 
 Asbley v. Hoot 
 
 
 
 /■)2"» 
 
 Asbley'g Adm'.x v. Martin 
 
 
 21'" 
 
 Asbloek V. Linder 
 
 
 
 .V.4*< 
 
 Atcliison, &.C. K. U. r. 
 
 Rlacksbirc 
 
 o,|J 
 
 r. (^upello 
 
 
 
 117!l'' 
 
 i: Lawler 
 
 
 078 
 
 '. 0781 
 
 r. Parker 
 
 
 
 ;!01-ii» 
 
 c. Stanford 
 
 
 
 2:)7''« 
 
 V. Tbul 
 
 
 806" 
 
 , IMW* 
 
 Atkeson r. Lay 
 
 
 
 2140 
 
 Atkinson v. lilair 
 
 
 
 Hn8« 
 
 Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Manning 
 
 1220''» 
 
 I I 
 
CCXVUl 
 
 Atlas Bank v. Doyle 
 Att.-Ge'v c\ Dublin 
 
 V. llalliday 
 
 v. llitclicouk 
 
 AtwattT V. Schenck 
 Atwood V. Barney 
 
 r. Scott 
 
 Autfusta ('. Windsor 
 Aulis c. Young 
 Aultman v. Clifford 
 
 c. Daggs 
 
 Austin V. Austin 
 
 V. lleiser 
 
 r. Holland 
 
 V. State 
 
 Austlne v. People 
 Averill v. Sawyer 
 Avery v. Avery 
 
 V. Miller 
 
 Ayer v. Bell Mfg. Co. 
 Ayrus v. Bane 
 
 V. Cliisum 
 
 V. Duprey 
 
 V. He'.vett 
 
 V, Watson 
 
 AMEItlCAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 References are to pages. 
 
 2Ttil^ 
 
 2" 
 
 l»;{i 
 
 U22'' 
 022* 
 
 688l^ 588-'^'' 
 808', 808-i' 
 
 808-5 
 80815 
 5o4-'! 
 368^1 
 978*" 
 122'J9 
 07851 
 
 Bacon v. Frisbce 
 
 I". Inhabitants of Charlton 
 
 6221" 
 
 ;;yi37 
 
 V. Towne 257'*, a'Jl*» 
 
 Badart f. Foulon 52- 
 
 Badgeri- Story 3585, 391" 3!tl*« 
 
 Baeder v. Jennings 428i 
 
 Bagley v. McMickle 18.3-;", SoS-"' 
 Baiilev, &c. Co. v. Saranac, &c. Co. 8085 
 
 Bailey v. Bailey 978<> 
 
 I,'. Kalamazoo Pub. Co. 21''^ 
 
 B.iin I.. Walsh 358" 
 
 Baird v. Baird 808-!* 
 
 Baker i\ Gausin 391'"' 
 
 I'. Goldsmith S"!** 
 
 V. Hall 8085 
 
 I'. Hess 554''' 
 
 V. Knott '21^- 
 
 r. Mich., &c. R. R. 80811 
 
 1-. Mygatt 2r-'' 
 
 V. Thompson OlOi'' 
 
 Balbo V. People 58815 
 
 Balch V. Smith 183" 
 Baldridge v. Penland 4635, 463ii, 4(i3i« 
 
 Baldwin v. Burt 
 
 r. Short 
 
 r. Tlirelkcld 
 
 r. Whitconib 
 
 Ball V. Gates 
 
 Biillew r. U. S. 
 
 Baltimore, &c. U. R. v. Glenn 
 
 r. Hanilio 
 
 r. Thompson 
 
 r. Woodruff 
 
 Baltimore Steamboat Co 
 Bank r. Bank 
 
 r. Dandridge 
 
 r. Miidgett 
 
 — — I'. Kutland 
 c. Zorn 
 
 35811 
 
 2571' 
 
 3582' 
 
 358n 
 
 4()3'' 
 
 1179' 
 
 521' 
 
 07859, 978* ' 
 
 978'^n 
 
 257*' 
 
 V. Brown 8O812 
 
 9781" 
 
 183'", 358-' 
 
 122n''> 
 
 3'.tl*» 
 
 0781, 978», 978»» 
 
 Bank of Augusta v. Earle 
 Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex- 
 press Co. 
 Bank of Newberry 
 Bank of No. Amer. v. JIcElroy 
 
 2183 
 
 Bank of Northern Liberties v. Davis 
 Bank of 11. S. v. Dandridge 
 
 r. Merchants' Bank 
 
 Bank of Upper Canada v. Boulton 
 
 I'. Smith 
 
 Hank of Utica v. Hillard 
 Banks t\ Burnliam 
 Bannon r. Aultman 
 Barber v. Merriam 
 Harbour r. Watts 
 Barcello i'. Hapgood 
 Barclay r. Waring 
 Barker i-. Bradley 
 
 V. Bushnell 
 
 V. Com. 
 
 V. Haskell 
 
 V. Kuhn 
 
 liarmby v. Plummer 
 Barnard r. Roane Iron Co. 
 Barnes v. Harris 
 
 )•. State 
 
 i\ Tiompowsky 
 
 Barnhart v. Fulkerth 
 Barnuni r. Barnum 427 
 
 215 
 
 2113 
 
 9101', 
 
 910i» 
 
 07881 
 
 ass-'ii 
 
 117919 
 
 808* 
 
 62* 
 
 12293 
 
 2lis 
 
 808^8 
 
 3013S 
 
 117020 
 
 117032 
 
 91018 
 
 80820 
 
 5547 
 
 39150 
 
 463i«, 46318, 40318 
 
 C2216 
 
 35818 
 
 8O&21 
 
 C22!» 
 
 58810 
 
 122013 
 21 
 
 Barr v. I'arr 
 Barron v. Mason 
 Barrow v. State 
 Barrows r. Downs 
 Barry v. Ryan 
 Bartholomew v. Farwell 
 Bartlett v. Emerson 
 
 V. Pat ton 
 
 Bartley r. People 
 Barton i-. Dundas 
 Bascom r. Smith 
 
 V. Toner 
 
 Bass r. Chi(^ago, &c. R. R. 
 Bassett v. Shares 
 
 r. Spofford 
 
 Basye r. State 
 Battaglia r. Thomas 
 Battle u. Baird 
 Battles r. Laudenslager 
 Battre v. State 
 Baugh V. White 
 Baxter r. Abbott 
 
 r. Ellis 
 
 1'. State 
 
 Bay I'. Cook 
 Bayly's Adm. v. Chubb 
 Bayse 1: State 
 Beacli V. State 
 Bealc V. Com. 
 Beall r. Poole 
 Boals r. See 
 Bcamor r. Darling 
 Beard r. Boylan 
 Beardsley v. Wildraan 
 
 2, 4273, 427», 
 
 4278, 4279 
 
 8082" 
 
 525, 26734 
 
 3913* 
 
 521" 
 
 1229" 
 
 46319 
 
 412" 
 
 4523 
 
 58825 
 
 46329 
 
 528 
 
 358» 
 
 301" 
 
 5548 
 
 403* 
 
 4709, gygi 
 
 368", 978*5 
 
 11 79*0 
 
 25720 
 
 521 
 
 808» 
 
 07853 
 
 18323 
 
 , 47013 
 
 , 40S'8 
 
 2P, 521" 
 
 6221* 
 
 fi35i 
 
 183** 
 
 80820 
 
 80821 
 
 6221" 
 
 8082'' 
 
 078<*, 97852 
 
 47( 
 
 4638, 
 
 
AMEKICAX TABLE OF CASES. 
 BeferenceB are to pages. 
 
 CCXIX 
 
 41 
 
 Beardstown v. Virginia 
 
 27t)» 
 
 Beasiey v. People 
 
 
 2o7« 
 
 Beattie v. Hilliard 
 
 
 3o8i» 
 
 Beatty v. Clement 
 
 
 4o2i 
 
 V. Lessee of Knowler 
 
 2113, 211^ 
 
 Beck iJ. Beck 
 
 
 SOS* 
 
 Becker v. Holm 
 
 
 52^ 
 
 Beckham v. State 
 
 
 588^J 
 
 Becknian v. Beckmaa 
 
 
 808^3 
 
 Iteilford V. Flowers 
 
 
 808-' 
 
 JJediiigfleld's Case 
 
 
 391-' 
 
 JJeeckinan v. Montgomery 
 
 IJoi-^ 
 
 Beenier v. Kerr 
 
 
 9785' 
 
 Beery v. U. S. 588" 
 
 , 58818, 
 
 58818, 588-'' 
 
 Beets V. State 
 
 
 470' 
 
 Bet'iiy r. Wheeler 
 
 
 183M, 3i)l-» 
 
 Bell v. Brewster 
 
 
 1229« 
 
 V. Chambers 
 
 
 978^» 
 
 ^— V. Kendrick 
 
 628. 
 
 35818, 4u3Ji 
 
 V. State 2139, 47010, 6881, sag*, 978i' 
 
 V. Woodman 
 
 
 8083 
 
 Belleville Sav. Bk. v. Bornman 808^' 
 
 Belmont v. Morrill 
 
 
 212, 2118 
 
 Belote V. State 
 
 
 588-^1, 688« 
 
 Ben V. State 
 
 
 4703 
 
 Benaway v. Conyne 
 
 
 978", 9781" 
 
 Benedict v. Flanigan 
 
 
 1229'5 
 
 V. Rose 
 
 
 257-^ 
 
 V. State 
 
 
 6221" 
 
 Benicia, te. Works u. 1 
 
 Sstes 
 
 808-ii 
 
 Benjamin v. Ellinger's 
 
 Adm. 
 
 183-^ > 
 
 V. Shea 
 
 
 27(J* 
 
 Bennett v. State 
 
 2119, 
 
 2573', 622^' 
 
 Benns v. State 
 
 
 470* 
 
 Benoist v. Darby 
 
 
 Sdl^' 
 
 Bentley v. Ward 
 
 
 46318, 4t5;}ji 
 
 Benton v. Martin 
 
 
 808*5 
 
 Berg V. Peterson 
 
 1229^7, 1220«> 
 
 Bergen v. People 
 
 
 588* 
 
 Bergman v, Shoudy 
 
 
 9781, i)78S 
 
 Berliner v. Waterloo 
 
 
 211" 
 
 Bernard v. Walker 
 
 
 8081' 
 
 Bernlieini r. DiUrell 
 
 
 257I8 
 
 Bersch v. State 
 
 
 25711 
 
 Besscn v. Southard 
 
 
 b2^ 
 
 Bethea h. Byrd 
 
 
 412», 412« 
 
 Beyerstedt v. Winona Mill Co. 808", 808" 
 Bickel V. Fasig OlO^i 
 
 Biddis V. James 1179''^ 
 
 Bieihaus v. W. U. Tel. Co. 52'^ 
 
 Bigelow V. Clmtterton 21' 
 
 V. Wilson 808" 
 
 Bi^ler v. Reylier 62215, 022' ' 
 
 Bignall, &e.'Co. r. Pierce, &c. Co. 808' 
 
 Blllingslea v. Smith 
 Killingsley i-. Hiles 
 Biiiford r. Young 
 Bingham v. Bernard 
 Binns i>. State 
 Birch V. Hale 
 Bird's Case 
 
 Birmingham v. McPoIand 
 Bishop 1: Jones 
 
 1: Nesbitt 
 
 Bissell I'. Briggs 
 
 9781 
 
 inO'^ 
 
 5541' 
 
 267'«, 25739, SOS'-* 
 
 470" 
 
 978'" 
 
 219 
 
 978' 
 
 21 •" 
 
 427^ 
 
 1179i« 
 
 Bissell V. Edwards 11792', IHU'"', IWJ-^ 
 Bituminous, &c. Co. v. Fulton 21'- 
 
 Bi.xler's Adm. v. Parker 21''» 
 
 Black I'. Sharkey 
 
 V. Ward 
 
 Blackburn r. Com. 
 
 V. Crawfords 
 
 v. State 
 
 Blackwell v. State 
 Blade v. Noland 
 Bladen v. Wells 
 Blair v Madison Co. 
 
 V. .eaver 
 
 Blake v. Damon 
 
 V. Fash 
 
 V. Hall 
 
 Blunchard v. Child 
 
 v. Young 
 
 Bland v. Warren 
 Blatz V. Hohrbach 
 Bless V. Jenkins 
 Blewitt V. Booruni 
 Bliss V. Brainard 
 
 r. Johnson 
 
 Blizzard v. Hayes 
 Blocker v. Burncss 
 Bloom V. Cox, &c. Mfg. Co. 
 Bloomington v. Shrock 
 Blossom ('. Griffin 
 Blotcky V. Caplan 
 Blount V. Kimpton 
 
 183», 1835 
 
 5881, 5yH8, (J7ai7 
 
 4271, 427', 427^ 403^: 
 
 470» 
 
 910', 910", 910', 910« 
 
 18:;« 
 
 808-, 808'', 8081 \ SOS's 
 
 :'.<)r'8 
 
 91011, 9101-2, 910'3 
 
 3918 
 
 358-'« 
 
 8081 
 
 391 '» 
 
 2701, 276» 
 
 403" 
 
 2r'8 
 
 18351 
 
 808^8, 808-27 
 
 27ti» 
 
 39 1« 
 
 257'* 
 
 9101* 
 
 522 
 
 391''2 
 
 808-" 
 
 97818 
 
 02215 
 
 ) 
 
 Board of Trustees f. Misenheimer 12295 
 Boardman v. Lessees of Reed 412i 
 
 V. Westchester, &c. Ins. Co. 3H6" 
 
 1: Woodman 257^' 
 
 Bodwell v. Swan 257*' 
 
 Body V. Jewson 183-'i 
 
 Boehringer v. Richards Medicine Co. 391*2 
 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Harrison 808^7 
 
 391-2 
 
 808-23 
 
 463-2" 
 
 5881-2 
 
 622* 
 
 978'T 
 
 46312, 6543 
 
 213-2 
 
 9781, 978-2. 978< 
 
 Holds ('. Woods 
 Bolles V. Sach.'4 
 Boiling V. Fannin 
 Bonahan v. State 
 Hondy v. Valois 
 Bonelli v. Bowen 
 Bonnell v. Maw ha 
 Bonner c. Phillips 
 Bonnet v. Glattfeldt 
 Bonsack Machine Co. i". Woodrum 8O8-2, 
 
 808" 
 Booby V. State 6222* 
 
 Bookman v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co. 2r'5 
 
 Boon V. State Ins. Co. 
 
 V. Wethered's Adm. 
 
 Born r. Rosenow 
 
 )•. Weathered's Adm 
 
 Bornheimer c. Baldwin 
 Bo. .in V. Fouts 
 Bostick V. Rutherford 
 Boston I'. Richardson 
 
 r. State 
 
 Bottomlev v. U. S. 
 Boulden r. State SSS'", 
 
 Bowden v. Spellman 
 Bowdle I'. Ry. Co. 
 
 18351 
 
 25739, 25752 
 
 978-'" 
 
 2.57« 
 
 39r2» 
 
 'J22* 
 
 2573*, 2573* 
 
 4281 
 
 2120 21-2» 
 
 257" 
 
 •'■705, 47013 
 
 9785 
 
 910^ 
 
 ii; i| 
 
 ill 
 
ccxx 
 
 AMERICAN TAIILK OF CASES. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 IJowen V. Chase 
 
 V. Humphreys 
 
 V. Jones 
 
 V. Mo. I'iic. II. R. 
 
 IJowers I'. State 
 liowersock v. Adams 
 liowman v. Hekia Fire Ins. Co. 
 
 V. Sanborn 
 
 Boyce v. Clieshire Tl. 11. 
 Boyd V. Ladson 
 
 V. State 
 
 V. U. S. 
 
 Boyle V. State 
 lirabston v. State 
 Braekett r. People 
 Bradberry !•. State 
 Bradford i.-. Barclay 
 
 V. Floyd 
 
 V. State 
 
 Bradley v. Goodyear 
 
 r. Kent 
 
 V. M'Intosh 
 
 Bradsliaw v. Combs 
 Brady c. Ca.ssidy 
 
 V. Page 
 
 V. State 
 
 V. U. S. 
 
 V. Wilson 
 
 Bragg ('. Cohvell 
 Brakefield v. State 
 Branilette v. State 
 Branch r. Howard 
 
 V. Texas Lumber Mfg. Co, 
 
 V. Wilson 
 
 Brand v. Brand 
 
 Brandon Mfg. Co. v. Mors" 
 
 Brazier's Case 
 
 Brennan r. Vogt 
 
 Brent r. State 
 
 Breton v. H. B. Claflin Co. 
 
 Bretz V. Mayor, &c. of Now York 
 
 Brewer v. Housatonic R. K. Co. 
 
 V. Porch 
 
 452'^ 
 8081" 
 
 2110 
 
 022ia 
 
 117!>*» 
 
 1170'!' 
 
 r22!)-« 
 
 2.')7-'i 
 
 4ti:}S 
 
 gio-ii 
 
 257* 
 470'', 4701' 
 
 470* 
 
 21"* 
 3!)1-"* 
 978*7 
 
 2Pn 
 688-'« 
 
 403" 
 
 910'»' 
 
 622-» 
 
 808", m'S-^ 
 
 808-s 
 
 2135 
 
 0221" 
 
 588* 
 
 42711 
 
 1229*- 
 
 47011 
 
 6221 
 808-!* 
 
 427" 
 808-^'' 
 0221'' 
 808H 
 
 9103 
 
 21J9 
 
 183*, 18.35 
 
 91019 
 
 2111 
 
 276" 
 078'" 
 
 Bromage r. Rice 
 Uronner v. Loomis 
 Brooke v. Jordan 
 Brooks V. Acton 
 
 V. Clay 
 
 Broscliart v. Tuttle 
 Droughton i;. Null 
 Urown V. Burrus 
 
 V. Com. 
 
 V. Deacon 
 
 V. Kdson 
 
 V. Fotster 
 
 V. Griffltli 
 
 122958 
 12295" 
 358'«, 36811 
 391»» 
 427* 
 C64», 554' 1 
 808'8 
 9785« 
 470', 470'7 
 808-" 
 1179" 
 30515 
 117918 
 4278 
 257*5 
 11791J 
 257", 97854 
 808--* 
 6226 
 391*' 
 2P5, 2139, 21*", 39138 
 39r'^» 
 3913^ 
 4701", 5881, 588*, 588B. 
 910", 97«i'>, 9783*. 97835 
 40318 
 358", 6221, 978-2«, 978-9, 
 1229-i-* 
 jht 52", 5218 
 
 Hrowne v. I'hila. Bank 21" 
 
 Browning v. Gosnell 978*5, 1229*^ 
 
 Brnyles r. State 5545 
 
 Hrubaker v. Taylor 978", 978*", 97851 
 
 Lazarus 
 
 Lnehrs 
 
 Mitchell 
 
 Mooers 
 
 Morgan 
 
 Pay son 
 
 V. People 
 
 V. Piper 
 
 V. Prude 
 
 V. Sheppard 
 
 V. State 
 
 Williams 
 Wood 
 
 Writ 
 
 Brice V. Miller 358^ 808*' 
 
 Briceland v. Com, 276' 
 
 Brick (.•. Brick 808-!" 
 
 Bridger v. Asliville, &c. R. R. Co. 52', 
 
 52K, 521" 
 
 Bridges v. Hyatt 39132 
 
 Briffltt V. State 2138 
 
 Briggs r. Rafferty 97811, 978" 
 
 r. Georgia 463' 
 
 V. Hcrvey 183*» 
 
 V. U. S. 1229«" 
 
 V. Whipple -iV^ 
 
 Rrigham r. Palmer 1229" 
 
 Bright V. Knight 808-^' 
 
 Brighthope R. It. v. Rogers 2572« 
 
 Britton v. Lnrenz 622^ 
 
 Broad Street Hotel Co. v. Weaver's 
 
 Adm. 21" 
 
 Brohston v. Cahill 1229 ^ 1229"" 
 
 Brock V. Com. 470', 470'5 
 
 V. Milligan OlO'i, 910'^ 
 
 BroUey v. Lapham 978'" 
 
 Hruce v. Priest 
 Hrimdred v. Del. Iloyo 
 Hruson v. Clark 
 Bryan i'. Beckley 
 
 V. Forsyth 
 
 V. Wear 
 
 Bryce Lorillard v. Ins. Co, 
 Bubster v. State 
 Buchanan v. Moore 
 Buckingham v. Roar 
 Buckley r. Buckley 
 Buckinaster c. Kelley , 
 Buddee v. Spangler 
 Buell V. State 
 
 V. Warner 
 
 Buford V. Bostick 
 
 V. Tucker 
 
 Bulger V. Ross 
 Bull V. Com. 
 
 V. Loveland 
 
 BuUard v. Lambert 
 
 V. Pearsall 
 
 Mul linger v. People 
 Bulman i'. Andrews 
 Bunnell v. Butler 
 Burbank i'. Dennis 
 Burcli r. Harrell 
 Burdick v. Hunt 
 Burgess v. Burgess 
 Burgin v. Chcnault 
 Biirk V. Andis 
 Burke i>. Delaney 
 
 257^' 
 
 1179* 
 
 21-", 213* 
 
 218' 
 
 1179* 
 
 117938 
 
 8082* 
 
 5881" 
 
 412* 
 
 6222, 91019 
 
 9783* 
 
 , 622" 
 
 5542 
 
 2123 
 
 21'* 
 
 11795 
 
 21*) 
 
 358i«, 3913-' 
 
 470'* 
 
 1229* 
 
 978*5 
 
 OVS!", 9782«, 97831 
 
 978", 97819 
 
 6221* 
 
 2575* 
 
 9782 
 
 35822 
 
 62223 
 
 122929 
 
 18318, 122921, 12292* 
 
 97818 
 
 8082' 
 
AMEIUCAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 References are to pa^es. 
 
 CCXXl 
 
 Burke v. Miller 
 
 
 
 978"^ 
 
 Campbell r. Woodstock Iron Co. 122935 
 
 r. Milteiiberger 
 
 
 
 2 1'" 
 
 Canfield v. Thompron 
 
 
 1179*3 
 
 !•. Hay 
 
 
 80811 
 
 , 80811 
 
 Cantey v. Piatt 
 
 
 1229''9 
 
 Burleson r. Collins 
 
 
 
 1179»«' 
 
 Cantilfe v. Septor 
 
 
 122ili'J 
 
 V. Goodman 4C3'ii, 
 
 403i--! 
 
 , 463-^ 
 
 ', 5543 
 
 Card V. State 
 
 
 257I'' 
 
 Burley v. (ierinan-Am. Bank 
 
 
 403-^' 
 
 Carder v. Primm 
 
 
 9782", 978*" 
 
 Burlington, &c. liy. Co. 
 
 V. Dey 
 
 21 IB 
 
 Cargill V. Atwood 
 
 
 403* 
 
 Burnett r. Henderson 
 
 
 
 21-^> 
 
 Carman v. Dunham 
 
 
 4035 
 
 v. Simpkins 
 
 
 
 257-' 
 
 Carmon f. State 
 
 
 2138 
 
 /■. State 
 
 
 
 257' 
 
 Carnes i'. Piatt 
 
 
 02211 
 
 V. Thompson 
 
 12291* 
 
 122!li'' 
 
 Carpenter v. Dame 
 
 
 35815 
 
 Burnham v. Aynr 12299, 1229-27, 
 
 1220-'« 
 
 i\ Dexter 
 
 
 2F, 211" 
 
 V. Webster 
 
 
 
 21" 
 
 r. Wall 
 
 
 978*9 
 
 JJurns r. Fay 
 
 
 
 4«3t 
 
 ,: Willey 
 
 
 183=8, 078'* 
 
 i'. Kerr 
 
 
 
 554" 
 
 Carr r. Griffin 
 
 
 5542 
 
 Burr V. Harper 
 
 
 
 1229-9 
 
 V. Miner 
 
 
 3589 
 
 r. Kase 
 
 
 
 358-^* 
 
 v. Moore 
 
 
 97853 
 
 V. Sim 
 
 
 183'» 
 
 , I8:F' 
 
 V. Stat(! 
 
 
 301» 
 
 Burrell v. State 
 
 
 257'" 
 
 , 978« 
 
 Carrico r. W. Va. &c. R. 
 
 R. 
 
 365" 
 
 Burt i-. State 
 
 
 391*" 
 
 , 391*8 
 
 Carrington v. Holabird 
 
 
 01017 
 
 Burtners v. Keran 
 
 
 
 SOS-ii 
 
 Carroll v. Norwood 
 
 
 12292* 
 
 Burton c. Blin 
 
 
 
 2701-! 
 
 c. State 
 
 
 978*2 
 
 V. Dri{?g8 
 
 
 35819, 
 
 1179** 
 
 Carskadden r. Poorman 
 
 
 427'* 
 
 V. Morrow 
 
 
 
 808' 
 
 Carson c. Smith 
 
 
 21' 
 
 Bush r. Com. 
 
 
 
 9101* 
 
 Carter c. Beals 
 
 
 391«, 391*6 
 
 r. Bobinson 
 
 
 
 808' 
 
 r. Com. 
 
 
 25732 
 
 Bustin V. Bogers 
 
 
 
 4(5;r' 
 
 r. Doe 122021, 
 
 122923, 12292* 
 
 Jiuswell Trimmer Co. v 
 
 Case 
 
 
 257*^ 
 
 V. Jackson 
 
 
 1229** 
 
 Butler V. Collins 
 
 
 
 2571'-' 
 
 V. State 9105, uiqb, 
 
 910", 91022, 010-*, 
 
 r. Com. 
 
 
 
 588^1 
 
 
 
 97853 
 
 i,'. Smith 
 
 
 
 808-' 
 
 1: Tinicum Fishing 
 
 Co 
 
 183*8, 4278 
 
 V. Watkins 
 
 
 
 25717 
 
 Cartier v. Troy Lumber 
 
 Co 
 
 18327 
 
 Butrick v. Tilton 
 
 
 
 42711 
 
 Carvillo v. Wostford 
 
 
 078ts 
 
 Buttrick i-. Allen 
 
 
 
 11791* 
 
 Carj V. State 
 
 
 2119 
 
 Butts !■. Smartwood 
 
 
 
 91013 
 
 Casat V. State 
 
 
 391*1 
 
 Buzard v. McAnulty 
 
 
 
 654" 
 
 Case V. Case 
 
 
 183*'', 80821 
 
 JJyass r. Sullivan 
 
 
 
 12206 
 
 V. Mayor of Mobile 
 
 
 2115 
 
 Byers v, McMillan 
 
 
 
 80810 
 
 V. McGee 
 
 
 117921, 117927 
 
 V. Wallace 4272, 
 
 427^ 
 
 427s, 
 
 11705, 
 
 V. Perew 
 
 
 21J8, 212" 
 
 
 
 
 1179' 
 
 c. PhttMiix Bridge Co. 
 
 8081", 80817 
 
 Byrd v. Campbell 
 
 
 
 ms-^ 
 
 Cassidy v. McFarland 
 Castello V. Casteilo 
 Castle V. Belard 
 
 
 21*" 
 
 0221 
 
 2671'', 257'9 
 
 Cabiness v. Holland 
 
 
 
 554' 
 
 Castncr r. Sliker 
 
 
 3913 
 
 Cabot v. Given 
 
 
 
 35819 
 
 Catcs I'. Kellogg 
 
 
 55413 
 
 Cadden v. Am. Steel Barge Co. 
 
 391*3 
 
 Catlett V. Pacific Ins. Co 
 
 
 11797 
 
 Cndy V. State 
 
 
 
 588--!i 
 
 Caujolle c. Ferrie 
 
 18382, 427-2, 427 '2 
 
 V. Walker 
 
 
 
 0225 
 
 Caulfield v. Hermann 
 
 
 80817 
 
 Caha V. U. S. 
 
 
 
 21'* 
 
 Cavender v. Guild 
 
 
 5218 
 
 Cain V. State 2V^\ 588', 
 
 68810 
 
 588^* 
 
 , 588--;7 
 
 Cawtliorn r. Haynes 
 
 
 391*0 
 
 Caldwell 1: Davis 
 
 
 
 G22« 
 
 Cayuga, The 
 
 
 808 '1 
 
 
 
 
 622" 
 
 Central, &c. Co. v. Gamble 
 
 2121 
 
 1: Hichmond R. R. 
 
 
 
 211-i 
 
 Central Land Co. &c. i-. 
 
 Calhoun 2123 
 
 Calhoun r. Richardson 
 
 
 8081'^ 
 
 , 808-'i 
 
 Central R. R. v. AUmon 
 
 
 978*5 
 
 V. Ross 
 
 
 
 117915 
 
 Chadron v. Glover 
 
 
 36611 
 
 Calkins r. State 
 
 
 
 3653 
 
 Chaffe V. Mackenzie 
 
 
 5547 
 
 Call V. Dunning 
 
 
 
 12291'^ 
 
 Chaffee v. Taylor 
 
 
 1229^'5 
 
 Cameron v. Blackman 
 
 
 
 215 
 
 Chaffee & Co. i-. U. S. 46328, 46.330, 46331. 
 
 u. Peck 
 
 
 
 35815 
 
 
 
 4633-2, 4633* 
 
 Camp 17. Simmons 
 
 
 
 8085 
 
 Chahoon v. Com. 
 
 
 6227 
 
 1: State 
 
 
 257*5 
 
 , 257*' 
 
 Chamberlain v. Bradley 
 
 
 1179*7,1179*8 
 
 Campbell v. Bannister 
 
 
 257aa 
 
 , 25738 
 
 V. Chamberlain 427i. 427", 427", 42712 
 
 V. Dearborn 
 
 
 
 80819 
 
 r. Enfield 
 
 
 257<2 
 
 V. State 3651" 
 
 , 4703, 4709, 
 
 47015, 
 
 V. Sands 
 
 
 97827 
 
 470" 
 
 , 588'-' 
 
 910« 
 
 . 910-^" 
 
 V, Smitli 
 
 
 808' 
 
 1^ 
 
m 
 
 II-:* 
 
 ccxxu 
 
 ATXERICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 Chatnberliiin v. Torrence 
 Cliamberlin v. Hall 
 Chamburg t*. Jones 
 Cliainbles8 v. State 
 Clianipion v. Miindny 
 Cliandler i\ Le Uarron 
 
 V. Von Hoeder 
 
 Clianoinc c. Fowler 
 Cliapin r. Dobson 
 
 (,'. Lapliam 
 
 V. Marlborough 
 
 Ciiaplain v. Uriscoe 
 Chaplin r. Hakcr 
 Cliapnian i-. Brewer 
 
 I'. Chapman 
 
 1). Cooley 
 
 V. Sutton 
 
 257''«, 257«' 
 
 808<, 1170*' 
 
 . 170'8 
 
 808«' 
 
 1229««, 122951 
 
 52', 62" 
 
 21" 
 
 8087, 80813, SOS'O.SOS^-i, 
 
 808'^i 
 
 1)"8« 
 
 3!)1'«' 
 
 1229* 1229- 
 
 808''> 
 
 62'2 
 
 4276, 42712, 427 '■' 
 
 257'", 078M 
 
 808'" 
 
 Charlotte i- Chouteau' 529, 521", 52i*, 52"^ 
 Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Gisborn 808* 
 Chase v. Lowell 391" 
 
 Chattanooga 11. R. Co. v. Clowdis 301^» 
 Cheatham v. State 635-», Goo"* 
 
 V. Young 1179'* 
 
 Cheeny r. Arnold 078'-' 
 
 Cheever v. Brown 403'-'- 
 
 r. Congdon 391'"' 
 
 V. Wilson 21'^ 
 
 Cheney v. Cheney 654" 
 
 Cherokee Packet Co. r. Ililson 978'* 
 
 Cherry v. Baker 21-- 
 
 Chesapeake Bank v. Swain 21-' 
 
 Chesa])eiike Ohio Canal Co. v, B. & O. 
 
 Ry. Co. 21«, 211", 2ia> 
 
 Chester v. Wilhelm 078'-» 
 
 Chew r. Farmers' Bank fyJ2*, (',22'i 
 
 Chicago Lumbering Co. v. Hewitt 4()3i7 
 Chicago, &c. R. R. v. Artery 978'»', 078*" 
 
 V Becker SUV* 
 
 V. Champion 21'^», 21-'" 
 
 V. Coal & Iron Co. 978'» 
 
 V. Ellis ('.221 
 
 V. Griffith 078«' 
 
 Chick c. Sisson 391- 
 
 Child V. Kingsbury 4128, 412* 
 
 Childs r. Merrill ISS^, 622», 022'' 
 
 Chirac v. Reinicker 622-', 622*", 622i« 
 
 Chishohn v. Sheldon 1220'-!» 
 
 Choisser v. People 18.S»i 
 
 Christian v. Columbus, &c. R. R. 978" 
 Christmas !-. Russell 1179'« 
 
 (liumasero v. Gilbert 52" 
 
 Church r, Ilubbart 21", 1170'^, 11 79», 1170'" 
 Church i\\ Brattle Square v. I3ullard 183"* 
 Churchill r. Fulliam 554" 
 
 Churchman i: S.'nith 40:!'-' 
 
 Cicero v. State 588< 
 
 Cincinnati, &c. R. R. v. Clifford 21'* 
 
 V. Granies 21-' 
 
 fMty Bank «f Macon v. Kent 808" 
 
 City Council of Montgomery v. Mont- 
 gomery, &c. I'lankroad 21''^ 
 City of Alleghaiiv r. XeKson 21'* 
 City of McPherson r. Nichols 21'* 
 City of St. Louis v. Roche 21"' 
 
 City of Winona v. Burke 
 Clanton v. Barnes 
 Ctapp V. Banking Co, 
 
 V. Ellington 
 
 V. Foster 
 
 V. Peck 
 
 V. State 
 
 Clark V. Bond 
 
 V. Bradstreet 
 
 c. Field 
 
 V. Freeman 
 
 I). Grand Trunk 
 
 V. Haney 
 
 V. Ilayward 
 
 V. Hills 
 
 V. Owens 
 
 V. Perdue 
 
 v. Sanderson 
 
 V. State 
 
 Clarke v. Bank 
 
 V. Canfield 
 
 V. Courtney 
 
 — — V. Kelsey 
 
 c. Magruder 
 
 Clator V. Otto 
 Clegg V. Levy 
 Cleland v. Applegate 
 Clem V. State 
 Clemens v. (\)nrad 
 Clement v. Cureton 
 
 c. Packer 
 
 Clements i;. Hunt 
 
 c. Kyles 
 
 V. McGinn 
 
 V. Moore 
 
 demons v. State 
 Cleveland v. Burnham 
 Cleveland, &c. R. R. v. Brown 
 
 v. Mara 
 
 ('. Perkins 
 
 V. Wynant 
 
 Cliquot's Champagne 
 Coale V. Hannibal, &c. R. R. 
 Coan u. Flagg 
 Coapstick v. Bosworth 
 Coates V. Sulau 
 Cobb V. Boston 
 Cobleigli V. McBride 
 
 V. Young 
 
 Coder v. Stotts 
 (^odman v. Caldwell 
 Cody I . Conly 
 Coffin V. Bucknam 
 
 )'. Grand Rapids, &c. Co. 
 
 V. 'Vincent 
 
 21", 2115 
 
 621" 
 8081 
 2705 
 6547 
 '.i78»9 
 
 e36« 
 
 978« 
 
 305* 
 
 622'-! 
 
 1229a8 
 
 5548 
 
 80814 
 
 2762, 276», 2761", 412" 
 
 18317, i220''2* 
 
 1179*" 
 
 1229'^" 
 
 470* 
 
 ]170'3 
 
 183*' 
 
 428'' 
 
 808« 
 
 46.3" 
 
 1179 « 
 
 463-"'« 
 
 183" 
 
 97830, 978*1 
 
 2* 
 
 4W, 412* 
 
 427* 
 
 412*, 412B, 412i« 
 
 910* 
 
 2782, 27611 
 
 588'Ji 
 
 808'^5 
 
 391*' 
 
 39r-2" 
 
 358-^3 
 
 2V^ 
 
 391" 
 
 257'-!* 
 
 1179" 
 
 808'^ 
 
 257*6, 257*» 
 
 9781, 978'^, 9781" 
 
 39r-» 
 
 18381, 18345 
 
 35823 
 
 40.38 
 
 12293;:, 1220'6 
 
 4526 
 
 2761'^ 
 
 978" 
 
 Coffman r. Niagara, &c. Ins. Co. 3581* 
 Cogswell V. Dolliver 4637, 4(,?,-^i 
 
 Cohen ir. Cohen 
 Coit ,: Millikin 
 Coker r. Hayes 
 
 ('. Scheiffer 
 
 Colburn r. Groton 
 Cole r. Cole 
 
 V. Com. 
 
 V. Dial 
 
 257'* 
 
 ♦ 21'2, 11792 
 
 622''*i, 978'''5 
 
 978'^* 
 
 5548, 5541", 5881, 5881" 
 
 554"', 022» 
 
 257* 
 
 4632, 4635 
 

 AMERICA X TA 
 
 RLE OF CASES. 
 
 ccxxia 
 
 
 ReferenceB 
 
 are to pagei. 
 
 
 Cole V. Fall Brook Coal Co. 365', 3ti&« 
 
 Com. i: Dowing 
 
 IKIMr 
 
 V. Hiulley 
 
 808''' 
 
 r. Eastman 
 
 1229*S 1229", l22!Ht» 
 
 V. Hijwe 
 
 808' 
 
 ,: Eddy 
 
 270«, 27611 
 
 .. 1-. Lake Shore, &c. U. It. 18327, 978.0 
 
 i: Emery 
 
 35812 
 
 1: State 
 
 4701" 
 
 V. Fenno 
 
 218» 
 
 Coletjrove v. N. Y. 
 
 &c. R. R. 528 
 
 V. Ft-rrigan 
 
 25711, 25712 
 
 Coleman v. Com. 
 
 52', 91021, OlO'" 
 
 V. Ferry 
 
 218'» 
 
 V. Frazier 
 
 452', 452«, 452'" 
 
 V. Flood 
 
 58«it> 
 
 I'. People 
 
 ('. Southwick 
 
 2o7>» 
 
 V. Follansbce 
 
 9781* 
 
 8!)l*i 
 
 V. Ford 
 
 9780, 9788, 97810 
 
 v. State 
 
 978'"', 122912, i22i)U 
 
 V. Funai 
 
 5545 
 
 Coleman's Caae 
 
 910*, ".tlO< 
 
 V. Galligan 
 
 978t9 
 
 Collagan v. Hums 
 
 3913, 391S 
 
 V. G" 
 
 5541 
 
 Collette V. Weed 
 
 80816 
 
 V. Goudnow 
 
 978^3 
 
 Collier v. Cogging 
 
 554' 
 
 
 52tt 
 
 V. Simpson 
 
 1229-» 
 
 V. Griffin 
 
 6223 
 
 V. State 
 
 4705 
 
 V. Ilackett 
 
 39110, 39119, .391^4 
 
 Collins V. Corson 
 
 80820 
 
 V Hall 
 
 25711 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, &c. R. R. 257'^'^ 
 
 V. Haney 
 
 4705, 47oi» 
 
 ('. Robinson 
 
 622' 
 
 >'. Hanlon 
 
 68812 
 
 V. Stanfield 
 
 80828 
 
 V. Hardy 
 
 257-'» 
 
 V. Waters 
 
 39130 
 
 V. Hawkins 
 
 978« 
 
 Collins Bros. ])n _, 
 
 Co. V. Graddy 46318 
 
 v. Hay den 
 
 1179<*, n7i>i» 
 
 Colquitt V. State 
 
 39P 
 
 I'. Heath 
 
 2701* 
 
 Colton, &c. Co. V. Swartz 808' 
 
 V. Hill 
 
 218» 
 
 Columbia Planing Mill Co. v. Ins. Co. 554' 
 
 1: Holmes 
 
 2578, o;j5'> 
 
 Columbia, &c. R. IJ 
 
 . c. Hawthorne 62* 
 
 V. llourigan 
 
 978'S 
 
 Columbus Omnibus Co. t). Semnies 218* 
 
 — r. Howe 
 
 58812 
 
 Combs n. Com. 
 
 :}58i-' 
 
 r. Hudson 
 
 9782T 
 
 V. Winchester 
 
 978«, 97852, 978*> 
 
 V. Hutchinson 
 
 9101, 9]()>i 
 
 Comer v. State 
 
 910' 
 
 V. Jackson 
 
 257i» 
 
 Commercial Bank 
 
 }. Dunham 12292 
 
 r, James 
 
 58823, 978-.» 
 
 Commissioners v, Leggett 3918^, 3!)r"* 
 
 ),'. Jeffries 
 
 1835* 
 
 — ^ V. Verbarg 
 
 554' 
 
 i\ Jeffs 
 
 9781') 
 
 Com. v. Abbott 
 
 257 '2 
 
 V. Johnson 
 
 267'», 5882& 
 
 (•. Autlies 
 
 521, 523 
 
 V. Keith 
 
 910^1 
 
 V. Bean 
 
 978« 
 
 1: Kendall 
 
 257'» 
 
 V. Billings 
 
 97832 
 
 V. Kenney 
 
 G88» 
 
 1'. Blood 
 
 183", 35822 
 
 V. King 
 
 2184 
 
 V. Boimer 
 
 978-"' 
 
 V. Kipling 
 
 «35« 
 
 V. Borrough 
 
 588** 
 
 V. Knapp 
 
 588", 58821 
 
 V. Bosworth 
 
 635*, 635«, 035' 
 
 I'. Kneeland 
 
 21-25 
 
 V. Bradford 
 
 5883 
 
 i>. Lawler 
 
 25753, 25754 
 
 1: Brown 
 
 588S 5885, 97817, 0782-2 
 
 V. Lynes 52«, 52', 9103, 910', 910', 
 
 1>. Burke 
 
 91012 
 
 
 910-22 
 
 V. Campbell 
 
 257<. 5882 
 
 V. Marzynskl 
 
 2125, 2187 
 
 V. Carey 
 
 47018, 9106, 910', 9108 
 
 V. Matthews 
 
 4709, 4701', 470" 
 
 V. Casey 
 
 470' 
 
 V. McGorty 
 
 1832» 
 
 V. Cliabbock 
 
 452' 
 
 V. McGrath 
 
 1833t» 
 
 t: Chaney 
 
 978^'i 
 
 V. McKie 
 
 276» 
 
 — ^ V. Chase 
 
 6350, n79»9, 117950 
 
 V. McManus 
 
 521 
 
 1'. Choate 
 
 2182, 2572>, 276' 
 
 V. Merriam 
 
 267» 
 
 V. Churchill 
 
 2.57^' 
 
 V. Minor 
 
 2701* 
 
 V. Clark 
 
 5883, i22i)<8 
 
 1 . Morgan 
 
 0783' 
 
 r. Cleary 
 
 622* 
 
 V. Morrell 
 
 0783* 
 
 V. Coe 528, 2579. 1229", 122'.l''>, 
 
 i: M'Pike 
 
 39110, 39119^ 3914U 
 
 
 1229<^ 
 
 r. Mullins 
 
 52T 
 
 V. Cooper 
 
 47012, 47013 
 
 1'. Murphy 
 
 25717, 9in-J0 
 
 V. Corkin 
 
 2578, 2572" 
 
 ('. Myers 
 
 SSSi-i, 58816, 5881T 
 
 V. Coy 
 
 5881S 
 
 V. Nagle 
 
 2573« 
 
 V. Cuffee 
 
 5885, fjggi'i, 5881!' 
 
 I'. Nef us 
 
 122928, 122929, 12204* 
 
 — — V. Culver 
 
 526, 58826, 58827, 588« 
 
 V. Nott 
 
 5881* 
 
 
 978W 
 
 V. O'Brien 
 
 257-2» 
 
 r. Dam 
 
 2183 
 
 i: Peckham 
 
 213* 
 
 
 2141 
 
 V. Phillips 
 
 11793a 
 
 I 1 lit 
 
 I I 
 
 .1 I 
 
 ,Mi'i3 
 
M 
 
 CCXXIV 
 
 Com. V. Pollard 
 
 c. I'opo 
 
 r. I'orter 
 
 I', lieynolds 
 
 V. liuberts 
 
 i: KobinsDii 
 
 V. Ku88ell 
 
 I-. I{>an 
 
 V. Samuel 
 
 r. SHiiborn 
 
 r. Scott 
 
 V. Scgo 
 
 r. Shepherd 
 
 V. Silcox 
 
 r. Smith 
 
 AMEIUCAN TABLE '^F CASES. 
 
 C8816, 5881' 
 
 V. Sturtivnnt 
 
 V. Suilivaii 
 
 i: Thompson 
 
 r. Towle 
 
 i: Trtl'etlitii 
 
 V. Vose 
 
 ReferenceH 
 
 035' 
 368^ 
 
 am' 
 
 ;W1« 470"', 4701'', 470'\ 
 
 47(li" 
 
 62^ 257»^ 2o7'^ 'Jo7-'" 
 
 f)88-''* 
 '.'67^- 
 270' 
 
 688'* 
 
 257'-i\ ;)«■>"■ 
 
 588>\ GSH'i" 
 
 47()'' 
 588'^«, yioi-, 
 
 078*'' 
 
 301-'- 
 
 9783", !)78*« 
 
 183''", ''70'', 470>», <.I7813 
 
 27(i" 
 
 688*, 588" 
 
 301*' 
 
 r. Webster 267»", 366", SOd-"", 1220^ 
 
 r. Weicli 3r)8< 
 
 r. Welsh 078-' 
 
 r. Wentz 022-'' 
 
 1-. Wiieeler 21-' 
 
 r. White 257"' 
 
 I-. Whittaker 183-'' 
 
 V. Williams 52" 
 
 Commissioners r. May 21'- 
 
 Comparet I'. Jernegan 1170'- 
 
 Comstock i;. Iladlynie Ecclesiastical 
 Society 270', 270", 301*" 
 
 I-. Smith 218*, 078*' 
 
 r. State 301"> 
 
 Condit V. Blackwcll 52» 
 
 Confederation Life Ass'n of Canada 
 
 1-. ( CDonnell 452" 
 
 Conpar v. Chicago, &c. R. R. 9783'', 97»'* 
 Congdon r. Howe Scale Co. 
 Con key v. People 
 Connell v. Vanderwerken 
 Conner v. State 
 Conn. I'. Mead 
 
 V. Penn. 
 
 Conn. &c. Ins. Co. v. Schwenk 
 
 V. Smith 
 
 Conrad v. Griffey 
 
 Consaul v. Sheldon 368^, 0785-, 07855 
 
 Conseqiia v. Willings 1179'' 
 
 Conway i-. State 5545, n78'i 
 
 Conwell V. Springfield, &c. R. R. 808-i-' 
 
 Conyers >■. State 
 
 Cook V. Ashmead 
 
 r. Brown 
 
 r. First Nat. Bank 
 
 V. Grange 
 
 V. State 58812, 9781^ 978i», 978l^ 
 
 9782* 
 
 V. Union R. R. Co. 52" 
 
 1'. Wood 1170'* 
 
 Cooke v. Wondrow 1229i\ 122918 
 
 Coon V. People 978'^5 
 
 are to pages. 
 
 Coon c. Swan 
 Coonroil r. .Madden 
 Cooper r. Dedriuk 
 
 r. Morrell 
 
 r. Slate 
 
 (^opes r. I'earce 
 C'ornelins r. Com. 
 Cornett i\ Williams 
 Cornwall r. State 
 (^orse c. Peck 
 Corsen v. Dubois 
 Corser v. Paul 
 Cortland Mffj. Co. v. 
 Costeio V, Crovvell 
 
 Couch r. Woodruff 
 Coulter V. Am. &c. E.x. Co. 
 Count Joannes r. Bennett 
 Countryman r. Bunker 
 County of Johnson c. Wood 
 ("oveney v. Tannahill 
 Covert r. Ilerfzou 
 
 358* 
 25735, 257*^ 
 808" 
 
 022^^' 
 412" 
 403-« 
 183'i' 
 978*" 
 
 2708 
 
 4()3i'' 
 
 978*" 
 
 1229^ 
 
 022- 
 
 622's 
 
 ^68" 
 
 I83''.i 
 
 403I-! 
 
 978'-, 078'" 
 
 427' 
 
 078'-' 
 
 858'', 1170''' 
 
 088'- 
 
 808-, 8(I8-' 
 
 1220* 
 
 654*, 554\ 654', 554'* 
 
 Piatt 978" 
 
 2&7'', 403^-, 1220**, 
 
 ]229*» 
 
 808'' 
 
 0782', 9783. 
 
 358*' 
 40315, 4o;;;ii 
 
 808« 
 0226 
 427I" 
 
 Coviiidton Drawbridge Co. y. Shep- 
 
 herd 
 Cowan r. Abbott 
 
 r. Sapj) 
 
 Cowden v. Reynolds 
 Cowley r. People 
 Cox r. Kayres 
 
 r. Jones 
 
 r. Morrow 
 
 V. People 
 
 r. Peterson 
 
 r. Kust 
 
 I'. State 
 
 Cozzens v. liiggins 
 Crafts I'. Com. 
 Craijf c. Brown 
 
 V. Proctor 
 
 f. State 
 
 Cramer r. Burlington 
 
 211*, 18:^19 
 
 80811 
 
 80810 
 
 078-'' 
 
 21% 
 
 9782«, 978''"', 078-'? 
 1170" 
 218, 219, 62», 52'", 6212 
 58818 
 808" 
 1179*8 
 3911, 3012, 391", 391", 
 4121" 
 
 213S 
 
 6366, 6367, 9785'' 
 
 117912, 11792!J 
 
 270" 
 
 257*6, 25752, 39115 
 
 622^5 
 
 Crane i'. P2lizabeth Library Ass'n 
 
 V, Lessee of Morris 
 
 Craufurd i-. Blackburn 
 Crawford v. Branch Bank 
 
 r. Elliott 
 
 Cre.s.swell v. Jackson 
 Creswell v. Slack 
 Crosby r. Berper 
 Crose V. Rutlcdge 
 Crosman i-. Fuller 
 Cross V. Bell 
 
 V. Cross 
 
 V. Riggins 
 
 Crouch V. Eveleth 
 ('rouse I'. Hoi man 
 Crow I'. Watkins 
 Crewe I'. Colbeth 
 Crowninshield v. Crowninshield 
 
 Crozor i-. New Chester Water Co. 
 
 Crump V. Com. 
 Crusen v. State 
 
 8082 
 
 18321 
 
 4271, 4271" 
 
 1179*3 
 
 1229"fl 
 
 4(1,^38 
 
 622", 622", 12295 
 
 0222 
 
 8082'J 
 
 18328 
 
 62224 
 
 6225, 62212 
 
 39iai 
 
 18332 
 
 80820 
 
 6541 
 
 2708, 
 
 2761* 
 
 3585, 
 
 858" 
 
 4701 
 
 6364 
 
AMERICAN TABLE OK CASES. 
 Refereiicei uo to pages. 
 
 ccxxv 
 
 Crutclier i-. Muir «08"» 
 
 Cry§tal Ice Mfg. Co. v. Son Antonio 
 
 Aits'n 9"S'' 
 Ciil.ly r. Hrown 427', 427^, 427- 
 ("ndiifv V. Ciiilnoy •'51'1*'| 
 Culliimii.s V. Limlsiiy W)8" 
 CiilvtT ... Murks 4639, 4(j;}:» 
 L\ Scott, &f. Lumber Co. (>78' 
 
 Cumbcrliind, &c'. Ins. Co. v 
 U. Co 
 
 liiltinan,nr.Hi-, 
 358-- 
 
 i<. Mau- 
 
 52' 
 
 40:i''' 
 
 21-" 
 
 1220", 122!)i» 
 
 2o7^", 257*" 
 
 4031, 4(;;{:.i 
 
 427'' 
 
 183", 452", 4f)2» 
 
 11 71)^' 
 
 412-i, 412" 
 
 2f)7' 
 
 910", OK)'.' 
 
 010' 
 
 U. 
 
 CumberlniKl, &c. H 
 
 guns 
 Cumiiiiiifrs V. Nichols 
 
 V. >Si()iie 
 
 Cunliflfc r. Sefton 
 Ciiiiningliiini r. State 
 Curren i-. (Crawford 
 Carrie r. Stairs 
 Currier v. (iale 
 Curry r. Hnyinond 
 Curtis ('. Aarunson 
 
 c. State 
 
 V. Strong 
 
 Clurtiss V. State 
 
 Cusliing r. Nantnskct Beacli R. 11. 1170' 
 
 V. Kico 808^' 
 
 Custeau v. St. Louis, &c. Co. 80H» 
 
 Cutter I'. Caruthers 21-- 
 
 r. State 183'' 
 
 Cuviliior i-. Browne 6541^ 
 
 Cuyler i>. Ferrill 2ia« 
 
 D.\nNEY I'. Mitchell OlOi" 
 
 Dado V. JEtna. Ins. Co. 358i« 
 
 Daggett V. Shaw 412", 412' 
 
 V. VVilley 412" 
 
 Daily v. N. Y. &c. R. R. 470' 
 
 V. State 21" 
 
 Dakota v. O'Hare 12208>, 12293'i, 122!)53 
 
 Danfortii v. Tenn., &e. U. 11. SuS" 
 
 Daniels f. Woonsocket 554'', 554''' 
 Dativille, &c. Plank-Road Co. v. 
 
 State 21" 
 
 Darby v. Roberts 183", 554' 
 
 Darling v. Hitclicock 21^ 
 
 Darrow v. Pierce 358''' 
 
 Davenport i-. Cummings 2' 
 
 V. McKee 978', 978', 978"' 
 
 V. Ogg 978", 978", 978^-', ^IS^* 
 
 Davidson v. Arsineau 978-'i 
 
 V. Nicholson 270" 
 
 i: Peticolas 21*^ 
 
 V. State 9105, qiq', 91022 
 
 V. Young 808-'" 
 
 Davie v. Briggs 18338 
 
 Davis V. Alston 1229', 122918 
 
 V. Bank of Fulton 21i'» 
 
 V. Best 211''' 
 
 V. Byrd 978" 
 
 V. Canada Farmers' Mut. Ins. 
 
 Co. 910", 91018 
 
 V. Cook 97826 
 
 V. Crookston, &c. Co. 80828 
 
 V. Dunham 12292 
 
 Davis r. Franke 
 
 r. Fredericks 
 
 r. Hopkins 
 
 r. McKnaney 
 
 I'. McSherry 
 
 r. Pearson 
 
 i". Rhodes 
 
 IK Boby 
 
 V. Sanford 
 
 ^— v. Sigourncy 
 
 V. State 
 
 Dawson r. Dawson 
 
 r. May all 
 
 Day r. Cooley 
 
 f. De Cousse 
 
 I'. Moore 
 
 I'. Stickncy 
 
 Deacon v. Schreve 
 Dean c. Stone 
 De Arnian i-. State 
 Do Baker v. So. Cal. 
 Deeary r. Poirier 
 De Cells v. U. S. 
 
 257»9, 257*" 
 
 1220''2 
 
 8081" 
 
 212'' 
 
 80H-;'' 
 
 122022, \2->\)'* 
 
 117932, 1179'-' 
 
 97H'2 
 
 403*, 4G35, 403', 4(i:!i'' 
 
 358-' 
 
 35822, 391»2, 978'-"', 078'' 
 
 212 J 
 
 4271 
 
 07H''i 
 
 214' 
 
 I179«, 117!t"> 
 
 978W 
 
 C2224 
 
 11792* 
 
 257'" 
 
 R. R. 21« 
 
 978*9 
 
 21'ii 
 
 De Haven v. De Haven 427i, 427", 427", 
 42712, 9782U, <j78''" 
 Dc Jarnette v. McDaniel 18;>''' 
 
 Delafield v. Hand aP, 1179"' 
 
 Delano i'. Jopling 21" 
 
 De la Hosar. State 211'' 
 
 De Lavaletie i-. Wendt 8082ti 
 
 Delaware, &c. K. R. i'. Converse 52^ 
 
 Demerritt v. 1." ndall 3G52, ,305» 
 
 Denioiroy v. ^\ alker 
 
 Denipsey i\ Kipp 
 
 Den V. M'AUistcr 
 
 Denmark, Griswold v. Pitcairn 
 
 Dennett v. Dow 
 
 Denning v. Roome 
 
 Dennis i". Weekes 
 
 Dennison v. Miner 
 
 Denton v. Peters 
 
 f. State 
 
 Denver, &c. R. R. v. Wilson 5542, gyaio 
 Denver Tramway Co. r. Owens 0221* 
 Derk v. Northern Central R. R. 
 Deshon i;. Merchants' Ins. Co. 
 Des Moines Savings Bank v. Col- 
 fax Hotel Co. 
 
 3012» 
 8081 
 36818 
 212 
 9782', 978'2 
 1179" 
 3»1«> 
 554" 
 808-20 
 391*5 
 
 97838 
 978'2« 
 
 554* 
 21'2* 
 ■Van Stein- 
 
 62', 978M 
 
 622" 
 
 21-22 
 
 978M 
 
 2571" 
 
 21" 
 
 6225 
 
 Diamond v. Northern, &c. R. R. 2572* 
 Dicken v. "Winters 40318, 4(5344 
 
 Dickerson i-. State 588-2. sgHis 
 
 Dickinson )•. Glenney 808-2* 
 
 Dickson i-. Waldron 9102* 
 
 Diehl V. Rodgers 91021 
 
 Dietrich i-. Mitchell 0220 
 
 Diggins' Estate, Jn re 1229» 
 
 Dcspau c. Swindler 
 Detroit, &c. R. R. v. 
 
 burg 
 Denser i'. Hamilton 
 Devine r. Burleson 
 Devlin 0. Crocker 
 Devoto !'. Com. 
 Dewees v. Colorado Co, 
 DeWolf V. Strader 
 
 ill 
 
 M 
 
 I 
 
CCXXVl 
 
 AMERICAN TAIILK OF CASES. 
 
 
 Beferencea are to i)agei. 
 
 
 Dillartl v. Scruggs 
 
 
 3016 
 
 Drohn v. Brewer 
 
 978»» 
 
 Dillingliam v. Snow 
 
 
 4121'' 
 
 Druniinond v. Hopper 
 
 183'-!« 
 
 Dillon V. Howe 
 
 
 3581^ 
 
 Driiniright v. State 
 
 r.88' 
 
 ('. Mattox 
 
 
 1170" 
 
 Dubois r. Baker 
 
 30ff>, 122'.l"i 
 
 Dimick v. Downs 
 
 
 257 ♦' 
 
 V. Fanteaux 
 
 21" 
 
 Dinckler v. Hacr 
 
 
 808-^' 
 
 Ducker v. Whitson 
 
 078'-"' 
 
 Dismiikes v. Stiilo 
 
 
 301!' 
 
 Duck wall c. Weaver 
 
 978»i, 12201S 
 
 Ditch V. VolUmriU 
 
 
 808" 
 
 Dueoign r. Shreppel 
 
 Am> 
 
 Division of Howard Co. 
 
 
 21" 
 
 Dudley V. Grayson 
 
 1170*1 
 
 Dixon V. Niccolls 
 
 
 21-.-J 
 
 V. McCluer 
 
 257'*' 
 
 i: State 
 
 470'', 470'- 
 
 V '.miner 
 
 1221)19 
 
 iJixon- Woods Co. r. Phillips Glass 
 
 
 DulTy i: I'eople 
 
 521, {iggii, r,HH'-'» 
 
 Co. 
 
 
 808'J 
 
 Duke of Cumberland v. 
 
 Graves IS^''', 
 
 Dobbins v. BInnchard 
 
 
 808' 
 
 
 18a" 
 
 Dobson /•. Cotliran 
 
 
 07H"i 
 
 Dumas v. State 
 
 4701', 47016 
 
 Doctor Leyflflil's Case 
 
 
 artH" 
 
 Dunbar v. Marden 
 
 12201", 1220"* 
 
 Dodge ('. Kiene 
 
 
 808'1 
 
 V. U. S. 
 
 3581" 
 
 V. State 
 
 
 OlW-i 
 
 Duncan v. Beard 1831'', 1220'^', 1220-'', 
 
 Doe i\ Henyon 
 
 
 122'.)'-'- 
 
 
 1220'---', 1220« 
 
 r. Hbit'knian 
 
 
 "2i-'" 
 
 r. Freeman 
 
 117'.)''' 
 
 i: Kslava 
 
 
 21'' 
 
 Dunham v. Riley 
 
 1 220'' 
 
 V. Ford 
 
 
 30r"' 
 
 Dunlap ''. Daughert\' 
 
 11*70« 
 
 V. Newton 12205«, 12 
 
 20«'. 
 
 122'.l«i, 
 
 — Waldo 
 
 1170-'" 
 
 1 
 
 229'-», 
 
 122<.l''"' 
 
 Dii; 1 I-. Altman 
 
 078'3 
 
 r. Iteagan 
 
 
 07HJ'' 
 
 .•. State 3tlf)\ 391", 
 
 391", 4709, f-i8« 
 
 
 
 122'.t"i 
 
 Dumiell r. Sowden 
 
 I220i 
 
 i: Wilson 
 
 
 1220- 
 
 Du I'oiit r. Davis 
 
 427< 
 
 Doc d. Arnold v. Aiddjo 
 
 4270,427" 
 
 Dupoy.ster r. (iagani 
 
 427», 427 '•' 
 
 Doe d. Dunlap r. Servos 
 
 
 427H 
 
 Diiree r. Brown 
 
 2|W 
 
 Doe il. Hagernian r. Strong 
 
 
 lo3-«' 
 
 Diiren v. Houston, &c. R 
 
 . Co. 2I» 
 
 Doe d. Maeleni r. 'I'urnbull 
 
 
 1220'^'.! 
 
 Durfee 1'. Abbott 
 
 40:1-;'' 
 
 Doe il. I'errv v. Newton 
 
 
 1220''> 
 
 Dnrgln r. Danville 
 
 18:!'-» 
 
 Doherty c Ilill 
 
 
 808J 
 
 Dnrkee c Lcland 
 
 1220* 
 
 Dole i>. Wilson 
 
 
 21" 
 
 ..•. Vt. Central It. R 
 
 3.'-)8l» 
 
 Doles r. State 
 
 
 SUl'i: 
 
 Diirkheiiner r. Hellner 
 
 40311 
 
 Dol|)li I'. JJarney 
 
 
 21" 
 
 Diirkln r. Col l.igli 
 
 80815, t:(iHi4 
 
 Donulioo V. Scott 
 
 
 «78^s 
 
 Durr r. i'l>;i.sr 
 
 81»8» 
 
 Donkle r. Kolin 
 
 
 010'* 
 
 Datlllct (. Ml.mclmrd 
 
 1170< 
 
 Donnelly r. State 3!H", 470»,470>'',07H-", 
 
 On; I'lii .-. W( odnian 
 
 078'''* 
 
 
 
 078*' 
 
 Dweliiii(*, i<c. Ins. Co. I' 
 
 Shaner 80K-' 
 
 Doolin r. Com. 
 
 
 470" 
 
 Dwelly 1. D«c'ly 
 
 0101", <)1(|1!) 
 
 Dooii r. Donahcr 
 
 
 1220' 
 
 Dyer i yredericks 
 
 3G8'." 
 
 r. Kavey 
 
 
 654'^ 
 
 r. , ,Hst 
 
 21J8 
 
 Dorr ('. 'IVpniont Bank 
 
 
 27((i' 
 
 V. Moiris 
 
 078'-'' 
 
 Dorsey i'. ("lapp 
 
 
 267;'" 
 
 
 
 Holy r. Smith 
 
 
 4ii;!''-! 
 
 Kai; \n r, Slate 
 
 21"H 
 
 Doiiil r. Held 
 
 
 122'.(''' 
 
 Fiigle r. Kinmet 
 
 183Sf', ik;!:m 
 
 Dougherty r. MeMinus 
 
 
 .•{'.»H 
 
 Kiiiiies 1'. Manies 
 
 183».i 
 
 DoiighiK r. Leightoil 
 
 
 078' 
 
 l'",arl /■. 'I'upper 
 
 301''" 
 
 DoiiglasH 1'. Hart 
 
 
 4(;3''' 
 
 Karle c. Karle 
 
 301" 
 
 r. Mitchell 
 
 
 18:1-:'' 
 
 r. Kice 
 
 808'-'' 
 
 Doiilhitt V. Stinson 
 
 
 2|.iJ 
 
 Kiirly V. Com. 
 
 5881", r,K8"' 
 
 Dow r. Tiittle 
 
 
 808' 
 
 Kason r. ('ha|iman 
 
 257«", 257'" 
 
 Dowd r. Will son 
 
 
 1 8;'. n 
 
 F.ast Hraiidywine, &c. H. 
 
 K.r. Kaiick 5.51^ 
 
 Dowlen 1'. State 
 
 
 .•JOI''" 
 
 KiiKterdiiy v. KillMini 
 
 Oil)'-!, Olll'' 
 
 Downer r. KowcU 
 
 978" 
 
 , 078I-! 
 
 Fast Line. \c. U. K. v. Scott 2r.7''". 257" 
 
 Dowtniii r. ('()iinell(>o 
 
 
 .'(OI-"' 
 
 Faslinan <\ Martin 
 
 427«, 427'' 
 
 Doyle '■. Village of Bradford 
 
 21 
 
 '», 21''" 
 
 r. Moullon 
 
 4(13'' 
 
 Drake r. (ilovcr 
 
 
 ' 52'" 
 
 r. Kiiihvay Co. 
 
 554 '« 
 
 r. Stale .T)")- 
 
 '. ;i!)i 
 
 ' ', i'i)'' 
 
 — — ■ V. lioland 
 
 wm--"* 
 
 Draper -■. Diaper IMO--. IHO", iMD' 
 
 1'. Shaw 
 
 my;"' 
 
 r. IidiabitantB of Hatfiolii 
 
 r.r.t', 
 
 F.ant 'reiitieHsee, &e. II. I{. r, Matoy 470'' 
 
 
 6541", i'>')|ii 
 
 r. Stewart 
 
 27(1' 
 
 Drrw r. Sutton 
 
 
 ilOjif' 
 
 l''ai>twood r. I'eople 
 
 3(15"* 
 
 DriscoU r. I'eople 
 
 
 :{0F 
 
 Katon r. Hall 
 
 1I70«* 
 
% 
 
 AMERICA X TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 CCXXVU 
 
 Eaton ('. Jervis 
 
 ('. 'riiliimdge 
 
 Kbersole i: Kiiiikin 
 Kborii r. Ziiiipelinan 
 Eby r. Winters 
 Eckel r. Ki;kel 
 
 References 
 
 427>, 427", 427'^ 
 
 (522' 
 
 3u8-<, 1220'', 122!»''4 
 
 Efker r. First Nat. Bank of Windsor 21-» 
 Kckerly v. Alcorn IHii^ 
 
 Kckfor.l r. Herry 808i» 
 
 Kctor r. Welsli 654'' 
 
 Eddy r. Gray .'{(15* 
 
 Kdelen r. UoukIi 1229-7, 122'J-'« 
 
 Edcii r. liourdinan 
 
 lOdwards r. Common Council 
 
 r. Jones 
 
 ('. Ottawa U. Nav. Co. 
 
 r San Jose, &c. Co. 
 
 r. Warner 
 
 Eel Kiver Draining Ass'n u. Topp 
 
 I')liie, Kstate of 
 
 Elirisniun r. Scott 
 
 Eiiand r. State 
 
 Eilert r. (ireen Bay, &c. R. R. 
 
 Eiscnioni v. C'iuni 
 
 Eidrid);e i^. Knott 
 
 - — c. State 
 
 ElkiiiH V. Melvean 
 
 Ellicott I!. I'earl 
 
 Elliott r. Dycke 
 
 u2' 
 
 3r)5'' 
 
 1179-'a 
 
 257-'« 
 
 2V« 
 
 257"* 
 
 21'* 
 
 270-' 
 
 978^ 97H''^ 
 
 688^ 
 
 52' 
 
 427" 
 
 2577 
 
 3!»1« 
 
 412^ 978.i- 
 
 4:!(i-'' 
 
 427' 
 
 r. IVirsol 
 
 V. Van Buren 
 
 Ellis I,, iiiitr 
 
 r. Park 
 
 I!, lieddin 
 
 r. Smith 
 
 r. State 
 
 Ellis's Kstate, in rr 
 Kllniaker r. linckley 
 
 (,'. Franklin Ins. Co. 
 
 ICIhnore i>. Mills 
 Ellsworth r. Potter 
 Elmer r. Fessendcn 
 Elniondortrr. (^armichnel 
 Elofrson r. Lindsay 
 HIsenratli i\ Kallmeyer 
 I'.lwell i: Mersick 
 
 I'. Walker 
 
 Flwodd r. Flannigan 
 Kniery r. Uerry 
 
 r. Twonihly 
 
 Emniett r. Peiioypr 
 Kmmons r. May ward 
 Empire \\(if. Co. n. Stuart 
 
 427', 127" 
 
 358^;Jo»^.■;!»l•'"• 
 
 117!H< 
 
 •JlJi 
 
 2 1 '■' 
 
 I22',t'-' 
 
 52" 
 
 I17'.t-'' 
 
 978^', 978'' 
 
 808^ 
 
 117'.t" 
 
 '"78" 
 
 34 1 'J 
 
 1229-' 
 
 808-'' 
 
 1229"' 
 
 358" 
 
 ;!5H-'< 
 
 211.-., 21 '7 
 
 1179'-' 
 
 1229'", 122'.i''< 
 
 808', 8()H" 
 
 27(1H 
 
 1229' 
 
 Empire State I'hosphate Co. v. IIcIKt 808 i 
 
 Endaily c. Stale 
 EndiTs r. .McDonald 
 I'.nficld c. IJIin^ton 
 Fn^'lish r. Sprague 
 Knnis r. Smith i 
 
 1179", 
 2", 52", 3581-!, 
 
 Kiislow r. Mitchell 
 Knterprisc Soap Works iv Savors 
 F.phland r. Mo. Pic. Bv. Co. " 
 Fquitable, &e. Ass'n i.'MeCluskey 
 
 257 1 ■» 
 2 1 '"' 
 1179'- 
 117',t"- 
 1179H, 
 117'.)" 
 1229-'" 
 5'.'-' 
 
 !t78'-' 
 .".91--'. 
 
 301* 
 
 are to pages. 
 
 Erickson r. Brookings Co. 808" 
 
 V. K. R. Co. (ir.i' 
 
 Erie U. H. c. Heath \.>-2'M 
 
 Krissman i-. Erissnian 078''', U78-'' 
 
 Eskridge v. Cincinnati, &c. R. R. 257- 
 
 1'. State 5a8''« 
 
 Estell I'. State ;>U1^» 
 
 Estrella, The 1179" 
 
 Ethier c. Homier 622'", t)22" 
 
 Etna I'. Brewer 
 
 Ettinger r. Com. 
 
 Eureka Springs li'y v. Timmons 
 
 Evans r. Browne 
 
 I'. Kvans 
 
 V. Hettich 
 
 V. Koons 
 
 I'. Montgomery 
 
 (•. State 
 
 Kvansich r. \l. K. 
 Kvanston r. (iunn 
 Evarts v. Middlebury 
 Kwing r. Bailey 
 
 r. Saniloval, &c. Co, 
 
 I'. Smith 
 
 .i!)!' 
 
 554' 
 
 52'» 
 
 21" 
 
 oioi» 
 
 <.llO-'« 
 257- 
 
 554< 
 
 470'". OSS"', (;35'» 
 
 257*>, 978i7 
 
 1179' 
 
 3r,5'* 
 
 910'-', 9101'', 910" 
 
 MlK-'i 
 
 808-1 
 
 'aiivan v. Russell 
 'aires r. Co(;krill 
 'airly c. Fairly 
 
 'alke r. Fassctt 
 'anchor r. De .Montogro 
 irmers' Bank c. Whitehill 
 arrar r. Bates 
 
 'arrow r. Nashville, &c. R. R. 
 'arwoll r. Tylor 
 ash >: Ulake 
 'aucot r. Nichols 
 'aulkner r. Kondoni 
 auiitleroy r. Hannibal 
 axon r. ilollis 
 iiy r. (iray 
 
 — c. Harlan 
 
 — r. .Miville 
 oalherman r. .Miller 
 CO r. Taylor 
 'oemstcr r. Uingo 
 'ell I'. Young 
 'elsontlial r. State 
 'fit ('. .Vniidon 
 'oltz ('. Walker 
 'cnno r. Weston 
 'onton i: Miller 
 
 — r. .Slate 
 'erdinand r. ,S(ate 
 'crguson I', llarwood 
 
 8()H-,i-! 
 18317, 078-", 978-'-', 
 1229^1, 1229J-i, 1229-'< 
 
 808'' 
 
 — r. McHean 
 
 — r. WalTorly 
 'cron r. D<uiolly 
 
 21'" 
 4tY.\-'' 
 
 1179''' 
 
 218' 
 
 1229" 
 
 257" 
 
 078" 
 
 21'- 
 
 40312, 403", 4f,;{'" 
 
 808^ 
 
 ;59l'« 
 
 21-!' 
 
 358''' 
 
 122iK''' 
 
 2r-'7 
 
 183", 1229-'' 
 
 257-'-> 
 
 391« 
 
 808-1 
 
 554* 
 
 1179" 
 
 2 pis 
 
 21 "' 
 1179^% 1179-:", 
 
 1179''^' 
 
 t'i2'2' 
 
 80S-' J 
 
 1179' 
 
 45-Ji 
 
 21-' 
 
 'iold r. Hoynton 
 
 'iolds r. State 
 
 'ife '•. Com. 270", 270', 588", SSS'-"', 588-'" 
 
 'Itleld r. liichardson 3<.ir'' 
 
 'ilo i: Springel 3.''i8-'i 
 
 inch t'. Alston Ib^ 
 
 |SI 
 
 1:11 iV'' 
 
CCXXVlll 
 
 AMERICAN TABLK OF CASES. 
 
 i 'i 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 fl78i, 978* 
 
 mo* 
 
 808" 
 
 808^ 808-3 
 
 80tti9 
 
 808' 
 
 B'k of Williams- 
 
 '.»78i, 978-^ 
 4«3» 
 
 808-* 
 
 257»^ 
 
 1179^ 
 
 4525 
 
 r.2i^ 
 
 978i«, 
 
 412' 
 
 010'>, 
 
 Finch V. Barclay 
 Finncgan i-. Dugan 
 Fire Asso'n v. Wiukliam 
 Firi.' Ins. Co. i-. Wickhani 
 First >'at. Bank v. Ashnicad 
 
 i: Dunn 
 
 I'. First Nat 
 
 port 
 
 r. Iluber 
 
 I'. Kingsley 
 
 t: I'ost 
 
 Fischer Leaf Co. i-. Whipple 
 Fisher i-. Conway 
 
 V. Mayor 
 
 V. Ulhnan 
 
 Fitch r. Chapman 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, &c. Con 
 
 struction Co. 
 Fitzgibhun v. Brown 
 Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick 
 Flagg V. Mason 
 Flaiiagin v. State 
 Flanders v. Merritt 
 Flanigin v. Washington Ins. Co. 
 Flattery v. Flattery 
 Flenii'-'g c Springfield 
 
 . r. Yost 
 
 Fletcher v. Boston & Maine R. R 
 
 V. Fitchburg R. K. 
 
 r. Fuller 
 
 V. Perry 
 
 I-. State 
 
 Flower v. Balto. &c. R. R. 
 Flowers r. Fletcher 
 Floyd r. Tewksbury 
 Floyd's Heirs r. Johnson 
 Flynn r. Coffee 
 Folks i: Burnett 
 Follain v. Lefevre 
 Follanshee v. Walker 
 Folsoni r. Cook 
 
 1'. Manchester 
 
 Fonda r. Burton 
 Foot c. Bentley 
 Foote V. Cohb 
 Forbush v. Goodwin 
 Force v. Martin 
 Ford i: Cunningham 
 
 r. Ford 
 
 r. State 
 
 Fordyec r. McCnnfs 
 Forgey v. First Nat'' Bank 
 Forrester r. State 
 Forsyth r. Charlebois 
 Fiiscue V. Lyon 
 Foster, /« re 
 
 V. Cleveland, &c. R. R. 
 
 ('. Collncr 
 
 r. llnll 
 
 — — V. Neilson 
 
 V. Newbrough 
 
 Fougup V. BurgeM 
 Fournol v. Duvert 
 Fonts r. State 
 Fowler v. A^lna Fire Ins 
 
 978" 
 , 4129 
 
 no^-' 
 
 183''i 
 21" 
 
 o;55* 
 
 4631" 
 
 97816 
 
 62« 
 
 183" 
 
 1220' 
 
 6881 
 
 3651' 
 
 12'29»^ 
 
 4282 
 
 2129 
 
 183»' 
 
 391", 391« 
 
 212* 
 
 622'i\ 9101' 
 
 183*» 
 
 622*8 
 
 8081 
 
 1229i» 
 
 8081 
 
 978»i 
 
 36813 
 
 257«, 257*'' 
 
 078W 
 
 891« 
 
 122fH» 
 
 80 r» 
 
 622* 
 
 21»' 
 
 078" 
 
 358*1 
 
 1229*" 
 
 622*, (1229 
 
 n* 
 
 8081" 
 
 391» 
 
 1229" 
 
 5«8i« 
 
 Co. 267*' 
 
 Fowler c. Simpson 427' 
 
 V. Stirling 808' • 
 
 Fowles r. Allen 554', 55413 
 
 Fox I'. Com. 21 '9 
 
 r. Peninsular, &c. Works 3".)1»'- 
 
 i: Keil 1229', 1229', 122'.|i* 
 
 Fralick r. Presley 078'" 
 
 Franiinghani Mfg. Co. v. Barnard 452'* 
 
 Franklin v. Franklin 257*, 978^'' 
 Franklin Bank v. Steam Nav. Co. 978*9 
 
 Fraser r. Fraser 078', 9788 
 
 V. State 588- 
 
 i\ Sutherland 022" 
 
 Frnzier v. Pennsylvania R. R. 257'*, 267" 
 
 V. State 978'i'' 
 
 Frear v. Drinker 9101' 
 
 Freeh i'. Phil. &c. R. R. 276" 
 
 Fredrick v. State 5882* 
 
 Free r. Buckingham 078''2 
 
 Freeman r. Bass 808* 
 
 V. Brewster 622" 
 
 r. Tliayer 183« 
 
 Freeny r. Frecnv 91 0''' 
 
 Fremont Butter.' &c. Co. v. Peters 978« 
 
 Fremoult c. Dedin 11799 
 
 P'rench v. Ryan 25719 
 
 V. Sale 267»9, 257'"* 
 
 V. White 2571' 
 
 J'. Wilkinson 365' 
 
 Frese v. State 21"* 
 
 Frick I'. Barbour 183''" 
 
 Friend v. Ilaniill 257" 
 
 r. Miller 1170i», 1179« 
 
 r. Smith Gin Co. 1832» 
 
 Friendly v. I>ee 978' 
 
 Frink & Co. i: Coe SOI*, SOI** 
 
 Fritz V. Burriss P78i 
 
 Frome i: Dennis 391'' 
 
 Frost r. McCarger 267*', G78" 
 
 Frye r. Barker 403' 
 
 Fudge V. Payne SOS'" 
 
 Fulkerson v. Murdock 1832« 
 
 Fuller V. Fox 1229** 
 
 f. Hampton 5541", 65412 
 
 V. Linzee 183*2 
 
 Fulton r. Central Bank of Pittsburg 078'«, 
 
 978« 
 
 Fulton Bank v. Stafford 078'" 
 
 Funderhurg i'. State 257" 
 
 Funk V. Babbitt 978*i 
 
 r. Ely 4fl;]2< 
 
 Furbush i-. Goodwin 8O8I' 
 
 Furguson v. Wright 183" 
 
 Furhman v. Mayor, &c. of Iluntsville 21" 
 
 O., C, & S. F. R'y Co. V. Jones 
 Oady r. State 
 Gaffney r. People 
 Gage V. Campbell 
 
 V. Lewis 
 
 Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Mining 
 Co. 
 
 r. New Orleans 
 
 r. Hcif 
 
 V. Scott 
 
 808» 
 
 2127 
 
 978*« 
 35819 
 80821 
 
 42711 
 
 427" 
 
 891*1 
 
 122012 
 
 !i 
 
AACERICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CCXXIX 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 Arispe 
 
 Gallagher i-. Market St. R. R 
 
 i: State 
 
 (iiillc c. Toile 
 (i;ilvestoii, &e. R. R. w 
 
 /•. Johnson 
 
 (hilvin V. Palmer 
 
 (iainniage v. Moore 
 
 (janahl i;. Shore 
 
 Ganilolfo r. State 
 
 (iannon c. People 
 
 (ianton r. Size 
 
 (iarden City Sand Co. r. Miller 
 
 Garilere v. Columbiiin Ins. Co 
 
 211-J 
 62-21 i 
 
 21" 
 
 117i»" 
 
 808-* 
 
 40^8 
 
 25789, 257", 2o7« 
 
 022* 
 
 4o2< 
 
 1170-:i 
 
 117'JiB 
 
 Gardiner v. People 
 Gardner r. Collector 
 
 i\ (\)nnelly 
 
 ('. Crenshaw 
 
 r. Kberhart 
 
 ('. Frieze 
 
 Kellogg 
 
 305'''', 3fi5-!i 
 
 211' 
 
 9782«, 978" 
 
 2o7-i 
 
 21-2, 35si8 
 
 ;]91'", oio« 
 
 I'. Lewis 52'- 
 
 Garneau v. Port Blakely Mill Co. 117yt- 
 Garner r. Myriuk 554'^ 
 
 Garrard r. State 588-'", 588--'', &88^« 
 
 (Jarrells r. Alexander 1229''' 
 
 Garrett v. State 
 Garrigues v. Harris 
 Garrison r. Goodale 
 (iarvin c. State 
 
 c. Wells 
 
 Garwood i-. Hastings 
 (jates i». Johnson Co. 
 Gaul c. Fleming 
 Gaunt ir. Ilarkness 1229'8 
 
 I'. State 
 
 Gavit r. Snowhill 
 
 (Jay r. Rogers 1179'5, 1179", 1179" 
 
 Gaynor r. Old Colony It. R. Co. 62' 
 
 Gebb c. Howell 
 
 Gebhart r. Shindle 
 
 Gelir r, Fisher 
 
 Geist r. Detroit City Ry. 
 
 Gelott r, Goodspeed 
 
 George c. Joy 9781, 9784, o78«, 978' 
 
 (ieorgia, &c. Co. i'. Reid 808i» 
 
 Georgia, &i'. R. R. v. (iaines 
 
 German Nat. Rank v. Rums 
 
 ''. Leonard 
 
 (ierrish r. Sweeter 
 (tihbons I'. Kliin 
 
 r. Wisconsin, &c. R. R. 
 
 Gibbs V. Gilead, &c. Society 
 
 tiibney c, Marclmy 
 
 Gibson V. Mnnuf'rs' Ins. Co. 
 
 r. Robinson 
 
 L<. Stevens 
 
 r. Trowbridge Furniture Co. 
 
 257", o54' 
 
 1179'* 
 
 .'J91« 
 
 36oi'-', 305^' 
 
 211' 
 
 183M, 183'- 
 
 21 iJ 
 
 27t)H 
 
 12294', 1229'" 
 
 3(io', 31!')' 
 
 1179-7 
 
 BOH-i- 
 
 91011 
 
 427' 
 
 21 '■' 
 
 12291'-' 
 
 (iilbert i-. Porter 
 
 Gilchrist r. Beswick 
 
 V. Brooklyn Grocers' 
 
 Assoc. 
 
 ('. Martin 
 
 Gilchrist & King v 
 I Giles v. Morrow 
 
 f. V'andiver 
 
 ! Gill f. State 
 
 Gilliam v. State 
 I Gilliland v. Sellers 
 I Gilman r. Riopelle 
 I Gilmanton i'. Ham 
 j Gilmore v. Baker Co. 
 i Gilpin I'. Greene 
 ' Gilpins i;. Consequa 
 I Ginnath v. Blankenship 
 
 (iirdlestone v. O'Reilly 
 I Gizler r. Witzel 
 I Gladdish r. Godcliaux 
 j Glass i: Bennett 
 I Glasscock r. Hughes 
 ; Gleason c. Kinney 
 
 Gleeson v. Wallace 
 
 Glen Brick Co. r. Shackell 
 
 Cilenn r. Hoosevelt 
 
 Mnnuf. 
 
 Martin & West 
 
 01020, 
 
 '2m 
 
 2l*u 
 
 ISS'"' 
 
 463^ 654'' 
 
 664», 55411 
 
 SOS-^" 
 
 257-» 
 
 52J 
 
 654'' 
 
 5215 
 
 11 79-^ 
 
 2 1'' 
 
 1229'^. 
 
 1229''« 
 183'" 
 
 Olddings c. l)av 
 
 Gilbert r. Campbell ((22i" 
 
 r. Flint, &c. R. R. 21"* 
 
 I'. Gooderlmin 978"* 
 
 r. Moline Plow Co. 358" 
 
 • V. Moline Water Power & Mfg. 
 
 Co. 2\*> 
 
 Glenn's Adm'r <-•. Express Co. 
 Glidden v. Dunlap 
 (ilobo Works . Wright 
 
 403'^i 
 boow 
 
 4U318 
 
 4529 
 
 452' 
 
 183W 
 
 554* 
 
 910^4 
 
 257*« 
 
 21^ 
 
 11795 
 
 3051 
 
 1179*1 
 
 808-« 
 
 808* 
 
 52'i 
 
 218 
 
 2761 
 
 8()8-a 
 
 391" 
 
 18317, 1229^4 
 
 40313 
 
 1229« 1229''i 
 
 358-'--i 
 
 1220'2, 1229M 
 
 1179-i'' 
 
 2* 
 
 62'' 
 
 (joddard c. Gardner 
 (ioins V. Moberly 
 (jolden I'. Knowles 
 Goldsmith i'. PicarJ 
 
 r. Sawyer 
 
 Goldstone i: Davidson 
 (ioltra V. Sanasack 
 (ionzales ;;. Koss 
 Gooch V. Connor 
 Goodall .. State 
 (iitod'j . Riley 
 (iooding V. Morgan 
 Goodman i-. .lames 
 (loodnow r. Parsons 
 (ioodrich r. Weston 
 Goodrich's Case 
 Goodrum v. State 
 (ioodwin '•. Appleton 
 
 1: Garr 
 
 r. Jack 
 
 r. State 
 
 (ioodwin, &c. (^o.'s Appeal 
 Goodwyn v. (loodwyn 
 Goodyear r. Vosburgh 
 (loodycar Rubber Co. v 
 Gordon r. Montgomery 
 
 r. Parke & Co. 
 
 r. Price 
 
 r. Searing 
 
 r Twi'eily 
 
 Gordon's Case 
 Gorgas r. Hertz 
 Gorlmni v, AuerswalJ 
 
 r. Canton 
 
 V. (iorham 
 
 Gormley r. Day 
 
 622", 02216, 02217 
 
 978i« 
 
 52" 
 
 257-'», 808» 
 
 216 
 
 1179» 
 
 808-" 
 
 21« 21»» 
 
 803« 
 
 470", 978" 
 
 808'» 
 
 21«, 21'", 2121, 21'a 
 
 1179« 
 
 5541, 5o4ij 
 
 3581* 
 
 1179i« 
 
 6221 
 
 2l« 
 
 42S> 
 
 688-» 
 
 622' 
 
 117i>« 
 
 1220*', 1220W 
 
 Scott Co. 978"'» 
 
 21 1« 
 
 8081* 
 
 ]22!t'T 
 
 858i» 
 
 1229'« 
 
 358U 
 
 554T 
 
 391« 301« 
 
 2* 
 
 21" 
 
 llilr 
 
t'CXXX 
 
 Gomilcy V. Uthe 
 
 
 1171)'' 
 
 (i(>88 >'. Froiiian 
 
 
 022^" 
 
 (ioulil r. Oawford 
 
 
 910'", yio^» 
 
 r. Ins. Co. 
 
 
 5u4H 
 
 i: Mc(;jirty 
 
 
 yj.\>{n 
 
 I'. Kniitli 
 
 
 aiti'" 
 
 Gove r. Downer 
 
 
 21-» 
 
 (Jovenior c. Roberts 
 
 
 308-' 
 
 (ioza V. Hrowniiin 
 
 12299, 1229<'^,12:Ji»'' 
 
 Grace v. McArtliur 
 
 
 207" 
 
 (iriigi; r. Learned 
 
 
 117'Ji7 
 
 Graliain v. Anderson 
 
 
 21>», 21^< 
 
 V. Campbell 
 
 
 3581-! 
 
 V. Chrystal 
 
 
 257^* 
 
 V. Nesniitli 
 
 
 122'.)"> 
 
 
 
 022' 
 
 V. State 
 
 
 257:1^ 
 
 r. Williams 
 
 
 21» 
 
 Grand Tower, &c. K. 
 
 11. V 
 
 . Walton SOH-i, 
 808- ' 
 
 Grand Trunk Uy. Co 
 
 v.M 
 
 icliardson 218- 
 
 Grangers' Ins. Co. v. 
 
 Brown S'.tl'" 
 
 Grant r. Coal Co. 
 
 62 
 
 ", 1179", 117!>''» 
 
 V. Frost 
 
 
 8»8i- 
 
 V. Hill 
 
 
 1171HB 
 
 V. I!!!<;llCB 
 
 
 80811 
 
 r. State 
 
 
 21», 21-!>, <.)78i» 
 
 Grauley v. ,Iermyn 
 
 
 3r.8i- 
 
 (ivnves r. Mattle Creek 
 
 COu", 3051' 
 
 r, Keaton 
 
 
 21" 
 
 ' '■. j'eo|>le 
 
 
 m^i. 47(»!' 
 
 AMERICAN TAHLE OP CASES. 
 
 KefRreiieeB are to pages. 
 
 (Jrittits r. Ivery 12290', 1229«« 
 
 (irinies r. Kddy 21"« 
 
 1: Martin 978" 
 
 r. State U10» 
 
 (iriswold ('. Gallup 21** 
 
 (irob r. Cusbnuin 21*'* 
 
 Groome r. < )(lKen City 808« 
 
 Groover r. Coffee 1229" 
 
 (iross r. Drager 808'-' 
 
 (irover r. Grover 11 79-* 
 
 (iruniley r. Wel)b 808i» 
 
 Giijiy f. Majruire 022*'' 
 Guidery r. Green 808", 808*', 808* 
 
 (Juilbeau r. Mavs 1179" 
 
 Gulf, &c. II. U. Co. t;. Ellis im" 
 
 r. Johnson 978*l' 
 
 V. Jones 808« 
 
 r. Nelson 3(i6" 
 
 r. Howland 2r)7'' 
 
 Gidick r. Gulick (f22» 
 Gulliver v. Fowler 808«, 808-' 
 
 (iulzoni V. Tyler 12J9*'' 
 
 Gumiing Co. v. Cusack 910" 
 
 Gurley v. I'ark 022» 
 
 Guyette r. Bolton 808" 
 
 t: 
 
 I'RVis 
 
 117".)'* 
 
 v. i\k'l..uighlin ;!91''< 
 
 V. IVntland «22i', 0221", 1229f' 
 
 Greany v. Long Island M. \i. 27(i'' 
 
 Great West. Uy. Co. v. Bacon 270* 
 
 Green «;. Bedell 391*« 
 
 V.Benton 1179* 
 
 V. Caulk 9"8«, 9780, 978", 978", 978i". 
 
 078" 
 
 V. Cawthorn 39^'' 
 
 V. Randall 808-'» 
 
 v. State B88I", C88'« 
 
 r. Terwilliger 1229<-'. 1229'« 
 
 I-. Van lluskirk 21'" 
 
 Greenleaf v. Dubuque, &c. R. R. 427", 
 
 427", 427 '< 
 Greenwood v. Fontaine 1179*^, 1179<' 
 
 Greer i-. Ricliardson Drug Co. .■»')8'" 
 
 Gregg V. Forsyth 1 1JO' 
 
 !•. Jamison 978«' 
 
 r. Mallett 18.r4, 1«:^'«, 18:!« 
 
 r. State 588>8, f)88'", 978'*, 078"-' 
 
 (Jregory '. Raugh 21-''- 
 
 267 
 
 —^ r. riianibers 
 
 r. Tliomas 
 
 Grt'llicr r. Nralo 
 
 Grennnn r. McGregor 
 
 Gress Lumber Co. v. Coody 
 
 (iriilcr I". Clopton 
 
 Grierson r. Mason 
 
 Griffln r. Smith 
 
 V. State ;191«', :191««, 1220 
 
 Grifflth I'. Williams 
 
 », 2.'.7-'* 
 2r)7'" 
 12211'' 
 21-'> 
 8(»H'> 
 808-'' 
 808-'« 
 022- 
 122! I'". 
 l*22'.t'" 
 122!K'f', 1229'"' 
 
 Haiikkty I!. State 
 Hacker r. Young 
 llackett r. IVoiile 
 I'ndfidd V. .L-'neson 
 Iliidji) r. Gooclen 
 Ilmlley 1'. Carter 
 Ilnerle v. Kreilin 
 Ilagenloclier v. Coney 
 
 R. R. 
 Ilaggui c. Ilaggin 
 Haines r. Hanralian 
 
 ('. Territory 
 
 Halbert v. Skyles 
 Hale r. Ard 
 r. I{()S8 
 
 Hall V. Anier. Masonic, &c. Ass'n 
 
 V. Brown 
 
 V. Costello 
 
 I', (didden 
 
 I . Ilougbton 
 
 I'. Manchester 
 
 f. I'helps 
 
 V. Rixey 
 
 r. Vanderpool 
 
 Hall's Deposition 
 Ilallerr. Clark 
 Halsoll V. Musgnivo 
 Ilalscy r. Sinsebaugli 
 Ham I'. Ham 
 Handiiirg r. Wood & Co. 
 Hamcl c. Amyot 
 Hiiniil I-. Knglaiid 
 Hamilton r. Clark 
 
 r. Holder 
 
 r. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co. 
 
 r, IVople 21=", 257'"' 
 
 588< 
 
 1179" 
 
 47(H 
 
 21» 
 
 25781, 25763, 9786« 
 
 301« 
 
 OlO" 
 
 Island, &e. 
 
 iiOli* 
 
 621* 
 
 62l^ 62i» 
 
 078'", 978-* 
 
 21" 
 
 1179'» 
 
 sort* 
 6r)4» 
 
 62 '6 
 
 403", 4C3"& 
 
 978-», 978™ 
 
 1179« 
 
 1229' 
 
 C22« 
 
 183", 183-* 
 
 183'" 
 
 910'» 
 
 808-' > 
 
 078'^ 978" 
 
 2iai 
 
 21'- 
 
 Hammett 
 Hamniil c, 
 
 21 
 267» 
 «23T 
 
 808" 
 
 978'» 
 62' 
 
 257". 
 
 022" 
 
 . Little Rock, &C.R.R. Co. 21'* 
 State 470» 
 
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 Reference! are to page*. 
 
 ccxxxi 
 
 Hammond i-. Varian ISliO-"^, 122!»ai 
 
 llftiiniiond's Case laJU'" 
 
 Ilainiiiond's Lessee i-. Inloes 21'| 
 
 llanawalt c. State 365^ 
 
 Hancock v. American, &c. Ins. Co. ISJJ^ 
 
 r. (^ook 
 
 V. Ilintniger 
 
 Handy v. State 
 Hanks v. Uliuads 
 llanley i'. DouoKliue 
 Hanlon v. Doliurty 
 Hanna v. Ilanna 
 Hnnney v. Com. 
 Ilainiuin r. Helchcrtown 
 Hanover It. K. r. Coyle 
 Hanrick v. Andrews 
 
 4r>-« 
 
 4tJ3'>, 46.J« 
 
 ;V.ll'' 
 
 078*', 'J7«»» 
 
 21«,-M'-, 21': 
 
 0:i2^, (122" 
 
 3'J1>* 
 
 ioi 
 
 022-< 
 
 3!»p: 
 
 11 ;'•'••! 
 
 Hanriot r. Sherwood 1229''*, 1229««. \T2'.)*- 
 Hanselnian c. Dovel UIO-"' 
 
 Hansen v. Miller U7»" 
 
 Hanson i: Mean C22* 
 
 V. (Uiiatovicli 183''' 
 
 I'. So. Scituate 21'" 
 
 Happel V. Bretliaucr 117U" 
 
 Hard v. Brown 31)1'* 
 
 u. City of Decorah 21'- 
 
 Harding v. State 588'^ 
 
 Hanly v. State 52' 
 
 Hargrove w. Adcock r22'.i'- 
 
 Harkness o. Sears 80t(" 
 
 Harlan, &c. r. Howard, &c. 428'. 428^ 428 = 
 llarland ly. Kastnian 427', 427", 427" 
 
 r. Dail 3'Jl« 
 
 I). Howe UTJ^ 
 
 Harriman v. Brown 412* 
 
 Harrington i'. Inhat'tants of Lincoln •>'>>', 
 5549, oJl"', 5.->4" 
 
 . 1: State 
 
 183-», 2.-)7" 
 
 Harris c. Harris 
 
 270' ' 
 
 0. Holmes 
 
 21 8^ 
 
 r. Hoskina 
 
 122!>^ 
 
 V. Howard 
 
 2.-i7* 
 
 r. Johnston 
 
 80.Sii 
 
 0. State 
 
 237's ".t7fr'' 
 
 Harrison r. Knwan 
 
 ii78*' 
 
 Hart w. Bait. & O. It. R. 
 
 21", 2I« 
 
 c. Bodloy 
 
 21" 
 
 r. Kendall 
 
 4.VJ' 
 
 V. Livingstou 
 
 40:P' 
 
 IK Slate 
 
 •jlj; 
 
 ". Yunt 
 
 368«, 3.')8». 3:)«': 
 
 ilartforil r. I'almer 
 
 !•;»", '.MO-!' 
 
 Hartford Bridge Co. i». Granger iVd''' 
 
 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. r. Ilcvnold* i>22'«. 
 <')22'''. ((22", ItKt-' 
 
 Hartigan v. International Society .t'lH' 
 
 Ilartranft's Appeal r>22': 
 
 Hartslield r. State <t78-' 
 
 Harvey i'. I'oiiny packer 8()8'^' 
 
 V. Sniitli 2' 
 
 1: Sidlcng 8fl8* 
 
 I'. Thorp :',."»«" 
 
 Harwood c. Miilry 403*, 4(W' ■ 
 
 Haseltine r. Concord R. R. 2.'.7''-'> 
 
 llRnkiJl r. (^)ln. 27<P 
 
 Hassard r. Municipality No. 2 21" 
 
 Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. IBS**, 
 
 183«», 183^1 
 Hatch r. Dunn 21** 
 
 Hatfield i-. St. Paul, &c. R. 36uB, 305'^, 
 
 •Jljo'* 
 
 Hatt V. Nay 267" 
 
 Haughey r. r'trickler 218'' 
 
 Hawes v. State 
 
 1220«. 
 
 Hawkin.s c. Grimes 
 
 1: James 
 
 r. Sumter 
 
 V. Thomas 
 
 Ha worth t;. Norris 
 Haycock f. Greuf 
 Hayes r. Adams 
 Haynes r. Mcltae 
 
 r. Trenton 
 
 Iliivs r. Northwestern Bank of Va 
 Hazic'on v. Union Bank of Colum- 
 bus 1220^ , •.229^1', 122!»«'' 
 
 183*J, 257". 257*« 
 
 122!>^« 
 
 218.« 
 
 122'J« 
 
 21^' 
 
 808" 
 
 122i)'» 
 
 1221K'' 
 
 183-'" 
 
 3«.')I 
 
 21'^ 
 
 Hazzard v. Vickery 
 Headman 1: Rose 
 Healy r. Moule 
 Hearst v. I'ujol 
 Huaston c. IMncmnati, &c 
 Heavenridge v. Mondy 
 Hebbard t'. Haughian 
 Heddeii I'. Roberts 
 Heddles r. Chicago, iScc. It 
 Hedge 1-. Clapp 
 He<lricks r. Morning Star 
 HelTron i-. Gallupe 
 Hcidenheimer v. Johnson 
 Heinemann 1: Heard 
 Heister r. Davis 
 Helm f. State 
 Helton ('. Alabama, &c 
 Hemenway r. Smith 
 Hemingway c. Garth 
 
 1: State 
 
 Hemmens v. Beiidey 
 Hempstead r. Iteed 
 Henderson t: Cargill 
 
 r. Hackney 
 
 r. State 
 
 '•. Terry 
 
 Hendricks r. State 
 Henry r. Bisliop 
 Henshaw r. Davis 
 Henslcy r. Tarpey 
 llenthorn .-. Doe 21», 
 Herbst r. Lowe 
 Hermann r. State 
 Hernandez r. State 
 Herrick r. Swomley 
 Herring '•. Rogers 
 
 '■. Skauirs 
 
 HiTster r. IL-rster 
 Hester r. State 
 lle.rltt r. Clark 
 
 r. I'igott 
 
 Hewlett r. CiwV 
 Hickey >'. HinH<lale 
 Hickman v. Hickman 
 
 122iH» 
 
 21' 
 
 122'J-'' 
 
 R. It. 21'-! 
 
 808-> 
 
 b22\ 022'' 
 
 183-2 
 
 R. i)78''' 
 
 »78-'» 
 
 808" 
 
 ()22« 
 
 462', 4r)2« 
 
 270-', 270'' 
 
 '■•^2" 
 
 452' 
 
 R. R. 3!»1 » 
 
 022", 622'" 
 
 078-s 978-" 
 
 18;!-" 
 
 978^* 
 
 1179" 
 
 427».4278,42.'", 
 
 427''» 
 
 122012 lOOfliW 
 
 183«,"978*«, {n'n''i 
 
 (1227 
 
 085' 
 
 122'.t' 
 
 403\ 4t)3' 
 
 21' 
 
 2P', 1170^', 122'f^' 
 
 3ti.-."'' 
 
 IHIl" 
 
 122!>«* 
 
 1220*', 1220*1 
 
 0-S*" 
 
 m)i<'» 
 
 978" 
 
 1)78*' 
 
 122'.»'« 
 
 428*, 421" 
 
 r.:>4* 
 
 808** 
 
 im 
 
ccxxxu 
 
 AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References are to pages. 
 
 Hickman v. Green 
 Hickuk l: Sli>.>lburne 
 Hickory i-. U. S. 
 Hicks V. Leaton 
 
 V. State 
 
 Higbee i'. Dresser 
 Hif(ginbotliani v. Campbell 
 Higgins V. Carlton 
 Higgs {-. Sliehee 
 Higliam r. Kidgway 
 Higley v. Gilmer 
 Hildeburn i: Curran 
 Ilililreth v. Aldricli 
 Hill f. Bacon 
 
 r. Com. 
 
 ('. Klridge 
 
 V. Gust 
 
 V. North 
 
 V. I'ostley 
 
 r. Proctor 
 
 • V. State 
 
 ant 
 
 1229««, 122'J«a 
 808" 
 2673 
 622'^ 
 621 
 978°« 
 4fi:i*' 
 3!)1*» 
 257'" 
 
 y785-' 
 
 978-^1 
 
 4709 
 81tl'" 
 978<« 
 
 910'''^ 
 4125 
 4701, 47018, 9788, gygB^ 97s<i, 
 978'8 
 
 r. Whidden 808*i 
 
 Hill, F. H. Co. V. Sominer 463if- 
 
 Hillary v. Waller 188'3 
 
 Hilts ». Colvin 358i, 117!H< 
 
 Hilyard v. Township of Harrison 1229* 
 
 Himmelmann v. Uoadley 21'9 
 
 Himrod v. Bolton \22\!^i 
 
 — - i\ Gilman 12295«, 12208^ 
 
 Hinchnian i'. Keener 
 
 Hinckley v. Beckwith 
 
 Hinde v. Valtier 
 
 Hines V. Cora. 
 
 ——- V. Driver 
 
 Hinkle v. State 
 
 Hinncmann i;. Rosenback 
 
 Hipes r. Cochran 
 
 Hissrick i-. Mcl'lierson 
 
 Hizer V. State 
 
 }IobbM V. Memphis, &c. R. Co. 
 
 Hodges V. Coleman 
 
 Hoefling v. Hambleton 
 
 Hoffman >•. Bloomsburg, &c. R. R. 
 
 Hugan r. State 
 
 Holt I'. Moulton 
 
 Holbrook v. Gay 
 
 Holcomb V. Holcomb OlQi, OlO-ii 
 
 Holder v. U. S. 
 Hollenbach v. Fleming 
 
 I'. Schnabel 
 
 Hollenback v. Todd 
 Holly V. Burgess 
 
 V. State 
 
 Holm r. Colm.in 
 Holman t>. King 
 Holmes V. Coryell 
 
 r. Goldsmith 
 
 V. Johnson 
 
 r. State 
 
 122<.>38 
 
 2|M 
 
 211" 
 
 4705 
 
 80P-'i 
 
 9781" 
 
 8086 
 
 21il8 
 
 4(J3i'> 
 
 211H 
 2117 
 
 39l»i 
 3681" 
 3<I6" 
 267<'' 
 1229* 
 
 4m-^ 
 
 9I0-", 
 
 910-i', 910* 
 
 97K'', 97817 
 
 1220-, 1220i'^ 
 
 21" 
 
 0227 
 
 257''«, 267M. 267«« 
 
 9101'', 910^1 
 
 521*. 62ii 
 
 3685 
 
 1229»«, 1229»*, 1229« 
 
 183»< 
 
 26789, 257", 688i», 1175)7 
 
 Holt V. Jarvia 391" 
 
 V. Moore 8081* 
 
 Ilomans v. Corning; 2i 
 
 Home Ins. Co. c. Baltimore Ware- 
 house Co. 564' 
 Homer i-. Cilley 1229«, 1229" 
 
 V. Wallis 12297, 12291", 1229i», 122yi« 
 
 12291s, 122919 
 Hood V. Bloch 365" 
 
 1'. Tyner • 564i* 
 
 Hooper v. Taylor 4(53i' 
 
 Hoover v. Cary 391* 
 
 V. Gehr 463", 463", 463i*, 4«3i», 
 
 4(!3« 
 Hope V. Balen 
 Hopkiiis V. Megquire 
 Hopkinsnn v. Leeds 
 
 122927 
 
 V. Turner's Falls Co. 412« 
 
 Holspy (-. State 267», 267««, 267« 
 
 Holston, &c. Co. V. Campbell 808" 
 
 Holt V. L^it eOBJ* 
 
 8087 
 
 1229'a 
 
 978-w 
 
 39181, 68811 
 
 6641 
 
 808-^8 
 
 4528, 452«. 4527 
 
 62», 6218 
 
 4G3» 
 
 808* 
 
 267* 
 
 97888, 978'M 
 
 40318 
 
 21" 
 
 4278 
 
 9781, 978*, 
 
 9784 
 
 622', 022* 
 
 117919, 1179* 117!H<* 
 
 18.3" 
 
 1179" 
 
 ()22« 
 
 1179^8, 1179«' 
 
 218* 
 
 4278 
 
 18386, 183*", 910« 
 
 368i'», 36811 
 
 ]229i 
 
 358i» 
 
 368i« 
 
 358*, 9788«, 978 o 
 
 Hopt V. Utah 
 llorniann v. Wirtel 
 Horn v. Hansen 
 Horsford v. Rowe 
 Horton V. Keed 
 Hough )■. Henk 
 
 V. People's Fire Ins. Co. 
 
 Ilonghtaling v. Kilderhouse 
 Houghton V. Jones 
 
 V. Paine 
 
 Houlton 1: Chic, &c. R. R. 
 
 V. Manteuflel 
 
 Houston, &c. R. R. v. Burke 
 
 Houx V. Blum 
 Iloiize I'. Houze 
 Hovey v. Sebring 
 Howard v. Coon 
 
 V. Copley 
 
 V. Gemming 
 
 r. Moot 
 
 I'. Russell 
 
 V. State 
 
 Howe v. Fleming 
 Howell r. Ashmore 
 
 r. Huyck 
 
 Howley r. Whipple 
 Howser I'. Con). 
 
 Iloxsie V. Empire Lmnber C .. 391^ 
 
 1229'i7 
 
 Hoy V. Morris ' t)22i* 
 
 Iloyt ('. Am. Exchange Bank 12'J9''i 
 
 >:. McNeil 52'<» 
 
 .). Russell 21», ai**. 21« 
 
 Hubbard v. And., &c. R. R. 267«> 
 
 V. Greeley 8(18* 
 
 V. Hubbard 97817, <,;a*i 
 
 r. Russell 368" 
 
 Ilubhy V. State '.i78« 
 
 Huckestein v. Kelly 8(»8« 
 
 Huekins v. Ins. Co. 978» 
 
 Hudson r. State 2182, 4701, 4707, (I22-* 
 Huetteman r. Viessehnann 664^ 
 
 Huffman 1: Cartwright 554* 
 
 r. Click 391« 
 
 Hughes V. Kogers 12290i 
 
 r. Sandal 8OHI 
 
 V. Southsm Warehouse Co. 358*" 
 
AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CCXXXIU 
 
 References &re to pages. 
 
 Hull ,: Lyon «22i8, 62217 
 
 Iliimble V. Schoemaker 978-' 
 
 Humeu. Scott 257« 
 
 Humes c. O'Bryan 452», 462', 554* 
 
 Hiiniphrey v. Burnside 213i 
 
 Hiinnicutt v. Peyton 412s, 412>' 
 
 ,: State 4706. 470»» 
 
 Hunscom v. Hunscom 910i^..91O" 
 
 Hunt V. Luqucre 1220-« 
 
 r. Order of Chosen Friends 1179'» 
 
 Hunter v. Gibbs 0786» 
 
 V. N. Y. &c. R. R. 21», 21-'» 
 
 y. State 3!»1« 
 
 Huntley r. Whittier 
 Hurd !•" People 
 Hurlburt r. Hall 
 Hurley r. O'SuUivan 
 llussninn v. Wilke 
 Hussoii V. Fox 
 Muster v. Davis 
 Huston's Estate 
 Hutcliins r. Hebbard 
 Ilutcliinson c. Hutchinson 
 
 r. Wiieeler 
 
 Hutchison t-. Patrick 
 Hutto V. State 
 Hyde v. Shank 
 
 V. Woolfolk 
 
 Hyde Park v. Canton 183»3, 1838' 
 
 Hynes v. McDermott 
 
 1835« 
 
 470* 
 978" 
 276" 
 
 8081 
 1229-^ 
 
 022* 
 40311 
 808'^ 
 
 808* 
 0786'' 
 
 358'» 
 1220'* 
 , ]83J«, 
 
 010^* 
 P220« 
 
 Irish I'. Horn 
 
 Iron Mfg. Co. v. Gaskell 
 
 Isaacson v. N. Y. Cen. R. 
 
 Israel v. Brooks 
 
 Ivy V. Yancy 
 
 46311 
 
 21W 
 
 21" 
 
 2u7'* 
 
 18;jw 
 
 Jack v. Martin 
 Jackling v. Edward 
 Jacks f. Stinipson 
 Jackson v. Blanshan 
 
 ■ V. Boneham 
 
 ■ V. Brooks 
 
 • V. Burtis 
 
 • V. Burton 
 
 ■ r. Chicago, &c. R. H 
 
 I vsiGi V. Brown P229'' 
 
 Iliinger i-. State 365'^i, 36&« ' 
 
 Illinois, &c. Co. v. Bonner 358i* i 
 
 i: Langdon 39l-'9 i 
 
 r. Murphy 5i2'^ i 
 
 v. Suttoi. 39136 j 
 
 I III lay I'. Rogers 622-1 j 
 
 Independence i: Pompton 427* 
 
 Indiana Car Co. r. I'd , ker 365«, 365*1 
 Indianapolis, &c. R. (Jo. v. Caldwell 211^ 
 
 r. llorst 276», 270» 
 
 V. Stephens 21"> 
 
 Ingalls V. State 183i« 
 
 Inglis V. Hughes 21 1^* 
 
 Ingraham i: Hart 621", 5.JU 
 
 Ingram i\ State 211" , 
 
 Inhabitants o; Springfield v. Wor- 
 cester 218 j 
 Inninn v. Foster 267** 
 Ins. Co. of No. Amer. c. Fo'-cheimcr 
 
 21l^ 629, 62i» 
 Ins. Co. f. Baker 1179'i 
 
 r. Mosley 39l», .191", 8911". Sitl'ii, ' 
 
 391*, 391W, a-)l« 
 
 V. Weide 46;T^i 
 
 International, &c. R. R. v. Anderson 
 
 89118 
 
 V. Dawson 808** 
 
 V. Pasture Co. 391" 
 
 V. Hagsdale 654', 5541" , 
 
 Ireland v. Cincinnati, &c. R. R. 267* 
 
 Irish V. Dean 808" 
 
 Cooley 
 
 c. Filleau 
 
 I!. Gridley 
 
 V. Jackson 
 
 ». King 
 
 c. Kingsley 
 
 V. Lar.iway 
 
 V. Lewis 
 
 V. Pliillips 
 
 1'. State 
 
 V. Swope 
 
 c. Waltermire 
 
 Jacksonville, &c. It. I{ 
 
 Land, &c. Co. 
 Jacobs r. Duke 
 
 V. Hesler 
 
 V. Whitcomb 
 
 James r. Wiiarton 
 Jameson r. Conway 
 Jaques c. Ilorton 
 Jaquith r. Scott 
 Jarvis i-. Robinson 
 
 V. Vanderford 
 
 Jaspers v. Lano 
 Jefferds v. People 
 Jefl^ries v. Harris 
 Jemison v. Planters & 
 
 Bank 
 Jenkins v. Eldridge 
 
 r. Kinsley 
 
 I'. Lykes 
 
 I'. Pepoon 
 
 '•. State 
 
 Jenkinson v. State 
 .lenne 1: Marble 
 Jennings r. St.irdevant 
 Jensen v. McCorkell 
 Jester v. Steiner 
 .lewell .'. Center 
 
 V. Jewell 
 
 Joannes v. Bennett 
 Joaquin v. Budd 
 .lockumsen v. Sufl'olk Suv 
 Joe V. State 
 Johnson V. Blanshaw 
 
 V. Day 
 
 r. Drew 
 
 V. East Carolina, &c. R. R. 
 
 V. Holliday 
 
 21 :» 
 
 li;2'J^ 
 
 52* 
 
 183", 18318, 1229^1. 
 
 1229**, 1229'^ 
 
 391'» 
 
 1229*9 
 
 12296 
 
 1229», 1229i» 
 
 427«, 427", 622i» 
 
 97856 
 
 910" 
 
 62'', 427* 
 
 1179*1 
 
 1229*> 
 
 1229*' 
 
 257*T 
 
 1229*» 
 
 688«, 97819, 978-« 
 
 978*' 
 
 18.3^* 
 
 V. Peninsular 
 
 257« 
 
 257* 
 
 022* 
 
 391*1 
 
 463*», 463'' 
 
 554''« 
 
 3581* 
 
 41 2W 
 
 21* 
 
 1229*2, 122(»«i 
 
 978»* 
 
 5881- 
 
 257« 
 
 Merchants 
 
 21 1» 
 978*9 
 
 inos" 
 
 52* 
 
 117919 
 
 G35*, 9781", 97HU 
 
 622*. 622W 
 
 6221 
 
 622' 
 
 18:1** 
 
 1229*' 
 
 21* 
 
 4276 
 
 I8;i*> 
 21 •■'4 
 
 183"« 
 
 688« 
 
 1229-» 
 
 654* 
 1179^ 
 808'« 
 
 5646 
 
 Bk. 
 
 1'! 
 
 • }\ 
 
 ill 
 
 t 
 
I 
 
 CCXXXIV 
 
 AMERICAN TAllLK OF CASES. 
 
 RefereiiceB are to pages. 
 
 Johnson ;•. Hudson K. U. U. Co. 21*', 21»« 
 
 V. Mason 122'.)i'^ ; 
 
 I'. Merithew 183«, l»a'» ! 
 
 f. State 2r)7<", ;Ji)F-, 6H8'', 58«i", ' 
 
 DSaJ", 688'», 0L'2-i=', i»l()", ItlO'", DlO'ia 
 U78l^ 'J'.H*", »:8M 
 
 «. Trinity Cliurcli !So. 654" 
 
 1.. VViitsJn 9101" 
 
 V. Wiley in»^, !)78« : 
 
 Johnston !•. Farmers Ins. Co. U78", 1)78' 
 
 V. lledden 21^ 
 
 Jones V. Blount 1221)'*' 
 
 V. Brewer 122'J»'i 
 
 V. Com. 391'» 
 
 u. Cordele Guano Co. 1179" 
 
 V. Ducliow 257^fl 
 
 V. Kast Tenn. U. U. Co. &2< 
 
 u. Gale's Curatrix 21"* 
 
 r. Hays 21 "> 
 
 V. Hen8l;all 463«, 40:iH 
 
 c. Howard 452>, 452" 
 
 V. Jones 
 
 SSS-'i^, 306», 305'', 427» 
 
 V. Lake View 
 
 r. Malvern Lumber Co. 
 
 V. Meiindy 
 
 1'. M'Neil 
 
 1?. Phelps 
 
 V. Portland 
 
 V. n. R. 
 
 V. Randall 
 
 r. Roberts 
 
 V. Simpson 
 
 V. State 21 8r 257'w, 257^', 391-*', 
 
 470», 470»», 470">, 4701', 022", 978«, 
 978>i, 1229<''' 
 
 1'. Swearingen 
 
 V. Townsend 
 
 V. Tucker 
 
 Jordan i: Faircloth 
 
 V. Osgood 
 
 Joseph ('. National Bank 
 
 I'. Ostell 
 
 V. State 
 
 Joslin !•. IjB Baron 
 Juilliard r. Chaffee 
 Jumpertz r. People 
 Justice t'. State 
 
 21ii 
 978" 
 
 1179*' 
 978« 
 
 122'.t''6 
 
 391'» 
 
 910>'' 
 
 1833. i»34 
 
 1229*'' 
 276'" 
 
 52'-', 808« 
 
 391<« 
 
 62« 
 
 12299 
 
 257" 
 
 1229<5 
 
 808' 
 
 035« 
 
 62'> 
 
 8081, 808* 
 
 12296', i220«2 
 
 470" 
 
 Kaelin I'. Com. 554^ 
 
 Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co. 5541^ 
 
 Kansas, &c. R. R. Co. v. Foster 52" 
 
 r. Miller 183« 
 
 V. Phillips 21« 
 
 V. Richardson 52* 
 
 Karr f. Jackson 1179''" 
 
 r. State 1229^', 1229'-'» 
 
 r. Stivers - 403°, 403i'' 
 
 Kaut V. Kessler 022' 
 
 Keagle r. Pcssell SoS**" 
 
 Keanr. Rico 1179" 1179ii 
 
 Kearney v. Farrcll •.m^ 
 
 c. "Mavor, &c. of N. Y. 808II, 3582" 
 
 ,: State 2",^ 
 
 Keiito* r. Dinunick 022' 
 
 Keefer v. /immerman 1229" 
 
 Keerans r. Brown 
 
 
 978", 078«« 
 
 Keith V. ilay<lcn 
 
 
 21'» 
 
 V. Lothrop 
 
 
 1229^«, 1221)»6 
 
 V. Stiles 
 
 
 1179" 
 
 V. Wilson 
 
 978", 978=". 978« 
 
 Keller i-. Stuck 
 
 
 183'» 
 
 Kelley r. Owens 
 
 
 270* 
 
 u. People 
 
 
 688*, 688S 
 
 1'. Saltniarsh 
 
 
 HOS* 
 
 1'. Storey 
 
 
 21'» 
 
 Kellogg v. Tompson 
 
 
 8081 
 
 Kelly V. Carter 
 
 
 808'^ 
 
 V. Dunlap 
 
 
 1229" 
 
 i\ Leachman 
 
 
 8086 
 
 V. McGuire 
 
 421*, 427^ 427'i 
 
 V. Oliver 
 
 
 8()8« 
 
 r. Peoi)le 
 
 
 9781'', 97818 
 
 r. State 
 
 
 265« 
 
 r. Stone 
 
 
 978« 
 
 Kelsea v. Fletcher 
 
 
 978-, 97810 
 
 Kelsey i'. Ilanmer 
 
 1179*2, 
 
 122y^«, 1229J6 
 
 Kclton V. Hill 
 
 
 403* 
 
 Kendall v. Collier 
 
 
 1229'", 1229* 
 
 V. Field 
 
 
 4«3ia 
 
 c. May 
 
 010», 910-1. .jioa 
 
 Kenidton v. Rowe 
 
 
 3056 
 
 Kennard v. Kennard 
 
 
 52», 62'-', 6216 
 
 Kenncbrew v. Southern, &c. 
 
 Co. 62i« 
 
 Kennedy i-. Com. 
 
 
 2128 
 
 V. Doyle 403'«, 463* 
 
 ', 463«, 11791 
 
 V. Lubold 
 
 
 412*, 4126 
 
 V. U. C. & B. 11. 
 
 Co. 
 
 391» 
 
 f. Reynolds 
 
 
 1179** 
 
 V. Upshaw 
 
 
 122981 
 
 Kenney r. Van Home 
 
 11791" 
 
 Kuiinon r. Gilmer 
 
 
 257*» 
 
 Kenosha Store Co. v. 
 
 Shedd 
 
 212» 
 
 Kent I'. Mason 
 
 
 391« 
 
 V. State 
 
 
 97862 
 
 V. White 
 
 
 2762 
 
 Kentucky, &c. Bridg 
 
 s Co. V. 
 
 Hall 808» 
 
 Kentucky Cen. R. K 
 
 V. Barrow 257^* 
 
 Kcppel V. R. R. 
 
 
 'M« 
 
 Kermott v. Ayer 
 
 
 21« 
 
 Kern i-. Brldwell 
 
 
 365» 
 
 Kernin )■. Hill 
 
 
 12296* 
 
 Kerr v. Freeman 
 
 
 2768 
 
 Kessel v. Albetis 
 
 
 21" 
 
 Ketchum i'. Am. &c. 
 
 Ex. Co 
 
 270i» 
 
 V. Brooks 
 
 
 35816 
 
 Keyser v. Coe 
 
 
 21:12 
 
 Kibby v. Harsh 
 
 
 80819 
 
 Kidd V. Ward 
 
 
 18329 
 
 Kidder i-. Blaisdell 
 
 
 2121. 2122 
 
 Kierstead v. Brown 
 
 
 554', 52418 
 
 Kilburn r. Bennett 
 
 391»», 391*^ 391« 
 
 Kile r. Ycllowhead 
 
 
 212« 
 
 Kilgore r. Stoner 
 
 
 1179» 
 
 Killebrew v. Murphy 
 
 
 2182 
 
 Kilpatrick.!'. Com. 
 
 
 212*, 47(y8 
 
 Kimball r. Davis 
 
 
 978*9 
 
 V. Morrell 
 
 
 122926 
 
 King I'. Colvin 
 
 
 2708 
 
 V. Donahoe 
 
 
 12296' 
 
 r. Donahue 
 
 
 1229« 
 
i^ '•-■■I.' I 
 
 AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 References are to pages. 
 
 CCXXXV 
 
 I 
 
 King V 
 
 . Doolittle 
 
 Duke 
 
 Kriswell 
 
 Gallun 
 
 Marring worth 
 
 Holt 
 
 117'.)3" 
 412» 
 
 •JIM 
 
 1229''' 
 1179', 1179« 
 
 Inhabitants of Bathwick 122»" 
 
 r. Kent's Heirs 'il-ii 
 
 V. Little IHS"* 
 
 V. N. Y. Central, &c. 11. R. 305» 
 
 V. Ruckman 257"' 
 
 V. Sears 1229^' 
 
 V. State 39123, 4706, f,88>2, <JW^ 
 
 V. Wortliington 3588, 910-* 
 
 Kingliorne /•. Montre»' Teleg. Co. 358'" 
 Kingman n. Cowles 117'J*', 1179-" 
 
 Kinnard Co. «;. Cutter Co. 808'" 
 
 Kinney v. Farnsworth 412", 554''' 
 
 V. Flynn 1229', 12298, 1229'^, 1229"' 
 
 V. U. S. 463-« 
 
 Kirby v. Com. 391''' 
 
 Kirchgraber r. Lloyd 267'' 
 
 Kirkland v. Sniitii in9« 
 
 Kirkpatrick v. Clark 808^1 
 
 Kiser v. CarroUton Dry Goods Co. 808^ 
 
 Kissniti V. Forrest 978^7 
 
 Kitner v. Whitlock 270'^ 
 
 Klare c. State 21'"* 
 
 Klein v. Lawdman ISS'*, 18339 
 
 V. Russell 358-« 
 
 Kleinmann v. Gieselmann 358" 
 Kline V. Baker 62", 52i«, 52i5, 62i« 
 
 Knight V. Ho>i3c- 257«, 267''" 
 
 Knode v. Williamson 257*" 
 
 Knowles i-. Crainpton 3652', 306^^ 
 Knox V. Silloway 1179<', 1179« 
 
 Koehler v. Buhl 978*' 
 
 Koehring ». Muemminghoff 808* 
 
 Koenig c. Bauer 978*5 
 
 Koons V. State 1229'* 
 
 Kornegay p. Kornegay 1229"' 
 
 Kostenbadcr v. Peters 808'" 
 
 Kotwitz V. Wright 463" 
 
 Kracke v. Ilomeyer SOS-' 
 
 Kriiger v. Pierce 97 8'''' 
 
 Kramer v. Goodlander 412* 
 
 Kraiiich v. Sherwood 808'^' 
 
 Krebs v. State 470* 
 
 Kreuzberger v. Wingf5eld 808^ 
 Kreuziger v. Chicago, &o. R. R. 39r«, 
 
 3913'' 
 
 Kuglar It. Garner 391*^ 
 
 Kuiider i'. Smith 978', 978» 
 
 Kusch V. Kusch 910"* 
 
 Kutcher v. Love 55412, 554"' 
 
 Lacy v. State 391« 
 
 La Fayette Bank v. Stone 1179", 1179W 
 
 Laing r. Raine 1229'- 
 
 Lake Merced Water Co. v. Cowles 2r" 
 
 Lake Shore, &c. H. R. v. Bangs 52' 
 
 r. Rosenzweig SOI'" 
 
 V. Squire 8082^ 
 
 Lamagdelaine v. Tremblay 2672^ 
 
 Lamar v. Micou 
 
 V. Pearre 
 
 Lamb v. State 
 
 V. Ward 
 
 Lambright i: State 
 Lamoreaux v. Atty.-Gen. 
 Lampton v. Haggard 
 Land v. Patteson 
 Lander i-. People 
 
 v. Seaver 
 
 Landis v. Turner 
 Lane v. Bryant 
 
 V. Cole 
 
 Lanergan v. People 
 
 Langley v. Wadsworth 
 
 Lannark v. Dougherty 
 
 Lanning v. Chicago, &c. R. R 
 
 Lansing v. Russell 
 
 Lapowski v. Taylor 
 
 La Roche 1: O'Uagan 
 
 Laros v. Com. 
 
 La Salle Co. v. Milligan 
 
 Lasher v. State 
 
 Lassing v. James 
 
 Lassone v. Railroad 
 
 Lathrop v. Stuart 
 
 Laughlin v. Fidelity Ins. Co. 
 
 V. State 978' 
 
 Laughran v. Kelly 
 
 Laurent v. Vaughn 
 
 Lavalle v. People 
 
 Lavcrenz v. Chicago, &c. R. R. 
 
 Lawder v. Henderson 9783*, 978'* 
 
 Lawrence v. Dole 8082* 
 
 v. Du Bois 80819 
 
 V. Kimball 452^ 
 
 V. Tennant 412', 412* 
 
 Lawson v. Glass 978«, 978', 978" 
 
 1'. State 257** 
 
 Lazard v. Merchants', &c. Co. 
 
 Lazare v. Jacques 
 
 Lazier v. Westcott 
 
 Lea V. Kilburn 
 
 League i'. Thorp 
 
 Learned v. Corley 
 
 )'. Tillotson 
 
 1'. Tritch 
 
 Leathe v. Bullard 
 
 Leather C ■. v. Hardware, &c. Co. 
 
 Lcavitt V. v. 'itler 
 
 Leo V. Fowler 
 
 V. Tinges 
 
 Li'fevre v. Lefevre 
 
 V. State 58826 
 
 Lefferts >'. Brampton 
 
 Legg's Case 
 
 Lehman Bios. !-•. McQueen 27ft2 
 
 Leiber i'. Com. 
 
 Leland i,-. Wilkinson 
 
 21"i 
 39180,4522, 11 79'" 
 036* 
 978"* 
 688» 
 427" 
 2127 
 
 21'» 
 
 39 U 
 
 2672" 
 
 403', 403'* 
 
 39126 
 
 1229' 
 
 554" 
 
 978** 
 
 3057 
 
 26726 
 
 11792T 
 
 1229'" 
 
 8082, 808'* 
 
 688« 
 
 211* 
 
 2132 
 
 808* 
 
 4033J 
 
 219, 183** 
 
 8081' 
 
 , 978" 
 
 036» 
 
 391*1 
 
 2113 
 
 62* 
 
 808" 
 80821 
 
 2113 
 
 391*9 
 
 1179*8 
 
 183»* 
 
 664* 
 80829 
 80828 
 
 62" 
 
 2123 
 
 808« 
 
 9782" 
 
 80828 
 
 . 68827 
 
 12292 
 
 18.'!8 
 . 27fi" 
 470*, 4707 
 
 21'* 
 
 Leonard v. Allen 25733, 2573*, 25739^ 257*' 
 
 V. Kingsloy 978" 
 
 Leport V. Todd 18.3'i 
 
 Lesher f. Levan 1229' 
 
 Leslie v. Hanson 4fi3'7 
 
 Lessee of Allen v. Lyons 2129 
 
 ■ fT 
 
 I ^ : ' 
 
 \\\^- 
 
 I'H- 
 
 ■Mil 
 
 ' ! ill 
 
 ! I 
 
 m 
 
CCXXXVl 
 
 AMERICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Beferenceg 
 
 Lessee of Scott v Ratliffe aoi*' 
 
 Lester v. State 588>^, 5881" 
 
 Levers c. Van Busk irk 022'" 
 
 Ix-vy c. State 21", 21>i, m5!^'>, 3l)|" 
 
 'J78'" 
 
 808 >» 
 21", 2r" 
 
 y78' 
 
 Lewis, In re 
 Lewis r. Barker 
 
 i: Bnyliss 
 
 r. Harris 
 
 V. Kriiiner 4Go'' 
 
 V. McCluro 21'^ 
 
 V. Meginniss 4(Y.i-* 
 
 V. State 21-', 470", 470i« 
 
 V. Supervisors 21'''' 
 
 i: Wintnxie 21-^ 
 
 L'Herbette c. I'ittsfleld Nat. Bank 257" 
 Libby v. Brown 452'i 
 
 Liddle r. Old Lowell Bank 078", 978»'' 
 Liddon i: Ilodnett 117',t'' 
 
 Liggett !-. Glenn 022''' 
 
 Lightfoot r. People 257'' 
 
 Lilly V. Waggoner ISIF- 
 
 Lincii V. Lincli 301«',3<JP' 
 
 Lincoln r. i',;>.ttclie 21'2, U1'J\ 1170'" 
 
 Lind c. Lind 183" 
 
 Lindauer r. Meyberg 358'' 
 
 Lindley f. Dakiii '2* 
 
 Lindsay r. Iliiniburg, &c. Ins. Co. 62''' 
 
 f. Williams 21*- 
 
 Lindsey r. Atty.-Gen. 21'" 
 
 Lingo V. State 022'' 
 
 Linnell v. Sutherland 40:5" 
 
 Linsley c. Lovely 808'^, 978*« 
 
 Litchfield v. Merritt (i22-^ 
 
 Little V. Cook &m'^'^ 
 
 I'. Downing 183l^ 403« 
 
 V. Kogers 122!f*" 
 
 f. State 39 !« 
 
 I'. Tlionipson 27(y 
 
 Little's Case 391"' 
 
 Littlefleld c. Rice 463i« 
 
 Little Rock (iranite Co. n. Dallas Co. 4(!3" 
 Little Rock IJy. Co. w. Leverett 391" 
 
 Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 
 
 21 '7 
 
 Livingston v. Arnoux 
 
 — V. Kiersted 
 — — V. Roberts 
 
 — V. Wood 
 Livingstone v. Gartshore 
 Lockhart v. White 
 Lock wood r. Crawford 
 Loeb r. liicharJson 
 Lofton r. Stcrrett 
 Loggins V. State 
 Loliman v. State 
 Londonderry v. Andover 
 Long t: Colton 
 
 Pntton 
 
 V. Slate 
 
 Longabaugh i*. 
 
 R. R. 
 Lsomis V. Bedel 
 V. Stuart 
 
 462' 
 
 910', 910^' 
 
 978« 
 
 808'« 
 
 622" 
 
 18338, i«3.ifl 
 
 21-'» 
 
 808''«^ 
 
 5546 
 
 21*5 
 
 427», 427< 
 412- 
 
 257" 
 Virginia City, &c. 
 
 2572* 
 
 1179«, n79«' 
 
 4fl3i« 
 
 nre to p»gea. 
 
 Lord I'. Am. &c. Ins. Co, 
 Loree v. Abner 
 Lorenzana t'. Camarillo 
 Lottawanna. The 
 Louden v. BIythe 
 Louisville, &c. li. R. c. B 
 
 f. Hall 
 
 V. Hurt 
 
 1-. Let son 
 
 V. Orr 
 
 V. Richardson 
 
 V. Terrell 
 
 V. Wood 
 
 V. Wright 
 
 Loveli r. Payne 
 Lover.idge v. Hill 
 Low V. Mitchell 
 Lowe V. Lowe 
 
 r. State 
 
 Lowell V. Todd 
 Lowry r. Cady 
 
 r. Moss 
 
 Loyd r. Hannibal, &c. R. 
 Lucas c. Flinn 
 Luce i". Coyne 
 
 r. Foster 
 
 Tucker r. Com. 
 Luke V. Calhoun Co. 
 Lull r. Cass 
 Lumpkin r. Murrell 
 Lund V. Tynsboro 
 Lunn V. Scarborough 
 Lunsford i-. Dietrich 
 Lurton v. Gillian) 
 Lush V. McDanitI 
 Lycoming. &c. Ins. Co. v. 
 Lyman v. Philadeljihia 
 Lynch r. Cronan 
 
 r. Moore 
 
 Lynde r. Judd 
 Lyon V. Lyon 
 
 V. Manhattan u. R. 
 
 V. Marine 
 
 V. Prouty 
 
 Lyons v. Gregory 
 
 uck 
 
 — — V. Wadharas 
 Lopez v. State 
 
 858", 5542 
 9101 
 
 808'9 
 
 21 '0 
 
 554'^ 
 
 216 
 
 391'! 
 391"> 
 3'.)1»» 
 OTHH 
 183 19 
 358 '2 
 257", 257"» 
 978« 
 S06» 
 6547, 65411 
 276* 
 0228 
 257'»' 
 97820 
 5882', ^agi-i 
 183^T 
 3581 
 452*, 4.'^i28 
 305*', 3t)5ia 
 978"» 
 ]220<2 
 8082S 
 
 2114 
 
 21»6 
 80821 
 
 3918, 30128 
 
 122021 
 
 257» 
 
 1179» 
 
 80184, 301»" 
 
 Wright 5215 
 
 267^9, 2576" 
 
 4035 
 
 257*2 
 
 1229» 
 
 588» 
 
 805» 
 
 2i8« 
 
 0228 
 1179" 
 
 R 
 
 Mabley v. Kittleberger 
 Macdonalil r. Dana 
 Macev v. Titcombe 
 Mack" V. State 
 .MacKinzie v. Stretch 
 Maclean i-. Scripps 
 Macomber r. Scott 
 Madden v. State 
 Magee v. Allison 
 
 I'. Burch 
 
 V. Scott 
 
 Magie i". Herman 
 Magill I'. Stoddard 
 Maguire >-. Middlesex Ry. 
 Maier i-. State 
 Mailler v. Ex. Propeller Co. 
 Major r. State 
 MaJcomson r. O'Dea 
 Mallory v. Ohio Farmers Ins. 
 
 39124 
 
 8081" 
 
 21'i 
 
 39122, 3912« 
 
 5541W, 5541a 
 
 35828 
 
 122046 
 
 183' 
 
 808*, 80828 
 
 3582 
 
 117987 
 
 358'6 
 
 80828 
 
 2571 
 
 2188 
 
 2572 
 
 2118 
 
 4281 
 1229*1 
 
 i 
 
 Co. 
 
AMKiaCAX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CCXXXVll 
 
 
 Mnllnry v. State 
 
 Miiiiclfl r. Swiin Laiul Co. 
 
 Miiiitte r. Iloliucs 
 
 Maiiiatcf Bank r. Se.vniour 
 
 Mann BoudDir C'mt Co. v. IJupre 
 
 Manning r. Maroiii-y 
 
 r. I'ippi'n 
 
 Manufacturers, &c. Bank c. Baack 
 Miniufiicturint? Co. v. Bennett 
 
 BeferenceB are to pages. 
 
 21- 
 
 Marbnry i-. Madison 
 Alarcly v. Sliults 
 Marcy v. Stone 
 Mardos v. Meycre 
 Mark i\ Hastings 
 
 c. Mcrz 
 
 Marks v. Sullivan 
 Marsh i*. Case 
 
 V. Davis 
 
 V. Hand 
 
 I'. Whitiiiore 
 
 Marsliali v. Baker 
 
 i\ Brown 
 
 V. (Miicajio, v*ii'. B. K 
 
 ,: (}. E. 11. H. Co. 
 
 V. State 
 
 Marshall l.ivery Co. i 
 Martin r. Anderson 
 
 I'. Bowie 
 
 r. Brown 
 
 nss'- 
 
 301 '■' 
 
 8t)8i- 
 
 188i« 
 117U--'' 
 
 c. Klliot 
 
 r. Ilardesty 
 
 r. Martin 
 
 V. Nichols 
 
 r. I'ayne 
 
 Martindale v. Falkner 
 Marvin c. Uichniond 
 
 )■• State 
 
 Marx i". People 
 Mask V. State 
 Mason c Fuller 
 Massey v. Bank 
 
 r'. State 
 
 Mathes i>. Bobinson 
 Mathews v. Yerex 
 Matlock V. Glover 
 Matter of Hall's Deposition 
 Matter of Page 
 Matter of Ridgway 
 Matter of Will of Snelling 
 Matteson r. Noyes 
 
 r. N. Y. Cen. R. U. 
 
 Matthews r. Hoagland 
 
 V. Holmes 
 
 r. Huntley 
 
 «. Park 
 
 I'. Sheehan 
 
 Matthowson r. Burr 
 
 Matthis V. State 
 
 Mattice r. Allen 
 
 Mattison r. Chicago, &c. 11. U 
 
 Mattox r. U. S. 
 
 Mauernian r. Siemerts 
 
 May I-. State 
 
 Mayer v. Dean 
 
 Mayes i\ State 
 
 ()2-2' 
 <J78', 1)78', l>78ii 
 
 12i:H" 
 
 :5:)8«, 86*1 
 
 257'», 257*' 
 
 (522-" 
 
 4oa« 
 
 808-' 
 
 368" 
 
 l8:'.i 
 
 808^" 
 
 3'JP'- 
 
 470' 
 
 470- 
 
 257^' 
 
 27011 
 
 IKll" 
 
 808'i 
 
 3t;5iJ 
 
 257" 
 
 2120^ 21-!' 
 
 4631* 
 
 5218, 1179",! 1791'' 
 
 183f, 183', 183* 
 
 55411 
 
 635' 
 
 978*^ 
 
 078^'-', 978^'« 
 
 427« 
 
 McKelry 
 
 122017 
 588'ii 
 463'' 
 910*' 
 
 122954 
 183*' 
 3:tiai 
 183<'' 
 078»- 
 358'-« 
 :•.'.» 1*' 
 622'', 022' 
 
 Mayhew v. Thayer t)78»», 978" 
 
 Mavo V. Dwitjlit 808''» 
 
 — ■- /•. Foley 62216 
 
 Mayor, «&c. of Baltimore c. State 21* 
 
 Mayor, &c. of N. Y. i>. Second Ave. 
 
 K. B. Co. 4031", 4(5,'}32 
 
 Maysville, &c. K. U. v. Pellani 808« 
 
 Maxham c. Place 022* 
 
 Maxwell 1: Hill 39H* 
 
 V. Wilkinson 978", 078" 
 
 McAllister c. McAllister 122yii» 
 
 McAmore v. Wiley 910^, 910", 910", 910". 
 
 OlO-"" 
 McAndrews v. Santee 
 McBride c. People 
 MeCall V. U. S. 
 McCiiniant r. Boberts 
 Mc(*artee v. Camel 
 McCarthy c. Burtis 
 McCarty v. Coffin 
 McCathern r. Bell 
 McCausland r. Fleming 
 McColloch r. Gore 
 McClaugherty c. Cooper 
 MeClerkin c. State 
 Mc(;io8key r. Davis 
 McCUui'e f. Pursell 
 McComl)s I'. Foster 
 McCormick c. Cheevers 
 
 V. Ilerndon 
 
 M'C^orinick r. Sisson 
 McCrady v. Jones 
 McCraw v. Gentry 
 McCrcary i'. Turk 
 M'Creary v. Grundy 
 McCullock c. Dobson 
 M'Cutcheon i-. M'Cutclieon 
 McDaniel c. State 
 McDonald v. Carnes 
 
 V. Com. 
 
 V. 'i)eCairl 
 
 c. McDonald 
 
 I'. Sa'-oy 
 
 I'. Unaka Timber Co. 
 
 V. Western R. R. 
 
 McDonough r. O'Neil 
 McDowell V. Preston 
 McICIninrray v. 'I'urner 
 MclClwee Mfn. Co. v. Trowbridge 
 McEweii /'. Portland 
 
 r. Shannon 
 
 McFarland r. Fricks 
 
 W)8i» : r. Shaw 
 
 257-'^ 1 McGhee, &e. Co. r. Hudson 
 21-'', 52" McGibl)on r. Burpee 
 8081' I i'!i'(Jinne8s v. Kennedy 
 257''^ McGinnis v. Allison 
 978<« MjGrath v. Seagrave 
 -^ 978"* McGregor v. Hudson 
 
 808» II. McArthur 
 
 470' r. Montgomery 
 
 52' I V. Wait 
 
 6881', 588« 978i« 1 McGuire v. People 
 
 80821 i I.. Sayward 
 
 891" 1 McHargue v. Com. 
 
 554- 
 4701* 
 4121 
 
 ino'i 
 
 183'» 
 1179^7 
 
 257''3, 257'" 
 
 8081' 
 
 41211 
 
 978'>' 
 
 1170 » 
 
 117911 
 
 270' 
 
 27iii 
 
 1229^' 
 
 808" 
 
 808i:» 
 
 62'' 
 
 3581-' 
 
 12297 
 
 358* 
 
 257** 
 
 978"' 
 
 257''-' 
 
 257'\ 257*' 
 
 463''' 
 
 257''« 
 
 21'^' 
 
 1229", 1229 •* 
 
 2578* 
 
 391" 
 
 21»" 
 183^" 
 
 554* 
 
 55411 
 
 183^* 
 
 910i« 
 
 117919, 1179^-' 
 
 470' 
 
 2136, 276^ 
 
 36817 
 
 8081'' 
 
 1229'« 
 
 1179«'> 
 
 3916'> 
 
 257-'' 
 
 358*' 
 
 122'.r-!i' 
 
 9106, giO-**, 910^' 
 
 1179«« 
 
 470» 
 
 ■['■■' ill 
 
 ■ IS 
 
 '?.il 
 
 ■ itiE 
 
 ■ I 
 
 i'f 
 
 i 
 
 
hi 
 
 CCXXXVIU 
 
 McHugh V. Dowd 
 
 r. (iallaKlicr 
 
 Melntire v. Lvvcring 
 Mfliitotili V. I^e 
 Mclnlurfr. >State 
 
 AMERICAN TABLE OP CASES. 
 References are to psRei- 
 
 21 
 8080 
 
 267^ « 
 21JU 
 
 3itl'» 
 588» 
 
 McKi-e V. I'eople 
 
 McKeitfiie r. .Janeavillo 301*«, SOls*, JV.Il ••' 
 
 McKeii/ie r. Sln-tcli 
 McKiMtiii* ('. Hariics 
 McKicI i;. Ueal Estate Bank 
 McKiriley t: Irvine 
 McKinney r. Nuil 
 McKinnon r. Bligg 
 
 c. NorcroKit 
 
 McKivi'tt V. Cone 
 McLane r. Juhnson 
 McLaiiglilin v. McDevitt 
 McLean i-. Clark 
 
 r. McDont'll 
 
 r. Stale 
 
 Mcl^llaii i: liicliardson 
 
 27f 
 
 120.J4,-. 
 
 •21 lit 
 
 1221)"' 
 
 P78«, il78''« 
 
 21'«, ;!r)8-! 
 
 978», U78" 
 8()«'| 
 
 8()8-!i 
 
 117!H-! 
 
 470", 470'', iilO''' 
 
 322-1 
 
 31)11' 
 
 McLi-od V. Ginther's Atlni. 31)li', .iDl^ 
 McMaster i-. Scriven 0221'' 
 
 Me.Matli v. Slate 31)l<^ 3l)l<» 
 
 McMillan v. Baxlev 3r)8-i 
 
 SlcMurray v. St. Louis Oil Co. m»^'' 
 
 McMiirrin r. Hi^by 3'Jl", SW 
 
 McXeely r. Duff <J78i 
 
 McNeil V. 0'(.'<)nnor 427- 
 
 McNeill V. Donoliue 1)58' 
 
 McNerney i". Heiidinfr U78''i 
 
 McXicliol V. I'aciHc Ex. Co. 21-« 
 
 McNutt r. McDonald f)u4- 
 
 M'Xutt r. Young 2&7'" 
 
 Md'hail v. Johns*.. i)78<'' 
 
 Mcl'licrson r. State 47()H 
 
 McQueen v. People's Bank 270- 
 
 V. State 47011 
 
 McQuigan r. Delaware, &c. H. H. Stiu" 
 McKeynolds v. Longenberger 3581-, 
 
 122yii, 122!)--' 
 McSliane, Henry, Co. )•. I'adian 808' 
 
 McTapgart f. Tlionipson 31)1^' 
 
 ~ " " 1229", 1221)17 
 
 022-!'' 
 
 9101- 
 
 5541 
 
 6221 
 
 1221)1- 
 
 89M 
 
 1220''3, 1221) « 
 
 403", 4C.:'.i'' 
 
 5r.4' 
 
 078'i 
 
 1221)''" 
 
 1221)1* 
 
 808-'''' 
 
 ^);!5^ ():!•)•' 
 
 ii7yi», 1171)-" 
 
 214 
 808'^ 
 
 21 1« 
 8(»8-5 
 3f.8i3 
 391^ 
 
 McVieker t: Conkle 
 Meade v. Smith 
 Mealer i-. State 
 Mears r. (Cornwall 
 Mechelke v. Branier 
 Meilary r. Catliers 
 Medley r. I'eople 
 Meihvay i: U. S. 
 Meeth /•. Hankin Brick Co. 
 Meguire r. Corwiue 
 Meixsell »•. Freezor 
 Melby r. Osborne & Co. 
 Melclier r. Flanders 
 Mellish c. Tiobertson 
 Melton V. State 
 Melvin v. Lyons 
 Merchants' Bank l: Hall 
 
 r. Mc,\n\ilty 
 
 r. .McOraw 
 
 r. .Morrison 
 
 Mercier v. Harnnn 
 Merkle t-. Bennington 
 
 Merrifleld i\ Robbing 52'8, 1179i''» 
 
 Merrill v. Dawson 21 '« 
 
 I'. Ithaca, &c. R. R. 078«, 978i' 
 
 Merritt v. Straw 1221)" 
 
 Mcrshon i'. State 2f')7'"' 
 
 Merwin r. Arbuckle oDH'' 
 
 r. Ward 183'^' 
 
 Mewster I'. Spalding inD"" 
 
 Meyer v. School District 1179« 
 
 Miami Turnpike (^o. v. Baily 365*, 3(!i'i", 
 
 Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co. t: Wil- 
 liams 808>s 
 Middleton v. Mass. 1229-'6 
 Miles i: Edelen 2i 
 
 r. Loomis 1220)», 1220f'M220n8, 1229<'« 
 
 Miller v. Brown 207"* 
 
 - r. Davis 8()8'» 
 
 i: Fletcher 8(i8» 
 
 i: Goodrich, &c. Co. 808' 
 
 iniH**, 1179^9. 11 7i)'» 
 
 y. Hale 
 I'. Jones 
 r. MacN'oagh 
 r. Miller 
 V. I'almer 
 r. I'roctor 
 I'. Heinhurt 
 r. Shay 
 
 183-', 1229''", 122!)«;* 
 
 21''i, 621", r.2ii 
 
 808''*' 
 
 808* 
 
 18:;« 
 
 1179" 
 
 4fl3>«. 4ti3i« 
 
 State 257'-, 4709, 470i«, 5546^ 5}<8'^ 
 
 1: Texas, &e. Hy. 
 
 Millington r. Millington 
 
 Million r. Com. 
 
 Mills r. Duryec 
 
 Millsaps I). Merchant's, &u. Bank 
 
 Milniine r. Burnliam 
 
 Mima Queen r. Hepburn 
 
 Minis r. Sturdevant 
 
 r. Swartz 
 
 Minchin v. Minchin 
 Mink r. State 
 Minneapolis, &c. 1{. R. 
 
 Co. 
 Minneapolis Times Co, 
 Minnesota r. Barber 
 Minor i-. Tillotson 
 Mississippi, &c. R. R 
 Missouri, &c. R. R. v. 
 
 r. (Jcrnan 
 
 r. Johnson 
 
 Mitchell r. Bridgers 
 
 r. Kingman 
 
 I', Sawyer 
 
 Mitelium v. State 
 
 Mobile, &o. Ins. Co. v. McMillan 
 
 Mobile, &c. K. R. r. Aslicraft 
 
 21:14 
 
 1229'»' 
 
 470>« 
 
 1171)19 
 
 808« 
 
 808« 
 
 ;;!)|ai 
 
 978'1 
 
 2V, 21» 
 
 8fl8-« 
 
 622''» 
 
 Home Ins. 
 
 808', 808" 
 
 Niniocks 3.'J8'5 
 
 21'« 
 
 358' 
 
 m\-» 
 
 3!'1« 
 
 35819 
 
 305", 301" 
 
 1179'W 
 
 808« 
 
 JI78» 
 
 391", 3919 
 
 808' 
 
 257 "> 
 
 . i". Arispe 
 Cocreham 
 
 & Birmingham R. 
 
 Mohile 
 Lndd 
 Mobley r. Hamit 
 Moekahee v. Com. 
 Modawell r. Holmes 
 iMoffct V. Moflet 
 Mottiii V. yEtna Axle, &c. Co. 
 MofHt ''. Miiness 
 
 I'. Witherspoon 
 
 Moline-Milburn Co. i'. Franklin 
 
 R. ('. 
 
 2129, SH" 
 
 257''9 
 
 470'" 
 
 21'" 
 
 270'^ 
 
 218* 
 
 8088 
 
 427* 
 
 257."» 
 
 k 
 
% 
 
 AMERICAN TAlUiK OF CASES. 
 
 CCXXXIX 
 
 M 
 
 Referenvea 
 
 Moline I'low Co. r. Hrnilun '21H' 
 
 Molyneaux r. Ccillk-r 554', 554" 
 
 Moimlmi. -•. Worcfstur 257«, HUH" 
 
 Mcmuy I'. Turniiiseeil '■il-^ 
 
 Montee r. Com. 5'2i 
 
 MDiitfortonw. Bondit 808" 
 
 MontBomcry r. Allun 554' 
 
 i;. Hevaiis ISo**' 
 
 w. Dt'cley '<il' 
 
 ,,.. PickLTiMR 622"' 
 
 r. Suhockey W)«-^' 
 
 r. State 470». 470'* 
 
 Moiitj?omery's Case 470'- 
 
 Montjoy r. Sttito '21-"' 
 
 Moody y. Rowell 078-'", 0783', 97888, 1229''' 
 MootTS v. Blinker 427'' 
 
 MooK V. Randolph 21"' 
 
 Mooney c. Kennctt 21"' 
 
 V. Olsen 391« 30H' 
 
 'J78'- 
 
 554" 
 
 52'^ 52i« 
 
 122'.)'" 
 
 80H-!' 
 
 are to p>K«i. 
 
 Mosli-y I,'. Ins. Co. 
 
 r. Vernioiit, &c. Ins. Co, 
 
 M(>!i!i V. (ireen 
 
 Mobsman c. Forrest 
 
 Mowell i». Van Biiren 
 
 Muditill Miniii^ Co. r. Watr(>U8 
 
 Muldoon ('. Delinu 
 
 Muliiado V. Brooklyn City R. U 
 
 y iillanphy Sav. Bank r. Scliott ;!58» ;i.".M'« 
 
 Adillun r. Morris 1170'-, 117'.»"« 
 
 Moore r. Chicago R. R. Co. 
 
 c. Gaus 
 
 ■ I', (iwynn 
 
 ('. Faliner 
 
 V. Hush 
 
 I!. Smead 
 
 V. State 
 
 V. U. S. 
 
 1'. Wingate 
 
 Moorman r. Collier 
 Mora I). People 
 Mordeuai i'. Bcal 
 Morehead v, State 
 MofL'land v. Lawrence 
 Morelock r. State 
 Morey v. Iloyt 
 Morgan v. Burrow 
 
 V. People 
 
 I'. I'lirnell 
 
 V. Roberts 
 
 V. State 257''' 
 
 80K' 
 
 470S 470i«, 470H 
 
 1220^-, 122U"" 
 
 022' 
 
 80K-» 
 
 470*, 58H' 
 
 358^ 358", 3o8'» 
 
 257*' 
 
 470"' 
 
 358" 
 
 21-'" 
 
 358"' 
 
 427'', 427«, 427"-' 
 
 ItlO" 
 
 , 257'«», 257'", 257^, 
 
 470-', 470", 470'' 
 
 654-' 
 
 427-i 
 
 39 1*' 
 
 427* 
 
 403", 463>'', 4(i.}"' 
 1: Columbian, &c. l)ock_,Co. 1)78> 
 1: Davidson 21" 
 
 c. Edwards 21*" 
 
 V. Leesee of Ilarmcr 21''^ 
 
 Morrell c Cawley 
 
 V. Foster 
 
 V. Morgan 
 
 Morrill c. Foster 
 
 r. Graham 
 
 Morris r. Briggs 
 
 (». Patclim 
 
 i>. Wadsworth 
 
 Morrison v. Dolorimier 
 
 ('. Jackson 
 
 V. Sturges 
 
 Morrissey v. Ingham 
 Morrow v. Parkman 
 Morse i-. Congdon 
 
 V. Kice 
 
 V. Weymouth 
 
 1: W( odworth 
 
 Morss V. Morss 
 Morton v. State 
 Moseley'B Adm'r v. Mnstin 
 
 117!)-!" 
 
 117'J''' 
 
 H78-'* 
 
 358", 358", :'.58-'J 
 
 2W 
 
 122!)- 
 .Sltl'"' 
 910" 
 
 408" 
 808" 
 52'i 
 358'" 
 910'" 
 391*" 
 
 21^5 
 
 21«T 
 257* 
 
 622', 022" 
 257 •» 
 b08" 
 305> 
 
 \iuller 1;. Dows 
 
 r. St. Louis Hospital Ass'n 
 
 Miillery v. Hamilton 
 Munn c. Burch 
 Muiins ('. Diipont 
 Miinroe v. Douglass 
 Munsbower r. State 
 Miirphey v. State 
 .Murphy v. Com. 
 
 1: Hendricks 
 
 IK People 
 
 I'. State 
 
 Murray r. Lcpper 
 
 I'. Marsh 
 
 i: Murray 
 
 I'. Polglase 
 
 Muse V. Richards 
 Musick r. Barney 
 Mutual Life, &c. v 
 
 V. Hillman 
 
 V. Robinson 
 
 0. Tillman 
 
 Myer c. Grafflin 
 Myers c. Carrie 
 
 r. Knabe 
 
 Mynatt t;. Hudson 
 Myron v. Union R 
 
 lH:tii» 
 
 978'i» 
 
 427* 
 
 21* 
 
 122i>' 
 
 52'' 
 
 21W uno 
 
 978-'* 
 
 022^ 
 
 21--i 
 
 588', 588"'' 
 
 688*, 5885, 5aa", 978'^ 
 
 1h;J-» 
 
 1179'* 
 
 iss'"', i8a*'> 
 11795 
 
 2)23 
 
 117!»"i 
 
 427* 
 
 391*'^ 
 
 21-w 
 
 403-" 
 257*' 
 30ia» 
 267** 
 808'» 
 
 Blodgett 
 
 R. 
 
 Xaanks v. State IHO** 
 
 N'ason v. .Jordan 358'* 
 
 National Bank, &c. i-. Gray 1229« 
 
 V. McManigle 183"''> 
 
 National Car, &c. Builder c. Cyclone, 
 
 &c. Co. 8081 
 
 National Cash Hog. v. Pfister 808", 808-'i 
 National Ulster Co. Bankr. Madden 978'' 
 Naiimberg v. Young 808*, 808"', 808'* 
 Neaderhouser r. State 
 Neal V. Neal 
 
 r. Patten 
 
 Neeb v. McMillan 
 
 Neese v. Farmers Ins. Co. 
 
 Nelnis V. State 
 Nelson r. Becker 
 
 i\ Davis 
 
 /•. Ladd 
 
 r. State 
 
 r. Weeks 
 
 Nesliit i". State 
 Nesbitt r. Cavonder 
 Neville v. Northcutt 
 Nevin V. Ladue 
 Newcoinb i-. Griswold 
 
 V Wallace 
 
 Newell V. Newton 
 
 12293' 
 
 2i« 
 
 978^< 
 
 622" 
 
 978*1 
 
 21» 
 
 1229t« 
 
 022" 
 
 h08-''> 
 
 21^4 
 
 62>, 9781*, 078 « 
 
 808" 
 470'» 
 808i» 
 4(i:!» 
 21 "• 
 978*'> 
 808-'* 
 
 ai-'s 
 
 1 I 
 fl 
 
 IH 
 
ocxl 
 
 AMEUICAN TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 References 
 
 Newell I'. Nichols 183'" 
 
 Ni'wliiill -. AppU-tun liij7'' 
 
 r. Ji'iikins 6SH" 
 
 New Hiivfii Co. r. Goodwin 403-', 40.!"' 
 Ni'w Httveii County Hank r. Milclicll 18:5» 
 
 Now Jersey, &e. (yti. i: Suydiun 117'.»*'' 
 
 Newman r. l)od^oll oOl*'' 
 
 I'. Jenkins Wi^ 
 
 New Miit'ord u. Slierman 81)1*' 
 
 New Portland r. Kinjjfield 978*' 
 
 Newg I'nh. Co. r. Huiier !t7«*' 
 
 New York Dry Dock >: Iliiks 117!)»' 
 N. Y. Mutual, &c. Ins. 
 8tron); 
 
 are to psges. 
 
 ' Oideyer r. Dernlieim 
 i Olive c. State 
 j Oliver r. I'ate 
 Oinistead r. Hill 
 
 V. Wlnsted 15ank 
 
 I Olson r. IVterson 
 
 j Omnium Securities Co. v. liieliard- 
 
 ! son 
 
 < >pj)enlieiin i'. Wolf 
 
 Ordway r. Conroe 
 1 r. Havnes 
 
 808« 
 2f)7-'>' 
 
 2< 
 
 •.t78-'» 
 
 u54" 
 
 •2\" 
 
 117'.)-i, 117!»'' 
 
 '.•78i« 
 
 Nicliols r. Ilaynes 
 
 r. Vinson 
 
 r. Webl) 
 
 Nickerson r. Uouhl 
 
 f. Spindell 
 
 Niles V. Spra^ue 
 Nixon r. McKinney 
 
 V. I'aliner 
 
 Noble I'. DoiiKlass 
 
 Norfolk, &c. H. H. c. Uroscclosc 
 
 Norman v. Waite 
 
 Norris r. Cargill 
 
 r. Harris 
 
 V. Ins. Co. 
 
 North Hank v. Abbot 
 North Hrooktield r. Warren 
 
 Co. f. Arni- 
 
 257 1» 
 
 40:!'' 
 
 40.;" 
 
 4t)3-» 
 218^ -21 H' 
 
 IJoM'' 
 
 117!>=" 
 
 iJ57« 267*', 2.-)7<i 
 
 IK'.'i 
 
 < )ret;on Steamship Co. i-. Otis IK)''', ;!r)8i» 
 
 117'.!'.! 
 
 am-' 
 
 1178'^' 
 
 62". 52'- 
 
 27tl" 
 
 4.MI" 
 
 427^ 427", 
 
 427» 
 
 Northern Pac. U. U. r. Urlin n78-'«, 078" 
 
 Nis'tliwestern Fuel (.'o. v. UruuH. 8(18'', 
 
 H)8'' 
 Northwestern M'f'g Co. i-. Chambers 21 J" 
 Northrop, The 
 Northrop c. Hale 
 
 Norton r. Ladd 
 
 r. Perkins 
 
 Norvell r. McHenry 
 Norwood i: Kentield 
 Noyes V. Ward 
 Nunes i*. Perry 
 Nunne v. Mayes 
 Nut© V. Nute 
 Nye V. McDonald 
 
 Orinan c. State 
 < )rr r. Lacy 
 Orton r. McCord 
 Osborne v. Allen 
 
 V. Forshee 
 
 r. Stringhnm 
 
 Ostrander r. .Snyder 
 Otey c. Hoyt 
 OttV. Soulard 
 Over r. Schiitling 
 Owen V. Boyle 
 Owens r. Hull 
 
 S()8" 
 
 427 
 
 2P' 
 
 427', 427«, 427\ 427", 
 , 427>'', 427''' 
 1)10", IIIO'J 
 
 <J78" 
 
 078-'«, ft7K«' 
 412" 
 
 r22r"' 
 
 427''' 
 
 078" 
 
 Jl» 
 
 Oak Leather Co, v. Union Bi.nk 52'^ 
 Oakes V. Harrison 270'', 27tli» 
 
 Oaks.'. Weller 18:1''^ 
 
 Ohert'. nialock TO' 
 
 O'HIenis r. State 2ft7'* 
 
 O'Hricn v. Com. 2A7''' 
 
 I'. Frasier 257"* 
 
 r, Krockinski 21^-' 
 
 Ocean Ins. Co. r. Fields 21" 
 
 O'Connor -. Chicago, &c. U. R. n!)l"' 
 
 Odiorne r. Hacon IK".!'-'' 
 
 Ohio iv liinchman 21'' 
 
 Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Delmlt 21», 21 ^ 
 
 Ohio « Miss. U. li r. Wlie«ler IHH'" 
 
 Ohio K.Co. r. Hidge 21'-' 
 
 Ohlert V. Alderson 808-' 
 
 v. Kansas City, &c. K, K. 
 
 I'. State 
 
 Owers r. Olatlie Co. 
 < >wing8 r. Siwed 
 
 Pahst HnEwiKO Co. v. Smith 
 PaclHu Iron Works ••. Newhall 
 Packard r. Dunsmore 
 
 r. Hill 1179''^, 
 
 Paddock v, Salisbury 
 Page i: Osgood 
 
 r. Parker 
 
 Pagett r. Curtis 
 Paige f. Carter 
 Paine r. Sclieiiectady 
 Palmer r. Aldridge 
 
 V. Atchison, &c. H. R. 
 
 V. Haight 
 
 c. State 
 
 I ..ncake i'. Cauffman 
 
 Pa|)e I'. Wright 
 
 Pajiin I', Hyan 
 
 Parent c. Walmsley's Adm 
 
 I'arish r. Pcrliam 
 
 Parke '•. Mears 
 
 Parker r. Carter 
 
 022' 
 
 218 
 
 622^ 022* 
 
 18*'* 
 
 '.»78'» 
 
 808-8 
 
 8(18" 
 
 12-J!M* 
 
 21" 
 
 2' 
 
 529, 521.1, 5214 
 
 21'^', 21'" 
 
 3ti5i'.«. 
 Htiu'a 
 »t78'a 
 ;{58-» 
 
 117!)" 
 
 1170" 
 
 808' 
 
 122!l'6 
 
 11 7»"' 
 
 2573'' 
 
 270H 
 
 r. Cleveland 
 
 r. Davis 
 
 i: F.iikIow 
 
 r. Hardy 
 
 IV Logan 
 
 r. State 
 
 Parkhiirst r. Mctirnw 
 
 I-. Van Coiirllandt 
 
 Purkinson .'. Nashua 
 Parliman r. Young 
 I'arsons i . State 
 Partin v. State 
 Patcheii V. Park 
 
 391», 801»\ 3'Jl'", »78« 
 
 21« 
 
 078', 'J78». 078T 
 
 21" 
 
 »» 
 
 52" 
 
 078'» 
 
 588a> 
 
 8»(8'» 
 
 267" 
 
 21« 
 
 21' 
 
 8088 
 
 1220' 
 
 022*, 022' ', 022'^ 
 
 022>«, 022'» 
 
 1170« 
 
 m«a 
 
 8tt0» 
 2« 
 
 808*> 
 
 oio», nic, oioi«, ".(78-''< 
 
 18;J^«, 022' 
 
 867* 
 
 «8A« 
 010* 
 
 078" 
 
1 
 
 
 AMKUICAN TABLE OF CASKS. 
 
 
 ccxll 
 
 
 
 Refereucea 
 
 tre to pages. 
 
 
 
 Patrick t-.Oibbs 
 
 
 1170-!' 
 
 People f. Denby 
 
 
 978<-^ 
 
 r. Ilallutt 
 
 
 626 
 
 r. Devines 
 
 
 QW^, 97a'» 
 
 V. Ji;ck 
 
 
 4U3X 
 
 f. Dillwdud 
 
 
 y7«'», 978'" 
 
 rutti'ii c. (ilover 
 
 
 C22'' 
 
 c. Diniock 
 
 
 267" 
 
 c. Moor 
 
 
 622i« 
 
 V. Diiliring 
 
 
 910's, 910"* 
 
 I'atlurson /•. Com. 
 
 
 C3u« 
 
 V. Klyeu 
 
 
 978'^ 
 
 ('. M'(':ni!i|iiii(l 
 
 
 21'i» 
 
 i: Ksirado 
 
 
 688* 
 
 Tattison r. Xorris 
 
 
 564'" 
 
 V. Kiting 
 
 
 21'-' 
 
 I'livey <•. I'livi'y 
 
 
 122i»*- 
 
 r. Kvans 
 
 257- 
 
 "i, 0.16\ U36< 
 
 I'awasliick, Tlic 
 
 
 62», I17!i'' 
 
 r. F.verliardc 
 
 
 267'' 
 
 I'ayiie '•. rr.atlwi'll 
 
 21 
 
 ■^1, -Jl-", 18:;:" 
 
 /•. Fair 
 
 
 267-'>', 267 "• 
 
 c. Troy & Uoston 
 
 K. U. 
 
 6J« 
 
 V. Flyini 
 
 
 688'- 
 
 I'fttcf r. .Ii'iikiiis 
 
 
 •l.Vi' 
 
 r. Fulton Fire Ins. 
 
 Co. 
 
 427- 
 
 IVH^ler r. Stablus 
 
 
 8(m'" 
 
 r. (iarl)Utt 
 
 
 270'',27(i''' 
 
 Peak V. State 
 
 
 470" 
 
 r. (ilenn 
 
 470 
 
 ,47(K', 47(1'- 
 
 IVarl I'.All.n 
 
 
 122'.>', 122U'^ 
 
 r. (ioiiilaicz 
 
 368', 
 
 Mii\ 305-!J 
 
 IVargon r. Darrington 
 
 
 o,»i*', 3!)r" 
 
 r. (irahani 
 
 
 978^ 
 
 I'euk c. Bi'ckwitli 
 
 
 Ht)«-< 
 
 f. (ireen 
 
 
 978i'i 
 
 r. Clark 
 
 
 412" 
 
 r. (irunxig 
 
 
 470", 470'» 
 
 1'. .Icniitoii 
 
 
 80«''> 
 
 r, Ilanifan 
 
 
 'J78M 
 
 r. I'ieroo 
 
 
 4<i3i ' 
 
 r. Ilawes 
 
 
 47U1 
 
 i: IJitcliey 
 
 
 978^*, U78'« 
 
 r. Haves 
 
 
 6224 
 
 V. Kyan 
 
 
 654'' 
 
 r. IlitV 
 
 
 078™ 
 
 V. Valt'iitiiie 1(53 
 
 -^978>, 1)78'. 'J7H" 
 
 
 
 391*', 470'^ 
 
 IVek c. ISooiiu 
 
 
 622" 
 
 r. Hoy Vea 
 
 
 688-" 
 
 Tell r. Hall 
 
 
 IKlw 
 
 
 
 022 •' 
 
 I'ultier'.s ("age 
 
 
 21" 
 
 r. Hiilbut 
 
 
 022-' 
 
 IVltoii c. Scliiiiidt 
 
 
 f)*-)!' 
 
 r. Jacobs 
 
 
 07h« 
 
 Pelzer M'f'n Co. /• Sun Fin- 
 
 Office 3r.M-' 
 
 /•. dolir 
 
 
 21"' 
 
 I'eiit'f r. MakepcaLv 
 
 
 ;).'.4'' 
 
 r. Jtnu'g 
 
 
 267" 
 
 r. \Vaiij:li 
 
 
 (CJ.JIH 
 
 V. Koeley 
 
 
 078'-^ 
 
 Penitentiary ('o. r. (iordon 
 
 27(l'» 
 
 c, Keith 
 
 
 078^' 
 
 Penn. Co. v. Coiilan 
 
 
 62^ 
 
 r. Kennedy 
 
 
 978' 
 
 1'. Dolan 
 
 
 8(>8-- 
 
 i\ Knapp 
 
 
 267-' 
 
 1'. Ilorton 
 
 
 21-' 
 
 i: Knickerbocker 
 
 
 470" 
 
 c. Ncwiiieyer 
 
 Penn. U. It. r. Lyons 
 
 3(J6«, 30 J", 07H-''' 
 
 V. j.antbert 
 
 
 62" 
 
 
 391'" 
 
 r. Langtree 
 
 
 010^' 
 
 Pinn, l{. K. Co. v. Uitf' 
 
 Icr 
 
 o2^' 
 
 i\ J<iii/.ey 
 
 OIC 
 
 , 910«, 910-=» 
 
 Pengiiolii K. U. c. ScliuJIir 
 
 :56H''' 
 
 
 
 267^" 
 
 People r. Allien 
 
 
 117'.i»' 
 
 r. Macliiin 
 
 
 »7.'S'» 
 
 r. AnderMon 
 
 
 DTK*' 
 
 r. Mackinder 
 
 
 (•.88* 
 
 '•. Atkinson 
 
 
 C22'', 022 '• 
 
 r. Mather 
 
 
 978-', 978Jn 
 
 1'. Austin 
 
 
 97«''-' 
 
 c. Matleiiiui 
 
 
 Slid'' 
 
 f. Darric 
 
 
 ()><8'< 
 
 c. McConnel 
 
 
 ■2\u 
 
 1'. HarriiiKcr 
 
 
 H(»«' 
 
 1'. McCrea 
 
 
 39 iw 
 
 r. Itidilli'inan 
 
 
 122'.t'^' 
 
 c. McCloin 
 
 
 688i» 
 
 c. Ulakeley 
 
 
 122" 
 
 — — c. M'tiarren 
 
 910", 
 
 910'-, 910'« 
 
 V. noscovitoh 
 
 978" 
 
 ', 97H---', 078-' 
 
 — ^ 1'. Mi'Nair 
 
 
 {)W^ 
 
 — — »'. Ilrooks 
 
 
 21", 97K'- 
 
 1'. MeC^uaid 
 
 62^, 621'. 62" 
 
 I'. Miiclianan 
 
 
 (122". U7H*' 
 
 ^-— r. Mexervey 
 
 
 391 X 
 
 i\ Hiiddentieck 
 
 305 
 
 , .'Kri'", Jldo'" 
 
 r. Mcthvin 
 
 
 2.-.7*« 
 
 c. KiimIi 
 
 
 2.'.; ■" 
 
 r. Mills 
 
 257"* 
 
 267'", 978M 
 
 I'. Carney 
 
 c. Caiisiily 
 
 
 8('i.'>', ."iCitV' 
 
 r. Miiick 
 
 
 IK'.H* 
 
 
 68H-* 
 
 r. Moelt 
 
 
 26 r" 
 
 
 
 68H''"' 
 
 •'. Murphy 
 
 
 978'' 
 
 ^— ('. (^llllKC 
 
 
 470" 
 
 r. o'llrien 
 
 
 tl!!6» 
 
 
 
 2 1.- aii.. 
 
 r. O'Neil 
 
 
 o:i.V 
 
 V. Clarke 
 
 
 688'" 
 
 »', o'Sullivan 
 
 
 267^301«' 
 
 
 
 978'" 
 
 
 
 lt78li« 
 
 
 
 OiniJ, <(78«'' 
 
 i: Park 
 
 
 01(K»I 
 
 
 
 1229". 122'.f^' 
 
 r. Parker 
 
 
 122'.»-' 
 
 i: r\ist<>llo 
 
 
 036', (13.'i* 
 
 r. Parlon 
 
 
 68«« 
 
 1'. Court 
 
 
 »78''' 
 
 
 
 470" 
 
 — — 1'. Daniels 
 
 
 r^HH' 
 
 (• Pinckney 
 
 
 122(»*» 
 
 
 267 
 
 ". 267*', i-(y 
 
 V. Poller 
 
 
 21« 
 
 :> I' 
 
coxlii 
 
 AMERICAN TAULE OP CASES. 
 Beforencei are to pages. 
 
 People 1'. Quanstrom 910"* 
 
 V. liainiruz 688>«, 588i'' 
 
 r. Ufutor, &c. of Trinity Cliurcii ITM'^ 
 
 Kubinson 
 
 Uoilerigaa 
 
 Saflbrd 
 
 Saiiclii-z 
 
 Sclir^vcT 
 
 Suvuraiice 
 
 8liva 
 
 .Siniongen 
 
 Siiiipsuii 
 
 Skeulian 
 
 Kiiiitli 
 
 S(»ti) 
 
 St()ke8 
 V. Strybe 
 V. Supirior Court of N. Y 
 
 Siitlierland 
 
 'I'lirall 
 
 Tyler 
 
 Vernon 
 
 Wells 
 
 Went/, 
 
 Westbrook 
 
 White 
 
 c. Williiims 
 
 V. Woleott 
 
 — • 1'. Wooil 
 
 r. Yduiik 
 
 I'eiiria. &i:. It. \i. v. Riee 
 I'epper c. Barnett 
 
 r. 
 
 V. 
 
 i: 
 i\ 
 
 V. 
 
 r. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 
 ■ V. 
 
 r. 
 
 ■ f. 
 
 688" 
 
 6»»''< 
 
 1)78'': 
 
 4"0'J 
 
 270' 
 
 122'J»' 
 
 SUV 
 688" 
 470« 
 
 978-" 
 
 •J 10' 
 
 , &88*' 
 
 18;{' 
 
 2* 
 
 978'^ 
 
 088" 
 
 2&7"» 
 
 3911'', 47(»^ 
 
 o;J5> 
 
 688\ 588" 
 
 Ultl-"' 
 
 2r)7--i>', 2->7''« 
 
 21'">, U78*> 
 fihS'x, 688''' 
 
 ;wi« 
 
 (122-'-'i 
 
 Phillips V. Kelly 39I»« 
 
 V. People 257«6, 267'« 
 
 V. State (i;{5« 
 
 V. Trowbridge Furniture Co. 308", 
 
 Pho'iiix Ins. Co. v. Moog 
 Plia-nix Pub. Co. Riverside v 
 iiig Co. 
 
 St)"." 
 
 P22iP, P22'.l-*, 
 
 122',>=", 1220- 
 
 Perdicaris v. Trenton City Bridge 
 
 Perfi iling r. State 
 Perkins c. Concord R. R. 
 
 /•. W\.8t 
 
 Perrin r. State 
 
 I'errv c Dubuque S. W. R. Co. 
 
 ■/•. Hill 
 
 r. MiiHiiey 
 
 — — c. Moore 
 
 r. New Orleans, &c. R. Co. 
 
 — r. Newton 
 '•. Riindidl 
 
 21'* 
 
 3m^' 
 
 39 F', f>or, 
 
 5.-)4", 654" 
 
 808''' 
 
 358" 
 2> 
 
 808" 
 978''" 
 978« 
 
 1229* 
 022', (122- 
 
 r, .Simpson Waterproof Mgt'. 
 
 Co. oiVl'* 
 
 i: State (122'«, f.22" 
 
 Peter r. TliickHtun 
 
 Pelerlioff, Tlie 
 
 IVterson, /•.'.!■ ixntf 
 
 Petemon c Morgan 2")7'''" 
 
 >: Slate 
 
 IVtrie r. Cohnnbia, &c. R. H. 
 
 l'eu>rli r. Davis 
 
 Peyroux r. llciward 
 
 I'lielan r. (iardner 
 
 Plienix, iV:!'. Ins. Co. c. Merchants, 
 
 &v. Ass'n 
 
 r. Sliopinaker 
 
 Philadi'lpliia r. Rule 
 Philadelpliiii, \i'. R. R. v. Lehman 
 
 391 •■' 
 217. .J|:ii 
 2r-M 
 
 2r,v^ 
 
 52" 
 
 391 -•' 
 
 808'" 
 
 21» 
 
 808-^' 
 
 858" 
 022' 
 3(I5'' 
 21" 
 
 I'iekard c. Bailey 
 Pierce i: De Long 
 
 I', lloffnian 
 
 I'. Indseth 
 
 i: Kimball 
 
 V. Newton 
 
 r. Nortliey 
 
 V. I'iercc 
 
 I'. State 
 
 Pierson v. Haiti 
 Pike V. Crehore 
 I'illard v. Dunn 
 I'illow V. Thomas 
 Pillsbury r. Locke 
 Pinkham v. Benton 
 
 V. Cockell 
 
 Pinney i.-. Jones 
 I'inney's Will 
 Pirie 1-. Wyld 
 Pitt t'. Kmniong 
 I'itts r. Allen 
 
 r. State 
 
 Pittsford V. Chittenu <m 
 I'iziirro, The 
 I'lank Road Co. v. Bruce 
 I'latt V. Ilaner 
 I'lummer v. Currier 
 
 r. Eastern R. R. 
 
 r. Ossipee 
 
 I'olk V. Bntterfleld 
 I'ollock r Pollock 
 
 V. Willcox 
 
 I'ool I-. Chase 
 I'orath V. State 
 Porter r. Hale 
 
 I'. ■Indson 
 
 V. State 978'", 
 
 r. WhIiz 
 
 I'. Waring 
 
 r. Wilson 
 
 PorlUKal, Church r 
 I'nst t'. Supervisors 
 I'otter r. Inhabitants of Ware 
 
 183» 183-^« 
 Cloth- 
 
 808 '♦ 
 
 62'», iivyi* 
 
 1221K'H 
 
 257" 
 
 21^, 2P', 52>' 
 
 21>» 
 
 257" 
 
 1229 '», 1 229*7 
 
 5648 
 
 521 
 
 21 '0 
 
 117i>^' 
 
 1225»w 
 
 02-2* 
 
 403'*, 4ti3"' 
 
 978* 
 
 122'.^'>', P229'" 
 
 39P 
 
 39D'> 
 
 f 54", 554» 
 
 3581" 
 
 808« 
 
 588-, 588" 
 
 (122'W 
 
 183« 
 
 183<« 
 
 11 TO" 
 
 654", 554'a 
 
 52* 
 
 267", 39ia« 
 
 52» 
 
 978'« 
 
 358'» 
 
 808»'> 
 
 035*, (135» 
 
 358-"" 
 
 21«, 403'» 
 
 )78", 9781" 
 
 391'' 
 
 Ilubbart 
 
 (', Stinipsoii 
 
 ;i91««, 978'W, 978''« 
 
 V. Mellin 
 
 I'lMigade r. \iyan 
 Powell r. Blat'kett 
 
 I', (idvernor 
 
 r. Tarry 
 
 1,1. Wnllace 
 
 power r. Howdlc 
 Powers V. McKenzio 
 — — r. Presgroves 
 
 21 1» 
 
 1229'^ft 
 
 2ii 
 
 1179''« 
 
 910". 
 
 910i« 
 
 6641 
 
 21" 
 
 122117 
 
 89 iw 
 
 6541 
 
 358» 
 
 2r» 
 
 1229<a 
 
 257«», 257W, 257«, 
 
 257*« 
 
 V. Rnssoll 
 
 Prairie School Township v. Ilnselen 
 
 808"', 808" 
 
AMKUlCAif TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 ccxliii 
 
 
 Befereucei are to page*. 
 
 
 Pratlier v. Palmer 
 
 183» 
 
 Ray V. DIackwell 
 
 808B 
 
 1-. WilkeiH 
 
 808" 
 
 r. l'a»tle 
 
 463'», HKi'-i 
 
 I'ratt r. Audrewg 
 
 207* 
 
 Ruynliam r. Canton 
 
 1170'^ 
 
 .•. LaiiKdoii 
 
 b08-« 
 
 Ray nor i: Lyons 
 
 b08"» 
 
 ,: Wliite 
 
 nii", dtia^' 
 
 Read i: Com. 
 
 022^ 
 
 rri'e|>t'r r. Keg. 
 
 52 •• 
 
 Real I'. I'eople 
 
 078«», •J7»'* 
 
 I'rell /'. McDonald 
 
 21" 
 
 A'e AsHignnient of Itca 
 
 :158" 
 
 I'rescott I'. Ward 
 
 a78<' 
 
 itedfleld /-. Gleason 
 
 808', 808'* 
 
 I'ricc r. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. 
 
 Co. 21W 
 
 Redlicli f. Daurlee 
 
 40:J>* 
 
 ('. Oarland 
 
 4t;3», 4(Wi'-» 
 
 Reed c. WiUon 
 
 2D, 2r-'» 
 
 r. Hiuliinond, &c. II. U. 
 
 ;jo8''' 
 
 Reese r. Reese 
 
 1221)3> 
 
 r. State 
 
 6881J 
 
 I'. Strickland 
 
 808^ 
 
 V. Torrington 
 
 4&.f> 
 
 Reeve r. Dennett 
 
 218^ 
 
 I'rii'st I'. Glenn 
 
 117U" 
 
 f. Liverpool, &c. In«. Co. 270* 
 
 I'riinni c. Stewart 
 
 18;JM, jjoisi 
 
 Reeves v. State 
 
 8u»> 
 
 Prince c. Ulackburn 
 
 122'J'-' 
 
 R. r. Andrews 
 
 636« 
 
 r. Sniitii 
 
 463", 40;;-- 
 
 i: Beckwiih 
 
 635«, 0:55"' 
 
 I'ringie r. Pringle 
 
 yiQi'-' 
 
 c. Berube 
 
 'JlO'i' 
 
 I'rintup r. Pattuii 
 
 654-' 
 
 i: Clittsson 
 
 2571^, 257''» 
 
 Prior r. State 
 
 2o7» 
 
 V. Doyle 
 
 588-1 
 
 Troclor r. Iloughtaling 
 
 2o7'« 
 
 r. Mailloux 
 
 183*, 078" 
 
 !•. Old Colony It. It. 
 
 654*, 554-' 
 
 1: I'ahMali-Gay 
 
 DIO" 
 
 I'riiltt r. Cox 
 
 2573' 
 
 r. Peltier 
 
 470>» 
 
 Pucitett r. State 
 
 21", 257-" 
 
 r. Perry 
 
 0356 
 
 Pulleii ('. Ilutcliinson 
 
 1221P 
 
 V. Reaney 
 
 470''' 
 
 Pullman Palace Car r. Harking <J78*' 
 
 c. Romp 
 
 588H 
 
 Purdy c. Piinly 
 
 •JKtw 
 
 r. Smitii 
 
 4708, 47()9 
 
 Piisey V. Wright 
 
 270'i 
 
 V. Sparlmm 470«, 470", 470" 
 
 Putnam v. Goudall 
 
 a58-' 
 
 V. The Minnie 
 
 21» 
 
 
 
 Reid r. McWhinnie 
 
 21« si'W 
 
 Qi;iMnv I'. Buzzell 122fl", PJSOK, 12201' 
 
 r. Reid 
 
 .•. Warner 1229-i' 
 
 257" 
 1229'5, 122'J'« 
 
 
 
 Reinhart c. Miller 
 
 122!>'6 
 
 IIaucliffb v. Ins. Co. 
 
 I179«, 117'J« 
 
 V. Oconto Co. 
 
 808* 
 
 UaddytTe r Rarton 
 
 55 »i 
 
 Reis r. Ilellman 
 
 K» 
 
 Itader i\ McKlvane 
 
 8t)8i' 
 
 Reitz r. Stale 
 
 86u^ 
 
 Kadford c. State 
 
 470'> 
 
 Renaud c. Abbott 
 
 21" 
 
 Uadley r. Seider 
 
 i)78''^ 
 
 Renier c. Dwelling-liotise 
 
 808« 
 
 lulling r. Com. 
 
 470' 
 
 Renner 1). Dank of Columbia 358'* 
 
 Kailroad c. Crider 
 
 27«'< 
 
 Rex V. (^lewes 
 
 257 1* 
 
 Uailway Co. v. Ueelcr 
 
 808' 
 
 i: Inhabitants of Ilarringworth P221t" 
 
 r. Cronin 
 
 358'" 
 
 r. .Morgan 
 
 1221K* 
 
 r. Henderson 403-'' 
 
 40.T^«, 4(i8W 
 
 r. ( trieby 
 
 18:J'» 
 
 r. Merrick 
 
 301'J, a"Jl»> 
 
 i: Plummpr 
 
 183' 
 
 1: McKcniia 
 
 52'' 
 
 Reyburn r. Deloiti 
 
 1221>'«', 1220« 
 
 V. .Murphy 
 
 403", 40:1"' 
 
 Reynolds r. Loiigenbcrger 
 
 183'T 
 
 i: Strout 
 
 52' 
 
 r. Manning 
 
 554', 554" 
 
 r. Wliitton 
 
 mi''-' 
 
 r. Robinson 
 
 808« 
 
 Kains (■. !<tate 
 
 588-« 
 
 c. SchalTcr 
 
 010*> 
 
 liainwater r. KIniore 
 
 o78''' 
 
 Rhoades r. Selin 
 
 1170"', 122'.ti> 
 
 ltiil|ili r. Drown 
 
 :i58i» 
 
 Rieard r. Williams 
 
 18:i'« 
 
 lialston i: Miller 
 
 412" 
 
 Riee 1'. Rice 
 
 «22» 
 
 Itiiiid r. Dodge 
 
 452-' 
 
 r. Sli04)k 
 
 8l*» 
 
 Kaitlal r. Yates 
 
 022" : 
 
 Rice's Succession 
 
 tm 
 
 Kan. hill r. Connecticut River 
 
 R. R. 52* i 
 
 Rich r. KIdreilgo 
 
 4M* 
 
 '•. Turner 
 
 808" : 
 
 Richards r. Day 
 
 808» 
 
 l<aiidi)l|ili r. Louglilin 1 
 
 220", 122',H'i j 
 
 .•, KIwell 
 
 I8;i'» 
 
 r. Wdodntock 
 
 1178" i 
 
 r. Noyes 
 
 554', 5.'^i4>'> 
 
 K.'iplev 1,'. Klugli 
 
 808" 
 
 Hichardson r. Deebo 
 
 808>«, 80HI1 
 
 Katlilt >'. Vandikes 
 
 0101' ' 
 
 r. Hoston 
 
 428'" 
 
 Kaw r. People 
 
 2 1 •"' 
 
 <•. Kmrry 
 
 4fl:l«, 4ti:iia 
 
 Kawley r. Drown 
 
 18:)M 
 
 1'. Kelloy 
 
 1)78<« 
 
 !!aw Maiif'g Co. r. Townseni 
 
 :i.-,8ii 
 
 r. Milburn 
 
 2I8«, 358* 
 
 l!ii<vson r. Ilnigh 
 
 ;mi" 
 
 r. Newcomb 
 
 ]2i!M9 
 
 Uay r. Bell 
 
 U78« 
 
 V. Robbing 
 
 358-i* 
 
CCXllV 
 
 AMERICAN TAIJLE OF CASES. 
 
 
 Kefereiicea Br« to pages. 
 
 
 Uiehiiiond r. I'attorson 
 
 llT'.t-' 
 
 Wogers /•. Stale 
 
 21-", <JW-' 
 
 Kicliiiiuiul, &L-. K. K. 1-. 
 
 (,'liiiilns» JJOi')", 
 
 r. Struub 
 
 bus-, HOh'' 
 
 
 ;jtio'-, ;>ii6", ;!().!>'•' 
 
 r. 'lyley 
 
 122'.l«-' 
 
 Kiddle r. Iliidgiii.s 
 
 WW ' 
 
 Koll r. St. Loiii.s Smelting 
 
 Co. 52" 
 
 Uiilgil<>- r. .Iiilingon 
 
 I •-'•21 »-••', 122!»-'' 
 
 liidlins r. Henry 
 
 117'.t'« 
 
 liit'iiuT /■. Kict' 
 
 hOH' 
 
 lionan r. hugan 
 
 2r"' 
 
 Kijrgg r. I'owell 12 
 
 2'J-', \)i2<.r\ \-22W'' 
 
 Uoop r. (lark 
 
 1170-1, 1170-^7 
 
 liik-y i: .lolinston 
 
 (i-JL'ii 
 
 Koosa r. H()>ton Loan Co. 
 
 301'*' 
 
 i: .Mayor 
 
 WW" 
 
 Iioot r. King 
 
 inoi" 
 
 i: I'ierce 
 
 ■n2" 
 
 Kose i: First Nat. Hank 
 
 1220'", 1220"', 
 
 r. Triunor 
 
 »t)8'* 
 
 
 1220'' 
 
 liindgi- r. liri'ck 
 
 W,fi 
 
 r. Otis 
 
 078*", '.I78'' 
 
 r. Wi.lker 
 
 W.l^-' 
 
 ?'. VVinnsboro Hank 
 
 122'.»*> 
 
 Kiplcy f. St'lignian 
 
 808^" 
 
 liosebooni r. Itillington 
 
 452^' 
 
 V. Warren 
 
 21.M 
 
 Uosenbauin r. Stale 
 
 nui« 
 
 Ui8k r. Slate 
 
 •Mo- 
 
 Koseiikrans r. Itarker 
 
 257'M 
 
 Kiteliie r. ( atlin 
 
 •2 If. 
 
 Hosintlial r. Walker 
 
 183^' 
 
 r. Holbrooke 
 
 (S-.""' 
 
 Koss r. Austin 
 
 21-«, 21'" 
 
 Hixfor.1 r. Milic-r 
 
 IKV" 
 
 r. Mo.swell 
 
 21*. 
 
 ]{ol)b (. Hewitt 
 
 f).'.-!'' 
 
 c. Hulder 
 
 OKI'" 
 
 ]{ol>l>iii8 r. Uobbing 
 
 ii;!.v 
 
 I-. Slate 
 
 267", :Ji>l- 
 
 r. Springfield 
 
 'JTH'"' 
 
 r. White 
 
 301.« 
 
 V. State 
 
 f.2', JTO'" 
 
 Rolen r. Slate 
 
 470'« 
 
 Robert's Appeal 
 
 or.4J 
 
 Kothrock c I'erkinson 
 
 1170''^ 
 
 Koberls r. Com. 
 
 078"'', '.i78-'« 
 
 Ki)U])ell ('. Ilawg 
 
 1220''" 
 
 /•. Di.xon 
 
 257-', ;558» li.W' 
 
 Ronsey r. Wood 
 
 2lii. 117»=!« 
 
 r. Miller 
 
 078'" 
 
 Hout r. L'iley 
 
 122JV.9 
 
 r. Mullenlx 
 
 WlH-" 
 
 Itowell r. Fuller 
 
 1229". 1220'- 
 
 r. Ogdensbnrg, &c 
 
 . K. R. ;Mi.V' 
 
 r. Newton 
 
 Hlh'' 
 
 ltolH.>rt8on r. Lynch 
 
 .•!68"* 
 
 Kowt r. Kile 
 
 122'.t''* 
 
 r. Miller 
 
 V2'i'M'> 
 
 Kiiyal ('. Chandler 
 
 412" 
 
 Koblnson i: Adams 
 
 ;«»l" 
 
 lioyal Ins. Co. i. Suliwing 
 
 27(J'-, 27«'* 
 
 ,: niakely 
 
 427M 
 
 Kuan r. Terry 
 
 257'^" 
 
 — — t'. (Mindwick 
 
 (■)22'! 
 
 Riidd r Frank 
 
 (•,22''' 
 
 c. Tnttcr 
 
 3581'* 
 
 Kndolph ('. Lane 
 
 35h-<» 
 
 c. Dana 
 
 !H(»-'-' 
 
 Knfer r. Slate 
 
 588-» 
 
 r. Dibl.lo 
 
 463". 4(i:;'« 
 
 Kullinan >•. Harr 
 
 858» 
 
 r. (iailier 
 
 18:i'- 
 
 IfuhitT r. People 
 
 .1fl5-'» 
 
 
 21M17yM17!»'i 
 
 Ru:upli r. Stale 
 
 122«« 
 
 — r. livers 
 
 80M" 
 
 Ituscli r. RiH^k Island 
 
 078' 
 
 ■ 1'. Ilutehingnn 
 
 '.I7«'" 
 
 Uusher '■. StJile 
 
 588-!'' 
 
 r. New Hruiiswick U. U. '2-'t'-> 
 
 WusM'll r. Huekley 
 
 183«», 183'i" 
 
 r. Peru, vie. K. U. 
 
 «7H^' 
 
 r. Cliundi 
 
 H08W 
 
 1'. Heynohls 
 
 U78-"' 
 
 /'. Martin 
 
 21* 
 
 1'. |{ol>in8on 
 
 27(i'» 
 
 iv Sargent 
 
 21M 
 
 c. State 
 
 257*", 207'' 
 
 Uyan /•. 0'(,'oniier 
 
 80H-" 
 
 r. Sttiart 
 
 654', r>.v^' 
 
 r. People 
 
 078" 
 
 Hoeeo r. Stnto 
 
 (122-' 
 
 r. Slate 
 
 MH't 
 
 Hoelic r. Fra«cr 
 
 27tl'' 
 
 Kyerson r. Abinglon 
 
 078*« 
 
 lloeke-'s Estate 
 
 v2->^y> 
 
 
 
 Kocikwell r. Tavlor 
 
 .'1!)1«« 
 
 
 
 lloekwood r. I'onndstone OT8«. »"8*' 
 
 Saiiiinokr r. People 
 
 iss--* 
 
 Koden r. Brown 
 
 ;)58iJ 
 
 St. Louis, &e. K. R. c. Dea 
 
 rborn wm" 
 
 Roderigas c. Ea§t River Saving! 
 
 /•. Dobbins 
 
 ;MI5'.i 
 
 Instn. 
 
 183* 
 
 1'. Kexniad 
 
 01»'» 
 
 Rodgers r. Trnok 
 
 awj' 
 
 c. Sweet 
 
 07M7 
 
 Rodrian r. N. Y, .«<• R. 
 
 K. 5." 
 
 i\ 'I'lionias 
 
 654* 
 
 Rodrigiu'Z V. Espinosa 
 
 301 «i 
 
 r. Weaver 
 
 52». 52"' 
 
 Roo r. Roe 
 
 122!K>' 
 
 St. Paul, Xe. Ins. (^). ■• Ciottbclf 078* 
 
 Rnnors r. Crn\n 
 
 nur"' 
 
 St. Vrain Stone Co. v. Denver, &c. 
 
 r. 1)0 Uardelcben. 4c. Co. 301*', 427i", 
 
 11. R 
 
 808^* 
 
 
 42711 
 
 Salnzar r. Taylor 
 
 I220-", 122»»J 
 
 
 (Vi'I* 
 
 Salem (iravel Road Co. c. 
 
 IVnning- 
 
 
 1I7',»'' 
 
 ton 
 
 801*. BOl*' 
 
 r. Ulttcr 1220*", 
 
 22O'»M22ft^,1220«J 
 
 Salomon v. State 
 
 SI" 
 
AMEKICAX TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 ccxlv 
 
 Refereucea 
 
 Sallsman v. N. Y. &c. U. R. 
 Srtiiiple V. Frost 
 SainpuDii 0. Noble 
 
 V. Overton 
 
 Sam Sloan, Tlie 
 Simliorn r. Murphy 
 Siiiiclioz I'. IVople 
 Santlers v. Heister 
 
 ■ V. State 
 
 r. Stokes 
 
 r. Wrtki'Weld 
 
 SnniU I'. Slate 
 Saiikey r. Cook 
 SantaAnn r. Ilarlin 
 Santissima Trinidail 
 Saraliass v. Armstrong 
 Sarbacli r. .loncs 
 Sargent u. Ilampilcn 
 Sartoriiis i*. Stale 
 Sasscer r. Farmers' Itank 
 Sauls V. Slate 
 Smus«v r K. U. 
 Saviiiuiiili, &v. K. R. r. Gray 
 
 r. llolliind 
 
 Savi'laiid v. (Jreen 
 Sawyer r. Kifert 
 
 w. Kriiert 
 
 Sayres r. Allen 
 
 SciiU'< I'. Deslia 
 
 Selialler r. State 
 
 Scliascr r. State 
 
 Seiieiner c. Minneapolig, &c. R. R. 
 
 »0b'- 
 
 ilJii ' 
 
 llT'.l!' 
 
 117'.l'4 
 
 ma - 
 
 97H^' 
 
 ;wi»t 
 
 'J1H« 
 078>. !>7«9 
 
 I'i-JO'-, 12^>», 122;»«6 
 
 y7«" 
 
 •Jl» 
 •21:11 
 
 9102. !tll|ii 
 
 022*, 022", f.22'' 
 
 •.t7h-' 
 
 21 •, •.I7h' 
 
 /■.KM'' 
 
 2.-)7'- 
 
 l«:!-» 
 
 358"'. .'•..'.4 ' 
 2.'i7" 
 2ri7W 
 
 3<.H-"» 
 
 2:i7'" 
 
 Scliell r. I'liimb 
 Sclilatr r. Louitiville, &c. R 
 SchlatiT r. Winpeiniy 
 ScliK'iicker r. State 
 Schlielit r. State 
 Selilosii r. Ili8 Creiiitori 
 Sclimult V. N. Y. &c. Ins 
 
 r. State 
 
 Sflinerlzell i'. YoiniR 
 St;liO('n r. Sunilerlanil 
 S 'liocil Dint. I'. Ins. Co. 
 
 1: 'liittle 
 
 School Furniture Co. r. 
 
 School l>i«l 
 S(rlirif<lh"y r. Stiite 
 Schroeiler r. Chicago, &c. 
 
 Sc-huhka);el v. DierNtoin 
 Schuchanit r. Alle.iii 
 Si-huliz '■. Chicago, &c. R. 
 Schuylkill Co. >•, Cuplcy 
 Scotiilil I). I'arlin, &c. Co. 
 
 Sooggin f. Dalrymple 
 Scotia, The 
 Scotlaiiil, The 
 Sioit IV Kletchcr 
 
 r. Iliileniiliurg 
 
 — — I'. Jackfion 
 
 I'. Waitlinian 
 
 V. Wood 
 
 ScoTille I'. UalJwia 
 
 Co 
 
 2.>7« 
 
 2r-', 
 
 21" 
 
 t7S'», {t7«-^' 
 
 .). ii'.M " 
 
 'J78" 
 
 «7,s*« 
 
 21'- 
 
 2> 
 
 2.')7'i; 
 
 270^ 
 
 I7!H< 
 
 1 
 
 21 >■ 
 
 WW"' 
 Jlii 'J I'' 
 
 insM" 
 
 Warsaw 
 
 62" 
 
 are to pages. 
 
 Scrogpin 1: McClelland 
 
 r. Wood 
 
 Searcy r. Slate 
 Seargeant r. Seward 
 Searls /■. Knapp 
 Sears r. Ilayt 
 Seavy r. l)earborn 
 Sebree c. Dorr 
 Secor r. I'estana 
 Secri^t r. (ireen 
 
 r. Petty 
 
 Seef 1: State 
 
 Seeley v. Kngell 
 
 Scguin c. Rouhon 
 
 Seiber r. I'rice 
 
 Seip's Estate. I'robst'a Appeal 
 
 Seidell r. Myers 
 
 V. State 
 
 SeUera Estate 
 
 Seniple r. Ilagar 
 
 S-niell v. State 
 
 Serviss r. StiK'kstill 
 
 Settle r. Alison llTft-V 
 
 Seventh Day, &c. Ass'n. v. Fisher 
 
 Seward i'. (iarlin 
 
 Seymour r. ''owing 
 
 Shafcr r. I.,acock 
 
 c. State 
 
 Shaffer V. McCrackin 
 ShalTiier r. Com. 
 Shafter r. Evans 
 Shailer v. Hiimsicad 
 Shallcr r. Mraiid 
 Slianfelter r. Baltimore 
 Shank V. Coulthard 
 
 02" 
 
 H(IH-1 
 
 688'», 588«» 
 
 l)lii>« 
 
 21*1 
 
 81tl< 
 
 27G>, 27(1", !»7««i 
 
 35S». ;i68" 
 
 6&4', o-.i* 
 
 117'.tai 
 
 oj-.a 21^" 
 
 r.2' 
 
 97«" 
 
 m»i> 
 
 (122* 
 808'» 
 t)22'' 
 8081 
 218 
 {(78S» 
 
 inir--* 
 
 :t58« 
 
 a»i" 
 
 27tl« 
 4t');!it' 
 257"» 
 
 r)2« 
 .loi'tx, n9i«\ :!'.ti« 
 
 122y'", 122tt-« 
 21" 
 
 BOS^ 
 
 Shaw I-. Bryant r^iW'S 
 
 c. I'.mery *^67'W 
 
 »>. Stale 'i\'^ 
 
 !•. Susquehanna Doom Co. ii'M-^ 
 
 Sharp c. Johnson 183W .IBS") 
 
 Shearer »'. Stale 27('>* 
 
 Shearman /•. Akins 452* 
 
 Sheihurnc Fidls Nat. Ok r. Townsley ls;i'>i 
 
 R. R .-Um" 
 
 aoii", ;to.'." 
 
 022' 
 
 21M 
 
 R. 80H" 
 
 ".»1(>^' 
 
 183<", 6;.4'-'. 
 
 W>4" 
 
 412« 
 
 21», 21»" 
 
 21' 
 
 257^- 
 
 02-/^ 
 
 21 '• 
 
 1221 >^> 
 
 270> ' 
 
 183* 
 
 Shellon '•• Hampton 
 
 U78*' 
 
 . »7H-'« 
 
 r. State 
 
 
 022- ' 
 
 Shcpard r. (iiddings 
 
 
 3ri8>» 
 
 r. Mo. &c R, R. 
 
 306'^, 306", 80oi» 
 
 Shi-panUciM r. Perkins 
 
 
 '2T(1'* 
 
 Shephard r. State 
 
 
 6H8« 
 
 Sheplurd •'. Buscli 
 
 
 808" 
 
 Sherff r. Jacobi 
 
 
 808-1 
 
 Sherman r. Cronhy 
 
 
 452'! 
 
 Shernil >•. .Murray 
 
 
 0|1A 
 
 SlierwiH>d r. Ilouslon 
 
 n9r-i'. 
 
 1179-1 
 
 Shlilds I-. Ciinninghain 
 
 U78*- 
 
 , l»78<'i 
 
 Slii«<1et 1: Com. 
 
 
 6881" 
 
 Shirwin v. People 
 
 
 2u7''" 
 
 Shoemaker v. Kellog 
 
 
 4o:{is 
 
 <•. Stiles 
 
 
 80810 
 
 ShiN-nbergcr r. Ilackman 358'" 
 
 , ar.8« 
 
 Shorb r. Kinzie 
 
 
 122»>'3 
 
 Shorey r. Ilussey 
 
 
 lt78-7 
 
 Sh.ire r. Wiley 403« 4(J3»>, 078*. 978' 
 
 Shown !•. Barr 
 
 
 1171M» 
 
 V. Mc.Mackin 
 
 
 lb3«> 
 
 M 
 
 i 
 
 iiiM 
 
 • :!-!«- 
 
 1 : 1 
 
 ' it ft 
 
ccxlvi 
 
 AMERICAN TAULK OF CASES. 
 Reference! are to page*. 
 
 I .'',, ) 
 
 ith 
 
 Slirowdcrs i». Harper 
 MiroytT V. MilltT 
 Sliutirick r. State 
 Sliiiriltir V. 1'arkiT 
 Sliutt; ('. 'i'hoinpHUll 
 Sibley r. Sinilli 
 
 r. Wiirtle 
 
 SiilekiiMi i: \Vaba8li,&u. U. U, 
 
 Sill r. Ki'i-M- 
 
 Silliiniiii r. riiornton 
 Siniiiioiig c. Truiiibi) 
 SiiiiiiiR r. Quebec, &c. R. It 
 
 I'. So. KxprcBH Co. 
 
 Simon i\ Stiite 
 Simons ". Norton 
 
 I'. People 
 
 i: Stale 
 
 Singer Mfj:. Co. i>. Clay 
 
 I'. LeeiU 
 
 u. MeFarland 
 
 Sitlcr I' (Jelir 
 
 Skclton V. Liubt & Power Co 
 Skinner v. Skinner 
 Skipwortli .•. Deyoll 4(W", 4(i:F'. HW*' 
 Sliittery r. I'eople 654'', 5H8'' 
 
 SlauKliter r. IJernar.Jii llTlt'-' 
 
 SleefHT I'. Van Miililleswortli 257*' 
 
 Sloan I'. N. York Central 078", <»7«'«, 
 
 ()7H"'- 
 
 r. Thompson I'-W", 12a!l"' 
 
 Sloeovicb i\ Oriental Mut. lUB. Co. 21'' 
 
 2ri7''« 
 
 !»7rt*^' 
 
 4121 1 
 
 305>-, ;i(Io" 
 
 ti22'i 
 
 305'^ :{tir,i'' 
 
 I22!>'" 
 
 '62''^ 
 
 2110 
 
 21 n 
 
 f)2'- 
 
 022-" 
 
 117'.H< 
 
 470" 
 
 M' 
 
 122!K'' 
 
 4();i''' 
 
 122!»'-! 
 
 4(liW7 
 
 '.»7H-'7 
 
 UIO'" 
 
 1229* 
 
 SloHNcn i: l{. K. 
 
 2:>7* 
 
 Sluby I'. Cliamplin 
 
 122!»"' 
 
 Small f. Clfwley 
 
 27«"', 27il''J 
 
 Smith i: Allen 
 
 JIoH" 
 
 V. AhImjII 
 
 122'J", 1221»"'* 
 
 ■ 1'. IthiKKO 
 
 117'.t", 117'.»." 
 
 i: Urown 
 
 8o«'^ ;t.-iHi-' 
 
 1'. Hutler 
 
 WtH'^ 
 
 i: Coffln 
 
 ow-, yi»»''' 
 
 «;. Com. 
 
 3'J14', ohH-J 
 
 V. ('room 
 
 iK;{t» 
 
 r. CuNliman 
 
 1I7'.I<' 
 
 ». Khanert 
 
 1I7H*' 
 
 r. Killer 
 
 117!»'« 
 
 r. l-'cniier 
 
 122'.».w 
 
 f. KilxKerald 
 
 HOH' 
 
 w. KorreHl 
 
 4I2« 
 
 r. Kowler 
 
 f)/>l'« 
 
 II. ( Jeer 
 
 427''' 
 
 V. (iilliim 
 
 27tJii 
 
 r. Kaniler 
 
 117'.('» 
 
 I-. Kiiowlton 
 
 IMIF- 
 
 r. Kane 
 
 408*>. 4oa'". ':hii 
 
 •'. iMUg 
 
 W(Ml« 
 
 i: Metropolitan H. 
 
 R. »7H<H 
 
 r. Monro 
 
 27(l« 
 
 1'. .MiiHiettor 
 
 WW*' 
 
 >K N. H, Society 
 
 2f>7'«, .-HM*' 
 
 r. NowelU 
 
 412" 
 
 1'. ( till ( 'olony, &p. R. R. 267"', 2r.7J'' 
 
 — — r. I'alnier ^rd- 
 
 I'. I'atteririii 427" 
 
 „. Poller 11711"; 
 
 — — I'. Powuri 11 7'.*'' 
 
 r. Putnam 301«, 463-« 
 
 Redden 117l"» 
 
 Rentz 4(!a-« 
 
 c. Royalton ',»7H''' 
 
 r. Sanford 4(j;j'«, 4(W"' 
 
 c. Satterleo Myf 
 
 I'. Savin^H Bank l!22''' 
 
 ('.Shell 654', f.r)4" 
 
 V. Smith 183a-", ih^ht, h;.,*! 
 
 i: Speed 21'", 21" 
 
 r. Statu 267«, 3682, 368", 47(1"», &«8'^', 
 
 l)78"', !»78<« 
 
 I'. Stevens 21"'' 
 
 i>. Swan 122i»^* 
 
 1. WeHt 117!t«* 
 
 /•. Whittier SOF', 391<", 664' 
 
 r. Zent 270' 
 
 Smitha r. Klournoy's Adni. 2r'«', 21'^' 
 
 .Smoot I'. liiiHsell 62"''' 
 
 Snciiler v. Patterson 8(t8* 
 
 Sno<l},'raii8 r. t.'om. 078'^ 
 
 Snow V. Alley 808" 
 
 V. Grace 267«, 2.-i7« 
 
 Snyder r. Snyder l>78'* 
 
 V. Stale 688'> 
 
 Soap8 v. Eiehburg 654'^ 
 
 Soeieta llaliana r. Sulzer 808" 
 
 Solary r. Webster 808» 
 
 Soiila r. Jarrow 12211"* 
 
 Solomon V. Dreschler 27<l'' 
 
 I'. Hughes 21'' 
 
 Solomon, &c. R. R. v. Jones 978', •.»78', 
 
 <J78H 
 
 Solver V. Ronianet 
 Soruerti i'. State 
 
 r. Wrijfht 
 
 Sonierville c. Winibisli 
 Somerviile, &c. R. li. c. Dougbty 
 Sophia, The 
 SouIp r. Itruce 
 
 South Kana. R. R. Co. v. Robbins 
 South & N. Ala. R. R. Co. r. Wood 
 Southern IJell Tele. Co. r. l^ynuli 
 Siiuthern ExpreHK (.'o. v. 'I'hornton 
 Southern, &u. Inn. Co. r. Wilkinson 
 S. W. School DiHlrict of Rolton f 
 
 Wlltiiims 
 Soulhwick r. South wick 
 Soiithwortb I', lloag 
 SpaidH r. Barrett 
 Spalding; r. Lowe 
 Sparfr, II. S. 
 Sparhawk r. Sparhawk 
 Sparks r. Com. 
 
 r. Sparks 
 
 SpauliliiiK r. flood 
 
 i\ Vincent 
 
 Spaunhorst r. Link 
 Spearman «. State 
 Spears r. Burton 
 
 r. Forrest 
 
 r. International Ins. Co. 
 
 r. Lawrence 
 
 21« 
 
 21>» 
 
 463" 
 
 21'' 
 
 «78« 
 808" 
 267*' 
 267'» 
 21H7 
 
 3(I6i'' 
 
 1220*' 
 
 427» 
 
 .S()eer r. Coale 
 Speiieer r. (.'uriis 
 
 412« 
 
 ()22'« 
 
 270' 
 
 8(IK*' 
 
 910" 
 
 688«, 688"* 
 
 9HM> 
 
 31tl*« 
 
 2 1*, 27«^ 022'', l'.22'' 
 
 270'« 
 
 62'«, 1170'". 1179'* 
 
 978<", 978*" 
 
 688''« 
 
 183'» 
 
 267" 
 
 267" 
 
 .•i:.8"» 
 
 412«, 412" 
 21*i 
 
fl 
 
 AMERICAN TAULK OF CASES. 
 
 ccxlvii 
 
 Reference! 
 
 Spencer >: Fortescue HOI* 
 
 c. I-niiKdon 1179*', 1I7".C^' 
 
 ,!. New York, &c. K. K. 'Ml* 
 
 V. Hoppr IHIJM, ih;}W 
 
 Spt'ii({lcr r. Williams 21™' 
 
 Spolin r. MinHOiiri, &c. It K, 078^'', 'J7K" 
 .S|ir,'i(lliiiK ••. Conway 03'2'' 
 
 SpriiKins r. White 62''' 
 
 S|)riiKUi> >•■ Sprajfuo 122'.t'''' 
 
 SpriiiKfleld, &c. K. R. i: AlU'ii SOU* " 
 
 Siiiiiri' i: Stnto IttJP* 
 
 Stttckiis r. N. Y. R. R. 62" 
 
 SliiKor I'. Pass. Ry. Co. G2* 
 
 StiiiliiiKB 1^. (iottschulk '1U:)I>, 80»i'i 
 
 c. Iliilliim 022" 
 
 r. State S'.tl*" 
 
 Stftiii|H'r r. (irifflii 257", •.(78" 
 
 SlaiiBleiii r. Stale 117!)'". 117'.t" 
 
 Stiipii'N r. Edwards, &c. Co. 808', 8»)8>« 
 
 V. Llano Co. IKl'" 
 
 r. Woliln){ton 
 
 Stapk-ton >■. Kin^ 
 Starkey i: IVople 
 Siarr r. Coin. 
 Slarratt r. Mullen 
 State r. Ahlxitt 
 
 1*. Ah ('huey 
 
 V. Aldricli 
 
 I'. Allen 
 
 V. Alston 
 
 I'. Anderson 
 
 V. Anitelo 
 
 r. Aridier 
 
 — — I'. Arnold 
 
 c. Ayer 
 
 I'. Hadey 
 
 r. Maker 
 
 I'. Italdwin 
 
 r. Itaninler 
 
 r. Hanks 
 
 I'. Barber 
 
 V. liartlett 
 
 are to pages. 
 
 State I'. Brown 
 
 c. Bruce 
 
 V. Butiington 
 
 V. Burton 
 
 I'. Beal 
 I'. Beoho 
 I'. Iti'hrnian 
 V. Belcher 
 r. Ilelknap 
 '■. Belton 
 c. Benner 
 V. Bertin 
 I'. Blackburn 
 ,'. Blake 
 r. Bli/e 
 I-. Bloom 
 r. BoKwell 
 I', Bowe 
 i; Bowen 
 r. Bowman 
 n. Boy<l 
 I'. Branhani 
 r. BraNcainp 
 i: Britt 
 r. Brookuhire 
 V. Itnmghton 
 
 808^' 
 BOS*" 
 470" 
 47()>« 
 27»VJ 
 
 JJ1J6 
 
 80f)i" 
 470" 
 
 2f)7< 
 
 C88", 688<», fiSH* 
 
 1»78«" 
 
 2r)7''", '.I7rt''* 
 
 a»)6"', 470'' 
 
 022-'* 
 
 21" 
 
 022^' 
 
 y78" 
 
 470* 
 
 1179«, 1170«', 1I7!H« 
 1I71H' 
 2r.7<« 
 fl22'"', 022-' 
 
 801'', :wi'', lUir'", 170^ 
 
 f)H8« 
 
 910'", '.iin'* 
 
 022«, 978*, 07H''", '.t7H«'' 
 
 ;ic..".'" 
 
 470'", 170" 
 
 ;i>>i<" 
 
 »:t:.J 
 
 267''«', 2r."f-' 
 
 2r)7«" 
 088-' 
 2 1 '-" 
 
 i>HH* 
 21" 
 088» 688*, ..HS'f- 
 2 1'" 
 ;10.V' 
 078", 978^'' 
 f)88'^ 
 
 GSS', GSS*", 808", 8089 
 
 064", 6H8''i 
 
 t;22'' 
 
 664'' 
 
 . r. Cadwell f)227 
 
 •I-. Cain 368-', :!!»l'" 
 
 B. Cake 117y*MI7'.t« 
 
 V. Caldwell 470" 
 
 I'. Calhoun 022* 
 
 ' V. Callahan (i:!6" 
 
 r. Cameron 470'* 
 
 V. Carr 688'", 122!t-" 
 
 I'. Carrick 688', 688^, 6^8••" 
 
 V. Cass 8<W-' 
 
 r. Center 470'\ 470'«, 470''', 470", 
 
 tl22'' 
 
 — V. Central, &c. R. R. 
 
 — r. (^ImmbiTlain 
 
 — I'. (^haml>cr8 
 
 — e. Church 
 
 — I'. City of Dubuque 
 
 — I-. Clark 
 
 — II. (Clifford 
 Clinton 
 Clothier 
 Cole 
 Col well 
 Cook 
 C(M)per 
 
 I'. Coupenlmvcr 
 r. Crab 
 c. Crawford 
 I'. Crockett 
 
 Cronin 
 
 ('r< •■•"in 
 
 Cr.. 
 
 Crowson 
 
 Daley 
 
 Danforth 
 
 Daniel 
 
 Darnell 
 
 David 
 
 Dawson 
 
 De «iraflr 
 
 Delesdenicr 
 
 Denny 
 
 District Board 
 
 Doni'lon 
 
 Dooley 
 
 Dooris 
 
 DoMKlass 
 
 Drake 
 
 Duncan 
 
 Dunwell 
 
 Kddon 
 
 Edwards 
 
 
 ■ I'. 
 
 ■ I'. 
 
 ■ I'. 
 
 ;i.>8'-i 
 
 ih;;--" 
 
 688', yio-jo 
 
 2 1'"' 
 
 2 1 "• 
 
 301*', 117j''' 
 
 688"* 
 
 1220''', 122!>"' 
 
 117'.l*'i 
 
 62* 
 
 Elllotte 
 
 KIIwikmI 
 
 Evans 
 
 Kasiiett 
 
 Fells 
 
 Fil'/huKh 
 
 Kilxnimmons 
 
 Kulweil 
 
 078" 
 
 910" 
 
 21" 
 
 fi-i-w' 
 
 fi.15', OKP* 
 
 270", 27tl'» 
 
 6r)44 
 
 4703 
 
 62' 
 
 27(1* 
 
 588"', 688'W 
 
 2ri7'" 
 
 :«1,-)* 
 
 470'J 
 
 688'^ 
 
 1229"! 
 
 «;t6« 
 
 68816, 12-20" J 
 21" 
 21'" 
 
 978*6 
 
 688'.M 
 
 117'.t'" 
 
 267'", 91 Of', 01 iy> 
 
 688'*, 688", .'■>HH'" 
 
 6HH-'« 
 
 21*) 
 
 470* 
 688", 910', PIO», 010--J 
 0IO« 
 470'", 470'^ 
 
 470'» 
 '.i78«» 
 27C,'i« 
 ft22'J", •122''' 
 
 WH''''. fiKHW 
 
 470', 470'» 
 
 978'-', 97Si» 
 
 267'» 
 
ccxiviii 
 
 AMKUICAN TATtLK OF CASES. 
 Rnfereiii^oa are to pkgei. 
 
 I'tnH 
 
 State V. Foot You 
 
 
 470«, 470", 470>'i 
 
 State 
 
 1-. Kidd 
 
 
 022^ 
 
 V. Ford 
 
 
 '2.'>7'" 
 
 
 . Kimball 
 
 
 iHir" 
 
 r. Fox 
 
 
 ;{',(H« 
 
 1 
 
 . Kindle 
 
 
 470'',470" 
 
 V. Frct'iimn 
 
 
 301*", '.t7S<« 
 
 
 , KinK 
 
 267»» 
 
 ,257*", . ■«•!•' 
 
 
 
 rj-i'.K'" 
 
 1 
 
 . Kingsbury 
 
 
 97H« 
 
 r. (Jiirrctt 
 
 
 n<).-)*', fjHK-' 
 
 
 . Kinli'y 
 
 
 l»7H<'i 
 
 r. (iarvi-y 
 
 
 688->, r,hK---!, f)hK« 
 
 
 . Kiniipy 
 
 
 ;i'.tl*' 
 
 i: (iiiy 
 
 
 1-J2'J'«, lU'JU"' 
 
 V 
 
 . Kiia|ip 267'* 
 
 267''», 
 
 267*", ;{(!r.", 
 
 I', (ii'dicke 
 
 
 liitl"' 
 
 
 
 
 3051", :!<.tl*' 
 
 r. (ii'or^u 
 
 
 688', GKH'", !l7h'* 
 
 1 
 
 . Knowlcs 
 
 
 688» 
 
 V. UiTiiiun 
 
 
 &88-, f)8K' 
 
 1 
 
 . Koontx 
 
 
 ]22!tw 
 
 — — r. (ieHt'll 
 
 
 I»7H-'" 
 
 
 . Laii^ford 
 
 
 910' 
 
 /•. (iilo 
 
 
 470"' 
 
 1 
 
 . Lanier 
 
 
 267« 
 
 c. (iiliimn 
 
 
 588- 
 
 1 
 
 . La|)aKe 
 
 
 267'* 
 
 r. (ilyiidcn 
 
 
 6881 
 
 t 
 
 . Lei- Doon 
 
 
 9781'. <)7K^-i 
 
 f. (Jl villi 
 
 
 078"'' 
 
 
 Lewi 
 
 
 183**, 978*" 
 
 — — I', (ioilw \ 
 
 
 «2'2*' 
 
 
 ,it. .ifleU: 
 
 
 0366 
 
 
 
 1»78" 
 
 
 ^I'jrr3 
 
 
 688'T 
 
 — — r. (iorliam 
 
 
 688"i, r)88-!'- 
 
 
 , .1 
 
 
 !»78« 
 
 —^ V. (ioNROtt 
 
 
 688>'' 
 
 
 /ison 
 
 
 588>, 688-'' 
 
 r. ( ioyotte 
 
 
 21 wi 
 
 
 . N . :;i)ii Coi V 
 
 Ct. 
 
 21-' 
 
 r. Oriiy 
 
 
 ol'^-' 
 
 
 •. Martin 
 
 
 978*' 
 
 c. Gri'Kory 
 
 
 .'tUl-! 
 
 
 . Mayes 
 
 
 078M 
 
 r. (iuriice 
 
 
 368i«, 368-!< 
 
 
 •. McAllister 
 
 
 267« 
 
 r. Iliibib 
 
 
 688"' 
 
 
 •. McHryde 
 
 
 62' 
 
 V. Unnan 
 
 078>'', 
 
 978», 0781!', 'J78-!' 
 
 
 •. McClain 
 
 
 3111 
 
 r. IlalHti-ad 
 
 
 IJ-W* 
 
 
 '. McDonnell 
 
 
 6882, 688" 
 
 — — 1'. Ilaiiiiibul, 
 
 &c. It 
 
 li, W.ii* 
 
 
 •. McCahey 
 
 
 078*'', 97H« 
 
 r. Hiinsi'ii 
 
 
 688'" 
 
 
 '. McCIU 
 
 
 ;;r.82i 
 
 c. Iliirnravo 
 
 
 :ji»h> 
 
 
 •. Medlicott 
 
 
 470'. no'-' 
 
 1". Ilitrpor 
 
 
 47(>'' 
 
 1 
 
 •. N'ellican 
 
 
 tl22-» 
 
 . I'. Harrison 
 
 
 688--I 
 
 
 •. Merrill 
 
 
 2.-.7-'" 
 
 r. lliirvi-y 
 
 
 1229-', 122!H" 
 
 
 ■. Mc.vherter 
 
 
 02-J" 
 
 I'. lluNtinga 
 
 
 122'.t'''" 
 
 
 i;. Mi.hael 910*. 91(K> 
 
 , 910", 9 K »--■«, 
 
 ^-^ r. Iliiwii 
 
 
 ".I78*'' 
 
 
 
 
 '.HO * 
 
 
 
 2i»7, tiisn' 
 
 
 
 •. Miller 
 
 C36<. 036«, t;:;6« 
 
 V. Ilaywiinl 
 
 
 0:!iV 
 
 
 
 '. Miiinick 
 
 
 21"* 
 
 1". Ilazlcton 
 
 
 (•.22« 
 
 .— . 
 
 •. Mitcliell 
 
 
 688'2 
 
 c. 1 IfdKepatIi 
 
 622', ■.)'.•)"' 
 
 
 
 ■. Molier 
 
 ' 
 
 (i;!6> 
 
 ,: llci'd 
 
 
 «:!')- 
 
 
 '. Montgomery 
 
 
 078'* 
 
 
 
 18:i'", 18:{<'' 
 
 
 •. Morris 
 
 
 21* 21« 
 
 — — r. Ilirscll 
 
 
 27<V' 
 
 
 '. Morrison 
 
 
 27(i* 
 
 V. HodRO 
 
 
 62', 18;{''" 
 
 
 •. Moy Looke 
 
 
 62'" 
 
 r. Hollinsclu'it 
 
 688' 
 
 
 '. Munson 
 
 
 688» 
 
 
 868" 
 
 40316, 4(|;pr) (,7j^M 
 
 
 '. Murfrcesboro 
 
 
 21 '2 
 
 • I'. Morton 
 
 
 :i(i.v, ;!".tl'' 
 
 
 '. Murray 
 
 
 2o7''», 68H« 
 
 — — I'. Howard 
 
 
 301«, 6.-.l'i, r)SH«, 
 
 
 '. Nasli 
 
 
 4701H 
 
 
 
 'JW^, 'Jl(»-i 
 
 
 •. Neil! 
 
 
 Id 0-0 
 
 r. Hoyt 
 
 
 r.*.'2'' 
 
 
 '. Nettlebush 
 
 
 r,(Y^ 
 
 —— V. Hiitcliinflon 
 
 1171»«J 
 
 
 '. Nilea 
 
 
 391*^, 31il« 
 
 — - 1'. Iiitox. Liquors 
 
 ;>l'Jn 
 
 
 •. Nixon 
 
 
 978" 
 
 i: Jackson 
 
 
 621" 
 
 
 •. Noelon 
 
 
 470», 470K 
 
 V. Janii'i 
 
 
 6221T 
 
 
 >. Norris 
 
 
 07H'" 
 
 
 
 21", 2111 
 
 
 '. Nortlirup 
 
 
 267"' 
 
 r. .TefTerson 
 
 
 267''<' 
 
 
 V. I'earce 
 
 
 9102< 
 
 — r, .loost 
 
 
 427" 
 
 
 >. IVnninKton 
 
 
 2121. I.IIOI!) 
 
 r. JoluiHon 
 
 '21-''. 
 
 26712, 4701", 47(»i«, 
 
 
 •. Perkins 
 
 267* 
 
 ■, 267", 664' 
 
 
 MO"' 
 
 f.88"', 688-», tl78« 
 
 
 '. I'ettaway 
 
 
 tyj.m 
 
 ,: Jolly 
 
 
 iun-'n 
 
 
 •. riiair 
 
 
 40324, 4fMii 
 
 r. Jones 
 
 27G'\ 
 
 391«<, .10l<\ :wi*', 
 470^, 688'^, 688'^» 
 
 
 •. I'lielps 
 -. rinllips 
 
 
 0102> 
 
 688« 
 
 — - r. Jordan 
 
 
 'J7811 
 
 
 •. Pike 
 
 
 .Vii 
 
 
 
 OlO" 
 
 
 •. I'lym 
 
 183" 
 
 1B3»*, is:!<' 
 
 t'. .hirclie 
 
 
 621 
 
 
 r. Pool 
 
 
 470' 
 
 V. Killy 
 
 
 isaw 
 
 
 1'. Powers 
 
 
 21*", 2121 
 
 m 
 
 Sh^ 
 
suite V. Pratt 
 
 1^. lingsilale 
 
 r. Kawls 
 
 i: Kay 
 
 c. liaymond 
 
 V. Ked 
 
 r. Heed 
 
 V. liiglitg 
 
 r. liixirigues 
 
 c. Uugurg 
 
 r. Hood 
 
 I'. Iiui;an 
 
 f. Itussell 
 
 c. Kalge 
 
 V. Saunders 
 
 c. SayiTS 
 
 r. Seliilling 
 
 r. Scott 
 
 c. Severson 
 
 c. Seymour 
 
 r. Slirtfl'er 
 
 i: Sliaw 
 
 r. Slielton 
 
 r. Sliiiford 
 
 r. Sibley 
 
 c. Simon 
 
 i>. Smilii 
 
 I'. Snow 
 
 r. Soj)er 
 
 V. Sparrow 
 
 I'. Spenco 
 
 r. Stade 
 
 r. Staley 
 
 r. Stallings 
 
 r. Stitnley 
 
 c. Staton 
 
 r. Sti'bbins 
 
 — ^ I'. Stepben 
 
 I). Sterrntt 
 
 1'. Stokeley 
 
 I'. Streeter 
 
 r. Sullivan 
 
 r. Swayzo 
 
 r. Swift 
 
 r. Talxjr 
 
 V. Tnlbert 
 
 V. Tally 
 
 r. Tatro 
 
 /•. Taylor 
 
 c. Terrell 
 
 I'. Thomas 
 
 r. Tlionipson 
 
 r. Tilgliman 
 
 r. Tompkins 
 
 r. Trivas 
 
 r. Turner 
 
 i: Tweedy 
 
 r. Twitty 
 
 V. Ulrioh 
 
 I'. IJmblo 
 
 r. Underwood 
 
 r. Viiigneur 
 
 i: Vann 
 
 AMERICAN TAULK OP CASES. 
 
 R«fere»ceii are to page*. 
 
 State i^. Vaughan 
 V. Vollander 
 
 978" 
 078" 
 078« 
 
 183«,188'>,368',0;{6' 
 58H' 
 
 267*', 470'", 561», 688* 
 18;!" 
 
 688i' 
 688'' 
 
 267«'' 
 
 470», (CJfV 
 
 078". 078''" 
 
 470<, 470'«, 470" 
 
 y78»» 
 
 1229"> 
 
 62' 
 
 S686 
 
 470'S 
 
 27fr' 
 
 47(H 
 
 267* 
 
 688* 
 
 478», 470'''. 47(t'« 
 
 3(16* 
 
 62' 
 
 022*' 
 
 78", 978'*, 078'», !»78'«. 
 
 078" 
 
 1220'" 
 
 1170i:> 
 
 078** 
 
 267"' 
 
 y78''''i 
 
 078" 
 035*, 0:{.V 
 62« 
 622*, 622'''', 022'* 
 t)22^'» 
 fl35», 035' 
 470' 
 18H' 
 4701" 
 257-* 
 470' 
 «22''' 
 68»n , 
 978", 078*" ' 
 47(»«; 
 257«, 078'" I 
 2\^, 1220«', 1221M ! 
 52" I 
 1220«», 122()»', 122!t«i, 
 122l>"-' 
 470'* 
 •122' 
 470* 
 1179", 1170'^ 
 2I« 
 470' 
 010», OIO'" 
 68tf", 588** 
 
 Wagner 
 
 r. WaUh 
 • I'. Walters 
 
 V. Walton 
 
 c. Ward 
 ■ r. Warner 
 
 r. Warren 
 
 i". 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 i\ 
 i>. 
 
 V. 
 
 r. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 i>. 
 
 Watson 
 
 Watt 
 
 Walters 
 
 Way 
 
 Weiners 
 
 Wcldoii 
 
 Wells 
 
 Went worth 
 
 West fall 
 
 White 
 
 Whitson 
 
 Whiitier 
 
 Whitwortb 
 
 Williams 
 
 /•. Wilner 
 
 V. Wilson 
 
 0. Wingo 
 
 r. Winningham 
 
 V. Winston 
 
 o. Wood 
 
 V. Woodrutr 
 
 r. Woodside 
 
 i>. Wright 
 
 r. /ellars 
 
 State Hank r. Cnrran 
 Steamboat Co. c. Hrockett 
 Stearns r. Doe 
 
 r. Mall 
 
 V. Merchants' Bank 
 
 Stoddard v. Durton 
 Stokes f. Dawes 
 
 f. Mackcn 
 
 V. I'eople 
 
 —— r. State 
 Stone u. Hunt 
 
 V. Ins. Co. 
 
 V. State 
 
 Stow r. Converse 
 Stcwe r. HiHliop 
 Stebbins r. Duncan 
 Steeil I'. Knowlcs 
 Steele v. Lord 
 
 r. Wood 
 
 Steeples v. Newton 
 Stein (■. Bowman 
 Stelner r. Jester 
 
 V. Snow 
 
 r. Stranum 
 
 SteinbofT i'. M'liae 
 
 Steinmetz v. Versailles Turnpike 
 
 Stephen v. State 
 
 ccxlix 
 
 470i» 
 
 0I(».«> 
 
 2H, 21» 21*', 2I*'», 
 
 47(t» 
 
 078^' 
 
 257», 257'*. 078** 
 
 47(t' 
 
 7', 078"*, 1229**, 122IHH 
 
 3'.tl*' 
 
 078» 
 
 ti;]5*, C35», 078*0 
 
 688'* 
 
 427'^ 
 
 257'' 
 
 :kJ5'» 
 
 OKM 
 
 lai*. o;!5« 
 
 257"', 588'T 
 
 470:, 010" 
 
 0J2'l 
 
 470* 
 
 910*, 910».01»--J, 0I()*« 
 
 078"» 
 
 21'«, 470'T 
 
 I8;!« 
 
 18;!*', »7()', 470^', 47(»'» 
 
 27f.7 
 
 588'* 
 
 5H8-'« 
 
 ((.'(51 
 
 .•!tl5« 
 
 010"* 
 
 183*» 
 
 y78"'' 
 
 21 '» 
 
 301-'' 
 
 .•i58*'« 
 
 808« 
 
 970-'", 07H-', 
 
 078*» 
 
 I8:t^« 
 
 427" 
 
 2I» 
 
 427'", 078*'. 078*-> 
 
 laSi^ 257*". 257*» 
 
 270» 
 
 978"« 
 
 Sgi", 688''^ 
 
 257« 
 
 554'* 
 
 358''« 
 
 368", 36HJa 
 
 358a' 
 
 3586, 4(j;;JH, 022-^ 
 OlO'T, 
 
 654> 
 
 257" 
 
 f.22' 
 
 1220*' 
 
 1170*' 
 
 1220<» 
 
 808'» 
 
 21 « 
 
 21-'* 
 
 m 
 
 Stephens c. Bernays 
 Stephenson i;. Bannister 
 
 11 79", 1170^<* 
 1179^ 
 
 lH!''!=ii 
 
 9i 
 
ii 
 
 h 
 
 ■ < 
 ■I' '. 
 
 ool 
 
 AMKKK.'AN TAULK OK CASES. 
 
 StiTtz r. Stewart 
 Stfttiuur V. White 
 Sti'vi'iiH 1'. Koniiir 
 
 — V. McNaniara 
 V. Mik'H 
 
 — V. n. H. 
 
 II. State 
 
 V. Sttjveiu 
 
 V. TuW 
 
 .Sti'veiirton I', Hoy 
 
 I.', suite 
 
 Stewart i-. Kverta 
 
 V. Scott 
 
 — — V. SoniiL'horn 
 — — V. Swaiizy 
 
 Sticr V, Osknloosa 
 Stiles >'■ KaHliiian 
 
 I'. KMtnbriiok 
 
 Stinelifielil r. Kniurgoii 
 Stindc ". (■(Kxlricli 
 Kidgway 
 
 Kuf«roni:ea 
 
 1831", ih;i»i 
 
 •Ml'-' 
 368 -a 
 
 ;ii)8'ft 
 
 368", ;i(I.JJ- 
 ilDl'''' 
 
 ao8'i' 
 
 117l)'^ 117»'», 117'.»'". 
 
 1171)^', 1171)'* 
 
 21" 
 
 o;ir>< 
 
 078" 
 
 ]8:t''7 
 
 18;J'^ 
 
 183«, 18:i''' 
 
 «re to pagoi. 
 
 SwHiiii r. Il(>u8mnn UIO" 
 
 Sweet i: Slieriimn 257'", \)~W'* 
 
 Swi'i((«rt i: liicliarda I'J'Jl*'''* 
 
 Swift r. Mum. &c. Co. ai>l« 
 
 Swift Kietiric lAf^Ut Co. v. Grant 078M 
 Swinit r. French 427'" 
 
 Swinnerton r. Columbia Ini. Co. 21*', 21* 
 Synie v. Stewart b'I\ &2'» 
 
 St(M'kbriilKe i: West StoukbridKu 
 SlokcH V. II. S. 
 Story i>. Kimball 
 
 r. I<<ivett 
 
 Stralton ''. Ilawkw 
 StrauHS c. Hodeker 
 
 r. (iroBS 
 
 Street V. State 
 Strickler i>. Burkliolder 
 Strinijfellow v. State 
 Strode t'. (-hurchill 
 Stroii({ i>. Bradley 
 
 I'. Brewer 
 
 Slrotlicr r. (Christy 
 
 V. liUcas 
 
 Stroud I). Tilton 
 
 Stuart r. Havens 
 
 Stubbs V. State 
 
 Studley ». Hall 
 
 Stud«till I'. State 
 
 Stiill I'. ThonipHon 
 
 Stiinnn r. Huniniel 
 
 Slurla V. Freccirt 
 
 Succession of Delauhaise ''■ Magin 
 
 nis 
 Succession of .Fustiis 
 Sur'cession of Morvant 
 Sullivan r. Collins 
 
 V. Coin. 
 
 r. I lense 
 
 I'. Kuykendall 
 
 r. I.ear 
 
 r. State 
 
 V. Sulliviin 
 
 Sumner r, Hiiiir 
 
 Sun Accident Ahs. r. King 
 
 SuKi|iH!lianna, &c. Ins. Co. t 
 
 dorf 
 Sutton I'. .Tohnslono 
 Swain V. (Jliciicy 
 
 - V. Comslock 
 Swan V. Humplireys 
 u. Morgan 
 
 1171»'« 
 
 I22!»'"' 
 
 117!>w 
 
 I221r- 
 
 3riH" 
 
 8(»8-^i 
 
 808'"' 
 
 267', 2f)7'^' 
 
 27tr' 
 
 f»78* 
 
 inic", ii-ir* 
 
 117!l»'* 
 
 122l»-i' 
 
 117IM* 
 
 122(V'^ r-WIK-e 
 
 403", 40:5», 403"', 4(J3« 
 
 a(i6»", 806", ;Mi6i» 
 
 21i» 
 
 «22W 
 
 21« 
 
 ;]«i6'' 
 
 11 70" 
 
 27«« 
 
 11711'"' 
 
 1229", 122H''''' 
 
 808'' 
 
 470» 
 
 21" 
 
 183"' 
 
 808« 
 
 470« 
 
 IP.O^' 
 
 978M, "I?*"* 
 
 •.)10"< 
 
 Mar- 
 
 368», SiW-) 
 
 62'^' 
 
 403'^ 4«3^' 
 
 211.1 
 
 fl22'" 
 
 462" 
 
 TviT r. H'lll 
 
 Talbot c. Seaman 
 Talbott r. Hedge 
 Tains V. Bullitt 
 Tarbox v. State 
 Tate I'. I'enne 
 
 v. Tate 
 
 Taulnian c State 
 Taylor, AV 
 Taylor ». Bank 
 
 V. Crockett 
 
 r. Fvans 
 
 I', (iodfrey 
 
 /'. (iould 
 
 r. Horsey 
 
 .•. reck 
 
 .-. K. U. 
 
 r. State 
 
 391* 
 
 fi2'\ 117U» 
 
 12293*, ]2'.".fW 
 
 2I8« 
 
 267'" 
 
 «22» 
 
 4&2«, C22'», 022'«, (136< 
 
 91()'» 
 
 891 » 
 
 1179W 
 
 808*', wm 
 
 022? 
 
 462* 
 891U 
 
 664' 
 
 301", 664 1» 
 
 688', 688'«, 688-', 
 
 078", 97h"' 
 
 (;22"'' 
 
 688» 
 
 1229'" 
 
 267" 
 
 257«'', 267M 
 
 62« 
 
 470< 
 
 Ilell- 
 
 27(1'» 
 
 21"» 
 
 664", 664» 
 
 267« 
 
 R 
 
 Tays i: Carr 
 Teacliont r. People 
 Teall r. Van Wy«!k 
 Tedeiis c. Sehiiiners 
 Teese v. Huntiii|{don 
 Teipel v. HilsendeKcn 
 Temple V. State 
 Temple St. Cable K. 
 
 man 
 Templeton i>. Morgan 
 Tennant v. Dudley 
 Tenney r. Tuttle 
 Tennis v. Rapid Transit Ry. Co. :W\'^ 
 Teiisley r. I'enniman 368'* 
 
 Terra ilaiite R. R. r. Stoekwell :S68i> 
 
 r. V<ielker 62'' 
 
 Terrill r. Bcccher 4(J3'^ 4()3» 
 
 'I'erritory r. Fly 122J1' 
 
 Terry i: Birmingham Nat. Bk. 403" 
 
 Tessmaii ('. Supreme Comn'iiindery ll7tX^' 
 Tessniann n. I'liited Friemls 1179" 
 
 Tt'wksbury c'Vicliulenberg 21"* 
 
 Texas, &e. Coal Co. e. Liiwson 403", 978» 
 
 Texas, &e. R. R. i: Barron 
 
 8W1»« 
 
 c. Black 
 
 21«l 
 
 v Chapman 
 
 62< 
 
 V. Robertson 
 
 .191 '• 
 
 Thayer c Boyle 
 
 267*. 267" 
 
 Tlieilmnnn r. Burg 
 
 21 It 
 
 Third Nat. Bank c. Owen 
 
 978' 
 
 Thoni r. Hess 
 
 564>-', 664'» 
 
 Thomas c Com. 
 
 21'". 2r« 
 
 r. Dunn 
 
 1229* 
 
 v. Haniniond 
 
 808' 
 
 >: llerrall 
 
 SOI"" 
 
 V. (iago 
 
 664« 
 
AMKItlCAN TAULK OK CASKS. 
 
 KeferoiK'Os are to paK"*- 
 
 Tlinmni r. Ciriflin 
 
 r. Keniuuly 
 
 r. I'eoplu 
 
 I'. State 
 
 r. ThoinnN 
 
 Tlininpitdii i>, Bfll 
 
 c. Kisxtoii 
 
 I'. Kriu Kail way Co. 
 
 V. liiTniiin Valley K. Co, 
 
 ,: llnskuH 
 
 '•. IhIi 
 
 i: Maxwell 
 
 r, Miianer 
 
 r. Stnto 
 
 V. Stownrt 
 
 r. Wcrtz 
 
 Tli()iii8(>n I', I'ortcr 
 
 (W2" 
 
 HOM-' 
 
 IW, 267'w. IT)?'* 
 
 lli-J'.t" 
 
 1h;!>- 
 w»«-'i 
 
 iip" 
 
 .•HM'*' 
 
 WW" 
 
 llV'.t". IIT'.M' 
 
 1»7H'-. '.ITH*" 
 
 21», llTil^, II7iii» 
 
 »7H" 
 
 4(5.')l, 403«. •lO.J'a 
 
 TlioiiiNoii-IIouHtoii Elcutric Co. r 
 
 riiliner .n.W*' 
 TliDriiton r. Thornton 1)7SW, Jl7«f""' 
 'riirirp V. (ioi'woy (122" 
 'riiruslier i'. Kvurlmrt 62'*, W'' 
 r. Ingram IHO", 117'J'''. 1I7'.»•'^ 
 
 ll7'J-», ll71t-7 
 ThrcadKill v. White &rt\i 
 
 'riiiirnian i<. Caiiu'ron 117'.>'" 
 
 'I'liiinnond i'. (Mark wm* 
 
 'I'liurdton r. Mastorion 1220«, 122".t-* 
 
 r. Whitney 010", IMO'-' 
 
 Tilihalsi V. IfDunil :!oK" 
 
 Tilk r. I'arHon* :(Hl" 
 
 'rilli.-, 'I'ho ih:i« 
 
 'l"illoti<on I'. Warner 1170''», 1 WiC' 
 
 r. WohJwr ll7'.t'' 
 
 TiiiKley r. Kairhaven Land Co. ;i'.M " 
 
 Tinker r. State 21''» 
 
 TiHclale r. Conn. &c. In*. Co. !«;»'■"' 
 
 Titus r. Ash 257", '2u''^, '.•78'" 
 
 Tolmcco Co. I'. MuElwco A') I'* 
 
 Tohins r. Treist 07H'- 
 
 Tol.in r. Sluur IS/F*. ;!'.tl»'' 
 
 Todd r. Itowlcv 257*' 
 
 Toledo, &f. M.'n. V. Bailey '.t7S'J 
 
 Tolinan v. Knier«on IhW", 18.T», 1221t*' 
 
 r. Wiird WW-t 
 
 ToLson I'. Iidand, &<!. Congting Co. 270'' 
 Tome i: I'arkeriliurK Branch U. It. 
 
 122'J-", V22f.V^ 
 Tondinson r. (Ireenfluld 21*' 
 
 ToinH r. Heche (122" 
 
 Tooker r. (iornier 551' 
 
 Toole r. Nieiiol 1I7«»' 
 
 Tooiiier I'. <tnilMiion •l(t;i<'> 
 
 Toplitz r. Iledden *MH** 
 
 Torlierti'. WiUon 1I71)-'" 
 
 Tottenc. II. S. (122'" 
 
 Towie r. Hhike :H»1 *' 
 
 Town of So. Ottawa i'. IVrkins 21'" 
 
 TowiiMi'iid r. State fi2' 
 
 Traction Co. c Hoard of Wnrku 11711', 
 1171V*'. 1171)11, ii7<HJ, H7'.i<'' 
 Traniincl! c Ilndnion 452" 
 
 r. McDade l)7K*> 
 
 I'. I'ilnriin WW' 
 
 TravollcrH Inn. Co. i-. Sheppnrd 391'«,;«)1"* 
 
 I Traviii r. Hrown 
 Trcnicr r. Stewart 
 Trinihle r. Kdwarda 
 Trout I-. Virxinia K. It. 
 Trujillo r. Terr. 
 Tucker r. Constable 
 c. Donald 
 
 /'. Kiiicli 
 
 c. Hyatt 
 
 ('. IVaHleo 
 
 c. Smith 
 
 f. State 
 
 r. WeUh 
 
 Tudor Iron Works i>. Weber 
 Tufts r. Charlcstown 
 Tnley r. Harton 80H' 
 
 Tully r. Kitchburn U. K. 
 Tunstall r. ('oltb 
 TurnbuU v. I'ayson 
 
 cell 
 
 1221V''' 
 
 21" 
 
 21"', ;158" 
 
 52'' 
 
 078-', '.t78-:.' 
 
 ;('.»i'' 
 
 (122'' 
 
 122'J'''' 
 
 2W, .•t'.tl'' 
 
 4I2», n2'» 
 
 21" 
 
 U78'» 
 
 805'' 
 
 554" 
 
 wrn'T 
 
 !t(l5'J 
 
 r. Kichardson 
 
 Turner r. Dewiin 
 
 c. Kish 
 
 V. Lulling 
 
 r. State 
 
 i: Turner 
 
 r. Waddington 
 
 r. Warren 
 
 Turner's Kstatc 
 Tiirney r. State 
 Turnipseed o. Hawkins 
 Turnpike ('o. r. lleani 
 Tuttle I-. Fitchliurg K. U. 
 
 I', (iridley 
 
 I'. Hainey 
 
 Tutton r. Darke 
 Tyhh-n r. Hiillen 
 Tyler c. Flanders 
 
 c. Old Colony U. R. 
 
 r. Todd 
 
 Tyson r. Uootli 
 
 808" 
 
 :i»i5"<, 
 
 122!l'\ I221>"» 
 
 •2l\ 1171»'", 1171V'-. 
 
 Il71t'» 
 
 21H' 
 
 452'' 
 
 21" 
 
 257" 
 
 306'», 47()» 
 
 8()8-'> 
 
 117'.t" 
 
 (122" 
 
 (»22» 
 
 078'" 
 
 1221M> 
 
 257" 
 
 257' 
 
 010", '.»I(»" 
 
 2r« 
 
 1221>'» 
 427' 
 
 :iiir* 
 
 1221H7 
 
 267'« 
 
 Ui.oKHzooK i: Com. 2W; ;jr.5» 
 
 lldy I'. Stewart 52", '.Wt'^ 
 
 I'fford r. Spaiilding 52"'' 
 ridman /•. Arnlioldt.&c. Brewing Co. 18;5'i 
 
 nimiiii r Hahcock 122'.)"? 
 
 Union r. IMaintlehl 427", 427* 
 
 I'nioii Hunk r. Kiiapp 4(1:1'", 4(1:1^ 
 
 I'nion I'ac. K. U. v. Botsford :!(I5', ;JC.5'>, 
 
 ;i()5"' 
 
 — I'. Kcese 
 I'nion Stove Wks. 
 I'lils 
 
 ». Arnoux 
 
 1' S 
 
 Clwirllon 
 I'. Aiiiedy 
 
 ;i(15'« 
 
 1»78« 
 
 808'' 
 
 <.t77" 
 
 117!V'« 
 
 21"" 
 
 I's;!* 
 isn*", l8:i''« 
 
 52> 
 
 21" 
 
 ((MM) American OoUi Coin 
 
 ■ I'. Anthony 
 ' r. Halicoirk 
 ' r. Haltlste 
 •r. Heche 21', 21-'". I17!V* 
 
 ■ r. Hredenieyer 257'"'', 257''' 
 i: Hritlon :t58i" 
 r. Hums 21-!' 
 c. Charlos 022" 
 .•. Collins JW6» 
 
 
 llilit'l 
 
 :^iii 
 
4* * 
 
 AMKIMCAN TAHLR OF CASKS. 
 
 1 1 
 j 
 
 'U 
 
 
 KefereiirflH are tn ptgei. 
 
 
 U. S. V. Ducourncau 
 
 21"" 
 
 Vicknair i^ Trngclair 
 
 8n8J", ditf'" 
 
 c. Fuller 
 
 21", 21'" 
 
 Vickgburg U. K. «. t )'Brien atH '". .'I'.il "', 
 
 —— V. (■(><iiiiii({ 
 
 WVi 
 
 
 aui-', '.tTM^i 
 
 i\ (iunncll 
 
 267*' 
 
 /•. Putnam 
 
 H'.il"'' 
 
 i: llaiiwiiy 
 
 oar.i 
 
 Vijjnie v. Mrady 
 
 8(»8.» 
 
 V. llanii'H 
 
 (•.«6" 
 
 Vi^uH r. O'liannoii 
 
 27(1» 
 
 r. 1 lay ward 
 
 27ti< 
 
 Nillajie of Ponca »•. Craw 
 
 ford 'iSW" 
 
 V. Illlltll 
 
 47(t' 
 
 VilhiKf of Winoohki v. Gi 
 
 key 21 1« 
 
 1'. Jac'kiilow 
 
 21 M 
 
 Vinal r. (iilinan 
 
 4:«t'» 
 
 I', •lack.xoii 
 
 2 Hi 
 
 Vincent v. Siata 
 
 \nW; OlO", 1II0--J 
 
 I'. Jolin-; 21^ 
 
 1170», inSH"' 
 
 ViniiiK r. Baker 
 
 18:r-* 
 
 a. jDurilinc 
 
 J5'.»F'i 
 
 Vinton <•. Peck ?A\N\ Vl'l^f't, 1229«. 122iri 
 
 V. KIrkwiMMl 
 
 r>H«i 
 
 Violet V. Bose 
 
 1221 1^" 
 
 
 21 u 
 
 Volkenaiid r. Drum 
 
 808-'» 
 
 .-. Mayflild 
 
 WMl' 
 
 Voorhies r. IlennenHy 
 
 808^" 
 
 r. MoHi'g 
 
 «22« 
 
 Vosburnh r. Thayer 
 
 4fl.T', 4r,.:« 
 
 V. Niirdullo 
 
 JJ'.tH^t 
 
 VoHc V. .Manly 
 
 n7it-'« 
 
 /•. Nott 
 
 688>«, 6HK-'i 
 
 Vrietg r. Hmkko 
 
 27(i"> 
 
 r. I'alriier 
 
 2H 
 
 
 
 i;. Heyburn 
 
 ;;r.K-i 
 
 
 
 !•. Keyni-g 
 
 21' 
 
 Wadi.ki.i: v. N. Y. Sc. B. 
 
 B. 8nr« 
 
 V. Kiciiard 
 
 5«H-'-' 
 
 WaddinKhiini r. Iliilett 
 
 257«, 2f)7« 
 
 c. Ititcliie 
 
 21" 
 
 Waddinf^ton v. CoiiKing 
 
 122'.^'" 
 
 f. KoKg 
 
 183««, 1HH*7 
 
 Waddle r. Owen 
 
 MIH' 
 
 !•. Sfliiii'ider 
 
 470' < 
 
 Wade r. State 
 
 nio«, iMO" 
 
 c. 'reschiiiuker 
 
 2im. 
 
 Wakefield v. Boss 
 
 lilO", Ul()''» 
 
 V. Turner 
 
 21'" 
 
 WailiritlKe r .loiieg 
 
 427' 
 
 <•. Inion I'nc. K. U. 
 
 21-<1 
 
 Waideler. N. V. (Vn. &c. 
 
 R. 470' 
 
 r. Vim Liiiveii 
 
 r,:jiy> 
 
 VValden r. Canfidd 
 
 2r" 
 
 ,: VaiisK'klo 2G7« 257", Vf."'" 
 
 V. Finch 
 
 <I78-'^ 
 
 — — r. WJKKiiiH 
 
 IHiJJ', 1I7!)'' 
 
 Walker r. Allen 
 
 2111ft 
 
 V. Williams 
 
 6H8'" 
 
 V. ("urtis 
 
 r)2" 
 
 V. Wood 
 
 fl;{6i, ^•.:^^)J 
 
 r. Detroit, &c. B. U. 
 
 270", 1>78'" 
 
 i;. S. Bank r. Biini:.n 
 
 4(W»-i 
 
 V. Greenlee 
 
 ;J68i 
 
 U. S. SiiKar Hefinery v. E. 
 
 P. Alli« 
 
 r. MnrBeilles 
 
 4621 
 
 Co. 
 
 3r)8'> 
 
 V. Murray 
 
 427» 
 
 U. S. Vinegar Co. v. Foclirenbach 117»'-^ 
 
 V. Sanborn 
 
 (122' 
 
 
 
 V. State 470-, 
 
 [i&8i, 010*. f»l(»i«. 
 
 Vaiii.e v. RrackonBeik 
 
 2119, 21-* 
 
 r. .Steele 
 
 122'.l«» 
 
 Valentine c. I'ipor 
 
 18.'5^^ 122'J5" 
 
 V. Stetson 
 
 f)2''' 
 
 Van Alotyne »•. Smith 
 
 tl22^ Wt8-'i 
 
 — V. Wheatly 
 
 8(I8-H 
 
 Van Bokkelen v. Taylor 
 
 H(W', mit^' 
 
 Wall r. l)ov(.y 
 
 4(];5ii, 4(iii« 
 
 Van Himkirk v. Mulock 
 
 1171t", IK'.M-i 
 
 Wallace r. Fletcher 
 
 183*', 18:(<H 
 
 Vance v. Vance 
 
 2'')7'" 
 
 !•. Ilarrig 
 
 18;5-'« 
 
 Vamlcrlin i> ilovia 
 
 W)8'' 
 
 r. Howard 
 
 427« 
 
 Vandorvoort /•. Coiimibian 
 
 In».Co. 1170W 
 
 I'. Kennolly 
 
 218* 
 
 Vanderwerkcr r. People 
 
 2r.*' 
 
 r. State 
 
 4701* 
 
 Van DeiiKen r. Turner 
 
 412'' 
 
 r. Towngcnd 
 
 «f)8" 
 
 Van (;iinden r. Vn. Coal & Iron Co. 8f.Hii 
 
 White 
 
 2r,76< 
 
 Van Kirk i: Scott 
 
 808' 
 
 Waller i-. Klevei-th School District it-Wi* 
 
 Van Hi per r. Morton 
 
 117!ti 
 
 V. Graves 
 
 2* 
 
 Van Sickle r. Gibson 
 
 427" 
 
 Walgton r. Com. 
 
 4701S 470*i>* 
 
 r. People 
 
 P22JK"' 
 
 Walter r. lloelTner 
 
 S»78'« 
 
 Van Storch v. Griffin 
 
 2.-)7*' 
 
 Walton r. Coulsoii 1831 
 
 7, 122',ii', I22!ti», 
 
 Van Svckcl v. Dalrymple 
 
 808'" 
 
 
 122!)-'i, 1221t'K' 
 
 Van Wyck v. Mclntogh 
 
 1220", 122fV'', 
 
 Ward, Kstate of 
 
 4(i:!-" 
 
 
 r^aiK-", i22<««=' 
 
 Ward V. Henry 
 
 21 19 
 
 VnnK'n Case 
 
 470", 47016 
 
 1'. Mclntogh 
 
 18H« 
 
 Vamlne v. Wilding 
 
 IKi'i* 
 
 c. Saunderg 
 
 ino"", ii7'.»«« 
 
 Vau|;lian c. Com. 
 
 4701-, WX^* 
 
 r, State 
 
 6881* 
 
 r. State 
 
 ♦i:ir^ 
 
 c. Vounp; 
 
 !»78''' 
 
 Velfen >■. Carmack 
 
 808*> 
 
 Ware v. Ware 
 
 276". 270i« 
 
 Viall I'. Smith 
 
 427», 42711 
 
 Warener i". Kin);f)mitl 
 
 1170» 117<.t« 
 
 Vickers v. Battershall 
 
 8(>8''» 
 
 Waring i-. U. S. Telg. Co 
 
 664* 
 
 W( 
 
AMKKK'A.N TAHLK OF CA.SES. 
 
 I'l'liii 
 
 Warlick r. Wliite 
 WuriiiT r. Colli. 
 
 r. State 
 
 Warri-ii r. Cliapnian 
 
 c. (iabrit'l 
 
 WaitlniliaiiKli c. Kiitrikvii 
 WHHiiiiiKloii I'. Stall- 
 Watfriiiaii r. Wliiiiiey 
 WalkliiN r. Iloliiiaii 
 
 /■. I'aiiK- 
 
 WatroiiB r. McOnw 
 WatKim r. liruwHtur 
 
 r. (Join. 
 
 ,: Millor 
 
 r. Tindal 
 
 V. Walker 
 
 Wattti I-. Kilburn 
 
 /'. Owens 
 
 Waii-kon-cliaw-iU'ck-knw r 
 Wi.y c. Uiitterwortli 
 
 r. t'ross 
 
 WeHtlieruly v. W'eatlifi-.sly 
 Wi'aver »'. (iaingvillo 
 
 i: McKllieiior 
 
 r. Wliil.Iuii 
 
 Wi'lil) V. State 
 Wi'l)l(er I'. Dunn 
 WelKT r. Cable l{y. Co. 
 
 r. Illin)( 
 
 Webster r. ('allien 
 
 c. Wootilbnl 
 
 Weiluwood'g Ciiso 
 Wcekit i». MciUer 
 Weitnmn c. 'I'liiot 
 Welch 0. Abbot 
 Welder e. Mc(7onib 
 
 306", ;itir)-' 
 lIT'.t'" 
 
 1»7«-''' 
 07H-», II78* 
 
 llT'.t';' 
 \)~H*!; 1»7H'» 
 .'!'J|'», ;l',M" 
 
 1I71M 
 
 ll7'.i-'i 
 
 il»l'", 4'1'\ \'2-M» 
 
 ((:;.)«, (CliV 
 
 HOH"", 1»7.S', '.»7«" 
 
 ih;i'" 
 
 21-, 117'J'«, n7!t«, U7i»'i 
 
 r-'-_'i»\ i2'j!ii" 
 
 Re(er«ii<'«i am to iwgea. 
 
 WliilHker i\ Sulinbury 
 
 U.S. 
 
 •J27" 
 
 it7H''' 
 
 (•.22--' 
 
 4tl;ii« 
 
 HOHl'i 
 
 W1H"> 
 
 •-M-' 
 
 12-", I"' 
 
 '.t78'^ '.t7H-:< 
 
 62" 
 
 HOHA 
 
 11 7111' 
 
 HOH-M 
 
 1171M' 
 
 WI8'« 
 
 I'JJ'.t-i 
 
 078", '.t7H"" 
 
 1171)^' 
 
 Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway aOH'', 
 
 6.^)4 n 
 Wells w. Hatch •ItCliJ 
 
 r. Jackson Iron Mfg. Co. 21>«, 21'' 
 
 WellH, &c. K.\. r. Fuller 8')H» 
 
 Welsh V. Barrett -IBIV*. 4(i:r'-i 
 
 r. State 270' 
 
 Weiiilellc. Abbott 412\ 117'.»''i 
 
 Wendt r. St. I'.uil 078««, 078'"', '.178'" 
 
 Wentworth r. Wentworth 18:1"' 
 
 Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co. :J!)P. H'.tl'' 
 West r. Fleek H(I8" 
 
 f. State \SS-\ 18.T''J,452',47(y', 122H-'-. 
 
 12211'" 
 Western U. Tel. Co. v. Cline JJoS'', :!.'iH-i 
 
 I'. Collins nriHii 
 
 r. Ilenilerson oltj'"* 
 
 r. Shutter :;r)H"i 
 
 r. Stevenson .'i.')H' 
 
 Wetherbee r. Dunn 21" 
 
 I'. Xorris 2J7*' 
 
 Welzler r. Kelly *!«' 
 
 Wli.trton I'. DoiiglasB 8M*-< 
 
 Wheat i: State 27tt'' 
 
 Wlieel.lon r. Wilson 2' 
 
 Wheeler c. WeliMer 21^« 
 
 Wheeloek c Boston & Albany R. Co. .V2-> 
 Whelan i'. I.yneh HUlw 
 
 Whitaker i;. I'arker 1221H« 
 
 -•. White 
 
 Wliiteher r. Sbatluck 
 White r. Ballou 
 
 r. Com. 
 
 r. Dwiiiel 
 
 r. Flelliiiitt 
 
 I22y'*, 
 
 l^21»'^ 
 .»i,;i-'' 
 ;iii|'" 
 
 'JlO', iiKI" 
 
 11 TIM" 
 
 l,s;[''' 
 
 i: Milwaukee City K. U. aOi". .•;().)'- 
 
 r. I'litciiix Ins. Co. 21-" 
 
 r. SdIoiiioii 12211'' 
 
 r. State 688' ', 978-', 1)78-"' 
 
 r. Sirollier 427'^ 
 
 i: Whitney 40;{<, 4Cii'», Hi::-' 
 
 r. Wood 122U" 
 
 White Suwiii); Machine Co. v. Gor- 
 don 1220<'> 
 Whitehead v. Jessup 808» 
 
 r. Park 808'' 
 
 Whitehoiise i\ Biekford 117!t'-''. 117'.t'^ 
 WhitiiiK .'. Nieholl 18:i'», 18;i»'\ 18;!'" 
 
 Whitley >: Imj. Life. v<,c. Co. 18:!'" 
 
 i: State 47(1'" 
 
 Whitman r. Morey 1'78-' 
 
 r. Shaw 12211-' 
 
 (-.State 21'-', 21" 
 
 Whitmore v. Dwelling House Ins. 
 
 (;o. 18;!'' 
 
 Whitiiev V. Bacon 412' 
 
 r. Bayley :i.'>8" 
 
 c. Clark 8081' 
 
 r. (iauche 21" 
 
 r. Thacher .'K»l"-- 
 
 r. Wall 808* 
 
 Whitoii e. Albany, &c. Ini. Co. '2V^, 2H' 
 
 117'J', 1171." 
 Whittier i-. Franklin 2.">7*- 
 
 Whitton r. Stale 18;!< 
 
 Wickencanip ».'. Wickencainp 07.->'* 
 
 Wickersimm e. Johnston 52'', 1170H, 
 
 117'J-*', 117»»^ 
 Wijrjjin r. Pluiner 1221t-'' 
 
 Wi^r^il,H Kerry Co. i-. C. & A. It. Co. 21'* 
 Widnlesworth r. Steers 808-"" 
 
 Wike )'. Lijjhtner 
 
 267"' 
 
 Wilber r. Kieholtz 
 
 122!t"- 
 
 Wilbur r. Flood 
 
 078* 078 '1 
 
 Wilburn d. State 
 
 ,n68i' 
 
 Wilcox r. Henderson 
 
 27<|i- 
 
 »'. Cnti- 
 
 808'" 
 
 Wibler r. Cowles 
 
 27f.'' 
 
 Wildriek r. Swain 
 
 80S'ii 
 
 Wiley «. Athol 
 
 ;!0i'' 
 
 V. Kwalt 
 
 «08*>, 808^1 
 
 Wilhelmi r. lA>onard 
 
 1I78'« 
 
 Wilkerson r. State 
 
 470«, 022* 
 
 Will of Khie 
 
 ]8:iw 
 
 Willett V. Kich 
 
 270" 
 
 Williams V. Brickell 
 
 a68»", ;V^8l' 
 
 )'. Com. 
 
 ;ioii 
 
 t>. Conner 
 
 V>'vr'.i 
 
 1'. Deen 
 
 1220^- 
 
 V. Finlay 
 
 C2». 62"! 
 
 ('. Fisher 
 
 8081 
 
 r. Urealy 
 
 62* 
 
 m 
 
 Ml 
 
 liif 
 
 iiiifi 
 
ccliv 
 
 AMEUUUN TAIILK OF CASKS. 
 Re(i<ranci» •!« to pagsf. 
 
 . 1 ,1 
 
 
 Willinma ; . Groy 
 
 r. (lunter 
 
 I'. .Ifiikina 
 
 V. Mitcliull 
 
 f. Mowvr 
 
 I'copio 
 
 36b", 3&8'> 
 mi" 
 S(W'" 
 
 664 > 
 
 Slate 21=". 2r;i, 2r>7««, fJ'S' 6HH"^. 
 r.««"', 688^' 688*,U10*',«78^', 122".!*». 
 
 I221t"" 
 I-. Waucr »7«' 
 
 f. WalkiT 1»78-' 
 
 i>. WiiiLTi n"i8>«. wiH'i 
 
 r. Wilki'n 117»M', Il71»w 
 
 c. WilliHIIIR 
 
 WilliiiiiiHun I'. Hrniidciihorg 
 
 .'. CuniliriilKi! H- K, 
 
 Williiik >. Mili-M 
 WilliH /•. Stiito 
 Willllll^lllly II. Carlctoii 
 c. iH'Wi'jr 
 
 Wills V. Slut.' 
 WilliUT r. Inrill'l 
 
 Wiliiiiiixtdii r. MiirlinKtnn 
 WilHoii I'. Iii-uiu:liuiii|t 
 .'. Itiicrcni 
 
 - c. ( 'Hr|i('iiti>r'ii AUin'r 
 
 r. |)wn 
 
 . . Dcrr 
 
 r. (iiKiilin 
 
 r. (irHiiby 
 
 - I'. lli)(ll('U 
 
 c. Mc(Mi>iiny 
 
 . . M.-lvin 
 
 — — r. Miiim'H|i()liN, &t'.. I 
 c. I'liii-iiix, &u. Co. 
 
 f, ToWlTI 
 
 V. Stale 
 
 n7'.»*' 
 
 •'!■-■? 
 
 ll"'.!'" 
 
 6l!8*>, MH-' 
 
 2l8t 
 
 47(»», 1»7H<" 
 
 •lt):i" 
 
 r. Vim Ia'UI' 
 
 r. W"K,.r 
 
 —— r. \\ Niiii 
 
 r. WrlKlit 
 
 Wilt r. Hir.l 
 
 r. CiilliT 
 
 \Viiiiliii>li I'. Slnlo 
 Wiiiicr I'. Smilli 
 Wilirll r. .N'ciriniui 
 Wiinlir I' l.itllc 
 Wiim . Aliliiill 
 Wiiiiii|iiitfiiKi'i' I<iik(' 
 
 427* 
 47(»i 
 W»8'" 
 
 8(m", KOH" 
 4n;i''' 
 :i!ii*' 
 
 WIH I 
 
 HUH''" 
 
 27«>" 
 
 l{. ;iri8"', :i.')8" 
 
 1I7U-!-' 
 8(W'" 
 i67«", 267", •.t7H«'', lt7N'\ 
 1(7 H« 
 
 2r'»", as-"", ■■■■r, r.'2i»-; 
 ia;j', 4«:i''. m' 
 
 Wiimliiii I', fiinP'T 
 
 Wlll»|l'« !• ('ill t 
 
 1 llrixkfll 
 
 Wiimtoii >'. liroiviiiK 
 Wiiiiirit r Karl 
 Wimjiiin r l(i>i'Vi'ii 
 Wi»i' r. W \ nil 
 
 WiKIIIIIIII !■ N I'uc H H 
 
 WilcliiT r. Mi'I.iiiikIiIiii 
 
 Wllllil' I Unwi' 
 
 Wiiliiirn '' lli-ii«liiiw 
 Willi' I'. i.nrliiiiiiii 
 1 I'i'rrviimii 
 Wolff V. Dyir 
 
 ill;!'* 
 
 t.'.Hl'' 
 
 firil"' 
 
 f.-.f"> 
 
 12VMI"" ' ■J2'.i''''', iVj'.i"' 
 
 ' "iwi', :!,''i8" 
 
 122'.»"' 
 
 427^ 
 
 ;ir.K", .•s.-.Mi ' 
 
 (.'(). r. Viitlllir ".M", 
 2l-''. 21" 
 18; I'" 
 
 AM', 
 
 »78"» 
 
 81 IM'^ 
 
 HOHJ 
 
 I22'.t-' 
 
 127^. 427'. 127' 
 
 jiriM"', ;i.'i8" 
 
 427', 4ti;t'" 
 
 •Mb', ;i(i:.' 
 
 H22I" 
 
 .'t;.H'7 
 
 267'' 
 W>8» 
 
 21" 
 
 Wolfe r. McMillan 
 Wdltfr. Van lloimen 
 Woinack r. licnriiiaii 
 
 r. Wainl.U- 
 
 WiiniliTly r. Iliilincii Lumber Cu. 
 WockI v. ('Iielwuiiii 
 
 I', ("iillen 
 
 V. Mc(iuire's Children 
 
 I'. Moriarty 
 
 — r. r. s. 
 
 W llH'i'k r. Keller 
 
 WiiiiilliriilKe. &c. Co. v. Hiller 
 
 808« 
 
 tt78<» 
 
 IK*'", 117'.»''» 
 
 Kllh« 
 
 Wt8» 
 
 1122' 
 
 :».i8'«' 
 
 l»78ft» 
 
 8118^ 
 
 2ri7i» 
 
 r.;j6i, ii;i6» 
 n7'.t« 
 
 Wouilbury r. Dintriet of Columbia 1)78'*, 
 
 II78W 
 
 f. Wooilliury 4t.:!" 
 
 Wooilbury (iranilc Co. r. Milliken Ct'^' 
 Wooilfonl I . VcCleiialiaii 12.'ll ', r.'2'.t-" 
 Wiioilnian r. Sr^iir 
 Woiiilrii'k r. Woodriuk 
 WoniU I', naiika 
 
 r. rcoplo 
 
 I . Wililer 
 
 Wiioilwiir'l I'. CliicaRo, &c 
 
 r. llnncoi'k 
 
 r. I.envilt 
 
 Wiioilwnrlli I. Mills 
 Wiiolfork i: Slali- 
 WoolKy r. 'rnmii'i'it 
 Wiiiilverloii I' Siiiiuier 
 ' VooHler r SiHir 
 Woolen r. WilkiiiM 
 iVorcexler .N'al. Itaiik v. 
 
 r. NorllilioriiU|;li 
 
 WiirLiiiKnii'ii'ii Itiink 
 Wiirlcy, Ailiii. I'. Ilini'Mian 
 WiiriiiHilorf r. Di'iriiil, &u. Ity. 
 Wi>r||iiiiKii)n r. Scribner 
 Wriiy r. Wniy 
 Wri'ire r. Winlcott 
 Wriulil r. liny 
 
 r. Ilawkinii 
 
 r. ilerm-V 
 
 I III. Hr. Tel. Co. 
 
 I'. MrKee 
 
 U It. 
 
 122'.ti». 1221I"' 
 1)7 8«« 
 1 1 7'.H<'i 
 2fi7'« 
 2 1*' 
 21 " 
 
 «22-'« 
 
 2/i7^« 
 
 2ri7'«. fiHMJ 
 
 1178'* •, ll7'.i''' 
 IMO'" 
 
 ;r.ti''i 
 
 47(1' 
 
 21 • 
 
 117!!' 
 
 2I'« 
 
 1h;p« 
 
 2fi7'' 
 
 Cheney 
 Con Verve 
 
 Wroe 
 
 l'liilli|i« 
 Skinner 
 Smif 
 Wrij;lit 
 v Stale 
 
 Wynn e. Cily, \f 
 Wynne r. Stale 
 
 (122!'. (122" 
 
 I8;i'i 
 
 664'. !<W> 
 
 H(IH''' 
 
 21", 2I''' 
 
 I22<.f" 
 
 (122« 
 
 2 1 ■■''• 
 
 l8:i-t 
 
 fih8« 
 
 21 8«, 2;(1'" 
 
 2r.7w, 47(»'», 4V0''. •.•78". 
 
 u. It ;i..8« 
 
 WI6'* 
 
 VATK.ar. Slate r>8W". r.88J'. 
 
 IV Ynlei. r.'21H« 
 
 Veamley'ii .\|i|m'iiI 4(l!l''' 
 
 Veal. Ill ••. Try ai'. 21" 
 
 Veil iv Lane 2I« 
 
 V.rVi" !■. Naliomil Hank 2I» 
 
 York r. IVnue li78''« 
 
 Viirk. Hif. K. Co. V. Winani 21' 
 
 ViMin I' l.amiint -i(W 
 
 Vminjf r. Hank of Aluxainlrla 1170*' 
 
 V. Hrailv 1'7H«'' 
 
 r. Cluiniller 117U'^ 
 
YouiiR !• Clapp 
 
 V. {\»n. 
 
 i: Jiiliiivon 
 
 r. M»kf|K)»ce 
 
 c. W.mmI 
 
 Yotiiigu V. Uuilbe«u 
 
 AMKUICAN TAHI.K OK (;AH1<><. 
 KefereUL'U wra tu pfit, 
 
 IH:!*" Youiik« <■ lIi'iTiivr 
 
 b88"* 
 
 mlr' 
 
 978'" 
 
 117U*' 
 
 YuUlil r. Uuwi-ll 
 
 Ztti.t II ('. Ilirt 
 /vllfrtiiii'li I'. AlltMibirg 
 i^uliluwiki V. bttttu 
 
 crlv 
 
 «7h" 
 
 I 
 
( ccxvii ) 
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 FAIUOBArnB ((() 
 
 »E«1.2,o. 10 916 
 
 46K(l. .1 1488, M89 
 
 '26 H. 8. c. i:i, HR. 2, 13 200 
 
 v.. M 963a 
 
 27 II. H, o. IB 1120 
 
 1 & 2 r. & M. 11. 13 8KH 
 
 2& 3 P. & M. o. 10 888 
 
 CKI. c. 9, H. 12 I24(i, 1270 
 
 v.'Hi 1120 
 
 13 Kl. <•. ft I.-iO 
 
 31 Kl. <!./»,». 5 7.'iu 
 
 IJ. 1,.!. 11, n. 2 200 
 
 7 J. 1,0. 12 709 
 
 21 J. I, 0. 10 73, 091, 744 
 
 H. 3 73, 716 
 
 10(;. 1, <!. 18, Ir 888 
 
 12('. 2, 0. 24, HH. 8, 9 UK) 
 
 14 & 16 0. 2,.!. 2, Ir 1770 
 
 17 & 18 C. 2,0. 2, M. .'.. Ir 1770 
 
 19 (1. 2, o. (•), H. 2 200 
 
 22 & 23 C. 2, f. 10 1(18 
 
 2» (;. 2, 
 
 0. 3 1000 
 
 M. 1 1001, 1019, 1107 
 
 •. 2 1001 
 
 1. 3 1002, 1107 
 
 a. 4., 1019, 1021. W\l, lOiltiA, 
 1009, 1107, 1143 
 
 ■. 6 1062 
 
 M. 7, 8, 9 1010, 1107 
 
 a. 17 ....loio, 102.>. 103011, 
 
 1039a. 1013. 1011. 
 
 loi,'>, 1107 
 
 0. 7, H. 446 
 
 7 W. 3. 
 
 o. 3 9.".S 
 
 H. 1.. 1188 
 
 a. 2 800, 9,'>2,\ 
 
 n. 4 O.ViA 
 
 iw. .'i, "tl 
 
 •>. 8 M2fl, 06(1 
 
 0. 12, Ir 1000 
 
 n. 1, Fr 1001, 1001 
 
 a. 3, Ir lO.V.' 
 
 HH. 10, 11, 12, Ir 1010 
 
 a. 21, Ir 1020 
 
 PARAOBAPm (}f) 
 
 11 4 12 W. 3, o. 7, B8. 8, 9, 10. . 1714 
 
 12 & 13 W. 3, o. 2, a. 3 14.68a 
 
 13 W. 3, o. 3, a. 2 968 
 
 4 A. n. 16, M. 20 1110 
 
 6 A. o. 18, H. 2 KI.ViA 
 
 A. 0. 2, Ir 1127 
 
 0. 7, H. 3 76 
 
 c. 18 200 
 
 0. 3ft, a. 17 1062a 
 
 7A. 0. 11 76 
 
 0. 20 1127, 1C.62B 
 
 a. 1 1110 
 
 0.21 968, 1373 
 
 a. ft 886 
 
 M. 11 1360, 1373, 1488 
 
 10 A. o. 18 1863 
 
 1 U. 1, Nt. 2, 0. 6, aa. 1, 6 1714 
 
 a. 8 76 
 
 8 O. I, o. 24, a. 1 1714 
 
 no. 1, c. 30, M. 16 127a 
 
 2 a. 2, 0. 23, H. 23 4.60 
 
 4 (J. 2, V. 37, H. 9 1714 
 
 6 (J. 2, V. .30, M. 1 286 
 
 8 (}. J, c. (i, a. 21 166'.'A 
 
 9 0. 2. <!. .'■), Ir 1011 
 
 11 (J. 2, 
 
 v. 19, H. 14 981a 
 
 MH. 20, 21 316 
 
 1ft (>. 2, f. 34 290 
 
 17 O. 2. 
 
 «i. 3. a. 2 30 
 
 H. 3 1604 
 
 18(1. 2, <•. 30 1714 
 
 26(1. 2, (>. 14, Ir 1611 
 
 2 (i. 3, c. 28 1070 
 
 6(1. 3, p. 21, a. 1, Ir 1488 
 
 eu. 3, 
 
 0. 36 371 
 
 c. 63, a. 3 968 
 
 9(». 3, 0. 16 74 
 
 11 it 12 O. 3,0. 8, Ir 1648 
 
 12 (J. 3, 
 
 o. 19, K. 3, Ir 1611 
 
 0.24 1714 
 
 >'•/. /. tndt MiM 4 U7I. 
 
IJMH 
 
 ItfH 
 
 h I 
 
 CCXVlll 
 
 13 O. 3, 
 
 0. 6" 
 
 TAMLK OF STATII'I F:!* CITED. 
 
 a. (4 . 
 
 PABAOnAI'IIH 'f^ 
 ,'.IM» 
 
 aw ific:. 
 
 mi) 
 
 ftoo 
 
 24 (. 
 
 IA-24 
 lit) 
 
 i:«i» 
 
 1 110 1 
 
 ili, M. 74, 76 i:i'2» 
 
 K.H'. Aim 
 
 •. 81 500, 1324 
 
 26(1. 3, 
 
 o. 67 1324 
 
 «. 2H r>oo 
 
 H. :J8 IH.'.l 
 
 27 a. 3, o. 16, H. H, Ir i.i4 U 
 
 •.Via. 3, 0. 60, w. 1, 2, 3, 4 42 
 
 33 <r 8, 
 
 I!. 62, a. 62 1333 
 
 o. 07,11. H 70 
 
 S4 (;. 3, o. 04 1676, lOHO 
 
 37 (>. 3, 0. 70, «. 1 1714 
 
 «H O. 8, 
 
 n.26,i.a 1270 
 
 o. 87 7H7 
 
 10 k 40 U. 3, n. 03. . . .867, 96H. i:U>0, 
 
 1373, 14HH 
 
 11 (!. a, 
 
 II. 00, H. 
 
 (I. 100, H. 11 
 
 M. 33, 34 
 
 H. 36 
 
 42 G. 3, 
 
 r. H6 
 
 N. 3 600, 1324 
 
 c. 107,a. 1 371 
 
 43 U. 3. 
 
 «. .'.H HO, HI 
 
 I-. 140 1272, 1276 
 
 44 (J. 3. .!. 102 1272, 1274 
 
 4.'. (I. 3,(1. 02 I20H 
 
 H. 3 l2fU 
 
 N. 4 12111 
 
 40 < J. 3; 0. 37 1403 
 
 ftO (I. 3, P. 102, M. a, Ir 47V, 400 
 
 62 O. 3,0. 140 MHO, lilOO 
 
 a. 1 001 
 
 ■. A 061, 1604 
 
 A3 O. 3, 
 
 r. 127, «. 1 I2H7 
 
 r. 141 H46 
 
 64 (i. 3, (!. 60, N. 4 1107 
 
 r,f,(i. 3, 0. 104 370a 
 
 AO(i. 3, 
 
 V. 87. ». 3, Ir 472, 400 
 
 <•. 160 1714 
 
 67 I). 3, c. 00, N. 1 2H2 
 
 AOO. »& 1 (1. 4, 
 
 II. 1,11. 7 70 
 
 n. 4, *. H 14HH 
 
 I A 2 O. 4, (1. 24, Ir. . .HMO, 062a, 060 
 
 N. 2, Ir HOT. 06H, 
 
 1.360, 1373, I4HH 
 
 3 O. 4, PARAORAPIIR m) 
 
 u. :iO, m. 1. 2, 3 1I20A, 1401« 
 
 MH. 6, 1401c 
 
 ■ •••••••I 
 
 o. 120, HM. 66, 67 
 NN. 72, 73 
 
 4 (}. 4,fl. 76, N. 21 .. 
 
 6 G. 4, 
 
 0. 83, « 
 n. 84, R. 
 
 M. 24 . , 
 n. 06. Ha. 2, 9 
 u. 113. H. .. 
 G. 4, c. AC, N. 
 n. 10 
 a. 21 
 aa. 23, 24. .668, 660, 600 
 
 7 0.4, 
 
 0. 46, aa. 4, 6 1601, 1778 
 
 a. 293 
 
 a. 13 73a 
 
 n, 04 HHM 
 
 a. 2 4H4 
 
 a. 3 484, a03 
 
 a. 4 402 
 
 N. 1234a 
 
 003 
 
 1604 
 
 70 
 
 1371 
 
 22 1267a 
 
 1012 
 1203 
 1714 
 1604 
 1604 
 1373 
 
 a. 14 
 N. 10 
 a. 20 
 a. 22 
 
 203 
 
 206 
 
 2H0 
 
 1263 
 
 a. 23 1264, 1260 
 
 aa. 24, 26, 27 1264 
 
 a. 20 r;67 
 
 a. 28 1267a 
 
 a. 3t 1234a 
 
 7 ft 8 G. 4, 
 
 0. 27 . . 
 
 
 
 
 .... 371 
 
 a, 
 
 II .. 
 
 
 
 .... 1012 
 
 0. 20. a. 
 
 26 .. 
 
 
 
 . . . 200 
 
 «'. 63, a. 
 
 42 .. 
 
 
 
 ... 1488 
 
 a. 
 
 74 .. 
 
 
 
 ... 1322 
 
 OG. 4, 
 
 0. 14, a. 
 
 a. 
 
 1.... 
 
 3 
 
 4 .... 
 
 .73, 
 
 600, 
 .QUI 
 
 744. 746. 
 
 771, 1073 
 
 , t>!i2, <iU3 
 
 .'44 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' m4 
 
 a. 
 a. 
 
 6 ... 
 
 7 .... 
 
 1034 
 
 n, U 
 
 (• . '16, 
 1107 
 
 ... 1020 
 
 0. 16 .. 
 
 
 
 
 .220, 24H 
 
 0. 31 . . 
 
 
 
 
 HI 
 
 a. 2'i 
 
 
 
 . . . 200 
 
 <1. 41, HH 
 
 •.. 64, li 
 a. 2 
 
 . 0. 20, 
 
 .Ir.":: 
 
 30 
 
 
 . . . 20.1 
 ... HHH 
 ... 12.16 
 
 a. I, Ir 402, 001, 12.34a 
 
 a. 0, Ir 001 
 
 a. 34. Ir 12.14a 
 
 0. 60, a. 4 70-8 
 
 M. 282, 1714 
 
 n. 77, a. 2 lAOl 
 
 M^frfmm mn ttp»r»tT»pkt {\\) mi /mfm. 
 
TABLE OP STATUTES CITKD. 
 
 COX IX 
 
 10 (1. 4, rAKAOBAnu (to 
 
 r. 34, •.23,Ir 1371 
 
 o. Ao, *. 03 ivn 
 
 I'., ctxiv 1067 
 
 11 (). 4ft 1 W. 4, 
 
 o. '^0, tMi. 4H AC lOAI 
 
 f. 40 1(57 
 
 .1. 08 1000 
 
 1 W 4 
 
 0. '22 600, 1680 
 
 M. 'i 1311 
 
 «. 1273 
 
 1 t 2 W. 4, 
 
 11. aj, •. 23 n.'.R 
 
 N. 30 410 
 
 H, 42 377 
 
 c. 37. (Mt. 23.24 1096 
 
 •1. 44, n. H, Ir I.123 
 
 r. .'.M 847, 1074 
 
 c. U«vl 1067 
 
 2 W 4 
 
 0. 1, M(. 16, 20, 22 . . . .1480, 1000 
 
 a. 31 1121 
 
 n.'it 1011. 1048 
 
 c. 4 801 
 
 •. 10. •. 3 373 
 
 3* 3 W. 4. 
 
 0.71, M. 1, 3, 3 ..76a, inu2, 1107 
 
 Mil. 4, 7 76a 
 
 ». 76a, 120 
 
 r.87, n. :«2 1011. lO.Vi 
 
 c. 1(3. N. 1 1287 
 
 r. 100 74a 
 
 H. I 1002 
 
 «. 8 120 
 
 • *4 W. 4. 
 
 c. 16 47. 1107 
 
 «. 2 S77 
 
 0. 22, M. 20, 27, 20 1.TJ9 
 
 c. 37 74a 
 
 M. 2, ID. 17, 21. 36, 20, 
 
 .10 33 74a 
 
 a. 14 1088. 1107 
 
 •. 2H 7«A. 747 
 
 N. 40 74a, IU88 
 
 0.41,1.. 7 1398 
 
 H. lU 1282 
 
 fl. 42 r^An A'rrDfn), l:i44 
 
 11.3.. 7611.092. 7 16, 1000. 1107 
 
 •.4 T.'.n 
 
 «. 6 ....7fth. 092, loim. 1107 
 
 a. II 840 
 
 tm. 23, H ^20 
 
 n. 30 |.^83 
 
 •.74 1060a 
 
 M. 41, 4(1, 49 1.33 
 
 N*. li\, .V2. 69 !I23 
 
 0.87, N. 1 1137 
 
 «. 2 1127, lor.l 
 
 a. 4 imil 
 
 4 ft 6 W. 4, r<.RAOiui-n)i (f }) 
 
 o. "2 I.'>9 
 
 c M M. 10 II ■•till 
 
 c. 30,11. 13 64 
 
 o. 70 1103, i;tll» 
 
 ». 18 1604 
 
 M. 70. 81 1103 
 
 V. 92. n. 79. Ir 1640 
 
 6&0 W. 4. 
 
 o. 60, H. 40 I.VII 
 
 a. 73 1071 
 
 o. 84 1(179 
 
 IS. 66 1(162 
 
 0. 03 i;«H9 
 
 c. 09 1.119 
 
 tt. 7 979 
 
 Oft 7 W. 4. 
 
 o. 14 1648 
 
 n. 2 i;u6 
 
 0. 71.11. 04 1(101 
 
 o. 76, ». 30 1318 
 
 c. 70, ». 19 146(1 
 
 o. 86 70 
 
 • 6 1604 
 
 «. 23 1110 
 
 ». 37 1011 
 
 n. 80 1696 
 
 n. 31 1 1 10 
 
 i. 36 1604, 1001, Kill 
 
 ». 37 1604 
 
 N .38 .. 0, 1001, 1011, 1774, 
 1776 
 
 <•. 90 1319 
 
 N. 6 1604 
 
 o. 100 1293 
 
 «. 10 I2!t;i 
 
 M. 19 0, 1640 
 
 ». 21 1640 
 
 c. Ill 362 
 
 o. 114 1449 
 
 II. 4 MUM 
 
 o. 116 I.'i84 
 
 •.29 119 
 
 n. 110,11. 106. Ir 1263 
 
 M. 100, 107, Ir 1267a 
 
 7 W. 4 ft 1 V. 
 
 0.32, a. 6 KIM 
 
 ». 8 1776 
 
 0. 30. M. 1, 9 1069 
 
 n. 7 104 
 
 aa. IV, II lO.'iO 
 
 a. 13 1061 
 
 a. 13 lo.'.ii 
 
 aa. 18 30 loiwi 
 
 a. 21 1009. 107(1 
 
 a 32 1072 
 
 aa. 34 33 Ijiii 
 
 a. 14 104, 1060, 1070 
 
 e.in 74* 
 
 n. 30. M. 36, 20 I7| 
 
 w. 27, 28,^1, 43 .... 1714 
 
 •'.44 |-.'64 
 
 i 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 ' .Wjm^ ^ 
 
 .1 
 
 Kid?''* ^ '^7%tJii 
 
 1 
 
 m:mM 
 
 
 . w^ 
 
 
 ".. ' ^^\- 
 
 
 rw. t. «.J^ wM i 07t. 
 
 I !, 
 
1 
 
 i 
 
 
 1 
 
 t 
 
 
 
 ccxx 
 
 TABLE OP STATUTES CITED. 
 
 7 W. 4* 
 
 c. M) 
 0. H», 
 0. HA. 
 
 1 V. 
 
 HK 1,2 
 ». i ... 
 
 H. ;j . . . , 
 
 H. 11 ., 
 
 PABAO&AriU Hi) 
 
 i;»ju 
 
 1504 
 
 HI 
 
 HO 
 
 209 
 
 8H,HH. 2, 3 1714 
 
 1714 
 
 1714 
 
 I • •*•••• 
 
 1310 
 
 
 0. Ul 
 
 N. 62 
 
 I 42 V. 
 
 o. 2.'). M. 2 
 
 o. hi, H. 121, Ir. 
 
 0. 77 1380a 
 
 b. 04 14H0, 14H4, 1601 
 
 MH. 1,2, 20 14H5 
 
 «. U80 
 
 M. II 6 
 
 n. 12 1480, IMS 
 
 H. 13 lfi:i.' 
 
 fl. oi IflAV 
 
 0. 10ft I3HH 
 
 0. 110 I«,'>2 
 
 H. 10 14010 
 
 Sft3V. 
 
 0. 11, NM. 3, 8, 1401(1 
 
 M. 4 lfl.'.2 
 
 0. 47, H. 24 1(170 
 
 0. 71. H. 40 17.'>7 
 
 1 
 
 <s. H4 
 
 a«4 V. 
 
 0. 0. n 
 
 0. 22 
 
 0. Ill, it. 1 
 
 0. 60,H. 1 
 
 M. 2 
 
 H. ;i 
 
 R. 4 
 
 «. 6ft 
 
 0. Tl.it. /i 
 
 e. H2, «. 2 
 
 o. 02 
 
 H. ft 
 
 KM. 0, 20.. . 
 NN !). 10. II 
 
 H.-<. 12 1)).. 
 H. 17 
 
 c. 07. HM. 7—10 
 
 0. W; Ir 
 
 K 12, Ir. . 
 M. 4H, 'Itl, I 
 MM. ft I, .'i2, I 
 •. 0:i, Ir. . . 
 ■. <H, Ir. . 
 «. n7. Ir. ., 
 
 1310 
 
 ICll 
 
 ,jOO 
 
 Iftxi 
 
 1317 
 
 Hill 
 
 1402 
 
 11.12 
 
 !.V:'i 
 
 ;<i 
 
 MOlo 
 
 l.'i04. I. '.02, Iftltft 
 
 Ift0< 
 
 Ifti»2 
 
 ...0, 1001, Dill 
 
 ir.ill, Kill 
 
 I.V.Ml, Kill 
 
 Ki.'ii! 
 
 l.iNO, Ki.i2 
 
 n 20* 
 
 , ■^2» 
 
 ... I '. ' » 
 
 (.'.k;i 
 
 12!l'f 
 1311 
 
 VVJi, 
 
 71, Ir 1272 
 
 «. MH, NH. 12 
 n. 110, M. 7 
 
 4 ft ft V. n. 4ft, UN 
 
 « ft (> V. 
 
 o. 27, a. 14 
 0. 3H 
 
 127, Ir. 
 13, 14 
 
 Ki.V. 
 
 .1;.:) 
 
 17H 
 
 fi ft V. PARAOBAPnS (f f) 
 
 0.46 008, 1110 
 
 a. 11 ....lft04, 1605, 1601, 
 
 177H 
 
 0. 61, a. 1 ..867, 0ft8, I3r;0, 1373, 
 
 148H 
 
 a. 2 I<ft8 
 
 0. 67 1310 
 
 0. 00 614 
 
 0. HO, Ir !0«3a 
 
 o. 07, M. 3 314 
 
 H. 6 73a 
 
 c. I08,H. 29 lUOl 
 
 6ft 7 V. 
 
 0. 18 180 
 
 HH. 6, 8, 13, 14, 10, 18, 
 
 20 1604 
 
 aa. 7, 17 1102, 1107 
 
 HH. 3ft, 60, ftl 1203 
 
 a. 48 l.'.Oft 
 
 a. 40 1604, IftOft 
 
 a. 02 1102, 1107 
 
 HN. <i(i, (18 1640 
 
 H. 100 1102 
 
 0. 22 1378 
 
 0. 38, H. IftHO 
 
 M. 14 Ift4(( 
 
 c. 54, Ir VU, 108H 
 
 c. lili U20A, 149IU 
 
 <i. (iH, H. 17 372 
 
 0. 73, N. 8 112(1 
 
 HH. 11, 23 ... Ift04 
 
 a. 20 1120, lft04 
 
 a. 37 4ft0 
 
 0. 82, H. ft 1312 
 
 HM. 0, 7 1312 
 
 0.8ft 1270, 1347 
 
 P. 1 13AI 
 
 0. 80, M. 10 KiOl, 1/; , 
 
 H. 20 :i72 
 
 H 23 1000a, 1107 
 
 H. 2H 1710 
 
 c. 01 17 
 
 1!. 0(i. n. 2 H:)| 
 
 0. 0(1, H. II h;j 
 
 H. 7 lift. ooii. 007 
 
 o. 08, H. 4 600, I.V.3 
 
 7 & M > 
 
 i-.'i Hftft 
 
 o. 12, H. H..lft()l, iMlft, ICOl, I77H 
 
 0. 22. HH. 2, .'! 372 
 
 (1. 27, Ir 74a, 1088 
 
 .. 27. H. 13 . 70 
 
 (1.20 7(1 
 
 0.32, «. 16 1(W13a 
 
 0.33, n. a 180 
 
 « 4\ H. 'i 76a, 1204 
 
 ",•..', aa. 30-3(1 il21 
 
 c '.> 1001, loo.l 
 
 n. 7i' aa. 3, 4, 13 ..,, '.191 
 
 - M, .X 2, 14, Ir Ift04 
 
 ^ 43 Kill 
 
 Me/rrtnen art It puraifr,i^hi ■,)}) nut JMtf—- 
 

 TAnr.K OF STATUTE CITED. 
 
 CCXXl 
 
 7 4 8V. PAIUORA.'IIR {§^) 
 
 o.Hl,»w. 48, 78, Ir 7« 
 
 w*. W, 7lJr. ..IftUA, l«Ol 
 m. (in— 70, Ir 1504 
 
 0. 86, H. I'J Ipp. 
 
 H. W l.'l!»(l 
 
 0.80 HH«, 1000 
 
 0.01. n. 71 I'M 
 
 0. 101 IHO, 1011 
 
 H. :I3 1604 
 
 H. 00 1001 
 
 H. 70 laio 
 
 M. 7.t 1110 
 
 0. 106, M. 711 74 
 
 0. 100, H. 40, Ir 12A;1, 12r,4 
 
 HH. 41, 4'2, Ir rj.'i7A 
 
 0. 107,H. 11, Ir 1644 
 
 CI. 110, NX. 7,26 410 
 
 8&0 V. 
 
 c. 10 1747a 
 
 H. 061, 904. 1767a 
 
 0. 10,8. 7 10:i0 
 
 H. 10 1604. ia;(7A 
 
 ■N. It, \'i 10»7a 
 
 H. 1 1 080 
 
 H.-2H 1781 
 
 «. 40 lOOl 
 
 iw. 46, 03, 116-110.. 1604 
 
 ■.07 0H7 
 
 «. OH 1600 
 
 UN. rJ4 127 I0.')6 
 
 H. l;iO 180 
 
 M, 101 1604 
 
 0. 17, H. 101 17H2 
 
 H. 106 1604 
 
 0. 18, HN. 10, 17 lOII, 10:I7a 
 
 M. .■)0 I.'k'ioii 
 
 M. OH 1074 
 
 H. 70 l-M 
 
 H. 160 1604 
 
 0. 19, H. 142 1604 
 
 o. 20, MM. 0. 102 l.')04 
 
 M. 10 1001 
 
 Ml. HO, 07 1011 
 
 «, 107 16(14 
 
 KM. I OH 111 1000, lO.'ill 
 
 0. :<:{, HH. 0, I6;i 1,104 
 
 11. :i7, H. 10, Ir loo:iA 
 
 o. 76, H. 2 HHl 
 
 o. 77, H. 3 372 
 
 o. 80, H. 34 OOKa 
 
 o. 101. HH. 0, 7 1067 
 
 0. 100. H. I 001 
 
 HH 2, 3 002 
 
 e. 100, H. 1466 
 
 H. 18 040 
 
 o. 112, MM. I. 2. 3 l.'IO 
 
 •. 113 ..7. 1624. I6H4. 1001, 1011 
 
 N. 1 ....7, 14. I6H0, 1001, 
 
 lOMU, ton, 1031, 
 
 1 06211, I0,'i6, 1067 
 
 a. 'J 7, 14, 1.680 
 
 Vol. J. etuti 
 
 8 & v. PARAORAPIIi ((f) 
 
 0. 113, R.3..6,7,l8,1.623,l.V2U,167l 
 
 H.4 7 
 
 H. 6 7 
 
 0. 118, MM. 2, 140 1001 
 
 HH. 0. 30,40, l.^iO. 104. 1329 
 
 HM. 104, 106. 167 1684 
 
 o. 128, H. a 372 
 
 & 10 V. 
 
 o. 3, H. 13 1604 
 
 11.4. Ir 1003a 
 
 0. 37, HH. 22. 28, 32-3.6, 44, 
 
 ir 1290 
 
 c. 30, H. 1604 
 
 c. 70 1.584 
 
 o. 74 1604 
 
 H. 13 1690 
 
 o. 87, H. 6. Ir 1604 
 
 0. 93 1097 
 
 H. 3 73 
 
 c. 96, H. S.-i 1348, 1361 
 
 0. lO.'i, H. 2 Ifill. 1068 
 
 M. 4 l.'iOO. 1011 
 
 10 & II V. 
 
 0. 10, HH. 11, 21. 20 1300a 
 
 o. 14. HH. 7, 8, .12 1011 
 
 HH. 42—49 1067 
 
 B. 60 1604 
 
 H. .'>8 1604 
 
 O. 16. H. 3H 1604 
 
 M. 46 1.604 
 
 0. 10, HM. 31, M. 70, HH-00. I6U4 
 
 HH. 90 9(i 1067 
 
 H. 110 1604 
 
 0. 17, HH. 7. 10 1611 
 
 HH, 21. 00 1604 
 
 0. 27, HH. 7. 10, 20 1011 
 
 •.60 16«H 
 
 MM. 83-90 1067 
 
 M. or 1.604 
 
 0. .12, H. 00 IHO 
 
 c. 34, H. 20 1011 
 
 HM. 200 207 1067 
 
 H. 214 1.604 
 
 ri. 42 1001 
 
 V. 06, MM. 7. H 1011 
 
 H. 00 l.'iOl 
 
 «•. 00. H. 1011 
 
 o, 70, M. 4. Ir lOO.'U 
 
 0. 80. H. 71 1067 
 
 H. 77 I.'>0» 
 
 0. '.10. H. 3. Ir •>, 1 100 
 
 N». 12. IH. Ir 1100 
 
 H, 19, 20, Ir. ,,I:IO0a, 132tf 
 
 0. 109, s. I, « 
 
 HH. 10. 20 1.604 
 
 HM. n,2i,2o..i:to9A. i:i2» 
 
 0. ill I.6H4 
 
 n A 12 V. 
 
 0. 12 1714 
 
 H. 10 1263 
 
 0.31, MM. 2,9 not 
 
 utth t 971. 
 
CCXXll 
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 11 & 12 v. FABAORAPRM (|}) 
 
 0. 42 399, 888a, 1316 
 
 H. 1 1234a 
 
 H8. II— lA 1318, l/i62A 
 
 H. 10.. 1234a, 1260,1316,1318 
 ■. 17..472,47U*, 4H4,4»(), HH9 
 ■. 18. .888a, H80, 890, 80:), 8U4 
 ■. 20.. 484, 8H8a, 8HU, 1234a, 
 123.'>, 120U 
 
 a. 21 3ft 
 
 H. 27 1488 
 
 11.28 HH8a. 8»2 
 
 ■.34 4U3 
 
 8oh. K 1318 
 
 Hoh. M 479a 
 
 Hoh. N. ..888a, 889, 893 
 
 0. 43 lolO, 1317 
 
 a. 3 1318, 16(t2A 
 
 a. 4 293 
 
 a. 7 1234, 1317, 1318 
 
 a. 11 70 
 
 H. 14 101ft 
 
 a. .3ft 1317 
 
 H. 30 7ftii 
 
 0. 44, H. 9 312, aift 
 
 H. 41 1072 
 
 o. 40. a. 4 248 
 
 0. 03, a. 3ft 
 
 o. 83, M. 1121, 1011, 1048 
 
 a. 14 1121, 1611, 1048 
 
 o. 99 1A84 
 
 0. 110, aa. 11,09 1011 
 
 o. 118, H. 3 70 
 
 0. 121, 8. IK 372 
 
 o. cUiii. a. 258 1321 
 
 13 & 13 V. 
 
 o. 1, a. 3 Ifl7ft 
 
 a. 1000, 1001 
 
 a. 10 1001 
 
 0. 16, a. 8, Ir 7:iA 
 
 o. 40 -HH 
 
 a. 1 1102a. 1107 
 
 8.2 11112a 
 
 0. 68 Ift93, 159.' <01l 
 
 KM. II, 12 lUUl, ttill 
 
 a. 18 1601, Hill 
 
 a. 20 1600 
 
 0. 77, a. 2. Ir 
 
 HM. 43, 49, Ir 1704 
 
 0. 78. a. 9 101 1 
 
 o. 89 14, 1100 
 
 0. 97. H. 20 1057 
 
 0. 100, M. 117 I4A8A 
 
 a. 118 1351 
 
 a. 200 1458a 
 
 0. 109, .1. 12 1047 
 
 a. 14 1542 
 
 HN. 17, 18 1647, 1650 
 
 13 & 14 V. 
 
 V. 17, H. 3 994 
 
 c. 28 1110 
 
 0. 29, H. 4 1052 
 
 13 ft 14 V. VAiuaRAPni (fO 
 
 0. 29, at. 6, 7 1011, 10.52 
 
 0.36,1.46 1882R 
 
 o. 43 1293 
 
 0. 08, Hoh. A. •••i.t 17 
 
 0. 69, Ir 1604 
 
 aa. 20. 33, 76, Ir 1103 
 
 aa. 56, 57, Ir 1293 
 
 m. 79, 81, Ir 1640 
 
 r. 113, Ir 180, 1102 
 
 a. 114, Ir 180 
 
 0. 72, a. 9 1011, 1653 
 
 a. 45, Ir 6 
 
 .i. 47, Ir mil 
 
 H. 52, Ir 1.504 
 
 n. 74, a. 10 lOll 
 
 14 & \o \. 
 
 y. 19, a. 5 80, 1708 
 
 a. (4 1264 
 
 o. 40, .t. II 1110 
 
 a. 21 IHOO 
 
 a. 22 1595, 1000 
 
 c. 42, H. 1121 
 
 n. 19, MH. 4, 5 l:»29 
 
 0. 66, M. I 1254 
 
 a. 2 1251, l-.'OO 
 
 aa. 4, 6, 1257 
 
 H. 7 1257a 
 
 H. 8 1257a 
 
 c. .'>fi. a. 2 IHO 
 
 V. 57, Ml. 10, 97. 110, 114, Ir. 1554 
 
 H. 19, Ir 702 
 
 a. 30. Ir 1704 
 
 f, 102. Ir i:i48 
 
 a. 100, Ir 247 
 
 a. 107. Ir 1544 
 
 N. 108, Ir 1700 
 
 o. 04, H. 1 l.')9(l, lO.iO 
 
 H. 3 1 l!'0, 1011 
 
 II. (iti, N. 10. 17, Ir. ..lliOlU. 11129 
 
 f. !'2. H. 13. Ir 5 
 
 0. 'jj, Ir 3'j9, 8H8a 
 
 H. 10. Ir 70 
 
 aa. 13, 44, If 12.34 A 
 
 a. 14, Ir 36, 888a, 1488 
 
 0. 94 560 
 
 a. 18 1361 
 
 HM. 31, 40 1293 
 
 H. 45 1504 
 
 0. 99 10, 1347, 1359 
 
 a. 1 1347, 1349 
 
 aa. 2, 3 ....1349, i:ift7, 1300 
 
 a. 4 1355a 
 
 1. 7 ....10,438, 1628, 1.5.50 
 
 1. 9 1557 
 
 ■. 10 1667, 1558 
 
 a. II 49, 1557 
 
 a. 13 I57S, 1011 
 
 1. 14 1677, I6K!I, 1AU9A. 
 
 tool, 1011 
 
 ■. IC 1.380 
 
 a. 18 1550 
 
 Ue/ertttett ar* to punufrapht ({}) nut puf/ti. 
 
TADLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 CCXXUl 
 
 14 ft U V. PABA0BAPII8 m) 
 
 0.69, a. 19 4U, IAA(S 
 
 0.100 '248 
 
 «. 1 ....24H, 280, 280, 203 
 
 M. 2, 3 248 
 
 fl. 9 200, 1708 
 
 §. 10 209 
 
 a. 12 1706, 1707 
 
 0. IH 287 
 
 ■.22 1573, lOri 
 
 •. 23 280 
 
 R. 24 204, 280, 284 
 
 ». 2.') 248, 280 
 
 0. 106,11. 10 1103 
 
 H. Vi 1702 
 
 0. 106 1466 
 
 16 & 16 V. 
 
 (!. 24 1067 
 
 DM. 1, 2 lOrtH 
 
 0.27,11. 1 1347 
 
 a. 2 . . 
 
 H. 4 .. 
 
 0. 28, a. 1 . , 
 
 fl. 66, H. 7 .. 
 
 1347 
 
 1477 
 
 6 
 
 1638 
 
 0. 67, a. 8 1320, 1466 
 
 a. 12 1326 
 
 0. 83, Ir 1605 
 
 0. 76, aa. 34, .Vi, 37 221 
 
 aa. 80, 81 n.Vi 
 
 m. 106-108 1604 
 
 a. 114 666, 6.'>9 
 
 •.222 221 
 
 0. 77, a. 1 l.')H2 
 
 o. 86 1677 
 
 a. 18 1701 
 
 aa. 40, 63 221 
 
 I 
 
 p. 87 
 
 I«ft 17 V. 
 
 0. 20, aa. 3, 4, 6 
 
 a. 6 
 
 0. 30, a. 9 
 
 0. 3.1 
 
 0. M, a. 6 . . 
 
 1504 
 
 1347 
 1347 
 1276 
 1601 
 1611, 1648 
 
 c. 83 680, 7660, 1361, 1369, 
 
 U67 
 
 a. 1 1361 
 
 a. 2 1361, 1.166a, 1362 
 
 a. 3 909*. 13'.1 
 
 1347, 1351 
 
 1601, 1778 
 
 ....IOOOa, 1107 
 
 1321 
 
 661, 1344 
 
 ...73, 75n, 601, 
 692, 746, lOliO 
 ,..76ii, 001, 6'.I2 
 ..76n,69l,602, 
 IdOO 
 
 •. 24, Ir 75n, 601,692, 
 
 744, 745, 1073 
 
 a 60, Ir. ... 314 
 
 aa. 86-91,231, If.. . 221 
 
 a. 4 
 
 0. 112, a. 12, Ir. . 
 
 a. 36, Ir. 
 
 a. 66, Ir. . 
 a 118, a. 3, Ir. .. 
 
 a. 20, Ir. . 
 
 aa. 21, 22. 
 a. 23, Ir... 
 
 16 ft 17 V. PAiuoiurna (t() 
 
 0. 134, a. 8 U}»i 
 
 0. 137, a. 6 <• 
 
 a. 8 1601 
 
 aa. 10-14 1329 
 
 a. 61 1604 
 
 17 ft 18 V. 
 
 o. 26, Ir 1373, 1488 
 
 a. 31, a. 7 1093, 1107, 1666 
 
 o. 34 1262 
 
 0. .18, aa. 6, 1466 
 
 o. 47 1398 
 
 c. 80, a. 68 1001, 1011 
 
 0.81, a. 46 20 
 
 0. 90 845, 1435, lOiHi, 1712 
 
 0. 102, a. 10 12.'>l, 1714 
 
 a. 12 1260 
 
 a. 13 1264 
 
 a, .15 1466 
 
 0. 126, a. 1 846 
 
 a. 22 1404, 1426 
 
 a. 21 1440 
 
 a. 24 1446 
 
 a. 26 1437 
 
 a. 27 1869 
 
 aa. 61, 56, 66, 67.... 621 
 
 a. 62 621 
 
 a. 63 621, 1329 
 
 a. 64 621, 1.120 
 
 a. 68 669 
 
 a. 60 1329 
 
 a. 65 1692 
 
 a. 87 437 
 
 a. y6 221 
 
 a. 103 1446, 1869 
 
 18 ft 10 V. 
 
 0. 15, aa. 2. 3 1491a 
 
 aa. 12, 14 1126 
 
 o. 30, H. 10 1110, 1839 
 
 o. 43 104 
 
 0. 6.1. M .10 1601 
 
 u. 81, H. 11 1611, 1621a 
 
 «. 87 1050 
 
 i\ lil| n. 3 •••••••••••#•* 86 
 
 0. 119, a. 82 1667 
 
 0. 120, a. 22 180 
 
 a. 60 1696, 17H2 
 
 aa. 61, 198, 199 1604 
 
 a. 149 976 
 
 a. 203 1057 
 
 a. 222 1IC6 
 
 0. 124, aa. 4, 6 6, 1601 
 
 a*. 6- 1329 
 
 a. 42 1127 
 
 H. 44 1604 
 
 10 ft 20 V. 
 
 e. 14, Ir 1106 
 
 0. 26, a. 2 1611 
 
 0. 36, Ir 1663a 
 
 0. 47, a. 16 10.19 
 
 a. 41 OHO 
 
 0.60, H. 6, 8(! 103011,1084 
 
 m 
 
 i*! 
 
 rd. I. md* mtk \ 971. 
 
CCXXIV 
 
 TABLK OF RTATirrKS CITED. 
 
 l>\ 
 
 }' 
 
 -h 
 
 19 ft 20 V. l-ABAdlUI-IIR (if) 
 
 o. (HI. H. 17, 8« 1H7 
 
 (!. (it '.'UO 
 
 c. 7ii. H. 4 i:i 
 
 HM. «7, 7'», HO. 147 .. lA.'iO 
 
 H. lOj i:i.')ii 
 
 H. 174 13, I.Vj'J 
 
 0. 04 ft 
 
 0. OH. H. 2 l«Ol 
 
 c. 07 74.'). lO.JOii 
 
 M. 8 10-Jt, lU3(lii, 1107 
 
 ». 7:i 
 
 I. 10 7.'>H 
 
 •. 13 ....73, 7»ft, 771, 1073, 
 1107 
 
 H. 14 600, 74.1 
 
 0. lOj, N. ■.'!. Ir 1431 
 
 K. •J7, Ir 144U 
 
 MM. ."iG Ml, Ir .'121 
 
 N. OH, Ir 142(1, 1440, 
 
 IHdO 
 
 0. 108, M. '1 1270 
 
 0. 113 1313 
 
 o. 110, M. 24 1011, IU2U 
 
 20 St 21 V. 
 
 •!. 3 1714 
 
 0.(10, H. 120, Ir 12H9 
 
 MM. 207, 2(m, If I0l.'i 
 
 MM. 271. 272, If 1013 
 
 «. ;I0U. Ir 1.100, I4.1HA 
 
 •. 307, Ir I.'UK) 
 
 a. 30M, Ir 1280 
 
 MM. 334,33.'), Ir H2(U 
 
 ■. 3(>l, Ir lft4H 
 
 «. 3)12. Ir 0, 14 
 
 M. 3(1.'), Ir 40.'i 
 
 M. .360, Ir 130H 
 
 M. 'W.'!, Ir ll.iH* 
 
 «. 77 42ft, 800, I7ft0 
 
 M. 22 
 
 M. 24 I2H3 
 
 M. 20 1810 
 
 M. 30 1810 
 
 MM. 01- O:' 17ftU 
 
 MM. 04, C.l 1700 
 
 MM. m (iH 1487 
 
 M 00 1689, IftOO 
 
 M. 80 1714 
 
 M. 81) 1487 
 
 o. 70, Ir 1768 
 
 M. 27, Ir 6 
 
 M. 20, li 1288 
 
 a. 31. Ir IHIO 
 
 M. 42, Ir 1810 
 
 ■M. 0.'. 67, Ir 17fttt 
 
 •.08 17(10 
 
 MM. 71 73, Ir 1487 
 
 a. 74, Ir l.Wt, l.MHl 
 
 M. 01, Ir 1714 
 
 M, 00, Ir 1487 
 
 0. 86 708, 1283 
 
 ■.7 1076 
 
 20 & 21 V. PARAOBAPni (ff) 
 
 0. 8.'>, M. 13 6 
 
 M. 10 049, 1075 
 
 M. 37 040, 1076 
 
 M. 31 1(176 
 
 M. 33 ....109, 172. 3A8. ft82. 
 
 8.')l, 040, 1410 
 
 HN. 41, 43, 40 1364 
 
 21 ft 22 V. 
 
 0. 2ft 1604 
 
 H. 3 IflOl 
 
 c. 42, Ir 7.')A, 1002 
 
 o. .'XI, MM. 12, 13 1688 
 
 o. 72, MM 8. T.i, Ir 
 
 MM. .')!, 8.'), Ir 86 
 
 0. 78, M. 2 1279 
 
 0. 00, M. 27 1(118 
 
 M. 31 .S03 
 
 M. 32 173, 308 
 
 M. 31 .308 
 
 M. 37 1611, 1040 
 
 M. 40 37(lA 
 
 0. 03 1076 
 
 MM. I, 2 .'>»4 
 
 0.06, K. 23 1283 
 
 M. 27 1 187 
 
 n. 08, N, 4 , 6 
 
 22 V. o. 20 1314 
 
 M. 6 1316 
 
 22 & 23 V. 
 
 n. 17 1200 
 
 r. 36, N. 12 lilO 
 
 o. 03 6 
 
 23 ft 24 V. 
 
 0.4, M. 0, Ir l.M»6, 1001, 1777 
 
 o. 38 Kl.Vi 
 
 M. 13 l()8i> 
 
 0. 63 74 
 
 o. 83. Ir 104 
 
 I!. 107, H. ;r.'. Ir 76 
 
 !■. 120, H. 3(1 221 
 
 0. 127, MM. 18. 22 1(1.39 
 
 c, 1.34, H. .'i 76o 
 
 0. ll'.\ M. 1186 
 
 o. I.')4, M. 4, Ir 1001 
 
 M. 6, Ir 100 
 
 M. 0, Ir 809 
 
 MM. 7. '.I, Ir 1003 
 
 n. 23, Ir 426 
 
 a. 24, Ir 123 
 
 ■. 41, Ir 1176 
 
 a. 42, Ir 1176 
 
 M. 13, Ir 807 
 
 a. 47, Ir 17H 
 
 M. 104, Ir. . .0'.i2, KM) I. 1003 
 
 M. 106, Ir lool, 11103 
 
 Siih. II., Ir 1001, 1003 
 
 24 ft 26 V. 
 
 r. 6, Mv 18, 10 372 
 
 V. M 1646 
 
 M. 14 e 
 
 lU/ireneu art to pitriiyiaph' (^}) nol ;niyr>. 
 
TAUI.K OF 8TATUTI':8 CITKD. 
 
 CCXXV 
 
 S4 k •ili V. PAiudiuniN (J4) 
 o. 10, ». 17 6n, imo 
 
 •.IB Mi 
 
 ».i\ riH.t 
 
 0. n A 
 
 o.ai 74 
 
 0. U4, M. I 17117 
 
 0. Uft KJ, HOI 
 
 0. 1)0 173, U.'iHa 
 
 MM. 6, U :i32 
 
 N. 10 'JUO 
 
 M i:» 371 
 
 MX. M, »A, 0.'), eu 37'2 
 
 «M. -.'4, 20 Wi 
 
 ».'M I4.M 
 
 «. 'iV 'in, M-'iA 
 
 ». 30, 31 JOI 
 
 MM. 3'2, 74 286 
 
 MM. 40, 4J, r>6, 01, 07 .. 20U 
 
 M. 41 iOO, 1708 
 
 ■M. 43, 47, 4H, AO— .V2. 
 
 73 1714 
 
 MM. 44, 40 43. 1714 
 
 a. .')8 3.'..;, 372 
 
 *. 60 280 
 
 M. 71 287, 3:11 
 
 •.72 1707 
 
 MM. 75 84 Ho/i, 1714 
 
 M. 8^ H.'.Sa, 1714 
 
 R. 80 14ftA, 1011:1, 1714 
 
 •. 87 1714 
 
 ■. 88 201, 1706, 1707 
 
 ■. Ill 1700 
 
 M. 02 3;»H 
 
 M. 1)1 2(11 
 
 M. llMt 1710 
 
 M. 110 .3.'i2. 1012 
 
 H. 121 ia.i4 
 
 0.97, MM. I A. 0. It, 14, 17, 
 211, 3(1, Xi, ;i.'>, 42, 
 
 43. 47 1714 
 
 ' H. 20, 21 280,371 
 
 •. Al 280 
 
 •.00 2114 
 
 •. 07 1710 
 
 •.77 12A4 
 
 0.98, KM. 0, 10, II, 14, 10, 17, 
 
 18, III 372 
 
 •M. 27, 28, 20 r 
 
 •.42 201, lOH 
 
 • 43 291 
 
 •.41 201 
 
 H. fil I2A4 
 
 0.99. «.. 2, 3 1714 
 
 MH. 0, 7 372, 1714 
 
 •.8 . . . . „ ;i72 
 
 •.12 I70A 
 
 •M. n, 19 ;«72 
 
 »M. 21, 2A 372. 1711 
 
 •, 20 AA(1 
 
 •. 37 3A2, 1012 
 
 •.42 12A3 
 
 24 ft 2ft V. PAnAaRAPiii (H) 
 
 0. 100 hi 
 
 M. ft, ll-lft, 18,21.22, 
 28, 29, 32, 33. A8, 
 
 61 1714 
 
 i. « 2.HH 
 
 ■. 2A 260, 17(18 
 
 MM. 42, 43 lOlft 
 
 ••. 44, 4A 101 A. 1710 
 
 •. 48 104. 1,'iAOn 1714 
 
 •. A2 13A0B 
 
 H. A3 I3.A0II, 1371 
 
 «. Al i:i,AOii. 1371 
 
 ». AA 13A0B 
 
 ■. A7 172. 200 
 
 •.60 110, 269 
 
 M. 77 12A4 
 
 0. 104. M^. 10, 11 AOO 
 
 0. 114 10024 
 
 M. 3 I06S 
 
 0. 134, MM 1(12, 180 14A8A 
 
 ». 203 1A48 
 
 M. 204 0. 14 
 
 M. 211 1300 
 
 25 k 26 V. 
 
 0.63. H. 125 
 
 MM. (18. 70. 71 1611 
 
 M. 123 rt 
 
 0. 50, M. I. Ir 700 
 
 M. 2, Ir 123 
 
 «. 63. MM. 2A. 26. 28 5 
 
 «. 07, M. 22 1011 
 
 c. 08, M. 3 1107 
 
 M. 4 IA()4, 10(11 
 
 •. 5 lAdl, 10(11, 1778 
 
 0. 89 080, 080, lAOO 
 
 MM. II, 10 0S» 
 
 •. 18 410, 1031 
 
 M. 22 1030 
 
 •M. 2 A, 20 177H 
 
 ■.31 1031 
 
 ».:Vi I.AO4 
 
 •.37 1778 
 
 MB. 47, 65 080 
 
 M. 01 1001 
 
 •M. 02, 03 180 
 
 a. 04 IIO.'.A 
 
 a. (!7 lAOfl, 1781 
 
 •M. IIA, 120. 138 1286 
 
 •. 12.'. 0, 14 
 
 •. lAI 1781 
 
 •. 174 ....IA04, lAOA, 1001, 
 
 1631 
 
 M. 102 1631 
 
 o. 104, H 12 14 
 
 20 k 27 V. 
 
 u. II. H. A. Ir 6. lAlU, 1601 
 
 M. AO ,'.2. Ir 1,')04 
 
 0.27, MM. 2, 3. Ir 1504 
 
 M. 10, Ir 70, 1605 
 
 r. 41. MM. I, 4 187 
 
 ill! 
 
 % 
 
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 IMAGE EVALUATION 
 TEST TARGET (MT-S) 
 
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 ^ ti& ill M 
 
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 Photographic 
 
 Sciences 
 Corporation 
 
 23 WEST MAIN STREET 
 
 WEBSTER, NY. MS80 
 
 (716) 873-4S03 
 
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ccxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 26 & 27 v. PAIUQRAPHS (§§) 
 
 0. 49, 8. 2 6 
 
 88. 30—33 1121 
 
 c. 66 1601 
 
 C. 65, 8. 24 1601 
 
 8. 29 1611 
 
 c. 87, 8. 4 1600 
 
 c. 88, 88. 3, 5, Ir 6 
 
 C.90, Ir 1601 
 
 c. 100, 8. 1, Sc 796 
 
 8. 2, Sc 123 
 
 0,114, 8. 33, Ir 6 
 
 8. 38, Ir 1309a, 1329 
 
 0.118, 8. 22 1039a 
 
 0. 119,8. 5 1465 
 
 c. 125 150, 709, 916, 1246 
 
 27 & 28 V. 
 
 c. 19 989 
 
 c.37,8. 10 372 
 
 c. 48, 8. 5 1657 
 
 c. 53, 8. 5 248 
 
 88. 6, 8, 10 1316 
 
 8. 24 76 
 
 8. 35 73a 
 
 0.77, 8. 7 1593 
 
 88. 8, 10 1695, 1600 
 
 8. 9 1504 
 
 0.96 73, 1697 
 
 0.97,8. 5 1601, 1775 
 
 8. 6 1.504, 1601 
 
 0.99, 8. 43, Ir 1276 
 
 8. 48, Ir 247 
 
 8. 49, Ir 248 
 
 8. 57, Ir 1554, 1672 
 
 o. 101, 8. 12 1671, 1601 
 
 0. 112, 8. 1 1652 
 
 0. 113, 8. 33 1657 
 
 c. 120, 88. 18, 30 1611 
 
 c. 121, 88. 20, 00 1611 
 
 28 & 29 V. 
 
 o. 18, 8. 1..1426, 1427, 1437, 1445, 
 1446, 1449, 1869 
 
 B. 2 1431 
 
 B. 3 1426 
 
 B. 5 1446, 1449 
 
 8. 6 1410, 1437, 1612 
 
 8. 7.... 392, 414, 435, 1839, 
 1847a 
 
 8. 8 1869, 1874 
 
 B. 10 1869 
 
 0, 27, ss. 3, 5 1611 
 
 0. 60, Ir 796 
 
 8. 7, Ir 123 
 
 0. 60 796 
 
 8.2 123 
 
 c. 63, B. 6 9 
 
 c. 72 1051 
 
 c. 78 995a, 1504 
 
 c. 86 184 
 
 0.88, Ir 1611 
 
 «. 56. Ir 6 
 
 c. 104, H. 34 1359 
 
 28 & 29 V. VABAOBAFHB (${) 
 
 c. 112,8. 1 1051 
 
 c. 113, 8. 2, Ir 1663a 
 
 29 & 30 V. 
 
 c. 44,88. 21, 23, Ir 1657 
 
 c. 49, 8. 20, Ir 1601 
 
 8. 21, Ir 6 
 
 c. 52, 88. 1, 2 1258 
 
 c. 66,8. 7 1309a, 1329 
 
 c. 84,8. 12, Ir 1126 
 
 88. 15, 26, 29, Ir 1504 
 
 88. 28, 32, Ir 1639 
 
 c. 97,8. 7,Ir 1601 
 
 8. 12, Ir 1778 
 
 c. 108, 88. 7, 8, 9, 12 1504 
 
 c. 109 5, 1930 
 
 8. 48 269 
 
 B. 54 76 
 
 B. 61 1293 
 
 8. 66 ....1293, 1334, 1338 
 
 8. 92 1360 
 
 0.112 500 
 
 c. 117,8. 4 1011 
 
 8. 33 1601, 1611, 1663 
 
 c. 118,88. 7, 9, 46 1611 
 
 8. 24 ,. 1601 
 
 8. 29 1601 
 
 8. 30 1611 
 
 30 & 31 V. 
 
 c. 35, 8. 2 1260 
 
 8. 3 490,1236, 1260 
 
 B. 4 1236, 1200 
 
 8. 5 1200 
 
 B. 6 491 
 
 8. 7 491 
 
 0. 44, Ir 1577 
 
 8. 102, Ir 1577 
 
 0. 58, 8. 172 76 
 
 8». 175, 179—181 .... 1316 
 
 C.69 127a,371 
 
 0. 70,88. 3—5, Ir 1485 
 
 88. 17, 19, Ir 1480 
 
 8. 18, Ir 6 
 
 88. 19, 20, Ir 1533 
 
 C. 101, 8. 61 1601 
 
 c. 105,8. 4 1293 
 
 0. 114, Ir 1546 
 
 8. 21, Ir 6 
 
 8. 41. Ir 521, 1810 
 
 B. 50, Ir 139a 
 
 B8. ,52, 09, Ir 1283 
 
 8. 57, Ir 12 
 
 8. 66, It 562 
 
 8. 104 1282 
 
 C. 116,8. 1 1707 
 
 c. 131,8. 37 989 
 
 c. 134,8. 17 372 
 
 31V. 
 
 c. 4, 8. 1 163 
 
 31 & 32 V. 
 
 c. 20, Ir 644 
 
 c. 25,88. 6, 8, 36, Ir ICll 
 
 R^trencet ai* to paragraph) (}}) twt pagei. 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 CCXXVU 
 
 tl ft 32 V. 
 
 (), 26, 8. 18, Ir. . 
 8. 23, Ir. 
 
 0.37 
 
 c. 45 
 
 FASAOBAFHS (^§) 
 
 1601 
 
 1601 
 
 8. 24, Ir 1611 
 
 14, 1527 
 
 B. 2 5, 15, 1527, 1662 
 
 8, 3 1527 
 
 B.4 7, 1527 
 
 8. 5 15, 1527, 1662 
 
 B, 6 1527 
 
 , 1778 
 
 8. 61 1564 
 
 c. 59, 8. 29, Ir. ..1601,1611,1663 
 
 c. 86,88. 1, 2, Sch 999 
 
 c. Ill 6 
 
 o. 118,8. 8, subs. 4 72 
 
 o. 119,88. 39, 47 1596 
 
 8. 126 1795 
 
 0. 121,8. 13 1638 
 
 0. 125,8. 15 1326 
 
 8. 31 1293 
 
 B. 32 1293 
 
 8. 33 1611 
 
 8. 34 1246b 
 
 8. 56 1326, 1455 
 
 32 & 33 V. 
 
 c. 24 1456 
 
 c. 41, 8. 18 147a, 409, 1600 
 
 0.66,8.47 72 
 
 8. 49 1329 
 
 8.57 180 
 
 0. 67, 88. 4, 5 372 
 
 8. 6.... 73a, 315,831, 15550 
 1710 
 
 o. 62,8. 11 286, 372, 898 
 
 8. 12 286, 372 
 
 8. 17 1255 
 
 8. 18 1260 
 
 8. 19 292 
 
 88.24,25 nil 
 
 88. 26, 27 ....U20a, 1491b 
 
 8.28 1491b 
 
 0. 67, s. 45 72, 1777 
 
 8. 64 1601 
 
 8.65 180 
 
 88. 67—69 1504 
 
 c. 68 950, 1350, 1355, 1685 
 
 8. 1 1351 
 
 B. 2 964a, 1355 
 
 8. 3 1355 
 
 0.71,8. 15 1039a 
 
 8.97 898 
 
 8. 107 1548 
 
 8. 109 6, 14 
 
 8. 127 72 
 
 0. 81,8. 6 1611 
 
 0. 89, ss. 10, 11 1260 
 
 0. 92, It 6, 1309a, 1329, 1601 
 
 8. 14, Ir 1778 
 
 0. 102, 8. 13 1777 
 
 c. 115, ss. 6, 8, 11, 15 1601 
 
 0. 117, s. 1 1638 
 
 33 & 34 V. PARAORAPIIS (^) 
 
 0.14, s. 12 1627, 1601, 1611 
 
 0. 19 1611 
 
 0. 20, s. 11 1604 
 
 8. 15 995a 
 
 0.23, 88. 1, 31 954 
 
 8S. 10, 18 1016 
 
 C.28, 88. 4, 8, 9 1097 
 
 0.35 1153 
 
 88.2,5,7 159 
 
 c. 46, 88. 31, 41,Ir 19 
 
 8. 58, Ir. ..148, 809, llOU 
 
 0.52 1313, 1561 
 
 s. 5 1663a 
 
 8s. 14, 15 1560 
 
 0.75,8. 30 1781, 1782 
 
 8. 64 1611 
 
 8.81 180 
 
 8. 83 1527, 1611 
 
 8. 87 1504 
 
 0.79,8. 21 1527 
 
 o. 90, 8. 9 372 
 
 .. -il 1119, 1611, 1653 
 
 8. 7 1611, 1653 
 
 0.93 1016 
 
 8. 12 1689 
 
 0. 98, 88. 18, 22 372 
 
 0.99 1456 
 
 0.110, 8. 11, Ir 6 
 
 34 & 36 V. 
 
 0.25, 8. 5 1663a 
 
 0.31, 8. 13 1611 
 
 o. 41, s. 20 183 
 
 8.38 372 
 
 0.43, 8S. 27,46, 50 1611 
 
 8.69 180 
 
 0.49, 8. 6, Ir 1283 
 
 8. 17,Ir 12 
 
 0. 65, 88. 12, 18, Ir 1504 
 
 0. 70 1504 
 
 8. 2 1329, 1527. 1762 
 
 8. 6 6,1106, 1627 
 
 0. 78,88.4, 7, 11, 16 1329 
 
 c. 83, 8. 1 1281 
 
 0. 96, 8. 20 375 
 
 o. 97, 8. 1 1096 
 
 0. 112, 88. 9, 20 362, 1612 
 
 8. 15 1371 
 
 8. 18 1612 
 
 8. 19 346,353 
 
 0. 113, 88. 23, 37 1504 
 
 8. 25 1(157 
 
 c. 116 1488 
 
 35 & 36 V. 
 
 0. 10 1774 
 
 c. 23 15!(5 
 
 c. 24, 83. 1, 6 1611 
 
 0. 33 1504, 1601, 1777 
 
 0. 44, 8. 11 72 
 
 c.46,8. 1 1293 
 
 Vol. I. ends with j 971. 
 
* ! 
 
 M 
 • 1 
 
 CCXXVIU 
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 
 36 & 36 V. FABAOBAPHS (^f) 
 
 c. 48, 89. 2— 4,Ir 119^ 1771 
 
 8. 3, Ir. .. 119, 1663a 
 
 o. 57, s8. 11, 12, It 286, 372 
 
 . 8. 17, Ir 1255 
 
 B. 18, Ir 1260 
 
 8. 19, Ir 292 
 
 8S. 23, 24,Ir 1111 
 
 0.68, 8. 6, Ir 6, 14, 1289 
 
 88. 52, 53, Ir 83 
 
 88. 57, 58, Ir 1750 
 
 88. 73, 74, Ir 1276 
 
 88. 91, 121, It. 1015 
 
 88. 97, 98, It 1013 
 
 8. 116, Ir 1749 
 
 8. 124, Ir 19 
 
 0.65, 8. 4 951, 964, 1757a 
 
 0.69, 8. 2, Ir 1657 
 
 8. 4, Ir 6, 1106, 1657 
 
 8. 5. Ir 1329, 1657 
 
 0.76, 8. 59 1657 
 
 8. 63 76, 1360 
 
 8.71 180 
 
 0.77, 8. 30 1657 
 
 8. 34 76, 1360 
 
 8.39 47 
 
 8.40 180 
 
 C. 93, a. 8 115 
 
 8.23 272 
 
 8.24 1099,1107 
 
 8. 25 123 
 
 8.31 372 
 
 0.94, 8. 51 1360 
 
 8. 58 1601 
 
 8.70 180 
 
 36 V. c. 9, 8. 5 591,964 
 
 36 & 37 V. 
 
 c. 33, 8. 3 1782 
 
 c. 36, 8. 5 1600 
 
 8. 6 1531 
 
 0. 48, 88. 21, 25 1329 
 
 8. 30 1596 
 
 8.35 180 
 
 0. 60, 8. 4 1561 
 
 0.66 7,1262 
 
 B. 3 1456 
 
 8. 16 675 
 
 8. 24 5 
 
 8. 25, subs. 3 156 
 
 subs. 4 193, 1014 
 
 fiubs. 5 176 
 
 8ub8. 6 997 
 
 subs. 11 ..5, 1497,1854 
 
 B. 34 2lB 
 
 8. 50 1798 
 
 8. 57 1292, 1798 
 
 s. 61 
 
 8. 87 19, 1639 
 
 B. 89 1315a, 1811 
 
 8. 91 39 
 
 0. 71,8. 45 1657 
 
 O. 77, 8. 22 1601 
 
 36 & 37 V. 
 
 pabaobafhs ($$) 
 
 c. 86,8. 24 1611 
 
 0. 89, s. 14 15) 
 
 37 & 38 V. 
 
 c. 35 1344 
 
 c. 36 1714 
 
 c. 42, 8. 20 1601, 1611 
 
 8. 42 1013 
 
 c. 50, 88. 1, 2, 5 830, 1689 
 
 c. 67 74a, 127, 747, 1088 
 
 8. 7 747, 1088, 1107 
 
 88. 8, 9 10S«, 1107 
 
 c. 62 104, 740 
 
 8. 2 1084 
 
 c. 64, 88. 1, 2 1347 
 
 c. 67, 8. 8 1657 
 
 c. 69, 88. 35, 36, Ir 1601 
 
 c. 78 129 
 
 8. 1 75, 129 
 
 8.2 129 
 
 c. 81, 8S. 5, 10 1542 
 
 0.84,8.2 6 
 
 c. 86 724a 
 
 8. 9 1288, 1309a 
 
 c. 87, 8. 1 1329 
 
 c. 88, 8. 32 1504, 1601 
 
 s. 38 1776 
 
 8.46 76 
 
 c. 94, 88. 13, 34 74a 
 
 c. 96 1347,1491c 
 
 38 & 39 V. 
 
 c. 14, Ii' 1663a 
 
 0.17,88.34—38,84 1657 
 
 8.60 1601 
 
 8.85 180 
 
 C.22, 8. 8 179 
 
 B. 9 1527 
 
 0. 25, 88. 4, 7—9 372 
 
 c. 65 372, 1504, 1601, 1783 
 
 8.7 6 
 
 88. 44, 80, 90, 113, 141, 
 157, 164, 167, 169, 
 172,182—188,314, 
 
 326 1657 
 
 e. 59 183 
 
 8. 60 372 
 
 8. 76 1601 
 
 88. 130, 135, 207 1527 
 
 8. 174 995 
 
 88. 219, 237 1504 
 
 8. 223 1600 
 
 8.252 76 
 
 8.280 6 
 
 0. 57, s. 27, Ir 1638 
 
 c. 59, Ir 1485 
 
 88. 9, 10, Ir 1533 
 
 c. 60, B. 10 1601 
 
 8. U 1611 
 
 8. 13 1611 
 
 8. 14 1504 
 
 B. 15 104, 1611 
 
 ll^erences are lo paragraphi (}M not pagtt. 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 CCXXIX 
 
 88 ft 39 V. PAEAOBAFHS (§§) 
 
 c. 60, s. 16 1013, 1015 
 
 8. 22 1293, 1814 
 
 subs, (b) 1309a 
 
 s. 30, subs. 11 180 
 
 s. 39 1601, 1609 
 
 0. 63, B. 21 1360, 1611 
 
 0. 66 1084, 1344, 1764 
 
 0. 70, 8. 14 1611 
 
 0. 77, Ord. XXXI 521 
 
 s. 14 1639 
 
 8. 18 675 
 
 8.22 1881D 
 
 0. 83, 88. 5—7, 22 995a 
 
 8. 23 1778 
 
 s. 24 1504, 1778 
 
 0.86,8. 11 1360 
 
 0. 87 1611 
 
 8. 18 125 
 
 8. 80 1611 
 
 8. 104 1004 
 
 88. 107, 120 6 
 
 88. 109, 110 1293 
 
 8. Ill 19 
 
 0.89,8.4" 180 
 
 c. 90, 8. 10 1182 
 
 39 & 40 V. 
 
 0. 36, 8. 10 1106 
 
 88. 36, 37 1329 
 
 88. 177, 180 116 
 
 88. 178, 191 372 
 
 8. 227 1322 
 
 s. 257 76 
 
 8. 259 372, 1359 
 
 8. 261 171 
 
 8. 263 15550 
 
 o. 37, Ir 74 
 
 0.45, 8. 7 1611 
 
 c. 48 1608a 
 
 o. 61, s. 34 964b 
 
 0. 63, Ir 34 
 
 c. 80, g. 4 372 
 
 40 &41 V. 
 
 0. 14, 8. 1 1360 
 
 0.18,8.48 148 
 
 0. 21, B. 6 6 
 
 8. 51 1527 
 
 0. 25 1504 
 
 8. 16 1639 
 
 8. 19 1596 
 
 8. 20 1596 
 
 0.26,8. 6 1601, 1631 
 
 C.41 1526 
 
 8. 3 19, 1527 
 
 8.4 6 
 
 8. 6 19 
 
 0.48,88.4,9 6 
 
 0.49, 8. 4, Ir 6 
 
 8. 11, Ir 1309a, 1,329 
 
 8. 23 1309a 
 
 8. 43, Ir 35a. 1668 
 
 B. 67, Ir 1663a 
 
 40 & 41 V. FABAOBAPHS (^§) 
 
 0.65 ICOl 
 
 0.66, 8. 3, Ir 1276 
 
 8. 31, Ir 1777 
 
 8. 32, Ir 1601, 1777 
 
 0.57, 8.21, Ir 1262a 
 
 8. 27, subs. 4, Ir 5 
 
 subs. 0, Ir 5 
 
 8. 28, subs. 3, Ir 156 
 
 subs. 4, Ir 1014 
 
 subs. 5, Ir 176 
 
 subs. 6, Ir 997 
 
 subs. 1 1 , Ir. . . 5 
 
 8. 34, Ir 1283 
 
 0.59, 88. 1, 18 1498 
 
 88. 4, 6 1839 
 
 8. 17 1777 
 
 a. 18 1611 
 
 8. 22 1039 
 
 o. 63, s. 6 1611 
 
 0. 77, Ir 521 
 
 41V. 
 
 C. 8, 8. 20 1657 
 
 0. 12, s. 1 372 
 
 8. 3 1360 
 
 c. 15, s. 19 , 372 
 
 0. 16, SH. 27—30 1611, 1640 
 
 8.79 180 
 
 8. 91 76 
 
 8. 92..372, 1555c, 1611,1640 
 
 41 & 42 V. 
 
 0.26, 8. 13 1.504 
 
 s. 36 1293 
 
 0.31,83.4,5 H20a 
 
 s. 10 1110, 1654 
 
 8. 11 iriOA 
 
 8.12 1491n 
 
 8. 16 1540 
 
 0.33, 8. 5 173 
 
 ss. 11, 29 16;i8 
 
 o. 38 1186 
 
 c. 49 H4a 
 
 88. 37, 41 1611 
 
 0.62, 8. 13, Ir 6 
 
 88.41,54,91,100,103, 
 
 105, 129, Ir 1657 
 
 8. 69, Ir 183 
 
 8. 70, Ir 372 
 
 8. 201, subs. 1, Ir. .. 995 
 
 8. 223, Ir l«-)7 
 
 8. 250, Ir 70, 375 
 
 8. 265, Ir 1527 
 
 8. 267, Ir 180 
 
 0.67 1313 
 
 0.74, 8. .58 1527 
 
 0.76, s. 12 180, 1105n 
 
 c. 79 1293 
 
 42 & 43 V. 
 
 0.8 1595,1601 
 
 o. 9 1 80 
 
 0.11,88.2—11 1608A 
 
 0.31, s. 4 372 
 
 I 
 
 Vol. I. endi with § 971. 
 
m ' 
 
 IHrh 
 
 ccxxx 
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 42 & 43 V. FABAORAFHS (§§) 
 
 0.49 1234a, 1258 
 
 ss. 10—14 1615 
 
 8. 10, eubH. 5 104 
 
 8. 19 1237 
 
 8. 22 1555 
 
 8. 24, subs. 2 35 
 
 8. 27, subs. 4 1615 
 
 8. 28 1258 
 
 8.29 18 
 
 8. 31, subs. 6 1555 
 
 8. 36 1234, 1318a 
 
 8.39 375 
 
 8.41 15860 
 
 Sched. 2 1319 
 
 0. 60, s. 4, Ir 1120a 
 
 8. 8, Ir 150a, 1120a 
 
 8. 11, Ir 1120a 
 
 8. 16, Ir 1540 
 
 " 1 831 
 
 8. 3 1675 
 
 V. tn 1246b 
 
 c. 78 1599a 
 
 8. 5 ....1119, 1120, 1120a, 
 
 1122, 1264, 1268 
 
 88. 5—8 14910 
 
 43 & 44 V. 
 
 c. 9, 8. 1 16 
 
 c. 13, 8. 36 76 
 
 c. 19 1600, 1601 
 
 0.42, 88. 1, 2, 3, 8 1182 
 
 8. 4 73 
 
 8. 7 180 
 
 0. 45, 8. 2 104 
 
 0.47, ss. 1, 3 1175 
 
 44 V. 
 
 c. 12, ss. 38, 39 975 
 
 88. 26—43 860 
 
 44 & 45 V. 
 
 c. 20, ss. 6, 7 1527 
 
 o. 24, 8. 4, subs. I 15860 
 
 subs. 3 1252 
 
 0. 36, 8. 5, Ir 1290 
 
 8. 9. It 1488 
 
 0.37,8.25 116 
 
 8.26 180 
 
 0.41, 88. 3, 7 129, 1174 
 
 8. 30 1015 
 
 88. .55, 56 96 
 
 B. 67 180 
 
 Soh. II. Pt. Ill 129 
 
 0.44, 8. 8 1097 
 
 c. 49, 8. 42, Ir 6 
 
 8. 48, subs. 3, Tr 1293 
 
 8. 50, subs. 2, Ir 19 
 
 C. 68, 88. 28, 44 1293 
 
 8. 29 1378 
 
 8. 52, subs. 3 1378 
 
 8. 52, subs. 4 1382 
 
 8. 53, subs. 7 566 
 
 8.56 269 
 
 8. 60, subs. 8 1276 
 
 44 & 46 v. FABAQSAPB8 (${) 
 
 0. 68, 8. 63, subs. 7 1278 
 
 8. 69 6, 1530 
 
 8.70 5 
 
 subs. 1, 3 6 
 
 8.80 1601 
 
 B. 124 1490a 
 
 B. 126 1293, 1334, 1338 
 
 8. 126, subs. 1 .. 1252, 1293 
 
 subs. 2 1378 
 
 subs. 3 1293 
 
 88. 127, 128 49a 
 
 8. 142, subs. 3 1714 
 
 8. 154 1596 
 
 8. 156, subs. 1, 2 .... 372 
 
 subs. 3 1360 
 
 8. 157 1611 
 
 8. 161 76 
 
 8. 162, subs. C 1611 
 
 8. 163, subs. A 1601 
 
 subs. B 1696 
 
 subs. C 1630 
 
 8ub8. D 1638a 
 
 subs. E 1601 
 
 subs. F 180 
 
 subs. G 1601 
 
 subs.H.....'.. 1601 
 
 8. 164 16U 
 
 8. 165 1655a 
 
 8. 170, subs. 1 73a 
 
 subs. 2 831 
 
 8. 172, subs. 1 1696 
 
 88.175,176,177,178.. 6 
 
 8. 179 1334 
 
 subs. 1, 20.... 6 
 
 subs. 6 6 
 
 subs. 11 1530 
 
 8. 180 6 
 
 8. 190 5 
 
 0.59 ..,.6,220,621,1791,1810 
 
 0. 60, 8. 6 1260 
 
 8. 13 1504 
 
 8. 16 1601 
 
 c. 62, 8. 3, subs. 2 1038 
 
 8. 9 1638 
 
 0.69, 8. 15 1252 
 
 8. 27 1262 
 
 8. 29 479, 1562 
 
 46 V. 
 
 0.9 1524, 1527 
 
 8.2 1523, 1527 
 
 B. 4 1627 
 
 0. 10, ss. 5, 10 1630 
 
 46 & 46 V. 
 
 c. 26, ss. 10, 17 1323 
 
 0. 38 6 
 
 8. 42 1601 
 
 8.48 6 
 
 8. 66, subs. 9 6 
 
 c. 39, s. 2 1640 
 
 8. 7, subs. 7, 8 1640 
 
 c. 43, 8. 4 1195 
 
 References are to paragraphs (§j) not page*. 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 CCXXXl 
 
 45 & 46 V. PAEAQBAPH8 (§§) 
 
 0. 43, 8. 8....I0OA, 1120a, 1491b, 
 
 1654 
 
 8. 10 1110 
 
 8.11 1491b 
 
 8. 16 1491b 
 
 c. 48, 8. 27 1601, 1611 
 
 c. 49,8. 44 1601, 1611 
 
 8.46 73a 
 
 8ubs. 3 831 
 
 o. 60, 8. 22, subs. 5, 6 1783 
 
 8. 24 1657 
 
 8.78 76 
 
 8. 94, subs. 1 1293 
 
 subs. 2— 4 .... 1293 
 
 6. 219, subs. 1 76 
 
 8. 226 73a, 315 
 
 8. 233 1504 
 
 0.61,88. 10, 11, 12 1168 
 
 8. 13 169, 170, 1168 
 
 8. 14 1168 
 
 subs. 4 16 
 
 8. 17 1094 
 
 B. 19 1822 
 
 8.20 1836 
 
 B. 30 148, 368 
 
 subs. 2 369 
 
 8. 46, subs. 2 30a 
 
 8. 49, subs. 12,13.... 30a 
 
 88. 61, 52 1110 
 
 8.54 851 
 
 8,58 853 
 
 8.60 72 
 
 8. 63, subs. 3 1828 
 
 88.69,70 437 
 
 8. 74, subs. 2 30a 
 
 88. 76—82 31 
 
 8. 86, subs. 2 30a 
 
 8.89 16 
 
 8.94 1110 
 
 Sch. I 1110 
 
 0. 72, 8. 11, subd. 2 1608a 
 
 0. 75 1015 
 
 88.1,2 770,1016 
 
 88. 12, 16 190, 1371a 
 
 88. 14, 16 830, 1689 
 
 8. 168 1360 
 
 0.77,88.3,4 180 
 
 46 V. 
 
 0.3, 8. 2 1714 
 
 8. 4, subs. 2 1360 
 
 c. 7, 8. 6, Ir 1120a 
 
 8. 8, Ir H20a, 1491b 
 
 8. 10, Ir 1110 
 
 88. 11, 16, Ir 1491b 
 
 46 & 47 V. 
 
 0.22 1778 
 
 8. 17 1596 
 
 8. 30 1564 
 
 c. 36, 8. 2 1329 
 
 8.30 1663a 
 
 0.49 221, 544, 560 
 
 46 & 47 V. PAEAOHAPHS ($$) 
 
 0.61 1246b, 1455 
 
 8. 3 1714 
 
 8.61 76 
 
 8. 52 1707 
 
 8. 53 1254, 1714 
 
 subs. 2 1360 
 
 subs. 3 1611 
 
 8.62 180 
 
 c. 62, 8. 4, subs. 1 809 
 
 8.11 180 
 
 8. 13 1549, 1747a 
 
 8. 16, subs. 4 14^1 
 
 8. 17, subs. 8 ..1458a, 1491 
 
 8. 18, subs. 9 72 
 
 8. 20, subs. 2 ..1649, 1747a 
 
 8. 21, subs. 4 1748 
 
 8.24 1458a 
 
 B. 27, subs. 1—3 1289, 
 
 1390, 1458a 
 
 subs. 6 519 
 
 8. 30 1750 
 
 8.31 202 
 
 8. 32, subs. 2 1750 
 
 B. 35, subs. 3 1747a 
 
 8.43 169, 1016 
 
 8. 44, subs. 3 1039a 
 
 88.47,48 83 
 
 8. 54 1015 
 
 8. 65 1013 
 
 8. 66 1013 
 
 8. 68, subs. 2 1386 
 
 8. 71, subs. 4 1491 
 
 fls. 79, 80 1491 
 
 8. 82, subs. 3 1749 
 
 8. 92 19 
 
 8S. 93, 100 246 
 
 8. 106, subs. 5 519, 1398 
 
 8. 110 1289 
 
 6. 113 748 
 
 8. 127 19, 1549 
 
 8. 132 1649, 1747a 
 
 8. 133 1552 
 
 8. 134 1548, 1748 
 
 8. 135 ir^52, 1566 
 
 8. 136 495 
 
 8. 137 6, 14 
 
 B. 138 1550 
 
 8. 140 1751 
 
 8. 142 180 
 
 8. 149, subs. 2 ..292, 1255, 
 1260 
 
 8. 163 286, 292, 372 
 
 88. 104, 166, 167 ... 292 
 
 8. 166 292, 1255 
 
 8. 168 1015 
 
 Sch. 1 1101, 1552 
 
 Sch. II 1386, 1491 
 
 c. 67, 88. 23, 55, 76, 78, 114 . . 1775a 
 
 s. 29 315 
 
 s. 30 562 
 
 88. 31, 96 1611 
 
 Vol. I. ends with } 971. 
 
 !i 
 
ccxxxu 
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 46 & 47 V. PABAOBAPHS (§§) 
 
 c. 67, B. 49 1611 
 
 8. 52 1504 
 
 (!.84 6 
 
 B. 87 998 
 
 8. 88 1504 
 
 B8. 89, ICJ IGOl 
 
 8.97 180 
 
 0.61,8.28 180 
 
 88.33,41,54 34 
 
 47 & 48 V. 
 
 c. P, 8. 25 1293 
 
 c. 12 1657 
 
 0. 14 190 
 
 8. 1 1360, 137U 
 
 c. 18 6 
 
 c. 30, 8. 3 1526 
 
 c. 39 5 
 
 c. 43 1102a, 1371 
 
 0.64,88.9,20— 22,31, 32, 45. .1652a 
 
 8. 51 1127 
 
 C.61, 8. 16 1262a 
 
 c. 70, 8. 30 1254, 1260 
 
 c. 76, 8. 15 1527 
 
 48 V. 
 
 c. 4 1652a 
 
 c. 8, 9. 7, 8ub8. 1 1596 
 
 8.8 5 
 
 c. 18 372 
 
 48 & 49 V. 
 
 C.27 1293, 1814 
 
 c. 36 1601 
 
 6. 6 1527 
 
 0. 63 1775a 
 
 0.69 81, 1389b 
 
 8. 4.. 104, 1359b, 1389c, 1714 
 
 88. 5, 7 104 
 
 8. 9 13890 
 
 88. 10, 18 1254 
 
 8. 20 13,59b 
 
 0.70 1564 
 
 c. 74, «8. 2—5 1314 
 
 49 V. 
 
 c. 5 1527,1601 
 
 c. 8, 8. 5 6 
 
 49 & 50 V. 
 
 c.48,8.26 173 
 
 60 & 61 V. 
 
 c. 20, B. 12, Ir 1663a 
 
 0. 28, 8. 10, 8ub8. I 1360 
 
 8.15 76 
 
 8. 17 1180 
 
 0.49 6 
 
 o. 55, 8. 16 35a, 1668 
 
 0. 68, 8. 62 76 
 
 8.71 47 
 
 0.71, 8. 4 901 
 
 8. 6 901, 1234a 
 
 B. 18, 8ubs. 5 1488 
 
 B. 19, subs. 2 1290 
 
 B. 20 ?83 
 
 88. 21—23, 26 1290 
 
 51 V. PAKAOSAPRS m) 
 
 0. 3 ..74, 75b, 150, 168, 315, 500, 
 
 98lA, 1016, 1019, 1110, 
 
 1324, 1611 
 
 51 & 62 V. 
 
 c. ':o, 8. 2 6 
 
 C.41 72, 1601, 1777 
 
 8. 40 180, 1596 
 
 8. 79 14 
 
 c. 42, 8. 4 1119, 16.i0 
 
 0.43 1348 
 
 8. 28 1554 
 
 8. 78 1686b 
 
 8. 81 1704 
 
 8. 87 246 
 
 ss. 88, 93 1719 
 
 8. 104 1417 
 
 8. 110 1291 
 
 B. Ill 1291, 1403 
 
 8. 115 [^Add. 1719] 
 
 B. 116 38 
 
 88. 133—137 1850 
 
 8. 164 1316a 
 
 8. 180 6 
 
 0.46, 8. 1 1382, 1389 
 
 8. 2 1382 
 
 8. 3 1382, 1384, 1388, 
 
 1,388a 
 
 B. 4 1382, i389 
 
 8. 6 1388 
 
 c. 50, 8.21 998 
 
 c. 64, 8. 9 1359a 
 
 52 & 53 V. 
 
 c. 7, s. 11 976 
 
 o. 10 11, 12 
 
 8. 6 1567 
 
 0. 21 144a 
 
 0. 30 6, 1601 
 
 >,. 2 1329,1601 
 
 88. 3—5, 7 1601 
 
 8. 6 6, 1601 
 
 8. 11 1329 
 
 0. 45 123 
 
 c. 49 1583 
 
 88. 8, 18 1292 
 
 c. 63 888a 
 
 8. 9 5, 16, 1523 
 
 63 V. 
 
 0. 6 1100, 1674 
 
 s. 9 1320 
 
 8. 114 1327 
 
 B8. 144, 152 1601 
 
 8.327 180 
 
 8. 332 1320 
 
 63 & 54 V. 
 
 c. 19 1110 
 
 0. 21, 8. 1, 8ub-8. 2 1601 
 
 8. 3 .. , 1600 
 
 B. 4 1595, 1601 
 
 8. 6 1601 
 
 8. 6 1596 
 
 8. 13 1600 
 
 Lt 
 
 References are to paragraphs (§^) not pages. 
 
 t- '. ' i ■. 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 CCXXXlll 
 
 63 & 54 V. PAKAOBAPHS (§}) 
 
 c. 21,8. 2, 171 
 
 0. 27 1<'>S6 
 
 0. »3 220 
 
 0. 37 17 
 
 0. 30 74r) 
 
 0.67,8.2 34 
 
 0. 71, s. 3 IflSO 
 
 8ub». 4 i:oi 
 
 subs. 13 ....72, l;j')0, 
 1748 
 
 subs. 17 1015 
 
 a. 8, Bubss. 2, 6 .... 1551 
 
 8. 10 1750 
 
 8. 13 1013 
 
 8. 22, subss. 1. 3 1101 
 
 8. 26 286, 372, 898 
 
 8. 27, subs. 2 1458a 
 
 64 & 66 V. 
 
 0. 10 1127 
 
 0. 38, S8. 13—15. 18 372 
 
 0. 39 397 
 
 8s. 12, 13 1763 
 
 8. 14, subss. 1, 2, 4 397 
 
 B. 15, subs. 3 397 
 
 s. 36 72 
 
 s. 72 446,724b 
 
 Sched 998a, 1043, 1850 
 
 c. 64, 8. 14 1601 
 
 0.64 1110, 16.52b 
 
 Sched. 1 1652b 
 
 0. 65, Sched 1320 
 
 0. 67 17, 1088 
 
 0. 69, s. 1 1527 
 
 c. 70, 8. 7 1371 
 
 65 V. 
 
 C.4 949 
 
 c. 9 1455 
 
 c. 10 3a, 1000 
 
 r &56 V. 
 
 0. 19 ..425, 500, 860, 1426, 1714, 
 1759, 1839 
 
 0. 23 1595, 1601, 1611 
 
 ss. 1, 11, 21 1600 
 
 s. 16 1622 
 
 K. 17 1611 
 
 0. 30 115 
 
 8. 26 180 
 
 c. 32 906. 1360 
 
 s. 2 1287 
 
 8. 6 76 
 
 8. 9 1287, A/ip. 
 
 C. 55, 8. 475 ..1260, 1318, 1.562a 
 c. 64 1281 
 
 66 & 57 V. 
 
 c. 39, 9. 43 . 1013 
 
 0. 53. S8. 26, 32 1764 
 
 0. 61, s. 1 73a, 315, 831 
 
 8. 2 73a, 315 
 
 0. 63, 88. 1, 2 842 
 
 8. 4 1231 
 
 66 & 57 Vict. PABAOBAPIIS (§§) 
 
 c. 63, 8. 7 76 
 
 0. 71 745 
 
 8. 4..1021,1030d, 1043.1044, 
 
 1045, 1143 
 
 subs. 1..1020, 1025, 1039a 
 
 subs. 2 1020 
 
 s. 12 1177 
 
 8. 14 1177a, 1178, 1179 
 
 B. 29, subs. 4 33, yldd. 
 
 ss. 60, 62 lO'zO 
 
 c. 73, 8. 3 14 
 
 57 & 58 V. 
 
 c. 8, 8. 7 73a 
 
 0.27 1389b 
 
 c.41,8. 12 1359b 
 
 8. 15 1389D 
 
 8. 17 115a 
 
 • 8 18, subs. 3 76 
 
 o. 46, s. 57. subs. 1 (b) 180 
 
 0.48 1182, 124fiB, 1254, 1258, 
 
 1260, 1293, 1326, 1360, 1455 
 
 c. 56 312, 1608a 
 
 o. 57 76 
 
 8. 5 1611 
 
 8. 10, subs. 5 1778 
 
 8. 37 ICOl 
 
 8. 46, subs. 5 1611 
 
 8. 48, subs. 1 1611 
 
 subs. 3 180 
 
 8. 62 372, 1178 
 
 8. 53 372 
 
 8. 57 (3) 1360 
 
 c. 60 1546 
 
 ss. 2, 3 998a 
 
 e. 10 1623 
 
 88. 24, 39, 40 998a 
 
 8. 64.. 1504, 1601, 1623, 1778 
 
 8. 77, subs. 6 998a 
 
 88. 92, 93, 96, 99 1623 
 
 8. 100 1601, 1623 
 
 88. 101, 103, 104 1623 
 
 8.107 1098,1107 
 
 88. 113-116 1098, 1107 
 
 8. 117 1601 
 
 8. 122 1098,1819 
 
 s. 123 454 
 
 s. 124 1098 
 
 8. 136, suos. 3 1601 
 
 8. 137. subs. 2 1584, 1601 
 
 8. 138 1098 
 
 88. 174, 208 1601 
 
 8. 229 1623 
 
 8S. 23U -241,. 1595, 1600,1778 
 
 8. 239, subs. 6 1601 
 
 88. 242, 243 1595, 1600 
 
 8 251 1595 
 
 8. 256 1504, lr95, 1001 
 
 8. 272 1023 
 
 88. 310, 334 1601 
 
 8. 362 1657 
 
 8. 365 10 
 
 I,',. 
 
 Vol. J. endi with § 971. 
 
 ■i I 
 
CCXXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF STATUTES CITED, 
 
 67 & 68 V. PABAORAPnS (^) 
 
 c. 80,88. 3C9, 370 1098 
 
 8. 371, »ub8. 3....1098, IfiOl 
 
 88. 373, 374 1778 
 
 88. 387, 39.5 1601 
 
 M. 391— 408, 41'2 1098 
 
 8.407 1819 
 
 B. 416 1601 
 
 8.418 5 
 
 8. 419. ...5, 206, 1596, 1601, 
 1700 
 
 8. 436, subs. 2 1601 
 
 8. 4.58 1182a 
 
 88. 464, 465 1329 
 
 8. 471 1623 
 
 88. 475,479 1421 
 
 8. 484 1601 
 
 88. 502, 503 208 
 
 8. 651 1601 
 
 8.633 208 
 
 57 & 58 V. PAnAORAPHR (J}) 
 o. 60, HH. 680. 082 1254 
 
 H. (i«3 76 
 
 H. 691 1564,1601 
 
 H. 692, BUbs. 3 998a 
 
 K. 69+ 1839 
 
 8. 695 1601 
 
 8. 697 1360 
 
 8. 700 1264 
 
 B. 719 1696, 1601, 1623 
 
 B. 729 1329 
 
 88. 742, 745, 8ubB. 1 E. , 998a 
 
 58 V. 
 
 0. 7, 8. 7 [6, 1530 Add.] 
 
 c. 9 [1527 Add.] 
 
 68 & 59 V. 
 
 c. 24, 8. 6 1360 
 
 0. 26,88. 6,7 nOi Add.} 
 
 0.28 1360 
 
 0.40,8.2 1360 
 
 Xrftrtneu art to jfaragrapht (})) notfaftt. 
 
( ccxxxv ) 
 
 RULES AND FORMS OF SUPREME COURT, 
 
 1883, CITED. 
 
 m 
 
 rASAOBAFHB (§§) 
 
 O. V. r. 7 1668 
 
 rr. 12, 13 1686 
 
 ,0. VIII. rr. 1, 2, 3 1586 
 
 O. X. r. 1 1586a 
 
 O. XII. rr. 26, 26 789 
 
 O.XIV 38 
 
 O. XVI 221,222,226,1811 
 
 r. 1 226 
 
 r. 4 226 
 
 r. 9 462 
 
 r. 11 228 
 
 r. 12 226 
 
 O. XVIII. r. 2 101 
 
 O. XIX 221, 222, 226, 299 
 
 r. 2 300, 462 
 
 r. 4 300, 727 
 
 r. 6 1799 
 
 r. 12 311 
 
 r. 13 ....301, 308, 824, 829 
 
 rr. 14— 16 301 
 
 r. 17 302 
 
 r. 18 ....300,302,304,369 
 
 r. 20 306 
 
 r. 21 1786 
 
 r. 25 109, 368 
 
 O.XXI.r.6 307,313 
 
 r. 19 311 
 
 r. 20 1691 
 
 r. 21 301, 371, 388 
 
 O. XXII. r. 1 831, 832 
 
 rr. 2, 4, 6, 7 831 
 
 0. XXIII. r. 6 301,308 
 
 O. XXV. rr. 1, 2 91, 306 
 
 rr. 2, 3, 4, 6 828 
 
 O.XXVI.r.l 1719 
 
 O. XXVII. r. 2 83,383 
 
 r. 13 ..300, 302, 824, 829 
 O. XXVIII 221, 222, 226, 304 
 
 0. XXXI 531,1500,1792 
 
 r. 1 1466 
 
 r. 6 1467 
 
 r. 8 442 
 
 r. 12 1799 
 
 r. 14 1791, 1798 
 
 rr. 15, 17 1787 
 
 r. 19 1494 
 
 rr. 20, 25, 26 1799 
 
 r. 24 623, 731 
 
 O. XXXII 724a (i), 724a (ii) 
 
 r. 1 ....724A(i), 724a (ii) 
 
 r. 2.... 724a (i), 724a (v), 
 
 724b 
 
 r. 3.... 724a (i), 724a (V) 
 
 FABAOBAPHa (§}) 
 
 0. XXXII. r. 4.. 724a (i), 724b, 724h, 
 
 7241 
 
 r. 6 724K 
 
 r. 6 724H, 827 
 
 r. 7 724H, 7241 
 
 r. 8 448 
 
 r. 9 456a 
 
 O.XXXIII.r.2 711 
 
 r. 3 711,812 
 
 r. 6 1403 
 
 0. XXXVI. rr. 2— 7a 21b 
 
 r. 6 1417 
 
 r. 12 1719 
 
 r. 30 1686 
 
 r. 36 1431 
 
 r. 37 344, 366, 360 
 
 r. 38.. 1427, 1434a, 1446 
 
 r. 44 2lo 
 
 r. 48 662 
 
 r. 49 1292 
 
 r. 60 1798 
 
 r. 67 383, 1310a 
 
 0. XXXVII 60lA, 604, 1285 
 
 r. 1..604, 615, 1394, 1395, 
 1843a, 1861 
 
 r. 2 1396a 
 
 r. 4....627, 1 17, 1536, 
 
 . >37. ' '38 
 
 r. 5.. 603, 604, 5, 
 
 646, 12 10, 
 
 1677, 1' U, 
 
 1 
 
 r. 6a 604 
 
 r. 7 1286, 1310 
 
 rr. 8, 9 604, 1310 
 
 rr. 10, 11 604 
 
 rr. 12, 16..504,546, 1677 
 
 r. 17 604, 1310 
 
 r. 18.... 472, 600a, 602, 
 
 604, 615, 1580 
 
 r. 19.. 1285, 1386, 1396b 
 
 rr. 20— 23 504 
 
 r. 24 604, 1396F 
 
 r. 25 470, 604 
 
 rr. 26, 27 1239 
 
 r. 28 1284 
 
 rr. 29, bO 1241 a 
 
 r. 31 1241 
 
 rr. 32, 33 1244 
 
 r. 34 1242 
 
 r. 35 644 
 
 rr. 36, 37, 38 .... 54o 
 
 rr. 39, 40 60" 
 
 rr. 41,42,44-46,49 607 
 
 Vol. I. ends with i 971. 
 
CCXXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF RULES AND FORMS. 
 
 PABAQBAPHB ({^) 
 
 o. xxxvin. r. I \:m 
 
 r. 3 ....139(iii, i;i()(io 
 
 rr. 4,6 i;«6is 
 
 r. ..12, 1390k, 1')(1C 
 
 rr. 8, 12, 13 139()D 
 
 r. 11 139GO 
 
 r. ir)..1390F, 1447, l.'>38 
 
 rr. 16, 17 1396f 
 
 r. 27 389 
 
 r. 28 1396a, 1429 
 
 r. 29 1396a 
 
 O. XXXIX. r. 6 lS82n 
 
 r. 8 397 
 
 0. XLL r. 1 l.')80 
 
 O. XLII. rr. 20, 21, 24 1686 
 
 O. XLIV. r. 2 12G9 
 
 O. XLV. r. 7 1692 
 
 O. L. rr. 3 -6 500 
 
 O. LI. rr. 7, 8 21 
 
 O. LV. r. 10 1284, 1386, 1396e 
 
 r. 17 1284, 1386 
 
 O. LVIII. r. 4 24lA, 1883a 
 
 O. LTX. r. 7 1882b 
 
 O. LX. r. 3 1485, 1599a 
 
 O. IjXI. r. 1.... 6, 1119, 1120, H20a, 
 
 1122, 1268, 148.5, 1491a, 
 
 1491b, 1491c, 15.39, 1.540, 
 
 1699a, 1611, 1647, 1653, 
 
 1654, 1668 
 
 r. 6 1386, 1396k 
 
 rr. 6, 7 6, 15, 39 
 
 r. 9 1611, 1653 
 
 rr. 17, 18, 23, 24 1491a 
 
 r. 28 1534 
 
 O.LXIV.r. 1 16 
 
 r. 11 446, 1.586a 
 
 r. 12 1586a 
 
 FABAOaAPHS (§{) 
 
 O. LXV. r. 1 39 
 
 r. 12 38 
 
 r. 27, par. 9 ....1247, App. 
 
 pur. 20 462 
 
 par. 25.... 128 4, 1386 
 
 par. 37 ^Ipp- 
 
 pars. 63,54 1538 
 
 O. LXVI. r. 1 442 
 
 O. LXVIL rr. 1— 9 1586a 
 
 r. 3 180 
 
 O. LX VIII 1.500, 1782 
 
 r. 1 21c, 246, 666 
 
 r. 2 245 
 
 O. LXXI. r. 1 39 
 
 O.LXXn. r. 2 App. 
 
 Appendix B. 
 
 Form 11 724a (v), 724o 
 
 12, 13 72411, 7241 
 
 14 442 
 
 Appendix C. 
 Form 7 101 
 
 Appendix G. 
 Form 21 1239 
 
 Appendix J. 
 
 Forms 1—7 1239 
 
 13 611 
 
 Appendix K. 
 
 Form824,26 1798 
 
 36— 37b 504 
 
 Appendix 0. .. 1380, 1387 
 
 EULES OF SUPREME COURT, OCTOBER 1884, CITED. 
 
 PABAQBAFHS (§§) 
 
 Rule 6 504 
 
 16 1882b 
 
 TABLE OP COUNTY COURT RULES AND FORMS CITED. 
 
 PARAaBAFHS (§6) 
 
 1889. O. IVa. r. 30 1248 
 
 O. Vll 1291 
 
 O. IX. rr. 7, 8 724i 
 
 O. XII. r. 3 566 
 
 O. XIV 246 
 
 O. XVIII 131.5a 
 
 rr. 1, 2 1291 
 
 r. 3 1397 
 
 r. 6 724o 
 
 r. 8 1879 
 
 r. 10 1397 
 
 PABAQBAFHS (§§) 
 
 1889. O. XVIII. rr. 13—28 .... 620 
 
 r. 16 1291 
 
 O. XIX. rr. 1— 9 1397 
 
 1892. O.XXVIa 1692 
 
 1889. O. La. rr. 6, 28 App. 
 
 rr. 30, 31 App. 
 
 1889. Form 90 724o 
 
 92a, 92b 724i 
 
 145a, 146a 1291 
 
 147 1291 
 
 1892. Form 156 1692 
 
 References are to paragraphs (§§) not pages. 
 
( ooBzxvii ) 
 
 ADDENDA AND ERRATA. 
 
 %* The additions in the Addenda following bring the decisions in 
 English Cases down to 3lst July, 1895; in Irish Cases to thost 
 contained in the Law Reports (Ir.) up to and including the July 
 Number of those Reports; and in American Cases down to and 
 inclusive of those contained in Vol, XLII. of the Am. St. Rep. 
 English legislation is also noted up down to 31st July, 1895. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 4, at end of note " add— "Ab amended by 58 V. c. 7 (' The Army Act, 1896 ' ), § 7." 
 
 16, line 2 from bottom of text. Before " matters of history " insert — " as to." 
 
 34, line 6 from top. After "much discussed'" insert — "By 'The Sale of Goods 
 Act, 1893,' it is expressly enacted (affirming the previous common law) 
 that ' what is a reasonable hour is a question of fact' '*." 
 
 Insert as note 2»— " «» 66 & 67 Vict. c. 71 {' The Sale of Goods Act, 1893'), 
 § 29, subs. 4." 
 
 17, in notes. At end of note ^, after "Cooke v. Wildes, 1885," insert — "And 
 
 this is so even where a Corporation is defendant (as to which, see post, 
 } 981) : Neville v. Fine Art, &c. Co., 1895." 
 At end of note », arfrf— "see also R. v. Baker, 1895 (C. 0. R.)." 
 
 68. At the end of § 69, add a netv sentence as follow* — "The circumstances must 
 be such as to produce moral certainty, to the exclusion of every reason- 
 able doubt. ' Moral certainty and the absence of reasonable doubt are 
 in truth one and the same thing."* 
 
 In the notes, add—'* * People v. Carlton (Am.), 1894 ; State v. Atkinson 
 (Am.), 1894 ; State v. Clifford (Am.), 1892." 
 
 ^ " ' See cases cited in note ", especially State v. Atkinson (Am.) 1894." 
 
 70, line hfrom top. At end o/§ 71 add — "It is at least questionable whether 
 a conclusive presumption can ever be raised in support of a criminal 
 charge.'*" 
 In notes, add—'' '» In America it has been decided that it cannot be ; see 
 note in 36 Am. St. Rep., p. 689, to People v. Cannon (Am.), 1893." 
 
 76, in note », instead o/3 # 4 Will. 4, "c. 27," read—"o. 42." 
 
 78, line 6 from bottom of note. Instead of 9 Geo. 4, " o. 69," read—"o. 69." 
 
 80, liv 5 from top. After "deadly weapon;'" insert — "an intent to do it 
 maliciously is in point of law inferred from an indictment ' for unlaw- 
 fully publishing a libel ' ; 3» " 
 
 In notes, add as note '» the following — " '• And an indictment for ' unlaw- 
 fully publishing a libel' is good without an averment that the defendant 
 published it 'maliciously' ; R. v. Munslow, 1896 (0. C. R.)." 
 
 I t! 
 
iiti 
 
 IB fit 
 
 ccxxxvlii 
 
 PAoe 
 
 ADDENDA AND ERRATA. 
 
 1:1' 
 
 100, iu note » after " (48 & 49 Vict. o. 69)," imleadof'ii'' read—" } 3." 
 
 In the 3rd line of note '*, after "ante, $ 42 " imerl — " He may also be a 
 member of a f riei-dly society ; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 60 (' The Friendly Societies 
 Act, 1875 '), § 16, 8ubH. 8. By ' The Friendly Societies Act, 1895 ' (68 
 & 69 Vict. c. 26), § 6, the nominee of an infant over sixteen may give 
 a valid receipt, except when the infant is known by the society to have 
 been marriea since the nomination. The infant member must, by ibid. 
 § 7, be over cue year of age, and may, if over sixteen, by himself, and 
 if under sixteen, by parent or guardian, execute instruments, &o., and 
 give receipts." 
 
 106, line 1 1 from bottom of text, and at the end of ^ 112, add — " In accordance with 
 this principle it has, in America, Lenn held that in a civil action {e.g. oa 
 a policy of insurr.nce) when there is no evidence as to its cause, a death 
 must be presumed to have been natural, and not to have been a suicide, 
 since suicide is a felony.*'" 
 In notes, add as note *» — " *» Walcott v. American Life, &o. (Am.), 1891." 
 
 113, in note *, after "see id." add — " Nor, semhle, does any arise unless it appear 
 that the ditch was artificial ; Marshall v. Taylor, 1895 (C. A.)." 
 
 116, in notes. At end of note * add — " But ' Hiring Agreements ' are not within 
 the Factors Act, and that Act does not enable a hirer to pass the 
 property in goods for which he has not paid : llelby v. Matthews, 1895 
 (H. L.). Payne f. Wilson, 1S95, having followed the decision of the 
 Court of Appeal in Helby v. Matthews, which was reversed by the 
 House of Lords, would ajpear not to bo now law." 
 
 125, in notes. At end of note "^ add — "As to the form in which the question 
 whether they will presume a lost grant should be left to a jury, see 
 O'Kttue V. O'Kane (Ir.), 1892." 
 
 167, in notes. At the commencement of note *, insert — " See 'The Judicature Act, 
 1873 ' (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), § 25, subs, iv." 
 
 169, in note ' line 6, after "Parsons v. Hayward, 1862," add — " and Brown v. 
 
 Wren Bros., 1895." 
 177, tn text. Strike out the reference "S" with the note at bottom. 
 181, in text, line !> from bottom. Insert "the disputable presumption of fact that 
 
 a person's life continues for u rea.sonable time after ho has last been 
 
 heard of,«» or the." 
 In notes, insert us note *• — " ** In the Goods of Connor (Ir.), 1892." 
 186, line 6 from lop. KStrHc ant the words " New Rules of." 
 
 196, line 10 from lop of (i\rt. Slriie out the icords "} 2 of," and in bottom line, 
 after " in," and before " criminal," insert the ivord — "certain." 
 
 220 »w text, line 4 jrom top. After ^ 293 insert a new piragraph, as follows : — 
 " §i!98A. The rule that the evidence must bo confiuod to the issues does 
 not, of course, exclude testimony bearing on one or more only of several 
 questions ruisod by an issue wliich is of a complex nature ; '• thus, for 
 instiinco, it may be shown that a defendant was negligent because, to 
 his knowkvlgo, other accidents had previously arisen from the same 
 condition of things"' (as, e.g., that he knew a maehino to ho in a 
 dangerous condition because h(> was awiire that athirs had been injured 
 by it previously to the aciiideut to the plaintitt) ; that the scienter (as it 
 is commonly called) must bo imputed to him because its owner kept a 
 dog or other animal after becoming aware that it had attacked others ; 
 and the existence of nuisances can only be shown by proof of the mis- 
 chief whioli the thing complained of has done to others of the public, as 
 well as to the plaintiff or prosecutor. See also post, ^ 33() et sei^." 
 
 In line 4 from top, after the irords " justcitetl," in.sert, " fu which ovidcnco 
 was rejected as irrelevant." 
 
 Ill no/is, iiisirt us note '•— " •• Brewing Coy. v. Beaucr (Am.), 1893, and 
 see also Brown f. Eastern, &c. lly. 1889 (C. A.)." 
 
 Itinert UK nut' "> — " "> Blumiugtou v, Legg (Am.), 1894 ; sec also cases iu 
 preceding nolo." 
 
ADDENDA AND ERRATA. 
 
 CCXXXIX 
 
 IPAOB 
 
 230, in notei. At the md of note * add — " As to the application of the rule in tha 
 
 Probate Court, see Young v. Hollo way, 1894 " 
 253, in note ''fur Order "XXVI.," read— Order "XXXVI." 
 299, in notei. At the end of note ' add — " As to pn of probate granted under 
 
 the old law, see post, § 1689." 
 332, in text, line Gfrom top. After the words "permanently insane," and before 
 
 note "*," imert the words — " or kept out of the way." 
 335, line ifrotn top. Strike out the word " oould " and insert the word — " can." 
 
 At end of note » add—" See also R. v. Mitchell, (1892), cited post, § 491." 
 339, »»• notes. In note * at commencement of note, insert — " See ' The Coroners Act, 
 1887' (50 & 61 Vict. c. 71), § 4, subs. 2. Corresponding provisions 
 were originally contained in 7 Geo. 4, o. 64, § 4, and are applied." 
 Strike out the whole of line 1 of note '. 
 368, in text. At the end of § 569, after the word " will," insert note "*." 
 376, at the end of note * add — " In America an attempted definition of res gestet 
 is, that the res gesta consists of ' the circumstances, facts, and declara- 
 tions which grew out of the main fact, are contemporaneous with it, and 
 serve to illustrate its character.' See Pinny v. Junes (Am.) 1894." 
 435, in text, line 5 from bottom. Strike out the word " pecuniary." 
 460, at end of note « add—'' and Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh (Am.), 1891." 
 468, at end of note * add — "The view stated in the text as once prevalent in 
 England is still held in America. See State /•. Johnson (Am.), 1893." 
 472, in notes. At the end of note * add—" By Order LXVIII. r. 1 (d) ' proceed- 
 ings for Divorce or other Matrimonial causes ' are expressly exempted 
 from the operations of the R. S. C. 1883." 
 477, in notes. In note ' after " 1889," insert—" Ord. XVIII." 
 506, line 6 from top. Instead of " § 774.'" read—" §§ 774—82."" 
 616, in notes. In note ' after the words " Robson v. Alexander, 1828," insert— 
 " B\it the law has been said to be otherwise as to confessions obtained 
 by illegal duress, &o. ; see post, } 883." 
 
 545, at commencement of note ' insert — "Henderson v. Williams, 1895 (C. A.)." 
 
 546, in notes. At the comtneneement of note ', insert — " Royal Bank of Scotland v. 
 
 Tottenham, 1894 (C. A.)." 
 
 668, in notes. At the end of note ", add — " Secus in America ; see Cook t'. State 
 
 (Am.), 1893, where the confession having been obtained by untruly 
 tolling the prisoner that he had been actually seen to do the criminal 
 act with which he was charged, was rejected.' 
 
 669, i» notes. In note ', strike out the last ientence, namely, " But this case would 
 
 seem not to be law," and insert — "This decision is in accordance with 
 subsequent American authority ; see Scott v. Commonwealth (Am.), 
 1893, cited post, \ 910." 
 
 671, in notes. At the end of note *, rtrfrf—" Compare the law as to admissiom 
 
 made under duress, ante, J 798." 
 673, at commencement of note ", strike out " Tlie " and insert — " See the." 
 580, in notes. At the end of note *, insert — " Not only (io those many authi<riti(»8 
 
 support the proposition in ilm u-.\i, to which the autlior took cxri'ptiiiii, 
 
 but the law in Anieric:! is tho same as the English law is goncnilly 
 
 taken to bo. Stjitc v. Clittord (A.m.), 1892." 
 
 684, innate''', instead of "'J Geo. 4,0. 74," &c., rcarf—" 9 Goo. 4, o. 5 4,§ 4 (cited 
 ante, § -192), and } (i, Ir." 
 
 690, in notes. At the end of note *, add — " But in America evon a letter, written 
 V)y an accused, whiiii in prison, to his wife, and voluntiirily given up hy 
 her, is considered to be a (^oiifideiitiiil e(nniiiunicati(>n between u bus- 
 band and wife, and is therefore not lulinittixl in eviden(M> against the 
 husband. See Se.ott f. Conmumweallh (Am.), 181)3. There is some 
 authority in Knglish law for a similar view ; see R. v. Pamenter, 187'2, 
 cited anti, ^^ 881, n." 
 
 804, in notes. In Une 1 of uole '\ instead of " Hth cd.," read — " loth ed." 
 
 ^',ii| 
 
 m 
 
ccxl 
 
 ADDENDA AND KRRATA. 
 
 PAOK 
 
 619, iff notti. At the end of note ', add-—" Latter «. Gulden is at pNwnt tbe 
 subject of appeal to the House of Lords." 
 
 639, in notes. In note '", in linet 3 and 4 from bottom, inttead ({^"the Metro- 
 politan Board of Works," r*arf— "the London County Council" ; and 
 at end of note insert — " and 51 & &2 Vict. o. 41 (' The Local Government 
 
 Act, 1888'), §40 (8)." 
 
 643, in noten. At end of note ', add—" and (also an action against a corporation 
 
 for libel) Neville v. Fine Art, &o., 1895." 
 
 644, tM notei. At end of note ^, add — " In America it is held that where a corpo- 
 
 ration makes a contract -which is ultra vires or unsealed, of which the 
 defendant has already had the beneftt, the remedy of the aggrieved 
 party is to difafOrm the contract, and to sue upon a quantum meruit for 
 the value of the work done ; see Bmnswink Gas, &o. Co. v. United Gas 
 Co. (Am.), 1893 ; and also Kadish v. Garden City, &c. (Am.), 1894." 
 
 661, in notes. At the end of note ^, add — " see post, § 1110." 
 
 673, innotes. At theendofnote\ add— '•Chipper&eld.v.Ca.rteT,l895 (Wnght,J.)." 
 
 679, in text, in line i from top. At end of 4 1034b add — " The provisions of Lord 
 Tenterden's Act'* must be considered in connection with those con- 
 tained in the Statute of Frauds on the subject of guarantees." 
 In notes. As tiote '», insert — " '• 9 Geo. 4, o. 14. These provisions are 
 set out and diHcussed post, §§ 1085 ct scq." At the end ofnote^, add — 
 " Re Eyre, 1895 (Romer, J.)." 
 
 688, at end of note ^, add—- ■ neither is an ag^ement by an artist to paint a picture 
 
 such 8 contract: Isaac v. Hardy, 1884 (Mathew, J.). In both these 
 cases cne contract is, in substance, one for the sale of goods, and 
 theref(/ro must be in writing, if the articles be of the value of £10 or 
 upwards." 
 
 689, at commencement ofnote*^ add— " Abbott & Co. v. Wolsey, 1895 (C. A.)." 
 
 690, tM text, line 1 at top. Hefore the word "marking," add — "taking of a 
 
 sample from the bulk'", or the mere " ; and in line 2 from top, instead of 
 "This Act," read—" each of thewe Acts." 
 In notes, insert as note '•— " '» Abbott & Co. v. Wolsey, 1895 (0. A.)." 
 699, in notes. At the end of note *, add—" Royle v. Harris, 1896." 
 72t , at the end of note ', add—" Tliis Act (see § 4) extends to Scotland." 
 
 724, in notes. Strike out at end of note \ " 369, 371, 391, 408, 412," and insert— 
 " 392 et seq., especially 395, which latter suction requirep such ajjree- 
 meut to be made before a Superintendent." 
 
 728, at commencement of § 1106, insert — "The London County Oouncil now 
 
 exerciMCH the functions formerly possessed by the Metropolitan Board 
 of Works'*." In name line sfrikfimt "is," and insert — " was." 
 In miles, insert as note '■ the fullouing — " '• See 61 & 62 Vict. o. 41 
 (' The Local Government Act, 1888 '), § 40." 
 
 729, in note ', instead of " Corporation of London v. Judge," read—" Corpora- 
 
 tion of Dublin v. Judge." In same note, immediately before "'The 
 Voters Registration Act,' " insert—" ' The Truck Acts,' ante, } 1096." 
 
 734. Instead of " § 1117," read—" §} 1117-18." 
 
 737, i>« Hue 5 in text, delete "of." 
 
 779, in text, line 1 from bottom. After " annexed by the " insert — "common." 
 
 780, in text, in line Sfrom top [being frst line of\ 1 184), and in line \Q from bottom, 
 
 between 'he words "the" ^- "law" insert {in each place) word — "common." 
 
 781, in text, line i from top {being frst line of ^ 118G), between the words "the" 
 
 and " law " imert the word—" common." 
 
 809, in text, on bottom line. After the words "summons'" insert — "or, if 
 necessary, by Crown Office subpoena." 
 hi note '', xnstend of " 32 & 33 Vict. c. 49" read—" 42 & 43 Vict. o. 40." 
 812, in text, lint Vifroin bottom of text, fur " from " read— "io attend." 
 
lii 
 
 ADDENDA AND EKUATA. 
 
 CCX 
 
 FAOR 
 
 819, in notu. In note ', strike out " Ord. IVa." and read—" Ord. La," 
 
 8-ir), in notes. In note ', line 2 nf note, instead of " ^ 50() " rea-/—" ^ .504." In 
 
 note ', strike out the lant fnur tvords of note, tiamchi — "citod ante, ^ flOG." 
 8-)l, in notes. In note ', serund line from bottom, strike out the tvords " a fow of tho 
 
 principal of hucIi " at the //<i/iiiiiinj/ of such note, and insert in its place the 
 
 fulloninij — "MoHtof tlio i)riii('ipal provinioiiH by which tlio attoudancu of 
 
 w'tnosNi'M before various tril)unalM may bo necurod, ■"'ill bo pimiiuTatod 
 
 on a later i)ii<!rc (hco post, § 1329, noto ", p. 8(i:!). The followiii^f uote 
 
 must aeoordiiiffly bo read in conjunction with tin; noto just referred to. 
 
 ]iiit in addition to the provisions mentioned in that note there are also." 
 8")7, in notes. At end of note *, insert — " § 24." 
 87G, in notes. In note cominif over from previous pui/r, in line i) from top of se/'ond 
 
 column, after " by ^ 2 that," insert — " in future in Scotland." 
 877, in notes. In note ^, line 10 from bottom, after the word "See" insert the 
 
 words — "for existin;? law." 
 893, at end if note '^ add — "In America she is oven allowed to prosecute her husband 
 
 for perjury contained in an affidavit made and used by him afi-iiiust 
 
 ' licr in the course of divorce proceedings : Dill v. l\'(ii)le (Am.), liS94." 
 
 905, in column 2, line 15 of note cominy over from previous page, strike out " And," 
 
 and in same line, after theu-ord "Scotland," insert — " Covenanters aud." 
 At end of note*, add — "It will bo noted that, as it contains no word.i 
 
 restrictiiif^ its operation, this Act extends to Scotland and Ireland." 
 948, at end of note ' add — " and if the statement be relevant, the witness if ho 
 
 swear falsely may be indicted for perjury : II. r. Baker, 181)5(0 CIl.)." 
 
 9(13, in notes. At the end of note eomin;/ orcr fro"i previous pai/e, add — " Jnilemiiity 
 clauses to witnesses f^iviiifc evidence are also coutainod in 'The ^ler- 
 chandiso Marks Act, 1S87' (50 i: 51 Vict. c. 28), J 19 (2); 'The 
 I'oi.soned Grain Proliibition A(^t, 18(13 ' (20 A: 27 Vict. c. 113), \ a ; and 
 in ' Tho Record of Title (Ireland) A.'.t, 1S05 ' (28 & 29 Vict. c. 88), § 59." 
 
 9G8, in text, in line ^ from top. At end if \ 1400, add - " Hut the (Toss-oxaininer 
 
 is bound by the witness's evidence, and cannot contradict him except 
 
 on a point which is relevant to the issue." 
 
 Line I'lfrom top of text. After "disfrracehini." add -note refirence "(«)." 
 
 In notes, before note ', add fool nut c {a), as follmrs ; — "(a) And this is the 
 
 practi(!e in Ameri'ja. See Carroll v. State (Am.), 189.1." 
 
 1001, in column 1 of note cominij onr from previous paije^ before I he words ^" Charitji 
 
 Trustees,' " insert — " 'JJoroui/h .■tccouuts aud Jloeunwiits.' See 'Municipal 
 Corporations.' " 
 
 1002, in notes, lu column 1 of note comitnj orer from previous pai/e, before the uords 
 
 "'The fricndli/ Societies Act, 1875,'" insert — "'Freemen's Roll oi li 
 I'orough.' See ' Municipal Corporations.'' " 
 /)( column 2 of same note, after " Turnpike'" and before "Jurors' Lists," 
 insert — "' Incorjioraled Lair Noeieli/'s Doriiiii' uts.' See title ' Solicitor.'" 
 
 1003, in column 1 of note. Itefore the words " ' The Miicha,:t Shippinij Art, 1894,' " 
 
 tnserl — " • London I 'oiiuli/ Council,' see post, lj{ I59b 1, n., aud infra, ' Tht 
 Metropolis Manayemcnt Act.' " 
 
 1005, in notes. After the word " infra," 'in top line of column 1 of note, insert — 
 " See also ' I'alualiou Lists,' infra." 
 
 1008, rt/(«rf()/4//i/iw/;/)«//i/«/')"''''~"'""lt'''u Documentary Evidence Act, 1895, *•" 
 
 Y/i notes, as *» add" '« 58 V. r.. 9." 
 
 1009, in notes. At the bottom if sebntule in note *, add in column 1 — " 'The Board 
 
 of Agriculture.' See ' 'J'hc Documentary Kvxdence Act, 1896 ' (58 Vict, 
 c. 9)" ; and also add iu coluiuu 2 of schedule — " Tho President, Sectretarj', 
 or any ineniln'r of the Hoard, or any person authorized by the President 
 to act on behalf of the Secretary." 
 
 Wll, in notes. In note " incoluiun 1 of note, in line '1 from bottm>', after "subs, (c)," 
 vnert—" as amended by 58"Vict. o. 7 ('The Army Act, 1895 '), aud iu," 
 tmd slrik* out the word "and" in same lint. 
 
 ! M 
 
 i \'.\ 
 1 : 4 
 
iii i ! 
 
 V 
 
 HIM 
 
 ccxlii 
 
 ADDENDA AND ERRATA. 
 
 
 
 PAOK 
 
 1010, i« <#a:/, /i«e 3 /rom io«oOT. After the wordii " dnminiGiitH which," infen — 
 "formerly belongwl to the old Commou Law sido of the Ckjurt of 
 ChaniMTy, and now." 
 
 In line 2 from bottom utrxke out the word " which," and the word " now," 
 Itt note ' strikeout the tcordu " whitih fjrivo," and mihutititte the word "jfavo" ; 
 andiniaine note after the word " dIhc where," insert -" Pout, § 1047, n.," 
 and strike out the remainder of the senttnee down to " exonuswl." 
 
 1047. at end of line 6 from bottom of eiiliimn 2 of note. '', insert — " But in pedigree 
 caHOH Huch Ijuokrt may HumotimeH be adniiHHible ; Het^ i>UKt, ^ 1709." 
 
 1050, in nctei. In column 1 of note eominij over from previous pai/e, before " ' Corpo- 
 rations,^ " insert — " ' Jlishop's liei/isters.'' See infra, ' luelesiastical Docu- 
 ments ' ; ^Chapter House ICeijislers,' Heo infra, ' Kcelesiastieal Documents.^ " 
 Also in last line of note comint/ over, before "'Vestri/ hooks,'" insert — 
 '" yWrie;-*.' Set? MU|)rii, ' Ecclesiastical llucuments.' " 
 
 1073, in notes. At end of note '' add—^' but ii joint tort fcu.sor will not be roloasod. 
 Dyerf. Munday, 189.') (C. A.)." 
 
 1077, at end of § 1637a, add — " We have aeon" that under certain circuinHtances 
 
 juHiicoN are al.so empowered to correct (UTorH in b()()i{.s of reference, &o." 
 In notes. Add, as note " — " " See ante, § 101 1, n." 
 
 1078, in line ^ from top, after " Burgeons," add note " {«)•'" 
 
 As note " (a) " add-" («) Se«; ante, § 173, n." 
 inai, -t com. of ^ 16.')2, before "JudgmentH," insert — "in the sixth place." 
 1080, in text. In first line of ^ 1052a, strike out " Hixth," and insert — "seventh." 
 1087, at eommeneement of J 165'in, strike out " seventhly," and insert — "eighthly." 
 
 In first line if ^ 10.').'t, strike out " eighth" and inurl-" ninth." 
 108H, infest line of J 16.')4 strike out " t(!nth," and insert— " eleventh." 
 1090, in col. 1 of note ', hefnrr • ' ' Dublin I'orporaltiin,' " insert — " As to bye-laws of 
 English common lodging-houses, see infra, sub tit. ' Public Health Act.' " 
 In column 2 of note ', a/'ter " London County Council," insert — " (by 51 & 
 
 62 Vict. c. 41, § lOl"." 
 In column 2 of note ', transfer the title " ' The .Mrtroimlis Water Act,' " now 
 misplaced at end of note, and make it come in iiiimedialeli/ before " Mines." 
 1103, in first line of text, after the leord " obje(^tioMs " insert note " (a)." 
 
 In notes, as foolnute (n), insert—'^ (a) ' A judgment in rem ' has, in Ireland, 
 been iefine<l as a ju<lgment by a (Jourt having s])ecial jurisdiction over 
 tlie subje(-t nuitt«,'r. tjee MacDonail r. Alcorn, 1894 (Ir.)." 
 1 114, in miles. At end of note '■', add—" As to an a(M|iiittal, see post, § 1722." 
 1 122, ill seioiiil line from lop of column 2 of note '', after " is," insert—" (See J 25, 
 
 subs. 9 of.Iudiiuture Act, 1873", being 30 iV: 37 Vict. e. 00)." 
 1138, in niile'\ afler "jirevads)," mite slum Id mid " 'V\\i' rules giving a non- 
 suit the efl'eit of a verdict for defi'iiilant liav(! been abrogated both in 
 the High Court and in the ('ounty ('ourt (see .Annual (/'ounty ('ourt 
 I'ractire for 1892, i>. 21"). See 51 *c 52 V. v.. 13, ^ 115, as to <'osts on 
 suing in a sec;ond action after judgment recovered in another court." 
 1107 (" nolix. At end of mile-, iiilil " Such liooks are in general not admi.ssililo 
 
 as eviden(!e, ante ^ 1592, n." 
 1173, i" /'■''. /" i-neHfrom liot/om, after " Hoartl of Worl<s, " i//«r< — "(now 
 tile Tjondon County (Jouncii)." 
 In miles. At end of note " add — " 51 k 52 Vict. c. 41, ^^ 10." 
 1182, in miles. At end of note '■', mlil, "Hut see A.-(l. r. North Metropolitan 
 
 Tramways Company, 1895 (('. A.)." 
 1205 in niilri. In milr ', nl'lir •' Wentworth, 1880," iiisrr/ " Hut the acceptor 
 will not Ih! liable beyond the amount origin.illy lllleil in, when lie 
 uci eiitcd it, on a bill wliieli ijn coiisei|uence of sueli acceptor failing to 
 
 observe how tin' bill had been tilled in) has I ri alten^l to a larger 
 
 amount, .iiid this even though the stamp on llie bill will cover the 
 hiigiT funi. Scholtii'ld /'. Lord lioiKh'sborough, 1895 (C. A. diiM. 
 Lopes, li.-l .). 
 In titu 10 from lop of eol. 1 of note \fur "indeed," read—'- too." 
 
PRACTICAL TREATISE 
 
 ON TlIK 
 
 LAW OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRKLIMINAKY OHSKRVATIONS. 
 
 si 1.' EviDExcK, ill Law, iiicliult!s till iho legal moans, oxcliisive 
 of mcro arguinont, wlii(;h tend to provo or disprove any fact tho 
 truth of which is submitted to judic'al investigation. It and the 
 word jn-oof are often used as synonyms. Accurate logicdaus, 
 however, apply the latter terra rather to the effect of evidence, than 
 to ((vidonce itself.'^ That high degree of evidence which is called 
 (ienumHt ration excludes all possibility of error, and nuitheraatical 
 truth alone is susceptible of it. 8uch evidence cannot bo obtained 
 in the investigation of matters of fact, of which tho most that can 
 ever be said is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them.' 
 lu trials of fact, therefore, the true question is not, whether it is 
 ]>ossiblo that the testimony may be false, but whether there is 
 sulliciont i)robability of its truth ; that is, whether the facts are 
 proved by competent and satisfactory evidence. 
 
 51 2.'* V>y eoDipvteut (or admissible) evidence is meant that which 
 the law re(pures, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular 
 (iase — such, for instance, as the production of a writing, where its 
 contents are the subject of inquiry. By Hdtinfuctory evidence, 
 sometimes called siiffieirnt evidence, is intended that amount of 
 proof which ordinarily satisfiea an unprejudiced mind beyond 
 
 • Or. Ev. § 1, in p;r<mt part. 
 
 '^ Soo Wills, ('ir. Kv. 2 ; Whatdly's 
 liOf^. h. ii. c. iii. § 1 ; N. York tiv. 
 ('odd, § l(i(;o. 
 
 " Sco (]iiml). Oiiido, 121. Even of 
 iniitlii'iimt IcaltruthB this writor juBtly 
 
 T. — VOL. I, 1 
 
 nnnarks, that, thoiit^li capablo of do- 
 inoiiHtration, tlii<y aro luluiittod by 
 most iiicii Holtdy on tho moral evidcuce 
 of general notoriety. Id. H)(i. Sea 
 N. Yolk Civ. (::odo,'§ Kili'J. 
 * Ur. Ev. § 2, almost verbatim. 
 
 \\\ 
 
' i 1 
 
 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 reasc lable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this 
 degree of proof can never be previously defined ; the only legal 
 test of which they are susceptible is their sufficiency to satisfy the 
 mind and conscience of an ordinary man ; and so to convince him 
 that he would venture to act upon that conviction in matters of 
 important personal interest.* Questions respecting the competency 
 or admissibility of evidence are entirely distinct from those which 
 respect its sufficiency or efEect. The former are exclusively within 
 the province of the court ; the latter belong exclusively to the jury.' 
 
 § 3.' The law of Evidence may be considered under three 
 general heads, namely, First, The Nature and Principles of 
 Evidence; — Secondly, The Object of Evidence, and the Rules 
 which govern its produotion ; — And, Thirdly, The Means of Proof, 
 or the Instruments by which facts are established. We will also, 
 in connection with the first head, consider what matters the courts 
 will notice without proof; and in connection with the second and 
 third heads, offer a few observations respecting the functions of 
 the judge, as distinguished from those of the jury. 
 
 § 3a. The present is a convenient place to mention that by the 
 Short Titles Act, 1802 (55 Vict. c. 10), short titles are gi-en by 
 statute to various Acts of Parliament (no less than 840), ana that 
 in the following pages this short title is stated between inverted 
 commas ; while the technical reference to the Act is also added, one 
 or the other of these references being placed in brackets. Moreover, 
 where a statement in the text is founded on a decision of the House 
 of Lords, it is marked " H. L.," while if founded on one of the 
 Courts of Appeal or Privy Council, it is marked " C. A." or " P. C," 
 American cases being dif ' inguished by the mark "(Am.)," Irish 
 cases by " (Ir.)," and Scotch authorities as " (Sc.)." On the other 
 hand, if it is founded on a diction of a particular judge, his name 
 is generally given in brackets after that of the case in wliich it was 
 uttered (wliether at Nisi Prius or in the course of a judgment 
 given in banc). The date of every case which is important in 
 estimating its value is given, and every known reference to it will 
 be found in the Table of Cases. 
 
 > 1 St. Ev. J78. 
 
 » 1 Ph. Ev. *i ; Carpenters' Co. v. 
 
 Hayward, 1780 (Buller, J.). 
 ' Or. Ev. § 3, iu great port. 
 
 • V. />. - 'I'liis mill siiniliir reforonces throughout the work aro to'Thillipps 
 and Aniould on EviiltMico." •> 
 
i;HAP. I.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 5i 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 § 1. Evidence Defined. — Evidence is that which shows. Legally, 
 it is any fact which, either directly or mediately, tends to show to 
 the mind the truth of a fact or proposition submitted to legal inves- 
 tigation. Miles V. Edden, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 270 (18G4); Schloss v. His 
 Creditors, 31 Cal. 201 (1866). 
 
 This definition includes both direct and circumstantial evidence, 
 though as was said in an Iowa case (Davenport i\ Cummings, 15 la. 
 219, (1863), "direct and positive evidence cannot with a critical 
 regard to accuracy be spoken of as tending to prove an issue." If 
 believed, it proves it. 
 
 " Fact." — The definition of " evidence " is obviously incomplete 
 until the term "fact" used in defining it is itself defined. But 
 "fact" is a term exceedingly difficult of definition. So difficult, 
 that Sir James Fitz-James Stephen frankly abandoned it. In the 
 first edition of the "Digest of the Law of Evidence" "fact" is 
 defined as, " (1) Everything capable of being perceived by tlie 
 senses ; (2) Every mental condition of which any person is con- 
 scious ; (3) Every part of a fact is itself a fact." As pointed out by 
 a careful (tritic in the " Solicitors' Journal " (20 Sol. Journal, 865), 
 (1876), this definition on application breaks down, — e. y. when 
 attempted to be incori)orated into the rule that evidence can only be 
 given of facts in issue or facts relevant tliereto. The "fact in 
 issue" may be, for example, the existence of negligence, something 
 clearly not " capable of being perceived by the senses," nor yet a 
 "mental state of wliich a person is conscious." The force of tliis 
 criticism was promptly recognised by Mr. Stephen, who contents 
 himself in later editions with the statement that " fact inohules the 
 fi'.ct that any mental state of whicli any person is conscious exists." 
 
 This is apparently correct. What A.'s motive was in taking a 
 mortgage or otlier transfer is a question of fact for the jury. 
 Wlu'i'ldon /•. Wilson, 44 ]\[e. 1 (1S,"')7) ; Hamburg v. Wood & Co., 
 (')() Tex. 108 (1886). For tlio same reason, "where tlie intent 
 with wliich an act was done becomes material, it is proper to ask 
 what it was." Over c. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 101 (1885); l^arnhart r. 
 iMilkerth, <)3 Cal. 407 (1S<)2) ; Stevens i\ Stevens. 150 iMass. 557 
 (I.SSO). So purpose is a cpiestion of fact. Honians v. Corning, 
 <>0 N. H. 418 (ISSO). The same cases hold tliat the person wjiose 
 mental state is in (^lestion may properly testify as to it. But wliat 
 a witness supposed A. tiionght as a motive fur wliat A. did, is not a 
 (•(impetent in(piiry. " dingli /•. Dowd, 88 Mich. 412(1801); Cl-'nient 
 '". Cureton, .36 Ala. 120 (ISOO). For a similar reason, a witness 
 cannot be asked what A. " un(le^^^tood " by a designated parcel of 
 real estate. "It must be dilKcult, to a degree bordering on tiie 
 
 ;' 
 
'41 
 
 ft i 
 
 ';: 
 
 Oi 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AKT 1. 
 
 Bfi i 
 ii ■'• 
 V ' 
 
 ■rt ' 
 li/! 
 
 impossible, for one person to testify, of liis own knowledge, wliiit 
 the untlerstiincling of another was, to any given question. Sueh 
 testimony is not to a faet; it must be merely an opinion, a con- 
 jecture as to a fact. Clearly this is as far as ])ossible from legal 
 testimony." Gorham v. (Jorham, 41 Conn. 242 (1«74). 
 
 Without attempting to define '• fact " it may be suggested that 
 the fundamental idea of "fact" is that irhi'rh c3-isfs. As a thing 
 cannot botli be and at tiie same time not be, tliat whicli exists 
 is the truth or fact of the matter. About this central thought of 
 real or true existence, seem to cluster various uses, all associating 
 with tiie word "fact" the ideas of truth, verity, accomidishment, 
 actually happening, &c. Thus the Latin fart k in imjdies some- 
 tldng done, an act or deed, something accomplished or dor.o. The 
 same word, factinsi, rej)resents the instrument of conveyance which 
 actually accomplished the transfer of land, — a "deed" as now 
 called. Probably the phrase " free act and deed," like nuuiy 
 other similar formulas is tautological, the words having nearly the 
 sanu' me;ining. So an officer dc facto is one in actual existence 
 ami dis(!harging certain functions, \shatever the rights of the dc jure 
 chiiiuant maybe. Tiie colhxiuial use of the word "fact" will be 
 most often found to embody the same conception of actual, real 
 existence. 
 
 This conception of fact is by no means limited to tangible objects 
 or those ])erceived by the senses. Tlu? phrase goes fui'ther, for the 
 purpose of including mental processes. A thouglit, intention, emo- 
 tion ; any mental state or feeling; the trutli of propositions phrased 
 by the intellect, are matters of "fact." Whatever has existence is 
 a fact. A question of fact is an inquiry into the truth or existence 
 of something. It is of course only sucli as are in issue that are the 
 subject of evidence. 
 
 It may be objected that under this definition the existence of a 
 rule of law is a question of i'\ct. Strictly speaking, such is the 
 case. Where no special considerations are involved, — for example, 
 in regard to the law of foreign countries, or, in most instances, Uie 
 law of other States of the Union, — this is recognised to be true. 
 The existence of a rule of law of a foreign state or country is purely 
 a (piestion of fact, and appropriate evidence is intioduced to prove 
 it as a fact. 
 
 For especial reasons, the existence of the rules of law or standards 
 of comluct which any domestic tribunal is established to enforce in 
 its own jurisdiction, are not legally treated as other matters of fact, 
 to be established by evidence, but are within the duty, knowledge, 
 and perception of the judge, without need of the intervention of evi- 
 dence. These matters of fact are separated from others and called 
 matters of law, judicially noticed by the Court. See post p. 2P. 
 
 Not only are such rules of law as are judicially noticed by the 
 
I 
 
 CIIAl". 1.] 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 08 
 
 Court excluded from the definition ot fact, but also that part of the 
 method of procedure whicli consists of reasoning from the facts 
 established by f . deuce to the ultimate facts in issue. This is the 
 faculty of judgment, the formation of an opinion. It is the same 
 fcaculty as is exercised by the expert witness, and is, under these 
 circumstances, called "Matter of opijiion." Excluding from the 
 entire list of facts as above illustrated those which are " Matter of 
 law " and " ]S[att.er of opinion," we have a residuum which for want 
 of a better name, or more precise detiuition, we call "Matter of 
 fact." 
 
 A DotiBriE ^Mkanixo. — The phrase "evidence," even as used 
 by the Courts, frequently presents a double meaning and more 
 or less consequent confusion, ''"le phrase is used to designate 
 (1) The effect of relevant facts upon the facts in issue, — e. ij., the 
 fact that A. has .always paid for food ordered in his name by B. is 
 said to be •'• evidence " of I).'s agency, if such agency be a fact in 
 issue ; (2) The statements of witnesses (or other means) by which 
 these r( levant facts are, in the first place, themselves sought to be 
 establislied, — e. f/., in the above instance, statements of witnesses 
 that they have been paid by A. under the circumstances mentioned, 
 are also said to be " evidence " of such paynient. Strictly speaking, 
 the correct use of the phrase is the second. The probative effect 
 of relevant facts is a matter of logical reasoning. 
 
 "Evidknce'" and "Pkook." — "Evidence" and "proof" are so 
 frequently confused as to emphasis'^ the necessity of avoiding collo- 
 quial equivalents for technical words. The confusion is so common 
 that a request for a ruling that a confessedly competent fact tending 
 to show negligence in an action where negligence is in issue, " is 
 not in itself y^/'oo/ of negligence " was held properly refused (Perry 
 /'. Dubuque S. W. I{. Co. 30 la. 102 (1872), as a ruling calculated 
 to mislead the jury. The Court say the instruction requested laid 
 ilown "a correct legal principle. ... In a legal sense /jjw*/ signifies 
 the effect of evidence as contradistinguished from evidence which 
 implies the medium or means of proof. But in ordinary language 
 the terms are, used interchangeably." 
 
 So where a statute required "proof" of the publication of a 
 notice and the Court allowed such publication to be proved by 
 attidavit, the ruling was sustained on the ground that there is " an 
 obvious difference between the words evidence and proof. The 
 former, in legal acceptation, includes the means by which any 
 alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investiga- 
 tion, is established or disproved. The latter is the effect or result 
 of evidence. These words are often -ised indifferently as expres- 
 sive of the same thing." 
 
 " Testimony." — A similar confusion follows the frequent use of 
 the word " testiraouy " as synonymous with " evidence." They 
 
!■:*;■ 
 
 2« 
 
 AMEHIC^Vl^ NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT I. 
 
 are not synonymous. The distinction between them is well stated 
 in Lindley i>, Dakin, Hi Ind. iidH (ISoD). In the upper court the 
 record recited that it embodied " all the testimony taken in the 
 Court below." Held : that this could not be so construed as to 
 amount to a statement of setting out the evidence, "'•'"'^timony is 
 not synonymous with evidence. It is but a sp class or 
 
 kind of evidence. Testimony is the evidence given uy witnesses. 
 Evidence is whatever may be given to the jury as tending to pvove 
 a case. It includes the testimony of witnesses, documents, admis- 
 sions of parties, &c." Tiiis is cited with approval in Harvey v. 
 Smith, 17 Ind. 272 (1801). 
 
 "CuMULATivK EviDEXCK." — Some difference of opinion exists 
 as to what evidence is to be considered cumulative. It is not 
 disputed that cumulative evidence is correctly defined in Parker v. 
 Hardy, 24 Tick. 246 (1837) as " additional evidence of the same 
 kind to the same point." But the cases, while agreeing as to the 
 rule, differ as to its proper api)licatiun. Certain authorities hold 
 that where a fact is in issue, any evidence tending to prove that 
 f.act is cumulative to any previous evidence tending to prove the 
 same fact, even though the later evidence differs somewhat in its 
 character from that which has preceded it. For example, the 
 turning-point of the case being whether a certain bill of exchange 
 had been left at a bank for collection before noon of a certain day, 
 and evidence of time of the leaving being gone into by various 
 witnesses, newly discovered evidence that a clerk, whose duty it 
 was to register the receipt if received before noon, did not register 
 the receipt until the following day, because not received until after 
 noon, was held cumulative. People v. Superior Court of the City of 
 New York, 10 Wend. 285 (1833). The Court intimate that evidence 
 that the plaintiff had been in such other places at the time in ques- 
 tion as to render the deposit impossible as and when he claimed it, 
 would not be cumulative. So where the fact in issue is the 
 existence of a partnership between the plaintiff and defendant, 
 newly discovered evidence that certain foods were ordered sent in 
 a way tending to show a partnership is said to be cumulative, 
 because it " tends to support the fact or issue which was before 
 attempted to be proved upon the trial." Olmsteail v. Hill, 2 Ark, 
 34G (1840). So evidence tending to discredit a witness by showing 
 contradictory statements is cumulative to other evidence tending to 
 discredit the same witness in another way. Glidden v. Dunlap, 28 
 Me. 379, 383 (1848). 
 
 On the other hand, other American courts incline to the view that 
 evidence tending to establish a fact in issue in a particular way is 
 not cumulative to evidence tending to establish the same fact in a 
 different way. 
 
 For example, the question being whether A. had authorised B, 
 
CIIAI'. 1.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 26 
 
 t ) sell a certain horse, and much evidence other than admissions 
 of tiie plaintiff having been received, a new trial was granted lor 
 newly discovered evidence that the plaintiff had a<lniitted the author- 
 ity in dispute. The Court, by Morton, ./., say, "This, therefore, is 
 a new kind of evidence, and although it is additional to other evi- 
 dence tending to prove the same jjosition, yet it is not cumulative 
 b:'cause it is of a different character tending to establish the same 
 general result by ])roof of a new and distinct fact." Parker v. 
 Hardy, 24 I'ick. 240 (1837). The same result is reached in Waller 
 i\ (Jraves, 20 Conn. 305, 310 (1850), where, in an action of libel, 
 aufl in support of the defence that the libellous language was 
 inserted without tlie defendant's consent and without his knowl- 
 edge, newly discovered evidence of an indei)endent witness tluit he 
 himself inserted the libellous matter, was held not cumulative to 
 the defendant's denial that he used the libellous epithets in the 
 article as written by him. Church, C. J., speaking for tiie Court, 
 says : — " There are often various distinct and independent facts 
 going to establish the same ground on the same issue. Evidence is 
 cumulative which merely multiplies witnesses to any one or more 
 of the facts before investigated, or only adds other circumstances 
 of the same general character. But that evidence which brings to 
 light some new and independent truth of a different character, 
 altliough it tend to prove the same proposition or ground of claim 
 before insisted on, is not cumulative within the true meaning of 
 tlie rule on this subject." As an instance of their meaning, the 
 Court take the case of an executor resisting a claim based on an 
 .alleged note of the deceased, and after an adverse verdict discover- 
 ing a receipt in full, or learning of the plaintiff's deliberate admis- 
 sion of payment. " There could be no question," they say, " in 
 such a case, but a new trial should be granted, although the new 
 facts go to prove the former ground of defence." 
 
 It would seem that the weight of reasoning was in favour of the 
 position taken by the Massachusetts and Connecticut cases. 
 
 The extent to which cumulative evidence is admissible is discre- 
 tionary with the Court. A party will not be permitted unduly to 
 waste time by multiplying witnesses to the same fact. 
 
 § 2. Competent Evidence. — Competent Evidence is that which 
 is admissible, as tending to prove the existence or non-existence of 
 facts in issue. The definition points to a central fact in the law 
 of evidence, viz., — that it is based upon logic. In fact, the modern 
 trial is an appeal* to the test of reasoning, as the result of a long 
 historical development from other tests of truth, more mechanical, 
 sacramental and formal, used by ancestors more or less remote. The 
 rules of correct reasoning are at every turn regarded as essential to 
 the due administration of jud'cial functions. The Court is charged 
 with the duty of enforcing this rule of correct logical reasoning. 
 
 : i 
 
 m 
 
™- 
 
 , 
 
 
 II 
 
 1 
 
 s 
 
 i 
 
 in 
 
 1 
 
 ji' 
 
 
 20 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKH. 
 
 [I'AUT I. 
 
 If its coadjutor in trials of fact, the jur}', sees fit to depart from 
 siicli a line of reasonin;,', wht-thcr under the influence of passion, 
 prejudice, or other improper motive, it is the duty of the Court to 
 correct the fault, even to the extent of nullifying a verdict which 
 appears to have been reached under such intluen(!e. The duty is 
 not, it will he observed, to enforce the particular reasoning whieli 
 commends itself to the Court. It is sutticient that a line of corre(tt 
 reasoning has been adopted by the jury, even if the Court itself 
 would have adopted a ditt'erent one. If the verdict is justified on 
 logical principles, it usually will stand. If the verdict is not so 
 justified, it is the duty of the Court, in discharge of its responsi- 
 bility to enforce the use of correct reasoning (even, iis has been 
 said, if not tlie Court's view of the particular line of correct reason- 
 ing it would adopt for itself), to set the verdict aside. 
 
 It naturally follows that a Court charged with the responsibility 
 of insisting on the observance of the rules of logical reasoning will 
 permit the jury, which it holds within these rules, to consider only 
 such facts as meet the same requirement, /. e., which have a logical 
 tendency to establish the existence or non-existence of the fact or 
 facts whose existence is in issue or in dispute. This rule is not 
 only a restriction upon the admissibilit}' of facts in evidence, but it 
 also states the test which makes them admissible. As has been 
 said, it is the fundamental rule of evidence that all facts whicdi 
 logically pi eve or disprove the existence of facts in issue, are 
 admissible. 
 
 Consideration of the law of evidence so largely consists in exam- 
 ining the established exclusit j of properly logical evidence, and the 
 instances in which these exclusions themselves do not apply, that 
 this first and principal rule of the law of evidence — that evidence 
 logically tending to establish the issue is admissible — is frequently 
 lost sight of. Uidess a special reason be shown for excluding facts 
 with a logically probative tendency, such facts are admissible. 
 
 Kklkvanty. — This logical relation of one fact to another, is 
 termed " relevancy." Of this the law furnishes no test. The test 
 is furnished by the ordinary principles of logic or a conscious per- 
 ception of the relation. A legal definition of relevancy was indeed 
 courageously attempted by Sir James Fitz-James Stephen in the 
 first edition of the " Digest of the Law of Evidence," based largely 
 on the relation of causation. This definition was abandoned. The 
 amended definition seems free from objection. Two facts are rele- 
 vant to each other when so related " that, accordijig to the common 
 course of events, one, either taken by itself or in connection with 
 other facts, proves or renders probable the past, present, or future 
 existence or non-existence of the other." (Dig. Law of Evid. Art. 1.) 
 
 TiiK RuLK FuKTHKU EXAMINED. — Such being the fundamental 
 rule of evidence, that all evidence logically probative is admissible, 
 
CHAI'. I.] 
 
 AMKUK.'AN NOTES. 
 
 tlie I'uither law of ovidcnco consista of exchuliiig certain facts ot 
 the evidence otherwise atlniissible under this fundanitMital general 
 rule. Tiio law of evidence becomes, therefore, so to speak, a series 
 of exclusions. These owe their existence principally to two lines 
 of considerations, — (1) The necessity for trying eases witiiin 
 reasonable limits of time ; {'J) The presence of the jury. These two 
 considerations may be examined briefly. 
 
 (1) LK(iAL ItKr.KVANOY. — The search for abstract truth, scien- 
 tific or otherwise, is not usually limited in time. No fact relevimt 
 at all is too remotely relevant to deserve consiileration. No press- 
 ing i\ecessity usually exists that the precise fact should be ascer- 
 tained this year or next year, or, indeed, within the next century. 
 Under such conditions, logic is given its unimi)ede(l course. All 
 facts logically relevant demand and receive consideration. 
 
 Hut the course of trials in Courts of law by no means admits of 
 sucli extended search into the minutiie of proof. The tribunal sits 
 for a limited time, and frequently is called on to dispose of many 
 contested matters within that period. The proceedings are expen- 
 sive, both to parties litigant, to those awaiting their turn (often 
 with witnesses held from gainful occupations by a comjjulsory i)ro- 
 cess), and to the government through the pay of jurors, Court officers, 
 itc. There is a recognised necessity that matters sliould be as 
 speedily disposed of as the interests of justice will admit. 
 
 This consideration was neatly put by Rolfe, H., in Atty.-Gen. /'. 
 Hitchcock (1 Kxch. 91, (1847). "The laws of evidenire on this 
 subject, as to what ought and what o>ight noc to be received, must 
 be considered as founded on a sort of comparative consideration of 
 the time to be occupied in examinations of this nature, and the time 
 whicli it is practicable to bestow upon them. If we lived for a 
 thousand years, instead of about sixty or seventy, and every case 
 were of sufficient importance, it might bo possible, and perhaps 
 proper, to throw a light on matters in whicli every jiossible question 
 might be suggested, for the purpose of seeing by such means 
 whether the whole was unfounded, or wliat portion of it was not, 
 and to raise every possible incjuiry as to the truth of tlie statements 
 made. But I do not see how that could be; in fact, mankind find it 
 to be impossible. Therefore some line must be drawn." 
 
 (2) Fkak of TiiK Jury. — A very distinctive feature of the English 
 law of procedure, of which the law of evidence is ])art, lies in the 
 fact that a jury frequently takes a share in tlie trial of causes. It 
 involves no disparagement to the benefits, real or assumed, of tlie 
 jury's presence to say that obvious dangers to the administration 
 of justice have always been recognised as arising from it. Tin? 
 average jury is composed of men selected by chance from the 
 general community, brought together for a short time and for a 
 limited object, with minds usually entirely untrained in the dif- 
 
 |-r:i:i 
 
 I 
 
23 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 ficult art of justly balancing the weight of conflicting statements. 
 Jurymen, almo; i; of necessity, are seldom given to reasoning with 
 logical exactness, and are therefore apt to jump across logical 
 chasms or breaks in a chain of ))roof ; especially at times when 
 sympathy or prejudice is aroused, or the fascinating process of 
 adjusting or, as it were, dovetailing together separate pieces of 
 evidence is nearly completed, and only fails for lack of a little 
 imagination. Above all, tiie jury at all times has been, as is 
 natural with so casual a tribunal, but little impressed with any 
 feeling of resi)onsibility for maintaining the integrity of legal 
 rules or the influence of precedent in the .administration of justice. 
 It has accordingly usually manifested a strong tendency to over- 
 look the n)()re important remote consequences of maintaining a 
 general rule for the purpose of relieving the hardship of individual 
 cases. 
 
 ExcLL'sioNs. — For these and similar rc^asons, the law of evidence 
 excludes much evidence logically relevant, either (1) By applying a 
 higher standard of relevancy than mere logic by requiring a certain 
 high grade of probative effect, which may be called legal relevancy; 
 and (2) By absolutely excluding certain facts both logically and 
 legally relevant. What facts are so highly probative as to comply 
 with the standard of legal relevancy cannot be reduced to a definite 
 ride. The innumerable rulings on the subject will be found to 
 depend rather ui)on the personal views and mental processes of 
 particular judges than upon any more definite rule. The positive 
 exclusions, on the other hand, generally admit of definite state- 
 meub. 
 
 rt 
 
CHAP. II.J MATTEKS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED, WITHOUT PROOF. 
 
 
 Im 
 
 § 4.' All civilised nations, as members of the great family of 
 sovereignties, give political acknowledgment of each other's 
 existence, and general public and external relations. After such 
 acknowledgment by their own country, the existence and titles of 
 a state are recognised by the public tribunals and functionaries of 
 every nation in the civilised world.' If, upon a civil war, one 
 part of a nation separate from the other, and establish an inde- 
 pendent government, the newly-formed nation cannot be recognised 
 as such by the judicial tribunals of other nations, until it has been 
 acknowledged by the sovereign power under which those tribunals 
 are constituted.* The judges of each nation are bound, ex officio, 
 to know whether or not their government has recognised a nation 
 as an independent state.* 
 
 § 5. In like manner the judges must recognise, without proof, 
 the common^ and statute law,' and all legal claims, demands, 
 estates, titles, rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities existing by 
 
 » See N. York Civ. Code, §§ 1705, 
 17()(i. 
 
 * Qr. Ev. § 4, in gioat part. 
 
 ' United States of America v. 
 Wagnor, 1867 (Ld. Chelmsford, Ch.). 
 Hut the existence of States unac- 
 kuowledged by the government must 
 bo proved by evidence, showing that 
 thoy are associations formed for 
 mutual defence, supporting their 
 own independence, making laws, and 
 hiiving courts of justice. Yrisari v. 
 Clement, 1826. 
 
 ♦ City of lieruo v. Bk. of Eng., 
 1804. 
 
 » Taylor v. Barclay, 1828. There 
 it was ialsolj' alleged in the bill, with 
 the view of preventing a demurrer, 
 that Guatemala, a revolted colony of 
 Spain, had been recognized by Great 
 ]3ritain as an independent state ; but 
 the V.-C. took judicial notice that 
 the allegation was false. See, how- 
 ever, contra, Dolder v. Bk. of Eng., 
 1803. as to which qy. 
 
 * Hein. ad Pand., L. xxii. t. iii. 
 §119. 
 
 "< R. V.Sutton, 1817; "The Inter- 
 pretation Act, 1889 " (52 & 53 V. c. 63), 
 § 9. As to private Acts of Pari., see 
 8 & 9 V. 0. 113, S 3, cited post, S 7. 
 
 8 b2 
 
 i '411 
 
Mm 
 
 LAWS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 the common law, or by any custom, or created by any statute ; ' 
 the rules of equity, and all equitable estates, titles, rights, duties, 
 and liabilities'' (while whenever the rules of equity and of the 
 common law differ, those of equity must prevail') ; the law of 
 nations, the law and custom of parliament, and the privileges and 
 course of proceedings of each branch of the legislature ; * the pre- 
 rogatives of the^ Crown,' and the privileges of the royal palaces ; *• 
 the maritin: , law;' the ecclesiastical law;* the articles of war, 
 whether in the naval,** the marine, or the land service,'" including 
 those made for the government of the forces in India," as well as 
 the auxiliary forces, — that is, the militia, the yeomanry, and the 
 volunteers,'^ — and also the reserve forces ; '' the rules of procedure 
 made in pursuance of § 70 of the Army Act, 1881, " whether 
 signified under the hand of a secretary of state" in relation to 
 the army," or promulgated by the admiralty with respect to the 
 marines ; " royal proclamations, such being acts of State ; '* the 
 
 » 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 24, sub-sect. 6 ; 
 40 & 41 V. c. 57, § 27, sub-sect. 6, Ir. 
 
 * See 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 24, sub- 
 eect. 4. See, also, as to Ireland, 40 
 & 41 V. c. 57, § 27, sub-sect. 4, Ir. 
 
 3 See 36 & 37 V. c. 66, § 25, 
 Bub-sect. 11. See, also, B\istros v. 
 White, 1876, C. A. ; and Palmer v. 
 Palmer, lfS85. See, also, as to Ireland, 
 40 & 41 V. 0. 57, § 28, sub-sects. 11, 
 29. 
 
 * Lake r. King, 1667 ; Stockdale 
 V. Hansard, 1830; Wason v. Walter, 
 1809; Cassidy V. Stouart, 1841 ; Case 
 of the Shelf, of Middlx. 1840; Sims 
 V. Mnrryat, 1866 ; Bradlaugh v. Gos- 
 eet, 1884. 
 
 » R. V. Elderton, 1703. 
 
 * Id.; Winter r. Miles, 1808; Att.- 
 Gon. V, Donaldson, 1842. Ilampton 
 Court has ceased to have privileges 
 as a roval palace, Att.-Gon.i;. Dakin, 
 1869; "R. V. Pousonby, 1844. 
 
 ' Chandler v. Grieves, 1812. 
 
 » 1 Roll. Abr. 526 ; 6 Vin. Abr. 
 496; Sims v. Marryat, 1866 (I<d. 
 Campbell). 
 
 » 29 & 30 V. 0. 109 ("The Naval 
 Discipline Act, 1866," amended by 
 •'TIiG Naval Discipline Act, 1884,'^' 
 47 & 48 V. c. 39). 
 
 '" See § 69 of "The Army Act, 
 1881 " (44 & 45 V. 0. 68). As to 
 
 printing of, and amendments to the 
 above, see 48 V. c. 8, § 8. See, 
 also, as to the Articles of War, § 179, 
 sub -sects. 1, 20, of the same Act as 
 to the Royal Marino.". The latter 
 articles, it is presumed — though the 
 Act is silent on the subject — must 
 be judicially noticed. 
 
 " Id., § 180. 
 
 » Id.,§§ 175—178. 
 
 " Id., § 190, sub-sect. 9. 
 
 " Id., § 70, sub-sects. 1, 3, amended 
 bv 49 V. c. 8, § 5. 
 ■'« Id., § 179, sub-sect. 6. 
 
 '• Dupays v. Shepherd, 1698 (L<1. 
 Holt). In Van Omoron v. Dowick, 
 1809, Ld. Ellenborough refused to 
 take notice of a proclamation, on the 
 pround that the Gazette containing 
 it was not produced. The latter case 
 docs not go the length of the mar- 
 ginal note, but simply decides that, 
 when a judge's memory is at fault, 
 some document must be at hand to 
 establish the fact he is called upon 
 to notice. Copies of royal proclama- 
 tions, if purporting to be printed by 
 the Queen's printer, are admissible 
 by 8 & 9 V. c. 113, § 3; see post, 
 § 7. They may be proved, also, in a 
 variety of otlier ways. See 3 1 & 32 
 V. 0. 37, § 2, cited post, § 1527. 
 
CHAP. 11.3 CUSTOMS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. 
 
 general practice of conveyancers ; ' the custom of merchants,' — at 
 least wliere such custom has been settled by judicial determiua- 
 tious," — such, for example, as the lien which a vendor has on 
 goods remaining in his possession for unpaid purchase-money ; * or 
 the general lien of an innkeper on all the property belonging to 
 his guest for the entire amount of his bill ; * or the general lien of 
 bankers and factors on the securities of their customers in their 
 custody ; ^ or the practice of drawing bills of lading in sets, and of 
 dealing with one of a set as representing the cargo independently 
 
 ' Willouffliby V. Willoughby, 1787 
 (Ld. Ilardwicke) ; Doe v. Hikler, 
 1819; Voev. Plowman, 1819; Eowo v. 
 Grenfel, 1824 (Ld. Tenterden). Ld. 
 St. Leonards, in 3 V. & P., 10th edit. 
 (18.'59), at p. 28, observed (the passage 
 does not appear in recent editions, in 
 consequence of the chapter on the 
 subject of Attendant Terms, having 
 become of little practical importance), 
 "It matters very little what is the 
 opinion of any individual convey- 
 ancer; but the opinion of the con- 
 veyancers, as a class, is of the deepest 
 imjiortance to every individual of 
 jjroperty in the state. Their settled 
 rule of practice has, accordingly, in 
 several instances been adopted as 
 the law of the land, not out of respect 
 for them, but out of tenderness to 
 the numerous purchasers who have 
 bought estates under their advice." 
 See, also, Howard v. Ducane, 1823 
 (Ld. Eldon) ; Re Rosher, 1884 (Pear- 
 son, J.). 
 
 ' Erskine v. Murray, 1728 ; Soper 
 V, Dibble, 1696 ; Carter v. Downish, 
 1687 ; Williams v. Williams, 1693. 
 
 ' IJarnett v. Brandao, 1843, where 
 judicial notice was taken of the 
 general lien of bankers on the secu- 
 rities of their customers in their 
 custody, and Ld. Denman (pronounc- 
 ing the judgment of the court) said, 
 ' ' The law merchant forms a branch 
 of the law of England ; and those 
 customs, which have been universally 
 and notoriously prevalent amongst 
 merchants, and have been found by 
 experience to be of public use, have 
 been adopted as a part of it, upon a 
 
 trinciplo of convenience, and for the 
 enefit of trade and commerce : and 
 when so adopted, it is unnecessary 
 to plead and prove them. They are 
 binding on all without proof. Ac- 
 
 cordingly we find that usages affect- 
 ing bills of exchange and bills of 
 lading, are taken notice of judi- 
 cially " ; and then gives as in- 
 stances the judicial recognition of 
 the genera! ''"n nf factors and 
 bankers. This judgment was after- 
 wards reversed by the IIou.se of 
 Lords (see Brandao v. Barnett, 1846), 
 but that portion of it which relates 
 to judicial notice of the general lien 
 of bankers was affirmed. In Edie v. 
 E. India Co., 1761, Mr. Just. Wilmot 
 observed, "The custom of merchants 
 is part of the law of England, and 
 coiu'ts of law must take notice of it 
 as such. There may, indeed, be some 
 questions depending upon customs 
 amongst merchants, where, if there 
 be a doubt about the custom, it may 
 be fit and proper to take the opinion 
 of merchants thereupon ; yet that is 
 only where the law remains doubt- 
 ful, and even then the custom must 
 be proved by facts, not by opinion 
 only; and it must also be subject to 
 the cont ol of law." In support of 
 the proposition that evidence can only 
 be taken as to mercantile custom 
 where the law is doubtful, the learned 
 judge says, that Ld. Mansfield, 
 with Denison and Foster, JJ.'s, re- 
 jected the testimony of witnesses to 
 prove the usage, solely on the ground 
 that the qxxcstion had a I read 1/ been 
 solemnly settled, by two adjudications 
 in the courts of law. See also Jones 
 V. Peppercorn, 1859. 
 
 * Imperial Bk. v. Lend, and St. 
 Katherino's Dock Co., 1875 (Jessel, 
 M.E.). 
 
 » Miilliner v. Florence, 1878, C. A. 
 
 • See cases cited ante, n. ', supra, 
 p. 5 ; also Lond. Chart. Bk. of Aus- 
 tralia V. White, 1878. 
 
 I. ■ ( 
 
 ! !'l 
 
CUSTOMS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. 
 
 [PaRT I. 
 
 of the rest;' or the usage among money dealers -^f treating scrip 
 certificates payable to bearer, whether of a foreign Government or 
 of a company, as negotiable instruments transferable on delivery ; * 
 or the custom of hotel-keepers holding their furniture on hire ; ' 
 the customs which regulate the special descent of gavelkind and 
 borough English lands,^ and it seems any other custom incident to 
 such tenures ; ' the custom or law of the road, viz., that horses 
 and carriages should respectively keep on the near or left side ;^ and 
 the following Tules with respect to navigation,— first, that ships 
 and steamboats, on meeting " end on, or nearly end on, in such a 
 manner as to involve risk of collision," should port their helms, so 
 as to pass on the port, or left, side of each other ; next, that steam- 
 boats should keep out of the way of sailing ships ; and next, that 
 every vessel overtaking another should keep out of its way.' Every 
 court will moreover take judicial notice of matters appearing in its 
 own proceedings. Therefore, if in the course of a case it appear 
 that an indictable conspiracy has been committed, it will take 
 
 ' Sanders v. Miiclean, 1SS3. 
 
 • Goodwin v. Robarts, 1(ST(>, II. L.; 
 Rnmball v. Mctrop. 15k., 1H77. 
 
 » Crawcour v. Salter, 1.SS1, 0. A. 
 
 « 1 Bl. Com. 7(5; l»oo v. Scuda- 
 moro, no.i; Crosby r. Ilothoriiigton, 
 1842 (Tindal, C.J.). 
 
 » llidor r. Wood. 18.j-j (Wood, 
 V.-C), foUowinj; I'avuo v. Barker, 
 lf)59. Soo also 3G & 37 V. c. m, 
 § 24, sub-Hect. G. 
 
 ' See Litnuo v. Bray, 1814, as to 
 carriugoH, and Tiirlcy v. Tliomas, 
 1837 (Colorid;^!', J.), as to saddle 
 horses. See also 14 & lo V. c. 92, 
 § 13, Ir. The rule lias been em- 
 bodied by Professor Selwyn, in what 
 an Mtoniau would call " Loiif;s an>l 
 Shorts:" — " Sed ])r(!Cor hoe jiosthae 
 rominiscero, rnrin; siiiixfniin : I 'ex- 
 tram oecurrenti lin((iiere norma 
 jnbet." In l''ranee the hiw of the 
 road is dilVerent, and horses and 
 carriajjes jiass on the otY side. 
 
 ' The l{e}j;nlations for I'reveiitinfi; 
 Collisions at Sea. containing; the rules 
 concerninj^ liKl'^^i f"f< *<if?"als. steer- 
 infj; and sailing', were embodied in a 
 table issued ori^finally under § 25 of 
 2o & 2(> V, c. (13. since re])ealed by 
 •' The Merchant Shipping A('t, WM^' 
 (:>1 & .')S V. c. ()!)), which substitutes 
 for it 1(1., §418 (I), andot two(Jnlers 
 
 in Council, dated re.spoctivoly Hth 
 August, 1884 (printed 9 P. iV. 247), 
 as to British ships and boats, and 
 14th August, 1879 (printed 4 P. I). 
 241), as to foreign ships. As to how 
 these regulations are to be p\iblished 
 and proved, see § 2(> of tlie original 
 Act, and for this § 419 {r>) of "The 
 Merchant Shii)ping Act, 1894," is 
 sub.stituted ; and by §28 of the original 
 Act (§ 419 (3) of "The Merchant 
 Shipi)ing Act, 1894 "), any damage 
 arising from the non-observance of 
 these Hi'gulations shall bejjrima tiK^ie 
 j)resunied to have been caused by 
 the wilful default of the j)er.son in 
 charge of tlu! deck of such sliij). See 
 jiost, § 2(»(i ; Cien. St. Navig. Co. r. 
 lledle'y, 18()9; Dryden r. Allix, 18(13; 
 The Concordia, 18(1(1 ; The Sj)ring, 
 18(1(1. As to the ])ri()r law, see ( 'had- 
 wick V. City of I'ubliu St. Packet 
 Co., 18.)G;" Smith r. Voss, 18,<7 ; 
 Zugasti V. Ijamer, 18,')8; Maddox c. 
 Fisher, 18,)1; Williams r. dutch, 
 18:)7; Tuff i'. Wariuan, 18.n. See 
 Morrison v. Gen. St. Navig. Co., 
 18,)2; Gen. St. Navig. t'o. u. Mor- 
 riso!i, 18,5G; Gen. St. Navig. (^o. 
 V. Mann, 18,j,'); Lawson v. Carr, 
 18.)(); Churchward c. Palmer, 18,j(i; 
 Till Plata, 18ao; Morgan v. Sim, 
 1858. 
 
 H 
 
.b 
 
 CHAP. II. 1 l-AWS AND CUSTOMS OF FOKEIGN STATKS. 
 
 
 judicial notice of the fact though it be not pleaded.' It will also 
 judicially notice the particular customs which have been tried, 
 determined, and recorded in such court.* The customs of London, 
 which have been certified by the recorder,' such, for example, as 
 the custom of foreign attachment * — the custom that every shop is 
 a market overt for the sale of goods of the same kind as usually 
 sold there * — the custom that mamed women may be sole traders * 
 — and the custom which defines the nature of a liveryman's office,' — 
 will be judicially noticed by the courts in which the certificates 
 are recorded.* No one court can, however, take notice of a custom 
 merely because it has been certified to another.* Neither can 
 judicial notice be taken of the usages prevalent among mining 
 partnerships conducted on the cost-book principle, for the judges 
 cannot determine without evidence the meaning of the term 
 " cost-book principle." "• Nor, again, will the courts take cognisance 
 of the laws, usages, or customs of a foreign state ; and even the 
 laws of the colonies," or J/^r'^ey,''^ Guernsey, or Scotland, must be 
 proved as facts,''' unless steps have been taken, either under the 
 
 ' Scott V. Brown, 1892. 
 
 * See Cniwcour v. Salter, 1881, 
 C. A. 
 
 ' Crosby r, ITothoriiifjton, 1842 ; 
 Bniiii V. Knott, 1842 ; Blacquioro v. 
 Hawkins, 1 780 (Ltl. Mansficjld). See 
 Blunt i;. Lai'k, 18j7. Uncortifiod 
 customs of Jjondon must be proved 
 in the lli^h Court, tlu)U{,'h they will 
 bo judicially noticed in the City 
 Courts : Stainton and wife v. Jones, 
 177!» (lid. Mansfield). So, also, the 
 (i. B. ])iv. in Ireland will not judi- 
 cially notico a custom of the l-ord 
 Mayor and ShcriiY's Court in Dublin, 
 unless certilied by the recorder : 
 Siiunionds r. Andrews, ISIi!) (Ir.). 
 
 * C'l^rtilled by Starkey in 22 Kd. 4. 
 See I Koll. Abr. iJo4 Iv 5 ; Hruce v. 
 Wait, 1S4(); Crosby r. Iletherin^ton, 
 1M42: Westoby r. f)av, IHM. 
 
 » (Vrtitied by Sir l). Coke, 5 Hep. 
 8;t /) (rather fuller, us L'10ves(|uo do 
 Worcester's case, l.')!)4). Seo Jjynns 
 V. ])(( Tass, 1840. See, also. Crane 
 V. London Dock Co., 1804; IIiw- 
 greavo i'. Spink, 1892. 
 
 * Lavio J'. }'hillii)s, 17()i). Local 
 cufltouiH, as that of carting whores 
 in liondon, and foreign attuchnient 
 
 in Bristol, Exoter, Liverpool, and 
 Chester, need not be sot out on the 
 r»*cord of a court of tlio city, as thoy 
 are judicially noticed in the court's 
 and of the respective cities (1 Dougl. 
 380, n. 90), as they also wUl be in a 
 court of error. See Bruce v. AN'ait, 
 1840. 
 
 ' King V. Clerk, 109,") ; cited 
 (Parke, B.) iu Piper v. Chai)pell, 
 184.J. 
 
 " The customs as to distribution of 
 the personal estates of ir.testate free- 
 men in London, York, and otlu>r 
 j)laces, are abrogated by 19 & 20 V. 
 c. 94. 
 
 » Piper V. Chai)pell, 184 J (I'arke, 
 B.). 
 
 '" In re Bodmin United Mines Co., 
 18,-)(). 
 
 " Prowso r. The European & Amor. 
 St. Shipi>ing Co., ISfU). 
 
 " Brcnau's case. 1847 fPattcson, 
 J.). 
 
 '•' Urquhart v. Butterfield, 1888, 
 C. A.; Dalryni])le c. Daliymple, 
 1811 ; Mostyu f. Pabrigas, 1774 (Ld. 
 Mansfield); Sussex Peer, case, 1.S44 ; 
 Maloi^. B(d)erts, 1800 (Ld. Kldon); 
 11. r. Povey, 18oo ; Woodham v. Ed- 
 
 !! 
 
SEALS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 British Law Ascertainment Act, 1859,^ or under the Foreign 
 Law Ascertainment Act, 1861,'* to obtain a legal opinion on the 
 subject from a superior court of the country whose laws are under 
 dispute.' The laws of Ireland being substantially the same as 
 those of England, except where varied by statute, a very able 
 judge has suggested that the English courts would probably 
 judicially recognise them.* 
 
 § 6. The courts will also judicially notice the following seals : — 
 the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, and the Great Seals of 
 England, Ireland, and Scotland respectively ; * the Queen's Privy 
 Seal and Privy Signet, whether in England, Ireland, or Scotland ; ^ 
 the Wafer Great Seal, and the Wafer Privy Seal, framed under the 
 Crown Office Act, 1877 ; " the seal, and the privy seal, of the dujhy 
 of Lancaster ; the seal, and the privy seal, of the duchy of Corn- 
 wall ; * the seals of the old superior courts of justice ; and of the 
 Supreme Court, and its several Divisions ; the seals of the old 
 High Court of Admiralty, whether for England or Ireland ; ^ of 
 the Prerogative Court of Canterbury ; '" and of the Court, of the 
 Vice- Warden of the Stannaries ; " the seals of all courts con- 
 stituted by Act of Parliament, if seals are given to them by the 
 Act ; '^ amongst which are the seals of the Court for Divorce and 
 Matrimonial causes in England ; *' of the Court for Matrimonial 
 causes and matters in Ireland ; ^^ of the Central Office of the 
 lloyal Courts of Justice, and of its several Departments ; '* of the 
 Principal Kegistry, and of the several district Registries of the 
 Supreme Court of Judicature ; '® of the Principal Registry, and 
 of the several district Registries of the old Court of Probate in 
 
 wards, ISIJG; Wey v. Tally, 1704; 
 Story, Confl. § G'.il, and cases cited 
 in n. See also post, §§ 48, 1423 — 
 1425. 
 
 » 22 & 23 V. c. 63. 
 
 » 24 & 25 V. 0. 11. 
 
 • See Lord v. Colvin, 1 860 ; Login 
 V. Princess of Coorg, 1862. 
 
 • Eeynolds v. Fenton, 1846 (Maule, 
 J., explaining Ferguson v, Mahon, 
 18;59). 
 
 » Lord Melville's case, 1806. 
 
 • Foggassa's case, 1349, cited in 
 Olivo V. Quin, 1658 ; Lane's case, 
 1687. 
 
 ' 40 & 41 V. c. 41, § 4. 
 
 « 26 & 27 V. 0. 49, § 2. 
 
 » Green v. Waller, 1703; 24 & 25 
 V. c. 10, § 14, now repealed by 44 & 45 
 V. c. 59 ; 30 & 31 V. c. 114, § 21, Ir. 
 
 '" Kempfon v. Cross, 1735. 
 
 " 6 & 7 W. 4, 0. 106 ("The Stan- 
 naries Act, 1836 "), § 19. 
 
 " Doe V. Edwards, 1839. 
 
 " 20 & 21 V. c. 85 ("The Matri- 
 monial Cansos Act, 1857 "), § 13. 
 
 '* 33&34 V. 0. 110, § 11, Ir. 
 
 '» R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXI. rr. I, 
 fi 7 
 '>«'36&37 V. c. 66, §61. 
 
 8 
 
CI! M\ II.] SKALS JUDICIALLY NOTICliD. 
 
 England ' and of the i)rpsent Court of Probate in Ireland ; ' of 
 the old^ and new Courts of Bankruptoy;* of the Insolvent 
 Debtors' Court,^ now abolished ; of the Court of Bankruptcy and 
 lusolvenoy in Ireland" (which, since the Gth of August, 1872, has 
 been called " The Court of Bankruptcy in Ireland) ; " ' of the 
 Landed Estates Court, Ireland ; * of the Record of Title Office of 
 tliat Court ; ^ and of the County Courts.'" Courts of law also judi- 
 cially notice the seal of the corporation of London.'' The seal of a 
 foreign or colonial notary-public will not generally be judicially 
 noticed, altbough such a person is an officer recognised by the 
 whole comniercinl world.'* Various statutes render different other 
 seals admissible in evidence without proof of their genuineness.'* 
 
 • 20 & 21 V. c. 77 (" The Court of 
 rroLato Act, 1SJ7"), §22. 
 
 « 20 & 21 V. c. 79, § 27, Ir. 
 3 Seo 24 & 25 V. c. 134, § 204, and 
 32&;i3 V. c. 71, § 109. 
 
 • See 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 137 ; 
 and the Bankruptcy Rules of 1883, 
 r. 12. See, also, r. 14, as to seals on 
 "otliee copies." 
 
 ' Doe V. Edwards, 1839. 
 
 • 20 & 21 V. c. 60, § 362, Ir. 
 ' 35 & 36 V. c. 58, § 6, Ir. 
 
 8 21 & 22 V. c. 72 (" The Landed 
 Estates Court (Ireland) Act, 1858 "), 
 § 8, Ir. 
 
 9 28 & 29 V. c. 88, § 56, Ir. 
 '" 51 & 52 V. c. 43, § 180. 
 
 " Doe V. Mason, 1793 (Ld. Ken- 
 yo!i). 
 
 '- Re Eavl's Trusts, 1858 ; Re Davis's 
 Trusts, 1869 (as to seal of a foreign 
 notary public) ; Nye v. Macdonald, 
 1870 (as to seal of colonial notary 
 public); see, however, contra. Anon., 
 1799; Hutcheon v, Mannington, 
 1802 ; Colo V. Sherard, 1855 ; and 
 Furnell v. Stackpoole, 1829 (Ir.). 
 
 " Such as the seals of the Local 
 Ooverninent Board for Eng. ind (34 
 & 35 V. c. 70, § 5) ; or Ireland (35 & 
 36 V. c. 69, § 4, Ir.) ; of the late Poor 
 Law Board. 10 & 11 V. c. 101 " The 
 I'oor Law Board Act, 1847 "),§ 5; 1 
 & 2 V. c. 56 (" The Poor Relief (Ire- 
 land) Act, 1838"), §121, Ir. ; 10 it 
 11 V. c. 90 (" The Poor Relief (Ire- 
 land) Act, 1847 "), § 3, Ir. ; of the late 
 Local Boards of Health (11 & 12 V. 
 c. 63, § 35 ; 21 & 22 V. o. 98, 8. 4) ; 
 
 and of Urban Sanitary Authorities 
 (38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 7) and Joint Sani- 
 tary Boards (38 & 39 V. c. 55, § 280 ; 
 41 & 42 y. c. 52, § 13, Ir.); of the 
 now abolished Commissioners for the 
 Sale of Encumbered Estates in Ire- 
 land (12 & 13 V. c. 77, § 2, Ir. ; see 21 
 & 22 V. c. 72, § 23, Ir.) ; of the Land 
 Registry Office in England (seo 25 & 
 26 V. c. 53, § 123; see also 38 & 3!» 
 V. c. 87, § 107), whether established 
 under the Act of 1862 or under that 
 of 1875; of the District Registry 
 Offices created under the Act last re- 
 ferred to (38 & 39 V. 0. 87, § 120) ; 
 of the Office for the Registration of 
 Assurances of Lands in Ireland (13 
 & 14 V. c. 72. § 45, Ir.) ; of the Irish 
 Land Conimi-sion (44 & 45 V. c. 49, 
 §42, Ir.); of tlieUeneral RegisterOffice 
 in England (6 & 7 W. 4, c. 86, § 38 ; 
 see 3 «& 4 V. c. 92, § 9), or Ireland 
 (26 & 27 V. c. 11, § 5, Ir.); of the 
 Charitv Commissioners for England 
 and Wales (16 & 17 V. c. 137, § 6; 
 and see 18 & 19 V. c. 124, § 4, 
 amended by 50 & 51 V. c. 49, and 
 § 5 thereof as to copies and certified 
 extracts, and the presumption that 
 sealed copies are originals) ; of the 
 Railway Commissioners (51 & 52 V. 
 c. 25, § 2) ; of the Commissioners of 
 Her Majesty's Works and Public 
 Buildings (15 & 16 V. c. 28 ("The 
 Commissioners of Works Act, 1852 "), 
 § 1 ; 37 & 38 V. c. 84, § 2) ; of the 
 Board of Agi'iculturo, which, speak- 
 ing generally, now discharges the 
 duties of the old luclosure Commia- 
 
 ! ; <{M'n 
 
 9 
 
 m 
 
 I ii 
 
DOCUMENT/ IIY EVIDENCE ACT, 1845. [I'AIJT •. 
 
 §§7 — 8. The Documentary Evidence Act, 1845^ extended the 
 principle of admitting in evidence official documents without 
 formal proof, to a numerous class of cases. That statute enacts, 
 that " whenever by any Act now in force or hereafter to be in force, 
 any certificate, official or public document, or document or pro- 
 ceeding of any corporation or joint-stock or other company, or 
 any certified copy of any document, by-law, entry in any register 
 or other book, or of any other proceeding, shall be receivable in 
 evidence of any particular in any court of justice, or before ajiy 
 legal tribunal, or either House of Parliament, or any committee 
 of either House, or in any judicial proceeding, the same shall 
 respectively be admitted in evidence, provided they respectively 
 purport to be sealed or impressed with a stamp, or sealed and 
 signed, or signed alone, as required, or impressed with a stump 
 and signed, aa directed by the respective Acts made or to be 
 hereafter made, without any proof of the seal or stamp, wher«^ a 
 seal or stamp is necessary, or of the signature, or of the official 
 character of the person appearing to have signed the same, and 
 without any further proof thereof, in every case in which the 
 original record could have been received in evidence." By sect. 2, 
 
 sioners, Copyhold Commissioners, 
 iind Tithe Commissioners (45 & 46 
 V. c. 3H ; (see 52 & 53 V. c. 30 
 ("Tlie Board of Agrieulture Aot, 
 1889"), cspt'i'iiiUj' § (i, and sec also 
 •'The Settled Lund Act, 1882" (45 
 & 4() V. c. 38), amended by "The 
 Settled Land Act, 1884" (47 & 48 V. 
 c. 18)) ; of th(> respective Commis- 
 sioners for the Universities o'' Oxford 
 and Cambridge (40 & 41 A[. c. 48, 
 §§ 4, !») ; of the Prison Commissioners 
 for England, and of the Ueneral 
 Prisons JJoard ior Ireland (40 & 41 
 V. c. 21, § (J, and c. 40, § 4, Ir.); of 
 the special Commissioners for Lish 
 Fislieries (2() & 27 V. c 114, *^ 33, 
 Ir. ; contiiiu.'d bv 31 & 32 V. c. Ill ; 
 and amende^! by ,32 & 33 V. c. 02, Ir.); 
 of the Comniis>ion(!rs of I'ublio 
 Works in Ireland, at, least for the 
 purposes of the 1 )rainage Acts (20 & 
 27 V. c. 88, ^§ 3, 5, Ir. ; 20 & 30 V. 
 c. 49, § 21, Ir.), and of "The Settled 
 Land Act, 1882" (45 & 46 V. c. 38, 
 §§ 48, 65, sub-sect. 9) ; of the office 
 
 established under " The I'atents, 
 Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 
 1883" (46 & 47 V. c. 57, § 84); 
 and of the llecord Ofiice, whetlier 
 in England (1 & 2 V. c. 94 ("The 
 Public Kecord OHice Act, 1838"), 
 § 11) or in Ireland (;}() & 31 V. 
 c. 70, § 18, Ir.). In all proceedings, 
 too, under the winding-u]) clauses of 
 the Comjianies Act, 18()2, the seal of 
 any oliice of the Court of Chancery, 
 or Bankruptcy, in lOngland or m 
 Ireland, of the Court of Session in 
 Scotland, or of the Court of the Vice- 
 Warden of the Stannaries, when aj)- 
 pended to any document made, issued , 
 or signed under those clauses, or any 
 official copy thereof, must be judi- 
 cially noticed (25 & 2() V. c. 89, § 125). 
 ' 8 & 9 V. c. 113. The autlior 
 naturally felt satisfaction in refer- 
 ring to this statute, as he originally 
 suggested to the Law Amend. Soc. 
 the alterations embodied therein, and 
 prepared the bill founded on them, 
 which was earned by Ld. Brougham. 
 
 10 
 
CHAP. II.] PIIOOF OF COLONIAL LAWS. 
 
 " all courts, judges, justices, roasters in chancery, masters of courts, 
 commissioner's judicially acting, and other judicial officers, shall 
 henceforth take judicial notice of the signature of any " judge of 
 the Supreme Court of Judicature,' "provided such signature be 
 attached or appended to any decree, order, certificate, or other 
 judicial or official document." By sect. 3, " all copies of private 
 and local and personal Acts of Parliament not public Acts, if 
 purporting to be printed by the Queen's printers, and all copies of 
 the journals of either house of Parliament, and of royal procla- 
 mations, purporting to be printed by the printers to the Crown, or 
 by the printers to either House of Parliament, or by any or either 
 of them, shall be admitted as evidence thereof by all courts, 
 judges, justices, and others, without any proof being given that 
 such copies were so printed."* 
 
 § 9. As to colonial laws, an Act of 18G5' provides that " the 
 certificate of the clerk or other proper officer of a legislative body 
 in any colony, to the effect that the document to which it is 
 attached is a true copy of any colonial law assented to by the 
 Governor of such colony, or of any bill reserved for the signification 
 of Her Majesty's pleasure by the said Governor, shall be prima 
 facie evidence that the document so certified is a true copy of such 
 law or bill, and, as the case may be, that such law has been duly 
 and properly passed and assented to, or that such bill has been 
 duly and properly passed and presented to the Governor ; and any 
 proclamation purporting to be published by authority of the 
 
 ' "The Judicature Act, 1873" 
 (;3fi & 37 V. c. (i(i). 
 
 " V>y § 4, forfjeiy or false printing 
 any of tlio doininumts roferreil to 
 iiliovo (or, by ;U & 152 Vict. c. .'57, 
 5 4, cited post, § l.')27 in noto. any 
 in'oclamation) is made a felony, 
 jmnishublo by penal soivitude, or 
 inil)iis()nment for not less than a 
 year ; and it also is provided that, 
 "whenever any such document as 
 before mentioned shall have been 
 received in evidence by virtue of 
 this Act, the court, judge, commis- 
 sioner, or other person oflficiating 
 judicially who shall have admitted 
 the same, shall, on the request of 
 any party against whom the same 
 is so received, be authorised, at its 
 
 or at his own discretion, to direct 
 that the same shall be impounded, 
 and be kejit in the custody of some 
 olHcer of the court or otlier j)io|)er 
 pers(m, until fuitlier order touching 
 the same shall 1)0 given, cither bv 
 such court, or the court to which 
 such master or other ollicer belonged, 
 or by the persons or person who con- 
 stituted such court, or by some one 
 of tlie ec[uity or common law judges 
 of the s)ii)erior com is at Westminster, 
 on appli(!ation being made for that 
 pur])()s(\" § ii enacts, that the Act 
 shall not extend to Scotland. See 
 24 & 25 V. 0. 98 ("The Forgery Act, 
 1861 "), ^§ 27-29. 
 
 3 28 & 29 V. c. 63 ("The Colonial 
 Laws Validity Act, 1865 ";, § C. 
 
 11 
 
 m 
 
 f ; 
 
 m 
 
^;n. 
 
 FOREIGN AND COLONIAL DOCUMKNTS. [PART f. 
 
 Governor in any newspaper in the colony to which such law or 
 bill shall relate, and signifying Her Majesty's disallowance of any 
 Buch colonial law, or Her Majesty's assent to any such reserved 
 bill as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of such disallowance 
 or assent." 
 
 § 10. As to foreign and colonial documents, Lord Brougham's 
 Evidence Act of 1851 ' enacts, that *' all proclamations, treaties, and 
 other acts of state of any foreign state, or of any British colony, 
 and all judgments, decrees, orders, and other judicial proceedings 
 of any court of justice, in any foreign state or in any British 
 colony, and all affidavits, pleadings, and other legal documents 
 filed or deposited in any such court, may be proved in any court 
 of justice, or before any person having by law or by consent of 
 parties authority to hear, receive, and examine evidence, either by 
 examined copies, or by copies authenticated as hereinafter men- 
 tioned : that is to say, if the document sought to be proved be a 
 proclamation,^ treaty, or other act of state, the authenticated copy, 
 to be admissible in evidence, must purport to be sealed with the 
 seal of the foreign state or British colony to which the original 
 document belongs ; and if the document sought to be proved be a 
 judgment, decree, order, or other judicial proceeding of any 
 foreign or c lonial court, or any affidavit, pleading, or other legal 
 document filed or deposited in any such court, the authenticated 
 copy, to be admissible in evidence, must purport either to be 
 sealed with the seal of the foreign and colonial court to which the 
 original document belongs, or in the event of such court having no 
 eeal, to be signed by the judge, or if there be more than one judge, 
 by any one of the judges of the said coiu-t ; and such judge shall 
 attach to his signature a statement in writing on the said copy 
 that the court whereof he is a judge has no seal ; but if any of the 
 aforesaid authenticated copies shall purport to be sealed or signed 
 as hereinbefore respectively directed, the same shall respectively be 
 admitted in evidence in every case in which the original document 
 could have been received in evidence, without any proof of the 
 
 » 14 & 15 V. c. 99 (" The Evidence c. 60), and 14 & 15 V. o. 99 (" The 
 
 Act, 1851 "), § 7. Evidence Act, 1851 "), as to proof 
 
 ' See § 365 of "The Merchant of proclamations by governors of 
 
 Shipping Act, 1894 " (57 & 68 Y. colouieB under the first-named Act. 
 
 12 
 
OIIAP. Il.J FORKIGN AND COLONIAL DOCUMENTS. 
 
 seal wliore a seal is necessary, or of the signature, or of the truth 
 of the statement attached thereto, where such signature and state- 
 ment are necessary, or of the judicial character of the person 
 artpearing to have made such signature and statement." 
 
 § 11, The Commissioners for Oaths Act, 1889,' enables affi- 
 davits, &o., to be sworn abroad before consuls, &o. 
 
 § 12. Order XXXVIII. of the E. S. C, 1883, provides, in 
 Rule 6, that "all examinations, affidavits, declarations, affirma- 
 tions, and attestations of honour in causes or matters depending in 
 the High Court, and also acknowledgments required for the pur- 
 pose of enrolling any deed in the Central Office, may be sworn and 
 taken in Scotland, or Ireland, or the Channel Islands, or in any 
 colony, island, plantation, or place under the dominion of Her 
 Mdjcsty in foreign parts, before any judge, court, notary public, or 
 person lawfully authorised to administer oaths ^ in such country, 
 colony, island, plantation, or place respectively, or before any of 
 Her Majesty's consuls or vice-consuls' in any foreign parts out of 
 Her Majesty's dominions, and the judges and other officers of the 
 High Court shall take judicial notice of the seal or signature, as the 
 case may be, of any such court, judge, notary public,* person, 
 consul, or vice-consul, attached, appended, or subscribed to any 
 such examinations, affidavits, affirmations, attestations of honour, 
 declarations, acknowledgments, or to any other deed or document."* 
 
 § 13. Again, the Bankruptcy Act for Scotland^ (passed in 1856) 
 facilitates the proof of certain Scottish judicial documents by enact- 
 ing, in § 174, that "all deliverances," — which term includes all 
 orders, warrants, judgments, decisions, interlocutors, or decrees 
 under that Act,' — " purporting to be signed by the Lord Ordinary, 
 or by any of the judges of the Court of Session, or by the sherifE 
 
 » 52 V. c. 10, post, Vol. II. 
 
 * In Baillio v. Jackson, 1833, the 
 Lords Justices refused to take judi- 
 cial notice of the signature of the 
 Hegistrar of Deeds iu St. Vincent to 
 a certificate, he admittedly having 
 no authority to administer an oath. 
 
 ^ I." there be no consul or vice- 
 consul accessible, an affidavit made 
 in foreign parts may be sworn before 
 a notary public. Cooke v. Wilby, 
 1884 (Chitty, J.). 
 
 * See ante, p. 9, n. •'. 
 
 * See "The Commissioners for Oaths 
 Act, 1889" (52 V. c. 10). And see, 
 also, Brooke v. Brooke, 1881 (Fry, J.). 
 Similar clauses to the rule above are 
 also contained in ' ' The Court of Ad- 
 miralty (Ireland) Act, 1867" (30 & 31 
 V. c. 114, § 57, Ir.), and " The Matri- 
 monial Causes (Ireland) Act, 187.1 " 
 (34 & 35 V. c. 49, § 17, Ir.). 
 
 « 19 & 20 V. c. 79. 
 '§4. 
 
 13 
 
WHAT SIGNATUUKS ARK JUDICIALLY NOTICKD. [PAUT I. 
 
 [or slioriff substitufo],' as well us all oxlractfi or oojiics thereof, op 
 from the hooks of the Court of Session, or the Sheriff Court, pur- 
 porting to bo signed or (jertified by any clerk of court, or extracts 
 from or copies of registers purporting to be made by the keeper 
 thereof, or extractor, shall be judicially noticed by all courts and 
 judges in England, Ireland, and Ilcr Majesty's other dominions, 
 and shall be received as prima facie evidence, without the neces- 
 sity of proving their authenticity or correctness, or the signatures 
 appended, or the oflicial character of the person signing, and shall 
 be sufficient warranty for all diligence and execution by law com- 
 petent." 
 
 § 14.* In America, the signature of the Chief of the Executive 
 of the State is recognised without proof.' In Louisiana, also, 
 the signatui-es of executive and judicial officers to all official acts 
 are similarly treated.'' The English doctrine on this subject is 
 difficult of definition. On the one hand, judicial notice will be 
 taken of the royal sign manual,*" and of matters stated under it ; 
 of matters stated in the certificate of a principal Secretary of 
 State,*" and of the signatures of the judges of the Supreme 
 Court of Judicature, and of the old superior equity and common 
 law judges, if appended to any judicial o^* official document.* 
 The legislature has moreover provided that judicial notice shall 
 be taken of the signatures of the judges, commissioners and 
 registrars of the old courts," and of the judges and registrars 
 of the Courts'' of Bankruptcy in England, and of the judges, 
 registrars, and chief clerks of the Coui't of Bonkruptcy and 
 Insolvency, now called the Court of Bankruptcy," in Ireland;^ 
 and has also directed that in all proceedings Under the winding- 
 up clauses of the Companies Act, 1862, judicial notice shall 
 be taken of the signatures of the otficers of the old Courts of 
 
 » 19 & 20 V. c. 79, §4. 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 6, in part, as to first 
 four lines. 
 
 ' Jonesv. Gale'sExora., 1817(Am.). 
 
 « Id. ; Wood V. Fitz, 1820 (Am.). 
 
 *" Mighell V. Sultan of Johoro 
 (1893), see also post, § 1381 ; Lord 
 Melville's Case (1806); 11. v. Miller 
 (1772), and R. v. Gully (1773). In 
 neither of the cases last-named was 
 
 any question raif^od as to the neces- 
 sity of proving the signature to be 
 genuine. 
 
 » 8 & 9 V. 0. 113, §2, ante, §7. 
 
 « 24 & 25 V. c. 134, § 204 ; 32 & 
 33 V. c. 71, § 109. 
 
 ' 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 137, cited ante, 
 p. 9, n. ". 
 
 8 35 & 36 V. t. 58, § G, Ir. 
 
 9 20 & 21 V. 0. 60, § 362, Ir. 
 
 14 
 
CIIAP. 11.] GAZiyiTKS WMKN JITDICIALLY NOTICKI), 
 
 ChiuK'orv in England or Iroliind, or of thd Courts of Bankruptcy 
 in I'lnj^land or Ireland, or of tlm (Jourt of Sossion iii Sijothind, or 
 of tilt) rcgiwtriir of the cotirt of tlio Vioo- Warden of tlio Stannaries, 
 wlionevcr such signatures are subscribed to any doeuiuent made, 
 issued, or signed under such clauses, or any (jflioial copy thereof,' 
 and that the signatures attached to certain other documents ren- 
 dered admissible by statute, need not be proved.'" On the other 
 hand, it has been said that the (Jourtswoidd i)robably not recognise 
 the signatures of the Lords of the Treasury to their oflicial 
 letters.'' Many bodies are, too, by particular statutes, created 
 corporations and given a seal, for instance. County Councils ; ' yet 
 in each such case the seal must, in the absence of statutory provi- 
 sion that judicial notice shall be taken of it, be formally proved." 
 
 § 15. The judges will take notice of the London, Dublin, or 
 Edinharqh Gazette on its mere production, and iL is unnecessary to 
 prove that it was bought at the office of the Queen's printer, or to 
 offer any evidence as to whence it came.' 
 
 § 16.* It is unnecessary to prove facts which may certainly be 
 known from the invariable course of nature ; such as that a man 
 is not the father of a child, where non-access is already proved until 
 within six months of the woman's delivery." Nor is it necessary to 
 prove the course of time,'" or of the heavenly bodies." Public 
 divisions of time, too, need not be proved, such as the ordina'-y public 
 
 > 25 & 26 V. c. 89, § 12^. 
 
 '« 8 & 9 V. c. 113, § 1, ante, § 7. 
 A partial list of the more important 
 of these documents will bo given in 
 Part iii. Ch. iv., on Public Docu- 
 ments. In ])ractice, no proof is re- 
 quired of the handwriting of the 
 governor of Holloway pi-ison (25 & 
 26 V. c. 104, § 12), which for all 
 pur|)o.so8 of law is now regarded as 
 thi' (iueon's Prison. See Alcock v. 
 Whatmoro, 1840; Short r. Williams, 
 1835; Fogarty V. Smith, U3J. 
 
 » R. V. Jones, 1809 (Ld. EUen- 
 boroiigh). See 12 & 13 V. c. 89 
 (" The Trensurv Instrnmonts (Signa- 
 ture) Act, 1849"), cited post, § 1106; 
 and 31 & 32 V. c. 37, cited post, 
 § 1527. 
 
 •51 A 52 V. c. 41 ("The Local 
 Govornmont Act, 1888"), § 79. No 
 
 ir) 
 
 seal is given to parish councils, 
 though they are incorporated. See 
 56 & 57 V. c. 73 ("The Local Govern- 
 ment Act, 1894"), § 3, sub-sect. 9. 
 
 • See, further, post, § 87. 
 
 » R. V. Forsyth, 1814 ; 31 & 32 Y. 
 0. 37, §§ 2, 5, cited post, § 1527. See 
 R. V. ilolt, 1793. The case R. v. 
 Wallace, 1865 (Ir.), can no longer be 
 relied upon, see post, § 1527. 
 
 * Or. J]v. § 5, in part. 
 
 ' Heathcoto's Divorce, 1851, H. L. ; 
 R. V. Lulfe, 1807. 
 
 '« See r.ury v. Blogg, 1848. 
 
 " However, in Collier v. Nokes, 
 1849, Wilde, C.J., is reported to have 
 held that he could not judicially 
 notice at what hour the sun set in the 
 month (if November. See, also, Tut- 
 ton r. Darke, 1860 (Pollock, C. B.). 
 Sed qu. ? 
 
 .! 'I 
 
 I I 
 
 I 
 
1 '''-■ 
 
 1 
 
 1! 
 
 !,■ 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 ^ : 
 
 
 
 
 MATTKKS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 fasts and festivals ; ^ the commencement or ending of the legal 
 sittings;^ the coincidence of the years of the reign of any sovereign 
 of this country with the years of our Lord ; * the coincidence of 
 days of the week with days of the month ; * the order of the 
 months ;^ the meaning of the word " month." ^ The meaning of 
 words in the vernacular language^ need not be proved; the 
 word " time," for instance, unless specifically stated, indicating 
 in Great Britain " Greenwich mean time," and in Ireland " Dublin 
 mean time " ; * and the word " distance " being, except under 
 special circumstances, taken to mean distance measured as the crow 
 flies.' Nor, again, need formal proof be given as to the legal 
 weights and measures ; ^^ nor the positive value of the coin of the 
 realm ; " nor its relative value at different periods of time ; '^ nor 
 matters of history affecting the whole public.*' 
 
 § 17.'* Courts also recognise the principal geographical divisions. 
 
 » 6 Vin. Abr. 492, pi. 8-44, 
 » 6 Vin. Abr. 4510, pi. 32. 
 ' Holiiuin V. Bun'ow, 1702 ; R. v, 
 Pringle, 1840. 
 
 * (J Yin. Abr. 492, pi. 6, 7, 8; Hoyle 
 V. Ld. Cornwallis, 1720; Pago v. 
 Faucet. 1591 ; Harry v. Broad, 1704; 
 Brough V. Parkins, 1703 (Ld. Holt). 
 Thus tho court is bound judicially to 
 notice what days of the month fall 
 on Sundays: Hanson v. Shackelton, 
 1835 ; Pearson v. Shaw, 1844. 
 
 » 11. V. Brown, 1828. 
 
 • This formerly, at common law 
 and in equity (sec Cons. Ord. Ch. 
 1H()0, Ord. XXXVII. r. 10, now an- 
 nulled), used to mean four weeks, 
 but meant a calendar month when 
 used in the ecclesiastical courts 
 (Bluck V. Rackman, 1846 (Knight- 
 liruce, V.-C); Man v, Ricketts, 
 1845 (Lord Lyndhurst) ; Simpson 
 V. Margitson, 1847 ; Johnstone v. 
 Hudleston, 1825 (Bayley, J.) ) ; in 
 mercantile transactions in tho city 
 of London (Turner v. Barlow, 1803 
 (Erlo, O.J.)); or in bills of ex- 
 change or promissory notes (45 & 
 4() V. 0. 61, § 14, sub-sect. 4, and 
 § 89) ; or in any statut(» passed after 
 the year 1850 (TIki Interjjretation 
 Act, 1889, of 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, § 9). 
 Ancl month, when used in tho Rules 
 of the Supreme Court (Ord. IjXIV. 
 r. I), or iu any j udgmeut or order of 
 
 16 
 
 that court (Id.), unless words bo 
 added showing lunar month to be 
 intended. As to the meaning of " ca- 
 lendar month" as applied to imprison- 
 ment, see Migottii;. Colville, 1879. 
 
 ' Clementi v. Golding, 1809, as to 
 the meaning of the word "book"; 
 Com. V. Kneeland, 1838 (Am.) ; R. v. 
 Woodward, 1831. In the last case 
 the judges unanimously held that 
 they were bound to notice that hxiua 
 were a species of puhe. So in R. v. 
 Swatkins, 1831, Patteson, J., after 
 conferring with Bosunquet, J., judi- 
 cially noticed that hurlci/ was corn, in 
 an indictment for arson under the 
 Act just mentioned. In R. v. Beaney, 
 1S2(), however, the judges refused to 
 notitie that a ailt was an animal of 
 the horse species. 
 
 » 43 & 44 V. c. 9, § 1 ; formerly 
 local time jjrevailod, see Curtis v. 
 March, 1858. 
 
 » Mouflet V. Cole, 1872. 
 
 '» Ilockin V. Cooke, 1 791 ; O'Don- 
 nell r. O'Donnell, 1878 (Ir.) ; 41 & 42 
 V. c. 49. 
 
 " (Hossop v. Jacob, 1815; Kearney 
 V. King, 1819. 
 
 " Bryant v. Foot, 1848. 
 
 " See Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, 
 1892, post. § 1785; Bk. of Augusta 
 V. Earlo, 1839 (Am.). 
 
 '♦ Or. Kv. § 6, as to first seven linos, 
 in great part. 
 
CHAP. II.] MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICED. 
 
 Thus they judicially notice the territorial extent of the jurisdiction 
 and sovereignty exercised de facto by their own government ; ' and 
 the local divisions of their country, such as states,* provinces,' 
 counties,^ counties of cities, cities,^ towns, parishes, and the like, so 
 far as political government is concerned or affected ; and when 
 dealing with questions of navigation, the geographical positions 
 and the names of places as shown on the Admiralty chart.® But 
 courts are not obliged to judicially notice mere local divisions, nor 
 their precise limits (further than they may be described in public 
 statutes '). Accordingly they have refused to notice judicially that 
 " a part of the coast called Suffolk " was not in Kent ; or that 
 *' Orfordness, in the county of Suffolk," was not situated between 
 the North Foreland and Beachy Head ; * that a particular place is 
 within a certain city ; ' or that a particular town is within a 
 certain diocese ; '" or that a street mentioned in the pleadings is 
 a public thorodghfare, though the word " street," via strata^ 
 would rather imply that it was ; '^ or that a particular street is 
 not in a certain county, though it be notorious that a street 
 bearing the same name is in another county \^^ or that a city 
 
 1 See "The Foreign Jurisdiction 
 Act, 1890" (53 & 54 V. c. 87), legivl- 
 iziiif? acts (lone in doiiiinioiis ticc^uirod 
 by (5 & 7 V. c. 94, treaty, capitula- 
 tion, grunt, usage, suH'erunco, or 
 other lawful means. One of Her 
 Majesty'h principal secretaries of 
 state, in answer to question put by 
 any court in the Uuoen's dominions, 
 is required, within a reasonable time 
 in tliat behalf, to cause projjcr and 
 suflicient answers to be returned to 
 all swell ([uostions, which answers 
 shall, iiiKiii jiriidudioii tlieriof, be Jinnl 
 ami roiicliislve tviilmce, in the suit or 
 otl r proceedings, of tho several 
 matters tliorein contained. 
 
 ■■' Why to V. Rose. 1842. There tho 
 Ceiiit noticed, that by "tho kingdom 
 of Ireland " was meant that part of 
 tlii^ United Kingdom called Ireland. 
 
 ^ Id. 
 
 *__ iJeybel's case, 1821. In 2 Inst. 
 6.)7, it is said "the King's courts" 
 "tnke notice of all the counties of 
 England." In K. v. Isle of Mly, 
 1S,)0, tho court judicially noticed 
 that the Isle of I'lly was a division 
 of u county in the nature of a riding, 
 
 T.— VOL. I. 17 
 
 and, as such, prima facie liable to 
 repair bridges within it. In Harris 
 V. O'Loghlen, 1871 (Ir.), tho M. R. 
 took judicial notice of the baroniea 
 in an Irish county, such baronies 
 having been enumerated in 13 & 14 
 \. c. 08, Sch. A. (repealed by £4 & 
 5j V. c. (57). 
 
 * R. V. fSt. Maurice, 18,)1. 
 
 • lUrrell v. Dryer, 1884. 
 ' Deybel's case, 1821; Fazakerley 
 
 V. Wiltshire, 1720; R. v, Burridgo, 
 17;io ; Thome r. Jackson, 1846. 
 
 » Deybel's case, 1821. In Kirby 
 V. llickson, 18,)(), the court refus(!(l 
 to take judicial notice that I'ark 
 Street, Grosvenor S(iuare, in Middle- 
 sex, was within twenty miles of 
 Russell Square, in the saino county. 
 
 " In Hrune v. Thoinjison, 1842, 
 where the ]>laintirt' was nonsuited 
 for not proving that the Tower of 
 London was within, tho City of 
 London. 
 
 '" R. V. Simps(m, 1738. 
 
 » Grant v. Moser, 1843 (Tindal, 
 C.J.). 
 
 " Humpiin^ys v. lUidd, 1841. So© 
 TLoruo V. Jucksou, 184(j. 
 
 Vh 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 ' i i 
 
 \ 
 1 
 
 yi 
 m 
 
MATTERS JUDICIALLY NOTICKD. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 mentioned in a document is in a particular country, even though 
 it appear that one with a similar name is the capital of such 
 country.^ They have, however, noticed that the Queen's Prison is 
 situated in England. - 
 
 § 18.^ Ine courts will, too, judicially recognise the political 
 constitution or frame of their own government ; its essential 
 political agents or public otfioors sharing in its regular adminis- 
 tration ; and its essential and regular political operations and 
 actions. Accordingly, all tribunals notice the accession and 
 demise of the sovereign of their country ; * the heads of depart- 
 ments, and the principal officers of state, whether past or present ; * 
 the marshals and sheriffs, but not the deputies of these func- 
 tionaries ; " the existence of a war in which their country is 
 engaged, at least when such war is recognised in public proclama- 
 tions or Acts of Parliament ; ' the days of special public fasts and 
 thanksgivings, when recognised in like manner ; the stated days of 
 general political elections ; the date and place of the sittings of the 
 legislature ; * and, in short, " all public matters which affect 
 the government of the country." ^ And though they were not 
 formerly so,'" the journals of either House of Parliament are now 
 evidence, if they purport to be printed by the official printers." 
 But the courts will not recognise private orders made at the 
 council-table ; '- nor, it seems, any orders of Council, even though 
 they regard the Crown and the government.^^ 
 
 ' Kearney v, Kinp, 1819. There 
 it W118 held that a declaration on a 
 bill drawn and accei)tcd at Dublin, 
 to wit, at Westminster, for 342/., 
 must bo taken to bo on a bill drawn 
 in I'liijiland for l']nj:;lish money, and 
 that th(iiofor(( proof of a bill drawn 
 at I )iiblin in Ireland for Irish money, 
 wliich is of less value, was a fatal 
 vurianco. 
 
 * Wickens V. Goatly, 1851. 
 ' (!r. VW. § (j, in part. 
 
 * IIolmaTi V. Burrow, 1702 ; R. v. 
 Priii-hs iNld. 
 
 " li, ('. Jones, 1809; Bennett v. 
 The State of Tennessee, 1820 (Am.) ; 
 Wliiiley ('. Carlish", ISGO (Ir.) (wlier.. 
 tlie eoiut jiidieially noticed that 
 hold lluwkesliury had been foreign 
 minister iu 1803). 
 
 « See Grant v. Bajj^o, 1S02. 
 
 ^ Dolder ?;. Ld. Huntingtiold, 1805; 
 R. V. Do Borenjjor, 1814. When war 
 is neither publicly proclaimed', nor 
 noticed in anj' statute, its existence 
 is soli'lv a question for the jurv: 1 
 Halo, 1()4 ; Fost. C. L. d. I, c. 2,§ 12. 
 The existence of war between forei^^n 
 countries will not be judicially no- 
 ticed : Dolder v. Ld. Iluntingfield, 
 1805 (Ld. Kldon). 
 
 » K. r. Wilde, 1069 ; Birt v. Roth- 
 well, 1097. 
 
 » Taylor v. Barclay, 1828. 
 
 '" ]{." r. KnoUys, 1694. 
 
 » 8 & 9 V. c.'llU, §3, (jited ante, 
 §7. 
 
 '» 6 Vin. Abr. 490. 
 
 '' Att.-fieii. V. Thoakstone, 1820. 
 See post, §5 1527, 1664. 
 
 18 
 
 l^itfH 
 
CIIAI' 
 
 II.] 
 
 MATTi.ItS JKDK'IAIJA' XOTICKD. 
 
 § 19. Lastly, each Division of the Supreme Conrt is bound to 
 jiulicially notice its own rules and course of proceeding ; ' the rules 
 and practice of the other Divisions ; ^ and also the limits of 
 their respective jurisdictions,^ — as, for instance, that the Probate, 
 Divorce, and Admiralty Division has so far jurisdiction over the 
 personal estate of an intestate British subject, whether situated in 
 Ireland, the colonies, or any foreign country, that it may grant 
 letters to administer such property, and must do so before tlio 
 administrator can sue in any English Court in respect thereof.* 
 All courts will further notice the privileges of their officers^ and 
 solicitors,'^ a term which now includes both "attorneys" and 
 " proctors" ;'' and also the fact that the assizes, though constituting 
 for some purposes one legal day, may be continued from day to 
 day with or without adjournment, and often occupy several natural 
 days ; * the existence of courts of general jurisdiction ; " the powers 
 of the Ecclesiastical Courts ; and the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy 
 Courts,'" togetiier with all general rules under that Act, whether 
 made by the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the President 
 of the Board of Trade, for carrying into effect its objects," or made 
 by the Board of Trade, for regulating matters of an administrative 
 character under it, if printed by the Queen's printers, purporting 
 to be issued under the authority of the Board.'^ Judicial notice 
 must also be taken of the rules made under the Bankruptcy 
 (L'oland) Amendment Act, 1872.'* Certain other rules made 
 under statutory authority are likewise judicially noticed.'* 
 
 ' Dobson V. Bull, 167G ; Pugh v. 
 Eobinson, 178(). 
 
 - Lane's case, 1587 ; Worlich v. 
 Mus.suy, IGOo ; Mounson v. Hoiirn. 
 KMS; Roidy v. Pierce, 18(>1 (Ir.) 
 (L'ipot, C.li.) ; Culdwell v. Hunter, 
 l^■^s. 
 
 ^ Doo V. Cuperton, 1829. Sec 
 SiKioner ?'. Juddow, 1848. 
 
 * SeoWhvte c. Edso, 1842. 
 » ()f,'lo r. Norclille, 1708. 
 « Stokes V. Miison, 1808; Chatland 
 
 V. 'rhonili'v, 1810; Ilunter v. N('ck, 
 18-11 ; Wiiifnrd /'. l-'leotwood, 184o. 
 
 " Jud. Act, 187;{ (3() & 37 V. c. (J6), 
 §87. 
 
 » Wlntiikcr r. Wioboy, 1852. 
 
 • Tivgauv r. Pletclier, 1()9(). 
 >" 4G & 47 V. 0. 52, §§ 92 et soq. 
 
 » Id. § 127. 
 
 " Bankruptcy Rules, 188;J, r. 257. 
 
 " ;J5 & 30 V. 0. 58, § 124, Ir. 
 
 '* The i)rincipal of these are rules 
 niacki by the Board of Trade under 
 "The Gas and Water Works Facili- 
 ties Act, 1873" (3(5 & 37 V. c. 89), 
 § 14 ; tliose made either by Order 
 in Council, or by the Coniniitttio of 
 Council, un(U'r "The Crown Office 
 Act, 1877" (40 & 41 V. c. 41), §§ 3, 
 5; tlioso Juade bj' tlio Lord Chan- 
 cellor, un(Un' " Tlio Sumniarv Juris- 
 diction Act, 1879" (42 it 43 V. c. 49), 
 § 29 ; tliose inado by tlio Lord 
 Cliancellor with the assistance of the 
 Rej,'istrur, under "The Land Trans- 
 fer Act, 1875" (38 & 39 Y. c. 87), 
 § 111; those made under "The 
 
 19 o2 
 
 I II 
 
 I : !1 
 
REFRESHING MEMORY OF JUDGE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 ill 
 
 § 20. It is not clear whether or not the judges of the Supremo 
 Court of Judicature are bound to notice who are the judges in 
 inferior courts of record. The weight of American authorities is 
 in favour of recognising them ;* but the Court of Queen's Bencli 
 once refused to notice who was judge of the then Court of Review.- 
 The Supreme Court will not, unless when called upon to review 
 their judgments,^ take cognizance of the customs and proceedings 
 in inferior courts of limited jurisdiction,* except so far as they are 
 regulated by statute.* 
 
 § 21.' Where matters ought to be judicially noticed, but the 
 memory of the judge is at fault, he resorts to such means of refer- 
 ence as may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence.^ 
 Thus, if the point be a date, he may refer to an almanac ;* if it be 
 the meaning of a word, to a dictionary ;^ if it be the construction 
 of a statute, to the printed copy ; or, in case that appears to be in- 
 correct, to the parliament roll.'" In some instances, the judge has 
 refused to take cognizance of a fact, unless the party calling upon 
 him to do so could produce at the trial some document by which 
 his memory might be refreshed. Thus Lord Elleuborough'^ once 
 declined to take judicial notice of the King's proclamation, the 
 counsel not being prepared with a copy of the Gazette in which it 
 was published ; and in a case in which it became material to con- 
 sider how far the prisoner owed obedience to his sergeant, and this 
 depended on the articles of war, the judges thought that these 
 ought to have been produced.'^ In other cases, the courts have 
 themselves made the necessary inquiries, and that, too, without 
 
 Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act, 
 1870," either by the Court t r Land 
 Cases Reserved, or by tht? Privy 
 Council in Ireland (:i3 & 34 V. c. 4(5, 
 §§3l, 41, Ir.) ; and those made by 
 the Irish Land Commission (see 44 & 
 45 V. c. 49, § 50, subs. 2, Ir.). 
 
 ' Hawks V. Kennebec, 1811 (Am.); 
 Ripley y. Warren, 1824(Am.); Despau 
 V. Swindler, 1825 (Am.). 
 
 * Van Sandau v. Turner, 1845. 
 3 Chitty V. Dendy, 18;J5. 
 
 * R. V. U. of Cambridge, 1736, 
 where the court refused to notice 
 that the University Court in Cam- 
 bridf^o proceeded according to the 
 ruluu of the civil law. iSee, also, 
 
 Lane's case, 1587 ; Peacock v. Boll, 
 16G7 ; and Dance v. Robson, 182'J. 
 
 5 As, e.g., the Court of the V.-Ch. 
 of Oxford, now regulated by 17 & 18 
 V. c. 81 ("The Oxford University 
 Act, 1854"), §45. 
 
 • Or. Ev. § 6, as to first three lines. 
 1 Gresi. Ev. 295. 
 
 * Page V. Faucet, 1591. Soo 
 Tutton V. Darke, 18«0. 
 
 ' Clementi v. Gokling, 1809. 
 
 '" R. V. Jeffries, 1722; Spring v. 
 Eve, 1677. 
 
 " In Van Omoron v. Dowick, 1809. 
 
 " R. V, Withers, undated (Bullor, 
 J.), cited in E. v. Holt, 1793 (Duller, 
 
 ;i: 
 
 20 
 
C'lIAl'. 
 
 II.] 
 
 R::ruKSHixG memory of judgi:. 
 
 stiiitly oonfining their researches to the time of the trial. Tims, 
 where ' the qxiestion was, whether the I'ederul iiopubliLi oi' Ceiitral 
 America had been recognised by the British Government as an 
 independent state, a Vice-Chancellor sought for information from 
 the Foreign Office ; in another case, the Court of Common Pleas 
 directed inquiry to be made in the Court of Admiralty as to the 
 maritime law ; ^ and the same Court also once made inquiry as to 
 the practice of the Inrolment Office in the Court of Chancery;* 
 while Lord Hardwicke * asked an eminent conveyancer respecting 
 the existence of a general rule of practice in the latter's profession. 
 
 i;l1 
 
 > Taylor v. Barclay, 1828. See, 
 also, The Charkieh, 1878. 
 
 « Chandler r. Grioves, 1792. 
 
 ' Doe I'. Lloyd, 1840, acting on 
 the authority of Worsley v. Filisker, 
 
 1620. 
 
 * Willoughby r. Willoughby, 1787. 
 See, also, Ex. S. 0. 1883, Ord. LI. 
 rr. 7, 8. 
 
 21 
 
 m 
 
 lii 
 
211 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part r. 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 § 4. Judicial Notice. — (Jertiiin facts a judge or jury will adopt 
 as the basis of action without requiring the party to whose case 
 they are essential to prove them by evidence. Tiiese facts, while 
 having the common feature that a judge will not require them 
 to be proved because he knows them already, are of two classes. 
 
 Some facts the judge is bound to take notice of or, in other words, 
 know, at his peril. If he does not treat them as proved, in any 
 case in which they are relevant, such (!onduct is error in law. The 
 ])arty aggrieved by a failure to recognise and adopt matters which 
 tlie judge is bound judicially to know, may have the error cor- 
 rected, upon proper proceedings, in a superior court, for all judges 
 in the jurisdiction are equally bound to know them. Strictly 
 speaking, it is not the duty of counsel to suggest them. It is the 
 duty of the court to know them. 
 
 Another class of facts the judge is not, as before, bound to know, 
 but as judges (and other men) usually know them lie may fairly be 
 assumed to know them. If a particular judge is not actually aware 
 of any particular one of these facts, he may c ae may not, as he sees 
 fit, inform himself from any source, inchu .ig the ])arties to the 
 action. If he does not clioose to inform himself, it is the duty of 
 counsel to supply him witli the needed information. If tlie court 
 still declines to know such tact, it nuist be proved in the ordinary 
 way or the jiarty will lose tlie bcnetit of it, without redress in a 
 superior court. Such facts are usually those of common knowledge. 
 
 The judge in any particular trial has a dual capacity. He is, in 
 the first place, a part of the administration of government, estab- 
 lished for the ])urpose of enforcing certain standards of conduct, 
 reasoning and liabiliiy, rules of law or practice, which have been 
 establislied by tlie sovereign power of the jurisdiction in which the 
 court is sitting. In the second place, he is an intelligent mem vcr 
 of the eomiiiunity in which he resides. As such, he knows what is 
 generally known to others in the coiiiiiiunity. These facts, usmdly 
 not disputed and capable of easy verification if disputed, may, as a 
 rule, be safely assumed to lie true unless and until disputed or dis- 
 proved. In otlnn' W( rds. tluM'e is in nuiiiy cases no need for jiroving 
 to a person of average intelligence what every one assuiu' s to be 
 true, unless the fact is disputed. As Lord EUenborough said in 
 Peltier's Case (L'S State Trials, (Jlfi) (I8O0), speaking of an admission 
 that Napoleon liuonaparte was Chief Consul and France and England 
 at peace on a certain date, "They were capable of easy proof if they 
 liad not been admitted. Their notoriety seems to render the actual 
 ])roof very unnecessary." 
 
 The division into two classes of the facts which, as is said, need 
 
< :1A1'. II.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 01; 
 
 not be ])roved, because judges already know them, follow with 
 goueral correctness this division between the official and jjersoual 
 capacity of judges. In other words, matters of law or established 
 by law are mi'tters of required cognisance; matters of fact are the 
 .subject of optional cognisance. When it is said a judge takes 
 judicial notice of the statute law of his state a somewhat different 
 thing is meant than when it is said that he knows, without ])ro()f, 
 the date of the battle of J ^xington. The judge may really be 
 equally ignorant on both these points. The statute in (question 
 may but just have been enacted and the actual knowledge of it 
 confined to a few officials at the seat of legislation. The judge may 
 n(>ver have read or heard the date of the battle. iJut the fact of 
 the statute he must know at the peril of committing error. The 
 other fact he may be assumed to know ; but if he does not, he com- 
 mits no error in law in refusing to assume its tr\ith as part of a 
 decision. The one refusal may be rectified in an appellate or 
 superior court. The other will not. 
 
 For example, in a case where both the court and parties assumed 
 the existence of a law which had been repealed, relief by a new 
 trial was granted although the point was not taken at the triah 
 lielmont 0. ]Morrill, G<) ^le. 314 (187<)). 
 
 IxTKKN ATioNAL IvKLATioxs. — Auioug the facts established by law 
 of which courts, as ])art of the administration of government, are 
 bound to take judicial notice are the existence of other nations, their 
 sovereignty and forms of government, and the seals and other usual 
 emblems or indicia of such sovereignty or government. Courts take 
 cognisance of the great seal of any nation recognised by tlu; govern- 
 ment under which the Court is acting, e. (/. Portugal, Cliurcli r. 
 Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 18C) (1804); Dennuirk, Griswold i-. I'itcairii, 2 
 Conn. 80 (1810) ; Lincoln v. Battelle, Wend. 47;". (1831). 
 
 Such a seal is said to ''prove itself," Watson v. Walker, 23 X, J I. 
 471. 4i)() (ISol), sp(!aking of tlie great seal of Englaiul. 
 
 The same rule applies in the courts of one state of the Union to 
 tlu' great seal of a sister state, e. ;/. of a copy of a Maryland statute 
 ;mthenticated by the great seal of ^Maryland when offered in a court 
 in Pennsylvania, U. S. r. Johns, 4 Dall. 412 (1800) ; so in New York 
 of a .Michigan record, Coit r. IMillikin, 1 Denio. .'}7(> (1845), and in 
 Elaine of a Massachusetts record, Kobinson r. (Jilnian, 20 -Me. 2'j.> 
 (1841). It was held in Coit c. Millikin that the seal required must 
 be one good at common lav, "an impression upon wax. wafer, or 
 some other tenacious substance," and that, in the absence of an 
 enabling statute, "an impression upon paper alone (as in that case) 
 is uot a seal." 
 
 Hut see Pierce v. Indseth, 10(5 U. S. 540 (1882) roufni. 
 
 The seal of the United States government will h? recognised i:i a 
 state court. Yount v, Howell, 14 Cal. 4G5 (1859) ; and ti'.e seal of 
 
2P 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PATIT I. 
 
 :-i^V 
 
 1 = 
 
 a state in the courts of the United States, U. S. v. Amecly, 11 AViieat. 
 31)2(1820). 
 
 The seal of a district court of the United States i)roves itself 
 citlier in a state or federal court, and the reeords of sueii court need 
 not be ])roved in any other way than under the seal of the (;ourt as 
 afhxed by the clerk. The rule is thus clearly and succinctly stated : 
 — " Circuit ami district courts of the United States certainly cannot 
 be considered foreign in any sense of the term, either in resjject to 
 the state courts in which they sit, or as respects the circuit or dis- 
 trict court of ai'.otl'.er circuit or district. On the contrary, they are 
 domestic tribunals, whose proceedings all other courts of the country 
 are bound to respect, when authenticated by the certificate of the 
 clerk under the seal of the court, the rule being that the circuit 
 court of one circuit or the district court of one district is presumed 
 to know the seal of the circuit or district court of another circuit 
 or district, in the same manner as each court within a state is })re- 
 suuuhI to know and recognise the seal of any other court within the 
 same state." TurnbuU v. I'ayson, Oo U. S. 418 (1877) ; Womaok r. 
 Dearman, 7 Porter, ol3 (lH.'58). " It will not be denied that the con- 
 stitution of the United States and the laws of congress passed in 
 pursuance thereof, will be judicially recognised by the courts of this 
 state. The several courts of the United States are called into exist- 
 ence by act of congress under the constitution, and their powers and 
 duties specifically defined by statute ; such courts, therefore, together 
 with their seals, will also be judicially recognised." Adams v. Way, 
 32 Conn. 419 (IBGO). 
 
 The great se;il of the Province of Upper Canada of itself imports 
 verity. Lazier v. Westcott, 20 X. Y. 140 (1802). 
 
 So the courts of a nation will so far take cngnisanoe of the sove- 
 reignty of insurgents recognised as belligerents by the executive or 
 legislative hranches of the government as to decline to inquire into 
 the title or commission of their public vessels. Santissima Trinidad, 
 7 Wheat. 283, 335 (1822). 
 
 In a case where the condemnation of a vessel for a fraud on the 
 revenue laws of St. Domingo during the French occu])ancy of the 
 island was a fact in issue, the attestation of the proper British author- 
 ities who had subsequently conquered and then held the island, was 
 deemed sufficient, though " certified only under the governor's seal 
 at arms, instead of a colonial or public seal." Hadfield v. Jameson, 
 2 Muuf. (Va.), r.3, 70 (1809). 
 
 Probably this knowledge on the part of judges of the international 
 relations of the government under which they act is, historically, a 
 survival of the ideas of the time when judges sat as the direct rep- 
 resentatives of the king ; and might therefore be required to know 
 what the king himself knew in other branches of his sovereignty, 
 «. ff. his relation to other nations. 
 
 I 
 
 Mi 
 
CU.W. i!.j 
 
 AMKiaCAN ^oTi:s. 
 
 2^4 
 
 So tlu' limits of the nation is I'iithcr a political tliaii a Ic^'al ques- 
 tion, tlie action of the exeinitive (M)ntrclling that of tlie courts, who 
 will supiKJi't the action of the co-orilir.atu branch of the government. 
 Foster v. ^'eilsoii, 1 Peters, 25^ (JHlii;). 
 
 It is, therefore, for the executive or legislative branch of rjovern- 
 nient to take the initiative in tlu'se international matters. Courts 
 will decline! knowledge of the existence of sovereignties not yet rec- 
 ognised by the executive and legislature. The rule is tiiat " where 
 tiie political authorities of the State have actually claimed andexer- 
 cisi'd jurisdiction over i)articular localities . . . the courts are thereby 
 concluded, and have only to declare the fact and govern tliemselves 
 accordingly, without undertaking to pass on the validity of such 
 claim." State r. Wagner, Gl ]Mt. 178 (187o). "The seal of such 
 unacknowledged government cannot be permitted to ))rove itself; 
 but it may be; proved by such testimony as the nature of the case 
 admits." U. S. r. Palmer, li Wheat. ()1(), 034 (1818). 
 
 I'l'BMC Laws. — It being their first and distinctive duty, as part 
 of the government, to enforce certain established rules of law and 
 general standards of conduct, courts are required to know, with- 
 out ])roof, the laws and standards they are constituted to enforce. 
 Speaking generally, and disregarding private statutes and acts of 
 local a])plicatiou, courts take judicial cognizance of the existence 
 and scope of all legal rules to which they are commissioned by the 
 sovereign of tlieir country co compel obedience. 
 
 Law of Nations. — The law of nations being part of the public 
 law of each jurisdiction receives judicial notice. 
 
 So of the rules of navigation adopted by commercial nations. 
 The Scotia, 14 Wall. 171 (1871). As the court in that case say: 
 " Foreign municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it is 
 not so with the law of nations." For the same reason, what is 
 part of the general law merchant " is matter of law for the court," 
 — /. e. will be judicially noticed. Jewell v. Center, 25 Ala. 498, 505 
 (1854). For "the principles of the law merchant . . . have become 
 a part of the common law." j\Iunn r. Burch, 25 111. 35, 38 (18G0). 
 Or, as the court in a New Jersey case (Reed r. Wilson, 41 N. J. 
 Law, 20 (1879) say, in taking judicial notice that a note payable 
 on a certain day was properly protested on the day previous : 
 '•The court must take judicial notice not only of the law merchant, 
 which is a part of the common law, but also of the almanac, from 
 which it appears that the 15th day of December, 1872, fell on 
 Sunday." To same effect, Sasscer v. Farmers' Bank, 4 Md. 409 
 (1853) holds that Sundays and great festivals such as Christmas are 
 dlfs non Jiirldicl in commercial usage. 
 
 It has, however, been held that while the general maritime law is 
 the basis of the law of the United States, it is, having no inherent 
 force of its own, only so far operative in any country as it has been 
 
 i 'I 
 
 1.1 1 
 
 ! Ill 
 
 1 1 
 
 1 
 
216 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT I. 
 
 adopted by the laws and usages of the country. The Lottawanna, 
 21 Wall. 008, 573 (1874); Tlie Scotland, XOo U. S. 24 (1.S81). 
 
 As courts of admiralty are tribunals recognised by the law of 
 natious, their seals need not be proved. Thompson v. Stewart, 3 
 Conn. 171, 181 (1819); Yeaton . Fry, 5 Cranch, 335 (1809). So 
 of the general customs of trade. "We cannot close our eyes," 
 say the supreme court of the United States, "to the well known 
 course of business in the country." Bank of Kentucky c. Adams 
 Express Co. 93 U. S. 185 (187G) ; Wiggins Ferry Co. r. C. & A. 
 K. Co., 5 Mo. App. 347, 375 (1878). But the custom, to be noticed 
 without pri of, must be one of the commercial world. A com- 
 mercial custom adopted by local autliority, e. ;/. a broker's boanl, 
 must be proved. "The court will not take judicial cognisance of 
 tiiose rules, unless they are rules or usages of trade and commerce, 
 which would be recognised without their adoption by any ])articul;ir 
 board or association." Goldsmith v. Sawyer, 4(5 Cal. 209 (1873). 
 
 The New York courts jilace " the general course of business in a 
 community, including the universal practice of banks " in the secoml 
 class ; i. e. among matters of optional cognisance •' of wliic^h courts 
 may take judicial notice." Merchants Bank v. Hall, 83 N. Y. 3.'!8 
 (1881) ; Yerkes i>. National liank, 09 N. Y. 382 (1877) ; Hunter v. 
 N. Y. &c. K. K.. IIG N. Y. 615 (1889). 
 
 Wiiere the indicia of title to certain goods to be forwarded were 
 assigned to a merchant to secure liis advances, tlie coui't say tliat it 
 is "tlie usual course of the great inland commerce " for agricultural 
 produce between the Mississipjii Valley and markets. " It has 
 existed long enougli to assume a regular form of dealing and it 
 embraces such a wide extent of territory and is of sucli general 
 importance, that its ordinary course and usages are now publicly 
 recognised and understood ; and it is the duty of the court to 
 recognise them, as it judicially recognises the general and estab- 
 lished usages of trade on the ocean." Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 
 384, 399 (1850). 
 
 Of a custom for merchants to exchange mutu.al credits, the 
 supreme court of Michigan say: — "We must take judicial notice 
 of a custom which is familiar everywhere." Cameron f. Blackman, 
 39 Mich. lOS (1878). 
 
 The powers of a notary public, being an officer recognised by the 
 law merchant in the ])rotest of foreign bills of exchange, will l)e 
 noticed by the court and his "seal proves itself in all countries 
 where the law merchant ])revails, and it is only necessary that it 
 should conform to the law of the place where the notary acts." 
 ( )rr /•. Lacey, 4 McLean, 243 (1847). " The court will take judicial 
 notice of tlie seals of notaries public, for they are officers recognised 
 by the commercial law of the world." Pierce /;. Indseth, 106 U. S. 
 546 (1882); Delafield v. Hand, 3 Johns. 310, 314 (1808). 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTES. 
 
 21' 
 
 See also Brown v. Pliila. Hank, G S. & K. 484 (1821). 
 
 The recognition does not extend to tlie power to attest deeds. 
 Nye V. McDonald, 2 JjOW. Can. Jurist, 109 (1857). Neese v. Farm- 
 ers Ins. Co., r,r> la. 604 (1881). 
 
 l)Ut the courts will not recognise without proof the right of 
 other officers empowered by local laws to protest negotiable instru- 
 ments, <: g. a huissier in France. Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 177, 
 178 (182!>). So of the certificate of a consul. Church v. Hubbart, 
 2 Cranch, 186 (1804). 
 
 In certain cases a no.L.i'ial seal has been considered a sufficient 
 certification of the proceedings of a foreign court. Yeaton v. Fry, 
 o Cranch, 335 (1809); Fellows v. Menasha, 11 Wise. 558 (1860). 
 
 While a notarial protest of a promissory note is not, strictly 
 speaking, an official act, such protest duly anthenticated by his 
 signature and seal is competent secondary evidence, after his de- 
 cease, of the facts stated in the protest, " because it is in the usual 
 course of their duty and business to keep such memoranda." Torter 
 I". Judson, 1 Gray, 175 (1854). 
 
 The seal may be made directly on the paper witho\it wax or other 
 adhesive substance. Pierce u. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546 (1882). 
 
 This judicial knowledge of the law merchant cannot be so far 
 extended as to embrace local customs. The local customs of miners 
 as to location of claims must be pro^^ed by competent evidence. 
 Sullivan v. Hen; e, 2 Col. 424 (1874); Tougade o. Kyan, 21 Nev. 
 449 (1893). The usages and customs of Indian tribes " must be 
 regarded as facts, and must be averred and proved like any other 
 material facts." Turner v. Fish, 28 Miss. 306 (1854). Courts will 
 require proof of local rights in water for irrigation purposes 
 even when such rights have been recognised by statute. Lewis <>. 
 McClure, 8 Oreg. 273 (1880). But see Amer. Nat. Bk. r. Bushey, 45 
 Mich. 135, 140 (1881) that the customers of a bank will be assumed 
 to know the " ordinary rules and necessities of business." 
 
 Fkdkkal Laws. — The constitution of the United States being 
 the supreme law of the land, all courts, state and national, take 
 notice without proof of certain public acts done in the exercise of 
 the powers conferred by that instrument. 
 
 Constitution- ok thk Fkoekvl Govkknmkxt. — Courts are 
 required to take notice of the office of president of the United 
 States, its incumbent and his signature. 
 
 So in speaking of a United States pater ; to lands, the supreme 
 court of California say: "The patent proves itself and requires 
 no authentication other than the signature of the president and the 
 seal of the government. The court takes judicial notice of both 
 signature and seal." Yount v. Howell, 14 Cal. 46.5 (1859). 
 
 Wliere a patent was signed by an acting commissioner of patents, 
 it was held unnecessary to aver or prove that he was legally entitled 
 
 i : U 
 
 Hii 
 
 'm\ 
 
2r 
 
 AM Ki. I CAN NOTKS. 
 
 [l'AI!T I. 
 
 to act in that capacit}-. "Tlio court will takt; notice judicially of 
 the |iersons who from time to time preside over tint patent otliee, 
 whether permanently or tninsientl}', and the prodnetioii of their 
 commission is not necessary to support their othcial acts." V(nk 
 vVc. ]{. Co. r. V.'inans, 17 ITow. .']() (lsr>\). 
 
 " State courts are bound to take judicial notice of the existence 
 of the federal courts." Minis v. Swartz, 37 Tex. 1.'5 (1.S7U); 
 Hoadman *•. Uose, (13 (Ja, 4.'8 (1<S7".»). "We all know that the 
 circuit courts of the several states are courts of general jurisdic- 
 tion, as well as we know that courts of justice of the peace are not; 
 and why should judges assume a degree of ignorance on the bench 
 which would be unpardonable in them when off of it '.' " Jarvis r. 
 JJobinson, L'l Wise. oL'.'J (18(i7). 
 
 So of the existence and powers of the president of the United 
 States. The proclamation of the ])resident of the United States is 
 " a public act of which all courts of the United States are bound 
 to take notice and to which all courts are bound to give effect." 
 Armstrong v. U. S., 13 AVall. 1^4 (lcS71). So of the departments uf 
 state, and public acts in pursuance of their legal powers, e. <j. the 
 instructions of the navy department to the naval commanders 
 of the Ignited States. The Teterhoff, Blatch. I'r. Cases, 463, oOO 
 (isr,3). 
 
 lint courts "are not bound to take official notice of the rules 
 adopted for the regulation of the different departments of the 
 federal government or those establidied by the board of land 
 commissioners or surveyor general of the United States for Cali- 
 fornia." Heush^y v. Tarpey, 7 Cal. 288 (1S57). Otherwise of the 
 action of the federal land office when regulated by statute, liige- 
 low V. Chatterton, 51 Fed. Kep. 614 (18i)2). 
 
 As treaties properly executed under constitutional prerogative 
 are part of the law of each jurisdiction in the United States, all 
 courts take judicial notice of them. Thus, in an action of slander 
 charging a murder in Ireland judicial notice will be takei\ that 
 under the " Ashburton treaty " between Great Hritain and the 
 United States, murder is an extraditable offence in this country, 
 ^lontgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wise. 709 (1854). The effect of the treaty 
 of Paris, ceding Louisiana to the United States, is judicially noticed 
 in relation to the land titles of that state. U. S. v. Keyner, 9 How. 
 127 (18o0). The rule includes treaties between the United States 
 and Indian nations. Carson v. Smith, .5 Minn. 78 (1860) ; U. S. v. 
 Ikebe, 2 Dak. 292 (1880); Lewis v. Harris, 31 Ala. 689 (1858). 
 But where a treaty confers authority upon certain persons to do 
 certain acts, courts, while recognising the existence of the authority 
 without proof, will require proof of the manner in which the author- 
 ity was, in point of fact, exercised. Thus, where a right to select 
 a certain amount of land was conferred by a treaty with the Chip- 
 
CIIAI'. II.] 
 
 AMKKKWN NOTKS. 
 
 •2V 
 
 jti'vvii Indians, proof was required of the manner in wliicli tlie right 
 wan exercised, when tliat fact was material. Dole v. Wilson, Iti 
 ^linn. r>-r> (^lf<71). The publie aets of eongress, for similar reasons, 
 are within the judicial knowledge of all courts, state and national. 
 Cox V. iMorrow, 14 Ark. (W6 (18r»4). 
 
 For example, judicial notice is taken of the natioiuil bankrupti^y 
 law. Morris c. Davidson, 49 Ga. oGl (ISTii); Minis v. Swartz, JiT 
 Tex. V) (\H72). Even if such public act of congress relates to the 
 District of Columbia, liayly's Adni, v. Chubb, 10 (.Iratt. 284 (1«G2); 
 or concerns exclusively the municipal affairs of the District of 
 Cohunbia. Chesapeake Ohio Canal Co. v. ISaltimore & Ohio Kail- 
 road Company, 4 Gill & J. 1, 63 (1832). Therefore where the laws 
 of Maryland were by act of congress continued in the District of 
 Columbia, the courts of Virginia take judicial notice of these laws. 
 I'.ird's Case, 21 Gratt. 800 (1871). So of the acts of congress relat- 
 ing to the "disposition of the public lands, and the kind of evidence 
 furnished to a purchaser and the system of surveys adopted for those 
 lands by congress." Gooding ?j. ^lorgan, 70 111. 275 (187.'i) ; Semple 
 V. Hagar, 27 Cal. 1(53 (18(15); I'apin v. Kyan, 32 Mo. 21 (1862); 
 Wright r. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452 (1866). So it is the duty of the 
 state courts to take cognisance of the United States internal rev- 
 enue laws and dismiss an action invalidated by such laws, though 
 the point is not relied on by tli parties but is taken by the court 
 .1UU sjtonti'. Kessel r. Albetis, 56 Harb. 3(i2 (1870). Where <!on- 
 gress has conferred upon a department the power to prescribe rules 
 and regulations, courts will take judicial cognisance of the latter. 
 Caha V. V. S., 152 U. S. 2U (18<)3). 
 
 Following analogous decisions, it is held that where the substance 
 of the statutes of arother state are incorporated in a public act of 
 eongress, state courts will take judicial notice of such statutes. 
 Flanegin v. AVashington Ins. Co., 7 Pa. St. 306 (1847). 
 
 Domkstk; Puhlic Laws. — Courts not oidy recognise, without 
 proof, the existence of treaties and congressional laws which they 
 are required to enforce ; they also recognise all public laws passed 
 by the appropriate branch of any state government under which 
 the court is organised. State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 300 (1861); Gird- 
 lestone /•. O'Reilly, 21 Q. B. U. C. 409 (1862) ; Iidiabitants of Spring- 
 field I'. Worcester, 2 (Uish. 52 (1S4S) ; U. S. r. Fuller, 4 N. :M. .'^58 
 (1889); Division of Howard Co., 15 Kans. 194 (1875); Griswold v. 
 (Jallup, 2J Conn. 208 (1852); Parent r. Walnisly's Adm., 20 Ind. 
 82 (1863); Evans, Auditor, v. Brown, 30 Ind. 514 (1869); Dolph v. 
 Barney, 5 Oreg. 191 (1874); "and where one state recognises acts 
 done in pursuance of the laws of another state, its courts will take 
 judicial cognisance of those laws, so far as may be necessary to 
 determine the validity of the acts alleged to be done in conformity 
 with them." Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 513, 531 (1869). 
 
 
 ii 
 
 Hi: 
 
 \M 
 
0^9 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 
 W' 
 
 mil 
 
 [part r. 
 
 Wlien the courts of one state liavo taken judicial cognisance of 
 the laws of another they will "until it is proved tliat the law has 
 been changed . . . presume it still exists." Graham v. Williams. 
 21 La. Ann. 594 (ISO!)). 
 
 Tlie courts of Canada take judicial cognisance of the acts of the 
 Provincial legislature even though locally limited. Darling v. 
 Hitcluiock, L'o (}. ]?. U. C!. MV.i (18GG); and Canadian Admiralty 
 Courts are "bound to take judicial notice of an order in council from 
 which the court derives its jUrisdi(!tion." Keg. i>. The Minnie, 4 
 Can. Exch. ir>\ (1S<)4). 
 
 The rule requires judicKu knowledge of such public laws of any 
 state or country of wliich the jurisdiction formed part as were iti 
 use wliile the union continued. Cox ». Morrow, 14 Ark. ()().'} (1S54); 
 Arayo w. Currell. 1 La. Kep. 528. 541 (I.S30) ; Stokes m. IMacken, 02 
 ?.arl). 145 (ISOl); llenthorne r. Doe, 1 I'dackf. 157 (ISL'l); Delano r. 
 Jopling, 1 Litt. 417 (1S22); U. S. r. Kitchie. 17 How. 525 (1854); 
 Otto /•. Soulard, 9 Mo. 57.'^ (1845); Doe v. Eslava, 11 Ala. 1028 
 (1847). 
 
 It is on the same principle tliat American courts take cognisance 
 of tlie ('(Miimon and . tatutory laws of England in force at the time 
 of the licvolution, — so far as suitable to tlie new conditions. Ocean 
 Ins. Co. V. Fields. 2 Story, 59, 75 (1S41). 
 
 So the courts of a territory are rt^cpiired to know the public laws of 
 the territory, and if the going into effeiit of such a law is dependent 
 on lapse of tinu' or other condition, must notice tlie condition and its 
 being complied witii at any particiil'v time, lloyt v. Iiussell, 117 
 V. S. 4(»1 (1885). The feder, 1 courts, for the same reasons, take 
 judicial cognisance of the ]>-,;Mic ivcts of congress. 
 
 I'J. fj. The National j>ai.!ci'uptfv Act. Lathrop ;;. Stuart, 5 
 McLean, 167 (1850). 
 
 So courts will notice repc ling laws equally with other laws. 
 State V. O'Connor, 1-'? La. Ann. 480 (IS5S;. 
 
 So of the amendments to tlie constitution, Graves v. Keaton, .'3 
 Cold. (Tein.) 8 (1806). 
 
 Ill general, tlie laws of a sister state must be ju'oved as facts; see 
 post )-. 52'". llauley r. Donagliue. 1 l<"> V. S. I (188."i). 
 
 It is usually not dilVieult to recognise a public act. As a rule it 
 applies to all parts of a state. 
 
 Hut this is not essential. " It is a public act if it extends to all 
 persons within the territorial limits described in the statute." 
 lycvy /'. State, (! Ind. 281 (18.^5). .\n act for the survey of a tract 
 of land is special. Allegheny *•. Wilson, 25 I*a. St., 'XVI (1855). 
 liut see Dun'u ;•. Houston &c. !{. Co., 80 Tex. 287 (189.".). Tiie 
 court will not take judicial notice of the stages of the passage of a 
 publico act, as set out in the legislative journals. The journals must 
 be offered. Hut, like other public documents, " they prove their own 
 
cMAr. II.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 2110 
 
 authonticity." Grob v. Cusbman, 45 111. 419 (18G7) ; Stall v. Druny, 
 lis Inil. 44!) (188S); Chesapeako &c. Canal Co. c. Baltimore &c. 
 ]{. K. Co., 4 dill &. J. 1, G3 (1S31'). 
 
 liiit wlu'ther a statute •' be a law or not a law, is a judicial ques- 
 tion, to be settled and determined by the courts and judges. . . . 
 When once it became the settled construction of the Constitution 
 of Illinois that no act can be deemed a valid law, unless, by the 
 journals of the legislature, it appears to have been regidarly passed 
 by both houses, it became the duty of the courts to take judicial 
 notice of the journal entries in that regard." Town of South 
 Ottawa r. Perkins, 1)4 U. S. L'GO (187()). Courts may examine the 
 original roll in Secretary's office and any other sourc(>s of infor- 
 mation, liowen *•. ]Mo. Tac. It. II., 118 Mo. 541 (189.")) ; .Moog r. 
 Kandolph, 77 Wii. 597 (1884). 
 
 To determine the existence of a statute or when it went into 
 effect jiiilges " have a right to resort to any source of information 
 which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a 
 clear and satisfactory answer to such question, always seeking 
 first for that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the 
 positive hiw has enacted a different rule." Gardner /». Collector, G 
 Wall. 499 (1867) ; Soniers r. State (So. Dak.), 58 N. W. 804 (1894) ; 
 State r. liailey. IG Ind. 4G (18G1); Pierson r. Ikiird, 2 Greene (la.), 
 235 (1849); Berliner v. Waterloo. 14 Wi.sc. 378 (18G1). 
 
 Certain laws applying only to a limited portion of the state are 
 considered public because they apply to all citizens of the state. 
 For example, in a Massachusetts case, I'arsons, C. -I., speaking of 
 an a(!t for tht^ preservation of bass in a certain river in the present 
 state of Maine, says, " We are of opinion that the statute referred 
 to is a public statute. It is obligatory on all the citizens, anil they 
 must notice it at their peril. We must, therefore, e,v offirio, take 
 notice of it. Indeed, all the laws regulating the taking of fish are 
 made for the ])ul)lic benefit, to preserve the fish, and are public 
 statutes." lUirnham r. Webster, 5 Mass. 2GG (1809) ; so where an 
 act forbidding any but specified ])ers(ms from surveying or marking 
 lumber in a certain county in Maine, and all ])ersons from buying 
 or selling lumber not so marked, was attacked as unconstitutional, 
 the court say : " It is true that public acts are usually general in 
 their character and operation, and equally applicable to all parts 
 of the state. There are other acts which are considered as pul)lic 
 acts, of which all persons are bound to take notice iqion their jieril, 
 and yet they are local, because the violation of them is and must 
 be local. . . . Nothing appears which indicates that the law was 
 not intended as a pid)lic benefit, of which all the citizens of the 
 stiite, as well as others, might eipially i)!irticiitate." Pierce it. 
 Kimball, 9 (irceiil. 51 (18.'>2). So an act antliorising riparian 
 proprietors of a section of Maryland to extend their ownership by 
 
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 2111 
 
 AMKlilCAX NOTES. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 improvements into public waters "operating as a grant of the 
 public domain, and aifecting tlie rights of navigation and fislicMy, 
 by allowing improvements to be made out into navigable water,'' 
 was said to be entitled to be "judicially noticed by the court as a 
 public law." Hammond's Lessees i>. Inloes, 4 Maryland, 138, li2, 
 (1853). On a criminal charge of selling "one pint of whiskey for 
 5 cents, not for mechanical or medicinal purposes," in violation of a 
 statute applying to three towns in a certain county, forbidding 
 sales of so small a quantity, except for these purposes, the defend- 
 ant objected that the statute was not set out in the complaint. In 
 overruling the objection, the court say, " Although local, it is not a 
 ])rivate statute. To constitute a statute a public act, it is not 
 necessary that it should extend to all parts of the state. It is a 
 public act if it extend equally to all persons within the territorial 
 limits described in the statute. The court was bound to notice that 
 statute without pleading." Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281 (1855). The 
 same rule is applied where a general " Local option " law is passed, 
 and the operation of the statute is dependent on an election. State v. 
 Cooper, 101 N. C. 684 (1888). 
 
 "There are statutes that are local in one sense which are never- 
 theless public statutes ; for it is not necessary to constitute a statute 
 a public act that it should be equally applicable to all parts of tlie 
 state. It is sufficient if it extend to all persons doing or omitting 
 to do an act within the territorial limits described in the statute." 
 Hretz V. Mayor &c. of New York, 6 Ilobertson. 325 (1868), a case hold- 
 ing that a statute conferring on the supreme court jurisdiction of 
 actions against the corporation of New York city, was a public 
 statute. So a statute creating a public office is a public statute. 
 State V, Jarrett, 17 Md. 309 (1861). So a joint resolution imposing 
 a duty on a public officer is a publii^ statute and will be judicially 
 recognised. State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex. 76 (1851). The courts of 
 Lower Canada take notice of acts j)ublished in the official gazette. 
 Dubois V. Fanteaux, 7 Rev. Leg. 430 (1875). 
 
 A statute changing the name of a township "is a public local 
 one, of which the court takes notice." State v. Cooper, 101 N. C. 
 684 (1888). 
 
 MuNicii'AL Corporations. — The case last cited is an illustration 
 of the general rule tluit, as municipal corporations are not so nuich 
 local legal entities with certain powers as they are instrumentalities 
 for carrying on the functions of government, legislative acts creat- 
 ing, enlarging, or otherwise modifying such local municipalities and 
 defining their powers, though necessarily of limited territorial 
 apjtlication, are public acts of which the courts take judicial notice. 
 Albrittin c. Huntsville, (!0 Ala. 486 (1877); Macey /•. Titcombo. 19 
 Ind. 135 (1862); Stier /•. Oskaloosa, 41 la. 353* (1875); I'rell /•. 
 McDonald, 7 Kans. 426, 445 (1871); State v. Murfreesboro, 11 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 2212 
 
 liuniph. (Tenn.) 217 (1850) ; Gallagher v. State, 10 Tex. App. 469 
 (18SI) ; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 10 Wise. 247 (1862) ; Fauntleroy 
 ,'. Hannibal, 1 Dill. (U. S.) 118 (1871) ; People r. Potter, 35 Cal.llO 
 (1808) ; Jones v. I^ke View, l&l 111. 663 (1894) ; Briggs i\ Whijjple, 
 7 Vt. 15, 19 (1835); liituminous &c. Co. v. Fulton, 33 Pac. Itej). 
 (Cal.) 1117 (1893). For this reason the charter of a village cor- 
 y)oration is a public law. Village of Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282 
 (1S77) 
 
 As in analogous cases, a special statute of village incorporation 
 wliich is declared in the act itself to be a public statute will be 
 noticed without proof. Gormley v. Day, 114 111. 185 (1885). 
 
 The rule applies to prior acts of incorporation since superseded. 
 Swain v. Comstock, 18 Wise. 463 (1804) ; by the same or a former 
 government. Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 231 (I860). 
 
 As the court say in Prell v. McDonald, (7 Kans. 426 (1871) : "In 
 chartering such corporations the state in one sense charters a portion 
 of itself. Such corporations are simply instruments in the hands 
 of the state, made use of for the better protection of rights, the 
 administration of justice, and the enforcement of the laws." 
 
 Tins judicial knowledge extends to similar acts of a former govern- 
 ment of the state. " San Francisco having been constituted, by a 
 j)ublic political act of the former government, a pueblo, wc^ must take 
 judicial notice of its existence, powers, and rights." Payne i*. Tread- 
 well, 16 Cal. 220, 231 (1860). The case is different only by being 
 stronger where municipalities, e. {/., towns, arc created under a 
 general law, " conferring uniform and general powers on each." 
 Aldermen and Council /•. Finley, 10 Ark. 423 (1850); Uriggs v. 
 Whipple, 7 Vt. 15 (1835). Courts take judicial notice of such incor- 
 porating statutes as being public statutes, "lint the fact that a 
 particular village or town has availed itself of tiie provisions of 
 these statutes, and became incorporated tifi they autliorise, is private 
 in its character, and we knov/ of no principle of law which would 
 require or ai horise the courts to take judicial notice of it." Hard v. 
 City of Decoiiih, 43 la. 313 (1876) ; Kousey i>. Wood, 47 Mo. App. 
 465 (1891). 
 
 Raii.koads. — The existence of a general railroad law stands on 
 tlie same footing as any other public law and is noticed as such. 
 Hcaston i>. Cincinnati, &c. R, P.. 16 Ind. 275(1861). 
 
 Put statutes incorporating particular railroads have been held to 
 be jirivate. They are said (Oliio R. Co. v. Ridge, 5 Plack. 78 (1839) 
 to "operate upon particular persons and private concerns." Atchi- 
 8(in, &c. R. K. V. Hlacksliire, 10 Kans. 477, 487 (1872) ; Perry c. 
 New Orleans, &e. Railroad Co., 55 Ala. 413, 426 (1876). Put see 
 Hall V. Prown,.^ X. H. 93 (1877); Caldwell ,:. Richmond R. H., 89 
 Ga. .55(» (1892), ronfnt. 
 
 In Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452 (1866), it was held that a 
 
 i 
 
V 
 
 2113 
 
 AJMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part T. 
 
 land grant or reserve to aiil tlie construction of a railroad is a public 
 act, though printed among tliu private laws. 
 
 " In the ease of public corporations created by public lawo, the 
 court is officially to take notice of the corporate character." 
 Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420 (18G0). 
 
 So of other public corporations. M >/., the existence of the state 
 bank of Arkansas need not be proved in the courts of that state. 
 McKiel V. Keal Estate Bank, 4 Ark. 592 (1841). So of the Bank of 
 Tennessee, Sliaw v. State, 3 Sueed (Tenn.), 8G (ISoo). 
 
 The courts will recognise bank ohn.rters as public acts of whicli 
 they are obliged to take judicial notice. Davis v. Bank of Fi on, 
 :il Ga. ()<) (1800) ; Bank of Newberry, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 495 (13^-)) ; 
 Hays V. Northwestern Bank of Virginia, 9 Gratt. 127 (1852). 
 
 And acts in amendment thereof. Jemison v. Planters and iMer- 
 chants Bank, 17 Ala. 754 (1850). 
 
 The rule extends to a case where an insurance company was by 
 statute made a bank of discount and deposit. Gordon v. Mont- 
 gomery, 19 Ind. 110 (18G2). 
 
 Stati'tory .Moi)Ik;<ati(>n'.s. — Counts may be required by statute 
 to take judicial cognisance of private laws. Bixler's Adni. v. 
 Parker, b Bush, '(Hi (1807). 
 
 Speiiking of such a private law, the Virginia court of appeals 
 say: "The judicial notice we are to take of it, is the same witli 
 that wliidi we give to laws of a general and public nature." 
 Somerville v. Wimbish, 7 Gratt. 205 (1850). 
 
 Where a public statute requires cognisance of particular facts, 
 e.ff. the result of local option (li(pior) elections such cognisance 
 will be taken, "and since no sources of information are pointed out, 
 it is incumbent on this as well as all otlier courts to inform itself 
 by recourse to any and all sources of information." Puckett i: 
 State, 71 .Miss. 192 (1893) ; Thomas i\ Com., 90 Va. 92 (1893). But 
 see also Whitman v. State. 80 .Md. 410 (1894). 
 
 So if a statute incorporating a private corporation declares itself 
 to be a public statute, the courts will take judicial cognisance of it. 
 Beaty v. Lessee of Knowles, 4 Peters, 152 (18,'}0). 
 
 So whert> the statute does not require that ])rivate acts should 
 be specially pleaded, llalbert v. Skvles, 1 A. K. Marsh, (Kv.) 3(>8 
 (1818) ; Hart v. Bait. & O. R. R., P^ W. Va. XM\ (187.'!). 
 
 When; a private statute is recognised and amended by an act 
 declared to be public, courts will take judicial notice of the original 
 statuti-. Lavalle v. People, 6 111. Ap. 157 (1880). So an ad(iitiou 
 to a public act is itself jmblie. Belmont v. Morrill. 09 Me. 314 ("1879). 
 Tile repeal of a ])ublic law is itself public. State v. O'Conner, 13 
 La. Ann. 487 (18.~»8). 
 
 Where particular far-ts are established by public statutes, the 
 court of course take notice of such facts ; e. g., the character of 
 
i 
 
 CHAl". :i.] 
 
 AMEItlCAN NOTES. 
 
 21H 
 
 cortain building's as public houses under the <janiing laws. Grant 
 V. State, L'7 S. W. IL'7 (Tex. 1894). 
 
 So of the establishment of a orobate eourt in a certain county. 
 La Salle Co. v. Milligan, 143 111. 321 (18'J2)- 
 
 I'lie courts of Canada take cognisance of facts published in tlie 
 ottiiMal gazette. Sinnns v. Quebec, &c. K. 11., 22 Low. Cau. Jur. 20 
 (1877). 
 
 li follows from what has been said that, except in these instances 
 of legal requirement, courts do not take judicial notice of ])rivate 
 statutes. Leland o. Wilkinson, 6 Peters, 317 (1832). So of the 
 incorporation oi jirivate corporations. ' Workingnien's I'.ank v. Con- 
 verse, 33 La. Ann. 9(53 (18S1) ; Broad Stree^. Hotel Co. v. Weaver's 
 A dm. 07 Ala. 2G (LS7(J) ; Danville &c. Flank-Road Co. v. State, 16 
 Ind. 45(5 (18()1); Terdicaris v. Trenton City Bridge Co., 29 N. J. 
 Law, 307 (18G2). 
 
 In cases where the statute incorporating a bank or other institu- 
 tion declares itself to be a public act, that fact al me is sufficient to 
 require the courts of the same jurisdiction to take judicial notice 
 of it. Buell V. Warner, 33 Vt. o7(» (ISGl). 
 
 So of a railroad. Cincinnati, &c. K. 11. r. Clifford, 113 Ind. 4G0, 
 467 (1S87); Hammett v. Little Bock, &c. it li. Co., 20 Ark. 204 
 (18o9) ; Western &c. B. li. v. Roberson, 61 Fed. Bep. 592 (1894). 
 
 ')r a statute may require courts to take judicial '"^tice of village 
 organisations as public acts. Doyle v. Village of Bradford, 90 111. 
 410 (1878). Or of the incorporation of proprietors of lands. Beaty 
 V. Lessee of Knowler, 4 Tet. 152 (1830). 
 
 In other cases where a statute "equires courts to take judicual 
 notice of an otherwise private statute it will be the court's duty to 
 take such notice. Eel liiver Draining Association v. Topp, 16 Ind. 
 242 (1801). 
 
 So courts take judicial notice of all statutes except those which 
 declare themselves to be ])rivate if such is the requirement of the 
 state constitution. Covington Drawbridge (Jo. v. Shepherd, 20 
 How. 227 (1857). 
 
 Courts do not take cognisance of other ])rivate statutes. City of 
 Allegheny v. Nelson. 25 Ba. St. 332 (1855). For examph", the in- 
 eorijoration of a turnpike by a special act. A/lter of a corporation 
 under a general law. Danville, &(>,. Blank Bd. v. State, 16 Ind. 456 
 
 (ison. 
 
 So the sujierior judiciary of a state will )u)t take cognisance of 
 city, town, or county ("'dinanees, or by-laws. Furuian v. Mayor, &e. 
 of Huutsvillo, 54 Ala. 203 (1875) ; Hassard r. Municipality No. 2, 7 
 Li. Ann. 495 (18.-.2); State w. Oddle. 42 :\ro. 210 (1808) ; City of 
 McThersou v. Xichols, 48 Kans. 430 (1892). (iarvin v. ^V.•lls, 8 la. 
 2S0 (18.V.)): Lucker i\ Com., 4 Bush (Ky.) 440 (1868):. City of 
 Winoiui I). Burke, 23 Minn. 254 (187r») ; Mooney t'. Kennett, 10 Mo. 
 
 1: 
 
 
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 1 
 
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 w 
 
 21^5 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 551 (1854); SJianfelter v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 483(1894); City of 
 St. Louis V. Koche (Mo.), 31 S. W. 915 (1895); Toiter v. Waring, 
 09 N. Y. 250 (1877). 8o of the regulations of a canal board. 
 Palmer v. Aldridge, 10 Barb. 130 (1852). 
 
 But it is within the reasoning by which courts take judicial 
 cognisance of laws which they are constituted to enforce that the 
 same municipal ordinances which must bs proved before a superior 
 court of judicature are recognised without proof by the courts of 
 the body which passed the ordinance. State v. City of Dubuque, 
 11 la. 407 (1800). 
 
 So though the court will take judicial cognisance of the charter 
 of a municipality and of its power to make by-laws, the existence 
 of any particular by-laws so made must be alleged and proved. 
 Case V. Mayor of Mobile, 30 Ala. 538 (1857) ; Sherrel v. Murray, 49 
 Mo. A[)[). 233 (1892). So where, by statute, a county board was au- 
 thorised to prescribe by order entered on its records such animals 
 as could legally run at large, if such orders exist that fact must be 
 alleged and proved. In the absence of such allegation and proof, 
 cases will be determined by tiie general rules of law, unaifected by 
 the statute. Indianapolis ike. K. Co. v. Caldwell, 9 Ind. 397 (1857). 
 The reason of the rule is partly given in Porter /*. Waring, 09 X. Y. 
 250 (1877), where the ('ourt say that a contrary rule "would 0[K'n 
 the door in many cases to mere conjecture, and involve an inquiry 
 as to local enactnunits; tiie time when they took effect ; the priority 
 of the same, and their application to the case in litigation; which 
 it would be difficult to dispose of without proof and which are not 
 properly included witliin the ordinary scope of judicial knowledge 
 in the determination and trial of cases.'' 
 
 Of course, the court, ce f/rnth, may look up the ordinance for 
 itself, as was done in Hassard v. Municipality No. 2, 7 La. Ann. 
 495 (1852) ; and it has been held that where an inferior court is re- 
 'luired to take cognisance of local statutes, the appellate court should 
 do the same, on hearing of the appeal. Solomon c. Hughes, 24 
 Kans. 211 (1880). 
 
 The statutory permission to prove a by-ln'-, ordinance, &c., by a» 
 I)rinted copy properly authenticated does not affect the rule. City 
 of Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn. 254 (1870). 
 
 Judicial Co(}nisaxck ok State Law by Federal Courts. — 
 Not only do state courts take notice of the laws of the United 
 States but the federal courts take cognisance of state laws. Thus, 
 the circuit courts of the United States take judicial cognisance 
 of the public laws of any state of the Union, when relevant to the 
 issue, though such state is not within its immediate jurisdiction. 
 The reason is stated by Story, J., in Owings v. Hull (9 Peters, 007, 
 024 (1835)) where it was held that the circuit court of the United 
 States for Maryland was bound to take judicial cognisance of the 
 
 .4"t 
 
CUAl'. II.] 
 
 .1 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 OJIO 
 
 laws of Louisiana as to the possession of a notarial instrument 
 executed in 'Sew Orleans. "Tlie circuit courts of the United 
 States are created by congress, not for tlie purpose of adminis- 
 tering tlie local law of a single state alone, but to administer the 
 laws of all the states iu the Union, in cases in which they re- 
 spectively apply. The judicial power conferred on the general 
 government by the constitution extends to many cases arising 
 under the laws of the different states. . . . That jurisprudence 
 is then, in no just sense, a foreign jurisprudence, to be proved in 
 the courts of the United States, by the ordinary modes of jjroof 
 by which the laws of a foreign country are to be established, but it is 
 to be judicially taken notice of in the same manner as the laws of 
 the United States are taken notice of by these courts." See also 
 Elwood V. Flannigan, 104 U. S. o(j2 (1881); Merrill v. Dawson, Hemp- 
 stead (C. Ct. of Ark.), 5()3 (1848); Ilinde v. Vattier, .5 Pet. .398 
 (18.U) ; Jones v. Hays, 4 McLean, oL'l (1849) ; Hanley v. Donaghue, 
 IIG U. S. 1 (1885). 
 
 The rule extends to state statutes. Merchants Nat. lik. v. 
 McCJraw, 59 I'ed. Hep. 972 (1894). So, following the analogy of 
 the state courts, the federal courts will judicially recognise the 
 law of any foreign country, establishing land titles in any state once 
 l)art of that country. U. S. v. Turner, 11 How. GU.3 (1850); Loree 
 V. Abner, 57 Fed. Hep. 159 (189:3). 
 
 In like maimer, the supreme court of the United States exer- 
 cising an appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts of the 
 United States takes the same judicial cognisance as to state laws 
 tiuit the circuit courts themselves do. It is accustomed "con- 
 stantly to take notice of and administer the jurisprudence of all the 
 states!" Owings (•. Hull, 9 Peters, G07, G24 (1835), per Story, J. 
 "Needing no averment or proof." Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U. S. 
 1, 7 (1885) ; Carpenter r. Dexter, 8 Wall. 613 (1869). As is said in 
 Hailey v. Donaghue (u/)l supra), "whatever was matter of law in 
 the court appealed from is matter of law here, and whatever was 
 matter of fact in the court ajipealed from is matter of fact here.'' 
 "The law of any state of the Union, whether depending upon 
 statutes, or upon judicial opinions, is a matter of which the courts 
 of the United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea 
 or proof." Lamar v. Micou, 114 U. S. 218 (1885). 
 
 Where the supreme court of the United States entertains a writ 
 of error to a state court of last resort it takes the same judicial 
 cognisance of the public laws of the state of the court said to be in 
 error that the state court itself would take, " needing no averment 
 or proof." Hanley v. Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1, 7 (1885). 
 
 Under these circumstances of a writ of error to a state court, the 
 supreme court of the United States has, it will be noted, a nar- 
 rower range of judicial cognisance than when sitting on ap])eal 
 
 !l 
 
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 i 
 
 211' 
 
 AMEUKJAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AUT I. 
 
 from a circuit court of the United States and "does not take 
 judicial notice of the laws of another state, not proved in tliat 
 court and made part of the record se"*; up, unless by the local law 
 that court takes judicial notice of it." Liverpool Steam Co. v. 
 rhenix Insurance Co., 129 U. S. 35)7, 445 (18S8) ; Hanley v. 
 Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1 (1885) ; Kenaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277, 
 285 (1886). 
 
 " The courts of the United States take judicial notice of the 
 laws and judicial decisions of the several states." Cheever v, 
 Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (1869) ; Elwood v. Flannigan, 104 U. S. 562 
 (1881); Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397, 
 (1888). 
 
 But while it is the duty of these courts to take such cognisance, 
 tiiey may by rule or otherwise compel litigants to assist them in so 
 doing, e. g. by setting out in their briefs all statutes relied upon. 
 Scliool Dist. V. Ins. Co., 101 U. S. 472 (1879). 
 
 "Fedkkal QuKSTioN," — Wiierc in a state court the provision 
 of the federal constitution requiring "full fai*;h and credit" to be 
 given to the "jjublic acts, records, and judical proceedings" of 
 another state is involved (Const. U. S. Art. IV. sec. 1, Stats. 1790, 
 11), the state court will take tiie same judicial cognisance of tlie 
 laws of the state tlic validity of wliose acts is in question that it 
 takes of its own laws. The reason on which this rule is based is 
 succinctly stated by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Ohio v. 
 Hinchman, 27 I'a. St. 479 (1856). "A judgment of this court, 
 adverse to tlie right arising out of tlie federal constitution and 
 legislation, would be reviewable in the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, and there tlu; states of the confederacy are not 
 regarded as foreign states, wliose laws and usages must be proved, 
 but as domestic institutions wliose laws are to be noticed without 
 pleading or proof. It would be a very imperfect and discordant 
 administration for the court of original jurisdiction to adopt one 
 rule of decision, while the court of linal resort was governed by 
 another; and hence it follows, that in questions of this sort, we 
 shall take notice of the local laws of a sister state in tlie same 
 manner the supreme court of the United States would do on a writ 
 of error to our judgment." 
 
 To same effect is Vaino ;>. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 II. I. 411 
 (1876). 
 
 FoKKKiN Laws. — Judicial notice cannot be taken of foreign 
 laws. As a general rule they must be alleged and proved like other 
 facts. See jjos^ p. 52"*. 
 
 The highest court of a state may be required, by statute, to take 
 "judicial notice of tlie laws and the statutes of our sister states." 
 Ilobbs V. Memphis & Charlestown li. Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 873 
 (1S72V 
 
ClIAI'. II.] 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 2118 
 
 Notice is not taken even when the foreign law, e. g. establislied 
 rate of interest in other states, is printed as part of the general 
 statutes of a particular state. Insurance Co. of North Anieiica v. 
 I'orcheinier, 86 Ala. 541 (1888). 
 
 if the foreign law is made part of the record in error before the 
 supreme court of the United States it will be considered. Green 
 V. Van l^uskirk, 7 Wall. V^^ (1808). 
 
 CooRDiNATK BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. — For reasous ana- 
 logous to those requiring state courts to recognise the existence 
 and composition of the national government and its international 
 relations, all courts recognise the existence and composition of the 
 gove iiment by which they are constituted, in its executive, legis- 
 lative, and judicial branches. " It is certainly true that the courts 
 will judicially recognise the public officers of the state, under wliose 
 laws and organisation they act as the cliief executive, tlie heads of 
 de[)artments ; judges of courts of general jurisdiction; attorneys, 
 for tlie state, sheriffs, and we see no reason why clerks of tlie 
 courts should not also be included." IMajor v. State, 2 Sneed 
 (Tenn.), 11 (1854), — a case deciding that where the clerk of the 
 circuit court in one county transmits papers to the circuit court 
 of another county, on a charge of venue, the seal of the court is 
 not essential to tlie authentication of the transmitting clerk, 
 wliose signature will be judicially noticed. Courts will not require 
 proof of the signature of the governor of their state or the date 
 of his election and inauguration. Wells v. Jackson Iron j\Ifg. 
 Co.. 47 N. H. 235 (18(J()) ; Dewees v. Colorado Co.. 32 Tex. 570 
 (1870) ; Hizer «. State, 12 Ind. 330 (1859). " The court must take 
 judicial notice of the changes made in the executive department." 
 Lindsey v. Atty.-Gen., 33 Miss. 508, 528 (1857). And courts will 
 notice the accession of the df facto governor. State v, Williams, 
 5 Wise. 308 (18r)G) ; and his appointment of A. as a district judge. 
 ])e la Kosa v. State, Tex. Crim. App. (1893), 21 S. W. Kep. 192; and 
 of the public proclamations of the governor, c ij., in calling for 
 troops. Hanson v. South Scituate, 115 Mass. 3556 (1874). So it has 
 been held by the supreme court of Louisiana that the signatures of 
 former Spanish governors of ti. Mr state need not be proved. Jones 
 ■(,'. Gale's Curatrix, 4 Martin, G35 (1817). 
 
 Courts "are bound judicially to know who are the sheriffs of the 
 several (bounties." Ingram v. State, 27 Ala. 17 (185.5) ; Alexander v. 
 Hiirnham, 18 Wise. 199 (1804); Tiiomi)Son f. Haskell, 21 111. 215 
 (1859) ; and their signatures. Wood ik Fitz. 10 Martin, 190 (1821). 
 A eourt will take judicial notice of tiie civil officers of the county 
 in wliich it holds its sittings. Thielmann ;>. IJurg, 73 111. 293 (1874) \ 
 and so of tlie signature of the recorder. Scott v. Jackson, 12 La. 
 Ann. 640 (18.57). So of the registers of the several counties of tiie 
 state. Fancher o. Ue Montegre, 1 Head, 40 (1858) ; and the levee tax- 
 
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 AMKHICAN NOTKS. 
 
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 oolloctor. Tenipleton v. IVIorgaii, IG La. Ann. 438 (1862) ; Wetlien- 
 bee V. Dunn, '6'J Cal. lOG (18(!7). "Courts are authorised and 
 required," say tlie supreme court of Alabama, "to t;ii<e judicial 
 notice of the v.irious commissioned officers of the state, and to 
 know the extent of their authority, their otficial signatures, an<l 
 their respecuive terms of oHice, — when such terms commence, and 
 when they expire. The dates of these commissions are matters of 
 jmblic record in the executive department of the state government, 
 being accessible to intpiiry by all who may be concerned, and the 
 law iixes the duration of each official term." Cary v. State, 7(5 Ala. 
 78 (1884); P.ennett v. State, 1 Mart. & Yerg. 133 (1827). Tlie 
 supreme court of California holds that " the courts will take 
 judicial notice of the officers of a county and the genuineness of 
 their signatures ; and when the law provides for the appointment of 
 a deputy by one of tliese officers, courts will also judicially recog- 
 nise such deputy and the genuineness of his signature." Himmel- 
 mann v. Hoadloy, 44 Cal. 213, 22G (1872). So the Pennsylvania 
 courts titke jiulieial notice of aldermen as public officeu Fox 
 V. Com., 81* Pa. St. 611 (1875). Illinois courts take cogi. "iu;e 
 who are justices of the peace; Graham v. Anderson, 42 111. .^M 
 (1867) ; and other civil officers, lirackett v. I'eople, 115 111. 29 
 (188."»), including "justices of the various courts of record of the 
 Srate, and of their terms of office." Vahle v. lirackenseik, 145 111. 
 231 (1893). Probably Courts will not take cognisance of the 
 official character of a deputy maishal. Ward v. Henry, 19 Wise. 
 76 (18()5). They will not recognise the official character of a 
 deputy sheriff. State Hank r. Curran, 10 Ark. 142 (1849) ; Land 
 V. Patteson, Minor (Ala.) 14 (1820), he not being "commissioned 
 in the name of the state or required by statute to take any oath 
 of office." But where a statute authorised a superintendent of 
 .streets to ap])()int deputies, the courts of California "judicially 
 recognise such deputy and the genuineness of liis signature." Him- 
 nielmann v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. 213 (1872). A deputy auditor general, 
 "being a state officer known to the law," will be judically recog- 
 nised. People V. Johr, 22 Alich, 461 (1871). 
 
 Where the terms of all justices of the peace by law expire on a 
 certain day the court will take notice of that fact. Stubbs v. State, 
 53 Miss. 437 (1876). 
 
 So the courts of Indiana " t.ake notice, as matter of law, that the 
 trustee of a civil township is also trustee of the school township. 
 Inglis r. Hughes, 61 Ind. 212 (1878). 
 
 Such cognisance includes knowledge of the general elections at 
 which such officers are voted for. State v. Minnick, 15 la. 123 
 (1863) ; Ellis v. Reddin, 12 Kans. 306 (1873). The reason is prob- 
 ably that given in Davis v. Best, 2 la. 96 (1853). "The An-^nist 
 election is established by law, and the time it is held shoidd be 
 
 
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 AMEKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 2120 
 
 judicially taken notice of." See alsc Hiirnott r. Henderson, 21 
 Ti'X. i">.S8 (IS.W) ; Lewis v. Supervisors, 70 111. 65il87.'5). 
 
 Of these re(iuirenieMt3 of jiidiciiil kiiowleiljje, tlit^ supreme eourt 
 of Alabama say (Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. L'.'i7 'IS.S.S): "Tliiseo<,Miis- 
 ance may often extend far beyond the actual knowledcje, or even llie 
 memory of judges, who may therefore resort to sueli documents of 
 reference, or other authoritative sources of information as may be at 
 hand, and may be deemed worthy of confidence." The cimrt will 
 not take cognisance of who are town constables. The fact is not " of 
 pulilick notoriety." Doe v. lUackman. 1 I). (Jhipnian (Vt.) 1(19(1707). 
 
 Statutory GiuxiKAiMiv. — Courts are required to take judicial 
 notice of geographical or administrative subdivisions of the 
 sovereignty by which they are constituted. Vanderwerker v. I'eojile, 
 ;•) Weu'd. oSO (18;i(l) ; McDonald v. DeCairl, 1 Chan. Cham. U 
 (ISr.O); State r. I'owers, 25 Conn. 48 (1856); State v. Wagner, 
 01 :\le. J7S (lS7;i); Com. v. Desmond, 103 Mass. 44;") (18()1») ; 
 Winuipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420 (I860); U. S. 
 r. lieebe, 2 Dak. 292 (1880) ; Smitha v. Flournoy's Adni., 47 Ala. 
 :nr> (1872) ; Martin v. ^Lirtin, nl Me. 366 (1863) ; Chesajieake &> 
 Canal Co. v. I'-altimore &c. K. 11. Co., 4 Gill & ,T. 1, 63 (18.'52)' 
 lioston v. State. ."> Tex. Ai)p. 383; Woodward v. Chicago &c. K. 11., 
 21 Wise. 309 (1867). 
 
 ''Courts take notice of the local divisions of the state, as into 
 counties, cities, towns. &o., and of the relative position thereof, but 
 not of the precise boundaries and distances. And they are not 
 bound to take judicial notice of the local situation and distances of 
 the different places in counties from each other." Goodwin i'. 
 Ap])leton, 22 Me. 453 (184.S) ; Doyle v. Village of Bradford, 90 111. 
 416 (1878); Bo.ston r. State, T) Tex. App. 383 (1879); Gooding v. 
 :\Iorgan, 70 111. 270(1873): Martin t-. Martin, 51 Me. 366 (186.3). 
 But the sujjreme court of KLode Island, without citation of author! 
 ties, hold that "the courts are bound to take cognisance of the 
 boundaries in fact claimed by the state." State v. Dunwell, 5 R. I. 
 127 (18")")); and that of Iowa judicially knows that Kace Island 
 is in the jurisdiction of the adjoining state of Illinois. Gilbert v. 
 :\Ioline Water I'ower & :\I'f'g Co., 19 la. 319 (1865). So of the popu- 
 lation of a county according to the United States census, if the 
 legislature has claspif ed counties on tliis basis. Woniester Nat. 
 r.ank r. Cheney, 94 111. 430 (1880) ; State v. Marion Co. Ct. (Mo.), 
 31 S. W. 23 (1895). Judicial notice is taken of population as fixed 
 by the census. Hawkins *'. Thomas, 3 Ind. App. 399 (1891). So a 
 territorial court is required to take cognisance of the limits and 
 relative distances of the territory, Hoyt ?•. Russell, 107 U. S. 401 
 (1885). So far as the limits of county jurisdiction depend upon 
 the construction of records, "it is purely a question of law for the 
 court." State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178 (1873). 
 
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 Wliere a statute declared certain liouses to be public, tlic (;ourl; 
 will "recognise sucli houses to be public places." (Jrahaiu v. 
 Williams, 27 S. W. Kep. 127 (1894), (CJriin. Ct. Appeals of Tex.). 
 " Judicial knowledge of the location of towns is limited to suuli 
 places as are recognised by general statutes." Field v. State (Tt^x.), 
 24 S. W. Kep. 407 (180.3) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton, UV2 fnd. 
 189 (1892). The public political act may be one by a former govern- 
 ment, establishing the municipality. Payne v. Treadwell, 1(J Cal. 
 220 (18G0). 
 
 Courts are not required to know that a place is within a particular 
 county. Poston r. State, 5 Tex. App. ;iS3 (1879) ; Cain v. State, 
 (Tex.) 2') S. W. Pep. 1119 (1894). Put see Gooding r. Morgan, 
 70 111. 275(1873); Kidder v. Plaisdell, 45 Me. 461 (1858); Com. 
 ,>. Wheeler, 1(>2 Mass. 429 (1894). 
 
 But they may do so if they see tit. " The court can take judicial 
 notice of the lines of counties and the towns embraced in tiiem." 
 Steinmetz r. Versailles Turnpike Co., 57 Ind. 457 (1877); Ham i>. 
 Ham, 39 Me. 263 (185.".); State /•. Powers, 25 Conn. 48 (l.S5()) ; 
 Smitha v. Flournoy's Adm., 47 Ala. 345 (1872); Lewis v. State, 
 24 S. W. (Tex.) 903 (1894); and also that it is a railroad termi- 
 nus and has a post office. Central &c. Co. ik Gamble, 77 Ga. 5«4 
 (188G). 
 
 Where the location of a place is referred to in public statutes the 
 location must be recognised without proof. Solyer v. Romanet, 
 .52 Tex. 562 (1880); Martin v. Martin, 51 Me. .'366 (1863); Peoi)le 
 . :tting, 99 Cal. 577 ( 1893) ; Peophi v. Curley, 99 Mich. 238 (1894). 
 So of the distance of a town from the county seat. Pruson i: Clark, 
 151 111. 495 (1894). See also State /•. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388 
 (1894). Courts of California will take cognisance that there is only 
 one city of 100.000 popidation in the state. In re Constitutionalitv 
 of Senate Pill 293, 39 I'ac. Kep. 522 (1895). In an Alabama case, 
 King /'. Kent's Heirs, 29 Ala. 542 (1857), the court state that as a 
 certain town is mentioned in the state constitution as the capitol 
 and in otlier pvd)lio acts, they are " bound " to know tliat it is in 
 Alabama and also that as an act of congress establishes a land 
 office tliere and it " has long been notoriously known and recog- 
 nised " as a land office, they " are authorised " to take notice of the 
 same fact. 
 
 In a later Alabama case, the court take the same view. " The 
 }mblic acts apprise us that Mobile is a municipal corporation of 
 Alabama and where it is situated." Alabama &c. Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 
 57 Ala. 547 (1877). See also to same effect, Houlton v. Chic. &c. 
 K. P., S() Wise. 59 (1893). So a court will take notice of Indian 
 reservations within their jurisdiction, and of the laws and procla- 
 mations establishing or regulating them. U. S. v. Peebe, 2 Dak. 
 292 (1880). 
 
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 AMKItKAN NOTES. 
 
 2132 
 
 And tliat tlio Indian Territory is beyond the jurisdiction of 
 T('x;u. Conner v. State, '2'.i Tex. App. 37S (KS87). 
 
 For the same reasons, in many of the western states of the 
 Union wiiere luditieal subdivisions, as well as the foundation of land 
 titles, rest on government patents based on official surveys, the 
 existence and location of the lines of such survey are among the 
 facts of which courts are required to take cognisance, ^fossman 
 V. Korrest, 27 Ind. 1,3.'? (1806) ; Desire y. Burleson, 35 Neb. 238 
 (18U2) ; Atwatcr v. Schenck, 1) Wise. 160 (1859) ; Quinn v. Cham- 
 pagne, 38 Minn. 322 (1888) ; Wright v. Vhillips, 2 Greene (la.) 191 
 (1849); Gooding v. :Morgan, 70 111. 275 (1873); Gardner v. Kber- 
 hart, 82 111. 316 (1876) ; Murphy v. Hendricks, 57 Ind. 593 (1877) ; 
 Money v. Turnipseed, 50 Ala. 499 (1874) ; Muse v. Kichards, 
 70 Miss. 581 (1893). So of the relation of a certain town to a prin- 
 cipal meridian will be noticed. O'Brien v. Krockinski, 50 111. App. 
 456 (1893). The United States supreme court say : " It is a 
 matter of which this court will take judicial notice, that, by law, 
 the country is divided into collective districts for internal revenue 
 purposes, and in some states there are several of these districts 
 with dofined geographical boundaries." U. S. v. Jackson, 104 U. S. 
 41 (1881). 
 
 As to proof of these lines, as matters of public and general 
 interest, as an exception to the rule against hearsay, see post, p. 412'. 
 
 Rules of rRAcTicE. — Courts take cognisance of the rules of 
 practice established in their own courts. 
 
 " And of the times when and the places where its sessions ap- 
 pointed by law are to be held." Kidder v. Blaisdell, 45 Me. 461 (1858) ; 
 Lindsay v. Williams, 17 Ala. 229 (1850) ; Boss v. Austill, 2Cal. 183 
 (1852). " Judicial notice is taken of the number of days the court is 
 in session at each term." Fabyan r. Ilussell, 38 N. H. 84 (1859) ; 
 Durre v. Brown, 7 Ind. App. 127 (1893). 
 
 But see Gilliland v. Sellers, 2 Oh. St. 223 (1853), contrK. 
 
 "This court judicially knows that the fall term of the circuit 
 couit of Lowndes County begins on the fourth ]\Ionday in October 
 in each year, and may continue three weeks : and that November 5th, 
 1873, was a day of the second week of said term." Bodgers r. State, 
 50 Ala. 102 (1874). To same effect, Spencer v. Curtis, 57 Ind. 221 
 (1877) ; Davidson v. Peticolas, 34 Tex. 27 (1870) ; Lewis v. Wintrode, 
 76 Ind. 13 (1881). 
 
 Courts will not take notioe of the rules established by inferior 
 tribunals. Cutter v. Caruthers, 48 Cal. 178 (1874) ; Cherry v. Baker, 
 17 ]\Id. 75 (1860). Or of their adjournments. Baker v. Knott, 
 Supreme Court of Idaho, 35 Pac. Bep. 172 (1893). 
 
 Courts are required to take judicial cognisance of th'^;ir own records 
 in a prior stage of the same case. Dawson v, DawFon, 29 ^lo. App. 
 521 (1888) ; Searles v. Knapp, (So. Dak.) 58 N. W. 807 (1894) ; State 
 
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 r. ririch, 110 Mo. .'{.")(» (1892); State" /•. lioweii, 10 Kans. 47.'> (ISTC): 
 rai,'t'tt r. Curtis, 1") La. Anil. 4")! (ISGO); llolh'iihacli '•. Sclinalu'l, 
 lOl Cal. .'{12 (1S'.»4); Veil r. Lane. 41 .Ark. ").'{ (l.SS;!); Sccrist r. 
 I'.'tty, lO'.Mll. INS (1.SS3); State /•. Schilling, 14 la. 4.m (ISC.L'); 
 Leavitt «'. Cutler, .')7 Wise. 4(1 (187")). Kveu in a ease where the 
 pr()cee(liii<xs against the garnishee and the principal dei'endant were 
 " virtually a portion of the same reeord." Karrar **. Hates, iio Tex. 
 V.y.i (ISSl) ; Kenosha Stove Co. v. Shedd, H'J la. r>U) (ISOl). 
 
 15ut courts are not rerjuired to take judicial cognisance of their 
 own records in other cases. National Uank of Monticello r. llryant, 
 1.". Hush (Ky.). 4l;> (1S77) ; Grace r. I'.allou, 4 So. Dak. '.VS.', (l.S<>;5) ; 
 McCorinick v. Ilerndon, ('►7 Wise. (i4S (18.S7). See also, /// /r San- 
 derson, r.l Fe.l. Uop. r.O (181)2). 
 
 Indeed a California case, speaking of another pending petition 
 against the defendam in the case at bar, go so far as to say : " We 
 ap))rehend that the court could not under any circumstances take 
 judicial notice of tho fact, except it were for nu-re calendar purjjoses.*' 
 Lake .Merced Water Co. *•. Cowles, .')1 Cal. 215 (ISGll). 
 
 So an aflidavit in another case cannot he judicially noticed by the 
 judge, though admissible in evidence if offered and the judge, in 
 point of fact, personally reniombers the affidavit, llaker v. .Mygalt, 
 14 la. i;51 (ISr.'J). 
 
 In the sanm way, a court cannot take judicial notice of the con- 
 nection existing between two cases on its docket. Hanks v. liuriuua, 
 (il Mo. 7(i (lS7r»). 
 
 " Hut the courts of one state cannot judicially take notice of the 
 laws and practict; of another."' Newell «•. Newton, 10 Pick. 470(18.'{0). 
 
 Courts will take judicial notice who were its members at a par- 
 ticular time and "the term fixed by law for the conimencement of 
 its sessions." (Jilliland v. Sellers, 2 Oh. St. 22;{ (IS.".;?). 
 
 .\nd courts will take notice who ,ire their officers. Central 
 Lainl Co. &c. r. Calhoun, 1(5 W. Va. ;;('.l (1880) ; Mont joy /•. State, 
 78 Ind. 172 (1881; , Norvell r. Mcllenry. 1 Mich. 227 (1840) : Dyer 
 »•. Last, Til 111. 179(1861)). And of their signatures. Hutdl v. State, 
 72 111. r)2;i(18«0,. 
 
 Whether 'ourts are retpiircd to take official notice of the pi'i-sonni'I 
 of inferioi courts is in dispute. " The court are bound to take notice 
 of all public acts and laws, without d(»ubt ; but whether they munt 
 know who are the justices or the clnef justices of inferior tribunals 
 certainly admits of question." Hiidey r. Warren, 2 Pick. 092 (1H24). 
 
 In Davis r. McKnany, loO Mass. 4r>l (IHitO) the supreme judicial 
 court of Massachusetts declined to take judicial cognisance of the 
 clerk of a police court, deciding that the record itself should show 
 liis official character. 
 
 On the contrary, the Kentucky court of appeals recognises who 
 are judges of the circuit courts of that state. Kennedy v. Com., 78 
 
Ill 
 
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 •Jl-» 
 
 K V. 147 ( ISSO). So tlio Illinois court of appeals, KusspII v. Saigt-iit, 
 7 ill. App. *.KS (ISSO). The supreme court of l'eiiiisylvaui;i, after 
 some review of the authorities, are " dispo.sed to take judicial 
 notice" of the constitution of an inferior court. They treat the 
 question as one of optional cognisance. " The rule,'' they say, " is 
 that courts will take notice of what ought to be generally known 
 within the limits of their jurisdiction. There seems to us to be as 
 nuich reason for our having knowledge of who are in fact the judges 
 of our constitutional courts, as for our having judicial knowledge of 
 the lieads of departments, sheritt's, etc., knowledge of whom is always 
 presumed."' Kilpatrick c. Com., 'M I'a. St. H»8 (185S); Cincinnati, 
 &c. K. 11. V. Grames, 8 Ind. App. 1 12 (1893). Hut see County of San 
 .foa(piin r. I'.udd, '.»C Cal. 47 (1892). 
 
 Courts when reciuireil to take cognisance of facts which they do 
 not actually know are constrained to resort to any ajjpropriate 
 source of information. " Infornuition to guide their judgment may 
 be obtained by resort to original documents in the public archives 
 or to books of history or science or to any other proper source." 
 Iloyt /'. lUissell, 117 U. S. 401 (188")); Gonzales /•. lloss, IL'O U. S. 
 (iOo (ISSO). 
 
 The Maryland courts " take judicial notice of the tribunals created 
 by the constitution." Tucker r. State, 1 1 Md. .*{L'2 (IXof). 
 
 In Louisiana, courts recognise the signature of all justices legally 
 appointed by the governor. Despau /•. Swindler, 3 Martin, n. s. 
 7(»r» (IHL'5). 
 
 This is in accordance with the general rule jjrevailing in that state : 
 " We have more than once held that we would not recpiire evidence 
 of the official capacity of functionaries commissioni'd in this state, 
 and would take notice of tlui oftioes held by them." Kollain *•. 
 Lefevre. ."> Kobinson, !.'{ (IH4L'). So, in that state, when court ofli- 
 cers take a bond in pursuance of law and file the same in court, no 
 proof is ne:'ded of the officer's signature. Wood r. Kit/., 10 Martin, 
 llKl (IHL'l). 
 
 And ,so the suiu-eme court of Alabama takes judicial notice of the 
 resignation of a (circuit judge, though without assigning any reason 
 for tiieir decision. Kr jxirtr Peterson, .".."> Ala. 74 ({H.-tM). 
 
 The Illinois courts take judicial notice who are the justices of 
 the peace in their respective ccninties. (Jraham r. .\nder.son, VJ 111. 
 ."»M (lM(i7). .\lso who are the ju<lges of inferior courts. Vahle v. 
 jiracki'iis-ik, I4."i 111. L'31 (ISO.'!); also the date of their ceasing to 
 hold the ofJice. I'eojde »•. MeConnell. ITm 111. 1<)L' (18%). 
 
 The Kings l?cneli of Lower Canada holds that courts will notice 
 the appointment of one of their otHcers to be judge of another court. 
 I'Xv r. Miville, 2 Uev. de Legis. 333 (IMH'.). Notice will be taken 
 of the jurisdii'tion of an inferior court as regulated by statute. 
 Nelson f. Ladd, 4 So. Dak. 1 (IM<)3). 
 
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 AMERICAN NOTK- 
 
 [part I. 
 
 LA\uuA(iB. — Courts take judicial cognisance of the ordinary 
 meaning of words in the vernacuhir. IMobably they are required su 
 to do. Com. r. Kneehind, I'O I'iek. L'()(j, 'Jil (1838) (" blasphemy ''; ; 
 Hill V. liacon, 43 111. 477 (1807) ; Adler v. State, 55 Ala. IG (187C.) 
 (••malt liquor"); Shubrick u State, 2 S. C. 21 (1870) ("sow"); 
 State If. Abbott, L'O Vt. 537 (1848) ("steer"). 
 
 " We take judicial notice of the true signiHcance of all English 
 words and jdirases, and may resort for aid to any a])i>roj)riate books 
 of reference." Grennan v. MclJregor, 78 Cal. 258 (1H8<)). 
 
 The court may decline to liear evi(U'nee ooncerning the siguiH- 
 cance of words, the meaning of which it judicially knows ; e. y. in 
 a Massachusetts case, on trial of a complaint for violation of tlie 
 Sunday law by keeping open a tobacconist's store, the defendant 
 claimed tliat he was lawfully selling "drugs and medicines," and 
 offered evidence of experts to show that tobacco and cigars liad 
 "a medicinal effect on the human system." The presiding justice 
 excluded tlie evidence, and an exception to this ruling was over- 
 ruled. "The court has judicial knowlec -e of the meaning of com- 
 mon words, and may well rule tiuit guns and pistols are not drugs 
 or medicines, and may exclude the opinions of witnesses who offer 
 to testify tliat tliey are." Com. y. Marzynski, 14'.) Mass. 08 (1881)). 
 See also Mattiiews' /•. I'ark, 159 Pa. St. 579 (1S94). 
 
 The court may not only refresh its memory by reference to dic- 
 tionaries, etc., but may permit standard authorities, e. (/,, Webster's 
 Unabridged Dictionary, to be read to the jury for its definition of a 
 disputed word. Adler ik State, 55 Ala. 10 (1876). 
 
 The court must study out the meaning of terms ; r. ij. " Congre- 
 gational." Atty.-(Jeii. ('. I)ul)lin, .'58 X. II. 459 (1859). Hut may re- 
 quire aid from the parties. School Dist. «'. Ins. Co.. KM U. S. 471' 
 (18711). And use tiie testimony of experts. Atty.-Gen. o. Dublin, 
 iihi SHin'tt. 
 
 Ill a New York ca.se, the court withoiit i)roof rendered judgment 
 for the dollar value of a number of English •' pounds." dolinston r. 
 Hedden, 2 Johns. Cases, 274 (1801). 
 
 Wlietiier ccmrts will notice customary abbreviations is more in 
 dispute. Apparei'.tly, tins species of knowledge is more nearly 
 analogous to tliose wliere cognisance is optional with the court, /. <'., 
 dependent upon tlu* knowledge or feeling of tlie jinrticuhir judge. 
 In an .Vlabama case the ctourt say it "must judicially take notice of 
 such ablireviations as ' Adm'r.' or acknowledge? itself incompetent to 
 understand tlu; commonest writings." Moseley's Adm'r r. Mastin, 
 37 Ala. 21li (18(')]). So the usual abbreviations of jiroper names 
 will be noticed. Stephen v. State, 11 (Ja. 225, 240 (1m52) (".las.") ; 
 Weaver /-. McKllienor, 13 .Mo. 89 (1850) (" Christy ") ; Sparks v. 
 Sparks, 51 Kans. 195 (1893) ("Dan"); Studsill c. State, 7 (Ja. 2, 
 (1849) C'Thos."). 
 
CilAI'. II.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 2120 
 
 On the other hand, the supreme court of Texas was unabh' judi- 
 ci;illv to know that " St. Louis, Mo. " meant St. Louis in tlie state 
 of .Missouri. Ellis o. Park, 8 Tex. 205 (1«5L'); or that "N«"\v Or- 
 leans, lia." meant Xew Orleans in the state of Louisiana. Kussell 
 v. Martin, 15 Tex. 238 (185o). Apparently these two cases rest on 
 an erroneous application of a jjrior ease in the same court, Andrews 
 /•. lloxie, ") Tex. 171 (1849), where the court decide that they cannot 
 judicially know that "The city of New Orleans," without more, 
 means the city of that name in Louisiana. This apparently is cor- 
 rect. Most people in the L'nited States know that there is a city 
 of New Orleans in Louisiana. Whether there are other cities of 
 the same name elsewhere is not, perhaps, so generally known as to 
 dispense with proof. 
 
 Slang and phrases of peculiar or local usage must be proved. Li 
 the case of Mayor &c. of Baltimore i\ State, o(> Md. .'>"(•, 4<>8 (LSoD), 
 where the legislature of Maryland had assumed control of the police 
 force of Baltimore by the appointment of commissioners under a 
 statute, providing "that no Hlack Iiejjublican or endorser or ap- 
 prover of tlie Helper Hook "' should be appointed to any otiice 
 under the board, tiie court say : " We cannot understand, olHcially, 
 who are meant to be affected by the proviso, and, therefore, cannot 
 express a judicial opinion on the question." 
 
 Hut the court will take judicial notice of the phrase '"gift enter- 
 prise" as used in a criminal statute. Lohman /•. State, 81 Ind. 
 15(1881). 
 
 And officially notice tlui meaning of the initials C. O. I). State v. 
 lutox. Liquors, 73 Me. L'78 (1881.'). Hut, on the contrary, the Mis- 
 souri court of api)eals "do not know that the mejiniiig of the abbre- 
 viation ' ('. O. 1).' as u.sed by expressmen, is sufficiently a matter 
 of common kmiwh^dge that the circuit court could take judicial 
 notice of it," and hold that its meaning is a question for the jury. 
 McNichol w. I'acitie Ex|tress Co., V2 Mo. App. 401 (188L'). ("nurts 
 will notice surveyor's initials, not jtretending " to be more ignorant 
 than the rest of mankind." Kile r. Vellowhead, 80 111. L'08 {lS:r,). 
 liut the courts of Minnesota refuse to take cognisance of the mean- 
 ing of " S« X. K.* and X. W." S. K.* " Keith /•. Hayden, L'C) .Minn. 
 211; (1S7'.)). To the same effect. Power r. Howdle, :\ Xo. Dak. 107 
 (iS'.i;!). 
 
 So 11 foreign language nuist be jiroved ; r.r/., in a case where 
 defendiint was convicted of rape upon a woman named " Kurkwiski." 
 and there was evidence that her name was written Kurkowiski, 
 tht! court refused a motion in arrest of judgment, which was 
 apjiroved on report to the upper court. " Tliere is no evidence 
 tending to sliow that, though pronounced Kurkowiski, it was not 
 l)roiierly spelled Kurkwiski. The courts of this state cannot take 
 judicial cognisance of the proper ortiiograidiy or j)ronuneiation of 
 
 ifi^i 
 
 i-ir 
 
2127 
 
 AMERICAN' NOTKS. 
 
 [PAKT I. 
 
 M '1 
 
 iiaincs in the I'olisli huigiuigL'."' State v. Johnson, 20 Minn. '.)]('» 
 (1S71)). 
 
 ('lucuLATiNo Mkdium, etc. — The conrt and jury will take 
 notiep, witliout proof, of tlie legal coins made at the mint of the 
 United States, pursuant to law and of foreign coins made curr iit, 
 by law. U. S. v. Burns, "> McLean, !'.'{ (1841)) ; also of what is It'i^al 
 tender. Chesapeake liank v. Swain, 29 Md. 483, 502 (18C8) ; Daily 
 V. State, 10 Ind. ~>'oii (18.")8). Also that United States notes "are 
 l)rima facie of a eommereial value efpial to that imputed by their 
 face." Gady i>. State, 83 Ala. ol (1887). 
 
 So courts take notice of the nature and denominations of the 
 circulating medium. Lampton v. Haggard, 3 Monr. (Ky.) 14S) 
 (1820) ; and that there aie " classes of notes and bills in circulation 
 as money " other than bankbills. Hart v. State, 55 Ind. 599 (1877). 
 That " nic^kels '' are of value need not be proved. Mallory i>. State, 
 62 Ga. 104 (1878). But in a case re<iuiring damages to be assessed 
 according to the value of the bank notes of the Bank of the Com- 
 monwealth, the court say : " We are not at liberty to take judicial 
 notice of the value of tht> paper of the bank at any particular time." 
 Feanster v. Ringo, 5 Monr. (Ky.) 330 (1827). To same effect, as to 
 depreciation of Confederate money, .see Modawell v. Holmes, 40 
 Ala. 391 (1807). That there was depreciation will be noticed. 
 Keppel r. K. K., Chase's Dec. 107 (1808). But the American courts 
 will not take notice of the value of Canadian currency. Kermott 
 V. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181 (1803). 
 
 Courts recognise also, without proof, the legal standards of weights 
 and measures prevailing in their parti(!ular jurisdictions. Courts 
 recognise the capacity of a "pint." lieid i'. McAVhinuie, 27 Q. B. 
 U. C. 289 (1868). 
 
 Matters of Optional Cogniaance. — The rule which allows a 
 court, in its discretion, to know, without proof, certain facts rele- 
 vant to the issue, Ijecanse undisputed and generally known, per- 
 forms much the same ofHce in the trial of causes, as do the rules of 
 pleading. It relieves the administration of justice from the con- 
 sideration of matters on which the jjarties are agreed or which they 
 do not care to contest, and eiuibles the tribunal to devote its entire 
 attention to the real points in dispute. 
 
 In every trial of an issue of fact one or more ))roposition3 are in 
 dispute between the parties. Involved or connc<;ted with the i)roof 
 or disproof of these are often found relevant facts whi<'h are not 
 disputed. Tliey are usually facts of notoriety, fre(iuently capable of 
 licing st'ttleil, one way or the other, with slight exertion. To expe- 
 dite business, as well as to avoid the anomaly of solemnly proving 
 what is not really disputed, (and generally every one knows to l)e as 
 stated), the court will usually dispense with the necessity of prov- 
 
!•; 
 
 CHAP. 11.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 2] 28 
 
 ing such fact and assume it to be as claimed until proof is de- 
 manded. The court wid instruct the jury on this basis. 
 
 Aijparently a party has the right to disput . such a fact, even at 
 tlie risk of a I'-JW trial if the jury be persuaded contrary to tiio 
 court's knowledge. 
 
 Such judicial cognisance is not usually taken in respect to mattcMS 
 in issue. "A matter which could legitimately be tiio subject of 
 in(iuiry in a court could not well be said to be so well establislied 
 and to have acquired such notoriety as to come within the judicial 
 knowledge of the court." Chicago »S:c. K. K. v. Champion, JJU N. E. 
 (Ind.) 874 (1892). 
 
 As facts of judicial cognisance are usually those of notoriety, 
 equally open to all, the jury may be assumed to know them ecpially 
 with the court, even without the aid of an instruction from the 
 bench. 
 
 Facts ok thk Almanac. — Whether '' e facts stated in the 
 almanac are of optional or required cognisance is not entirely clear 
 u[)on the American authorities. The permissive form of expres- 
 sion is usually employed, and that fact has controlled the classitica- 
 ti(Ui. There is much, however, in the dirtiun of I'ollock, C. I?. 
 (Tutton 0. Darke, 5 II. & N. CM (IHOO). "The almanack is part of 
 the law of Enc;land." A reputable almanac may be introduced in 
 evidence to sliuw the time of the rising of the moon on a certain day. 
 Case V. IVrew, 40 Hun, N. Y. Supreme Court, 67 (188';; Mun- 
 sliower ". State, 5") Mil. 11 (1880); the hour of sunset on a certain 
 day, St ,0 r. Morris, 47 Conn. 171) (1871t); or the hour of sunrise, 
 People IK Cliee Kee, 01 Cal. 404 (1882). 
 
 The almanac is not used as evidence of the fact stated. It 
 merely reminds tiic tribunal of a fact which it already is supposed 
 to know. "Tiie almanac in such cases is used, likit tht; statute, not 
 strictly as evidence, but for the purpose of refreshing tiie memory 
 of tlie court and jury." State v. Morris, 47 Conn. 174 ( 187'.>). 
 
 indeed, the alnuinac need not be introduced in evidence at all to 
 l)e available to the party who relies on a fact stated in it. Counsel 
 are entitled t. refer to such fact in argument and to cite the almanac 
 in support of it. "However often departed from as a matter of 
 cfjuvenience, the rule is that matters of which judiiiial notice is 
 taken, including th(> dates in the almanac, do not recpiire to be ])ut 
 in evidence at all." Wilson /•. Van Leer. 127 Ta. St. ."hI (1889). 
 "The fact [time of sunrisi'] for the ))roof of wiiich t' >> almanac 
 was offered, was one of those facts of which a court may take 
 JMiIicial notice; formal proof of it was therefore unnecessary. It 
 woidd have been sutKcient to have called it to the knowledge of the 
 judge at the trial ; and if his memory was at fa\ilt or his information 
 hot sufticMcntly full and precise to induce him to a<'t U|)on it, he liad 
 the right to resort to an ahnanac, or any other book of reference, 
 
 I! 
 
 1 
 
 \ ;i 
 
 , . |, 
 
j .' i 
 
 ' i it 
 
 ■1 
 
 1:] il 
 
 ' 
 
 i 
 
 n 
 
 ■ i 
 : i 
 
 oyjii 
 
 AMKKICAX XOTKS. 
 
 [I'AUT I. 
 
 for tlio pur|)Ose of siitisfyiiig himself about it; and such knowhvlge 
 wouhl havu boon ovidonco.'' l'eu{)lo o. Cliee Koi, (il Cal, 404 
 
 In like mannor, the coincidonco of tli* days of the week with 
 those of the month will be noticed. *• It is the duty of the court to 
 notice tiie days of the week on \viii(di particadar days of the month 
 fall." Philadelphia &o. K. K. v. Lehman. 06 Md. L'09, l,"J(i (ISSl) ; 
 Wilson r. Van Leer, 1 "J? I'a. St. .'mI (ISS'J); Mcintosh /•. Lee, 57 
 la. .'JoC) (ISSl); IJrennan *-. Vo,!,'t, ".>7 Ala. (»47 (181)2); Ecker v. 
 First Nat. I5k. of Windsor, ()4 .Md. L".»L' (188.")); lioeil r. Wilson, 41 
 N. .]. Law, lit) (1870) ; First Nat. Tank &o. r. Kingslev. 84 Me. Ill 
 (181)1); Williams u. lirandenbert,', Ind. App. 5)7 (18'Jl')- ^loi'g^iu 
 V. r.iirrow (.Mi.ss.), IG So. 401,' (IH'JI). 
 
 For the same reason the regular procession of the seasons need 
 not lie proved but Avill be judicially recognised. Koss v. lioswell, 
 <)(» Iml. L'.'i.T il877); Tomlinson r. Cireentield, .'U Ark. oo7 (1870) ; 
 I'atterson r. McCaiisland, ."i Hland (Md.) Chan. (59 (1830) ; Loeb /•. 
 liichardKon, 74 Ala. .'511 (188.')). For example, that cotton is not 
 planted in January. Wetzler v. Kelly, H'A Ala. 440 (1887). 
 
 lUit a court cannot be required to take cognisance of a tiuctuating 
 event, e. //. the i)articular time of ripening of any particular crop 
 ut a partic\dar place under the vi(Mssitudes of any particular season. 
 Dixon r. Niccolls, IV.) ill. .'572 (18(l(i). Or that each concicntric layer 
 oF a tree denotes a year's growth. I'atterson /•. McCausland, i{ Hland 
 (Md). Chan. (>1) (18.'{0). Or that the " pasture season " ends at " any 
 particular day or time." (Jove e. Downer, oS) Vt. 139 (188(5). 
 
 So tlie courts will take judicial luitice of the facts set forth in the 
 almanac as to the rising oF the moon. Case /•. I'erew, 4(5 Hun, r)7 
 (18S7): .Munshower r. State. .V. Md. 11 (18,S0); Mobile & nirming- 
 liaiii li. i{. V. Ladd.'.>2 .Ma. 2H7 (1890). The hour of sunset. State 
 V. Morris, 47 C.nin. 179(1879). 
 
 Sii courts may take cogni.sance of other usual manifestations of 
 natural laws. r. ;/., tiie normal limits in height of a human being. 
 " We know that the average height of man is less than six feet. 
 That tlie average length of the body from the lower en<l of the 
 •spine to the top of the hiiad is less than thirty-six imdies. That the 
 uieasurtMuent varies but little in adults, and that the chief dilTerence 
 in the height of men is in the h'ngth of their lower limbs." Hunter 
 /;. N. V. .S:c. it K., 11(5 N. V. (51.-), (522 (1889). 
 
 Or of the 01 iinary length of human life. Schefller *•. Minne- 
 apolis &c. I{. !!.. 32 Minn. f.LS (1881); .lohnson /•. Hudson K. K. K. 
 <:o.. () Dner, (;;;3. ()18 ( lS,-)7) ; Lt'ssee of .Mien r. Lyons, 2 Wash. 47") 
 (1811) ; Floyd's Heirs /•. Johnson. 2 Littell, 109 (1822). The court 
 may use the ".Mortalitv tables." Kansas City Ike. U. U. Co. r. 
 I'h'illips. 98 Ala. l.V.l (1892). Mat sc I'rice c. (ionn. Mut. Life Ins. 
 Co., 48 Mo. App. 281 (1892j, rmitra where the court decline to tako 
 
CHAl'. II.] 
 
 AMKKICAN' NOTKS. 
 
 2130 
 
 c()gnisn.nce of the value of an insurance poliey, established in this 
 Wiiv, "(lepeniling partly on extraneous facts and partly on tiic ac- 
 curacy (if an intricate computation." 
 
 'I'lie court will judicially noti(!e the usual limits of the period of 
 gestation. Whitman r. State. 34 111. 300 (1870); Konan /•. Dugau, 
 iL'i; M;iss. ITC. (1S7'.)). 
 
 liisTinticAL, Kacts. — An instance of facts of optional cognisance 
 is tound in matters of public history-. Such as the existence of 
 the late civil war (between the United an<l Confederate States of 
 America). Woods r. Wilder, 43 N. V. 104 (1870) ; Iron Mfg. Co. r. 
 Caskell, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 742 (1879); Bishop r. Jones, 28 Tex. 204 
 (ISOC)). 
 
 And of the particular acts whicdi led to it. Swinnerton r. (!olumbia 
 Ins. Co., 37 X. V. 174 (1807). Or happened during its continuance, 
 Cuyler r. Ferrill, '. Abb. (V. S. Circ. Ct.) 100, 178 (1807); Buford v. 
 Tucker. 44 Ala. 80 (1870). So the courts will notice the issuance 
 and general value and ])rogressive depreciation of the Confederate 
 paper currency. Lum])kin i\ Murrell, 40 Tex. /»1 ( 1870), But it is 
 error to take judicial cognisance that in a j)articular county it was 
 hazardous to ]iersou or projierty to hold certain political views. 
 "Tins fact onglit to have been proved, and not been thus assumed 
 by the court as a historical fa(!t, of which the court could take 
 judicial notice.'* Simmons r. Trund)o, W. \'a. 308 (1870). Of 
 tlie course of trade to which the war gave rise. The Northrop, 
 Blatch. I'r. Cases, 23."> (1802) 'I'he Peterhoff, Blatch. I'rize Cases, 
 40."., .".OO {180;>). The sending t.. gold to a premium. V. S. v. 4000 
 American Cold Coin, 1 Woolw. 217 (1808). And of the financial and 
 social condition in which it left the Confederate States. "The 
 general and common condition of the country and its people is a 
 part of its history. This is presumed to be kiu)wn to courts and to 
 everyone." Ashley's .\dm'x v. Martin, TiO Ala. 537 (1873) ; Foscue 
 V. Lyon, o.l Ala. 440 (1870). So slavery was recognised as existing 
 in certain states as part of th»> history of the country, .lack /•• 
 Martin. 12 Wend. 311, 328 (18;!4). 
 
 Sn tlie abolition of slavery will b(> judicially noticed. Ferdinand 
 i>. State, ;>'.» .Via. 700 (1800). And the interdicting of eommerei;il 
 intercourse during the pendency of hostilities. Kice r. Shook. 27 
 Ark. i;{7 (1S71). But notice will not be judicially taken of the 
 ri'litive positions of the opposing armies at any i»arti(!ular period of 
 the war. Kelley if. Storey, Heisk. 202 (1871 ). ( »r of the military 
 ordi'is issueil by a ])articular commander. Burke r. Miltenberger, 
 10 Wall. ."10 (187;!). 
 
 The courts of (ieorgi;. take judicial notice of "Shernian's march 
 to the sea." and its date. Williams *•. State, 07 Ga. 200 (1881). So 
 the ailo]itinn of the jlritish order in council (regulating lights on 
 Vessels and the rules of navigation) by other commercial nations 
 
 •\ ! 
 
H 
 
 1 
 
 
 11 
 
 1 
 
 t '■ 
 
 ' 
 
 1 
 
 
 2181 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAHT I. 
 
 will be noticed as a historical fact. The Scotia, 14 Wall. 171 
 (1H71). 
 
 So judicial notice will be taken in Illinois of historical facts 
 attending the settleiuent of Dakota. Miller v. MacVeagh, 40 111. 
 App. 532 (1S<)1). 
 
 In taking notice of Col. .J. C. Fremont's career in California in 
 184(5 and 1847 the United States Court of Claims say: "The 
 court will take judicial notice of the leading and controlling events 
 in the h.istory of the country and of the official relations of the 
 piincipal actors therein to the governuK'nt; and, in elucidation 
 thereof, also of loss important transactions of general and public 
 interest imiiu'diately 'Mine' leJ therewith, when they have passed 
 into commonly receiv n itl.'cntic history." De Celis v. U. S., 13 
 Ct. of Claims, 117(18,. 
 
 Tiie court can take tice o" the results of the census "and 
 resort for information to ajipro ^^ i "^e documents of reference." 
 Peojde P. William.s, G4 Cal. 87 (1883); State v. Uraskamp, 87 la. 
 
 nm (1893). 
 
 So the court will take notice that in 1844 the Methodist Episco- 
 cal church of the Uinted States was divided. Humphrey v. Burn- 
 side, 4 Bush (Ky.), 21") (1808). 
 
 To the contrary e'fcct is Sarahass v. Armstrong, 1(5 Ivans. 192 
 (1870). 
 
 Cognisance will be take.i of county history relating to the choice 
 of a county seat. Ivoss v. Anstill, 2 Cal. 183 (18,12). 
 
 But see, to the ( ffect that notice will not be taken of the date 
 of the organisation of a county, Triud)le v. Edwards, 84 Tex. 4U7 
 (181)2). 
 
 "Courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety rectir to 
 the history of the times when it was passed." U. S. v. Union 
 Pacific K. R., 91 U. S. 79 (187")). wiiere the construction of 
 statutes relating to the Union Pacific Itiiilroad was aided by con- 
 sideration of the circumstances under which, the road was projected. 
 "The history of a cotuitry, its to|K)graphy and comlition, enter into 
 the constru(!tion of tlie laws whidi are made to govern it, and we 
 must notice these facts judicially." Williams c. State. 04 Ind. 
 ruhi (1878) ; Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. 270 (1873) ; Ohio Life Ins. Co. 
 IK Debolt, 10 How. 41() (18")3). 
 
 So the early history of the settlement of the country may be 
 noticed in deciding (juestions of jurisdiction as based on occupancy 
 and acts of ownership. Key.ser v. Coe, 37 Conn. .197 (1871). 
 
 Naturally, courts are especially apt to take judicial notice of the 
 history of their own state, llenthorne v. Doe, 1 Blackf. 107 (1822); 
 Hart r. Bodh'v, Hardin (Ky.) 98 (1807) ; Walden v. Canfield, 2 Kob. 
 (La.) 400 (1842) ; I'aiiie r. Treadwell, !(> Cal. 220 (1800) ; Lewis v. 
 Harris, 31 Ala. 089 (LSilS); Gonzales v. lioss, 120 U. S. 005 (1887> 
 
CIIAI". II.] 
 
 A.MKKKAN NOTKS. 
 
 i:l-" 
 
 So of tlio buildiiijj; of the first j^rcat state railroad. Hurt v. Bait. & 
 (). U. U.. W. \'a. .'WS (1S73). 
 
 And so also of tlu! liistorical source of land titles in their particu- 
 lar jiirisiliotion. Smith v. Sti'veiis, 82 111. r»r)4 (1S7C) • I'lDimer r. 
 i'hiilip.s, 77 .Ma. 4L'7 (1884) ; K.-yser v. Coe, 35 Conn. r>\)7 (1871). 
 A treaty of ccs.sion of territory from one state to another, and the 
 cxtinijriiishnient of the Indian title in the sanic, may be judicially 
 noticed. Howard v. Moat, 01 N. V. 2G2 (1870). 
 
 So ••tlif history of the Six Nations of Indians is a part of the 
 history of the state, of which the courts will take notice." l/iiiL 
 Notice has been taken of the exi.sten(!e and conditions of land- 
 grant contracts. Hatch V. Dunn, 11 Tex. 7(IS (1854). 
 
 And the cession of territory by a state tt) tiie United States will 
 be judicially recognised, probably, also, on other grounds. Lasher 
 V. State, ."50 Tex. App. 387 (1891). So the surrender of the office of 
 governor will l)e reiiognised. State v. Boyd, .'U Neb. 4.*ir) (181>1.'), 
 But tlu! historical fact should not be such as "concerns iiidividu: 
 or mere local communities." McKinnon v. Bliss, LM N. Y. 21." 
 (18()0). 
 
 So the action of one of the ])ublic officers in making military 
 records of the nuister rolls of the state's volunteer regiments will 
 bo noticed. "It is part of the history of the state of which ' j 
 must take notice." Commissioners f. May. G7 Ind. r>G2 '1879). 
 And that the state remained loyal during the American war ' the 
 l{el)ellion. Douthitt c. Stinsou. G'.', Mo. 2(58 (1870). Or was under 
 military nde. (rates r. Johnson Co., 'M Tex. 144 (1871) ; Killebrew 
 V. Murphy, 3 Hei.sk. WO (1871). Though these are matters of 
 judicial cognisance where the court, if in doubt, may resort to 
 any desirable method of refreshing his knowledge, such historical 
 facts have been occasionally treated as to be established by evidence, 
 and a distinction has been taken ; — to the effect that historical 
 facts " of general and public notoriety " may be established by 
 " reputation " or proved by " historical works of known character 
 and accuracy," while the work of a living author in reach of com- 
 pulsory process can be proved by summoning the author himself. 
 Morris v. Lessee of Harmer, 7 Bet. 5r»4 (183.'i). See also Whiton v. 
 Albany &c. Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 24 (1871). 
 
 If these historical facts are disjuited and made part of the issue 
 between the parties, "some evidence of them must be adduced." 
 McKinnon r. Bliss, 21 N. Y.20C (1860) ; Gregory v. Baugh, 4 Rand. 
 (Va.) Oil (1827). 
 
 Courts are justified in judicially knowing the current history of 
 the times, — for example, the court will understand that to say of a 
 clergyman "that Iowa Beecher business of his lost him a situation," 
 is an imputation of adultery, "inasmuch as courts have no right 
 to be ignorant of the meaning of current phrases wh'ch everybody 
 
 ! .; I 
 
 I 
 
 ■\Mm 
 
 Hi 
 .It 
 
 1 1 
 
 Ui 
 
21S3 
 
 AMEUlt^AN NOTICS. 
 
 [I'AKr I. 
 
 ■I . . \ 
 
 else imderstiands." liailey v. Kalamazoo Tub. Co., 40 Midi. 251 
 (1871)). So that "sack" means a fund used for politieal corruption. 
 Edwards v. San Jose &c. Co., '.»9 Cal. 431 (LSO^J). Courts will take 
 eo[(nisani;e tliat private and town boundaries have "almost, if not 
 quite uniformly, been run out according to the nuignetie meridian." 
 Wells V. Jackson Iron Alfg. Co, 47 N. II. -.'{o {18(](>). In the same 
 way courts may take cognisance of the state of local feeling due to 
 recent events, (leiat v. Detroit City K'way, 91 Mich. 44G (1892). 
 That companies of a certain class are incorporated in a certain way 
 is said to be "a matter of public history" which the court "cannot 
 refuse to notice." Ohio &c. Co v. Debolt, IG How. 43o. So " that 
 there was a great complaint of tax collectors . . . specidating in 
 warrants." Smith v. Speed, 50 Ala. li7G (1873). Of the differences 
 of christian sects, and between the King James and Douay versions 
 of the Bible. State v. District Hoard, 70 Wise. 177 (ISUO). 
 
 In Hank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 519 (1839), at page 590, 
 the action of certain corporations is spoken of as " a matter of 
 history which this court are bound to notice " as if the judicial 
 cognisance were not optional. Probably this is an inadvertence, 
 unless, as sometimes used, the constraint spoken of is a moral 
 rather than a legal onv. 
 
 (iKooKAi'HicAi, Fai;ts. — "We recollect of no decision that the 
 courts are ex officii) to notice tiie great lakes, rivers, and mountains 
 of the state as parts of it, and lying within its limits, but it can 
 hardly be doubtt>d tliat the courts would notice, of course, the 
 great geograpliical features of the state." Winnipiseogee Lake 
 Co. V. Voung, 40 N. 11. 420 (18G0) ; State v. Thompson, 85 Me. 189 
 (I891i). 
 
 Tiie question as to whetlier a place has been recognised by the 
 legislature as within a certain county, presents nothing for a jury to 
 try. It is for the court alone. State c. Wagner, Gl Me. 78 (1873). 
 Even in the absence of express legislative recognition the (piestion 
 is one for tiie court. " A criminal might as well call for the opinion 
 of the jury upon the regularity of tlie judge's commission or the 
 validity of tlie election of the governor by wiiom he was appointed. 
 The administration of justice becomes possible only by assuming 
 that certain things have been regularly and definitely settled, and 
 are so to remain." State w. Wagner, Gl Me. 178 (1873). The 
 .Michigan Supreme ('ourt say of the contention that it should not 
 judicially notice "Lake St. Clair" in that state tliat it "is not 
 worthy serious consideration."' People v. lirooks, 101 Mich. 98 
 (1894). 
 
 So the supreme court of Wisconsin "take notice of the fact that 
 the capacity of many snudl navigable streams in this state to float 
 logs and lumber into the larger streams below and to market has 
 been greatly increased by the erection of dams across them." 
 
^•!IAI'. II.] 
 
 AMElilCAN NOTKS. 
 
 21** 
 
 'J'ewksbuiy v. Suliulenborg, 41 Wise. 584 (1S77). Hut wIhtc tlioro 
 are no jmis(lictiun.il faiits, e. ;/., a criuui in a vessel at sea, the 
 question whether the spot of tl>e occurrence is within the boMiidu- 
 ries of thn state is one for the jury. U. S. v. Jackalow, 1 Hhiek 
 (T. S.) 484 (18G1). 
 
 So of tlie boundaries of a city, and the course, &e., of a river fre- 
 ([uently mentioned in the statutes of the state. J)eJ?aker v. So. 
 Cal. K. K. (Cal.) .'59 I'ac. GIO (1«<)5). 
 
 The position of a long established railroad is a geographical fact 
 of which judicial cognisance is taken. Miller v. Texas &e. Ky., 83 
 Tex. 518 (1892). And of their termini, (lalveston, &c. K.IJ. r. 
 .lolmson (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 428 (1895). 
 
 So a court will take notice that a deponent resided more tlian 
 thirty miles from the place of trial. Hinckley v. lieckwith, 2.'i 
 Wise. o28 (1808). Ur more than one hundred. iMut. &c. Life Ins. 
 Co. V. llobison, 58 Fed. llep. 723 (189o). In a late Illinois case it 
 is said that "the court will take judicial notice of the geography of 
 the country, and that Hatavia was oidy some two mihfs distant from 
 the court-liouse at Geneva, where the court was held." Hruson v. 
 Clark. 150 111.495 (1894). 
 
 In Indiana, speaking of the Mississippi and its navigable tribu- 
 taries, the court say : "The courts take judicial notice of such 
 streams, as they form part of the geography of the countiy and 
 their navigability is known as forming a part of the common public 
 history." Neaderhouser v. Stite, 28 Ind. 257 (18(;7). 
 
 In the case of IVyronx v. Howard, 7 IVt. 324, 341 (183.".), the 
 court say : " We think wo are authorised judicially to noticu- the 
 situation of New Orleans, for the j)urpose of determining whether 
 tlie tide ebbs and flows as high up the river as that place," citing 
 The Ajwllon, 9 Wheat. .302, .'574 (1824); V. S. r. La Vengeance, 
 ;i Dall. 297 (1796) ; Trenier /•. Stewart, 55 Ala, 458 (1876). So, that 
 the Mersey is a tidal river. Whitney r. Gauche, 11 La. Ann. 432 
 (1H5(;). 
 
 In a Massachusetts case, the court say: "We think that the 
 superior court might take judicial notice that the Connecticut 
 liiver, above the dam at Ilolyoke, does not. eitln'r by itself or by 
 uniting with other waters, constitute a public highway over wiiich 
 commeree may be carried on with other states or with foreign 
 countries, although, if the court had entertained any doubt on 
 the sid)ject, it might havti required evidence to be produced." 
 Com. r. King, 150 Mass. 221 (1889). 
 
 So the courts of Michigan know judicially that all of the St. 
 Cliiir Kiver is not in Michigan. (Jummings v. Stone, 1.'? Mich. 70 
 (I8(i4). And those of Alabama that no i)art of the Talla])oosa Hiver 
 is in the city of Montgomery. City Council of Montgomery v. Mont- 
 gomery &c. I'lankroad, .'U Ala. 7G (1857). 
 
 
 \'\m 
 
 1 , 
 
 31 
 
 > l< ( 
 
 1 . II 
 
I 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 It 
 
 21 an 
 
 AM Kit IC AN N()TK8. 
 
 [I'AIIT r. 
 
 It lias beon liappily said (1 Wliart Kvi«l. § 3.'{n) that in tliis 
 connection tho niinntencss of tlio knowledge expected "is in inverse 
 proportion to tiic distance." 
 
 Til lilts of Alabama take notice that in a certain county all 
 
 the rivers are of fresh water. Walker v. Allen, 7- Ala. 4')() (ISSI'). 
 
 Hy statute the courts of California are rerpiired to take coj,'iii- 
 sancc of the .streets of San Francisco. Uraily v. I'age, .W Cal. 't'J 
 (l.SSl). 
 
 The courts of Indiana decline to take judicial cognisance that 
 a railroad did not extend into a particular (bounty, there heing no 
 law on the subject. Uut such notice is taken of the geographical 
 position of a certain station. Indianapolis &u. II. K. /'. Steiihens, 
 I'S lud. 4'1\) (1.S67). 
 
 Hut whether a particular section of a state is "arid" within 
 the meaning of an irrigation statute is a question of fact. JMcGhee 
 &c. Co. If. Hudson, So Tex. oS? (1S«.)3). 
 
 Courts will take notice tliat the territory of a town has been 
 incorporated into a city, but not that the plotting of lots is the 
 .same. Ritchie i\ Catlii'i, SO Wise. KM) (ISI).".). 
 
 So of the inimber of railroads centering m a particular town. 
 Texas &c. Kd. r. Hlack. 87 Tex. 1C>0 (INDI)! 
 
 (Common- I'iiockktiks ok Mattkk. — Among the facts which 
 courts will, in their discretion, consider established witliout the 
 iiiti'o(lu(!tioii of evideiKH' are many of the ordinary mechanical, 
 chemical, or industrial processes, as commonly known and carried 
 on in the community. For example, ".V court cannot refuse to 
 take judicial cognisance that jihotography is the art producing 
 facsimiles, or representations of objects by the action of light on 
 a prepared surface. As such it has been .so long recogni.sed, the 
 mechanical and chemical process employed and the scientific prin- 
 ciples on which it is based are so generally known, that it would 
 be vain for a court to decline cognisance of it." Luke v. Calhoun 
 Co., .'52 Ala. 11") (lS7r»). "The process [[ihotograjdiy] has become 
 one in general use, so common that we cannot refuse to take 
 judicial cognisanc(! of it as a proper means of producing correct 
 likenesses." Uddeizook v. Com., 7(5 I'a. St. 340 (1S74). "We do 
 not fail to notice, and we may notice judicially, thui all civilised 
 communities rely upon photograjihic pictures for taking and pre- 
 senting resemblances of persons anci animals, of scenery and all 
 natural objects, of buildings and otlier artificial objects." Cowley 
 r. People, S3 N. Y. 464 (1SS1); see also Cozzens v. Higgins, 1 Abb. 
 Ct. of App. Dec. 4r.l (ISGC). So the nature and operation of 
 elevated railroads may be judicially noticed. Bookman v. N. Y. 
 Elevated K. It. Co., 137 N. Y. 302 (1893). 
 
 Among matters of common knowledge in the natural world of 
 which courts require no proof is the freezing of substances in a 
 
CllAl". 11.] 
 
 AMEUIOAK N()Ti:S. 
 
 21-w 
 
 cliaiiiiHT, till) atniosplipre of wliicli is not in contact with the fncz- 
 iiij,' i'orut', and ii patciit for a devioe imii bodying that j)iiiiciiih' is void, 
 tiiim,i,'ii tlic (li'ftMicc is not irlied on in the pleadings. JWown v. J'iper, 
 91 U. S. ;;7 (l^TC). 
 
 So of llie nomnion hahit of coniprcssiiij,', for "the convpniciipo of 
 tradi'," several iiackagcs of various conuiiodilifs, wool, fcatliiTs. plug 
 tol)a(!i-o, etc., into a si'iglc parcel. King r. ( Jallun, It)'.) V . S. 1)'.) (IMh;*). 
 
 jiiit the supreme court of Indiana refuse to take notice of the 
 action of a freight car under certain conditions. " The natural laws 
 of wliicli courts tak.' judicial notice are such as are of uniform 
 occurrence and invariable in their action." Chicago, &c. 1{. IJ. v, 
 Cliami.ion. :51,' N. K. Kep. H74 (IS'.)li). 
 
 So the fact that the valiu! of unimproved fleeces is deiireciated by 
 the undue (luauiity of hair on the belly, flanks, etc. of the animals. 
 '• is common knowledge, taught by all text-books on sheep, and 
 within tiie judicial cognisance of the courts." Lyon c. .Marine, 
 iV) Fed. Jtep. 1)<;4 (I.S'.)3). 
 
 .Mis( I'.i.i.ANKoi s .Mattkks. — It is natural that many facts of 
 which courts are at times and in their discretion content to take j\iili- 
 cial cognisance do mit admit of precise tdassilication. Indeed, many 
 of thi'Mi depend rather upon the jiersonal views of the individual 
 judge tlian upon any nu)re deHnife rule. 
 
 Facts which are so generally known that every well-inf(U'med 
 ])ersou knows them or ought to know them, need not be |)roved, ami 
 will lie judicially recognised without proof. In a ca.se where the 
 supp'me court of Alabama take notice; of the '• Anu-rican Table of 
 -Mortality " as a basis for the calculation of annuities dependent on 
 the probability of human life, it is said : " This cognisance uuiy extend 
 far beyond the actual knowledge or even the nu'uiory of jiulgcs, who 
 may therefore resort to such documents of reference or other authori- 
 tative .sources of information as may be at hand and nuiy be deemed 
 worthy of confidence. The rule has been held in many instances to 
 embrace information derived informally by inquiry from experts." 
 (iordon (>. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 1.*;3l; {\HH3). The fact that the great 
 inland transportation of the country is largtdy done by connecting 
 lines, each forwarding goods for a continuous carriage, m;iy be jiuli- 
 cially noted. McDoiuild r. Western K. ).., 34 N. V. 497 (IhV.O) ; 
 r.urlington, &c. ll'way Co. c. Dey, 8L' la. A2 (1891). So the ten- 
 dency of objects to frighten horses '• is '- rtof the (common kiu)wle(lge 
 j)ossessetl by all intelligent i)ersons of mature years." Clevelaml, &c. 
 U. \{. V. ^Vynal.^ 114 Ind. .^2") (1SH7). 
 
 The usual di. ition of a voyage across the Atlantic is " part of the 
 experience and cummon knowledge of tlie day and as such are legiti- 
 mate grounds for the judgment of the court." Oppenheim v. Vi olf, 
 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) Ciian. 571 (184G). So of the rapidity of travel made 
 possible by modern inventions. Hipes v. Cochrau, 13 Ind. 175 
 
 I t 
 
 ^m 
 
 m 
 
0-|fl7 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTK8. 
 
 [I'AIST 
 
 (1M."»{)). And the custom of tlirougli olioeking passengers' liuggagc 
 Isiuicson V. N. V. On. !{., 94 N. Y. :,'7H (ln«4). 
 
 Ha tlie (!uint will take notice that cigars are not "drugs and 
 medicines." "Ordinarily whether a substance or artich' comes 
 within a given description is a question of fact, but some facts are 
 so obvious and familiar that the law takes notice of them and receives 
 thi'iM into 'ts own domain. . . . Cigars are mainifaetured articles 
 familiar to everylMxly." Com. r. Mar/.ynski, 149 Mass. (W (1«H'.(). 
 
 So the court " must take judicial notice of the nature and (piali- 
 ties of toliaeco.' Application of Jacobs, 9« N. V. DM, ll.'J (iMHo). 
 
 Tiie peeidiar nature nH lotteries and the method in which they are 
 carried on will be judicially noticed. Salomon r. State, I'M Ala. M.» 
 (iHoC). 
 
 Courts will notice the variation.* of the magnetic nu'ridian. Hryan 
 V. Heckley. i\ Litt. (Ky.) 91, 95 (18(19). 
 
 No |)riiof is needed that an assault with a loaded ])istol aiul a h<ie 
 IS an assault with a deadly weap(»u. •• A hoe, both in ]in;iular and 
 legal signilication, is /*»■/• sr a deadly weapon, — lully as much so us 
 a loaded ]iistnl or an axe." Hamilton /'. People, 1 1;{ 111. ."{4 ( iHS.'i). 
 In White o. I'hu'iiix Ins. Co.. M.'J .Me. L'7'.t (ISUl) the court in takiu;; 
 cognisaiu'e that vui'ating the premises increast-d tlie risk, declared 
 tli:it expt-rt eviden-.-e to prove it •' was incompetent and uinieeessary," 
 
 Kvidence is not needed that coal oil is inllamri.ible. "(Jourts do 
 not .eipiire proof that lire will burn, or powder explode, or gas illn- 
 minat •, or that many other processes in nature and art pntibm- 
 certain known <'tftetH." State c. Il.iyes, 7S Mo. .'ttt? (I««.'i). 
 
 Hut t'.i' supreme court of N'ermont, in construing an insurance 
 policy, ViVi r.'fused to take judicial notice that "gin" and "turpeii- 
 liuf" are " intlammable liipuds." Mosley /•. Ins. Co., o'l Vt. 111? 
 {\SH-J). 
 
 In the sanui whv, speaking of a statute forbidditig the mainifac- 
 ture ot' oleomai'gannc and butlerine. the supreme court (d' Micliig.in 
 say : " We are not called upon or qualilied by any knowledge which 
 Wf possess to determine the merits itr delects of the well-known 
 substances which this statute was intended to -^iippress." N'orth- 
 wesle-.i Ml'u'. Co. r. Chandlers. oS Midi ."Hi ( lSM.1). 
 
 The siipreiiii art of .Mabama, after laying down the rule as to 
 
 what nuitters ;ire of what is "sometimes called juilieial knowledge, 
 frerpieiitly. coiimiou know ledge," as that "all men know tliem :nid 
 
 iherel'ore they n 1 nut lie jiroved," go on to .^ay thiit the rule lor 
 
 measuring corn in the shock does not fall within the delinition. 
 South \' N. Ml. l:. i;. Co. e. Wood. 71 Ala. 449 (iHM.'l). '{'he su- 
 preme eoiiii ol .Missouri has refused to tiike notice of t!ie ilanger of 
 I'ontagioii from Texas cattle. Uradl'onl r. Kloyd. .S(l Mo. 1,'(I7 (ImH.'I). 
 
 The sam lurt later reversed this decision and cite with appr(»val 
 
 tlie language of .fudge Harlan, in delivering the opinion of the 
 
CHAl'. II.] 
 
 AMKHICAN NOTKS. 
 
 21« 
 
 siipreiiif court of the Uiiitod States in .Minnesota r. Harber, 130 
 U. S. .Sl.'i (IXKU), ona similar tinestion : — "If a fact, alloged to 
 exist, and upon which the ri>,'hts of [)artit'S dei)end, is within comiuou 
 experienif and knowledge, it is one of which the courts will take 
 judicial notice." Grimes >: Kddy, (Mo.), L'8 S. W. TAG (18<»4). 
 
 It has Ix'en held in .Michi^;an that the fact tiiat an eni))ty box car 
 in the limits of the highway will not frighten ordinary horses is 
 among the " thiups which do not recjuire to be pleaded or to be made 
 ^*ie subject of specitic proof," and that it is error to leave the ques- 
 tion to the jury, (iilbert v. Flint, &e. K. K., 51 Mich. 4S.S (18S.'?). 
 
 So ■ the court, from its general knowledge, can judicially say 
 that whiskey is an intoxicating licjuor ; and the jury might so find 
 ii|i(in their geiu'ral knowledge." Schlicht v. State, 5(5 Ind. 17o 
 (IH77). (juoting with approval the language of Carmon v. State. 18 
 In.l. 4r»() tlSGL') followed in Kgan v. State, r.3 Ala. IGl' (187(i). In 
 Krese v. State, 'J',l Fla. UG7 (1887), to the same effect, t!ie question 
 is treated as a matter regarding the meaning of words, and the 
 dictionary is relied on. Where the licjuor has l)een elassitied in a 
 statute as "spirituous," it will be so recognised. Keid r, MeWhin- 
 nie, '27 i). U. V. C. 1'8'» (1MJ8). So of other di.stilled litpiors. 
 ".lurors are not to be presumed ignorant of what everybody el.sc 
 
 knows Now every one who knows what gin is, knows not 
 
 t)idy that it is a li(pior, but also that it is intoxicating. And it 
 migiit as well have been oltjected that the jury could not find that 
 gin was a liipnu', without evidence that it was not a solid substance, 
 as that they could not find that it was intoxicating without testi- 
 nioiiy t.i show it to be so." (!oni. i». I'eekham, 2 (Jray, Td I (I8r»|). 
 
 Tlie courts of Indiana take cognisance tiiat brandy is intoxica- 
 ting and that " the addition to the term ' brandy ' of the word ' black- 
 berry ' docs no more than designate it as a particidar kind of 
 brandy." Kenton /•. State, 100 Ind. r)!»8 (18S.1). So that " apple 
 bratuly" is intoxicating "is a matter of common knowledgi' of 
 whicli the court will take judicial luitioe." Thomas r. Com., "JO Va. 
 
 UL' (ts'.i;;). 
 
 On the other hand, "beer." being a generic term covering a wide 
 range of licpiiils of ditTerent alcoholic e<»mposilion. is not judicially 
 known to Itc intoxicating. It is necessary t. prove in any individual 
 c;isf tlial tlif lii'cr was intoxicating or that it was of a kind judi- 
 cially known to lie intoxicating. IMot/ e. Kohrbai'h, IIG N. Y. 
 4:.0(1,S,S!(); Klare r. State. i;{ Ind. 18.'! (!87;{) Miit s.'.' Nevin 
 r. I.adiic. ;; Denio. I.'!; (1810) ; |5rilhtt /•. Stati-, T.S Wise. ;!«.» (IS8:t), 
 loiilrn. "It seems to be well settled tiiat the word 'beer' in its 
 ordinary sense (h'liotes a beverage whieji is intoxicating." Maier 
 f. State. 'J Tex. ("iv. App. !.".•(•. (18<»;!); V. ^ r. Dncourneau, Al Fed. 
 Ilcp. 1;{8(|8'.M). And the court will take eognis.ince tliat lager 
 beer is a malt liquor. " The government miglit almost as well In- 
 
 M 
 
 '\ ! 
 
 1 - ; 
 
 I i'SSi 
 
m« I 
 
 ,-. !l 
 
 0^30 
 
 AMKiaCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [taut r. 
 
 n'(|uir('(l to prove tl>at gin or whiskey or bnindy is ii strong; li(|M»)r 
 ;i.s to prove tliat lager beer is a malt licpior." State r. (ioyettc, II 
 It. I. riOli (1.S77). And intoxicating. State /•. Clinreli (So. l);ik.), 
 (10 X. W. li;; ( lHi)4). Hut see Kau v. People, iV.i N. \. L'77 (1S7A); 
 Tinker c. State, 1)0 Ala. (;47 (1«!»0). Of " riee beer " tlie Georgia 
 suiirenio court aay : " Some beverages, such as whiskey, brandy, 
 &e., are in such common and notorious use as intoxicants that un 
 l)roof is rerpiisite to stamp tliem with tiiis (diaraetiM-. I'lUt rice 
 beer is comparatively a rare li(pior. Whether it will pniduce intox- 
 ication or not ought to be proved." r.ell r. State, 01 (Ja. 1.'L'7 (1801.'). 
 
 Courts in Imliana refuse to tak»^ notice that a fence sidlicient to 
 restrain sheep will restrain liogs. Enders v. McDonald, ;"> Ind. \\>\>. 
 207 (ISOL'). 
 
 That business men refer t(» "American Lloyds,"' "The (ireen 
 I'louk," and the >• IJecord Hook," for tlie standing of ships will lie 
 judi(!ially re(;ognised. Slaeovicli r. Oriental Mut. Ins. Co., lOS 
 N. V. r)<5 (IHHS). ".Ml persons are supposed to know the curiosity 
 of eiiildren and their disposition to play around and .dtoiit ol)jects 
 of uimsual apptiarance." .Spengler v. Williams, (17 .Miss. 1 (ISSO). 
 
 (iKNKKAi. CoNsioKKATioNS. — Sucli actiou Oil the part (d' the 
 court in dispensing witli proof is (tptional. Proof may be; reipiired 
 bv tlie JMilge even if the fact is not disputed by a party litigant; 
 and he may decline to know the fact until it is proved, to his satis- 
 facition or that of the jury. 
 
 On the othi'r liaml, if he pnd'ers, the judge may satisfy hims<df 
 of the truth of a fact by resorting to any source of information he 
 inaychooso; «. ;/. by n'sorting to public doeumeuts not introduced in 
 evidence. IT. S. »>. Teschmaker. J'J How. WJ, l().~) (IM.V.I); Hrown 
 i\ i'iper, 01 V. S. 37 (1S7."'>); Whiton v. Albany etc. Ins. Co., 100 
 Mass. L'l (I.S7I). 
 
 In so doing, he is satisfying his own mini! or conscience. IF(> is 
 not limited to evidence which would l)e competent, if objected to, 
 before a jury. .\ mnvspaper may be as usefid as an exem|ililicatinii 
 under the great seal (d" state; *!.;/., in S(dielHer n. Minneapolis i'<:e. 
 K. K., :i'2 .Minn. .")1« (IHHl), mortality tables of recogidsed staml- 
 ing wer<! received as bearing on tlm "expectation ui' life" of a 
 person killed by a loccmiotive. T(» the same effect, •Johnson /•. 
 Hudson II. K. K. Co., (J Diier, (YM\, 01« (lHr)7). 
 
 So a history of the Southern ('oiifcderacy, "The Lo.st (laiise," 
 may be resorted to for dates and Rvonts. Swiiinerton v. Columbian 
 Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 171 (IHCu). 
 
 The court may rcipiire the aid of the parties. School Dist. o. 
 Ins. Co., 101 V. S. 471; (1870). 
 
 "Nor does the fact that the information thus sought by the judge 
 has been laid before him in tln^ jiresence of the jury without any 
 (listiiK^t ruling that it was designotl for tho court alono, give a party 
 
m 
 
 CHAI'. II.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 2140 
 
 the riijlit to insist tliat tlio jury shall pass upon it." Stair r. 
 Wa-ii.T, CI Mt!. 17S (isr;;); Mobile Sic. IL K. v. Luiiil, UL' Ala. 
 L'ST (ISDO). 
 
 r.ut a court is not at libi'rty, any nioro than u jury is, to supply 
 evidence of facts in issue from its |)ersonal kno\vle(l^,'e where such 
 fac'ts arc not part of the coninion stock of inforniation of the cum- 
 nmnity, — as that plaintitFs lawyer had ceased Ui practise. Day /•. 
 I)e Course. 12 Low. Can. Jur. L'Ci") (ISOS). 
 
 'i'lius where thc^ fact is relevant, that A. is a resident of another 
 state must be proved, thou^di it is a fact known to individual 
 nieiubers of the court. Whecder /•. Websti-r. 1 K. D. Smith (N. Y.) 
 1 (lS"i(l); Hrown (.'. I'iper, '.M V. S. .37 (1S7('»). So it is error for a 
 court to refer a oast! on insju-etion because under the pleading's it 
 apparently involved a number of items. This is matter for evidence. 
 Cassidy /•. M(!Karlaml, 1;W .N. \. 201 (IS'.K!). 
 
 lint see Secrist /•. Petty, KH) 111. 1S8 (lS,s;{), wlien' tlioro aro 
 apparently dlrta to the elTect that a judge may supply facts not 
 generally known, from his own knowleilgo. 
 
 So courts will not take notice of tin; newspajiers pidtlished in any 
 particular county. Atkeson r. Lay, H") .Mo. o.'JH (IS'.KJ). 
 
 Speaking of the general tiMidentjy to extend the range of ()|>tional 
 judicial cognisanco to nn-et the growth of art, science, and general 
 knowledge, the Alal)ama suprenn- court say : "There is a pruilent 
 liuiitatioM to be put upon this princi|ile so as to confine it t.i nuitters 
 of a general and public; nature m- such as do not concern individuals 
 or local e<imnuinities. The facts nnist be of such i'gc or duration as 
 to have U'conic established as part of the common knowledge of 
 w»dl-informi'd jx-rsona, at least." (Jeorgia^ic. K. K. /•. (iainus, 88 
 Ala. ;;77 (ISW); Morris e. Kdward.s, I Ohio, ISi) (IHL'3). 
 
 4 
 
I 
 
 ! 
 
 ■^ 
 
 TRIAL BY JUKVj LIOSS TltUbTEU NOW THAN FORMKRLY. [p. 
 
 CIIAI'TER III. 
 
 HOW m KSTIOVS OF VMrr TRIKI) — Kl'NfniONS OK JITOOR IN JHRV 
 
 TRIALS. 
 
 § '21a. Tkiai. by jury niay, at least in a nidimpiitary form, ho 
 trat'Pfl l)iick to llu' tinios of our Saxon ancestors. In 1H4() tlio 
 c'T.'ution of niotli'rn County ConrtH atFortlcMl suitors an opportunity 
 of in futuro determining for tKcmselvo.^ whether their disputes 
 ehould be settled by a single judge, or by tlio unanimous venlicit of 
 five jurors. They by an overwh* Iming majorit}' j>ronotinr>;i in 
 favour of the judge.' In the High Court also the tendeney of 
 litigants tiow is to dispen.se with the services of a jury. The 
 respective merits and demerits of Trial by Jury will be found 
 impartially disciifsed in the Second Report of the Common Law 
 Commissioners in JH.M}.' 
 
 S21h. The prov'sions now in force in the High Court (Onler 
 XXXVI. rr. '2 — 7a) are too long to set out at length here. They 
 are disc-ussed in detnil in most of the Hooks on I 'met ice.' Their 
 general (^Ifect * is that in actions <tf slander, libel, false imprison- 
 ment, malicious |>roseeutioi., seduction, ur breach of proujise of 
 murriage, a trial with a jury nwiy be hml by a party,' if, when he is 
 a plaintiff, in his notice of trial, or if, when he is a defendant, ho, 
 by notice given by him, witl' > four days !'• :. the time of tho 
 flervico of notice of trial, or within (;uch extoiib'-i 'imo as tho court 
 or a judge may allow, signify his desire to have the issues of foct 
 tried by a judge witl. a jury, upnn which the same hliall be so 
 tried; but that in all other can's trial without a jury is the normal 
 nioile (tf trial, and a jury can only be had by special order oblaiued 
 
 ' In the rminty (\>\nt Tectum ' Si-tt, <"'/., tli<> Aniiiml rincfico 
 
 fer til" yciir Is'lit," ]iulilishiMl Nov., fi»r ISIM. i)p. (is.l et m<'(|, A li«t of 
 
 1S!I(, tlie followiiit; lijran's ii|i|i(>iir : — ruiifrf, uikI inattiTH uHHi^'iii«| nxclii- 
 
 " .\i tioiiM lii'ti'i'iiiini'il witli II jury, HJvely to tlii> ( 'liunn'ry Ifivixioii in 
 
 l.i:t0; witl'oiit u JMiy, (i77,17l." contuiiiccl in ;tti \ .17 V. c. 00, § .11. 
 TIk' lulililioiiul cost of II jury in, iu * 'riiiiHou c. Wilson, INHH (liiiui- 
 
 rl'- roiinty CdiirtM. only it. loy, L.J.). 
 
 » I'j). 3 tl. 
 
 22 
 
Cih :r'. 
 
 TKIAL HY JUKY IN CUIMINAL AND CIVIL CASJiS. 
 
 uii(l.>r (). XXXVl. rr. •'{,' 6,» or Tii.^ The oJl'o t of this Order has 
 li Til that tlie number of lauwH tried in the Ui^li Court of Justice 
 without a jury are chjsoly aiiiiroiuhing the ni. ibor of thtwe whicli 
 are tried with a jury.* 
 
 S :.Mc. In divorce onuses, by a nde ninths in July, IHSO,' 
 tliouf,di tho ruh's fii-Ht cited are inapjilicabh'/' the action is lu'ard, 
 if (hmmgcs bo not chiimi'd, before the court without a jury, but if 
 »hiina}j;('8 are chiinied, a connnon jury is as of course summoned. 
 Ju cither case any juirty may ajijily by summons for a direction 
 that the cause he tried iu a different nuinner, or by a special jury.' 
 Trials in the Admiralty l)ivisi<)n of the Ilij^h Coiut are almost 
 invariably without a jury. There is, however, power ((). XXX VI. 
 r. M) to summon a jury, though it is said never to have bueu 
 exercised since the Jndicatim* Acts.** 
 
 S 21 1). In criminal eases an acoused, either by indictm? nt or 
 information, l»as still the right to bo tried "per legale judicium 
 parium suorum." In eivil causes, however, the ease is widely 
 diil'creut. 
 
 S 'J','. lionl Hardwicko has observed that it is of the greatest 
 importance to the law of Knglan<l, and to the subject, tluit the 
 powers of the judge and jury be kept distinct." IJut important as 
 tiiis umlouhtedly is, it is, oven at the prctient day, not very 
 perfectly effected. The general j)rinciple, that the judgt» must 
 determine the law, and the jury the fm-t, is not, and cannot be 
 disputed ; '" but in the application of this principle, cmbarrasuing 
 
 ' lliviiijj power to order u trial by 
 jury ia f'imiicfrv uctiniis. 
 
 * Wliitli itriM'iveK till' ri|;lit V, 
 liiivi', on ii|>|ilii':itiiiii witliiii ten iIuvh 
 iiftiT notii'i' of trial, ii!i order fn.' n 
 tiiiil )>y jury in all )iiiri>ly roini lou 
 law actions, Ji-nkinNC. itusliev, INDI 
 (i.in.ll.v. I..J ;. 
 
 ■" Uiviii^' i^eneral jiownr to a judKe 
 to order trial Ity jury at any lime. 
 
 ' 'riui judicial HtatiMti( s lor 1M1''J 
 (|iulilMli('d NovenilM-r, \HW] hI'.ow 
 (p. !•) tliut then- Wfre tried in tliut 
 year, in the runmion daw and <"him- 
 • '•rv Iiivi«ionK toy;iitlii'r, HOH iietioiiH 
 Willi juries, and TO^I without jiirius. 
 
 ' iliilua iu l)iv, uiid Mat. Cuiiikm, 
 r. Jli.V 
 
 • Ord. LXVIII. r. 1. 
 
 ' .S>c) Oakley's Divoroti rructico, 
 p. 111. 
 
 • See WilliaiiiM and MriK-e, Admi- 
 ralty i'lattici'. MU. 
 
 • Si'i' reniark:4 fn the alMivo off' 't 
 jM'r l,d. I 'airtiH, in Mi'ir.ipiditan l;y. 
 r. .lailiHon, 1»<"7, lited powt, nolo to 
 § ;t:.v. 
 
 '" 111 U. f. The Keiinof St. A«iil>h, 
 ITH.'i, I.d. Manslli'ld ilri'lared, "that 
 the fiindaini'iil.il ililiiiitinn of trial 
 ")y jury deprndi'd ii])oi! llie univerMal 
 ina.tiin, ud c|uiestioii«in juli^ uoii ro- 
 hpo. ideal juraton-M; ad i|i!ii'Htioiii'iii 
 fiioti noil reM|iondi'nt jiidicnM"; itnd 
 luldcid " W'licfo A (|ueHtioii can l»o 
 provetl liy the t'ona o( {lUiuding, tho 
 
 2;j 
 
 
RESl'l-XTIVK DUTIES OF JUDGE AND JUKY. [PAUT I. 
 
 questions not unfrequeutly arise, from the exp<'rioncc(l difTioulty of 
 defining with clearness the obscure and shifting boundaries of law 
 aud fact. 
 
 distinction in proRor\-o<l upon the face 
 of tho roconl, luul tlio jury ciinnot 
 vDcroiirh tiiion tlu; jtiristlictiDii 4)f thu 
 court; whun, by thn form of i>l('ii(l. 
 inp. tho two ({iicHtioiiH urn hlciKl'Ml 
 topt'thrr, uiirl riinnot bo HcouiiitfHl 
 \ip<iii tln' fact) of till) rcconl, tlio dis- 
 tiiictioii is pri'Hovwl by tho lioiuwty 
 of tho jury. TIk' constitution trusts 
 that, undfT tho (lircM'tion of a jiidp-, 
 thov will not usiir|; a .iurimiiition 
 wluch iM not in tl^ir jtrovinco. 'J'hoy 
 do not know, and uro not prosuniud 
 to know, tho law : they aro not sworn 
 to di'rido th't law; they am not ro- 
 (lulrod to dc'ido tho law. . . . It is 
 tna duty of tho judgo, in all caaos of 
 goncrul jubtifo, to toll thr jury how 
 to do ri>;ht, thou^fh thoy havo it in 
 thrir pim er to do wronj^, which is a 
 inattor entirely Initwoon Uod and 
 thi'ir own cuiisciciiccM." :',\ linw. ."^t. 
 Tr. Kl.l!), 10 Mt. Mr. I[arj,'rav.>, in a 
 noto to 1 Co. I/itt. l-'job, which is 
 an olaliorato chs,./ on this subject, 
 8tat4-s th:lt " the i-Murdiittf and ilirfct 
 Tit;\\t of dccidiiif» i,;ion ()Ui'stion8 of 
 law is intrusted to the jiidires; that 
 inn jury it is u^ly inriilinlitl ; that 
 in the exercise of iliis incidental ri^ht, 
 the hitter aro not onl; pliiceil under 
 tho fiuperintondonco of tho fonnor, 
 but are in some de^rtio ('<)ntrollit!)!o 
 by them; and, therefnrc, that in all 
 piiititsof liiw arisiuK on atrial, juries 
 ou>;ht to show the most ri'spectful 
 deference U> the advico iiiel recom- 
 niendatiop of judges." ill .\;i< lint. 
 Ml, ,lustico .^tiiry has s:ii(( : "Tho 
 learned ( oiuiHel lor tlv piisoner con- 
 tends thrt in I'lintinal cases, and 
 OHjM«<'irtlly ill !!a]iital cases, the jury 
 are the jlldfjes of tlu) la\» , as well IIS 
 
 of the fact. My oiiii 'on is, that tho 
 jury are im nioro (Uiltn's of the law 
 HI a capital or r.M. -.'i- cii;iiinal ca.<o, 
 upon the ph.;; i' not y^e ,;_,-^ than 
 thoy are in ■ voiy ' Ivi! <'<,r triod 
 ujion tho pui'T'l isi^ii''. Ji! •ch of 
 those cases, tb.eir venliot, wl 'ti . <ie- 
 ral, is nocessarilv coiiipo';, licdet i:iw 
 and of fact, ami inclik''< < i'lith ii: 
 
 each, they ?IH.Ntneee--,-;:,rily il(.t..i'ihini' 
 
 tho law, as wuU fui tlio fa ;t. In uuob. 
 
 24 
 
 they havo tho physical power to dis- 
 ropird thu law, as laid (town to them 
 by tho court. But 1 deny that, in 
 any case, civil or crinnnal, thoy have 
 tho moral ri^ht to decide tho law 
 according to their own notions or 
 pluasuro. On tho contrary, I hold it 
 tho most bacriil constitutional rif^ht 
 of every party accused of a crime, 
 that tho jury shotild respond as f<> 
 tho facts, and tho cmirt ii": to tno law. 
 It is tho duty id tho cou; t to inHtrint 
 tho jury as to the law; and it is the 
 duty of tho jurv to fcdlow tho law, as 
 it is laiil dow-n by the court. This is 
 tho ri>;ht of evory citizen, and it is 
 his orily i)rotection. If the jury wore 
 at liberty to settle tho law for them- 
 sidves, tno ort'oct would bo, not only 
 that tho law itsidf would bo most 
 uncertain, from the dittcrent views 
 which dilTi'ient juries niiKlit take 
 of if, but in case of error, theie 
 would bo no remedy or redress by 
 tho injured jxuty; for the (uiiirt 
 would not liav'< iMiy rif;ht to review 
 till' law, as it had bi'en settled by the 
 jury. Indeed, it would Im* alnmsl 
 niipracticable t' ascertain what the 
 law. as settled iiy tho jury, actually 
 was. On the contrary, if the iiourt 
 should on in laying' down tho law to 
 the jury, tl.ere is an adei|iiiite remedy 
 for the iujure<l iiialv by a molimi for 
 a new trial, or a writ of error, as the 
 nature of the jmisdiution of the par- 
 ticular loiiit noiy rtHjiiiro. l'',very 
 perMin acciisi'd as a criminal has » 
 rifjhi to h- livod acordiiij; to tho 
 }n\v of the land, the (ixml law of the 
 land; and not by the Ihnv as a jury 
 may nndi'istand it, or choose, from 
 wantonness, or ignorance, oi ucci- 
 deutai mistake, to interpret it. If I 
 thoufi^ht that a jury were the pro|M'r 
 judp's of the liiw in criminal luisos, 
 I shouli' holit it my duty to abstain 
 from the rcr^ponsibility of stntinp the 
 lav;' to them ■,i]H)n any such trial. 
 Hut believinjr, as I do that every 
 citi/.en has .i rii,'ht to Is- tried by (ho 
 la«', and accorilin)r to the law, that 
 it IS hi^ luivili'^je and truest shield 
 agiiinst oppi-uttsiuu auU wruni;,— I 
 
CUAP. III.J 
 
 DUTIKS OF JUDGE. 
 
 § 23. The duty of a judge i)rosiding at a trial by jury is four- 
 Idld : — First, he must docido all questions res[»eoting tlie ndmissi- 
 bility of evidence ; secondly, he must instruct the jury in the rules 
 of law, by which the evidence, when admitted, is to be weighed ; 
 thirdly, he must determine, as a legal ({uestion, whether there be 
 liny evidence fit to be submitted to the jury for their consideration ; 
 and lastly, he must explain and enforce those general principles of 
 law that are applicable to the iM)iut at issue.' 
 
 § 23a. First, then, speaking generally, all questions as to tlie 
 ii(/ininsiliilifi/ of evidence are for the judge. It frequently happens 
 that this depends on a disputed fact, in which case all the evidence 
 adduced both to prove and disprf)ve that fact must bo received by 
 the judge, and — however complicated the facts or conilioting the 
 evidence- — must be adjudicated on by him alutu} For example, 
 the judge alone must decide a question of wliether a confession 
 should be excluded on account of some previous threat or promise, 
 and to do this has to determine, first, whether the threat or promise 
 was really miido; and, secondly, whether, if made, it was ^uffi(Jient 
 in law to warrant the e.xelusion of the evidence •* if a dying decla- 
 ration bo tendered, the judge alone decides whether it has been 
 satisfactorily proved that the deceased believi'd, when he made 
 it, that he was on the jnunt of death;* where the receipt in 
 evidence of a deposition depends on the inability of the deponent 
 to attend the trial, whether the sickness of the witness, or other 
 special cause disabling him from attendance, has b»H3n satisfactorily 
 proved;*' whetlier the declarant in a question of pedigree has been 
 
 Uw\ it my <Uity to stuio ray view* 
 fully mill 'ipoiily on the prcKi-nt mvu- 
 Nioii." r. S. r. Hiittintc, In:».') (.Xtii.). 
 Sill fuitliiT, OH this iiiti'it^Htiiif; siili- 
 jcct, 2 W'vimii'H Kiiiioiinm; ItiislifU'rt 
 ciiHc, ItiTo; l''ruii<'klin'H cuuo, l".'!l ; 
 
 uixl H. r. \V Itall, I'lTO. 
 
 ' Aiiioii); tlic (MwiHtionK ])r<)i>oiuiilctl 
 l»y till' liiOi I'luiiiiini'iil to tlm juilp"* 
 of that country in lli-ll, wuh omo, 
 " whi'thiT till' jinlf^c or jurorn oii^ht 
 to l>i> jtiilf^cuf till' niiitti'iM of fuct," 
 to which the jniJjfcK rcplii'il, that, 
 " ulthiiii^'h flic jiiroi'M lie the Mulii 
 Hnlp'M of niiitti-r of fuit. yet the 
 judp'H of the court lire juil(feH oi the 
 ihdidity of the evidence, »ud uf tht 
 
 ninttrrii of law arim'iiii out of tho mtme, 
 wherein the jury oiijiht to lie ^fiiidtMl 
 by Iheni." "J NiiIhoii's ( oil. of Stato 
 I'liji. .JTi). M'i, Lonil. Kis.j. 
 
 ' .\s to this HOC I'linton r. Williums, 
 IMI, citeij iiifrii, n. ♦ to j '.'8. 
 
 » Hiiillett -■. Smith. 1H«;{. 
 
 * Se 1 Stiiik. r. :>-S.i, II. /).. 1816. 
 ' ."Ni I'i'Milveil hy nil the jud^iH, in 
 
 two niHen fit>'il liy I'liike, H,, in 
 HiUtlett ii. Smith, isJU; imil in ono 
 (!UHO citoil hy iiil. MllenlHiioti){h, in 
 
 li. C. 11UC|(H, INK). ThcHU 1.IUMIM 
 
 virtuiilly oveirule It. ,■, Woodcmik, 
 1"n7, where Kvre. C.H., loft tho 
 qucHtion to the jury. 
 
 • D, of Uottufort V. Cruwshtty, I«tJ«. 
 
 3{( 
 
iiHi! 
 
 'if ii 
 
 DUTIKS OF JUUQE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 proved to be a deconscJ iiuinbtT i>f tho family — and this evou 
 though tho rohitionhhip of the dodarant haiipuns to bo the very 
 queHtion at issue in tlie cause ;' anJ whether or not an attesting 
 witness, of wlioso signature proof is olTerod, has absented liinisclf 
 from the trial by collusion with the opposite party.' In like 
 luanncr tho judg«» alone decides ujjou tlui adtuissibility of the 
 evidence where the questiiu is whether a document has been didy 
 exefuted or stanij)ed ;■* or whether it comes from the right custody;* 
 or whether sulhcient search has been made for it to admit secondary 
 evidence of its contents;' or whether notice to produce it has been 
 drdy served ;" or wlu^tlier, in ^he event of its being i)roducod under 
 notice, it be tlie origiiuil paper required;' or whether it is pro- 
 tectctl 08 being a confidential communioaticm ;* or whether a 
 witness objected to on the ground of unripeness or imbecility of 
 i?und is competent to give evidence. 
 
 § 24. Again, where evidence is offered of acts done in places 
 other than the jdace in dispute, it is for the judge to decide, in tho 
 first iii.stance, whetlier there is such a \inity of (;haractor in these 
 different localities as to render evidence affecting tho one admis- 
 sible with reference to the other, llo also has to pronounc^e whether 
 acts relied on as such amount to evidence of ownership," or whether 
 witnesses have ])rovcd a general usage in trade'" or a custom (as the 
 case may be). 'J'he general rule is, that where evidence is by law 
 udmissiltle for the detoimiiiation of the jxiiiit raised, the judge is 
 bound to lay it before thf jury; but that llm (piestion whethci 
 the evidence / admissible or not, is for the judge alone. 
 
 S 24a. Whenever the rule just indicated applies, however, the 
 credibility and weight of the oviilenco ufter it has been admitteil 
 are entirely for the jury, who nuiy consider all tho circin.istaiKses of 
 the case, including those already j)rovod before the judge, and give 
 
 ' Dim- I'. llllvit'H, 1NI7. Seo Ilit- 
 
 chiiiH r. I'.iinlli'V, IHTI. 
 
 •' J'Vaii .'. I,iirkia, 1S42 (I»iiuly, 
 ('.ll.)(lr.). 
 
 » IJ.iitlctt V. Siaitli, lK^:l; DiuiH- 
 
 Bon, It.). 
 • fliiivoy I'. Mitili<ll, 1811 (I'lirk.t, 
 
 li.). 
 
 ' l-'ioilil.) r. llohlw, 1M.»{) (UyloH, 
 J.); Iliiylo I'. Wiwe'iiaii, iH'to : ovi-r- 
 
 fonl r. CuilcwiM, lN,")i» (Hill, J.). ruliii(x .J..nt>s c. l''i.rt, IH'JS. 
 
 ,Sff .-^tiiwn ('. liiifriH r, INTO, 
 
 'li'iivti I'. iluui'H, iNiVJ. Sm), ulao, 
 
 IH:{<i 
 
 ll|i. ..f M.'iillir. .M.oi Wiii.ll.'Htor, It. r. IliU, \H,[ 
 
 |)o.j V. Jvi'diii'', ims il.d 
 
 itl'lllltUll) 
 
 J.). 
 
 i)itii I. Ki'iiip, 1h;U (Booanqi 
 
 <^ iiurlltitt V. Suiitb, IHC) (Aldur- '" Luwis r. ALuithull, 1U14. 
 
CHAP. Ill 
 
 •1 
 
 l>ITTirX OF JlTnOR. 
 
 jiui li ovidenof) only tlie crodit which, upon the wliole, thoy think it 
 (l«H<'ive«.' Tho judge ujondy dt'oides whotlier thoro is, primd f'arir, 
 any roosou for proHonting it ut all to the jury ; and his decision on 
 this point, if erroneous, may be reviewed by tho court abovn.' 
 
 S '2-'). Scciindly,^ it is tho duty of the judge to point out to the 
 jury any rule of law, which either renders evidence on any par- 
 tjculiir point unncoeBsary, or which gives any particular species of 
 evidence peculiar weight, or which defines how a certain fact must 
 be proved. Thus, he should distinctly explain the nature of any 
 jircsuniptions, which may apply to the point ut issue, distinguishing 
 such as are conclusive from those which are liable to be r(!butted 
 by counter evidence ; and again, dividing this latter class into 
 those p'osumptions upon which the jury are bound to act, in the 
 absence of (ionflicting testimony, and th<»He upon which it is merely 
 exp<'tlient, or allowable, to rely. Again, if by common or statute 
 law any document, when proved, Ixicomes conclusive evidence of the 
 facts it states, the judge must point out to the jury that the 
 existence of sui-h facts cannot be disputed or denied, and that the 
 only (jucstion for their deliberation is, whether or not the document 
 b(» duly proved. If, too, the uncorroborated testimony of a single 
 witness be insidlicient by law to establish guilt (as, for instance, in 
 charges of treason or jterjury), the judge must ac(piaint the jury 
 with the nature and extent of this rule. Eve|i where a c(»nvictir)n 
 founded upon such testimony a» the jury have before them would 
 b(? strictly legal (as in th(« case of an a(!oomplice becoming witness 
 for the Crown), the jtidge would not projterly dis<'harge his duty 
 uiile.ss lie warned the jury against placing implicit reliance upon 
 stutenu'uts coming from siieh a suspicious ([uurter. (ireat caution 
 and tact are, however, necessary on the part of the judge if lie 
 thinks it right (as he nuiy do) to tell the jury his opinion respecting 
 matters of fact, since this may arouse the jealous feelings of a 
 jury, and ex(ite them, in their anxiety to prove their ind(*pen- 
 dcnce, to pronoimce an unjust vta'dict.' 
 
 II 
 
 i hi 
 
 t iM 
 
 ' Wi'll.fciiil I'. Levy, ISUl (I'lirko, * " I-'ew thiiifftt iiirito mo moro to 
 
 J.); |)i)or. Idivifs, IHI7 (lid. Den- r((|)fl a doitrirui thiia iiitoli runt 
 
 niiiii) ! Uoss c. (Innld, IH'JN. utliMii|it^ to forco it on my undfr- 
 
 ' Cli'iivo I'. .)oii(<M, IH.VJ (Martin, Ntandinj?." Si«i> I)r, Cliannint^'H 
 
 !».). WnrkK. Vol. III. p. :n!». L.I. 
 
 • Soo Hupra. % 'li. liuo<iQ, in liis udvico to Iluttoa, J.. 
 
 27 
 
DUTIES OF JUDGE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 § 25a. Thinlly ;' the jiulgo must, at the close of each case, det('r- 
 mine whether any evidence hiis been given on which the jury cnn 
 properly find the question for the party on wliom the onus of proof 
 lies; and if no such evidence exists, he ought to withdraw the 
 question from the consideration of the jury, and direct, either 
 a non-suit to be entered if the onus be on the [tlaintiif, or a verdict 
 to be found if the onus bo on tliu defendant.' It is not always 
 easy to act ui)on this somewhat vaguo rule which (hardly less 
 vaguely) is somotimcs said to be that a judge should withdraw the 
 case from the jury, unless there be rainondh/o evidence on which 
 rcdHoiKiltk men could reanoiuib/i/ or fairly find a verdict.' But a 
 judge will not often go astray if in every ilouhtful case he takes 
 the opinion of the jury, and leaves the question, as to how far ho 
 was justified in thus acting, to be decided thereafter by the court. 
 And, whenever there is conflicting evidence on a question of fa(!t, 
 he »(««/ leave the consideration of it for the decision of the jury, 
 whatever his own opinion may bo respecting its weight.* 
 
 § 26. Lastly;* the judge must o.xplain to the jury what principles 
 of law are aj)plicablo to the point in issue. To do this correctly, 
 he must distinguish qtiestions of law from questions of faiit, wliich 
 is, in ordinary oases, no very diflicult task. For instance, on a 
 charge of larceny, he lays down, as a general i-'^oosition of law, 
 that all persons who take and remove the personal chattels of 
 another without such other's consent, and with a felonious intent, 
 are guilty of the crime charged ; and then, atx'ording to the cir- 
 cumstances of the case, he e.xplains, with more or less particularity, 
 what constitutes a taking, removing, «tc. These, obviously, are 
 (questions of law, and together form the major prcuiiss of the 
 syllogism. The jury decide whether it is proved that the goods 
 
 Hiiys, "You Hhonld bo a light to 
 juioiH t() ojKsn their oycH, but not n 
 fiftii(Ut to Icail them by their iiohch." 
 Hue. WorkH, Vol. Vll. p. '271, oil. 
 Moiitugu. 
 
 ' Seo Hiipra, § 'l'>\. 
 
 » Ihdcr V. Woiiibwell. 1808; up- 
 iirovod of anil lulopted in Metroi). 
 Ity. Co, V. Jackson, LsTT; and lu 
 I )'ubl. W. & W. lly. Co. V. Slattory, 
 1H7S (lid. UatUorloy and Ld. Ulaek- 
 liuru). 
 
 28 
 
 » Sofl Dublin, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. 
 Slattery, 1H78 (l.d. Coleridf,'o). On 
 the kindred (]iieHtion as to Hotting; 
 aside verdicts which thero was no 
 BUtlicient evidoncn to sujiport, soe 
 Webster v. Friedeburf,', lH8(i; Solo- 
 mon I'. Hitton, 18HI. 
 
 « Dublin. W. & W. Ry. Co. v. 
 Slattery, 1878, 11. L. Soe, also, 
 Mctroj). Ry. (^o. v, Jackson, 1877; 
 ]>oHt, § 37, n. *. 
 
 * Seo supra, § 23. 
 

 CHAP. III. J 
 
 DUTIh> OF JUDUI-^ 
 
 luivo l)OPn taken and romovod in snch a mannnr, and with such an 
 intent, as the judge has jii<vliiii.-.ly iuslruiled thuiu will unioiinl to 
 liirceny. Tliese are i|iie8tions of fact, and togetljer form the minor 
 premiss. Lastly eonieH tho conclusion of guilt or innoeenee, whiuh 
 may either ho drawn hy tho jury apidying to tlie facts which f/it'i/ 
 tind tho rules of law as inter{)ret<nl hy the judgo; or hy their 
 liiiding the facts spceinlly (hut not tho ttirrr vridvnrr on whi li tho 
 facts aro founded'), and leaving tho court to apply tho law to suoh 
 facts, and pronounce tho final decisifm. Simple, howover, as this 
 process appc;irs to ho, the lino hetwecu 1 iw and fact has, in u 
 certain class of cases, heon very indistinctly drawn, and in those, 
 tlH»r<.'fore, the respective duties of tho judgo and jury are not 
 clearly defined. For instance, if tho question ho whether a certain 
 party had ]in)hahle cause for doing an act, or whether ho has done 
 an act within a rcasonahle time, or with due diligence, it may he 
 ditiicult to say whether the definition of what constitutes prohable 
 (iause, rcfisouahlo time, or duo diligence, ho for the judgo or the jury, 
 and specious arguments are not wanting in favojir of the claims 
 of either i>arty. In truth, tho expressions jtist mentioned consti- 
 tute neither matters of fact, nor matters of law, exclusively, hut 
 are rather matters of quality or opinion, which aro generally termed 
 "mixed cases." They form, in logical phrase, tho middle term, 
 and aro alikt* common to both the premisses, which aro respectively 
 intrusted to the judge and jury, and upon which tho ultimate 
 decision must proceed.' 
 
 § 27. It is, liowever, necessary to see how far this subject is 
 governed hy actual decisions which have taken place on it, and aa 
 to wliother the questions arising in particular oases ore to be re- 
 garded as matters of law or of fact. 
 
 S 2!^. First: A question of prohnhk cause must, it is now clearly 
 established, — albeit the wisdom of tho rule has been stoutly dis- 
 puted,* — be decided exclusively by tho judge, and tho jury can 
 only be permitted to find whether the facts alleged in support of 
 the presence or absence of probability, and the inferences to be 
 
 ' Hul)l)iinl V. Johnstone, 1810 • Soo, on this diflicult subject, 13 
 (Wo(mI, K.); niirwoo«l t-. 0(x)(lright, Law Mug. 33—74; 1 St. Kv. 512— 
 1774 (Lil. Munsfiold); Mirea v. Sole- b'l{\. 
 
 buy, 1(J7». » liistori'.Porivmiin. 1870, H. L. ; 
 
 Hicks v. Fuulkuur, 1881. 
 
 29 
 
 
 j II 1 1 
 
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 M IIIII16 
 
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 Photographic 
 
 Sciences 
 Corporation 
 
 23 WEST MAIN STREET 
 
 WEBSTER, NY. MS 80 
 
 (716) $73-4503 
 
 
/ 
 
 o 
 
 
 L 
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 % 
 
4u 
 
 m 
 
 PROBABLE CAUSE. 
 
 [PAKT r. 
 
 drawn therefrom, really exist.^ Thus, in an action for a malicious 
 prosecution, the jury, if the evidence on the subject be conflicting, 
 may be asked whether or not the defendant, at the time when he 
 prosecuted, Jmew of the existence of those circumstances which tend 
 to show probable cause, or believed that they amounted to the 
 ofFence which he charged ; and if they negative either of these 
 facts, the judge will decide as a point of law that the defendant 
 had no probable cause for instituting the prosecution.'^ The rule 
 of law as to the respective functions of a judge and of a jury in 
 such cases is based on the assumption that judges are more com- 
 petent than juries to determine the question how far it may have 
 been proper for a person to have instituted a prosecution.' It is 
 equally binding, however numerous and complicated the facts and 
 inferences may be.^ Indeed, it would be impracticable to lay 
 down any hard-and-fast rule as to what cases are " complicated." 
 Besides, it would be inconsistent to hold that a rule, applicable to 
 a simple case, should not equally apply where the facts were com- 
 plicated.' Any difficulty in the application of the rule is, more- 
 over, more apparent than real, for it rarely happens but that some 
 leading facts exist in each case, which present a broad distinction 
 to the view, witliout having recourse to the less important circum- 
 stances.^ The judge has a right to act upon all the uncontradicted 
 
 t 
 
 ■ ■ '-A 
 
 ^ i -, 
 
 i 
 
 k. 
 
 
 ' Micholl V. Williiuns, 1843 ; Pan- 
 ton v. Williams, 1841 ; llailes v. 
 Marks, 18(51 ; Sutton v. Johnstone, 
 1787; Miti'hc'U v, Jenkins, 1833; 
 Ilinton V. lioathor, 1845 (Aldorson, 
 B.) ; West v. Baxoudalo, 1850. On 
 tliis subject see. generally, Abratli v. 
 North Eastern R. C (188(i). 
 
 » Turner v. Ambler, 1847. The 
 absence, however, of belief must be 
 proved by the jilaintilt', and cannot 
 bo iKfcrrtMl from the mere fact that 
 the detendant had made nse of the 
 charge for an unfair jjurjiose : id. 
 See, also. Broad v. Ham, 18;i}(; Ilad- 
 drick V. lleslop, 1848 ; Hcslop v. 
 Chapmun, 1853. 
 
 3 Fraser v. Hill, 1853 (Ld. Cran- 
 worth). 
 
 ♦ In Panton v. Williams. 1841, 
 Tindal, C.J., observes, "Wo take 
 the broad qimstion between the 
 parties to be this : whether, in a case 
 
 in which the question of reasonable 
 or probable cause depends, not upon 
 a few simple facts, but upon facts 
 which are numerous and complicated, 
 and upon inferences to be drawn 
 therefrom, it is the duty o: the judge 
 to inform the jury, that if they find 
 the facts pi'oved. and the inferences 
 to bo wail anted by such facts, the 
 same do or do not amount to reason- 
 able or probable cause, so as thereby 
 to leave the ([uestion of fact to the 
 jin-y, and the abstract question of 
 law to the judge. And wo are all of 
 opinion that it is the duty of the 
 judge so to do." See Rowlands v, 
 Samuel, 1850 ; Douglas v. Corbett, 
 185(). 
 
 » l'ant(m v. Williams, 1841 (Tindal, 
 r.J.), pronouuciug judgmeut of the 
 Ex. ("h. 
 
 » Id, 
 
 30 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 REASONABLE BELIKF. 
 
 facts, and it is only where some doubt is thrown upon the credi- 
 bility of the witnesses, or where some contradiction occurs, or some 
 inference is attempted to be drawn from some former fact not dis- 
 tinctly sworn to, that he is called upon to submit any question to 
 the jury.' 
 
 § 29. Although, as to ^^ prohahle cause" the question is for the 
 judge, yet, on the other hand, as to the reafionahlene-sH of the belief 
 or suspicion, upon which a party acts in causing an arrest or in 
 detaining goods, is a question for the jury to decide.'^ Thus, if a 
 magistrate, sued for false imprisonment, rely, under not guilty by 
 statute, upon want of notice of action or the like, the question 
 whether he believed, with some colour of reason, and bomi fide, that 
 he was acting in pursuance of his lawful authority, so as to entitle 
 him to the protection of the statute, is, in strictness, one for the 
 jury to determine, if the plaintiff desire their opinion to be taken 
 on the evidence.^ But if, as commonly happens, these questions be 
 first submitted to the judge on an application for a nonsuit, and 
 the plaintiff does not then desire them to be left to the jury, the 
 plaintiff will be bound by the decision of the jii<l2:e, if the court 
 think it warranted by the evidence.* 
 
 § 30. The question of reasonable time is a more difficult one. 
 Upon some subjects, indeed, of frequent recurrence, the courts, for 
 the sake of commercial convenience, have laid down precise rules 
 as to what constitutes this. In these cases the duty of the jury is 
 dearly confined to the simple tosk of ascertaining whether the 
 facts proved fall within the rules or not. 
 
 !5 ;30a. For example, reasonable time for notice of dishonour of 
 a bill of exchange means,^ — according as the parties live in the 
 same or in different places, — either that the letter containing 
 notice should be so posted that in the due course of delivery it 
 would arrive on the day following that on which the writer has 
 received intelligence of dishonour ; '' or that su h letter should be 
 
 ' Michell y. WilUams, 1843(Aldor- 
 soii, 15.). 
 
 » Wedge )•. Bt-rkoloy, 1838; Annott 
 V. Osborne, l.S4() (Ir.); Ila/.eldino v. 
 Grove, 1844 ; Ilughos v, Buckland, 
 1846. 
 
 * Iltizoldinn v. Giovo, 1844, supra. 
 
 * Iliizcldiiie V. Orovp, 1844; Abcatli 
 V. North Eastern Ry. Co., 1880, supra. 
 
 81 
 
 See post, § ;5S. 
 
 » See, now, 43 & 40 V. c. 61 (" The 
 Bills of ExchanKO Act, lhN2 "), § 4!», 
 sub-8. 12, which codifies the law as 
 stated in tlie text. See as to j)re- 
 vious law, 18(i0, Hirschfield y. Smith, 
 1.S41 (Erie, O.J.). 
 
 « Stocken »'. Collin. 1841 ; Smith 
 V. Mullett, 180'J (Ed. EUenboroiigh); 
 
 ■m 
 
 I < . 
 
 I ,1 
 
 i 
 
If 
 
 'I I I 
 
 REASONABLE TIME 
 
 [part I. 
 
 posted before the departure of the mail on the day following the 
 receipt of intelligence ; * or if there be either no post on that day,* 
 or only one starting at an unreasonable hour in the morning,'' tlien 
 on the next day (thus giving the writer an additional day). If a 
 bill be presented through a banker, one day more is allowed for 
 giving notice of dishonour than if it were presented by the party 
 himself.'' The holder of a bill has in general but one day to give 
 notice to all the parties against whom he intends to enforce his 
 remedy, though each of the indorsers in turn has his day,'' and the 
 holder may avail himself of a notice duly given by any other 
 party to the bill.® And the holder of a cheque, or of a bill or note 
 payable on demand, must, in general, present the instrument for 
 payment on or before the day following that on which it was 
 received ; ' though in these cases the term " reasonable time " 
 may sometimes receive a different construction, regard being had 
 to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade, and the 
 particular facts.* 
 
 . § 31. Generally, the rule as to the time thus allowed applies 
 not only as between the parties to a cheque,** but as between 
 banker and customer with regard to its presentation, unless, in- 
 deed, circumstances exist from which a contract or duty on the 
 part of the banker to present earlier, or later, can be inferred. '*• 
 It, however, does not apply to claims by the holder of a cheque 
 against the drawer, unless during the delay the fund has been 
 lost, as, e.g., by the banker's failure." AVhen, however, the 
 rule is applicable, it matters not, so far as the liability of the 
 
 Hilton V. Faii'cloiigh, 1811 (Law- 
 ronce, J.) ; Rowo v. Tipper, ltiJ3 
 (Maule, J.). 
 
 ' Williains v. Smith, 1819. See 
 Sholton V. Uraithwaito, 1841. 
 
 2 Geill V. Jeremy, 1827 (Lord Ten- 
 terdon). 
 
 ' Iluwkos V. Salter, 1830 ; Bray v. 
 Hadwon, 1816 ; Wright v. ShawcrosB, 
 1819. 
 
 ♦ Alexander v. Burchfield, 1845 
 (Tindal, C.J.); Haynes v, Birks, 
 1804; Scott V. Litti.rd, 1808; Lang- 
 dale V. Trimmer, 1812. See 45 & 46 
 V. c. Gl, §4!>. s"^'8. 13. 
 
 ' Rowe V. Tipper, 1853 ; Dobree v, 
 Eaatwood, 1827. See, however, Glad- 
 
 wrll V. Tumor. 1869. 
 
 ° r'hai>miiri v. Keane, 1835 ; Rowe 
 V. Tipper, 1853 (Jervis, C".J.). 
 
 ' Ricktord v. Ridge, 1810; Bod- 
 diiigton i;. Schlencker, 1833; Moule 
 V. Brown, 1838. See Bailey v. Boden- 
 ham, 1864. 
 
 " 45 & 46 V. c. 61, §§ 45, suoa. 2 ; 
 74, snbs. 2; and 86, subs. '2. 
 
 » See Hopkins v. Ware, 1869. 
 
 '» Hare v. llunty, 1861. See Pri- 
 deaux v. Griddle, 1869. 
 
 " Robinson v. Hawksford, 1846; 
 Serle v. Nortou, 1841 (Ld. Abiusj-or) ; 
 LawH V. Rand, 1857. In these caHos 
 no time Ionh than six yeai'8 is deumed 
 unreasonable. 
 
 32 
 
CHAP. II\.] 
 
 REASONABLE HOURS. 
 
 drawer is concerned, whether the presentation for payment he 
 made hy the party himself or hy liis banker. Thus, when an 
 uncrossed cheque, given on the 10th of March, was paid into 
 payee's hankers' on the 11th, and presented by them on the 12th, 
 but the bankers on whom it was drawn had stojiped payment 
 early that morning, the payee failed to recover the amount of the 
 cheque from the drawer, because the presentment for payment had 
 not been made within a reasonable time, and the bankers at the 
 time of their failure had sufficient funds of the drawer's to pay 
 the cheque. • Had the payee in this case stipulated that his 
 bankers' names should be crossed upon the cheque, or had the 
 drawer discounted his cheque in the country, the result would 
 have been otherwise, for the drawer then would have been taken 
 as agreeing that presentment should be made through a banker, 
 and the steps actually taken were in conformity with this course.^ 
 
 § 32. With regard to the time for the presentation of instru- 
 nunts for payment, it has been held that, as a general rule, an 
 instrument payable at a banker's must be presented within 
 banking hours ; ^ and one payable elsewhere, at any time when the 
 drawer may be expected to be found at his place of residence or 
 business, though it be as late es eight or nine o'clock in the 
 evening.* If, however, a banker appoint a person to attend at 
 the olHce after banking hours for the purpose of returning an 
 answer to a presentment, and such person does return an ansAver 
 before midnight, no objection can be taken to the unreasonableness 
 of the hour when the i)re8entment was made ;' and the same rule 
 would seem to prevail if a bill be pernoiiallij prenenied to the 
 acceptor before twelve o'clock at night on the day that it falls due.^ 
 § 32a. With regard to a reasonable hour for a demand or tender 
 of rent on the lami, the common law is that it must, in order to 
 create or avoid a forfeiture, be made before sunset, this being a rule 
 of convenience adopted to prevent the necessity of one party 
 waiting for the other till midnight. But if the tenant actually 
 
 ' Alexanders. Burchfield, 1842. 
 
 » Id. (Tindal, C.J.). See 4.) & 46 V. 
 c. <)1, §§ 76—82; and Iloywood v. 
 I'ickeiiii}!;, 1874. 
 
 » Puikor V. Gordon, 1808 ; Elford 
 V. Teed, 1813. 
 
 T —VOL. I. 33 
 
 * Wilkins v. Jadis, 1831 ; Jamo- 
 8on V. Swinton, 1810, Barclay v. 
 Bailey, 1810 (Ld. Ellonboroufjh). 
 
 * darnett v. Woodcock, 18 17. 
 
 * See Startup v. Macdonald (1841). 
 (Parke, B.). 
 
 n 
 
 ■I 
 
 I ; I 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 .1 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 . 1 
 

 REASONABLK HOURS. 
 
 [_PART I. 
 
 meet the lessor, either on or off the land, at ani/ time of the last 
 day of payment, and tender the rent, it will be sufficient, provided 
 there was time before midnight to receive and count the money 
 tendered.^ 
 
 § 33. The law as to what is a reasonable hour for the delivery of 
 goods has been much discussed.^ Where a jury found by special 
 verdict that certain oil, which the defendant had agreed to purchase of 
 the plaintiffs, was tendered to the defendant (who must consequently, 
 it is clear, have been then at his place of business) at half-past 
 eight in the evening of the last day allowed for delivery ; that there 
 was full time for the plaintiffs to have delivered, and for the de- 
 fendant to have examined, weighed, and received the whole before 
 f 3xt (a Sunday) morning ; but that the time of tendering was 
 unreasonably late, the Exchequer Chamber held (reversing th') 
 Common Pleas, and Lord Denman dissentiente), that the plaint i if 
 was entitled to recover. Alderson, B.,' thus laid down the general 
 rule : — " Wherever, in oases not governed by peculiar customs of 
 trade, the parties oblige themselves to the performance of duties 
 within a certain number of days, they have until the last minute 
 of the last day to perform their obligation. The only qualification 
 that I am aware of to this rule is, that in acts requiring time in 
 order that they may be completely performed, the party must, at all 
 events, tender to do the act at such period before the end of the 
 last day, as, if the tender be accepted, will leave him sufficient tims 
 to complete his performance before the end of that day. In tho 
 case of a mercantile contract, however, the opposite party is nut 
 bound tv:> wait for such tender of performance beyond the usual 
 hours of mercantile business, or at any other than the usual place 
 at which the contract ought to be performed. The party, there- 
 fore, who does no*" make his teader at that usual place, or during 
 those usual hours, runs a great risk of not being able to make it at 
 all. In this case the plaintiffs have had the good fortuae to meet 
 with the defendant, and to make a tender to him in sufficient time. 
 And I think, under these circumstances, that the defendant was 
 
 > Startup V. Macdonald, 1841 (Pat- 
 teson, J. ; Aldorson, B. ; I'aike, B,), 
 reversoJ bv Kx. Ch. in 184.'<. 
 
 ' Espocially ia Startup v. Mac- 
 donald, siipiu. 
 
 * In Startup v. Macdonald, 1841. 
 
 34 
 

 CHAP. 
 
 III.] 
 
 REASONABLE NOTICE TO QUIT. 
 
 bound to accept the goods, and is liable in damages for not accept- 
 ing them."' 
 
 § 34. The law is, again, well settled as to what is a reasonable 
 time to allow in giving a notice to quit. A reasonable notice to quit 
 a yearly tenancy has for centuries, in legal construction, meant a 
 six calendar months' notice,^ terminating at the expiration of the 
 current year :^ referring, when the tenant holds different portions 
 of the premises from different days, to the day of entry on the 
 substantial subject of the holding.* The Agricultural Holdings 
 (England) Act, 1883, provides that if a holding be either agricul- 
 tural or pastoral, or both, or be wholly or in part cultivated as a 
 market garden,* a year's notice, "expiring with a year of tenancy," 
 shall be necessary on every tenancy whether created before or after 
 the commencement of that Act, unless the landlord and tenant 
 shall have agreed in uriting that this enactment shall not appl}', in 
 which case a six months' notice shall continue to be sufficient." A 
 mortgagor occupying by arrangement with mortgagee, is entitled 
 not only to compensation, but to six months' notice.' 
 
 § 34a. So, again, a reasonable notice to terminate service is, by 
 
 ' See to same effect judgment of 
 Patteson, J., id. ; and also the lumi- 
 nous judgment of Parke, B., id. 
 
 * That is, from one quarter day to 
 the next but one following. The 
 exact number of months or days does 
 not signify. Notice on 26th March 
 to quit on 20th September, insuffi- 
 cient. Notice on 28th September to 
 quit on 2oth March, sufficient. Mor- 
 gan V. Davios, 1878. 
 
 * Doe V. Spence, ] 803 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough). It has for the last thirty 
 years been held in the County Courts 
 that a week's notice to qait is neces- 
 sary, but sufficient, to terminate a 
 W""kly touancy. Such also is the 
 Irish law. Sue Harvoy v. Cope- 
 land, 1892. Tlicro appears to bo 
 no ex])rcss decisions on the point, 
 however, in the English Su])erior 
 Coiu'ts. See, and compare, Jones v. 
 Mills, 1801 ; liuffell v. Armitstead, 
 1830 (Parke, B.); and Towno v. 
 Campbell, 1847. If the hiring be 
 monthly, a month's notice, and if it 
 be quarterly, a quarter's notice, will 
 
 apparently bo necessary. Towne v, 
 Campbell, 1847 (Coltman, J.). See 
 also Kemp r. Derrott, 1814 (Ld. 
 Ellenboroiigh) ; Right d. Flower v. 
 Darby, 1786 (Ld. Mansfield); Bridges 
 V. Potts, 1804. 
 
 * Doe V. Snowdon, 1709; Doe w. 
 Spence, 1805 ; Doe v. Watkuis, 1800 ; 
 Doe V. Rhodes, 1848. In this last 
 case the question raised, but not de- 
 cided, was whether, where a tenant 
 held a farm from year to year, — the 
 land from 2 Feb., the house from 
 1 May, — a notice to quit the whole, 
 given half a year before 2 Feb., was 
 sufficient to entitle the landlord 
 to recover tho whole in ejectment, 
 on a demise dated 3 Feb. The in- 
 clination of Ld. Al)inger's opinion 
 appears to have been towards the 
 affirmative. 
 
 40 & 47 V. c. 61, § o4. See also 
 39 & 40 V. c. 63, Ir., as to the corre- 
 sponding law of Ireland. 
 
 « 40 & 47 V. c. 61, § 33. See also 
 §41. 
 
 ' 53 & 54 V. 0. 67, § 2. 
 
 'Ml 
 I I 
 
 35 
 
 1)2 
 
 ill i: 
 

 RKASONAUI.K TIMi:. 
 
 Lpart I. 
 
 law, in the casra of domestio servants, — whioh term has heen held 
 to include huntsmen,^ snd head gardeners,^ — a calondar month's 
 warning.' This rule is inapplicable to farm servants,* clerks, 
 travellers, governesses,' housekeepers in large hotels,® and the like. 
 
 § 34b. So, the reasonable period during which a member of Par- 
 liament is entitled to freedom from arrest on civil process has, for 
 at least two hundred years, been fixed by law at forty days before 
 and after each session, the rule being the same in the ease of a dis- 
 solution as in that of a prorogation.^ 
 
 § 35. Again, the reasonable time for which a party charged with 
 an indictdhle offence may, in England or Ireland, be remanded is 
 limited by statute to eight clear days, where the accused is re- 
 manded by warrant, or, in England, to three clear days, where he 
 is remanded by verbal order.* This rule does not apply where 
 justices have power to deal smnmarih/ with a case which is also 
 indicitable. In such a case the remand may, by express enact- 
 ment," be to " the next practicable sitting " of the Petty ^'^essions 
 Court, though this may be more than eight days off. If, in any 
 case not expressly provided for, the question arise whether a party 
 has been remanded for a reasonable time, the statutory rule 
 would doubtless be considered by the court as furnishing some 
 guide. But, meanwhile, the jury woull, no doubt, be called upon 
 (as in the case of probable cause) to ascertain the existence 
 of the facts, and to leave the court to determine, upon those 
 facts, whether the time was reasonable or not.'" On three occa- 
 sions, indeed — two in England," and the other in Ireland '^ — the 
 entire question appears to have been submitted to the jury. But 
 the latter'' of the two English cases rested upon the authority of 
 
 
 ' NiioU V. Greaves, 1804. 
 » Nowlan v. Ablett, 18:55. 
 
 * Nowlan v. Ablett, 1 835 ; Fawcett 
 V. Cash, 1834. 
 
 * Lilloy V. Elwin, 1848. 
 
 » Todd V. Keirick, 1852. See post, 
 §177. 
 
 • Lawler v. Linden, 1876 (Ir.). 
 
 ' Goudy V, Buncombe, 1847 ; In 
 re Ani^lo- French Co-operativo Soc, 
 18S0; Ro Armstrong, Exp. Lindsay, 
 1892. 
 
 • 11 & 12 V. 0. 42 ("The Indict- 
 
 able Offences Act, 1848"), § 21. See. 
 as to the Irish law, 14 & 15 V. o. 93, 
 § 14, Ir. 
 
 » 42 & 43 V. 0. 49, § 24, subs. 2. 
 
 '" Davis u. Capper, 1829. 
 
 " Davis V. Capper, 1829 (Gaselee, 
 J.) ; Cave v Mountain, 1840 (Li. 
 Abinger). 
 
 " Gillman v. Connor, 1840 (Ir.). 
 
 " Cavo V. Mountain, 1840(Tindal, 
 O.J.). Moreover, Ld. Abinger, who 
 tried the cause, was, "under all the 
 circumstances, satis^ed with the ver- 
 
 36 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 REASONABLE TIME. 
 
 the former, and in the former no ohjection was taken at Nisi 
 Prius to the suraming-iip of the judge, though its correctness was 
 questioned on a subsequent motion in Banc, and at the second trial 
 the course suggested above was distinctly adopted.* 
 
 § 35a. Finally, the questions whether an arrest has been counter- 
 manded within a reasonable time,^ or whether an executor has had 
 reasonable time to remove the goods from the testator's mansion,' 
 are in each case for the judge 
 
 § 36. While there are fixed rules of law as to what is a reasonable 
 time for certain matters, the question appears to be, with respect to 
 some others, governed by no precise rules, and to be purely a matter 
 for a jury to determine. Thus it is for a jury to say whether a crop 
 has been left on the ground for a reasonable time, so as to enable 
 the tithe-owner to compare the tithe net out with the remainder of 
 the produce ; ^ whether a copy of a rate has been delivered by an 
 overseer to an inhabitant within such reasonable time as to satisfy 
 the Act,^ which requires it to be given " forthwith " upon demand 
 and tender of payment;^ whether the vendor of railway shares 
 has offered to transfer them within a reasonable time ; * whether 
 the owner of cattle, which have strayed on land through defect of 
 the proprietor's fences, has removed them within a reasonable 
 time;^ whether goods purchased by sample have been rejected,'" 
 or goods taken by distress have been sold," within a reasonable 
 time ; whether a foreign or inland bill of exchange payable at or 
 after sight has been presented ;'^ whether a blank stamped accept- 
 
 dict," 80 that the propriety of his 
 leaving the question to the jury 
 coukl not practically bo questioned 
 in the coiu't abo'.'o. 
 
 1 Davis y. Capier, 1829. 
 
 * Scheibel !'. I'aiibaiin, 1799, where 
 Ilea*^^ J., hold that a counter- 
 mand ought to be made in the course 
 of the day on which the debt was 
 received. 
 
 » Co. Lit. § 69, and p. 66 b. 
 
 * In an action agaiast ?. sheriff lor 
 escajjo under the old. law, which is 
 now no longer maintainable (30 & 
 51 V. c. 00 ("The Sheriffs Act, 
 1887"), § 16; and 40 & 41 V. 
 e. 49, § 43, Ir.) the question whether 
 his officer had or had not been guilty 
 
 of unreasDUable delay in taking the 
 party arrested to prisoji was likewise 
 one for the judge: Ueuton v. Sutton, 
 1797 (Heath, J.). 
 
 * Facey ;■. llurdom, 1824. 
 
 « 17 G. 2, c. 3 ("The Poor Rata 
 Act, 1743"), §2. 
 
 ' T-nnant v. Hell, 1846. 
 « Stewart v. Cauty, 1841. 
 
 • Goodwyn v. Cheveley, 1869. 
 »« Tarker v. Palmer, 1821. 
 
 " Pitt (;. Shew, 1821. 
 
 '* Muilnmn v. D'Eguino, 1795 ; 
 Fryt'. Hill, 1817. See, ante, § 30, 
 ad fin. In det(nmining this ques- 
 tion, the jury should bo directed to 
 take into consideration the intercstt 
 not only of the drawer, but of the 
 
 37 
 
 iH» 
 
 ^'i i 
 
 Hi 
 
 iMIII 
 
m^ 
 
 ' !'-^ ' ' 
 
 
 ■ l"'-'' 
 
 
 REASONABLE .SKILL — DUE DILIGENCE, ETC. [PAKT I. 
 
 ance has been filled \ip by the holder ;' whether a voyage insured 
 lias been commenced or prosecuted," or whether costs have been 
 taxed, within such time.' The last-named questions, indeed, turn 
 upon the ordinary course of business or trade, and are, consequently, 
 matters with which the jury are peculiarly aciiuainted. 
 
 § 37. Having now considered how questions of "reasonable 
 time " are to be dealt with, when they are solely for the decision 
 of the judge, and when thoy must be left to the jury, we next 
 must consider how questions of reasonable skill o' care^ due dili- 
 gence, and f/ross ney/iyenee are to be dealt with. 
 
 § 37a. Now questions of the description just mentioned must, 
 in the great majority of instances, be solely determined by the 
 jury.'' The judges can rarely have materials which will enable 
 them to decide such questions by rules of law. Thus, in actions 
 against a surgeon for negligence in the treatment of patients,* 
 against gratuitous bailees for grose carelessness in losing property 
 intrusted to them,^ and in like cases, even when the jury have 
 found a verdict in opposition to the opinion of the presiding judge, 
 
 holder also. Ramchurn MiiUick v, 
 Luckmecchund Radiikissen, 1.Sj4 ; 
 Mellish V. Ruwdon. 18;i2. Soo Chart. 
 More. Bk. of India, &o. v. Dickson, 
 1871 ; and Van Dieman's Land Bk. 
 V. Victoria Bk., 1871. 
 
 ' Temple v. PuUen, 1853. The 
 question of reasoiu.blo time doos not 
 arise when the bill is in the hands 
 of a bo7id fide indorsee for value 
 without notice. Montague v. Per- 
 kins, 1853. 
 
 ^ Mount V. Larkins, 1831 ; Phil- 
 lips V. Irving, 1844, •where it was 
 said that " no certain or fixed time 
 could lie said to ho a reasonable or 
 unreasonable time for seeking a 
 cargo in a foreign ])ort ; but that 
 the time allo'wed must vary with the 
 varying circumstances, which may 
 rcnider it more or loss difficult to ob- 
 tain such ('argo." Id. (Tindal, C.J.). 
 
 3 Burton n. Griffiths, 1843. 
 
 * In the Metropol. Ry. Co. v. Jack- 
 son, 1877, Ld. Cairns.'C, in II. L., 
 thus explained those principles : — 
 " The judge has to say whether any 
 facts hiivo boon established by evi- 
 dence from which negligence ma-ji l>e 
 reasonably inferred ; the jurors have 
 
 to say whether, from those facts, 
 when submitted to them, negligence 
 ouf/lit to be inferred. It is, in my 
 opinion, of the greatest importance 
 in the administration of justice that 
 the separate functions sliould be 
 maintained, and should be main- 
 tained distinct. It would be a serious 
 inroad on the ])rovince of the jury 
 it, in a case where there are facts 
 from which nogligence may reason- 
 ably be inferred, the judge wore to 
 withdraw the case from the jury 
 upon the ground that, in his opinion, 
 negligence ought i.ot to be inferred ; 
 and it would, or tho other hand, 
 place in tiie hands of tlie jui'ors a 
 power wliich might be exercised in 
 the mo>t arbitrary manner, if they 
 were at libeity to hold t!iat negli- 
 gence might be inferred from any 
 state of facts whatever." See, also, 
 ante, § 22 ; Bridges v. N. Lond. Ry. 
 Co., 1874; Robson v. N. East. Ry. 
 Co., 187(), C. A. ; Rose v. N. East. 
 Ry. Co., 1870, C. A. 
 
 * Dooiman v. Jenkins, 1834 (Taun- 
 ton, J.). 
 
 ' Doorman v. Jenkins, 1834. 
 
 38 
 
CHAP. JII.] REAS UBLE SKILL — GHOSS NEGI.IGKNCi:, ETC. 
 
 th« court must generally refuse to grniit a new trial.' In sf)ine 
 cases, indeed, where the question relates to matters of legal practice, 
 as, for instance, if a sheriff be charged with neglect of duty in not 
 executing a writ, or if a solicitor be sued for negligence in con- 
 ducting an action,^ the judges would appear to be more competent 
 than a jury to decide whether the facts proved amount to a want of 
 reasonable care ; but it seems that, even in such cases, the province 
 of the judge is merely to inform the jury for what species or 
 degree of negligence the defendant is answerable,^ and what duty 
 in the particular case devolved upon him, by law, or 2>ractice ; and, 
 having done this, to leave the jury to decide, first, whether the 
 defendant has performed his duty, and next, whether, in case of 
 non-performance, the neglect was of that sort or degree which was 
 venial or culpable in the sense of not sustaining or sustaining an 
 action.^ The judges are, however, the proper parties to decide 
 whether fines, customs, or services are reasonable,* or whether 
 deeds contain reasonable covenants ^^ powers.'"' 
 
 § 38. Questions of bona Jides,^ actual knowledge,^ express malice,^ 
 real intention,^ or reasonable cause, next require consideration. 
 Generally speaking, all questions of this description belong abso- 
 lutely to the jury. To this rule there are, howover, some few 
 exceptions. Thus, the law will sometimes presioi the existence 
 
 ' Doorman v. Jenkins, 1834, per 
 Cut., commenting on and oxjilain- 
 ing Shiells v. Bliickburne, 1789; 
 Mooro V. Mourgue, 1776. 
 
 ^ In Godefioy v. Dalton, 1830, 
 the judges laid down, that in an 
 action for negligence against him, 
 a solicitor is, generally speaking, 
 " liable for the consequences of igno- 
 rance or non-observance of the rules 
 of ])ractice of this court ; for the 
 want of care in the preparation of 
 the cause for trial ; or of attendance 
 thereon with his witnesses ; and for 
 the mismanagement of so much of 
 the conduct of a cause, as is usually 
 and ordinarily allotted to his depart- 
 ment of the profession. Whilst, on 
 the otlier hand, he is not answerable 
 for error in judgment upon points of 
 new occurrence, or of nice or doubt- 
 ful construction, or of such as are 
 usually intrusted to men in a higher 
 branch of the piofcssion of the law." 
 
 » Hunter v. Cal 1847 (Ld. 
 
 Denman); Reecc irby, 1821 
 
 (Abbott, C.J.); Shtiiot Passman, 
 1836 (Alderson, B.). 
 
 * Co. Lit. 56 b, o9b; Wilson v. 
 Iloaro, 1839; Bell v. Wardell, 1740. 
 
 * Smith V, Doe d. Jersey, 1819 
 (Abbott, C.J.). 
 
 * !See ante, § 29; and see also 
 Wedge V. Berkeley, 1837 ; Mooro v, 
 Mourgue, 1776; Gray v. Dinnen, 
 1840 (Ir.); Coxhead v. Hichards, 1846 
 (CresswoU, J.); Uascldine v. Grove, 
 1842; Hughes v. Bucklaiid, 1846, 
 Hornv.Thoinborough, 1849; Douglas 
 V. Ewing, 1857 (Ir.). 
 
 ' Harratt v. Wise, 1830. 
 
 * As in actions for malicious pro- 
 secution or arrest. Mitchell v. Jen- 
 kins, 1833. 
 
 » Doe V. Wilson, 1809 ; Powis v. 
 Smith, 1822 ; Doe v. Batten, 1775 ; 
 Zouch I'.Willingalo, 1790 (Gould and 
 Wilson, JJ.) ; Cox v. Eeid, 1849. 
 
 39 
 
BONA FIl)i;S — MALICE — INTKNTION. 
 
 [PAllT I. 
 
 of fraud, knowledge, malice, intention, or justification, from the 
 proof of other remote facts,' and whenever these presumptions are 
 embodied in rules of law, the court will either draw the inference 
 ■without the aid of a jury, or the jury will be bound to follow tlie 
 directions of the judge. Moreover, in some particular cases tlie 
 decision of questions of bona Jides, reasonable cause, Sfc, actually 
 belongs to the judge. For example, in cases where by law notice 
 of action is still required,' the judge has to decide whether notice 
 of action is necessary, and consequently the question of bona Jii/es 
 must be determined by him, and not by the jury ;^ and, on an 
 application at Nisi Prius for an amendment, it is the duty of the 
 judge to determine, as a matter of fact, from the pleadings and the 
 evidence, what is the real question in controversy between the 
 parties.* Again, questions of discretion, or of yood came, in con- 
 nection with costs, are for the decision of the judge. Thus, where, 
 in an action in the High Court, the plaintiff in an action of 
 contract recovers (except by summary judgment under R. S. C, 
 Ord. XIV.) a sum not over 201., or between '201. and 50/., or in 
 an action of tort recovers not over 10/., or between 10/. and 201., 
 he is, in each case, not entitled in the first event to any costs, or 
 in the other, to more than County Court costs, unless the judge 
 certify that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action to 
 the High Court, subject, indeed, to a power in the High Court or 
 at Chambers to allow costs.' 
 
 § 39. The judge's discretion must, however, be exercised subjt-ct 
 to a rule** which provides that — " Subject to the provisions of the 
 Acts' and these Pules, the costs of and incident to all proceedings 
 in the Supreme Court, including the administration of estates and 
 trusts, shall be in the discretion of the court or judge: Provided 
 
 * See Chap. " On Presumptive Evi- 
 dence," post. 
 
 * In many cases it is not now re- 
 quired, but defendant must instead 
 be given an opportunity of tendering 
 amends. See post, § 73, at p. 72. 
 
 * Kirby V. Simpson, 1854; Arnold 
 l>. Hamol, 18o4. 
 
 * Wilkin V. Reed, 1854. 
 
 * See § 1 16 of " The County Courts 
 Act, 1888" {bl & 52 V. c. 43). 
 Whether for the purpose an action 
 
 of detinue is one of tort or of con- 
 tract depends on the facts of the par- 
 ticular case. Bryant V. Ilerbert, 1H77, 
 0. A.; R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXV. 
 r. 12; Pitt-Lewis' County Court Prac- 
 tice, vol. i. p. 110. 
 
 • R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXV. r. 1. 
 
 ' These are "The Sup. Ct. of Judic. 
 Acts, 1873 to 1879, and 1881," and 
 " The App. Jurisd. Act, 1876." See 
 Ord. LXXI. r. 1. 
 
 40 
 
CHAP. 
 
 III.] 
 
 COSTS IN SUl'UEME COURT. 
 
 c- 
 
 c. 
 id 
 
 that nothing heroin contained shall deprive an executor, adminis- 
 trator, trustee, or mortgagee, who has not unreasonably instituted 
 or carried on or resisted any proceedings, of any right to costs out 
 of a particular estate or fund, to which he would ho entitled accord- 
 ing to the rules hitherto acted upon in the Chancery Division : 
 Provided also that, where any action, cause, matter, or issue is tried 
 with a jury, the cosh shall follow the eronf, unless the judge by whom 
 such action, cause, matter, or issue is tried, or the court, shall, for 
 good cKttsr, otherwise order." * 
 
 § 39a. Under the above Rule, when a cause is tried with a jury, 
 the presiding judge may "for good cai,se " deprive a successful 
 litigant of costs, either on an application being made to him for 
 that purpose, or of his own motion.'^ An application to the judge 
 for this purpose should be made either during the trial, or within 
 a reasonable time after its termination ;' and an application to the 
 court must — to be successful — be made without undue delay, but 
 may be entertained by the court, whether a previous application 
 to the judge who tried the cause has or has not been mado.* In 
 no case will either the judge or the court deprive the successful 
 litigant of his costs unless for good cause.* The judfre, in exer- 
 cising his discretion, tnust assume the truth of the facts found by the 
 jury, but is not confined to the consideration of the party's conduct 
 in the course of the litigation, and may consider such of his pre- 
 vious acts as have conduced to the action.'' In an action in 
 which the defendant succeeds, he ought not to be deprived of costs 
 in the Queen's Bench Division, simply because such a result would 
 have followed in the old Court of Admiralty.' To ascertain 
 
 ' Qucere, Does this Riilo extend to 
 the Liverpool Pas.-ago Court ? See 
 King?'. Ilawksworth, 1879; and 36 
 & 37 V. c. 6G, § 91. 
 
 ' Turner v. Heyland, 1879; Collins 
 V. Welch, 1879 ; Marsden v. Lane. & 
 York. Ry. Co., 1881, C. A. 
 
 ^ See Kynaston v. Mackinden, 
 1870, C. A. 
 
 * See Myers v. Defries, and Siddons 
 V. Lawrence, 1879, C. A. ; Bowoy v. 
 Bell, 1878; Gen. St. Nav. Co. v. 
 Lond. & Ed. Ship. Co., 1877. 
 
 ' Everything which increases the 
 litigation and the costs, and which 
 places upon the defendant a burthen 
 which he ought not to bear in the 
 
 course of that litigation, is "good 
 cause for dejjriving jiliiintiff of lli^i 
 costs." Iluxloy V. East London lly. 
 Co., 1889 (Ld. Halsbury, L.C.). 
 
 « Harnett v. Vise, 1880, C. A. lu 
 Jones V. Curling, 1884, C. A., it was 
 held, Ist, that the facts must show 
 that it would be more just to dis- 
 allow than to allow the costs, as, for 
 instance, that there has been oppres- 
 sion or misconduct on the part of 
 the successful litigant ; 2nd, that the 
 question of costs is one respecting 
 which an appeal will lie. 
 
 ' Gen. St. Nav. Co. v. Lond. & Ed. 
 Ship. Co., 1877. 
 
 \ .• 
 
 !'ii:i 
 
 lii 
 
 I ' '"n 
 
 41 
 
 i.il! 
 
11: 
 
 B'S 
 
 
 it''*. 
 
 PRIVILKGKD COMMl'MCATIONS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 •whether there is or is not " good cause " the judge may not look 
 at commnnications made "without prejudice."' 
 
 § 39h. Attempts to determine the '^crrni," which, in the absence 
 of a special order, costs are to " follow," have given rise to much 
 controversy.^ In a general way it means the result of all the pro- 
 ceedings incident<al to the litigation ; so that among the costs which 
 follow it will be included the costs of all stages of that litigation, — 
 for example, the costs of a first trial wlieu a second has been 
 ordered.^ When a plaintiff has united several independent causes 
 of action, and has succeeded on some of the issues^ and failed on 
 the others, the term " event " is to be read distributively, and the 
 plaintiff will liave only the general costs of the cause, while the 
 defendant will get the costs of those issues on which he succeeds,* 
 although the fact of the great majority of the issues being found for 
 the defendant ma?/ be " good cause " for depriving plaintiff of the 
 general costs of the cause.* 
 
 § 40. Questions as to the construction of written documents 
 must next be discussed. Matters of great nicety arise in con- 
 nection with this subject. But the clear general rule is that the 
 construction of aU written documents is for the court alone. The 
 construction of these is, as we have said, for the court alone so soon 
 as the true meaning of the hwy/.s" in which they are couched, and 
 the smrounding circumstances, if any, have been ascertained as 
 facts by the jury ;" and it is the duty of the jury to take the con- 
 struction from the court, either absolutely, if there be no words to 
 be construed as words of art or phrases used in commerce, and no 
 surrounding circumstances to be ascertained;** or conditionally, 
 when tliose words or circumstances are necessarily referred to 
 them. Tlio term "written documents" includes Acts of Parlia- 
 ment, judicii.l records, deeds, wills, negotiable instruments, tigree- 
 
 li ■ : 
 
 » Wiill,-(>r V. Wiltshirn, 18S9, C. A. 
 
 « Soi! Ci.lliiis t'. Wi'lch. 187'J, C. A. 
 (BiaiiiwcU, L.J.) ; and Myers v, JJe- 
 Iriis, IST!). 
 
 ^ Field r. rit. North. IJy, Co., 1878; 
 Harris r. I'vthcrick, iAtS), 0. A.; 
 V.vs'vw r. Wri-ht, 1877, 0. A. 
 
 * My<T.s V. DolVios, 1881), 0. A. ; 
 Ellis V. Doilva, 1881, C.A.; Sparrow 
 
 V. Hill, 18S1. 
 
 * i'orstor v. Furquliar, 1893. 
 
 « Soo Ashfnrth7-. Rcdford, 187:5; 
 AU'xaiidi'r V. Vaudi'rzce, 1872. lUit 
 SCO IJowcH V. Sliaud, 1877, alHriuing 
 Shaiid I'. Howes, 187(5. 
 
 ' StM! Taiiivaco v. Lucas, ISOli; 
 Lyle ('. .Uicliai'lH, 18(1(5; D.otDevon- 
 tihiro t'. Neill (Ir.), 1877 (I'allos, 
 
 c.r..). 
 
 " Kej' V. Cotosworth, 18.32. Soo, 
 also, Lang i'. Smith, 1838, as to 
 iiiorciiiitik) visiiyo. 
 
 42 
 
CHAP. 
 
 I...] 
 
 CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. 
 
 monts, and letters. A Misconstruction by the court is the proper 
 puhjeet of appeal to a court of error ; but a misconstruction by the 
 jury cannot in any way be effectually set right.' The effect of 
 the rule consequently is to render > law certain. A marked 
 instatu'c of its application occurs in the case of the construction of 
 the s{)C(;ification of a patent, for though the interpretation of such 
 an instrument, — relating as it does to matters of science and skill, 
 — would seem peculiarly adapted to the practical information of 
 jurors, the court must construe it^ after merely ascertaining from 
 the jury an explanation of technical terras.^ Again, the construc- 
 tion of all written contracts is for the court. Where a contract for 
 the sale of barley was in letters, one of which offered good barley, 
 and the other accepted the offer, " expecting you will give us fine 
 barley and good weight," it was held, that the jury (though they 
 might be asked as to the mercantile meaning of the words " good " 
 and "fine"), after having found that there was a distinction 
 between the two terras employed, could not further decide that 
 the parties did not misunderstand each other, but that they were 
 bound to take the interpretation of the contract, as a matter of 
 law, from the judge.* So, too, it is for the court to decide, as 
 matter of law, whether the sum mentioned in an agreement as to be 
 
 ' Judgment in Noilson v. Hiirford, 
 1841. 
 
 2 Noilson V. Harford, 1841 ; Bovill 
 r. I'imm, 1S,')6. Those oases virtuiilly 
 ovi'rrulo llill v. Thompson, 1817, 
 whoro Ld. Kldon obstM'vcd, that tho 
 inlillu/iliiliti/ of the dencriiition of a 
 i-lH'cific!iti(>n was a matter of faot. 
 In Aiiioiioa the s-ullicioiioy of the 
 dcscrijjtion in a sjiocilioatiou is still 
 lolt as a (luostion of fact to bo dotoi- 
 ininod by thi^ jury, unless the stuto- 
 moiit bo obviously too vapuo. Wood 
 r. Undorliill (Am,), 1847. bui in 
 I'iU^Miind, whoro in a jiatont oatiso the 
 want of novelty a])})ears distinctlj' 
 from documents, such, for instance, 
 as a ])rior patent and spooitioatiou, 
 tht! judp', and not the jury, must 
 notict! tlio identity of the two sup- 
 jjosc'd invontioMM, and the consoijuont 
 want of nnvclty in tlio second. Hush 
 t'. Fox, l.S,')(); llooth )', Ketuiard, 
 1868; IJilia v, London Gaslight Co., 
 
 1860 ; Betts v. Menzies, 1859. See, 
 toi), Betts V. Menzies, 18G2, 11. L. ; 
 and Seed v. Higjijins, 18()(), U. L. 
 But sec also the observations of Ld. 
 Westbury, C, on Bush v. l''ox, 1856, 
 and the law supposed to bo thoro 
 laid down, in Hills v. Evans, 1862. 
 
 3 Hills c. Evans, 1862. 
 
 * Hutchison c.Bowker, is,t!l, whore 
 Parke, B., ol)served, " It is the duty 
 of the court to construe all written 
 instruments; if thoro an; ])rciiliar 
 expressions used in it, which have, 
 in })iU'ticular places oi' trades, a known 
 meaning attacheil to them, it is for 
 the jiinj to say what the iixiiiiiiii/ nf 
 t/i(i.fr i:riin'K'>iiiii.< was, but for the cnrt 
 to (li'cid(^ what tlio iii>'tiiiiii(/ of the 
 riiulviicl was," See also Bourne v. 
 (iatlifre. 1841 ; Urilliths v. Bigby, 
 1856; Hills i\ London (bislight Co,, 
 1858; Kirkland v. Nisbet, 1859; 
 Montgomery v. Middle ton, 1862. 
 
 4;"i 
 
 inliii 
 
 i! 
 
Si i 
 
 
 
 CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMKNTS. 
 
 [part T. 
 
 paid for a breach thereof is a penalty or liquidated damages;^ 
 whether a letter containing no words of doubtful trade meaning, 
 and as to which the extrinsic facts are not in controversy, amounts 
 to a guarantee ;' or whether* a written acknowledgment of a debt,'' 
 or of title,^ is sufficient to take the case out of the statutes of 
 limitation. On this last subject it will indeed, in a doubtful ca^t^ 
 be prudent for the judge both to express his own opinion, and also 
 to take the opinion of the jury.' Moreover, whenever a document 
 is connected with other evidence affecting its construction, the 
 whole must be submitted to the jury together.* 
 
 § 41. Letters, as mentioned in the preceding section, fall within 
 the general rule as to "written documents."" Their construction, 
 consequently, unless, indeed, extrinsic circumstances be capable of 
 explaining them, is for the court, no matter how ambiguous the lan- 
 guage in which they are couched.'" If, however, letters be written 
 in BO drbious a manner as to bear different construi-tions, but can 
 be explained by other transactions, the jiu-y (who are clearly the 
 judges of the truth or falsehood of such collateral facts which may 
 vary the senee of the letters themselves) must doeido upon the whole 
 evidence." Accordingly, on a question whether the defendant had 
 adopted the acceptance of a bill, the construction of a letter written 
 by him on the subject, taken in connection with his subsequent 
 conduct, was held to be entirely for the jury.'^ Whenever, too, 
 a contract has to be made out partly by letters, and partly by 
 parol evidence, the jury must deal wiih the whole question.'* If a 
 document bo lost, and oral evidence be given of its contents, the 
 judge must construe its meaning in the same manner as if it had 
 been produced, but here again the jury may be asked if they 
 
 > SooWallisv. Smith, 1882. 
 
 » Huiiitor t). ForguHon, 1849(Wil(lo, 
 C.J.). Fornu'i'ly tJiis was occusion- 
 uUy Itift to tlui lury. Suo C.'riwluo v. 
 lic.lton, 1N27 (H'cHt, C.J.). 
 
 •' Uk. of Montioal v. Munstor Dk., 
 187G. 
 
 * Son, contni, Lloyd v. Maiiiul, 
 1788; LiiiHcll 1'. liimncr, 18,'!,). 
 
 " Moncll ('. Frith, 18:i8; Jiout- 
 Icil'Tii I'. Raui.say, WM (Ld. Duii- 
 iiiaii). 
 
 « ] )on»'. Edmonds, 1810 (I'liiko, M.). 
 
 ' Biickot V. Churcli, 1810 (I'liiki', 
 
 B.) ; Mom^ll i-. Frith, 18;i8 (id.). 
 
 * l?;)utl('dpo V. liainwiy, 18U,S (l,d. 
 l)(!iniii!u); Morrcll v. Frith 18;i8; 
 Moori! I', (jliirwood, 18lit; AHlijiitcl v, 
 S»!n'(iiiil)(% 18,j(); Foster v. Mentor 
 Life Ahs. Co., IH.VI. 
 
 » Berwick r. llorsfall, 1858. 
 
 '" Furness r. :Meck, 18()2. 
 
 " MiicImmUIi r. ilaldimand, l"8rt 
 (Buller, J.); Smith r. Thiim])son, 
 181!). See IaIo r. IJichurdN, |.S(i7. 
 
 '- AVilkiiiHiin r. Storey, 18;;!). Suo 
 Hiook r. lldok, 1871. 
 
 '^ B(jlukow V, Seymour, 1804. 
 
 44 
 
CHAP, in.] CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMKNTS. 
 
 l)i'lioVG oral evidoiico wliiiih lias been givea aa to tlie (urourastances 
 of tlio allcgod loss.' 
 
 § 42. An excioption to the general rule of law whioh intrusts 
 the judge with tiie construction of all written documents arises 
 whore the writing forms the subject of an indictment or an 
 action, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant depends upon 
 the popular meaning of the language employed. Thus, the legis- 
 lature, after much discussion,^ has oxi)roHsly determined^ that, 
 on a prosecution for libel, the question whothor the particular i)ub- 
 lioation is a libel or not, sliall always be entirely for the jury. 
 Even hero the judge may, as a matter of advice to them, give his 
 own opinion respecting the nature of the publication, though he is 
 not in point of law bound to do so.* The statute here referred 
 to is in strictness only applicable to criminal trials, but as it is 
 a declaratory Act, its provisions liave in practice been adopted 
 in civil actions for libel, and it has now for a series of years 
 been the course for the judge, — who still has to decide whether the 
 words complained of are reasonably capable of bearing the dofa- 
 
 ' B(>rwick v. HorsfiiU, 1838. 
 
 ''■ As to this (•oliibriitod dispute, in 
 suiiiJDit of tho cliiims of tho judj^ea, 
 sec R. ,K Udall, li390; 11. v. Wood- 
 fall, 177()(Iid. MiinsHold); R. v. Doiin 
 of St. Asiii)h, 17S;i Hid. Munsfuild); 
 mid in supjiort of tlio rights of tho 
 jury, li. V. Tiitchin, 1704 (Ld. Holt) ; 
 li. V. Owoii, 17.V2 ; R. v. J)oiin of St. 
 Asiijih, 17K.'J (VVillcs, J., and Ld. 
 KUonborough). As to tho procood- 
 in^js in thu llouso of Lords on tho 
 passingof " Tho Lib.il Act" (32 G. 3, 
 c. ()(»), soo 22 How. St. Tr. 2i)4, 2!)7. 
 
 ' \V1 (J. 3, c. (id (commonly callod 
 " l'"ox's Libol Act"), declares and 
 eiiuL'ts (§ 1 ) that, on every trial of an 
 indictment or infm'mation for a libel, 
 " the jury sworn to try the issue may 
 give a general verdict of guilty or 
 not guilty ui)on tho whole matter ^)ut 
 ill issue ujum such indictment or in- 
 formation ; and shall not bo re<iuirod 
 or directed by the court or judga, 
 
 before whom such indictment or in- 
 formation shall be tried, to find tlio 
 d(!fendant or defendants guilty, 
 merely on the proof of tho publica- 
 tion bj' such defendant or defendants 
 of tho paper charged to be a libel, 
 and of the sense ascrib^>d to the same 
 in such indictment or information." 
 § 2 provides, that, " on every such 
 trial, tho court or judge, beforti whom 
 such indictment or information shall 
 bo tried, m/ki/I,' according to their 
 or his discretion, give their or liis 
 opinion and direi;tions to the jury 
 on the matter in issue between the 
 King and tho defendant or defen- 
 dants as ''n other criminal cases." 
 § 3 ^)rovide.- that a jin-y nuiy find a 
 special verdici , "ti-? §4 reserves to 
 defendants a right to move in arrest 
 of judgment. 
 
 * Per Parke, B., in Parmitor v. 
 Coupland, 1840. 
 
 • It has boeu said that tho word " shall" should hero be interprotod as if 
 the word " may" hud buon used. Uaylis v. Luwrenco, 1840 (lattloduie, J.). 
 
 liiilfi 
 
 i , il 
 
I 
 i 
 
 LI B EL — TH REA'n:X I NG LETTI:RS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 matory meaning ascribed to them by the plaintiff,'— to firet give 
 a legal definition of the offence, and then leave the jury to deter- 
 mine whether the writing complained of falls within that definition 
 or not.' It is, indeed, not absolutely necessary that the judge 
 should explain what constitutes a libel, but he may leave the whole 
 question without reserve to the jury.' If, however, they find a 
 verdict against the defendant, either on an indictment or an action, 
 the court will arrest the judgment, where the writing on the face 
 of it is not libellous.* 
 
 § 43. The respective duties of the judge and jury on indictments 
 for writing threatening letters ' are not very clearly defined. In 
 some cases the jury have been permitted, upon examination of the 
 paper, to decide for themselves whether or not it contained a 
 menace.^ In other cases, the question appears to have been ex- 
 clusively determined by the court ; ' while on a few occasions the 
 opinion of the jury, and of the judge, have been both alternatively 
 taken.^ On a question as to ti <^ construction of a writing written 
 by defendant and alleged to be libellous, other libels by the defen- 
 dant are admissible''* both as to construction and to show malice.'" 
 
 § 44. In connection with the subject of libel, it should be men- 
 tioned that it is a question of law for the court whether a eoinmuni- 
 cation be privileged or not. If, indeed, the privilege claimed be of 
 a character that it is on public grounds regarded as almolute,^^ the 
 jury must first determine what the circumstances were under which 
 the communication was made, and also whether such communica- 
 tion was made bom file. They ought to find bona Jiden unless the 
 evidence be sufficient to raise a probability that the communication 
 was colourably made.'^ After they have found the facts and deter- 
 
 ' Hunt V, GoiiiUiiko, IH'.'J ; Start 
 V. Uliifif,', lfi-47 (Wihl.N C.J.). 
 2 I'iiiiiiitcr >\ Coiiplaiid, 1H40. 
 ' Kiivlis II. Liiwreii(^((, 1.S41. 
 
 • llc'uiiio V. Stowoll, 1S4(); Gold- 
 stein V. Foss, 1H27 ; I'liniiitoi- v, 
 Coupland, 1840 (AldoiHon, H.). 
 
 ° As to wliioh, Hoo 24 & '2") V. c. 9() 
 (" Tho Ijiimfiiy Act, IHOl "), •§§ 44, 40. 
 
 • 11. V. Oirdwood, 1770. 
 
 ' R. V. Smith, l«4i) ; R. v. Pick- 
 ford. 1h;jo. 
 
 • R. V. Robinson, 1706; R.v.Coady, 
 
 18H2. 
 
 " I'lolton V. O'nrii-n, 188,",. 
 
 •" iJiirrott V. l.on.i,', iN.il, II. L. 
 Tlioujj;li tho jury iiro iisiinlly cati- 
 tioncd not to ;j;ivt) diiiiiiiiics for thoin, 
 tho omission of sucli caution is not ii 
 misdirection. Darby v, Ouaoloy, 
 18,j(). 
 
 " As to such ubsohito jtriviiegc, 
 800 Dawkins v. I'uulct, lisdi); and 
 Dawkins v. lid. Roknby, 187.'{. 
 
 " Taylor I'. Hawkins, 18.51; Somer* 
 villo i;. Hawkins, 1851. 
 
 46 
 
ClIAP. III.] QUKSTIONS OF FACT FOR JURY. 
 
 rained the questioa of bona fides, the judge must decide, as a 
 question of law, whether the occasion of the publication was such 
 as to rebut the inference of malice.' If, however, any doubt exist 
 as to whether or not the defendant in some respects exceedf d the 
 limits of his privilege, and made comments, which may be evidence 
 of nvtual malice, the opinion of the jury must be taken upon the 
 effect of such evidence.^ 
 
 § 45. On an indictment for perjury, it is still a moot point 
 whether the materiality of the matter in wliiuh the false swearing 
 is proved, is a question of fact for the jury, or a question of law for 
 the judge. According to the better opinion, it ought to be regarded 
 in the latter light.' 
 
 § 45a. All questions of mere fact are for the decision of a jury, 
 unaided by any positive legal rules — it being the duty of the judge 
 merely to take care that tliey are not misled by anything coming 
 out in the evidence.* Questions of this description are as to ])er- 
 missive occupation ; * the assent of an executor to a bequest f the 
 unsoundness of a horse ;' the delivery of a document as an escrow, 
 unless the question turn solely on the construction of writings ; * 
 the infringement of a patent," where such infringement does not 
 depend merely on the construction of the specification •,'" the novelty 
 of a design, within the meaning of the Acts relating to copyright 
 of design for articles of manufacture ; " the existence of a nuisance, 
 as caused by erecting a bridge or weir in a navigable stream ;"^ the 
 definition of the word " street," '^ excef)t in certain cases Avhere the 
 term has been employed in an Act of I'arliament ; '* tlio seawortlii- 
 
 ' C()xh(wh'. Richiirds, 1H4()(Civhs- 
 woll, J.; Coltirmii, J.); Stiico v. 
 Grillith, 18(i(). 
 
 ' Cdokc r. Wililos, 18Jj. 
 
 ' S(<i) iind compiiro 11. v, Courtney, 
 lH.-)(i (Ir.) ; II, V. Liivoy, l.S.)(); 11, v. 
 Dmistiin, 1H24. 
 
 * I 'it lid. Aliiiij^or, in ^[iK^kiiito.sh 
 V. Mui!*liiill, 1H4:J. 
 
 ' JjOHswi of I'liiijMo V. Fahy, 1H;J2 
 (Ir.); Jouos I'. Boliiiid, 1810 (Ir,^; but 
 Hoo Wliitmcre v. SymoudM, 1808. 
 
 ° Miison V, Fiirnidl, 184-1, oven 
 thoufi;h " the quostion dopcuidw ujion 
 tho niroful und woniowhiit critical 
 coiniiarison of tho tonus of a dood 
 with the uthur circumMtaucu8 and 
 
 facts of tho I'lisc." Pit Ahh^r.-iou. H., 
 prouinuH'ing tlio juiljjjiiuMit of tho 
 court. Soo, idso, i'lUiott v. Elliott, 
 1811 (lid. .\l)iii-iT.). 
 
 ' Si'o ])i'r I'atti'soii, J,, in Haylis i\ 
 Lawri'Ui'o, 1810. 
 
 •^ Funx'ss V. iMcck. 18,-)8, II. I;. 
 Sec auto, § 41, post, § 18;i4. 
 
 " Do la Huo /'. Dicki'usou, 18J7 ; 
 Lister V. IjcatluT, 18,')8. 
 
 •0 Sood r. lliKt,'ins, 1 800, 11. L. 
 See post, § 43. 
 
 " Harrison v. Tav'.or, 18(i0. 
 
 " K. u. Ilotts, 1800 ; 1{. V. lluasoU, 
 1827 ; 11. V. Ward. 18;i(i. 
 
 " 1{. r. FuUforil, 1801. 
 
 '* Kobiusou V. Local board of Bar- 
 
 il 
 
 'I 
 
 ; ( 
 
 i:: 
 
 Mi 
 
 IH 
 
 lU 
 
QUESTIONS FOR JURY — NECESSARIES. [PART I. 
 
 r 
 
 nesB of a ship ; * the construction of a policy of insurance, shown 
 by evidence to contain a latent ambiguity;^ the materiality of 
 facts not communicated in effecting an insurance;' the competency 
 of a testator in a will cause, and his freedom from undue influence;* 
 the cruelty of a husband as a ground for judicial separation ;* the 
 condonation of a conjugal offence;^ whether there has been an 
 acceptance of goods sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds;' 
 whether a tender be absolute or conditional.^ The court, however, 
 in the last-named case, should be mindful to point out that a tender 
 is not invalid in law as being conditional, if it merely implies that 
 the debtor admits no more to be due, but that to make it bad it 
 must go further, and imply that the creditor, if he takes the sura 
 offered, will admit that his entire claim is satisfied.^ The jury 
 have also, in any question relating to the amount of interest payable 
 on a foreign bill of exchange, to determine as facts, first, what rate 
 of interest is usually paid at the respective places where the bill was 
 drawn or indoi-sed or accepted, and next, whether the plaintiff has 
 sustained any damage requiring the payment of interest at all ; but 
 the judge will decide as a pure question of law, whether the case is 
 to be governed lege loci confrfiefm, or ler/e loci solutionis '' 
 
 § 4(5. Among other matters of fact it is for a jury to decide 
 whether articles supplied to an infant be necessaries . but, as to this, 
 their decision is suhjict to the control of the judges,'^ who have laid 
 down general rules of law, as follow : first, the question whether 
 articles are necessaries or not does not, in any degree, depend upon 
 what allowance the infant may have received from his father, and 
 may have misapplied ; '^ secondly, the articles must be really useful, 
 
 ton, 1 882 ; Maude v. Baildon Local 
 Board, 1883. 
 
 ' Clifford V. Hunter, 1827 (Ld. 
 Tcnterdcn). 
 
 * Ilordorn v. Commercial Union, 
 Ac, 1887. 
 
 * Eiiwlings V. DesLorough, 1840 
 (Ld. Denmau), 
 
 « Purdon V. Ld. Longford, 1877 
 dr.). 
 
 * Tomkms v. Tomkins, 1859. 
 
 * Peacock v. Peacock, 1859. 
 
 ' Lillywhito v, Devereux, 1846 ; 
 Aldovson, B., recognising Edan v. 
 Dudfiold, 1841; Clark v. Wright, 
 1860 (Ir.). 
 
 * Eckstein i'. Rej-nnlds, 1837 ; 
 Marsden v. Goode, 1845. 
 
 ' Bo won V. Owen, 1847 ; Bull v, 
 Parker, 1843 ; Henwood v. Oliver, 
 1841. 
 
 '0 Gibbs V. Fremont, 1853. See 
 further on this subject, post, § 47. 
 
 >' Harrison v. Fane, 1840 (Tiiidal, 
 C.J.) ; Ryder v. Wombwell, 1868. 
 
 » Biui'hart v. Hall, 1839; Peters 
 V. Fleming, 1840. But see Barnes v. 
 Toye, 1884, whore it was held that, 
 on a qiiO'*tinn of necessaries, an in- 
 fant might prove that at the duto of 
 the salo ho was suflRciently supplied 
 with other similar goods. 
 
 48 
 
m 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 INFANT — NECESSAi;iKS. 
 
 and therefore merely ornamental jewellery/ or luxiirious confec- 
 tionery,^ cannot be uece&saries ; and, thirdly, articles, even if 
 useful, must be such as would be necessary and suitable to the 
 degree and station in life of the infant/* The judge determines 
 whether the articles are capable of being necessaries, regard being 
 had to the position of the defendant ; and if he decide this in the 
 alPrraative, the jury say whether, under the circumptances, they 
 actually were necessaries or not.* Funeral expenses incurred on 
 her husband's death by an infant widow ;* legal expenses incurred 
 by an infant bride on marriage,^ and a gold watch and chain for 
 an undergraduate,' are all capable of being " necessaries." But a 
 pair of jewelled solitaires and a silver-gilt goblet cannot be '" neces- 
 saries."' And in a case where the jury, in opposition to tho 
 opinion of the judge, found that the hiring of horses and gigs were 
 " necessaries " for an Oxford undergraduate, who was the younger 
 son of a man of fortune, but kept a horse of his own, the court 
 set aside the verdict as perverse, and granted a new trial;"* the 
 same course was jjursued, where an Irissli jury had found that a 
 hunter was *' necessary " for a mere boy." 
 
 § 47. Questions as to the meaning of particular expressions have 
 already been seen to be in all criminal cases — and this even when 
 they are in writing — entirely for the jury.'" Speaking generally, 
 it may be said that the meaning of expressions is in most cases 
 to be determined by a jury. The power of a jury to interpret 
 expressions is not confined merely to such as are employed in con- 
 tracts, or have a peculiar commercial meaning. It extends to all 
 phrases, capable of being used in a technical sense, which do not 
 require any knowledge of the law to explain them. Accordingly, 
 the courts have more than once refused to entertain the question, 
 whether an excavation is or is not a mine," and as such not rate- 
 
 
 
 ' Rydor u. Woiubwell, 18GS, supra. 
 
 » Ihoiikor V. Scott, 1843 ; Wharton 
 r. Mackenzie, 1844, and Cripps v. 
 Hills, 1814. 
 
 s Peters v. Flem.ng, 1840. 
 
 ♦ See Skrine v. Gordon (Ir.^ i7jra, 
 and Cripps v. Hills ' ',44, supra. 
 
 '' Chappie V. Cooper, 1844, 
 
 • Helps V. Clayton, 1864. 
 ' l^'tor8 V. I'loming, 1840, 
 " Harrison v. Fane, 1840. 
 
 T. — vni,. I. 49 
 
 • Skrino v, Gordon, 1875 (Ir.); so 
 in Wharton v, Mackenzie, 1844, and 
 Cripps V. Hills, 1844, whore juries 
 decided that wine parties and suppers 
 were necessaries for undergraduatoa. 
 
 '" Ante, 9 42. 
 
 " Any question as to whether a 
 mine is a mine within the meaning 
 of the Mining Acts "shall be referred 
 to a Secretary of State, whose deci- 
 sion thereon shall be final." 50 & 51 
 
 
 ' j 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 , 
 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 ' 
 
 
 1 
 
 ' 
 
^♦ili 
 
 
 MEANING OF TECHNICAL PHRASES. 
 
 fPAUT r. 
 
 able to tho relief of the poor, and have left the Sessions to apply 
 to the question, as one of fact, the information they possess, and 
 their knowledge of the English language,' declining to lay down 
 any legal principle, except that the method of working is to be con- 
 sidered, and not the chemical or geological character of the produce.* 
 It also is exclusively for a jury to say whether what is proved to 
 have taken place is or is not " a representation " of a dramatic work, 
 so as to subject the person representing it to penalties under the 
 A<tt of 3 & 4 W. 4, 0. 15 (" The Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833 ").» 
 If, however, a word of doul.tful import be used in an Act of Par- 
 liament, its general meaning ought to be explained to the jury by 
 the judge ; and accordingly where, on the trial of an issue whet!-jer 
 a railway was passing through " a town," within the meaning of 
 the Railway CI '.uses Consolidation Act, the jtidge merely told the 
 jury that the word "town" was to be understood in its ordinary 
 and popular sense, the omission to give them any further instrui- 
 tion was held to constitute a misdirection, and a new trial Viis 
 granted.* But the inspection of a record is a matter within 
 the peculiar province of the court; and a jury will not be allowed 
 to examine a record, for the purpose of giving their opinion as to 
 what word has been written above an erasure.* 
 
 § 48. Questions as to whether a/orriffn law, &c. exists or not p.ivv 
 as we have already seen,'' entirely matters to be found an facts by a 
 jury. Foreign' laws, usages and customo cannot be judicially 
 noticed, but must be proved as facts in each particular case,* find 
 found by the jury. In such cases, the abstract mcaniiig as well as 
 the euMcncc of the law must, in general, be determined by tue jury 
 
 v. 0. .58, § 71 ; and 35 & 3G V. c. 77, 
 
 ' li. V. Sodgoley, 1831 ; R. v. Bret- 
 tull. 1832; 11. V. Duiisford, 183j. 
 " Till' Court of Quarter Sessions are 
 judj^es of law and fact. The appeal 
 to tho Queen's Henuh is confined to 
 questions of law. The distinction, 
 therefore, hi'tweeu tho respective pro- 
 vinces of tho two courts ia so far 
 analojfous to the distinction under 
 discussion as lo justify the drawing 
 of illustrations from cases of appeal." 
 
 - See Darvill v. Koper, 1855 ; Bell 
 V. Wilson, 1866 ; Dow. Ducli. of 
 Clnvelmd ?i. Meyrick, 1868 (Malins, 
 \'.-( '.). ijut see Jones r. Cwiriorthen 
 Slate Co., 1879. Sec, also, iNJdl. lly. 
 
 Co. V. Haunchwood Briok and Tile 
 Co., 1882. 
 
 » Planche v. Braham, 1837. 
 
 * Elliott V. South Devon Ry. Co., 
 1848. 
 
 » R. V. Ilucks, 1816 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough). 
 
 * Ante, § 5. 
 
 ' As to colonial laws, see ante, § 9. 
 
 * Although a point of foreign law 
 may have been proved and acted 
 upon in one court, another court will 
 not rely upon the report of such a 
 case, but will require fresh proof of 
 the law,. as a matter of fact, on each 
 particular occasion : M'Cormick v. 
 Garuott, 1854 (Knight- Bruce, L.J.). 
 
 50 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 FOREIGN LAWS. 
 
 on the testimony of the skilled witnesses.' It is, however, the duty 
 of the court to decide, first, as to the competent knowledge of the 
 witnesses ca'.i,'d;'* next, as to the admissibility of the documents 
 by which they seek to refresh their memory ; and lastly,' as to the 
 speoial applicability of the law, when proved, to the particular 
 matter in controversy.* Even where the admissibility or inadmissi- 
 bility of certain evidence depends on its exiistence or interj)rctation, 
 proof of a foreign law should exclusively be addressed to the court, 
 just as in other cases where a question respecting the admissibility 
 of evidence rests upon disputed facts.* Perhaps, indeed, as the 
 object of the proof of foreign aw is to enable the court to instruct 
 the jury respecting its bearing on the case in hand, it will always 
 bo advisable for the judge to assist the jury in ascertaining what 
 the law really is.* 
 
 § 49. Before leaving the subject of foreign law, it must be pointed 
 out that the rules of evidence adopted in one country, — whether 
 established by the practice of its courts, or enacted by its legisla- 
 ture, — will not regulate the proceedings of courts in another 
 country, when transactions in the first-named country become the 
 subject of investigation in the latter.' The lew- fori governs every 
 court upon all questions of evidence. Such questions as whether 
 a witness is competent or not ; whether a certain matter requires 
 tc be proved by writing or not ; whether certain evidence proves a 
 certain fact or not, must be determined, not lege loci contrm'tun, but 
 by the law of the country where the question arises, where the 
 remedy is sought to be enforced, and where the court sits to enforce 
 it.* Thus, where (before the Evidence Amendment Act of 1851 ") 
 the assignees of an English bankrupt sued in Calcutta, the bank- 
 ruptcy and the assignment could not bo proved in the Calcutta 
 court by producing copies of the proceedings in the Bankruptcy 
 Court, purporting to bear the seal of that court, and to be signed 
 
 ' E. V. Picton, 1806. 
 
 * Bristow V. Sequeville, 1850. The 
 whole of this subject will be di.8- 
 cussed, post, §§ 1423—1425. 
 
 * See Sussex Peer, case, 1844; 
 Ld. Nelson v. I A. Bridport, 1844. 
 
 * Story, Contl. (Am.), § 638. 
 
 » Tiasher v. Everhurt, 1831 (Am.) ; 
 Story, Confl. (Am.), § 638, n. 3, ante, 
 § 23. 
 
 « See Story, Confl. (Am.), § 638; 
 Mostyu V. Tabiigas, 1774 (Ld. Mans- 
 field) ; Disora ('. Phillips, 1863. 
 
 ' Clark V. MuUick, 1840 (Ld. 
 Brouf^ham), infra. 
 
 * Bain v. Whitehaven, &c. June. 
 iiy. Co., 1850 (Ld. Brougham) 
 (H. L.). 
 
 e 14 & 15 V. c. 99, §§ 11 and 19. 
 
 '* I . 
 
 
 ll! 
 
 m 
 
 61 
 
 V.2 
 
 M 'I P 
 
 
w 
 
 m 
 
 r • 
 
 
 1( lU . . 
 
 
 'rill 
 
 1 |i 
 
 
 1 
 
 III 
 
 n 
 
 |l 
 
 :\ 
 
 
 1 " 
 
 
 
 1 \h. 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 [\ 
 
 
 
 *1 1 ■ ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 rOUKKJN RULES OF KVIDENCE. 
 
 [PAKT I 
 
 by the Clerk of Enrolniints>, for such evidence, although sufReient in 
 English courts of justice, was not then admissible in India.' Again, 
 although by Scotch law, all instruments prepared and witnessed 
 according to the provisions of the Scotch Act of 1^*<1 are probative 
 writs, and may be given in evidence in a aourt without 
 
 any proof, in an English court, the mere production of such a 
 Scotch instrument would not suffice, but it would be necessary to 
 call one or other of the attesting witnesses.' A copy of a charter- 
 party which has been verified in accordance with the law of the 
 place where it was entered into, cannot on that account be received 
 in an English court, but is inadmissible there.' Several other oases 
 might be cited to the same effect;* and in all, the distinction is 
 recognised between the cause of action, which must be judged of 
 according to the law of the country where it originated, and the 
 mode ofprocecdiiif/, including of course the rules of evidence, which 
 must be adopted as it happens to exist in the country where the 
 action is brought.' 
 
 § 49a. English courts-martial held abroad are expressly excepted 
 from the general rule that the lex fori governs the laws of evidence. 
 For the Army Act, 1881,^ enacts, first, that " a court-martial 
 under this Act shall not, as respects the conduct of its proceedings, 
 or the reception or rejection of evidence, or as respects any other 
 matter or thing whatsoever, be subject to the provisions of the 
 Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or to any Act, law, or ordinance of any 
 legislatu'-e whatsoever, other than the Parliament of the United 
 Kingdom ;" and next, that " the rules of evidence to be adopted in 
 proceedings before courts-martial shall be the same as those which 
 are followed in civil courts in England ; and no person shall be 
 required to answer any question or to produce any documents, 
 which he could not be required to answer or produce in similar 
 proceedings before a civil court." 
 
 > Clark y. Mullick, 1840. 
 
 * Yates V. Thomson, 1833 (Ld. 
 Broufj;liain). 
 
 ■> Brown v. Thornton, 1837. 
 
 * Ti'imbey V. Vignier, 1834; Huber 
 V. Steiner, 1835 ; British Linen Co. 
 V. Druuimond, 1830; ipleton v. 
 Ld. Braybrook, 1816; Blaik v. Bray- 
 
 brook, 1816; Don y.Lippmann, 1837; 
 Leroux v. Brown, 1852; Finlay v. 
 Finlay, 18G2. 
 
 * Mostyn v, Fabrigas, 1774. See 
 also Story, Confl. (Am.), §■} 556 et seq. 
 and 629—636. 
 
 • 44 & 46 V. c. 58, §5 127 and 128. 
 
 63 
 
cii-vr. III.] 
 
 A.MKItlC'AN NOTIiS. 
 
 52» 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 Law and Fact. — The Hue of distinction between matter of law 
 and matter of fact by no means follows the same lines as the divi- 
 sion of judicial functions between the court and the jury. The 
 action of the jury is confined to deciding such facts as are involved 
 in the issue raised by the pleadings in the case, or by the nature of 
 the particular investigation. These are what may be called the 
 ultimate facts. It is to such facts alone that the evidence sub- 
 mitted to the jury is limited. State v. Hodge, 50 N. H. 510, 522 
 (18G9). Various dicta, indeed, speak of a wider power on tlie part 
 of the jury. Thus Judge Story, in denying the right of the jury to 
 judge of the law in criminal causes, says : " 1 hold it the most 
 sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that 
 the jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the 
 law." U. S. V. Battiste, 2 Sumn. 240 (1835) ; Townsend v. State, 
 2 Blackf. 151 (1828). That it is the duty of the jury, even in 
 criminal cases, to take the law from the court, see liobbins v. State, 
 8 Oh. St. 131 (1857) ; Duffy v. People, 26 N. Y. 588 (1863) ; Com. 
 V. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185 (1855) ; Battre v. State, 18 Ala. 119 (1850); 
 I'ierce v. State, 13 N. II. 536 (1843); Hardy v. State, 7 Mo. 607 
 (1842); Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151 (1828); State v. Hodge, 
 50 N. H. 521 (1869). "The jury are not judges of the law in any 
 case, civil or criminal. Neither at common law, nor under the con- 
 stitution of Pennsylvania, is the determination of the law any part 
 of tiieir duty or their right." Com. ;;. McManus, 143 Pa. St. 64, 86 
 (1891); Higginbotham v. Campbell, 85 Ga. 638 (1890). Counsel 
 can address the jury on all questions of law within the issue. Cora. 
 V. I'orter, 10 ]\Ietc. 263 (1845). Under these decisions all questions 
 of domestic law are for the court ; some questions of fact are for 
 the jury. 
 
 To the contrary, see State i>. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849) ; State v. 
 Jurche, 17 La. Ann. 71 (18()5) ; Nelson v. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.), 
 482 (1852); State v. Snow, 18 Me. 346 (1841); Montee v. Com., 3 
 J. J. Marsh. 132, 151 (1830). 
 
 CoNSTRucTiox OP WRITINGS. — Though construction of writ- 
 ten documents is in most cases merely attempting to ascertain a 
 fact, viz., the intention set forth in it, tlie duty of construction is a 
 function of the court. In Hamilton r. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co., 136 
 U. S. 242 (1889), it is said that " the construction of the correspon- 
 dence in writing between the parties," presents " a pure question 
 of law." The same phrase is employed in Allen v. Frost, 62 Ga. 659 
 (1879). Probably the rule had its inception in the fact that in 
 early days juries could noi read. It owes its continuance to reasons 
 
 him 
 
 i 
 
 i I'l P! 
 
 ■lilHH 
 
 i; 
 
Ill 
 
 §m 
 
 i 
 
 I':, 
 
 52« 
 
 AMKUrcAN NOTKS. 
 
 [PAUT I. 
 
 of policy find conveiiii'iKM'. Morse v. Weymouth, 28 Vt. SUl (isrwi); 
 Allen />. Frost, (!li Gil. (;r)'J (l.S7<)); Jl. k/Co. /•. McKcniiii, l;{ Lea, 
 2S() (1.SH4) ; .loii"S 0. Sweiiri,!-,'*'!!, 4'J S. C. .W, (57 (181)4) ; I.imlsiiy 
 V. Hiunbui-g, &c. Ins. Co., 115 N. C. L'12 (1894). 
 
 " Where a contract is oral, the (iiu-slion wliat tlic contract is 
 must, it' controverted, be tried by the jury as a qiu'stion of fact; 
 but where the terms of a contract are un<lisi)uted, its construction 
 and effect, where the contract is oral as well as where it is written, 
 are to be determined by the court.'' Globe Works c. Wrij.(ht, 1(M> 
 Mass. 207 (1870). This duty of construction may, at times, princi- 
 pally involve a (question of the meaning of words, of which the 
 court takes judicial cognisance ; e. //., whether the term " Congrega- 
 tional persuasion" means theological doctrine, or merely (^liurch 
 government, so as to embrace a " Unitarian clergyman." Atty.- 
 Gen. IK Dublin, 3S N. II. 459 (1859). The court may be aided "by 
 experts in reading a document, e. (j., railroad orders. K. K. v. 
 McKenna, 13 Lea, 280 (1884). It is error to submit the question of 
 the construction of a deed to the jury " withoiit limitation or 
 restriction, and witlumt si)ecitic instruction." but if the jury take 
 the correct view, a new trial will not be granted. Morse v. Wey- 
 mouth, 28 Vt. 824 (185(i). 
 
 While '"the construction of a written document, where the mean- 
 ing is to be collected from the document itself, is matter of pure 
 law and for the court," its nu'aning, if to be determined by refer- 
 ence to extrinsic facts or usages, must be submitted to the jury as a 
 question of fact under approjjriate instructions, (iibbs v. Gilead, 
 &c. Society, 38 C(;nn. 15; J871). W^hether the printed regulations 
 of a railroad applied to a particular train is a question of construc- 
 tion for the court, and it is error to submit it to the jury. Illinois 
 Central II. R. Co. v. Murphy, 52 111. App. 65 (1893). 
 
 " The interpretation of writings is always for the court except in 
 two cases : First, where the writing is ambiguous and the ambiguity 
 must be solved by extrinsic, nnconceded facts; and next, where the 
 ■writing is merely adduced as containing evidence of certain facts, 
 from which different inferences may be drawn, and where it is for 
 the jury, and not the court, to draw the inferences." Enterprise 
 Soap Works v. Sayers, 55 ^fo. A])p. 15 (1893). 
 
 Whether tne written contr.act was made as the final agreement 
 of the parties, is a question for the jury. Holm v. Coleman, 89 
 Wise. 233 (1895) ; Bloom v. Cox, &c. Mfg." Co., 83 Hun. 611 (1894). 
 
 And the meaning of a contract in a foreign language as inter- 
 preted by those familiar with it. Uadart v. Foulon (Mich.), 61 
 N. W. 536 (1894). So where there is ambiguity in the contract. 
 Ginnath ?>. Blankenship, 28 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.), 828 (1894); 
 Becker v. Holm, 89 Wise. 86 (1894). See to same effect, Wood- 
 bury Granite Co. v. Millikeu, 66 Vt. 465 (1894). 
 
 m 
 
CHAl'. Ml.] 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTE8. 
 
 W 
 
 VVliure the facts attoiulin^ tlie makiiij,' of an allegod contract are 
 in dispute, it is not error, as nil'iMTiiij,' the oonstriuition of a written 
 instriiMU'Mt to tiie jr.vy, for tiiu court to construe tlic contract upon 
 till! assuin[)tion that certain facts exist, and thiMi leaving it to the 
 jury to determine whetiier tliese facts do exist, liasconi v. Smitli, 
 nil Mass. Gl (189r>). 
 
 So the interju'etation of statutes "in order to ascertain the true 
 intent and meaninj? of tl»e legislature," /. /'., a plain matter of fact, 
 is a (piestion for the (!ourt. Com. c. Anthcs, ~> Gray, 185, l'.)0 
 (IH.KJ); Edes i>. l^oardman, 58 N. II. 580, 5'Jli (187'J). 
 
 The reason on which this rule apparently at present rests is in 
 jiiirt tiin necessity of a uniform adnunistration of justice. " It is 
 of tli(! highest importance, not only that tliere should be a true and 
 correct interpretation of the statute, . . . but also that such opera- 
 tion shall be equal and uniform over all those who are subject to the 
 sami! government." Com. v. Anthes, 5 (Jray, 185, IDl (1855). 
 
 The meaning of unambiguous oral language is a cpiestion for the 
 court. Matthews *'. I'ark, 159 I'a. St. 579 (1894) ; Spragins v. 
 Wliite, 108 X.C. 449 (1891). 
 
 Nkolioknck. — It is said that when the facts are undisputed, neg- 
 ligence is a matter of law for the court. This is an imperfect 
 statenuMit. It is, as has been said, part of the duty of the court to 
 enforce the rules of correct reasoning. It is but natural, therefore, 
 that courts should find themselves forced to attempt establishing a 
 standard of what is reasonable conduct under certain circumstances, 
 where tl>e question is not as to the existence of facts, but as to the 
 inferences to be deduced from them. Joslin /•. Le Baron, 44 Mich. 
 ICO (1880) ; Woodward (;. Hancock, 7 Jones (Law), 384 (18(50) ; 
 Mauermau i>. Siemerts, 71 Mo. 101 (1879) ; Lake Shore, &c. K. H. 
 V. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470 (1882) ; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. i\ Righter, 
 42 N. J. Law, 180 (1880) ; Stackus v. N. Y. R. R., 79 N. Y. 404 
 (1880); Delaware, &c., R. R. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 4(59 (1891). 
 It is also clearly of advantage on recognised grounds of public 
 policy that certain standards of conduct should be uniformly and 
 definitely settled, to afford serviceable guides for the future. 
 
 This can, of course, best be done by removing cases which are 
 clearly settled either on reason or by previous action of the jury as 
 being or not being instances of negligence, from the further con- 
 sideration of the jury and deducing froni them a rule of law. Tiiis 
 is legal growth. 
 
 Beginning with clear cases on either side of the line, courts are 
 enabled, by this process of ruling as matter of law, gradually to 
 restrict the range of doubtful cases, with the result of more defi- 
 nitely establishing legal standards of conduct. Wheelock v. Boston 
 & Albany R. Co., 105 Mass. 203 (1870). 
 
 For instance, it has " become a postulate that due care requires a 
 
 'i 
 
 u\hm 
 
 !| I'iJ 
 
 ■iJ 
 
■wh 
 
 ■ it ■ . ; 
 
 it : ■ 
 
 52* 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part 
 
 
 pedestrian, before crossing a railroad track, to look in either direc- 
 tion to ascertain whether a train is approaching." Rodrian v, N. V., 
 &c. K. K., 125 N. Y. 52G (1891) ; Fletcher v. Fitchbnrg K. R., 14i> 
 Mass. 12'i ( .889) ; Lavarenz v. Chicago, &c. R. li., 60 la. Go9 (1881). 
 
 But to the contrary, i. e., that the failure to look is a fact to be 
 left with other faf^ts to the jury, see Texas, tS.c. E. R. v. Chapninii, 
 57 Tex. 75 (1832) ; Plumnier v. Eastern R. R., 73 Me. 691 (1882) ; 
 Terre Haute R. R. v. Voelker, 129 111. 540 (1889). 
 
 Doubtful cases of negligence, which have not been covered by 
 rules of law, where "it is a matter of judgment and discretion, of 
 sound inff ;ence, what is the deduction to be drawn from the undis- 
 puted facts," are pure questions of fact for the jury. " It is 
 assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life 
 tlian does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions 
 from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge." Rail- 
 road Co. V. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (1873) ; Williams v. Grealy, 112 Mass. 
 79 (1873) ; Randall v. Connecticut River R. R., 132 Mass. 2G9 
 (1882); Teipel v. Hilsendegen, 44 Mich. 461 (1880); Stager v. Pass. 
 Ry. Co., 119 Pa. St. 70 (1888); Kansas Pacific R. R. v. Richardson, 
 25 Kans. 391 (1881). 
 
 " It is a matter of right in the plaintiff to have the issue of neg- 
 ligence submitted to the jury when it depends upon conflicting 
 evidence, or on inferences to be drawn from circumstances in regard 
 to which there is room for a difference of opinion among intelligent 
 men." Payne v. Troy & Boston R. R., 83 N. Y. 572 (1881) ; Jones 
 V. East Tenn. R. R. Co., 128 U. S. 443 (1888). 
 
 " Whether there was negligence or want of ordinary care in the 
 conduct and acts of the plaintiff under all the circumstances of this 
 case, is a question in regard to which reasonable men may honestly 
 hold different views. This being so, it follows that we must sustain 
 the refusal of the court below to withdraw the case from the con- 
 sideration of the jury." Cumberland, &c. R. R. Co. v. Mangans, 51 
 Md. 53 (1883) ; Detroit, &c. R. R. v. Van Steinburg, 17 :\Iich. 99 
 (1S68). 
 
 It is in this sense that it is frequently said that negligence is a 
 question of fact. Not " that the definition of negligence is one 
 of fact, and that the jury shall be left to their own fancies to 
 determine what, in each case, shall be the measure to which the 
 proof shall be applied in determining whether there is negligence, 
 but, simply, the general rule being declared as matter of law, the 
 jury must determine whether such facts have been proved as bring 
 the case within that general rule." Pennsylvania Co. r. Conlan, 
 101 111. 93 (1881). 
 
 The question of negligence, in other words, may be, and often is, 
 a complex one involving two main questions : (1) Did the defendant 
 do or omit to do certiiu tilings ? (2) Do these acts or omissions 
 
 ( 
 
CHAP, in.] 
 
 A3IERICAN NOTES. 
 
 52& 
 
 constitute negligence ? The court may leave both these questions to 
 the jury; or it may leave the first to the jury and rule, in a clear 
 case, itself upon the second. In a doubtful case the court, not feel- 
 ing confident of whether the reason of mankind unhesitatingly 
 stamps the conduct as negligence, " aids its conscience by taking 
 the opinion of the jury." Holmes, Common Law, p. 123. 
 
 Due Diligence. — What is reasonable diligence in giving no- 
 tice of dishonor to the drawer or indorser of commercial paper 
 is, when the facts are proved or admitted, a question in many cases 
 for the court. Walker v. Stetson, 14 Oh. St. 89 (1862) ; Bank of 
 Upper Canada v. Smith, 4 Q. B. U. C. 483 (1847). 
 
 But what is a " reasonable time " in which to cut and carry away 
 cedar under a contract has been held to be " a (luestion for the jury 
 to determiue upon evidence given on that subject." Jenkins v. 
 Lykes, 19 Fla. 148 (1882). 
 
 The same considerations call for this rule as affect the action of 
 the courts in matters of negligence. The result has been reached in 
 the same way ; l. e., by establishing rulings upon clear cases, and 
 gradually limiting the doubtful cases in which lies the province of 
 the jury. 
 
 Prohable Cause. — So where the facts are proved or conceded, 
 the existence of reasonable and probable cause in an action for 
 malicious prosecution is "a question of law to be determined 
 by the court." Taylor y. Godfrey, 36 .Me. o2S (18r)3) ; Jacks *•. 
 Stimpson, 13 111. 701 (18r)2) ; Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189 (1858). 
 
 So in an action for nuilicious prosecution, tlie supreme court of 
 the United States say : " It is true tliat what amounts to probable 
 cause is a question of law in a very important sense. In the cele- 
 brated ease of Sutton v. Johnstone, 1 T. R. 493 (178G), tlie rule is 
 thus laid down : ' Tlie question of probable cause is a mixed ques- 
 tion of law and fact. Wliether the circumstances alleged to show 
 it probable are true and existed, is a question of fact ; but wliether, 
 supposing them to be true, they amount to a probable cause, is a 
 question of law.' This is the doctrine generally adopted. M'Cor- 
 mick ;;. Sisson, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 71.5 (1827); Besson c. Southard, 10 
 N. V. 23(5 (1851) ; " Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 IT. S. 187. 194 (1878). 
 
 In all these cases wliere, if the facts were admitted or otherwise 
 settled, the determination of due care, reasonable and probable 
 cause, due diligence, &c., would be matter of law for the court, the 
 facts themselves are in dispute, it is the <luty of the court to submit 
 tlie (piestion of fact to the jury with alternate rulings of law appro- 
 ])riate to the jury's action in determining tlie issue of fact. Ash v. 
 Marlow, 20 Ohio, 119 (1851); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187 
 (1878). 
 
 I'KKMMmAHY Fact.s. — In discharging his duty of presiding and 
 enforcing the rules relating to the admissibility of evidence, either 
 
 
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 AMERICAX NOTES. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 sua sponto or when called upon to act, many occasions arise where 
 such admissibility dejieuds on the determination by the judge of 
 some preliminary fact. 
 
 Such decision is final, and not reviewable on exceptions. Walker 
 V. Curtis, 116 Mass. 98 (1874). Such finding " is a finality as niuoh 
 as the verdict of a jury upon a question of fact." State t>. Tike, 41) 
 H. II. 301) (1875). " But his ruling as matter of law that such fact 
 renders the evidence competent or incompetent is the subject of re- 
 vision." Com. V. Gray, 1119 Mass. 474 (1880). 
 
 Whether a dying declaration was made under a sense of impending 
 dissolution is a question for the court, its weight being a matter for 
 the jury. State v. Tilghman, 11 Ired. Law, 513 (1850). 
 
 The competency of a witness to a codicil to a will is " in the first 
 instance clearly a matter for the court." Wilson v. Van Leer, 11.'7 
 Pa. St. 371 (1889). 
 
 So whether, in case of a disputed handwriting, a certain writing 
 is so far proved to be genuine as to serve as a safe standard for 
 comparison, is a preliminary fact to be settled by the court. Com. 
 V. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, 603 (1874). 
 
 So whether an expert is sufficiently qualified to testify is a ques- 
 tion of fact for the court. Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H, 510 (1800) ; 
 St;ite V. Cole, 94 X. C. 958 (1886) ; I'reeper v. Reg., 15 Sup. Ct. of 
 Can. 401 (1888) ; Com. v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62 (1870). 
 
 Whether the subject on which the evidence of the expert is offered 
 is such that the jury might reasonably be expected to derive benefit 
 from expert opinion, is a matter of law. Shatter v. Evans, 53 Cal. 
 31i (1878"); Wliite v. Ballon, 8 All. 408 (1804) ; Jones v. Tucker, 41 
 N. H. .')46 (1860). 
 
 So the question whether a confession offered in evidence is " vol- 
 untary," presents a fact for the decision of the judge. Ellis v. 
 State, 65 Miss. 44 (1887); State r. Pike, 49 X. IL 399, 407 (1870). 
 
 This question cannot be submitted in toto to the jury except by 
 consent. "The prisoner has always the right to require of the 
 judge a decision of the com]ietency of the evidence, and even after 
 the judge has decided the evidence to be competent, the prisoner 
 has the right to ask of the jury to disregard it, and to give no 
 weight to it. because of tlie circumstances under wliich the con- 
 fessions were obtained." Com. r. Calder, 120 Mass. 464 (1879). 
 
 Where secondary evidence is offered of the contents of a written 
 document, the question whetlier a sufficient foundation has been 
 laid for its admission by accounting for failure to produce the 
 original, is a preliminary question of fact for the court. Bell v. 
 Keiidrick. 25 Fla. 778 (1889). 
 
 Wlietlier a witness is (]ualified to testify, as being of sufficient 
 mental capacity to understand the nature and solemnity of an oatli, 
 is (]uestion of fact for the court. Com. v. Lynes, 142 Mass. 577 
 
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CHAI>. 111.] 
 
 AMEinCAN NOTES. 
 
 52' 
 
 (1886) ; IVterson v. State, 47 (Ja. ol'4 (1S73) ; State v. Severson, 78 
 la. Gi5o (1889) ; Coleman v. Com., L'6 Chutt. 8G5 (1874) ; Udy o. 
 Sttnvart, 10 Out. Rei). 591 (l88G). 
 
 Tilt! court may suspend his examination as to competency to allow 
 the witness to be instructed as to the nature and meaning of the 
 oatii, e. ij., 'ny a christian minister. Com. c. Lynes, 142 Mass. ;'577 
 (188(5). 
 
 Till) finding of the court may be reviewed by an upper court upon 
 evidi'iice duly reported. Udy i\ Stewart, 10 Out. liep. 591 (l88G). 
 But the court will be very loath to disturb the finding of the lower 
 court. "He has the child before him. We can only judge of its 
 capaiiity from written evidence." Peterson r. State, 47 Ga. 524 
 (1873). 
 
 'riie court's inquiry in case of youth may extend to the mental 
 capacitv of a v.itness. Simpson c. State, 31 Ind. 90 (1869) ; Com. 
 V. Mulfins, 2 All. 295 (18G1). 
 
 Tliis inquiry must be condiifted by the iudsre himself in open 
 court and in presence of the jjarties. He cannot properly delegate 
 the duty to some one else out of court, and decide according to 
 the report. Simpson /■. State, 31 Iiul. 90 (1869). 
 
 No case has been found that " the right to the preliminary exam- 
 ination, when insisted on, could be denied." Seeley v. Engell, 13 
 N. Y. 542 (1861)). 
 
 " The decision upon this particular question of the admissibility 
 of the evidence is ordinarily conclusive, unless the judge sees tit to 
 reserve or report the question. . . . There is no rule of law that, in 
 order to render the testimony admissible, such prior fact must be 
 established by a weight of evidence which will amount to a demon- 
 stration, and shut out all doubt on the question of its existpnee. It 
 is only necessary that tiiere should be so much evidence as to make 
 it proper to submit the wliole evidence to the jury." Com. /•. Rob- 
 inson, 146 Mass. 571 (1888). 
 
 In pursuance of its duty to enforce ••,he exercise of correct reason- 
 ing and decide what is reasonable in connection with legal liability, 
 it is for the court to determine, as matter of law. whether there is 
 any evidence on which tiie jury can. by logical rules, reasonably 
 liiid in favour of a contested proposition of fact. School Furniture 
 Ci). i\ Warsaw School Dist., 122 Ta. St. 494 (1888) ; State /•. Me- 
 i!i Till", 79 N. C. 3i)3 (1887) ; Chandler r. Von Ifoeder. 24 How. 224 
 (18()lt) ; i'.ridger /•. Ashville. etc. R. W. Co.. 25 S. C. 24 (1H85). 
 
 " If there is, that is suflRcitMit to send the ease to the jury, no 
 matter liow strong niav be tlie proofs to tlie contrary." School 
 i'uniiture Co. r. Warsaw Scliool Dist., 122 I'a. St. 794 (1888); and 
 it is tlie duty of the judge to send it there, "although in his opinion 
 its i)reponderance should be against the plaintiff." Cavnor /■. Old 
 Colony R. R., 100 Mass. 208 (18GS); Eilert ,: Green Hay. &c. i{. H., 
 48 Wise. 606 (1879). 
 
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 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
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 " The court will not decide the question upon the preponderance 
 of the evidence." Cook v. Union Railway Co., 125 Mass. 57 (1878). 
 
 "Whether there is any evidence is a question for the judge; 
 whether there is sufficient evidence is for the jury." Chandler r. 
 Von Roeder, 24 How. 224 (1860). See, also, State v. Stephen, 45 La. 
 Ann. Pt. 1, 702 (1893). 
 
 Demurkek to Evidence. — A method of getting a ruling as 
 matter of law from tlie court as to the sufficiency of certain facts 
 to support a verdict, is by demurring to the evidence. It is the 
 right of either party to ask the court to rule that upon the facts 
 submitted by the opposite party, the latter has not sustained his 
 contention. Trout v. Virginia R. R., 23 tiratt. 619 (1873) ; Kansas, 
 &c., R. R. Co. V. Foster, 39 Kans. 329 (1888). 
 
 For example, in an action for negligence, " a demurrer to the 
 evidence must be sustained where iin unavoidable inference of con- 
 tributory negligence arises out of tlie plaintiff's own evidence, or 
 out of other evidence which stands uiulisputed in the case." Weber 
 c. Cable Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 194 (1889). 
 
 This right is not waived by putting in contradictory evidence. 
 " Tne defendant, by putting in its evidence, took the chance of aiding 
 the plaintiff's case ; bu^ it was not thereb\' deprived of the right to 
 ask the court to direct a verdict on all the evidence." Weber v. 
 Cable Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 194 (1889). 
 
 Indeed, it is held that the party demurring must rest his case on 
 demurring, and that overruling a demurrer where the party demur- 
 ring does not rest, cannot be assigned for error. Columbia, &c. 
 Railway r. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202 (1892). 
 
 "The demurrer to evidence has long since gone out of use in 
 this state, and ought not any longer to be regarded as a right upon 
 whicli an exception can be jDredicated." Colegrove v. N. Y., &c. 
 R. R., 20 N. Y. 492 (1859). 
 
 So the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts say : " A demur- 
 rer to evidence is rarely resorted to in our ])ractice, as the statutes 
 furnish more simple and convenient ways of raising any questions 
 of law." Golden i: Knowles, 120 Mass". 336 (1876).^ 
 
 " Unless all inferences are admitted which a jury might have 
 drawn, judges, instead of confining themselves within their province 
 of deciding on questions of law, will also become triers of every 
 matter of fact." Patrick /'. Hallett, 1 Johns. 241 (1806). 
 
 Foreign Laws. — As has been stated, the existence of a rule of 
 law is in reality a fact. Such facts are segregated from others 
 largely because rules of domestic law are not the subjects of evi- 
 dence, but are in a special sense within the cognisance of the court 
 ns representing that branch of government whose duty it is to en- 
 force the rights they prescribe and the standards of conduct they 
 
4.SK«&' .. 
 
 c;iiAr. 111.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 52^> 
 
 establisli. Wlierc the existence of a, rule of law other than those 
 which the court is cliargud with tiie adniinistiMtivc duty of euforc- 
 iii;', e. g., a foreign law, is a fact in issue or relevant to the issue, 
 the reason for distinguishing rules of law from other facts at once 
 ceases. " The existence or non-existence of a foreign law is a ques- 
 tion of fact." Konnard v. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303 (188;")); Hortoir 
 ('. Reed, 13 K, 1. 36(1 (1881); Williams v. Finlay. 40 Oh. St. ;i4L! 
 (1S83); Chumasero v. Gilbeit, L'4 111. 293(1860); People r. Me- 
 Quaid, 85 Mich. 123 (1891); Ins. (Jo. of N. America v. Forchcimcr, 
 8(; Ala. 541 (1888); Condit v. Blackwell, 19 X. J. Kq. 193 (18(;8); 
 St. L. & S. F. Ky. Co. /;. Weaver, 35 Kans. 412. 425 (1886) ; Syni<' /•. 
 Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 78 (1865) ; Klin.- p. I5ak'>r, 99 Mass. 253 ('l>'()S ) ; 
 Eunis n. Smith, 14 llow. 400, 427 (1852) ; Charlotte v. Ciiouteau, 25 
 Mo. 1(55 (1857) ; Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. ()03 (1854) ; Polk /•. Butter- 
 field, 9 Col. 325 (1886); Jackson r. dackson, 80 Md. 176 (18'.t4). 
 
 Hut on an indictment for adultery in Vermont, the marriage uf the 
 female defendant having been in New York and no proof being 
 offered at the trial court as to the laws of New York, the supreme 
 court say, speaking of the New York law, " It was not necessary 
 to prove the law if it was known to the court at the trial, or if it is 
 now known to be as decided on the trial." State r. Hood, 12 Vt. 
 396 ( 18411). 
 
 To contrary effect and with better reasoning, see People v. Lam- 
 bert, 5 Mich. 349 (1858). 
 
 Pkook of FoKKKiX Law. — In the absence of statutory provis- 
 ions, the accepted rule is that proof of the foreign law is a matter 
 for expert testimony by those familiar with it. Kennard r. Ken- 
 nard, 63 N. H. 303 (1885); Ennis r. Smith, 14 How. 400, 427 
 (1852); Owen /•. Boyle, 15 Me. 147 (1838); Pierce r. Indseth, 106 
 U. S. 546(1882); People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349 (1858). "The 
 laws of Wisconsin are not, in fact or by theory of law, known to 
 the courts of this state and must be proved, either by experts, coun- 
 sel learned in the law of that state, or copies of its statute, with the 
 decisions of its courts thereon." Condit r. Blackwell, 19 N. J. Eq. 
 193 (1863). Speaking of some of the Wisconsin decisions on cer- 
 tain of their statutes, the learned Chancellor (Zabriskie) says: "T 
 concur in (and would be bound by, if I did not) the conclusion at 
 which the courts, with hesitation, but with sound reasoning, ar- 
 rived." I/it(l. To the same effect, the supreme court of Kansas, 
 speaking of a cause of action which arose in Arkansas, say that "If 
 it had been proved in the case what view the supreme court of 
 Arkansas has taken with respect to the common law in cases of this 
 kind, we would follow its view ; and this we would do even if its 
 views should differ from ours. If within its views the plaintiff has 
 no cause of action, we would also hold that he has no cause of 
 action." St. Louis, &c. Ry. v. Weaver, 35 Kaus. 412, 426 (1886). 
 
 
 
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 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 Speaking of the law of Virginia, the court of appeals of Mary- 
 land say, " Tliat law is a fact to be proved in our courts, as other 
 facts: if unwritten, by the testimony of experts; if statutory, by 
 the law itself or exemplified copy." Baltimore &c. R. R. v. Glenn, 
 28 Md. 287 (1807) ; Charlotte r. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465 (1857) ; State 
 /•. Moy Looke, 7 Oreg. 54 (1879). So a Spanish lawyer Avho has 
 practised in Cuba, can testify from the Commercial Code as to the 
 law of partnerships in Cuba. Barrows c. Downs, 9 R. I. 446 
 (1890). 
 
 " The law of a foreign country on a given subject may be proved 
 by any person, who, though not a lawyer, or not having filled any 
 public office, is or has been in a position to render it probable that 
 he would make himself acquainted with it." American &c. Ins. Co. 
 r. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. St. 507 (1875). 
 
 Law of othkk States. — •' The existence of a law of another 
 state is a (piestion of fact." Ingraham r. Hp,rt, 5 Ohio, 255 (1842); 
 Miller r. MacVeagh, 40 111. App. 532 (1891) ; Hoyt r. lAIcXeil, 13 
 Minn. 390 (1868). 
 
 A declaration which states the alleged effect of a statute of an- 
 other state instead of setting it out is demurrable. Hoyt r, McNeil, 
 13 Minn. 390 (1868). 
 
 " The relation of the United States to each other in regard to all 
 matters not surrendered to the general government by the Constitu- 
 tion, are those of foreign states in close friendship, each being 
 sovereign and independent ; and the courts have generally held that 
 therefore tlie laws of one state were to be proved in the courts of 
 another oidy as other foreign laws."' liayley's Adm. v. Chubb, 16 
 Gratt. 284 (1862). 
 
 But, as the Arkansas supreme court say : "Where two countries 
 have the same origin, or were at one time associated, the courts of 
 each are bound to take juflicial notice of what the law was when it 
 was common to both," giving as an example the states of Missouri 
 and Arkansas. Cox /■. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603 (1854). 
 
 Where a statute of a sister state certified according to act of 
 (Congress embraces several subjects, it need not contain all its sec- 
 tions but only such as are relevant to the case in which it is offered. 
 Whore in the certified statute anotlier act is referred to, the statute 
 itself is admissible without including the statute referred to. Grant 
 r. Coal Co., 80 I'a. St. 208 (1876). 
 
 As to what is a sufficient compliance with the formalities of au- 
 tlipiiticatioii required by tlie act of congress, see Rice's Succession, 
 24 Lii. Ann. 614 (1869). See also Grant r. Coal Co., 80 Ta. St. 
 208 (1876). 
 
 Where the law of a sister state is an essential fact and no evi- 
 dence is adduced .as to wliat it is. the court of the forum is obliged to 
 assume as to the law of the sister state either, (1) That the common 
 
CHAP. lU.J 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 52" 
 
 law prevails in the s'Ate in question on that point. (L'j That tlift 
 foreign law is the same as that of the forum. 
 
 Which of these assumptions is indulged in, frequently depends 
 on whether the sister state was originally settled by those using the 
 common law of England. 
 
 (1) It is assumed that the common law prevails in "those states 
 which were originally colonies of England or carved out of sueli 
 colonies." Norris r. Harris, 15 Cal. 21'6 (18(50) ; Miller /•. MacVeagh, 
 40 111. App. 632 (1891) ; Eureka Springs liy. i: Tinuuons, ol Ark. 
 459 (1888). 
 
 " In the absence of any proof as to the statute law of Michigan, 
 we must assume the existence there of the common law." Leather 
 Co. r. Hardware &c. Co., 67 Mo. App. 297 (1894). 
 
 In the case of Miller r. MacVeagh, uOi supni, the court were asked 
 to rule that while the common law would be presumed to exist in all 
 states of the American Union which were colonies of Great Britain, 
 judicial cognisance should be taken of the fact that Dakota (the 
 state whose law was involved) was formed out of the "Louisiana 
 Purchase "' from France, and therefore the civil law should be pre- 
 sumed to exist in that state. The court in declining so to rule say : 
 '• Laws are for people and not for mere territory, as such. In the 
 ])ortion of the Louisiana purchase from which Dakota was formed 
 there existed no civilised community governed by any law at the 
 time of the cession. When Dakota was peo[)led and an organised, 
 community created in her territory it was by emigrants from states 
 where the common law was in force, and by citizens who looked to 
 that common law as their natural right and as forming the source 
 and basis of their jurisprudence." 
 
 The same ruling is made in the courts of California. Norris c. 
 Harris, 15 Cal. 226 (1800) ; and in those of Arkansas concerning 
 the state of Missouri. Eureka Springs Ry. v. Timmons, 51 Ark. 
 459(1888); and in those of Missouri. Roll r. St. Louis Smelting 
 Co., 52 Mo. App. (iO (1892). 
 
 " Hut no such presumption can apjdy to states in wliich a govern- 
 ment already existed at the time of their accession to the country, 
 as Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. They had already laws of their 
 own, which remained in force until by tin; proper authority they 
 were abrogated and now laws were pronuilgated. With them there 
 is no more presumption of the existence of the common law than of 
 any other law." Xorris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 22G, 25.'] (1860), ^kt 
 Field, C. J. So he^ ■• of Texas in Brown /'. Wright. 58 Ark. 20 
 (I89;i). 
 
 (2) Wlien the sister state was not settled by men living under the 
 common law, and had at the time of the cession to the United States 
 an organised jurisprudence, the assum])tion of the prevalence of 
 the common law can no longer he indulged, and recourse must be 
 
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 52" 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT I 
 
 liail to another aHsuniptioii, viz., — that the law of the state in ques- 
 tion is the same as that of the forum. 
 
 "The hiw of the sister state of Illinois, both statutory and 
 common, in the absence of any showing to the contrary is presumed 
 to be the same as that of our own state." Bierhaus r. ^,\. U. Tel. 
 Co., 8 Ind. App. L'46, 2(53 (1H93); Oak Leather Co. r. Union Bank, 
 9 Utah, 87 (1893); Haggin /•. Haggin, 35 Xeb. 375 (1892); Palmer 
 r. Atchison &c. 11. E., 101 Col. 187 (1894) ; Scroggin v. :McClelland, 
 37 Neb. 044 (1893) ; Chapman v. Brewer, 43 Neb. 890 (1895) ; 8illi- 
 nian i: Tliornton (Tex.), 30 S. W. 700 (1895). 
 
 This rule applies also to England. AVickershan v, Johnston, 104 
 Cal. 407 (1894). So the rate of interest in a sister stt'te will be 
 presumed to be the same fixed by the statutes of Nebraska. I'itz- 
 gerahl r. Fitzgerald &c. Construction Company, 41 Neb. 374 (1<S94). 
 
 Of the two assumptions, the second seems the one sustained by 
 the weight of authority. " It is almost universally held that where 
 there is no proof of the law of another state, nor judicial knowledge 
 of the origin of such state whicli would raise a presumption that the 
 common law prevails there, it will be presumed that the law of the 
 forum in which the issue is being tried is the law of that state on 
 the question under consideration.'" Keni;ebrew v. Southern &c. Co. 
 (Ala.), 17 So. Eep. 545 (1895). 
 
 The feeling on the ])art of the court M'hich leads to this 
 course is well stated in an early California case. "The question 
 then recurs as to what is to be i>resumed as to the law of Texas, in 
 the absence of any proof on tlie subject. We can perceive only one 
 way in which the question can be answered, and that is to presume 
 the law of tliat state to be in accordance with our own. We are 
 called upon to determine the matter in controversy', and are not at 
 liberty to follow our own arbitrary notions of justice. We cannot 
 take judicial notice of the laws of Texas, and we must therefore, as 
 a matter of necessity, look to our own laws as furnishing the only 
 rule of decision on which we can act; and to meet the requirement 
 that the case is to be disposed of according to the laws of Texas, the 
 presumption is indulged that the laws of the two states are in ac- 
 cordance with each other." Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 22C, 253 
 (18(50), citing Smoot r. Russell, 1 Martin, N. S. 523 (1823); Allen 
 V. Watson, 2 Hill (S. C), 319 (1834) ; Syme v. Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 
 78 (18(55) ; Gardner v. Lewis, 7 Gill. 377 (1848). 
 
 If the laws are in fact different, the party desiring the benefit 
 of the difference " can only obtain the benefit of the foreign law by 
 making it a part of the case in evidence." Cox r. Morrow, 14 Ark. 
 603 (1854). See also Simms v. So. Express Co., 35 Kans. 129 
 (1808). 
 
 The same result is reached on other grounds by the New York 
 court of appeals relating to the law of Scotland. It is held that 
 
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 A>rERICAN NOTES. 
 
 5213 
 
 ui'ima fiirie the lex fori governs, and wlioever desires tlic benefit of 
 the law of any other jurisdiction must ])rove what that hiw is. 
 Monroe c. Doughiss, 1 Seld. 447, 4")!^ (ISol). 
 
 " With no proof before him as to the laws of Texas, the Chan- 
 cellor could not determine the right to the Tyler hotel otherwise 
 than according to our own laws." Brown c. Wright, ^.S Ark. 20 
 (IM!);]). 
 
 The supreme court of Alabama in a case where no evidence 
 was offered of the New York rate of interest on an insurance pol- 
 icy decline to make either assumption and treat the evidence as 
 iailing as to an essential fact. Ins. Co. of N. America v. Forcheimer, 
 .SC) Ala. o41 (18S(S). So also in California, Cavender v. Guild, 4 Cal. 
 L'.")() (1854). It is not perceived why such a course is not, in point 
 «)f principle, correct. 
 
 I'koof, now MADK. — If the law in question is said to be estab- 
 lished by the decisions of the courts of the sister state, the courts 
 of the former will examine the officially printed reports of their 
 decisions. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in an equity case, 
 say : " The question of what is the law of Massachusetts is a ques- 
 tion of fact, to be determined on evidence, and on such a question 
 we can have no better evidence than the decisions of the highest 
 judicial court of the state." Horton r. Heed, 13 R. I. 3(i(; (1881) ; 
 Kennard /•. Kenna,rd, 03 N. H. 303 (1885) ; Ames v. McCamber, 124 
 Mass. 85 (187S). 
 
 But there seems force in the decision of the .supreme court of 
 Kansas. "If it be claimed that we should take judicial notice of the 
 common law of Arkansas, we would answer that we cannot do so. 
 The courts of this state may take judicial notice of the common law 
 of Kansas, and what it would be except for our own statutes or our 
 own written law ; and for this jjurpose our courts may take judicial 
 notice of all tlie judicial decisions of this country, and of all other 
 countries which have adopted the common law of England. But for 
 the purjjose that the courts of this state shall know as a fact in a 
 particidar case what the common law of some other state is, such 
 law nuist be proved like any other fact." St. Louis, &c. Ry. r. 
 Weaver, 35 Kans. 412 (1886). See. to same effect, Owen v. Boyle, 15 
 Me. 147 (1838). 
 
 Unofficial publications, e. g., Brightley's Pennsylvania Digest, if 
 properly authenticated as reliable, will be admitted for the same 
 purpose. People r. McQuaid, 85 ]Mich. 123 (1891), where the Digest 
 was admitted on the statement of a Pennsylvania minister that he 
 had consulted it and seen it used in court, and that it had continued 
 publication for twenty years. The court add : " It was within the 
 knowledge of the trial court that Brightley's Digest is not a fugitive 
 publication." 
 
 The use of official reports of decisions is frequently provided for 
 
 :! i 
 
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 m 
 
 
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 F 
 
 
 
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 ri 
 
 621* 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT I. 
 
 by statute. Bridger r. Asheville, &c. R. R., 25 S. C. 24 (18Huj. The 
 volume must be produced and offered in evidence; it is not suf- 
 ficient merely to refer to it. Ihld. Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 
 (Jonn. 3G1 (18-47) is to the same effect. 
 
 " The written foreign law may be proved by a copy of the law 
 properly authenticated. . . . They may be verified by an oath or 
 by an exemplification of a copy, under the great seal of a state, or 
 by a copy proved to be a true copy by a witness who has examined 
 and compared it with the original, or by a certificate of an officer, 
 properly authorised by law to give the copy ; which certificate muh-t 
 be duly proved. But such modes of proof as have been mentioned 
 are not to be considered exclusive of others, especially of codes of 
 laws and accepted histories of the law of a country." Eunis /•. 
 Smith, 14 How. 400, 427 (1852) ; Charlotte r. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 4G5 
 (1857). The validity of a discharge in bankruptcy under the law of 
 Canada can only be proved by a witness who produces a copy of the 
 law authorising it. " Some copy of the law wliich the witness 
 (;ould swear was recognised in the Province as autlioritative should 
 have been ju-oduced." Spaulding v. "Vincent, 24 Vt. 501 (1852). 
 See also Pub. Sts. of Mass., Chap. 169, § 73. So a printed voIuuh! 
 of the laws of New Brunswick, j)urporting and proved to be official, 
 has been admitted as evidence of these statutes. Owen /•. Boyle, 
 15 Me. 147 (1838). 
 
 " In the admiralty, as in other courts, foreign law must be pleaded 
 and proved as a fact. ... I believe it to be the true doctrine that 
 the unwritten law of England may be proved in this court, not by 
 experts only, but also by text-writers of authority and by the 
 printed reports of adjudged cases; and that the unwritten law may 
 be prove'" by the printed copies, and be construed ,with the aid 
 of text-books as well as of experts." The Pawashick, 2 Lowell, 
 142 (1872). 
 
 If tlie government of the court of the forum has itself promul- 
 gated a foreign law or ordinance as authentic, that promulgation is 
 sufficient proof of such law. Talbot r. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 38 
 (1801). 
 
 To WHOM PuooK IS TO BE MADE. — "The rulc of the common law 
 undoubtedly is, that the laws of other states and nations are to be 
 proved here by documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses ; 
 in which case the jury are the judges of the proofs, as in other 
 questions of fact." Lockwood r. Crawford, 18 Conn. 3G1 (1847); 
 Thra,sher r: Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 (1831) ; Kline r. Baker, 09 
 Mass. 253 (18(18) : Moore /-. Gwynn, 5 Ired. 187 (1844); Ingraham 
 r. Hart, 11 Ohio, 255 (1842); Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400,427 
 (1852). 
 
 The qualification of these experts is a preliminary question of fact 
 for the court. Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253 (1808) ; Hall /-. Costello, 
 
CHAP. 111.] 
 
 AMEIUCAN NOTKS. 
 
 ii-J. 
 
 )16 
 
 48 N. H. 17G (1868). Ami \vh»ne tlui (luestioii to which the existence 
 of the foreign law is relevant is one for tlie decision of the court, 
 e. g., tile admission of evidence, "the evidence to enable the decision 
 to be made must of course be addressed to the court." Vickard /•. 
 Uailey, 2G N. 11. 152 (1852) ; Thrasher c. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 
 (1831). 
 
 But even this question the court can leave, if in doubt, to the jury, 
 with alternative instructions. Thrasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234 
 (1831). Holman v. King, 7 Mete. 384, 388 (1844), applies this rule 
 even to the construction of foreign statutes. Like any other finding 
 of fact, a finding of the existence of a foreign law is usually final. 
 Kennard /•. Kennard, 63 N. H. 303 (1885) ; Williams r. Fiiday, 40 
 Oliio St. 342 (1883). " When the law of another state is in disput*', 
 it is to be determined as a question of fact by the court or jury trying 
 the case. If the evidence was conflicting, as the plaintiff contends, 
 we have no authority to revise the finding, although the judge has 
 reported tlie evidence." Ames r. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85 (1887). 
 
 A question much debated in Charlotte /•. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465 
 (1857), was this : Whether proof of the existence of a foreign law 
 should first be made to the court or jury. The court conclude : 
 " The decided weight of the American authorities goes to the length 
 of estal)lishing the doctrine not only that it is the province and duty 
 of tlie court to instruct the jury as to the meaning and effect of a 
 foreign law, when proved, whether the law is written or unwritten, 
 but that the proof must be made to the court." 
 
 "It is well settled that foreign laws, like foreign judgments, are 
 to be proved as facts, and the better opinion is that the evidence 
 should be addressed to the court and not to the jury." Pickard *•. 
 Bailey, 26 N. H. 152, 169 (1852). 
 
 On the contrary, except in cases of " a statute or judicial opinion 
 or document," in Massachusetts, " it is a general rule, that laws of 
 other states must be proved as facts ; and ordinarily, in a trial by 
 jury, the question must be left to the jury to decide as a fact what 
 the law of another state is, if it becomes material to be determined. 
 This may in some cases prove inconvenient in practice, especially in 
 view of the provision of our statute that the court shall not charge 
 juries with respect to matters of fact ; but such is the established 
 rule in this commonwealth." Afford v. Spaulding, 156 i»tass. 65 
 (1892). 
 
 " When the evidence admitted consists entirely of a written docu- 
 ment, statute, or judicial opinion, the question of its construction 
 and effect is for the court alone." Kline r. Baker, 99 Mass. 253 
 (1808); Haines r. Hanrahan, 105 :\rass. 480 (1870); Gibson v. 
 .Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 81 (1887) ; Lycoming, etc., In- 
 surance Co. V. Wright, 60 Vt. 515 (1888) ; Charlotte r. Chouteau, 33 
 Mo. 194 (1862) ; Afford v. Spaulding, 156 Mass. 65 (1892). 
 
 * ! 
 
 i I 
 
 if 
 
 
i; 
 
 I 
 
 \- ^mi 
 
 ^ I 
 
 r)-ji« 
 
 AMEIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AUT I. 
 
 Sen also, to the effect tliat tlie court eiiii, if so disi)Ose(i, leave tlie 
 question of eonstiuctiou of a statute to the jury, lloliuau v. King, 
 7 Mct(!. 3H4, .'588 (1844). 
 
 l>ut tilt' suiUL'iuu judicial court of Massachusetts will not, on 
 exceptions, consider any statute of another state which is not made 
 part ot the bill of exceptions. Haines r. Jlannhan, 10/) Mass. 480 
 (1870). To same effect, Drake r. (ilover, 30 Ala. 382 (1807). 
 
 " The statute being authentieated in the manner pointed out by 
 the constitution of the United States and the act of Congress, both 
 the fact of its existence and its proper construction is matter for the 
 court." Moore /'. Gwynu, 5 Ired, 187 (1844); State /•. .Jactkson. 
 2 Dev. 508 (1830). 
 
 "And if the evidence is uncontroverted and will not s>ip])ort the 
 action, it is the duty of the court so to instruct the jury.'" Kline r. 
 IJaker, 99 Mass. 'J63 (1868). 
 
 In the North Carolina case, which actually was an instance of a 
 written statute, the court lay down a broader rule than seems sus- 
 tained by the current of authority. "The existence of a foreign 
 law is a fact. The court cannot judicially know it, and therefore it 
 must be proved ; and the proof, like all other, necessarily goes to 
 the jury, lint when established, the meaning of the law, its con- 
 struction and effect, is the province of the court. It is a matter of 
 professional science." State /-. Jackson (it/ji Kiipra). 
 
 Statutoky Provisions. — It has been usually provided that 
 printed copies of th(^ statutory laws of any state of the American 
 Union, apparently published by official authority, will be received in 
 the courts of the forum as prhmi fiirir evidence of the existence 
 of such statutes. 
 
 People V. McQuaid, 85 Mich. 123 (1891) ; bridges /•. Asheville K. K. 
 Co., 25 S. C. 24 (1886); Martin r. Payne, 11 Tex. 292 (1854) ; Clan- 
 ton ('. Barnes, 50 Ala. 260 (1874). 
 
 So if a pamphlet copy of laws of a single session purporting to be 
 published by authority. Ashley v. Root, 4 All. 504 (1862). 
 
 It is sufficient that the title-page of the volume ^uestion bears 
 the words " By authority." Merrifield v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 150 
 (1857). So " Printed by order of the Governor " is sufficient Wilt 
 r. Cutler, 38 Mich. 189 (1878). 
 
 Under such circumstances parol evidence or an unofficial copy of 
 a statute cannot be received. Martin v, Payne, 11 Tex. 292 (1854). 
 
ClUP. IV.] DISrOBITlON TO liLUEi' INSTINCTIVfi, 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE GROUNDS OF BKMEF. 
 
 
 
 § 50.' We proceed now to a brief consideration of the Oenaral 
 Nature and Principles of Evidence. No inquiry is here proposed 
 into the origin of human knowledge ; it being assumed, on the 
 authority of approved writers, that all which men know is referable, 
 in a philosophical view, to perception and reflection. But, in fact, 
 the knowledge acquired by an individual through his own percep- 
 tion and reflection is but a small part of what he possesses ; much 
 of what we are content to regard and act upon as knowledge, 
 having been acquired through the perception of others.* It is not 
 easy to conceive that the Supreme Being, whose wisdom is so con- 
 spicuous in all His works, constituted man to believe only upon 
 his own personal experience ; since, in that case, the world could 
 neither be governed nor improved ; and society must remain in the 
 state in which it was left by the first generation of men. On the 
 contrary, during the period of childhood we believe implicitly 
 almost all that is told us ; and we thus are furnished with informa- 
 tion which we could not obtain for ourselves, but which is necessary 
 at the time for our present protection, or as the means of future 
 improvement. This disposition to confide in the veracity of others, 
 and to believe what tliey say, may be termed inMinctire. At an 
 early period, however, we begin to find that of the things told to 
 us some are not true ; and thus our implicit reliance on the testi- 
 mony of others is weakened ; first, in regard to particular things, 
 in which we have been deceived ; then, in regard to persons, whose 
 falsehoods we have detected ; and, as these instances multiply upon 
 us, we gradually become more and more distrustful of statements 
 made to us, and learn by experience the necessity of testing them 
 by certain rules.' " Confidence," exclaimed Lord Chatham, on a 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 7. nearly verbatim. 
 
 * Abercr. on Intell* Pow., I'art 2, 
 
 p. •\2. 
 
 * Id. Part 2, § 3, p. 73. 
 
 63 
 
 v\ n 111 
 
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 INSI'INCTIVK Ti:XUKNCY TO BKLIEF. 
 
 fPART T. 
 
 memoraUe occasion, " is a plant of slow growth in an aged 
 Losom ; " and indeed, it may be generally observed, that, as our 
 ability to obtain knowledge by other means increases, onr instinc- 
 tive and indiscriminate reliance on testimony diminishes, by 
 yielding to a more rational belief.' Still, in every period of life, 
 
 i-.: 
 
 P> 
 
 • Gr. Ev. § 7, 11. vorlmtim. See also 
 Gamb. (juido, 87; M'Kiniion, I'liil. 
 of Ev. 40. Dr. Ri'id, in his In(]uiry 
 into the Human Mind, c. (i, § '24, 
 pp. 190, 197 of his collected Works, 
 observes : — " The wise sind beneficent 
 /viithor of Nature, who intended thut 
 we should be social creatures, and that 
 we should receive the jjreatest and 
 most im])ortant part of our knowledgo 
 by the information of others, hath, 
 for these purposes, implanted in our 
 nature two principles, tliat tally with 
 e:ich othia\ The first of these prin- 
 ciples is a propensity to speak truth, 
 and to use the sij^ns of laiignajije, so 
 as to convey our real sentiments. 
 This principle has a powerful opera- 
 tion, even in the greatest liars ; for 
 where they lie once th(!y sjieuk truth 
 a hundred times. Truth is always 
 uppermost, and is the natural issue 
 of the mind. It requires no art or 
 traininp, no inducement or temi)ta- 
 tion. but only that we yield to a 
 natural impulse. Ijyinfj, on the 
 contrary, is doing violence to our 
 nature; an<l is never pructisi'<l, even 
 by the worst men, without some 
 temptation. Spesikiui:; truth is like 
 using onr naturiil food, which we 
 would do from appetite, altlioiigh it 
 answered no oi'.d ; but lying is like 
 taking physic, which is nauseous to 
 the tiiste, and which no man takes but 
 for some end, which he cannot other- 
 wise! uttain. * • * * Anotlier original 
 ])riiici))le, im])lanti'd in us by the 
 Su])reme Bi'ing, is a disposition to 
 contide in tlu! vin'acity of othei-s, and 
 to Ixilieve wliat tliey ti'U us, Tiiis is 
 the counterpart to the former : and 
 as that may be calli'il the )irinci])lo 
 of vtawity, we shall, for want of' a 
 projier name, call tliis tlie iiriuciiijo 
 of credulity. It is unlimited in <hd- 
 dnni until they meet witli instiinces 
 of deceit and fulsi'hodd ; iii.d it con- 
 tains a v.'ry considerable degree of 
 strength through life. If nature had 
 
 left the mind of the speaker in eqiii- 
 librio, withr>ut any inclination to the 
 side of truth more than to that of 
 falsehood, children would lie as often 
 as they speak truth, until reason was 
 so far ripened, as to suggest the im- 
 prudence! of lying, or c<mscienc(!, as 
 to suggest its immorality. And if 
 nature had left the mind of the 
 hearer in equilibrio, without any 
 inclination to the side of belief more 
 than to that of disbelief, we should 
 take no man's word, until wo had 
 positive evidence that bespoke truth. 
 His testimony would, in this case, 
 have no more authority than his 
 dreams, which may be true or false : 
 but no man is disposed to believe 
 them, on this account, that they were 
 dreamed. It is evident, that, in the 
 matter of testimony, the balance of 
 human judgment is by nature in- 
 clined to the side of belief ; and turns 
 to that side of its(>lf, when there is 
 nothing put into the opposite scale. 
 If it was not so, no proposition, that 
 is uttered in discourse would be be- 
 lieved, iintil it was examined and 
 tried by reason: and most men would 
 be unaiilc! to find reasons for believing 
 the thousiindtb part of what is told 
 them. Such distrust and incredulity 
 would deprive! us of the! gre'atest 
 benefits of se)ciety, anel ])lace us in 
 a worse cejiidition than tliat eif sav- 
 ages. Childre'ii. e)n this su])pe)sitie)n, 
 woiilil hi- alisolute'ly ine're'eliilous, anel 
 tlierefori! absolute'ly ine'ii])able e)f in- 
 structicin; tliose- wlio hiid little kneiw- 
 le'dge eif humiin life, and of the' man- 
 ners anel cliarae'terse)f men, we)ulel be 
 in the next ele'gre!e incre^elulous ; anel 
 the! me)st e're-duleius me'U we)ulel be 
 those of gi'e'iite'st expi'rience!, anel e)f 
 the elee>|M!st Jie'ue'tratieiu ; be'e'aiisei, 
 in miiny e'ase-s, thety woulel bi! able 
 to find ge)e)d re'a<e)ns feir b(!lie'ving 
 te'slimeaiy, which the> we!iik anel the 
 igiie)rant e'oulel not elise'eiver. In a 
 word, if cruelulity woio the effect of 
 
 H 
 
CHAP. IV.] INSTINCTIVE TENDKNCY TO BELIRF. 
 
 and in every state of intellectual culture, man is instinctively more 
 prone to believe than to disbelieve the testimony of others, and this 
 disposition towards credulity may be regarded as a fundamental 
 princi[)le of our moral nature, implanted in us by the Almighty for 
 the widest and most beneficent purposes. As such it constitutes the 
 general basis upon which all evidence may be said to rest. 
 
 §51.' Subordinate to this paramount and original principle, 
 evidence rests upon our fnifh in hnmnn trutimony, as sanctioned by 
 experience ; that is, upon the generally experienced truth of the 
 statements on oath of men of integrity, having capacity and oppor- 
 tunity for observation, and without apparent influence from pas-ion 
 or interest to pervert the truth. This belief is strengtlicned by our 
 knowledge of the narrator's reputation for veracity and intelligence, 
 by the absence of conflicting testimony, and oy the presence of 
 that which is corroborating and cumulative.' 
 
 § 52. In the hasty progress of a trial at Nisi Prius, it is difficult, 
 and sometimes impossible, to ascertain, with anything like cer- 
 tiiinty, what characters the witnesses respectively deserve for 
 honesty and intelligence, and how far they are actuated by inte- 
 rested, malignant, or other improper motives. A rigid cross- 
 examination, skilfully applied,* will, however, often tlirow much 
 light upon these subjects; while a careful attention to the demea- 
 nour of the witness is always a good guide. While simplicity, 
 minuteness, and ease are the natural accompaniments of truth, the 
 language of witnesses coming to impose upon the jury is usually 
 laboured, cautious, and indistinct.* We have, too, more or less 
 
 \\ 
 
 
 rciisoninp; and oxpoiienco, it must 
 prow up mul {jatlicr ,sti'('ii,!.'th, in tho 
 siiiiio projortinn as roasun and cx- 
 pciicnco (.(). ]$'it if it is the gilt of 
 nature, it will 1'M strongest in child- 
 hood, pud liuiilt d aiul restiainod by 
 I'xpciii'iice ; and tho most supcriicial 
 view of human lito shows, that the last 
 is really tho east, aiul not the first." 
 ' (Jr. ]')v. § 10, nearly voihatiuij 
 * Arehhishop Whately, in his jou 
 d'esprit, " Historic ])oul)t8 relative 
 to Najudeon lUiniuj parte," clearly 
 states tho nuiiii tests of human 
 Vi'rncity. lie says: "I suppose it 
 ■will not 1)0 deiii(>d that the three 
 following are among the nwst im- 
 
 portont points to be ascertained, in 
 deciding on tho crodihility of ■wit- 
 nesses : first, whether they have tho 
 means of gaining correct informa- 
 tion; Becouilly, whether they have 
 any interest in concealing truth, or 
 propagating falsehood; and, thirdly, 
 whi'ther thev agree in their testi- 
 mony."— I'. U, (ithcd. 
 
 3 In the Tiehhorue trial of 1871, 
 Mr. Hawkins' cross-exauu'nation of 
 Mr. llaigeut should he cai'efully 
 studied, as being the best modern 
 exam])le of forensic ability in that 
 direction. 
 
 * ( 'lianning, !•>. of Christ. ;3rd vol. 
 of Works, ;ij(l. 
 
I'll 
 
 I i 
 
 tin 
 
 
 DEMEANOUJl OF WITXKSSES — TESTS OF J'RUTH. [PAKT 1. 
 
 conclusive indications of insincerity or falsehood when we find a 
 witness over-zealous on behalf of his party ; exaggerating circum- 
 stances ; assuming an air of bluster and defiance ; ' answering 
 without waiting to hear the question ; forgetting facts where ho 
 would ^ . open to contradiction ; minutely remembering others, 
 which he knows cannot be disputed ; ^ reluctant in gpiving adverse 
 testimony ; replying evasively or flippantly ; ' pretending not to 
 hear the question, for the purpose of gaining time to consider the 
 effect of his answer ; affecting indifference ; or often vowing to 
 God* and protesting his honesty.* In the testimony of witnesses 
 of truth there is, on the other hand, a calmness and simplicity ; a 
 naturalness of manner ; an unaffected readiness and copiousness of 
 detail, as well in one part of the narrative as another ; and an 
 evident disregard of either the facility or difficulty of vindication 
 or detecticm.^ 
 
 § 63. Besides these tests of truth, which are obviously of value 
 in fixing what amount of credit is due to each individital witness, 
 certain general rules must be borne in mind, as bearing upon the 
 relative merits of particular classes of witnesses. It has been said 
 that " a propensity to lying has been always, more or less, a pecu- 
 liar feature in the character of an enslaved people, — accustomed to 
 oppression of every kind, and to be called upon to render strict 
 account of every trifle done, not according to the rules of justice, 
 but as the caprice of their masters may suggest ; — it is little to be 
 wondered at if a lie is often resorted to as a supposed refuge from 
 punishment, and that thus an habitual disregard is engendered."^ 
 This passage accounts in some measure for the lamentable neglect 
 of truth evinced by most Oriental nations, by Kussians, and by 
 some of the Irish peasantry. 
 
 • ' ' Asseveration blustering in your 
 
 face 
 Makes contradiction such a 
 hopeless case." 
 
 Cowi'ER, Conversation. 
 
 • "For, when we risk no contra- 
 
 diction, 
 It proni])ts the tongue to deal 
 
 in fiction." 
 Gay's Fuhles, Part I., Fahlo x. 
 
 • " All persons who have been 
 accustomed to soo witnesses in a 
 oourt of justice know, that those who 
 
 are stating falsehoods are extronuily 
 apt to give flippant and impertinent 
 answers." Per Mr. Brougham on 
 the Queen's trial, 1820. 
 
 • "And oven when sober truth 
 
 prevails throughout, 
 Thoy swear it, till afHrmanco 
 breeds a doubt." 
 
 CowpEH, C'jnvermlion. 
 
 • 1 St. Ev. 547. 
 
 • Greenl. on Tost, of Evang. § 40. 
 
 ' Bj). of Tasnuiuia'e Leot. oa Christ. 
 Catucliism, -519. 
 
 56 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 TESTIMONY OF WOMEN. 
 
 § 54. Again, aa exaggeration chiefly springs from an innate 
 vain love of the marvellous,^ and is most remarkable in the softer 
 sex,^ a prudent man will, in general, do well to weigh with some 
 caution the testimony of female mtuesses. This is the more neces- 
 sary, in consequence of the extensive and dangerous field of false- 
 hood opened up by mere exaggeration ; for, as truth is made the 
 groundwork of the picture, and fiction lends but light and shade, 
 to detect the lurking falsehood often requires much patience and 
 acuteness.' In short, the intermixture of truth disarms the 
 suspicion of the candid, and sanctions the ready belief of the 
 malevolent.* If due allowance be made for this feminine weak- 
 ness of a proneness to exaggerate, the testimony of women is at 
 least deserving of equal credit to that of men. Indeed, in some 
 respects they are superior witnesses ; for first, they are, in general, 
 closer observers than men ; next, their memories, being less loaded 
 with matters of business, are usually more tenacious ; and lastly, 
 they often possess umivalled powers of simple and uuaft'ected 
 narration.* 
 
 
 • Bp. of Tasmania's Lecture on 
 Clirist. Cato(il!ism, 522. 
 
 ' The u-vinan of Samaria, for in- 
 stance, whin told by our Saviour that 
 she had had five husbands, went into 
 the city, saymg, " Come, see a man, 
 which told me aU things that ever 1 
 did." 4th ch. of St. John, v. 29. 
 
 " Bp. of Tasmania's Tioct. on Christ. 
 Catechism, 522. The difficulty of 
 detecting falsehood engrafted on 
 truth has been noticed by Tennyson, 
 in the " Grandmother": — 
 
 " and the paraon . . . said like- 
 wise. 
 
 That a lie which is half a truth is 
 over the blackest of lies, 
 
 That a lie which is all a lie may bo 
 met and fought with outright. 
 
 But a lie which is part a truth is a 
 harder matter to tight." 
 Mr. Brougham, in the Queen's ti'ial, 
 IH'JO, said : " If an individual wore 
 to invent a story entirely, — if he wore 
 tf) form it completely of falsehoods, 
 the result would bo his inevitable de- 
 tection ; but if he build a structure of 
 falsehood on the foundation of a little 
 truth, he may raise a tale which, with 
 
 a good deal of drilling, may put an 
 honest man's life, or an illustrious 
 Princess' reputation, in jeopardy." 
 1 Ijd. Br. 8p. 147. And, again: 
 " The most effectual way, because 
 the safest, of laying a plot, is not to 
 swear too hard, is not to swear too 
 much, or to come too directly to the 
 point ; but to lay the foundation in 
 existing facts and real circiimstaucos, 
 — to knit the false with tho true, — 
 to interlace reality with fiction,— to 
 build the fanciful fabric up(m that 
 which exists in nature, — and toescape 
 detection bj- taking most especial 
 care, as they have done lu!re, never 
 to have two witnesses to the same 
 facts, and also to make tho facts as 
 modi>rate, and as little oHensive, as 
 possible." 1 Ld. Br. Sp. 215. 
 
 * Bp. of Tasnuvnia'sLect. on Christ. 
 Catechism, 522. 
 
 ' Take, for instance, the Jjettors of 
 Madame do Sevigne, or 1-ady Mary 
 Wortley Montagu. The only letters 
 written by men which at all eciual 
 them are those of tho offeuiinato Ld. 
 Orford. 
 
 57 
 
 ^iil 
 
 I 
 
 1 i' 
 
i'i:i 
 
 
 
 
 TESTIMONY OF CHILDREN. 
 
 [part I, 
 
 § 55. Sir William Blackstone apjiarently tliouglit,' that loss 
 credit was due to the testimony of a vliild than to that of an adult; 
 but reason and experience scarcely warrant this opinion. In 
 childliood, observation and memory are usually more active than 
 in after life, while the motives for falsehood are less numerous and 
 powerful. The inexperience and artlessness accompanying tender 
 years usually render a child incapable of sustaining consistent 
 perjury, while they operate powerfully in preventing his true 
 testimony from being shaken. A child comprehending the drift 
 of the questions put in cross-examination has no course but to 
 answer them according to the fact. Thus, if he speak falsely, he 
 is almost inevitably detected ; but if he be the witness of truth, he 
 avoids even that suspicion of dishonesty, which sometimes attaches 
 to older witnesses, who, though substantially telling the truth, 
 throw discredit on their testimony, by a too anxious desire to 
 reconcile every apparent inconsistency. 
 
 § 56. The testimony of foreigners and of others, who are brought 
 from a distance to the place of trial, requires to be scrutinised with 
 more than common caution. Such persons speak before a tribunal, 
 which ordinarily knows no more of them than they care for it, 
 whose threat they have no reason to fear, and whose good opinion 
 they utterly disregard. Consequently they are obviously far less 
 likely to be influenced by the dread of having their falsehoods 
 exposed than witnesses living on the spot.'^ Such witnesses, even 
 if detected of perjury, have little to fear from loss of chnraeter, 
 and are in no real danger of punishment. A dishonest foreigner, 
 who has attained a tolerable knowledge of our language, may, too, 
 conceal it, and by seeking the assistance of an interpreter, obtain 
 an opportunity of preparing with caution his answer to any incon- 
 venient question during the time that the interpreter is furnish- 
 ing him with a needless translation.^ 
 
 § 57. The testimony against a prisoner of pnlicrme))^ cnnstnhh's, 
 and others employed in the suppression and detection of crime, 
 pliould usually be watt^hed with care ; not because they inten- 
 tionally pervert the truth, but because their professional zeal and 
 
 « 4 lU. Poin. 'JKi. id. p. 241. 
 
 » rcrMr.liroii^'liumonthoQuoon'p .•'' Id. 1(!.S. Soo R. '. Buiko, 1869 
 tiJul, 1820. 1 Ld. lir. Sp. 120. Soe (Ir.), cited post, § Mil. 
 
 58 
 
CHAP. IV.J TKSriMONY OF SKIIl.ED WITNESSES. 
 
 Ii!i1)itiial contact with had men and women almnst necessarily leads 
 tliem to ascribe nil netions to the worst motives, and to give a 
 colouring of guilt to facts and conversations, which, in themselves, 
 are consistent with perfect rectitude.' The creed of the police is 
 naturally apt to be that " all men are guiltj^ till they are proved 
 to be innocent." 
 
 § •'■(S. The testimony of i^l-illrd in'fnrsKCS is perhaps that which 
 deserves least credit with a jury. These usually speak to opinions 
 and not to facts ; and it is often really surprising to see the facility 
 and extent to which views can he made to coincide with wishes or 
 interests. Skilled witnesses do not, indeed, wilfully misrepresent 
 what they think: but their judgments have often become so 
 warped by regarding the subject from only one point of view, that 
 they are, in truth, not capable of forming an independent opinion 
 even when they would conscientiously desire to do so. Being 
 zealous partisans, their belief becomes synonymous with the 
 Apostle's^ definition of Faith, "the substance of things hoped 
 for, the evidence of things not seen." Lord Campbell once 
 said, " Skilled witnesses come with such a bias on their minds to 
 support the cause in which they are embarked, that hardly any 
 weight should be given to their evidence." ' 
 
 § 59. Coincidences in the testimony of independc^nt witnesses 
 afford a t/iird ground for the credibility of evidence. Such 
 coincidences, when numerous, and presenting themselves as un- 
 designed, or incidental, necessarily produce a prodigious effect 
 in enforcing belief; because, if the witnesses had concerted a 
 plot, the coincidences would almost inevitably have been con- 
 verted by cross-examination into contradictions ; * while, if the 
 supposition of collusion, or that some deception has been practised 
 on the witnesses, be excluded, then coincidences and harmony in 
 
 I'l! 
 
 ii 
 
 ^ !|i!!i!l 
 
 • Sno jiost,, § f)8. 
 
 ' E|). to tliL! IFclircwa, c. xi., v. 1. 
 ' Tracy Poer., l.S-i;j. Sot; post, 
 § fi.S. 
 
 * Mr. Broupjham said on the 
 (iucon's ti'inl ; -•• Wliy worn tlioro 
 iiovur t\v;) witnesses to tho siiiiu! I'lict? 
 Bi'ciiuso it is (liiiif^erous ; ln'caiiso, 
 when you live umldu;; ii jilot, you 
 bUouM liavo oue wituoBb to a livct, 
 
 and finothor to a confirmntion ; liiivo 
 sonu' thiiij^'s ti'iio. wliieli iiiiini;'iMch- 
 ahlecvidciice (Mil jirovi"; other tliiii>,'S 
 tiiliricateil, without which tlio truo 
 would hii of no avail, — but avoid 
 calling two witiu'sscs to llio saiiio 
 thiu^' at tho same time. l)r<Muse the 
 rro-*s-examiiiatioii is (^xtrenielv likelv 
 to make them ('(nitradict oach othor." 
 1 lid. Br. Sp. 'lid, 1820. 
 
 69 
 
 ■n'it 
 
 ' m 
 
 
 I ■>' 
 
Rf f . 
 
 CX)INCIDENCES IN TESTIMONY. 
 
 [ 
 
 PART 1. 
 
 ill 
 
 t 
 
 the evidence of several persons can be explainpcl upon no otiior 
 hypothesis than that their individual statements aie true. Each 
 witness taken singly may be notorious for lying ; but tlie 
 chances against their all agreeing by accident in the same lie 
 may be so great as to render the agreement morally impossible.' 
 It has been remarked, that " in a number of concurrent testi- 
 monies, where there has been no previous concert, there is a 
 probability distinct from that which may be termed the sum 
 of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the wit- 
 nesses ; a probability which would remain, even though the 
 witnesses were of such a character as to merit no faith at all. 
 This probability arises purely from the concurrence itself. That 
 such a concurrence should spring from chance, is as one to 
 infinite ; that is, in other words, morally impossible. If, there- 
 fore, concert be excluded, there remains no cause but the reality 
 of the fact." * 
 
 § GO. Lord Mansfield gave expression to the truth of this prin- 
 ciple when he once observed, " It is objected that the books 
 [Keble's and Freeman's Reports] are of no authority ; but if both 
 the reporters were the worst that ever reported, if ■suhntnidially they 
 report a case in the same way, it is aemonstration of the truth of 
 what they report, or they could not agree."' Dr. Paley, in his 
 Evidences of Christianity, says that " the usual character of human 
 testimony is substantial truth nudor circumstantial raricti/. This is 
 what the daily experience of courts of justice teacb^s. When 
 accounts of a transaction come from the mouths of different wit- 
 nesses, it is seldom that it is not possible to pick out apparent or 
 real inconsistencies between them. These inconsistencies are 
 studiously displayed by an adverse pleader, but oftentimes with 
 little impression upon the minds of the judges. On the contrary, 
 a close and minute agreement induces the suspicion of confederacy 
 and fraud." * Theae last observations apply with almost over- 
 
 > Aber. on IntoU. Pow., Part 2, 
 § 3, p. 91. 
 
 ' CumpboU's Philos. of Rhotoric, 
 ch v., b. 1, par. 3, p. 125 ; Wbi'.toly's 
 lihotoric, Part 1, ch. 2, § 4, pj). S'J, 
 £9. 
 
 » E. V. Genge, 1774. Tho ■word 
 
 "substantially" hero used is highly 
 important, with a view to tho ques- 
 tion of collusion, sinco it is scarcely 
 possible that several independent 
 witneHses should tell precis oly the 
 wamo tale, without any vajiatioa. 
 * Part 3, ch. 1, p. I'oS. 
 
 60 
 
ini 
 
 CHAP. IV.] PROBAlilLITY OF liVIDEXCE. 
 
 whelming force when the facts deposed to consist of conversations, 
 or of a scries of trifling and unimportant events, and the testiiuouy 
 is given atter the lapse of a considerable interval of time.' 
 
 §61.^ Fourthh/, in receiving the knowledge of facts from the 
 testimony of others, men are much iullueuced by their accordance 
 with facts previoits/f/ kiio- n or hcUcvcd ; and this constitutes what 
 is termed their probahi/ifi/. Statements, thus probable, are received 
 upon evidence much less cogent than is requii'ed for the belief of 
 those whicb do not accord with previous knowledge ; but while 
 such statements are more readily received, ;uid justly relied upon, 
 care should be taken lest all others be unduly distrusted. While 
 unbounded credulity is the attribute of weak minds, — which quo 
 magis nesciunt, eo magis admirantur, — indiscriminate scepticism 
 belongs only to those who, affecting to make their own knowledge 
 and observation the exclusive standard of probability, forget that 
 they are liable to be misled even by their own senses.^ Such 
 persons, therefore, if they intend to sustain a truly consistent 
 character, shoidd act like Moliere's Docteur, in "Le Mariago 
 Force," who, in answer to Sganarelle's statement that he had come 
 to see him, replied, " Seigneur Sganarelle, changez, s'il vous plait, 
 cette fafon de parler. Notre philosophie ordonne de ne point 
 ^uoncer de proposition decisive, de parler de tout aveo incertitude, 
 de suspendre toujours son jugement ; et par cette raison vous ne 
 pouvez pas dire, je suis venu, raais, il me semble que je suis venu."* 
 ]']ven sceptical philosophers, true to the nature of man, but incon- 
 sistently with their avowed principles, receive a large portion of 
 their knowledge upon testimony which has been derived, not from 
 their own experience, but from that of other men ; and they will 
 even do this about matters which are at variance with their own 
 personal observation. Thus they receive with confidence the testi- 
 mony of the historian in regard to the occurrences of ancient 
 times ; that of the natur list and the traveller, in regard to the 
 natural history and civil condition of other countries ; and that of 
 the astronomer, respecting the heavenly bodies ; facts which, upon 
 
 ' See further on this interesting 
 subject, Greonl. on Tost, of Evang. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 8, in great part. 
 
 • Abercr. on Intell. Pow., Pai't 2. 
 
 § 3, p. 74. Channing, on E''. of 
 llovoiiled llelig., "^rd vol. of V/orks, 
 p. IK), obsorvos — '■ All liiy senses 
 have aomotimes given false reports." 
 « Scene 8. 
 
 61 
 
 
 
 J 
 
'V 
 
 
 !, ^ 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 II 
 
 11 
 
 i' i 
 
 ACCOKDANCE VVlTli PKEViOUS KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 [I'AKT f. 
 
 the narrow basis of their own "firm and unalterable experience," 
 which is so much relied upon by Hume, they ought to reject, as 
 wholly unworthy of belief^ 
 
 § 62. The sceptical philosopher is not the only person, however, 
 who is reluctant to lend fuith to a narrative of facts, which do 
 not strictly accord with preijonceived opinions that are mistaken 
 for knowledge. Persons of a similar stamp of mind to his 
 are abundant in all ranks and conditions. Thus, the king of 
 Siam rejected the testimony of the Dutch ambassador, that, in 
 his country, water was sometimes congealed into u solid mass ; for 
 it was utterly repugnant to his own experience ; * the stories of the 
 Abyssinian traveller Bruce were long considered mere fictions; 
 and in 1825, the evidence of George Stephenson, before a parlia- 
 mentary committee, was much impaired by his venturing an 
 opinion, that steam-carriages might possibly travel on railroads 
 twelve miles an hour.* With his finite knowledge, man should, in 
 truth, on the one hand, be slow to reject a narrative as incredible, 
 merely because it is beyond, or even contrary to, his own very 
 limited experience. On the other hand, scientific knowledge is not 
 confined within the narrow limits of ancertained facts, but enlarges 
 the understanding so as to prepare it for the further reception oi 
 truth, and sets it free from many of the prejudices which influence 
 men, whose minds are limited by merely the narrow field of actual 
 experience. For example, Archimedes, deeply imbued as he was 
 with science, might well have believed an account of the invention 
 and wonderful powers of the steam-engine, which unscientific 
 Englishmen of the last century would have rejected as incredible 
 and absurd.* 
 
 § 63.* A Jiff h basis of evidence is* the known and experienced 
 connexion subsisting between collateral fads or circumstances satis- 
 factorily proved, and facts and circumstances such as those which 
 are in controversy. This is merely the legal application of a process 
 
 ' Abercr. on Intell. Pow., Tart 2, 
 § 3, pp. 79, 80. 
 
 » Id. p. 75. 
 
 ' Life of George Stephenson, by 
 Samuel Smiles, 1857, oh. 19. 
 
 * Abcicr. on Intell. Pow., Part 2, 
 § 3, pp. 75, 7(). So Voltaire shrewdly 
 
 observes : — " La oi le vuliriiire rit, 
 le philosophe admire ; et il rit oii 
 le vulgaire ouvre de grands yeux 
 stupides d'etonnement." Vol. 42, 
 p. 142. 
 
 » Gr. Et. § 11, verbatim, except 
 the uotaa. 
 
 62 
 
 11 r 
 
ClIAC. I V.J 
 
 ClUCUMSTANTIAL KVI UKNCK. 
 
 familiar in natural philosophy, namely, that of proving the truth of 
 an hypothesis by showing its coircidence with existing phenomena. 
 Such connections and coincidence^, may be either phj'sical or moral ; 
 and the knowledge of them is derived from the known laws of 
 matter and motion, from animal instincts, and from the physical, 
 intellectual, and moral constitution and habits of man.' Their 
 degree of force depends on their sufficiency to exclude every other 
 hypothesis but the one under consideration, and will be considered 
 hereafter.'^ Meanwhile a good illustration of the legal application 
 of the piinciple is afforded by the doctrine of law by which the 
 possession of goods recently stolen, accompanied with personal 
 proximity in point of time and place to them by the party charged, 
 accompanied by inability on his part to show how he came by 
 them, naturally, though not necessarily,* excludes every hypo- 
 thesis but that of his guilt, although the possession of the same 
 goods at another time and place would warrant no such conclusion, 
 since it leaves room for the hypothesis of the goods having been 
 lawfully purchased in the course of trade. Another illustration of 
 the same prin(3iple is afforded by the legal rule of construction 
 •' nosciiur a sociifi," vhich implies that the meaning of words in 
 a written instrument is ascertained by the context. 
 
 § 64.* In considering this subject, it must always be borne in 
 mind, that in the actual occurrences of human life nothing is incon- 
 sistent. Every event, which actually transpires, has its appropriate 
 relation and place in the vast complication of circumstances of 
 which the affairs of men consist ; it owes its origin to those which 
 have preceded it ; it is intimately connected with many others which 
 occur at the same time and place, and often with those of remote 
 regions ; and, in its turn, it gives bii-th to a thousand others whioli 
 succeed.* In all this system of inter-dependence perfect harmony 
 prevails ; so that a man can hardly invent a story, which, if closely 
 
 II! 
 
 ' For an amusinp oxample of a 
 fact proved by a long chain of cir- 
 cumstantial ovidenco, see Voltaire's 
 Zadifi;, cli. ',i. 
 
 » Post, §§ (54— (59. 
 
 ' For Joseph's cup was found in 
 Benjamin's sack, Gen. c.4-4, v. 1 — 17. 
 The story of the Hunchback, in the 
 Arabian Nights, and that of the 
 
 Baked Head, in Mr. Morior's Hajji 
 Baba, both turn on an erroneous 
 presumption of guilt ari.-^ing from 
 recent possession. >*oe, too. Smollett" .s 
 Rodnrick Random, oh. xxi. 
 
 * Or. Ev. § 12, in great part. 
 
 » 1 St. Ev. 560; 3 Channing'tf 
 Works, 133, 340. 
 
 63 
 
 ■! i. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 i|'> 
 
 (:;"• 
 
 ' ! ■ ' 
 
 
 ?!. 
 
 DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL KVIDKNCE. [PART I. 
 
 coniparod with all the actual contemporaneous and successive 
 occurrences, may not be shown to be false. From these causes, 
 minds enlarged by long and matured experience, and close obser- 
 vation of the conduct and affairs of men, me*', with a raj)idity and 
 certainty approaching to in.aition, perceive the elements of truth 
 or falsehood in the face itself of the narrator, without any regard 
 to the narrative. Thus, an experienced judge may instantly dis- 
 cover the falsehood of a witness, whose story an inexperienced jury 
 might be inclined to believe. But though the mind, in these cases, 
 seems lO have acquired a new power, it is properly to be referred 
 only to experience and observation. 
 
 § G5.' In trials of fact, it will generally be found that ihe/anium 
 prohamlitm is either directly attested by those who speak from their 
 own actual and personal knowledge of its existence, or is to be 
 inferred from other facts, satisfactorily proved. In the former case, 
 the proof rests upon the second, third, and fourth grounds of belief 
 before mentioned ; that is, it depends, partly, upon faith in human 
 testimony, as sanctioned by experience ; — which faith will be in- 
 creased or diminished in proportion to the apparent honesty and 
 intelligence of the witnesses, and their opportunities for observa- 
 tion ; — partly, upon the exercise of reason on the consistency of 
 the narratives given by different witnesses ; — and here the value of 
 the testimony will vary, according to the number of the deponents, 
 and the apparent absence or presence i' collusion ; — and partly 
 upon the conformity of the testimony with experience. In the 
 latter case, however, namely, when the fact in dispute is to be 
 inferred from other facts satisfactorily established, the proof rests 
 upon the grounds before mentioned, with the addition of the con- 
 nexion shown by knowledge and experience to usually exist 
 between collateral facts such as those which have been proved, and 
 facts such as those which are in controversy ; which connexion has 
 already been pointed out to constitute the fifth basis of evidence 
 before stated. In both the two cases which have been above sup- 
 posed, the facts proved are directly attested. In the former one, 
 the proof applies immediately to the factum prohandum, without 
 any intervening process, and is therefore called direct or positive 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 13, in great part. 
 64 
 
ClIAl'. IV.J DIRKCT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 testimony. In the latter case, the proof applies immediately to 
 collateral facts, supposed to have a connexion, near or remote, with 
 the fact in controversy, and is termed circitimtantial ; and some- 
 times (althongh not with entire accuracy) presiinipfive. For example, 
 if a witness testifies that he saw A. inflict a mortal wound on B., of 
 which B. instantly died, this is a case of direct evidence. If, how- 
 ever, a witness only testifies that a deceased person was shot with a 
 pistol, and it is proved from other sources that the wadding was 
 found to be part of a letter addressed to the prisoner, the residue of 
 which was discovered in his pocket, the facts themselves are directly 
 attested ; but the evidence which they afford is termed circuinstan- 
 tial. From such facts, if unexplained by the prisoner, the jury 
 may, or may not, deduce, or infer, or presume his guilt, according as 
 they are satisfied, or not, of the natural connexion between similar 
 facts and the guilt of the person thus connected with them. In 
 both cases the veracity of the witness is presumed, in the absence 
 of proof to the contrary ; but in the latter case there is an addi- 
 tional presumption or inference, founded on the known usual con- 
 nexion between the facts proved, and the guilt of the party impli- 
 cated. This peration of the mind, which is more complex and 
 difficult in the latter case, has caused the evidence afforded by 
 circumstances to be sometimes termed presumptive evidence ; 
 though, in truth, the mental operation is similar in both cases. 
 
 § 66. Much has been said and written respecting the compara- 
 tive value of direct and circumstantial evidence ; but one argument 
 urged in favour of circumstantial evidence is palpably erroneous. 
 " Witnesses may lie, but circumstances cannot," ' has been more 
 than once repeated from the bench, and is now almost received as 
 a j udicial axiom. Yet no proposition can be more false or dangerous. 
 If " circumstances " mean — and they can have no other meaning — 
 those facts which lead to the inference of the fact in issue, they not 
 only can, but constantly do lie — in the sense that the conclusion 
 deduced from them is false. For example, when the viper fastened 
 on St. Paul's hand at Melita, the barbarians said " No doubt this 
 man is a murderer ;" but when they saw that no harm came to 
 
 imi 
 
 mm 
 
 :i :>r 
 
 ii 
 
 ' Annesley v. Ld. Anglesea, (Ir.) 1743 (Mountenoy, B.); E. v. Bland'^, 
 1752 (Leggo, B.). 
 
 -VOL. X. 
 
 6o 
 
 ■i'l 
 
fU 
 
 '.*: 
 
 DIRECT AND CIUCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 [pAIiT I. 
 
 ■J 
 
 r 
 
 him, ** they changed their minds, and said that he was a god," ' 
 and both conclusions were alike false. Again, in Macbeth, Lenox, 
 Macduff, and the other chieftains are described as en-oneously 
 assuming, first, that the grooms had murdered the King, because 
 " their bands and faces were all badged with blood, so were their 
 daggers, which unwiped we found upon their pillows :"* and next, 
 that " they were suborned " by the King's two sons, who had 
 "stolen away and fled."* In truth, the only "circumstances 
 which cannot lie " are those which necessarily lead to a certain 
 conclusion. Who is to decide on this necessity ? Clearly those 
 who have also to decide on the fact in issue. Throw a case of 
 circumstantial evidence into the form of a syllogism, and it will bo 
 found that the major premiss rests solely on the erring experience 
 of the tribunal to whom it is presented. Besides, these very circum- 
 stances must be proved, like direct facts, by witnesses, who are 
 equally capable with others of deceiving* or of being deceived. In 
 no sense therefore is it possible to say, that a conclusion drawn from 
 circumstantial evidence can amount to absolute certainty, or, in 
 other words, that circumstances cannot lie. 
 
 § 67. It may not be without some advantage to keep in mind 
 the dangers against which juries should especially guard, in 
 deciding cases supported by each species of testimony. In a case 
 sought to be established by direct evidence the witnesses are 
 usually few, and there consequently is the more reason to 
 apprehend conspiracy and fraud ; since it is far more easy to find 
 
 ' Tho Acts, xxviii. 3 — 5. So, whon him.; Josnpli is irltlinat doubt rent in 
 Jacob saw Joseph's coat of many piccca.' " Gen. x.vvii. 33. 
 colours stained with kid's blood, "he '■' Act il., sc. 3. 
 
 knew it, and said, 'It is my son's ' Act ii., sc. 4. 
 
 coat ; au evil boast hath devoured 
 
 * lago's stoiy of the handkerchief, which goaded Othello to madness, will 
 occur to everyone : — 
 
 "Iauo. Have you not sometimes seen a handkerchief, 
 Spotted with strawberiies, in your wife's hand? 
 Otiikli.o. I gave her such a one ; 'twas my first gift. 
 Iago. 1 knew not that; but such a handkerchief, 
 (I am sure it was your wife's,) did I to-day 
 See Cassio wipe his board with. 
 Ol'IlELLO. If it be that, — 
 
 Iago. If it be that, or any that was hers. 
 
 It speaks uf/ainst her, with the other proofs. 
 Othello. Oh I that the slave had forty thousand lives — 
 One is too poor, too weak for my revenge ! 
 Nubu du I SCO His true.'^ 
 
 Othello, Act iii., Sc. iii. 
 bb 
 
 m\ 
 
CITAP. IV.] CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 two or three persons who, from motives of interest or malignity, 
 will combine to aggrandise thomselvos, or to ruin an opponent, 
 than to get together a larger number. The story, too, being for 
 the most part simple, is readily concocted and remembered, while 
 its very simplicity renders it extremely difficult, on cross-examina- 
 tion, to detect the imposture. The uncorroborated statements of 
 single witnesses, especially when they testify to atrocious crimes, 
 such as rape, &c.,* or ore known, like accomplices,- to be persons of 
 bad character, and to have an interest in the result, are in conse- 
 quence regarded with distrust, and, in practice, generally deemed 
 insufficient to warrant a conviction. 
 
 § 68. In cases supported by circumstantial evidence, juries 
 should remember, that, although the number of facts drawn from 
 apparently independent sources renders concerted perjury both 
 highly improbable in itself, and easy of detection if attempted ; ' 
 yet, the witnesses in such cases are more likely to make uninten- 
 tional misstatements, than those who give direct testimony. The 
 truth of the facts they attcut depends frequently on minute and 
 careful observation, and experience teaches the danger of relying 
 implicitly on the evidence of even the most conscientious Avitnessos, 
 respecting dates, time, distances, footprints, handwriting, admis- 
 sions, loose conversations, and questions of identity. Yet these in 
 general are the links in the chain of circumstances, by which guilt 
 is sought to be established. The number too of the witnesses, who 
 must (dl speak the truth, or some link will be wanting, renders 
 additional caution the more necessary. Besides, it must be 
 remembered, that, in a case of circumstantial evidence, the facts 
 are collected by degrees. Something occurs to raise a suspicion 
 against a particular party. Constables and police officers are 
 immediately on the alert, and, with professional zeal, ransack 
 every place and paper, and examine into every circumstance wliiuh 
 can tend to establish, not his innocence, but his guilt. Presuming 
 him guilty from the first, they are apt to consider his acquittal as a 
 tacit reflection on their discrimination or skill, and, with something 
 like the feeling of a keen sportsman, they determine, if possible, to 
 
 Hill 
 
 > 1 Hale, 635. 
 
 » E. V. Jones, 1809. 
 
 8 Greenl. on Test, of Evang. § 40. 
 67 p2 
 
 I i n 
 
 US 
 
 '■i ' 
 
 
I' 
 
 i\l 
 
 i 
 
 'M 
 
 :i 
 
 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 bag their game. Though both sportsmen and policemen alike 
 would be horrified at anything unfair or " unsportsmanlike," yet, 
 as both start with this object in view, it is easy to unintentionally 
 misinterpret innocent actions, to misunderstand innocent words, for 
 men readily believe what they anxiously desire,^ and to be ever 
 ready to construe the most harmless facts as confirmations of 
 preconceived opinions " These feelings are common alike to the 
 police, to counsel, engineers, surveyors,' medical men, antiquarians, 
 and philosophers; iLnluod, to all persons who first assume that a 
 fact or system is true, and then seek for arguments to support and 
 prove its truth. 
 
 § 69. But, even where the facts sworn to are satisfactorily 
 proved, the task of the jury in cases turning on circumstantial 
 evidence is highly lifficult. For they must decide, not whether 
 these facts are consistent with the prisoner's guilt, but whether 
 they are inconfiistent with any other rational conclusion ; since it 
 is only on this last hypothesis that they can safely convict the 
 accused.* 
 
 ' A strikinj? illustration of this 
 was the cii'<lit that was given by the 
 ■whole civilised world to the lyiner 
 telegram which, in October, lj<i4, 
 auuounoed the fall of Sc^"?t ^^ol 
 
 » Ante, § 57. 
 
 » Waters v. Thorn, 1856 (Eomilly. 
 M.R.). 
 * £. V. Hodge, 1838. 
 
 68 
 
ClIAP. v.] 
 
 PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE. 
 
 1 i'l 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENCE. 
 
 § 70.' PREsuMmvE EVIDENCE 18 Usually divided into two 
 branches, namely, presumptions of law, and presumptions of fact. 
 Presumptions of law consist of those rules, which, in certain 
 cases, either forbid or dispense with any ulterior inquiry. Pre- 
 sumptions of law are sub-divided into two classes, namely, 
 conclusive and disputable. For the general doctrines in accordance 
 with which presumptions are made are not peculiar to municipal 
 law, but are common to all departments of science. For instance, 
 the presumption of a malicious intent to kill from the deliberate 
 use of a deadly weapon, and the presumption of aquatic habits in 
 an animal found with webbed feet, belong to the same philosophy, 
 difforing only in the instance, and not in the principle of its 
 application. The one fact being proved or ascertained, the other, 
 its uniform concomitant, is universally and safely presumed. The 
 presumption, however, has more or less force, in proportion to the 
 universality of the experience ; and this furnishes the reason for 
 the distribution of presumptions of law into the two classes which 
 we have mentioned, namely, conclusire and disputable. 
 
 § 71.* Conclusire, or, as they are sometimes termed, imperative, 
 or absolute presumptions of law, are rules determining the quantity 
 of evidence requisite for the support of any particular averment, 
 and forbidding such averment to bo overcome by any evidence that 
 tlie fact is otherwise after the degree of proof which they demand 
 has been furninlied. Conclusive presumptions exist chiefly in 
 those cases in which the long-exporienced connexion, just alluded 
 to, has been found so general and uniform, as to render it expedient 
 for the common good, that such connexion should be taken to be 
 
 • Or. Ev. § 14, largely. 
 
 « Gr. Ev. § 13, largely. 
 
 6U 
 
 ! 
 
 
 J,: i 
 
 !| i^' 1:1 
 
CONCLUSIVE STATUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS. [PART I. 
 
 
 ^:i 
 
 insepariiLle and universal. They have been adopted by common 
 consent, from motives of common policy, for the sake of greater 
 certainty, and the promotion of peace and quiet in the community. 
 Where they arise all corroborating evidence is dispensed with, and 
 all opposing evidence is forbidden.^ 
 
 § 72. Sometimes this common consent is expressly declared 
 through the medium of the legislature in uttttutcs. Thus, under 
 the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, in the absence of fraud, the approval 
 of the Court, testified by a certificate of the official receiver, is 
 conclusive as to the validity of any comjjosition, or general scheme 
 of arrangement, accepted in pursuance of the Act;' all the requisi- 
 tions of the Public Schools Act, 18()8, in respect to any statutes 
 made by the governing body of a school, " shall be deemed to have 
 been duly complied with," so soon as the statutes themselves have 
 been approved by Iler Majesty in Council;' under the Endowed 
 Schools Act, 1869, an Order in Council approving a scheme is 
 conclusive evidence of its validity;* under the Valuation Metro- 
 polis Act, 1869, " the valuation list for the time being in force 
 shall be deemed to have been duly made ;" * under the Act for the 
 protection of bankers, it is enacted that " any draft or order drawn 
 upon a banker paj'able to order on demand, which shall, when 
 presented for payment, purport to be indorsed by the person to 
 tv/tom the same shall be drawn paj/able,"^ shall be a sufficient 
 
 ' Tho prpstimption in Eomnn law 
 is dt'HiKMl to ho, "c'onjoctuni, duota 
 alt (!(), qu(»l ut pluriininn tit. Eii con- 
 ji'ctuni vcl a Icfic induritur, vol a 
 jiiilice. tiiion ab ipsa lego iiiducitur, 
 vol ita cninpanitii, ut probutiouciii 
 coiitiaiii liiuidadiiiittat; vol ut oadoiu 
 jxissit I'lidi. I'riiirem doctoros /irir- 
 »iniii>tiiiiien jrias KT 1)K jritK, jmx- 
 tivii'Vcm pni'siniijitiiuiiin jriiis, ad- 
 pflliiiit. Ciuii' a tiinliri' iiiducitur 
 con jcctura, jirifsnmiilio IIOMIXIS vo- 
 cari solct ; ct s('in]iiM' ndiiiiUit pioha- 
 tinnciii contiinii, (inunivis, si alicujua 
 iiioiiii'nti sit. priilmndi nutTo rclovot." 
 Jlcin. ad Paud.. Pars iv. § 124. Of 
 till' fiirniPi', ausweriu;; to our von- 
 clu.-iivo ]ii'('.siini])ti(iu, AriiHciivdiiH ob- 
 BiM'vi'H, — " Super hiic jnu'Huiii])tiono 
 Idx tii'iiiuin Hauuit jus, et eum pro 
 vttitiitc liitbH." 1 do I'rob., Qiuust. x. 
 
 48. An oxppption to tho conchisivo- 
 ness of this chiMS of jin siuni])tions is 
 allowL'd by tho civil law, whon tho 
 pri'suiiiption is luct bj- an achnission 
 in /'iidicid. 
 
 » 4(i iV 47 V. c. o2, § 18, subs. 9 ; 
 o3 & .M V. c. 71. § .'J, subs. l.{. As 
 to prcsunijitic HIS which, in tho absence 
 <d' fraud iirosc under the Itankiuptcv 
 Act of l.S(i!», SCO ;i'J & ;{3 V. c. 71, 
 § 127. 
 
 •' ;il & ;i2 V. 0. lis. § 8, subs. 4. 
 
 * .•i2 iJt a;) V. c. j(), §"47. 
 
 :i2 vV ;t:t V. c (i7, § 4"). Seo also 
 " The r,ociil (Jovernnient Act, 18,SH" 
 (.Jl \- .VJ V. c. 41). 
 
 ° These woi'ds includes the pnyoo's 
 agent, though not really authori/ed 
 to endorse, soo Charles u. Blackwoll, 
 1877, C. A. 
 
 70 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
 
 aiitliority to such banker to pay the amount of such draft or order 
 to the bearer thereof ; and it shall not be incumbent on such 
 banker ' to prove that such indorsement, or any subsequent indorse- 
 ment, was made by, or under the direction of, the person to whom 
 the said draft or order was or is made payable either by the 
 vVr-awer or any indorser thereof ;2 and, under the Stamp Act, 
 1891, "a bill of exchange or promissory note purporting to be 
 drawn or made out of the United Kingdom, is, for the purpose of 
 this Act, to be deemed to have been so drawn or made, although 
 it may in fact have been drawn or made within the United 
 Kingdom."' 
 
 § 73. Again : by the Statutes of Limitations,* where a simple 
 contract debt has not been distinctly recognised within six years as a 
 subsisting obligation, either in some writing signed by the party 
 chargeable, or his agent, or by part payment of principal, or by 
 payment of interest,^ such debt" is, at the end of the six years, con- 
 clusively presumed to have been paid ; and a presumption of satis- 
 faction arises with respect to all injuries, the remedy for which is an 
 action on the case, other than slander, trespass to goods or land, or for 
 detinue' or replevin, unless they have been sued for within six years 
 after the cause of action shall have accrued ; ^ while actions for an 
 assault or false imprisonment must be brought within four years ; * 
 for slander, within two years;* for compensation to the families of 
 persons killed by accident, within twelve calendar months from the 
 death of the deceased.' Actions under the Employers* Liability 
 Act must be commenced within six months from the date of the 
 
 ' Tliis enactment does not protect 
 any other person than a hanker who 
 takes a eheiiuo on tlie faith of a 
 foi'fied indorsonieut. Ogdun v, JJenas, 
 1.S74. 
 
 ' Tliis Act is extended to drafts by 
 the raviiiastor-(ionoral hv ',i'i & ;J(» 
 V. c. 44. § 11. See, also. 4.) iV 4(i V. 
 c. (>1, § ()(). And see Ilaro i<. Cop- 
 land, 1802 (Ir.). 
 
 3 r.4 & oj \ . e. ;59, § ;?«. 
 
 « 21J. 1, c. Iti ("Tlio Limitation 
 
 Art, lO'j;}"); 1() & 17 V. e. IIH, § 20 
 
 (li.). 'i'he fust-named Aet is amended 
 
 i)V 19 & 20 V. e. !»", § 9. 
 
 ■» Tho St. of Limitat. 21 J. 1, c. 16, 
 
 npjilies to nn action of deht for a 
 ]ienalty under a hy-iaw. T(d)acco- 
 jiijje ^takers' Co. r. Loder, IS.jl. 
 
 « i» U. 4, c. 14, § 1 ; 19 & 20 V. 
 c. 97. § l.{. 
 
 ' Se(! Wilkinson v. Verity, 1871, 
 as to when the cause of action will 
 accrui^ in detin\ie. 
 
 " 21 J. 1, c. l(i, § 3. As to when 
 concealed fraud and non-discovt'i'y 
 can he jileaded in rejilv to a defence 
 under the Stat., .see (Jihhs r. U\iild, 
 1882, ('. A. See, also, liarbor v. 
 Hou.tim, 1885 (Ir). 
 
 » 9 & 10 V. c. 9,1, § 3, as amended 
 by 27 & 28 V. c. 9j. 
 
 '41 
 
 ill! 
 
 ri 
 

 ^^1 
 
 ■■!i 
 
 STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
 
 [part 1. 
 
 
 accident, or, in case of death, "within twelve months from the 
 time of death." ^ 
 
 § 73a. The PubUc Authorities Protection Act, 1893,2 enacts^" 
 that where, after Ist January, 1894, " any action, prosecution, or 
 other proceeding is commenced in the United Kingdom against 
 any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution, or in- 
 tended execution of any Act ot Parliament, or of any public duty 
 or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the 
 execution of any such act, dutj or authority, the follow; ^ pro- 
 visions shall have effect: — 
 
 (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be 
 
 instituted unless it is commenced within six months next 
 after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case 
 of a continuance of injury or damage, within six months 
 next after the ceasing thereof : 
 
 (b) Wherever la anj' such action a judgment is obtained by the 
 
 defendant it pLall carry costs to be taxed as between 
 solicitor and client : 
 
 (c) Where the proceeding is an action for damages, tender of 
 
 amends before the action was commenced may, in lieu of 
 or in addition to any other plea, be pleaded. If the action 
 was commenced after the tender, 't is proceeded with 
 after payment into court of any money in satisfaction of 
 the plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff does not recover 
 more than the sura tendered or paid, he shall not recover 
 any costs incurred after the tender or payment, and the 
 defendant shall be entitled to costs, to be taxed as 
 between solicitor and client, as from the time of the 
 tender or payment ; but this provision shall not affect 
 costs on any injunction in the action : 
 (rf) If in the opinion of the court the plaintiff has not given the 
 defendant a sufficient opportunity of tendering amends 
 before the commencement of the proceeding, the court 
 
 > 43 & 44 V. 0. 42, § 4. A notice has power to relax tho stringoticy of 
 
 ihat injury has been sustained must this last rule, 
 
 also be given "within six weeks," * o6 & 67 V. o. 61. 
 
 though in coses of death, the judge ' § It 
 
 72 
 
w 
 
 CUAP. v.] 
 
 STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
 
 I t] 
 
 may award to the defendant oosts t^^ be taxed as between 
 Bolicitor and client. 
 " This seotion shall not affect any proceedings by any department 
 of the Government against any local authority or officer of a local 
 authority." 
 
 By § 2 of the Act last cited so much of any public general Act 
 is repealed a3 enacts, with reference to any proceeding, that — 
 '• (a) The proceeding is to be commenced in any particular 
 place; or 
 (i) The proceeding is to be comi .need within any particular 
 
 time; or 
 (c) Notice of action is to be given ; or 
 
 (rf) The defendant is to be entitled to any particular kind or 
 
 amount of costs, or the plaintiff id to be deprived, of oosta 
 
 in any specified event ; or 
 
 {e) The defendant may plead the general issue." 
 
 The section then repeals various oldtr enactments. 
 
 A provision contained in an earlier Act, which was passed in 
 
 1842,' provides that actions for anything dono in pursuance of any 
 
 public local and personal Act, or any local and personal Act, shall 
 
 be brought within two years after the cause of action shall have 
 
 accrued, or in the case of continuing damage, within one year 
 
 after the damage shall have ceased.^ Any action, prosecution, or 
 
 proceeding against any person for any act done in pursuance or 
 
 intended execution of the Army Act, 1881, or of the Militia Act, 
 
 1882, must be commenced within six munths next after the 
 
 act, neglect, or default complained of, or, in case of a continuunye 
 
 of damage within six mouths next after the ceasing thereof.' 
 
 Actions and proceedings against persons acting under the Seamen's 
 
 Clothing Act, 18G9,'* or the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882,* must 
 
 be commenced within six months after the act complained of shall 
 
 have been committed.* Justices of the peace in England fall 
 
 within the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 
 
 and in Ireland every action against a justice of the peace for 
 
 » 6 & 6 V. 0. 97. 
 
 '§3. 
 
 » 44 & 46 V. 0. 58, § 170, subs. 1, 
 iiniomlt'd by "The Army (Anuunl) 
 Act, 1894 " (57 V. o. 8), § 7 ; 45 & 46 
 
 V. c. 49, § 46. 
 
 • 32 & Xi V. 0. 57, § 0. 
 
 • 45 & 4(i V^ c. 50, § 226. 
 
 • Soe uoto ', post, p. 74. 
 
 73 
 
 ■;tii 
 
 ;i !' 
 
 
ifi^'» 
 
 I ' ■ ■ 
 
 I 
 
 M 
 
 ^^ 
 
 
 STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 anything done by him in the execution of his office must be 
 brought within six raontlis.' On similar principles, when a 
 judgment has been obtained against a banking copartnership, no 
 execution can issue thereon against any former member of such 
 copartnership, after the expiration of three years next after the 
 person sought to be charged shall have ceased to be a member.' 
 
 § 74. Presumptions that their rights have been satisfied or in 
 Bome other way extinguished are, in like manner, sometimes raised 
 by statute against the Crown or the Duchy of Cornwall. Thus, 
 the right of the Sovereign,' or of the Duke of Cornwall,^ to insti- 
 tute legal i)roceedings for the recovery of lands, rents, or minerals, 
 is barred, under several special statutes, by uninterrupted possession 
 for a period of sixty, or in certain cases, of one hundred years. 
 
 § 74a. Length of enjoyment, too, as between subjects of the 
 Crown raises a conclusive presumption of right. Thus, the pos- 
 session of land, or of rent, for the length of time mentioned in the 
 general statutes of limitation, under a claim of absolute title and 
 ownership, constitutes a conclusive presumption of a valid grant;* 
 
 ' 12 & 13 V. c. lOC'Tht) Justices 
 IVotoctiou (Iiuluiid) Act, KS40"), § 8. 
 Ill S(.'.)t!im(l, un(kT"The Summary 
 I'loe. .\ct, l.S()4," the poriod is fixed 
 at two mtinths, 27 & 28 V. c. o.'J, § Aa. 
 
 » 7 G. 4. c. 4G. § i:J (" The Country 
 lUiukers Act, 182(i"). See In ro 
 North of iMif^l. Joint Stock liunk 
 €o., Ex parte Oouthwaite, 1851 ; 
 Uarkfi' V. buttress, 184.). 
 
 ' !» G. ;>, c. in, amended by " The 
 Stat. l.awKiA-. Act, 188.S "(ol V. c'X) ; 
 24 & 2.) V. c. ()2 ; a!» & 40 V. c. 37 (Ir.). 
 
 « 7 \- 8 V. c. lO.J. S§ 73 e.t seci- 
 
 23 & 24 V. c. -)3 ; 24 & 
 
 c. «2 
 
 ("Tlu' Trowii Suits Act, l.S(il "). 
 
 ' This peiiod has for many years 
 past been shortened, at successive 
 revisions of the law, both in Kngland 
 and llie I'liitcd States. In 1833 the 
 Act of 3 iV 4 \V. 4, c. 27 (" The J{cal 
 Property Limitation Act, 1833"), §2, 
 passed, and baricd all actions to re- 
 cover land or rent, after twenty years 
 from the time wlieii the rif.'ht of 
 action accrued ; unless, at sui^h timi-, 
 the plaintitV or the party tlirouf,'h 
 whom he claims shall liiive be(Mi 
 uniler some disability, speeitied in the 
 Act, in which case ho is allowed ten 
 years fiom the ceasiu;; of the dis- 
 
 abilitj' ; provided that in no case 
 shall an action be broufrht after forty 
 years from the time when the right 
 first accrued, although the period of 
 ten years shall not have expired : 
 §§ l(i and 17. This statutory rule is 
 extended by §§ 24 and 25 to uU claims 
 in ('(juity for the recovery of land : 
 Magdalen College v. Att.-Uen., 18,)7, 
 II. L. ; it also ai)i)lio8 to a claim for 
 de .v'er : Mai'shall r. Smith, 1805 
 (Stuart, V.-C.^; to a claim forcompen- 
 salion for eiiuitable waste: D.of I eeds 
 V, Ld. ;^ '- horst, 184(J; and to the i laim 
 of an aiiiiuity chai-ged u])on hind by 
 will, the twenty yi'ars in this last 
 case lieing calculated from the deatli 
 of the testator : James i'. Salter, 1837. 
 The secilons just referred to do nctt, 
 however, a|)ply to s))iritual or elee- 
 mosynary coriMiratious .sole, who are 
 em])owered by § 2i* to bring actions 
 or suits to recovei' land or rent within 
 two successive incumbencies and six 
 years, or, in case these periods do not 
 amount to sixty years, then witliiii 
 sixty yeai's next after the right of 
 action shall lirst havo accrued. See 
 l>]cclesiaH. ( 'ommis. v. Howo, 188((, 
 II. 1-. §§ 30-33 limit the time 
 within which advowsons can be 
 
 74 
 
 L 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 TITLE TO LAND. 
 
 ? 
 
 the payment of a modus, or the mhrne, and as of ri'^/if enjoyment 
 of land tithe-free, for the yieriods specified in the xYct of 2 & 3 
 W. 4, c. 100,' conchisively bars the right of all parties, even the 
 Queen, to recover tithes, unless such payment has been made, or 
 enjoyment had, under an express written consent or agreement.* 
 
 § 75. The principle that, by statute, rights are after a certain 
 time to be presumed to be extinguished is further exemplified by 
 the rule that on the completion of any contract of sale of land, the 
 period of the commencement of title which a purchaser may 
 roquire (or, in the language of conveyancers, the root of title) is 
 now fixed by statute at forty years, unless tliere be some stipula- 
 tion to the contrary in the contract, or some very special circum- 
 stances in the case.' 
 
 § 75a. Again, by the Prescription Act, 1832,* the length of time 
 
 nio 
 
 1X1 
 
 ropov('rcd, whilo § 40 enacts, that 
 ull inonoya chuifi;ud upon liiiul and 
 lef^iu'ics shall bo doomed satisfied 
 ot the end t)f twenty years, unless 
 Bouio interest shall have been paid, 
 or Koiiio writton ncknowledpuont 
 shall have been given in the mean- 
 while. Under § 28 no mortgagor 
 8hall bring a suit to redeem a 
 mortgage but within twenty years 
 from the time when the mortgagee 
 took possession (see Kinsman v. 
 House, 1^81 ), or from the last writt(>n 
 acknowledgment of the mortgagor's 
 title. Mortgagees also may bring 
 actions to recover laiul at any time 
 within twenty years next after the 
 last payment of any part of the 
 ])vineipal or interest secun-d by the 
 mortgage : 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 28 ; Doc 
 V. Kyre, 1>SJ1 ; Jjoo i-. Massoy, ISol ; 
 Ford r. Ager, 1803; provided that 
 such last jtavTuent be itself within 
 t\v aty years from the date of the 
 7iioitgage : Hemming v. lUanton, 
 iSTIi; and jirovided that the pay- 
 ment bo madi! by the mortgagor, or 
 by some jua'son bound to make it on 
 Ins behalf : llarlock l: Ashberry, 
 1.SS2. On Ist January, 1S79, tlio 
 " Keal l'n)ii(<rtv Jamitafion Act, 
 1ST4" (37 iV 3>< V. c. ,-)7), came into 
 opi'iation, and by it these periods 
 of limitation were rednced by 
 six, twelve, and thirty years being 
 Hiihstituted for the ten, twenty, and 
 forty years mentioned in the Acts of 
 
 7fi 
 
 1833 and 1837. 6 & 7 V. c. 54, and 
 7 & 8 V. c. 27, extend to Ireland 
 such of the provisions of 3 & 4 W. 4, 
 c. 27, as wei'O not already in force 
 there, and exjdain and amend that 
 Act. The ])eriod of twenty years 
 has been adopted in most of the 
 United States. .See 4 Kent, Com. 
 188, n. a. The same period in regard 
 to the title to real jjrojierty, or, as 
 .?onio construe it, only to the ])rofits 
 of the land, is adoi)te(l in the Hindoo 
 law: 1 Macnagh. Klem, of Hindoo 
 L. 201. See, as to the Scotch law, 
 37 & 38 V. c. 94, §^ 13, 34. 
 
 ' See Salkold v. Johnson, 1848. 
 See, also, Followes v. Clay, 1842, 
 and Salkold v. Johnson, IHKi. 
 
 * See Tovnibee i\ Jirown, 1849. 
 
 » 37 & 38 V. c. 78 (•' The ^'ondor 
 and Purchaser Act, 1874"), ^ 1. 
 
 « 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 71,— extended to 
 Ireland by 21 & 22 V. c. 42.— liinits 
 the))eriod of legal memory as follows: 
 — In cases of riirhts of common or 
 other ])rofits er benefits 'n'ising out 
 of lands, except tithes, rent, and 
 services, jirirmi t'lin'f to thirty years, 
 and conclusively to sixty years, 
 unless it shall a])})ear that such 
 rights were enjoyed by some consent 
 or agreement expressly given or 
 made by deed oi' writing ; § 1 ; in 
 cases of ways or other easements, 
 watercourses, or the use oi water, 
 priino fiirif to twenty years, and 
 conclusively to forty years, luiless it 
 
 H hi 
 
 t in 
 
 t H 
 
 ' l-i 
 
 I ; 
 
 ii 
 
1 
 
 r' 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 I 
 i I 
 
 SPECIALITIES — ACTIONS FOR PENALTIES. [PART I. 
 
 which constitutes the period of legal memory, or, in other words, 
 which affords a legal title in respect of incorporeal rights,' has 
 been definitely fixed. 
 
 § 75b. Further, by the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833,' 
 the time within whi("h actions for rent due under a lease, actions 
 of covenant,' or debt on specialties,'' and debt or scire facias on a 
 recognizance,'' may be brought, is expressly limited. So, likewise, 
 by the same enactment, is the time for actions for debt or on an 
 award, where the submission is not by specialty ; for copyhold- 
 fines, escapes, money levied on a scire facias, or for penalties.' 
 
 § 75c. Again, as regards religious trusts. Where any real or 
 personal estate, subject to a trust for a Roman Catholic charity, 
 has been applied upon some trusts connected with that religion for 
 twenty years, but the original trusts cannot be ascertained by any 
 document, a consistent usage of twenty years is, by statute, rendered 
 conclusive evidence of the trusts on which the property has been 
 settled." Under Lord Lyndhurst's Act for regulating suits relating 
 
 shall be proved, in like miinnor, by 
 wiitten evidence, that the sunie were 
 enjoyed by consent of the owner: 
 § 2 ; and in cases of lights, conclu- 
 sively to twenty years, unless it shall 
 be proved, in like manner, that the 
 same were enjoyed by consent : § 3. 
 See Bewley v. Atkinson, 1880; Tup- 
 ling V. Jones, 1865 ; Lanfranchi v. 
 Mackenzie, 1857 ; Aynsley v. Glover, 
 1875. § 4 directs, that the before- 
 mentioned periods shall bo deemed 
 those next before some suit or action 
 respecting the claims, and further 
 detiues what shall amount to an 
 interruption. § (5 enacts, that no pre- 
 sumi)tiou shall be made in support of 
 any claim, upim proof of the enjoy- 
 ment of the right for any less period 
 than the j)('riod uientiont;d in the Act 
 us applicable to the nature of the 
 claim. § 7 provides for parties who 
 are under legal disabilities. As to 
 what evidence of user is necessary 
 under this Act, see Lowe i;. Car- 
 penter, 1851 ; IloUins v, Vernoy, 
 1884, C. A. 
 
 ' A right to the passage of air and 
 light to a garden : I'otts v. Smith, 
 1869 (Malins, V.-C.) ; or of air to a 
 windmill or house, is not within the 
 mraiiing of this Act: Webb v. Bird, 
 IsOo ; Bryant v. Lefever, 1879, C. A.; 
 
 nor is a claim of " a free fishery " in 
 the waters of another proprietor : 
 Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming, 18(i5 ; 
 Smith V, Andrews, 1891. For "pre- 
 scription pre-8upi)0808 a grant, see 
 Smith V. Andrews, supra, and no 
 
 frant of the right claimed can here 
 e imagined. 
 
 » 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27. As to spe- 
 cialties, see § 3 of this Act. § 4, as 
 amended by 19 & m V. c. 97, § 10, 
 provides for parties under legal dis- 
 abilities, and § 5 states the effect 
 of an acknowledgment in writing 
 or part payment. See the Irish Act 
 of 1() & 17 V. c. 113. §§ 20—24 ; also 
 Alliance Bk. of Simla v. Carey. 1870. 
 
 * See In re Baker, Collins v. lihodes, 
 1882. 
 
 * The tenn "specialty" inclvides 
 all actions on statutes, as, for iii- 
 stanco, an action against a share- 
 holder of a company for calls : Cork 
 & Band(m Bail. Co. v. Goode, 1853 ; 
 Shejiherd v. Hills, 1857. 
 
 * See, also, as to actions for penal- 
 ties, 31 El. c. 5, § 5, as limited by 11 
 & 12 V. c. 43 ("The Summary Juris- 
 diction Act, 1 S48 "), § 3(5, and amended 
 by "The Stat. Law' Rev. Act, 1888" 
 (51 V. c. 3), and Robinson v. Curry, 
 1881 ; overruling Dyer v. Best, 1866. 
 
 * 23 & 24 V. c. 134, § 5. 
 
 76 
 
'')l 
 
 70. 
 
 kal- 
 11 
 
 m. 
 
 CHAP, v.] SPECIALITIKS — ACTION'S FOR PliXAT/riES. 
 
 to meoting-houses and other property hold for religious purposes 
 by dissenters, fh" iis/ifja for twenty-fice i/mra imiUddiatcly preoodiug 
 any such suit, shall be taken as oonoluaive evidence that the reli- 
 gious doctrines, opinions, or mode of worship, v/hicL for that period 
 have been taught or observed in these houses, may properly be 
 taught or observed, provided the contrary is not declared by the 
 instrument declaring the trusts of such houses, either in express 
 terms or by reference to some other document.' 
 
 §^ 7G-8. The principle that after the lapse of a certain period it 
 must be presumed that the offender is innocent, or, at all events, 
 must not be called upjn to defend himself, is also one which finds 
 a place in Criminal Jurisprudence. Many statutes accordingly 
 limit the period within which particular offenders may be prose- 
 cuted. Some of the principal of these are mentioned in the foot- 
 note.* Clauses of this nature will be found in a vast variety of 
 
 » 7 & 8 V. c. 45 (" Tho Noncon- 
 fonnist Chapols Act, 1844"), § 2. 
 See Att.-Gen. v. Bunce, 1868 (Malins, 
 V.-C.}. 
 
 ' Tlio under-mentioned statutes 
 (aiTinif^ed in alphabetical order) 
 l)re.sci'ibe periods of limitation which 
 are respectively as follows, viz. : — 
 "The Army Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. 
 c. 58, § 161), ci-eates a limitation of 
 three years for offences other than 
 mutiny, desertion, or fraudulent en- 
 listment, and by it absolute ira- 
 mimity is confeired (except for the 
 offence of desertion on active ser- 
 vice) by three years' exemplary ser- 
 vice ; " The Births and Deaths 
 Registration Act, 1874" (as to 
 England, 37 & 38 V. o. 88, § 46, 
 and as to Ireland, 43 & 44 V. c. 13, 
 § 3t!), creates a limitation of three 
 years ; " The Clergy Disciplii i Act, 
 1«!)2" (55 & 56 V. 0. 32, § 5, with 
 which compare former Acts on this 
 ^subject, as construed in Denison v. 
 Ditcher, 1857 ; Ditcher v, Denison, 
 
 1857 ; Bishop of Hereford v. T n, 
 
 1M53 ; and Simpson v. Flamank, 
 1867), creates (by § 5) a limitation of 
 five years, or of two years after con- 
 viction by a temporal court; "The 
 Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887 " 
 (50 & 51 V. c. 58, § 62), one of three 
 months; "Tho Corrupt Practices 
 Act, 1H83" (46 &47 V. c. 61, § 51, 
 and Part 12 of " The Municipal Cor- 
 porations Act, 1882," viz., 45 & 46 
 
 V. c. 50, § 78), unless against a party 
 who has absconded, creates a limita- 
 tion of one year from date of of- 
 fence, or within three months after 
 report of commissioners; offences 
 against "Tho Customs Act, 1876" 
 (39 & 40 V. c. 36, § 257), must be 
 prosecuted withiii three years from 
 commission of tho offence ; offences 
 against "The Diseases of Animals 
 Act, 1894" (57 & 58 V. c. 57), must 
 be prosecuted within tho time limited 
 by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts 
 (which see) ; offences against ' ' The 
 Factory and Workshops Act, 1878" 
 (41 V. c. 16, § 9n, within two 
 to three months (varying with the 
 offence) from commission of act ; 
 a false declaration, in order to 
 procure a marriage to take place out 
 of its proper district (3 & 4 V. c. 72, 
 
 5 4), within eighteen months from 
 tho marriage ; high treason, or mis- 
 prision of treason (7 W. 3, c. 3,§§ 5, 6, 
 extended to Scotland 7 Anne, c. 11), 
 within three years after offence ; 
 summary proceedings under "The 
 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 " (57 & 
 58 V. c. 60, § 683), on tho construction 
 of which see Austin v. Olson, 1868, 
 must bo usually taken six months, but 
 in some cases within two months of the 
 date of the alleged offence; offences 
 against the MaiTiago Acts (the Eng- 
 lish " Marriage Act, 1836," being 
 
 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 85, on the construc- 
 tion of which see H. v, Ld. Duu- 
 
 '!1 
 
 li 
 
 !;Hi' 
 
 i:>^ tl 
 
 '^m 
 
 H-l: 
 
 77 
 
 ; I I 
 
 ■ M 
 I'i 
 
f" 
 
 
 5 1 
 
 
 II ! 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 I : ■ ! 
 
 STATUTi:S OF LIMITATION. 
 
 [pAi:r I. 
 
 statutes, to which it is considered unnecessary to make particular 
 reference.* 
 
 § 79. The principle upon which these statutes rest would 
 appear to be simply the broad one of general expedience and 
 justice, rather than upon that of any presumption, for " Intere&t 
 reipuWicjB ut sit finis litium." When a party has ueen in 
 undisputed possession of property for a considerable length of 
 time, it is harsh to deprive him of that which, however obtained, 
 has now acquired the character of a vested interest. No presump- 
 tion of a former grant is. however, necessary to give validity to his 
 title, but it rests on the fact of long uninterrupted enjoyment. 
 When a person has foregone a claim for many years, there is, 
 indeed, no need for presuming that he has, in reality, been satis- 
 
 boyue, 1850, and the Irish Act being 
 7 & 8 V. c. 27, § 13), within tnroo 
 yeiirrt, or in tho case of offoncea 
 under tlio Irish Act, punishable on 
 siunmarv conviciion (7 & 8 V. c. 81, 
 §§48, 78"; also 2() & 'll V. c. 27, § 16), 
 ■within throe months, or in tho case 
 of false declarations to ])r()euro a 
 niavriugo oxit of its piojier district, 
 within the tiirio stated above, under 
 head "False JJeclaration " ; "Tho 
 Minos Regulation Act, 1872" (;}j & 
 SC) V. c. 76, § (vJ, r. 1 ; and c. 77, 
 § ,'M, r. 1, extended to Isle of Man by 
 (34 (>c 00 V. c. 47), reiiuires ott'ences 
 against it to bo prosecuted within 
 three months; "Tho Municijial 
 Corpoiations Act, 1882" (45 & 46 
 V. c. 5(1, § 219, subs. 1), re([uir,os 
 proceedings for offences and fines 
 under it to bo taken within 
 six months from act ; proceedings 
 und.u' tho Public Ileulth Acts (of 
 1875, for England, being 38 & 39 
 V. c. 00, § 252, and of 1878, being 
 41 & 42 V. c. 52, § 250. for Ireland), 
 must bo taken within six months 
 from when matter arose ; ])roceod- 
 ings under "Tho Naval Discipline 
 Act, ir>()() " (29 & 30 V. c. 109, § 54), 
 within throo yea'-s frf)ra ctYeuce, or if 
 offender has boon abroad, one year 
 from his return ; proceedings under 
 "Tho Night Poaching Act, 1841" 
 ^beiiig 7 & 8 V. c. 'zi)), are, as to 
 indictable offences (by 9 G. 4, c. 59, 
 § 4, and 7 & 8 V. c. 29, as to the con- 
 struction i)f which see R. v. Casbolt, 
 l.S()9). to bi' within twelve calendar 
 months; and as to offences punish- 
 
 78 
 
 able on summary conviction, to be 
 within six calendai months, the 
 commencement of tlu 'iroKecution 
 being tho laying of an u. nnation, 
 or the obtaining of a warrant : see 
 R. V. Parker, 1864; R. v. Hull, 
 1860; R. V. Brooks, 181"; R. r. 
 Killminster, 1835; and R. v. Main- 
 waring, 1858; under "Tho Pre- 
 vention of Cruelty to Children Act, 
 1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 41), by § 18 (3), 
 a summary con vietiim must be wittiiu 
 si.x months of the otlence. Tho 
 Summary Jurisdiction Acts, in ail 
 cases whore no time is specially 
 limited, require that complaint shuU 
 be made, and information laid, within 
 six calendar months. See "The 
 Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848" 
 (11 & 12 V. c. 43). § 11. 
 
 ' Various periods of limitation are 
 also imposed by 11 & 12 Y. c. IIH, 
 § 3; 1 G. 1, St. 2, c. 5, § 8; 33 
 G. 3, c. 67, § 8; 4 G. 4, c. 76, 
 § 21 ("The Marriage Act, 1S23"); 
 60 G. 3 & 1 G. 4, c. 1 (i)aitially 
 rejjealed bv "Tho Stat. Law Rev 
 Act, 189M " 56 & 57 V. c. 61), § 7; 
 6 A. c. 7. § 3 ; 23 & 24 V. c. 107, § 32 
 (Ir.)("The Refreshment lIouses(lr(!- 
 land) Act, I860"); 14 iV 15 V. c. 93, 
 § 10, r. 4 (Ir.); " The Merchandise 
 Marks Act. 18^7 " (50 & ,.1 V. c. 28), 
 § 15. In Scotland summary com- 
 plaints must, in general, bo insti- 
 tuted "within six months from the 
 time when the matter of such com- 
 plaint arose." 27 A 28 V. c. 53, § 24. 
 See as to the Police Courts in Edin- 
 burgh, 30 & 31 V. c. 58, sch. § 172. 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 
 
 fied ; it is siilTicieut to say that his light to recover is lost by his 
 own negligence. The statute of Juiiies, which has been hold not 
 to discharge the debt, but merely to bar the remedy, is strongly 
 confirmatory of these views.' Lord t'lunl-.et once eloquently said, 
 " If Time destroys the evidence of title, the laws have wisely 
 and humanely made length of possession a substitute for that 
 which has been destroyed. He comes with his scythe in one 
 hand to mow down the muniments of our rights ; but in his other 
 hand the law-giver has placed an hour-glass, by which ho motes 
 out incessantly those poiiions of duration, which render needless 
 the evidence that he has swept away." ^ 
 
 § 80.' The doctrines of irrebuttable presumptions are sometimes 
 (as in most of the instances just cited) embodied in statutes. In 
 other instances they are declared by judicial tribimals as being the 
 common laic of the land. The decisions of the courts on such 
 matters are respected, equally with the enactments of the legisla- 
 ture, as authoritative declarations of imperative rules of law, 
 against the operation of which no averment or evidence is received. 
 In short, in determining the legal rights and liabilities of i)artie3, 
 the courts conclusively presume that which in a vast number of 
 cases must of course be contrary to the fact.* For instance, it is 
 conclusively presumed that every sane person, above the age of 
 fourteen, is acquainted with the criminal as well as the civil,^ the 
 common " as well as the statute,' law of the land ; and the doctrine 
 "ignorantia juris, quod quisque triicfur seive, nerainem excusat," is 
 as uniformly recognised in this country, as it formerly was in 
 ancient Home;* and, indeed, has been carried so far as to include 
 the case of a foreigner, who was here charged with a crime, which 
 
 impedit, on the trial of which Ld. 
 Pluukot iniido iiso of tho imagery in 
 hirt address to the jury. 
 
 ^ Gr. Ev. § 17, as to first six lines. 
 
 * Soo Afartiudalo v. Palkiior, 18-1(> 
 (Maulo. J.) 
 
 » Bilbio V. Luiiiloy, 1802 (Lord 
 Ellouborough). 
 
 " A mistake of tho legal effect of n 
 document cannot be set up as a defence 
 Powell V. Smith, 1871,' (Ld. IJomiUy). 
 
 ' See Stokes v. Suloiuons, 18.j1 
 L'harlotta, 1814 
 
 ' Spears v. Ilartly, 1857 ; Higgins 
 V. Scott, 1832. 
 
 ' See " Statesmen of tho Time of 
 George III.," by Ld. Brougham, 
 3rd Ser. p. 227, n. In Malouo 
 V. O'Connor, 185!) (Ir.), Napier, C, 
 tho above passage is cited as fol- 
 lows : — "Time, with tho one hand 
 mows down tho muniments of our 
 titles ; with tho other, ho metos out 
 tho portions of duration which render 
 these muniments no longer neces- 
 sary." iJrury's Cas. in Ch. tomp. 
 Napier, G44. This version is pro- 
 bably more accurate than any other, 
 as it was furiished to tho Chancellor 
 hy one of tta counsel in tho ,quarc 
 
 (Turner, V.-C.) ; Tho Chi 
 
 (Sir W. Scott; ; Middleton v. Croft, 
 
 17;j<) (Ld. Ilardwicke). 
 
 » See 1 lluss. C. & M. 154 ; 1 Ilale, 
 42 : Ff. 22, 6, 9. 
 
 r 
 
 n 
 
 'W 
 
 m 
 
 4 •) 
 
1 
 ! 
 
 ; 
 J 
 i 
 
 11 
 
 It 
 
 '1 
 
 i 
 
 1 , 
 
 
 CONCLUSIVE PRKSIIMPTI0N8 AT COMMON LAW. |_PAUT T. 
 
 •woB no offonco in his own country.' It is again conclusively 
 prosumed that every '» sane man of the age of discretion contem- 
 plates the nattiral and probable coHXpqiirnrrs of his own acts. Thus 
 an intent to kill is conclusively inferred from the deliberate violent 
 use of a deadly weapon ; ^ on an indictment for cutting with intent 
 to do the prosecutor some grievous bodily harm,' the prisoner is 
 rightly convicted, though it appeared that his real intent was to 
 wound another person ; ■• an intent to defraud a particular party 
 will be conclusively presumed on an indictment for forgery, pro- 
 vided the defrauding of such party would be the natural result of 
 the prisoner's act, if successful,* and this even though it be proved 
 that the prisoner did not entertain the intention charged ; ^ and on 
 a charge of arson for setting fire to a mill, an intent to injure or 
 defraud the mill-owners will be conclusively inferred from the 
 •wilful act of firing.'' The same doctrine would, apparently, on 
 principle, apply to all other crimes.* 
 
 § 81. There are, indeed, several decisions which tend to show 
 that where the character of statutory offences varies according to 
 the intent with which they are perpetrateil, the real intention of 
 the prisoner must be left to the jury. For instance, on an indict- 
 
 Hitii 
 
 ' R. V. Esop, 1836 (Bosanquot and 
 Vaughan, JJ.); Barrouot's case, 1853. 
 
 '* Gr. Ev. § 18, as to four following 
 linos. 
 
 » Soti 1 Ru88. C. & M. 940, 941 ; 
 E. V. Dixon, 1814. But if death does 
 not ensiio till a year and a day, that 
 is, a full year, after the stroke, it ia 
 conclusively presumed that the stroke 
 was not tlie sole cause of the death, 
 and it is not murder. 4 Bl. Com. 
 197 ; Glassf. Ev. 592. The doctrine 
 of pr' aumptive evidence was familiar 
 to the Mosaic Code ; even to the 
 letter of the principle stated in the 
 text. See Numb. xxxv. 16, 17, 18, 
 where every instniment of iron is 
 conclusively taken to be a deadlv 
 weapon ; and the use of any such 
 weapon raises a conclusive presump- 
 tive of malice. The same presump- 
 tion arose from lying in ambiiah, and 
 thence destroying another. Id. v. 20. 
 But, in other cases, the existence of 
 malice was to be proved, as one of 
 the facts in the case ; and in the ab- 
 sence of express malice, the offence 
 was reduced to the degree of man- 
 slaughter, as at the common law. Id. 
 
 w. 21, 22, 23. This very reasonable 
 distinction seems to have been un- 
 known to the Gentoo Code, which 
 demands life for life, in all cases, 
 except where the culprit is a Brah- 
 min, " If a man deprives another of 
 life, the magistrate snail deprive that 
 person of life." Halhed's Gentoo 
 Laws, b. xvi. § 1, p. 233. 
 
 ' Under the repealed Act of 43 
 G. 3, c. 58. 
 
 * R. V. Hunt, 1825; R. v. Fretwell, 
 1864. See, also, R. v. Smith. 1855, 
 which was an indictment imder the 
 repealed Act, 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 85, 
 § y; and R. v. Ward, under 14 & 16 
 V. c. 19, § 6 (fifteen judges). 
 
 » R. V. Beard. 1837 (Coleridge, J.); 
 R. V. Hill, 1838 (Aldereon, B.); R. 
 V. Cooke, 1838 (Patteson, J.). 
 
 « R. V. Shoppard, 1806; R. v. Maza- 
 gora, 1815 (all the judges); R. v, 
 Geach, 1840. The prisoner may also 
 be convicted on a count charging the 
 real intent. R. v. Hanson, 1841 (by 
 all the judges). 
 
 ' R. V. Earrington, 1811; E. v. 
 Philp, 1830. 
 
 « See R. V. Murphy, 1875. 
 
 80 
 
CHAT, v.] CASES WIIEUK REAL INTKNT MUST I):: I'KOVKD. 
 
 mont for cutting,' where the intent laid in tlie sevoral counts wns 
 to murder, to difiible, nnd to do grievous hodily harm, but the 
 intent found by the jtiry was to prevent being ajtjirohended, it was 
 lield that a conviction could mot be sustained, thougli the prisoner 
 had inliicted a serious wound ; '^ where a party was charged with 
 intlicting an inju'-y dangerous to life witli iiihfut to murder, it was 
 held ^ that the ju -y must bo satisfied that *he prisoner, at the time 
 he committed the assault, luid formed a deliberate intention of 
 murdering his victim; on an indietraent* charging the prisoner 
 with shooting at the prosecutor with intent to murder him, the 
 jury were allowed to pronounce a verdict in accordance with the 
 actual intent, which was to kill another person, and the prisoner 
 was consequently acquitted ; * on the same principle, where the 
 prisoner was charged ^ with causing poison to be taken by the 
 prnseoutor with intent to murder him, and it appeared that the 
 prisoner's real intention was to poison another party, he was 
 acquitted." 
 
 § 82. Nevertheless it is submitted that the distinction which 
 these decisions seek to establish is founded on no sound principle, 
 and goes far towards frittering away one of the most valuable pre- 
 sumptions known to the criminal law. Moreover, one judge of 
 great experience in the administration of criminal justice refused 
 to recognise the distinction.* 
 
 § 82a. It is immaterial whether the intent charged be the prin- 
 cipal or subordinate motive which instigated the commission of the 
 
 ' Under the repealed Act of 43 
 0. 3, c. 58. 
 
 » R. V. Duflin, 1818. This case is 
 badly reported, and perhaps the deci- 
 sion turned upon the ground that 
 the attempted apprehension was not 
 lawful. 
 
 > R. V. Cruse, 1838 (Patteson, J.). 
 But the jury may infer such intent 
 fiom the circumstance that if death 
 had been caused it would, under the 
 circumstances, have been murder : E. 
 V. Jones, 1840 (Patteson, J.). 
 
 * Under 9 G. 4, c. 31 ; repealed 
 by 24 & 25 V. c. 95, and other pro- 
 visions enacted in 24 & 25 V. c. 100 
 ("The Offences against the Person 
 Act, 1861"). 
 
 ' R. V. Holt, 1836 (Littledale, J.). 
 
 1. VOL. I. 81 
 
 The learned judge observed, in sum- 
 ming up : " If this had been a case 
 of murder, and the prisoner intend- 
 ing to murder one jJorHoii, had, by 
 mistake, murdered another, he would 
 be equally liable to be found guilt}'. 
 The question, however, may be dif- 
 ferent on the construction of this 
 Act of Purlianiont." 
 
 « Under 7 W. 4 & I V. c. 85, § 2 ; 
 repealed by 24 & 25 V. c. 95, and 
 other provisions enacted in 24 & 25 
 v. c. 100 (" The Offences against the 
 Person Act, 1861"), amended by 48 
 & 49 V. c. 69. 
 
 ' R. V. Ryan, 1839 (Parke and 
 Alderson, lib.). 
 
 « R. V. licwis, 1833 (Gurney, B.); 
 E. V. Jarvis, 1837 (id.). 
 
 ^m 
 
 
 ;i!n« 
 
 ,1 ! 
 
PRESUMPTION OF INTENT AND MALICE. [PART I. 
 
 crime. Therefore where the jury found that a prisoner had 
 wounded the prosecutor with the view of preventing his lawful 
 apprehension, and that, in order to effect that purpose, he intended 
 to do him some ^jrievous hodily harm, the conviction on a count 
 charging the latter offence was held right.' And the same rule has 
 been applied where the immediate object of the criminal was to 
 rob the party he wounded, and the wound was inflicted as the 
 means of effecting the robbery.* 
 
 § 83. The presumption that a party intends the natural conee- 
 quences of his acts, also extt-uds to civil responsibilities. Thus, in 
 an action for libel,' the deliberate publication of calumny, which 
 the publisher knows to be false, or has no reason to believe to be 
 true, is by stutute taken to raise a conclusive presumption of 
 malice ;* if a party make a representation, which he knows to be 
 false, and injury ensues to another, it will be inferred by law that 
 he was actuated by a fraudulent or malicious intent;* the willul 
 neglect of a defendant to plead within the time appointed by law, 
 is taken conclusively against him, as a confession of the plaintiff's 
 right of action ; * if a person wh<j is, in the language of the Bank- 
 ruptcy Act, " unable to pay his debts as they become due from hi? 
 own money," spontaneously muiie a transfer or pa3'ment in favour 
 of any creditor, which necessarily has the effect of defeating or 
 delaying liis other creditors, it will be conclusively presumed to 
 have bten made with that intent, and the transfer or payment 
 will be set aside as fraudulent, though all fraud in fact may 
 be distinctly negatived if the payer or transferor is adjuilged b-uik- 
 rupt on a petition presented within throe months from the date of 
 the transaction.' 
 
 > R. V. Oillow, IS':-). 
 
 » \\. V Hctwfii, \M\ (roloridjro, J.). 
 
 » S. <i & 7 V. I'. iXi ('-Thi' Lilifl 
 Aft. IMI.T'), <j (i. 
 
 * lluiiv r. Wilson. 182?) ; R. r. 
 Shijili'v, 17H4 (Asliluiist, J.): FiN".:-" 
 V. Cli'iiii'iit, l.s;i0 \\A. Tcntoidcn) ; 
 IJavlis '■. Luwn'ni'f, IKU) (I'littcwm, 
 J.)"; Hddwi'll r. OspMMl. IH'J:. (Am.). 
 
 ■■' Tiipii 1'. Lee, lH(i:j; KosttT v. 
 f'hiiili'8, 1!S;J0; Pontifox v. 1%U()1(1, 
 
 IHIl, 
 
 " H. S. (". 1SN;J, Onl. XXyil. r. 'i 
 et st'<|. 'riio I'liiiciplu of thin Order 
 
 boloiips to ppnovnl jurisprudonco. 
 So ill till' UoiiiuM liiw : " Coutiiiiiiiciii 
 oormii. (jui juh dic.iiti iion obtciii- 
 iMTiiiit, litiH duiiiuo coci'cctur." l>if,'. 
 lib. 4'J, t. 1 , 1. 't'A. " Si citatUH uli(|iiiM 
 iioii coiiipiii'ijtit, hiibutiir ))ro t'on.s(>!i- 
 tioiif." ;J Miiw. do Prob. p. 2JU, con- 
 cl. ll.-)I). II. 2(i. 
 
 1 4() & 47 V. c. 32, § 48. and Ho & 
 3(i V. c. .)H, § i},\, Jr. Heo Ex jiart^ 
 Cruvtii, 1870; In lorruvoii, Kx jwiito 
 TcMiipcBt, 1871 ; llidwii <•. K(*iiiptoii. 
 1850; In n' ('h(<m((broiii{li, 1871; 
 Smith t'. ("hiiiiuii, 1854 ; Jn n> Wood, 
 
 82 
 
 k 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 JUDICIAL PUOCEEDIXGS. 
 
 S 84. Conclusive preeumptions are, again, made in fovour of all 
 judicial proceedings. Thus, as an undoubted rule of pleading, 
 nothing will be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior 
 couit but that which is so expressly alleged, so that the records of 
 superior courts, among which are the courts of the Counties 
 Palatine, need not state the cause of action to have arisen within 
 the jurisdiction ; ' whenever the contrary does not plainly and 
 expressly appear, the respective Houses of Parliament will be con- 
 clusively presumed to have acted within their jurisdiction, and 
 agreeably to the usages of Parliament, and the rules of law and 
 justice. So that a warrant issued by the Speaker of the IIoush of 
 Commons at the instance of the House for the arrest of a witness 
 need not contain any recital of the grounds on which it was 
 founded;- all writs issued by any Division of the High Court of 
 Justice are presumed to bo issued duly in a case in which the court 
 has jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears on the face of them, 
 so that such writs of themselves, and without any further allega- 
 tion, protect all officers and others in their aid acting under them, 
 and this even though they appear on the face of them to be 
 irregular, or even void in form.' The respect due to the High 
 Court, and the credit given to it, that it will not abuse its powers, 
 furnish alike the reason and the justificatioa for this somewhat 
 arbitrary presumption.* 
 
 § 85* The irrebuttable presumption that all judicial proceedings 
 have been regularly conducted, has, among others, the following 
 consequences. It is assunuHl, at least priiml facie, that the un- 
 reversed sentence of a foreign or colonial court of competent 
 jurisdiction is correct, since otherwise our courts v/ould be, in 
 elfect, constituting themselves courts of appeal, without ]»ower to 
 reverse the judgment." Judicial acts arc, ua a general rule, con 
 
 M 
 
 ' i 
 
 m\ 
 
 Si 
 
 rte 
 
 III, 
 1 ; 
 
 1872; Ex pnrt<* Hiiih'v. Tn loBarn'll, 
 IN.VJ; ItittlcMtoncr. r<")<)k.>, 1N,)(>; IWl 
 r. SiiMjiNon, IN.JT ; HIIIh c Smith, 
 IH(W. St'o, nlsd, iiH to till' •.iviiiilunco 
 lit vdltiiifiiry HottlciiK^ntu, 4(1 & 47 W. 
 1-. .VJ, §47;"aiiil ;J5 & M V. c. 58, 
 § 62. Ir, 
 
 ' I'cncdck t'. Bell. 10(17. rocognisod 
 ii\ ()oHH(>t r. Howurd, IMIT. 
 
 • (JoBsut V, Ilowuid, l»n. 
 
 83 
 
 * OosHct I'. TT'iwiinl, 1847, citinpf 
 PoniitJtsHof Kiitiiiiid's cuse, ICiOi"), 1111(1 
 I'lirsdiis V. J/py.l, 1772. 
 
 * 111. Soo the olriliiirato judpmfnt 
 df !'!x. Cli. iii(id>.int V. Howard, liS47. 
 
 ' (Jr. Kv, § 12, as t^) oiio or two 
 
 * Hronan's raso, 1K47 (Tid. Den- 
 inaii); lidhcrtHun v. Strutb, 1H43 
 (l'attf(M)U, J.). 
 
 o2 
 
 l( 
 
 
HHbiII 
 
 ~" ' 
 
 BHUfl 
 
 i^ ■ If 
 
 iil;] i 
 
 iii 
 
 11 i 
 
 
 |: ■ :«iiM: 
 
 V. 
 
 ill' 
 
 JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 clusively prosumed to have taken place at tlie earliest period of the 
 day on which they were done, so that a jud<»ment is regular though 
 signed several hours after the defendant had died,' — provided 
 only thif doctrine does not work injustice in any particular 
 case; 2 and with the further limitation that it does not apply 
 to the issuing of a writ of summons, since, if it did, a plaintiff 
 could not commence legal proceedings till the day after the cause 
 of action had accnied, and the defendant in the meanwhile might 
 escape out of the jurisdiction.^ The recordu of a court of justice, 
 and indeed all records, must again always be presumed to have 
 been correctly made;' so that no evidence will be admissible to 
 <ihow that a charter granted by the Crown was made or delivered 
 at another time than when it bears date ;* while the day specified 
 in a record of conviction will be co) elusive proof of the commission 
 day of the assizes at which the trial took jdace,' — though (as in the 
 case just mentioned), the court will, where it is necessary to do so, 
 in order to prevent justice being defeated," allow the party against 
 whom the record is produced to show by parol evidence the actual 
 day of trial, and will judicially notice that though by fiction of 
 law the whole time of the assizes is only one legal day, yet that 
 this legal day may consist of many natural days, and thus prevent 
 justice from being defeated by a mere arbitrary rule ;" and will on 
 production of a Nisi Prius record containing two counts, on distinct 
 caus(>8 of action, admit parol evidence to show that on a verdict 
 entered as awarding damages to the plaintiff generally, that the 
 substantial damages were recovered on one count oidy.' In these 
 two last-named cases proof of the real facts would not rontnuUd the 
 record, but merely (\rj)i(iin if. On the principle, too, that every 
 presumption necessary to sustain a record will be made, it will after 
 verdict, whether in a civil or a criminal case," be presumed that those 
 
 * Wi-iRht V. Millfl, 1859 ; Edwards 
 V. R., 1MJ4. 
 
 » ("lurkof. llnulliiugh. 1881. 
 
 * Hft'd 1'. iliuksoii. 1801 ; Riuns- 
 bottoui c. IhickliuiHt, 1814 (lid. Kllon- 
 boronKli); li- "• tVrlilo, 1832 (Ld. 
 Ttmtonlcn). " Roh judicutu pro vori- 
 tttto um|iitiir." Dig. lib. 60, t. 17, 
 I. 20;. 
 
 * liudford V. Orotton, 1576. 
 
 • Ree Thomas v. Ansloy, 1806 ; R. 
 V, Puf^o. 1788. 
 
 • Whitakt-r v. Wisbey, 1862 ; Roe 
 V. IlfTHoy, 1771. 
 
 ' ProHtou V. I'coko, 1868. 
 
 • R. V. Wfttors, 1848 ; R. v. Bowen, 
 184H; lleymaun v. R., 1873; R. «. 
 (loldHiuith, 1873 ; R. v. Aapinall, 
 1876. 
 
 84 
 
 i i l!| 
 
 <,uii 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 LEGAL PUOCEEDIXGS. 
 
 facts, without proof of which the verdict could not have beea 
 found, were proved, though they are not distinctly alleged in the 
 record ; provided such record contains terms sufficiently general to 
 comprehend them in reasonable intendment.' In other words, the 
 verdict will cure any defective statement, though it will not cure 
 the omission of any material averment.* It is, again, always a 
 presumption of law that the notes taken by the judge at Nisi 
 Prius are correct, and no party is allowed to raise any question 
 respecting the rejection of evidence at the trial, unless it appears 
 from these notes that the evidence was formally tendered.' 
 
 ^ 86. A conclusive presumption in favour of an act is sometimes 
 raised by the solemnity with which it was done, though it was not 
 done in court. Thus, where an award professes to be made de 
 proemissis, the presumption is that the arbitrator intended to dis- 
 pose finally of all matters in difference, and if by any intendment 
 it can be made so, his award will be held final ; ^ a bond, or other 
 specialty, is, so long as it remains unimpeached,* presumed to have 
 been made upon good consideration, and for the consideration 
 stated on it.^ And, by an Act of the present reign,' " every bill of 
 lading in the hands of a consignee or indorsee for valuable con- 
 sideration, representing goods to have been sliipped on board a 
 vessel, shall be conclusive evidence of such shipment as against the 
 master or other person siyninij the samc,^ notwithstanding that such 
 goods or some part thereof may not have been so shipped, unless 
 such holder of the bill of lading shall have had actual notice at the 
 time of receiving the same, that the goods liad not been in fact 
 taken on board ; provided that the master or other person so sign- 
 ing may exonerate liimself in respect of sut'h niisrojuvsentation, by 
 showing that it was caused without any default on his part, and 
 wholly by the fraud of the shipper, or of the holder, or uf some 
 
 f f 
 
 ' Jiickson V. Pi'skod, 181.'< (TiOnl 
 l'!ll('iili()r(Hi{i;li); Spionis v. Parkor, 
 17H(!; Hiivisr. lUiuk. 1S41(L(1. Dou- 
 iimii. C.J., and J'attcson, J.); Harris 
 r. Goodwyn, 11S41; Ui)ldtliorj)o v. 
 Ilitrdinan, IN-I.'). StHt, also, Smith v. 
 Kciitinj;, 1H^<»; Kidfjill c. Moor. IH.JO; 
 imil Ld. iJolaincro v. Tho Uui'oii, 
 18(i7. 
 
 •' JJradlmiph r. H., 1H7«. C. A. 
 
 • Uibbs i: I'iko, 184'J(Ld. Abinger, 
 
 and Aldi'rson, B.). 
 
 * Harrison r. Croswick, 1853; 
 Jowoll r. ("hristii', lS(i7. 
 
 * fiowii I). Poors, 17(i.S; Story, 
 Itills. § 10. Hoo jKist, § IJH. 
 
 " Marlon r. Hank of Now South 
 WaloM. tN<»() (p. v.). 
 
 ' 1H\- 1!» V. f. Ill ("Tlio Hills of 
 Lading' Act. lS.),i"), § ;j. 
 
 * Soo Moyor r. iJrt'ssor, 1SG4 ; 
 Jessol I'. Bath, 1807. 
 
 I| 
 
 So 
 
 " \.\n I. 
 
LEGAL PKOCEKDINGS. 
 
 [PAUT I. 
 
 I :^ 
 
 person under whom the holder claims." Again, it is by statute 
 enacted that every conveyance made under the Act for facilitating 
 the pale and transfer of land in Ireland shall be " for all purposes 
 conclusive evidence " that all previous proceedings leading to such 
 conveyance have been regularly taken ; ' and that every declaration 
 of title by the Landed Estates Court shall be as conclusive upon 
 the rights of all parties as any such deed of conveyance.^ 
 
 § 86a. Again, when (as is now often the case) the contract is 
 made by one party delivering to the other a document, in a common 
 form containing tlie proposed terms, if the form is accepted without 
 objection, the acceptor is presumed to have agreed to its terms, 
 and is bound by the contents, whether he has or not in fact read 
 the document.' Exceptions to this rule exist, however — 1st, where 
 from the nature of the transaction the person accepting the docu- 
 ment may reasonably suppose that it contains no special terms ; 
 2nd, where the terms are printed in a mode calculated to mislead ; 
 and 3rd, where the terms or conditions are in themselves unreason- 
 able or irrelevant.' 
 
 § 87.* Another conclusive presumption made by the law, is t.iat 
 in favour of the due execution of anrirnf ilvcdft and inf7*i. When 
 these intiruments aid iliirty years old, and are unblemished by 
 any alterations, they (as it is said) prove themselves ; their bare 
 production is sufBcient, and the subscribing witnesses are conclu- 
 sively taken to be dead. This presumption,— so far as the jjresent 
 rule of evidence is concerned,— is not affected by proof that the 
 witnesses arc living,'' and, it seems, even actually in court ;^ nor, in 
 the case of wills, by showing that the testator died within the 
 thirty years.' But it must appear tliat the itjstrument comes from 
 custody, which (oven though it is not in point of law ptrictly 
 proper), affords a reasonable presunijjtiou in favour of its genuine- 
 
 • 21 & 22 V. c. 72 ( " Tho Lniulod 
 EstiitcH Cdurt (livliitKl) Act, l.sr.H"), 
 5 N.">, If. Sfi) I'dWrr r. H.M'VOH, IS'lt 
 (11. L.) ; la ru Tottenhuiu'ij Eatiitu, 
 1807. 
 
 » 21 & 22 V. p. 72. § 51, Ir. ; llillinj? 
 V. W.'l.li. 1,S71 (Ir.). 
 
 » Wiitkiiis V. l{yiiiill, 1883, and 
 Ottsud thui'u citud. 
 
 * Or. Ev. § 21, in groat part. 
 
 • Doo r. ]5uiilftt, IS.'lti. 
 
 ' I'd' Vuti's, J., as citi'il (Lil. Kon- 
 yoii) iu Mni.Hh v. CoUnctt, 17!).s. 
 
 ' JicHM'. Wolloy, I.S'JN. lu.JackHon 
 V. liluiiNlmn. iKOHrAm.), th<> Suj). Ct. 
 of Ni'W Vdik lii'ld that the tliirty yuars 
 iiiiiHt ho wmputod iiom tho t*)8tutor'9 
 duutli. 
 
 8li 
 
Cn.VP. v.] ANCIENT INSTRUMENTS — ESTOPPELS. 
 
 ness ; ' and tliat it is otlierwise free from just ground of suspicion.' 
 It is not altogether clear whether, if the deed be a oouveyanoe of 
 real estate, the party is bound first to sh )vv some acts of possession 
 under it ; but the weight of opinion seems to be in the negative, 
 as will hereafter be more fully explained.' It also is (questionable 
 whether the rule applies to an instrument bearing the seal of a 
 court or a corporation ; " because, although tlie witnesses to a 
 private deed, or persons acquainted with a private seal, may be 
 supposed to be dead, or not capable of being accounted for after 
 such a lapse of time, yet the seals of courts and corporations, being 
 of a permanent character, may be proved by persons at any dis- 
 tance' of time from the date of the instrument to which they are 
 affixed."*. 
 
 Si 88. The presumption in their fi^'our, if they come from the 
 proper custody, and purport to be thirty years old, is not confined 
 to deeds and wills, bu^ extends equally to letters,'^ entries,^ receipts,'' 
 Hrttkment certificntcH,^ and indeed to all other uritten documenta ; and 
 in such cases the signatures and handwriting need not be proved. 
 The rule is founded " on the great difficulty, nay, impossibility, of 
 pioving the handwriting of the party after su'H a lapse of 
 t; '10." 9 
 
 § 89.'" Entoppeh may be ranked among the class of irrebuttable 
 presumptions.'' A man is estopped, when he has done or permitted 
 some act, which the law will not allow him to gainsay. " The law 
 of estoppel is not so unjust or absurd, as it has been too much the 
 custom to represent." '* Its foundation rests partly on the obli- 
 gation to speak and act in accordance with truth, by which every 
 lionest man is bound, and jiartly on the policy of the law, which 
 thus B>. ks to prevent the mischiefs that would inevitably result 
 
 ' Dot! ('. SiiinploH, 1H;(8; liisho]) nf 
 Mtfiith V. M. of WiiichottUT, 1H;{() 
 ^Tindnl, (".J., rrprcMcutiiig all tho 
 jiiilgf'M in J)(im. I'n!e.). 
 
 * ]{()« i\ l{iiwliii;;s, 18lo. 
 
 ' Siju Miilcolii sou ('. ()'])oa, 
 (II. li.), oiti«(i post, §§ (Kij, ()()<(. 
 
 ♦ K. V. Jtiithwiik, W,V1 (IaI. 
 tprdon, C.J.). 
 
 » Doo V. Hovnon, 1840; Horo v. 
 W.ir.l, IH21 (DiilliiH. C.J.); uiul 1823 
 (L.I. TimtiTdfii, ('..!.). 
 
 • I'er cur. iu Wyuuo v. Tyrwhitt, 
 
 1802 
 Tou- 
 
 18.TJ. 
 
 ' Hortio I'. Hoiiumont, 181(J. 
 
 » K. r. Uytou, i:!)2; H. v. Nothor- 
 thou;;, 181;}. lu Uii'nc casos uo proof 
 of tilt) I'UMtody WHS ^ivt'U iu t*viiiuuco, 
 but tlu> court lit 1 i tliiw to Im iiumu- 
 tttriiil. 
 
 " Wvnno V. Tyrwhitt, 1821. 
 
 '" (Jr. Kv. § 22, iu part. 
 
 " Hy till- N. YinkCiv. Code, § 1792, 
 estiipiu'lH iirii iil>oliHht!il, 
 
 ■' I'l^r i'liuutou, J., ia iiowinaa v. 
 Taylor, 1834. 
 
 .1 
 
 ; m 
 
 ' !!i,.„ 
 
 87 
 
 I'M 
 
 ill! 
 

 ESTOPPELS BIND PARTIES AND PHIVIES. [PAUT I. 
 
 from uncertainty, confusion, and want of confidence, were men 
 permitted to deny wliat tliey had deliberately asserted. The doc- 
 trine of estoppel is, however, guarded with great strictness, or, as 
 it is said, "estopjjcls are odious." The reason for this is not 
 because the party enforcing the estoppel is presumed to be desirous 
 of excluding the truth ; indeed, the more reasonable supposition is 
 that that which the opposite party has already solemnly admitted 
 to be so really is the truth ; but because the estoppel mai/ exclude 
 the truth. It consequently is required that all estoppels must be 
 certain to every intent ; for no one shall be prevented from setting 
 up the truth, unless it be in plain contradiction to allegations and 
 acts previously made in his interest.' 
 
 § 90. From these last words it will be gathered that a man is 
 estopped not only by his own allegations and acts, but also by 
 those of all persons through whom he claims} In technical language, 
 estoppels are usually binding upon both parties and prides} Lord 
 Coke divides privies into three classes ; first, privies in blood, as 
 heirs ; secondly, privies by estate, as feoffees, lessees, assignees, &c. ; 
 and thirdly, privies in law, " as the lord by escheat, the tenant by 
 the courtesy, the tenant in dower, the incumbent of a benefice," * 
 husbands suing or defending in right of their wives,* executors 
 and administrators.* Upon the principle qui sentit commoduin, 
 sentire debet et onus, the privy stands in no better position tlvin 
 the party through whom he derives his title ; and if the latter is 
 not at liberty to contradict what he has formerly said or done, the 
 former is subject to a like disability.' An exception to this rule is 
 admitted in favour of those privies, who would themselves bo 
 aggrieved or defrauded by the conduct of the party through whom 
 they claim. For instance, where a man executes a deed with the 
 fraudulent intent of defeating the statutes of mortmain, his heir- 
 at-law is not estopped from questioning the validity of the inden- 
 
 III 
 
 » Bowman v. Tiiylor, 1835 (Lord 
 Doninuu und Tuunton, J.); liiiiu- 
 Bou V. Trcmoro, WM ; Kopn v. Wig- 
 Rftt, 1851 (Williams, J.); Pullctn>au 
 V. Jackson, WM (Am.); Curvor v. 
 JuckHun, 18:i() (Am.). 
 
 » u. N. P. 2aa. 
 
 • Soo post, §§ 787 — 793, as to ad- 
 missions by privies. 
 
 • Co. Litt. 352 a. 
 
 • Outram v. Morowood, 1814. 
 
 • II. V. Uobdon, 1738. 
 
 ' Taylor v. Noedliam, 1811. 
 
 88 
 
 Uli 
 
CHAP, v.] ESTOPPELS NOT BINDING UNLESS PLEADED. 
 
 ture, since his claim to the lands is founded, not on the deed, hut. 
 on his title by descent.* 
 
 § 91. There are three classes of estoppels; namely, estoppels by 
 matter of record, estoppels by deed, and estoppels in pain? Judg- 
 ments ' are the most extensive species of records, and consequently 
 estoppels by record will be most conveniently discussed in treating 
 of judgments. Neither an estoppel by record nor one by deed will 
 operate as a conclusive estoppel, unless the matter of estoppel appears 
 on the record,* nor unless it \\a.s been cxprcsn/i/ plradvd by way of 
 estoppel whore an opportunity of so pleading it has been afforded.* 
 If a party, having an opportunity of pleading an estoppel, does 
 not avail himself of it, the court will conclusively presume that he 
 has intended to ■?"'.ive all benefit derivable from it, and allow the 
 jury to form their own conclusions from the facts presented to them 
 in evidence.^ If, indeed, no opportunity for pleading the matter 
 of estoppel in bar has arisen, an estoppel by record or by deed 
 ought, on principle, to be binding when offered in evidence ; and 
 this has been held to be the law in some of the United States,^ 
 though the point has not yet been expressly decided in this 
 country.* In pleading, an estoppel can only be mot by the plead- 
 ing which is now equiv; ^ to t'ae old demurrer. '•• 
 
 § 92. As a general rule, howt ver, estoppels in puis med not bo 
 pleaded in order to make them obligatory. For instance, if a man 
 represent another as his ag«'nt, in order to procure a person to con- 
 tract witli him as such> and this person so contract, the contract 
 
 » Doo V. Lloyd. 1839. Soo Smyth 
 V. Wilson, 1841 (Ir.). 
 ^ Co. liitt. 352 u; 2 Smith, L. C. 
 
 * See post, §§ 1607 ot soq. 
 
 * Soo Uobiiison v. Rohiiison, 1H7J). 
 
 * 2 Smith, li. C. <)7(), iui, ami (>83. 
 Tho wholo noto, from m. (i,)() to 72(), 
 should Ih) perused. It contiiius an 
 eliihonito oxposition of a vory dillicult 
 branch of tnn niw. Soo also Tro- 
 vivan v, Lawrence, 17()4; Mugrath 
 V. Hardy, 1838. 
 
 ' ())itram v. Morowood, 1814; 
 
 Voo{,'ht V. Winch, 1832; Doo v. 
 
 lluddart, 18W; Doe v. Seutou, 1835 
 i'arko, ]{.); Nowlnn i'. Gibson, 1847 
 It.); Matthew r. Osborno, 1855; Doe 
 
 V. Wright, 1839 ; Magruth v. Uiirdy, 
 
 1838, as to 08toi)pel8 by matt'T of 
 ro(M)rd ; Wilson r, IJu'tlor. 1838; 
 Hiiwinan v. Kostron, 1835 ; Voun<; v. 
 liaincock, 1847; ("arpcntcr r. HiilJiT, 
 1841; I'otts c. \ixun, 1H7() (Ir.), us 
 to osto])i)ols bj' dofxl ; anil l-'rconmn c. 
 I'ooko, 1818 (I'arko, 11.), us to both 
 kinds of t'stoijpol. 
 
 ' Soo Howard i'. Mitchell, 1817 
 (Am.); Adams c. liarnos, 1S21 (Am.). 
 
 • K. I'. lUakomore, 1852. See R. 
 V. Ilaufjhton, 1853; Ld. Kovorshaui 
 V. Emerson, 1850 ; and 11. v. Ilutchins, 
 1880, ro versed (on another point) ia 
 C. A., 1881. 
 
 » R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXV. rr. 1- 
 2; see, also, JJru'Uey v. Uookett, 
 1844. 
 
 n 
 
 till 
 
 sii 
 
 i.iii 
 
 ^•m 
 
NO ESTOrPEL FROM SETTING UP ILLEGALITY. [PART I. 
 
 binds the prinoijtiil oqiially with one made by himself, and no form 
 of pleading can loave such o matter at large, or enable the jury to 
 treat it as no contract ; ' and in an action by indorsee against 
 accf>[)tor on a bill payable to drawer's order, to a plea that the 
 drawer had no authority to indorse, j)laintiff, though he might 
 reply the estoppel,'^ would not be forced to do so, but he might by 
 his pleading raise the point of law., that the defence disclosed no 
 legal answer to the action.' 
 
 § 93. A party is not, however, estopped by his own deed whei*e 
 he can make it v i ' b;' pn^ving that it was execjuted for a fraudu- 
 lent, illegal, or i -rd : 'jrpose. In one case,* indeed, where a 
 man, in order to ^ * hit b other a colourable qualifioation to kill 
 game, had conveyed some -.vis to him, it was hold that the 
 grantor's widow could not avoid this conveyance in an action of 
 ejectment against her by the brother. But although Sir Nicholas 
 Tindal attempted to support this decision as resting on the fact, 
 that " the defence set up was iiiroHxisfrnf with the deed," * it can, 
 even on this trround, scarcely be supported. Modem decisions 
 have establishea thai in an action of ejectment by the grantee of 
 an annuity, to rjoover premises on which it was secured, the grantor 
 may show thai, the premises were of less value than the annuity, 
 and that the deed, consequently, required enrolment, notwithstand- 
 ing that he hfid expressly covenanted in the d(!ed that the premises 
 were of greater value ;" and that where a bond has been given, or a 
 covenant ma<le, for an illegal consideration, the obligor or cove- 
 nantor may avoid the instrument by pleading and i)roving the 
 
 ' l''r(.H'inan v. Cooko, 18JH (I'arku, 
 15.). 
 
 ■' Sand Tsou J'. Colliimii, \H-i'>i. 
 
 " Ilullitiix r. Lylt', 1M!». 
 
 « Doc r. I{(il)i-i"t8, l.s:{2. Soe ulso 
 riiilljiott.s r. l'liill|.(.ttH, IH.JL 
 
 •"• I 'role c. \Vi;,'f,'iiiH. \KM. 
 
 • 1 »((« c. l-'onl, IM.'!.), whom n quoH- 
 tioit was riiisi'd wluitlmr a covdimiit, 
 iiMiliT liny t'iinimHtiincos, is hih-Ii a 
 <iiM'liiratiiiii as to t'sto]) a jiarty iroin 
 altcrwaids (liM])utiiij.' t.lin fact cnvo- 
 iianti'd toi', Imt \.\w jiDint was lol't 
 uiiili'i'iilcil. Ill AiiKii'icaa party may, 
 ill ^oiiu! casns, bo cNtniipt'd liy a 
 iu>vi'iiaiit. Thus a covenant of war- 
 ruiity L'stops tho graiitur fnjiu (jotting 
 
 up (iti aftor-acqiiiroJ tltlo nj^aiiist 
 till' jjrmti ', for it is a jicipi'timlly 
 <ipt!iatinj;('i)vt'naiit : Ti-rrt'tt /•. Tiiylor, 
 IHl.> (Aim.); Ja<'ks()n c. Alatsdotf, 
 1«I4 (Am.); Ja.ksou v. Wnj;lit. 
 1817 (Am.); M'Willianis i'. N'isl.y, 
 1810 (.\ni.) ; Somes r. Skinner, Lsil.') 
 (Am.), lint a grantor is not esto]i|H)d 
 by a covenant, tliat lie is seised in 
 feo and has j^ood rijfht to convoy ; 
 .\llen r. Sayward, IH.'M (Am.); for 
 any seisin in fact. t)ioii<;h by wronj.', 
 i« sntlicient to satisfy this covoiiunt, 
 its im]M)rt lM'in(< merely tiiis, that ho 
 has the seiHin in fact, at the time of 
 conveyance, and thereby is ({naiitiod 
 to traiiHt'er tho OHtuto tu the grantee. 
 
 90 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 ^_ 
 
 
CHAP, v.] ESTOPPEL BY DEED — ILLEGAL COVENANTS. 
 
 illopality ;' and this too. thougli a lognl, lint untrup, eonsifleration 
 18 stated on thu fa< e of the doed.'^ Indeed, wlicro both parties to 
 an indenture either know, or have the means of knowing, that it is 
 executed for an immoral purpose, or in contravention of a statute, 
 or of puhlif! policy, in general neither will ho estopped from 
 proving facts which render the instrument void ah initio.' For 
 although a party will thus, in certain cases, bo enabled to take 
 advantage of his own wrong,^ yot (his evil is trifling in comparison 
 with the flagrant evasion of the law, that would result from an 
 oppo.site rule.* Neither will a party bo estopped by his deed, if he 
 executed it while, from duress, infancy, or other cause, he was 
 incapable of making a valid contract, or if ho was deceived by the 
 fraudulent misrepresentations or acts of other parties.*' 
 
 !i !)4. The doctrine at one time prevailed" that trustees ctir-!: 
 for the benefit of the public could never be estopped from d'^putiuj^ 
 the validity of their deeds, because, if they were, tho innocent 
 parties, on whose behalf they were acting, might be seriously 
 injured.' The doctrine now, however, only holds good in cii^es in 
 which the trustees have, in their dealings with ano t party, 
 violated a public statute, the contents of which are presumed to 
 be known to sxich party. Therefore, where a bridge Act authorised 
 commissioners to mortgage the tolls, and enacted that the mort- 
 gagees should have no preference by reason of priority, it was held 
 in an action of ejectment brought by a mortgagee of the tolls 
 against the commissioners, that the defendants were estopped from 
 setting up the fact of an earlier mortgage to defeat the legal estate 
 of the lessor of the plaintiffs." 
 
 S 95. Though an estoppel may bind a person acting in one capa- 
 city, it does not necessarily follow that it will have a similar elfect 
 
 ' Prolo V. WifTfrins, 18;}7; f'dlliim 
 r. lUiinti'iii, ITfiT ; Uiis Li;;lit iiiul 
 Cdk.i Co. c. Tinner, IS.'Jit; alTd. in 
 J•;x.('h.,l^i^(); Stmtliiiilan.lMori'ti.ii 
 l!y. Co. r. Strutton, ISIl.!; Hill i: 
 Mauuh. Watcrw. Co , ISUl ; Ucnvou 
 t'. Xcttlcfold, 18.j(); lloitoiic.Wub'tm. 
 Iinpi-Dvi'. I'oinr-i., 1S.V_'. 
 
 '' I'axtou f. I'opiiain, 1,S14. 
 
 » Id. 
 
 * Doo V. Ford, l83o (Ld. DDiMnau); 
 
 Doo V. HowcUh. 18;}2. 
 
 » iJt'nyon r. Xuttlffold, 18jO. Soo 
 Mallalii'u c. Ilod^'soii, Iti.Yl; liowea 
 ('. Foster, iHoH; Taylor c. JJowors, 
 1877. 
 
 • Hayno v. Maltby, 178!». 
 
 ' ]'"airtillo v. Oilixit. 1T,''7 ; Doe v. 
 llaroM, 18.« (I.ittl.-dalo, J.). 
 
 " Doo c. lloriit!, lH+!{; 1{. ,. Wliito, 
 184U ; llortnii c. \Yestra. Improve. 
 Comrs., 18 J2. 
 
 i 
 
 91 
 
 !|,lii* 
 
 'li 
 

 
 i|rl 
 
 
 .;? il , 
 
 
 ,:h||l: 
 
 ■ I 
 
 1 11 
 
 f 
 i 
 
 \ 
 
 [■ ' m 
 
 ill 
 
 * 
 
 
 iili 
 
 ESTOrPKL IJY DEED — MERE DESCUIITION. 
 
 [PAKT I. 
 
 when ho is sustaining a totally different character.' For instance, an 
 executor de son tort, who has verbally agreed with the landlord to 
 deliver up demised premises, but has afterwards taken out letters of 
 administration, is not concluded from bringing an '\ction of eject- 
 ment against the landlord, who has actually obtained possession 
 under the agreement.' Where, however, "an heir apparent, 
 having only the hope of Buccession, conveys, during the life of his 
 ancestor, an estate, which afterwards descends upon him, although 
 nothing passes at that time, yet, when the inheritance descends 
 upon him, he is estopped to say that he liad no interest at the time 
 of the grant."* The distinction between these two cases is, that 
 in the former, the party not estopped was acting for the benefit of 
 others ; in the latter, the party estopped was sui juris, and acting 
 on his own behalf. 
 
 § 96. A deed does not estop a party from disputing the correct- 
 ness of that wliich is not an essential averment thereon, but is 
 mere (/cscrip/ioii — such, for instance, as the date of the deed ; the 
 quantity of land ; its nature, whether arable or meadow ; and the 
 like— for these statements are but incidental atid collateral, and 
 may be supposed not to have received the deliberate attention of 
 the parties.'* In this country, however, if a deed of conveyance 
 distinctly states in the operative part that the consideration money 
 has been received, and the estoppel is properly pleaded,* the fact of 
 payment, and the amount paid, are conclusively presumed.® The 
 Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881," has expressly 
 enacted that this (which appears to have been so long before the Act) 
 shall be so in favour of a subsequent innocent purchaser. Under 
 
 > 2 Smith, L. C. 6(57 ; Robinson's 
 cnso, l(i(»;{; Smyth v. Wilson, 1H41 
 (Ir.); L.'Kp)tt r.Gt. N. lly. Co.. 1H76. 
 Sen Ik'nnutt v. Giimffeo. 1877, C. A. 
 
 ' Dot) V. Olonn, 1H:J4. Soo also 
 Miildleton's case, 1603 ; Mi^ttors v. 
 Jirown, 1K()2; Lyons v. Muldorry, 
 1H;J2 (Ir.); Kirwiln v. Gorman, 1840 
 (Ir.) ; Johnson v. Warwick, 1HJ(J. 
 
 » Hay no v. Maltby, 1789 (Ld. 
 Konyon). 
 
 ♦ Com. Di. Estoppel, A. 2 ; Yelv, 
 227, by Metcalfo, n. 1 ; I)oddington'8 
 
 case, lo94; Shipworth r. Green, 1725 
 
 » Potts )•. Nixon. 1870 (Ir.). 
 
 • Sludly r. Wright, 1737 ; Cossens 
 
 V. Cossens, 1737; l{<).k"ntn!0 r. Ja<M)b, 
 
 18()!>, in which la>t easo tluTe wi-ro 
 
 hi{^hly8U8))i(i()iisciri;timNt4inc-<!stfn(I- 
 
 ing to show that the consideration 
 
 money had not in fact been j)aid; 
 
 liaker v. Dewcv, 1823; Iiani])on r. 
 
 Corke, 1834 ; Hill r. Maiich. \Vat(aw. 
 
 Co.. 1832. ,Sco Smith v. Uattams, 
 
 18 J7 ; also Gn;slty r. Mrjusloy, 1801. 
 
 ' 44&45 V. c.'il.Joo. 
 
 ' f| 
 
CHAP, v.] E.sTOPn:Ls — uixitals in dekds. 
 
 tlie snmo Act,' tho proiluctum by a solicilDr of a »1»'(m1 with a receipt 
 in the l)(i(ly tlicn'of or indorsed niou it lor tlio eousidfriition is 
 Hiifficicnt autliority for the piiymont of the considoration to him, 
 nltl)ough a receipt indorsed upon the deed will not in itself amount 
 to an estoppel.- In America,'' though tho party is estopped from 
 denying the conv»\vanc;e, and that it was for a valuable considera- 
 tion, the statement in the deed is ajiparently only prirail facie 
 evidence of the amount paid.* 
 
 S 97. Lord Coke's doctrine that "a recital doth not conclude, 
 because it is no direct affirmation,"'' luis bi en expressly overruled. 
 The law now is^ thus: "If a distinct statement of a particular 
 fact is made in the recital of a bond, or other instrument under 
 seal, and a contract is made with reference to that recital, it is 
 un(jue8tionably true, that, as between the parties to that instru- 
 ment, and in an action upon it, it is not competent for the party 
 bound ' to deny the recital, notwithstanding what Ijord Coke says 
 on the matter of recital in Coke Littleton, ''i-')2 b; and a recital in 
 instruments not under seal may be such as to be conclusive to 
 the same extent. A strong instance as to a recital in a deed, 
 is found in a case * where, in a bond to secure the payment of 
 rent under a lease stated, it was recited that the lease was at 
 a rent of 170/., and the defendant was estopped from pleading 
 that it was 140/. oidy, and that such amount had been paid. 
 So, where other particular facts are mentioned in a condition 
 to a bond, as that the obligor and his wife should appear, the 
 obligor cannot plead that he appeared himself, and deny that he 
 is married, in an action on the bond." All the instances given 
 
 1n;H; R. r. StiimiMT, 1.S41; Hill ,k 
 Miim^h. Wiit(>rw. ("o., Ih.'Jl ; I'lirpjtor 
 r. Harris, 1S4,); ("liirkev. Hull, lH8i> 
 (Ir.). SofiilHoHuyWi'.Hradloy, lW-18; 
 Vouiig V. Kaiiicock, 1847; Horton c 
 Wewtin. lini)r()VO. CdiiirH. , 18.52; and 
 Hiiiipsrford v. Hoochcr, 18o.) (Ir.). 
 Hut Hoo liimlsay v. E. of Wicklow, 
 1873 (Ir.). 
 
 ' Kven thotigh sho bo a married 
 womim, seniblo (Ld. J. Jamos), Joues 
 V. Frost, In re Fiddoy, 1872. 
 
 • Lainson v. Tremoro, 1834. Seo 
 Brooke v. Hayincs, 1868. 
 
 » I fioU. Abr. 873, o. 26. 
 
 1 
 
 > 44 &4.J V. c. 41, §56. 
 ' liaiii|)oii (t. Corke, 18;J4 (Ilolrovd, 
 J., H.'Ht, J.); Stratou v. Kastall, 1788. 
 ' (}r. Ev. § 26, n., almost verbatim. 
 
 * Tho principal cases will bo found 
 rofcri-ed to in tho early editions of 
 this Work. 
 
 » Co. Lit. .1.')2 h. As to tho offoct 
 of recitals in a deed which has biti-n 
 tendered fnr execution but not exe- 
 cuted, seo Hulk'v V. HuUey, 1875. 
 
 • Per Parke, B., in Carpenter v. 
 BuUer, 1 84 1 . As to other cases where 
 a recital has been held conclusive, seo 
 Bowniiaii V. Taylor, 1835; Hills v. 
 Luming, 1854; Ijuiiison v. Tremere, 
 
 •m 
 
 93 
 
li 
 
 I (J 
 
 I' 
 
 I i 
 
 111 
 
 WHEN RECITALS OPERATE AS ESTOPPELS. [PART U 
 
 in Com. Dig., Estoppel, A. 2, under the head of ' Estoppel hy 
 Matter of Writing ' (except one which relates to a release), are 
 oases of estoppel in actions on the instrument in which the 
 admissions are contained. By his contract in the instrument 
 itself a party is assuredly hound, and must fulfil it. But there is 
 no authority to show that a party to the instrument would be 
 estopped, in an action by the other party, not founded on the deed, 
 and uho/Zi/ collateral to it,' to dispute the facts so admitted, though 
 the recitals would certainly be evidence ; for instance, in another 
 suit, though between the same parties, where a question should 
 arise whether the plaintiff held at a rent of 170/. in the one case, or 
 was married in the other case, it could not be held that the recitals 
 in the bond were conclusive evidence of these facts. Still less could 
 it be so aeld, if the matter alleged in the instrument were wholly 
 immaterial to the contract therein contained ; as, for instance, 
 suppose an indenture or bond to contain an unnecessary description 
 of one of the parties as assignee of a bankrupt, overseer of the poor, 
 or as filling any other character, it could not be contended that such 
 statement would be conclusive on the other party, in any other pro- 
 ceeding between them." 
 
 § 98. To make a recital operate as an estoppel, there must then 
 be, first, a distinct statement * of some material ' particular * fact ; 
 secondly, a contract made with reference to such statement ; * and, 
 thirdly, either an action directly founded on the instrument con- 
 taining the recital, or one which is brought to enforce the rights 
 arising out of such instrument." If these requisites are satisfied, 
 
 ' Soe S.-Eii8t. Ey. Co. v. Warton, 
 1862. 
 
 '' Sec Kepp v. WijTRott, 18,>1. 
 
 » In Curpcutc r. Uullor. 1X41. tho 
 court were stmiifjly inclined to think 
 that, in a (Iced rclatinj,' to an adit, a 
 recital that certain nt.'ifrhhourinf? 
 lands, throufrh which the adit did not 
 I)asM, bolonp-'d to A. 15., was an im- 
 material mattei', which a i)arty to tho 
 deed was not estojiped from denying. 
 Tho point, howovcr, was not directly 
 decided, fts the admission was held 
 inconclusive on other grounds. 
 
 * Ah to tho distinction between 
 generality and particularity, see Com. 
 Dig., Esto])i)el, A. 2, and notes to 
 
 Riiinsford v. Smyth, l.JGl. 
 
 * In Stnmghill c. Ikick, 1830. the 
 oouit thus stated the law :— " Wiiero 
 a recital is intended to bo a state- 
 ment, which all the parties to tho 
 deed have mutually agreed to admit 
 as true, it is an estopjiel upon all. 
 ]Uit whtne it is intended to be the 
 statc^ment of one party oidy, tlie 
 estop])el is conlined to that party, 
 and the intention is to be gaflua-ed 
 from construing thf* instrument."' 
 See, also. Young r. l{ainc<ick, 18-47 ; 
 Ulackhall v. (libsoii, 1878 (Ir.). 
 
 • "Wiles V. Woodward, 18-Jl ; Carter 
 V. Carter. 18,)8 (Wood, V.-C.) ; Fru-^er 
 V, Pondlebury, 18B2. 
 
 94 
 
CHAP, v.] ESTOI'I'KW MIIRT HK KKCH'KOCAL. 
 
 the doctrine may, in some cases, be extended to instruments not 
 under seal. In all cases of estoppel by recital, the matter recited 
 requires no proof ; since the recital is not offered as secontlnry, but 
 as primary evidence, which cannot be controverted, and winch 
 fonns a muniment of title. This rule, however, only applies to so 
 much of a deed cs is ait nail if irvitvd ; and therefore if it liecomes 
 necessary to rely ou a yaii of the recited deed which is not itself 
 recited, such recited deed must be produced and proved in the 
 regular way.' 
 
 S 99. It is a rule in the general doctrine of estoppels, that every 
 estoppel must be reciprocal ; that is, it must bind both parties, since 
 a stranger can neither take advantage of an estoppel, nor be bound 
 by it.* For example, where a party, holding chambers in Lincoln's 
 Inn as tenant-at-will under the benchers, in a deed, by which he 
 conveyed his interest to A., recited that he was seised oi them for 
 life, and subsequently stirrendered them to the benchers, who 
 admitted li. as tenant, it was held that B. was, as against A., 
 not estopped from denying that the surrenderor was seised for 
 life ; ' again, where a man took lands from the assignees of a 
 bankrupt, by a deed describing such lands as freehold, Ik^ was held 
 not estopped, as against the bankrupt's wife (on a claim by her of 
 dower), from proving that the lands were in fact leaseholtl ; * in an 
 action against an individual for using a way,* plaintiff's conviction 
 on a previous indictment, in respect of the same way, for obstructing 
 a public highway, though doubtless strong evidence, cannot be used 
 as an estoppel ; while the grantee or lessee under a deed poll if he 
 claim title under it (although not, in general, esto[)ped from 
 gainsaying anything mentioned in the deed which is the deed of 
 the grantor or lessor only) is thereby estopped from denying title 
 of the grantor." Indeed, as against {hd grantor under such a deed 
 poll an exception to the general .ulo requiring reciprocity in 
 estoppels might perhaps be recogi.'jed, because in these instruments 
 only one party is ever intended to be bound, and as he has executed 
 a deed wn i the same solemnities as an indenture, there is no 
 
 ' Abbott V. Oill.^tt, 1838. 
 ' Co. Lit. 3.V2 (I. 
 
 * Doo V. Errinj^ton, 1840. 
 
 * Gaunt V. Waininan, 1836. 
 
 » Petricf. Niittall, 1835. 
 • Co. Lit. 363 b ; Goddard's case. 
 1684. 
 
 m 
 
 Ml Ih ! 
 
 96 
 
 1 
 
 
iV 
 
 
 si 
 
 II 
 
 at^f^H 1 
 
 'i 
 
 f:sTorrcL3 hy dkkd — ksioi'I'Kls in pais. 
 
 [I'ART I. 
 
 vnlid reason why the dootrine of estoppel sliould not apply to 
 
 iii 
 
 III.* 
 
 S 1(M(. Another rule with respeet to estojtpelH by deed is that a 
 deed whieli can take effeot />;/ iiitrrrst pjiall not be eonstrued to take 
 etrect by estoppel.' Therefore if a lessor has any interest in the 
 demised preiiii.Mm, even though it be one lass than ho professes to 
 grant, the lease siiall not work by estoppel, but shall enure to tho 
 extent of tlio lessor's interest, and no further.' If, howi^ver, a 
 ])erson, liaving no titl»» whatever, makes a lease by indenture, this 
 will esto]» tli(! parties to the deinl from alleging tho h«ssor's want of 
 title during the eontinuanco of tho lease; and if the lessor suliso- 
 quently purchases the land, or otlierwise obtains an intere.st in it, 
 the leaM>, wliich was originally a lease by r-u'o/ijit'/, will bo converted 
 into a lease in iiiffrcxf, and tho heir or a.ssigneo of the lessor will he 
 bound thereby, as well as \\w lessee and his a.ssigiu'es.* 
 
 {i lOl. The third kiiul of ohtoppt-ls are estoppels by matter in 
 piiin} Tho rnost ordinary instanee of these is the well-established 
 ru)i>, that a tenant, during his possessicm of jiremises, shall not 
 deny tliat a landlord, \inder whom im enlered, or from whom lie 
 has taken a renewal of his holding," or to whom he has paid rent, 
 liiid title at such time.' Neither in an ejeetment by the lai<dlord, 
 ii<.' in an action by him for rent or for iise and oeenpation, oan the 
 ter.aiit set up the superior lith' of a third person," or that the lainl- 
 lord has no title. For instar.ee, if the plnintiif be an incumbent, 
 the tenant cannot give evidence that his presentation was simo- 
 iiiucal ; '' if lie be a devisee he will not be allo»ved to prove that the 
 devisor was iMcapable of making a will'" (unlcRs, indeed, tlie party 
 clainiiiig as d«>vi:4ee was guilty uf fraud in making tho will, and in 
 falsely representing it to hiui as a valid one)." The only course 
 
 ' '1 Smith, I-. (". (i(M* ; Hue. Abj. lit. \>A« in ikiih, hoc )Mmt. S§ 772, 7«a, N'JO 
 
 ],('!»*•«, (>, tit b"'l|., Nilll t>t Htl(|. 
 
 '' Doc r. Piiiton. 1N40 (I'littosou, • \hw v. \Vin>:iim, IHI.J. 
 
 J.), ' Doc I'. I'l'KKc, l"N7 (1.(1. Miiim- 
 
 ' III. ill iiiKiiiiiciit; Co. Lit. 4.'i(i, ililil); Dou v. Mioton, is 10. Sco 
 
 47/-; Doc (. Siiton, 1n;1.-( (I'liiko, Atl.-(icii. r. StcphciiH, Its,").). 
 
 i;.); \\iil;oii I'. Wiiti rlioiiM). l(17'J. ' D<»o v. I'ckK'". '^^7 (IhI. MaiiH- 
 
 ' W. Iil>.'. Austin, IM I ; SliuKcon lir,lil). 
 
 V. WiiiKlicld. IS Mi. • ('<M»ko I', I.oxliy, I7ICJ. 
 
 ' Ah to "jiiiiHiiil ailiiiii<f>ioiiH," hikI '" Dor I', WifiniiiK. IMJ, 
 
 " Milini^xioiix ixtcil ii]ioii," wliii'h " l.il. Duiiuiitii, in 111. 
 m uic'tiiiicH uiu t'luHMil uuiuiij; i'mUiji- 
 
 flfi 
 
CHAP v.] KSTOPPKI. IN PAIS — LANDLOKP AND TI'.NANT. 
 
 which a f(>iiiiii< wlio wishes (<» (lisjmte th»» litlo of tho huullonl 
 iiiwh'r whom he •tutcriMl vaw jtursuti (siiv<* iiulccd in tho oin' cdsc uf 
 his l)i'iii}j; abk' to show that his ailiiiission of Immii}^ tonnikt was 
 obfaiiit'il hy a chmr fraud) is to yicM \i\) the iiri'iniscs, and then 
 hriii}r ail uctiiiii to nn-ovor tluMH.' So strict is thia ndo, that, even 
 if a hiiidloi'd, in {troviug his own caso, discloso tho faut that he has 
 only an t'(iiiitahh' or a joint ostatf in the pn'inisi's, the tenant 
 ciiimot avail himself of that eircuinstance as a defence.- Further 
 examples of the rule are, that a lessee, who iias once acei'iiteil a 
 lease and paid rent under it, cannot disjiute the lessor's title, 
 though thu d(>ed itself admits upon its face som*; infirmity in that 
 title," and that a tenant who has held jjremises under a corporation 
 aggr»>gate, and paid rent, ennnot object to such corporation suing 
 him fur use and occupation, on the ground that a corporation 
 cannot demists except by deed, and that he has occupied without 
 deed.' The rule that i> tenant cannot ileny his landlord's title is 
 applicable in an action of trespass, as well as in one to recovitr 
 hind;'* ami is binding, not only (m tho tenant himself, but on all 
 who claim in any way through him," as, for instance, a party to 
 whom a lessee has given up jiossessiou." Its principle, moreover, 
 extends to the case of a person coming in by ]iermi.ssion as a mere 
 lodger, a servant, or other licensee." 
 
 $ Kl'J. [bit though u tenant cannot deny that the person, by 
 whom he was let into possession, had title at the tinie when he so 
 let him in, he nuiy show that such person had no title at some 
 jinvious time. I''or instance, where the defendant claimed under a 
 mnveyance from a certain company, dated in |S'J4, he was allowed 
 
 'i 
 1 
 
 ' I'd' < 'iili'i'iil^c, ■)., ill III. .')77 ; \>i»' 
 
 >■. I.ll(lv .<lllVlllc, ISl,'). Sec \{. ,S. r. 
 
 issit, (till.' will. r. •-•; A|.|i. V,. 
 
 • iK.ll.y V. Ilm, IHIU, 
 
 ' l>uk« V. AMlil.y, IH«J;!; Mnrtnii r. 
 
 W I-., IMIW. 
 
 • M.iy. ef StiilTonl v. Till, isjlt; 
 I'i'iiii jiiiil Cli.iif Koi'licMcr c. riiTcc, 
 
 ISON; I'l'rn^'liiHCil in FiHhliii(||j{clN' 
 Co. r. lti>l>crtH(iii, \H\X Hi'C I'iii'li'H. 
 ('(iimiiiM. V, Mcrril, IWllt; iilmi ikjmI, 
 S l»M. 
 
 ' lit'iiiiiny v. Fdx, \M1 \ (iiiiiliry- 
 iii;: u (III turn u( I'ulluuk, t.li., nt 
 
 T.— \oj.. I. , 
 
 \Vul-<iiii )'. I,iiiii>, |S,')(i. Sco iilsd 
 Willll r. Itviili, IST'i. 
 
 • '...ii.l. \v N. W.M. l!v. (',,. r. 
 Went. ISIIT. 
 
 ' H.ic .'. MillH, 18.I.-. ; |)i..> V. I.iidy 
 Siiiyliic, IHIT; 'I'livlnr c. Nccillniiii, 
 iNim. 
 
 " line c. Iliiytllp, iNlfi, wlifin u 
 Woliiilll wllii llllil IIHki'il li'ilVe to ffOt 
 
 vi p'tali|i'>4 ill fill' ^iinlcii, Mill oil- 
 tciiii'd tlic kc\M for tliis piiiiii nc, 
 truiiiliili'iitly ttiiik |HiHMi'HNiiiii of tho 
 lldlimt ikiiil tried (iiiiNiic'CNMriilly, of 
 (■((iirMc) to fi't ii|i tt title, Su«) ulso 
 l)oe I'. Iliii liiiioi)., \KM. 
 
ESTOPPEL IN PAIS — LANDLORD AND TENANT. [I'ART I. 
 
 to dispute the titlo of the company ro convey the same premises to 
 the i)laiutifF in 1818 ; • a lessee let into possession in IH'^C) under a 
 demise from a tenant for life, was allowed, in an action brought 
 by the reversioner (though he would not liavo been permitttxl to 
 show after the death of the tenant for lifo adverse title iu another 
 at the (late of the lease), to prove that, Ixfore 1826, the legal estate 
 was outstanding in a third party, and that, consequently, the 
 reversioner, who claimed in common with the t«uant for life under 
 a settlement of a much earlier date, had no legal title.* A tonaiit 
 is also allowed to prove that, since the commencement of the 
 tenancy, the title of his lessor has expired or V)een defeated.' For 
 example, he may prove that his landlord was a tenant pour autre 
 vie, and that the cesttii (pie vie is dead ; or that he was a tenant 
 from year to year or at will, and that the superior landlord had 
 given him a notice to quit or determined the will;* or that l\w 
 person who let him in was a mortgagor in possession, who, not 
 having uj* to the date of dcmiiso been treated as a trespasser, had 
 then title to confer the legal possession, but has subsetpiently been 
 treated as a trespasser.* In short, the tenant may rely on any 
 fact whi(!h either amounts to an evictior by title paramount,' or 
 shows that the title of his landlord has expired." 
 
 S lOIJ. It is not always clear what constitutes a "letting into 
 possession." Where a party was in possession of preini.ses without 
 leavtf obtained fnmi any one, and a person came to him and said, 
 *' Vdu have no right to the jtremises," upon which he aoquiesocd, 
 and took a lease from ihis person, the relation of landlord and 
 tenant was lu^d to be sulliciently created to dultar the one from 
 
 « l»o<) V. Pnw.ll. 1h;m. 
 
 • lion I'. Limpldli, IHJH; Drxt v. 
 Whitl...., IH-.".'. 
 
 ' 1 r. iJiiitoli. IHIO (Lil. Di'Il- 
 
 iiiiiii'* ; HKjifiaft I'. Kt'VM, lN.'i;i. fSco 
 MiiylfV I'. Hniilliy, IM«7; WiitHon c. 
 I.iiiii', IH.'jO; l.iiii^fortl c, ScliiH'H, 
 
 1N,')7; lldWt- I'. .SiilTott. 1H,')!»; Loud. 
 
 & N. Wfnt. iJv. Co. I'. W.Kt, \m't. 
 
 * Dim) I'. I(a'il<iii. IMO. 
 
 ' |)(Mi I'. Huitiiii, Hiiimi. A inort- 
 (rap'i<, by Hiiii|ily );:iviii|.r iiotico tothi* 
 toniiiit. t(i i_)ay n-tit to liiin, tlooH nut 
 trcMit th« iiioi'tKitKor im >t tr*tH|MiMN«r : 
 Ilii'kiniut f. Muchiu, INJ!), but it 
 
 iiofin', to biivii sin'h iiu offi'ct, iinist 
 ritliiT 1)11 roii|il)>(| with an att<irn- 
 nicnt, or be I'ollowcil by actual |)ay- 
 nirnt of ri'iif. to tlio niorl;;a;;i!(i. .Sen 
 ill. ; also Wilton v. l)iinn, iNiil ; 
 Tiirniir v. ('anu'i'on'H Coalbrook St. 
 Coul Co., 1M,5(I; Litchliold r. Hrady, 
 IH.'iO; Tivnt .-. Hunt. IH.VJ. 
 
 • Oolllilswoltll r. Klii«lltH, isi:t. 
 
 ' llowim II. Cooper, lull. ,Si>)<l)(io 
 I-. AVatM4in, 1H17; Doo r. Scuton, IsiKi; 
 ClaridpM'. Ma(!k)>nxii*, \M'1\ Mount- 
 noy r. CollitT, 1H,')U; I'lmtiiy I'. Mar- 
 n«tt, ls,')S; Ifidine^u v, MuUiua, 
 1875, lix. fh. 
 
 98 
 
;. v.] 
 
 WHAT CONSTITUTES A LETTING INTO POSSESSION. 
 
 disputing tlie title of the other.' But where a teuant, already in 
 possession of premises under a demise from a termor, at the expi- 
 ration of the termor's right entered into a parol agreement with 
 another party to hold under liira, in ignorance of the real facts, 
 and under the supposition that this party was entitled to tVe pre- 
 mises, this agreement was held not to be equivalent to the first 
 letting into possession.* Neither a parol agreement by a tenant to 
 hold of a party, by whom he was not let into punsooiioii,'^ nor an 
 attornment,* nor an actual payment of rent to such party, even 
 under a distress,* will in themselves operate as estoppels ; but the 
 tt-nant may still show that he has acted in ignorance, or under a 
 misapprehension of the real eircumstancos," or, in the case of pay- 
 ment of rent, that some other i)arty was entitled to receive itj 
 
 i 104.*' There are also certain conchisive presumptions of law 
 with respect to iiifautx.^ Thus, an infant under seven is conclu- 
 sively presumed incapable of committing any felony, or, in<l<'eJ, 
 any indictable offence,'" for want of discretion ; " a male infant 
 under fourteen is presumed incapable, on the ground of impotency, 
 of committing a rape as a principal in the first degree,'^ or of being 
 
 • Door. Mills, 18;J5(Patt.'son, J.). 
 Set) hIho D.ilhy v, IIoh, IN4(>. 
 
 ' ('lari(l;;(i r, Muckcii/io, 18-12. 
 "'nicni wiiH no niin poHHiwHion jjivcn 
 liy thii <|i'fi'iiiliuit ; sho was in no 
 way projiuliciul ; hHh coiiltl not Imvo 
 turned tho pluintitY out of jiossch- 
 nion ; and hi'foni their iif^rt'eincnt, if 
 hIu' IiimI Ix'dii^ht her ejectinent, tlic 
 i)liiintill' niirfht huvo hIiowu tliat hIio 
 iiait no titli', and tlmt tlio titlo was in 
 Konie one *>lHt>. It in not like tho 
 case of a ]i('rson letting.' unother into 
 |piissessi(in of vacant promises ; it is 
 m fact a remaining in possession of 
 ]ircniiseM, which had bet'ti f.)rniei'iv 
 ncciipied Ity thotoiianl." I'erTindal, 
 CJ. 
 
 •' Id. 
 
 • !).<<• r. Hrown, 18:17. 
 
 • Kninl't I'. Cox, 1h;)(1. 
 
 • (iri'f;ory '•, Doidpt, 1827; Orii- 
 venor r. Woodhoiiso, 1824 ; ItotjerH 
 r. Pitcher, 1818; Doe r. Harton, 1840; 
 Hull r. Ilutler, I8;j(» (I'ntteson, J.). 
 
 ^ ('(Mtper r. Hlandy. 18;J!); Don w. 
 TrHntMH, 18,17 ; in which caMi* pay- 
 luoiit of runt buiTig th j only uvidonoo 
 
 of tenancy, Puttoson, J. aUowed the 
 dofendant to show, that tho hrnxor of 
 the plaintitY had acted us the uffont 
 of tliird parties. Seti IIitciun}»'s c, 
 Thompson, 18.j(), explained hy Ld. 
 Crnnwoith, (",, in Att. -Gen. v. 
 Htephens, 18.),). 
 
 " (ir. Mv. § 2H, in part. 
 
 • In all civil <|uestionH where the 
 rifjlits of parents de]iend on tlm birth 
 of a livin;; child, tlie Scotch law con- 
 clusively presiiiuert that the child 
 was not horn alive, if it was not 
 heard to cry. I hickson, Kv. 18((. 
 
 '" 12 \- »;l V. c. 4!»C' The Summary 
 Jurisdiction Act, 1H7!»"),U0,hii1)-s. .). 
 
 " 4 lU. Com. 2.1; 1 Hale, 27. If 
 an infant under seven is ^iven into 
 custoily on a charpi of felonj', an 
 action for false iinprisonuieut will 
 lie; Maish >\ Loailer, I8l>;{. 
 
 " 1 IIale,(i;t(»: 1 HuHs. C.&M. 07«. 
 This presumjition is not alTccted hy 
 24 & 2.') V. c. 100 ("The OJfenceg 
 npiiinst the I'erwMi Act, 18«1 "j, § 48 ; 
 R. >'. (IroomhridKo. I8;j(i ((l.iseiee, J., 
 and Ii<l. .\l)inp<r) ; audit applioH to 
 the ull'uiicu of oarniiUy abuiuiig a 
 
 uu 
 
 u , 
 
lii 
 
 i 
 
 OONCLUSIVF, PU'l'-SllMI'TIONS — INFANTS. [PAILl i- 
 
 guilty, iimlor sect. 4 of the Criminal Tiaw Amtiiidniont Ant, I8.S.'),^ 
 of tho offence of carnal knowl('<lf*o of a girl undtsr tliirtf'fni,^ thougli 
 h« may Lo convicted of a criminal asKuult upon hor,'' or of com- 
 niittiiig an aswiult with intent to perpetriite that orinio ; * n 
 ft;nial(( inider thirteen is presumed incapaUo of consenting to 
 Bexual intercourse, and to have carnal knowledge of her is a 
 felony ; while an attempt to have such knowledge is a misde- 
 meanour,* and to have, or attempt to have, carnal knowh'dge of a 
 girl over thirteen and under sixteen is a misdemeanour," and the 
 conscnit of a girl mider thirteen to an act of indecency cannot bo 
 set up as a det'enco to a charge of assault.' An uumarrietl girl 
 under eighteen cannot consent to be abducted in onh-r that a man 
 may have carnal knowledge of her, and to abduct such a girl for 
 such a purpose is a misdemeanour.* An infant of eith(>r sex under 
 twenty-one is presumed to be so far incaiJablo of managing his 
 own ad'aii-s as not to be able, in general," to alien land, execute a 
 deed,'" state an account, to make any bitidiug confmet," unless for 
 necessaries." lie is also incaj)ablo of being Hubjectc'd t^) a receiving 
 order made under tho Bankru[.icy laws ; ' ' and since th»» first of 
 
 pill under tho statiitory ago ; U. r. 
 Jonliiii, ls;)H (Williains; J.). Hut if 
 tlic l»>y Imvii a inincliii'VocH iliscrt*- 
 tinii, hit iiiiiy Im) ti pi'iii('i]>iil ill tho 
 niMdml (h'fi'rco ; 1 lliilo, (i;50. Tlio 
 jiafii'iit iiiuy l>o convii'tcd of an un- 
 natural crinir, tliiiu}^h tlm agent ho 
 undir tniirtccn; U. r. Allen, 1826, 
 
 ' IH iV I'l V. f. (i!l. 
 
 » |{. V. Wait", 1H!»2. 
 
 » It. V. WilliaiiiH. 1H!»3. 
 
 ♦ U. i\ Kld.TMhaw. 1N2« (Vaughan, 
 K); v.. I'. I'hilips, lH;{7(l'attoH<.n.J.), 
 
 * Sit "Till' ( 'riniiird buw Anicnd- 
 mcnt A.'t, IMH,-)" (4.S & mi V. <•. (ii»), 
 $ 4 ; anil soo, also, U. c. itcale, lS(t((. 
 
 • Si'o Id. § •'). 
 ' r.'. \ H V. c. 4.', ("Thn Criniinal 
 
 ], aw Amendment Act, IHNO"). § 'J; li. 
 f. Kiiaclley, ISNO. The last -named caso 
 in overruled l>y the ahovo unuctinent. 
 
 • 4H * l!» V'. c. (W, § 7. 
 
 » S.o IH & ll» V. c. 4:} ("Tho In- 
 fants' Settlemeiitfi Ai;t, 18W"). and 
 'j:j * 24 V. i\ n;J (!r,), enuhling iiuilo 
 infa.itNof t A-eiity, aiul fuoMilo infaiits 
 (if Moventeo" to niako, with the ap- 
 
 firobalion -•; ihn ('htnic^'ry l>iviMioii, 
 liiidiiig t)uttlumuiit« on miirriagp. 
 
 '» Soo Martin r. fiale, l.SIIT, hold- 
 ing a deed hy an inlant ('liarginj.' 
 his reveisionai'v interest to secnrH 
 money advanced for iiecessarieM vcid- 
 alile and nut enforceaiile. 
 
 " :»7 \- :tH V. e. <i'J("Tl\e InfantM* 
 Helief Act, 1N74"). As to how fur 
 .in infant ■.ui act as a trustee, or 
 exorfJHf >' "'i>r, sei. K'ing c Idllord, 
 18H;J; • !- ii, roArnifs Trusts, IHIW, 
 (Ir.); li, !.• !. Angihau. IS.Sd, ('. A. 
 
 '' 1 hi. ( om. 4(i.), 4(>(): Co. Lit. 
 7N h. As t^l what are liecesMuries, 
 
 Ki'e ante, § 4'J. .\h to Ikiw fill' infant 
 shareholders are liulile to lutions for 
 calls, see Xewry & Mnnisk. l!y, Co, 
 i: (Jomho, 1S49": IaiciIs & Thirsk Uy. 
 Co. c. Kearnlcy, \HW , Cork iV: Han- 
 doii l{v. Co. r. Ca/enove, 1S17; N. 
 West. Hy. Co. i: McMichael, l.S.V); 
 Hirkenhead, Ijiiiio. & Clu'sh. Juno, 
 ily Co. ('. I'ilchnr, IHM). An infant 
 lesseo, thongh not liahlo on tho ct'ii- 
 tnict of tenan(^v, in answeralslc for 
 the vont during bis occuji.ition of tho 
 premises. HIako c. CunramiiMi, lN70 
 I'li.). I'.iit HOC l.emjinei-o i'. Lungo, 
 iN7!l (Jessel. M.ll.V 
 
 " Ho JonoB, Ex p. Jones, 1881, 
 C. A. 
 
 100 
 
CHAP, v.] CIIILD-HK.VUINO AOE -IJIOIIIMACY. 
 
 January, 1H;JH, such a perBon caiino*; m' j a will, whether it pur- 
 ports to dispose) of rt'dl or of personal estate.' 
 
 S !()">. No rigid nresumption is fixed by law as to the exact 
 period of life at which the possihility of having issue, without 
 miraculous agency.' becomes in women extinct ; but in directing 
 the distribution of trust funds, the courts have been in the habit of 
 iu»Hiiniing that, in general, females, after arriving at the age of 
 fifty-three, arc past child-bearing.' 
 
 S I0(i. A conclusive presumption in favour of Inntiiiuirif exists in 
 certain cases.* Thus, where husband and wife Imve cohabited 
 together, and no impotciuey is proved, the issue is conclusively 
 presumed to be legitimate, though the wife is shown to liave been, 
 at the same time, guilty of infidelity.* Even where the parents 
 ore living 8e[)arate, a strong pro8umj)tion of legitimatjy still arises, 
 which can only be rebutted, either by proving a divorce a mcnsA 
 ct thoro, or, since the lltli of January, IMAH, a judicial separatinii, 
 or by cogent and almost irresistible jjroof of non-access in a sexual 
 sense;" and, indeed, the fact that a married woman is living iu 
 notorious adultery, though amounting to very strong ovidtmce, is 
 not, in itself, sullicitnit to repel the presumptidu of the legitimacy 
 of her oir.spring.' But where alleged parents have been divorced 
 
 i i 
 
 ' 7 W. J & 1 V. 0. 2«("Tho WillH 
 Act, IHltV"), §§ 7, 34. Hclon, that 
 iliitc, txiy.s 'of fiiurtt'on yciM'H, aiut 
 j^irlw of twi'lvfi, luiirlit liiivn (liM|iimi'il 
 (if ]H>rN(iiialty liy wiM. if jMovod to 
 
 IlilVi' l)ft>li <)t Sltllirliillt llirtcrutioii. 1 
 
 Will, oil V.S.. II 1(1. 
 
 ■' SiM' 111 u,, I'll, xvii., vv. 1.1 l!'; 
 I'll, xviii., vv. \t ■ l.j, itiid eh. .\\i., 
 vv. 1 7. 
 
 ■' lluMH'H I'. lIiivii(>H, lN(i(i (Kin- 
 ili'iTili'y N'.-(".), iiiiil riiMi'M citcil ill tlio 
 
 lldtc. SiM' IiIno |{|> WkIiIow's TlllHtH, 
 
 lN7!{MiiliiiH,V.-('.}.iii!.lli.'.MilliiiT'H 
 i';Miit<s \H~'l, iu wliicli liiHf .•ii«i> II 
 vs'oiiiiiii iiiiirri»'il fnr twiiity-Mi.x yuarM, 
 liiiil /laving never liail a cliilil, wuh 
 liriKiii;it'<| to 1m> harri'ii at the a^e of 
 foily-iiiiif ytuii' and niiin iiiiiiiMih. 
 Hut ill t'loxton I'. May, lN7<l, tlm 
 Court, of .\ii|M>iil r.ffiiHiiil to rof'iii'il M 
 Woiiiaii wli"i-i(i ii'fo wa.-i (Ifiy-foiir ainl 
 a Uulf yuuin, tiiunioU tLa<u ) out m, utid 
 
 M'lrprt ». 
 
 ll('lr(>rat«, 
 lH.-(,i; Hail- 
 
 ApJH'Il- 
 
 I I'Vcr having' hail a i'liild, ]iHMt cliild- 
 bcai'iii);. Si'd i|ii , iiiid ki'o Itavidrtou 
 V. Kuiiptoii, issi. 
 
 * Sic ante, § 1(1. 
 
 » ('o|M' i\ Coiie, is;{;i; 
 Davien, llS(i(i; Wiinlit c 
 IN.')(»; \,<']:\n^i\ 1-MiiKihdH, 
 l.ury i'.-r.. l7-'7. II. I,. 
 ili\, II. K. to i,e .Mar('liaiit'H(tar>liii>i' i« 
 I'eer. : It. i\ l.iille, lN((7. A to tlii) 
 Malionii ihiii Law oil tliJH Hiilijiut, him) 
 AhIihiIoiiiI I'ciwlali .Vlimed c. Ilyiler 
 Ilos-ieiii K'liaii. iNs,), 
 
 ' Id.; lloNvilo I'. Attoriioy-'ien., 
 1HS7; .Siyeaiid.Selel'tier., l.siii, ILL.; 
 Iliii'l^rave r. Ilar^fiave, INIIS ; liowes 
 V, HoMHi'V, iHiiJ; Ati'hl' V c. .'^iirij,'^, 
 18(11. 
 
 ' it. i>. Manstinld, IHII. Ill tliiH 
 I'liH.) lid. !>nmiiaii qiieritioiiH the au- 
 thority of ('u|ie ('. ('o|tn. lK:l;j, .Sim 
 lluwi»;i V, llimigoi, lt»s;j ^Kuy, J.). 
 
 m 
 
i|»i 
 
 ill 
 
 SPOLIATION OP PAPKR8 — RUNNING BLOCKADE. [PART I. 
 
 or judicially separated, children bom during the separation ore 
 prim& facie illegitimate.' 
 
 § 107.* Conclusive presumptions are also known to the taw of 
 natioits. For instance, despatches of the enemy which a nvutriil 
 vessel is found carrj'ing between different j)arts of the enemy's 
 dominions, nre i)resumed to bo hostile,' at least, if thoy have been 
 fraudulently conuealed ; the Hpoliatioii o/'jiujhtk by a captured party 
 is regarded, in all the States of Continental Europe, as giving rise 
 to a conclucivc presumption of guilt. But, in general, in Englan<l 
 and America, the presumption of guilt is only prima facie, and is 
 open to explanation. English and Amoricnii law are more lenient, 
 and do not found on the more spoliation of papers »in absohite pre- 
 sumption of guilt. But they only stop short of that result ; for a 
 ease that escapes with sucl) a brand upon it is saved, as it were, 
 from the fire ; * and where the case labours under otiier circumstances 
 of suspicion, or the surrounding circumstances establish bad faith 
 or gross prevarication, the presumption is, even in English and 
 American law, conilusive.* Again, a presumption all but conclu- 
 sive is ral^> ' against any vessel which has boer. r-aptured while 
 entering a blockailcd port ; and the ovvujt can protect the shiit 
 frr,ns l.".>iiig condonumd as lawful prize only by establishing u 
 justificntiim on the groiind of imperative iiecessity." It is, n>ore- 
 over, alKO priinii facie prfsumed that the owners of a cargo foun<l 
 on board a ship, which is condennicd for blockade-running, were 
 privy to the intention of violating a blockade, and their only escape 
 from this pn^sumptiim is their Iwing able to prove that, at the time 
 wlun the shipinc! t was made, they could not have known that the 
 blockade had been imposed.' 
 
 § H^H.* In all cases of ooutrlusive presunsptlon, the rule of law 
 mert'ly attaches wself to the cin-uinst^inueH wh.-n proved ; it is not 
 deduced frojK Miera. It is not a rule of inlVronre from testimony, 
 but a :'.!;•- of jTotectioa, which is held to be expedient for the 
 
 ' St. (l'M.rr* ■ '^t. M ;rfr«rot, 17!)«; 
 Ilnthi'vin;; i /U t>. iloti-t*)' ^ton, ISH". 
 Ill Hiic'h i'rti»«)», H" :.-u" ■'!« is pro- 
 iuiiuiil. 
 
 ' (Jr. Kv, § v., in j>wt. 
 
 * Tbu Atuluittu. \6iM. 
 
 « The Iliiiitor, 181.^ (Sir W. Scott). 
 » Tiio I'i/urni. IN17 (Am,); Tho 
 
 liuiifi-r. iNi.-i. Sft. |Mist. J no. 
 
 * l«altii/,/i r. Kyilor, 1«4H. 
 ' 1(1. 
 
 * (ir. Ev. i d'i, almoitt vtiib»tuia. 
 
 1U2 
 
CTIAP. v.] DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS. 
 
 general good. It is not, for example, assumed that all landlords 
 liave good titles; but it is held that it will bo a public incon- 
 venionuH to suffer tenants to disjuite them. Neither is it assimiod 
 that all averments and recitals in deeds and records are true ; but 
 it is held that it will be mischievous if parties are permitted to deny 
 them. It is not ossumed that all simple contract debts, of six 
 years' standing, are paid, nor that every man quietly ooeujiying 
 land twenty years as his own has a valid title by grant ; but it is 
 desmetl expedient that claims ojiposed by such evidence as the 
 Icpso of thos" periodH affords, should not be coimtonaiiced, and that 
 society is more benefited by a refusal to entertain such claims than 
 by siit^'oring thuiii to be made good by proof. In fine, the law does 
 not assimie the impoesibility ol things whijh f.'e jiossible ; but the 
 pri'sumptitm of Itnv is for.ii led, not only cm the jwHsibility of their 
 uxistence, but on their fjccjiusionnl occuiTonw); and it is against the 
 miBcliiefs of fheir ocijurrence th.it it interposes its protecting prohi- 
 bition ' 
 
 S 109 — 110.' We now come to the urmmf class, into which are 
 divided presumptions of law,' These are what arc ternujd i/i.s/)ii/- 
 ■ihlc }itrmoiij)fioii'>, and answer to the f)y(vsiinif,t.iniv>i Jiini of the 
 Roman law. Presumptions of this class may always be overcfuue 
 by opiKtsing proof.* These disputable pnnjumptifmn of law are, 
 like wiir/iiHin' f)resumpti))i)s, the result of the general experience of 
 a connection between certain facts or things, the one b(nng iisuaUy 
 found to be the companion, or the effect, of the other, Wlasre 
 disputable presum)>tioiis arise, however, the connexion is not so 
 intimate, or so imiform, that it (lan be concltisively presumed to 
 exist in every case ; yet it is so general, that th«' law itself, with- 
 out the aid of a jury, in the absence of all (-pposing evidence, infers 
 the one fasi from the proved existence of the other, .In this mode 
 f/it' fair — even in the ulwence of any (Hrrrcflpoi'.iHng allegation in (he 
 pleading-^ — deliium the natort* and amount of tlie evidence wl'.ich is 
 BulHcieut to eslablish a primA faei(< case, mid to throw the burthen 
 of pr(K)f on the othei' party ; and Mxyt- thai in such casos, if no 
 opposing evidence is offered, lh»i jury are bound to find iu favour 
 
 » S«o tt Lii» M111.C. :148. .l.W, .'Wfl. » Ileit). imI Pftiid. P. iv. ( 121 
 
 » Or. Kv. § ;«;». ia gnul i^mI. » U. S, (\ 1H,n,{, Ord. XlX. 
 
 » H<Mi supru, § 70. fitwl jMwt. 5 .3(>«, a. 
 
 II 
 
 r. 20, 
 
11 
 
 
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 _ 
 
 Hi 
 
 ll 
 
 1 
 
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 11 
 
 1 
 
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 1 
 
 H 
 
 j; : i 
 
 m 
 
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 9B 
 
 , !: ! 
 
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 i 
 
 I'Kr.Hl'Ml'TIONS OF LAW AND OF FACT. 
 
 [I'AKT I. 
 
 of the pre8uin|iti()n, and tlmt u contrary vordiot may bo set aHidn as 
 being against ovidfuicu. 
 
 § 111. Disputable prosumittioiis of law dilfur from more pro- 
 sumptions of faut in thruu i!iipf)rtant particulars. In tho (irst 
 place, the judge is bound to explain to the jury whatev(tr Ic^al 
 presumptions arise frcra the factg proved ; ' next, the jury are 
 bound to give full weight to the presumptions so explained ; and 
 lastly, the court ulone, without the intervention of tho jury, nuiy 
 draw ine proper legal inferences, whenever the retpiisite iactn are 
 developed in the pleadings.* In practice, however, the distinotion 
 between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact is by no 
 means well d(>tincd, and the lino of demarcation, oven when visible 
 at all, is oft' n overlooked.* A presumption which is regarded by 
 some judges r.n one of law, it treated by otluus as one of !avt', 
 nay, the same judges place the same presumption at different 
 tinjes in dilftrent classes. Tho following remarks principally 
 apply to disput^ible presumptions of law, but tiiey will bo ouca- 
 eionally found to extend to cogent presumi)tions of fact. 
 
 i 112. One of the most im]iortant of disputable legal jiresurnp- 
 tions is that of iiiiwiriic: This, in legal phraseology, " gives the 
 bont^fit of a doubt to the accused," and is so cogent, that it cannot 
 be rep(«lled by any evidenite short of what is sullieient to estabjisli 
 the fact of criminality with moral certainty.* In civil (Usputes, 
 when no violation of the law is in question, and no le^^al pre- 
 sumption operates in favour of either party, tint , )reponderari(:(T .u 
 j)rf>babiiflv, due regard being had to tho burthen of proof, may 
 oonstitute sullicic^nt ground for a verdict.'' To allix oi» any person 
 the stigma ol" crime requires, however, a higher degree of assurancft ; 
 an<l juries will not be justified in taking sui^h a siep, except <>u 
 evitlence which excludes from their minds all reasonabli* d<)iiltl." 
 It has sometimes been said, that the presumption in (juestion is 
 oonfined to tho criminal ci>urts, and is adopte<i there specially in 
 favour of life and liberty, and as a safeguard against error in 
 
 ' Ante. § 2.5. • St. Ev. HI 8. 4th od. ; 1 Or. Ev. 
 
 * U.mt, Ev. UH, JOS. §lMii; Ht'st. Hv. I'JO; ('..(.iter r. .Hliwla, 
 
 • H.mt, Ev. 4-'». IN.'iH, II. I.. (Will.m, J,). 
 
 ♦ St. Ev. H17, N(i.). Ith 0(1. ; 1 Or. • St. Ev. 617, BOJ, 4th «d.. liwt, 
 Kv. § 13 u ; 11. V. WliiU), 18(i6 (M.irtiu, Ev. 12U. 
 
 B.). 
 
 104 
 
CHAP, v.] PRK8UMPTI0N OF INNOCKNCB. 
 
 oonviotions which are not open to rovwion.' But it rosta on a 
 broader biwis. Tho right which every iniui has to his ehiiraoter, 
 tile value of that eharuuter to hinisitlf uidI his fiiniily, and the evil 
 eouso(|uence8 that wouhl result to society if charges of guilt were 
 lightly entertained, or readily established in courts of justi(!o:^ 
 these are the real considerations which have led to the adoption of 
 the rule that all imputations of crime nmst be strictly proved. 
 The rule, accordingly, is recognised alike by all tribunals, whether 
 civil or criminal, and in all proceedings, whether tho (juestion of 
 guilt be directly or incidentally raised.^ For example, in an 
 action against an insurance company to recover a loss by fire, and 
 where the defence is that the plaintiff wilfully burnt down the 
 jirciaises, the jury, before finding u verdict agiiinst the plaintiff, 
 must be eutisfied that the act imputed to him hll-^ been proved by 
 clear evidence, so clear as to justify a conviction f(jr arson ;' and, 
 in gt;neral, whether the question arises in a prosecution for it, or 
 in u civil court, forgery or bigamy nmst simihirly be citablislicd 
 by the same s'.riot evidence.* 
 
 Sll'J.* ^o strong is the jtresumptiitn of iii;iorrn<r, that even 
 where guilt can be established only by pntving a negative, tliat 
 ncgativ(t must, in most cases (unless indfcd a special Matufe bo 
 applicable"), be proved, though lis a g«'iieral rule the b\ii'tlien of 
 proof lies on the party alleging the allirmative. For instance, a 
 lilaintiir who complained that the cinirterer of a ship had put on 
 board un article highly inllammable aixl dangeyous, itiHiont ijiriny 
 iiutiir of its nature to tin* master in cliaigc, was held boumi to 
 prove this negative averment.' 
 
 8 114." tiuchtions of nicety arise where the presumption of 
 
 ' MiipMM'. >rark, tsdO (lr.)(l'ij;.it, 
 (Ml.); lic.Ht,, Kv. I'JO; 1 Ur. Kv. 
 ji i:iu. 
 
 '' It.'.st, F,v. HT. 
 
 » Tliml.'ll r. Itriiimiunt, lK'j;i. 
 
 * C'lmliiHTM c. Slmrkfll, \K\\ (Tiii- 
 diil. <'.J.); Willinctt r. liiiniiiT, 
 
 IS.'tO (l.il. Ut'lillliUl). Sim, uUii, 
 
 N.ilfj- r. i^K'k. lN;m ('I'iiiiliil, c.J.); 
 .Miip>o r. Murk, 1«(U» (Ir.) (Kitz- 
 K'Tal'l, I'-.). 
 
 • Ur. liv. § 3,"», Ju \Mxi. 
 
 • S.M. |).>Ht. § Mi. 
 
 ' WillmiiiK ,'. ]•;. Iii.l. Co., 1802. 
 Sii of ulli'K'iti<in?> that u |>iivty hud not 
 taki'ii th)'.Si<'iuiiii'iit : 11. c. Iliiwkiii.'i, 
 I.SO.S; III' Iia«l tint i'i>lii|ilii'<l with tllO 
 Art iif IJnil'orniity, iVr. : I'nwtill c. 
 .Milliiini, 177'J; or that f;ii<>ilM wuro 
 imt h'pilly iiii]iiirtuil : Sismins v, 
 l*i.viiii, IN'JO ; or that li thuutru wits 
 lint 'liily lirt'iiMiiil : Uodwtill v. Uudgu, 
 IM.'I. Sill piiMt, § ;t71. 
 
 * Ur. Ev. \ 36, iu part. 
 
 106 
 
IJ 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 I's 
 
 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. 
 
 [fart I. 
 
 innocence is met hy snnjo oountor iiroHumption.' For example, 
 whoi-o a woman, lw<!lvti months aftur Ikt Imsband (ii soldier on 
 fonngn Horvice) was last heanl of, married a second huHband, on a 
 question uh to tlm settlement of the children by the 8«»cond 
 husbuiid, it was held that it might be presumed that the first 
 husband was diuid at the time of the second marriage, though the 
 presumption of the ctmtinuance of life would have prevailed had it 
 not been disphuicd by the stronger l(>gal i)r('sunjption of innocence;' 
 and on a trial for bigamy of a woman who had niarrieil again only 
 four years after separating from her first hutiband, it wbk held that 
 the l^nr could not premmie the continuance of the first husband's 
 life, but that it was a (juostion of fact for the jury whether he was 
 alive or dead at the date of the second marriage;' but where a 
 letter was jiroved to have been written by a wife from Van 
 Uienum's Land, dated only twenty-five days prior to second 
 marringe, it was held that it might be j)resumed that the husband 
 had lj«>en guilty of bigamy ;'* and on an indictment for manslaugliter 
 by driving a cab over a woman, the fact that the woman had been 
 killed was in itself regarded as suiHcient prinu\ fncie evidence of 
 negligcni e to rebut the presumption of innocence, and to ])lace upm 
 tlut driver the burthen of proving that he had exercised due care.* 
 S 11''). An excepti<m to the rule that innoctr.ce is to be presumed 
 on jtrincijiles of jiublic policy exihts in some ciu«m of agencty, both 
 in crituiiial ami civil cases." Thus, a contract baker may 1m) 
 convicted of selling unwholesome bread, if it appear that he has 
 uUowtMl his foreman to use a!um, though not in such (piantities 
 as to render the bread unwholesrune, but that the servant luis 
 introduced alum to a deleterious extent;' by the Pawnbrokers 
 Act, lH7'i, "anything done or omitted by the servant, apprcntiic, 
 
 • S«<i. MiililHon I'. Hiimod. 1H49; i-. Oriorunn, 1818, H. L. ; nnd thn 
 li, V. lti<i:iisi'ii, l8tiJ. lin-uiliilliaiiii ciihu, iMili, II. L., citiil 
 
 • K. i'. TwyiiiiiK, 1819. Siio H. v. jMist. § 17'.'. 
 
 Joni>H, |sh:{. 
 
 » H. r. i.miih'.v. I8m»; It. i-. Will- 
 Mhini, 18H1. Sco flirt luT, U. r. JdiicH, 
 I8li8; iiml Hf<>, its to the |)i'('HUiii])tiuii 
 of iif.'. §5 HIS '.'OH, jMwf. 
 
 « H. .. Ilinliorii.i, IHIJ,-); 1{. v. 
 Munsfiolil, 18-11. iSiio, uIbo, LiiiwUiy 
 
 » 1{. V. CavciKliKh. 1873 (If.). 
 
 • S'li jMiMt, 5§ !M».^, IMMl. Seo, iilwj, 
 ('....IMT (. .Shiili), 1857, II. L. (I.d. 
 Wi'iiMlrydalu). 
 
 ' U. r. Itixon. 18H. Hoo Att.- 
 Oeii. f. Hidilli', 1832; und Svurle v, 
 lUiynoldH, 1800. 
 
 106 
 
ClIAl'. v.] 
 
 Ph'KsUMrnON OF OlIILT. 
 
 ,•! 
 
 or npont of a juiwnbrnkor, in tlio courw) of or in roliition to the 
 liUHJut'SH," hIiiiU Imj (it>(*niu<l to lie tlont* or omitttxl by the pawn- 
 broker;' \]ui tlircctorH of ii giiH itonipany ore t>riminally auHweruhle 
 for an act done by tli«ir siiporintendont and onginwr, undor 
 II g*Mu>rul authority to niiuiago tho works, though luTHonuUy 
 ignorant of the particular plan adojitod, and though NUch plan waa 
 a dt'parturo from tlio original and understood mulluMl, which the 
 dirt'i'tors had no roa»on to suppow) waH di.H('ontinu(Hl ;'' and the Halo 
 of a libel* in a bookseller's shop by his servant in the ordinary 
 coiirKi nf his eniph)ynient, is evidence of a ;.'uiUy publication by 
 the master. Hut this prestimption is never roiw/usiir against tho 
 niaster. Inde(Hl, on indictments for HIk*!, it is especially pmviiled 
 that the niaster, under '• not guilty," may prove that the publica- 
 tion was in fact made *' withotit his authority, concent, or know- 
 li'tlge," and that there was "no want of care or caution on his 
 jiart."* Himilar principles apply not only to publishers of news- 
 jtapirs,* but to owners of alkali works." 
 
 i 115a. In spite of the usual presumption of innocence, it must, 
 too, be presumed on a jirosecution under the rrevention of 
 Cruelty to Chihlren Act, 1S!»4, that the chihl, who is the subject 
 of the cliarge, is of the age which it is charged as being and 
 apparently is.' 
 
 S IK).* Moreover, tho presumption of innocence may be over- 
 thrown, and a prrsiiniptioii of ;niilt lUi raised, by the miseonducit of 
 the party in suppressing or tl-strui/imj cridiucv^ whi<'h he ought to 
 jiroduce, or to which the other party is cntithHl." For example, 
 
 ' ;t5 & ;m V. c. 9:j, § 8. 
 
 » 11. 1'. MfilUiy, 1H.J4 (1,(1. Don- 
 iiuili), S<'(', iilmt, It. I'. Sti'itlu'iiH, 
 ISliti; MiilliiiH 1. ColliiiH, 1H74 ; uiul 
 \Minv, ])« Vitit-, imm {\a\. (')>oliii8- 
 f<inl, C); iiiitl I)i<^kiiiH<in v. Fli'tclior, 
 1M74; Soiii.'im-t r. llillt, 1 HH» ; dig. 
 tiii);uiHli('(l Hdjul V. Kvaii-«, \HHx. 
 
 •* <ir. \',\. § ;K}, in |mrt. 
 
 ♦ <l& 7 V. c. imC'Th.. LiWl Act, 
 • '^••IJ")i§ 7. Ak t' tho law Intforo 
 thr Htiit., WH1 1 ItiiMs. ('. * M. 'lf>\ ; K. 
 '■. (hitch, 1H'J!»; IliiriliiiK »'. (Jnion- 
 ia^, 1"»I7 ; 11. >■. .Vlmoii, 1770. 
 
 • I UuNH. I". & M. -J.^l ; (i A 7 V. 
 ■••. im ("Tlio Libtsl Act, lS-13"), S 7; 
 
 J 
 
 R. I'. Ilolbrook, 1878 ; on wcond 
 tl-ial, 1N7H; It. I'. HuniHfV, IN84. 
 
 • U A \!> V. c. ;J7 (" Thl' Alkali. &o. 
 WorkM Uc>{iihtti(in Act. INN I "j, § 25, 
 uir-iiildil t>v .M & M \. c. 30. 
 
 .•)7 * .)N V. c. 41, § 17. 
 
 • (ir. I'lv. § 37, in ;;ii'uf part. 
 
 • For iiiHtani'u, foiiin'ily, by 21 
 J. 1, 0. 27 ^|ii'<i)iahly ('ii|iii'(l from a 
 Hiinilar edict <if Hen. II. of i'^rancn, 
 ('it)-(i hy Donia't), X\w ni<ith<<r of iiu 
 illi'^itiiiiati) (')til(I wlio (•iiih'avounol 
 Iirivatt'ly, i-itlior liy (liowiiin);, or 
 M'crut buryiiijf, or by uny •)tlier way, 
 to concH'ul itM deatli, wan )>r(mui)i<t(l 
 to havu niurdurcU it, uiiIumm hLu uuuld 
 
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 SUPPRESSING OR DESTROYING EVIDENCE. [PART I. 
 
 the spoliation of papers, material to show the neutral character of 
 a vessel; furnishes, as before pointed out'), a strong presumption, 
 in odium spo/iatoris, against the ship's neutrality f if any person on 
 board a vessel, which is being chased by an officer of the preven- 
 tive service, throw overboard, stave, or destroy any part of the 
 lading, the vessel is forfeited, because such conduct raises an almost 
 irresistible presumption that the freight so made away with was 
 legally liable to seizure f the concealment on board a vessel of any 
 goods liable to duly, justifies the inference that the owner intended 
 to defraud the customs, and such goods will accordingly be for- 
 feited;^ a presumption that they are adverse to him is raised 
 against a party, who, having obtained possession of papers from 
 a witness, after the service of a subpoena duces tecum upon the 
 latter, withholds them at the trial.^ Indeed, the general rule is 
 " ohinia pnetsioniinfur contra Kpoiintorctn"'^ whose conduct is attri- 
 buted to a supposed consciousness that the truth would operate 
 against him. Thus, to take a familiar example, wl.ere the finder 
 of a jewel Avould not produce it, the jury, uuvler tlie judge's direc- 
 tion, presumed against him that it was of the highest value of its 
 kind.' But in an action for goods sold against a defendant who 
 has been guilty of no fraud or improper conduct, in the absence of 
 evidence of the quality of the goods which were delivered, the pre- 
 sumption is that such goods were goods of the cheapest description." 
 § 117." But the mere fabrication of evidence does not of itself 
 furnish any presumption of lair against the innocence of the party, 
 but is a niotter to be dealt with by the jury. Innocent jiersons, 
 under the influence of terror, have soiujtiraes been k'd to the simula- 
 tion of exculpatory facts, of which there are several instances in tlie 
 
 prove by one witness' at the least that 
 th(3 child was born dead. Thin bar- 
 barous rule is now reseindod both in 
 England and Ameriea. See, as to 
 
 f resent English law, '2-i & '2') V. c. 100 
 'The Offences against the Person 
 Act, 1801 "), § 00. 
 
 ' Sui)ra, § 107. 
 
 » The Iliinter, ISl-J; The Pizarro, 
 lH2T(Ain.). 
 
 3 Sec »9 & 40 V. c. HO (" The Cus- 
 toms Consolidation Act, 1M70"), § 180. 
 
 * See ;19 & 40 V. c. HO, § 177. 
 
 » Leeds v. Cook, 180;i. 
 
 « 2 Poth. Obi. 292 ; Dalston >: 
 Coatsworth, 1721 ; r'()W])er v. LI. 
 Cowper, 17.'U; It. r. Arundel, 17^1; 
 I), of Xewcastlo r. Kinderley, IHO.'J; 
 Gray r. llaig, IH.Jo ; Annesley /•. E. 
 of Anglesea, 174U (Ir.). See, also, 
 Sir S. lloniilly's argument in Ld. 
 Melville's case, IStHi; Anon., 1098. 
 In IJaker /'. Ray, 1820. the L. C. 
 tliougiit that this rule had in some 
 casi's been ])res8ed a little too far. 
 
 ' Armory v. ])(dainirie, 1721. 
 
 Cluniies r. I'ez/ey, 1807. 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 37, as to first six liucs. 
 
 108 
 
r. v.] FAISRICATIOX AND XON-PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 bofiks.' ]\[oroover, the exercise by a client of liis unJoubterl 
 riglit to prevent his sohcitor from diselusiiig coiiri(hntial coin- 
 municatious, forms no just ground for adverse presumption against 
 liim.^ The non-production of deeds or papers, after notice, has, 
 in general, only the effect of admitting the other party to prove 
 their contents by parol,* and, as against the party refusing to 
 produce them, to raise a prima facie presumption that they have 
 been properly stamped.'' Nevertheless, such conduct is, in the 
 absence of excuse, calculated to produce a very prejudicial effniit in 
 the minds of the jury against tlie pr-rson having recourse to it ; ■' 
 and if the production of his papers would establish the guilt or 
 innocence of a person charged with fraud or misconduct, the jury 
 will be amply justified in presuming him guilty from the unex- 
 plained fact of their non-production.® Indeed, jurors will always 
 do well to regard with suspicion the conduct of a party, who, 
 having it in his power to produce cogent evidence in support of his 
 case, offers testimony of a weaker and less satisfactory character. ' 
 
 § 118^ Though the general presumption of law is in favour of 
 innocence, yet, as men seldom do unlawful acts with innocent 
 intentions, the law presumes that every act, which in itself is 
 unlawful, has been wrongfully intended, till the contrary appears.' 
 Tims, on a charge of murder, malice is presumed from the fact of 
 killing, unaccompanied by circumstances of extenuation ; and the 
 burthen of disproving the malice is thrown upon the accused ; '" and 
 if an unauthorised party, to raise money, puts the name of another 
 person to a bill, a felonious intent will be presumed, unless the 
 accused show reasonable grounds for believing that he was autho- 
 
 
 72 1; 
 iiso:}; 
 
 !•;. 
 
 also, 
 
 Ld. 
 
 1()98. 
 
 ('. 
 
 ■loine 
 
 ' See 3 Inst. 232 ; Wik. Circ. Ev. 
 154. 
 
 2 Wontworth v. Lloyd, 1864, H. L. 
 (Ld. (.'luslmaford]. 
 
 = Cooper V. Gibbons, 1813. 
 
 * Crisp V. Anderson, 1815. See 
 § 148, post. 
 
 » See Koe v. Ilarvey, 1769 (Ld. 
 Mansfield) ; Bate v. Kinsey, 1835 
 (Ld. Lyndlmrst) ; Sutton v. Devon - 
 poit, 1858 ; Edmonds v. Foster, 
 1N76, 
 
 • Clifton r.U. S., 1846 (Am.). 
 
 ' See N. Y. Civ. Code, J 1852, 
 arts. 6 &ud 7. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 34, as to first seven 
 linos. 
 
 " "Whore an act, in itself in- 
 difft-reiit, if done with a particular' 
 intent becomes criminal, there the 
 intont must bo proved and found ; 
 but where the act is in itself unlaw- 
 ful, the proof of justificaticm or ex- 
 cuse lies on the defendant ; and in 
 failure thereof, the law implies a 
 criminal intont." R. v. Woodfall, 
 1770 (Ld. Mansfield). See also R. v. 
 Harvey, 1827 ; R. v. Wallace, 1853 
 (Ir.); and R. v. Creovey, 1813. 
 
 '« Fost. C. L. 26o. 
 
 109 
 
 I I 
 
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 UNLAWFUL INTENT WHEN NOT PRESUMED. [PART I. 
 
 rised to act as he did, and acted on that helief.^ A similar pre- 
 sumption arises in civil actions, where the act complained of is 
 unlawful. Thus, on the one hand, where the act was primS. facie 
 unlawful, malice in law is presumed. For instance, in actions of 
 slander, though it appear that the defendant was not actuated hy 
 iU-will against the plaintiff, malice in law will usually he inferred 
 from the fact of intentional puhlication.'^ And in other actions for 
 damages founded on wrongs, as for a malicious arrest, a malicious 
 prosecution, and the like, the fact that the defendant has had 
 recourse to legal proceedings raises a prima facie inference in his 
 favour, which the plaintiff is bound to rebut by proving the absence 
 of all reasonable and probable cause,' and the presence of an actual 
 malicious intent.* On the other hand, where the act was prima 
 facie la II fill, and an action cannot be maintained in respect of 
 it except on proof of " malice," malice in law will not be implied, 
 but it is necessary that actual malice be proved. If, therefore. 
 
 » R. V. Beard, 1837 (Coleridge, J.). 
 
 ' Bromage v. Pressor, 1825, where 
 Bayley, J., as to iinpled (or legal) 
 malice (as distinguished from malice 
 in fact), says : " Malice, in the 
 common acceptation, means ill-will 
 against a person ; but in its legal 
 sense it moans a wrongful act, done 
 intentionally, without just cause or 
 excuse. If I give a perfect stranger 
 a blow likely to produce death, I do 
 it of malice, because I do it inten- 
 tionally, and without just cause or 
 excuse. If I maim cattle, without 
 knowing whose they are ; if I poison 
 n fishery, withoiit knowing the 
 owner, I do it of malice, because it 
 is a wTongful act, and done inten- 
 tionally. • * * If I traduce a man, 
 whether I know him or not, and 
 whether 1 intend to do him an injury 
 or not, I apprehend the law considers 
 it as done of malice, because it is 
 wrongful and intentional . It equally 
 works an injury, whether I mean to 
 
 Eroduce an injury or not, and if I 
 ad no legal excuse for the slander, 
 why is he not to have a remedy 
 agaiufit mo for the injury it pro- 
 duces? And I apprehend the law 
 recognises the distinction between 
 these two desrnptions of malice, 
 malice in fact, and malice in law, in 
 
 actions of slander. In an ordinary 
 action for words, it is sufficient to 
 charge that the defendant spoke them 
 falsely ; it is not necessary U) ptate 
 that they wore spoken maliciously. 
 This is so laid down in Sty. 392, and 
 was adjudged upon error in Mercer 
 i;. 8parkes, loS6. The objection there 
 was, that the words were not charged 
 to have been spoken maliciously, but 
 the court answered, that the words 
 were themselves malicious and slan- 
 derous, and, therefore, the judgment 
 was affirmed. But in actions for 
 such slander as is prima facie ex- 
 cusable on account of the cause of 
 speaking or writing it, as in the car.o 
 of servants' characters, confidential 
 advice, or communications to persons 
 who ask it, or have a right to expect 
 it, malice in fact n.ust l)o proved liy 
 the plaintiff, and in Kdmonson r. 
 Stevbuson, 1705, Ld. Mansfield takes 
 the distinction between those and 
 ordinary actions of shinder." 
 
 » Abrath v. North East Ry. Co., 
 188(3. II. L. See, also, Davidson v, 
 Smvth, 1887 (Ir.). 
 
 ''Mitchell V. Jenkins, 1833 ; Portor 
 t). Weston, 1839; Johnstone r. Sutton, 
 178(5. The jury may, but ore not 
 bound, to infer malice in fact from 
 the want of probable cauee. Id. 
 
 110 
 
 it 
 
CHAP, v.] BOUNDARIES — RIPARIAN OWNERSHIP. 
 
 defamatory language was used upon a privileged occasion, the 
 plaintiff must establish actual malice,^ and in order to do thisy 
 must, either by extrinsic or by intrinsic evidence,* prove facts which 
 are inconsistent with bona fides.' The occasion being lawful, the 
 prima facie legal presumption, which exists till it is displaced by 
 actual evidence, is that the speaker was actuated by proper 
 motives.* 
 
 § 119. Some presumptions also exist with respect to the owner- 
 ship of property. Thus, with regard to boundaries of property,"* 
 where two counties or parishes are separated by a non-tidaP river, 
 the mid-stream is the presumptive boundary between them ;' the 
 owner of a several fishery is, when the terms of the grant are un- 
 known, presumed to be the owner of the soil ;' the soil of unnavig- 
 able rivers, usque ad medium filum aquae, together with the right 
 of fishing, — but not the right of abridging the width, or interfer- 
 ing with the course, of the stream,* — is presumed to belong to the 
 owner of the adjacent land;'" and, in navigable rivers and ai-ms of 
 the sea, the soil is prima facie vested in the Crown, and the fishery 
 is prima facie public.'' These presumptions as to riparian owner- 
 ship in streams, do not, however, apply to great non-tidal inland 
 lakes, whether navigable or not.'* But somewhat similar presump- 
 tions are recognised in respect of the sea-shore. Land there which 
 
 ' Clark V. Molj-noux, 1877, C. A. 
 
 ' Cooke V. Wildes, I80G. 
 
 » Too-ood V. Spyring, 1834; Whit- 
 aeld V. South East Ry. Co., I.S08; 
 Coxhoad v. Richards, 184() ; Spill v. 
 Maule, 18G9 ; Wright v. Woodgato, 
 1815 j; Taylor y. Hawkins, 1851 ; Gil- 
 pin V. Fowler, 1854 ; Somorville v. 
 Hawkins, 1851 ; Harris v. Thompson, 
 1853; R.v. Wallace, 1853 (Ir.). In an 
 action for alleged libel contained in 
 an answer to inquiries respecting a 
 servant's character, the jury may find 
 express malice from the simple fact 
 that the answer complained of was 
 untrue to defendant's knowledge. 
 Fountain v. Boodle. 1842. 
 
 * Note h to Hodgson v, Scarlett, 
 1818 ; approved of by Aldereon, B., 
 in Gibbs v. Pike, 1842. 
 
 • As to bonndarios of counties, &c.. 
 
 in Ireliind, see 35 & 36 V. c. 48 ("The 
 County Jjoiiudarios (Iro'uiid) Act, 
 
 1872"), §§ 2, 3, 4, cited post, § 1771. 
 
 * Bridgwater Trust v. Bootle-cum- 
 Linacre, 186(5. 
 
 ' R. V. Landulph, 1834 (Pattoson, 
 J.); M'Cannon v. Sinclair, 1859; 
 R. ;•. Strand Board of Works, 1864. 
 
 » D. of Somerset v. Fogwell, 1826; 
 Holford V. Bailey, 1850 (in error) ; 
 Marshall v. The UUoswator St. 
 Navig. Co., 1863. But see observa- 
 tions, contra, by Cockburn, C.J., in 
 S. C, at pp. 747 — 74i) ; also, Bloom- 
 tield V. Wharton, 1867 (Ir.). 
 
 • Bickott V. Morris, 1866, H. L. 
 
 >» Carter f. Murcot, 1768; Wishart 
 V. Wyllie, 1853 ; Lord v. Commiss. 
 for City of Sydney, 1859; Crossley 
 V. Lightowler, 1867 ; Dwyer v. Rich, 
 1871 (Ir.). 
 
 " Carter v, Murcot, 1768; 
 comson v. O'Dea, 1862, H. L. 
 
 " Bloomfield v. Wharton, 
 
 Mai- 
 
 186T 
 
 (Ir.); Bristow y.Cormican,1878,H.L. 
 
 ill 
 
 ' : .i 
 
 y 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 H 1 
 
 ■! lii 
 
 i 
 
III 
 
 I 
 
 PRESUMPTION'S RESPECTING BOUNDARIES. [PART I. 
 
 is covered by the ordinary high water, — or, to speak more accurately, 
 by the medium high tide between the spring and the neap,- — is 
 presumed prima facie to be the property of the Crown, tho'igh by 
 grant or prescription it may belong to the lord of the manor, or to 
 any other subject ; ^ while that which is overflowed only at spring 
 tide, is presumed to be vested in the proprietor of the adjoining 
 lands;* land between higli and low water mark, though forming 
 part of the body of the adjoining county,'' is prima facie presumed 
 to be extra-parochial.* Similarly, waste land on the sides, and the 
 soil to the middle, of a highway, are, in the absence of evidence to 
 the contrary, presumed to belong to the owner of the adjoining 
 inclosed land, whether he be a freeholder, leaseholder, or copy- 
 holder." This latter presumption is founded on a supposition that 
 the proprietor of the adjoining land, at some former period, gave 
 up to the public for passage all the land, between his inclosure and 
 the middle of the road,' and is, consequently, liable to be rebutted 
 by showing that the road has never in fact been dedicated to the 
 public at all,* or that it was originally dedicated by some other 
 party,' or that the lord of the manor, or even that a stranger, has 
 exercised acts of ownership, either over the spot in dispute, or over 
 other waste land in immediate connection with it.'" The presump- 
 tion just mentioned as usually prevailing in the case of a public 
 liighway, also obtains in the case of a private occupation road 
 running between two properties. In the absence of all evidence 
 of acts of ownership, in such a case each owner will be presumed 
 to be *.V(e proprietor of the soil usque ad medium filum viae.'' And 
 
 ' Att.-Gon. V. Chambers, I81J4. 
 
 * lUiiiidoll V. Cattorall, 1821 (IIol- 
 r<)y(l,J.,Bayley,J.); Lopez ('.Andrew, 
 1«2«, Calmady t'. Eowe, 1848. See 
 post, §§130, 131. 
 
 ^ Lowe I'. Govett, 1832. 
 
 * Embleton v. Brown, 1860. 
 
 * R, V. MusHon, 1858; Waterloo 
 Bridge Co. v. Cull, 1859 (Ld. Camp- 
 Lell). This presumption applies not 
 only to the main seashore, but also 
 to an estuary or arm of the sea : 
 Ipswich Dock CJommrs. v. 8t. Peter, 
 Ipswich, 18(j7 ; and to the shore of a 
 tidal river : Bridgwater Trust v. 
 Bootlo-oum-Linacre, 1867. 
 
 * Doe V. Peareey, 1827 ; Steel v. 
 
 Pwckott, 1819 (Abbott, C.J.); Cooke 
 V. Greeu, 1823 ; Scoonos v. Morrell, 
 1839 ; M. of Salis^bury v. Gt. N. Ey. 
 Co., 1858; Simpson v. Dendy, 1860; 
 Berridge v. Ward, 1861 ; 11. v. Strand 
 Board of Works, 1864. See Gery v. 
 Redman, 1875. 
 
 ' Doe y. Pearsey, 1827(Bayley,J.). 
 
 » Leigh V. Jack, 1879, C. A. 
 
 » Iloudlam v. Ueadloy, 1810 (Bay- 
 ley, J.). 
 
 "* Doe V. Kemp, 1835 ; Grose v. 
 West, 1816; Anon., 1773; Doe v. 
 Kemp, li!31 ; Doe v. Hampson, 1847; 
 Beckett v. Corporation of Leeds, 1871 
 (L.JJ.; 
 
 " Hc^jnes v. Bellingham, ]8o9. 
 
 112 
 
CHAP, v.] lilGHT OF OWNKRS OF ADJOINING LAN'1)8. 
 
 the mere fact that the owner of a field has a private ri'glit of way 
 over a lane leading only to that field, affords no presumption that 
 the soil of the lane is vested in him.' Indeed, as to roads set out 
 under the first general Inolosure Act, the presumption that " tlie 
 herhage and grass arising therefrom" belongs to the proprietors of 
 the adjoining lands is conclusive.^ As to roads madt^ under the 
 later Act of William the Fourth, the commissioners are directed to 
 award " the grass and herbage growing and renewing upon " them 
 to such persons as in their judgment are best entitled to the same.^ 
 l?ut as both Acts are silent respecting the ownership of the .vo//, it 
 seems that no legal presumption as to that can, under either Act, 
 arise in favour of the proprietors of the neighbouring allotments.* 
 
 § 120. Further i)resumptions of law with regard to boundaries 
 are as follows. Where fields belonging to different owners are 
 separated by a hedge and ditch, the hedge prima facie belongs to 
 tlie owner of the field in which the ditch is not.^ Tlie common 
 user of a wall separating lauds or houses which belong to different 
 proprietors, is prima facie evidence that the wall, and the land on 
 which it stands, belong to them in equal moieties as teiumts in 
 common." But this presumption may be rebutted by showing 
 that the wall in fact stands on land, parts of which were separately 
 contributed by each proprietor.' There is* a distinotion between 
 a bank and a wall ; the former, being made of earth taken from 
 the adjacent soil, is presumed to belong to the party whose land 
 iidjoins thereto ; the latter, being built of materials brought from a 
 distance, is prima facie the property of the person who is bound to 
 repair it. Where a tree grows on the boundary of two ficilds, 
 so that the roots extend into the soil of each, the property in the 
 
 ■i i\ 
 
 % 
 
 \v. 
 
 \m 
 
 » Smith V. Ilowdon, 1803. 
 
 » 41 (>. 3, V. 10!), ^ 11 ("Tho In- 
 cliwuro (Consolidiitidii) Art, 1801 "). 
 
 M)&7 W. 4, (3. Ua, §'J}). 
 
 ■• II. V. llattiold, 18;5.j (Ld. Don- 
 niiui) ; R. ('. Edmonton, 1831 (Ld. 
 Tontordon). 
 
 •■* (luy V. Wo.st, 1808 (Bayley, J.). 
 Whoi't' thoro ai'o two ditchos, ono on 
 oach side of tlio hedge, no i)i'(!S(inip- 
 tion arisea, and tho ownership of the 
 hedge depends iipon evidence : see 
 id. In Franco, boundary hedges 
 
 and tho trees in tliom are declared to 
 bo common property, " mitoyens," 
 exceijt in certain cases ; Code Civ., 
 Arts. ()T(), G73. 
 
 « Cnbitt V. Porter, 1828; Wiltsln're 
 V. Sidford, 182" ; Watson v. Grav, 
 1880 (Fry, J.). 
 
 ' Matts )\ Hawkins. 1813; Mmly 
 V. M'Dormott, 1838. 
 
 8 I), of Newcastle v. Clark, 1818 
 (Park, J.); Calhs on Sowers, p. 74, 
 4th ed. 
 
 T. — vol,. 1. 
 
 113 
 
 
mm 
 
 r.i : 1 
 
 ADJOINING OWNERS — SURFACE OWNERS. [PAKT I. 
 
 tree is presumed to belong to the owner of that land in which it 
 ■was first sown or planted.^ 
 
 § 121. The following disputable presumptions arise when the 
 surface and the property lying beneath it are vested in different 
 owners. In the case of land, if the surface and the subja' ^nt 
 minerals are vested in different owners without any deeds * regu- 
 lating their respective rights, the law presumes that the owner of 
 the surface has a right to the -wpport of the minerals.' Similarly, 
 when a building is divided into different flats, the proprietor of 
 every upper story has a presumptive legal right, without any 
 express grant, or enjoyment for any given time, to the support of 
 each lower story, and the owner of each lower story is entitled to 
 the protection afforded by the upper rooms as a rocf or covering 
 for his dwelling.* When two adjoiviing closes, or two ancient 
 buildings,* respectively belong to different persons, the owner of 
 the one is presumed to have a limited right ^ to the lateral support 
 of the other.' This presumption of a right to support does not 
 extend to a c",se where, by the erection of modern buildings, an 
 additional weight has been put upon the land.^ Yet even here, if 
 the house has been built for more than twenty years, the law will 
 presume the grant of an easement entitling the grantor to have his 
 house supported by the soil of his neighbour's property if the 
 
 « Holder v. Coates, 1827 (Littlo- 
 dale, J.); Masters v. Pollie, 1620; 
 contra, Waterman v. Soper, 1697 — 
 1698; Anon., 1623. 
 
 * Where such deeds exist, see 
 Aspden i\ Sodden, 1875 ; Davis v. 
 Troharne, 1881, per Dom. Proc. 
 
 ' Iluiiiphries v. Brogdcn, 1848 ; 
 Smart v. Morton. 18 JJ; Harris v. 
 Rydinj;, 1839; Haines v. Eoberts, 
 1857 ; Rowbothani v. Wilson, 1861 
 (H. L.); Caledonian llv. Co. v. 
 Sprot, 1856 (H. L.). hee Elliot 
 V. The N. East. Ry. Co., 
 (H. L.); Brown v. Robins, 
 Fletcher v. Gt. W. Ry. Co., 
 Gt. W. Ry. Co. r. Bennett. 
 Pountney v. Clayton. 1883 (C 
 
 1863 
 1859; 
 1859 ; 
 1867; 
 
 A.); 
 
 Jeffries v. Williams, 1850; Rogers 
 V. Taylov, 1858 ; Eadon v. Jeff cock, 
 1872 ; Koxt v. Gill, 1872 ; Dugdale 
 V. Robertson, 1857. The right of 
 support is an ordinary right of pro- 
 
 perty incidental to all land, a id not 
 a right founded on any premimption 
 of a grant or an easement : Back- 
 house V. Bonomi, 1861 (II. L.). Also, 
 Wakefield v. I), of Buccleuch, 1.S66; 
 also. May. of Birmingham v. Allen, 
 1877 (C. A.); Dixon v. White, 1883 
 (H. li.). And every fresh subsidence 
 of a worked- out mine gives a now 
 cause of action : Mitchell v. Darley 
 Main Coal Co., 1886 (II. L.). 
 
 * Humphries v. Brogden, 1848; 
 Caledonian Ry. Co. v, Sprot, 1856 
 (H. L.). 
 
 * Leniaitre v, Davis, 1881 (Hall, 
 V.-C). 
 
 * See Smith v. Thackeray, 1866; 
 and Siddons v. Short, 1877. 
 
 " 2 Roll. Abr. 564, Trespass I., 
 pi. 1, cited in 12 Q. B. 74;). 
 
 * Murchie v. Black, 1865. 
 
 » Wyatt V. Harrison, 1832; Hide 
 w. Thornborough, 1846; Partridges. 
 
 114 
 
criAP. 
 
 v.] 
 
 LATERAL SUPPORT — WASTE LANDS. 
 
 easement has been enjoyed peaceably, openly, and without any 
 attempt at deception or concealment.' Where, too, a landowner, 
 having built two or more adjoining houses in such a way as to 
 require mutual support, or mutual drainage, afterwards parts 
 with them to different persons, either a grant or reservation will, 
 in g<^neral,* be presumed, entitling each owner to have his house 
 support'' a by,' or drained through,* the adjoining buildings. A 
 presumption, however, of a legal right for bowsprits to project 
 will not be made where a dock and a wharf belonging to the Fame 
 owner, a separate sale is made of the wharf after the bowsj)rits 
 of vessels in the dock had for some years usually projected over 
 a part of the wharl.* 
 
 § 122. With regard to manors, the following disputable pre- 
 sumptions exist. The lord of the manor is prima facie entitled to 
 all )raHte lands within the manor ; and it is not essentially necessary 
 that he sliould show acts of ownership upon them.* The lord, in 
 exercising his right as owner of the soil to take gravel, marl, loam, 
 or subsoil, so long as he can do it without injury to the commoners, 
 will be presumed not to have exceeded his limited powers, and if 
 they complain the tenants must adduce some evidence that he has 
 done so.' In the case of an " approvement " by him, however, the 
 presumption is against the lord, apparently on the ground that, as 
 he has made a grant over the whole waste, his right to inclose any 
 portion of it must be conditional on his establishing that sufficient 
 waste is left for the tenants to enjoy their rights of common.* 
 
 § 122a. When a tenant encroaches upon and incloses the waste 
 contiguous to his farm, he is presumed, in the absence of facts 
 proving a contrary intention, to have done it for the benefit of his 
 
 iHiil 
 
 )l». 
 
 Scott, 1838, all of which cases are 
 cominontcd on in Iliiniphries v. 
 Uiogden, 1848. See Hunt v. Poake, 
 18()0 (Am.) ; Jeffries v. Williams, 
 1850; Rogers z>. Taylor, ,?.J8. 
 
 ' Dalton V. Angus, 1881 (H. 
 See, also, Bell v. Love, 1884 (H. 
 
 * See Mui'chie v. Black, ISiio. 
 ' Eichards v. Rose, 1852. See 
 
 Solomon v. Vintners' Co., 1859, and 
 Kempston v. Butler, 1861 (Ir.). 
 
 * Pyer v. Carter, 1856 ; Hall v. 
 Lundi 1863. The authority of Pyer 
 
 y: 
 
 V. Carter has been denied by Ld. 
 Westbury, C, in Suffield v. Brown, 
 1864. See Pearson v. Spencer, 1863; 
 Wheeldon v. Burrows, 1878, C. A. ; 
 Polden V. Bastard, 1865; Watts v. 
 Kelson. 1870. 
 
 " Suffield V. Brown, 1864. 
 
 « Doe V. Williams, 1836 (Cole- 
 ridge, J.). 
 
 ' Hall V. Byron, 1876. 
 
 9 Id.; Arlettv. Ellis, 1827 (Bayley, 
 J.); Lascellea v. Ld. Onslow, 1877 
 (Lush, J.), 
 
 115 
 
 i2 
 
 

 i^ i 1 1 
 
 i I 
 
 
 pursirMPriox Ai;r>iN'r. fkom rosstissiox. [paut i. 
 
 liinillord.' This prosiiniption will bo rt'Of>p;iii«'(l evt-n though tl'r 
 lundd inolosod be tho property of a stranger;' ami will be much 
 strengthoned, if the landlord of the farm be also tho lord of the 
 waste.' 
 
 S JvJ3. A presumption of oinirr-s/iip in many cases arises from 
 pn-sNi's.sion, as men gen(>rally own the ])rf)perty they possess.* This 
 pre8uni[)tion arises under the Factors Act ;* under the Irisli, Scotch, 
 and English Acts relating to injuries done by dogs to sheep f under 
 tho Pawnbrokers Act, 1872, so far as relates to the holders of 
 pawn-tickets ;' and also under most of the statutes authorising tlu^ 
 coiuptdsory sale of hinds for jiarticular purposes; as, for instance, 
 in tho Lands Chiuscs (consolidation Act/ It may also be illus- 
 trated by a great variety of eases at common law. Thus in an 
 action on a policy of insurance on ship and cargo, plaintiff ma}' 
 rely on the mere fact of possession,' or of having purchased the 
 ship's stores,'" without the aid of any documentary proof or title 
 deeds, imless such further proof be rendered necessary by some 
 contrary evidence. In matters relating either to real or personal 
 property, possession again gives rise to the same presumption of 
 ownership, which in the case of real property is presumed to be 
 ownership in fee.'^ Indeed, in actions for frcsjidss to real property, 
 the presumption arising from the possession, as against a mere 
 wrongdoer, amounts to couclunivr evidence.'- Therefore, in an 
 action for an injury done to the reversion of real estate, proof of 
 
 in ' 
 
 m! 
 
 ' Doe V. Jones, 1846; Androwes v. 
 Ilailfs, 18j;5; Kiiififsiiiill v. Millard, 
 l«.jj; lid. Lisbunio c. Davios, lS(i<); 
 Doe r. Massoy, 18.il ; Doe i\ AVil- 
 liains, 1H:{(); Doo v. MurroU, 1837 
 (Ld. Al)inf,'<'r); Doe v. Recs, 18;54 
 (Park.', J{.); Doo u. Tidbuvy, 18 J4; 
 \Vhitiuore v. Huuiphrics, 1871; Att.- 
 Geii. r. Toinline, 1877. Formerly 
 this point was othorwisn : see Doe v. 
 Mulliner, 179'> (Ld. Kenyon) ; Doe 
 V. Davios, 179o. 
 
 * ( 'ases cited in last note. 
 » Bryan v. Winwood. 1808. 
 
 ♦ Webb V. Fox, 1797 (Ld. Kenyon). 
 
 • 52 & 53 V. c. 45. See Iloyman v, 
 Flewkor, 18(33; Bainos v. Swainson, 
 1863; Fuentes (1. Montis, 1868 (Ex. 
 Ch.); Vickers v. Hertz, 1871 ; Johnson 
 r. Credit Lyonnais Co., 1877, C. A. 
 
 116 
 
 • 25 & 26 V. c. .59 ("Tho Dors (Iro- 
 laTid) Act, 1862"). § 2. See, also, 28 & 
 2!» V. e. 50, § 7. Ir. ; 26 & 27 V. c. 100 
 ("The Dogs (Scotland) Act, 1863"), 
 (^ 2, So. ; and 28 & 2!» V. c. 60 (" The 
 bo<fs Act. 1865"), § 2. 
 
 " 35 & 3() V. c. 93, s. 2.5. 
 
 « 8 & 9 V. c. 18, § 79. 
 
 » Rf,bertson v. French, 1803 ; Sut- 
 ton r. Buck, 1810. 
 
 '" Thomas 0. Foyle, 1803 (Ld. El- 
 lenboroiif^h). 
 
 " Doe V. Coulthred, 1837 (Ld. 
 Denuian) ; Jayno v. Price, 1814 ; 
 Doe V. Penf.dd, 1838 (Patteson, J.). 
 See Mctters v. Brown, 1863, as to 
 how this presumption can be re- 
 butted. 
 
 « Elliott I'. Kemp, 1840 (Pal•k^.^ 
 B.). 
 
CilAl*. v.] I'KKSl'MITKJN AKisiNU FliOM I'OSSIXSION. 
 
 the reoeipt of rent' by tho pliiiutilf will, unless tho sum anniiiilly 
 received be so small us to raise a pre8umi>tioii tbat it is a mere (piit 
 rent,'^ be aulfieient evidence of title to the reversion aa against all 
 the world, ex(;ojit the real owner and persons claiming under him.' 
 In actions ugninst wrong-doors for injuries to jiemotKi I chattels, proof 
 of possession, when coupled with evidt^nce that the j)laintilf has 
 some special property in such chattels, has, too, long been held to 
 constitute a complete title.'* Therefore, an undischarged bankrupt 
 may* sue in trover a wrong-doer wlio has taken goods out of hia 
 custody ; cortaiidy possession of a ship under a transfer from tho 
 riglitful owner, void under the register Acts for ufm-compHanco 
 therewith, constitutes a sufficient title to support an action of 
 trover against a stranger for converting a part of the ship which 
 was wrecked ; '' even a general bailment will suffice, without being 
 made for any special purpose, but only for the benefit of the 
 rightful owner ; ' and a mere naked possession will (when no more 
 is proved) entitle a party to maintain trover as against a wrong- 
 doer,* though it will not entitle a mere bailee, who is proved to be 
 under no liability to his bailor, to maintain an action for negligence 
 against a third party.' 
 
 *5 124. Many authorities also sli \v that the fact of his producing 
 a document makes it ample priii i ficie evidence for a jury in 
 support of a plaintiff's claim.'*' Tl le production of an I U 
 
 signed by the defendant, thoug addressed to anyone by 
 
 name, is, in general," abundant evideur. , not indeed of money lent 
 (of which it furnishes no proof whatever), '^ but of an account stated 
 
 > Seo, also, 23 & 24 V. c. l.M, 
 § 24, Ir., wlu(:li iiiiiki's tlio r(Hi'ij)t of 
 iL'ut, under ccitiiin circiinistiuiccs, for 
 a coitaiu jii'i'iod, jiriiiia taiio cvidi'iico 
 of a landlord's derivative title. 
 
 ' Doe V. Johnson, 1819 (llolroyd, 
 J., rccof^niHod in Eeynokls v. Key- 
 uolds, 1,S4H) (Jr.). 
 
 " Daintry r. Brocklohiivst, 1848. 
 
 • Elliott V. Kemp, 184()(l'arko, B.). 
 
 • Webl) V. Fox, 1797; Drayton v. 
 Dale, 182;5; Fyson i>, Chanibors, 
 1842; those wore decisions under tho 
 old law. 
 
 « Sutton V. Buck, 1810. 
 ' Per ( 'hanibre, J.. iO. 309. 
 
 • Jeli'rieu v. Gt. West. lUiil. Co., 
 
 18d(i, which resolves a doubt raised 
 by I'arke, B., in l''yson i\ Chambers, 
 1842; Fil/]iatrick r. Dunjihy, 18.)1 
 (Ir.). See also Armory c. Delamirie, 
 1721, 1722; .Sutton v. Buck, 1810 
 (La wren. 'o, J.). 
 
 '■' ( 'larri(lfj:(; v. South Staffordshire 
 Eail. Co., 1892. 
 
 '" Fcsenmayer v. Adcoek, 1847 
 (Pollock, ('. lU. 
 
 " But it will not furnish evidence 
 of an account stated, if the defendant 
 can show that, in fact, it was not 
 given in aikiiowledf;nient of a debt 
 due: Lemere r. Elliott, 1801. 
 
 "^ l'\^seniriayer r. Adcoek, 1847, 
 quostiuuing Douglas v. Holme, 1840, 
 
 117 
 
 .nil 
 
 V\\ 
 
 it i; 
 
 I'll 
 
 ; 
 
 
 1 
 
 J 
 
 
 
 
 ' SI 
 
 i 
 1 1 
 
 jl 
 
 1 
 
 i 
 
 

 PRESUMPTION ARIPINO FROM POSSF.SSIOX. 
 
 [part r. 
 
 ( 
 
 I 
 
 ! 
 
 I 
 1 - 
 
 between the parties,' and if a letter bo given in evidence with the 
 direction torn off, the jury will do well to presume, prim& facie, 
 that it was addressed to the party who produces it.* 
 
 § 125. As possession is prima facie proof of ownership in actions 
 for the recovery of land, it is on the one hand an inflexible rule 
 that the ]»laintiff must solely rely on the strength of his own legal 
 title, and on the otlier hand clear that proof of a prior possession 
 by the plaintiff, however short, will be primA facie evidence of 
 title as against a wrong-doer.* Thus, where the plaintiff had given 
 possession of a room to a third party, he was held entitled to 
 recover against the defendant who had, about a year afterwards, 
 broken into the room at niglit and taken the key ; ■* and again, 
 whexe on the plaintiff's part, possession for twenty-three years, and 
 making increases of rent during that period, were proved, it was 
 held that defendant could not rebut the presumption of a seisin in 
 fee arising from these unequivocal acts of ownership by merely 
 showing a subsequent possession (for less than twenty years *) by 
 himself. The presumption of ownership which arises from posses- 
 sion will in general extend not only to the surface of the land 
 which has been the subject of possession, but to all minerals which 
 are under it.' Still, this presumption is not universal, since in 
 mining districts the right to the minerals and the fee-simple of the 
 soil are frequentlyl n different persons. Even where it arises it 
 may be rebutted by showing either an absence of enjoyment of 
 the minerals by the owner of the soil, or an actual user of the 
 minerals by a stranger.' A very similar prima facie presumption 
 is that the tenant of the surface is tenant of the subjacent strata. 
 But this presumption also is liable to be defeated by proof that the 
 surface and the subsoil have become separate tenements.* 
 
 ' See last note; Curtis v. Eickards, 
 1840; Croker v. Walsh, 1852 (Ir.). 
 See Wilson v. Wilson, 1854. 
 
 •^ Curtis V. Eickaids, 1840 (Tiudal, 
 C.J.). 
 
 » Asher V. Whitolock. 1865. 
 
 * Doe V. Dyeball, 1829. See Doe 
 V. Barnard, 1849. 
 
 6 Doe V. Cooke, 1831 (Ld. Tonter- 
 den). See, also, Brest t'. Lever, 1841. 
 
 • But see "The 'IViinsfer of Land 
 A.ct, 1862 " (25 & 26 V. c. 53), § 9, and 
 
 "The Land Transfer Act, 1875" (38 
 & 39 V. c. 87), § 18, both of which 
 statutts, for puri)()sos of legistration 
 of title, recdf^nise an opposite pre- 
 sumption, unless, in the description 
 of the land, mines or minerals be 
 expressly mentioned, 
 
 ' Eowe V. Grenfel, 1824 (Ld. Ten- 
 tordon); Howe v. Bronton, 1828; 
 Ilodfykinson v. rietchor, 1781. 
 
 * Keyse V. Powell, 1853; Smith v, 
 Lloyd, 1854 (Parke, B.). 
 
 118 
 
C:iAP. v.] LONG UNINTERRUPTED POSSESSION. 
 
 § 12(5. The j)iosurapti()ii of title nrisiug from posspRsion will 
 alwnyH bo much strtMigthoued by proof of uuinterruptud onjoyiiieut 
 for a t'oii8i(l(>riibl« time. lu many cases, inJeod, the legislature has, 
 as before observed,' fixed what periods of undisturbed possession 
 will sufHce to confer an absolute title. In such cases, when the 
 party by his pleading shows that he relies upon the statutory limi- 
 tation, no lapse of time but that of the full period fixed by Act of 
 Parliament will justify a i)resuraption in sui)i)ort of the claim.^ If, 
 however, a party, instead of depending upon the statute-law, relies 
 (as he may do) upon common-law presumption, or a lost grant, 
 enjoyment for a less period than the statutory number of years, 
 when coupled with other circutnatdncen, will warrant a jury in 
 Bnding a verdict in his favour.* 
 
 ^ 127. The principles of legal presumption which we have just 
 been discussing apply, indeed, to all cases to which the statutes of 
 limitation do not extend, though in many of them they are of 
 necessity only capable of a vague interpretation. For instance, 
 though (as we have just incidentally seen"*) a plaintiff seeking to 
 recover land is bound to establish his own title, he will not be 
 required to prove strictly every successive link in it, provided that 
 the property has been long in his possession. Therefore, when a 
 person claiming under a feoffment proved that he had had un- 
 interrupted enjoyment of the premises for twenty years, the court 
 and jury presumed, in his favour, that the necessary formalities of 
 the old livery of seisin had been complied with.^ Presumptions of 
 this latter nature will not, however, now be raised, where the land 
 has been held for a less period than twelve years,*^ nor will they, 
 where the acts of the parties, or the other facts in the case, lead to 
 a different inference.' 
 
 § 127a. Another disputable presumption of law is that arising 
 from the possession of stolen property recently after the commission 
 of a theft. Such possession raises a prima facie presumption that 
 
 ' Ante, § 74. 
 
 » See 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 71, § 6 ("The 
 Prescription Act, 1832"); 2 & 3 W. 
 4, c. 100, § 8; Eldridge v. Knott, 
 1774; Lowe v. Curi)ontur, 1851. 
 
 ^ See Wheaton v. Maple & Co., 
 1893; Bright v. Walker, 1834 (Parke, 
 B.); Ld. Stamford v, Dunbar, 1845 ; 
 Lowe V. Carpenter, 1851 (Parke, B.); 
 Hanmer v. Chance, 1865 (Ld. West- 
 
 bury). 
 
 * Ante, § 125. 
 
 * Eeos V. Lloyd, 1811; Doe v. 
 Cleveland, 1829 ; Doe v. Davies, 
 1837 ; Doe v. Gardiner, 1852. 
 
 « 37 & 38 V. c. 57 (" The Real Pro- 
 perty Limitation Act, 1874"); and 
 see cases in last note. 
 
 ' Doe V. Gardiner, 1852. 
 
 119 
 
 It 
 i ■ 
 
 I •! 
 
 I 'i 
 
 i iiiiiii 
 
 I • 
 
 il i; 
 
'I 
 
 ■,{l. 
 
 r 
 
 RKCKNT POSSESSION OF STOI.l'.N rK01'i:iMY. [PAKT I. 
 
 tlie possessor was either tlie thief, or tlie nicoiver, nccording to tlio 
 other eircumstiiiiees of tlio case.^ This presumption, though rehut- 
 tahle, is, wlum unexplaiiUMl,^ either by direct evidence, or by the 
 eluiracter and habits of the posrrsror, or otherwise, usually rcgaTilcd 
 by the jury as cfinclusive.''' Tlio question as to what amounts to 
 recent possession, varies according as the stolen article is or is not 
 calculated to pass readily from liand to hand. Thus, where two 
 ends of woollen cloth in an unfinished state, contiisting of about 
 twenty yards each, were found in the possession of a prismuu" two 
 months after they had been stolen, it was held that the prisoiu^r 
 should explain how he camo by the property.* But, on the otlier 
 hand, where the only evidence against a i)risoner was, that certain 
 tools had been traced to his possession three months after their 
 loss, an acquittal was directed ; * and a similar course was pursued 
 on an indictment for horse-stealing, where the horse was not dis- 
 covered in the custody of the accused until after six monihs from 
 the date of the robbery ; " and where goods, lost sixteen months 
 before, were found in the prisoner's house, but no other evidence 
 was adduced against him, he was not called upon for his defence.' 
 The finding of stolen property in the /ioiixt< of the accused, provided 
 there were other inmates capable of committing the larceny, will, 
 moreover, bo of ihvlf insufficient to prove IiIh jiossession, however 
 recently tho theft may have been ed'ected ; * though, if coui»led 
 
 ' IL r. l/iuiRinciKl, l.S()<. 
 
 « K. r. Kxiill, lS(;(i(l*oll()rk, C.B.). 
 
 » 2 J'liist, V. C. <!*•)() ; 1{. ,'. , 
 
 IS'20; Th.-Stiit(( r. Adams, 17.S!» - INOO 
 (Am.). "l"'ui'tMin ])iii<suiiiitiir com- 
 iiiisHiim all illi), ])t'iu^s ([iicm w.h 
 luiiitii iiivciita t'uciit. adcd ut si nou 
 doi'uciit a (|iio ii'iii liiihiiciit, justt\ 
 «'X ilia iuvi'iitioiH', ])()t('iitr Hulijici 
 formi'iitis." '1 Ma-^c, <1(^ I'nil). coiicl. 
 IS.'i4 ; Muiiocli. dt! I'lWH. lib. o, juivs. 
 31. SiK) ante, § filt. 
 
 * 11. V. I'urtridgo, 18UG (Pattoson, 
 J.). 
 
 » R. V. Adams, 182H (Park.-, J.). 
 8e(> 1{. V. Cockiiifi;, ISIifi, wlicm tvo 
 ftacks worn foiiiKl in the ]tris<piii'r's 
 
 I)()HHonHi()n twoiity dayn after tlicy had 
 n'M\ missdd : ami ('(ili'ridfj;i', J., left 
 thiMiin'niiou t<) till' jury, iibHorviii^;, 
 Hiat "Htdlon ))i((|)erl,y usually jjasHcn 
 throuf^li many hund.s." Sen the oh- 
 eervutiuus oi the rupurtor ou this 
 
 prcsiimption, id. 
 
 » J{. ,\ (^;)<ii.(T. IH.VJ (Mawle, J.); 
 E. V. Harris, lH(i() (Channrll, M.). 
 
 ' ]{. i: , l.S'J(;(Havley, J.). 
 
 * 2 St. I'lv. (in, n. ((/).' Sco Kx 
 ])arto Han^h y, WIW, wh('r<» the haro 
 limlinfi; of smii),'f,'led s]mits in do- 
 fendant's hduse, diirin;;; liis alisencn 
 from liome, was held insuilicient to 
 HUjiport a I'onviction under 11 (i. 1, 
 V. ;iO, § Hi (now repealed hy ;{() \- ;il 
 V. (!. oil), foi' knowinj^ly harhoiiiinj; 
 and concealinp;. Al)i)ott, (!.J., oh- 
 sei'ved, "The mere naked fact of tho 
 s])irits heinj? found in tho defendant's 
 house durinj^ his ahsence cannot ho 
 consid(>ri'd as conclusivo evidenci^ of 
 knowled;>:n to HU|)j)ort ii conviction 
 on this statuto. tIk^io is abundant 
 fjround for suspicion, but wti cannot 
 say that it is a clear and Hatisfa(!t.ory 
 ground to couvict." Boo, ahjo, U. v, 
 Hulo. 177». 
 
 120 
 
CHAP, v.] EECKNT TOSSHSSION OF STOLKN rk)l'EUTY. 
 
 with proof of other suspicious circumstances, it may fully warrant 
 the conviction of the accused.^ 
 
 § 127n. This presumption is in all cases one of fact rather than 
 of law. It is ooeas 'ually so strong as to render unnocossary any 
 direct proof of what is called the corjtKx (li/ivti. Tlius, to horrow 
 an apt illustration from Maule, J., if a man were to go into tlie 
 London Docks quite sohor, and shortly afterwards were found very 
 drunk, stiiggoring out of one of the cdliirs, in which above a 
 million of gallons of wine are stowed, " this wouhl he reasonable 
 evidence that the man had stolen some of the wine* in the collar, 
 though no proof were given that any jiarticfular vat had been 
 broached, and that any wine liad actually been missed." * 
 
 *5 127c.* The presumption under discussion is not coiifinod to 
 cliarges of theft, but <i.'.teTuls to all >liiM'ges, however ])enal. Thus, 
 on an indictment for arson, proof that property, which was in an 
 house at the time it was burnt, was soon al'tcrwanls found in the 
 possession of the prisoner, raises a probable pr('Sunii)tion that he 
 was present nnd concerned in burning the house;'' ami under 
 similar circumstances u like inference arises in the cases of munhir 
 accompanied by robbery,'* of burglary," and of the possession of 
 a quantity of counterfeit money.' 
 
 § 128. The maxim, "ex diuturiiitato temporis omnia |ir;i'sumun- 
 tur rite et solcnniiter esse acta," is also of great importance. It is 
 a presumption of law that where there has been long continued 
 j)ossession in assertion of a right, the right must be presumed to 
 have liad a legal origin if such a legal origin was jiossible, and 
 that all those acts were done and the circuiMNtiinces existed which 
 were necessary to the creation of a valid h'gal title." It is r.lso a 
 presumi)ti()n of law that till transactions were originally legal and 
 honest, whihi the older they are the stronger will be the presiim|ili()n.* 
 S\u!h presumj)tion intleed is sometimes, and under certain circum- 
 stances, conclusive. An instance of this has already been furnished'* 
 
 Ml 
 
 ' «. r. Wi.tson, 1817 (Ld. Mien- Exall, IKdfJ. 
 
 bdioiif^li and Abbott, J.), 
 
 '' H. r. Marton, 1,H,VI. Sf.>, also, R. 
 V. Mdckford, ISiiH. Sen, liowi'vtir, U. 
 V, Williams, 1H71 ; scd qy. this case. 
 
 Mir. Hv. § ;{4. 
 
 * K. i\ l{irkman, 17Hi). 
 » Wills. Vv. Kv. (11. 
 
 • Bou 11. V. Uould, IBIO; 11. v. 
 
 ' U. ('. Fuller, IHKi; 11. v. Jarvis, 
 
 ih:),-). 
 
 " I'liillipH r. Halliday, 1N91 (Ld. 
 llcrsrli.'ll). 
 
 * Croft V. Kirkmansworth llifjfh- 
 wnv Hoard, 1H8H ; rostlcthwaito v. 
 IJickniau. ISHll (U.A.) (liowou, L.J.). 
 
 '» Auto, (j 87. 
 
 121 
 
Ji: 
 
 I ' 
 
 
 f 
 
 II 
 
 REGULARITY PRESUMED FROM LAPSE OF TIME. [PART I. 
 
 in the case of ancient documents, the due execution of which will be 
 pre sumed on their mere production. And the American courts recog- 
 nise other applications of the rule. Thus, after^ the lapse of twenty 
 years, they conclusively presume, in favour of every judicial tribunal 
 which has acted within its jurisdiction, that all persons interested in 
 its proceedings have had due notice.^ They have also held, that 
 where an authority is given by law to executors, guardians, and 
 other officers, to make sales of lands upon being duly licensed by 
 the courts, but they are required to advertise the sales in a par- 
 ticular maimer, and to observe other formalities, the lapse of 
 sufficient time (which in most cases is fixed at thirty years) raises 
 a conclusive presumption that all the legal formalities were ob- 
 served ; ^ the licence to sell, and the official character of the vendor, 
 being provable by record or judicial registration, must in general 
 be so proved ; and the deed must also be proved in the usual 
 manner ; but the intermediate proceedings are presumed. Probaiis 
 extremis prcvsiiumntur media. And in England the valid existence 
 of a bye-law will be inferred without any direct proof of its having 
 been passed, or of the loss of it, but the court will infer its existence 
 from a usage of long standing.* 
 
 § 129. The maxim, " ex diuturnitate temporis omnia proesu- 
 muntur rite esse acta " has, indeed, since the passing of the Vendor 
 and Purchaser Act, 1874,* become one ',i the leading rules, which 
 are henceforth to regulate the practice of conveyancers and the rigid s 
 of vendors and purchasers. And by tlie Conveyancing and Law of 
 Property Act, lyHl,** it is enacted that the purchaser of any prupeity 
 *' shall assume, unless the contrary appears, tliat the recitals contain id 
 in the abstracted instruments of any deed, will, or other document 
 forming part of the title [prior to tbe time prescribed by law 
 
 » Liuet'ly, Gr. Ev. §§ 19 and 20. 
 
 » ]$rowu V. Wood, 1«2() (Am.). 
 
 * Soo l'(.'jei)scot Prop's i'. Itiuisom, 
 1817 (Am.); IJlossom v. Ciumoii, 1!S17 
 (Am.); C'lilmau v. Aiideiwdii, IHKJ 
 (Am.); ^VllliaI'lS v. Eytoii, 18J!); 
 (Jniy f. (iardinor, 1807 (Am.), 
 hohiinj^ an interval of twunty-two 
 yoars .siiHicii^nt. Stio cases coUcctod, 
 liioom's Ldpil Maxims (Gth udit. p. 
 890), tit. ' 'Onmia PiiL'sumuntur, &i'. ' ; 
 Society, &c. I'. Wheolor, 1814 (Am.). 
 
 « R. V. I'owoU, 1854 ; May. ot Hull 
 V. Horner, 1779 (Ld. Mansfield). Woo 
 
 Johnson v. Barnes, 1873 (Ex. Ch.). 
 
 37 & 38 V. c. 78. Provisions 
 ulinost identical with those in the 
 te.xt contained in the Act of 1881 
 are contained in § 2, subs. 2, of the 
 Act of 1874, and are said, in tho 
 tabular index to statutes for that 
 year (wliidi is of no authority how- 
 over), to be repealed by tho Act of 
 1881, but tlicy aie not mentioned in 
 the repealing portions (viz., § 7, and 
 Sched. 11. Part 111.) of tho Act of 
 1881. 
 
 « 44 & 45 V. c. 41, § 3, subs. 3. 
 
 122 
 
CHAP, v.] REGULARITY PRESUMED FROM LAPSE OF TIME. 
 
 for its commencementl are correct, and give all the material 
 contents of the deed, will, or other document so recited, and that 
 every document so recited was duly executed by all necessary 
 pfirties, and perfected, if and as required, by fine, recovery, 
 acknowledgment, inrolment; or otherwise." The time prescribed 
 by law for the commencement of the title may be fixed by express 
 stipulations, and it is always desirable to so fix it, at the same time 
 stating the nature of the instrument wich which the title com- 
 mences.* In the absence of stipulation,' abstracts of title in 
 general ^ commence, as to freeholds, with a document at least forty 
 years old ; ' as to leaseholds for years, with the lease or under- 
 lease ; * as to the freehold interest in enfranchised copyholds or 
 customary freeholds, with the deed of enfranchisement.* 
 
 § 130. The presumption afPorded by the maxim, "ex diuturni- 
 tate temporis omnia prajsumuntur rite esse acta," has again an 
 important application where the rights of the Crown are con- 
 cerned. Here," — though lapse of time does not of itself furnish a 
 conclusive legal bar to the title of the Sovereign, — yet, if the 
 adverse claim could have had a legal commencement, juries are 
 instructed or advised to presume such commencement, after many 
 years of uninterrupted possession. Accordingly, royal grants, 
 charters, and even Acts of Parliament, have not infrequently been 
 thus found by the jury, after long continued peaceable enjoyment, 
 accompanied by the usual acts of ownership ; ' the long enjoyment 
 of port duties, tolls, customary dues, fees, or the like, will, if the 
 nature of the case admits it,* be held to warrant the presumption 
 of any fact necessary to make them legal ; ° while if distinct 
 
 * Wolstenholmo & JJrinton's Con- 
 veyanoinj^ Act, Gth edit., ], 2. 
 
 ' See Bolton v, Londou School 
 Board, 1878. 
 
 ' Vfiiidor and Purchaser Act (37 & 
 ;« V. c. 78), § 1. 
 
 ♦ Id. § 2, r. 1 ; and " The Convoy- 
 anring and Law of Property Act, 
 1881" (44 &45V. c. 41), § 3, subs. 1. 
 
 ' Id. 8ul)8. 2. 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 45, in part, as to nine 
 lines. 
 
 ^ Ooodmun v. Mayor of Saltash, 
 1S8'.>(('. A.); R. V. Brown, 1779; May. 
 of Hull V. Ilornor, 1779; Eldridge v. 
 KiKitt, 1774 ; Lopez v. Andrew, 1826 ; 
 Dtlarue v. Church. 1833; O'Neill v. 
 
 12 
 
 Allen, 1859(Pigot, C.B.) (Ir.); Doo 
 (/. Devine v. Wilson, 1850 (P. C.) ; 
 Little V. Winstield, 1859 (Ir.) ; Boo 
 V. Ireland, 1809 ; Ooodtitle v. Bald- 
 win, 1809; Att.-Gen. v. Ewehiie 
 Hospital, 1853; Matlior v. Trinity 
 Church, 1877 (Am.). 
 
 ' SeoGann I'. Ereo Fishers of Whit- 
 stable, 18(i4 (II. L.); Free I'^ishors 
 of Whitstablo v, Gann, and Gann v. 
 Johnson, 18()3 (Ex. Ch.); Bryant 
 V. Foot, 1868; Ijawronco v. Ilitch, 
 1808. See, also. Mills v. May. of 
 Colchester, 18H7 ; Forman v. Vroa 
 Fishers of Wliitstable, 1809 (II. L.). 
 
 ° May. of Exeter v. WaiTeu, 18i4 
 (Ld. Denman). 
 
 1 
 
 : Ui !■ 
 
 ' ; ! ■ * : 
 
 ^m 
 
 liii 
 
V'Hl 
 
 \i 
 
 •i 
 
 TITLE I'RESUxMED FUOM LONG ]:N.J0VJI1:NT. [I'Ali'l' 1. 
 
 evidence of any such payments be given as far luuk as living 
 memory goes, tlie jury, unless evidence to the contrary be shown, 
 will not only be quite justified in presuming, but will be direet(;d 
 to presume, that such payments were immemorial, or at least were 
 referable to a legal origin ; ' and a series of acts of ownership exer- 
 cised on the seashore by an adjoining proprietor, or the production 
 by him of a royal grant conveying the right of wreck,^ affords 
 abundant evidence for a jury to presume that the Crown formerly 
 granted the soil to one of his ancestors.^ On the same principle, 
 after evidence of possession for nearly forty years of a tract of land, 
 of a ] trior order in council for a survey and of an actual survey, a 
 jury has, in America,* been instructed to presume that a patent 
 was duly issued. A longer period is, however, usually required for 
 this presumption to arise with regard to Crown or public grants 
 than is needed in the case of a grant by a private individual.* 
 
 § 1-51. Agfiin, on the same principle, the uninterrupted user of 
 a road by tlie [lublic for forty or fifty years justifies a presumption 
 in favour of the original animus dedicandi, although there was 
 ground for supposing that the soil of tlie highway was vested in 
 the Crown," and this although it is a rule that, to constitute a valid 
 dedication to the public of a higliway, the owner of the soil must 
 intend to dedicate.^ Even a qualified or partial dedication of a 
 way may be presumed from continuous use. Accordingly, where, 
 as far back as living memory goes, the j)ublic have enjoyed a riglit 
 of way across an arable field, and the owner has plouglied up the 
 wliole field, including the path, it is presumed that tlie original 
 dedication of the way was subject to the liglit of ]»l()ugliing it up 
 in due course of farming,** and therefore the public had no right of 
 d(;viating from it, although the path mny have become tomjoraiily 
 impassable in consequence of being so ploughed." Where, too, tli6 
 
 ' Malcoiiison v. 0'])ctt, 18(i2 (II. 
 L.); MillH V. Miiy. of ColchcHtor, 
 18(i7 ; D. of Beaufort v. Hmitli, IN4<) 
 (I'lirki!, K.); I'dlmiii v. PickerHgill, 
 1"87 (AshiirHt, J.); Shopliard v. 
 I'ayiKs INO;*, (Kx. Ch,). 
 
 '* IJiilo do Juni Mar. 2'), rocofjjTUHcd 
 ill (,'aliiiadv v. Kowo, IHIH. 
 
 ■' Caliiiady v. Itowii, 1818; I), of 
 Hcaufort V. May. of Swiiiisca, 1810; 
 LcStraiiK''''. Kow(!, lS(i,)(Kil.-.('..I.); 
 Ilcalv r. Thoruo, 1870 (Ir.). tSuo 
 imtiiA 11!'. 
 
 * Jackson v. McCall, 18i;j (Am,). 
 
 * SiM) Masnird do I'lob., p. '2',i\); 
 coiR'l. 19!), n. 11, 12. 
 
 « J{. r. ]']aHt Mark, 1848; It. v. 
 Potiin, 18.55; Tumor v. Walsh, 1881 
 (!'. ('.). Sco (ii'coiivicli jioard of 
 VVorkn r. MauilKlay, 1870; I'oworw y. 
 J'.atliuiHt, 18^0 (l''i"y, J.). 
 
 ' I'oolov. Ilusliiiisoii, 184|{. 
 
 * M(!i('or V. \Vond>,'ato, 1870; Ar- 
 uold V. Ulakor. 1871. 
 
 » Arnold v. llolbrook, 1873. 
 
 124 
 
CHAP, v.] TITLi: ITCKSU.MKD FROM LOXG ENJOYMENT. 
 
 facts proved loave room for such a presumption, property which a 
 piirisli has enjoyed for a long period niay be presumed to be vested 
 in trustees for such parisli.* 
 
 § 1^32. In cases of incorporeal hereditaments, where it is desirable 
 to raise a presutn[)tion of lost grant, juries should' not he required 
 to find as a fact tliat a deed of grant has been ((dmtUij executed, 
 hut without believing any grant to have been made, they may 
 often, imder the instruction of the court, presume its existence for 
 the sijn[)lo purpose of qnu'tUig poHHemon} 8uch a presumption may 
 he sometimes raised even against a rcvorsioni^r, provided it can bo 
 either directly proved, or reasonably inferred, that he has had full 
 knowledge of his opponent's actual enjoyment of the right in 
 ([uostion, and has tacitly assented thereto.* But the presumption 
 of a grant can only arise wlien the person against whom the right 
 is claimed might have interrupted or prevented the user relied on.^ 
 Therefore, the grant of a right to the uninterrupted passage of air 
 to a windmill from over the soil of a neighbour, cannot be pre- 
 sumed from an uninterrupted use of the mill for forty years.' 
 
 § 133.'' Juries are also sometimes advised to presume convey- 
 ances of ('orpni-o((l hereditaments between private individuals, in 
 favour of the party wlio has proved a right to the beneficial owner- 
 sliip, and whose undisturbed possession, heing consistent with the 
 existence of the conveyance required to be presumed, affords reason- 
 able ground for belief that the legal title has in fact been con- 
 veyed.' Tliis presumption is made in order to prevent an apparently 
 just title from being defeated by mere formal matter." It ought 
 oidy to be drawn where a party has shown a right good in sub- 
 stances, but in some way technically deficient in form. 
 
 ' ILiii-ih v. Wost, 1893 (C. A.). 
 
 » DiM.bli! V. Liiiohun, 18()() (Ir. Ex. 
 Ch.), following tluulicta of lid. Miuih- 
 tii'hl ill J'lldiidgo /'. Knott, 1774; and 
 of Fid. Wcnslnydalc) in Bright v, 
 Walkca-, l.s;}j; and in Magdakai C(dl. 
 V, Att.-Gon., 18o7 ; and ovorruling 
 a dictum of Hay ley, B., in Day v, 
 Williams, 1832 ; Little v, Wingtiold, 
 18511 (Ir.). 
 
 » I)i'(*l)l() V. Linehan, 18(iO(Tr. Ex. 
 Ch.); Wiiitorbottom o. Ld. Derby, 
 isi;:. 
 
 ♦ Clias'iiinrn v, Bichards, 1869 
 (H. L). 
 
 « Webb )'. Bird, l.S(i3 (Ex. Ch.); 
 Brvant '■. Lofovor, 1879 (C. A.). 
 
 « (Jr. Ev. § ■!(), in part. 
 
 ' Doe V. C'ook(>, 18i'9(Tindal C.J.). 
 Soo Doe V. Milk'tt, 18-18, and cases 
 there cited. 
 
 " Doe r. Cooke, 1829 (Tindal, C.J.); 
 Doe ('. Sybouin, 179(1 (Ld. Kcnyou). 
 In Little c. Wingfield, 18 J9 (Ir.). a 
 passage in Doe v. Cooke (Nui)ni). in 
 which Tindal, CJ., states in what 
 cases this presuni])tion may be made, 
 is called in question, as laying dowu 
 the law too narrowly. 
 
 125 
 
 til 
 
 iiii 
 
 
 1 
 
 t; 
 
 
 i* 
 
 . 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 \\ - < 
 
 ! 
 
Pi 
 
 Uli 
 
 1 . 
 
 r. 
 
 ff 
 
 PRESUMPTION OP CONVEYANCE OF LEGAL TITLE. [PT. I. 
 
 § 134. A presumption in favour of such a conveyance Laving 
 been made will, in general, prevail whenever it was the t/wty o* 
 trustees to convey to the beneficial owner at a specified time, as 
 upon his attainment of the age of majority, or on the death of a 
 cestui que vie, or after the payment of debts, legacies, portions, or 
 the like, for in such cases it is reasonable to presume thj,t the 
 trustees have performed their duty, and have done what a court of 
 equity would compel them to do.' A like presumption probably 
 arises where the duty to convey, though not expvcmi. may vomti'm- 
 tkeUj be gatliered from the object of the trust, as, for instance, 
 where an estate is vested in trustees for a temporary purpose, 
 which has been attained, and no further intention is declared, or 
 can reasonably be infeiTed, requiring the legal estate to remain 
 outstanding.' 
 
 § 135. It is said (probably rightly) that this presumption will 
 never be made againd the owner of the inheritance, save in cases 
 where he has attempted to defeat the solemn acts of himself, or of 
 those through whom he claims. If, however, a mortgagor attempt 
 to set up an outstanding fee as agt.inst a mortgagee for years, or 
 the appointee of a devisee in fee to >""ispute the right of a former 
 devisor to grant a lease of the promises in question, on the ground 
 that the legal estate was, at the time of the grant, outstanding in a 
 trustee, the jury (even if in cases the estoppel is not pleaded) may 
 presume a conveyance. In the first case,^ the presumption will be 
 made in favour of the honesty of the mortgagor at the time of the 
 mortgage, though against his interest at the time of the trial ; and 
 in the second,* it will prevail, in order to give effect to the grant of 
 the devisor, which would otherwise be void. 
 
 § 136. Questions under this head of presumptionis frequently 
 arose in former times, when juries used often to be called upon to 
 
 » England v. Sladn. 1792 ; Doe v. 
 Syboinn, ITOO; Wilson r. Alien, 
 18'2() (Sir T. PluuKsr); Emory v. 
 Grocock, 1821 (Sir J. Loach). In 
 England v. Slado, a convoyanco from 
 tho trustoos was prosninod, though 
 only three years had elapsed from the 
 time when they ought to have con- 
 veyed. 
 
 « Hillary v. Waller, 1805 (Sir W. 
 Grant) ; Doe v. I^loyd, 180(1 (Law- 
 rence, J.). See Sug. V. & 1'. (14th 
 edit), .-i'JO; Math., Pres. Ev. 215— 
 217. 
 
 8 Per Abbott, C. J., in Doe v. Ililder, 
 1819; Cottrell V. Hughes, 1855. 
 
 * Bartlott V. Downos, 1826 (Abbott, 
 O.J.). 
 
 126 
 
 if 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 OUTSTANDINO TKRMS ACT. 
 
 presume the surrender of oufufanding fintisfind terms ; * but an Act,' 
 passed in 1845, provides that every satisfied term of years, wliidi, 
 either hy express declaration or by construction of faw,^ sliall, upon the 
 Slst day of December, 1845, be attendant upon the inheritatice or 
 reversion of any land, shall on that day absolutely cease and 
 determine as to the land, upon the inheritance or reversion whereof 
 such terra shall be attendant as aforesaid, except that every such 
 term of years which shall be so attendant as aforesaid by express 
 declaration, although thereby made to cease and determine, shall 
 afford to every person the same protection against every incum- 
 brance, charge, estate, right, action, suit, claim, and demand, as it 
 would have afforded to him if it had continued to subsist, but had 
 not been assigned or dealt with, after the said 31st day of December, 
 1845, and shall, for the purpose of such protection, be considered in 
 every (tourt of law and of equity to be a subsisting term. It also 
 provides * that every term of years now subsisting or hereafter to 
 be created, becoming satisfied after the said Blst of December, 
 1845, and which by express declaration or construction of law, 
 shall after that day become attendant upon the inheritance or 
 reversion of any lands, shall, immediately upon the same becoming 
 so attendant, absolutely cease and determine as to the land, upon 
 the inheritance or reversion whereof such term shall become 
 attendant as aforesaid.* 
 
 § 137. Notwithstanding this Act, it is perfectly clear that no 
 presumption can be allowed in favour of the surrender of a term 
 whidi is still unsatisfied,^ or the continuance of which is found in 
 a special verdict, or admitted in a special case ; ■' for, whatever 
 individual hardship may result, it is obviouslj' absurd to permit 
 any inference to be drawn, which is directly opposed, either to the 
 ascertained fact, or to all reasonable belief.^ 
 
 § 138. A jury may also, under certain circumstances, presume 
 
 » Seo (tnrrard v. Tuck, 1849 ; Doo 
 V, Liinpdon, 1848. 
 
 » 8&9 V. c. 112. 
 
 ' Seo Doe v. Prico, 1847 ; Doo v. 
 Moulsrlalo, 1847; Doe v. Jones, 1849; 
 Cottrull V. Hughes, ISJo; Plant v. 
 Taylor, 18G3. 
 
 M 2. 
 
 • As to the construction of tliis 
 
 Act, 800 § 3. 
 
 • Doe V. Staple, 1788, where the 
 lessor of tho i)liiiutift' was hoir-at- 
 law, and only claimed the promises 
 subioct to the charf^o. 
 
 ' Goodtitle v, Jonos, 1796; Roe v. 
 Reade, 1799. 
 
 " See per Bayloy, J., in B. v. Upton 
 Gray, 1830. 
 
 127 
 
 I It* i' 
 
 ill 
 
PKlvSUMPTION OF SUIIRENDKU OF LEASE. [PAliT I. 
 
 the surrender of a lease by operation of law. The production hy 
 the lessor of a cancelled lease will not, indeed, warrant the pre- 
 sumptinii of sui-h a surrender as will satisfy the Statute of Frauds.' 
 Yet, when the production of the cancelled lease was coupled with 
 proof that a new lease had been granted to another party, who, 
 like the former lessee, was a mere trustee for the same cestuis que 
 trust, and it further appeared, that when leases were renewed from 
 time io time, the usage was to send in the old lease to be cancelled 
 in the lessor's office, the jury were allowed to infer that the second 
 lease was granted with the assent of the former tenant.- The 
 unexplained payment of an abated rent for thirty ytars by a 
 tenant of premise^;, which were shown to have been loased vo 
 another party for an unexpired terra, has been treated in Ireland 
 as evidence from which a jury might presume the surrender of the 
 original lease, and the creation of a new tenancy from year to 
 year, at the abated rent, in favour of the present occupier.' 
 
 §§ 1 39 — 142. The principle " ex diuturnitate teraporis omnia 
 prassumnntur rite esse acta " has also been ajiplied in a variety of 
 matters other than tho.se mentioned iibove. Thus, where eject- 
 ment was brought to recover a messuage, demised for a long term 
 by a lease containing a covenant that the house f;hould not oe 
 used as a shop without the lessor's written consent, wilh a proviso 
 for re-eutry on breach of such covenant, it was held that, on proof 
 of tlie uninterrujited user of the premises as a beershop for twenty 
 years, the jury ought to be directed to presume that a licence in 
 writiu ' hud been duly given ; * after the lapse of sixty years, the 
 court, in the absence of any direct evidence, has pretiumed that 
 executors, who were proved to have renounced, had also disclaimed 
 an estate in a chattel real, which had been bequeathed to them by 
 the testator ; * and it is a general proposition," that stale demands 
 ought always to be regarded in courts of justice with jealous 
 suspicion,' and that long acquiescence in any adverse claim of 
 
 ' Doe V. Thomas, 1829; Roe v. 
 Abp. of York, IHDo. 
 
 '' Thomas v. Cook. 1S18. See, also, 
 AVulker i'. Kichanlsoii, 1837. See 
 pf)st, §§ 1009, KHO. 
 
 3 LoU-oy V. Walsh, 1851 (Ir.). See, 
 also, Tenr.ont v. Noil, 1870 (Ir. Ex. 
 Ch.); Ex parte fiaymond, 1874 (Ir.). 
 
 * Gibson )'. Doeg, 1858. 
 
 * M'Kciina v. Eager, 1875 (Ir.). 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 47, in groat part. 
 
 ' Sibhoring ;;. Ld. Balcarras, 1850. 
 See H., falsely called C, (,-. C, 18(i2 ; 
 T. V. D., falsely called IJ., 186(5. Thus, 
 too, the non-user of a patent for a 
 series of years raises a strong pro- 
 
 128 
 
 .i.i' 
 
ii 
 
 CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTION OMNIA RITK ESSE ACTA. 
 
 right is good ground, on which a jury may presume that the ohiim 
 had a legnl commencement ; ' since it is contrary to general 
 experience for one man long to continue to pay money to another, 
 or to perform any onerous duty, or to submit to any inconvenient 
 claim, unless in pursuance of some contract, or other legal obli- 
 gation.^ 
 
 § 143-4. In the great majority of cases to which the maxim " ex 
 diuturnitate temporis omnia prsosumuntur rite esse acta " applies it 
 is only available, " donee probetur in contrarium. " * The application 
 of the presumption arising from it to acts of an official or Judicial 
 character will oe best illustrated by referring to one or two deci- 
 sions.* For instance, where successive decisions are inconsistent 
 with a general order of the court, a reversal of that order ought to 
 be presumed ; * on an indictment for perjury proof of the signa- 
 tures of the defendant, and of the official before whom the docu- 
 ment purports to have been sworn, is sufficient evidence that the 
 defendant was regularly sworn to the truth of its contents, though 
 the clerk, who proves the handwriting of the official, has no re- 
 collection of administering the oath, and admits that the jurat was 
 not written by himself ; ^ the fact that a town was in the military 
 occupation of an enemy, and proclamations, purporting to be signed 
 by the general in command, posted on its walls, is evidence whence 
 a jury may infer that the placards had been printed and posted by 
 the authority of the commander ; ' on an indictment for bigamy, 
 proof of the solemnization of the first marriage in a Wesleyan 
 chapel in the presence of the registrar, and of the entry of such 
 marriage in his book, raises a prima facie presumption that the 
 chapel was duly registered ; * and so also proof by a witness present 
 at it, that a marriage was solemnized in a parish church by the 
 curate of the parish, renders it unnecessary to prove either tho 
 
 Bumptionof its practical inutility: Re 
 Allan's Patent, 18G7, P. C; Eo Bake- 
 well's Patent, 186'.', P. 0. ; Ee 
 Hughes' Patent, 1879, P. 0. 
 
 ' See Re Birch, 1853. 
 
 ' See Castleden v. Castleden, 1861, 
 H. L. ; Ogilvie v. Currie, 1868 (Ld. 
 Cairns, Ch.). 
 
 » See 11. I). Bjornsen, 1865. 
 
 * See, also, Lee v. Johnstone, 1869. 
 
 -VOL. I. 
 
 • Bohun V. Delessert, 1813 (Ld. 
 Eldon) ; Man v. Ricketts, 1845 (Ld. 
 Lvndhurst). 
 
 '« R. V. Benson, 1810 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough). See, also, Cheney v. 
 Coiirtois, 1863 ; and Re Chapman, 
 Ex parte Johnson, 1884, 0. A. 
 ' Bruce v, Nicolopulo, 1855. 
 
 * R. u. Mainwaring, 1857; Sichelr. 
 Lambert, 1864; R. v. Cradock, 1863 
 (Willes, J., and Pollock, C.B.). 
 
 129 K 
 
 i'l 
 
 if 
 
 m 
 
t 
 
 1 
 
 1) ' ■ 
 
 
 
 
 PRESUMrilON OMNIA RITE ESSE ACTA. [PART I. 
 
 repscration of the raarringe, or tl»e fact of any licence having betii 
 granted, or of any banns having been published ; ' and the constant 
 performance of divine service from an early period in a chapel, 
 raises a prima facie preni hat it has been duly consecrated. - 
 
 § 1 44a. An Irish decisiuu .,a.ried this presumption to its extreme 
 limit. There a shopkeeper (prior to the passing of the Weights 
 and Measures Act, 1878)* was prosecuted for using weights whicli 
 were light when compared with the county standard. Proof that 
 the county standard had been compared with the imperial standard 
 within the last five years, although such comparison was expressly 
 required by statute, was held unnecessary, on the ground that the 
 prima facie presumption was that the officials in charge of the local 
 standards had performed their duty.* 
 
 § 1 15. Again, the court presumed the regularity of the proceed- 
 ings, and that tlie writ had in due course come to the gaoler 
 through the coroner, on a motion to discharge out of custody a 
 party detained for debt in the sheriff's gaol, made on the ground 
 of irregularity in the proceedings, although it did not appear that a 
 writ of ca. sa. at the suit of the sheriff, which was in the hands of 
 the governor of the gaol, had ever been in the coroner's hands, 
 such writ having been set out in a return which the gaoler had made 
 to a writ of habeas corpus previously issued, together with a certifi- 
 cate by the coroner, that the copy of the writ was a true one.* The 
 court has also presumed that a parish certificate purporting to he 
 granted by A, the only churchwarden, and B, the only overseer 
 of the parish, sixty years previously, during which the appellant 
 parish liad submitted to such certificate, was regular, and that, by 
 custom, there was only one churchwarden in the parish, and that 
 two overseers had been originally appointed, but that one of them 
 was dead, and his vacancy not filled up at the date of the certificate ; ^ 
 in favour of the regularity of a parish indenture of apprenticeship, 
 signed only by one churchwarden and one overseer ; ' in favoui- of 
 
 ' R.r. Allison. 1806. See Limerick 
 r, Limerick, lS();i. 
 
 ■' Kuj?}? ('. Kingsmill, 18G7 ; R. v. 
 Crfsswell, 1870. 
 
 41&42V.C.49; amended by 52 & 
 63 V. c. '21. 
 
 ♦ Hill V. Ilennigan, 1877 (Ir.). 
 
 » Bastard v. Trutch, 18;io. 
 
 « R. V. Catesby, 1824. See also, 
 E. V. Whitchurch, 1827. From R. v. 
 Upton Gray, 18.'50, it appears that 
 this presumption is rather one of fact 
 than of law. 
 
 ' R. v. Hinckley, 1810; R. v. Stain- 
 forth, 1845. 
 
 lau 
 
CHAP, v.] OFFICIAL AND JUDICIAL ACTS. 
 
 of 
 
 deeds of jmrisli appreiitice>lii|i — lliat where such a deed had been 
 allowed by justices as requind by the then law, in the absence 
 of evidence to the contrary, it must be taken that notice had been 
 duly given to the officers of the parish, where the apprentice was 
 to serve;' that where such a deed, certified by the allowance of 
 the justices, contained a recital of the order of binding, no 
 evidence of such order, beyond the indenture itself, is necessar}-,* 
 and that where an apprentice had served his time under a deed 
 executed thirty years before, and it was proved both that such 
 deed was lost, and that the parish in which the pauper was settled 
 under it had relieved him for the last twelve years, it must be 
 presumed that the deed was properly stamped, though the stamp 
 officers proved that it did not appear in their office that any 
 such indenture had been stamped during the last thirty-one 
 years.' 
 
 § 146. On this same principle of "omnia proosumuntur rite esse 
 acta," every reasonable intendment will be made in support of an 
 order of justices, provided it appear on the face of the order that 
 the justices had jurisdiction.* But this rule does not extend to 
 convictions, which, as combining summary power with penal con- 
 sequences, are watched with peculiar vigilance, and construed with 
 strictness at least as great as indictments.* Still, even with respect 
 to convictions, if the authority of the magis-trate can be distinctly 
 collected from the facts stated on the record, the court will not be 
 astute in discovering irregularities in the proceedings. The safest 
 rule on the subject is that laid down by Lord EUenborough, that 
 the court " can intend nothing in favour of convictions, and uill 
 intend nothing against them,"" and the conviction or order will bo 
 construed according to the very language employed in it.' 
 
 > E. V. Whiston, 1836 ; R. v. Wit- 
 ney, 1836. 
 
 '■* E. V. Stainforth, 1845. Soo also 
 E. V. 8t. Mary Magdalen, 1803 ; E. v. 
 lii'oadhempston, 1859. 
 
 f E. V. Long Buckby, 1805. Both 
 this case, and E. v. Catesby, 1824, 
 cited above, partly rested on the 
 presumption of validity arising from 
 long acquiescence. See ante, §§ 126 — 
 131, 139 
 
 * E. V. Morris, 1792 (Ld. Kenyon); 
 Onnerod v. Chadwiek, 1847 ; E. v. 
 
 Preston, 1848; E. v. Stainforth, 1845. 
 
 ' E. V. Morris, 1792; E. v. Baines, 
 noO; Fletcher v. (.'althrop, 1845; E. 
 V. Little, 1758 (Ld. Mansfield); W.v. 
 Cordon, 1769, whore tho court ob- 
 served that "a tight hand ought to 
 be holden over tlieso summary con- 
 victions :" E. V. Pain, 1826 (Abbott^ 
 C.J.); E. V. Daman, 1819. 
 
 » E. V. Hazell, 1810. See Paley 
 on Conv. 74 — 77. 
 
 ' E. V. Helling, 1715, 1716 (Pratti 
 C.-Lj; Christie V. Unwin, 1840 (Cole, 
 
 lil K l 
 
 I i ■ 
 
 m 
 

 
 
 m ii 
 
 I 
 
 OFFICIAL AND JUDICIAL ACTS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 § 147. Neither does the rule tliat "omnia pnpsumuntur ritA essso 
 acta" apply, 80 as in any event to (jia' jurisdiction to authorities 
 acting judioinlly unflcr a special statutory power; but in all such 
 cases every circumstance lequired by the statute to give juris- 
 diction mud appear on the face of the proceedings, either by direct 
 averment, or by reasonable intendment.* There is no distinction, 
 in this respect, between convictions, commitments,* inquisitions, 
 warrants to arrest, examinations, or orders;' and whether an order 
 under a special act be made by the Lord Chancellor or by a justice 
 of the peace, the facts which gave the cuthority must be stated.* 
 A presumption that an Ecclesiastical Court will exceed its juris- 
 diction will not be made.' On the same principle the courts 
 refuse to anticipate the decision of the master on a question of 
 costs, as they cannot presume that he will decide erroneously.^ 
 
 § 147a. The presumption under consideration is ignored in the 
 case of highway rates. In such cases, although its recognition 
 would have been productive of much public advantage, the pro- 
 duction of the official book, with the rate duly entered in it and 
 allowed, does not even furnish at least primA facie evidence of a 
 highway rate ; and the fact that it has been duly published must 
 still 3 proved by independent evidence.^ With regard to poor- 
 rates, however, it has been expressly enacted, that " the production 
 of the book purporting to contain a poor-rate, with the allowance 
 of the rate by the justices, shall, if the rate is made in the form 
 prescribed by law, be primS. facie evidence of the due making and 
 publication of such rate."* 
 
 § 148. The doctrine that " omnia prsesumuntur rite esse acta " 
 
 ridge, J.); In re Clark, 1842 (Ld. 
 Donman.). 
 
 ' E. ('. All Saints, Southampton, 
 1828 (Holroyd, J. ) ; Gosset v. Howard, 
 1847 ; R. V. Helling, 1715, 1716 
 (Pratt, C. J.) ; R. v. Totness, 1849 ; R. 
 V. Hulcott, 179fi, and note to § 147, 
 infra. 
 
 ■^ But a warrant of commitment 
 which purports to be founded on a 
 preceding conviction will be good, 
 though it does not state that the evi- 
 dence was given on oath, or in the 
 presence of the prisoner : Ex parte 
 Bailey, and Ex parte Collier, 1854. 
 
 » Day V. King, 1836 (Williams, 
 J.); Brook V. Jenney, 1841 (per id.); 
 Johnson v. Reid, 1840 ; Gosset v. 
 Howard, 1847. 
 
 * Christie v. Unwin, 1840 (Cole- 
 ridge, J.), 
 
 » Chesterton v. Farlar, 1838; Hall 
 V. Maule, 1838; Hallack v. U. of 
 Cambridge, 1841. 
 
 • Head v. Baldry, 1838. 
 ' Bird V. Adcock, 1878. 
 
 ' " The Poor Rate Assessment and 
 Collection Act, 1869" (32 & 33 V. 
 0. 41), § 18. 
 
 132 
 
CHAP, v.] SOLEMN ACTS OF PRIVATE I'EKSONS. 
 
 i V. 
 
 V. 
 
 is, in many instances, recognised in support of the solemn acts of 
 even private persons. For instance, if an act can only be lawful 
 after the performance of some prior act, due performance of that 
 prior act will be proaumed.' Again, although, in the case of 
 contracts not under seal, a consideration must in general be averred 
 and proved, bil/n of exchr.tuje and promissory notes are primA facie 
 presumed to be founded on valuable consideration,* this latter 
 presumption being made partly because it is important to preserve 
 the negotiability of such instruments intact, and partly, because 
 the existence of a valid consideration may reasonably be inferred 
 from the solemnity of the instruments themselves, and the deliberate 
 mode in which they are executed.' The following are further 
 examples of presumptions : if secondary evidence bo tendered to 
 prove the contents of an instrument either lost or detained by the 
 opposite party after notice to produce it, it will be presumed that 
 the original was duly stamped, unless some evidence to the con- 
 trary, as, for example, that it was unstamped when last seen,* can 
 be given ;* under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act, 
 1877, the execution of a lease by the lessor furnishes sufficient 
 presumptive evidence that the counterpart has been duly executed 
 by the lessee ; •• where lands originally leasehold have been dealt 
 with as freehold for a long period by jjersons in possession, as 
 between parties claiming under such jjersous, a presumption will 
 be raised that the reversion has been got in;' in the absence of 
 all proof as to which of two deeds of even date was first executed, 
 the court will presume in favour of that order of priority which 
 will best support the clear intent of the parties;* and where an act 
 has been done by a joint stock company, to the legality of which 
 certain formalities are requisite, and the circumstances are such 
 
 ' Kinpi's County v. Neath National 
 Bank, 1893 (Am.). 
 
 » 45 & -16 V. c. 61, § 30 ; Collins v. 
 Martin, 1 797 ; HoUiday v. Atkinson, 
 1826 ; Story, Bills, §§ 16, 178. See 
 ante, § 86. 
 
 3 Story, Bills, §§ 16, 178. 
 
 * Marine Investment Co. v. Havi- 
 side, 1872, H. L. 
 
 » Hart V. Hart, 1842 (Wipram, 
 V.-C.) ; Crowthe'r v. Solomons, 1S48 ; 
 Pooley V. Goodwin, 1836; Crisp v. 
 
 Anderson, 1815 ; E. v. Long Buckby, 
 1805 ; Closmadeuo v. Carrel, 1866. 
 Seo Arbon v. Fus.-ioll, 1862; Connor 
 V. Cronin, 1838 (Ir.) ; Herbert v. Hae, 
 1862 (Ir.1 (Smith, M.E.); 33 & 34 V. 
 C. 46, § 58, Ir. 
 
 • 40 &41 V. c. 18, §48. 
 
 ' Hqlmes v. Milward, 1878 (Fry, 
 J.). 
 
 * Taylor v. Horde, 1757. See E. 
 V. Asiiburton, 1846 ; Gartside v, 
 Silkstone, &c. Co., 1882. 
 
 133 
 
 ■fl, 
 
 ilili 
 
 'i 
 
 
 
 iiij( 
 
 ! 
 
 
 
EXECUTION OF DKEDS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 !i 
 
 that acquiescence may be imputcJ to the shareholders, a cora- 
 ])liance with the necessary formalities will, as against the company, 
 bo presumed.' 
 
 $i 149. On tlie same principle, where the atfontation of a deed hao 
 been in the usual forra,'^ and the signature of the party has boon 
 proved, the jury will ho advised to presume a duo sealing and 
 dclivc^ry, and that, too, in cases whore the attesting witness has 
 denied all recollection of any other form having boon gone through 
 beyond the more signing.'' Indeed, it is not necessary, to consti- 
 tute a valid sealing, that an impression should be made with wax 
 or with a wafer, but an impression made in ink with a wooden 
 blocik will sulHce ; ■* and even though no impression at all appear 
 on the parchment or jjaper, still, if the instrument purport to be a 
 deed, is on proper stamps, and be stated in the attestation to have 
 been duly sealed and delivered, it will, in the absence of evidence 
 to the contrary (especially if it be an ancient instrument),' be pre- 
 sumed to have been sealed.^ Evidence to the contrary will, how- 
 ever, be afforded where a bond, bearing no trace of any seal, and 
 referring to contemplated testamentary dispositions which are to 
 supersede it, is found among the papers of the ohliyorJ And a 
 transfer which bears upon it a printed circle, and within such 
 circle the words " I'lace for seal," but bears no actual seal, is not 
 a deed merely because its attestation clause says it was " signed, 
 senled, and delivered." * But a deed executed by a corporate body 
 need not have the corporate seal affixed to it, but the corporation 
 may adopt any prirate seal they ]tlease for the occasion, and the 
 jury may presume that the use of the adojjlcd seal was a corporate 
 
 • Qnidy's ruse, Rn The British 
 T'rov. Lift' mill Kirn Ahs. Soc, IW.i; 
 Lumo'h case, IKfiU (lid. Wi'stbury, ( '.). 
 
 '•' Ah to jn'csmiiiititm in favour of a 
 will liuviiij; a (lim uttrstatiou claiisi', 
 80(> jiost, § I(ir)(l. 
 
 ^ l'"ass(!t r. ilrnwii, ISfJl ; Ori-Uior 
 V. N«^ali>, 17i)() (lid. Kciiyon); Talhot 
 V. Ilod^'Hoii. ISKi; Hall v. Wiun- 
 brid.u:"', 11^1'''*; Biirlint; ". I'atoi'Hoii, 
 ITJI'i (I'attcson, J.); Davidwou u. 
 Cooper, 1,S»;J (Ld. Allin^'t•l■). Sc«n, 
 also, Il<)() IK lii'wis, IMItO; l)o(! )'. 
 Biu'di'tt, 1.SI3; Nowtoii ('. Uickctts, 
 IbiUl, 11. L. ; uud Buriihuin v, liuiuiutt, 
 
 V6i 
 
 1817. Tl'is ])rosiiiii])tion was for- 
 iiii'ily ticat(Ml as oiio of law, lnit is 
 now coiisidi'i-Dd Olio of fact, and loft 
 to till' jury. 
 
 * U. ('. St. raid's, Covcnt Oanlon, 
 IHI,-). 
 
 " Crawford and Lindsay Poer., 
 INIS, II. L. 
 
 " 111 rii Siiiidilands, 1871, citud by 
 Ld. l)iMiiiiaii in 1{. i<. St. I'aiirs, 
 Covont (JardiMi, 181,'». 
 
 ' Hi' Smith, Oswi'll r. Shophord, 
 18!IL>, C. A. 
 
 " Ho Btilkis Co., 1888. 
 
'^' 'I 
 
 CHAP, v.] 
 
 EXECUTION OF DKKDS. 
 
 act, if the instrument purport to be executed by tlie head and the 
 Huhordinnte nionibers of the corporiitiou " under their seal." ' The 
 presunijjtion in favour of the due execution of instruments was 
 (carried to a great Icngtli in a case'" in wliidi an action having been 
 brought upon the assignment of certain h)tt»;rs-patent to recover 
 the consideration nKmey named therein, one of the defen<lants 
 ])k!U(hMl non est factum, and produced the deed, wlu(;li was signed 
 and executed by all the jtarties to it excerpt himself, but with a 
 seal placed for him in the usual way. And he having acted 
 under tlie assignment, and liaving recognised it as a valid instru- 
 ment, it was presumed that he had duly execiuted it. 
 
 I5 150. In accordance, again, with the maxim, " omnia prmsu- 
 rauntur rite esse acta," every man is, in the absoncjo of evidence to 
 the contrary, presumed to know the contents of any deed which ho 
 executes,^ and to be bound by it. It is, however, enacted by UJ 
 EHz. c. o,"' that all conveyances of lands or chattels, which are not 
 made for a valuable consideration and bona fide,'' shall be void as 
 jigiiinst any person, including the Crown,'^ whoso (;laims on the 
 original owner of the proj)erty shall bo thereby delayed or dis- 
 turbtHl." Whenever, therefore, any transaction is sought to be 
 invalidated under this Act, the purchaser must both establish the 
 justice of his title, and show affirmatively, not only that the deed 
 under which he claims was duly executed, but that it was made in 
 perfect good faith, and also for a valuable, as contradistinguished 
 from a mere good, consideration.' In determining the (juestion of 
 boiia fides, the jury will take into considi^ration all the circum- 
 Btances connected with the transfer. If, therefore, the ccmveyance 
 be absolute, and passes to the V(>ndoe an in)m<Mliate right of j)os- 
 session, the fact of the vendor being allov.'cd to continue as the 
 apparent owner of the pro[)erty naturally raises a very strong 
 
 II' 
 
 
 
 ' JoncH ?'. Oiilway Town Coiiiiiiiss., 
 1«J7 (In). 
 
 '" ('liiaiy V. lloiniii},', lH4i). 
 
 ' 111 ro (.JodiHir, 1H82 (JohsoI, 
 M.K. . 
 
 ' Mado p(tr|)(4iml by '2i\ & 27 V. 
 c. l'2'>, iind aiiiiiixicd \>\ Stiituto liaw 
 .•Hcvisiim Act, IShN (,■)!" V, c. ;{). 
 
 * S(M) In 10 iiidlor, iiidlur v, lliUlor, 
 IbW, U. A. 
 
 • Shaw V, Uraii, IHHi; Mori'wood 
 V. "Wilk.H, WM; IVrkiim v. Ihadlry, 
 1H1L>. S(.(, Whitakor /'. WiHliiiy, lH,-)2. 
 
 ° S(H) Frci'miui V. I'opo, 1(S7(); 
 Crosshiy V. I'llwoithv, 1H71 ; Coniisli 
 V. Clark, l.S7li (1-d." Uoiiiilly) ; Knit 
 V. liil.'v. 1872 (lid. K(.iiiillv); (ic.ldcu 
 V. (iilluiiii, 1HS2, ('. A,; \]\ ])ai'le 
 lUis^.'ll, Hd lliittcrwditli, ib»2, C. A. 
 
 ' Tw) uo'h cubo, Hi.:, 
 
 135 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 

 f^ ' 
 
 
 \ 
 
 
 ■i- 
 
 r 
 
 1; 
 
 
 
 
 PRi:suMr"'ioNS respfxting deeds of gift, [part I. 
 
 presumption of fraud. ^ If, indeed, the conveyance or bill of salo 
 is by way of mortgage, and the mortgagee is not to take possession 
 till a default in payment of the mortgage money, then, as the 
 nature of the transaction does not call for any change of possession, 
 the absence of such change will not of itself furnish any evidencft 
 of collusion.* 
 
 § 160a. Bills of sale of personal chattels are, moreover, now ren- 
 dered void under the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, unless they set 
 forth the consideration for which they were given.' 
 
 § 151. Notwithstanding the maxim, "omnia prsesumuntur rit^ 
 esse acta," whenever any person by donation derives a benefit 
 under a deed to the prejudice of another person,* — and the more 
 especially so, if any confidential or fiduciary relation subsists 
 between the parties, — the courts so far presume against the validity 
 of the instrument as to require some proof (varying in amount 
 according to circumstances) of the absence of anything approach- 
 ing to imposition, over-reaching, undue influence, or unconscionable 
 advantage.* For example, a deed of gift, or other disposition of 
 property, except a will,^ made in favour of a solicitor by a 
 client,' of a medical attendant by a patient,* of a parson by one of 
 his congregation,* of a " spiritual medium " by one of his dupes,'" 
 of a trustee by a beneficiary," of an executor by a legatee,'^ of a 
 guardian by a ward, of a parent by a child,'^ of a Imsband by a 
 wife, of an agent by a principal,'* or of a shrewd' man of business 
 by an infirm ignorant old woman,'* will be regarded with jealous 
 
 ' Martindalo i;. Booth, 1832; Lin- 
 don V. Sharp, 1843 (Tindal, C.J.). 
 
 2 Martindiile v. Booth, 1832. 
 
 3 45 & 46 V. c. 43, § 8 ; 42 & 43 
 V. c. 50, § 8, Ir. Aa to what is a 
 BufRcient complianco with this rule, 
 Bee Ex parte Firth, Re Cowburn, 
 1882 ; Ilamlyn v. Betteley, 1880 ; 
 Hiuuilton V, Chaine, 1881, 0. A.; Ex 
 parte Rolfe, Re Spindler, 1881, C. A. 
 
 * Cooke V. Lamotte, 1851 (Romilly, 
 MR.). See Coutts v. Acworth, 1869. 
 
 » 1 Story, Eq, Jur. §§ 308—323. 
 See Baker v, Bradley, 1856. 
 
 « I'artitt V. Lawless, 1S72. See 
 Ash well V, Lomi, 1850. 
 
 ' (irosleyv. Itloii8loy,1859; O'Brien 
 V. liowis, 1863 ; Gardener v. Ennor, 
 1860; M'Phorson v. Watt, 1877, 
 
 H. L. 
 
 8 Mitchell V. Ilomfray, 1881, C. A. ; 
 Dent V. Bennett, 1858. 
 
 » Nottidge V. Prince, 1860; Hu- 
 guenin v, Baseley, 1807. 
 
 »» Lyon V. Home, 18G8 (Giffard, 
 V.-C). 
 
 »» liuff V. Lord, 1864. 
 
 " Gray u. Warner, 1873 (Wickons, 
 V.-C). 
 
 " Wright V. Vanderplank, 1056; 
 Bainbrigge v. Browne, 1881 (Fry, 
 J.) ; Hartopp v. Hartopp, 1855 ; 
 Dimsdale V. Dimsdale, 1856; Bury w. 
 Oppenhoim, 1859; Daviea v. Diivies, 
 1863 (Stuart, V.-C.) ; Potts v. Surr, 
 1865 ; Turner v. Collins, 1871, C. A. 
 
 '* King V. Anderson, 1874 (Ir.). 
 
 » Baker v. Monk, 1864 (L.JJ.); 
 
 13G 
 
 » 
 
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS IN DEALING WITH REVERSIONS. 
 
 10 
 
 suspicion, and the instrument will be set aside as conclusively void,' 
 or the person benefited will have thrown upon him the burthen of 
 establishing beyond all reasonable doubt the perfect fairness and 
 honesty of the entire transaction.^ 
 
 § 152. A grotesque attempt was made in Ireland to extend this 
 doctrine to a case in which a woman had, living in adultery with a 
 married man, assigned some of her property to secure a debt owing 
 by her paramour, and had the hardihood to afterwards apply to 
 the Court of Chancery to set aside the assignment on the ground 
 of undue influence. But it was held that the doctrine in question 
 was only applicable when some lawful relation existed between the 
 parties.' 
 
 § 153. The old Court of Chancery used to look with peculiar 
 favour on heirs apparent and other expectant heirs, who entered 
 into negotiations as to their expectancies.* Every person who dealt 
 with an expectant heir for his reversion had, if the transaction were 
 subsequently disputed, the burthen of proof upon him to establish 
 its entire fairness.* At the instance of some prominent lawyers,* 
 an Act passed in December, 1867, enacts, that " no purchase made 
 bona fide, and without fraud or unfair dealing, of any reversionary 
 interest in real or personal estate, shall hereafter be opened or set 
 aside merely on the ground of under-value." ' It will be noted 
 that this enactment is carefully limited to purchases " made bona 
 fide and without fraud or unfair dealing," and it not only leaves 
 untouched the law which governs unconscionable bargains, but 
 allows under-value to be still regarded by the court as a material 
 element in cases where fraud is charged.* 
 
 Summers v. Griffiths, 1866; Slator v. 
 Nolan, 1876 (Ir.). 
 
 ' Tomson v. Judge, 1835. This 
 was tlio case of a deed of gift by a 
 client to liis solicitoi'. 
 
 » 1 Story, Va\. Jur. §§ S08-323; 
 Hunter v. Atkins, 1832 ; Nedby v. 
 Nedby, 1852 ; Uoghton v. Iloghton, 
 1872; GroHvenor v. Shonatt, 1860; 
 Savery v. King, 1856, H. L. ; Espoy 
 V. Lake, 1852 ; Billage i'. Southoe, 
 1852. Son Price v. Price, 1852; 
 Toker v. Toker, 1863; Phillips r.Mul- 
 lingH, 1871, C. A.; King v. Anihr.son, 
 1874 (Ir.) See Taylor v. Johnston, 
 1882. 
 
 137 
 
 ' Ilargroave V. Evevard, 1856 (Ir.). 
 
 • Hroniloy v. Smith. 1859; Ld. 
 Portmore v. Taylor, 1H31 ; Davies v. 
 I), of Marlborough, 1818; Sharp v. 
 Leach, 18(i2 ; Croft v. Graham, 1863; 
 Perfect v. Lane, 1861 ; Benyon v. 
 Fitch, 1866. 
 
 • See cases cited in last note. 
 
 • See Webster v. Cook, 1867, C. A. 
 (Ld. Chelmsford, C). 
 
 ' 31 V. c. 4. § 1. See Miller v. 
 Cook, 1870; Tyler v. Yates, 1871 
 (Ld. Hatherloy, C); JucUl v. Groon, 
 1876. 
 
 » Ld. Aylesford v. Morris, 187.3 
 (Ld. Selborne, C.) ; Beynon v. Cook, 
 
 t 
 
 ill 
 
 i 
 
 
tifin n 
 
 i'« 
 
 ijpiui 
 
 fl^iii 
 
 .1; ' .i.i 
 
 INCUMBRANCES — CHARITABLE GRANTS. [_PAET 1. 
 
 § 154. It is a presumption that a tenant for life, or other person 
 having a partial interest in settled estates, who pays off an incum- 
 brance upon them, intends to keep the charge alive as against the 
 inheritance for his own benefit.^ This presumption, however (on 
 technical rather than on substantia) grounds), is inapplicable to a 
 case where a tenant for life pays off the bond debts of the settlor.* 
 Neither does it extend to the ease of a charge bearing interest, 
 where, — the rents and profits of the estate having been insufficient 
 to meet the interest, — the tenant for life has paid the balance of it 
 out of his own pocket, without having warned the remainderman 
 of his intention to charge the excess of his payments on the 
 inheritance.^ 
 
 ^ lo5. Certain presumptions are also recognised as to charitable 
 imtitidions, and in interpreting charitable grants. Thus, if the 
 charity be founded to support a religious establishment, or to pro- 
 mote religious education, and the intentions of the founder be not 
 clearly expressed, the prima facie presumption is, first, that he 
 intended to support an establishment belonging to some particular 
 form of religion, or to promote the teaching of cerLain particular 
 doctrine ; next, that the form of religion or doctrine contemplated 
 was that which he himself had professed ; and lastly, if no evidence 
 be adduced of his entertaining particular religious views, that the 
 established religion of the country was the one meant to be sup- 
 ported. If, however, the charity were founded for purposes of 
 mere secular education, or if it were one of a purely eleemosynary 
 character, the court, in the absenca of any expressed intention to 
 the contrary, will presume that its benefits are intended to be 
 shared by all persons, whatever their religious opinions.'* 
 
 § I06. It is also now presumed (contrary to what was once 
 considered to be the law) that an estate for life without impeach- 
 ment of waste does not confer upon the tenant for life any legal 
 right to commit " equitable tcaste," unless an intention to confer 
 BUL'h right exfiressly appears in the instrument creating the estate.* 
 
 1875. C. A. SoG, also, Novill v. 
 Sncllin-r, 1880; O'Horko v. Buliug- 
 brokc, 1877, II. L. See, too, Uuu,, 
 ch. XXV. vv. 29 — 34. 
 
 ' Morley v. Morloy, anil Hailiind 
 V. Morloy, 18.J3. Soo post, § i70A. 
 
 '^ 1(1. Bee lloddam v. Morley, 
 18J7. 
 
 ' Ld. Konsiiigton v. Bouvcrie, 
 1859, II. L. 
 
 * Att.-Goii. V, Calvert, 1857 
 (Eoniillv, M. R.). 
 
 " ;i() & ;i7 V. 0. G() ("Tlu! Supreme 
 Court of Judicature Act, 1873 "), 
 § 25, subs. 3 ; 40 & 41 V. 0. 67, § 28, 
 Hubs. 3, ^Ir.). 
 
 1^8 
 
iMi' 
 
 n 
 
 o5 
 
 CHAP, v.] JOINT TENANCY — VOLUNTARY SETTLKMENT8. 
 
 § 157. The presumptions, or, rather, the rules of construction 
 recognised in equity with respect to Joint tciKtncy are " not very 
 comprehensible." ^ If two persons jointly advance money on 
 HWitgage, a mere tenancy in common will be created, though the 
 [iroperty be conveyed to them as joint tenants, because the law 
 presumes that men will not willingly speculate with money which 
 they lend.^ But, on the other hand, if two persons jointly advance 
 money as jmrc/tHners, and the sums paid by each be equal, a joint- 
 tenancy will be established, because here it is supposed that men 
 will readily gamble as to survivorship with respect to property 
 which they buy.' If, however, two persons make a purchase, and 
 one of them advances more of the purchase-money than the other, 
 even tliough the deed does not contain the words " equally to be 
 divided " there will be no survivorship.* 
 
 § 158. The existence of some mistake in it will not be presumed 
 from the absence frora a voluntary settlement of a power of revo- 
 cation. The circumstance will, however, generally be taken into 
 account, as entitled to weight, in deciding on the validity of the 
 instrument.* Parties relying upon an irrevocable voluntary settle- 
 ment ought, therefore, to be prepared to prove that the settlor was 
 properly advised when he executed it, that he thoroughly under- 
 stood the effect of omitting the power, and that he intended to 
 omit it.* 
 
 § 159. It is, in the absence of any express stipulation to the 
 contrary, since the 1st of August, 1870, presumed, that " all rents, 
 annuities," — which term includes salaries and pensions,"- " divi- 
 dends,' and other periodical payments, in the nature of income, 
 whether reserved or made payable under an instrument in writing 
 or otherwise," accrue from day to day, like interest on money lent, 
 and are apportionable in respect of time accordingly.* The statute 
 
 ' See Harrison v. Barton, 1801, 
 and the remarks there of Wood, V.-C. 
 » Petty V. Styward, 16;}2. 
 ' Rigdon V. Vallier, 1751, 
 
 ♦ Hall V. Hall, 1873, C. A. ; 
 Phillips V. Mullings, 1874, C. A. See, 
 also, Welman v. Wolman, 1880. 
 
 » Id. 
 
 • Treacv v. Corcoran, 1874 (Ir.) ; 
 33 & 34 V. c. 3.j (" The Apportion- 
 ment Act, 1870"), §3. 
 
 ' See In re Griffith, Carr v. Griffith, 
 1879 (Jfssel, M. R.). 
 
 8 33 & 34 V. c. 35, §§ 2, 7. See, 
 also, 4 & 5 W. 4, c. '22 ("The Ap- 
 portionment Act, 1834"). See Jonog 
 V. Ogle, 1873, 0. A. See, also, C'apron 
 V. Cupron, 1874 ; Ro Cline'a Estate, 
 1870; Pollock i'. I'ollock, 1874 ; llae- 
 liick I'. IVdlcy, 1875; Daly r. Att.- 
 Geii., 1870 (Ir.); Re i'ox's Trusts, 
 1878 (Hall. V.-C.); Swansea lik. v. 
 Thomus, 187U. 
 
 139 
 
 t ■'I 
 
 If 
 
im- 
 
 •! :!•' 
 
 EXECUTION or WILLS. 
 
 [rAET I. 
 
 providing this extends to wills, wliich, though executed before its 
 passing, have come into operatii)n i^iuce its date.' 
 
 § 160. T/iere exint the foHoicing presutnptions with respect to 
 the execution, alteration, and revocation of wills : * — First, on 
 proof of the signature of the deceased, he will be presumed 
 to have known and approved of the contents and effect of the 
 instrument he has signed ; * such knowledge and approval being 
 essential to the validity of the will.^ This presumption, how- 
 ever, is liable to be rebutted by showing any suspicious circum- 
 stances.* Therefore, if the testator, from want of education, or 
 from bodily infirmity, was unable to read," or if his capacity at 
 the time of executing the instrument is a matter of doubt ; ' 
 or if the party who is materially benefited by the will has pre- 
 pared it, or conducted its execution, or has been in a position 
 calculated to exercise undue influence ; * or if the instrument itself 
 is not consonant to the testator's natural affections and moral 
 duties ; * — a more rigid investigation will take place, and probate 
 will generally not be granted, unless the court be satisfied by evi- 
 dence that the paper propounded really does express the true will 
 of the deceased '° In cases of extraordinary suspicion, it will be 
 highly expedient to prove, either that instructions were given by 
 the deceased corresponding with the actual provisions of the will, 
 or that the instrument was, at the time of execution, road to or by 
 
 M 
 
 w 
 
 n)»ij 
 
 » Constable V. Constable, 1879 (Fry, 
 J.). The Act applies where a tenant 
 for life dies after its passing, but the 
 testator, under whose will he took, 
 died before that date; Lawrence v. 
 Lawrence, 1884 (Pearson, J.). 
 
 * For other presumptions respecting 
 wills made prior to Ist Jan., 1838, 
 see the former editions of this Work, 
 §§ 131 — 134. 
 
 ^ Billinghurst v. Vickers, 1810; 
 Fawcett V. Jones, 1810; Guardhouse 
 1'. Blackburn, 18G6; Wheeler v, 
 Alderson, 1831 ; Browning v. Budd, 
 1848, P. C. 
 
 * Hastilow V. Stobie, I860 (Wilde, 
 J. 0., overruling a dictum of Cress- 
 well, J. 0., in Middlehurst v. John- 
 son, 1861 j. See Cloare v. Cleare, 
 1869. 
 
 » Von Stentz v. Comyn, 1848 (Ir.) 
 (Brady, C). 
 
 * Barton v. Robins, 1769; In re 
 
 Duane, 1862; In re Wray, 1769 
 (Ir.) ; but see Loiigchamp v. Fish, 
 1807. 
 
 ' 1 Phillim. E. 193; Ingram v. 
 Wyatt, 1«28; Dodge v. Meeuh, 1828; 
 Dufaur v. Croft, lft40, P. C. 
 
 " Mitchell V. Thomas, 1847, P. C. ; 
 Scouler v. Plowright, 1856, P. C. ; 
 Eaworth v. Marriott, 1833 ; Greville 
 V. Tylee, 1851, P. C. ; Pasko y. 
 Ollat, 1815 ; Zacharias v. Collis, 
 1820 ; Wheeler v. Alderson, 1831 ; 
 Billinghurst v. Vickers, 1810; Ful- 
 ton V. Andrews, 1875, 11. L. (Ld. 
 Cairns, C); Durling v. Lovelund, 
 1839 ; Chambers v. Wood, 1848 (Ld. 
 Cottenham); Paine v. Hall, 1812; 
 O'Connel v. Butler, 1819 (Ir.); Gore 
 V. Oahagan, 1819 (Ir.). 
 
 • See Prinsep and E. India Co. v. 
 Dvce Sombre, 1832, P. C. 
 
 '" Browning v. Budd, 1848, P. 0.; 
 Fulton V. Andrew, 1875, H. L. 
 
 140 
 
 m 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 EXECUTION OF WILLS. 
 
 the testator, or that he had expressed some subsequent knowleilgo 
 and approval of its dispositions ; but this precise species of evidence 
 is not absolutely required, and it will be sufficient if, by any means 
 of proof, a knowledge and approval of the contents of the will can 
 be brought home to the deceased.' 
 
 § 161. Secoii(f/i/, wliere proof can be furnished that, prior to the 
 execution of a will by a competent testator, it was either read over 
 to him, or otherwise brought specially to his notice, the Probate 
 Division will, in the absence of fraud, not only infer, prima facie, 
 that he approved of the contents, but will recognise a coiiclitairo 
 presumption to that effect. No matter what evidence may be 
 forthcoming to establish a case of obvious error, or to show that 
 some passage has crejjt into the instrument by a sheer mistake of 
 the draughtsman, the judge will turn a deaf ear to all such testi- 
 mony.'^ Where, however, the jury found as facts, both that a certain 
 word had been introduced into the will by a blunder, and that the 
 clauses in which it appeared had never been brought to the notice 
 of the testator in any way, the court directed that the obnoxious 
 expression should be struck out of the instrument wherever it 
 occurred.' 
 
 § 162. Thirdltf, in the absence of direct proof, when several 
 sheets of paper, constituting a connected disposal of property, ara 
 found together, the last only being duly signed and attested as a 
 will, it will (even in spite of partial inconsistencies in some of the 
 provisions) be presumed that each of the sheets so found ■! ^^med a 
 part of the will at the time of its execution.* 
 
 § 163. Fourthly, it is, in favour of attestations to wills, presumed 
 that if a testator might have seen them, that he, in fact, did see, the 
 witnesses subscribe their names.* The fact of his having been in 
 the same room with them is prima facie evidence of their attesta- 
 
 . I 
 
 ' Barry v. Butlin, 1838, P. C. ; 
 Mitchell V. Thomas, 1847, P. C. 
 See further on this subject, 1 Will, 
 on Ex. 97, 311, 312; and Atter v. 
 Atkinson, 1869. 
 
 ' Guardhouse v. Blackburn, 1866 
 (Ld. Penzance); Harter v. Harter, 
 1872 (Sir J. Hannen). Sed qu., for 
 the judicial reasoning in these cases 
 is not so logical as might fairly be 
 
 expected. See In re Oswald, 1874. 
 
 » Morrell v. Morrell, 1882. 
 
 * Marsh v. Marsh, 1858; Gregory 
 V. Queen's Proctor, 1846; Rees v. 
 Eees, 1873. See, also, In re Cattrall, 
 1863. 
 
 » Todd V. Ld. Winchelsea, 1826 
 (Abbott, J.); Doe V. Manifold, 1814. 
 See post, § 1054. 
 
 141 
 
 1 J 
 
 t i 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 ;; \ 
 
 \ ' 
 
 
 
ALTERATIONS IN WILLS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 tion in bis presence, while an attestation not made in the same 
 room is prim& facie not made in his presence.* 
 
 § 164. Fifthly, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
 the law presumes that all alferntiom, interlineations, or erasures, 
 which may appear on the face of a will, were made after its execu- 
 tion,^ and even after the execution of any codicils thereto.' Con- 
 sequently the Probate Division of the High Court will, in a case 
 of unexplained alteration, interlineation,* or erasure, only grant 
 probate of the will in its original form.* This presumption, how- 
 ever, — which is contrary to that which jjrevails with respect to 
 deeds,* resolutions, and other official documents,'— may be rebutted 
 by slight affirmative evidence,^ such as a statdment in the attesta- 
 tion clause that a will had been executed " with a few alterations."" 
 And it will not apply at all to the filling up of blanks. Therefore, 
 where a testator gave instructions that his will should be prepared 
 with blanks for the amount of the legacies, and after his death the 
 will was found regularly executed, with the amounts filled up in 
 his own handwriting, it was, in the absence of all evidence on the 
 subject, presumed that the blanks were filled up before the will 
 was signed, since otherwise the execution would have been a mere 
 idle ceremony.'" 
 
 § 16u. Sui/i/i/, if a will, traced to the possession of the testator, 
 
 ;^ 1 ,:•■ , 
 
 If ■(;]' 
 
 ' Noil V. Neil, 1820, 1839 (Am.). 
 
 « Siinmoiids r. KmlnU, 1K,>(); ])oo 
 r. Ciitoiiioro, 18 Jl ; Doe v. I'lilinor, 
 18.)1 ; In re fStone James, 16J8 ; 
 Williuins I'. Ashton, 18(5' . 
 
 » Lushiugton v. Onhlow, 1848 (Sir 
 II. Fust). See, also, Christmas v. 
 Whinyat'es, 18(j3. 
 
 ♦ In re Wliito, 1861. But see In 
 re Cadge, 18G8. 
 
 » Gann v. Gregorj', 18o3 (Stuart, 
 V.-C); Coojun- v. Bockett, 18(i3, 
 P. C. ; Grcvillo r. Tylee, 18Jl, P. C. ; 
 In re Hardy, 18()1. A curious in- 
 stance of this occurred lately. A 
 will was found with pieces of paper 
 stating the amounts of certain 
 legacies pasted over it. These were 
 presumed to have been made since 
 execution, and so not admitted to 
 probate. At that time the original 
 figur(!s, imdeiiieath the pieces so 
 pasted on, could not be read, so 
 
 they wore also not admitted to 
 pr()i)ate. Aboiit twenty years after- 
 wards it was found that these original 
 figures were legible, and the probate 
 was amended by ins(3rtii)g them ; 
 Flinch V. Combe, 1894. See llules 
 for Reg. of Ct. of I'rob. in Non-con- 
 tentious Business, Nos. 8— 10. 
 
 " Simmonds v. lludall, 1850 ; Doe 
 V. Catomoro, 1851. 
 
 ' Stoovous's Hospital v, Dyas, 1863 
 (Ir.). 
 
 '* Soo Dench v. Dench, 1878 ; In re 
 Dully, 1871 (Ir.); and In re Sykes, 
 1873; Moore v. Moore, 1871 fir.). 
 The presumption, moreover, has oeen 
 altogetiior set at nought in the case 
 of a will made by an oHicer in actual 
 military service : In re Farcpiharson 
 V. Tweedalo, 187'). Sed ou. 
 
 » Doherty v. Dwyer, 18"9() (Ir.). 
 
 '0 Birch V. Birch, 1 848 (Sir II. Fust) ; 
 Greville v. Tylee, 1851. 
 
 142 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 REVOCATION OF WILLS. 
 
 and last seen in his custody, be not forthcoming on his death, a 
 presumption is made under ordinary circumstances, and unless 
 there he sufficient evidence to rebut it, that such will has been 
 destroyed by the testator, animo cancellandi.* But the declarations 
 of a testator, whether written or oral, and whether made before or 
 at or after* the execution of the instrument, in such cases furnish 
 cogent proof of his intentions.' Again, the finding of the will 
 among the testator's papers, with the signature cut out, raises a 
 presumption tliat the mutilation was efffoted intentionally by the 
 testator himself ; and the will cannot be regarded as revived, though 
 the signature has been again attached by gum to its original placn, 
 and the document, when discovered, was in that condition.* In 
 the event, moreover, of a testator having become insane after the 
 will was made, the burthen of proving that it was destroyed by 
 him while of sound mind lies upon the party who sets up the revo- 
 cation.' The revocation of a will by the testator was at one time 
 considered to raise a prima facie, though by no means a conclusive, 
 presumption that the testator intended to revoke every codicil to 
 it," but this presumption no longer prevails ; and now a codicil 
 (however dependent it may be on the will) can only be revoked in 
 one of the methods prescribed by the Wills Act.' 
 
 § 166. With regard to gifts in wills, the following presump'ons 
 arise. It is, in the absence of any distinct intimation to the con- 
 trary, presumed that every testator considers his estate sufficient to 
 answer the purposes to which he has by his will devoted it. Con- 
 sequently, in the event of any deficiency arising in the assets, all 
 annuities and legacies will, prima facie, be held to abate rateably. 
 In all cases the onus lies upon those who claim any priority to 
 furnish conclusive proof from the language employed, that the 
 
 ■I 
 
 > Supdon v.lA. St. Loonards, 1876, 
 C.A.; Welch V. Phillips, LSJO, V. C. 
 (Parke, B.) ; Finch v. Finch, 1807; 
 Johnson v, Lyford, 18(58; Podniore 
 ('. Whntton, 1861 ; Dickinson v. 
 Stidolph, 1861 ; ]5rown v. Brown, 
 1858; In re Brown, 18.58; Wood v. 
 Wood, 1867 ; ditto v. Gilbert, 1854, 
 P. C. (Dr. Lushington). 
 
 » Sugdon V. Ld. St. Leonards, 1876, 
 overruling Quick v. Quick, 1864. 
 
 ' Whiteley v. King, 1854 ; Keen v. 
 Keen, 1873; Sugden v. Ld. St. 
 
 Loonnrds, 1876. Sco also Saunders 
 I'. Saunders, 1.S48; Williams f. Jones, 
 1849; Patton v. Poulton, 1858; 
 Ecker.sley ('. Piatt, 1866. 
 
 • Bell V. Fothorgill, 1870. 
 
 • Spriggo V. Spriggo, 1868. 
 
 • Grimwood?'. Cozens, 1860; In re 
 Button, 1862; Medlycott v. Asshoton, 
 1824 ; Clogstown u. Walcot, 1847. 
 But see In re EUice, 1864 ; Black v. 
 Jobling. 1869. 
 
 ' Be Turner, 1872 (Ld. Penzance). 
 
 143 
 
 i 
 
 
 1 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 1' 
 
 i 
 
BliQUKST OF ANNUITY LEGACY TO EXECUTORS. [PT. I. 
 
 testator intended th« bequests not to stand on an equal footing.* 
 Again, it is prima facie presumed that property specifically be- 
 queatlicd or devised was intended by the testator to pass to the 
 legatee or devisee in its entirety ; and this presumption will not be 
 rebutted by a codicil, charging certain pecuniary legacies on all 
 the testator's estates, both real and personal.^ If, too, an annuity 
 be bequeathed by will for an indefinite period, the law will pre- 
 sume, in the first instance, that it was intended to be given for the 
 life of the annuitant ; but this presumption is liable to be rebutted 
 by proof that the testator has used words which indicate an inten- 
 tion tliat the annuity should be granted, either in perpetuity, or 
 for a fixed number of years.' 
 
 § 167. It is likewise prima facie presumed that a legacy 
 bequeathed to a person, who is also named in the will as an 
 executor, was given to him in that character, and consequently 
 if such person decline to accept the office, he must relinquish the 
 legacy, unless he can show, from the language employed, that 
 the bequci-t was made to him independently of his character 
 of executor, and solely as a token of personal regard.'* When, 
 too, under the terms of a will, the consent of executors or 
 trustees is rendered necessary to the validity of any act, the law 
 presumes, in the absence of any express direction on the subject, 
 that this discretionary power should be exercised by those only 
 who undertake the duties of the office ;* and an executor or trustee, 
 who, even without any formal renunciation or disclaimer, declines 
 to accept the office or to act in the trusts, thereby relieves the 
 parties interested from the responsibility of obtaining his consent.^ 
 It also is presumed, in the absence of evidence of intention to the 
 contrary, when executors are appointed, and the residuary estate is 
 undif-posed of, that the executors are trustees for the next of kin ; ' 
 
 > Miller v. Huddlostone, 1851 (Ld. 
 Truro); Brown v. Brown, 183(3; 
 Thwaites v. Foreman, 1844 ; Dun- 
 boyne v. Brander, 1854. 
 
 * Conron v. Conron, 1858, H. L. ; 
 Campbell v. M'Conaghey, 1870 (Ir.). 
 
 ' Y.ates V. Maddan, 1851 ; Lett v. 
 Randall, I860 ; Stokes v. Heron, 
 1845, H. L. ; Potter v. Baker. 1850; 
 Blewitt V. Roberts, 1841; Hill v. 
 Ratley, 1862 (Wood, V.-C.) ; Sul- 
 livan V. Galbraith, 1870 (Ir.). 
 
 * Stackpole v. Howell, 1807 ; In re 
 Reeve's Trusts, 1877 (Jessel, M. R.); 
 Harrison v, Rowley, 1798; Reed v. 
 lJ(!vayne8, 1791 ; TJix v. Reed, 1823; 
 Piggott V. Green, 1833; Jewis v. 
 Lawrence, 1869 ; In re Banbury's 
 Trusts, 1876 (Ir.); In re Reeve's 
 Trusts. 1877 (Jessel, M. R.). 
 
 » AVhite V. M'Dermott, 1872 (Ir.). 
 
 • Id. 
 
 Ml G. 4& 1 W. 4, 0. 40. 
 
 144 
 
 '» 
 
 ,KH 
 
CHAP, v.] MEANING OF TERMS USED IN WILLS. 
 
 and that if there be no next of kin (as where the testator is illegiti- 
 mate), that they may retain the property for their own use instead 
 of its becoming forfeited to the Crown.' The presumptions of law 
 with rrgiird to emblements ' are somewhat capricious ; '" for it is 
 presumed that the personal representatives of a man dying seised 
 in foe of land are entitled to the emhlements in preftrence to the 
 heir, but where there is a devise of the land, that the testator 
 intended them to pass to such devisee.' This capricious presump- 
 tion may he rebutted by a specific bequest of the growing crops, or 
 " farming stock,"* to another party ; but the title of the devisee to 
 tliem will not be ousted by a mere disposition of all the testator's 
 personal estate.' 
 
 § 168. There is a prima facie presumption that the following 
 terms, when used in wills, bear the following meanings : — The word 
 "children" is limited — as it also is when employed in the Statute 
 of Distributions," — to such children as are legitimate according 
 to the law of England ; and this presumption will be conclusive, 
 unless there be something in the will itself to show clearly an 
 intention to provide for natural children.' In this last event, such 
 a child, though en ventre sa mere at the date of the will, is 
 included in the term.* The word " cousins," in a will, is inter- 
 preted to mean " first cousins " only ; — first cousins being persons 
 who are cousins german, that is, persons having the same 
 grandparents ; while " second cousins " prima facie means persona 
 having the same great-grandparents." Neither " cousins " nor 
 " second cousins " will, in the absence of an evident intention,'* 
 include the children or grandchildren of first cousins, who are 
 commonly called first cousins once or twice removed." Again : 
 a testator who uses the word " family " will be presumed, primjl 
 
 ' In re Knowles, 1880 (Mulins, 
 V.-C.j. 
 
 ' The old technical term "enhla- 
 vmce de Met," for the profits of a 
 growing crop. 
 
 ''» Westv. Moore, 1807 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough). 
 
 ' Cooper V. Woolfitt, 1857. 
 
 * Evans y. Williamson, 1881, C. A. 
 (Jesscl, M. E.). 
 
 " Cooper V. Woolfitt, 1867. 
 
 • 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, as amended 
 
 by " Stat. Law Rev. Act, 1888" (51 V. 
 c. 3) ; In re Goodman's Trusts, 1880. 
 ' Dorin v. Dorin, 1875, H. L. ; 
 Ellis V. Houstoun, 1878; Boyes v. 
 Bodale, 1863 ; Megsou v. Ilindle, 
 
 1880, C. A. See Laker v. Hordern, 
 1876. 
 
 8 Crook V. Hill, 1876. 
 
 ' Ee Parker, Bentham v, Wilson, 
 
 1881, C. A. 
 
 '" Re Bonuor, Tucker v. Good, 
 1881. 
 
 T. — VOL. 1. 
 
 145 
 
 ilpi 
 
 I ' 1! 
 
 !i li 
 
 I!!' 
 
li 
 
 1 ■ 
 
 i', 
 
 li.. 
 
 
 
 \u 
 
 'iWll! \U 
 
 PRKSUMPTIONS RESPECTING DATE OF DOCUMENTS. [I'T. I. 
 
 facie, to mean the cliiidren, if any, of the person whose family 
 is spoken of, and there must be a special context to give the 
 word a different meaning.' Further, the word " moneys " in a 
 testamentary instrument, will, in the absence of anything in the 
 instrument indicating a different intention,' bo confined to ready 
 money actually in hand ; * the word " furniture " — unless under 
 special circumstances ■* — will not include tenant's fixtures ; * the 
 term " debentures " will not include " debenture stock " ; " and tlie 
 term " unmarried " will, unless otherwise explained by the context, 
 mean " without ever having been married." ' 
 
 S 169. Another general prima facie presumjttion of law is, that 
 all (locuiucnts urrc tiiddc on t/ic day they hear (lafv.^ This presump- 
 tion obtains, whether the document be a modern or ancient deed," 
 a bill of exchange or promissory note,'" an account," or even a 
 letter ; ''^ and whether it be written by a party to the suit or not." 
 The rule, however, has been only recognized with reluctance by at 
 least some distinguished judges,'* and it is, moreover, certainly 
 subject to two except ioiin}^ The first is, where, in order to prove a 
 petitioning creditor's debt, an instrument is put in signed by the 
 bankrupt, which purports to bear date before the act of bankruptcy. 
 The effect of a proceeding in bankruptcy being retrospective,'® and 
 to invalidate all transactions which have taken place between the 
 act of bankruptcy and the time when the adjudication takes effect, 
 the court feels a reasonable jealousy of a collusion between the 
 petitioning creditor and the bankrupt, and, accordingly, requires 
 that independent proof of the existence of the instrument, previous 
 to the act of bankruptcy, shnuia be given in evidence." The 
 
 ' rigg V. Claiko, 1876 (Jeseol, 
 M. H.). 
 
 - St'O Re Cadogan, Cudogan v. 
 Paluj^i, 18815. 
 
 •' I,angdale v. Whitfield, 1838 
 (■\V()()d, V.-C); Williams v. Williams, 
 1877 (Haggallay, L. J.). 
 
 * I'atou V. Shopiiard, 18139. 
 '• Finney i'. Grico, 1878 (Jossol, 
 
 M. 1{.). 
 
 " In re Lane, 1S8(). 
 
 ' Dulrymplo r. Hall, 1881. 
 
 " Malpas V. Clements, 18o(); Potez 
 V. GlosHop, 1848; Morgan v. Whit- 
 inoro, 1852. 
 
 • Anderson w. Weston, 1840; Davies 
 V. l.iivtndes, 1843; Doe r. ■•^tiUweil, 
 1838; Smith v. Battens, 1834. 
 
 146 
 
 '0 4o & 46 V. c. 61 (" The Bills of 
 Exchange Aet, 1882 "). § 13 ; Ander- 
 son I'. Weston, 1840; Smith v. 
 Battens, 1834. 
 
 " Sinclair v. Baggnley, 1838. 
 
 " I'oti'z V. Glossop, 1848; Lewis?'. 
 Simpson, 1848, and Angell c. Worslev, 
 1840; Hunt r. Massey, 1834 ; Good- 
 title V. Millhurn, 1837. 
 
 '•> Potez r. Glossop, 1848; Anderson 
 V. Weston, 1840 (Hosanquet, J.). 
 
 '* Potez ('. Glossop, 1848. See also 
 Butler V. Mountgarrot, 1859, II. L. 
 (lid. Wensleydale). 
 
 '* See also Re Adamson, 1875. 
 
 '« 46 & 47 V. c. 52 ("The Bank- 
 ni])tcy Act. 18S;5"), §43. 
 
 " Andeison y. Weston, 1840 (Bos- 
 
 !!! 
 
 ii 
 
UIIAP. v.] DATE OF D0LUMKNT8 — ACTING IN OFFICKS. 
 
 s roiid except ion is, where, in petitions for dariages for ndultory,' 
 letters are put in evidence to show the terms on which the Imshand 
 and wife were living before the seduction. Here again, to avoid 
 the obvious danger of collusion, some independent proof must be 
 given that the letters were written at the time they bear date.* A 
 thu'd exception to the rule in those oases perhaps now exists, where 
 evidence of indorsements made by a deceased obligee on a bond, 
 aoknov/ledging the receipt of interest, is tendered by his assignee, 
 to defeat a plea of the Statute of lamitations, by the obligor.* 
 
 *i 170. In applying the presumption that a document was written 
 on the day on which it is dated to bills of exchange, the date of a 
 bill, though priraA facie evidence of the day when it was drawn, is 
 no proof that it was accepted at the same time. The most that the 
 law will presume is that a bill was accepted within a reasonable 
 time after it was drawn, and before its maturity ; and it makes 
 that presumption, because in all ordinary transactions such a course 
 of busineps would be pursued.* 
 
 § 171. It is another prinri facie presumption of law that a 
 person has been duly appointed to it if he has in fact acted in an 
 official capacity. For it cannot be supposed that any man would 
 venture to intrude himself into a public situation which he was not 
 authorised to fill. The legislature itself has expressly adopted this 
 presumption in the statutes relating to the excise ' and customs.* 
 At common law it applies to lords of the treasury,' masters in 
 chancery, though exercising special powers,* deputy county court 
 judges," commissioners for taking affidavits,'" surrogates,'^ sheriffs,'* 
 
 iinquet, J.) ; Sinclair v. BaggiJsy, 
 1838 (Lil. Abingor); Iloaro v. Cory- 
 ton, 1812; Wright v. Lainson, 1837. 
 These cases overrule Taylor v. Kin- 
 lock, 181G. 
 
 > See 20 & 21 V. c. 85, "The 
 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857," § 33. 
 
 '' Trelawnoy v. Coleman, 1817; 
 (Ilolroyd, J.) ; Ilouliston v. Smyth, 
 1825 (lieat, C.J. ). 
 
 ' Seo this question discussed, post, 
 §§ 690-696. 
 
 * Roberts v. BethoU, 1852, ques- 
 tioning Israel v. Argent, 1834, and 
 Blyth V. Archbold, 1835, cited in 
 Pears. Chit. PI. 330, n. b. See 45 & 
 46 V. c 61 (" The Bills of Exchange 
 
 Act, 1882"), § 13. 
 
 » 53 & 54 V. c. 21 ("The Inland 
 Eevenue Begulation Act, 11^90"), 
 §24. 
 
 • 39 & 40 V. 0. 30 (" The Customs 
 Consolidation Act, 1876 "), § 261. 
 
 ' K. V. Jones, 1809 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough), 
 
 " Marshall v. Lamb, 1843. 
 
 » 11. V. Roberts, 1878, by Ct. of 
 Crim. App. 
 
 '" l\.v. Howard, !832(Patteson, J.); 
 R. V. Newton, 1844. 
 
 " R. V. Verelst, 1813 (Ld. EUen- 
 borougli). 
 
 '* Buubury v. Matthews, 1844 
 (Parke, B.). 
 
 147 
 
 > ■■ ' I 
 
 1 ,ii 1 
 ; lU. 1 
 
 l!i 
 
I w 
 
 ^^^^ 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 : i 
 
 
 
 i 'I 
 
 ]5.^ ■ 
 
 
 J' 
 
 
 
 M 
 
 Wl 
 
 \\\\l 
 
 
 ill 
 
 
 
 mi 
 
 
 »< 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS FROM ACTING IN PUBLIC OFFICES. rPT. I. 
 
 under-sheriffs,' justices of the peace,' constables,' though appointed 
 by commissioners under a local public Act,^ trustees under a 
 turnpike Act,* churchwardens,^ overseers,' vestry-clerks," trustees 
 empowered to raise church-rates under a local Act,' weigh-masters 
 of market towns,'" attested soldiers engaged in the recruiting 
 Borvice," and, indeed, to all public officers.'^ Moreover, no distinc- 
 tion is recognised, though the appointment is one required to be 
 either in writing,''' or under seal,'"' or though an action be brought 
 in the name of the officer, "* or though the title be directly put in 
 issue by the pleading," or thougli the proceedings be criminal, (as, 
 for instance, a trial for the murder of a constable in the execution 
 of his duty,) and in the highest degree penal.'' Nor will any 
 exception to the rule be allowed, even where parties are indicted 
 for offences committed by them in their character of public officers. 
 For example, if a person employed by the Post-office be indicted 
 for stealing or embezzling a letter,'* his formal appointment need 
 not be proved, but it will suffice to show that he has acted in the 
 capacity charged." 
 
 § 172. On similar principles the law prim& facie presumes the 
 
 > Doe V. Brawn, 1821. Soe Plumor 
 V. Ihisi'o, 1 847 ; llobinsou v. Colling- 
 W(H)(1, 18()0. 
 
 * Berryinan v. Wise, 1792 (Bullor, 
 JX 
 
 Id. 
 
 « Butlor V. Fonl, 1833. 
 
 » rritchard v. Walkor, 1827. 
 
 « R. V. Mitnholl, 1818 (Abbott, 
 C.J.), citod 2 St. Ev. ;}07, n. r, 
 
 ■> Doo r. Barnt's, 184(5. 
 
 8 M'Gahoy v. Alston, 1836. 
 
 » J{. I'. Murphy, 1837 (Coleridge, 
 J.). 
 
 '" M'Malum v. Lennard, 1838, 
 II. L. ; llayoH v. Doxtor, 18G1 (Ir.); 
 M'Mahon V. Ellis, 1863 (Ir.). 
 
 »' Walton V. (javin, 18o(). 
 
 '» M'(iahov«. Alston, 183(5 (Parko, 
 B.); Marshall v. I>anib, 1843 (I'at- 
 toHon, J.); Don v. Young, 184.'). 
 
 " Soo cases cited in preceding notes 
 to this section. 
 
 '« I)ext<>r V. Ilayos, 18G0 (Tr.) 
 (Fit/.girald, B., exjilaining Smith 
 V. Cart Wright, 18,')1). 
 
 >• M'Oahey w. Alston, 183(5; M'Ma- 
 hon V, Leiuiurd, I8J8, U. L. ; Doe 
 
 V. Barnes, lS46,whichwasanactionof 
 ejectment brought by l)arish odicers : 
 Cannell v. ( "urtis, 183.'), wliere anaver- 
 nient in a declaration that the plaintiff 
 hud hvi'u ttfifiuiiitril and was assistant 
 overseer was traversed hy the i)lea. 
 But Tindal, C.J., intimated a strong 
 opinion tliat it was only necessary 
 for the jilaintiff to prove that ho 
 ucti'd as assistant overseer. This 
 ruling was cited by Parke, B., iu 2 
 M. & W. 209, 183(1. 
 
 '» Haves V. Dexter, 1801 fir. Ex. 
 Ch.); M'Mahon v, lieuiiard, 1858, 
 II. L. 
 
 " R. V. Gordon, 1789. 
 
 " See 7 W. 4 & 1 V. 0. 36 ("The 
 Post OHice (Offences) Act, 1837"). 
 §§ 2,-). 2(5. 
 
 '» ('lav's case, 1784 ; R. v. Reos, 
 1834 (I'arke, B.); R. v. Barrett, 
 1833 (liittledaln and Bosanquet, JJ., 
 and BoUand, B.); R. v. Townsend, 
 1841 ; R. V. Goodwin, 1828. In an 
 Irish case, some proof of actiiif^ with 
 the Kiviction of the I'ost-ollice autho- 
 rities was apparently lield neoessaiy. 
 B. V. Tronwyth, 1841 (Ir.). Sod qu. P 
 
 14S 
 
CHAP, v.] piiivSUMrnoNS as to makriage, i:tc. 
 
 existence of certain relations in life from parties having acted 
 towards each other as occupying those relationships. From such 
 conduct tliere may be inferred the relations of landlord and tenant, 
 of partnership, and of master and servant,' or of master and api)ren- 
 tice, even where no direct proof of the existence of any indenture 
 has been given. ■^ A cogent legal presumption is also raised in 
 favour of the validity of any marriage which is shown to have been 
 celebrated de facto,' and will not be rebutted where a minor is 
 married by licence in her father's lifetime by the mere fact that 
 the motlier's name appears in the register as the consenting party, 
 and no evidence is adduced as to the consent of the father ; * if 
 persons live together as man and wife, it will, in favour of morality 
 and decency, be presumed that they are legally married,* while this 
 presumption has been carried in Scotland so far that even where 
 the connexion was shown to have commenced in adultery, a sub- 
 sequent valid marriage has been inferred from strong evidence of 
 habit and repute." Two exceptions to this last example are, how- 
 ever, recognised in England. Both on an indictment for bigamy,' 
 and on a petition claiming damages against an alleged adulterer,' 
 a valid first marriage " must be proved ; and even the proof of a 
 ceremony, which the parties supposed to be sufficient to constitute 
 the relation of husband and wife, is not enough, unless it be shown 
 to be legally valid.'" These two exceptions rest on the ground, that 
 
 • E. V. Fordingbridgo, 1858 (Erlo, 
 J.). 
 
 « Id. ; E. V. St. IVriirvlolxmo, 1824. 
 
 » riciH ('. I'iors, 1849, II. L.; Sicliol 
 V. liiinibcrt, 18()4 ; Sastry Vclaiilcr r. 
 Sfinlu'ciitty, 1881. I'. I'. Sco Iliiriod 
 V. lliirrod, 18,V1, also unt(>, § 144. 
 
 • Uiurisoii V, Corp. of Soutluiinptoii, 
 18.);{. 
 
 ' Doo »). Fluiniiig, 1827; Qoodimin 
 V. rioodiiiiin, 18,ji); Collins r. Hisliop, 
 187!»(MiilinH, V.-C); Siwtry Vclaidcr 
 V. ScmlHM'utty, 1881, P. C. Tho kuuio 
 i)i('siini]itioii i« itw()giiint'd by tho Mii- 
 noiiu'daii Ijaw(Hani'o Khujooi'ooiiisn, 
 r. Miissainut llniishim Jcliau, liS7'i, 
 P. C.) ; and by tho Ronian Dutch Law 
 HH picvaiHiig in Coylon. Aronogary 
 V. Sanib()nad(\ 1881, P. C. 
 
 • Tlio 1 iivachiUmnc caKo, 1 W()7 , II . T,. ; 
 ox])laininfi;. or, pciliai)?*, an sonic may 
 think, e.r2>Uiiiiuiy uivity, Cunningham 
 
 V. Cunningham, 1814; and Lapsloy 
 V. (jriorson, 1818, II, Ij. Soo also 
 Lyhi I'. Kliwood, 1874; Do Tlioron c. 
 Att.-Gon., 1S7.>, H. Ii. ; and Dy^rat 
 Poor., 1881, II. L. 
 
 ' 24 & 2,) V. c. 100 (" Tho Offoncos 
 against tho Poison Act, 18()1"), §57. 
 S'c R, r. (Jiitlin, 187!). 
 
 » 20 & 21 V. 0. 85 ("Tlio Matii- 
 nioiiial Causes Act, 1857 "), § 'M. 
 
 • Tiii^ .s('(()/»/ inai'i'iago need not be 
 such as would bo binding in law, if 
 it wore not bigamous; ('.7.. a widower 
 may bo con victcd of bigamy, if, having 
 a socond wifo living, ho has gone 
 through tho oorcmony of nianiago 
 with a nioco of liis first wifo. II. v, 
 AUon, 1872 ; overruling 11. v. Fan- 
 ning, I8()5. 
 
 '" Cutliciwood V. Caslou, 1814 
 (Parko, 1?.); Hurt v. Hurt, ISOO. 
 Ihit 800 Uookor i'. Uookor and Now- 
 
 149 
 
 <:■: 
 
 'ti ' 
 
 m 
 
 |SW 
 
if 
 
 r 
 
 
 
 ^ ' 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 M'^ 
 
 CORPORATE BODIES — PROFESSIONAL MEN. [PART 1. 
 
 iih' 
 
 suoh proreediiigs, being of a penal nature, require the stricteFt 
 proof ; and for the exception in cases of adultery, a further reason 
 is, to prevent parties from setting up pretended, marriages for evil 
 purposes.' 
 
 § 173. It is not altogether clear, however, how far the presump- 
 tion, derivable from acting in a particular character, raises a prima 
 facie i)resumption that those who have done so filled the character, 
 which they have assumed, of corporate hot/irx, or of persons suing or 
 being sued as prq/hm'oiia I men, or as filling particular situations. On 
 an indictment, whicli charged the accused with obtaining the goods 
 of the company by false pretences,^ parol evidence that a limited 
 company had acted as such was held sufficient, without strict proof 
 of incorporation ; but in this case no allegation of ownership was 
 necessary.* In an action against a clergyman for non-residence, 
 the plaintiff was held not to be bound to prove the admission, 
 institution, and induction of the defendant, but to have given 
 sufficient prima facie evidence by showing that he had received 
 tithes and acted as incumbent.* Plaintiff's appointment as Farrier- 
 General under the Post-liorse Act, was, too, presumed from defen- 
 dant's having accounted to him as such ; * and a solicitor, who sued 
 a party for slandering him in his profession, by threatening to 
 strike him off the rolls for misconduct, recovered damages, on proof 
 that he had actod as a solicitor, without showing his due admission 
 and enrolment.^ The same lax evidence has several times been 
 allowed in actions by surgeons " and solicitors for their fees, and by 
 parsons for their tithes.* But all these cases, perhaps, lest not so 
 much upon the jjresumption now under discussion, as on the 
 ground that the opposite party had, b/ his admissions, either by 
 word or deed, rendered it unnecessary to prove the actual appoint- 
 
 ton, 1S()4 (Wilde, J.O.). Soo, ulso, 
 Piitrickson v. I'atricksoii, lK(i,) ; and 
 cases cited onto iu two la.st nototi 
 Huvo onu t(j § 143-4. 
 
 I Morris i>. Miller, 1767 ; Birt v. 
 liarlow, 177!»(lid. MnnsK.dd). 
 
 •■* K. V. KaiiKtoii, IH77, ('. A. 
 
 » Hy 24 it IT) V. c. !JG (" Tlio Lar- 
 coiiv A('t. iHiil "). 
 
 «"|{<'viiu r. Williams, 177'), 1770 
 (Lord Miuisficld). 
 
 » iladford v. M'lutoBh, ViWi. 
 
 * Hervymiin r. Wise, 1701. 
 
 ' (irciiiiiiri! I'. Ii(^('l(!ik iJoisValon, 
 1K()!». St'(! also (.'()[M! r, llowlands, 
 1830. But 21 & 22 V. c. 90, § 62, 
 has rond(3red it noccssary for a 
 medlciil iiiiin (and 41 & 42 V. c, .'J3, 
 § 5 (amiMidcd by 49 & 50 V. o. 48, 
 § 20) for a Jtiitid), when suing for his 
 chiirfjjcH, to jirovc! liis duo ri^^istratiou. 
 
 " Uudfordc.M'lntoHh.l790; Borry- 
 maii r. Wise, 1791 (Bailor, J.). See 
 (JrtiL'U f. Jackson, lUOd. 
 
 160 
 
 I': ■ i 
 
CTI. v.] 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING PROFESSIONAL MEN. 
 
 ment.' Where no such admission has been ma^le, the safer, if not 
 the necessary, course will be to prove the a[>pointraent in the 
 ordinary manner ; and to do so seems most consistent with modem 
 practice and the latest decisions. 
 
 § 174. As a rule, indeed, it is clear in an action for slander on 
 him in any particular character, the plaintiff must show that he 
 possesses that character.^ At all events, where, in an action for 
 defaming him as a physician by using words denying that he held 
 an M.D. degree, the plaintiff, not content with resting his case on 
 evidence of having practised, proceeded to prove that he had 
 received the degree of M.D. from a Scotch University (St. Andrews), 
 the court having held that this did not entitle him to practise in 
 England, he was not allowed to fall back upon proof of practice, 
 on the legality of which he had himself thrown doubt. 
 
 § 175. There are, moreover, three actions, brought by persons 
 who alleged that they held particular offices, where the plaintiffs 
 were respectively nonsuited on failing to prove appointment to the 
 offic) claimed, although it does not appear that any evidence was 
 offered that they had ever acted in the respective capacities alleged.' 
 These cases, though for this reason, perhaps, not direct authorities, 
 tend to show what the practice has been, and so lu,.- "upport the 
 view that the rule which renders evidence of acting prima facie 
 proof of due appointment, is confined to cases where the parties 
 occupy a jviblie situation, or, perhaps, where the question of 
 appointment is not direvtli/ in issue.* 
 
 § 176. There are also various prim4 facie presumptions which, 
 are founded upon the experience of human conduct in the ovdinary 
 
 1 Sco Smith V. Taylor, 180,J(Cham- 
 bre, J.) ; alwo judgment of Ilfiith, J. 
 
 * CulliiiH )'. OanifKi''. 1«^J ; l'i<'k- 
 fonl )'. Uuti'h, 1787 (lUillor, J.) ; and 
 Smith i;. Taylor, IHOo, wlioro possibly 
 tlio words inipliud an admission of 
 tho I'haractor in which the ))laintiff 
 snod. In actions of tliis kind, if tho 
 etatomcnt of claim allcfjod that the 
 plaintiff holds a certain oflice, or 
 belongs to a j)articnlar profession or 
 traih', no evidoncti is jiow rccjnii'ed to 
 Bujiport this statement, unless it bo 
 distinctly deni(Ml in tlu^ statement of 
 dofonco. 1{. S. C, 1883, Urd. xix. 
 
 r. 13. 
 
 » Sellers v. Till, 1825; Savago v. 
 , 1780; Cortis v. Kent Water- 
 works Co., 1827. 
 
 * R. V. Jones, 1774, whoro, on an 
 indictment against an a]i])ientice for 
 fraudulent enlistment, it was held 
 that the indenture must bo proved, 
 is an authority on neither side of this 
 (luostion, for that decision rested on 
 tno ground, tliat as tho aduul. and 
 li'Unl binding was tho fact wliich con- 
 stituted the gist of the offeni^e, this 
 could only bo provod by tlio best 
 evidence. 
 
 151 
 
 •fi 
 
PRESUMPTIONS FOUNDED ON BUSINESS. [_PAIiT 1. 
 
 III! 11 
 
 
 ifiM [j 
 
 ill 
 
 ftl. 
 
 conne of busincHH. For instance, a mere holding over after the 
 expiration of an old lease, even for a long period (such as ten 
 years), raises no presumption of a new tenancy from year to year ;' 
 but the receipt of rent raises a legal presumption of a new tenancy 
 from year to year ; ^ though either the payer or tlie receiver of siush 
 rent may repel the presumption, by proving that the payment was 
 made under circumstances inconsistent with it, as, for example, 
 under the impression that the old lease was still subsisting.' 
 Again, if a tenancy from year to year be created, the law presumes 
 that it was intended to be determinable by either party at the end 
 of the first, as well as of any subsequent, year, unless the parties, 
 when arranging tho terms of the contract, have used expressions 
 showing that they contemplated a tenancy for two years at least.* 
 Further, if a lessor, having mortgaged his reversion, is permitted 
 by the mortgagee to continue in the receipt of the rent incident to 
 that reversion, he is during such permission presumptione juris 
 authorised, if it should become necessary, to sue for such rent, or 
 to prevent or recover damages in respect of any trespass or wrong 
 relative to the property, in his own name only.* Whether, under 
 these circumstances, the mortgagor could realise the rent by 
 distress in his own name, is not so clear, but under the old law he 
 could distrain for it in the mortgagee's name, and as his bailiff." 
 The same implied authority is also recognised in favour of a party, 
 to whom the mortgagor has assigned his equity of redemption.' 
 Again, in actions of trover, the jury will be advised, if not directed, 
 to presume a conversion from unexplained evidence of a demand 
 and refusal.* 
 
 i5 176a. Whether paying off a mortgage will keep it alive or 
 extiiiguisli it, depends upon the intention of the parties ; but, in 
 the absence of any express evidence, equity will raise a presumi)tion 
 
 » Cusack V. Farroll, 1887 (Ir.). 
 
 * Hiahop V. Howard, 1823 ; l)oo v, 
 Taniore, 1848 ; Ecclo.s. Commiss. v. 
 Morral, 1869. In these last two 
 cases the lessoi's were a corporation. 
 
 8 Doev. Crago, 1848. 
 
 * Doe V, Sniari(l(j;o, 1845. See 
 Brown V. Synions, l6(i(); Langton v. 
 Carloton, 1873. 
 
 * 36 & 37 V. c. G() (" The Siiproino 
 Court of Judicature Act, 1873"), 
 
 § 25, subs. 5 ; 40 & 41 V. o. 57, s. 28, 
 subs. 5 (Ir.). 
 
 « Trent v. Hunt, 1853 CAldorson, 
 B.). 
 
 ' SnoU V. Finch, 1863. 
 
 * Caunco v, Spanton, 1844; Stan- 
 clirt'n V. Ilardwick, 1835 ; ThonijJHon 
 V. Trail. 1826; Thompson v. Small, 
 1845; Davios v. Nicholas, 1836; 
 CIcndon v. Dinneford, 1831. See 
 Towno V, Lewis, 1849. 
 
 162 
 
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIVE TERMS OF SERVICE. 
 
 in favour of that intention, which, under the circumstances, would 
 be most advantageous to the party paying. Thus, a mortgage 
 paid off by a tenant for life will, as stated in another place, * be 
 presumed to have been intended to be retained for his own benefit 
 against the inheritance ; but if the owner of an estate in fee or in 
 tail pays off a charge, a contrary presumption will be recognised, 
 and the mortgage will prima facie be extinguished.^ 
 
 § 177. It is also prima facie presumed upon a general hiring 
 of a servant, without any stipulation as to time, that such 
 hiring was for a year, unless, indeed, there are circumstances 
 tending to rebut this presumption,' as, for instance, an agrf^-^ment 
 to pay weekly or monthly wages, with no stipulation showing an 
 intention that the service should continue for a longer period than 
 a week or a month.'' This rule applies to domestic as well as to 
 farm servants. There is, however, this difference between the two 
 classes, that the service of domestic servants, unlike tliat of farm 
 servants,* may be determined by a month's warning or on payment 
 of a month's wages." In the case of clerks, wuroliouseinen, 
 travellers, editors, reporters, actors, ushers, governesses, and the 
 like, the law raises no inflexible presumption of an indefeasible 
 yearly hiring from the mere fact of a hiring for an indefinite 
 period. In all such cases, the jury must determine tlie question 
 for themselves, after weighing ail the circumstances proved, and 
 ascertaining, if possible, what usage prevails in the particular 
 business or employment to which the hiring rcliites." 
 
 § 177a. There is c presumption that there was a promise that 
 the act should be done within a reasonable time on proof of a 
 promise to marry,^ to discharge a cargo," and in all cases («. g., a 
 
 * Ante, § 154. 
 
 ' Adiuus V. Aiigoll, 1870; Mohosh 
 Lair. MohuntHiiwan J)iis, 1883, P-*^'- 
 » liillcy r. Elwiu, 18i;{. 
 
 * 11. V. WorHolfl, 1704; R. v. St. 
 Andrew, I'orshoro, 1828 ; R. v. Pilk- 
 iii^jton, 1844 ; Baxter v. NurHe, 1844 
 (Coltnmu, J.). 
 
 * Beestoni'. Collyer, 1827 (Ouaeleo, 
 J.). 
 
 " Turner v. Miisoii, 184.) (I'liiko, 
 IJ.); lieeaton v, CoUyor, 1827 (Gase- 
 
 loo, J.); Fawcott v. Cash, 1834, 
 Aiito, § 34. 
 
 ' Haxti'r V. Nurso, 1844. See IIol- 
 ci'oft ('. Barber, 1843; Todd v. Kerrick, 
 18o2; l>;.rkor v, Iblmtsou, 1858; 
 t'airnian v. Oak ford, 18()(). 
 
 » Totter ( . Debons, 1816 (Ld.EUen- 
 boroiif^h) ; Atchiiison v. Baker, 17!>7 
 (Ld. Kcin'on). 
 
 » I'ostlolhwaite v. Troelaud, 1880, 
 ILL. 
 
 153 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
i 
 
 • 
 
 \ i 
 
 m 
 
 :f i 11 
 
 ^ 
 
 U 
 
 
 
 II 
 
 t , 
 
 V 
 r 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING PAYMENTS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 contract to deliver goods) in which the time of completioc has been 
 left undefined.* 
 
 § 178.^ Moreover, as men are usually vigilant in guarding their 
 property, prompt in asserting their rights, and diligent in claiming 
 and collecting their dues, the law prima facie presumes, where a 
 bill of exchange or an order for the payment of money or the 
 delivery of goods is found in the hands of the drawee, or a 
 promissory note is found in the possession of the maker, that such 
 note has been duly paid,'" or that the goods ordered have been 
 delivered ;' a receipt for the last year's or quarter's rent is evidence 
 of all the rent previously accrued having been paid.'* Further, 
 the mere delivery of money, or of a bank cheque, by one person 
 to another, or the transfer of stock, is, if unexplained, presumptive 
 evidence of the payment of an antecedent debt, and not of a loan ;* 
 while payment of money of another, which the drawer admittedly 
 had in his hands, must be presumed on its being shown that a 
 cheque in favour the plaintiff, who has had it duly cashed, has 
 been drawn on the account of the person who held the money, 
 though it be not proved that the cheque was directly received by 
 the plaintiff from the defendant, and it be urged that it might 
 have passed through many other hands.* 
 
 § 179." Several prima facie presumptions, moreover, are made 
 from the regular course of business in a piihlic office. Thus, post- 
 marks on letters, {irhcn capable of being deciphered,) are prima 
 facie evidence that the letters were in the post at the time and 
 place therein specified;^ "the oflicin^ mark of any sum on any 
 postal packet as due to the Post-office, British, colonial, or foreign. 
 
 ' iniis V. Tlioinpson, 18:58 (Al(](n-- 
 son, B.). See roid v. Cotodwoitli, 
 18J0. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 38, in part. 
 
 '• Breiiibridgo i'. Oshorno, 1810. 
 
 ' Gibbon V, Foiitherstonhiiugh, 
 1810; EjJK t'- liiirnott. l.»0(); (Jarloi'k 
 V. Goortner, 18;U (Am.) ; AlvorJ v. 
 Baker, bS.'Vi (Am.); Woidner v. 
 Sohweigart, 1823 (Am.); Shepherd y. 
 Currie. 18 10. 
 
 »» 1 Gilb.Ev. 309; Brewer r.Knapp, 
 1823 (Am.); 23 et 24 V. o. 1.5-4, § 47. 
 
 ♦ Welch )'. Soaborn, 181G; Breton 
 
 V, Copo, 1701 ; Llovd v. Sandilnnd, 
 1818; Caryr. Gerrish, 1801 ; Aub(>rt 
 V. Walsh, 1812; Hoswell v. Sniitli, 
 1H33; Graham v. Cox, 1848; I'attou 
 V. Ash, 1821 (Am.). 
 
 Mountford v. llurpor, 1847 (Al- 
 dersoii, H.V 
 
 « Gr. ]:v. § 40, in part. 
 
 ' Fletcher -•. BnuMyll, 1821 ; R. v, 
 Johnson, iNOo ; It. r.'Wutson, 1808; 
 Archanjijolo v. Thompson, 181 1 ; li. 
 V. Pliimer, 1814; (■"jcknn v. OoUin, 
 1811; Butler v. Mountgarret, 1809, 
 U. L. 
 
 164 
 
 i' J 
 
 ^ . ' i ' ■ 
 
CHAP. V.1 NOTICES, ETC. SERVED THROUGH THE POST. 
 
 ii 
 
 in respect of that packet, shall in every part of Her Majesty's 
 dominions be received as evidence of the liability of such packet to 
 the sum so marked;"^ and if a letter properly directed^ is proved 
 to have been either put into the post-office, or delivered to the 
 postman,' it is presumed to have reached its destination at the 
 regular time, iind to have been received by the person to whom it 
 was ^ddressed.^ 
 
 § 180. This last presumption, indeed, though generally only 
 prima facie,' is in certain cases rendered conclusive, either by 
 rules of court, or by Act of Parliament. Thus, Order LXVII. 
 r. 3 of the 11. S. 0. of 1883 provides, that " notices sent from any 
 office of the Supreme Court may be sent by post ; and the time at 
 which the notice so posted would be delivered in the ordinary 
 course of post shall be considered as the time of service thereof, and 
 the posting thereof shall be a sufficient service." Under sect. 142 
 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, " all notices and other documents, for 
 the service of which no special mode is directed, may be sent by 
 prepaid post letter to the last known address of the person to be 
 served therewith," ^ and by the Bankruptcy Kules, as to notices of 
 meetings of creditors,^ — "an affidavit by the trustee, official receiver, 
 or other officer of the court, or the solicitor in the matter, or by the 
 clerk of any such person, that the notice has been duly posted, shall 
 be sufficient evidence of such notice having been duly sent to the 
 person to whom the same was addressed." There are also con- 
 tained in such rules special provisions,* as to the service of creditors' 
 petitions, and the proof of sucli service with respect to bankruptcy 
 notices,^ and as to serving and proving service of petitions for 
 administering insolvent estates,'" while the rules further provide *- 
 that, " where notice of an order or other proceeding in court may 
 
 > 38 & 39 V. c. 22, § 8. 
 
 ' "Wliero the address was " Mr. 
 llaynes, Bristol," it was lield in- 
 sutH'-'ont to raiso this presumption ; 
 Walter V. Haynes, 1824 (Abbot, 
 C.J.). 
 
 » iSkiroeck v. Garbett, 1845. 
 
 * Saundorson v. Judge, '79o; 
 Woodcock V. Houldsworth, i84() ; 
 I'unlop V. Higgius, 1848, II. L. ; 
 lloiiMohold l''iro, i&c. Ins. Co. v. 
 Grant, 1879, C. A.; Bussard y. Lever- 
 ing, 1821 (Am.); Lindenberger v. 
 
 IBeal, It.'t (Am.); Warren t^.Warren, 
 1834; Kufhy. Weston, 1799; Dobree 
 V, Eastwood, 1827 ; Wall's case, 
 1872 (Mulins, V.-C.) ; In re Ilickey, 
 187j (Ir.) ; Story, Bills, § 300. 
 
 * lleidpath's case, 1870 (Ld. Eo- 
 milly. M.ll.). 
 
 « 4(1 & 47 V. c. 52, « 142. 
 ' Seen-. 1K4 and 188. 
 
 * See Bankruptcy Rules, 144 — 8. 
 » J:i. r. 123. 
 
 '" Id. r. 201. 
 " Id. r. 82. 
 
 155 
 
 , i 
 
 f.i . 
 
 i!ii 
 
 '. 1 1 
 
 
 
 I 
 t 
 
 i,y 
 
 
 1 , 
 
 ' ill 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 1 
 
 s 
 
 I 
 
 
 ■ 1 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
t if,- 
 
 ■ ; ■ . ■ 
 
 {ii ■ 
 
 ■ ■"! 
 -i,-: 
 
 NOTICES, ETC. SERVED THROUGH THE POST. [PAKT r. 
 
 be servod by post, it shall be sent by rcgiafcrcd letter."' Again, in 
 Scotland, any summons or warrant of citation, whether of a party 
 or a witness, or warrant of service or judicial intimation, may, in 
 any civil action or proceeding in any court, be executed by posting 
 a registered letter duly addressed.'^ And, under various Acts of 
 Parliament, the service of notices and other documents by post 
 (which is indeed sometimes re<][uired to be registered post) is per- 
 mitted. Some of the principal of these Acts are enumerated in 
 the foot-note, but reference must be made to the provisions of the 
 particular statute to see if any given notice or document has been 
 served in the manner required by its provisions.' 
 
 ' See, however, 46 & 47 V. c. 52, 
 §11, which relates to the service of 
 or(ler.s stayiiif? proceedings, and is 
 inconsistent with the above rule. 
 
 * 43 & 4() V. c. 77, §§ 3 and 4. 
 
 ^ Some of the principal of tlio sta- 
 tutos liere referred to, arranged alpha- 
 betically (no better arrangement sug- 
 gesting itself), under which notices, 
 &c., may be served by post, are as 
 follow : — " The Agricultural Holdings 
 (England)Act, 18H3"(46&47 V.c.Gl, 
 § 28) ; "The Alkali, &c. Works Eegu- 
 lation Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. c. 37, 
 amondod 55 & 56 V. c. 30, § 26) ; 
 " The Army Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. 
 c. 58, § 163, subs. P.) ; The Act of 
 1851 as to Charitable Institutions 
 (14 & 15 V. c. 56. § 2) ; " The Com- 
 panies Act, 1862 " (25 & 26 V. c. 89, 
 §§ 62, 63) ; " The Companies Clauses 
 Act, 1845" (8 & 9 V. c. 16, § 136); 
 " The Conveyancing and Law of Pro- 
 perty Act, 1881 " (44 & 45 V. c. 41, 
 § 67, subs. 4); "The Copyhold Act, 
 1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 46, ^ 57, subs. 
 1 i): "The Corrupt and Illegal 
 Practices Prevention Act, 1883" 
 (46 & 47 V. c. 51, § 62) ; The Act of 
 1844 as to Covuitv Kates (7 & 8 V. c. 33, 
 § 6); "The Dentists Act, 1878" (41 & 
 42 V. 0. 33, § 39) ; " The Diseases of 
 Animals Act, 1894 " (57 & 58 V. c. 57, 
 § 48, subs. 3); "The Ecclesiastical 
 Dilapidations Act, 1871 " (34 & 35 V. 
 c. 43, § 69) ; " The Elementary Edu- 
 cation Act. 1870" (33 & 34 V. c. 75, 
 §811; "The P^ndowed Schools Act, 
 1869" (32 & 33 Vict. c. 56. § 57) ; "The 
 Employers' Liability Act" (43 & 44 V. 
 c. 42, § 7), on the construction of 
 which see Movie v, Jenkins, 1.^81 ; 
 
 "The E.tplosives Act, 1875" (38 & 39 
 V. c. 17, § 85); "The Factories and 
 Workshops Act, 1878" (41 V. c. 16, 
 § 79) ; " The Friendly Societies Act, 
 1875 " (38 & 39 V. c. 60, § 30, subs. 11, 
 as amended by 4 2 V. c. 9); "The 
 Landed Property Improvement (Ire- 
 land) Act, 1847'" (10 & 11 V. c. 32, 
 §60); "The Licensing Acts, 1872" 
 (35 & 36 V. c. 94 , ^ 70) ; ' ' The London 
 County Council" (see 18 & 19 V. 
 c. 120, § 22, and 51 iV: 52 V. c. 41, § 40, 
 subs. 8); "The Lunacy Act, 1890" 
 (53 V. c. 5, § 327) ; " Tlie Mines llegu • 
 lation Acts, 1872" (.35 & 36 V. c. 76, 
 § 71, and c. 77, § 40); " The Parlia- 
 mentary A'oteis' Pegistration Act, 
 1843 " (6 & 7 V. c. 18); " ThoPatinits 
 Designs and Trade-inarks Act, 1883" 
 (46 & 47 V. e. 57, § 97) ; " The Poor 
 Law Amendment Act, 1844 " (7 & 8 
 V. c. 101) ; "The J'ublic Health Acts, 
 1875," for England (38 & 39 V. c. 55, 
 § 267); and for Ireland (41 & 42 V. 
 c. 52, § 267); "The Public Works 
 Loans Act, 1875" (38 & 39 V. c. 89, 
 § 47); " The Pegulation of Railways 
 Act, 1873" (36 & 37 V. c. 48, § 35); 
 " The Telegraphs Act, 1878" (41 & 42 
 V. c. 76, § 12); "The Valuation 
 (Metro])olis) Act, 1869" (32 & 33 V. 
 c. 67, § 65); "The Parliamentary 
 Voters' Registration Act, 1843," for 
 England (6 & 7 V. c. 18, on construc- 
 tion of which, see Bishop v. Helps, 
 1845; Hickton v. Antrobus, 1846; 
 Bayley v. Overseers of Nantwich, 
 1846; Lewis V.Evans, 1874; Hornsby 
 V. Uolton, 185() ; Ilannsford v. White- 
 way, 1856) ; and for Ireland, 13 & 14 
 V. c. 69, §§ 113, 114. 
 
 156 
 
CHAP, v.] PRlvSUMPTIONS FOIINDKD ON RUSLN'KSS. 
 
 § 180a. Where by the course of business in a public dopartmpnt 
 a thing has tak'H place which would not have been allowoi to 
 occur without che previous performance of certain formalities, it 
 will be presumed that those formalities have taken place. Thus, 
 on its being sliown that the Custom-house would not liave allowed 
 goods to be entered without an indorsement on the licence, under 
 which the vessel in which they came was sailing, of the time of her 
 clearance, such an indorsement will be presumed to liave been 
 made ;' and on proof that goods, wliich cannot be exported without 
 licence, were entered at the Custom-house for exportation, a licence 
 to export them will be presumed.* 
 
 § 181. A similar presumption to that just mentioned is some- 
 times drawn from the usual course of men's private offices and 
 but^iuess, where the primary evidence of the fact is wanting.^ For 
 example, underwriters upon a foreign ship or a foreign voyage are 
 presumed to know the usages and laws of foreign states which 
 affect that shin or that voyage, because such knowledge is neces- 
 sary for the due conduct of the business;'' an underwriter is often 
 presumed, as a matter of fact, though not as one of law,* to know 
 the contents of Lloyd's Shipping List, to which, in the ordinary 
 course of business, be has access ;" a man who deals in a particular 
 market will be taken to act according to the custom of that 
 market ; a man who, if he directs another to make a contract at a 
 particular place, will be presumed to intend that the contract 
 should be made according to the usage of thot place;'' so that a 
 person employing a broker on the Stock Exchange im^/'iedly 
 authorises him to act in accordance with the rules there established, 
 provided only that they be reasonable, or, in othar words, legal;* 
 and this whether the principal himself be or be not acquainted 
 
 > Butlor V. AUnutt, 1816. 
 
 * Van Omeron v. Dowick, 1809. 
 
 » Doe V. Turford, 1832 ; Ohamp- 
 noys V. Peek, 1816 ; Pritt v. Fair- 
 clouffh, 1812. 
 
 * Young V. Turing, 1841 (Ld. 
 Abinger) ; Noble v, Kennoway, 1780 
 (Ld. Mansfield). 
 
 * Morrison v. The Universal Mar. 
 Ins. Co., 1872. 
 
 * Mackintosli v. Marshall, 1843. 
 
 This presumption is strictly con- 
 fined to cases where the assured has 
 made no representation inconsistent 
 •with the list, which is calculated to 
 mislead the underwriter. Id. 
 
 ' Bayliffe v. Butterwcrth, 1847 
 (Alderson, B.); Pollock ;. Stables, 
 184K ; Graves v, Legg, 1857 ; Buckle 
 V. Knoop, 1867. See post, §§ 1160 
 et seq. 
 
 » See Pearson v. Scott, 1878. 
 
 157 
 
 I ii II : 
 

 i>' 
 
 
 
 in; ^ 
 
 
 
 ■'/ 
 
 
 
 I ^ ' .;■ 
 
 
 
 i > ' 
 
 
 ! 
 
 
 
 m\\\ 
 jflii ii 
 
 PRKSUMPTIONS F0Ux\D1:D ON HUSINIXS. [ifAllT I. 
 
 with the rules hy which Buoh brokers are governed.' This latter 
 doctrine, however, will not be carried toe tar ; ^ and therefore whervs 
 goods were shipped at Liverpool, and the bill of lading was 
 indorsed 'o parties residi.ig in New South Wales, evidence of a 
 local usage in Liverpool, affecting the construction of the written 
 contract, was held inadmissible as against the indorsees, in the 
 absence of proof that they were acquainted with the usage.' 
 Moreover, " Lloyd's " at the Royal Exchange is not a market 
 within the rule, and the usage there prevalent among insurance 
 brokers is not such a general usage as to bind merchants and ship- 
 owners unacquainted with its existence.^ Indeed, it is doubtful 
 whether the doctrine applies in its full force to cases of maritime 
 insurance, and authorities^ are not wanting which "look the other 
 way."*' 
 
 S 182. The presumption arising from the usual course of men's 
 private offices and business, again, gives rise, where letters or 
 notices properly directed to a gentleman are left with his servant, 
 to a prima facie presumption that they reached his hands ;^ while 
 the fact of sending a letter to the po?t oiTits will in general be 
 regarded by a jury as presumptively proved, if the letter be shown 
 to have been handed to, or left with, the clerk, whose duty it was 
 in the ordinary course of business to carry it to the post, and he 
 declares that, althouf'^. he has no recollection of the particular 
 letter, he invariably took to the post-office all letters that either 
 were delivered to him, or were deposited in a certain place for that 
 purpose.* But it has been held at Nisi I'rius that neither proof of 
 
 ' Sutton V. Tiithiim, 18;J!) ; recog- 
 nised ill liiivlitto V. Buttoiwortli, 
 1847; Pollock v. Stiiblee, 18-48; Bay- 
 ley v. Wilkins, 1849 ; Tiiyior v. Stray, 
 1851 ; Ilodfikinson i\ Kelly, 18(>8 ; 
 Coles r. Bristowo, 18()8, C. A. ; 
 Bowring v. Shepherd, 1870 ; Grissell 
 f. Bristowe, 18(i8; Duncan v. Hill, 
 1871. See Nickalls v. Merry, 1870, 
 H. L. 
 
 ' See Eohinson v. MoUott, 1875, 
 H. L. 
 
 * Kirchner v. Venus, 18.')!), P. C. 
 But see The Steamship Co. Nordcn v. 
 DempHey, 1876. 
 
 * Sweeting v. Poarco, 18(51, Kx.Ch. ; 
 Scott V. Irving. 18;j(); Todd /•. Ueid, 
 
 18J1 ; Gabay v. Lloyd, 18'2u. 
 
 « Bartlettc. Pentland, 18;J0; Gabav 
 V. Lloyd, 1825. 
 
 • Baylitto V. Butterworth, 1847 
 (Ld. Wensleydale). 
 
 ' Macgrcgor i: Koily, 1849. This 
 pre.sunij)tion is sometimes conclusive, 
 as, for iui^tanco, in the case of a notice 
 to quit sei-vt^d at the tenant's house 
 on one of his servants. Tanham v. 
 Nicholson, 1872, II. L. 
 
 * Skilbeck v. Garbett, 1845 ; Heth- 
 oringtou v. Kom]), 1815; Trotter v. 
 Maclean, 1875; Ward v. Ld. Londes- 
 boroiigh, 1852; Spencer c. Tlioiiipson, 
 lS,j(; (Ir.). So, in Si'oMntnl, ' wliere 
 there is i)roof of the regular j)!;i(tii e 
 
 168 
 
CHAP, v.] WOKKINO OF SCIENTIFIC INSTULMKNTS. 
 
 the possession of a letter by a (iecoaml person for the purpose of 
 posting, nor of an entry in a postage book made by liira in tlie 
 ordinary course of business, is sufficient legal proof of the postage 
 of a letter.' 
 
 § 183. The working accuracy of scientific instruments is also 
 presumed. For example, in the absence of evidence to the 
 contrary, a jury would be advised to rely on the correctness of u 
 watcii or clock, which had been consulted to fix the time when a 
 certain event happened ; a thermometer would be regarded as a 
 sufficiently safe indication of the heat of any liquid in whi(;h it had 
 been immersed ; a pedometer would aiford jjrima facie evidence of 
 the distance between two places which had been traversed by tho 
 wearer; and similar prima facie credit would be given to aneroids, 
 anemometers, and other scit'iitific instruments ; and blood siains aro 
 every day detected by means of known chemical tests. Indeed, 
 in some instances this presumption has been recognised by the 
 legislature.- 
 
 § 184. Various presumptions are again recognized in tho law of 
 prirfHcrship. The mere fact of participation in tlio net profits of a 
 business was, prior to 1860, supposed,^ by an arbitrary and absolute 
 presumption of law, to constitute a partnership. In that year the 
 House of Lords, in the well-known case of Cox v. IJ.icikruan,* 
 however, denied the existence of any legal presumption to this 
 effect. Consequently, although a right to share in the profits of 
 trade is a strong test of partnership, and, Avhen standing alone, will 
 even justify a jury in presuming its existence, tho question whether 
 or not several persons are partners must, nevertheless, in each case 
 depend on the real intention and contract of the parties.* And 
 
 of a house of business to despatch its 
 letters in a particuhii- manner to 
 tho post-olRce, it is not necessary to 
 prove tliiit the indivitl'-al hittor in 
 •liiostion M>as so de.sjmtdi 3(1." Dick- 
 son, Ev. § (J, and cases cited in n. e. 
 
 ' Kowland v. Do Vecchi, 1882 
 (Day, J.). 
 
 ^ Thus, under " The Gas Works 
 Clauses Act, 1871," and th ^ Public 
 Health Acts of 1875 for Knj^land, 
 and 1878 for Ireland, tho rc^^ister of 
 u gas or water meter " shuU boi)riniri 
 
 facie evidence of the quantity " of gas 
 or water consumed. See Jil & ',io V. 
 c. 41, ^ 20 ; US & ;«) V, c. 55, § 59 ; 41 
 & 42 V. c. 52, § ()!), Ir. 
 
 ' Waugh V. Carver, 1793; Pott r. 
 Eyton, 1840. 
 ■« 18(50, 11. L. 
 
 « Mollwo, March & Co. v. The Ct. 
 of Wards, 1872, 1'.C; Kosav.rarkyns, 
 1875 ; Pooley if. Driver, 1876; Ex p. 
 Teiinant, Ko Il-n.^v-rd, 1877, C. A. ; 
 Ex p. DeP.asse, lie Mogovu,r'd, 1867, 
 C. A. ; Tawsoy v. Armstrong, 1881. 
 
 159 
 
 ..'I'^l 
 
 f 
 ■: 
 
I'UESUMPTIONS IN LAW OF PARTNKHSHIP. [PART I. 
 
 the Partnership Act, 1865 ' (commonly called Bovill's Act), enahles 
 loans of money and contracts for remuneration to he made and 
 anniiitios to be granted by partnerships without making the 
 recipient a partner. And in partnership law, it is still presumed — 
 in the absence of any contract between partners, or any dealing 
 from which a contract may be implied, — both in England * and in 
 America,^ following the civil law,^ that the business has been con- 
 ducted on terms of an equal partnership ; and, consequently, that 
 each partner has a right to insist on an equal participation in 
 profit and loss. It has even been held at Nisi Privis, that, in the 
 absence of all evidence on the subject, partners must be presumed 
 to be interested in equal proportions in the partnership stovk.^ 
 
 § liSo. Every member in an ordinary trading copartnership is 
 moreover i)resumed to be intrusted with a general authority to enter 
 into contracts on behalf of the firm for the usual purposes of the 
 business, and, consequently, to be empowered to borrow money, 
 and to contract or pay debts, on account of the partnership, and to 
 make, draw, indorse, and accept negotiable securities in the firm's 
 name." Similar powers, however, are not presumed to exist in the 
 case of minizjg copartnerships. Accordingly one of several co- 
 adventurers in a mine has no authority, as such, to negotiate any 
 bill on behalf of his fellows,' or to pledge the credit of the general 
 body for money borrowed for the purposes of the concern." Still 
 less have the members of a firm, not established for trading pur- 
 poses (as, for example, a firm of solicitors) any implied authority 
 to bind each other by drawing or indorsing bills of exchange, or 
 making promissory notes or even post-dated cheques." Nor in an 
 
 V'l ! -.1 
 
 > 28 & 29 V. c. 86. 
 
 » Stewart v. Forbes, 1849 (Lord 
 Cottonham, C, recognising ruling of 
 Lord Eld on in Peacock v. Peacock, 
 1809); Webster y. Bray, 1848; 
 M'Gregorv.Bainbrigge. 1848; Robin- 
 son V, Andeison, 1855; Collins v, 
 Jackson, 1862; Story, Part. § 24. 
 Bnt see contra, Peacock v. Peacock, 
 1809 (Ld. EUenborough) ; and Tomp- 
 6011 V. Williamson, 1831. 
 
 » Gould V. Gould, 1830 (Am.). 
 
 * Inst. lib. 3, tit. 26, § 1 ; Dig. lib. 
 17, tit. 2, § 29. 
 
 » Farrar v. Beswick, 1836 (Lord 
 Wonsleydale). 
 
 ' Jenkins v. Morris, 1847 ; Ex p. 
 Darlington, &c. Bank Co., Ee Riches 
 and Marshall's Trust Deed, 1864 ; 
 Story, Part. §§ 102, 124, 125. Bk. of 
 Australasia v. Breillat, 1847, P. C. 
 See Maclae v. Sutherland, 1854. 
 
 ' Dickinson v. Valpj', 1829. 
 
 * Ricketts v. Bennett, 1847 ; Bur- 
 mester v. Norris, 1851. See In re 
 German Mining Co., 1853; and post, 
 § 1185 ad fin. 
 
 » Forster v, Mackreth, 1867 ; Med- 
 ley V, Bainbridge, 1842. 
 
 160 
 
IJUAP. v.] rillvSUMPTIONS KKSPECTING rAItlNKUS. 
 
 ordinary partiiorahip has one member of a firm power to bind the 
 others by contracts out of the ordinary mode of the partnership 
 dealings, merely because they are reasonable acts towards effecting 
 the partnorfhip purposes.' Consequently, where a partner signed 
 a guarantee in the name of the firm for the purpose of giving effect 
 to a transaction within the scope of the partnership dealings, it 
 was, in the absence of proof of any usage, and of any recognition 
 by the other partners, held that the firm was not bound by the 
 guarantee.' Had any evidence been given of the adoption of the 
 act by the other partners, the result would, of course, have been 
 different.' 
 
 § 186. Presumptions are also made in the law of (igcncy. Thus, 
 when a seller deals with an agent resident in this country, and 
 acting for a foreign principal, he is presumed not to co;x...ict with 
 the foreigner, but to simply trust the party with whom he actually 
 makes the bargain.* This, however, is at best * a mere presumption 
 of fact, liable to be rebutted by any evidence, whether extrinsic or 
 intrinsic, that credit was intended to be given to the foreign 
 principal." 
 
 § 187. One or two presumptions also attach to particular trades, 
 having been originally founded on principles of public policy.' 
 Thus with regard to common carriers. If goods intrusted " to a 
 common carrier be lost or damaged, the law will conclusively 
 presume that the carrier has been guilty of negligence, unless he 
 can show that the loss or damage was occasioned by " the act of 
 God," or by the Queen's enemies.' Similarly the loss or damage 
 
 * 
 
 C. 
 
 ir- 
 re 
 
 ist, 
 
 ' See Bishop v. Countess of Jersey, 
 1854. 
 
 ' Brettel v. Williftms, 18-19; over- 
 ruling Ex p. Gardom, 1808. See 
 also Hasloham v. Young, 1844 ; 
 Duncan v. Lowndes, 1813. One 
 puitner, too, has no implied autho- 
 rity to bind another by submission 
 to arbitration. Hatton v, Royle, 
 1858. 
 
 ^ Sandilands v. Marsh, 1819. See 
 Maclae v. Sutherland, 1854. 
 
 • Heald V. Konworthy, 1855 (Parke, 
 
 • It is put too strongly by Mr. 
 Justice Story in Story, Agen. j 290. 
 
 • Green v. Kopke, 1856; Mahoney 
 
 V. Kekule, 1854. 
 
 ' Best, Ev. 528-530. 
 
 • The rule does not extend to a 
 passenger's luggage placed in the 
 same carriage with him on a railway ; 
 and if such luggage be lost or injured 
 the company will only be liable for 
 the damage on proof oi the negligence 
 of thoir servants. Bergheim v. Gt. 
 East. Ey. Co., 1878, C. A. 
 
 » Ross V. Hill, 1846 (Tindal, C.J.); 
 Coggs V. Bernard, 1704- (Ld. Holt). 
 See post, § 1172. The Scotch law on 
 this subject is now embodied in § IT 
 of 19 & 2(1 v. c. 60, which enacts, 
 that " all carriers for hire of goods 
 within Scotland shall be liable to 
 
 T. — VOL. I. 
 
 161 
 
 iill 
 
 ;i ■ 
 
 
 N'M'' 
 
 r 1.; 
 
 1 ; 1 ; 
 
 Mil] 
 
 uii 
 
1 
 
 
 i'ImPS 
 
 
 Ir . 
 
 ^ il ' H " 
 
 
 ir 
 
 
 
 llili il 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING INNKEEPERS. 
 
 [PAUT I. 
 
 of luggage, while under the custody of a stage-coachman, a cab- 
 man, or even a gratuitous bailee, raises a primft facie inferonce of 
 want of care, which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
 renders the bailee liable to an action.^ Again, with regard to 
 innkeepers. Where chattels not exceeding in value the sum of 
 thirty pounds,^ have been lost by a guest ' in a public inn, — which 
 te^m seems to include an hotel, a tavern, and a cofPee-house,* — 
 or injured there, the prima facie presumption is that the loss or 
 injury was occasioned by the negligence, or, at least, through the 
 defect, of the innkeeper or his servants : * but on proof that it wiis 
 caused by the negligence of the guest, the landlord's responsibility 
 will cease.' The salaried manager of an hotel belonging to a 
 company, is not regarded as an " innkeeper " within this rule, 
 chough the hotel licence may have been granted to himself 
 personally.' 
 
 § 188. A presumption of negligence sometimes may be made (if 
 a jury think fit) from the mere happcuing of an accident, if it be one 
 which, in the ordinary course of things, does not happen to thoso 
 who use proper care in the management of their business, and 
 therefore affords reasonable evidence of negligence, in the absonco 
 
 i m 
 
 mak- p-oo 1 to tho owner of such goodB 
 all losi.sps arising from accidental firo, 
 v>''»ilo such goods lire in the cuatody 
 or posscHsrin of such carriers." 
 
 ' Boss V. Hill, 1846; Ilarris v. 
 Cos'cir, 18'J.); Cof;^'ij v. Bernard, 
 1704. See Gt. N.-rth. Ry. Co. v. 
 Sheppard, 18.52. 
 
 " The common hiw liability of inn- 
 keepers has Lecn r<'strieted by 2() & 
 27 V. c. 41 ('The Innkeepers Lia- 
 bility Act, IHO.'J "), and is now limited 
 to 3l)/., save ns to Roods d(>]iosited for 
 eafe custody, atul as to horses an<l 
 cnrriasyes, if the inn has a copy of 
 § 1 of the Act (exhibited in a con- 
 s|)icuous part of its hall or t^ntrance. 
 As to tho construction of the \vi, 
 there is a case of Moss r. Russell, 
 1.SH4, 0. A. See, as to this point, 
 8j)ice ('. Macon, 1N77, C. A. 
 
 ' The depositor nuist be a guest. 
 See as to r.-iiat constitutes a fruost, 
 Strauss i\ Coiuity Hotel Co., INH.'J. 
 
 ♦ Thompson v. Lacy, 1H2() ; Turrill 
 V. Crawley, 1849. § 4 of 2<i & 27 V. 
 0. 41 ("The Iimkoopers' Liability 
 
 Act, 186.'J "), interprets the word 
 "inn" as meaning "any hotel, iiui, 
 tavern, public-house, or other ])laco 
 of refreshment, the keepcn- of which 
 is now by law responsible for tho 
 goods and property of his guests." 
 See Doe v. liaminar, 1H14 ; and R. i<. 
 Rymor, 1877. A boarding house or 
 lodging-house keeper hii- no duty 
 imposed upon him by law to take 
 care of his lodgers' goods. Holder 
 V. Soulby, lH(i(); Dansey v. Richard- 
 son, 18,')4. 
 
 * Dawson I'.Chamney, 1843; Mor- 
 gan V, Ravtiy, 1801 ; Hichmond v. 
 Smith, 18;i0 ; Hurgess i\ Clements, 
 1815; Armi.steail v. Wilde, I8.-)l ; 
 Calye's case, 158;}; Day v. Rather, 
 18();{. 
 
 « Armistead v. Wildo, 18,)1 ; Cas- 
 hill V. Wright, 18j(i; Morgan c. 
 Ravey, 18(i(); Filipowski v. Merry- 
 weather, 18()(); Oppenheim v. White 
 Ijion Hotel Co., 1871 ; Spicoy. Bacon, 
 1877, C. A. 
 
 ^ Dixou V. Birch, 1872. 
 
 162 
 
 k 
 
 Li,... 
 
 
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING ACCIDENTS. 
 
 of any explanation by the defendant.' For exarajile, this has been 
 done where the injury oom{)lained of was caused, either by a col- 
 lision between two railway trains belonging to the same company,* 
 by a railway carriage having, during the journey, unaccountably 
 left the rails,' or by a barrel of flour falling on a man out of a 
 warehouse window while he was walking in the street below.* On 
 the other hand, where a ladder, inside a private house, from some 
 unexplained cause fell against an upper window and broke it, and 
 the glass in falling damaged the eye of a person passing by, the 
 proof of these facts alone was held insufficient to fix the owner of 
 the house with negligence.* And the mere happening of an acci- 
 dent does not raise a presumption that an injury, which was caused 
 to a person by his acting with rashness to avoid an imaginary 
 danger, that he erroneously supposed had arisen owing to such 
 accident, is attributable to the negligence which originally occasioned 
 such accident.* Indeed, an accident will not be presumed to have 
 been attributable to it in all cases where negligence by the defen- 
 dant is proved. If the facts are equally consistent with its having 
 been caused by some voluntary act of the plaintiffs, a case should 
 only be left to the jury (1) where the circumstances make it a 
 question of fad whether such voluntary act of the plaintiff was 
 negligent or not ; or (2) where the circumstances are such that an 
 inference that the defendant could, by reasonable care, liava avoided 
 the accident would not he unreasonable.^ 
 
 § 189. Various primft facie and disputable presumptions arise, 
 again, in respect of iii/ants. Thus, infants between seven years 
 and fourteen, are prima facie presumed to be unacquainted with 
 guilt, and therefore cannot be convicted, unless the jury shall be 
 satisfied from the evidence, tliat, when the offence was committed, 
 they had a guilty knowledge that they were doing wrong." This 
 
 ■ 
 
 - 
 
 1 
 
 1 '' !-. 
 
 { 
 i 
 
 'l^llii 
 
 IIS- 
 
 r. 
 rry- 
 
 ' Cnsos cited infru, noto '. 
 
 • Skiimor v. Ijond. & Brighton Ry. 
 Co., I,S5(i. 
 
 • Fliiiinoiy V, Watoii. & L. Ey. 
 Co.. 1877 (Ir.). 
 
 • Uynu! V. Hondlo, 1803 ; Scott v. 
 Lond. Dock Cm., 18(15; Kciiriicy v. 
 Loud. & biigh. liy. Co., 1871, Exch. 
 Oh. 
 
 • ITipffs V- ^ravniird. ISGfi; Wel- 
 fart! r. Lond. & J$ii},'h. Hy. Co., 18G9. 
 Suo MofYiitt V. Katcmau, 18«9. 
 
 • Koaruoy v. Gt. Soiithoin & \Vo8- 
 tcrii l{y. Co., 188(5 (Ir.). Compare 
 JoiU'H r. Ilovcc, 181(i; Ihivio v. 
 London & S. W. Hy. Co., 1883. 
 
 ' Coylo V. Oiont North of lioload 
 Rv. Co., 1887 (Ir.). 
 
 • UuHB. C. & M. 1— A. 
 
 ica 
 
 m2 
 
 I ' 
 
 m 
 
 ' h -ii imj 
 
PRESUMPTIONS RKSPECTING INFANTS. [PART I. 
 
 rule, though perliiips originally adopted in favorem vitoo with 
 respect to capital offonops ouly,' has for many years past been ex- 
 pressly held applicable to all felonies.^ There seems no reason, on 
 principle, why it should not also be extended to misdemeanors, 
 with the exception, perhaps, of those where an infant occupier of 
 lands, charged with the repair of a br'dge or road, might be 
 indicted for non-repair.' The test of juvenile exemption pro- 
 pounded by Lord Hale, is whether the accused was capable of 
 discerning " between good and evil." * These words are sufficiently 
 indefinite, since they may apply either to legal responsibility or to 
 moral guilt ; ' and many children of tender years, though perfectly 
 well aware that it is wrong to take what does not belong to them 
 (who are consequently, according to this test, fit subjects for 
 punishment), may yet be only partially acquainted with the sinful 
 nature of theft, and be wholly ignorant that it is a crime against 
 the law of the land.* 
 
 § 190. The law also recognises certain presumptions with respect 
 to married women. Thus, if a wife commit a felony,' other 
 
 1 Hale, c. 3. 
 
 R. V. Owon, 1830. 
 
 E. V. Sutton, 1835. 
 
 1 Hale, 27. 
 » Soe 30 Law Mag. 24, and article on 
 M'Naughtnn's trial in Log. Obs. for 
 May 27, 1843, as to the dangerous and 
 unphilosophical nature of this test, 
 
 ' The loose and unsatisfactory 
 manner in which this merciful pre- 
 sumption of infantile innocence has 
 — ^at least in former years — been 
 practically rebutted, cannot be more 
 clearly exposed than by referring to 
 a sbvtisticiil return of juvenile delin- 
 quents, published in the present 
 roigu. By those it appears that, out 
 of 297 children under the age of 
 fifteen, committed in the metropolis 
 alone during a single year, 238 were 
 actually convicted ; and of these no 
 fewer than 36 wore sentenced to 
 transportation. See Porter's Statist. 
 Tables, Part 14, pp. 149. 151, 152, 
 l.')3. In 1844, 1596 children, under 
 the age of fifteen, were committed 
 for trial in England and Wales. 
 Porter's Progress of Nation, p. 050. 
 
 ' Some doubt exists as to the 
 erimos excepted from this presump- 
 
 tion. " Thus, Ld. Hale, in one 
 part of his Pleas of the Crown, 
 vol. i., pp. 45, 47, assorts that the 
 presumption is recognised in all 
 cases excepting treason and murder; 
 but in later passages (id. 434, 516) 
 he excludes from its operation man- 
 slaughter also, and cites as his autho- 
 rity a passage from Ualton, in which 
 manslaughter is not ini-ntionod : Dalt. 
 c. 104, p. 207 ; new od. c. 157, p. 603. 
 Mr. Serjt. Hawkins makes the excep- 
 tions consist of treason, murder, and 
 robbery (1 Hawk. c. 1, p. 4) ; while 
 Mr. Justice IJlackstono, in the first 
 vol. of his Conim., mentions only 
 treason and murder (c. 15) ; and in 
 the 4th vol., c. 2, excepts also crimes 
 that are mala in so, aud prohibited 
 by the law of nature, as murder and 
 the like. • • • We would gladly see 
 the exception extended to all capital 
 folonios, if not to all crimes punish- 
 able with transportation, and thus 
 abolish a rule of law, which was 
 originally founded on doctrines that 
 no longer prevail, and which every 
 naiTiod man knows is often diametri- 
 cally ojiposod to the fact": 30 Law 
 Mag. pp. 9, 11. 
 
 164 
 
en, 
 
 v.] 
 
 PllKSUMl'TIONS Ki:sriXTlNU MAUKIED WOJ.IKN. 
 
 than treason or homicide,' or, perhaps, highway robbery,'^ in com- 
 pany with her husband, the law presumes that she acted under his 
 coercion, and consequently without any guilty intent, unless the 
 fact of non-coercion be distinctly proved. This presumption appears, 
 on some occasions, to have been considered conclusive, and is still 
 practically regarded in no very difPerent light, especially when the 
 crime is of a flagrant character.' The better opinion, however, now 
 seems to be that, in every case, the presumption may be rebutted 
 by posilke proof that the woman acted as a free agent.* Indeed, 
 in one case,* the Irish judges apparently considered that such posi- 
 tive proof was not required, but that the question was always one 
 to be determined by the jury on the evidence submitted to them. 
 However, a married woman cannot, under any circumstances, be 
 convicted as a receiver of stolen goods, when the property has been 
 taken by her husband, and given to her by him.* But she may 
 now be convicted of stealing her husband's goods.' 
 
 § 191. It is somewhat doubtful whether this doctrine of coercion 
 extends to any misdemeanors. But the better opinion seems to 
 be, that, if the misdemeanor be of a serious nature, as, for instance, 
 the uttering of base coin,* the wife will be protected in like manner 
 as in cases of felony. The protection does not, however, extend to 
 assaults and batteries,® or to the ofPence of keeping a brothel." 
 Indeed, it is probable that in all inferior misdemeanors, the pre- 
 sumption, — 'if admitted at all, — would be held liable to be defeated 
 
 % 
 
 
 
 
 1: 
 ' . ' : i 
 
 \\\ 
 
 
 ;hat 
 ory 
 tri- 
 jaw 
 
 • See R. V. Manning, 1849. 
 
 » In R. .;. Stiiploton. 1828 (Ir.), the 
 majority of tho judges thought that 
 this piosuinptiou does not amily to 
 highway rohlierj". It certainly does 
 not apply to a case of felonious 
 wounding with intent to disHguro, 
 or to do grievous bodily harm: 11. r. 
 Smith, 1858. But see R. v. Torpey, 
 1871. 
 
 ' 1 Hale, 45 ; R. v. Archer, 182G. 
 8oeR. (,'. Torpey, 1871. 
 
 * See 7 Rep. of Criin. Tiaw Com., 
 p. 21 ; :)() I,aw Mag., pp. 0—12; R. 
 V. Hughes, 18i;j; R. v. I'ollard, 18;{8 
 (Tindal, C.J., aiul Vaughan, J., in 
 a case of arson where i\w husband 
 WUH bedridden). See, also, H. «. 
 Smith. 1842 (Ir.). 
 
 • R. V. Stapleton, 1828 (Ir.). 
 
 • R. V. Brooks, 1853. See E. v. 
 Wardropor, 18(iO. 
 
 ' See ' ' Tho Married Women's Pro- 
 perty Act, 1882 " (45 & 4fi V. c. 76), 
 §§ 12, IG, amended by " Tlie Manied 
 Women's IVoperty Act, 1884 " (47 & 
 48 V. c. 14); R. v. Bi-itUeton, 1884 
 (Ct. of Trim. App.). Formerly she 
 could not bo convicti^d, oven if she 
 had committed adultery and Hed with 
 her paramour, taking tho goods with 
 her. R. v. Kenny, 1877. 
 
 • R. V. Conolly, 182!) (Bavley, J.); 
 E. V. rnce, 18;n ; Anon., 1841 (Ir.). 
 
 • R. V. (.'ruse, 1838 ; R. v, Ingram, 
 1705. 
 
 » E. V. Williams, 1710. 
 
 165 
 
 
 
PRESUMPTIVE AGENCY OF MARRIED WOMEN. [PART I. 
 
 by far less stringent evidence of the wife's active co-operation than 
 would sufRce in cases of felony.' 
 
 § 192. The following prim& facie presumptions exist with 
 regard to a husband's liability for debts contracted by his wife ; 
 where goods are supplied to family or wife, on the order of a 
 man's wife, who is living with him at the time, and the articles 
 are neither excessive in quantity, improvident in quality, nor 
 extravagant in price, it is, in the absence of evidence to the con- 
 trary, presumed that the wife was tb husband's agent to order 
 Buch goods.* But this presumption muy always be rebutted by 
 proof that the husband, while supplying his wife with an adequate 
 allowance, has expressly forbidden her to pledge his credit even for 
 necessaries ; and that, too, though the tradesman may have had no 
 knowledge whatever of the husband's prohibition.* If. jdeed, the 
 debt has been incun-ed by the wife while living separate from her 
 husband, the doctrine of presumptive agency will depend on the 
 cause of separation. Should the wife have been turned out of 
 doors or deserted by the husband, or have left him because his 
 misconduct rendered it impossible for her to remain under his roof,* 
 she has an implied authority to pledge his credit for necessaries,* 
 whether supplied to herself or to her infant child,^ unless by an 
 adequate^ allowance frori her husband, or by the terms of her 
 settlement, or perhaps by her own exertions, she be in a position 
 to provide for her maintenance.® On the other hand, a wife who 
 leaves her husband without his consent, and without justifiable 
 cause, has no authority to bind him by her contracts."" Where 
 
 m 
 
 ill 
 
 fe " '. 
 
 » E. V. Cruse, 1838. 
 
 * Lane v. Ironmonger, 1844 ; re- 
 cognising FroBstone v. Butcher, 1840 
 (Ld. Abinger) ; Atkins v. Curwond, 
 1837; Johnston v. Sumner, 1MJ8; 
 Morgan r. Clietwynd, 1H<I5 (Cock- 
 burn, (\J.); Waithinun i>. Wiikctiuld, 
 1807; Manby v. Scott. KiHO. See 
 Beneaux v. Tcakle, 1853; I'hillipson 
 V. Ilayter. 1870 ; Moylan v. Nolan, 
 18(54 (Ir.); Hold i;. 'Tcakle, 1803; 
 Kuddock V, Mainh, 1857 ; Jowsbiiiy 
 V. Newbold, 1857 ; and post, §§ 77(», 
 771. See also post, § 842. 
 
 » Deberiham v. Mellon, 1880, II. L. ; 
 Jolly V. l^'os, 1804 ; Ryan v. Nohm, 
 1804-5 (Ir.); Jotloy v. Hill, 1884 
 
 (Pollock, B.). 
 
 * Ba/.eley v. Forder, 1868 (Black- 
 burn, J.). 
 
 » Wilson )'. Ford, 1868. As to ho\r 
 far this doetriuc applies to cases where 
 the wife has retained a solicitor to act 
 for her in divorce or other legal pro- 
 ceedings against her husband, see 
 Ottaway v. Hamilton, 1878, C. A. ; 
 Mecredy v. Taylor, 1S73 (Ir.); Shep- 
 herd ('. Mackoul, 1813; Brown r, 
 Ac^krovtl. 1850; Orindoll v. God- 
 mimd, 1830. 
 
 * Ba/eley v. Forder, 1868. 
 
 * Baker c. Sampson, 1803. 
 
 * Jr>hu8ton V, Sumuer, 1858. 
 » Id, 
 
 166 
 
ii'l 
 
 CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIVE AGENCY OF MAIfRIED AVOMEN. 
 
 husband and wife have parted by mutual consent, aud the wife has 
 afterwards incurred a debt for articles suitable to her degree, the 
 creditor, to recover from the husband, must affirmatively show 
 either an express authority from him, or at least such circumstances 
 as will justify the jury in implying an authority ; for instance, 
 that the wife has been left without adequate means of support, or 
 that an allowance promised to her by the husband has not been 
 paid.^ Under any circumstances, too, the authority of a wife to 
 pledge her husband's credit is no greater when he is a lunatic 
 than when he is sane.^ 
 
 § lii3. Moreover, though a wife has often an implied authority 
 from her husband to procure goods on credit, an E'^glish court 
 would never, under the old system, presume that shr .vas his agent 
 for the purpose of borrotving moiipy ; and this even though she 
 were turned out of doors without any misconduct on her part, and 
 without any means of livelihood, and notwithstanding she might 
 have expended the whole of it in procuring the actual necessaries 
 of life.' But a creditor who had been non- suited at common law 
 in pursuance of this doctrine might succeed in equity before a vice- 
 chancellor.* The rules of equity will, in future, prevail on this 
 subject.* 
 
 § 194. The rule of law as to proving impotence in matrimonial 
 suits for nullity of marriage is somewhat fantastic. Where the 
 marriage has not been consummated, and no visible defect is 
 proved to exist in either party," impotence is presumed after, but 
 not before, the expiration of three years of ineffectual cohabita- 
 tion.' This rule, however, only applies where the impotence is not 
 otherwise proved, but is left to be presumed from continual non- 
 consummation ; and the court will never reiy on this rule of pre- 
 sumption when other evidence on the subject orn be obtained.* 
 
 § 195. The presumptions with respect to par; nt and c/iiM are not 
 
 ' Johnston v. Sumnor, 1838; Biffin 
 y.Bigneli, 18()2; Eustlandf. BunhoU, 
 1870. Soo Manby v. Scott. 1 «(>(). 
 
 * Richardson v, Dubois, 18G9. Soo 
 Drew V. Nunn. 187!», T. A. 
 
 > Knox V. BushoU, 1857. 
 
 * Jennor i'. Morris, 1861. Soe Bo 
 Woo("8 Estiite, 1863. 
 
 * The old law in Ireland was aa it 
 
 formerly was ii.. equity in England. 
 Johnson v. Manning, ISOO (Ir.). 
 
 " Soe ])., falsely called F. v. V,, 
 18(54 ; B., falsely called B. v. B., 
 1875 (Ir.). 
 
 ' M., falsely called H. v. II.. ISrj; 
 Ticwia, falsely cillod Ilayward v, 
 Ilavward, 1H65, 11. L. 
 
 "'v., ful.soly culled D. v. 1)., 1865. 
 
 167 
 
 m 
 
 I 
 
 n 
 
 ) 
 
 m 
 
 :l i.s 
 
t 
 
 'i 
 
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 ffiiii 
 
 ■d 
 
 1 
 
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 nm' I 1 
 
 iiiSiir^^ 
 
 
 PRKSUMPTIOXS A8 TO SENIORITY. 
 
 [PAUr 1 
 
 very important. If a parent and a child both bear the same 
 Christian and surname, and this name occur in an instrument 
 without any addition of " senior " or " junior," it will be presumed, 
 in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the parent was 
 intended.' For example, if a legacy be left, or a noto be muio 
 payable, to John Holland, and there be two of that name, father 
 and son, the law, prim& facie, presumes that the father is the 
 legatee or payee. This presumption may, however, readily be 
 rebutted, as for instance, in the case of the will, by proving that 
 the testator did not know the father,^ or in the case of the note, by 
 showing that the son had had it in his possession, or had indorsed 
 it, ov had given instructions to bring an action upon it.' No pre- 
 sumption of a promise to pay a debt contracted by the child for 
 necessaries is made from the mere moral obligation of a parent to 
 maintain his child.* 
 
 § 196.' Various primft facie legal presumptions are founded on 
 the continiiance, or immutability, for a longer or shorter period, of 
 human affairs, which experience tells us usually occurs.* For 
 instance, when the existence of a person, or pei-sonal relation, or a 
 state of things, is once proved, the law presumes that the person, 
 relation, or state of things continues to exist till the contrary is 
 shown, or till a different presumption is raised, from the nature of 
 the subject.' For example, where a jury found that a certain 
 custom existed up to 1689, it was held, that, in the absence of all 
 evidence of its abolition, this was in legal effect a verdict finding 
 that the custom still subsisted in 1840 ; ^ in settlement cases, unless 
 there be some eviaence to the contrary, it will be presumed that a 
 son, though long since arrived at manhood, has continued uneman- 
 cipated,' and that the ;. .ttlement of a pauper,'" or the appointment 
 
 ' Steblying v. Spicer, 1849 ; Lepiot 
 V.Browne, 1703; Sweeting i;. Fowler, 
 1815 ; Jarmain v. Hoopor, 1843. 
 
 * Lepiot V. Browne, 1703. 
 
 * Stebbing v, Spicer, 1849; Sweet- 
 ing v. Fowler, 1815. 
 
 * Shelton v. Springott, 1851 ; re- 
 cognising Mortimore v. Wright, 1 840, 
 and overruling Baker v. Keone. 1819; 
 Blackburn V, Mackoy, 1823; Law w, 
 Wilkin, 1837. See Bazoloy v. Furder, 
 1868. 
 
 • Gr. Ev. § 41, as to first seven 
 linos. 
 
 • See argument in Blandy v. Do 
 Burgh, 1848. 
 
 ' See Price v. Price, 1847, over- 
 ruling Mercer v. Cheese, 1842. See, 
 also. The Gananoguo, 1862. 
 
 • Scales V. Keys, 1840. 
 
 ' B. V. Lilloshall, 1845, explaining 
 R. V. Oulton, 1835. 
 
 w E. V. Tanner, 1795 (Abhhuret, J.). 
 
 168 
 
» i'>.*5 I 
 
 -rij^" 
 
 ifti 
 
 CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOUR OF IMMUTABILITY. 
 
 of a party to an oflBcial Bituation, continues in force for, at least, 
 a reasonable time ; ' a partnership, agency, tenancy,* or other 
 similar relation, once shown to exist, is presumed to continue, till 
 it is proved to have been dissolved.' From the presumption of a 
 continuance of a state of things once shown to exist, it follows that 
 when a business is carried on by partners after the expiration of 
 the term limited by the articles, it is primS, facie presumed, that 
 such of the provisions of the articles as are not inconsistent 
 with a partnership at will, continue to apply : * if a tenant hold 
 over after the expiration of the term, he impliedly holds subject to 
 all the covenants in the lease which are applicable to his new situa- 
 tion ' — and this, though the rent has been advanced,' or though 
 the original lessor has assigned his interest to a third party, or, 
 being a clergyman, has resigned his living, and a fresh incumbeat 
 has succeeded him ; ' and that if a man on several occasions 
 authorise his mistress to order goods from a tradesman on his 
 credit, he is liable for articles supplied after the termination of the 
 connexion, unless the tradesman knew of such termination.* 
 
 § 197. The continuance of a debt once shown to have existed, is 
 presumed, in the absence of proof of payment, or some other 
 discharge.' It is also presumed, till the contrary appears, that 
 opinions,'" which individuals once entertained and ex[(ressed, and 
 that a state of mind on their part once proved to exist, remain 
 unchanged." Every man who has once been sane is presumed to 
 be still of sound mind till the contrary is shown.*'' 
 
 m 
 
 » R. V. Budd, 1805 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough). 
 
 ■' See Pickett v.Paokham, 1809, C.A. 
 
 ' Clark V. Alexander, 1844, whore 
 a partnership admitted to exist in 
 1816 was presumed to continue in 
 18.'{8. See, also, Alderson v. Clay, 
 1816; Blandy v. De Hur','h, 1848; 
 and Parsons v. Hayward, 1862. So, 
 by Ilindoo law, a family once joint 
 is presumed to retain that status, 
 unless evidence can bo piven to show 
 that it has become diTidcd : Mussu- 
 mat Cheetha v. Baboo Miheen Lall, 
 1867. 
 
 • And this, however difficult it 
 may be to say what provisions fall 
 within this description : Cox v, Wil- 
 loughby, 1880 (Fry, J.); Clark v. 
 Leach, 1863. See VVoods v. I<amb, 
 1866 (Woods. V.-C). 
 
 • Tonianov.Younfj, 1833; Thom.as 
 V. Packer, l.SJT; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 154, 
 § 5, Ir. But see Oakley v. Mouck, 
 1865 (Kx. Ch.). 
 
 • iJiRby V. Atkinson. 1815 (Ld. 
 Ellenborough), explained in Johnson 
 V. St. Peter, Hereford, 1836. 
 
 ' llutton V. Warren, 1836. See 
 Thettord v. Tylo", 1845. 
 
 • Ryan v. Sams, 1848. 
 
 » Jackson v, Irvin, 1809 (Ld. 
 Ellenborough). 
 
 "• Gr. Ev. § 42. 
 
 " For instance, all members of a 
 Christian community are presumed 
 to believe the common faith till their 
 acts or declarations evidence the 
 contrary. See The State v. Stinson, 
 1844 (Am.). 
 
 " JJyco Sombre v, Troup, 1856 
 (Sir J. Dobson). In Sutton v. 8a4- 
 
 1G9 
 
 I n 
 
 ill 
 
 n N '! 
 
 . I 
 
 1 i 'U 
 
 
 ! 
 
 ■; '1 ■ 
 
 i'lhiij 
 
 
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ii 
 
 
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 = i 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS AS TO CONTINUANCE OF LIFE. [PART I. 
 
 § 1 98. It is on the above principles also a presumption of law that a 
 person shown to ^^ave ouoe been living is, by English law, in the ab- 
 spnoeof proof that he haa not been heard of within the last seven years, 
 presumed to be still aliv>3:' until a time considerably exceeding the 
 ord'.nary duration of human life has elapsed. In the civil law the 
 presumption of life ceases at the expiration of one hundred years 
 from the date of the birth,'^ and the same rule appears to have been 
 adopted in Scotland.' In England, however, no definite period 
 has been fixed, at the end of which the presumption of a continu- 
 ance of life ceases. In several old cases, however, the possibility of 
 persons having survived the expiration of terms, periods varying 
 from eighty to ninety-nine years, was neglected in determining the 
 nature of remainders.* In an action of ejectment, where the plain- 
 tiff, to prove his title, put in a settlement 130 years old, by which 
 it appeared that the party through whom he claimed had four elder 
 brothers, the jury were allowed to presume, not only that these 
 persons were dead, but, in the absence of all evidence to the con- 
 trary, that they had died unmarried and without issue.'' And 
 
 ler, 1857, this presumption was held 
 to be one of fait, which ought not to 
 influence the jury in a case of con- 
 flicting evidence. See, also, Ander- 
 son V. Gill, 1858, II. L. (Ld. Wens- 
 leydalo) ; Crowninshield v. Crownin- 
 shield, 1854 (Am.). And, on the other 
 hand, where any derangement or 
 imbecility is proved or admitted to 
 liavo existed ut any particular period, 
 it is presumed to continue till dis- 
 proved. See Att.-Oen. i;. Parnther, 
 1792; Grimani v. Draper, 1848 (Sir 
 11. Fust); Johnson v. lilane, 1848 
 (Sir II. Fust) ; Dyce Sombre v. Troup. 
 1856 (Sir J. Dodsou) ; Frinsep and 
 E. I. Co. V. Dyce Sombre, 185ti, P. C. ; 
 Nicholas and Freeman v. Binns, 1858 
 (Sir C. Crosswell) ; Ilassard i'. Smith, 
 1872 (Ir.); Hlitko v. Johnson, 1819 
 (Ir.); Smith f. Tobbitt, 18(57— unless, 
 indeed, it be obviously of a partial or 
 temporarv character. See Walcot v. 
 AUevn, 1819 (Ir.); Legeyt v. Obrien, 
 18;M"(Ir.); Airoyv. Hill, 1824; White 
 i;. Wilson, 18()(); Hall v. Wan-on, 
 1804. 
 
 ' See, however, R. v. Lumley, 
 18C9, cited ante, § 114. 
 
 I •' Vivere etiam usque ad centum 
 
 annos quilibet prresumitur, nisi pro- 
 mortuus." Corpus Juris Glossutum, 
 tom. 2, p. 718, n. 5; 1 Masc. de Prob. 
 concl. lo3, n. 5; Campegius Tract, 
 de Test. reg. :}o(), 
 
 ' Morison, Presump. xvi.. Car- 
 stairs V. Stewart, 1734 ; Ilubb., Ev. 
 of Sue. 168. Mr. Dickson in his Law 
 of Evid. in Scotland, states, however, 
 that "a precise limit to this pre- 
 sumption nas not been fixed." 1 vol. 
 p. 183. For other foreign laws on 
 the same subject, see Hubb., Ev. of 
 Sue. 758, 759. 
 
 * Weale v. Jjower, 1672 (Lord 
 Hale) ; Napi)er v. Sanders, 1628 ; lid. 
 Derby's case, 1592. 
 
 ' Doe V. Deakin, 1828; Doe v. 
 WoUey, 1828. There Bayley, J., in 
 stating that the jury had properly 
 made this presumption, relied on the 
 general rule, that things must bo 
 presumed to remain in the same state 
 in which thoy were proved to have 
 once b'jen, unless there is some evi- 
 dence of a subsoqiiont alteration. 3 
 C. & P. 403. It is, however, sub- 
 mitted that the rule waa in this case 
 strained some'nhat beyond its legiti- 
 mate extent. If presumptions are 
 
 170 
 
 " ■ It jl 
 
^'m}''i 
 
 M 
 
 CHAP, v.] PKERUMrnONS AS TO CONTINUAXCE OP LIFE. 
 
 whenever it becomes necessary to prove the exhaustion of remote 
 branches of a family, the jury may safely be advised to act on very 
 slight evidence, such, for example, as unanswered advertisements 
 or ineffectual inquiries.' And in two other cases a book kept by a 
 person has been admitted in evidence, without proof that any 
 inquiries had been made for the writer, or as to his death, in the 
 one case after the lapse of seventy-four years,^ and in the other of 
 fifty-four years only.' 
 
 § 199. On the other hand, where a term was for sixty years, the 
 court refused to presume the death of the termor at the expiration 
 of that period, and recognized the possibility of his living after its 
 expiration : * and where a person's deposition had been taken sixty 
 years previously it was held that there was no presumption of his 
 death, and it was refused to admit such deposition in evidence in the 
 absence of any proof of search having been made for the depone^ i , 
 or any account of him.' 
 
 § 200. The presumption of life will, however, certainly on the 
 one hand continue for a period exceeding half a century, unless 
 proof be given either thut the party has not been heard of by those 
 jiersons who would naturally have heard of him had he been alive, 
 or, at least, that search has been ineffectually made to find him.* 
 On the other hand, if evidence be furnished of a person's con- 
 tinuous unexplained absence from home, and of the non-receipt of 
 intelligence concerning him, after the lapse of seven years'' the 
 presumption of life ceases, and the burthen of proof is devolved on 
 
 « ■ 
 
 
 fouuded, as they should be, on the 
 experienced course of events, it was 
 surely . ore probable that one out of 
 four brothers should many and have 
 children, then that they should all 
 die unmari'ied. In Doe v. Griffin, 
 1812, where a similar que.-itioii arose, 
 evidence neyativing the nuirriaf/e of 
 the party, who was there presumed 
 to have died without issue, was given ; 
 and in Hichards v. liichards, 1731, 
 whore the plaintitT claimed as heir 
 by descent, antl proved the death of 
 his elder brothers, the court held that 
 he must further show that they died 
 without issue, since in ejectment no 
 
 presumption could be admitted against 
 the person in po8iios.'«ion. See in re 
 Webb's Estate, 1870 (Ir.); Mullaly v. 
 Walsh, 1872 (Ir.). 
 
 * Greaves v. Greenwood, 1877, 
 0. A. 
 
 * Jones V. Waller, 1763. See also 
 Doe V. Davies, 1847. 
 
 » Doe V. Michael, 1851. 
 
 * Beverley v. IJeverley, 1690; Doe 
 i; Andrews, 18J0. 
 
 ' Henson v. Olive, 1781; Manbyv. 
 Curtis, 1815. 
 
 * Doe V. Andrews, 1850. 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 41, in part. 
 
 I 1 u 
 
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 ilM!iH 
 
 I 
 
 r. 
 

 ■ ' 
 
 ;1 
 
 \ti-' 
 
 m 
 
 mm 
 
 m 
 
 III 
 
 i^' . ,ii 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS AS TO CONTINUANCE OF LIFE. [PART I. 
 
 the party denying the death.* TI\U8, where a person whose life is 
 insured has not hoen heard of for seven years, those who have 
 effected the insurance are, at the end of that period, entitled to 
 have it paid.' The fixing of this arbitrary period of seven years is 
 explained by its having been inserted in thi, old statutes concerning 
 leases for lives,' and since, by analogy, been adopted in other oases.* 
 A period of seven years is also recognized in the various Acts 
 relating to bigamy.* Under the last-named statutes on an indict- 
 ment, if it appear that the prisoner and his first wifr, lived apart for 
 seven years before the second marriage, mere proof that the first 
 wife was alive at the latter time will not warrant a conviction, but 
 affirmative evidence that the accused was aware of this fact must be 
 gi'.en.* Although, however, a person who has not been heard of 
 for seven yer.rs, is presumed to be dpa;' the law raises no presump- 
 tion as to the time of his death; ana '* any one who seeks to 
 establish the precise period during those seven years, at which such 
 person died, must do so by actual evidence.^ 
 
 ' Hopewell v. De Pinna, 1809; 
 Rusty. Bukor, 1837; Loiingr.Steino- 
 man, 184(. (Am.). In Bowden v. Hen- 
 derson, 1854, the presumption of death 
 after seven years' absence was held 
 not to arise, if tlie probability of the 
 exile sending intelligence home bo 
 rebutted by circumstances. See also 
 M'Muhon V. M'Klroy, 1809 (Jr.); 
 Prudential Ass. Co. ♦;. Edmonds, 
 1877, II. L. 
 
 ' Willyams v. Scottish Widows' 
 Fund, 1888. 
 
 » 19 Car. 2, c. 6, § 2. See also 6 A. 
 c. 18, entitled " An Act for the more 
 effectual discovery of the death of 
 persons pretended to be alive, to the 
 prejudice of those who claim estates 
 after their death." For the construc- 
 tion and ])ructice under which, s^e In 
 re Pople, Ex parte Baker, 1889. 
 
 * Doe u, Jesson, 1805; Doe v. 
 Deakin,1821 ; King v. Paddock, 1820 
 (Am.). In Scotland the law on this 
 subject is embodied in " The Pre- 
 sumption of Life Jjimitation (Scot- 
 land) Act, 1881" (44 & 45 V. c. 47). 
 See especially § 8. In America it is 
 not necessary that the junty be proved 
 to be absent from the United States ; 
 
 it is sufHciont if it a])pears that ho hiis 
 been absent for seven years from the 
 particular State of his residence, 
 without having bt^en heard of. New- 
 man i". JenkiiiS. 18'i0 (Am); Innis v. 
 Campbell, 1829 (Am.); Spurr v. 
 Trimble. 1818 (Am.); Wambough «. 
 Shenk, 1807 (Am.); Woods v. Woods, 
 1802 (Am.). In the New York 
 Civ. Code, the presumption is thus 
 briefly exim'ssed: — "That a pers<m 
 not heard from in seven years is 
 dead." § 1780, art. 26. As to cases 
 where the i)re8umi)tion of life con- 
 flicts with that of innocence, see 
 § 114, ante. Willvame v. Scottish 
 Widows' Fund, 1888. 
 
 » IJ. l,c.ll,§2; 90.4,0.31, §22; 
 24 & 25 V. c. 100 (" The Offoncbs 
 against the Person Act, 1801 "), §57. 
 
 ' R. r. C'urwengen, 1805. See R. 
 V, Jones, 1883. 
 
 ' Connor, In the goods of, 1892 
 (Ir.) ; Re Rhodes, Rhodes v. Rhodes, 
 1887; lie I'hene's Trusts, 1809, 
 C. A.; Ro Lewes's Trusts, 1871, 
 C. A. ; Re Corbishley's Trusts, 1880 ; 
 Hickman v. Upsall, 1877, C. A.; 
 Lambo v. Orton, 1800; Pennefather 
 V. Pennefather, 1872 (Ir.); Thomas 
 
 172 
 

 
 CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTIONS AS TO SURVIVORSHIP. 
 
 § 201. Whore, moreover, the facts reasonably raise such an 
 inference, a person's death may be presumed to have taken jdaoe 
 be/ore a certain date,' and death may be presiimed after the lapse of 
 a shorter period than seven years — as for instance, if the party, 
 Avhen last heard of, was aged, or infirm, or ill,'^ or had since been 
 exposed to extraordinary peril, such as a storm and probable ship- 
 wreck.' Although the pre.sumption of the common law, indepen- 
 dent of the finding of a jury, does not attacli to the mere lapse of 
 time short of seven years.* 
 
 § 202.* Closely connected with the subjoit of the legal presump- 
 tion as to the continuance of life is that of presumption as to 
 Hurvivonhip, which may become important with regard to the devo- 
 lution of property. Common instances, affording occasions for 
 questions of survivorship arising, occur when two persons (especially 
 when two relatives), perish in the same calcmity, such as a wreck, a 
 battle, or a conflagration. Direct proof can seldom be procured in 
 these cases. In the Koman law, and in several other codes, recourse 
 is had to artificial presumptions, whenever the particular circum- 
 stances connected with the deaths are wholly unknown, such pre- 
 sumptions being based on the probabilities of survivorship resulting 
 
 :."'i 
 
 t 
 
 i 
 
 m 
 
 V. Thomafl, 1.S60; In re Bonham's 
 Trusts, 18G8 (Rolt, L.J.) ; In ro Peck, 
 18()(;; In re Nichols, 1872; Dunn w. 
 Hnovdon, 1803; Doe v. Nojioan, 
 1833. In Nepean v. Doe d. Knight, 
 1847 (iTx. Ch.), Ld. Donman, in the 
 court's judgment, observes: — "It is 
 true the doctrine will often practically 
 limit the time for bringing the action 
 of ejectment in such cases [viz., 
 where the plaintiff claims as grantee 
 in reversion of an estate] ; and cir- 
 cumstances may l)o supposed, as of a 
 lease for seven years, commencing 
 on the death of A., or of a promissory 
 note payable two months after A.'s 
 death, and many other cases which 
 might be put, in which it would be 
 difficult to carry into effect certain 
 contracts, or to have remedies for the 
 breach of them, if the parties inte- 
 rested, instead of making inquiries 
 respecting the person on whose life 
 80 much dopendod, chose to wait for 
 Uie legal presumption. Such incon- 
 
 veniences may no doubt arise, but 
 they do not warrant us in laying 
 down a rule, that the party shall bo 
 presumed to have died on the last 
 day of the seven years, which would 
 manifestly be contrary to the fact in 
 almost ail instances. 2 M. & W. 
 913, 914. 
 
 ' 8ee, for example, Sillick v. Booth, 
 1841 ; Ommaney v. Stillwell, 1856. 
 
 * R. V. Harborne, 1835 (Ld. Den- 
 man) ; Re Uousney's Trust, 1809. 
 
 » Watson V. King. 1815 ; Patter- 
 son V. Black, 1780. In the case of a 
 missing ship, bound from Manilla to 
 Ijondon, on which the underwriters 
 had voluntarily paid the amount 
 insured, the death of those on board 
 was presumed by the Prerogative 
 Coui-t, after the absence of only two 
 years, and administration was granted 
 accordiiigiy : In re Hutton, 1837. 
 
 * See further on this subject,Hubb. 
 Ev. of Sue. 167 et seq., 768, 769. 
 
 * Gr. Ev. s. 29, in part. 
 
 173 
 
 ilill 
 

 I. I 
 'i! ' 
 
 
 :'il. 
 
 V. i 
 
 . i ' 
 
 
 PR1':SUMFTI0NS AS TO SURVIVORSHIP. [PAKT I. 
 
 from strength, age, and sex. Thus, if a father and son perish 
 together in the same shipwreck or battle, Eoman law presumed 
 that the son died first, if he was under the age of puberty ; but if 
 he was above that age, that he was the survivor; the principle 
 being, that in the former cose, the elder is generally the more 
 robust, and in the latter, the younger.' The French code has 
 regard to the ages, and presumes that of those under fifteen the 
 eldest survived ; and that of those above sixty, the youngest sur- 
 vived ; that if one of the parties were under the age of fifteen, and 
 the other above the age of sixty, the former survived, and that if 
 both parties were between those ages, but of different sexes, the 
 male survived, unless he were more than a year younger than the 
 female : but that if they were of the same sex, the survivorship of 
 the younger must be presumed, as opening the succession in the 
 order of nature.* The same rules were in force in the territory of 
 Orleans, at the time of its cession to the United States, and have 
 since been incorporated into the Code of Louisiana.' They have 
 also, with some modifications, been adopted into the State of New 
 York.* 
 
 § 20'}. The law of England, however, in such cases recognizes* 
 
 • Dig. lib. 34, tit. 5; Do rebus 
 bubiis, lib. 9, § 1. 3; Id. i. 16, 22, 
 23 ; Monoch. do Prros. lib. 1 , Quoest. 
 X. n. 8, 9. This rule, however, was 
 subject to somo exceptions for tho 
 benefit of roothers, patrons, and 
 beneficiaries. 
 
 « Code Civil, §§ 720, 721, 722; 
 Duranton, Cours do Droit Frangiiis, 
 torn. 6, pp. 32, 42, 43, 48, G7, (59 ; 
 Eof^ron, Code Civil, Expli. 411, 412; 
 Touiller, Droit Civil Fran^'uis, torn. 4, 
 pp. 70, 72. 73. 
 
 2 Civ. Code of Louis, art. 930— 
 933; Dip. of Civ. L. of Orleans, 
 art. fiO— f)3. 
 
 • N. Y. Civ. Code. § 1780, tit. 3. 
 
 • Alston, In the Goods of, 1892 ; 
 R. V. Dr. Hay, 1767. The latter 
 case (known as General Stanwix's 
 case) was compromised upon the re- 
 commendation of Ld. Mansfield, who 
 Said he knew of no legal principle on 
 which he could decide it. See, 1767, 
 2Philliui. B.268, n.; Foarne's Posth. 
 
 Works, 38; Doe v. Nopoiin, 1833 
 Underwood v. Wing, 18J4 (llomilly, 
 M.R.) ; aff. on appeal (Ld. Cran- 
 worth. C, assisted by Wightman, J., 
 and Martin, B.), 1856; Mason »-. 
 Mason, 1816. See Diirrant v. Friend, 
 1857; Burnett v. Tugwell, 1862. 
 For tho cases decided in the old 
 Ecdes. Courts, sec Wiight v. Nether- 
 wood, 1793; more fully repoitod 
 under tho name of Wriplit v. Sar- 
 muda, 1793; Taylor »'.l)iplock, 1815; 
 Selwyn's case, 1831 ; In the Goods 
 of Murray, 1837. In tho brief note 
 of Colviu V. Proc. Gen., 1827, where 
 tho husband, wife, and infant (if any), 
 perished togblLar, the Court seems to 
 have held that tho prima facie pre- 
 sumption of law was that the husband 
 survived ; but the question was not 
 much discussed ; and in Satterthwaite 
 V. Powell, 1838, where a husband 
 and wife perished in the same wreck, 
 the CO art would not presume that he 
 survived, and consequently refused 
 
 174 
 
 m 
 
ClIAP. v.] PRESUMPTIONS AS TO SUKVIVORSniP. 
 
 no presumption, either of «urvivorslup, or of contemporanoons 
 death;* and in the total absence of all evidence respootiug the 
 particular circumstances of the calamity, treats the matter oa one 
 incapable of being determined.' If indeed, any circumstances 
 connected with the death of either party be proved, the ques- 
 tion of survivorship may be dealt with «« one of fact, and tho 
 comparative strength, or skill, or energy, of the two sufferers taken 
 into account.' 
 
 § 2(»4. A primA facie presumption in insurance law is that, if a 
 vessel has sailed, and no tidings of her have been received within a 
 reasonable time, she is presumed to have funmletrd at sf-a.'* By 
 ** tidings " are meant, not mere rumours, but some actual intelli- 
 gence received from persons capable of giving an authentic account.* 
 In an action on a policy from an English to a foreign port, the 
 presumption of loss will arise, from proof that the shi{) was not 
 heard of in this country after she sailed, without calling witnesses 
 from the port of destination to show that she never arrived there." 
 
 to grant to his repreaontative the 
 administration of property vested in 
 the wife, tho subject of presumed 
 survivorship is fully treated in 4 
 Burgo, Com. on Col. & For. L., 11 — 
 29; and in Hnbb. Ev. of Sue. ISfi, 
 et soq., and 759— 7G4. See, also, 
 2 Kent, Com. 435, 4:36, 4th ed.. n. b. 
 
 ' By the Mahometan law of India, 
 when relatives thus perish together, 
 "it is to be presumed that they all 
 died at tho sumo moment ; and tho 
 property of each shall pass to his 
 living heirs, without any portion of 
 it vestina: in his companions in mis- 
 fortune." See Baillio's Moohum- 
 mudan Law of Inherit. 172. 
 
 ' Wing V. Angiave, 18()(), H. L. 
 
 » In Sillick v. Booth (1«41), 
 Knight-Bruce, V.-C, hold that a 
 presumption of priority of death 
 might be raised from tho compara- 
 tive age, strength, and skill of the 
 parties ; and accordingly, whore two 
 orothers perished by shipwreck, under 
 tho circumstances wholly unknown, 
 the one twenty-eight years of age, 
 and the master of the ship, while the 
 other was under age, and act(Hl as 
 second mate, presumed that the elder, 
 
 as tho stronger and more experienced 
 sailor, survived the younger. This 
 case must, however, bo taken not 
 as laying down any rule of law. but 
 as merely a finding of fud, under 
 the particular circumstr.ncrs. 
 
 * Green v. Brown, 1744; Newby ?;, 
 Reed, 176;i ; Koster v. Roed, 1H'2«. 
 But in order to recover on a policy, 
 there mu.st bo some evidence that 
 when tho ship loft the port of 'ntfit 
 she was bound upon the voyage in- 
 sured. Cohen v. Ilinkley, I'sOO (Ld. 
 Ellonborough) ; Koster v, Innes 
 1825 (.Vbbott. C.J.). 
 
 " Koster r. Reed, 1826(Bayley. J.), 
 where the statement of a witness that 
 a few days after tho vessel sailed he 
 heard that she had foundered, but 
 that tho crew were saved, was held 
 not suflicient to rebut the presump- 
 tion of loss which arose fiom the ship 
 never having arrived at her port of 
 destination, and not to oblige tho 
 plaintiff either to call any of the 
 crew, nor to show that he was unable 
 
 to do 80. 
 
 • Twemlow v. Qswin, 1809 (Sir J. 
 Mansdeld, C.J<)> 
 
 .'.'6 
 
 ^ wm 
 
 ! M 
 
 
 li! i 
 
 ! I 
 
 r M 
 
PRESUMPTIONS ADOPTED IN INSURANCE LAW. [PART I. 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 '' 
 
 l« u 
 
 Neither English law nor any general custom has fixed any drfinite 
 period after which the assured may demand payment for his loss, 
 in case n 3 intelligence is received respecting the vessel insured ; hut 
 among insurers a vessel is in practice treated as lost if she be not 
 heard of within six months after departure for any port in Europe, 
 or within twelve months for a greater distance.* 
 
 § 205. Another presumption in insurance law is thn.t if a ship, 
 shortly after sailing, without visible or adequate cause, becomes 
 leaky, or otherwise incapable of performing the voyage insured, she 
 is deemed to have been unseaworthy at the commencement of the 
 risk.' This, however, is not really a proposition of law, but simply 
 an inference of fact which may be drawn by the intelligence of the 
 jury,' and it ia not so binding that the court will grant a third 
 trial, after the verdict the other way by two special juries.* 
 
 § 206. Certain presumptions are again, in maritime cases, made 
 by tho Admiralty Division of the High Court, which technically 
 shift the burthen of proof. Thus, if two vessels come into collision, 
 of which one was at anchor,* or " in stays " * at the time, the fact so 
 far raises a presumption in her favour that she is so iax prcnumed to 
 be without blc.i.ie ; and the burthen of proof rests on the opposite 
 side to establish, either that the other vessel was to blame or had 
 been improperly put " in stays," or that the damage was occasioned 
 by stress of weather, or by other unavoidabla accident. Again, in 
 the case of a collision between two ships, if the master of either 
 ship fail to render assistance to the other, and to stay by her for 
 that purpose, the collision shall, in the absence of proof to the con- 
 
 ipiijiit 
 
 ' 1 Piirk. Ins. 149. By tho ordi- 
 nancoH of Spuin, if ii ship iii.Mucd cm 
 goin^ to, ')r«)ining fioiii, i\w Iiidios, 
 18 not linird of within u yuiu° iind u hulf 
 after h<<r di'imrturo from tho port of 
 outKt, sho iH ,l"«'inod hwt, '2 Mittens, 
 an ; by those of Franoo, if tho ussured 
 rocoivoH no n^ws of his >)hip, hi^ may, 
 at tho oxpirittioii of a your for citnimon 
 voyoffOH, lorkoninR from tho day of 
 the flopHrturo, and uftor two yours 
 tor ihonn of u gioator distanco, mako 
 his soHsiou U) tho uiulorwritors, aad 
 demand payment, without being 
 
 oblipfod to produce any cortificKte of 
 tho loss. Ordonnanco de !a Murine, 
 liv. n. t. (), dos Assur. Art. 58. 
 
 » Wutson V. VUrk, 18i;{; Munro 
 V, Vundum, 17!M (I,d. Konyou) ; 
 I'urk.T V. Po.th, IHl j, U. L. 
 
 ' Pickup V. Tliumos Ins. Co., 1878, 
 C. A. 
 
 • Foster V. Stoolo, 1837 (Tindal, 
 C.J. und Park, J.; Vaughan and 
 Coltmun, JJ., diss.). 
 
 • Tho Hothnia, 18fi0. 
 
 • The irioa Nymph, 1860. 
 
 176 
 
 -1^ ■ \ 
 
fi 
 
 CHAP, v.] riMisiiMrrioNs adoited in maritime law. 
 
 trary, be deomcd to have been causod by tlio wrongful act of 
 the defaulter.' Moreover, the infringement of any regulation for 
 jtrevonting tollisiuns at sea,- made under the Merchant Shipping 
 Act,' 18m, raises a presunipticm of blame as against the infringer, 
 unless lie can show either that circumstances "made a departure 
 from the regulation necessary," * or that the infringement charged 
 could not by possibility have contributed to the collision.* Again, 
 if a salvor's vessel be injured or lost while engaged in a salvage 
 service, the Admiralty Division presumes, primal facie, that such 
 injury or loss was caused by the necessities of the service, and not 
 by the salvor's default.* 
 
 § 2l>7. Another presumption of maritime law, moreover, is in 
 favour of the rights of property in the owners, whenever any ques- 
 tion of derelict is mooted betwoon them and the salvors. There- 
 fore, where salvors make a claim, as in a case of dereliction, it will 
 not suffice for them to merely prove that they found the vessel at 
 sea apparently abandoned, but they must go further and pi'ove that 
 the master and crow, when they left the vessel, did so without any 
 hope, expectation, or intention of being able to return, or, in tho 
 technical language of the law, sine spe recuperandi.' 
 
 § 208. Another presumption of ^faritime I^aw is that a ship- 
 owner, — o.xcept so far as his liability is limited by tho Merchant 
 
 > Tl.o Quoon. 18G0 ; .i7 & oS V. 
 c. 60 ("Tho Morthant Shippinj? Act, 
 1NP4"). §422. 
 
 '■' Miido iintlor Ordor in Council, 
 gii/.pttod Utth AuKiwt, 1884. 
 
 » d7 & 58 V. c. (iO, §r)03(l, 2). 
 
 • 67 & .")8 V. c. m, § 410 (U. 4). 
 Thfis(> wonlH incun * ' absolutol y iiccos- 
 Hiny." leiiviiij^ no iimri^in for dis- 
 crt'tinn: Htooinviiiu't, &c. i'. I'on. & 
 Ori.'ii. St. Nav. Co., 1880, II. L. 
 Hut § 17 dons not ui>i)ly to an in- 
 frinp'Tiumt of tho Thitnios Uulos : 
 The ilarton, 1884. 
 
 • Tho MiiKnot, 187.); Tho English- 
 nian. 1877; Tho Tir/ah. 1878; Kniory 
 V. Cichoro. Ro Tho Arklow, I88:». 
 
 • Tho Thotnas Hlyth, 18(W. 
 
 ' In re CoHinopolitan, 1848 (Dr. 
 Stock), and cascg thoro cited. ITio 
 iiid)i;niont of tho court in thii4 caHO is 
 HI accoKJanco with tho i'i:<rd artiolo of 
 the laws of Olcroo, "if from any ship 
 
 or other voss(<l have boon cast ovor- 
 board Huvoral pnxU or iiioi'chaii(hH(<a 
 wliich are in cliontN well locked and 
 nnido faHt ; or bookH ho well Hociirod 
 and so well conditioned that they may 
 not ho daninitiod by huU water ; in 
 sucli caflos it M to bo prcHuinod that 
 they who did cast Huch gooda over- 
 board do Htill retain un intention, 
 hope, and desire of recovering the 
 Bamo: for which reatton, such a« 
 shall hai)pen t^o find xuch thinp^s, are 
 oblififed to make rcHtitution thereof to 
 him who Hhull mako a iluo inquiry 
 after them," which haH been tho law 
 for 7<)0 yearn and in still in full force 
 and deserves att<<ntivo nonisal. In- 
 dependentlv of dtuoliciion, tho Ad- 
 miralty Idvision will never decree 
 more than a moioty of tho value of 
 tho article Hnvo<l for mere nilvuKe : 
 Qon V. Hothel, 1858, 1*. 0.; The 
 luca, 1858. 
 
 T. VOL. I. 
 
 177 
 
 I* 
 
 » ■ 
 
 Mm 
 
 I !' in 
 
Il ."i' ^ 
 
 '3 j^ 
 
 ) 1 ] Il 
 
 Rh 
 
 m 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS ADOPTED IN MABITIME LAW. lP^**^ I. 
 
 Shipping Act, 1894,' — is primA facie responsible for any damage 
 occasioned by negligence in the navigation of his vessel. To 
 bring himself within the exemption from liability conferred upon 
 him by the Act where pilotage is compulsory,* a ship-owner must 
 show not merely that he had a pilot on board a; the time of the 
 accident, and that the presence of such pilot was compulsory,' but 
 also that the damage was occasioned exclusively by the pilot's 
 fault.* It will, however, suffice for him in the first instance if he 
 show that the pilot's fault occasioned the damage, leaving his 
 opponent to establish, if he can, a case of contributory negligence 
 against the ship-owner.' 
 
 § 208a. It is a further presumption of Maritime Law that the 
 legal owner of a ship is prim& facie liable to pay for all suoh 
 repairs and sto-es ordered by the master," as are necessary for the 
 equipment and navigation of the ship in the voyage or trade in 
 which she is employed, and that in the absence of all evidence to 
 the contrary,' the master is the agent of the owner to give all 
 
 hi 
 
 > 67 & 58 V. c. 60. §§ 502, 503, and 
 § 63;i, infra ; as to the conHtruction 
 of which, see The Kajah, 1872. 
 
 » § (i3;J of 57 & 58 V. c. 60 (" The 
 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894,") 
 enacts, that " An owner or master 
 of a ship shall not be answerable 
 to any person whatever for any 
 loss or (lamago occasioned by the 
 fault or incapacity of any qualified 
 pilot acting in charge of such ship, 
 within any district where the em- 
 
 Cloyment of such pilot is compulsory 
 y law." Sc(f Conseiv. of Riv.Thanios 
 t>. Hall. 18(!S ; Piowso i'. The Kuro- 
 pt'in & Amor. St. Shii)ping(\)., ISfiO; 
 Th(! Clan Gordon, 1MM2. This statut- 
 abh' law is applicable to a case where 
 the ((lUision has dccuni'd within the 
 limits of a foreign port : Tho Ilalloy, 
 1S(>H, 0. A. As t^) tlKuiicaiiingof tho 
 word "compuls<)iv."s(M<(i(m.St.Nav. 
 Co. r. Hiit. .V: Col'. St. Nav. Co., l.S6!». 
 As to tho mi-aiiiiigof the term "acting 
 in chaign," son The I'riiicfton, 1878 ; 
 The ( iiiy Mannoring, ISHJ, < '. A. A 
 pilot being on boiird a towed vessel 
 will not exempt tho tug fit)ni lia- 
 bility: Tho Mary, 1878; Tho Sin- 
 quoai, 1880. Se«, also, Spai^^ht v. 
 Todcastlo, 1881, II. L. 
 
 17 
 
 » The Earl of Auckland, 1861 , P. C. ; 
 S. C. nom. Malcomson v. Baldock. 
 1861 ; The Hanna, 1866; The Anna- 
 polis, 1861 ; The Lion, Owners v. 
 The York Town, Owners, 1869. 
 
 * Hammond r. Rogers, 1850. P. C; 
 Pollock V. M'Alpin. 1851, P. C; 
 Hates r. Don Pablo Sora, 18.»6, V. C. ; 
 The Carrier Dove, 1863; The lonii. 
 18()7, P. C. ; Tho Minna. 1868; Tho 
 Valesquoz, 1867. P. C; The Victoria, 
 1867 (Ir.); Tho Oeneral Do Caen, 
 1855; The Mobile, 1856; The Admiral 
 RoxT, 1857; The Sihwnlb.. 1861, 
 P. C. ; The Netherlands St. Uoat Co. 
 V. Styles, 1854. 1'. C. ; Tho Protector, 
 18:}»; Tho Diana, 1840, P. C. ; 
 Kodricpios ('. Mi'lhuish, 1854; Wooil 
 V, Smith, lie The City of Cambridge, 
 1874; Clyde Navig. Co. v. Uarclay, 
 1876. ILL.; The Meteor, 1875 (Ir.). 
 
 » Clyde Navig. Co. v. Harclav, 
 1876, ll. L. ; The Daioz, 1878; Tfie 
 Maritthon, I87i>. 
 
 • As to tho authority of a shijt's 
 husband to bind tho owners, see 
 Thomas r. Lewis, 1878. 
 
 ' Mitcheson v. Oliver, 1855 ; Ilibbs 
 V. Ilo88, 1860; Uuim v. Buborts, 
 1874. 
 
CHAP, v.] rRESUMPTIOXS RESPECTINO DOMICIL. 
 
 needful orders, and has authority to pledge the owner's credit for 
 goods supplied or work done in pursuance of his orders.* 
 
 § 209. In private International Law, legal presumptions are 
 sometimes made with regard to domicil. Where, for instance, a 
 man either has no fixed place of residence, or has two homes, the 
 scale hetween which is almost evenly balanced, the presumption is 
 primfi facie in favour of what is called the forum originis, or domicil 
 of origin ; by which is meant, not the place where he may chance 
 to have been bom, but the home of his parents.' Intention to adopt 
 a place as his domicil may be presumed from a person's merely 
 residing or merely marrying in a country — and k fortiori from 
 both ^ in cases where the domicil of origin is not known ; * though 
 any presumption which would otherwise arise from the circum- 
 stances last mentioned may be rebutted by showing that the person 
 whose domicil is in question merely came to live in the country 
 for a limited period, or for a special purpose, or that he had no 
 animus manendi, or settled intention of making that country his 
 place of permanent abode.' It wiU also be presumed, where a 
 married man has two houses situate in different countries, in each 
 of which he is in the habit of residing, that his home or domicil 
 is in that house in which his lawful wife and his establishment of 
 servants usually remain when he is at the other." In consequence 
 of the legal presumption in favour of the domicil of origin,' slighter 
 evidence is required to warrant the conclusion that a man has 
 intended to abandon an acquired domicil, and to resume his domicil 
 
 'til 
 
 u 
 ■ill 
 
 > FroBt V. Oliver, 1833; Boldon v. 
 Ciuriiibi'll, IHol ; The Great Eiwtem, 
 18(i8 ; EdwunlH v. Ilavell, 183a. S«o 
 Wiilluce V. Fieldon, 1851, P. C. ; 
 Tronson v. Dent, 1853, V. C. ; Myers 
 V. Willis, 1855 ; lirodie v, Howard, 
 1851!; itaikwood v. liyall, 1855; 
 MiK'kouzie v. Pooloy, 1 85(J ; Whitwidl 
 V, Perrin, 1858. Hee Atlantic Mut. 
 In8. Co. V. lluth, 1880. 
 
 » Munroc.Muuro, 181(),II.L.; Bell 
 I'. Kcimi'dy, 18(}H, II. L. ; Somorvillo 
 V. SdiiK-rvillo, 1801 ; Forbes i'. Forbes, 
 1851; Crookeiidon v. Fuller, 1850; 
 Whicker v. Hume, 1851>. II. L. ; 
 Ij<ird V. Colviu, 1859 f Kindersloy, 
 V.-C); Iliidgsou V. De lieuuchosno, 
 18.)8, P. 0. 
 
 • In re Eschmann, infra. 
 
 • In re Eschmann, 18i)3; Bempde 
 V. Johnstone, ITiMJ (Ed. Thurlow) ; 
 Bruce i'. Bruce, 17!H>; The Diana, 
 1803; The Ocean, 1804; The Presi- 
 dent, 18t»4 ; Guier v. O'Daiiiol, 1800 
 (Am.). 
 
 ' Hruco V. Bruce, 1790; Bell v. 
 Kennedy, 18(i8; Lord w. Colvin, 
 18()!l; Jopp V. Wood, 1805; Kinf? v. 
 Foxwell, 187<!; Ciillis i-. Oillis, 1874 
 (Ir.); The IlaruKmy, 1800; Guier ». 
 O'Diiniel, 180(i (Am.). 
 
 • Forb's V. Forbes, 1854 (Wood, 
 V.C.) ; 1'l.itt V. Att.-Gen. of New 8. 
 Wales, 1878, P. ('. 
 
 ' See Udny v. Udny, 1809, H. L. ; 
 King V. FuxwoU, 1870. 
 
 179 N 2 
 
 ■ m 
 
 ! iH 
 
 K ! 
 
Nfi 
 
 n' 
 
 i !i 
 
 i 'hi; _ ;!. 
 
 
 ! »; 
 
 iH 
 
 UikL^ 
 
 
 
 
 JAi 
 
 DOMICIL — COPYHOLDS — PEKRAOES. [PART I. 
 
 of origin, than is necegsary to justify the conclusion that he has 
 determined to abandon this lust, and to acquire a new domicil.* 
 
 § 210. There will, however, be a stronger presumption against 
 the acquisition of a new doraicil in the case of a person who is 
 alleged to have gained one in a foreign land, than against the acqui- 
 sition of one at a place where the party would not be a foreigner.^ 
 For instance, a Scotchman would be more readily decided to have 
 acquired an English, or Anglo-Indian, domicil than a French 
 one. This is because a man's acquisition of a foreign domicil is a 
 most serious matter, since it not only renders the validity of his 
 testamentary acts, and the disposition of his personal property, 
 liable to be governed by foreign laws, but is calculated to involve 
 him in a conflict of national duties, and to subject him to the 
 embarrassments of a divided allegiance.' Further presumptions 
 with regard to domicil are thit it is by law presumed that the 
 domicil of a wife is ihe domicil of her husband. Although, how- 
 ever, this presumption is, as a general rule, conclusive,* an excep- 
 tion might possibly be recognized in the cas( of a judicial separa- 
 tion pronounced by competent authority,* or where the husband 
 ha<^ objured the realm, deserted his wife, and established himself 
 permanently in a foreig:n country, or hod committed felony, and 
 been transported.* 
 
 § 211. It is a presumption of law with regard to copyhold pro- 
 perty which is made in the absence of proof of any specific custom 
 in the manor, first, that estates tail cannot be created, and next, 
 that if they can, they are liable to be barred either by a common 
 surrender, or by a surrender to the use of a will." 
 
 § 212. It is a prim& facie presumption of law with regard to 
 peerages that where the limitation of a peerage cannot be dis- 
 covered, it descends, not to the heirs general, but to the heirs male 
 of the body of the original grantee.* 
 
 ' Lord V. C.)lvin, 1859 (Kindorsley, 
 V.-O.); Douglas v. Douglas, 1871 
 (WickonB, V.-C). 
 
 « Id.; Whicker v. Hume, 1858, 
 H. L. (Tjd. Cranworth); Hodgson 
 V. Do lleauchosne, 1858, P. 0. ; 
 Orookondon v. Fuller, 1859. 
 
 • Id. 
 
 * Dolphin V. Robins, 1859, H. L. 
 
 * Id. (Ijd. Cranworth, Ld. Kings- 
 down). 
 
 * Id. (lid. Cranworth). 
 
 ' (lould V. White. 1854 ; Radford 
 V. WilHon, 1754 ; Moore v. Moore, 
 1755. 
 
 * Ulbucairn Peer., 1796, H. L. ; rt- 
 
 180 
 
CHAP, v.] NATIONAL COMITY — PRESUMPTIONS OF FACT. 
 
 § 213.' It is a presumption arising from the spirit of comity 
 which is presumed to e^ist among nations, and a maxim of inter- 
 national law, that when the solution of any legal question depends 
 upon the laws of a foreign state, — as, for example, when a contract 
 made in one co'intry is sought to be enforced in another, — courts 
 of justice must, in the absence of any positive rule affirming or 
 denying or restraining the operation of such foreign laws, presume 
 that such foreign laws have been adopted by their own government, 
 unless, indeed, they are repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to 
 its interest.* 
 
 § 21;{a. The above appear to be some of the examples of pre- 
 sumptions of law which are most frequently met with. 
 
 § 214.' Pkesump^ins of fact, it was pointed out, at the 
 commencement of this chapter,* are the second of the two 
 branches into which all presumptive evidence may be divided. 
 Such presumptions are, in truth, mere arguments, of which the 
 major premiss is not a rule of law ; they belong equally to any 
 and every subject-matter ; and are to be judged by the common 
 and received tests of the truth of propositions, and the validity of 
 arguments. They depend upon their own natural efficacy in gene- 
 rating belief, as derived from those connexions, which are shown by 
 experience, irrespective of any legal relations. They differ from 
 presumptions of law in this essential respect, that while presump- 
 tions of law are reduced to fixed rules, and constitute a branch of 
 the system of jurisprudence, presumptions of fact are derived 
 wliolly and directly from the circumstances of the particular case, 
 by means of the common experience of mankind, without the aid 
 or control of any rules of law. Such, for example, is the inference 
 of guilt, drawn from the discovery of a broken knife in the pocket 
 of the prisoner, the other part of the bladt* being found sticking in 
 the window of a house, wliich, by means of such an instrument, 
 had been burglariously entered.* 
 
 
 
 
 '■ i 
 
 
 ■■"P • 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 ■3\ 
 
 ' 
 
 
 cognized and Ponfirm(>d in Montroso 
 Poor., l«j;j. II. L. ; IkarioB' I'oor., 
 IHJH, II. L. ; Dreudulbanu Poor., 
 1858, II. L. 
 
 > Or. Kv. $ 4.1. in part. 
 
 * Itk. of Augusta i: Kurlo. IHlit) 
 (Am.); Story, CouU. ^ J>(>-38; 
 
 Iluber, do Confl. Log., lib. 1, tit. 2, 
 § '2, p. 5:j«. 
 
 * Or. Kv. § 44, almost verbatim, 
 excopt tho note, 
 
 * Supra, § 70. 
 
 * In Il-iiry VI., Pt. ii., Act iii., 
 So. 2, Warwick, aftur cuutvmplating 
 
 181 
 
PRESUMPTIONS OF FACT. 
 
 [part. 1. 
 
 
 1, J 
 
 ;;•(! 
 
 § 216. These presumptions of fact remain the same under what- 
 ever law the legal effect of the facts, when found, is to be decided.* 
 They embrace all the relations between the fact requiring proof 
 and the fact or facts actually proved, whether such relations be 
 direct or indirect, and whether they be physical or moral. A 
 single circumstance may raise the inference, as well as a long chain 
 of circumstances. For instance, the decision of King Solomon as 
 to which of the two harlots was the mother of the living child, 
 rested on the general presumption * in favour of maternal affection,' 
 while the famous judgment of Sancho Panza acquitting the herds- 
 man charged with rape,* was founded on the ascertained fact that 
 the prosecutrix successfully resisted the attempt to take her purse, 
 which the accused made by order of the court. 
 
 § 216.' Although it is the exclusive province of the jury to fix 
 the due weight which ought to be given to presumptions of fact, 
 juries are usually aided in their labours by the advice and instruc- 
 tion of the judge, more or less strongly urged, at his discretion. 
 Indeed, some few general propositions in regard to matters of fact, 
 and the weight of testimony, are now universally taken for granted 
 iu the administration of justice, and are sanctioned by the usage 
 of the bench.' Such, for instance, is the caution usually given to 
 juries, to regard with distrust the testimony of an accomplice, 
 
 "duke Humphrey's timeless death," 
 comments thus : — 
 
 "Who finds the heifer dead, and 
 bleeding frosh, 
 And sees fast by a butcher with 
 
 an axe, 
 But will suspect 'twas he that 
 made the slaughter ? " 
 See, also, Smollett's " Adventures of 
 Roderick Riuidom." Ch. xx. 
 
 ' See :J St. Ev. });}2 ; «5 Law Mag. 
 370. This subj(;ct hiin boon suecoss- 
 fully illustrattJd iu Wills, Cir. Ev. 
 paNsim. 
 
 ' Apart from this prcHumption. the 
 socred narrutivo contiiius not imo 
 word to show thut, iiftitr all, the 
 judgment was really in uocordanco 
 with the fact. 
 
 ^ 1 Kings, ch. H. vv. 10-28. 3ne- 
 toviius, in his lifu of the Einporor 
 Claudiun, ch. 1<), states that that 
 monarch disc^jvered a woman to be 
 the real mother of a young man, 
 
 whom she refused to acknowledge, 
 by commanding her to marry him ; 
 for rather than commit incest she 
 confessed the trnth. Diodorus Sicu- 
 lus also speaks of a King of Tliriice, 
 who discovffred which of three claim- 
 ants was the son of a deciiustMl king 
 of the Cimmerians, by ordering each 
 of thom to shoot an arrow into the 
 dead boily. Two obeyed without 
 hesitation, but the otlmr refused. 
 See Hag.-tt'r's Comprehensive Bible, 
 note H. to v. 2o of th. H of 1 Kings. 
 
 * "Sinter of mine," said honest 
 Saniho, to the diunMol, " hnd yon 
 shown the same, or but half as much 
 courage and resolution in defending 
 your chastity, as yon have shown in 
 defending your money, the strength 
 of Hercules could not have violated 
 you." iJou Uuixote, purt 2, book 3, 
 ch. l.'J. 
 
 ' (ir. Ev. § 43, in part. 
 
 • See New York Civ. Code, $ 1852. 
 
 182 
 
CHAP, v.] TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICES. 
 
 unless it lie materially confirmed by other evidence, for though 
 there is no rigid presumption of the common law against such 
 test imoiiy, experience has shown that it is little worthy of credit : 
 and on this experience the usage is founded.' Other cases in which, 
 though there is no actual rule of law on the subject, similar cautions 
 should be given, are with regard to the verbal admisiiions of a 
 party, (this kind of evidence being subject to much imperfection 
 and mistake^), or to the effect that little reliance can be placed on 
 the remainder of the evidence of a witness who has been detected 
 in telling a falsehood in one part of his testimony. 
 
 ' See further as to the corrobora- 0. & P. 542, n. (Parke, J.) ; R. », 
 
 tion of accomplices, post, §§ 9G7 — Simons, 1884 (Aldorson, B.); Wil- 
 
 071. liams v. Williams, 1798. See poet, 
 
 * Oxford Spring Circuit, 183S, 6 §§ 861, 862. 
 
 183 
 
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 183» 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT I. 
 
 Conclusive presumptions. — Tlie 
 tiuii" is a cuntradictioii in turius. 
 
 phrase " conclusive presu'iii)- 
 There is and, indeed, in ti.e 
 
 nature of things, can be, no such thing. The expression, wliile 
 possibly sufficient or ut least innocuous for the purposes of particular 
 cases in which it has been used, has brought into the law of pre- 
 sumptions an almost impenetrable mass of ambiguity. A presump- 
 tion is an inference of the existence of one thing from proof of 
 another. It is a creature of logic ; — a syllogism where the major 
 ')remj",u if the known connection wliicij human experience establishes 
 <» v,v een Lhs fact proved and the fact to be proved. A dry remark 
 . . lit' 'ustice Chapman (Atwood v. .Scott, 99 Mass. 177 (18(58) 
 il!- , trat-'s 'his. "Experience is not sufficiently uniform to raise a 
 prei^umptio.: is at one who has the means of paying a debt, will 
 actually pay it. Accordingly, it is held that the fact that a debtor 
 has Iiad such means is not evidence tending to show that the debt 
 has been paid." ♦ 
 
 In all cases where evidence is not direct, it produces convic- 
 tion in tiie mind of the tribunal in this way. Where ^.vidence is not 
 directed immediately to the fact in issue but to facts which tend to 
 render probable (or improbable) the existence of the fact in issue, 
 i. e., when facts relevant to the issue are the subject of evidence, tiie 
 probative force of those mediate facts consists entirely in this ; — that 
 they " raise a presumption " of the existence of the fact in issue. 
 Strictly speaking, therefore, all presumptions are of fact. Juris- 
 prudence may intervene, for various reasons, and with various effects, 
 to asHume that certain of the stronger presumptions of fact are 
 sufficient to establisii a prima facie case, in the absence of evidence 
 to tiie contrary. It is convenient to call Uiese latter, " presumptions 
 of law." Itnt such a course is confusing if it leads to any obscuring 
 of tiie fact that a " presumption " is, as has been stated, merely* the 
 logical inference of the existence of the unknown from proof of the 
 known. 
 
 The confusion so created is increased if not only the "assumj)- 
 tions" of jurisprudence but the rules of positive, even, at times, of 
 stivtutory, law are classed among presumptions — " conclusive pre- 
 Hunjptions," as the phrase is. When it is said that we " presume " a 
 certain fact exists because we know that another fact, with which it 
 usually co-exists, is in existence, it is of the v(?ry essence of the ex- 
 pression that it is permissible to show that the inference is erron- 
 eous ; — either (1) ISecause the major premise cf common expericMico, 
 to which reference is impliedly made, is fallaciou:-i, or (2) Heeause 
 the minor premise, that the case in hand comes within the rule, is 
 itself untrue. If, for example, it be claimed that, as a matter of 
 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMEKICAN XOTE8. 
 
 183a 
 
 experience, men not heard from for seven years by those who would 
 be most apt to hear from them are dead, and that since A. has not 
 been heard from by such persons within that period he is presum- 
 ably dead ; — we have a case of pr< mmptive reasoning. Without tak- 
 ing into consideration any weight which judges have seen tit to give, 
 SIS a rule of law, to the probative force of this presumption, wo have, 
 in any case where the death of A. is in issue, or relevant totlie issue, 
 established an inference or presumption of his death. lUit it must 
 necessarily be open to tlie opposite interest to contend r.iul offer evi- 
 dence to show either (1) That men not so heard from are not usually 
 dead ; (2) that A. has been heard from ; — in other words that one or 
 the other premise of the syllogism is false. If the instance is a fair 
 one, it follows that all presumptions are rebuttable ; — from the 
 meaning of words. 
 
 What, then, are conclusive presumptions of law ? They will, it is 
 thought, be found to have no direct rr'tion whatever to the 
 law of evidence. They are almost unifoit .y . les of substantive 
 law expressed as a rule of evidence. Likeotiier lesof jjositive law, 
 they determine what facts may be provt in ..iiy particular issue, 
 and as evidence is only directed to the existence of facts in issue, 
 the rules of substantive law which n^^sqnerade us so-called 
 "conclusive presumptions," affect the law of evidence merely by 
 determining what issues can be raise lUit to extend tlu; law of 
 evidence so as to embrace decisions as , what issues may be raised 
 would obviously be to transfer a large part of the entirt? rorjms Juris 
 into this branch of the law. What facts may be placed in issue in 
 a given matter is a question to be settled by sid)st:intive law. 
 Which of these facts are placed in issue in a given case is a 
 question of pleading. What may be shown, assuming a fact to 
 have been placed in issue, in order to prove (or disprove) its exist- 
 ence, is ?i question of evidence. 
 
 Yet judges only too frequently rule that '• evidence is not admis- 
 sible to prove " a certain fact when wiiat tiiey really mean, or should 
 mean, is that the fact itself is not admissible, U'cause, as a matter 
 of positive law, or under the pleadings, the fact itself is not in 
 issue or relevant to any fact that is in issue. In any case wliere 
 the fact itself is admissible, very frequently the evitltMK^e offered 
 and properly rejected wo\ild l)e entirely- competent. 
 
 In much the sanie way, judges have said that a fact is ''conclu- 
 sively presumed," to exist when, in truth, the rules of positive law 
 forbid its existence being ])laced in issue and have therefore made it 
 impossible to introduce any evidence on the subject. This has 
 usually been done for two umin reasons : (1) From the confusion of 
 expression above referred to ; (2) From a desire to conceal the fact 
 of judicial legislation. 
 
 (1) False presumptiont. Statutr ok Limitations. — It is said, 
 
 
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 183» 
 
 AM Kit HAN N<)TP:.S. 
 
 [I'AllT T. 
 
 for exaiiii)l(>, that uiilt'ss a causf of action accniPil within a certain 
 time prior to briii^zin^' procctMlinf^s to iMiforcc it, it will bo "con- 
 clusively presuincd," tiiat tin* <;aiis»! of action hits been paid or other- 
 wise settled. This is spoken of as part of the law of evidence. Hut 
 where the statute of limitations is relied on to defeat a cause of 
 action it is perfectly clear that the issue is not one of payment ; — 
 where the defendant supports a jilea of payment by setting up a 
 coni'lusive presumjjtion of payment under the statute. The statute 
 itself must be pleaded and relied on, and the only issue is whether 
 the facts necessary to this statutory bar really exist. Did the cause 
 of action accrue within the statutory period ? If it did not, has the 
 statutory bar been waived or defeated ? These are the only points 
 on which evidence is admissible, because they alone can be in issue. 
 The fact of payment of thu cause of action is not in issue. It is ol 
 no conserpience. The phrase that it is "conclusively presumed" to 
 exist is merely a misleading way of saying so. With the intention 
 of the legislature, or the grounds of public expediency on which the 
 legislature proceeded, the law of evidence is not concerned, except 
 in the matter of construction. 
 
 loNOKAXcE OK Law. — Another instance of the fact that "con- 
 clusive presumptions " are paraphrases of some rule of positive law 
 is furnished by the learnerl author in § 80, siiprn. The statement 
 is that "courts conclusively jjresume that which in a vast munber 
 of cases must of course be contrary to the fact . . . that every sane 
 person, above the age of fourteen, is acquainted with the criminal 
 as well as the civil, the common as well as the statute, law of the 
 land." 
 
 It may well be doubted, we may notice, in passing, whether any 
 authority whatever can be cited for this proposition. The English 
 authorities seem to he opposed to such a rule. 
 
 " There is no presumption in this cfmntry," says Mr. Justice 
 Maule, "that every person knows the law; it would be contrary 
 to common sense and reason, if it were so." Martindale /•. Falk- 
 ner, 2 C. B. 700, 711) (l.S4(;). So Lord Mansfield, in Jones r. 
 Randall, 1 Cowper, 37 (1774), said, speaking of the contention that 
 all the judges knew the laws, " as to the certainty of the law 
 mentioned ... it would be very hard upon the profession, if the 
 law was so certain that everyl)ody knew it; the misfortune is that 
 it is so uncertain, that it costs much money to know what it is, even 
 in the last resort." 
 
 What is meant by this conclusive presumption apparently is that, 
 as a matter of substantive law, knowledge of the law is immaterial 
 on the question of its observance. It is not and cannot, with safety 
 to society, ever be a defence to a claim of legal liability that the 
 party said to be liable did n«)t know of his liability. No issue, 
 therefore, can be raised on the question of such knowledge. There- 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMKItlCAN NOTKS. 
 
 188* 
 
 fore no evidence can be submitted as to it. The equivalent plirast", 
 " Ignorance of tlie law excuses no one," correctly states the rule as 
 one of positive law. Such a form of statenujnt is not open to tiie 
 objection of attempting to incorporate into the law of evidence 
 something with v/hich evidence has no concern ; — by saying that a 
 fact, tiie existence of which is immaterial, is "conclusively pre- 
 sumed '' to exist. That the latter is the correct statement of the 
 rule is amply establislied by authority. 
 
 '• No system of criminal juris[)rudence can be sustained on any 
 other principle " than that " ignorance of the law excuses no one." 
 U. S. ('. Antony, 11 lilateh, 200 (1873); "No man can avoid a 
 liability, as a general thing, because he is ignorant of the law. 
 This is an essential rule of society." lilack /•. Ward, 27 Mich. 
 lUl (1S73). 
 
 '• The rule is that ignorance of the law shall not excuse a man or 
 relieve him from the consequences of a crime, or from liability 
 upon a contract." Martindale v. Falkner, 2 C. K. 709, 720 (1846) ; 
 " As he is bound to know the law, he is held to the consequences 
 of a wilful violation of it, whether he knew of its existence or not. 
 Otherwise it would be ditticiult to punish any man for a violation 
 of law. because it might be impossible to prove that he had knowl- 
 edge of the law. Hence the legal presumption is that every nmn 
 knows the law and that his violations of it tare wilful." Whitton v. 
 •State, '47 Miss. .'t7l) (18"/.)) ; "If a man knowingly does acts which 
 are uidawful the presumption of law is that the 7iiens rva exists ; 
 ignorance of the law will not excuse him." R. v. Mailloux, .3 I'ugs- 
 ley, 49.'{, .'515 (187(5) ; " It is a rule of presumption, adopted from 
 necessity, and to avoid an evil which would otherwise eonstantly 
 perplex the courts in the administration of the criminal law; that 
 is, the plea of ignorance. Hence the maxim 'that ignorance of the 
 law excuse"? no one.' The courts and the profession, however, well 
 know that this necessary rule of presumption, as often, and periiaps 
 oftener than otherwise, presumes against the truth." lirent v. State, 
 4.3 Ala. 297 (1800). 
 
 That the so-called conclusive presumption of knowledge of the 
 law is in truth not a presumption is demonstrated when knowledge 
 of the law becomes a fact in issue or relevant thereto and wlion there- 
 fore it is to be established by affirmative evidence. Under these cir- 
 enmstances the .so-called "presum])tion " of knowledge is found to 
 have no probative force whatever. For example, wiiero a question 
 arose whethf^r a wager as to the existence of a rule of law was \\\)o\\ 
 a rrrfdin event; held, it was not. .Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowper, 37 
 (1774). Where the question was whether a client knew enough 
 law to understand when and in what courts the services charged 
 liy an attorney were rendered, the court say, "The (juestion is, 
 whether this bill conveys information enough to a person as igno- 
 
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t 
 
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 188» 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT I. 
 
 rant of the law as he may with propriety bo. I think that the 
 client is not to be presumed to know that the business was done in 
 Chancery, because of the mention of warrants, interrogatories, de- 
 crees, and the like. . . . Afterwards tliere couios a charge fctr ' periia- 
 ing decrees and reports at the lve[iort-ottice ' wiiicli it is said tlie 
 client must know could only bo in Chancery. I do not agree tii:it 
 the client is to be presumed to know anything of the kind." Martin- 
 dale 0. Falkner, 2 C. H. 7(M) (i8i<)). Wiiurc, by statute, all votes 
 cast at a certain election for a candidate were, if the latter was 
 known to be ineligible to election, thrown asvay ; and an election 
 was luih' at which votes were cast for A., who was by a plain pro- 
 vision of law ineligible to the office in question, it was decided that 
 there was no such presumption that the voters knew the law as to 
 prove tliat, as a matter of fact, they did know it and, by consequence, 
 tiiat such votes would be thrown away. " It does not seem to nie 
 consistent with either justice or common sense or common law, to 
 say tiuit because these voters were aware of a certain (iircumstance, 
 they were necessarily aware of the disqualification arising from that 
 circiunistance. ... A maxim has been cited, which, it has bei-u 
 urged, imputes to every person a knowledge of the law. The 
 maxim is tynortiiUla li'gls neiiiinein ej-cusnt, but there is no maxim 
 that says that, for all intents and purposes, a person must be taken 
 to know the legal consequences of his acts." Queen /'. Mayor of 
 Tewksbury, L. R. li Q. H. 6l't) (1SG8). 
 
 In a case where a promissory note payable in Canada was made 
 payable in " Canada currency " and this was construed to mean 
 payment in gold, the contention was made that as tiie parties 
 must be prt^sumed to know that, by the law of Canada, the iu)to 
 would have been payable in gold without express stipulation, some 
 other meaning must have been intended, the court say, ''The maxim 
 referred to in regard to a knowledge of law is misapplied. No man 
 can avoid a liability, as a general thing, because he is ignorant of 
 the law. This is an essential rule of society. Hut the law is not 
 so senseless as to make absurd presumptions of fact." Black n. 
 Ward, 27 Mich. 11)1 (ISTiJ). Negligence is not imputable to an 
 attorney because he followed a widely .accepted but erroneous con- 
 struction of the law. Mash r Wliitmore, 21 Wall. 178 (1874 »; 
 .Morrill r. Graliam, 27 Tex. 64(5 (18(>4). 
 
 The real nature of this "conclusive presumption " is further 
 shown by the limitations which have been plaeiMl on it. •• It must 
 he confined to presuming that all j)ersons know the law exists, but 
 not that they are presumed to know how the courts will construe it, 
 or whether, if it be a stitute, it will, or will not, be held to be 
 constitutional." lirent v. State, 4.*? Ala. 297 (ISO'.J); « Where tlie 
 .act done is malum in ae, or where tlie law wliich has been infringed 
 i"* settled and plain, the maxim in its rigour will be ajiplied ; but 
 
 It'll 
 
 >-'\i 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 1888 
 
 where the law is not scttli'd, or is obscure, and where the fjuilty 
 intention, being a necessary cunstitiiciit of the partieuhir offence, is 
 dependent on a kiiowh'dge of the law, this rule, if enforced, would 
 Iw misapplied." Cutter ada. State, y« N. J. Law, VJo (1S73). So 
 where trustees acted in good faitli and under the advice of couiisel, 
 but in !iu erroneous view of the law, the supreme ccnirt of < )liio say : — 
 " Woulil it be just under sucii circumstances to hold them account- 
 t'.ble for their iguoraiuie of this recondite, and 1 miglit even say, 
 .loubtful principle of law ? . . . A majority of the court think not." 
 Milh-r V. Proctor, 20 Oil. St. 442 (18710- "The familiar juaxim 
 that JLfnorance of the law is no excuse for the breach or non- 
 performance of any agreement, becauao any one is prosnmeil to 
 know the haw, applies only to i,'eneral ])ublic liiws, wliich prescribe 
 a rule of action to the entire comnuinity: ... It has no application 
 whatever to special or private laws. . . . All tin; authorities concur, 
 that ignorance of foreign law is deemed to be ignorance of finf ; 
 because no one is presumed to know the foreign law . . . The laws 
 of the other states of the Union are to be regarded as foreign 
 laws." King v. Doolittle, 1 lle:id (Tenn.), 77 (ISoS). 
 
 CoNCLUsiVK Pbksumi'TIon ok Intknt. — So the learned author, 
 relying on 1 Ureenleaf, Evid. § 18, affirms that "a sane man of the 
 age of discretion is conclusively jiresumed to contemjilate the nat- 
 ural and probable consequences of his own acts." If by this is 
 meant, as a matter of positive law, tiiat if A. has done an illegal 
 act, he cannot set np in defence that he did not mean to do it, the 
 statement is correct. In this view, it closely resembles the so-called 
 "conclusive presumption that every one knows the law." 
 
 But if the statement is intended to assert a rule of evidence, it is 
 not only erroneous, but fairly open to the criticism which the 
 supreme court of Indiana (Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480, 484 (1869), 
 in a well-considered opinion, make on the statement as it ay)pear8 
 in the learned work of Prof. Greenleaf. " It is not sustained 
 by the authorities which the author cites in its support. It is 
 entirely at variance with principles which have received the uni- 
 form sanction of all the courts in this country and Great Britain. 
 It is a great inaccuracy, and it is strange that a work whi(di has 
 pa.ssed through so r;any editions should still contain it. A con- 
 clusive presumpti'" » admits of no proof to rebut it; and murder 
 is a felonious k'..nng. . . . The purport of it, tlien, is, that if the 
 defendant killed the person named by the deliberate use of a 
 deadly weapon, no evidence to show that the act was done in his 
 necessary self-defence can be sufHcient to rebut the presumption, or 
 to prove that the killing was excusable and not felonious." The 
 courts of Kansas refuse even to allow the presumption the prima 
 facie, force of a presumption of law. " The presumption that the 
 accused intended the natural and probable consequences of his own 
 
 \ '■ 
 
 ii 
 
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 18a' 
 
 AMBKit'AN NOTES. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 acts is not one of law to be applied by the court, but one of fact to 
 be weighed by the jury." Madden v. SUte, 1 Kans. 340, 36(i (l«o.H). 
 " The intention may be inferred from the act, liut this in principle 
 is an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not an implica- 
 tion of law to be applied by the court." I'eople v. Slokes, 53 N. V, 
 164 (1873). In a later New York ciise (Thomas r. IVople, (57 N. Y. 
 L'18 (1870) the court of appeals sustain a ruling that the fivcts that 
 the prisoner used a deadly weapon, and ainied at and struck a vital 
 part, were presumptive evidence of an intent to kill. ''lie must 
 be |)resumod to have intended the natural consequences of his act, 
 just as if he had uiincd at tiie heart of th<; deceased and tired a 
 gun. It was not charged that the evidence was conclusive, but 
 simply that it was presumptive, and it w.i.s left to the jury to 
 deterniin^ the fact upon the evidence under the charge as given." 
 '■ Tlie intent may be inferred from the act, but this, in principle, is 
 an inference of fact to be drawn by the jury, and not an iiuplication 
 of law to Imi applied by the court." State o. Swayze, 30 La. Ann. 
 pt. 2, 1323(1878). 
 
 Mai.K'k. — The example given l)y Mr. Greenleaf of the "conclu- 
 sive |)resuuiption " of intent is ahso atlirined by the learned author : 
 — "Therefore the intent to kill is conclusively -nferred from the 
 deliltcnite violent use of a tlcadly weapon." This is the so-calh'd 
 "eonchuive presumption of iiiiilicc" Kxactly liuw it cume ali<mt 
 that the nuist vital |>art of the guviTiiment's case in an iinlictmi-ut 
 for murder could be established without proof has, as might l>e 
 expfctetl, furnished sonunvhat of a niysteiy ti) the courts. Much 
 learning has been displayed in weighing the claims of the •• presump- 
 tion of innocence" against this so-i:alled "coui^lusive presumptioM " 
 of mali(Mt. lu fact, neither of these so-called presumptions are 
 presumptions at all. Tlie " presumption of innocence " merely 
 states the burden of proof in criminal eases. The "presumption 
 of malice " probably owes its origin to another branch of positive 
 law. It w;is at lirst, in all probaiiility, merely a rule of juiiieial 
 const ru •tie. !i. The jury in cases of munler rre(|ueutly found sjieciiil 
 verdicts: stating the facts and reserving the (luestioiis of law 
 for the court to pass upon. When, on such a verdict, the mere 
 fai't was stilted of n '•killing," without circumstances of justili- 
 cation or cxi-use, tlu^ courts very naturally ruled that, as a (piestion 
 ol how to construe this language, tlu-y must understand killing to 
 be " xoliiiilary," for the plain reason that, had cireuiiisfanees of 
 jnstilieation or excuse existed, it was the duty of llie jury to have 
 stated them. Their not having domt so must Im> taken to mean 
 that in)ne such existed. Thus IMuinnu'r's (!ase (Kex e. riummer, 
 Kelyng, 10'.> (1701), The indii'tnn'nt was lor murder. The jury 
 returned ii special verdict that umler certain circumstances therein 
 stated, one of a company of snmgglers "did shoot olT the fu/.eu 
 
 
<HAP. v.] 
 
 AM£UICAN NOTES. 
 
 1888 
 
 and thereby did kill " one of the others. The court, by the 
 (•hii'f-justice, in oonstruiiiK this ver(li(!t say : " It secuis to mo 
 hard upon a Special Verdict to construe that the fu7.ee went otY 
 by accident, but it must be understood to l)e voluntary ; thou^'h 
 even in an Indictment for Manslaughter, it is reciuisite thut il 
 sliould be averred that he discharged it voluntarily ; but in a 
 Verdict it need not be so alleged, but the saying he did it must 
 be understood to bo with, and not against iiis will; for where 
 any one upon any killing of a Man is to l>e discharged by an 
 involuntary killing, it must be so found, without whicii it will be 
 understood to be voluntary; for a Man being a free Agent, if he 
 be found to do any Act, it must be supposed to Ih; witii liis will, 
 unless it bo specially, and partii'ularly fimnd to he against his 
 will. Therefore when a Man is indicted for a voluntary killing, if 
 lie (lid kill tin) Man by misadventure, the special Circumstances of 
 tiu! Case must be found that it may appear to Ihtt Court to be 
 by accident." In ()n«'by"s Case (Kcx V. Oneby, L' li.iym. 118.".. 141)4, 
 li Strange, 700 (1727) the court say, " Altliough tiiere are many 
 sp«'cial verdicts in indictments for murder, there nev«'r was one, 
 wliere the jury iind iu express terms that tiie nvt was done with 
 malice, or was not done with malice prepense, or that it was donu 
 upon a sudden (piarrel and in transport of passion, or that tin* piassion 
 was cooled or not coole<l ; or that the act was deliberate or not 
 deliberate; but the collection of tliose things from the facts fouml, 
 is loft to the judgnn-nt of the court." In reply to an objection that 
 the honii(ud<! was on a sudden ciuarrcl ami so manslaughter, the 
 cotirt say. " I must first take notice, that where a man is killed, 
 the law will not ])resumi> that it was upon a sudilen (pianel, unless 
 it is proved to be." 
 
 The general reason for the rule is stated in Lord Kaymond's 
 report of the saiiu* <ui.se at page 14'.)7. In eommenting on Legg's 
 Ciisi' (Kelyii, -7) the court say: — "If A. kills H, and no smhlen 
 ipiiirrel appears, it is murder; for it lies <ui the party indicted to 
 priive the sudden (piarrel ; and therefore the jury not having found 
 any such thing for the prisoner's benelit, it is to l)e took, there was 
 no such." This rule of eoiistrnction is |>rol»iibly the origin of the 
 so-callod " presum<>ti(ni of nniliee." To turn this rule of constriic- 
 tion into a rule of evidence is |)reci«ely to reverse it. In construing 
 the special verdict malice is |)iesunie(| because it must have been 
 proved to the jury. As a rule! of evidence malice, it is said, need 
 not be jiroved at all, but is ronrhiHivehj /treniiiiietl on mere proof <if 
 the killii)'.;. 
 
 The rule that malice is conclusively presumed from deliberate 
 killing has been either, (I) repudiated in the American courts or, 
 ('-') so explained as to render it of but little practical elTecl, 
 
 (I) Among the courts which dooliiiH to reuogniHe thii4 " conclusive 
 
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 183» 
 
 AM mac AS NOTKS. 
 
 [PAKT I. 
 
 I»re8iiinpti()ii " are tlie following. Tlin supreme court of Indiana 
 say: — " \Vliatev«*r tlie origin ot the nili' may be, we are convinced 
 tiiat it is entirely arbitrary, contrary to the reaso!i and the analogies 
 of the iaw of criminal proeediire, both at common law and under 
 our procedure and code." Olem /•. State, .'51 Ind. 4<S0, 4S4 (IS(;">j. 
 In Farris o. Com. 14 liush, 302 (187S), on an indiutinent for murder 
 the trial court ruled: — "Malice is implied by the law from any cruel 
 and uniu'cessary ;ic.t done by one person to another, and from the 
 <leliberate and unnecessary use of a deadly weapon." It will be 
 noted, in passing, that this ruling does not come up to the level of a 
 ** roncliinii'e presuni|iti()n," but is stated in the language of a pr«'- 
 sumptiou of law. Hut even this modified expression of the doctrine 
 was held to be error. "Malice," the court hold, "is necessarily a 
 constituent element in the crime of murder, and nuist be established 
 by evidence to the satisfaction of the jury, as any other fact 
 necessary to make out tlm olTence, and it is no more within t\w 
 province of the court to determine, than the fact of death or the 
 chanicter of the weajion used to iuHict it." In Tennessee (Corteo v. 
 State, :i Yerger, '2M (1831,'), a ruling that, " if the fact of killing by 
 the defendant be proved, the law implied him gnilty of murder 
 unless the proof clearly and satisfactorily showed the offence was 
 one of less magnitmle," was held erroneous. " There is no reiison 
 in saying that a jury must a<*(ptit upon a doubt as to the fact of 
 killing, and yet upon a stronger doubt as to tln^ equally imjjortant 
 fact of malice, tiiey nuist convict." //>/</. In I'eople v. Stokes, oiS 
 .N. V. ir»4 (1S7.'{), the court of appeals say, " Argument seems un- 
 necessary to demonstrate the error of this charge. It was a necessary 
 jKirt of the case of the ])ro8ecution to establish that the homicide 
 was perpetrated with a premeditated design to effect the death of 
 the person killed. Vet rhe court, assuming to determine what the 
 circumstajiccs of the killing were, solemidy instrui^ted the jury that, 
 the fact of killing iM'lng conceded, the law implied malice." See 
 also Teople V. Downs. ITA X. Y. (»7 (1890). 
 
 (li) In other jurisdictions, the so-called " conclusive presumpti(Mi " 
 <d' malice from proof of killing is treated, not as conclusive, but ns 
 an ordinary presumption or inference of law unless and until 
 evidence is introduceil, liy one side or the other, of justi- 
 fication or excMise. When such evidence is ii\troduced, the pre- 
 sumption, as sui'h, is, like any other presumption of law, as 
 distinguished from ii prosumption of hwt, fmiHiis nffirSn. There is 
 reason for thinking that the courts have not in all cases been care- 
 ful to distinguish between the burden of proof (whicdi, in a crimiuid 
 ease, never leaves the government) and the "biinlen of introducitig 
 evidence," which, in case of murder, upon the establishment by the 
 govennnent of a deliberate killing, without justification or excuse, 
 obviously rests, for any justification or excuse, upon the defence; — 
 
 'f\ i' 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 183"' 
 
 whctlu'r this burden of •'stahlisliiiij^ cviiUnice is, strictly sprakiii;.', 
 sliilti'd by tlie estiiblisliiiK-iit ot a jiresuiiiptiun oi law fruiii killing' 
 itst'H, or not. 
 
 The .supri'me (;ourt of Miissacliusetts shows the tendonoy nnini- 
 fi'stcd l)y llu' cuiirls wliicii do not rcpiKliatf the prcsuniiition, but 
 "draw its sting." In York's Case (Com. o. York, i) Mete 'JI (ISir)), 
 the cimrt was divided on this " presumption of nniliee." I'he 
 majority, in an exhaiistivi; opinion by Chief thistice Shaw, adopt 
 tlie view that when the fa(;t of killinj,' is proved, the acc-used must 
 establish any facts of justification or excuse by a preponderance of 
 the evidence. As they say, " It will not be suflieient to make it 
 doubtful or (piestionable. It must preponderate." From this 
 opinion, Mr. Justice Wilde dissented. The dissentini,' <ipinion has 
 been, by general pr<»f«'ssional opinion, (ionsidered to contain the better 
 law. In his view '•Tlif (piestion depends <'ntiri'l3- upon the rule of 
 law as to the burd(Mi (d' proof. If the burden of proof, throughout 
 the trial, was on tlui Commonwealth, the instructions to the jury were 
 clearly incorrect; if, on the c(Uitrary, it was on the prisoner, afU'r 
 the proof of the homii-itle as charged, he has no ground (d exce])tion. 
 . . . The counsel for the Comnn>nwealth contends, that, tin; homi- 
 citle having been proved as charged, the law presumes malice, and 
 consc'piiMitly that a /niimi fudr case for tiu' government was fully 
 |)roved, and thereupon the burden of proof shifted, and was thrown 
 on the i»risoner, to nuike it appear that the homicide was excusable, 
 or was committed on su(di provocation as would be Hutlieient 
 to reduce the crime to manslaughter. This argument cannot be 
 maintained, unless the law of hondidde as to the bunlen of proof 
 is an ex(!eption t<i tin* well-<'stablished rule <d" law in all other 
 oases. ... In criminal cases, tlie burden of proof m-ver shifts, so 
 long as tin- defendant groutuls his defence on the denial of any 
 essential allegation in the indictment. . . . And how can the |»riiiciplo 
 vary when a /irimn furl,- cas<f is made out partly by i)resumption ? 
 If on the whole evidence, the jury had a n'asoiiable doubt ol the 
 prisoner's guilt as charged, they could not Ix' justiHed in convicting 
 1dm." .\fter examining the authorities cited by the majority, and 
 tracing them all back to Oneby's Case (L' Ld. Ray. US.') (1727), — a 
 case of special verdict, — I»e reaches tlie conclusicui that " Thesi- 
 principles and authorities are wlndly irreconcilable with the pre- 
 sumption of malice on which the counsel for the Ccunnionwealth 
 relies. No mali(!c (fan be inferred from the mere act of killing. Sueli 
 a j)resumption, therefore, is arbitrary and unfouinled." The results 
 of a full examination of the entire field are sumined up by the 
 leariu'd judge in three projiositions ; — which have frcipiently l)oen 
 oit'd with approval, as a dear and (fonci:;e statement of the law. 
 He holds: " (1.) That when tins facts and circumstances accompany- 
 ing a hoiuioide ure given iu uvidenou, the q^ue^tiou whether the 
 
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 183»» 
 
 AMKRICAN NOTK.'.. 
 
 ri'AKT I. 
 
 •onmc is murder or nuiiislaufjlitcr is to !vo doeideO upou t .0 evi- 
 dence, and not upon any prusnniption from the > i«re p*!; of kiiliii};. 
 (2) That if tliere Ix! any siicli presumption, iL iri a pnv-i. nipt it " olfiu'l, 
 and if the evi(U>nce leads to a veiusonable doubt wltethcr the pre- 
 sumption be well founded, that d(mbt will avail in favour of the 
 prisoner. (.'{) That tlie burden of proof, in every criminal ciise. is 
 on the Commonwealth to ])rovu all the material allegations mi the 
 indictment ; aiul if, on the whole evidence, the jury havt; a reasonable 
 doubt whether the defendant is guilty of the crime cluuv'l, they 
 are bouml to acMpiit him." 
 
 A few years later, in Con), v. Hawkins, .'Hiray, 46.'! (lSiV»), Chief 
 iFiisti(!e Shaw himself, interrupting counsel when proceeding to 
 argue in favour of the dissenting opinion in Vori;'s Case {uhi sii/im), 
 lemarked, according to the report (page KJ")), '• that the doctrine of 
 Vork's Case was lluit where the killing is proved to have been com- 
 mitted by the defendant, and luitli'un, furthi-r is s/imi'ii, the pre- 
 suni[>tion of law is that it was malicious and an ac: of murder; 
 and that this was ina[)plicable to the present case, where the 
 circumstances attending the homiiide wt>re fully shown by the 
 evidence," and cliarged tliat "'if the jury, upon all the circum- 
 stances, are satisiied lieyoinl a reasonable doubt, tiia' it was done 
 with malice, they will return -i verdict of murder . ■fllMM-wiso, they 
 will find the defi'iidaut gniUy of manslaughter." Ti. "igh there is 
 rea.son to doubt whether York's (Jasc wouhl s.'ll be followed even in 
 .Massachusetts on precisely the saiiu; facts, the (pialitication on the 
 rule laid down in (Join. /•. Hawkins ( it/ii .Hii/tni) eifectually removes 
 the prat^ticai mischief of the rule, iis it |irobaMy can lint seldom 
 happen tliat, in any given case, the killing and m<» otiier f.act will 
 appear in evidemte. 
 
 The Vermont courts ftdlowthe rule laid down ir. (\tiii. r. Hawkins 
 [ii/ti mi/irii), ill holding that the hoiiiicide is presumed U) be malicious 
 only wIk'ii notliing cx"<>i<t th(> killing is shown, and follow the 
 learned . ''licf justice : .i.is') liy ipioting his very clear iMid ((incise 
 ruling in tl'.^t cum'. • T; niunler charged must be proved; the 
 burden of proof is on the (>ommoiiwealth to prove tlie caso ; all the 
 evidence (III Itolh sides which the jury lind true is to be taken into 
 consideration and if, the homitdde being conceded, no excuse or 
 justifuMtioii is shown, it is either murder or manslaughter; and if 
 the jury, upon idl the (drcumstances, are satisiied lieytmd a reiusoi- 
 abb* doubt that it was done with malice, they will return a verdict 
 ol' murder; otherwise they will find the defendant guilty of man- 
 slaughter." Stiite n. l'att«'rsoii. »r» Vt. .'iOH (IHl'A). 
 
 in Maine in a case where the trial court riileil that "in nil cases 
 where the nnlawiul killing is proved and there is nothing in the 
 circunistaiuies of the case, as proved, to explain, (lualify, or palliate 
 tiie act, the l:iw pri^suines it to havo bouii done maliciously; and if 
 
 r 
 
ClIAI'. v.] 
 
 .VMKUICAN NcrrH. 
 
 IH^'* 
 
 tlie acciisi'd woiiM r<!(Uuie the criiiu' below the ue^reeof murder, the 
 biMiii'ii is Kpou him to n-hut tlic int'erenue of malice which the luw 
 niises trom the act of .illiiig, hy evidence in del'eiie.e," — the in- 
 struction, " not having been satisfactorily shown to be erroneous." 
 was sustained. State •'. Kniglit, 4.'J Me. 12, \',i~ (l.S.")7). 
 
 In Texas, the trial court had charged tiie jury that "they should 
 look to all the facts and circumstances attending the homicide, sis 
 disclosed by the evidence, and if they disclosed no facts or ' -rcum- 
 stances which reduce the offence to negligent homicide or man- 
 slaughtt.'r, or which excuse or justify the fact, the law, in such 
 cases, implies malice and makes sutdi killing murder." Tht? court 
 on appeal say: — " We are unable to discover any e.ror in this 
 instruction calcidated to injure the rights of the defendant." 
 iJrown I'. State, 4 Tex. App. 27'> (1878). 
 
 In Louisiana, the trial judge (duu-ged that " where tlic killing is 
 proved, malice is presumed by the law from the fact of killing, and 
 that it was incund)ent on the a(!(ui.sed to jirovo any matter of excuse 
 or extemuiLion." Held, crr(»r. '"The < ircumstamu's which surrou.. . 
 the act either attest or negative a criminal intent. If noiui exist, 
 the court — as said by Mr. CJreeideaf — is justilied in (dunging that 
 from the act of killing, iiiiincitiiijiinilid by rtmnnsfinirrs of r.rtritu- 
 (ifimi, malice is presumed (he should have saiil ' mai/ In- iiifrrnd ') and 
 that the burden of disproving it is then t.lirown u|ion the accused. 
 This rule is as correct as rational, and its a]iplication would prevent 
 an otherwise unavoidable eoiiHiet betwet-n the presumption «'stal>- 
 lished by law in favour of the statu and of tiie iirisoncr. Tin; intent 
 nuiy be inferred from the act ; hut this, on principle, is an inference 
 t)f fact to be drawn by tint jury, and not an iniidication of law to be 
 applied by the court." State /•. Sway/.e, ,'{(» La. Ann. pt. L*. IJS-.'i 
 (1878). !n a later case in the same court, the trial judjjt: id 
 cliargeil that the state must prove, 1. Tlu- killing; 2. That ae 
 prisoner ilid it, and that *' when this is done, tlie law pr' :red 
 malice." Held error. ''The jury must be instructed tt- eigh 
 and consider all the cintumstanees arising from, or > onnocted w ;tli, 
 the evideiue jiroving tli" homieide, and that the iiresuiuption ' iho 
 iunocfuee of thi' a<iused must yi(dd to tin' presumption o*" . 'on 
 delilM'rate intent, only when the evidence .s liuaeeomp; "i-. . , eir* 
 cunistauees showing alleviation, justification, or excuse." Htiit<» e. 
 Trivas. ;tl La. ,\nn. l(>S(i (1880). 
 
 In Mississijtpi, the rule is laid ilown thus: — "We understand the 
 settled rule to Imi this ; The law presumes the accused to be 
 innocent of fhe crime <'liargi'd, iiiitil the contrary is nuide to 
 ajipear; lint when it is shown that he killed the deceased with % 
 ileadly weapon, the general presiiniittifUJ of innoet-nce yields to the 
 speeifin priiif of such h(unii'iiIo, and the law infera that it wan 
 malicious and thuruforu murder, iHioause, as a rule, it is unlawful to 
 
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 188»» 
 
 AMKIMCAX XOTKS. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 kill a human bcins. iuid it is tiiiinicr it' not soniPthius vhv, .md as 
 H|M'('ial ciiruiiistaiKM's alone can vary the lcj,'al vitnv of honiicido 
 8() as to rt'liiivo it Ironi tlir charaotcr ot' nmnliM', it is infcrn'd or prc- 
 8tnncd to he smdi Iroiii tiie la(;t of killing', unexplained; hut if the 
 attendant (tin iinisLanees are slutwn in evidence, whether on the part 
 of the state or the aeeused, tluf character of the killinj^ is to he 
 (leterniined by consideriii); them, and it is then nut a nuittor for 
 presiimpti.)n, which operates in the ahsence of explanatory evi- 
 dene:-, hut for the determination fron) the eircunistances siiowu iu 
 evidence." Ilawthoriu) r. State, 08 Miss. 77H (IsSl). 
 
 In North Carolina, a ehar>je was sustained, • tliat a preHiimption 
 in favoiir of innoc(!nce prevailed, until overcome l»y ((videuce of the 
 truth of the criminal ehar^e, and this must be such as to nunove all 
 reasoiial)le doubt from tin- mind. That when such prucd' of the 
 homicide is presented, matters in <'xcuse or miti^'ation must ap- 
 pear, or be shown, not beyond a reasonalile doubt, liut to tlie satis- 
 faction of the jury. The prisoner admitting the killinj; l»v means of 
 a shot from a jiistol, that instrument, thus used, is a deadly weajion, 
 and the law implies malice, \inless its absence is maile to appear, 
 and this nuisl be to the satisfaction of the jury." State r. I'otts, 
 100 X. ('. ir.: (ISHH). See also State /-. Smith, 77 \. C. JSS (tH77). 
 
 iu (ie<ir<„'ia, the court approve a ruling' that " When tho state has 
 shown the defendant has done the killing, such killint^ would be pre- 
 huukmI to have been done with malice, unless the d(>fendant or the 
 ciriMimstanees of the case show the contrary." Marshall 1; State, 7i 
 (ia. *-''•, (ISS I). 
 
 In .\labama. the supreme court indorse a rulinj? that " When life 
 is taki 11 by tln^ direct use of a deadly weapon, the law presumes 
 that the killiii;; was malicious and tlierefore miinier, and <'asts upon 
 the ilcf«Midants the onus or burden td rebu(;tiut; it ; unless the evi- 
 dence estabUshiii},' the killing; also sliows circumstances of justi- 
 fi<!Ulion, excuse, or milij,'ation, which overturn the ju-e^timption." 
 Thn court say: "Tljere was no error in that portion of the ehar^J•^" 
 (}il)son If. State. Ml) Ala. I'-M (IHH(>). See also Sylvester r. State, 7'J 
 Ala. 201 (IML'.) 
 
 It will be observed that in no instance throu}(hout these rulings 
 is the presumption (d' malice spoken of as roiir/iisirr. 
 
 Mamik r\ Lini'.i,. — It is said by the learned author (§ .S.'i), 
 following Mr. (Jreenleaf (in § |m), that the deliberate publication of 
 f;il;nnny, which tl: * jtublisher knows t(< Ih» false, or ha« no nnwon 
 t 1 i ;>Iievc to be true, r.'vises a conclusive presumption of malice." 
 liike. 'ither so-called ' eonclusiv> presumptiouH " this is a rule of 
 Hubsthutive law, having no direct ndati<ui to the law of evidenofl. 
 ft ;ii!i M»nts to saying that, under tho law of libel, malice is immn- 
 terlu,!. If a defamatory statement is false and made without reason- 
 ablo an<i probable cause, tho publisher is legally (even if not 
 
 m ..: 
 
i*' 
 
 CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 1H3» 
 
 luonilly) liiiblt'. As Jiidj^t' CodIcv says (Cooley, Torts, 2ir>) : " It 
 seuins ini.sU^udii);^, tluMt'foro, to fiiiploy tliu ttM-iii iiiiilice, uiid iiiiili- 
 oious, in (IfHiiiiig tlit!So wrongs; niul, in a U^gal sciirfc, as usod, tlu^y 
 can only mean that tlu; talsu and injurious publication has been 
 made without legal excuse." So in an action for sland(>r, nroinane 
 r. I'rosser, 4 15. & C. 1.'47, LT..") (l«25), Hayley .1., said, ".Malice in 
 conunon acce|)tation means ill-will against a person, but in its legal 
 sense it means a wrongful act dune intentionally, without just 
 cause or excuse." (lertainly this is true of the law of libel, wluu-e 
 no (piestion of privilege is involved. So in a Teunsylvania action 
 for libel, the co\irt say, " In its conunon acceptation inalict^ means 
 ill-will against a person; but in its legal sense it means a wrongful 
 act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse, and therefore 
 every utterance or publication having the other <jualities of slander 
 or libel, if it be wilful and unautluuised, is in law maliciou.s." 
 Uarr /•. Moure, H7 l*a. St. .'W,"!) (lH7(S^. See also Moore v, Stevenson, 
 '.'7 Conn. 1-4 (1S">M). 
 
 " The publication of what is necessarily injurious, and done 
 purposely and knowingly, and not fm* any good purpose or justiti- 
 ai>le end, is legally malicious in the law of lilxd." Mclican c. 
 Scrii)ps, r»l* .Mich. Iil4 (IS.S;?). 
 
 "The court properly declined to instruct the jury . . . that if 
 the <lefeiidant actted boun j\i\i' in the discharge (d" what he believed 
 to be his duty, the action could not be maintained without extrin- 
 sic proof of express mali<!e." Smart /•. Hlanchard, 42 N. 11. 137 
 (IHCiO). "If a pulilicatioii be libellous and not privileged, the law 
 implies that it was malicious. I'his is not a mere presumption, 
 which may be wholly overc<ime by proof, but it is a legal ecuiclnsion 
 which cannot lie rebutted." Lii-k w Owen, 47 Cal. 'ITitl (1874). 
 The siiiireme court of Wisconsin holds, excu'pt in questions of 
 privilege, that " In all other actions for lilnd and slander, malicioiia 
 intent constitutes no part of the issue, but is or may be considered 
 oidy as a cirenmstaiice iu aggravation of damages." Wilson »'. 
 Noonan, .T» Wise. .'LM, ."111) (IM7I). See also Lewis v. Chapman, 10 
 N. Y. Wl'l n«.".7). 
 
 It is merely jmtting tlie rule in another form to say that " When 
 the appellant proved ilie publication of tin; article, the law implie(| 
 malice, anil appellant was entitled to recover such compensatory 
 damages as he h;ul sustained, regardless of the intent that actuated 
 the ai)p('llee in the pnl)lication of the libel." !!eariek r. Wilson, 81 
 111. 77 ( lH7t'M. '• In common parlaiier malice means ill-will against 
 a person, but the law attaidies a dilferent meaning. In its legal 
 sense the term implies an act wnuigfully and intentionally done, 
 "vithdut just cause or excuse, and does not necessarily imply malevo- 
 lence of diMposition or enmity toward any particular individual." 
 I'ennington e. .Meuks, 4(1 Mo. -17 (1H70). See also lndiana|Hjlis 
 
I! i 
 
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 I M 
 
 
 183« 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTKM. 
 
 [I'AllT I. 
 
 Sun. (!o, r. lloircU, ".3 Iiid "/JT (ISTC). '<Thn falsity of tlio lil»'I 
 is siitticifiit |)i-().)f of inali(;i' to ii|)li<>l(i (•xciiiplary 'liiniiij^cH." Ititrj.;- 
 ni.uiii ('. .Jones, l»4 N. V. ol (IHSy), "Wiu-n! tlif wonls H|»okfii or 
 wiitU'ii air, siiowii to bo witliiii ii conliilfiitial or privilttgud coin- 
 nimiicacioii, tlu; pn-suinittioii of nialicu no loii^t^r exists ; but tlio 
 plainUff in Hiich :i case must sliow oxpri'ss niiilict*, und cannot rely 
 on til*! prosuni|ition of nialico wliiuh tlit* law attucli(>H in all otlior 
 cast's to the uttcraui'c or publication of tliu wortU Hpuken or written." 
 Dill.ird ,: Collins, 2.'> (Jratl. .'M.'i (IST-l). 
 
 Mamck IX Otiiku C'oNNKtrioNs. — III all (jasoM where tho oxist- 
 o'lCd of malice in a inaturial fact, exce[)t in the anomalous case of 
 hoin>ci(l<( ai)ovo referred to, it must 1m! proved lik<' any otlier fact. 
 For exaiii]ile. on an in<lictment tor maliciously placing ubstni<;tioiiH 
 on tho track of a railroad. State c. Ilessenkamp, 17 la. -'» (1H(J4); 
 C'liMi. /'. niikcman, lO.*) .Mass, .'I'S ( l<S7<0- !*^o of malicious mi.s(;hicr. 
 Com, c. Williams, 110 Mass. KH (l'"*^-)- 
 
 Otiiku Co.vclusivk PuKsr.Mi'Tioxs. — The oiIht runcliisive pie- 
 Humptioiis referred to l»y the learned author are . rpially rules (d' 
 Hul>stantiv<> law. I'he coniilusive ell'ect of judgments, for example, 
 is properly referable to that subji'ct, see /mst, i 1(5S'.'. The law of 
 esto])pel is a branch of substantive law, considcrctl atifr, § 89. So the 
 rules as to tile conidusiveMcss of a default upon liie service of process 
 have clearly no relation to the law of eviilence. That an award 
 binds the parties, if within the scope of the H>i!>missioii ; that a 
 documenl uiider .st*al rc(piires no considiM'atioi ; — tlK-.';e and many 
 others stand on the .same tooting. Most ru es td' substantive lau 
 suein capable (d' iHMiig made an apparent Mart of the law of evidence, 
 by simply saying that "evidence is adnissible to show, Ac.," or 
 "avi(b>iice is not admissibh^ to show," ;!ccordiiig as tliu rubf uf 
 |K>nirave law is in form attirmativc or negative. 
 
 Amiknt I)o( I mknts. — The rule ridating to ancient documents 
 ditfers from those above>mentionei| by being 1i>gitimate|y part if 
 the law of evidence. There seems, however, but little reason for 
 stating the rule in the form of a onchisive presumption, or indeed 
 in the torm of a piesiimption at all, \ well recognised rule of evi- 
 dence reipiircs that ll xei iitioii id' a wriltvn instrument, ixccutcd 
 
 in presence of a subscribing witness, should ite proved by the siiU 
 scribing witness, or, in case of bis death, disaliility. or justitialile 
 alisciice, by proof id his sigiiiMiire. In cim- there i> no subscribing 
 witness, the signature of the party must Ih> pruved, uiii<-ss admitted. 
 See fxisf, i \H:\\). 
 
 Ancient dniniincnts, — /. /■, documents .it least thirty years old, 
 produced from the pro|ier custody and frne from oircuiiistanceH 
 of Huspicion, form a recognised exception to tliiH rule. Their pro- 
 duction and inspection is sulHcient ivideiiee ol execution. If 
 there is a sul).scribing wituuss, liu need nut U cuiiud. No proof is 
 
CIIAI'. v.] 
 
 AMKItMAN NOTKS. 
 
 183>« 
 
 iii-(H>.ss:tt'y ol' the si^niiititrc of an unavailalilc Hiibscrihiii}; \vitn(>8H. or 
 ot a party. It' tlio (lociniwiit is n-linaiit, it mn-n in cvidiMictt dm itH 
 i'acf. Il is Haiil tliat tin- siiltscriMiij,' witncHhcs an* "roiichisivcly 
 IM't'siuiK'il to Ih; ditad." It is |)frliu|is quitu as auourati* to miy that 
 tlif ruh' applies, whctln-r they an- tlcad or ii(»t, or cvon wlictlicr they 
 arc ill court or not. 'rhorc scfiiis to he iio iiilficiicc, pn'smiiptioii, 
 or qmmtiuii uf proof about tlu' iiiattfi-. It is Himply a ipu'stioii of a 
 niif. 'I'lif ruh' (lispi!iia«'s with liviiij,' cvidcii'-i' if tin' witiifssi-s 
 all' alivi-; of proof of Hij^iiatunm, if tht-y arc dcivd. All is, a (huiu- 
 ini'iit tiiirty years ohl proves itself. TImk, of coiir.se, is by no iiieans 
 the same tiling' as saving that it is adiiiissii)le. To be admissible, 
 the evidence must also bo reb-vaiit and not the Hubjeet of any rule 
 of exclusion. 
 
 For example, the Massachusetts supreme judicial court say : — ■ 
 " It is an old and \v<dl-sci,tlcd rule of evidenci-, that re^,'isti'red deeiU 
 which ujtpear to be thirty years old, and whiidi have been followeil 
 by possession under them, may be given in evidence, without any 
 proof of their exi-ciition. Afti r such a lapse of time the witnesses 
 are presumed Ut be deatl. And it is said to \n> a peicniptory rule of 
 law, found tu bo both safe and cunvfiiient, that, after a lapse of 
 thirty years, a deed, unacrcoiiipanied liy any (Mrcumstances of sus- 
 picion, may be admitted without proid Of its execution." (ii n e. 
 
 Chelsea. '.'i I'ick. 71 (I«:W.I; Ileiithorne e. Doe, 1 Hlackf. I o" ( I H'Jl') ; 
 'riiriiston ('. .Masti'iscdi, ',» D.ina, I'l'H (jH.'HI); Carter /•. (;handr<Mi, 
 L'l .Ma. 71', ".U (iSf)!';; Mclicynolds r. hoiiKenbcrK'er, oI Pa. Si. l.'J, 
 ;!I (ISCS, ; Duncan c. Heard. L' Nott N: .MeC. 4(»(» (I.S'-'O): <"iii'k ••• 
 tlweiis, IM N.V. i;U (1M.*.H); Hiirgin »'. Chenault, D Ii. Monr. l'8o 
 (INIS); Wcitiuaii <•, Thiot. fit (ia. 11 (IH7<.)). Mo in speaking' of a 
 iiii'iiiorial <if an ancient deed, the crourt (d' <puu'n's bench of Cpper 
 Canada Ixdd, ''The principle of receiving in evidence documents 
 more than thirty years old, without proof of their authenticity, is 
 not conlined to the deeds themselves, but extends to any written 
 documents whatever, evi'ii to letters." Dtie v, Turnbull, o l^. H. I,', C. 
 l'.".l (ISIH). 
 
 The Kiipreme I'ourt of (Jeorgia, speaking of a witnessed recei|>tover 
 thirty yr-.-iis old, say, " It was properly adi lissible in evidence oii 
 the ground that it was more than tliirty years (dd, and therefore its 
 
 execution n I not have been prov -n at the trial. In admitliii}} 
 
 written documents in evidence, when nnut« than thirty years old, 
 the ooiirtR do not go altogether upon the presumption that the 
 Hiibscribing witnesses are proved To be dead, but they ado|it that 
 limit of time, iM'voiid which proof cd' the execution of written 
 instruments will not be reipiired, ahhougli the subscribing witneHses 
 may 1m. aliv.-." Settle e. Ali.son. Sda. 'JOl (jH.-.O). So of a wiM. 
 ''The rea.Hon of the law, in dispensing with the attendance of 
 witnesses to a deed of thirty yearn' standing, and where poHsession 
 
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 AMKUICAN SOTKS. 
 
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 has Immmi held iiii(l(>r it, is fuuiidcd upuii tliu presumption tlint they 
 urn dead, and tlit; impossibility of proving its uxccutiun ; and 
 ulthuu^h tliey are, in hwt, alivo, it is not ntcussary to pi-o<lucu 
 tliem, for the rule is ^iMUM-al in its operation. The reason of this 
 rule applies tu the time of tiie execution of a will, and not to 
 the death of the testator, for the same dittieulty of proof exists in 
 the one ease aa ia the other." Juekson v. Hlanshan, o doluis. I".)!' 
 (1K()8). " The rule on this subject is, that when instnmients are 
 more than thirty years old, and are unblemished by any alterations, 
 and obtained from the proper custody, they are said to prove them- 
 selves, and the bare production is sutticient, the subscribing witnesses 
 or all living witnesses of the transaction being presumed to be dead; 
 and this presumption, as tar as this rule of cvi(lence is concerned, is 
 not atTected by proof that there are witnesses living. Hut it is 
 essential that it appear that the instrument or instruments come 
 from such custody as to afford a reasonable presumption in favour 
 of thttir genuineness and be otherwise free from just grounds of 
 suspicion." Reynolds i>. Longenbtirger, 57 I'a. St. Hi, 31 (1HG8). 
 
 The rule is arbitrary. A document twenty-nine years old is ex- 
 cluded. Ghisscock V. Hughes, oo Tex, 401 (1881). 
 
 Where a deed wiis executed under a power, the power, if an 
 ancient document, proves itself etpially with the deed made under 
 it. Hut if the iM>wer is on rcconi, neither are admissible, uidess 
 the power or u copy of it is proiluceJ. Tolman r. Emer.son, 1 i'ick, 
 160 (i81'G). 
 
 The supreme court of Illinois have gone further; — holding that 
 ancient documents cannot be .^'Imitted in evidence when pur|K)rtiMg 
 to be executed by one acting in a fiduciary character, in the absence 
 of proof of his authority to make tlie deed. Fell e. Young, Oil 111. 
 100 (ISTli). 
 
 Where there are circumstances of suspicion concerning a docu- 
 ment over thirty years old, if the evidence explains or ri'futes suciii 
 circumstances, the (Uxnimnnt is t^ntitled to the InMietit of the rule. 
 Walton 0. (!oulson, I McLean, lliO (18.'M). To come under the rule, 
 " it is notsutHcient . . . that the instrunu^nt merely bears date thirty 
 years before the time of its pr<»duction. It is necessary to show 
 that it has l)e(;n in existence for that period of time ; and that may 
 Imj d(m(! not only by evidence of its execution, by the maker, or of 
 its possession by the party claiming under it for that period, but by 
 circumstances creating the presumption of such existence." Kairly 
 r. Fairly, ."18 Miss. L'80 (IHr.O). In New York existence for tliirty 
 years is notsutticient. " If possession has accompanied the deed, for 
 that length of time, that is enough. If not, other circumstances 
 may be resorted to for the purpose of raising the niices.sary pre- 
 smnption in favour of the deed." Clark v. Owens, 18 N. Y. VM 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMEllICAN NOTES. 
 
 188'» 
 
 That a predecessor in title relied on such iinoicnt deed is sufficifut 
 to admit it. Whether witliout this it would liavo l)ecii udiuissihl'-, 
 qiKm: Uur^'in v. Clieniiult, '.) li. .Mour. I'So (iHlM). 
 
 Ill MuHsacluisetts, " If u subscribing witness be alive, he shall Im« 
 called to prove the deed, ultliougii it 1m^ more than thirty years 
 old." Tolinan v. Einerson, 1 I'iek. 1(10 (iSIiCJ), (litiiig .Faekson r. 
 Hlanshan, 3 Johns. 1,"J2 (1808), which, by the way, does not support 
 it. 
 
 The basis of such presumption as may exist in tlx* matter is ])rob- 
 alily found in Duncan r. Uearil, 2 Nott & McC. 400 (18L'0) : 
 '* After a lapse of tiiirty years it is dilHcult, and in most eases im- 
 possible to proeurt! tlie witin'sses to the deed. Those who are parties 
 to a deed of thirty years' standing, must bo upwards of tifty years 
 old, and a large portion of those who are born, die before tliat 
 jMiriod." 
 
 The rule relating to proving the execution of antuent documents 
 must not Im) confused with the .somewiiat analogous rule that ancient 
 records from proper custody are admissible to show facts of ancient 
 title, without furtlier attestation. For exami)le, " Ancient books pur- 
 porting to be record (tf the Lower llousatcuiic I'roprietary " prod iced 
 froiii the custody of the clerk, " were projierly admitted as evidence, 
 without any further procd' of the original anil continued urgaiiisation 
 of the proprietary. This species of eviileiuM' is that usually intro- 
 duced in tracin;.: ancient titles, and has huig Ih'cii sanctioned by this 
 court.'' King c. Little, I Cush. \'M\ (IKl.S). 
 
 So the supreme court of \cw llampsiiire iiold that an "ancient 
 book of records, purporting to be tlie proprietary records of 
 Rumney, accompanied as it was b\ an admission that it came from 
 the custody of tlie town clerk of Kuminy, the proper depositary, by 
 statute, of le pul)lic records of that character belonging to the 
 town, was properly admitted in evidence, without jinxd' that it con- 
 tained the re(!ords of the original proprietors of the town. . . . The 
 jury may well i)resume many things, wliidi it would In- imlispensablo 
 to prove in relation to more recent documentary evidence." Little 
 «•. h.iwmng, ,'{7 N. IL ;{">;">, ;$(•..". (1S.".«). 
 
 Tl tlicr eonclusivt^ pnsumptidiis mentioned by the learned 
 
 autluu- fall into the same class. They are rules of j)ositive law. 
 Thus that a <'hild under seven cannot be guilty of felony; that a 
 Inty undtu- fourteen cannot be guilty of rape and et.iain kindn'd 
 crime > ; that a female child under a fixed age cannot legally consent 
 t-o certain sexual acts, — are among the rules of criminal law, common 
 or statutory. That an infant under a given age (iannot dispo,se of 
 real or personal property in ccrtiiin ways; that th<- children of 
 husband and wile lM>gotten during their cohabitation cannot be 
 shown to be illegitimaU^ by the U'stimony of the parents, — all 
 present no (question in the law of evidence. 
 
 
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 AMEKIOAN NOTES. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 (2) Fictions. — Courts have tisually been sensitive about con- 
 fessing that they an; making hiw rather than dedaring it. A 
 CDiuinon nietliod of concealing this lieqnent and often valuable 
 ])r()cess has been by interpretation. Anotlier has been by the 
 (U'eation oi fictions. Now, it is obviously essential to the value of a 
 legal fiction that it should not be disputed. The casual loss by the 
 l)laiiitiff and the finding by tlie defendant, in an action of trover; 
 the promise in an liiilchitdtiis ussiim/islf, for exami»le, would have 
 been of but little use, as fictions, if they could have been traversed 
 and an issue raised on them. The liction was necessarily non- 
 issuable and, as in other cases, where a fact is not issuable, it has 
 been " conclusively presumed " to exist. 
 
 A modern instance will illustrate this process of legal develop- 
 ment. The circuit courts of the United States have acquired juris- 
 diction over suits between corporations organised under the laws of 
 different states, or where the other party is a citizen of a different 
 state, by establishing the fiction that the members of any corpora- 
 tion before them are all citizens of the state to which such corpo- 
 ration owes its charter. This is done by conr/itsive/i/ itri'sitniin<j 
 them to be so. 
 
 " A corporation itself can be a citizen of no state in the sense in 
 which the word 'citizen ' is used in the Constitution of the Unit'Hl 
 States. A suit may be brought in the Federal courts by or against 
 a corporation, but in such a case it is regarded as a suit brouglit by 
 or against tlie stockiiolders of the corporation ; and, for the ))urposes 
 of jurisdiction, it is conclusively presumed that all the stockholders 
 are citizens of the state which, by its laws, created the corporation." 
 Muller V. Dows, !)4 IJ. S. 444 (187(5). 
 
 " The members of tlie corporate body must be presumed to be 
 citizens of the state in wliich the corporation was domiciled and 
 that both parties were estojiped from denying it." Louisville, itc. 
 K. Ii. r. Letsoii, '2 How. 4t)7 (1844). cited in Covington Drawbriilge 
 Co. V. She])herd, 20 How. 2L'7. L'3;UlHr)7) ; ()hio& :\Iississipi i It. R.V. 
 AVheeler, 1 lilack, 28(;, L".)7 ( ISGl): \l. II. Co. /•. Whitton, 1.'! Wall. 'J7(» 
 (1.S71). Tiie same rule a[)plies to a corporation created under the 
 laws of the United States, e. ;/. a National Hank ; IVranufacturers, &c., 
 Hank I', r.aack, 2 Abb. Circ.'ct. 232 (1871). 
 
 Presumptions. — I'resumptions. strictly so called, are divided into 
 two main classes, " I'resumptions of Fact" and " Vresumjjtions of 
 Law." 'I'he presumi)tion of fact is, as has been said, the logical 
 inference of the existence of one fact from proof of another. It is 
 the only real presumption, as the " jtresnmption of law " is an 
 assumption of jurisjjrudence that a given presumption of fact has a 
 certain ])r()bative force, to wit: tliat it establishes a jiriina furlf 
 case, or, in other words, that a tribunal of fact would be justified in 
 
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CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 18320 
 
 acting on it in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is, tlioro- 
 fore, a rule of law, concerning presnni])ti()iiH. It is a li-ramni pm- 
 bntionis, rather tlian proof itself. It is. like an admission, or other 
 k'Vdiiicn prolidfionla, rather a fact to be i)roved by evidence, than 
 evidence to prove a fact. I'resuniptions of law are rules of law ; 
 and a rule lias no probative force. The phrase " presumption " has 
 proved a very favorite one in judicial reasoning, and it apparently 
 embodies many different meanings. In deciding whether, in any 
 parti(!ular case, we are dealing with a hoiia. fide presumption or a 
 counterfeit, but one infallible test presents itself, — to weigh it in 
 the scales of logic. If the " presumption " shows probative weight, 
 it is a presumption. If it does not, it is sometliing else, — usually 
 a rule of positive law, or possibly one of i)leading. A useful way 
 of verifying this result will be to see whether the so-called 
 "presumjition" can be exactly restated as a rule of jiositive law or 
 pleading. A true presumption does not lend itself readily to this 
 process; but a rule whicli has been paraphrased fioni the positive 
 law into the language of presumption can usually be paraphrased 
 back again. Good illustrations of this process may be found 
 in the so-called "presumption of innocence," or the "conclusive 
 presumption that every one knows the law." 
 
 A '• presumption " (or assumption) of law, Mr. Wharton (2 Whar. 
 Ev. § l'J.'?7) well says, '' derives its force from jurisj'rudence as dis- 
 tinguished from logic." Perhaps it would be fully as a; cerate to say 
 tiiat its force is derived from a definite weight, which jurisi)rudence, 
 in certain cases, has seen fit to give to logic. The law of evidence 
 alone does not fix rules for carrying on a line of reasoning. Hut 
 courts, from early times have apparently felt under pressure of 
 an obligation to the general community for the promotion of cer- 
 tainty in the rules of law. Tliey have constantly tried to lessen 
 the field of the uncertain and the debatable in connection with 
 ri'^lits and liabilities; to make repeated trials of fact settle S(une- 
 tiiing valuable generally ; to ])revent, so far as possible, the use- 
 less expense and annoyance of trying the same question of fact 
 over and over again. As in cases of negligence, reasonable care, 
 due diligence, &c., the effort is to " lay down a rule about it"' which 
 will remove some element of uncertainty as to what the legal stan- 
 dard really is. In its dealings with tiie jury this feeling has ajipar- 
 ently been intensified by practical dangers which a permanent 
 tribunal, realising the value of precedent, and responsible for tlie 
 larger consequences of litigation, would readily perceive might, 
 arise from the uncontrolled and unaidiMl efforts of a casual tribunal. 
 littk> giv(>n to th<^ solution of the problems which they were called 
 upon temporarily to solve, and much more apt to be moved by tiie 
 facts of a particular case than bj a consideration of the remoter 
 social consequences of permitting tliemselves to follow their feel- 
 
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 18321 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT r. 
 
 ings. Partly to guide the jury, ami perhaps largely to control it; 
 partly to bring the exjjerience of the past to tlieir aid, and partly to 
 enforce the use of correct reasoning, or retain in the court a power 
 which it was undesirable tlie jury should exercise, — the court 
 naturally and early adopted the practice of stating to the jury that 
 certain plain, obvious inferences or " presumptions " of fact tliry 
 miglit safely assume to be correct, until they were disputed by other 
 evidence on the same point. When conflicting evidence was gone 
 into, the "assumption" they had been asked to make would of 
 course be gone, and it became the duty of the jury to weigli all tlie 
 evidence, including the presumption of fact wliich they could have 
 assumed to be correct if it had been alone. It is obvious that this 
 action on the part of the court practically amounts to a ruling as to 
 tlie burden of proof in the sense of the " burden of introducing 
 evidence." This burden rests always on him against wliom the 
 tribunal of fact would decide if no more evidence were introduced. 
 In other words, at the opening of the case, it rests, together witli 
 the " burden of establishing," on him who has the affirmative of the 
 issue, but may shift during the trial whenever the i)arty on whom 
 it has rested succeeds in establishing a prima furh; case in his own 
 favor. Proof of a presumption of fact sufficiently strong to be 
 assumed by the law to be correct, establishes sucli a prima facie, 
 case. Hence it is said tliat "a presumption of law shifts the burden 
 of proof;" which is true, if the burden of introducing evidence 
 is meant. When the party on whoui this burden of evidence now 
 rests introduces evidence to show that the assum[)tion of law is in- 
 correct in the particular case, the "assuuiption " in fanrtuH officio as 
 such, leaving the presumption of fact to have its jirobative force. 
 It simply has ceased to be assumed to be correct. U. S. v. Wiggins, 
 14 Pet. 3.34, 347 (1840). There is nothing in the above practice to 
 conflict with the rule that the probative force of a presum])tion is 
 always a question for the jury. '' Whenever evidence is offered to 
 the jury which is in its nature jirima facie proof, or presumptive 
 proof, its character as s\ich ought not to be disregarded ; and no 
 court has a right to direct the jury to disregard it, or to view it 
 under a different aspect from that in which it is actually presented 
 to them. Wliatever just influence it may derive from that charac- 
 ter, the jury have a right to give it." Crane v. Lessee of Morris, 
 6 Peters, 698, ()2() (1831>). 
 
 The facts on which the presumption or inference is claimed must 
 be tliemselves proved by affirmative evidence. Tliey cannot be 
 themselves presumed. A presumption on a presumption is not per- 
 mitted. "A presumption which a jury is to make is not a circum- 
 stance in proof; and it is not, therefore, a legitimate foundation for 
 a presumptioi\." U. S. r. Poss, 92 U. S. 281 (1875); Douglass v. 
 Mitchell, 35 Pa. St. 440 (l.SGD). 
 
 1 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMEUKIAN NOTES. 
 
 18:}^ 
 
 LllU- 
 
 fov 
 
 V. 
 
 Illustrations of certain of the more usual and definite presump- 
 tions of law have been cited by the Icnniod autluir. 
 
 '• I'kk.scmi'TIox UK IxNocKNC'i;."' — This is a spurious presuuiptiou, 
 and juerely a paraphrase of the usual statement of the rule of the 
 burdi'u of proof in criminal cases; — that the burden is on tlie gov- 
 ernment to prove beyond a reasonable doid)t all facts material to the 
 offence cliarged. I\Ir. Justice Stephen (Dig. Law of Evid. Art. 94) 
 frankly abandons this so-called " presumption." It rests apparently 
 on no probative basis of fact. Speaking of the rights of a prisoner, tlie 
 supreme court of Ohio say : " The benefit of the presumption of 
 innocence was fully and practically secured to him in the instruc- 
 tion that the state must prove the material elements of the crime 
 beyond a reasonable doubt." Morehead ik State, 34 Oh. St. 212 
 (1,S77); Hemingway v. State, 68 Miss. 371, 408 (1890). "'flie first 
 uistruction prayed puts the point, whether the burthen of proof of 
 the offences charged in the iiulictment does not rest upon the United 
 States. Without question it does in all oases where a party stands 
 charged with an offence, unless a different provision is made by 
 some statute; for the general rule of our jurisprudence is that the 
 l)arty accused need not prove his innocence ; but it is for the gov- 
 ernment itself to prove his guilt before it is entitled to a verdict or 
 conviction." U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 400, 471 (1827). 
 
 Where the charge covered the rule as to burden of proof, but did 
 not state the " presumption of innocence," held, no error. Hutto n. 
 State, 7 Tex. A\)p. 44, 49 (1879). "A reasonable doubt must be 
 charged in every felony case whether asked or not." Ihtd. 
 
 The nature of this so-called presumption is seen when the attempt 
 is made to use it in a probative capacity. So tested, it cannot be 
 used as evidence of the fact of iiniocence. For exaiuple, on an 
 indictment charging the seduction of a woman "of previously chaste 
 character," affirmative evidence of the woman's chastity must be 
 furnished, the presumption of innocence furnishing no evidence of it 
 whatever. The court say that the presumption of innocence is 
 '•always to be used in the administration of justice as a weapon of 
 defence, not of assault. They are the shield of the accused ; not 
 the sword of the prosecutor." W(>st r. State, 1 Wise. 209 (1803) ; 
 People V. Itoderigas, 49 Cal. 9 (1874). 
 
 So on an indictment for enticing women of " chaste life and con- 
 versation," the judge at nisi prius ruled that it was for the govern- 
 ment to prove their chastity, but that " in the absence of evidence 
 to the contrary, it is a presumption of law that they were of chaste 
 life and conversation," This was held erroneous. " This instruc- 
 tion permitted the jury to find that the burden on the government 
 was satisfied by the legal presumption that the women were chaste, 
 although the government had introduced no affirmative evidence of 
 their chastity. . . . The defendant is presumed to be innocent until 
 
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 18328 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT 
 
 every material allegation necessary to constitute the offence charged 
 is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To allow the proof of such an 
 allegation to rest merely on the legal presumption that the women 
 were chaste, would be to permit the presumption in favor of the 
 defendant's iimocence of tiie offence charged to be overborne by 
 another legal presunijjtion in favor of the innocence of other persons 
 not parties to this proceeding." Com. v, Whittaker, 181 Mass. 224 
 (1881). 
 
 To the contrary effect that in an action of seduction " the chaste 
 character of the prosecutrix was presumed, and the burden was on 
 the defendant to overcome the presumption," see State v. Wells, 
 48 la. 071 (1878). 
 
 On a civil action for breach of promise of marriage, the plaintiff 
 
 claimed a pretended marriage and subse(i[uent cohabitation. The 
 
 ndant being already mi>,rried ; held that evidence of recognition 
 
 ui. the plaintiff as his wife, &c., would not warrant a presumption of 
 
 a lawful ceremony. Wright v. Skinner, 17 C. P. U. C. 317 (18G6). 
 
 ])ifft!ring from other courts, the supreme court of Vermont appar- 
 ently regards the " presumption of innocence " as having a certain 
 probative force. See Childs v. Merrill, (3G Vt. 302 (181)4). 
 
 *' The presumption is single, and the same in all cases, and in all 
 must be overturned by evidence which excludes every other reason- 
 able hypothesis but that of guilt." Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 72 
 (1889). 
 
 Where proof of good character is said to raise a " presumption of 
 innocence," a true presumption of fact is referred to, but such is not 
 tlie usual meaning of the expression. Harrington v. State, 19 Oh. 
 St. 264 (18G0). 
 
 In many civil cases, on the analogy of the " presumption of inno- 
 cence," is a so-called presumi)tion against fraud, illegality, &c., 
 which amounts merely, as also in many cases the so-called pre- 
 sumption of regularity, to a statement that tlie burden of evidence 
 is upon him who relie3 jn proof of fraud, illegality, or irregularity. 
 "He who alleges fraud must prove it." I'arkhurst c. McGraw, 
 24 Miss. 134 (18.-)2). 
 
 So in an action on a promissory note it is for t]u> defendant to 
 allege and prove illegality or fraud. Haxter v. Ellis, 57 Me. 178 
 (18G9). 
 
 So where a corporation was prohibited from making certain con- 
 tracts after a given date, it was held, in an action on such a con- 
 tract, " the presumption being that there was no violation of law," 
 it would be presumed that the contract was made wliile it was yet 
 legal to make it. Friend v. Smith Gin Co., 59 Ark, 8(5 (18!)4). So 
 wliere a constitutional provision prohibited towns from issuing 
 bonds in aid of a railroad, after a certain date, held, in an action 
 on such bonds, " Courts can presume that an act was don"? prior to 
 
 ay ,' 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 183« 
 
 a period after which it could not legally have been dune." St:ite 
 V. Hannibal &c. R. R., 113 Mo. 1^)7 (18<»;i). 
 
 Tkesumption of Ownkk.suii'. — The presumption of ownership 
 from proof of possession is one of fact based on the general expe- 
 rience of mankind, stated by the learned author at § 1 23 sirpni, that 
 "Men generally own the property they possess." McEwen r. Port- 
 land, 1 Oreg. 300 (18G0). 
 
 The accuracy of this presumption of fact is an assumption or pre- 
 sumption of law, and proof of possession is prima facie evidence of 
 ownership. " The first evidence of personal property is possession. 
 If this young man was in possession of the house; holding himself 
 out to others as the owner ; and acting as the owner, the presum|ition 
 of law is that he was the owner." Drummond i>. IIopi)er, 4 Har- 
 rington, 327 (1845). "Possession is prima farir evidence of title." 
 Viiiing V. Raker, 53 Me. 544 (1866) ; Andrews v. Reck, 23 Tex. 455 
 (1859). "Possession of personal property is ^^r////*^ /Wr^V evidence 
 of ownership." Goodwin v. Garr, 8 Cal. 615 (1857). So of a 
 promissory note. Its possession at the trial is jirima farir evi- 
 dence of ownership and authority to sue. Hovey v. Sebring, 24 
 Mich. 232 (1872)] Vastine v. Wilding, 45 Mo. 80 (1860); Stod- 
 dard V. Rurton, 41 la. 582 (1875). " It is a presumption of law, 
 that every species of property found in a person's possession at his 
 death belongs to his succession." Alexander's Succession, 18 La. 
 Ann. 337 (1866). 
 
 So in an action of trespass tjiiare rhnismii, the court say, "The 
 presumption of the law is, that the person who has the title is the 
 one in possession." Finch y. Alston, 2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 83 (1832). 
 
 So possession of land under a general claim of title is jirima. 
 farir evidence, of a seisin in fee sinii)le. Ward r. Mcintosh, 12 Oh. 
 St. 231 (1861). So Chief Justice Savage, in .fackson v. Waltermire, 
 5 Oowen, 301 (1826), speaking of actual possession of land, sa^'s : 
 •'This is presumptive evidence of a seisin in fee, and sufficient until 
 tlie contrary appears." 
 
 •• Possession of property alone and without explanation, is evi- 
 dence of ownership; but is the lowest si)ecies of evidence. It is 
 merely presumptive, and liable to be overconui by any evidence 
 slui>.ing the character of the possession, and that it is not neces- 
 sarily as owner. If the custody and ])ossession is siiown to be 
 equally consistent with an outstanding ownership in a third person, 
 as with a title in the one having ])OSsession, no presumption of 
 ownership arises solely from such possession." Rawley v, Rrown, 
 71 X. Y. 85 (1877). 
 
 The reasoning from experience on which the presumption is based 
 defines its scope. "The possession of an open account in favor of 
 another has never been held to be evidence of ownership in the 
 holder." Gregg v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74 (1802). 
 
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 [part I. 
 
 Omnia Contua Stomatokkm. — Tho presumption that one who 
 destroys or supprcssfs evidence does so because tlie evidence so 
 Kupi)ressed would opeiate a,i^ain!-:t liini, seems a true in-esumptioii, 
 /, !•., one of distinct probative effect. As in tlie case of other 
 presiiniiitions, it is capable of being -.obutted. Thus, in prize i)ro- 
 ceedings, where it appeared tliat during the chase resulting in the 
 capture, a package of pajjers rehiting to the cargo was thrown over- 
 board by the master and super-cargo, the ship i)apers being retained, 
 the court say: — ''Concealment, or even spoliation of papers, is 
 not of itself a sutticient ground for condemnation in a prize court. 
 It is undoubtedly a very awakening circumstance, calculated to 
 excite tii3 vigilance and justify the suspicions of the court. ]>ut 
 it is a circumstance open to explanation, for it may have arisen 
 from accident, nec(;ssity, or superior force; and if the party in the 
 first instance fairly and frankly explains it to the satisfaction of 
 the court, it deprives him of no right to which he is otherwise 
 entitled. If, on the other hand, the spoliation be une/plained, or 
 the exi)lanation appear weak and futile ; if the cause labour under 
 heavy suspicions, or there be a vehement presumption of bad faith, 
 or gross prevarication, it is made the ground of a denial of further 
 proof, and condemnation ensues from defects in the evidence which 
 the i)arty is not permitted to supply." The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227, 
 241 (isil). 
 
 So abstracting from the court files part of a vessel's original 
 report of a collision "throws great discredit on the claimant's side 
 of the case." The Sam Sloan, 65 Fed. Rei). 125 (1894). So where 
 a party attempts to suppress testimony by defacing a public record, 
 it is held that the court was " justifi;^d in construing the testimony 
 strongly" against him. Murray /•. Lepper, 99 Mich. 135 (1894). 
 
 " The spoliation of evidence, damaging to a litigant's cause, may 
 constitute just as much of a fraud, as the manufacture of evidence 
 that is favourable to it." riioenix Ins. Co. v. Moog, 78 Ala. 284, 
 307 (1884). 
 
 For similar reasons, a plaintiff who has deliberately and volun- 
 tarily destroyed a promissory note will not be permitted, in the 
 absence of suitable explanation, to give secondary evidence of its 
 contents. " I believe no case is to be found, where if a party has 
 delibei-ately destroyed the higher evidence, without explanation 
 showing affirmatively that the act was done with pure motives, 
 and repelling every suspicion of a fraudulent design, that he has 
 had the benefit of it." Blade v. Nolaud, 12 Wend. 173 (1834). 
 
 So it is held error to allow the plaintiif in an action for Mbel 
 to introduce secondary evidence of the contents of an alleged 
 libellous letter which he had voluntarily destroyed. "This we 
 think was a violation of the cardinal principle that where it ap- 
 pears that a party has destroyed an instrument or document, the 
 
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 AMKUICAN NOTICS. 
 
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 ])i'osiuniition arises that if it liad been produced it would have hccii 
 against liis interest or in some essential particular unfavorable to 
 Ids claims untlor it. Confnt upoiuiiorem, omnia presinuantur. . . . 
 He must fi.ot rebut the inference of fraud which arises fron: the 
 act of a voluntary destruction of a written paper before lie can 
 asiv to be relieved from the consequences of his act by introducini;; 
 pMi'ol (evidence to prove his case." Joannes /;. Jiennett, 5 All. IfiO 
 (18G2). " It is not a matter of course to allow secondary evidence 
 of! the contents of an instrument in suit njjon proof of its destruc- 
 tion. If the destruction was tiie result of accident, or was without 
 the agency or consent of the owner, such evidence is generally 
 admissible. ]>ut if the destruction was voluntarily and deliberacely 
 made by the (;wner, or with his assent, as in tiie present case, tiie 
 admissibility of the evidence will depi nd upon the cause or motive 
 of the party in effecting or assenting to the destruction," Bagley 
 c. McMickle, *) Cal. 4;3(), 416 (IfwS). 
 
 Where the destruction was done in good faith ; — for example, 
 uniler the well intentioned though injudicious advice of a sister, 
 the secondary evidence is receivable. Tobin v. Shaw, 45 Me. 331 
 (1S5S). 
 
 In a lesser degree, the same presumption arises where a material 
 witness is withheld. '"Wiiere a party has evidence in his power 
 and within his reach, by which he may repel a claim or charge 
 against him, and omits to produce it, this supplies a presumption 
 of fact that the charge or claim is well-founded. This presumption 
 attaches with more force in cases where a party, having more 
 certain and satisfactory evidence In his power, relies upon that 
 which is of a weaker or more inferior nature." Savannah, &c., 
 K. R. V. Gray, 77 Ga. 440 (188G). But this rule receives a reason- 
 able construction. No presumption can be drawn against a railroad 
 if it does not produce a witness — one of its engineers — who has 
 gone to another state and whose residence is unknown. I//i(L 
 And where the witness is " subject to the call of either party," 
 no inference can be drawn from a failure to produce him. Haynes 
 )•. McKae, 101 Ala. 31S (1893) ; Scoville v. Baldwin, 27 Conn. 316 
 
 (isr,s). 
 
 Where the question is as to the meaning of a certain written 
 contract which the appellant refused to produce, the court say; — 
 '• Wliere the adverse party has it in his rower to produce evidence 
 that would settle the question at issue, although not compelled to 
 produce it, every intendment and presumption is to be made 
 against the party w.io might remove all doubt on the question." 
 Benjamin v. Ellinger's Adm., 80 Ky. 472 (1882) ; Cross v. Bell, 34 
 N. H. 82 (1856) ; Wallace v. Harris, 32 Mich. 380, 394 (1875). 
 
 So the defendant's non-production of his books on notice is 
 "strong presumptive evidence against him." Atty-Gen. v. 
 
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 Halliday, 2G Q. B. U. C. 397 (1807). " If he does not exliibit it 
 to the court and jury for their satisfaction, they have tlie right to 
 inftT that it contains evidence unfavourable to him in the matters in 
 dispute between iiim atul the defendants." Lowell v. Todd, 15 
 C. 1'. U. C. 300 (1865) ; Merwin v. Ward, 15 Conn. 377 (1843). 
 But see Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co., 138 111. 533 (18D1). So where 
 the defendant did not appear to testify to matters peculiarly 
 within his own knowledge, the court say that his course " carries 
 with it the usual unfavourable and damaging presumptions." Con- 
 necticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. o. Smith, 117 Mo. 2G1 (1893). 
 
 The limits of the rule are well defined in a Michigan case. 
 Wliere a female plaintiff was absent, without excuse, a ruling 
 "that if she was absent when able to be present, the jury might 
 consider that as evidence tending to impeach the good faith of lier 
 claim " was held correct. An instruction that there was a pn;- 
 sumption of law that, if s!io had testified, her testimony would 
 have hurt her was held to liave been properly refused. Cole i>. 
 Lake Shore, &c. E. R., 95 Mich. 77 (1893). So where parties re- 
 fuse to obey the precept of a siibj'wna duces tecum, the court say 
 that "it is a circumstance that the jury could have considered as 
 a fact tending to show a i)urpose u{)OU the part of appellees to 
 suppress evidence against them." Darby v. Iloberts, 3 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 427 (1893). 
 
 But the " mere non-production of books, upon notice, has no other 
 effect than to admit the other party to prove their contents by 
 parol. . . . Any presumption against him can only be on the ground 
 that he withholds evidence and omnia confrtt, spoJiatorem. liut 
 this rule cannot operate where all that is done is not to produce 
 evidence whi"h can only go in by consent of the other side." 
 Cartier v. Troy Lumber Co., 138 111. 533 (1891). 
 
 " Where withholding testimony raises a violent presumption 
 tiiat a fact not clearly proved or disproved exists, it is not error to 
 allude to the fact of withholding as a circumstance strengthening 
 the proof." Frick v. Barbour, <)4 Ta. St. 120 (1870); Gulf, &c., 
 R. R. Co. V. P:ilis, 54 Fed. Rep. 481 (1893). 
 
 " The non-production of evidence clearly within the power of a 
 party creates a strong presumption that, if ])roduced, it would be 
 against him." Miller /•. Jones, 32 Ark. .337 (1877). 
 
 "In equity, as at law, the omission of a party to testify in con- 
 trol or explanation of testimony given by others in his presence is 
 a proper subject of consideration." McDonough v. O'Niel, 113 
 Mass. 92 (1873); Eckel v. Eckel, 49 K J. Eq. 587 (1892) ; Hall v. 
 Vanderpool, 15() Pa. St. 152 (1893). 
 
 "Where evidence which would properly be part of a case, is 
 within the control of the party whose interest it would naturally 
 be to produce it, and, without satisfactory explanation, he fails to 
 
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CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMEUIC.VN NOTKS. 
 
 18;3M 
 
 do so, the jury may draw an iafcroiice that it would bo unfavourablo 
 to liiiu. It is an inlVrciuro of fact, not a presuniptioii of law." 
 Hall ('. Vanderpool, (nfn sujirn). 
 
 It is competent for the party against whom such presumption 
 would lie to introduce evidence to meet its force. Thus, where it 
 is claimed that the plaintiff, in an action for personal injury, was 
 feigning weakness to esca])e medical examination into the extent 
 of her injuries, it is comj)etent for her to show that shortly prior 
 she had herself freely invited such examination. Durgin r. 
 Danville, 47 Vt. 95, 105 (1874). 
 
 liut it has been held that (however important as bearing on 
 evenly balanced evidence) the mere failure to question one's own 
 witness as to a certain fact will not relieve the other side of the 
 necessity of proving the fact affirmatively ; — if material to his case. 
 " To so hold would be substituting conjecture for proof." Arbuckle 
 r. Templeton, 05 Vt. 205 (1892). But where a party offers only 
 weak and unsatisfactory evidence, when lie clearly has ])lenary 
 evidence in his control, such evidence as is offered should " be 
 viewed with suspicion." Wimer v. Smith, 22 Oreg. 469 (1892). 
 
 In criminal cases, the voluntary suppression of testimony is 
 usually cogent circumstantial evidence of guilt. For example, 
 that a defendant travelled under an >.ssumed name and destroyed, 
 on his arrest, the notes alleged to have been forged, State /•. 
 Chamberlain, 89 Mo. 129 (188(5) ; or offered to destroy some 
 barrels furnishing incriminating evidence of barratry. Phoenix 
 Ins. Co. i\ Moog, 78 Ala. 284, 307 (1884), do not differ in any 
 essential particulars from other facts circumstanti 'ly tending to 
 sustain the claim of criminality. 
 
 The same inference or presumption obtains whev dence is 
 fabricated in support of any contention. Indeed, have fre- 
 
 quently exhibited a perhaps natural resentment anu iiu itnice in 
 disposing of such cases and have not always, apparently, felt in- 
 clined or constrained calmly to balance the weight of evidence in 
 favor of one who has deliberately attempted to mislead them 
 But even as matter of logic, an inference or presumption of lack 
 of real merits in a claim or defence which feels forced to rely upon 
 manufactured testimony, presses most strongly on the judgment. 
 
 Thus, in an admiralty case of collision, where the defendants 
 produced a log-book found to be false, the court say, "This conclu- 
 sion disposes of the case ; for, in a conflict of evidence such as the 
 case presents, the production of a fabricated log warrants the 
 rejection of the testimony which it is brought to support." The 
 Tillie, 7 Benedict, 382 (1874). 
 
 Similarly, for a plaintiff to attempt to bribe the sheriff to select 
 certain jurymen "is in the nature of an admission that the cause 
 of the party resorting to bribery of witnesses or jurors is unjust, 
 
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 [PAKT I. 
 
 aiul thtit Ills olaiin is dislioiifst uiul unrighteous," KiiUl /•. Ward, 
 (I own) ')!) N. W. 271) (ISU-J). 
 
 So \u rt'lutiou to witui^sst's. "Evidence ol' the fact ol' an at- 
 tempted subornation is admissible as an ailniission by (tonduot that 
 the party's caus(( is an unrigliteous one." Fulkerson r. .Murdock, 
 r*;} i\lo. A\>[). lol (\h02). So a party may show, if lie ean, that his 
 opponent has attempted to prevent an adverse witness from attend- 
 ing the trial, and to bribe a witness to testify on his own behalf. 
 Carpenter /•. Willey, G5 Vt. IGS (1«;)L'). 
 
 Kkcknt i'ossKssioN — Tho possession of stolen goods shortly after 
 the commission of the crime is presum|)tive evidence of guilt, or of 
 a receiving with guilty knowledge. "The rule is well established, 
 that the recent exclusive jxjssession of the fruits of crime soon alter 
 its commission is jiriiiKi fncir evidence of guilty jjossession.'' ilcn- 
 derso.i /■, State, 70 Ala, L'V. (1.881), 
 
 The supreme court of Illinois has sustained the following ruling: 
 "The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that possession of 
 stolen property, immediately after the theft, is sufficient to warrant 
 a conviction, unless attending circumstances or other evidence so far 
 overcomes the presumption thus raised as to create a reasonable 
 doubt of prisoner's guilt." Sahlinger v. People, 102 111. 241 (1882). 
 
 It may well be doubted, however, whether the prima favlr weight 
 of a presumption of law has usually been given this presumption. 
 It seems to be essentially one of fact. " The instruction, that pos- 
 session of stolen property immediately after the theft, if an unsatis- 
 factory account is given, 'affords 2)resumptive evidence of guilt,' was 
 right; and the whole matter of the degree of force the presumption 
 ought to bear in the particular case was submitted to the jury, as a 
 ([uestion of fact, in a manner which leaves no ground tor exception." 
 Com. V. McGorty, 114 Mass. 299 (l«7;i). " The doctrine of the cases 
 referred to is, that there is no presum[)tion of law arising from the 
 possession of stolen goods. To that doctrine we readily yield our 
 assent. It is not a presumption of law for the court, but a presump- 
 tion of fact for the jury." State v. Raymond, 4G Conn. 345 (1878). 
 The reasons for declining to assign this presumption the probative 
 weight of a presumption of law are principally that the varying cir- 
 cumstances of particular cases, as to remoteness of time, presence 
 or absence of reasonable explanation, etc., give this presumption 
 a very varying weight. 
 
 " Tlie first practical difficulty in the way of making it a presump- 
 tion of law is the impossibility of inventing a rule by which to 
 determine whether the possession is recent or not. ... It is use- 
 less to call such a presumption a presumption of law. Call it what 
 we may, it is a presumption of fact. ... It is a presumption estal> 
 lished by no legal rule, ascertained by no legal test, defined by no 
 legal terms, measured by no legal standard, bounded by no legal 
 
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 AMKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
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 limits. Jt liiis iioiu' of tlio cliiiructeribLics of l.iw." SUiti' /'. J lodge, 
 oU N. II. 510 (18(5U). 
 
 la Stokes v. State, 58 Miss. (177 (18H1), a ruling that the present 
 was a presiiuiptiou of law was held erroneous. '' However strongly 
 tln^ one fa<;t may seem to follow from the other, they (the jury) 
 cannot be told they must infer it, or that the law infers it for 
 them." 
 
 " Ordinarily it is stronger or weaker in proportion to the jjeriod 
 intervening between the stealing and the finding in possession of 
 the accused; and after the lajjse of a considerable time before the 
 possession is shown in the accused, the law does not infer his guilt, 
 but leaves the (piestion to the jury under the consideration of all the 
 circumstances.'' State /'. Kights, S'J N, C. 075 (ISSO). 
 
 Jn lli;rnandez v. State, '.) Tex. App. 'JHH (IHSO), the court say that 
 th'j request lor an instruction that, '" The possession of ])roperty re- 
 cently stolen is a circumstance proper for the consideration of the 
 jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, but does 
 not of itself constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of 
 guilty," should have been granted. To same effect, State v. Kim- 
 ble, 3i La. Ann. 31)2 (1882). On the contrary, and with a confused 
 perception of the real relations of presumptions of fact to assump- 
 tions of law, the supreme court of Iowa hold that "the presumjjtion 
 in question, unless overcome, will authorise conviction. It is a pre- 
 sumption recognised by the law, and may therefore be termed a 
 presumption of law. The term 'presumption of fact' iin]ilies that 
 from certain facts the law will raise a presumption. Either of 
 these terms, 'presumption of law ' or ' presumption of fact,' may be 
 used to express the same thought, for they are identical in mean- 
 ing." State v. Kelly, 67 la. G44 (1882). 
 
 Like other presumptions of fact, i)roof of the recent possession of 
 stolen goods amounts to circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue, 
 " The fact of the possession of the stolen property by the accused is 
 evidence tending to prove his guilt, but in no sense conclusive as 
 to his guilt ; nor does his guilt follow as a presumption of law 
 unless such possession be exjdained by the accused." Ingalls v- 
 State, 48 Wise. 047 (1879). See also State v. liaymond, 40 Conn. 
 045 (1878). 
 
 I'uKsi'MPTioN OF CONTINUANCE. — The inference of the existence 
 of a fact at a particular time from proof of its existence at a time 
 previous seems to be entirely one of logic. In other words, it is a 
 presumption of fact. The inference naturally varies niu.^li in weight 
 according to the nature of the fact itself and the length of time over 
 which the continuance is sought to be presumed. The presumption 
 has probative force so far as based on experience. 
 
 The illustrations of the inference are as endless as the application 
 of any other line of thought. 
 
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 18331 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part t. 
 
 " If seizin is once proved, it will be presumed to continue until 
 the contrary is shown." Currier /•. Gale, All. 522 (18()5) ; Cob- 
 leigh i: Young, lo N. H. 493 (1844) ; Liud /•. Lind, 53 iMinn. 48 
 (1893) ; Bulch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497 (1892). 
 
 Plvidence being introduced of delivery of bonds to a railroad, and 
 there being no evidence as to what was done Avith them, the court 
 say: "The only presumption arising from these facts is that said 
 bonds are still in the hands of the railroad company." Choisser v. 
 People, 140 111. 21 (1892). 
 
 Where A. is sliown to have owned certain personal property "the 
 law would presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
 that it continued to be his up to the time of his death, and that it 
 belonged to the estate at the date of the commencement of this 
 action." Hanson v. Chiatovich, 13 Nev. 396 (1878); Flanders r. 
 Merritt, 3 i^arb. 201 (1848). 
 
 But finding a piece of property at a certain place eight months 
 before the death of the deceased is no evidence that it was in the 
 same place at his death. Adams r. Clark, 8 Jones (N. C.) L. 56 
 (1860). 
 
 Where one enters into possession of premises as a tenant, he will 
 be presumed to hold under that title, and any intention to claim 
 under a title adverse to the landlord can only be shown by "plain 
 proof." Leport r. Todd, 32 N. J. Law, 124 (186()). This presumption 
 has been extended over a period of ten years without evidence in 
 the meantime. Alabama State Ld. Co. v. Kyle, 99 Ala. 474 (1892). 
 The fact that A. was insolvent shortly before giving a certain note 
 and mortgage raises "a legal presumption" that he was insolvent 
 at the time issue was joined in a suit on the note. Evidence tliat 
 he was solvent at the trial of the cause does not countervail the 
 presumption. J')ody v. Jewson, 33 Wise. 402 (1873). 
 
 When a person's residence is proved to Vie in a certain place, it 
 will be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. "As A.'s 
 residence was admitted to be in the state in 1886, the law presumes 
 that his residence continued to be in this state unless such presumyi- 
 tion has been rebutted." Ferguson /■. Wright, 113 X. C. 537 
 (I8!)3). 
 
 "When the residence of the defendants in New York is once 
 established, it is presumed to continue there till tlie contrary is 
 shown; and the burden is cast upon the defendants to show a 
 change of residence." Uixford r. Miller. 49 Vt. 319 (1877) ; Xixon 
 V. Palmer. 10 Barb. 175 (18.")0i; Prntiior r. I'almer, 4 Ark. 4.56 
 (1841) ; Wray /-. Wray. 3;5 Ala. 187 (18.-.S). 
 
 The expr«>ssion last above quoted from the court in Rixford r. 
 Miller is significant. The presumption of continuance, like many 
 others, is often made useful by the courts in determiniTig who has 
 the burden of evidence as to a particular fact. In determining this, 
 
 
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CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 18332 
 
 jurisprudence plays a part as well as logic, and the presumption of 
 fact being ruled in the language of a presumption of law as a 
 Ijrima facie case is jn-o hue vice, given tlie force of a presumption 
 of law. 
 
 Insanity and otiikr ^Mkntal St ;s. — A state of settled per- 
 manent insanity once shown to exist will be presumed to continue. 
 
 " The rule does not apply to cases of occasional or intermittent 
 insanity ; but it does to all cases of habitual or apparently confirmed 
 insanity, of whatever nature," State r. "Wilner, 40 Wise. 304 
 '187()) ; Lilly v. Waggoner, 27 111. 305 (18G2). 
 
 "When it ai)pears in proof that a person was, at any given time, 
 of unsound mind (unless from some temporary or transient cause), 
 the legal presumption is, that that state of mind continues until the 
 conti-ary is made to appear by evidence." Crouse i>. Holman, 10 
 Ind. 30 (1802). 
 
 If a certain state of relations is shown to exist between two per- 
 sons it will be presumed to continue. Eames v. Eames, 41 N. H. 
 177 (1860). 
 
 So of improper sexual relations. CaujoUe r. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90 
 (18G1). 
 
 Evidence that certain persons were partners two or three years 
 before raises a presumption that they are still partners. Cooper 
 V. Dedrick, 22 Barb. 51(5 (185(5). 
 
 So if a course of dealing, t'.;/., taking by an insurance company of 
 a promissory note secured by a pledge of the policy in payment of 
 the premiums on a life insurance policy, is once shown to exist, it 
 Avill be presumed to continue. Hastings r. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 
 138X. Y. 473 (1803). 
 
 But where a former marriage would render a second one bigamous, 
 it will not be presumed to continue on proof that it once existed. 
 "That a fact continuous in its nature, will be presumed to continue 
 after its existence is once shown, is a presumption which ought not 
 to be allowed to overthrow another presumption of equal if not 
 greater force, in favor of innocence.'' Klein r. Lawdman, 29 j\Io. 
 250 (1860). 
 
 The real meaning of this apparently is that a presumption is not 
 proof beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal ca^es. 
 
 ruicsi'Mi'Tioxs AS TO LiFK, — The presumption of the continu- 
 ance of life may be and frequently is of but slight probative force. 
 Its logical effect apparently varies greatly not only with the inter- 
 val of time which it is sought to cover with the presumption, but 
 also with the probability of procuring evidence other than the pre- 
 sumption if the fact be as claimed. While the presumption of the 
 continuance of life certainly continues during the period of seven 
 years from the time the person was last known to be alive, the 
 presumption of fact may and usually does gradually grow less and 
 
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 18333 
 
 AMIiKIUAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT 
 
 less strong; — until it finally remains merely a forensic presuuij)- 
 tiou or assumption of law ; in other words, amounts to a ruling 
 as to the burden of proof; — that he who asserts the death of 
 a person shown to be alive before seven years of unexplained 
 absence has intervened must introduce evidence to show it. " The 
 presumption of the continuance of life is merely a presumption of 
 fact, which is subject to be controlled by facts and circumstances 
 and other legitimate evidence. ... It is a presumption by no means 
 of equal strength at all times and under all circumstances. If the 
 last known of a person was tliat he was a soldier, and was about 
 entering into a battle, and had been seen by none of his comrades 
 after the battle, the presumption of the continuance of life would 
 be very slight, and very slight evidence would be sufficient to con- 
 trol it." Hyde Park v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505 (1881). " The evi- 
 dence, therefore, that a person was living at a particular time is but 
 one of the facts to be considered in the determination of the ques- 
 tion whether he is living at any future given time." Ibid. 
 
 So if a person be once shown to be alive, he will be presumed to 
 continue to live, within reasonable limits, until the contrary is 
 shown. State i: Flym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890). " Ordinarily, in the 
 absence of jvidence to the contrary, the continuance of the life of 
 an individual, to the common age of man, will be assumed by 
 presumption of law. The burden of proof lies upon the party 
 alleging the death of the person." Stevens r. McNamara, 30 Me. 
 176(1853). 
 
 " The rule is, that the proof of the death of a person, known to 
 be once living, is incumbent upon the party who asserts his death ; 
 for it is jiresumed he lives until the contrary be proved." Duke of 
 v'Jumberland /'. Graves, 9 Barb. 595 (1850). 
 
 Extreme age alone is not sufficient to rebut the presuii.ption of 
 the continuance of life. "The civil law v.-ill presume a person liv- 
 ing at a hundred years of age, and the common law does not stop 
 much short of this." Watson v. Tindal, 24 Ga. 494 (1858). So the 
 fact that a person in " bad health " twenty-two years before, would 
 now, if alive, be eighty years old, raises no presumption of death. 
 Matter of Hall's Deposition, 1 Wall. Jr. 85 (1843). 
 
 Pkksumi'Tiox of Dkatii. — This apparently is not the entire 
 truth in the matter. As the unexplained absence grows in duration, 
 even during the seven years, and as the inference that the person in 
 (luestion is alive because he has been shown to be at a previous time, 
 therefore continuously grows weaker, a presumption of fact that he 
 is dead has been gaining probative force. As both processes are 
 continuous, a time comes in any case when the probative weiglit of 
 the second presumption of fact not only preponderates over that of 
 the first, but preponderates to such an extent as to constitute a 
 p7'{ma facie case in favour of death. The burden of introducing evi- 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 1833* 
 
 of 
 
 of 
 
 I. 
 
 ire 
 
 )ii, 
 
 u 
 
 (lence to prove the existence of life under these circumstances lies 
 on him who asserts it; — in other words, there is a presumption of 
 law that the person is dead. This period the law, somewhat arbi- 
 trarily but upon reasons historically satisfactory (see Stat. 1 Jac. 1, 
 Ch. 11, sec. 2 ; 19 Car. 2, Ch. G), has tixed at seven years. Jolinsou 
 V. Merithew, 80 Me. Ill (1888) ; Whiting v. NichoU, 46 111. 230 
 (1867); Adams v. Jones, 39 Ga. 479(1869); Winsliip r. Conner, 
 42 N. H. 341 (1861) ; Primm v. Stewart, 7 Tex. 178 (1851) ; Spen- 
 cer (;. Koper, 13 Ired. 333 (1852) ; Youngs v. Heffner, 36 Oh. St. 
 232 (1880) ; Giles v. Morrow, 1 Out. Hep. 527 (1882) ; Osb'<:ne v. 
 Allen, 26 N. J. L. 388 (1857) ; Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150 (1838) ; 
 Learned r. Corley, 43 Miss. 687, 709 (1871) ; State v. Henke, 58 la. 
 457 (1882) ; Holmes v. Johnson, 42 Pa. St. 159 (1802) ; Garwood 
 r. Hastings, 38 Cal. 216 (1869). 
 
 " When a person goes abroad and has not been heard of for a long 
 time, the presumption of the continuance of life ceases at the expi- 
 ration of seven years from the period when he was last heard of. 
 And the same rule holds, generally, with respect to persons away 
 from their usual place of resort, and of whom no .account can be 
 given." Whiting v. Xicholl, 46 111. 230 (1867). 
 
 It is error to exclude evidence of persons who have heard of the 
 alleged deceased on the ground that it is liearsay. It rebuts the 
 presumption, which only arises wlien a jjerson is not heard from 
 in seven years. Dowd v. AVatson, 105 N. C. 470 (1890). 
 
 " The presumption of death, from any lapse of time which the 
 evidence in the case would justify, would only apply where the indi- 
 vidual alleged to be dead had left the place of his domicile and had 
 not been heard from for seven years or more." Duke of Cumber- 
 land V. Graves, 9 Barb. 595 (1850). 
 
 "The statutory presumption, in certain cases, of death after 
 seven years affords no ground for tlie converse jjroposition that, if 
 the person has been heard from within seven years, there is a pre- 
 sumption of law that he is still living. Neither is it true that there 
 is any iiresumption of law one way or the other as to the continu- 
 ance of life. It is a mere presumption of fact which is subject to 
 be controlled by facts and circumstances, and consetiuciitly by no 
 means of equal strength at all times, an 1 under all circumstances; 
 or, perhaps, more correctly speaking, there is no rigid presuniptiou 
 one way or the other." State /•. I'lym, 4.'i Minn. iiii~) (1890). 
 
 If the contention that great length of absence tends rather to 
 show that the person in question has changed his home than that 
 he is dead, the court say, " We do not perceive any solid foundation 
 for it." Winship v. Conner, 42 N. H. 341 (1861). But the court 
 of Alabama very truly say that " considering the great length and 
 breadth of this country, and the migratory character of the people, 
 the presumption has less force here than in the country where the 
 
 ■4 
 
 \ i i 
 
 ! i, 
 

 18335 
 
 AMKUK^VX NOTES. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 l;i\v on this subject originated." Smith r. Smith, 49 Ala. 156 
 (1873). 
 
 Where lieirs at law, while very young, moved to a western state as 
 a place of permanent residence, evidence that for twelve years they 
 Jiad not been heard of by the testatrix at the place of their original 
 residence, does not raise a presumption of their death. " The 
 absence, witliout being heard from for seven years, which will war- 
 rant the presumption that a person is dead, means absence from 
 that person's place of residence — his liome — with which place he 
 would most certainly keep up some kind of communication, or to 
 which he would return were he alive." Keller v. Stuck, 4 Kedf. 
 2U (1880). 
 
 The death of such person at any time within the seven years 
 is not presumed, but must be proved. Newman r. Jenkins, 10 
 Pick. 515 (1830) ; Whiting ». Xicholl, 4G 111. 230 (1807) ; Spencer 
 /•. IJoper, 13 Ired. 333 (1852); Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. Ill 
 (lSiS8). Such "death may be proved by showing facts from which 
 a reasonable inference would lead to that conclusion, as by proving 
 that a person sailed in a particular vessel for a particular voyage, 
 and that neither vessel nor any person on board had been heard of 
 for a length of time sufficient fo information to be received from 
 tliat part of the globe where the vessel might be driven or the per- 
 sons on board of her might be carried." Johnson v, Merithew (iif)i 
 ,siij/r(i). So that "tlie person was dangerously ill, or in a weak state 
 of health, was exposed to great perils of disease or accident, or tliat 
 he embarked on board of a vessel wliich has not since been heard 
 from, thougli the length of the usual voyage has long since elapsed." 
 Eagle v. Emmet, 4 I'.radf. 117 (1850); Smith r. Knowlton, 11 N. H. 
 191 (1840). 
 
 "Any facts or circumstances relating to the character, habits, con- 
 dition, affec*:ions, attachments, prosperity, and objects in life wliich 
 usually control tlie conduct of men and are the motives of tlioir 
 actions, are competent evidence from which may be inferred the 
 deatli of one absent and unheard from, wliatever has been tlie dura- 
 tion of such absence." Tisdale v. Connecticut, &c.. Ins. Co., 26 la. 
 170 (1868). 
 
 •' It may well be conceded that where a person is studious in liis 
 habits, attentive to liis business, has a fixed and permanent resi- 
 dence, and is surrounded by those infliuMices whicli are calculated 
 to endear him to his liome, suddenly and unaccountably disappears, 
 a presumption may arise which would warrant a jury in finding that 
 he was dead." Hancock r. American, &c., Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 26 
 (1876). 
 
 " A ju'y may find the fact of death, if the circumstances of the 
 case (ioncur, from the lapse of a .shorter period than seven years." 
 Puckett r. State, 1 Sneed, 355 (1853). So in a case where deceased 
 
.^1 
 
 I? 
 
 CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMEKICAN Nt)TES. 
 
 18335 
 
 was last seen on an overland jonrney to California, through a coun- 
 try infested with hostile Indians, and determined to fight his way 
 through, the court presume from the fact that neither he nor any of 
 the party were since seen that lie died soon after he was last seen. 
 Davie /•. Briggs, 97 U. S. GL'8 (1878). 
 
 Whoever claims that death occurred at any period within the 
 seven j-ears has the onus of proving that fact. Doe d. Ilagerman 
 r. Stmng, 4 Q. B. U. C. olO (1848), confirmed 8 Q. B. U. C. 291 
 (I8r)i;; Howard v. State, 75 Ala. 27 {1883). 
 
 ]S0 rUESLMl'TIOX OK DeATII WJTillX THE SeVEN YeAKS. — TllB 
 
 attempt has been made to establish a presumption of law that the 
 person died precisely at the end of the seven years, i. e., lived through 
 that period. The better opinion seems to be that the time of death 
 within the prescribed period of seven years is a matter entirely for 
 evidence, and that the person to whose contention the fact of such 
 death is essential, must prove it. " It certainly has not been 
 expressly decided that the person must be taken to have lived 
 throughout the period ; but that conclusion inevitably follows from 
 the legal presumption of life, which, though prospectively rebutted 
 at a particular period, is sufficient to sustain the allegation of exist- 
 ence during the time it lasted." Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150, 171 
 (1838). "The legal presumption . . . establishes not only the fact 
 of death, but also the time at which the person shall first be 
 accounted dead." Whiting r. Nicholl, 4G 111., 230 (1867) ; Eagle 
 r. Emmet, 4 Bradf. 117 (1^'5C) ; Whiteley r. Equitable Life, &c., Co., 
 72 Wise. 170 (1888). " It is no answer to .say that the probabilities 
 are that the death did not occur at the ex])iration of the .seven 
 years, but at some other time within that period. The time of the 
 death, as well as the fact of death, are presumptions not of fact 
 but of law. The law regards neither as certain. It simply declares 
 that the party shall be jiresumed to be dead at the ex])iration of 
 seven years, whenever his death shall come in question." Clarke 
 r. Canfield. 15 X. J. Eq. 110 (1802); Shown /-. ^SIcMaekin. 9 Lea, 
 601. 607 (1882); Stevens /•. MeNamara, 36 ]\Ie. 176 (1853); Craw- 
 ford /•. Elliott, 1 IToust. 465 (1856) ; Montgomery v. Be vans, 
 1 Sawy. C. Ct. 653 (1871). 
 
 If a person was unmarried when last heard from, it will be pre- 
 sumed that he died without issue. Shown r. INIcMaekin, 9 Lea, 
 601 (1882). 
 
 Whose Ioxoraxce is Important. — Tn an Alabama ease it is 
 very truly said that "evidence of parties having no particular 
 interest in the ])erson whoso life or death is in issue, not being rela- 
 tions, friends, or members of the family, — parties with whom the 
 absent person, if alive, would not be likely to have any correspond- 
 ence; . . . should have but little weight." The court held a single 
 letter from the alleged deceased from Texas to one of her friends 
 
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 18337 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT I. 
 
 four years before of much greater weight than many affidavits from 
 persons who would not naturally be expected to hear from the per- 
 son, if alive. Smith v. Smith, 49 Ala. loG (lS7y). 
 
 No presumption of death is raised by the fact that inquiries 
 at the post-office of the party's former residence reveal the fact 
 that he is not known there; — even if the person were in "bad 
 liealth " twenty-two years ago ; that if now alive he would be 
 eighty years old, and that his name is not in the directory ; — in 
 the absence of evidence of inquiry being made among his friends, 
 tlie kind of ill health, and the fact of change of residence. " Show 
 me that (alleged deceased) was the subject of some quick consum- 
 ing disease, or of any specific malady, ?,nd you will change the case. 
 ... It is no presumption of law that tlie runners of the post-office 
 know, so as to answer at first inquiry, the name and residence of 
 every person in a populous city." Hall's Deposition, 1 Wall. Jr., 
 8o, 104 (1843). 
 
 " There is no rule of law which confines such intelligence to any 
 particular class of persons. It is not a question of pedigree." Flynn 
 IK Coffee, 12 All. 133 (1866). 
 
 So where a wife left the place where the parties had resided as 
 husband and wife, her evidence that she had not heard of her hus- 
 band for seven years iloes not raise the presumption of his death. 
 The persons whose not liearing is significant of the death of per- 
 sons not heard from are " those who are nearly related to them, or 
 were upon terms of friendship with them, and remaiiie<i at or near 
 the place wliere they last resided." Thomas /•. Tliomas, 16 Neb. 
 553(1884); Com. v. Thompson, 11 All. 23 (1865). To the same 
 effect is Hyde Park v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505 (1881). Under simi- 
 lar facts, and answering the question as to wiiether the former, 
 abandoning, husband, were dead, the court say: "This is a pure 
 question of fact; and, in the absence of any direct evidence, is to 
 be determined by the presuniption which the law authorises. If a 
 man leaves his home and goes into parts unknown, and remains 
 unheard from for the pace of stiven years, the law authorises to 
 tliose tliat remain, the presumption of fact that he is dead; but it 
 does not authorise him to presume therefore that any one of tliose 
 remaining in the place which he left has died." Hyde Park r. 
 Canton {iibi siiprn). To same effect, of an absence of seventeen 
 years under similar circumstances, see Garwood v. Hastings, .38 
 Cal. 216 (1889). The fact that one has been absent twenty years 
 from a certain place raises no presumption of death, "as there is 
 no evidence he ever established his residence there." Stinclitiejd 
 -(;. Emerson, 52 Me. 465 (1864). 
 
 It is unnecessary to say that the presumption may be rebutted. 
 Youngs V. Heffner, 36 Oh. St. 232 (1880). "This is nierely a pn>- 
 sumption of fact, and may be rebr.tted." Flynu v. Coffee, 12 All. 
 
 ( 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 183«« 
 
 133 (18GG). The explanations of such absence may be such as to 
 deprive the presumption of nnioh of its probative force. 
 
 Where a person leaves home for some foreign place, unex- 
 plained absence for seven years does not raise a presumption of 
 death unless inquiry were " made at such place without fretting 
 tidings of him." Wentworth /•. Wentworth, 71 Me. 7L; (1880) ; 
 McCiirtee v. Camel, 1 Barb. (X. Y.) Chan. 455 (1846). 
 
 It naturally follows that if tlie presumption of death from seven 
 years' absence turns out to be erroneous, that acta done on the 
 strength of the presumption are of no legal validity. For example, 
 a savings bank may be required to pay to a depositor money already 
 paid to his administrator, erroneously appointed on the presumption 
 of his death from seven years' absence. Jockumsen v. Suffolk 
 Savings Bk., 3 All. 87 (1861). For a New York decision, by a divided 
 court, CO the contrary effect, see Roderigas r. East River Savings 
 Instn., 63N. Y. 460 (1875). 
 
 Bkesumptiox of Likk ix Ckiminal Cases. — The presumption 
 of the continuance of life, being at the highest a presumption of 
 law, regulating the burden of proof and based upon a presumption 
 of fact of a varying probative force, which grows weaker in exact 
 proportion as it becomes necessary to rely on it, is not considered 
 sufficient to sustain the government's burden of proof in a crim- 
 inal case on a material point. In other words, it is not proof be- 
 yond a reasonable doubt. To adopt a common expression, " The 
 presumption of life yields when in conflict with the presumption of 
 innocence." "Though the law presumes a continuance of life, yet 
 where this pi-esumption necessarily involves a presumption of crime, 
 and comes in conflict with the presumption of innocence, the former, 
 which is the weaker, yields to the latter presumption, and the party 
 affirming that an individual is not dead will be bound to prove it." 
 Lockhart v. White, 18 Tex. 102 (1856). For these reasons, on an 
 indictment for bigamy, the courts have usually refused to consider 
 the fact that the defendant's first liusband or wife was alive shortly 
 before the second marriage as sufficient evidence that such husband 
 or wife was actually alive at the time of the second marriage. 
 Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 467 (1874). 
 
 On an indictment for bigamy, the supreme court of Indiana de- 
 cline to consider the fact that the first wife was alive two years 
 before the second marriage sufficient evidence that she was alive at 
 that time. " Inasmuch as the state was required to prove the appel- 
 lant's guilt byond a reasonable doubt, we think the jury were not 
 justified in coming to the conclusion, over the presumption of his 
 innocence, that t^** first wife was living at the time of the second 
 marriage." Squ.x-e v. State, 46 Ind. 459 (1874). The :;ame rule is 
 applied in a civil case where the continuance of life would establish 
 bigamy in a criminal case. Sharp v. Johnson, 22 Ark. 79 (1860); 
 
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 In 
 
 18389 
 
 AMEHICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT r. 
 
 Klein v. Laudnian, 29 Mo. 2;'50 (ISfiO) ; West r. State, 1 Wise. 209 
 (lcSy,3). " Thougli the law presumes a contimiauoe of life, yet 
 where this presumption necessarily involves a presumption of 
 crime, and comes in eonfliet with the presumption of innocence, the 
 foriiier, which is weaker, yields to tlie latter })resumptiou, and the 
 party affirming that an individual is not dead will be bound to prove 
 it." Lockhart v. White, 18 Tex. 102 (185G). " Otherwise the second 
 marriage would be held criminal, by rejison of a presumption ; which 
 would be to establish a crime upon a bare presumption." Spears v. 
 Hurton, 31 Miss. 547 (1856). 
 
 While " it may be true that inuocen(!e is to be j)resumed, and that 
 when the presumption of life is brought in conflict with the pre- 
 sumption of innocence, the latter should prevail," the jury are not 
 to presume death except at the end of seve.'i years, but are to weigh 
 all the evidence in the case. Murray v. Murray, 6 Oreg. 17 
 
 (1S7(;). 
 
 The rule, mor- or less definitely announced in the above cases, 
 that the presumption of the continuance of life cannot be used to 
 prove the defendant guilty of biij;amy was considered in an interest- 
 ing Massachusetts case. Com. v. McGrath, 140 Mass. 290 (188;")). 
 The indictment was for polygamy. For the lawful marriage tlio 
 government relied on a marriage to one N. W. on January 24, 
 1880. The defendant set up tliat previously, in 187G, he had mar- 
 ried one C. T. and cohabited with her until within a month of his 
 going through the ceremony with the said N. W. He then asked 
 tiie court to rule that " the jjresumption of law in the absence of 
 evidence to the contrary '' was that C. T. was alive at tlie dale oi 
 the ceremony relied on by the government as the legal marriage. 
 This the judge, on the strength of tlie presumption of innocence, 
 declined to do. Held error. " The fact that a person is alive at a 
 certain tinu^ does afford some presumption that lie is alive a monili 
 later, as it does that he was alive an hour or a year later. It is evi- 
 den(!e tending to prove hat fact, whicli in ordinary cases, in the ab- 
 sence of otlicr evidence, would be deemed conclusive. Its weight, of 
 course, would be affected by any cinuimstances affecting the proba- 
 bility of the continuance of life in particular cases, or rendering it 
 probable that deatli had occurred ; and, in this case, the fact of the 
 defendant's marriage is such a circumstance. But the question 
 whether a person is alive at a certain time, whether a day, or a 
 month, or a year, or any period less than seven years, after direct 
 evidence that he was living, is for the jury, to be determined by the 
 general presumption or probability of the continuance of life, modi- 
 fied by the circumstances of the particular case. . . . The jury were 
 to judge of the strength of the presumption of the innocence of the 
 defendant, as well as of the continuance of the life of his former 
 wife, in view of all the circumstances affecting them. The instruc- 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMEltlCAN N(>Ti:s. 
 
 183«» 
 
 tions of the court were not merolj tliat there was no presumption oE 
 law, and that the fact was for tlie jury to find upon the evidenec, 
 but were in 'fEect a lulinj; that the presumption of innocicnce 
 destroyed the presumption of the continuance of life, so that the 
 fact that the first wife was alive a month before the second marriage 
 was not to be considered as evidence that she was living at the time 
 of that marriage." 
 
 In a libel for adultery on account of a second marriage, the first 
 being denied, it was held that the general rule that marriage could 
 be inferred from cohabitation did not apply, and an actual marriage 
 must be proved. " We caiiuot indulge this inference without pre- 
 suming that the defendant has been guilty of the crime of bigamy." 
 Case V. Case, 17 Cal. C'JS (ISC^). 
 
 b\)V analogous reasons, when the crime of bigamy is collaterally 
 involved, the continuance of life will not be presumed, cf/., in an 
 action ul" ejectment where the claim is made that certain heirs of 
 the patentee were illegitimate because a former wife was shown to 
 be living within five years of his marriage to their mother. Sliarp 
 V. Johnson, 2'2 Ark. 79 (1800). 
 
 Fkesumi'Tion ok Continuance Affirmed. — But this contention 
 that where, in a civil case, the presumption of the continuance of 
 life tends to show a subsequent marriage to be bigamous, the pre- 
 sumption of innocence requires that probative force should be 
 denied the presumption of continuance of life, has been vigor- 
 ously repudiated. In a case involving a pauper settlement acquired 
 by a second marriage and residence in the defendant town, the 
 (hifence being that of a prior marriage to a man who had abandoned 
 the pauper several years before and not shown to be dead, the court 
 say: "It is said, however, in argument, that there is a presumption 
 of innocence, which of itself is sufficient to overcome the presump- 
 tion of continuance of life ; and that therefore the fact that the 
 pauper married again is to be considered as some evidence that slio 
 might lawfully do so. The presuuiption of innocence is not based 
 upon factts, but is independent of all evidence. The presumption of 
 continued life rests upon facts proved; and those established facts, 
 while they raise the presumption of continued life, rebut the pre- 
 sumjition of innocence." Hyde I'ark v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505 
 (1881). 
 
 Under similar circumstances, the supreme court of Oregon say: 
 " Ordinarily the death of a person would not be presumed until 
 after an absence of seven years without being heard from. But if 
 within the seven years, the presumption of life is to be overcome by 
 the presumption of innocence, then the entire ease and circum- 
 stances under which a party claims such force for this presumption 
 of innocence ought to be carefully considered." Murray v. Murray, 
 6 Oreg. 17 (1876). 
 
 • 1 
 
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I: 
 
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 iHJCl!iH!!!il 
 
 183" 
 
 amkii[<;an notkh. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 For siiailiir reasons, *^lif' court will not allow a statute permitting 
 juM'sons to marry at'tor thrct! years' unexplained absence by a former 
 liusbaud or wile without being deemed guilty of bigamy to be used 
 as proof of actual death in a criminal case where such death is a 
 material fact. State r. Henke, .58 la. 407 (1""' 
 
 Hut in a Minnesota case, on an indictment 
 
 liowe 
 
 ver, 
 
 there 
 
 were corroborating circumstances, the lirst wife being shown to be 
 alive witliin two years of the second marriage, the court sustain a 
 '•uling that " when life is once shown, it is presumed to contiiuie 
 until it is sliowu to liave ended. That presumption may be stronger 
 or weaker according to the circumstances of any particular case. 
 It is not a conclusive presumption, but it is a presumption which 
 tlie jury is warranted in drawing, from the fact of life being shown, 
 that life contiiuics until it otherwise appears." The court state 
 tlieir opinion thus: "Taken as a whole, we find no error in this 
 statement of the law. There is some confusion, if not conflict, of 
 view^ in the decisions in cases of conflicting presumptions of the 
 continuance of life and of innocence as to which shall prevail. Some 
 hold that what is called the presumption of the continuance of life 
 must yield to the stronger presumption of innocence ; and therefore, 
 in prosecutions for bigamy, the fact that the former husband or wife 
 was living at some particular date before the second marriage will 
 not warrant a conviction ; that there nuist be some direct evidence 
 that he or she was still living at the date of the second marriage. 
 Reduced to its logical result, the effect of this would be that, if it 
 was proved by the most indisputable evidence that the former hus- 
 band or wif(^ was alive and in good health a few liours before the 
 second marriage, the jury could not presume that death had not 
 intervened, without some direct evidence to the contrary. The 
 unreasonableness of this as a practical rule of evidence would seem 
 almost self-evident." State r. Plym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890) ; Howard 
 V. State, To Ala. 27 (1883). 
 
 Probably the "confusion, if not conflict," referred to in State r. 
 Plym, 43 Minn. 385 (1890), in part, at least, arises from a failure 
 to distinguish presumptions of fact from assumptions or presump- 
 tions of law. In a criminal cause, the forensic rule of the " pre- 
 sumption of innocence" m.ay fairly be considered to be inconsistent 
 with the establishment of a conflicting rule of presumption that 
 there is such a probative force in the presumption of fact of a 
 continuance of life as to satisfy the burden of establishing pre- 
 scribed by the " presumption of innocence." But there seems no 
 reason why the presumption of continuance should not be used as 
 an inference of fact with such weight as the jury see fit to give it. 
 
 Survivorship. — A mass of ingenious reasoning clusters about 
 the question. What pri viumption of survivorship exists when several 
 persons perish in a common accident ? The rugged common-sense 
 
ClIAl'. v.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTEkS. 
 
 i«a« 
 
 of English law, after some sli^'lit attfuiipts to adopt tliciii, disciirds 
 the intricate prrsiiinptions of tlie civil law, as hast'd on age, liealth, 
 Hcx, &c., and adopts the ndc that there is no prosuniption oti the 
 subject whatever; that he who relies on the fact of survivorsliip 
 must establish it as best he can. Newell v. Nichols, V2 Hun, ()(i4 
 (1.S7S) ; Newell v. Nichols, I't N. Y. 78 (IST.S) ; Stiiidt- v. IJidg- 
 wav, 55 How. Prac. .'JOl (1878) ; Stinde v. Goodrich. 3 Jtedf. 87 
 (1877). 
 
 So in charging a jury, in such a ease, Mr. Justice Woods says: 
 "There are no i)resuniptions of law in the case. If the evidence 
 produced by the i)laintilfs establishes the fact of survivorship to the 
 satisfaction of your minds, your verdict should be for the ])laintiff. 
 . . . Tiie plaintii'fs have the afKrniative of the issue, the burden of 
 proof is on them, and unless the testimony in the ease satisfies and 
 convinces your minds you cannot return a verdi(!t in their favor; 
 but, if you are satisfied and convinced, you can and should." Kobin- 
 son /•. Uallier, 2 Woods, 178 (1875). 
 
 It is merely reversing the statement, without affecting the mean- 
 ing, to say, as is frequently done, that the jiarties are presumed to 
 have perished at the same moment. What is meant is, that he who 
 desires to establish any survivorship, has the burden of proving it. 
 Tiiere is no jjrobative force in the *' presumption " of simultaneou.s 
 deatii, and if that fact were material, aflirmative evidence would be 
 refpiired to prove it. 
 
 •■' When two persons, lius\)and and wife, are killed in the same 
 accident, and there is no proof on the subject, the presumption of 
 law is that they died co-instantaueously," Kansas Tac. R. v. Miller, 
 2 Col. 442 (1874). 
 
 Apparently the facts that the accident was at sea; that the hus- 
 band was in the prime of life and an expert swimmer, while the 
 wife was in feeble health, does not authorise an inference that the 
 husband survived. Fuller v. Linzee, 1,35 Mass. 4C8 (1883). 
 
 lUit, on the contrary, in weighing the effect of positive testimony, 
 the tribunal may properly take into consideration the ])hysical con- 
 dition of the parties. For example, where a father was washed 
 overboard from a wrecked vessel, a son for a time remaining, evi- 
 dence of the health of the father may found an inference of the 
 point of time at which the father died. "As we understand the 
 doctrine of the connnon law, it is this, that when several individuals 
 ])erish by a common calamity, and there is no circumstance other 
 than that of age, sex, &c., from which it may be rationally inferred 
 who was the longer liver, in such case, no presumption arises ni)on 
 which a conclusion can be predicated. V>\\t that when the calamity, 
 though common to all, consists of a series of successive events, sep- 
 arated from each other in point of time and character, and each 
 likely to produce death upon the several victims according to the 
 
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!i 
 
 :iMi 
 
 183" 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [l AI!T I. 
 
 degree of exposure to it, in such a case, the difference of age, sox and 
 health beeonios a uiatterof *'r("(/«'«(r and may be relied upon as sucli." 
 Smith /'. Crooni, 7 Fla. 81, 144 (1857). To the same effect is IVU 
 V. Hall, 1 Chevfs (S. C.) lOq. D'J, 108 (1840), where the fact that the 
 wife was heard for some time loudly calling for her husband in all 
 parts of the vessel, without reply, was held sufficient evidence to 
 warrant the finding of her survivorship. " Because the plaintiffs 
 are to prove the fact of survivorship, it does not follow that they 
 are to prove it to demonstration." KjhI. So where an elderly lady 
 was swej)t away by a wave, while her grandchildren were se( ;i 
 standing in the place " some ten or fifteen minutes after the grand- 
 mother disa|)peared," it was held that " it may be that the evideniie 
 is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the children survived their 
 grandmother as they were last seen alive." Stiude **. Kidgway, 
 55 How, I'rao. oOl (1878). This decision, however, was reversed in 
 Matter of Kidgway, 4 Redf. 22G (1880), where the surrogate says, 
 after remarking that in such a calamity those who abandon the ve.s- 
 .sel are the safer: "The facts of this case seem to me to indicate 
 the instant and inevitable doom of the children, with hope of res- 
 cue or at least some contiiniance of life on the part of the grand- 
 mother. At all events, I am of the opinion that the parties alleg- 
 ing survivorship have not satisfactorily proved the fact." Iln'd. 
 
 Where the conditions of a common death, e.rj., that caused by a 
 bniliiug building, can be made the subject of evidence, all the oii- 
 cumstances of the case are relevant of the question of survivorship. 
 "The death of the several victims resulted from a succession of 
 causes." Will of I'^hle, .,3 Wise. 445 (1889). 
 
 riiKsuMi'Tiox OF Reoulauity. — lu uiost iustauces, this so-callod 
 presumption is rather a rule of administration than one of logic. 
 It generally has slight probative force, and amounts in many in- 
 stances to a statement that whoever relies on an irregularity must 
 prove it. In other words, it states who has the burden of intro- 
 ducing evidence on that particular subject. As the effect of tlu! 
 courts announcing an assumption or "presumption" of law is to 
 shift this burden of introducing evidence, the process of locating the 
 buitlen of introducing evidence on a particular point by ruling that 
 there is a p'-esumption of law to the contrary has proved an ca.sy 
 one. The practical considerations wliicli have led courts to assume 
 the regularity of proceedings (especially those of long standing) 
 until the contrary is shown are obvious and valuable. It is fair to 
 say of these assumptions, as Sir William Grant, in Hillary (/.Waller, 
 lli Vesey, Jr., 239, 252 (1806), said, in presuming a lost grant of the 
 estate, that these " Presumptions do not always proceed on a belief 
 that the thing presumed has actually taken place. Grants are fre- 
 ([uently presumed, as Lord Mansfield says (Eldridge v. Knott, 1 
 Cowp. 214 (1774), merely for the purpose, and from a principle of 
 
riiAV. v.] 
 
 AMUItllAN NOTKS. 
 
 1H;J" 
 
 fiuietiiig tho possession. Then' is ^is imicli occasion for preauiniiig 
 conveyances of legal estates; as otherwise titles must forever remain 
 imiuirfect, and in many respects unavailable, when from length of 
 time it has become impossible to discover in whom the legal estate 
 (if outstanding) is actually vested." This statement is cited with 
 approval in Fletcher r. Fuller. lliO U. S. CM (1886). 
 
 JuDif'iAL Puoc'KKUiNUH. — Wliocver would imi)each the accuracy 
 of judicial proceedings must introduce evic'ence to that effect. The 
 reason is partly given by the supreme court of Pennsylvania : — 
 
 " We are not to expect too much from records of judicial i)ro- 
 ceedings. They are memorials of the judgments and decrees of the 
 judges, and contain a general but not a particular detail of all 
 tliat occurs before them. . . . Much must be left to intendnirnt 
 and presumption, for it is often less ditlicult to do things correctly 
 than to describe them correctly." lieale r. Com., 25 l*a. St. ll 
 (l.Sof)); State v. Lewis, 22 N. J. L. CG4 (1840); Worley Adni. r. 
 J lineman, 6 Ind. App. 240 (1892). 
 
 •'It is a principle long since settled, that in pleading the judg- 
 ment or decree of a court having plenary jurisdiction of tlie subject, 
 it is not necessary to set forth the proceedings preliminary to such 
 judgment or decree. The presumption of law is conclusive, that 
 all the r(>quisite prior proceedings were had in the case until the 
 contrary appears." Lathrop v. Stuart, 5 McLean, 107 (LSoO). 
 
 So the 'Maryland court of ap))eals, in a case involving the validity 
 of a license iss\ied to a Pennsylvania corpor.ation by the governor of 
 Pennsylvania under an act of the legislature of that state, hold that 
 they are required by comity "to presume, that the license granted 
 by the governor, purporting to be in pursuance of the law, Avas a 
 regiUar exercise of power, and further to presume from it, that the 
 jiatent had duly and regularly preceded it." Plank Koad Co. v. 
 lirure, 6 .Md. A'u (1854). 
 
 lUit the proceedings must be prutiii furif regular. 
 
 The courts of Massachusetts, for exam])le, will not assume, in the 
 absence of a recital in the record or evidence to luliat effect, that a 
 California court had jurisdiction to grant a valid divorce between 
 non-resident parties. '' A presumjjtion may exist in favor of the 
 jurisdiction of a court of record of another state, which has assumed 
 'to exercise jurisdiction over a subject matter in controversy between 
 parties residing there. But there is no such presumption in favor 
 of the jurisdiction of such a court over parties not there residing." 
 Com. r. Blood, 97 Mass. 538 (18G7). 
 
 Omnia rite acta. — So it will be assumed, after a suitable length 
 of time, that all facts existed necessary to the validity of an ancient 
 title. The rule proceeds partly upon the presumption of fact that 
 if serious flaws had in reality existed, advantage would have been 
 taken of them in so long an interval, and partly upon consideration 
 
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 183^6 
 
 AMEHICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [rART I. 
 
 of the practical advantages of quieting titles as contrasted with tlie 
 mischief and hardshij) of requiring the proof of trivial things in 
 cases wherr the evidence is ])erishable, and, after an interval of 
 time which would render the furnishing of absolute proof extremely 
 difficult and exjjcnsive, if not indeed impossible. "There is a time 
 when the rules of evidence must be relaxeil. We cannot summon 
 witnesses from tlie grave, rake memory from its ashes, or give fresh- 
 ness and vigour to the dull and torpid brain." llichards v. Elwell, 
 48 Pa. St. 301 (1864). 
 
 So in a case in ]\Iaine, where the question turned on the validity 
 of a tax-deed over thirty years old, it is said that " after the lapse of 
 thirty years from a collector's sale of land for taxes, it may be i)re- 
 sumed from facts and circumstances proved, that the tax-bills, valu- 
 ation, warrants, notices, &c., were regular ; that the assessors and 
 collector were duly chosen at legal meetings ; that the colletstor was 
 sworn ; that a valuation and copy of the assessment were returned 
 by the assessors to the town-clerk, and that everything which can 
 be thus reasonably and fairly presumed, may have the force and 
 effect of proof." Freeman t\ Thayer, 33 Me. 70 (1851). 
 
 Where the plaintiff's title was based in part on a grant of land 
 by a proprietors' meeting ten years before the bringing of the action, 
 held: "It is but a just assumption as against them (and a fortiori 
 against a stranger) that a grant asserted by their records to have 
 been made at a legal meeting, was made by a meeting duly warned 
 and linlden, until the contrary appears." Cobleigh v. Young, 15 
 N. H. 41)3 (1844). 
 
 IJut in a Massachusetts case, where five persons petitioned for a 
 proprietors' meeting under a statute authorising that number to 
 apply to a justice of the peace for the purpose, and nine years 
 after a writ of entry was brought on a title derived through the 
 proceedings of tliat meeting, it was held that there was no " legal 
 presumption " that all five were in fact i)roprietors, but that the 
 demandant must establish that fact by competent evidence. Stevens 
 r. Taft, 3 Gray, 487 (1855). 
 
 In a later case in Maine, the point was raised in 1802 that the bond 
 filed by an administrator who had made sale of certain real estate 
 in 1830 did not ap[)ear of record to have been apjjroved in writing 
 by tlie judge of probate, as required by law. The court say : " When 
 we consider that this was a transaction which occurred more than 
 twenty years ago ; that the law required the bond to be approved 
 by the judge before it could be legally filed; that the bond was in 
 fact filed ; that the record shows that all the substantial steps were 
 taken required by law, and, so far as the administrator was con- 
 cerned, with technical accuracy ; that the sale was a public one, and 
 that the defendant immediately entered under his deed, and has held 
 undisturbod possession for more than twenty years, the law would 
 
 If' 
 
 M 
 

 CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN N()Ti:s. 
 
 183« 
 
 fully authorize the conclusion that all was done which was required 
 to give the defendant a perfect title." Austin /'. Austin, 50 Me. 74 
 (18G2). In a case in Missouri, where executors had been directed 
 by the probate court to give a deed, and there had been undisturbed 
 possession for over twenty years, the court say : " It may well be 
 presumed that the executors . . . executed . . . a deed . . . in con- 
 formity to the order of the probate court." The court further speak 
 of " the liberal presumptions that we would indulge in order to pre- 
 vent irregularities or imperfections in such transactions from being 
 held fatal." Williams *;. :Mitchell, 112 Mo. 300 (1892). A sheriff's 
 deed, over thirty years old, recited a judgment. The court records 
 being burned, held: "The existence of the judgment and execution 
 recited in the sheriff's deed ought to be presumed." Giddings v. 
 Day, 84 Tex. 605 (1892). 
 
 In a North Carolina case the court, in deciding that a commis- 
 sioner appointed to take depositions offered in evidence is pre- 
 sumed qualiiied until the contrary is shown, use the following 
 language : — 
 
 " l*)y the general rules of evidence, certain presumptions are con- 
 tinually made in favour of the regularity of proceedings and the 
 validity of acts. It presumes that every man in his private and 
 official character does his duty, until the contrary is proved ; it will 
 presume that all things are rightly done, unless tlie circumstances 
 of the case overturn this ])resumption. Thus it will presume that a 
 man acting in a public office has been rightly appointed ; that entries 
 made in public; books are rightly made by the proper officer, and 
 like instances abound of those presumptions. Bank v. Uandridge, 
 12 Wheat. 04; " Gregg v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74 (1892). 
 
 Otjikk IxsTAXf i:s. — The same rule, for the same reasons, assumes 
 the propriety of official conduct in matters not of record or in aid of 
 ancient titles. 
 
 So tlie official acts of public officers, within the general scope of 
 tbeir jiowers, will be presumed to be by legal authority. Payne r. 
 Troadwell, 10 Cal. 220 (1800). 
 
 Tublic officers and all other ]ieople will be presumed to do their 
 duty, — the idea being that the onus of evidence is on tlie person 
 alleging the contrary. A county judge, for example, will be pre- 
 sumed to have paid over insurance-money to the ccmnty treasurer as 
 required by law. Stajdes r. lilano (U). (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 
 .109 (1894). So it will be presumed that a sheriff in giving a deed 
 acted within his legal ])owers. Ivy v. Yancey (Mo. Supreme Court), 
 31 S. W. 937 (1895). The courts of North Carolina say that there 
 is a presumption that men do their duty, private and official, until 
 tlie contrary is shown ; that all things were rightly done unless tlie 
 circumstances rebut the ])resumption ; tiiat they will presume men 
 in public office were rightly appointed; that entries in public books 
 
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 183« 
 
 AMERICAN :T0TES. 
 
 [part T. 
 
 were made by the proper officers. So it will be presumed that a 
 commissioner appointed by the court to take depositions is qualified 
 until the contrary is shown. Gregg [v. Mallett, 111 N. C. 74 
 (1892). 
 
 Such a presumption, as has been said, usually amounts merely to 
 a statement of tlie burden of evidence. Its lack of probative force 
 is seen when it is attempted to use it probatively, i. e., to supply 
 proof of such alleged regularity. Such a force the courts have 
 declined *o give it. '' The presumption that public officers have 
 done their duty, like the presumption of innocence, is undoubtedly 
 a legal presumption ; but it does not sui)ply jiroof of a substantive 
 fact. . . . Nowhere is the presumption held to be a substitute for 
 proof of an independent and material fact." U. S. v. Ross, 92 U. S. 
 281 (187",). 
 
 Lost Gkaxt. — Analogous to the presumption of regularity in acts 
 of ancient possession is the rule that, in favor of the legality of a 
 long continued enjoyment of corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments, 
 a jury is authorised to infer the previous existence and subsequent 
 loss of such documents as would legally account for the existing 
 user. Tliis "presumption" hardly pretends to be anything more 
 than a judicial tiotion. By employing the language of the law of 
 evidence, the idea that judges declare law and do not create it is 
 made to " moult no feather." At first the inference of a lost grant 
 was said by the court to be a justifiable one; /. c, one which the 
 jury might draw if so disposed. Then it is stated as an inference 
 which the court advised. Finally, the rule was laid down broadly 
 that a jury should be instructed not only that they might, but also 
 that they were bound, to presume the existence of such a lost grant, 
 although neither judge nor jury nor any one else had the remotest 
 idea that any such instrument had, in fact, really existed. 
 
 iNCOKiMmKAi, Hkukditamknts. — In case of incorporeal heredita- 
 ments, tlic presumption of a lost grant has been stated as a positive 
 rule. " Adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty 
 years of an incorporeal hereditament affords a conclusive presump- 
 tion of a grant or a right, as the case may be, which is to be applied 
 as a j)resinii/)fi(> Juris c.f tie jinr, wherever by possil)ility a right can 
 be acrpiired in any manner known to the law." Wallace r. Fletcher. 
 SON. 11. 4.'U (18r.o). 
 
 The rule has even been invoked in favor of the state's power of 
 taxation. Certiiin Indian lands in the stati? of New .lerscy were, by 
 convention in 1758, exempted from taxation. In lHO.3, these lands 
 were sold to t\u' predecessors in title of the realtors, who, upon 
 being taxed by the state under a statute of 1804, resisted the attempt 
 to collect the tax, and by a decision of the United States supreme 
 court (State of \ew Jersey tf. Wilson, 7 Crancli, l(i4 (1812) suc- 
 ceeded in their contention. For some unexplained reason, the pay- 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN Nt)TK.S. 
 
 183« 
 
 inentof taxes was resumed in 1814 and continued until 1877. Upon 
 their again insisting ou an immunity from taxation, it was lield by 
 the court in giving judgment affirming the tax, tliat " the presumption 
 will arise from the payment of the tax for so long a period, that the 
 claim of the citizen has been discharged and extinguished." Tlie 
 fact " raises a conclusive presumption that by some convention 
 with the state the riglit to exem})tion was surrendered." State v. 
 Wright, 41 N. J. L. 478 (1879). . Tlie language of the court as to 
 "conclusive presumjjtions " sufficientljMudicates that tlie rule laid 
 down is not one based upon logic primarily, but is a rule of jiositive 
 law. 
 
 l>ut in a well-considered case in l^ennsylvania, Carter r. Tinicum 
 Fishing Co., 77 Pa. St. 310 (1875), user of a fishery for a long 
 period was held to raise merely a presumption of fact, the weight 
 of which should have been submitted to the jury. "Acts of owner- 
 ship over incorporeal hereditaments," say the court, "corresponding 
 to the possession of corporeal, are cli;i:;r.cd a foundation for a 
 presumption." 
 
 Coui'OHKAL IIkkkditamknts. — The presumption of a grant of 
 corporeal hereditaments has not usually been placed higher tiian a 
 presumption of law, while in case of incorporeal hereditaments it 
 lias been laid down as a positive rule of law, under the disguise of 
 a presumption of law. 
 
 " In cases where the party claiming title under sucli presumption, 
 may find it necessary to rely upon the presumption of a deed, we 
 tliink that long continued user is evidence of a lost or non-existing 
 grant, from some person who might, at some time, have made a valid 
 grant to some ]iersoii capable of accejjting it." AVallace c. Fletcher, 
 SON. H. 434,452 (ISSn) ; Proprietors of the Church in Prattle 
 Square r. P.ullard, 2 IMetc. 3G3 (1841) ; Williams v. IMitchell, 112 
 Uo. 300 (1892). 
 
 The rule in Massachusetts is stated thus by Chief Justice Shaw : 
 " Sucli a question is a mixed question of fact and law, to tliis 
 extent, that the facts being found, it is for the court to advise the 
 jury, whether in tlieir nature and quality they are sufficient to raise 
 tlie presumption proposed, tlie weiglit of the evidence being for the 
 jury." Valentine r. Piper, ii2 Pick. 85, 94 (1839). 
 
 This presumption of a grant "can never fairly arise where all the 
 circumstances are perfectly consistent with the non-existence of a 
 grant ; h fortiori, tliey cannot arise wliere the claim is of such a 
 nature as is at variance with tin' supposition of a grant." llicard v. 
 Williams, 7 Wheat. 59, 109 (1822). 
 
 ItKiaTi.Aurrv in IJusimoss. — Incases involving tlie operation of 
 an establislied course of public or j)rivat(! business wliere precision 
 is a necessary requirenien*-, and systematic accuracy has been demon- 
 strated by exjierience. it is evident that we liave in the so-called 
 
 !i<l 
 
183« 
 
 AMKUK'AN NOTKS. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 ])resuinption of regularity souicthing more than a statement that 
 the burden of introducing evidence to the contrary rests on him wiio 
 disputes it. The presumption in such cases is one of fact, the ])nj- 
 bative force of which is readily recognised, though it may greatly 
 vary, for obvious n^asons. 
 
 Rkcuilakity ok Mails, kt(\ — For example, letters received in 
 regular course of business responsive to letters on the same subject, 
 with proper letter-heads, envelopes, etc., are presumably authentic, 
 according to their purport. Scotield v, Parlin, &c. Co., Gl Fed. liep. 
 804 (1894). 
 
 The postmark of a letter containing a notice of protest of a 
 promissory note " is evidence that the letter was mailed and sent, 
 rather than that it was merely put into the post-office." New Ilavcn 
 County ]{ank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 20G (1842) ; Oaks y;. Weller, !(> 
 Vt. ()3 (1844) ; Kussell r. Buckley, 4 11. I. b'2o (1857) ; U. S. v. Bab- 
 cock, 3 Dill. C. Ct. 571 (187(5). 
 
 The presumption has been placed as high as a presumption of 
 law. " The depositing in the post-office of a letter properly 
 addressed, with the postage prepaid, is jiruixt, jhcie evidence that 
 the person to whom it was addressed received it. The fact that the 
 defendants had no additional proof that the letters were actually 
 received by the plaintiff is immaterial. The evidence that letters 
 were so deposited was comj)etent, and should have been submitted to 
 the jury to be weighed by them in connection with the other evi- 
 dence in the ease. They alone have the right to decide whether the 
 inference that the letters were received, founded ui)on the proba- 
 bility that the officers of the government will do their duty, and that 
 letters will be duly delivered, is overcome l)y the other evidence." 
 liriggs r. Ilervey, 130 Mass. 18G (1881); Folsom v. Cook, 115 Ta. 
 St. 5;{9 (1887). 
 
 Speaking of a notice of dissolution of a jjartnership, the supreme 
 court of Illinois say : " Proof of tlu! mailing of the circular to tiiem 
 was pi-imit fdrit; evidence tliat they received it. And no rebutting 
 testimony was introductMl to overcome the presumption thereby 
 created." Young v. (;lai)p, 147 111. 17G (1802). 
 
 " It is well settled tliat t!ie fact of depositing, in the post-office, a 
 l)roperly addressed, prepaid letter, raises a natural ])resumi)tion, 
 founded in common exjjeriencie, that it reached its destination by 
 due course of mail. In otlier words, it is /triiint. fudc evidence 
 tliat it was received by the person to whom it was addrt!ssed ; but 
 that prhiu' farir, proof may be rcfbuttcd by evidence showing tliat 
 it was not receivcid. Tiie quuotion is necessarily one of fact, solely 
 for the determination of the jury, under all the evidence." Whitmore 
 V. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 148 Ta. St. 405 (1892). 
 
 "It was error to instruct the jury that the mailing of a IcttiT 
 addressed to the ajipellants was notice to them of its contents. It 
 
 « 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 18360 
 
 was presumptive evidence, but nothing more." Eckei-ly v. Alcorn, 62 
 Miss. 228 (1884) ; Hastings r. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 
 473 (1893). 
 
 So the supreme court of Pennsylvania say : " There is no jtre- 
 sumption of law that a letter, mailed to one at the place he usually 
 receives his letters, was received by him. A strong probability of 
 its receipt may arise . . . and the fact of its deposit in the mail- 
 bag in connection with other circumstances may l)e sufficient to 
 warrant the court in referring the question of its receipt to the 
 determination of the jury." National Bank, &c. v. McManigle, 09 
 I'a. St. ir)0 (1871). 
 
 The requirement that the letter be sent to the sendee's permanent 
 address is a reasonable qualification of the rule. Huntley v, Whit- 
 ticr, 105 Mass. 391 (1870). 
 
 '' Such a presumption is in accordance with and is founded upon 
 connnon experience, and is therefore known to the law as a pre- 
 sumption from the ordinary course of business. Farther proof of 
 the receipt of a letter than what is derived from proof of tlie proper 
 direction and mailing of it would be wholly unnecessary, always 
 difficult, and often impossible." Kussell r. Buckley, 4 11. I. f)2.'> 
 (1857). 
 
 Other courts have considered the presumption purely one of fact. 
 " The presumi)tion so arising is not a conclusive presumption of law, 
 but a mere inference of fact, founded on the jn'obability that tin; 
 officers of the governujcnt will do their duty, and the \isual course 
 of business ; and when it is opposed by tsvidence that the letter was 
 never received, must be weighed, witii all the other circumstances 
 of tlie case, by the jury, in determining the (jucstiou wjiether tii»? 
 letter was actually received or not; and the burden of ])roving its 
 recei])t remains througliout upon the party who asstu-ts it." Huntley 
 V. Wliittier, lO;"* Mass. 391 (1870), quoted with approval in Rosen- 
 thal r. Walker, 111 U. S. 185 (1883). "Tiie mailing of a notice 
 properly directed to the party to Ix' cliargod raises a presumption of 
 notice in fact, for it is presumed that letters s(Mit by jjost to a party, 
 at Ids residence, are njccived by him in due course. But it is a prr- 
 suniption of fact and not of law, and may be repelled by proof."' 
 Austin /•. Holland, (59 X. Y. 571, .570 (1S77); De .Jarnettc /•. 
 McDaniel, 9;{ Ala. 215 (1890); (Jerniau Nat. Bk. r. Burns, 12 
 Col. 539 (1889). 
 
 "There is no presumption of law that a letter directed and mailed 
 to out! at the i)lace where he usually received his letters was 
 received by him. . . . From its postmark, the fact that a letter was 
 mailed may be inferred; btit by that, or other admissible evidiMKic, 
 the mailing, when material, must be ])roved. It will not be pre- 
 sumed from evidence that it had been written. So as to time of 
 mailing. No presumption whatever arises from the date written 
 
 m 
 
 \-m 
 
18361 
 
 AMKIIICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 in the letter. . . . The date of a postmark upon a letter is not evi- 
 <lence that it was forwarded on tliat day. . . . A fortiori the date of a 
 letter is not.'' Uhhnan /'. Arnholdt, &o. liryvving Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 
 485 (181).'{). 
 
 'fhere is no presumption of law that a letter postmarked June 
 IL'th was not dejjosited in the post-ottice until that day. "A letter 
 de[)0sited on the 11th might happen not to be noticed or stamped 
 until the ILJtii. It was sutticient, on this jjoint, to instruct the jury 
 that t\n) 2)ostmark was one of the circumstances to be taken into 
 consideration, with others, in deciding whether the letter was actu- 
 ally left on the llth, or not till the llith." Shelburne Falls Nat. 
 Bank V. Townsley, 102 Mass. 177 (18(;9). 
 
 Kentucky court of appeals denies the presumption the weight of 
 a ])resumption of law, but considers it " proper testimony to be con- 
 sidered by the jury, together with the other evidence, in determin- 
 ing when it [the letter mailed] was received ; and tliey should not 
 have been instructed that a presumjjtion arose from it wiiich must 
 prevail, unless overtiirown by other satisfactory evidence." Sulli- 
 van V. Kuykendall, 82 Ky. 483 (1885). 
 
 The presumption does not go so far as to establish the date of the 
 receipt of the letter in the absence of evidence as to the frequency 
 and speed of trains or the "usual course and time of mails." Boon 
 V. State Ins. Co., 37 Minn. 426 (1887). 
 
 The mailing must be itself proved. Where the secretary of an 
 insurance company testified that he wrote and signed a certain 
 letter, and gave it to an attendant to press-copy ; tiiat the latter 
 brougiit it back looking as if it had been press-copied; that he 
 folded and enclosed it in a sealed envelope, on which was a notice 
 to return if not delivered; directed it to the insured, and put it in a 
 basket where letters for nuiiling were usually ])laced. And the 
 ottice-porter testified that it was his business to take the letters from 
 the basket and mail them ; that he mailed all letters found in the 
 basket, but had no recollection of ever seeing or handling this jiar- 
 ticular letter, it was //cA/, tliis being the only evidence on the jwint, 
 that whether the letter was mailed was a question for the jury, and 
 it was not so (ionclnsive as to authorise the court to take the ease 
 from the jury. Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 473 
 (18!).3). 
 
 So no ])resumption of the receipt of a letter arises in the absence 
 of evidence that it was stamped. Bless v. .Jenkins (Mo. Supreme 
 Court), 31 S. W. 038 (18!)5). 
 
 ( )n the same ground of tlu' due performance of official duty rests 
 the presumption that a letter was received by the sendee, if the 
 envelope containing it bore a request for its return to the sender if 
 not delivered in a 'jcrtain time, and it has not been returned. "Evi- 
 dence that upon the envelope was printed a request for a return of 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMKHICAN NOTKS. 
 
 18852 
 
 the letter to the i)Ost-ofRce address of the phiiiitiff, if not failed for in 
 ten days, and that tae letter was not returned to liini, was rightly 
 admitted in connection with the evidence that the plaintiff sent the 
 bill enclosed in this envelope by mail to the defendant. It was 
 the dnty of the officers of the postal service to return the letter to 
 the address upon the envelope (the postage being prepaid) if it was 
 not delivered to the person to whom it was addressed, and there 
 is the .same inference of fact that they would do their duty in this 
 respect as in forwarding and delivering letters addressed to a mer- 
 chant at his place of business." Hedden v. Roberts, 134 Mass. 38 
 (1882). In a recent Pennsylvania case, the court say that the fact 
 of non-return of a letter bearing a request for return in case of non- 
 delivery so strengthens tlie presumption of receipt from mailing 
 " that it becomes well-nigh conclusive." Jensen v. McCorkell, 154 
 Pa. St. 323 (1893). 
 
 liut this presumption of the regular performance of official duty 
 may have but small weiglit in a particular instance especially outside 
 of the routine work of an office, and it may therefore be only a 
 ruling on the burden of evidence, t. e., a pure presumption of law. 
 On the question whether a defendant knew he had no title to timber 
 he had cut, an attempt was made to show that he had been notified 
 by the United States government authorities that his entries had 
 been cancelled. Defendant absolutely denied that he ever had been 
 so notified. To prove notice, evidence was introduced that the 
 (Commissioner of the Land-Office had notified the local register 
 that tlie defendant's entries were cancelled, and directed him ^o to 
 notify the defendant. Tlie plaintiffs then relied on tiie presumption 
 that the Register had done as directed. The court say : "They rely 
 upon the familiar rule that all reasonable presumptions must be 
 made in favor of the regularity and validity of the action of public 
 officers and tribunals. This rule is well established, but it does not 
 appear to be applicable under the present circumstances. It is a 
 mere presumption of law, which operates only in case of absence of 
 evidence. It disappears entirely in the presence of positive, uncon- 
 tradicted evidence upon the subject ; and, furthermore, it seems 
 very doubtful whether any presumption could be indulged here that 
 the register gave the notice in question." Befay v. Wheeler, 84 
 Wise. 13") (1893). 
 
 Rkoclauity in TKLRfiUAMS. — Bascd on similar reasons, a pre- 
 sumption of fact exists that a telegram properly directed and deliv- 
 ered to the company for transmission is duly received by the person 
 to whom it is se..;. Rut little can be added to the very cogent 
 reasoning adopted by the New York court of appeals on tlu^ subject. 
 Finch, ,L, in Oregon Steamship Co. v Otis, 100 N. Y. 440, 451 (1885) ; 
 Com. V. Jeffries, 7 All. 548 (1803) ; U. S. v. Rabcock, 3 Dill. C. Ct. 
 571 (1870) ; White v. Flemming, 20 Nova Scotia, 335 (1888). 
 
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 allegation;:' and EVIDKXCE MUST COUliESl'OND. 
 
 PART TI. 
 
 EULES GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION OF TESTIMONY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE OF EVII)KN(;E WITH ALLEOATIONS ; SUBSTANCE OF 
 
 issue; variance; and amendment. 
 
 § 217.* The production of evidence on a trial — whether civil oi 
 criminal — is governed by four general rules. First, the evidence 
 must correspond with the allegations in the pleadings,^ but the 
 substance only of the issues raised thereby need be proved ; nccomlly, 
 the evidence must be confined to the points in issue ; thinlly, the 
 burthen of proving a proposition at issue lies on the party holding 
 the substantial affirmative ; and fourthli/, the best evidence, of 
 which the case in its nature is susceptible, must always be 
 produced. 
 
 § 218.' The first rule is that the evidence must correspond with 
 the allegations in the pleadings. The pleadings, it may be explained, 
 are the written allegations of the parties, terminating in proposi- 
 tions distinctly affirmed on one side, and denied on the other, 
 called the issues.^ If these are propositions of fact, the first rule, 
 which it is important to remember, is, that the evidence must corre- 
 spond with tlic (tlleii(di(>»s,l,ut that it is sufficient if the substance of thi 
 issues be proved. Pleadings being intended* to apprise the parties 
 of the specific questions to be tried, this object would be def6ated 
 
 > Gr. Ev. § 50, slightly. 
 
 * Pee generally as to the Dature of 
 pleiidirgs, and the rules by which 
 they are now governed, poat, § 298 
 et seq. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 51, in part, as to first 
 six lines. 
 
 * As to their objects, see further, 
 post, § 299. 
 
 184 
 
CHAP. I.] AMENDMENTS UNDER SUCCESSIVE STATUTES. 
 
 if either party were at liberty to prove facts essentially dilTereiit 
 from those stated on the record, as constituting tho tlaini or charge 
 on the one hand, or the defence on the other.' Every material 
 disagreement, between the allegation and the proof, constitutes 
 what is called a viiriancc, which, in strictness, is as fatal to the party 
 on wliom the proof lies as a total failure of evidence. 
 
 § 219. Having regard to the recent changes in the law on this 
 subject, it appears to be unnecessary to give detailed instances of 
 what the old law held to be a variance. ^ 
 
 § 220. A partial remedy for the injustice which in old days was 
 done by the highly technical rules which prevailed as to " vari- 
 ances " was provided in 1828 ; ' larger powers of amendment were 
 granted in 1833 to the English judges,* and in 1840 to the Irish 
 judges.* 
 
 §221. In civil cases further powers of amendment were created 
 in 1852, by the Common Law Procedure Act,* and by the Equity 
 Procedure Act of that year ; ' the Common Law Procedure Acts of 
 1854 and 1860 contained clauses authorising the amendment of 
 " all defects and errors in any proceedings under the provisions " of 
 those Acts respectively, " if duly applied for ; " * while the Irish 
 Common Law Procedure Act of 1853 empowered the judges in 
 that country to amend " all defects and errors in any writ, pleading, 
 record, or other proceeding in civil causes," " and the law relating 
 
 ;Ml 
 
 ' In Caton v. Caton , 1 849, Dr. Lush- 
 inf^ton observed: "The maxim of the 
 Eccles. Courts, and I may say of all 
 other courts, is to decide secundum 
 allegata et probata. There must be 
 both charge and evidence ; the party 
 cited is entitled to know the specific 
 charge for the purpose of defence. * * 
 The difficulty I feel is to avoid the 
 error of adhering to this rule with 
 ■pedantic strictness, and, on the other 
 hand, not to weaken a rule which is 
 founded on one of the great principles 
 of justice." See Malcolmson v. Olay- 
 ton, 1860, P. C. (Ld. Chelmsford); 
 The Ann, 1860, P. C; Tyrer v. 
 Heniy. 1860, P. C; Kilgour v. 
 Alexander, 1860, P. 0. ; The Has- 
 well, 1864; and The Amalia, 1864. 
 
 * Jones V. Cowley, 1826, was de- 
 clared by Alderson, B., to be "a 
 
 great disgrace to the English law," 
 m Hemming v. Parry, 1834. See, 
 also, Goodtitle v. Lammiman, 1809; 
 Brooks ('. Bhinshard, 1833. 
 
 ^ I5y Geo. 4, c. 15 (repealed by 
 63 & o4 V. c. 33, " The S. L. E. Act, 
 1890"). 
 
 ♦ By 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42, §§ 23, 24 
 (repealed as to High Court by 44 & 
 45 V. c. 59). 
 
 » By 3 & 4 V. 0. 105 ("The Debtors 
 (Ireland) Act, 1840"), §§48, 49. 
 
 « 15 »& 16 V. c. 76, §§ 34, 35, 37, 
 222 (repealed by 46 & 47 V. c. 49). 
 See corresponding sections in the 
 Irish Actofl6&17V.c.ll3,§§ 85-91. 
 
 ' 15 & 16 V. 0. 86. §§ 49, 53. 
 
 « 17 & 18 V. 0. 125, §96; 23 & 24 
 V. c. 126, § 36. Repealed by 46 & 47 
 V. 0. 49. 
 
 • 16 & 17 y. 0. 113, § 231, It. 
 
 185 
 
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 AMHNUMI.NT UND7JI RULES OF 1883. [PART II. 
 
 to siinli amendments was in civil cases further altered bj the Rules 
 of Court originally framed under the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 
 1875 ; and in 1883 these last-named Rules were aimulled. The 
 Rules, now regulating the amendment of proceedings in civil oases 
 in the Supreme Court, are Orders XVI., XIX., and XXVIII. of 
 the R. S. C, 1883.' 
 
 § 222-5. Not one of the above named three Orders, however, has 
 any effect on criminal proceedings, or on proceedings for divorce or 
 other matrimonial causes. Orders XVI., and XIX., moreover, are 
 inoperative in proceedings, either on the Crown side, or on the 
 Revenue side, of the Queen's Bench Division. Order XXVIII, 
 however, applies to all cicil proceedings on the Crown side, includ- 
 ing mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto, and to all pro- 
 ceedings on the Revenue side, of the same Court.* And it will be 
 recollected that the law as to amendment of civil proceedings in 
 many inferior courts, is still governed by the enactments earlier 
 than the Judicature Act which are referred to in § 220. 
 
 § 226. Reference must be made to a Book upon Practice for the 
 details of the contents of the Rules just mentioned, and of the 
 decisions upon them. Briefly, however, their effect may be sum- 
 marized by sa^'ing that, 1st, the court or a judge may at any stage 
 of the proceedings, " for the purpose of determining the real ques- 
 tion or issue," ^ allow eitaer party to alter or amend his indorse- 
 ment or pleadings ; ■• 2nd, all such amendments shall be made as 
 
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 h ^ 
 
 1 
 
 Ji.'i4..^: 
 
 1.. J 
 
 ' Evon an indorsement can be 
 amended, see Cornish v. Hochen, 
 18 J3 ; Leigh v. Baker, 185". Ais to 
 amendments of pleadings in the Con- 
 sistorj' Conrt of liondon, see Keg. 
 Gen. of 1877 relating to that court, 
 Ord. III. 
 
 * Crown Office Rules, 1883, r. 299. 
 
 3 As to wliat is " the real matter 
 in controversy," it has been said that 
 it is a mutter, not of law, but of fact, 
 what "the real question in contro- 
 versy between the parties" is; next, 
 that this matter of fact miist be de- 
 termined, not by the jury, but by the 
 judge on a careful consideratioii of 
 the pleadings and the evidence; and, 
 lastly, that " the question ir contro- 
 versy " is, in other words, the ques- 
 tion which both parties really in- 
 
 tended to have tried, and not any 
 question which, diuing the course of 
 the trial, may for the Hrst time bo 
 brought into coiitrover.sy by one of the 
 litifjants. See Eoles v. iJavis, ISoO 
 (judgment of Court of Common 
 Pleas). As to amendments of names, 
 or substituting or adding parties, see 
 rr. 11 and 12 of Ord. XVI., under 
 which an application caiuiot bo made 
 ex ])arte : 'i'ildesley v. Haiper, 1876 
 (Hall. V.-C.) ; S. C. in C. A., 1878. 
 
 * Where a plaintilY amends liis 
 claim so as to alter the whole cause 
 of action, the ])H)])(>r course is to 
 apply to the couit to disallow the 
 amendment, or to allow it only on 
 terms: Bourne v. Coulter, 1884. See 
 also rr. 1 and 4 of Ord. XVI., which 
 respectively render amendments un" 
 
 18;5 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 AMKNDMENT OF PLKADINnS. 
 
 raay be necessary for the purpose of dotormining tlie real questions 
 in controversy ; ' 3rd, without leave, but subject to the risk of 
 having to pay coats, the phiiutiff mny amend his statement oi 
 claim, and the defendant may amend his counterclaim or set-off ; 
 4th, the application for leave to amend any pleading may be 
 made by eitlier party to the court or a judge, or to the judge at 
 the trial of the action ; * 5th, pleadings may be amended by 
 striking out any scandalous or embarrassing matter ; and lastly, 
 any of these respective amendments raay be allowed upon such 
 terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just. 
 
 § 227. The power.s of amendment conferred by these ruU-s ouglit 
 to be exercised in a liberal spirit.' 
 
 Mm 
 
 necessary in cases whovo too niaity 
 plaintiffs or defcnclants have bucn 
 joined. See Child ». Stunning, 1877; 
 Udoth V. Bi'iscoo, 1877. 
 
 ' See n. ', ante, p. 186. 
 
 ' An application to amend can only 
 be made whei'e there lias been a bona 
 fide mistake: Clowes v. Ililliard, 1893 
 (Jessel, M.R.). But such mistake 
 may bo one of law : Duckett v. Govor, 
 1877 (Jos.-el, M.R.). And the court 
 must be satisfied, where a party is 
 proposed to bo added, that ho has 
 assented, or that his interests have 
 been properly i)rotected : Tiirquand 
 V. Fearon. Ifs79. Whore, after an 
 amendment, the opposite party fails 
 to plead afjain, he is taken to rely on 
 his original pleading : Boddy v. Wall, 
 1S77. If a party be added (see r. 11 
 of Old. XV'l. as to this) he must, if 
 ho be a plaintitt', have given a written 
 consent, and, if a defendant, bo served 
 with a suriimons or notice. As to 
 when a plaintiff will or will not pre- 
 judice the fair trial of the action by 
 asking alternative relief, see Bagot 
 V. ivistoii, 1877, C. A. As to what is 
 Bmbariassing, see Heap r. Marri'i, 
 1870; Davy v. Garrett, 1877, C. A. ; 
 Stokes /'. Grant. 1878 ; I'hilipps r. 
 I'hilipps, 1878, C. A. This last case 
 shows what statements must be con- 
 tained in an action for the recovery 
 of land of which the plaintiil has 
 never been in possession. A county 
 court judge can amend a mi-*join.ler 
 of defendants in an action remitted 
 Irom the High Court. See llennison 
 
 r. Walker, 1872. 
 
 ' This was so even with regard to 
 the power of amendment conferred 
 before the Judicature Acts. See Parry 
 V. Fairhurst, IfsliJ (Alderson, B.) ; 
 Sainsbiiry v. Matthews, 1838 (Parko, 
 B.); Ward v. Pearson. 18;i!»; Evans 
 V. Fryer, 1839 (Williams, J.) ; Pacific 
 St.. Xavig. Co. I'. Lewis, 1847 (Pol- 
 lock, C.B.); Smith r. Knowelden, 
 1841. Lord Mansficdd long ago said 
 (Bristow V. Wrighr, 1781): "The 
 strong bias of my mind has always 
 leaned to previMit the manifest justice 
 of a cause fioni being defeated or 
 delayed by formal slips, which arise 
 from the inadvertence of gentlemen 
 of the ])rofes'iion ; because it is rx- 
 treiiic/i/ liitril mi the }i(i)ii/ tn he turned 
 riiiiiid, (iiiit put to e.rpriise, frinn such 
 inittu/ien (if tlit aiiiiine/ ur ultoriieij lie 
 einji/ni/n. It iii Imril, (//so, (jii t/ic jiio- 
 fesnif'ii." AVith reference to amend- 
 ments under th(; Judicatxu'O Act, 
 Bowen, ]j.J., said tliat there was no 
 kind of error or mistake which, if not 
 fiaudiileiit or intended to overreach, 
 a court ought not to correct, if it can 
 he done without injustice to the other 
 party, for courts of justice do not 
 exist for the snke of discipline, but 
 for the sak(^ of (h'ciding matters in 
 controversy, and amendments for this 
 purjiose ought not to be regarded 
 as matters of favour or of grace : 
 Cropper c Smith, 1884, C. A. (Bowen, 
 L.J.). In accordance with the spirit 
 of this dictum, the Court of Appeal 
 has held that an amendment on such 
 
 187 
 
! I: 
 
 l:! 
 
 :1 ! 
 
 
 AMKNDMKNTS A [.LOWED UNDKU OLD LAW. [I'AU'I' IL 
 
 § 228-0. It would, sinoo this ia not a book of Pnictico, not only 
 !)(' irrelevant to give details of the various do('i8if)ns which have 
 taken pliicf* as to ainendinents, hut it would also ho of no practical 
 utility, seeing that it is extremely unlikel}' that a case in which the 
 necessity for amondnient arises at Nisi I'rius will he identical, or 
 nearly so, with any case which has been previously the subject of 
 actual decision. 
 
 § 2;U). At the same time, it may not be entirely without use to 
 here jioint out a few instances which exemplify priiiripks, in 
 accordance with which an amendment has been permitted to be 
 made even under the old law.' 
 
 t^ 2'M. Where the real questions in dispute were, first, whether 
 land in the possession of a tenant was the plaintiff's property, and, 
 next, whether there was a public footway across it, the plaintiff 
 was allowed to amend tlie pleadings in such a way as to really raise 
 these questions free from technicalities.* Whore the real question 
 was whether cargo had been delivered in proper time, an amend- 
 ment of the pleadings, by inserting averments that raised this 
 question in proper foim, was allowed.* 
 
 § 232. In an action for slander, whore the words charged were, 
 " S. is to be tried at the Old Bailey, &c.," and those proved to 
 have been really spoken were, " / /i/iv 'iranf that S. is to be tried, 
 &c.," an amendment was allowed on pnymont of costs,* Bosanquet, 
 J., observing that the introduction of the words " I have lieard" 
 left the slander as actionable as before, although the amount of 
 
 terms as tho ciroiinstnncos may de- 
 Tniind ought always to l)o allowod 
 whoro tho other party would not be 
 seriously or irremediably damnified, 
 but uo injmy would be caused to 
 him which would not bo sufficiently 
 coiiipensateil for bv costs, see Clapa- 
 rede v. Comm. Union Assurance Co., 
 18!);j, C. A.; Tildesley v. Harper, 
 1«78, C. A. ; In re Trufort. Trailord 
 V. IJlane, ISSo. In St. Losky v. 
 Green, 1800, Bj'les, J., observed, 
 " Various statutes have, from timo 
 to time for more than oOO years, been 
 pa<8fd, from tho 14 Ed. ',i, c. 6, down- 
 wards, to facilitate amendments, but 
 the strict and almost perverse con- 
 struction which the judges put upoa 
 them, rendered them nearly abortive- 
 
 But now a totally different principle 
 prevails. Ever' nmondment is to bo 
 made, which is .;ei;essary for deter- 
 mining tho rial question in con- 
 troversy between tho parties." 
 
 ' Tho'se who wish to understand 
 tho irry old doctrine of vaiifince, and 
 to trace its oppressive ojioration pre- 
 viously to the passing of tho remedial 
 statutes, will find the subject fully 
 and ably treated in 1 St. Ev. 430 — 
 494. See, also, 1 I'h. Ev. 50;3 et seq. 
 See, also, the casee cited supra, in n. ' 
 to § 219. 
 
 * May V. Footner, 1835. 
 
 ' Tennyson v. O'Brien, 1855. See 
 Savage v. Canning, 18G7 (Ir. C. I'). 
 
 ^ Smith V. Xnowelden, 1841. 
 
 188 
 
CHAP. I.] AMKNUMKNTS ALLOVVICD UNDHU OLD LAW. 
 
 dftmages might be losaciiHil, and also tliiit, as tlie diimagos wore 
 given for tlio wordu as proral, and as tlio dofondant <liil not apply 
 to amend his pleadings or to put off tlio trial, it did not api)flar how 
 he could have been prejudi(!tMl in his disfonoe.' In another action 
 for slander, wliere the words alleged to have been spoken about a 
 surgeon were, " There have been many inquests held upon persons 
 who have died, Iwrdiigo he attended thora ; " but those proved were, 
 "Several have died that lie (plaintilf) has attended, and inquests 
 liave been held on them," an amendment was likewise allowed.'' 
 Where the only variance was, that the words stated in the deolara- 
 tion were in English, while the expressions proved were Welsh, an 
 amendmont was also allowed.' 
 
 § 233. Iti another action for defamation, on objection being 
 taken that the plaintiff's pleadings did not (as is necessary) set out 
 the libel, but merely stated its substance, an amendment by setting 
 out a verbatim copy of the defendant's letter on the record was 
 allowed.* Whore it was alleged tliat the defendant published a 
 libel, " o.ontainod in and hoiiig an article in a certain weekly paper^ 
 called the ^ Paul Pri/,^ " and proved that he had given a slip of 
 printed paper, containing the libellous matter, to several persons to 
 read ; but it was not proved that this slip had been cut from any 
 newspaper, the record was amended by striking out the allegation 
 marked in italics without any terms whatever being imposed.* 
 Similarly, a statement by way of justification, that goods had been 
 stolen by " some person unknown," was allowed to be amended by 
 striking these three words out, and substituting the name of the 
 party who was proved to have taken such goods.' 
 
 § 23-1, Where a special contract is stated, and the pleading then 
 contains an erroneous allegation in conformity with its supposed 
 legal effect, such allegation (even under the old law) might either 
 be struck out, or so altered as to express oorreocly the real meaning 
 of the contract.' 
 
 1 2 M. & Gr. 563. 
 
 * Southee v. Donny, 1847. 
 
 » Jenkins v. Phillips, 1841 (Cole- 
 ridge, J.). 
 
 * Saunders v. Bates, 1857. 
 
 * Foster v. Pointer, 1840 (Qurney, 
 B.). See, also, Pater v. Baker, 1847. 
 
 • Pratt V. Ilanbury, 1849. See, 
 also, West v. Baxendale, 1850 ; and 
 Hailes v. Marks, 1861. 
 
 ' Whitwill V. Scheer, 1838. But 
 see Bowers v. Nixon, 1847, cited 
 post, § 2;i9. 
 
 189 
 
 iJ 
 
pvpifW'i 
 
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 »'■ 
 
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 V'r ! 
 
 
 AMENDMENTS ALLOWED UNDER OLD LAW. [PAliT II. 
 
 § 235. An amendment, too, ralght, under the old law (and 
 sL fortiori may now) usually be made, where the contract, or tort. 
 or custom declared upon, turns out to be either more or less com- 
 prehemire than the one proved.' For example, the statement of a 
 general warranty of a horse has been amended by substituting an 
 allegation of a qualified warranty, where the defence did not depend 
 upon the qualification introduced ; ^ and a pleading alleging that 
 defendant promised to lay out certain money in the purchase of a 
 government annuity, and avemng as a breach that he had not done 
 80, but had placed it in the bands of some private company, has 
 been amended by substituting " security " for " annuity," where 
 the evidence showed tliat the money had in fact been received for 
 the purpose of investing it in some government ■•■ieeurity} 
 
 % 236. Where a contract, a duty, an instrument, or other matter 
 has been mindescribed on the record, an amendment to suit the facta 
 proved is permissible, alike under the old law and the present Rules.^ 
 For example, where the pleadings stated that the defendants, in 
 consideration of plaintiffs supplying beer to a third party, promisi d 
 to pay them the amount of the beer so supplied, and in support of 
 plaintiff's claim a written guarantee was put in, the " variance " 
 (between an original liability to pay, and the collateral liability 
 arising on a guarantee) was allowed to be amended by substituting 
 the word "guarantee" for "pay."^ In former editions of this 
 work, numerous further cases were set out, which furnished detailed 
 examples of amendments liaving been allowed ; but, for the reasons 
 already given, it is thought that the insertion of any more detailed 
 inst.'nces would be now useless. 
 
 >i 2-37. Even under the old law (and a fortiori now) the court 
 could, upon the trial of an issue of nul tiel record, — which, be it 
 remembered, must be determined by tlie court, and not by a judge 
 and jury," — amend, by inserting in the pleadings, the true date of 
 the judgment alleged to have been recovered.' A defence of " Not 
 
 ' See Pacific St. Niivig. Co. v. Lewis, 
 1847. 
 
 » L'e iiiiiint? v. rariy, 18154 (Al(li>r- 
 8on, li.) ; Mush c Deiishaiii, 1834 
 (irt.) ; Roiid c. Diinsmoie, 1840. 
 
 ^ Giufoid ('. Hiiyley, 1842. Sec, 
 also, Evans v. Fryer, 1839 ; May. of 
 Curmarthen v. Lewis, I8U4. 
 
 ♦ Iluiihury v. Ella, 1834. 
 
 ' I'liny c. Faiihurst, 1845. 
 
 * Ante, § 47 ; and boo llithardson 
 V, Willis, 1872. 
 
 ' Niible ('. Chapman, 18J4. .See, 
 also, Hunter i'. Eninianuel, 18J4, 
 where the true amouut recovered 
 was inserted in the declaration. 
 
 190 
 
.11 
 
 rdson 
 
 CnAr. I.] AMENDMENTS ALLOWED UNDER OLD LAW. 
 
 guilty by statute " has been amended by inserting in the margin 
 an Act which had been omitted ; ' and a defence, not technical I if 
 proved by the evidence, was amended at Nisi Prius so as to raise 
 the substantial question, without the imposition of any costs.^ A 
 judge has been held^ justified in amending a claim at the trial so 
 as to increase it from 600/. to 750/. ; and in an action against the 
 clerk of a local board of health, an amendment of the proceedings, by 
 substituting the board as defendants instead of the clerk, has been 
 allowed,* and vice versa amendment has been sanctioned, where the 
 board had sued in the name of their clerk in lieu of their own name.' 
 
 § 238. The cases in which amendments were refused under the 
 old law furnish no safe guide in interpreting the more liberal 
 language of the new rules. Indeed, it is clear that very many of 
 such decisions are no longer law.' So far, however, as they appear 
 to establish pn'iieiples which may be supposed to still exist, they are 
 to the effect stated in the following paragraphs : — 
 
 § 239. Some of the decisions cited in the footnotes were, it will be 
 noticed, before the Judicature Acts and Rules, but it would appear 
 that the principles they establish are sound, and ought still to be 
 acted upon. It would thus, on principle, appear that there exist 
 two great limitations on the exercise of the power of amendment. 
 
 First. An amendment ought never to be made for the mere pur- 
 pose of conferring jurisdiction.' 
 
 Secondly. An amendment ought never to be made where it 
 would be impossible if this were done to replace tlie opposite party 
 in the position in which he formerly stood, and irremediable hard- 
 ship would consequently be inflicted upon him by permitting the 
 amendment.* In accordance with this principle, where more than 
 six months after action brought, defendants snuglit to amend by 
 the first time setting up a defence that tlie liability for the act 
 complained of rested with a tliird person against whom all remedy 
 had been lost because he was only liable if sued within six months 
 
 ' Edwnrds v. Ilndpos, 1835. 
 ' IJvK'kliind I'. JohiiHon, 18i)4. 
 ^ KnowlmHii c. jUiictt, 18";J. See 
 AVutkiuts I'. Morgan, 18.'J4. 
 
 * ]jj. Boliubroko v. Towiisond, 
 1873. 
 
 • Mills V. Scott, 1873. 
 
 • Sco, also. Wilkin v. Rocd, 1854 ; 
 Lucivs r. Taii.;t()U, 18J8; lloloH v. 
 JJiivis. 1.SJ9. 
 
 ' llojippr V. Wiirl)urton, 1863. 
 
 * Stowurd r. North Metropolitan 
 Tram. Co., 1886, C. A. 
 
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 191 
 
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 AMENDMENTS REl'USED UNDER OLD J:AW. [PART II. 
 
 of the act, leave to mnke the amendment was refused.' On this 
 principle, although the mere impropriety or liarshness of an action 
 ought to have no etfect in influencing the decision of the judge,^ 
 an amendment has been refused where the matter sought to be 
 expunged has been purposely and improperly introduced, with the 
 view of creating a prejudice against the other side ; as, for instance, 
 where a complaint contains averments and innuendoes unfairly 
 connecting the plaintiff with parts of an alleged libel, which, in 
 fact, related to other persons.' Moreover, as the rules for allowing 
 amendments at Nisi Prius are intended to meet varinnces arising 
 from mere slips or accidents, the judge will be very reluctant to 
 allow an amendment, where the party has intcntionaUt/ framed his 
 pleading in such a manner as to give rise to the objection.* When 
 it turns out at the trial that the plaintiff, having misconceived his 
 remedy, seeks to convert the proceedings into an action of a 
 different character, an amendment will usually be refused — certainly 
 at Nisi Prius — and never granted on other than strict terms.* 
 
 § 240. On this latter principle, the court has, to prevent in- 
 justice, refused to amend a variance, where it appeared likely that 
 such variance has prevented the defendant from pleading a good 
 bar to the action," or where the amendment proposed would in all 
 probability have caused the defendant either to raise a question of 
 law,^ or to plead different defences from those on tho pleadings,* 
 or would introduce an entirely new contract and new breach,' or, 
 perhaps even, any entirely new matter.'" 
 
 ' Steward v. North Metropolitan 
 Tram. Co., 1880, C. A. 
 
 » Doe V. Pidwiirds, 1834 (Parke, 
 B.); Doe v. Leach, 1841. See Bren- 
 iian V, Howard, 1856. 
 
 ' Prudhoiume v. Frasor, 1834 (Ld. 
 Deninan). 
 
 • Bowers v. Nixon, 1847 (Maule, 
 J.); Clowes 1^ Uilliard, 1876 ( Jossol, 
 M.B.). But see Whitwill v. Scheor, 
 1838, cited ante, § 234. 
 
 • See Jacobs v. Seward, 1 872, H. L. ; 
 Newby v. Sharpo, 1877, C. A. ; Clark 
 V, York. 1882 ; Hipgrave v. Case, 
 1885, C. A. ; Clark v. Wray, 1885. 
 See, however, Laird v. Briggs, 1881, 
 C. A. ; Cargill v. Bower. 1878. 
 
 • Ivoy V, Ycung, 1836 (Aldorson, 
 
 B.). 
 
 ' Evans v, Powis, ISV ; Bury v. 
 Blogg, 1848; Martyn v. Williams, 
 1857. 
 
 * Perry v. Watts, 1842, explained 
 in Gurford v, Baylcy, 1842; Frankum 
 V. Ld. Falmouth, 1835. 
 
 • Brashior V. Jackson, 1840; Bou- 
 cher V. Murray, 1844 ; Richards v, 
 Bluck, 1848 ; Moncrieff v. lleado, 
 1848. 
 
 '» David V, Preece, 1843. Se« Gull 
 V. Lindsay, 1849; luid Addington v. 
 Magan, 1851. For examples, see 
 Perry v. Watts, 1842, explained by 
 Maule, J., in Gurford i". Bayley, 
 1842; Frankum v. lA. Falmoutn, 
 1835. 
 
 192 
 
 %j 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 ADDING PLKAS AT TRIAL. 
 
 all 
 of 
 
 Gull 
 
 see 
 d by 
 
 yi'7' 
 
 nuth, 
 
 § 241. Independently of actual decisions, there is very little doubt 
 that the judge may allow a paragraph raising a new defence to be 
 added at the trial, whenever it is necessary for the purpose of 
 placing on the record the real question in dispute.' It often 
 happens, as was once observed by Maule, J., that in consequence 
 either of imperfect instructions given to the pleader, or of ignorance, 
 or of oversight, the substantial point intended by the parties to be 
 tried is not raised by the pleadings ; * and when this occurs it would 
 he obviously unjust to refuse an amendment.* It was, however, said 
 (before the Judicature Acts) that a direction that all amendments 
 necessary for determining the real question in controversy " n/iallhe 
 made," does not make it mprrative on the court to allow a plea to be 
 substituted after issue joined, even though the application be made 
 prior to the trial, and though it be supported by an affidavit that 
 the real question in controversy between the parties can only bo 
 raised on the record by the introduction of the proposed plea.* 
 
 § 241a. All disputed questions of amendment depend upon the 
 discretion of the judge ; the Court of Appeal ^ will, therefore, always 
 be very unwilling to interfere with that discretion, save in a case 
 where it is obvious that some serious mischief would result from 
 non-interference.* 
 
 § 242. It remains to notice a few piacfiml points respecting the 
 exercise of | i wers of amendment, which, though decided under earlier 
 statutes, probably would, in general, be acted upon even with regard to 
 the powers of amendment conferred by the Judicature Acts ; First, 
 an amendment at Nisi Prius must be made, if at all, during the 
 trial and before the verdict ; ' unless, indeed, the opposite party 
 waives his right to enforce this amount of strictness, in which case it 
 would suffice if the amendment were made within the time allowed 
 for moving, provided it were ultimately in agreement with the judge's 
 note." Secondly, the amendment must be allowed by the ])residing 
 judge, who, it seems, may be the sheriff or his officer.' Thirdly, 
 
 ' MituhoU V. Crnsswoller, 1853. 
 » "Wilkin V. Rood, 18,j4. 
 
 * Soo supra, note ' to § 227, and 
 infra, § 2o'i\, as to the spirit in which 
 appliciitions for amondmonts ought 
 to DO ontoitiiinod. 
 
 * Kitchio V. Van Goldor, 1H.)4. 
 
 » Soo K. S. C. 1883, Ord. LVllI. 
 
 r. 4, citod p(>^t, § 1883. 
 
 • Golchng V. Wharton Salt Works 
 Co., 187(i, (". A. 
 
 ' Unishior v, Jackson, 1840; Doe 
 V. Loiif?, 1841 (Coloridgo, J.). 
 
 " Joni's r. Hutchinson, 1851. / 
 
 » Hill '•. Suit, 1834. Compare Co» 
 V. Hill, 1892. 
 
 T. vol,. I. 
 
 193 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 iilit 
 
 it 
 
m I fiMj 
 
 COSTS OF AMENDMENTS. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 ' : 
 
 M I! 
 
 ' v^: !' 
 
 wlien, in consequence of an amendment being allowed in a state- 
 ment of claim, some alteration becomes necessary in the defence, 
 the court will direct this also to be made, should the counsel for the 
 defendant decline to interfere or to amend the pleadings himself.' 
 Fourthly, a divisional court ^ will not control the discretion of the 
 judge either in refusing '^ or allowing * an amendment to be made, 
 unless upon clear proof that he was wrong, or, at least, unless it be 
 Bhown, by affidavit, that the defendant has been prejudiced by the 
 amendment. In all these cases, if both parties consent, a larger 
 power may be exercised, either by the judge at Nisi Prius, by the 
 person substituted in his stead, or by the court above.^ 
 
 § 243. It is difficult to lay down any distinct rule as to the terms 
 with regard to costs, and otherwise, upon which an amendment will 
 be permitted. Each case must, in a great degree, depend upon its 
 own particular circumstances. As a general proposition it may be 
 said that the court will not allow any additional expense to be 
 thrown upon the opposite party by reason of any amendment." 
 Thus, if the defendant has put a defence on the record, the proof 
 of which will be rendered unnecessary by the plaintiff's amendment, 
 or has summoned witnesses, whom it will thereby become needless 
 to call, or has otherwise been at any bona fide expense in preparing 
 to disprove the original allegations, the plaintiff will only be per- 
 mitted to amend on payment of the costs occasioned by his error. 
 If the defendant, in consequence of plaintiff's amendment, will 
 require to alter his statement of defence, or to summon other 
 witnesses, the trial will at least be postponed, and the plaintiff 
 obliged to pay the costs of the postponement. In cases where a 
 variance cannot have misled the opposite party, an amendment will 
 be allowed without the payment of any costs.' 
 
 § 244. Although the judge at Nisi Prius has a discretionary 
 
 ' Porry v. Fisher, 1846 (Ld. Den- 
 inan). 
 
 ^ So, too, tlio C. A., see supra, 
 §24U. 
 
 3 ]JoG V. Errington, 18;J4; Jenkins 
 V. Phillips, 1841 (Coloridgo. J.); 
 Whitwill V. Scheer, 18o8 (Patteson, 
 J.); llolden v. Iklliintyno, 18G0. See 
 
 Lucas V. Uealo, 
 Uoward, IBJG. 
 
 1861 : Brenuau v. 
 
 ♦ Fuinsbury i'. Matthews, 1838 (Ld. 
 Abinger). 
 
 ° I'any v, Fairhurst, IS'.io, noticed 
 by Patteson, J., in Guest v. Elwes, 
 18;J(i; Koborts v. Snell, 1840; Brawhier 
 V. Jackson, 1840. 
 
 * Smith IK Brandrara, 1841 (Tiudal, 
 C.J.). 
 
 ' tit. Losky V. Greou, 1860. 
 
 194 
 
CIIA.P. I.] APPLICATION OF RULES AS TO AMENDMENTS. 
 
 power of awarding or refusing costs in the event of an amendment, 
 the court will take care that no injustice is done by his accidentally 
 omitting to give directions on the subject. Therefore, when an 
 order had been obtained by the plaintiff, enabling him to withdraw 
 the record and amend his pleadings, but no mention was made as 
 to costs, the court held that, as the variance had been corrected 
 for the benefit of the plaintiff, he was bound to liquidate the 
 defendant's costs of the day.' 
 
 § 245. As already stated,'^ the present Rr. S. C, which have 
 been referred to as to amendments, " apply to all civil proceedings 
 on the Crown side of the Queen's Bench Division, including man- 
 damus and prohibition, and also to quo warranto, and to all pro- 
 ceedings on the Revenue side of the said Division." * Such Rules 
 further apply to the High Court exercising jurisdiction in Bank- 
 ruptcy, which now forms part of the Supreme Court,* to Admiralty 
 actions, and to Probate actions, and to such of the County Courts 
 as have Bankruptcy jurisdiction.' But they do not affect the 
 procedure or practice, either in criminal proceedings, or in pro- 
 ceedings for Divorce or other Matrimonial Causes.^ In the Divorce 
 Court the only material rule respecting the amendment of pleadings 
 was promulgated in 1875, and is thus expressed : — " Either of the 
 parties before the court desiring to alter or amend a pleading may 
 apply by summons to one of the registrars for an order for that 
 purpose." ' 
 
 § 246. Large powers of amendment are also possessed by the 
 County Courts, when errors have been committed with respect to 
 the names, descriptions, numbers, or representative characters of 
 the plaintiffs and defendants ; * and, in addition to these powers, it 
 is provided" that a County Court judge "may at all times amend 
 all defects and errors in any proceeding- in the court, whether there 
 is anything in writing to amend by or not, and whether the defect 
 or error be that of the party aj)plying to amend or not ; and all 
 
 ' Skiiinor v. Lond. & Bright. liy. 
 Co., 1850. 
 » Ante, § 221. 
 » Old. LXVIII. r. 2. 
 
 ♦ 46 & 47 V. c. 52 (" Tho Bauk- 
 ruptcy Act, 1883"), §93. 
 
 * Ibid., § 100. 
 
 « Ord. LXVIII. r. 1. 
 
 ' Eiiles in Div. and Mat. Causes, 
 r. 187. Soe also it. 35 — 37. 
 
 8 Soe Cy. (Jt. llules, 1889, Ord. 
 XIV. See Mills v. Scott, 1878, cited 
 ante, § 237. 
 
 » By § 87 of "The County Courts 
 Act, 1888" (51 &52 V. c. 43). 
 
 195 
 
 o2 
 
 ! I I 
 
rii 
 
 
 mv: 
 
 
 
 Wii! 
 
 ■lii 
 
 ! i 
 i ■ 
 
 )! 
 
 AMEXDMKNTS IN CIVIL BILL COURTS. [PART II. 
 
 Buoh amendments may be made with or without costs, and upon 
 snch terms an the judge may think just ; and all such amendments 
 as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real ques- 
 tion in controversy between the parties shall be so made, if duly 
 applied for." Still, if the particulars of the plaintiff's claim do not 
 disclose a case within the jurisdiction of the County Court, the 
 judge has no power to amend them, so as to turn the complaint 
 into one over which he has cognisance.' 
 
 § 247. The Civil Bill Courts in Ireland possess'^ powers of amend- 
 ment ; for, by § 2 of the Act regulating their practice,^ " it shall 
 and may be lawful for the several assistant barristers, and judges 
 on appeal, and they are hereby respectively empowered, in all cases, 
 to amend all variances between the statement of the cause of action 
 in any civil bill, or other process or proceeding in their respective 
 civil bill courts, and the evidence in support of such cause of action, 
 and also to amend all va iances, omissions, and misdescriptions in 
 the descriptions, additions, and resid- ice of the parties, or any of 
 them, or otherwise howsoever, of or . any such process, or between 
 the original and any copy or copies thereof, provided such last- 
 mentioned variances, omissions, or misdescriptions shall not, in the 
 opinion of the assistant barrister, be calculated to mislead the defen- 
 dant or defendants therein ; and in e ery case of any misjoinder 
 of parties or oauses of action, it shall and may be lawful for every 
 assistant barrister to strike out of the process the name or names of 
 any one or m )re plaintiffs or defendants, or any count or counts in 
 such process, by reason of whom or which such misjoinder shall arise, 
 and thereupon to proceed therein as to justice shall appci tain." * , 
 
 § 247a. We have now indicated in a general way, and so far 
 as they appear to be relevant to a work on Evidence, the principles 
 which regulate amendments in civil cases. The subject of amend- 
 ments in criminal cases remains for consideration. 
 
 §§ 248 — 61. We have seen that in 1828 * some po>ver8 of amend- 
 ment of variances in criminal cases were given,* these powers were 
 
 ' Hopper t'. Warburton, 1862 (Mel- to the "judge of assize on appeal," 
 - ■ ~ - ■ by 27 & 28 V. c. 99, § 48, Jr. 
 
 lor, J., in B. Ct.). 
 
 « By 14 & 16 V. c. 57 ("The Civil 
 Bill Courts (Ireland) Act, 1851"), 
 § 106. 
 
 ■' Further powers of nincndniont 
 are given to the Civil Bill Cts., and 
 
 196 
 
 * By 9 G. 4, c. 15. See ante, 
 §220. 
 
 » See E. V. Cooke, 1836 ; R. v. 
 Howins, 1841 ; E. v. Christian, 1842. 
 
CHAP. I.] LORD Campbell's criminal act of 1851. 
 
 exceedingly limited. Accordingly, in 1848, and the following 
 year, the limited provisions of the Act of 1828 were greatly 
 extended, and made applicable to all offences whatever.' In 1851, 
 at the instance of Lord Campbell, an Act was passed,'' which has 
 placed criminal proceedings on nearly the same footing with civil 
 actions, in respect to the amendment of variances between the record 
 and the proof.' 
 
 I 1 
 
 .! 
 
 » By 11 & 12 V. c. 46, § 4, as to 
 assize courts; and 12 & 13 V. c. 45 
 ("The Quarter Sessions Act, 1849"), 
 as to sessions, the provisions of which 
 Act are extended to Irish quarter 
 sessions by 27 & 28 V. c. 99, § 49, Ir. 
 The inferior courts in Scotland have 
 now, under " The Summary Pro- 
 cedure Act, 1864 " (27 & 28 V. c. 53), 
 § 5, large powers of amending com- 
 plaints before them with respect to 
 variances and other defects. 
 
 » 14 & 15 V. c. 100 (" The Criminal 
 Law Procedure Act, 1831 "). 
 
 * The principal provisions of this 
 Act are as folio iv-s : § 1, " Whenever, 
 on the trial of any indictment for any 
 felony or misdemeanor, there shall 
 appear to be any variance between 
 the statement in such indictment and 
 the evidence offered in proof thereof, 
 in the name of any county, riding, 
 division, city, borough, town corpo- 
 rate, parish, township, or place men- 
 tioned or described in any such in- 
 dictment, — or in the name or descrip- 
 tion of any person or persons, or 
 body politic or corporate, therein 
 stated or alleged to be the owner or 
 owners of any property, real or 
 personal, which shall fonn the sub- 
 ject of any offonco charged therein, 
 — or in the name or description of 
 any person or persons, body politic 
 or corporate, therein stated or alleged 
 to bo mjured or damaged or intended 
 to be injured or damngcd by the 
 commission of such offence, — or in 
 the Christian name or snrnamo, or 
 both Christian name ai. . surname, 
 or other description whatsoever, of 
 any person or ])ersons whomsoever 
 therem named or described, — or in 
 the name or description of any imiittr 
 or thing whatsoever therein named or 
 described, — or in the ownership of 
 any property named or described 
 
 therein, — it shall and may bo lawful 
 for the court before which the trial 
 shall be had, if it shall consider such 
 variance not material to the merits of 
 the case, and that the defendant can- 
 not he prejudiced thereby in his defimce 
 on such merits, to order such indict- 
 ment to be amended, according to the 
 proof, by some officer of the court or 
 other person, both in that part of the 
 indictment whore such variance 
 occurs, and in ever}' other i)art of 
 the indictment which it niuy btjcoma 
 necessary to amend, on such terms 
 as to postponing the trial to be bad 
 before the same or another jury, as 
 such court shall think reasonal)le ; 
 and alter any such amendment the 
 trial shall proceed, whenever the 
 same shall be proceeded with, in the 
 same manner in all respects, and 
 with the same consequences, both 
 with respect to the liability of wit- 
 nesses to be indicted for perjury and 
 otherwise, as if no such variance had 
 occurred ; and in case such trial hihall 
 be had at Nisi Prius, the order for 
 the amendment shall be indorsed on 
 the postea, and returned together 
 with the re(;()rd, and thereupon such 
 papers, rolls, or other records of the 
 couit from which such record issued, 
 as it may be necessarv to amend, 
 shall be amended accordingly by the 
 proper otlicer ; and in uU other cases 
 the order for the amcndme t shall 
 either bo indorsed on the indictment, 
 or shall be engrossed on parchment, 
 and filed, together with the indict- 
 ment, among che records of the 
 court. Provided always that, in all 
 such cases where the trial shall be so 
 postponed a^ aforesaid, iu shall be 
 lawful for sach court to respite the 
 recognisances of the proseci'.lor and 
 witnesses, ai.d of the defendant, and 
 his surety or surbties, if any, acorrd* 
 
 IN 
 
 197 
 
If?! 
 
 'n: 
 
 AMENDMENTS IN CUIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. [PAUT II. 
 
 § 252. Under the provisions of the Act just referred to, an 
 indictment charging the defendant with liaving obstructed a foot- 
 way may be amended, when one of the termini of the way has been 
 misdescribed, provided the variance be not calculated to prejudice 
 the defence ; ' — an amendment may be made when the ownership ol 
 stolon property,* or the stolen property itself,* is wrongly described ; 
 — the misnomer of a party injured may be rectified ; * — the misde- 
 scription of any persons described iu the indictment may be set 
 right;" — an erroneous date ascribed to the passing of a statute 
 may be struck out ; " — an indictment for perjury alleging that the 
 crime was committed on a trial for burning a barn, may (to meet 
 the facts) be amended by alleging its commission on a charge of 
 firing a Htiiek.'' It, moreover, is not too late to apply for an amend- 
 ment, even though the counsel for the prisoner may have addressed 
 the jury.' 
 
 § 252a. In general, however, the court will not amend an indict- 
 ment after plea, if, in its amended form, it would be open to a 
 demurrer." Neither can an amendment be made after verdict.'" 
 
 inply ; in which caso the prosecutor 
 and witnesses shall bo bound to attend 
 to ]iios(!cuto and give evidence re- 
 spectively, and the defendant ehiiU 
 b 3 bound to attend to be tried, at the 
 time and placu to which such trial 
 shall be jiostponed, without enter- 
 inj; into any fresh recognisances for 
 that purpose, in such and the same 
 inaunor as if they were originally 
 bound by their recognisances to 
 ai)])c'ar and prosecute or give evi- 
 dence at the time and place to which 
 such trial shall have been so post- 
 poned ; " and a further proviso 
 directs, " that, whore any such trial 
 shall bo to be had before another 
 jury, the Oown and the defendant 
 shall res])ectively be entitled to the 
 saTue challenges, as they were respec- 
 tively entitled to before the first ,iury 
 was sworn." By § 2, "Every verdict 
 and judgment, which shall do given 
 after the making of any amendment 
 under the provitioiis of this Act, 
 shall bo of the same force and effect 
 in all respects, as if the indictment 
 had originally been in the same form 
 in which it was after such aTuend- 
 mont was made." By § U, "if it 
 
 shall become necessary at anj' time 
 for any purpose whatsoever to draw 
 np a formal record, in any case where 
 any amendment shall have been made 
 under the provisions of this Act, such 
 record shall bo drawn up in the form 
 in which the indictment was after 
 such aTuendmont was made, without 
 taking any notice of the fact of such 
 amendment having boon made." See 
 further as to amendment of formal 
 defects in indictment, § '25 of the Act, 
 post, § 281), n. '. 
 
 * R. V. Sturge, 1854. 
 
 * R. i\ Vincent, 1852 ; R. v. Ful- 
 larton, 1853. 
 
 » R. V. Gumblo, 1872. 
 
 * R. y. Welt(m, 1862. 
 
 » R. V. Western, 1868. 
 
 « R. V. Westley, 1859. 
 
 ' R. V. Neville, 1852 (Williams, J.); 
 R. V. Tymms, 1870 (Lush, J.). 
 
 « R. (\ FuUarton, 185;j(Ir.)(Lefroy, 
 C.J„ and M()nahan,CJ.); overruling 
 R. V. Ryiner, 185U (Williams, J.). 
 
 ' R. V. Laliement, 1853. Sod (ju. 
 The case, as reported, is not satis- 
 i'actorj'. 
 
 '" R. V. Larkin, 1854 ; R. v. Frost, 
 1855. 
 
 198 
 
 I'!'' ' 
 
CHAP, I.] 
 
 AMENDING INDICTMENTS. 
 
 Nor will the court amend an amendment, or restore an indiotniont, 
 once amended, to its original foriA.' Where a prisoner was indicted 
 for a statutable forgery, but the evidence only sustained a forgery 
 at common law, an amendment on the indictment by striking out 
 the word " feloniously " (thus converting a charge of felony into 
 one of misdemeanour), has been refused.^ 
 
 § 253. The Acts which authorise amendments in criminal pro- 
 ceedings are founded on the policy tliat substantial justice is of 
 more real importance than technical precision, and they accordingly 
 seek to render punishment more certain, by neutralising the eifect 
 of trivial variances, which have constantly protected the wrong- 
 doer. So long as the least rational doubt exists respecting hia 
 guilt, juries should weigh with jealousy the evidence against a 
 prisoner; and judges should see most clearly that the act, with 
 which he is charged, is an offence against the law. But when 
 courts of justice go further than this, and permit the law to be 
 defeat ""d by technical errors, which cannot by possibility mislead a 
 defendant, and which have nothing to do with the substantial 
 merits of the case, they take the most effectual means of rendering 
 the administration cl the criminal law a fitting subject for con- 
 tempt and ridicule. In civil causes, the Rules authorising amend- 
 ments receive a liberal construction.' Why should an unduly strict 
 construction be applied in criminal courts? The statutes tliem- 
 selves warrant no such distinction, and to introduce into the 
 interpretation of them the old doctrine *' strictissimi juris," is to 
 misunderstand and misap})ly the meaning of that doctrine. 
 
 § 254. Having drawn attention to the Rules and the Acts now 
 authorising amendments, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, 
 and the leading decisions upon their construction, some three or 
 four general rules, which regulate the law of iriiiance, may, with 
 utility, be noticed ; for although a discrepancy between the allega- 
 tion and the proof is not (as formerly) fatal, if immaterial to the 
 substantial merits, yet it may still entail considerable expense and 
 responsibility as to costs on the party, who is driven by a " vari- 
 ance " to apply for an amendment. It is in view of this that the 
 
 ' R. V. Barnos, 186<); R. v. Prit- 
 chard, 18G7 ; R. v. W('l)st«>r, ISO I. 
 » fi. V. Wright, 1860 (Uill, J.). 
 
 ' Sdo as to tho spirit in wliit'h thoy 
 should bij rogiirded, supra, § 227, and 
 note ^ thoroto. 
 
 199 
 
 II 
 
 ii^fij 
 
IjM I 
 
 vl 
 
 Ik- K 
 
 mm 
 
 I 
 
 SURPLUSAGE NEED NOT BE PROVED. [PART II. 
 
 subject is still discussed in this work, and in applying the strict 
 lilies which exist as to variances, the ample power of amondment 
 now possessed by the courts must not be forgotten. Subject to this 
 observation, the rules wi'h regard to va? ance may be stated to 
 he/our in number, and are as follow : — (1) Surplusage need not be 
 proved; (2) Cumnlativp alley ntiom, or such as merely operate in 
 aggruvafion, are immaterial ; (3) Mere formal allegations need not he 
 proved ; (4) But allegations of matter of essential description must be 
 proved as laid. Having stated these four important rules, the 
 remainder of this chapter will be devoted to discussing them in 
 detail — 
 
 § 255.' The first rule as to " variances " is, that siirplusage need 
 not be proved, and that the proof, even if offered, should he rejected. 
 " Surplusage " comprehends whatever may be stricken from the 
 record without destroying the right of action, or the charge, on the 
 one hand, or the defence on the other. This, it is true, is a loose, 
 and therefore unsatisfactory, definition ; but it is difficult, if nv?t 
 impossible, to find one more distinct and practical. Each case 
 must, in a great measure, depend on its own paiticular circum- 
 stances. The best general idea of what will, or will not, amount to 
 surplusage, is to be gained from one or two decisions on the point. 
 Thus, where the pleading in an action for breach of a warranty 
 that some claret wao in a certain state alleged that it was not, and 
 that the defendant well knew it was not in that state, but at the trial 
 no evidence was given of the defendant's knowledge, after a verdict 
 for the plaintiff, a motion having been made for a new trial, on 
 the ground that the scienter, having been alleged, ought to have 
 been proved, the court were unanimously of opinion that the alle- 
 gation of the scienter was wholly unnecessary and immaterial, and 
 therefore required no proof.^ Said Lord EUonborough : " If the 
 whole averment respecting the defendant's knowledge of the unfit- 
 ness of the wine for exportation were struck out, the declaration 
 would still be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover upon the 
 breach of the warranty proved. For, if one man lull another into 
 security as to the goodness of a commodity, by giving him a war- 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 61, in part. 
 
 ' Williamson v. Allison, 1802; pitod 
 
 by Ld. Abinger in Cornfoot v. Fowke, 
 1840. 
 
 200 
 
i 
 
 CHAP. I.J 
 
 INSTANCES OF SUKPLUSAOE. 
 
 ranty of it, it is the same thing whether or not the seller knew it 
 at the time to bo unfit for sale ; the warranty is the thing whidi 
 deceives the buyer, who relies on it, and is thereby put off his 
 guard. Then, if the warranty be the material averment, it is 
 BufReient to prove that broken to establish the deceit." Said 
 Lawrence, J. : "I take the rule to be, that if the whole of an 
 averment may be struck out without destroying the plaintiff's right 
 of action, it is not v sessary to prove it ; but otherwise, if the 
 whole cannot be struck out without getting rid of a part essential 
 to the cause of action ; for then, although the averment be more 
 particular than it need have beevi, the whole must be proved, or the 
 plaintiff cannot recover." ' 
 
 § 256 — 7."^ On the same principle, in an action for removing earth 
 from the defendant's land, whereby the foundation of the plain- 
 tiff's house was injured, the allegation of bad intent in the defen- 
 dant need not be proved, for the cause of action is perfect, 
 independent of the intention ;' in an action for impounding cattle 
 in an unfit pound, an averment that the pound was " at all times 
 unfit, as the defendant well knew," may be rejected as immaterial, 
 and consequently it requires no proof;* if plaintiff's pleadings dis- 
 close a state of facts upon wLrh an action may be maintained, 
 althougb it may also (needlessly) allege malice or fraud, the 
 plaintiff is not bound to prove either, and may recover upon the 
 liability which the facts disclose, and this even if both fraud and 
 malice be actually disproved ; * in an action against a common carrier 
 for the loss of property intrusted to him, negligence, though averred, 
 need not he proved ;° in trespass, for driving against the plaintiff's 
 curt, an averment that he was in the cart is immaterial ; ' an aver- 
 ment that the defendant wrongfully cut in plaintiff's close, used as 
 a private road, a certain large sewer, and thereby diverted the 
 water from a pond, was held clearly immaterial, so far as regarded 
 
 » In Williamson v. Allison, 1802. 
 See, also, Jackson v. AUaway, X^AA; 
 Att.-Gen. v. Clerc, 1844; Tempest v. 
 Kilner, 1845; Anderson v. Thorn- 
 ton, 1853; Thorn v. Bigland, 1853; 
 Southall V. Rigg, and Forman v. 
 Wright, 1851. 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 64, as to first four lines. 
 
 » Panton v. Holland, 1819 (Am.) ; 
 Twiss V. Baldwin, 1832 (Am.). 
 
 • Bignell v. Clarke, 1860. 
 
 • Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford, 
 1860. 
 
 • Eichards v. Lond. & South Coast 
 Ey. Co., 1849. See ante, § 187. 
 
 ' Howard v. Peete, 1817. 
 
 201 
 
 U! 
 
 
W- fti 
 
 i! 
 
 nli; 
 
 :. 
 
 1 ■ ; 
 
 P i 
 
 ■' • f 
 
 • i ( 
 
 1 
 
 
 i'lii 
 
 BURPLU. AGE IN CUIMINAL PROCEKDINCSS. [PART II. 
 
 the words marked in italics, and the plaintiff entitled to recover 
 damages, though it appeared that the sewer was (!ut jireviously to 
 the construction of the road. " For," said Tindal, C. J., " what 
 has it to do with the wrongful act of the defendant, or the 
 measure of damages which the plaintiff is entitled to claim, 
 whether the defendant used his close as a road, an orchard, or a 
 garden P " ' 
 
 §§ 258 — 262. In the former editions of this work many further 
 examples of averments in pleading in civil cases which were 
 " surplusage," and consequently " immaterial," were given, but 
 having regard to the present liberal state of the law with regard 
 to amendments, it is not thought advisable to weary the reader 
 with any further examples of the application of the rule in civil 
 cases.'" 
 
 § 263. The law rejecting surplusage applies equally in criminal 
 as in civil proceedings. The api)lication of the rule that immaterial 
 averments (or " surplusage ") need not be proved in criminal 
 cases may, moreover, be usefully exemplified. For instance, if a 
 party be indicted for robbery in f/ic dwel ling -house of A. B} or for 
 arson in the night time^ the allegations marked in italics may be 
 rejected as surplusage, and, consequently, need not be proved ; ^ 
 and where one section of a statute' (now repealed) said that a 
 certificate given hiowinghj and wilfully, with intent to deceive, 
 should be a misdemeanour, and a separate clause made it a distinct 
 offence to give such a certificate without having visited the patient,^ 
 it was held that a conviction on an indictment, blending two 
 distinct offences in one charge, and stating that defendant 
 knoiring/j/, find with intention to deceive, signed the certificate tcithout 
 having visited the patient, was, after a verdict in which the jury 
 
 ' Dukos V. Qostling, 1835. 
 
 '^ Exiimplos of the appliciition of 
 the old hiw are containecl in Powell 
 V. liradbury, 1849 (soo, however, 
 Lush V. Russell, 1850, whore this case 
 is denied to be law) ; Smith v. Lovoll, 
 1850; Horton v. M'Murtrv, 1800; 
 Keller v. ]31ood, 1861 (Ir.); R. v. 
 M'Kenna, 1842 (Ir.); R. v. Duroro, 
 1784; and E. v, Upton-on-Severn, 
 1833. 
 
 ^ R. V. Pye, 1790 ; R. v. Johnstone, 
 17!)3 (by all the judges) ; see, also, R. 
 V. Wardle, 1800. 
 
 3 R. V. Minton, 1786. 
 
 * For other instances, see R. ", 
 Phillips, 1818; R. v. Oxford, 1819; 
 R. V. Summers, 1705; R. v. Hick- 
 man, 1784; R. V. Radley, 1849; R. v. 
 Otway, 1849 (Ir.); R. v. Williams 
 1850; R. V. Kcaley, 1851; R. v. 
 Healey, 1824. 
 
 » 9 a. 4, c. 41, §§ 9, 29, and 30. 
 
 202 
 
 
 I 
 
CHAP. I.] CUMULATIVE ALLEfiATIOX.S IMMATERIAL. 
 
 negatived any intent to deceive, hut found the defendant guiUy, 
 held to have been rightly recorded, nince, on the charge under the 
 latter clause of the statute (viz., that of having certified without 
 visiting), the averment of intention was mere surplusage." 
 
 § 264. On the same principle, too, where an indictment charged 
 the defendants with conspiring to indict the prosecutor, A/ Av///, with 
 intent to extort money, they were held to be rightly convicted, 
 though the jury, in finding them guilty of conspiring to indict 
 with the intent alleged, expressly negatived any conspiracy to 
 make a false charge ; for the court observed that a conspiracy to 
 prefer an indictment for purposes of extortion was doubtless a 
 misdemeanour, whether the charge were true or false.'* Again, 
 where a parish was indicted for non-repair of a highway, an alle- 
 gation that the road in question was an immemorial highway has 
 been rejected as surplusage ;''^ on an indictment ior jointly receiving 
 stolen property, persons guilty of separately receiving any part of 
 such property may by statute be convicted;* and on an indictment 
 charging a common law offence as having been committed " against 
 the form of the statute," tin allegation in question may bo rejected 
 as surplusage.* 
 
 § 265. Tlie second rule" respecting variances is, that ciimidntive 
 allegations, or such as mcreli/ operate in aggravation, are iminaferial^ 
 provided that sufficient is ])roved to establish some right, offence, or 
 JuHtification, included in the claim, charge, or defence specijied on the 
 record.'' For example, where a defendant was charged in an in- 
 formation with composing, printing, and publishing a libel, but no 
 evidence having been given to show that he was the author, his 
 counsel having claimed an acquittal, Lord Elleuborough* observed^ 
 " It is enough to prove publication. If an indictment charges that 
 the defendant did and caused to be done* a particular act, it is enough 
 to prove either. The distinction runs through the whole criminal 
 law ; and it is invariably enough to prove so much of the indict- 
 
 ' R. V. Jones, 1831. 
 
 * R. V. HoUingbony, 1825. 
 
 * R. V. Turwoston, 1830. 
 
 * 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny 
 Act, 1861"), §91. 
 
 * R. V. Mathews, 1793. See, also, 
 14 & 15 V. 0. 100 ("The Criminal 
 Procedure Act, 1851"), § 24, cited 
 
 post, § 280, n. '. 
 
 * Supra, § 254. 
 
 ' R. V. Macphorson, 1869. 
 
 « See R. V. Uunt, 1811; S. P. in 
 R. V. Williams, 1811 (Lawrence, J.). 
 
 » S. P. (Ld. Mansfield) in E. v. 
 Middlehurst, 1757. 
 
 :li| 
 
 f 
 
 20-S 
 
¥ 
 
 CUMULATIVE ALLEGATIONS IMMATERIAL. [PART II. 
 
 ment as shows that tbie delendant has committed a suhstantive 
 crime therein specified." 
 
 § 266. Accordingly at, common law, on an indictment for 
 mnrder the prisoner maj' bo convicted of manslaughter, for the 
 averment of malice aforeth'jught is merely matter of aggravation;' 
 on an indictment for treason or conspiracy charging several overt 
 acts, it is sufficient o prove one ; * and on an indictment for 
 obtaining property by several false pretences, it is not necessary to 
 prove them all, unless they are so connected as to be incapable of 
 separation,^ but it will suffice to prove the one or more, by which 
 the property was in fact obtained.* 
 
 § 207. Moreover, if a compound intent, or several intents, be laid 
 in the indictment, and if one part of the compound intent, or each 
 of the several inte» fs, when coupled with the act done, constitute 
 an offence, it will li^t be necessary to prove the whole as laid. For 
 example, an indictment for killing a sheep, with intent to steal the 
 whole carcase, will be supported by proof of an intent to steal part 
 of the carcase ; ' if a prisoner be charged with obtaining an order 
 for a certain sum from the prosecutor with intent to defraud him 
 of the sdinfi, he may be legally convicted, though it appears that 
 his real intention was to client the prosecutor out of a small portion 
 only of the procee'?° r>" the order;' under the old law a man 
 accused of assault: rg a girl with intent to abuse her and carnally 
 know her, might be found g. alty of an assault with intent to abuse 
 simply ; ' and a party 'udicted for publishing a libel with intent to 
 defame certain magistrates, and also to bring the administration of 
 justice into contempt, may be found guilty, if the libel was pub- 
 lished with eit/irr of those intents.* 
 
 § 268. But the intent proved must either correspond with, or be 
 included in, the intent alleged. Thus, it will be a fatal variance if 
 an indictment for burglary charge an intent to steal, and it be 
 
 ' Co. Lit. 2H2a. 
 
 Fost. 1!I4. 
 
 K. r. Witkham, 1839. 
 
 R. V. Hill. IHll. 
 
 11. V. WilliamH, 1825. The same 
 
 EDint 80OII13 to havo boon riilod by 
 rosswoll, J., in R. v. Marloy, 1842. 
 The principle in both cases was ' ' that 
 tho offonce of intending tn steal a 
 
 part was part of the offence of in- 
 tending to steal tho whole, and that 
 tho statute meant to make it ini- 
 matniial whether the intent applied 
 to the whole, or only to part." 
 
 « R. V. Leonard, 184S. 
 
 ' R. I'. Dawson, 1821 (llolroyd, J.). 
 
 • R. V. Evans, 1821 (Bailey, J.). 
 
 204 
 
 11 
 
CHAP. I.] now FAR INTENT MUST BE PROVED AS LAID. 
 
 shown that the real intent wus to commit rape or murder ; ' and a 
 prisoner charged with hurglary and stealing will he acquitted, if no 
 property was taken, though it appear that the house was entered 
 with an intent to steal ; and though, had larceny actually been 
 committed, he would have been convicted without any allegation in 
 the indictment of a felonious intent.^ 
 
 §§ 269 — 70a. The rule that matters merely of aggravation are 
 material, provided enough be proved to establish some substantial 
 right, offence or defence included in the proceeding upon the 
 record has been adopted by statute on several occasions. For 
 example, by statute, on an indictment for burglary and stealing, 
 if the prosecutor establish his case with the exception of proving 
 that the breaking was by night, the prisoner may be convicted of 
 housebreaking ; * if no breaking be proved, but the property stolen 
 be laid in tlie indictment, and be proved by the evidence, to be of 
 the value of five pounds, the verdict may be guilty of stealing in a 
 dwelling-house to that amount,* the prisoner may be found guilty 
 of larceny, if the evidence be not sufficient to prove the commission 
 of the more aggravated crime ; ^ if no satisfactory evidence be 
 offered to show, either that t^e house laid in an indictment as such 
 was a dwelling-house, or some building communicating therewith ; 
 or that it was the dwelling-house of the party named in the indict- 
 ment ; or that it was locally situated as therein alleged ; or that 
 stolen property, laid as of that value, was of the value of five 
 pounds, provided it appear that any goods were stolen by the 
 prisoner, he may be convicted of simple larceny ; * and the same law 
 applies on a charge of stealing in a dwelling-house with menaces,' 
 or of stealing from the person, with or without violence," or of 
 stealing as a servant,* while an indictment under the statute for 
 horso-stealing, though bad for not describing the animal by any 
 term used in the Act, will support a conviction for larceny ; '" a 
 
 M 
 
 
 > 2 Eiist, P. C. 614. 
 
 » R. V. Furnival, 1821 ; B. v. Van- 
 dorcomb, 1796. 
 
 3 Under 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The 
 Larceny Act, IHOl "), § 50. 
 
 * Ibid., §60; see R. v. Compton, 
 182H (Gasoloo. J.). 
 
 » 2 little, 302 ; 2 EaHt, P. C. 784. 
 
 • 11. V. Bullock, 1825 ; B. r. 
 
 Brookes, 1847 (Pnttoson, J.); E. v. 
 Jackson, 1842 (C'rcsswoll, J.). 
 
 ' See 24 & 23 V. c. 96 ("The 
 Larceny Act, lH(il"), §61. 
 
 » Ibid., §§ 40, 43. 
 
 • R. V. Jonninffs, 1858; 24 ft 25 
 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny Act, 1801"), 
 §67. 
 
 '" R. V. Beauey, 1820. 
 
 it 
 
 205 
 
 :i II 
 
HOW FAR INTENT MUST BE PROVED AS LAID. fPART II. 
 
 m 
 
 woman charged with the murder of her infant may be convicted of 
 endeavouring to conceal its birth ; * a person indicted for felony in 
 administering poison so as to endanger life, or to inflict grievous 
 bodily harm, may be convicted of the misdemeanour of adminis- 
 tering poison with intent to injure, aggrieve, or annoy some one; * 
 on the trial of an indictment for simple or aggravated robbery, 
 the jury may convict of a simple or aggravated assault with Intent 
 to rob, if the evidence shall prove such an ofPence to have been 
 committed ; ^ upon a count for maliciously wounding, or for 
 maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, against the statute, a 
 prisoner may be convicted of a common assault, even though the 
 term " assault " be not found in the indictment ; * and it is pro- 
 vided^ that, "if, on the trial of any person charged with any 
 felony or misdemeanour,' it shall appear to the jury upon the 
 evidence that the defendant did not complete the offence charged, 
 but that he was guilty only of an attempt to commit the same, 
 such person shall not by reason thereof be entitled to be acquitted, 
 but the jury shall be at liberty to return as their verdict, that the 
 defendant is not guilty of the felony or misdemeanour charged, but 
 is guilty of an attempt to commit the same, and thereupon such 
 person shall be liable to be punished in the same manner as if he 
 had been convicted upon an indictment for attempting to commit 
 the particular felony or misdemeanour charged in the said indict- 
 ment ; and no person, so tried as herein lastly mentioned, shall be 
 liable to be afterwards prosecuted for an attempt to commit the 
 felony or misdemeanour for which he was so tried." ' 
 
 ' 24 & 25 V. c. 100 (" Tho Offences 
 against tho I'urson Act, 18(51"), § CO. 
 
 » Ibid., §25. 
 
 3 24 & 25 V.c. 96 ("Tho Laicpny 
 Act, 180i"), § 41; H. v. Mitthulf, 
 1852. Sco K. )•. Woodhull, 1872 
 (Dciiunan, J.). 
 
 ♦ R. V. Tavhjr, 18(J8; R. v. Can- 
 well, 18(i{>; R. V. Oliver, 1860; R. v. 
 Yeadon, I8()l. Seo, also, R. v. 
 Outhiio, 1870. 
 
 » 14 & 15 V. c 100 f" Tho Criminal 
 Proccduro Act, 1851"), §0, replacing 
 7 W. 4 & 1 V. c. 85, § 11 (which was 
 worded differently, and la repealed 
 by 14 & 15 V. 0. 100, $ 10) ; as to tho 
 
 conntruction of which, see R. v. Bird, 
 1851. y<'0 R. r. M'l'herson, 1857. 
 
 « See R. V. Ryland, 1868; R. v. 
 ITa](g()od and Wyatt, 1870. 
 
 ' Tho Articles of AVar for the 
 government of tho Navy establish 
 rules similar to thoao rocogniacd by 
 canon and statute law. "Tho Naval 
 Discipline Act, 1866" (29 & IJO V. 
 0. 100), expressly enacts, indeed, in 
 § 48, that " whoro any prisoner shall 
 be charged with murder, a court- 
 martial nuiy find him guilty of man- 
 slaughttir, or of a common assault; 
 where ho shall bo charged with 
 sodomy, a oourt-martial may find 
 
 206 
 
CHAP. I.] CUMULATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN CIVIL MATTERS. 
 
 ir.l. 
 
 V. 
 
 § 271 — 7. The rule that mere " cumulate allegotiom" or " aver- 
 ments in aggravation," need not be proved not only prevails in 
 criminal cases, but equally obtains in civil actions. For instance, 
 in an action for defamation, if the plaintiff allege special damage, he 
 need not prove it, provided the words be actionable per se ; ' in an 
 •.otion on a policy of insurance, the material allegation is the loss ; 
 but whether total or partial, is a mere question of degree ; and if 
 the former be alleged, proof of the latter is sufficient.* In all 
 cases, indeed, a party may in his statement of claim sue for a less 
 right than he is able to prove, provided that the lesser right claimed 
 does not differ in kind from, but is included in, the greater right 
 proved.' 
 
 § 278 — 9. The third rule* with regard to variances is that mere 
 formal allcgatiom need not be proved. " Formal allegations " 
 comprise, — among other matters, — all those averments of place, 
 time, number, value, quality, and the like, which may be inserted 
 in the pleadings, without being either essentially descriptive of the 
 subject of the claim or charge, or otherwise rendered material by 
 special circumstances, and also a multitude of other idle statements, 
 which, in former times, English lawyers loved to introduce into 
 
 him guilty of an indocont assault ; 
 where he shall be charged with theft, 
 a court-martial may find him guilty 
 of an attempt to thieve, or of em- 
 bezzlement, or of wrongful appro- 
 priation of property belonging to 
 another ; and, generally, whore any 
 prison -• 8hall bo charged with any 
 oft'enci' iiuler this Act, he iiT^y, upon 
 failure of proof of the commission of 
 tho greater offence, be found guilty 
 of another offence of the sumo chi.ss 
 involving a less degiTo of puuish- 
 mont, but not of any olfonco involv- 
 ing a gri'utor degree of punixhnu'nt." 
 "The Army Act. 1881" (44 & 45 
 V. 0. 58), in § 5G thereof, also con- 
 tains provisions to the same effect, 
 and enacting that any prisoner 
 charged before a court-martinl with 
 steiiling may be found guilty of em- 
 bezzlomont, or of fraudulently mis- 
 applying money or property ; and if 
 ho be charged with emb(!zzlement 
 may be convicted of stealing, or of 
 fraudulent misa^jplicatiou ; and if ho 
 
 be charged with desertion may be 
 found guilty of attempting to desert, 
 or of being abroad without leave; 
 and if he be charged with attempt- 
 ing to desert may bo found guilty of 
 desertion or of illegal absence. Tho 
 section then concludes with a general, 
 but not very happily expressed, en- 
 actment, that ' ' a prisoner charged 
 before a court-martial with any other 
 offence under this Act may, on failure 
 of proof of an offence being com- 
 mitted under circumstances mvolv- 
 ing a higher degree of punishment, 
 bo found guilty of the savie offence as 
 being committed under circumstances 
 involving a less degree of punish- 
 ment." 
 
 ' Smith V. Thomas, 1835 (Tindal, 
 C.J.). 
 
 ' Gardner v. Croasdale, 1700 ; 
 Uenson v. Chapman, 1848, H. L. ; 
 King V. Walker, 18()3. 
 
 ' Dimcan v. Lourh, 1845; Hailey 
 V. Appleyard, 1838 (Coleridge, J.). 
 
 * Supra, § 264. 
 
 :;' t 
 
 \-¥m 
 
 liiiii 
 
 207 
 
1^ ;i 
 
 1 
 
 i 
 
 w 
 
 'i 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 t 
 
 
 r" 
 
 
 
 iJi 
 
 II ^i: 
 
 {;: 
 
 iHi 
 
 FORMAL ALLEaATIONS NEKD NOT BE PROVED. [PART II. 
 
 every legal document. Since the modern amendments in the law, 
 the rule in question has fortunately become a matter more of his- 
 torical curiosity than of present practical interest. 
 
 § 280. Indeed, so far as civil actions are concerned, this rule ha? 
 passed into a dead letter ; and Lord Campbell's Act of 1851,' 
 renders it of little importance even in criminal cases. With regard 
 to averments of phce, it is ixow sufficient in all cases, excepting 
 where local description is required, to state in the margin of the 
 indictment the county, city, or ■.iiher jurisdiction, as the 3nuo for 
 all the facts averred in the body of the indictment.* 
 
 > 14 & 15 V. c. 100 r"The Criminal 
 Procedure Act, 1851 ), §23, enact- 
 ing, that "it shall not bo necessary 
 to state any ve7nie in the body of 
 any indictment, but the county, city 
 or other jurisdiction named in the 
 margin thereof shall be taken to be 
 the venue for all the facts stated in 
 the b,dy of such indictment; pro- 
 vided tliat in cases whoro local de- 
 scription is or hereafter shall be re- 
 quired, such local description shall be 
 given in the body of the indictment ; 
 and provided also, that where an in- 
 dictment for an offence committed in 
 the county of any city or town corpo- 
 rate shall be preferred at the assizes 
 of the adjoining county, such county 
 of the city or town shall be deemed 
 the venue, and may either be stated 
 in the margin of the indictment, with 
 or without the name of the county in 
 which the offender is to be tried, or be 
 stated in the body of the indictment 
 by way of venue. § 24 enacts, that 
 " no indictment for any offence shall 
 be held insufficient for want of the 
 averment of any matter unnecessary 
 to be proved, nor for the omission of 
 the words ' as appears by the record,' 
 or of the words ' with force and 
 arms,' or of the words 'against the 
 peace,' nor for the insertion of the 
 words ' against the form of the 
 statute,' instead of ' against the form 
 of the statutes,' orvicevors4, nor for 
 that any person mentioned in the 
 indictment is designated by a name 
 of offlco, or other descriptive appella- 
 tion instead of his proper name, nor 
 for omitting to state the time at 
 
 which the offence was committed in 
 any case where time is not of the 
 essence of the offence, nor for stating 
 the time imperfectly, nor for stating 
 the offence to have been committed 
 on a day subsequent to the finding of 
 the indictment, or on an impossible 
 day, or on a day that never happened, 
 nor for want of a proper or perfect 
 venue, nor for want of a proper or 
 formal conclusion, nor for want of or 
 imperfection in the addition of any 
 defendant, nor for want of the state- 
 ment of the value or price of any 
 matter or thing, or the amount of 
 damage, injury, or spoil, in any case 
 where thf value or price, or the 
 amount of damage, injury, or spoil, 
 is not of the essence of the offence." 
 § 25 enacts, that " every objection to 
 any indictment for any form'il defect 
 apparent on the fiu e thereof shall be 
 taken, by demurrer or motion to 
 quash such indictment, before the 
 jury shall be sworn, and not after- 
 wards ; and every court, before 
 which any such objection shall be 
 taken for the formal defect, may, if 
 it be thought necessary, cause the 
 indictment to be forthwith amended 
 in such particular by some officer of 
 the court or other person, and there- 
 upon the trial shall proceed as if no 
 such defect had appeared." 
 
 ' As to the former law, see R. v. 
 Hollond. 1794; R. v. Haynes, 1815; 
 R. V. Foargus O'Connor, 1843; 7 
 G. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law 
 Act, 1826 "), § 20. Even before the 
 Act it was no objection in the case 
 of a transitory felony that there was 
 
 208 
 
no 
 
 V. 
 
 15; 
 
 ; 7 
 aw 
 the 
 Mise 
 
 cn.vr. r.] averments of place — local offences. 
 
 § 281. In indiotments, however, for those offences which the law 
 regards as bearing a local character, the pro'-f respecting the place 
 must still correspond with the allegation ; though probably in 
 many cases of variance on this point the courts would sanction an 
 amendment of the record.' The distinction between local and tran- 
 sitory offences is not very clearly drawn, but among local offences 
 are— among others— burglary,' but not highway robbery ; ' house- 
 breaking; * stealing in a dwelling-house ; * sacrilege ; ' riotously de- 
 molishing cLnrches, houses, machinery, &c. ; ^ maliciously firing a 
 dwelling-house, perhaps an out-house, but not a stack ; * forcible 
 entry ; ' poaching ; '" iiuisances to h.j,hways ; " and malicious in- 
 juries to sea-banks, mill-dams, or other local property. In most 
 of these cases it is sufficient to allege and prove the parish, town- 
 ship, or other local district, less than a county, in which the offence 
 was committed ; '^ but in some, a more accurate description is 
 necessary. 
 
 § 282. For example, an indictment for not repairing a highway 
 must specify the situation of the road within the parish, and any 
 substantial variance between the description and the evidence will 
 be material ; " on an indictment for night poaching, it has been 
 held, by a majority of the judges, that the locus in quo must be 
 described either by name, ownership, occupation, or abuttals, and 
 that it is not sufficient to allege that the prisoner was found " in a 
 certain close in the parish of A ; " " but on a charge of taking or 
 
 ii 
 
 no such parish in the county as that 
 in whifh the offence was stated to 
 have been committed : R. v. Wood- 
 ward, 1831 ; R. V. Dowling, 1826. 
 
 > 14 & 15 V. c. 100 ("The Criminal 
 Procedure Act, 1851"), § 1, cited 
 ante, § 249. 
 
 » 1 Russ. 0. & M. 82G; R. v. 
 St. John, 1839. 
 
 » R. V. Dowling, 182G. 
 
 • R. V. Bullock, 1825. 
 
 • R. V. Nappor, 1824; R. v, Jarrald, 
 1863. 
 
 ' Arch. Cr. PI. 67, and p. 457 oJ 
 2lBtcdit. (1893). 
 ' R. V. Richards, 1SS2. 
 » R. V. Woodward, 1831. 
 
 • 2 Leon. 186. 
 "> R. V. Ridley, 1823. 
 » R. V. Steventon, 1843 
 » See R. V. Napper, 1824. 
 T. VOL. 1. 
 
 » R. V. Great Caafield, 1810; B. 
 V. Upton-on-Severn, 1833; R. v. 
 Steventon, 1843. See R. v. March. 
 Dow. of Downshire, 1835 ; R. v. 
 Waverton, 1851. If a earriago-r.'ay 
 is described as a bridle-way, the 
 variance is material: R. v. St. 
 Weonard's, 1834. See, also, R, w. 
 Lyon, 1824. 
 
 " R. V. Ridley, 1823, under tne 
 repealed Act of 57 G. 3, c. 90, § I , 
 R. V. Crick, 1832 (VauRhan, B.";. 
 imdcr 9 G. 4, c. 69 ("The Nighi 
 Poaching Act, 1828"), § 9. In R. v. 
 Owen, 182(>. whore the close was 
 described by name and occupation, 
 but the name proved was different 
 from that allegctl, the judges held 
 that the variance nas fatal. See R. 
 V. Andrews, 1837 ( Jurney, B.), »ad 
 £. V. Eaten, 1851. 
 
 30» r 
 
 I i 
 
 'i' 
 
ft! 
 
 AVERMENTS OF PLACE. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 destroying fish in water adjoining a dwelling-house, if the boundary 
 of any parish, township, or vill, happen to be in or by the side of 
 Buch water, it is by statute sufficient to prove that the offence was 
 committed either in the parish, township, or vill, named in the 
 indictment, or in any such local district adjoining the water ; * and 
 if the charge be that of stealing oysters, or oyster brood, the bed, 
 laying, or fishery may also by statute be described by name or 
 otherwise, without stating it to be in any particular parish, town- 
 ship, or vill.* Moreover, an indictment for an affray cannot be 
 sustained, unless it contain an averment that the offence was com- 
 mitted in a public street or highway, and unless that averment be 
 supported by corresponding proof.' 
 
 § 283. Why a burglar should be entitled to more accurate infor- 
 mation respecting the house he is charged with having enterecl, 
 than the highway robber can claim as to the spot where his ofPence 
 is stated to have been committed, it is impossible to say ; either 
 full information should be given in all cases or in none. 
 
 § 284. Excepting in the very few cases where time, is of the 
 essence of the offence, an indictment,* too, need not contain any 
 allegation respecting time.* 
 
 § 285. Allegations of number and value are, also, in general 
 immaterial in indictments. Thus, if a party be charged with steal- 
 ing five horses, he may be convicted of stealing one ; and if he be 
 indicted for larceny or robbery, and the property be laid as of the 
 value of twenty shillings, the offence will be complete, though it 
 
 » 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny 
 Act, 1861 "), § 24. 
 
 » Id. § 26. 
 
 « R. V. O'Noill, 1871 (Ir.). 
 
 ♦ So as to coioniTS inquisitions ; 
 SCO " Tho Coroners Act. 1H87 " (30 & 
 61 V. c. 71), § 20; and see, also, R. 
 V. Ingham, 1804. 
 
 » 14 & ioV. c. 100 ("Tho Criminal 
 rrocodure Act, 18.Jl"), § 24. citod 
 ante, § 280, n. \ on p. 208. Tlio()hl 
 rule roquiied a day to be specified, 
 but did not rc(iuiro that day to be 
 proved. Ihit tho lof^ishiture has 
 now adopted my Uncle Tol»y's reply 
 to Corporal 'I'rini's argument in 
 tolling his unfortunate story of tho 
 King of Hoheinia. " ' Thoro was a 
 certain King of Bohemia, but in 
 
 what year of our Lord,' — ' I would 
 UjD give a lialfpenny to know,' said 
 my Uncle Toby. ' Onh/, an' please 
 yiiur Honour, it mnkes a story look the 
 liftti-r ' the face,' ' Lcdve out the 
 date entirely. Trim;' said my Uncle, 
 'a stori/ jiu^ses rcri/ inell without these 
 niceties, unless one. is pretty sure of 
 'en!'" Even before the statute, 
 whiTO a court had no jurisdiction to 
 try a criminal, except for an offence 
 committed after a certain day, no 
 objection could bo taken to the in- 
 dictment in arrest of judgment, for 
 alleging that the act was done before 
 that day. when the jury had ox- 
 j)reKsly fotind tliat this was not 
 correct. !Seo, a\m, R. v. Troharne, 
 1831; and 11. v. Levy, 1819. 
 
 210 
 
 m 
 
CHAP. I.] ALLEGATIONS OF NUMBER AND VALUE. 
 
 appear that the article stolen was of less value than any coin of the 
 realm, provided that it was of .so/we value to the owner.' 
 
 § 28G. In certain cases, however, value is essential to constitute 
 the offence ; as where a bankrupt is indicted for fraudulently con- 
 cealing or removing property to the value of ten pounds,^ or for 
 absconding with property to the amount of twenty pounds,' or a 
 person is indicted for maliciously injuring property to an amount 
 exceeding iive pounds,* or a tenant is indicted for stealing a chattel 
 or fixture let to him with his house or lodging, and exceeding the 
 value of five pounds,* or a party is charged with stealing in a 
 dwelling-house chattels, &c., to that amount,' or with stealing, or 
 with destroying or damaging, either maliciously or with intent to 
 steal, any trees in a park, pleasure-ground, garden, or orchard, 
 above the value of one pound, or any trees elsewhere above the 
 value of five pounds.' In such cases as these, the evidence must so 
 far correspond with the allegation as to show that the statutable 
 offence has been committed : that is, the property fraudulently or 
 maliciously dealt with, stolen, or destroyed, must be proved, as well 
 as alleged, to be of the requisite value ; though if this be done, the 
 exact amount specified in the indictment need not be proved. 
 Where * a bankrupt was charged with concealing his property, and 
 the indictment, — after specifying many articles without stating the 
 separate value of each, — added tliese words, " and also one hundred 
 
 
 i; f 
 
 i !! .Ul 
 
 "/ 
 
 > R. V. Morris, 1840 (Parke, B.) ; 
 R. V. Bingloy, 183:1 (Gurney, B.) ; 
 R. V. Clark, 1810. The fact of the 
 article being in the possession of the 
 prosecutor is, in general, evideuco 
 that it was of value to him. Id. 
 
 » 32 & 33 V. o. 62 ("The Debtors 
 Act, 18G9"), § 11, Bxibs. 4, 5; as 
 amended by 40 & 47 V. c. 52 ("The 
 Hunkruptcy Act, 1883"), § 103, and 
 ■13 & 54 V. c. 71 ("The Bankruptcy 
 Act, 1890"), § 20; 35 & 30 V. c. 57, 
 511, subs. 4, 5, Ir. 
 
 » 32 & 33 V. 0. 62, § 12; as 
 amended by 46 & 47 V. c. 52, § 103; 
 35 & 30 V. c. 57. § 12, Ir. 
 
 * 24 & 25 V. 0. 97 ("The Miilicious 
 Damage Act, 180r'), § 61. The 
 damage must be done at one time : 
 R. V. Williams, 1862 (Ir.). The vahio 
 of each article injured uojd not be 
 
 211 
 
 stated, but it will be sufficient to 
 allege that the amount of the aggre- 
 gate damage exceeded 0/. : R. v. 
 Thoman, 1871. 
 
 » 24 & 25 V. 0. 96 ("The Larceny 
 Act, 1861 "), § 74. If the value of 
 the property stolen do not exceed 51., 
 tlio jirisoner is not liable to penal 
 servitude. Id. 
 
 « 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larceny 
 Act, 1801 "), § 60. 
 
 ' 24 & 25 V. c. 96 ("The Larcen" 
 Act. 1801"), § 32; 24 & 25 V. 
 c. 97 ("The Malicious Damage Act, 
 1801''), §§ 20, 21. Where several 
 tr(!e8 have been stolon or dumagwl 
 at the 8a.me time, their collective 
 value will watisiy the Act: R. v, 
 Shoidierd, IHOS. 
 
 * R. V. Forsyth, 18H (all the 
 Judgoa). 
 
 p2 
 
 1IH 
 
fpn 
 
 ! 1- ' 
 
 i 
 
 pi ■ 
 
 i 
 
 ■ i 
 
 
 
 III- 
 
 ■ 1 
 
 i'!^ ; 
 
 
 ALLEUATIONS OF NUMIJEIt AND VALUC. [I'ART II. 
 
 other aiticles of furniture and a certain debt due from J. T. to tlie 
 prisoner, to the value of twenty pounds and upwards ;" ' the indict- 
 ment was held bad, as all the property concealed was not specified, 
 and no distinct value was put upon the aiticles enumerated. It, 
 therefore, would seem that where value, being material, is ascribed 
 to several articles collectively, the offence must be made out as to 
 each of those articles. 
 
 § 287. Descriptions of the subject-matter of the offence are also, 
 in many cases, unnecessary. Thus in an indictment for embezzle- 
 ment against a clerk or servant, or against a person employed either 
 in her Majesty's public service, or in the police, if the offence 
 relate to any money or valuable security, it is sufficient to allege 
 that money was embezzled, without specifying any particular coin 
 or valuable security; and such allegation may be supported by 
 equally loose evidence ; ' and it seems, even by proof of a general 
 deficiency of money that ought to be forthcoming, without showing 
 from what persons the money was received, or of what coins it con- 
 sisted, or that any particular sum was»received, and not accounted 
 for by the prisoner.' So, also, " in any indictment in which it shall 
 be necessary to make any averment as to any money,* or any note 
 of the Bank of England, or any other bank, it shall be sufficient to 
 describe such money or bank-note simply as money, without speci- 
 fying any particular coin or bank-note ; and such allegation, so far 
 as regards the description of the property, shall be sustained by 
 proof of any amount of coin or of any bank-note, although the 
 particular species of coin of which such amount was composed, or the 
 particular nature of the bank-note, shall not be proved ; and in 
 cases of embezzlement and obtaining money or bank-notes by false 
 pretences, by proof that the offender embezzled or obtained any 
 piece of coin or any bank-note, or any portion of the value thereof, 
 although such piece of coin or bank-note may have been delivered 
 to him in order that some part of the value thereof should be 
 returned to the party delivering the same, or to any other perstni, 
 and such part shall have been returned accordingly." * 
 
 ' This case was .Iccided under the 
 repealed Act of 5 G. 2, c. 30, § 1. 
 
 » 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny 
 Act, 1861 "), § 71. 
 
 • B. V. Grove, 1833 (eight judges 
 
 212 
 
 including the three chiefs against 
 seven). 
 
 « See R. V. Gumble, 1872. 
 
 • 14 & 15 V. 0. 100 ("The Criminal 
 Procedure Act, 1851 \ J 18. 
 
CHAP. I.J 
 
 ALLEGATIONiS OF QUALITY. 
 
 § 288. Allegations of quality (or, in other words, those allegations 
 which describe the mode in which certain acts have been done) may 
 often be omitted from an indictment, and it b seldom necessary to 
 prove them with precision. For example, in an indictment' for 
 murder or manslaughter, it is unnecessary to set forth the manner 
 in which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was 
 caused ; but it is sufficient to charge that the defendant did felo- 
 niously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought kill and murder 
 the deceased, or, in an indictment for manslaughter, that he did 
 feloniously kill and slay him.* Moreover, should an indictment 
 for homicide unnecessarily allege the means of death, it would be 
 quite sufficient for the proof to agree with the allegation in its 
 general character, without precise conformity in every particular. 
 Similarly, on a charge of felonious assault, if it be alleged that it 
 was committed with a staff, and the proof be that it was done with 
 a stone ; or if a wound, alleged to have been given with a sword, 
 be proved to have been inflicted by an axe ; or if a pistol be 
 stated to have been loaded with a bullet, and it turns out to have 
 been loaded with some other destructive material,* the charge is 
 substantially proved, and no variance occurs.* 
 
 § 289. The fourth general and remaining rule * as to variances is 
 that allegations of matter of essential description must be proved a» 
 laid. The only practical mode of understanding this rule is to 
 examine some of the leading decisions on the subject, and then to 
 apply the reasoning or ruling contained therein to other analogous 
 cases, always bearing in mind that the judges now have large 
 powers of granting amendments both in civil and in criminal pro- 
 ceedings.* And first, with respect to the criminal law, it is now 
 clearly established, that tie name or nature of the property stolen or 
 damaged is matter of essential description. For example, the variance 
 is fatal if, ou a charge of firing a stack of hay, it turns out to 
 
 * This term includes inquisitions 
 taken before coroners ; B. v. (ngham, 
 18(54. 
 
 » 24 & 25 V. c. 100 (" The Offences 
 against the Person Act, 18(51 "), § (i. 
 
 3 H. r. Oxford, 1840. See II. v. 
 Hughes, 1832, the marginal note of 
 which is misleading. 
 
 * 1 East, P. 0. 341 ; K. v. Martin, 
 1832 (Parke, B.). See, further, aa 
 to the law prior to the passing of 
 
 Ld. Canipliell's Act in 1851, R. v. 
 M'Conkey, 1841(Ir.)(Toiron8, J.), B. 
 V. Waters, 1832; R. v. Culkin, 1832; 
 R. V. Thompson, 182(5; R. v. Kelly, 
 1825; R. V. Mosley, 1825; R. v. 
 Tomlinson, 1834 (Pattcson, J,); E. 
 V. Turner, 1830 (Parke, B.); B. v. 
 Warman, 1846. 
 
 * Supra, § 254. 
 
 • See ante, §§ 220—226, ?49. 
 
 213 
 
 '^ 
 
 I I 
 
8 ' ' ' 1 
 
 m ' 1 ■ 
 
 1 ^ ! 
 
 l! 
 
 Il-l 
 
 *Fiiii 
 
 MATTEll OF KS.SKNTIAL DKSCRirTION. [PAIiT II. 
 
 have been a stack of wheat ; or if a man be accused of stealing a 
 drake, and it is proved to have been a goose, or even a duck, 
 unless, ii'.deed, an amendment be permitted.' An instance of the 
 application of this rule, before amendments were as liberally 
 allowed as now, occurred some years ago at assizes. \ man, 
 charged with stealing " a slop," the theft of which was clearly 
 proved, when called upon for his defence, exclaimed, " Why, my 
 lord, it ain't no slop." " You hear what he says," observed the 
 judge to the jury. " Is it a slop, gentlfmon ? " " No, my lord, 
 it's a smock," said they. " Then you must acquit the prisoner." 
 He was acquitted ; but the grand juiy not being discharged, a 
 second indictment was preferred and found, charging him with 
 stealing " a smock." Nothing daunted, the prisoner now pleaded 
 autrefois acquit, and called several witnesses to prove that the 
 article he had stolen was in fact a slop, and this ques ^n was sub- 
 mitted to a second jury with much gravity by the learneu judge.* 
 § 290. AVhere the stealing of specified animals is made a sta- 
 tutable offence, it seems sufTioient to use the generic term which 
 includes the whole species, even though the language of the Act 
 should be more specific. Thus, on an indictment for sheep stealing, 
 framed under an Act ' making it penal to steal any '* ram, ewe, 
 sheep, or lamb," charging a man with killing a sheep, with intent 
 to steal the carcase, it having been proved that a sheep was killed, 
 but the sex could not be disccn^ered, a great majority of the judges 
 held that *' sheep " was a geneiio term, which included equally 
 rams, ewes, and wethers, and confirmed the conviction ; * an in- 
 dictment for stealing a sheep will now be supported by evidence of 
 killing a lamb ; * but whether a charge of stealing a horse would 
 
 Bi5 ; 
 
 l^l' 
 
 \i' 
 
 « Under § I of 14 & 15 V. c. 100 
 ("Tho Crimiiml I'locudui-e Act, 
 18 jl "), cited unto, § 249. 
 
 » 29 Law Mii<<. 12, U. 
 
 ' 7 & « O. 4, c. 29, § 25 (now 
 repealed). Tlie samo words are now 
 contained in 24 & 25 V. c. 90 ("The 
 Larceny Act, ISiil"), § 10. 
 
 « K. V. Ml'iiUev, lS:iS; K. v. 
 Bannnin, 1.S.'59 (Ir.). Tlieso cii.ses 
 overrule R. v. Puddif<jot, 1829. 
 
 • R. ". tSpicer, 1IS45, overruling R. 
 V. Loom, 1827. Tho decision in R. 
 V, Loom was under the repeulod Act 
 of Id a. 2, c. 34, which, like the Act 
 
 of 7 & 8 O. 4, 0. 29, § 25, specified 
 Iambs ac well as slieop. In an old 
 Act of 25 II. 8, c. 13. §§ 2, 13, which 
 is now re])('al(Hl by 19 & 20 V. c. 64. 
 f.n<l which ])rohibited persons from 
 havinfj above 2,000 sheep, it was 
 expressly enacted, that " 'ambs nnder 
 tho age of one wliolo 5'ear shall not 
 bo adjudged for sheep prohibited by 
 the statute." The special insertion 
 of such a clause leads rather to an 
 inference, that, without it, the men- 
 tion of tho grown aumial would have 
 included the young. See next note. 
 
 214 
 
CHAP. 
 
 !•] 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF OFFENCE. 
 
 be sustained by proof of stealing a gelding, a mare, a colt, or a 
 filly,' is by no meane» clear. 
 
 § 291. When forgery was a capital offence, on prosecutions for 
 that offence great nicety was required in describing the instrument 
 forged. The law, however, is now happily amended, and the 
 punishment for forgery has become less severe but more certain. 
 For tlie Act of 1861, row governing the law on this subjent,* by 
 § 42, enacts that, " in any indictment for forging, altering, offering, 
 uttering, disposing of, or putting off, any instrument, it shall be 
 sufficient to describe such instrument by any name or designation 
 by which the same may be usually known, or by the purport 
 thereof, without setting out any copy or fac- simile thereof, or 
 otherwise describing the same or the value thereof." A similar 
 lasity of description is permitted, whenever any person is indicted 
 for engraving or making '* any instrument, matter, or thing," or 
 for using or unlawfully possessing any plate, material, or paper on 
 which any instrument, matter, or thing shall have been engraved, 
 made, or printed.' 
 
 § 292. Moreover in indictments, too, for offences under the 
 Debtors Act, 1869,* or the Bankruptcy Act, 1883,* it is sufficient 
 to " set forth the substance of the offence charged, in the words of 
 the Act specifying the offence, or as near thereto as circumstances 
 admit, without alleging or setting forth any debt, act of bank- 
 ruptcy, trading, adjudication, or any proceeding in, or order, 
 warrant or document of, any court acting under the Bankruptcy 
 Act, 1883." » 
 
 § 293. Generally speaking, the name of the person injured,'^ and, 
 indeed, the name of every person necessarily mentioned in the 
 
 I K 
 
 . ! li' 
 
 ' Probably it would be good; 
 " horse, mare, gelding, colt or lilly " 
 are the words used m 24 & 25 V. 
 c. 9(5 ("The Larceny Act, 18G1"), 
 § 10. Under an old Act, which only 
 Tnontioned "horses, goldiiigs, and 
 mares," proof of stealing a Jillji was 
 held to support an indictment for 
 stealing a mare : R. v. Welland, 
 1822. 
 
 » 24 & 25 V. c. 98 (" The Forgery 
 Act, 1861"), §42. 
 
 » Ibid. § 43. 
 
 * 32 & 33 V. 0. 62, § 19; amended 
 by 46 & 47 V. o. 52, § 149, subs. 2. 
 
 » 46 & 47 V. 0. 52, §§ 31, 163-167. 
 "The Irish Debtors Act, 1872," 
 contains a similar provision. 35 & 
 36 V. c. 67, § 19, Ir. 
 
 ' See, as to the old law on this 
 subject, 11. V, Biss, 1838; R, v. 
 Eobinson, 1817; R. v. Campbell, 
 1843; R. V. Waters, 1848; R. v. 
 Willis, 1845; R. v. Stroud, 1842; E. 
 V. Sweeny, 1841 (Ir.); R. v. Smith, 
 1833; R'. v. Evans, 1839; E. v. 
 Sheen, 1837 ; R. v. Hogg, 1841. 
 
 215 
 
 1 
 
 iJ 
 
wi;.: 
 
 '^1 
 
 
 11^ 
 
 NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS IN INDICTMENTS. [PART II. 
 
 indictment,' is matter of essential description, and formerly it must 
 have been proved with precision. There is, however, little room 
 for doubt that the court would now, in every case of meio 
 misnomer f^ direct an amendment to be made almost as a matter of 
 course." Still a question may ©ccasionally arise as to what the 
 nature of the amendment ought to be, and as to this, the following 
 rules, therefore, may furnish some guide : — Ist. If the name of the 
 injured party cannot be proved, it will suffice to describe him as a 
 person " whose name is to the jurors unknown." * 2nd. It is not 
 necessary to describe a party by what is, in strictness, his right 
 name ; but it will be sufficient to state any name he has assumed,* 
 or by which he is generally known, and the omission of a second 
 christian name has been frequently held to be immaterial.* 3rd. 
 An illegitimate child is not entitled to the surname either of the 
 mother or of the putative father, but can only acquire a surname 
 by reputation.^ 4th. The proper mode of describing a peer is by 
 his christian name and rank in the peerage ; but the christian 
 name may be omitted ; * and it seems that under the degree of a 
 duke, a nobleman may be designated by the simple title of " lord."* 
 6th. Foreigners of rank may be described by their christian names 
 and foreign titles, provided they be generally known by those 
 appellations ; •" or it will suffice, as it seems, to describe them by 
 
 ' See, as to the old law on this 
 subject, E. V, Dumnurry, 1841 (Ir.); 
 E. V. Walker, 1811; E. v. Jiush, 
 1818. 
 
 » See E. V. Welton, 1862. 
 
 » Under § 1 of 14 & 15 V. c. 100 
 (" The Criminal Procedure Act, 
 1851 "), cited ante, § 249. 
 
 * See E. 1'. Welton, 1862. 
 
 » E. V. Norton, 1823. See E. v. 
 Williams. 1836. In E. v. Toole, 1857, 
 where the only proof of the prose- 
 cutor's christian name was the state- 
 ment of a witness, who said that he 
 had see»i the prosecutor sign the 
 charge against the prisoner, and the 
 deposition before the magistrates, 
 and that the signatures of those 
 documents, which the witness iden- 
 tified, corresponded with the name 
 laid in the indictment, the court held 
 that the evidence was suSicient. 
 
 • Att.-Gen. v. Hawkes, 1830 ; R. v. 
 Berriman, 1833; E. v. , 1834; 
 
 Williams v. Bryant, 1839. But see 
 E. V. M'Anoruey, 1841 (Ir.) (Cramp- 
 ton, J.). 
 
 ' E. V. Waters, 1835; E. v. Clark, 
 1818. 
 
 8 E. V. Frost, 1855. 
 
 » E. V. Pitts, 1839, whore the pro- 
 secutor was described as " George 
 Talbot Eice, Lord Dynevor," instead 
 of "George Talbot, Baron Dynevor; " 
 P.. V. Elliott, 1839, where the words 
 were, " The Right Honourable Wil- 
 liam Fitzhai dinge, Lf)rd Segravo," 
 he being an earl. It seems that 
 "Edward, Bishop of Ilereforu, ' is 
 not a right description : E. v, Pitts, 
 eupia. 
 
 >" R. V. Gregory, 1846, where the 
 prosecutor was held sufficiently de- 
 scribed as " Charles Frederick Au- 
 gustus William, Duke of Brunswick 
 and Luneberg," his name being Ch. 
 Fr. Aug. Wm. D'Este, and he having 
 ceased to be the reigning Duke : £. v. 
 
 2lri 
 
CII. I.] I,'AME OF INJURED PARTY NEED NOT HE PROVliD. 
 
 tlieir chnfitinn and Burnames, with the addition of the word esquire, 
 that being the title which English ('oiirtosy confers on foreign 
 noblemen." 6th. If a parent and (rlrild bear the same name, it will 
 Buffice in an indictment to describe the latter by that name without 
 the addition of "junior."' And lastly, where joint-stock com- 
 panies, trustees, oi; other joint owners have been injured, several 
 Acts of Parliament have been passed, which render it sufficiont in 
 Buch cases to describe in the indictment one person only by name, 
 and to state that the offence has been committed against that 
 person, and another or others, as the case may be.' The same de- 
 Bcription * is allowed, under certain circumstances, in informations 
 or complaints before justices of the peace. 
 
 § 294. In some few instances it has been expressly provided by 
 statute that, to justify a conviction, the name of the injured party 
 need neither be alleged nor proved. For instance, on an indict- 
 ment against a person for any offence against the Act of 1861 
 relating to malicious injuries to property, it will suffice to allege 
 and prove that the prisoner did the act charged with intent to 
 injure or defraud, and no allegation or proof is necessary that the 
 prisoner intended to injure or defraud any particular person ; • 
 the law is the same in prosecutions " for forging, altering, 
 uttering, offering, disposing of, or putting off, any instrument,"* 
 or for obtaining, or attempting to obtain, any chattel, money, or 
 valuable security by false pretences ; ' — and, in this last case, the 
 indictment will be good,' " without alleging any ownership of the 
 chattel, money, or valuable security." Similarly, in indictments 
 for stealing, or fraudulently destroying, or concealing wills," or for 
 stealing, or fraudulently taking, or maliciously destroying, records 
 
 Sulls, 1800, where, in an indictment 
 for larceny, the goods stolen were hold 
 to bo properly laid as the property of 
 Victory, liaroness Turkhoim, the pro- 
 eecutrix being an Alsatian lady, whose 
 real name was Selina Victoire. In 
 both these cases the parties were well 
 known by the names used. 
 
 > R. V. Graham, 1791. 
 
 » R. V. Peace, 1820; E. v. Hodg- 
 son, 1831 (Parke, B.) ; R. v. Bland, 
 1832 (Bolland, B.); Sweeting v. 
 Fowler, 1815; B. v. Bayley, 1835. 
 See ante, § 195. 
 
 » 7 G. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law 
 Act, 1820"), § 14. See, also, 7 G. 4, 
 0. 40 ("The Countiy ]3anker8 Act, 
 1826"), §9. 
 
 • 11 & 12 V. c. 43 ("The Summary 
 Jurisdiction Act, 1848"), § 4. 
 
 » 24 & 25 V. c. 97 ("1110 Malicious 
 Damage Act, 1861 "), § 60. See E. 
 V. Newboult, 1872 (C. C. R.). 
 
 • 24 & 25 V. c. 98 ("The Forgery 
 Act, 1861 "), § 44. 
 
 ' 24 & 26 V. c. 96 {" The Larceny 
 Act, 1861 "), § 88. 
 
 • Id. S 29. 
 
 217 
 
1 
 
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 1 
 
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 1 
 
 DESCUIPTIVE ALLEGATIONS IN ACTIONS. [PART II. 
 
 or legal documents,' or for stealing fixtures attached to any square, 
 street, or place dedicated to public use or ornament,'^ it is not neces- 
 sary to allege that " the article in respect of which the offence is 
 committed is the property of any person." 
 
 § 295. The prisoner's name is not a matter of essential descrip- 
 tion, because on this subject the prosecutor may have no means of 
 obtaining correct information. Therefore, if it, or his addition, be 
 wrongly described, or the addition omitted, the court may correct 
 the error, and call upon the prisoner to plead to the amended 
 indictment.' 
 
 § 290. The rule that proof must be given of descriptive allega- 
 tions, which are essential, need not be illustrated with regard to 
 civil actions, because that subject has already been discussed, while 
 examining the cases that have been decided on the Rules authorising 
 amendments.* 
 
 hi 
 
 > 24 & 25 V. c. 96 (" The Larceny 
 Act, 1861 "), § 30. 
 
 « Id. § 31. 
 
 » 7 G. 4, c. 64 ("The Criminal Law 
 Act, 1826"), § 19. See R. v. Orchard, 
 1838, where a woman charged with 
 
 the murder of her hushand, being 
 describtd as " A., the lui/e of B. C," 
 the record was nmonded by inserting 
 the word "widow" instead of "wife 
 (Ld. Abinger). 
 * Ante, S 227 et seq. 
 
 218 
 
 m 
 
 \ 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 218> 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 Relation of Pleading to Evidence The rules of pleading exert 
 
 in certain directions a controlling intiuence upon the admissibility of 
 evidence. They determine also which party has the onus of convin- 
 cing the tribunal, to a i)redetermined extent, of the truth of facts in 
 issue. As the only admissible evidence is that bearing on facts iu 
 the issue or relevant to the issue, the issue is an absolute limitation 
 upon the facts provable in any given case. As sui!h, a very natural 
 habit may be noticed on the part of the court to rule that evidence 
 offered to prove facts other than those in issue or relevant tlu-reto, 
 is not admissible to prove such facts; — as if such an exclusion 
 were under some rule of evidence. 
 
 The truth, however, fretiuently is that, in such a case, the evi- 
 dence offered is excluded not by the rules of evidence, but i)y those 
 of pleading. Very possibly the evidence offered to prove the fact 
 is perfectly (lompetent by the rules of evidence to i)rove it if the 
 fact itself were competent. It is not, and therefore evidence to 
 prove it is not admissible. The pleadings have not made tlie fact as 
 to which evidence is offered relevant, — a circumstance which the 
 rules of evidence themselves have no power to control. 
 
 Frr rontra, a ruling is f recpiently made that evidence is admissible 
 to prove a certain fact when no possible question has been or eoidd 
 be raised that the evidence is competent to prove the fact in any 
 case where the fact itself would be admissible, and all that such 
 ruling in reality amounts to is a statement tliac und»'r the pleadings 
 tiie fact itself can be proved, 
 
 Tlio object and function of the pleadings being to l)ring tiic par- 
 ties to an issue of fact upon some one or more material fact (ir facts 
 atfinned on the one side and denied on the other, it is of importance 
 in any given c;tse to determine what facts are material, for it is only 
 on these tliat issue can be taken. To iiscertiiin tiiis, namely, what 
 are the material allegations of fact in any case, resort must lie had 
 neither totl'fl law of evidence (whicii decides iiow a fact in issue may 
 1)1! proved) nor to the law of pleading (which determines wliat material 
 facts are placed in issue, and how ir should i)ro|)erly be iloiie) Init to 
 the rules of the branch of the substantive law involveil in tiie casi'. 
 In other words, what allegiitinns are material in any given matter is 
 a ([uestion of positive law ; which of these material allegations is 
 placed in issue, is a question of pleading ; how such allegation, when 
 placed in issue is to be proved or disproved is; a<pu'stioii of evidence. 
 Tliere seems, as lias been saiil, an unfortunate tendency to turn 
 many of the riiles of positive law or pleading into rules of evidence 
 sinijily by saying that evidence is not admissible to prove a certain 
 fact, or that the opposite of it is "conclusively |)re8umed *' when 
 
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 M 
 

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 2182 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 what is meant is that, as a matter of i^eading, the fact is not in 
 issue or perliaps, as a matter of positive law, is not material. Or, 
 on tlie other hand, to rule, as if on a point in the law of evidence, that 
 evidence is admissible to prove a certain fact when what is meant is 
 that, as matter of jiositive law, the fact is material and that, as a 
 matter of pleading, it has been placed in issue. 
 
 That the evidence offered must tend to prove some fact placed in 
 issue by the pleadings, is abundantly sustained by authority. 
 
 " It is a settled principle, that no evidence can be admissible, 
 which does not tend to prove or disi)rove the issue joined." Hudson 
 V. State, 3 Cold. HCtii (180G). " The prinoiph; is, that all the evidence 
 admitted must be pertinent to the point in issue." Com. v. Choate, 
 305 Mass. 4")! (1870). 
 
 " Evidence was introdu(!ed .... tending to show that the defend- 
 ant held possession of the property under some other right than 
 under the contract. In so holding the Court erred, for the reason 
 that there was no such issue." J'^oline Plow Co. i: Braden, 71 la. 
 141 (1S87). 
 
 " The fact that, &c did not tend to prove or disprove the 
 
 issni! joined." Hawkins t\ James, 09 Miss. 274 (1H91). 
 
 "The end and jiurpose of testimony in legal proceedings is to 
 arrive at the truth of the issues between the parties." Turnbull v. 
 Itichardson, 69 .Mich. 400 (1888). "Collateral facts are not admis- 
 sible. The evidence must be relevant to the issue, that is, to tiie 
 facts jmt in controversy by the jjleadings." Nickerson v. Gould, 8L' 
 Me. 'tVJ (18!>0); Grand Trunk II. 11. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 
 454, 4()9 (I87r»). 
 
 Where the issue is not defined, "and whereof course, at the time, 
 it is often impossible to anticipate what (piestions may arise in the 
 course of the trial, the rule in such cases is, that the testimony 
 slionld be received, if it is competent evidence in any view of the 
 case wiiicli may be thereafter taken," Harris r. Holmes, .'iO pt 302 
 (1808) jM-r Ked'fi.'ld, ('. J, 
 
 KviiiKNcK .\i>MiTTKi> i>K HKNK. — As a party can prove but one fact 
 at a time; and as a strictly logical order of proof, especially wlien 
 offered by different witnesses, is not ahv.nys i)Ossible, except at great 
 practical inconvenience, courts frecjnently receive evidence condi- 
 tionally upon its being (lonnected later; i.e. made relevant and 
 otherwise admissible, " Wc agree," say the supreme court of (lon- 
 nectieut, " with tiie defendants' counsel that, as a general rule, no 
 evidence should Im' admitted till the court can see that it is admis- 
 sible, Wht're Ijowever the admissibility of eviihiuce depends up(m 
 several facts, to some extent independent of each other, and where 
 eaith fact must be jiroved to (tomplete the chain of evidence, the exer- 
 cise of a sound judicial discretion does not require the court, uiii- 
 formiy, to interfere in the order of the testimony. A beginning 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 218- 
 
 must be made somewliere ; and when, as in the present case, the eouit 
 is satisfied that tlie party is actini,' in good faith, and intends fairly 
 to supply each particular link till tiie chain of testimony is j)erfect, 
 the evidence, as offered, may come in, subject to objection, to be 
 stricken out and j,'o for nothing if the necessary connecting ])ortion 
 be not supjdied." Moppin v. .Etna Axle, &c. Co., 41 Conn. L'7 
 
 (1874). 
 
 Such a ruling, being as to the order in which the evidence may be 
 
 introduced, is matter of judicial discretion, and therefore not a mat- 
 ter to which an exception may be taken. Com. e-. Dam, 107 Mass. 
 210 (1871). 
 
 If the condition is not complied with, ami the other side does not 
 ask to have it stricken out or disregarded, there is no error on the 
 ])art of the court in not itself taking action in regard to the matter. 
 Reeve >'. Dennett, U.T Mass. 2.'} (18S7). 
 
 Kelkvaxcv. — Whether a fact tends to establish the existence or 
 non-existence of a fact in issue is a question of logic. As the views 
 of particular judges naturally differ as to the logical effect of facts, 
 it is not surprising to have the supreme court of Maine say, that 
 " the relevancy of evidetu-e of other facts, as bearing upon the proba- 
 bility or non-probability of the main fact in issue, has been one of 
 the most troublesome <pu'stions for the courts to decide.*' Nickers'Mi 
 r.G(mld, 82 Me. .'31 2 (181»0). 
 
 Tiie recognition of a logically probative effect on the issue lieing a 
 fact preliminary to the receipt of evidence, it is one to be decided by 
 the court. In exercising this discretion, it has been held that where 
 the fact offered in evidence seems to the court to be of but slight j)ro- 
 bative force, either because too remote in point of time or for other 
 reasons, it is permissible within reasonable limits, for the court to 
 reject it. tlones r. State, 2G Miss. 247 (18.");>) ; Morrissey v. Ingham, 
 111 Mass. ().'i (1872). 
 
 This discretion may be reviewed on exceptions and reversed wiiere 
 it appears to have been unreasonably exercised. Tims where a 
 defendant, endeavoring to show that he did not consent to his wife'.s 
 using lier own liouse, in which he also resided, for an illegal 
 imrpose, was tronfined to his acts during the time covered by the 
 iiidictuient, an exception to this ruling was sustained. " \Vlieii 
 tlie questiou is of the state of mind of a person at or during a jtartic- 
 ular time, which can only be shown by acts or speech, evideiu'e of 
 what he said or did for a rea.sonable time before, if it tends to sliow 
 a permanent or settled state of mind on the subject, has always been 
 admitted."' Com. r. Hill. 14.') Mass. .'{()"> (1887). 
 
 ICvidence that during ten days innuediat(dy i)rior to the date 
 alleged certain premises were used for the illegal purpose charged 
 in the indictunuit is eom]»etent. Com. r. Ferry, 1 1(5 Mass, 20;{ 
 (1888). The issue being whether u party was insane at a certain 
 
 i iU 
 
m 
 
 218* 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AllT II. 
 
 i^-- ■• 
 
 time, the court refused to uchnit evidence of such party's mental statt! 
 eight months after. " We cannot say that the judge who tried tlie 
 cause exercised tlie discretion confided to him erroneously." Wright 
 r. Wright, 139 Mass. 177 (1885). 
 
 It is not necessary that evidence offered should be sufficient to 
 prove any fact in issue. "If such were its tendency — if it were 'a 
 link in the chain of proof,' it was within the sphere of competency, 
 while its effect was for the consideration of the jury." Schuchardt 
 V. Aliens, 1 Wall. 359 (18G3). "Distinct matters, forming separate 
 links in a connected chain of title, often cannot convenientl}- he 
 given in evidence together. It is no answer to evidence, that it 
 does not prove the plaintiff's whole case ; if it is a link in the chain 
 of tlie evidence afterwards to be given, it is admissible." Haughcv 
 V. Strickler, 2 W. & S. 411 (1841) ; Tarns v. Bullitt, 35 l»a. St. 3o's 
 (18G(»); Tucker v. J'easlee, .'50 X. H. ](»7 (1.S5S) ; Com. r. Kenno, 
 134 Moss. L'17 (1.S8;!); Sanders v. Stokes, 'M Ala. 432 (1857); Co- 
 lumbus Omnibus Co. r. Semmes, 27 Ga. 283 (1859); Willougliby r. 
 Dewey, 54 111. 2()(; (1870); Farwell r. Tylir, 5 la. 535 (1857); 
 Comstock /'. Smith, 20 Mich. 338 (1870). 
 
 " Although, of itself, it may have been weak and inconclusive, yet 
 being derived from a legal source, and pertinent to the issiu', the 
 jury was the proper tribunal to pass upon it." liichardson v. Mil- 
 burn, 17 Md. ()7 (18<;0). 
 
 Au.xiLiAKY F.MTs. — If a fact bc admissible, all preliminary and 
 introductory facts necessary to explain it are efjually admissible. 
 As Mr. .,'ustice Stejiaen (Dig. Law. Kvid. pt. 1, chap. 2, Art. 8) says, 
 " Facts necessary to be known to explain or introduce a fact in issue 
 or a relevant fact, or which support or rebit an inference suggested 
 by the fact in issue or relevant fact, are relevant in so far as they 
 are necessary for these purposes respec tivcly." Thus the question 
 being whetiier a lease was verbally surrendered, evidence is (loiupe- 
 tent as to certain dealings between the landlord and tenant as to the 
 (juality of certain ale, comphiiut as to whi(!h was the cause and occa- 
 sion (>r tlie alleged surrender. Wallace r. Keiinelly, 47 X. .1. L. 
 242 (1S85). 
 
 in contests not held under the rules of tlie eomnion law, and 
 where, therefore, there are, strictly speaking, no j. leadings, the facts 
 in issue are deteriiiined by the nature of the investigation, and the 
 burden of producing conviction in the tribunal lies on him who asks 
 the iiiterveiiiion of the c<iiirt in his favor. 
 
 (Questions involving the power of the court in the allowance of 
 auuuidments and relating to th»^ suHiinency of allegations, etc., are, 
 it would seem, too closely related to the statutory procedure of the 
 several states to admit of profitable discussion. 
 
CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE CONFINED TO POINTS IN ISSUE. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CONFINING EVIDENCE TO POINTS IN ISSUE. 
 
 ill 
 
 § 298. We may now pass to the consideration of the second of 
 the four general rules which have been pointed out ' as governing 
 the production of evidence. This second general rule is, that the 
 evidence must be confined to the points '■ issue. These points having 
 been selected by the parties in their pleadings, as those on which 
 they are respectively willing to rest the fate of the cause,'' any 
 evidence, in support oi other facts, would be obviously improper. 
 Accordingly, in an action of defamation, where the issues raised by 
 the pleas of justification were whether the plaintiff's scholars were 
 "ill-fed, badly lodged, and covered with vermin," defendant's 
 counsel was not permitted to put any questions to show t'lat the 
 bf . a were also badly educated.^ In another action of the same kind, 
 where the defendant had only pleaded the general issue, Jjord 
 EUenborough would not allow the plaintiff to prove that the asser- 
 tions contained in the libel were false, observing : " There io no 
 plea of justification on the record, and, therefore, I can no more 
 hear a falsification on the one side than a justification on the 
 other."* Where to an action in contract {not founded, be it 
 obser^o'' '^n any allegation of fraud) the defendant pleaded the 
 Statute of Limitations, to which there was a replication that lie did 
 promise within six years, and the plaintiff did not reply fraud to 
 this plea, but siraidy denied the fact by taking issue on the plea, 
 the plaintiff was not allowed to prove that the action was grounded 
 on a fraudulent -eceipt of moncif by the defendant, and that the fraud 
 teas first diseorered nithin six years from the commencement of the 
 suit ; ' where the breach of covenant for which the action was 
 
 * Soo supra, § 217. 
 » Stqih. i'l. lir». 
 
 • lioldrou V. Widdows, 1824. 
 
 ♦ Stuart V. Lovoll, 1817; Cornwall 
 V. KichanlHon, \H2d, 
 ' Clark V. lloughum, 1823. 
 
 219 
 
 r 
 
 ■ ■»-■ 
 
 'Am 
 
 I i liiilil 
 
!;' 
 
 ;iii 
 
 iii= 
 
 ii 
 
 (ii 
 
 lii 
 
 I 
 
 
 w 
 
 NEW RULES OF PLE.VDING — THEIR OBJECTS. [PART II. 
 
 brought was that defonflant had not used tlie piniutiff's farm in a 
 husbandlike manner, but had committed waste, evidence of bad 
 husbandry not fii/iounfitig to mistc was rejected.' 
 
 § 299. The cases just cited were decisions under the old rules of 
 pleading. The new rules (Order XIX. of 11. S. C, 1883), are 
 intended to effect three material objects : first, to make each party- 
 acquainted with the intended case of his opponent, and thus to 
 prevent either side from being taken by surprise at the trial; 
 secondly, to save the expense of collecting unnecessary evidence ; 
 and thirdly, to bring legal defences more prominently forward on 
 the face of the record.* 
 
 § 300. Accordingly, it is provided, in general terms, that all 
 pleadings shall henceforth consist, first, of a statement of claim, 
 and of the relief or remedy sought ; ' next, of a defence, set-off, or 
 counter-claim ; * thirdly, of a reply,* if any ; and lastly, of a joinder 
 of issue on the one side or the other.* It is further provided that 
 ** such statements shall be as brief as the nature of the case will 
 admit," ' and that " every pleading shall contain, and contain only, 
 a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the 
 party pleading relies, but not the evidence by which they are to be 
 proved." * For example, if an agreement be alleged in any plead- 
 ing, it is not sufficient to aver generally its existence, and to state 
 its effect, but the party relying on it should state whether it be in 
 ■writing, or by parol, or the result of a series of documents.* 
 The phrase *' material facts " will include any facts which the 
 party pleading is entitled to prove at the trial.'" Thus, in an action 
 for breach of promise of marriage, the plaintiff may allege in her 
 Btateraent of claim her consequent seduction or infection, these 
 matters being important by way of aggravation." 
 
 § 301. Twelve other pleading rules have a material bearing on 
 the Law of Evidence. Rule 13 of Order XIX. provides that 
 
 > Ha^•i^' . Mantle, 1789. 
 
 • Soo Isaac c: Farror, ISUfl (Ld. 
 Abingor) ; Barnett v. Glossop, 1835 
 (Park ami Hoaanuuet, JJ.); Outsole 
 V. Mathers, 1830 (Ld. Abinger). 
 
 » Ord. XIX. r. 2. 
 
 *Id. 
 
 •Id. 
 
 • Ord. XIX. r. 18. See post, § 304, 
 also § 829, and Ord. XXVII. r. 13, 
 thoro citod. 
 
 ' H. 2. 
 
 • II. 4. flee Heap v. Marris, 1876; 
 Philipps V. Philipps, 1878, 0. A. 
 
 • lurquand v. f'earon, 1879, 0. A. 
 '* Miilington v. Loring, 1880, 0. A. 
 
 220 
 
CHAP. II.J FACTS NOT DENIED IN PLEADING — ADMITTED. 
 
 ** every allogation of fact in any pleading, not being a petition or 
 summons, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or 
 stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the opposite party, 
 shall be talru to he admitted,^ except as against an infant, lunatic, 
 or person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition." 13y 
 Rule 14, " any condition precedent, the performance or occurrence 
 of which is intended to be contested, shall be distinctly specified iu 
 his plc-ding by the plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be ; 
 and, subject thereto, an averment of the performance or occurrence 
 of all conditions precedent necessary for the case of the plaintiff or 
 defendant shall be implied in his pleading." Kule 10 provides, 
 that " the defendant or plaintiff, as the case may be, must raise by 
 his pleading all matters which show the action or counter-claim 
 not to bo maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or 
 voidable in point of law,* and all such grounds of defence or reply, 
 as the case may be, as if not raised would be likely to take the 
 opposite party by suiiirise, or would raise issues of fact not arising 
 out of the preceding pleadings, as, for instance, fraud,' the Statute 
 of Limitations, release, payment, performance, facts showing ille- 
 gality either by statute or common law, or Statute of Frauds.** 
 By Rule Ifi, "No pL /j, not being a petition or summnns, 
 shall, — except by way of aiiieiidmoif,* — raise any new ground of 
 claim, or contain any allegation of fact inconsistent with the 
 previous pleadings of the party pleading the same." 
 
 § 302. By Rule 17, ** it shall not be sufficient for a defendant 
 in his staiement of defence to deny (jcnerdlh/ the grounds alleged 
 by the statement of claim,* or for a plaintiff in his reply to deny 
 geucmllif the grounds alleged in a defence by way of counter-claim, 
 
 ' Sen Tildesley v. Ilarpor, 1S78, 
 0. A. ; Ilunis v. Guuiblo, 1S78 (Fry, 
 J.); Kultm-r. Tn-Kt'iit, 1H79. 
 
 'All cxcpption to this proposition 
 is coutiiiiR'd i" Onl. XXI. r. 21, 
 which provides, thut " no dufi'iiditiit 
 in an notion for tho rocovcry of himl, 
 who in in j)osscssion hy himself or his 
 tenant, wvA i)loiid his till<\ utdoss 
 bin dcfi'nci' di'ponds o:. iin ('(luitiihlo 
 ostato or rifi;ht, or he chiinis relief 
 U]ion liny e(|iiita))le ^roiiml apiinst 
 any right or titUi a-inerted liy tho 
 plaintiff." As to tluD role, aee Dan- 
 
 ford r. M'Aniiltv, 1883, ILL. 
 
 " Soo l)ost, <^ .''.iMi. 
 
 * See, also, Ord. XXTTI. r. fi, which 
 provide-), that " )io ?/«''• ii-^Hii/niifiit 
 shall lie necessary or nsed." Itut 
 ovfrvtiiinj; which was formerly al- 
 le<;ed l>y way of now assiffnment may 
 liereal'ter be introdnced by aineiid- 
 uiont of t)»e statement of eluiin, or l)y 
 way of reply. .See j'iarp i\ Hender- 
 son, 18"(i, as explained by Hull v. 
 Jive. lH7(i. 
 
 » Sen Harris v. Gamble, 1878 (Fry, 
 J.); liuttor V. Tregout, 187tf. 
 
 '>?1 
 

 w 
 
 IIIN- 
 
 lU 
 
 
 %'-r 
 
 f 
 
 'l f 
 
 W ;ii! 
 
 GENERAL ISSUE PRACTICALLY ABOLISHED. [rAUT II. 
 
 but eaob party must deal sppcificalhj with each allogation of fact 
 of which he does not admit the truth, except damages." llule 18 
 provides that, " subject to the last preceding rule, the plaintiff by 
 his reply may join issue upon the defence, and each party in his 
 pleading, if any, subsequent to rejtly, may join issue upon the 
 jirevious jjleading.' Such joinder of issue shall operate as a denial 
 of every material allegation of facsts in the pleading upon which 
 issue is joined, but it may except any facts which the party may 
 be willing to admit, and shall then operate as a denial of the facts 
 not so admitted. 
 
 § 303. The g ' ef*>ot of these rules — especially of the two 
 
 which are Inst citt -is t j 'o away in the .sfafrnitiii of (fr/rnrc witji 
 ■what used to be termed by i }x-.:al Pleaders " the General Issue." 
 Under the old forms of pleading, on an action, which was in form 
 one " ex contractu " (or founded on contract), being brought, when- 
 ever the defendant could show that no (/rht in fact existed before 
 action brought, he was allowed to do it under the plea of " never 
 indebted." Foi- examiile, in an ordinary action for yoo(f.i sold and 
 deliirred, the defenJant might, under the useful j)lea of " never 
 indebted," show either that they were paid for by ready money ;^ 
 that they were sold on credit, which was unexpired when the 
 action was commenced;' that tliey were bought through an agent, 
 to whom, before the expiration of the credit, the defendant had 
 remitted the price ;* that thoy were sold under a condition, that if 
 they did not answer their purpose nothing should be paid for them, 
 and that in fact they did not answer their purpose;^ that they 
 were sold under any special agreement, wliich had not been per- 
 formed;' that they were delivered under a contract of barter;' 
 that the goods delivered did not answer the description of the 
 articles which tlie vendor professed to sell;* or that they turned 
 out to be utterly uselcfs." 
 
 ' As to tho fffcct of not (li'livi'iiiij 
 a n'lilj', or itiiy KubMiMiuciit i»li.'iiiliu}j 
 ■within tlio i)n)]i('r jM'i'iod, mio Old. 
 XXVII. r. 13, cito.l post, § K2!). 
 
 » 15u.>(H(!y V. liunictt, 1H42. But 
 Bee Littlochild v. liiiiikH, 1845. 
 
 ' lirooiiificld I'. iSiiiitli, 1h;{(), ovor- 
 ruliii}? Edmonds r. ll'iirriH, IH.'H. 
 
 * yinyth V. Andi'i'soii, IHI!). 
 
 * UrouuttuU V. Lumb, lHHi. See 
 
 I auiond )•. Tliivall, 1S47. 
 
 " Hroomficid c. yiiutli, 1.S3G (Ld. 
 Abiiif^ci) ; (iaioy r. I'yko, hSIJi); 
 HiivHfldon I', Stuff, 18;j(i; Mo.^-uly v. 
 M'MiilI.'ii, lSJ(i (Ir.V 
 
 ' Jliinisou I. Luke, lh4); Smith 
 f. Winter, 1852; UrucegiiJlo y.ilinka, 
 185 ». 
 
 " (lompi'itz I'. HartHt, 1853. 
 
 * L'uubiiut V. i'uddou, 1835, recog- 
 
 222 
 
 il: 
 
ii 
 
 CHAP. II.] REPLIES — EVASIVE PLEADINGS. 
 
 § ']03a. a similar multi[)lit'ity of defences was open under the 
 plea of " never indebted " in an action for use and ocoupation. No 
 useful jjurpose is to be served by mentioning thenx in detail. 
 
 § ;U>;Ji«. Now, however, the grounds of defence are in all cases 
 (in the two above specified, as well as in others), recpiired to be 
 djxrifirdl/i/ set out in the statement of defence. 
 
 § aO'Ac. While in an action founded on contract a great variety 
 of defences was thus permitted to be raised (without any previous 
 notice to the plaintiff as to which of such possible defences the 
 defendant intended to set up), under the " general issue " (or plea 
 of " never indebted "), in an action founded upon tort a similar 
 variety and choice of defences was allowed under a " plea of the 
 general issiie," taking the form of " not guilty." The efect of 
 such a plea is learnedly discussed in BuUeu on Pleading.' B' 'he 
 Pleading llules of 1803 the operation of such a plea was co'isider . 'y 
 restricted. But even after the passing of these rules the pleu 'ji " not 
 guilty " had still, in some cases, a wide operation ; for instance, in 
 actions for fraud, its operation was to deny that the defend<.iit made 
 the representation charged, that it was false, that he . 'de it either 
 knowing it to be false, or even without a belief in its truth, that 
 he made it with the intent to induce the plaintiff to act upon it, 
 that the plaintiff did act upon it, and also that the plaintiff sustained 
 damage in consequence of so doing.'' Again, in respect of slander 
 for words not actionable in themselves, but which are so only hy 
 reason of special damage caused by them, a plea of " not guilty " 
 denied the speaking of the words, the speaking of them maliciously, 
 their use in the defamatory sense imputed, and the alleged special 
 damage.* 
 
 § 304. The general issue is, by the rules at present in force under 
 the Judicature Act, forbidden to be raised by a statement of defence. 
 But it will be observed that, by Rule 18 of Order XIX. it is still 
 allowed to be contained in the plaintiff's reply, the rule saying that 
 the plaintiff " by his reply nifii/ join issue upon the defence."* The 
 
 nis(>(l by Ld. D'»ninnn in IlayspUlnn 
 V. Staff, IHm; IJiiillio v. Koll, 1W8; 
 Obapol V. Uirka, 1833; Allou v. 
 rumoron, 1833. 'nioso cases over- 
 rule Roffoy V, Smith, 1834. 
 
 * 3rd edit. pp. (iO" ot so*!. 
 
 ' Htilluii oil i'loading, ubi supra, 
 p. 701. 
 
 » Wilby V. Elston, 1849. 
 
 * Soo auto, § 3U2. 
 
 4 
 
 223 
 
 I!! ^i I' 
 
\t\M 
 
 Mi 
 
 riiMi 
 
 ,:r 
 
 '11: 
 
 
 II. I 
 
 ,1, -.1 
 
 B! 
 
 H. -i 
 
 ri ' ^M 
 
 ISSUES TO !!!•: DKl'IXlTi: AM) Dl.SllNrT. [I'AUT II. 
 
 nile in quostion does not mean tliat the jilaintilT iiiiiHf tuko {lint. 
 course, llo may — except in a case where, under the ohl system <<t 
 oommon law pleading, a new assignment would have been neces- 
 sary,' — either amend hin claim under Order XXVIil., or traverse 
 the allegations in the defence generally or specially, or ounfosB and 
 Avoid them, or unite in one reply those several answers.' 
 
 § 305. Thus the whole object of the present system of plea<ling 
 is to narrow the parties to definite and distinct issues, and thereby 
 to diminish expense and delay, especially as regards the amount of 
 oral testimony required on either side at the trial.' 
 
 § 30fl. This object is further sought to be attained by the help 
 of various rules besides those which have already been cited. Thus 
 Order XIX., r. 20, provides, that " when a contract, promise, or 
 agreement is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the same by 
 the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial in fact of the 
 express contract, promise, or agreement alleged, or of the matters 
 of fact from which the same may be implied by law, and not as a 
 denial of the Icyalitij or sufficiency in law, of such contract, promise, 
 or agreement, whether with reference to the Statute of Fraui/n or 
 otherwise." Tiie effect of this rule is, that, whenever a party in- 
 tends to rely on the illegality or insufficiency in law of any con- 
 tract, whether with reference to the Statute of Frauds, or other- 
 wise, he must specialli/ plead such illegality or insufficiency, and it 
 will not be sufficient to traverse allegations made by his opponent 
 in anticipation of objections to the contract upon such grounds.'' 
 Neither can a defendant avail himself of the Statute of Frauds by 
 simply raising in general terms by his pleading a point of law' (the 
 substitute for the old general demurrers" ), nor will it suffice for hira 
 to state generally that he relies on a statute, but the facts which 
 make the statute applicable must distinctly appear on the plead- 
 ings.' 
 
 § 307. Again, Rule 5 of Order XXI., provides, that " if either 
 party wishes to deny the right of any other party to claim as 
 
 » See ante. p. 221, n. «. 
 
 « Hall V. Eve. 187«. C. A. 
 
 • Thorp y.IIoldsworth, 187()(Jessol, 
 M.R.); Byrd i-. Nunn, 1877, (I A. ; 
 Tildesloy v. IIiirptT, 1878, C. A.; 
 Collctto V. Goodo, 1877 (Fry, J.). 
 
 J.) 
 
 * Clarke v. Callow, 1870. 0. A. 
 » Futcher v. Futchor, 1881 (Fry, 
 
 • Ord. XXV. rr. 1, 2. 
 
 ' PuUeu V. Snelus, 1879. 
 
 224 
 
 kk. 
 
 \ 
 
!| 
 
 nitAF. II.] WANT OF STAMP — OF JUUISDICTION. 
 
 executor, or as trustee, whether in bankruptcy or otherwise, or in 
 any representative or other alleged capacity, or the alleged consti- 
 tution of any partnership firm, ho shall deny the same speci- 
 fieally." 
 
 § 308. Sometimes it will be difficult to reconcile this last rule, 
 and also Rule 13 of Order XIX.,' with certain e.xpross enactments. 
 For example, if in an action on a doc^tor's bill the statement of 
 claim allege that plaintiff is a " legally qualifio(l medical prao- 
 titionej'," ^ an omission to specifically deny this statement amounts 
 to an admission of the fact. But the Medical Act of IHOH' 
 expressly enacts that " no person shall be entitled to recover any 
 charge in any court of law for any medical or surgical advice, 
 attendance, or for the performance of any operation, or for any 
 medicine which he shall have both prescribed and su])plit'd, unltsss 
 he shall prove upon the trial that ho is registered under the Ai;t." 
 Yet it cannot be that a qtiiick doctor, who must inevitably bo 
 nonsuited in any county court, would have a fair chance of 
 recovering his charges, if he sues in the High Court. 
 
 § 309. Again, it would appear to follow that the objection that 
 an instrument is not stamped, or is insufllciently stiiinpod, cannot be 
 taken at the trial by a party who has nut relied on that point in 
 his pleading.* But when the document is offered in evidence, 
 these pleading rules do not affect the steps which must be taken 
 either by the presiding judge, or by the ministerial officer of the 
 court, to protect the interests of the Revenue. 
 
 § 310. Moreover, the question how far a defendant can avail 
 himself of want of jurisdiction in tlie court witliout raising that 
 defence by means of a si)eoial plea, does not seem to have been set 
 at rest by tlie rules of pleading under the Judicature Act, aud is 
 m an unsatisfactory state.* 
 
 , I 
 
 > Oitoilante. §;{01. 
 
 » Soo 21 & 22 V. c. flO, § 34. 
 
 » I<1. § 32. 
 
 * Sooi us to tho old liiw. Field v. 
 Woods, ln:)7; 1 »aWHon r. Macdoiiiild, 
 18:J«; M'DowuU i'. lij-stor, 183(5. 
 Seo. ulso, ))()8t, § 397. 
 
 » Scfi Spoonor V. Juddow, ISJS-flO, 
 P. C. , whuro tho I'rivy Council decided , 
 thatwhon tho facts ouHtiug thojuiis- 
 
 T. \0t. I. 
 
 diotiiiu urn lnonjjht liy tho plniiiliff 
 hiiiiHi'lf to tho iiotico ot' tho court, the 
 niero oiiiisMion of th(! dofonduiit to 
 plead 8])ccially will not givo tho 
 court jurisdiction over tho suit, hut 
 it will ho lM)und, whatever ho tho 
 nature (»f the issues raised, either to 
 nonsuit tht! plaintiff, or to din.-ct a 
 verdict for tho defendant, but do- 
 cliui'd to state what would be tba 
 
 225 
 
 J 
 
I i; 
 
 i*!i 
 
 PLEA OF NOT GUII/IY BY STATUTE. 
 
 [PAUT II. 
 
 § 311. Tho numerous niiaos in whioh a defendant is exi)ros.sly 
 empowered to picttd ^' Nut (Jiiiltii In/ stutntc,''^ and to give speeiiil 
 mutter in ovi<lence under suoli pleii, are nf)t affected hy the preeont 
 pleading rules further than tluH, that the party who intends so to 
 I)leftd cannot " plead any other dofeuoe to the same cause of acition 
 without tho leave of the court or a judge ; " ' and raust " insert in 
 tho margin of his pleading the words ' By Statute,' together with 
 the year of the r«Mgn in whicjh the Act of Parliament on which he 
 relies was passed, and also tho chapter and section of such A(!t, and 
 ppecify whether such Act is public or otherwise ; otherwise such 
 defence shall be taken not to liave been pleaded by virtue of any 
 Act of l'arliam(>nt." * 
 
 S -'J 12. Under this form of general issue a defendant may some- 
 times give special matter in evidence so as to be entitled to lely 
 upon the want of notice of action, or a tender of amends, or on 
 some other special protection given by a particular Act of Parlia- 
 mont. lUit when such a privilege as this is claimed by virtue of 
 liaving (ictvd in cm office, or under a statute, it is extremely difficult 
 to lay down, as an abstract prop()8iti(m of law, what amounts 
 to such an acting in piirttiifince of the xtatntc, or in the execution of the 
 office, as to entitle tho defendant to the protection of the statute.' 
 This much, however, may safely be stated, that if a party believes, 
 bona fide, in the existence of a state of facts* which, if they had 
 existed, would have afforded a defence to tho action,' he is, —with- 
 out reference to the reasonableness of such belief," — entitled to pro- 
 
 m ■ 
 
 m 
 
 Iiiw, if tho i)liiiiitifT wcifl to close liis 
 case without hetriiyiuf.j tho want of 
 jmisilictiou. and the; (Icfeiidaiit wore 
 tlion, without any Hjiooial plea raisin;? 
 th(! jioiut, to oi, T evittoiico of facts 
 with a view of showing? that the 
 cause of action was ultiu vires. 
 
 ' Old. A' IX. r. 12. 
 
 » Old. XXL r. 19. 
 
 ' Si!o Anicdd c. Ilainol, 18.54 ; 
 and .Kirliy '■. Simpson, IS.VJ, where 
 a i;iairistrati', actin;? in (^vci'ution of 
 his ollico malii'iintsly and without 
 roa-iiiuablu and i)robal)h) cause, was 
 hohl outitlcd hy 11 & 12 V. c. 44 
 ("Tlio Justices' Proti'ction Act, 
 1S4S "), § i» (nowrt'pcak'd hy 57 & 08 
 V. 0. 50), to notice of uctiou, 
 
 226 
 
 * If there are no facts on wliich 
 a hoiiii fide hidiof can rcasonahly ho 
 founded, tho jirotcnrtion will not 
 apply: A;;no\v c. Johson, 1H78. 
 
 * Ilcrnuuin c. Siuicsclial, lH(i2 ; 
 Heath V. Ur ..cr, 1H(>4; Mid. Ky. 
 Co. V. Within^rton Local Hoard, 
 188;}, 0. A. ; Itolxats /•. Orchard, 
 18();j. .Sfo l)owninj; c. Capol, 18(57; 
 Sclnics c. Judp", 1871. 
 
 * CliainJM'rlain ''. Kinp, 1871. Prior 
 to this decision, it was tliou;;ht by 
 many tliat the beliof, to be availubhi, 
 must liavo rested " on some coloiii' of 
 rtsason." See (.'auii v. Clipperlon, 
 18:J!»; Cook V. Leonard, 1827, as 
 qualitied in Jones r. Uooday, 1842. 
 8oe, also, Kiuo v. Jivorshod, 1847; 
 
 n'M 
 
CHAP. II.] PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY STATUTE. 
 
 ttMjtioii, although lio iiiiiy havo proeeedod ilh'f^ully or exoeotk-J 
 his jurisdiction.' Stiitutos of this kind are inti^uded for tlio pro- 
 teetiou of honest jMjrsons, wlm bontl fido mean to discharge tlieir 
 duty ; ' and the court will, consetiuontly, so interpret theii' provi- 
 fiioiiH, H8 to save harmless all persons who act illfgully under tho 
 reiisoiiiihle belief that they are authorised in wliut they do by Act 
 of rurliament ; and this, too, whether tho error complained of has 
 been comn;illed In respect of fitiic, pfarr, or rirciiiihs/diicr.^ 
 
 §313. Under a plea of "iVW Giii/fi/ hj/ .stntufr" a defendant 
 may, too, clearly set up any defence that could he specially ph-aded, 
 whether it he founded wholly or partly on the statute, or be merely 
 KUJ-tainable at common law.* For example, in an action for an 
 excessive distress, such a plea puts in issue not only the matter of 
 justification, hut the tenancy and the ownership of the goods.* This 
 being the ca.se, the courts will not, in general, allow a defendant to 
 plead "not guilty by statute," together with any other defence; 
 but if a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the defendant, in 
 regard to tho particular act complained of, is entitled to such 
 a plea, the rule will, in favour of substantial justice, be some- 
 times relaxed." 
 
 § 314. It may be added in connection with this subject that' so 
 nuich of any clause or provision in any Act commonly called 
 Public local and persoiud, or Local and personal, or in any Act of 
 a local and personal nature," whereby any party was entitled, 
 
 Tippto V, Hurt, 18(iS ; Spoonor v. 
 Jiiddow, lHJ,S-.j(), P. U. (Lil. (.'iiiiii)- 
 l)ull); Booth V. Clive, l.S.Jl ; \\vm\ r. 
 Coker, lHo',i; Arnold r. llanicl, I,Sj4 ; 
 lii'i'iiiaiui r. Si'iR'si'hal, IN(i;{. 
 
 ' IIiizoldiiKi r. Orovo, IM'2; Spooncr 
 V. Jiiddow. 1848-(iO, 1*. ('. ; Jont^s c. 
 (ioodav, IM2 (Piiik(» u/id AldtMsoii, 
 ]U{.);"Thi'olmld r. Ciulmiorc, IHKS 
 (lid. Elleiilior()ii{,'h, luid liMvlcy. J.), 
 i^t'c, further, Kliot v. Allen, IHl.) ; 
 [Slmtwoll r. lliiU, 1842; Hopkins r. 
 ( "rowo, 18;}( Lidstor y. Uorrow, l8;{i»; 
 JIuhIi v. Urn ; 18;}"; Smith r, Slmw, 
 182!»; Davis ?•. ('urlinf;, 181"); Voxv. 
 l{eid, 1849; Thomas v. Stei>h»)n8on, 
 iS.iU; Nowt^mc. iillis, ISoJ; i'oiil&um 
 V. Thirst, 18(i7. 
 
 ' Por Purko, B., in Jonos v. Oooday, 
 1842. 
 
 » lIii;,'ho8 c. Buckland, 184(> (Pol- 
 loek, C.B.); Horn c Thorn borou};h, 
 l.S4i», 
 
 * Ho89 V. Clifton, 1811 ; Mannd i>. 
 Monmouth Can. Co., 1812 (CretJH- 
 well, J., Htatin;,' tlio ^^cneral opinion 
 of t'lc ju(l;;cs); ]""isher i'. Thames 
 Jii c. l{y, Co., 18;17; Hainti i\ i)avev, 
 1 .td; Kaj.'Ieton v. Outtoridgo, 184;{ 
 ^Parke, U.). 
 
 ^ Williams I'. Jones, 184 1. I'ornn'rly 
 it also onalili'd a dciVnilant to disputo 
 tile eliaracter in wiiieh jjlaintiiV sued: 
 Tharpe r. Stalhvood. 184:1 (Cress- 
 well, J,). But see, now, Ord. XXI. 
 r. i), set out at § ;i()7. 
 
 « I.anf,'fonl r. Woods, 1844. 
 
 ' By o & () V. e. !)7, § .'J. 
 
 * As to the meai\ing of this phrase, 
 
 isnnraso, 
 SCO Biehards c. Eustu, 1846; Cuck v. 
 
 It 
 
m 
 
 
 
 m^ 
 
 W 
 
 ii.-i 
 
 i; 
 I 
 
 ''•:"' IJ 
 
 :li|i 
 
 PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY STATUTE. [PART II. 
 
 before tlio 10th of August, 1842, to givo Hpocial matter in ovidem-u 
 under the general issue, is rejx^aled. The Irish Coniniou Law 
 Proceduro Act of 18o-"{,' also repeals, by S <){>, " so mueh of any 
 Act of Parliament as entitles or permits any person to plead the 
 general isstie oidy, and to give special matter in evidence without 
 ])h'a(ling the same." lTnfortunat(»ly a similar clause is not to be 
 found in either of the English {-'(inunon Law Procedure Acts; and 
 the pleader is consecpiently still left to discover, as best ho may. iu 
 what cases the defendant may or may not avail himself of this 
 indefinite and comprehensive form of pleailing. 
 
 S -'{i 5. It will be recollected that a general pr()t(!otion to public 
 authorities is, in lieu of the plea of " Not (hiilty," now afforded by 
 the provisions of the I'ublie Authorities Protection Act, IHJ).'},' within 
 which is included every Junfice of the peace, siicd for anything 
 done by hini in the vxrcnfiim of hix offur} There are, however, 
 still in existence various statutes empowering delendiints to plead 
 the general issue, and to tender or jtay into court amends for the 
 injury complained of. In many of these* (but not in all of theiii*) 
 it is expressly enacted that tender of aoiends or payment into 
 court shall b(» specially pleaded.* 
 
 § 81oA. The general ruh* of law, as staleil above,' which limits 
 priHif to the matters put in iasue by the pleadings, has been supple- 
 mci.t.^d by express cMUUitment, as regards actions for infringement 
 of patents, by the Pat«'nts, Designs, and Trade-marks Act, 
 ISH^.J 
 
 (ifiit, INCJ; Kanictt v. fox, 1M7 ; 
 I'llkin^'tnii r. Itili.y, \MV \ Mi='il'". 1 
 
 V. Slllll|), lN.')ti. 
 
 ' l(i\- 17 V. e. il;i, Ir. 
 
 » .'ili iV :>', V. c. (il. ante. § 7:». 
 
 » S..e .'j(l * .'.7 V. c. (il ("Til) 
 ViiMic AutliorilicM I'ldlei'tiiin A<'t, 
 iKIIlt "), iiiiti', H 7;iA : iinij 1(11 till' i(ni- 
 Mtnictiiiii of li n'|ii'iili'il .'\rt (II \' \'l 
 V. «'. -I-I, M. it), Stic Kirliy r. Siiii|miiri, 
 18>H, uittnl unto, nnti's to § 'A\'i. 
 
 * Si'd, r,(/,, " Till' SeiiiMun'MClotlnnj; 
 Act, IHfiH" (;»J iS: ;j;i V. <•. ■•.7), ^ tl; 
 nnd, iilHi.. li O, '.>, «•. lit cTlii' His- 
 tiT-iH fur K.-nt Art, 17:17 "), §§ '.'(i, •.'! ; 
 iinii'niiiiil l>v " Tliii S. I,. l{t!V. Alt, 
 
 IHKS" (,-,1 V, r, :»). 
 
 ■• Sim. •(,•) iV •Id V. c. .'lO ("Tl.n 
 Uuni<n]itil (.'or|Miriiti<ins .Vut, lh8'J"), 
 
 22H 
 
 § •J'Jf!, HIlllH, 2. 
 
 " \\X {% 'MS rt Mi'.|, 
 
 ' Ifi.V 17 V. .'. .-.7. § •-•() of thin .\pt 
 |)roviiir.s UH I'lilJuwH : 
 
 "(1.) In an iictinn I'nr infiinp'- 
 n)<>nt III It ]iiiti>nt tlm ]iliiintilV niiiHt 
 ili'liviT with liis Htati'MH'nt of ciiiiiii, 
 or liy iinliT nf llif roiiii or the jmlp', 
 
 ut anv -"111 |ui'hf tinn-, iiiitirul.irN 
 
 of till' hri'iirhi's ('oni|iiaini'il of, 
 
 "(2.) The ili'fi'mii.nt niiist ileiiviT 
 with his Htati'iiii'iit of ili'tVuco, or. hy 
 
 oriliT of th lilt or a jinlui', at uii) 
 
 HiiliH<'(|iii'iit tiiiii', |iiii'tirularH of liny 
 oliji'itiims on wliith ho i-i'IIhh in 
 Hii]>|Hirt thiTi'iif, 
 
 ",;!.] If tint ili'fi'iiilant ilispiiti'i 
 
 .1 vuliility of thu )iutoiit, thu jiiu- 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
CHAP. II.] EVIDKNCE OF COLLATERAL FACTS EXCLUDKI). 
 
 § 316. The rule nonBuing evidence to the points in issue not 
 only prechidtw tlu) litigant parties from proving any facts not dis- 
 tinctly controvertod by the ploailings, bnt it limits the mo(ie of 
 proving even the issues themsolvos. Thus,' it excluders all evidence 
 of collatrntl fdih, which are incapable of affording any reasonable 
 presumption as to the principal matters in dispute. The reason 
 is, that su.h evidence tends needlessly to consume the public 
 time, to draw away the minds of the jurors from the points in 
 ife&ue, and to excite prejudice and misleail ; while tlio adverse party, 
 having had no notice of such evidence, is not prepared to rebut it. 
 The duo application of this rule will occasionally tax to the utmost 
 the firmness and discrimination of the judge; so that while he 
 shall reject, as too remote, every fact which merely furnishes a 
 fanciful analogy or conjectural inference, he may admit as rele- 
 vant the evidence of all those matters wliich shed a real, though 
 l)erhap8 an indirect and feeble, light on the question in issue. The 
 circuniHtancos of the parties to the suit, and the position in which 
 they stood' when the matter in controversy occurrcid, are generally 
 proper subjects of evidence ; and, indeed, the cliango in the law 
 enabling parties to give testimony for thems<>]ves, has rendered 
 this proof of *' xurroinufiiuj ciiriimataiircH " still more important 
 than it was in former times.* Accordingly, in an action for m«)noy 
 lent, the poverty of the alleged lender is a very relevant fact, 
 evidence of whic^h is admissible for the purpose of disproving tlio 
 loan.* 
 
 !i ;U7. Tlio most important facts which are excluded on the 
 ground of ivrehvuncy, are the acts and declarations, either of 
 
 tii'iiliii'H (li'livorod by him iiiiiwt Htato 
 nil whiit ^|-<lllll(lH ho <liMi)iit('M it, iiiiil, 
 if oiiit of thoMit ^I'diiiKlH ix wiiiit of 
 ii(iv<'lty, iniiHt Htiito tho tiiiuninil iiliicit 
 of till' orcviniiH ])ubli('ution or imiir 
 hIIi'ki'iI tiy liiiii, 
 
 "(I.) At tht« hearing no oviih-nco 
 t»huli, oxropt hy U'avn of tho conit or 
 H jii(l(^>, Im< aihiiiltt'il ill ]ii'iiiif of uiiy 
 ullt'K>><l iiifriiigi'iiK-iit oi oliji'ction, of 
 which piirticiihii'H urn not. ho ilclivurcil. 
 
 " (5.) riirtiiulurM delivered may ho 
 from timo t ) time amcndod, hy h'livo 
 of tliii court or a jiidfi:<<. 
 
 "(li.) On taxation of contM, rojjunl 
 ■hbll bo hud to the purtiiulurs du- 
 
 livcrnd hy tlio phiintifT and by the 
 di't'cndaiit.H ; and thi'y rcHpcciivcly 
 hIiuII not bii allowed any rostH in 
 ri>H|Hict of any |iartii'uliii' delivered 
 by tlieni, iinlesH the Hiinie in cerlilii'd 
 by the court or a ,jud^e to have been 
 proven, or to have been rcanoimblo 
 and proper, witliout repird to the 
 general coMt« of the cuMe." 
 
 ' dr. J'lv. §.')'-•, in part forHix liiiei, 
 
 • S»M( Woodward f. liiichuiiun, 
 INTO. 
 
 » Dowling V. Dowling, 18(10 (Ir.) 
 (I'igot. CM.). 
 
 ♦ Dowling V. Dowling, IbOO (Ir.). 
 
 
 1 : 
 
 i 
 
 if'! 
 
 ■ 1 
 
 ,1 
 
 I 1 
 
 229 
 
 !ii' 
 
\ 
 
 f 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 Ml' ■ 
 
 I ',!!■ 
 
 Willi 
 
 RES INTER ALIOS ACI.E EXCLUDED. 
 
 [r.VIir IL 
 
 Btrnngers, or of one of the pnrtios to the action in liis (leuliii;,'s 
 with strangers. Tliose, in technical language, are dcnonuiiutcd 
 " ITS inter alioH nrtcr." 
 
 § 318. A good example of matters being oxeludod for irre- 
 levancy, and as " res inter nlion nrfir," is that in an a<'tion to recover 
 goods by his assignees against a bankrupt's creditor, proof of the 
 commission of acts of bankruptcy, by showing that ot/icr goods 
 which, about the same time, had been delivered to other creditors 
 before the goods in dispute came into defendant's hands, had been 
 got back from them, was rejected. It wa.- suggested that tho con- 
 duct of such other creditors bor(> upon the case which was being 
 tried, a« it showed the conviction of the other crcditoi-s that they 
 had received the goods under tircuniHtances which did not entitle 
 then) to keep possession. Hut as their opinions, expressed after 
 the liat, could not have bi>en receivetl as evidence, so also evidence 
 of their acts, adduced for the purpose of raising an inference 
 respecting the ])revious intentions, either of themselves or of the 
 bankrupt, was iiiadiuiKsible.' To return, proof of llic usage of u 
 particular estatis however extensive it nmy be, is inadmissilile for the 
 purpose of importing into tlie lease of a farm on that estate some 
 B]iocial stipulalioiiH relative to the mode of cultivation ;* on a (pies- 
 tion between laudh.rd and tenant, win ther rent be payable <|uar- 
 terly or half-yearly, cvidenee of the mode in which other tt'nants 
 of the same huidlurd pay their rent is rejected;^ and where if was 
 necessary for a brewer to prove that he had supplied a puldieau 
 with good beer, other piiblicans were not allowed to show tliat, 
 during the same ])eriod as thecb-aling in ({uestion, hehad furnished 
 them with beer of an excellent ipiality, for a man may deal well 
 with some of his customers, though not with others.* 
 
 !i UUJ. Again, where the issue* is whether the jilaintifT's seholars 
 have been ill-fed, although eviilence is admissible to show tlie 
 gitirriil treatment <tf boys at schools, a witnens may not be asked 
 as to the comparative (pmlity of the provisions supplied by the 
 plaint ilF with those cr)nsimiod in a /w;7/n//rtr school ;•'* in an action 
 
 > Huckhinuut r. JmieH, |S;«>. KlleiilxiriiU);))). H<>fl, ,^\m^, \\\\\\'\\\\t- 
 
 • WdiiKTHlcv r. Dully, IH.)7. liuni ., II. ml, \hM\\ Hew <•. lliit.liiiiH, 
 
 > Cuitor V. I'lyke, itsil \\.i\. Ken- iHiil ; li.iw.uil r. Shewunl, IHIMI. 
 yoii\ * lleMion I'. WiililoWH, 1«24 (Al>- 
 
 ♦ Holcdiabo I', llewieii. IS1«(I,.|, l.ott, (".J.). 
 
 230 
 
 

 1 1 
 
 ClfAP. II.J CUSTOMS OF MANORS WIIKN AnMISSIULE. 
 
 ngainst a niarrieil woiiinn, wli^ro tltoro is nn issue wlu^tlior slio had 
 represented herself to the i)laintiff as a feme sole, and he had dealt 
 with her as such, evidenoo of the defendant's dealings with other 
 trad(>sinen is only admissihle, if at all, on the ground that she had 
 held herself out to others as a single woman in such a nmnncir us to 
 reach plaintiff's oars ; ' in an action by the indorsee against the 
 acceptor of a bill, where the defence is that tho acceptance is a 
 f()rgery, evidence that a collection of bills, on which the defendant's 
 acceptance was forged, had b(*en in plaintiif's possession, and that 
 some of them had been circulated by him, was rejected, as no dis- 
 tinct proof was given that the bill in (juestion had wrr Jhnmd part of 
 t/itif vnllrifioii} 13ut in an actiim fur ii nuisance to a highway by 
 jilacing a heap near it, evidence that ollnr horses (as well as 
 plaintiff's) had shied at it goes to prove that that piirtittular heap 
 is a nuisance, and such evidence is acctu'dingly admit'sible.' 
 
 S ;Vj(). The two cases last (iited point us to an cjrviptioii to the rulo 
 under discussion, which is, that tn-idence of facts which, though col- 
 lateral, are proved to be couiirrtidhy W)n\*i gen(?ral link with tho 
 matter in issue, is admissible. There are numemus other instaniM** 
 of the recognition of this exc«'ption. Thus, although the ntxfuniH 
 of one iiKiiKir usually cannot be given in evidenct! to prove the 
 customs of another,^ yet such customs beconie evidence the moment 
 that a foundation has been laid for tlieir admission, by clear proof 
 of a sutHcient c(»nnection between tho two nwinors. Tlu' mere fact 
 that two nuinors lie within the same parish and leet, nor even that 
 th(* one was a subinfeudation of the other, will not be sullli i«>nt ; 
 at least, unless it b(* clearly shown that they weie separatrd after 
 the time of legal memory, since otherwise* they may have had dif- 
 ferent immemorial customs.* If, however, it can bo satisl'actorily 
 
 ' 'Hunli'H I', Kf'vcili.'rf?. IS.'l". Poo Siirli (•viilnici' wmilil Ih' ili'inly inud- 
 Siiiitl; I'. WilkiiiH, lH,'t;{, win re, tlio iiiiH-ilili' in an iiiilicttiii'nt Inr t'orp'iy 
 i|ii<>r<tiiiii lii'in); whi'tlii'i' I'l'i'iiit wuh (1,(1. I>*'nin:ui\ 
 
 );ivi>ii t4) lii'fcniiaiit'N wile ni' to )ii>r 
 fiitliiT, cviilrnci- that otlxT truili'mncn 
 liJiil Kivrn cnKlit tt> the f'ltlii'r was 
 rt'j.'itctl l)y Tinilal, CJ. Alxn Uolu- 
 lantlii I'. |',aii«. INIO. 
 
 ' OrillitH r. I'ayiif, IMMO; ThdUj))- 
 sim r. MtiHily, lh;t;i(l,(l. I,vnil)iuii*f); 
 Vincy V. llarHH, 17H') ( Ltl. Kt nvoii) ; 
 ]»al..'lU V. Hfiuni, 17!i'.' (Miilli'l, J.). 
 
 ' Hiowii ct iix I'. KaKtorn Coiiiitit'ii 
 Uy.. l.sHK, (". A. 
 
 * M. of Aiij^l'^'V r. I-<1, IlatlxT- 
 foii, IHVI (I,ti. Aliiiipii) ; Kuriii'aiix 
 ''. llutcliiiiH, 177H; l>oe v. SInmou, 
 
 * M of AukI'si'J' v. Lil. Ilutln.'ituu, 
 1H12. 
 
 'il 
 
COLLATKRAL FACTS 
 
 [PAHT II. 
 
 ■Ill j 
 
 (I 
 
 ^/roved 'lial I'^e cn8t(»iiis in the two manors are identical, ' ihai the 
 cue was derived frc/m tlie otlier after tlie time of llichard tho First, 
 then the customs of each will respectively become cnidence.' More- 
 over, whenever the custom in question is as to a particular incident 
 of a general tenure proved to be common to the two manors, 
 evidence may be given of what the custom of the one is as to that 
 tenure for the purjioso of showing what is the custom of the other 
 as to the same.' For instance, prove in a particular manor that 
 borough English or gavelkind prevails, and then you may see from 
 other manors what are the peculiarities of those tenures.' 
 
 S 321. Similarly, in the manors on the border between Scotland 
 and England,^ a particular species of tenure, called tenant-right, 
 and in the manors in the mining districts of Derbyshire and 
 Cornwall, partiotdur customs, as to the rights of the minors and the 
 rights to the nunerals, prevail. If in one of those no example can 
 bo rtddtioed of what is tho custom in any particular case, in order tc; 
 exjilain tho nature of the tenuri) or right in question, evidiMice is 
 adniissibh* to show what is the general usage with respect to that 
 tenure or right.* 
 
 S ii'22. Accordingly, too, \i\wx\ a question wliether the Crown, ir 
 right of the Dueh}' of Ijancastor, had the exclusive privilege, imder 
 an original chart<'r, of appointing a coroner within tho honour of 
 I'ontefraet, ovidenee of api>ointnients of coroners, and of flioir ail- 
 ing, in other parts of thepame duchy, was admitted.' On tho pume 
 princij*!", tho mode of conducting a particidar branch of trade in one 
 place may be proved by showing the "immer in which tlu? same 
 trade is carried on in a.xthor place.' .\;.ii) whore there is a dispute 
 as to tho exact lino of boundary b(ftwK ,. manors, evidence that the 
 alleged boundary is a uatnral one, and bounds ono of tho manors 
 from certain other manors (not the subjects of controversy) is 
 admissible, because the boundary being a natural ono, equally 
 
 ' M. of Aiifjh'Hoy r. lid. Iliithorton, 
 ISI'J ( .\l(l.Ts(,n, H.). 
 
 " 1(1. : Staul.iy 1'. Whito, 1811 (1,(1. 
 Elk-nbonniKh) ; II. v. KIIIh, 1H1;{ 
 fid.) ; 1). of SoincrHct v. 1''iiiim'(?, 
 I72( : rhinniiiiin »•. AtkinMon, 1(i72 ; 
 oxi)]aiii('(l(HoUc, IDinM.ofAii^jloHflv 
 V. I A. Ilafhcrton, \K\'l. 
 
 * M. cf Augluouy V, Ld. liuthuitou, 
 
 INI'.' (Rolfo, II.). 
 
 ♦ Howo V. I'liikor, 1792 {lA. Kon- 
 yoii). 
 
 * M. of An(?losoy »•. T,d. Ilatherton, 
 ISI'J (1,(1. A!.int?.T); liowo v. \S\vn- 
 toii. 1N2N. 
 
 • iliwinoti it. DyRon, IH42. Son 
 FIdft -. Mnrlon, 1871. 
 
 ' Noblo V, Kouuoway, I7b0, 
 
 232 
 
CHAP. II.] CONNECTED WITH FACT !>: ISSUE. 
 
 suitable ia botli onsc», it is higl-.ly unlikely to have beea 
 varied.' 
 
 S 32'i. Where, too, the question is wlictlior a slip of waste land, 
 lying between the highway and the enclosed lands of the plaintiff, 
 belong.s to him, or to the lord of the manor, — the loid may give 
 evidence of acts of ownership on othor jmrts of the waste land 
 between the v^w;^ road and the enclosures of othor persons, although 
 at the distance of two miles from tlio spot in dispute, and although 
 the continuity of the waste be interrupted.' Again, where, in 
 trespass, the plaintiff's object is to prove himself owner of the 
 entire bed of a river flowing between his laiul and that of the 
 defendant, and thus rebut the presumption that each party is 
 entitled ad medium filum aquoc,' ho may give evidence of acts of 
 ownership exercised by himself upon the bed and banks of tht; river 
 lower down the stream on the defendant's side, where the same 
 river flows between the plaintilf's lan<l and the farm of a third 
 ])arty, or of repairs done, beyond the limits of the defendant's land, 
 to a fon(H* dividing defendant's and other land from the river, 
 which runs for a considerable distance along the side of the strcMim, 
 till at last it comes actually opposite to the extremity of the plain- 
 tiff's property on the other side.* 
 
 ! t I 
 
 ' Urisoo I'. TiCmnx, 18;5ft. 
 
 • Doo I'. KiMiip, IS.U, ri'corf'iiy.od 
 (Paiko, H.) in JcncH r. Williams, 
 IN.IT; ]lrvuii V. Winwooil, i«08; 
 J>('ii(ly ('. Si;ii])s()n, \H')(\. 
 
 ' Auto, § Hit. 
 
 « In. lon.'sr. Williams, 18;n.P;irke, 
 H., ohservfs : — "I think thcovidonco 
 (ilTi'i'c'd of acts in annthi'r ]iart of one 
 rnntinuons Ikm'.jji". ami in tlic wliolo 
 boil lit tlin river, iidjoininj; tin' |ilain- 
 tin's lanil, was admissibli- in iivi- 
 (li-nui, on till' j,'ioiinil that tlwy aro 
 ciich acts as mi;;lit rrasoiialilv Icatl 
 to till' infuiTiici' that till' rntirc In'dpi 
 anil bcil of tho river, ami, ronMo- 
 qni'iitly. tilt' part in ilisjaiti'. hiilonjjji'il 
 to till' iiliiintilY. OwniT-iliip may hn 
 jirovod hy j)roof of poHsi'ssion, .ind 
 that can ho shown hy acts of onjoy- 
 mcnt r,f tlio lanil itself; hut it is iui- 
 ])Os-ihlo, in 'ho nature of things, t« 
 conllno tho oviili'iini to tho vory pio- 
 cisi' s])i'l on whii'h tho allo)fi'(l trcn- 
 pUHii niuy havtt Liwu uuuunittcd ; eri- 
 
 dencf may }if i/ivrn n/artx iloiifim aflier 
 jxiriit. jiriiriilid tliirr in mifh a couimou 
 I nntitir of luraliti; 'ittifrni tlmsr /mrt/i 
 tiiiit till- Hfiut III <iiiiKti<iii, us traiilil 
 riii»f a reasoiKihU iujimice i'« tht 
 miiiili <>/ tilt jury, ihut the plnrr in 
 ilin/iittf hihiiKjrd to thr fil'iiiiUff if tht 
 iilhi r i-'irl.t fliil. In ordinary ra-M's, to 
 jirnv!' his title to a closi', tho claimant 
 may <^\vi' in cvidi n'l' acts of owin-r- 
 hhip in any part of tho same on- 
 cloiuiro ; for tho owiii'imIh of one 
 part cansi's a roasonahli' infori'iico 
 that till' other hrlon^s to the ^amc 
 
 })i'rson ; thoii;,'h it hy no means fol- 
 iiws as a necessary ciin-'i'i|iience, for 
 dilVerent persons may huve halks of 
 land in the same enclosure ; l>ut this 
 is II fact to he Huhmitteil to the jury. 
 Ho, I anprehend, tin ^llme rule is 
 iipplicahlo to a wnuil which is not 
 enclosed hy any fence: if you prove 
 the eultiiifj of timber in one part, I 
 lake that to he ovideliee to jro to H 
 
 jiuy to pt'uve a right iu thu whole 
 
1 
 
 illili 
 
 COLLATKRAL FACTS 
 
 [I'AUT il. 
 
 § 324. Tho same principle applies to the case of mines. There- 
 fore, on a chiim founded upon a demise of all mines and minerals 
 under a large contiguous area, evidence of working under one part 
 of the surface is evidence of possession of the entire subject of 
 demise.' 
 
 S ti'25. In oases, as those above referred to, it is for the judge to 
 decide,* whether such an unity of character exists between the spot 
 in dispute and tho parcel of land over whi'-h acis of ownership 
 have been exercised, as to lead to the fair inf<>rence tiiiit bo^h iiro 
 subject to the same rights, and constitute in fact but parts of an 
 entire ]troperty. If no stieh inference can be raised, evidence of 
 acts done beyond tlie limits of the locus in quo will be inadmissible. 
 YuT example, whcire it was attempted to connec^t parcels of wiislo 
 land with each other, by merely showing that they all lay within 
 the same manor, and between enclosures and public roiul.s, ovidt^nce 
 of acts of ownership over some of these lands was held inadmissible 
 to prove title to the others.^ 
 
 wood, altlidiipli tliuro Iw no fonro, or 
 (listiiict l«...uiluiy sundiiiiiliii^r tho 
 
 whdli' 
 
 (', till' CllMtl of Stuuli'v I'. 
 
 Whito, iNll, I coiiciiv"'. is to t)o 
 (•xj)l!<iiii'(l on tliin iniiiciplt' : tluro 
 WHS 11 (•(''.I'iiiiioiiM Ih'U ot trt'i'H, iinil 
 nets of owiu'i's'iiii on (iiic jmi't wcif 
 held til hif iidii.ir^-iblf to prove that 
 tho idain'ilf w;is Mil' owner olunipthcr 
 part, on whitli the tl•l•s|m^^wllH iniii- 
 niitted. So I »hoiild uiiply tlie i-aino 
 reasoiiiii); to a I'oiitihuoiiM ii< iltr*! ; 
 thoiij^li no duuht th.i ilelemlant 
 niijilil relmt the ii!f'>Hn<'c that tho 
 
 whole helollpd to tliv silne Jiclhon. 
 
 I)y Hhiiv. iiij.' aeti ol ownersliij) on his 
 
 Iiait ali>?ip Uii siniie I'eOie. It li.»rt 
 )eeii Miiii 111 the eniUKe of !h(> argu- 
 ment, that the i/(/i uliinl Inn! im iii- 
 frrid (ii i/ii>iiiili' 'Ai loY.i (i/ tiiiiiirKliift 
 not iiiijiiiitUi' h< ■ iiirii liihil ; hill 'lif 
 yroinnl im triii'/i inch nrtn iirf <iil- 
 mittibli it hOt the le ■luiiniiiirr of am/ 
 jHirly : ''n'l art tutn.) AiUr <•/ L m- 
 nrlvm iir.irri" i''<:--ri , _/'«•■ thtii tun! to 
 provf :li,ii he ahu dtn'n fJunt i* the 
 iiwiirr of ihr i»>U ; ,' .md/A •/ thri/ iire 
 iliiur ill tlir iiI'Miii; <;/' ill! ■■' rmiiiH in- 
 ttrcntid I'l diK/iIlt' /Aria, </i( ■, 'Iff i[l"tv»3 
 irriiiht," See, ul'o, H. r, Unj^htfido, 
 liiorluw, 184U; I'laidon v. Uiidcrliili. 
 
 234 
 
 1S,')(); Ponejiiill r. Temi.lemoro, IS.VS 
 (Ir.) (Christian,. 1. 1; ind In ro J^elfa^t 
 bi'ik Ait, lS(;(i-7 (Ir.). 
 
 ' Tiiylor V. I'any, IMO (Timhil, 
 C.J.I 
 
 ' hi :•. Kemp, 1S31 (iJoHiiniinut, 
 J.); ante, § '-M. 
 
 •' Hoe /. Kemp, 1K;J."). I,d. Ken- 
 man, in irivin;; jiiilj^nient, oliseiieH, 
 "It till' liii'ii has a litrlit to one |ii(ri) 
 of wiisti' hmd, it aD'Mids no inlei- 
 onee, even tile moht remote, that Ik- 
 luis a I'ifrht to another, in th<> Maino 
 matior, altlioii;:h liitli may he simi- 
 larly sitimtid with ii^pect to the 
 hii:ii«iiy ; assiimin).' that nil were 
 originally the jiio|ierty of flie hhihk 
 ]teisoii, as the litrd of lh ' manor, 
 'A h'l h is all that the fait of tliiir 
 bi ill); in 'he same maimi' prii\ .'s, no 
 preMuni)ition liriscs fmni liis retain- 
 iii); one part in his hunds that he 
 refaineil iinother; nor, if in one part, 
 of the manor the lord has dedirate.l 
 a Jiortion of the waste to the use of 
 tlie plihlie, iilid ^'Milted out the ad- 
 j'linin^ land to private individuals, 
 does it hy any means follow, iiiir 
 dix'H it raise any prohahilily, that in 
 aimther part heiiiaynot have^ranled 
 tho whole out to private iudividuuU 
 
CHAP. II.j WHEN EXCIADKU IN CKIMIVAL CASKS. 
 
 S I{2(). Tho rule that ovitlcnco must be strictly confined to the 
 points in iusuo (as liniitod in the nmnner above stated), a]>{)lieg 
 with oven greater force to n-iininul than to civil proceedings. 
 An indictment should afford distinct information to the prisoner 
 of the specific charge about to bo brought against him. There- 
 fore, the admission of any evidence of facts unconnected with 
 that charge, and relating to acts alleged to have been doms at 
 a different time or jjlace, would be clearly open to the sori'>u8 
 objection of taking the jirisoner by surprise. No man should be 
 bound, at the peril of life or liberty, fortune or reputation, to 
 answer at once and unprepared for every action of his life. Few 
 even of the best of men would choose to submit to such an ordeal.' 
 Consccpi'jntly, if <m an indictment for burglariously entering a 
 house on a certain day and stealing gooils therein, the prosecutor 
 fail in ])roving that any larceny was committed on that occasion, 
 he cannot abandon the charge of burglary, and then proceed to 
 show that the prisoner stole some of the articles mentioned in the 
 indictment on a prcrious occasion ; because, though time is not 
 usually a material allegation, yet the prisoner, having been led to 
 suppose that he was to meet a charge of burgliirv, ciinnot be 
 expected to come prepared to prove his innocejice with ropect to a 
 distinct offence, saitl to have been committed at a totally di'?irent 
 time.' Accordingly, too, an admission by a prisctner that he has, 
 at (inof/iir liinc, committed an offence similar to that with which he 
 is charged, and has a tendency to jierpetrate su< h crimes, cannot 
 bo received.' Thus, on a charge of firtinoii, no overt act amounting 
 to a distinct independent charge, though falling under the same 
 head of treason, can be given in evidence, unless it be either itscH 
 expres>ly alli gctl in tin- indictment, or bo direct proof of some or 
 one of tho overt acts which are there luid.* 
 
 and they iifterwuniM hiivo deilicuteil (Huxley, J.). 
 
 itiirt iiM 11 ]iu)>li<' iniid. Itiit the ciise ' l'"ii!st,, ( '. I,. 'J4fi. Vote the (\i»~ 
 
 !■< vei V dinVl'ilit willl ie-*|ieit to tho-e tilictinn lietweeu Nllrll cilMeM iiiul 
 
 jiaiteis, wliiih liiiiii Iheii lucal >itiiii- tlm^'e where a eliiiip" neiertsiirily 
 
 tioll limy he deemed |):Mts of one iHi-flirM some i.fhei' di-tiiict oU'eiiO'? 
 
 waste or comiiKm ; m-ts of ownership to liave heeii roiiimitted nt liif miint 
 
 ill oiii) |mrt. of tho same field, are t/'/n'- »fii/ /i/i/rc, us to whicth, Heu ante, 
 
 I'videllCO of title to the wliole ; and ^§ '.'(i.i ('< Xf'i. 
 
 the like may he said of similar acts ' It. c. \ andercninh, I'UO. 
 
 on Jiart of one lal^e waste or com- ' ]{. r. Colo, INIO (Ity nil flie 
 
 moil," See, also, Tyrwhitt c. Wynne, judf,'esV 
 
 1«1» ; lloUia V. "Uoldliich, 182;J « 7 W. 3, o. 3 ("The Trsuson A. t. 
 
 2lio 
 

 m 
 
 WHAT COLLATERAL FACTS ADMISSIBLE. [PART H. 
 
 § 327. When, however, aovcral/i'/oiiirs are so connooted togellior 
 as to form part of one eutira tranFaction, an exception to the 
 gciH'rul rule tliut oollatcral facts must he exchidod arises, similar 
 to that which prevails in civil cases,' and evidence of one felony 
 may be given to show the character of the other.' Thus, on 
 nn indictment for litealing (Is. from a till, evidence was received 
 that on one occasion, when the till contained marked silver and 
 other money, amounting in all to 12.s. G<i., the prisoner went to it, 
 and it was afterwr.ids found to contain lis. 6<i. only, and that on 
 Buhsequent exar.iinations of the till the money was perceived to 
 have gradually diminished, and that, on the prisoner being searched, 
 Ss. of the marked money was found on his" person ; for thougli 
 each unking was a separate felony, they were all so connected 
 together as mutually to illustrate and prove each other.* So whore 
 the lessee of a coal-mine had run lev(>ls from his own shaft into liis 
 neighbours' mines, and had, during a period of four years, been 
 constantly extracting coal belonging to thirty different proprietors, 
 an indictment charging him in one and the same count with 
 etealing the coal of each of these proprietors was held valid ; and 
 the judge refused to make the prosecutor elect on which casa he 
 would rely, but allowed him to give evidence in support of all the 
 charges, as at least furnishing proof of a felonious intent. ' 
 
 !5 ''}2H. Again, whc^re four indi(!tments against a woman respectively 
 charged her with poisoning her husband and two of hor sons, and 
 with ati«^raj)ting to poison a third son, on the trial of the first indict- 
 ment evidence was admitted that arsenic must have been taken by 
 the three sons a few months after their father's death ; that all the 
 four parties, when taken ill, exhibited the same symptoms; and 
 
 ll\d.') "), § 8, as oxpliiinid in Fost., 0. 
 li. 24.> ; citiiif; Ainlnoso Hookwond's 
 cast!, KiJIO; J-owick'n oiiso, HiOfi ; 
 Liiynr's cuso, 17'J2; Di'acon's chho, 
 17'iii ; and WrMldirbuino's cawj, 1710. 
 AwMJi'din^fly, <iii an indic^tinont for 
 ndlii'iinff to lh<i Kin^'n (tncniioH on 
 till' liifjh sea, wlioro tho ovni-t act laid 
 ■wuH tlu) nrimmdrVi cniiHin^ on tho 
 Kin^'u MinjcctH in a voHwd calli'<l tho 
 lioyal Cloncarty, dvidinco, without 
 unytliiiiK to ronni'ct it with tho overt 
 h<(m for whicl) 111' Wii-* J)"in«^' trii'd, 
 tliut hu hud buuiu tiniu butoiu cut 
 
 away the cUHtom-houKO barjyn, and 
 goni! a cruising in hiT, was ii'ji-ctod: 
 Vaujrhan'H caHo, l(}!)(i. 
 
 ' Ah to which, 800 Bupru, §§ .'120 — 
 325. 
 
 » ]{. I'. FlliH. 1824 (BayJoy, J.); 
 RouiH'll r. IlawH, 1H03, K. v. lloar- 
 don, \m\ (WilloH, J.). 
 
 » n. V. Ellis, 1H26. 
 
 * H. V. lUcuMdalo, 1848 ■&!«. J). 
 Son R. r. I'iith, I8<i», wieni the 
 piiHoniT was indicti'd for Btealin); 
 gao: IL. V. Iluuwoud, IblO, 
 
 236 
 
 I 
 
 |l"!i 
 
 
cirAr. II. J 
 
 IJOCI'UINK OF KLKCTION. 
 
 thnt tho woinaij, wlioliiid lived in tho saino hnuso witli lior huHbiind 
 aud oliiidrt'ij, Imd Itocn in tho lialiit of propaiiug thoir nioals, sneh 
 evidence going to prove, first, that tho husband (tlio Huhjfct of the 
 indictment tliat was then being tried) died of arsenic, and next, 
 that his (h'ath liad not been uccidental.' Where, too, a man 
 committed throe burghiri«'s in one niglit, and left at one of the 
 Ijouses property taken from another, the three felonies were con- 
 sidered 80 connected that tho court could hear tluj history of nil ;* 
 and similar evidence was received wljore a prisoner was charged 
 on three indictmojits witli firing throe slacks belonging to separate 
 j)arties, within sight of each other, which had all been sot on fire 
 at about the same time.' 
 
 ^ '62\). In connection with tho principle that rriiniiittl eases are 
 governed by tho general rule that evidence d collateral facts 
 cannot bo given txccpt where it is shown to bo immediately con- 
 nected in some way with tho transaction which is tho immetliato 
 subject of the inquiry, wo may usefully, with this first oxcei)ti()U 
 to such general rule,^ consider tho special rules of law, called tho 
 doctrine of cliclion, by which tho application of this exception is 
 limited. 
 
 ^ \V-l\)\. Now, in point of law, no objection can be raised, either 
 on demurrer or in arrest of judgment, though tho defendant or 
 defendants be charged in different counts of an indictment with 
 dlll'erent oU'ences of the same kiml.' In<li'ed, on the face of the 
 record, every count jturports to bo for a separate olfenne,' and 
 in mlMlemeanors it is tlu; daily practice to receive evidi iice of 
 several libels, several assaults, several acts of fraud, and the like, 
 upon the same indictment.' In cases of felony, however, this lulo 
 
 f 
 
 > n. M. r..!.Tinv', tHi!» (r..ii.«k. 
 
 O.ll., iiltnv coiisiilliii}; Alili'isdh, U., 
 and 'i'iilfmoil. J.) ; 15. i'. I''l:iii:i;,'ua, 
 18S'.' (Ilivtt, J.); It. V. (iiirniT, lN(i» 
 (WiUcs,.!.. iinil I'oll.M'k. (M».); K. .'. 
 I'oU.m. lS7a (Archilmlil. .1., iiiiil 
 I'ollwk. U.); 11. I'. It.iii.Mi, I.STJ 
 (LuHh,.!.): 1^- *'• HtM'soiii, IHT.siil.). 
 Soo inmt, §;1UI. Hut Hfi- U. V. Wins- 
 low, lN(i(l"'Mai1in iind Wild.'. lUJ.), 
 
 ■^ <'ilid l)v Ld. i;ilinl'iiii>ii;.'li ill 1{. 
 r. Wvli. , IMU; U. c. SlnnstT. lNi;{ 
 fWij,'litiniin, .I.), See, ulsd, Ali-^iin, 
 Cr. L. ;J13, ;ilJ, uud WilU, ('ir. Lv. 
 
 I'lH (!(t, for icniMikiilili' rases <f a 
 similar natitiu wliicli (icciiired iu 
 Snilland. 
 
 ^ 1!. i: Lonj,', l.s;t;i ildurni'v, 15.); 
 11. r. C.iImI.'Ii. I.S()'.' (Mraniw.'ll', M.). 
 
 ' A>* til iitluT cxi'initiouH, M(!o iiifni, 
 §§ .'(;{.■) nt soq. 
 
 » K. V. Kin;,'ston, IHOO; It. v. 
 Jones, INOII 1^1,(1. KII.'nl.oroM(.'li). Ah 
 t.(i clfr-Uon ill civil uuhuh, si'o llowiini 
 I'. Newton, IsiiJ. 
 
 • VoiioK '■• It.. 17N0(Hul!.T, J.). 
 
 ' It. i: .I..n..H, lmi!» (!,d. Kileii- 
 l)orouj,'ii) ; U. V, l.ovy, lt>ll». Sitw, 
 
 237 
 
DOCTHINE OF KMXTION. 
 
 [I'AKT II. 
 
 ;- 
 
 3r 
 
 hn9, from motives of Imniiuiity, bwii coiiHidcniMy nioiliflcd. As 
 an iiulictnu'iit containing M'Vcral distinct cliargtm is calculatcMl to 
 cmliarrass a jirisoncr in \m dcfcnco, the judges am accuhtonicd to 
 (liiasli indictnu'ntH ko framed, when it apiicars, heforn tho iiri.soncr 
 luiH pleaded and the jui} are chargod, that tlie incjuiry \n to inchido 
 Boparat*! erinioH. When, however, thifi cirounistttnco is di«oovore(l 
 (hiring a trial, the jiroHccutor i» nsually called upon to elcc^t ono 
 felony, and to confine hiniself to that,' unless the oU'eiieeH, though 
 in law (li>tinct, seem to constitute in fact hut parts of ono con- 
 tinudus transaction, in which latter event an "election" will not 
 be e n forced. '•' 
 
 S 'V-U). l''<ir instance, in general if a prisoner he charged with 
 knowingly receiving several stoh-n articles, and it he proved that 
 they were received at separate times, the prosecutor may ho put 
 to his election. Hut if it bo possible that all the goods nuiy 
 have been received at on(> tin»e, ho lannot V)e compelled to 
 abandon any part of the accusation.' The court, too, refused to 
 put the pio.seeutor to an election, hut heard the whole story, in a 
 oaso where several prisoners were ehargeil in difb rent eounts of 
 tlio same indictnu>nt with successive rapes upon the prosecutrix, 
 and with aiding each other in turn.' A similar course has been 
 followed where an in<]ii'tment contained live counts for wtting tire 
 to tivo houses belonging to diiferent owners, and it appears that 
 the hoiises wci'c in a row, ami that one fire burnt them all;* so, 
 also, it was where an in<ii('lment, in the i-ame count, chargetl four 
 prisoners with assaulting and roi»bing two persons, who w(<re 
 walking tog«>ther at the time wlion they were attacked ;' and also 
 in a case where the defendant was charged in a single count with 
 uttering several forged rec<-iptK (even as many as twenty-two) 
 purporting to be signed by diilerent persons, with intt»nt to defraud, 
 
 nlse. Jl. »'. Kiiiacuni', 1h:i;1; It. r. 
 CelliiT, ls:;i, Hut sen U. c. liunv, 
 isii,-) Miiitiii. H.). 
 
 ' 1{. f. Wunl. lH(il (Hyl.H. .).). 
 That WMH an iinlit'tiiicut with tlirco 
 coiintM for sniiliii;^' thicK tliriiitiiiiii;; 
 letters. ll<'|il. tliiit |il'<meriitiir must 
 vluct t() procuixl uii oau cue lit. 
 
 238 
 
 • YemiK' r. It.. i:H!)(null.T, J.); 
 
 II. r. I.evv, INIK; It. ,.. ItinUeye, 
 1N;10. See, uInm, .\ii(i|1., ISU (Ir.). 
 ' It. r. Ihiiiii, iN^Mt; ]{. V. lliiiley, 
 
 lN|:{{.Mallle, .1.). 
 
 • n. r. I'nlkeH, IHII'J ; U. v. Gray, 
 iK.t,.; It. .'. I'anv, Is.lT. 
 
 ^ U. r. Trileiiia'ii, IS.lll. 
 
 • It. r. (ii.ldiiiH, iNI2(Tiii.lul,C.J.). 
 
 i. ', i 
 
C!I.\P. II.] LIMITATION OF DOCTIMNK or F.I.KCTION. 
 
 it lit'ing allogotl fhiit all wero uttiTotl ut ono atul tho same time, 
 ami tli<' proof (jornwpoiiiling with this alI('}>;iition.' 
 
 S <{•{!. It is (>xpn'SHly proviihxl by HtatiitH that in tho onso of 
 cmlH'z/.lt'tiu'iit hy clfi-ks, wrvantrt, aiul pirsons otiiploy<'(l in (ho 
 j'ulilic service, or in llu» polieo, distiiu't aets, not excet-ding threw, 
 ma}' he (rhargetl in one iiulictnienf, if coniinittod against the same 
 master, and within nix calendar months from tho first to the lust of 
 Hiieh acts.' Still, if a proseontor (not taking advantage of tlio 
 htatiife) in<li(!t his servant for a hiiigle act of oinhez/lement, lie 
 nnist ciiidin(( his evidence to that alone, and, if it appear that tho 
 jirisdiicr received dilfcrcnt simis on dilfereiit days, ami made a 
 false account respecting each sum separately, ho must oleot one 
 sum and one day nii which to prot d.' 
 
 {i 'V-V-i. In tho cjwo of hircony, again, it is by statute provid(>d 
 that several ((ounts may be inserted in tho same indictment for 
 distinct acts of stealing, nf)t exceeding three, which may have 
 been committed by ♦ho prisoner ogainst tho same person within 
 tho space of six calendar months. ^ If, moroovcr, upon tho trial 
 of any indi(!tnient for larc«!ny, the ])ri']H'rty alh'gcd to have Itcen 
 stolen at ono time shall turn out to have* l)een taken at different 
 times, the prosecutor shall not bo put to his oh'ction, iinless it 
 shall appear that (here wore more than throe takings, or tluit more 
 than th(» space of six calendar months elapsed between the first 
 and tlut last of such takings.' In oitlier of these last events tho 
 ]a'osecutitr shall be recpiircd 1 elect to proceed for .such number of 
 takings, not oxc« eding three, tin havo occurnid within six months 
 of eai'h other.* 
 
 5i ;{■'{•'{. In tlio coso, too, of receivors of stolen goods, it is also 
 by statute provided" that if tho incpiiry relate to a single criminal 
 not, one or more counts for feloniously stealing property may be 
 joined in (ho same indidiuent with one or more counts charging 
 the I'eliinious receipt of the hamo property by the prisoner, he well 
 knowing it to have Imcd stolon.' 
 
 ' U. V. 'rii..muM, isno. 
 
 • 24 & '2:, V. <•. IMi (•Tim Liirccny 
 Act, IHOI"), S 71. Sie U. V. Dulls, 
 
 1H71. 
 
 • U. V. WillwiuH, IHM. 
 
 239 
 
 • 24 .1- '2r, V. c. m ("Tho Lurcony 
 Act, isdl ••).$«. 
 
 • bl. §(i. 
 
 • 1.1. § !»•_>. 
 
 ' It. r. \\,.,'Um, 1840. Soo B. ». 
 
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 COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN AUMlSiSIlSLE. [PART IT. 
 
 § 334, The time for putting the prosecutor to his election is, 
 when it shall appear by the cddeneo that the two or more 8U£)posed 
 occurrences took place at different periods. It is not sufficient for 
 this purpose that the ootxusel for the Crown, in his opening address, 
 states that the fact is so, because the witnesses, on being oxamimjd, 
 may put the matter in a different light.' 
 
 § 335. It is now time to return to the consideration of the excep- 
 tions to the general rule that evidence of collateral facts is not 
 usually receivable. The first exception to this general rule, which 
 we were considering when we entered upon a digression as to the 
 law of election is, it will be remembered, the exception embodietl in 
 the rule that evidence of collateral facts is received when such facts 
 are connected with the transaction which is the subject of inquiry. 
 A second exception to the general rule, which laj's down that evidence 
 of collateral facts i:annot be received, arises where the question is a 
 matter of .science, and where the facts proved, though not directly in 
 issue, tend to illustrate the opinions of scientific witnesses. For 
 example, where the point in dispute was, whether a sea-wall had 
 caused the choking up of a harbour, and engineers were called to 
 give their opinions as to the effect of the wall, proof that other 
 harbours on the same coast, where there were no embankments, had 
 begun to be choked about the same time as the harbour in question, 
 was admitted, as such evidence served to elucidate the reasoning of 
 the skilled witnesses.^ If the point in dispute be whether a defen- 
 dant was or was not in his right mind on a certain occasion, it is 
 clear that, after proof by a medical man, or (in a civil case) an 
 admission by counsel, that madness is often of an hereditary 
 character, evidence tending to show that none of the defendant's 
 ancestors or near relations had been insane, would be admissible in 
 support of the negative proposition , and on a question of disjiutod 
 paternity, once prove as a matter of science that children are apt to 
 inherit the features or general appearance of their pai'cnts, and tlien, 
 as a matter of course, evidence will be received of personal resem- 
 blance between the party in question and his alleged fatlier.^ 
 
 § 336. Yet a third exception to the general rule which, in 
 
 » R. V. Smart, 1811 (Ir.) (Bushe, 
 O.J.). 
 
 » Folkos)'. Ch!ul(l,l'82; MTaddcn 
 V. Munlock, 1807 (Ir.). 
 
 » Biigot V. liagot, 1878 (Ir.). 
 
 240 
 
 ■n 
 
 !*■ * * f- *i 
 
CHAP. II.] COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLTi:. 
 
 criminal cases, excludes evidence of collateral facts, is that in sucIj 
 cases evidence of such collateral facts is not excluded, when it can 
 raise a fair inference respecting the matter in issue by either tending 
 to show a prisoner's identity or to corroborate the testimony of a 
 witness in some material particular. For example, on an informa- 
 tion for a libel, where the printer swore that he had received the 
 manuscript from the defendant, and had returned it to him, and 
 notice to produce it had been given to the defendant, other libels 
 written by him concerning the same subject were received to corro- 
 borate the statement of the printer ; ' where a prisoner was charfl:ed 
 with robbing the prosecutor of a coat by threatening to accuse him 
 of an unnatural crime, evidence of a similar, but ineffectual, 
 attempt on the following evening, when the in-isoner brought 
 a duplicate pawn-ticket for the coat, which was found on him 
 at the time of his apprehension, was held admissible, as con- 
 firmatory of tlie truth of the prosecutor's evidence respecting 
 what occurred on the former day ; ^ on a charge of highway 
 robbery, the prosecutor was allowed to rebut an alibi, by proving 
 that, shorily before the attack upon him, and near the same spot, 
 the prison, r hr^d robbed another person;-' and even had no such 
 defence been set up, similar evidence would, it seems, have been 
 admissible, as showing at least that the prisoner was in the neigh- 
 bourhood at the time when the crime was committed.^ 
 
 § 3-37. The exception just stated also prevails in civil causes. 
 For instance, where a party was sued on a bill of exchange, accej)ted 
 in las name by another person, and evidenc^o had been given that 
 this person had a general authority from the dcfciuliuit to accept 
 bills in his name, an admission by the del'ondiiut of his liability on 
 another bill so accepted was held reeolvablo in ovldence to conlirm 
 the witness who had spoken to the general authority.* 
 
 § 338. It may, in connexion with the rule that evidence of col- 
 lateral facts is usually inadmissible, bo noted that, where the 
 1;iiohIc(I(jc, iiiicnf, or yooit fait/i, of a party is material, ovidouce 
 may be admitted to prove facts which hapiieued before or after 
 
 ' R. V. Pcarco, 1791 (Ld. Kciiyon). 
 ' 11. V. Kjji'rtou, INK), citu("l by 
 Ilolioyd, J., Ill K. V. Ellis, 1820. 
 ' 11. V. Br\i^i;H, 18;{» (Ald.Tson, B.). 
 * 11. V. liuouuy, 1B30 (Littlodiilo, 
 
 J.). Soo, aUn, R, v. Fiirsoy, 18U3 
 (I'lirko and (jriisoloo, JJ.). 
 
 ' LlinvuUyu v, Winckworth, 184j. 
 Soo lloUiii^'hum v. lload, 18J8 ; 
 Morris v. iJothell, 18G9. 
 
 , v. 
 
 t , 
 
 I ti 
 
 T. VOL. I. 
 
 241 
 
 ! ! 
 
W\i 
 
 w:^m 
 
 ,hi 
 
 n 
 
 COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART II. 
 
 the principal transaction, even when they have no direct or 
 apparent connexion with such transaction. At first sight the 
 admission of such evidence may appear to constitute another 
 exception to the general rule. But the knowledge or good faith, or 
 inti-nt of the party heing a material fact, the evidence, though 
 ajiparently collateral, and foreign to the main subject, really has 
 a direct bearing on an issue in the case. Therefore, the admission 
 of such evidence, instead of being an exception to the rule, falls 
 strictly within it. An example of this principle is that where tlie 
 question is, whefher the acceptor of a bill of exchange eitlicr 
 knew that tlie name of the payee was fictitious, or at any rate 
 had given the drawer a general authority to draw bills on him 
 payable to fictitious persons, evidence may be admitted to show 
 that he had accepted other bills, drawn in like manner, before it 
 was possible to have transmitted them from the place at which they 
 bore date.' Again, in an action for an assault and consequent 
 injury, evidence that she bad ascribed her injury to a previous 
 accident having been given for the defence, the plaintiff was 
 allowed to show that in fact no such accident had ever occurred.- 
 So, too, in any trial, evidence will be admissible to prove or dis- 
 prove any attempt at subornation of witnesses.'^ 
 
 § 3»'39. Further, in an action for fraudulently representing that 
 a trader was trustworthy, whereby the plaintiff was induced to 
 trust him, the defendant was permitted to call fellow- to wu'^mon of 
 the trader to state that, at tlie time when tbe representation was 
 made, the man was, according to their belief, in good credit; ^ in ar. 
 action for the price of fixing railings to certain houses belonging to 
 defendant, the defence to which was that plaintiff had given credit 
 to a builder by whom the houses were built under a contract, such 
 builder was, to show the bona fides of the defence, allowed to state 
 that the ordfT was given by him on his own account, and not as 
 agent for the defendant, and that the defendant had actually paid 
 him for the building of the houses, including tlie charge for the 
 railings; ' and where a person seeks to set aside a contract on the 
 ground of his having been insane when it was made, it must be 
 shown that the defendant was at the time aware of the insanity,^ 
 
 • Oibson i'. IlniifiT, ITSM. 
 » MMlliuish !'. ("oilier, ISoO. 
 ' iSlii'ou V. Buinsteiid, 18U3. 
 
 242 
 
 * Gorish V. rimrtier, 184,5. 
 » Impoiiul Loau Co. v. Stone, 1892 
 (C. A.). 
 
 u 
 
CHAP. II.] COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 and, upon this question, evidence of the plaintifT's oondiict, at 
 diih'i'ent times, both b -fore and after the date of the contract, is 
 admissible to show tliat the madness was of such a character as 
 must have been apparent to anyone who had had opportunities 
 of observation like those afforded to the defendant.^ 
 
 § '-'AO. On the same principle, in an action against a company to 
 recover money paid to thorn in consequence of a fraud alleged to 
 have been committed by their agent, with their knowledge and 
 for their benefit, evidence of similar frauds jierpetrated on otlier 
 persous by tlie same agent, with the knowledge and for the benotit 
 of the defendants, is admissible in proof of fraudulent complicity 
 in the case before the court ; ^ in actions for false representation, 
 where the questions turn q\\ fraudulent iiifcuf, other mis-statements 
 besides those laid in the statement of claim will be admissible in 
 evidence, for the purpose of showing that the defendant was 
 actuated by dishonest motives ; * in the Divorce Division, in a suit 
 for dissolution of marriage, evidence of acts of adultery, subsequent 
 to the date of the latest act charged in the petition, will be 
 admissible for the purpose of showing the character of previous 
 acts of improper familiarity ;■• in actions for malicious arrest, the 
 jury are always at liberty to draw an inference of malice ex 
 autecedcntibus et consequentibus ; ''' and in actions for defamation, 
 other words written or spoken by the defendant, either before," or 
 after, those declared upon, or even after issue joined,' are admis- 
 sible as evidence of actual inalico or of driihorate jmhiication ; * 
 
 i'i 
 
 ' Beavan v. M'Donnoll, 1854. 
 
 ' lUiiko V. Albion Life Ass. Co., 
 187S. Sco ante, § 328. 
 
 ^ lluntinpford v. Massoy, 1859 
 (Ci'oinptoii, J.). 
 
 ^ I'.dddy v. lioddy, 18G0. 
 
 ' SponuLT V. Thompson, 1855 (Tr.), 
 
 'Long V. BaiTOtt (Ii'.), 1845; 
 15iiriett I'. Long, 1850 H. L. Libels 
 wiittt'n as niiicli as six years bcforo 
 that sued npon ai'o achuissiblo. The 
 jury eliould, however, be cautioned 
 not to give damages respecting tliem ; 
 Ibid. But tlu! omission to give sucli 
 caution will not amount to misdirec- 
 ti(m : T^arby v. Oiiseley, 185(i. Such 
 other libels are also admissible upon 
 u (juestiou us to tho 'cvndrut^lwn of 
 
 the alleged libel : Bolton v. O'Brien, 
 18S5 (Ir.). 
 
 ' I'earson v. TiO Muitro, 1843. A 
 letter written siibse(iiioiitly to the 
 commencement ot tht^ action, and 
 fourteen months alter the libel com- 
 l)laini'd of, is admissible : Ibid, See, 
 also, Macleod r. Wakk'y, 1828, where 
 a paragraph published only two days 
 before the trial was admitted bv Ld. 
 Tenterden ; and I'huik.'tt /•. ( 'olibett, 
 1N(I4, when^ proof that a cojiy of the 
 paper containing the libel was sold 
 after action brought was admitted by 
 Ld. ICUenborough as evidence of do- 
 liberate publication. 
 
 " I'eaison r. LeAfaitre, 1843; Bar- 
 well V, Adkias, 1840 ; i'erkins v. 
 
 \\\ 
 
 243 
 
 k:.^ 
 
 i'l 
 
i' 
 
 
 I M i 
 
 ;|r,! 
 
 <',\ 
 
 i 
 
 11 
 
 :! i 
 
 %r,J^\ . 
 
 COLLATERAL FACTS WHEW ADMISSIBLE. [PART H. 
 
 and this whether the hmguage on which the action is founded be 
 equivocal or clear,' — wliether the colLiteral words tendered iu 
 evidence be addressed to the same party, to whom the slander is 
 lileged iu the statement of claiu to liave been spoken, or to a 
 stranger,- — or whether those words be themselves actionable or not.* 
 § 341. Again, in an action for false imprisonment, in which the 
 defendant pleaded, first, not guilty, and secondly, a plea (which 
 was abandoned and a[)ologised for at the trial) setting up a justifi- 
 cation, and alleging tliat plaintiff had committed a felony, it was 
 held that, iu estimating the damages under the first issue, the jury 
 might take into account the fact of a justification having been 
 pleaded, because the placing such a f)lea on the record was a 
 persisting in the charge, which, under the circumstances, was 
 strong evidence of malice.'* And if, ou the trial of an action for 
 slander, to whicli the general issue and a justification are pleaded, 
 the plaintiff express his willingness to acce^jt an apology and 
 nominal damages on the plea of justification being withdrawn, 
 but the defendant refuses to abandon such plea, though he offers 
 no evidence in support of its trutli, the jury may consider the 
 defendant's conduct, not only with reference to the question of 
 damages, but as furnishing evidence of e.\press malice, and thus 
 
 M A^ 
 
 ¥ 
 
 , i 
 
 .] 1 
 
 1: 
 
 1 
 
 i 
 41 ^ .^. . 
 
 Vaughan, 1842 ; Ilemmings v. Gas- 
 son, 18o8 ; Rustt'll V. Mcicquister, 
 1809 (Ld. IJlIouboroTifrli) ; Cliarltor 
 r. liiu'ict, 17yi>(Ld. Kfuyt)n) ; Lee v, 
 llii.son, ITStl (id.) ; Scott v. Ld. Ox- 
 ford. 1808 (Lawronco. J.); L!Jl(■,^'al 
 V. lliRhlpy, 18;i7 (Tiudal, C.J.); 
 Jackson v. Adams, l8t}J. 
 
 ' See n. ^, below. 
 
 " Pearson v. liOinaitro, 1843; Mead 
 V, Daubi^'uy, 1792 (Ld. Kenyon). 
 
 ^ I'eaison v. Louiaitio, 1843, ques- 
 tioning iVavce V. Ornsby, 183o, and 
 Syimnons v. ]$lak,i, 183o. Tiudal, 
 C.J., iu pronouncing tlie judgment 
 of the court, states the correct rule 
 to bo, " that eith(;r j)arty may witli 
 a view to damages, give evidence to 
 prove or di.s])rovo the existence of a 
 malicious motive in the miad of tho 
 publi.sher of defamatory matter ; but 
 that, if the evidence given for that 
 Tiurpose ostabli.shes anotlier cause of 
 action, the jury shall bo cautioned 
 
 against giving any damages in resjioot 
 of it ; and if such (evidence is ottered 
 merely for the jjurjjose of obtaining 
 damau'cs for sucli subsfciuent injury, 
 it will be ])ro])erly rejected. And 
 perliaps tho cases of I'carce v. Ornsby 
 and SynuKons v. lilake wont no 
 farther thiiu this. * * Upon principle, 
 we Hiink that the fsnirit (iml iittvntidii 
 of the ])arty puhlisliing a libel are tit 
 to bo considered by a jury, in esti- 
 mating the iujiu'y done to tho plain- 
 tiff, and that evidence L'uding to 
 prove them cannot bo excluded, 
 simply because it may disclose 
 another and dilferent cause of ac- 
 tion." .See, also, Rustell v. Maccpiister, 
 1809, where Ld. lOUenborough re- 
 marked, that tho distinction between 
 words actionable and not actionable 
 ■was not founded on any principle ; 
 and Camfield v. Bird, Tsj'i (Jervis, 
 C.J.). 
 
 * 'Warwick v, Foulkos, 1844. 
 
 244 
 
CHAP. II.3 COLLATERAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 rendering the words proved actionable, though they were prima facie 
 privileged commnnioations.' 
 
 § 342. If, however, in an action for a libel, the defendant set up the 
 dofonces of a privileged communication and justification, which are 
 openly abandoned at the trial, tlie jury ought not to take into considera- 
 tion the circumstance that the justification was once pleaded.* And 
 where it clearly appears that other libels are offered in evidence, merely 
 with the view of unfairly recovering damages for the injury sustdiTied 
 by their publication, they will properly be rejected ; ' — indeed, no libels 
 subsequent to that which is the subject of the action ought to be 
 admitted, unless they directly refer to the defamatory language set out 
 in the statement of claim, or at least relate co the same subject-matter.* 
 
 § 343. Not only is other defamatory matter sometimes admissible for 
 the purpose of showing the animus of the defendant, but the mode in 
 which such matter was published may also be highly material ; as, for 
 instance, if printed placards were sent to the plaintiff's house, or paraded 
 before his door.* 
 
 § 344. On the other hand, on the principle that evidence of collateral 
 facts is admissible to show intent, malice, ur good or bad faith, a defendant 
 has been allowed, in mitigation of damages, to give evidence palliating, 
 though not justifying, his act of publishing a libel. For instance, he 
 may show that he copied it from another newspaper," or that he had 
 been provoked to act as he had done by the conduct of the plaintiff, who 
 had previously published libels of him respecting the same subject-matter, 
 which had only recently come to the knowledge of the defendant ; ' for 
 
 !i 
 
 :^, ''\ 
 
 ' Simpson v. Robinson, 1848. A jury 
 should, howov.ir, always consider quo 
 071 imo a justification which, fails was 
 pleaded, and whether it was put forward 
 bond fide as a defence, or only to onibrace 
 the opportunity of reiterating the charge. 
 The mere failure to prove a justification 
 is not alone and in itself evidence of 
 malice: Upton v. nume(Am.), 1893. 
 
 * Wilson V. Eobinson, 1845. 
 
 ' See cases cited, ante, in notes *, ', 
 and"* to § ;J40; Stuart v. Lovell, 1817; 
 Defries v. Davis, 1835. 
 
 ♦ Finnerty v. Tipper, 1809 (Sir J. 
 Mansfield). 
 
 ^ Bond V.Douglas, 1836 (Ld. Abinger). 
 ° Uptun V. Hume (Am.), 1893; Saun- 
 ders V. Mills, 1829, cited by Tindal, C.J., 
 
 in Pearson v. Le Maitre, 1843. InTal- 
 butt V. Clark, 1840, Ld. Donnian would 
 not permit the editor of a newsjiaper to 
 show, in mitigation of damages, that the 
 libel was published on the communica- 
 tion of a correspondent; and referring 
 to a case, which was probably Saunders 
 V. Mills, his Lordship observed, that 
 ' ' that decision had lieen very much 
 questioned." However, by the I'ecogni- 
 tion of Saunders v. Mills in Pearson v. 
 Le Maitre, Talbut v, Clark would seem 
 to be indirectly overruled. See, also, 
 East V. Chapman, 1827 ; Charlton v. 
 Watson, 1834 (Patteson, J.); Creevy v, 
 Carr, 1835. 
 
 ' Watts V. Eraser, 1837 ; Tarpley v. 
 Blabey, 1836; May v. Brown, 1824; 
 
 i I 
 
 245 
 
 1 I 
 
Ii!i 
 
 m 
 
 COLLATEUAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART 1[. 
 
 evidence of provocation by libels on the defendant is admissible, not on 
 the ground of any right to set off one libel against another,' but f/om an 
 indulgent consideration of the weakness, which sometimes leads an anj>Ty 
 man to say " that ho should be sorry for." But it is now directed that 
 in actions for libel or slander, in which .,he defendant does not by his 
 defence assert the truth of the statement complained of, the defendant 
 shall not be entitled on the trial to give evidence in chief, with a view to 
 mitigation of damages, as to the circumstances under which the libel or 
 slander was published, or as to the character of the plaint itf, without the 
 leave of the judge, unless seven days at least before the trial he furnishes 
 particulars to the plaintiff of the matters as to which he intends to give 
 evidence.^ 
 
 § 345. Evidence as to animm or intent is, moreover, frequently admis- 
 sible in criminal proceedings. For instance, on an indictment for know- 
 iogly uttering a forged document, or a counterfeit bank note, or counter- 
 feit coin, proof of tlie possession, or (by statute) of the prior or subsequent' 
 utterance, either to the prosecutor himself or to other persons, of otlier 
 false documents or notes, or bad money, though the latter be of a dif- 
 ferent description,^ or themselves the subjects of separate indictments,'^ is 
 admissible as material to the question of guilti/ knoiilodye or intoit!' In 
 these cases, however, it is essential to prove distinctly that the instru- 
 
 ilii: A\ 
 
 "Wakley v. Johnson, 1826; Finnorty v. 
 Tipper, lSOi>. Seo Uichiirds v. Richards, 
 1844. In America the defendant is 
 allowed to jrive evidence, not only in 
 miti'^ation of damages in a civil suit, but 
 of ])uiiishm<'nt in criminal proceedings, 
 that tliii plaintilf has libelled him pre- 
 viously to the publication by tlio defen- 
 dant of the libel complained of. See 
 Decamp v. Arc^liibald (Am ), l.Sit.'J. 
 
 ■ Watts )'. Fra^^er, l.s;i.5 (lid. Denman). 
 In Judge f'.l'icrkeley, 182J,Burrough, J., 
 allowed the defendant, in an action of 
 assault, to prove, in mitigation of dama- 
 ges, a series of libellous article's ])ub- 
 Eshed respecting him by the plaintilf, 
 one of which appeared on the day of the 
 assault- 
 
 2 R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXVI. r. 37. 
 
 ^ R. V, Forster, 1855. This case dis- 
 poses of a doubt raised in R. v. Taverner, 
 1809, and in R. v. Smith, 1831, as to 
 ■whether evidence of subsequent utterings 
 
 Wv uld bo admissible, if the notes or coin 
 we»o of a ili'lfcreni 'escription. 
 
 * R. V. Harris. 183(3 (by all the judges); 
 R. I'. Forster, lt>J5. Doubts had benn 
 entertained on this subject by some of 
 the judges in R. v. Millard, 1813, but 
 the evidence was admitted in Sunder- 
 land's, Hodgson's. Kirkwood's, and 
 Martin's cases (1830). The same evi- 
 dence is admissible in Scotland : Alison, 
 Cr. L. 420. 
 
 ^ R. V. Hough, 1806; R. r. Weeks, 
 1861 ; Kirkwood's case, IS.'iO (I.ittledalo, 
 J.); Martin's case, 1814 (id.); I'.c. Aston, 
 1838 (Alderson, B.); R. v. Lewis, 1840 
 (Ld. Denman). Contra, B. v. Smith, 
 1827 (Vauffhan, B.). 
 
 « R. V. Wylie, 1804 ; R. v. Ball. 1807; 
 R, 0. Harrison, 1834 (Taunton, J., and 
 Alderson, B.) ; R. v. Green, 1852 (Oross- 
 well, J.); R. w. Nisbott. 1853 (Williams, 
 J.); R. V. Salt, 1862 (Waiiams, J.); E. 
 V, Colclough, 1882 (Ir.), 
 
 246 
 
CHAP. 
 
 "•] 
 
 COLLATF.RAL FACTS WHEN ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 meiits offered in evidence of guilty knowledge were Iheraselvos 
 forged.' Moreover, though the prosecutor may prove the uttering 
 of other forged notes by the prisoner, and his conduct at the time 
 of uttering them, it seems that he cannot show what the prisoner 
 said or did at another time, with respect to such uttering ; for theso 
 collateral facts are too remote for any reasonable presumption of 
 guilt to be founded upon them, and such as the prisoner cannot by 
 any possibility be prepared to contradict.^ 
 
 § 346. Evidence of this description has long been admissible on 
 charges of uttering, and of one or two offences of a cognate character.* 
 It has now been expressly rendered by the Legislature also admis- 
 sible against receivers of stolen goods ; the Prevention of Crimes 
 Act, 1871, enacting^ that, "where proceedings are taken against any 
 person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for 
 having in his possession stolen property, evidence may be given at 
 any stage of the proceedings that there was found ^ in tlie possession 
 of such person other property stolen within the preceding period of 
 twelve months," and such evidence may be taken into consideration 
 for the purpose of proving that such person knew the property to 
 be stolen which forms the subject of the proceedings taken against 
 him" 
 
 § ;H7. Nevertheless, in ordinary criminal trials, judges may, if 
 they so please, still decline to recognise the doctrine under discus- 
 sion.' Yet not only has such doctrine been acted upon in the cases 
 previously mentioned, but on a charge of sending a threatening 
 
 > R. V. Millavd, 1H1;5. 
 
 ^ R. V. I'hillips, 1829 (Bavlov, J.); 
 R. V. Cooko, 18:58 (Pattcsoir, J.). 
 Contra, R. v. Forbes, 18.i3 (Colo- 
 riilge, J.). See R. v. Brown, l.'-fil. 
 
 ^ J''.'j., tlio obtaining; money by 
 falsely pretondinp: to a pawnbroker 
 that a spurious chain was silver : R. 
 V. Rocbnek, \Ho,i ; R. v. Fvanuis, 
 1874. The (loetrine, however, does 
 not extend to ordinary indictments 
 for false pretences : R. c Holt, 1800. 
 Still, it lia" been applied to cases of 
 arson with intent to defraud insur- 
 ance companies : R. v. Gray, 18()6 
 (Willes, J., and Martin, B.), scd qu. 
 
 * 34&35 V. c. 112, § 19. 
 
 ' It is not sufficient under theso 
 words to prove that the prisoner had 
 very recently <lnt/t n-itk other stolea 
 propertv: R. v. Drage, l87o (Bram- 
 w.'ll. f,. J.); R. V. Carter, 1884: 
 (C. C. R.)- 
 
 " This . vidence will be admissible, 
 though the property so founil may 
 be the subject of another indictment 
 ai^ainst the ju-isoncr at the samo 
 assises : R. v. J(mes, 1877. 
 
 ' See and compare R. v. Fairie, 
 1SJ7; R. r. Winsh)W, 18G0 ; R. v. 
 Geerinj?, 1819, cited ante, § 328, 
 followed R. V. Flannagan, 1882 ; R. 
 r. Oddv, 18ol; R. v. Sirrell, ISoO; 
 R. V. Dunn, 1826; E. v. Ni^holls, 
 1838. 
 
 2i; 
 
^•il 
 
 COr.LATKRAL FACT.S WIIKN ADMISSIBLE. [PART II. 
 
 l(!tter, other Ictlors written by the prisoner, both before and after 
 the one in question, have been admitted to exphiin its meaning ; • on 
 an indictment for malicious shooting, if it be doubtful whether the 
 shot was fired by accident or design, proof may be given that the 
 prisoner at another time intentionally shot at the same person ; ' 
 and on indictments for murder, evidence of former menaces or 
 quarrels will have an important tendency towards supporting the 
 legal inference of malice,' while proof of expressions of kindness or 
 of friendly acts towards the deceased will be entitled to equal 
 weight as raising a counter presumption.* 
 
 ^ 348. On an indictment for a robbery, where the prisoners 
 formed part of a mob who went into the prosecutor's house, one of 
 which mob had civilly advised prosecutor to give it something to pre- 
 vent mischief, evidence that the same mob, in the presence of some 
 of the prisoners, had demanded money at other houses on the same 
 day, was admitted, as tending to prove that the advice was not 
 given bona fide, but was in reality a polite mode of committing a 
 robbery.^ On this last case the acts given in evidence were not 
 committed by the prisoners themselves, but only by some of the 
 mob with whom they were connected. But the principle is the 
 same, the law being, that where several evil-doers conspire together 
 to effect some unlawful purpose, acts done by any one of the party 
 in furtherance of the common design shall be considered as done 
 by all.« 
 
 § 349. On this rule, that collateral facts are admissible to show 
 (inimm or iufciif, rests the admissibility of evidence as to the (jcneral 
 chardctei' of individuals. Such evidence is tendered for the purpose 
 of eitb 3r raising a presumption of innocence or guilt, or of affecting 
 the amount of damages, or of impeaching or supporting the veraciti/ 
 of a witness ; ' the first object being chiefly confined to criminal 
 
 ,iii ' 
 
 > R. V. Eobinson, 1796. 
 
 » E. V. Voko, 1823. For other 
 examples, see R. v. Mogg, 1830 ; R. 
 V. Dossott, 1846 (Maule, J.) ; R. v. 
 Richardson, 18G0 ; R. v. Horris, 
 1864. See, also, ante, §§ 327, 328. 
 
 ' See R. V. Hagan, 1873. 
 
 * 1 Ph. Ev. 470, 476. 
 
 » R. V. Winkworth, 1830 (Parke, J., 
 
 with the conci'rrence of Ld. Ten- 
 terden, Aldeison, J., and Vaughan. 
 13.). This doctrine forms an incident 
 in Mr. Baring Gould's Novel ' ' Cheap 
 Jack Zita." 
 
 s R. V. Watson, 1817 ; R. v. Hardy, 
 1794 ; R. V. Salter, 1804 ; R. v. Hunt, 
 1820. 
 
 ' 2 St. Ev. 303. 
 
 248 
 
 il 
 
CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE OF GENERAL CHAUACTEK. 
 
 prosecutions, and the second to civil causes, while tlio third is 
 equally applicable to both forma of procedure. 
 
 § U60. The terra " character," as here used, is not — as some able 
 judges have considered it to be ' — synonymous with " disposition," 
 but it simply means " reputation," or the general credit which a 
 man has obtained in public opinion.^ The position of a witness 
 who is called to speak to character is exactly the opposite of that 
 of a master who is asked for the character of his servant. The 
 master must give his servant the character which his own personal 
 experience has told him that the servant deserves. But a witness 
 to character cannot give the result of his own personal experience 
 and observation, or express his own opinion, but must, in strict law, 
 confine himself to evidence of mere general repute.' This rule 
 rests rather on authority than on reason, and would probably have 
 been long ago discarded but for two causes. First, the rule, in 
 practice, is seldom strictly enforced ; and next, as " the best 
 character is generally that which is the least talked about," * the 
 judges have modified it, to a certain extent, by permitting witnesses 
 to give negative evidence on the subject, and state that "they 
 never heard anything agaimt the character of the person on whose 
 behalf they have been called." ' 
 
 § 351. V hen the point at issue is whether the accused has 
 committed a pn ' 'oular criminal act, evidence of his general good 
 character v msly entitled to little weight, unless some reason- 
 
 able doubt \i s to his guilt ; and, therefore, in this latter event 
 alone will the jury be advised to act upon such evidence.* The 
 inquiry, too, must be confined, — except where the intention forms a 
 material ingredient in the offence,' — to the general character of 
 the prisoner, and must not condescend to particular facts.* For 
 
 • R. V. Rowton, 1865 (Erie, C.J., 
 and Willes, J.). 
 
 » Id. 
 
 ' Id. See post, § 1470. 
 
 ♦ Ter Erie, C.J., 1865. Some 
 judges, indeed, have asserted that 
 evidence in this nej^ative form is the 
 most cogent proof of a man's good 
 reputation : Id. 
 
 » PerCockburn, C.J., 1865. 
 ' In R. V. Turner, 1664, Hyde, 
 C.J., observed to the juiy: — "The 
 
 witnesses called in point of reputa- 
 tion I must leave to you. Few men 
 that come to be questioned but shall 
 have some come and say, 'he is a 
 very honest man ; I never knew any 
 hurt by him ; ' but is this anything 
 against the evidence of the fact ? " 
 
 ' Ante, § 345. 
 
 * J 'Anson v. Stuart, 1796 (BuUer, 
 J.). In former times the practice 
 was less strict. See B. v. Turner 
 1664. 
 
 249 
 
! 
 
 Iliiiliilj 
 
 lit 
 
 
 EVIDENCE OF OKXERAL CHARACTER. [t.WIT II. 
 
 although tho common reputation, in whicli a person is licM in 
 society, may bo uiuleservod, and tho ovidonco in 8up[)oit of it must, 
 from its very nature, bo indofiiiito, yet Homo inference, varying in 
 degree according to circumstances, may fairly be drawn from it ; 
 since it is not probable that a man, who has uniformly sustained a 
 characfer for honesty or humanity, will forfeit that character by 
 the commission of a dishonest or a cruel act. The mere proof of 
 isolated facts can, however, afford no such presumption. " None 
 are all evil," and the most consummate villain may bo able to prove 
 that on nome occasions he has acted with hunuinity, fairness, or 
 honour. In all cases, too, when evidence is admitted touching tho 
 general character of the party, it ought niiinifestly to bear reference 
 to the nature of the charge against him ; ' as, for instance, if ho 
 be accused of theft, that he has been reputed an honest man ; — if 
 of treason, a man of loyalty. It should also relate to the samo 
 period as tho supposed oironco ; for, as Lord Holt once rotnarkod, 
 " A man is not born a knave ; there must be time to make him so ; 
 nor is ho presently discovered after he becomes one."^ Subject 
 to these observations, evidence of the defendant's general good 
 character is admissible in all prosecutions whether for felony or 
 misdemeanor.' 
 
 § 352. Although a defendant is, from motives of humanity, 
 allowed this reasonable indulgence, the prosecutor cannot, in the 
 first instance, have recourse to similar loose testimony for the pur- 
 pose of establishing the guilt of the accused.* If, however, with 
 the view of raising a presumption of innocence, witnesses to cha- 
 racter are called for the defence, counsel for the Crown may then 
 not only cross-examine such witnesses to rebut this presumption, 
 either as to particular facts,'^ or, if it be deemed essential, as to the 
 groimds of their belief," but evidence of general bad character will also 
 
 .1 I 
 
 !if;i; ■ 
 
 > Douglass V. Toiisey, 1829 (Am.). 
 
 * R. V. iSwpiiil.scn, 1702. 
 3 2 Russ. ( '. \- M. 784. 
 
 * R. V. TulM'itluld, ls(i4. In that 
 caso tho question was put, not to 
 provi' tho Ljuilt of tlio prisoner, but 
 to sliow tliat tlio witness, a jjoliee- 
 man, had had probable cause for 
 arresting him. Held, nevertheless, 
 that tho answer was not evidence. 
 
 « R. V. llodgkiss 18:50. In R. v. 
 Wood, 181,0, Parke, B., allowed a 
 witness to (character to bo aski'd, in 
 cross-examination, whotlicr ho had 
 not hoard that the pi'isoiior was 
 suspected of having committed a 
 robberv some years before. 8ee, also, 
 R. V. Turner, 1(504. 
 
 • 2 St. Ev. 304. 
 
 25f) 
 
 
CHAP. 11.] EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS COXVICTiON 
 
 be admissible,' — tliough tho right of counyol for tlio Crown in this 
 respect is in practice seldom resortcul to.* Moreover, in most trials 
 for felony, and in some for raisdetneanor, if defendant endeavour 
 to establish a good character, either by calling witnesses himself, 
 or by cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution,' tho pro- 
 secution have a right — which is usually exercised — to, in answer, 
 prove tho specific fact that tho prisoner has actually been convicted 
 j)reviously. The statutes authorizing this, however, do not extend 
 to any capital felonies, and apply only partially to misdemeanors.* 
 
 § 35f3. Moreover, the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871,* in addi- 
 tion to the j)rovisions which have been already" set out, provides^ 
 that " where proceedings are taken against any person for having 
 received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his 
 possession stolen property, and evidence has been given that the 
 stolen property has been found in his possession, then if such person 
 has within five years immediately preceding been convicted of any 
 offence involving fraud or dishonesty, evidence of such previous 
 conviction may be given at any stage of tho proceedings, and may 
 be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that the 
 person accused knew the property which was proved to be in his 
 possession to have been stolen ; provided that not leps than seven 
 days' notice in writing shall have been given to the person accused 
 that proof is intended to be given of such previous conviction ; 
 and it shall not be necessary for the purposes of this section to 
 charge in the indictment the previous conviction of the person so 
 accused." * 
 
 § '6'A. The admission of evidence of general character is only 
 
 > R. V. Rowton, 1805, by nil the 
 ju(l<;t.'s, overruling R. v. Burt, iSJl. 
 
 2 •> St. Ev. 3(M. 
 
 ' It. V. Shrinipton, 1851 ; R. v. 
 Ga.lLury, IK.'iS (I'urko, B.). 
 
 ^ !See, us allowiiifi; this, (i & 7 W. 4, 
 c. Ill, as to (tny feliiiii/ imt iii'iiishalile 
 with ileath after conviction for felony; 
 as to oft'encos punishiiblo under that 
 Act, 24 & 25 V. c. 9(5 ("Tho Larceny 
 Act, ISOl"), § IKi; seo also, us to 
 offences Uirainst the coin, 24 & 25 V. 
 c. 99 ("Tho Coiniige Offences Act, 
 1861"), § 37; R. u. Martin, 18(59; 
 and as to any felony, or the oilence 
 
 of uttering false or counterfeit coin, 
 or of iios.soshing countcifeit gold or 
 silver coin, or tho oilence of obtain- 
 ing goods or money by false ])ro- 
 teiicf^s, or the offotico of conspiracy 
 to defraud, or any nii.sdenieanor 
 under 24 & 25 V. c. 9() ("The Larceny 
 Act, I8()l"), § 58. Sec, also, "The 
 Prevention of ("rimes Act, 1671" (34 
 & ;J5 V. c. 112), §§ 9, 20. 
 
 6 ;m & 35 V. c. 112. 
 
 « Ante, § 345. 
 
 ' In § 19. • 
 
 * E. V. Davis, 1870. 
 
 251 
 
m ■ 
 
 il| 
 
 S , 
 
 1 1 
 
 ^ ' 1 ; 
 
 P^ 
 
 ill 
 
 
 EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART II. 
 
 allowed in criminal proceedings, where it was originally received, 
 Bome two centuries ago,' in favorem vita?. So strict is this rule, 
 that even upon an information for penalties filed in the Revenue 
 side of the Queen's Beach Division by the Attorney- General, such 
 evidence will he rejected, because proceedings of this kind, though 
 brought in the name of the Sovereign, are considered as civil suits.^ 
 Evidence of general good character or competency is not admissible 
 either in an action of ejectment by an heir-at-law against a devisee, 
 where defendant was charged with having imposed a fictitious will on 
 the testator in extremis ; ' in an action for slander — even where, by 
 pleading the truth of words charging the plaintiff with stealing 
 money, the latter had put the char."''ter of the former directly in 
 jeopardy;* in an action for malicious prosecution,' in support of 
 probable cause ; in an action of trespass for false imprisonment on 
 a criminal charge, in which the defendant must not even cross- 
 examine, either as to the plaintiff's bad character, or as to previouo 
 charges made against him ; " nor in an action for a libel charging 
 a professional man with want of skill in some particular work — 
 and this even though the evidence be offered with a view of 
 showing that the defendant, in making the charge, was actuated 
 by malice.' 
 
 § 355. A distinction, however, exists between cases where par- 
 ticular acts of misconduct are imputed to a party, and those where 
 his general conduct is put in issue. For general evidence of cha- 
 
 ' So early as 1664, the practice of 
 calling "witncases in point of repu- 
 tation " was well establiMliod. See 
 Hyde, C.J., in R. v. Tinner, 1664. 
 Accordingly, in 1680, such evidence 
 was received even by Scroggs, C.J., 
 with Jeff eries as jjrosecuting counsel : 
 R. V. Harris, 1680. 
 
 > Att.-Gen. v. Bowman, 1791 (Eyre, 
 C.B.). IliH lordship observed, that 
 ' ' the true lino of distinction is this ; 
 in a direct jiroseciition for a crime, 
 HUch (evidence is admissible ; bnt 
 where the ])rosecution is not directly 
 for t'u) crim<! but for the penulty, as 
 in this information, it is not." See 
 Att.-Gen. v. RmUoff, 1854 (Martin, 
 11.). 
 
 ^ Doe V. Hicks (Buller, J.), cited 
 by Gibbs, arguendo, in Doe v. Walker, 
 
 1801. 
 
 * Cornwall v, Richardson, 1825 
 (Abbott, C.J.). 
 
 ° Nowsaoi V. Carr, 1817 (Wood, 
 B.); Gregory v. Thomas, 1811; 
 contra, Rodriquez v, Tadmire, 1799 
 (Lord Kenyon). In America, this 
 kind of evidence has been also re- 
 jected in actions of assault and bat- 
 tery : Givens r. Bradley, 18i;{ (Am.) ; 
 and in assumpsit, Nash r. Gilkoson, 
 1819; and is inadmissible whenever 
 the general character is involved by 
 th<! j)loa only, and not by the nature 
 of the action : Anderson v. Long, 
 1823 (Am.); Totter v. Webb, 1829 
 (Am.). St!e Or. Ev. § 55. 
 
 ' I)owning v. Butcher, 1841; Jones 
 V. Stevens, 1822. 
 
 252 
 
 ' Brine v. Bazalgette, 1849. 
 
 ■ii.i 
 
1825 
 
 CH, II.] KVIULNCi: OF CHARACTER TO ATrECT DAMAGES. 
 
 ratter, thougli rejected in the former, is ailinittod in the latter class 
 of cases.' Thus, in an action for a libel, where the languugo com- 
 plained of stated that the defendant parted with the plaintiff " on 
 account of her incompetency, and her not being ladylike or good 
 tempered," general evidence of her competency, good temper, and 
 manners was given by her personal friends ; ^ and where, in a 
 similar action, the words charged the plaintiff generally with 
 dishonesty and misconduct while in service, a witness, with whom 
 she had formerly lived, was allowed to testify to her antecedent 
 general good conduct.' These cases are, however, in truth no 
 exception to the rule of exclusion.^ 
 
 § 356. General evidence of character is (subject to compliance 
 with the rule as to previous notice in actions for libel or slander, 
 which has been set out while considering the subject of evidence of 
 libellous attacks upon a defendant being received in mitigation of 
 damages') admissible, not only upon questions of mnlic^, intent, and 
 so on, but also for the purpose of increasing or diminishing damrigcs. 
 For example, evidence impeaching the previous general character 
 as to chastity of the seduced wife or daughter is admissible on a 
 petition claiming damages on the ground of adultery," or in an 
 action for seduction.'' For in these proceedings the plaintiff in 
 reality (though in aeti(ms for seduction it is not the ostensible ground 
 of claim •*) seeks compensation for the pain caused him, by the dis- 
 grace of his family, and the ruin of his domestic happiness ; and 
 the damages should bo commensurate with the pain, and vary 
 according as the character of the seduced wife or daughter was 
 
 Jones 
 
 ' Doo V. Hicks, undiitod (I5nllor, 
 J.), as citoil by (iil)hs, arguL'iulo, iu 
 Doo I'. Wiilkor, Ism. 
 
 ' Fouutiiiii !•. lioodio, 184'2. Soo 
 Brini! r. l{iiziilfj;,'t.to, 184!). 
 
 ■' Kin- I'. Waniij;, 18l);{ (Lil. Al- 
 viinloy). 
 
 * For just as in (.'Uinulative of- 
 foncos, sucli as trca.'-on, or a con- 
 s|)irra'y to carry on tlio Ijiisincss of 
 common cheats, many acts arc giv(>n 
 in evidence, liecau.se such ctimes can 
 ho ])roved in no other wnv : l\. v, 
 Kobevts, 1S()8 (I,d. I'lneiil'iorou^'h), 
 so wlicro tlio {i;eiiiM'Ml hehiivioiir of a 
 party is impeached, it is only by 
 
 {reneral evi(h>nco that such charge 
 can b,! rebutted. 
 
 " Sen Ord. XXVI. r. ;57, auto, 
 § 314 ; see. also, § ;i4i». 
 
 « 2(1 iS: 21 V. c. 8,-. (" Tlio ^fatri- 
 monial Causes Act, IS.jT"), § 'M. 
 
 ' 15. X. P. 27, 2!t(i; Elsani v. 
 Faucett, ITOT (IjiI. Kenyon). 
 
 " S,u> Dodd r. Xorri's, 1,S14 (Ld. 
 Ellenboroujiih) : Anditnvs r. Askcy, 
 18;(7, (Tindal, C.J.). Seo, also, cases 
 cited in n. n, to S. C. ; GrinnoU u. 
 W(dls, 1.S14 ; Thomiison v. iioss, 
 1M,-|H ; l,on^' i\ K'ei-htlev. 1877 (Tr.) ; 
 Ri.st r. I'"aux, l.S(i:i; Terry r. llutch- 
 iusou, 1808 ; lludyes y. Tagg, 1872. 
 
 253 
 
 :'V7 
 
U i 
 
 
 \l:r -^m 
 
 EVIDENCE or CHARACTER TO AFFECT DAMAGES. 
 
 [PT. II. 
 
 previously unblemiabed or profligate. Therefore, in such cases, 
 not only is evidence of general bad cbaracter admissible in mitiga- 
 tion of damages, but even particular acts of immorality or indecorum 
 may be proved.' 
 
 § 357. Both evidence of acts of this description, as well as proof 
 of general bad character, must, however, be confined to occurrences 
 previously to the defendant's misconduct, because this very miscon- 
 duct may, by weakening the principles of the woman, have been 
 the indirect cause of subsequent immorality, and may have itself 
 occasioned a general want of reputation.^ In an action of seduction, 
 where plaintiff's daughter is called as a witness, the defendant can 
 probably in strict law (but if such a course were adopted in practice 
 it would be made matter of strong observation) prove specific acts 
 of immorality, without first cross-examining the woman ; since, on 
 principle, such evidence may be tendered, not so much to impeach 
 the veracity of the party seduced, but to show that, as her previous 
 conduct had been disgraceful, the father's feelings could not have been 
 wounded by the misconduct of the defendant.^ However, where the 
 daughter, in her examination in chief, states that the defendant 
 seduced her, and that she has borne a child in consequence, and the 
 defence is that she has declared another person to be the father, it is 
 clear that witnesses cannot be called to prove her declarations, unless 
 she be first cross-examined as to the fact of her having made them ; 
 because, though language of this kind, if lightly uttered, would tend 
 to degrade her character, yet, if used in earnest, it would directly 
 contradict the testimony she had given, and would be evidence not 
 in mitigation of damages, but in bar of the action.* 
 
 § 358. On a claim of damages from an alleged adulterer," 
 the co-respondent may prove, in mitigation of damages, that the 
 petitioner has bcju guilty of notorious infidelity ; has turned 
 his wife out of doors ; has refused to nuiintaiu her ; or has other- 
 wise been guilty of dissolute condiKft ; " for, in such cases, a man 
 can scarcely complain of the loss of that society upon which he has 
 
 1 Vorry v. Watkins, 1830 (Al'lor- 
 son, I!.). Sco, iiIhd, Siuipsoii v. Gray- 
 son, 1892 (Am.). 
 
 » Klsam V. Fiiucctt;, 1707. 
 
 » ('ari)ontiT r. Wall, ISIO. 
 
 * Id. ; AuilrowB v. Askoy, 1837 
 
 (Tindal, C.J.). 
 
 » Woo '20 & 21 V. 0. 85 ("The 
 Matrimonial Causoa Act, 18o7 "), 
 
 « B. N. P. 27 ; Broniloy v. Wallace, 
 
 i8oa. 
 
 254 
 
en, II.] EVIDENCE OF CHARACTEK TO AFFECT DAMAGES. 
 
 himself placed so little value. In an action for seduction, it would 
 on principle appear that evidence in mitigation of damages may be 
 given (since plaintiff conduced to the result by allowing his daughter 
 to consort with such a person) to show that the defendant is notori- 
 ously a man of profligate habits. In actions for breach of promise, 
 the defendant is entitled to prove, in mitigation of damages, that 
 the plaintiff is a person, either of bad character,' or of coarse and 
 brutal manners,^ though acts of misconduct committed after the 
 promise, or even before that event irithout the Imnicledge of the 
 defendant,' can, where sufficiently glaring to constitute a bar to 
 the action,* only be proved under a special defence.* 
 
 § 359. It has been much discussed, and is not now clear, 
 whether, in an action for defamation, evidence impeaching the 
 plaintiff's previous general character, and showing that, at the 
 time of the publication, he laboured under a general suspicion of 
 having been guilty of the charge imputed to him by the defendant, 
 is admissible as affecting the question of damages.* 
 
 § 3G0. Assuming, however, such evidence to be admissible, a 
 defendant in libel or slander, who has not pleaded truth as a justi- 
 fication, is now precluded, by a Rule of Court already set out, 
 from attempting to mitigate damages by giving evidence reflecting 
 on the plaintiff's character, unless he has complied with such Rule.' 
 
 ' Foulkes V. Scllway, 1800 (Ld. 
 Kcnvon). Soo, aliso, Johnson v. 
 Caulkins, 1799 (Am.) ; Boynton v. 
 KuUogg, 1807 (Am.). 
 
 ' Leeds V. Cook, 1803 (Ld. EUon- 
 borouph). 
 
 ^ Iiviitp; V, Greenwood, 1824 (Ab- 
 bott, C.J.). 
 
 * Leeds V. Cook, 1803; Baddoloy 
 V. Mortlock, 1810. 
 
 Ante, § 301. Seo Young v. 
 Murjiliy, 18:JG; and Pujolas v, Hol- 
 land, 1841 (Jr.). 
 
 " ;';'^ 'n support of the admissi- 
 bility of the evidence, Kichards v. 
 
 Eichards, 1814; v. Moor, 1813; 
 
 Ld. Leicester ;;. Walter, ls()9; liell 
 r. Parke, ( Ir. ) 18(i0 ( I'ifrot. C. B. ); "Wil- 
 liams V. ('alleiider, 1810; l']amer v. 
 Merle, 180'J-i) (Ld. Lllenborou^rli); 
 Kiiobell y. Fuller, 1797 (Lyre, C.J.); 
 Newsam v, Carr, 1817 (Wood. B.); 
 Ellorshaw v. Bobinson, 181(>-'_'8 
 fllolroyd, J.) ; Moore i'. Oastler, 1836 
 (Ld. Dopjjiau, after consultiuy I'arko, 
 
 B.); Mawby v. Barber, 1820 (Ld. 
 Tentorden) ; Hardy v. Alexander, 
 1837 (Coltmau, J.). These last four 
 cases are cited in 2 St. Ev. 041, 042, 
 n.f, ; . I cr. Kirkmiin ('. Oxley, 1811-16 
 (Heath, J.). iSee contra, Scott v. 
 Saiiii)son, 1882 (Mathew and t.'avo, 
 JJ.); Jones r. Stevens, 1822; 
 Waithman v. Weaver, 1822 (Abbott, 
 C.J.); Connvall I'. I^iehardson, 1825 
 (Abbott. C.J.); Siiowdon v. Smith, 
 1811 (Chambre, J.). In Seotland 
 the evid(Ui('e is admissihlr : Dickson, 
 Ev. (Sc.)§24, and cases xV.nv cited in 
 n. ('/). I'^or the Amciiean autho- 
 ritie.-,, seo Boot )'. King, 1827 (Am.); 
 Bailey ''. Hyde, 1820 (Aiu.); Ben- 
 nett r. Tfyde", 182.') (Am.); DoUfjlasB 
 V. Tousev. 1829 (.\m.); Inniiin \k 
 Foster, 18;52 (Aju.); Walcott r. Hall, 
 1810 (Am.); Boss c. Lai)hani, 1817 
 (Am ); Foot v. Tracy, 1800 (Am.). 
 
 ' B.S.C. 1883. Onf. XXXVLr.37, 
 cited unto, § 344, ad liu. 
 
 '•1 'i 
 
 200 
 
\\> 
 
 m 
 
 EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER TO AFFECT DAMAGES. [PT. 11. 
 
 § 361. In the above cases, as well as in other actions for libel, 
 and other actions where witnesses to character are admitted, the 
 evidence impeaching the plaintiff's previous general character 
 must (if admissible) be confined to the particular trait in it 
 which is attacked in the alleged libel. Such evidence must, 
 moreover, be confined to the general reputation as to plaintiff's 
 character on this point, and it must not relate to particular acta 
 of bad conduct.^ Evidence of any rumours calculated L- com- 
 promise the plaintiff's character must, too, be strictly confined 
 to rumours which were prevalent before the publication of the 
 slander of the defendant ; otherwise a man might slander another, 
 and then call neighbours to say that they had heard of the impu- 
 tations which he had himself originated.^ 
 
 § 362. A plaintiff cannot give evidence of general good character 
 in (aggravation of damages, unless counter-proof has been first offered 
 by the defendant ; for, until the contrary appear, the presumption 
 of law is already in his favour. Therefore, in an action of slander 
 for imputing theft, plaintiff will not be allowed to prove his cha- 
 racter for honesty, even though the defendant has placed on the 
 record pleas of justification.* Indeed, in an action for seduction, 
 where evidence was jjroduced for the defence, to jirove that the girl 
 had previously had a child by another man, she was not allowed to 
 be asked respecting her general good character for chastity, but 
 plaintiff was restricted to proof that the specific charge made by 
 the defendant was false ; * on another occasion similar evidence 
 was rejected where the daughter had been cross-examined, with a 
 view of showing that she had been guilty of gross levity and 
 indelicacy ; * and in a case for criminal conversation, in which the 
 defendant had endeavoured, by cross-examining the plaintiff's wit- 
 nesses, to impeach plaintiff's character, but had failed, plaintiff was 
 not permitted to call witnesses to his general good conduct.* It is 
 true that in these cases the characters attacked remained, in strict- 
 ness, uuimpeached, because the facts insinuated had, or might have, 
 
 ' See cases citud in last note but (Abbott, C.J.). 
 
 one, uiid t'urthor, Androws v. Van- * Hamfiold v. Massoy, 1808 (Ld. 
 
 duzcr, 1814 (Am.); Sawyor v. Eit'ert, EUonboiough). 
 
 1820 (Am.). " Dodd f. >forri8, 1814 (Ld. Ellon- 
 
 ' Tnompson v, Nye, 1850 ; Bell v, borough). 
 
 Parko, 18(j0 (Ir.). « Kmg v. Francis, 1800 (Ld. Ken- 
 
 * Cornwall v, Bichaidson, 1825 yon). 
 
 256 
 
 |jf;i 
 
 li 
 
CHAP. II.] EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER OF PROSECUTRIX. 
 
 been denied. But, the very circumstance of the questions being 
 asked was calculated to excite a suspicion in the minds of the jury, 
 wliich, it may be said, the plaintiff should be given an oppor- 
 tunity of removing.^ A contrary rule has prevailed in a later 
 English case,^ subsequently followed in Ireland.^ 
 
 § 363. The law as to the admission of general evidence of cha- 
 racter to impeach the verncity of a witness will be discussed hereafter.'' 
 Such evidence is, however, sometimes receivable, not so much to 
 shake the credit of the witness, as to show directly that the act in 
 question has not been committed. Thus, on indictments for rape, 
 or attempts to commit that crime, not only is evidence of general 
 bad character admissible to show that the prosecutrix ought not to 
 be believed upon her oath, but so also is proof that she is a reputed 
 prostitute, for it goes far towards raising an inference that she yielded 
 willingly. In such cases general evidence of this kind will on this 
 ground be received, though the woman be not called as a witness, 
 and though, if called, she be not asked, on cross-examination, any 
 questions tending to impeach her character for chastity.'^ Counsel 
 for the defence cannot, however, prove upvcific immoral acts with 
 the prisoner, unless he has first given the prosecutri.v on opportunity 
 of denying or explaining them." Moreover, the prosecutrix, if 
 cross-examined as to particular acts of immorality with other men, 
 may decline to answer such questions, while, if she answers them 
 in the negative, witnesses cannot be called to contradict her.' 
 
 
 ^m 
 
 » 1 C. & p. 100, n. a ; 2 St. Ev. 
 30(i, 307. 
 
 ■' Bate V. Hill, 182:5 (Park, J.); 
 Mui'f^atroyd v. Murgatroj'd, 1K28 
 (Baylcy, J.). Soc, also, 11. v. Clarke, 
 1817. 
 
 " In Brown v, Goodwin (Ir.), 1841 
 (Torrcns, J.), an action for sodnction, 
 in which phiintitt"8 danj^htor having 
 been asked questions to inipcacli her 
 reputation, plaintiff was ulhjwed to 
 call witnesses to her general good 
 character. 
 
 * Post, ^§ 1470—1473. 
 
 » 11. V. Clark(\ 1817 (llolroyd, J.) ; 
 E. v. Cluro(lr.), 1841 (Cranipton, J.). 
 
 « R. V, Cockcroft, 1870. 8eo R. v. 
 Martin, 1834 ; 11. v. Robins, 1843 ; 
 
 E. V. Aspinall, 1827 (llullock, B.). 
 On one occasion the prisoner's counsel 
 was allowed to ask tho piosecutrix, 
 with tho viem of cdiitrwiictiii;/ her, 
 .whether sue had not, on a day si)ico 
 the alleged rajie, been walking in a 
 certain street with a cor "on prosti- 
 tute, looking out for hicn : R. v. 
 Barker, 182!) (Park, J., alter considt- 
 iiig I'arke, J.); see, also, Ycrry v. 
 \V:itkins, 18JB; Andrews v, Askey, 
 l.s.)7 ; and R. r. Dean, I8j2. 
 
 ' R. V. Cockcroft, 1870 (Willes, J., 
 and Martin, B.); R. v. Ilolmes and 
 l''urness, 1871 (C. C. R.); overrulin;j 
 R. r. Robins, 1843 ; R. v. Hodgson, 
 1812 ; secus, as to acts with prisoner 
 himself, post, § 1441. 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
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 257' AMKUICAN NOTES. PAKT II. 
 
 Res inter alios actee — It may be doubted whether many of the 
 facts excluded undei- the rule hinted at in the phrase res inter alios 
 iiefcE are excluded because they are irrelevant. It is one of the few 
 errors in Mr. Justice Stephen's admirable Digest of Evidence that 
 all questions of admissibility are dec'ded by him on the single test 
 of relevancy. Such does not seem to ba the case. Relevancy indeed 
 is essential to admissibility. But it is not sufficient, in all in- 
 stances, to secure it. It might almos^t be said to be the essential 
 characteristic of the English common iaw of evidence that much 
 evidence, perfectly relevant, is not received; — because practical 
 dangers and difficulties in receiving it are thought or have been 
 thought to outweigh the advantages which could be derived from its 
 use. Probably the historical reason of much of this is to be found in 
 a persistent influence of the feeling that a jury was liable to be con- 
 fused, or misled by the consideration of certain .matters that would 
 not att'ect better disciplined minds to the same extent. Tliat it was 
 better, on the whole, to lose the benefit of the evidence, rather than 
 run the risk. The fact that many kinds of evidence are admitted, 
 either directly or as exceptions to the rules of exclusion, which 
 seem quite as dangerous as those which are ruled out, count's for 
 but little. The law of evidence is neither the growth of one mind or 
 of several mi. ids at one time. It was not even the work of a single 
 age. Its synn-ietry therefore lays little claim to admiration. And 
 all that can be said is that certain great rules for excluding other- 
 wise competent evidence became established. That they are prin- 
 cipally four; — Res inter alios aetfe, matters of hearsay, character, 
 and opinion. That certain exceptions in the operation of each of 
 tliese general rules have also become established. It is perhaps not 
 a scientific statement. But it is ajiparently correct as a general 
 .statement, and gives the present condition of a branch of law 
 wliicli, considering the conditions of its growth, is greatly to the 
 credit of those men who have helped to mould it; — in that it has 
 served its jmrjiose, on the whole, fairly well. 
 
 The rule of res inter alios excludes evidence otherwise relevant. 
 There is little need of a special rule excluding irrelevant evidence. 
 It excludes itself, furnishing slight apparent necessity for classify- 
 ing the reasons why it is irrelevant. As a rule of exclusion, the 
 rule forbids the attemi)t to prove that A. did or omitted to do a 
 certain act by means of evidence that he did or omitted to do the 
 same or a substiuitially similar act at anotlier time. 
 
 On the question wln^thei' tlie driver of a horse-car stopped his car 
 with undue suddenness, it is erroneous to iulmit evidence of his sud- 
 den stopi)ing on })revious occasions. ^laguire v. Middlesex Rail- 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 J.) ( ' 
 
 way, 115 Mass. 239 (1874). In a case involving responsibility for a 
 maritime collision, it is error to permit tlie captain of one of tlie 
 vessels to be asked as to "accidents which had happened while lie 
 was pilot or captain of the propeller." Mailler v. Express Propeller 
 Co., 01 N. Y. 312 (1874). The question whether a railroad company 
 gave danger signals at a certain crossing " is a question of fact that 
 cannot be affected one way or another by showing the conduct of 
 subordinate officers or servants in charge of some other train or 
 trains" in giving the signals at this crossing. Eskridge v. Cincin- 
 nati, &c. R. 11., 89 Ky. 3(57 (1889). So in a case in ]Massacliusetts, 
 the issue being whether the bell was rung and the whistle sounded 
 at a certain crossing, the court say, " It was not competent for tiie 
 defendant to prove that its servants usually rang the bell at this 
 crossing, and to ask the jury to infer therefrom that it was rung at 
 the time of the accident ; neither was it competent for the plaintiff 
 to prove that the defendant's servants often or usually omitted to 
 ring the bell at this crossing, and to ask the jury to infer therefrom 
 that the bell was not rung at the time of the accident." Tuttle v. 
 Fitchburg K. E. 152 ^lass. 42 (1890). 
 
 On an issue as to the terms of a contract for the service of a 
 stallion, evidence is incompetent as to contracts with others for tiie 
 same service. Evans v. Koons, 10 Ind. App. 603 (1894). Of course 
 the rule does not apply where the second contract refers to the first. 
 Gardner r. Crenshaw, 122 Mo. 79 (1894). See also Roberts r. 
 Dixon, 50 Ivans. 43G (181)3). 
 
 On an issue of (levisavlt vel non the claim was made by the 
 remonstrants that the will was forged by the propounder. Held : 
 the propounder could not be asked whether he had not been guilty 
 of other forgeries. " The fact of forgery of a particular pajjcr can- 
 not be shown by proof of other crimes of the same kind." Frank- 
 lin V. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44 (1890). Similarly, it has been held 
 tliat where the payee is claimed to have forged one of the endorse- 
 ments on the note, evidence of his previous conviction of forgery is 
 immaterial. Benedict v. Rose, 24 S. C. 297 (1885). Or that the 
 party liad the " capacity, skill, and ajipliances which would enable 
 him to forge the note in suit." The court say : — " In cases where 
 a person is accused of a crime, it is not competent to show, as evi- 
 dence of the corpus di'Iictl, that he has committed similar offences, 
 or that he is of bad cliaracter, or that lie has the capacity and the 
 moans of committing the crime. The argument in favor of admit- 
 ting such evidence is plausible. It might aid the jury if they could 
 know tlie character of the defendant, — whether he is a man morally 
 anil jihysically able and likely to commit the offence; but the law 
 excludes such evidence upon grounds of public rolicy, to ])revent 
 the multiplication of issues in a case, and to protect a party from 
 tlie injustice of being called upon, without notice, to explain the 
 
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 I 
 
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 IN; 
 
 2573 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AliT 11. 
 
 acts of liis life not shown to be ooiinoctiHl with tho offciico witli 
 which he is charged." Costeh) y. Crowell, 1;5<J Mass. aHS (18Sr)). 
 
 Wliere the question was whether the phiintiff made a certain (ion. 
 tract with the defendant, it is not competent for liiin to sliow that 
 he made siinihir contracts with other people. '' Tlie maxim that a 
 transaction between two 2)ei'sons ought not to operate to the disad- 
 vantage of a third, tliough somewhat obscure in its application, 
 because it does not show how unconnected transactions should be 
 supposed to be relevant to each other, and though failing in its 
 literal sense, because it is not true that a man cannot be affected by 
 a transaction to which he is not a party, is U' vertheless one of the 
 most inii)ortant and pr'u-tically useful maxims of the law of evi- 
 dence. It means . . . that you are not to draw inferences I'rom one 
 transaction to another that is not specitically connected with it 
 merely because the two resemble each other ; that they must be 
 linked together by the chain of cause and effect in some assignable 
 way before you can draw your inference." Aiken v. ICennison, 08 
 Yt. (U)") (188(>). On the question what arrangements a firm of book 
 publishers made with one of their canvassers, evidence is incompe- 
 tent, of their contracts with other canvassers, in the absence of evi- 
 dence that the jiai'ticular canvasser knew of such other contracts or 
 of some usage in the business. Newhall /•. .\i)pleton, 101} N. Y. lo.'J 
 (1880). 
 
 " It would seem also that custom or the habitual conduct of the 
 defendant is not admhssible to show the existence or absence of 
 negligence in a given case." Oulf, &c. iiy. Co. c. Kowland, 82 Tex. 
 IGG (18!)1). 
 
 In New Hampshire, howevei', "a different rule prevails, and has 
 become established in cases where the evidence is conflicting; and 
 it is here held to be competent to show that the party charged with 
 negligence had performed or omitted the same act in the same way 
 before, as tending to show tliat he did or omitted the act at the time 
 in (piestion, on the ground that a jjcrson is more likely to do a thing 
 in a jiarticular way, as he is in the habit of doing "r not doing it." 
 Tarkinson 0. N; sl'iua, .'vc. U. R., (it X. H. 41G (is'si). 
 
 In Massachusetts, the rule prevails that on an issue of the value 
 of laiul evidence is admissible of the price at which other lots, simi- 
 larly situated, sold about the same time. Roberts v. I'oston, 149 
 Mass. 31() (188!)). The preliminary (piestion as to whether the lots 
 are so far similar and the time snthciently ne ir to render evidence 
 of sales competent is for the court. "It is net competent to put in 
 the opinion or judgment of witnesses as to the value of other land 
 in the vicinity." Thomjison r. Boston, 148 Mass. .'587 (1889). 
 
 On a question whether a certain brick-kiln was a nuisance to the 
 ]ilaintiff, evidence is inadmissible that a certai;i otlun* brick-kiln 
 ■was not a nuisance to the witness. Kirchgraber v. Lloyd, 59 Mo. 
 App. o9 n894\ 
 
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CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN XOTKS. 
 
 2.->l* 
 
 Of couvso the doing of acts at another time may be inadmissible 
 on tlie ground of irrelevancy. For example, on an indictment lor 
 arson, it is fatal error to allow evideinte tiiat the defendant had 
 stolen a V'uggy i)revioiisly. Sehaser /•. State, oG Wise. 41".) (1874). 
 So on an issue of the value of a son's services in his father's store, 
 evidence of what the father jiaid another son is immaterial. Cohen 
 r. Cohen, 2 Maiikey, 227 (18iS3). So in an action to recover against 
 an estate for horse hire, evidence that the plaintiff did not charge 
 certain other persons for the use of the same horse is immaterial. 
 Harris r. Howard, 5G Vt. G95 (1884). 
 
 In Criminal C.vses. — The rule excluding proof of similar acts at 
 another time as evidence on the question of the doing of a particular 
 act, has naturally been enforced with especial strictness in criminal 
 cases. The increased probative force of proof of a prior illegal 
 act and the seriousness in consequences to the prisoner have per- 
 mitted but comparatively little relaxation in criminal as compared 
 with civil cases. To permit this evidence, would substantially 
 amount to proof of character by evidence of particular acts of mis- 
 conduct. This cannot be done directly, and this rule forbids its 
 being done indirectly. " The rule is a familiar one in criminal pro- 
 cedure, that a party cannot be proved guilty of one offence by evi- 
 dence that at a different time and place he was guilty of committing 
 a similar crime." Com. r. Campbell, 7 All. ,')41 (1863), 
 
 Thus on an indictment for advising a slave to escape, it is error 
 to allow the government to show that the defendant previously 
 advised another slave to escape. Cole v. Com., 5 Graft. 09(5 (1848). 
 On an indictment for infanticide, ar admission, by silence, that the 
 prisoner '• had a child this way before, and put it away," is inadmis- 
 sible. State i: Shuford, 69 N. C. 486 (1873). 
 
 So on an indictment for murder it was held to be error to permit 
 the government to connect the prisoner with other offences. " The 
 only effect of testimony of this character was io distract the atten- 
 tion of the jury from the real issues in the case and to fill their 
 minds with prejudice against the accused. All independent mat- 
 ters and all independent crimes which are disconnected from the 
 crime then under investigation, which shed no light upon the alleged 
 criminal transaction, are to be rigorously excluded for the reasons 
 already given." State v. Parker, 96 Mo. .382 (1888). 
 
 " As a general rule, it is not admissible to adduce evidence that 
 a defendant committed an offence, in order to prove that he com- 
 mitted another." State v. Alston, 94 X. C. 930 (1886). 
 
 On an indictment for murder, preceded by an attempt at robbery, 
 it is error to permit evidence of prior robberies by the defendants. 
 " Proof of them only tended to prejudice the defendants with the 
 jurors, to draw tlieir minds away from the real issue, and to produce 
 the impression that they were wretches whose lives were of no 
 value to the community." Boyd v. U. S. 142 U. S. 450 (1892). 
 
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 257° 
 
 AMKHICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [taut II. 
 
 On an issup of burglary cviilonco is inconipctiMit of a prior bur- 
 1,'lary of the iioiisa of tiio proiioontor and tiic jirisoncr's fonnuctiou 
 with it, Jii^'btfoot r. People, IG Micili. 507 (IHlIN). 
 
 The {^overiiiiK'nt in a eriniinal ease, however, is not prevented from 
 proviii" the offence charged because such proof incidentally shows 
 tl i ' jfendant has been guilty of another crime. Com. /■. tlohn- 
 so.,, ...w i\[ass. o4 (hSS!)). 
 
 The rule has no api)lieation where the ])rior act was the cause of 
 the act in question. Under these circumstances "the two embrace 
 but one continuing transaction, ami, occurring at the sanui time and 
 place, together constitute but the rrs tjcsta; of a single principal 
 fact." Trior v. State, 77 Ala. r»G (1884). 
 
 Kklaxation of the Kllk. — In two important particulars the bene- 
 fits to be derived from tht; use of this species of evidence have been 
 considered to more than compensate for the danger of admitting it. 
 The controlling consideration apparently has been that two impor- 
 tant sets of facts can frequently be proved in no other way. These 
 are, (1), mental states, and, (2), in seeking a responsible cause among 
 several possible causes. 
 
 (1) JMkntal Statks. — To prove purpose, intent, motive, knowl- 
 edge, or other nu'iital state is a task of difficulty. To the niedi;eval 
 mind, indeed, the task was insui)erable. To ascertain the seovt 
 thoughts of th(i human lieart seenuMl to our ancestors a task beyond 
 mere mortal j)ower. A direct appeal to the judgnn'ut of Heaven, 
 by ordeal, wager of battle, &e., was needed to aid consciously feeble 
 resources for the discovery of truth, when locked up in a human 
 breast. 15ut this is a mystery which modern jurisprudence by the 
 use of reason undertakes to unravel. It demands, however, from 
 the nature of the problem, a certain relaxation of the usual rides of 
 evidence. Unless tlie jjerson whose mental state is involved ad- 
 mits its existence, the fact of such mental state can be establislied 
 only by proof of its natural manifestations, either in langunge or 
 conduct. It folh.ws therefore that in cases where a mental state is 
 a fact in issue or relevant to the issue, the usual expressions of such 
 state are competent. The exclamation of pain, hatred, or malice; 
 the tiireat of revenge ; tiie timid exjiression of fear by a mind unduly 
 inHueneed to do wliat its sense of justic(i repudiates; — these, and 
 many others are admissible in any case where smdi a mental state is 
 in issue or relevant, not as Jiearsay evidence of the facts stated, but 
 as original cinnimstantial evidence of the existence of the state of 
 mind of which they are the usual expression. 
 
 In hke manner, the existence of such a mental state may be 
 proved by evidence of eomluct which is the usual expression of such 
 state. It naturally follows tliat sucOi jiroof will frecpiently be found 
 in the doing of an act at anotlun- time similar to the one as to winch 
 the issue is raised in the case on trial. That such proof would 
 
CllAP. VI.] 
 
 AMKItI(;.\N N(»TKS. 
 
 t.V)78 
 
 
 cjoiiio within the scopo of tlin riilo .a!,':un.st fiilinittinj; rns infer iilii>s 
 dctd', (loi'S not iift'oct tlio Viilidity ol' the reasoning nndcr wiiich it. is 
 I't'ceiviul. 
 
 Intknt. — Porhiips the most Ireqncnt mental state to be iitliruiiu 
 tivoly shown, especially in criminal cases, is the existence ol' a 
 spcciiic intent. 
 
 In an indictment for assault with intent to commit murder, 
 " previous attacks . . . during the same evening, which showed a 
 continuous and persevering determination, by rei^ated assaults, 
 accompanied by threats to kill (the ])rosecutor) or otherwise injure 
 him" were admitted. Koss ik State, (L' Ala. U24 (1S78). 
 
 So on an indictment for murder previous threats or attempts ti) 
 kill are competent. '•This evidence did not of itself establish the 
 fact that the defendant intended to kill his wife at the time he tired 
 tiie fatal shot; but it was to be weighed by the jury in connection 
 with all the facts surrounding the homicide for the purpose of deter- 
 mining the motive and intent of the defendant at the time.'' I'eoplo 
 /'. .lones, IM) N. Y. (167 (iHcSr.). 
 
 So in an indictment for rape a prior unsuccessful attempt to com- 
 mit the same crime upon the prosecutrix is competent. People v. 
 O'Sullivan, 104 N. Y. 481 (1887); State ;>. Walter.s, 45 ia. .'!8'.> 
 (1877). 
 
 So in a libel for divorce on the ground of adultery prior acts of 
 adultery are admissible "for the purpose of proving an adulterous 
 disposition in the persons implicated, which itself tends to provi; 
 the particular act charged, as a continuation of the same immoral 
 proclivity." Hicks v. State, 80 Ala. .'{!) (1888). So on an indic^t- 
 ment for adulter}', subsequent acts of adultery are competent, but 
 the effect of the evidence must be properly limited, and it is error 
 not to do so. Funderburg v. State, 'So Tex. App. 3*.»2 (1887) ; State 
 /'. Way, 5 Neb. 28.'} (1877). 
 
 [n an indictment for adultery, one of the government witnesses 
 testified to seeing the alleged guilty parties undress for the pur- 
 pose of occupying the same bed for the night and go to bed together. 
 The defence introduced evidence of the witness's character for truth. 
 It was- held that prim- acts of undue familiarity were admissible. 
 " The circumstances thus ])rovcd wi^re such as naturally excite in 
 the mind a belief that a woman who would so conduct herself, would 
 be more likely to commit the fact alleged against her, than if her 
 deportment had been modest and discreet." ()om. r. Merriam, II 
 I'ick. 018 (18;W). 
 
 In an action for malicious and wilful mischief the court permit 
 evidence of other similar offences against the prosecutor by the 
 defendant. "Inasmuch as the case was one where the motive or 
 intent with which the act was committed was the gist of the offence, 
 it was permissible to go into and show other criminal transactions 
 
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 257" 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AKT tl. 
 
 »»f ii siiuiliir rharaotcr, as oviileuco of tho iiitont or inotivo." Street 
 *•■ Mtatt", 7 Tex. Apj). ") (1.S7U). 
 
 So ill a case ot larcii-ii y, •• as a general rule, evidence that the 
 ilefeiuhiiit lias coniniitted offences other than tiiose charged in tho 
 iiidictiiu'iit. though of a similar nature, is prima facue inadiiiissihlc. 
 The general rule lias its limitations and exceptions. Wiu-n it is 
 material to show the intent with which the act charged was com- 
 mitted, to illustrate its criminality, or to identify the accused as the 
 person who committed the act laid in the indictment, such evidence 
 is admissihle." Curtis v. State, 78 Ala. 12 (1884). 
 
 In an action of libel the publication of which is claimed to be 
 malicious, subsequent publications by the defendant are admissible 
 '• for tlie purpose of showing the personal malice and ill-will of the 
 defendant towards the plaintiff." Grace v. McArthur, 7G Wise. 
 r»41 (1S90). In an indictment for manslaughter, evidence of cruel 
 and abusive treatment of the deceased is admissible on the (juestion 
 of malice. Knrnett r. State, 14 Lea, iVJ (1884) ; Eldridge v. State, 
 L'7 Fla. 102 (I8i)l). 
 
 So where the replication of express malice was made to a defence 
 of privileged communication in an action of slander, the plaintiff is 
 entitled to give evidence of a previous statement to a similar effect, 
 under eireumstances not privileged. Hamel v. Amyot, 14 Quebec, 
 m (1S87). 
 
 Where an innkeeper, in an action by a guest to recover for loss of 
 j)ro{)erty by lire, relied on ii statutory exemption that the fire was 
 incendiary, evidence was offered that on the same evening an attempt 
 was made to fire a neighbouring building by similar means. The evi- 
 dence was rejected, and such rejection was ruled to be error. The 
 court, jii'r Andrews, J., while conceding that the evidence offered would 
 be incompetent against the prisoner on an indictment for arson, con- 
 tinue : — " But in investigating in a civil suit a question depending 
 solely upon circumstantial evidence, it would, I think, be holding 
 too strict a rule to refuse evidence such as was offered in this case, 
 which is connected with the principal fact by circumstances which 
 naturally tend to establish it. There is no fixed and definite rule, 
 by whi(;h it can be determined whether a collateral fact is so 'remote 
 as to be inadmissible to support the princii)al fact sought to be 
 established. The question must, to a considerable extent, be de- 
 cided in each case, on its own circumstances." Faucett r. Nichols, 
 (!4 N. Y. 377 (187C). On an indictment for arson, a prior attempt 
 four weeks before by the defendant to fire the same buildings, is 
 competent. " Evidence of previous unsuccessful attempts to com- 
 mit the same crime for which a respondent is on trial, is admis- 
 sible." State V. Ward, fil Vt. 158, 181 (1888). 
 
 Where the issue was whether the jdaintiif was dealing with the 
 cashier of the defendant bank as an individual or as an officer of the 
 
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CIIAT. VI.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 I'il* 
 
 (lofeiidaiit, l);iiik, ovidonco is compt'tcut of foniior triuiaactions of 
 a similar natnie between the parties. L'JIerbette /•• I'ittslielcl 
 National Banlt, UVJ Mass. U57 (l.S'.)4). 
 
 Acts admitted lor tlie purjujse of sliowing intent may really 
 amonnt to what would popularly be, termed circumstantial evidence 
 of guilt, though in truth all evidence of the existentc of oni' thing 
 by proof of the existence of another is, in a sense, circumstantial. 
 Thus on an indictment for stealing a hog, evidence is admissible 
 that the defendant after the taking altered the brand on the hog, 
 though this would be a distinct offence, '• to show the intent with 
 which the act charged was done . . . inasmuch as thf' altering of 
 the previous mark of an animal tends to show the intent of convert- 
 ing it to one's own use." State v. Thomas, .'}() La. Ann. Pt. 1, GOO 
 (1878). 
 
 Ou an indictment for using instruments on a certain woman to 
 procure a miscarriage, evidence of treatment by electricity of the 
 same woman on the same occasion and of similar acts on other occa- 
 sions, is competent. " Whether it was of acts which formed part of 
 the principal transaction, or of acts of the defendant at other times, 
 it tended to prove attemj)ts of the defendant to procure the identi- 
 cal result the intent to ])rocure which constituted the gist of the 
 offence charged, — that is, to prove the intent which was charged in 
 the indictment." Com. v. Corkin, 13G Mass. 429 (1884). 
 
 Where the defendant, an insurance agent, was indicted for 
 fraudulently transferring to a certain insurance company from 
 another company, for the purpose of shielding the latter, after he 
 knew that the vessel called the " Wade " and her cargo insured 
 had been lost, a certain share of the risk, evidence is admissible 
 that he did the same thing as to other risks about the same time. 
 " it was necessary for the People to show the evil motive and 
 fraudulent intent of the defendant in changing the insurance upon 
 the cargo of the Wade, after knowledge of the loss, from the Conti- 
 nental to the Thames and Mersey; and for the purpose of showing 
 the motive and intent, it was competent for the People to show that 
 the defendant had done similar acts, although it might thus be 
 shown that he was guilty of other crimes." People v. Dimick, 107 
 X. V. 13, ;;2 (1887). 
 
 Malick. — Acts of the person wiiose malice at a particular time 
 is important, whether made before or after the time in question, 
 may be shown if such acts tend to establish the existence of malice 
 fit the time alleged. 
 
 On an indictment of a husband for the murder of his wife evidence 
 of threats and acts of violence for a period of eight years prior to 
 tlie death is competent. " It tended to show a settled ill-will and 
 malice on the part of the defendant towards his wife, and therefore 
 l)ore directly on the question whether there was any motive for him 
 to commit the crime." Com. v. Holmes, 157 Mass. 233 (1892). 
 
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 2579 
 
 AMERICAN KOTES. 
 
 [taut II. 
 
 So in an action for malicious prosecntion, the court say : " Malico 
 may also lie inferred, of course, from the circumstances surrounding 
 and attending upon the prosecution, the conduct and declarations of 
 the prosecutor, his activity in and about the case, his efforts therein 
 to secure some personal end. Indeed, the existence of malice being 
 a fact which, in the nature of things, is incapable of positive, direct 
 proof, it must of necessity be rested on inferences and deductions 
 from facts which can be laid before the jury; and hence it is that a 
 wide range is permitted in adducing attendant circumstances which 
 tend to throw any light on the subject." Lunsford c. Dietrich, 93 
 Ala. ofio (1890). 
 
 KxowM;u(iK. — That a particular fact was known to a person is 
 difficult of proof in the absence of an admission or other affirmative 
 proof. When, as fre<]uently happens in criminal cases, it becomes 
 necessary to establish such a mental state, the usual, and apparently 
 the necessary, method of doing so is by proving facts which tend to 
 render such knowledge probable. Usually a single fact of this nature 
 so easily admits of explanation in the way of accident or mistake us 
 to furnish but a slight degree of probative force. But it will be seen 
 that the number of such as facts is multiplied, hypotliescs which 
 satisfactorily explain them all grow rapidly fewer and more diffi- 
 cult of belief. The necessity of the case and the valuable results to 
 be obtained from the process have warranted a frequent use of 
 facts which would otherwise be objectionable as res hitcr alios 
 Kctcc. 
 
 The question being whether A. fraudulently induced 1?. to loan 
 him money on the security of false certificates of stock, evidence ol' 
 the possession and use by A. of other altered and false certifioates 
 about the same time, whether before or afterwards, is "competent, 
 to show that his possession of those, for the use of which lie was 
 indicted, was not casual and accidental. . . . They were admitti'd 
 and allowed to be used only to show guilty knowledge." (Join. v. 
 Coe, 11") Mass. 481 (1874). 
 
 On indictments for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have 
 been stolen, evidence of stealing from the same persons of similar 
 goods and tlieir purchase by the accused, is competent. "The rule 
 is recognized as well established, that in eases like the jireseiit, 
 where guilty knowledge is an ingredient of the offence charged, tlie 
 same may be proved as other facts are proved, by circumstantiiil 
 evideiKic, and tliat other acts of a like cliaracter, altliough involviii'^' 
 substantive criincs, may be given in evidence to ])i'ove tlie sriniffr. 
 The i)riiici|ial limitation of the rule is, that the criminal act wliicli 
 is souglit to b" given in evidence, must be necessarily connected witli 
 that wliicli is tlie subject of the prosecution, either from some con- 
 nection of time and place, or as furnishing a clue to tli(! motive on 
 the part of the accused." Coleman v. People, 08 N. Y. fiHS (1874). 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTES. 
 
 •2.3710 
 
 It is not essential to this rule that the gooils should have been 
 stolen, in the second instances, from the same party. " Upon the 
 trial on an indictment for receiving certain stolen goods, knowing 
 them to have been stolen, evidence that other goods, known to have 
 been stolen, were previously received by the defendant from the 
 same thief, is admissible for the purpose of showing guilty knowl- 
 edge on tlie part of the accused that the goods, for receiving wliioh 
 he is charged, were stolen." Schriedley tu State, 23 Ohio St., 130 
 (1872); Devoto t'. Com., 3 .Mete. (Ky.) 417 (1861). 
 
 On an indictment for forging and uttering certain receipted bills 
 for hides, " on the question of the defendant's knowledge that the 
 bills in issue were not genuine, his possession and use of other sim- 
 ilar false bills, about the same time, whether before or afterwards, 
 in a continuous series of transactions with the same persons under 
 the same contract, was comjietent to sliow that his use of the former 
 was not innocent." Com. v. White, 145 :\[ass. 392 (1888). It is 
 immaterial that the transactions extend some months later than the 
 latest forgery mentioned in the indictment. Ibid. 
 
 To prove defendant's knowledge of the falsity of tlie false pre- 
 tence used in obtaining a certain amount of money by means of a 
 cheque, evidence of prior frauds on other parties, shortly before, is 
 admissible. Tarbox v. State, 38 Oh. St. 581 (188.3). In an action 
 against a stage line for damages sustained by tlie overturning of a 
 stage-coach, as bearing on the bad nature of the roads and the 
 defendant's knowledge of the necessity of providing a careful driver 
 in consequence, the frequent occurrence of other similar accidents 
 may be sliown. IJut such evidence is not admissible " for the pur- 
 pose of showing negligence on the part of the driver at tlie time." 
 Higley v. Gilmer, 3 .Mont. 90 (1878). 
 
 So in an action of negligently setting fires by sparks escaping 
 from a locomotive engine, prior instances of similar tires are admis- 
 sible as bearing on " wliether, in view of their previous occurrence, 
 the comjmny was, at tlio time of the fire in question, in the exer- 
 cise of reasonable care." Smith v. Old Colony, &c. li. R., 10 R. I. 22 
 (1871). JUit no evidence of past fires is admissible for tliat purpose. 
 [/>!(/. So on ail issui' of negligence, it is competent to show other 
 occurrences showing knowledge of defects on the part of the defend- 
 ant. Thus, in an action for ])ersonal injuries caused by the cars of 
 a freight train running off the track, evidence is competent that 
 freiglit trains under tlie same e()n<hietor liad run off tlie track seven 
 or eight times within the preceding month, ^lobile, &c. R. J!, r. 
 Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15 (1872). 
 
 So on an indictment for passing counterfeit money a witness tes- 
 tified " that tlie defendant's wife sold to him a twenty dollar coun- 
 terfeit bill belonging to the defendant, in liis absence; but that tlie 
 defendant subsequently was advised of the transaction and sane- 
 
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 257" 
 
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 PART II. 
 
 tioned it." This was not the bill for the passing of which the 
 defendant was indicted. Held, " the evidence was admissible as 
 tending to show knowledge on the part of the defendant that the 
 bill passed by himself was counterfeit, as, the transactions were 
 about the same time." Bersch v. State, 13 Ind, 434 (1859). 
 
 On an indictment for uttering and passing counterfeit money, 
 evidence that the prisoner " had been employed in the business of 
 printing parts of genuine bank bills was pertinent for the purpose 
 of showing his knowledge in respect to bills. It tended to show 
 guilty knowledge that the bills he passed were counterfeit." Com. 
 V. Hall, 4 All. 305 (1862). 
 
 So on an indictment for uttering a forged cheque, it is competent 
 to show the uttering of other forged cheques upon other occasions. 
 " Such proof is not received for the purpose of showing other crimes 
 than that charged in the indictment, but for the purpose of show- 
 ing the guilty knowledge and intent which are elements of the 
 crime charged." People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591 (1887). 
 
 MoTivK. — It is obvious that where the doing of an act, especially 
 one of serious consequence, is to be established by circumstantial 
 evidence, one of the most essential objects of judicial inquiry is as 
 to the existence of motive. Crimes of magnitude and other acts 
 of grave import are not usually done without a motive, of some 
 kind, which, for the time at least, probably appeared adequate. 
 To establish such a motive, resort frequently must be had, as in 
 proving other mental feelings, to proof of acts which are its. usual 
 expression or otherwise point to it. " Indeed, it would be difficult to 
 detect criminals and bring them to punishment, by any other means 
 than by following the thread of impelling motives." Com. v. Ferri- 
 gan, 44 Pa. St. 386 (1863). Instances of the use of this kind of 
 evidence are extremely frequent. 
 
 For example, in a case where a father was indicted for murder of a 
 daughter, May, it was the theory of the government that the defend- 
 ant desired to be rid of a wife and two children, Irene and May, in 
 order to marry another woman, "There was evidence tending 
 strongly to support this theory, and to show that the death of each 
 one of the victims was but a part of a system in which the lives of 
 all were involved, and in the working out of which to the accom-. 
 plishment of defendant's ulterior purpose, the life of each was, in 
 substantially the same manner, ruthlessly sacrificcnl. Under these 
 circumstances, all evidence going in any way to connect the defend- 
 ant with the murder of his wife, or of his daughter Irene, was rele- 
 vant to tlie issues involved on his trial for the murder of May, and 
 was properly admitted." Ilawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 67 (1889). 
 
 Similarly, where the object of the government was to show that the 
 murder was committed to enable the prisoner to marry the wife of 
 the victim, evidence of adulterous intercourse between these parties 
 
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 25712 
 
 was admitted. " He is a poor judge of huiiian motives and impulses, 
 who cannot see in such a rehitiou .as proposed to be proved liere, 
 between the deceased's wife and the prisoner, that it might lead to 
 the perpetration of the crime cliarged, or who would deny that it 
 would probably shed light on the motive for the act. History is 
 full of such examples." Com. /•. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. St. 3SC (1863). 
 So evidence is competent, in a similar case, "that during four of 
 the eleven niglits intervening between the killing and the finding 
 of the body of the deceased, the accused and Polly, the wife of the 
 deceased, slept in the same bed, and together, at witness's house. 
 Clearly this was a pregnant circumstance, taken with the other 
 proofs tending to show a motive for the crime on the part of the 
 accused." Miller v. State, 68 Miss. 221 (1890). 
 
 " Evidence of one crime may be given to sliew a motive for com- 
 mitting another, as in the case of Ilex v. Clewes (4 C. & P. 221), 
 and ^"here several felonies are all parts of the same transaction, 
 evidence of all is admissible upon the trial of an indictment for any 
 of them." P. V. Chasson, 16 New Bruns. 546, 582 (1876). So 
 where the motive claimed for a murder was revenge fcr procuring 
 prisoner's dismissal from employment, evidence is admissible that 
 the prisoner had stated that he so believed and had threatened to 
 " fix " deceased for it. " Upon an indictment for murder, evidence 
 of former grudges and antecedent threats is received, because it 
 tends to show malice in the defendant against the deceased. Such 
 evidence is admissible because it supplies a motive for the act." 
 State V. Palmer, 65 N. H. 218 (1889). 
 
 On an action against certain judges of (dection for refusing to 
 allow the plaintiff to vote, it was the plaintiff's contention that the 
 motive of tlie defendants, who were all members of one political 
 party, was the partisan one of preventing members of the oi)posite 
 political party (of which the plaintiff was a member) from voting. 
 Held : that evidence was competent that the defendants on the same 
 day had rejected others of tlieir political opponents for the same 
 trivial reasons. " Wliere the inipiiry turns upon intention and motive, 
 and in cases where fraud, corru|)ti()n and the like constitute the gist 
 of tlie action, acts and declarations of a similar cliaraeter, at or 
 about tlie same time, to or towards third parties, are admissible to 
 sliow the quo (I II lino of tlie particular transaction." Friend v. 
 Haiiiill, 34 Md. 298, 306 (1870). 
 
 In an indictment for tlic niurder of one Prince Arthur Freeman 
 by poison, the motive of tlie defendant, as claimed by the govern- 
 ment, was as follows. That Freeman, a married man with a wife 
 and two children, had insured liis life for $2000 in favor of his wife, 
 Aiiiiio Freeman. Tliat the defendant, a sister of his wife, was bur- 
 dened with and pressed for tiie payment of debts which she had no 
 means of paying. That thereupon, tiie defendant formed the plan 
 
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 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT II. 
 
 and intention of procuring to herself this insurance money, for the 
 payment of these pressing debts, by lirst killing her sister; then 
 inducing Freeman to make his life insurance payable to herself and, 
 finally, killing him. The wife died February 26th, 1885 ; on May 
 13th, 1885, the defendant was appointed by Freeman beneficiary 
 under his insurance certificate ; on June 27th, 1885, Freeman died ; 
 the defendant's bills were paid from the insurance money which 
 was duly received on September 23rd, 1885. The court ruled that 
 upon a trial of a defendant for the commission of a crime, evidence 
 that at another time he committed a similar crime could not be 
 received or considered as tending to show that he committed the 
 crime for Avhich he was on trial ; that therefore evidence tending to 
 show that the defendant killed her sister Annie Freeman was not 
 to be considered as indicating that she would be likely to kill Prince 
 Arthur Freeman, and that all the evidence in relation to the death 
 of Annie Freeman was only to be considered so far as it bore upon 
 tlie question whether the defendant, at the time of the alleged mur- 
 der of l*rince Arthur Freeman, was actuated by the motive which 
 Avas imputed to her by the (Jonimon wealth, to obtain for her own 
 use the life insurance money payable on his death. Held: "the 
 ruling at the trial was correct." Com. v. Ilobinson, 1-40 Mass. 571 
 
 In a Pennsylvania case involving a series of murders by poison, 
 where the apparent motive in each case wns different, the court 
 insist that the existence of a common motive is ;i,n absolute essen- 
 tial to admitting evidence of other crimes. In other words, the 
 crimes must be means to a common end foreseen from the begin- 
 ning, as in the Itobinson case, to admit the evidence of other crimes. 
 "To make one criminal act evidence of another, a connection 
 between them must have existed in uhe mind of the actor, linking 
 them together for some purpose he intended to accomplish ; or it 
 must be necessary to identify the person of the actor, by a connec- 
 tion which shows that he who committed the one must have done 
 the other." Shaffner i>. Com. 72 Pa. .St. GO (1872). 
 
 Where tlie supposed motive for the murder of a wife to whom the 
 prisoner had been .sccrelly iiKirried was the fact that the announce- 
 ment of such marriage, wliich could be delayed but a sliort time 
 longer, would interrupt his relations witli a prostitute n,nd prevent 
 marriag" with another woman ^.viiig in Indiana, to whom he was 
 then under engagement of marriage, letters of the prisoner to the 
 deceased and such other women were held competent. "All of 
 them . . . showed the existence of a relation between the accused 
 and these two women which might be broken off or interfered with 
 by his marriage to the deceased becoming pu1)lic. They exhibited a 
 motive why he should desire to rid liiinself of his wife and their 
 unborn offspring." O'lJrien v. Com., 81) Ky. 354 (l.SSD). 
 
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CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMIiRICAN NOTES. 
 
 2571* 
 
 Where the claim was that the insured had swindled an insurance 
 company by insuring his life for lars^e amounts in favour of his cred- 
 itors and otlier friends, then killini,' himself, a witness was allowed 
 to testify that a few months before tlic process of insurance began 
 he went at request of insured to raisr money for him from his 
 (insured's) friends ; that he failed to accomplish the purpose and so 
 informed the insured. "It indicated an existing motive for the 
 fraud in the want of money and the failure to obtain it.'' Smith v. 
 X. B. Society, 123 X. Y. 85 (1890). So where a prisoner had mur- 
 dered his father and step-mother, the government was permitted on 
 an indictment for the murder of the father to show ill-will on tlie 
 part of the prisoner against the step-mother. " Tiie motive whieh 
 induced the defendant to kill any one of the family might very well 
 be held to have induced him to kill the others." AVoolfolk r. 
 State, 85 Cia. 01), 105 (1890). So in a murder case, tlie court rule 
 tliat, "It is permissible to prove previous altercations or cond)ats 
 between the accuced and the deceased as tending to show malice, 
 ill-will, or a motive for the killing. The object of such evidence is 
 the fact of the jn-evious difficulty, and collateral inquiries into the 
 jjarticulars, details of merits, are not allowable" Garrett c. State, 
 76 Ala. 18 (1884). 
 
 On an indictment for murder in an attempt to rape, evidence of 
 the defendant's conduct about the time of the homicide toward vari- 
 ous women in tlie neighbourhood showing an apparent desire to 
 commit the crime of rape is admissible. But the government can- 
 not show that the defendant committed a rape several years before 
 on a woman other than the deceased. " The law in regard to proof 
 of intent, is, I ajipreliend, in no particular different from the law in 
 regard to the proof of other facts, unless it may be in the general 
 principle that a person is ordinarily presumed to intenil the natural 
 conseiiuences of his actions. Hut always the evidence will be sub- 
 ject to the condition that it legally and logically tends to prove the 
 facts in issue, whether it be th(^ intent or any other fact.'' State v. 
 Lapage, 57 N. H. 245, 290 (187(5) ; State r. Walters, 45 la. 389 
 
 In an indictment for rape, evidence of solicitations six months 
 previous is competent. " The evidence was admissible as tending 
 to show the existence of a motive or passion tliat would render the 
 commission of the act charged more probable." State v. Knapp, 
 45 N. H. 148 (1803). 
 
 To sliow tliat a defendant had negotiated the nrce in suit at a 
 larf,'e discount because of his impecunious condition, evidence is 
 admissible that he negotiated other notes at large discounts at about 
 the same time. Turner r. Luning, 105 Cal. 124 (1894). 
 
 Where the doing of a prior act possesses a jirobative force apart 
 from its resembkuice to the act in question, such fact is, in general, 
 
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 AMKIUCAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT II. 
 
 admissible, in the absence of special danger to be apprehended from 
 its use. 
 
 Purpose. — So where criminal acts form part of a common imr- 
 pose or organised plan of operations. " There is a distinct and 
 significant in-obative effect, resulting from the continuance of the 
 same plan or s(!heme, and from the doing of other acts in pursuance 
 thereof. It is somewhat of the nature of threats or declarations 
 of intention, but more especially of preparatioi.'s for the commission 
 of the crime wliicli is the subject of the indictment." Com. v. 
 Robinson, 146 :\rass. 571 (1888). 
 
 On an indictment for stealing a horse it may be shown that the 
 defendant on the same night stole a wagon from another person. 
 " The taking a wagon to use with the stolen horse, if they were used 
 together, was evidence of a corroborating circumstance to the main 
 charge, and could be used as evidence for that purpose, notwith- 
 standing it was proof of another felony also, not charged in the 
 indictment." Phillips r. People, 57 Barb. 353 (1869). On an issue 
 of larceny of a horse evidence of the larceny of a saddle and blanket 
 at the same time was competent. State v. Folwell, 14 Kans. 105 
 (1874). So a larceny of a whittletree about the same time, useful 
 in enabling the prisoner to escape. Und. 
 
 On the contrary, the supreme court of Arkansas granted a new 
 trial in a case where, on an indictment for larceny of two horses, 
 evidence was admitted that the defendants had shortly afterwards 
 stolen bridles and saddles with which to equip the horses for the 
 journey. " It was not competent for the State to p^'ove these sepa- 
 rate and distinct offences, by the admissions of appellant, or other- 
 wise, on his trial upon the cliarge of stealing the horse and mare. " 
 Endaily v. State, 39 Ark. 278 (1882). In tliis latter case, however, 
 the evidence of stealing the horse was plenary the defendants leav- 
 ing confessed. The evidence of the further larcenies seems to have 
 served no useful purpose. 
 
 It is necessary to establish a connecting link between the trans- 
 action sought to be shown and the transaction in question ; — as that 
 they are part of a single plan or scheme. In a well-considered 
 Massachusetts case, of alleged false pretences in the sale of a horse, 
 similar false pretences in sales to other persons shortly before were 
 held inadmissible. " It is not in general competent to show a dis. 
 tinct crime committed by the defendant for the purpose of proving 
 that he is guilty of the crime charged. . . . But as in all crimes, 
 except a few statutory offences, a criminal intent is necessary to be 
 proved, evidence which legitimately bears upon this may be put in, 
 even if it be derived from circumstances which also show the com- 
 mission of another offence. . . . The evidence here admitted as to 
 the three other distinct fraudulent sales does not appear to come 
 within any of the exceptions to the general rule th.at limits the trial 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 2571'' 
 
 to the immediate act for ■vvhicli the defendant is indicted. . . . The 
 transactions foi mod no part of a single scheme or plan, any more 
 than the various robberies of a thief." Per Devens, J., in Com. v. 
 Jackson, 132 Mass. 16 (1882). 
 
 Where, on the trial of one charged with the forgery of a promis- 
 sory note, it appears that the crime in question is one oi a system 
 of like crimes committed by the defendant in pursuance of a con- 
 spiracy, other notes forged by him during the pendency of tlie 
 conspiracy and purporting to be executed by different ])ersous, are 
 admissible in evidence against liim. " The reason foi- the rule in 
 this and similar cases is that when once system is proved, eacli par- 
 ticular part of the system may be explained by tlie other parts 
 which go to make up the whole." Card v. State, lO'J Ind. 415, 420 
 (188C). 
 
 In a case in New Hampshire which the court evidently feel is <a 
 close one, the evidence having been admitted on the wrong ground 
 at the trial, the court "after some hesitancy " decide that on an 
 indictment for placing obstructions on a railroad track, evidence 
 was admissible that shortly before and shoicly after the obstruc- 
 tions in question were struck the defendants j^ilaced other obstruc- 
 tions on the track, in the immediate vicinity. "These aets would 
 show that the defendants were near the place whore the offence was 
 committed, about the time it was committed, an-l that tlu^y were 
 consequently in a situation to place tlie obstruotit.ns on the track, 
 and had the strength and ability to put them tliere." State o. 
 Weiitworth, 37 N. H. 19G (1858). A similar reasoning is adopted 
 in a Massachusetts case. " Where unlawful acts of the same 
 general cliaracter are continuous in their nature, and appear to 
 be parts of a general scheme or plan, participation in them at an 
 earlier stage is the usual evidence that one who was afterward 
 present was a particii)ator then." Tyson v. Booth, 100 j\Iass. 258 
 (ISOS). 
 
 Fraud. — Xowhere is a wider lat-rude given into tlie range ot 
 res Inter alios activ. than in cases of fraud. 
 
 To show fraudulent intent, evidence is admitted of other frauds 
 of a similar nature, especially where such evidence tends to estab- 
 lish tlie existence of an organized scheme, of which separate frauds 
 constitute part. 
 
 For example, where it was claimed that the plaintiff was patentee 
 of an invention for baling cotton, and that tlie defendants, an 
 English company, making a similar device, fraudulently iiretended 
 to be about to purchase this invention, not actually intending to do 
 so, but with the real object of keeping the market for their own 
 process during the pendency of protracted negotiations, evidence 
 that the defendants, during the same period, entered into negotia- 
 tions with other American inventors, patentees of competing inven- 
 
 
 
 
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 257" 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKii. 
 
 [taut II. 
 
 tions, in the same way and with the same object, is competent. " It 
 was an important iiupiiry in the case, what was the pnrpose or 
 animus of the defendants in their negotiations with the phiintiff ? 
 ... If a motive exist prompting to a particular line of conduct, 
 and it he shown that in pursuing that line a defendant has deceived 
 <aud defraniled one person, it may justly be inferred that similar 
 conduct towards another, at about tlie same time, and in relation to 
 a like subject, was actuated by the same spirit." Hutler v. Wat- 
 kins, I'o Wall. 450, 4()4 (1871). On an issue whether the defend- 
 ants fraudulently sohl the plaintiff's goods to a person of no financial 
 staiuling, it may be shown that they sold the goods of others to such 
 persons with similar false representations. "Actions of this de- 
 scription, . . . where fraud is of the essence of the charge, neces- 
 sarily give rise to a wide range of investigation, for the reason that 
 the inttuit of the defendant is, more or less, involved in the issue. 
 E.xperience shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts is not gen- 
 erally to be expected, and for that reason, among others, the law 
 allows a resort to circumstances, as the means of ascertaining the 
 truth." Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172. 187 (1859). So on an 
 issue of a fraudulent entry of goods at the custom-house, evidence of 
 similar previous fraudulent entries has been received. " Wherever 
 ttie intent or guilty knowledge of a party is a material ingredient in 
 the issue of a case, these collateral facts, tending to establish such 
 intent or knowledge, are proper evidence." liottomley r. U. S. 
 1 Story, 135, 144 (1840). Where it was claimed that the defendant 
 procured an extension of time upon a certain indebtedness by fraud- 
 ulent representations as to his ability to pay, evidence is admissible 
 that at the same time the defendant was making like false repre- 
 sentations to others. "The plaintiff relied upon showing, that the 
 defendant had been engaged in a sclieme, to defraud those upon 
 whose credulity he could impose; and the entire history of the 
 defendant's dealings with him, in regard to this money loaned, 
 would tend, in some degree, though perhaps remotely, to show that 
 it was witli a continued intent to defraud, that he made the rep- 
 resentations " in question. French r. White, 5 Duer, 254 (1856). 
 On the issue whether a certain conveyance to the plaintilf was in 
 fraud of A.'s creditors, evidence is admissible of other conveyances 
 from A. to the plaintiff and collusive suits between A. and the 
 plaintiff about the same time which were also in fraud of A.'s cred- 
 itors. " It is usually the only nu)de of proving such matters. 
 Purpose and intention, especially when tliere is an obvious motive 
 for disguise, is only to be reached by inference, and safe inference 
 can almost never be made from a single transaction, especially wlien 
 tht! form of the act is in itself indifferent and of hourly occurrence." 
 Pierce /•. Hoffman, 24 Yt. 525 (1852) ; Baldwin r. Short, 125 N. Y. 
 553 (1891). " It is not essential to the competency of such evidence 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 257« 
 
 tliat it slioiild relate to transactions contemporaneous with the one 
 investigated. If thoy are so closely related in time that the intent 
 that governed in the one may fairly and reasonably be inferred to 
 be the intent that controlled the other, then the one sheds light 
 upon the other and is therefore a relevant subject of investigation." 
 Bernlieini r. Dibrell, OG :\Iiss. 199 (188S). 80 evidence that the 
 alleged fraudulent grantee assisted the grantors in devising means 
 to prevent their creditors from availing themselves of their legal 
 remedies, c. (/., by leaving the State and remaining away until alter 
 a certain session of the trial court, is competent. Adams /•. Keniuy, 
 59 N. H. ].".3 (1879). 
 
 It is not, /)('!• contra, sufficient to show that two frauds are contem- 
 poraneous to succeed in establishing a probative relation between 
 them. Tiiis would only tend to show that the defendant was likely 
 to do tlie act complained of because he had done it before, — whieli 
 is precisely what the rule of tlie n-.t inter aUus seeks to prevent. 
 Such a line of i)roof substantially .anunints to proof of eliaractfr by 
 specific acts of conduct. Evidence of pvior frauds is admitted only 
 wlien done with a persistent motive, or as part of a systematic plan. 
 In a case where the plaintiffs, who were wholesale merchants, 
 claimed that the defendant had procured a sale to liimself of certain 
 goods by fraud and with intent not to pay for the same, it was held 
 error to admit evidence of similar fraudulent representations to 
 other merchants about the same time, unless the transactions should 
 be connected in some particular manner. *• The admission of such 
 evidence would introduce a multiplicity of collateral issues, calculated 
 to withdraw the attention of the jury from the real issue in the csase ; 
 and it would operate unjustly to the uefendant, as it requires him 
 to explain his transactions with others, without any notice or oppor- 
 tunity for preparation." Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457 (1872). 
 After reviewing the authorities, the court in that case (Jordan v. 
 Osgood) say : "We think the true rule to be deduced from them is, 
 that another act of fraud is admissible to prove the fraud charged 
 only where there is evidence that the two are parts of one scheme 
 or plan of fraud, committed in pursuance of a common purpose." 
 Ihkl. Edwards r. "Warner, 35 Conn. 517 (18G9) ; Moline-^Iilburn 
 Co. V. Franklin, 37 :\linn. 137 (1887). 
 
 Where, in an action on a life insurance policy, the defence was 
 that the policy was procured by one Hunter on the life of Arm- 
 strong for the fraudulent purpose of feloniously killing Armstrong 
 and securing the money from the policy, the benefit of whicli had 
 previously been assigned to him, it was lield that "evidence that he 
 effected insurances upon the life of Armstrong in other com[>anies 
 at or about the same time, for a like fraudulent purpose, was admis- 
 sible. A repetition of acts of the same character naturally indicates 
 the same purpose in all of them; and' if when considered together 
 
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 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PART JI. 
 
 they cannot be reasonably expln.inod without ascribing a particiihxr 
 motive to the perpetrator, sucli motive will be considered as 
 prompting each act." New York Mutual, &c., Ins. ('o. v. Arm- 
 strong, 117 U. S. 591 (1885). In a Virginia case, on an action to 
 cancel a contract for the sale of land alleged to have been procured 
 by the fraudulent misrepresentation of an agent, evidence that tlie 
 agent made similar representations to others is admissible, not as 
 showing wliat took place on the particular occasion, but as being 
 " very persuasive of the bent " of the agent's mind. Wilson t>. 
 Carpenter's Adm'r, 21 S. E. 243 (1895). 
 
 So in an action in ^1 ichigan, where the issue 'vas whether the sale 
 of a certificate of stock was induced by certain fraudulent represen- 
 tations of a promoter, similar representations to others by the same 
 promoter may be shown. Frencii v. liyan, G2 N. W. 1016 (1895). 
 
 On a bill in equity to rescind the purchase of a silver mine on the 
 ground of fraud perpetrated by "salting" the specimens of ore 
 taken by the complainant for assay, evidence is competent that the 
 defendant also " salted " samples used in prior negotiations with 
 other persons for the sale of the same mine. ^Mudsill Mining Co. 
 V. Watrous, 61 Fed. Rep. 163 (1894). To prove that the ''salting" 
 was not accidental, evidence is competent that no native silver was 
 found in the samples assayed, but that each one of thirty samples 
 contained ])owdered silver. Ibid. To establish fraud in the impor- 
 tation of certain merchandise, evidence of twenty-nine other invoices 
 imported by the claimant into the same port is admissible " for the 
 puri)oseof showing the fraudulent intention of the claimant in tliese 
 importations as well af- the ])resent." The supreme court of the 
 United States, speaking by Story, J., say : "Indeed, in no other 
 way would it be practicable, in many ca-jO's, to establish such intent 
 or motive, for the single act taken by itself may not be decisive 
 either way; but wlien taken in connection with others of the like 
 character and nature, the intent and motive may be demonstrated 
 almost with a conclusive certainty." AVood v. U. S. 16 Peters, 342, 
 360 (1842). "Experience shows that positive proof of fraudulent 
 acts is not generally to be expected, and for tliat reason, among 
 others, the law allows a resort to circumstances, as the means of 
 ascertaining tlie truth." Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172 (1859). 
 
 In cases of fraud, subseipient acts may be sliown to establish 
 a prior fraudulent intent. " The subsequent acts are illustrative 
 of the intent and character of the first." Butler i\ Collins, 12 Cal. 
 457 (1859). 
 
 Skill. — So in the proof of any other mental state, e. g., the 
 skill needed to do the act alleged to have been done, evidence of 
 acts done at another time may be received. 
 
 On an indictment for arson, the government, after showing that 
 the fire was set by the use of a peculiarly constructed box, well 
 
 * I 
 
 I: < 
 
CHAP, VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 2oT*'> 
 
 adapted to that purpose and to no other, was permitted to show 
 that a box found a month before, iinder circumstancos showing its 
 use for incendiary purposes, was made at the defendant's shop *' to 
 sliow tliat lie possessed the requisite skill, materials, tools, and 
 opportunity to have made " the box used in the fire in question, and 
 that this was the sole legitimate iniriiose of the evidence, " unless 
 the jury should find, in the one, such marks as show that one hand 
 must have made both." Com. r. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870). 
 
 It is immaterial that the proof of a mental state in this way inci- 
 dentally results in showing the commission of other crimes. Street 
 /•. State, 7 Tex. App. 5 (1879) ; Com. v. Kobinson, 146 Mass. 571 
 (1888); State v. Palmer, 65 N. H. 216 (1889); R. v. Chasson, 16 
 New. Bruns. 546 (1876) ; Phillips i\ People, 57 Barb. 353 (1869). 
 If evidence " tends to prove the crime alleged, it is not to be re- 
 jected, though it also tends to prove the commission of other crimes, 
 or to establish collateral facts." Com. v. Choate, 105 ^lass. 451 
 (1870); Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222 (1877) ; Com. v. Corkin, 136 
 ^Fass. 429 (1884). The rule is well stated by the supreme court of 
 Missouri in State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585 (1888). "Evidence of 
 another crime is never admissible unless so connected with the one 
 then being investigated as to show that the commission of the for- 
 mer had something to do with the perpetration of the latter. Un- 
 less the apparently collateral crime be brought into a common 
 system, a system of mutually dependent crimes, or unless it be so 
 linked to the crime under trial as to show that the former, though 
 apparently an extraneous offence, is not so in reality, such evidence 
 is not admissible." 
 
 (2) TkACiN(j A Constant Causk. — A frequent and indeed the 
 usual ground on which facts objectionable as res inter alios acfce are 
 admitted to prove intent, knowledge, motive or other mental state 
 is that a constant effect under various circumstances in which one 
 cause alone (the mental state sought to be proved) remains constant 
 strongly tends to show that the mental state is the impelling cause 
 in the case under consideration. This naturally results from the fact 
 that other hypotheses, perhaps at first equally tenable, are being con- 
 stantly eliminated from the problem. If the case under considera- 
 tion were alone subinitted to examination, it would be difficult (if not 
 imjjossible) to establish to the required extent the proposition that 
 one among the several possible causes disclosed by the evidence, was 
 the one actually operative. Various other hypotheses would, in all 
 probability, seem equally tenable upon the facts in evidence. Ijut 
 as these facts are varied in other instances and as these instances 
 are multiplied, if the same effect follows it will naturally be found 
 that as instance after instance is added to the scope of the inquiry, 
 one permissible hypothesis after another is being excluded ; — until 
 only the mental state alleged remains as a constant cause. This 
 
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 l\ 
 
 25721 
 
 AMKIMCAN NO'I-KS. 
 
 [' 
 
 •AUT II. 
 
 line of reasoning is in frequent use in other fic-lds of incjuiry, and it 
 is doiibtful vvliether tlie search for trutli on many issues involviiij,' 
 the existence of a mental state can l)e profitably prosccMitcid in any 
 other way. 
 
 The same statement will be found to apply to many cases other 
 than those involving the existence of a mental state. Where the 
 effort is made to fix liability for a certain result uiuin one among 
 several possible (iauses the same thing is true. Upon the evidence 
 ill the case itself, the effort must fail, where other exculpating theo- 
 ries are deducible from the facts. Among them the cause to whicdi 
 liability is assigned may not stand out with sufficient prominence to 
 sustain tlie onus of establishing the case. JtJx iificcfti^itatu ni, the 
 pleader must proceed to show that in other instances, where different 
 facts existed, the same result followed the presence of the cause for 
 which liability is claimed. Any exculpatory hypothesis must now 
 apply to all the cases, and these will be found to be few and faint ; — 
 if, indeed, they exist at all. The process, sufficientjy continued, 
 leads to mental certainty. 
 
 For example, it is claimed that the plaintiff's horse, when opposite 
 a pile of lumber, which the defendant town permitted to remain 
 near the highway, shied violently, hy which damage occurred. The 
 plaintiff''s claim is that the pile of lumber frightened the horse, and 
 that permitting such a ])ile to remain was a defect in the highway, 
 it may be claimed, in defence, tliat ot]u>r causes than those inherent 
 in the aj)pearance of the pile of lumber, are responsible for the acci- 
 dent. The time of day, the condition of the weather, the care and 
 skill of the driver, the unsafe character of the horse; — these or 
 other more or less possible causes of the accident may be so left 
 upon the evidence of the particular occurrence as to render it doubt- 
 ful to which of such causes the injury is fairly to be attributed. 
 If. however, the plaintiff can go forward and show that at all times 
 of the day, in many various conditions of the weather, with many 
 drive' f>f varying degrees of skill and care, other horses, old and 
 youu',-, kind and vicious, were affected in a substantially similar 
 manner when brought in contact with the same pile of lumber, it is 
 evident that new facts are being shown ; — of probative force great 
 in pro])ortion as they exclude the oj)eration of causes other than the 
 nature of the pile of lumber itself. 
 
 It may fairly be alleged against this method of proof that it tends 
 to a inultiiilicity of issues. liut this objection is purely a matter for 
 the court, on a fair consideration of what may reasonably be expected 
 to be gained by pursuing such inquiries. As the supreme judicial 
 court of Massachusetts say : '• So far as the introduction of collateral 
 issues goes, that objection is a purely practical one, a concession to 
 the shortness of life. When the fact sought to be proved is very 
 unlikrly to hiivc any otlier ('xjilaiiation tlnin the fact in issue, and 
 
 if; i: 
 
 m 1: 
 
I.HAI'. VI.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTES. 
 
 25T2» 
 
 may bo proved ot disproved without uii reasonably protracting tlio 
 trial, there is no objection to going into it."' Keeve c. Dennett, 146 
 Mass. 23 (1887). 
 
 Keeve v. Dennett (/<W supra) is im instance of the application 
 of this rule. The issue was fraud in the sale of shares in a eoni- 
 2)any intended to encourage the use in dentistry of a compound dis- 
 covered by the defendants called " Naboli." The plaintiff's claim 
 was that this compound was worthless. In reply to this evidence, 
 "the defendant put on a number of liis patients, who testified that 
 the defendant's operations upon their teeth, using his invention, 
 were practically painless, whereas similar operations before had been 
 very painful." Held that this was competent: " If a dozen patients 
 should testify that, when the defendant used his luiboli, he lilled 
 tlieir teeth without hurting them, aiul that he hurt them a good deal 
 when he did not use it ... it woidd go far towards proving that 
 naboli had some tendency to deaden pain. Indeed, the same thing 
 is true in a less degree, if the painful operations were by another 
 hand. Filling teeth, however skilfully d()n(>, is generally unpleas- 
 ant. If it is found to be wholly painless when a certain compound 
 is used, as the witnesses testified, probably the compound is at least 
 in ])art the cause." Ihitf. 
 
 Where a horse was alleged to have been frightened by steam 
 escaping from the defendant's mill, situated on the margin of the 
 public highway, "witnesses for the jdaintiff were i»erniitted to tes- 
 tify that, when travelling by the mill with horses wtdl broken and 
 ordinarily safe, their horses were frightened by the escaping steam. 
 This evidence was limited to a short tinu' before and after tlu; 
 plaintiff's injury, wiicn tlic mill \v;is in the same condition as 
 when she wa.; injured ; and was admitted for the sole purpose of 
 showing the cai)acity of the escaping steam to frighten ordinary 
 horses." Held, no error. '• We tliink tlie competency of the evi- 
 dence rests upon tlie same principle; as evidence, in actions against 
 railroad corporations for damage by fire, alleged to have been set by 
 coals or sparks from a passing hjcomotive, that the same locomo- 
 tive, or others similarly constructed and used, have emitted sparks 
 and coals, and set tire at other places and on other occasions. It 
 tends to show the capacity of the inanimate thing to do the mischief 
 comidained of." Crocker i\ Mc(Jregor, 7(1 Me. 282 (1884). So 
 in an a(!tion to re(!over for injuries caused by a defect in a liigh- 
 way where the defence is that the plaintitT was driving at a very 
 higli rate of speed, the capacity of the horse foi' going at that 
 rate of speed may be shown by evidence of recent trials of his 
 speed on a race-track. Whitney r. Leominster, 13() Mass. 25 (1883). , 
 So in an action against a town for an injury caused by an alleged ' 
 defect in the highway consisting of a i)ile of lumber by the side of 
 the road likely to frighten horses, where the defence was that the 
 
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 25723 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'ART II. 
 
 plaintiff's horse was vicious and unsafe, evidence is admissible that 
 another horse on driving past this pile of lumber was also fright- 
 ened by it. Darling f. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401 (1872). "In 
 this case two primary questions arose, whether the lumber was 
 likely to frighten horses, and whether it did frighten the plaintiff's 
 horse. Was it of such a character, quality and condition, that it 
 <jould, and probably or manifestly would, be an object of terror to 
 horses in general, or horses of ordinary gentleness or of average 
 skittishness ? That was one question. Was the plaintiff's horse 
 frightened by it ? That was another and very different question. . . . 
 No one doubts that the fright of the plaintiff's horse was compe- 
 tent evidence on that question (whether the lumber was likely to 
 frighten horses) ; and, ordinarily, where evidence of one experiment 
 is admissible to show the character of i.:"r'"iate matter, evidence of 
 two experiments of the same kind is not inadmissible. . . . What 
 rule of law considers the fright of Mr. Darling's horse as impor- 
 tant, and disregards the fright of Mr. Fletcher's horse as of no 
 consecpience at all ? " Ibid. 
 
 Jiailrmid C<(ses. — The nature of the questions raised by certain 
 injuries caused by the operation of railroads makes a resort to the 
 evidence of other occasions necessary, while the general regularity 
 of operation and similarity of construction in machinery, &c., which 
 may be presumed to exist under a common and highly systematized 
 management make a resort to such evidence frequently productive 
 of a highly j)robative effect. 
 
 Thus with regard to fires alleged to be communicated by sparks 
 from locomotive engines. 
 
 In an action to recover damages to the plaintiff's mill from fire 
 alleged to have been communicated by one of two locomotive en- 
 gines of the defendant company, on June 7th, 1870, "the plaintiffs 
 were allowed to prove . . . that at various times during the same 
 summer before the fire occurred, some of the defendant's locomo- 
 tives scattered fire when going past the mill and bridge, without 
 showing that either of those which the plaintiffs claimed communi- 
 cated the fire was among the number, and without sliowing that the 
 locomotives were similar in their make, tlicir state of repair or 
 management, to those claimed to liave caused the lire complained 
 of." Held, no error. "Tlie question has often bi.'en considered by 
 the courts in this country and in England ; and such evidence has, 
 we think, been generally held admissible, as tending to prove the 
 possibility, and a consequent probability, that some locomotive 
 caused the fire, and as tending to sliow a negligent habit of the 
 officers and agents of the railroad company." Grand Trunk R. R. 
 V. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875); Koontz r. (). R, & X. Co., 20 
 Oreg. 3 (IH'.)O); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Stranahan, 79 Ta. St. 405 
 (1S75) ; Field lu N. V. Cen. R. R. .32 N. Y. 339 (1805) ; Cleavcliuid 
 V. (}rand Trunk R. R. 42 Vt. 449 (1869). 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 2r)T-* 
 
 So a ])l;iintiiT ran show that at intervals during a jjcriod of lour 
 years {trior to tlie scttiui^ of tlie tire in (lucstion, coals dropped from 
 the defemlant's locomotives had caused tires in the same [)lape and 
 that such locomotives hademitted sparks of suthcient six.e to set iire 
 to the plaintiff's property'. Longabaugh v. Virginia City. vS:e. Iv. Ji. 
 9 Nov. 271 (IS7-I). 
 
 So the fact "that fires frequently occurred along the line of rail- 
 way after the passing of the defendant's trains " is admissible. 
 Ivobinson r. New JJrunswick 11. R. 2.'> New Uruns. 02;! (1S,S,'>). 
 
 So evidence is competent, in a similar case, that trains frccpiently 
 set fire to fences and grass at other places in the vicinity of 
 plaintiff's prenuses during the same autumn. Kentucky Cen. R. R. 
 i\ Barrow, 8i) Ky. (538 (181)0). So that within a week bei'ore the 
 lire in question the engines of the defendant, in passing, had scat- 
 tered large sparks which were capable of setting fires to combustible 
 articles along the road, and that frequent fires, occasioned by such 
 sparks, had been put out within that time. Annapolis, &c. R. R. r. 
 Gantt, 3'J Md. lla (1873). 
 
 " It is competent for the plaintiff to show the emission of sparks 
 or ignited matter from other engines of the defendant, passing the 
 spot upon otlier occasions, eitlier before or after the damage 
 occurred for which the action is brought, without showing that they 
 were under the charge of the same driver, or were of the same con- 
 struction as the one occasioning the damage." The actual inquiries 
 were limited to within a month of the fire. Diamond /•. Northern 
 &c. R. R. () Mont. 580, o8G (1887) ; Hrighthope R. R. v. Rogers, 7G 
 Va. 443 (1881). 
 
 For similar reasons evidence is admissible "that engines had 
 prior to the fire passed over the road under like conditions of wind, 
 weather, iScc, irit/ioiit causing fires '" on an issue whether there was 
 negligence in causing the fire in question. Atchison, &c. R. R. r. 
 Stanford, 12 Ivans. 354 (1H74). 
 
 In a Rhode Island case, evidence of both antecedent and subse- 
 quent fires from sparks was held admissible under certain restric- 
 tions. " We think there are two purposes for wliich su(di testimony 
 may be admissible. Tlie fact that otlier fires have been communi- 
 cated before, and especially if recently before, the occurrence of the 
 fire in question, is a fact which should put the company on their 
 guard and stimulate them to increased watchfulness, and therefore 
 testimony relating to such fire might properly piiss to the jury, to 
 enable the jury to judge whether, in view of their jirevious occur- 
 rence, the com])any was, at the time of the tire in (juestion, in the 
 exerc'^ie of reasonable care. For this pur|)ose, however, no testi- 
 mony should pass to the jur}-^ relating to fires subsequent to the fire 
 in question, for obviously no such fire could have ])ut the eomj)any 
 on their guard against the fire in question. A second purjwse for 
 
 If 
 
25725 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AItT i:. 
 
 It 
 
 which suoli testimony might be iulmissible is this, namely : to show 
 the possibility of eommuiiicating lire by sparks from a locomotive, 
 if any question were made npon that point, and, for this purpose, 
 it would be immaterial whether the testimony related to fires of an 
 earlier or later date than the tire in question. If, however, the pos- 
 sibility were not questioned, and, especially, if it were admitted 
 that the fire so originated, testimony relating to fires of a later 
 date should be carefully excluded as being irrelevant, and as having 
 a tendency to excite prejudice against the company." Smith u. Old 
 Colony, &c. K. K. 10 R. I. 22 (1871). 
 
 Where " the fatal fire has been set out from a designated engine, 
 it is admissible to introduce evidence of other fires previously set 
 out by the same engine but not by any other engine of the defen- 
 dant company." Jacksonville, &c. II. 11. v. Peninsular Land, &c. 
 Co., 27 Fla. 1, 104 (1891). "Former fires by the same engine arc 
 admissible as evidence tending to prove its defective condition or 
 construction, or improper management, and those put out by other 
 engines are excluded because they are matters collateral to the 
 issue and not evidence of the imperfect condition or bad manage- 
 ment of the particular locomotive." Hud.- Ireland v. Cincinnati, 
 &c. K. II. 79 Mich. 16;} (1890). 
 
 So where the evidence placed responsibility for the fires on one 
 of two' designated engines, fires set by other engines were excluded. 
 "The evidence in this case was circumstantial, and it should not be 
 extended to circumstances which could not have any logical bearing 
 upon the issue. Tlie .syllogism that because other locomotives on 
 this road caused other fires at other times in the vicinity, therefore 
 these two locomotives, or one of them, which ])assed the place at 
 this time, caused this particular fire, would be ;io more logical than 
 that locomotives on some railway in another state, a thousand miles 
 distant, caused fires in the vicinity of the railway, on account of 
 insufficient manufacture or repair, or other negligence." Gibbons 
 r. Wisconsin, &e. II. II. .-)8 Wise. ?,",5 (18.s;!). 
 
 "The testimony tending to show that other fires were set about 
 the same time by the same engine was competent." Haseltine c. 
 Concord II. 11. ()4 X. H. 545 (1888) ; Stertz /■. Stewart, 74 Wise. 
 KiO (1889). So of fires on the same day and trip. Lanning c. 
 Chi(!ago, &c. R. R. 68 la. 502 (188(1); Slossen >-. R. It. (JO la. 215 
 (1882). 
 
 Wliere the fire was (daimed to have been set by a designated 
 engine, evidence that about the same time other engines had set 
 fires along tlie defendant's road was excluded as collateral although 
 it wiis in evidence that all the locomotives on the road used the 
 .same kind of s]iark arresters, and that the designated engine "was 
 a good, safe engine which was su])])lied with the most ii,])proved 
 Hpark arrester." Coale v. Hannibal, &c. R. R. CO Mo. 227 (1875). 
 
 i, 1 
 
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 'u 
 
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 CHA1\ VI.] 
 
 AMKinCAN NOTES. 
 
 ■2r^T» 
 
 The only autliority cited by the court in support of this proposi- 
 tion is IJaltiniore, &e. K. R. t>. Woodruif, 4 Md. 242 (1853), whicli 
 may be considered as overruled. 
 
 It has been held that where the emitting of sparks must, accord- 
 ing to the testimony, be due to a want of repair in the spark 
 arresters or similar contrivances, it is the duty of the court, before 
 admitting evidence of subsequent fires, to ascertain that the str;.te 
 of repair of the engine is approximately the same on the two occa- 
 sions. Collins c. N. Y. Central, &c. K. K. 109 X. Y. 243 (1888). 
 So in New Ilampsliire, the qualification is made on the admissi- 
 bility of evidence of other locomotive fires or sparks tliat the other 
 engines were of the same construction, used in the same manner, 
 and in the same state of repair. Boyce t'. Cheshire K. R. 43 X. H. 
 G27 (18G2). 
 
 Such evidence of other occasions is only admissible where it is 
 necessary to rely on it for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to 
 prove his case. Where the issue is a simple question of fact to be 
 settled by direct evidence, it is not admissible. Thus on an issue 
 whether the defendant company had set fire to the plaintiff's wharf 
 and lumber-yard by sparks emitted from the smokestack of a 
 steamer, the screens being negligently left open, " evidence of the 
 screens being open and the escape of sparks therefrom on other 
 occasions and at other places than at the time and place iu question 
 was inadmissible." Edwards v. Ottawa River Navigation Co., 39 
 Q. B. U. C. 264 (187G). 
 
 So where the facts are capable of being shown to the jury such 
 evidence will not be received. Thus where the question was 
 whether the defendant railroad had left the highway to the plain- 
 tiff's tavern in suitable condition evidence that " one or more per- 
 sons had l)een upset in driving over the road in question," is not 
 admissible. "The width of the road, the smootlniess of its surface, 
 its elevations and depressions, the obstructions remaining thereon 
 and their si/e and position, are all susceptible of exact admeasure- 
 ment, and from these facts as disclosed with more or less of accuracy, 
 it will be for the jury to determine how far and to what extent the 
 condition of the road may have been the cause of injury to the party 
 complaining." Hubbard r. And. &c. R. R. 39 Me. 50G (1855). 
 
 CiiAUA('Ti:u EviDKVcK. — Au exclusionary rule characteristic of 
 the English law of evidenc^e is that whi(!li, on the (piestion whether 
 a person did or did not do a certain act, Avithholds from the consid- 
 eration of the jury the fact that the i)erson alleged to have done or 
 refrained from doing the act in (question was of a character such aa 
 to make it probable that he did it or refrained from doing it. ISattlea 
 ('. Laudenslager, 84 I'a. St. 44(> (1H77) ; Lander r-. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 
 (1859); Sonic t^. Bruce, 07 iMe. 584 (1877); McCarty v. Leary, 118 
 Mass. 009 (1875); Jacobs v. Duke, 1 E. I). Smith, 271 (1851). 
 
 I i . 
 
■iJ.!'!. 
 
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 2o7 
 
 2- 
 
 amp:i:icax notes. 
 
 [l>AUT ir. 
 
 Tims, in an action of assumpsit by a pliysician for services, wliere 
 the (lel'endant offered evidence of the plaintiff's poor character as a 
 physician, the evidence was held to have been properly excluded. 
 '•Character was not put in issue by the nature of this action. . . . 
 The plaintiff is entitled to compensation for his skill and labour 
 whatever they might be." Jeffries v. Harris, 3 Hawkes, lO;") (1S24). 
 
 In a civil action for assault and battery evidence of plaintiff's bad 
 character and loose morals is not competent even on the question of 
 damages. Bruce r. Priest, 5 All. 100 (18GL'). 
 
 This evidence is not, as a rule, excluded because irrelevant. On 
 the contrary, it is frequently probative in a high degree. Character 
 evidence may, on the other hand, be properly rejected because irrele- 
 vant. For example, where a witness had admitted on cross-examina- 
 tion various acts of drunkenness, evidence of a general reputation 
 for sobriety is irrelevant as " it would not have removed the imputa- 
 tion which resulted from his testimony on the stand." I^IcCarty i: 
 Leary, 118 Mass. 509 (ISTi)). So where a specific act of negligence 
 is proved, " the (juestion whether it is actionable negligence is to be 
 decided by the character of that act or omission, and not by the char- 
 acter for care and caution that the defendant may sustain," and evi- 
 dence of defendant's character as a careful man, is immaterial and 
 irrelevant. Teuney r. Tuttle, 1 All. 185 (IHOI). 
 
 All that is meant is that the ground for excluding evidence of 
 character is not, primarily, that it is irrelevant. 
 
 The reason for the rule is probably to be sought, in ])art, at least, 
 in that rigor of the early Euglish criminal law code which naturally 
 led to unusual and, perhaps, undue leniency in its administration. 
 
 Ctvii. Cases. — In a civil action the rule is well settled that 
 neither party is allowed to introduce evidence of good character. 
 Even though the facts savor of criminality, the party affected does 
 not have the option (as in criminal cases) to introduce evidence of 
 his good character. Boardman r. Woodman, 47 X. IT. lliO (IHGO) ; 
 "On principle, as well as authority, evidence of good reputation is 
 not competent to show that one is not guilty of a dishonorable or 
 unlawful act which is not punishable as a crime." Lamagdelaine 
 V. Tremblay, 1G2 ^lass. 3.39 (1894). 
 
 So in an action on a policy of insurance, where the defence is 
 fraud, the plaintiff cannot set up evidence of good character. Fowler 
 r. vEtna Fire Ins. Co., G Cowen, G73 (1827); "If such evidence is 
 proi)er, then a person may screen himself from the punishment due 
 to fraudulent conduct, till his character becomes bad. Such a rule 
 of evidence would be extremely dangerous. Every man must be 
 answerable for every improper act ; and the character of every trans- 
 action must be ascertained by its own circumstances, and not by the 
 character of the parties." Ibkl, Schmidt v. N. Y. &c. Ins. Co., 1 
 Grav. 529 (1854). But see Spears r. International Ins. Co.,1 Baxter, 
 370"(1H72). 
 
 Imi I 
 
OlIAl'. VI.] 
 
 AMEUICAN N()t;:s. 
 
 25728 
 
 So ill an action of debt, tlie plea of fraud does not put in issue tlie 
 cliaracter of tlie plaintiff. No eviden(!e is admissible regai'din<,' it. 
 Anderson /•. Long, 10 8. & II. ~}~> (IS'Jo) ; Dudley v. jNIcCluer, art ,Mo. 
 L'4i (1S77). Even if tlie facts in an action of trespass amount to an 
 einbozzlement, evidence of good cliaracter is incompetent. Wright 
 V. McKee, 37 Vt. lOl {\HM). 
 
 So on an action for bastardy, cliaracter evidence is inadmissible. 
 Low V. ]Mitchell, 18 Mc. 371.' (1841). 
 
 In a civil action for assault with a knife, the defendant offered 
 evidence of his good character as a peaceable and orderly person. In 
 attirming the rejection of the evidence the court say, after a full ex- 
 amination of the authorities, that these authorities " assert two 
 principles. (1) Tliat in civil suits evidence of the (diaracter of the 
 parties, except where the character is directly in issue, is not admis- 
 sible. (-) That putting character in issue is a technical expression, 
 which does not mean simply that the character may be affected by the 
 result, but that it is of particular importance in the suit itself, as the 
 character of the plaintiff in an action of slander, or that of a woman 
 in an action on the case for seduction. The remark of Professor 
 Greenleaf, in his Treatise on Evidence, Vol. 1st, sect. o4, that 'gen- 
 erally in actions of tort, wherever the defendant is charged with fraud 
 from mere circumstances, evidence of his general good character is 
 admissible to rejiel it,' is not sustained liy any authority which I can 
 find, save Kuan ''. I'eiry, 3 Caines (120), and this is expressly over- 
 ruled in IG Wend. (()4G) above referred to." Porter r. Seller, 23 Pa. 
 St. 424 (lSr)4). Speaking of Ruau v. Perry (i(h! stipnC) the court of 
 appeals say '• Tiiat case was long since overruled." Pratt r. An- 
 drews, 4 y. Y. 493 (I80I). This view is concurred in by the court in 
 Gregory *•. Chambers, 78 Mo. 2'.)4, 300 (1883), and Amer. Fire Ins. 
 Co. i\ Hazen, 110 Pa. St. 530 (188.")). Put see Scott v. Fletcher, 1 
 Overton, 488 (1812), which follows I'uan v. Perry. Evidence of 
 character is incompetent for tlie plaintiffs in an ju'tion on an insur- 
 ance policy wliere tlie defenct^ set uji is that tlie plaintiffs burned 
 their own mill. Amer. Fire Ins. Co. r. llazen, llo I'a. St. r)3(> 
 (1880). 
 
 So an action of tort for maliciously Imriiing the pliiinliff's barn 
 does not jiut the defendant's character in issue, or enalile liim to in- 
 troduce evidence of good character. Thayer v. l>oyle, 30 ]Me. 475 
 (1840). 
 
 In an action for slander not imputing a crime, a defence of truth 
 does not entitle the ]daintiif in rebuttal to put in evidence of his 
 general good character. ^lattJKMvs r. Huntley, X. If. 14G (1838); 
 IToughtaling v. Kilderhmise, 1 X. Y. 030 (1S48). 
 
 The courts of Vermont admit such evidence in these cases of in- 
 direct incrimination on the ground that the incriniinating evidence 
 impeaches the character of the [daiiitiff as a witness ft)r veracity. 
 
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 AMKltlCAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT ri. 
 
 '• 'I'liat testimony tending to show that he liad sworn falsely upon a 
 material matter then in issue and on trial, would have that tendency 
 cannot be doubted." Mosley v. Vermont, &c. Ins. Co., 55 Vt. 14'2 
 (1SS2). 
 
 In Alabama, the rule is laid down that unless character is in issue 
 in a civil case evidence of reputation is incompetent ; but that if 
 evidence of bad character is introduced tlie jiarty assailed may intro- 
 duce evidence of good character. Goldsmith 0. l*icard, 27 Ala. 142 
 (1855). 
 
 Ckiminal Casks. — In criminal cases, the defendant is entitled to 
 introduce evidence of his good character, if he desires. Unless and 
 until he avails himself of this option, the government can introduce 
 no evidence that the prisoner's character is bad. Felsenthal v. State, 
 30 Tex. App. G75 (1892) ; State /•. ]\[errill, 2 Devereux, 2G9 (1829). 
 When the prisoner opens the subject, the government is not only at . 
 liberty to meet the defendant's evidence but to prove attlrmatively 
 that the defendant has a bad character in relation to the trait in- 
 volved in the inquiry. People v. White, 14 Wend. Ill (1835); 
 People V. Fair, 43 Cal. 137 (1872) ; Com. v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 303 
 (1807). 
 
 This disproof of the defendant's evidence of good character must 
 follow the same limitations as the proof itself. 
 
 Even when the accused has opened the issue of character, and the 
 government attempts to rebut the evidence offered by tlie prisoner, 
 " ordinarily such rebutting testimony must be confined to general 
 reputation, and cannot be extended to particular acts." Ilolsey v. 
 State, 24 Tex. App. .35 (1887). So after accused offers evidence of 
 good character as a peaceable and quiet person, the government 
 cannot show that he has been indicted for an assault. Com. *'. 
 O'J^rien, 119 Mass. 342 (1875). Or has drawn his revolver on a cer- 
 tain occasion. Olive v. State, 11 Xeb. 1, 27 (1881). 
 
 By reason of th" fact that the legitimate [)robative effect of char- 
 acter evidence lit-s in throwing a suspicion upon facts tending to 
 show that a person of excellent moral character should have been 
 guilty of the offence charged, courts have been led to rule that it was 
 of comparatively little value in the case of serious offences. "There 
 are cases of circumstantial evidence, where the testimony .adduced 
 for and against a prisoner is nearly balanced, in which a good char- 
 acter may be very important to a man's defenc(>. . . . I'ut where it 
 is a question of great and atrocious criminality, the commission of 
 the act is so unusual, so out of the ordinary course of things and 
 beyond oominon ex[)erience; it is so manifest that the cffenee, if 
 perpetrated, must have been influenced by motives not frequently 
 operating ui)on the human mind • that evidence of character, and of 
 a man's habitual conduct imder common circumstances, must be 
 considered far inferior to wliat it is in the instance of accusations 
 
 V I 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 ■Zoi 
 
 3) 
 
 of a lower grade. Against facts strongly proved, good character 
 cannot avail. . . . But still, even with regard to the higher crimes, 
 testimony of good character, though of less avail, is competent 
 evidence to the jury, and a species of evidence which the accused 
 has a right to offer." Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 324 (ISoO). 
 
 Following the same line uf thought, it has been ruled that " evi- 
 dence of good character in relation to the particular crime charged, 
 seems to be only admissible in cases where the guilt of the party 
 accused is doubtful." MoDaniel v. State, 8 Sm. & M. 401 (1847); 
 Bennett v. State, 8 Humph. 118 (1847) ; State v. Ford, o Strob. 517 n. 
 (1849) ; Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502 (1851). 
 
 Such, however, is not the prevailing rule in the United States. 
 
 The ruling in Com. i<. AVebster {iibi siipni) has frecpienfly been 
 repudiated as unsound, l^'or example, in Harrington v. State, 19 
 Ohio St. 204 (1809), a charge based on Com. v. Webster was held 
 erroneous. The court say, " The weight that ought to be given to 
 proof of good character does not depend upon the grade of the crime, 
 but rather upon the cogency and force of the evidence tending to 
 prove the charge, and the motives shown to exist for the commission 
 of the crime by the accused. . . . The reasonable effect of proof of 
 good character is to raise a presumption that the accused was not 
 likely to have committed the crime 'ivith which he is charged. The 
 force of this presumption depends upon the strength of the opposing 
 evidence to produce conviction of the truth of the charge. If the 
 evidence establishing the charge is of such a nature as not, upon 
 principles of reason and good sense, to be overcome by the fact of 
 good character, the latter will, of course, be unavailing and imma- 
 terial. But the same will be true of any other fact or circumstance 
 in evidence, which, after receiving its due weight, does not alter the 
 conclusion to be drawn from the other evidence in the case. Good 
 character is certainly no excuse for crime ; but it is a circumstance 
 bearing indirectly on the question of the guilt of the accused, which 
 the jury are to consider in ascertaining the truth of the charge." 
 
 A ruling that evidence of character is adnussible only in a doubt- 
 ful case, was held erroneous. '"In the laws of all civilized countries, 
 under various aspects of the question, good character is recognized 
 .as an element, ^ very potent element of defensive proof, going 
 directly to tlie credibility of the accusing witness, to the intrinsic 
 value of the inculpating testimony, to tlie probabilities of mistaking 
 niemorv. of mistaken identity, of innocent motives in actions appar- 
 ently (!ulpable and in many instances anu)unting in and of itself to a 
 complete defe ice." U. S. v. Guniiell, 5 .Mackey, 100 (18S0). "Good 
 ciiaracter is always to be considered. It will of itself sometimes 
 create a doubt '•. iiere none could exist without it." People v. jNIo.'tt, 
 23 Ilun, 00 ( 1880). '• Evidence of good character is substantive and 
 
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 2o731 
 
 AMKKK'AN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AUT II. 
 
 iiiiist 1)0 trciitetl as such; that it is not a iiiero makeweight ti) lie 
 thrown in to determine the bahince in a doubtful ease, but that it 
 may, ot itself, by the creation of a reasonable doubt, produee an 
 acquittal." llanney v. Com. 11(> I'a. St. o2- (J8.S7). ''If upon the 
 whole of the evidence iutroiluced, including that of the good char- 
 actor of the defendant, the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to 
 the defendant's guilt, he should be acqiutted." State v. Douglass, 
 44 Kans. G18 (18<)0). 
 
 In Vermont, a ruling that evidence of the defendant's good char- 
 acter "was received " as a kind of makeweight in his favor, if there is 
 a pinch in the case," was held to erroneously impress the jury with 
 the idea that the evidence was of no value except where the respon- 
 dent was entitled to an acquittal without it. " Such evidence is not 
 only useful in cases of doubt, but it is equally so, for the purpose of 
 creating, geutu-ating doubts." State v. Daley, 53 Vt. 442, 440 (1881). 
 " A long and honorable life must be worth something to a man when 
 accused of a crime in cases other than those where the evidence, in- 
 dei)endent of his good character, is doubtful or obscure." State v. 
 I^orthrup, 48 la. 5S.'J (1878) ; Long v. State, 11 Fla. 295 (18(5(5). Of 
 course, " If the evidence in this case had been so clear, and con- 
 clusive as to satisfy the minds of the jury, and leave no doabc as to 
 the guilt of the party, then character, however excellent, could not 
 be considered." Ifjiif. 
 
 In Alabama, where evidence of good general character for twenty 
 years was introduced in favor of a person accused of murder, a ruling 
 that '"'proof of good character, then, is not permitted to go to the jury 
 for the purpose of shielding the defendants from the consequencies 
 of their conduct, but simply as a circumstance to be considered l)y 
 the jury, along with the other evidence in the case," and that if u])()U 
 all the evidence the jury found the defendants guilty they were to 
 say so "as firmly against a man of good character as of bad,'" was 
 approved. Armor /;. State, (33 Ala. 173 (187!)). "In all criminal 
 prosecutions, whether of felony or misdemeanor, the accused may 
 prove his good character not only when a doubt exists on the other 
 proof, but even to generate a doubt of his guilt. ... It does not 
 shield from the consequences of a criminal act, proved to the satis- 
 faction of the jury ; though it may raise a reasonable doubt of the 
 act having been done with a ci'iminal intent." J//!i/. 
 
 It abundantly appears from the foregoing eases that the theory on 
 which evidence of good character is admitted in criminal cases on 
 behalf of the accused is, that it renders improl)able the evidence 
 tending to show that a man of good character has been guilty of an 
 act involving moral turpitude. It necessarily follows that evidence 
 of the accused's good reputation is of no importance where it can 
 have no such effect. If the criminal act in question is the viola- 
 tion of a municipal ordinance, town by-law, &c., where the act has 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMKKICA>: NOTES. 
 
 no moral (quality, the reasons for ailniittiny cliaracter eviileno(! coa.'io 
 to apply. So in an indictment for sellin<^ liqnor to a minor, evitlenet* 
 of the defendant's good reputation for observing the conditions of 
 liis license was held properly rejected. " This rule has little or no 
 application to penal acts which have no moral ([uality, but aro merely 
 mn/it jini/n'/nf<i. That one is of good reputation as an honest, [x-aee- 
 able citizen has little tendency to show that he has not violated a 
 statute or ordinance forbidding him to catch trout out of season, or 
 to drive certain vehicles faster than a walk, o" requiring him to keep 
 tlie sidewalks abutting on his premises free from snow and ice. Tiio 
 sale of intoxicating lic^uor to minors is strictly forbidden by the 
 statute, but it does not necessarily involve any moral turpitude." 
 Com. V. Nagle, lo7 ^Fass. r>iH (18<).3). 
 
 Failure to offer evidence of ehar.acter in a crimin; 1 case is a fact 
 which nuiy be brought to the attention of the jury. State v. McAl- 
 lister, 24 Me. 139 (1844). 
 
 Hut this view lias been strenuously opposed as destructive of the 
 defendant's privilege not to open the issue of cluiracter unless ho 
 sees ht. Where the government attorney was allowed to comment 
 on the fact tiiat the prisoner had oiferetl no evidence of character, 
 the supreme court of Michigan held tliat it was " error of the gravest 
 cliaracter. Xo presumption of guilt arises from the fact that a i)er- 
 son, when on trial for a crime, fails to call witnesses in support of his 
 good character. This is a privilege which the accused may avail 
 himself of if he chooses. . . . No legal inference can arise from such 
 omission tluit he is guilty of the offence charged, or that h.is char- 
 acter is bad." J'eople v. Evans, 72 Mich. :Hu. .'ISL' (ISSS). Tiie 
 same case holds that the error of permitting such an argument is not 
 cured by an instruction to disregard it ; (piotiiig I'rom (^)uinn r. Peo- 
 jile, 12,3 111. tf.Vi, the remarks of the court on the futility of a similar 
 attempt on the part of the trial judge, ■• As well might one attemjjt 
 to brush off with the hand a stain of ink from a piece of white 
 linen. One, in the very nature of thinj:!, is just as impossible as 
 the other." 
 
 Tlie character of a defendant is to be established by repiitation 
 before the difficulty iirose. He is not to be exposed to the injustiee 
 of having the arising of the ditheulty assist in proving its truth. 
 Wroe V. State, 20 Oh. St. iCA) (1S70). 
 
 Evidence of character subseijuent to th(> doing of the act in ques- 
 tion is rejected as ''irrelevant and inunaterial." Graham v. State, 
 20 Tex. App. 31 (1890); Carter v. Com. 2 Va. (Jases, 109 (1819). A 
 different ride would expose tlie defendant to tlu; great danger of 
 having his character ruined or badly damaged by the arts of a po])- 
 ular or artful prosecutor stimulated to activity by the hope rif thus 
 making his prosccutit)n successful." State v. Johnson, 1 Winsteil, 
 (X. C.) lol (1803). 
 
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 25733 
 
 AMKKICAN XOTKS. 
 
 [r.VllT 11. 
 
 (.JiiAKAf'TKK IN Tssi'E. Civii. Casks. — 'Plio vule by no iiioiiiis 
 absolutely cxcludos ovitli'iiee of clianuttcr. It exoluilcs such evideuce 
 merely UM evide'-.tiary that a person did 11 certain act because he was 
 of a certain character. In many eases the existence of a pariicular 
 "haractor is part of the substance of the issue. To such cases the 
 rule has no applii'ation. 
 
 There are many instances of the a])plication of this principle. 
 For exain[)le. in instituting an action for the brcacih of a promise of 
 marriage a female plaintiff places in issue her character for chastitj'. 
 McCarty /•. CofHn, 157 Mass. 478 (1H'.)2); Van Storch v. Grithn, 77 
 Pa. St. ri04 (1S7;')). To the extent that damages are claimed for 
 injury to reputation, any flaw in the reputation may be shown in 
 mitigation of damages. 
 
 Tiie witnesses of such a plaintiff may be asked on cross-examination 
 "respecting tiie plainiiff's general badness of character" in mitiga- 
 tion of damages. :\[cGregor r. :srcArthur, 5 C. P. U. C. 4').3 (18.")(;). 
 
 So' the action for indecent assault puts in issue the plaintiff's 
 character for chastity. IJinghain v. Pernard, ^6 Minn. 114 (188(5). 
 In like manner, an action for seduction, being based on the previous 
 existence of chastity in the woman, places such portion of cliaracter 
 in issue. People t\ Knapp, 42 Mich. 207 (1879) ; M'Creary u. 
 (Jrundy, 39 Q. P. U. C. 310 (1870). For the same reason, in a civil 
 action for damages caused by a rape, the character for chastity of 
 the plaintiff is in i?sue, and may be impeached by particular acts of 
 misconduct. Voung r. Johnson, 123 X. Y. 226 (1890.) The fui- 
 ther ruling in this case that good reputation for chastity is part of 
 the plaintiff's original case, seems somewhat more doubtful, as a 
 matter of princii)le. 
 
 Evidence of plaintiff's bad character in these actions involving 
 offences against chastity is admissible in mitigation of damages. 
 M'Xutt r. Voung, 8 Leigh, 542 (1837). "Among the elements of 
 damages is the injury to feelings and the injury to reputation. lUit 
 both these injuries would be less in the case of a woman of bad rcjuita- 
 tion tliiin in one of good." IWirnett r. Simi)kins, 24 111. 2()4 (1800). 
 
 On tiie contrary, the Court (jf (^)ueen's lieneh of Upper Canada 
 liave ruled that such evidence is inadmissible. Myers 0. Carrie, 22 
 Q. n. U. C. 470 (1803). 
 
 On an action for libel or slander the character of the plaintiff is 
 in issue. Peterson r. Morgan. 11(5 Mass. 350 (1874); Ilolley /•. 
 Purgess. 9 .Via. 728 (1S4()) ; Cami)bell r. I'.annister. 79 Ky. 205 (1880); 
 Podwell /•. Swan, 3 Pick. 370 (1825) ; Leonard v. Allen," 11 Cash. 211 
 (185;!); Sawyer r. Eifert, 2 Nott cS: McC. 511 (1820); Powers /•. 
 Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227, 241 (1859); Paddock /•. Salisbury, 2 Cowen. 
 811 (1824). 
 
 It is not necessary that the plaintiff shouhl rest content in relying 
 on the presumption that his re[)utation was good at the time of the 
 
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CIIAl'. VI.] 
 
 AMKKIC'AN NOTICS. 
 
 :2oT*» 
 
 re I villi;' 
 (iT tilt' 
 
 alleged defaiiiation. TIo can introdupe aftirmative evidi'uco to that 
 effect. Adams r. Linvsoii, 17 (iratt. 'Ji>0 (IHO?); Sliroyer /•. Miller, 
 li \V. Va. lAH (ISC)*.)). So of a plaintiff in a civil action for rape as 
 to her character lor chastity. Y'oung r. ilohnson, 123 N. V. -'L'6 
 (1S90). The plaintiff in an action of slander can certainly prove 
 a good reputation when it is attacked, llolley r. lUirgess, 9 Ala. 
 72S (1S4()). For example, by evidence of rumors that the alleged 
 slanderous statements were true. Inman /•. Foster, 8 Wend. 00- 
 (\^32). But see Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 32o (1820), contra. 
 
 Ill an action for malicious prosecution, evidence of the plaintiff's 
 general bad character as a horse racter and gambler is admissible. 
 '• It would certainly require less stringent proof to make out probable 
 cause for prosecuting such a character for larceny, than one who 
 maintained a good character, and followed an occupation for a liveli- 
 iiood altogether lawful.'' ]\Iartin v. Hardesty, 27 Ala. 458 (185")); 
 :\rark r. :Mer/, 53 111. App. 458 ''1893); ^Miller r. Brown, 3 -Mo. 94 
 (18;!2); Barron v. ^lason, 31 Yt. 1<S9(1858); Gregory v. Thomas, 
 2 Bibb, 286(1811). 
 
 The plaintiff, on the other hand, may prove his good reputation as 
 tending to establish his claim that there was no probable cause for 
 the [irosecution. "To prove that the attack was originally nuuh; 
 without probable cause, we think he should be permitted to show his 
 good reimtation known to the defendant when the prosecution was 
 commenced." ^Melntire r. Levering, 148 Mass. 540 (1889) ; Bostick 
 r. liutherford, 4 Hawks, 83 (1825); Blizzard v. Hayes, 40 Ind. 1(!0 
 (J874); Woodworth r. .Mills, 01 Wis. 44 (1884); Israel i\ Jirooks, 
 2;', 111. 575 (1800) ; ]\Iiller r. Brown, 3 Mo. 94 (18.'i2) ; Rosenkrans r. 
 Barker, 115 111. 331 (1885). Evidence of plaintitt"'s bad reputatior. 
 is admissible in malicious prosecution in reduction of damages. 
 O'lirien r. Frasier, 47 X.J. L. 349 (1885); Bacon r. Towne, 4 Ciisli. 
 217 (1849); Fitzgibbon r. Brown, 43 .Me. 109 (1857); Gregory /•. 
 Chambers, 78 ]\Io. 294 (1883), which cites with disapproval the 
 statement in 1 Greenleaf Evidence, § 55, to the effect that character 
 evidence "is not permissible 'in trespass on the case for malicious 
 prosecution.' The single authority cited by him in support of the 
 text is Gregory v. Thomas, 2 I'dbb, 280. With great respect I sub- 
 mit that the case is no sujiport for the text. . . . The trial court 
 had, under the special jdea, admitted evidence of other jiarticular 
 charges of thefts, &c. imputed to the ])laintiff. That was held to be 
 error. But the court expressly say : ' We think the court ought not 
 to have permitted the inquiry to have extended further than to the 
 ]>hiintift''s general character.' It is, therefore, an express authority 
 lor impeaching the general character." (Jregory v. Chambers, 78 
 :\Io. 294 (1883) ; Ilosenkrans /•. Barker, 115 111. 331 (1885). 
 
 A defendant has been permitted to show, in mitigation of damages, 
 that the defendant's char-icter was bpjl after the prosecution, ff the 
 
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 AMKUIOAN NOTKS. 
 
 [l'.\i;r I!. 
 
 prosecution itself oiuised the bad re])utntion, (l:iiiKHj:es should Iji' 
 enliauoed. IJostick /•. Ivutherford, 4 IlawUs, S.'J (l.SL'r>). 
 
 Ill iiii action ai,'aiiist a master for kccpiiig an iiiconipetent servant, 
 traits of eliaracter sliowiiij^ inuoiii])eteiioy are in issue. East (.inr, \c. 
 11. U. /•. Seott, OS Tex. ()'.)4 (ISST) ; Krazicr i\ I'eiinsylvaiiia K. I!., 
 3« Pa. St. 104 (KSCO). 
 
 So in an aetion for false imprisonment, evidence as to the plaintiffs 
 (diaraeter lias been admitted, and evidence of specific acts of iiiis- 
 condiict rejected. Wolf v. J'errynuiii, H2 Tex. Ill' (18'.)1). 
 
 Where the issue involves the existence of due care on the part 
 of the ])laintiff, evidence of his general character in the particular 
 involved is not admissible. The ([iiestion is to be "decided by the 
 character of the act nr omission, and not liy the character for care 
 tliat the defendant nuiy sustain.'' McDonald v. Savoy, 110 3Iass. 
 41) (1872). 
 
 Such evidence of reputation for due care is not admissible; — cer- 
 tainlv where the facts have been observed by eye-witnesses. So. 
 Kaus. H. K. Co. v. Kobbins, 4;? Kans. 14;") (IHDO)." 
 
 Ill a civil case, wliat portion of a party's entire character may be 
 made the subject of evidence is determined by the pleadings or the 
 nature of the investigation. So in an action for slander in alleging 
 that the plaintiff set lire to a schoolliouse, tlu^ defendant in reduction 
 of damages was permitted to introduce evidence of tlui plaintiffs 
 bad reputation either for integrity and moral worth or in regard to 
 condu(!t similar to that charged in the slander. Leonard /•. Allen, 
 11 Cash. 1>41 (1853). 
 
 Ckimixal Cases. — The rule excluding character evidence in 
 criminal cases until the defendant opens the issue applies only to 
 the character of the defendant, it may be of the substance of the 
 issue for the government to establish the character of some person 
 other than the accused ; a-iC ;t may be equally open to the defendant 
 to disprove smdi a character or make its existence doubtful. 
 
 For exain})le. on an indictment for carnal knowledge of a girl 
 under sixteen " theri'tnl'ore chaste.'' the girl's character for chastity 
 is in issue, and evidence is coinpetent to prove it. People r. Mills, 
 94 Mich. ().'J'.) (18!).'!). So on an indictuient for rape, evidence is 
 admissil)le of the eliaracter of the jirosecutrix for chastity. "The 
 witness must b(> able to state what is generally said of the ])ers()n 
 by tliose among whom he dwcdls, or with whom he is chiefly con- 
 versant, for it is this only that constitutes general rejmtation or 
 character." Conkey r. People, 1 Abb. (Jt. of App. Dec. 418 (1860) ; 
 O'Blenis r. State, 47 N. J. Law, 279 (1885). 
 
 So in an indictment for indecent assault, the accused may show 
 that the reputation of the woman for chastity is bad. Com. r. Ken- 
 dall, 113 ]\rass. 210 (1873). 
 
 So on an indictment of an attempt to commit rape. Camp v. State, 
 
 1 1"-' ' 
 
( IIAl". VI. J 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 'J")-*' 
 
 .'! Kelly, 417 (1H47). On uii iiulicttment for rapo the cliiiractcr for 
 cliastitv of tlu! prospoiitiiig witness is in issue. Kvidenco of partic- 
 iihir acts of niiscondiict, suttioiently nuniorous to bo kaldtttiiU lias 
 Ir'cu aduiittud. Tims in a Mow \\n\\ case;, nunu'rous witnesses wore 
 allowed to testify that tlic woman had been "in the habit of reoeiv- 
 iiiL;- men tiiere lor the purpose of promise.uous intercourse." it seems 
 jirohable that tlie evidence was really received as cireumstantially 
 establishing the fact that the woman was a prostitute — " proof more 
 satisfactory than that of a bad general reputation for chastity." 
 Woods c. People, bo 'S. Y. 515 (1874). 
 
 Especially as bearing on the probability of consent, single acts 
 of sexual misconduct have been admitted, in indictments for rape. 
 In Vermont, on such an indictment, a single prior act of illicit sexual 
 intercourse with a person other than the prisoner was admitted, on 
 cross-examination of the woman. As compared with general reputiv- 
 tion for chastity, the court say, that " The testimony here offered has 
 piacti(rally the same tendency, thoutrh inferior in force and conclu- 
 siveness." Stati! /•. Keed, 39 Vt. 4i.i ^1807). So that the complain- 
 ant had been delivered of a bastard child. State /•. Murray, G3 X. C. 
 ;!1 (1808); State r. Jefferson, (> I red. Eq. 305 (1840). In Illinois 
 the right to i)rove character by specified acts of incontinence as 
 distinguished from evidence of general reputation for chastity has 
 been denied, though such evidence was admitted for another pur- 
 pose. Shirwiu v. People, 09 111. 55 (187.")). So on an indictment for 
 adultery, the evidence of the complainant may be met by evidence of 
 prior acts of undue intimacy with other men. U. S. v. JJredemeyer, 
 () rtah, 143 (1889). 
 
 So on an indictment for murder, to aid a plea of self-defence the 
 prisoner may ])rove that the general character of the deceased in the 
 neighborhood where lie lived " was that of a turbulent, bloodthirsty, 
 and violent man." Williams r. State, 74 Ala. 18 (1883) ; Thomas v. 
 Peoide, G7 N. Y. 218 (1870). 
 
 WiTNKss. — The character of a witness for truth and veracity may 
 be said always to be in issue. It may be impeached by evidence 
 directed to that point. Evansich r. It. K., 01 Tex. 24 (1884). 
 
 The rule applies to the attesting witness to a will. Chamberlain v. 
 Torrance, 14 Grant's Chan. Kep. 181 (1808). And to the defendant 
 when offering himself as a witness. McDonald r. Com., 80 Ky. 10 
 (1887). 
 
 Such evidence is confined to character for truth and veracity. 
 Moreland v. Lawrence, 23 ]\Iinn. 84 (1870) ; Shaw r. Emery, 42 Me. 
 59 (1850). 
 
 A party cannot, in the first instance, sustain himself or other 
 witnesses by proving their good character for truth and veracity 
 until these qualities are directly impeached. A mere conflict of 
 evidence is not sufficient, although of such a nature as to raine a 
 
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 25737 
 
 A.MKIMCAN N(»Ti:s. 
 
 [I'AKT il. 
 
 strong presumption that one side or the other is testifying falsely. 
 Morgan /•. State, 88 Ala. L'L*3 ( 1889). As is said in People v. liusli, 
 (>5 Cal. 1U9 (1884), "Where witnesses contradiet each other, tiic 
 character of tlie one is as much impeached as that of the other." 
 Prnitt I'. Cox, 21 Ind. 15 (18().'5); Vance /•. Vance, li Mete. (Ky.) o8i 
 (1869); Saussy v. R. H., 1.'2 Fla. 327 (188()); Tedens v. .Sehumers, 
 112 111. 2(53 (1884) ; Sweet r. Sherman, 21 Vt. 23 (1848) ; Stamper /■. 
 Griffin, 12 Ga. 450 (1853). 
 
 A similar rule obtains where the contradiction is not between 
 different witnesses, but where evidence is introduced of contradic- 
 tory statements of the same witness. By the weight of authority, 
 it is not competent for the party offering the witness thus discredited 
 to sustain him by proof of his good general character. Frost r. Ma- 
 Cargar, 29 Barb. G17 (1859); Chapman /•. Cooley, 12 Rich. (S. C.) 
 Law, 054 (1860); State <: Archer, 73 Iowa, 320 (18S7) ; lirowu v. 
 Mooers, G Gray, 451 (1856) ; Stamper v. Griffin, 12 Ga. 450 (1853). 
 
 Many of the earlier cases, relying largely upon 1 Greenl. Ev, § Hi'.}, 
 which " is not sustained by the case the author cites of Hex /•. 
 Clarke, 2 Stark, li. 241, and is not law " [Brown r. !Mooers, 6 Gray, 
 451 (1850)], have adopted the opposite view, /, i'., that under such 
 circumstances, sustaining evidence of good general character is 
 competent. Burrell /-.State, 18 Tex. 713 (1857); Sweet v. Sher- 
 man, 21 Vt. 2.". (1848) ; Hadjo /•. (iooden, 13 Ala. 718 (1848); Hairis 
 r. State, 30 liid. 1.31 (1808). 
 
 And see also Cluunberlaiii i<. Torrence, 14 Grant's Ch. Kep. ISl 
 (1808), where it is said tiiat as soon as any doubt is thrown on the 
 execution of a dcM'd, the person offering it may give evidence of the 
 good character of the subscribing witness. 
 
 1'ko(»k ok C!ii.\K.V("ri:u (Jknkram-v. — The proof of character is 
 by [)ro()f of gener;il reputation in the community where tlie jjcrsdii 
 resi(h)s. As the Suprtfuie Court of Alabama say. it '• is the (;nly 
 mode in which chara(!ter can be exhibited to us." Jones v. State. 70 
 Ala. 8 (1884); Bodwell r. Swan, '5 Tick. 370 (1S25). 
 
 '• It is not competent to show \^'hat two or three ])ersons only may 
 think or say concerning the witness, but the intjiiiry must be coniined 
 to the general estimation in which he is held by his neighbors and 
 acquaintances." .Matthewsoii c. Burr. 6 Xeb. 312 (1877). 
 
 "It is a gtMieral rale that j)articidar acts are not a<lmissible to 
 sustain an attack u|i(in cliaracter." McCarthy r. Collin, 157 Mass. 
 47s (1S92). So in an action for a breach of jiromisi' of marriage 
 "an intimacy with several dill'eifnt men " cannot be jtroved. //'/(/. 
 In an action for slandering the plaintiff by accusing her of unchastity. 
 evidvncc is incomiictcnt that others maih' similar remarks. " Neither 
 can the character of plaintiff for chastity be assailed by this class 
 of testimony. Nothing but general reputation is allowable for such 
 a purjiose. It cannot be attacked by proof of particular acts or 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 .\MKRICA\ NOTKS. 
 
 :>5T-» 
 
 particular suspicion.s." Troctor v. llouglitaliiig, .">7 Mich. -II (liSTT); 
 Jones V. State, 76 Ala. 8 (18.S4). 
 
 " Particular facts are not admissible to prove the reputation of a 
 party or witness to be either good or bad, for the reasons that they do 
 not necessarily tend to establish a general character ; that tliey con- 
 fuse the jury by raising collateral issues, and especially that a party 
 is presumed to be ready to defend his own general reputation or 
 tliat of his witnesses, but not to meet specific charges against either 
 without notice." Nixon v. McKinney, 105 M. C. 23 (1890) ; People if. 
 Wliite, 14 Wend. Ill (1835); Campbell r. liannister, 79 Ky. 20r> 
 (1880) ; Kearney v. State, 08 Miss. 233 (1890). 
 
 Though a defendant in an action of slander may show that t]w 
 |)laintitt"s character was bad as to the offence charged at tlie tinui of 
 tlie alleged speaking of the words, he cannot show it by rumors 
 current in the community. Such evidence is objectionable as a 
 surprise on tlie plaintiff, " and besides proof of false rumors alono 
 must of necessity be by hearsay evidence in its most objectionable 
 form." reter.son v. ^Morgan, 116 Mass. 350 (1874); Holloy ,•■ 
 iiurgess, 9 Ala. 728 (1846). 
 
 In an action for malicious prosecution, the defendant can introduce 
 evidence of plaintiff's bad reputation in reduction of danuiges, or as 
 affording probable cause for the prosecution, but he cannot prove 
 individiuil acts of misconduct. So ])articular rumors are to be 
 rejected. Towers v. Presgroves, 38 Miss. 227. 241 (1859). And 
 what a iii'uiiiritji of his neighbors say is not competent, though 
 precisely why not, if tlie evidence is offered in mitigation of 
 damages, is not appiirent. IhUI. It is not jjermitted in sucli a 
 case to show tiiat tlie jilaintiff was seen on tlu; street in bad 
 com])any, at all liours of the niglit, swearing louder tiian otlierboys. 
 'Mifiieral reputation, when thus placed in issue may be supported 
 by the party thus attacked by calling witnesses to prove tlie contrar}' 
 of the stateiiKMits of witnesses by which his reputation is attacked. 
 It would be (juite ditlicult to see what proof could liave been made 
 to reliiit the impression created in the minds of tlie jury by tlii.s 
 testimony." Dorscy r. Clapp. 22 Neb. 564 (1887). Evidence tend- 
 i':g to show disiionesty has, however, been admitted, tiiough not 
 apparently against objection, as bearing on the (piestion of reason- 
 al)le cause for suing out a searcli warratit. In siicli case tiie party 
 sought to be impcaclied may give rvidrnce of his general character. 
 Mark /•. Merz, 5.3 111. App. 45S (1893). 
 
 The fact that no reputation exists on the jiarticiilar aspect of cliar- 
 acter is competent evidence. " Such evidence is often of i\w 
 strongest description, as when' a character for truth is in issue, 
 that among those acquainttul witli tiie party, it has never been 
 iHicstioned, and so, as to character for peace and (piietness. that 
 among those with whom the party associates, no instance has been 
 
2.37=i9 
 
 AMKinCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AKT JI. 
 
 known or lieard of. in which lio has been engaged in a quarrel."' 
 Cianilolfo r. State, 11 Oh. St. 114 (18G0J ; Freneh r. Sale, (>3 Miss. 
 ;!SG (1.S85) ; 15oon i\ Weathered's Adm. 23 Tex. 075 (1859) ; Uinghani 
 /•. Bernard, 3G Minn. 114 (188()) ; Davis /•. Franke, 33 Gratt. 413 
 (ISSO). 
 
 The evidence as to the defendant's character in a criminal case 
 nuist be relevant to the offence with which he is charged, /.*•., 
 directed to the particular mental or moral attributes involved in 
 tlie accusation, otnerwise the evidence is witliout logical forf'e. 
 
 On an indictment for felonious assault, evidence of reputation as 
 a law-abiding citizen is inadmissible. "The law limits the inquiry 
 in sueii eases to liis general character as to the trait in issue." State 
 r. King, 78 Mo. oof) (1883). 
 
 On the other hand, by a paritj' of reasoning, on an indictment for 
 assault with intent to kill, evidence of character for truth and 
 veracity is incompetent. Morgan r. State, 88 Ala. 223 (188!)). 
 
 On an indictment for murder of a man by his mistress, no evidence 
 of the prisoner's bad reputation for chastity is admissible, " inas- 
 mucli as it involves a trait of character not in the slightest degree 
 involved in the alleged commission of tiie crime with which she 
 stood charged.' People (;. Fair, 43 Cal. 137 (1872). 
 
 But it has been held that on an indictment for rape, the defendant 
 may offer evidence tending to show that he is of a good moral 
 character. State i\ Knapp, 4") X. ][. 148 (18()3). 
 
 On an indictment for larceny evidence of general moral character 
 is incompetent. " General character is shown by general reputation, 
 and not by tlie particular facts of one's life; but the general reputa- 
 tion may well be confined to the particular traits of character that 
 are supjiosed to render, to some extent, the commission of the crime 
 charged improbable." State v. Bloom, 08 Ind. ~}4 (1870). 
 
 Si'KCIFir A< TS. — AVllKX Al>MISSIIJI,K. — CUOSS-KXAMIXATION. — 
 
 Tlie exceptions to tlie rule thatcliaracter must be jiroved by evidence 
 of general reputation are neitlier numerous nor iinporta 1^. In 
 attempting to weaken the force of evidence of tiie defendant s good 
 character in a criminal case, the witnesses in his favor may be asked 
 in cross-examination as to specific instances of misconduct involving 
 tlif existence of the trait of character in (piestion. " Ft has been 
 thought useful and favorable to the elucidation of truth in such cases 
 to allow on cross-examination an inquiry as to particulars in the 
 charges and also in reference to the jiersons who made them, or gave 
 their opinion as to the character of tlie individual impeached." 
 Leonard r. Allen. II Cush. 241 (ISo.S); Sawver r. Frbert, 2 Xott & 
 McC. oil (1820) ; H(dnies r. State, 88 Ala. 2{\ (188!)). 
 
 Wliere on an iiidietment for rape witnesses for the defendimt 
 testified to his good character for morality, as wtdl as ch.astity. "on 
 cross-examination, the State was properly allowed to test their accu- 
 
CHAl'. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 2o7'»" 
 
 rucy by inquiries as to liis reputation for selling liquor in violation 
 of the law ; for the court surely cannot say tliat such acts are not 
 immoral." State r. Kuapp, 45 N. ]J. 148, 157 (18(53). 
 
 So on an indictment for murder, where a government witness had 
 testitied that the reputation of the deceased as a peaceable man was 
 good, the defendant is entitled to inquire, upon cross-examination, 
 whether he had not heard of certain enumerated acts of violence 
 done by the deceased. De Arman r. State, 71 Ala. 351 (1882). As 
 the defence was that the killing was in self-defence, the evidence 
 offered was probably admissible on other grounds. 
 
 A witness to good character of a deceased person may state in 
 cross-examination "that he did not think tliat he jKissessed that 
 higli character the latter part of his life." Nixon c. McKinney, 
 105 N. C. -'3 (1890). 
 
 Evidence of hearsay of specific acts has been admitted in cross- 
 examination of a witness to the defendant's character. For example, 
 on an indictment for murder, a witness testifying to the defendant's 
 character may state that he " had heard for the last few years that 
 defendant had frequent difficulties with, and struck liis wife." 
 Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 71 (1889). 
 
 Rkputation is Cuauactkk. — It may well be doubted whether 
 in selecting reputation in the community as the sole permissible 
 proof of character the law uses the only rational means of proof, or 
 even the best. Th^ effort is to prove the existence or non-existence 
 of a mental attribute by circumstiintial evidence. The probative 
 success of such an effort rests on a presumption of fact that when 
 a man has a trait of character his neighbors know of it, and suffi- 
 ciently discuss it to establish a reputaticm as to its existence. Experi- 
 ence liardly seems sufficiently uniform to lend much weight to such 
 a ])resumption. Ability to conceal real diaracter is an essential 
 element in the commission of many offences, and dissinudation is 
 sufficiently common to make good standing in a community by no 
 moans a reliable, nnudi le:is a necessary test, of actual character and 
 disposition. On the other liand, suspicion, gossip, unpopularity; — 
 tlu'se and other misfortunes may place a really fair character at great 
 disadvantage when tested by its reputation. A partial explanation 
 of the limitation is found in the historical origin of this species of 
 evidence. Historically considered, it is a final remnant of compurga- 
 tion, a fact which naturally explains the test of reputation in the 
 community. Starkie, Evid. (*7()) n. h. 
 
 While, under any circumstances, the existence of a certain repu- 
 tation or the absence of any reimtation concerning a particular trait 
 of character is a (iircumstance of probiitive value, other (at present 
 jjrohibited) methods of proving the existence of such traits seem at 
 least of ecjual value. 
 
 Character is a mental or jjsychical condition, The usual proof of 
 
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 257" 
 
 AMEIUCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AIiT I!. 
 
 sucli conditions is by proof of acts or statpinents whicli juc tiicii- 
 natural expression. That a multiplicity of issues might be tlnis 
 raised has not sufficed to offset the admitted benefit of receiving tliis 
 class of evidence in otlier cases requiring proof of a mental state. 
 The difficulties do not seem greater in the case of evidence of 
 character. 
 
 As a genera) rule, such evidence of sjiecific acts is not admissible. 
 Thus on an action for furnishing a careless conductor, the supreme 
 court of Pennsylvania say: "Character for care, skill, and trutli of 
 witnesses, parties or otliers, must all alike be proved by evidence (>f 
 general reputat'nn, and not of special acts. . . • Ciiaracter grows 
 out of special a. i, but is not proved by them. Indeed, special acts 
 do very oftev indicate frailties or vices that are altogether contrary 
 to the ciiaracter actually established. And sometimes the very frail- 
 ties that may be proved against a man, may have been regarded by 
 him in so serious a light, as to have produced great improvement of 
 character. IJesides this, ordinary care implies occasional acts of 
 carelessness, for all men are f; ible in tiiis respect, and the lav\" 
 demands only the ordinary.'' Frazier v. Pennsylvania K. II. .'iS I'a. 
 St. 104 (1800) ; Nixon r. ^FcKenney, 105 N. (J. 33 (IS'.K)). So in an 
 action against an employer for furnishing an incompetent foreman, 
 specific acts of carelessness are incompetent. Ilatt v. Nay, 144 ]\lass. 
 186 (1887). 
 
 In several cases, however, such evidence has been i-eceived, appar- 
 ently without objection. 
 
 On an indictment for murder a witness to the defendant's ciiar- 
 acter was allowed to testify " He is the most {piiet, peaceable bov 
 I ' .'er saw or liad. ... If I spoke roughly to him, it would bring 
 tears to his eyes, Imt no retort. ... I never knew him to give an 
 uncivil word to any of them." (randolfo v. State, 11 Oh. St. 114 
 (ISOD). "Those acquainted with tlie party, — with tlie ordinary 
 course and conduct of his life, would know how far and U> what 
 extent he had exhibited or failed to exiiibit the (piality or trait."' 
 
 r/>!,/. 
 
 In an action against a town for a defect in a highway tlie defonce 
 was that the driver, the i)laiiitifl"s husband, was fast and careless. 
 Plaintiif was then allowed to testify to his careful driving on several 
 other oc(!asi<)ns. "The evidence was relevant to tlie (|ucstion of tiie 
 husband's character for driving safely or otherwise."' I'lummer /•. 
 Ossii)ee, 51) N. H. 55 (1S79). 
 
 In th(! case of lower animals, ciiaracter, when material, may be 
 ])rovcd by s]»ccilii'. acts of conduct embodying the trait in question. 
 
 ( Ml an issue whether a certain liorse was gentle, evidence of both 
 prior and subsequent conduct on the part of the animal is competent. 
 Turnpike Co. v. Ilearn. 87 Tcnn. L'iM ^888), citing with approval 
 Todd /•. Kowley, S All. 51 (18G4), where, tiie character of a horse 
 
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CHA]'. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 2o7« 
 
 being in issue, under similar circunistiincL'S, the court say: "The 
 liabit of an animal is in its nature a eontiuuous fact, to be sliown by 
 proOi. of successive acts of a similar kind."' To the same effect, also 
 in a highway accident case, see Chamberlain /•. Entield, 4.'5 X. II. ooC) 
 (18G1). So in an action against the proprietors of a stage line in 
 providing vicious horses, causing injury to the plaintiff. " The 
 vicious habits of a horse can only be proved by instances. . . . That 
 he had this habit might be proved by instances before and after the 
 accident in question." Kennon v. Gilmer, 5 ]\lont. 257 (1885) ; 
 Lynch <•. Moore, 154 IVIass. 3o5 (1891). 
 
 Traits of character even of inferior animals, f. y. a horse, may, it 
 has been said, also be jjroved by general reputation, .^'ormsdorf /•. 
 Detroit &c. Railway, 75 Mich. 472 (1889). 
 
 On the contrary, the supreme court of New Hampshire, in allow- 
 ing the character of a horse to be shown by specific acts, state that 
 they are not ''aware of any ; ithority that would allow evidence 
 of general reputation. The ^<ise does not stand like the character 
 of a person for truth, for then it may well be presumed that it 
 cannot be bad without being known to the public, but it may be 
 otherwise in respect to the vicious propensities of the horse." "Whit- 
 tier r. Franklin, 4G X. H. 23 (1805). 
 
 AVhere the question relates to the existence of a hahlt, it would 
 seem that, on |)rinciple, repeated acts calculated to show its exist- 
 ence ".re comi)etent. The range of these acts is largely discretionary 
 with the court. They may be "so remote in time or so insignificant 
 in character, as to turinsh no aid in deciding the fact to be found." 
 Com. /•. liyan, i;54 Mass. 22.'5 (18S3) ; Com. v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472 
 (1881). 
 
 Again, n]ion principle, a further method of proving character 
 would bt tiuit those accpiainted with the person a particular aspect 
 of whose character is involved, should testify what, in their opinion, 
 was the character of the person, based on their observation. Such 
 evidence is received as to the existence, on a particular occasion, of 
 anger, fright, insanity, v.:A other mental states. It is difficult to 
 assign a satisfactory reison why, for exanijile, a character of prone- 
 ness to the exhibition o'.' these same mental (jualities should not be 
 proved in the same or a s'luilar way. 
 
 Such evidence of chavacter by the opinion of the witness has 
 occasionally been ro('eiv(i\ (^n an indictment for rape a witness 
 was allowed to state that •. /lis opinion the chu.acter for chastity of 
 the i)rosecuting witness was good. Conkey v. I'eople, 1 Abb. Ct. of 
 A))p. Dee. 41 8' (1 800). 
 
 But tlie rule is well est.iblished that the only proper proof of 
 charactei is by evidence of reputation. 
 
 Til Mississippi, on an in'U;!tment for murder, counsel for the 
 l)risoner wen; not allowed to ask for the prisoner's general ohar- 
 
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 257*3 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 iicter ''for peace or violence" as a preliminary for asking whether 
 from the witness's knowledge of that character he " regarded him 
 as a man of violent or i)eaceful character." The court thought the 
 second question was correct, but required the counsel to first inquire 
 as to the '• general character of the accused." McDauiel v. State, 
 8 S. «fc M. 401 (1847). 
 
 On an indictment for murder in procuring an abortion, a physician 
 cannot be asked, in reference to certain testimony, "if, on that testi- 
 mony, you would lose faith in the character of any person whose 
 character had heretofore been high in your estimation." Beasley i-. 
 People, 89 111. 571 (1878). 
 
 So, on an indictment for murder, where a witness was asked, con- 
 cerning the defendant, " What is his character for -peace and quiet- 
 ness. . . . By character I mean what the man is, not what people 
 say about liim," the question was held rightly excluded. " If the 
 question ' What the man is ? ' was intended to . . . require from the 
 witness his opinion farmed from sources not common to those 
 acquainted with the party, and having no reference to the general 
 character as shown by his ordinary course and conduct, we do not 
 think that the rule has ever been carried so far." Gandolfo v. State, 
 11 Oh. St. 114 (1860). In a suit for damages caused by an incom- 
 petent engineer, to show incompetence, the opinion of an expert 
 engineer who had had no previous acquaintance with the engineer as 
 to whose competence he was testifying was offered. The evidence 
 was held properly rejected. " Incompetency cannot be thus estab- 
 lished." East Line &c. K. R. v. Scott, 68 Tex. 694 (1887). 
 
 Such opinion as to tiie existence of traits of character cannot be 
 said to be excluded because such evidence would not be relevant. 
 The reason assigned is that the rule is otherwise. Of course, in 
 certain cases where the mode of use of an inarimate object is 
 involved, such evidence of opinion would be simply irrelevant. For 
 example, the character of a house in which a ceitaiii assault was 
 committed is not a matter for evidence of opinion. People v. Lock 
 Wing, 61 Cal. 380 (1882). But the character of a house as being a 
 '•lewd house" must be proved by its reputatifjn. Hogan v. State, 
 76 Ga. 8L' (1885). 
 
 Community Dkfixed. — The question has naturally arisen in 
 cases where the person whose eharacter is in issue has ^ accessively 
 resided in several communities, which community was entitled to 
 speak on the subject of his character. Is it the community where 
 he last resided, where he longest resided, or where ho now resides ? 
 
 The question has received a very sensible answer. Inquiry may 
 be directed to reputation in anj' community where the party in 
 question has resided for a sufficient length of time to .acquire a 
 reputation for the ]>articular trait involved ; provided, the time is 
 surticiently near to the time wliei. the fact is important, to have an 
 
CHAl*. VI.] 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 257^* 
 
 appreciable probative effect. The question of remoteness is a pre- 
 liminary matter of fact for determination in the discretion of the 
 court. In the absence of sui'prise, the exercise of this discretion 
 will not be reviewed '• unless the circumstances of the case show a 
 gross abuse of this discretion." Snow i'. Grace, 29 Ark. 131, 141 
 (1874). In this discretion, evidence of rci)utation seven or eight 
 years prior to the trial has been received. Graham v. Chrystal, 2 
 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 263 (ISG.j). 
 
 In Holsey v. State 24 Tex. App. 35 (1887) it was held that the 
 reputation of a witness can be proved either '• in the community of 
 his residence or where he is best known." " The general reputation 
 of a witness among his neighbors is the only legitimate subject of 
 inquiry. . . . Neighbors are those who dwell near each other ; and 
 he who would testify as to the general reputation of a witness must 
 be able to state what is generally said of the person by those among 
 whom he dwells, or with whom he is chiefly conversant." Wadding- 
 ham V. Hulett, 92 ]\Io. 528 (1887). 
 
 So evidence offered of the reputation of the ap2)ellant as a witness 
 for truth and veracity in the county of Johnson, where he had lived 
 until four years before, was admitted. " The law does not presume 
 that a person of mature age, whose reputation has been notoriously 
 bad to within a period such as intervened between the time the 
 appellant i-esided in Johnson County and the time when the witness 
 testified, has so reformed as to have acquired a different rei)uta- 
 tion. The evidence offered may not have been entitled to so much 
 weight as if it had related to his reputation in the community in 
 which he lived at the time the testimony was given . . . and was 
 subject to be rebutted by evidence showing a different reputation at 
 the time of the trial in the (iomniunity in which he resided." 
 Mynatt r. Hudson, GO Tex. 00 (1886). The character of a witness 
 may be impeached by persons in whose neighborhood he had lived 
 until four years prior to the trial, though he had then removed to 
 iinother place fourteen miles from that neighborhood, where he had 
 since resided, and tlio witnesses did not know the character which 
 he bore at tin; hitter i)lace. " There is a strong probability that one, 
 wiiose general character was bail four years siiu-e, is still of doubtful 
 or disparaged fame. So macii, at least, may be asserted, witliout 
 evincing the feeling of a misanthropist or any unseemly lack of 
 charity." Sleeper r. Van .""idilles worth, 4 Denio, 431 (1817). So 
 it has been held that reputation in a jilace where a witness had lived 
 two years before was admissible for ])ur])oses of impeachment. Kelly 
 V. State, 01 Ala. 19 (1878) ; Louisvilh> \-e. K. I{. v. Itichardson, 00 
 Tnd. 4.". (1879). So the inmates of a jjrison can testify to the repu- 
 tation of a deceased person as quarrelsome and vindictive in the 
 community when* they became acquainted with it, i.e., in the prison 
 Itself. Thomas r. People, 07 X. Y. 218 ( 1870). So where a witness 
 
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 AMKiaCAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT II. 
 
 a few months i)i'ior to the trial liad removed to a now place of 
 residenee, where he had not lived long enough to aetjuire a 
 reputation, evidence of reputation at his former residence was 
 admitted. Tape /•. Wright, 11(5 Ind. aOL' (1888) ; Coates v. Suhui, 
 4G Kan. 341 (18'J1). So evidence of the rei)Utation of a witness 
 two years prior at another place is competent. Lawson r. State, ',i'2 
 Ark. 1.'20 (1877). "General reputation at a former ])eriod and in 
 another neighborhood may or nuiy not tend to prove tliat issue, 
 according to the remoteness of the time and place, and other circum- 
 stances. Ordinarily these will affect the weight, but not the compe- 
 tency of the matter." IJrown v. Luehr.s, 1 HI. App. 74 (1877). Two 
 or tiiree years are not too remote. State v. Lanier, 79 N. C. G22 
 (1878). 
 
 On the contrary, where a witness had resi;1ed for the last five years 
 in his present residence "and there was abundant evidence as to his 
 reputation," it was held incompetent to inquire as to his character 
 for truth and veracity at the place of former residence. State r. 
 I'otts, 78 la. ().")() (188!)). 
 
 So the chara(!ter for truth of a witness at a distant place where he 
 has resided but three months on a temporary visit is not competent. 
 "A man's character is to be judged bj" the general tenor and current 
 of his life, and not by a mere episode in it." Waddingham v. Hulett, 
 92 ^Fo. 528 (1887). ' 
 
 Tiie rei)utation of a person among a iiiitwrif// of his neighbors is 
 not competent. Powers r. I'resgroves, .*]8 .Miss. 227, 241 (ISoO). 
 But it is not necessary that the witness should know that the repu- 
 tation he states is the opinion of the majority, llobinson /•. State, 
 IG Fla. 8.-}o (1878 . 
 
 The existence of a certain reputation may be circumstantial evi- 
 dence entirely apart from any effect in proving cliaracter. In sucli 
 cases tlie rules under consideration have, of course, no application. 
 For example, on the question whether the vendor of a chattel intended 
 to reserve the title in himself, evideiu^e of the ])oor reputation of the 
 vtndee for tinaneial stability is competent. liuswell Trinnner Co. )•. 
 Case, 144 Mass. 3."»(> (1887). So in an action against an emjiluyer for 
 negligence in hiring a fellow servant jthysically too infirm to safely 
 do his duty, evidence is competent tiiat he " was generally reputed 
 to be iidirm in tlie senses of sight and hearing and in piiysical 
 strengtii " . . . " for the ])urp()se of jiroving tliat iiis infirmitij'S in 
 tlies(! respects were well known in tlie coniniunity," and that there- 
 fore tlie employer either knew of his condition (>r with reasonable 
 diligence might have learned. Monahan /•. Worcester, l')0 Mass. 
 4.'W(18nO). 
 
 TuooF OF CirAKAcTKU. WiiXKss. — The law is now entirely 
 settled that, as to a witness, the only proper object of inquiry is 
 as to rejjutation for trutii and veracity. 
 
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CIIAl'. V 
 
 I] 
 
 A.MEUK'AN NoTKS. 
 
 :i.)T*'» 
 
 Ct'rtaiii of the earlic' cases, indeed, suiij,'lit to establisli the rule 
 tliat the f^ciieral moral character of the witness is tlie preliminary 
 subject of inquiry. 
 
 It lias ue(',onlin,!,'ly been hehl that to impeacli a witness the ^jroper 
 nietliod '"is by askin<,', iirst, the (pu'stion * what is the witness's gen- 
 eral cliaracter?' If tliis is answered tliat it is bad, then it is fol- 
 lowed by the (juestion, ' from his j,'eneral clianieter would you believe 
 him on Ids oath in a court of justice'.'"" Anon. 1 Hill, Law (S. C.) 
 LT)!, L'r»S (is;};;; ; state r. Uoswell, L' Dcv. Law (X. C), I'O!) (18l.'<»; ; 
 Stokes r. State, 18 Ga. 17, o7 (l.S*>5) ; Hume v. Scott, '.) A. K. Marsh. 
 L'GO (1821); State /'. Stallings, 2 Haywood (X. C), 3()(» (1804); Cun- 
 ningham 0. State, Go Ind. 377 (187'J); Gilliam r. State, 1 Head, ;>8 
 (18-18). ' 
 
 In support of this form of interrogation, it has been urged, that 
 if the in([uiry be limited to reputation for truth alone, a witness 
 of immorality so notorious that tlie mere matter of veracity has 
 escaped remark, would stand unim])ea(died. 
 
 [n reply, it has been said that " a man who is notoriously im- 
 moral, who is believed to be dishonest, •; 1 who is addicted to mis- 
 vei)resentation, can never have a good cliaracter for truth."' U. S. 
 /•. Vansickle, 2 McLean, C. Ct. 219 (1840). 
 
 The position taken in U. S. f. Vansickle (iihl supra) has been gen- 
 erally approved. The prevailing rule, therefore, is that the deposing 
 witness must first be asked wiiether he knows the general reputation 
 for truth of the witness sought to be imjjeached instead of asking 
 for liis "general character." '• What is wanted is the common o\n\i- 
 ion, that in which there is general concurrence, in other words, gen- 
 eral reputation or character attributed. That is presumed to be 
 indicative of actual character, and hence it is regarded as of impor- 
 tance when the credibility of a witness is in question." Knode r. 
 "Williamson, 17 Wall. 'M (187;}); Craig w. State, 5 Ohio St. 005 
 (18,-.4); Davis v. Franke. 3;! Gratt. 4L3, 425 (1880); U. S. /•. Van- 
 sickle, 2 McLean, 210 (1840) ; Smith >: State, 58 Miss. 807 (1881) ; 
 Teese /•. Huntingdon, 2;5 How. 2 (18.")0). 
 
 Wliere a witness was impeacdied by evi(h'nce of bad general char- 
 acter for honesty, the form of in([uii'y was held to be error. l>orn 
 /•. Wi'athered's .\dm. 'l'.\ Te.x. &ir> (18.-)0) ; Craig r. State, o Oh. St. 
 OOo (18."i4). 
 
 A party who takes the stand has the same jmsition as any other 
 M'itness, and the impiiries arc limiti'd to character for veracity and 
 do not extend to general character. State '•. Heal, ((8 Ind. 34o 
 (1879); Mershon /•. State, 51 Ind. 14 (ls75): State /•. Rugan, 5 Mo. 
 Ai)p. 592 (1878). 
 
 It is eipially W(dl settled that spocitic instances of untruth or im- 
 morality ar(» incompetent to prove the character of the witness for 
 truth and veracity. 
 
 ■'», 'i 
 
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 1 
 
 1: 
 
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 Mk 
 
 L 
 
 2o7^' 
 
 am;:i;i('An notks. 
 
 [PAllT H. 
 
 The vi'iacihy of a male witness cannot be imppached by sliowin;,' 
 tliat ho is liiil)itually intoxicatctl. Thayer it. lioyU^, 30 ^Me. 47") 
 (1841)). Or lias indulged in unhuvt'ul sexual intercourse. Cunniiii,'- 
 liani V. State, G5 Ind. 377 (lS7i)). 
 
 Wiieru eviden<!e on beliait' of tlie accused as to his good character 
 for truth and veracity was met by the governnu-nt by evidenct! of 
 particuhir acts oi immoral conduct, tending to sliow low and im- 
 moral associations, the court held that " This . . . was clearly ille- 
 gal evidence." As, however, the evidence as to truth and veracity 
 was itself improperly admit^^^ed, the court decline to reverse the judg- 
 ment. Morgan i>. State, 8-^ Ala. 223 (1889). "A witness cannot be 
 impeached by evidence o'' particular wrongful acts, nor is it proper 
 to (piestion the witness witli reference to such matters." Jones /•. 
 Duchow, 87 Cal. 109 (1890) ; U. S. v. Vansickle, 2 McLean, C. Ct. 
 219 (1840). 
 
 The ciiaracter for veracity of a female witness cannot be im- 
 peached by showing lack of chastity. People r. Mills, 94 Mich. G30 
 (1893); Cai-i) i>. State, 3 Kelly, 417 (1847); Johnson v. State, Gl 
 Ga. 305 (187h, Jackson /'. Lewis, 13 Johns. 504 (1816); Spears v. 
 Forrest, 15 Vt. 4^ ■ (1843) ; Cora. v. Churchill, 11 Mete. 538 (184G); 
 overruling Com. o. Murphy, 14 Mass. 387 (1817) ; Dimick v. Downs, 
 82 111. 570 (1870). 
 
 But see U. S. v. Ikedemeyer, G Utah, 143 (1889) where the court 
 apparently decided that on an indictment for adultery, the character 
 of the woman as a witness may be impeached by proof of improper 
 relations with other men. The evidence was admissil>le, howtiver, 
 on other grounds. 
 
 The rule forbidding proof of character by particular instances of 
 conduct, does not interfere with the rigiit, on cross-examination of a 
 sustaining witness to character, to inquire as to such particular in- 
 stances. Jones IK State, 7G Ala. 8 (18S4) ; llohnes i'. State, 88 Ala. 
 2G (1S8<»); Leonard /•. Allen, 11 Cush. 241 (18.");{); Steeples v. New- 
 ton, 7 Oreg. 110 (1879). An impeaching witness may be asked, on 
 cross-examination, to state the names of all persons whom he lias 
 heard speak against the reputation of tlie witness impeached. iJates 
 i>. Barber, 4 Cnsh. 107 (1849). As tlie court say in State r. Perkins, 
 6G N. C. 12G (1872), " It is settled that a witness who swears to tiie 
 general bad ciiaracter of another witness on the other side, may, 
 upon cross-examination, be asked to name the individuals whom he 
 heard sjieak disparagingly of the witness, and what was said. This 
 is everyday practice." 
 
 Where the att nipt is made, on cross-examination, to limit the 
 bad reputation to a particular set of facts, r. ;/., promises to pay 
 debts, the impeaching party can extend the scope of the bad repu- 
 tation to the extent of making it general. Pierce v. Newton, 13 
 Gray, 528(1859). 
 
CHAP, vr.] 
 
 AMEUICAX XOTKS. 
 
 '2r,7« 
 
 So the opinion of one witness as to the truthful character ot an- 
 other is not competent. 
 
 On the matter of tlie veracity of a witness, an impeacliiny witness 
 ctMinot be asked " From what you Itnow of his reputation, and ivlutt 
 i/oii know of him, wouUl you believe him under oath in a nuitter in 
 which he is interested ? " The court say " so far as it autliorizcd 
 the witness under examination to base belief on his personal knowl- 
 edge — as distinguished from general reputation — the question was 
 improper." People v. Methvin, 53 Cal. 08 (187H) ; llolsey o. State, 
 24 Tex. App. 35 (1887) ; Sti'te v. King, 78 Mo. 655 (1883). 
 
 The preliminary question is whether or not he knows the general 
 reputation for truth and veracity in the neighborhood in which he 
 resides. If he says no, his examination should stop. If he says 
 yes, he should be asked whether that general reputation is gooil or 
 bad, and whether, from such general reputation, he would believe 
 the person under oath ; and the sources and extent of his information 
 may be tested on cross-examination. French v. Sale, 03 Miss. .'{86 
 (1885). He must answer, as a matter of conscience, if a sufficient 
 number of neighbors have expressed themselves. If>i(/. Hamilton 
 V. People, 29 Mich. 173, 189 (1874) ; Wilson v. State, 3 Wisi;. 798 
 (1854). If the witnesses to char.acter understand the phrase in a 
 general sense, it is not error to omit the word ''general " in in([uir- 
 ing for the reputation of the witness. Coates v. Sulau, 40 Kans. 
 341 (1891). 
 
 This preliminary (juestion as to whether the second witness knows 
 the reputation of the first, is for the jury and not for the court. 
 Bates V. Barber, 4 Cush. 107 (1849). 
 
 " It is not like the case of experts, who are called to give opinions, 
 and whose qualifications to give such opinions must be first ex- 
 amined and decided upon by the court. Wliat is the reputation of 
 a witness for truth and veracity, is a simple question of fact; and 
 there is no more roason for the court to make a preliminary exami- 
 nation as to tlie knowledge of witnesses called to testify to tliis fact, 
 than tiiere is for making such examination as to tlie knowledge of 
 witnesses called to testify to any other fact. All witnesses, com- 
 petent to testify to any fact in the case, are competent to testify to 
 the fact of reputation for truth; and the in(iuiry as to the aniftnut 
 and means of this knowledge is for tlie jury, in order to enable tiiem 
 to satisfy themselves as to the weiglit and importance of the testi- 
 mony." r.ates /•. IJarber, 4 Cush. 107 (1849). 
 
 "Ex«iLisu IviTLK." — Assuming that the impeaching (or sustain- 
 ing) witness has answered that he knows the reputation for truth 
 and veracity of the witvicss sought to be impeached, and has next 
 been asked whether it is good or bad, the point in dispute on the 
 cases is whether the in(iuiry siiould stop here or whether tiie witness 
 should be further asked, *■ From what you know of this reputation, 
 
,,1, 
 
 im 
 
 257*0 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AKT II. 
 
 ^V()lll(l voii bt'licvc liiiii iiiidcr outli ".' " This latter (luostioii, if iiskt'tl, 
 is said to 1)C! acconliii,!,' to tliu so-called •• Eiii,disli rule." 
 
 It is Indieved that tlu,' j,'r('iit [)r('i)(jii(U'raiu:t' of authority is in fiivor 
 of this socallod '' Eiii,'lish '" form of iiiti-rrof^ation. Thu gri'at iii- 
 llui'uct! of Professor (Jrcciilcaf is probably ri'spoijsible for such con- 
 flict as exists. It is saiil in Hamilton v. JVople, lit) Mich. 173 (I.S7I;, 
 " Until ]\Ir. (Jrccnlcaf allowed a statement to creej) into his work on 
 evidence to the effect tiiat the American authorities disfavored the 
 Eni,'lish rule, it was never very seriously (luostioned. ... It is a 
 little remarkable that of the eases referred to to sustain this idea, 
 not one contained a decision upon the question, and only one con- 
 tained more than a passing dictum not in any way called for." 
 
 The reasons in favor of the form of (piestion calliu},' for tlio 
 opinion of the witness as to the effect on his own mind of the re[)u- 
 tation of the impeached witness, are <,Mven in this well considered 
 case of Hamilton v. People, 2D Mich. 173 (1874). " Unless tin; iuj- 
 peaching witness is held to showing tln^ e.vtent to which an evil 
 reputation has alfected a person's credit, the jury cannot accurately 
 tell what the witness means to express by stating that such repu- 
 tation is good or bad, and can have no guide in weighing his testi- 
 mony. ... It has also been commonly observed that impeaching 
 questions as to character are often misunderstood, and witnesses, in 
 spite of caution, base their answer on bad character generally, whiiili 
 may or may not be of such a nature as to impair confidence in tes- 
 timony. . . . The objection alleged to such an answer by a witness 
 is, that it enables the witness to substitute his opinion for that of 
 the jury. l>ut this is a fallacious objection. The jury, if they do 
 not act from personal knowledge, cannot understand the matter at 
 all without knowing the witness' opinion, and the ground on which 
 it IS based."' ///id. The following authorities, among others, follow 
 th(! English rule. T.-ople r. Davis, 21 Wend. 3(l!> (isy'.l) ; Titus r. 
 Ash, 24 N. H. 311) (IS.")!) : L.vmaii r. I'hiladelphia, oO I'a. St. IS8 
 (lS(i7); Knight/'. House, 2'» -Mil. l'.)4 ( ISCS) ; Hason r. Chaimian, 
 21 111. 33 (iM.'iS); Wilson c. State. 3 Wis. 7'.IS (18r>4); Stokes/-. 
 State. IS (Ja. 17 (IS.*.,")); .M'Cnteiien r. M'Cutchen. '.). Porter (Ala.), 
 <;."■)() (is;!!)); United States /•. Vansickle. 2 .MttUean, C. Ct. 21'.t 
 (1S4<>) ; .Mol)ley /■. Hamit. 1 A. K. .Marsh, .V.H (18I<.») : Ford r. 
 Ford, 7 Humpii. '.12 (iMlti); Robinson v. State, 10 Fla. 83r) (1878) ; 
 Snow e. (irae.e, 21) Afk. 131 ( 1874). 
 
 In a New ^'ork case a witness called to sustain a prior witness 
 whose vci'aeity luul been attacked, testilied that he did not know 
 " from the speech of the ])eo]de " what the prior witness's character 
 for veracity was. ]?ut that he had known liim for ten years, knew 
 liis character, and liad heard it (piestiomnl. He was then asked, 
 " From the spee(!h of the ])eople as to his character, would you be- 
 lieve him under oath ?" Held t') be a jjroper (piestion. Adams c. 
 (ireenwich Ins. Co.. 70 X. V. ICG (IH77). 
 
 "I ■ i 
 
CHAV. VI.] 
 
 AMKHKJAN NoTKH. 
 
 •J.. 7 
 
 .*)() 
 
 To the Siuno offcnt is tlio reasoning,' in Kord r. Knnl. 7 IIiim|ilin'y 
 CriMiii.). '••- (ISKJ : •• W.' think it is inuiicr tiial tlit- wit'ii'ss should 
 tt.'slil'y as to his own oiiiuioii. J5ut tliis opinion must bi- thi- result 
 of his knowledge ot tlie general reputation oT the principal witness; 
 not of itartieular facts, nor of his estinuite of the character of the, 
 l)arty. foundeil upon his knowledge of many facts. . . . Humors may 
 e.\ist. and may ae(piire a general einnilation in a neighhoriioml, and 
 yet their origin may be so vague, or the sources from wliieii they 
 s|iring so unworthy of credit, as that tlie ju-ople of the neighijorhood 
 may tfutirely disregard them, and retain the ntmost coididencc in 
 the party to whom they relate. . . . The party has no such general 
 reputation as tiiat which these rumors, if btdievod, wovdd give, 
 (ieneral rei)ntation is the estimate one's neighbors place upon ids 
 character." J/ni/. Wike r. Lightner, II S. & 15. IDS (1,S1.'4). •• We 
 all know that there are persons so given to aiiocryjihal statements 
 in their common conversation and inten^ourse with their friends 
 and neighbors, that no one places any conHdenci.' in their statt;- 
 meiits, and this want of truthfulness bo(!oines a subject of common 
 remark among all who know them, still, from their dai^y walk and 
 conversation in other resi)ects, none would donbt their truthfulness 
 when .solemnly called to testify in a court of justice." Eason c. 
 Chapman, LM 111. 3.') iSoH). The same rules ajiply to a i)arty 
 when he takes the stand as a witness. State r, IJeal, (18 Ind. o-lu 
 (i87i»). 
 
 Where a party is a wittiess the form of the question may be modi- 
 fied as follows. After in(iuiring as to the general reputation for 
 truth and veracity in the community when? he resides, the impeach- 
 ing witness may be asked, '• Whether, from that reputation, he, the 
 witness, would believe him on oath, in a matter in which he was 
 interested." Knight v. House, 211 .Md. I'.M (1S(5S). 
 
 Should the sustaining witness, wlien inquired of as to the reputa- 
 tion for truth and veracity of the first witness, state that he has 
 iiev(ir heard it <iuestioned, he is entitled, if otherwise competent, 
 to state that he would btdieve him on his oath. •' If such a question 
 was not iH'rmitted, tlie most respectable man in the community might 
 fail in being sujiported if his character foi' trutli should hajipen to 
 be attacked." People c. Davis, L'l Wend. ;!0;> (18;5!»). But where 
 the second witness said, " I never heard his reputation sjioken 
 of. I have heanl ])eople say he lias lied," it was held that he did 
 not ))ossess the re([nisitc knowledgi^ of tlie reputation for truth to 
 entitle him to state his own btdief in the value of the first witness's 
 oath. " A witness must state his own knowledge of another's general 
 good reputation before he will be permitted to say he would b(di(!ve 
 him on oath, otherwise he has no legitimate foundation for his be- 
 lief. In some of the states tlie secondary (piestion a.v to belief is 
 not permitted at all." Lyman r. I'hiladelphia, oG I'a. St. 488 
 (1H('.7). 
 
;i 
 
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 Piii'l'l 
 
 N 
 
 257°i 
 
 AMEIilCAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT II. 
 
 Cfi'tiiin Amoriean authorities, followinj^ the authority of ProlVssor 
 Grotudoaf, hohl that the only i)r()[)er iniiiuries are whether the wit- 
 ness kuows the general rei)Utation of the impeaelied witness for 
 truth and veraeity, and if so, what it is. I'romineut auiong these 
 states is .Massacliusetts. 
 
 In tliat state the usual question is, " What is his general reputa- 
 tion for trutli and veraiiity ? " It is discretionary with tiie eourt to 
 direct tht; examining party to first impure whetiier the witness 
 knows the reputation. "The prac^tice upon this subject differs in 
 different courts, in tins state, no jjractiee is established as a rule 
 of law. but it is witiiin tiie discretion of tiie presiding judge to re- 
 quire the j)relin:inarv ipiestion above stated to be asked of each 
 witness if he shall deem tiiat the interests of justice require it. 
 The same principle is ai)])licable to tiie examination of witnesses 
 upon other subjects. It often occurs, in the trial of cases, tliat tlie 
 judge is called upoti to inquire of a witness whether he has knowl- 
 edge of the matter of which he is called to testify. If it appears to 
 be doubtful whether the witness umh'rstands and appreciates ids 
 duty to testify only to what he knows of his own knowledge, or if, 
 fo" any reason, there is danger tliat he may testify to hearsay, it is 
 the right, and may be the duty, of tiie presiding judge to inquire of 
 liim if he has knowledge of the matter as to which lie is asked to 
 testify; and the party calling the witness would not !);• thereby 
 •aggrieved, and no exca'ptions would lie." Wetiierbee r. Xorris, lo;{ 
 Mass. ~ti')~t (1S7()); tiuii'sigamond liank n. IIol'l)s, II (Jray, L'oO 
 (18r..S). 
 
 Tlie rule is the same in New Jersey. It is not sufficient that the 
 impeaching witness should state that from what he kuows of his 
 reputation he would not Ixdieve him under ojith. ''The only testi- 
 mony allowed in siwh ease is as to the general reputatittn of thi' 
 witness impenclied, in the neighborhood, fur trntli and veracity, ami 
 that sucli rei)utation is generally bad ; saying that tin- witness, from 
 what he knew id' his reputation, would not believe him under o itli, 
 is not suUi ient." King /•. Ifneltman, 'JO N. .1. Kq. .'ilC) (IHC.K). 
 
 ,\nd (!alif(U'nia, " 'I'he (picstion of veracity is one of fact for tlie 
 jury, and it e;innot be artirmed, as a legal proposition, that a witness 
 is not successfully impeaelied, unl"ss tlie impeaching witnesses 
 testify that, from tlie general reputation of such witness, tiiey 
 woiilil not believe him or her under oath." I'eople r. Tyler, X> Cal. 
 
 In Texas, the impeac hing witness, after stating knowledge as to 
 the first witness's reputation for truth and veraeity, 'may then 
 juoperly be asked whether tliat general reputation is such as to en- 
 title the witness to creilit on oath." but not whether he wouhl be- 
 lieve liim on oath. Miirshiiil r. Stiite, .", Tex. App. LT.'J. l.".U (IS7S). 
 
 Tlie reasons lor excluding the linal question as to the witness's 
 
 ft I 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMEltlCAK NcrrKS. 
 
 25762 
 
 bi'lief is thus stated in Boon *•. Weathered, 23 Tex. 075 (IS.")*.)), 
 titod with approval in Marshall '•. State {ii/ii siipni). "Where tiie 
 impeaching witness is asked ' whether or not he could believe the 
 other under oath,' lie is more likely to give an an wer suggested by 
 his personal knowledge, or pronijjted by his personal feelings, or his 
 inilividual opinion, than when he is asked, whether or not he is ac- 
 (puiinted with the general reputation of the impeached witness, for 
 truth, and whether it is good or bad." 
 
 In Ohio a somewhat similar rule is adopted. The court suggest 
 the following as the proper form of <|uestion : " Have you the means 
 of knowing the general reputation of A K, the witness, for truth '.' 
 Or, this preliminary question may be thus : Are you aeciuainted with 
 \ B, and do you know what is his general reputation for truth? 
 So, any other form of words may be adopted, by which to ascertain 
 whether the witness has sufficient knowledge of the public estima- 
 tion for truth, iu which the witness i)roposed to be impeached is 
 held." Craig u. State, 5 Ohio St. (505 (1854). 
 
 Kkpctation antk LifKM MoTAM. — The reputation as to veracity 
 is reputation at the time of trial. As bearing on this question, 
 reputation subsetiuent to the bringing of the suit is competent, 
 tiiough if it arises out of the suit itself its force is naturally much 
 weakened. "A foundation for such evidence must first be laid by 
 showing that the witness has a reputation, that there is a (lommon 
 report as to his veracity ; and to determine this, it is proj)er to show 
 its e.xtent, how it originated, and what originated it, whether in the 
 transaction out of which the controversy arose, or independent of it. 
 It' from the controversy itself, and sintte it commenced, its force and 
 weight would be nuiterially lessened." .\niidon r. Hosley, 54 Vt. 
 25 (1HS2) ; Fisher r. Conway, 21 Kans. 18 (187S). 
 
 In New .Fersey tht^ (courts have gone further, and Jiold that the 
 reputation of a witness for veracity arising since the controversy, is 
 incomitetent. " No rule is bettca- settled, or founded on clearer 
 principles, tiian that which excludes all testinu>ny toucliiiig reputa- 
 tion fo\nide(i on opinions expressed /tost llfini niottnii. Not only 
 sliould evideiu^e as to tiic cliaracter of the witness be founded on 
 reputation, previously existing, but a stranger si'iit by a party to 
 tlie neighborhood of the witness to learn his character, will not be 
 permitted to testify as to tiio result of his iiupiiries." Reid *'. Keid, 
 17 N. d. K(i. 101 (IS(54). 
 
 Where evidence of liad rejuitation of a witness for veracity is re- 
 ceived, evidence is competent that prior to a certain event, e. g. his 
 failure in busiiu'ss, it was good, tjuinsiganiond Hank r. Ilobbs. 11 
 Cray, 2."»(> (1S5H). So where an impeaching witness has stated, in 
 reply to the usual cpu^stions, that he co»dd not believe the fust wit- 
 lu'ss \Mider oath, lie may state further that, laying aside impressions 
 which he received at a certain trial at which the impeached witness 
 
 I 
 
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 ft: 
 
 III! 
 
 I , 
 
 i 1 ' ' 
 
 
 i.'oT'^ 
 
 AMKHICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT 11. 
 
 testified, he would believe Lim under otitli. Titus /•. .Vsli, 24 N. II. 
 319 (I8r.l). 
 
 Who MAY TKSTiKY. — In Morgan f. State, 88 .Via. L'2;{ (188!)), a 
 party testified to his (nvn reputation for trutli and veracity. The 
 evidence was held incompetent, but not apparently on account ot 
 any disability of the witne; -, to testify. 
 
 Wiiere the impeaching witness liad had no dealings with the 
 principal witness for five years, it was held discretionary with the 
 court to refuse to admit the question. Teese r. Huntingdon, 'Jo 
 How. 2 (185!)). 
 
 It is not necessary tliat the second witness should be a member of 
 the community in wliicli the reputation e.xists. It is sutticient if he 
 knows what it is. Iladjo r. Gooden, 13 Ala. 718 (1848). If an 
 impeaching (or sustaining) witness knows the reputation of tlie 
 first witness wliere he resides hu need not himself be one of his 
 neighbors. That is a circumstance going merely to tiie weight of 
 his evidence. Wallace /-.White, .")8 Wis. •>(> (_188;?). Hut "ordi- 
 narily, tlie witness ought to eonni himself from tlie neighborhood of 
 the person whose (diaracter is in (juestion." I'owers /•. I'resgroves, 
 38 Miss. 227,241 i!8.V.)); Louisville, &c. R. Ii. r. Kiciiard.son, (li; 
 Ind. 4.") (1871)). It is for the jury to judge as to the (pialifications 
 of the second witiu'ss. If lie says lie knows the reputation of the 
 first witness he can testify, even if the court tiiinks dirt'erently. 
 liates r. I'.aiber. 4 (hisli. 107 (l.S4!»). I'.ut if the witness (hies not, 
 claim knowledge, his evidence may be excluded. Com. r. hawler, 
 12 All. r>H~) (18(>()) ; State /•. Perkins, GO X. (!. 12(5 (1872). 
 
 In the case of Com. r, Lawh'r, 12 .\11. TiS.") (IS(iO), tlie governiiieiit 
 relied oil the evidence of one \. "In order to impeach liim, the 
 defendant called a witness, and asked him, • Wliat is tlie general 
 reputation of Connell for truth and veracity '.' " The defendant tlien 
 asked the several (piestions following; but all were excluded by 
 the judge. 'Have you heard his character for truth and veracity 
 called in (piestion? If you hav(! heard his character for truth and 
 veracity called in (luestimi, state; what the common speecdi of people 
 is as to his character for truth and veracity. What is the general 
 reputation of Connell for truth ami veracity, among tho.se who 
 speak of it at all ? ' The juilge nileil that the defendant might ask 
 the witness what was the common speech of people as to (.'oiiiieirs 
 character for truth and veracity, but that the (piestions in the form 
 put by the defendant were inadmissible." This ruling was sus- 
 tained on exceptions, the Supreme ,Iiidici;il (;()urt (Migelow (!. d.) 
 saying, — "The defendant has no valid ground of exception to the 
 ruling of the court, lie was permitted to jiut to the witness the 
 proper iiupiiry as to the general reputation for truth of tin; person 
 whose character for veracity he sought to impeach. The (piestions 
 whicli were ruled out were calculated to eli(at testimony to the 
 
CHAl*. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN N()TH;l. 
 
 '2'u'^ 
 
 piejuilioo of the witness offered by the govpninieiit, from ;i person 
 who had no luitmil knowledge of liis general reputation for trutli. 
 If answered, they might have led to tiie introduction of evidenee of 
 particular instances of prevarication by the government witness, or 
 of doubt as to his truthfulness on some special occasion, without 
 touching his general character for veracity. The rule is perfectly 
 well settled that the evidence must be contii\ed to the general repu- 
 tation of the witness, and the court did nothing more than hold the 
 party to a strict observance of it, by requiring his questions to be 
 restricted to that form of inquiry solely." Com. /•. Lawler, 12 All. 
 .-)85 (ISGO). 
 
 The inimber of impeaching and sustaining witnesses to credibility 
 may be limited by the sound discretion of the court, to be exer- 
 cised according as the issue of credibility is important in the case. 
 " It would be absurd to hold, that, upon iin cncpiiry of that sor"-, de- 
 pending, in a great measure, upon the opinion of witnesser,, a party 
 has the right to examint; as many as he pleases, and that the court 
 and jury are bound to sit and hear them, without any power to inter- 
 fere." liunnell i\ Jiutler, L'.'} Conn. 05 (lHo4). In this case the 
 court limited the number tu six on each side 
 
 t " 
 
 'h In-ill 
 
iiij-ii 
 
 
 
 Ni:' 
 
 w 
 
 
 RULES UE.SPECTINU THE BUBTIIEN OF PROOF. [PART II. 
 
 CHAPTER m. 
 
 BURTHEN OF PROOF. 
 
 5 364.' The third of the rules^ governing the production of evi- 
 dence is, that the hui-then of proof lien on the party who fmbstantiat/i/ 
 aHHerta the ajfirmative of the issue. This rule is in the Roman law 
 thus expressed, Ei ineuinhit probatio, qui dicit, nan qui negnt? It 
 has been adopted in practice, not bec.use it is impossible to prove 
 a negative, but because the negative does not admit of the direct 
 and sjraple proof of which the affirmative is capable ; * and also 
 since it is but reasonable and just that the suitor who relies upon 
 the existence of a fact should prove his own case. In its applica- 
 tion, regard must b had to the substance and effect of the issue, 
 and not to its grammatical form ; for in many oases a party, by 
 making a slight alteration in his pleadings, can give 1 'p issue a 
 negative or affirmative form at his pleasure.' 
 
 ;i 'MS'k The best tests for ascertaining on whom the burthen of 
 proof lies are, to consider first which party would succeed if no 
 evidence were given on either side ; " and, secondly, what would be 
 the effect of striking out of the record the allegation t(f be proved. 
 The onus lies on wliichever party would fail, if either of these 
 steps were pursued.' Instances in which, on these grounds, aver- 
 ments negative in form must be, nevertheless, proved by the . .irty 
 who as-sorts such negative, arise in an action for non-compliance 
 with tlio covenants in a lease, where the brer.ch assigned is tliat 
 
 ill! 
 
 Bt I- 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 'A in part. 
 
 * Son unto, ^217. 
 
 » Di}?. liil). 122, tit. 3, 1, 2; Maac. 
 do Trol). Coiicl. 70. tot. ; Concl. 1128, 
 n l(t. Soc Tiiit. Kv. 1. 
 
 • Dniiuiuot r. i'rudhomine, 1831 
 (Am.). 
 
 " Soward v. liOgujatt, 1830 (Ld. 
 Abiuger). 
 
 AinoH »'. IIuglK>.s, 183.'* (Aldt'i- 
 
 ion, 1!.); Btdchor v. M'liitowh, 1S3« 
 id.) ; I)()o V. RowlandH, INH) (Colc^- 
 
 son, 1! 
 
 (. 
 
 ridgo, J.) ; Osl)()rn v. Thomijsou, 
 
 183!) (KiAinr, J.) ; llidgwav v. Kw- 
 
 baiik. lS3i){Aldor8on, 1».); Uoach c. 
 
 Inptll. LSI,-) (id.). 
 
 ' Mills V. I 
 
 B.). 
 
 Jarbor, 1836 (Aldcrson. 
 
 258 
 
CHAP. III.] KXAMPLES RESPECTING BURTHEN OF PKOOK. 
 
 the premises wore not kept in rei)air, for this allegation must, if 
 traversed, be provcMl by plaintiff ;' and in an action where a plaintiff, 
 lainiing on a life policy, avers that the insurance was efPected on 
 an assertion, made by the insurer, that tlio insured was not subjt'c t 
 to habits or to attacks of illness tending to shorten life, and was in 
 good health, which was true ; but the defence is that such state- 
 ment was false in these respects, namely, that the insured was 
 f-ubject to habits and to attacks tending to shorten life, that is, to 
 habits of intemperance and to attacks of erysipelas, and was ill at 
 tiie time when the assertion was made, in which case the burthen 
 of proof here again lies upon tlje plaintiff — since, to entitle him to 
 a verdict, somb evidence must be given that the life was insurable 
 at the time when the policy was effected.* 
 
 § 366. Similarly, the burthen of proof lies upon the plaintiff in 
 an action for not executing a contract in a workmanlike manner, to 
 which it is pleaded that the work was properly done ;' in an action 
 on a warranty of a horse, where plaintiff alleges that the horse was 
 not sound as warranted, and the defendant denies the unsoundness;* 
 in an action against a solicitor for not using due d'ligence ;* against 
 a merchant '^r not loading a sufficient cargo on board a ship, pur- 
 suant to a charter party ;° against an architect for not building 
 houses according to a specification ; ' and, indeed, in ever}' case in 
 whioh plaintiff grounds his right of action upon a negative allega- 
 tion, and the establishment of this negative is consequently an 
 (essential element in support of his claim." The practice in Admi- 
 ralty is also in accordance with these principles. In a duinugo suit 
 there, if a defendant, making no charge of negligence against 
 plaintiff, ilvnicH /lis (iirrnifnf.s, and pleads inevitable accident, 
 
 ■ilH 
 
 ' Soward v. Lcprfratt, 18!U); Doo 
 »•. Howliintls, ISIO ,('i)lori(lj;(', .),); 
 Mi'lchor V. M'luto.sli, lH;iy (Alih-r- 
 soii, !{.). 
 
 ' lluckinan v. Firnie, 1838; Ashby 
 »'. I?utf8, SJ() ; 0(!«ch 1'. liif^iill, 
 1S4.); Rawlins v. D(mb()rnn{»h, IHIH 
 Lil. Doniium); Craig n. Finn. 1841 
 xd.); I'olo V. llogorn, 1840 (Tiudal, 
 L\J,). 
 
 ' Amos V, Hughos, 18;J5. 
 
 ♦ ()st)orn V. Thompson, 18:19 (Rrs- 
 kino, J.) ; Cox v. Waltor, umJati-il 
 
 HA. Donman); S. P. (Tindal, C.J.). 
 Ill Fisli.T r. Joyo', ls;t!», Colo- 
 ridge, J., allowed dofniidant to bogiu, 
 hut in Doo c. Rowlands, 1840, loii- 
 fcsscMl this wrong. 
 
 ' Shili'ockc. PasHman, 18;if)(Aldor- 
 8on, 15.). 
 
 ' Ridgway v. Ewbank, 18;ii) (Alder- 
 son, M.;. 
 
 ' Hniith t'. Davios, 1836 (Aldorson, 
 H.). 
 
 " l)o() i«. Johnson, 1844 (Tiudal, 
 (5. J.). 
 
 209 
 
 82 
 
 ili*i! 
 
1 
 
 m 
 
 (HH 
 
 'IJU:-. 
 
 ii: ;! 
 
 |i! 
 
 M 
 
 EFFECT OF DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW. [PT. II. 
 
 plaintiff must begin at tlie trial.' But if, on the adoiitfed farh, the 
 onus of proving that there was «o negligence by him is upon the 
 defendant, hi^ begins.^ 
 
 § 367. There are certain exceptions to this general rule that the 
 burthen of proof rests on the party whose assertion, though in form 
 negative, is in substance atHrmative. These must now be noticed. 
 The first exception to such rule is that the party who asserts the 
 negative must begin whenever there is a dixputohle prrsum/)fion of 
 fate in favour of an affirmative allegation.' The presumption, till 
 displaced by direct evidence, servos the party, in whose favour it 
 arises, as well as if he had given express proof. Thus, for instanoe, 
 where a 8hi[)per was charged in a civil action with having shipped 
 dangerously combustible goods without giving notice of their 
 nature, whereby the ship was burnt, as the omission to give notice 
 would have been criminal on the part of the defendant, the law 
 was held to ])re.sume that notice had been given, and to thus throw 
 upon the plaintiff the burthen of proving tlie negative;* in an 
 action by a landlord against a tenant for forfeiture by breach of a 
 covenant to insure, it was held that the law presumed, in favour of 
 the party in possession, that he had satisfied the covenant, and that 
 the non-insurance must therefore be proved by the plaintiff,' and 
 that the landlord could, to relieve himself from the burtlien of 
 giving this negative proof, have inserted an express clause to 
 that effect in the lease;" in an action on an insurance on a Ehip, if 
 the underwriter plead that certain material facts, known to llie 
 assured, had been concealed from him, the burtlien of proving tlie 
 non-communication of tliese facts will, on a reply traversing tliis the 
 whole statement of defence, be on the defendant ; for the presump- 
 tion of law prima facie is that the assured discliarged his duty of 
 communicating all material facts to the underwriter — though tli<' 
 
 ' Tho Benmoiv. 187:1 ; The Ottor, 
 1874. 
 
 ' Tho Merchant I'rinco, 1892. 
 
 ^ It is only witli ruforonco to dis- 
 piitiiblo prosunij)tii)ns of law thiit this 
 rule ii])plii's, for if tho iir(muin])tion 
 be ('oaclusivo. no nvidonce at all can 
 bo given to rebut it ; if it bo merely 
 ono of fact, tho promiinption itself 
 doen not ariao till mode oj a jury. 
 
 Soo ante. §§ 71, 109. 211 -•-'I'i. 
 
 ♦ Wdiianis v. E. India Co., 1802. 
 
 ' Sen Toltiinun v. I'ortbury, 1809 
 (Ex. ("h.). 
 
 • Doo V. Whitehead, 18;W, whore 
 refusal to produce the policy or any 
 receipt for premium was held n(.t 
 sufficient proof oi an omission to 
 insure. 
 
 260 
 
CHAP. III.I IJTFECT OF PKliSUMPTIOXS IN SHItTING ONUS. 
 
 amount of evidence required to show the contrary will vary accord- 
 ing to circuiUritunces. Indeed, nottHtimrx very slender evidence will 
 be sufficient, to that, for instance, proof that a ship was known by 
 the assured to have been burnt at the time when the assurance was 
 effected would in itself be reasonable evidence to show that it had 
 not been communicated, because no underwriter, had he been aware 
 of such a circumstance, would have executed the policy.' 
 
 § 368. A common example of the principle that a person who 
 asserts that which is contrary to a prima facie presumption of law 
 must prove it, is afforded by actions upon bills of exchange, for in 
 these the plaintiff need neither allege nor prove that the bill sued 
 upon was given for good consideration, as, in the absence of evi- 
 dence to the contrary, the law presumes that fact.^ But in an 
 action by indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, on a 
 defence that the bill was accepted for the accommodation of the 
 drawer, and was indorsed to the plaintiff without value," and when 
 it wa3 overdue,* and a reply traversing tlie latter of these allega- 
 tions, the burthen of proving tliat no .ralue was given for the bill, 
 or that it was overdue at the time of indorsement, devolves on the 
 defendant, because the defence does not contain an allegation " 
 any fraud which would counteract the presumption arising from 
 the possession of such an instrument.* 
 
 § 3G9. Where, however, the defendant " taints the bill" (as it ia 
 called), that is, shows fraud or illegality in the orif/iunl transaction, 
 — as, for instance, after stating that the bill was originally obtained 
 by fraud or duress, or had been given for gambling purposes,* oi 
 had been lost or stolen, he avers that the plaintiff held it without 
 value, and this last fact is traversed, — the plaintiff is required 
 to prove that he gave value, because the presumption of illegality 
 arising from an admitted fraud in the inception of the bill is pre- 
 
 ' Elkin »'. Janson, 1845 (Piirko and 
 Alderson, BH.). 
 
 » See 4o & 46 V. c. (il (" Tho 
 Bills of Exchanpo Act. 1882 "). § M). 
 See, aUo, li. S. C. 188U, Ord. XIX. 
 r. 25. 
 
 •Mills V. Barber, 1836; Whit- 
 taker V. Eduuuds, 1 834 (Pattetion, 
 J.) ; Fitch V. Jones, 1855. 
 
 * Seo (Alderson, B.) Elkin v, Jan- 
 Bon, 1845. 
 
 ' Tiowis V. Parkor, 1836 ; Jacob v. 
 IluiiKiito, 1834 (I'arke, B.) ; Brown 
 V. I'hilpot, 1N4() (lid. Deuiuau). Seo, 
 also, Siiiitii ('. Martin, 1K4I. 
 
 • Tho fact that a note was given 
 for a wager on duty subject to 
 fluctuation, dooa not render tho in- 
 strument illegal within this rule, fur 
 such a wagHf was only a promise 
 which tho law would not «u(orc« : 
 Eitc'h V. Jones, 1855. 
 
 201 
 
 Ml 
 
I ', 
 
 • 'I 
 
 m^'. 
 
 
 ji! 
 
 
 
 \\ 
 
 EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIONS IN SHIFTING ONUS. [PART II. 
 
 fimiiod to attach to every subHpquent lioWer, and to render liiin in- 
 cnpahle of recovering on such a hill in the absence of evitU-ncH 
 fliowing under wljat circumstances lie heeame possessed of it.' 
 Similarly, if in such a case, whether the actirm he upon a bill- or 
 upon a note,^ the plaintiff, in answer to such a dofonce, merel}' 
 reply a general denial,* and defendant gives evidence of the fraud, 
 as soon as the illegality is proved, the onus of showing that ho gave 
 value is cast upon the plaintiff without notice of any fraud. 
 
 § 370. On the same principle, too, that a person who asserts the 
 negative of a legal presumption must begin and prove his denial, 
 if a plaintiff avers that a certain party was, at a specified time, of 
 sound mind, and this averment is traversed by the defendant, the 
 latter is bound to prove the negative allegation of incompetency, 
 for the law presumes every man to be sane till the contrary is 
 shown.* If, however, on the trial of such an issue, the defendant 
 
 ' Soo cases cited in last four pro- 
 cedinp: notes. Also 45 & 46 V. c. 61 
 (" TJie Hills of Exchange Act, 1882"), 
 § 30, subs. 2 ; and lSinf;haui v. IStun- 
 loy, 1841, overruling Ld. Denman's 
 decision at Nisi Prius as reported in 
 9 C. & P. 374. See, also, Elkin v. 
 Janson, 1845 (Aldcrson, B.). Soo 
 also, however, Masters v. mrrots, 
 1849. 
 
 - Harvey v. Towers, 1851 ; Smith 
 V. Hraiu, 1851 ; Ilofjp v. Skeen, 
 1865 ; Horry v. Aldennun, 1853; 
 Fit(;h V. Jones, 18o5 ; Mather v. lid. 
 Maidstone, 1856 • Hall v. Feather- 
 stone, 1858. 
 
 ' Huiley V. Bidwcll, 1853, ovor- 
 riilin>r Paterson r. Ifiirducre, 1811. 
 
 * Which is now the proper plead- 
 ing . see K. S. r. 1N83, Ord. XIX. 
 r. 18; ant(>. §§302. 304. 
 
 ' See Sutton v. Sadler, 1857 ; Dyco 
 Sombre '•. Troup, iHjCi. The pro- 
 position stilted in the text, that every 
 man is jiresumed to bo sane till the 
 contrary is proved, is doubth-ss true 
 in criminal cases. It may even be, 
 too, that it is also true in civil cases. 
 Hut, so far ns jnohate issues are con- 
 c(-Tn<>d, tlie cases are corflicting. See 
 a learned note on the whole matter 
 in (Ireeidoaf on Evidence, 15th edit. 
 (18921, p. 124. The passage in the 
 text has been allowed in stand, n<< it 
 appoarii to oxpreus the deliberutily 
 
 262 
 
 formed opinion of the Author. Aa 
 to Probate issues, however, many 
 other text books state the law some- 
 what differently to the proposition in 
 the text above, and in the above citf^d 
 note to (Jreenleaf on Evidence (a 
 work upon which the j)re8ent treatise 
 was, originally, to a large extent 
 founded) it is said that, on a (jues- 
 tion of j)r()bate, the b»u-th(!n of prov- 
 ing that the testator was of soiuid 
 mind " is, by the luitter rases, held 
 to rest upon the party ))rop(>unding 
 the will.' The present Editor, while 
 h(^ does not fed justifii'd in altering 
 Mr. Pitt Taylor's text, nevertheless 
 personallj' agrees in the views ex- 
 pressed in the alK)ve cited note to 
 Oreenleaf, since, in his opinion, the 
 maxim that "every man is presumed 
 to 1)0 sane till the contrary ai)pears" 
 does not arise at nil, until it has been 
 shown that the individual, whose act 
 is under investigation, was like other 
 men, and, possibly, ai)plies only in 
 criminal cases, while the ca.se oi 
 Sutton i: Sadler itself shows that a 
 direction to the effect suggested in 
 the text is a misdirection tf) a jury. 
 As to wills, a contrary rule prevails 
 in Massachusetts. Crowninshield v. 
 (Vowniiishield, 18,34 (Am.); and sec 
 Andcrsmi r. Gill. 18.)8, II. L. (Ld. 
 Wensleydale) ; Smee v. Smoe, 1879. 
 
lior 
 
 in 
 
 ol 
 
 u 
 
 in 
 
 ry. 
 
 Cir. I'l.] I'.riMIIF.N OF PUOOF IX CKIMIXAL IMMK'F.KIUXGS. 
 
 puts in evidence an inquisition finding the imrty lunntic from a 
 date prior to the transaction in (juesfion, this evidence, tliougli only 
 prima fa' ie and not conclusive, shifts tlie burthen of proof on the 
 plaintiff, who asserts the party's sanity.' Thu . if it he shown that a 
 testator was insane, or even subject to delus'cj 's,- at any time prior 
 to the date of an alleged will, or within a few yfars after that date, 
 the burthen of establishing his testamentary capacity will certainly 
 be shifted on to the party propounding the will.^ 
 
 § 371. On the ground that a prosecutor must p^ive every fact 
 necessary to substantiate his charge against a prisoner, (jr, in other 
 words, that the law always presumes innocence in the absence of 
 convincing evidence to the contrary, in criminal cases the burthen 
 of proof, unless sb'^'^ed by legislative interference, always falls on 
 the prosecuting p. riy. -and this though, in order to convict, he 
 must necessarily liave i. course to negative evidence. Thus, if a 
 statute, in the direct description of an offence, and not by way of 
 proviso, contain r"gative matter, the indictment or information 
 must both contain an allegation negativing such matter, and the 
 allegation its ' nuist also be supported by prinui facie evidence.* 
 A better illustration of this principle cannot be given than to 
 point out that the old (and now repealed) statutes nuido it au 
 offeuco to either course deer in inclosed grounds without the con- 
 sent of the owner,* or to cut trees without such consent ;° and that 
 the law, having uuxde the absence of consent a material element 
 in such offences, on indictments for them it was necessary both to 
 allege and to prove that the act was done without such consent. 
 
 § 372 — 374. The liOgislatiu-e has now, however, in many in- 
 stances got rid of the necessity for proving negative matter either 
 
 » Ilassiird V. Smith, 1872. • R. r. .Mlm, 1S20 ; 42 O. 3, c. 107, 
 
 » Since V. Sniec, '.S7i) (Sir J. ITan- § 1. ivjHiiliil liy 7 & S (}. 1, c. 27. 
 
 (IIIkt ])iiivisiniis, oinitti)!^ nil iihmi- 
 fioii 111' ciinsfut. arc n<i\v Mili-tiliiti'd 
 l)v 21 \- 2."> V. V. !i(i (••'111.! Luiviiiy 
 Art, iMil "V § i:t. 
 
 '' It. /•. n'ii/y. is2(>: (i (t. :j, c. ;j(i, 
 
 ri'iMiilia lii>t'i.v 7 & H <i. 4, c. 27, 
 anil, wiundly, i»y ;») & M V. c. o!>. 
 (ttliiT ]ii()Vi>i(pns, oniittinf.' nil iiifii- 
 lion lit' constiit. arc nuw swli-titiiti'd 
 l.v 21 \' 2.") V. r. !»: (•• Tlic Mali, iuviu 
 Jianiajju Act, I6GI "), §i 20, 21. 
 
 203 
 
 ncn 
 
 ■" Waring v. Waring', iSIS ([,,|. 
 l?i<iii}:liani) ; Fowli.s v. J laviil.-.m, 
 IMS (,Sir II. rust';; (iiiniani /■. 
 l)rak.T, IHIS (id.); I'linsij) v. l»vio 
 yoinl>iv, lS,-)(i(l'. C); antf. § n»7'. 
 
 * I{. r. Jai'vis, \~M; Tayli>r v. 
 Ilnnipliiifs, 18()J; I'avis c. .■^I'laiu, 
 l.S<i!l; Mor^ran r. li.'(|.;.,T, 1870; 
 C.iiilcy '■. Duit.in, lh70. 
 

 i! 
 
 mi -' 
 
 )i; 
 
 I :' 
 
 t I 
 
 r^' , 5 
 
 Jl , 
 
 mm 
 
 lUrRTHKN OF VllOOV SIIIITKn UY STATL'Ti:. [I'Airi' 11. 
 
 by oniiL'tim'uts creating the offonco afroslj, iiiid (.niitliiig all 
 nidutioii of tho nogiitivo inatfcr,' but more generally by ex- 
 pressly enacting that the hurt hen nf proriiuj itnlhoriti/y coiisnif, 
 htirful rrriixt', and the like, shall lie on the (liffiuldiif. Thus, 
 tho accused is, by llu' statuti's relating to the offences, bound to 
 protect himself by showing alfinnatively tlio oxistence of some 
 lawful authority or excuse where he is charged with sundry statut- 
 able offences.' 
 
 ' Sic, for instance, tho two pro- 
 
 CCmHiii^ Ilotrs. 
 
 - Aiii(iii;,'sts>ich()ffun('esar(': bcitif; 
 f( ■,ui(l l>y iii;;lit ill jjossi'ssioii of any 
 j>icklock ki'v. crow, jin'k, liit. or 
 otluT iMi|>l<'iiii'iit of lioiisi'liriMkiii;; 
 ('JJ A: •!■) V. c. !i()(" Til." I-iincny Act, 
 IMdl"), § .jH) ; or Iniyiii;; or sdlinj; 
 coin lit an iimlerviiliic, or i'X|iortin;;or 
 iniportin^, countci I'cit coin (21 i^i 'I't 
 V. c. !»!) (•• 'I'lif ( 'oinii^jc < MlVni cs Act, 
 isiil "),§§(!. 7, H, 14, VJ); or luakirit,', 
 incndin;;, or havinj; jMisHcssion of, 
 coininj; tools, r>r cnnvcyin;,' such 
 tools, or iiiiv I'oiii or hiiUioii, out of 
 the Mint (24 A: •-'.» V. c. !!!»(•• I ho 
 ("oiiiii^'cOIV.Micc.sAct, 1.SI)1"),!;:J14.'.'4, 
 'i:>\ sec It. ,'. llavvcy. 1S71 (('.('. ]{.); 
 or havin;; ])o«scssioii of )p:i)M'r. (ilittcs, 
 or (lies used in connection with tin; 
 Htmiii) duties (:t:{ vt :t» V. c. its, 
 §§ IS, 22; .">» \- .V) V. c. ;18 ("Tiie 
 Stiini|) Duties Maniiy:enii'nt Act, 
 1N!»! "), § I')); or (hein;,' licensed to 
 sell staniiis) huviii;; iio>sessioii of any 
 for;red stamps (see j I iV o.j V. c. .'tS, 
 § 1H\ or any instrmneutsor materials 
 for iiiakinjr eithiT letter stanijis ,)1 »V: 
 A.'» V.(!. ;i.S,^l;{, siiiis. 1): ore.\cise|ia|.i'r 
 (2 W. 4, c. Hi ("The K.vcise I'ermit 
 Act. is.t2"l §:{; 11 * 12 V. (•. 121, 
 § 1S\ or jiaper us<'d for niakin;; e.\- 
 che.|uer hills (24 vt 2.-) V. c. r., ;: l.S; 
 '21 \- 2') V. c. ''s (" The l'or;.'erv .V<'t, 
 ISfil "), § !)\ hank notes (24 \-'2.i V. 
 r. !».S ("The I'oru'ery Act, ISCl "\ 
 
 5 !l\ the notes of private li:inkers 
 (Id. § IM), or foreij,'!! notes (Id. § 1!»): 
 or for nianiifacf HI in;r paper siiiiilai' 
 to that u-.cd for staiij|i'< hy or niider 
 tliei 'oniniissionersof Inland liiveniie 
 (.»l v'; .■).) V. c. ;tS, § 11 ; see. also. 21 
 
 6 2.-I V. c. ,). § IS;" 21 A: 2.> V. c !»S 
 ("The For-eiy Act, isill "1. 5 10'; 
 or havinir |i>>^e^sion of sinh paper 
 bcluro it \i\xa hueii r)tuini)ud und iBsued 
 
 264 
 
 for USB (54 & int V. o. ;iS, U5 ; 24 & 
 2.-. V.c.!tS("Tho I''orf,'eiy.Vct, 18)51 "). 
 511: 24 vV 2.') V. c. ,■). 5 1!»') ; or on>,'rav- 
 in^' hank notes or any ])art thereof 
 (24 iV 2.) V. c. <IS ("The I'"or^'eiy Act, 
 iMll "), ;;;i Ki, 17). the notesof private 
 hankers j^ld. § IS), or forei(;n notes 
 (Id. § \\)]\ or liavin;; po^sission of 
 countei'feit dies for niakin;; p)ld 
 and silver wares, or in^lrunients for 
 niakinj; siicii dies, or any wares of 
 pdd, silver, or haso metal, liavin;,' 
 thereon for;;ed dies (7 iV: S V. c. 22 
 ("The (ioM and Silver AVares Act. 
 1SI4"), §^ 2. ;t) ; or hiivin;; jiossessioi 
 of hackney-coach and sta;,'e plates, 
 or drivers" or watormen's tickets ((> \- 
 7 V. c. SCf"'!'!^; London Hackney 
 Carria^'es Act, IS i;{ "'), § 2U ; and see 
 also ;{(» i\i ;(1 V. c. 1;J4 (amonded hy 
 4S V. c. is), 5 17); and certain othi-r 
 coi;nate otTences (sei) U. c. Kilnililid- 
 .son, ls,'(<»). Tho law i.s tho same 
 whiMi, on a jiarfy heinf; char;;od with 
 apphin;; any marks ujipropriatcd to 
 ller" MajcslV's stores (.'{S ,t .TJ V. 
 c. 2.". ("Tho I'uhlic Stores Act, 
 1S75"), !j 4\ or with converting; or 
 liavin^ in iiis jpossession any such 
 stores, when the same ar<! rcasonahly 
 siis|iected of heinj; stolen or unlaw- 
 fully ohtaiiied (§ 7 ; see, also, §§ 8 and 
 '.I). piiMif is fi'^'cn, or an inferonco 
 raiscil, tliat he has acted (It. /'. Wil- 
 mi'tt. ISIS ("oltman,.!.); II. /•. Cohen, 
 |S,-,s \Vats.in. M.. an.l Hill. .1.); It. 
 c. Sle.p. isilj) " knowin;;ly ; " so, the 
 lilllthen of proof also rests (It. r. 
 Maiiks, 17!M I.il. Keiiyon)) upon the 
 accused in a prosecution uiiil< . fhi« 
 direction of the ( 'oinniissioners of 
 
 I'u-toiiis. in re-pi'ct of ;,'oods .seized 
 
 for non-payment of duties, or any 
 other cause of fill leiture, or for re- 
 coverin;,' any innalty unih'r any .\ct 
 rtlatiu^ tu tiiu cuuLuuis; uu un in- 
 
PKAP. III. J nUKTlIKN OK PROOF SiniTKF) RY STATITR. 
 
 (lictiiu'iit for inakiii(7 a si<rtml to ii Hiitisfactory in'count of how ho ciiinc 
 
 HiiniH;t;liii;; vt'sscl itf s<>ii, tlu' ili-t'i'ii- iii(-<-c-si'il of tln' aitiflt! Iniiiiil (•_•■! iS 
 
 limit ,;i!>»V: 10 V.c. ;((>(•' TlK-CuNfoiiiH 'J.* \. c. !«i ("Th.' Iiiicfiiy Act. 
 
 Consoliiliif ion Act, lisTfi"), §'_'.')!)) must l.Sdl "\ § ;(.»). rcrsoiis fminil in 
 
 prove tli;it till- si;^niil \v:is not nmih' ])o>si-*-ioh of, or olVninj; for i«ah<, 
 
 for tilt' imriioso of ^'iviii'; ill('",',il slii|)\vi('(k''il frooiN, iirc iMiimd ir 
 
 nolico (1(1. § III] ) ; anil ^fomls foiinil show that they have imt transj,'rcsst'il 
 
 or M'i/iil iinilcr tin- ci^toiiis laws the law in lakinj,' thciii Jil. §§(>."), (i(i\ 
 
 will he ileemeil to lie mil p)oiU, In jiidceeiliii;rs a^rain^t any peisori 
 
 nnh'fs the owner can prove the edii- for ha\inf.' or keeiiiii;.' an niilireiisiMl 
 
 trary (Iil. § I'lS). The hnrthen of theatre, or for actiii;,' nir hire there- 
 
 jiiMtifyinj; his coiiiliict (.'i'J & ;{;i V. in, if it he jiroveil that the theatre i»- 
 
 c. ,")T. §5 ■'• •"') ''!'*" I'l'^ts n|ion the do- umil for the ]nihlic |i 'iforniance ,if 
 fenilant in ])roceeiliiij;.< uinh 
 
 Sejiiieii K 
 
 11 
 
 nil 
 
 er 
 
 Clotl 
 
 'I'h 
 
 Tlie Mta;;o jilays. the Imrthen of pr .ini,' 
 So. that it is iliilv lieenseil or aiit'.ioii/iMl 
 
 imil; Act. iNtiil. 
 l'"oreii'ii I'lnlistnieiit lies on th 
 
 Act, ISTd," wliero tho hr.'iich of 
 neutrality ('harj^eil relates to the ilo- 
 
 1i\ 
 
 t a s 
 
 hi|> t< 
 
 .f tl 
 
 le States 
 
 ruseil Mi vV 7 V. c. (IS 
 '••The Theatres Act, lS»;t"), § 17). 
 In an action tor a jienaltv iimler 
 "The Puhlic Health Act. Is7.'»." for 
 
 (;i:{ (V ;tl V. c !H», § li) at war. So, improperly (f'tinj; as a meinher of a 
 uniler •• The Merchant Shippin;^.\ct, local Ixmnl, thii hiirthen of proof is 
 
 1K!H. 
 
 it siiiiilarlv rests when 
 
 in fjreat moasiire shifteil en to the 
 
 jierson is char;,'eil with seinlin^. or ilefetulant (ItH & ;{!( \' . c. .V). Scli 
 attempting; to send, or fake a ship to rule 1. snh-rnle 7(0- I" any dispute 
 sea in an unseaworthy state so as to in the hosiery trade hetween tho 
 eiidaiif;er lite (:»!) iV: H) V. c. HO, § J); manufacturer and the workmen ro- 
 und in such cases tho indictment spectin;.' the alle;;ed imperfect exe- 
 need neither aver that the accused cution of any woik. which has hren 
 knew tho ship was unseaworthy. delivered to the mannfaiturer or his 
 nor ne^'ative tiie use of reasonahlo av:ent. the work, if not ]iroiIi;ced in 
 metins to insuro her f;"'"rf ^" ''^'''^ order to adjudication, will he deemed 
 
 in 
 
 a seaworthv .state : H. 
 
 1' 
 
 to) 
 
 lavc 
 
 h( 
 
 •n p 
 
 rlv executed H it 
 
 man. 1.S7.') (Ir.). In any jirosecution !> V. c. 77. § :{ : H iV !l V. c. 12.S. § ;t). 
 under the Act for jireventin^ acci- So, on ii comiilaint that a jw'rson 
 
 dents hy threshini; machii 
 
 m employed in a factory or workshop 
 
 roof that the machiiio was not duly without a siir}.'ical cortilicite. is unile 
 ■need while workinj;. the person to th" prescrihed aire, if the court lie of 
 whom it heloiie-s. or for whom it has that opinion, the emjdover shall ho 
 
 h 
 
 used. 
 
 st •' satisfy the court 
 
 liahl 
 
 e to penaltii 
 
 liul 
 
 ess no can 
 
 that he took all reason. ihlc jirecaii- ])rcivi'tliat the pai'tyumiiloyed isof tlv 
 
 tions to ensure the ohservance of the ap' riMiuired '11 V. c 10 ("The I-'ac- 
 
 Acf"(ll a il V.c. I'J (•• The Thresh- tory andWorkshop Act. 1H7H").^ !>•_'). 
 
 in;,' Machines .\ct, 1N7X"). § 1). So. Tho ])roof of the ajj^e of the employed 
 
 the hnrthen of proof that he actc i also rests upon the defi'iidant in any 
 
 innocently lios upon any ]» ;.-<on jirosecution of a chimney sweeper for 
 
 charjred under •• The Army Act. illi"_Mlly emjiloyinvr a climliin^.' hoy 
 
 Issl." with illo^'ally jmicliasin^ (21 iS: '2H \'. c. ;{7. $ 10). and in any 
 
 from soldiers re;;imental necessaries, ]iroceediii;r ae;ainsl any peisoii for 
 
 e(|uipmeiit. or stores, or with illepilly em]i|oyin^ a child in a dani^eroiis 
 
 hein^' in possession of any such nerformanco (I'J .V III \'. c ,'ll, § l), 
 
 artiides (14 & -i'i V. c. .Vs. § I.IO, Similarlv. the ]>ronf of the (lo;r's a^o 
 
 Kuh-ss. 1 and •J). A^'ain. a man sum- lies on the defendant on the hearinf? 
 
 nioned for hein;; unlawfully in ]iosses- of an information for a jnnalty for 
 
 sion of venison, must satisfy the keepinj; a do;; without a lie 
 
 i;ristrate that he came lawfully l>y wlcie it is said that tl 
 
 animal is 
 it !'JI & '_'■) v. c. !Mi ("Til.' Larceny a mere puppy ( II V.c. l.VThei'us- 
 Act, lH(n "). § H); and one who tomsand Inland Ijev.nue Act, I.S7S"). 
 kiiowin;,'lv and unlawfully has on 5 "*)• -^ i>awiiliroker char^'cd with 
 his premiseH any tree, shrul). post, certain olfeiices a;rainst " The I 'awii- 
 julo, rail, or tho like, um^'t givo a hrokorsAct, KST^/'inrttquirodtopiuvo 
 
 205 
 
f I' 
 
 FACIS I'l.CUMAKI.V IN KNOWLl.ln;!: OF I'AUTY. [pAKl 11. 
 
 § ''i7C>. Moronvor, as to all ciifos fiilliiij^ williiii tho Siiniiniiry 
 Juiisdittiou Act, 187!),' it im gciicniUy juovidtMl,-' that "any oxtcji- 
 tion, ('X('iiii>fi(iii, |ir()viwi», nxciisc, or <iualifiiatioii, wliotlier it floes 
 or does not af'(()iii|iatiy, in tin- haiiut section, the ilosoriiition of 
 tlie offt'ncc in tho Act, onlrr, liyo-law, regulation, or other docu- 
 ment creating the oU'eiice, may be proved by the Jefendunt, hut 
 need not he sjiecitied or negatived in the information or com- 
 plaint, and, if so upecified or negatived, no proof in relation tc 
 tho matters so specified or negatived shall be recjuircd on the part 
 of tho informant or complainant.' 
 
 § 376. The first exception to the general rule that the burflien 
 of proof rests with the party who asserts the substantial alHrmative 
 is, then, that it does not apply where there is a prirail facie pre- 
 sumption of law one way or tho other; and it is suflicieutly esta- 
 blished by the exatnplos which have been cited. 
 
 ^ tJTGA. The second exception to the above-named general rule 
 is that where the subject-matter of tho allegation //(>« peciiiiar/^ 
 wit/iin the knoickdyc of one of tho j[)arties, that party must prove it, 
 whetlier it bo of an atlirmativo or a negative charactcM-, and t!Ven 
 though there be a presumi)ti(jn of law in his favour.* lAjr instance, 
 
 Romo lawful or rousonablo excuse for 
 his eoiuluct (;<o & ;«) V. c. »;{, § 23, 
 r. 4, anil § :tl). In most jji'owccu- 
 tioiiH for olVciici'H a^aiii!st tlm baiik- 
 ru])t luw, tlio lu.'ciisod limy bo con- 
 vifti'il oil tlic t^ole jimof of liis liavitif; 
 ('oiiiiiiitt)'(l tho net cliiirfrod, "unless 
 tho jury is siitisiiod tiuit ho liutl /lo 
 inti'iit to ilcfiiiiul," or, "to fonccal 
 tlic static of hisalTairs," or, "to defeat 
 file luw," as the case may be {',V1 &. .'Jli 
 Y. c. (>2, §§ 11, 12; as amended bv 
 4(i & 47 V. c. i)-l, § Ifi.J; bi. & J4 V. 
 
 c. 71, § 2«; .'ij & ;)<> V. c. :r,. §§ ii, 
 
 12, Ir.'. Tho bnrtlien of sliowiii^if 
 "uny lawful authority or excuse" 
 for his eondwct rests u|ioii a jieison 
 charp'd witli liavin.i,' coiniiiilted an 
 olVelK'i! against "The I diseases of 
 Animals Aet, 1H!»4 " (.n A: .JH V. 
 c. <'>7), §§ b'l, b\\. Sec IIue:^'ins r. 
 AVard, l.'SS2. On a eliaij;e against 
 a consumer of fiaiululently ab-lniet- 
 in^? f;as, "the existence of iirtilicial 
 means" for altering; the index to any 
 meter, or for ]ire\eiitintr any meter 
 from duly ref^isteiin^', or for ab- 
 stracting, consuming, or usin;; t?^s 
 
 when s\ich meter is under the eim- 
 Humer's control, in jiriiiia facie evi- 
 dence that such alteration, |ireveii- 
 tion, abstraction, or consnniiition has 
 been fraudulently, knowinjrly, and 
 wilfully caused by the consumer ',.'i4 
 iV: ;{.) v. v.. 41 ("Thn (laswoiks 
 ( 'lanses Act, 18" 1 "), § 'M). In cliaincH 
 iipiinst consumers for fraudulently 
 ubstractinf; it, or water sn|i])lied bv 
 meter (;i.S & ;iy V. c. o.>, § (lU; 41 vS; 12 
 V. c. o2, § 7(1, Ir.), the burthen of 
 proof also rests with the accused. 
 As to casi's under tho iVdlurH Act, 
 Bco infra, § 'M'). 
 
 ' 42 A 4,1 V. c. 4!». 
 
 » ^ ;i!), subs. 2 ; " The Pedlars Act, 
 1.S7 1"" (;M & :i.j V.c. !)(i), § 20, sub-s. .{; 
 41 it 42 V. c. bi, § 200, Ir., contains 
 a similar ]irovision. 
 
 ^ See, on the construction of thii-. 
 lloberts I'. Iliimjihruys, 1S82 (ib cided 
 on a very similar clause in the Liceiis- 
 infj Acts). 
 
 * llickson V, Evuns, 1794 (.\sh- 
 hnrst, J.) ; 1{. v. Turner, INK! (I'.ay- 
 ley, J.), jhit see the obm-rvalions of 
 AlderbUD, li., in Elkin v, Junsuu, 
 
 236 
 
 
CHAP. 111.] FACTS ri:cl.'LFAI{I,Y IN KNOWIJ'.pnR OF PAUTY. 
 
 under tlie old law, in nn lUition for penaltit's against a ihthoii for 
 practising as nn apothocary without n ciiHilioate,' aw tlio dct'cndant 
 was peculiarly oogni/ant of tho fact whctlitT or not In* Imd obtained 
 a certifioato, and, if lie had done so, could have no dilliculty ahout 
 ju'oduoing it, tho law conipoUud him to do so (although, had it not 
 been for the principle in question, the jilaiutill' would have been 
 bound to prove the negative for two reasons ; first, as essential to 
 his case, and secondly, to rebut the presumption of innocence), 
 and in aeoordanco with tho i)rineiplo under consideration it is 
 for him to do so, auJ not for the plaintiif to prove it non- 
 existent.^ 
 
 S '677. This second exception also prevails in all civil or eriniinal 
 j)roceeding8 instituted against parties for doing acts which they 
 are not pennitted to do unless duly qualified. It holds good, and 
 compels tho defendant to produce tho necessary liceiu-e or autho- 
 rity (as the case may bo), in proc(>(>dings for selling li(juors, oll'ences 
 against the game laws,'' improperly exercising a trade oi' profession, 
 and tho like;' in actitms for penalties against the proprietor of a 
 theatre, for performing dramatic pieces without the written eon.sent 
 of the author;^ in proceedings for misprision of treason — where, if 
 the treason be proved, and the knowledge of it be traced to the 
 prisoner, he is, in strictness, bound to negative tho aveiniont of 
 concealment by offering proof of a discovery on liis part.'' It also 
 ])revail8 in the Ecclesiastical Courts, so that, in proceedings against 
 a clergyman for non-residence without licence or exenii»tion, the 
 prosecution need neither aUcge nor jirove that the defcmlant had 
 not a licence, or that he was not resi(b'nt on another benefice; but 
 if defendant have a licence ho must produce it.' 
 
 181.'), siijr^rostinf; that tlm riili' only Ji-lTiics, IS'JI ; Tliitison's ciiso, 18J1 ; 
 
 reins to fli.' ir,i<i!,l. of th(^ cvidciic.-. Sh.-liloii r. Cliirk, IHOd (Am V V. .*^. 
 
 hut thiit tliore shouhl hn soiim' fvi- r. I|:iv\v:0(l, IHl,) ( Am.) ; diiiiii'; c. 
 
 (h'lico to stiirt tho pri'smii)itioii utiil Tho Stuto, iS'i'J (Am.). Sec, iilso, 
 
 cast tho onus; on till' otliiT siilo, I loo r. W liitcho!nl, ISoS, oitoil auto, 
 
 ' I'liiloc ,V) (r. ;{, c. 11)1 ("Tho § ;i(lT, wIu'H' thi;< i iilo was hchl in- 
 
 AlMithniirios .\ct, ISl,')"). SfO, now. :i|)|ilic;ili|c' 
 
 2\ \- -JJ V. v.. !l(l. § -10. 
 
 » Ajiolh. ("o. V. IJontlov, 
 (Al)hott, C.J.). 
 
 I82» 
 
 .Sfo 1 & 2 W, 
 
 32 ("Tho 
 
 Oamo Act, 18;il"V ^ 42. 
 * li. V. Tmucr, 1810; Smith v. 
 
 ' I'n.lor ;{ \: 4 W. 4, c. ITi ( ' The 
 I)niniiilic Copyn-rht Act, Ks;i;{ "V 
 § 2 ; Morton »■. ('o|iclanil, IS,"),') (,\m.). 
 
 » 1!. )\ Thistli.wood, l.S'JO (Al)lmtt. 
 C.J.. in rhiir;;(' to frrand jtirv''. 
 
 ' liluck I'. IJuLkmun, 1640 (P. C). 
 
 207 
 
 I : 
 
 M-* 
 
I 
 
 RULK.S RKSPHCTINO THK UIOIIT TO HKGIN. [I'ART II. 
 
 § »}7M. Tin* lliinl rult) jifovcriiinj^ the iJiotliictioii of I'VuliMR-e, 
 nariif'ly, tliiit thn Imu'iIicii of jiroof g.-iitTiilly lit's uiiou tlio iiurty 
 who siilisfaiitially iisscrtrt tlu* iifliniiiitivo, 1ms now licon in itsi'lf 
 hiiflicinitly cuiisidcn'tl. I?ut in connt'c'lii.n with this rulo (nicstions 
 friMpuMitly ariso with rt^siict't to tlu' //<//</ (u liryiii. Thoroforc, it 
 will ho well to I'oiicludf this ohft|tt»T with a thscussion upon this 
 ini|Mirtant suhjt'ft. TIuh is, iuiliM'tl, strictly s|niikin<;;, jM-rhiips a 
 «ligr»'hsion from tht> suhjcct of the chaiilcr, uaini'ly, the oonsidora- 
 lion of the rulo as t.) tln' J'urthcn of I'roof. Yi-t it is so iiiti- 
 niaftly coinuutf'd with tlm suhject, soohviously luust bo tlctorniiiiid 
 with u (hi)' regard to tho [irinciplos contained in this third rule, 
 and so important, that its coiisiih'ration will ocrtaiidy not ho 
 irrclovant. Tho " riijlil to hti/iii," — in other words, thu privih-go 
 of opening tlio euso to the jury — is oft'-n oi.o of consideruhln 
 udvaiita/(> hefore any trihunal,' hut in particular at Nisi I'rius. 
 it not only enahles a jiarty to create ai! impression in his favour, 
 which it may be ditliiult suhsetpiently to erase, but also secures 
 him the last word, iu tho evi'ut of wilnessos being called by his 
 opponent. Still, cases Hometimea oceur where u defendant goes 
 to trial relying simply on tho weakness of tho plaint ill's case, and 
 where, if called upon to begin, he will instantly be defeateil.- 
 The duty of beginning is, conscipiently, sehlom u mutlor of iu- 
 dill'crenee, but is generally regarded as an (tbject wliieh it is 
 important either to attain or to avoiil, according to the circuni- 
 htanees. The principles which govern the (pjcstion as to who 
 has tho privilege or duty (as tlm case may b«*) of tho " n>;/tf to 
 hn/iii" arc dillicult of application, and are, moreover, not very 
 distinctly understood, and the decisions as to such right arealike 
 numerous and eonllicting. A detailed examination of them r.ll 
 W(»uld hi' out of place here, but a few general rules may, perhaps, 
 bo of practical value. 
 
 S .'i7l>. The first general rulo as to tho right to begin is, that 
 
 ' (>i\ till' lu'iiriinr of u|i|mmiIm in siiliitaiu'i') wuh wiuit of riiic<ii|<'rii- 
 
 <M|iiity till' .i|i|M'llii!it iilwiiVH UM'il to lion; tli>' |il:iiiitill' liuviii;; i'.'|ilii'il, iM 
 
 W^tMi : Willi. iiiiH I'. Willi. iiiiN, iNilll. to |iait iif till' Kiiiii cluiiiii'il, tliiit. Iiii 
 
 ^ IIi'kI •' < h, li'iijlit III Hiiiiii," 'Jtl , '2H, k"^'' I'DM-iiliiiiliiiii, iitiil as til till' 
 
 He«», (•.</., l''.ihvaiiN i'. JmifM, IN.'JT ; ri''<ii|ii'', iinlli' iirnwuiii, AIiIi'I-noii, 11., 
 
 whi'l'o, ill an arti'Ui mi a noti' liy lidil tlcil iji'li'iiiliint iiiii*! lii'Kiii.aiiilus 
 
 lUiioiMMi iigiiiiiiit iiiaki'i', till' |i|i'a jii In- rniilil nut, |ilaintiil' hud li vuiilii't. 
 
 •JliH 
 
CHAP. III.J KIIM:S RKSPKCTING Till-: RlfJIIT TO hVMlS. 
 
 the pot'tif on irhoin tin' onus prohiiiii/l //(■>■,' ^^s• t/rrr/nprr/ int fho rccnrif. 
 inii'Sf hrtfiii} It soinctimos is wiiid that tlic lij^lit of h'^nnning 
 l)i'l()iigs ti) th<> jmrty on whom tlu* afflrnmtive ol' the issue lies ; btif 
 lliis assertion, if literally uuilerstootl, is hv no means accurate, since 
 (iis we have seen) it iloes not iipply eitlier where the affinuative 
 alli'tr ition is siipporteil by a lejjal pn'suinption, or the truth of the 
 nejrative averment is peculiarly within the knowleil^c of the party 
 who relies on it.* And the rule as to the liiijhf to tinjln is, in what- 
 ever form it may bo stated, subject to some civ/itions. I'irst, in 
 sojiii' eases, if iif t/ir trinl \\w defeiidaut will admit the irholc prima 
 faeie ease of the plaintiff, he will b(> entitled to betjin, jiroviiled he 
 was not bf)und to have* made this a<lmission by his plradinp;' at 
 an earlier period. For instance, this is so in a claim by a person 
 as heirat-law of the person last in possession against a devisee 
 under such person's will, if tlie defenilant admits not only that 
 plaintiff is heir, but tluit the anoestor, throiijrh whom he claims, 
 died seised.* 
 
 *i :!Si>. The exc(>ption will, however, be strictly confined to easas 
 when! the del'eudant admits the nliolr title of the plaintiff. There- 
 fore, if defendant, in an action to recover lan<l, admit at thi^ trial 
 a will under whicli the ])laintiff claims, and rely on a subserjuent 
 devise or codicil, he will not be entitled to begin. For so 
 far from admitting the iihole title of the plaintiff, be would 
 expressly deny a rao.st material \r,\r\ of it, sinct* by setting up a 
 second will or codicil, he would in effect assert that bis opponent 
 was not dtivisee at the time of the testator's decease.' Again, a 
 defendant whose title rests upt)n a conveyance from the ancestor," 
 or in part undt3r the ancostor'ii marriage sottlemeut,' cannot, by 
 
 ' .\4 to thfi Im'nI tests i>f tlic niiiis I'littcHDH, J.), tlcfi'iidiiit was allowed 
 
 ]ll'iili:lllili, sen iilltc, 5 .'tll.'i. tci liejriii, tlluM;;li |iluilltilY. lis In part 
 
 ' 'riiiis, where II liiisliaiiil |ii'titionH of the |iri'iiii.si'pi, wa'- |il'e|iaiei| to prove 
 
 for II ie-«titiitiuu of I'oii jiiy:iil ri^rhls, ii that hi' was iissi^rnre of an hiiIsIiiimI- 
 
 rii|i(ini|i'iii wlio aiiMWei.s liy |ili'ailiiijf iii;r tctiii. See, now, It.S. ('. ISh.'l, 
 
 riihlty is eiilitleil to he^'i'ii : Cli.ny I >iil. .\ .\ I. r. I'l, cileil ante, ; :i(il. ii. ' 
 r. I'lienv. 1 ■'*'>'<• 
 
 •' i».'st,' " On lii'iht tn lUfiiH," 'i!*. 
 
 Sen ante, 5§ ;t<>T, •I'li. 
 
 * (liHiiititle >'. Itrahiiiii, ITD'J ; ]>oe 
 
 f. Ihavne, IS IN; l»iie v. Ilailief*, 
 
 iH.tl l,.l. liriiiimii). Ill l*oe c, .Smart, 
 IH.'iii ^(Juiiiey, U., aflur uoiitiultiitg 
 
 ° I loe r. llniyiii'. IM.S; (ivcnuliiif^ 
 jliif r. ('(iiiii'ft, |sl;i, ami an iiieiiiy- 
 iiiiiiis i'li.sM ciii'il liy 1,(1. Id'uiiiaii in 
 Ki.e r. MaVlie-*, ISIU. 
 
 "• Hoe r. 'I'lick. r, lH;to JIoIIiukI, li). 
 ^ l>iKi t;, liHWlH, iHtli (Miiulu, J,). 
 
 '-iti'J 
 
J '■ 1. 
 
 m 
 
 i:; 
 
 
 
 PLAINTIFF SHKKIXG UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGKS. [I'AliT 11. 
 
 pimply atlmitting his oppoiiPiit's hcirsliip and bis own possession, 
 (U'jirive tlie fuinior of liis li^'lit to lirj^iji, Ik-cuiisc muIi ini adniissinn 
 will not ooviT tlio ontirn title of the jilaintill'. Where, too, eaili 
 party claims as l»eir-at-law, and the defendunt is clearly the heir, 
 if /njifitiiatc, his admission of a conditional title in the plaintiiV, // 
 the defendant was ille^^itimate, is insnilicient to give him the right 
 to hegiji, because the plaint i If, in order to recover, nnist prove bis 
 own title ; for althoiigl: in this particular castt the tith' may d(>pend 
 on (h'fendant's legitimaty, the legitimacy does not constitute the 
 direct issue. 
 
 S ;{S1 — 2. A second rjrccpiion to the general nde that the party 
 on whom lies the onus probandi, as developed on the record, must 
 begin, is that the jdaintilf begins in all actions where ]ui seeks 
 Hubntdutial and unliqiiidiilid (liinitdjix, tlioiiijh (hr (i//inii(i/if<' lie ujkih 
 the ili/rmliiut. This doctrine rests upon the broad ]irinciples of 
 public convenience and justice, and was promulgated by a majority 
 of the judges many years back, as applic.'d)h> to acti(jns for ////(/. 
 Kiaiif/cr, and iiijiirira to tlir jurxdii, and extended (in 1M40) by a 
 consideretl judgment of the Court of (iueen's iWnch.- Its ojteration 
 was subsequently extended to actions of covenant and assumpsit, 
 and indeed, as it wouhl seem, to a// (ivfioiix, when; the jilaintilf is 
 seeking to recover actual danniges of an iiii'iK<rrftiiiii(l amount.'* 
 
 ^ -JSU. This second exception, however, does not extend to cases 
 wliere the jilaintilf seeks to recover a debt, or a liquidated demaml in 
 money;' since in such actions, unless a specific denial of the claim 
 be placed on the record, the plaintiff is not nqiiired to give any 
 evitlence as to its amount. Neither does such exception apjilv 
 where the damages sought to be recovered, though technically 
 tinli<piiilated, are obviously nominal i'* nor where they are admitted 
 
 ' I><.ci'. Hmv. IH'.'H (Vaa^flmii, IJ.). 
 
 ' III M.mi.t")'. Wliiill. |si.), ail iic- 
 tioii liy a Milii itiii'sili'ik lur \vniii);liil 
 (lisiiiiHsiil, wliii'h (li'I'c'iiilaiit jiiNtilii'il 
 liv ])l<'ailiii^ iiiisi'iiiiiliii't (III Ills pait, 
 plallltllT Wa^ hi III I'litllli'il til li(>i;iii, 
 S'ti jiulniiH'iit llii'ii'iii (li'livcicil liy 
 lid. Di'iiiiian. (I'lirkc, II., novxr us- 
 Miiitcil tn tliis i!Xi'i')itiiiii, liiit waM 
 
 III' 1)11 wlmm tlio liiiitiii'ii iiT ni'iiiit i.iy 
 mij;lit til lir;:iii "), Sfn, aUo, ('uitii 
 V. .Iiuiirt, lH,i;(. 
 
 " S. 11 Fill. V c. TmImii-, IS'il. 
 
 ♦ WiMiilpilf r. |',.||M, iHIT (I'lllkii, 
 
 II.) ; FdwIit c. CdsIit, IsjN J,il. Ti'ii- 
 tcidi'ii) ; lliiiifii'lil r. .Siiiiili, |,m;|; 
 U. S ('. ISS.J. Kill. X.WII. r. '.'. 
 
 • IIimIkcs c. lli.l.lir, lNl.l(llavl"y, 
 
 ulwu)(t of ii|iiiiiiia timt " iu all cu^ "< J.); Jauknou i;. iinHkoth, islit ^iil.) 
 
 
CHAP. III.] WHEN PLAINTIFF MUST BEGIN. 
 
 liy the tlefondant, so fur as amount is concornod;' nor whoro tlioy 
 can be asoertaiiioil l»y nion^ (iomputatiou, as, for instance, wliero tlie 
 notion is lu'oii<»}it on a bill of oxchiingc or a jtroniissory note; '■' nor 
 where the pLiiiitilF will not say whotlior or not he intends to 
 proceed for t)ul)stantial damages.' 
 
 i^ ''384. A second general ridt> as to the right to begin is, that if 
 Hie record contaiiiH srvoral ismifn, mid the hitrfhon of prnriiKj nmj one 
 ■if thfin /irs on thp plaintiff, he is rnfif/rd to hcgin prodded he rill 
 undertake to (jive evidence upon it.* This ride will equally prevail, 
 though it clearly appears, as matter of calculation, that i" thw 
 ilt'fendunt should eventually suecseed on a certain one of the issues, 
 the proof of wljich lies upon him, the plaintiff will recover nothing 
 on the issue which lies upon him.' lUit the proviso at the (tnd (tf 
 the rule constitutes a material part of it; and, therefore, if a mere 
 :'laim in general terms for an unlicpiidated money diMnand has been 
 adde<l to some special claim for li(iui<lat('d damages, and the 
 defendant, while confessing and avoiding the special claim for the 
 li(]ui(bitcd amount, specifically denies that made in general terms 
 for the unliquidatcil amount, such a denial will not entitle the 
 (tlaintiff to begin, unless in fact he intends to rely on the claim 
 which has thus been made in general terms for an unliquidated 
 amount, and to udtluce evidence in support of it." The effect of the 
 proviso is, in short, this: that it must be the object of an opt^ning 
 to e.xplain to th"? jury the facts which th(> witnesses are going to 
 prove. 
 
 kj .'IS'). Sometimesthoburthenof proof of someone or more issues 
 lies upon the plaintiff, while that of proving others lies upon the 
 defendant. Under such (iircurastanccs the plaintiff may (at his 
 own option) either go into the whole cose in the first instance, or 
 else elect to only give evidence with regard to those issues which 
 
 ' Tiiiiliill r. IJiiskott, IHdl (Krlo, niHng Iloinan i-. Tlioiniison, l.s.'H; 
 
 C.J.). Kaitii v. Mliityio, iN.l.); Ouko- 
 
 ' Oiuiniim V. I''iinnftr, 1849; R.S.C. loy "• <'(>ilili»'ii, l^lil (Kyliw, .I.\ Sno 
 
 1S8;», Old. X.X.XVl. r. .•):. Ki1k« r. Hilliiiy. IH.VJ." whom't.. nn 
 
 ' t'liupiiiiiii 1. lUwHon, IN^.V action for i^doiIs sold, ilifiticjatit 
 
 * KawliiiH ii. J)onl)()ro\if^li, 1810 plcadid, i«xri|it un to l.ill/., thu 
 (l.d. DciiiiianV p'lui'al JHsiiit, and ufl lo that, huui a 
 
 * Ciipim c. Widls, lH»;jrilolfo, 11.); (i|).cial jilfu. Thu plaintitT'h jiar- 
 rcropiisi'd in Month r. MillnM, 181(1. ticiilars limited his doniaiid to l.>0/., 
 
 * Smart v. Huviht, 18;M (I'arkn, and it wa-. Imld (Ld. CainidMill) tlutt 
 U.); Miila v. Uddy, 1834 (id.); oTor- dufundunt Hhould l)«>giu. 
 
 •JTl 
 
 i '• 
 
F;,ii>7;y'^K in kkim-v. 
 
 [PMir 11. 
 
 W^^- 
 
 
 IT^ 
 
 he is him?=r1f l)oui)d in ];vovp, reiprving flio right of ruhuttiiig liis 
 ailvorsiiry's luool's, 1m ths-^ «% .'lit if tho hitter cstalilishiiig a priniii 
 facie case in sujuiort uf tlic i^savs wiiii-h lie u\nm him.' Tim hist- 
 naniPil course \», in practice, most usually adopted ; and if it is 
 followed, the defendant may have a special reply on the plainfifr's 
 fresh evidence, while the plaintil'' will he entitled to the general 
 reply or the whole case. If, however, the plaint itf at the outset 
 thinks fit to call any ovidenot to repel the defendant's ease, ho 
 will not ho permitted to give i'urther evidence hy way of reply ; 
 in other words, he "cannot sjdit his case ;" since if such a privi- 
 lege were allowed to a plaintiiF. tlio defendant, in common justi('(», 
 might claim the same, and the proceedings wouM run the risk of 
 being extended to a very inconvenient length." 
 
 S '•W\. Accordingly, in an action hy the indorsee of a hill against 
 the acceptor, where the only issue was on ii defence denying the 
 indorsement, the plaintiff was not allowed to re.st his case at first 
 on testimony given to identify the intlorser's handwriting, and 
 after evidence for the def 'ni '• had heen given to ahow that plaiiitill 
 liimsflf was too poor to hrc e discounted the hill, and that he liud 
 disclaimed all kn<n 'edgt> ol. it, to call hy way of mjily evidence to 
 show that, in point ( i lact, plnintiff actually had dise()unt<'d the 
 instrument.'' A fiir'lnr illustration of the same principle will he 
 found on a later pagc,^ 
 
 S MS7. The ijuesti(. respecting the right to hegin or to rejily is 
 a matter of practice and regulation upon which the presiding jutlge 
 must exercise his discretion. Acconlingly, the court will not 
 Interfere with his decision, unless i', he clearly j)rovod, not only that 
 the ruling on this point was nuniifiKflii inoin/, hut that it has 
 occasioned suhstantial injustice.* It will not grant a now trial, 
 
 1+^ 
 
 ' l-'iirnioily, when oitlu-r \>y plead- a different courHe was, indeed, pcr- 
 
 iiig or iKitii't', tile (it-fi'iirt! waM known, niifti'd ; N«>d (|y. if it l)e ullowi'd now. 
 
 thu uluiiililT wuH bound to o|K>n lim '' Ji'cohN c. 'J'aiU'lt>n. ININ. Sue, 
 
 whole caste; Keo.s i'. Sniilii. 'HU5; uIho, N/iii^lit c. Wilcox, 16J0. 
 
 but tuis jimctice having JMiri found ♦ Infiu, § JlH". 
 
 inconveiiiont, hiw b«M>ii abandoned: ' Mi-uHilfoKJ r. l''r<H'inun, 18.V); 
 
 browiio I'. Miiriiiy, IH'JJ (Abbott, Kdwaitls r. MutthewH, INl". See, 
 
 C.J.); Hliaw v. Keck, 1N.)3. See also, lliirrell r. .NidioUon. lN;i;i (Id. 
 
 Penn e. Jack, INUU. Doninaii); Jiird i: lii).:giui«ou, Ibill 
 
 " Urowno v. Murray, 1H25 (Ab- Hucknniu i'. l-'ernie, l«;tM; Dai v, 
 
 bott, C.J.); Syivifter v. Hall. \H-id lUaMie, ISiH; Itooth t<. AlilliiM, IHlli; 
 
 (id.\ In WilliuMw I'. l>aMe-. \h:]A. < i!i| m.iu c Euidua, l«ll (_roleiidg«\ 
 
 272 
 
CHAP. III. J IM'Li: liKSI'EL-TINO THK K'PIHT SO It!'.! 1.*'. 
 
 merely Wause the jml^f iiuc I'itluT uiliniucl fv!'.. n : in ;•«;.!_/ 
 w' 'oh shruld in stridiiesH luive boeii prfxhutMl in '11)1,111 oi th«i 
 jilaiiitiff's origiiiivl case,' or has prevented the p'-iiii iff l?'."n (nulling 
 witnesses in anticipation of the defendan'/s (<!;»•, prjvid'.'d ,mw]\ 
 \vitne8.ses ho suhserjuently examined in reply .^ 
 
 § ;W7*. The right to begin, however, usually diaws after it, hotli 
 in civil and criminal proceedings, whenever the ativersriry od<luw)» 
 evidence to the jury in support of his ease, Home right of reply.' 
 The right of reply thus conferred may be either (a) a right to make 
 a further speecli in nsjdy to the a Iversary'b case, or (b) u right to 
 r/i/l priilfitrr in reply to such case. 
 
 $i 'M<7\. With these prefatory remarks, civil and criminal easeft 
 must be scjiarately considered. 
 
 S tiHTu. In civil cast-s a right even to nuike a speech in reply is 
 not conferred by the mere commenting o: i cash-book, whirli luw 
 been used to refn^sh the memory of one of the a<lverso witnes-ses, or 
 even by a reference to parts of this book, not looked at by such 
 witness,* nor by the produt-lion of a pajjcr, which the judge has 
 called for in onh^r to satisfy his consctiencie.* Neither will tho 
 I)laiiitiff be entitled to a siM-ech in reply, because, in the course of 
 the trial, it has become noces-sary for the defendant to cal! witnesses 
 to inform llic Jtidijc up<Hi a question respecting tl •' admissibility of ' 
 evidence." 
 
 S ;}H7c. In criminal oases where e; vral jtrison.^r?, are jointly in- 
 dicted, and one of them calls witnesaoe, t'. '■ oum' , i f' I'tho prosecutor 
 has a htrict right to reply generally, \l '^ cluirf; 1 be a joint ohe, and 
 the evidence affects the prisoners gtaii Tsy. If, however, tli(! charges 
 be separate (as for stealinL; and rec'iv 'ngy, or the d'"enc(> ))e a 
 separate one (as an alibi), counsel *" ihe jir )secution has not a 
 general, but only ■>■ sjwciul, repl; ai ! • uist iu his reply confine his 
 remarks to the ease of the party for whom witnesses have a[>penn!d.' 
 
 J.); !)<»« V. Kowlaiuls, IHIO ^iil.); 
 Mi'icnr f. Wluill. isi,); (.io;ich v. 
 ]iiK"ll. lNl.i(rollock, (• B.). 
 
 ' Williiiiiis I DttvioH, ls;J3; Doo 
 V. lt(iw«'r. Ik.jI. 
 
 » .'^iiiilh -■. Miirrable, XHA'l. 
 
 ' lU-Ht ■Oh Thi- lliuld to llnjin," 
 83, anil chmoh thom collccU'd. 
 
 ♦ I'ullun V. White. 1.SJ8 (Ik'st, 
 
 T, \OI.. I. 273 
 
 CI.). 
 
 ' DowliiiK V. riuifjun, 1824 (Iivst, 
 O.J.V 
 
 • liurvov '•. Mifclii'II. ISIl (I'arkp. 
 11.}: iN.voV »'. MiM'stii'T. IKIH {lA. 
 Kilf!tli<in)iit;h). Suo unto, § L'.'i. 
 
 ' li ■. lliiycH. l«;wa'iiike, 11., anil 
 <'<)ltiiian, J.I; U. c. lUuikburn, IHiA 
 ('ialfoiinl iwA Williumij, •IJ.); U. v. 
 
I Si'' 
 
 f|W 
 
 
 j\ " 
 
 
 1 
 
 IB 
 
 1 ill 
 
 ^Ri 
 
 ^wi 
 
 : 
 
 m 
 
 i 
 
 PRACriCK A8 TO CALLING EVIDKNCE IN UKPLY. [iT. II. 
 
 Again, " if tlio only oviilcnoo called on the part of a prisoner is 
 ovidt^ncc? to cluiractcr, although the counsel for the prosecution is 
 entitleil to the reply, it will ho a matter for his iliscretion whether 
 he will use it or not. Cases may occur in which it may be fit and 
 proj)er to do so." ' 
 
 S MS7i). It has not boon clearly dot^ided whether the counsel for 
 the plaintiff or the prosecution will be entitled to reply, if tho 
 defendant, without fl^/f/»r7H// rnV/rwr/*, opens new facts ; hut tho better 
 opinion is that no such right can be r/tiimcd, thotigh tho judge 
 may, in a flagrant case, permit its exercise.* 
 
 i5 Uf^S. As to the nattiro of tho t'vi(lnnr which may be called in 
 reply, tlie remarks made on a previous page to the effoot that the 
 party beginning is "not allowed to split his ease,"' must in tho 
 first place be borne in mind, llegard also must be had to tho 
 oiroiinstaneos of the individual case, and considerable latitude will 
 necessarily be granted to tho judge in the exercise of his discretion.* 
 Thus, where a plaintiff in ejectment made out a primA facie case 
 as heir-at-law, which was met by a will being proved for the 
 dt>fendant, he was permitted, in reply, to put in a subsequent will 
 whereby the estates claimed were devised to himself; for although 
 this will proved him to bo entitled to the premises as devisee, and 
 thus set up a title dilfcreiit from that on which ho originally relied, 
 it operated also as a revocMition of the former will, and thus 
 deniolislied the defendant's case.* Indeed, in one ease^ where tho 
 plaintiff in an accident case originally offered evidence to show 
 that (he defendant was at Layton at a given time, and the defen- 
 dant had called witnesses to show that lie was th«»n at Richmond, 
 the judge refused to exclude further witnesses, tenderetl in reply by 
 the plaintilf to ])rovo tliat tl»e defendant was not at Uichniond, hut 
 at Layton, at tho time in cpiestion." On thedflier hand, where the 
 
 .Tnidim. lS:iit (Williiims, J.'; \\. v. 
 Trevflli, 1HS2 (Hawkins, J.); U. v, 
 Kiiiii, ISH.'J iStc|)lH'ii, J.). 
 
 ' KeHoliillDii of tlio jddf^cH, 1>*;J7, 
 r(>|>iirtei| "('.&!'. ()T(). 
 
 ' Creriir r. Soil.., 1NJ7 (I,<!. Ton- 
 fenli'iO. See, in fiiviiur of tlie riirht, 
 11. r, llotnt), 1777; U. v. Hi>fiii>l(l, 
 1NJ4 (Abliott. r.J.); 11. I', t'liililii, 
 IH.'M (Vark. J.); lte«t " n„ Thf Itiijht 
 til Itnfin," 02 1*4 ; iipiiiist it, Ho8t, 
 id. 94— »»; Fiiith v. M Intyro, lH3o 
 
 274 
 
 (I'lnko. \\.)\ Ste|.ll(>lis V. Wel.h, 1S;(,^; 
 H. r. ;\liili^'(l"ll, I7!l-I (I.il. K'eiivnii); 
 Niiinh i\ Ilni\vii,IHUi(I'ollock,('.U.). 
 
 ' Siiiuii, § .'IN. 
 
 « Wiiy:lit /•. Wil.nx, IH.V). 
 
 • i)oe ('. linsli'V (I<il. I)einil!m). 
 Sell (|;i. iiM to tile jneMeiit Jinictice. 
 
 See W.S.C. iH.s:i,()i-.|. \XI. r.'Jl.MMi! 
 Oiil. Will. r. (i. cited iinte. ^ :;n|. 
 ' HritrjTH r. Ayimwoitli, l«.iH([,ii. 
 I)«>niiiiiiri. This cuNe (Mirttiinly cui lien 
 the jirivilej^o of uddiieiiig ovitloiico 
 
LH. III.] 
 
 PllACTICK AS TO CALLING KVIDKXCK IN HKPLY. 
 
 issue Wiis as to the souihIiicss of a liorsc, which was oxhil)itt!d to 
 the jury during tlic tlcfciHiiint's caw, the phiititiff wiia not iillowcd 
 to recall his veterinary witnesses, who had possessed an ojipf)rtunity 
 of inspecting the horse before llu! plaintiff's case had been dosed, 
 but had only seen him on the view in (luestion, to give tlieir 
 opinion respecting his soundness.' 
 
 S ;{8!), In civil cases in which evidenc(> is taken by adidavit umler 
 R 8. C. 188;}, Order XXXVIII., it is expr.'ssly provided by 
 R. 27, — in accordance with the jiractico described in the jtreceding 
 section, — that the plaintiff's aflidavits in reply " shall bo confined 
 to matters strict />/ in rc/i/i/."'^ 
 
 § 39t). With regard to the nature of the evidence which may be 
 'jailed in roply in criminal cases, sufficient guide will for the most 
 part bo obtained from what has already been .said as to the pnictiee 
 in civil cases. But in criminal co-ses it is further a rule that on 
 the trial of public proKcciitioiifi, whether for felony or misdemeanor, 
 (lirvitlij instituted ttij the C'rcwii, and conducted personally by the law 
 oilicers of the Crown, but not on prose(;utions merely directed by 
 them,'' such law of!ic(«rs are in htrictness entitled to reply, even if no 
 evidence be adduced on the part of tlie defendant.* As, liowever, 
 
 ill roply t" itH extrtiiit' limit; for 
 (dtliiMi^fli the iiliiiiititY WIIS lit lilierty 
 to ilis|)i-(ivt' tlie ulilii Ity sliowiiij; ti.'it 
 the (lefflidallt wiih not lit Iticliiiioiiil, 
 yot wIk'u the witnes.sc.t went on to 
 jirovii ttiiit lie wiiH lit I.aytoii. they 
 tliey not only pive ('\ iili'ncK wliiili 
 on^fht to have lii'cii siiliniitti'ii to tiie 
 jury ill tlie livst instainc, hut con- 
 iiniu'il that which was actually niveii 
 in chief, and wiiidi. consiMiiinitly, 
 slioulil liave lieoil tili-ll exllillistod 
 (sei- note (t to y. < '. Ji]). HH), 1 70.) 
 
 ' OhImii-u v. Thoinitsoii, IM.)!* (Kr- 
 skiiii', .1.). 
 
 • Hut this rultuiiniemsto have been 
 disrepiidi'd ill rcacock i'. llaiper, 
 IHTH. Scd qu. 
 
 ■' My II leHolutioii of the jndf^cB 
 coiiii- to ill issT, anil iciiortiMJ in 
 6 St. Tr. N. S. ]). ;M, it wiik rcMilvcd: 
 " Thiit in thoNc Crown ciini'm in whicii 
 the .\tt.-(!in. and Soi.-(!en. is ]icr- 
 Hoiiiiily enpif^i'd, ii re|ily. when- no 
 witiic.NNcs 111'' ciiIIihI for the ilffeiicc, 
 is to bo allowed, us it lij^lit. to tlii' 
 
 eounst'l for the down, and in no 
 otheiH." It had before this, in H. 
 r. Cliristie, IN,-)8, been held that tho 
 
 privilejre does not extend to the .\tt.- 
 
 <!en. of tlie County I'lilatine, uud 
 that wliere HUch ])roseciition was not 
 (Minducted by a law ollicer in jieison, 
 it did not extend to a |iro.secutioii 
 iliicrled bvthe I'onr L;iw Itiiai'd ; U. v. 
 Meck«ithjs.-),s |l\|es. .1.'; hut thiitit 
 
 did llpltly to i'ost-Ullice ri'o.HeciitioiiH, 
 
 and that it extended to the,Sol.-(ien., 
 
 us well as to the Att.-tiell. : U. V, 
 Toiikley. ISIili (Mellor, J.); K. V. 
 
 Harrow, lH(>(i. With respect to tho 
 Att.-dnll. of the I'rince of Wales, seo 
 Att.-(»t'n. of r. of Wales r. Cross- 
 iniiii, |N(ili. The uullmrities us tu 
 the Alt. -(fen. 's lijrht of v jily uro 
 collected '.' SI. Tr. N. S. Itllit. 
 
 • Hoolntioii of the juilp'- 111 l.S;n, 
 re|.orted 7 < '. \ 1'. fi7<i: It. <. Home, 
 1777 n.d. Miiiisliel.n; It. r. Maisthn, 
 
 lN-'!t(l,(l. TeMteid.ll). The sniiie un- 
 ju-t rule |lleMlll« III till- lievt line sidll 
 ol the (iUi I II .-> ]', III li I )i\ . in all cases 
 
 ''4 
 
 27'. 
 
 t2 
 

 mi 
 
 fc 
 
 rj 
 
 ^H 
 
 
 • t 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 H 
 
 
 l| 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 -'ii 
 
 iHll ^ 
 
 I 
 
 
 BH^ ' 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 ATTORNEY-OKNKRAL KXTITLKD TO RKPLY. [PAUT H. 
 
 this is a privilege, or ratlior u jirtTogiitive, opposed to tliu ordinuiy 
 practici' of the courts, and is, (>nipluiticully, " more honoured in the 
 breach than the obsorvunco," it should bo watched with jetilouHy. 
 Mr. Home, in 1777 observed, that the Attorney-Goiu>ral would 
 be gi'ievously embarrassed to produce a single argument of reason 
 or justice on behalf of his claim.' As the rule which precludes 
 tlie counsel for the prosecution from addressing the jury in reply, 
 when the defendant has culled no witnesses, has been long thought 
 to afford the best 8(>ourity against unfairness in ordinary trials, a 
 natural suspicion anses that a contrary rule may have been 
 adopted, and may sti/l be followcnl, in 8lut»( prowHaitions, for a less 
 legitimate purpose. It is to be hoped that, ere long, the Legislature 
 will int«'rfere, and intnxluce one uniform practice in thj trial of 
 political and ordinary offenders.* 
 
 wht*ru th<' I'lowii ih coiicorntH M. of fonniition nisjMictinfrthoHuhjocts dis- 
 
 (.'hundori (', ComrH. of inl. ll«v., 1851. euHfWHl in thiH chuptor urn i-itt'orrtMl t<> 
 
 ' 1777, !2(( How. Ht. Tr. ti«;J. to Mr. UohI'm vf'>ik "(M Tht Itiyht to 
 
 ' ThuH« who wiitb fur fmlher iu- lityiii." 
 
 
 276 
 
CHAr. III.] 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTK8. 
 
 2761 
 
 AMKKICAN NUTKS. 
 
 Burden of Proof. — In tho law of uvideiuM^ tliia phrase me., j ono 
 of two (li.stiiict tilings. " I'roof " means oitlmr (I) •• provinjj," t»r 
 (2) evicloiKU' to prove. In otlu^r words, cither tlie result of evidene*', 
 in producing atlirniative belief, or the means u.sed in |uroUucing 
 that result. Therefore, it means either a mental statu or thu meauH 
 of producing one. When incorporate*! into the phrase " burden of 
 proof," and the latter applied to the trial of causes, where an issue 
 has b<^en raised as to thu oxiutene** of u particular fai;t or facts, the 
 phrase necessarily mwins (1) The duty of creating by a certain pre- 
 [xuideranee an attirmative Indiuf on thu part of the tribunal in the 
 existeiuic of the fact or facts in issue, or (2) Thu duty of introduc- 
 ing the evidence necessary to establish facts which produce or pre- 
 vent such athrniative belief. That these two bu^lens are distinct 
 from e;i(!h other; that they may and often do rest at particular 
 times oil ditt'erent parti<>8 to the litigatitm, is {>erhaps obvious. It 
 is, however, rather the rule than thu extu^ption that they are suitably 
 distinguished in pnictice. It seems lulvisable, therefore, to consider 
 their respective differences. 
 
 (1) ItritDKN' OK F..H'rAiiMsiirN'u. — With the placing of this «»»« 
 the rules of evidence have nothing whatever to do. It has la-en 
 determined iM'fore the time comes for thu use of evidence by the 
 issue as raised by the pleadings. Under tiie established rules of 
 pleading, the parties litigant have formed an issue of fact: — un 
 allegation of fact a.sserted by one party and denied by the other. 
 Onu party has, tlierefore, assumed, by asserting the truth of a eon- 
 tested fact, tlie athrmativo of tiie issue. Hy so (h)ing, hu has, as a 
 matter of sul)stantivu law (not under a ruluof evidence), undertaken 
 the responsibility of resting tim result of the entire case upon his 
 ability to produce in the minds of the tribunal, by a certain rtupiired 
 preponderance of evnJence, an atlirniative belief in the existence of 
 tho fact or facts whiuli hu has a.sserted and his o|)ponent has denied. 
 In (itlier words, lie mint jirove his case. He lias assiinietl the bur- 
 den of eshibli.shing it. riicre is no such burden on tin* other siih'. 
 If that interest can mi.rely prevent the neces.sary attirmative belief 
 by the party having this burtlen of establishing, it succeeds. All 
 this has nothing to do with the rules of evidence. As a matter of 
 pleading or siibHtiiiitive law, whoever substintially luus the attirma- 
 tive of the issue :is determined by the pleadings, has whe burden of 
 establishing his case. 
 
 " Hu who attirins must prove." lUanchard r. V'oung, 11 Cush. 
 ;W1, .'Wo (IH.'Wt); McClure i: I'ursell, ♦i Ind. 'XM) (IH.Vi); Seavy e. 
 DearlM.rn. lU N. II. Aol (1S41)); Southworth ,: Hoag. 12 III. 44(1 
 (IMiT); Ciizler o. WiUel, H2 111. 322 (1M7(3) ; UakuH v. Ittu-rison, 24 
 
I 
 
 2Ht^ 
 
 AMKKK AN N(>Tr-H. 
 
 Ll'AIlT II. 
 
 la. irn (18(57); Hoyal Ins. Cu. r. SrliwiiiK, S7 Ky. .nO(lSHS\; S.M.tt 
 i: W.ioil, Hi C;il. ;bs (l«S!»)i Mt'in.'iu;imi r. Mciinl, «»:,' N. V. M/S, 
 4.M (l«7ri); Clark r. Hills, (17 'h-x. Ill (1S.S(5); Kast Tfiiiu'ss.-.MSic. 
 Ji. It. r. Sli'wart, I,*} I.t-a, VSJ (ISHI) ; Kstato (»! Kiilf. 7:\ Wis. l\\ 
 4.'iH (ISSU); lUu'.lw v. Krascr, 7 Low. Can. liep, 472 ( I«">«) ; I^'linian 
 I'. McQucfii. <•.". Ala. r»70 (IHS(I); McQuofn /•. IV-oplc's Hank. Ill 
 N. C. r.o«) (IHUL'); Krnt c. Wliitf, L'7 ln«l. .'!'.•(» (ISCWJ) ; .MotlVt f. 
 MotTft, IM) la. 4IL' (IM'.U); MrK.Mi/.ic v. Strolcii. 4.S 111. App. 410 
 {IH'.rj) ; Vdun r. Lainont, TiC. .Minn. L'KJ (1S<M). 
 
 So wlu'iv the tlofcnci) to a pnmussory note is payment, tlio biinlfn 
 of cstalilishinK i.s on tin; dcfnidant. Kondall v. Mrowiison, 17 X. II. 
 186 (18<)0). So whore the defence is the existence of fraud known 
 to tiio phiintiff. Iteevo v. Liverpool, &c. Ins. Co., .'{*.) Wis. AL'O 
 (187(5). The saint! rules as to tiie effect of the pleadinf^s to deter- 
 mine the burden of establishing obtain in ei|uity, as at law. I'usey 
 r. Wright, ;{l I'a. St. .'587 (1H58). " In both, the jiarty maintaining 
 the atlirmative of the issiie has it cast tijion him." ////«/. " It is an 
 establishe<l rule of evidence in equity, that '.vher(! an answer whieh 
 is put in issue, admits a fact, and inuists upon a distinct fact by way 
 of avoidance, the faet admitted is established, but the fact insisted 
 upon must be proved ; otherwise the admission stands as it the fact 
 in avoidance had not Ix'en averred."' CliMnents r. Moore, (1 Wall. 
 290, ;iir» (18(57) ; MeChee Irrigation Ditch Co. *-. Hudson, Ho Tex. 
 r>87 (18'.>;{) 
 
 In what particular instances the burden of establishing is on the 
 ])laintitT or on the defeiulant is not a cpiestion in the law of evidence. 
 '1 II. <illirmative of the issue may, as a matter of pleading, rest upon 
 the defendant when equally satisfactory a /irlnrl reasoning would 
 ])lace it upon the defendant. As is said in Starratt c. .Mullen, 1 18 
 MuflH. ri7(> (1H,S'.>) : " I'ndoubtedly nuiny matters whieh, if true, 
 would show that the plaintiff never had a caus<< of action, or even 
 that he never had a valid contract, must Im' plcailcd and proved 
 by the defendant; for instance, infancy, coverture, or, probaldy, 
 illegality." See also Sparks e. Sparks, ol Kans. l',»."> ( !8<.t;{). Hut 
 with all this the law ol cvidem-e is not dirciMly concerned. Kvi- 
 dence takes uj» the proceihiro of the trial where pleading leaves it. 
 Iiiderd Henthain says with great truth (Works, Vol, \'I. p. I'l I) : 
 '•This topic . . . iiinis pri.hiiiidl . . . seems to licloiig rather to I'ruce- 
 dure than to Kvi<lence." Kvidenee is limited t.i facts from which 
 a judicial tribunal may infer the existence of a fiuit in issue. The 
 detinition, therefore, exchidcs m"re argument. Yet the burden of 
 establishing, fixed and unshifting, lies upon the party who has the 
 affirmativo of the issue, during the stage of argument, after the 
 eviilencc is all in, and throughout much legal reasoning, whether 
 relating to rules of law or issue of fact. Thcref'ire while biinlen of 
 jiroof (uuicerns the law of evidence, it concerns it merely because 
 evidence is part of the law of procedure. 
 
 it 
 
niAP. III. I 
 
 AMKItlCAN NOTKH. 
 
 27<l« 
 
 Whi'r«' 11 |i:irty has ussiiiiit'd without (»l)jiM'tioii tho Ixinlon nl fs- 
 tiililisliiiiK' ill tilt' trial court, hi; will nut hv pcnuitttMl to coiiti'inl iit 
 t\w u|i|iiT rourt tliat 111' w TiiUKtully assuiiiud that hurdon. I'i'iijaiiiiii 
 t: Slu-a, h:\ la. 'MJ (IS'.M). 
 
 Tho burden uf ostahlisliiii^j may iiivolvu proof of ni'f,'ativo aver- 
 iiiciits or liicis. 
 
 " Whilst till* party haviui; the atiiriiiutivc ol' tlm issui- IioIiIh th« 
 burdi'ii of proof, an a K*'»('ral ruh* it is not nooessary that the issue 
 siioiild always bi* pri-senced iu an aniniiativi* I'oriii. If this were 
 rfipiisiti', a iiwre ehauK'i' iu the lorni of tho issue woulil change tho 
 burden ot proof, without regard to thu substance and etVeet of tho 
 
 issue 
 
 Chirk I'. Hills. (57 Tex. Ml (IS.SO). 
 
 So III an action for nialiciotis pnisecution, tho jilaintitT must show 
 that the prnceediiigs were iiistitiiled ii'if/iniit probable cause. King 
 i: C'ulvin. II K. !. ns'2 (1H77); Amus ». Snider, ()'.) 111. ;t7l5 (1M7.*{); 
 Smith e. ZcmI, ."•'.> Ind. :UV2 (1S77). 
 
 In an action for negligence the plaintiff may b« rorpiirod to show 
 that cortaiii warnings were intt given. (Jroany v. Long Island H. K., 
 HU N. V. Ill) (ISSC). On a complaint against the keeper of a 
 liilliard table for allowing a minor to |ilay billiards at his tablo 
 irltliniit the consent of his parent or giiantian, the burden of proving 
 that the parent or guardian did not consent is on the State. (!onyer.s 
 e. State, ,'i() (la. IH.'J (1H7.'{). .So in an action ag.iinst a surety on a 
 note, where the surety has given notice of his intention ni>t to (fon- 
 tinuo liable, the burden of proof is on the |ilaintitT to show that tho 
 money could imt have been collected if suit had been brought when 
 notice was given. .Strickler m. Ibirkholder, 17 I'a. St. I7<» (18(51). 
 
 In like minnor, on a bill in equity to eanoel a deed, on the ground 
 that it was nev. r executed, it is incumbent on the complainant to 
 prove the negative allegation. Kerr /•. Frei'man, .'{.'{ .Miss. L".»2 
 ( 1H-.7). 
 
 So in an indietmcnt for selling liipior to a sl.ive without an order 
 
 was 
 
 from his owner, it i.-- the diitv of the State to prove that no order 
 
 given. 
 
 Hate /•. Kvans, o .loiies, I'.ld (|H."iS), In an indictment for 
 selling guilds //»>^ of the growth, prodiiee, or iimnufactiire of the state, 
 
 tin* burden is on tlw government to prove this negative averment. 
 Stati' i\ llirsch, I." .Mo. IL'IJ ( 1S70). So on an indictment for selling 
 goods //<»■' tho produce I ir inanufacturo of the riiited States. Com. 
 c. Samiii'l, L' I'iek. III.'! (18'.',. So when' a utitiite gave a civil 
 remedy for cutting logs iritlnmt the owner's consent, the plaintilT 
 must show aMirmativelv the absence of such eon.sent. Little v, 
 Thniiipson, L' (ireeiil. L'L'.S ( iSL'.'t). Hut see to the ( ntrary elTect, 
 Welsh c. State. II Tex. .'tll.S (Is.",}). 
 
 Hut while the onus of establishing may include proof of negative 
 averments, it does not folluw that the same cogency of proof is re- 
 i|iiired as in proving pnsitivc allegations. 
 
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 276* 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 On a bill in equity for the cancellation of an agreement in writinj^ 
 on the ground that certain representations were false and fraudulent, 
 and the plaintiff's burden of establishing involved proof of certain 
 negative averments, viz. : that one Lea had not invented a new and 
 improved process for making iron and steel ; had not taken out a 
 caveat on the same, and had not transferred the same to a certain 
 companj', the court say : " The degree of proof of a negative allega- 
 tion is seldom measured by that required of an affirmative allegation. 
 In some cases a negative may be positively and conclusively proved, 
 . . . but in many cases this is impossible, and hence the amount of 
 proof required to support the negative jn-oposition and to shift the 
 burden will vary according to the circumstances of the case ; and 
 very slight evidence will often be sufficient to shift the burden to 
 the party having the greatest opportunities of knowledge concerning 
 the fact to be inquired into." Kelley v, Owens (Cal.), 30 Pac. Kep. 
 696 (1892). 
 
 Where the burden of establishing involved proof of a negative alle- 
 gation, viz., that no alluvion existed at a certain time susceptible of 
 private ownership, the court hold : " Inasmuch as this involves the 
 proof of a negative and is an exception to the general rule that the 
 party holding the affirmative must prove it, demonstrative evidence 
 is not required, and the burden of proof may be shifted when suffi- 
 cient facts are established to raise a strong presumption in favor of 
 the negative." Succession of Delachaise v. Maginnis, 44 La. Ann. 
 1043 (1892). This extract, by the way, is an excellent instance of 
 the common confusing of the " burden of establishing " and the 
 "burden of evidence." The first reference is apparently to the bur- 
 den of establishing ; the second to the burden of evidence. " Full 
 and conclusive proof, however, where a party has the burden of 
 proving a negative, is not required, but even vague proof, or such as 
 renders the existence of the negative jirobable, is, in souk! cases, 
 sufficient to change the burden to the other party." l>eardstown r. 
 Virginia, 70 111. ."4 (1875) ; cited with approval in Vigus v. O'Ban- 
 iion, 118 111. 334 (1886). 
 
 "Where the negative does not admit of direct proof, or the facts 
 lie more immediately within the knowledge of the defendant," the 
 party within wliose knowledge the proof is, is required to produce evi- 
 dence of the affirmative. U. S. v. Hay ward, 2 Gall. 485, 498 (1815). 
 
 So in an action for a penalty in neglecting, without excuse from 
 the judge of probate, to probate a will, it was held that the onus 
 was on the plaintiff to establish the negative averment of lack of 
 excuse. Smith v. Moore, 6 Greenl. 274 (1830). 
 
 Probably the onus of the party having the burden of establishing 
 is reliev«-(i of the proof of these facts because of the presumption 
 that sujjpressed evidence is unfavorable to the one who declines to 
 produce it; a feeling embodied in the \\\&x\m, omnia contra spoVuX' 
 
 it: 
 
 III 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 2766 
 
 torem. Lovell v. Payne, 30 La. Ann., Pt I., 511 (1878) ; Great 
 Western R. K. v. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (1863). 
 
 " Where it is as easy for the plaintiff to prove the negative as it is 
 for the defendant to disprove it, then the burthen of proof must rest 
 upon lain, as that the place where the animal was killed was not in 
 a town or village, or was not more than five miles from a settlement ; 
 but where the means of proving the negative are not within the 
 power of the plaintiff, but all the prftof on the subject is within the 
 control of the defendant, who, if the negative is not true, can disprove 
 it at once, there the law presumes the truth of the negative averment, 
 from the fact that the defendant withholds or does not produce the 
 proof, which is in his hands if it exists, that the negative is not true. 
 In other words, the burthen of proof is thrown upon the defendant 
 to prove the aifirmative against the negative averment." Great 
 Western R. R. /•. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (18G3). 
 
 Facts well knowx to other Party. — The rule requiring proof 
 of essential negative facts by him who has the burden of establishing 
 is especially modified where such proof includes facts difficult of 
 proof and peculiarly within the knowledge of the other party. 
 
 Thus where the defendant is charged with the commission of an 
 act without a license or other authority of law, as the fact of such 
 license or authority being one peculiarly within the knowledge of 
 the defendant, he may be called upon to prove it. State v. Morrison, 
 3 Dev. 299 (1831) ; Haskill v. Com. 3 B. Mon. 342 (1843) ; State v, 
 Crowell, 25 Me. 171 (1845) ; Shearer v. State, 7 Blackf. 99 t IU\) ; 
 Schmidt v. State, 14 Mo. 137 (1851) ; Wheat v. State, 6 Mo. 455 
 (1840). 
 
 On an indictment for selling intoxicating liquor, not being an agent 
 appointed for the sale of the same, it is not incumbent upon the 
 government to prove the negative averment ; but if the necessary 
 facts exist, the onus is on the defendant to introduce evidence to 
 prove them. State v. Shaw, 35 N. H. 217 (1857). On an indict- 
 ment for keeping a ferry without a license, the same rule is applied. 
 Wheat V. State, C Mo. 455 (1840). So on an indictment against a 
 physician for practising without a license. Williams v. People, 121 
 111. 84 (1887). 
 
 So in an action against a railroad company, under a statute, for 
 killing stock, the burden of establishing is not on the plaintiff to 
 prove the averment that there was no contract between the company 
 and the owner of the land that the owner should fence. Great 
 Western R. R. v. Bacon, 30 111. 347 (18G3). 
 
 "When a fact is peculiarly within the knowledge of a party, the 
 burden is on him to prove such fact whether the proposition be 
 affirmative or negative." Robinson r. Robinson, 51 111. App. 317 
 (1893) ; Clapp /-. Ellington, 87 Hun, 542 (1895). 
 
 Where the plaintiff is the party to whose case the existejice of a 
 
 I I 
 
270« 
 
 A.NiEHICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AHT II. 
 
 
 I'.- ■•! 
 
 license is essential, he nuist prove it. For example, in a civil action 
 for liquors sold. lUiss v. lirainard, 41 N. H. 250 (18G0) ; Solomon 
 V. Dreschler, 4 Minn. 278 (^ISfJO). 
 
 To the contrary effect, see Wilson v. ]\Ielvin, 13 Gray, 73 (ISiTJ). 
 " There is no legal presumption that tlie sale is unlawful, and there 
 should hardly l)e, in favor of a defendant who has himself joined in 
 the contract. As against tlie Commonwealth, the legislature have 
 required that the defendant in a criminal prosecution shall prove 
 the authority under which he acts, when charged with a violation of 
 the statutes prohibiting the unlicensed sale of intoxicating liquors ; 
 but they have imposed no such obligation upon parties who seek the 
 enforcement of contracts." Ilmh So where the defendant sets up 
 the illegality of such a contract, it is for him to establish it, even if 
 so doing includes the proof of negative averments. Craig v. Proctor, 
 G R. I. 547 (18G0). 
 
 The same result is reached by statute in Massachusetts. Pub. 
 Stats. Ch. 214, Sect. 12. Under this section it has been held, speak- 
 ing of the licensee, " If he be invested witli tliat authority only in 
 case certain circumstances exist, it is for the party relying on the 
 license to prove the existence of the circumstances." Com. r. Towle, 
 138 Mass. 490 (1885). Therefore, in case of a sale on Sunday, it is 
 necessary to show that the persons sold to were guests of tlie 
 licensee's hotel, such sales only being authorized by the license. 
 
 Burden of Establishing in Criminal Casks. — The pleadings 
 in a criminal case place the burden of establishing upon the govern- 
 ment as to all the essential ingredients of the crime charged. State 
 r. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). Shaier r. State, 7 Tex. App. 239 
 (1879) ; Com. /•. ]\rcKie, 1 Gray, 61 (1854) : " The burden is on the 
 Commonwealth to prove all that is necessary to constitute the 
 crime of murder." Com. r. Eddy, 7 Gray, 583 (1856); People c. 
 Garbutt, 17 ^lich. 9 (1808). 
 
 So of insanity in a criminal case. As the court say on a trial for 
 murder, " The prosecution takes upon itself the burden of establish- 
 ing not only the killing, but also the malicious intent in every case. 
 There is no such thing in the law as a separation of the ingredients 
 of the offence, so as to leave a part to be established by the prosecu- 
 tion, while as to the rest the defendant takes upon himself the 
 burden of proving a negative. The idea that tlie burden of proof 
 shifts in these cases is unphilosophical, and at war with fundamental 
 principles of criminal law." People v. Garbutt, 17 IMich. 9, 21 
 (1868) ; State /•. Crawford, 11 Ivans. 32 (1873); Fife v. Com., 29 Pa. 
 St. 429 (1857). 
 
 In a criminal case, where the defence of nh'bi was relied on, the 
 court say that if they are to construe a ruling of the trial judge, 
 that by evoking this defence, " the prisoner changed the burthen of 
 proof under his plea of not guilty, and waived his right under that 
 
CHAP, in.] 
 
 AMERICAX NOTES. 
 
 27<i'' 
 
 c. 
 
 plea, to demand from the Commonwealtli full proof of his guilt, w(; 
 should be bound to say tliat it was a cruel and monstrous misai)pre- 
 hensiou of the law. . . . But it is very clear that a resort to that 
 kind of evidence neither changes the burthen of proof on the other 
 questions in the cause, nor in any manner entitles the Common- 
 wealth to a verdict against the prisoner without proof of liis guilt 
 beyond reasonable doubt." Fife v. Com. 29 Pa. St. 429 (1857). 
 
 In a Massachusetts case for arson where the defence of (ilihi was 
 also relied upon, the court sustain a ruling which, indeed, is correct, 
 though using the phrase " burden of proof" indiscriminately as des- 
 ignating the burden of introducing evidence to support the claim 
 of (ilifil (which clearly rested on the defendant as soon as the gov- 
 einment had made out a 2)>'l»ut farl-i case), and the burden of 
 establishing that the defendant was guilty (which at no time left 
 tiie government). ''The proposition was, in substance, that if the 
 defendant sought to establish the fact that he was at a particular 
 place at a particular time, the burden of proof was upon him. But 
 he (the trial judge) modified this statement in respect to its bearing 
 upon the burden of proof which was upon the government to 
 establish the alleged fact that the defendant was present at tiie lire. 
 The substance of the whole ruling was, that if the evidcntie of the 
 defendant which tended to prove an (dUil was such tliat, taken 
 together with the other evidence, the jury were left in reasonable 
 doubt as to whether the defendant was present at the alleged fire, 
 they should acquit him. We cannot see that he has any ground to 
 object to this ruling, for it left the evidence whicii tended to prove 
 the (d!'>l, even if it failed to establisli it, to have its full effect in 
 bringing into doubt the evidence tending to prove the defendant's 
 ju'esence at the fire." Com. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870). To 
 the same effect see Briceland ik Com., 74 Pa. St. 4(5.3 (1S78). " There 
 is no shifting of tlie burden of proof. It remains upon the State 
 throughout the trial. The evidence may shift from one side to the 
 other. The state may establisli such facts as must result in a con- 
 viction, unless tlie ])resumpti()n they raise be met by evidence, l)ut 
 still the burden of proof is on the State to establisli the guilt of tlie 
 accused beyond a reasonable doubt." State /•. Wingo, Gi> ^[o. ISl 
 (1877). 
 
 To the contrary effect, that when the defendant in a criminal case 
 relies on the justification of self-defence, he must prove the same by 
 a fair preponderance of the evidence, see Peo[)le r. Schryver, 4ii 
 N.Y.I (1870). 
 
 Pkoceedinos wrTHOUT Pi.KADiNiis. — Where the legal investiga- 
 tion is of such a niiture that there are no pleadings, the analogy of 
 pleading is so far followed that the burden of establishing lies upon 
 him who asserts the affirmative of the issue as determined by the 
 nature of the investigation. 
 
!■'• :!i 
 
 M ■ i 
 
 ■ilii rn 
 
 2768 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 As the party offering a will for probate impliedly affirins that the 
 will " was executed with the requisite formalities by one of full age 
 and sound mind, he m\ist prove it." The onus of establishing is 
 therefore on him throughout. Tiiis burden is not shifted by evi- 
 dence of sanity by the subscribing witnesses. Crowninshield v. 
 €rowninsliield, 2 Gray, 524 (18o4) ; Comstock r. Hadlyme Ecclesi- 
 asti(!al Society, 8 Conn. 254 (1830); Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenl. 42 
 <18yi). 
 
 TiiK BuKDKN OK EsTAUMSHiNu DOES NOT Shift. — It is hardly 
 necessary to say that this burden of establishing a case does not 
 shift, it cannot shift, sinii)ly because the issue has been fixed once 
 for all by the pleadings, and the rules of jileading do not permit it 
 to be altered during the progress of a trial on those pleadings. 
 Wright V. Wright, 189 Mass. 177 (1885). " AVe understand the doc- 
 trint! to be well settled in this Commonwealth, that the burden of 
 proof nev ■- shifts ; and we think, that in the case we are discussing, 
 and in case at bar, the burden to sliow negligence was upon the 
 plaintiffs from the beginning, and remained on them throughout the 
 trial." Willett v. Rich, 142 .Mass. 350 (1886); Aulls v. Young, !)8 
 Mich. 231 (1893). 
 
 In this sense, it is true that "a jiriiiKi facie case does not change 
 the burden of proof." Blanchard v. Young, 11 Cush. 341, 345 (1853). 
 In an action of contract on the warranty of the endorsement on a 
 promissory note, the defendant set np that he was acting as a broker 
 in the negotiation of the note, and that the plaintiff knew the fact. 
 The plaintiff asked for a ruling that the burden of proof was on the 
 <lefendant to satisfy the jury of these facts. Held: that such an 
 instruction was rightly refused. " Although it was incumbent upon 
 the defendant to establish the truth of any fact relied upon by him 
 to overcome the prima facie case which the plaintiff had made out, 
 yet there was no change in the burden of proof in a legal sense. 
 This defence was not a confession and avoidance. It was indeed an 
 assertion of new and distinct facts ; but it tended to establish the 
 negative of the very proposition r.pon which alone the plaintiff could 
 recover ; namely, that his contract was with the defendant in the 
 suit." Wilder v. Cowles, 100 Mass. 487 (1808). 
 
 It is thought that a certain amount of ambiguity in the use of the 
 phrase "burden of proof," lies in the fact that under the statute 
 laws of many of the states of the American Union, there are no 
 such things as pleadings, — in the scientific sense. The defendant is 
 allowed to set up some kind oi a general issue and introduce, under 
 that traverse, a number of affirmative defences on which, in a more 
 scientific system of pleading, the burden would be on him. For 
 f^xample, under a general issue to a declaration charging negligence, 
 th(^ defendant, it has been held, is entitled to give evidence of 
 contributory negligence. Indianapolis &c. II. R. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 276« 
 
 291 (187C). Under these ciroumstanocs, the burden of proof is said 
 to be upon the defendant to establish tiie defence relied upon l)y a 
 fair preponderance of the evidence. In other words, he has the 
 burden of establishing that issue. As a matter of conmion-law 
 pleading, the defence of contributory negligence is set up by an 
 afiirniative plea. Stone r. Hunt, 94 Mo. 475 (1SS7). 
 
 It may plausibly be said that in cases like Indianapolis &c. R. R. 
 V. Horst (iibi supra), the burden of estaV.ishing changes, or, as it is 
 said, shifts. Color is given to this suggestion by the fact that while, 
 on the record, the affirmative of the issue seems to be upon the 
 plaintiff, after the afHrmative defence of contributory negligence is 
 set up, the burden of establishing it, by a fair preponderance of the 
 evidence, is upon the defendant. This seeming exception to the 
 rule that the burden of establishing does not change, exists in 
 appearance only. The fact seems to be that the parties are not 
 really at issue on the allegations of the record, and only become so 
 when the defendant states his real defence in the evidence. In 
 other words, the defendant is allowed to raise the issue by his evi- 
 dence, instead of in his pleading. The real issue in Indianapolis 
 &c. II. R. ('. Ilorst was one of contributory negligence, and on this 
 defence the affirmative was on the defendant. Under a scientific 
 system of pleading, this issue would have been revealed before the 
 close of the pleadings, and the burden of establishing definitely 
 ])laoed upon the defendant. Under the system of pleading in use in 
 Indianapolis &c. R. R. r. Horst {iihi siqini), the defendant was 
 accorded the privilege of delaying the time at which he should set 
 np his real affirmative defence until the record pleadings had closed 
 and the trial begun. Another instance may be found in MoCloskey 
 V. Davis, 8 Ind. App. 190 (1893), where the court say: "When a 
 !j;eneral denial is pleaded, all defences may be proved under the 
 issues thus formed, except a set-off or counter claim." 
 
 (2) BuKDEN OF EviDEvcK. — The duty of introducing evidence 
 to prove or prevent proof of facts in issue is not, like the burden of 
 establishing, a resultant of the pleadings. lis position, as between 
 the parties, is determined, not by the state of the pleadings, but by 
 the logical state of the case. The issue being fixed, the logical 
 interest of one party is to produce an affirmative conviction on the 
 ])art of the tribunal. It is the object of tlie other party to prevent 
 it. Such a state of the evidence as would, if undisputed, produce 
 such affirmative conviction, constitutes a prima ftin'r case. It merely 
 repeats the statement, therefore, in another form, to say that the 
 interest of one party is to establish such a prima facie case, and of 
 the other party to destroy it, either by establishing a prima facie case 
 of his own, or by reducing the probative force of tlie opposing case 
 belo.v the required standard. Should this effort succeed, the neces- 
 sav ■ consequence is that the burden or necessity rests on the first 
 
 ii! 
 
T! 
 
 :! 
 
 27610 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT J I. 
 
 pleader to introduce additional evidence with a view to strengthening' 
 liis former proof into a jirimn fucir case, either by disproving the 
 facts alh'ged against it, or by jjroving additional facts. If, when 
 tiie evidence on both sides is all in, the pleader wlio lias the afhrnia- 
 tive of the issue remains witli what tiie tribunal considers tlic 
 equivalent of a pr'unn facie caso, lie succeeds ; otlierwise, not. Tlie 
 necessity for having the final tip of the scale in his favor lias not 
 clianged since the pleadings placed it on him, however many times 
 the probative scales may have changed in tlieir balance. " Wiieii 
 upon all the facts the case is left in equipoise, the party atHrming 
 must fail." Oaks v. Harrison, 24 la. 17'J (18GS). 
 
 The BiMiDKN of Evn»r':\('E Shifts. — It follows from what has 
 been said that this burden of introducing evidence to prove or dis- 
 prove a prima facie case may, and frequently does, change from one 
 side to the other. A fair test of where it rests at any particular 
 stage of the case is to answer the question : Against whom would the 
 tribunal decide if no further evidence were introduced ? Applying 
 this test, it is obvious that at the opening of the case the burden of 
 establishing and the burden of evidence rest on the same person. 
 Vriets v. Hagge, 8 Ta. 103, 11)2 (1859). Upon the establishment by 
 him of -A priina facie case, while the burden of establisliing remains, 
 tlie burden of evidence is obviously shifted. Powers v. Kussell, 13 
 Pick, m, 77 (1832) ; Tolson v. Inland, &c. Coasting Co., G Mackey, 
 39 (1887) ; Penitentiary Co. v. Gordon, 85 Ga. 159 (1890) ; Ketchum 
 V. Amer. «fec. Exp. Co., 52 Mo. 390 (1873). ' The two burdens are 
 distiiict things. One may shift back and fcrth with the ebb and 
 flow of the testimony. The other remains with the i^arty upon 
 whom it is cast by the pleadings, — that is to say, with the party 
 who lias the affirmative of the issue." Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 398 
 (1889.) 
 
 " During the progress of a trial it often happens that a party 
 gives evidence tending to establish his allegation, sufficient it may 
 be to establish it prima facie, and it is sometimes said that the 
 burden of proof is then shifted. All that is meant by this is, that 
 there is a necessity of evidence to answer the prima facie case, or it 
 will prevail, but the burden of maintaining the affirmative of the 
 issue involved in the action is upon the party alleging the fact 
 which consti';utes the issue, and this burden remains throughout the 
 trial." Heinemann v. Heard, 02 N. Y. 448, 455 (1875). The su- 
 preme C'jurt of Texas, after saying that the fact that the negative 
 form of the issue does not determine the burden of proving, add, 
 " Much less does the fact that a defendant is forced to maintain the 
 affirmative of some fad, in disproving the plaintiff's ^ase, shift upon 
 him the burden of proof." Clark v. H.'.lls, 67 Tex. 141 (1886) ; Small 
 V. Clewley, 62 Me. 155 ri873) ; Jones v. Simpson, IIG U. S. G09 
 (1885); Harris v. Harris, 154 Pa. St. 501 (1893). 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 '27(5" 
 
 WIhm'p a (It'od prima furle correct was ])nt in evidence by tl)e 
 plaintiffs in aid of their title, the burden of introducinj,' evideneo to 
 show a forgery is on the defendant. "The appellees having made a 
 j'fivKf facie case of the genuineness of the instrument the burden 
 »)f proof was cast v.jion the intervenor to rebut this." Smith v. 
 (iilluui, SO Tex. 120 (ISOI). In an action for negligently over- 
 driving a horse the court say : " A prima facie case was made by 
 the introduction of evidence tending to prove that the horse, at the 
 time of the delivery to the defendant, was apparently in good con- 
 dition. If the evidence had closed at this point, the plaintiff would 
 have been entitled to recover, provided the jurors were satisfied 
 from its evidence that the horse was in a healthy condition at th'3 
 time of its delivery to defendant. Therefore, at this stage of the 
 proceeding, the burden of evidence was cast on the defendant to show 
 by some substantial' evidence chat he exercif sd ordinary care in 
 the use of the animal. When this burden was met, then the final 
 question for the jury was whether the whole evidence preponderated 
 in favor of the plaintiff as to the constitutive facts of its cause of 
 action, i. e., that the defendant was negligent in the use of the horse, 
 and that such negligence was the proximate cause of its death. The 
 burden of proving these issues by a preponderance of evidence was 
 imposed on the plaintiff by the pleadings, and we can conceive of no 
 principle, recognized in our code of civil procedure, that would re- 
 lieve the plaintiff of this onus." Marshall Livery Co. v. McKelvy, 
 o5 Mo. App. 240 (1893). 
 
 " In every case in which there is prima facie evidence of any 
 right existing in any person, the burden of proof is always on the 
 ])erson or party calling such right in question." Walker v. Detroit, 
 &c. R. R., 47 Mich. 338, 351 (1882). 
 
 Sc where a plaintiff claims an easement by prescription, the 
 onus of proving the easement claimed is on him. When the 
 necessary facts are shown, the prima facie case is established. If 
 the defendant's position be that he was under a disability at the 
 time of the user claimed to be adverse, the onus of introducing evi- 
 dence to prove such disability is on the defendant. Davidson v. 
 Nicholson, 59 Ind. 411 (1877). 
 
 So far as proof of ])artioular facts goes, it is undoubtedly true that 
 the party whose case reuuires proof of any particular fact is under 
 the onus of introducing evidence to prove it. Lehman Bros. n. 
 McQueen, G5 Ala. 570 (1880); Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall, 299, 315 
 (18G7); Freeh i>. Philadelphia, &c. R. R., 39 Md. o74 (1873). 
 
 If such particular fact, however, is involved in the proof of the 
 aiKrmativc of the issue in the case, it is saflicient for the party 
 not having the burden of establishing, to create an equipoise or 
 reasonable doubt, according as the case may be civil or criminal. 
 
 As an instance of the ambiguity arising from the use of the term, 
 
I ' 
 
 1 
 
 i- !■ 
 
 
 276" 
 
 AMEItK'AN NOTKS. 
 
 [PAIJT II. 
 
 "burden of proof," to indicate the burden of introducing evidence 
 to prove particular facts, see Burton /'. Blin, 23 Vt. lol (ISril), where 
 the learned judge (Chief Justice Kedtiekl) says : " As a general rule, 
 it is fair to say, that the burden of i)roof rests upon both parties, to 
 make out their own part oi the case." 
 
 Pkksumptionh ok Law. — It is said that " presumptions of law 
 shift the burden of proof.'' This is not true of the burden of estab- 
 lishing. It may be quite correct as to the burden of evidence, if the 
 presumption in question covers a fact in evidence. As to such fact, 
 there is a levunifn probiithni'iK in I'avor of the party having the onus. 
 A presumption of law is a fact to be proved, rather than evidence 
 to prove a fact. 
 
 As lias been said, the burden of evidence is, at first, on the party 
 who has the burden of establishing, and afterwards on the party who 
 has to meet an amount of adverse evidence equivalent to a prima 
 facie case. A jiresumption of law as to fact covered by it estab- 
 lishes a prima facie case. That is its precise object and effect. It 
 follows that the party who is able to prove the existence of a pre- 
 sumption of law in his favor has, in so doing, made out a prima facie 
 ca.«'e as to the fact covered. The burden of disproving it is cast on 
 the opposing interest. In other words, the burden of evidence is 
 shifted. When conflicting evidence on the point covered by the 
 presumption of law is gone into on the initiative of the opposing 
 interest, the presum]ttion of law is fumfiis offlrio, as such. The 
 presumption of fact on which it is founded loses its prima facie value 
 as a levamen j>ro/»<ifioiiis, but retains any probativo force. 
 
 So in an action on a promissory note, where the defence is lack of 
 consideration, the court charged that the burden of proof was on the 
 defendant to prove such lack of consideration. Held, that this was 
 erroneous. " In one sense, a burden of proof would be upon tlie de- 
 fendant a particular burden, to rebut the prima facie case maile by 
 the production of a genuine note, but the general burden of proof 
 was upon the plaintiff to show a consideration for the notes, and 
 that burden does not shift. . . . Here the plaintiff declares, in his 
 writ, that the notes were given for value. If not so given, they 
 were not the contracts upon which the defendant could ye legally 
 held. The plaintiff is required to prove this essential allegation. 
 He can rely on the presumption which arises from the note itself. 
 But there being other evidence on both sides, which has a beariuji 
 upon the question of consideration, the burden remains upon the 
 plaintiff upon all the evidence produced, including the note itself 
 and the presumption that arises from it, to establish what he, in the 
 declaration in his writ, has necessarily alleged." Small /•. Clewley, 
 62 Me. 155 (1873; Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R. I. 76 (1868) ; Manistee 
 Bank v. Seymour, 64 Mich. 59 (1887) ; Wilcox v. Henderson, 64 
 Ala. 5;55 (1879) ; Coffin v. Grand Rapids, &e. Co. 136 N. Y. 653 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTK."*. 
 
 27fJI» 
 
 (189.^); Kitner /•. Whitlock, 88 111. r,l;{ (IS7S); Temple Street 
 Cable R. K. v. Hellinan, 10.'3 Cal. <)o4 (181)4). 
 
 A fair instance of the effect of a presumption of "law in shifting 
 the burden of evidcMice may be seen in the deftMu^e of insanity in 
 criminal causes. According to tlie better opinion the bunion is on tlui 
 ifovernment to prove sanity — beyond a reasomihle doubt. State r. 
 Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 400 (1871) ; People c. (}arbutt, 17 Mich. <) 
 (18G8); State v. Crawford, 11 Kaus. 32» (1873) ; (Jom. r. Kddy, 7 
 Gray, .'583 (185(5). 
 
 At the opening of the trial the burden of proving the defendant 
 guilty rests on the government. The burden of introducing evi- 
 dence of the facts necessary to sustain that burden of proving, in 
 other words the establishment of a prima facie case, is also on the 
 government. 
 
 Kut to make out such a prima facie case, so far as sanity is con- 
 cerned, the government is not required to produce affirmative evi- 
 dence as part of its original case. It is a presumption of law that 
 all men are sane. 
 
 If the accused rests his defence on the claim that he is insane, and 
 there is no other evidence in the case, the burden" of evidence is on 
 him to introduce evidence to that effect. If he is silent, the pre- 
 sumption of law prevails. It thus has shifti. ' the burden "of evi- 
 dence from the government to the accused. But the burden of 
 establishing the defendant guilty has not shifted. If the accused 
 weakens the government's prima facie case by raising a reasona- 
 ble doubt as to his sanity, the burden of introducing evidence to 
 strengthen the government's (piantum of proof to the ecjuivul'Mit of 
 a prima facie case now rests on the government, — who may ntro- 
 duce affirmative evidence of sanity. In so doing, while the j>riivi 
 facie effect of the presumption of law as a hvoiiien prohntlo' > 
 gone, the government is entitled to the full probative effect ? 
 
 presumption of fact that the accused is sane, because men general i^v 
 are. 
 
 When all the evidence is in on the issue of sanity, the burden of 
 establishing still contiiuiingto rest on the government, if the accused 
 has succeeded in preventing the government from establishing the 
 equivalent of a prima facie case, by raising a reasonal)le doubt as to 
 liis sanity, he must be acquitted. State r. Jones, oO X. II. 3G9, 40O 
 (1871); People v. (Jarbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (18()8) ; State v. Crawford, 
 II Kans. 32 (187.']). 
 
 Presumptions of law may be established by the legislature pre- 
 scribing that certain facts shall establish a prima facie case. 
 
 liike other presumptions of law, the presumptions so created do 
 not operate to alter the burden of establishing, but transfer to the 
 opposite party the onus of introducing evidence to meet the prima 
 facie case they establish. While the party having the burden of 
 
 I ! ! ! 
 
 1 ! 
 
270'^ 
 
 AMKItlCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AIIT II. 
 
 pstal)lis]iiiif; is pxcusod from goiuR forward in the first iiistaiioo wiicii 
 t.luM'c is a i)rt'siiiiiption of law in his favor, lift is hy no iiieuits tliert'- 
 hy t'xcusod from tiic necessity of establishing that fact if dispnted. 
 Com. ('. Heath, 11 Gray, .m'i^lSoH). 
 
 Thns, when an auditor's report is made prima facie evidence by 
 statute for the party in whose favor it is. "The auditor's report, it 
 is true, is only jjrima facie evidence, and does not change the hiirdeu 
 of proof, but the plaintiff may in the first instance rest his case upon 
 it, anil, if it is attempted to control or impeach it by other evidence 
 offered by the defendants, may be permitted to put in evidence in 
 reply, in support of his own case." JJrewer v. Ilousatonic K. K. Co., 
 104 Mass. oDS (1870); Shepardson v. Perkins, CO N. II. 7G (1880); 
 lilodgett V. Cummings, GO N. H. llo (1880). So of the assessment of 
 value by api)raisers appointed under a statute. Kailroad v. Crider, 
 91 Tenn. 480 (1802). 
 
 Such prima facie effect may be given to certain evidence, by stat- 
 ute, not only in civil but in criminal cases. 
 
 Th\is the law may provide that the act of a physician in prescrib- 
 ing whiskey is prima facie a violation of the "local option" law. 
 Com. V. Minor, SSKy. 41.'2 (1880). 
 
 ItioiiT TO Opkn and Ci.osk. — This right is rather a rule of 
 practice and jirocedure than one involved in the burden of proof. 
 As a rule, however, the party having the burden of establishing has 
 the right to open and close. Seavy v. Dearborn, 19 N. H. 3/)l (1849) ; 
 Koyal Ins. Co. /•. Schwing, 87 Ky. 410 (1888) ; Ware v. Ware, 8 
 Greenleaf, 42 (18:11) ; Gaul v. Fleming, 10 Ind. 253 (18r)8) ; Norris 
 V. Ins. Co., 3 Yeates, 84 (1800). But while this is so, the right is 
 largely discretionary with the court, and on a probate of a will 
 where the party not under the burden of establishing was given tli< 
 open and close, the court refused a new trial. Comstock v. Hadlynie 
 Ecclesiastical Society, 8 Conn. 254 (1830). 
 
 In Massachusetts, on the contrary, the plaintiff opens and closes, 
 regardless of who has t\"i burden of establishing a case under tlic 
 pleadings. Tage i: Osgood, 2 Gray, 2fi0 (1854) ; Hurley v. O'Sulli- 
 van, 137 Mass. 80 (1884). The rule is the same in equity cases. 
 Dorr V. Tremont Hank, 128 Mass. 349 (1880). 
 
 In probate trials, in Massachusetts, the executor propounding the 
 •will opens and closes without regard to the burden of proof. Dorr 
 f. Tremont {uhl sti/jrti) ; Crowninshield v. Crowninshield, 2 Gray, 
 524 (1854). The rule is essentially one of procedure. For a short 
 period the right to open and close could be acquired by the defend- 
 ant under a rule of court. Spaulding ». Hood, 8 Cush. 602 (1851) ; 
 Emmons v. Hay ward, 11 Cush. 48 (1853). 
 
 ir''! ' 
 
ClUP. IV.] UEST EVIDENCE MUST BE PRODUCED. 
 
 Hit 
 
 ' M 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 BEST EVIDENCE. 
 
 § 391.' The fourth of the rules which have been laid down * as 
 governing the production of evidence is, that the best evidence, of 
 which the I'ase in its nntitre is susceptible, should alwaj's be presented 
 to the jury. This rule does not demand that the greatest amount 
 of evidence which can possibly be given of any fact should be 
 offered ; it is designed to prevent the introduction of such evidence 
 as, from the nature of the case, allows room for supposing that 
 better evidence is in the possession of the party, and to prevent fraud. 
 For when better evidence than that which is offered is withheld, it 
 is only fair to presume, that the party has some sinister motive 
 for not producing it, which would be frustrated if it were offered.' 
 The rule is thus essential to the pure administrati(m of justice. In 
 requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to each 
 particular fact, it is meant that no evidence shall be received which 
 is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original 
 evidence is attainable.* For instance, depositions are in general 
 admissible only after proof that the parties who made them cannot 
 themselves be produced ; * and a preliminary agreement, which has 
 been followed up by the execution of a deed of conveyance, cannot 
 be admitted as evidence to show what parcels were subsequcnitly 
 conveyed.* For the contents of every deed must be proved by the 
 production of the deed itself, if such deed be within the control of 
 
 > Gr. Ev. § 82, in part. 
 
 » Ante, § 217. 
 
 3 See Strother v. Barr, 1828 (Best, 
 C.J.); Brewster v. Sewell, 1H20 (Hol- 
 rovcl, J.) ; Twyman v. Knowles, 1853 
 (Jervis, C.J.); Clifton v. U. S., 18-16 
 (Am.) (Nelson, J.). 
 
 * 1 Phil. Ev. 418; 1 St. Ev. -500; 
 Ghssf. Ev. 2«()- -278; Tiiyloe r. Riggs, 
 1828 (Am.); U. S. v. lieyburn. 18;}2 
 (Am.); Minor ?;.Tiliotson, 183;i(Am.). 
 
 » B. N. P. 239. 
 
 * Williams v, Morgan, 1850, 
 
 277 
 
 ill 
 
BKST EVIDENCE MUST BE PRODUCED. [PAIJT IT. 
 
 
 '' ! 
 
 
 the party. For every deed is tlie best evidence of its own contents, 
 and its non-production raises a presumption that it contains some 
 matter of defeasance. On the same principle, if there be duplicate 
 originals of a deed, all must be accounted for, before secondary 
 evidence can be given of any one.* 
 
 § 392. Similarly, an instrument, requiring attestation to its 
 validity,^ must in general be proved by calling a subscribing 
 witness;' and if there be two such witnesses, it will not be sufficient 
 80 long as one of them is alive, sane, free from permanent sickness, 
 within the jurisdiction of the court, and capable of being found by 
 diligent inquiry, to prove the signature of the other who is dead ; 
 for such evidence would merely raise a presumption that the deceased 
 had witnessed all which the law requires for the due execution of 
 the instrument ; whereas the surviving witness would have been 
 able to yirc direct proof. Such direct testimony is evidence of a 
 better and higher nature than mere presumption arising from the 
 proof of the witness's handwriting.* 
 
 § 393. The rule under discussion only excludes evidence which 
 itsc/f indicates the existence of more oriyinal sources of information. 
 Therefore, when there is no substitution of inferior evidence, but 
 only a selection of weaker, instead of stronger, proofs, or an 
 omission to supply all the proofs capable of being produced, the 
 rule is not infrhiged.' For instance, in proof or disproof of hand- 
 writing, or in proof of the contents of a letter whicli cannot ho 
 produced, it is not necessary to call the supposed writer ; " whore it 
 is necessary to prove negatively that an act was done without the 
 consent, or against the will, of another, the person whose will or 
 consimt is denied, need not be himself called,^ and where an 
 instrument is required to be attested by two witnesses, it is only 
 neeessni'y,-— exce])ting in the case of wills relating to real estate, — 
 to call one of them, though the other may be at hand.* Even the 
 
 ' Alivon V. Furnivnl, 18.'}4 (Purko, 
 
 - As to provin;:; oxociition of Jocu- 
 inontrt not ro(inirin<7 attostatii-u, eoe 
 28 & 'Ji) V. c. IH, § 7. 
 
 •' Uowiiian V. Hodgson, 18G7. 
 
 • Wright V. Doe d. Tathum, 1834 
 (Timlal. C.J.). 
 
 • 1 Ph. Ev. 
 
 418. Sue Alfonso v. 
 
 U. S., 18415 (Am.). 
 
 • R. V. lluiloy, 1843 ; Ilughns' 
 caso, 1802; M'Giiiro'H ciiso, 1801 ; U. 
 V. Bonson, 1810; Liobmau v. Poolcy, 
 ISKJ; bank ProHocutio.is, 1819. 
 
 ' 1!, v. Hazy, 1820; 11. v. Allon, 
 182(>; R. V. lliirloy, 1843. 
 
 « Andrew)'. Motley, 1862; Belbin 
 V. Skeats, 1857; Eo'reter y, Forstor, 
 
 278 
 
oolcy, 
 
 CHAP. IV.] PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 previous deposition of a deceased subscribing witness, if admissible 
 on other grounds, may supersede the necessity of calling the 
 survivor.' 
 
 § 394.* The nile that in each case the best r linable evidence is 
 required to be given naturally suggests that all evidence is divided 
 into PRIMARY and seoionuary. Primary evidence is the best or 
 highest evidence, or, in other words, that kind of proof which, 
 in the ey > of the law, affords the greetest certainty of the fact in 
 question. Until it is sliown that the production of this evidence is 
 out of the party's power, no other proof of the fact is in general 
 admitted. All evidence falling short of this in its degree, and 
 suggesting on the face of it that other and better evidence is 
 attainable, is termed liccondary. The question whether evidence is 
 primary or secondary has reference to the natuio of the case in the 
 abstract, and not to the peculiar circumstances under whicli the 
 party, in the particular cause on trial, may be placed. It is a dis- 
 tinction of law, and not of fact ; referring only to the quality, and 
 not to the strcnyth of the proof. Evidence, which carries on its 
 face no indication that better remains behind, is not secondary, but 
 primary. 
 
 § 395.' But though all information must, if possible, be traced 
 to its fountain head, yet if there be several distinct sources of 
 information of the same fact, it is not in general necessary to show 
 that they have all been exhausted, before recourse can bo had to 
 secondary evidence with respect to one of thera.^ For instance, if 
 it be requisite to prove that a collector has received certain sums of 
 money, primary evidence of that fact is the evidence of the col- 
 lector himself if he be clive, or else the evidence of the parties who 
 paid him, while (if the collector be dead) secondary evidence — such 
 as entries in his book acknowledging the receipt, or if the book 
 itself be in the hands of the opjjuiite party, who, after notice, 
 refuses to produce it, even secondary evidence of its contents — is 
 also admissible.* 
 
 1863; Anstoyv. Dowsing, 1745, 1746; 
 Or. Kv. 1-20, V12, 123. 
 
 ' Wright t'. Doo </. Tatham, 1834. 
 
 » Or. Kv. § 84, in part. 
 
 • Or. Ev. § 84 , as t« first four linos. 
 
 « Cutbush V. Uilbert, 1818 (Am.) ; 
 
 U. S. V. Oibert, 1834 (Am.). 
 
 » Middlotou V. A.olton, 1820 (Bav- 
 loy and I'urko, JJ.); Harry v. Ikib- 
 bii\gton, 1792. The diHtiiiction Iw- 
 twccn this case and that of tho two 
 subscribing witucssos to an instru- 
 
 279 
 
 ' 1 
 
 ■ I ■ 
 1 ' ■ 
 
 ■ ' ( 
 
 ; ! I 
 
 
Wh 
 
 h'\l 
 
 
 I 
 
 i 'SI 
 
 DOCUMENTS NOT PROVABLE BY PAROL. [PART 11. 
 
 § 396.' The cases which most frequently call for the application 
 of the rule that the best evidence of which the ease is susceptible 
 must always be produced, are those which relate to the siihstitidion 
 of oral for written evidence. The effect of the rule on these cases is 
 to render it necessary that the contents of a written instrument, 
 which is capable of being produced, be proved by the instrument itself, 
 and not by parol evidence? Lord ' Tenterden said : " I have always 
 acted most strictly on the rule, that what is in writing shall only 
 be proved by the writing itself. My experience has taught me the 
 extreme danger of relying on the recollection of witnesses, however 
 honest, as to the contents of written instruments ; they may be so 
 easily mistaken, that I think the purposes of justice require the 
 strict enforcement of the rule."* Lord Wynford observed: "I 
 seldom pass a day in a Nisi Prius Court without wishing that there 
 had been some written statement evidentiary of the matters in 
 dispute. More ar+ions have arisen, perhaps, from want of attention 
 and observation at the time of a transaction, from the imperfection 
 of human memory, and from witnesses being too ignorant, and too 
 much under the influence of prejudice, to give a true account of it, 
 than from any other cause. There is often a great difficulty in 
 getting at the truth by means of parol testimony. Our ancestors 
 were v,ise in making it a rule, that in all cases the best evidence 
 that could be had should be produced ; and great writers on the 
 law of evidence say, if the best evidence be kept back, it raises a 
 suspicion that, if produced, it would falsify the secondary evidence 
 ,on which the party has rested his case. The first case those writers 
 refer to as being governed by this rule is, that where there is 
 a contract in writing, no parol testimony can be received of its 
 contents, unless the instrument be proved to have been lost." * An 
 additional but important reason for the application of the rule 
 
 ment, where, as we have soen (ante, 
 § ;{92) proof must be given that both 
 the witnesses are uniiblo to be called, 
 before evidence of the handwriting 
 of one of them can bo received, — 
 seems to be, that the iittesting wit- 
 nossiis are either rendered necessary 
 by statute, or at least have \wv.n 
 8c)loiiii\ly (ihoson by the j);irti('«. us 
 the persons on whoso united tebti- 
 
 mony they wish to roly, and, conse- 
 quently, so long as one of them can 
 DO callt!d, secondary evidence respect- 
 ing the other cannot be admitted. 
 
 ' (ir. Ev. § 85, as to first three 
 lines, 
 
 ' The Queen's case, 1820, H. L. 
 
 ' Or. Kv. §88, in part. 
 
 « Vincent c. (We, 1828. 
 
 6 Htrother v. iJarr, 1828. 
 
 280 
 
 liit 
 
L. 
 
 CII. IV.] WANT OF PROPER STAMP, HOW CURED AT TRIAL. 
 
 in the manner pointed out is, that the court may acquire a know- 
 ledge of the whole contents of the instrument, which may have a 
 very different effect from the statement of a part.' 
 
 § 397. Tlie rule requiring every written document to he proved 
 by production of the docu;uent itself in civil courts ^ often indi- 
 rectly inflicts grave injustice* in consequence of the stamp laws. 
 For, as a general rule, a document which is inadmissible for want 
 of a stamp* to prove the fact it prima f.acie shows is also inad- 
 missible for any purpose whatever,* even a collateral purpose — so 
 that, for example, an insufficiently stamped promissory note cannot 
 be used as evidence of the receipt of money by tlie maker of such 
 note.' An exception to this rule indeed prevails when it is only 
 sought to use a document to refresh the memory." And, moreover, 
 the judges, some years ago, promulgated a rule (which is, perhaps, 
 of questionable expediency), that, unless the want or insufficiency of 
 a stamp be pointed out at the earliest possible period, that is, as soon 
 as the document is tendered in evidence, an objection on that ground 
 will not bo entertained." And a further attempt has been made to, 
 as the Common Law Commissioners express it,** "reconcile the claims 
 of justice with the interests of the revenue," hy enabling all such 
 instruments as may be stamped after execution to be received in 
 evidence, though unstamped, or insufficiently stamped, if the party 
 who tenders them is prepared at the trial to pay to the officer of the 
 court the proper duty," the penalty, and a further sum of 1/.'^ 
 
 > The (iueon's case, 1820, H. L. 
 
 ' In criminal courts a stamj) ob- 
 jcutioii dous not u])])!}' at ail. " Tlio 
 Stamp Act, 1891" (o4 & 55 V. c. 3'J), 
 § 11, subs. 4. 
 
 ^ Sl'o i)or Ld. Tcntordon, in lloid v. 
 15atto, 182!>. Tlio law us to stamps 
 is now contained for tbo most part in 
 •'The Stamp Act, 18i»l " {oi & 55 
 V. c. ;j!t). 
 
 * Intoiloaf Publisliing Co. v. Phil- 
 lips, 188.'). 
 
 5 Asbling V. IJoon, 1891. 
 
 • Soi' post, § 1411. 
 ' llobuisou V. Jid. Vurnon, 1859. 
 
 Si^e ante, § ;)()9. 
 
 " 2n(l Itcp. p. 2(). 
 
 ' AdocnnuMittobo "dulystainiiMl" 
 must bo stamped "in ac'cordaiut! with 
 tht» law in force at the time wh(^ii it 
 •..'as hrst o.xucuted." tj4 & o5 V. 
 
 c. 39, § 14, gnbs. 4; Clarke v. Eoche, 
 
 1877. 
 
 '» 54 & 55 V. c. 39 (" The Stamp 
 Act, 1891"), § 14, snbss. 1 and 2, 
 enacts, tliat " upon tlie production of 
 an instruin(!nt cliarj^cable witli anv 
 duty as evidinco in anyc^ourt of civil 
 judicature in any part of the United 
 Jvinj,'dom, or belcvo any arbitrator or 
 refert'O, notice siiai" bo taken by tho 
 jiidf^e. arbitrator, or rii'. : . of any 
 omission or iiisulficiency of tlie stamp 
 th(!reon ; and if the iiistiunient is ono 
 wliich may h'j^ally bo stamped after 
 the execution tliereof, it may, on 
 l)aynient to tlie olllcer of tlie court 
 whose duty it is to read the instru- 
 ment, or to tlu! arbitrator or refeico, 
 of the amount of the unpaicl duty, 
 and the piMialty payable on staiii]iiii{? 
 the sauiu us aforesaid, und of a f urtlior 
 
 28 L 
 
 1 
 
1 
 
 ! 
 
 lilts <l 
 
 
 <»UI««B! 
 
 -mi: -Li • 
 
 
 ■ . i. 
 
 1 ^ ' 
 
 282 ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN WRITING REQUIRED. [PART II. 
 
 Further, it is provided that instruments executeJ abroad may 
 be stamped within thirty days of their being received in the United 
 Kingdom.' And this provision applies to a charterparty tcholly 
 executed abrofid.' By R. S. C, 1883, Ord. XXXIX., r. 8, it is 
 also provided that " a new trial shall not be granted by reason of 
 the ruling of any judge that the stamp upon any document is 
 sufficient, or that the document does not require a stamp." This 
 provision impliedly restrains a judge at Nisi Prius from reserving 
 for the court any question respecting the sufficiency of a stamp on 
 a document admitted by him at the trial,' and makes the ruling of 
 the jndge final where a case is tried by him without a jury.*. In 
 the criminal courts, no objection can now be taken to the admis- 
 sibility of any document in evidence for want of a sufficient stamp. 
 
 § 398. The cases under the rule requiring the contents of a 
 document to be proved by the document itself, if its production be 
 possible,6 may be arranged in three classes : the fr.st class contain- 
 ing those instruments which the law . tHjuires to be in writing ; 
 the second, those contracts which the parties have put in writing ; 
 and the third, all other writings material to the issue, the existence 
 or contents of which are disputed.' 
 
 § 399." The Jird class of cases in which oral evidence cannot be 
 substituted for the writing are those in which there exists any 
 instrument w/iich the law requires to be in writing. The law having 
 required that the evidence of the transaction should be in writing, 
 no other proof oan be substituted for that so long as the 
 
 Bum of one pound, be received in 
 evidence, saving all just exceptions 
 on other grounds. The officer or 
 arbitrator or referee rccoiving the 
 duty and penalty shall give a receipt 
 for the same, and make an entry in 
 a book kept for that purpose of the 
 payment and of the amount thereof, 
 and shall communicate to the com- 
 missioners the name or title of the 
 proceeding in which, and of the party 
 from whom, he received the said duty 
 and ])onalty, and the date and de- 
 scription of the instrument, and shall 
 pay over to such person as the com- 
 misf^io'iers may appoint, the money 
 received by him for the said duty and 
 penalty." 
 
 ' See now 34 & 5f> V. c. 39 ("The 
 Stamp Act, 1891 "), § 15, subs. (3). 
 
 » The lielfort, 1884. 
 
 ^ Siordet v. Kuczinski, 1835; Tat- 
 tersnll v, Fearnley, 1836 ; Cory v, 
 Davis, I8G3. 
 
 ♦ Ulewitt V. Tritton, 1892 (C. A.). 
 
 » 34 & 33 V. c. 39 (>' The Stamp 
 Act, 1891 "), § 14, snbs. (4). 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 83, in part. 
 
 ' The iiuestion how far witnesses 
 maj- bo cross-examined as to written 
 statements made by them without 
 producing the writings, will be dis- 
 cussed hereafter. See post, §§ 1446, 
 et soq. 
 
 " Gr. Ev. § 86, as to first six lines. 
 
 282 
 
CHAP. IV.j ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN INADMISSIBLE. 
 
 •writing exists, and is in the power of the party. Accordinglj, 
 parol evidence is inadmissible to prove records, public and judicial 
 documents, official informations' or examinations, deeds of con- 
 veyance of lands, wills, other than nuncupative, acknowledgments 
 under Lord Tenterden's Act, promises to pay the debt of another 
 person, and other writings mentioned in the Statute of Frauds ; 
 or to show at what sittings or assizes a trial at Nisi Prius came 
 on,* or even that it took place at all, the only proper evidence of 
 this being the record, or at least the record with a minute of the 
 verdict indorsed on it,' nor to prove the date of a party's appre- 
 hension for a particular offence, as the warrant for apprehension or 
 committal is superior evidence ; * as it also is to prove the testimony 
 of a witness when it is required by law that it should be reduced 
 into writing, — as, for instance, when it is taken by depositions, 
 either before an Examiner of the Court, or before a magistrate on 
 an indictable charge, — since the writing is in all subsequent pro- 
 ceedings, whether civil or criminal, the best evidence of what the 
 witness has stated ; * and so it also is as to the statement of a 
 prisoner before the magistrate upon an examination reduced into 
 writing, and subscribed, and returned by the justice,* in conformity 
 with the Indictable Offences Act, 1848,' in England, or the cor- 
 responding Act in Ireland. 
 
 § 400. Parol evidence of what was said by a prisoner before a 
 magistrate is however admissible if the written examination be 
 excluded for informality,^ — other than for having been a confession 
 taken on oath, and therefore not voluntary,' — or if it be clearly 
 
 ill 
 
 •'i, '' 
 
 > E. V. Dillon, 1877. 
 
 » Thomas v. Ansloy, 1807 (Lcl. 
 Ellenborough) ; 11. v. Page, 1807 
 (Ld. Konyon); as explained inWhit- 
 aker v. Wisbey, 1852, cited ante, §85. 
 
 * Olive V. Gwin, 1058 ; E. v. 
 Browne, 1829. 
 
 ♦ E. V. Phillips, 1818. 
 
 • Leach v, yiinpson, 1839, post, 
 § 416. But in E. v. Coll, 1889 (Ir.), 
 the judge at the trial, having rejected 
 a deposition which ho ouglit to have 
 received, appears to have afterwards 
 set the matter right by the reception 
 of oral evidence from a witness of 
 what he said he had also sworn on 
 
 the same day, and the majority of 
 the Irish Court of Criminal Appeal 
 sanctioned his action. The refine- 
 ment by which it was supported was 
 that for all that appeared th(3 witness 
 was s})eakiiig of a separate sworn in- 
 formati(jn wliich had not been re- 
 duced into writing. 
 
 « E. V. Foiirshiro, 1779; E. v. 
 Jacobs, 1784. See post, § 893 et soq. 
 
 ' 11 & 12 V. c. 42; 14 & 15 V. 
 e. 93, Ir. 
 
 8 E. V. Eoed, 1829 (Tindnl, C.J.); 
 E. ('. Cliristopher, 1849, post, § 410. 
 
 » E. V. Wlieeley, 1838 (Alderson, 
 15.); E. V. Eiveis, 1835 (Park, J.). 
 
 283 
 
ORAL TFSTIMONY, WHEN CONTRACT IN WRI'iTNG. [PT. II. 
 
 provt I' that the statement was not reduced into writing. So it 
 may also, if the prisoner was examined on two occasions, or with 
 reference to two offences, and the examination, signed by the 
 magistrates, relat(*s only to what occurred on one occasion,* or with 
 respect to one offence,' as to statements made by the prisoner in 
 that part of the inquiry not included in the written examination. 
 In like manner, if a witness, having given a written deposition 
 in a cause, has afterwards testified orally in court, parol evidence 
 may, in the event of his death, be given of his viva voce testimony, 
 notwithstanding the existence of the deposition ; * for, in this last 
 case, as two independent sources of information exist, the party 
 who relies on the evidence may, at his discretion, have recourse to 
 either. In all these cases the parol evidence is offered, not in 
 substitution for that of ihe official document, since no such docu- 
 ment exists, but as the best evidence which the circumstances 
 admit of. 
 
 § 401.' The second class of cases " falling within the rule requiring 
 the contents of a document to be proved by the document itself 
 if its production be possible consists of those in which the parties 
 have of themselves chosen to put their contract into uriting. Here 
 also oral proof cannot be substituted for the written evidence. The 
 written instrument may indeed be regarded, in some measure, as 
 the ultimate fact to be proved, especially in the case of negotiable 
 securities ; and has tacitly been treated by the parties themselves 
 as the only repository and the appropriate evidence of their agree- 
 ment. The written contract is not collateral, but is of the very 
 essence of the transaction ; ' and consequently, in all proceedings, 
 
 * But in Parsons v. Brown, 1^52, 
 Jervis, C.J., held that the Court 
 could not, in the absence of positive 
 evidence, let in parol evidence by 
 pnanming that ejiainiiic.tions before 
 justices on a charge of felony were 
 not taken down in writing ; but see 
 E. V. Coll (Ir.), cited ante. § 399, n. ». 
 
 » E. V. Wilkinson, 1838 f Parke, B., 
 and Littlediile, J.) ; E. v. Christopher, 
 1849. See also E. v. Coll (Ir.), supra. 
 
 3 E. V. Harris, 1S32. 
 
 * Tod V, E. of Winchelsea, 1828 
 (Tid. Tenterden). 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 87, in part. 
 
 • See supra, § 398. 
 
 ' See E. V. Castle Morton, 1820 
 (Abbott, C. J.). Doiiiat thus explains 
 the principles on which a document 
 is deemed part of the essence of any 
 transaction, and consequently the 
 best or primary proof of it: — •'The 
 force of written proof consists in 
 this : men agree to preserve by 
 writing the remembrance of past 
 events, of which they wish to create 
 a memorial, either with a view of 
 laying down a rule for their own 
 guidance, or in order to have, in the 
 instrument, a lasting proof of the 
 
 284 
 
CirAP. IV.] ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN LEASE EXISTS. 
 
 civil or criminal, in wliioh tlie issue depends in any degree upon 
 the terms of a contract, the party whose witnesses show that it was 
 reduced to writing, must either produce the instrument, or give 
 some good reason for not doing so. Thus, for example, if in an 
 action to recover land against a tenant holding over, or in an 
 action for the use and occupation of real estate, it should appear, 
 either on the direct or cross-examination of the plaintilf's witnesses, 
 that a written contract of tenancy has heen signed, plaintiff must 
 either produce it, or account for its absence ; ' and in an action by 
 landlord against tenant for rent and non-repair, if it should ap[)ear 
 that the parties had agreed by parol that the tenant sliould hold 
 the premises on the terms contained in a former lease between the 
 landlord and a stranger, a nonsuit would be directed, imless this 
 lease could be produced.' 
 
 § 402. The same strictness prevails where the question at issue 
 is simply what amount of rent was reser"ed by the landlord,' or 
 who was the actual party to whom a demise had been made,'' or 
 under whom the tenant came into possession.* It has also several 
 times been held that, in an action for extra work done beyond the 
 contract, if it appeared that the work was commenced under an 
 agreement in writing, in the absence of positive proof that the 
 work in question was entirely separate from that included in the 
 agreement, and was in fact done under a distinct order, the 
 plaintifP is bound to produce tl\e original document, since it may 
 
 trutn of what is written. Thus con- 
 tracts uro written, in order to pres(n'vo 
 the moniorial of what the contracting 
 parties have presoiihed for (jach other 
 to do, and to make for thonisolves a 
 fixed and immntublo law, as to what 
 has been agreed on. So, testaments 
 are written, in order to i)rc.sorvo the 
 I'omenibrance of what tlie jiarty, who 
 has a right to dispose of liis property, 
 has ordained concerning it, and 
 thereby to lay down a rnle for the 
 guidance of "liis heir and legatees. 
 On the same principle uro reihiccd 
 into writing all sentences, , iidgnients, 
 edicts, ordinances and other niattoi's, 
 which either confer title, or V /e the 
 force of law. The writing p jservcs 
 unchanged the matters intrusted to 
 it, and expresses the inteutiou of the 
 
 parties by their own testimony. Tho 
 ti'Uth of written acts is established 
 by tho acts themselves, that is, by 
 the inspi'ction of tho originals " : 
 Domat's Civ. Law, Liv. li, tit. 6, § 2. 
 
 ' Brewer v. Pabner, ISOO (Ld. 
 Eldon); Fenn v. (jritlith, l,s;i() ; 
 Ileuiy c. M. of Westmeath, 1S4;5 (Ir.) 
 (RichiU'ds, B.); Thunder y. Warren, 
 184.} (Ir.); Itudge y. M-Carthy, 1841 
 (Ir.).' ^ 
 
 » Turner v. Power, 1828. 
 
 ' B. ('. Merthyr Tidvil, 1830; Au- 
 gusticn n. Challis, 1847, where Aldnr- 
 son, B., observes, "you may jn-ove 
 by parol the relation of liimllord and 
 tenant, but without tho lease you 
 cannot tell whether anvront wusduo." 
 
 * B. I'. Bawden. 18L>8. 
 
 Doe c. llarvoy, 1832. 
 
f 15 
 
 II 
 
 m 
 
 ORAL TESTIMONY IN CLAIM FOR KXTRA WORK. 
 
 [I'T. II. 
 
 furr.iHh cvidonoo, not only that the items sought to be recovered 
 ^ve^e not inelu(h>d (herein, but nlso of the rate of remuneration 
 upon whieh the parties liad agreed." On like principles, where an 
 auctioneer delivered to a bidder, to whom lands were let by 
 auction, a written ])aper xiijiml hij hhmelf, containing the terms of 
 the lease, in an action for use and occupation, the landlord was 
 lield bound to produce Ihis paper duly stampi^d as a memorandum 
 of an ngroement.^ 
 
 § 403. Similarly, where ' the plaintiff had been employed as 
 secretary to the committee of a charitable society, pursuant to a 
 resolution entered in the book of the committee, of which, having 
 ncco})ted the situation and entered upon its du^ie^, the plaintiff 
 during his service Jind the care, and on the society being afterwards 
 dissolved sued some of the members of the committee of the society 
 for his salary, it was he.d that he was boimd to produce the book 
 under which he was engaged. It is doubtful whether, in an action 
 for an injury done to the plaintiff's reversion, his interest as 
 reversioner may be proved by the parol testimony of the tenant, 
 when it appears that !:he premises are occupied under a written 
 agreement.* 
 
 § 404. On principle, in cases of this kind, the fact that the 
 writing is in the possession of the adverse j>arty does not change 
 its I liaracter ; it is still the primary evidence of the contract ; and 
 its absence must be accounted for by notice to the other party to 
 produce it, or in some other legal mode, before secondary evidence 
 of its contents can be received. But in all such cases, if the 
 plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, without betraying the 
 existence of a wiitten contract relating to the subject-matter of 
 the action, he will not be precluded from recovering by the defen- 
 dant subsequently giving evidence that the agreement was reduced 
 
 > Vincent r. Cole, 1828 (L<1. Ten- 
 terden) ; Buxton v. Cornish. 1844; 
 Jones r. Howell, 18;?5; ll<)ll);ird v. 
 Stephens, 1841 (Williams, J.); ruiton 
 V. Cole, 1842 (Pntteson, J.). Seo 
 Eeid c. Batte. 1829. cited post, § 40j ; 
 and Ixlie v. Kingst'ord, 18')4. 
 
 2 BamsliDttom v. Morth'v. 1814. 
 See Eamsliottom c. Tiiiiliri(lL''i'. i.S14, 
 cited post, § 406. See, uIbo, Hawkins 
 
 V. Warre, 1825, -where Abbott, C.J., 
 draws the rlistinction between papers 
 signed by the jiarties or their agents, 
 and those whieh are unsif?nod. 
 
 3 Whitford t. Tutin, 1834. 
 
 « Cottevill /;. Hobby, 1825, holding 
 that the af;;reeinent must be produced 
 (wliich soeiiis correct), and in Strother 
 V. Bmm-, 1S2S, whore the judges were 
 equally divided. 
 
 .'80 
 
CHAP. IV.] ORAL TESTIMONY, WHEN ADMI.SSIBLE, 
 
 into writing; but tlio dofondnnt, if he mofins to rely on a writton 
 contriuit, must })r()cbice it uh ])iirt of his evidence,' and in the event 
 of its turning out to h" unstainpod, or insufHtdently stamped, ho 
 nmst pay the duty and penalty'' — and tliis even thougli a notice to 
 ])ro(hioe the (hxjument lias been served on the phiiiitiff.^ It lias 
 even been held in an action of ejectment that the ]tlaintiff cannot 
 bo forced to jiroduce a written agrofment merely because one of 
 his witnesses proved, on cross-examination, that an agreement, 
 v/nich he only knew related in noine way to the land in (/iiention, was 
 seen on that morning in the hands or the ])laintifl''s solicitor, and 
 was produced at a former trial between the same parties, since, to 
 exclude i)arol evidence of the tenancy, it should appear (wliich 
 it did not) that the agreement was between the same parties, and 
 was binding at the time of the second trial/ 
 
 § 405.* Mo) eover, a written communication or agreement between 
 the parties which is collateral to the question in issue, need not 
 be produced. For example, plaintiff can recover without pro- 
 ducing the original written agreement if during an employment 
 under a written contract a verbal order is given for separate work, 
 if he can show distinctly that the items, for which he seeks remu- 
 neration, were not included therein ; as, for instance, that wliilst 
 certain work was in progress in the inside of a house under a 
 written agreement, a verbal order was given to execute some 
 alterations or improvements on the outside.^ So, also, the fact of 
 the existence of a particular relationship may be shown by parol 
 evidence, though the terms which govern such relationship appear 
 to be in writing.' Thus, if the fact of the occupation of land is 
 alone in issue, without respect to the terms of the tenancy, this 
 fact may be proved by any competent parol evidence, such as pay- 
 ment of rent, or the testimony of a witness, who has seen the 
 tenant occupy, notwithstanding it appears that the occui ancy was 
 
 » Magnay v. Knight, 1840; Ste- 
 phens V. Pinnoy, 1818 ; Miirston v. 
 j)ean, 1836; Try v. Chapman, 1836; 
 11. V. Padstow, 1832; Ecod v. Deere, 
 1827. 
 
 » Ante, § 397. 
 See cases cit(;d in n. ', supra. 
 
 * Doe V. Morris, 1810. 
 
 « Or. Ev. § 89, in part. 
 
 • Roid V. Batte, 1829 (T,d. Tenter- 
 den); commented on by I'utteHon, J., 
 in I'arton v. Cole, 1842. See Vincent 
 V. Cole, 182b, and cases cited ante, 
 § 402, n. >. 
 
 ' See dictum of Ahlerson, B., and 
 other cases cited in next note. 
 
 287 
 

 
 
 
 ■'" , ■ i 
 
 
 ; 
 
 
 ij 
 
 
 J 
 
 1 
 
 ^ 
 
 ]\\ ^ 
 
 ^""^ 
 
 COLLATERAL WRITINGS NEED NOT BE PRODUCED. [PT. 11. 
 
 under an agreement in writing ;' where a tenant luilils lands under 
 written rules, but the length ot' his term has been agreed orally, 
 these rules ncod not be produeed in an action of trespass where the 
 defendant denies the tenant's possession, because it is only necessnr}' 
 to prove the extent of the tenant's term, whi ig been 
 
 agreed to by pai'ol, does not depend upon the written inirid ;•' the fact 
 of partnership may be proved by ])!irol evidence of the acts of the 
 parties, without producing the deed;' and the fact that a i)arty 
 has agreed to sell goods on commission may be established by oral 
 testimony, though the terms respecting the payment of the com- 
 mission have been reduced into writing.* 
 
 § 406. Parol evidence will be admissible when the writing only 
 amounted either to mere unaccepted proposals, or to minutes 
 capable of conveying no definite information to the court or jury, 
 and could not, by any sensible rule of interpretafion, be construed 
 as memoranda, which the parties themselves intended to operate as 
 fit evidence of their several agreements. Thus, it has been admitted 
 where, at the time of letting premises to the defendant, the plaintiff 
 had read the terms from pencil miautes, and the defendant hud 
 acquiesced in these terms, but had not signed the minutes ; " where, 
 upon a like occasion, a memorandum of agreement had been drawn 
 up by the landlord's bailiff, the terms of which were read over, and 
 assented to, by the tenant, who agreed to bring a surety and sign 
 the agreement on a future day, but omitted to do so ; ^ where, in 
 order to avoid mistakes, the terms upon which a house was let 
 were, at the time of letting, reduced to writing by the lessor's agent, 
 and in his absence signed by the lessee's wife, in order to bind him, 
 and the lessee himself afterwards entered upon and occupied the 
 premises but did not otherwise appear to have constituted the wife 
 
 » E. V. Holy Trinity, Hull, 1827; 
 Doe )'. Ilarvoy, 1832 ; Spiers v. Willi- 
 Boii, 1808 fAiii.) ; Dennett v. Crocker, 
 18;}'2 (Am.) See, however, the obser- 
 vations of Best, C.J., on E. v. Holy 
 Trinity, in Strother v. Barr, 1828 ; 
 Bee, also, Twynam v. Knowlos, 1853; 
 Augustien v. Challis, 1847 (Aldei'son, 
 B.), cited ante, § 402. 
 
 * Hey V. Moorh.iiise, 1839. 
 
 ^ Alderson v. Clay, 1816 T.d. 
 Ellenborough). 
 
 * "Whitfield «. Brand, 1847. 
 
 6 Trewhitt v. Lambert, 1839. See 
 Drant v. Brown, 1825 ; and Bethell 
 V. Blencowe, 1841, where it was held 
 that written proposals, made pond- 
 ing a negotiation for a tenancy, might 
 be admitted without a stamp, as 
 proving one step in the evidence of 
 the contract. 
 
 « Doe V. Cnrtwright, 1820. See 
 Hawkins v, "Waire, 1825. 
 
 288 
 
CHAP. IV.] WIll^N PAROL EVIDENCE NOT EXCLUDED. 
 
 as his agent, or to have recognized her act ; ' where lands were 
 let by auction, and a written paper was delivered to the bidder by 
 the auctioneer, containing the terms of the letting, but was never 
 signed either by the auctioneer or by the parties ; ^ and where, on 
 the occasion of hiring a servant, the master and servant went to the 
 chief constable's clerk, who in their presence, and by their direction, 
 took down in writing the terms of the hiring, but neither party 
 signed the paper, nor did it appear to have been read to them.' 
 
 § 407. Where, too, an action is not directly upon an agreement 
 and for non- performance of its terms, but is in tort, for the 
 conversion, or detention, or negligent loss of the writing containing 
 such agreement, plaintiff may give parol evidence, descriptive of its 
 identity, without giving notice to the defendant to produce the 
 document itself.* Moreover, even though the defendant be willing 
 to produce such document without notice, the plaintiff is not bound 
 to put it in, but may leave his adversary to do so, if he think fit, as 
 part of his own case.' For, as has been observed, for the purpose 
 of identification, no distinction can be drawn between written 
 instruments and other articles ; between trover for a promissory 
 note, and trover for a waggon and horses." 
 
 § 408. A similar rule prevails in criminal cases. For example, if 
 a person be indicted for stealing a bill or other written instrument, 
 its identity may be proved by parol evidence, though no notice to 
 produce it has been served on the prisoner or his agent.' On an 
 indictment for forgery, however, if the forged instrument be in the 
 hands of the prisoner, the prosecutor must serve him or his solicitor 
 with a notice to produce it, before he can offer secondary evidence 
 of its contents.* 
 
 See 
 
 * E. V, St. Martin's, Leicester, 
 1834. 
 
 * Kamstottom v, Tunbridge, 1814. 
 See Eamsbottom v. Mortley, 1814, 
 cited ante, § 402. 
 
 ' R. V. Wrangle, 1835. See, for 
 other instances, Ingram v. Lea, 1810; 
 Dalison v. Stark, 1803 ; Wilson v, 
 Bowie, 1823. 
 
 * Scott V. Jones, 1813 ; How v. 
 Hall, 1811; Biicher v. Jarratt, 1802; 
 Eead v. Gamble, 1839; Eoss v. Bruce, 
 1803 (Am.) ; The People v. Uolbrook, 
 
 1816 (Am.); M'Loan v. Hertzog, 
 1820 (Am.). These cases overrule 
 Cowan V, Abrahams, 1793. 
 
 « Whitehead v. Scott, 1830 (Ld. 
 Tenterden). 
 
 « JoUoy V. Taylor, 1807 (Sir J. 
 Mansfield). 
 
 ' E. V. Aickles, 1784. 
 
 " E. V. Haworth, 1830 (Parke, J.); 
 E. V. Fitzsimons, 1869 (Ir.). Several 
 grounds for this difference between 
 larceny and forgery may be suggested. 
 One is, that under the old law (see 
 
 T. VOL. I. 
 
 289 
 
 i I 
 
 i I I 
 
WllKN PAROL KVIUKXCK KXCLUDKD BY WUlTIXaS [P. II. 
 
 § 400.' The third class of cases* falling witliin the rule that a 
 written document can only be proved by the instrument itself, 
 embraces every trriting not falling within the two classes already 
 discussed, as to the exintence or contents of tc/iieh there i« a (/impute, 
 and which is material to the iHstie between the parties, and which is 
 not a mere memorandum of some other fact. Thus, to take some 
 common examples, newspapers and account-books are the best 
 evidence of their own contents, and therefore a witness cannot be 
 asked whether certain resolutions were published in the newspapers;' 
 neither can he be questioned as to the contents of his account-books.' 
 The primary proof of the publication of an opera is the product'on 
 of the printed music, and consequently the fact of publication 
 cannot be proved in the first instance by a witness who has merely 
 Been the oper.~ in print, or heard parts of it played in society.* The 
 fact of a person being rated to the relief of the poor can only be 
 legally proved by the rate-book itself," or at least a certified or 
 examined copy fro.ii it,' and it therefore cannot be shown by the 
 collector stating that such person's name was on the rate ;' neither 
 can a plaintiff be asked on cross-examination whether his name is 
 written in a certain book described by the questioner, iinless a 
 satisfactory reason be first given for the non-production of the book 
 
 mx 
 
 now 24 *!t 25 V. c. 98 (" The Forgery 
 Act, 1861 "), § 42, cited ante, § 291), 
 it was always sufficient, on charges 
 of laicony, to both in the indict- 
 ment and the proof describe a stulen 
 instrument in very general terms, 
 whereas, in the case of /orrery, 
 the prosecutor was often required to 
 enter into a minuto description of the 
 document allcgod to have been forged 
 (Butcher v. Jarratt, 1802 (Cham- 
 bre, J.)). A second is, that a per- 
 son charged with stc i-ling an instru- 
 ment must know, from the very 
 nature of the accusation, that lio will 
 be called upon to produce it, while 
 an indictment for forgery furnishes 
 no such intimation ; and it will be 
 presently seen, when the rules which 
 regulate the sei-ving of notices to 
 produce are discxissed (post, § 452), 
 that this is a material distinction. 
 A thiid (and very substantial) one 
 is that, where the charge is oae of 
 
 larceny, it is highly improbable that 
 anything material will turn either 
 upon the contents of, or a minute 
 description of, the instrument itself, 
 whereas on a charge of forgery the 
 exact oppo.site is the ease, and an 
 examination of the instrument itself 
 may very probably prove of the 
 highest importance. 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 88, in part. 
 
 * See 8U])ra, § 398. 
 
 » R. V. OTonnell, 1843-4 (Ir.). 
 
 * See post, § 4()2. 
 
 " lioosey V. Davidson, 1849. liufc 
 see Geralopulo v, Wieler, 1851 (Jervis, 
 C.J.). 
 
 * K. V. CoppuU, 1801, recognised 
 (Patteson, J.) in E. v. Staple Fitz- 
 paine (1842). See " The Poor Rate 
 Assessment and Collection Act, 1 869, " 
 32 & 33 V. 0. 41, § 18, cited ante, 
 § 147a. 
 
 1 Justice V. Elstob, 1858. 
 
 29' 
 
C. IV.] 
 
 PAROL ADMISSIOyS SUBSTITUTED FOR WRITINOS. 
 
 itself.' Having regard to llu»so priii«i|ilos, it is voiy doubtful 
 whether the contents of handbills written or di(!tated ut a meeting 
 of conspirators can he proved by oral testimony.* 
 
 § 410 — 11. When it is stated that oral testimony cannot be sub- 
 stituted for any writing included in either of the throe classes above 
 mentioned, a tacit exception must, perhaps, be made in favour of 
 the parol ailmissiona of a party, and of his acts arioitntiiig to admis- 
 dions, A party's admimons, and acts amounting to admissions, are 
 primary proof against himself and those claiming under him, even 
 where they relate to the contents of a deed or other instrument, 
 which are directly in issue in the cause.' It is said that the reason 
 why such statements or acts are admissible, without notice to 
 produce, or accounting for the absence of the written instrument, 
 is, that they are not open to the same objection which belongs to 
 parol evidence from other sources, where the written evidenoo 
 might have been produced ; for such evidence is excluded from the 
 presumption of its untruth, arising from tlie very nature of the 
 case, where better evidence is withheld ; whereas, what a party 
 himself admits to be true, may reasonably be presumed to be so.* 
 
 ' Darby v, Ouseley, 18ofi. 
 
 « B. V. Thistlewood, 1820. See 
 post, § 417. 
 
 3 Eiirle V. Picken, 183.3 (Parko, B.); 
 Newhull V. Holt, 1840 (id.) ; Slatterie 
 V. Pooluy, 1840 ; BethoU v. Bloncowo, 
 1841 ; lioward )'. Smith, 1841 ; K. v. 
 Welch, 1840; Kin{? ?;. Colo, 1848; 
 11. V. Basiiif^stoko, 1851; Boulter v. 
 Peplow, 18J0. These cases overrule 
 Lord Tenterdon's decision in Bloxam 
 V. Elsie, 1825. See Fox v. Waters, 
 1814. 
 
 * Slatterio v. Pooley, 1840 (Parke, 
 B.). Althouffh tho admission of a 
 party may fairly bo presumed to bo 
 true, tho jmrol evidenoo by which 
 that admission is pioved need by no 
 means bo so ; and, indeed, such 
 testimony is open to even greater 
 objection than applies to the ordinary 
 case, where secondary evidence is 
 produced, and the best evidence is 
 withheld. When the admission is 
 made in Court, it may very reason- 
 ably be allowed to render needless 
 the production of the written instru- 
 
 ment to which it refers, because the 
 simple (piestion in such case will be, 
 is the admission true ? and tho 
 rational iiresumption is, that a man 
 will not tell a falsehood, which is 
 against his own interest. But wlien 
 a witness is called to say that he has 
 heard tho opposite party make .-i 
 certain statement with respect to tho 
 contents of a writti'ii instrument, 
 tho further (juestion ari.ses, was this 
 statement really made ? and to ])cr- 
 mit such parol evidence to be equally 
 admissible, in jjroof of the contents 
 of the instrument, with tlie pro- 
 duction of the iustnunent it.self, is to 
 ojjeu a vast field for misapjirehension, 
 perjury, and fraud, which would bo 
 wholly closed, if tho salutary rule of 
 law, recjuiring tliat what is in writ- 
 ing should be proved by the writing 
 itself, were here, as in other cases, 
 to prevail. Lord Tenterden and Mr. 
 Justice Maule have emphatically ex- 
 pressed opinions in support of the 
 view here suggested (see Bloxnm v. 
 Elsie, 1825; Boulter v. Peplow, 
 
 ! 
 
 291 
 
 u 2 
 

 '1 
 
 m 
 
 M 
 
 m 
 
 i I 
 
 m^m\ 
 
 I 
 
 PAROL ADMISSIONS COXFKSSIO JURIS. [PART II. 
 
 § 412. Since some observations in the last footnote dealing with 
 the above reasons were written, the judges in Ireland ' have declared 
 their disapproval o! the principles which such reasons embody. " The 
 doctrine that parol admissions can prove the contents of written 
 documents is," said Pennefather, C. J., " a most dangerous propo- 
 sition ; by it a man might be deprived of an estate of 10,000/. per 
 annum derived from his ancestors through regular family deeds 
 and conveyances, by producing a witness, or by one or two con- 
 spirators, who might be got to swear that they heard the defendant 
 say he had conveyed away his interest therein by deed, or had 
 mortgaged, or had otherwise encumbered it; and thus, by the 
 facility so given, the widest door would be opened to fraud, and a 
 man might be stripped of his estate through this invitation to fraud 
 and dishonesty." 
 
 § 413. In any case it is doubtful whether (even assuming it 
 to be established) the doctrine allowing admissions by parol to 
 sufficiently prove a written document extends to records, as well as 
 to deeds and ordinary writings, and whether it would embrace the 
 case of a confcssio j'liriH, as well as that of a confcssio facti. On the 
 one hand, the admission of a party that he had been discharged 
 under the Insolvent Debtors Act, was held insufficient evidence of 
 a valid diseharge, because the judicial document, on being pro- 
 duced, might be found, irregular and void, and the party might be 
 
 18.50); while Parke, B., liitnsolf has 
 declared that the parol eviilonce of 
 admissions may, in sojno cases, he 
 quite iinsatist'actory to a jury (Slat- 
 terio V. I'ooloy, 1810), ami that too 
 grout wi'ijjht ouj^'ht never to ho 
 attached ti) such evidence, since it 
 fro([iiontlv happens that the witness 
 not only has niisnnderstood what the 
 party has said, hut, hy unintention- 
 ally altering; a few of the expressions 
 really used, has given to the stato- 
 mout aiv effect completely at variance 
 with what was intended. See note 
 to Earle v. Picken, 18^3. Moreover, 
 as the reporter observes in tlio re- 
 port of Bonlton V. Peplow (IHiiO). 9 
 C. H. .")()1, n. c, "according to 81at- 
 terio V. Pooley, wliat A. states 
 as to what B., a party, has said re- 
 Bpoctinp; the contents of a docniment 
 which B. has seen, is admissible, 
 
 whilst what A. states, respecting a 
 document which he himself has seen, 
 is not admissible, — although in tlie 
 latter case, the chance of error is 
 single, in tho former, double." 
 
 ' Lawless c. Queale, 1845 (Ir.). The 
 case which called forth tho remarks 
 cited above was an action for use 
 and occupation. At the trial, one 
 of the ))laintiff's witm'sses, after 
 proving the occupation of tlie jiro- 
 misos by the detendant, ackuow- 
 hnlged in cross-examination the 
 existence of a written agreement ; 
 and the Court held, that this agree- 
 ment must bo produced, tliough tlie 
 defendant had admitted that he was 
 tenant at a jiarticular rent. See, 
 also, Ld. Oost'ord v, Robb, ISl.'); 
 Parsons r. I'urcell, 184!); and Hen- 
 man V. Lester, 18G2 (Bylos, J.). 
 
CHAP. IV.1 
 
 ORAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMFSSini.E. 
 
 Tlie 
 liu'ka 
 
 use 
 
 oua 
 
 altor 
 
 j.io- 
 
 uow- 
 
 the 
 lent ; 
 
 thn 
 
 WilS 
 
 Soo, 
 SI,-, ; 
 
 mistaken.' On the other hand, on an indictment for bigamy, the 
 prisoner's deliberate declaration, that lie had been married in a 
 foreign countrj' was held to render it unnecessary to prove that the 
 marriage had been celebrated according to the laws of that 
 coimtry ; * and in an action for wages, an admission by plaintiff 
 that his claim had been referred to an arbitrator, who had made 
 an award against him, was held admissible evidence on behalf of 
 the defendant.' 
 
 § 414. A material difference, at all events, exists between proving 
 by an admission the execution of an instrument requiriug attestation, 
 which is produced, and proving the party's admission, that by such 
 and such instrument, which is not produced, a certain act was done. 
 It will hereafter be shown,* that when an instrument, which requires 
 attestation to give it validity,' is in court, and its execution is to be 
 proved against a hostile party, an admission on his part of due 
 execution, unless made with, a view to the trial of that cause, is 
 generally" not sufficient. 
 
 § 415.' Where a writing does not fall within either of the three 
 classes already described, no reason exists why it should exclude 
 oral evidence. For instance, if a written communication be acconi' 
 panied by a verbal one to the same effect, the latter may be received 
 as independent evidence, though not to prove the contents of the 
 writing, nor as a substitute for it ; ' the payment of money may be 
 proved by oral testimony, though a receipt be taken ; ' a verbal 
 demand of goods may be shown, though a demand in writing was 
 made at the same time ; '" the admission of a debt is provable by 
 oral testimony, though a written promise to pay was simultaneously 
 given ;" and the determination of an interest in land, whether free- 
 hold or copyhold, may be proved without producing, or accounting 
 for the non-production of, the title-deeds or court rolls, but merely 
 
 ' Scott V. Clare, 1812 (Ld. Ellon- 
 horoujjh). See, also, Suiuinersctt v. 
 Adainson, 1822; Joiiiut v. JoULflo, 
 IMO (Am.); Wclldnd Cimiil Co. v. 
 lliitliiiway, 18;52 (Am.). 
 
 2 11. V. Nowtoii, 1843 (Wi^'bttnan 
 nnd Cresswt'U, JJ.). Hut see 11, v, 
 I'liilicrtv, 1847; and R. v. Savage, 
 1870 (Lush, J.). 
 
 " Murray v. Orepory, 1830. 
 
 « See post, §§ 1843, 1849. 
 
 » See 28 & 29 V. c. 18, § 7. 
 
 • See, however, Nagle v. Shea, 
 1870. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 90, in part. 
 « See unto, § 4()(). 
 
 • Kiiiribert v. Cohen, 1803; Jacob 
 V, Liiidsav, 1801. 
 
 '" Smith i\ Young, 1808 (Ld. Ellon- 
 borougli). 
 
 " Singleton v. Barrett, 1832. 
 
 ■ ill! 
 
 293 
 
 i I I 
 
m-4 
 
 ih|i 
 
 «i«''i' 
 
 .^i-': 
 
 l!) 
 
 ' ! :l| 
 
 
 'I 
 
 i! "'■ 
 
 i 
 
 ORAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [i'AIJT I.'. 
 
 showing that a deceased occupier had, while in possession, declareiJ 
 that his interest in the premises would expire at his death," since,— 
 as will presently be seen,'* — all statements by a person, while iu 
 possession of property, are, after his death, in themselves primary 
 evidence, if they tend to out down his interest therein.' 
 
 § 416. In the same way, oral evidence of what then passed will 
 be equally as admissible as the clerk's note, where, on a prelimi- 
 nary hearing of a charge, the magistrate's clerk takes down what 
 the witness says, but neither the witness nor the magistrate signs 
 the writing, and it does not constitute part of the depositions 
 returned :* or if, on the hearing of an information for a trespass in 
 pursuit of game," the clerk takes a note of the charge ; because 
 this is not one of those cases where the magistrate is bound to take 
 down what the witnesses say ; ° or if in support of an indictment 
 for perjury committed in a County Court, without production of 
 the judge's note, the perjury be proved by any witness who was 
 then present, if the case was one in which the law does not require 
 the judge to take any note.' Similarly, too, what passed at a 
 meeting where the proceedings of directors, commissioners, public 
 trustees, and the like, are voluntarily entered in books, may be 
 proved by parol, because the fact that such books are rendered by 
 statute admissible in evidence, does not exclude verbal proof of what 
 has taken place.* On like grounds, it is not necessary to produce 
 a certificate of registration ia order to prove that a joint stock 
 company has been completely legistertJ." The fact of birth, 
 baptism, marriage,'" death or burial, may, for the same reason, be 
 proved by parol testimony, for though the law requires a narrative 
 or memorandum of these events to be entered in registers, the 
 existence or contents of these registers form no part of the fact to 
 
 > Doo I'. Lanjjfield, 1847. 
 
 » Post, § GS4 nt 80(1. 
 
 » Doo ('. Liiii{,'field, 1847 (Parke, 
 B.). 
 
 * Joiins V. Whcedon, 184.'J (Cress- 
 well, J.); R. V. Christopher, 1849; 
 ante, § 400. 
 
 » Under 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 32 ("The 
 Oiimo Act, 1831 "), § 30. 
 
 « Hobiiisou V. Vaughtou, 1838 
 (Aldorson, B.). 
 
 ' R. V. iforgan. 1852 (Martin, B.); 
 Hariner v. Bi-im, 18J3 (Piirko, 13,). 
 
 ' Miles i\ Bouph, 1842 ; Infjlis v. 
 Gt. North. Ry. Co., 18.)2, H. L. 
 
 ' Agricultural Cattle Ins, Co. v. 
 Fitzgerald, l8ol, decided under the 
 repealed Act, 7 & 8 V. c. 110, §§ 7. 
 25. See, now, 2.5 & 26 V. c. Hit, § 18. 
 See, also, R. r. linngton, 187(). 
 
 '" Lady Limerick V. liOrdLiineriok, 
 1862. 
 
 294 
 
CHAP. IV.] OKAL EVIDENCE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 be proved, and the entry is no more than a collateral or subsequent 
 memorial of that fact, which may be used to furuish a satisfactory 
 and convenient mode of proof, but cannot exclude other evidence,' 
 while the non-production of a minute book or register at most does 
 no more than afford grounds for scrutinising such evidence with 
 more than usual care. The fact that a picture is an infringement 
 of the copyright in another picture may, too, be proved in an action 
 for infringement of copyright without producing the original 
 picture.' It is also every-day practice for the fact that writing is 
 very like that of a named person to be proved without producing 
 any of that person's writing. 
 
 § 417.^ The principle under consideration, though hitherto only 
 illustrated by examples drawn from civil cases, tilso applies in 
 criminal ones. Accordingly, on prosecutions foi political offences, 
 such as treason, conspiracy, and sedition, the imcriptionn on flags and 
 banners paraded in public, and the contents of resolutions read at a 
 public meeting, may be proved, as being of the nature of speeches, 
 by oral testimony.* Where, too, a party was indicted for ad- 
 ministering an unlawful oath, a witness was permitted to give 
 parol evidence of the words used, though he stated his belief that 
 the accused read the words from a paper, which he held in his 
 hand when he administered the oath, and no notice to produce this 
 paper had been served on the prisoner.' 
 
 § 418. The rule of law that the best evidence which the nature of 
 each case permits must always be produced, has thus far been 
 discussed as to its effect in forbidding oral evidence being substi- 
 tuted for written evidence. But the same rile of law sometimes 
 excludes wrifinrp which the law considers as entitled to less weight 
 than those which might be forthcoming. The original of a 
 document must always (with a few exceptions that will be 
 presently mentioned") be produced, and a mere copy, however 
 
 ' Evans v. Morgan, 1832; R. v, 
 Allison, 1806; Iliirrison v, Corp. of 
 Southivmpton, 1803 ; R. v. Miiin- 
 waring, 18 J6; Rood v. Passer, 1794; 
 St. Devoreux v. Much Dow Church, 
 1761-2; Morris v. Miller, 1766-7; 
 Hirt V. Barlow, 1779; Com. v. Nor- 
 cross, 1813 (Am.); Ellis y. Ellis, 1814 
 (Am.); Owings V. Wyaut, 17yi5(Am.). 
 
 » Lucas V. Williams, 1892, C. A. 
 
 « (Jr. Ev. §90, in part. 
 
 * R. t;. Hunt, 1820; Sheridan's and 
 Kirwan's case, 1811; R. v, O'Connoll, 
 1843-4 (Jr.). See ante, § 40tf, and 
 cases cited in notes. 
 
 » R. V. Moors, 1801. 
 
 ■> Post, § 428. 
 
 ::'l 
 
 lih 
 
 29-^ 
 
BEST DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRODUCED. [PART II. 
 
 accurate, will not be, in the first instance, admipsible.' For 
 instance, on an indictment for feloniously setting fire to a house, 
 with intent to defraud the insurers, the policy itself, being the best 
 evidence of the fact of insurance, must be produced by the 
 prosecutor ; and recourse cannot be had either to parol evidence 
 that the premises were insured, or to the books of the insurance 
 office, unless notice to produce the policy itself has been duly 
 served upon the defendant, as this ought to be, and usually is, in 
 his possession.' If, too, it be necessary to show the contents of a 
 manuscript which is in the possession of the opposite party, a 
 paper, purporting to be a printed copy, cannot be received in 
 evidence, without a notice to produce the manuscript.' The ques- 
 tion as to what is or is not an original is sometimes raised. On 
 this point it is settled that, on the one hand, a duplicate writing, 
 taken from an autograph at one impression by means of a copying 
 machine cannot be regarded as an original, but the autograph 
 itself must be produced, or its non-production be accounted for as 
 in ordinary cases.* On the other hand, all printed copies struck 
 off in one common impression, though they constitute merely 
 secondary evidence of the contents of the paper from which they 
 are taken, are primary evidence of each other's contents.' 
 
 § 419. The memorial of a registered conveyance is primary evi- 
 dence ° to prove the contents of a deed against the party by whom 
 the deed is registered, and those who claim under him, being con- 
 sidered in the light of an admission,' and is at the very least, as 
 against such persons, good secondary * evidence. As against third 
 persons, however, it is certainly inadmissible as primary evidence.' 
 
 ■ B. N. P. 293, 294. 
 
 » R. V. Doran, 1791 (Ld. Kenyon); 
 E. V. Kitaon, 1832; 11. v. Gilson, 
 1807 ; R. V. EUicombe, 1833 (Little- 
 dalo, J.). 
 
 3 R. V.Watson, 1817. 
 
 * Xodin V. Murray, 1812 (Ld. 
 Elloiibovough). In India, " an im- 
 pression of a document made by a 
 copyitif? machino Rhnll be taken 
 •without further proof to be a correct 
 copy." Act 11 of 1835, § 35. 
 
 " R. V. Watson, 1S17, where the 
 question was, whether a priaonor was 
 acquiiintod with the contents of 
 certain placards, some copies of 
 
 which were traced to his possession, 
 and a copy remaining with the i)rinter 
 was allowed to be road in evidence 
 for the prosecution, though no notice 
 had boen served upon the prisoner to 
 produce the copies which had been 
 delivered to him. 
 
 * Boulter v, Peplow, 1850 (Maulo, 
 J.). See Brown v, Ai-mstrong, 1873 
 (Ir.). 
 
 ' WoUaston v. Hakewill, 1841. 
 
 8 Uoe V. CHfford, 1847 (Alderson, 
 B.) ; D. of Devonshire v. Noill, 
 187(i-7 (Ir.). 
 
 » Molton V. Harris, 1797 (Ld. 
 Kenyon). 
 
 396 
 
'.•niv! 
 
 !«"• „ 
 
 III 
 
 CHAP. IV.] MEMORIAL OF REGISTERED DEED. 
 
 On one or two occasions, indeed, such memorial, or oven an 
 examined copy of the registry, has, under special circumstances, 
 been received as secondary evidence of the contents of an inden- 
 ture, not only as against parties to the deed, who have had no part 
 in registering it, but also as against third persons.' The enrolment 
 of a lease granted by the Crown is primary evidence, because the 
 possessions of the Crown cannot be alienated but by matter of 
 record ; and so also are memorials of leases granted by the Duke 
 of Cornwall, on account of the identity of interest which subsists 
 between his Royal Highness and the Crown,* 
 
 § 420. Occasionally it is a question of some nicety to determine 
 what instrument constitutes the primary evidence of a transaction. 
 For instance, it has been discussed what is the primar}' evidence of 
 the transaction where goods have been sold througli the medium of 
 a broker. Some have said that the broker^ s hook, if signed by the 
 broker, is the primary evidence of the transaction, and conse- 
 quently, in the first instance, the only admissible proof of the con- 
 tract.' On the other hand, it has, after much consideration, and 
 after consulting merchants, been held that the bought and sold notes, 
 provided they agree, and are signed so as to satisfy the Statute of 
 Frauds,* constitute the contract, and, as such, must be produced in 
 the first instance." It is at least quite clear, that if no not6s have 
 been transmitted to the principals, recourse may be had to the 
 signed entry in the book kept by the broker,^ or, indeed, to any 
 other memorandum made by him as agent for both parties, which 
 
 ..■il 
 
 I 
 
 (Ld. 
 
 > See Sadlier v. Biffgs, 1853, II. L. ; 
 Biggs V. Sadlier, 1847 (Ir.); IVyton 
 V. M'Donnott, 1837 (Ir.)- >^oo, also, 
 Collins I'. Maiile, 1838; Doe v. Kiluor, 
 182(). In all these cases, however, 
 either the paities liad been acting for 
 a long period in obedience to the pro- 
 visions of the supposed instrument, 
 or the deed has been recited or re- 
 ferred to in other documents admis- 
 sible in the cause 
 
 * Bowe V. Brenton, 1828. For 
 other instances, see post, §§ IGJO 
 et seq. 
 
 ' Sievewright v, Archibald, IS'il 
 
 g'attoson, J., and Ld. < 'iuui'bcU) ; 
 evuuin f. Neulc, 18(I!» {lA. Ellen- 
 
 borough) ; Grant v. Fletcher, 1826 ; 
 HendiH'son r. Barnewall, 1827. 
 
 * Uurrell I'. Evans, 1801. See Far- 
 ton V. Crofts, 18G4 ; and Thompson 
 V. Gardiner, 187(). In those lust two 
 cases the jjroduction of the sold note 
 only was held sulticient to satisfy the 
 statute. 
 
 s doom i: Afhilo, 182() ; Thornton 
 V. K(unpst(U', 1814 ; Thornton v. 
 Meux. 1827 (Abbott, C.J.) ; Cum- 
 niing V. Boebuek, 1816; Ilawos v, 
 Forster, 18.'54 (Ld. Dennian) ; Town- 
 end r. Drukefonl, 1843 (id,). 
 
 » Townond v. Draki'ford, 1843; 
 Pitts v. Beckett, 184.> (I'arke, B.); 
 Tiiouipson V. Gardiner, 1&76. 
 
 I i 1 
 
 297 
 
 1 I 
 
broker's books — BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES. [^PART II. 
 
 lis; ii--i'- ■ ■ ■■ ■ 
 
 
 'M 
 
 is sufficient to satisfy the statute.' But if even a single note, actually 
 signed by one party, has been delivered to the other party, this 
 note has been held to itself constitute the contract, even though 
 it differed materially from the note which was sent to the party 
 signing that originally produced by the plaintiff.'* Wliere the 
 bought and sold notes are signed by the broker, and it is affirma- 
 tively shown that these substantially differ from each other, no 
 binding contract is usually effected, even although the purchaser, 
 on objection raised by the vendor to a particular word inserted in 
 the sold note, strikes out that word, and evidences his consent to 
 the erasure by affixing his initials thereto.* 
 
 § 421. Whether the broker's book may be resorted to if there be 
 a material disagreement between the bought and sold notes is a 
 very difficult question. Two eminent judges, on three different 
 occasions, held that it could not.^ But a third, Avho was no mean 
 lawyer, thought that it could,* and it is submitted that his opinion 
 will ultimately prevail. 
 
 § 422. In general, it will be sufficient if a party seeking to en- 
 force a contract made through a broker produces the note in his 
 possession, and shows that the broker was employed in the trans- 
 action by his adversary without producing the original broker's 
 book. His adversary, if he rely on any variance between the 
 bought and sold notes, must produce, as his evidence, the one that 
 has been handed to himself.' 
 
 § 423. As already indicated,* any substantial variance between 
 the bought note and the sold note may prevent there ever having 
 been any contract at all. But the amount of variance that will 
 have this effect cannot be expressly defined. In one case, where 
 
 1 Eichey v. Garvey, 1847 (Ir.). 
 There the inemovaiuhim had Ih^cu 
 drawn up two or three diiys utter tlie 
 sale ; but the Court helil this fact to bo 
 immaterial, the broker's authority as 
 agent for the parties not having been 
 revoked. 
 
 '• Howe V. Osborne, 1815. 
 
 » Cowie V. Remfry, 184(i, P. 0. 
 But sen Rowe v. Osborne, 1815 (Ld. 
 EUeuborough), recognized in (.'owio 
 V. llemfry, P. 0., supra; and see. 
 
 also, Moore v, Campbell, 18,54 ; Iley- 
 worth (', Knight, 18(54 (Willes, J.).' 
 
 \ Thornton v. Charlos, 18;i(> (Ld. 
 Abiiigor) ; Towneiid v. Dnikijlord, 
 184;i (Ld. Denman) ; and Gregson v, 
 Euck, 184;^ (Ld. Denman). 
 
 * Lord AV'ensleydalo in Thornton 
 V. Charles, 18;J(j. 
 
 " llawes V, Forster, 1834 (Ld. 
 Donniitn). 
 
 « Cowio V. Remfry, 184G, P. 0., 
 supra, § 420. 
 
 298 
 
CH. I V.J VARIANCE BETWEEN BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES. 299 
 
 the bought note spoke c a brokerage of one per cent., and a deposit 
 of fifteen per cent., and the l old note stated that the brokerage was 
 ten shillings per cent., and omitted all mention of the deposit, it 
 was ruled that the discrepancy was fatal, though with respect to 
 the brokerage one of the jury interpreted the notes as meaning 
 that the broker should be paid by the buyer one per cent., and by 
 the seller a half per cent, ; * and a similar conclusion was come to 
 in another case, where Scotch iron was named in the bought note, 
 and Dunlop's iron, which is Scotch iron, but not the only kind of 
 Scotch iron, was specified in the sold note ; * and in yet a third, in 
 which the sole difference between the bought and the sold notes 
 was, that the one purported to deal with " Riga," and the other 
 with " Petersburg," hemp.' But a mere clerical error, or even a 
 mistake in a name, if productive of no loss, will not invalidate the 
 Bale.* 
 
 § 424. In applying the general rule that the original document, 
 and not a mere copy of it, must be produced as evidence, to notarial 
 instruments, it is always considered a duplicate made out at any 
 time from the original or protocol in the notarial book, is equiva- 
 lent to an original drawn up at the time of the entry in the book.' 
 
 § 425. Primary proof of the title of a person as executor or 
 administrator may, as to grants since the 11th of January, 1858,^ 
 be proved either by producing the probate or letters, or by an 
 exemplification thereof granted by a registrar or district registrar 
 of the Probate Division of the High Court.' 
 
 § 426. The rule as to whether any or which of the copies of 
 deeds executed in duplicate may be regarded as an original, and as 
 to any or which of them are to be regarded as copies, is this : — 
 When two or more parts are sealed and delivered by each party, — 
 
 ' M 
 
 ' Townend v. Drakoford, 1843 (Ld. 
 Denman). See Kempson v. Boyle, 
 1805, where parol evidence was ad- 
 mitted to explain away an ap^ arent 
 variance between the notes. 
 
 ^ Sievcwright v. Archibald, 1831. 
 
 ^ Thornton v. Kempster, 1""4. 
 
 * Mitchell V. Lapage, 1810. See 
 Bold V. Eayner, 1830. 
 
 * Geralopulo v. Wielor, 1851 
 (Manle, J.). 
 
 « When the Act of 20 & 21 V. o. 77 
 
 f " The Court of Probate Act, 1857 ") 
 (as now amended by "The Statute 
 Law llevisi(m Act, 1892," 55 &. 50 
 V. 0. 19), came into operation. See 
 Gazette of Friday, Doc. 4, 1857. 
 
 ' See forms of cxomplitications 
 appended to the Eules, &c. of 1802, 
 for the Registrars of the Court of 
 I'robate in respect of non-contentious 
 business, Nos. 10 and 1 1 ; and similar 
 forms appended to Rules, &c. for the 
 District Registrars, Nob. 11 and 12. 
 
Mi 
 
 
 r\ 
 
 •1 ■* 
 
 i ■ ,1, 
 
 if 
 
 .:il!. 
 
 Sf.,: •!■ 
 
 Hi 
 
 «■ ' 
 
 DUPLICATE OUIGINALS — COUNTKRPAUTS. [PAUT II. 
 
 a practice which of late years has frequently prevailed, — they are 
 denominated duplicate or triplicate originals,^ and each copy is 
 considered primary evidi'nce.^ When, however, each pai't is exe- 
 cuted by one party only (as often occurs in the case of leases), the 
 two instruments are called counterparts, and each is alternately the 
 best evidence as against the party sealing it, and those in privity 
 with such party,' and secondary evidence of the contents of the 
 other part.* Thus, if a landlord briKgs an action for rent, he 
 produces the counterpart executed by the tenant as original 
 evidence,' or, in the event of its loss, he may have recourse, either 
 to the part sealed by himself, or to any other species of secondary 
 proof of such counterpart : ^ if, however, the tenant is the person 
 aggrieved, he must rely on the part delivered by the landlord, and 
 that executed by himself will only be considered as secondary 
 evidence. For stamp purposes the counterpart sealed by the lessor 
 is usually deemed the original ; but that which is sealed by the 
 lessee may be described in pleading as the " indenture," though 
 stamped as a counterpart, provided the action bo brought against 
 the lessee.' Where any discrepancy is found to exist between a 
 lease and its counterpart, the law will presume that the lease is 
 correct, unless it be clear that the mistake is in that instrument.^ 
 
 § 427. On one or two occasions, where it was necessary to show 
 that the plaintiff's ancestor had exercised acts of ownership over the 
 property in question, counterparts of leases older than the period of 
 living memory, and found in the ancestor's muniment room, have 
 
 * Note by reporter, 2 M. & Gr. 
 618 6, 1841. 
 
 2 See Colling v. Trewoek, 1827 
 (Baylov, J.) ; Brown v. Woodman, 
 1834 (Parke, J.). 
 
 3 Eoo V. Diivis, 1806; May. of 
 Carlisle r. Blamive, 1807; Paul v. 
 Meek, 1828; Pfarce v. Morrico, 1832 ; 
 Burleigli v. Stibbs, 1793; Houghton 
 V, Kcrnig, 1856. 
 
 * Munn V. Godbold, 1823. As 
 secondary evidence it will bo admis- 
 sible, though unstamped : id. See 
 64 & 55 V. c. 39 ("The Stamp Act, 
 1891 "), § 72 ; and ante, § U8. 
 
 * The law in Ireland is now regu- 
 lated by § 23 of the Act 23 & 24 V. 
 o. 154, which enacts, that " iu all 
 
 actions, suits, and proceedings, proof 
 by or on behalf of any landlord of 
 the perfection of the counterpart of 
 an J' lease shall be equivalent to proof 
 of the perfection of the original lease ; 
 and in case it shall appear that no 
 counterpart existed, or that the 
 counterpart has been lost, destroyed, 
 or mislaid, proof of a copy of the 
 original lease or counterpait, as tlie 
 case may be, shall bo sufficient evi- 
 dence of the contents of the lease, as 
 against the lessee, or any jjorson 
 claiming from or under him." 
 
 « Doe V. EoPS, 1840; Hall v. Ball, 
 1841. 
 
 ' Pearce v. Morrice, 1832. 
 
 » Burchell v. Clark, 1876. 
 
 300 
 
CHAP. IV.] COUNTERPARTS OF OLD LEASES. 
 
 been admitted in evidence even against strangers, though executed 
 by no one but the persons named as lessees, who were not shown to 
 have actually held under them, and though no excuse was given 
 for not producing the original leases sealed by the ancestor.' It is 
 difficult to reconcile these decisions with strict principle, since the 
 counterparts amounted, in fact, to no more than admissions by 
 third parties that the ancestor was seised ; but the rule was 
 apparently relaxed in consequence of the acknowledged difficulty 
 of tracing acts of ownership after the lapse of many years. 
 
 § 428. The rule which requires the production of the best 
 attainable evidence has now been discussed, and an attempt 
 has been made to illustrate the distinction between primary and 
 secondary modes of proof. It remains, before concluding this 
 chapter, to be seen upon what occasions secondary eckleiice will be 
 received. 
 
 § 428a. The first general rule is, that srcondnn/ ciidcncc is 
 inadmissible , until it is shown that the production ofpriinari/ evidence 
 is out of the prirtf/s power. The second is, that secondare/ eridence as 
 to previous oral testimonij can onlij he given in a prescribed naij and 
 subject to certain restrictions. The remaining general rule as to 
 secondary evidence is that there, are no degrees of secondarij evidence. 
 
 § 428b. The first of these general rules, namely, the rule that 
 secondary evidence is inadmissible until it be shown that the production 
 of primary evidence is out of the ])arty^s power, and the exceptions 
 to it, will be most conveniently discussod with regard to, first, 
 documentary evidence, and, next, to oral testimony. 
 
 § 428(;. With respect to documents, proof of their contents may 
 be established by secondary evidence, first, when the original 
 writing is destroyed or lost ; secondly, when its production is 
 phyhically impossible, or at least highly inconvenieut ; thirdly, 
 when the document is in the possession of the adverse party, who 
 refuses, after notice, or in some cases without notice, to produce it ; 
 fourthly, when it is in the hands of a tliird party, who is not com- 
 
 :',^^'i 
 
 
 » Doe V. Pulinan, 1S42; D. of 
 Bedford v. Lopus, 1m;}8, decided 
 by Ld. Donmau; Biistow v. Cor- 
 iiiican, 1878 (Ld. lUiickburn), in 
 II. L. ; Gov. of Magdalen Hospital 
 V. Knott, 1877, 0. A.; Clarkson 
 
 V. Woodliouso, 178-. In tliifl last 
 case the distinction between couuter- 
 piii'ts and leases does not appear to 
 have been much discussed, if taken 
 at all. 
 
 301 
 

 llM 
 
 (IF'' 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 Wm 
 
 mu 
 
 I i it 
 
 ;lii|||j^»i§l|i| 
 
 WHEN INSTRUMENT IS DESTROYED OR LOST. [PART II. 
 
 Reliable by law to produce it, and who, being called as a witness 
 ■with a subpcona duces tecum, relies upon his right to withhold it ; 
 fifthly, when the law raises a strong presumption in favour of the 
 existence of the document : sixthly, when the papers are voluminous, 
 and it is only necessary to prove their general results ; and lastly, 
 •when the question arises upon the examination of a witness on the 
 voire dire. 
 
 § 429.' First, if an instrument be destroyed or lost, a party who 
 seeks to give seeonrlary evidence of its contents must, to begin 
 ■with, give some evidence that the original once existed," and then 
 either prove positively, or at least presumptively (as by showing 
 that it has heen thrown aside as useless^), that such instrument has 
 heen destroyed, or he must show that it has been lost by proof that a 
 search has been unsuccessfully made for it, in the place or places 
 ■where it was most likely to be found. What degree of diligence ig 
 necessary in a search for a lost instrument cannot easily be defined, 
 as each case must depend much on its own peculiar circumstances.^ 
 The party seeking to be allowed to give secondary evidence, on the 
 ground that an instrument is lost, is, however, generally expected 
 to chow that he has, in good faith, exhausted m a reasonable 
 degree all the sources of information and means of discovery which 
 the nature of the case ■would naturally suggest, and which wore 
 accessible to him.' The object of the proof is merely to establish a 
 reasonable prf umption of the loss of the instrument, and this is a 
 preliminary inquiry addressed to the discretion of the judge.^ The 
 party offering secondary evidence, therefore, need not on ordinary 
 occasions have made a search for the original document, as for 
 stolen goods, nor be in a position to negative every possibility of its 
 having been kept back.' If the document be important, and such 
 as the owner may have an interest in keeping, or if any reason 
 exist for suspecting that it has been fraudulently withheld, a very 
 
 'l. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 5o8. in part. 
 
 * Dog v. Wittcomb, 1851 (Ld. 
 Campbell) ; in H. L., 1853 (Alderson, 
 B.]. 
 
 » E. V. Johnson, 1805. 
 
 * Brc^rster v. Sowoll, 1820 (Best, 
 J.); Gully V. Bp of Exeter, 1827. 
 Soo i'aidoo V. i'lice, 1844 ; K. v. 
 
 Gordon, 1855. 
 
 « E. V. Saffron Hill, 1852. Seo 
 Moriartj' v. Grey, 18(J0 (Ir.). 
 
 « Ante, § 23. 
 
 "< M'Galiey v. Alston, 1836 (Aider- 
 son, B.); recofjnized (Wigram, V.-C.) 
 in Hart v. Hart, 1841. 
 
 302 
 
CHAP. IV.] SEARCH FOR LOST INSTRUMENT. 
 
 etrict examination will be required ; but only a comparatively 
 slight degree of diligence will be demanded on a search for a paper 
 supposed to be of little or no value.' 
 
 § 430. When a document belongs to the personal custody of a 
 pnrtieidar individual, or is proved, or may be presumed, to be in 
 his possession, he must in general be served with a subpoena duces 
 tecxim, and be sworn to account for it ; " since, so long as he is 
 capable of being called as a witness, his declarations respecting it 
 will in strictness be inadmissible,^ and even after his death this 
 species of evidence, though admissible as tending to prove the 
 diligence and extent of the search, must be received with great 
 caution.* However, this species of evidence being only required 
 for the purpose of satisf}'ing the conscience of tlie judge on a 
 preliminary inquiry, a looser rule is allowed to prevail than would 
 have been applicable to proof of material issues ; indeed it even has 
 
 » Gathercole v. Miall, 1846 (Pol- 
 lock, C.B., and Aldorson, B.); Brew- 
 ster ■". Sewell, 1820 ; Kensington v. 
 Inplis, 1807; R. v. East I'airley, 
 1825 (Bayley, J.); Freeman v. Arkell, 
 1824. 
 
 * See E. V. Saffron HUl, 1852. 
 
 8 R. V. Denio, 1827 ; R. v. Castle- 
 ton, 1795 ; Williams v. Young- 
 husband, 1815; Walker v. Lady 
 Beauchamp, 1834 (Alderson, B.), 
 
 * R. V. Rawden, 1834 (Ld. Den- 
 man). On one occasion, where an 
 apprentice, shortly before his death, 
 had stated that his indenture had 
 been given up to him after the expi- 
 ration of the apprenticeship, and 
 that he had burnt it, secondaiy evi- 
 dence of its contents was received 
 without any search having been 
 made for it, as proof was given that 
 the deed had not been executed in 
 duplicate, that the master was dead, 
 and that his executrix had declared 
 that she knew nothing about the in- 
 strument (R. V. Morton, 1815). This 
 decision appears to have proceeded 
 on the somewhat dubioiis ground, 
 that if the statement of the appren- 
 tice was inadmissible, the indenture 
 was not traced into his hands, and as 
 the term of service had expired, no 
 particular reason could be assigned 
 
 why it should be in hia custody, 
 while, if the statement was receiv- 
 able to show a possession of the deed 
 by him, it further showed that search 
 for it was unnecessary (per Ld. 
 Ellen borough, in 4 M. & Sel. 50, 
 1815; explained by Bayley, J., in 
 R. V. Denio, 1827. See Eichai'ds v, 
 Lewis, 1852). The second branch of 
 this dilemma is unanswerable, but 
 the first is open to much doubt ; for 
 even if the fact of the deed not being 
 traced into the hands of the appren- 
 tice could preclude the necessity of 
 searching in that quarter (as to which 
 see post, § 434, n. *), it could not 
 discharge the parties of laches, in 
 having neither called the personal 
 representative of the master, nor even 
 examined his papers. Perhaps, how- 
 ever, the case may best be supported 
 on the grounds stated in the text a 
 few words further on. In City of 
 Bristol V. AVait, 1834, too. Aider- 
 son, B., held that, in order to 
 let in secondaiy evidence of the 
 appointment of one of the defen- 
 dants as overseer, it was sufficient 
 to show that one of the witnesses had 
 asked him for his appointment, and 
 that ho had said he had lost it, whei'e- 
 upon no search was made. See, also, 
 R. V. Eordingbridgo, 1858. 
 
 303 
 
 i 
 
 
 : '1' 
 
 j ' i 
 
 1 ' 
 
 1 
 
•,!* 
 
 
 ;l^i!'l 
 
 '!i 
 
 '111 
 
 11 ;ii' 
 
 Itl'll! 
 
 ii 
 
 iirt 
 
 SKAUCri FOR LOST INSTRUMKNT. [I'ART II. 
 
 boen held' that, in order to show tliiit so.irch 1ms lucii niiido for ii 
 document, so us to let in sccHindary proof of its t'onlout.s, hearsay 
 evidenoe of the anxwcn-N given by persons who wero likely to have it 
 in their custody ought to he received.* 
 
 § 431. If an instrument oiiglit to have been deposited in a pullio 
 office, or other particular place, it will generally be deemed sufHeient 
 to liave soanilied that [)lace, without calling the party whoso duty 
 it was to have put it there, or any other person who may have had 
 access to it. For example, wliere a parish indenture of apprentice- 
 ship was proved to have been given to a person since dead to take 
 to the overseers, and a fruitless search had been made for it in the 
 parish chest, which was the proper repository for such instruments, 
 secondary evidence was admitted without more ; ' where it was the 
 duty of a paying clerk of a parish to deposit a certain cancelled 
 cheque in a room of the workhouse, an application to the successor 
 of this clerk for an inspection of the cheques iu the room, and an 
 ineffectual examination of several biindles, which were handed to 
 the party searching by the successor, was deemed a sufficient search 
 to let in secondary evidence, though no notice to produce had been 
 served on the first clerk, he being the defendant in the cause, and 
 though the person who succeeded him in the office was not called ; ' 
 and on proof by the high constable, who levied under it, that he 
 had deposited it in hit, office, and had sought for it there in vain, 
 secondary evidence of the contents of a warrant issued by the 
 defendant has been received, and this though the constable added 
 that the town-clerk had access to the office, and it was objected 
 that the defendant should have been served with a notice to produce 
 the warrant, and the town-clerk with a subpoena duces ft., um.* 
 
 » E. V. Kenilworth, 1845 (Colo- 
 ridge, J.). 
 
 * E. V. Braintree, 1859; E. v 
 Kenilworth, IS'15 ; Smith v. Smith, 
 1876 (Ir.). 
 
 3 E. V. Stourbridge, 1828. See 
 Minshall v. Lloyd, 1837. 
 
 * M-Gahey v. Alston, 1836. 
 
 * Fernley v. Worthiiigton, 1840. 
 Where, however, it appeared that 
 a solicitor, who had prepared an 
 agreement between the plaintiff and 
 defendant, had sent it after execu- 
 tion to the defendant by his clerk, 
 and tiiis clerk was not called (having 
 
 quitted the service of the solicitor a 
 long time back), but the defendant's 
 clerk stated that he had searched 
 for the deed in his counting-house, 
 whore tlio transactions to which it 
 referred were all carried (mi, and 
 where books containing entries re- 
 lating to those transactions were 
 kept; the case, on this state of 
 facts, and without the expression 
 of any opinion as to the effect of the 
 absence of the solicitor's clerk, was 
 referred back to a master, in order 
 that a further search might be made 
 at defendant's private residence, since 
 
 304 
 
C. IV.] SK.VRCII rOK LOST WUITINGS — PROPER CUSTODY. 
 
 § 43"2. It is oftoii (liirieult to nsccrfain wliat is tho propor rmtodif 
 of an insfrunicnt,' and it will then iihviiys bo I'xpL'dii'nt, and somu- 
 times nofiossmy, to soarcli novcral places. For oxainplo, whore a 
 Tiiarriagn settlement, after providing a portion for younger eliildron, 
 and vesting a Irgal term in trustees to secure it, reserved an 
 ultimate remainder to (he settlor's heir, a search among the papers 
 of the surviving younger child was hold insufficient to let in 
 secondary evidence of its contents, as the papers of the surviving 
 trustees, and of tho heir, should also have been examined ; ' an 
 expired indenture of apprenticeship remains sometimes with tho 
 master, sometimes with the apprentice, but, since the apprentice 
 has the greatest interest in its preservation,' stricter inquiry should 
 be made of him than of the master, and in the absence of positive 
 proof respecting the possession, caution would suggest what strict 
 law might not require* — a search among the papers of both. Search 
 for an expired lease should be made among the papers of both lessor 
 and lessee,' whether a term has come to an end by efflux of time or 
 by forfeiture, since the lessee will have a right to keep the deed, 
 for a time at least, to use in an action of covenant against the 
 lessor, but it will frequently, after a considerable interval, be found 
 in the landlord's possession, as constituting one of the muniments 
 of his title.6 
 
 § 433. A deed of compromise which comes from the office of the 
 solicitor to one of the parties to it comes from the proper custody.' 
 The legal custody of a document appointing an overseer is in that 
 
 it did not appear that his clerk, who 
 hud been actively concerned in the 
 transactions in question, had ever 
 Been the deed at tho counting-house : 
 Hart V. Hart, 1841. And m Bligh 
 V. Wellesley, 1826, a witness stated 
 that he had in vain searched for some 
 
 Eapers in a box, in which he thought 
 e had put them, but that he still 
 fancied they were somewhere in his 
 possession, though he had not looked 
 elsewhere for them ; this was insuffi- 
 cient (Best, C.J.). 
 ' As to this, see post, §§ 659 — 664. 
 ' Cruise v. Clancy, 1844 (Ir.) 
 (Sugden, C); Richards v, Lewis, 
 1852. 
 » See HaU v. BaU, 1841. 
 
 * R. V. Hinckley, 1863. 
 
 » Brewster v. Sewell, 1820; Hall 
 V. BaU, 1841 (Erskine, J.). 
 
 8 Hall V. Ball, 1841 ; Tlaxton v. 
 Dare, 1829 ; Klworihy v. Sandford, 
 1864; R. V. North Redburu, 1784 
 (Buller, J.) ; Doe v. Keeling, 1848. 
 It has, however, never been ex- 
 pressly decided that a search among 
 the muniments of the lessor alone 
 would not let in secondary evidence ; 
 and Bayley, J., on one occasion, seems 
 to have thought that an examination 
 of the lessee's papers would not be 
 absolutely necessary. See cases just 
 cited. 
 
 ' Miller v. Wheatley, 1890. 
 
 305 
 
 ' 
 

 I 
 
 SH '! 
 
 SEARCH FOR LOST WRITINGS. 
 
 [rART II. 
 
 officer, lie being the person most interest'- 1 in it, and requiring its 
 production as a sanetion for those acts which lie may he railed upon 
 to do under its authority; therefore, in the ahsenco of proof that the 
 other parish officers have the actual custody of such an instrument, 
 it will not suffice to give them notice to produce it, but before 
 secondary evidence can be received it will be necessary to call the 
 overseer himself.' 
 
 § 4"54. If the party entitled to the ciistody of a document be 
 dead, inquiries should generally be made of his personal represen- 
 tatives, and if the document relate to real estate, of the heii'-at-law 
 also. But these steps will not be necessary should it appear that 
 another party is in possession of the papers of the deceased. There- 
 fore, where the master of an apprentice, being possessed of the 
 indenture, failed, and an attorney took the custody of his papers, 
 a search among these papers by tliv? attorney, after the master's 
 death, was held sufficient to let in secondary evidence of the deed 
 of apprenticeship, though no inquiries had been made of the 
 master's widow.' 
 
 § 435. The law does not, moreover, require that the search should 
 have been rrcrnf, or made for the piirposon of the cause. Therefore, 
 a search made amongst the proper papers three years before the 
 trial, was held sufficient, though it would have been more satis- 
 factory hod the papers been again examined.' If an instrument 
 were executed in duplicate, or triplicate, &c., the loss of all the 
 parts must he proved, in order to let in secondary evidence of the 
 contents ; * and, in every case, before such evidence will be admis- 
 sible, the original instrument must be shown to have been didy 
 executed, and to have been otherwise genuine.* If the instrument 
 were of such a nature as to have required attestation," the attesting 
 witness must, if known, be called, or in the event of his death, his 
 handwriting must be proved, precisely in the same manner as if the 
 deed itself had been produced ; though, if it cannot be discovered 
 who the attesting witness was, this strictness of proof will, from 
 
 > R. V. Stoko Oolriing. 1817. 
 
 • R. V. Piddlohinton, 18U2. 
 » Fitz V. Rabbits, 1H;}7. 
 
 • R. f. CiiHtleton, 17!).); Alivon v. 
 luniiviil, 1834. Soo iiiitd, § ;i91. 
 
 • Uoodior v. Lake, 17117 ; R. v. 
 
 Culpoppor, IGOO; T)oo v. Whitcfoot, 
 1838 ; JiK'kson r. Krittr, l.sii) (.\m.) : 
 Kinibiill r. MoiTcU, 18L>() (Am.). 
 
 • St'c, hownvor, us to doiMimi'iits 
 hot ii'(|\iiiiiig attosUitiou, 28 & 29 V. 
 c. 18, § 7. 
 
 306 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 PROBATE OF LOST WILL. 
 
 necessity, be waived. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
 the court will presume that a lost instrument was duly stamped,' 
 
 § 436. In the Court of Probate where a will itself has, after the 
 death of the testator, been irretrievably lost or destroyed, if its 
 subatdHce can be distinctly ascertained (either by the original 
 instructions, by a copy of the will, or even by the recollection of 
 witnesses who have heard it read) probate may be granted of a 
 copy embodying such substance.* On one remarkable occasion the 
 contents, or rather a large portion of the contents, of a lost will, 
 were allowed to be proved by the testimony of a single interested 
 witness, whose veracity and competency were unimpeached ; and 
 probate granted to the extent of the proof.' In all cases, however, 
 of this nature, the jurisdiction of the court must be exercised with 
 the greatest possible caution; and a judge will scarcely feel justified 
 in acting on the evidence, unless it be of the most cogent and 
 irrefragable character, not oidy free from suspicion in its sources, 
 but exact and certain in its conclusions.* 
 
 S 437. Notwithstanding the rule, which in general enables parties 
 to prove, by secondary evidence, the contents of documents which 
 have been lost or destroyed, in certain cases prior to the year 1804, no 
 action could be maintained either upon certain written instruments 
 themselves or even upon the consideration on which they were 
 founded, without the production of such written instruments them- 
 selves. Thus, no action could at law be sustained on a /o.s7 bill of 
 ('.rcli(ii)(ir, promissory note, or cheque, or on their respet^tive con- 
 siderations, provided the instrument had been originally drawn 
 payable tu order, or bearer, and provided the fact of the loss had 
 been specially pleaded.'^ The payee of a lost instrument of the 
 description indicated was, to recover payment, formerly comiielled 
 
 ' .\nto. § 148. 
 
 « Wharriiiii v. WTinrrnm, 1S03; 
 rodmin'o V. Wliiittoii, l.S(U ; Mooro 
 V. Wliitohousc, liStH ; In lo Uody, 
 l.S(i4; In ro Ikibor, IHfJO; WoodV. 
 "Wood, 1H()(); Finch V. Finch, 1K(}7 ; 
 Utiils I'. Burls. 18»)H ; In ro Calliin, 
 1«74 (Ir.); Miihood c Muhood, 1874 
 (Ir.). Soo post, § 550. 
 
 ^ Siigden V. Ld. Hi. Leonardo, 
 1876. 
 
 * Piisps in liist note hut onn. 
 
 ' Kiiniu/ /•. Ciowc, 1847 ; Crowe t>. 
 (May, IS.VI ; lliinsard r. Kohinson, 
 l.Sl>7; riorson c. Iliitcliinisoii, ISO!); 
 iMiiyor i). Johnson, I8i;{ ; Diivia v. 
 J)odd, 1812; ('liatnjiion v. Ti'rry, 
 1822; IWau v. Hill. 810; Wood- 
 ford ?-. Whitcloy, 18;iO. Sec .\lo.\- 
 nndor ?•. Stronp, 1842; T.ulihock r. 
 Tribe, 18;i8 ; ]5Iai-ki<> c. I'idding, 
 1848; and Charuley v. Gruudy, 1634. 
 
 ^io; 
 
SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF MURAL MONUMENTS. [PT. II, 
 
 Bf;!!;; 
 
 >l;; 
 
 
 lr-1 '• 
 
 :;! : 
 
 -!?■' \ 
 
 
 
 Ulr' \ 
 
 
 
 lii. ■ 
 
 
 
 ■mi ■ 
 
 
 
 ■iilivr::: 
 
 
 ^^X'- ,■ 
 
 
 
 ^uy .:. 
 
 
 s 
 
 to resort to a court of equity.' But the law on tliis subject was 
 altered in 1854 by the Common Law Procedure Act of that year 
 (which appears to be still in force) and the Bills of Exchange Act, 
 1882, repeats very similar provisions.* 
 
 § 438. Tiie second case^ in which the contents of a written 
 document may be proved by secondary evidence, is when its produc- 
 tion is either phijHknlly imposnble, or highly inconvenient. Thus,^ 
 inscriptions on nails and fixed tables, mural monuments, gravestones, 
 surveyors^ marks on boundary trees, notices affixed on boards to 
 warn trespassers, and the like, may be proved by secondary 
 evidence, since they cannot conveniently, if at all, be produced in 
 court.* For instance, on one occasion a man was convicted of 
 
 ;MTjKi 
 
 V i ■■ >.! 
 
 m: 
 
 > Warmsley v. Child, 1749 ; Toul- 
 min V. Price, 1800; Ex parte Green- 
 way, 1802 ; Macartney v. Graham, 
 1828; Davies v. Dodd, 1817 ; Mossop 
 V. Eadon, 1810. 
 
 ' § 87 of " The Common Law 
 Procedure Act, 1854 " (17 & 18 V. 
 c. 12j), is as follows: — "In case 
 of any action founded upon a bill 
 of exchange or other negotiable 
 instrument," which words will in- 
 clude a bank note (M'Donnell v. 
 Muri'ay, 18j()), or a lost half of a 
 bank note (see liyles on Bills, 1891 
 edit., p. 394)— "it shall be lawful 
 for tlio court or a judge to order that 
 the loss of such instrument sliall not 
 be sot up, ])r<)vidcd an indemnity is 
 given, to the satisfaction of the court 
 or judge, or a master, against tlio 
 cliiinis of any other porson upon such 
 lu'gotiabli! instrument " (see Aran- 
 guerin r. ScholHeld, ISiJO; King v. 
 Zimmermann, 1871). If the payee 
 of a lost note can show that the in- 
 strument was never negotiable, as 
 having been originally made payable 
 to himself alone, he cannot, as it 
 would seem, be called ujjon to give 
 an indemnity under this clause, but 
 the action will be sustainable, either 
 on the instrument itself, or on tho 
 consideration ; because, in such case, 
 tho defendant cannot be rendered 
 liable to pay the amount a second 
 time (Wain ?'. Bailey, 18.'{9 ; recog- 
 nized in llamuz r. Crowe, 1847 ; 
 day V, Crowe, 1853. As to what is 
 
 the effect of the bill being destroyed, 
 see § 322 of the 1st edit, of this work, 
 and Wi'ight v. Ld. Maidstone, 1855 
 (Wood, V.-C). See, too, Conflans 
 Quarry Co. v. Parker, 1867 ; where 
 circular notes having been lost, the 
 party losing them was held not en- 
 titled to sue the bankers for money 
 had and received). §§ 69 and 70 of 
 "The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882" 
 (45 & 46 V. 0. 61) are as follow : — 
 
 § 69. " Where a bill has been lost 
 before it is overdue, the person who 
 was the holder of it may apply to the 
 drawer to give him another bill of 
 the 81.' me tenour, giving security to 
 tho drawer, if required, to indem- 
 nify him against all persons what- 
 ever in case the bill alleged to have 
 been lost shall be found again. 
 
 "If the dr.i wor, on request as afore- 
 said, refuses to give such dupliciito 
 bill, he may bo compelled to io 
 so." 
 
 § 70. " In any action or proceeding 
 upon a bill, tho court or a judge 
 may onler that the loss of the in- 
 strutnont shall not be set up, pro- 
 vided an indemnity bo given to the 
 satisfaction of the court or judge 
 against the claims of any other person 
 upon tho instrument in question." 
 
 ^ See supra, § 42Mn. 
 
 ♦ Gr. Ev. § 94, in ])art. 
 
 » Mortimer i'. M'Callan. 1840 (Ld. 
 Abingor and Aldersou, B.); R. v. 
 Eursi'y. 1833; Doe v. C(de, 1834 
 (Patteson, J.) ; Bartholomew v. 
 
 308 
 
CH. IV.] 
 
 FOliKIGN DOCUMENTS — llECORDS — REGISTEitS. 
 
 writing a libel on the wall of the Liverpool gaol, on mere proof of 
 his handwriting.^ In order, however, to let in this description of 
 secondary evidence, it must clearly appear that the document or 
 writing is affixed to the freehold, and cannot easily be removed ; 
 and therefore, where a notice was merely suspended to the wall of 
 an office by a nail, it was considered necessary to produce it at the 
 trial.* If, too, a document be depositeil in a foreign country, and 
 the laws or established usage of that country will not permit its 
 removal, secondary evidence of the contents will be adriiittcd, 
 because in that case, as in the case of mural inscriptions, it is not 
 in the power of the party to produce the original.' 
 
 § 439.* On a similar ground, the existence and contents of any 
 record of a judicial court, and of entries in any other ptih/ic books 
 or registers, may be proved by an examined copy, and in some cases 
 by an office copy, by a certified copy, or even by a mere certificate.' 
 This rule extends to all records and entries of a public nature in 
 books required by law to be kept ; and is adopted, — partly, because 
 of the serious risk of loss which the removal of such documents 
 would occasion, — partly, because of the inconvenience which the 
 public might experience from the removal, especially if the docu- 
 ments were wanted in two or more places about the same time, — 
 and partly, because of the public character of the facts recorded, 
 and the consequent facility of detection of any fraud or error in the 
 copy.' 
 
 $i 439a. For very similar reasons, too, and on grounds of con- 
 venience, in an action for infringement of a copyright in a picture 
 
 Stephens, 18139 (id.); Bruce v. Nico- 
 lopnlo, 1855. 
 
 ' Mentioned by Ld. Abinger in 
 Mortimer v. M'Callun, 1840. 
 
 ' Jones V. Tarloton, 1842. On one 
 occasion, indeed, the Committee for 
 Privileges in the House of Lords 
 recoivod in evidence, as proof in a 
 pedigree, a copy of a plate of the 
 arum of the Knights of the Garter, 
 which had been put up in the Chapel 
 lloyal at Windsor in the reign of 
 Iloiirj' v., and which, being fastened 
 to the buihling only by screws, was 
 phy.sically removable; but this case 
 soems to rest, at least partly, on the 
 ground that the plate in question 
 
 could not have been removed with- 
 out a special warrant from tlie Queen. 
 Semble, this evitleiico would not have 
 been adiiiissiblo had not the question 
 at issue related to a jivdii/ree : Berke- 
 ley Peerage, 1858-()1, II. L. ; Shrews- 
 bury Peerage case, 1857, II. L. 
 
 =• Burnable y. Baillio, 18S9; Ali- 
 von V. Furnival, 18;i4 ; Boyle v, 
 AViseman, 1855 ; Quilter v. Jorss, 
 185;j. See 14 & 15 V. c. 99 ("The 
 Evidence Act. 1851"), § 7; and 
 Crispin r. Doglioni, 1802. 
 
 « Gr. Ev. §91, in part. 
 
 * This subject will be discussed 
 post, §§ 15;J4 ot seq. 
 
 • B. N. P. 22G. 
 
 309 
 

 PAPERS IN POSSESSION OF OPPONENT. [PAPT II. 
 
 it is not necessary to produce the original picture, but the infringe- 
 ment may be proved by persons who, on looking at the infringe- 
 ment in court, say that it resambles it.^ 
 
 § 440. The third case in which secondary evidence of a written 
 document is admissible is when a document is in the jwssesnion of 
 the advermry, who with/iok/s it at the trial, and a notice to produce the 
 orif/inal has been dull/ served, where such notice is requisite,^ This 
 rule applies equally both in civil and criminal cases. In either 
 mode of proceeding, in order to render the notice available, it must, 
 ho'vever, be first shown that the instrument is in the hands, or 
 under the control, of the party required to produce it.' Very slight 
 evidence will raise a sufficient presumption of this where the 
 document exclusively belongs to or in the regular course of business 
 ought to be in the custody of a party served. Therefore, where a 
 bankruptcy certificate was proved to have been obtained for a 
 defendant, the court presumed that it had come into his possession ; * 
 while, if papers were last seen in the hands of a defendant, it lies 
 upon him to trace them out of his possession,* — and for this 
 purpose he may interpose with evidence while the plaintiff's case is 
 proceeding, and, such evidence being submitted to the judge alone,* 
 its admission does not give the plaintiff's counsel a right to reply 
 to the jury.' Where a party has notice to produce a particular 
 instrument which has been traced to his possession, he cannot, it 
 seems, object to parol evidence of its contents being given, on the 
 ground that, previously to the notice, he had ceased to have any 
 control over it, unless he has stated this fact to the opposite party, 
 and has pointed out to him the person to whom he delivered it.* 
 Neither can he escape the effect of the notice, by afterwards volun- 
 tarily parting witli the iii>trument, which it directs him to produce.® 
 
 1 Williums V. Luciis, 1892, C. A. 
 
 » 11. V, Watson, 1788 (IJuUer, J.); 
 Att.-Gen. v. Le Marchunt, \~''? ; 
 Gates V. Winter, 1789. As to the 
 presumption respecting the stamp, 
 880 ante, § 148. 
 
 3 Sharpe i'. Jiamb, 1840. 
 
 ♦ Henry v. Leigli, 18i;J (Ld. Ellen- 
 horoiif^h). See, also, Robb v. Star- 
 key, 1845. 
 
 » R. V. Thistlowood, 1820; E. v. 
 IngH, 1820. 
 
 » aupra, §§ 23 et seq. 
 
 ' Ilaryeyv. Mitchell, 1841 (Parke, 
 B.) ; Smith v. Sleap, 1843 (Alderson, 
 B.). 
 
 " Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1824 (Rest, 
 C.J.). In Knight v. Martin, 1819, 
 where secondary evidence was lield 
 iri'.dniistiil)le, the party, who was 
 served with notice to produce a lease, 
 told his opponent tnat he had as- 
 signed it. 
 
 » Per Dallas, C.J., iii Knight v. 
 Maitin, 1819. 
 
 810 
 
CH. IV.] NOTICK TO PRODUCE — POSSESSION BY AGENT. 
 
 m 
 
 ■4 
 
 § 441. If an instrument be in the possession of a person in 
 priiity with the party, such as his banker,' agent, servant, deputy, 
 or the like, such person need not be served with a subpoena duces 
 tecum, or even be called as a witness, but a notice given to the 
 party himself will suffice.^ For example, the admission of secondary 
 evidence will be justified by a notice to a shipowner to produce 
 papers, though the captain has possession of them for his own 
 protection,' — or by a notice to a sheriff to produce a warrant, which 
 is shown to have been returned to the under-sheriff during the time 
 that the sheriff remained in office ; * and a document deposited in a 
 court of equity by a party to a suit, and scheduled in his answer, 
 which had been ordered to be delivered to him, was held to be 
 sufficiently within his control to let in secondary evidence after 
 notice to produce, though it appeared that, at the time of the trial, 
 the document was still in the hands of an officer of the court.* 
 But the party served with the notice to produce must have such a 
 right to the instrument which is the subject of it as would entitle 
 him not merely to inspect it, but to retain it. Therefore, where a 
 document is held by a stakeholder between the defendant and a 
 stranger to the cause," or where it has been delivered to a third 
 person, under whom the defendant has justified in an action of 
 trespass, and by whose directions he aoted,' parol evidence of its 
 contents must be rejected, notwithstanding that a notice to proJ'Jce 
 has been duly served on the defendant. 
 
 § 441a. a proper notice to produce is, however, in all these 
 cases necessary before secondary evidence becomes admissible. A 
 few remarks as to the form and service of such a lotice will, there- 
 fore, not be out of place here. 
 
 § 442. The notice must, it seems, not only be in uritiiig,^ but, 
 so far as civil proceedings are concerned, must be in a special 
 
 « Partridge v.Coates, 1824 (Abbott, 
 C.J.) ; Burton u. Payne, 1827 (Bav- 
 ley, J.). 
 
 • Sinclair v. Stevenson, 1824 (Best, 
 C.J.). 
 
 » Baldney v. Ritchie, 1824 (Ld. 
 EUenborough). 
 
 * Taplin v. Atty, 1825 ; Suter v. 
 
 ap. 
 bII, 
 
 Burrell, 1857. 
 
 » Eush .;. Peacock, 1838 (Ld. Den- 
 man). 
 « Parry v. May, 1833 (Littledale, 
 
 ' Evans v. Sweet, 1824 (Best, 
 CJ.). 
 
 * See R. S. 0. 1883, Ord. LXVL, 
 r. 1. 
 
 311 
 
 I ;■' 
 
SERVICE OF NOTICE — CONTENTS OF NOTICE. [PART II. 
 
 form.' It may be directed to the party or to his solicitor, and may 
 be served on either.^ Indeed, it will be sufficient to leave the notice 
 with a servant of the party at his dwelling-house, or with a clerk 
 at the solicitor's office.' Where the solicitor has been changed, a 
 notice served on the first solicitor before the change will suffice ; 
 for otherwise the effect of the notice might be easily evaded by 
 changing the legal adviser on the eve of the trial.^ A notice duly 
 served on the party will not be rendered invalid by a subsequent 
 bad service on the solicitor.* 
 
 § 443. It is difficult to lay down any general rule as to tchat a 
 notice to produce ought to contain, since much must depend on the 
 particular circumstances of each case. No misstatement or in- 
 accuracy in the notice will, however, be deemed material, if not 
 really calculated to mislead the opponent.® Neither is it necessary, 
 by condescending minutely to dates, contents, parties, &o., to 
 specify the precise documents intended. Indeed, to do so may be 
 dangerous, since if any material errors ' ere inadvertently made, 
 the party sought to be affected by the notice might urge, with 
 possible success, that he had been misled thereby. If enough is 
 stated on the notice to induce the party to believe that a particular 
 
 Hi. .; 
 
 ^mk 
 
 
 « Order XXXII. r. 8. The form is as follows .— 
 
 No. 14. App. B. 
 [Heading as in Form 1.] 
 
 "Take notice, thau you are hereby required to produce and show to the 
 court on the trial of this all books, papers, letters, copies of letters, 
 
 and other writings and documents in your custody, possession, or ower, 
 containing any entry, memorandum, or minute relating to the matters in 
 question in this , and particularly 
 
 Dated the day of , 18 . 
 
 To the above-named 
 
 / (Signed) 
 
 h solicitor or agent. 
 
 » Hughes V. Budd, 1840; B. v. 
 Barker, 1858; E. v. Boucher, 1859; 
 Houseman v. Roberts, 1832 ; Gates v. 
 Winter, 1789. This last case was a 
 qui tam action. See B. v. Downham, 
 1858. 
 
 , named 
 
 , of , agent for 
 
 , solicitor for the above- 
 
 » Evans V. Sweet, 1824 (Best, C.J.). 
 
 * Doev. Martin, 1832(Tindal,C.J.). 
 » Hughes V. Budd, 1840 (Patteson, 
 
 J.). 
 
 * Justice V. Elstob, 1858 ; Graham 
 V. Oldis, 1858. 
 
 312 
 
CHAP. 1V.1 CONTENTS OF NOTICK TO PKODUCE. 
 
 instrument will be c<alled for, this will be sufRciont.^ But a notice 
 to produce " all letters, papers, and documents, touching or con- 
 cerning the bill of exchange mentioned in the declaration, and the 
 debt sought to be recovered," * has been held too vague to admit 
 secondary proof of a notice of dishonour sent by the plaintiff to the 
 defendant. And in an action ' against four defendants, as owners 
 of a sloop, to recover an account f'^" warehousing the rigging of the 
 vessel, in order to prove that one defendant was a joint owner, the 
 plaintiff called for a letter, which was stated to have been written 
 nine years before by this defendant to the son of another defendant, 
 and relied upon a " notice to produce letters and copies of letters, 
 and all books relating to the cause," but the court decided that the 
 notice was too uncertain, and no sensible man could entertain a 
 different opinion. It is believed that many judges still act upon 
 these old principles, though later decisions justify a greater laxity 
 of practice.* 
 
 § 444. In an old case, a notice which misdescribed the title of 
 the cause was held invalid ; ' but an objection to a notice on the 
 ground that it was entitled (by mistake) in a wrong court, was over- 
 ruled, Alderson, B., saying, "One does not know where we aro to 
 stop. Would the notice be bad if one of the names was spelt 
 wrong? . . At the time of the decision in Harvey v. Morgan, the 
 courts were much more strict than now as to matters of this nature."* 
 
 ' See Rogers v. Custance, 1839. 
 
 « France ?;. Lucy, 1825 (Best, C. J.). 
 
 ' Jones !'. Edwards, 1825. 
 
 * Thus, a notice to produce ' ' all 
 li'tters written by the phiintiff to the 
 dofondaiit, rehiting to the mutters in 
 disjjute in the action " (Jacob r. Lee, 
 18.'i" (Patteson, J.); see, also, Coniiy- 
 bear v. Farries, 18GJ)), or " all letter-! 
 written to or received by the jjlaintifl 
 between the years 1837 and 1841, 
 both inclusive, by and from the defen- 
 dants, or either of thein, or any per- 
 son in their behalf, and also all books, 
 papers, &c., relating to the subject- 
 matter of this cause" (Morris v. 
 Hauser, 1841 (Ld. Dennian)), have 
 res])ectively been held suflicient to 
 let in ])aioI evidence of a particular 
 li'tter not otherwise specified. In 
 tlii'se cases the names of thts parties 
 by and to whom the letters were 
 
 addressed appeared on the notice. 
 This was pointed out and relied upon 
 by Patteson, J., in Jacob v. lice, 
 1837. The Coiu-t of Queen's Bench, 
 in an action for work and labour, 
 also decided that a notice to pro- 
 duce " all accounts relating to the 
 matters in question in this cause," 
 comprehended with sufficient pre- 
 cision a particular account relating 
 to a small jiart of the work, though 
 it apjieared that many such accounts 
 for dirt'ei'ent parts of the work had 
 been rendered by the jilaintiff to the 
 defendant : Rogers v. Custimce, 1837. 
 
 ' Harvey v. Morgan, ISKi. The 
 notice in that case was entitled "A. 
 & B., assignees of C. & U., v. E.," 
 instead of " A. & B., ass'gnees of C, 
 V. E." 
 
 * Lawrence v. Clark, IC.'o. 
 
 I 
 
 313 
 
> 
 
 
 " V9 
 
 if 
 
 !l 
 
 
 
 m^ 
 
 w. 
 
 !' iikk 
 
 m 
 
 u 
 
 ■f 
 
 TIME AND PLACE OF SERVICE OF NOTICE. [PART II. 
 
 § 445. As to the timr and pface of the service, no more precise 
 rule can be laid down, than that it must be such as to enable the 
 party, und^T the known circumstances of the case, to comply with 
 the call.' If the person to be served, whether client or solicitor, 
 dwell in another town than that in which the trial is had, he must 
 generally be served before the commission day.* Service after he 
 has left home to attend the court will usually be insufficient.' In 
 town causes, however, and in country causes, where the solicitor 
 lives in the assize town, a shorter notice will suffice, and if the 
 documents be such as may reasonably be presumed to be in the 
 solicitor's possession, service on him, or at his office, before six 
 o'clock* in the afternoon of the day preceding the trial, will 
 generally be sufficient ; * though, if the documents would probably 
 be in the client's custody, — as, for instance, if they were a trades- 
 man's books," or if they were letters or papers not obviously 
 connected with the cause, — such service would be too late.' And 
 a notice during the trial of a town cause lasting twelve days, given 
 on one day during the trial for the next, is not sufficient.* If a 
 party be served with notice sufficiently early to enable him to 
 produce the document, it makes no difference that at the time of 
 the service the cause is part heard.' 
 
 § 4 1^. If the party served with a notice to produce can prove 
 that his papers are in a foirign country, or at such a distance from 
 the place of trial as to render it impossible for him to produce them 
 under an ordinary notice, such a notice will be inoperative. The 
 
 > R. V. Hankins, 1849 ; E. v. Kit- 
 Bon. 1853. 
 
 * Tiist V. Johnson, 18,33 (rark, J. 
 E. V. Ellicombe, 1833 (Inttledale, J. 
 Lessee of Leader v. Dut^gan, 1841 
 (Ir.); Iluniiihrey v. St. Li'gor, 1841 
 (Ir.); M'MastcrandBoyle'scase, 1843 
 (Ir.). Boe Howard t^. Williams, 18r2. 
 
 ^ George f. Thompson, 1836; llar- 
 gestr. Fothergill, 1832 (Taunton, J.). 
 
 * fcjee post, § lo8()A, citing Ord. 
 LXIV., r. 11, of E. S. C. 1883. 
 
 " Atkins V. Meredith, 183G ; Leaf v. 
 Butt, 1842 (Alderson, B.); Moyrick 
 V. Woods, 1842 (id.); Firkin r. Ed- 
 wards, 1H40 (Williams, J.); Gibbons 
 V. Powell, 184(» ((runipy, B.): E. v. 
 llamp, 18o2 (Ld. Campbell); Holt f. 
 
 Miers, 1839; LaT/rence v. Clark, 1845. 
 If the trial is to take place on the Mon- 
 day, a service on the Sunday, or even 
 on Saturday alter 2 p.m. (spo rule 
 oited iu last note), will not do ; and 
 perliai)s a service on a Sunday would 
 in any event be bad. See Ilughes v. 
 Budd, 1840 (Patteson, J.); and 29 
 Car. 2, c. 7, §()(" The Sunday Observ- 
 ance Act, 1077"). 
 
 • Atkins V. Meredith, 1830. 
 
 ' Bryno v. Harvey, 1838 (Ld. Pen- 
 man) ; Vice v. Lady Anson, 1827 (Ld. 
 Tenterden) ; Atlalo v. Eourdrinier, 
 1829 (Tindal, C.J.). 
 
 s Sugg V. Bray. 18S5. 
 
 ' Sturm V. JelYroe, 1847 (Pollock, 
 C.B.). 
 
 314 
 
1 
 
 CHAP. IV.3 TIME OF SERVING NOTICE TO PRODUCE. 
 
 courts, however, incline to favour thj sufficiency of tlie notice, 
 whenever the circumstances will warrant it. For example, where 
 a party had gone ahroad, leaving the cause in the hands of his 
 solicitor, it was presumed that he had left with him all papers 
 material to the cause, and, consequently, a notice served on the 
 solicitor the evening next but one before the trial, was held to 
 be sufficient ; ' a four days' notice, given to the defendant to 
 produce letters written by him to his partner in New South Wales, 
 was considered good, where long litigation on the subject of them 
 made it presumable that they had been remitted to this country ; ^ 
 and even a similar notice to a foreign defendant was sufficient 
 where the action had commenced only seven months before the 
 trial, though the letters required had been addressed to him eighteen 
 years before at his residence abroad, Abbott, C. J., observing that 
 it would lead to great inconvenience and delay if trials were 
 allowed to be postponed upon such an objection.^ 
 
 § 447. However, a party who seeks the production of papers 
 must not put his adversary to needless trouble and expense. A 
 solicitor who, having been served in Essex with notice to produce 
 certain deeds, fetched them from London, and on the commission 
 day was served with a fresh notice to produce another deed, which 
 he on being served stated was also in town, but then said that it 
 should be forthcoming at the trial if the other side would pay the 
 expenses of a messenger, after this offer had been declined, was held 
 justified, in the absence of payment of such expenses, in not com- 
 plying with the notice, and it also was held that secondary evidence 
 was not rendered admissible by such second notice.* If a party, on 
 being served with a notice to produce a document, states that it is 
 not in existence, parol proof of its contents will be received, and 
 no objection can be taken to the lateness of the service.' A notice 
 to produce certain documents " upon the trial of the cause," applies 
 not merely to the trial which it immediately precedes, but to every 
 subsequent trial of the same cause which may take place.^ 
 
 > Eryan v. Wagstaff, 1825 (Abbott, 
 C.J.). 
 
 * Sturgo V, liuchanan, 1839. 
 
 » Drabble v. Donner, liS24. But 
 BOO Eliioiw|)orgon v. Anderson, 1848. 
 
 * Doc V. Spitty, 1832. Purbaps the 
 secoud notice, having been nerved on 
 
 the commission day, would have been 
 too late, indepondout of the special 
 ciroumstauces. 
 
 * Foster v. Pointer, 1841 (Gr;u'ney. 
 B.). 
 
 * Jlope V. Buadou, 1851. 
 
 315 
 
Pillil|l|i 
 
 l# 
 
 NOTICE TO PKOEUCE WHEN UNNECESSAUY. [PART II. 
 
 § 448. By R. S. C, 188-3, Order XXXII. r. 8, "An affidavit of 
 the solicitor, or his clerk, of the service of any notice to produce, 
 and of the tiroe when it was served, with a copy of the notice to 
 produce, shall in all cases be sufficient evidence of the service of the 
 notice, and of the time when it as served." 
 
 § 449. In .spi'cn cases notice to produce is not necessary, viz. : (1) 
 where a duplicate original or a counterpart is at hand ; (2) where 
 the document required is itself a notice ; (3) if the form of the 
 proceedings tells the party that he will be charged with the 
 possession ( f the instrument and called on to produce it ; (4) in 
 odium spoliatoris ; (5) in the case of agreements by sailors with 
 masters of ships ; (6) where the document required is admittcul_y 
 lost ; and (7) where it is actually in court. 
 
 § 449a. Each of these seven cases requires a feAv separate words 
 of notice. 
 
 § 449u. The first of such seven cases is, where the instrument in 
 the possession of the adversary, and that tendered in evidence, are 
 either duplicate originals,^ or are counterparts, and the part offered 
 in evidence has been executed by the adversary, or by some person 
 through whom he claims. The instrument produced is, as before 
 stated, considered primary evidence, not secondary.'* 
 
 § 4o0. The second of the seven cases just indicated arises where 
 the instrument to be proved is itself a notice. This exception 
 appears to have been originally adopted in '-^gard to notices to 
 produce, for the obvious reason, that, if a notice to produce such a 
 document were necessary, the series of notices would become 
 infinite.^ The exception has subsequently been extended to other 
 
 • Colling v.Trowoek, 1827(Bayley, 
 J.); Philipson v. Chase, 1809 (Ld. 
 EUonborough). 
 
 2 Ante. § 42G. 
 
 » 3 St. Ev. 731) ; Philipson v. Chasn, 
 1809. But see ante, § 448. This 
 has arisen, partly, perhaps, from a 
 misapprehension of the ground on 
 ■which the doctrine rests (iu Philip- 
 bon I'. Chasi:, 1809, Ld. EUonborough 
 observes: " xV'ilson, J., said that if 
 a duplicate of the notice to quit was 
 not of itself sufHcient, no rnoro onght 
 a duplicate of the notice to produce, 
 and thus notices niiglit bo required in 
 infinitum"). The foregoing reasoning 
 is fallacious. See 3 St. Ev. 3rd edit. 
 (1842) 730. The real reasons for the 
 
 rule are, partly, the experienced in- 
 convenience attendant on a strict ob- 
 servance of the rule requiring notice 
 (2 Ph. Ev. '22'), n. 5); partly, because 
 the secondary evidence that is usually 
 offered of a notice is a copy of the 
 paper sent, which partakes in great 
 measure of the character of a dupli- 
 cate original (Kine v. Beaumont, 
 1822) ; and, chiefly, because it con- 
 stantly happens that the opposite 
 partj' is well aware, from the nature 
 of the action, that he will be chiirged 
 with the jjossession of the original 
 document (Colling v, Treweek, 1827 
 (Bay ley, J.); llobinson v. Brown, 
 1845 (Maule, J.). See post, § 4^2). 
 
 316 
 
CHAP. IV.] NOTICE TC TRODUCE A NOTICE UNNECESSARY. 
 
 notices, and now lets in proof by copies, if not by any species 
 of secondary evidence, of a notice to quit ; ' of a notice of dis- 
 honour,* provided the action be brought upon the bill, but not 
 otherwise ; ' of all such notices of action, or written demands, as 
 are necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover ; ■* and of bills of 
 costs of solicitors, and parliamentary agents, delivered pursuant to 
 statute.' 
 
 § 451. An exception to the troneral principle, that no notice to 
 produce a notice is usually required, appears to exist in all cases in 
 which the notice required to be produced has been served on a third 
 person.^ Accordingly, where two parties had become sureties, by a 
 joint and several bond, for the payment, within one month after 
 notice should have been given to them, of such sum as should be 
 d^ 9 from their principal, it has been held that the service of notice 
 upon one of the parties cannot be proved in an action brought 
 against the other, by producing the duplicate of the notice, but 
 that the first party should have been subpcsnaed to produce the 
 original, or to account for its ncn-production.^ 
 
 § 452. The third of the seven cases in wliioh a notice to produce 
 is unnecessary, is wliei j from the nature of the action, or indictment, 
 or from the form of the pleadings, the defendant mn-it l;iioic that he 
 will be charged with the possession of an instrument, aud be called 
 upon to produce it.* For instance, in an action of trover for oon- 
 
 ' Doe V. Somerton, lS4o; Jnry v. 
 Orchard, 17T9 (Ld. Eldon) ; Colling 
 V. Trswoek, 1827 (Bayloy, J.). Soe 
 R. V. Mortlock, 18J5. 
 
 ''■ Swiiin V, Lewis, 18155 ; Kine v. 
 Seaumont, 1822 ; Ackland v. i'earce, 
 1811 (Le Blanc, J.) ; Eoborts i\ Brad- 
 shaw, 1815; Colling v, Trowcok, 
 1827 (Bayley, J.). The first two of 
 these cases wore decided after con- 
 ferring with the judges of the other 
 courts, and put the question beyond 
 dispute, overruling Langdon v. Hulls, 
 1804, and Shaw v. Markham, 1791. 
 
 ' Lanauzo v. Palmer, 1827 (Abbott, 
 C.J.). 
 
 * Jory V. Orchard, 1799. 
 
 * Colling V. Treweek, 1827, decided 
 on § 23 of the repealed Act (2 G. 2, 
 c. 23), but equally applicable to § 37 
 of 6 & 7 V. 0. 73 (•• Tho Solicitors 
 
 Act, 1843"'). In an action against a 
 surety, on a bond conditioned to pay 
 the pluintilf tho principal within six 
 months after notice. Lord Ellen- 
 borough, however, held a notice to 
 produce this notice to be necessary, 
 on tho ground that it was not a mere 
 notice, but in tho nature of a state- 
 ment of account b(>tweiu tho plain- 
 tift' and the principal (Grove v. \Vare, 
 1817). "Whether this case would now 
 be considered a binding authority 
 may well be questioned, since, in 
 principle, it i; ditlicult to distinguish 
 it from sever il of the cases cited 
 above, in which notice to produce 
 has been deemed unnecessary. 
 
 • Robinson v. Brown, 1846. 
 
 ' Id. 
 
 « Colling V. Treweek, 1827 (Bayley, 
 J.). See ante, §§ 407, 408. 
 
 317 
 
WIIKN NOTICE TO PRODUCE UNNECESSARY. [PART II. 
 
 verting a bond, a bill of excliange, or otlior writing,' or in a 
 prosnoution for stealing any document,^ the counsel for the plaintiff 
 or the Crown may at once i)roduoe secondary evidence of its 
 contents, even though the defendant offer to produce the document 
 itself.' A like rule prevails in an action on contract against a 
 carrier for the non-delivery of written instruments/ as also in 
 indictments for conducting a traitorous correspondence.' It is, 
 however, inniiplicable on a charge of forging a deed ; ' or on an 
 indictment for arson, with intent to defraud an insurance ofRco." 
 Similarly, it is the necessary (though reverse) consequence of this 
 rule that a [tlaintiff may object to a defendant, who is the maker of 
 a note or cheque, or the acceptor of a bill, the making or acceptance 
 of which is not denied by the latter's pleadings, and is therefore 
 admitted on the record," giving secondary evidence of its contents, 
 for the purpose oven of identification, unless a notice to produce has 
 been duly served," or unless the instrument is shown to be in court.'" 
 
 § 453. The fourth case, in which a notice to produce is not 
 necessary, is where possession of the paper, the production of which 
 is required, has been obtained by the adverse party, fraudulently 
 or forcibly, as where, after action brought, he has received it from 
 a witness, in fraud of a subpoena duces tecum." In such cases 
 "in odium spoliatoris" a notice to produce is not required to be 
 given to him before admitting secondary evidence of the contents 
 of the document of which he has improperly obtained possession. 
 
 § 454. The fifth case in which notice to produce is not needed, is, 
 that by statute every seaman may bring forward evidence to prove 
 
 ;<; . fli 
 
 III- 
 
 iij 
 
 ' Scotb V. Jones, 1813; How v. 
 Iliill, 1811; Bucheri;. Jairatt, 1802. 
 'Tht'KO cases overrule Cowau v. Abra- 
 liiuiis, 1793. 
 
 =* E. V. Aieklos, 1781 ; E. v. Bren- 
 naii. 18-i;i (Ir.) (renin, J.). 
 
 ^ Wliiteliead v. Scott, 18150 (Ld. 
 Tentcrden). 
 
 * Jollev V. Taylor, 1807 (Sir J. 
 Miiiislicld, P.J.). 
 
 ° E. r. ])e la Alotte, 1781 ; Layer's 
 case. 17122. 
 
 « E. V. Ilaworth, 1830 (Paiko. J.). 
 See Sin'afrjje's case (no date given ; 
 decided by Buller, J.), citiMl by Ijd. 
 Klleiilioiough, Ihll ; also 11. V, El- 
 woithy, 1807, 0. C. li. 
 
 ' E. V. Ellicombe, 1834 (Littledale, 
 J.) ; E. V. Kitson, 1852. See E. v. 
 Humphries, 1829; E. v. Mortlock, 
 1845. 
 
 * The plaintiff, however, cannot 
 recover interest on the bill from the 
 date of its maturity without pro- 
 ducing it: Hutton v. Ward, 1850; 
 Cha])lin v. Levy, 1854 (Parke, 13.). 
 
 ' Goodered v. Armour, 1842 ; ex- 
 plaining Eoad V. Gamble, 1830; Law- 
 rence?'. Clark, 1845. See, also, Chap- 
 lin V. Levy, 1854 (Parke, B.). 
 
 "• Dwyer v. Collins, 1852. 
 
 » Ticeds V. Cook, 1803 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough); Doe V. Eies, 1831. 
 
 318 
 
CHAP. IV.] WIIKN NOTICK TO PUODUCE UNNECESSARY. 
 
 the contonts of his agrooment with the rnastpr of tlie ship, or 
 othprwise to support his case, without produuing, or giving notice 
 to produce, the agreement itself or any copy of it.' The reason for 
 this indulgence is the proverbial inexperience and recklessness of 
 seafaring men. 
 
 § 4')0. Tlie sixth instance in which notice to produce is dispensed 
 with is where either the adverse party or his solicitor has admitted 
 tluit a document is lost — for in such case the notice would bo 
 nugatory,'^ — or where, as it seems, the party in possession of the 
 writing might himself give secondary evidence of its contents 
 without producing it, as, for instance, if it be an inscription or 
 notice attached to the freehold.' Under this exception, however, a 
 party cannot call witnesses to prove the destruction of a document 
 that has been traced into the hands of his opponent, and then show 
 its contents by secondary proof, unless he has first served a notice 
 to produce, since (notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary) 
 the document may still be in existence, or, at any rate, the 
 opponent may dispute the fact of its having been destroyed.* 
 
 li 456. In the seventh, and last, place, notice to produce is 
 unnecessary if it be proved that tlie adverse party, or his solicitor, 
 has the original instrument in court. For the object of the notice 
 is not, — as was formerly thovight,' — to give the opposite party 
 an opportunity of providing the proper testimony to support or 
 impeach the document, but merely to enable him to produce it, if 
 he likes, at the trial, and thus to secure the best evidence of its 
 contents.' If a solicitor, on being called by his client's opponent 
 to state whether he has a particular document in court, asserts that 
 he does not know whether he has it with him or not, and that he 
 does not intend to ascertain that fact, unless compelled to do so by 
 the judge, it is undecided whether or not he will then be ordered 
 to search among his papers ; probably he will. 
 
 1 57 & 58 V. c. 60 (" The Merchant 
 Shipping Act, 1894^'), § I'J.'i. See 
 Bowman v. Manzelman, 1809. 
 
 2 K. V. Haworth, IHIJO (I'arkc, J.J; 
 Foster v. Pointer, 1841 (Gurnoj-, B.); 
 Howv. Hall, 1811 (L(l. Ellenborough); 
 Doe V. 8pitty, 1832. 
 
 ' Bavtholomow v. Stephens, 1839 
 (Patteson, J.). 
 
 * Doe I'. Morris, 1835. 
 
 " Bate r. Kinsoy, 1834 ; Cook v. 
 Hearn, 1832 (Pattoson, J.); Doe 
 V. Grey, 1816 (Ld. Ellenborough); 
 Exall V. Partridge (no date given), 
 cited (by Scarlett, urfi. Doe v. Grey) 
 as having been ruled by Ld. Kenyou. 
 
 * Dwyer v. Collius, 1852. 
 
 319 
 
if^ 
 
 
 ■iik 
 Tf, 
 
 m 
 
 
 'inf. 
 
 m 
 
 t! 
 
 mm 
 
 
 SECONDARY EVIDENCE WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAHT II. 
 
 § 456a. The RR. S. C. jirovide that " if a notice to produce 
 coinprises documents which are not necessary, the costs occasioned 
 thereby shall be borne by the party giving such notice." ' 
 
 § 457. The fourth - cla<s of cases in which secondary evidenne as 
 to documents is admissible, is when a document is in the hands of 
 a stranger, who is either noi rompoUahlc by law to produce it, and 
 who justifiably refuses to do i eitlier when summoned as a witness 
 with a subpoena duces tecum,'^ or, when having been sworn as a 
 witness without a subpoena, ue admits that he has the document in 
 court.* The mere disohedienee of a person served with a subpoena 
 duces tecum will not render admissible secondary evidence of the 
 contents of the document which he is called upon to produce.' To 
 do tliis the witness must heJiiHtifird in refusing the production, for 
 otherwise the party will I 've no remedy, except as against ////h." 
 The rule is only recognized at all for the same reason as that which 
 allows of parol proof, when an adversary, after notice, refuses to 
 produce a deed in his possession, — namely, because tlie party offering 
 secondary evidence has done all in his power to obtain the original 
 document.' If, therefore, a solicitor refuses to jtroduce a deed as 
 claiming a lien upon it, secondary evidence of its contents cannot bo 
 received, where the party tendering sueli evidence is the person liable 
 to pay the solicitor's charges.* A.nd if a solicitor, who is not acting 
 under special instructionL' f'-oii, his client, declines to produce an 
 instrument on the ground of privilege, it is very questionable 
 whether the client must not Vr subpoenaed, in order to ascertain 
 whether he relies on a right to withhold thb deed ; ^ and it will at 
 least be prudent to do this, inasmuch as the privilege is, in strictness, 
 not that of the solicitor, but that of the client. If, however, the 
 solicitor swear that his client has instructed him not to produce tlie 
 instrument, it will not be necessary to subpoena the client ; for in 
 
 ..Iil 
 
 F,i, I 
 
 i( j 
 
 > R. S. G. Ord. XXXII. r. 9. 
 
 ' Soo § 42H, su))rii, a« to tho throo 
 cliisHCH which iircccdod imd us to the 
 others which follow the ])i('si'ut cliiHa, 
 
 ' Miiistoii V. DowiK's, 1S:M ; 1 )oo 
 r. Iloss, 1840; Mills v. Oddv, 1«;M 
 (I'uike, n.); ])oo V. Owen (1837) cau 
 no loiip^or bo supportod. 
 
 « Door. Clillord, 1H47 (Aldorson, 
 13.); Nowtou V. Chaplin, 18a0. 
 
 • Josus Coll. V. OibbM, 1834. 
 
 • II. V. Llanfi.cthly, 1853. 
 
 ' DOO V. KONS, 184(1. 
 
 » Att.-Oon. V. Aslio, 1s,-)0 (Tr.). 
 iSoo, however, aa to u claim of Lien, 
 iufin, § 4.)8. . 
 
 " Doo V. Boss, 1840; Nowton v. 
 riiajilin, 1850; In ro Caniorou'a 
 Coalbi'uok, &c. Kail. Co., 1858. 
 
 !{1>0 
 
 i|!i 
 
CII. IV.] WITNKSS NOT BOUND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT. 
 
 sucli a case it would be assumed that the client, if called, would 
 continue of the same mind.' 
 
 § 408. Judges always refuse to compel either a witness or a 
 party to a cause - to produce either his title-deeds,' or any document 
 the production of which may tend to criminate him,* or any docu- 
 ment which he holds as mortgagee * or pledgee.^ But a witness 
 will not be allowed to resist a subpoena duces tecum on the ground 
 of an}' lien ' he may have on the document called for as evidence,* 
 unless the party requiring the production be himself the person 
 against whom the claim of lien is made." If the witness bo a 
 solicitor, though he will be permitted, he will certainly not be 
 force(l,^° — e.\cept in some cases for the purpose of identification,'* — 
 to produce any instrument which he holds confidentially for his 
 client, and which the client has a right to keep back ; ''^ but, as just 
 noticed, it by no means necessarily follows that, in the event of the 
 client himself not being summoned, secondary evidence will be 
 admissible." 
 
 .i It! 
 
 ' Phelps V. Prew, 1854. 
 
 ' The nile, so far as it relates to 
 parties, appears to be this ; a plain- 
 tiff will not b') compelled to produce 
 iiuiiiiincnts of title which he swears 
 (Ij not, to the best of his knowledge, 
 information, and belief, contain any- 
 thing impeaching his case, or sup- 
 porting or material to the case of the 
 dofeniiant: Minet r, Morgan, 1873. 
 
 ' rickering I'. Noyes, IH'IS; Harris 
 V. Hill, 1K1>2 (Abbott, C.J.) ; It. v. 
 Upper Boddington, IS'itJ; Doe v. 
 Clitl'ord, IH47 ; Egromont Burial 
 15()urd f. Egremont Iron Ore Co., 
 KSNO (Miilins, V.-C). 
 
 * See Whitaker i: Izod. 1809. 
 
 ' Doe r. l^).ss, 1840; e.xpliiined by 
 Turner, L.J., in II<)j)e r. Liddell, 
 18Jo; Chichester r. Marq. of Done- 
 gall, 187(t (GilVard. L.J.) ; Costa 
 Bica, Bejmblit: of r. Eilanger, 1875. 
 
 • See Ex i)arte Shaw, 1821. 
 
 ' In the Courts of Bankruptcy, 
 " no person shall, as against the 
 official receiver or trustee, bo en- 
 titled to withhold i)ossession of the 
 books of account Uelonging to the 
 debtor, or to set nj) any lien there- 
 on": Bankruptcy Bules, 188.'$, r. 'JoO. 
 
 » Hunter t'. Leiithloy, 1830, ro- 
 ooguized (i'urke, li.) in Ley v. Bar- 
 
 low, 1848; Thompson v. Mosely, 
 1833 (Ld. Lyndhurst) ; Brassington 
 1'. Brassington, 1823 (Leach, V.-C); 
 Pratt V. Pratt, 1882 (Bacon, V.-C); 
 Eurlong v. Howard, 1804 (Ir.) (Ld. 
 lledesdale); In re Cameron's Coal- 
 brook, &c. Rail. Co., 1858; Hope v. 
 Liddell, 1855. overruling Gritlith r. 
 Itickotts, 1849. See, also, Ijockett r. 
 Cary, 1804 (Roniilly, M.H.); Ex parte 
 Paine and Layton, 1809, C A. ; Be 
 Toleman, Ex j)arte Bramble, 1S80. 
 
 " Kemp V. King, 1842 (Ld. Den- 
 man), recognized in Hope v. Lid- 
 dell, 1855. See In re Capital Eire 
 Ins. Assoc, 1883, and cases tlicre 
 cited. ALso, In re Cameron's Coal- 
 brook, &c. Boil. Co., 1858 (Bouiillv, 
 M.B.); Vale v. Oppert, 1875, C A. 
 But see Eowler r. Fowler, 1881 (Kay, 
 J.), et (ju. ; Bo Martin, 1883 (Ir.). 
 
 '» Ilibberd r. Knight, 1848, ex- 
 plaining Maist<m I'. Downos, 1834. 
 
 " Phelps ,:. Prew, 1854. 
 
 " Harris .'. Hill, 1822; Volant v. 
 Soyer, 1S53; Doe r. James, 1837 
 (Ld. Denman); Ditcher v. Kenrick, 
 1824. See Doe r. Langdon, 1848. 
 
 " This sentence was cited and ap- 
 proved (Esher, M.B.), in Burtwll v. 
 Tanner, 1886, C. A. 
 
 321 
 

 |l,. ^M 
 
 WHEN WITNESS BOUND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT. [PT. IT. 
 
 § 459. The nile exempting witnesses from producing title-deeds 
 extends to a will, under which the witness claims as devisee, 
 though such will extend to personalty as well as to realty, and, 
 therefore, ought to have heen deposited in the Ecclesiastical Court, 
 where the public might have had access to it.' But the rule will 
 not prevail unless it appears that the title of the person possessing 
 the document will in some way be affected by its production.* For 
 instance, in an action of ejectment, where plaintiff's title was 
 disputed, the solicitor of a gentleman, who had been in treaty 
 (which ultimately went off) for the purchase of the property, was 
 allowed to produce on behalf of the defendant the abstract delivered 
 to his client, as furnishing secondary evidence of the contents of 
 the deeds relating to the property, which had, after notice, not 
 been produced.' 
 
 *? 4G0. However, the mere circumstance that the pi'oduclion of 
 the document may render the witness liable to a riri/ action, does 
 not entitle him to withhold it as being within the protection of the 
 rule. For instance, in an action of ejectment, where a plaintiff 
 claimed under a devise in remainder, and defendant held under an 
 invalid lease by a late tenant for life, a witness, who was an 
 executor and legatee of the late tenant for life, was compelled to 
 produce his testator's rent-book to enable the plaintiff to identify 
 the lauds in question with the lands originally devised, notwith- 
 standing that the witness was, as executor, bound (imder a covenant 
 contained in the lease granted by the late tenant for life) to 
 indonmify the defendant from all loss lie might sustain from an 
 adverse verdict ; * and where a witness, who was steward of a 
 borough, and attorney for the lord, declined to produce certain old 
 precepts, books of presentment, and a case, relative to his office, on 
 which the opinion of counsel had been taken by a former steward, 
 Bayi'-ig that he Iield them as attorney for the lord, and that tlioir 
 production would prejudice his client's interest, it was held that 
 as the precepts and presentments were public documents he was 
 bound to produce all of them, except the case and opinion.* 
 
 > Doe V. James, 1837 (Ld. Donman). * Doo v. Date, 1842. 
 
 » Loe V. Merest, 187t). • K. v. Woodley, 1834 (Ld. Den- 
 
 * Due V. Langdon, 1848. man). 
 
 822 
 
 ili; 
 
CH. IV.] WITNESS NOT BOUND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENT. 
 
 § 4G1.* The fifth* cmss of cases in which secondary evidence to 
 prove the contents of a document is admissible, in the first phice 
 consists of those cases in which the law raises a strong presumption 
 of the existence of such a document. For instance, the original 
 written ajjpoiuimcnt to a public office need not in general be produced, 
 in conseqr'^iice of the strong presumption of the validity thereof 
 which arises from its undisturbed exercise, but it will be sufficient 
 to show that any such officer has acted in an official capacity.' 
 
 § 462.* The sixth ^ relaxation of the rule demanding primary 
 proof to be given of a document before any secondary evidence of 
 it is received, occurs where the evidence required is the result of 
 roltnninoiiH facta, or of the inspection of many hookn rind papem, tho 
 examination of which could not conveniently take place in court.* 
 For instance, if bills of exchange have been drawn between 
 particular parties in one invariable mode, this may be proved by 
 the testimony of a witness conversant with their liabits of business, 
 who speaks generally of the fact without production of all the 
 bills ; ^ a witness who has inspected the accounts of the parties, 
 though he may not give evidence of their particular contents, will 
 be allowed to speak to the general balance without producing the 
 accounts ; ' and where the question is as to the solvency of a party 
 at a particular time, the general result of an examination of his 
 books and securities may be stated in like manner.** But the 
 exception under consideration will not enable a witness to state the 
 general contents of a number o^ letters received by him from one 
 of the parties in the cause, though such letters have since been 
 
 ' Or. Kv. § 92, in groat part. 
 
 * Soo supra, § 42H, as to what the 
 othors are, 
 
 ^ Si'o auto, § 171. Soo, also, llrew- 
 stor V. Sowoll, 1820 (Ifolroyil, J.). 
 
 * (Jr. Ev. § OH, in groat part. 
 
 " ll'h. Kv. 4;W. lu ])loa(liug, too, 
 a gonoral ullogation is froiiuoiitly 
 allowod, " whon tho luattors to bo 
 ])loa(lo<l tond to iufiuitoiioss auil uiul- 
 tijjlit'ity, whoroby tho rolls shall bo 
 incumborcd with tho length there- 
 of": Mints V. IMhil, KiOl. See 
 E. 8. C. 1883, Ord. XIX. r. 2; 
 Ord. LXV. r. 27, subs. 20. The 
 courts admit the same excoption. 
 
 and act on similar prinoiplos, if tho 
 ])urtios to actions are numerous : 
 Urd. XVI. r. 9. 
 
 « Snoncor v. Hilling, 1812 (Ld. 
 Ellonnorough). If tho modo of deal- 
 ing has not Im'ou uniform, tho <'aso 
 (loos not fall within this exco{)ti()n, 
 but is govornod by tho rule requiring 
 tho production of tho writinjjs. 
 
 ' Hoborts V. Doxon, 1791 (Ld. 
 Konyon). Hut soo Johnson v. Ker- 
 shaw, 1847, wlioro tliis course was 
 not allowod by Knight Bruce, V.-O. 
 
 ' Meyer r. Softon, 1817 (IIolix)yd, 
 
 a23 
 
SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY. |_PART II. 
 
 
 
 
 destroyed, if the object of the examination be to elicit from the 
 witness not a fact but merely an opinion or impression ; for instance, 
 the impression which the destroyed Utters prodtioed on his mind 
 with reference to the degree of friendship subsisting between the 
 writer and a third party.' In the other cases mentioned the fact 
 in question is one which simply depends on the honesty of the 
 witness, whereas he might, from the perusal of the documents, 
 conscientiously draw a very different opinion or inference from that 
 which would be drawn by a jury. 
 
 § 463. The seventh and last clasb of cases in which seconr y 
 evidence of documents is admissible is in the examinatif^n of a 
 witness on the voire dire, and in preliminary inquiries of the same 
 nature. Owing to the modern improvements in the law as to the 
 competency of witnesses, this rule has become practically inoperative; 
 further discussion of it is therefore unnecessary.* 
 
 § 464. We have now fully considered the general circumstances 
 under which secondary evidence as to documents is admissible.' 
 We may therefor** pass on ^x) consider the circumstances under 
 which secondary evidence of oral testimony will be received. The 
 broad proposition as to this is, it will be recollected, that such proof 
 is only admissible where the production of primary evidence is out 
 of the party's power. Subject to this it may be stated, as a general 
 rule, that where a witness has given oral testimo y under oath in 
 a judicial proceeding, in which the adverse litigant had the power 
 to cross-examine, the testimony so given will, if the witness himself 
 be incapable of being called, be admitted in any subsequent suit 
 botween the same parties, or those claiming under them, if such 
 suit relate to tlie same subject, or substantially involve the same 
 material questions.* 
 
 § 465. This rule is now recognized by all courts of justice.' 
 
 ' Topham r. M'Gropor, 1844 (Rolfo, 
 B.). Suo Taylor v. Carpenter, 184(5 
 (Am.). 
 
 ' Soo Ist adit, of this work, § 342 ; 
 and casop cited in this edit., post, 
 { i;i!);j. last note. 
 
 * Soo auto, § 428. 
 
 « IJ. N. P. 239—243; Mayor of 
 Poncastor v. Pay, 1810; Strutt v. 
 Uovingdon, 1803 (Ld. Ellonborongh); 
 li. V. JoUitTe, 1791 (Ld. Kouyon); 
 
 Pvko J'. Croiich, 1()90 ; Wripfht v. 
 Do.x/.Tatham, 1834; Glass v. Ik-ach, 
 1833 (Am.); Lightnor v. Wiko, 181H 
 (Am.). 
 
 ' See Lawronco v. Maiile, 18,)9 
 (Kindorsloy, V.-C). The rule has 
 boon cxttuuiod to affidavits: Duiiuo 
 V. Enfj;lisli, 1874. Soe, also, Parker 
 V. MlCenua, 1874, and Moyrick v. 
 James, 1877. 
 
 324 
 
CHAP. IV.] SECONDAKY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY. 
 
 However, to render secondary evidence of the testimony of a 
 witness adniissibk, it must be proved that the witness was dulif 
 sworn in some judicial proceeding', to the authority of which the 
 party, against whom his testimony is offered, was legally bound to 
 submit, and in which he might have exercised the ritjlit o/'cross- 
 examiniition. If this were not the rule, the preposterous consequence 
 would follow, that secondary evidence of testimony might be 
 received under circumstances that would exclude the testimony 
 itself. Therefore, sliould it appear that depositions were taken, 
 either by parties Lot legally authorised to take them,' or without 
 the sanction of an oath or affirmation, or in the absence of the 
 party against whom they are ofPered,^ when, as in most criminal 
 investigations,^ his presence was requisite, they cannot be received.* 
 
 § 465. But although it is necessary that the party, against whom 
 depositions are offered in evidence, should have had in opportunity 
 of being present at the examination, and of cross-examining the 
 witness,' yet it is by no means requisite that he should have 
 exercised that power. If, for example, notice has been given to 
 him of the time and place of an examination on commission, and 
 he ne'ther intimates a wish to cross-examine, nor a^-^lies to the 
 court to enlarge the time for that purpose, it will be presumed that 
 he has acted advisedly, and the depositions will be received." 
 
 § 467.' The admissibility of this secondary proof of oral testi- 
 mony seems to turn rarher on the right to cross-examine than 
 upon the jirecise identity, either (if the opponent be substantially 
 the same) of the parties or of the points in issue, in the two 
 
 ' 12 Vin. Ab. Ev. A. b. 31 ; B. N. 
 r. 241. 
 
 ■■' Tho admissibilify of depositions 
 tiiken bi't'oro a coi'iiiior, in tho iib- 
 8t;n(o of tlio uccuwhI, will bo dis- 
 cussed hereiilter. Hec post, § 494. 
 
 ^ See post, § 479. 
 
 « In li. V. Eiiswoll, 1790 (Ld. 
 Kenvon). 
 
 " Att.-Oon. V. Davison, 1825. If, 
 theri'foro, a coiniuission bo exocnted 
 withont liny notieo, or ■without a 
 sullieiunt notice (Fitzgerald i'. Jfitz- 
 geruld, 18(i;{), binng given to the 
 opposite party, to i-nablo him, if lie 
 pleases, to j)ut cross-interrogatories, 
 tlio depositions will be rejected • 
 
 Stoinkellor v. Newton, 1S40. 
 
 ' In Cazenovo v. Vaughun, 1813, 
 the examinations taken under the 
 order were held to be admissible in 
 evidence, although thi' detendant had 
 received no notice ot the time and 
 place of taking them: McCombio v, 
 Anton, I84;i, where a defendant, 
 after joining ])laintilf in obtaining a 
 commission to examine witnesses 
 npon interrogi'toiies, gave notice that 
 lie declined to proceed with the exa- 
 miiuition, npon which jilaintiff sent 
 him word that he should .q>l)ly for a 
 commissioii ex jiarte, and tiid done 
 BO, and obtained one. 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 104, in part. 
 
 325 
 
t 
 
 i 
 
 TESTIMONY IN FOKMEK JUDICIAL PROCEEDING. [PT. II. 
 
 prooeed:ng8.' Cdnaequently, the evidence taken on the first trirtl 
 is admissible on a second trial if, although, the two trials be not 
 between the same parties, the second trial is between those who 
 represent the former parties, and claim through them by some title 
 acquired subsequently to the first tritd ; ^ if in a dispute respecting 
 lands any fact comes directly in issue, the testimony given to that 
 fact is admissible to prove the same point in another action between 
 the same parties or their privies, though the last suit relate to other 
 lands ; ' and, in criminal cases, a deposition taken on a charge 
 either of assault and robbery, or of stabbing, or of doing grievous 
 bodily harm, can, after the death of the witness, be read upon a 
 trial for murder, where the two charges relate to the same transac- 
 tion ; * for, if this were not the law, the deposition? of the deceased 
 would, in many cases of homicide, be most improperly excluded.* 
 Thus, where a prisoner, who had been summarily convicted of an 
 assault, was, in consequence of the death of the party struck, 
 subsequently indicted for murder, the convicting magistrate was 
 permitted to state what the deceased had sworn in the prisoner's 
 presence, the examination not having been reduced into writing ; * 
 on another indictment for murder, a deposition of the deceased 
 taken on a prior charge of larceny against the accused was read.^ 
 
 § 468. If, however, the point in issue, though very similar, was 
 so far different in the two proceedings, that the witness, who was 
 called to prove or disprove the issue in the former, need not have 
 been, /'«//// cross-examined in regard to the matters in controversy 
 in the latter, his deposition, if tendered on the second trial, will 
 be excluded. On this ground a deposition taken on a charge of 
 
 > WriRht V. Doe d. Tatham, 1834, 
 whfire the evidence of a witness who 
 had testified in a suit, wherein A. and 
 several others wei'o plaintiffs and B. 
 detVi\(liiiit, was, after his death, held 
 adniissilile in a suhse([uout action re- 
 lating to the same matter, brought 
 by B. against A. alone. 
 
 ' Com. Dig. Ev. A. 5, explained 
 by Littledale, J., in Doe v. Derby, 
 18m ; Doe v. Powell, 1852. 
 
 * Doe ('. Foster, \K\\ (Aldorson, 
 
 B.); Llanover i;. llorafray. 1880. 
 
 * R. V. Smith. 1817; R. v. Lea, 
 1864 (Pollock, C.B.); R. v. Dilmore, 
 
 1852 (Wightman. J.); R. v. Beeston, 
 1855; R. r. "'illiams, 1871. 
 
 » 2 Stark, ii. 212 (1817), note by 
 the reporter. 
 
 • R. V. Edmunds, 1833 (Tindal, 
 C.J.). The learned judge appears, 
 however, to have received the evi- 
 dence, not as proving the facts stated, 
 but as producing an answer from the 
 prisoner. 
 
 • R. V. Buckley, 1873 (Lush, J.). 
 This, however, was allowed not as 
 any evidence of the facts deposed, 
 but simply as affording a motive for 
 r»y«Dg« ou the part of the prisoner. 
 
 326 
 
ii 
 
 CHAP. IV.] SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF ORAL TESTIMONY. 
 
 assault was afterward? rejected on an indictment for wounding ; ' 
 again,* in America, where the issue in one action had been upon a 
 common or free fishery, and that in another action was upon a 
 several fishery, evidence of what a witness, since deceased, had 
 sworn upon the former trial, has been held inadmissible.^ 
 
 § 469. In stating that this rule mainly depends on the oppor- 
 tunity given for cross-examination, it must however be carefully 
 noted that though a party may have had the right of cross- 
 examining a witness, he will be liable to have the statement of that 
 witness adduced against him in a subsequent action, only in the 
 event of his opponent being Hubatantially the same in both suits.* For, 
 unless this be the case, the adversary in the second suit has had no 
 power to offer evidence in his own favour.' 
 
 § 470. In a civil case, R. S. C, 1883, Ord. XXXVII. r. 25, 
 provides " all evidence taken at the hearing or trial of any causo 
 or matter may be used in any subsequent proceedings in the same 
 cause or matter." 
 
 §471. Subject to the above rule, secondary evidence of oral 
 testimony cannot (as has already been stated) be received. An 
 attempt made some years ago in equity to engraft an exception on 
 this rule — and to say that whenever depositions have been taken 
 not strictly in the same matter, but against a party in one suit, who 
 is also a party to a second suit, wherein substantially the same 
 questions arise, such depositions are as against him admissible in 
 the se lond suit without any proof that the witnesses are dead, or for 
 other good reasons incapable of being examined •■ — entirely failed.' 
 
 §§ 472-8. The common law (apart from the rule above cited) 
 
 • R. V. Ledbotter, 1850, com- 
 mented ui)on, however, in R. v, 
 Beeston, 1865. 
 
 » Or. Ev. § 164. 
 
 3 Melvin v. Whiting, 1828 (Am.); 
 Jackson v. Winchester, 1800 (Am,). 
 
 • Morgan v. NichoU, 1866, 
 
 • Doe V. Derby, 1834. 
 
 • As to what constitutes this, see 
 next section, 
 
 ' Blagravo v. Blagrave, 1847. The 
 cases of Novil v. Johnson, 1703 ; 
 Barton v. Palmes, 1704 (in both 
 vhich cases it is not clear that 
 
 the witnesses were alive) ; Bjrno v. 
 Frere, 1828 (where the wituusst'S 
 wore clearly dead) ; and City of 
 London v. I'erkiiis, 1734 (where the 
 decision of the House of Lords does 
 not touch this point), and which were 
 relied on for that purpose, do not, 
 when carefully and critically exa- 
 mined, afford any authority for the 
 contrary. See, also, Carringtou v. 
 Cornock, 1829; see, and compare, 
 3 Br, P, C. and 24 Lords' Journ. 248 
 (28th January, 17G4). 
 
 327 
 
!l 
 
 Hi" 
 
 !l 
 
 il 
 
 WHEN WITNESS INCAPABLE OF BEING CALLED. [PT. II. 
 
 ref^ards a witness as incapable of being calUJ.' — 1, "Wlien ho 
 is dead ; ^ 2, When he is out of the jurisdiction of the court, 
 or possibly, when he cannot be found after diligent inquiry ; ^ 
 
 ' In wliich case only is his evi- 
 donco on oath in a prior suit botwoon 
 the siinie parties admissible, supra, 
 § -iM. 
 
 ■' Tyke v. Crouch, 1696. The 
 court, however, — unless some ac- 
 count of the death of a witness 
 be given, or at least some evidence 
 be furnished showing that proper 
 inquiries have been made, and that 
 no tidings can be heard of him, — 
 will not presume his death, so as to 
 admit his deposition, though taken 
 as much as fifty years before : I5en- 
 8on V. Olive, 1732. See ante, § 297. 
 
 ' This is clear where it is proved 
 that the witness is actually residing 
 in some i)lace beyond the jurisdidion 
 of the court : Fry v. Wood, 1731. 
 But questions sometimes arise re- 
 Bpecting the amount and nature of 
 the proof required to establish this 
 fact. Thus, if a witness has been 
 examined on interrogatories by con- 
 sent, on account of expected absence, 
 it is rot absolutely necessary that he 
 should be on his voyage when the 
 trial comes on. If the ship has 
 sailed, though it has put back, or 
 if the witness has gone on board, 
 and was i-eady to sail, though pre- 
 vented by contrary winds, that is 
 BuHicient : Fonsick v. Agar, 1807 
 (Sir James Mansfield). But see 
 Carruthers v. Graham, 1841, cited 
 post, § 517. For instance, secondary 
 evidence was admitted where the wit- 
 ness had sailed for Spain, had been 
 driven back by stress of weather, and 
 six days before the trial was at Fal- 
 mouth, exjiecting to sail again imme- 
 diately : Ward V. Wells, 1809. See 
 Varicas v. French, 1849. But where 
 it was only sworn that the witness 
 was a seafaring man, and some six 
 months before the trial had belonged 
 to a ship lying in the Thames, this 
 evidence was rejected as too vague, 
 though possibly admissible, if it could 
 be further shown that any efforts had 
 been recently made to find him : 
 Falconer u. Hanson, 1808 (Ld. EUen- 
 boroi igh). This case suggests the pro- 
 j)riety of noticing au old decision of 
 
 the time of James the First (Godb. 
 386), in wliich it was expressly laid 
 down that, if a party cannot find a 
 witness, then ho is, as it were, dead 
 to him ; and his depositions in a 
 cause betwixt the same parties may 
 be road, ])rovided the i)iirty make 
 oath that he endeavoured to find him, 
 but could neither see him nor hear 
 of him. In no modern case has pre- 
 cisely the same point been ruled; but 
 as it has frequently been hold that 
 proof of inability to find an attesting 
 witness will let in evidence of his 
 handwriting (Kay i;. Brookman, 1828; 
 Cunliffe v. Sefton, 1802; Crosby v. 
 Percy, 1808; Ld. Falmouth v. 
 Roberts, 1842 ; Parker v. Hoskins, 
 1810 ; Burt v. Walker, 1821 ; Spooner 
 V. Payne, 1847), these analogous de- 
 cisions would sei^m in some degree to 
 support the correctness of the old 
 authority, at least so far as relates 
 to civil causes. 
 
 A similar latitude is not allow- 
 able in criminal proceedings, and 
 the deposition of a witness, whether 
 taken before a magistrate or a coro- 
 ner, will not be rendered admissible, 
 on mere proof that the witness him- 
 self cannot be found after diligent 
 search : Ld. Morley's case, 1666 (all 
 the Judges); R. v, Scaife. l.Sjl. 
 Neither will it be received, though 
 satisfactory proof be given that the 
 witness was not absent from any 
 intention to defeat justice, but that, 
 being a foreigner, he liad, since the 
 prisoner was committed for trial, 
 returned to his own country, and 
 was at the time of the trial resident 
 abroad: R. v. Atisten, 1856; R. v. 
 Ilagan, 1837. These cases overrule 
 the law as laid down in B. N. P. 
 242. This kind of evidence has also 
 been r.ijected in America, both where 
 the witness could not be found within 
 the jurisdiction, but was n^ported 
 to have gone to an adjoining state 
 (Wilbur V. Selden, 1826 (Am.)), and 
 where he was proved to have left 
 the state, after being summoned to 
 attend at the trial : Finn's case, 
 1827 (Am.). 
 
 328 
 
CH. IV.] WHEN WITNESS INCAPABLE OF BEING CALLED. 
 
 3, When he is either insane, or seriously sick ; ' and 4, When 
 it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that he is 
 
 . 3 
 
 How far ansmcrs to inqnirus tQ- 
 Bpc^ctinp; the witness iiro adinissiblo 
 to piovu that lu) cannot bu found, is 
 not vtiiy clearly dufiiiod. That such 
 answers will be rejected as hearsay, 
 if tendered in proof of the fact that 
 the witness is abroad, is beyond all 
 doubt (Kobinson v. Markis, 1841 (Ld. 
 Abinger); Doe c Powell, 18:}()J ; but 
 whore the question is simply wnother 
 a diligeuL and unsuccessful search has 
 been made for the witness, it would 
 seem, both on principle and authority, 
 that the answois should bo received 
 as forming a prominent part of the 
 very point to bo ascertained: Wyatt v. 
 Batoman, 1836 (ColeriJge, J.); Burt 
 V. Walker, 1821 ; Austin v. Ilumsey, 
 1849 (Erie, J.). In order to show 
 that inquiries have been duly made 
 at the house of the witness, his decla- 
 rations as to where he lived cannot 
 be received (Doe v. Powell, 1832) ; 
 neither will his statement in the 
 deposition itself, that he is about to 
 go abroad, render it unnecessary to 
 prove that he lias put his purpose in 
 execution : Proctor v. Lainson, 1836 
 (Ld. Abinger). 
 
 ' If ho bo proved at the trial to 
 be insane, the witness's deposition 
 will be admissible (as to dei)osi- 
 tions taken by committing justices, 
 see post, § 47!>a), in like manner 
 as if he were dead (R. v. Eriswell, 
 1790 (Ashhurst, J., and Ld. Ken- 
 yon)); and the same rule is stated 
 to prevail, tlumgh the insanity be 
 only of a tomjxirary cliaiacter : R. 
 V. Marshall, 1841 (Ludlow, S., after 
 consulting Coltman. J.). This, how- 
 ever, appears to bo carrying the 
 doctrine beyond its legitimate ex- 
 tent; for since the casual illness of a 
 witness will not — as shown below — 
 warrant the reading of his former 
 testimony, at least in a civil suit, 
 but will only furnish good ground 
 for moving to postj)one the trial, tlio 
 same rule should surely prevail in 
 the event of a witness being afflicted 
 with toinporury madness. No sen- 
 sible distinction can be drawn be- 
 tween the two cases. Wheio deposi- 
 tions are tendered on the ground of 
 
 the witness being insane, it may 
 sometimes bo advisable to stiow that 
 his intellect was sound at the time 
 of his jn'ovious examination ; and if 
 such examination wore had but a 
 short time before thotrial this courses 
 niav even bo necessary : R. v. Wall, 
 1830 (Park, J.). 
 
 It is somewhat difficult to discover 
 from the authorities what dvrjrre of 
 ■illness must bo ])rovod in order to 
 let in dej)ositions : 11. r. Bull, 1871. 
 See R. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXVll. 
 r. 18, cited post, § 506. In an old 
 case, where a witness on his journey 
 to the place of trial was taken so ill 
 as to be unable to proceed, his 
 deposition was allowed to be read 
 (Luttrell v. Reynell, 1677); but too 
 much weight must not be given to 
 this decision, since, if the course tliero 
 adopted were ordinarily allowed, there 
 would be very sudden indispositions 
 and recoveries : Harrison v. Blades, 
 1813 (Ld. Ellenb(nougli) ; Jones v. 
 Brewer, 1811 (Heath, J.). The rule 
 laid down by Lord EUenborough, that 
 where a witness is taken ill, the party 
 requiiing his testimony should move 
 to pot off the trial, is certainlj' less 
 open to objection and abuse : Harri- 
 son V. Blades, 1813. In the criminal 
 courts this practice has long pre- 
 vailed, and it has there been ex- 
 presslj- decided, that the deiiositions 
 of a womiin who was so near her 
 confinement as to be unable to attend 
 a trial could not be received : R. 
 V. Savage, 1831 fPatteson, J.); see 
 po.st, § 481. If, liowever. from the 
 nature of tiie illm-ss or other infir- 
 mity no reasonable ho])e remains 
 that the witness will be able to aj)- 
 pear in court on any future occasion, 
 his depesition is certaiiilv admissible 
 in criminal (11 & 12 V. e. 42 ("The 
 Indictable UiYer-es Act, 1848"), 
 § 17, cited ])()St, § 479; 11. v. Hogg, 
 1833 (OnrMcv. B.) ; R. v. Edmunds, 
 1833 (Tindai. C.J.) ; R. v. Wilshaw. 
 1841 ; R. V. Cockburn, 18.)7}, as it is 
 in civil, i)i'ocee(liiigM (Jones v, Jones, 
 178j; Aiidii'ws '•. Palmer, 1812; I'lv 
 V. Wood, 1731; Corbett r. Corbett, 
 1813), The case of loo v. Evans, 
 
 29 
 
 i| 
 
 I I i 
 

 iiHi 
 
 DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES. [PART TI. 
 
 kept out of the way by the contrivance of the opposite 
 party.* 
 
 ii 479. The Legislature has moreover also expressly provided 
 that, in certain cases, certain depositions should, under particular 
 circurastancep, be received in evidence.' 
 
 § 479a. Depositions taken in criminal cases in pursuance of 
 " The Indictable Offences Act, 1848," ' are made secondary 
 evidence if the witness be (1) dead, (2) so ill as to be unable to 
 travel. The Act in question provides, " That in all cases, where 
 any person shall appear or be brought before any justice or justices 
 of the peace charged with any indictable offence, whether com- 
 mitted in England or Wales, or upon the high sea, or on land 
 beyond the sea, or whether such person appear voluntarily, upon 
 summons, or have been apprehended, with or without warrant, or 
 bo in custody for the same or any other offence, such jusi.""*) or 
 justices, before he or they shall commit such accused person i 
 prison for trial, or before he or they shall admit him to bail, shall, 
 in the presence of such accused person, who shall be at liberty to put 
 
 i8'27, where Vaughan, J., is said to 
 have rejected the depositions of a wit- 
 ness, who was bedridden, and nearly 
 a century old, and (luite unable to 
 attend the trial, is obviously not law. 
 Where, upon an '.ssue beiiip directed 
 out of the old C ourt of Chancery, it 
 appeared that a witness, who had 
 been examined in the cause as to the 
 handwriting of certain documents, 
 had since become blind, the court 
 made an order that his depositions 
 should be read at the trial : Lynn v. 
 Robertson, 1823. 
 
 ' The projiosition that, if a witness 
 be kept out of the vni/ by the adver- 
 sary, his former statcnicuts on oath 
 will be admissible, rests partly on 
 the authority of sevcrul decisions 
 l)oth in the civil and criminal courts 
 (Ld. Morley's case, 1G()6 (all the 
 Judges) ; II. v. Uarrisou, 1092 (Ld. 
 Holt); Green v, Gutewick, 1673; 
 R. t . Scaife, 1851 ; R. v. Guttridge, 
 1840. See, also, Egun v. Larkin, 
 1842 (Ir.) (Brady, CB.)); partly on 
 the analogii^s furnished by one or 
 two statutes (see M) O. 3, c. 102, 
 § o (Ir.); aii G. 3, c. 87, § 3 (Ir.), 
 
 noticed post, § 497) ; but chiefly 
 on the broad principle of justice, 
 which will lint permit a party to 
 take advantage of his own wrong. 
 In a case whore three prisoners wore 
 indicted for felony, and a witness lor 
 the prosecution was proved to be ab- 
 seit throng)) the procurement of one 
 of tiiom, the coiut held that his de- 
 position might be read in evidence 
 as against the man who had kept 
 out of the way, but that it could not 
 be received against the other two 
 men: R. v. Scaife, 18ol. 
 
 ■■^ See, as to depositions in criminal 
 cases, supra, § 479a ; as to deposi- 
 tions iu bankrujitcy cases, infra, 
 § 49() ; and as to certain ppecial cases, 
 infra, § 497 (as to Ireland), and § 490 
 (as to India and the Colonies); and 
 as to those in ordinary civil cases 
 taken on conimissiim, infra, § oOJ; 
 and as to those tiled in answer to 
 interrogatories, §§ 521 et seq. For 
 another and special instance, see 
 "The Fugitive Oflenders Act, 1881" 
 (44 & 45 V. 0. 69), § 29, cited post, 
 § 1562. 
 
 3 11 & 12 V. 0. 42, § 17. 
 
 330 
 
 ^^ i 
 
CHAP. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES. 
 
 questions to any witness produced against hirr-., take the statement' 
 on oath or affirmation of those who shall know the facts and 
 circumstances of the case, and shall put the same into writing, and 
 such depositions shall he irad oirr to and siyurd respectively hy the 
 tritncHKcs who shall have been so examined, and shall be sif/ticd also 
 by the J mt ice or justices taking the same; and the justice or 
 justices, before whom any such witness shall appear to be examined 
 as aforesaid, shall, before such witness is examined, administer to 
 such witness the usual oath or affirmation, which such justice or 
 justices shall have full power and authority to do ; and if, upon 
 the trial of the person so accused as first aforesaid, it shall be 
 proved, by the oath or affirmation of any credible witness, that 
 any person whose depositions shall have been taken as aforesaid, is 
 dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel, and if also it be proved that 
 Buch deposition was taken in the presence of the person so accused, 
 and that he or his counsel or attorney had a full opportunity * of 
 cross-examining the witness, then, if such deposition purport to be 
 signed by the justice by or before whom the same purports to have 
 been taken, it shall be lawful to read such deposition as evidence 
 in such prosecution, without further proof thereof, unless it shall 
 be proved that such deposition was not in fact signed by the 
 justice purporting to sign the same." 
 
 § 480. Although the above enactment only renders his deposition 
 admissible if the witness be " dead, or so ill as not to be able to 
 travel," the maxim, "expreisio unius est exclusio alterius," has 
 
 ' The form given in Sched. M to the Act is as follows :— 
 Depositions of Witneaset, 
 
 "To Wit,— The examination of C. 1)., of [Farmer], and E. P., 
 
 of {^Labourer'], taken on \oiith'] this day of , in the year of 
 
 our Lord at , in the [cmiutu'] aforesaid, before the iindersij^nod, 
 
 [one'] of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the suid [count ji], in the 
 presence and hearing of A. B. ; who is charged this day before [me], for that 
 he the said A. B. on at [&c., flexcribiufi the offence as in a irarrunt 
 
 of coinniitment]. This deponent C. 1). on his [oath] saith as follows [&c., 
 stating the liepositioii of the witness us nearli/ as -possible in the words he uses. 
 When his deposition is complete, let him sign it]. 
 And this deponent E. F. upon his oath saith as follows [&c.]. 
 
 The above depositions of C. D. and E. F. were taken and [sworn^ before 
 me at on the day and year first above mentioned. T. 8." 
 
 ' This fact may be negatived by 
 proof that the accused was insane 
 when the deposition was taken, or 
 was otherwise incapacitated b}' ill- 
 
 ness from cross-examining the depo- 
 nent : R. V. Peacock, 1870 (Brett and 
 Mellor, JJ.). 
 
 .S.31 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 t 
 
 ' i 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 i 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 1 
 1^ 
 
);:, 
 
 I ir ; 
 
 \i 
 
 i,- 
 
 i\ 
 
 ffii 
 
 Ml 
 
 DErOSITIOXS TAKEN IJEFORK JUSTICES. fPAUT H. 
 
 no appl'cntion, and it does not abrogate the common-law rule,' 
 that if a witness he fraudulently or forcibly kept out of the way by 
 the prisoner himself, his deposition ought to he received.^ Whether 
 the courts will go one t-tep fmther, and admit the deposition of a 
 witness, who, although not too ill to travel,^ may he proved to bo 
 permanently insane,^ remains to he seen ; but such a decision pcems 
 naturally to follow from the former ruling. 
 
 § 481. Some judges consider (though this is not clear) that the 
 statute does aholish, however, the old conmion-law rule' that a 
 prosecutor ought to apply for a postponement of the trial, where a 
 material witness is only suffering under a temporary indisposition. 
 Accordingly, such judges have, under the statute, admitted the 
 deposition of a woman who, when the trial took place, had just 
 been confined." But other judges think that a confinement (which 
 after all is but a natural state) is not "illness" within the meaning 
 of that word or the statute.' 
 
 § 48'.?. The statute, too, apparently authorises the reading of the 
 deposition on its being merely proved that the witness is dead, or 
 too ill to travel ; that he was examined in the presence of the 
 accused, who had a full opportunity of cross-examining him ; and 
 that the document purports to be signed, either by the committing 
 ju> -ce, or, at least, by the justice " by or before whom the sunie 
 purports to have taken place."* Possibly, however, it is also 
 
 » Ante, nolo » to §§ 472-8. 
 
 » K. V. Siuifc, 18JI. 
 
 ' When a witmss is able to travel 
 without I'ii^k. lujv olil age and nervous- 
 ness anil inability to (stand a cross- 
 examination will not justify the 
 reading of her deposition : E. v. 
 Fanell, 1.S74; 1{. v. Thompson, 1876 
 (Lush, J.). 
 
 « Antt', note ' to §§ 472-8. In E. 
 V. Cockburn, lSo7, the deposition of 
 a witno>s was received, on his doctor 
 provinjj; that, thouf,di ho might liavo 
 Deen brought tc the court without 
 danger to life, ho was sutfeiing from 
 paralysis, which disabled him alto- 
 gether from giving evidence. See, 
 also, R. c. Wilson, ISOl. 
 
 » Ante, note ' to (J'^ 472-8. 
 
 • Thus in R. v. Stephenson, 1802, 
 and R. v. llan-ey, iNoO, the court 
 admitted the dei)osition of a woman, 
 who was daily expecting her confine- 
 ment, and was "otherwise poorly." 
 
 See, too, E. v. Croucher, 1862; E. v. 
 Wilson, 1874; E. v. Ileosom, 1878 
 (Lush, J.); and E. v. Goodfellow, 
 1879 (Bowen, J.); E. v. Wellings, 
 1878. In these last three cases the 
 woman was daily expecting her con- 
 finement. 
 
 ' E. V. Wilt<jn. 1858 (WiUes, J.); 
 E. V, Walker, 18j9 (id. with concur- 
 rence of Crowder, J.); E. v. I'arker 
 and Ashworth, York Summer Assixes, 
 1 862 ( Mellor, J. , say ing that the gene- 
 ral opinion of the bench was with him); 
 E. V. Omant, 18J4. And at all events 
 from E. V. Tait, 1861 (L'romjjton. J.), 
 and other cases in this note, it ajjpears 
 that the juilge, notwithstanding the 
 Act, has a discretionary powta- of 
 postponing the trial (which some 
 judges habitually exercise), instead 
 of allowing the deposition to be read. 
 
 8 In E. V. Vidil, 1861, Blackburn, 
 J., held the deposition of a sick wit- 
 ness admissible, though it had been 
 
 332 
 
C. IV.] DI-TOSITIONS TAKEN HY JUSTICES, HOW PROVED. 
 
 necessary for the prosecutor to further prove all or some of tlie 
 following facts, viz., that the deposition was taken before tlio 
 accused was committed or bailed ; tliat it was taken on oatli or 
 affirmation ; that it was read over to the witness, and tliat it was 
 signed by him. For it may bo contended that the section set out 
 ttbovo enumerates all those circumstances as apparently necessary 
 ingredients in a valid deposition ; and then, in thn jjaragraph rela- 
 tive to the proof, speaks, first, of " the person, whose deposition 
 shall have been taken as aforrnaid" being dead, &.c., and next, of 
 ^^siwli^ deposition" purporting to be signed by the justi(;e, while 
 in the form of deposition provided the justice merely states that 
 the witness was examined on oath, and in the jtresence of the 
 accused, and such form is wholly silent as to whether or not the 
 examination was read over to the witness, or was signed by him. 
 
 § 483. It is submitted that while " omnia i)ru3sumuntur rite esse 
 acta," a deposition will be rendered inadmissible if the prisoner can 
 show affirmatively that the signature, purporting to be that of the 
 justice, is a forgery, or even that the deposition was not taken upon 
 oath, or that it was not read over to tlio witness, or that the signa- 
 ture purporting to be that of the witness was not made by him, or 
 that the witness had refused or omitted to sign thn statement. 
 
 § 484. A few words as to the piopev coume of tahintj dcjio-sifions 
 under the Act, so as to render them admissible in evidence, will 
 probably prove useful here. To render depositions admissible, it 
 is apparently necessary that the accused should, when they were 
 taken, have been charged wth some indictable offence ; that the 
 statement of each witness should have been made under the sanc- 
 tion of an oath or affirmation, administered by the magistrate 
 before whom the charge is preferred ; ^ that such oath or affirma- 
 tion should have been administered in the presence of the accused ; 
 that the statement should have been made entirely in liis presence,' 
 
 taken boforo two magistrates who 
 noted only on that occusion, and the 
 prisoner had been charged before 
 and committed by another magis- 
 ti'ute. Sed qu. 
 
 * As to the meaning of the word 
 *' such," SCO Ld. Brougham in Case- 
 ment V. Fulton, 18-45, P. C. 
 
 * See R. I'. Vidil, 1801, cited ante, 
 § 482, n. s. 
 
 * The same doctrine provailijd at 
 common law. See 1{. v, Erriugton, 
 18;J8; K. V. Wooilcock, ITS'); K. v. 
 Dingier, 1701; U. i: I'aino, 109,5; 
 cited with approbation (Ld. Konyon) 
 in E. V. Eriswell, 17U0. 
 
 IM 
 
 333 
 

 I:, 
 
 1 
 
 Si : 
 
 1 
 
 f ■ 
 
 ; I 
 
 t 
 
 MODE OF TAKING DEPOSITIONS BY JUSTICES. [PART II. 
 
 and that he should have had full opportunity for cross-examina- 
 tion ; that the whole of the statement elicited either by examina- 
 tion or by crofs-examination, and not merely so much of the 
 evidence as the justice might consider tnatrrial^ should have been 
 reduced to writing in the first person, and in the very words of the 
 wituf'ss ; * that the deposition, when completed, should have been 
 read over to the witness, and signed by him, as a token of his 
 assenting to its correctness ; ' that the whole body of the deposi- 
 tions, if not each deposition,* should also be signed by the justice; 
 and that they should have been transmitted by him, — together 
 with the written information, the statement of the accused, and 
 the recognizance of bail, if any such documents should exist, — to 
 the proper officer ci the court in which the trial is to be had, before 
 or at the opening of such court.* 
 
 *5 485. The Legislature, in directing the magistrate to take down 
 the statements of the witnesses as nearly as possible in their own 
 words, and not merely " so much thereof as shall bo material," of 
 course did not intend the depositions to be loaded with every idle 
 word let fall by the persons under examination, and with expres- 
 sions obviously having no reference to the charge against the 
 accused. But it certainly meant to fetter the discretion of the 
 justices, who, under the old la.v, were apt to reject as immaterial 
 much valuable information. For facts which on a preliminary 
 inquiry appear to be of trifling importance, turn out often to bo 
 extremely relevant ; and where all the evidence is not given, the 
 court, the prosecutor, and the prisoner, are alike kept in the dark, 
 and much time may be wasted in endeavours to tlirow discredit 
 upon the testimony oi witnesses, by lowing that they have made 
 statements at tho trial which are not to be found in the depositions 
 returned." If a person of weak intellect, or a child, be examined 
 before the justice, it is also dosirablo that the questions and 
 
 If 
 
 ' This wiiM tlio old law. Sco 7 0. 4, 
 u. <)4, §§ "J iiiul \i (" Tlu) riiiniiml l.uw 
 Act, iNl'fi "). 
 
 ■' Sw Schcd. M. cited auto, §470a, 
 n. '. 
 
 » See 11. V. riummor, 1844 ; R. v. 
 Flommiiig, 1799. 
 
 » See § 487, pout. 
 
 » Hue §§ 17 and 20 of 11 & V> V. 
 c. 42 (" Tho ludictable Ott'encos Act, 
 184H''). 
 
 • R. V. Potter. 1829 ; 11. v. Thoman, 
 1837; K. V. Oriidv, WM\; 11. v. 
 Smith, 1845 ; R. i». WoUer, 1848. 
 
 334 
 
 It I 
 
 ii, 
 
CHAP. IV.] DEPOSITIONS TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES. 
 
 answers touching his capacity to take an ooth, should appear on 
 the face of the deposition.' 
 
 S 486. Whether a deposition originally written down in the 
 ahsence of the prisoner could be received in evidence under the 
 Act, on proof being given that it had afterwards been read over in 
 his prp^t'uce to the witness, who had then assented on oath to its 
 contents, is very problematical. Although depositions, thus laxly 
 taken, have more than once been admitted under the old law,'^ this 
 course of proceeding has frequently been condemned by judges as 
 higlily unjust;' and, indeed, it is obvious that it aifords no fair 
 opportunity to the accused of cross-examining the deponent. On 
 one occasion, Piatt, B., rejected a deposition expressly upon this 
 grojmd, remarking that a prisoner could not have '* a full oppor- 
 tunity of cross-examining the witness," within the meaning of the 
 statute, unless the deposition was taken down in his presence, and 
 in the presence of the magistrate, and unless he was warned by the 
 magistrate at the close of the examination that he might put any 
 questions he liked to the witness, with reference to the statoniout 
 which had been made.* It also is extremely doubtful whether a 
 deposition can be read in a case where the prisoner has abstained 
 from asking any questions in consequence of the witness being too 
 ill to bear further cxamiuatitm.* 
 
 § 487. As to the mode in which depositions should be entitled, 
 one caption at the head of the whole body of do{)ositions will 
 suffice,* if, indeed, it be necessary, in strict law,' to have a cai)tion 
 at all ; * and no objection can be sustained on the ground that the 
 title does not state with sufficient precision the charge against the 
 accused." Although each witness must sign his own dejmsition, it 
 will be sufficient for the magistrate to attach his signature, once for 
 all, at the end of the whole body of deposititms, provided that all 
 
 » H. V, Faintor. 184fi (Wildo. C.J.). 
 
 * U. V. Smith. 1M7; 11. v. ("iilvi<rt, 
 1H4.S; H. !•. WuIhIi. 1850. Hoo U. v. 
 ChiiHtophnr, 1«41). 
 
 » U. r. JohnHon, I8«fl (IMiitt, 11.); 
 H. »). roilKW, 1814 (('haml)r«. J.); 
 U. V. Kiildy. 18JJ; U. r. Ciilvort. 
 ITNii (Uolfo, IJ.); H. V. WiiIhU, lS.)(t; 
 H. V. Hpi'Hton, 18;)4 fAldt'M.u, 13.). 
 8t>u, al8o, U. V. t'ruwtuor, 1780. 
 
 • U. f. Duv. 18V2. Soo n. V. Bates, 
 18(i(); U. V. Wutts. 18(14. 
 
 ' U. I-. liy.l.', 1848. 
 
 • U. V. JdhiiMon, 1817 (AMorson 
 R). 
 
 ' S(>o, liowoviT, U. f. Xcwton, 
 18.Mt; uikI U. v. Oiilvin, 18(1.) (Ir.). 
 whnro till- point iiliiioHt «K|uully 
 dividi'tl tint Iri^li jiid^oH, 
 
 • It. v. Langluidgn, 1849. 
 
 • Id. 
 
 \ ' 
 
 ^M 
 
 335 
 
|H I' 
 
 CAPTION OF DEPOSITION.S — SKiXATURlvS. [f'AK'T II. 
 
 of thera be written either on one sheet < f papci-,' or on difFiTi nt 
 sheets connected with each other.^ Still, if the dfjiositioiis bo 
 copied on separate sheets, and no proof bo given of their liaving 
 been pinned, or otherwise fastoiiod together, at or before the time 
 when the last was signed,''' those bearing no signature will Ijo 
 rejected.* The signature of the justice must seemingly appear on 
 the face of the deposition to be that of the magistrate " by, or 
 before, whom the same puri^orts to have been taken," and no parol 
 evidence can supply ony omission ou this head.* Depositions, 
 when admissible under the Act, may be read iu evidence before the 
 grand jury as well as at the actual trial. ^ 
 
 § 488. It is no longer necessary (as formerly) to verify the 
 signature of the magistrate taking the deposition, but proof must 
 be adduced "that the deposition was ta'en in the presence of the 
 accused, and that he, or his counsel or attorney, had a full 
 opportunity of cross-examining the witness." Either the justice, 
 clerk, or at least some person who was present during the whole 
 inquiry,' must be forthcoming, to show that the requirements of 
 the law have been duly complied with. When a deposition is 
 sought to bo read on the ground of the sickness of the witness, it 
 must, of course, be further proved that ho is at the actual time of 
 the trial too ill to travel. The judges require this fact to be 
 strictly established.* Mere proof that the witness was confined to 
 his bed some days before will not suflice ; " and, as a general rule, 
 it will be prudent,'" though it is not absolutely necessary," to liave 
 the testimony of a medical man. 
 
 $i 489. As already mentioned,'^ a deposition will be admissible 
 under the Act, though taken upon a charge technically dillereut 
 
 ' I?. »'. Youiip, 18jO; II. V. Oslxiino, 
 1837 (,Col(ii(i','o, J., iiiul Ij(1. Abin- 
 gor). 
 
 ' II. V. Parker, 1870; ovornilinH; 
 E. i: IJichariU, lK(i(i. See, ulso, It. 
 1'. Carrol, l!S(i!> (lluiinen, J.). 
 
 ' Seo 1{. V. lieo, 18(Jl (Pollock, 
 (\H.). 
 
 * K. V. l''nm(!o, IHUi) (AlilorNou 
 nnd Piuke, 151?. V 
 
 » R. V. Miller. lH,-.() (Mimlo, J.). 
 
 * ii, V, Oluuitiiito, lUJl. 
 
 ' Se(! P. »'. Wilshiiw, ISIl ; R. v. 
 Wilson, 1S74. 
 
 * See P. r. Hiirris, l.s,-)(); R. v. 
 Ulner, l^.•.0; P. r. Pil.y, 18,)1. 
 See, also, P. r. Hiiv, 1HJ1>. 
 
 » P.r. Pil.v, isjl; P. I. Williams. 
 W)u (l'i^'(>tt,"l5.). 
 
 '" P. r. Pilev, l.S.')l ; P. V. Weltoli, 
 ISd'J (livleH. "J.); P. t^. Williams, 
 l8(l.-» {\'i'ti»n, IV;. 
 
 " P. V. SteplirliM.il, ISdJ; R. V. 
 
 Cloudier, IHli'.' (IJrumwoll, li,). 
 " Ante, § 407. 
 
 336 
 
 1^:: 
 
(•II. IV.J DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED. 
 
 from tliat in respect of which the accused is afterwards indicted, 
 provided that on the former incjuiry a full opportunity of cross- 
 examination had been afforded to him. For instance, the deposition 
 of a deceased person, taken on a charge against the prisoner of 
 having stabbivl him, or done him some grievous bodil}' harm, can 
 ho read on a subseijuent trial for his murder or manslaughter.' 
 
 § 4U0. In addition to the regulations considered above,* an Act 
 of 1867' contains two important enactments on this subject. The 
 first* provides in substance that every person, who is charged 
 before a justice with an indictable offence, s'.iall be asked whether 
 he desires to call any witnesses ; and, if he does so, the justice in 
 liis presence shall examine such witnesses on oath, and reduce their 
 statements to writing. The depositions thus taken shall then be 
 road over to the witnesses and signed by them, and shall also be 
 countersigned by the justice, and " transmitted in due course of 
 law ; " and, afterwards, upon the trial, all the laws relating to the 
 depositions of witnesses for the prosecution shall apply to these 
 depositions. 
 
 S 4!il. The other enactment,* after reciting the provisions of 
 the Indictable OfEences Act, 1848, which have been already set 
 out, further recites that it is permitted under certain circum- 
 stances to read in evidence on the trial of an accused person tlie 
 deposition, taken in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, 
 of a witness. " It may happen that a person dangerously ill, and 
 unable to travel, may be able to give material and important 
 information relating to an indictable offence, or to a person accused 
 thereof," and " it may not be practicable or permissible to take, iu 
 accordance with the provisions of the said Act, the examination or 
 deposition of the person so being ill, so as to make the same 
 available as evidence in the event of his or her death before the 
 trial of the accused person, and it is desirable in the interests of 
 truth and justice that means should be provided for perjiotuating 
 such testimony, and for rendering the same available in the event 
 
 • R. V. Booston, 1854 ; R. v. Dil- 
 moro, I8.VJ(\Vij;htinan, J.); H. r.Loe, 
 IWi-l (Pollock, C.n.) ; H. V. Williume, 
 1871. iSoo U. V. Cltuke, IKoft. 
 
 • Under § 17 of 11 & 12 V. 
 
 c. 42 ("The Indictiiblo Offencos Act, 
 1848 % 
 
 ' M) & ;n V. c. 33. 
 
 ♦ § a of :H» & ■'«! V. c. .35. 
 » ao & 31 V. c. 35, § B. 
 
 3;i7 
 

 .,l,j!.»'il 
 
 iii;>. ' 
 
 r 
 
 
 
 r ^ 
 
 '4m a 
 
 hi' 
 
 li.: 
 I*' 
 
 m I: 
 
 Hi' : !^ 
 
 'PI -I 
 
 i 
 
 !)]■: 'I;; 
 
 DEPOSITIONS TAKEN TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY. [PT. II. 
 
 of the death of the person giving the same : therefore, whenever it 
 shall he made to appear to the satisfaction of any justice of the 
 peaco that any person dangerously ill, and in the opinion of some 
 registered medical practitioner not likely to recover fiom such 
 illness, is able and willing to give material iufomiatiou n-lating to 
 any indictable offence, or relating to any person accused of any 
 such offence, and it shall not be practicable for any justice or 
 justices of the peace to take an examination or deposition in 
 accordance with the provisions of the said Act of the person so 
 being ill, it shall be lawful for the said justice to take in writing 
 the statement on oath or aflirniation of such person so being ill, 
 and such justice shall thereupon subscribe the same, and shall add 
 thereto by way of caption a statement of his reason for taking the 
 same, and of the day and place when and where the same was 
 taken, and of the names of the persons (if any) present at the 
 taking thereof, and, if the same shall relate to ;_iny indictablo 
 offence for which any accused person is already committed or 
 bailed to appear for trial, shall transmit the same with the said 
 addition to the projter officer of the court for trial at which sutl; 
 accused person shall have boon so committed or bailed ; and in nil 
 other cases V'l shall trar mi.t the same to the clerk of the peace of 
 the county, division, city, or borough in wliioh he bliull have taken 
 the same, who is hereby required to preserve tha same, and file it of 
 record ; and if afterwards, upon (ho trial of an_,' olfender or (»lft'n<'(' 
 to which the same may relate, the jierson who made the saint> 
 statement shall be proved to bo dead, or if it shall bo proved that 
 there is no reasonable probability that such j)erson will ever b« 
 able to travel or to give evidence, it shall be lawful to read such 
 statement in evidence, either for or against the accused, without 
 further proof thereof, if the same purports to be s-gncd by tiic 
 justice by or before whom it purports to be tnkcM, and provided it 
 be proved to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable notice' of 
 the intention to take such statement has been served upon the 
 person (whether prost^cutor or accused) against whom it is proposed 
 to be read in evidence, and that such person, or his counsc'l or 
 attorney, had or might have had, if he had chosen to be present, 
 
 * Tbia ntuat be in writing : R. v. Shurmer, 1880 (C. 0. B.). 
 
 am 
 
CHAP. I V.J DEPOSITIONS TAKKN BP^FOKE CORONEKS. 
 
 full opportunity of cross-examining the deceased person who made 
 the same.'*' 
 
 ' § 492, The depositions of witnesses examined ^^fore the coroner 
 as to a murder ^r manslaughter are probably admissible as 
 secondary evidence* if certified and subscribed by such coroner 
 with the recognizances, if they and also the inquisition taken before 
 him, are delivered to the proper officer of the court in which the 
 trial is to be, before or at the opening of the court. 
 
 § 493. Assuming that the above provisions as to coroners* 
 depositions are still in force,' they differ materially from thoso 
 which regulate the mode of taking depositions before justices, and 
 of proving them when taken. In the first place, the coroner is 
 only required to put in writing " so much of the evidence as shall 
 be material;" secondly, the narrative may ■•■) drawn up in the 
 third person ; thirdly, the witness is not required to sign the docu- 
 ment, though he usually doe? so for the purpo.se of identifying 
 it;* fourthly, the deposition must, it would seem, be proved, either 
 by calling the coroner who subscribed it, or by j)roving his signa- 
 ture thereto, and showing by his clerk, or by some i)ers()n who was 
 present at the inquiry, that the requirements of the law wer~ duly 
 complied '*h.* 
 
 § 494. it was at one time said that a striking distinction existed 
 between depositions returned by justices and those takcti by 
 coroners, inasmuch as while (as we have seen) depositions taken 
 before justices, to be admissible as secondary evidence against the 
 prisotjer, must have been taken in his presence, depositions taken 
 before coroners might be received, though taken in a prisoner's 
 absence. Tlrs doctrine, however, has not only been questioned by 
 
 » 
 
 1' 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 ''H 
 
 sM 
 
 ' A cross-oxiiininiitiou 8t(t])])(>(l in 
 M)nH<H]uon('ii of till) witiK^sM's illnoss 
 will nittsiitlico: U. <•. Mitchell. Isill'. 
 § 7 I'liiicts, tlmt " wlii'iii'viT a iirincmiT 
 ill iii'tiiiil custody sliiill have servdil, 
 or hIiuU liiivii rcccivtid. iioticii of iiii 
 intention to tiikc such ntiil»'in»'nt. ns 
 hcrciiilitiforo niciitioncil, tlin jmlffe or 
 jiiKtico of tlio jioiico hy whom tho 
 priHoncr wuh eoniniitttMl, or tlic visit- 
 ing justiccH of tho ]>riHon in wliich 
 ho \H contimnl, may, hy an order in 
 vritiug, direct the gaoiur having the 
 
 custody of tho jirisonor to convoy 
 him to the pliiii' mentioned in tin) 
 Hiiid notice for the purpose of In'iiiff 
 pri'sent at the tiikiny; of the state- 
 iiieiit ; and such pidler shall coiiv»'y 
 thi' prisoner iiccoriliii;;lv • • •" 
 
 ' Itv 7 (!. », e. ,V», § I, oxtendoil 
 to Ireland hy !M». ■». c, ijl, §4. 
 
 ' i'ossildv thev are rejiealed hv 
 C .11 of 11 & 12 V". c. r2, as to which, 
 however, SCO U. r, Clearv, I'^fi'J. 
 
 ♦ S(H. U. .-. FleinminK." 179». 
 
 • Mm B. v. Wikhaw, 1841. 
 

 r I 
 
 i 'I ' 
 
 
 DEPOSITIONS IN BANKIU.'ITCY. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 W 
 
 fiuoh modern text writers of eminence as Starkio,' Pliillipps," and 
 KusspU;' but Montague Smith, J.,'* has decflined to act upon it, 
 and the doctrine will probably be discredited by all the jutlgos 
 whenever it formally comes before the Court of Criminal Appeal.* 
 
 S 405. Two other statutes make depositions taken either under 
 the English Bankru[)tcy Act, 1883," or the Irish Bankrupt and 
 Insolvent Act, 18o7,' admissible in evidence. The English Act 
 provides' that, "in case of the dcath^ of the debtor or his wife, 
 or of a witness whose evidence has been' received by any court in 
 any proceeding under this Act, the deposition of tlie person so 
 deceased, purporting to be sealed with the seal of the court, or 
 a copy thereof purporting to be so sealed, shall be admitted as 
 evidence of the matters therein deposed to." The Irish Act 
 provides'" that, in the event of the death of any witness deposing 
 to the petitioning creditor's debt, trading, or act of bankruptcy, 
 under any bankruptcy heretofore or hereafter, or imder any 
 petition for arrangement, his deposition, purporting to be sealed 
 with the seal of the Court of Bankruptcy, or a vojii/ thereof pur- 
 porting to be so sealed, shall in all cases be received as evidence of 
 the matters therein respectively contained. 
 
 §!l 406 — 4!)8. In Ireland," if any person, after giving information 
 or examination upon oath against any person for any offence, shall, 
 before the trial, be murdered or violently put to death, or so maimed, 
 or forcibly carried away and secreted, as not to be able to give 
 evidence on the trial, his information or examination shall be 
 admitted in all courts of justice in Ireland as evidence on the trial ; 
 
 ft 
 
 > 2 St. Ev. 381—386. 
 
 » '1 I'h. Kv. 71, -.-.. 
 
 » 2 Huss. <". & M. 892, 803. 
 
 « In U. >'. HiKt,', 18()(i. 
 
 » S.M. l{. V. Wall, 1830. Tho doc- 
 trine that dcpositioiiH tiikon bi'foro a 
 (^(iroiiiT in u niiin'M uhst^nco iiro ovi- 
 (lonf<< iipiinst liim i]i]iun'ntly rests 
 on t\vi> or tliriM' ileciHions U'lnp. 
 f'hiirlos II. (Lil. Morloy'H fuse, l(>(iti 
 (all theJud^fesin II. L.): Hioniwich's 
 oiiso, KitKi; Tliiitchnr I'. Wiillcr, KiT.j; 
 K. V. lIiirriHon, H)'.>2), wlioii flienilos 
 «»f evidence wuro only piirtially iindctr- 
 ntood, and appear to Ixi eapiiliie of a 
 fur moro limited iutorpretation ; —on 
 
 dicta thrown out hy Ld. Ivenyon and 
 Bullor, J., in U. I'.'Kriswell.lTJMt; — 
 on a note of a (tam Baid to have lu'on 
 derided by llothain, H. (K. c. ''iini- 
 foy, 1704);— and on a ruliiif? l>y 
 Coloridp'. J.. SilJH c llrowu, 1840. 
 
 • 4i) & 47 V. c. b'L 
 
 ' 20 & 21 V. c. ()(», Jr. 
 " 4(i & 47 V. c. .VJ, § 13(). 
 
 • Tho answerH of a liankrupt aro 
 not- at least, diiriii'.^ liis life— made 
 oviden(;e in procoediii'^.s in tho bauk- 
 ruj)t('y a^'ainst per-<ons otlier than 
 himself: IWunner, In le, ls.s7. 
 
 '» 20 & 21 V. c. (it), § 3iij, Ir. 
 " By 50 O. 3, 0. 102, § 5. 
 
 340 
 
CHAP. IV. 
 
 ("OMMis>i(»\ TO i:x\MiM': \vnxi;ssi;.s. 
 
 provi»l»Ml' tliat tlio iufoiniation nr oxaiiiinution of a witness secreted 
 shall not be evidence, unless it shall be found on a eoUateial issue, 
 to be put to the ,;«>•// trying the prisoner, that ho was secreted by 
 the person on trial, or by some person acting for him, or in his 
 favour. By a subsequent Irish statute' informations, or examina- 
 tions, under similar circumstances, are rendered, after similar proof, 
 receivable in evidence before the grand jury. 
 
 § 499. The original common law rule which required that, to 
 constitute them evidence, the examinations of witnesses should be 
 taken rivd voce in the presence of both a jury, and of, in a criminal 
 case, the accused, and in a civil case both parties, has in modern 
 times been much broken in upon by sundry Acts of Parliament 
 and rules made by slatuiory authority. 
 
 § 500. Evidence may be given about matters which have taken 
 place in India or the English Colonies, or elsewhere, and have 
 become the subject of criminal or civil proceedings in England, if 
 such evidence be taken in accordance with certain statutory pro- 
 visions which are mentioned in the footnote. * 
 
 ' This is a remarkable proviso, 
 since it differs ironj the ordinary 
 rule of law on the subject, which is 
 stated ante, § 23. 
 
 » .J6 O. ;j, 0. 87, § 3. 
 
 ' The principal of such provisions 
 is " The East India Company's Act, 
 1772 " (13 a. 3, c. 63, amended by 
 " Tlio .Statute Law IJovision Act, 
 bSNS," of ol V. c. 3, and further 
 aini'iidod by " Tlio Statute liaw llv- 
 visi.in Act, 18!>-J." of oo & Mi V. 
 c. 1!*). made applicable (see Wilson 
 r. Wilson. 188.i, ('. A.) to the In- 
 
 diii 
 
 lli-'h ( 'ourts by 24 & 26 V. 
 
 c. 104 ("The Indian Ili«h Courts 
 Act, 1861"), §§ 10, 11. § 40 of the 
 orifrinal Act relates to criminal pro- 
 ci'cdings in the (luecn's IScnch for 
 ollVnces committed in India, and 
 j;ives power to the Ciucen's llench to 
 issue warrants to the liuiiau (.'ourts 
 in such i)roccedin}j:H in the Queen's 
 licnch ; and if under this section the 
 Attorney-General move for a rule to 
 order the hulian Courts to take evi- 
 dence, his statement tl.at this is ne- 
 cc ssary will be sullicient without any 
 alli<lavit. See K. v. Doufflus, 1824 ; 
 uud also B. V. Douglas, 1U46. The 
 
 provisions of this section were re- 
 enacted by 24 G. 3, c. 26 (" The East 
 India Company's Act, 1781 "). § 78, 
 
 •I in 26 G. 3, c. 57 (" The East 
 India Company's Act, 1786"), § 28. 
 5§ 42 and 4.) of the same Act relate 
 to pioceedinps in Parliament touch- 
 inj^ offences comnulted in India, and 
 giv(! the Lord Chaiicellor or Speaker 
 (as the case may be) powei" to i>sue 
 warrants to the Jndum Courts to 
 take the necessary evidence. § 44 
 of tlie Act relates to actions in the 
 Ilif^h Court in En;,'land for causes 
 of action which arose in India, and 
 gives such High Court in I-lngland 
 l)ower to issue warrants to the hidiiiu 
 Courts to take the n(!cessaiy evidence. 
 As to the ('(uistiuctioii of the Act 
 geiuMiiily, and in particular of the 
 expression "cause of action," see 
 Francisco c. Gilmore, 1797 ; Savage 
 V. llinnev, 1834 ; and Kelsall v. Mar- 
 shall, lsV>6. 
 
 The (iueen's Bench ])ivision in 
 Enj-land is authorized to try any 
 jHjrson employed in the public ser- 
 vice abroad, who, in tiie exercise or 
 under colour of such employment, 
 shall have committed uny ollence, 
 
 341 
 
Cini MISSION TO EXAMINK WITNESSES. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 !!,■■ 
 
 ii 
 
 K 
 
 § r)0('.\. It will be noticed that none of the statutes above ri'- 
 ferred to require the party to prove that the witnesses who>c 
 depositions he seeks to use are beyond the jurisdiction of the coui i 
 at the time of the trial. Perhaps, however, principle requires thiil 
 some slight evidence of this kind shall be given, and this view 
 derives confinnation from Ord. XXXVII. r. 18.* 
 
 $5 '001. In rrintiiuii proceedings a resort to the provi-sions of the 
 Acts mentioned in the footnote to ^ 500 may even now become 
 sometimes necessary. 
 
 § 501a. In civil c "s, however, the statutes mentioned in the 
 footnote have been i .ed nractieally obsolete by the provisions 
 
 contained in R. S. C. ( X.J VII.'" 
 
 |5 502. The examinatiu.i of w. cv ^^es taken (/i- hoir chhi' on com- 
 mission may also be contained in depositions which may be read at 
 the trial if such depositions were taken under an order for that 
 purpose, which may generally be obtained where a witness is over 
 seventy years of age,'- or is dangerously ill, or is about to g(j 
 abroad,' and the inability of the witness to attend the trial is 
 proved.* 
 
 $i 503. The 1 ligh Court, moreover, has a general power * to order 
 the examination of witnesses in any cause or matter to be taken 
 by depositions on commission wherever it " shall ai)pcar necessary 
 for the purpocos of justice." 
 
 by 42 G. ;j, c. 8,j. Tlio tniilfnco on 
 Biich trial may (by § 'A of tho above 
 stiitutc, and also by § 81 of 24 G. 3, 
 c. 2.)) be taken iijiou foniini!<sion. 
 S('t>, as to j)ost])(iiu'iiiont of a trial 
 uiiiltT till! oiMitiiiciit abovo uien- 
 tioiii'il, H. r. Joiics. 1S()(!. 
 
 Till! ]»riivisi( lis of § 40 of " Tho 
 East India ('o.iii]iany'8 Act, 177:^" 
 ^siipra), aro I'xti'ndril to tlio trials 
 in till! (iuwii'n Ki'iii'h Division of 
 olVt'iioos against " Tho Slavo Trado 
 Acts" by <i & 7 V. c. !)H, § 4 (" Tho 
 Slavo Trade Act. 1 S i;t '). Tlu-ir pro- 
 visions us to takiii}; i-vidi'iici! by 
 commission uro also cxtondnl to all 
 C'olonii!S, and to nil ai'tions (not 
 boin^ actions at thu suit of the 
 Crown: see K. v. Wood, 1841) in 
 ■whatovor country the cause of action 
 may have arisen, by 1 W. 4, c. 22. 
 
 The High Court of Justice ii Ire- 
 land is pivcn powers similar to tlmse 
 posBi'sst'd by the llij?h Court of Jus- 
 tice ill 10ii;,'Ianil, by .'{ \- 4 V. c. 22 
 (••The Debtors (Ireland) Act, 184(1.") 
 As to the powi'i's of the Scotch Courts, 
 see 2(» iV ;{0 V. c. 112. 
 
 ' Si'i! post, § .■)(f4. 
 
 '• IVist. § .>()4. 
 
 ' This rule, however, does not en- 
 title the i)arty to an order for the 
 examination of a very lar<;e number 
 of witnesses: IJidder c. llridp's, 1884, 
 C. A., which consult generally as to 
 examiimtion of old witnesses de bene 
 ease. 
 
 » Uellamy v. Jones, 1802. 
 
 « I'ost, § 504 ; Ord. XXXVII. 
 r. 18. 
 
 • Under Ord. XXXVII. r. 6, set 
 out in full, post, § 504. 
 
 342 
 
)H 
 
 CHAP. IV.] CJOMMLSSION TO EXAMINE WITNESSES. 
 
 § 504. Under whichever of tlio powers niontioned above evidence 
 by depositions may have been taken, (piestions as to the admissi- 
 bility of such depositions may arise in connection with the law of 
 evidence; therefore, although it would be quite foreign to this 
 work to give any detailed instructions as to the practice ' to bo 
 followed in obtaining an order to take evidence on commission, it 
 may be useful to set out a large portion of R. S. C. of 188^}, 
 Ord. XXXVII., which practically collects in a code the powers of 
 the High Court upon this subject. Tlie material parts of such 
 Order appear to be as follow : — 
 
 " Ord. XXXVII. Examination of witnesses. 
 
 5. The court or a judge may, in any cause or matter where 
 it shall appear necessary for the purposes of justice, make any 
 order* for tlie examination upon bath before the court or judge 
 or any officer of the court, or ani/ other pri'fion and at aiii/ place, of 
 any witness or person,* and mny empower any party to any such 
 cause or matter to give such deposition in evidence therein on men 
 terms* if any, as the court or a judge may direct.* 
 
 6a. If in any ease the court or a judge shnll so order, th j 
 shall be issued a request to examine witnesses in lieu of a commis- 
 sion. See R. S. C. Ord. XXXVII. r. 6a (R. S. C, October, 1884, 
 r. 6).' The Appendix to the Rules of 1884 contains (in forms 1 
 and 2) the forms of such order and request, which may be cited as 
 forms !i7A and ;i7n in Appendix. 
 
 8. Any person wilfully disobeying any order requiring his 
 attendance for the purpose of being examined or producing any 
 
 ' This will 1)0 found in any pood 
 book on I'rai'tico, «.,'/., thn Amuiiil 
 I'riictico for 189j, at pp. 727 et sicj. 
 
 ' Tlio fonns of " Ordor for Kxii- 
 niination of Witnesses bi-foro Trial " 
 ttn» given in 11. S. C l.SM.J, Aj)p. K. 
 Xou. M] and .'$7. An order under 
 this rule may be made ex parte, but 
 only at the peril of the applicant : 
 Itidder v. IJridgeH, Hupra. 
 
 ^ See also r. 1 of same Order, cited 
 post, § i;J!).). 
 
 * See r. \H, post, § 504. 
 
 ' An order under this rule can 
 only bo made whore it is sought to 
 examine witnesses. Under it the 
 English Court hus no jurisdiction to 
 
 order tho production rf documents. 
 Capo Copper Co. v, Coinptoir d'Hs- 
 conipte, ISOO, C. A. Hut (luiero 
 wlii'tlier It'tters of re(inest, or any 
 matter witliin the jurisdiction may 
 not be added to the commission. 
 See Mason and Barry >'. Coiuptoir 
 d'Kseompto, 1890, ^loreovor, whoa 
 no action is pending against him, 
 and it is not necessary for the carry- 
 ing out of an order already iiiailo, 
 there is no jurisdiction under thia 
 rule to make an order against a 
 person not a party to any ponding 
 action. See Elder v. Carter, 1890, 
 C. A. 
 
 a 13 
 
WITNKSSKS KXAMINKD UNDER COMMISSION. [PART II. 
 
 i; i 
 
 1!^ 
 
 'Isjir^ll;; 
 
 1 
 
 W 
 
 
 " document sliull bo (loomed guilty of contempt of court, and nmy 
 be dealt with accordingly. 
 
 !». Any person rerpiired to attend for the purpose of being 
 oxarained or of producing any document, shall be entitled to tlio 
 like conduct money and payment for expenses and loss of time as 
 upon attendance at a trial in court. 
 
 10. Where any witness or jjerson is ordered to bo examined 
 before any officer of the court, or before any person appointed for 
 the purpose, the person taking the examination shall bo furnished 
 by the party on whose application the order was made with a copy 
 cf the writ and pleadings, if any, or with a copy of the documents 
 necessary to inform the person taking the examination of the ques- 
 tions at issue between the parties. 
 
 11. The examination shall take placfi in the presence of the 
 parties, their counsel, solicitors, or agents,' and the witnesses shall 
 be subject to cross-examination and re-examination. 
 
 12. The depositions taken before an officer of the court, or 
 before any other person appointed to take the examination, sliall 
 be taken down in writing by or in the presence of the examiner, 
 not ordinarily by question and answer, but so as to represent as 
 nearly as may be the statement of the witness, and when completed 
 shall be road over to the witness and signed by him in the prgsence 
 of the parties, or such of them an may think Jit to attend. If the 
 witness shall refuse to sign the depositions, the examiner shall sign 
 the same. The examiner may put down any particular question or 
 answer if there should appear any special reason for doing so, and 
 may put any question to the witness as to the moaning of any 
 answer, or as to any matter arising in the course of the examination. 
 Any questions which may be objected to shall be taken down by 
 the examiner in the depositions, and he shall state his opinion 
 thereon to the counsel, solicitors, or i)arties, and shall reft-r to su.'h 
 statement in the depositions, but he shall not have power to decide 
 upon the materiality or relevancy of any question. 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 16. When the examination of any witness before any examiner 
 shall have been concluded, the original depositions, authenticated 
 
 > How if thoy do not thiuk fit to attend P See r. 12. 
 
 ;i44 
 
VU\l\ IV.J WITXHSSKS KXAMINKD IJNUKIt COMMISSION. 
 
 "liy tilt! Mf^niifuro of tho cxatiiiniT, sliiill bo truusiulttod by Iiim to 
 tho Coiitnil Olfioo, and tiiore filtHl. 
 
 17. Tho jicrsoii taking tho cxiimination of a witness undor tlieae 
 Riiloa may, and if need be shall, nuiko a sporial report to tho court 
 touching such examination and tho conduct or absence of any 
 witness or other person thereon,' and the court or a judge may 
 direct such proceedings and make such order as upon tho report 
 they or ho may think just.' 
 
 18. Except where by this Order otherwise provided, or directed 
 by the court or d judge, no deposition si; ill bo given in evidence 
 at the hearing or trial of the cause or matter witliont llic coimcnt of 
 tho party against whom the same may be offered, iiitlcHx tho court 
 or judge is satisfied that the deponent is (Uud^ or heyoiut tlie juris- 
 diction of tho court, or unab/e from siclnuxs or other infirmity to 
 attend tho hearing or trial, in any of which cases the depositions 
 certified under tho hand of the person taking the examination shall 
 be admissible in evidence, saving all just exceptions, without proof 
 of the signature to such certificate. 
 
 • • * • • 
 
 20. Any * * • • party or witness, having made an affidavit to 
 be used or which shall be used on any procetding in tho cause or 
 matter, sliall be bound, on being served with such subpcena, to 
 attend before such officer or person for cross-examination. 
 
 21. Evidence taken subsequently to tho hearing or trial of any 
 cause or matter shall be taken as nearly as may be in the same 
 manner as evidence taken at or with a view to a trial. 
 
 22. Tho practice with reference to the exiiniiiuition, cross- 
 examination, and re-examination of witnesses at a trial, shall extend 
 and bo applicable to evidence taken in any cause or matter at any 
 stage. 
 
 23. The practice of tho court with respect to evidence at a trial, 
 when applied to evidence to be taken before an officer of the court 
 or other person in any cause or matter after the hearing or trial, 
 
 ' Soo r. 5, niito. It scims that tho ritor of ono of tho pin ties; In ro 
 
 oxamiiKT iiiiiy order any \vitni'.-« to AVcst of Canada Oil T/uids and Works 
 
 hu uxiiininod apart from tho itthcrs, Co., 1877 (JomkoI, M.U.), 
 even tliough lio bo tho aj^cnt or soli- 
 
 345 
 

 
 
 m 
 
 
 !tt^ 
 
 U 
 
 EXAMINKRS OF SUrilKMK COUIIT. [PART 11, 
 
 " shall be subject to any special directions wliieli may bo given in 
 any cnso. 
 
 24. No affidavit or deposition filed or made hr/orr ifisKi' Joiiin/ 
 in any cause or matter shall, without special leave of the court or u 
 judge, be received at the hearing or trial thereof, unless witliinone 
 month after issue joined, or within such longer time as may bo 
 allowed by special leave of the court or a judge, notice in writing 
 shall have been given by the party intending to use the same to tiie 
 opposite party of his intention in that behalf. 
 
 2>'). All evidence taken at the hearing or trial of any cause or 
 matter may bo used in any subsequent proceedings iu the same 
 cause or matter." 
 
 S*^ 500 — (). It is incumbent on the judges to exercise extreme 
 caution befoie making any order of an unusual character umler 
 either rule, i.nless such order be obviously necessary for the pur- 
 poses of justice.' An arbitration under the Companies Acts is 
 a " cause or matter " falling within them.^ 
 
 §*i 507 — 10. The " officers of the court " mentioned in Rule 5 ar(> 
 barristers of at least three years' standing,' a2)pointed by the Lord 
 Chancellor for five years, and removable by him.* They are called 
 *' Examiners of the Supremo Court." All the examinations ordered 
 in the Chancery Division imixf be referred to them in rotation, 
 unless the court or a judge otherwise directs* ; and they iiiai/ tiikc 
 the examinations in any cause or matter depending either in the 
 Queen's Bench or in the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Divi- 
 sions, if the court or a judge so directs." The examinations, unless 
 the court or a judge entrusts the inquiry to one particular ex- 
 aminer,' are distributed by tho princii)al clerk to the registrars of 
 the Chancery Division among tho whole body, " according to 
 regidar and just rotation, and in such ninnner as to keep secret 
 from all persons tho rota or succession." ** They are to give 
 appointments in writing, specifying the place and time, not more 
 
 ' r(>ntrai Xew.s Co. v. East. Nows 
 Tel. Co., 1SH4, C. A. 
 
 2 In ro MvHort), &p. Co., 1889. 
 
 3 K. S. (■'. iimdo 4 Fob. 1884, 
 Oril. XXXVII. r. 40. 
 
 39. 
 
 « Id. 
 » Id. r. 
 
 • Id. 
 
 ' Id. r. 49. 
 
 • Id. rr. 41, 42. 
 
 346 
 
CIIAr. IV.J KXAMJNATIONS TAKKN UNDKIi COMMISSIONS. 
 
 than seven days in advance, " at wliicli, Bubjoot to any apiilii'ution 
 of tlie parties, the examination hIiiiII be taken ; "' tln-y are to re- 
 gard the convenience of the witnesses, and all the circinnstaMces of 
 the case;- and, snhject to such adjonrinnent a;i they sliall think 
 reasonable or just, they are to proceed de die in diein ;■' they may, 
 with like consent, examine persons not namt'd in the order.'* 
 
 § ijll. The Form^ g'wvn by the 11. S. (J. l^H'i for a commission 
 to oxamiiie wif nefises coritKins a clause rerpiiring the commissioners 
 to be sworn. Decided cases" show that (.'ominissions may be 
 granted to examine witnesses resident in countries bc^yoiid the 
 dominion of the IJritish Crown. A commission (.'nntaining such u 
 clause, but appointing a single commissioner, should also authorize 
 him to ailministcr the oath to himself.' 
 
 S 5l!2. To render the depositions taken under a commission avail- 
 able, the evidence must be such, in substance, as would be received 
 according to the English law. If at the trial it api)ears, either on 
 the face of the depositions, or by extrinsic proof, that the oonmiis- 
 sionera have, after due objection taken,* admitted illegal, or rejected 
 legal, evidence, the judge will in his discretion suppress the deposi- 
 tions either wholly or in part." The examiner's certificate must 
 be taken up. If it be not, its effect may not bo stated to the 
 court.'" 
 
 § 513. The commissioners must, moreover, have substantially 
 followed the instructions given by the instrument appointing them. 
 The court, however, will not look out critically for objections to 
 their conduct, but will rather in their favour presume that they 
 have discharged their duty." Thus, though a conmiission that 
 after the examinations had been taken, f/ir same should be trans- 
 mitted to this country, is not satisfied by sending mere copies of 
 them;''^ where oommissioners were directed to reduce the examina- 
 
 ' Id. r. 44. 
 
 » Id. r. 4j. 
 3 Id. 
 
 ♦ Id. r. 40. 
 
 • Sun V. 13, par. ■«, App. J. 
 
 • Fischer v. Sztutjy, IbJS ; Duc- 
 kett V. Williuins, IHJl. 
 
 ' Wilson c. 1)0 C(iul..n, 1883. 
 
 * liobinsou v. Davioa, 1875). 
 
 • LuT ..'v r. (ho, 1K,J4. 
 
 w < ..ait r. Jta'lkis ("u., 1883. 
 
 » AtkiiiH r. I'aUncr, 1821 (Al.bott, 
 C.J.): (iruvillo r. Stulz, 1N17 (Ld. 
 Iloiiiiiaiil ; liitcliiii-t c. Ilitchiiis, 
 18()|>; (irill 0. (icii. Iron Scrow 
 Colliir Co., 18()(); llodgus v. Cobb, 
 ISIiT. 
 
 '• Clay V. Stfphunuon, 1837. 
 
 347 
 
DKPusmoNs, wiiKN admiksmjm:. 
 
 fPAi: 
 
 r II. 
 
 tion8 info writing in tlu.' English limgiiHgt', and to fiwcar nn intn- 
 pri'ttT to tiiinslat» tho oath, intcnogatorios, and dfpositions", the 
 commission was hold to bn well t'xt'cuted by tht* return of dopoKi- 
 tions, wliicli had originally been taken down in the foreign lan- 
 guage, and translat< (I by tlio interpreter into English »i.\ wecU 
 afterwards;' and when a commisHion contained a (lirection that 
 tho witnesses should be examinetl apart from each other, tho 
 court presumed that the eommissioners had eomi)lied with this 
 order, allliough tneir return was silent ou tho subject.' I'o.xsiltly, 
 however, tho court would not feel justified in presuming that coni- 
 misaioners had taken the oaths prescribed to them before acting.* 
 When documents have been produced in ovidonco before tho com- 
 missioners, it will now HulRco to transmit with the deposit ion.s 
 either tho origimils or ccrtilied cojties ur e.\tra»ts; and attention 
 is drawn to this rule, because a moru btringeut uuo used to 
 jirevail.* 
 
 § 514. Wlion a commission to take evifb-n^o has been directed to 
 a court, it is of Cv/ursu desirable that the court should liavo been 
 rightly iiamed ; but a slight cjTor iti the docriptiftn, jirovidcd it 
 bo rwit of stjch a nature as to render it really doubtful what 
 tribunal was intended to havo been addressed, will not invalidato 
 a commission.'' 
 
 {S8 tOl'i — '»l(t. With regard to reading at the trial depositions 
 vhich luivo Im'cu taken under any of tlie various jirovisions men- 
 tioned above, reference must be made to the terms of Uide IS of 
 Order XXW'Il.. which has been alreaily set out in full." TheiflVct 
 of this ride is, that depositions taken under tlu> above rides are in 
 genend admifsible oidy in one or other of four events. Eirsl, if 
 tlte opjiosite jiarty ro/M7H/,v; secondly, if the witness Im< pr(»ved to 
 be ilvtn! ; thiully, if he be shown to be hiijuuil i/ir Jiin'mlir/ioii of tho 
 court ;" and, lastly, if it apiiear that, from m/iiicHH or infirmity, — 
 
 > Atkins V, I'lilni.T, IS'Jt ; U. 
 DonKliis. IHKi. 
 
 ' Siiii;iis r. IIiiiiliTNoii, 1HI8. 
 
 * ]lrvilp's I'. Ilriuitill, IMl. 
 
 * If.'.-. Dnll^lil--, lN|.->. 
 
 • Wilson i\ Wiloii, inh;j. 
 
 • Su|tiii, § .'lOi, lit \i. ;ii.v 
 
 t, iiiiilcr n ciiinniiNhiitn iiiuy )•<' H'iiiI 
 witliiiul )ii<)\ in;,' lit llm tiiiil IIimI hit 
 in then nliM'iit ; tlin ihiuh of hliiiw- 
 iii;^' tli;it 111' in williiii tin- jiiriNilictiiiii 
 resls nil till' iiliji'rtintx |iuity: ><utli>u 
 V. .Viimlii', IS.VJ. 'I'lix HiiniiMlm II iiio 
 w.is iidiipti'il liy Sir ( '. ( 'ii'^-.uill ia 
 
 '' Ity .^rotrli liiw. tin' ili'|><mitinn of tin' Miiti innini.i! ('unit: I'nll.ii k c, 
 A wituub* rttidiiiy uliiimd t'Xuiiiiiicii riillauk,l>S<Jl; mill MilUr, Mills, IHUl. 
 
 MS 
 
ClLVr. IV.] DKrOSITIONS, WIIHN ADMI.SSIHLE. 
 
 wliich terms do not nocossarily moim an iiiniruft/r niahidy, Ijut will 
 bo satiHfiod by any jyravo illnoss,' — ho cannot atton<l tho trial. By 
 liiilo /i,' indeed, none of those conditions are absolntrly l)indiii<jf, 
 for the judge has power to order deposit ions to bo given in ovi- 
 denoo in any ease. Still, that power must be guidtfil by a judicial 
 disoretion.' Tho admissibility in evidence of depositions will 
 still, in tho absence of connnit, depend (as it formerly did) upon 
 whether tho witness at the trial* is or is not able. Indeed, in the 
 ease of ajf! Ittvitu, it is expressly provided '' tliat " wluTe it appears 
 to tho ',,'ourt or judge that tho other party bona tiiln desinn the 
 jirodiietion of a witness for (iross-examination, ami ///'// such irifnrsx 
 cmi III' ]>ri)ilttiril, an order shall not be made authori/ing the evidence 
 of such witness to bo given by allidavit."" 
 
 S '^»17. The (piestion remains, how the incapacity of the witness 
 to attend tho trial is to be ])roved. The evidence as to such inca- 
 pacity being exclusively oddress(>d to tho judge, ii/fii/nrits an» 
 probably admissible upon the point as well as ordinary vivi voce 
 testimony.' The K. S. C. IHS.'J, nuike no reference to tlie matter, 
 wliile the (mly two forms which allude to it do so in language 
 inconsistent and obscunt. The Form of Order for a commission to 
 examine witnesses contains a clause that the (b'positinns may bit 
 given in «'viilcnee, " without any other proof of the <ih.\iiiir front 
 thin coittifri/ of the witness or witnesses therein named, than an 
 allidavit of the solicitor or agent of the said as to his belief 
 
 of the ." This, so far as it goes, is dear, but it deals simply 
 
 with tho ease of tin* witness being out of the jurisdi( tioii of the 
 court. Tho form given for an onb-r for examining witiie-M-H 
 1ii>|'ore an examiner, contains a direction that the depositions of 
 
 ' I), of lli'iiufdit I'. Cruwsliiiv, 
 
 '' (it^'il unto, § AIM. 
 
 '' S.... WjiiimTc. .M..s«.'h(('. .\.\ tNSO 
 {.liKHfj. M. !{.); Ui.l.l.T .. lliiilp.^, 
 issl. 
 
 ♦ S... lliiK.it I. Hit^'ot (lr.\ ISTS. 
 
 " llv l{. S. V. Hi.l. XXXVll. 
 r. 1. 
 
 The )i<iiiit was iiKuiii r lisnl unci Idt, 
 
 Uliijri'iihil ill till- riiHi- nf |||i< j I, iif 
 iti'ilillort »'. ( 'tM\\.<||iiy, iMili. I'licid, 
 
 W'llJi'N, il,, wliii xi'i nii'il iiiriiiiiij to 
 Ki||i|»irt tlie lllliliif of flin Cliii'f 
 It.ioiii. ri<ri'nvi| to it. r. );>!•', Isil, 
 
 lilll tllllt )'ll-<'. nil I'Mli'llll I'XulliitiU- 
 tiiiti, will lie liillllil tit tlll'iiW II llliist 
 tlTUrlli'l'iillH ll^'llt nil thii Hlllijiti t, ii<4 
 
 • See N'llilill I'. llllsHi'lt, |NH;|, (^. A. it rchlteM fii It llii'leex |miti' |iIim(><i|. 
 
 ' On one ncnisinn I'olliick, (Ml., ill;?. Si'i', also, ( 'iirriilhi'rs 1. < Intliiiiii, 
 
 ri'ri'ivml the illlliUvit of ii mulnnl ls|| (|,i|, I Ii'MIIIiiii ! ; ItoliiliMon I'. 
 
 >/i'Oi, iiM Nnllii'ii'iit proof of thi' ■•irk- .Murkis, |.s|| [\A. Ahingit); iiinl 
 
 iHHs (if It ilelionellt to li't ill Ills (|i'|io- linle, jjj 17.1, i'tO, 
 bitliill : Juilgllt V. ('itlll|iliiill, IHIN. 
 
COMMISSIONS. 
 
 »'9'' ■''!{•.'' ' • 
 
 Suft i ■t-i'i:f>.i:i 
 
 iii 
 
 III 
 
 [I'ART II 
 
 any witness may ho given in ovidtmco on tho trial of tlie cause, 
 *• witliont any further jtroof of the uliacnrc of tho said witncws tliau 
 tho affidavit of the solicitor or agcut of the as to his 
 
 helief." llorc the term " ahscnco " has a nioro indefinite signifiia- 
 tion than in the former form, and it is sufrgesteil tluit it may he 
 interpreted as including an ahsence from the court in co:i8e(|ueii(0 
 of death or illness, as well as an absence from the country. 
 
 ti olH. All the provisions of the sjM>cial Acts cited in a footnote 
 on a previous page' relating to the examination of \vitness(>s under 
 commissions and orders have been extended to all suits and pro- 
 ceedings on the Itevenue side (»f the (iueens U(>noh Division, and 
 also inado aj)plicahle to the Probate and liivorce Division in 
 Knglnnd.'- and to the corresponding courts in Ireland.' 
 
 ?i oli». The Court of J?ankruptcy is emj)o\vered ^ to " order that 
 any person, who in Kngland would be liable to be brought before 
 it," with the view of di.seo\ering the debtor's proj)prty, "shall he 
 examined in Scotland or Ireland, or in any other pluce out of 
 ICpgland " ; and it is also provide<l* that " subject to geiuTal ruli's, 
 tin* ccmrt may in any matter take the whole or any part of tho 
 evidence either viva voce, or by int.-rrogatories, or upon ailidavit, 
 or by voiti mission (thioaiiy Wy (leneral Rule (id, tho court may 
 empower any party to any matter, " where it shall appear 
 nece.tsary for the purposes of justiev," to give depositions in 
 ovidonco on such terms as tho court nuiy direct ; and by r. (ill, 
 " an order for a commission to examine witnesses, an<l the writ of 
 connnissir)n shall follow the formn for the tinse being in use in the 
 High Coin't, with such variations as circumstances may rcfpiirc" 
 
 (5 oVJO. 'J'he County Court ml* s on the sidiji'ct (d' taking evidence 
 by deposition will bo found in Ord. XVIII. of the Uules of i^SIt, 
 rr. 11 — ^J!^, which ar(» substantially itlentical with tho provisions 
 of U. S. C., Ord. XXX NIL rr. 0— •,''), which have been already set 
 out." It is also provided' that "aflidavits and depositions shall be 
 rcaii as the ovidenco of the person h;/ iiIkhh tiny air iwf/." 
 
 Itiil.'M of IH(1,'» fc.r the Ct. of Div. iiii.l 
 Mat. ("uilNe.x, IT. rj'.l l;J7, I'eini •-'•>. 
 
 • lly Ki iV j; V. c. .•iL>("'nir lliiiik- 
 niittry .\.l. iss.l"), 5 i'7, sulw. j. 
 
 • III. ;; lo.'(, hiil.c .'». 
 
 • Sii|ira. 5 .'((ll. 
 ' C. I', old. Will. r. la. 
 
 ' See footnote to § .V)0, sllpril. 
 • See Itiijes ill 1 liv. ami Mat. 
 Cim-M. rr. V.Vl LIT, ll'S. 
 
 ' See, iiIho, oil flli* milijert, Ilrowii 
 V. r.towii, lS(t<(; tlie ItllleNof Matrll, 
 \H'\. lor the Ct, (.f I'loli. ill lllij.'., 
 rr. ll(i- Vl'A, aiel I'dtiii \\\ \ uud tlie 
 
 ;5(j 
 
CHAP. IV.] INTKUKOCiATORIES UXDF.K RULES OF 1883. 
 
 § 521. It has boon aln-iuly inoidiMitally niPiitioiKMl that evitlonco 
 other than oral (in oIIut words secondary) is somotinios ohtuiiicd 
 by moans of intcrrofraton 's, and tlie depositions in answer totlicin. 
 Betwetm tlio yoars lHr>l and 1870 many rules were framed either 
 by Iho Legislature or the judges, with the view of enabling 
 litigants, bt^fore the actual trial took place, to scrape the con- 
 sciences of their opponents by means of interrogatories.' Tiio law 
 on the subject is now embodied in H. S. C, 188;{, Ord. XXXI. 
 
 S tj'22. Any discusrion as to u/ini interrogatories may be 
 administered, or as to the practice with regard to them, would 
 appear to be out of place here. Mf)re()ver, full iuform»ti(m ou the 
 subject will be found in any book upon " Praciiic." In this 
 edition of the present work * it will therefore not bo further 
 discussed. 
 
 S 'VJ'{. The question whetlier any and what use can bo made at 
 the trial of the answers to interrogatories which have been given 
 by the other side may i)roperly be considered a branch of the Law 
 of Evidence. As to this, the MR. S. C, 188;{, provide, by Ord. 
 XXXI. r. 24, as follows: — "Any party may, at the trial of aii 
 action or cau«e, nuitter, or issiie, use in evidence any one or more 
 of the answ»>r8, or any part of an answer, of the (»|)posite party to 
 interrogatories without putting in the others, or the whole of such 
 answer: Provided always, that i>i such case the jiulge may look at 
 the whole of the answers, and if he shall be of opinion that tiny 
 others r)f them are so co^lnct•ted with those put in tiiut the last- 
 mentioned answers ought not to be usetl without them, ho may 
 direct them to be put in." 
 
 SS 'V24 — /i42. It has been renuirkeil, *' Under the new rules the 
 ])laintiiT can read oiu> passage without referring to the whole, even 
 of the same paragraph, and I think no judge would allow a 
 defendant, where he had ma<le an admission, to read with it a 
 jiassago whi.h was not connected in sense or substance with that 
 
 » 17 * IH V. 0. I'-'o, ^ li\-:n; laltv. wliethnr for Knulmi.l ( 24 
 
 ■M & :w V. <•. 77, Onl. XX.XI. For At '2o V. c. 10. $ 17, n-pfiii.d l.y 44 
 
 <4)i'ii'*^|iiiii(liii^ |iii)vihiiiiiM rciutivii to & 4.) V. c. .'iKj, or for Iri'luiui ; son 
 
 liviaii.l.m'o nt iVJoV.c. l(i:'. §5 •»«- ao & 111 Virt. i . 114. §41. Ir. 
 Ml loiiKl'-' : 40 \- 41 V. f. 77(lr.j iiml ' Tim .i^rlitli r.liti.iii iss.',) ..f tliis 
 
 iiiili'f'. i^iiiiiliir |iii\v('rs wi'ie uUo work liiHt'ii^-scii tlin t.iibjuut ut jjri'ut 
 
 cxtoMilud to tliu old Cuuii ol' Atiiiii- I'ligtli. 
 

 !' 
 
 APTIONS Foil PKUPIVrUATIXO TKSTIMONY. [VaIJT \'. 
 
 ndmisaion, even i ' }io had put in ii statonifnt sulimiltiii}^ t]i;ii Im 
 wnf fii'itlml to do mo, iind i'laimiii;^ to do so. Of cmirsi', wIhmi ;\n 
 u'inni-Mnn jm read, ovorvtiiiii"; oii;^dit to Im read which is fairly coii- 
 iiettod with tlnit admisHioii, hut I tliink it woidd ho wrong for dm 
 d'^fcudant, and ho wouhl not bo nUowcd, to try to hring iu nnittfr 
 wliii'h WHS not in any way conncctctl wiHi the inatti-r u(hnitt<'d." ' 
 
 ii -'tVi. lU'foro ctiurts of hiw woro unipoworfil In issuo roniMiis- 
 sions for thotnsplvos, it was ofti'u nocoasary to instituic proceedings 
 in Chan<'ory as auxiliary to an action at law; ami in such cases, 
 rocourso was had to what was called "an action for pcrpotuating 
 testimony." 
 
 S ")44. To extend tho benefits derivable from this mode of pro- 
 ceeding, two Acts were passecl. The lir.st of these was pa'^scd in 
 IHl'J,- and is now repealed, lis provisions aie, however, sub- 
 stantially end)odied in tho U. S. C, iHH'-i, Ord. XXXVIl. r. Ho,' 
 whi(;h provides, that *' any person who wouh', nidor tho eircum- 
 stanees alleged by him to exist, become entitled, upon the happen- 
 ing of any future event, to ajiy honour, tith*. dignity, or oJKce, or 
 to any e.stato'' or interest in any jiroprrty, rca' or pi-rsiual, the rij:lit 
 or claim to which cannot by him be brought to trial before tlie 
 hajijiening of such event, nuiy commenc^e an a(;tion to porpetuato 
 any testimony which nuiy bo nuiterial for establishing such right 
 or claim." By tho Ijogitimaey ])cclarati()n Aot, IS'^y,* which 
 is th(f second of tho A<ts just referred to (and is still in foroo), tho 
 Divorce l)ivisi(m of tho High Court, on tho petition of eortain 
 jiersons specially interested, may make di'cree^ declaratory of the 
 lcgitiina<'y or illegitimacy id' n* y such petifi •■h- a. <;• nf the validity 
 or invaliili*y of tho marriage of ojs parents, vv ':'-.ndparents, or of 
 liis own niarriagu, or of hia right to bo doemeil u natin'al-borti 
 Hubject. 
 
 8 ;"j45. An action to porpotuato testimony must have " been com- 
 menced for tho purpose," or no witness will 1h( allowed to \w 
 ('xamiued." The court may, on motion in such an action, if the 
 
 • Cotton.L.J.,inLyellt'. Konnctly, bell c K. of Dalliousic, INti'.i, II, I,. 
 1NS4 ; iiimI see Itowcii. I„J. * Sen Kc Stner, \HS\, ('. A. 
 
 ' .-. & (i V. c. («», i.'iii.al.d l.y 10 & » '.M ,*i '22 V. •■ ".HI. §§ :, 'J; ox- 
 
 47 V. ,.. .|». tciul. il to Irclaiut hy ill & H'i V. 
 
 ^ riiMiMiliiu^t uuilcr tliii* iMiiti c. *J0, If. 
 ■').■• -hi UijouloUHly wut<;licd: Cuinii- • (.)nl. XXXVIL r. ,17. 
 
Cn.M*. iV.j VIVA VOCK TKSTIMONY, HOW PROVKD. 
 
 (Icft'iidimt mnkcs (lofault ii> <l(»livnriii;r adofdiioo, ninko an order for 
 the (Kitiou to j»roc(!(Ml iu due couno, uii!! that (when' *'us in advisuhh') 
 a witness bo at oiicn examined, as if tho j»le,idiii;»s were elosed.* 
 The witnosses will b» examined orally before one of tlio ('xatniners 
 of tliH eotirt nmlor Ord. XXXN'll. r. •').' The depositions will 
 then 1)0 taken down, signed, aiithentioated, and transmitted to the 
 Central Office, as in other cases. ^ No relief boinj^ ])rayeil, the 
 action must not bo set down for trial.* In general, the depositions 
 will not be received at a subsequent trial as ovidenco,' except in 
 support of an action, nor then, unless it Ik proved that the wit- 
 nes.ses are dea<l, or otherwise iiienpablo of attending to be examined.' 
 The practice of the ecclesiastical courts was similar.' 
 
 § -OK). If a witness, besides being o.\amin<Ml on interrogatories, 
 should testify at the subsecpunit trial of a cause, either party, on 
 any further trial respecting the same subject, may, if the witn< as 
 bo then incapable of attending, rely, at his option, either on tho 
 deposition, or on the previous vivA voce testimony.'* What such 
 witness" orally te.stified may bo proved, <»ither by any person, who 
 will swear from his own memory,'" or by notes taken at tlu» time 
 by any person, who will swear to their accuracy," or po.ssibly from 
 tho necessity of the case, by the judge's notes." This last mode 
 of proof, however, is open to very grave, if not insuperable, objec- 
 tions, as such notes form no part of tho record, nor ia it the <luty 
 of the judge to take them, nor have they tli ■ sanction of his oath 
 to their accuracy or completonoss.'* ll(»w far it may bo necessary 
 to prove tho prcvine iconin spoken, does not clearly appear. Jt ia 
 
 ' ^[un|lH'H«of Huto I', Juines, 188(1; 
 mill Hi'i> rlllico i;. |{iiii|i<'ll, Isfi.'l. 
 
 ■■' Miti'i|UeHH of I'.utti r. JiiinoM, 
 Hiipru. Soe, iiImo, J.itliiit I', .Miii'|iliy, 
 1K7N (Ir.), (Ii'i'idinl on IIm' fiiiri'Hj«mil- 
 iiiK liiMh (MiliT. (tnl. XXX VI. r. «. 
 
 » ()r.l. XXXVII, IT. r.', 1(J. 
 
 • Old. XXXVII. r. ;W. 
 
 • Whno the ( "lowii hiiH iin iiitt'n st, 
 if tint .Ut.-Ui'ii. Ill' iiiiiile (iofi'iiiiiint, 
 tlii>li no ohjiM-tiuii I'liu )h) takt'li to 
 tbli ll(t|MIHitl<>IIH (III tl.O f;(roUU<l lliut 
 
 Kav. IHI.J 
 
 ' \v.'i|ii.ii,i r, \Vf(|iic.iiii. ih;)!>. 
 
 " To.i r, ]•;, of Win.li.NtMi, IS28 
 {\A. Tiiitfiilfii), uiit<', S liMK 
 
 • (if. Kv. 5 KKl, ill tiiirt. 
 
 '» Sliutt !•. Hoviiiploii, lso;t (I,.l. 
 Mllftilioioii^fh) ; \li\\. of l>oiii'UM».'r 
 V. Day. IHKI; U. v. JollifTu. ITUl 
 {IA. ivi'iiyoii). 
 
 " Mav.'of l)oii(-niit^r i>. Day, 1810. 
 
 '» l.:.\.SirJ. M.iiiHti..l(l). 
 
 '» C( (inuii f. Connuli, lNfl«(\Vilde, 
 
 ••■ I'"' • rt -...-- , • ^ ....^1,., 
 
 tho Crown wuM not u jiarty to tho J.O.); Mih'H i'. o'llurii, 1811 (Am.); 
 
 ai lion : (»i.l. XXXVII. i, Ud. l''(mt<.r r. Shuw, Wi'. (Ain.); Esparto 
 
 • 1 MiiiiJh'HCh. I'r. 7(ll>; Morrimm LourinouUi, 18'.'l. 
 
 V. Atmiil, mi, tinfi Att.-Uuu 
 
 'dtj'i 
 
ii: 
 
 VIVA VOCE TK8TIM0NY, HOW PUOVKD. 
 
 [part II 
 
 II 
 
 '■' I -i: 
 
 
 «tti(l that in ono caso the evidence of a witness wiis roje«;te(l " ns 
 he could not undertake to give the words, hut nien-ly to swear to 
 tho effect of them."' The sanio precision has, on Beveral occa- 
 sions, been deemed requisite in America.'' On the other hiind, it has 
 been forcibly urgtsd' tliat to insist upon strict accuracy, in cHect 
 exchides this sort of evidence altogether, while oxtrotno jwiiticu- 
 larity and minuteness in a witness's narrative, and an undertaking 
 by him to repeat with exactness every word of the d<*ceased's testi- 
 mony, ought to excite just doubts of tho witness's honesty, and tlic 
 truth of his evidence.* 
 
 8 <i47. It has been, on tho one hand, decided tliat a dying depo- 
 sition is not admissible unless tlio very words of tho deceased were 
 taken down, both question and answer having been taken ilowii 
 where (juestions were put.'' On tin* other hand, on indictments lor 
 perjury, it is not neces.sary to state tlie entire examination, but it 
 will hutlice to narrate, with ai'ciiraey, the whole of that portion of 
 the evid('nce whirh relates to tho point on which tho perjury is 
 assi|^ned, ju'ovlilcd the witness can further swear that he heard the 
 whole examination, and that nothing was subseipumtly said to 
 qualify theur!;.^iiial statement." Unless he can do this, his evidence 
 cannot be received;' and as the same rule ought to apply to th(> 
 proof of tho !<•!•< imony of a deceased witness, it .uid follow that the 
 pernon who heard .t deceased witness give his evidence must ut all 
 events be able to positively state what was said f)n the examination in 
 chief, and must also bo able to give th»* substiinee of his answn-s 
 in cross-exan)inatioh, or to positively swear that nothing escaped 
 tho wiln<»ss, which (sould vary or qualify tli«> tirst statement.'* 
 
 S .048. When lb positi'ius are tendi icd in evidence as hccondary 
 proof of oral teittiiaony, they are, of course, ojien to all the objec- 
 tions which nii^lit liiive \wn raised hail tlic witness himself been 
 jiersonally prc(vnt uf ir.r liial. 1 reading and other illegal (pu'stions 
 are therefore conslantly suppressed, togetli»»r with the answers to 
 
 ' Mciitiontv't f \ '.onl '.( >>)on in 
 11. V. J.illitVo, i;i»i. 
 
 » U. S. I. "• .nii, :•;*!« ; im.); 
 FoMter I'. Hhiiw, i.»2t (Am.' Wi l>ur 
 V. Hcld.iii, 1K2(J (Am.), C»w. ••. 
 lli.Juuils, lH;»«(Am.). 
 
 » dr. Kv. § 10.V 
 
 * Boo (".im.'ll >■, Uroon. >HJ;l(Am.) . 
 
 MilcH V. (Vll.im. 1811 (Am.); t'utoii 
 r. Lenox, ISJ7 (Am.); JuckMoii r. 
 Hiiilcv, IHOti ^Am). 
 
 • li. V. Mitchull, iMil',', 
 
 • H. I'. Uowloy, iN-'i; Ii. v. Uow 
 liu. 57!»'.'. 
 
 ' U. I', Jones, 179i. 
 
 • W.ilf r. Wyoth, 1824 (Am.). 
 
 .Md4 
 
CHAP. IV. ] DEPOSITIONS OPEN TO WHAT OIUECTIONS. 
 
 them ; and this, too, whether the tefetirunny liiis hoeii taken vivft 
 voce or by written interrogatories.' But a party eannot repudiate 
 an answer which has been given to an illegal question put on his own 
 side ; ^ and in all cases where objections are taken to interrogatorie.i 
 on the ground of their being couched in a leading form, the judge 
 is vested with a wide discretion as to how much, if any, of the 
 dei»osition8 returned he will in consequence strike out.'' Whore a 
 witness, on being examined upon interrogatories in a foreign country, 
 stated in one of his answers the contents of a letter which was nut 
 produced, f/iat part oi the deposition was supprcj^sed at the trial, 
 though it was urged, that as the witness was beyond the jurisdic- 
 tion of rho court, no means existed for compelling the production of 
 tlie letter.* Said Cliiof Justice Tiudal,'' " We have no power to 
 compel the witness to give any evidence at all : but if he doe.s give 
 an answer, that answer must be taken in relation to the rules of our 
 law on the subject of evidence." 
 
 5i '')l'i. In another case, under similar circuras>tance8, where a 
 witness described the contents of a letter and of the reply to it» 
 but produced neither, on this dejiosition being tendered the vnurt 
 at the trial rejected the answers which stated what the letters nm- 
 taiiu'd, but admitted so nuich of the deposition as stated that the 
 witness had written a letter to the party in question; for had the 
 witness been himself present in court he might have been e.xamined 
 thus far, in order to prove that the defendants through him hnd 
 used some exertion to procure the party's answer." Again, de|.i>- 
 siiions have been admitted, though the witness on his examiuiitiiin 
 had refreshed his memory with some jwipers, which he alleged were 
 partly in his handwriting and partly not, but which ho refused to 
 allow the commissiimers to see upon the ground tliat they were 
 j»rivate memoranda ; for, as it was a matter for tlu; discretion of the 
 commifsi(.iners wlnther they would permit the witness to reft-r to 
 
 ' IlutchiuHon v. lioinard, 1830. Htiiincs. thiit litli.r the letter must 
 
 * Id, be |iiiiiliict'(l, nr the ir/iolf iiitcr- 
 
 * Siniill I'. Nairno, 1819. i()f,'iitt>ry libanddiicd. IJut this cii.su 
 
 * StciiiUfllor t'. Ni'wton, 18158 {Tin- is ch'iirly imt law. S(>o pur lid. 
 dill, C.J.). Ill Whisj-liT 1'. Alkiim, l)i>iiiiiun, in Sinnll v. Niiirno, 184U. 
 180.'), lA. ElIonb<ii()ii(j;h iw rciioitiHl ■* In Stoinkolh r c. Newton, 1838. 
 to huvo held, uudur uiiuiUr circiuu- * Tuttuu v. Whituiuiu, 181U, 
 
 855 
 
iii 
 
 S( f 
 
 !i t' 
 
 i]"\ 
 
 NO DKCKEKS IN SKCOXDAKY KVIDKNCE. 
 
 [ 
 
 I'AUT FI. 
 
 papers during liis examiniilion, the learned judge, at the irial, 
 prosunu'd tlmt tljcy had exoroiHcd thfir discretion with jjroprioty.' 
 
 § 54!^. Tlie rules gf)vprning the jiroduotion of depositions us 
 evidence hiivo now been fully dinciissed. 
 
 § 550. It romainr. to consider a third lioad of the subject of 
 secondary evidence, viz., the general principle that the law 
 recognises no (Ihji'cch in the various kinds of secondary evidence.' 
 This rule applies whether the original evidence be itself oral or 
 documen.avy. For instance, if a deed be lost, or in the hands of 
 the adversary, who after due notice refuses to produce it, secondary 
 evidence of its contents may at once be given by parol testimony, 
 avjn though the party offering such evidence may be proved to 
 have in his posrossion a counterpart, a copy, or an abstract of the 
 document ; ■> and the former testimony of a deceased witness may 
 bo proved by any person who heard hira examined, even where a 
 clerk or a shorthai d writcT took down his evidence word for word.^ 
 
 S 5ol. At the same time, the rule that there are no degrees of 
 seeon<lary evidence simply applies to the (tilmimbilitif of secondary 
 evidence, and not to the degree of uritj/if to which different sorts of 
 secondary evidence are enti'.led ; it does not mean that the mere 
 memory of a witness, who has ren<l a deed, is entitled to (Mjual 
 weight with an authenticated copy of the same instrument. In 
 many cases a jury would properly regard evidence with distrust if 
 it apj)eared that more satisfactory proof was intentionally wilhhdd, 
 and under some circumstances this distrust might even amount to 
 absolute inci lidity. 
 
 § 5;"i2. Cases in wliich the law has expressly substituted some 
 partitMdar species of Hfcojidary evidence, in the ])lace of primary 
 proof, are, however, rn/iaM from the opcmtion n/thr viilr that tliere 
 are no degrees of secondary evidence. For instance, examined 
 copies, and, in some cusci, oflico or certified copies of public records 
 
 > Stoinkellorr.Nowton, 1838 (Tin- 
 dul, r.j.). 
 
 = I)(»> I'. Ross. IS 10; H.ill V. Hull, 
 1N41 ; Urowii i'. Wooilimin, 1N:J4 
 (I'arko, 1$.); Jcuns v. Whowloii, 
 184:J (rri'SHWcll, J.). 
 
 ' CnHns in last iu)t»i ; also, S\ip;ilon 
 V. Tid. St. Lodiuinh. INTO; Hmwn v. 
 UruwD, 1«J8 ; lu ro lirowu, 18J« ; 
 
 356 
 
 and In ro Onnlnor, IHSS, in whuli 
 discs oral oviiii'Mco of tlw conti'iits 
 of a lost will was iidniittcil. .*'<•<• 
 Johnson I'. Lvford, 1«(>H; also, ant*?. 
 
 « Joans I'. Wlmodon, 1843 (Or 
 w.'ll, J.). 8t)o li. V. ChriHtoplw 
 1N4». 
 
CHAP. IV.] coriKS of vvuuc documknts. 
 
 and (locunients iiro, on grounds of gonorul convt-nienco, considered 
 iidniissiblts' and, tliotjgh in slrictiifss Hecondiiry evidonco, partake 
 HO much of the character of primary proof, that so h)ng as it is 
 possihle to produce thcni, otlier inferior degrees of secondary 
 evidence cannot be reooived.* Parol testimony, in sucli cases, 
 can only be admitted on proof, first, that tlio piiblio record or 
 'locunient lias itself been lost or destroyed (for otherwise a copy 
 might be obtained), and, secondly, that any copy whitfh nmy 
 liave been taken, is no hmger under the control of the i)arty 
 relying upon less satisfactory evidence.' In like manner, if ii 
 witness has been examined before a magistrate or coroner under 
 such circumstances, that these otfic(»r8 respectively have, in pur- 
 suance of their duty, taken down his statement in writiiifr, i)arol 
 evidence of his examination cannot be given in the event t' his 
 (loath, so long as the deposition itself (uin be jinMluced, since the 
 law, having constituted the deposition as the authentic medium of 
 juoof, will not permit the admission of any inferior speci(!s of 
 evidence. The mere statement of a witness who wiut pn^sent at the 
 ••xamiuation will bo admissible if — and only if — it can be shown 
 that the deposition is lost or destroyed, or is in the possesHion of 
 the opj)08ito party, who after notice revises to produce it.* 
 
 S SOU. The princiide, too, which includes every species of secon- 
 dary proof in one legal category, by no nu>ans, hf»w(»vci', opens a 
 iloor to any sort of evidence, however lot)8e, which a j^arty chooses to 
 tender.' For example, the contents of a written iiistninient which 
 is lost cannot be proved by means of a copy, until it be shown that 
 such copy is accurate. If, as frequently hapjteuH, a party to flio 
 huit has himself made a copy of a letter which he has sent t(i his 
 iidverhary, this copy, should the adversary, after notice to do so, 
 refuse to produce the original letter, cannot bo read in evidence, 
 unless tlm party who made it can swear to its accuracy, or some 
 (itlicr witness can be called who has compared it with the original." 
 Neither can a document, — excepting in a \{>ry lew cases by 
 
 ' '1 
 
 ' Auto, § 130, oml post, §§ 15:H, Wvlde, 1n;h. 
 
 I."i4.), l.")!)8 et HO(j. » Kvcriiifflmin v. l{()mi(lill, 1H,)8 
 
 ' l><)(i r. HoHH, 1840 (Lfl. AMnpor). (Alili tmoii, U.). 
 
 ' TliiiiHton 1. SliitfonM'OO; Muc- • FiNlicr i. Samiiilu. IHdS (I,d. 
 
 iluiipil I'. Vomif;, IN'Jd. KIU'iiImuouj^Ii). Hut Hi'o Waldy v. 
 
 • S.M, 2 Uusa. C. & M. 893; 11. v. (hay, 1N7.^ (Hacou, V.-O.). 
 
 357 
 

 i: H, 
 
 
 \>- 
 
 ■J': 
 
 t ' 
 
 ' ■ ^! ■ 
 
 ■'' ' 
 i 
 
 |i 
 
 COPIES OK C0PIK8 INAI)MI88IHIiK. 
 
 [I'AIM' II. 
 
 Btatutory authority, — bo provo<l by tlio i)ro(luction of tlio cojiy 
 of a copy.' Suoh ovidonce is rejoi-tod on tho broad ground wliii li 
 rendunt honrxay ovidonce inadnuHHiblo, for asHuniing tho scM-und 
 copy to corrt'Hpond exiictly with tho firnt, tho iirHt muHt b« pmduci'il 
 and proved to have been eonjparod with tho original, or ofhtTwisn 
 thoro would bo notbing to hIiow that tho sucond copy and tlio 
 original wcro identical. Such eviduuco would iu faut bo but tho 
 bIuuIiiw of a hIuuIo. 
 
 S /ioiJA. Wo have now diwjUHsod iu full tho four great riilon 
 governing the jjroduction of testimony, which are : (i.) that the 
 evidence muHt correspond with the issue — a nde which has necessi- 
 tiitcd as iucidciutal to it tho consideration of " variances" and of 
 "ann iidiiients ;" — (ii.) that tho evidence must bo confined to flio 
 point in issue; (iii.) that tho burden of ])roof always lies u|hmi the 
 ]mrty who substantially asflcrts tho allirniativo — a rule as suli- 
 sidiary to which the subjects of tho "Right to Ucgin," and " lJi>,'ht 
 to Ikcply " have been necessarily considered — ; and (iv.) that tlie 
 best evidenco must always bo produced — tho subjects of "Secon- 
 dary Evidence" beijig rendered adiuissibh^ (1) as to ilociiniciits, 
 by means of "Notices to Produce," i^c., and (J) as to oral evi- 
 dence by depositions, «&o., having been tieatud of us arising out of, 
 and in connection with, this fourth rule. 
 
 S .OO'Jii. The general rules governing tht* production of testimony 
 having been thus explained fully, we may now usefully pass on to 
 the next jiart of our 8ubjt!ct, which will bo to uonsider tho parti- 
 cular kinds of ovidenco. 
 
 ' liicbiuuu V. i'ooloy, IHlU (lA. KUunburoiigli) ; Kvoringhtiiu v, IluuudoU, 
 18U8. 
 
 358 
 
 It 
 
CHAl*. IV.J 
 
 AMKUK'AN NOTKS. 
 
 AM Kill CAN NoTKS. 
 
 3r»H' 
 
 Best Evidence. — Tt is oxtri'iut'Iv ilduhtl'iil wliftlior any nilo so 
 |tliil(»s(»|iliiral ami ^jcrnTal exists in tin- Kii;^'lisii law of i'\ iilincf as 
 tliiit "the Ix'St ovidcMicc, oT wliidi tlio case in its nature is siiseep- 
 tilile, slidiilil always 1>.' [irvseiileil ti> tlie jury," if liy this is meant 
 
 tliat. (itliiT evidence is ex»;liideil. Tliat it would I 
 
 le \V( 
 
 11 
 
 as 
 
 rule of imlulpMiee tliat evidenee hIiouI)! he admitted in all cases it' 
 it is tint best tlial tin* nature of the actual situation |icniiils. |i>r 
 example, lieaisay statements of a deceased |ieisoii, is a |iosilioii in 
 favor of wliicli iiimdi mi;,'lit he urf^ed. Hut neitlier as a rule of 
 reiiuireiiieiit or of imhilj,'etiee, doe.s the rule exist that the lust 
 eviileiiee (d' which the case is capalde is to he j,'iven. It is (piite 
 |iossiiili' to trace in the devcdopment of the law (d eviden<'e lioth 
 the feidini,', oii the part of jud!,'es, that tho hest evideiiou must 
 lie j^ivcM and tliat evidence should he received, il', »./• nnrssltnfr n i , 
 it is the hest that can hu olTered, Uut luithei" jiulioy has hecomo 
 cHtahlished into a rule. 
 
 Diiriii!,' the (dose (d' the sixteenth and for the major jmrf of the 
 seventeenth ci'iituiy, a formative peri<id in the law (d evidence, 
 the elTort was persistently made to determine all exclusions and 
 admissions hy this stain 
 
 ilard. 
 
 The earlier American cases, as niij,dit he expected, follow these 
 Hta;.{es id' devtdiipment (d' the "hest evKiciice" rule in I'.iij,dami hy 
 insistint; on the rule in its wider scope. 
 
 So held that conviction <d' larceny could not he shown hy pand 
 to impeach a witness tveii if the court records had lieen lU Iroycd 
 hy the hurninj,' (d the court house, since it was the iluty of t lu- 
 ll istrict attorney i.i send a certifii-ate "f the conviction to the Court 
 of Kxcheipier, and that certificate wa-- ■higher and hetter procd." 
 Ililts I'. Colvin, II .{(diiis. IH'J {1S17). So where an exenipliticd 
 cojiy of tlie jud.i,'nient can he ohtaiiicd, "neither the records them- 
 selves, nor minutes, should ever he rccnved, 'vheii copies can he 
 ohtained, unless there is some stronj; reason for ilispensint,' with the 
 usual and appropriate evidence." Lowry c. ("ady, I \'l. otU ( IS.'!!'). 
 Sii«di "stroiij,' reason" w.is coiisidcied to exist where i he pid'^Mueiit 
 was in l7S.'t "in a new and frontier County Court at the close (d' 
 the revolutionary war, at a time and in ii place where we may 
 lu'csume the reciu'ds were made and kept in a slovenly manner." 
 
 Walker c. <trienlee, 'A Hawk 
 
 .'HI (1,S1>.|). The l.iilii of 
 
 ceased cannot ht! proved hy witnesses while the rei,'ister of the 
 hirth is not accoinited for. M.irti^'an v. Iideinatioiial. \'c., Society, 
 S L. Can. Jiir. l'(i;; (I.SC.;!). It will he; ohserved that many (d tiiese 
 eases hear <iii tin? Vfjrnfa i/uiiesflo of de;.,'rei s in secondary evideiiee. 
 So the {ionllary of tho "hest eyidonco " rule — that the hest 
 
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 hr i 
 
 evidence "^vhich it is possible to olTer will be received — has been 
 laid down in broad terms, Tims the court of appeals of New 
 York: "It is a universal rule, founded in necessity, that the host 
 evidence of which the nature of the case admits is always receiv- 
 able." McKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 200 (1800). 
 
 It is not surprising that survivals are found, even in recent 
 times. 
 
 On an indictment for larceny of a hog the son of the owner was 
 not allowed to testify that his father had not consented to the 
 taking. "The best evidence of non-consent was that of the owner 
 himself; and before secondary evidence as to that fact was admis- 
 sible a reason should have been shown satisfactorily accounting 
 for the non-production of the best evidence." Smith v. State, 
 l.T Tex. App. 507 (1883). But the later development of the law 
 has rejected the "Best Evidence" rule in its sweeping form, both 
 as a rule of indulgence and as one of requirement. 
 
 The strict rules of evidence are relaxed on the ground of impos- 
 sibility of other proof than that excluded only in specified instances. 
 For example, " The rule excluding hearsay evidence applies with 
 full force notwithstanding no better evidence is to be found, and 
 though it be certain, if the account is rejected, that no other can 
 possibly be obtained." Reeves v. State, 7 Tex. App. 27() (1879). 
 
 Certainly there is at present no rule which requires, except in 
 certain specified cases, that weaker evidence cannot be received 
 where stronger is available. If a party, for any reason, presents 
 a case of inherent weakness, either on account of the nature of the 
 proof presented or because an unfavorable inference arises from 
 the apparent suppression of better evidence, probably no rule of 
 law is broken. 
 
 The official character of an individual may be shown by his 
 openly acting in that capacity as well as by jjroduction of a com- 
 mission or ap])ointment. U. 8. v. Keyburn, I'eters, 352, 307 
 (1832); Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 04, 70 (1827). 
 
 A promissory note may be used to prove a fact, though it is c(m- 
 tradicted by a recital in a deed. Magee v. Burcli, i08 ]\Io. 3.")() 
 (1891). Any person may state what the op|)osite party said on a 
 ])revious occasion in court, though, the evidence has been taken 
 down by a stenographer, and no attempt is made to account for 
 failure to produce his notes. Briee v. Miller, 35 S. C. 537 (1891). 
 
 The defence that cortain machines sold do not comjdy witli a 
 warranty mny be established by the results of certain tests made 
 by the vendor; though the defendants have themselves made no 
 attemi)ts to ]mt the machines into actual use. "It is obvious that 
 tlie well-known rule of law to which the learned judge who tried 
 the case called the attention of the jury has no just ai)plication 
 to the case on trial. Its purpose is to recpiire parties to deal 
 
 ^ 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AMEUK'AN NOTKS. 
 
 358^ 
 
 irankly with court and juries, to produce the best evidence in thfir 
 possession or control at the time of the trial, and it' it apjiears (hu- 
 iu" the trial that the party has in his possession, or under liis 
 control, evidence which is better in quality than that wliicii is pro- 
 duced, it is tlie duty of the court to direct tlie jury, in effect, to dis- 
 regard the evidence produced, and to take into consideration tlie 
 attempted fraud." Baker, D. J., in U. S. Sugar llehnery r. E. P. 
 AUis Co. oG Fed. Rep. TSG (1893). '-The testimony of the chemist 
 who has analyzed blood, and that of the observer wlio has merely 
 recognized it, belong to the same legal grade of evidence; and 
 though tlie one may be entitled to much greater weight than the 
 other with the jury, the exclusion of either would be illegal." 
 People V. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y. 49 (ISGG). 
 
 ISo a witness can testify even if better witnesses could have been 
 produced. " One who can testify under any circumstances upon 
 the facts on wliich he is examined, may do so as well wliere h^s 
 superiors are to be found as where he knows as much as any other." 
 KUiott V. Van Pureii, 33 Mich. 40 (1875). In the same way, on 
 an indictment for selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, the minor 
 was allowed to testify to his minority, though better evidence, in 
 tlie persons of his father and mother, was available, and an 
 instruction to the effect that such evidence was not "the best evi- 
 dence of which the case will admit " was held correctly refused. 
 "It is perhaps true that the evidence of the minor may not be so 
 satisfactory, as to the fact, as the evidence of tlie failn-r or mother, 
 or some other person ])resent at his birth — ■ still, his statement on 
 oath as to his age, should be received and permitted to go to the 
 jury as evidence, to have such weight as it is entitled to have, 
 under the circumstances. ... It is true, it is a rule of evidence, 
 that, the best evidence of which the case, in its nature, is suscep- 
 tilile, sliouhl be required. Put still, when there is no substitution 
 of evidence, but only a selection of the weaker instead of the 
 stronger proofs, or ai» omission to supply all the i)roofs ca[)able of 
 being ])roduced, the rule is not infringed." State /•. Cain, ',) W. 
 Va. 559, 5G9 (187G). Where a document from the comptroller's 
 office was ])roduce(l, in the absence of the comptroller, by a witness 
 to whom he had left the keys of his office, it was objected that the 
 comptroller himself was the best evidence, and so tliat offered was 
 iiia(lmissil)le. Held: — unsound. "The rule that the best evidence 
 ill the jiarty's power or possession shall be produced, does not apply 
 in this case, for that rule only applies to grades of evidence. Oral 
 evidence shall not be received when tliere is written, a copy when 
 the origimil can be hail." (Jovernor v. Koberts, 2 Hawks, L'G (1S22). 
 The dithculties of applying the "best evidence" rule to the ex- 
 tent contended for are thus set out. " If the rule was, that the 
 most full and satisfactory evidence should l)e produccil, it would 
 
il'- . 
 
 ri;- ;- 
 
 IhTii r .■ M 
 
 358* 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 follow that where it appeared there were others present, they 
 siiould also bo produced, or where a person from his situation had 
 a better view of the transaction; one who liad a less favoural)le 
 position should not be received, or where it appears that anotlier 
 could give a more detailed account of the affair, one who could 
 not give so full a one should be excluded , although there may be 
 no doubt as to his knowledge of the facts to which he deposes." 
 Ibhl. 
 
 To prove the incarceration of a prisoner the sheriff who took him 
 there is a competent witness, though the warden, keeping a record 
 of the terms, &c., of prisoners, would be a better one. "If the 
 marriage or birth of the prisoners had been wanted as introductory 
 to evidence of the crime charged, it would scarcely be argued that 
 a witness, who was present at the birth or marriage, was incompe- 
 tent to prove it, because a registry existed. In questions of iden- 
 tity, records and registries are not the best evidence, for after the 
 entries in them are received it is necessary to individuate the per- 
 sons mentioned, and this must be done by evidence dehors the doc- 
 ument." liowser V. Com. 51 Pa. St. 332 (1805). Evidence is 
 admissible that a tumbler contained intoxicating liquor without 
 producing the liquor or accounting for its absence. Com. v. Welch, 
 142 Mass. 473 (1886). The condition of clothes may be described 
 though no reason is given for not producing them. To hold other- 
 wise would require real evidence in all cases where it would be 
 possible. Com. v. Pope, 103 Mass. 440 (1809). And yet it has 
 been held that testimony was admissible that certain parts of a 
 broken machine fitted each other, though the machine was present 
 in court and could have been examined by the jury. Congtlon v. 
 Howe Scale Co., CC Vt. 255 (1894). 
 
 In proving what was done in buying and selling oil through 
 agents at distant points under telegraphic orders, the principal is 
 a competent witness, though better evidence could very probably 
 be given by the agents who effected the transactions. 
 
 " In requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to 
 each particular fact, it is meant thnt no evidence shall be received 
 whicli is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original 
 evidence can be had. The rule excludes only that evidence which 
 itself indicates tlie existence of more original sources of informa- 
 tion ; but where there is no substitution of evidence, but only a 
 selection of weaker instead of stronger proofs, or an omission to 
 supjdy all the i)roofs capable of being produced, the rule is not 
 impinged." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa. St. 
 442 (1889); Richardson v. Milburn, 17 Md. G7 (18G0). "It may 
 bo weaker than other evidence which might be attained, teiuling 
 to prove the same fact; but the niere selection of weaker, nstead 
 of stronger proofs, will not justify the exclusion of the weaker. 
 
 
 m 
 
iil 
 i'M 
 
 €HAP. IV.] 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 358» 
 
 liiM^ 
 
 when it is, in its nature, primary and riilevant." McCreary r. 
 Turk, 29 Ala. 244 (185(5). To prove percolation, the jjlaintiff is 
 not called upon to go to the expense of an uncertain experiment 
 of ditching. Crozer v. New Chester Water Co., 148 Pa. St. 130 
 (1892). 
 
 Where the making of certain statements is in issue as the basis 
 of conduct, one who heard them may testify to them, although the 
 party who made them might himself have been called as a witness. 
 Jiadger v. Story, 16 N. H. 1G8 (1844); Featherman v. Miller, 45 
 I'a. St. 96 (1863). Or tlie statements are in writing. State r. 
 Seymore (la.), 63 N. W. G61 (1895). The age of a person may 
 be shown by witnesses, though there is a record of the birth in a 
 family Bible. State r. Woods, 49 Kans. 237 (1892). 
 
 To the contrary effect, i.e., that a witness with inferior know- 
 ledge cannot be called, while a better witness is available, see 
 Parliman v. Young, 2 Dak. 175 (1879). 
 
 SuiiSTiTUTioxAKY Evn>?:xoE. — There seems no doubt, however, 
 that merely substitutionary evidence will be rejected, or, if received, 
 will be so counterbalanced by the inference of fraud caused by the 
 suppression of the superior evidence as to possess little, if any, 
 resultant of probative force. This proceeds upon the line of 
 thought embodied in the maxim, " Omnia contra spoUatorem" 
 and has been considered in that connection. See ante, p. 183'-*. 
 There seems but slight practical advantage in formulating the 
 " best evidence " rule to cover the same ground already covered by 
 this presumption. 
 
 In Holmes v. Coryell, 58 Tex. 680 (1883) the court cite with 
 approval an extract from 1 Greenl. Evid. 82. " This rule does not 
 demand the greatest amount of evidence which can possibly be 
 given of any fact; bat its design is to prevent the inti eduction of 
 any which, from the nature of the case, supposes that better evi- 
 dence is in the possession of the party. ... In requiring the best 
 evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant that no 
 evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its 
 nature, so long as the original evidence can be had. The rule only 
 excludes that evidence which itself indicates the existence of more 
 original sources of information." 
 
 On the principle of ouiiiia contra spoJiatorcm, the unfavorable 
 inference wliich arises from failure to produce witnesses who know 
 the entire facts, while putting forward those who know less, is both 
 logically and legally obvious. As the court say on an indictment 
 for keeping a gaming house, where several persons present at the 
 time of the raid were in attendance at the trial and not called as 
 witnesses, " Had there been any reply to be made to the inculpa- 
 tory evidence produced by the state, it was clearly in the power of 
 the accused to answer that evidence ; and his failure to do so, 
 
 11* 
 
358« 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 notwithstanding liis ample opportunity, could well be considered by 
 the jury as adding strength and force to the prima facln ease niadt; 
 out by the state. He introduced other witnesses who did not know 
 the material facts, but carefully avoided introducing those who did 
 know them. ' Where a party being apprised of the evidence to he 
 adduced against him has the means of explanation or refutation in 
 his power if the charge or claim against him be unfounded, and does 
 not explain or refute that evidence, the strongest presumption arises 
 that the charge is true or the claim well-founded, it would be 
 contrary to all experience of human nature and conduct to come to 
 any other conclusion.' 1 Stark Evid. 545." Stevenson v. State, 
 83 Ga. 575 (18S9). 
 
 " The jury may draw unfavorable inferences from a party's failure 
 to call witnesses who have knowledge of material facts." Wimer r. 
 Smith, 22 Oreg. 400 (1892). 
 
 " Any failure to do this could hardly happen without some motive, 
 and in the absence of any other being shown, the almost irresistible 
 conclusion would be that he feared at least the witness would not 
 support his other testimony, and thus have the effect to create 
 more or less doubt and discredit of such party's case." Seward i\ 
 Garlin, 33 Vt. 584 (18G1) ; Whitney c. I'.ayley, 4 All. 173 (1SG2); 
 Baldwin v. Whitcomb, 71 Mo. 651 (1880). 
 
 The modern objection to substitution lies in the bad faith to the 
 tribunal implied in suppressing better evidence Avhile offering an 
 inferior quality, presumably less injurious to him who declines to 
 produce the more conclusive. " For if it appear from the very 
 nature of the transaction, that there is better evidence of tlie facts 
 proposed to be proved, which is withheld, a presumption arises that 
 the party has some secret and sinister moti\e for not producing the 
 best and most satisfactory evidence, and is conscious that if the 
 best were to be afforded, his object would be frustrated." Hart n. 
 Yunt, 1 Watts, 253 (1832). 
 
 Facts showing that the evidence is not substitutionary but that 
 some good excuse exists for not producing the better evidence, 
 are admissible, witi; the effect of admitting the evidence otlierwise 
 excluded. Smith c. State, 13 Tex. App. 507 (1883) ; INlark v. Hast- 
 ings (Ala.), 13 So. Rei). 297 (1893) ; Crozer v. New Chester Water 
 Co. 148 Pa. St. 130 (1892). 
 
 What evidence is substitutionary depends upon the circumstances 
 of each particular case. It by no means follows because more con- 
 clusive evidence is possible that a party is withholding and suppress- 
 ing it because, if ))roduced, it would injure his case. A reasonable 
 construction of the situation is adopted. 
 
 " The rules of evidence are adopted for practical purposes in the 
 administration of justice ; and although it is laid down in the books 
 as a general rule, that the best evidence the nature of the case will 
 
 -f ■ I 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AMERICAN N0TP:S. 
 
 3r)8" 
 
 admit of, must be given ; yet it is not understood that this rule 
 requires the strongest possible assurance of the matter in question.'' 
 Minor v. Tillotson, 7 Teters, 99 (1833). The existence of a judg- 
 ment cannot be shown by the parol statement of the creditor. It 
 " implies that there is better evidence of its existence than mere 
 testimony can be." McNeill r. Donohue, 44 111. App. 42 (lfS91). 
 
 Wkittkx Instki'MKNTs. — The rule excluding substitutionary 
 evidence has its most rigid and invariable application where tlie 
 substitution attempted ',is that of secondary or inferior evidence of 
 tlio contents of a written instrument for the primary evidence of 
 the instrument itself. J'robably the rule (and it was a most natural 
 beginning of the entire " best evidence " rule) concerned itself at 
 first with sealed instruments, and was connected withtlie rules regu- 
 lating /ii-'ifcrf, wliich required the actual production of the very in- 
 strument set up in tlie pleadings. The reasons requiringyy/v;/r// and 
 the nature of the acceptable excuses are forcibly and (piaintly set 
 forth by Lord Coke. " And therefore it appears, that it is (huigerous 
 to suffer any who by the law in pleading ouglit to shew the deed 
 itself to the court, upon the general issue to prove in eviilenee to a 
 jury by witnesses that tliere was such a deed, which they liave lieard 
 and read ; or to prove it by a copy ; for the viciousness, rasures, or 
 interlineations, or other imperfections in these cases, will not ap[)ear 
 totliecourt; or peradventure the deed may be ui)on condition, limi- 
 tation, with power of revocation, and by this v/ay truth and justice, 
 and the true reason of the common law would be subverted. But yet 
 in great and notorious extremities, as by casualty of lire, that all his 
 evidences were burned in his house, tliere if that should apjiear 
 to the Judges, they may, in favour of him who has so great a loss 
 by fire, suffer him upon the general issue to i>rove the deed in 
 evidence to the jury by witnesses, tiuit affliction be not added to 
 aitiiction ; and if the jury find it, altliough it be not sltewed fortli 
 in evidence, it shall be good enough." Doctor Leyfield's Case, 10 
 Co. Kep. 88, 92 (KilO). 
 
 Tlie transition from tlie production of the document as a matter 
 of procedure to its use as evidence and the broadening of the rule 
 from sealed to written instruments probably ])roved easy. 
 
 Still, as late as 1797 tlie common hiw rule obtained in New Jersey 
 that jealed instruments went with the jury to their consultation 
 room as of right, while otlier written documents went only by con- 
 sent or order of court. State r. Kaymond, ,W X. J. 200 (1891). 
 
 IMoDKKN " Bkst Evidexc'k " RvLK. — At jiresent tlie rule re(piir- 
 ing the best evidence is practically limited in scope to requiring 
 proof of the contents of a written instrument by the primary 
 evidence of the instrument itself until a sufficient excuse has been 
 shown for allowing secondary evidence. 
 
 " The term ' best evidence ' is confined to cases where the law has 
 
M 
 
 
 I 
 1(1 
 
 3588 
 
 AAIKIirCAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 divided testimony into primary and secondary. And there are no 
 degrees of evidence except where some document or other instrii- 
 inont exists, the contents of which sliould be proved by an original 
 ratlier tlian by otiier testimony which is open to danger of inaccu- 
 racy." Elliott r. Van Buren, :V,i Midi. 49 (1875). 
 
 Even a cortiiied copy of a deeu is not admissible until the party 
 offering shows that the original is not in his possession or control. 
 Plienix, &c. Ins. Co. v. Merchants, &c. Assoc, 51 111. App. 471) 
 (18!)3). 
 
 When it appears that the party offering evidence of an inferior 
 grade is not suppressing evidence, but is offering the best he has, 
 such proof is received. So where the minutes of a parish meeting 
 were never extended on the records of the parish, they may be 
 proved by parol. AVallace v. Townsend, 109 j\Iass. 2G3 (1872). 
 
 The preliminary inquiry when secondary evidence is offered of 
 the contents of a written document is Avhether the party ottering it 
 is suppressing the primary evidence. Has he the original document 
 in his possession or control, and, if not, could he by reasonable care 
 and diligence have procured it ? 
 
 " liefore, therefore, testimony of an inferior grade is iiermitted to 
 be adduced, the court to whoin the preliminary enquiry is addressed, 
 will require satisfactory pkoof, that better evidence is ifot voluntarily 
 withheld." ]\Iordecai v. Beal, 8 Porter, 529 (1839); Morrison y. 
 Jackson, 35 S. C. 311 (1891). 
 
 The rule excludes even press copies. The originals must first be 
 accounted for. State v. Halstead, 73 la. 376 (1887) ; Marsh v. 
 Hand, Ho Ud. 123 (1871). 
 
 " A letterpress cojjy is not an original. It in no wise differs from 
 anj' other accurate copy than in the mode in which it is made ; ann 
 it can be used in the place of the original in no case Avhere a proved 
 copy, made in another manner, would not' be equally admissible." 
 King r. Worthington, 73 111. 161 (1874); Foot v. Bentley, 44 X. Y. 
 166 (1870); Wackins v. Paine, 57 Ga. 50 (1876). 
 
 The contention that such copies are always admissible is queried 
 in Gilbert r. Moline Plow Co., 119 U. S. 491 (1880). Press copies, 
 however, are admissible upon proof that the original letters were 
 duly sent by course of mail, and that the sendee has made diligent 
 and fruitless search for tiiem. Powell v. Wallace, 44 Kans. 650 
 (1890). 
 
 Tiie onus is on the party offering secondary evidence to 
 establish a satisfactory excuse. This he may do in one of three 
 ways, according as the original is ((() presumably in his own 
 ])ossession, (f>) presumably in that of tlio adverse party, ('•) presum- 
 ably in the hands of a third party. 
 
 DiLKiicxT Skaucii — (ft) Owii Posst'ssion. If the document, when 
 last seen, was in his own possession or control, a party offering 
 
CIIAI'. IV.] 
 
 AMKHICAX N'>TP:S. 
 
 858» 
 
 sooondary evidence of the same must show diligent search in all 
 places where the document might fairly be expected to be, and 
 that suoli a search, pursued for a reasonable period, has been fruit- 
 less. J'hilliiis r. Trowbridge Furniture Co., 8(5 Ga. G<.»!» (1S;)(»); 
 Wing '•• Abbott, 28 Me. 3G7 (1848); I'errin r. State, 81 Wis. 135 
 {IS'.tL') ; Sebree v. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 558 (1824) ; Hart /•. Yunt, 1 Watts, 
 2.".3 (1832) ; Susquehanna &c. Ins. Co. v. Mardorf, 152 Pa. St. 22 
 (181)2); Roberts v. Dixon, 50 Kans. 430 (1893); Putnam v. Goodall, 
 31 N. H. 419 (1855); Danforth v. Tennessee, &c. K. K. 09 Ala. 331 
 (1S92). 
 
 Where court papers were taken from the files, and traced through 
 several successive attorneys for the plaintiff to one who said that he 
 had never seen them, he/d that a sufficient basis had been laid for 
 the introduction by the plaintiff of secondary evidence. Carr v. 
 Jliner, 42 111. 179 (18C6). 
 
 lieasonable diligence in search is the test applied. Where an 
 ancient deed was sought among the other similar papers of the 
 owner of the Ian. 1,' without effect and no other place of search ap- 
 peared, secondary evidence was admitted. " If any suspicion hangs 
 over the instrument, or that it is designedly withheld ; a more rigid 
 inquiry should be made into the reasons for its non-produetion. 
 l^ut when there is no such suspicion, all that ought to be required 
 is reasonable diligence to obtain the original." Minor v. Tillotson, 
 7 Peters, 99 (1833). Where the written resolution of a board of 
 directors was not found, on due search, in the office of the recorder 
 of deeds, nor in that of the receiver or of the attorney for the 
 assignee, who had received the assets prior to the receiver, but 
 neither the secretary, president, or assignee of the conipany were 
 produced or their depositions taken, held, that no sufficient foun- 
 dation had been laid for the admission of secondary evidence. 
 Mullanphy Savings Bank v. Schott, 135 111. 655 (1891). 
 
 "It must be proven — that a diligent, unsuccessful search has 
 been made for it in all places where it is likely to be." Bascom v. 
 Toner, 5 Ind. App. 229 (1892) ; Darrow v. Pie'-ce, 91 Mich. 03 (1892) ; 
 Smith /•. Allen, 112 N. C. 223 (1893). " We agree that the rule of 
 law which requires the best evidence within the power or control of 
 the ])arty to be produced should not be relaxed, and that the court 
 should be satisfisd th.at the better evidence has not been wilfully 
 destnyad nor voluntarily withheld. Put the rule on the subject 
 does not exact that the loss or destruction of the document of evi- 
 dence should be proved beyond all possibility of a mistake. It only 
 demands that a moral certainty shoidd exist that the court has had 
 every opportunity for examining and deciding the cause upon the 
 best evidence within the power or ability of the litigant." U. S. /'. 
 Sutter, 21 How. 170, 175 (1858); Pullman v. Parr, 54 Kans. G43 
 (1895); Mark v. Hastings, 13 So. (Ala.) 297 (1893); Brooke v. 
 
 I ' 
 
il .i! 
 
 
 il 
 
 i I 
 
 tli 
 
 35810 
 
 AMKIUCAN NOTICS. 
 
 [I'AIIT 111. 
 
 Jordan, l4 Mont. .37;") (1894). It is not sufRcient tliiit a present 
 court stenographor could not find the notes of a former stenoyruplier. 
 Siisquelianiia Ins. ("o. i: Mardorf, \r>2 Pa. St. '22 (18!)2). 
 
 Amount ok 1'kook. — " Tlio amount of ovideiKte required to 
 prove tlie loss of a written instrunuuit, for the jjiirpose of admittin-^' 
 secondary evidence of its contents, depends, in a great measure 
 upon the nature of the instrument and tlie cinuimstanees of tlie 
 case. . . . Thus, it is obvious, tiiat the same evidence ought not to 
 be required, to prove the loss of a promissory note, after the deiit 
 had been paid, and tlie note taken up by the maker, as would be 
 requisite to establisii the loss of a deed, uiuler winch a party claimed 
 title. For, it is not usual to preserve instruments of the fornu'r 
 character, after the debts which they represent iiave been jjaid ; 
 while title deeds are generally kept with care." Waller c. Klevenih 
 School District, 22 Conn. 320 (1853); Wiseman r. Northern I'ac. 
 n. H., 20 Oreg. 425 (18<»1). 
 
 Slight search will be sufficient for a subscription paper which had 
 become of no value, because the amount on which the obligation was 
 conditional had not been raised. " It ndght then be treated as mere 
 waste paper." AValler v. Eleventh School District, 22 Conn. .'32(5 
 (1853). 
 
 AV'here the record of a judgment of a deceased justice of the 
 peace was lost, secondary evidence of its contents was not admissible 
 in the absence of evidence of inquiry among the family of the 
 deceased. Wing ;•. Abbott, 28 Me. 3G7 (1848). " To entitle a party 
 to give parol evidence of the contents of a paper alleged to be 
 lost, it is incumbent upon him to show that a diligent and careful 
 search was made at the proper places and by the proper persons, 
 and that it could not be fouiul. It is not enough to give sonu^ evi- 
 dence of it.j loss, but he must give such evidence as will satisfy the 
 court that the proper foundation for the admission of secondary 
 evidence has been laid. Where a 2)aper which the law requires to 
 be filed and kept by a i)ublic officer as part of the records or papers 
 of his office, is alleged to be lost, the court has a right to require, 
 before recfeiving parol evidence of its contents, that careful and dili- 
 gent search was made in the office, and by o\.a so fully acquainted 
 with the offi(!e, records and papers as to make it probable that if 
 the paper was in the office he would find it.'' Howe v. Fleming, 
 123 lud. 262 (1889). 
 
 A search at the Dead Letter Office will not be recuired in case of 
 a missing letter, in the absence of evidence that such a search would 
 lirobably be successful. Williams r. Grey, 23 C. V. U. C. 501 (1874). 
 
 There must be proof '"that there has been diligent search and 
 inquiry made of the proper person and in the proper place for the 
 lost deed; that the loss must be proved, if possible, by the person 
 in whose custody it was at the time of the loss, if such person be 
 
 iiltl 
 
CHAP. 
 
 .v.] 
 
 AMKiaCAN NOTKH. 
 
 3')8>» 
 
 living; and if dead, application should hu made to his representatives 
 and search made ainoiij^ the documents of deceased.'' Trimble r. 
 Kdsvards, 84 Tex. 4<J7 (1892); Tibbals v. ItHaml, 10 Wasli. t.-)! 
 
 (istir.). 
 
 If siudi search is not made among tiie effects of the deceased 
 possessor of the document, secondary evidence is inadmissible. 
 Adkins ('. (Jalbraith (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. L".)l (ISOo). 
 
 If such search is made, evidence of contents of a deed is adniissi- 
 ble, "even in the absence of certificates showing tlie projjer execution 
 of tlie original." Van (Junden /•. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., oli 
 Fell. Rep. 838 (189-). " Tlio courts have never attempted to detint; 
 the precise degree of diligence essential to be shown in the effort to 
 ])roduce a written instrument in order to render admissible parol 
 evidence of its contents. But it would seem to be sutfi(!ient if the 
 party offering such proof has in good faith exhausted all the sources 
 and means of discovery which the nature of the case would suggest, 
 and which are accessible to him." Baldwin v. i'>urt, 43 Neb. 'Ji~} 
 (1895). 
 
 (Jooi) Faith fob tiik Coi-ht. — The degree of proof of good 
 faith in the searcli for tlie primary evidence is addressed to the 
 sound discretion of the court. 
 
 " What shall constitute this satisfac<"nry proof, to authorize the 
 introduction of secondary evidence, cannot easily be reduced to any 
 lixed rule; it is addressed to the discretion of the court, to be 
 governed by the circumstances of the case." Mordecai v. Boal, 8 
 I'orter, 029 (1839); ^Morrison r. Jackson, 35 S. C. 311 (1891); 
 (iorgas V. Hertz, loO Pa. St. 538 (1892) ; Bain v. Walsh. 85 Me. 108 
 (1892); Williams v. Grey, 23 C. P. U. C. 5G1 (1874); Stratton r. 
 Hawks, 43 Kans. 53S (i.S90); Elwell w. Mersick, Tx Conn. 272 
 (1882); Kleinmann /•. (Jieselmann, 114 Mo. 437 (1893) .tin r. 
 
 Bowie, 37 S. C. 102 (1892); Brooke *•. Jordan, 14 Mon : 1894). 
 
 "The finding of the presiding judge upon preliminar\ ^U' ais of 
 fact material to the competency of evidence at the trial are not open 
 to revision in this court." Stevens r. Miles, 142 Mass. 571 (188G). 
 
 The discretion of the trial court is final, unless it has been abused. 
 Howe /•. Fleming, 123 Ind. 202 (1889). "His determination of the 
 fact cannot be reviewed here, unless the ])roof of loss was so clear 
 and conclusive that it was error of law to find against it." Kearney 
 r. .Mayor &c. of New York, 92 N. Y. 017 (1883). 
 
 There seems to be an abiise in exercising this discretion when 
 secondary evidence is admitted of an instrument alleged to be lost 
 where the witness, in whose custody it has been, testifies that, after 
 an hour's search, he is unable to find it. but thinks it must be among 
 his papers, and that, by further search, lie might possibly find it. 
 Wilburn v. State, 60 Ark, 141 (1895). 
 
 "Whether there was sufficient evidence of the loss of the assigu- 
 
 \b\ 
 
ill' 
 
 iii^ 
 
 :5r)8i2 
 
 AMKinCAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 luent of which secondary evidoiico was admitted, was a question nl' 
 fact for the presidiDj; jiidf,'e. Unless his finding was based updn an 
 error of hiw, or upon evidence wliiidi, us matter of hiw, was iusnlli- 
 eient to sustain tiie Hndin;,', it would not hero be open to revision." 
 Snutii i: lirown, lol Mass. IVJS (l.S!)(»). 
 
 Unt while the preliminary iiKpiiry necessary to the introduetioii 
 of secondary evidence is addressed to the discretion of tiu; couit, 
 yet all the evidencie admitted is for the consideration of tlii; jin v. 
 "The adnnssibility of the evidence was a question for the court, but 
 its weight aiul effect, when taken in connection with other facts in 
 the case, was a question for the jury, and should be left to tlieir 
 consideration and judgment." Graham v. Campbell, o() Ga. LTiS 
 (l.S7(i). 
 
 What IxsTurMKN-rs auk [ncmioko. — Where the regidations of 
 a railroad company are printed in a book, which is not produced or 
 accounted for, parol evidence is not adnii.ssibh>. riouisville, ^r. It. It. 
 /'. Orr, 1)4 Ala. OOU (18U1) ; Trice v. Uichuu)nd, &c. 11. 11. oS S. (,'. 
 lUl) (lS!t2). 
 
 The rule applies to books of original entry, orders, drafts, &(^ 
 McCrady i-. .Jones, JJG S. C. 1;5(! (181H). To books of account, liiu 
 Mfg. Co. /•. Townsend, oO ill. Api). o.j.S (18'.);)). To tinu' books, 
 Dillon V. Howe, 1)8 Mich. I(i8 ( LSIKI). To the books of a bank, Itodcii 
 /•. Hrown (Ala.), lo So. liep. 5SJ8 (1894). To an ordinary messa-e, 
 if contained in a written note. Combs r. Com. (Ky.), -o .So. West. 
 590 (1894). 
 
 The fact of a complaint to the assessors of taxes can only lie 
 shown by their record and not by the testimony of one of tlu'ir 
 number. State >\ Central, &c. R. 11. 17 Nev. 259 (188;}). 
 
 Where dying declarations are reduced to writing they (lonie under 
 the application of the rule. Bouldeu r. State, 102 Ala. 78 (I89.'i). 
 
 The rule under consideration applies to ancient documents e(iually 
 with others. McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 I'a. St. l.'J (1808). 
 
 So as to docu'uents refreshing memory. Dillon r. Howe, 98 Mich. 
 108 (181);}). 
 
 So to the heading of a hotel register. Grauloy n. Jermyn, 10;i I'a. 
 St. .501 (1894). And to proof of a foreign law. Ennis v. Smith, 
 14 How. 400,420 (1852). 
 
 So of entries in corporation books and papers. Mandel v. Swan 
 Land Co., l.")4 HI. 177 (1895). 
 
 If the authority to draw a bill of excliango is itself in writing, it 
 must be produced. Tensley i>. Penniman, 83 Tex. 54 (1892). 
 
 A certified copy of a registered deed is not admissible until notice 
 has been given the grantee to ])roduce tlic original. Com. v. Emery, 
 2 Gray, 80 (1854). But a plaintiff who has never had the original 
 deeds in her possession may introduce such a copy. Be Assignment 
 of Ilea, 82 la. 231 (1891). 
 
CIIAI'. IV.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 r,r.si:« 
 
 Wliftlicr t.lit' oriyiiiiil is in tiin possession or control of the party 
 oIL'rin;^ i', copy is iupiestioii fur the court, iiell v, Kendrick, 1'.') Khi. 
 77.S (1^8!)). 
 
 JJi;(jiii:i:s i.\ Skconoauy Eviok-vck. — The rule re(piirinj,' prodl' 
 of ii written instrument liy tiie production of tlie instrnnieiit ilsell', 
 ))r;u!tie;dly the solitary survival of ii once swei-piii,!,' '* hest evidence" 
 rule, retains in many jurisdictions much of tlie old-time strictness 
 of tht^ oriifinal. It is required tiiat i!ven when secrondary eviih'uee 
 is admissil)le an inferior deyree or grade of secondary cividenci; sliail 
 not he re(!eived while it is in th(! power of the party to present ;i 
 hi;^dier jj;i'ad(! of tins secondar}' proof. 
 
 Suidi is tlie recpiiremeiit in the (iourts of the United States. 
 
 Where th(! ori,!,dnal record of a jud,^meut and .i certilied eojjy 
 of tiie same hail hotii been destroyed by lire, a certilied copy (d' tins 
 iirst co|)y was lield udnussible. ''Tlie principle established by 
 this court as to siH'.ondary evidence in cases like tins is, tliat it 
 must be the best the l)arty has it in his power to produce. The 
 rule is to be so applied as to promote the ends of justice and guard 
 against fraud, surprise aiul imposition. . . . This court has not 
 yet gone the length of the ICnglish adjudications, which hold, 
 without qualification, that there are no degrees in secondary 
 evidence." Cornett i>. Williams, L'O Wall. 220, 240 (lS7a). 15ut in 
 llenner i\ IJank, 9 Wheat. oSl (1S24) it was held that in i)roving a 
 lost note a notarial copy was not nuiuired, — "it not being neces- 
 sary that a promissory note should be protested." [h'ul.\ Stebbins /•. 
 Duncan, 1(KS U. S. 32, 43 (1882). Apparently the courts of Crcorgia 
 adopt a similar view. Where, a blank form of a bill of sale of 
 furniture on the instalment plan was offered with evidence that the 
 contract between the parties was made by tilling out a similar blank, 
 the evidence was rejec^ted. "The {iroper foundation was not laiil 
 for the introduction of this paper. One of the originals which had 
 been executed should have been introduced, if obtainable. If none 
 could be obtained from the original parties, or a certified copy of 
 the same from the record, in case they had been recorded, then, 
 perliai)s, the paper presented might have been admissible." Phillips 
 i\ 1^'owbridge Furniture Co., H6 Ga. GO:) (1890). 
 
 So in Louisiana, where re(u)rd of a copy of a marriage contract 
 was admitted although neither the absence of the original was 
 accounted for or any evidence offered that a copy of the original 
 could not be procured, the judgment was reversed. " The objection 
 embodied an elementary principle found in every work on evidence, 
 and so completely consecrated by established jurisprudence as to 
 dispense with any citation of authorities to support it." Mercier i\ 
 Harnan, 39 La. Ann. 94 (1887). 
 
 So in Arkansas, Steward v. Scott, 57 Ark. lo3 (1893) ; and Cali- 
 fornia, Ford V. Cunningham, 87 Cal. 209 (1890). 
 
:5.")S>« 
 
 AMEIJIOAN' XOTKS. 
 
 [PAItT III. 
 
 A modified insistance on degrees in secondary proof prevails in 
 Alabama. '• While the doetrine, that there are no degrees in secoiid- 
 ar}- evidence has 'lot prevailed to its fullest extent, in this State, we 
 are not prepared to adopt a stringent extension of the rule, which 
 excludes all seconilary. until the absence of the primary evidence is 
 ju'CouDted for, to secondary evidence. Where the secondary evi- 
 dence offered, »*j^ nnfnnt rei, supposes a higher degree of secondary 
 evidence, the liest should be produced. ' But, where there is no 
 ground ff>r legal presumption that better secondary evideniie exists, 
 any proof is received, which is not inadmissible by other rules of 
 law, unless the objecting party can show that better evidence was 
 previously known to the othei-, and might have been produced; thus 
 subjecting him, by positive pioof, to the same imputation of fraud. 
 which the law itself presumes when primary evidence is withheld.' 
 When a certified or examined copy of a paper reruired to be recorded, 
 or a letter-press copy of a writing, is shown to be in existence, it is 
 better evidence than the memoriter statements of a witness, and 
 its pio<luction should be demanded." Jaques v. Horton, 70 Ala. 
 l.';J8 (!Sh4). 
 
 •• We confess that the American rule appears to us more reason- 
 able than the English ; and we see great propriety, if there was an 
 examined copy of an instrument in the possession of a party, in 
 refusing to allow him to prove it by the uncertain memory of wit- 
 nesses. A copy of a letter, taken by a copying press would unques- 
 tionably be lietter evidence of the original than the recollection of 
 its contents by a witness; and the same reasons which would require 
 the production of the original, if in the control of the party, would 
 openite in favor of the production of the fac-simile, or of tlie 
 examined copy. But, in all these cases, the strength, of the proposi- 
 tion consists in the fact, that there is secondary evidence, in its 
 nature and character better than that which the party offers, and 
 that it is in his power to produce it. He certainly must be allowed 
 to .show, that what a[>pears to be secondary evidence of a higher 
 degree is not so in fact. In other words, he would be allowed to 
 show that the paper, wliii-h ])urported to bo a copy, was not in fact 
 a-.. 1 in truth one." Harvey i'. Thorp. 2S Ala. '2r,0 (ISaG). 
 
 'J"h.- courts of Georgia insist upon the existence of degrees in 
 secondary evidene.-. '• There are degrees in secondary evidence, and 
 the best' .should always be produced. ... A sworn copy sliould 
 always be reeeiveil in preference to verbal testimony, to jirove the 
 contents of a written contract." Williams r. Waters, oG (la. i'ti 
 (lsn7L 
 
 Tiie rule is the same in Tllinois. It appearing i.robable tliat tliere 
 is in existence a copy of a lost will, parol evidence of contents is 
 not admi-ssible until the non-production of the copy is account-nl for. 
 liliuois. &c. Co. r. I'.onner, 75 111. 31") (1H74). 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 M 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 35815 
 
 The rule is the same in Peunsylvania. Parol evidence of the 
 contents of a letter is not admissible while a facsimile (in a letter- 
 jiress copying book) is not produced or accounted for. Stevenson c. 
 ]I(.y, 43ra. St. 191 (1802). 
 
 The courts of Minnesota do not ap{)ly iie rule that there are 
 degrees in secondary evidence to cases where "tlie nature of the 
 case does not of itself disclose the existence of such better evi- 
 dence." Minneapolis Times Co. v. Nimocks, 53 Minn. 381 (1893). 
 
 On the contrary, it is held in many states that, when the sources 
 of original evidence are exhausted, the contents of the instrument 
 in question may be proved by any competent evidence. 
 
 Among these states is Massachusetts. "When the source of 
 original evidence is exhausted, and resort is properly liad to second- 
 ary proof, the contents of private writings may be proved like any 
 other fact, by indirect evidence. The admissibility of evidence 
 offered for this purpose must depend upon its legitimate tendency 
 to prove the facts sought to be proved, and not u\)on the compara- 
 tive weight or value of one or another form of proof." Goodrich *•. 
 Weston, lOU Mass. 3(52 (18()9). " If there are several sources of 
 information of the same fact, it is not ordinarily necessary to show 
 that all have been exhausted before secondary evidence can be 
 resorted to." Smith v. Brown, lol Mass. 338 (1890). Maine fol- 
 lows the same rule. Xason c. Jordan, 02 Me. 481) (1873). 
 
 The rule in Indiana is the same. " There are no degrees, as a 
 general rule, in secondary evidence." Carpenter ;•. Dame, 10 Ind. 
 125 (1858). 
 
 Ami New York. A copy of a letterpress copy is admissible after 
 notice to the other side, in whose possession it is, to produce the 
 original letter. Robertson r. Lynch, 18 Johns. 451 (1821). 
 
 In New Jersey. Ketcham i\ Brooks, 27 N. J. E(i. .147 (1870). 
 
 In Connecticut. " The rule that a copy of a copy is not evidence, 
 properly applies to cases where the original is still in existence and 
 capable of being compared with it; or where it is the copy of a 
 copy of a record, the record being still in existence, and being by 
 law as high evidence as the original. TIu; reason of the ruh' is the 
 same in both cases, the copy offered is two removes from the original. 
 But it is quite a different (piestion where the original is lost, and the 
 record is not deemed in law ;i» liif^h as the original." Cameron r. 
 Pet'.k, 37 Conn. 555 (1871). 
 
 TKLKditAMs. — Skcon'dakv Evidk.vck. — The single point of 
 difference, so far as relates to primary and secondary proof of con- 
 tents, between telegrams and other written instruments, lies in the 
 fact that there are frequently two written instruments in each trans- 
 mission of intelligence; — viz., the document delivered to the 
 transmitting oftice and that delivered to the sendee by tlie receiving 
 ottice. Which of these two instruments is the on'i/iiKil document 
 
35816 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part in. 
 
 
 !l 
 
 it . 
 
 it 
 
 'illlli 
 
 within the meaning of the rule under consideration is, under tlie 
 weight of authority, determined by the rules governing the law of 
 agency. 
 
 " When the sender of a telegraphic message takes the initiative, 
 the message, as delivered, may, as between him and the person to 
 wiiom it is sent, be treated as the original, in the absence of evi- 
 dence to show mistake in the transmission of it." Nickerson v, 
 Spindell, 164 Mass. 25 (1895); Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 
 (187(5); Durkee v. Vermont Central K. R., 29 Vt. 127 (185G) ; Mor- 
 gan i\ People, 59 111. 58 (1871) ; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Asso- 
 ciation r. Hutmacher, 127 111. 652 (1889) ; Western Union Telegraph 
 Co. V. Shotter, 71 Ga. 760 (1883) ; Wilson v. Minneapolis, &c. R. R. 
 31 Minn. 481 (1884) ; Morgan v. People, 59 111. 58 (1871) ; Magie v. 
 Herman, 50 Minn. 424 (1892). 
 
 To the contrary effect, that the original in all cases is the message 
 delivered at the transmitting office, see Matteson i: Noyes, 25 111. 
 591 (1861) ; Williams v. Brickell, 37 Miss. 682 (1859). 
 
 It is necessary in some way to show that "the alleged sender did 
 actually send or authorize to be sent the dispatches in question." 
 Oregon Steamship Co. v. Otis, 100 N. Y. 446 (1885). 
 
 This evidence may frequently be found in the telegram, signed by 
 the party himself or his agent, i. p., the copy delivered to tlie com- 
 pany. Ihld. Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138 (1880). 
 
 For the rule to apply at all, it is essential to show that the tele- 
 grams were in writing instead of being delivered ortiUy, many 
 telegrams being communicated to the transmitting office in that 
 way. Terre Haute, &c. R. R. i-. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98 (1888). "In 
 proving a contract entered into in such a manner, it would, I appre- 
 hend, be necessary to produce the original communication^ with the 
 proper signatures of the parties, and tho tranoinission over the wires 
 migiit then be admitted as the means of informing them of the 
 proposition on one side and the acceptance on the other." Kiiig- 
 horne v. Montreal Telegraph Co., 18 Q. B. U. C. 60, 71 (1859). 
 
 Where the person who afterwards becomes the sendee of a tele- 
 gram, requests an answer by telegraph, the telegra])h company 
 becomes the agent of the sendee, and the original is the message as 
 delivered to the telegraph company at the transmitting office. " But 
 where the party to whom the communication is made is to take the 
 risk of transmission, tlie message delivered to the operator is the 
 original, and that is to be produced, or the nearest approach to it by 
 way of copy or otherwise." Durkee v. Vermont Central R. R. 29 
 Vt.' 127 (1856) : Smith /•. Easton, 54 Md. 138 (1880). 
 
 The rules governing the admission of secondary evidence in the 
 case of telegrams are the same as obtain in connection with other 
 written instruments. Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 (1876); 
 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Collins, 45 Kan. 88 (1890); 
 
 (18[ 
 
iff 
 
 CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTK8. 
 
 3.')817 
 
 Prather /•. Wilkens, C8 Tex. 187 (1887) ; Howley r. Whipple, 48 
 K. IT. 487 (1869) ; State v. Hopkins, 50 Vt. 316 (1877) ; Lindauer r. 
 ?*Ieyber-,', 27 Mo. App. 181 (1887) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. 
 V. Cline, 8 Iiul. App. 364 (1893). , 
 
 There is no question that a telephone message may be proved by 
 the oral evidence of the sendee. Wilson v. Minneapolis, &c. li. K. 
 31 Minn. 481 (1884). 
 
 Wlien parol evidence is admissible as to the contents of a written 
 instrument it is naturally confined to such portions of the instru- 
 ment as would be relevant if the instrument itself were produced. 
 It is no objection to the competency of a witness that he cannot 
 state the immaterial portion of a letter. McGibbon v. Burpee, 25 
 New Bruns. 81 (1885). 
 
 Admissions as Pkoof of Contexts. — Whether an admission 
 by a party otherwise entitled to insist upon primary proof of con- 
 tents by production of the original, regarding the contents of a 
 written instrument is such a levamen j)robationls as to dispense with 
 the proof of such contents is in dispute. 
 
 That an admission does have that effect, see Wolf v. Lachman 
 (Tex. Civ. App.), 20 S. West. 867 (1892); Loomis v. Wadhams, 8 
 Gray, 557 (1857) ; Hoefling v. Hambleton, 84 Tex. 517 (1892) ; 
 IVIorey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 542 (1893). 
 
 So of the contents of a telegram, as admitted by the sender. 
 Williams v. Brickell, 37 Miss. 682 (1859). 
 
 To the contrary, see Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480 
 (1832). " The admissions of a party are competent evidence against 
 himself only in cases where parol evidence would be admissible to 
 establish the same facts, or in other words, where there is not, in 
 the judgment of the law, higher and better evidence in existence to 
 be produced." Jbicl. 
 
 Production of written receipts is not excused by the fact that a 
 third party has made a memorandum of them to the accuracy of which 
 the party demanding primary proof has assented. Hart v. Yunt, 1 
 Watts, 253 (1832). 
 
 In New Jersey the rule prevails that while an ordinary admission 
 does not have the effect of relieving tln' adverse party from the 
 necessity of proving the contents of a written instrument, a " formal 
 and solemn" admission has been "ever regarded as intrinsically 
 possessing all the force of primary evidence." C'v:.berland, &c. 
 Ins. Co. ('. Giltinan, 48 X. J. Law, 4i)5 (1886). 
 
 The rule requiring primary evidence of contents is not dispensed 
 with in favor of a holder in a suit against tlie maker on a promissory 
 note by the fact that under a statute the defendant is not entitled to 
 dispute his signature, having filed no aflidavit to that effect. Seebree 
 V. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 558 (1824). 
 
 (i) Papers in Adverse Possession. — If the original document 
 
 I ' ; i 1 
 
 f 
 

 Stat I'. 
 
 
 
 ^1 
 
 ' <4 
 
 ' I It 
 
 358^8 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT HI. 
 
 is in the possession of the adverse party, liis failure to produce it, 
 upon being seasonably requested so to do, will be regarded as sufK- 
 cient proof that the party is not suppressing evidence to let in 
 secondary evidence of contents. Steed r. Knowles, 97 Ala. aT.'J 
 (1891.'); Roberts v. Dixon, 50 Kans. 436 (1893); Coftman (-.Niagara 
 &c. Ins. Co., 57 Mo. Ap. 647 (1S94) ; Morse v. Woodworth, la"* Mass. 
 L'3;?, L'4.S (1892). Or to his attorney. Den v. M'Allister, 7 N. J. Law, 
 46, r)3 (1823). This is sntticient even where there was no evidence 
 that tlie original had never been in the hands of the defendant, but 
 was traced into the liands of his attorney through his connection 
 with another case. Ib!(/. " Hut such notice may be dispensed with 
 upon proof that such party has said that such writing has been lost 
 or destroyed. . . . The law nowhere requires the doing of an 
 obviously nugatory and unavailing act." Barniby v. riunimer, 29 
 Neb. (14 (1890) ; U. S. tf. T.ritton, 2 Mason, 464 (1822). 
 
 So win-re from the nature of the action the diifentlant has notice 
 that the plaintiff intends to cliarge him with the possession of a 
 written instrument, e. g., a notice in writing, formal notice to pro- 
 duce is not required. Railway Co. v. Cronin, .38 Oh. St. 122 (1882) ; 
 Ho\\ell r. Ilnyck, 2 Abb. App. Cases, 423 (1867). 
 
 In a criminal case, where an oii_;inal instrument is in the posses- 
 sion of the accused, apparently notice to produce is excused. The 
 court will not compel him to furnish evidence against himself. 
 State V. Gnrnee, 14 Kans. Ill (1874). See also Dunbar n. U. S., 156 
 U. S. 185 (1894). 
 
 An admission by the defendant that he wrote a letter which he 
 refuses to produce on notice is sufficient to admit secondary evi- 
 dence of its contents. Dunbar v. U. S., 156 U. S. 185 (1894). 
 
 Wiiere tlie defendant puts in part of a letter wliich he has 
 received from the plaintiff, but which the plaintiff claims is muti- 
 lated, the plaintiff can give parol evidence of the mutilated portion 
 without ii, notice to produce given to the defendant. Robinson v. 
 Cutter, 163 Mass. 377 (1895). 
 
 A seasonable notice must be given. A notice given on the same 
 day as the copy was received in evidence, the opposite attorneys dis- 
 claiming any knowledge of the original, has been held insufficient. 
 Pitt V. Emmons, 92 Mich. 542 (1892). 
 
 So a notice to attorneys to produce papers which are in a distant 
 state must be sufficiently extended to permit the originals to be 
 found and produced if secondary evidence is to be received. Dade 
 V. .Etna Ins. Co., 54 Minn. 336"(1893). 
 
 Less extended notice may be sufficient where the party in whose 
 possession they are, in view of their relation to the case or their 
 use in former hearings, has reason to expect that the originals will 
 be called for. Battaglia r. Thomas, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 563 (1893). 
 
 If tlui instrument is within the control of a party it is tlie same 
 
 in 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 SoS'" 
 
 thing as if in his possession. '• If a party has the legal right to the 
 possession of a document, iu a legal sense it is witliiu liis control, 
 though he may have left it with an agent or other person, from 
 whom he has a right to receive it by demanding its possession." 
 Wilson V. Wright, 8 Utah, 215 (1892). 
 
 W^iere the defendant, on being requested to produce certain 
 written receipts, excuses their non-production by claiming that a 
 third party refuses to surrender them, he cannot afterwards intro- 
 duce parol evidence of their contents if the judge finds that, in 
 point of fact, the defendant has attempted to suppress the written 
 receipts. " A party who has suppressed a written document, and 
 refused to produce it upon notice, and so compelled the adverse 
 party to resort to secondary evidence thereof, is not afterwards 
 entitled to offer proof of its contents." Gage v. Campbell, 131 
 Mass. 566 (1881). 
 
 Mere failure to produce a written document on notice, where a 
 reasonable excuse exists, will not prevent the party on whom the 
 demand was made from proving its contents by secondary evidence. 
 Spears v. Lawrence, 10 Wash. 308 (1894). 
 
 (c) Possession in a Strangkk. — I: the document itself is pre- 
 sumably in the possession of a tliird party, reasonable efforts to 
 procure his attendance as a witness, with the document, will be 
 required in order to admit secondary evidence of contents. Greer 
 V. Richardson Drug Co., 1 Tex. Civ. App. 034 (1892). 
 
 Where the document is in the hands of a tliird person outside the 
 reach of the process of the court, production is excused. Cabot i\ 
 Given, 45 Me. 144 (1858): Mordecai v. Beal, 8 Porter. 529, 536 
 (1839); Pensecola K. R. v. Schaffer, 70 Ala. 233 (1884) ; Beattie o. 
 Milliard, 55 X. H. 428 (1875); Missouri, &c. E. R. v. Gernan, 84 
 Tex. 141 (1892); Burton v. Driggs, 20 W^all. 125 (1873); Gordon v. 
 Searing, 8 Cal. 49 (1857); Zellerbach v. Allenberg, 99 Cal. 57 
 (1893); Brown ?,'. Wood, 19 IV^o. 475(1854); Shepard r. Giddings, 
 22 Conn. 282 (1853) ; Ralph v. Brown, 3 W. & S. 395 (1842). When 
 the residence of the holders of an instrument is beyond the jurisdic- 
 tion of the court, the instrument is presumably out of the jurisdiction. 
 Manning v. Maroney, 87 Ala. 563 (1888). 
 
 But see Mullanphy Savings Bank i\ Schott, 135 III. 055 (1891). 
 where, upon the original paper being traced into the probable 
 possession of persons outside the jurisdiction, the court suggest that 
 "Although all three were either non-residents or out of the state at 
 the time of the hearing, yet no reason is perceived why tlieir testi- 
 mony could not have been taken." " It has repeatedly been held 
 that the person last known to have been in possession of the pa[)er 
 must be examined as a witness, to prove its loss, and that even if he 
 is out of the State, his deposition must be procured if practicable, or 
 some good excuse given for not doing so." Kearney v. Mayor, &c., 
 
 ^^ \"' 
 
 \u 
 
1' 
 
 I IhHBI 
 
 I ' ■ 
 
 1 1 
 
 'i 
 
 1 
 
 ! 
 
 1 
 
 jL till 
 
 35820 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III, 
 
 92 N. Y. 617 (1883). "The law provides an easy and simple 
 method of taking the deposition of a witness residing out of the 
 state, and his deposition should have been taken, or some proper 
 effort made to obtain it. Tlie fact that the person to whose posses- 
 sion the paper was traced resided out of the state, did not excuse 
 defendant from a diligent effort to procure it." Wiseman v. North- 
 ern Pacific K. R., 20 Oreg. 425 (1891); Wood v. Oullen, 13 Minn. 
 394 (1868) i McGregor v. Montgomery, 4 Pa. St. 237 (1846) ; Porter 
 V. Hale, 23 Can. Sup. 265 (1894). 
 
 But if the party having the custody of the original is out of the 
 state, and on being asked to give a deposition refuses in the interest 
 of the opposite party to surrender the original, secondary evidence 
 is competent. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer, 52 Minn. 
 174 (1893). 
 
 If an original deed is in a foreign court, which declines to permit 
 its removal, a copy is admissible. Owers v. Olathe Co. (Colo.), 39 
 Pac. Rep. 980 (1895). 
 
 The suggestion that parol evidence is substitutionary and offered 
 in bad faith instead of written evidence, and to avoid its effect, pre- 
 sents itself in a most incisive form when it appears that the ^jriginal 
 has been voluntarily and intentionally destroyed by the party offer- 
 ing the parol evidence. Under such circumstances the party is not 
 allowed to offer secondary evidence. ]»agley ■«. Mc^Mickle, 9 Cal. 
 430 (1858) ; Count Joannes v. Bennett, 5 All. 169 (18o2) j Rudolph 
 V. Lane, 57 Ind. 115 (1877). 
 
 So where original documents are destroyed by the plaintiff after 
 the commencement of the suit. Baldwin v. Threlkeld, 8 Ind. App. 
 312 (1893). 
 
 Where the destruction is by accident or in good faith, parol 
 evidence of concents is competent. Pollock v. Willcox, 68 N. C. 46 
 (1873) ; Steele v. Lord, 70 N. Y. 280 (1877). But the party destroy- 
 ing must repel every inference of a fraudulent design in its destruc- 
 tion. Blake v. Fasii. 44 111. 302 (1867). 
 
 Mere negligence ir not fatal to the right to introduce secondary 
 evidence. Rodgers v. Crook, 97 Ala. 722 (1892). 
 
 The rule requiring the contents of a written instrument to be 
 proved by tlie production of the instrument itself, does not apply 
 when the only fact to be proved is tliat of the execution of the 
 instrument. " Here the suit was not on the paper : its contents had 
 nothing to do with the case." Shocnberger v. Hackman, 37 Pa. St. 
 87 (1860). "The rule that excludes secondary evidence in aeon- 
 test with primary, does not mean that everything is secondary which 
 is not of the highest grade of proof, but only that which discloses 
 the existence of other evidence, .the non-production of which may 
 be supposed to be on the ground that if jiroduced would work 
 against tlie party offering it." Ibid. So wherever tlie effort is to 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AMERICAN N(^TES. 
 
 85821 
 
 prove the existence of a fact which may be shown by a writiiifr, 
 parol evidence of the same fact is not rejected. For example, " If 
 a person acts notorionsly as cashier of a bank, and is recognised by 
 the directors, or by the corporation, as an existing officer, a regular 
 appointment will be presumed : and his acts, as cashier, will bind the 
 corporation, although no written proof is or can be adduced of his 
 appointment." Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. G4, 70 
 (1827). So where it is sought to prove, not the conteiits of ceitaiu 
 depusi*'.io'.is, but sim])ly the fact that they were ])roperly taken and 
 used in a previous suit between the same parties toucliing the same 
 subject-matter, this may be done by parol. Ayers v. Ohisum, 3 New 
 jMex. 52 (1884). In a case involving the foreclosure of a mortgage 
 by notices posted, objection was made to evidence of the posting of 
 these notices on the ground that they were in writing and should have 
 been produced. Held otherwise. "The rule requiring the produc- 
 tion of the writing itself as the best evidence does not extend to 
 mere notices or to matters collateral." McMillan v. Baxley, 112 
 N. C. 578 (1893). So tlie substantive fact that proofs of loss had 
 been made and delivered under an insurance policy may be proved 
 by parol. "The thing to be proved, tlierefore, was not what was 
 contained in the written proofs of loss but tlie fact that such written 
 proofs of loss had been furnished to the company within the pre- 
 scribed time." Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Sun Fire Office, 36 S. C. 213 
 (1891). A witness may state that he had a mortgage, began a suit 
 to foreclose it, and took a deed of the same j)roperty, although the 
 record could also be used to prove them. File v. Springel, 132 Lid. 
 312 (1892). A witness may testify that he received orders from the 
 Post Office Department to demand certain things of a defaulter, 
 though these orders were in writing. " The question did not call 
 for the contents of the orders." Alexander i\ U. S., 57 Fed. Rep. 
 82S (1893). So evidence is admissible that a defendant applied in 
 writing for a government liquor license, though the application is 
 not produced. State v. McGill, 65 Vt. 604 (1893). In an action 
 against a railroad company for failure to carry a theatrical company 
 to their destination on time, the plaintiff may testify that he was to 
 receive 75 per cent, of the box receipts, tliougli the agreement estab- 
 lishing this share was in writing. Foster v. Cleveland, &c. R. R., 
 56 Fed. Rep. 434 (1893). 
 
 On an action for failure to deliver a telegraph message, parol evi- 
 dence of the contents of the message as delivered and received is 
 admissible. " That a certain message was delivered for transmission 
 was a substantive fact necessary to be proved, and the rule is, that 
 when parol evidence is as near the fact testified to as the written, 
 then each is primar; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cliue, 8 
 
 Ind. App. 364 (1893). 
 
 In refusing to apply the best evidence rule so as to exclude parol 
 
 f 
 
35823 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAllT HI. 
 
 m 
 
 evidence that A was not mentioned in a certain will not directly 
 involved in tlie case itself, the Supreme Court of Alabama say: 
 " The question was not owe directly raised by the issue in the cause, 
 but came up incidentally. In such case, the rule requiring the 
 highest and best evidence the nature of the question admits of does 
 not apply." Bulger v. lloss, 98 Ala. 207 (1891-0. 
 
 A party may testify to the payment of money though a receipt 
 was taken at the same time. Davis v. Htate, d2 Tenn. 034 (1893). 
 
 In an action on an account for rent or use and occupation, the 
 plaintiff can recover on proof of an admission that the account is 
 correct and due notwithstanding the defendant has taken a written 
 lease of the premises from the plaintiff, and this lease is neither 
 produced nor any attempt made to account for it. Burch v. Harrell, 
 93 Ga. 719 (1894)., 
 
 Parol proof of the identity and character of an instrument not 
 produced will be admitted. The " best evidence " rule applies only 
 to proof of ""ontents. Morrison v, Jackson, 35 S. C. 311 (1891). 
 On a complaint brought under the laws regulating the sale of intoxi- 
 cating liquor, evidence is competent as to what was written on 
 labels attached to jugs and decanters in the defendant's shop, with- 
 out producing them, or accounting for their not being produced. 
 "The labelr on the jugs do not come within any class of written 
 instruments, the contents of which cannot be proved without pro- 
 ducing the original paper or document, or accounting for its loss or 
 unavoidable absence," Com. v. Blood, 11 Gray, 74 (1858). 
 
 ScoPK OF KuLE. — The rule requiring production of the primary 
 evidence of the contents of a written instrument applifj; ouly when 
 the instrument in question is admissible itself because relevant to 
 the issue. It does not extend to the use of written instruments in 
 incidental or collateral matters. " This rule has never been unuor- 
 stood to extend to matters aside from the issue and merely inci- 
 dental to the trial. Thus, the interest of a witness, and similar 
 concerns, could alw^tys be shown without the production of the 
 document by force -of which such interest had been acquired."' 
 Cumberland, &c. Ins. Co. v. Giltinan, 48 X. J. Lav., 495 (1880). 
 "The general rule has no application where the written instrument 
 is merely collateral to the issue ; as where the parol evidence relates 
 to matters distinct from the instrument of writing, although the 
 same fact could be proved or disproved by the writing," Coonrod v. 
 IMadden, 120 Ind. 197 (1890) ; Schoenbergcr v. Hackman, 37 Pa. St. 
 87 (1800), 
 
 But it has been held that a witness cannot be questioned about a 
 copy of a statement until the non-production of the original is 
 accounted for. Glen Brick Co, v. Shackell, 14 Low. Can. Jur. 238 
 (1870). Or allowed to refresli his memory by a copy of a deed until 
 the original has beea accounted for. Jones v. Jones, 94 N, C. Ill 
 (1880). 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 358 » 
 
 Parol evidence of contents cannot be given until proof is offered 
 tliat the original, if itself produced, would be competent. The con- 
 tents of a letter suppf^"ed to have h'H'.n written by the prosecuting 
 witness in a bastardy complaint cannot be proved until some evi- 
 dence is adduced that she wrote the letter itself. Stevens v. State, 
 ."»() Kaus. 712 (1893). A lease cannot be proved by parol until the 
 subscribing witness is produced. Hughes r. Southern Warehouse 
 Co., 94 Ala. 613 (1891). 
 
 In case of i)arol proof of the contents of a lost will ; " Unless 
 che whole can be proved, his intention will not be effectuated, and 
 therefore no part of the will can be established." Davis v. Sigour- 
 ney, 8 Aletc. 487 (1844). But that a certain instrument is a copy 
 of a will and that the will was properlv executed may be ])roved by 
 parol. Keagle v. Pessell, 91 :\[ich. Gil (1892). 
 
 The rule above stated does not extend so far as to forbid other 
 evidence of the fuct which the written instrument would establish. 
 Consaul w. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247 (1892). So where a certain sum 
 of money was paid and a receipt taken therefor, the evidence of a 
 witness who saw the sum of money paid is competent, even if the 
 same witness would not be allowed, until a suitable foundation was 
 laid, to state the contents of the receipt. " The difference between 
 the two principles consists in this : Tue payment of the money was 
 a fact testified to independent of the receipt, and was capable of 
 parol proof. But when the witness went further and stated that he 
 saw a receipt for the money signed, he undertook to give the con- 
 tt-Mits of the receipt, and the receipt itself was the better evidence." 
 Steed V. Knowles, 97 Ala. 573 (1892) ; Hyde v. Shank, 03 ]Mic]i. 535 
 (1892). ^nvnership in a vessel may be shown by acts of ownership 
 ecjually well as by the ship's register. Stearns v. Doe, 12 Gray, 482 
 (185'J). A horse-car conductor may testify to the number of his 
 passengers on a particular trip though his slip is not produced. 
 Wynu r. City, &c. R. II. 91 Ga. 344 (1893). 
 
 But see also Coder r. Stotts, 51 Ivans. 382 (1893). 
 
 '1 he rule does not apply wliere a written document is used to 
 '■test the temper and credibility of the witness." Klein v. Russell, 
 19 Wall. 4;5.'5, 4.".9, 4G4 (1873). 
 
 A j)hGtographic copy will not excuse faihun; to produce the 
 original. Maclean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214 (1853). 
 
 Dui'LicATKS. — The rule also does not apply to the case of dupli- 
 cate originals. In sucli case, each of the duplicates is admissible, 
 not as a copy but as an original. Crurdner r. Eberliart, 82 111. 31G 
 (1S7G). 
 
 There is no obligation to account for the absence of the other- 
 (lu])licates or any of them. Cleveland, ccc. R. R. r. Perkins, 17' 
 Mich. 29G (18G8). 
 
 Where two letters are written at the same time, one being retained 
 
 i I I I' 
 
iii 
 
 m 
 
 ar)8'-^ 
 
 AMKinCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [PAIST III. 
 
 and till! other sent, tiu-, one rotained is not a cojiy but a dii])lie!itt' 
 origind, and is adniissiljlo without notit^u to ])roduce the otlicr 
 ori,u;inal. JTubhai'd r. Hussell, 'J I Harb. 4(»4 (1857). 
 
 When a paper is made out in duplicate and one of the originals is 
 lost and the other in the hands of the pers . -d of a criminal 
 
 offence, a copy is admissible, as the court cai.w. . jnipel the prisoner 
 to put in the other original against himself. State r. (iurniK', 14 
 Kans. Ill (1S74). 
 
 So wiiere a bill of lading was executed in duplicate, the plaintiff. 
 to prove the contents by secondary evideiu;e, must satisfactorily 
 account for the non-production of both originals. When the jilain- 
 tiff introduces parol proof of contents, the defendant may n'l)ut 
 the jiroof by (evidence of a similar luiture. Dyer v. Fredericks, (j.') 
 Me. 17.'5, m'2 (1874). 
 
 I'uooK OK (joNTKXTs. — The parol evidence of contents must be 
 confined to an attempt to state th(! language contained in the written 
 instrument. Evidence is not competent of the previous conversation 
 of the parties in relation to what they ])rop()sed to agree in the 
 writing to be drawn ujx llichardson v. Ifobbins, IL'4 ]Mass. 10") 
 (1878)^. 
 
 The language itself is to be given and not evidence as to what 
 the witnesses understood were the propositions made and accepted 
 in the written instrument. Elwell r. Walker, 62 la. 2i")G (1H7!)) ; 
 Burr r. Kase, 108 Va. St. 81 (1895). 
 
 A photograi)iiic reproduction of the original is admissible as 
 secondary evidence. It is merely a cojty and whether a facsimile 
 or not is a (question of fact for the jury. Eborn r. Zimpelman, 47 
 Tex. 503 (1877). 
 
 Depositions. — The law relating to depositions is so largely 
 statutory and so varying in the different states that it appears hardly 
 to admit of profitable attempts at classification. 
 
 lilll 
 
 LI .! 
 
 if f* 
 
PART III. 
 
 PAETICULAR KINDS OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 EVIDENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SENSES. 
 
 § 554. The first degree of evidence, and that which, though 
 open to error and misconception, is obviously most satisfactory to 
 the mind, is afPorded by our own senses.' " Believe half what you 
 yourself see, and a twentieth part of what you hear from others," is 
 a maxim, founded in the main upon the experience of life, marking 
 the vast distinction that obtains between a knowledge of facts 
 derived from actual perception, and the belief of the existence of 
 facts resting on information. In judicial proceedings, the judge 
 or jury can seldom act entirely upon evidence of this description.* 
 In a vast number of instances, however, especially where the fact 
 in dispute is sought to be proved by circumstantial evidence, the 
 verdict will rest materially upon matter submitted to the ocular 
 inspection of the jury. 
 
 § 555. Indeed, in all cases in which the guilt or innocence of a 
 
 ' " Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem, 
 
 Qiiam quai .sunt oculis subjecta lidelibns, et qtiae 
 Ipse sibi tradit spectator." — Uok. Ars I'oct 1. ISO. 
 So, also, in Shakespeare's " Eape of Lucroce," we read, — 
 
 "To see sad sights moves more than hear them told, 
 For then the eye interprets to the oar." 
 
 * Though, when pregnancy is 
 pleaded, a jury of matrons is em- 
 powered to decide the issue upon 
 examination of the jjerson of the 
 prieioner: Bayiiton's Ciise, 1702; 'X, 
 V. Wycherley, 1838. But even here 
 it appears, from the last of the cases 
 
 just cited, that the matrons may, in 
 addition to their personal inspection, 
 hear the evidence of a surgeon ; but 
 in that event he must bo examined 
 as a witness in open court. See, 
 also. Lady Essex's case, 1013. 
 
 359 
 
PRODUCTION OF ARTICLES FOR IDENTIFICATION. [p. HI. 
 
 prisoner depends upon the identity of two articles found in difforent 
 places, it is highly expedient that a direct appeal he made to the 
 senses of the jury, and that the actual articles to be compared should 
 he produced in court. Thus, on an indictment for stealing corn, where 
 the prisoner's possession of wheat, apparently resembling a quantity 
 from which a portion has been recently taken, is relied upon by 
 the prosecution, a comparison by the jury of the wheat found upon 
 the prisoner with a sample of that belonging to the prosecutor, 
 will evidently be more satisfactory than for its identity to be sworn 
 to by a witness, who has examined the two lots out of court. It is 
 true that the jury may come to an erroneous conclusion in such a 
 case ; for either the witnesses, who state that the two parcels of 
 wheat produced were respectively taken from the prisoner and the 
 prosecutor, may intentionally or accidentally assert what is not 
 t''ue. or the jurors themselves may be mistaken in assuming the 
 identity or non-identity of the grain. Still, in the event of a 
 witness being called to state the result of his previous examination 
 of the two samples, these sources of error will both equally exist, 
 while, in the latter case, there is also the further possibility that 
 the witness may tell a fabricated story with little danger, since 
 examination as> io me'^ matters of opinion is almost necessarily 
 inconclusive. Similar considerations arise where it is necessary to 
 compare two articles found in different places ; as, for example, the 
 wadding of a pistol with portions of a torn letter found on the 
 person of the accused ; the fractured bone of a sheep with mutton 
 found in his house ; or fragments of dress with his rent garment ; 
 or to compare damaged property with the instrument by which the 
 damage is supposed to have been effected. 
 
 § 555a. However, the rule which demands the production of the 
 best evidence does not expressly require that the course sug- 
 gested should always be adopted, but permits a witness to testify 
 as to his having made the comparison, without first proving that 
 the articles cannot be produced at the trial. Nevertheless the non- 
 production of articles which could be produced, when unexplained, 
 often generates a suspicion of unfairness, and will always furnish 
 an occasion for serious comment.^ A well-known instance of the 
 
 1 See ante, § 117. 
 360 
 
CHAP. I.] SKILLED WITNESSES AIDING THE JURY. 
 
 application of this principle occurred where a boy having found a 
 diamond, took it to a jeweller, who refused to return it to him, or 
 to produce it at the trial, on which the jury were directed to pre- 
 sume that this diamond was one of the fino5.t water.' Another 
 inHtance of the principle was f urniched by a case ^ in which, the poiut 
 at issue being whether " llunning Rein," a Derby-winner of 1844, 
 had been foaled by " Mab " in 1841, the plaintiff, being unable to 
 comply with an order of the court to produce " llunning Rein," 
 submitted to a nonsuit. 
 
 § 556. In auch cases as these, however, where the personal ex- 
 amination of the articles by the jury themselves is very valuable, 
 they ought, in certain instances, to be assisted by persons conversant 
 with the particular articles produced. For instance, on a question 
 whether two samples of wine be drawn from the same bin, or two 
 pieces of cloth be the produce of the same loom, or two coins be 
 struck in the same die, a wine-merchant, a clothier, or an officer of 
 the Mint,' should respectively be called. Still, even here the 
 articles should be produced, that the jury may test the accuracy of 
 the opinions expressed by the witnesses, and may perceive that 
 the reasons, upon which those opinions are founded, correspond 
 with the actual state and condition of the articles themselves. 
 These observations are especially applicable in compariscms of dis- 
 puted handwriting — the mere fact that an expert ■sfij/.s that two 
 specimens of handwriting are similar or dissimilar is of little value, 
 but becomes of great weight if he can point out to the jury 
 peculiar features of similarity or dissimilarity in them. 
 
 § 557. Though evidence addressed to the senses, if judiciously 
 I'mploycd, is obviously entitled to the greatest weight, care must 
 be taken not to push it beyond its legitimate extent. The minds 
 of jurymen, especially in the remote provinces, are grievously open 
 to prejudices, and the production of a bloody knife, a bludgeon, or 
 a burnt piece of rag, may sometimes, by exciting the passions, or 
 enlisting the sympathies of the jury, lead tlieni to overlook the 
 
 ' Armory v. Delamirie, 1721. 
 
 « Wood V. Poel, 1844, cor. Alder- 
 son, B., MS. 
 
 ' By 24 & 25 V. c. 99 (" The Coin- 
 age Offences Act, 1861"), § 29, in 
 order to prove coin to be counterfeit, 
 
 it is not necessary to call any moneyer 
 or other officer of the Mint, but is 
 sufficient to prove that fact by the 
 evidence of any other credible wit- 
 ness. 
 
 361 
 
\> 
 
 ABUSE OF EVIDENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SENSES, [p. III. 
 
 necessity of proving in what manner these articles are connected 
 with the cr minal or the crime ; and they consequently run no 
 slight risk of arriving at conclusions, which, for want of some 
 link in the evideuce, are by no means warranted by the facts 
 proved- The ab-ose of this kind of evidence has been a fruitful 
 theme for the satirist.^ 
 
 ^ 558. In causes relating to disputed rights of way, light, or 
 water, or otherwise, involving some question which depends on the 
 relative position of places, it is often desirable that the jury should 
 have an opportunity of viewing the spot in controversy ;' since the 
 knowledge derived by these means is far more satisfactory than 
 any obtainable by the mere examination of maps or plans, which 
 are often inaccurate and obscure, and may perhaps have been pre- 
 pared with an express view to mislead. A clause providing 
 machinery to direct a view of the place in question, " where 
 proper, after writ issued by order of the court or a judge," is con- 
 tained in the Jury Act of 1825.' 
 
 § 559. The Act just cited extends to criminal cases depending in 
 the superior court.* In civil actions it, however, extended only to 
 such as those for trespass, quare clausum f regit, ejectment, or 
 
 ' For instance, Shakespeare makes 
 Jack Cade's nobility rest on this foun- 
 dation : for Jack Cade having asserted 
 that the eldettt son of Edmund Mor- 
 timer. Earl of March, "was by a 
 be{rgar wnman stolen away," "be- 
 came a bricklayer when he came to 
 age." and was his fathi-r; one of the 
 rioters wmKniis the story, by say- 
 ing, '• Sir. he made a chimney in 
 my father's house, ai.d the bricks are 
 alive at this day to te>tity it : there- 
 fore, dc'uy it not." — Second Part of 
 Hen. 6. act 4. scene 2, Whately 
 makf« use of the above anecdote in 
 his diverting " llisti>nc Doubts rela- 
 tive to NaiKiIeon Buonaparte," p. 28, 
 6th edit., and adds, " Tmly this evi- 
 dence is such as country people give 
 one for a story of apparitions ; if 
 you disc«iver any signs oi incredulity, 
 they triumphantly show the very 
 house which the ghost haunted, the 
 identioil dark corner where it used 
 to vanish, and perhaps even the tomb- 
 stone of the person whoso death it 
 foretold." So. m the interesting story 
 
 of "The Amber Witch" ("Amber 
 Witch," translated by Lady Duff 
 Gordon, pp. 78—80), the poor girl 
 charged with witchcraft. — after com- 
 plaining that she was the victim of the 
 sheriff, who wished to do "wanton- 
 ness with her," — added, that he had 
 come to her dungeon the night be- 
 fore for that purpose, and had 
 struggled with her, " wh(>rouj)on 
 she hud screamed aloud, and had 
 scratched him across the nose, as 
 might vet be seen, whereupon he 
 had left her." To this the Dhoriff 
 replied, " that it was his little 
 lap-dog, called Below, which had 
 scratched him, while he ])layed with 
 it that very morning," ami having 
 produced the, d' ;/, the Court were 
 satisfied with the truth of his ex- 
 planation. 
 
 * For an early in'-tance of this 
 being ordered, see Monsani v. Ivy, 
 1(W4. 
 
 3 6 0. 4, c. 50, §§ 23, 24 ("The 
 Juries Act, 1825 "). 
 
 * See Id. 
 
 362 
 
 n 
 
 '''^^■\m 
 
 M 
 
CUAP. I.J OliUEli TO INSFI'XT PKOl'liRTY IN DISPUTB. 
 
 waste.' The cumbrous machinery it provided having been first 
 iraprovei],^ the narrow construction placed upon this Act led' to 
 its being practically superseded, so far as regards civil causes, by 
 § 58 of the C. L. P. Act, 1654.'' 
 
 § 560. The last-named is itself now repealed,* and the law ou 
 the subject, so far as concerns civil cases, is governed by the 
 R. S. C, 1883, Ord. L. Rule 3 of this Order, in general terms, 
 gives the court or a judge power, upon the application of any party 
 to a cause or matter, and upon such terms as may be just, to make 
 any order for the detention, preservation, or inxprction of any property 
 or thing, being the subject of such cause or matter, or as to which 
 any question may arise therein, and for all or any of the purposes 
 aforesaid to authorise any persons to enter upon or into any land 
 or building in the possession of any party to such cause or matter, 
 and for all or any of the purposes aforesaid to authorise any 
 samples to be taken, or any observation to be made or experiment 
 to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose 
 of obtaining full information or evidence. Rule 4 of the same 
 Order gives power to any judge, by whom any cause or matter may 
 be heard or tried with or without a jury, or before whom any cause 
 or matter may be brought by way of appeal, to inspect any property 
 or thing concerning which any question may arise therein. Rule 5 
 extends the provisions of Rule 3 to inspection by a jury, and gives 
 the court or a judge power in such a case to make all such orders 
 upon the sheriff or other person as may be necessary to procure the 
 atteudance of a special or common jury at such time and place, and 
 in such manner as they or he may thiuk fit. Finally, Rule 6 pro- 
 vides that an application for an order under Rule 3 may be made 
 to the court or a judge by any party. " If the application be by 
 the plaintiff, it may be made after notice to the defendant at any 
 time after the issue of the writ of summons, and if it be by any 
 other party, then on notice to the plaintiff, and at any time after 
 appearance by the party making the application." 
 
 ' Sco Stones i'. Monhora, 1848. 
 » By IJ & IG V. c. 70, § IH. 
 ' Ou the recoinmondatioii of the 
 0. L. Cuinmibsiuuers coutuiued in 
 
 their 2nd Report, at p. 37. 
 « 17 oc 18 V. c. 125. 
 » By 4G & 47 V. o. 49. 
 
 363 
 
1 1 
 
 Hi 
 
 i 
 
 ( ; 
 
 n 
 
 II 
 
 
 ffil 
 
 1 ' 
 
 mm 
 
 i.u 
 
 
 
 > (. ■ : i : 
 
 V.--1H 
 
 hi 
 
 III: 
 
 III 
 
 Hi- 
 
 POWER TO ORDER A VIEW. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 § 661. Very similar (though not identical) provisions are in force 
 in Ireland.* 
 
 § 562. Powers of directing a view are also possessed by the court 
 in which such actions are pending, in actions under the Patents, 
 Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 ; ^ by the Admiralty Court ; ^ 
 and a Referee and his assessors (if any) to whom an action pending 
 in the High Court, or any cause or matter, or any question in any 
 cause or matter, has been referred, also possess powers of ordering 
 an inspection or a view.* 
 
 §§ 563 — 5. All these powers to order views of places or inspection 
 of property, whether granted by statute or rule, give to the courts 
 and judges, by implication, authority to order all things ancillary 
 to the view or inspection required. Where, therefore, a wall had 
 recently been erected in a mine, so as to obstruct a complete 
 inspection of the workings, the court, on a question of encroach- 
 ment, ordered the removal of such obstruction.* 
 
 § 566. County Courts,^ Barmote Courts' and Courts-martial,* 
 also possess power of ordering a view or an inspection. But with 
 these important exceptions the power of ordering a view appears to 
 exist only, and so far as regards the RR. S. C. of 1883" are expressly 
 confined to, the High Court and its judges. It is suggested that 
 the most extensive powtx of directing a view ought to be extended 
 to every court of reconl and also to all criminal proceedings, the 
 practice in which respecting viev. :• still rests on the inadequate 
 provisions of the Acts of 1825 and 1852.'" In short, the presiding 
 judge at any trial ought to be expressly empowered to order a view. 
 
 » See 16 & 17 V. c. 113. 
 
 » 46 & 47 v. V. o7, § 30. 
 
 » Under 24 & 2o V. c. 10 ("The 
 Admiralty Court Act, 1861"), § 18. 
 See 30 & 31 V. c. 1 14, § 66, Ir. See, 
 also, The Gei mania, 1868. 
 
 « Ord. XXXVI. r. 48. 
 
 » Bennett v. Griffiths, 1861. 
 
 • Cy. Ct. Kulos, 1889, Ord, XII. 
 r. 3. 
 
 ' See 14 & 15 V. c. 94, 1 Sch., 
 §S 22—28, and 2 Sch. Form. 
 
 8 44 & 45 V. c. 68 (" The Army 
 Act, ISai "), § 63, subs. 7. 
 
 • R. S. C. 1883, Ord. LXVIII. 
 r. 1. 
 
 '« 6 O. 4, c. 50. §§ 23 and 24 (" The 
 Juries Aft. 1H25"); 15 & 16 V. 
 c. TO, § 114, both cited ante, § 558. 
 As to tliH existing practice in criminal 
 cases which have been removed 
 into the Queen's Bench Division 
 of the High Court, see Sliort & Mol- 
 lor's Crown Office Practice, pp. 215 
 et seq. An order for a view is drawn 
 up as of course. See Crown Office 
 Eules, r. 252. 
 
 864 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 POWER TO ORDER A VIEW. 
 
 even after the evidence may have been heard^ if in his opinion such a 
 step is necessary for the purposes of justice. 
 
 » In E. V. Martin, 1872 (0. 0. E.). 
 the Court of Crim. Appeal held that 
 the deputy assistant judge for the 
 Middlesex Sessions, on the trial of a 
 misdemeanour, was empowered to 
 allow the jury to haye a view of the 
 
 premises in question, after he had 
 summed up the evidence to them. 
 Here, however, no argument was 
 heard, and the attention of the judges 
 was not directed to any of the sta- 
 tutes on the subject. 
 
 365 
 
36r)» 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 1" 
 
 
 i 
 
 iUjR 
 
 riksL 
 
 ^:M 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 . ;i Til 
 
 I ■;.l 
 i ' 
 
 Jl -i 
 
 Hi 
 
 Real Evidence. — As is implied by its derivation from the latin res, 
 the phrase under consideration indicates the evidence furnished by 
 things, as distinguished from persons. This is Bentham's idea. 
 " By real evidence, I understand all evidence of which any object 
 belonging to the class of things is the source ; persons also in- 
 cluded, in respect of such properties as belong to them in common 
 with things." o Rationale Jud. Ev. p. 26. Bentham, indeed, divides 
 the genus into two species. (1) The evidence furnished by things, 
 which is brought to the tribunal by witnesses. (2) The evidence 
 which things (and persons considered as things) furnish to the 
 tribunal itself. "Physical real evidence (whether issuing from a 
 real or from a personal source) requires to be distinguished into 
 immediate and reported. I call it immediate, in the case where the 
 thing which is the source of the evidence is made present to the 
 senses of the judge himself. I call it reported, in the case where 
 it is. not made present to the senses of the judge himself — but the 
 state of it in respect of the evidence, the evidentiary facts afforded 
 by it, is presented to the judge no otherwise than by the report of 
 it made by a person, by whom (in the character of a percipient 
 witness) the state and condition of it in respect of the evidentiary 
 facts in question is reputed hy him to have have been observed." 
 3 Ibid. p. 33 (1802—1812). 
 
 A usKLESS DISTINCTION. — It sccms an unnecessary and useless 
 refinement to distinguish in the oral testimony of witnesses between 
 facts which these witnesses have derived from persons and those 
 which tliey have derived from observation of tilings. With the 
 exception of oral statements, most circumstantial evidence is real 
 in this sense. 
 
 But real evidence, in the sense of immediate real evidence — the 
 information which the court or jury receives from seeing things 
 themselves, actually produced in court, is (luite a different matter. 
 The phrase then represents a class of evidence which it is well 
 worth distinguishing. The court sees for itself; — res ipsa 
 loquitur. 
 
 It is always difficult and frequently impossible so accurately to 
 describe a thing as to communicate tlie impression formed in tlie 
 mind of the witness to the mind of the tribunal. Producing the 
 thing itself for inspection answers the purposes of evidence per- 
 fectly. To tliis inherent advantage of real evidence is added an- 
 other : — namely, that the diances for error on the part of the tri- 
 bunal are largely decreased. In all cases where witnesses testify, 
 even directly, lurks a double danger (1) that the witnesses may not 
 observe correctly or may not draw correct inferences from what they 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 3652 
 
 see, and (2) that their evidence may be lu ..understood. Where the 
 court itself stands in the position of the observing witness, the 
 second opportunity for error from human fallibility is removed. 
 
 MiXKD KEAL KviDENCK. — Mucii real evidence comes to the ti-i- 
 bunal of fact involved and blended with personal evidence. 
 
 It had been said that persons, considered as things, may furnish 
 real evidence. Instances of tliis have been found in cases involv- 
 ing an inspection of a witness or other perso.i present in court as 
 to age, color, race, or resemblaiics to other persons, said to stand 
 in certain relations to the person in question. 
 
 To a certain extent every witness is under inspection while on 
 the stand or in court and furnisliing thereby real evidence. What 
 he says is of course personal evidence, under Hentham's classification. 
 But while testifying as a witness and indeed at all times, at the 
 option of the tribunal while in its sight, every witness is creating 
 an im})ression, favorable or otherwise, as to his bias, veracity and 
 general reliability. That this is done by means so subtle and in ways 
 so numerous as to elude statement, and sometimes conscious recog- 
 nition does not detract in the least from the force of this kind of 
 evidence. It ia this which largely assists to create the "atmo- 
 sphere" of a trial, — frequently impressiv'e, though intangible; 
 which enables a jury to decide on conflicting testimony and makes 
 the court of appeal which has merely the statements of the wit- 
 nesses without these tests and earmarks of truth, loath to disturb 
 the verdict of a tribunal which has had the benefit of them. 
 
 The same statements are true, to a lesser degree, in case of a 
 document. Its contents are an instance of personal evidence. I>ut 
 the paper, or other substance forming it, may on inspection furnish 
 much evidence to the tribunal. It is probably principally for this 
 reason, as applied to erasures and other blemishes, that tlie early 
 laws of pleading required jn'ofert of sealed instruments. 
 
 Tlius on an issue involving the validity of a will, the attention 
 of the court and jury may be called to evidence tliat tlie sigi\ature 
 is a simulated and counterfeited hand, Withee v. Rowe, 4;") Me. o71 
 (1S.58). As to evidence, in connection with an examination of the 
 will itself, that the signature is "entirely uidike and could not have 
 been written by the same hand" as certain genuine documents. 
 Demerritti'. Ranilall, 116 Mass. 3.'U (1874). So in an action ona[)rom- 
 issory note wiiere the defence of forgery is relied on, tliat the body 
 of the note, wliich was written in blue ink, had been written after 
 signature by the maker, which was written in black ink, because 
 certain parts of the blue ink passed on and overlipped the black 
 ink ; that there was an erasure in the note ; that the erasure was 
 made at a certain time relative to the writing of the body of the 
 note ; whether eitiier of the edges of tiie note were cut edges, or 
 the ordinary foolscap edge; — "are all facts apparent and obvi- 
 

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 3658 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 OU3 upon an inspection of the note." Dubois v. Baker, 30 
 N. Y. 355 (1864). 
 
 Ill a siiuilar way, the jury may compare a disputed handwriting 
 with a speciiiuMi admitted to be genuine. Wilson v. Beaucliainp, 
 50 Miss. 24 (1874) ; Calkins v. State, 14 Oh. St. 222 (18G3) ; 
 Vinton o. Peck, 14 Mich. 287 (18GG). 
 
 Experts may point out to tlie court the facts visible on inspection 
 of a document. " It is very true that the jury may examine the 
 paper for themselves and that opinions are not usually admissible 
 where the jury can form their own conclusions unaided. But we 
 do not think it would be safe in this country to adopt a rule which 
 assumes such a degree of knowledge and skill among jurors" as to 
 dispense with assistance in recognizing the facts visible on inspec- 
 tion of a document. Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287 (1866) ; Dubois 
 V. Baker, 30 X. Y. 355 (1864); Wilson v. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 24 
 (1874) ; Calkins r. State, 14 Oh. St. 222 (1863); Withee v. Rowe, 
 45 Me. 571 (1858) ; Demerritt v. Randall, 116 Mass. 331 (1874). 
 
 Constant and apparently increasing use is made of the aid which 
 actual inspection can give the court. 
 
 On an indictment for homicide in killing a person by the use of 
 improper building materials, especially inferior mortar, used in the 
 construction of a tenement house, specimens of the mortar used by 
 the defendant and of mortar properly prepared were received in 
 connection with the testimony of an expert witness as to the differ- 
 ences. People V. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487 (1886). 
 
 In a highway accident case, the shoes of the horse who was 
 injured may be exhibited to the jury in connection with the evi- 
 dence of a blacksmith that the corks were not appropriate for the 
 season of the year in which he was being driven. Evarts v. Middle- 
 bury, 53 Vt. 626 (1881). 
 
 Where samples of paving stones used in paving a street in 
 front of the defendant's residence were offered in evidence it was 
 held not necessary to produce any of the identical stones used in 
 the construction. Philadelphia n. Rule, 93 Pa. St. 15 (1880). In 
 an action to recover for injuries from the fall of a derrick caused 
 by the breaking of an iron hook, which the plaintiff claimed was 
 insufficient, a jwrtion of the broken hook may be exhibited to tlie 
 jury, together with evidence as to its weakness and the causes of 
 it. " King i>. New York Central &c. R. R. 72 N. Y. 607 (1878). 
 
 Rkskmhlan'ce. — On questions of the relationships between per- 
 sons "where the parties are before the jury, and the latter can 
 make the comparison for themselves, whatever resemblance is dis- 
 covered may be a circumstance in connection with others, to be 
 considered." Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144 (1876); Stumm v. Hum- 
 mel, .39 la. 478 (1874). 
 
 So in a bastardy case, the bastard may be exhibited to the jury, 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 365* 
 
 and any reseinblau to the putative father commented upon. 
 " Why shouhl not the j ry be permitted (when they ha\ f the 
 op[»ortuiiityj to see for themselves and draw their own conclusions 
 from their observation, as well as to hear witnesses depose as to 
 their observation made in the same way?" State v. Woodruff, 67 
 N. C. 81) (1.S72) ; Gaunt v. State, 50 N. J. 490 (1888) ; Gilmaiiton 
 V. Ham, 38 jSJ. H. 108 (1859); Finnegan v. Dugan, 14 All. 197 
 (1867). 
 
 In Iowa, the exhibition to the jury of a child two years old in 
 a bastardy proceeding has been held permissible. "It is a well- 
 known fact that resemblances often exist between persons who 
 are not related, and are wanting between persons who are. Still, 
 what is called family resemblance is sometimes so marked as 
 scarcely to admit of a mistake. We are of opinion, therefore, that 
 a child of the proper age may be exhibited to a jury as evidence of 
 alleged paternity." State v. Smith, 64 la. 104 (1880). Exhibi- 
 tion of a child three months old has, on the contrary, in the same 
 state, been refused. State v. Danforth, 48 la. 43 (1878). In com- 
 menting on this, the court in State v. Smith {ubi supra) say, " A 
 child which is only three months old has that peculiar immaturity 
 of features which characterizes an infant during the time tliat it 
 is called a babe. A child two years old or more has, to a large 
 extent, put off that peculiar immaturity." On an indictment for 
 seduction under promise of marriage, the child, resulting from the 
 unlawful intercourse, can be exhibited to the jury to enable them 
 to trace a resemblance to the defendant as bearing on the fact 
 of sexual intercourse. State v. Horton, 100 N. C. 443 (1888). 
 
 On the contrary, it has been held error, in a bastardy complaint, 
 to allow a child six months old to be exhibited to the jury for the 
 purpose of basing an argument on the supposed resemblance. " In 
 a case like this, where the child was a mere infant, such evidence 
 is too vague, uncertain and fanciful, and if allowed would estab- 
 lish not only an unwise, but dangerous and uncertain rule of evi- 
 dence." Clark V. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 454 (1888). 
 
 The reasons for this ruling are partly pointed out in People v. 
 Carney, 29 Hun, 47 (1883), a bastardy case, where it was held 
 error to allow the mother, when on the witness-stand, to be asked 
 to examine the infant, and tell the jury the color of its eyes, and 
 thereby enable them to compare the color with that of tlie defend- 
 ant's eyes. "Common observation reminds us that in families of 
 children, different colors of hair and eyes are common, and that it 
 would be dangerous r" >ctrine to permit a child's paternity to be 
 questioned or proved by the comparings of the color of its hair or 
 eyes with that of the alleged parent." Ibid. 
 
 Evidence of paternity from comparison, with a very young infant 
 should therefore "be very sparingly resorted to. It could scarcely 
 
H 
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 fr - 
 
 3656 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT III. 
 
 be said that a want of resemblance between the defendant and tlie 
 child could be treated as a strong circumstance against the alleged 
 paternity." Udy v. Stewart, 10 Ont. Hep. 591 (1886). 
 
 In certain jurisdictions, the evidence of inspection as proof of 
 paternity in bastardy cases is not permitted, whatever the age of 
 the cliild. So in Indiana. Iteitz v. State, 33 Ind, 187 (1870); 
 Risk V. State, 19 Ind. 152 (1S62). 
 
 In Wisconsin, Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84 (1885). And in 
 New York, People v. Carney, 29 Hun, 47 (1883). 
 
 Because inspection would be permitted on tlie question of resem- 
 blance it does not follow tliat evidence on the same point will be 
 received. One claiming to be the son of A. cannot introduce the 
 evidence of witnesses as to tlie resemblance between himself and 
 A. " We all know that nothing is more notional in the great 
 majority of cases. What is taken as a resemblance by one is not 
 perceived by another, with e(iual knowledge of the parties between 
 whom the resemblance is proved to exist." Jones v. Jones, 45 
 Md. 144 (1876). 
 
 " The effect of the substitution of testimony for inspection is to 
 put the subject-matter of investigation one further remove from 
 its responsible judges, and thus to add to the intirmities inherent 
 in proof of this class the additional danger of bias and imposi- 
 tion." Gaunt V. State, 50 N. J. Law, 490 (1888). The same 
 case speaks of "the almost utter worthlessness of the testimony 
 of witnesses adduced in the question of the resemblance of a bastard 
 to an alleged parent." 
 
 In bastardy process, a complainant is not entitled to introduce 
 the evidence of witnesses of a resemblance between the bastard 
 and the putative father. Eddy v. Gray, 4 All. 435 (1862). It "is 
 matter of opinion." Keniston v. Howe, 16 Me. 38 (1839); U. S. 
 V. Collins, 1 Cranch. C. Ct. 592 (1809). 
 
 On the contrary, in North Carolina, where the defence to a bas- 
 tardy complaint involved evidence that the complainant at a time 
 when the child oould have been begotten was habitually liaving 
 intercourse with a man otlier tlian the defendant, evidence that 
 the child resembled the other man is admissible. State v. Britt, 
 78 N. C. 430 (1878). 
 
 In Massachusetts, it lias been held that the complainant in such 
 a case cannot meet the defendant's evidence of intercourse with 
 another by showing a dissimilarity in personal appearance between 
 the child and the person claimed by the defendant to be the fatlier. 
 Young /'. Miikepeace, 103 Mass. 50, 54 (1869). "Points of dis- 
 similaritv, not implying a difference of race, do not tend to disprove 
 paternity." H>i<l. 
 
 Rack, Color, ktc. — Alany of the infirmative suggestions which 
 pertain to evidence of reseir.blance from inspection, do not as sug- 
 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 3G5« 
 
 'IS 
 
 s. 
 
 i ■ i - 
 
 gested in Young v. Makepeace, *v/^j?(f, weaken the force of the more 
 deejjly graven facts of raue or color. Tliat one person, especially 
 at a very early age, resembles another is often a matter of fancy. 
 Whether a person is white or colored, whether he has a set of 
 features usually found in the African or European races, can fre- 
 quently be established with small chance of error. A child of 
 white parents, claimed to be illegitimate, may be exhibited to the 
 jury with a view to demonstrating that she is of colored parentage 
 at least on one side. "On general principles it would seem that 
 when the question is whether a certain object is black or white, 
 the best evidence of the color would be the exhibition of the object 
 to the jury. The eyes of the members of the jury must be i)re. 
 sumed to be as good as those of medical men. Why should a jury 
 be contined to hearing what other men think they have seen and 
 not be allowed to see for themselves." VVarlick v. White, 76 N. 
 C. 175 (1877). 
 
 Perso.val Injuries. — A plaintiff injured by a defect in machinery 
 may exhibit his wounded hand to the jury. Indiana Car Co. v. 
 Parker, 100 Ind. 181, 199 (1884). So of an arm injured by the 
 negligence of the driver of a street railway company, Mulhado v. 
 Brooklyn City, R. R., 30 N. Y. 370 (1864); Hatfield v. St. Paul, 
 &c. R. R., 33 Minn. 130 (188;")). So the plaintiff has been allowed 
 to exhibit her injured feet to the jury. Louisville, &c., R. R. v. 
 Wood, 113 Ind. 544 (1887); Edwards v. Common Council, 96 Mich. 
 62.5 (1893). In an action for ])ersonal injury to the plaintiff's 
 shoulder requiring amputation, the plaintiff' may exhibit to the 
 jury the naked remnant of the arm. "The plaintiff had a right to 
 prove the hurt, and that it had entailed lasting injury by causing 
 the amputation and loss of his arm. He could prove that by oral 
 evidence. He could himself stand before the jury for ocular 
 demonstration of the fact; and why may he not intensify and make 
 more certain the fact by inspection of the naked shoulder itself? 
 It is only more and more conclusive evidence upon a fact, which 
 he was entitled to prove, and, being relevant, we cannot exclude 
 it, because there may have been danger of inspiring sympathy in 
 the jury and increasing damagps." Carrico v. West Virginia, &c., 
 R. R., 39 W. Va. 86 (1894). So in an action for personal injuries 
 through mill machinery claimed to be unsafe, the plaintiff's clothes 
 as torn by the machinery are admissible. "We think the admis- 
 sion of such evidence rests in the sound discretion of the court. 
 If the manner in which the plaintiff was injured, or the nature or 
 character of the injury, could be better ox])laiiied by the produc- 
 tion of the torn clothing which the plaintiff' was wearing at the 
 time the injury was received, we perceive no reason why such evi- 
 dence may not be resorted to." Tudor Iron Works v. Weber, 
 129 111. 535 (1889). 
 
V 
 
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 3657 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT HI. 
 
 In an action against a city for personal injuries through a defect 
 in the sidewalk the plaintiff may not only exhibit his injured limb 
 to the jury, but may have it examined by a medical expert iu 
 presence of the jury. Lanark r. Dougherty, 153 111. 1G3 (181(4). 
 In a similar case in Missouri, where the plaintiff, while on the 
 stand, was permitted to exhibit his injured leg to the jury, it is 
 error not to permit the defendant to call experts to examine the 
 limb in presence of the jury with a view to stating, as the result 
 of such examination, their opinion of the condition of the injuries 
 as compared with their condition at a formei trial. Haynes v. 
 Trenton, 12.3 Mo. .326 (180i). "When a party in open court vol. 
 untarily submits his person to inspection for his own benefit, he 
 confers upon the opposing party a right to the further inspection 
 precisely the same as a party who becomes a witness must submit 
 to cross-examination." Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 87 Hun, .584 
 (1895). "The rule is well recognized by substantially all the 
 courts of the country that the injured party may exhibit his 
 wounds to the jury, in order to show their nature or extent, and 
 that rule has been followed in this state." Graves v. Battle Creek, 
 95 Mich. 26(5 (1893). 
 
 So in an Indiana case. " The evidence in the cause tended to 
 prove that an incurable disease of the hip joint and curvature of 
 the spine followed as a result of the injuries inflicted by the appel- 
 lant's servant upon the appellee. During the progress of the trial, 
 a physician was permitted to exhibit to the jury the appellee in 
 his then condition and to place him in different attitudes in order 
 to enable them to determine the extent of his disability." Tliis 
 was lieh' correct. Citizens' Street It. R. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 
 563 (189.3). 
 
 The exhibition must be conducted under such circumstances as 
 not to mislead the jury. Therefore, in an action for injuries 
 caused by a dog bite it is error to permit the plaintiff to exhibit 
 the then condition of liis limb — tliree years and four months after 
 the bite — without any testimony tending to show absence of 
 change for the worse. French r. Wilkinson, 93 Mich. 322 (1892). 
 
 Compulsory Examixatiov. — A conflict of authority exists on 
 the question as to whether a defendant can be compelled by the 
 court to submit liis j)crson to an examination of the extent of his 
 injuries. 
 
 The opinion that such a power does not exist in the court at 
 common law is strongly contended for by ^Ir. Justice Horace 
 Gray, speaking for tlie majority of the United States supreme 
 court in Union Pacific R. R. o. Rotsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1890). 
 (.)n an action by a female passenger for injuries to tlie back of her 
 head, rujituring the membranes of the brain and spinal cord, the 
 defendant moved the United States circuit court "for an order 
 
CHAP. 1.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTK8. 
 
 8« 
 
 );," 
 
 agiiinst the plaintiff, requiring her to suhuiit to a surgical examin- 
 atiou, in the presence of her own surgeon and attorneys, if she 
 desired their presence; it being proposed by the defendant tliat 
 such examination should be made in manner not to expose the* 
 person of the plaintiff in any indelicate manner; the defendant at 
 the same time informing the court that sucli examination was 
 necessary to enable a correct diagnosis of the case, and that with- 
 out such examination the defendant wouUl be without any wit- 
 nesses as to her condition." The court overruled the motion on 
 the ground that they had no authority to make or enforce such an 
 order. This was sustained on writ of error. The court say, "No 
 right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the 
 common law, than the i-ight of every individual to the possession 
 and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer- 
 ence of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of 
 law. . . , The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by 
 a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel 
 any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit 
 it to the toucli of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indig- 
 nity, an assault and a trespass; and no order or i)rocess, commancl- 
 ing such an exposure or submission was ever known to the common 
 law in the administration of justice between individuals, except 
 in a very small number of cases, based upon special reasons, and 
 upon ancient practice, coming down from ruder ages, now mostly 
 obsolete in England, and never, so far as we are aware, introduced 
 into this country." Ibid. 
 
 Tlie supreme court of Indiana say, "so far as we know, the 
 courts of this state have never attempted to exercise such a power, 
 and we are of the opinion that no such power is inherent in the 
 courts." Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401 (18!)1); 
 Kern v. Bridwell, 119 Ind. 226 (1889). Until modified by statute, 
 the rule was the same in New York. "The exercise by the court 
 of the power now invoked, as has been shown, is not sanctioned by 
 any usage in the courts of England or of this state. Its existence 
 is not indispensa,ble to the due administration of justice. Its 
 exercise depending on the discretion of the judge, would be subject 
 to great abuse. We think the assumption by the court of tl'.is 
 jurisdiction, in the absence of statute authority, would be :ui arbi- 
 trary extension of its powers. It is a jus'; inference that an alleged 
 power which has lain dormant during the whole period of Englisli 
 jurisprudence, and never attempted to be exercised in America 
 until within a very recent period, never in fact iiad any exis- 
 tence." McQuigan v. Delaware, &c., E. R., 129 N. Y. oO (1891). 
 The party may submit, if so disposed, to any examination not 
 indecent. Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401 (1891). 
 
 Should a party refuse to acquiesce in a reasonable request to 
 
 !1 
 
II- i 
 
 ;}059 
 
 AMERICAN N0TE8. 
 
 [part m. 
 
 svibinit his person to examination, it gives rise to the same pre- 
 stimptiou as refusing to produce any other evidence in his i)ower. 
 "Should a litigant willingly submit, there could be no legal oh- 
 jw'tion to such an examination, and sho\ild he refuse to submit 
 to a reasonalde examination his conduct mig)it possibly be proper 
 matter for comment, but tliis is quite a different matter from com- 
 pidliiig him, against his will, to submit his ])erson to the examina- 
 tion of strangers." Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401 
 (isyi). "If he unreasonably refuses to show his injuries, when 
 asked to do so, that fact nmy be considered by the jury, as bearing 
 on his good faith, as in any other case of a party declining to 
 produce the best evidence in his power." Union Pacific It. U. v, 
 liotsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1890). "It is unknown to our practice 
 and to the law." Loyd v. Hannibal, &c. R. R., 53 Mo. 509 
 (1S73). "Tlie court had no power to make or enforce sucii an 
 order." Parker v. Enslow, 102 111. 272 (1882). "This court is 
 committed to that doctrine. We do not think injustice is likely 
 to result to a defendant by a refusal to make such an order, 
 especially when given the full benefit of the fact that the plaintiff 
 has refused to submit voluntarily thereto, as was done in this 
 case." Peoria, &c., R. R. v. Rice", 144 III. 227 (1893). 
 
 "If a party is entitled to the compulsory exhibition of the body 
 of his opponent, it would seem to follow that he might have 
 such examination made before the jury. And the court might 
 require the plaintiff, on the trial and before the jury, to submit to 
 the same examination as is recjuired by this order. . . . We know 
 of no right which this court has to compel a party to submit to any 
 bodily examination." Roberts v. Ogdcnsburg, &c., R. R. 29 Hun, 
 154 (1883); Cole v. Fall Hrook Coal Co. , 87 Hun, 584 (1895). The 
 rule has been changed by statute in New York, and such a law has 
 been held not to infringe any of the express or Implied restraints 
 upon the legislative power to be found in the federal or state 
 constitution. Lyon v. Mnnhattan R. R., 142 '' Y. 298 (1894). 
 A very sagacious ruling was laid down in the rase last mentioned. 
 "The power conferred by the amendment should never be used in 
 such a way as to leave any doubt as to the fairness and good faith 
 of the proceeding, otherwise it may prove to be a sword instead of 
 a shield. It should be a fair and open inquiry after truth, in 
 ■which both sides are or may be actors. If it is used only for the 
 ]mrpose of enabling the defendant to prepare expert witnesses to 
 give testimony at the trial it will be hardly possible to keep the 
 fact from the jury, and it is easy enough to see how such an ele- 
 ment in the case might be used to excite sympathy, stimulate 
 ■|)rejudices, and in some cases possibly to enhance damages." Iliid. 
 
 CoMPULsoKY ExAMixATiON Orderkd. — The considerations wliich 
 have induced certain courts in the southern and western states of 
 
 . .I', 
 
i 
 I i 
 
 CIIAl'. I.] 
 
 A.MKltlCAN NOTKS. 
 
 8(i:)10 
 
 AiiH'i'icM, iiiidi'V tho lead of Iowa in 1S77. to make orders comiPidliiig 
 cxamiiiatioiis of the person oi the phiiulilf in cases cd' idaiiiis for 
 personal injuries, are jiaitly stated in tlie l)ree/y dissenting ojiinion 
 of the justiees lirewer and JJrown in Union I'acilic IJ, |{. /•. 
 liotsfoni, 111 i;. S. L'r>0 (IS<)0). "It seems strange tliat a jdain- 
 tiff may, in the presence of a jury, be permitted to roll n[) his 
 sleeve and disclose on his arm a wound of which hetestilies; l)ut 
 wlien he testilies iis to the existence of su(!h a wound, the court, 
 though persuaded that he is perjuring iiiniscdf , cannot riMpiire him 
 to roll U[) his sleeve, and thus make manifest the truth, nor re(iuire 
 him in the like interest of truth, to step into an adjoining room 
 and lay bare his arm to the inspection of surgeons. It is said 
 that there is a sanctity of the person which may not be outraged. 
 We believe that truth aiul justice are more sacred than any jx'r- 
 sonal considerations; and if in other cases in the interests of jus- 
 tice, or from considerations of mercy, the courts may, as they often 
 do, re(juire such personal examination, why should they not exer- 
 cise the same power in cases like this, to prevent wrong and 
 injustice?" Ibid. 
 
 The leading case to this effect, above referred to, is Schroeder ?•. 
 Chicago, &c., 11. It., 47 la. 37o (1877). The plaintiff was injured, 
 by the alleged negligence of the defendant's employees, in his 
 back and hips. He claimed that these injuries were pcnnanent, 
 had impaired the nervons system to the extent of partial paralysis, 
 especially of the bowels. The aiiplication for an examination was 
 refused in the lower court on the gronnd that the defendant was 
 not entitled, as of right, to the order sought. This was held to be 
 error. The grounds of this ruling in nuiin are: (1) Every party 
 litigant l)as a right to exact justice, which involves obtaining the 
 entire truth on all nuitters in issue. (2) A proper examination by 
 skilled physicians would be more apt to do full justice to both 
 jpartics than any other way. (3) The i)laintiff has testimony under 
 his control which reveals the truth more clearly than any other. 
 •'The cause of truth, the right administration of the law, demand 
 that he should have produced it." (4) The jdaintitt' is jjractically 
 being cross-examined, as he has ottered himself as a witness, 
 (o) 'I'liere is no indignity; as parties assured, pensioners, men 
 enlisting in the army and navy submit to rigid examinations of 
 their bodies. (Ci) A plaintiff can exhibit, in a case of this kind, 
 his wounds or limbs. (7) The divorce courts have ordered exam- 
 inations in eases of alleged imi)otency. 
 
 In Nebraska, while the court will order an examination in a suit 
 for personal injuries, the examinaticm must be before the trial and 
 hy experts agreed on by the ])arties or appointed by the court. 
 Stuart V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211 (l.SSr>). 
 
 It cannot be regarded as definitely settled that the courts of 
 
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365" 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT iir. 
 
 urn 
 
 ■'■''■a 
 
 i 
 
 u 
 
 r 
 
 
 ;■.!:: i" 
 
 Nebraska will compel such an examination at all. But it is at 
 least definitely settled that " if such an application is proper under 
 any circumstances, it must be made before trial." Cliadroii v. 
 Glover, 43 Neb. 7.52 (1895). 
 
 A precisely reversed ruling has been made in Wisconsin. In 
 that state, an examination may be ordered during the trial and in 
 the presence of the experts of the adverse party. White i'. ^lil- 
 waukee City R, R., 61 Wis. o.'J6 (1884). So also in Kansas, 
 Atchison, &c. R. R. u. Thul, 29 Kans. 460 (1883). In Schroedor 
 V. Chicago, &c. R. R., 47 la. 375 (1877) the application was made 
 at the trial and before evidence was gone into, and the motion was 
 for a board of physicians appointed by both parties. In Ohio, " in 
 an action to recover for personal injuries caused by the negligence 
 of the defendant, the court has power to require the plaintiif to 
 submit his person to an examination by physicians and surgeons, 
 when necessary to ascertain the nature and extent of the injury." 
 Miami Turnpike Co. v. Baily, 37 Oh. St. 104 (1881). In Texas 
 the court ordered an examination out of court, but upon the plain- 
 tiff objecting to one of the defendant's doctors on personal grounds, 
 and the other declining to go on alone, refused to stop the case or 
 compel the plaintii¥ to be examined by tlie two doctors suggested 
 by the defendant. Missouri, &c., R. R. v. Johnson, 72 Tex. 95 
 (I8S8). "If this power should be exercised at all, it slwmld be by 
 the apix)intment by tlie court of one or more disinterested exjjerts, 
 either of its own selection or such as may be agreed upon by both 
 parties." lf>!'/. The question of the court's power was regarded 
 as an open one in (Julf, &c., R. R. r. Nelson, 5 Tex. Civ. .\|ip. 
 .387 (180.3). The power to con\pel an examination is asserted in 
 (Jeorgia. Richmond, &c., R. R. c. Childress, 82 (Ja. 719 (1SS9). 
 And in Alabama. Alabama, &c., R. R. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71 (189(1). 
 The rule is the same in Nebraska. Stuart c. Havens, 17 Neh. 
 211 (18.S.5). -Vnd in Mieliigan it has been ludd error to refuse to 
 request a female plaintiff to remove her glove from an injured 
 hand. "The decisions are not uniform upon this cpiestion, l)ut 
 the very great weight of authority is in favor of tlie exercise of 
 such power by the court, under proper restrictiims; the rule recog- 
 nizing, however, that a wide discretion is vested in the trial ornirt, 
 which justifies a refusal to require the examination wiiere the 
 necessities of the case are not such as to call lor it, or where the 
 sense of delicacy of the plaintiff may be offended by the exliibi 
 tion, or whert' the testimony would be merely cumulative, or where, 
 in the judgment of the trial e(nirt, it would not materially aid the 
 jury." Graves /•. Rattle Creek, 95 Mich. 266 (1893). But on an 
 action for breach of warranty on the sale of a horse the court lias 
 no jx)wer to order that the <lefendant have the privilege of sending 
 a vet<erinary surgeon into plaintiff's stable to examine the horse. 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 36oi'^ 
 
 " The court had no power to compel the i)laintiif to submit to such 
 an invasion of his premises." Martin v. Elliot (Mich.), G3 N. W. 
 y.)<S (181)5). 
 
 The courts of Missouri after at first deciding that such an order 
 could not be made (Loyd v. Hannibal, &c., R. K., u.'i Mo. jIOO 
 (1873),) subsequently reversed their position, and now hold that 
 they will order the submission. Shepard v. Missouri, &c., R. K., 
 85 Mo. 629 (1885); Sidekum i\ Wabash, &c., K. K., 93 Mo. 400 
 (1887); Owens v. Kansas City, &c., K. K., 95 Mo. 169 (1888). 
 
 In Arkansas, the rule is laid down as follows : — " Where the 
 plaintiif in an action for personal injuries alleges that they are of 
 a permanent nature, the defendant is entitled as a matter of right, 
 to have the opinion of a surgeon upon his condition — an opinion 
 based upon personal examination." Where the evidence of experts 
 is abundant, the court niay, however, refuse an order. Sibley i\ 
 Hmitli, 46 Ark. 275 (1885). But where the defendant requested that 
 the plaintiff should be examined by experts in open court, the 
 judge at nisi pruts overruled the motion, but required him to sub- 
 mit to an examination at his own home before certain physicians 
 representing both sides and passed upon by the court. This was 
 held correct. " It is within the sound discretion of the circuit 
 court to order such an examination, or not, and to direct whether 
 it should be made in court or not; and the court will not control 
 the exercise of that discretion, unless its exercise is abused." St. 
 Louis, &c., R. K. /'. Dobbins, 60 Ark. 481 (1895). 
 
 Ordkk is Discrktionaky. — The order is discretionary with 
 the court. White c. Milwaukee, &c., Ky., 61 Wis. 5.'5(i (1884); 
 Miami, &c., Turnpike Co. v. Baily, 37 Oh. St. 104 (1881). Where 
 an application was not made until the close of the phiintitf's case, 
 the application can be refused on that ground. I/iid. " It is evi- 
 dent from the very nature of things that the propriety t)f such an 
 order must usually rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, 
 and it could only be in case of a plain abuse of such discretion 
 tliat we would interfere." Hatfield v. St. Paul, &c., R. R., 33 
 Minn. 1.30 (1885). "And we are by no means prc])ar(!d to say 
 tliat there may not be circumstances where tlie defendant would 
 not have the right to such an order." lf>i</. "We decide simply 
 that the power exists, and that in each case it is to be exercised or 
 not, according to the sound discretion of the jjresiding judge." 
 Richmond, &c. , R. R. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719 (188!)); Southern 
 r.cll Telejihone Co. v. Lynch. 95 (in. 529 (1804). " It is a matter 
 in which the court has a discretion which will not be intert'ored 
 with unless manifestly abused." Shepard v. Mis.t,ouri, &c., R. 
 R., 85 i\Io. 629 (1885)', where the i)laintiff offered to sid)mit her 
 jierson to the examination of one physician, but not of three. The 
 court can refuse an apidicatiou "for the time being," reserving to 
 
 >: I 
 
 
H: 
 
 8()a 
 
 13 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part ITI. 
 
 the defendant the right to ap]ily later. Unless this is done the 
 ])rior application may be treated as waived. Sidekum v. Wabash, 
 &c. II. R., 9.3 Mo. 400 (1887). Possibly the action of the court 
 was affected in that case by the fact that the defendant asked that 
 the ,)laintiff, a lady, submit her injuries, largely displacement of 
 the A. jiiib, to the examination of four surgeons, and was taken 
 in view of the action of the court in Shepard v. Missouri, &c., K. 
 R. (lib! siijtrd). "Tlie real question liere is, wliether there has 
 been an abuse of the discretion lodged in the trial court." Owens 
 V. Kansas City, &c. K. R., 95 Mo. 169 (1888). Where the phaintiff 
 had exhibited an injured arm to the jury, and three physicians had 
 testified with regard to it, it was held no error for the court to 
 overrule the defendant's motion for an order compelling the plain- 
 tiff to submit his arm to four physicians selected by the <lefendant. 
 Stuart V. Havens, 17 Neb. 211 (1885). 
 
 Tlie supreme court of Georgia suggest as reasonable jirelini- 
 inaries to the exercise of this power that the plaintiff should first 
 be asked to submit voluntarily, and his refusal proved in case of 
 an application for an order; as well as the probability of results 
 important to the cause of justice being elicited; the experts sliould 
 be selected by the court rather than the party or parties. " It is 
 likewise obvious that all the expenses should be borne by th.e 
 party at whose instance tlie examination is made." Richmond, 
 &c., R. R. V. Childress, 82 Ga. 719 (1889). This was substantially 
 followed in Alabama, &c., R. R. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71 (1890). 
 
 The effect of the autliorities on the matter of dii:cretion is thus 
 summed up by the supreme court of Alabama. "It is apparent 
 from the adjudged cases, that the statement of the rule as to the 
 revision of tlie trial court's action on a motion of tliis sort, to the 
 effect that such action will not be interfered with unless it involves 
 a manifest abuse of discretion, is inapt and misleading. What is 
 reallv meant — the rule fairly deducible from the o])inions — is, 
 that if a jiroper case for granting the motion is clearly made, and 
 is refused, the appellate court, having before it al' tlie facts 
 involved in the determination of the matter in the lower court, 
 will reverse the judgment thus infected with error." Alabama, 
 &c., R. II. *•. Hili, 90 .\la. 71 (1890). The court then proceed to 
 ask, " Was it essential to the ends of justice tliat ))h!intiff sliouhl 
 submit to this examination. We think it was, and grant a new 
 trial for the failure of the trial court to order the examination. 
 I()iil. The rule in Arkansas is similar. " In refusing to order tlie 
 examination, as it may do when tlie evidence of experts is already 
 abundant, the circuit court must exercise a sound discretion; and 
 its action is subject to review in case of abuse. Tliere could not 
 be a more flagrant instance of tlie evils resulting from such a 
 refusal than the present case atfords." Sibley v. Smitli, 40 Ark. 
 275 (1885). 
 
ciiAr. 1.] 
 
 AMKHK.'AN NOTES. 
 
 30, V* 
 
 The .supreme court of Kaiisiis, however, speak of the order coiii- 
 pelling inspection in iuttioiis for permanent personal injuries as a 
 ]iiatter of rij^ht, thougli j^ivinfj; the court a discretion to reject it if 
 cumulative evidence only would be secured therel)y, or the evidence 
 would be otherwise objectio'.iable on s,'euerul principles. The court 
 is also given a discretion in prescribing details, &c. '' We would 
 think that the defendant in a case lik(! tlie present would be 
 entitled as a matter of right, upon a proper a])plication and u])on 
 a proper showing, to have an ortler made by the court compelling 
 tlie plaintiff to submit himself to a personal examination, for the 
 ])urpose of ascertaining the nature, character, extent and perma- 
 nence of his injuries; but of course the court sliould exercise a 
 sound judicial discretion in making such an order. The right 
 to the order, being founded upon necessity, would not of course 
 extend beyond the necessities of the case." Atchison, &.C., R. K. 
 ('. Thul, 2d Ivans. 4G6 (18.S.S). 
 
 So the supreme court of Iowa assert that the defendant has a 
 right to demand an examination. Schroeder v. Cliicago, &c., 
 K. 11., 47 la. 375 (1877). But the conditions of the examination 
 as to time, examiners, &c., is in the discretion of the court. Ibid. 
 
 How KNFOKCKu. — The method of enforcing an order for an 
 examination of personal injuries of a permanent nature is some- 
 what differently suggested by those who assert the power of tlie 
 court to issue such an order. The dissenting justices in Union 
 Pacilic K. 11. r. liotsford, 141 U. S. L'50 (l.SOO), one of whom 
 (Brewer) was a iii'inber of the court which decided Atchison, &c., 
 li. li. v. Thul, 29 Kans. 400 (188.*?), say that refusal to try the 
 order is not a •ontempt, and suggest tluit "such an order may be 
 enforced by sta} .ug the trial or dismissing tlie case." In Schroeder 
 ('. Ciiioago, &c., R. R. 47 la. 37o (1877), the court say that the 
 ])ower of the court "was amply suHuuent to coerce obedience." 
 Tiie witness being in contempt, he would be treated as a recusant 
 witness. If the recusancy were persisted in, " the court could have 
 stricken from the pleadings all the allegations as to permanent 
 injury, and withdrawn from the jury that part of the case. The 
 plaintitf by voluntarily withdrawing iiis claim for such injury 
 would liav(> been relieved from the necessity of submitting to the 
 examiniition, and ])roceedings as for contemijt would have been sus- 
 jiended." This language is cited with a))proval in Atchison, &c., 
 R. R. r. Thul, 2!) Ivans. 40(5 (1883). "On the refusal of the plain, 
 tiff to comply with such onler, when pro[)erly made, the court may 
 dismiss the action, or refuse to allow the plaintiif to give evidence 
 to establish the injury. . . , Authority to exclude the evidence 
 arises out o;" the inherent power of the court over the subject under 
 investigation," Miami, «&c., Turnpike Co. v, Baily, 37 Oh. St. 
 104 (1881). 
 
3(;-V6 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AUT m. 
 
 
 tli 
 
 '•Certainly, if tho court can make the order, it will liave no 
 (lifHcnilty in enforcing it. Not that it can compel the party to sub- 
 mit to a personal examination, but it may dismiss a plaintilf'.s suit 
 for a persistent refusal to do so; or, in case of either defenchmt or 
 jdaintiff, treat it as a suppression of testimony, and so present the 
 matter to the jury as to make the refusal equivalent to proof of 
 the fact, which the party asking sucli perscmal examination would 
 make it probable, by affidavit or otherwise, the examination would 
 disidose. Shepard v. Missouri, &c.. It. K. .S5 Mo. OL'!) (1.S85). 
 
 Power to enfoi'ce such an order is frequently conferred by statute. 
 Richmond, &c., K. R. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719 (188.')). 
 
 Exi'iciiiMKNTS IN CouKT. — A peculiarly cogcut method of prov- 
 ing a fact is to test its existence by an experiujent in open court. 
 The evidence so furnished is frequently real evidence, properly 
 so called. 
 
 For example, in a Massachusetts case, in an action to recover the 
 price of a suit of clothes wiiich it was claimed did not fit, "while 
 the defendant was testifying, the plaintiff produced the clothes in 
 court, and requested the defeiulant to try them on in the jiresence 
 of the jury. The defendant assented, and, having put tlieni on, 
 wore them in the presence of the court and jury. The pluintilf 
 then called several tailors as experts, who testified that the clotiies 
 needed some alterations before they could be called a good lit, but 
 that such alterations could be easily made without injury to them." 
 Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 1.36 (1873). When^ the evidence was 
 unoontroverted, in an action for personal injuries, that the female 
 plaintiff limped, the court declined to compel her to walk across 
 the court-room in ])resence of the jury at the defendant's request. 
 Hatfield i\ St. Taul, &c., R. R., 33 Minn. 130 (188;-)). The genernl 
 right of the court to order such an exhibition is, however, insisted 
 on. "As the object of all judicial investigations is, if possible, to 
 do exact justice and obtain the truth in its entire fulness, we have 
 no doubt of the power of tlie court, in a prober case, to require the 
 party to perform i physical act before the jury that will illustrate 
 or demonstrate tlie extent and character of his injuries. Tliis is 
 in accordance with analogous cases in otlier l)ran(^hes of the law. 
 Wlien a view of real estate will aid the jury in ri^aching a conclu- 
 sion, it is witliin the discetion of the court to permit it. When 
 an inspection of an article of personal property will aid tliem. it is 
 not infrequent to cause the article to be brouglit into ccurt for the 
 same purpose. The practice in patent and in certain e(iuity cases, 
 of allowing tests to be ajiplied liefore the court, is somewhat analo- 
 gous in principle. So is the practice of divorce courts, of ordering 
 an examination of the ])erson of the party in certain cases." H>!d. 
 
 The American courts have shown themselves unwilling to con- 
 sent to the use of experiments in court where the circumstances 
 
 til 
 
 n 1' '■ i 
 .f- I 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 AMEKICAN KOTES. 
 
 365i« 
 
 were such as to lead to a suspicion that evidence was being fabri- 
 cated by this means. Thus where a colored defendant on an indict- 
 ment for larceny in a corn-tield was claimed to have a peculiar 
 foot, with which a government witness connected certain foot- 
 prints found in the cornfield on the occasion of the larceny, tlie 
 court permitted the defendant to exhibit his feet to the jury and 
 walk barefooted on the sawdust floor of the court room, but declined 
 to aUow him to walk on tlie open ground in jn-esence of tlie jury 
 or to have soil similar to that of tlie corn-iield brought into the 
 court room for the same purpose. Though the defendant objected 
 to the refusal, it was ludd to he " at the option of the court to per- 
 mit or not the same experiment to be made on mellow earth, either 
 in or out of the courthouse, within view of tlie jury, for their 
 information. ... In the present case, it could not be very mate- 
 rial that the defendant should be permitted to make tracks for 
 exhibition to the jury; for the jieculiarity of his ordinary tracks 
 might be caused by some habitual trick of motion in lus gait, which 
 he would take pains on such an occasion to avoid." Campbell v. 
 State, 55 Ala. 80 (187G). 
 
 In a case where certain masked liurglars broke and entered a 
 dwelling house for the purpose of extorting from the cashier of a 
 bank the combination of the lock in the bank vault, the cashier 
 testified that he identified the defendant as one of the gang by 
 means of his voice — •which was peculiar. On cross-examination, 
 he was asked to state the peculiarity. Heing umible to do so, the 
 deiondant's lawyer asked the defendant to stand up and repeat 
 something, which he did. Whereupon the witness said that the 
 defendant was suppressing liis voice. On the defendant being 
 asked "to s|)eak it right out," the judge interposed the suggestion 
 that this was not competent. The counsel for the defendant con- 
 tended that he had a right to have the jieculiarities of the defend- 
 ant's voice pointed out by the witness, and that for that jmrpcse 
 the voice itself was competent to be intrcx'uced. The judge ruled 
 otherwise, and was sustained. "His manner of speaking being in 
 question, there was no way of determining whether he would use 
 his voice in the court room in his natural or in a constrained and 
 simulated manner, tli(> genuineness of the voice used not being 
 supiiorted by his oath." Com. i<. Hcott, 12.'] Mass. 222 (1S77). 
 
 A distinction is to be drawn between experiments made in court, 
 the results of which, to act as evidence, should bi' obtained during 
 the stages of the trial at which evidence is admissible, and U!us- 
 f rations which may be used merely to enforce an argument. Thus 
 in an action against a railroad company for land damages, counsel 
 may illustrate his argument that it is an injury to a mill power to 
 lessen the "head" of water, by demonstrating "by appliances pro- 
 vided for the pui'pose and not previously exhibited in evidence . . . 
 
SbT) 
 
 amkri(;ax N(rrKs, 
 
 [I'AIiT III. 
 
 I ■ 
 
 that of two ooluinns of water of the same diameter but of different 
 heights, the liigher would discharge more quickly and with greater 
 power than the lower." Hoffman v. liloomsburg, &c., 11. li., U;5 
 Pa. St. 503 (1891). 
 
 Exi'KuiMKNTS OUT OF CouRT. — The rulc relating to experiments 
 in court has nothing to do with a somewhat similar rule that the 
 court may i)ermit witnesses to state the result of experiments made 
 out of court, the results of which are rele\rant to the issue. 
 
 Thus on an indictment for a rape committed upon a woman said 
 to be of weak physical condition, to prove the comparative 
 strength of the prisoner, the government was allowed to show 
 "that he had taken a barrel of flour up in his hands before him 
 and carried it several rods, and then down several stairs or steps 
 into a cellar; also, that he had within a few years carried a barrel 
 of sugar some ten rods on his shoulder and then set it down on a 
 platform," and that he "seemed to carry them easily." State v. 
 Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 (1863). Other witnesses were allowed to 
 testify ill the same case as to similar experiments testing their 
 own strength, and the results of " scuffles " between them and the 
 prisoner. Ibid. 
 
 ViKW. — It is discretionary with t' court to permit the jury to 
 visit any locality involved in the ca^j. Facts so learned are real 
 evidence. People v. Buddensieck, 103 X. Y. 487 (1880). 
 
 Though the granting of a view is in the discretion of the court, 
 which will not ordinarily be reviewed on appeal, error in law may 
 be committed by the court in instructing the jury as to the effect 
 they may give to the facts learned .n that way. Boardman v. 
 Westchester, &c.. Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 364 (1882). For example, 
 where the jury were informed that the opinions of witnesses in a 
 land damage case as to the value of the land were not to control 
 their own opinion gained by a view of the premises, the court held 
 it to be error. Hoffman v. Bloomsburg, &c., R. R., 143 Pa. St. 
 503 (1801). In that case, the court cite with approval, and adopt 
 the language of a previous ruling (Flower v. Baltimore, &c., R. R., 
 132 Pa. St. 524 (1800)), that an instruction to the jury that "You 
 are only permitted to view the land, that you may better under- 
 stand the testimony. The value of the land you are to ascertain 
 from the witnesses " is a correct statement of the law. "The 
 jurors were sworn," the court say in Flower v. Baltimore, &c., 
 R. R., "to render a true verdict according to the evidence. It 
 was never intended that the view of the jury should be substituted 
 for the evidence, and that they should make up their verdict from 
 the view in disregard thereof. The object of the view is, as was 
 correctly said by the learned judge, to enable them the better to 
 understand the testimony; to weigh conflicting testimony, and, thus 
 aided, to arrive at a sound and just conclusion." Ibid. Probably, 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 365»8 
 
 however, this is not a complete statement of the law. In Massa- 
 chusetts, in an action for personal injuries, where it was contended 
 for the plaintiff, that the court could not grant a new trial on the 
 ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence where 
 the jury had had a view, the court say : " In many cases, ami per- 
 haps in most, except those for the assessment of damages, a view 
 is allowed for the purpose of enabling the jury better to understand 
 and apply the evidence which is given in court; but it is not lu'ces- 
 sarily limited to this; and, .n most cases of a view, a jury must of 
 necessity acquire a certain amount of infoimation, which they may 
 properly treat as evidence in the case." Tully v. I'itchburg, li. R., 
 134 Mass. 499 (1883). 
 
 So in a criminal case, State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 (1863), 
 where the view was granted of the locus in which tlie offence was 
 said to have been committed, the jury were sent "to view the 
 premises, in charge of the high sheriff, accompanied by one agent 
 on each side, such as each party chose to select, under proper direc- 
 tions from the court, to the officer, the jury, and the agents, as to 
 how the view should be conducted. One of the counsel on both 
 sides went as agents with the jury." So also in Com. v. Webster, 
 Para. (Bemis Ed.), 31, 32, 4G (1850). 
 
 The court may decline to order a view, especially if satisfied of 
 the accuracy of the photograph taken at the time of an accident. 
 People V. Buddensieck, 10.3 X. Y. 487 (1886). 
 
 The view, if granted, must be under conditions prescribed by the 
 court or by law. Accordingly, where certain jurors in a cai)ital 
 case after the close of the evidence, while walking out for exercise 
 by leave of court and in charge of an officer, visited and examined 
 the place where tlie homicide occurred, and in regard to wliich the 
 |witnesses had testified, it was held to be a sufficient reason for 
 granting a new trial. " It is a well settled rule that if a jury, after 
 a case is submitted to them, receive any kind of evidence which 
 can have the most remote bearing upon the case, it will be fatal 
 to their verdict." Eastwood v. People, 3 Parker, Or. R. 25, 52 
 (1855). 
 
 The accused is entitled in a criminal case to be confronted with 
 the witnesses .against him, and this rule applies to the evidence 
 furnished by a view. On an indictment for burglary the judge 
 directed the jurj', in the absence of the defendant, to inspect the 
 premises where the alleged burglary was committed. Hp directed 
 a witness for the state to accompany them and jioint out the places 
 marked on a certain diagram of the premises. Held error. " Wliy 
 sucli proceedings were permitted, we are not infoimed, and caiinot 
 imagine." State v. Bertin, 24 La. Ann. 46 (1872). 
 
 In Cuimival Casks. — Tliere is no necessity of proving to che 
 jury what they can see for themselves. Where a uefendaiit was 
 
 !l 
 
'I 
 
 \ 
 
 365i» 
 
 AMliUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part m. 
 
 «li!soi'ibetl ill aii indictment as a "colored person," this allegation is 
 sutfificntly i)roved hy 2>rofert, if tlie jury are satisfied of the fact 
 on inspection. "It would not be necessary to prove by other 
 testimony than ]>rofci't of the party that he was *a jjcrson,' or a 
 'man,' if so described in the indictment. Under certain circum- 
 stances jurors may use their eyes as well as their ears." Garvin 
 V. State, oU ^liss. 207 (1876). So the court and jury can judge 
 from inspection whether a prisoner is over fourteen. State v. 
 Arnold, 13 Ired. 184 (1851); Com. v. Kmmons, 98 Mass. 6 (1867). 
 
 On a complaint for knowunjh/ suffering a female under the age 
 of twenty -one years to resort to the defendant's jiremises for pur- 
 poses of prostitution, the jury may judge from inspection of the 
 girl as to the defendant's knowledge. "If the subject of tlie 
 scienter in this case had been tliat liertha was a f/!vl, as well as 
 under the age of twenty-one years, and the question had been 
 whetlier the defendant knew her to be a girl, her appearance alone 
 would be satisfactory, without question. The evidence in this 
 case, in a degree, is very much of the same character." Hermann 
 V. State, 7;^ Wis. 248 (1888). 
 
 So on a trial for murder the government was permitted to exhibit 
 to the jury the backbone of the deceased, — though the dramatic 
 effect of such an exhibition might naturally be apprehended by tlie 
 accused. " It served to show to the jury the attitudes and relative 
 positions of the parties when the shot was fired. It was not an 
 unnecessary parade of the bones of the dead man to excite preju- 
 dice against his slayer, but was legitimate and proper evidence, 
 ami a party cannot, upon the ground that it may harrow up feel- 
 ings of indignation against him in the breasts of the jury, have 
 competent evidence excluded from their consideration." State v. 
 Weiners, 66 Mo. 13 (1877). So where the admission of a section 
 of the ribs and vertebrae were given in evidence and excepted to "on 
 the ground that it was calculated to inspire the jury with such 
 horror as to influence their verdict," the court say, "It was intro- 
 duced for the purpose of showing the direction and lodgment of 
 the ball, and was clearly admissible." Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 
 r)47 (1890). 
 
 Bo of a pistfd by means of which a homicide was caused. "We 
 can see no objection to the pistol being exhibited to the jury and 
 inspected by thein, with testimony as to its appearance, how it 
 was fired, the indentations or marks upon the cartridges indicating 
 wlicther any, or how many barrels had boon snapped, and every- 
 thiiig about it as it was when the difficulty closed." Wynne v. 
 State. 06 Ga. 113 (1876). 
 
 So where the case turned on the identity of a deceased person 
 who had lived under different names at different places, various 
 letters, hotel registers, and other documents showing a similarity 
 
;hap. I.] 
 
 AMKIIICAN NOTKS. 
 
 365a" 
 
 in liiuidwrit.ing of the two men (supposed to be the deceased under 
 an alius) may l)e examined by the jury in tlieir consultation room. 
 Udderzook v. Com., 70 Pa. St. 340 (ls;4;. The bloody clothes in 
 Avhich homicide is alleged to have beei committed may be exhibited 
 to the jury. Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 41o (18«o) ; People v. Gonzalez, 
 .'J5 N. Y. 49 (1.S66); and the clothing worn by the deceased at the 
 time of a fatal aifray may be "produced in evidence before the 
 jury." Levy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 203 (1889); Gardiner v. People, 
 6 Park(!r, C. K. 155 (1860). 
 
 "In criminal cases a jury may form their opinion as to the gen- 
 uineness of a document, alleged to be forged, by a comi)arison of it 
 with other writings admitted or proved to be genuine." Garvin v. 
 State, 52 Miss. 207 (1876). And may be aided in so doing, by the 
 use of magnifying glasses. Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 
 181, 200 (1884). 
 
 Exhibition to the jury of clothes, weapons, &c., belonging to tlie 
 prisoner, is not objectionable as compelling a person accused of 
 crime to furnish evidence against himself. Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 
 413 (1885). Where it was claimed by a prisoner that the deceased 
 came to her death by the clothes accidentally catching fire, and 
 that she (the prisoner) had burned her own hand in a vain attempt 
 to save deceased, the court compelled her, against objection, to 
 remove the bandages on the hand alleged to be injured. It proved 
 entirely free from any indication of a burn. This was held, no 
 error. State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85 (1874). 
 
 It has been held that in a criminal case, to establish the iden- 
 tity of the prisoner, he may be compelled by the court to bare his 
 arm to the jury and exhibit certain tattoo marks which were tes- 
 tified to a witness, and that such a course is not compelling the 
 prisoner "to be a witness against himself." State v. Ah Chuey, 
 14 Nev. 79 (1879). 
 
 Circumstantial EvinExcE. — Frequently in criminal cases re- 
 quiring the use of circumstantial evidence, many of the links in 
 the chain of proof or evidence bearing on them can be produced 
 for the inspection of the jury. Where a clerk was killed by 
 burglars while resisting arrest, a rocket-drill found in the i)ris- 
 oner's possession and fitting the bits with which entrance to the 
 store was effected, may be exhibited to the jury. Ruloff v. I'eople, 
 45 N. Y. 213, 224 (1871). 
 
 In Com. V. Webster, 5 Gush. 295 (1850), where the body of the 
 deceased had been, it was claimed, mutilated and partly burned 
 by the prisoner, artificial teeth found in the privy vault of the 
 I)risoner, and alleget^ to have been those of the deceased, were pro- 
 duced in court aiid fitted to the plaster cast made for the mouth of 
 the deceased; a letter obviously written in a peculiar style and 
 by the use of an unusual instrument was compared in court with a 
 
 ill 
 
 J 
 
>i ■' 
 
 36521 
 
 AMKUIOAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT 111. 
 
 small stick tipped with cotton found in the prisoner's possession. 
 Beniis Hei)ort, pp., 80, 81, 204, 205, 208, 210. 
 
 On an iiidi(!tuient for the murder of one Mulock by blows on his 
 head, inflicted with a niusk(!t, tlie court held that no error had Ix'cu 
 committed in permitting " le district atton.ey to produce in fMJUvt 
 and show to witnesses, in the presence of the jury, the hat and .^un 
 found near Mulock's dead body, or a watch it was claiuied Miiloiik 
 had on his person tlie morning he disappeared, or any otlier article 
 found on or near his dead body, or in permitting the district 
 attorney to produce Mulock's skull in court. ... It was also 
 proper ... to allow Dr. Wey to examine the skull of Mulock in 
 court, with the broken gun that was found beside Mulock's dead 
 body, and explain the fractures in the skull and the marks on it to 
 the jury, and to show them liow nicely parts of the guii-iock [ivA 
 sight on the gun fitted the indentations or fractures in the skull." 
 Gardiner i>. People, 6 Tarker's G. R. 155, 201 (18CG). 
 
 The decision that on a prosecution for selling liquor to a minor, 
 the jury are not entitled to judge of the minor's age by his appear- 
 ance seems hardly in accordance with the current of the decisions. 
 Ihinger v. State, 53 Ind. 251 (187G). 
 
 Admission khkqukxtly Dis(;ketioxary. — The admissibility of 
 real evidence is frecpiently in the discretion of the court. The 
 court may exclude such evidence when, in its opinion, it is too 
 remote or trivial to be of sufficient advantage to the decision of the 
 case. On an action for the price of a large consignment of Swiss 
 cheeses, the quality of which was in dispute, the court refused to 
 permit any of the cheese to be exhibited to the jury because of the 
 difficulty of agreeing on samples which the deterioration in the 
 interval and the bulk of the whole consignment presented. Hood 
 V. IMoch, 29 W. Va. 244, 255 (1886). Such evidence may be ex- 
 cluded where the decency, morals, or sensibilities of the community 
 would be shocked by the exhibition offered. Probably a ])regnant 
 woman would not be allowed to prove that fact by exposing herself 
 to the jury. Warlick /;. Wliite, 70 N. C. 175 (1877). 
 
 The defendant in an action for personal injuries to a young 
 woman by alleged breaking of her ribs "offered in evidence a sec- 
 tion of a human body which he claimed would show the character 
 and relative position of the bone and cartilage constituting the 
 human ribs, and the manner in which tlie bone and cartilage are 
 joined together, and joined to the breast-bone; which the surgeon 
 testified tiiat he had cut from the body of a woman about the size 
 and age of the plaintiff." Tlie court rejected the evidence. "The 
 exhibit being of doubtful utility and offensive in its nature, we 
 think the court might well exercise its discretion." Knowles v. 
 Crampton, 55 Conn. 33G (1887). 
 
 The court probably cannot reject evidence simply because it is 
 
("MAI*. l.J 
 
 AMEIMCAN NOTICS. 
 
 30522 
 
 oft'ciisive, either to the siglit or tlie intellij^ence. But if other evi- 
 (leiiee is available, the court has a discretion to exchuhi — whicli 
 it is usually not slow to exercise. Knowles /'. Cnuiijiton, o.") Conn. 
 .'WG (ISiST). " In matters of discretion the action of tiie trial court 
 is not subject to review." Knowles v. Crampton, 55 Conn. H'AG 
 (1,SS7). 
 
 By "discretion," in this connection, can hardly be meant that 
 the admission of real evidence is de])endent u])on the whim of a 
 particular judge. That tliis class of evidence can be rejected when 
 irrelevant, remote, mislead-'ng, or, indeed, objectionable upon any 
 ground wliich gives the court a right to reject personal evidence is 
 clear. But that relevant evidence, not excluded by some general 
 rule, can legally be excluded because its source is real when the 
 same evidence, if given by witnesses, would be admitted, has not 
 been decided. 
 
 " It is not true, as a rule of law, that evidence is incompetent 
 merely because it is inconclusive. It is oi-dinarily admissible, if 
 the fact sought to be proved is itself relevant to the issue, and if 
 the proposed proof legitimately tends to establish it." Teople v. 
 Gonzalez, 35 "NT. Y. 49, 62 (1806). It is not perceived that the rule 
 differs in this respect between real and personal evidence. 
 
 Cannot bk kepoutkd. — The fact that real evidence cannot in 
 many, perhajis in most, instances be reported to the appellate court 
 is a characteristic feature of this class of evidence. 
 
 Appellate courts have felt inclined to regard this circumstance 
 in various ways. It has frequently been held that as the appel- 
 late court cannot have the benelit of certain real evidence — for 
 example, the appearance of the witnesses — it should be cautious in 
 upsetting findings made upon conflicting testimony. 
 
 ]?ut in a case where, the jury having had a view, the contention 
 was made that as the facts obtained through a view are evidence 
 which the court did not have, no new trial could be granted, the 
 rule was laid down that, even under the circumstances stated, the 
 court could still grant a new trial if the judge decides that "he is 
 so far in possession of all the material evidence as to act intelli- 
 gently." Tully V. Fitchburg, R R., 1.34 :\rass. 49!) (1883). 
 
 Other courts have insisted that they have the right to review 
 findings of fact and, by consequence, a finding based upon real evi- 
 dence may deprive a party of his rights upon appeal. Stephenson 
 V. State, 28 Ind. 272 (1867); Ihinger v. State, 53 Ind. 251 (1876). 
 
;ll|: n 
 
 ^t ■ i- 
 
 I!!": 
 
 i' 
 
 EXPLANATION OF HEARSAY. [PART lU, 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 HEARSAY. 
 
 § 567.' As evidence afforded by our own senses is seldom at- 
 tainable in judicial trials, the law is satisfied with requiring the 
 next best evidence, namely, the testimony of those who can speak 
 from their own personal knowledge. It is not, indeed, requisite 
 that the witness should have personal knowledge of the main fact 
 in controversy ; for this may not be provable by direct testimony, 
 but only by inference from other facts shown to exist. But it is 
 in general necessary that a witness should only be permitted to 
 speak to such facts only as are within his own knowledge, whether 
 they be things said or done, and that he should not testify from 
 information given by others, liowever worthy of credit they may 
 be. It is, too, indispensable to the proper administration of 
 justice, — first, that every witness should give his testimony under 
 the sanction of an oath, or its equivalent, a solemn affirmation, — 
 and secondly, that he should be subject to the ordeal of a croys- 
 examination by the party against whom he is called, so that it 
 may appear, if necessary, what were his powers of perception, his 
 opportunities for observation, his attentiveness in observing, the 
 strength of his recollection, and his disposition to sp^j.^ Vac truth. 
 And testimony from the relation of third persons cannot, even 
 where the informant is known, be subjected to either of these 
 tests. It has been well observed that, " If the first speech were 
 without oath, another oath that there was such speech makes it 
 no more than a mere speaking, and so of no value in a court of 
 justice."^ Besides, it is often impossible to ascertain through 
 whom, or how many persons, the original narrative has been 
 transmitted. Evidence of this sort constitutes that sort of second- 
 
 1 Gr. Ev. § 98, in great part. 
 
 » B. N. P. 294, b. 
 
 366 
 
 fev 
 
 
 'Bl''':' 
 
 
 if 
 
 < 
 
 Mm 
 
 ii' 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 HEARSAY INADMISSIBLE. 
 
 hand evidence which is termed hearsay ; a species of proof which, 
 with a few exceptions that will be presently noticed, cannot be 
 received in judicial investigations.' 
 
 § 568. The rule excluding such evidence has been recognised in 
 England as a fundamental principle ever since the time of Charles 
 the Second.* It even applies in cases where no other evidence can 
 possibly be obtained. For example, a statement not on oath, even by 
 a dead man who was the only eye-witness of a transaction, is inad- 
 missible;' and on indictments for ravishing children, too young to 
 be admissible witnesses, statements made by the children to their 
 mothers shortly after the offence was committed cannot be received 
 in evidence.* Where a servant was indicted for perjury, in 
 saying that her deceased mistress had never had a child, declara- 
 tions of the mistress were rejected as evidence for the Crown.' 
 
 * The rule excluding hearsay evi- 
 dence, or rather the mode in which 
 that rule is f retjuently misunderstood 
 in courts of justice, is amusingly 
 caricatured by Dickens : — 
 
 " ' I believe you are in the service 
 of Mr. Pickwick, the defendant in 
 this case. Speak up if you please, 
 Mr. Weller.' 
 
 "'I mean to Foeak up, sir,' re- 
 plied Sam. ' I am in the service o' 
 that 'ere gen'l'man, an wery good 
 service it is.' 
 
 " ' Little to do, and plenty to get, 
 I suppose?' said Serjeant Buzfuz, 
 with jocularity. 
 
 " ' Oh, quite enough to got, sir, 
 as the soldier said ven they ordered 
 him three hundred and fifty lashes,' 
 replied Sam. 
 
 " ' You must not tell us what the 
 soldier, or any other man, gam, sir, 
 interposed the judge, ' if a not evi- 
 dence.'' 
 
 "'Wery good, my lord,' replied 
 Sam." See the account of Bardell 
 V, Pickwick in the Pickwick Papers, 
 at p. 367. 
 
 "^ One of the earliest cases in which 
 the rule was acted upon is Sampson 
 V. Yavdley, 1667. 
 
 3 1 Ph. Ev. 209. In Scotland the 
 rule is othei-wise ; evidence on the re- 
 lation of others being admitted, where 
 the relator is since dead, and would, 
 if living, have been a competent wit- 
 
 ness : 1 Dick.son, Ev. Sc. 66, 67 ; 
 Dysart Peer. (II. L.), 1881, where tlio 
 extent of, and exceptions to the rule 
 are disnussed at some length. It 
 seems that even where the relation 
 has been handed down to the witness 
 at second hand, and through several 
 successive relators, each only stating 
 what he received from the inter- 
 mediate relator, it will still be ad- 
 missible, if the original and inter- 
 mediate relators are all dead, and 
 would have been competent witnesses 
 if living: Tait, Ev. 430, 431; but 
 see 1 Dickson, Ev. 70. The reason 
 for receiving hearsay evidence in 
 cases where, as is often the case in 
 Scotland, the judges determine upon 
 the facts in dispute, as well as uj)on 
 the law, is stated and vindicated by 
 Sir J. Mansfield, in the Berkeley 
 Peer., 1811. Even in English courts, 
 hearsay evidence is often admitted 
 and acted upon in affidavits, which 
 are submitted to the judges only. 
 
 * R. V. Brasier, 1779; R. v. Nicho- 
 las, 1846 (Pollock, C.B.). The fact 
 that the witness made a complaint is 
 admissible. See post, § o80. And the 
 late Willes, J., used to admit the 
 further question whether, in making 
 the complaint, any name was men- 
 tioned, but this appears incorrect. 
 See R. V. Wink, 1834, post, note to 
 §681. 
 
 ^ Heath's case, 1744. In an action 
 
 367 
 

 mmw 
 
 li'i 
 
 "!-i 
 
 fi'4 
 
 '^^4- 
 
 ^t*(' <S| 'Jlj 4 
 
 'i' 
 
 IS ■' '' 
 
 I'l '. 
 
 J: ;!: 
 
 mi 
 
 GROUNDS FOE EXCLUDING HEARSAY. [PART III. 
 
 Moreover, a declaration, though made on oath, and in the course 
 of a judicial proceeding, cannot be received, if the litigating parties 
 a-e .lot the mvie ; because, in such case, the party against whom 
 the evidence is offered, has had no opportunity of cross-examining 
 the declarant.* 
 
 § 569. The rule excluding hearsay evidence will even shut out 
 proof of dec/a rationr in disparagement of his own signature made bg 
 a deceased subscribing witness to a deed or will. 
 
 S 570.' The terLT. hearsay is used in law with reference to what 
 is done or written, as well as to what is spoken. In its legal sense 
 " hearsay " evidence is all evidence which does not derive its value 
 solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but which rests 
 also, in part, on the veracity and competence of some other person.* 
 Such evidence is rejected not only because it is not given upon 
 oath, because it co -not be tested by cross-examination, and because 
 it supposes soma better testimony, which might be adduced in the 
 particular case, but also because of its tendency to protract legal 
 investigations to an embarrassing and dangerous length, its intrinsic 
 weakness,* its incompetency to satisfy the mind as to the existence 
 of the fact, and because of the frauds which might be practised 
 with impunity under its cover.* 
 
 § 571. Nevertheless, the rule excluding hearsay evidence (though 
 in general admu^iblj calculated for trials before popular tribunals) 
 may in particular inittanc ^s work considerable injustice. For 
 example, on a question respecting Wv> competency of a testator, the 
 conduct of his family or relations taking the same precautions in 
 his absence as if he were a lunatic, or his election in his absence to 
 
 of ejectment, where the same ques- 
 tiou was in issue, and the words 
 charged a« perjury were uttcrwl, such 
 evid'-nce was admitted, as relating to 
 a matter of pedigree : see Annosley v, 
 1). of Anplesea. 174:1 (Ir.). 
 
 • R. r. Nunfham Courtney, 1801 ; 
 Ferrj- Frystone, 1801 ; R. v. 
 
 Hepburn, 1813 (.\m.). 
 
 * See Stobiirt v. Dryden, 18.'56, 
 where the mutter was much dis- 
 cussed ; and it was pointed out by 
 the Court that the ])iuty adversely 
 affected had nut hud any opportunity 
 of cross-exuniinution. 
 
 » Or. Ev. § \)\), in groat part. 
 
 * 1 I'h. Ev. 185. 
 
 R. t 
 
 Abergwilly, 1807 ; Mima Queen v, 
 
 • " Pluris «»t oculatus testis unuB, qunm auriti deoom ; 
 
 Qui audiuDt, audita dicuut, qui vidont, plane eciunt." 
 
 I'LAUT. Trucu. Act 2, bo. 6, 1. 8, 9. 
 
 • Per Marshall, C.J., in Mima Davis v. Wood, 1816 (Am.); E. v. 
 Queen o. llepbum, 1813 (Am.) ; Eriswoll, 179G. 
 
 368 
 
CHAP. II.J EXCLUSION OF HEARSAY SOMETIMES UNWISE. 
 
 some high and responsible oIUcp, or the conduct of a ])hysi(iiin who 
 permitted him to execute a will, are facts which, tliough affording 
 cogent tnoral evidence, are inadmissible as evidence in a court of 
 law, because when considered with ret'crence to tlio matter in issue, 
 they appear to be mere statements expressed in the language of 
 conduct instead of the language of words, and consequently, in 
 fact, only " hearsay." ' Again, on a question of soiiworthiness, the 
 fact that a deceased captain, after examining every part of the 
 vessel, embarked in it with his family, is (for similar reasons) not 
 legal evidence on a question as to the vessel's scavvortliiuess ; * 
 neither, in an action to recover for the loss of insured proi»erty, is 
 the fact that other underwriters have paid on the same policy ,2 nor, 
 on a question of when an act of bankruptcy was committed, and 
 the title to goods arose, is evidence that after the issuing of a fiat, 
 certain creditors of the bankrupt returned to his assignees goods 
 which they had received from tbe bankrujjt previously to the date 
 when he delivered other goods to the delViulant.^ 
 
 § 572. In the instances given above, as illustrating the occasional 
 inconvenience of the rule, the evidence rejected amounted to some- 
 thing more than the mere dec/arafioiiH of parties not examined on 
 oath, nor subjected to cross-examination ; for these declarations 
 were accompanied bi/ acta done in confirmation of their sincerity, 
 and, as smth, the evidence was, morally speaking, entitltMl to great 
 weight. They were the more entitled to consideration, because if 
 an act done be relevant to the issue, and therefore evidence per se, 
 any declarations accompanying tliat act are — as we shall presently 
 see* — admissible for the purpose of illustrating, qualifying, or 
 completing it. Where, however (as in tliese instances), tlie act is 
 in its own nature irrelevant to the issue, if the declaration be 
 per se inadmissible, the union of the two canjiot reniler them 
 evidence.* 
 
 S 573. This question was much discussed in a case " whicli was 
 tried four times, where the title to jiroperty depended ujjou the 
 
 ■lii^ 
 
 t i 
 
 ;(! 
 
 « Post, ^§ :>m «t 80(1. 
 
 " "^ A. vV' K. ;it;i ; 1 liiiif,'. N. C. 498. 
 
 ' Wrijjht V. Doo (/. Tiithum, 1837 
 (Piirko, li,, Vini^liiin, J.). 
 
 ' 7 A. & K. ;(8T. ;W8. Si'o (Jioliaiu Hotel I'o. c Muiniiii),', 
 
 ' Hiii'klioiiMo i\ J011C8, 183i). Soo, lsi)7, Ir. 
 hIso, ( ircsliam llotol Uo. v, Muuninfj. " Doo (/. Tiitluiiii v. Wright. 183". 
 
 ISO 7, Ir. 
 
u 
 
 Si;! 
 
 
 !■;! I: 
 
 !• r'l 
 
 t 
 
 DOE d. TATHAM V. WRIGHT. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 oompetency of a testator to make a will. The House of Lords 
 (agreeing with the opinion of the majority of the judges, who were 
 divided as mentioned post, in note ^ at end of this section) finally 
 decided, that letters addressed to a person, whose sanity is tlie fact 
 in question, are inadmissible to show that he was sane, though the 
 writers were since dead, and the party was addressed as an 
 intelligent man, unless such letters can be connected by evidence 
 with some act done by such deceased in relation thereto. A great 
 majority of the learned judges also thought that the more fact of 
 finding such letters, many years after they were written, with the 
 seals broken, in company with other papers which bore indorse- 
 ments in the testator's handwriting, in a cupboard under his 
 bookcase in his private room, was insutRciont to i-aise an inference 
 that they had been read, understood, or acted upon by him, 
 because although letters, found in such a situation, would un- 
 doubtedly be evidence against a party crinunallj' a(!eused or civilly 
 charged — since it is a prima facie presumption of law that every 
 man is of sound mind, and it would therefore be assumed tliat the 
 deceased had appreciated the letters ' — yet that to act ujion this 
 presumption in a case where the capacity of the party is the very 
 matter in controversy, would bo to argue in a circle. It would, in 
 fact, be to argue thus : — because the testator had suflicient ability 
 to transact business, the inference arises that he read and under- 
 stood tlie letters ; and because he read and luiderstood the lf'tt(*rs, 
 therefore the inference arises that he had sufficient ability to 
 transact business.'- 
 
 § 574. If, indeed, the testator, in the case just mentioned, had 
 himself indorsed these letters, or if any direct and positive evidence 
 
 > Seo 7 A. & E. 3(i» (Onrnoy, B.); 
 id. ;{"») (HosaiKiiict, J.); 4 Bing. N. 0. 
 o:n (Althnson. H.)- 
 
 ^ Si'o 7 A. & K. :ini (Piirko, B.); 4 
 Bin^r. X. C. r.4 J (id.) ; id. oM (Alder- 
 son. B.); id. oO'J, .•)()4 (ColoridKO.J.); 
 id. .')2J, iVJCi (l'attfs..ii, J.). Tho 
 letters rejected in this ease were 
 three. Is't. A letter of gratitude to 
 the testator from iv eleigyinan to 
 whom he had formerly given pro- 
 forment; 2nd. A letter of friendship 
 from a relative, with whom tho 
 testator was proved to havo corro- 
 
 apondod three years afterwards ; 
 3rd. A letter advising tho testator 
 to direet his attorney to take steps 
 in a transaction with a certain parish. 
 This letter was indorsed by the attor- 
 ney, who was long since deceased. 
 Throe of tlio judges considered that 
 all the letters were admissible, six 
 thought that tho last was. The 
 remaining judges, including Tiords 
 Brougham, T/yndhurst, ami Cotten- 
 ham. held thiit all the letters were 
 alike inadmissible. 
 
 370 
 
 Hi 
 
CHAP. II.] HEARSAY AND ORIGINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 had he(ii\ given to show that he had, wliether by act, speech, or 
 writing, manifested a knowledge of their contents, tlie letters 
 could not have been rejected, or in any way withdrawn from the 
 consideration of the jury ; for although they would then have 
 been admitted solely on the technical ground that they explained 
 and il'istrated his conduct, no rule of law could have prevented 
 them from operating with full effect upon the minds of the jury, 
 as showing the unbiassed opinions of the writers, and in what 
 manner the testator had been treated by them.' 
 
 S 575. The Probate Division is now bound by statute to recog- 
 nise the rules of evidence observed in the other Divisions of the 
 High Court,'^ and would therefore appear to bo bound to follow the 
 decision in the case just mentioned.* 
 
 § 57 G.^ It does not follow that, because the writings or words in 
 question are those of a third person not iinder oath, they are 
 therefore to be considered as " /icarsft;/." On the contrary, it often 
 happens that the very fact in controversy is, whether certain 
 things were written, or spoken, and not whether they were tn(p ; 
 and at other times the oral or written statements tendered in 
 evidence may be the natural or inseparable concomitants of the 
 principal fact in controversy.* In either of these cases it is obvious 
 that the writings or words are not within the meaning of hearsay, 
 but are original and independent facts, admissible in proof of the 
 issue. Thus, if the question be whether a party has acted 
 prudently, wisely, or in good faith, the iiifornudion on which he 
 acted, wh<<1ier true or false, is original and material evidence. 
 Illustration of this" often u'>cur in actions for malicious prosecu- 
 
 !l 
 
 » 7 A. & E. 323 (Ld. Doiiinan); 
 4 Uiiifj. N. C. 500 (ColcridKo, J.); 
 id. oM) (Aldi'i-soii, \\.)\ iil. olO 
 (Williiiins, J ); i<l. .J()7 (Tindiil, C.J.). 
 
 ' "Tlie Sii])r. Ct. of Jud. Aci, 
 1873 " (:JG & 37 V. c. G(i), ^ 1« ; "The 
 Supr. ( 't. of Jud. Act, 187 J " (38 & 39 
 V. c. 77), § 18. 
 
 ' Whon tho cci'loHinsticiil trihuniils 
 woro courts of probiito, they iidi)|itud 
 II diffiiront rule from thiit cHtiibliwhod 
 liy tho ciiso of Doe d. Ttithani v. 
 Wright ; and in (juoHtioiiH rcspocting 
 the Qiuutul capacity uf a testator, they 
 
 ailinitto<l, as cvidcnco of Iridtinint, 
 IcttorH writt(!ii to liim hy liis fricinl.s, 
 without i)roof of any recognition on 
 hiw putt (Moigiin v. JJoys, l,S3(i (Sir 
 li. Jcnncr) ; llundh^y v. Jones, \K,i(>; 
 WittiTH r. Jlowlott, 1S31 (Sir J. 
 Nicholl) )■ — and, as cvidcnco of a/ii- 
 in'iiii, letters written by his rehitivea 
 even to otlier piirtics : AVheelur v, 
 Alderson, 1.S31 (Sir J. Nicholl). 
 
 * (Ir. Mv. § 1(10, in great j)art. 
 
 » IJartlctt ('. Dolprat, lH{)H (Am.)} 
 Du Bost ('. Herosford, 1810. 
 
 • Or. Ev. § 101, in part. 
 
 371 
 
H 
 
 REPLIES AND GENERAL REPUTE. [I'AKl III. 
 
 tion,^ or libel ; * and in cases of agency, and of trusts. Thus, in an 
 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff— to show that the 
 magistrate's Ipniency in admitting him to bail was occasioned, not 
 by the intercession of the defendant, but by a letter said to 
 have come from a great personage — may give such letter in 
 evidence, without proof that it was written by that personage's 
 autlioiity.^ A defendant in such a case may state that he acted 
 on the advice of a magistrate in what he did.* An affidavit 
 by a clerk of prosecutor's soliciH)r, used on an applicatio for bail 
 stating that means had been taken on the part of the ^j. isecutor 
 to prevent a person from becoming bail for the plaintiff, is likewise 
 admissible in such an action as original evidence, without the 
 clerk's being called- to prove by whose instructions he had made 
 it.^ And the replies given to inquiries made at the residence, 
 either of an absent witness, or of a bankrupt, denying that he 
 v/as at home, are original evidence, without examining the persons 
 to whom they ^^ere addressed, inasmuch as to establish the denial 
 (wlii(;h is the only material fact) the testimony of the parties 
 inquiring is sufTicient.® 
 
 S 577.' This doctrine not only applies whenever the fact that a 
 certain communication was made, and not its truth or falsehood, is 
 the point in controversy ; * but it also extends to those ca^es, where 
 the truth of the fact in dispute will be inferred from the exintcnee of 
 another fact which is under investigation. Thus the exMnicn of 
 general reputation, reputed ou'iirrs/iip, public rumour, tjeneral charaeter, 
 general notoriety, and the like, is prim& facie evidence of its truth. 
 In other words, the fact that the rumour which is in fact com- 
 posed of the speech of third persons not under oath exists, is 
 original evidence and not hearsay ; rumour showing the con- 
 currence of many voices as to the immediate subject of inquiry 
 
 ' Eavcnga v. Mackintosh, 1824. 
 
 * Coloman v. Southwick, 1812 
 (Am.). 
 
 =• 'hiyXoT V. Williams, 1837. 
 
 * Mctnnghan v. Cox, 1892 (Am.). 
 
 • Taylor v. Williame, 18;J7. 
 
 • Crosby V. Percy, 1808 ; Koy v. 
 Shaw, 1HH2 ; Morgan v. Morgan, 
 1h;}2; Suninor v. Williama, 1809 
 (Am.); I'ollotreau v. Jackson, I8.t.'l 
 
 (Am.); Phelps v. Foot, 1816 (Am.). 
 VVlioro it is necessary to show, not 
 only that diligent search has been 
 mane for a witness, bnt that he is 
 actually absent, such evidence is not 
 admissible. 8oe ante, §§ 475, 617. 
 
 ' nr. VjV. § 101, in part. 
 
 « Wl.it.'lic-ii(l c. .Scott, 1830; Shott 
 V. St:v,illirl,l, 1830. 
 
 ^72 
 
'W 
 
 CHAP. II.] NOTORIKTY WHEN ORIGINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 raises a presumption that the fact ia which they concur is 
 true.^ 
 
 li 57(S. For example, f/rnrral ^epi'tation is usually admissible to 
 establish the fact of parties being married."^ In many of the 
 reported oases on this subject the marriage has been proved by 
 evidence of certain specific facts, such as the parties being received 
 into society as man and wife, being visited by respectable families 
 in the neighbourhood, attending church and public places together, 
 and otherwise demeaning themselves in public, and addressing 
 each other, as persons actually married.* liut mere general 
 evidence of reputation in tue neighbomuond, even wlien un- 
 supported by facts, or when partially contradicted by evidence of 
 a contrary repute,* will be receivable in ptoof of marriage. Indeed, 
 the uncorroborated statement of a single witness, who did not 
 appear to be related to the parties, or to live near them, or to know 
 them intimately, but who asserted thnt he had heard they were 
 married, has been after verdict held sutficiont prima facie to warrant 
 the jury in finding marriage, the adverse pr.rty not having cross- 
 examined the witness, nor controverted the fact by proof.'^ And a 
 fact, as, e. </., a marringe, may be even established by reputation, 
 though one of the parties to it denies it." 
 
 § 579. Upon somewhat similar grounds, on a prosecution for 
 conspiring to procure large meetings to assemble for the purpose 
 of inspiring terror in the comnnmity, a witness may be called to 
 prove that several persons not examined at the trial had cornjiliiined 
 to him thai, they were alarmed at these meetings, and had re- 
 quested him to send for military assislance;" and on a question 
 whether a libellous painting represents a certain individual, the 
 
 » Foulkosv. Sollwiiy, 1800; Jonoa 
 »'. I'oiTV, 17!l(i; Olivor v. Baitluft, 
 1H1!»; (JiiiT *'. liuttou, INK). 
 
 - Kxci'])t in jM'titioii.s for (liiiiuifrfis 
 for utlultcry und prosecutions for 
 liifjamy, wlicro, as wi^ have soor 
 (unto. § \''l), t^trict iiroof is roqiiirod. 
 
 * Kay V. 1 )ut'lK's.so (1(1 Vi('r.:i", 1811; 
 Ili^rvoy V. Ilcrvov, 1"".'5 ; I'irt v, 
 Harlow, 1770; Head r. Passer, 1704; 
 licader )'. I'.airy, 170.'); I)oe c. I'Mi iti- 
 iiifj, 1827; (JoodiiiMii c. (Jooiliiian, 
 I8j8 ; biuitli i'. JSiuith, 1811; liaiii- 
 
 (Ilall, 
 1878 
 
 .•57 
 
 miok I'. Bronson, 1S12 ; In r(> Taylor, 
 181'J. Tliese iniu'lit possil)ly be jmi; 
 iijHUi tli(! f^roiiiid tliat tliey aiiioiiiit 
 to (iilm<8sioiii> by the parties thom- 
 solvos. 
 
 * I.yle i: Ellv.ood, 1S74 
 V.-('.j; Collins r. Bisliop, 
 (Malins, V.-('.). 
 
 * I'lvans c. >lorfi;iin, 1S;{2. 
 
 « I'lllidtt r. Totnes l.i.ion, l.SO.'J. 
 ' R. r. N'iiiouiit, 1840 , Uedl'ord v. 
 Birley, 1822. 
 
■ 
 
 F.XI'RlvSSIONS OF BODILY OR MENTAL FEELINGS. [PT. III. 
 
 declarations of spectators while looking at the picture in the 
 exhibition are admissible.* 
 
 § 580.^ Whenever the hodily or mental /pcliiiffs of an individual 
 are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings, 
 made at the time in question, are also original evidence. If they 
 were the natui-al language of the affection, whether of body or mind, 
 they furnish satisfactory evidence, and often the only proof, of its 
 existence. And the question whether they were real, or feigned, 
 is for the jury to determine. Thus, the representations by a sick 
 person of the nature and effects of the mahdi/ under which he is 
 labouring are receivable as original evidence, whether they be made 
 to the medical attendant, or to any other person, though the former 
 are naturally entitled to greater weight than the latter, inasnmch 
 as a physician is far more capable than a man unacquainted willi 
 the symptoms of diseases, of forming a correct judgment respecting 
 the accuracy of the statements.' 
 
 ^ (JSl. Accordingly, on a trial for murder by poisoning, state- 
 ments made by the deceased in conversation shortly before he took 
 the poison, have been received in evidence for the purpose of 
 proving the slate of his health at that time.* In actions or in- 
 dictments for assault, what a man has said about himself to his 
 surgeon is evidence to show what he suffered by reason of the 
 asirault;* on an indictment for highway robbery, the fact that tlie 
 
 I Du Bost r. Berosford, 1810 (Ld. 
 Ellonboroujjh). 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 102, in part. 
 
 ' Avosou V. lid. Kiiiniiird, 1805 ; 
 E. V. Bliimly, 17.>2 ; Chvy v. Younj!;, 
 1823 (Am.) ; Gilchrist v. Bale, 1839 
 (Am.). To such tin extent has this 
 doctrine been carried that whore, 
 in an action by a husband uiMin a 
 policy of insurance on the lite of his 
 wife, the question was ns to the 
 state of the wife's health at the time 
 when the policy was etVected, a wit- 
 ness for the defendants was aUowed 
 to state the result (jf a conversation 
 with the deceased, which took ]ilaco 
 shortly after the surf,'eon who was 
 consulted in olYecting the insurance 
 had given a certificate of her heiiltli. 
 in the course of wiiieh tlii^ decea>ed 
 had expressed an ajipreheusiou that 
 she should only live u lew dujs, and 
 
 had added that she had not been well 
 from a time preceding her being ex- 
 amined by the surgeon. The con- 
 versation being held admissible, 
 al^'hough at that time it was a general 
 rule that the declaration of a wife 
 against her husband must be ex- 
 cluded Cseo, now, 10 & 17 V. c. 83), 
 as the argeon liad been first called 
 by the plaintiff, and had admitted 
 that ho had formed his opinion 
 respecting her health, j)rincipally 
 from the satisfactory answers which 
 she then gave to his inquiries : Avcsoa 
 V. Ld. Kinnaird, lcS{»,j. In Witt v. 
 Witt and Xlin.lworth, 1862, Sir 0. 
 Cresswell rejected Idtura written by 
 a patient to a medical man describing 
 his symptojns. Sed ipi. 
 
 * K. ('. Johnson, 1.S47 (Alderson, 
 B.); B. V. JUandy. 17.)2. 
 
 " Avesou V. Ld. Kiunaiid. 1803 
 
 3r4 
 
 '( 
 
 !*' 
 
CH. II.] EXPRESSIONS OF BODILY OR MENTAL FEELINGS. 
 
 prosecutor, a few hours after the attack made upon him, com- 
 plained to a constable that he had been robbed, will perhaps be 
 admissible.* In prosecutions for rape, proof that the woman 
 shortly after the injury complained that a dreadful outrage had 
 been perpetrated upon her, would seem to be receivable as inde- 
 pendent evidence ; "^ and if the prosecutrix were called as a witness, 
 such complaints would a fortiori be admissible as tending to confirm 
 her credit.* In no case, however, can the pm'tkuJnrH of the com- 
 plaint be disclosed by witnesses for tlie Crown, either as original, 
 or as confirmatory evidence, but the details of the statement can 
 only be elicited by the prisoner's counsel on cross-examination.* 
 
 § 582. In consequence, too, of the general rule * that the menial 
 feelings of individuals may be shown by proof of what they 
 naturally expressed at the time, in petitions for damages on the 
 ground of adultery ,*• if it be material, with the view to damages, 
 to ascertain upon what terms tlie husband and wife lived together 
 before the seduction, their language and deportment towards each 
 other, their correspondence together, and their conversations and 
 correspondence with third persons, are original evidence.' But 
 here, to guard against abuse, it is required to be proved by some 
 evidence, independent of the date appearing on the face of the 
 letters,^ that they were written by the wife to the husband prior to 
 
 
 J 
 
 I 
 
 (Lawrence, J.) ; R. v, Guttiidgo, 1840 
 (I'arko, B.). 
 
 ' R. V. Wink, 18;54 ; commented 
 
 ipon (Cresswcll, J.) in R. v. Osborne, 
 
 .842. The witness, however, cannot 
 
 be further asked whether on making 
 
 the complaint, prosecutor mentioned 
 
 anyone's name : Id, 
 
 » R. V. Megson, 1840 (Holfe, 1?.); 
 R. V. Osborne, 184U (Cresswell, J.); 
 R. V. Lunny, 18,j4 (Monahan, C.J.). 
 In R. c. Uuttridge, 1840, whcsre a 
 proseciitiix for a rape was absent 
 from the trial, J'arke, 15., rejected 
 proof of her complaint, ai)i)arently on 
 the ground that it was only confir- 
 matory evidence. 
 
 " R. V. ^leg8(m, 1840; R. >■. Clarke, 
 1817; R. V. Wood, 1877 (liramwell, 
 L. J.). 
 
 ♦ R. V. Walker, 18;J9 (Parke. B.); 
 R. V. Osborne, 1842 ; R. v. (iuigley, 
 1842 (Torreus, J.), J.r. But see R. 
 
 a: 
 
 V. Wood, 1877 (Bramwell, L.J.). It 
 is ditlicult to see u])on what jirinciple 
 this rule is fouiuled, wliia'e the com- 
 plaint is olfcred as conHrmatory (evi- 
 dence ; because, if witnessi's were 
 ])ermitted to ndate all that the pro- 
 secutrix had said in nuiking her 
 original comi>laint, such evidcnco 
 would furnish the best test of the 
 acciuacy of iier recollection, when 
 she was sworn to describe tli(! same 
 circumstances at the trial : see R. v. 
 Walker, 18;}!». 
 
 ' Su])ra, § .)80. 
 
 « See 20 & 21 V. c. 8o ("The Matri- 
 monial Causes Act, bS,J7 "), § 'M. 
 
 ' Trelawney v. Coleman, 1817; 
 Willis r. Bernard. l.S.'{2; Winter »•. 
 Wroot, 1n;{4 (Ld. livndhurst) ; Uil- 
 clirist r. Bale, l8;j!) (Am.). 
 
 " Ti'elawney r. Coleman, 1817 
 (Ilolrovd, J.); Ilouliston v. Smyth, 
 182j (Best, C.J.)' 
 
 5 
 
ii'fj 
 
 
 If % 
 
 it 'i 
 
 i' ! 
 
 
 
 DOCTKINK OP liKS OESTiE. 
 
 [I'T. Ill 
 
 any suspicion of misconduct on lier part, and, consequently, at a 
 time when it cannot be supposed that there was any reason for 
 collusion.' It is not, however, necessary, in the absence of other 
 suspicious circumstances, to explain why the husband and wife 
 were living apart at the time when the letters were written,^ 
 though of course it is expedient that such explanation should, if 
 possible, be given. 
 
 § 583.' Another rule is that decorations and arts which form 
 what is called part of the res gestoe are not regarded as hearsay, 
 but admitted as original evidence. It is not easy to exj)lain of 
 what the res gestae consists. The best explanation of the prin- 
 ciple which admits evidence of res gesta) is this. The affairs of men 
 consist of a complication of circumstances, so intimately interwoven 
 as to be hardly separable from each other. Each owes its birth to 
 some preceding circumstance, and each in tvirn becomes the prolific 
 parent of others : each, during its existence, has its inseparable 
 attributes, and its kindred facts, materially affecting its character, 
 and essential to be known, in order to a right understanding of 
 its nature. Consequently, these surrounding circumstances may 
 always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact, as it 
 constitutes part of the res gestce, in other words of the transaction 
 if looked at in its entirety and as a whole. It is impossible to say 
 in each case how the individual jiidge will exercise his discretion. 
 For there are no fixed principles for dealing with this question ; * 
 the application of the doctrine of res gestae is consequently hard 
 to understand. Lord Blackburne once sarcastically remarked to 
 another counsel in the editor's hearing, that if one tenders inadmis- 
 sible evidence, he should, if it is in chief, say that " it is part of the 
 res gestae," and, if it is in re-examination, that " it arises out of 
 the cross-examination." Perhaps the best general idea of what is 
 meant by res gestae, is that this expression includes everything that 
 may be fairly considered " an incident of the event under conside- 
 ration." The following examples may serve as illustrations of 
 
 » Edwards v. Crock, 1801 (Ld. 
 Kenyon) ; Trelawney v. Colouian, 
 1817 ; Wilton v. Wob.ster, 1835 (Cole- 
 ridf»o, J.). Soe Wyiidham's Divorce 
 Bill, l«oa, H. L. 
 
 ' Trelawuoy v. Coleman, 1817. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 108, in groat part. 
 
 * Per Parke, J., in Eawson v. 
 Haigh, 1824; Kidloy v. Oydo, 1832; 
 Poolw. Bridfres, 182') (Am.); Allen r. 
 Duncan, 1831 (Am.). 
 
 376 
 
'1 
 
 CHAP. II.] 
 
 DOCTRINE OF RES OEST^. 
 
 rulings upon the point, and would doubtless be followed if ever a 
 similar, or nearly similar, state of matters arose. Thus, on the 
 trial of Lord George Gordon for treason, the cry of the mob, who 
 accompanied the prisoner, was received in evidoniie, as forming 
 part of the res gestoo, and showing the character of the principal 
 fact.^ What the driver of a train said directly after a child has 
 been knocked down by his train is also evidence.^ On an indict- 
 ment for manslaughter, a statement as to liow the accident happened, 
 made by the deceased immediately after he was knocked down, 
 has been held admissible.^ Even evidence as to what the wife said 
 immediately after the occurrence, was received in an action by 
 husband and wife for wounding the wife.* Directions given by an 
 alleged owner of goods to a person to whom lie hus given actual 
 possession of such goods, to the efPect that the goods are to be 
 treated as a certain person, who has since become bankrupt, should 
 direct on calling, are evidence on a question of title arising between 
 the alleged owner of such goods and the bankrupt's assignees.* 
 
 § 584. Generally where a person enters upon laud to take 
 advantage of a forfeiture, to foreclose a mortgage, to defeat a dis- 
 Ecisin," or the like ; or changes his actual residence, or doniicil,' or 
 is upon a journey, or leaves his home, or returns thither, or remains 
 abroad, or secretes himself; or, in fine, does, or suffers, any other 
 act material to be understood ; * his declarations made at the time 
 of the transaction, and expressive of its character, motive, or object, 
 are regarded as " verbal acts, indicating a present purpose and 
 intention," and are therefore admitted in proof, like any other 
 material facts.^ Thus, in a suit for enticing away a servant, his 
 
 ' E. V. Ld. George Gordon, 1781- 
 
 * Ilcruies V. Chicago Ry. Co., 18i». 
 (Am.): International Hy. Co. V. Andor- 
 8011, 1891 (Am.). Compare, po.st, note ' 
 to § 584. 
 
 ' R. V. Foster, 1834 (Parke and 
 Patteson, JJ., and Gurney, B.), 
 queHtioned by Cockburu, C.J., in 
 K. . Bedingtield, 1879, and in a 
 Hubseqiient pamphlet, but supported 
 by the author in a letter to the Cliief 
 Justice in reply, published l)v Messrs. 
 Maxwell in 1880. 
 
 * Thompson v. Trevanion, 1694 
 (Ld, Holt). 
 
 ' Sharp I'. Newsholme, 1839. 
 
 ' Co. Lit. 49 b, 245 b ; Bobidou v. 
 
 Swott, 1825 (Am.). 
 
 ' Brodic v. liiodie, 18(il. 
 
 * I'arrott v. Watts, 1877; Mutual 
 Life, &c. V. Ilillman, 1892 (Am.). 
 
 » IJateman u. Bailey, 1794, anil 
 the observations of Mr. Evans upim 
 it, in 2 I'otli. Obi. App. No. xvi. 
 § 11; Rawson v. llaigh, 1824; 
 Yacher v. Cocks, 1829 (Ld. Tenter- 
 den); Smith V. Cramer, 1835; Doe 
 V. Arkwright, IHM (I'arko, B.); 
 Lord V. Colvin, 1857 ; Gorham v. 
 Canton, lb28 (Am.); Thorndiko v. 
 City of Boston, l,S4U(Am.); Lund v. 
 Tvngsborough, 1851 (Am.). In R. v. 
 Edwards, 1S72, Ciuain. J., on a trial 
 of wile miuder, allowed a witness to 
 
 'h 
 
 877 
 

 
 i 
 
 DOCTKINK OF RES GESTiE. 
 
 [ 
 
 VMIT HI. 
 
 fitatement at tlie time of leaving his master will be received, as 
 tending to show the mot ire of his departure.' Similarly, upon an 
 inquiry as to the state of mind, sentiments, intentions, or opinions ^ 
 of a person at any particular period, his contemporaneous declara- 
 tions are admissible as parts of the res gestoo, though evidence of 
 this nature is seldom entitled to much weight.'' 
 
 *i 585. The operation of the doctrine that statements may be 
 admissible in some cases as part of the res gestie is so extensive tha*. 
 it may sometimes even override the general provision of law, whi A\ 
 precludes a party's declarations from being evidence for himself. 
 For example, in an action for falsely representing the solvency of 
 a stranger, whereby the plaintiffs were induced to trust him with 
 goods, statements by them at the time when the goods were 
 supplied, that they trusted him in consequence of the representation, 
 were received as evidence on their behalf ; * and in au ^tion against 
 a bailee for loss by negligence, his declarations, contemporaneous 
 with the loss, are, in America, admissible in his favour, as tending 
 to show the nature of the loss.^ But witnesses called to speak to 
 what defendant said at a meeting held on a certain date, though 
 they may be cross-examined as to the whole conversation at that 
 meeting, cannot be asked (with a view to explaining his intentions 
 or conduct) what defendant said on other occasions." 
 
 § 5Kt). In the practical application of the doctrine as to the 
 admission of evidence as part of the res gestoe, two points deserve 
 especial attention. The first is, tnat declarations, — though adniis- 
 pible as evidence of the declarant's kiwnledyc or bi'licf of the facts 
 to which they relate, and of his intentions respecting them, — are no 
 
 atatc whiit the wifo had siiiil about 
 hor hiisbiiiul a wook boforo lior dxiith, 
 oi! biin},'iii}^ to tho oottugo of tlio wit- 
 nc^ss an iixo anil carving knit'o to bo 
 takoii euro of. ^I'd tin. as to this caso. 
 ' Iladlcy L'. Carter, IK.'JJ. p't-o, 
 however, K. V. "SVainwright, 1H76 
 (("ockburn, C.J.), and il. v. Took, 
 1.HT1 (Hovill.O.J,), etqu. InBosccxi's 
 Niwi Trills (Kith odit. Vol. 1. p. (Jl!»). 
 it is stated that tho declarations of a 
 coachdrivor as to tho loss of a parcel 
 sent hy coach aro evidenco aj^ainst 
 )iis iiiiistc, and Mayhew c. Nelson, 
 1S:<:{. is cited for this. But tho jiro- 
 jiosition is too broadly stated , decla- 
 rations by a servant aro only evidenco 
 
 37 
 
 if maile at the time. See ante, § .js:j. 
 
 * Bartholomy v. The People, &c., 
 184'2 (Am.). 
 
 ^ lio(l<j:son V. Do Beauehosno, 1858 
 (Dr. Lii.shington), cited with appro- 
 bation (Jessel, M.Il.) in Doiicet v, 
 Geoghc^an, 1878; Ilaldano v. Iv'k- 
 ford, 18(i!> (James, L.J.) ; and Dou- 
 cet V. Geoghegan, 187K 'id.). 
 
 ■» Fellowes v. Williamson. 1829 
 (Ld. Tenterden). See, also, Miluo v, 
 Leislor, 18(i2. 
 
 i- Story, Bail. ^ 'M9 ; citing Tom- 
 kins )'. Saltniarsh, 182(j. See, also, 
 Beardsleo r. Kichanlsou, 183U(Am.). 
 
 « Soe 21 ilow. St. Tr. 542, 54 J 
 (1781). 
 
 8 
 
C. II.] 
 
 WHAT DECLARATIONS FORM PART OF RKS GK.ST.15. 
 
 proof whatever of the facts themselves. If it he necessary to sliow 
 tlie existence of such facts, proof aliunde must be laid before the 
 jury. Indeed, it seems that, in strict practice, this proof should bo 
 given in the first instance, before the court bo called ui)on to 
 receive evidence of the declarations. For instance, the fact of 
 insolvency must be established before statements of the insolvent 
 to show that he wajs aware of his embarrassed circumstances will be 
 admitted.' 
 
 § 587. The second point to be observed with regard to the 
 admission of hearsay evidence is, that, although acts, by whom- 
 soever done, are res gestro when they are relevant to tlie matter in 
 issue,* yet if they be irrelevant, both the acts themselves and the 
 declarations qualifying or explaining tliem will be rejected. For 
 instance, in an action against a town for injuries sustained through 
 a defect in a highway, the declarations of a surgeon, since de- 
 ceased, made at the time of his examining the plaintiff's wounds, 
 have been rejected as evidence of the nature and extent of the 
 injuiies, since the fact of the surgical examination would itself 
 have been immaterial, and the declarations were no more than the 
 mere hearsay expression of a professional opinion.* To non-atten- 
 tion to this principle was due one of the main fallacies in support 
 of the contention that letters written to a person are evidence 
 (which we have seen that they are not) * in support of his sanity. 
 For such a letter, if admissible at all, must be so, either because the 
 act done in writing and seeding it is evidence in itself, or because 
 the opinion which is inferentially expressed by it being donw is 
 evidence. But the act done (that of writing and sending the letter) is 
 
 ' Thomas V. Conncll, 18;J8; Craven 
 V. IliiUiloy (no date), (Parko, B.); 
 Vachor v. Cocks, 1829. Souiotinies, 
 indi'od, nndor the law relating to 
 bankrupts, the truth of the facts 
 need not bo i>r()ved. Again, if an 
 act roliod on as an act of bankruptcy 
 be an absenting witli intent to delay 
 creditors, a declaration by the baiik- 
 ruj)t that he left home to avoid a 
 writ will be admissible, though no 
 evidence bo given that any writ was 
 actually out against him, because, in 
 order to coiistituto this act of bank- 
 ruptcy, neitlier writ nor pressure is in 
 fact uecessaiy (Jlouch v. Gt. West. 
 
 3 
 
 Ey. Co., 1841 ; Newn)an r. Stretch, 
 182i» (I'arke, J.); K.\ i)artc Miiniford, 
 1809; iJobson r. Eolls, l,s;i;i); but 
 the d(!parture from home, wliich is 
 the siibstantivo net, must bi' ))roved 
 by evidence indcpciidcnt of the do- 
 cbiratiou ; and being an iict in its(>li 
 enuivttcal, the stati'umnt c>l thf liank- 
 rujit, niiidt' (lui'iiig its cciuiiiiuitnce, is 
 adniis>ibl(' to show tl>e iiitriitinii with 
 which it was done. 
 
 « Wright i\ Doe (/. Tatlinm, I8:J7 
 (Parke, li.). 
 
 ' Lund V. Tyngoborough, 1815 
 (Am.). 
 
 * Supra, § 572. 
 
 9 
 
m 
 
 '! 
 
 i!(iJ3l 
 
 I: 
 
 
 I ■■ 
 fl 
 
 j ■1.1 
 
 WHAT DECLARATIONS FORM PART OF RKS (ilvST-E. [l>. KI 
 
 (like tlie medical exiiminatiou iu tlio case just cited) obviouMlv 
 immatorial to the strict issue (that of sanity or insanity) ; and ' 
 where the declaration jier se cannot he received, no ease has yet 
 establislied that tlie union of the two things (the irrelevant act and 
 the accompanying declaration) will rcndijr them admissihle.* 
 
 § 5H8. In all these cases the principal points for consideration 
 are, whotlier the circiinnifdiircs and (frc/drafioii.s offered in i)roof were 
 80 coniipctcd iritli the main fart under ccmsideration as to illustrate 
 its charactir, to further its object, or to form, in conjunction with 
 it, one continuous transaction. It was at one time thoUght neces- 
 sary that they should bo coitfritiporrniroiis with it ; * but it seems 
 now to be deinded, that, although concurrence of time must always 
 bo considered as material evidence to show the connection, it is by 
 no means essential.^ For example, what a bankrupt said imme- 
 diately on his return home, as to the place where he had been, and 
 his motive in going, is admissible ; * where a disputed act of bank- 
 ruptcy is whether a transfer was fraudulent or not, a declaration 
 by the bankrupt, iu which he gave a false account of the matter, 
 made nearly a month after it had taken i)laee, to a creditor, who 
 had pressed for payment of his debt immediately before the 
 transfer, and had been promised security for the following day ; 
 when, instead of keeping his word, the bauknijit had transferred 
 his property to a relative, and had absconded, was held to be 
 receivable in evidence." And where a trader had absented himself 
 from home during the latter half of February and the commence- 
 ment of March, two letters written by him on the IGth of Januar}-, 
 in which he had asked for time on some bills of exchange payable 
 iu February, were admitted in evidence, as tending to throw light 
 
 * As before obspr%'e(l. § 572. 
 
 « So2 per CultiiiHii, J., in Wright 
 V. Dot! (/. Tiitliiuii, 18;J7, ante. § 52. 
 
 ' This Ki'ouis still to bo the law 
 in Aiiu'ricu. In Enos v. Tattle, 
 IK'-'O (Am.), Ilosmer, f'.J., observed, 
 that (It'ilaiiitioiiH, to become pnit of 
 the res jjesliv, "must have been made 
 (it fill- tiiiif ii/lhf (irl (!iiiii\ which they 
 are suiijjo^ed to (•hara(t((ii/o. and have 
 been well calcnlati'd to unfold tlie 
 natui'ti and ij[uality of the facts tlu'V 
 
 were intended to explain, and so to 
 harmonize with tlu-ni. as obviously 
 to constitute one transaction.'' 
 
 * Kouch V. Cit. West. Ky. Co., 
 1841. 
 
 ' Iktemnn V. I3ailey, 1794; recop:- 
 ni/.ed by the court in Kouch v. (.It. 
 West. K'v. Co., 1841. 
 
 « IJidrey V. Gyde, 18:52; disson- 
 ticnto Gasoleo, J., but reeopnized 
 and cnnfirmed in IJouch v. Gt. West, 
 liy. Co., 1841. 
 
 yso 
 
 H j; ! 
 0«;- i' 
 
 ■1'^ 
 
 te> : 
 
niAP. 11.] NARRVTIVES OF PAST EVENTS INADMISSIMLE. 
 
 mi tilt) cause of his absonco.' Indeed, tlipse cases oxoinplify the 
 ivinarks of Mr. Justioo Park,^ namely, " that it is iniiiossiiilo to tie 
 down to time the rule as to the doitlarations," and that, if eon- 
 iK'ctinjT circumstances exist, a declaration may, oven at a month's 
 interval, form part of the whole res gestoo. 
 
 S 589.' Still, an ar". cannot bo varied, qnalifird, or explained, 
 either by a declarati(»n which amounts to no more than a mere 
 iiiirrafiiv of a past occurrcnrr, or by an inolafi'd conversation hold, or 
 an isolated act done, at a later period.* Accordingly, the schedule 
 of an insolvent, delivered four months after his execution of a deed 
 of assignment, has been rejected, when tendered by the assignees 
 as evidence that the indenture was executed with intent to peti- 
 tion ; * and where a creditor called upon a bankrupt in the morning, 
 and being told that he was out, paid a second visit in the evening 
 of the same day, when the bankrupt made a statement respecting 
 his absence in the morning, this statement was held inadmissible 
 for the purpose of showing that the bankrupt had intentionally 
 denied himself to his creditors, it being, he considered, too remote 
 in point of time from the absence which it purposed to explain,* 
 But declarations made, or letters written, during absence from 
 home, explanatory of the motive of departure, are nevertheless 
 admissible as original evidence, the departure and absence being 
 regarded as one continuing aot.' 
 
 § 590.* Similar principles to those just mentioned, namely, that 
 the acts and the declarations must be connected together as regards 
 time and otherwise, apply to the reception of evidence of the acts and 
 declarations of one of several individuals in a company of conspirators 
 as evidence against his fellows. Here, a foundation should first be 
 laid by proof, sufficient, in the opinion of the judge, to establish 
 primrv facie the fact of conspiracy between the parties, or, at least, 
 proper to be laid before the jury, as tending to establish such fact. 
 The connexion of the individuals in the unlawful enterprise being 
 
 ' Smith V, Cramer, 1835. 
 * In Eawson v. Haigh, 1824. 
 Gr. Ev. § 110, slightly. 
 Hyde v. Palmer, 1862. 
 Peacock v. Harris, 1836. 
 Lees V. Marton, 1832 (Parke, B.). 
 It is, however, hardly possible to 
 reconcile this case with Bateman v. 
 
 Bailoy, 1794, cited ante, § 588, n. *, 
 and it possibly would now ' be con- 
 sidered as applying the principle 
 stated in the tcixt too strictly. 
 
 ' Eouch I'. Gt. West. Ey. Co., 1841 ; 
 Eawson r. Ilaigh, 1.S24. 
 
 " Gr. Ev. § 111, in groat part. 
 
 381 
 

 
 I ) 
 
 ACTS AND DECLARATIONS OF CONSPIRATORS. [PART II F. 
 
 thus shown, every act and declaration of each member of the con- 
 fed»Ta<-y, in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with 
 reference to the common object, is, in contomj)lation of law, tho act 
 and declaration of them all; and is, therefore, original evidence 
 against each of them.' 
 
 § 591. Sometimes, for the sake of convenience, the acts or 
 declarations of one are udtuitted in evidence before proof of the 
 conspiracy has been given ; the prosecutor undertaking to furnish 
 such pnx)f in a subsequent stage of the cause. ]3ut this mode of 
 prof-eeding rests in the discretion of the judge, and in seditious or 
 other general conspiracies is seldom permitted, except under par- 
 ticular and urgent circumstances. If it were, the jury might be 
 misled to inter the fact of the conspiracy itself from the declarations 
 of strangers. Still, as a conspiracy need not be established by 
 proof which actually brings the parties together, but may be shown, 
 like any other fact, by circumstantial evidence, the detached acts of 
 the different persons accused, including their written correspond- 
 ence, entries made by them, and other documents in their possession 
 relative to the main design, will sometimes from necessity bo ad- 
 mitttnl, as steps to establish the conspiracy itself. On this subject it 
 is difficult to establish a general inflexible rule, an 1 each case must, 
 in some measure, be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.' 
 
 ^ .0!»2.' It mokes no dilference at what fime the party accuse;! is 
 proved to have entered into the conspiracy or combination ; because 
 every one, who agrees with others to effect a common illegal pur- 
 l^me, is generally considered in law as a party to every act, which 
 either had Wfore been done, or may afterwards bo done, by the 
 confederates, in furtherance of the common design.* One or two 
 
 m 
 
 ' h. r. Stone, 17fM>; .Vmoriciin Kui 
 Co. r. U. S.. 1H2!» (.\m.); rrownin- 
 ^hieMfj caw.-. lM;m (A;u.); U. S. i;. 
 licMMliiiff. ISJT .Vm.); »'nm. r. I'ImtIo, 
 1817 (Aiii.;. In H. r. MKcnnii, \nri 
 (Ir.). I'enm-fathw, I'. J., niiiil:— " It Ih 
 noco«*ary to provf tho existonoe of 
 a conspinirv, and to connw^t the 
 priiiuner with it in tho fiiHt inHtunee, 
 whor»» you HO«'k to ^ivo in eviiltuico 
 a^minr't him tho docliimtion of » co- 
 rf>nf«pirat<»r ; and hiivinj? donn bo, 
 jou ai-e tht-n at lilx'ity to give iu 
 
 oviili'uco apiiimt tho priHonor acts 
 ilono l)y liny i-f tho parfios, whom 
 you liavo coinu'iti'd with tho con- 
 miinicy ; but wlion a piirtyV own 
 dcclitnitionH ant to bo giv(«n in ovi- 
 donco, Miich pn.'liniinary jiroof is not 
 riMiuinito, and yo.i niiiy, iis in any 
 othrr otYonco, jirovo tho whohi cam) 
 apiinst him by hiH own aihiiiMHions." 
 
 ■' Soo R. t'. iJhiko, 18M; Ford v. 
 Elliot, 1840. 
 
 » Or. Ev. 5 111, in part. 
 
 * H. V. Watson, 1817 (Uayloy, J.), 
 
 382 
 
CnAP. II.] ACTS AND DECLARATIONS OF COX.SnUATOUS. 
 
 individuals may have concocted the scheme, but all who afterwards 
 join in carrying it out are equally guilty with the originators ; ' ut 
 least, if any evidence be forthcoming from which their adoption of 
 the previous acts of the association can reasonably be inferred.' 
 Neither does it matter whether the acts were done, or the declara- 
 tion made, in the prcnencc or in the nhscnrr of the accusfMl, but 
 everything said or done by any one of the consi)irator8 or accom- 
 plices in furtherance of the common object is evidence against 
 each and all of the parties concerned, whetlior they were present or 
 absent, and whether or not they were individually aware of what 
 was taking place.* For example, it is on this principle that (as wo 
 liave seen'*) the cries of a mob, with whoso proceedings the prisoner 
 is connected, though made in his absence, are admissible against 
 him, as explanatory of the objects which he, in common with the 
 multitude, had in view;* proof of expressions used by jtcrsons 
 going to a meeting convened by the defendant is admissible,' and 
 papers supporting a defendant's views, publicly sold at meetings 
 convened by him, may be received in evidence, though no proof be 
 given connecting the defendants with the persons selling the papers.' 
 § 69;}. Care, however, must be taken to distinguish betwcsen 
 declarations, which are either acts in themselves purporting to 
 advance the objects of the criminal enterprise, or which accompany 
 and explain such acts, and those statements (not amounting, of 
 (■i)urse, to admissions by the accused himself), whether written or 
 oral, which, although made during the continuance of the jilot, are in 
 fact a mere uirmtitr of the measures that have already been taken. 
 These last statements are, as before explained," inadmissible. Kor 
 t'xampl's a letter, written by a co-conspirator to a private friend, 
 who was nnconnovited with the plot, giving an account of the j)ro- 
 ceedings of a society to which the writer and the defendant wero 
 proved to have belong(Ml, and enclosing several ."^editions songs 
 htated to have been coniposc^l by the writer, and sung by him at a 
 meeting of the society, has been rejected, on the ground that such 
 
 ' R.r. Murphy, lH;J7(<'()li>ri(lK0, J.). 
 
 » K. V. O'Oonn.'ll, lH4;{-4 (Ir.) 
 (roiiuofuthor, C.J.). 
 
 ' H. V. HnnKhoth, 1H17. 
 
 « U. V. 1,(1 Gi!o. ndriloii. 1781, 
 Bupi-a, { dtt3 ; citod by buller, J., iu 
 
 R. r. Hanly, 17!»». Soo R. v. IVtiho- 
 riiii, IN.V). 
 
 » R. V. Hunt, 1820; R...lf.,nl .;. 
 Uiil..v, 1H'J2. 
 
 « R. r. O'Comioll, 1S43-4 (Ir.). 
 
 ^ Autu, § oStf. 
 
 888 
 
 ^1 
 
li I 
 
 i I ; 
 
 ■! :"! 
 
 mi 
 
 NARRATIVP:S, descriptions, etc. inadmissible, [p. III. 
 
 letter was not a transaction in support of the conspiracj', Imt merely 
 a relation of the part wliioh the writer had taken in the plot, and, us 
 such, only admissible against himself.^ On the other hand, a letter 
 written by a co-conspirator to a delegate in the country, describing 
 the events that had occurred in London, and encourtigiiuj him tlivtrhii 
 to prorred in the cruniiial l)Hfiiiirii.s in n-hich he was emjafjed, being 
 considered by the court as an act done in furtherance of the plot, 
 has been received against the defendant, though no evidence was 
 given to show that it had over reached the person for whoso 
 perusal it was intended.* 
 
 § 504. In a similar way entries in books made in furfh.orance of 
 a conspiracy are admissible,' but memoranda of payments made 
 after the fraud by one conspirator to another are not.* Neither is 
 evidence of a conversation overheard between men apparently 
 rcfnniing from a meeting, lield .Ithin an hour before, about half a 
 mile off, though it be offered as evidence, not only of the general 
 nature of the meeting, but of the eftect that was likely to bo 
 produced by the language there employed.* In a word, the 
 declarations of a conspirator or accomplice are receivable against 
 his fellows only when they are in themselves acts, or when they 
 accompany and explain acts, for which the others are responsible ; 
 but not when they are in the nature of narrative % descriptions, or 
 subsequent confessions. 
 
 S 590. On a somewhat similar principle, if, after his appre- 
 liension, papers be found on the person or at the lodgings of a 
 co-conspirator, they will be admissible or not against either an 
 alleged conspirator according as there is or Ib not evidence 
 that they existed previously to the arrest of the prisoner who 
 is on his trial. If there bo no such evidence, they will be 
 rejected, as ' a prisoner cannot be responsible for acts or 
 writings, which possibly may not have existed until after the 
 
 ' R. V. Hardy, 1794 rEyro, C.J., 
 Macdonald, C.U., and llofham, H. ; 
 HuUor and Oroso, JJ., diss.). In U. 
 t'. Watson, IHl", Ld. Kllonborotiuh 
 oliscrvi'd that thcio was a ^Mvat 
 \vi'i;rlit in tho argumcuta of Uullor 
 and UroHO, J J. 
 
 • B. V. Hardy, supra (^racd'inald, 
 G.1I., Ildthuin, li., Itulltn- and CJruoo, 
 JJ. ; Kyio, (".J., dtibit.). 
 
 ' It. r. Hlako, 18-14. 
 
 « Id. 
 
 » 11. V. OTmmAl lS4.'J-4 fir.). 
 S('i>, iilsd, P.. r. Mui'idiy, W,i' ; U. v. 
 \V.itM.)n, IM7. 
 
 3f>4 
 
CHAP. II.] PAPERS FOUND UNPUBLISHED WRITINOS. 
 
 common enterprise was, so far as he was concerned, at an end ; ' 
 but if their previous existence be established, either by direct 
 jiroof, or by strong presumptive evidence, no objection to their 
 iiilmissibility can prevail.* 
 
 § 596. On an indictment for conspiracy, unpublished irritiHgs 
 upon nbsfmct subjects are certainly admissible in evidence if it be 
 proved that they were intended to be used in furtherance of the 
 (omraon design.' Possibly, too, such writings, although no proof 
 that they were connected with the common design was given, 
 would be in strictness admissible if they appeared to be closvhj 
 cniinected with the nature and object of the alleged crime ; but 
 unpublished writings upon abstract subjects of a kindred nature 
 with the crime charged, but having no direct relation to it, are 
 ceitdinly inadmissible.'* Where conrersafions of co-conspirators or 
 !ici'omi)lice8 are proved, the effect of the evidence will of course 
 depend upon the surrounding circumstances, such as the fact 
 iitid degree of the prisoner's attention to what was said, and his 
 approval or disapproval thereof.* 
 
 $i 597. The declaralions of co-trespassers in civil actions are 
 governed by rules similar to those in cases of conspiracy which we 
 have just been considering; that is, if several are jointly sued, the 
 (It'darations of each, which constitute parts of the res gosta?, are 
 iiiliuissible against all ; " while those which amount to more 
 admissions, or narratives of past events, can only be received 
 against the party making them.' Where no common object or 
 
 • R. V. Hardy, 1794. 
 
 « U. V. WiitsDii, 1S17. Soo R. V. 
 M<'utt'oit.V, lH(i()-7 (Ir.). Thurc, acts 
 (if iiisuiTi'ction coiuiiiifteil at'tt'i" tho 
 iiirc.st of tho priHoiiur, hut in cou- 
 w(|\i('i\<'() of iiistructionH jrivon hv 
 hull hi^foro lio was mtprflicndtMl, 
 wi'i'ii huld to be adniiw.tihhi in ovi- 
 di'iico on n. charge of consiiiracy to 
 laist' I'tihuiUoii, 
 
 •• U. I'. Watson, 1817. 
 
 * In Alpffinon Sidney's case, KiH.'J, 
 (iliMcivi'd ujicin (.Xhhdtt. J.) in U. 
 '•. Watson, 1S17, a tieatiMo eontain- 
 iir_' ^J)eculutive rejmhlican doi triiicH, 
 V liii h not oidy was un|)u)diHh<-ii and 
 iil'imii'iitly unconnected with the 
 tieuiiunablo pructiuub uf which ho 
 
 was accused, hut liiid heen composed 
 Kovcral ycavH liefoicthf trial, was, in- 
 deed, aihnitted in evich'iict' (Jt^tlVrics, 
 J.). Hut suhsequi'nt times have re- 
 garded this trial as a judicial murder. 
 
 » K, r. Uardv. ITlij (Kvre. C.I.). 
 
 • Sc.^ J{. V, llardwi(k,'lM(i<» (I.d. 
 Kllenliorough); I'owdl r. Ilodgctts, 
 l.S'.M) ;(Jarro\v, 1'..); North c. .Miles, 
 l.S()8 (i,d. Kllenhorough) ; Bowshur 
 V. C'allcv, l.Sd.S (id.). 
 
 ' ]>anicls V. {'(ittcr, IHMO (Tindal, 
 O.J.). The case of Wiicht c. Court, 
 IN'J.V -wheiK ui an action for falso 
 imiirisoiinient, (iarrow, 15., admitted 
 tlie declarations of a co-didendant, 
 showing jiersonal malice, as evidence 
 
 HI 
 against tho uthur dufundantd, though 
 
 ii85 
 
;l<' '■ I 
 
 U ■ 1 ' ! 
 
 Nit 
 
 
 DECLARATIONS OF PARTNERS. [PART III. 
 
 motive is imputed, as in actions for negligence, the declaration of 
 each defendant is admissible against himself alone.* 
 
 § 598.' The principles just discussed also apply to cases of 
 partnership. Whenever any number of persons are associated 
 together in the joint prosecution of a common enterprise or design 
 (as in commercial partnerships, and similar cases), the act or 
 declaration of each member, in furtherance of the common object 
 of the association, is the act or declaration of all. By the very act 
 of association each partner is constituted the agent of the others, 
 for all purposes within the scope of the partnership concern;' 
 unless, under the special circumstances of the case, an intention 
 can be inferred by the jury, that a particular act should not be 
 binding without the direct concurrence of each individual partner.* 
 While the firm thus created exists, it speaks and acts only by the 
 several members; but when that existence ceases by dissolution, 
 the subsequent acts of the individual members are binding on 
 themselves alone,' except so far as otherwise agroed upon by the 
 articles of association or dissolution,^ or as the acts relate to the 
 previous business of the firm.' An instance of this last exce|)t:on 
 arises where one partner in a finn which has been dissolved has 
 admittfcu, subsequently to the dissolution, the payment of a debt 
 due to the firm.* 
 
 § 599. In cases such as that just instanced, the party making tlie 
 admission must, however, be, at the vime, jointly interested with 
 the parties against whom his statement was tendered in evidence." 
 Where, therefore, a bill was filed to set aside a bond given to a 
 
 
 made in their absence, and several 
 weeks after the act complained of — 
 probably would not now De regarded 
 aH a safe proeodout. 
 
 ' Daniels v. Potter, 18130 (Tindal, 
 
 C.J.)- 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 112, in part. 
 
 « Saudilandrt v. Marsh. 1819 ; R. v. 
 Hard wick, ISOU; l''ox v. Clifton, ISUO; 
 NichoUs w. Dowdin}?, 181 j; Ilodon- 
 pyl V. VinRorhoed, 1818 ; Van Roims- 
 dyk V. Kane, 1813 (Am.); Coit v. 
 Tracy, 1830 (Am.). Ante, § 185. 
 
 ♦ Latch V. Wudlake, 1840. 
 
 » W(M)d V. Ikaddick, 1808 (Sir J. 
 Mausileld); I'etheriok v. Turner, 
 
 1802; Kilgourn. Finlyson, 1781). 
 
 • Burton v. Issitt, 1821 ; Boll v. 
 Morrison, 1828 (Am.). 
 
 ' Wood V. Bradilick, 1808. See 
 Parker v. ?Iorrell, 1848. 
 
 » Pritcliard v. Drapw, IH.'JO— 31 
 (Ld. Brougham). Loomis and Ju(^k- 
 son V. Loomis, 1854 f/.m.), expressly 
 supports the general proposition in 
 the text. 
 
 • See, and compare, the observa- 
 tions of Ld. Cottenhinn in I'arkor v. 
 MorroU, 1848 ; of the Reporter in 
 S. 0. 4(i4, n. b. ; and of Crcsswoll, J., 
 in S. C. on issue tried at Niai Priui. 
 
 '686 
 
CHAP. II.] ACKNOWLEDaMENT OF DKIiP HY IWirrNKU. 
 
 banking firm on the ground of fraud, and before tho connnonoe- 
 ment of the suit, the partner, who originally managed tho trans- 
 action, had retired from the firm, and ceased lO have any longer an 
 interest in the bond, this man's answer was held not to be rei oiv- 
 able in evidence against the continuing partners.' 
 
 § 600. Moreover, as against other members of a firm, neither a 
 partner's written acknowledgment of a partnership debt, nor 
 written promise to pay it, nor even actual payment by him of the 
 interest, or part payment of the principal due, whether made diu-ing 
 the partnership, or after the dissolution,- will take a case out of the 
 Statute of Limitations.' 
 
 § 601. It has, indeed, been contended* that a signature by one 
 of several partners, minff the name of the Jinn, will take the ease out 
 of the statute as to all the partners, in a transaction in which all 
 are interested, because a partnership name is tho name of each and 
 every member of the firr^ and the enactment just referred to 
 speaks merely of joint contractors, and does not in terms mention 
 partners, but the contention does not appear to bo tenable.* 
 
 § 602.^ The declarations of agents are admissible against their 
 principals on grounds very similar to those which gove .i tho de- 
 clarati -\^ of co-partners. The principal constitutes the agent as 
 his representative in the transaction of certain business. Wliat- 
 ever, therefore, the agent does in the lairful prosecution of that 
 business, is tho act of the principal. As Mr. Justice Story observes, 
 " where the acts of the agent will bind tho principal, thoro his 
 representations, declarations, and admissions, resi)outing the 
 subject-matter, will also bind him, if made at the same time, and 
 constitutirg part of the res gestoa." ' They are original evidence 
 and not heu,i>ay ; and, being regarded as verbal acts, they are 
 receivable in evidence without calling tho agont himself to prove 
 them." Still, the admission or declaration of an agent binds liis 
 principal only when made during tho contiiiuanoo of the agency, 
 
 ' Piirkor V. Morroll, IS'IS. 
 
 « Bmtow V. Millor, 1848 (Ir.) ; 
 Watson V. Woodmau, IHTo. 
 
 ^ Teiitordon's Act of » O. 4, o. 14, 
 § 1, umoiulud bv 1» & 20 V. c. !»7, 8. 14 
 [•'Miiriuiiitilo Law y\im;iidiMfiit Act, 
 IbJO"); JouoBV. liydor, l»a»; Hop- 
 
 kins V. Lnpui, IS.iO (I'arko, U.). 
 ISuo, also, post, §§ 744, 74j. 
 
 « Clark c. Alexander, 1SI4. 
 
 » So.) IJiiHtow V. Milhii', 1848 (Ir.).. 
 
 • Or. Kv. § li;i, ill jiart. 
 
 ' Mtoiy, Ag(ai. § i;VJ. 
 
 " Doo V. lluwkms, 1841. 
 
 M 
 
 a.s7 
 
1= 
 
 In ( ' 
 !1 ' . 
 
 DECLARATIONS OF AGENTS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PT. III. 
 
 in regard to a transaction then depending, et dum fervet opua} 
 When the agent's right to interfere in the pa/tioular matter has 
 ceased, the jjrincipal is no longer affected by his declarations, any 
 more than by his acts, but they will be rejected in such case as 
 mere liearsay.^ 
 
 § G03. Accordingly, when a horse-dealer, or livery-stable keeper, 
 employs a servant to sell a horse, any statement made by him 
 respecting the horse at the time of sale, even though it amount to a 
 warranty of soundness,' which the servant has been really ordered 
 not to give, will bind the master.* But the servant's declarations 
 or acknowledgments at any other time, whether made to the 
 purchaser or to a stranger, will not be received.* Again, if a letter 
 written by an agent form the whole or part of an agreement, which 
 by the course of his business he was authorized to make, it will be 
 admissible against the principal, but if it be offered as proof of 
 the contents of a pre-existing contract, or if it contain an account 
 of transactions already performed, it will probably be rejected, 
 though addressed to the principal himself ; ^ unless the principal 
 has replied to it, or has otherwise adopted or acted upon it, in 
 which case the agent's letter will be received as explanatory of the 
 principal's conduct.' On the same principle a letter, written diu-ing 
 the voyage, by the master of a ship to the owners, while admissible 
 against the latter as to the facts it states, is not so as evidence of 
 the master's opinion.* The rules are the same as to an engineer's 
 log-book kept during the voyage." 
 
 
 '( 'm 
 
 ' Seo KirkstiiU Brewery Co. v. Fiir- 
 ni'ss llv. Co., 1874 ; lie Devala Prov. 
 Gold Mill. Co., \m?i. 
 
 •i Fiiirho V. Ilustiups, 1804 (Sir W. 
 Grant); Garth v. Howard, 18:12; 
 Laiighorn v. AUnutt, 1812 (Oibbs, 
 J.); llt'thain t-. lionson, 1818 (Dallas, 
 C.J.); Mortimer v. M'Callan. 1840; 
 11. V. Hall. 1S;J8 (Littlodule, J.) ; The 
 MociiauicH' hV if Alexandria v. Hk. 
 of Columbia, l^:iO(Am.); llannayr. 
 Stewart, 1837 (Am.); Stockton v. 
 Deinuth, 18:18 (Am.); Stewartson v. 
 Watts, 18;i9(Am.); Uarinf; v. Clark, 
 18:i7 (Am.); Hk. of Monroe v. Field, 
 1812 (Am.) ; Story, A^pii §§ IJM. HH. 
 
 ^ Hrady V. Tod, 1801 (Kilo, C.J.). 
 But thti utii'vaut of a private owuor. 
 
 intrusted to sell a horse, not at a fair 
 or public mart, but on some one 
 partitnilur oceusion, has no imiilied 
 authority to bind his master by a 
 warranty : Id. 223. See Miller v. 
 Lawton, 1804. 
 
 « Howard >'. Sheward, 1866. 
 
 ' Allen V. Densttmo, 18;i9(Kr8kine, 
 J.) ; Helyear v. llawko, 1803 (Ld. 
 KUenborou^h). See, also, Peto v. 
 Hapua, 1804 (Ld. Kllenborough) ; 
 Gt. West. Ry. Co. v. Willis, 18(i5. 
 
 • Fairlie v. Ilastiiipfs, 1804; Lang- 
 horn V. AUnutt, 1812; Kahl v, Jan- 
 8en, 1812 ; Reynor v, I'oaraon, 1812 
 
 ' Coates )'. I'laiiibridge, 1828. 
 
 • The Solwav, 188.V 
 
 • The Earl of Duuiliios, 1886. 
 
 888 
 
CH. II,] DKCI.AKATIONS OF AGKNTS, WHEN ADMIS.SinLE. 
 
 
 § 604. Sir AVilliam Grant has well exi)lained the law uiion this 
 suhject as follows : ' " As a general proposition," said he, " what 
 one man says, not upon oath, cannot bo evidence against another 
 man. The exception must arise out of some peculiarity of situation, 
 coupled with the declarations made by one. An agent may 
 undoubtedly, within the fcope of liis authority, bind his principal 
 by his agreement, and in many cases by his acts. "What the 
 agent has snid may be what constitutes the agrtn^ment of the 
 principal ; <^v the representations or statements made may be the 
 foundation of, or the inducement to, the agreement. Thertjfore, if 
 writing is not necessary by law, evidence must be admitted to 
 l)roTe that the agent did make the statement or representation. 
 So, with regard to acts done, the words with which those acts are 
 accompanied frequently tend to determine thair quality. The 
 party, therefore, to be bound by the act, must be affected by the 
 words. But, except in one or the other of t'lose ways, I do not 
 know how what is said by an agent can be evidence against his 
 principal. The mere assertion of a fact cannot amount to proof of 
 it ; though it may have some relation to the business, in which the 
 person making that assertion was employed as agent. * * * The 
 admission of an agent cannc. assimilated to the admission of the 
 principal. A party is bound by his own admission ; and is not 
 permitted to contradict it. But it is impossible to say that a man 
 is precluded from questioning or contradicting anything any person 
 has asserted as to him, respecting his conduct or his agreement, 
 merely because that person has been an agent of his. If any fact, 
 material to the interest of either party, rests in the knowledge of 
 an agent, it is to be proved by his testimony, not by his mere 
 assertion." 
 
 § 605. As the rule admitting the declarations of the agent is 
 founded upon his legal identity with the principal, such declarations 
 only bind the principal so far as the agent had legal power to make 
 them.* For example, the declarations and acts of an agent cannot 
 bind an infant, because an infant cannot appoint an agent ; so that, 
 if an infant, even by letter of attorney, appoints a person to make 
 
 I r.l 
 
 * lu Fuii'lie v. Iluatiugs, 1804. 
 
 ' Soe FauHBott v. FauRSott, 1849 ; 
 Hogg V. OaiTott, 1849 (Ir.). 
 
in 
 
 
 DKCr.ARATIONS OF AGENTS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART III. 
 
 a lea«e, he will not be bound thereby, neither will his ratification 
 bind bini ; but such lease, to be good, must be the infant's own 
 personal act.* Questions of much nicety often occur, where power 
 to make an admission is sought to be inferred by implication from 
 an authority to do a certain act. Thus, whore a wife is authorised, 
 in her husband's absence, to carry on the business of his shop, her 
 admissions, made on application to pay for goods previously 
 delivered at the shop, will be evidence against the husband.* But 
 proof of her acknowledgiuent^ of an antecedent coutraci for the 
 hire of the shop, . of Her agreament to make a new contract for 
 the future occuj^^ ' o* ft, will be rejected, as it cannot be 
 necessary that the % i sh .>a 1 have this extensive power of binding 
 her hudband, for the mere pa ) vse of conducting the business of 
 the shop.^ The declarations of a bank manager made behind the 
 bank's counter as to the usual course of business at a bank are 
 evidence against the bankers.'* The declarations of a pawnbroker's 
 shopman made behind the shop counter that his master had received 
 goodB said to hove been deposited with him in the ordinary course 
 of his business, v/ould probably be admissible against the master, 
 because it migh^- well be assumed that the shopman was authorised 
 to answer any inquiries respecting the goods, made by persons 
 interested in them. But if, in the case last suggested, the admission 
 related to a transaction unconnected with the immediate business 
 of the shop, — as, for instance, if it refeiTed to the loai- of several 
 hundred pounds on a single pledge at five per cent, interest, — it 
 would not be received.' So again, although the solicitor of a 
 judgment creditor may fairly be assumed to have acted as his 
 client's agent in directing the issue of a fi. fa., because the taking 
 such a step might be essentially nocessary for the benefit of the 
 client, yet special instructions to seize particular goods cannot be 
 considered within the scope of any implied authority.^ 
 
 § 606.' To sum up : there are fhrrr rianscs of dcclnratiom, which 
 though treated under the head of hearsay, are, in truth, original 
 
 k::\ 
 
 
 '' 1 
 
 ife*;.. \ ^^ ■ 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 ■ 1 
 
 l^s '^^ 
 
 V '■ 
 
 ;■ ■ A 
 
 ET . '.: 
 
 
 
 bl 
 
 kk 
 
 M 
 
 > Doe V. Roberts, 1847 (Parke, B.). 
 See Hargmve v, Hargravo, 1850. 
 » ClitYdrd V. Burton, 182.'}. 
 * Meroditli v. Foutuor, 1843. 
 
 * Siimmovs v. London Joint Stock 
 Bunk, l>Si»(l. 
 
 » Oiirth r. riowunl, 1832. 
 « Smith V. Koal. 1882. C. A. 
 ' Gr. liv. § 123, iu great part. 
 
 390 
 
CHAP. II.] THREE CLASSES OF DECLARATIONS EVIDENCE. 
 
 evidence. The first class consists of cases where the fact that the 
 declaration was made, and not its truth or falsity, is the point in 
 question ; the second includes expressions of bodily or mental 
 feelings, where the existence or nature of such feeli^igs is the 
 subject of inquiry ; and the third class embraces all other cases, in 
 which the declaration offered in evidence may be regarded as part 
 of the res gostoe. These classes are all involved in the principle of 
 the last, and have been separately treated merely for the sake of 
 greater distinotness. 
 
 :'! 
 
 391 
 
 4 ,\ 
 
1 . )l 
 
 
 ??J« 
 
 391 » 
 
 AMi:i:i('AN NOTKS. 
 
 AMKHICAX NOTES. 
 
 [I'AH'r- III. 
 
 Declarations part of the Res Oestae. — Among the statements of 
 persons not witnesses to wliioli tlie rule excluding hears;iy does not 
 apply are statements admitted "as part of the res gestie." 
 
 In this phrase both the term "part" and the term "res gestii" 
 are the subject of contli(!ting interpretation and no small amount uf 
 ambiguity. 
 
 Jiis (itstfe. — It would probably be ditttcult, if not impossible, to 
 give a wholly satisfactory definition of the phrase res gesUe. As is 
 said by the supreme court of Georgia, "The dittieidty of formulat- 
 ing a description of the res gestie which will serve for all ciiscs 
 seems insurmountable. To make the attempt is something like try- 
 ing to execute a portrait which sliall enable tlie possessor to recog- 
 nize every member of a very numerous family." Cox r. State. (!l 
 Ga. .'574, 410 (1879). The Latin expression imi)lies the idea of 
 action, of something done ; yet, as emi)loyed in the law of evidence, 
 facts as well as acts are among the res gesta;. Thus, on an indii't- 
 ment for murder, the bullet taken from deceased's body of the same 
 kind as that carried by a pistol habitually carried by the prisoner, 
 and burglar's nippers identified as prisoner's and found near .scents 
 of homicide, were lield to be admissible " as part of the res gestie." 
 Williams i>. Com.. Sr> Va. 007 (ISSO). Very possibly, tiiis con- 
 venient ambiguity constitutes no small part of the attractiveness of 
 the phrase. The res gestae of any case ai)parently embraces all such 
 facts as unite to constitute the state of affairs for which legal <'oii- 
 se(p;enoes are claimed. Under such a definition, many facts may be 
 entirely relevant to the issue, and consequently admissible, without 
 assisting to constitute the res gestie. Legal liability in any ease is 
 predicated upon the existence of some particular "transaction" or 
 stute of affairs. It is this group of facts or events which make up 
 its res gcstie. Obviously the degree of remotenes« which excludes a 
 relevant fact from being considered part of the res gestie will be 
 largely a matter of judicial discretion, and one in which considerable 
 diversity of opinion may be fairly expected. 
 
 Courts have experienced considerable difficulty in fixing the point 
 of time over which the res gestie extends. 
 
 Where the (piestion is as to whether the intercourse between a 
 man and woman living together as husband and wife is matrimonial 
 or meritricious, the res gesta* covers the entire period of their living 
 together, and includes the declarations as well as the acts of the 
 parties tending to characterize their intercourse. In n- Taylor, 
 1) I'aige, on (1842). 
 
 On an indictment for assaidt with intent to miirder, the acts of 
 persons present and apparently co-operating with the prisoner in 
 
 \ 7'; 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 AMKKK'AN NOTKS. 
 
 3<>12 
 
 his attempt to intercept the prosecutor, on the ocoasion of th(^ as- 
 sault, are jiart of the res gestie. Uoss r. State, (VJ Alii. L'L'4 (IHT.S). 
 
 Niiiiierous illustrations of this tlilHoulty will appear in tlic fiirllier 
 consideration of the topic;. 
 
 I)i:ci,Ai!ArioNs MAv coNSTiTi'TE THE Rks ( Jkst.k. — Tilt' entire 
 res gescu! of a particular ease may (jonsist of vcrhal or writfi-n decla- 
 rations. Where a contract or other obligation is said to result Ironi 
 a conversation between the parties, tlieir statements are juoved as 
 tlu^ facts which constitute the transaction. With s\ieh proof the 
 rule against hearsay has nt) concern. The verb:il facts are proved 
 because from their existence the contract or other obligation arises, 
 (jiiick r. Siiison, 1);") Mich. 4lL' (iHiKJ) ; State /•. (Jregory, i'.VJ Ind. 
 ."587 (181)1') ; Holds /•. Woods, <) Ind. .Vpp. (\r,7 (IS'j:!). 
 
 Where a contract is ptM'feeted after repeated interviews, all repre- 
 sentations made at the previous interviews ;ire included in the res 
 gestu!. Aheru c. Gooilspeed, 7'J N. V. lOS (I87.S) ; I'orter r. Waltz, 
 GO Mo. 4(> (18S()). Where there is an agrt'cment to arm and light, 
 "the res gestie of the transaction comprehend ;dl pertinent acts and 
 declarations of the parties (either or both) which take place in the 
 interval between the agreement to fight and the consummation of 
 the homicide such interval being very brief." Cox r. State, (»4 (Ja. 
 .'J74, -110 (1879). On the other hand, so long as anything in the 
 usual course of business remains to be ilone to complete a transac- 
 tion, — e. g., giving a receipt, — wiiile the parties remain together, 
 whatever is said until the tran.saction is thus ended assists to con- 
 stitute the res gestae. Fificdd /•. Iliidiardson, .'il Vt. 410 (iSdl). 
 
 Dklakatioxs Facts i.\ thk Mks (Id.st.k. — Verbal and written 
 declar.'itions may not only constitute tlie res gest;e in a given case, 
 such a declaration may itself be an independent fact in the res 
 gestae. 
 
 Where a declaration, oral or in writing, of a person not a witness, 
 is in and of itself i)art of the rep gestie, it is ailmissible upon onli- 
 nary principles. X verbal fact docs not differ in its proof from any 
 other fact, e.jually relevant. Of this nature are declarations show- 
 ing a particular intention in doing an act. Here the intention is an 
 independent fact legitimately part of tlie res gesta', and llie declara- 
 tion is admitted because it shows it. Sucli a <leclaration may at;- 
 company an act, — it most frerpu'utly does so; but the declaration 
 is not dependent for its ailmissibilitv on being part of the act. 
 As was said by the suprenn! court of South ('arolina, '• Where the 
 iiKpi.iry is as to a certain transaction not only what was done, but 
 also what was .said by those present during the transaction, is ad- 
 missildc for the jiurpose of explaining its character." State *'. 
 Helcher, 13 S. C. 4r>'.) (ISSO). 
 
 On an indictment for murder, a threat by the defendant to kill 
 shortly before the murder is competent as part of the res gestae. 
 
8918 
 
 A.MKIUCAN NOTKS. 
 
 I ,1 
 
 '\'i 
 
 [I'AKT Ml. 
 
 thniiijli no Olio in i)articuliir is nninod. Stiito r. Kiiif», 9 Mont. n."i 
 (IHi)O). (Ml tlic (loiitrary, stiitt'iiiuiits Ix'twi't-ii tlie parties on tlic 
 fortMiooii of tlic day of an assault are not part of tho res gt'sta- of 
 tlic assault itself. HoscnWaiiiii r. State, 'Mi Ala. .'{.51 (l.S;V.)). " If an 
 act proved is relevant and material, declarations accoinpanyiii}^ the 
 act aiid strictly explanatory of it are adniissiiilc as part of the res 
 gestic. Tucker r. I'easlee, ,•)(; N. H. 1(57 (lSr»H). So whore the 
 «piestioii was whether A, took part in a mutual affray, the fact that 
 he took part may he shown by his shoutinj,' to one about to interfere, 
 to let him alone. The verbal act is itself one of the res gestu! 
 facts. Castner r. Sliker, ,'W X. J. liaw, '.)'> (I.S(IH). So, on an in- 
 dictment for burglary, the fact that a certain person stated in jnes- 
 
 ence ot tlie (ieteiulant that slie recognized liim. " i he truth or 
 falsity thereof is not tho (juestion, and the testimony is only apiili- 
 cable to inn i/tH<(iii, as a contempoiMiieous fact forming part of the 
 res gesta , and as such is admissible, just as any other oontemporaneous 
 physical ociinrrcnce could be proven." State v I Torton, .'!.'{ Fia. Ann. 
 281' (I.SSl). So, on a probate appeal, where the (piestion w;is as to 
 the intention with which a certain instrument was torn, verl)al or 
 written declarations W(!re reganleil as verbal facts assisting to I'on- 
 stitute the res gestie. C'ollagaii v. Hums, 57 Me. 44!) (lcS(»7). Where 
 the defendant was the ringleader of the mob that killed tlm deceased, 
 evidence of their exclamations, declarations, etc., are facts in the 
 res gestae, so far as they tend to show the intent with whi(;h the 
 mob were acting. "They are regarded as verbal facts, indicating a 
 present i)urpose and intention, and therefore admitted in proof like 
 any other materird facts." C/.ivv r. State, 4:5 Ark. •.)'.» (IS.S4). 
 
 On an action for assault and battery, the abusive remarks made 
 by the defendant when the plaintilt first came up which might bo 
 considered to reflect upon the ])laintitf are ])art of the res gestie. 
 Hlake *;. Damon, KKJ Mass. 199 (ISO'.*). In a (triminal action for 
 assault and battery, the language of the jiarties uttered at the time 
 of the assault are part of the res gestic (^ohpiitt /•. State, .'{4 Tex. 
 TmO (1871). 
 
 In Insurance Co. r. .Mosley. S Wall. .'^7 (1S(;9). more fully stated 
 later, so far a* declarations by the deceased as to his then present 
 pains ami injuries, made after tiie ottciirrence of «'-me obvitmsly great 
 change in physical condition, were admitted by the court "as verbal 
 acts, ... as competent as any other testimony, when relevant to 
 the issue," the action of the supreme court of the United States 
 seems justified by the rule under consideration. It is when the 
 court go further and admit the sufferer's statement as to the cause 
 of his injury that the ruling is open to exception. 
 
 The distinction obviously is between a declaration which is com- 
 petent as an independent fact in the res gesta? atid a declaration 
 which is admissible not because it is of itself part of the res 
 
 f- 
 
 I 
 
<iiAr. II.] 
 
 AMKKH'AN NOTKS. 
 
 801* 
 
 j,'cstii', but because it is part of some fiu-t wliieh assists to consti- 
 t.\itf till- ri's gt'stii'. How easily such a iliHtiiiction uia^ he lost sij,'lit 
 of uiay perhaps Ixf illustrated by a case iu the supreme jutlieial 
 court of Massa(rliusftts. 
 
 Wrsson /'. Washburn Iron Co., 13 All. 0.') (l.S(5(>), was ati action for 
 injury to the ijlaintiif's inn from a nuisance erected on the (h'fend- 
 ant's premises. Statements of guests on leaving the inn aljruptly 
 .soon alter arrival as to tlie reason of their leaving were held incom- 
 petent. be(!ause '• merely declarations of a previously existing tact 
 or state of things which operated on the minds of the persons who 
 \ittered theni, and induced them to leave the house ; but they had no 
 tendeiKiy whatever to show that this act, of itself (ilcar ami mi- 
 ecpiivocal, should have any different sign i filiation or elTect than that 
 which shouhl be given to it if proved as an independent fact, irre- 
 spectively of the statements which acfccmpanied it." Wesson r. 
 Washburn Co., l;{ All, Uo (18(J(J). While these declarations <'er- 
 tuinly did not characterize the act of leaving, the mental state of the 
 guests was apparently itself a res gesta- fact, best provcid by their 
 declarations as to its existence. 
 
 Tn the same way, where the infrnf with which an entry is made 
 on certain premises is material to the issue and part of the res 
 gestae declarations of the party entering as to his intent in so doing 
 is a verl)al facit which may be proved by his declarations. The mere 
 fact that the de(!laration i.s contemporaneous with the entry and 
 tends to characterize it does not nuike the admissibility of the decla- 
 ration dependent upon the admissibility of the fact of the entry. 
 Dougherty r. McManus, [Hi la. (JoT (lH7."{i. Or for what purpose a 
 i)aMk deposit was made. Medley r. IVople, 41) III. App. L'lS (1h<.)l'). 
 So, on a (piestion whether an ea.sement of a way had been ac(piired 
 by adverse user, the declarations of a former owner of the land, 
 while ])loughing across the alleged right of way, that no right of 
 way existed there, and that the user had been permissive, are com- 
 petent, not as proof of the facts asserted, but as evidence ijun mihno 
 tlie ploughing was done. Sears r. Ilayt, .'57 Conn. 400 (ISTd)- So, 
 wliether a holding is under a claim of right. Smith r. I'utuam. tlli 
 N. 11. IWs) (1881i). On a ipiestion of the settlement of a pauiier. the 
 intention with whi(!h lu? left a town being rnevant to the issue, his 
 declarations on the subject at the time of ' .iving are a fact in the 
 res gestu'. Ktna c. ]'>r<nver, 7S Me. .'{"" .iS.Sti). Where the (pies- 
 tion is as to the power of the husband as an agent to bind the wife 
 !is a grantor, he declarations to him as to the terms on which he 
 was to deliver u ire part of the res gestie. Harper r. Dail, '.)- N. 
 ('. ',V.)\ (18S.'>). Statements of the intention with wiiieh .\. removed 
 a certain fence, made :it the time of the removal, ari' competent in any 
 case where this intention is material. Spencer r. New York, \c. 11. K., 
 CiL' Conn. L'4L' (18!)!.'). So, what a grantee's agents said immediately 
 
K- • . •» 
 
 ii 
 
 I! 
 
 \r> 
 
 m 
 
 391» 
 
 AMKHK'AN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 o:i learning of the making and dclivt'iy of tlip di-cd conoernini,' tin' 
 a«'ci'i>tancf thereof is proper evidmce to show his assent tlicrtli). 
 Fiseher Leaf Co. r. Wiiipple, ol Mo. App. Xh\ (ISirj). On im in. 
 dietnieiit for murder, evideiiee tliat tlie aeiniseii iinniediatelv altir 
 tlie hoiiiieidal aet start;d olT ; that a hystaiith'r cried out. "Call iln; 
 police:"; that thereupon the accused siiai>ped his ritic at. 'icr, l.iit 
 did not tire, — is couipetent. as these facts assist to constitutr the 
 K8 gi'stic. .lohnson r. State, SS (ia. L'o;; (IS'.M ). On an aciMu 
 brought Ity a water company a^'ainst a town, the defendant daiini'd 
 to .show iu-ts of the plaintiff te>tin;^'and ahandoning dilferent soun'cs 
 of water .supply as admissions by tiui phiintiff that the ipiantity of 
 water furidshed was insutHident. /AA/, that the plaint ilT c.iuld 
 sliow, in H'ply, l»y the re(;ord of corporate votes under whic'i tlii'su 
 te.sts wen? maiie, tiiat tlieir object was to improvt- the cpiality of tho 
 water, "'riie de(daration ctf the purposi' is a part of the doings of 
 the eorjH)ration, by the authority of wld(di tht* acts were done. It 
 dcM'S ni«t ap|>ear tliat at the time lhe.se votes were p.isscd the present 
 controversy hail arisen. Apparently it i.s the eomm.m case of (h-clara- 
 tions .'u-conipanying acts which teinl t(» explain or ipialify t\w niean- 
 ing<d" the .acts, and which are considered .is a pari ol the res gestie.'' 
 Wiley /•. Atliol, ir»(» .Mas.s. 4'_'() (INIUM, — whi(di is appan-ntly another 
 instance nt tiu* .sanie confusion of thought th.at appe;iis in the curliei- 
 decision of Wesson r. Washburn Iron (/'onipaiiy, I.'! .Ml. '.).">( I .slid). 
 The deehirations were not competent l)ecausc they accompanied a 
 relevant fact, imt because they were themselves relevant facts, and 
 part of the res g»'stie. 
 
 In the same way, as illustrating /iiir/msf on an action to restniin 
 ).rjf lay-out of a highway across the plaint ill's laml, the fact that 
 T.hile tin* plaintitT's preilecessor was having the land surveyed lie 
 said he was not going to have a ro.id on the west side of the land ho 
 Wiwi surveying was competi'Ut. Tait r. Hall, 71 Cal. 14'.) (iHSl'i). 
 
 (hi :;>< ;;"tion of trover for a plougli, the defendant's intent ion in 
 Iwirrowing Jie same may be shown liy his deidarations at the lime. 
 Frome r. 2)eiinis. !.'• N. .1. L. 'Art (IHH.'J). 
 
 Un :in i>sue •>( the making id' a contract to do a certain thing, a 
 deelaMtioii to the defendant a few hours previous that he intended 
 t«i do tliat {Kirtieiilar thing is competent. "This declaration, it is 
 elaimed. was made a few hours lud'orc the alleged contrait betwciMi 
 plaiiititl .and defendant was consummated. It was admissible as a 
 part of tlnr res gestii* lor the pinpost* of illustrating the snbseipieiit 
 agn-euieiit. It would not prove tiiat a contract li.nl been made, 
 but was a circumstance fnnu which the jury might reasonably infer 
 that the defendant had .sought the plaintiff for that purpose. So, 
 too, would any decl.iration be admissilile as a part of the res gcKtii- 
 made by the ilefendant on his way to meet the phiintilf, that he was 
 seeking him for a particular purpose. Such evnlenuu would tciiil 
 
{•IlAl'. II.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 391« 
 
 only lo show tho object and purposf of tlin meeting; not tlmt it hud 
 1mm II iioconiplislicd. It was a ciniuiiistaiuM! whicii the jury liad a 
 1 i,'iit to consider in connection with tiu; evidence of the settlement."' 
 (ianison i: (Joodale, 23 Oregoji, .'H)7 (1X92). 
 
 A statement hy the lender made during the making of a loan that 
 lie is lending some one else's money is part of tiic res gestje. Carter 
 r. I!. Ills, 44 N. II. 40S (lH(V2). The ohjiMitions of a wife, made before 
 ami at the time of giving lii^r acknowledgment, though at an inter- 
 val of several hours, are part of the res gesta;. Louden *•. Hlylhe, 
 Hi I'a. St. o.'ii (1Hr>l). So the declarations of a l»arty on receiving 
 initiiey tliit he does not accept it in full payment. Dillard /•. Scruggs, 
 .'{(■» Ala. ()7(( (IS(IO). Where the intention with which a iiregiiiint 
 wiiiiian visited a doctor's ottice is nuiterial, her declarations »)n that 
 joint when leaving home are part of the res geste. State; r. Howard, 
 ."2 \"t. 3.S(t, 404 (I8.")l)). In an action for alienating a wife's aiTec- 
 tio.is. her declarations on leaving houie, and on arriving at her 
 iatiiir's liou.se "explanatory of her troubled mental condition and of 
 luT reasons fiu' going to her father's house " are competent " as parts 
 (.1 the res gesta'." Glass e. Hennett, HJ) Tenn. 478 (iM'.IO). Where 
 tlie question is as to the fairness of the presiding othi'er of an elec- 
 tinii when votes were challenged as illegal, his declarations and 
 conversations made at that time are part of the res gestae Little r. 
 State, 7.". Tex. ('>\i\ (1S<)(t). 
 
 Where it is imp(utant to show that a city had notice of the dan- 
 gerous condition id' a certain shade tree within the limits of the 
 lii,'liway. the declarations of persons as to its dangerous character, 
 while looking at its decayed roots at a time when they wi're exposed, 
 are iaets in the res gesta>. ''The acts of persons in lociking at the 
 roots were an important part of the evidence, From this it might 
 lie inferred that tlu-y noticed the decayed condition of the roots, anil 
 so that knowledge of the defect became general. Mut that evidence 
 iiii','ht judju'rly be strengthened by introducing as a part ol the res 
 \ir^\;v the declarations whi"h aeeomp.inied the acts, and whii'li eliar- 
 aeteri/eil them as acts that comniunieated intelligi'iice of the condition 
 ol the tri'c to those who looked. The remarks maile at the time 
 nndeied it certain that the view of the roots gave notice of the 
 ilefect to those who then saw them. If the fact that these |iersons 
 looked at the decayed roots was <'ompetent as tending to show the 
 notoriety of the defect, then clearly the accompanying declarations 
 whieli teiuled to show the nature of the aet of looking were also 
 •■oiM|.etent." Chase r. Lowell, l.'.I .Mass. 421.' (J.SIKI). 
 
 The remark with w'.iich one of the participants in a mutual assault 
 si'l out to clinch his antagonist is admissible as part (d' a res gesta' 
 lai-t. llaker r. (Jausin, 7(1 Ind. .'117 (ISMI). Such statement on an 
 issue of self-defence would probably be admissible an itself a fact in 
 the res gestu) as indicating Intention to injure. Ihld. The declara- 
 

 m^ 
 
 »• 
 
 
 
 H 
 
 3917 
 
 AMKHICAX Nf)TKS. 
 
 [PAliT 111. 
 
 tion of a bystandor, calonlatod to affect the action of the (lofciidaiit 
 if made at the time of tlic affray, is equally a fact in the res (^estie, 
 for the same reasons. Uni/. Where a man, chiiminfj to have hern 
 robbed, ran calling for the police, the facts Mial lie met a |M>lici'maii ; 
 told liini his story; that they went bjick aitd loiind the defendant 
 counting certain money by the aid of street lamp, •• wen; a<lmis.sihl(« 
 as part of the res gesta\ The whole was praetirally one i-oiiliiiiicil 
 and brief transaction, and all that took place was of some conse- 
 cpienco in construing the conduct of both |)arties." Driseoll r. I'eoplc, 
 47 Mich. 4ia (ISSli). 
 
 So the declaration of a party that ho considered a boiuidary line 
 settled may be competent evidence as bearing on his purpose in 
 having a re-s\irvey. Arrher /•. Helm, 70 Miss. .S7J (IS'.t.'i). 
 
 On an indictment for rape, where the identity (d' the prisoner with 
 the assailant is involved, tht^ fact that certain witnesses of the assault 
 recogiiizeii the accused next day as the person in (pie.stion is compe- 
 tent; and the exclamation of one of these witnesses to the other, 
 " There goes the man,'' and the reply of the other, '• Ves, then- he 
 goes," are competent as part of the res gestu-. " It is not (pie.stiniii'd 
 that it was perfectly competent to show that the witnesses saw and 
 readily recognized the accused, near the s(!en« of the tran.sacticm, on 
 th<i following day, as testifieii to by theii!, ami it must be admitted 
 the spontaneous exclamation, ' Thert! goes the man,' with tlie re- 
 sponse, ' Ves, there he goes,' is highly characteristic of tin- fact of 
 their recognition. The true test, in all ca.ses, by whi<'h the admissi- 
 bility of such testimony is determined, is, the act, declaiatinn or 
 exclamation must be so iiitiuiately interwoven orconiu'cted with the 
 prini'ipal fact ur event wliich it characterizes, as to iw rcgardeij a 
 part of the transaction itself, and also to dearly negative any pre- 
 meditation or |)urpose to nianulactuie testimony, and we are of 
 opinion the circumstances of this case (dearly bring it within the 
 rule." I/inder r. The I'cople. KH [11. UlM (]HS'J). 
 
 l)i:( i.MtATioNs I'Aiti OK A Kf.s (Jkst.i; kact. — Declarations 
 \vhi(di constitute the res gesta* and those whose existence forms in- 
 depeiidi'Ut. facts in the res gesta' are admitted in evidence as verlial 
 facts and upon orilinaiy principles. Kveii where the declaration is 
 that of a person not called as a witness, the ride excduding hearsay 
 does not apply. 'I'he fact of a statement having been madi' (as dis- 
 tinguished from the truth of what is stated) differs in no essential 
 |)articular of proof from any other fact e(pially competent. The 
 liearsay rule, however, does exeluile the statennuit of persons not 
 witnesses as proid' id' the facts therein stated, excejit in certain speci- 
 fied instances. The statements excluded by the hearsay rule wiiiidi, 
 on an exi!e))ti()ti to the operation of that rule, are admitted as part of 
 the res gesla- are those whitdi are not themselves fact: in the res 
 gestu;, but are part of some fact which is itself part of the res gesta-. 
 
 i 
 
ClIAl'. II.] 
 
 AMEIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 a!>18 
 
 It is probaMy with this in iiiiiid tliat tlic court in Mitclnun r. 
 State, 11 (iii. rd") ( iHoli) sivy "The ideu of tlio res gesta- presniipnses 
 ii iiiiiin fact." 
 
 To make a dechiration in a person's own favor adniissihh' as part 
 of tlie res gesta; "it is essential tliat the a(!t whidi siicli dechnatidM 
 cliaracterizes or exphiiiis sliouhl itself be adniissible. ... if such act 
 is not adniissihlo in evidence, its actual admission, without ohjcc- 
 tiou, does not render the accoini)anying declaration cohipetcnt." 
 Piiiney v. Jouph, G4 Conn. 54;") (181)4). 
 
 "The credit wliich the act or fact gives to the accompanying dec- 
 larations, as a part of the transaction, and the tendency of the con- 
 temporary declarations, as a part of tlie transaction, to explain tiie 
 particular fact, distinguish this class of declaration from mere hear- 
 say. . . . There must be a main or i)riiu'ipal fact or transaction, and 
 oidy such declarations are admissible as grow out of the principal 
 transaction, illustrate its character, are contemporary with it, and 
 derive some degree of credit from it." Lund r. Tyngsborough, '.) 
 Cusli. .'{('• (lsr»l). The acts of a testator in collecting, flrying, and 
 pasting t(»gcther the parts of a torn will being part of the res gestiP, 
 liis de(!larations while engaged on this work tiiat "the old woman 
 had got in one of her tantrums, and liad torn it, but that he could 
 tix it together again " art! competent. Collagan c. Munis, .'"t" Me. 
 44'.) (1S()7). " Declarations are jjcrtiuent if they are uttered contem- 
 poraneously with pertinent acts, and serve to account for, 'pialify.or 
 explain them, and are apparently natural aiiu pontaneous." Cox 
 r. State, (»4 (Ja. .'574, 410 (1871))." 
 
 .\ declaration to be " part " of such res gestie fact must (1 ) accom- 
 pany it ('_') explain or characteri/.e it. liotli tiies(« elements are 
 essential. They represent the guarantees of relial)ility on whicii 
 the operation of the rule excluding hearsay has been suspended. 
 
 (1) .MtsT III: (iiNTKMroltANKoi s. — 'I'o admit evidence of a deel.i- 
 ration, otherwise excluded, on the ground that it is |iart of a relivant 
 act i»r other fad in the res gesta'. it is necessary that liie (ieeliir;itinn 
 should accom|rany the act. The dillicidty at once presents itself tliat 
 to limit the rule to a pn cise coineiilenee in time would Ih- to alun- 
 gate it for all practical purposes. \ certain amount of leeway is 
 thercfcM'c ni'cessary and tlie (piestion largely becmiies one oi degree. 
 
 "To bring such declar.it ions within this principle generally, they 
 milKt Im' e.uitemporaneous with the main fact to which they relate." 
 insurance ( .- r. Mosley. H Wall. W7 ( ISC,'.)). ■• Wln'ii tlu- act is 
 one material anil relevant, and proper for the consideration id the 
 jury, tho declaratioiiH of the actor accompany ing and explanatory of 
 the acts done, are uniformly admissible as part of the res gestie. 
 Collagan e. Hurns, r.7 Me. 4 i'.) (18(;7). 
 
 So the supremo court tif Iowa, in admitting the doclaration of a 
 paasenger as to tho extent of hiH injury "at the time of the over- 
 
am'* 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [PAi:- 
 
 iui 
 
 I' 
 
 M 
 
 m 
 
 till nil)},' " of ti oojKili. " According to the autlioritif.s, •. riucli a 
 «l!'.:liivatinii was iiuule at tlie time tlit; act was douo, and is oak;nl;i;,u 
 to «'x plain tlic character, nature or (luality of tlit; facts constitntini,' 
 the act and its tdfccts, so as to unfold and liarnioni7,c tlicni as parLs 
 of the same transaction, then such a dttclaration naist be rcj^anlcd as 
 a part of the res gestie, and may always be shown to thi! jury nhtw^ 
 with the principal facts." Frink & Co. c.Coe, 4 (Jrei-ne, "(."i i IS.'di, 
 
 On an action against a refiner of petroleum fur selling inipmper 
 oil, l)y means of which the plaintiff's husband w^ts killed, vhat the 
 latter said when enveloped in the Hanies or immediatfly after as to 
 the <'ause of the accident " was ch-arly (M)mpetent evideiice as ;i. [larl 
 of the res gostie." Klkins /•. McKean. 7!) I'a. St. 4'.».'{ 187")). 
 
 Wiiertf a witness, l)eing alarmed in tht! night, ran from her mom, 
 lier ex(!lamati()n " that she saw some one at tin; win(h)w in her room " 
 is compeLciit as part of the res gustw. Dismukes r. State, S'A .Via. 
 287 (t«K7). 
 
 '• Declarations whidi accompany the a(!t (iharat^terizo it; but to do 
 HO the declarations must \>v by the pei'sons engaged in llu; act,, con- 
 temporaneous with it, if not precisely concurrent in point of time, 
 and proved as other facts by witnesses. 'I'o make ilcidarations a 
 part of the res gestu' they must ne (•ontemporaneous with the main 
 fact, not, however, preci.sely <!oiicurrent in point of time. If they 
 .spring out of tin; transactio'i. elucidate it. and are made at a time so 
 near to it a;' reasonably to lu'cclude the idea of deliberate des.gn. 
 they are then to be regarded as contempiu-aneous." State c. Hehlur 
 l;> S, C. 4r)'.> (ISMil) ; Mitchum r. State, 11 Ga. (M") ('l,S.-)2). The ex 
 claniation of tin; juisoner immediattdy after tiie killing, •' 1 would 
 not have done it for the world!" is competent as part of the res 
 gestie. l/i!i/. "The transaction ujhju which this a<!tion is fiiund< i 
 is the alleged cntioing of the plaintiff's daughter from her home by 
 tiie defcmiants. That i.-i the res gestie, am 
 by the aittors in that transai!tion contnv 
 tends to illustrate its chi. -.cter. are pat 
 be proved on tht? trial by eithiT party.'" 
 4«',7 (1.S77). 
 
 .\\ Kxti;m>i:i) I)i:vi:i.oi'mi:nt. — .\s (Munparcd with the Knglish 
 decisions, the rides regulating the admission (d ileclaratimis as jiart 
 of a res gestu' fact have received an extended development in the 
 United States. It bi'ing conceihvl not to be strictly necessary that 
 tl'.e dcidaration absolutely acc<Hni)any tiie act of which it is part, it 
 Jias proveil dillieiilt in many cases accurately to distingiii^^h between 
 mere narrative of a com|deted transactitm (whiidi is excluded) ami 
 
 a declaration rapiilly su ding an act, — ciunpelled and as it were 
 
 instinctividy forced out iiy the act itself, in the altsence ui a more 
 ilefinite test in point, of time, many tribunals have practically sid>- 
 Htitutei' another test, - that of sjntnhni)-!/;/. They receive "as part 
 
 dl that was said or done 
 —iry with it, and whiidi 
 h ■reof, and as smli may 
 r It c. Amidon, l.'i Wis. 
 
', l( \i'. II.) 
 
 AMKIMCAN NMTKS. 
 
 J';'l-» 
 
 )f the res <]j<'stiii " tho story of oveuts rcci Jitly past, ]iii)viilii(l that it 
 -iinii'it'iiUy appears tliat there is ji-itluT time 
 
 •r iiiotiv.' tor iiiis- 
 
 represciitatiiMi or invention. Most of tln'se ai.dioi'ities rest uiti 
 iiiately uiion a .\lassai;liu,setts case, — (!uiii. r. .M'I'ike, .'{ C-'ii?' 
 
 ISI'.I). 
 
 fi.M. /• 
 
 M'I'iKK. — Tiiis leadiiif,' ease can liardlv be said to In 
 
 !S1 
 
 ivo 
 
 Ipceii apparently one of nmeli eonsiileration l»y tiie court, and pos- 
 siiiiy. lint lor its adoption by tlie niajnriiy n| die supreme court of llm 
 I'liited States in Insurance <'o. r. Mosley as the liasis of tlieir de- 
 rision, mi^ht not liave been heard from a,t,'ain. The court wiucli 
 rendered the deeisiun a few yi'ars hiter ainiouneed a mueh sounder 
 Iriral principh" in Com. r. Haekett. 'J All. l.'JC. (ISOl). As a matter 
 i){ reasoninj,', it is ditlieult to follow the court in Com. /'. .M'I'ike in 
 seeing,' of wiuit res gestic fact the dc(daration a<'tually atlmitled was 
 claimed to lie part; uidess the principle lie announced that the men- 
 tal «ir physical slate (if a dcidarant, resul! ini^' from the res ;,'i'stic. then 
 past, be it.self a fact in the res },'est;c, and. lurther. that declarations 
 iif the i)erson in (piestion account in;^ for tlic cxistencf of such siite 
 slmrtly after its creation are part of smdi state, (diaractcri/.in<j and 
 explaining it. For siudi a general principle thert^ is no basis of au- 
 limrity, except as furnished by these decisions themselves. 
 
 The casi' was oiu* of indictment foi' manslaut^hter. Tlie deceased, 
 a woman, between twidve and oiu' o'clock in the inornin:,' of July 
 ."ith, IHIS, ran from her sleeping-room, when' the injury was intlicted, 
 In the room of a witness on tin- stoi'V above and kuncked on the door, 
 
 er\ Ml'' 
 
 .Muni 
 
 er 
 
 Tl 
 
 lis (iiitcrv attracted tic attention of a second 
 
 witnes.s, who at once got up fmm bed, to 140 iip-stairs to her ndief, 
 but. being dissnadi'd by the iirst witness, then comiic^ linw n-slairs 
 ill search of a priest and physician, wi'iit I'nr a watrlmi m iii-.ti'ad. 
 itu returning, the si-cond witness went immediately up i'> tic iiMim 
 above where the dcceaseil then Was. Alter certain reipic^t-i, the de- 
 ceased then told the witness that she had bci'M stabli 
 band, the accused. This was Indd cdinpeti'iit by tin 
 
 bill 
 
 OWIIC. 
 
 aic'iiage 
 
 r 
 
 bv IcT iius- 
 
 >>irt in the 
 le witness descrilM-s the sllualmii in which 
 
 he found the party, her appearam-c, and her rcipiest bir assistance, 
 and, in cdnnection Ihen'with. her decdanitiim of the ciiise (if the in- 
 jury. Tiie peridd of time, at which these acts and statements took 
 place was so n-cent aft"r the n'ceiving itf the injury, as to justify 
 
 the admissnin o 
 
 f th 
 
 eviilei 
 
 ice as a part of the re-; j,'esta' 
 
 In tl 
 
 10 
 
 admission <d' testimony nf this idiaraetcr. much must, be hd't tn tli»! 
 
 exercise of the sduml discretion of the pn-siding judge 
 M'I'ike, ;{ Ciisli. IMI (ISUh. 
 
 Com. 
 
 Insi'kanck Co. v. .Mosi.kv, 
 
 The rile in Cm. 
 
 M'I'ike (///.J 
 
 "/(»•") was followed in Insiinince C,>>. r, Mosley, M Wall. ."«W7 ( ISCj'.O, 
 hiidi is hen> sniumarized siibsl.antiallv in the language used in a 
 
 w 
 
 iiidst hii 
 
 Ipful 
 
 series of articles upon 
 
 thi 
 
 S SItl 
 
 lijcct ill l."» Am. Law 
 
391" 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 Li'AKT 111. 
 
 Rev. 8G ot seq. Iiisiirancc Co. /'. Mosley was an action of a.ssuiii|i- 
 sit on a policy of insiiranou issued by the [jlaintiff in orror to tin' 
 liefcndant upon the life of her husband. The case came up by writ 
 of error to one of the circuit courts of the United States. Tiie (pie.s- 
 tion was as to the .soundness (jf two rulings in tlie court below uimjm 
 points of evidence. The policy insured against deatii resulting from 
 jjersonal injury, "caused by some outward and visible means;" it 
 was expressly ])rovided that the policy should not extend to any 
 injury •• eaustid by or arising from natural disea.se." Tiie declara- 
 tion alleged that the deticased died from injuries that resulted from 
 falling down a pair of stiiirs. The defendants (btdow pleaded the 
 general issue. The (pjestion was whether the cause of the deceased's 
 death was aicident or disease. He was " in his usual hcMiltli "' until 
 a certain night when, after having gone to bed, he got up and went 
 down stairs ; he returned ill, and complained of having had a fall, 
 describing his symptoms, and he continued ill for three or fmir d;iys 
 until hedietl. Tlu^ testimony whieh was ol)jected to was: (1) Tlmt 
 of Mrs. Mosley giving the declaration of her husband. She tesli- 
 lied that he got up between twelve and one o'rlock at niglit. and 
 went down-sta'rs to the privy; .she did not know how long lie 
 was goiie ; wlun he came back he said he had fallen tlown the ba(!k 
 stairs, hiid hit an. I hurt the back of his liead. ;ind almost killed 
 himsel.'- his voicie trembled so as to attrairt her atttMition at once; 
 ho (tom;>!ained, and apjieared to be :n pain, and was sick, and she 
 was up wiih him all night, Oix the next morning he said lie •• fidt 
 bad," .uid fainted. ("J) The testimony of the son of the deceiised, 
 giving I ; rtaiii declarations of his fiithei, was also objeeteii to, l»ut 
 received. II. testified that he slept in the lower part of the build- 
 ing; tiiat at about twelve o'ehxik of the night in <piestion he s;iw 
 iiis lather lying with his heiid on the (!ount» r, iuid asked him wliut 
 was the matter; he replied that he had fallen down liie back stairs 
 and hurt liiuiself vi-ry !>ailly. That on the day after the tail his 
 father said he f 1*^ very badly, and that if he atti-mpted to walk 
 across the room I'.is h»*ad becunie diz/y ; on the following day he 
 said he was .i little worse, if anything. Nobody testified to seeing 
 the deceased fall. Tlu! majority (»f the court, Swayne, .1. giving 
 the o[)iniou, str^e the cpu'stions to be whether the (lourt i rred in 
 admitting til" <leelarations of the deceased (1) as ta his Imdily in- 
 juries an' pains, and ('-') to jtrove that he had fallen dowii-stairs. 
 The t'vf^^ dass < ' ■'■•elarations they n.itdily eoneliide to be admissiiile, 
 lis beiti^ih'' usual e.tnressioiis of such fetdings, and as relating wholly 
 to wl.M ■^^as ji;<'se<ii. The other (piestion is answered in the same 
 way, on the gron <l ti>. t the dcidarations were mad(> immediately or 
 very soon after the rent, — soni" of thr>m before the deceased 
 returned tw !\iH roinn jutd the others upon reaidiing it. Moth 
 declarations are conceived to oe " a part of the res gestie." " In 
 
 1 til 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 AMKlilCAN NOTKS. 
 
 3!)1 '2 
 
 tlio (!()iintlcxity of huiniui affairs," say tlu' court, " wliat is done* 
 and what is said am often so irlated that iicitlit-r v.iin \n' tU-- 
 tacht'd without leaviii}; thc! residue; fraf,'iiieiitary and distorted. 
 . . . Here tlie priiieipal faet is the hodily injury. The res gestse 
 are tlie statements of tlie eause niadt; by tlie assured almost 
 eontoniporaneously with its ocourrenoe. and those reiating to tlie 
 eonsetiuences made whih; tin; latter subsisted and were; in progress. 
 Where sickness or affection is the subject of in<|uiry, the sicknesij 
 or affection is the principal fact. The res gestie are tlie declarations 
 tending to show the reality of its existence, and its extent and char- 
 acter." Seven cases are relied upon, including Aveson r. Kinnaird) 
 (!oni. »•. M'l'ikp, Thompson c. Trevanion, and K. v. Foster. 
 
 .Mr. .Justice ClilTord (with whom Nelson,.!., concurred), dissented 
 in an o[)inion which is (h-voted to a consideration of the (h'darations 
 as evidence to prove the falling down-stairs. It is insisted that the 
 declarations wore not contemporaneous with that fact. Tlie oa.se of 
 Com. /". M'I'ike is condemned, as inconsistent with all other Massa- 
 chusetts cases; Thompson v. Trevanion and H. r. Foster as very 
 slightly reported, as (li8ai)proved by Uoscoe in " his valuable trea- 
 tise on tiie Law of Kvidence," and as inconsistent with all the tests 
 laid ilown in Taylor. 
 
 It seems dillieult to support this naae upon the facts as reported, 
 in so far a.s it admits tlie dcchirations as to the fact of falling down- 
 stairs. There is nothing whatever to show how long the interval 
 was lietweeii the going ilown of the deceased and his ri'turn, and 
 nothing deKnite to show tlie interval iR'twecn his going down and 
 tin; interview with the sou. There is no evidence tli;it lither the 
 son or the wife, <ir anybo<ly, heard the fall; and tlu; wife s;iys 
 expressly that "she didn't know how huig hi' was gime." The 
 interval may have lieen live niinuti's, or tirteen, or thirty. It seems 
 impossible to say that such a dctdaration is shown to be c(tntempo. 
 raneous with the cause of the injury, — so near it that it may fairly 
 btM-alled a jiart of it; yet the court make the dec]:ir;ition admis- 
 sible, as being connei'ted with the "iiodily injury," and as stating 
 the cause of it almost conteniiioraiieonsly with its occurrence. 
 
 It oertiiinly is extremely dilHeult to see of what res gesta- fact the 
 declaration admitted e;in fairly be said to !»■ a part. 
 
 The decisions in (!;ilifnrnia apparently follow the rule laid down 
 in (!oni. r. .M'I'ike and Insurance Co. c. .Mosley. 
 
 Where a witness heard a shot and ••about ha!!' a minute ;ind not 
 exceeding three (juarters (d' a niimiti' from the time witness heanl 
 the first shot" met deceased walking rapitlly away from tin- ju-is- 
 (iiii'r's house and w;is informed of the cireuiastances of the shooting, 
 held; these declarations were admissible. "Dcchirations to be a 
 part of the n^s gestie, are not required to be jirecisely concurrent in 
 pint of time with the principal fact, if they spring out of the 
 
jv.tl'" 
 
 AMICIJK'AN NOTKS. 
 
 [|'Ai:t III. 
 
 1 s f I, 
 
 3l. 1 
 
 lirincipiil tmnsactioii, if tlit-y it-iul to cxiiliiin it, arc voliiiil.ifv iiinl 
 s]i(iiitant'()u,s, and arr luatlc at ,i tiino so iirar it as ti> |in'clii(l(' iln- 
 iilfii of (IflilM'ratc ilcsii^ii, tlii-ii tlu'y aro to Ih' rci^anlcil as conti'in- 
 poraiu'oiis, ami an' admissihlc" I'l-oplo r. Vcriioii, ."!;") Cul. |;i 
 (ISdS). 
 
 Siicli a niliiij,' liibovs uiidiT Mic dilliculty stated ahovi". It is 
 hard to sen of wliat r<'s j^'csta* fact tlic dccliirations in (iiicstioii arc 
 jiart. ("crtaiiily tlicv were not part of tlic I'lU'li of sliootiiij,'; as to 
 tills liny are mere ii ii'rativc. 
 
 Sm in \'iri,qnia. 'I'lie statement of a prisontT to a witness on liis 
 own btdialf made a few minutes after llie fatal shot, on the scene 
 iif the res j,'csta', in ailmissihlc. " It was very (dosely connected, 
 lioth in time and pliii-.>, with the homicide, which was the subject 
 «if the prosecution, and mi),'ht well have ti-ndcd to elucidate that 
 fact as part, of the res ;,'esta'. It was said when the deceased was 
 lyin;^ idosc hy, in a dyinjjj state, from the cdlVct of the wounds he 
 had received, and in the presence, and it seems the hcariiii,', of 
 ('I'lumlins anil (iilhert Little, the former of whom had a pist(d in 
 ea(di liiind an I tho latter a (^un in his hand, and also in th(> presence 
 ami hearin;^ of Oscar F/ittle, who was also wounded. It is not 
 pmliahle that the prisiuier iiad cither time or motive to fabricate a 
 statcnuMJt under such ciii^umstances." Little's (la.sc, L'o (iratt. \)'J\ 
 (1^71). Where :i party murderously assaulted ran to the door 
 caiiinji '• niunlcr," walked arouinl the house .some eij,dity feet to fi 
 iiei,'lib(u's house; roused the latter who was asleep and, on hciii}^ 
 admitted said "I am shot; William Kirby has shot, me;" it was 
 held that the dcidarations were ciuupctcut. " Men', the de/ l.uMtiniis 
 111 (piest.ioii were n'>i. only maiie recently, but probably uilhiu two 
 minutes, after the td'.ot was liied. And this, taken in iMiineetinn 
 with the dccdarant.'s ('(indil inii, mental ami physical, produced iiy liie 
 nnexp Tted, iiuproVdUed, and, as he supposed, fatal shot thioii'^'h 
 tho hcji'!, repels the idea that his dc«darations were falu-icaled. In- 
 deed, under the eiriMimstances disclnsed iiy the recdrd. it is hardly 
 reasomil)lc to supposi; that ttiey could have been fabric:it<'d, as imth 
 the time ami capacity for rctlccticm were wautinj^." Kirby r. Ci.m., 
 77 Va. OS I. C.SK (ISsii). 
 
 And Texas. Where deceased, imiucdiati'ly upon beiii'.^ shot 
 stam^crcil into the house, asked his wife to examine his wound, 
 and when she told him tlie ball had passed throni^h liis liody, 
 
 exclaimed "I am :i dead man, but, thank (10(1, I die inn ut ; " 
 
 and, in ri-ply to her (piestion. ''who did it, I!ob'.'" replied • Mur^'. 
 Mitlnturf (the defendant* and them," the dcdarjitioiiH were held 
 admissible as part of the res j,'csta'. Midntnrf r. State, ?• T>'x. 
 App. .'{;i."», .'J.'m (ISSO) ; Drake r. State, L",» T-x. App. L'f.;; JHWi. 
 In a Texas divorct! (iasc a witnoHH was allowod to tcHtify "that 
 the plaintiff oannf to her house crying', and said defendant had 
 
 
('MM'. II. 
 
 A.MKKICAN N(rn;s. 
 
 ;»!'* 
 
 jdst 
 
 Hlilpl' 
 
 licr mill imIIi'iI Iici- :i liildi. 
 
 •n 
 
 ir witiit'ss 
 
 riirlli 
 
 stiiti'd, dial aiiprllcc's lace was iimI tui one siili', aiiil tlial slir liail 
 just (rt)iiic troiii lidiiu' lo vvitiii'ss' Ikuisc, alioiit, .'!(•(» yauls away. 
 I'mU'r tlic (nn'iiiiisl.aiin'.s, \\n'. st.at.ciiii'iil. inailr liy a|i|M'lltr was 
 ITS j,'»'sla'." Ilatiiia r. Ilaiiiia, .'! 'I'rx. Civ. \\t\>. .'i| (l.s'.i;;). 
 
 Tiiis iili'a llial. wlifff a stati-iiu'iil. is nnl, t.aiiiLfd witli lialnlity t(» 
 fabrirulidii it is adiiiissililc as |iai't nt I In- res p-sla> altiinii>;|i tint, 
 pari. I't' any paiti<Miiar res tcfsla- lacl. lias iii'cn addptcil in lf},'islali(iii. 
 (iror^ia I'tiilt', § .'»7.'!.'!. " l>i'claral.i()iis afCdiiipaiiyiii^; an art, or s(» 
 iii-ai'ly coiiiiiTlcd tlinrwitli in liiiit! as In !)<■ Irci! t'roni all siispiriuii 
 
 <i|' device or ai'l.erUiiin<'iit, are adniissiiile in 
 
 •\ Klenee 
 
 part 
 
 n-s 
 
 •sla-." (Niniinciitin^; on this pntvisinn. I lie nmrl, in '{'r.-iveliers 
 
 In 
 
 Slieppard, .S."i (la. 7."il, TT'i (IS'.IO) say 
 
 r 
 
 le II 
 
 I. 
 
 ('iinleniplal.es llial all llie res ^'esta*, ini'liidiii;.; dcelaralions rniniin^ 
 
 part. llieie(d. ninsl, Ininspire witliiii t.lie present tin I' tlie tiaiisae- 
 
 timi. r>iil l.lial. time, while it eaniint he Irss, may he more rxlcnded 
 tliaii till' present (if the jiriiieipal i'aet, in some insl.aiiees a hilie, in 
 
 tilers very mneh mure, l/'siially if they eaii 
 
 others niiieii, and in <• 
 ail he ascertained, some of the res ii;esta' w ill he ruiind simiiitaneoii.s 
 with, iinii some anterior and others posterior to the priiiei|ial fact. 
 Thus, siip|)ose an electric disehar>,'e during; a snmnier shower to hn 
 the principal tact, the rormation oi' the idoiid, the lallin^' of tlio 
 rain, the thunder and its reverheratinii would all, lor some piirjioses, 
 he within the res ;.;esta! of the event, liion.i;h the piineipal iaet was 
 lint a Hash of li^ditiiiii^. This example may .serve as a tl'^iire to 
 characteri/.e the instances in which deidaralinns Mihsecpienl to the 
 fact .1 re rei;ei\'al)lc in evidence. Let thnnder lepieseiit mmtal im- 
 pressions prodiiced hy the event. 'I'lieii re\ eiiii'iat ion will represent 
 admissihie deelaral ions repinlinj; these impressions, it will reprt;- 
 seiit them liy a close anahij;y in two respecrts, first, in ln'in^' speedy, 
 secoiiil in heiii;,; spontaneous. That they shall he or appear to Ik; 
 spontaiM'ons is iniiispeiisahlc, and it is for this reason alone that 
 they are icfpiired to lie speedy. There nrisl he no lair oppoitnnity 
 till' Ihi' will -if the speaker to mould or mniiify Iheiti. His will 
 must lia\'e liecume and remained dormant, so far as any ihlilr-ration 
 in eoneoi'l in^; matter for speech or seleetini; words is eoneerned. 
 Mnlcover, his S|ieecli, he.sides lieill;.,' ill the pl'i'MliI tllin- of I hi' lialis- 
 
 •lion, must he in liie plisenee of it ill respect to .spac 
 
 III 
 
 inns 
 
 III' on or near I he scene of action or of some maleiial part i>f the 
 action. His deelaratiiiiis must he the ntteiai of human cat lire, 
 
 the I'cniis homo, rallier than of tl 
 
 iiiili\ niii 
 
 i In! V an oa 
 
 th 
 
 can guarantee individual veracity, lint spoiitaneini^ impnl.M' niay 
 he a siillicieiit sanction for the s|ieeeh of man as such, man as dis- 
 tinguished from this or that |iarticiilar man. True, the verhai 
 deliverance in eaidi instance is that of an imlividnal person. !'«nt if 
 till! iitate of his mind he such that his iiidividnalily is for the tiiiiu 
 
! 
 
 %^'': 
 
 I''!- 
 
 i! i 
 
 :;!tl'" 
 
 AMKIUCAN XOTKS. 
 
 [pa It 
 
 r III. 
 
 hi'iiij^ siipiJiTsscil iiinl silnieotl, so tliiit he utters tlip vtiici* nl' Ini- 
 iniiiiity rallicr tli.iii of liiiiisclf, wliut lu; siivs is rryurdcd liy tlic l;iw 
 iis ill sniiii' (l('|,Mt'<' tnistwortliy.'' TravelliTs liis. Co. v. Slu'pp.ini. 
 «."»(5;i. 7.'.!, 77.'. (IHllO). 
 
 'I'lic fiiso of Ooiii. /•. .M'Pikc (iil)i supni) has t'vcii Im'cii rclini ini 
 to siistiiiii :i niliii;.; that, on an iiKlictiaciit for iiiunhT tlic (h-ft'iiilaiil 
 can ]m)vv as part of tin' res }»''''ta! what ho tohl Ills iiKttlicr on liis 
 n'ttini honii', lih't'din^j, weak, and naus(!ati'(l, hctwt't'ii tt-n and thirty 
 iniiiuti's al'tfr tlic! fatal stahltiny, ('lai-,' v. State, .'!0 Te.\. App. (Jl'.l 
 (IH'.)l'). 'Must wliL'ii a faet or statement is or is not a [lart of tiie 
 ros fjestiu is one of tho most ilitfienlt (jiiestions to solve known to the 
 writer. The old rule was, that to be part of the res f,'esta' the riici 
 or statement should he eontt'iiiporaneons with the traiisacttioii, and 
 
 this rule is approved by many courts oi un: nrsc auiiity. nn iiu' 
 otlur hand, the rule has been construed so as to admit acts and dec- 
 larations (KM'iirrin^' not contemporaneously with the transact.on, but 
 which precede iw follow it. . . . The rule wt> may understand, but 
 in its application the dillicnlties arise." //</(/, On the other iiaiid, 
 in a Virj^inia c.ise very similar to (Iraij; c. State in its facts, where 
 A. claimed to havu been robbed by the defendants, his declarations 
 to a witness ten minutes afti-r, some distaiKio from the scene of the 
 res j,'csta', are iiirompetcnt. The court adopt with approval a saj;e 
 statement from Mr. Wiiarton ((!rim. I'.vid. '.» I'd. I )■■>•. I'll). '• .\s soon 
 iis we pass the line wliidi (iistiii.i,'uislies lietweeii the transaction 
 talkin.LCof itself, and talUiiii,' as modilyin;,' the transaction, — in other 
 W(M'ds, as soon as we p.iss the line between the time of the trans- 
 iU'tion and the time that follows it, we hat. no limits that can lie 
 imposed. If we are tn n-ci-ive declarations made ten minutes after 
 a transaction, we nnist receive declarations made ten years alter- 
 w.irds. The impulses of aic^'cr, or it may be cd' uiiK'niunded sus- 
 picion, may, in many minds, operate even more elTectively and 
 passionately, ten r.iinutcs after an in|uiy, than they would after ten 
 years had idapsed." doiies r. Com., SO \'a. "U* ( tS'.ld). 
 
 NKiil.MJKNCK ('asks. — l''ollowiii}i out tiie line of thouj,'lit exempli- 
 lied in Com. r. M'I'ike, Insurance (lo. /•. .Moslcy and similar I'ases. 
 that a spontaneous deidaratioii by a party not a witness, made .soon 
 after an occurrence, is admissible even if it is only a story about 
 the occurrence itself, many (niscs, more particularly actions of ne;,'li- 
 geiice a^jainst a corpiu-ation, apjiareiitly ;idmit any statement made 
 |>rior to the peri«; I of invention ; /. i: <d' the time when a plaintilT 
 iiegins to think of his ri','hts or a defendant to consider how to 
 evade liability. 
 
 So lonj; as tho mind of tho declarant may fairly be assumed, in 
 the discretion of the court, to be so lilled with and controlled by the 
 recent transaction as to make his statement an instinctive outcoiiic 
 of the event its. If rather than the result of thonyht, in whit h tliu 
 
 ("MA 
 
 1,1' I 
 
riiAP. ll-l 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 301 w 
 
 aiiticij>ation of consoquftnoos may Iw exix-cted to cxprt an iiiHiifiioo, 
 till! stiitt'ineiits arc, it in said, to b<' taken as part of tlif rns |,'»'stn'. 
 Tliiis whtTc a f'roiylit train liad injiin-d ci-rtain lioisi-s on tlic track, 
 a Hl.itt'int'nt liy tliu enf^incfr to the conductor as to when lie first saw 
 the liorscs, *' made iniinediatidy alter tlio accident, hy one person 
 then cn^'ai^'ed in the (h-fendant's Imsiness to anotiier siinilarlv em- 
 ployed, in nd'ereiiee to wiiat iiad just (x^'un'MJ, and what iMey were 
 then lib in consetiuenee of Hindi occurrence, tiiere not appearinj; anv 
 caust! other than sik li orrmience to produce or inlhieiiee the dechira- 
 tion, was connecte<l with, and ^,'rew directly out <d', the main I'act -^ 
 the accident — so as to bo a jiart of tlie same transaction " was htdd 
 admissiltle. O'Connor r. (!hica>,'o, &c. I{. 1{.. 21 Minn. Hill ilSSOi. 
 
 What a 1)1 ikcman, ne^digcntly injured liy derecti >• macliinery ainl 
 liackiuK the defendant's locomotive, said within two niiniites of tlii> 
 injury, while in presence of the train and the derectjve niaidiiiiery is 
 ]iart of the res ^'esta-. '• Declarations which were the natural i-iiiana- 
 tions or out,i,'rowths of the act or occurrence in liti^'ation, allhoip^di 
 not precistdy concurrent in point of time, if they arc yet voluntarily 
 and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to i)e in the 
 j)resence id' the iransactioii whi(di they illustrate and explain, and 
 were iiiadt! under such circumstances as necessarily to exclmle the 
 idea of (lesii,'n or ihdiheration, nnist, upon the clearest iM-iiiciples of 
 justicre, be admissihle as jiart of the ad or tiansaciion itself." hnuis- 
 ville, \-c. |{. I{. *'. I'.uck, in; Iiid. rA',r, (IHSS); 'I'exa.s, &c. K. I.', r. 
 |{(d)crtsoii. SI' Tex. ('m7 (IS'.)I). in ;i case ai,'aiiist a railroad for the 
 acts of a brakenian in knocking,' the plaintilf from a movin.,' train, 
 tlio statements of the injured per.son to the person who first reaidied 
 him seven minutes after the acciileiit as to tin' cin'uiiistaiices accom- 
 panying' and precedinj^ his injury are competent. '• The licclaratioiis 
 \inder consiilcration were made at the place of the accident and 
 within a v«'ry few minutes after it occurred, anil while the plaintilT 
 was still writhini,' under the pain inllicted by it." International, itc. 
 |{. 1{. i\ Andi'rson. SI.' Tex. ."itC. ( IS'.M ). I'he court in this cise. after 
 expressing,' an apparent ref,'ret at the extension of the res jjesta- rule 
 state the rule aMthorizini: the reeeplimi of this idass of evideiiei' as 
 follows; — "Another ruii', applied in niany of the .American courts 
 at least, is to admit i~: parts of the res ;,'esta' not only siudi deidara- 
 
 tions as ai'coniiiany liie transaction, 
 
 but also sucli as are niaile uinter 
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 such circumstaiiccs as will raise a reasoi able presuni|>ti(in that they 
 
 arc the spontaneous utteraii d tlioiij,dit.s created by or sprin^infj 
 
 out of the transaction itself, ami so soon therealtcras toexcdude the 
 presumption that they are the result <d' |U'emedilatioii (U- desi.i,'n." 
 lf}li/. On similar .u'i'ounds, the declarations of the conductor (I'ish) 
 of a train just wrecked as to the runnin^r time he supposed he hail 
 is admissible in an action aj,'ainst the cninpany by a jiassen^'cr injured 
 dlision. "The declarations ol Fish were made within a few 
 
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 AMKUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AltT III. 
 
 seconds after the casualty, in view of the wrecked train, and amidst 
 the search for persons whose fate was then unknown, and while 
 Ciinther (tlie plaintiff's intestate), who lived but thirty minutes, was 
 dying from the injuries he had received, lie had no time to contrive 
 or devise a falsehood by which to exonerate himself h\nn blame. "" 
 McLeod /'. Ginther's Adm. SO Ky. ,'}<J9 (ISSl*). In the case of Han- 
 over 11. 11. u. Coyle, oo Pa. St. 3%, 402 (1S07), where a jjcddler's 
 •wagon was struck and the peddler injured by the negligence of the 
 engineer, the hitter's declaration, made after the infliction of the 
 injury, was admitted as a part of the transaction itself, tiie court 
 saying ; — " We cannot say that the declaration of the engineer was 
 no part of the res gestaj. It was made at the time of the accident, 
 in view of goods strewn along the road by the breaking up of the, 
 boxes ; and it seems to have grown directly out of, and immediately 
 after, the happening of the fact." In an action against a railroad 
 company for negligence in running over one Leverett, a brakeman, 
 his exi)lanation of the cause and manner of the injury, while still 
 under the car which ran over him is competent as part of the res 
 gestie. "The statement of Leverett was made immediately after 
 he was run over, and while the wrong complained of was incom- 
 plete, he being still under the car, and was a part of the res gestae, 
 and fairly goes to explain the cause of the condition in which he was 
 at the time it was made. It wi^s an emanation of the act in ques- 
 tion, and so connected with the cause of his injuries as to pre(dude 
 any idea that it was the product of calculated i)olicy. Aside from 
 any credit due Leverett for veracit}', the circumstances immediately 
 preceding and connected with his statement, impress the mind with 
 confidence in its truth. It was competent evidence." Little Rock 
 Ky. Co. V. Leverett, 4S Ark. 'AP>3 (LSSO). Where a passenger was 
 ejected by a brakeman from the ladies' car, the conversation be- 
 tween tl'e ])laintiff and the offending brakeman " almost immedi- 
 ately after" the plaintiff's ex[)ulsion from the car is competent as 
 ])a.rt of th."! res gestie. Hass v. Chicago, &c. K. li., 42 Wis. G.j4, 
 ()71 (1S77). Where a pa.-.ienger was injured by being thrown from 
 a car, what was said by him "immediately after the train ])assed, 
 and while he lay on the platform where he fell. It was, under the 
 authorities, a part of the res gestae. It differs from the declaration 
 which was reported in Ogden r. E. K., (44 Leg. Ind. I.'].") as that 
 was mad(! after the removal of the injured party from the ])lace 
 where he was found; in this case, it was made while the party was 
 lying where he fell and an instant after his fall.'' Pennsylvania 
 1{. 11. V. Lyons, 120 I'a. St. 113 (1889). 
 
 On an action of negligence against a firm of tin roofers for negli- 
 gently burning plaintiff's building by the escape of sparks, what the 
 (lefendant's servants said as to the ciuise of the Hro, made during its 
 progress, is competent. Shafer c. Lacock, IGS I'a. St. 407 (1805). 
 
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CHAP. II.] 
 
 AMPUUCAX XOTES. 
 
 39P'» 
 
 
 A stricter rule, and one more defensible in point of principle, has 
 been laid down in Mississippi, tliat " it is not enoii<,di that the state- 
 ment will throw light upon the transaetion under investigation, nor 
 that it was made so soon after the occurrence as to exchuk' tlie pre- 
 sumption that it has been fabricated, nor that it was made under such 
 circuuistances as to compel the conviction of its trutli; the true in- 
 ipiir}', according to all the authorities, is whether the dechiration is 
 a verbal act, illustrating, explaining, or interpreting other parts of 
 tiie transaction of which it is itself a ])art, or is merely a history or 
 a part of a liistory of a completed past affair. In the one ease it is 
 competent." IMayes v. State, 04 ]\liss. ;i29 (ISSC). In tliat ease, 
 wliere tiie deceased, who had tied after receiving th(^ fatal injury, 
 was approached by a witness about live minutes after being cut, his 
 statement as to the defendant's having done tlie injury is iuc^omijc- 
 tent. " We flunk . . . the statements of the injured party were not 
 of the res gi'sta'; that they found no sui)i)ort or credence by reason 
 of anything being done, but owe their whole force to the credit of 
 tlie declarant, and therefore should liave been excluded by the court." 
 
 The supreme court of the United States by a divided court has also 
 declined to follow tins modern extension. Vicksburg R. R, r. O'Brien, 
 110 U. S. y.) (18S()), is a leading case in tliis connection. Tlie action 
 was against a railroad for negligence, causing injury to the original 
 plaintiff's wife by ovi-rturning the car in which she was riding. 
 Plaintiff offered tlie evidence of a witness that he had a conversa- 
 tion with the engineer in charge of the train about the rate of speed 
 at which the train was going. The evidence was admitted over 
 defendant's objection. Witness said that between ten and thirty 
 minutes after the accident he had a talk with the engineer, and the 
 latter told him that the train at the time of the accident was going 
 eighteen miles an hour. Held, error. Harlan, .1., for the court 
 says: "It (the declaration) did not accompany the act from which 
 the injuries in question arose?. It was, in its essence, the mere nar- 
 ration of a past occurrence, not a part of the res gesta — simply an 
 assertion or representation, in the eours(> of conversation, as to a 
 mutter not then ])endiiig, and in respect to which liis authority as 
 engineer liad been fully exerted. It is not to be deemed [lart of the 
 res gestie, simply l)ecause of the brief [H'riod intervening between 
 the accident and the making of tlie declaration. The fact remains 
 that the occurrence had ended when the declaration in (pu'stion was 
 iiiiule, and the engineer was not in tlie act of doing anything that 
 could i)ossibly affect it." 
 
 Four judges dissent in an o])iniou liy Fiidd, -T., and conclude, tliat 
 iu view of the short time which had elajised, and from the fact that 
 the statement was made in view of the wrecked train and when the 
 engineer was surrounded by excited passengers, that it was adniis- 
 

 39119 
 
 AMEHICAN N'OTP:s. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 sible as part of tlie res gestip. The modem doctrine as to tlie res 
 gestae, the ininority say, has rehixed the ancient rule. " It now 
 allows evidence of them, when they appear to have been made under 
 the immediate influence of the principal transaction, and are so con- 
 nected with it as to (diaracterize or exphiin it." Vicksburg, &c. K. K. 
 V. O'lirien, 119 U. S. 9!) (ISSG). 
 
 TiiK SouNDKK DocTKixi:. — The doctrine that a narrative, even 
 if recent or even instinctive, can be so far jjart of the fact which tlie 
 dechiration describes as to be admissible under the exception to the 
 hearsay rule admitting declarations as part of the res gestae seems 
 not to have been universally approved. It is doubtful whether 
 Com. i\ ^I'lMke would be followed in iMassachusetts. The sounder 
 doctrine, that a declaration to be admissible as part of the res gestse, 
 must constitute part of some fact in the res gestae, is ailirmed in a 
 later Massachusetts case, — Com. v. Hackett, 2 All. 1.36(1861),— 
 which, although somewhat similar in its facts to Com. v. MM'ike, 
 falls on the other side of the line and apparently enunciates the cor- 
 rect rule. The case was murder by stabbing. A witness was 
 allowed to testify that on the street, in the night, he heard the de- 
 (icased cry out, " I 'm stabbed ; " that he at once went to him and 
 reached him in twenty seconds, and that the deceased said : "I'm 
 stal)l)pd — I 'm gone — Dan Hackett [the defendant] has stabbed me.'' 
 The evidence was tliat the defendant had suddenly come upon the 
 deceased, had stabbed him twice, and had run away. This case was 
 elaborately considered; the court gave it "the most anxious and 
 ciireful consideration, not only on account of [its importance], bi;t 
 because the exception is urged with great earnestness and apparent 
 confidence." The court (Bigelow, C. J.) say that the rule in regard 
 to decdarations part of the I'es gestse has been often loosely admin- 
 istered, but that " the tendency of recent decisions has been to 
 restrict within the most narrow limits this species of testimony.'" 
 " The objection to the admission in evidence of the declarations of the 
 deceased, made immediately after the infliction of the alleged mortal 
 blows, is put on the ground that it was a mere narration of a jiast 
 event, uttered in the absence of the defendant, and therefore in its 
 nature essentially hearsay testimony. If we regarded oidy the form 
 of words in which the declaration was made, this objection would be 
 well founded. Tl<e language used by the deceased apparently referred 
 to an event which had passed. Hut this is by no means a decisive 
 consideration. The argument would have been equally strong, in 
 case the words had been uttered as soon as the knife had been with- 
 drawn from the body of tli3 deceased, if it had appeared tliat, from 
 any cause, the defendant could not then have heard them. But it 
 is necessary, in order to determine the question of the competency 
 of this evidence, to regard not only the language used, but also the 
 circumstiuHV's umlcr which it, was uttered. T£ it was a narrative 
 
(MAP. 11.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 891'^0 
 
 stiiteinent, wholly unconnected with any transaction or- principal 
 liict, it would be clearly inadmissible. JJut such was not its charac- 
 ter. It was uttered innnediately after the alleged homicidal act, in 
 the hearing of a person wlio was present when the mortal stroke 
 was given, who heard the first words uttered by the deceased, and 
 wlio went to him after so brief an interval of time that the declaration 
 or exclamation of the deceased may fairly be deemed a part of the 
 same sentence as that which followed instantly after the stab with 
 tin; knife was inflicted. It was not therefore an abstract or narra- 
 tive statement of a past occurrence, depending for its force and 
 effect solely on the credit of the deceased, unsupported by any prin- 
 cipal fact, and receiving no credit or significance from the accom- 
 panying circumstances. But it was an exclamation or statement 
 contemporaneous with the main transaction, forming a natural and 
 material part of it, and competent as being original evidence in the 
 nature of res gesta>. The true test of the competency of the evidence 
 is not, as was urged b^'- the counsel for the defendant, that it was 
 made after the act was done, and in the absence of the defendant. 
 These are important circumstances, entitled to great weight, ami, if 
 they stood alone, quite decisive. But they are outweighed by the 
 other facts in proof, from wliicli it appears that they were uttered 
 after the lapse of so brief an interval, and in such connection with 
 the principal transaction, as to form a legitimate part of it, and to 
 receive credit and support as one of the circumstances which accom- 
 panied and illustrated the main fact, which was the subject of 
 iiKjuiry before the jury." Ihld. 
 
 ()f what res gestas fact is the declaration in Hackett's case part ? 
 Tlie declaration was clearly not of itself a fact in the res gestie. If 
 ailniissible, it must be as forming part of such a fa :t, accompanying, 
 ilhistrating, necessary to its being understood. Apparently tiie fact 
 (if stabbing is such a fact. In Hackett's case the declaration did 
 iKit accompanj', as in M'l'ike's case, the mere description or exist- 
 ence of a condition produced by the res gesta-, then over ; it illus- 
 trated, and from its proximity and nature formed in a legitimate 
 sense part of the fact of stabbing. The first exclamation clearly 
 was of tliat nature. The second declaration, if nnuli' whik! tlie 
 assailant was withdrawing the knife from the body of the deceased, 
 anil prepared to renew the assault, would clearly have been part of 
 the stabbing. If made wliile the deceas(^d was himself withdraw- 
 ing tlu! knife from the wound it would hav(! been part of the res gesta' 
 fact of stabbing. If so, the length of the interval between tin; two 
 declarations and the nature of the exclamation, an apjiarent continu- 
 ance of the first outcry, still leave the second declaration a legitimate 
 part of the act of stabbing. Xice (inestions of degree nmy arise, 
 hut it would seem as if the test wo\ild always be : Is tin; declaration 
 offered itself a res gesta; fact or a legitimate part of a fact in the 
 res g(>stie. 
 
!• '. 
 
 I V' 
 
 31»1-' 
 
 AMKIilCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'.MIT 111. 
 
 It will be nottnl that in many particulars tlio f;aso of Com. r. 
 Hackctt (ul)i suin'a) is not inilikt' that of R. /,». I'x'ilingfiokl, 11 Cdx 
 Cr. C. .'!41 (187!)). Under the ruling in that case, the cxclainatidn 
 in Com r. Ilackett (ubi supra) would proljably iiavt' been ri'ji'i'U'd. 
 As dc'liuL'd by Lord Chii'f Justice Cockburn i.i a pamplijct ('ouccrning 
 the case, "tiu^ term 'res gcstiu,' as ap|)lied to a criminal c isc,"' is; 
 " Wiiati'ver act, or scries of acts, constitute, or in point of time im- 
 mediately accom[),vny and terminate in, tiie principal act cliargcd 
 as an offence against the accused, from its iuci'ption to its consum- 
 mation or iiual com[)icti()n, or its prevention or ai)andoumei)t. — 
 wiictlicr on the part of tiie agent or wrong-doer, in order to its per- 
 formance, or on that of tlu; patient or party wronged, in order to its 
 prevention, — and whatever nuiy be said by either of tlie parties 
 during tiie (jontinuance of the transaction, with referenda to it, in- 
 cluiling herein what may be said by the suffering party, tliough in 
 the absence of the accused, during the continuance of the action of 
 the latter, actual or constructive, — as, e. g.,in tiie case of fliglit or 
 ajiiiliitations for assistance, — form part of the principal transac- 
 tion, and may be given in evidence as part of the res gestse, or par- 
 ticulars of it; while, on the other hand, statements made by the 
 comiilaining party, after all action on the j)art of the wrong-doer, 
 actual or (H)nstructive, has ceaseil, through the completion of the 
 princijial ai^t or other determination of it by its prevention or its 
 abandonment by the wrong-doer, — such as, e. g., statements made 
 with a view to the apprehension of the offender, — do not form part 
 of the res gesta;, and should be excluded." Bedingtield's Case, 14 
 Amer. Law Kev. 822 (1880). 
 
 If this is the law of England, which may be doubted, it certainly 
 lays down a stricter rule than has been adopted by any American 
 jurisdiction. Unless there be something implied in the " construc- 
 tive "' action of the wrongdoer, his actual absence from tiie scene 
 of the res gestic (even thougli unknown to the declarant) cannot be 
 adopted as the decisive test of the admissibility of such a declara- 
 tion. If we have a relevant fact, admissible as part of tiie res 
 gesta>, and, accompanying it, such a declaration as to be in a just sense 
 part of it. the declaration is admissible, though an appreciable interval 
 of time lias elaiised. 
 
 In Equitable &c. Association ?•. IMcCluskey, a case similar in its 
 facts to Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397 (18G9) the plaintiff was not 
 permitted to state declarations of the deceased made at the moment 
 of his being drawn out of the mine in which he was said to have been 
 injured. After referring to the dangers of hearsay evidence, the 
 court proceed : — " The most dangerous exception ingrafted upon 
 the rule is that which admits the declarations of a party, or an agent, 
 uttered at the time of the principal transaction, and therefore taken 
 to be a part of it, because it is supposed to be illustrativ- and evi- 
 
llf •• 
 
 rirAP, II.] 
 
 AMEUICAX NOTES. 
 
 3i)122 
 
 (Icuoe of the principal fact which is the subject of the iiKiuiry. Tt 
 pniliahly had its origin' in the troubh; soiiictiuies experienced in 
 criminal cases to identify tlie perpetrator of a crime. Tlie desire of 
 till' courts to prevent wiiat would be an evidcMit miscarriage of justice 
 ,i,'radually led to the extension of tlie rule to civil controversies ; and 
 it is possibly as well settled as any of tlie rules of evidence, that the 
 diuihiration of a party mach; at the time of an act which may be given 
 ill evidence, if it be calculated to exi)laiii, qualify or characterize 
 tlu! act itself, and is so connected witli it that it may be taken as a 
 part of one and the same transaction, and is in no sense a narrative 
 of something which has passed, may be proven ;is a part of the res 
 gt'st;e. Courts have gone a long distanct; in the application of the 
 rule to particular facts, but, for the purpose of this opinion, it is 
 wholly unnecessary to call in (piestion or criticise the extriMiie cases, 
 or to attempt the statement of any g(!neral principle, or limit its 
 application. It is enough to hold, which is as far as this opinion 
 goers, or is intended to go, that the declarations offered in evidence 
 were not under any of the well considered cases a part of the res 
 gesta>." Equitable, &c. Ass. r. McCluskey, 1 Col. Aiip. 47.'! (1892). 
 The statements of a woman suffering from arsenical poisoning are 
 not competent. " Any statement made by ]Mrs. r)ariial)y at the time 
 of taking the fatal dose, or so soon thereafter as to make the decla- 
 rations a part of the transaction and *>xplaiiatory of that act, was 
 admissible. But with a single exception the statements are not of 
 this character, and consequently the evidence should not liave been 
 allowed as part of the res gestie. It is not only hearsay, but hearsay 
 evidence of the most objectionable kind. Under claim that it was 
 part of the res gestB, witnesses were permitted to detail statements 
 maiie by Mrs. l^arnaby that would not have been receivable in evi- 
 dence, if she had recovered and appeared as a witness upon the stand, 
 against the defendant upon a charge for a lesser offence." Graves 
 r. I'cople, 18 Col. 170, 177 (ISO,".). 
 
 While it is necessary that the declaration be practically coiitem- 
 ])oraneous with the act of wliicdi it is part, it is not required that it 
 lii> contemporaneous with tlie |)rincipal act in the case. "The fact 
 that the acts given in evidence occurred i)revious to the time when 
 the murder was committed, can make no difference as to the rule. 
 If till! a(!ts of the accused done before the commission of the crime! 
 with which she is chargiMl are competent evidence tending to show 
 that she committed such crime, then what was said at the time tlie 
 act was done is also admissible, as explanatory of the same, and as 
 indicative of the intent or object of the act." Mack v. State, 48 Wis. 
 1.'71 (1879). 
 
 The exclamation of the deceased at the moment of receiving the 
 fatal injury, "Banks has shot me," is competent. State v. Banks, 10 
 Mo. App. Ill (1881). 
 
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 39123 
 
 A.-MEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'ART iir. 
 
 J^ABKATivK ExcLiDKi). — As a mere narrative of past transac- 
 tions cannot accompany and assist in constituting some fact in the 
 res gestjB, it is excluded as siniplt; liearsay. Koss v. White, 00 \'t. 
 o58 (1888) ; Doles c. State, 97 Ind. ^Sa (18S4) ; Waldel r. New Yoik 
 &c. li. K., 95 N. Y. 274 (1884) ; Petrie v. Columbia &c. R. E., 27 S. C. 
 63 (1887); Lund v. Tyngsborougli, 9 Cush. 36 ,1851) ; McKinnou i>. 
 Norcross, 148 Mass. 533 (1889). ^lere nearness of time does not 
 affect the rule. The first statements of a person after being shot 
 through a window as to who sliot him, made about live minutes after 
 the shooting, are neither themselves part of the res gestae nor admis- 
 sible as part of any res gestie fact. They are mere narrative. " They 
 in no manner served to illustrate the main fact, the shooting. The 
 chief purpose of them was to show, not that the deceased had been 
 shot, or tlio manner in wliich, or the circumstances under which, but 
 the person by whom, it had been done. . . . They were the simple 
 statements of the deceased, narrative of what had already tran- 
 spired." Jones V. State, 71 Ind. 66 (1880). " The length of the 
 interval of time between the main fact and the statements cannot be 
 important, if such time elapsed as to make tlie statements, liaving 
 regard to their form and substa!ice, mere narration." Ibid. Tliat only 
 a minute elapsed does not alter the rule. King v. State, Go Miss. 
 576 (1888). 
 
 So what the defendant's engineer said just after the accident is 
 not competent. '• -Vny statement the engineer might have nnide 
 would have been concerning a past and completed transaction, and 
 lieT.ce, would have been incompetent evidence against the railway 
 company to prove the manner and cause ul the decedent's death. 
 The fact that the statement was made in fi-> minutes after the acci- 
 dent would not render the evidence admissiLle, if the con ersation 
 referred to a past occurrence, and not connected with the res gestie." 
 Tennis v. Rapid Transit Ky. Co., 45 Kansas, 503, 509 (1891). So of 
 statements by an injured man made soon after being struck. ''The 
 res gestit, speaking generally, was the accident. These declarations 
 were no part of that — were not made at the same time, or so nearly 
 contemporaneous with it as to characterize it, or throw any light 
 U[)on it. They are purely narrative, giving an account of a transac- 
 tion not partly past, but wholly past and completed. They depend 
 for their truth wholly upon the accuracy and reliability of the de- 
 ceased, and the veracity of the witness who testified to them. 
 Nothing was then transpiring or evident to any witness which could 
 confirm the declarations." Waddele v. N. Y. &c. E. E., 95 N. Y. 274 
 (1884). 
 
 In an action for damages caused by the collision of two teams, the 
 statements of the driver of one team to third parties "shortly after 
 the injury " are not part of the res gestae. " If contemporaneous 
 with the main fact under consideration, they would be admissible, 
 
CHAP, ir,] 
 
 AMEIUCAX NOTICS. 
 
 .•;!)1« 
 
 but if made after the injury was done, and after the transaction liad 
 terminated, tiiey would not be." Mabley v. Kittleber!,'('r, 37 Micb. 
 .'J60 (1877). The statement of a passenger compelled to jump Irom 
 a moving train, as to the circumstances of liis injury, made half an 
 hour after their occurrence, to one attracted by his cries is not part 
 of the res gestte, but mere narrative. Savannah, &c. R. R. v. IloHaiid, 
 SU Ga. 257 (1888). So where a boy, after being pushed from a street 
 car, got up, walked to the sidewalk and sat down, his statement rs 
 to the cause of his injury made during or just after the sitting down 
 is mere narrative and no part of the res gestte. " Tlic true inquiry, 
 according to all the authorities, is whether the declaration is a verbal 
 act, illustrating, explaining or interpreting othiir parts of the trans- 
 action of which it is itself a part, or is merely a history or part of a 
 liistory of a completed past affair. In the one case it is competent, 
 in the other it is not." Chicago, &c. R. R. v. liecker, 128 111. 545 
 (1889). 
 
 Wliat the plaintiff said to his doctor, who had driven a dozen miles 
 to treat him at his house, as to the cause of his injury is hearsay. 
 Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509 (1889). 
 
 Where a child was killed by the negligence of the railroad company, 
 the n;other's declarations immediately after tiie accident are mere 
 hearsay. Norfolk, &c. R. R. v. Groseclose, 88 Va. 267 (1891). 
 
 The statement of the engineer in charge of the train causing the 
 injuries complained of as to the speed of tlie train made from ten to 
 thirty minutes after the accident is not competent as part of the 
 res gestae. "His declaration, after the accident had become a com- 
 jjleted fact, and wlien he was not performing the duties of engiuoer, 
 that the train, at the moment the plaintiff was injured, was being 
 run at the rate of eighteen miles an hour, was not explanatory of 
 anything in which he was then engaged. It did not accompany the 
 act from which the injuries in question arose. It was, in its essence, 
 the mere narration of a past occurrence, not a part of the res gcstsr, 
 — simply an assertion or representation, in the course of conversa- 
 tion, as to a matL'^r not then pending, and in respect to which his 
 authority as engineer ha<l been fully exerted. It is not to be deemed 
 part of the res ^•estiP, simpl}' because of tlie brief period intervening 
 between the accident and the nmking of the declaration. The fact 
 remains that the occurrence had ended when the declar.vtion in ques- 
 tion was made, and the engineer was not in the act of doing anytliing 
 that could possibly affect it. If his declaration had been made the 
 next day after ths accident, it would scarcely be claimed tliat it was 
 admissible evidence against the company. And yet the circumstance 
 that it was made between ten and thirty minutes — an appreciable 
 period of time — after the accident, cannot, upon principle, make 
 this case an exception to the general rule." Vicksburg, &c. R. R. v. 
 O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99 (1880). 
 
^i ■ !V 
 
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 m 
 
 
 
 li! 
 
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 3!)1" 
 
 A.MKKICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'Airr HI. 
 
 Shitcmonts by an. injurcil ])orson to liis physician doscrihiiig tlio 
 :i('ci(lt'iit, a siitiiciunt time having ehipsed to carry tlu! injured man 
 liouic and to summon tlie doctor, are not admissible as part of the res 
 },'i'Sti>'. Alerkhi v. IJennington, 58 Mich. 150 (1885). 
 
 Am account by an injured man to liis wife, fifteen or twenty 
 minutes after the aceicUnit, is not admissible. "'They were no part 
 of the transaction that was being tried." Estell v. State, 51 N. ,1. I., 
 18L' (1S8',)). So of a narrative by a husband to his wife maih! from 
 thirty to sixty minutes after the occurrence in question. Armil /•. 
 Ciiiciigo.&c. il'y Co., 70 la. I'M (18.S()). "The res gestae or transac- 
 tion was the accident, and how it occurred. It is not essential that 
 the declaration sought to be introduced in evidence was uttered at 
 tlie identical time the accitlent occurred, but, if made soon after- 
 wards, and explanatory tliereof, it is admissible." Armil, Adm'x, /'. 
 Chicago, &c. Il'y Co., 70 la. I'M (1880). 
 
 Mere nearness in point of time has not sutKced to admit state- 
 ments as part of a res gest.i? fact, even in courts which favor a liberal 
 interpretation of the rule, whore the utterance does not seem to 
 have been instinctive. Thus, in an indictment of assault with intent 
 to murder, the remarks of the assailant while lying woumlijd on the 
 ground shortly after the termination of the assault, are not compe- 
 tent in his own favor. " Were the statements of defendant to 
 HaselHeld spontaneous, instinctive, generated by excited feeling ? 
 We think not. When asked to tell about the matter he does not do 
 it, seems to be thinking more about catching his horse than anything 
 else, and only agrees or promises to tell witness if he will first catch 
 his horse and fetch it to him ; and he does not tell .him until he has 
 done so, and tliat, too, after the lajjse of about three minutes. This 
 looks very much like a 'break or let down' in the ccmtinuity of the 
 transaction. In his .apparently cool condition and freedom from ex- 
 citement, the three minutes' time might have afforded defendant 
 ample opportunity to concoct the stat-ement which was afterwards 
 made to the witness. We are of opinion the court did not err in 
 holding that the declarations were self serving, and eonsefpiently 
 inadmissible." I radl)erry v. State, 22 Texas Apj). 27;> (1880). 
 
 Where the conductor of a horse-car said to a passenger immedi- 
 ately upon the happening of the accident that it was his fault, the 
 fact is not competent as \yivt of the res gestie. The court adopt 
 the language of an earlier decision (Lane v. l^ryant, 9 (xray, 245) : 
 " Tiie declaration of the defendant's servant was incompetent, and 
 should liave been rejected. It was made after the accident ocjurred, 
 and the injury to the plaintiff's carriage had been done. It did not 
 accompany the principal act, . . . or tend in any way to elucidate it. 
 It was only the expression of an opinion about a past occurrence, 
 and not part of the res gesta?. It is no more competent because 
 made immediately after the accident than if made a week or a month 
 
ClIM'. 11.] 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 3!tt2« 
 
 al'ttTwarcls." Williamson r. (.'aiubridge U. ]{., 141 Mass. 1 I«(1SS7); 
 Tyli'i- '•• Old Colony II. 11., 157 Mass. .'JoO (I.S'.IIJ). 
 
 What liio plaiiitit't' in an action t'ur injuries from lalling or hcing 
 puslit'il into a ditch by the dei'endant's iiegligcniU' said n\n)\\ being 
 [lulled out of the diteh is mere hearsay. " Altiiougli occurring ini- 
 mediately after tlie accident, it was no part of the res gesta', but a 
 narration of a past transaction, and therefore iiu-rc hearsay evi- 
 dence.'' Cleveland, &c. Iv. K. /'. Mara, '2('> Uh. St. l.S") (187")). "^ 
 
 (L') In Hoover v. Cary, 8G la. 4<J4 (l8'.)L'), declarations were re- 
 jected as part of the res gestiu because nut made at such a time 
 ■•as to reasonably' exclude the idea of deliberate design." 
 
 Mist (;iiAUA(;Ti:iuzK riii': riM\<ii'.\i, Fact. — .\s has l)een abun- 
 dantly seen in the foregoing cases, it is essential in order to be in 
 any just sense part of a res gestae fact that the declaration in (pies- 
 tion should so limit, explain, or characterize siuih res gesta- fact as 
 to be necessary in order to its full undtu'standing. 
 
 "In the complexity of human affairs, ndiat is done and what is 
 said are often so related that neither can be detached without leav- 
 ing the residue fragmentary and distorted. There may Ije fraud and 
 falsehood as to both ; but there is no ground of objection to one that 
 does not exist equally as to the other. To reject the verbal fact 
 would not Infrequently have the same (dfect as to strike out the con- 
 trolling member from a sentence, or the controlling se.itence from 
 its context." Insurance Comi)any r. jNIosley, 8 Wall. 3'.)7 (fS(5!)). 
 '■ It becomes a part of the act itself, is explanatory of it, and gives 
 it, to a great extent, its character." Mack o. State, 48 Wis. 271, L'8() 
 (1879). In a Connecticut ise the court say that declarations part of 
 a res gestie fact '-must mf have been mere narratives of past occur- 
 rences, but must have been at the time of the act done which 
 they are supposed to ohai ', and have been well calculated to 
 unfold the nature and qua.iu the acts they were intended to ex- 
 l)lain, and to so harmonize with lliem as to constitute a single trans- 
 action." Rockwell I'. Taylor, 41 Conn, iio (1874). "Tin! limita- 
 tions upon that ruh^ are easily stated, but often ilillicult in their 
 application. The declarations iniist be made at the time of the act 
 done which they are sui)i)osed to cluiracterize ; tiiey must be calcu- 
 lated to unfold the nature and qualily of the facts wliidi tliey are 
 intended to explain, and they must so harmonize witli these facts as 
 to form one transaction." Suiith r. X. ]>. Society. JL'o X. V. 8.j 
 (1890). "The difficulty of formulating any exact rule by which the 
 admissibility of such declarations as a part of the res gestie shall be 
 determined has been a source of frequent perplexity to the (tourts, 
 and a cause of common lamentation to the judges and tlie text- 
 writers. The inherent difficulty of the subject, and the necessity of 
 referring each case to its own particular eireumstanoes, are univer- 
 sally recognized. The declarations in question must not be mere 
 
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 J. iMi 
 
 891!*' 
 
 A.MKKICAN NOTKH. 
 
 [I'AUT 111. 
 
 iiiiinitivcs of a past oecurronce, but must have been made at tlm 
 time of tlie act done whicli they are supposed to characterize ; ami 
 tlu'y must be well calculated to unfold the nature and quality of tho 
 facts wliich they are offered to explain, and must so harmonize with 
 tiiem as obviously to constitute one transaction. Hut, while sut'li 
 declarations must be made at the time of tiie act done, that rule is 
 not pressed to the extent that they must be precisely concurrent in 
 point of time. If tlie declarations spring out of tlie transaction, 
 if they elucidate it, if they are voluntary and spontaneous, and if 
 tliey are made at tlie time or so near to it as reasonably to preclude 
 the idea of deliberate design, and they be not a narrative of a past 
 occurrence, they are then to be regarded as contemporaneous." 
 Archer v. Helm, 70 Miss. 874, 8!K) (J 81)3). 
 
 Jn an action against a carrier for assaulting the plaintilf, whose 
 ticket did not permit him to use the part of the boat wiiere he was 
 found, the plaintiff is entitled to put in evidence tiie declarations of 
 the defen(huit's servants while engaged in violently removing liim. 
 " We are of opinion that these declarations constituted a part of the 
 res gestu'. Tlicy were made by one servant of the defendant wiiile 
 assisting anotlier servant in enforcing its regulation as to deck pas- 
 sengers. Thijy v/ere made when the watcliman iind tlie mate, accord- 
 ing to the evidence of the plaintiff, were botli in tlie very act of 
 violently ' pushing liiin,' while in a hel[)less condition, to that part 
 of the boat assigned to deck passengers. IMainly, therefore, they 
 iiad some relation to the impiiry, wlietiier the enforcement of that 
 regulation was attended witli unnecessary or cruel severity. They 
 accompanied and explained the acts of the defendant's servants out 
 of which directly iirose the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff." 
 Steamboat Co. t>. Crockett, IL'I U. S. 637, 649 (188C)). 
 
 DrscRRTioN. — Fre(pient statements appear in the foregoing deci- 
 sions to the etfect that the admissibility of declarations as part of 
 the res gestie depends upon the discretion of the court. .Many such 
 expressions appear unduly sweeping. The discretion of the court 
 ill admitting sucli declarations is no greater than in other cases 
 wliere relevant testimony is offered. Whether the evidence is of 
 sutticient probative force to warrant its admission ; whether it is too 
 remote to be of value; whether it is dangerous, as tending to mis- 
 lead the jury, — these and similar (piestions are determined by the 
 sound discretion of the court, subject to control by tiie upper court 
 in case of abuse. Hut the presiding justice has no discretion to 
 modify the rules of evidence in the case of declarations part of the 
 res gestae in a different sense than in other cases where nice ques- 
 tions of degree arise. " It is not a matter of discretion with the 
 l)residing judge, to determine whether or not the declarations are 
 admissible. That is determinable by well settled principles of law, 
 which must be applied to each case as it arises ; the restriction being 
 
 Ins. 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 A.MKUICAN NOTICS. 
 
 gov;8 
 
 IS 
 
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 t of 
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 OUl't 
 
 ises 
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 the 
 
 are 
 law, 
 
 
 
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 tliat the declaration must be contemporary witli tlic iiriiici[)al trans- 
 action, anil derive some degree of credit from it." Kciiiitalilc, tic 
 Ass. /•. McCIuskey, 1 Col. .Vpp. -iln (iH'.rj). 
 
 Statkmknts iiY A(JKNrs, C(M (iNsi'iK.\r()K> &(\ — Willi all dun 
 deference to I'rofessor Greenli-af, who is followed by the hMnied 
 author, tlie attempt to introduce the dcidaratioiis of agents, fcUow- 
 consi)irators, &c.,as instaiuies of the res gestie nile, merely brings 
 an (dement of further ambiguity into the consideration of a subject 
 wiiich is at best considerably bidbgged. L'lider certain circumstances, 
 fixed by positive law, the acts and deidaratioiis of l'>. are considered 
 as being those of A. This lias nothing to do with the law of evidence. 
 It is part of the law of agency, privity, conspiracy, HiC. When it is 
 ascertaiiKul by the rules of these branches of the substanti'^e law, 
 that the proper circumstances exist to enable 15. to act or speak for 
 A., the law of evidence applies precisely the same ruh; in receiving 
 the declarations of 15. that it would have ap|died to those of A. 
 Clearly, therefore, the question is not one of evidence. The con- 
 venient obscurity of the phrase "res gestie" operat(!s at this point. 
 The substantive law decides that B., as a partner or other agent, can 
 bind A. by his acts or declarations, when he is engaged on the /hisI- 
 ni'Ks of his principal. B., as a conspirator, can, by the rules of posi- 
 tive law, bind his fellow-conspirator, A., by his acts or omissions only 
 when engaged in furthering the i«,s'/«^',v.s' agreed on by the conspiracy. 
 This word "business," by being turned into the ])hrase " res gesta'," 
 may readily become confused with the same phrase ''res gestu) " 
 where it means the facts in issue and certain relevant facts in a 
 particular case. So far as the law of evidence is conceriu'd, the use 
 of the phrase in any other than the latter sense is greatly to be 
 deplored. 
 
 The extent to which the confusing of these two possible mean- 
 ings of the phrase " res gestae" is carried is shown in a late case in 
 the supreme court of Texas, where the statements of physicians 
 made while attending a sick man and diagnosing his case were held 
 admissible as part of the res gesta*. "Tlie opinions ex[)ressed at 
 the time with reference to the subject of consideration by one or the 
 other in the course of their examination were, in our opinion, in the 
 nature of res gestip, and so admissible. The decdaratioiis were made 
 in the course of their business and while engaged in a professional 
 duty. They were coincident busiii(!ss declarations." ]\Iut. Life 
 Ins. Co. V. Tillman, 84 Tex. 31 (1892). 
 
 Hearsay. — The rule excluding the reported statements of parties 
 not called as witnesses is unquestionably an essential cliaracteristic 
 of the English law of evidence. Like many other characteristic 
 features of this law, its original reason for existence is probably 
 to be sought in fear lest that juries might be induced to give -i 
 
 I ' 
 
li '' I 
 
 ' <i it 
 
 ;Ji)i29 
 
 AMKHICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AHT III. 
 
 ii'])()rte(l statement undue probative force. As a matter of logii', 
 tliat a person not present in court has stated a certain fact to he 
 true is probably of but slight iirobative force as proof of the fact. 
 A tribunal of intellectual poise might, however, safoh^ be jx-rmittcd 
 to receive sucdi a statement, giving it proper weight. Instances 
 fre(piently occur where tlie operation of the hearsay rule is to 
 remove from the consideration of court and jury evidence winch 
 would be helpful to a correct conclusion. Hut practical considera- 
 tions have tirmly established the rule that the e.xistenee of fads 
 must be proved by tiie statements of persons called as witnesses or 
 by documents properly verilied to the tribunal. Fougue r. l'.urges.s, 
 71 Mo. ;!81) (18S0); Slierwood v. Houston, il Miss. r»'.) (ISdC)); For- 
 rester r. State, 4G Md. ir)4 (1S7G); Spencer i-. Fortescue. Ill' N. (,'. 
 2(;s (IS!).".) ; Atchison, &c. R. K. v. I'arker, o C. C. A. L'l'O (1HI>;;) ; 
 Marks r. Suilivan, 9 Utah, IL' (189.']) ; Myers v. Knabe, ol Kans. Tl'O 
 (ISIK!) ; Salem Gravel Road Co. i<. rennington. 02 Ind. 17o (1S7S) ; 
 Anderson i'. Fetzer, 75 Wise. m2 (1890);' SeaU's i\ Desha. 1C> Ala. 
 308 (1849) ; Fage v. Farker, 40 N. U. 47 (18()0) ; Kent v. Mason, 79 
 HI. r)40 (187")) ; Hornheimer (.-, lialdwin, 4'2 Cal. 27 (1871) ; Shaw v. 
 Susquehanna liooni Co., 125 Fa. St. .'524 (1889) ; Village of Fonca v. 
 Crawford, 1>^ Xel).551 (ISSC.) ; Refay r. Wheeler, 84 Wis. FW (189.",); 
 Little r. (\)ok, 55 Minn. 2G5 (189">) ; Brown v. l»rude, 97 Ala. O.'.'J 
 (189;}); Illinois Central K. II. v. Langdon, 71 Miss. 14G (189."); 
 Downtain n. Connellee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 95 (18',>;{) ; Faker v. ({old- 
 smith, 91 Ga. 17.'} (1892). What a witness " understood from some 
 source" is properly rejected as hearsay. Scales v. Desha, IG Ala. 
 308 (1849); "That it was a matter of common report and i)ulilic 
 notoriety that intoxicating li(piors were sold at " a certain drug store 
 is hearsay and inadmissible. Cobleigh i: .McHride, 45 la. IKi (187(')). 
 The error of admitting hears.ay is not cured by an instruc^tion to dis- 
 regard it. Denu)ney r. Walker, 1 N. J. liaw, 3.'{ (1790). 
 
 Its admission is none the less subject to objection and excep- 
 tion where the ([lu^stions bringing it out are asked by tlic judge. 
 Hornheimer r. Haldwin, 42 Cal. 27(1871). The fai't that the rei'ioiied 
 statement is that of an expert's opinion does not aU'eet the applica- 
 tion of the rule. Village of Fonca v. Crawford, 18 Xcb. 551 (18.SG). 
 
 AMU)ng the objections to hearsay must be included the infirmity 
 which arises from the fact that the person on whose credit the jtro- 
 bative stiitement really rests cannot be subjected to the tests of cross 
 examination. " .V person who relates a hearsay is not oblig(>d to 
 enter into any j)artienlars, to answer any (pu'stions. to solve any 
 ditticulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to exjjlain any obscurities, 
 to renu)ve any ambiguities ; lie intrenches hiniself in the simple 
 assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely njion 
 his dead or absent author." Coloinan v. Southwiok, 9 Johns. 45 
 (1812). 
 
('ii.vr. II.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 ;;<)l3o 
 
 h», 
 
 The rule applies equally where prohative statement of the iieisoii 
 not called as a witness is in writing, as, for exanqile, a letter, lirooks 
 r. Aeton, 117 Mass. l.'l)4 (1875) ; Anderson /•. Fctzer, 75 Wis. 5(iL' 
 (^KS'JO); 1' rsun /•. Darrington, ol' Ala. L'1'7. L'5(> (lS,")f<). (.)r is con- 
 Uiined in deposition. I'age r. Tarker, -K) N. II. 47, <>(! (ISdO). 
 
 The United States supreme cinirt in an early ease apparently re- 
 ceived hearsay as evidence of death seemingly on the ground o( a 
 ilitliculty in getting better evidence. Lessee of Scott /•. Katliffe, 5 
 IVters, 81, SG (IN.'Jl); Jackson y. Honeham, 15 Johns. l.'l.'(; (1818). 
 
 Tlie (piestion has been raised wlietliei a witness in stating liisown 
 ag" is testifying to hearsay. That he is not, see CiieevcM' r. C'ongdon, 
 ;U Mieii. 2\k> (187()); Morrell v. Morgan. ()5 Cal. 575 (1884) ; State 
 r. Cain. W. \'a. 55'J (187(>); State /-. -McClain, 4',) Kans. 7;}0 (18i)2) 
 Kogers r. De Hardeleben Coal &c. Co., '.)7 Ala. 154 (181»L'). " It is 
 quite clear that one may testily from his own knowledge of himself 
 wliether ho was twenty-one or sixteen years of age ataeertain time " 
 — to be given sm;h weight as the jury jdease. Hill r. Elridge, 126 
 Mass. L'.')4 (1879) " The witness knows the age of her sister from the 
 declarations of her mother, who is de(!eased. Now. that this species 
 of evidenci! must W' adniitted has always been held, for otherwise a 
 person could not prove his own age; for where no family record is 
 made, he can only show it from the declaration of his parents or 
 others cognisant of the fact. Such testimony has always been re- 
 ceived, unless there was better evidence in tiie power of the party. 
 Tiie general rule undoubtedly is, that the best evidence whiidi the 
 nature of the case admits must be ])roduced. Ihitthisrule is ndaxed 
 in cases of jiedigree." Watson /•. llrewster. 1 I'a. St. .'i8l (1845). 
 
 ihit the declarations of a testator are not admissible as to his age. 
 It is " a fact of whicli \nr could not have any personal knowledge." 
 Doe n. Ford, .'i Q. B. U. C. 35L' (1847). 
 
 So a young girl may testify as to her i)arentage. " It is certainly 
 competent for one wiu), from his earliest recollection, has been a 
 member of lUie's family, given his name, and reared in the btdief, 
 and in all ways given to undi rstand tiiat he is a son in tlu' household 
 to ti'stify of his parentage ... to so rear a child is in tiie nature 
 id' an admission of pari'ntage. ai'd should be so regarded." C(Unstock 
 /•. State, 14 Neb, 205 (I88;i). 
 
 On tiie otlier hand, a person cannot testify as to an injury suffered 
 at the age of four. (irangtM's' Ins. Co. /•. Hrown, 57 Miss. ,'{(I8 (187'.t). 
 .\ i>res('nt impression ])ro(luced by information from others is still 
 iieaisay. Lamar r. i'earre, <)() Ga. .".77 (18i)2). 
 
 A man cannot nd'rcsh his memory from nuMiioranda made from tin* 
 reports of seivants. Tingley r. Kairhaven Land Co., 1) I'tah, .34 
 (1801). Or testify as to what he has learned from a record m.ade by 
 another person. Cleveland, &i'. K. R. Co. v. 15rown, 5.'? 111. Api). 2'27 
 
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 39131 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AltT III. 
 
 P.KST Evidence Rule. — An attempt has been made to regard the 
 rnle a,i,Minst liearsay as an application of the best evidence rtUc and 
 permit its reception " when no evidence can be supposed to exist." 
 Gould V. Sniitli, 35 Me. T)!,') (1S53). "The cases in whicli hearsay, 
 declarations of parties, and reputation, have been allowed in evidence, 
 are where no better evidence can be supposed to exist." Crouch v. 
 Eveleth, 15 Mass. .304 (1818) ; Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch, 
 290 (1813) ; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1883). " Hearsay is uni- 
 formly iiolden incompetent to establish any specific fact which is in 
 its nature susceptible of being proved by witnesses who can sjieak 
 from their own knowledge." Page v. Parker, 40 X. H. 47, 60 (1860). 
 "Such testimony is excluded whenever it appears that a higher 
 degree of evidence of that fact can be obtained by the production of 
 the per.s(o\ from whom tlie evidence offered was derived ; but wliPii- 
 ever Ihv testimony of sucli person is of no higher degree in establish- 
 ing the f;ict CO be shown than the evidence offered, either is original 
 and primary evidence of that fact." Smith v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 
 293 (1892). 
 
 It is certainly to be modified to the extent stated by Chief Justice 
 Marshall in Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch. 290 (1813); — 
 "That this species of testimony supposes some better testimony 
 which might be adduced in the particular case, is iiottlie sole ground 
 of its exclusion. Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy 
 the mind of the existence of the fac^t, and the frauds which might be 
 practiced under its cover, combine to support the rule that liearsay 
 evidence is totally inadmissible." I/juf. 
 
 It is probably upon the principle of its being the best evidence 
 available tluit tiie recognized exception to tlie hearsay rule obtains 
 "tliat declarations, wrif'-'u or oral, made by a testator after the exc- 
 cutinn of his will, are, in the event of its loss, admissil)le, not only 
 to prove that it has not been cancelled, but also as secondary evidence 
 of its contents." Matter of Page, 118 111. 576 (I88(n. 
 
 P)Ut it is furtlun' true tliat where no better evidence can possibly 
 be secured hearsay is not competent. For example, the statements 
 of a deceased person, not part of the res gestie, and not made as a 
 witness on a former trial, are not admissible to prove an account. 
 Salem Grav.d Road Co. v. Pennington. 62 Tnd. 175 (1878). So the 
 fact that a witness is dead or has left the country is no rea.son for 
 admitting his declarations, either written or spoken. Peansou c. 
 Harrington, 32 Ala. 227, 250 (1858). 
 
 Heahsav to thi;Coi:kt. — The nature of the danger appreliended 
 to the administration of justice from the use of hearsay in mislead- 
 ing the jury is emphasized by the fact that, where the question is 
 one of faet preliminary to tlie admission, and therefore to l)e decided 
 by the court, the rule excfluding hearsay does not apply. For ex- 
 ample, the court in deciding whether proper search hn- the original 
 
 
CHAP, n.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 39132 
 
 document has taken place sufficient to let in secondary evidence 
 of contents, may rely upon hearsay. Bridges v. Hyatt, 2 Abb. Trac. 
 449 (18r)6). 
 
 UooKs OF Standakd Authokity. — A statement is none the less 
 hearsay because it is contained as a scientitic statement in a 
 standard work on medicine, lirowu r. Sheppard, 13 Q. ]^. U. C. 
 178 (ISilG) ; Fox v. Peninsular, &c. AVorks, 84 Mich. 070, 081 
 (1891); r.loomington v. Shrock, 110 111. 21!) (1884); Tucker r. 
 Donald, 60 Miss. 4G0 (1882) ; Com. /-. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68 (1889) ; 
 Gallagher v. Market Ht. R. K.. 07 Cal. 13 (188.5); Kreuziger v. 
 Chicago, &c. IJ. K, 73 Wis. 158(1888); Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 
 Mass. 122 (1875). The rule cannot be evaded by reading from the 
 book to an expert medical witness, and asking him wliether it is the 
 truth. jNlarshall v. Brown, 50 Mich. 148 (1883) ; Davis v. State, 
 38 Md. 15 (187.3). 
 
 The rule refusing to admit works of standard authority is not 
 modified by the fact that counsel declined to examine an expert 
 further entirely on the expectation that he could offer tlie book 
 itself later, nor that the expert had read passages on his cross-ex- 
 amination. State r. O'Brien, 7 R. I, 330 (1802). 
 
 So of the United States ]\Iedical Dispensary'. Boehringer v. 
 Richards Medicine Co. (Tex.), 29 S. W. .508 (1894). 
 
 Such statements cannot be shown even for the jjurpose of cor- 
 roborating an expert by showing that he is sustiiin(ul by nu'dical 
 authority. Fox r. Peninsular, &.v. Works, 84 ]\Iicli. 070 (1891) ; 
 Huffman r. Click, 77 N. C. 55 (1877). 
 
 But where an adverse expert witness bases his opinion upon the 
 authority of a particular author, that work nuiy be read in evidence 
 to contradict him. " Where a witness says a tiling or a tlic ry is so 
 because a book says so, and the book, on being produced, is discov- 
 ered to say directly to the contrary, there is a direct contradiction 
 which anybody can understand, lint where a witness simply gives 
 his opinion as to the proper treatment of a given disease or injury, 
 and a bof)k is produced recomnu-nding a different treatni'Mit, at most 
 the repugnance is not of fact, but of theory ; and any number of 
 additional books expressing different theories, would obviously be 
 quite as lompetent as the first. IJut since the boDks arc not ad- 
 missible as (M'iginal evidence in such cases, it must follow that tliey 
 are not admissible on cross-examination, where their introduction is 
 not for the direct contradiction of sometliing asserted by the witness, 
 butsimjilv to prove a contrary theorv." lUoomington /•. Schrock, 
 110 111.219 (1S84). 
 
 It would seem that, upon iiriiieiplc, a statement in a book of stand- 
 ard authority should be competent where tbe fact to be ])roved is 
 not the truth of tlie statenuMit, but the existenee of tlie statement. 
 In a case like lirown r. I'iper, where originality was claimed for a 
 
li' 
 
 •! 
 
 «n Ml 
 
 ( 1 
 
 30133 
 
 AMEiaCAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT HI. 
 
 cortain invention, it would seem to be competent to show that tlie 
 essential principle of the alleged invention was described in the 
 American EncyclopaMlia. Brown r. Piper, 91 U. S. 37 (1875). 
 
 The error in admitting the statements of medical works may ho 
 cured by the otherside going into the same kind of evidence without 
 objection. Kreuziger v. Chicago, t&c. K. li., 73 Wis. 158 (188S). 
 
 MoitT.ALiTV Tablks. — Ou the other hand, mortality tables uf 
 recognized authority are admissible to assist the jury in estimating 
 decreased earning capacity, «fcc., caused by a personal injury. " I.» 
 order to assist the jury in making such an estimate, standard lil'e 
 and annuity tables, showing at any age the probable duration of 
 life, and the present value of a life annuity, are competent evidence. 
 But it has never been held that the rules to be derived from such 
 tables or computations must be- the absolute guides of tlie judgment 
 and the conscience of the jury." Vicksburg, &c. R. It. v. I'utnani, 
 118 U. S. 545 (1880). "The expectancy of life is ascertained by 
 the average mortality of large numbers, and for convenience tlicse 
 averages are gathered into tables. There are several such tables, 
 English and American, and any of them shown to be used by 
 reputable insurance companies, with such other proof as the 
 parties may offer, either as to the condition of the individual 
 or tlie general mortality of the community, would be admissible.'' 
 Mississippi, »&c. R. 11. v, Ayres, 10 Lea, 725 (1880); j\[cKeigiie 
 V. Janes'.'ille, G8 Wis. 50 (1887). But the mortality or annuity 
 tables must be shown to be correct; and it is error to intro- 
 duce in evidence the table of the expectation of the years of life 
 contained in a book entitled " A Million of Facts ; Conkling's Handy 
 Manual of Useful Information and Atlas of the World ; all for 
 Twenty-five Cents," without more evidence, or that it was of any 
 " higiier character than any cheap book sold on railways." Galves- 
 ton, &c. K. 11. V. Arispe, 81 Tex. 517 (181)1). 
 
 Scoi'K OK THE lluLK. — The rule as stated above is not equivalent 
 to saying that the statements of persons not called as witnesses are 
 not admissible. They are not admissible as evidence of the exis- 
 tence of the facts which they purport to state. But the fact that a 
 certain statement has been made may itself be relevant, whether 
 it states the truth or not. In fact the truth of the statement is 
 not what is relevant. It is the .statement itself. 
 
 Tlie hearsay rule ac^cordiiigly does not apply to jiroof of an oral 
 contract by a bystander. " It was not hearsay, but legal proof of a 
 contract of which there was no other or better evidence. It was 
 evidence of a fact, and not of a mere conversation or declaration." 
 Blaiichard v. Child, 7 Gray 155 (185G). A by-stander can testify to 
 such a conversation, even if carried on through an interpreter, though 
 he only understands one language, and relies on the interpreter for 
 the other. Com. v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393 (1892). 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 3913* 
 
 • for 
 
 111 the same way the fact that a certain statement has been made 
 out of court may be admissible to fix a date or identify an interview. 
 Hill V. North, 3i Vt. G04 (1801). Or to fix the time at whicli a 
 witness' attention was called to a fact. Barrow v. State, 80 (la. 
 191 (18S7). 
 
 A declaration maybe used as a fact to identify an interview. 'I'lie 
 hearsay rule has no application to such a use. " Any circumstance 
 or act occurring at that transaction and remembered by both witnesses 
 would show that they were testifying to the same occasion, and would 
 be clearly competent. So we are of opinion that tiie conversation 
 of the parties or any declarations made at the time are to be regarded 
 as in the nature of verbal acts, and admissible for the purpose of 
 identifying the occasion of which the witnesses speak. Statements 
 used for this limited purpose are admitted without regard to the 
 truth of the fact stated." Earle r. Earle, 11 All. 1 (18G5). 
 
 Giving notice may be " considered an act, which he might prove in 
 any case in which it became material." Kilburn v. IJenuett, 3 Mete. 
 19!) (1841). 
 
 Exclamations of paix, &c. — Where the existence of any 
 bodily or mental state is a fact in issue or relevant to the issue the 
 usual verbal expressions attending the existence of such state are 
 competent original evidence of the fact of its existence. Such 
 statements are not an exception to the hearsay rule. It is the 
 existence of the statement rather than its purport which is con- 
 sidered relevant. 
 
 "Whenever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are 
 material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings are 
 original and competent evidence." Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 
 Wall. 397 (1869) ; Texas, &c. R. R. v. Rarron, 78 Tex. 421 (1890) ; 
 McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50 (1887); Phillips v. Kelly, 29 
 Ala. 628 (1857) ; Sanders *•. Reister, 1 Dak. 151 (1875) ; Frink v. 
 Coe. 4 Greene (la.) 555 (1854); Hagenlocher r. Coney Island, &c. 
 R. R., 99 X. Y. 136 (1885) ; Western Union Tel, Co. r. Henderson, 
 89 Ala. 510 (1889) ; Helton r. Alabama &e. R. R., 97 Ala. 275 
 (189;?); Reople r. Meservey, 76 INIich. 22.'? (1889) ; Lush r. McDaniel, 
 13 Ired. L. 485 (1852) ; riummer r. Ossiiiee, 59 N. II. r>r> (1879); 
 Texas, &c. 11. R. v. Harron, 78 Tex. 421 (1890); (Jray /•. Mc- 
 Laughlin, 26 la. 279 (1868); Commissioners v. Leggett, 115 Ind. 
 544 (1888). " It is evident tliat tlie reason for tli rule is a sound 
 one, since it is clear that as many of the organs of the body cannot 
 be seen, latent injuries can only be discovered and known through 
 the declarations of the injured person." 
 
 Exclamations of pain are evidence of a then present condition 
 when made to a physician wlio is not attending tlie declarant jiro- 
 fessionally, in the same way and to the same extent that they 
 would be competent if made to a non-professional witness. Drew 
 
I ' i\ 
 
 1 
 
 .'■ : 
 
 *ii 
 
 i^/ 
 
 39185 
 
 AMERICAN X01J1«. 
 
 [PAKT III. 
 
 v 1 
 
 r. Sutton, ;") \'t. 580 (1882). Apparently in Newman v. Dodson, 
 ()1 Tex. 91 (1884) it is ivgai-ded as i:ii material whether the physi- 
 rian is employed or not. Siioh exclamntions ^v^hiie under examina- 
 tion by a physician who is preparing himself to be a witness in the 
 case are not competent. '• It has all the evih of manufactured 
 testimony, without any p()ssil)le means of detecting the falsity 
 of it." Jones v. I'ortland, 88 Mich. 598 (1891) ; Stewart v. Everts, 
 7G Wis. 35 (1890). 
 
 The name of the party iuHictin^- the injury is to be excluded 
 from such a statement. Denton v. State, 1 Swcn, 27C (1851). 
 
 Thus in an action for i)ersonal injuries exclamations of pain 
 littered by deceased at the time of the injury and from that tinu; 
 down to her death are admissible. McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 
 50 (1887). 
 
 The declarations of a sick person made from time to time con- 
 cerning present sufferings and sensations are admissible to prove tlie 
 fact of such sufferings and sensations. Elliott i\ Van Buren, 3.3 
 Mich. 49 (1875) ; Hall v. American Masonic &c. Ass'n., 80 Wis. 518 
 (1893). 
 
 ••' Evidence of exclamations which are natural concomitants and 
 manifestations of pain and suffering are still admissible, because 
 regarded as involuntary and natural expressions which a witness 
 may describe for the same reason that he may the appearance of 
 the party." Kenuv dy v. R. C. & B. K. Co., 130 N. Y. 054 (1891) ; 
 Thomas V. Ilerrall, .8 Oreg. 540 (1S90). 
 
 On an action for a nuisance by the noxious smells from the de- 
 fendant's out buildings, the plaintiff can give in evidence com- 
 plaints by his wife since deceased. " It is difficult to perceive why 
 the complaint of a person suffering from a nuisance, may not be 
 received as an expression of bodily or mental feeling, and as origi- 
 nal evidence, as well as in any other case of annoyance or injury." 
 Kearney v. Farrell, 28 Conn. 317 (1859). 
 
 In an action against a town for injuries caused by a defect in the 
 highway the presiding judge ruled that " groans or exclamations of 
 pain, made by the plaintiff, at anytime, were admissible in evidence, 
 although they referred either by word or gesture to the kxiality of 
 the pain ; as if a man should ))ut his hand upon his side and groan, 
 or should say, ' Oh ! my head ! ' or utter similar complaints, being 
 an expression of present pain or agony ; but that any statement of 
 liis condition or feelings, made in answer to a question, or as a 
 narrative, or with a view to communicate information, was not 
 admissible." This ruling was sustained by the supreme judicial 
 court, as follows : — " The rule of law is now well settled, and it 
 forms an exception to the general rules of evidence, that where the 
 bodily or mental feelings of a party are to be proved, the usual and 
 natural expressions of such feelings, made at the time, are consid- 
 
 il' 
 
CHAP. 11.] 
 
 AMUHIUAN NOTES. 
 
 39136 
 
 ored competent and original evidence in his favor. And the rule is 
 founded upon the consideration, that such expressions are tlie natural 
 and necessary language of emotion, of tlie existence of which, from 
 tlie very nature of the case, there can be no other evidence. Tliere 
 are ills and pains of the body, which are proper subjects of proof 
 in courts of justice, which can be shown in no other way. Such 
 evidence, however, is not to be extended beyond the necessity on 
 wliich tlie rule is founded. Anything in the nature of narration or 
 statement is to be carefully excluded, and tlie testimony is to be 
 confined strictly to such complaints, exclamations and expressions 
 as usually and naturally accompany, and furnish evidence of, a 
 present existing pain or malady. Of course, it will always be for 
 the jury to judge whether such expressions are real or feigned, 
 which can be readily ascertained b; the manner of them, and the 
 cireumstanees under which they are proved to have been made." 
 Bacon v. Inhabitants of Charlton, 7 Cush. HSl (1851). 
 
 Statemexts to Physician. — Analogous to statements of pain, 
 &c., are the communications made to a doctor as t\w basis of med- 
 ical treatment. State v. lielcher, 13 S. C. 459 (1880) ; Collins v. 
 Waters, 54 111. 485 (1870) ; State v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 86 (1881); 
 Rogers v. Crain, 30 Tex. 284 (1867); Barber v. Merriam. 11 All. 
 3L'2 (1865) ; Fay v. Harlan, 128 Mass. 244 (1880) ; I\Iatteson v. 
 New York Central R. R., 62 Barb. 3G4 (18G2) ; Towle v. Blako, 48 
 N. H. 92 (18G8); Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873) ; Wilson v. 
 Granby. 47 Conn. 59 (1879) ; Lakeshore, &c. R. R. v. Rosenzweig, 
 113 Ra. St. 519 (1886) ; Perkins v. Concord R. R., 44 N. H. 223 
 (1862). 
 
 Such a statement cannot be so extended as to include a statement 
 tliat a particular person caused the injury. Morrissey v. Ingham, 
 HI Mass. 63 (1872). Or symptoms at a previous period or the 
 existence of disease at such earlier time. Lush v. McDaniel, 13 
 Ired. Law, 485 (1852). Nor can a physician testify as to what the 
 patient says is the cause of the injury. " W^hile a witness, not an 
 expert, can testify only to such exclamations and complaints as 
 indicate present existing pain and suffering, a physician may testify 
 to a statement or narrative given by his patient in relation to his 
 condition, symptoms, sensations, and feelings, both past and present. 
 In both cases these declarations are admitted from necessity, be- 
 cause in this way only can the bodily condition of the party, who is 
 the subject of the injury, and who seeks to obtain damages, be 
 ascertained. But the necessity does not extend to declarations by 
 the party as to the cause of the injury, which is the principal sub- 
 ject matter of inquiry, and which may be proved by other evidence." 
 Roosa V. Boston Loan Co., 132 Mass. 439 (1882); Illinois &c. R. ;:. 
 V. Sutton, 42 111. 438 (1867). 
 
 So a patient's declarations as to the instrument with which an 
 
 ''I 
 
 ^1 
 

 I 
 
 
 11 
 
 m 
 
 f"' : 
 
 ~''iJ||9^ilffi 
 
 
 .5H| 
 
 ? '. ;;': ^rr~;. 
 
 f.:. 
 
 39137 
 
 AMEHICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT III. 
 
 injury is inflicted is incompetent. Collins v. Waters, 51 111. 18.") 
 (1870). 
 
 A mere narrative to a doctor cannot be used as evidence oi' the 
 fact stated any more than the same story wlien told to some one 
 else. " It was a statement of a fact, and was used as evidence oi 
 that fact. It was therefore wrongly admitted." Chapiu v. .Marl- 
 borough, 9 Gray, 244 (1857). Probably the statement would have 
 been competent as cross-examination of the doctor if made the basis 
 of his opinion. 
 
 " Everything in the nature of a narrative of what is already past 
 is to be carefully excluded, and the testimony conHied to such ex- 
 pressions as furnish evidence of the jjresent condition of the 
 patient." Taylor v. K. E., 48 N. H. 304 (18C9). 
 
 If the statements, on the other hand, ire not narrative of some- 
 thing that is past but " a description of his symptoms at the time it 
 was made ... it may be fairly inferred that vc was made for the 
 purpose of medical advice and treatment " and such statements are 
 admissible if made a day or two before or even during the trial. 
 Fleming v. Springfield, 154 Mass. 5L'0 (1891). 
 
 Such declarations are limited to proof of the bodily or mental 
 state. The declarant cannot go further and manufacture self-s(!rv- 
 ing evidence by declaring the cause of the injury. "The rule of 
 law is now well settled, and it forms an exception to the general 
 rules of evidence, that where the bodily or mental feelings of a 
 party are to be proved, the usual and naturiJ expressions of such 
 feelings, made at the time, are considered competent and original 
 evidence in his favor. A"d the lu.e is founded upon the considera- 
 tion, that such expressions are the natural and necessary langua'^e 
 of emotion, of the existence of which, from the ver}' nature of the 
 case, there can be no other evidence. There are ills and pains of 
 the body, which are pvojjer subjects of proof in courts of justice, 
 which can be shown in no other way. Such evidence, however, is 
 not to be extended beyond the necessity on which the rule is 
 founded. Anything in the nature of narration or statement is to 
 be carefully excluded, and the testimony is to be confined strictly 
 to such complaints, exclamations and expressions as usually and 
 naturally accompany, and furnish evidence of, a present existing 
 pain or malady. Of course, it will always be for the jury to judg(! 
 whether such expressions are real or feigned, which can Ik; readily 
 ascertained by the manner of them, and the circum itances under 
 which they are proved to have been made." Bacon v. Inhabitants 
 of Charlton, 7 Gush. .581 (1851). 
 
 This was approved in Chapin v. Marlborough, 9 Gray, 244 
 (1857). 
 
 Compared with Rks Gkst.t:. — A very natural tendency, how- 
 ever, exists, wherever proof of the physical and mental state in 
 
 ■i 
 
 I 
 
niiAP. II.] 
 
 AMEIUCAN NOTKS. 
 
 39138 
 
 244 
 
 ([ucstioi; is contemporaneous with some relevant act to treat the 
 [iioot' ;is admitted as a dechiration part of the res gestae. 
 
 Fur example, the intention with which an alleged bankrupt left 
 his liome being expressed in his declarations, proof of the statements 
 lias hiHMi treated as part of the res gestte act of leaving. Intention 
 is really a fact itself in the res gestip, and its proof is admissible on 
 ordinary principles, llawson /■. Haigh, 2 Hing. 99, 104 (1824); 
 Kidley r. Gyde, 9 JJing. .'549 (18;}2). 
 
 So, in an aggravated assault by a school-teacher on a pupil, the 
 plaintiff cannot show that the scholar said to his father two or three 
 nights after the assault that his hips pained him so he could not 
 sleep. Tlie reason assigned is that " the statements were made too 
 loni.' after the infliction of the injury," and the rule is stated in the 
 laii!,'..age jf the res gestiti rule that the declarations must be instinc- 
 tive. Dowlen v. State, 14 Tex. App. 01 (1883). 
 
 It is thought that the correct rule is that announced by the su- 
 preme court of Iowa in a case of injury from a defective highway. 
 " A witness was asked to state what complaint of pain or disease 
 plaintiif made about a week after the accident. It is now insisted 
 that, as plaintiff's complaints 'were no part of the res gestie, they 
 were not admissible. They were not admitted on that ground, but 
 for the reason that his complaints of pain or disease were competent 
 to show the condition of his health, which was in issue under his 
 claim that he was siwerely and permanently injured." Blair v. 
 Madison Co., 81 la. .'n.3 (1890). 
 
 Any attempt to assign a cause for the injury, and any narrative 
 of -'how it hapy)ened " are incompetent. Commisbicners v. Leggett, 
 ll.'ilud. 544 (1888). 
 
 Sanity. — Where the issue involves the fact of sanity, many 
 declarations, oral or written, of the jiarty whose mental state is in- 
 volved may be given in evidence, not for tlie purpose of proving the 
 truth of the declarations (which would be objectionable as hearsay), 
 hut as circumstantial evidence of the existence of a state of mind of 
 which they are indicia or natural expression. 
 
 Thus, on an issue of the sanity of a testatrix, of her declarations 
 showing a belief in spiritual communications, in her power to heal 
 the sick, and "various other imaginations, delusions in one way and 
 another." " The rule allowing the introduction of the declarations 
 of a testator to show the condition of his mind is very general, and 
 admits much that would be excluded if offered as testimony to prove 
 facts. The rule allows great liberality to both parties as to the 
 kind of evidence, and as to the length of time over which it extends- 
 Much is n>icessarily left to the discretion of the presiding judge, and 
 it is impossible to lay down any general rules which would cover all 
 cases. To enable the jury to determine the real state of mind, the 
 action of that miad, as shown best by conversations, declarations, 
 
 JBBIv 
 
-J 
 
 39189 
 
 AMKHICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT rir. 
 
 claims, and acts, is the most satisfactory evidence. Hut, in oidor to 
 fairly judye, the examination must not be confined to a single decla- 
 ration or conversation, but must embrace sometimes many years and 
 many different acts and declarations, and sometimes, perliajjs, tiie 
 evidence n^!1'^ at first view, be remote, and far from a demonstra- 
 tion." .. V. Adams, 613 Me. 369, 413 (1870). 
 
 Letter^ \, ..uten by a testatrix are admissible on the question of 
 her mental capacity. Hulger r. lloss, 98 Ala. 207 (189.'}). 
 
 Fbaud or Uxduk Influe.vck. — So, where the question is as to 
 •whether a testiitrix was induced to execute a will by fraud, a fixed 
 intention, both before and after its execution, to make a different dis- 
 position of her property is relevant, and such intention may be sliown 
 by the declarations of the testatrix, within certain limits fixed by the 
 discretion of the court. " The declarations of the testator accom- 
 panying the act must always be resorted to as the most satisfactory 
 evidence to sustain or defend the will whenever this issue is pre- 
 sented. So it is uniformly held that the previous declarations of the 
 testator, offered to prove the mental facts involved, are competent. 
 Intention, purpose, mental peculiarity and condition, are mainly 
 ascertainable through the medium aiforded by the power of language. 
 Statements and declarations, when the state of the mind is tlie fact 
 to be shown, are therefore received as mental acts or conduct. Tlie 
 truth or falsity of the statement is of no consequence. As a narra- 
 tion, it is not received as evidence of the fact stated. It is only to 
 be used as showing what manner of man he is who makes it. If 
 therefore the statement or declaration offered has a tendency to 
 prove a condition not in its nature temporary and transient, then, by 
 the aid of the recognized rule that what is once proved to exist 
 must be presumed to continue till the contrary be shown, the 
 declaration, though prior in time to the act the validity of which is 
 questioned, is admissible. Its weight will depend upon its signifi- 
 cance and proximity. It may be so remote in point of time, or so 
 altered in its import by subsequent changes in the circumstances of 
 the maker as to be wholly immaterial, and wisely to be rejected by 
 the judge. 
 
 Upon the question of capacity to make a will, evidence of this 
 description is constantly received; and when tlie issue is one of 
 fraud and undue influence it is equally material. "The requisite 
 mental qualification to make a will might exist, and be entirely 
 consistent with such a degree of weakness, or such peculiarity, as 
 would make the party the easy victim of fraud and improper influ- 
 ence." Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112, 120 (18G8) ; Thompson 
 V. Ish, 99 Mo. 160 (1891) ; Gardner v. Frieze, 16 11. I. 640 (1891) ; 
 Linch V. Linch, 1 Lea, 526 (1878). Declarations of intention to 
 benefit certain persons do not, alone, furnish evidence which, as 
 a matter of law, Avould justify a jury in setting aside a will on the 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOT KM. 
 
 5!»1*'' 
 
 i,'roun(l of testamentary incapacity. Cawthorn r. llaynes, L'4 Mn. 
 2;5G (1857). 
 
 " Siieli declarations, alone, are not competent evidence to jjiovm! 
 acts of others amounting to undue influence, although when the acts 
 are proven, the declarations of the testator may be given in evidcnco 
 to show the operation they had upon his mind." Cudney v. Ciidncy, 
 6.SN. Y. 148 (1877). 
 
 The admissibility of these declarations is not confined to those made 
 prior to or at the time of the execution of the will. It extends to subse- 
 (juent declarations. As the court say in Shailer v. Humstead, '.)!) Mass. 
 1 12, 120 (1868), " This evidence was not competent as a declaration or 
 narrative to show the fact of fraud or undue influence at a previous 
 ])eriod. But it was admissible not only to show retention or loss of 
 memory, tenacity or vacillation of purpose existing at the date of 
 the will, but also in proof of long cherished purposes, settled con- I 
 victions, deeply rooted feelings, opinions, affections or prejudices, or >. 
 other intrinsic or enduring peculiarities of mind, inconsistent with ; 
 the dispositions made in tlie instrument attempted to be set up as . 
 the formal and deliberate expression of the testatrix's will; as well as ' 
 to rebut any inference arising from the non-revocation of the instru- 
 ment. They were not rejected as too remote in point of time, or us 
 having no tendency in their character to sustain the fact claimed to • 
 exist." If)i<l. ; Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y. 157 (1854) ; Mooney . 
 V. Olsen, 22 Kan. 09 (1879). 
 
 So the declarations of a testatrix subsequent to the execution of 
 the will are admissible to show imbecility of mind. MeTaggart v. 
 Thompson, 14 Pa. St. 149 (1850). Or, on the other hand, declara- 
 tions of a testator to show his mental capacity for transacting busi- 
 ness are competent. Pinney's Will, 27 Minn. 280 (1880). 
 
 " Parol evidence of the declarations of a testator expressing dis- 
 satisfaction with his will, and made shortly after its execution, such 
 as ' I have done something I ought not to have done ; I have made 
 my will, and did not make it as I wanted to ; I know I did wrong, 
 but I could not help it. Lord God Almighty, who ever heard of ' 
 such a will, but I can't change it,' is admissiljle, not to prove the . 
 fact that fraud was practiced upon him, or that undue influence 
 was actually exercised, but as tending to show the state of testator's 
 mind, and that he was in a condition to be easily influenced." Den- 
 nis V. Weekes, 51 Ga. 24 (1874) ; Ilerster v. Herster, IIG Pa. St. 
 612 (1887). 
 
 On the other hand, the view has been entertained that the declara- 
 tions of a testator tending to show undue influence were admitted as 
 part of the res gestae, and therefore must be made contemporaneously 
 with the execution of the will itself. Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 
 254 (1830). 
 
 This has been established as the rule in New York in cases 
 
■v,mi^, w 
 
 ;v.)H' 
 
 AMKlilCAN NOTKH. 
 
 [PAUT III. 
 
 " wlicrc tlie validity of ii will is disputed on the ground of fnuid, 
 duress, Miistakf!, or some similar cause, aside from tlie nu'ntal wciik- 
 iii'ss of tlic testator." Waterman /'. Whitney, 11 X. V. InJ (IMJ). 
 
 A ruliiii,' to the elfeiit that siudi deelarations must be competent us 
 part of the res gestic was reversed in Linch v. Linch, 1 Lea, oL'd 
 (1H7.S). 
 
 OniEii Mkntal Statks. — So where the qiu'stion is as to the un- 
 friendliness of one woman to another, her declarations to third parties 
 on the snl)je('t are competent. " Whenever the mental feelings of un 
 individual are to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelin;_,'s 
 are orii,'inal evidence, and often tlie only jjroof of them whieli can he 
 had."' Jacobs v. Whitcomb, 10 Cush. L'oo (l8r>2) ; Casat r. State, 40 
 Ark. /ill (IHH.S); State ». llarf,'rave, 97 X. C. 457 (lM87). " A man's 
 words show his mental condition. It is common to j)rove insanity 
 by the party's sayings as well as by his acts. One's likes and dis- 
 likes, fears and friendsliips, hopes and intentions, are shown by his 
 utterances. So that it is generally true that whenever a party's 
 state of mind is a subject of inquiry, his declarations are admissil)le 
 us evidence thereof. In other words, a declaration which is sought 
 as mere evidence of an external fact, and whose force depends upon 
 its credit for truth, is always mere hearsay if not made upon oath, 
 but a declaration which is sought as evidence of what the declarant 
 thought or felt, or of his mental capacity, is of the best kind of evi- 
 dence." Alooney r. Olsen, 22 Kansas, 09, 77 (1879). So the affection 
 of a husband for his wife may be shown by his letters to third per- 
 sons. Gaines v. Keif, 12 How. 472 (1851). " Intention, purpose, 
 mental peculiarity and condition, are mainly ascertainable through 
 the nu^dium afforded by the power of language. Statements and 
 declarations, when the state of mind is the fact to be shown, are 
 therefore received as mental acts or conduct." Shailer u. Kumstead, 
 i)9 Mass. 112 (18(58). 
 
 So where the (pu'stion of inti'titlon is involved, declarations stating 
 the intention, either oral or in writing, are competent. So lield 
 where letters declaring an intention to leave a certain ydace were 
 admitted as evidence of the existence of the intention. The letters 
 being oifered as entries in the course of business were iirst re- 
 jected, the court very carefully taking the distinction, frequently 
 overlooked, between the letters as evidence of intention and as part 
 of the res gestue. " A man's state of mind or feeling can only be 
 nianifesced to otliers by countenance, attitude or gesture, or by sound 
 or words, spoken or written. The nature of the fact to be proved is 
 the same, and evidence of its proper tokens is equally competent to 
 prove it, whether expressed by aspect or conduct, by voice or pen. 
 When the intention to be proved is important only as qualifying an 
 act, its connection with that act must be shown, in order to warrant 
 the admission of declarations of the intention. But whenever the 
 
 i;t,A. i>v 
 
( IIAP. U.J 
 
 AMKUICAN NnTHS. 
 
 ;;iti<^ 
 
 III 
 
 t-ciit ion is of itself a distiiict ami luiitcrial fact, in u el 
 
 mill (I 
 
 fcii' 
 
 cinii- 
 
 were 
 "ttcrs 
 
 re- 
 ^ntly 
 part 
 ly be 
 )unil 
 ed is 
 it to 
 pen. 
 gan 
 ■rant 
 
 the 
 
 .-tanci's, it may be proved by conti'iiijioraiicoiis oral or wnticii dccla- 
 ratioiis of tlic party. The existence oi' a paitieiilar inlciitioii in a 
 certain person at a eertain time lieing a iiiatciial l;u't lo l,c proved, 
 evidence tliat be expressed tliat intention at that time is as (brci't 
 eviileiie.e (d tlie fact, as bis own testimony tliat lie then bad that 
 intention would be." Miit. Life Ins. Co. c. llilhiion, 1 l.'. l'. S. L'H") 
 (ISDI) ; Iliint-r /•. State, -l(» N. ,J. Law, I'jr, (ISTM), These deela- 
 latioiis should be made, to be admissible, at a time when then- was 
 lotive to misrejiresent. Miit. Mle Ins. Co./-. I lillmoii, 1 li"» L'.S. 
 
 no n 
 
 I'S.') (1«!)1) ; Hunter r. State, 4(» N. •). Law, 4'Jo (1H7«). 
 
 So where the ([uestion is as to a servant's reason for abandoning 
 an employment, his deidarations as to the reason are eonipelent. 
 "The testimony is admitted on the prt'sumption. arising' iroia expe- 
 rience, that when a man does an act, his eotemporary de(daralioii 
 accords with bis real intention, unless there be some n asoii br mis- 
 representing such intention.'' Hadley /•. Carter, H N. 11. 10 ( Ih;;,")) ; 
 Lliiier /'. Fessenden, 1;')! Mass. .'!;')',) (IH'.IO). "We cannot follow the 
 ruling at nisi jjfiiis in Tilk /•. Tarsoiis, L' (,'. A 1*. HOl, that the testi- 
 mony of the persons concerntid is the only evidence to jirove their 
 motives. We rather agree with .Mr. Starkie that sucdi declarations, 
 made with no ajiparent motive for misstatement, may be better evi- 
 dence of the maker's state of mind at the time than the sul)se(pient 
 testimony of the same persons." Stark. Ev. (lOth Am. ed.) Xi), 
 As a rule such declarations are not evidence of the past facts which 
 they may recite. The eases in which they have been admitted to 
 jirove the cause of a wound or injury, when the declarations were 
 made at the time, or inunediatidy after the event, if not exceptions 
 to the general rule, at least mark the limit of admissiliility. Com. 
 r. Ilackett, 2 All. 130, 140. Com. v. M'I'ike, ;>> Cnsh. I.sl,'lS4. In- 
 surance Co. i\ Mosley, 8 Wall. o'J7. The excluded t ■stiiiioiiy was 
 not competent to prove that the defendatit did tell the workmen the 
 stor}-. As to that, it was mere hearsay, and was not within the scope 
 of the special reasons wdueli led to the detdsions last citrii." Elmer 
 r. Fessenden, 1;')! jNLiss. oi)'.) (181)0). A eonversatiiui showing a 
 present intention to ]mrchase certain premises is com])etent evidence 
 that the jdaiiitiff's ett'oits were not the cause of tiie trade. Folks v. 
 r.urnett, 47 Mo. App. 004 (1891). 
 
 So the intention of taking a train on the part of a man inju.°d by 
 alocomotive may be shown bj- his declarations. Theeourt app.nently 
 rely upon an unnecessary reference to the rule as to declarations part 
 of the res gestijc. Ilaihvay Co. w. Herrick, 49 Oh. St. LT) (1802). 
 So an intention of making a permanent or temporary change of resi- 
 dence may be shown by the declarations of the person himself. 
 Ciorham v. Canton, 5 Greenl. 260 (1828) ; Kilburn v. liennett, 3 
 ^letc. 199 (1841). So on an action for negotiating a sale of property, 
 
 H 
 
J,- FPti ;■ 
 
 I I 
 
 391*3 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part hi. 
 
 prior declarations by a purchaser showing a previously formod inten- 
 tion of buying the property are competent. Folks v. Burnett, 47 Mo. 
 App. 564 (1891). The purpose for which a man is walking being 
 important, his statement that he is going " to look for it" is compe- 
 tent. U. 8. V. Nardello, 4 Mack. 503 (1HH6). 
 
 When it is said that such statements are admissible as part of the 
 res gestiP, what is (or should be) meant is that the intention is a 
 fact in the res gestae of that particular case. As most of these decla- 
 rations of intention are contemporaneous with some relevant act, the 
 tendency to confuse the rule of proving a mental state by its usual 
 verbal expression and the rule admitting declarations as part of the 
 res gestae has proved a strong one. See Gorham c. Canton, 5 Green- 
 leaf, 26G (1828) ; Kilburn ». Hennett, 3 Mete. 199 (1841). 
 
 Knowlkdgk. — Where the relevant mental state is that of knowl- 
 edge of certain facts, a statement showing knowledge of these 
 facts is admissible, not as evidence that the facts are true, biif as 
 evidence of tlie existence of the knowledge. Rodriguez i\ Espinosa, 
 25 S. W. 609 (1894) ; Cadden i\ American Stoel Barge Co., 88 
 Wis. 409 (1894) ; Chattanooga K. R. Co. (;. Clowdis, 90 Ga. l'.")8 
 (1892). 
 
 In a suit for infringement of a patent, on a question of when the 
 plaintiff made his invention, liis declarations to third parties at a 
 certain time describing his invention are competent evidence. "In 
 many cases of inventions, it is hardly possible in any other maimer 
 to ascertain the precise time and exact origin of the particuhir in- 
 vention. Tiie invention itself is an intellectual process or opera- 
 tion ; and, like all other expressions of thought, can in many cases 
 scarcely bo made known, except by speech." I'hiladelphia, &e. R. R. 
 V. Stin^pson, 14 Teters, 448, 462 ('l840). 
 
 So on the question of admitting dying declarations, statements by 
 third parties to declarant are adniissibh^ as evidence of his knowledge 
 of his condition. Com. r. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296 (1871). 
 
 Where it is claimed that negligence arises from t'aihire to meet cer- 
 tain known requirements, notice of these requirements is a material 
 fact and if conveyed in an oral statement, such statement may be 
 proved either by admission of the party or by any one who heard it 
 given. This is not under the hearsay rule. " If the fact soiight to 
 be established, is that certain words were spoken, without reference 
 to the truth or falsity of the words, as, for instance, that a certain 
 statenuMit was made as a party to the action is an admission of a 
 fact, or was made to him as a notice, or under such circumstances 
 as to require action or rejdy from him, the testimony of any person 
 who heard the statement is original evidence, and not hearsay." 
 Smitli V. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 293 (1892). 
 
 Where the question is as to whether an assured knew that he had 
 a certain disease at the time of his application, evidence of his state- 
 
("HAP. II.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 S<>1« 
 
 iiients to third parties about tliat time is competent. Swift a. Massa- 
 cliusetts, &e. Co., 63 N. Y. 18(5 (l87r)). 
 
 On a defence of insanity to an inilictment for murder, the defend- 
 ant is entitled to show that his wife made certain statements to liim 
 shortly before the killing to the effect that deceased had ravished her 
 and stolen from the defendant, for the purpose of showing his mental 
 state at the time of the killing. I'eople ik Wood, 126 X. Y. 24i) (1H!)1). 
 
 Where the issue raised involves knowledge by a testatrix of the 
 contents of her will, her declarations showing such knowledge or 
 lack of it are competent. Maxwell v. Hill, H'J Tenn. 584 (1890). 
 In an accident caused by a blind message by the train despatcher of 
 a railroad to the conductor of a train, his nmlerstanding of the mean- 
 ing of the despatch may be shown by his <h!clarations made at the 
 time of the collision. McLeod v. Ginther, 80 Ky. 3!)'J (1882). 
 
 Acts of memory may be shown where the fact of being able to 
 remember is a relevant fact. Donnelly r. State, 26 X. J. L. 40.'$ (lHr>7). 
 
 lle])utation that a railroad track is in bad condition is admissible 
 on tlie question of notice. Missouri, &c. R.R. v. Johnson, 72 Tex. 
 1)5 (1888). 
 
 As Hkaking on Motive, &c. — Where the question arises as to 
 what was the thought in a person's mind at the time he acted the 
 relevant statements brought home to his consciousness are comix'tcnt. 
 This is not under the application of the hearsay rule. It is the fact 
 of the statement whicli is admissible, regardless of its trut'a or falsity. 
 In other words, the statement is not admitted as evidence of wliat is 
 stated, but as evidence that such a statement was made. If it was 
 the basis of conduct, whether it should have been is generally imma- 
 terial. 
 
 So the existence of a rumor may be good circumstantial evidence. 
 State V. Jones, oO X. II. .'569 (1S71). 
 
 On an indictment for manslaughter, where the defence is that the 
 killing was in necessary .self-defence, threats by tlie deceased directed 
 against tlie prisoners can be shown in evidence. Sparks r. Com., 89 
 Ky. 644 (1890). 
 
 So where an injured person, subsequently deeease<l, uccuseil during 
 his last illness A. of tlie fatal shooting, tiie fact tiiat deceased knew 
 or believed that A. had threatened to kill him is admissible as show- 
 ing a reason why tiie deceased might have inferred it was ,\. instead 
 of actually seeing him. Jones v. State, 71 I ml. (j(i (1880). 
 
 Threats of a deceased jjerson not shown to have been communicated 
 to the defendant are admissilde on an indictment for murder to cor- 
 roborate evidence of previous threats jireviously admitted, and alho 
 on the (piestion who began the assault. Levy «. State, 28 Tex. A pp. 
 203 (1889); Cox v. State, 64 Ua. 374 (1879). Where a statement 
 explains the cause of relevant conduct, it is competent. People v. 
 Kodgdon, 55 Cal. 72 (1880). 
 
!'• -m': 
 
 301^5 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [PAIJT III. 
 
 On an indictment for felonions assault, the defence was that the 
 cutting was done in self-defence. In support of this plea the defend- 
 ant " sought to prove various facts, among them, tiiat during the 
 rencounter some one in the crowd was heard to say of the defendant : 
 ' Kill liim ! kill him ! don't let that nigger get back to the bottom. 
 Kill him ! ' The Court rejected tiie evidence as incompetent because 
 the witness was not able to state who used uie language. This 
 ruling was erroneous. The rejected evidence was clearly compet(Mit 
 as a part of the res gestie, and as tending to show great hostility 
 toward the defendant and the danger to which he was exposed." 
 Morton /-. State, 91 Tenn. 437 (18i)L^). 
 
 Under certain circumstances, the existence of a rumor may be good 
 circumstantial evidence. State v. Jones, 50 N. II. 3Gt) (1871). 
 Wliere a person claims to have acted on certain statements, one wiio 
 heard them may testify as to them. Badger v. Story, 1(5 X. H. 1C8 
 (1844). 
 
 Wliere the question was as to the motive with which an alleged 
 libel was published, the statements relating to the subject-matter 
 made to the defendant are admissible as original evidence. " It 
 hap])ens in many cases that the very fact in controversy is, whether 
 the words of a third person, n-^t under oath, were written or spoken, 
 and not wliether they were true, and in other cases, such language 
 or statements, whether written or spoken, may be the natural or in- 
 separable concomitants of the principal fact in controversy. In siich 
 cases ... it is obvious the words or writings arc not within the 
 meaning of hearsay, but are original and independent facts, adniis- 
 sibl(! in proof of tlie issue." Jones v. Townsend, 21 Fla. 4.')1, 448 
 (188")). So where a vendor was sued for fraud in the sale of lands 
 wliich he had never seen, evidence is competent of declarations to 
 him by his grantor to the same effect. Merwin /'. Arbuckle, 81 111. 
 601 (187(5). 
 
 So on a question with what motive A. purchased a ])istol. the fact 
 that A.'s sister informed him of certain facts which would make 
 such a purchase reasonable, is competent, wliether the information 
 were true or false. People v. Shea, 8 Cal. 538 (18.')7). 
 
 So wliere the defence of provocation by the speaking of words is 
 relied ui)on as a defence in an action for assault and battery, the 
 making of the statement is a fact which may be testified to by one 
 who heard it, and if the party who heard it has forgotten, but testi- 
 fies he reported it correctly, the ])arty to whom it was reported can 
 testify to it. (Jreen v. Cawthorn, 4 Dev. L. 40<.) (1834). In general, 
 where tlie motive of a party in doing an act is involved, it is 
 competent to show that he was induced to do the act by what he 
 had learned from third persons. Carter v. Heale, 44 N. H. 408 
 (18(;-2). 
 
 And, in general, when a party claims to have acted on certain 
 
 I" 
 
 m 
 
CIIAI'. JI.J 
 
 AMEKICAX XOTKS. 
 
 391 <« 
 
 )r(Is is 
 
 T, tlio 
 
 ly "110 
 
 tcsti- 
 
 (1 ('Ml 
 
 iicrnl, 
 it is 
 
 lat lio 
 . 408 
 
 u'taiu 
 
 staUMueiits any one who heard may testif v to them. Badger c. Story, 
 1() X. II. 1G8 (1S44). 
 
 When the question was why the female plaintiif in a suit for breach 
 of promise of marriage burned a certain hotter, a witness may testify 
 that slie advised her doing so. Tobin c. Sliaw, 45 Me. '3'Al (LSoH), 
 
 On an action for malicious prosecution, statements made to tlie 
 defendant before instituting proceedings and incriminating tlu^ plain- 
 tiif are competent. Bacon u. Towne, 4 Ciish. 217, 240 (1841)), On 
 tlie question of defendanfs negligence in crossing certain railroad 
 tracks, the statements of bystanders tliat the train (which actually 
 struck him because it was on time) was late, is competent. Kail way 
 Company r. Ilerrick, 4!) Oh. St. 25 (18'J2). 
 
 Otiiicu Instances. — Tlie fact that a statement has been made in 
 the presence of a party and his action in connection with the state- 
 ment are not objectionable as hearsay. Tlie statement is not ad- 
 mitted as evidence of the truth of wliat is said, '•but simply to show 
 what it is that callc for a reply, and the action of the defendant 
 himself under the circumstances, as indicating an acquiescence in, 
 or reimdiation of, the truth of the statement." People v. ]\IcCrea, 
 o'2 Cal. 98 (18G7) ; Green r. Bedell, 48 N. II. 540 (1869). 
 
 It is on this principle that to discri'dit a witness he may be asked 
 whether he has not stated differently tlian at the trial at another 
 time, and if such prior statement is denied, and is on a material 
 ])nint, it may be proved. The prior statement is not offered as evi- 
 dence of tlie truth of what it says, but because the existence of such 
 a ])vwv statement, true or false, discredits the witness. State v. 
 Blake, 25 Me. 350 (1845). 
 
 Wliere it is claimed that evidence is given under the influence of 
 bias, interest or other improper motive, evidence is competent of 
 prior consistent statements of the witness made before the bias, in- 
 terest, or other imjtroper motive could have operated. It is the fact 
 that such a statement was made which alone is admitted. 
 
 Oil a question of pauper settlement, the place whicli the pauper 
 regard('<l as home may be proved by his declarations. New ^lilford 
 r. Siierman, 21 Conn. 101 (18.51). 
 
 Where conversations by tliird i)arties witli a witness is what 
 called his attention to a fact or impressed it upon his mcuKiry, such 
 conversations are conipoteiit, '• Wlictlier the stateuu'iit of the third 
 person was true or false was jierfectly immaterial. Tiie fact that 
 the communication was made to the witness, and not its truth or 
 falsitj', was the only material ])oint. The conversations were not 
 hearsay, witliin the proper meaning of that term, l)ut were original 
 and imbqiendent facets, and therefore admissible in evidence." State 
 ('. Fox, 25 X. J. Law, 5(;() (1850). 
 
 Kkksii C'oMrLAiNT, &c. — III certain witnesses, tlie making of a 
 certain statement may be a fact tending to corroborate a witness. 
 
391« 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part iir. 
 
 The rule that in cases of rape, attempts at rape, and assault with 
 intent to eoniuiit rape, the fact of coniphiint by the injured feiiude 
 is iidiiiissiblo seems to be more easily explained as that it is the fact 
 of the statement, or circumstantial evidence in favor of the eoni- 
 j)lainant, rather than the trutli of it which is admitted. Thus, in 
 case of rape, McMurrin v. Rigby, 80 la. 322 (1890) ; liurt i\ State, 
 23 Oh. St. 394, 401 (1872) ; State v. Warner, 74 Mo. 83 (1881) ; State 
 V. Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874). ; Griffin v. State, 7C Ala. 29 (1884) ; State 
 v. Knapp, 45 X. H. 148 (1863) ; Brown d. People, 30 Mich. 203 
 (1877). 
 
 The rule is the same in a civil action by a parent to recover dam- 
 ages for an indecent assanlt npon his minor daughter. Gardner t'. 
 Kellogg, 23 Minn. 403 (1877). 
 
 So of an attempt to commit rape. Perfelling /'. State, 40 Tex. 
 480 (1874). 
 
 In Ohio, " the well settled law " is " that tlie declarations of the 
 prosecuting witness, made immediately or soon after the commis- 
 sion of the alleged rape, may be received in evidence. They are to 
 be received, not as evidence of their own truth, not as evidence of 
 the guilt of the defendant, but merely in 'corroboration' of the 
 prosecuting witness, in the sense that they remove from her testi- 
 mony a cloud of suspicion which might otherwise rest npon it."' 
 lUirt ('. State, 23 Oh. St. 394 (1872). The rule also extends to tlie 
 admission of the particulars of the assault. Dunn v. State, 45 Oh. 
 St. 249 (1887). "The complaint constitutes no part of tlie res 
 gestir ; it is only a fact corroborative of the testimony of the com- 
 plainant; and, where she is not a witness in the ease, it is wliolly 
 inadmissible." State r. Clark, 09 la. 294 (18S(i). "They are 
 merely hearsay, and are not competent as evidence in chief to 
 prove the eommission of the offense." Dunn >\ State, 4") Oh. St. 
 249 (1887). 
 
 The [larticulars of the complaint cannot be jjroved by the govern- 
 ment. The only competent fact is the circumstantial evidence fur- 
 nished by the existence of a fresh complaint. AlcMurrin /•. Kigby, 
 80 la. 322 (1890) ; State v.Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874) ; Lacy r. State, 45 
 Ala. 80 (1871 ) ; State v. Jones, 01 :\Io. 232 (1875) ; Pefferling v. State, 
 40 Tex. 480 (1874). 
 
 Not even where the particulars are set forth in a letter can they 
 be shown to corroborate the j)rosecntrix. State r. Clark, 09 Ta. 294 
 (1880). To the contrary, see Dunn r. State, 45 Oh. St. 249 (1887), 
 Where the attempt is made to impeach the complainant, evidence is 
 admissible of the particulars of her former complaints to show that 
 they correspond with the evidence on the trial. Griffin r. State, 7() 
 Ala. 29 (1884); Pelferling v. State, 40 Tex. 480 (1874); State /•. 
 Kinney, 44 Conn. 153 (1870); State v. Freeman, 100 N. C. 429 
 (1888). 
 
(;hap. II.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 3[)1*« 
 
 The . ct that the complaint related to the defendant can be given 
 in evidence. Burt v. State, 23 Oh. St. 394 (1872). 
 
 To tlie contrary, see State v. Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874) ; Griffin /.'. 
 State, 7()Ala. 29 (1884). 
 
 Time is not the sole test of what constitutes a fresh complaint. 
 The entire surrounding facts must be taken into consideration, and 
 a reasonable excuse may exist for even protracited silence. 
 
 That comj lainant did not confide to her mother, with whom she 
 resided, knowledge of an alleged assault by her stepfatlier for two 
 months, and only revealed the facts upon an absence from home, and 
 in response to the questions of a person hostile to tlie accused is not 
 a sufficient objection to receiving the evidence. State v. ^S'iles, 47 
 Vt. 82 (1874). 
 
 In Oliio, tlie particulars of the complaint are admitted, and the 
 rule is assimilated more strongly to those regulating tlie res gestse. 
 "They are presumed to be the natural outburst of outraged feelings, 
 and, if made at all, would naturally be made at the first opportunity, 
 while the injury is yet fresh and aggravating.'' Dunn i\ State, 45 
 Oh. St. 249 (1887). 
 
 "If such complaints are not made soon, or within a reasonable 
 time after the injury, or witliout any inconsistent deh) . 1^ is a 
 strong, though not conclusive, presumption against the trutli of the 
 charge." State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 (18(;3). 
 
 A delay of eleven months, unexplained, will prevent tlie .admis- 
 sion of tlie complaint in evidence. "The outrage in such a case 
 upon a virtuous female is so great that there is a natural presumption 
 that at the first suitable opportunity slie would make disclosure of 
 it ; and she would be so far discredited if she did not make the dis- 
 closure, for the purpose of confirming her evidence where she is a 
 witness, such disclosure may be received. But where the disclosure 
 is not recent, as soon as suitable opjiortunity is furnished, tlie reason 
 for receiving it in evidence does not exist, and tlie jjriiiciple justify- 
 ing its reception does not apply." I'eople r. O'Sullivaii, 104 X. Y. 
 481 (1857). 
 
 Tlie defendant may bring out the particulars of the complaint 
 upon cross-examination. Griffin v. State, 70 Ala. 29 (1881). 
 
 Wliere the comidaint is practiciiUy (Hintempfiraneous with the 
 injury, the particulars of the complaint have brni admitted as jiart 
 of the res gestir. Griffin c. State, 7() Ala. 29 (1S84); McMath t». 
 State, 55 (Ja. 303 (1875). 
 
 Thus where a witness, the complainant's sister, saw the defend- 
 ant holding the .'omiilainant, who was crying, on his lap. holding 
 her hands, and urging lier "never to da.-e to mention it" the court 
 regard the particulars of the comiilaint as "admissible as part of 
 the res gestir. It was made but a lew moments after the alleged 
 ravishment had been accomplished, and while declanvnt was under 
 
•I 
 
 
 il.il 
 
 391^3 
 
 AM Kit IC AN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AItT i;i. 
 
 the influence of the mental excitement which it proiluced. It was 
 made within such time after the act to which it referred, and under 
 such circumstanc'es, as to prechuU! the element of premeditation."' 
 McMurriu v. Kigby, (SO la. 322 (ISDO). 
 
 If the i)arty assaulted is an infant of tender years, it is not neces- 
 sary in all cases that she should testify to have her contemporane- 
 ous declarations admitted as part of the res gesta;. McjMath /;. State, 
 55 Ga. r,03 (1S75). 
 
 In like manner, on a bastardy comjdaiut, it being in evidence that 
 the comidainant accused the defendant at the time of her travail as 
 being the father of her child, the fact was elicited, on cross-examina- 
 tion, that her mother told her she must do so. To meet the defence 
 that the mother was the instigator of the charge, evidence of a prior 
 disclosure to the mother is competent. " Her statement, therefore, 
 if she mo,de any, was in itself a fact; and its occurrence nught be 
 proved by any competent evidence. For upon tliis question the 
 inquiry was not whether her accusation was true, but whether the 
 advice and instruction which the mother gave to her daughter was 
 in consequence of information previously received from her." Mango 
 L'. Holmes, 7 All. K^6 (1863). 
 
 Ki'UTTATiox. — In like manner, reputation, though frequently 
 hearsa}', or even hearsay distilled, as it were, can be proved where 
 the existence of the reputation, rather than the truth of its purport, 
 is a relevant fact. 
 
 Where the question is, whether A. had reasonable cause to believe 
 that 15. was insolvent at the time of a certain conveyance, it is '• clearly 
 competent'' to show that he was "reputed to be insolvent." Lea 
 V. Kilburn, 3 Gray, 594 (1(S54). " Or was in good pecuniary cr':'dit in 
 his neighborhood." Wiiitcher c. Shattuck, 3 All. 319 (iSG'2). In 
 the same way, where it is claimed that the defendant was negligent 
 in hiiiug a servant infirm in sight, hearing, and ])hysical strength, 
 the plaintiff may show, " for the purpose of proving that the defend- 
 ant either knew of these inlirmities, or by the exercise of reasonable 
 care would have known of them," may show that he was generally 
 so reputed. Monahan v. Worcester, 150 Mass. 439 (1890). 
 
 So the credit of a person in a community frequently is derived 
 from hearsav, but may be testified to as a matter of opinion. Hard 
 V. Brown, 18 Vt. 87 (1840) ; 15ank v. Rutland, 33 Vt. 414 (1800). 
 
 The fact that an alleged lender had no money to lend cannot 
 be show^n by evidence of his financial reputation. " In none of these 
 cases was any attempt made to introduce evidence of the financial 
 re))utation of the lender ; and we have found no case where such 
 evidence has been admitted on the i.ssue of the making of a loan. 
 ' Uepntation,' as said by Le Blanc, J., in Higham v. Bidgway, 10 
 East, 109, 120 (1808), 'is no other than the hearsay of those who 
 may be supposed to have been acquainted with the fact, handed 
 
 
CHAP. 11.] 
 
 AMEllU'AN NOTKS. 
 
 y91^> 
 
 down from one to another.' The general rule is that hearsay evi- 
 dence is to be excluded. To this rule there are certani well-detined 
 exceptions; but the case at bar docs not fall witlnu any of thcni. 
 Tliere is a class of cases relied ui)()n by tlie defendant, wlicre 
 evidence of reputation has been admitted, naniely, wliere a convey- 
 ance is sought to be set aside as a frauiiulent preference, and the 
 ([uestion is whether the grantee had reasonable cause to believe that 
 tlie "rantor was solvent or insolvent at the time of the makin<' of 
 the conveyance. Here the inquiry is as to the state of mind or be- 
 lief of the grantee, and it is said that any evidence is competent 
 whicli tends to show the existence of sutdi facts or circnmstani'cs as 
 would naturally influence the mind of an honest and reasonable 
 UKin in forming a eonelnsion in relation to the subject matter in- 
 volved in the issue." Bliss i<. Johnson, IGL' Mass. 3'S6 (ISD-l). 
 
 "General reputation is not competent evidence to prove tin? ex- 
 istence of a fact. After a fact lias been estdtlished by competent 
 proof, general reputation is admissible to show that the i)arty sought 
 to be cliarged on account of the fact, had knowledge of its existence." 
 Schlatf v. Louisville, &c. K. Iv. Co., 1(10 Ala. .'577, 088 (IHlK!). 
 
 Reputation for sobriety, &c., cannot be used as proof of the fact. 
 If the reputation is offered as evidence of knowledge, tlio offer 
 should be limited, and a general offer is properly rejected. Stevens 
 /'. R. R., 100 Cal. .554 (1893). The character of a liouse as a bawdy 
 house cannot be proved by its reputation. Uarker r. Com., 1)0 Va. 
 820 (1894); McGregor v. Hudson (Tex.), .'50 S. \V. 48'.) (IS!);-)). 
 
 So of a ])erson's pecuniary condition generally. "Where par- 
 ticular knowledge of a fact is sought to be brouglit home to a l>arty, 
 evidence of the general rejiutation and belief of tlie existence of that 
 fact among his neighbors is admissible to the jury as tending to show 
 that he also had knowledge as well as they." Renoist r. Darby, 12 
 Mo. 196 (1848). '• General knowledge of a fact in a community may 
 be proved, as evidence tending to trace notice of h cii fact, its exis- 
 tence being otherwise shown." Hodges v. Coh'man. 70 Ala. 10,'} 
 (1884) ; Louisville, &e. R. R. v. Hall', 87 Ala. 708 (ISSS); Kuglar 
 /•. Garner, 74 Ga. 76;"» (188.")). In like manner, the fact that the in- 
 tcmjierate habits of the person to wliom liquor was sold were notori- 
 ous in tlie neighborhood in wliieli tlie defendant lived is profjcr 
 evidence for the consideration of the jury in determining whether 
 his habits were known to the defendant. " The principle upon 
 which these decisions rest is, that if the existence of a fa"t is shown, 
 and it is .also proved that a jiarty was in a situation and had o]q)or- 
 tnnities to know of it, this is evidence tending to prove that lie ilid 
 know of it." Stallings r. State, .3.3 Ala. 425 (18.19) ; Adams v. State, 
 25 Oh. St. 584 (1874). On the other hand, in .an action for gelding 
 plaintiff's horse, knowing that it w.as kept as a stallion, evidence 
 that the fact of plaintiff's horse was " generally known" to be kept 
 
lik 'i . 
 
 i!: :i;( 
 
 l':li 
 
 j 
 
 
 391^1 
 
 AMEIUCAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAIIT III. 
 
 Tucker /•. Constable, IG Oreg. 
 
 for that purpose is not competent. 
 407 (1S88). 
 
 Certain cases have gone further, and held that reputation is evi- 
 dence of the fact it alleges. It is doubtful whether such holding is 
 not a plain infringement of the rule against hearsay. Thus, in a 
 question whether a slave was bought with the intention of taking 
 him beyond the state, " his general character as a negro trader is 
 relevant." Taylor v. Horsey, 5 Harr. 131 (1849). That one was a 
 deputy of the sheriff may be proved by reputation. Holt v. Jarvis, 
 Draper (K. B., U. C), 190 (1830;. Reputation has also been ad- 
 mitted, together with long-continued absence, to prove the fact of 
 death. Primm lu Stewart, 7 Tex. 181 (1851). 
 
 The character of a house as disorderly may, it has been held, be 
 established by proof of its reputation. Stone v. State, 22 Tex. App. 
 185 (1886). To tlie contrary effect, see Handy v. State, 03 Miss. 
 207 (1885) ; Wooster v. State, 55 Ala. 217 (1876) ; Smith »•. Com., G 
 15. Monr. 21 (1845) ; U. S. v. Jourdine, 4 Cranch, C. Ct. 338 (1833). 
 
 It may be contended that the hearsay rule proceeds in part upon 
 the theory that the fact that A., not a witness, makes a statement 
 is slight circumstantial evidence of the truth of wliul; he asserts, and 
 that this objection of lack of probative force hardly applies to 
 instances of a general consensus in a community. Tlie rule that 
 admits general reputation as proof of character might constitute an 
 example of acquiescence in this line of reasoning were it not for the 
 fact that proof of character by proof of reputation has been modi- 
 fied b}' the ancient rules of compurgation. 
 
 Markkt Valuk. — Analogous to the rules allowing the proof of 
 reputation is the rule that market value may be shown as a fact, 
 though only embodied hearsay. The relevant fact is the existence 
 of tlie market value, and proof of its existence establishes the fact 
 it states. International, &c. 11. R. v. Pasture Co., 5 Tex. Civ. App. 
 180 (1893) ; Missouri, &c. R. R. u. Cocreham (Tex.), 30 S. W. lllS 
 (1895). So a Parisian price-current delivered by the dealer to the 
 purchaser will be received as evidence of the market value of certain 
 wines. " We think that the price current is not liable to the objec- 
 tion that it was hearsay. It was prepared and used by the party 
 who furnished it in the ordinary course of his business." Cliquofs 
 Champagne, 3 Wall. 114 (18G5). 
 
 A witness is competent to testify to the market price of peas in 
 New York, though he has never resided there, if he is in the pro- 
 duce business and obtained his knowledge of ]irices from his corre- 
 spondents. " As a general rule, the market value of any particular 
 arti(de, at a given time, is determined by the dealings of many differ- 
 ent individuals in such articles, and a knowledge thereof can only 
 be obtained by information from others." Laurent v. Vaughn, 30 
 Vt. 90 (1858). In the same way, merchandise brokers doing busi- 
 
(HAP. 
 
 11.] 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 :59P2 
 
 iioss in Boston and New York, and conversant with the market 
 value of sales of gunny bags during the time covered by a certain 
 (•(intrac't " from daily price-current lists and returns of sales fur- 
 iiislu'd them in Huston from New York may testify as to the market 
 value of gunny bags in tlie New York market at said time." Whit- 
 ney t\ Thacher. 117 Mass. 52.'} (1875). " It is not necessary, in order 
 to (lualify one to give an opinion as to values, that his information 
 should be of such a direct character as would make it competent in 
 itself as primary evidence. It is the experience which he acquires 
 in the ordinary conduct of affairs, and from means of infornuition 
 such as are usually relied on by men engaged in business, for the 
 conduct of that business, that (jualifies him to testify." llihl. 
 
 A witness may testify as to the market value of logs, tliough he 
 is without actual personal knowledge of sales. " Value in a business 
 sense consists largely of the opinions of persons familiar with the 
 market, and these opinions are largely made \\\) of wliat is said and 
 reported by others. Hence, if a person shows that his business is 
 such that, by commercial re[)orts or other means of like nature, he 
 is familiar with the current market prices of an article, he is compe- 
 tent to testify on the subject, although he may not have actual per- 
 sonal knowledge of any particular sales." Hoxsie v. Empire Lumber 
 Co., 41 .Minn. o48 (1889). 
 
 But it has been held in New York that a mere price current in a 
 newspaper is not competent evidence of market value, " without 
 some proof showing liow and in what manner it was made up ; 
 where the information it contained was obtained, or whether the 
 quotations of prices made were derived from actual sales, or other- 
 wise. . . . The credit to be given to such testinionj must be gov- 
 erned by extrinsic evidence, and cannot be determined by the 
 ne\vspaj)er itself without some proof of knowledge of the mode in 
 which the list was made out." VVhelan *'. Lynch, 60 N. Y. 469 
 (189.-,). 
 
 Local newspaper quotations as to the price of merchandise at the 
 point of consignment have, however, been held admissible when 
 value is a material fact. I'eter n. Thickstun, 51 Mich. 589 (188.'i). 
 
 "If, however, there be no market ])rice at such place, by reason 
 of the want of dealers or the want of the commotlity, then the actual 
 value at such place can be ascertained by proof of market value in 
 other markets, . . . such other nuirkets to be at the nearest points 
 where goods of the quality and (piantity can be bought or sold." 
 McDonald v. Unaka Timber Co., 88 Tenn. 38 (1889). 
 
 The estimated cost value placed on certain lands by the ncigldjor- 
 hood generally is incompetent. Powell «. Governor, 9 Ala. 36 (1846). 
 
II 
 
 SIX EXCEPTIONS TO KULE KE.JIXTING IIEAK.SAY. [l T. III. 
 
 liifM 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 MATTERS OF PUBLIC AND GENERAL INTEREST. 
 
 § 607.' Having illustrated the nature of hearsay evidence, 
 Bhown the reasons on which it is generally excluded, and explained 
 the distinction between such evidence and that which is original, it 
 will next be convenient to consider f/ie vascx in u-/iich the rii/c 
 rejecting hearmi/ lim been relaxed. These may be con\eniently 
 divided into six classes : first, those relating to matters of public 
 and general interest ; secondly, fho?e relating to pedigree ; 
 thirdly, those relating to ancient posso.-sion ; fourthly, declarations 
 against interest; fifthly, declarations in the course of office or 
 business ; and lastly, dying declarations. It will be observed, 
 that these exceptions, which are allowed only on the ground of the 
 assumed absence of better evidence, and, as it were, from necessity, 
 meet most of the inconveniences that would result from a stern 
 and universal application of the rule, and thus remove the principal 
 objections which have been urged against it. These six exceptions 
 will now be discussed in their order. 
 
 § 608. And first, the admissibility of hearsay evider.ce respecting 
 matters of public and general interest, rests mainly on tho following 
 grounds : — that the origin of the rights claimed is usually so 
 ancient, and the rights themselves are of so undefined and general 
 a character, that direct proof of their existence and nature can 
 seldom be obtained, and ought not to be required ; that in matters, 
 in which the community are interested, all persons must be deemed 
 conversant ; that as common rights are naturally talked of in 
 public, and as the nature of such rights much lessens the pro- 
 bability, if it does not exclude the possibility, of individual bias, 
 what is dropped in conversation respecting them may be presumed 
 
 1 Gr. Ev. § 127, in part. 
 392 
 
CII. III.] MATTERS OF PUBLIC AND GENERAL INTEREST. 
 
 to he true ; that tho general interest which belongs to the suhjeot 
 would lead to immediate contradiction from others, if tlie state- 
 ments advanced were false ; that reputation can hardly exist 
 without the concurrence of many parties unconnected with each 
 other, who are all more or less interested in investigating the 
 subject; that such concurrence furnishes strong presumptive 
 evidence of truth ; and that it is this prevailing current of 
 assertion which is resorted to as evidence, for to this every member 
 of the community is supposed to be privy, and to contribute his 
 share.' 
 
 § 609.^* In speaking of matters of public and general interest, 
 the terms " public " and " general " are sometimes used as 
 synonyms, meaning merely what concerns a multitude of persons.' 
 But, in regard to the admissibility oi hearsay testimony, a dis- 
 tinction has been taken between them ; the term public being 
 strictly applied to that which' concerns ereri/ turnihrr of the state; 
 and the term grneml being confined to a lesser, though still a 
 considerable, portion of the community. This distinction should 
 be carefully attended to, because in matters strictly public, such, 
 for example, as a claim of highway or a right of ferry, reputation 
 from anij oiip appears to be receivable. Declarations would, 
 indeed, be practically worthless, unlesb made by persons who, by 
 living in the neighbourhood, or by frequently using the road or 
 ferry, or the like, are shown to have had some means of knowledge. 
 Yet the want of proof of the connexion of the declarants with I;he 
 subject in question seems to affect the value only, and not the 
 admissibility, of the evidence. If, however, the right in dispute be 
 simply general, that is, if those only who live in a particular 
 district, or adventure in a particular enterprise, aru interested in it, 
 hearsay from persons wholly unconnected with the place or 
 business would be probably altogether inadmissible.* Competent 
 
 ' Wright V. Doe d. Tatham, 1837 
 (Coltman, J.); S. C. (Alderson, B.); 
 Morewood v. Wood, 1792 (Ld. Ken- 
 yon) ; Weeks v. Sparke, 1813 (Ld. 
 Ellenboiough ) ; Berkeley Peer. ,1811 
 (Sir J. Mansfield) ; R. v. Bedford- 
 shire, 1855 (Ld. Campbell), adopting 
 ahnost the language above employed. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 128, in part. 
 
 » rim V. Curell, ISJO. 
 
 * LVease v. Barrett, 1835 (Parke, 
 B.). By Roman law, reputation, or 
 common fame, spcms to have been 
 admissible in evidence in all cases ; 
 but it was not generally deemed suf- 
 ficient proof, and, in some cases, not 
 even stmiphnn prabatio, unless corro- 
 borated ; niai aliia udmiuiculia ad- 
 
 393 
 
\vimii 
 
 
 IiP :* 
 Hi!' Is 
 
 ■ I ■■'' 
 
 " ■^^':l 
 
 i;v 
 
 MATTERS OF PLIJUC AND GENERAL INTEREST. [PT. III. 
 
 knowledge in the declarant is an essential pre-requisite to the 
 admission of his testimony ; and although all the Queen's subjects 
 are presumed to have that knowledge, in some degree, whore the 
 matter is of public concernment, yet in other matters, whioli are 
 not strictly public, though they are interesting to many persons, 
 Bome particular evidence of such knowledge is generally required.' 
 S 610. For example, in a dispute as to the existence of a local 
 custom, in which all the tenants of a manor were interested, 
 evidence of reputation would be admissible, not only from any 
 deceased tenant, but from any deceased resident within the manor ; 
 for it might fairly be presumed that the residents, being persons con- 
 versant with the neighbourhood, would be acquainted with the local 
 customs.' Therefore*" on a question whether Nottingham Castle was 
 within the hundred of Broxtowe, certain ancient orders, made by 
 the Justices at the Quarter Sessions for the county, desoiibing the 
 castle as being within that hundred, were held admissible evidence of 
 reputation ; the justices, though not proved to have been residents 
 within the county or hundred, being presumed, from the natiu-e 
 and character of theii- offices alone, to have been acquainted with 
 the subject in dispute.* 
 
 juvetur. 1 Muse, do Prob., Concl. 
 17' n. 1; Concl. ISU, n. 2; Concl. 
 64/, n. 19. It was hold sufficient, 
 jiliiKi praliiitio, wherovt)!', from the 
 nature of tho case, Li'ttor evidence 
 was not attainable ; nbid commitinter 
 accidentibiis, prohttio (lijflcilis eft, 
 /ama }ilenam, solet prabattoiiem fiicere ; 
 ut ill prohutione filiationes. ButMas- 
 cardus deems it not sufficient, in 
 cases of pedifii*.., A'ithin the memory 
 of man, whic'u lie limits to fifty-six 
 years, unless aided by other evidence 
 — tunc ntmpf non aufficeret puhlici vox 
 et /ama, aed una cum ipm deheret 
 tractutus et vomimitio prabari, vel alia 
 adminicula urijcntiaadhiberi. 1 Masc. 
 do Prob., Concl. 411, n. 1, 2, 6, 7. 
 
 ' See infra, §§ 616 et seq. 
 
 * Ld. Dunraven v. Llewellyn, 1850 
 (Parke, B.). SeoWan-ick v. Queen's 
 Coll., Oxford, 1871 (Ld. Hatherley, 
 C). The actual discussion of tho 
 BUDJect in the neighbourhood, was a 
 fact also relied on, in the E«man law, 
 in cases of proof by common fame. 
 " Quando testis vult probaro aliquem 
 
 sci.'i.Hse, non videtur sufficere, quod 
 dicat illo scivit quia crut vicinus; 
 sed debet addcrc, in vicinia hoc crut 
 cognitum per famain, vel alio iiiodo ; 
 et ideo iste. qui erat vicinus, potuit 
 id scire." 2 Menoeh. do Prajs. lib. 6, 
 Pr.TS. 24, n. 17, j). 772, See, also, 
 1 Masc. de Prob. ;iS9. 390, Concl. 
 395, n. 1, 2, 19, 9, whero the law is 
 thus laid down: — "Confines pio- 
 bantur per testes, Verum ,scias velim, 
 testes in hac materia, qui vicini, et 
 circum ibi habitant, e.s,se magis 
 idoneos quam alios. Si testes non 
 sentiant commodum vol incommodum 
 immediatum, possint pro sua com- 
 munitato deponere. Licet hu jus- 
 modi testes sint de universitate, et 
 deponant super confinibus suce uni- 
 versitatis, probant, dummodum priB- 
 cipuum ipsi commodum non sentiant 
 licet inferant commodum in univer- 
 8um." 
 
 »» Gr. Ev. § 129, in part. 
 
 ' D. of Newcastle v. Broxtowe, 
 1832. 
 
 394 
 
C. III.] DECLARANT MU8T HAVE COMPETENT KNOWMDdE. 
 
 § 611. Again, on a question as to the cuHtom of niiiiiii<; in u 
 particular district, persons, under whose estates the minerals liiv, 
 with respect to wliich the custom was said to exist, wore held 
 sufficiently connected with the subject to make their declarations 
 evidence, as they were more likely than otliers living at a distance 
 to become adventurers, and consequently to bo subjocted to the 
 operation of the custom.' But where the question was, whether 
 the city of Chester anciently formed part of the County Palatine, 
 an old document, purporting to be a decree of certain law oiHuers 
 and dignitaries of the Crown, not having authority as a court, was 
 held inadmissible as evidence of reputation, because it was not 
 shown that the persons making it had any peculiar knowledge of ' 
 the subject, excepting what they derived in the course of that one ' 
 unauthorised proceeding.* ' 
 
 § 612. If, however, the quality of the hearsay itself raises a 
 natural inference that the persons from whom it was derived must 
 have been specially acquainted with the locality, the courts will 
 not require independent proof of that fact. The case just ' 
 mentioned as to whether Nottingham Castle was within Broxtowe 
 Hundred is an instance of this. Other examples are that on a 
 question turning on a manorial custom, depositions, purporting to 
 have been made by copyholders in an ancient suit between a 
 former lord and a person claiming admission to a copyhold, were 
 admitted in evidence without proof that the persons making them 
 were either copyholders, or were otherwise acquainted with the 
 customs of the manor, since it must be assumed that such persons 
 would not have been brought forward as witnesses, had they i 
 been ignorant of the subject ; ' and where an ancient unsigned 
 customary of a manor, purported to be ex anHenm omfuam 
 tcnentium, had been handed down with the court rolls from 
 steward to steward, it was received as evidence to prove the course 
 of descent within the manor.* Where, however, to prove the 
 boundaries of a manor, an ancient survey which purported to have 
 
 * Crease v. Barrett, 1835. 
 
 * Rogers v. Wood, 1831 ; recog- 
 nized by the Ct. of Ex. in Crease v. 
 Barrett, 1835. See, also, Evans v. 
 Taylor, 1838. Sut see Freeman v. 
 
 Bead, 1863. 
 
 '•' Freeman v. Phillipps, 1816. 
 
 * Denn v. Spray, 1786. See Chap- 
 man V. Cowlaa, 1810. 
 
 895 
 
1*1' t5 
 
 
 EXAMPLES OF MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST. [rx. III. 
 
 been made in the time of Queen Elizabeth by a deputy surveyor 
 npjioiuted by the Crown, and to have been founded on the? 
 presentments of certain tenants of the manor, whose names were 
 appended to it, was produced from the proper custody, the court 
 rejected it on the ground that no proof had been given that tlie 
 deputy surveyor had any authority to institute the inquiry ; and, 
 stripped of this authority, he not only had no right to make auy 
 kind of return, but the presumption that he did make one fell to 
 the ground. The paper might, it was said, have been written by 
 any clerk idling in the office where it was found, from his own 
 imagination, or compiled, possibly, by some interested person in 
 furtherance of a sinister object of his own.^ 
 
 !^ Gl-'i. It may be expedient to here enumerate a few of the 
 principal questions which have been deemed to involve matters 
 of public or general interest, so that evidence of rvputdtion (in 
 other words, "hearsay") may be admitted, and then by way of 
 contrast to enumerate a few of the cases which wore considered of 
 a private nature, so that this sort of evidence is inadmissible. On 
 the one hand, the following will be regarded as questions of public 
 or general interest : questions relating to a right of common exist- 
 ing by immemorial custom,- a feeding per cause de vicinage resting 
 on a similar foundation,^ a parochial'* or other district modus,'' a 
 manorial custom," a custom of mining in a particular district," 
 a custom of a corporation to exclude foreigners from trading within 
 a town," the limits of a town," the extent of a parish,'" the boundary 
 between counties, parishes, hamlets, or manors," or even between a 
 rvpiitcd manor (that is, an estate which from some intervening 
 defect has ceased to bo an actual manor) and the freehold of a 
 
 ' EviiiiH V. Taylor, 18:58. Seo, 
 also, 1). of Hfiiufort v. Smith, \M\)\ 
 iJmiicl V. Wilkin, IHJ'J. lUit suo 
 Fn'oiiian v. Eoiid, 184!) ; Smith v. 
 L(l. Ihownlow, 18GS); ]). of Dovon- 
 filiire u. Neill, 1870-7 (I'alk'S, C.B.), 
 
 (Ir.). 
 
 ■^ Weeks V. Sparke, 18i;<, exphiinod 
 in L(i. Duiiravon c LU'wellyii, 18,")(). 
 
 •' Trifhanl v. I'owoll, l84d, ex- 
 
 f)laiii('(l in Ld. Dumavuu v. Llewol- 
 yn, 18.)(t. 
 « Mosfloy V, Davies, 1822 ; White 
 
 V. Lislo, 1819; Short v. Luo, 1821. 
 » Kiidd V. Wright. l.s;52. 
 
 • J><)0 u. Sinson, 1810. 
 
 ' Cmisd ('. Barrett, l^;i4. 
 
 • Davios V. Morpm, 18;U. 
 
 » IroLuid V. I'owcll, 1802, citod 
 (Chaml)i'o, J.) and ri'cognizod (Wil- 
 liams, J.) in U. V. Bliss, 18H7. 
 
 '" 1{. i\ Mytt(m, l.s()(). 
 
 " NichoUs I'. I'arkuv, 1811 ; Briseo 
 I'. TiOiiiiix, l.s;(8; I'jvansi'. Roes, ISUi) 
 riaxton (', Dare, 182!); Thomas v. 
 Jenkins, 1837< 
 
 896 
 
 'N^-.L 
 
en. III.] EXAMPLES OF MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEKKST, 
 
 ; 1 
 
 |iiivate individual,^ or between old and ncir land in a manor,* a 
 claim of tolls on a public rnad,^ the faot whether a mad was ]iublio 
 or private/ a prescriptive liability lo repair sea-walls,'' or bridges,'' 
 a claim of higliway,^ a right of ferry,* tlie fact whctlier land on a 
 river was a public landing-place or not,^ the existence and rights 
 of a parochial chapehy,'" the jurisdiction of a court, and the fact 
 whether it was a court of record or not," the exislonce of a manor,'^ 
 a ])rescriptive riglit of toll on all malt brought by the west cjountry 
 barges to London, ^^ a right by immemorial custom, claimed by the 
 deiiuty day meters of London, to measure, shovel, unload and 
 deliver all oysters brought by boat for side within the liTuits of 
 the port of London,'* a claim by the lord of a manor to all coals 
 lying under a certain district of the manor,'^ a claim of lieriot 
 custom in respect of freehold tenements within a manor lield in 
 fee-simple,"' a custom of electing churchwardens by a select com- 
 mittee,'' and a prescriptive right to free warren as appurtenant to 
 an entire manor.'* 
 
 § 614. On the other hand, it has been considered that evidence 
 of rcpiifdtion as to ihoni nnint he rrjcrfti/, and that the following 
 were mere private rights ; namely, questions as to what usage had 
 ol.tained in electing a schoolmaster to a grammar school,'" whether 
 the sheriff of the county of Chester, or the corporation of the city of 
 Chester, was bound to execute criminals,-" whether certain tenants 
 of a manor had prescriptive riglits of common for cattle levant and 
 couchant,^' what were the boundaries of a waste over which many 
 
 ' I)i>o V. Slccman, IS-JR. 
 ' Hiiinos I'. M;i«s()U. IS in. 
 '■ H.Ht y. Bealos, 182!) \\a\. Ton- 
 tunli'u). 
 
 * li. V. Bli-s, 1837 (Williinns, J.). 
 
 « H. v. l-eif,'h, 1840. Tho iiioro 
 fiiCt thiit oiicli lioiitii>;er hiis iihviiv.s 
 irpiiii'cd tho sea wall in iioiit of his 
 liiiid is not, ill itself, siidicioiit e\i- 
 ilciuo of a ])iescii])fivo liability to 
 iii:iiiitiiiii tho wall: Hudson i'. Tabor, 
 IfsTT, C. A. 
 
 « U. V. Sutton. 1838. 
 
 ^ t'lvanH (/. liavrott, 18.34 (Parko, 
 1!.); lieed /'. Jiickson, 1881. 
 
 " Pun V. Cuiell, 1840. 
 
 • lhiid;wiitv!r v. Porter, 1835 
 (L'okiidyo, J.). 
 
 w C-M-v V. Mostvii. 18,-i0. 
 " (i()(.dtitl(! i: i»ew, 1M)'2. 
 '= Steel (-. Pricke t. l^li) (Abbott, 
 C.J.) ; Cwi/on V, Lonia.s., L>()3 (Ld. 
 
 ICllcllbolollull). 
 
 '3 Citv oi London v. Clerko, 1G90 ; 
 D. of Beiuifoit V. Smith, ISIO. 
 
 '* Liiyl>i)iini I', ("li-p, IS.'IS. 
 
 '5 liii'iiiesc. Mawsoii. 1813. In that 
 C'is(> cvidi'iice WMs jjivcii of an uni- 
 t'onii exi'icisi' of the li^rlit. 
 
 '» Danii'ivll V. I'roth.'Kie, 1847. 
 
 " Heny r. Paiiner, {"-WJ. 
 
 '" Ld. Carnarvon ii. Villebois, 1844. 
 
 '» Withnell v Uarlhuni, 1705 (Ld. 
 Keinon). 
 
 ■•"'|{. c. Antrobut*, 1S3,-). 
 
 " Suo Ld. Duuravou v. LlowoUyn, 
 
 397 
 
i 
 
 ,. va 
 
 Sif 
 
 ,1 
 
 I: 
 
 I' :'f 
 
 n V 
 
 
 ii' " 
 
 MATTERS NOT OF PUBLIC INTEREST. [PART III. 
 
 of the tenants of a manor claimed a right of common appendaiit,' 
 whether the lord of a manor had a prescriptive right to all wreck 
 within his manorial houndaries,* whether the plaintiff was ex- 
 clusive owner of the soil, or had a right of common only,* whether 
 certain land in dispute had been purchased by a former occupier, or 
 was part of an entailed estate of which he had been tenant for 
 life,* what patron formerly had the right of presentation to a 
 living,' whether a farm modus existed, and what was its nature,^ 
 whether a party had a private right of way over a particular 
 field,' whether the tenants of a particular manor had the right of 
 cutting and selling wood,* and what were the boundaries between 
 two private estates.® Where, however, it was shown by direct testi- 
 mony, the admission of which was unopposed, that the boundaries 
 of a certain farm were identical with those of a hamlet, evidence of 
 reputation as to the hamlet boundaries was let in for the purpijso 
 of proving those of the farm.'" For though it was objected that 
 evidence should not be thus indirectly admitted in a dispute 
 between private individuals, Coleridge, J., observed that " he 
 never heard that a fact was not to be proved in the same manner, 
 when subsidiary, as when it was the very matter in issue." 
 
 § 615. Evidence of reputation would on principle appear not to 
 be admissible to prove or disprove a pricate prcm'ij/fivc r'njht or 
 liability. Yet whether it is or not is perhaps doubtful." Never- 
 theless, where a prescriptive right of digging stones on a lord'h 
 waste was claimed by the defendant, as annexed to his estate, and 
 
 Wright V. Rudd, 1832 (Ld. Lyiid- 
 liuist). See, however, Webb v. Pottis, 
 (undated); Donuitioii v. Elsley, 1824 ; 
 and cases cited 1 Ph. Ev. '.Ml, n. 2. 
 
 ' Semble (Dami)ii'r, J.), in Weeks 
 V. Sjiaike, 1813; aii<l [\A. Ivonyoii), 
 iu Heed v. Jackson, 1800. 
 
 » Bhiekott V. Lowes, 1814 (Ld. 
 EUenborough). 
 
 « Clothier v. Clmpinan, IKOo. liy 
 the lloinan law, evidence of repu- 
 tation seems to have been deeiiiecl 
 admissible, even iu matters of pri- 
 vate boundary. See 1 Masc. de Prob. 
 391, Concl. 396. 
 
 i» Thomas v. Jenkins, 1826. See, 
 also, Urisco v, Lomax, 1838. 
 
 '* See Prichard v. I'owell, 1845. 
 
 18d(), overruling Weeks v. Sparke, 
 1813; Williams v. Morgan, 18o0. 
 See, also, and compare Warrick v. 
 Queen's Coll., Oxford, 1871 (Ld. 
 Hathorloy, C). 
 
 ' Ld. Duuraven v. Llewellyn, 
 18dO. 
 
 '■i Talbot V. Lewis, 1834. As to 
 what constitutes "wreek" distin- 
 guished from "flotsam," see Stack- 
 poolo I'. The Queen, 1873. 
 
 3 Richards I'. Bassett, 1830, semble 
 (Littledale, J.). Sed qu. 
 
 * Doe V. Thomas, 181 1. 
 « Per Ld. Kenyon iri R. v. Eris- 
 
 well, 1790, questioning Bp. of Meath 
 V. Ld. Belfield, 1748. 
 
 • Wells V. Jesus College, 1830 
 (Aldersou, B.); White v. Lisle, 1819 ; 
 
 398 
 
 I 
 f 
 
CHAP. III.] PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS. 
 
 u 
 
 'i 
 
 the lord offered evidence of reputation to prove that no suoh 
 right existed, the court was equally divided on its admissibility.' 
 On the trial, however, of an indictment against the inhabitants 
 of a county for the non-repair of a public bridge, to which the 
 defendant pleaded that certain persons named were liable to repair 
 the bridge ratione tenuroe, evidence of reputation was admissible 
 to support the plea,^ it being considered that the fixing an in- 
 dividual with, or the relieving him from, such a liability as the one 
 in question, had a necessary tendency to abridge or increase the 
 liability of the whole neighbourhood,'' — and, moreover, that the 
 admissibility of evidence of reputation, when tendered to dinproce 
 a public liability or right, cannot be governed by a diiTereiit prin- 
 ciple from that which prevails, when such evidence is offered to 
 edahliiih the liability or right.* 
 
 ^ (UG.^ The reason generally assigned for rejecting evidpnce of 
 reputation or common fame, in mattors of mere priaifc riijJit is the 
 probiible want of competent knowled(jc in the declarant. " Evidence 
 of reputation upon general points is receivable," said Lord Kenyon, 
 " because, all mankind being interested therein, it is natural to 
 suppose that they may be conversant with the subjects, and tliat 
 they should discourse together about them, hr.viug all the samo 
 moans of information. But how can this apply to private titlc.«, 
 either with regard to particular customs, or private proscri[)tion8 '( 
 IIow is it possible for strangers to know anything of what con- 
 cerns only private titles?'''" It may not indeed on all occasions 
 be an easy matter to distinguish between public aud private rights, 
 and some few of the cases cited above may possibly be considered 
 to rest on somewhat doubtful reasoning. Still, the general rule of 
 
 4 
 
 ' !Morowoo(l )'. Wood, 1792. Since 
 it is (lillicult to neo how tho public 
 uoiilil liavo boon intorostod in tho 
 matter, luih^ss it had boon shown 
 Jwhioh it was not) that tho rijrhts of 
 the commoners woro infringed by tho 
 (IctVnilant's cluim, such evidenco 
 would probably at th" present day 
 hi; rejected. See, also, §§ (110, 611. 
 
 ' R. V. Bcdiordshiro, ISiJo; over- 
 ruling R, V, Wavertroo, 1841, an<l 
 ' Dutirming li. v. Cottuu, 1813. 
 
 8 S(Hi Fricluird v. Powell. 1845 
 (Patteson, J.). 
 
 * Soo Itriukwiiter v. Porter, 18^55 
 (CohTi(l,u;(!. J.) ; and post, § (L'O. The 
 two cases are proliably explicable on 
 tho strict ground that, in tho one first 
 cited, tho ])ublic were not interestc'd 
 in tho dispute, while in tho luat 
 named they wore, 
 
 ' (ir. Ev. § l.'J", in part. 
 
 • Morewood v. Wood, 1702. 
 
 3d9 
 

 REPUTATION AS TO PARTICULAR FACTS. [PART III. 
 
 law cannot be disputed ; namely, that if the matter in question bo 
 of a public or general nature, — that is, if it be interesting to the 
 community at large, or even to a comparatively small portion 
 of the community, such, for example, as the inhabitants of a 
 parish, a town, or a manor, — it falls within the exception by which 
 evidence of reputation is admitted; whereas, if it have no con- 
 nexion with the exercise of any public right, or the discharge 
 of any public duty, or with any other subject of general interest, 
 it falls within the ordinary rule by which hearsay evidence is 
 excluded. 
 
 § 617.' The necessity for competent knowledge in the declarant 
 may serve to explain and reconcile what is said in the books re- 
 specting the inadmissibility of reputation in regard to pnrticukr 
 facts. Upon general points, as we have seen, such evidence is 
 receivable, because of the general interest which the community 
 have in them. But particular facts, not being equally notorious, 
 may be misrepresented, or misunderstood, and may have been 
 connected with other facts, by which, if known, their effect might 
 be limited or explained, and, therefore, evidence of reputation as 
 to the existence of such particular facts is rejected. For in- 
 stance, if the question be whether a road be publlo or private, 
 declarations by old persons since dead, that they hate seen repairs 
 Hone upon it, will not be admissible;* neither can evidence be 
 received that a deceased person planted a tree near the road, and 
 stated at the time of planting it that his object was to show where 
 the boundary of the road was when he was a boy ; ' nor can proof 
 of old jersons having been heard to say that a stone was erected, 
 or boys whipped, or cakes distributed, at a particular place, be 
 received as evidence of boundary.* And where the question was 
 whether a turnpike stood within the limits of a town, declarations 
 by old people, since dead, that formerly houses stood where none 
 any longer remained, was rejected, on the ground that these state- 
 ments were evidence of a particular fact.* If, too, the existence 
 
 » Or. Ev. § 138, in part. * Por Coleridge, J., in E. v. Bliss, 
 
 » Per Puttoson, J., in E. v. Bliss, 1837. 
 
 1837. * Ireland v. Powell, 1802 (Oliam- 
 
 E. V. Bliss, 1837. tre, J.), cited by Williams, J., in E. 
 
 400 
 
Cil.VI'. 
 
 HI.] 
 
 STATEMENTS BY PERAMBULATOllS. 
 
 S.? 
 
 ^ fe 
 
 ?>■ 
 
 ]r 
 
 autl amount of a parochial modus be in issue, hearsay evidence of 
 the payment of a specific sura in lieu of tithes by a deceased occu- 
 pier will be inadmissible ; though general evidence of reputation, 
 that it has always been customary to pay that sura for all the 
 lauds in the parish, will be received.' 
 
 § 618. Sin)ilarly, on a question whether a certain place was 
 parcel of a particular parish, an old book containing entries by a 
 deceased churchwarden, not charging himself, but relating to the 
 repairs of a chapel alleged to belong to the place in question, have 
 been held inadmissible ; ^ and so have been also entries in parish 
 books, which recorded the fact that perambulation" had taken a 
 particular line.' Still, it has been usual to admit evidence of what 
 old persons, since deceased, who accorapanied the perarabulators, 
 have been heard to say upon such occasions ; * because the custom 
 of perambulating parishes having long received high judicial 
 sanction as a legitimate mode of recording boundaries,'' — and the 
 fact of a perambulation having taken place being considered in 
 itself evidence of the exercise of a right," — it follows that statementa 
 made by perarabulators may be regarded as declarations accom- 
 panying acts, which, on grounds already explained,'' will be 
 admissible in evidence, provided they are not confined to particular 
 circumstances.* 
 
 § 619. It is now^ held that proof of the exercise of the right 
 claimed within the period of living raemor}', is not an essential 
 condition of the reception of evidence of reputation ; though, of 
 course, the absence of such proof, in cases where the nature of the 
 subject admits of its production, will materially atfect the value of 
 hearsay when received.'" Neither is it necessary that the opinions 
 
 V. Bliss, 
 
 f 
 
 V. I'lifis, 1837. On the other hand, 
 in thu ^*^lnl(3 ciiso, evidonco of rt'i)uta- 
 tion to show thiit tho town rxtoiided 
 to a curtain jioint was recuivod, as 
 the limits of tho town wore a mattT 
 oi' p'nural public intorost. 
 
 ' ILirwood ('. Sims, 1810, moro 
 t'lillv ro))oitod and oxi)lain"d in 
 Mn>(.lcy V. Davios, 18J2; Chatfiold 
 v. Fivor, 1816; (iarnons v. Hariiard, 
 ITICJ; Wolls y. J(>sus (\)lloji;o, 181(0 ; 
 Di'aclo V. Hancock, 18'J4. !Seo, also, 
 Cruase v. Barrutt, 1835. 
 
 » Cooko V. Banks, 1826 (Abbott, 
 C.J.\ 
 ^ Taylor v. Dcvov, 1837. 
 
 * Wreks V. Spaiko. 1.S13 (Ld. El- 
 lonborouj;h, a. id Lu Blanc, J.). 
 
 « Taylor i<. Devcy, 1837. 
 
 * WccKs /'. S])ai'k(', 1813. 
 ' Ante, §§ ■■)83 ~J88. 
 
 8 1 i'h. i;v. 248. 
 
 * Per liidlcr, J., in Morowood w. 
 Wood, 17!)2; Weeks v. Sparko, 1813 
 (Lo Blanco and Dampior, JJ.). 
 
 "' Cruuso V. Burrott, 1835; Ld. 
 
 401 
 
Ill I I isi 
 
 ' 
 
 U '! 
 
 M: 
 
 , I'- 
 
 ,rr%\^ 
 
 
 i;i:putation evidence against public rights, [p. hi. 
 
 of deceased persons, which are tendered as evidence of common 
 fame, should appear to rest on reputation derived from others, or 
 should liave heen expressed in the course of a trans<iction relating 
 to a question of reputation. Therefore, on an issue whether or not 
 a lane in a certain hamlet was a common highway, a paper signed 
 by several inhabitants of the hamlet, since dead, stating that the 
 lane was not a highway, was received as slight evidence of reputa- 
 tion, although it had been drawn iip at a public meeting, which 
 had been convened for the sole purpose of considering the propriety 
 of repairing the road, and although the opinions expressed in the 
 document did not appear to have been founded on reputation 
 received from others.' 
 
 ^ 620.- Reputation is evidence as well against a ptihJic ruiht as in its 
 favour ; and this, too, whether the evidence consist of declarations 
 which expressly negative the right, or set up an inconsistent claim, 
 or simply omit all mention of the right on some occasion, when a 
 i\ 4ce of it might be reasonably expected. In accordance with this 
 principle, where the question was, whether a landing-place was 
 public or private property, the declarations of ancient deceased 
 persons, that it was the private landing-place of the party and his 
 an'^estors, have been held admissible ; ' and where, to negative the 
 existence of a particular manorial custom, an ancient deed, made 
 between the lord of the manor and a great many of the copyholders, 
 in which the latter claimed, and the former admitted and confirmed, 
 what they mutually conceived to be the immemorial customs of the 
 manor, and in wh' h all mention of the particular custom in 
 question was omitted, was considered evidence of reputation showing 
 that the right claimed did not exist at that day, and that the 
 subsequent usage relied upon in support of it was referable to 
 usurpation, and not to right.* 
 
 § 621.^ It will have been seen from several of the cases cited in 
 this chapter, that oral declarations are not the sole medium of 
 
 Dunraven v. Llewellj-n, 1850 ; R. v. 
 Sutton, 1838 ; Curzon v. Lomax, 
 1803 (Ld. EUenboroiigh) ; Steel v. 
 Piickett, 181i» (Abbott. C.J.); Roe 
 V. Pai'kor, 17!)2 ((Jioso, J.). 
 
 • liiiiiiiclo;i^li ('. Jolinson, 1838. 
 
 « Gr. Ev. § HO, in part. 
 
 ^ Drinkwater v. Porter, 1835 (Colo- 
 ridge. J.). 
 
 * M. of Anglesey v. Ld. Hathor- 
 ton, 1842, iu which any actual de- 
 ji>iion as to fact cited in the text 
 boeaine, however, unnecessary. See 
 D. of rcutUind r. Hill, 1866. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 139, in part. 
 
 402 
 
CHAP. III.] DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF REPUTATION. 
 
 proving traditionary reputation in matters of public and general 
 interest. Indeed, the principle which makes evidence of reputation 
 admissib-e at all, applies not only to oral proof but equally to 
 documentary evidence, and to all other kinds of proof denominated 
 hearsay, so that deeds,' leases,'' and other private documents are 
 admissible, as declaratory of the public matters recited in them. 
 Even copies and abstracts of old deeds and wills ' have occasionally 
 been used for the same purpose. But these are not in f/ipinsehes 
 evidence of reputation, but merely admissible as secondary evidence 
 of the original instruments. Consequently, in strictness, no such 
 document can be received, without some proof being furnished of 
 the former existence and present loss of the originals.* 
 
 § 622. Maps, showing the boundaries of counties, towns, parishes, 
 Of manors, which are not proved to have been prepared by persons 
 •who were either deputed to make them by some one interested in the 
 question, or who themselves had apparently some personal know- 
 ledge on the subject, or who are shown to have been in some way 
 connected with the district, cannot be received as evidence whatever 
 their age or apparent accuracy may be.' But if proof be forth- 
 coming that they have been either made or recognised by persons 
 having adequate knov/ledge, they would seem, on principle, to be 
 valid evidence of reputation. Accordingly, where upon the trial 
 of an indictment against a parish for the non-repair of a highway, 
 to show that the road in question was not within the parish, a map 
 was produced which had been made some thirty years before by a 
 surveyor, from information derived from an old parishioner, who 
 had pointed out to him the boundaries, it was held, that, if proof 
 could be given of the old man's death, the map would be admis- 
 sible as evidence of reputation, though it came from the chest of 
 the parish indicted.® A map made under the authority of the 
 sovereign's commission, u^opted in the presentment of a jury acting 
 
 Ji' 
 
 '. ) 
 
 i 1 
 
 > Curzon v. I,omax, 1803 (Ld. El- 
 lenborough) ; Brett v. Boalus, 1829 
 (Ld. Tentordcn). 
 
 * Plaxtor, V. Dure, 18'2(); Barnes 
 V. Mawsoii, 1813; M. of Aiij^losoy v. 
 Ld. Ilatheiton, 1842; D. of Beau- 
 fort V. Sm th, 1849 (Parke, B.). 
 
 * See Siirowsbury Peer., 18o7, 
 H. L. ; Brayo Pcjr., lo3G-9, II. li. 
 
 * See and compare Doe v. Skinner, 
 1818; Doey. Wittconib, 18j3, II. L.; 
 Perth Peer., 1846-.S, H. L. ; and D, 
 of Devonshire v. Neill, 1876-7, (Ir.) 
 (Pallcs. C.B.). 
 
 * lliiniiiiond r. Bradstreet, 1854. 
 
 S(>p 
 
 
 
 Pipe r. Fulchor, 18.58. 
 
 P. V. Milton, 1843 (Erskine, J.). 
 
 403 
 
mti 
 
 
 I 
 
 « 
 
 M 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 ^m :!! 
 
 MAPS — COURT ROLLS PRESKNTMKNTS. [I'AUT III. 
 
 under tliiit coinraission, and acted on for nearly sixty years, is, too, 
 evidence of the limits of a sewer's level.' On another occasion, also, 
 maps appear to have been received merely as public documents ;* 
 but in an older case, where, in order to prove that the locus in quo 
 was a highway, a copper-plate map, purporting on its face to have 
 been taken by the direction of former churchwardens, which it was 
 proposed to prove was generally received by the parish as authentic, 
 was rejected with the observation, that " it would be equally 
 improper to admit it, as to admit a plan taken by the lord of the 
 manor, who might thereby crush and destroy the estate of his 
 tenants."' The decision is of the less authority, however, because it 
 does not appear from the report that the map was an ancient one, 
 or tbat the churchwardens, by whose direction it was drawn, were 
 dead. 
 
 § 62;J. Again, copies of court rolls, and especially presentments 
 in manor courts,'* stating the customs or boundaries of a manor, 
 depositions of conventionary tenants of a manor, taken in an 
 authorised inquiry, and representing the rights of the lord,'^ and 
 other similar documents, are admissible as evidence of reputation ; " 
 though, unless it can be satisfactorily proved, or at least reasonably 
 inferred, that the proceedings were conducted in a legal and regular 
 manner, it will seldom be prudent to run the risk of a new trial by 
 tendering such evidence.' 
 
 § 624. Verdicts of juries, and judgmentH, decrees, and orders of 
 courts of competent jurisdiction, are not now^ admissible as being 
 actual evidence of reputation.^ Nevertheless, these documents, 
 though not reputation, are as good evidence as reputation ; *" and 
 
 • New komney (Mayor) v. New 
 Romney (Couimissioners of Sowers), 
 1892. 
 
 ■' Alcock W.Cook, 1829 (Best, C.J.). 
 This is ovideutly the case ou which 
 Tindal, C J., acted in the one re- 
 I'ened to in 2 Ph. Ev. 21(5, n. {e). 
 
 3 Pollard V. 8colt, 1790 (Ld. Iven- 
 yon). 
 
 ♦ Evans v. Eees, 1809; Roe v, 
 Parker, 1793; ArundoU v. Ld. Fal- 
 month, 1814 ; Daincrell v. Protheroe, 
 1847. 
 
 * Creas^i;. Barrett, 1835; Freeman 
 V. PhillipjJS, 181G ; Gee v. Ward, 
 1807. 
 
 » See Evans v. Taylor, 1838, as 
 explained in D. of Beaufort v. Smith, 
 1849; Daniel?;. Wilkin, 1852. 
 
 ' See 11. V. Leigh, 1839. 
 
 8 Pirn V. Curell, 1840 (Alderson, 
 B.). 
 
 * Formerly they wore admissible ; 
 the doetriiio that they wore so having, 
 as regards verdicts, tnken its rise 
 from tlio days when juries wore sum- 
 moned de vicimtii. Evans (/. Roes, 
 1839 (Patteson and Coleridge, JJ.); 
 Brisco V, Lomax, 1839 (Patteson, J.). 
 
 "> Brisco V. Lomax, 1839 (Little- 
 dale, J.). 
 
 404 
 
 j- ] 
 
 ilij, ' . ■& 
 
CHAP. III.] VERDICTS — JUDGMENTS — DECREES. 
 
 (whatever be the principle on which they are admitted) the rule has 
 been established by too many authorities to be now questioTied/ 
 that, in all cases, involving matters of public or general interest, 
 wherein reputation is evidence, a verdict or a judgment upon the 
 matter directly in issue, though pronounced in a cause litigated 
 between strangers to the parties on the record, is also admissible ; 
 not as tending to prove any specific fud exiding at the time, but as 
 evidence of the most solemn kind, of an adjudication by a com- 
 petent tribunal upon the state of facts and the question of usage at 
 the time.* For example, where a public right of way was in 
 question, the plaintiff was allowed to show a verdict, rendeied in 
 his own favour against a defendant in another suit, in which the 
 same right of way was in issue.^ It matters not as to the admis- 
 sibility (though it may as to the Aveight) of such evidence whether 
 the judgment has been suffered by default, or, though of a very 
 recent date, is not supported by any proof of execution or of the 
 poyment of damages,^ or even that the verdict, where one has been 
 obtained, has not been followed up by any judgment or decree.* 
 Neither is it material whether the verdict be one at Nisi Prius, or 
 be the finding of a jury summoned under a commission from a 
 Duchy court, or any other special commission. It must, however, 
 be proved, or be inferred from the circumstances, that the inquiry 
 was a lawful one.** 
 
 § 625. If, when the record is produced, a direct issue appears 
 to have been raised on the right or custom in controversy, the 
 opponent will not be entitled to show that in lu t no evidence was 
 given on that issue ; since the record is conclusive of the fact of 
 such a finding, though not of its truth as between other parties.' 
 If the record contains no direct issue on the custom, the party 
 producing it must furnish some evidence to show that the custom 
 was really in question ; for, otherwise, the mere verdict would 
 prove nothing.* In an action by the lord of a manor against a 
 
 > Evans v. Eeea, 1839 (Ld. Den- 
 man). 
 
 » Pim V. Curell, 1840 (Ld. Atin- 
 ger) ; D. of Devoufihiio v. Neill, 
 1876-7 (Ir.) (Palles, O.H.); Ncill v. 
 D. of Devonshiio, 1S82, H. L. (Ld. 
 Selborne. C). 
 
 ' Beedf. Jackson, 1801. SoePetrie 
 
 V. Nuttall, 1856. 
 
 * Ld. Cainiivvon i». Villebois, 1844. 
 Soo Pv. r. Biifrlitsido Bicilow, 1849. 
 
 ° IJrisco I. Lomax, 1838. 
 
 8 Id. 
 
 ' Rood v. Jackson, 1801. 
 
 " Laybourn v. Crisp, 1838 (Ld. 
 Abinger). 
 
 405 
 
JUnr.MKXTS, ETC. ARE EVIDENCE OF REPUTATION. [PT. III. 
 
 ^ :"' -U 
 
 It;- -!' 
 
 .. .!+ 
 
 copylioldiT for trehpas^sing on his free warren, an ancient judgment 
 on a quo warranto ir.iormation filed by the Attorney- General 
 against a former lord, in which the defendant pleaded, and the 
 Attorney -General confessed, a prescriptive title to the free warren 
 as appurtenant to the manor, was received in evidence for the 
 plaintiff, as being the judgment of a competent court upon a 
 matter of a public nature, which concerned the Crown and the 
 subject, and being "admissible on the same footing as an allowance 
 before the Justices of Eyre, an inquisition post mortem, or an 
 inquisition issuing out of the Court of Exchequer to ascertain the 
 extent of the Crown lands." ' 
 
 § 626. Decrees and orders of all competent tribunals stand upon 
 the same footing as verdicts.* Therefore, orders of the commis- 
 sioners of sewers requiring landowners to repair sea-walls, will, on 
 an issue respecting the liability of a party to make such repairs, 
 be evidence as adjudications by a court of competent jurisdiction ; 
 and, if they are of an ancient date, it will be presumed that they 
 Lave been duly executed and acted upon.' To render decrees of 
 the old Court of Charcci^ admissible, it is unnecessary to put in 
 the depositions to which they refer ; because, in equity, the judge 
 must have collected the questions in dispute from the bill and 
 answer onl3^* Still, a decree, to be evidence, must be final ; and 
 mere ■■'nterlocutonj orders, not involving any judgment upon the 
 rights of the parties, cannot be received.* 
 
 § 626a. So anxious, however, are the courts to confine this species 
 of evidence within strict limits, that they have rejected an award 
 in a suit inter alios, though the cause was referred by order of the 
 judge at Nisi Prius.^ 
 
 § f)26B. No mere claim to the possession of lands, not followed 
 by judgment, will be admissible in evidence,' nor can any verdict, 
 judgment, decree, or order, be received, if it appear that the parties 
 pronouncing it were acting without legal authority.* 
 
 ' Earl of Carnarvon v, Villebois, read by the opposite party as hia 
 
 1844 (Parke, B.). 
 
 '■ See Laybourn v. Crisp, 1838 
 (Parke, B.). ; D. of Devonshire v. 
 NeiU, 187(5-7 (Ir.) (Palles, C.B.). 
 
 3 R. V. Leigh, 1839 ; D. of Devon- 
 ehiro v. Neill, 187()-7 (Ir.). 
 
 * Laybourn v. Crisp, 1838. It 
 eci'iiis that the depositions may be 
 
 evidence : id. 
 
 » I'iin V. Curell, 1840. 
 
 « Evans r. Et'es. 1839; R.v. Cotton, 
 1813; Wenraan I'. Mackenzie, 1855. 
 
 ' I), of Devonshire v. Neill, 1876-7 
 (Ir.) (Palles, C.B.). 
 
 8 Rogers v. Wood, 1831. 
 
 40(5 
 
C'flAP. in.] MODE OF PROOF OF JUl)nMi:NTS, ETC. 
 
 § 627. Judgments and decrees must in }^onenil be proved eitlier 
 by producing the originals, or by examined, or now by offioe,' 
 copies. Occasionally, however, a copy of a less authentic cliaracter 
 than those named will be received, if it has been dealt with by the 
 party against whom it is tendered, or by those through whom he 
 claims, either as an authentic copy (in which case it will be admis- 
 sible as secondary evidence) or as a paper containing a true state- 
 ment of the custom or other subject-matter of reputation in dispute 
 (in which case it will be received as primary proof). For instance,* 
 where the question at issue turned on the existence or non-existence 
 of a particular manorial custom, a copy of an old decree of the 
 Court of Chancery in a suit between a copyholder and the lord, 
 establishing the custom, was allowed to be read as secondary 
 evidence of the decree, it being held that, inasmuch as it had been 
 found among the papers of a former deceased lord, that fact fur- 
 nished some evidence of its having been recognised as a true cojjy, 
 proof having first been given of an inefPectual search for tiie original, 
 though it was pointed out by the court that it was inadmissible as 
 primary evidence, since the mere circumstance of its having been 
 deposited among the papers of the deceased lord was not sucli a 
 dealing with it as to be equivalent to an admission, upon the lord's 
 part, that it contained a true account of the customs of the manor. 
 A second document tendered in evidence in the same case was an 
 office copy* of another decree, and as there was some evidence to 
 show that this had been given to a witness by the lord as proof of 
 the customs of the manor, the court regarded it in the light of an ad- 
 mission, and held it admissible as primary evidence of those customs. 
 
 § 628.* The doctrine that declarations of deceased persons as to 
 matters of public interest are an exception to the general rule, that 
 hearsay evidence is inadmissible, is subject to an important qualifi- 
 cation, which is, that such decluvatioiiH, to be ad/nissible as evidence of 
 reputation, must have been made before anij controrerxy arose touching 
 the matter to which they relate ; or, as it is usually expressed, ante 
 litem molam. The ground on which the declarations of deceased 
 persons ai'e admitted at all, is, that they are the natural effusions 
 
 « B. S. C. 1883, Ord. XXXVII. 
 r. 4, cit(!(l post, § 15;38. 
 
 » i'lico I). Woodhouse, 1849. 
 
 9 Soe post, § l.i3S. 
 
 * Gr. JiiV. s 'ill. in part. 
 
 40? 
 

 
 li ■ ! 
 
 DECLARATION'S ADMISSIHLK IT MADE ANTK LITKM. [p. III. 
 
 of a party wlio is prosiMiioil to know tlio real fiicts, imd to 8]iofik 
 upon an occasion when liis mind staiuls in an even position, 
 ■without any teinptntion to exceed or fall short of the truth.' Ihit 
 no raan is presumed to he thus indifferent in regard to lUiitlers 
 in actual controversy; for when the contest has begun, jMinple 
 generally take part on the one side or the other; tlieir minds iiro 
 in a ferment ; and, if they are disposed to siteak the truth, faits are 
 often seen by tliem through a false medium. To avoid, therefore, 
 the mischiefs which would otherwise residt, all ex parte declarations, 
 even those upon oath, are rejti'ted, if they can be referred to a date 
 subsequent to the beginning of the controversy.* As the doctrine 
 that declarations cannot be received unless made ante litem motam, 
 is not confined to matters of public and general interest, but eipially 
 governs the admissibility of hearsay evidence in matters of pedigree, 
 it will be convenient to illustrate its operation by refen'ing indis- 
 criminately to both these classes of cases. 
 
 § 629.^ This rule was familiar in the Roman law ; but the term 
 lis niota was there applied strictly to the commencement of the 
 action, and was not referred to any earlier period of the dispute.'' 
 But iu our law the term Uh is taken in the classical'' and larger sense of 
 controversy; and by lis mota is understood the commencement of the 
 controversy, and not the commencement of the suit." It is now decided 
 that, to render declarations inadmihsible as pod litem iiiotain at the 
 time when they are made, " there must be, not merely facts which 
 may lead to a dispute, but a lis mota, or suit, or controversy pre- 
 paratory to a suit, actually commenced, or dispute arisen, and that 
 upon the very same pedigree or subject-matter which constitutes 
 the question in litigation."' 
 
 > Per Ld. Eldon, in Whitelocke 
 V, Buker, ISOT ; E. v. Cotton, 1S13 
 (Diiiiiiiicr, J.). 
 
 2 Berkcaoy Poor., 1811 (JJ. in 
 H. L.) ; Monkton v. Att.-Gen., 
 1831 ; Eichaids v. Bassctt, 18:50. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 131, in jjurt. 
 
 ♦ Lis est, lit primum in jus, vel in 
 judicium veiitiiin est ; uiittijiiiim in 
 judiciiuii veiiiiitnr, ciuitruirrsia est, 
 noil lis : Cujac. Op Post. torn, o, col. 
 193, B. and col. 1G2, 1). Lis inchoati 
 est oniiiiutii jur libvlliim, i-t siitistln- 
 
 Juris Glossatnm, torn. 1, col. 353, ad 
 Dij;. lib. iv. tit. (i, i. 12. Lis mota 
 rt'iisitiir, dill nisi solus urJor vijurit : 
 Calv. Lex., Verb. liis mota. 
 
 ' " Phil()soi)lii iKtiitum in litibus 
 conteiunt." — Cic. ; cited (Lawrence, 
 J.) in Berkeley Peer., 1811 (J J. in 
 IL L.). 
 
 8 Per Sir J. Mansfield, in Berke- 
 ley Peer., 1811(JJ. iiiK.L.); Monk- 
 ton V. Att.-Gen., 1831. 
 
 ' Davies v. Lowndes, 1843 (Ld. 
 Deniiian); Shedden v. Att.-Gen. 
 
 tionem, licet lum sit lis conttsta: Corpus and Patrick, 18GI ; Berkeley Peer., 
 
 408 
 
en. HI.] DOCTRINE OF LIS MOTA, WU.VV IT KXCI-UDKS. 
 
 § (530. From tlio explanation of lis niofn given abovn, three 
 propositions follow. Tho first proposition is, that dcflarationa will 
 not he r-'joctod, in conso(iuence of their having heon made trifh the 
 cj-prc-H ririr ofpiriruliixj dlxpHtrs ; and it is cxoniplified by tho judges 
 having unanimously hold, in conformity with an earlier opinion 
 expro<sed by Lord Mansfield,' that an entry made by a father in 
 any book, for the express purpose of establishing the legitimacy 
 of his son at the time of his birth, in case the same should be 
 called in question, will be receivable in evidence, notwithstanding 
 the professed view with which it was made,'' a doctrine which has 
 since been sanctioned by Lords Brougham* and Cottenham in 
 England,* and by Lord St. Leonards in Ireland,' and may there- 
 fore now be considered as established law in both countries. Tho 
 second proposition is, that declarations ar^. .^Jmissible, if no dispute 
 had arisen when they were made, though they were made in direct 
 support of the title of the claimant.^ For although a feeling of 
 interest will often cast suspicion on declarations, it has never been 
 held to render them inadmissible. The third proposition is, that 
 the mere fact of the declarant having stood, or thought that he 
 stood, in pari jure with the party relying on the declaration, will 
 not render such declaration inadmissible. One peerage case, in- 
 deed, appears at first sight to throw some doubt upon the subject ;' 
 but it is highly probable that the pedigree was there rejected, not as 
 having been made by a party while standing in the same situation 
 as the claimant, but as having been concocted by such person in 
 direct contemplation of himself laying claim to the dignity. 
 
 § 63L Even if the peerage case just referred to be not suscep- 
 tible of this explanation, a single isolated decision can scarcely 
 
 1811 (JJ. in H. L.) ; Slaney v. Wade, 
 18;j6. See Biitlcr v. Monntgarret, 
 18 J9, H. L. ; Frederick i;.Att. -Gen., 
 1874. 
 
 ' Goodright v. Moss, 1777. 'Ihe 
 commencement of the controversy 
 was, at one time, further dettnod by 
 Alderson, B., to be "the arising of 
 that state of facts on which the claim 
 is founded, without anything more" : 
 Walker v. Boauchnmp, 1834. But 
 this dictum, — though afterwards 
 upheld by Ld. Cottenham (Davies 
 
 V. Lowndes, 1843), — has since been 
 overruled : Shedilen v. Att.-Oen. and 
 Patrick, 1861 ; Eeilly v. Fitzgerald, 
 1843 (Ir.). 
 
 2 4 Camp. 418. 
 
 3 Monkton v. Att.-Gen. 1831. 
 * Slanov V. Wade, 183(). 
 
 » Eoilly V. Fitzgerald, 1843 (Ir.). 
 
 ' Tho leading authority support- 
 ing this proposition is Doe v. Davies, 
 184", whence the remark in the text 
 is taken. 
 
 ' Zouch Peer., 1807, H. L. 
 
 (!i 
 
 409 
 
I"' 
 
 DOCTRINE OF LIS MOTA, WHAT IT EXCLUDES. 
 
 [I'T. Ill, 
 
 m ■■, 
 
 It" 
 
 i< 
 
 controvert a rule of law, which has been sanctioned and acted uiiou 
 by numerous judges,' and which is so founded on reason that a 
 oontreiry doctrine would go far towards excluding all evidence of 
 reputation. For instance, in cases of public and general interest, if 
 the circumstance that the declarant stood, or believed he stood, in 
 pari Jure with the person relying on the declaration were a ground 
 for rejecting the evidence afforded by such declaration, it would be 
 g'aringly inconsistent with the rule, which requires the statement 
 to have been made by some person having competent knowledge of 
 the subject.' In cases of pedigree, too, though the result of 
 excluding declarations of persons in jjarijure would not be equally 
 mischievous, it would frequently have the effect of drying up 
 sources of information which would be highly valuable in the 
 investigation of truth. The circumstances assumed in each one of 
 the cases just supposed may indeed render it very possible that the 
 declarant may have had some secret wish or bias, which may have 
 induced him to make a statement either partially or totally false ; 
 but the same observation might apply to all evidence of this nature, 
 and its weight in each particular case must be determined by the 
 jury. 
 
 § 632.^ So much of the rule under consideration as declares that 
 a declaration shall be rejected as having been made poxt lilvin 
 motam only when the controversy relates to the very same 
 subject-matter as is in question in the litigation in which the 
 dt:laration is offered as evidence, is based on sound sense. For, 
 the mere discussion of other to[)les, howevor similar they may be 
 in their general nature to the real matter in dispute, does not 
 necessarily lead to the inference tliat that matter was coutrovcrted. 
 The reasonableness of the rule is shown by the following ilhistra- 
 tion : — In a suit between a copyholder and his lord, where the 
 point in issue is, whether a certain customary fine is to be assessed 
 by the jury of the lord's court, depositions taken in an ancient 
 suit against a former lord, whore the controversy turned on the 
 
 > Mosoleyv.Uavies, 1822 (Graham, 
 B.); llarwood V. SiiiiH, 1810; Deaclo 
 V. llaucock, 182'1 ; Moukton v. Att.- 
 Gen., 1831 (Ld. Brougham); Free- 
 man V. I'hillipps, 1811) (Ld. EUon- 
 borough), citud with approbation (Ld. 
 
 Lyndhurst, C.B.) in Daviosi). Morgan, 
 18;U ; Nicholls v. Parker, 18()o ; Do« 
 V. Tarver, 1824 (Abbott, C.J.). 
 
 » Ant«, §§610, Oil. 
 
 > Gr. Ev. § 132, iu port 
 
 410 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 DOCTRINE OF LIS MOTA. 
 
 amount of such fine, in which depositions the fine was mentioned 
 as assessable by the lord, are plainly admissible as evidence to 
 negative the existence of any custom for the jury to interfere.' 
 As one of the learned judges observed in that case, " where the 
 point in controversy is foreign to that which was before contro- 
 verted, there never has been a lis niota."'^ 
 
 § 633. It is not, however, necessary that the former controversy 
 should have been between the same parties, or should have related 
 to the same property or claim, provided it appears that the matters, 
 respecting which the declarations offered in evidence on the second 
 trial were made, were really under discussion in the former 
 dispute. Consequently where in a peerage case the question i 
 before the Committee of Privileges respected the legitimacy of the ' 
 claimant, and this turned on the fact whether his parents (who 
 had certainly gone through the ceremony of a marriage after his 
 birth, and had subsequently had several children) had been 
 privately married two years before he was born ; — a deposition of 
 the father, wherein he swore positively to the fact of the first 
 marriage, taken some years before, in a suit instituted by the 
 claimant and three of his brothers born before the second marriage 
 against the other children born after that event, for the purpose of 
 perpetuating the testimony of the legitimacy of the former, who 
 claimed in that character to be entitled in remainder to an estate 
 then held by the father, was rejected.* So, in anotiior pcernge 
 case, where the claimant was recjuired to prove that his partMits 
 were legally married, declarations contained in the will of one 
 of the parents, affirming most solemnly the fact of marriage, as 
 also statements to the same effect made by him in conversation, 
 were rejected, since it appeared that some years previously to such 
 declarations and statements being made, a suit ha<l heen instituted 
 by the Crown to annul the marriage, and it was not shown (as 
 in truth it could not be) that that marriage, then disjjutod, was not 
 the very marringe relied on by the present dainmut.* 
 
 > Frecnian v. rhillipjis, 1H1(5. 
 
 • Id. (Hiiyloy, J.) Sc-o, aUo, Goe 
 ». Ward, 18.)7; D. of Dovonshir© v. 
 Neill, 1877 (Ir.) (I'alloB, C.B.). 
 
 * Borkoloy I'oorago case, 1811 (J J. 
 in II. L.). 
 
 * Soo Sussex Pcorago Case, 1H4I, 
 H. L., as reported 11 CI. aud Fin. 
 85, 9U-103. 
 
 411 
 
,i-' 
 
 > I I 
 
 \ 
 
 hi ; 
 
 1 : 
 
 1 i 
 
 DECLARATIONS MADE TOST LITEM MOTAM. [PART IH. 
 
 § f)34. Declarations, made after the controversy has originated, 
 are in all events to be excluded, even though proof be offered that 
 the cxiiitence of the controversy was not known to the declarant.' 
 This is justified on the ground not only that whether the declarant 
 knew of the existence of the previous litigation, raises a coUatiMl 
 issue, and that such prioi litigation may have been instituted 
 fraudulently, but on the further ground that, " If an inquiry were 
 to be instituted in each instance, whether the existence of the 
 controversy was or was not known at the time of the decluration, 
 much time would be wasted, and great confusion would be 
 produced."^ 
 
 > Sheddenv.Att.-Qen. and Patrick, 
 1861. 
 
 * Berkeley Peer., 1811 (Sir J. 
 Mansfield, in 11. L.). 
 
 412 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 4121 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 Matters of Public and General Interest. — An interesting survival 
 of a period when jurymen were members of the eoiiinumity seh'cted 
 for special personal knowledge of matters of notoriety in their 
 respective localities is found in the ex(!eption to the hearsay rule 
 which admits the reported statements of (U^cicased persons, if i)rop- 
 erly oualilied, concerning matters of public and general interest 
 wlien such statements are made oiita lifinn viofaiii,. Lawrence v. 
 Tennant, G3 N. H. 5.32 (188S); McCall v. U. S. 1 Dak. .'520 (1876). 
 
 Among suidi matters of public and general interest are clearly 
 the boundaries of a state, territory or other large iniuiicipal divi- 
 sion of territory for purposes of government. 
 
 On an hidictment for murder at Deadwood, in the lUack Hills, 
 on the (pu!st,ion of tlie locality of the homicide, evidence is co)npe- 
 tent that Deadwood is commonly reputed to be in the tcwitory of 
 Dakota. The court say; — "It may, tlierefore, be taken as settled 
 that where the question is as to territorial limits, and wliere the 
 boundary concerns the extent of a public municipal jurisdiction, 
 (as whether lands lie, or rights are exendsable within its true 
 limits), eitlier public reputation, or the particular dechuations of 
 deceased persons, made tmte litem inotain, are receivable." McCall 
 V. {]. S. 1 D.ik. ;i20 (1870). 
 
 So tlie i)ositiou of a line separating two towns is a matter of 
 jiublic interest and the statenu'nts of deceased persons are comiie- 
 tent though their declarations concern the position of a particular 
 hoiisi? as related to tliat line. Abingtou v. North Hridgewater, 2.3 
 rick. 170. 174 (18;W). 
 
 The location of a public highway may be proved as a matter of 
 public and general interest by the statements of decca^i'd persons 
 ])r()perly qualilied. Lawrence v. Tennant, (14 N. II. 5.'>2 (1888); 
 15 A. 54.3 (1888). 
 
 What auk not ai'im£opriate Mattkus. — The ])artieular date 
 at which an ancient school-house w;is built is not a matter of gen- 
 eral interest. "The fallacy on the ])art of the defendants seems to 
 be in assuming that because a school-liouse is a piddle biulding for 
 a ]»ublic ])nrpose, the ])reeise date of its erection must nlso be a 
 matter of piddic or general interest to be ))roved b\' traditionary 
 evidence; and therefore one of the defendants attempts, by repeat- 
 ing the nnsworn statement of her decensed motlier or grandmother 
 as to a date, to change this pid)lic matter of a s(dioid-hi)iise into 
 her own private property. . . . The law does not dispense witii 
 the sanction of an oath and the test of cross-ex. imiiiation as a jire- 
 re(]uisite for tlie admission of verbal testimony, unless it discovers 
 in the nature of the case some other sanction or test deemed equiv- 
 alent for ascertaining the truth. 
 
 I' ! 
 
4122 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 The matters included in the chiss under consideration are sucli 
 that many persons are deemed cognizant of them and interested in 
 their truth, so that there is neither the ability nor the temptation 
 to misrepresent that exists in other cases; and the matters are pre- 
 sumably the subject of frequent discussion and criticism, which 
 accomplishes in a manner the purpose of a cross-examination, while 
 the persons whose declarations are offered in evidence must have 
 been in a situation to know the truth. After passing such an 
 ordeal it is reasonably safe to accept the result as established fact. 
 .l)ut if the fact to be p*'>ved is a particular date, though connected 
 incidentally with a pu'. c matter, it is easy to see that it could not 
 stand out as a sal'cnt tact for contemporaneous criticism and dis- 
 cussion so as to furnish any guaranty for its correctness; so that 
 the general rule excluding hearsay evidence applies in full force. 
 The human memory is proverbially treacherous even in regard to 
 very recent dates, and little reliance c"t be placed on the sworn 
 testimony of living witnesses in such i otters, unless they avo able 
 to associate the date given with some more striking fact." S. W. 
 School District of Bolton v. Williams, 48 Conn. u()4 (1881). 
 
 Declarations of deceased persons j.re admissible in evidence 
 regarding a private boundary when such boundary is coincident 
 with a public boundary. 
 
 Such a case frequently arises in states once part of th juiblic 
 domain of tlie United States, where the meridian or range and sec- 
 tion lines, tliough the bounds of jirivate estates, are also of <,'ciieral 
 interest to the comlfiunity because serving as the boundaries of a 
 largo nuii.iier of similar estates. 
 
 it is difficult to classify witli precision the cases in which ]iri- 
 vate boundaries may, by their coincidence witli public boundaries, 
 become provnlde as matters of general interest. As is said in Cur- 
 tis V. Aaronson, 49 X. J. Law, G8 (188G). 
 
 "Tt nniy not, in every instance, be readily determinable wlictlier 
 a disputed boundary is of such public character as to permit evi- 
 dence of reputation concerning it. In the case of lines of counties, 
 towns, townships, liigliways, large water-courses, ami the like, 
 there ean be no doidit. But tliere may be lines and monuments of 
 a less marked i)ublic cliaraciter, and yet, by reason of their relation 
 to numerous minor titles and land divisions, a local ]ni\)]u- interest 
 may arise, and a consequent knowledge in tlie neighborhood con- 
 cerning tliem may be readily supposed to exist. Such cases it is 
 believed come witliin the rule." 
 
 Bkivate Boundakiks. — In matters of prUmte boundaries, cor- 
 ners, &c., the declarations of deceased persons whether made avte 
 or post litem wofani. are in most of tiie states regarded as incompe- 
 tent. Curtis V. Aaronson, 49 X. J. Law, 08 (1880). In this case 
 the court, in course of a well-considered opinion, lay down the fol- 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4128 
 
 ].n- 
 
 I'ios. 
 'iii- 
 
 llfM- 
 
 cvi- 
 ics, 
 iko, 
 
 :s of 
 ition 
 
 ■rest 
 ■mi- 
 lt is 
 
 oor- 
 <nife 
 11 po- 
 caso 
 fol- 
 
 lowing propositions. "In some of the American states the rule 
 excluding hearsay testimony is, in this line of fact, to some extent 
 tlepaited from, and traditionary evidence is received to establish 
 private boundary. It has been permitted, under color of making 
 proof by ancient reputation, to give the declarations of third per- 
 sons, strangers to the title, made when not engaged in any i)rov- 
 able act, such declarations being recitals of past acts and doings of 
 the declarant, or expression of opinion on matters exclusively per- 
 taining to the rights of others. The reception of such evidence is 
 confessedly in derogation of the established rules of evidence under 
 our system, and is justified only on the ground of an alleg^.^ 
 necessit" 
 
 It is needless to cite these cases, as they are fully referred to in 
 the text-books in common use. 
 
 "But the decided weight of authority ' . the country, and upon 
 the solid ground of reason and principle, is against the admissi- 
 bility of evidvjuce of this character." 
 
 The position of a corner in an ancient survey cannot be proved 
 by the declarations of a deceased cliain-carrier, though made while 
 the lattL'v was standing at or near the corner. "It was not merely 
 hearsay, ;)at hearsay not to matters of general reinitation, or com- 
 mon interest among many, but to specilic facts, viz. the manner 
 and place of ru' ing tlie boundary lines of llemey's patent. The 
 general rule i.^, that evidence, to be admissible, should he given 
 under the sanction of an oath, legally adniinistcred; and in a 
 judicial proceeding, depending between tiie parties alfecLed by it, 
 or those who stand in privity of estate, or interest with them. .So 
 it was laid down by Lord Ken3on, in his able opinion in tlic King- 
 V. Eriswell, 3 T. Me]). 721. Certain exceptions have, liowever, 
 been allowed, wliicli perhaps may be as old as the rule itself. lUit 
 these excejitions stand upon ijccnliar grounds; and as was remarked 
 by Lord Ellenborough in Weeks c. Sparke, 1 ^L and Sclw. 086, 
 the admission of hearsay evideiuc, niio.: all or-casions, wlietlior in 
 matters of public or private right, is somewhat of an iinomaly. 
 Hearsay is admitted in cases of ped.'i.'i'ce; of prei-:eri|itiv(> li^lits and 
 customs; and of some other eases of a jmhlic or quasi public nature. 
 In cases of pedigree, it is admitted ipon the grcmml of necessity, 
 or the great difliculty, and sometimes the impossibility of proving 
 remote facts of this sort by living w.hesses. lUit in these cases 
 it is only admitted when the tradition comes from persons inti- 
 mately connected, or in close relation with the family; or from 
 sources of a kindred nature, which, in a general sense, may be said 
 to import verity; thei" being no lis mofn or otlier intei .>st to affect 
 tlie credit of tlieir statement." Ellicott v. Tearl. 10 Jet. 412, 4.'i3 
 (IS.'JO). This (decision was ii)iheld in Clement r. Tacker, 125 U. S. 
 30*.) (1887), on the solo ground that it was decided by the particular 
 
 'U 
 
4124 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part hi. 
 
 n X 
 
 4i!l 
 
 tt" f 
 
 rule existing in Kentucky, and no disposition to approve it is 
 shown. A decision to tlie opposite effect seems to have hem 
 reached in Hoanhnan v. Lessees of Keed, G Pet. ',V2H, 'Ml (1(S;51.'). 
 " Ijaiuhnarks are frcfpiently formed of perishable materials, which 
 pass away with the generation in which they are made. V>y the 
 iinprovenient of the country, and from other causes, they are olteii 
 destroj-ed. It is therefore important, in many cases, that hearsny 
 or reputation should be received to establish ancient boimdarics: 
 but such testimony must be pertinent, and material to the issue 
 ^between the parties." 
 
 In certain states, moreover, "declarations of deceased persons 
 who were disinterested at the time such declarations were male, in 
 res]iect to boundary lines and corners of land, are competent to 
 jirove their location, if such jjcrsons had opportunity to be in- 
 formed in respect thereto." Ik'thea v. liyrd, 95 N. C. .'iO') (1S.S(;). 
 "Jt is true that such evident is hearsay in its nature, but it has 
 been deemed necessary to classify it with, and make it one of the 
 excejitions to the general rule of law, that hearsay is not conijie- 
 tent as evidence. Whether this exception comes strictly within 
 the spirit and reason of the rule, may admit of some (piestion, l)ut 
 however this may be, it is now, and has been for a long period, the 
 law of this State. The reason of the exception seems to have been, 
 and indeed, still is, the circumstances of the country, and the un- 
 certainty, confusion, and indistinctness generallj', of boundary 
 lines and corners of tracts of land that belong to individuals. 
 These and like considerations have rendered the exception neces- 
 sary. Such evidence is not of a very high type, ar.ii niiiy not ordi- 
 narilv be very satisfactory, still, it is found tliat it subserves tlie 
 ends"of instice." liethea v. Hyrd, 05 N. C. ;5()9 (ISSG): Scoggin 
 V. Dalrymple. 7 Jones (N. C.) Law 46 (1859). 
 
 So in I'ennsylvania. Buchanan v. INfooi^e, 10 S. & R. 2"5 (ISL'.'V); 
 Xramer v. Goodhinder, 98 Pa. St. "(;() (1881); Clement r. Tacker, 
 125 U. S. 309 (1887). In Kennedy v. Lubold, 88 I'a. St. L'l(>, 
 (1878>, tlu^ declarations of a deceased surveyor thirty-tive years 
 befoi. the trial as to the location of certain oaks and hickories as 
 corner bounds, made while marking them, were admitted by the 
 trial court as being weak evidence, hardly amounting to evi(h"ice, 
 the ruling was held to be error. "These two cases were argued 
 together. They seem to hnve been tried upon the doctrine of leav- 
 ing first ]>rinci]des and going on to perfection. Put old surveys 
 •are not to be so tested. :Most perfect in the beginning they are 
 "constantly undergoing change and decay, until by wind, fire, rot- 
 tenness, and the nets and frnuds of men, their evidences lie only 
 in memory and hearsay. Hence wiien the learned judge said of 
 the acts of the surveyors, who forty >ears before went upon the 
 ground, ran the lines, blocked the tre^s, counted the growths. 
 
CHAP. II I.J 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTi::-;. 
 
 41 i'- 
 
 found original marks, and pronounned tlie liickory tlie nuiiibi'iid 
 corner of donation lot No. 12G0, it was inere liearsay, lie hardly 
 l)(dieved it evidence, admitted it with reluct.anci', and it was weak 
 (nidenci! in determining, he clearly misled the jury. The r(!Versc 
 is true — the eviilence was strong, and ought to prevail unless 
 clearly riihutted, by showing either a mistake ol' the witness relat- 
 ing the facts, or error in the surveyors making the declaration that 
 the hickory was the numbered corner and the white oak opposite 
 an original corner. . . . The declarations as to the corners when 
 found, blockeil and counted, were a part of the res gcstie, and so 
 far from being doubtful evidence were competent and always 
 admitted when the transaction is old and the surveyor dead." 
 Kennedy v. Lubold, 88 I'a. St. 24(5, 'J'to (1878). 
 
 So in Texas, of statements by deceased persons made to a sur- 
 veyor pointing out to him posts upon the disputed boundary line as 
 posts placed there by the surveyor who ran the original i)artition 
 lines. "It is well settled by our decisions that the declaratiouf: of 
 disinterested parties since deceased, who were in a position to 
 know a boundary line, are admissible in a controversy about such 
 line." Tucker v. Smith, G8 Te\. 473 (1887). 
 
 A dictuui in New Hampshire is apparently to the effect that this 
 class of evidence "is contiued to monuments and lines and bound- 
 aries, but does not extend to acts of ownership, or possession, or to 
 any other facts." Wendell v. Abbott, 45 N. II. 349 (18G4). la 
 the case itself a witness was j)ermitted to testify as to what a de- 
 ceased surveyor had told him about the corner of a private estate, 
 but not as to the cutting of certain pine trees upon the disputed 
 premises. 
 
 The rule is the same in Virginia. "Evidence is admissible to 
 prove declarations as to the identity of a particular corner tree or 
 boundary, made by a person who is dead, and had peculiar means 
 of knowing the fact; as, for instance, the surveyor or chain carrier 
 upon the original survey, or the owner of the tract, or of iin adjoin- 
 ing tract calling for the same boundary ; and so also tenants, proces- 
 sioners and others, whose duty or interest would lead tl.em to 
 diligent enquiry and accurate information as to the fact; always 
 excluding those declarations which are liable to the suspicion of 
 bias from interest." Harriman r. IJrown, 8 Leigh, (V.)7 (1837). 
 This case is cited with approval in llili <'. I'roctor, 10 W. Va. 59,. 
 85 (1877). 
 
 The courts of Virginia do not, however, evidence an inclination 
 to extend the doctrine laid down in Harriman «. Rrown (ubi 
 supra). They are " not disposed to extend it in the least beyond tlie 
 very terms in which it is there expressed." Clements v. Kyles, 13 
 Gratt. 468 (1P5G). So where the deceased declarant lived on the 
 premises in dispute, but was neither a chain-carrier or surveyor at 
 
 I ! 
 
4126 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAIIT 111. 
 
 .i)i 
 
 
 the time of the original survey, nor owner of the tract or any ad- 
 joining tract calling for the same boundaries, his evidence was 
 rejected. " That his living within the bounds of the survey gave 
 him the op])ortunity to see trees marked as corners of some survey, 
 found accidentally or otherwise, would surely not be sufficient un- 
 less some duty or interest can be traced to him by which he would 
 have been prompted to make diligent enquiry and to obtain accu- 
 rate inforinaticjii within the meaning of the rule as propounded in 
 Harrimau v. Brown." Clements v. Kyles, 13 Gratt. 468, 471) 
 (1856). 
 
 The rule in South Carolina is very similar. Speer v. Crate, 3 
 McCord, 227 (1825). 
 
 "How often have we known :eputed boundaries, proved by the 
 testimony of aged witnesses, and even by the hearsay evidence of 
 such witnesses, established in opposition to the most jjrecise calls 
 of an ancient patent. Such evidence has been constantly received, 
 and dietances have been lengthened or shortened, without the 
 slightesi regard to the calls of the patent. The reason is obvious. 
 It is not the lines reported, but the lines actually run, by the sur- 
 veyor, \>hich vests in the patentee a title to the area included 
 within these lines. The survey returned, or the patent, is the evi- 
 dence of tlie former; natural marks or reputation is in almost all 
 cases the evidence of the latter. The mistakes committed by sur- 
 veyors and chain carriers, more particularly in an unsettled coun- 
 try and wilderness, have been so common, and are so generally 
 acknowledged, as to have given rise to a principle of law, as well 
 settled as any whitdi enters into tiie land titles of this country, 
 which is, that, when the mistake is shown In* satisfactory proof, 
 courts of law, as well as courts of equity, have looked beyond 
 the i)atent to correct it. It will be readily admitted, that such 
 evidence should be eautioush' received, if it should have a pre- 
 jionderating influence in determining the question of boundary." 
 Conn. r. I'enn., 1 I'et. C. Ct. 4!)0. 511 (181,S). 
 
 The MAssAriirsKTTS Eule. — In Massachusetts, the rule as to 
 declarations of deceased persons regarding private boundaries has 
 been largely affected by what l^rofessor Greenleaf has called "the 
 principle of the res gestae; " — a thing difficult to understand. De- 
 clarations of a deceased owner of land as to his boundaries, cor- 
 ners, «&c., made while in possession of such land, and in the act of 
 pointing out his own boundaries, are admissible as evidence of these 
 facts, provided no interest to misrepresent at the time existed. 
 Daggett r. Shaw, 5 ISIetc. 223 (1842); Holmes v. Turner's Falls 
 Co.' 150 Mass. 535 (1800). 
 
 If the declarant was not at the time, and never had been, the 
 owner of the premises or in possession as tenant or otherwise, his 
 declarations are inadmissible. Bartlett v. Emerson, 7 Gray, 174 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 A^rERICAN NOTES. 
 
 412" 
 
 (185()). If the declarant had occupied the premises in question, 
 but had ceased to do so at the time of the declaration, it is also 
 incompetent Whitney v. Bacon, 9 Gray, 206 (1857). 
 
 If not made Avhile in the act of pointing out the boundaries of 
 the declarant's land, the declarations are incompetent. "This is 
 an element whicli cannot be disregarded, especially when the ques- 
 tion is one of private boundary. The declaration derives its force 
 as evidence from the fact that it accompanies an act which it (jual- 
 iHes or gives character to. The declaration is tlien a part of the 
 act. Without such accompanying act, the declaration is mere nar- 
 rative, liable to be misunderstood or misapplied, and open to the 
 objections which prevail against hearsay evidence." Long v. 
 Colton, 116 Mass. 414 (1875). 
 
 It is essential that the declarant should be deceased. If he is 
 alive and could be called as a witness, the declaration cannot be 
 received. Flagg r. Mason, 8 Gray, 556 (1857). 
 
 The admissil)ilit.y is limited to the fact and location of the boun- 
 dary; the declaration is not evidence of particular <"''cts mentioned 
 at the same time. " Any further declaration of a i.tcc material to 
 the issue, would have been an attempt to prove such fact by hearsay 
 evidence, and so contrary to the rule. Had the deceased been re- 
 quested to go and point out' the line, and he had done it without 
 any declaration whatever, it would have been an act of the same 
 character and admissible upon the same principle." Van iJeusen 
 V. Turner, 12 I'ick. 532 (1832). 
 
 It is not an objection to the competency of this evidence that 
 the statements of the deceased declarant were in favor of himself. 
 
 " It is undoubtedly true, as an established principle of the law 
 of evidence, that hearsay- testimony cannot be received; and the 
 wisdom of tlie principle is confirmed by the uniformity of the 
 decisions in various courts and in different countries, which en- 
 force it; but, like very many general rules, it is not without, its 
 exceptions. One of these is traditional evidence or hearsay testi- 
 mony of ancient witnesses respecting boundaries. In regard to 
 this exception, many autliorities have been cited by the counsel for 
 the demandant, to prove tliat these declarations are only to be 
 received as admissions of a party in possession, when made against 
 his interest. But we think the rule, as it has been practised upon 
 in this Commonwealth, is not so restricted; and that the declara- 
 tions of ancient persons, made while in possession of land owned 
 by them, pointing out tlieir boundaries on the land itself, and who 
 are deceased at tlie time of the trial, are admissible in evidence, 
 where notliing apppars to show that they were interested to misre- 
 present in thus i)ointing out their bounihiries; and it need not ap- 
 pear affirmatively that the declarations were made in restriction of, 
 or against, their own rights." Daggett r. Shaw, 5 Mete. 22.S (1842). 
 
II; 
 
 41 2« 
 
 AMIiUlCAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT 111. 
 
 Iiii.K i:K(iAKi)Ki) AS Anomalous. — The supreme judicial court 
 of MassiiclniKctts evince no iuclinution to extend the luuniialy 
 iuither tiiau at present carried. Tliey have accordingly decline il, 
 on a (!ase lor the conversion of the waters of a spring, to sustain 
 the admission of a declaration by a deceased owner, that he cajlfd 
 a cei'tain stream a "sijri"';" and intended to carry it off the land. 
 The reason given is this: — "Such delarations have generally been 
 regarded as an exception to the general j'ule against hearsay, and 
 that we cannot extend the principle further than it has been carried 
 by authority. We are not aware that it has ever been applied to 
 a case like this." Peck v. Clar\, 142 Mass. 43G (1886). 
 
 Massachusetts Kulk For.:.o\VEu. — With various modifications 
 the "Massachusetts rule" has been followed in other states, — for 
 example, in the federal courts. "They (declarations of a particular 
 fact respecting a private boundary) are, therefore, receivable only 
 when made coincidently with pointing out the boundaries and gen- 
 erally as part of the res gestiE." Hunnicutt v. I'eyton, 102 U. S. 
 333, 3G3 (1880). 
 
 So in Vermont. Ci. ' v. Kingsbury, 46 Vt. 47 (1873). 
 
 And in New Jersey. "Proof of declarations of persons since 
 deceased, in respect to private boundaries, to be admissible in evi- 
 dence, must have been made by a declarant in possession as owner 
 at the time, and while engaged in pointing out the boundary in 
 question, and such declarations need not be against interest or in 
 disparagement of title; they are received when nothing appears to 
 show an interest to deceive* or misrepresent." Curtis v. Aaronson, 
 49 N. J. L. 68, 77 (1886). 
 
 And in Maine. Koyal v. Chandler, 83 Me. 150 (1891). "We 
 think this rule has been recognized and acted upon in cases like 
 this in this state. It is an exception to the general rule of evi- 
 dence, that heaisay evidence is incompetent. Landmarks in the 
 early surveys are usually formed of perishable materials, fre- 
 quently destroyed in clearing and the improvement of the land, 
 and pass away with the generation in which they were made. In 
 such cases, when no direct proof can be made as to the location and 
 character of the monuments, we are forced to secondary evidence; 
 and the acts of the owner of the land when upon it, pointing out 
 the mon'.iiaents and location of his line, and his declarations, made 
 at the time in regard to tiieni, when no controversy exists, are 
 competent to be submitted to the jury, after his death, as having 
 some tendency to prove the location of the line." 
 
 In New Hampshire the declarations of a deceased owner of land 
 as to his boundaries are admissible even if not made while in the 
 act of pointing out his bounds. " Two things are necessary in order 
 tc make the declarations of deceased persons competent evidence 
 as to bouiularies. 1st. It must appear that the deceased party, or 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 412'' 
 
 decliirunt had knowledge. 2d. Ho must have no interest to mis- 
 represent. ... It is a general presumption that owners of land 
 know tlieir boundaries, but sometimes they do not, and wlirn they 
 are ignorant of tiiem, of course tlieir statements in relation to 
 them, whether made on, or off their land are of but little or no 
 coiisecpience, but when such bcmndaries are eli'arly known, or 
 established by those in interest, then tliey generally can communi- 
 cate accurate knowledge, whether their statements be made at the 
 bouiulary or at a distance from it." Smith r. Forrest, 41) ><'. 11. 
 2;W (1870); Lawrence o. Tennant, 04 :,'. 11. TWJL' (IS.S.S). 
 
 Such declarations may of course be admissible strictly as part of 
 a res gestiE fact. For example, where the fact that a deceased pro- 
 prietor of land had built a fence on his land was a competent fact, 
 the intention with which he ]daced it in a certain position, as 
 shown by his declaration when building it, is competent. Quinn v. 
 Eagleston , 108 111. 248 (188.3). 
 
 Dkoi-akaxt must he Dkad. — Such is the original rule. Ikthea 
 V. ]?yrd, 95 N. C. 309 (1886); Tucker v. Suiith, 08 Tex. 473 
 (1887). 
 
 So, in case of the peculiar rule in Massachusetts above referred 
 to, as to declarations relating to privxte boundaries, it is an insu- 
 perable objection if the declarant is not shown to be dead. Flagg 
 V. Mason, 8 Gray, 5r)0 (1857). 
 
 Antk litkm Motam. — The declaration must be made before any 
 controversy has arisen concerning the subject-matter of the decla- 
 ration. Bethea v. Byrd, 95 N. C. 309 (1880). 
 
 If made post litem motam, they are excUnled unless prior similar 
 statements were made ante litem motam. Speer v. Coate, 3 McCord, 
 227 (1825). 
 
 Mu.sT i!E Disinterested. — It has frequently been deemed 
 necessary that the declarant should be personally disinterested. 
 Bethea v. Byrd, 95 N. {). 309 (1880); Tucker v. Smith, 68 Tex. 
 473 (1887). 
 
 This jihrase has been interpreted in Vermont to require that 
 there should be no object to misrepresent. Thus, in admitting 
 evidence of declarations of a deceased ])roprit'tor as to a jjrivate 
 boundary, the court say: — "The case does show that these ])ersons 
 had been interested in this boundary before they made the declara- 
 tions, and perhaps it shows enougli so that it may fairly be claimed 
 that they were so interested at the time tliey were shown to have 
 stated in regard to it. But however this may be, the case does not 
 show that they were interested to misrepresent in regard to what 
 they said about it. It does not api^ear that any one was claiming 
 to so locate the boundary as to restrict the land of cither, Tior that 
 either was so situated as to desire to have it located anywhere but 
 
412'" 
 
 AMKKKAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AItT in. 
 
 il I 
 
 1'! 
 
 ■1 1 
 
 11 
 
 4;!. 
 
 ili 
 
 41 f 
 
 in its true pliico, nnr tliat in iuiytliiii!,' »'ithor said, ht> was speaking 
 ill .subscrviciHjy to any wish on liis part to maintain any one ]iar- 
 tii'ular location of tiii' linn over another. There arc cases, it is 
 trne, that would exclude such declarations as these, although tliey 
 would admit those oi' de(;eased persons disinterested in every 
 respect.'' Child /•. Kingsbury, 4(5 Vt. 47, 5^ (l.ST.'J). 
 
 Khi'utation. — That the hearsay as to matters of jmblic and 
 general interest has taken the form of reputation does not materi- 
 ally atfe(!t the rule. 
 
 The incorporation of a parish may be shown by reputation. " It 
 is a well known fact that l)y two several fires in the town of I'xistdu 
 a great pai't of the public records of the late ])rovince were burnt : 
 and unless the existence of a corporation could he proved by repu- 
 tation, many towns and jiarishes would lose all their corporate 
 rights and i)rivileges. Dillingham n. Snow, o Mass. .547 (18(111). 
 The existence of a reputation concerning ancient public boimdaries 
 is admissible as proof of tlie location of the boundary. Ilunnicutt 
 V. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333, 3(53 (1880). 
 
 "Nor is it denied that in Virginia not only general reputation, 
 but also hearsay evidence as to particular facts, may under certain 
 circumstances be jiroperly received as evidence." Clements v. 
 Kyles, 13 (iratt. 4G8, 477 (1856). 
 
 The location of a county boundary may be proved by reputation, 
 and the rule is the same in civil and in criminal cases. Cox v. 
 State, 41 Tex. 1 (1874). 
 
 So the location of a highway may be established by reputation. 
 "I'roof of general rejmtation was admissible in this case, for the 
 purpose of showing the existence and extent of the highway in 
 question." Noyes v. Ward, 11) Conn. 250, 209 (1848); Jaquith v. 
 Scott, 03 N. H. 5 (1883.) "Ancient reputation and possession in 
 respect to the boundaries of the streets, are entitled to infinitely 
 
 ■ more respect, in deciding upon the boundaries of the lots, than any 
 
 ■ exj)erimental survey that can now be made. If not, the whole 
 city, and all oth.er towns, would be thrown into the utmost con- 
 fusion." Kalston v. :Miller, 3 Hand. (Va.) 44 (1824). 
 
 "Reputation as to the exi.stence of particular facts not of a pub- 
 lic nature, is not generally admissible, though, where the existence 
 of the facts has been proved aliunde, reputation is sometimes 
 received to explain them." Shutte v. Thomjison, 15 Wall. 151 
 (1872). Therefore a refusal to allow proof of the reputation of the 
 neighborhood as to a pojdar corner at the then present tinie, "'un- 
 less such reputation was traditionary in its character, having passed 
 down from those who were acquainted with the re])utation of the 
 tree from an early day to the present time,' or unless 'the in- 
 formation as to sucii reputation was derived from ancient sources, 
 
CHAI'. III.] 
 
 AMKltlCAN NOTIX 
 
 ■n 
 
 •)II 
 
 1)1" from piTSons wlio Iiad pcciiliiir means nl' knowing wliat tlie 
 loputiition of th(» tn-c was at an early day ' " was held to he " fully 
 stistaini'd liy authority." Ihid. 15ut the court iiorniittcd cvidciKM' 
 that the occupants of tiie estates adjoining,' the poplar corner liad 
 •'(daiincd the poplar as the true corner of their tracts.'' Jhul. 
 
 In Te.xas, ^'cneral reputation has been allowed to jirove the loca- 
 tion of ancient jirivate boundaries. "These boundaries were an- 
 cient, and their locality soem.s to have been a matter of sullicient 
 interest in the neighborhood to have been the sid)ject of observa- 
 tion aiul conversation among the peoj)le. The witness stated the 
 reputation to have been general, and it clearly appeared that it 
 was formed before this controversy was begun." Clark v. Hills, 
 (57 Tex. 141, loli (188G). 
 
 See also a dictum in Connecticut. Kinuey v. Faruswortli, 17 
 Conn, .'i.") (184r>). 
 
 "From the nature of the thing, an (dd boundary cannot, in gen- 
 eral, be ])roved by direct and positive proof; and reputation is 
 therefore, from necessity, admissible." Smith v. Xowells, L' Litt. 
 (Ky.) 1")'.) (1822). " Pedigree .and boundary are the excepted cases, 
 wherein reputation and hearsay of deceased persons are reccdvod as 
 evidence. The statements of deceased persons relative to bounda- 
 ries of which they spoke from actual personal knowledge, have 
 l)een frequently received in evidence in this state." McCausland 
 r. Fleming. 03 Pa. St. .% (18<il)). 
 
 So in Florida. "There is no error in the ruling that although 
 some portion of the evidence respecting the boundaries of tiiese 
 grants is mere reputation or hearsay, yet such evidence, taken in 
 connection with other evidence, is entitled to resjiect in cases of 
 boundary when the lapse of time is so great as to render it ditli- 
 cult, if not impossible, to prove the boundary by the exist Mice of 
 the primitive landmarks or other evidence than that of hearsay." 
 Daggett /'. Willey, G Fla. 482, rAO (I8r>r)). 
 
 "A surveyor is an expert, and he may state the facts on wdiich he 
 i)ases his opinion, that a line run or surveyed by himself has been 
 correctly done. He may state that lie •' found the corner stake ' 
 of a public survey, and 'the bearing points, and the markeil trees 
 along a line ' of such survey. These are facts, wiiich are conijjetcnt 
 and relevant, when the fact to be proven is the accuracy of a boun- 
 diiry line of adjacent tracts of lands. See Nolin v. Parmer, 21 
 Ala. (•)(). 
 
 " When the proofs tend to show that it is uncertain upon which 
 of two parcels of land, separated by a section line, a trespass has 
 been committed, the admissions of the adverse party to the suit, who 
 is the owner of the lands on one side of the line, that \\w line of 
 separation is in a certain place, may be permitted to go to the jury, 
 
412" 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT III. 
 
 to show the truth of the fact thus admitted. T^omidary may be 
 proven by reputation and hearsay. It may be sliown in tliis way 
 whether land is {)an!el or not jKircel of a certain tract of land, 
 lioardman v. Reed's Lessees, (> Voters, 341 ; also, 1 IMiil. Kv. 
 (C. & H. Kd. Notes) pp. 1'1«, L'l'J et seq." Shook v. Tate. ')() 
 Ala. 91 (1873). 
 
CHAP. IV, ] HEAESAY IN QUESTIONS OF PEDIGBEBL 
 
 CHAPTEB IV. 
 
 MATTERS OP PEDIOREB. 
 
 § 635. It has been pointed out ' that while, as a general rale, 
 hearsay evidence is not admitted, there are hi'x exceptions to this 
 guiifcral rule. Evidence as to matters of pedigree forms the second 
 exception to such general rule. This exception rests on the 
 ground of necessity. For example, in inquiries respecting 
 relationship or descent, facts must often be proved which occurred 
 many years before the trial, and were known but to few persons. 
 Courts of law, have, constHjuently, so far relaxed these rules in 
 matters of j)edigree,' as to allow parties to have recourse to 
 traditional evidiMioe; often the sole species of proof which can be 
 obiained. The Probate Division will even grant probate to the 
 estate of a person whose Ohristi.an name is not known, but who is 
 proved by admissible declarations of members of the family to 
 have had an existenne.' It was, indeed, long doubtful wliother 
 the declarations of servants, friends, and neighbours, might not be 
 received. But the settled rule is that the admission of hearsay is 
 restricted to hearsay proceeding from persons who were de Jure 
 rvlatcd by blood or marrioyc to the family in question, and who 
 may, consequently, be sujjposed to have had the gnMitcst interest 
 in seeking, tliH best opportunity for obtaining, and the least reason 
 for falsifying, information on the subject.* 
 
 » Anto, § 007. 
 
 * Ak to tlio biirtbon of proof in 
 mattoi'H of po'ligroo, soo In ro I'or- 
 tnii, roiiiHoii V. Att.-Otjn., 1885 
 (Chittj, J.), 
 
 » l{(t Goods of ThompBon, 1S87. 
 
 • Johnson i>. Lawson, 1824; (Urease 
 »'. Harictt, 18:1.^; Vowlo* v. Young, 
 18UU (Ld. Ei'bkiuu); Uoodright v. 
 
 AFoss, 1777 (T;(l. ManHfic'ld), as ex- 
 pliiiiii'd l)j' I,d. Kldcm in Whitidocko 
 r. Hiikor, 1807; Monkton v. Att.- 
 (JtMi., 18.11 (1,(1. Itn.u^'luiin) ; Staf- 
 f.ird r.«M-., 18J.-), II. h. ; Jow.dl V. 
 Jhwi'II, I8i;t(.\in.); JmkNon f. Urow- 
 nur, 18'.'(l (.Am.) ; ('Impinan v. ( 'hap- 
 man, 1817 (Am.); Waldioa v. Tuttle, 
 1828 (Am.). 
 
 418 
 
\ 
 
 J" ' ' IP 
 i 
 
 ARE DECLARATIONS OF BASTARDS ADMISSIBLE. [PT. III. 
 
 § 636. So far as blood relations are concerned, no limitation in 
 the rule has ever been recognised.' And with regard to relation- 
 ship by affinity, not only are declarations by a husband respecting 
 his wife's family* admissible, but so also are now the wife's 
 declarations concerning her husband's relatives.' But statements 
 made by the wife's relatives — even, for instance, her father — are 
 not.* Moreover, the rule does not apply at all as between 
 iUegitiniate members of a family. Therefore, an assertion by a 
 man that one of his natural brothers had died without issue must 
 be rejected ; * as also must a declaration by one brother that 
 another brother has had an illegitimate son.* 
 
 § 637. Whether, under any circumstances, the declarations of a 
 pen on deceased, asserting his own illegitimacy, can be received 
 is doubtful. Such declarations, however, can always be received 
 as admissions against himself and those who claim under him 
 by some title derived subsequontly to the statements being 
 made.' Declarations of a parent that a child is illegitimate are 
 
 ' Davics V. Lowiules. 184H (Paiko, 
 B.); Shrowsbmv IVor., 18.J7, II. L. 
 (L(l. Woiisl.'viliii.'). 
 
 » Ovoiniliii^' (lictim in Duvies v. 
 LowiuU'tf. 1M;{ (I'aiko, B). 
 
 3 Shruw.sbuiy I'oor., 18J7, II. L. 
 
 *Id. 
 
 » Dot) V. Barton, 1827 (PuttcBon, 
 J.). Soo Doo )'. iJiivies, 1847. 
 
 • Crisiiiii 1'. Dojjliniii, 18()3. Soe, 
 howovcr, contra, Cooko v. Lloyd, 
 1803, infra, in note '. Set", also, 
 Ilitcluna c Kardley, 1871. 
 
 ' Sou 11. <•. lUsliworth. 1812 (Wifjht- 
 man, J.); luul I'roc.-Otn. r. Wil- 
 lianiH, 1S()1 (Sir ('. Crossw.-ll) ; S. C. 
 nom. Dvko c Williiun.s, 18()1 ; In ro 
 Miirv limf^lcy, 18(>2. In Cook«< v. 
 Llovtl, 180;] (Ln Bliiiic, J.), tho 
 (pii'stion was wlu'thiT an nldor son, 
 who had taken i)o.><scs.sion of tho 
 patornal cHtati's, and eonvoyod thorn 
 to oni' of tho litigants, was horn in 
 w.MUock. Aftor wnch ohUir sou'b 
 (loatli, hirt own doiliration that ho 
 was a bastard was rocoivod in ovi- 
 donco (Lo Blanc. J.), tli.nigh nnido 
 mihs.'(]uontlv to ho convcyanco, "as 
 the roprost-ntation of onn ot tho fanuly 
 of tho degroo of rohition«hip lio horo 
 to it." If tho cases cittid in tho toxt 
 
 1)0 law,— as thoy wonld probably bo 
 doomed at tho pro.suiit day, — this do- 
 ciision can scarcely rost npon tliat 
 ground, unless tho special circum- 
 stances of the case be praj-ed in aid ; 
 and unle.xsit can successfully bo con- 
 tended, that, since tho defendant's 
 claim rested on the le^^itimacy of the 
 vendor, ho could not object to the 
 vendor's declaration, witliout relin- 
 quishing tho only prop of hi.s title. 
 Should this rotined argiiniont be 
 deemed inconclusive, perhips tho ad- 
 missibility of tho declaration mi^'ht 
 bo snstained, on th«! ground that the 
 tauso turned, not only on tho con- 
 dition of tho father's family, but on 
 the actual s'atus of tho cU'clarant 
 himself ; but hero we are met by tho 
 dillic.ulty, that tho son eouhl only 
 liavo known the fact of his own ille- 
 gitimacy by information received 
 from others; and, as a bastard 
 has in tho eye of tho law no re- 
 latives, tho hearsay nuist havo been 
 derived from strangers, and its ad- 
 missibility might on that ground 
 1)0 questioned. Soo lurthor ro- 
 niarks on this case, infra, in text. 
 Moreover, in one case ovidonco 
 was received that the father had 
 
 414 
 
' 3 
 
 CHAP. IV.] DECLARATIONS AFTKR WIFK's DEATH. 
 
 admissible after such parent's death,' notwitht-tandiug the nilo 
 of law, which possibly stilP precludes parents from giving testimony 
 to bastardise issue born during wedlock.' Possibly, however, after 
 previous proof of a valid marriage they are inadmissible.'* 
 
 § 638. If a man has once been connected with a family by 
 marriage, the death of his wife will not dissolve that connexion, so 
 as to render inadmissible declarations subsequently made by him. 
 Therefore where, in a case of pedigree, a witness was asked whether 
 he had not heard a husband, since deceased, state, after his wife's 
 death, that she was illegitimate, the answer was received.' The 
 court presunwd that the knowledge must have been obtained by the 
 husband whilst he was a member of the family.^ | 
 
 § 639. Again, no valid objection can be taken to evidence of '. 
 tradition as to family history, on the ground that it is heamnij upon ^ 
 hearmi/, provided all the declarations come from different members . 
 of the same family, or do not directly appear to have been derived 
 from strangers.' For example, the declarations of a deceased 
 widow respecting a statement which her husband liad made to her, • 
 as to who his cousins were, or the declaration of a relative, ia 
 which he asserts generally that he has heard what he states, are 
 both receivable ; and even general rrptife in the fainily, proved by 
 the testimony of a surviving member of it, has been considered ..a 
 falling within the rule." Moreover, it is not necessary to show 
 
 specified the time of his maniiige, 
 hud dechired his ehlest son to hiive 
 been horn hei'ore tluit diite, had 
 heaped upon him op])robrioua epi- 
 tliets implying illogitimaey, and had 
 on liis death-bed pointed to his 
 younger son as his heir ; and tliese 
 deehiiaticms would seem to have been 
 ch'arly admishibh', if not as directly 
 proving tho bastardy of a person, 
 who, though do faeto his son, was do 
 jure a stranger to him, at least as 
 showing the jiosition of the legitimate 
 portion of his family, thro\igh whom 
 tho plaintirt' claimed his title. Seo 
 Ooo(h'ight I', ^[oss, 1777 (Lil. Mans- 
 field); Murray v. Milnor, 1870 (h'ry, 
 J.). Seo, also, In re Perton, Pearson 
 V. Att-Oon., 188j (Ohitty, J.). 
 
 ' Soo In ro Perton, Pearson v, Att.- 
 Gen., 1884; AyloBl'ord Pour., 1883, 
 H.L. 
 
 » Seo post, § 9J0. 
 
 » l\. V. «tourton. 1S3G. 
 
 * Murray v. ililner, 1879, supra 
 (Fry. J.). 
 
 » Vowlea V. Young, IHOO (Ld. 
 Erskinc); Doer. Harvey, 182J(Littlo- 
 dale, J,). Ijut seo ob.servatidiis ia 
 last section. 
 
 • Johnson v. Luwson, 1824 (Bur- 
 rough, J.). 
 
 ' 8heddene.Att.-0t 
 18(il. 
 
 » Doo V. Giillin, 1812; Shedden v. 
 Att.-Gen. and Patrick, isdl. Ifthis 
 were not so, the main objci t oi re- 
 laxing tho ordinary rules of evidinco 
 wi'iild be trustrati'd, since it seldiim 
 happens that the declarations of do- 
 eeuscul reintives embrace matters 
 within their own personal knowlcdgo : 
 Dog v. Randall, 182S; Monkfon v. 
 Att.-Guu., ISai (Ld. lirougham); 
 
 }en. and Patrick, 
 
 415 
 
RELATIONSHIP OF DECLARANT MUST BE PKOVED. [p. lU. 
 
 that the declarations were contemporaneous with the events to 
 wliich they relate.' 
 
 § 640. Before, however, a declaration can be admitted in evidence, 
 the ir/afioiiHhi/) of the det-lamiit with the family must he estahliHhed 
 by some proof other than the declaration itself.* In tracing ancient 
 pedigrees, the court would probably be satisfied with slight evidence 
 on this head, since the connexion of the declarant with the family 
 might be equally difficult of proof with the very fact in controversy. 
 But some evidence would certainly be required even here. Other- 
 wise, a stranger, by claiming alliance with a family, and then 
 making statements respecting it, might asj^umo to himself the 
 power, after death, of materially altering the relative rights of its 
 Bevere.l branches.' It seems, however, unnecessary to show the 
 exact degree of relationship that subsists between the declarant and 
 the person respecting whom the declarations are tendered, but it 
 will be sufficient to prove that they were in some manner connected 
 by blood or marriage ; * and if the question be whether any, or 
 what, relationship subsists betweea two supposed braiu.'hes of the 
 same family, it is only necessary to establish the connexion of the 
 declarant with either branch.* It has, indeed, been urged, that 
 proof must be given connecting the declarant with both branches ; 
 but if this vere necessary the declarations would be superfluous, as 
 merely lemUug to prove a connexion, which, by proof showing 
 that the declarant was related to both branches, had already been 
 established.® 
 
 Slimoy I'. AVado, ISIlfi. See Rohann 
 V. Att.-Goii., 1«4;{, II. L., iiml I)iivi(>s 
 V. LownduH, 18-13. See poet, §5 «ij<i, 
 
 ()0(). 
 
 ' Monkton f. Att.-Oon., 1831 ; 
 Loviitt l'i!i'iii2rp, 18'-'t) -o7, II. li. As 
 L(l. liroiifihain has woU obsuivcd, 
 such a restriction " wouhl di'feat the 
 pur|K)80 for wliieh hear8ay in podij!;roo 
 la hit in, by provoiitinc it from over 
 Roinj? back beyond tlie lifi'tinio of the 
 p<!rson whoso declaratinn is to bo 
 adduced in evidence;" and, to use a 
 homely illustration, — it would oven 
 render inadmissible the Btatement of 
 a deceased person as to the maiden 
 nam9 of liiii own grauduiothui. 
 
 ' Moiiklon V. Att.-n>n., 18;)1 ; 
 IJiiiiburv I'.MT.. Is i», II. L. ; Ld. 
 El.lonih H.'iki-i.'vl'.M.r.. IHll, ILL.; 
 lieialil'.'tT..18J.S -li!l. II.I>.;StalVord 
 I'cr.. iMVj. U. L. ; U. »•. All Samts, 
 182S(lSi\li!v, J.); Duvios c .Morwun, 
 1k:)1 (Id.); Att -d.-ii. ('. Kiihlcr, 
 lrt()l, II. L. ; riant c. Taylor, 1861; 
 Ihke V. Williams, 18(11 ; In re Mary 
 Einslev, 18()2. 
 
 » See iJoo V. Randall, 1828 (Best, 
 C. J.). 
 
 • See VowloB V. Younj?, ISOrt. 
 
 • Moiikton w. Att.-Ocn., 18:11 (M. 
 Ili-oujjham). See Smith v. Tebbitt, 
 18(17. 
 
 • Monkton v. Att.-Qen.. 1831 (Ld. 
 Brougham). 
 
 416 
 
CHAP. IV.] DIX'LARATIONS INADMISSIBLE DURING LIFPL 
 
 55 (Ml. Thnugh the ground upon wliioh hearsay evifh>nee is 
 n(liiiitti'(l ill cases of petligree is, technically, hecause it is presumed 
 thai no hetter eviilence can be procured, yet such evidence will not 
 be rejected, though living witnesses might have been called to 
 prove thii very facts to which it relates.' For example, the 
 ilcihiratioiis of a deceased mother, as to the time of the birth of 
 her son, may be received, though the father he living and not 
 called.^ Where, however, the declarant himself is alive, and 
 (■ai)ablo of being examined, his declarations will be rejected.' 
 < 'onsecpiently, it lies upon the party, who seeks to avail himself of 
 this species of evidence, to prove the declarant's death. Thus, 
 where, to establish a Scotch marriage, a relative of the supposed 
 husband had '^en asked at the trial what she had hoard on the 
 subject from " members of the family," the answer was rejected, 
 tm the ground that the question had not been limited to statements 
 made by dccruHcd relatives.* Moreover, as pointed out in the last 
 clia])ter, even in matters of pedigree, hearsay dedaiatious made 
 liod liU'in niofatn are not receivable.^ 
 
 ^ U4:^.^ The term pcd'Kjrer embraces not only general questions 
 (if descent and relationshi[), but ah > the particiidar facts of Inith, 
 DKtrviafjc, and death, and tbe tiinr.s'' when, either absolutely or 
 relatively, those events happened, provided such facts are recjuircd 
 to be proved for some goneah)gieal purpose!.** All these facts, 
 therefore, may, in any genealogical in([uiry, be established by 
 hearsay derived from relatives, though, with respect to specifio 
 iliitcs, snme doubts have been entertaiticd as to tlio extent ond 
 iili[)lication of the rule.'-* The high authorities cited in the footnote'" 
 
 ' Ph. I'.v. 'Jl'J. 
 
 ' ]{. r. IHiiniiiijhani (midntofl). 
 
 ■' I'.'iiilr.'ll i: i'.i,«li.-ll, 17;U. 
 
 ' Biitlur I'. Mi)untgunvt, 18j9, 
 11. I,. 
 
 ■' Aiit<\ ?§ (;'.>8-(i;M ; BiitliT V. 
 .MnimipiiT. t. 1S,);», II. L. 
 
 " (jr. Va. § lo^, lis to lir.tt four 
 
 lilirs, ill J).llt. 
 
 • Belly V. N'Mil, lS.>(l(Ir.). 
 
 " As to this jiroviso, soe jMist, 
 
 • Tiii(l:il, (^.J., rojectod tho docla- 
 
 iMtiollS of llcCCllKOll |)('IS()IIM, tOllllcnHl 
 
 to piuve tho ugub uf thuii' lulutiveti, 
 
 on tho proiiinl tli:it, thmi^'h luliniH- 
 
 Sihlc I'dl' tllr [nil |JOSi' of ^llll\villy: tho 
 
 roliitioiisliip, ilii'v ciiuld not be itj- 
 ceived its )iroot oi ]iaiticiiLir fiictH, 
 Bach us llin u;,'es of p.irtiiw. Lord 
 Itroii^'liMiii, liowevci', on II motion tor 
 a new tiial, intiiiia'ed a very sfidiifjf 
 o]iiiiion in favour of the a>luiissil)jlity 
 of tlio evidence, and Hulisi'(|uenlly 
 Ntated tiiat I'lii'ke and Littledaiu, 
 JJ., eiitiielv coiiciined in this viow: 
 
 Kilhley i\ ('oiUl)Ulll, lN;fl. 
 
 '" ll'ellielt r. 'I'nikal, l()(i;t; re- 
 co(^iii/i!d liy I.oid lllloiilioiDugh, 
 in iloo V. Kiiwlin^H, IhOU ; caM 
 
 417 
 
•t( ' 
 
 BIRTHS, MARUIAQKS, ETC., PROVABLE BY HEARSAY. [PT. HI. 
 
 and tho general practice of the profession, appear, however, to show 
 that these doubts are groundless. 
 
 § 643. Hearsay evidence of particular facts being inadmissible in 
 support of public rights,' it may be urged that such evidence ought 
 to be also inadmissible upon questions of pedigree. But, " on cases 
 of general right, which depend upon immemorial usage, living 
 witnesses can only speak of their own knowledge to what passed in 
 their own time ; and to supply the deficiency, the law receives the 
 declarations of persons who are dead. There, however, the witness 
 is only allowed to speak to what he has heard the dead man say re- 
 specting the reputation of the right of way, or of common, or the like. 
 A declaration with regard to a particular fact, which would support 
 or negative the right, is inadmissible. In matters of pedigree, it 
 being impossible to prove by living witnesses the relationshii)s of 
 past generations, the declarations of deceased members of the 
 family are admitted ; but here, as the reputation must proceed on 
 parficiilar farts, such as marriages, births, and the like, from the 
 necessity of the thing, the hearsay of the family as to these par- 
 ticular facts is not excluded. General riglits are naturally talked 
 of in tho neighbourhood ; and tho family transactions among the 
 relations of the parties. Therefore, what is thus droppcil in con- 
 versation upon such subjects may be presumed to bo true." ^ 
 
 § GI4. Still, hearsay evidence must, when given as to pedigree, 
 bo confined to such facta as are unmediatc/i/ connected with tho 
 question of pedigree ; and declarations as to independent facts, 
 from which the date of a genealogical event may be iuferreil, will 
 probably be rejected. The following examples will explain the 
 extent and operation of this rule. In a question of h^gitimacy, 
 turning upon the time of birth, a declaratiou by the deceased sister 
 of the alleged bastard's mother, stating that she had suckled the 
 child, when coupled with proof of the time when her, the witness', 
 
 cited in 1 Ph. Ev. 214, from Vin. 
 Ab. Ev. T. b. 91, IT.'U ; Vulliamy 
 V. Huskisson, IS-JS (Ld. Abinger); 
 Eyder i'. Mai bone, IS.U, citod 2 Uus.s. 
 & Nfyl. 1()9, us a decision by Little- 
 dule, J. Ld. MansHold, in Goodright 
 V. MoH8, 177" ; Lord Hrougham, 
 in Moukton ». Att.-Uen., Ib31 ; 
 
 K. Bruce, V.-C, in Shields v. Boucher, 
 1847; Pollock, C.B., in Plant v. 
 Taylor, 1861 ; 1 Ph. Ev. 213 ; Ilubb. 
 Ev. of Sue. 649; 3 St. Ev. 841. 
 
 > Ante, § 617. 
 
 •Sir J Mansfield in Berkuley 
 Peerage caae, 1811, H. L. 
 
 418 
 
 .1 1 
 
 r 
 
CII IV.] HEARSAY AS TO PEDIGKKK, WIIKN ADMISSIHLH. 
 
 own child was bom, tended to fix the alleged bastard's birth at a 
 period subsequent to its parent's marriage, but its admissibility is 
 doubtful ;' in a case,* turning on the relative seniority of three 
 sons, born at a birth, declarations by the father that ho had 
 christened them Stephanus, Fortunatus, and Achaicus, according to 
 the order of the names in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corintiiians,' 
 for the purpose of distinguishing their seniority, and also declara- 
 tions by an aunt, who, at the confinement, with a similar object, 
 had tied strings round the arms of the second and third child, were, 
 however, admitted. In the former case, the fact of suckling the 
 child had no direct bearing on its ago or l(>gitimaoy, but was only 
 a species of circumstantial evidence from which these facts might 
 be inferred; whilst in the latter, the christening and the tying 
 strings round the arms of the children were intended from the first 
 to afford tlie means of ascertaining their relative seniority.* 
 
 § G45. Mr. I'hillipps justly observes that, " there appears to be 
 no foundation for any distinction between cases where a matter of 
 pedigree is the direct subject of the suit, and other cases where it 
 occurs incidentally." ' The declarations of relatives are, neverthe- 
 l**"*. only admissible in cases which directly or indirectly involve 
 some question of relationship, and the fact sought to be estalilishod 
 by hearsay is required to be proved for some (jciiru/uifirdl purpose ; • 
 they will not necessarily be admissible when the date, place, or 
 other facts connected with the birth, marriage or death of a party 
 is the subject of controversy. Consequently, in an action for use 
 and occupation by a reversioner against a tenant j)()ur autre vie, who 
 has held over after the death of the ci'siui que vie, the hitter's death 
 must be proved in the ordinary way, and the hearsay of relatives 
 will be inadmissible ; ' while letters written by the deceased father 
 of the defendant cannot be read in sui)port of a defence of infancy;* 
 
 er, 
 
 V, 
 
 bb. 
 
 ley 
 
 I-.- 
 
 ' Isaac I'.Gompertz, 1837. Ginm-y, 
 li., iidmittoil this ovidonco, but Lord 
 C()tt<'nlmin expi'o.-sod lai opinion that 
 \w was wrong m so doing. 
 
 " Vin. Ab., Ev. T. b. i*l ; probably 
 
 rufoirod to a» Spadwoll v. , 1731, 
 
 by Luwrenco, J., in the Berkeley 
 I'm-., 1811, 11. L. 
 
 " Ch. 10, V. n. 
 
 * iSee, further, on this subject, 
 Palmer v. i'almer, Ibtti (li.); the 
 
 Lovat Pcoraj^o cjiso, IHHo, II. L. 
 » 1 I'h. Kv. 2U\, n. o. 
 
 • iSliii'lds V. JioiR'.hor, 1847 (K. 
 IlriK'o, V.-C). Sue Smith v. Snath, 
 187(J(Ir.). 
 
 ' \Nl»ittuck V. "Waters, 1830 (Tark, 
 J.). 
 
 * Figg V. Wodderburne, 1842 (I'at- 
 teson, J.]. Sen, ulao, Uuiiiea r. 
 Guthrie, 1884, 0. A. 
 
 419 
 
HEARSAY KVini:XCi: OF LOCALITY. [PART III. 
 
 CHAP. IV, 
 
 \i 
 
 where several sons are entitled to an estate in order of seniority, in 
 an action of ejectment for it by a younger son, family tradition is 
 not admissible to prove the death of an elder ; ' and in a settle- 
 ment case,'' the declarations of a deceased father as to the place 
 where his child was born, cannot be received as evidence of the 
 birth settlement of the child.' 
 
 § 046. The settlement case just referred to* does not, however 
 (as has sometimes been supposed), establish that in a strict question 
 of pedigree, hearsay evidence of locafifi/, — or, in other words, the 
 declarations of deceased persons respecting the p/ficr.>t where their 
 relatives were born, and where they married, resided, came from, 
 V ent to, or died, — cannot be received.' And hearsay evidence of 
 locality has, indeed, on several occasions been admitted to elucidate 
 matters of strict pedigree. 
 
 ?5 (547. For example, where the question was, whether A. B., an 
 ancestor of the declarant C, was thi same person as A. B., a 
 blacksmith, who had resided at X., a declaration by C. that his 
 ancestor was a blacksmith, and that he resided at X., was received 
 in evidence." If it be necessary to show that a family had relations 
 who lived at a particular place, declarations by a deceased member 
 of the family, that " he was going to visit his relatives at that 
 place," will be evidence ; not, indeed, that he went there, or that 
 any person of his name lived in that neighbourhood ; but as proving 
 a tradition in the family, that they once had relations living in 
 the place in question, which tradition, in the event of its being 
 shown by other evidence that persons of the same name had 
 resided there, might be important as a mode of identifying those 
 
 > ralincr v. Palmer, 1885 (Tr.). 
 
 » K. v. Eiith, l.S(17. In tliis case 
 tho cliiM WHS a bustard, and the do- 
 cliU'iitions i)f his ]>utiitiv." fathfv would 
 thoreforti huvo Ix^-n inailnna<il)le even 
 on a qui'stuni of jifdi'jrruo ; but this 
 point was not raised. Sec ante, 
 
 •' Strinnious nnsuccpssful efforts 
 wore I'oniu'rly made to render tho 
 dcclaiations of dcci'ascd jiorsons ad- 
 niissibb- in jiroof of particulars ro- 
 Bpc'Ctiiiu' tln'ir snttli'ineiits. Sco R. 
 V. Kriswcll. 1790; 11. v. Chadderton, 
 1801 ; U. i: l'\'rrv Frystone, ISOl ; 
 E. r. AbLTiiwilly,1801. 
 
 ♦ R. V. Erith, 1807. 
 
 » See Shields v. Boucher, 1847, 
 where Knif.'ht Bruce, V.-C, intimated 
 a stronjj ojjinion that such evidence 
 was adiriis<i])lo, and ohsi^iTod that in 
 R. V. Kiith, l.S()7, Lord F-llcid)orouph 
 carefully lested tlie juilftTneut on tho 
 fact that no question wliatsocver of 
 relationship was involved in tho in- 
 quiry. !^o that, in the opinion of the 
 V.-("., if tho evidence tendered in 
 that case liad bi-en re([uirod for any 
 penealojrieal i)ur])osi>, a ditVerent con- 
 clusion niiKht very possibly have been 
 arrived at. 
 
 « Hood V. Lady Beauchamp, 1836 
 (ShadweU, V 
 
 Ijuay 
 
 420 
 
CHAP. IV.] ro!:.Ms of iu-aiisay — oiiaf. di:clauation8. 
 
 porsons with tlio branch of tlio fiitnily tilliulol to ; ' and evidence 
 bus also b('{3U rooidved of a family tradition, that a particular 
 individual diod in India, ^'or the purpDse of tounecting th.. 
 individual with the family of tho claimant.- 
 
 {5 648. The fonnH under which hearsay evidence in matters oi 
 pedigree may be presented are very numerous. Letters written 
 under dictation from, and in the name of, a deceased person, are 
 regarded as declarations by such deceased person,' and all oral 
 declarations by a deceased rclaticc are clearly admissible if made 
 ante litem motam.* But declarations by deceased relatives, how- 
 ever made, are rarely deserving of much weight ; * for not only 
 are they usually sought to be established by pers(ms interested 
 in the litigation, but they are often 3cc''ded or remembered for 
 tho first time after the contest has aiise The court, therofore, 
 necessarily runs considerable risk o/ being deceived by deliberate 
 falsehood, and the more so as it is obviously diflicult, not to say 
 impossible, to convict a witness of pi jury in narrating what he 
 alleges that he heard in a conv "aation with a deceased person.' 
 Even assuming that the sincorit} oi the witness cannot reasonably 
 be doubted, men are often, without deliberately intending to 
 falsify facts, extremely prone to believe what they wish, to 
 confound what they believe with what they have heard, and to 
 ascribe to memory what is merely imagination.' 
 
 *5 649.* Fiiiiiili/ conduct, too — such as the tacit recognition of 
 relationship, and the distribution and devolution of property, — 
 is frequently received as evidence from which the opinion and 
 belief of the family mav be inferred, and as resting ultimately on 
 the same basis as evidence of family tradition. For example, " if 
 
 ' Eishton V. Nosbitt, 1844 (Rolfo, 
 
 '' Id., citiiif!: ^ronkton v. Att.-Gon., 
 lH:n. Kni},'lit Bruco, V.-C, in a 
 very elaboruto jutlginont in Sbii-lils 
 I'. Houcbcr, 1847, intiniiitoil a xtiong 
 opinion, that, inacoiitrovei'sy mornly 
 p'lioidogieal, decliirations nmdo by a 
 ilcwsasod person as to wlioro ho or his 
 fiiinily cuino from, "of what place" 
 his father was doai{»natod, and what 
 occupation his father followed, would 
 lio adtnissibl(>, and niiyrht be most 
 uiutcriiil evidence for tlio purpose of 
 
 idontifyiiif? and indivi(hi!ilisinj; the 
 peison ami t'aniily nniler discussion. 
 
 ^ In r ' Tur.icr, Gloiiistor v. llard- 
 inf?, 188.). 
 
 * Sec ante, § (i44 ; Lovut Peerage 
 ease, IhS.J, 11. L.; In ro Porter, 
 PeaisDii V. Att.-Gon., INSJ. 
 
 ' ^'^'e e. (/., tho Lovat Peerage case, 
 188.J, II. L. 
 
 • Crouch V. Hooper, 1852(Komilly, 
 M.R.); "Webb v. Haycock, 18.J4 (id.). 
 
 ' Crouch ('. Hooper, 18J2(Uomilly, 
 M.B.). 
 » Gr. Ev. § 106, in part. 
 
 421 
 

 '•^*fti': 
 
 KVniKNCE OF FAMILY CONDUCT ADMI8.SIULK. [PAUr III. 
 
 tlie father is proved to liavo brouglit up tlio party as liis Ipgitinmtn 
 son, this amounts to a daily assertion that the son is l.-gitimufo." ' 
 On the other hand, the concealment of the birth of a child from 
 the luishand,''— the subsequent treatment of such child by the 
 person who, at the time of its conception, was living in a state of 
 adultery with tlie mother,— and the fact that the child and its 
 descendants assumed the name of the adulterer, and had never 
 been recognised in the family as the legitimate offspring of the 
 husband, — are all circumstances that will go far to rebut tlio 
 presumption of legitimacy, which the law raises in favour of the 
 issue of a married woman.* Again, on a question whothor a 
 person, from whom the claimant shows descent, was the son of a 
 particular testator, the fact that all the members of the family 
 appear to liave been mentioned in the will, but that no notice is 
 taken of such person, is strong evidence to show, either that such 
 person was not the son of the testator, or at least that he had died 
 without issue before the date of tlie will.'* The production, too, of 
 a man's will, in which no notice is taken of his family, and by 
 which his property is bequeathed to strangers or collateral rela- 
 tions, is cog(mt evidence of his having died childless." 
 
 § 650." E'lirieH vuidc hy a parent or relation in bibles,^ prayer- 
 books,* missals,' almanacs,'" or indeed in any other book, or in 
 any document or paper," stating the fact and date of the birth, 
 marriage,'* or death of a child, or other relation, are also evidence, 
 in pedigree cases., as being written declarations of the deceased 
 persons who respectively made them. Entries in a family bible or 
 testament will be admissible, even without proof that they have 
 
 ' Berkolov Poorngo case, 1811 (Sir 
 J. Maiistiuld), II. L. 
 
 * Iluif'iavo V. llarpravc, 1848. 
 
 » Gooiliitrlit f. .<uul, noi (Ash- 
 hurst, J.) ; Morris r. lJnvi((s, 1n;J()-7, 
 H. L. ; Hanbiiiy Poor., 1811, II. L.; 
 11. V. MaiihfioM, 1841; Towii«hoiid 
 Peer., 1843, II. L.; Atchley v. Spiigg, 
 18U4. 
 
 « Tracy Poor., 184;i(Ld. Campbell), 
 II. L. ; ■llobsoii V. Att.-Gon., 1843 
 (L(l. Cottcnhaiii), II. L. See ante, 
 \ G20. nd fin. 
 
 ^ Ilungato '■. <lasfnigno, 1840; De 
 Boos Peer., 1804-5, U. I.. 
 
 • Or. Ev. § 1(14, in jmit. 
 
 ' Bork.'l.'v PoLT., 1811, II. L. 
 
 • Leigh I'ciT., 1828, II. L. 
 
 • Slano IVnr., 18j.), II. L. 
 '» lloihort V. Tuckal, 16ti3. 
 
 •' Ik'ikoloy Poor., 1811. II. L. 
 See Jackf-on I', ("ooley, 1811 ^Ain.); 
 DouglaH r. Saundcrson, 1"!H (.\ni.); 
 Carskaddon v. I'ooiman, 1840 (Am.). 
 
 '» lu the Sussex Poor., 1844, II. L., 
 on entry made by the mother of the 
 claimant in her prayer book, declar- 
 ing the fact of her marriage, waa 
 admitted in evidence. 
 
 422 
 
CHAP. IV.] ENTRIES IN BIBLES, ETC. ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 lioen made by a relative ; for as this book is the ordinary register 
 of families, and is usually accessible to all its menibors, the 
 presumption is that the whole family have more or loss adopted 
 the entries contained in it, and have thereby given them authen- 
 ticity.' This presumption, however, will not prevail in favour of 
 an entry in any other book of however religious a character, but 
 proof must bo given, either that the entry was made by some 
 member of the family,* or that it has been acknowledged or 
 treated by a relative as a correct family memorial,' or, at least, if 
 ancient, that it was made at the time when ' it purports to have 
 been written. In order to establish this last fact, the evidence of 
 sliilled witnesses, conversant with manuscripts of different ages, is 
 admissible, though, as before observed, such evidence is entitled to 
 very little weight.* 
 
 § 651.* The correspondence of deceased members of the family,* 
 too, on proof of the handwriting,' recitals in fumily deeds (such 
 as marriage settlements,^ and other instruments'), descriptions in 
 vitls,^^ and the like, will bo received as evidence in pedigree cases. 
 Moreover, recitals of descent, and descriptions of parties, in such 
 deeds other than family instruments, will be received, provided 
 such deeds come from the proper custody, and are proved, or may 
 from age be presumed, to have been executed by some member of 
 the family to which the statements refer." Wherever the state- 
 ment is contained in a deed, the execution of the deed by a 
 relation is, however, an indispensable requisite.'* But where the 
 
 ' 'J 
 
 « Beikoloy Tocr., 1811 (Lds. El- 
 lenborou};h iind Hodosdulc), II. L. ; 
 Monktoii i: Att.-Gon., 1K31 (Ld. 
 Bniuslittni); lliibburd »'. Lees, IHfili. 
 
 "Tiiicy I'oer.. 184.1, II. L. ; Cniw- 
 fonl uiid Lindsay Poor., 181S, II. L. 
 
 * Ilood ('. ik'iKu-liainp, ISHO. 
 
 * Triicy Peer., 1S4;1, II. L. ; unte, 
 J 50. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 104, in part. 
 
 • Iluntiii^'don Peer., 1818, II. L. ; 
 Kidni'y r. Coiklmrn, 1831; Leigh 
 Poor., 1828, II. L. ; Hastings Peer., 
 184(), II. L. Soo Ihitlor v. Mount- 
 ganet, ISJSI, II. L. 
 
 ' Miirchniont Poor., 1840, H. L. 
 See Aiith Poer., 18;{!», II. L. 
 
 • Neal r. Wilding, 1740; Do Roos 
 Peer., 1804-o, 11. L.; C'handosPcor., 
 
 1791, XL L. ; Zouch Poor., 1807, II. 
 L. ; JJcvon Poer.. 18;J2. II. L. ; L'IsIe 
 IVcr., 182.3, II. L. ; liunbury Peer., 
 18("J, II. L. ; V'.iix IVor., 1824, 11. 
 L. ; llnntuy Peer., 18;t8, II. L. ; 
 Itostcommon Peer., 1824, II. L. 
 
 • Smith V. Teb'.'ict, lfi<)7 ; Stafford 
 Poi-ra^je cu.so, 182.'), H. Ij. 
 
 '" Vulliamv i\ llnskisson, 1838 (Ld. 
 Abin'roi); lio Kons Peer., 1804, II. 
 L. ; L'Wo Peer., 1S2J, II. L. 
 
 " Maiinyon Peer., 18IH, IL L. ; 
 Hastings Poor., 1810, II. L. ; Borth- 
 wick Peer.. 1812, II. L. ; Iliingato v. 
 (jascoigiio, 184t); I to IJoos Peer., 
 1801. II. li. Sfo Stokos V. Dawes, 
 1820 (Am.). 
 
 " Sliincv t'. Wude, 1836; Foot ». 
 Clarko, 1626. 
 
 423 
 
INSCUIITIONS ON TOMHSTONIW, ETC. ADMISSIULK. [p. III. 
 
 doclimtion is (iontained in the draft of a will prepared hy direction 
 of the deceased, and on information derived solely from him, such 
 draft is adniissihle.' A. id, a forfiori, a will which was duly 
 executed, but which has been revoked as a will, is also admissible.' 
 In regard to recitals of pedigree in old answers in Chancery (which 
 were sworn), those relating to facts which were not in controversy 
 are admitted, but those referring to facts which were then in 
 controversy are excluded as made po.st litem multim? Recitals in 
 old bills in equity are always inadmissible, being regarded as the 
 mere flourishes of tlie draughtsman.* The admissibility of pro- 
 ceedings in a Sheriff Court in Scotland is governed by the same 
 principles.* 
 
 § (i J2." IiiHci'iplioHH on toinhstones,'' coflin-plates," mural monu- 
 ments," family portraits,'" engravings on rings," hatchments,'" 
 charts of pedigree,'* and the like, are also admissible evidence in 
 pedigree cases. Those proved to have baen made by, or under the 
 direction of, a deceased relative, are admitted as his declaraticms ; 
 8uch as are only proved to have been publicly exhibited, may be 
 supposed to have been well known to the family, and they are also 
 admitted on the ground of taoit and common assent.'* It is 
 
 i; 
 
 > Lanihoit, In ro, 18S6. 
 
 » Soo D.>o V. Poinbroke, 1809. 
 
 ' Soo 1 I'll. Kv. '219, 2'M, and the 
 authorities tliore citwl. Soo, also, De 
 Roos I'oer., 1804, II. L. 
 
 ♦ Boiloau V. llutliii, 1843 (Parko, 
 B., citing the !?iinl>ury Poor., 180!), 
 II. L.). Those cases appear to over- 
 rule Taylor ('. ("olo, 17!)'. 
 
 » TiV.'ll /'. Koiiiiody, 188!), II. L. 
 
 « Ci'i . l>v. § 10.), ill l)art. 
 
 ' Moiikton V. Att.-Oon., 1831 ; 
 Gooiliij^ht V. Moms, 17"7. 
 
 » Chandos P.:i'r.. 1791. II. L. ; 
 Hokobv Peer., W.W, II. L. ; Lovut 
 Peer.. '1827, II. L. 
 
 » SLuiov V. Wade, 183G; Do Roos 
 Poor., 1804-.J, II. L. 
 
 •" Camovs Poor., 1839, II. L. 
 
 » Vowlos I'. Young, ISiKj. 
 
 " Iliuigato I.'. Uascitigno, 1S46. 
 
 " Mcaikton v. Att.-Uen., 1831; 
 G(K)driL;ht V. Moss, 1777. 
 
 " Monkton «. Att.-Gen., 1831 ; 
 Davies i>. Lowndes, 184:5. Parko. B., 
 obstii'vua, "The ground upon which 
 
 the inscrijition on a tombstone or a 
 tablet in a church is admitted , is that 
 it is prosiuniid to have boon put there 
 by a membor of the family cognizant 
 of tho facts, and whose doclaratiun 
 would bo ovidoiico ; whore a podigroe 
 liuiig up in the family man.sioii is 
 received, it is on tho ground of its 
 rocogiiitioa by the mombera of the 
 family." Doubts have boon ex- 
 prosHod it Nisi IVius lespocting tho 
 admissibility of an inscription on a 
 toml'-coni! in a burial-ground for dis- 
 sn.ters ( vVhittuck i'. Waters, 1830 
 (P^rk. J.)); but such doubts appoar 
 wholly grouiidloss. since tliis »i)ccio8 
 of ovitli.'uco has boon admitted by tho 
 House of Lords in peerage claims 
 (Say and S.-le Peer., 17.S1. H. L. ; 
 llubback's Ev. of Succ, 1811, citing 
 Scrj. lldl's Colli'ct. in Line. Inn 
 liibrary, vol. 2()), and it may be 
 pointed out that in tho case cited an 
 inscription on a tombstone in the 
 dissontiTij' burial-ground in Bunhill 
 Fields was admittttd by the House of 
 
 424 
 
■n 
 
 C. IV.] 
 
 MUUAL INSCKirriONS — FAMILY DOCUMENTS. 
 
 prosumod, — tlioupli tliis is n presunifition wliidi Ih tlouMloss often 
 oontmry to tho fiiet,' — that the rfilativca of a family would not 
 permit an orroneous insoription to riMiiaiu; and that a pcn-Hon would 
 not knowingly wear a ring whioli boro a ini«-statement upon it.' 
 
 § 6i>i.'' Mural and other funereal in-scriptions are i)rovttblo, utt 
 already shown,* by copirx, or other sot-ondary evitlence. Their 
 value as evidence depends much on the authority under which they 
 were set up, and on the distance of time between their erection and 
 tlie events which they purport to commemorate.* If parol testimony 
 of their contents be offered, on the ground that the original monu- 
 ments are destroyed or effaced, the court will not be satisfied, 
 unless tlie prior existence of the muntmients, and the genuineness 
 of the inscriptions, bo established in the very 8tr()ngo>t manner that 
 the circumstances will admit." The ease with which (evidence of 
 this nature can bo manufactured, and the dilficuUy of fixing the 
 witnesses with perjury, render it needful to enforce this rule with 
 strictness. 
 
 § 654. The family reengnition of the truth of a document may 
 not only arise from its publicity, but also from other circumstances. 
 If a document, though privately kept, be clenrly proved t4^> have 
 been preserved in a family as an authentic memorial of pcdigroo, it 
 will be receivable in evidence without proof of its origin.' The 
 mere production, however, of a document from among the family 
 archives,* and, d fortiori, its production from a museum, or other 
 public place of deposit,' will not render it admis.'-ible, without proof 
 that it was made or recognised by some member of the family. 
 
 Lords, and that inscriptions nn/om'i/n 
 nioiunneuts hiivo also hrcn rticcivcd 
 in ovidoiioo: ILstiiif^s I'ooi-., 1«U), 
 11. L. ; IVrth ' mi:, 1HI8. II. L. 
 
 ' SoniM \vv .rkiiblo niis-st itoinniits 
 onuioiiuinv-^tsuro nieiitioiu'tl in 1 I'll. 
 Ev. 2:^2, n. 4. The uutlior of ibis 
 work found on ii inonuni'-iit in a 
 London coniotory tliis utiiitlinjj iiu- 
 nouiioomont: — "Tlio victim of u 
 iiiotlud-'s teinpor." 
 
 - Vowlua V. Young, IHOO (Ld. 
 Ei'skiiui). 
 
 * dr. Hv. § 105, in part as to first 
 five linos. 
 
 * Ante, § 438 ; and boo Tracy 
 
 Peer., is:i;t-i;j, If. L. : l^oscoinmou 
 and \.<-i'j;\i I'.cr., ISJJ, 11.1,.; Sliiioy 
 r. W.ido, lS:iU; I'ortli I't'W., 1«48, 
 11. L. 
 
 ' AthiMiiv l'rif.,l.s:((!, ILL.; Vuux 
 I'.MT.. is.i i, II. L. ; Eitzwiilttsr Poor., 
 IsJJ. II. L. 
 
 « Tracy I' •., ls;l!», II. L. Soo 
 
 Slii('\v.sl)iiry I'ci'r., l.s.)7, U. L. 
 
 ' Vuux i'u'i-., Is.iiJ, 11. L. ; ("iinjoya 
 I'.MT., l.s;(!». H. L. 
 
 ' iM'/.Miilt.T I'.'cr., IHrj, II. L. ; 
 Lov.it IViT., IS.'T, II. L. ; I), of 
 Duvoii-liin^ i: Niill, 1877 (I'ulloa, 
 
 C. 15.). IL !'■ ill-)- 
 » Chaudos i'otr., 17yi, 1' L. 
 
 425 
 
PKniOREFIS — ARMORIAL DEARINOS. [PART III. 
 
 S 655—0. Tho (niostion how far a pedigree, purporting to liave 
 been cotujn'M, oithor wholly or in part, from retiistcru mid otlmr 
 documents which are unt shown fo linir hrpit fosf, is admissible, hii8 
 been nmeh tliscus8(>d. A W<'lsli p(>digreo, proved to ho in tho 
 handwriting of one of tho ancestors of the defendant, produced 
 from tho proper (nistody, ami tracing tho genealogy of the family 
 from an almost fahuhms antiquity, and bringing the descent down 
 to the immediate contemporary relatives of the writer, and con- 
 taining at its foot a memorandum in these words : " Collected from 
 parish registers, wills, raonuincnhil inscriptions, family records, and 
 history. This account is now jiresented as correct, and as con- 
 firming the traditictn handed down from one generation to another, 
 to Thomas Ijloyd, Esq., of Cwm (iloyne, this 4th day of July, a.u. 
 17U3, by his loving kinsman, Wm. I<loyd," was offered in evi- 
 dence ; anr". the Common Picas rejected the whole. But the 
 Exchequer Chamber, after much doubt and full consideration, 
 decided that part, if not all, of tho pedigree in question was 
 receivahh) in evidence,' saying, " tho pedigree in question was 
 admissible, because it was certainly acknowledged by Wni. Lliyd 
 to bo correct." 
 
 § ()57. Armorial henriixjK, whether carved on wood, painted on 
 glass, engraved on monuments or seals, or otherwise enihlazoncd, 
 are also ailmissible in cases of jiedigrco; not only as tending to 
 prove that ihe person who assumed them was of the family to which 
 th"y of right belonged, but as illustrating tho particular branch 
 from which the descent was claimed, or as showing, by tho inipal- 
 iugs or quarterings, the nature of tho blazonry, or the shape of the 
 shield, what families were allied by marriage, or what members 
 cf the family were descended from an illegitimate stock, or were 
 maidens, widows, or heiresses.'' The value of this evidence depends 
 nlnio>t wholly up<»n its anticpiity. Since the Revolution,' tlie 
 hciiilils have exorcised uo authority in correcting usurpation, and, 
 
 r 
 
 V* 1 
 
 ' I»avii«s I'. LowikIch, ISJ.'J (Ld. 
 
 » Hull. MS. 18:i(l, 0141; lI.TV.-y 
 V. Ihivi'y, 177J ; Chundos I'licr., 
 I7U1, II.' li. ; limitinpliiii I'for , 
 isi.s, II. ]-. : lliiMiiips iVrr.. INU». 
 U. L.; 81ucwi*iiury r«Mjr., UiJ7, 
 
 II. L. ; Fifzwultor Poor.. 18|'.>,1M,. 
 CiiiiHiVH IVrr., I(!()7, 11. lt.\ Huh. 
 Kv. <iiSiu'. (»U. 
 
 * Tito liiMt Ilnnild'n visitiitioii wim 
 in IliHd, tlio lii.st ImvitiK l>>'*<ii in 
 \bl», S.U Hull. Kv. of .Sue. >iVL 
 
 
CIIAI' 
 
 .v.] 
 
 AIJMOKIAI, HKARINnS ADMISSIRLE. 
 
 tlnroforo, tlic nso of iirinorial bcariiigs HuLsccpicully to tliat date is 
 ciitilliMl to but littlo, if any, w«^i}jlit as pvidt^ncn of goiicalorry.' 
 When jiroof of this tiatiiro is ofr«)re(l, Homo officer of tlio llcrafds' 
 (^(ilicpc Hliottld be in attendance, to explain the horaldio meaning 
 of tlio evidence produced.' 
 
 ' I Ph. Ev. 224 ; Hub. Ev. of Sue. aro occaflioiuilty admiBsihlo as ovi- 
 
 (iO(J. denco, — not, howovor, aa tlio hnnrsay 
 
 • ^ f'hanclos Poer., 1791, H. evidonco of rolutivos, but us ])uf)lio 
 
 Ij. Iloni(lo8 the (lifToront Bpocios documontH, and tho law ruHpnctinp^ 
 
 of OTidonoo onumon»t<?d abovo, thn thoin will bo diHr'.ieswl hcn-aftor : 
 
 HoriildH' 1)ookH, ijKjuiHitions post Part V. Chan. IV. Soo De Boos 
 
 inortom, puriiih l>uokH, rugitttora, &c., Poor., 1804, 11. L. 
 
 427 
 
427^ 
 
 AMEinCAV NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT III. 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 \h ! 
 
 Hearsay concerning Pedigree. — Wliere the facts of geiu'alo<,'v or 
 of piMligrt'i' in ;i given t;iiuily luc the siilijci't of jiitlitMal iniiniiy, 
 
 tlio ilcclaratioiis of (U'ccast'il uicmlu'rH of the faiiiil 
 
 V affi'cteil are 
 
 iulniittt'd as ('vidcnnf of such facts, or of parlieular iacts rch'vaiit 
 thereto, if luacUi nufi; /ifi'in mtitniii. (Jraiifiird v. IMackhiirn. 17 Md. 
 
 Do 
 
 (is:.-,); 
 
 Jones I'. .Jones, .'W Md. 147 (1.S7-'); llarhind v. Eastman. 1(17 ill. 
 
 en 
 
 •M) (iSdO); S. C. on api)eal, :\ Wall. 17."> (l,S;;,->); De llav 
 llav.'n, 77 Ind. L'.'Sl". (ISSI); Ciiddv c. Hn.wn, 7S 111. n."> (is 
 
 iiWT} (l.SS;',i; Nortiintp r. Hale. 7C. .Me. .'{()(> (ISSJ); Kowlcr /-. Siiiip- 
 )n, 7U 'r<'x. (ill (IS'.)lj; l)a\vs(.iv v. .Mayall, la .Minn. lOS (ISDl); 
 
 8< 
 
 Eisenlord /-. Cliini, 12(5 N. V. ooL' (iJSUl); Elliott i\ IVirsol, 1 I'et. 
 MI'S. ;!;i7 (ISl'S); Eaton r. Tallniadge. L'l Wis. 1'17 (l.SGDj; Cliaui- 
 berl liii v. Chaniherl.iin, 71 N. V. H.'.') {1S77). 
 
 "It has, therefore, hefiouio a universally recognized exception to 
 the general rule excluding hearsay, based on various so\ind consid- 
 erations, that iis to certain fai-ts of family history, usually den<imi- 
 nated pivligree, eoiriprising inti-r n/iu, liirth, death and marriage, 
 togi-tiier witii their respective (hites, and. in a <iualilied .sense, 
 legitimacy an<l illegitimacy, declarations are admissilde; (1) When 
 it a]ipe;irs by evidencu' i/i-hirs tin- de<'Iaralions that the de(darant 
 was lawfully related by i)lo()d or marriage to the |ierson or family 
 whose history th(> fa(rts concern ; (L') I'liat the dcidarant was dead 
 whi'U the ih'idarations were tendered; and (.'>) That they were 
 made fiiitf lih III iiiutiiiii." Northrop /•. Male, 7(> M(\ .'{(X; (bSS-l). 
 
 pAiiTiiii.Aii I'\\(rs. — Not merely the fact of relationship itself 
 may b:' estai«lishe(| by such deidaratn)ns. but particular facta iiear- 
 ing on the isaiie may be proved in that way. 
 
 The fact of the existence of a marriage being involved in an 
 issue of pedigree concerning the l.'gitiniaey (d' a claimant, declara- 
 tions of the alleged husl)and both in iavor (d' and against tiie mar- 
 riage are itdmissil)le after his (htatli. (Crawford c. lilackbnrn, 17 Md. 
 •J'.) (iSCill). The point reli(>d upon, that unless the maniage were 
 tirsl. found )o be legitimati', tlie decdarant could not be shown 
 to i)e a meudier of the family of tlie (daimint, was not sustained. 
 J/ili/. iU.ickburn c Criwfonls. .'t Wall. 17.". tlSC,,",). 
 
 So a marriage miy be proved l>y the detdar;iti(Uis of a deceased 
 wife. Walker i>. .Murray, o Out. (l.'JS (iSSh; ('haiid)i'rlain r. 
 Chamlierlain, 71 N. V. IL'.'! (IS77). Colialiilation need not first lie 
 shown to admit declarations establishing a marriage. Copes v. 
 I'earce. 7 Cill. 217, 2(;;i (iSlS). 
 
 "The term pedigree iindades not only 'leseent and ndationship, 
 but also the facts (d' i)irth, mirriige, ah.) death, and Hie times 
 when these events happene.l. Ihcse faets miiy be established by 
 
ClIAl'. IV.] 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTES, 
 
 427» 
 
 AuiL'ricMii, &(.'. Trust Co. v. llosciiaLdi', 77 Vii. St. 51)7, olG 
 
 general repute in the family, i)rove(l by a surviving nioiultcr of it, 
 in all ca.se.s wliero they occur incidentally and in relation to jiedi- 
 grce. 
 (lS7o). 
 
 \ failure of heirs may he proved h" tlie declaration.s of deceased 
 nuMuhcrs of the family. I'eo[)le r, Tiilton Kirc Ins. Co., L';") Wend. 
 Ijd.l ^^1840). '■ riie ijuestion is, were the statements as to independ- 
 ent facts, such as being a meml)er of tiic army, presence in Texas, 
 or the time and phu'c of dcatli, admissihle under t!ie rule? It is 
 often stated tliat declarations of di'ceased mend)crs of a family are 
 not admissihle to prove tin; time nor jilace of hirth, residence, or 
 death. Hut tiiis rule has l)een applied in the main to eases in 
 which the poor-laws were being administered, and a riu'ht was 
 being asserted based upon the residence or birth at a given place. 
 Where the time or place of residence or death is introduced for the 
 purpose of icU'Utifying the person in (|uestion as a member of a ])ar- 
 liiMilar iiunily. it is admissible as being so (dosely related to, if not 
 in fact part of, pedigree, that the same rules of law are aiiplicable. 
 Mr. lMiillii)s, in his work on Kvidence, volume I., p. L'b". (lifth 
 American edition) states the rule so terstdy that we cojjy it as the 
 best statement of the jjroposition that we have been able to lind. 
 He says: ' Locality may, however, be so involved in pedii,iee as 
 to fall within the general rule and render hear.say evidence admis- 
 sible on the subject; as where the object is to identify certain jier- 
 sons nonnected with a i>articular place as belonging to a family.' 
 This rule is W(d! suiiimrted by many autliorities, both Euglisli and 
 American, ami as we believe by souml principles of law. We cite 
 the following autlunities as ap])licable ami in support of this rule: 
 IIul)b;i(d< Successions, .'51.''-'; Shndds r. I'ouclnT, 1 De (Jex & S.. j), 
 40; Winder r. Little. 1 Veates (I'a.). l"*!'; I'.isliop ;■. Nesiiitt. L' M. 
 iS: 11. n.")!; Wi.se e. Wynn, .T.) Miss. ;5S1; MuUery v. Hamilton. 
 71 (Ja. 7L'(>; Cndiiv r. I'.n-wn, 7S III. 41.".; Morrell ik Foster. .'!.'{ 
 
 Conn. .".71 
 
 ); I 
 
 ns. 
 
 C 
 
 (osenat 
 
 I'a. St. r.(»7; McNeil w. 
 
 O'Conmir, 71) Texas, '2'27." Hyers i-. Wallace, S7 'I'ex. ".().•{, nil 
 (ISih-)), 
 
 The deidaratious of a tleceascd mother as to her .son's marriage 
 are competent to show tiiat one claiming to bo his son is illegiti- 
 nmte. r.arnum v. I'.ariuim, 4'_' :\Id. '-'.'(l. .'MU (lS7r.). On a rpu's- 
 tion of legitimacy, tiie declarations of a deceased fatlier to the 
 elfect that his son was illegitimate, and tliat ho had never married 
 the boy's mother are competent. I/iiil. 
 
 Hut'se<' State t'. Watters, .'! lied. CN. C^ L. 4.m (1S4.'5). 
 
 A mother may testify as to her son's legitimacy. Caujollo v. 
 Ferrio, lid Harb. 177 (18r.7). 
 
 A brother may testify as to the ago of a sister from declarations 
 of her deceaseti mother. "That this species of evidence must bo 
 
427^ 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTfcH. 
 
 [part hi. 
 
 ! ^ ■ «f 
 
 ■SI 
 
 iuliuitted has always been held, f" oti.">)-wise .i person could not 
 prove his own age; for wh. i\- no family r- -ord i.-i made, he can 
 only show it from the declarations of his parents." Watson v. 
 Brewster, I Pa. St. 381 (184")). 
 
 So the date of a person's birth may be testified to by himself or 
 by members of liis family, although they kne'v the faet only by 
 hearsay based upon [popular tradition, lloulton v. Manteuffei, al 
 Minn. 185 (1 81)2). 
 
 Marriage may be proved oy rei)iitation in ,he family. Morgan 
 V. I'urnell, 4 Hawkes (N. C.) Do (l81,'o); IJaruum v. Uarnuni, IL' 
 Md. 2r>l, MU (187".). 
 
 "In all eases, except in actions of rrlm. cou., and [)rosecutions 
 for l)igamy, the faet of marriage may be established by evidence of 
 the acts and declarations of the parties, by proof of tiie general 
 repute in tlie family, and by proof of tlie declarations of deceased 
 persons, who were njlated to tlu'm l)y h; lod or maniage." Hen- 
 derson c. (Jargill. 'M Miss. 'Mu , 40'.) (I8r)(»); Jackson r. Jackson, 
 SO Md. 17(> (IS'.M). Harnum v. ISarnuni, 4'J .Md. L'ol (l87o), adds 
 seduction to this list of exceptions. 
 
 Wiiether the place of residence of a n>ember of the family may 
 be proved in this way is sonicwlnit ir di: pute. It has been iicid 
 that it may be. The supreme eonrt of A! i ,.sissippi say: — 
 
 "Tliis rilling of tin* learned j -dge was baseil upon tiie dicta of 
 many autliorities to tin* ert'ect, that while in (piestions of pedigree 
 the iiearsay declarations of a deceased meml)er of a family are 
 re(!eivable in evidence, as to all matters of birth, th'ath, age, mar- 
 riage, ami tlie like, deidarations as to plaei; are not. The later and 
 better considered cases, liowi-ver, nMMidiate tliis distinction i»e- 
 tween deelarations as to place auil those touching otlier family 
 nmtters. wIumm? the in(piiry is stri(rtiy one of pedigree, .and tlie 
 declarations iv.\ U) place are not relied on as giving any right by 
 reascni i.i : i' i.iace, but proof as to place is m: ile nn'rejy by way 
 <(f identihiMti'n. of tlie person or laiiiily. Thus, in a fpiestinn of 
 setlleiiicnt under the poor laws, where the right of settlement is 
 depeiiileiit Upon tlie place of present or former residemic, hearsay 
 declar.itions as to \Am\v. are inadmisHJIde; Imt where the (piestion 
 is piiitdy one of pedigree, and the effort is to identify the particu- 
 lar jierson or family about whom the ileclarant was speaking, 
 declarations as to place stainl upon the ;.anic footing as any otlnu'S 
 relative to matters of family history." Wise «. Wynn, fij) .Miss. 
 MS (1.S.S2). 
 
 Hut declarations or reputation in the family as to the residence 
 or birth of a person in a particular place are not c(Miipetent l»y the 
 weight of authority, unlesi they can be considered as part of the 
 res gesta'. Londonderry c. .\iidover, L'H Vt. 4I<> (isr»(>); Union «'. 
 IMaiiifield, .'V.) Colli'. .".(;;{ (18!).'f). Tlie same is true of a record 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AVEiacAN N TKS. 
 
 4- 
 
 »-i 
 
 entry in a Tamily Hihlc Union v. I'laiiifioid, 31) Conn. .")(■>.'{ ( I ST.'!;; 
 Currie v. Stair.s, ' New. Hniiis. 4 (1HS.">). 
 
 The time of a birth may Itc sliown by the (leolarations of a i»' 
 ceased member of the family thi)iit,'li tiiere is a "family registxi t* 
 birth.s " which i.s not prodiuied. "Tiie gr.ido i.s the same." (."ii :'. 
 ents V. Hunt. 1 .lone.s (N. C.) L. 400 (1S.")4). 
 
 So the death of a person may be .shown by "information received 
 from the family." l)u I'ont e. Davis, ;{0 WiK. 170 (INTL'); Ander- 
 .son V. I'arker, G Cal. 1D7 (IHoli); Mason r. Fuller, 4'> Vt. L".) 
 (1872). 
 
 Or by the declarations of a deceased member of the family. 
 Morrill c. Foster, ;{.'{ N. U. .'17!) (lSr>«;). "The phrase, ' i)edi},'r.'e,' 
 embraces not only descent anil relationship, but also the facts of 
 birth, marriuj^e and death, and the times when these events hap- 
 
 icne( 
 
 Kelly I'. .Mcduire, lo Ark. ")."», <'»()4 (IKA.")). 
 
 On an action of ejectment, where tiu- lessors of the ]ilaiiitifF 
 claimed as heirs at law of A., .\.'s declarations to the elT' -t the 
 plairtilTs were the children of a married sister, deceased, and IiIh 
 nearest livini; relations are competent to prove the rtdafinnsiiip, 
 iiiarriaj^e and birth of children in we. Hock. Mollit v. Withcrspoon, 
 10 Ired. (N. (;.). 1.. IHf) (1S4")). 
 
 A declarant may state that ,\. is her natur.il son, born bcfon' her 
 marriaj^e. Northrop »>. Hale, 70 Me. 'MW, (ISSI). 
 
 iNgriUY MrsT KKi,.\'ri'. ro I'kdkiiikk, — Where the issue is of 
 the settlement of a |pau|ier, his Idrtliplace or residence in a particu- 
 lar town (Munot be proved by repntalion in tlie family "i lic! l.ir.i- 
 ti(.ns in any form by deceased members of it. I nion r. I'lai'ifie!.;, 
 :!',> Conn, iti'tli (1S7;<); I,o'i(!ondcrry v. .\ndover. L'S \t. 110 (i.Sod); 
 Independci re r. INnnpton, 
 
 <l N. .1. Law L'O'.t (ISl 
 
 • i\ 
 
 '\l\i 
 
 lllliL 
 
 r. {{nrlin-lon, I I'ick. 17 J (ISUO). 
 
 It is settled that heiirsay is not admissilih- to pi 
 
 lie pivee 
 
 nf a person's birth." Adams r. Swansea, IiO Ma;- ■''! (isr.l); 
 Ciirrie r. Stairs, L'a New nruiis. 4 (l.SS.')i; I'looks /'. ( i ly. .'{ A. K. 
 .Marsh. (Ky.) r.l.^» (IHIM): Tyler r. Flanders. 57 N. H fUM (IS7<W. 
 Ibit in an aeti<,n of ejcifiueiit, the death of a joif 
 
 ■)i; '1. i-aii 
 lie sliown by such declarations. I Hi I'ont c. p i .' \\ i,,. 170 
 
 (I.S71»). 
 
 On the settlement of a pauper, the iptestioii of lb" li'L;itiiii,icy of 
 his father, tlirou),'h whom the settlenn-nt wa,-. clainn'il, brin^' l•s^en- 
 tial, a witness testilied that she had seen his father ali\e ihuin>? 
 the lifetime of S. IJ., who died the year before the fathir's parents 
 were m; rried. To prove tlie late of the deatli of S. I'>., "The de- 
 fendants then offered, as ovidenci' that Susanna died on th.' ll.'th of 
 Deoomber IHO.'t, a lar^e ornamented sheet of paridinient , Iwaru-tf 
 the inscription 'family record,' on which were entered tl.» date;< of 
 the birth luid marriage id" Susanna Mlair's parents, the dale.i of 
 
12< 
 
 AMEKICAX NOTKS. 
 
 [part hi. 
 
 [ail 
 
 t!|' 
 
 1 
 
 t'% 
 
 
 i 
 
 ' ^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 r^f^ 
 
 
 till' birth 1111(1 (loath of Susanna, and of the births, niarriag(>s and 
 death ol' two sons born subs(>(iupntly of tiic! sanu' part'nts. One of 
 these sons, lorty-seven years old, testified that, ever since his ear- 
 liest reeolleetion, his fatlier had kept this parehiuent franied and 
 ban^'ing in a eonspieuous jilaee in his dweliinK-liouse, and iiad 
 handed it (h)\vii to iiiin; that diiriag all this time tlie same entries 
 liad been on it; and tiiat ids fatlier and mother were dead. Ami 
 tliere was evideiiee tiiat tlie entries of the births and deaths upon 
 the p;ireiiment were made, all at one time, by direetion of Sii- 
 .saiina's father, more tiian forty years Ind'ore the trial; tliat tlie rec- 
 ord of the marriages of his (diihlren had been added, from time to 
 time, as tliey occurred; and that he and his sou kept and exliil)ited 
 the parclimcnt as a true statement of tlie events rec(n(lcd on it. 
 
 The defendants also ottered to prove that an aneient gravc^stone 
 in the burial-ground of the I'.lair family bore the nauie Susanna, 
 and hiid ins(!ribe(l on it December iL'th, 1S0.'{ as tln^ date of her 
 <leath." Moth (Uudarations were held admissible. No. lirookheld 
 ♦'. Warren, l(! (Jray. 171 (1S(;(>), 
 
 A teiideucy to extend the exception to cases where facts of fam- 
 ily liistory are relevant to in(iuiri('s other than tiiose (d' genealogy 
 is plainly ai»[iarent. 'I'lius in an airtion iig linst a life insurance 
 company on a pf)licy on tlie life of A., A.'s deidaratioiis as to her 
 own age have iieen held coiiipetent as a (]uestioii of (ledigree. 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. lUodgett, Tex. 'J7 S. W. L'SC. (IS'.M). 
 
 Who may hk 1)i;i i.ai! ants. — .Any member of the family or the 
 husband (.i .ife ot such member is (pialilied as a deidarant. 
 
 Tile mother of a bastird is a niember of the family of her son, 
 by statute, Hulhcieiitly to make declarations as to his ]»ai'eiitage, 
 admissible after his decease. Northrop r. Hale, "(J Me. .'{(MJ 
 (ISSI). 
 
 'l"lu> de(daration of a deceased husband that the fatlier and 
 mother of ids wife were never married is (iompeteiit ou an issue 
 of genealogy. "lie does not appear to have named the person 
 from whom he derived his iid'ormation, nor to Inve stated that his 
 knowh(lg(' was derived from the general understanding and reputa- 
 ti(Ui iii his wile's family. Itut iIk^ knowledge of events of this 
 description most generally exists in every family, and hence the 
 declarations of <uie of its nieiiibers is admissible, although he docs 
 not mention the source from whi(di he derived his inf.u'miition; 
 and HUch de(darations are ecpially admissible, whether his eonneo- 
 tioii with the family is by blood or marriage." .lew(dl r. Jewell, 
 17 iVtiis, LM.'J, L'l'lilHl.'l); Nairn t'. Mayes, (Tex.j 'M S. W. il'.i 
 (IH'X,). 
 
 Neighbors, though acquainted with the facts, cannot be dcdar- 
 juits. " rallies cannot establiidi pedigree by jiroviiig what the 
 neighbors thought or said upon the subject of the paternity of the 
 
(MAP. IV.] 
 
 AMKIMCAN NoTKS. 
 
 42:'' 
 
 licrsoii wliose pedigroo is in disimto. rroctf ol' ixdi^icc is ic- 
 stricti'd to tlif tli'ciiinitious oi (Icct'iisid |h'is(iiis wiio ;ih' iclatt'd by 
 lilo'.id or innTiiigc to tlic jicrsoii whnsc iKircntir^c is I lie sidijcct of 
 iiivi'sti|-,';iti(iii." ])e Iliivcii r. Dc Ilavcu. 77 liid. L'.'iti (iNSlj; Nor- 
 tlini|ir. Male, 7(> iM<'. ;!(iC. (ISSJ;; liraiicli o. Texas I.uinber Rll'g. 
 Co.. ')(•> I-'cd. Ht'p. 707 (1S".».J). 
 
 'I'liis is true even if tin- iicarsay t:ik( s the form (d' !L';('ii('ral rpim- 
 
 titii.ii. lleiidt'isoii I". Oai'dll, .'51 Mis 
 
 .".(■.7. 11!) (iNod). 
 
 Hue wliosc only information vniiw tn-ni "talixs with tlic iamilv" 
 and " reports ironi liis relations,'" iieitlier tlie dat<'s (d' sneii talks 
 and reports, the decease of tiie infornKints. imr the (h',i,n'ee of tlio 
 ndationship ol the inlornianls to the peison whose pedii,'reo was in 
 
 tniversy beinj; shown, is not ('onipetunt to tebtify. NN'allaro 
 
 I'lm 
 
 il<.war(l, (Tex.) .*«» S. \V. 711 (ISy")). 
 
 It was .-u;^j,'ested in an early Conuectioiit ease that the rule would 
 admit the detdarations of '• those who had lived in tlie family '' to 
 prii\.^ relationship. Cbapnian r. Chapman, L' Conn. ."17 (1S17). 
 .\ii(( there an- <lirfii to the same cdleet in .lacdison v. Cooley, 8 
 .lohns. iL'tS (iSll), I', ji., "Tile decdaratinns (d' persons, who from 
 their situation are liktdy to know. ;ire eomiietent evidenee." And 
 a hite e.ise in Texas lias gor.e so far as to admit amdent doeu- 
 ments by third i)arties as lelevant en pedigree. Howard v. Itsis- 
 .sell, 7."» I'ex. 171 (INNJ)). Hut even a trusted family servant's 
 >tatement as to the death <d' a member of the family is not eom- 
 pi'ti'iit. Doed. Arii(dd /•. Auhlj.i. .">(>. 15. V . C. 171 (iSlS). 
 
 W'iicre tlie rejiutatiou in tlie laniily is the fact ndied on, proof 
 ean only Ix- made by the surviving niembers of the family. Du- 
 povster ;'. (Jagani, SI Ky. -K'.'J (1S.S(>); .Mmgan r. I'lirmdl. 4 
 ilawkes (N. C.) Urnl^-">)i l''aiinim v. I'.anum. 41,' ,Md. L'.">1, .'JO-l 
 (1S7'.). 
 
 In a eas'' in Mieliigan the ootirt say ; — "The impiiry ndated t 
 r;iniily <'Piineelion and membership ard to tiie decease, and tinn • 
 id dee<Ms<' oi' memliers, and whether they had been or wei'e niar- 
 riiMJ; ami the answers returned, although in ]iait based on the 
 cdursi' id' spei'idi and undrrst indiii',' in the family instead of direct 
 personal knowledge, would seem to iiave been ] roper mi view of 
 till' nattire of the subject." Van Sickle r. (iibson, 10 Miidi. 170 
 
 (lS7'.t). 
 
 'I'he rehitionshil> to the family timst be estalilished by evidcMieo 
 nihniilr. Doe d. Duul.ip r. Servos. ."■. (). 1!. I'. C. L'S4 (1S-M>). 
 '•( Ulierwise evidence to support a ease of this kind might be got »)> 
 mi the deeli ration of the merest stranger, iirst receiving his dccda- 
 iMlion to establish the supposed relationship, whiidi alone would 
 111 ike his de(daration of any widglit. and then receiving his deelar.a- 
 tii'U as to the primdjial faet." ////»/. I.anioreaux v. .\tty. Cen. 89 
 .Mich. IK; (\S\)]). 
 
427^ 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AUT 
 
 III. 
 
 I 
 
 
 IM 
 
 li ■] 
 
 i 
 
 The declarations of a sifter of an alleged wife as to her si>t'i's 
 marriage with A. do not constitute evidence aliunde tliat tlie nt'ces- 
 fary rehitionship exists between her sister and A. on an inijuiry of 
 pedigree in A.'s family. IMackburn i\ Crawfords, [\ Wall. ITo 
 (18(5")). "If it had been proved by independent testimony that 
 Sarah Evans was related by bhiod to any braneh of tlie family of 
 David Crawford, and her dechirations had been offered to prove 
 the relationship of another person (daiming, or eluimed to belong 
 also to tliat family, this case would be in point. IJut the declara- 
 tion of Sarah Evans, offered to prove that her sister was connected 
 by marriage with a member of that family, was neither within the 
 principle nor the language of that authority." 
 
 In pursuance of this qualilication upon the rule, it has been sug- 
 gested that the declaration of A., a deceased person, that he liad a 
 brother living at a particular place would not be evidence sutli- 
 cient of itself to enable his own children to claim as heirs of the 
 brother. Wise v. Wynn, r.<) Miss. oSS (ISSL'). Hut tliat, on the 
 contrary, such declarations can be recived to enable the estate of 
 the brother to claim in the propi rty of the declarant. Ibid. 
 Cuddy c. Mrown, 7S 111. tl") (187.")). 
 
 When the declaration of a deceased person as to ])edigree is 
 offered to show that A. and H. were ndated to each other ity l)lood, 
 it is sufKcient, to lay tiie ground for its introduction, to show that 
 the ileelarant was connected witli the family of A.; it is not neces- 
 sary to show by evidence <leliors tint declaration, that the de<'larant 
 was also related to 15. (Jehr r. Kisher, M;{ I'a. St. Ml (ISDI). 
 
 The rule rcfpiiring ovii'enc',- of relationship ii/!iiii(/r doi's not 
 require that the declaration and the evidence dejiors the declara- 
 tion sliould come to the tribunal by separate witnesses. So wliere 
 a certain witness was relied on to sustain the whole weii,'lit of 
 the proof, the court held it sufficient. "Here tiie witness liore 
 tlie same name as the ancestor, lived in the neighborhood witii tlie 
 otlier sons of his grandfather, knew the mimes of the family, and 
 seemed ac(iuaiiited with the farms which they owned, and otlier 
 minute facts concerning them !>esidcs the cireumstaiice of being 
 requested as heir-at-law to join his uncle in the imn'tgage re- 
 ferred to, 
 
 "No objection was suggested at the trial that he was not a coni- 
 pctent witness to ju'ove the declaration of his mother, grandmother 
 and niii'les as to his heirship, f.>r want of independent evidence of 
 his conneetion with the family." WalHiridge r. Jones, .■{.'{ V. C. 
 
 Q. i\. (513 (is:;}). 
 
 "This evidence is primarily addressed to the presiding justice, 
 who, before admitting the ^Kctastions, must be satisfied that a 
 prima facie case of tlie rfqnisite relationship has been made 
 out. . . . And the facts shown, tlie birth, place of birth, the 
 
CUAV. IV.] 
 
 A MK IMC AN NOTKS. 
 
 4278 
 
 hiiiiyiiig up iiiul tliR namo of tlio a[)))t'llant, are ample piitnft facie 
 t'vidt'iice of n'latioiisliip to warrant tlio admission of tlii' declara- 
 tion mentioned." Noithrop i-. llalc, 7(1 .Mc. iJOd (1.S.S4). 
 
 It is only ncce.s.sary that a prima facie case of relationship to the 
 family should he estahlishi-d hy other (jvidence than the declar 
 tions, and slij,'ht proof will sutticc where there is identity of name 
 
 ;ini- 
 
 f'S. 
 
 great lajise of time and other oorrohorating circumstances. I'.rown 
 c. Lazaru.«, o Tex. Civ. App. SI (l.S<);{). 
 
 FoK.M OK J)K( i.AKATio.v. —The form of the declaration and the 
 medium through which it i.s conveyeil to the tribunal are imma- 
 terial. 
 
 A reforeneo in A.'s will to his children hy 1?. as "his natural 
 children" by h(>r is a roui[)ctont declaration after his decease on 
 the (piestion of the existence of a marriage to 15. or an issue of 
 pedigree involving the existence of such marriage. lUacUl urn v. 
 (Jrawford.s, .'> Wall. 17"> (l.SOr>). "The entry of a deceased parent, 
 
 or otiier relative, made in a Hihle, family missal, or any other 
 hook, or document, or paper, stating the fact and dale of the liiith, 
 marriage, or deatii, of a child or relative, is regarded as the decla- 
 ration of siudi parent or relative in a matter of pedigree. Corre- 
 spondence of deceased memliers of the family, recitals in family 
 deeds, descriptions in wills, and other stdcmn acts, ;nc ori^^iiial 
 evidence, wiicre the oral declarations of the parties are admissiiile. 
 Inscriptions on tombstoneu, anil other funeral monuments, engrav- 
 ings on rings, ii:scriptions on family portraits, ciiarts of pcdigice, 
 and the like, an^ also admissible, as original evidence of the same 
 facts." Kelly i\ McCJuire, lo Ark. r>'ut. (101 (iSoo). 
 
 It is not even lu'ccs.-ary that the di'clariilinn sliouhl rel'ite 
 directly to any fact of pedigree. 'I'lius the declaration of a lather 
 speaking of his daughter, "that unless he made a will Louisa could 
 gel notliing by law," is competent on the (pustion of her Icgiti- 
 ma. y. Viall r. Smith, (1 11. I. 117 (iNCd). 
 
 Kccogniti(!n in a deed is sulHeient. Ilarinim /•. liarnnm. IL' Md. 
 LTiI, l.".t(l (lS7r»); .Jackson r. Cooley, S,li)lins. I'.'S (ISll): Carter /•. 
 Tinicum Fishing (-'o., 77 I'a. St. .'>1(» ilS7o); Stokes c. Hawcs, I 
 Mason, L'dS (ISL'(l). Or in a will, (iaines r. New (Mhaiis, (1 Wall. 
 M'J (18(17). 
 
 .•\ recital in a deed by a motlicr is not admissible to prove that 
 her husband had not had ac(M'ss to her. and tliat consc(|nenlly the 
 <'hild was illegitimate. Watts >k Owens. (IL' Wis. .".I*.' (IKSo). 
 
 \ statement in a letter is Hullicieiil. IJyers /•. Wallace, 87 Tex. 
 
 rm (iH<>r.). 
 
 A "family recford " of dates of births, deaths, marriages. &c., 
 made by deceased uu'mbers of the fantily, is competent. North 
 Ilrookfield v. WarriMi. Hi (Jray, 171 (18(10); Kastman r. Martin, 19 
 N. 11. 152 (1848)1 Whitcher c. McLaughlin, llo Mass. 1(17 (1871). 
 
4270 
 
 AMKIilCAN NOTKS. 
 
 fl'AI:!- III. 
 
 <(! 
 
 "Tlio oxistoimo of a family n'^'istcr does not oxcliulf iinxil (,f 
 ili'cIaiMtioiis (ifdccciiscil iiicinh«'rs .if tlii' I'aiiiily." SwinU r. Knncli, 
 11 lii":i, Crciiii.) 7S (tH,s;{). A n-cdrd is (KmipcttMit if iiiinif liy a 
 Htr.iiij;cr uiiiiiT t,lu' instnictions cil' a iiicuihci- ol tlio liimiiy. Statt* 
 V. .locst, r»l hill. I'ST (l.STa). 
 
 "A pcilii^rcc is ailiiiissiltlc, tlidiii^li not Iimii; tip or iiia<lc |Mil»lic, 
 on proof of its having' liccii iiiadc l«y a iiiciiihcr of ilic laiuily. If 
 luni.!^' up, it is ailinissiltlo witiiotit jti-oof of its liaving Itccii inadr hy 
 (lii'iTlion of tlif faiiiilv, on Mir 'ground ilial it is a faniiiv acUnowl- 
 
 eir'ini'iit. 
 
 If tiic p('di!,'ri'i' be Iniiit,' up piddicdy in a iaiiiil 
 
 .V 
 
 in lusiou, it would lit' adniissililc without kuowiug who was its 
 auth.u'." KastMiiu r. Martin, I'J \. II. I.'.L' ( IS JH). 
 
 A familiar form of rntord is the family I'dldr. |)r( larations in 
 siudi form of facts of pcdif^n-o mado hy dt'ccuscd nn-inlitTS of tht- 
 family an* coiiipi'tt'iit fvidcncc of tip' facts thcrciu stated. (Jrccn- 
 Icaf r. Dulm.pu'. vS;c.. 1{. U. .'tO la. .'tiM (IHTO) Southi-rn, &c., In--, 
 (lo. r. Wilkinsiin. ."»;» (Ja. ri.'l."i (IS74); Ohandicrlaiu r, Chandicrlain, 
 71 X. V. VS.) (1S77). 
 
 The fads that the cntrios wcro made all at ono time hy a dc- 
 ccascil sister and not j^'enerally admitted in tho family to he accii- 
 Mte, alTect only the wei,:,'ht of the evidence. Southern, itc, Ins. 
 Co. r. \VilUiii.siMi,r»;{(Ja. "..Tx 1S71). 
 
 The inscriptions oi' an ancient j,'ravestone are competent to show 
 dates and other faets of pediiirec. North Hrooklitdd r. \\ iirrcn, l(i 
 (tray, 171 (IS(lli); Marnuni r. Harnum. IL' Md. L'.*»l. .'Km; (1,s7.".); 
 
 SniitI 
 
 1 r 
 
 \: 
 
 •rson, 
 
 .M( 
 
 II. \.\J (ISIS) 
 
 (ISSS;; 
 
 .astman 
 
 .M 
 
 irlin, 
 
 U) N. 
 
 .\ written meniorandnm onclosini,' a lock of hair is competent, 
 r.aiinim r. i'.arninn. 1-' Md. L'.'il. ;!il| (lS7r>). 
 
 ■• l''amilv iiistory is notliinj,' liiit the ilccdaration of different nu>m- 
 bers of a family rep;'at'!il by so many persons and for such .i time ,is 
 
 to lii'ciiiiit mnion repute in the family. l'])oii the saiiir sidijccts 
 
 the fimily iiistory and the detdaiations of a d ased luemlier ol a 
 
 family ai*'- e(piiliy admissible; the widyht to lie ^'iveii to each 
 <lepends uiKiu tiie circimstaiices. and is a (piestinn tor the jury. 
 not a ipu'stion of adniissibilily." ISyers r, Wallace, S7 Te.\. ;■»(•.'{ 
 (IS!),-,). 
 
 IJ.vsis Ol- Tin; Him,!' 
 
 It is said bv the learneil .lutlmr ^§ fi.'sro 
 
 th It "this exception rests on the (.jround of necessity." Whi i' this 
 was undoiilitedly a maiu r«' isoii for its adoption, the same necessity 
 lias not sulHoed to adiuit the stitement.s of deee.Tsed per.sons in 
 other conimctions, thoii'^h no other evidence is available. 
 
 /'/!/• ritiifrii, the dc(d intioiis re<,Mrdin',' pediurce are competent, 
 thcmgh tliere is no necessity for roocdvinp them. So in a case 
 wliere t!ie fact in dispute was the existence of .a certain marriai^e, 
 it was obji'ct«> 1 that evidence of the statements of the deceased 
 
IIAI'. IV.] 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTKH. 
 
 4:iT'" 
 
 iillr,:,'t'(l liiislciiul was iiicohi]i('t.ciit ln'(;;nis(' tlic all("^'((l wife w 
 
 IS 
 
 ifsciit lis ii witin'ss. 
 
 his (I 
 
 WJfclioii iirisi's Iroiii a iiiisa|iint'licii- 
 »iini of tlic nilc. SiuOi ilcclaratiitiis arc not licld to he atliiiissililc 
 ur iiiailinissililc accor.lin^' to tlic uccM'ssity ol' tlif particular case; 
 liat tilt'}' iU'(! adiiiitti'U as priiaii v fviilcin'f mi sucii Mihjccts I v tin- 
 I'st.ililislu'd rule ol' law, wliicli, tlioii;,'li said to have had its orii,'iii 
 ill iit'ccssitv, is universal in its a|tplic;;tion. Nor do siicli dctdara- 
 timis stand upon tlit; tootiii}? ot siMiondary cviilcncf, to Ijc cxcdiidcd 
 
 lis 
 
 will 
 
 ro ii witiii'88 ctiui l«! liiid who speaks upon tin- sidiject Iroiii 1 
 own knowlcdj^'c. ' llcaisay cvidfiuu! is of imiuisc inadiiii^silili', if 
 tlio person niaUiii;,' tiie deel, nation is alive, and eaii lie called. Tut 
 tli« declarations id' ;>. deceased niotlier, as to tlic time ol tlie liiitli of 
 her son, are luliuissilde. tlioii|^h the father is liviiij,' and not ealled.' 
 lliihhack on the Kvideiiei" of Siii-cession, (KiO," Craufiird if. 
 llla(dcl)iuii, 17 Md. v.) (iNflO). To the eoiitravy eli'eft, see Covert r. 
 llcrt/.o-,', I i'.i. St. 1 l."» (ISU!), a case which holds that wliere there 
 are living; witnessi's of eidialdtatioii, eviilence of the de(daiations 
 of a dc'ceasod rehitivo as to thm fact of a nianiaye is not competent. 
 //-/'/. 
 
 The sujireme court of Alabama 1ms dei lined to receive re]inta- 
 lion in A.'s family as to licr a;^e, so loii^,' as the evidiiici' of living 
 witnesses is available, and where those who declare the reputation 
 are themselves present in court. IJoyers r. De ISardidebeii, &c. 
 Co. U7 Ala. l")l (l.S<.»L'). 
 
 It may be comduded, however, that these deidaratioiis do not so 
 stroiijjly contravene the line of leyal policy which has estaiilished 
 the hearsav rule, as would be the case with many other declarationa 
 
 ipf deceased persons. 
 
 n nios 
 
 t eases, the fact that a declaration has 
 
 ipccii mi 
 
 de is, in ami of itself, circumstantial evidence of the truth 
 III the si.itcinent of a jirobative wei;.,'Iit soslii,dit as to reiiuiie that it 
 lir withheld from the jury. Where the mere making of a state, 
 iiiciit is to a certain extent probative of its truth; in other words, 
 where the stateii.ent is not aci-eptcd, if at all. as rest in;,' on the 
 creilit of a deceased jierson not exaiiiiiiod as a witness, but because 
 the makiii!^ of it is eirciimstanlial evidence of its truth, the jucidse 
 evils intended to be )>ri'veiited by the hearsay rule do not present 
 themselves in nnniitii^Mted form. It will be found, it is believed, 
 tliat this fjein il line of tliou'^dit can be tracei. more or less dis- 
 tinctly, ill many of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, — c. ij., 
 iiyiii^' decliratious, entries in coarse of liiisiness, liooks of account, 
 deidaratioiis against interest, Ike. 
 
 If the deelaratiim does not rest at all niioii the credit of the 
 
 declarant; 
 
 where the statement is ndevaiit leganiless <d' its 
 
 truth or falsity, r. //., on an issue of self-defence, that an allefjcd 
 iiiiirderer hail been tid 1 that the decea.sed was carrying a jMstol and 
 had threatened to shoot the prisoner at sight, Stokes r. People, 63 
 
IMAGE EVALUATION 
 TEST TARGET (MT-3) 
 
 // 
 
 
 1.0 
 
 I.I 
 
 1.25 
 
 Ui|2S 
 
 ■ 50 *^™ 
 
 Hf 1^ 12.0 
 
 15. 
 
 m 
 
 1.4 
 
 %-V^ 
 ^ 
 
 HiolDgrapjhic 
 
 Sciences 
 Corporation 
 
 33 WfST MAIN STREET 
 
 WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 
 
 (716) 872-4503 
 
<^ ^P MP 
 
 
 
 € 
 
 
 9) 
 
427" 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part IIT. 
 
 ,.' 'I 
 
 X. Y. 1(54 (1873) the hearsay rule has no application. Tliis rule 
 is considereil elsewhere. 
 
 Apparent!}' the statement of tlie deceased inemher of the family 
 is admitted on the issue of genealogy, because it is, in a certain 
 degree, circumstantial evidence of the truth of the statement. 
 
 deputation in the family is competent circumstantial evidence 
 of relationship, and of the facts of pedigree on such an issue, 
 though usually it is only hearsay; — so mellowed by time that the 
 individual voices are lost. Kelly r. AIcGuire, lo Ark. oo5, (505 
 (l-Soi")); Harland r. Eastman, 107 111. Mo (1883); Viall /•. Smith, 
 C R. I. 417 (18G0); Doe d. Arnold r. Auldjo, 5 Q. ?,. U. C. 171 
 (1848) Henderson /•. CJargill, 31 Miss. 3(57, 409 (185(5); Butrick 
 r. Tilton, 155 Mass. 4(51 (18<)2). 
 
 "Traditional declarations become the best evidence sometimes, 
 when those best actpuiinted with the fact are dead. When derived 
 from those who are most likely to know the truth, and are under 
 no bias to misrepresent the fact, sxwAi evidcMice aifords a reasonable 
 presumption of the truth." Eisenlord r. Clum, l'2(i N. Y. 552, 564 
 (18S)1); Eaton r. Tallmadge, 24 Wis. 217 (18(59). "Common 
 reputation in tlie family, is admissible as evidence of a marriage 
 in that family; and it is said that tlie declarations of an individual 
 of that family, are evidence of that common reputation. But such 
 declarations must have been made before any contest had arisen in 
 regard to the marriage. It is necessary that tlu'y should have been 
 made not only without any view of benetiting the person making 
 them, but also witlu)ut a view of benefiting any other; that they 
 should have flowed from a desire only of s]teaking the truth, which 
 all are presumed to liave, wlien there is no nu)tive to declare the 
 contr.ivv. The jierson, therefore, who olfers suoli declarations, 
 must show that they were made under sutdi circumstances; it is a 
 prerequisite to tlieir admissibility." Brady r. Wilson, 4 Hawks 
 (X. C.) 93 (1825). 
 
 Recognition as a relative by other members of the f. inily is 
 clearly good cireumstantial evidence on such an issue. De Haven 
 r. De" Haven, 77 lud. 2.3(5 (1881); Viall r. Smith, (5 R. I. 417 
 (1800); Henderson r. Cargill. 31 Miss. .3(57. 409(185(5); (Jliamber- 
 lain I). Chamberlain, 71 X. Y. 423 (1877); (laines /•. Green Pond 
 Iron Mining Co. 32 X. J. Eq. SO (1880). 
 
 "Tiie declarations are admitted upon the tlieory that they tend 
 to show that the jierson to whom they refer was recognized and 
 treated as one of a family. The statements of an ancestor or de- 
 ceased kinsman are not to be regarded as sejiarate and distinct 
 ce.iversations, constituting in themselves inde]iendent subjects of 
 i.ivestigation. but tlu'y are to be taken as a connected and indivisi- 
 ble thing indicating the treatment of the j)erson wliose i)e(ligree is 
 in dispute. The acts and declarations of the deceased kinsman 
 
I 9 
 
 CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 42712 
 
 are an entirety, and the question is, not simply what he said or 
 did on one day, or within one week, but what was his general line 
 of conduct." l)e Haven v. De Haven, 77 Ind. 236 (1881); White 
 ('. Strother, 11 Ala. 720 (1847); Eaton v. Talhnadge, 24 Wis. 217 
 (18(;y). 
 
 !So the fact that in making up "a register of my children " in the 
 family Uible a father omitted the mime of a child by a ])avtifular 
 woman, is circumstantial evidence id' illegitimacy. Chamberlain 
 V. Chamberlain, 71 N. Y. 423 (1877). 
 
 Declarations accompanying sucli acts of recognition would clearly 
 be admissible as part of tlie res gest.T. 
 
 It is plain, however, that in cases of pedigree the declarations 
 to be admissible need not constitute part of the res gestic. If 
 they do, they are admissible on tliat ground; — irrespective of any 
 question of admissibility as being involved in a case of pedigree. 
 
 Even declarations, without more, of deceased members of a 
 family as to the existence of a r-hitionship between themselves 
 and a particular individual i)artake somewhat, thougli to a lesser 
 degree than in case of reputation and recognition in the family, of 
 the same probative force. Personal and family ])ride; the general 
 interest in accuracy; a constant discussion among members of 
 the family and the consequent correction of mistakes; — mnke it 
 probable tluit tlie statement would not have been made and ac- 
 cepted unless it had been true. "It seems now to ue settled, that 
 the principle upon which the law resorts to hearsay evidence in 
 cases of pedigree, is ' the interest of the declarants in the person 
 from whom the descent is made out, and their eonseciuent interest 
 in knowing the connexions of the family.' And hence the rule of 
 admission is restricted to the declarations of deceased persons, who 
 were related by blood or marriage to the person, and therefore 
 interested in the succession in question. And under this rule it is 
 held, that general repute in the family may be jjroved by the testi- 
 mony of a surviving member of it." Henderson i>. Cargill, 31 
 Miss. 3(i7, 418 (imi). 
 
 Lis ^loTA. — Tliat the declaration must be nuide ante Hfcm 
 mofatii, see Northroj) r. Hale. 7(5 Me. 300 (1884); ]M(>rg;in /•. I'ur- 
 nell, 4 Hawkes (N. C.) 9.5 (1825); Caujcdle r. Ferrie, 20 15arb. 177 
 (1857). 
 
 "But the declarations of a deceased member of the family are not 
 to be admitted, unless it aiipears they have been made under such 
 circumstances that the relation may be supi)osed to be without an 
 interest, and without a bias. If they were to he made on a subject 
 in dispute, after the commencement of a suit, or after a contro- 
 versy preparatory to one, they ought not to be received in evi- 
 dence, on accouiit of the probability that they were partially 
 drawn from the deceased, or perhaps intended by liim to serve 
 
 [■ 
 
 ■ i 
 
 Il1 
 
 '1 
 
427^^ 
 
 AMEllICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 
 lt> 
 
 w 
 
 m> 
 
 '!' 1' 
 
 If 4 
 '"1 
 
 1 i 
 
 ^«; 
 
 V" 1 
 
 one of the contending parties." Chapman v. Chapman, 2 Conn. 
 347 (1817). 
 
 Trobably the lis mota must concern the subject matter of the 
 declaration or the qualiticitiou will not apply. Elliott u. Peirsol, 
 1 Pet. 328, 337 (1828). 
 
 Dkci-auaxt must be Dkceasku. — Ilarlaud v. Eastman, 107 
 111. 535 (1883); Dupoyster v. Gagani, 84 Ky. 403 (1880); Nor- 
 throp tK Hale, 7G Me. 3()() (1884); Mooers v. liunker, 29 N. H. 420 
 (1854); llobinson c. Blakely, 4 llich. (S. C.) 580 (1851); Kogers 
 V. De Bardeleben, &o., Co. 07 Ala. 154 (1803); Smith n. Geer (Tex.) 
 30 S. W. 1108 (1895). While the declarant must be deceased, his 
 statement may be proved by any one. If, however, the fact to be 
 shown is reputation in the family, this can only be shown by a 
 surviving member of the family; and if alive, by his evidence in 
 court. " It is only in the instance that the declarant is dead, and 
 was related to the person in question by blood or marriage, that 
 his declarations as to tlie relationship, and the degree of it, of such 
 person can be proved by third persons; and any person, whether 
 related or not, if otherwise competent as a witness, who heard such 
 declarations, may prove them. If, however, such relationship is 
 attempted to be proved by the general repute in the family, and 
 not by the declarations of its deceased members, then the proof 
 must be confined to the surviving members of it. If the declarant 
 is not dead, then it is not competent to prove his declarations, 
 because he can himself testify to the fact, which is tlie best testi- 
 mony." Dupoyster v. Gagr^ni, 84 Ken. 403, 409 (1880). 
 
 So to render an entry of births and deaths in a family Bible or 
 record admissible in evidence, the entry must have been made by a 
 deceased parent. If it is not shown that the parent wlio made the 
 entry is deceased, it will be inadmissible. Greenleaf v. Dubuque 
 &c. 11. 11. 30 la. 301 (1870). " The evidence is clearly incompetent, 
 upon two grounds. 1. The date of a birth and death of an indi- 
 vidual, being matter of pedigree, may be proved by hearsay evi- 
 dence and general repute in his family, and an entry of a deceased 
 parent, made in a bible, is regarded as a declaration of the parent 
 making the entry and therefore admissible. Krreenl. Ev. § 104; 1 
 rhil. Ev. (Cow. & Hill's and Edw. Notes) 249-252 and notes. 
 
 "It will be observed that entries of this character, in order to be 
 competent evidence, must have been made by a dece.i.ied parent or 
 relative. Tiiis witness in the case before us does not prove, nor is 
 it otherwise shown, that the father of decedent was dead. For this 
 reason the evidence was inadmissible, 2. The evidence introduced 
 was secondary in its character. The family record itself is not 
 offered in evidence, but the witness gives, in his deposition, a copy 
 ^hereof, or rather recites in his deposition the contents of the record. 
 
 U 
 
 !''■ 
 
' !i 
 
 CHAP. IV.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 ■427 »« 
 
 It is not such a record that it may be proved by an examined copy, 
 but, us all private writings, must be produced. If its absence be 
 properly accounted for, secondary evidence, as a coj)y or proof of 
 its contents, is admissible. 1 Phil. Ev. (Cow. & Hill's and Edw. 
 Notes) 250 and notes; 1 (Jreenl. Ev. S 958 and notes." Greenleaf 
 V. Dubuque &c. R. II. Co., 30 la. 302 (1870). To the contrary 
 effect, see Carskadden v. Poorman, 10 Watts. 82 (1840). 
 
 I'l '■ 
 
 '1. 
 
 m 
 

 K m 
 
 HEAKSAY IN SUPPOBT OF ANCIENT POSSESSION. [PT. lU. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ANCIENT POSSESSION. 
 
 § 658. A THIRD EXCEPTION to the general rule by which hearsay 
 evidence is rejected, exists in favour of ancient documents (by which 
 ip Tipant documents more than thirty years old), when they are 
 
 -Jered in support of ancient possession. These are often the 
 only attainable evidence of ancient possession, and therefore, the 
 law, yielding to necessity, allows them to be read on behalf of 
 persons claiming under them, and against persons in no way privy 
 to them, provided that they are not mere narratives of past events, 
 but purport to have formed a part of the act of ownership, exercise 
 of right, or other transaction to which they relate. This species 
 of proof demands careful scrutiny, for, first, its efPect is to benefit 
 those from whose custody they have been produced, and who are 
 connected in interest with the original partiei.^ to the documents, 
 and next, the documents are not proved, but are only presumed to 
 have constituted part of the res gestae. Forgery and fraud are, 
 however, matters, comparatively speaking, of rare occurrence, and 
 a fabricated deed generally betrays, from some anachronism or 
 other inconsistency, ii;^ornal evidence of its real character. The 
 danger of admitting these documents is, consequently, less than 
 might be supposed. It is more expedient to run some risk of 
 occasional deception, than to permit injustice to be done by strict 
 exclusion of what, in many cases, would turn out to be highly 
 material evidence. On a balance of evils, this kind of proof has, 
 Bubject to certain qualifications, for many years past been 
 admitted.' 
 
 § 659. But care is especially taken to ascertain the genuineness 
 of the ancient documents produced ; and this may in general be 
 
 > aco 1 I'll. Ev. 273; 1 St. Ev. 67 ; Gr. Ev. § 141 ; imd liost, Ev,. 615. 
 
 428 
 
 ■I 'I 
 
CHAP, v.] l.EO.VL MKAXIXO OF PROPER CTTSTODy. 
 
 shown, prima facie, by proof that they come from the proper 
 custody} Proof of this is, however, required not only where 
 documents are tendered in support of ancient possession, but in 
 most cases where deeds, papers, or writings are rendered admissible 
 by any rule of law without strict proof of their authenticity. It, 
 therefore, is highly important to explain, with as much precision 
 as possible, the legal meaning of the words "proper custody."' 
 The subject will, therefore, be illustrated in this place once for all. 
 § 660. As to what is "proper custody," Tindal, C. J., has said,'" 
 " Documents found in a place in which, and under the care of 
 persons with whom, such papers might naturally and reasonably 
 be expected to be found, are precisely in the custody which gives* 
 authenticity to documents found within it ; for it is not iicci'ssari/ 
 that then should he found in the bent and most proper place of deposit. 
 If documents continued in such custody, there never would be any 
 question as to their autherticity ; but it is when documonts are 
 found in other than their proper place of deposit that the inves- 
 tigation commences, whether it was reasonable and natural, under 
 the circumstances in the particular case, to expect that they should 
 have been in the place where they are actually found ; for it is 
 obvious, that, while there can be only one place of deposit strictly 
 and absolutely proper, there may be many and various, that are 
 reasonable and probable, though differing in degree ; some being 
 more so, some less ; and in those cases the proposition to be deter- 
 mined is, whether the actual custody is so reasonably and probably 
 to be accounted for, that it impresses the mind with the conviction 
 that the instrument found in such custody must be genuine. That 
 such is the character and description of the custody, which is held 
 suiUciently genuine to render a document admissible, appears from 
 all the cases." ' 
 
 § 661. These principles have accordingly led, on the one hand, 
 to the rejection of old grants to abbeys, offered as evidence of 
 private rights, where the possession of them appears altogether 
 
 ' See ante, §§ 432 et seq. 
 
 ' As to what is " proper cu'^>tody," 
 see Bishop of Moath v. Marquis of 
 Winchester, 18;i(). See, also, Doe v. 
 Samples, 18;W (I'attoson, J.) ; Doe v. 
 I'hillips, 1H4,). 
 
 '• In bishop of Moath v. Marqiiis 
 
 of Winchester, 1836. 
 
 ^ For American authorities, see 
 Bar V. Oratz, 1819; Winn v. Patter- 
 son, 1835; Clarke?). Couitiicy, 1831 ; 
 Hewlett 1". Cock, 1831 ; Duiicun v. 
 Beard, 1820; Middloton v. Mass, 
 1819. 
 
 in: 
 
 M 
 
 429 
 
i , i 
 
 
 MEANING OF PKOPtR OUSTODY ILLUSTRATED. [PAKT III. 
 
 unconnected with the persons who liaJ any interest in the estate;' 
 of a manuscript found in the llernlds' Office, enumerating the 
 possessions of a dissolved monastei-y, the pnssr'ssion of whidi is 
 unconnected with an interest in flie propinty ;''^ of a curious 
 manuscript Ijok, entitled the "Secretum Abbutis," preserved in 
 the Bodluian Library at Oxford, and couta ning a grant to an 
 abbey ;^ of an old grant to a priory, brought from the Cottonian 
 MSS. in the British Museum :* and of ancient writings, pur- 
 porting respectively to be, the cue an endowment of a vicarage, 
 and the other an inspexiraus of the endowment under the seal of 
 a bishop, purchased at a sale as part of a private collection of 
 manuscripts.* The registers of burials and baptisms (being by 
 statute" required to be kept by the clergyman of the parish either 
 at his own residence or in the church) have, in the alisence of all 
 explanation on the subject, been rejected, as not coming from the 
 proper custody, when produced from the house of the parish clerk.' 
 Terriers found among the papers of a mere landholder in the 
 parish must also be rejected,® because the legitimate repository for 
 such documents would be either the registry of the bishop, the 
 registry of the archdeacon, or the church chest.'' 
 
 § 662. In further accordance wi^^h the principles above sum- 
 marized by Tindal, C. J., it has, on the other ha,nd, been held that 
 the poor-house of a union is not an improper repository for the 
 documents of any parish within the union ; '" that an old chartulary 
 of a dissolved abbey may be admitted, when found in the possession 
 of the owner of part of the abbey lands, though uot of the principnl 
 proprietor; " that an old book of a collector of tithes is equally well 
 
 W ni. 
 
 ft : I 
 
 > 3 Bing. N. C. 201, 183G (Tindal, 
 C.J.). 
 '■* L\goii V. Strutt, 1795. 
 3 Micholl V. llabbetts, 1810. 
 
 ♦ Swiniieitou v. M. of Stafford, 
 iSlO. 
 
 » Potts y. D'lrant, 1795. 
 
 • 52 G. 3, 0. 146, §§ 1 aud 5. 
 ' Doo V. Fowler, 1850. 
 
 * Atkins V. llatton, 1794; Atkirs 
 V. Ld. Wiiloughby Do Broke, 1794. 
 See, also, Bidder v. Bridges, 1885 
 (Kay, J.). 
 
 • Armstrong u. Hewett, 1817; Potts 
 V. Dui'aut, 179U. lu llandolph v. 
 
 Gordon, 1815, this doctrine was 
 cun'ii'd to Its oxtrome limit, for the 
 grandson of a formor rector, having 
 produced a book purporting to be 
 tlie book of such rectoi', it was re- 
 
 i'ected, as he did not show that he 
 lud found it among hisgriimltathor's 
 papers, or that it hud come into his 
 posse.ssion iu a legiiimate manner: 
 see, also, Mi^nbv v. Cavtis, lsl5. 
 
 w Slater v. Hodgson, 1846. 
 
 " Bullen V. Michel, 1816. See, 
 also, R. V. Mytton, 1860. The 
 strictly proper custody for such a 
 ducuiuout as this would have beeu 
 
 430 
 
 rr- 
 
CHAP, v.] MKANING OF I'UOPFJl CUSTuDY ILH;.S1I;AT1;D. 
 
 See, 
 
 The 
 
 uh a 
 
 beeu 
 
 authenticated, whetlior produced from the custody of thn suf^orssor, 
 or exeoutor, of the inoumhont, or from the hands of the successor 
 of the col','ctor;^ and that an unproved will, more than thirty 
 years oLl, disposing of real and personal estate, and produced from 
 the custody of a younger son of the testator, who, in common 
 with his brothers, derived a benefit under it, may be admitted, 
 though it was contended that it ought to have been deposited in 
 the ecclesiastical court of the diocese* 
 
 § H(i3. Again, an expired lease produced from the custody of the 
 lessor, and proved to have been received by him from a former 
 occupier of the demised premises, who had for several years paid 
 the precise rent reserved by it, and had, subsequently to the 
 expiration of the term, procured such expired lease from two 
 strangers who claimed no interest in it, and delivered it up to the 
 lessor, was held to be admissible, without proof in what manner it 
 had come into the hands of thes9 strangers.' A case stated for 
 counsel's opinion by a derea'^ed bishop, respecting his right of 
 presentation to a living, has been admitted against a subsequent 
 bishop of the same see, on a question touching the same right, 
 though the paper was not found in the public registry of the diocese, 
 but a.mong the private family documents of the descendants of the 
 former bishop ; * and a settlement, reserving a life estate to himself, 
 and coming from amongst the settlor's papers, has, where more 
 than thirty years old, been allowed, in an action of ejectment by 
 his subsequent incumbrancers, to be put in evidence, though it was 
 strongly urged that the trustees or their representatives were the 
 parties entitled to its custody.* Again, a deed to which as well as 
 to the suit, trustees and executors were parties, when produced by 
 them comes from proper custody.^ 
 
 § (i64. Thert is some doubt whether the custody of a document 
 must be proved by a sworn witness, when it purports on its face to 
 
 the Augmentation Office (BuUen v. 
 Michel (,Lcl. lledesdule), supra); but 
 as between the diffeieut jiroprietors 
 of the abbey lands, :^ iright nuta- 
 rally be supposed to have been de- 
 posited with the largest ; and the 
 court held, that its actual place of 
 custody was one whoie it might 
 reasonably be expected to be found: 
 Bishop of Meath v. Marquia of Win- 
 chester, 183ti (Tindal, C.J.). 
 
 ■ la ; referring to Jones v. Waller, 
 1753. 
 
 ' Doe V. Pearce, 1839 (Coleridge, 
 J.); Andrew v. Motley, 1802. 
 
 3 Roes ('. Walters, 18;W. 
 
 * Bp. of Moath V. M. of Winchester, 
 KSMG. 
 
 ° Doe V, Samples, 1838. See, also, 
 Bertie v, Beaumont, 181fi ; Ld. 
 Triinlestown v. Kemmis, 1843, H. L, 
 
 « Miller v- Whuatley, 1890 (Ir.). 
 
 »r! 
 
 431 
 

 « ., li'' 
 
 
 mi 
 
 ■■"r^^ 
 
 
 1 I, 
 
 <■'! 
 
 
 li 
 
 OORRunOUATIVE PROOF OF ANCIKNT DOCUMENTS. 
 
 ['• 
 
 III. 
 
 belong to the party who tenders ii, in evidence. In one or tw^ 
 settlement coses, the respondents were permitted to produce old 
 certiBcates, purporting to have been granted to them by the appel- 
 lants, without giving any account respecting their custody.' But 
 where,* on a question of boundary, plaintiff's counsel proposed to 
 read certain manor-books without proving the custody whence they 
 came, on the ground that they belonged to the lord, who was 
 admitted to be the real plaintiff, the court held that they could not 
 be read ; Coleridge, J., observing that, unless Pome witness was 
 sworn for the purpose of proving their custody, they might have 
 been procured from a grocer's shop. But where the witness 
 producing the document can swear that he received it from the 
 representative of the person originally entitled to it, as a paper 
 which had belonged to such person, this evidence will in ordinary 
 cases be sufficient, without calling the representative himself to 
 explain how he became possessed of the document." 
 
 § 665. The mere production of an ancient document, unless 
 supported by some corroborative evidence of acting under it, or of 
 modern possession, would be entitled to little, if any, weight.'' Still, 
 there appears to be no strict rule of law, which would authorise the 
 judge in withdrawing it altogether from the consideration of the 
 jury : — in other words, the absence of proof of possession afEects 
 merely the weight, and not the admissibilitij, of the instrument.* 
 
 § 6ri6. For instance, where, to prove a prescriptive right of 
 fishery as appurtenant to a manor, ancient licences to fish in the 
 locus in quo, appearing on the court-rolls, as granted by former 
 lords in consideration of certain rents, were tendered in evidence, 
 it was held that they were admissible without any proof of the rents 
 having been paid— but it was added that, to give 'hem any weight, 
 it must be shown that in latter times payments had been made 
 under licences of the same kind, or that the lords of the manor had 
 exercised other acts of ownership over the fishery, which had been 
 acquiesced in ; " " in an action brought to try the title to the bed of a 
 river, after proof of a grant from Henry VIII., two counterparts 
 
 » E. V. Eyton, 1793 ; E. v. Nether- 
 thons, 1814. 
 
 « Evans v. Eees, 1839. 
 
 » Earl V. Lewis, IKOl (Heath, J.). 
 See Doe v. Keeling, 1848. 
 
 * 1 Ph. Ev. 276, 278. 
 
 » Malcomson v. O'Dea, 1863, H. 
 L. ; Biistow v, Cormican, 1878, H. L. 
 (Ld. Blackburn). 
 
 • Eogors V. Allen, 1808 (Heath, J.) ; 
 Malcomsou v. O'Dea, 18G3, H. L. 
 
 432 
 
CHAP, v.] PRESUMPTinxs OK .WCirXT nOClTMKNTS. 
 
 of leases having been produced fioin the jtlainiifl's muniment room, 
 comprehending the soil in question, but no proof of any payment 
 by a tenant, nor of any modern act of ownersliip having been 
 given, the instruments were nevortlieless admitted as coming from 
 the right custody, the judge observing that no circumstance in the 
 case threw suspicion upon them, and that " the absence of other 
 kinds of proof was mere matter of observation ; " ' and in one of 
 tlie numerous ejectments brought by Lord Egremont,' a document 
 produced from the muciment room of the property inherited from 
 such ancestor, which purported to be a counterpart of a lease of 
 this land made by him but executed only by the lessee, was held 
 admissible in evidence to show that the land in question had been 
 part of the estate of the lessor's ancestor, though no proof was 
 given of actual possession under it. 
 
 § 667.' Subject to the observance of the above rules, ancimt 
 documents are receivable as evidence tliat the transactions to which 
 they relate actually occurred. And though they are usually spoken 
 of as hearsay evidence of ancient possession, and, as such, are said 
 to be admitted in exception to the general rule ; yet they seem 
 rather to be parts of the res r/cstw, and therefore admissible as 
 original evidence, on the principle already discussed.* An ancient 
 deed, which has nothing suspicious about it, is pi umed to be 
 genuine without express proof, the witnesses being 'osumed 
 dead ; '' and, if found in the proper custody, and co ated by 
 
 evidence of corresponding ancient or modern enjo^ a or by 
 other equivalent or explanatory proof, it will be presumed to have 
 constituted part of the actual transfer of property therein men- 
 tioned ; because this is the usual course of such transactions. The 
 residue of the transaction may be as unerringly inferred from the 
 existence of genuine ancient documents, as the remainder of a 
 statue may be made out from an existing torso, or a perfect skeleton 
 from the fossil remains of a part. 
 
 f. Blanshan, 1808 (Am.); Crowderv. 
 Hopkins, 1843 f Am.J ; Jackson v. 
 Luquere, 182.i (Am.); Jackson v. 
 Lamb, 1827 (Am.); Barr v. Gratz, 
 1819 (Am.); Hewlett v. Cock, 1831 
 (AmO. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 144, in great pai-t. 
 
 * Ante, §§ 583 et secj. 
 
 » Ante, § 87. 
 
 » Duke of Bedford v. Lopes, 1838 
 (Ld. Denman). 
 
 « Doe V. Pulman, 1842. See, fur- 
 ther, Clarkson v. Woodhouse, 1782 
 (Ld. Mansfield) ; Brett v. Beales, 
 1829 (Ld. Tenterden); Tisdall v. 
 Parnell, 1863 (Ir.) ; Doe v. Passing- 
 ham, 1826 (Bmrough, J.); EanclifEe 
 V. Parkyns, 1818 (Ld. Eldon) ; 
 McKenire v. Eraser, 1803; Jackson 
 
 ■'V 
 
 Hi 
 
 i'lil 
 
 433 
 
 il 
 
4;5:|i 
 
 AMEUICAX NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AUT III. 
 
 mill 
 
 
 m 
 
 III 
 
 r)' 
 
 P 
 
 AMEHTCAN NOTES. 
 
 Hearsay Concerning Ancient Possession. — Docuiuonts thirty 
 yc'.ir.s old not only dispi'iise with proof of I'.xt'cution, but, .so far as 
 tlu'y inir])i)rt to show the vxcrcisi' of acts of ownership, arc evi- 
 dence of the existence of such acts. Harlan v. Howard, 7'.) Ky. 
 :n:i (ISSl); I'.oston /•. Richardson, !<)"> Muss. 351 (1«7()); IJaeder 
 t>. .Jennintj;.s, 40 Fed. Kep. 11)1) (l.SSD). 
 
 On an issue of ownership of a strip of beach, licenses of tiie 
 claimant more than sixty years old, i)ro(luced from the proper cus- 
 tody, purportin;j; to authorize the erection of a tisli-house u|)()n the 
 l)remises in (piestion, are evidence in sui)i)ortof the licensor's title. 
 JJoston V. llichardson, 105 Mass. 351, 371 (1870). " The fourth 
 rulin,^ at the trial was, that there was not sufficient evidence to 
 autiiorize the jury to liiid that the town had since the jjassaye of tiie 
 ordinance of 1617 gained any title to the demanded premises by 
 disseisin. 
 
 " The demandants ofTered evidence tending to show that a iish 
 box, eight or ten feet long by four or five feet wide, with a folding 
 lid or table, upon which fish were sold, stood upon the p'-emises as 
 early as 1808, and thenceforward until 1824 or 18U5, when the city 
 of Boston removed it and i)ut an engiiu'-house in the same place, 
 l)rojecting partly over the dock, which remained until 1830. The 
 demandants also offered the records of two orders of the selectmen 
 of the town of IJoston ; one in 17G1, granting to ' Mr. Blake, a fish- 
 erman,' upon his apjdication, ' liberty to set up a fish-house at the 
 ond of Summer Street, near the Bull Tavern,' 'provided he pays 
 one dollar per annum to the town as a consideration, for said privi- 
 lege of a fisli market;' and tlie other in 1803, by which 'Joseph 
 iStevens is permitted to occupy the fish stall at the bottom of Sum- 
 mer Street, lately allowed to liobinson, who consents thereto.' and 
 two of the selecti. en ' were desired to direct the alterations in the 
 stall which Mr. Stevens proposes to make.' 
 
 " These licenses were excluded, on the ground that no acts were 
 proved to have been done under them. But we are of opinion 
 that, at least when taken in connection with the evidence of 
 the subsequent occupation of the premises for the purpose men- 
 tioned in them, they were admissible. Otherwise, as those acts 
 would not be matter of record, and as the testimony of witnesses 
 to facts which happened at so distant a period could hardly be 
 obtained, it would l)e impossible to supply the proof required." 
 Boston /•. Richardson, 105 Mass. 351, 371 (1870). The court quote 
 with api)roval from the opinion of Willes, J., in Malcolmson v. 
 O'Dea, 10 H. L. Gas. 51)3, Gll-OIG (1803). "The proof of ancient 
 possession is always attended with difficulty. Time has removed 
 
 U I 
 
CIIAI'. V.J 
 
 A.MKUKAN NOTi:S. 
 
 A',Mi 
 
 till! witiu'sst'S wlio could in'ovc acts ol' nuiH'islii|) of tl:tii' own ]mt- 
 ti)\\ il kiiowlcdj^c, iiiul resort must iicccssaiilv lit- had to written 
 cvKii'iicc. Tlic nili! is. that aiicii'Ut docii:at'iits, (Miuiiim out <,t' 
 jn'opcr I'UHtndy and ])uri)orlin},' upon the iucc ol tlicin to show 
 I'Xrn'ist' oi' owiicrshi|i, su(di as a lease or a lieeiiso, may he ^dveii 
 in evidence wUliout prool' of possession or payment of rent under 
 tlieni, as lieiii;^' in themsidves aetsol ownership and prool ol' jxisses- 
 bion. This riih' is sometimes stated with the (lualilication, jiro- 
 vided that jiossession is proved to iiavi- Idllowed similar documents, 
 or tii.it then; is some prool ol' actual enjoyment in accordaiu^e with 
 tiu' title to whi(di the documents relate. And certainly, in tho 
 case ot property allowinj^' ot continuous enjoyment, without proof 
 of actual t'xercist! of the ri^ht, any nun lier of nn-re pieces of ]iapor 
 or parchment, purportiii.n' to he leases or licenses oui^dit to he of no 
 avail. It may be a (luestioii, wiiether the ahseiice of proof of en- 
 joyment consistent with siudi doeumeiits n;ors to the admissiliility 
 or only to tlie wiij^ht of the evidence; jirohably the latter. 'We 
 know of no case in which an amdent document, coming fioin a 
 proper custody, and purporting to be an act of ownership, by way 
 of lease or license over the ])roperty, in (tompany with other evi- 
 dence showing enjoyment ponsisteiit witli sucii ownership, has been 
 rejected iijion the ground that the eiijoyiuent could not be referred 
 to the particular document in (luestion.'" lioston i-. Iticdiardson, 
 105 Mass. 3r,l, ;{71 (1S70)- 
 
 "The tenants also had a right to ]iut in evidence, as a i)art of 
 their chain of title, the various deeds of the persons wdio formerly, 
 as they contended, were the owners of the lUdcher jiortion of the 
 proTierty, and under whom they claimed. The partition and these 
 deeds were evidence of acts of ownership on the part of the ten- 
 ants' predecessors in the title, at and after the date of that parti- 
 tion in ISnr), and before l<S;i2; and we think they were properly 
 admitted as such. They would furnish jirima facie evidence, liable 
 of course to be rebutted and disproved, but, in the absence of other 
 evidence, they would raise a ])resumption of suliieient seisin in the 
 grantors to enable them to convey, and, especially in transactions 
 so ancient, would operate to vest the legf 1 seisin in the grantees." 
 riovd /•. Tewksbury, 120 Mass. .'5()2 (ISSO). 
 
 A lease one hnndred and eight years old may be read in evidence 
 without proof of its execution. Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Wend. 371 
 
 (18.31). 
 
 The exception has been extended so ns to include ancient i)ro- 
 prietors' records as evidence of the facts set forth in them. "Courts 
 have felt obliged from necessity to depart from the strict rules of 
 evidence in tlie admission of ancient writings, documents, books 
 and records, to prove the existence of the fucts thcv re(dte. The 
 rule of evidence requiring tli " <•'-=• i'lmnv of the liwful custodian of 
 
'f< '!)<*' fSi 
 
 
 4833 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 
 "" v> 
 
 ^M 
 
 books of record offered in evidence, that they are of the descrip- 
 tion claimed, before they are admissible, ha^s repeatedly been 
 relaxed in the case of ancient books of record of proprietors of 
 land. In such instances, such books have been held to prove 
 themselves. When ancient books, purporting to be records of such 
 proprietary, contain obvious internal evidence of their own verity 
 and there is no evidence of the present existence of the proprietary 
 or of any person representing it, or any clerk or other person 
 authorized to keep the records, they are admissible in evidence 
 without proof of the legal organization of the proprietary, or of its 
 subsequent meetings." Goodwin r. Jack, 62 Me. 414 (1872). 
 
 pROPEit Custody. — The ancient documents must be produced 
 from such a natural custod\^ as relieves them from suspicion. 
 Harlan v. Howard, 79 Ky. ,373 (1881). 
 
 Finding t]>e counterpart of a lease one hund;'ed and eight years 
 old among the muniments of title of the lessor is sufficient. "An- 
 cient writings, which are proved to have been found among deeds 
 of evidences of land, nuiy be given in evidence, although tlie exe- 
 cution cannot be proved, for it is hard to prove ancient things, 
 and finding them in such a place, is a presumption that they were 
 honestly and fairly obtained, and preserved for use, and are free 
 from suspicion of dishonesty." Hewlett v. Cock, 7 Wend. .'571 
 (1831). 
 
 CouROBouATiox. — It lias been widely lield that some proof of 
 actual possession or user under them should accompany and cor- 
 roborate the statements set forth in the ancient documents tliem- 
 selves. 
 
 That possession under the ancient document is necessary, see 
 Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Peters, 310, 344 (1831). 
 
 Subsequent occupation of the premises for the same purpose and 
 under the same authority is a sufficient corroboration to authorize 
 the admission of prior licenses of long standing. Richardson r. 
 Boston, 105 Mass. 351, 371 (1870). 
 
 "Possession accompanying the deed is always sufficient, without 
 other proof, but it is not indispensable." Hewlett v. Cock, 7 
 Woud. 371 (1831). 
 
 Other corroboration will suffice. In Hewlett v. Cock (ubi supra) 
 the fact that the lessee and his absigns treated the land as leased 
 was sufficient corroboration. 
 
 "It has been settled by the weight of authority that ancient 
 deeds of conveyance of real estate are admissible without first 
 recpiiring tlie i)arty olTering them to show acts of possession over 
 the lands embraced by them. For until the court is made ac- 
 (luaii^.ted with the tenor of the instrument, the natural order of 
 introducing the evidence would be reversed by requiring proof of 
 corresi)onding possession. 
 
CHAP, v.] 
 
 AMERIOAiJ NOTKS. 
 
 433* 
 
 The genuineness of such instruments may be shown by otlier 
 facts as well as that of possession. 
 
 And when proof of possession camiot be had, it is within the 
 very essence of the rule to admit the .^trumeut where no evidence 
 justifying suspicion of its genuineness is shown, and it is found in 
 the custody of those legally entitled to it." Harlan &c. v. Howard 
 &c., 79 Ky. 373 (1881). 
 
 i: I 
 
 <«f 
 
 if 
 
DECLAKATl'JXS AGAINST INTEllEST. [PART IH. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 f^'iil 
 
 ff 
 
 iiii 
 
 iLil 
 
 ^ I 
 
 i!;! 
 
 r-i f 
 
 DECLARATIONS BY DECEASED PERSONS WHICH ARE UNLIKELY 
 
 TO BE FALSE. 
 
 § 6G8.* The fourth of the six exceptions which we have seen' to 
 exist to the general rule that hearsay evidence must he rejected, 
 renders admissible declarations made hij persons since deceased tinder 
 such circumstances that they are extremely unlihely to he false? The 
 regard which men usually pay to their own interests is considered 
 a suflicient bccurity against any wilful mis-statement, and affords 
 also a reasonable inference that the declarations or entries were not 
 made under any mistake of fact, or want of information on the 
 part of the declarant. The danger of any fraud in the statement 
 will be still less dreaded, if it be borne in mind, th.at the evidence 
 is not receivable till after the death of the declarant, and that if the 
 opponent can show that the statement was made with any sinister 
 motive, it will at once be rejected. The ordinary tests of truth, 
 afforded by the administration of an oath and bj cross-examination, 
 are certainly here wanting ; but their place is in some measure 
 supplied by the circvimstam'es of the declarant. The inconveniences 
 that would result from the exclusion of evidence, having such 
 guarantees for its accuracy in fact and Its freedom from fraud, are 
 considered as, on the whole, much greater than any which are 
 likely to be ex[)erienced from its admission.* 
 
 § 069. The most common example of this species of evidence is 
 furnished by " declarations atjainst interest." In order to render 
 declarations against interest admissible as such, it must ap- 
 pear, eitlier by proof or by presumption,' that the declarant is 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. ? 118, in groat part. Loe, 1821 (Pliimor, M.R.). 
 » Ante, § (iOT. * 1 I'h. Ev. '.'iU. 
 
 • SiissL'x I'l'or., 1844, 11. L. • • Doo v. Michael, ISJl ; ante, 
 
 Higl-am v. liidgway, 1808; Slioit v. § 198. 
 
 431 
 
LI I A p. VI.] 
 
 DECLARANT MUST BE DEAD. 
 
 Jcac/} The more fact Ibat he has absconded abroad in coiiso(]ueTi('n 
 of a criminal charge, or that lie is otherwise out of the power of lh(j 
 party to produce as a witness, will not be sufficient,' It hiis b -en 
 expressly decided that, as regards declarations against prnniNiri/ 
 interest, it is " not necessary that the deceased person should have 
 his own knowledge of the fact stated, — that, if the entry cliarged 
 himself, the whole of it became admissible against all persons, — 
 and that the absence of such knowledge went to the weight, and 
 not to the admissibility, of the evidence."' As regards declara- 
 tions against propfietanj interest, indeed, it is necessary, where the 
 declarant had no personal knowledge, that he should have simul- 
 taneously declared his belief in the hearsay.* M(U'eover, declara- 
 tions against interest are admissible although such declarations 
 were not contemporaneous with any acts.^ Such circumstances only 
 affect the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. 
 
 § G70. It is now fully determined," first, that the statement or 
 entry must have originally been against the actual pecuniary 
 interest at that time of ' the person making it ; * and, secondly, 
 that the interest must be of a peatnianj or propridari/ luiture,^ 
 which latter term will include declarations as to the statiis (as e.g., 
 the legitimacy) of the declarant.'" Lord Chancellor liyndhurst, in 
 
 » Phillips V. Colo, 1839 (Ld. T)cn- 
 manl; Sjiarfro v. Brown, l.S2!» ; Smith 
 V. Whittiiighiim, lfs33. See anto, 
 §641, ami post, § "(W. 
 
 ' St(^l)heii «. Owenap, 1831 (AlJcr- 
 Bon, J.). 
 
 * Soi3 Crease v. Barrett, 183j ; 
 Peroival v. N'anson, 18')1. The con- 
 trary was (to adojit Ld. Diiniian's 
 exiJii'ssion in O'Connell v. Tlie (iuecn, 
 18-(4, 11. ]i.) "taken for granted" 
 formerly, and in the old cases of 
 Ilighaiu I'. l{id,i,'way, 1808 (Baylcy, 
 J.); Marks t;. Lahop, IH.iT (Tindiil, 
 C.J., I'ark and Vau^dian, JJ.); 
 Barker v. Bay, 182(i (Ld. Kldon); 
 Short V. Lee, 1S21 (riiimer, M.ll.). 
 Indeed, in tho Sussex I'eerago case, 
 1844, II. L., it was so laiil down 
 (Lds. Dennian and Brougham). 
 
 * Ld. Trimlostown v. Koi 
 1843, II. L. 
 
 » Doe V. Turford, 1832. 
 
 juimis, 
 
 • lu" was long a matter of doubt in 
 our Colli ts whether tho absence of 
 all intcl•e^t to niisrepre.sent, coupled 
 witli peculiiir knowledge in tho de- 
 clarant, would not render his de- 
 tlaralions admissible alter his death. 
 See Glynn v. Bk. of England, 1750 
 (Ld. llardwieke) ; Iligham v. Ridg- 
 wa\, 1808 (Le JSlanc. J.); Oleadow 
 r. Atkin, 1833 (Bayley, J.); B(-9 w. 
 Bawlin;,'"^, i8()(t (Ld. KUenhorough); 
 and Daly ,■ Wil.-on, hS4:i (Ir.). 
 
 ' In 10 Tdllrniuclio, Ex parte Ed- 
 wards, lfS,S4, C. A. 
 
 8 Berkeley Peer., 1811, II. L., cited 
 and coutiiniod in Sussex I'eer., 1844, 
 ILL. 
 
 » Sussex Peer., 1844, II. L., ex- 
 plained and acted upon by lid. Dep- 
 man in Davis r. Lloyd, 1844. See, 
 also. Smith r. Blakoy, 1807 ; MasHoy 
 V. Allen, 187!). 
 
 '" In ro I'orton, Peaiaon v. Att.- 
 Geu., 1885. 
 
 435 
 
 ■I,- 
 
'1 
 
 PECUNIARY OR PROPRIETARY INTEREST. [PART III. 
 
 the Sussex peerage case, observed, ** It is not true that the declara- 
 tions of deceased persons are in all circumstances receivable in 
 evidence, when in some way or other they might injuriously affect 
 the inierest of the party making them. Nor is it true, that 
 because, while living, a party would be excused from answering as 
 to certain facts, his declarations as to those facts become evidence 
 after his death. These are not correlative nor corresponding 
 propositions." * Lord Brougham added, " To say, if a man should 
 confess a felony for which he would be liable to prosecution, that 
 therefore, the instant the grave closes over him, all that was said 
 by him is to be taken as evidence in every action and prosecution 
 against another person, is one of the most monstrous and untenable 
 propositions that can be advanced." * 
 
 § 671. A declaration by a deceased person, who would, in the 
 event of her late husband having died intestate, be entitled to a 
 certain amount under a settlement, that he had left a will by 
 which he had given her a less sum, isj however, against pecuniary 
 interest, and therefore admissible.' And, in any case, the courts 
 will not weigh with nice scales the amcunt of the pecuniary 
 Interest possessed by the declarant, but will admit every entry 
 which, at the time when it was made, comph'tely charged the maker 
 to anij extent.* An incomplete charge Avill, however, not be 
 suflicient. Therefore, an entry in the following form, "April 
 4th. — A. came as a servant, to have for the half year 21." was 
 hold to be inadmissible as a declaration against interest, it being 
 merely a memorandum of an agreement, which must be supposed 
 to have been made on fair terms, and was, consequently, as much 
 in favour of the maker's interest as against it, since, if the master 
 had to pay for the services, the servant had to perform them.' 
 
 § 672. The term " declaration," both with regard to declarations 
 against interest and declarations made in the course of duty or 
 business," includes a mere oral statement, as well as a written 
 memorandum.' The former may indeed be entitled to less weight 
 
 • Sussex Poorago, 1844. 
 
 • 1(1. Tiiis case overrulos Standon 
 Rtimdoii, 17!»1. 
 
 » Mood V. llubsoU, 1892 (Ir.). 
 
 * Orrtitt V. Corsnr, 1 855 ; Richards 
 V. GoKiU'tv, ISTCi (Ir.). 
 
 « ]{. V. Worth, 184;}. 
 
 • li. V. Buckley, IS?:}. 
 
 ^ ii. V. liirmiughain, 1861. See 
 
 436 
 
was 
 
 CHAP. VI,] ORAL STATEMENTS — WRITTEN STATEMENTS. 
 
 with the jury than the latter, but the law recognises no distinction 
 between statements made by word of mouth, and those made in 
 writing, except where the writing is by deed,' or is rendered 
 necessary by some statute. 
 
 § 6713. It is further clear that the term " declaration," as applied 
 to declarations against interest, or in the ordinary course of 
 busiuess, embraces all written statptnents, whether made at the time 
 of the fact declared^ or on a subsequent daj/,'^ though the most 
 frequent example of it is contained in entries in books of account. 
 Where' these are books of collectors of taxes, stewards, bailiffs, or 
 receivers, which are subject to the inspection of others, and in 
 which the entries are generally of money received, charging the 
 party making them, they are clearly admissible.* But private 
 /joolcs, though exclusively retained within the custody of their 
 owners, are also admissible ; for their liability to be produced in 
 courts of law on notice or subpoena, and the chance of their 
 contents becoming known through accident, are deemed sufficient 
 security against fraud.^ An entry, too, is not admissible, unless it 
 either charges the jtarty making it with the receipt of money on 
 account of a third person, or else ochiowtedgcs the prn/ment of money 
 due to himself, and it is only considered as sufficiently against hia 
 interest to be brought within the exception, in the one or the other 
 of these two events." 
 
 § 674. No valid objection can be taken to the admissibility of 
 an entry, which charges the person making it with receiving 
 money from another, on the ground that such entry forms only a 
 part of a general debtor and creditor account, the balance of which ia 
 in favour of the receiver.' The reasons for this are, first, tliat if an 
 action were brought against the receiver by his employer, that part 
 
 > ! 
 
 1:1 
 
 m 
 
 Stapylton v. Clougli, 1853 ; Fursdnn 
 V. Clogg, 1842; Sussex Poer., 1844, 
 H. L. Soo, also, post, § 708. In 
 Smith V. Bliikoj', 18<>7, Blackburn, 
 J., said obiter, and citing no autho- 
 rity, that this proposition was "too 
 broadly stated." 
 
 ' Buwley v. Atkinson, 1880(Thosi- 
 ger, li.J.). 
 
 » ])oo w.Turford, 18;i?(Pavko. B.); 
 Short 1-. Leo, 1S21 ([I'lumor, M.Il.). 
 
 • Gr. Ev. § 150, iu groat part. 
 
 * Barry v. Bubbington. 1792; Goss 
 V. Watlington, 1821; "Whitna.sh v. 
 Ooor;,'e, 1828. 
 
 " llighani v. Ridgway, 1808 (Bay- 
 lev, J.); Uoo I', liawlings, 18()() (Ld. 
 Ellenboroiigli) ; Middloton v. Molton, 
 182i». 
 
 1 See l-'ostor V. M ' Mahon , 1 84 7 (Ir. ). 
 
 ■" Bosve I'. Brenton, 1828; Williams 
 V. (ieav(!s, 18;i8 (Tutteson, J.); R. 
 (•.Worth. 18i:i(Colcridgo, J.); Clark 
 r. Wilmot, 1841. 
 
 437 
 
ill 1 
 
 WllKUi: ENTRY IS SOLK EVIDENCE OF CHARGE. [I'T. III. 
 
 of the account which charged the receiver would be evidence 
 against him, while the entries which showed his discharge, though 
 not absolutely inadmissible for him, v/ould, as compared with the 
 entries against his interest, be entitled to very little weight ; ' that in 
 any case (and even if the law were not as just stated) the admission 
 of the receipt of money would still be against his interest, as the 
 balance in his favour would thereby be diminished to the extent of 
 the sum admitted;^ that a man is little likely to charge himself 
 for the mere purpose of getting a discharge ; ' and that, as almost 
 all entries which are tendered in evidence as being declarations 
 against interest are contained in accounts containing items on both 
 sides, the objection, if allowed to prevail, would strike at the very 
 root of the exception under consideration.* 
 
 § 675. It is a question of some difficulty, and the authorities on 
 the point are conflicting, as to whether an entry made by a party 
 acknowledging ihe payment of money to himself, will be ad- 
 missible as a declaration against interest, in cases where mich entry 
 in the onlif evidence of the debt and charge of which it shows the 
 suhscqiient liquidation. 
 
 § 67(i. Some years ago such entries were twice b'^ld to be 
 inadmissible,* but in three other eases (one of which is as recent 
 as 1876), Lord Denman," Lord Wensleydale,' and Sir George 
 Jessel,^ appear to have admitted such entries. The modern view 
 will, probably, ultimately prevail ; for though while that part of an 
 
 « RoG 2 Smith, L. C. 286. 
 
 " ^>cc AVilliinna r. Getives (Ludlow, 
 Sovj., aiguomlo), 1838. 
 
 ^ Rowo V. Brcnton, IP'^8 (Little- 
 dale, J.). 
 
 * I'er Ld. Tenterden, in id. 
 
 « Doov. Vowlcs, 18;J3 (Littlcdnle, 
 J.) ; Doo V. Burton, 1840 (Giuney, 
 B.). 
 
 * R. V. Hondon (an undated de- 
 cif<ion of Lord I)cnman"s), cited 
 aif,'nond() in Doe v. Burton, 1840. 
 
 ' 11. r. Ij iwer tIe^ lord. 1840, cited 
 2 Sin. L. C. 283. In this case Ld. 
 Wiiisleydale, and. in that cited in 
 the hut note, Ld. Deninan, expressly 
 disuppvoved of Doo v, Vowies, 1833, 
 each sayinp: that ho thon<;ht l)oe v. 
 Vowles contrary in j>rinciple to the 
 wull-kuowu leudiug case of Ilighum 
 
 'J. Ridgway, 1808. But Xligham v. 
 Ridgway scarcely furnishes a safe 
 guide ou the subject, tor there it wus 
 proved by evidence aliunde that the 
 service charged foi' in the acconnt had 
 in fact been performed ; and although 
 Ld. EUenborough first lays down the 
 general doctrine that " the evidence 
 was admissible upon tho broad jirin- 
 ciple on which receivers' books have 
 been admitted,— namely, that tho 
 entry inaiie was in prejudice of the 
 party making it,"— ho aiterwards, in 
 two different parts of his judgment, 
 adverts to the fact that the work for 
 which tho charge wa8 made waa 
 proved to have been done by other 
 evidence: 10 East, 117, 119. 
 
 * Taylor v. Withain, and Witham 
 .;. Taylor, 1376. 
 
 438 
 
CHAP. VI.] ENTRIES, EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL MATTERS. 
 
 entry which is in the writer's own favour stands unconfirmed, 
 suspicions may possibly be enlortained that the whole statement 
 is a fiction ; ' it is highly improbable that any tradesman would 
 first enter a false claim on one side of his book, and then admit 
 on the other that it had been satisfied. To require corroborative 
 proof of the claim would, too, tend to embnrrass the trial by 
 raiciug colluteral issues, while the very impossibility of obtaining 
 such proof is often the sole cause which renders it necessary to have 
 recourse to the entry at all. It on the whole seems, therefore, that 
 the admission of such entries must, alike on the grounds of justice 
 and expediency, be regarded as a less evil than their rejection. 
 
 § C77. Entiies may be received as evidence of collatvntl and 
 indcpeixlent matters, which, though forming pnrt of a (Icclimilion 
 against interest, are not in themselves against the interest of the 
 declarant} For instance, in a well -known leading case,^ to prove 
 on what day a child was born, the book of the accoucheur, who had 
 attended the mother in her confinement, was produced, and as his 
 charge for such attendance on a day specified was marked in the 
 book as paid, this entry was admitted as evidence of the date of the 
 birth, Lord EUonborough, observing, " It is idle to say that the 
 word paid only shall be admitted in evidence without the context, 
 which explains to what it refers : we must therefore look to the 
 rest of the entry, to see what the demand was, which he thereby 
 admitted to be discharged." ' Similarly in another case * the entry 
 in a book of a deceased attorney of charges paid for a lease there 
 stated to have been drawn on a certain day, was held to be evidence 
 that the lease was drawn on that day. 
 
 § 678.* In an action upon a joint and several promissory note 
 for 300/., a memorandum of a partial payment made by A., 
 indorsed by the payee upon the note in these terms, — " lieueivud 
 of A. the sum of 1:^80/. on account of the within note, the <iOO/. 
 having been originalhj advanced to C," — was held, in nn action 
 by A. against B. " as a co-surety," to be, after the death of the 
 payee, evidence not only of the payment of the money, but of the 
 
 ■f 
 
 > 2 Sm. L. C. 283. 
 
 * Hightuu V. Kidgway, 1808. 
 
 * Id. 
 
 * Doe V. Robson, 1812. Soo, also. 
 In the Goods of Tboiims, 1871. 
 " Gr. Ev. § 152, in great pait. 
 
 439 
 
 il 
 
I H 
 
 
 ENTRIES, EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL MATTERS, [part III. 
 
 fact that C. whs the principal debtor ; leaving the efEect of such 
 proof to be Jatermined by the jury.' 
 
 § 679. In yet another oase,^ two entries were held admissible 
 which had been made by a deceased clerk of plaintiff's attorney in 
 the day-book of the office, by the first of which the clerk acknow- 
 ledged the receipt of iOO/. from his employer, for the purpose of 
 making a tender to the defendant, while the second was as follows : 
 " Re Colnaghi, attending Mr. Lahe^ ; tendering him 100/. for each 
 of the plates, and the etching of the Queen separately ; when he 
 declined to let me have same, and said he had no objection to 
 deliver up the impressions, upon payment of the expenses of 
 making them ; " — although objection was taken to the admissibility 
 of the second entry, on the ground that it did not charge the party 
 making it, but "ather discharged him, as showing that he had 
 fulfilled his duty ; that the second entry must be taken by itself, 
 because the first did not prove the tender ; and being so taken, 
 there was nothing to show that the clerk did not tender his own 
 money ; in which case the entry contained nothing to charge 
 him. And in a still earlier case' it -was held that where, 
 to establish the existence of a customary payment, two entries 
 in a parish book have been put in, the first of which stated the 
 custom, and the second, which was written on the samd page, 
 was as follows : — " Received of Ilaworth, who this year disputed 
 this our ancient custom, but afterwards paid it, 8/.," both entries 
 were admissible, the latter as charging the parish officers with 
 receipt of the money, the former as immediately preceding the 
 latter, and being referreo. to in it.* 
 
 § 6«0. It must not, however, be supposed that because a docu- 
 ment contains entries against interest, it will be admissible in proof 
 of indcpvndeiit matters, when the entries against interest do not 
 refer to, or require to be read, in order to explain such matters, 
 but such matters appear as separate items unconnected with such 
 entries.^ For instance, if an account be rendered by a steward 
 
 ' Daviesv. HiTmphroys, 1840. See, 
 alHo, Percival v. JSanson, 1851. 
 
 * Marks v. Lahee, 1S;57. 
 
 ' tStead )'. lleaton, ITi)-. Thiscase 
 was said (Aldoison, 15., in Kri^lit v. 
 Waterford, 18-10) to carry the prin- 
 
 ciple on which it proceeds to the 
 extreme verge of the law. See, also, 
 May. of Exeter v. Warren, 1844. 
 
 * See Mi'sgrave v. Emmerson, 1847. 
 
 ° Per Ld. Lyndhurst, in Rudd v. 
 ^y right, 1832. At oue time doubts 
 
 440 
 
C. VI.] ENTRIKS NO PROOF OF INDEPENDKNT MATTERS. 
 
 containing on one side items charging himself with the receipt of 
 moneys, and on the other side items discharging him hy showing 
 how the moneys received liad been disbursed, the discharging 
 entries will not be admissible, unless they are necessary to explain 
 the chaiging entries, or are expressly referred to by them.' Accord- 
 ingly wiiere,^ to show that former lords of the manor had been 
 liable to pay poor-rates on the tithes, the accounts of a deceased 
 steward were tendered in evidence, and on one side of these the 
 steward acknowledged the receipt of rent for tithes from a tenant, 
 and on the other side had made an entry in discharge of the former 
 item, by allowing the tenant a c 'tain sum for poor rates on the 
 tithes, the second entry was rejected on the ground that it was not 
 directly ooiiueoted with the first item, though made about the same 
 time. 
 
 § 68.'. .' In order that declarations against interest should be 
 admissible, it is not necessary * that the declarant should have been 
 competent, if living, to testify to the facts it asserts.' Neither, as 
 regards the adnmsibility of declarations, is it material that the 
 matters stated therein are provable by living witnesses who might 
 have been called." Moreover, no objection can be taken to an 
 account, in which a deceased agent charges himself with the receipt 
 of money, on the ground that it does not appear by the account 
 itself for whom the sums were received ; provided it can be shown 
 alhuuR that they were in fact collected for a third person.' 
 
 ?! 682. Accounts will be received in evidence, as being declara- 
 tions of a deceased person charging himself, if they were written 
 by him either wholly * or in part,'-* though they were not signed ; 
 or if they were signed by him, though they were written by a 
 
 I!: 
 
 were unquestionably entertained on 
 the subject. See BuUen v. Michel, 
 181G. 
 
 ' Doe V. Beviss, 1849; "VVhaley v. 
 Carlii'le, lK6(i (Jr.), 
 
 * Knifiht V. Marquis of Waterford, 
 1840 (Aldorsoii. B.). The learned 
 judge addiMl that if the amount 
 charged had been explicitly stated to 
 bo a sum Jess than that deducted on 
 the other side of the account, it might 
 pos.-^ibly have been admissible, on 
 the authority of Stead v. Ueaton, 
 
 supra. 
 
 3 Gr. Ev. § 153, in part. 
 
 * Formerly it was thought other- 
 wivse. See lligham v. liidgway, 1808 
 (Bay ley, J.). 
 
 » Gleadow v. Atkin, 1833 ; Short 
 V. Lee. 1821. 
 
 « ]yrid,llcton V. Melton, 1829 (Parke, 
 J.); ante, §(>41. 
 
 ' Eowe V. Brenton, 1828. 
 
 8 Id. 
 
 » Uoo V. Colcombe, 1841 (Cola- 
 ridge, J.). 
 
 141 
 
ENTRIES AUTIIOKISKD BY PAUTIC8 CHAHGED. [PART III. 
 
 hU 
 
 
 Ml 
 
 l< * 
 
 Mi '■ 
 
 V, I 1 
 
 stranger.* So tliey will also be, though thpy were neither written 
 nor signed by the deceased, if either direct jiroof can be furnislied 
 that they were written by his authorised ageiit,^ or if that fact can 
 be indirectly established, as, for instance. ^•'' ^•">wiiig that the 
 deceased subsequently adopted the acco s his own, and 
 
 delivered them in at an audit.' Nor does it signify in such a case 
 whether the party who actually wrote the accounts bo alive or dead 
 at the time of the trial, though, if he be alive, his non-production 
 may be matter of observation.'* If, however, no proof can be given 
 that the account was either written, or signed, or authorised, or 
 adopted, by the deceased person made chargeable thereby, it cannot 
 be received. Therefore, a rental, in which a deceased steward 
 was debited with certain receipts, written by a party since dead, 
 styling himself clerk to such steward, was not received as a decla- 
 ration against the interest of the steward, no parol evidence having 
 been given to show that he ever employed the writer to make the 
 entries ; and it was equally inadmissible as made against the 
 interest of the clerk, because it did not purport to charge hiin.^ 
 After the lapse of thirty years, the handwriting o^ an account need 
 not be proved, provided the book containing it be produced from 
 the proper custody.^ 
 
 § 683.' Where the evidence consists of entries made by persons 
 acting for others, as agents, stewards, or receivers, some proof of 
 mich agenc]/ is generally required, previously to their admission. 
 Where, indeed, the office is public and must exist, the law will 
 presume that a person who acts in it has been regularly appointed. 
 But where it is merely private, preliminary and independent 
 evidence must in general be adduced of its existence, and of the 
 appointment of the particular agent or incumbent.* Even the 
 antiquity of the book containing the entry does not, per se, afford 
 suiticieut ground for dispensing with this preliminary proof. 
 
 > Doe V. Stacey, 1833 (Tindal, 
 C.J.). 
 
 ' Bradley v. Jatner, 1S53. 
 
 ' Doe V. Hawking, 1841; Doe v. 
 Mobbs, 1841 ; May. oi Exeter v. 
 Wairon, 1S41; Att.-Gon. v. f-Jtephens, 
 18,.o (Wodd. V.-C). 
 
 * Doe V. Uawkins, 1841 ^Pattoson, 
 J.). 
 
 • Baron do Riitzen v. Farr, 1835. 
 
 « Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, 1821 ; May. 
 of Exeter v. Warren, 1844; Doe v. 
 Michael, 1851; Att.-tien «. Stephena. 
 1855. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 154, in part. 
 
 B iShort V. Lee, 1821 (Flumer 
 M.II.). 
 
 442 
 
CHAP. VI.] ENTRIES BY AGENTS — PROOF OF AGENCY. 
 
 Then fnre entries have been rejected for want of it, though they 
 wore ap|iarently made as much as fifty, seventy, and in one case, 
 even one hundred and pixty years bnfore the trial.' Bayley, B., 
 in rejecting an entry bearing dute 1G73, observed, " The character 
 of the evidence must be established before the entry is read ; you 
 cannot read it to show the position of the party making it ; that 
 must be proved aliumle.''^ Sir Tliomas Pluraer, M.li., said, with 
 reference to a book seventy years old, purporting to have been 
 kept by a tithe collector named Beale, " If the writings of persona 
 not invested with the proper characters were received, nothing 
 could be more dangerous to property. Suppose that Boale was 
 not the [lerson authorised to collect the tithes, but nevertheless had 
 for some purpose made these entries ; then, if after his death the 
 book purporting to be a collector's book was to be evidence to 
 prove that he was collector, and his being collector was to prove 
 the entries to be correct, the consequence would be, that the rights 
 of the rector on the one hand, or those of the parishioners on the 
 other, would be exposed to the greatest danger, and perhaps from 
 the writings of a person having a contrary interest." * If, how- 
 ever, ancient books come from the proper repository, slight proof 
 of the official character of the writer will usually be sufficient to 
 warrant their admission. If, too, such documents contain strong 
 infernal evidence of their actually being what they purport to be, 
 they may, it seems, on that ground alone, be submitted to the 
 jury.* 
 
 § 084. Declarations against pvoprietary interest include state- 
 ments made by persons while in possession of land, explanatory 
 of the character of their possession. Such declarations, ;/ made in 
 disparaijemnit of (he declarant's title, are receivable, not only as 
 original admissions against himself and all persons who claim title 
 through him,* but also as evidence for or against strangers.' 
 
 ' Manby v. Curtis, 1815; Short v. 
 Lee, 1821; Davies v. Morsan, 1831. 
 ' Davies v. Morfjan, 1831. 
 » Short V. Lee, 18:^1. 
 
 * Doe V. Thynne, 1808; Brnne v. 
 Thompson, 1841 (Lrl. Denmiin) ; 
 May. of Exeter v, Warren, 1844; 
 Doe V. Michael, 1851; Att.-Ge . v. 
 Stephens, 1855. See ante, § 612. 
 
 * Ld. Irimlestowu «. Kemmi». 
 
 443 
 
 1843, n. L. ; Doe v. Pettett, 1821; 
 Doe V. Austin, 1832. For American 
 authorities, see West Cambridge v, 
 Lexington, 1824 ; Little v. Libby, 
 1823; Rankin v. Teiibrook, 1837; 
 Jackson v. Bard, 1809 ; Weidman v. 
 Kohr, 181 S; Gibblehouse v. Strong, 
 1832; Davies v. Campbell, 1841; 
 Crane V. Marshall, 1839. 
 * Curoo V. Nicoll, 183J?; Doe ». 
 
 .( 
 
■■f 
 
 !■■ :•' 
 
 I ; 
 
 lii 
 
 I i 
 
 'y}\ 
 
 h > H 
 
 DECLARATIONS AGAINST PROPRIETARY INTEREST, [p. III. 
 
 Whether in this latter event they are admissible in the lifetime of 
 the declarant, or only in cases where his death can be proved, has 
 not been distinctly decided. In most of the cases where the 
 evidence has been receivel the declarant was dead ; ' but on two 
 occasions, at least, the evidence was admitted, though the declarant 
 was living.* These declarations can, it is said, only be receivable 
 during the declarant's lifetime as being statements accompanying 
 acts of possession, and as such constituting part of the res gestce. 
 This argument, however, proves too much, as it would let in all 
 declarations of the occupier, whether in disparagement or in 
 atippnrt of his title ; an extension of the rule which (however 
 consistent it may be with principle), is certainly not warranted by 
 judicial decisions.' Such declarations ought to be regarded as only 
 receivable when the declarant is dead, but as then being good 
 primary evidence ; * and as then admissible simply on the ground 
 that they were made against the interest of a deceased declarant.* 
 
 § 685. Possession is, however, prima facie evidence of seisin in 
 fee simple.^ Consequently, any declaration by a person in pos- 
 sessioii that he is tenant in tail, or for life, or for years, or by 
 sufferance, as it makes strongly against his own interest, may 
 safely be received in evidence, on account of its probable truth,' 
 whether such declaration be made verbally,^ or in writing,® or by 
 deed,*" or by will (even an unproved)," or in a statement of defence 
 
 '* J; 
 
 
 Langfield, 1847 ; Doe v. Jones, 1808; 
 Davies v. Pierce, 1787 ; Doe v. Eick- 
 arby, 1803 ; Peaceable v. Watson, 
 1811; Doe v. Coulthred, 1837; 
 Garland v. Copo, 1848 (Ir.); Mount- 
 noy V. Collier, 1853 ; Oery v. Eed- 
 man, 1875. 
 
 ' Carne v. NicoU, 1835 ; Doe v. 
 Jones, 1808; 7~)avie8 v. Pierce, 1787 ; 
 Peaceable v. Watson, 1811 ; Doe v. 
 Coulthred, 1837; Doe v. Pettett, 
 1821. 
 
 ^ Walker v. Broadstock, 1795 
 (Thomson, B.); Doe v. Rickarby, 
 1803 (Ld. Alvanley). In Papendick 
 V. Bridgwater, 1855, Walker v. 
 Broadstock was denied to be law. 
 
 3 See Doe v. WainwriRht, 1838. 
 
 ♦ Doe V. Langfield, 1847 (Parke, 
 B.). 
 
 » In Phillips V. Cole, 1839, Ld. 
 Denmau, in pronouncing the judg 
 
 444 
 
 ment of the court, says : " It is clear 
 that declarations of third peisons 
 alive, in the absence of any com- 
 mnnity of interest, are not to be re- 
 ceived to affect the title or interests 
 of other persons, mcreh/ because they 
 are against the interests of those who 
 make them." 
 
 • Ante, § 123. 
 
 ' Chambers v. Bernasconi, 1831 
 (lid. Lyndhurst) ; Peaceable v. Wat- 
 son, 1811 (Sir J. Mansifield, C.J.J; 
 Crease v. Barrett, 18 io (Parke, B.); 
 Doe V. Langfield, 1847. 
 
 * Carne v. Nicoll, 1835 ; Baron de 
 Bode's case, 1845 ; E. v. Birming- 
 ham, 1861 ; E. V. Exeter, 1K69. 
 
 » Doov. Jones, 1808; E. v. Exeter, 
 1869. 
 
 »" Doew. Coulthred, 1837 ; Garland 
 V. Cope, 1848 (Ir.); Sly v. Sly, 1877. 
 
 » O'SuUivan v. Burke, 1873 (Jr.). 
 
C. VI.] DKCl.ARATIONS AGAIXSI I'UOIMMr/rAKY INTKREST. 
 
 to an action.' But it must relate to matters, cither within the 
 declarant's own knowledge, or on which lie has himself formed an 
 opinion ; and therefore a statement of defence, narrating what tho 
 declarant has heard anothcv ponon state respecting his title, is not 
 admissible to defeat his estate — at least if he does not add that he 
 believes such statement to be true.* 
 
 § 686, It is difficult to fix with precision how far declarations 
 against interest are evidence of the facts contained in them. They 
 have been received to show the name of the landlord under whom,* 
 and the identity of the will under which,* the declarant held ; the 
 amount of rent that was paid ; ' the fact of the payment of rent ; • 
 the extent of the tenement that was occupied ; ' and tho fact that 
 it was freehold and not copyhold.' Indeed, the courts seem now 
 inclined to admit such declarations not only as proof of the interest 
 which the declarant enjoyed in the premises, but as evidence of 
 any fact which is not foreign to the statement against interest, and 
 which forms substantially a part of it.° In all cases in which it 
 is sought to give evidence of a declaration on the ground that it 
 was a declaration against proprietary interest, it must, however, be 
 proved that the declarant was actually in possession of the land in 
 question ; since otherwise his declaration that he has a limited 
 interest therein may be regarded in the. light rather of a statement 
 in his own favour than of one against his interest.'" Still, slight 
 evidence on this head will suffice." Therefore, where a person was 
 seen felling timber in a wood, this act of his — though probably he 
 was in fact a mere labourer — was held to be a sufficient assertion 
 of ownership to raise a presumption that he was possessed of the 
 fee, and, consequently, to let in any statement made by him as to 
 who was the actual proprietor.'* 
 
 § 687. In applying the rule that declarations against proprietari/ 
 
 > !• 
 
 I Id 
 
 * Ld. Trimlestown v. Kemmis, 
 1843, H. L. 
 
 ' Ld. Trimlestown v. Kemmis, 
 1843, H. L., by the Lds., confirming 
 the unanimous opinion of the judges. 
 
 ^ Peaceable V.Watson, 1811 ; Hol- 
 loway V, Rakes, 1772, cited by Bullrr, 
 J., in Davies v. Pierce, 1787 ; Doe 
 V. Green, 1820. 
 
 * Sly V. Sly, 1877. 
 
 • R. V. Birmingham, 1861. 
 
 • R. V. Exeter, 1869. 
 
 ' Mountnoy v. Collier, 1853. 
 
 • Doe V. Jones, 1808. 
 
 • R. V. Birmingham, 1861. 
 
 "> See Crease v. Barrett, 1835. 
 
 " La Touche v. Hutton, 1875 (It.), 
 
 » Doe V. Arkwright, 1833 (Parke, 
 
 445 
 
STATI'-MKNTS IN DISP/.UAOEMRNT OF TITLE. [PAKT HI. 
 
 hii'fir.sf aro n(ln)i8Hil)le, caro must bo taken to distiDgiiish botwottu 
 Btntcineiifs made by an ocoui)ior of land in disjiunigeinent of his 
 own titlf, ind such deolarations as niBrely go to abridge or 
 in(!umbcr tlio property itself. Tho former arc receivable, but the 
 latter will bo rejeeled. For instance, a Hfatemnnt by an occupier 
 that ho is only tenant for life, will, after his death, bo admissiblo 
 evidence against astrangpr; but an admission by him that property 
 was intersei^tod by a j)ubIio highway, or that a neighbour had an 
 easement over it, or that he was not entitled to common of [)asturo 
 in respect of it, will only bind himself and those who claim under 
 him, an<l will not be admissihlo as against his landlord or a 
 Btranger.' The groimds for this distinction are obvious. It is 
 Bcarcely possible to imagine any inducement which will lead a 
 person pofsossed of premises in fee to admit that ho is only a 
 tenant. 15ut many reasons might induce a tenant to acknowledge 
 the existence of an easement or a highway, — espeiMally where it 
 was either not incjonvenient, or oven absolutely beneficial to him ; ' 
 a tenant, about to remove from one farm to another, might, for 
 example, readily feel an interest in denying tho existence of rights 
 attached to tho farm he was leaving, with tho view of increasing 
 the value of those which belonged to that which he was entering.* 
 § G81S. Entries contained in the l/ooln of dccmKcd rectors or vicars 
 have long becm admitted as evidence hi /avo'ir of their micccumrfi.* 
 The admi.ssihility of this class of entiios is differontly viewed. 
 Some persons regard it as nltogelher anomalous.* Others look 
 upon it as justified by the same princi[)lo as makes the rule which 
 admits old leases, rent-rolls, surveys, &c., admissible." Others, 
 again, consider that it falls within the Fame principle, viz., tho 
 extnnie improbability of falsehood, which renders declarations 
 against interest admissible evidence. At any rate' "it is now the 
 settled law of the land. It in nut to be prcsiimctl, that a pcrnon, 
 
 I ! 
 
 • B.r.BlisM, 18,37; Scliolesi'. Oliad- 
 vicli, lKi:i (Crenswell, J.); Ticklo V. 
 lliowii, lH;i(i (I'litteHoii, J.); Tjijien- 
 dick I'. Itiidgwiiter, IH.'i"). 
 
 » iSi'd II. r. IJliss, 1H:57 (L(1. Don- 
 m.in); Duniel v. North, 1809 (Lo 
 Blanc. J ). 
 
 ' I'diiumlick V. Dridgwutor, 185iJ 
 
 (Erie, J.). 
 
 * Sco Duly V. Wilson. 1812 (Ir.); 
 YoiiiiK r. Clmo Il.dl. 1S,>1. 
 
 ° Oiitriim V. Moiowood, 1793 (Ld. 
 Kdiiyon). 
 
 " Stotiiirt V. Drydon, WMi (I'urke, 
 
 n.). 
 
 ' 1 I'h. Ev. ao8, ao9. 
 
 446 
 
 Hi 
 
CHAP. VI. J ENTJtlKH IN D00K8 OF DKCKAHVA) ItKCTOKS. 
 
 having a fcmporanj hifrreat onh/, ui/l innrri a fdlnchnod in his honk, 
 from wfiich he cnii drrive no fK/nitifdt/c." ' Tlie rule i-^ixtoiids to 
 admit, the bof)kH of occlosiusticjul corporations agf^rt'giit(»,' and, as it 
 would seem, those also of lay imprr)priatorH in loo. With regard, 
 however, to these last, it would certainly be open to considerable 
 ouspioion, since a lay impropriator in fee, having a jtermanont 
 intcrnst to advance, might possibly be induced to make evidence 
 for his heirs.' 
 
 § G8ii. Though, however, the law admits such entries by deceased 
 persons in ecclesiastical books as evidence, juries will do well not to 
 place implicit reliance on them. Moreover, although general 
 observations have sometimes been made which appear to authorise 
 the admission of any kind of statement contained in such books, 
 they must, nevertheless, be rejected unless the entries contain 
 receipts of money or ecclesiastical dues, or are, in other ros{)e(!ts, 
 apparently prejudicial to the pecuniary or proprietary interests of 
 the makers.* And further, as in other cases, jjroof will be required 
 tliat the writer was authorised to receive the money stated, and 
 that he is actually dead; and that the document has come from 
 the j)roper custody.* 
 
 § 600. The improbability of falsehood is again probably the 
 principle " ujjon which the indorncmrnf by the payee of the pai/nient 
 of interest, or of pari paijuient of tlus principal, on a bond, bill of 
 exchange, or other negotiable security, might, under the old law, 
 be given in evidence by bin reprenentatirrn aft(!r his death, in order 
 to bar the Statute of Ijiinitations, or to rebut the presuinjjtion of 
 payment that would otherwise have arisen from lapse of time. 
 Accordingly, where such indorseni(!iit was shown to have been made 
 before the creditor's n-nicily was inifjaired by lapse of time, it was 
 admissible evidence of an acknowledgment;' if after that period, 
 it was rejected.* As to how the time at whicJi the indorsement 
 
 'i\ 
 
 i .', I 
 
 > Short V. Loo, 1821 (Sir T. I'lum- 
 
 nor, M.U.)- 
 
 » 1 I'h. Kv. 470—470. 
 
 » Id. 47!t, 480, and <;iihoh tliero 
 citod. 
 
 * 1 Ph. Kv. :J0:1 ; Ward v. Pomfrot, 
 18:{2. 
 
 • Orofll. Ev. 221 ; CarrinKton v. 
 JoQM, Ib'H; Porigul v. Nicuolsou, 
 
 1810. 
 
 " IJiit lit least onn oTniiient writer 
 upon the liiw of eviiintice tri'utH tliis 
 cliiHH (;f ciisi'H in connection with 
 entrieH tniide in thti (MHirms of ItiiMi- 
 newH: 1 I'h. Kv. XiO -Xiri. 
 
 ■■ Seiirlo V. Jjd. lkrrin;,'ton, 1728; 
 UoHWoith V. Cotchett, 1H2». 
 
 ' Nuwbould V. Smith, lb8y, U. L. ; 
 
 447 
 

 m' . 
 
 r 
 
 ir 
 
 ii 
 
 INDORSEMENT OF PART PAYMENT, ETC. [PART III. 
 
 was made can be proved is a point upon which much contrariety of 
 opinion has prevailed.^ 
 
 § 691. Now, however, so far as notes, bills, and other writings 
 subject to the operation of the Statute of Limitations,' are con- 
 cerned. Lord Tenterden's Act ' enacts, that " no indorsement or 
 memorandum of any payment written or made upon any promissory 
 note, bill of exchange, or other writing, by or on behalf of the 
 party to whom such payment shall be made, shall be deemed 
 sufficient proof of such payment, so as to take the case out of the 
 operation of the said statute." * An attempt was once made in an 
 action by the executors of the payee of a promissory note, to extend 
 this salutary provision beyond its legitimate limits. The plaintiffs, 
 to defeat the Statute of Limitations, having tendered in evidence a 
 book, in which the maker of the note had himself, by the direction 
 of the testator, entered two payments of interest, as having been 
 made to the testator by tlie defendant within the last six years, 
 they were objected to, on one ground, that their receipt in evidence 
 would violate the spirit, if not the words, of the enactment just 
 cited. But the objection was overruled.^ 
 
 § 692. With respect, moreover, to bonds and other specialties, a 
 modern statute" has rendered nugatory the old doctrine of presump- 
 tion of payment from lapse of time generally, by enacting that all 
 actions of debt for rent upon an indenture of demise, all actions of 
 covenant or debt upon any bond or other specialty, and all actions 
 of debt or scire facias upon any recognisance, &c., shall be com- 
 menced and sued witliin twenty years after the cause of such 
 actions or suits ; though the Act in question contains ' a proviso, 
 that, if any acknowledgment shall have been made, either by 
 writing signed by the party liable by virtue of such indenture, 
 specialty, or recognisance, or his agent, or by part payment or part 
 satisfaction on account of any principal or interest being then due 
 thereon,* the person entitled to such action may bring it for the 
 
 Turner v. Crisp, 1728; Glynn v. Bk. 
 of England, 1750; liriggs i. Wilson, 
 18o3. 
 ' Seo cases rofcnod to, post, §§ 693 
 
 — wm. 
 
 '' 21 J. 1, c. 16, ("The Limitation 
 Act, 1623"). 
 » » Ci. 4, 0. 14, § 3. 
 
 * As to the Irish Law, see 16 & 17 
 V. c. 113, §§20—24. 
 
 ' liradloy v. Janios, 1853. 
 « 3&4"VV. 4, c. 42, §3. 
 ^ In § o, as to which see post, 
 §§ lOSIO, 1091. 
 
 * In Roddam v. Morley, 1857, pav- 
 
 ment of interest on a bond by the 
 
 448 
 
C. VI.] INDORSEMENT OF PART PAYMENT ON SPECIALTIES. 
 
 money remaining unpaid and so acknowledged to be due, within 
 twenty years after such acknowledgment by writing, or part pay- 
 ment or part satisfaction as aforesaid ; and the plaintiff may, by 
 way of reply, state such acknowledgment, and that such action 
 was brought within the time aforesaid in answer to a plea of the 
 statute.* The Act contains, however, no clause corresponding with 
 the provision in § 3 of Lord Tenterden's Act, which has just been 
 set out. It therefore seems clear that, — provided the point be 
 properly raised by the pleadings, — the acknowledgment of the debt 
 afforded by the payment of interest or part payment of principal 
 may, in the case of bonds and other specialties, be still proved in 
 the same manner as formerly ; that is, by producing the document 
 and showing that it bears indorsements of such payments, even 
 though these indorsements were written or adopted bj' the creditor 
 himself, through whom the plaintiff claims. The only difference 
 between the old and new law is, that, whereas this evidence was 
 formerly admissible in answer to a plea of payment, it is now 
 received in support of a reply setting up an acknowledgment 
 by the defendant, where the original demand has been met by a 
 plea of the statute. 
 
 § 693. It consequently may still become important to determine 
 to. what extent and in what mannev it is necessary to adduce proof 
 as to the time when an indorsement tendered in evidence to prove 
 payment of interest or part payment of principal was written. 
 Now, the whole system of admitting such indorsements in favour of 
 parties in privity with the persons making them, is an anomaly which 
 cannot be supported by any of the reasons whereon the admissibility 
 of rectors' books is made to rest,^ and which, so far as regards parol 
 instruments, has been expressly rejected by the Legislature.' 
 And such indorsements are only admissible on tlie higlily technical 
 ground that they were, at the time they were made, entries against 
 
 I i I 
 
 & 17 
 
 post, 
 
 pav- 
 y the 
 
 tenant for life of certain land under 
 the will of the obligor, was held to 
 prevent this Htatuto from barring the 
 action against the heirs and dovisooa 
 in remainder, after the expiration of 
 twenty years from the time of the 
 bond becoming due. See Pears v. 
 
 Liiing, 1871 (Hacon, V.-C). But 
 see Coope v, Crosswoll, IHtHi ; and 
 Dickenson v, Teasdale, 18()2. 
 
 • As to Irish Law, see 16 & 17 V. 
 c. U;i, §§2()--24. 
 
 » Ante, § G88. 
 
 » 9 Ooo. 4, c. 14, § 3. 
 
 449 
 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF DATE OF INDORSEMENT, [p. III. 
 
 1, 
 
 1^' 
 
 
 i::': 
 
 'n,! 
 
 
 (he interest of the person making them, since his right was at that 
 time unaffected by any Statute of Limitations. Under these circum- 
 stances it is not unreasonable to contend, that the courts should 
 require strict proof of the time when the indorsements were really 
 made, before admitting them in evidence. In ordinary cases, the 
 law may eafely presume that a document was written at the time 
 it bears date. An exception to this general rule was recognized,^ 
 under the old law of bankruptcy, in cases where a note signed 
 by a bankrupt was put in by his assignees to support the 
 petitioning creditor's debt, and it was required that the date 
 of the instrument should be proved. The grounds applicable 
 in this case would appear to apply equally to the indorse- 
 ments under discussion,* which, if really made irithin twenty 
 years from the date of the bond, are received (because being in 
 such case against the interest of the obligee, they are presumed 
 to be true) ; but, if made beyond the twenty years, are rejected 
 (because, after the lapse of that time, it would be so obviously to 
 the advantage of the obligee to revive, by their means, the remedy 
 barred by the statute). It is as easy to fabricate a date as to 
 fabricate an indorsement, of which the date forms part, and it 
 would be a strange mode of checking such fraudulent practices to 
 say to an obligee, " Your remedy on the bond is barred by the 
 statute, and therefore if you now indorse upon it any admission 
 that you have received some interest from the obligor, no credit, 
 after your death, will be given to such admission ; but carry on 
 your deceit one step further, and add to your indorsement a date, 
 which will give it the semblance of having been made while your 
 remedy was unimpaired, and then, at your death, your repre- 
 sentatives may recover against the obligor." For these reasons it 
 is submitted that evidence outside the instrument itself may 
 reasonably be required. Indeed, to throw on a defendant the 
 burthen of proving negatively that an indorsement on an instni- 
 ment was not written on the day of the date, is in fact to shut 
 the door upon all inquiry into the matter ; because, as the note 
 continued in the hands of the payee or his representatives, it was 
 
 ' Ante, § 169. See, also, another * See Potez 
 exception noticed ante, §§ 169, 682. (Parke, B.). 
 
 460 
 
 V. Qlossop, 1848 
 
-&-. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 3 HOW DATE OF INDORSEMENT PROVED. 
 
 scarcely possible for the maker to ascertain at what time any 
 indorsement was written upon it. 
 
 § 694, The authorities cannot be said, however, to lay down any 
 decisive rule on the point.* A case in the House of Lords'* is 
 usually cited' as an authority against the view above contended 
 for. But that case is not reported, and is noticed so shortly by 
 text writers* that the grounds of the decision cannot be ascertained. 
 In another,* extrinsic evidence was apparently given of the time 
 when the indorsements were made, though only one reporter (Mr. 
 Brown) mentions it ;* and he in but a loose way. In a third case,' 
 in addition to an indorsement signed by the obligee, a witness 
 was called, who proved actual payment of the interest. In yet 
 another,* the payment of interest by the obligor to a stranger -^as 
 proved ; and many circumstances concurred to show that the in- 
 dorsement relied upon by the plaintiffs was written on or about its 
 alleged date, and, moreover, it signified liHle when it was written, 
 as it was equally against the interest of the obligee at all times.* 
 
 § 695. The strongest case against the view above contended for is 
 a Nisi Prius ruling'" in which an indorsement upon a promissory 
 note of the receipt of interest thereon (dated previously to the 
 statute) was admitted without any extrinsic proof of the time 
 when it was actually written ; the judge observing, that, " in 
 the absence of all evidence to the contrary, he should assume 
 that it was written at the time it bore date." This case has been 
 cited with approbation by the Court of Common Pleas," and by 
 Lord Justice Turner on a more recent occasion,'^ as supporting 
 the general doctrine that documents are presumed to have been 
 written at the time when they bear date. 
 
 § 696. The view taken in the present work that evidence of date, 
 
 1848 
 
 ' Per Bayley, B., in Gleadow v. 
 Atkin, 18a;i. stating the result of his 
 own rosoai'ches. 
 
 » BosT\'orth V. Cotchott, 1824, H. L. 
 
 * Per Vaughan, B., in Gleadow v. 
 Atkin, 1833. His lordship was 
 counsel in Bosworth v, Cotchett, 
 1824. 
 
 * 1 Ph. Ev. 333; 3 St. Ey. 824. 
 In this last work the case is cited as 
 Parr v. Cotchett. 
 
 ' Searle v. Lord Barriugtou, 1728. 
 
 • 3 Br. P. 0. 594, where the 
 reporter says that " other circum- 
 stantial evidence " was given to prove 
 that the bond had not been satisfied. 
 
 ' Sanders v. Movedith, 1828. 
 
 • Glciidow V. Ackin, 1833. 
 
 • See per Bayley, B., id. 
 
 w Smith V. Battens, 1834 (Taunton, 
 J.). 
 
 " In Anderson v. Weston, 1848. 
 » Briggs V. Wilson, 1853. 
 
 
 IH 
 
 II 
 
 451 
 
 ' ' 'I 
 
i. 
 
 I ' • 
 
 
 
 w. 
 
 
 
 
 HOW DATE OF INDORSEMENT PROVED. [PART III. 
 
 other than that afforded by the instrument itself, must be given, is, 
 however, supported by the language of Lord Ellenborough,' where, 
 in refusing to admit in evidence a certain indorsement, the date of 
 which was not proved, but which displaced evidence already given 
 on the other side, his lordship said, " I think you must prove that 
 these indorsements were on the bond at or recently after the times 
 when they bear date, before you are entitled to read them. * * * 
 If such indorsements were receivable whensoever they may have 
 been written, this would be allowing the obligee to manufacture 
 evidence for himself to contradict the fact of payment. I have 
 been at a loss to see the principle on which these receipts, in the 
 handwriting of the creditor, have sometimes been admitted as 
 evidence against the debtor ; and I am of opinion they cannot be 
 properly admitted, unless they are proved to have been written at 
 a time when the effect of them was clearly in contradiction to the 
 writer's interest." 
 
 § 696a. Perhaps the safest rule that can be laid down on this 
 subject is, that if the indorsement appear hi/ its date to have been 
 written within the twenty years, the question may be left to the 
 jury, under all the circumstances of the case, whether it were 
 really so written;* the law raising no presumption either way. 
 In equity, however, the fact is one for the judge to determine.' 
 
 » Eose V. Biyant, 1809. 
 » See per Vaughan, B., in Glea- 
 dow V. Atkin, 1833. 
 
 * See Newbould v. Smith, 1889, 
 luL. 
 
 452 
 
 
 I 
 
 !/. ■ A'' 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4521 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 Declarations against Interest. — A well established exception to 
 the rule excluding hearsay is that which admits as evidence of the 
 facts therein stated, declarations of a deceased person when made 
 in derogation of his pecuniary or proprietary interest. 
 
 Entries by a deceased agent of the receipt of rent from a tenant 
 are evidence of the occupation of the demised premises by the ten- 
 ant. Jones i>. Howard, 3 All. '223 (18G1). 
 
 A receipt given by a sheriff for money paid him by a judgment 
 debtor to redeem land sold on execution is competent evidence of 
 the fact, date, amount and parties to the payment, not only us an 
 entry in the course of otHcial business, but as a declaration against 
 interest. "The receipt was admissible on another ground. The 
 ofttcer thereby charged himself with the money, and rendered him- 
 self accountable for it to the creditor. It was an admission against 
 his interest, made in respect to a matter pertaining to his official 
 duty. Written memoranda, made under sucli circumstances, may 
 reasonably be assumed to be truthful, and are evidence after the 
 death of tlie party who made them, as well of the fact against his 
 interest, as of the other incidental and collateral facts and cir- 
 cumstances mentioned, and are admissible irrespective of the fact 
 whether any privity exists between the person who made them and 
 the party against whom they are offered." Livingston r. Arnoux, 
 66 N. Y. 507, 519 (1874). 
 
 So of a sheriff's receipt for the purchase-money of a lot recited 
 to have been sold some three years before. " Upon tlie same prin- 
 ciple and for the same reason, tlie receipt of the sheriff for the 
 purchase-money, although made long after the occurrence of the 
 transaction, and after he was out of office, was admissible, and 
 ought to have been allowed by the Court to go to the jury as evi- 
 dence. Declarations of this cliaracter are received in consequence 
 of the death of the party making them. They embrace not only 
 entries in books, but all other declarations or statements of facts, 
 whether verbal or in writing, and whether they were made at the 
 time of the fact declared or at a subsequent day. To render them 
 admissible, it must appear that the declarant is deceased, that he 
 possessed competent knowledge of the facts, or that it was his duty 
 to know them, and tlie declarations were at variance with his 
 interests." Field v. Boynton, 33 Ga. 239 (1862). 
 
 In an action betv. en third parties, to show the deposit of money 
 in the banking establishment of Bassett & Bassett, an entry on 
 their books in the handwriting of a deceased clerk showing the 
 receipt of certain deposits is com])etent. Heidenheimer r. John- 
 son, 76 Tex. 200 (1890). "In connection with the entry offered in 
 
 1 : I 
 
 1? 
 
4522 
 
 AMElilCAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT 111. 
 
 
 l{ 
 
 iv',,p 
 
 1' 
 
 J 
 
 n I 
 
 ;1. 
 
 this case, it was proved that the entry was in the handwriting of 
 one Kobertson, a bookkeeper for Bassett & liassett, who was then 
 dead; and also that Jett'erson Bassett, of tlie firm of Bassett & 
 Bassett, was also dead. It appeared in evidence that the other 
 ni jniber of the firm was not dead, but no objection was made to the 
 evidence upon that ground. It did not appear that he had any 
 knowledge of tlie transaction, and if such objection had been urged 
 it would probably have been shown that he took no part in the 
 management of the business of the firm and knew nothing of its 
 details. The ett'ect of the entry was to charge the firm of Bassett 
 & Bassett with the sum of $5200, and was clearly against their 
 interest." 
 
 On the question of the nature of a possession of certain ])rem- 
 ises, evidence is competent that a deceased tenant charged himself, 
 in favor of the demandant's title, with the proceeds of timber cut. 
 
 "Of the same nature, and of additional force upon another 
 ground, are the entries in his books, in which he charges himself, 
 as in favor of those parties, with the avails of the timber cut from 
 the land; because such a charge is, for this additional cause, 
 against his interest, rendering him accountable for a sum of 
 money. 
 
 The admissibility of entries made against the interest of the 
 party making them at the time, as evidence between other parties, 
 upon the ground of their being against such interest, is established 
 by many cases in which the principle has been discussed and ap- 
 plied." Rand ('. Dodge, 17 N. H. 343, 360 (1845). 
 
 A receipt by an attorney for money paid in settlement of a claim 
 is evidence in a suit between third parties of the payment of the 
 money. Sherman v. Crosby, 11 John. 70 (1814). So a guardian 
 may put in receipts of persons to whom money has been paid by 
 him as prima facie evidence of payment. "It cannot be expected, 
 and never is required, that for money charged in the account of a 
 guardian or administrator, he shall be held to the trouble and 
 expense of charging the estate with a multitude of witnesses." 
 Shearman v. Akins, 4 Pick. 282, 293 (1826). 
 
 Declarations by a deceased owner of land to the effect that his 
 wife had "sold all the property out of his hands," under a power of 
 attorney given her for another purpose but that they had compro- 
 mised the matter, are relevant as between third parties, because 
 against the proprietary interest of the declarant. Bowen v. Chase, 
 98 U. S. 254 (1878). 
 
 So of a declaration by a tenant that her interest is for life. 
 Lamar v. Pearre, 90 Ga. 377 (1892). 
 
 A declaration of a deceased husband that he had cancelled an 
 antenuptial agreement with his present wife is admissible in an 
 action between her and a third party as being against interest, 
 
 I- i 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4523 
 
 because tending to reduce the amount of property over which the 
 declarant had disposition and control. Hosford v. Rowe, 41 Minn. 
 245 (1889). 
 
 So a party's admission of a debt is competent evidence between 
 third persons. " A declaration, though made by a stranger to the 
 suit, may sometimes be used when the fact which it tends to estab- 
 lish is relevant to the case, and the declaration is against the inter- 
 est of the party making it, and he is dead. Men do not falsely 
 admit debts against themselves; and it is this presumption wliieh 
 induces the law to admit such a declaration." Bartlett c. Patton, 
 33 VV. Va. 71, 82 (1889). 
 
 Where the plaintiff's deceased husband had entered on a cash- 
 book the receipt of rent from the defendant, it was lield that the 
 declaration was admissible as against interest though the effect of 
 admitting the evidence was liighly favorable to the plaintiff. "1 
 think it very clear that the entries in question are prima facie 
 entries made by Mr. Turner against his interest, and so admis- 
 sible, whatever value they may be." Turner o. Dewan, 41 (.}. B. 
 U. C. 361 (1877). The statement by A., an insolvent debtor, that 
 B. is not his partner, is against A.'s pecuniary interest, as it puts 
 the entire burden of the indebtedness upon himself. Such a 
 declaration is therefore admissible between third parties. "It is 
 an established rule of evidence, that while, in ordinary cases, the 
 mere declarations of a person as to a particular fact are not evi- 
 dence of that fact, being regarded as hearsay; yet declarations 
 made by a person which are at variance with his pecuniary or pro- 
 prietary interest, are admissible in evidence of their own truth, 
 under certain circumstances. These conditions are, that the de- 
 clarant possessed competent knowledge of the facts, and is deceased 
 at the time his declarations are proposed to be proved. The ab- 
 sence of any motive of a pecuniary nature, which would tempt him 
 to falsehood, creates a strong and intrinsic probability of the truth 
 of his declaration; and it is, therefore, admitted as secondary evi- 
 dence, after the death of the declarant, being tlie best which the 
 nature of the case will, under the peculiar circumstances, permit." 
 Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 64, 78 (1883). 
 
 To prove the existence of a debt between third parties, the 
 declaration of the alleged debtor that he owed it is competent. 
 " The declarations were made by a man, upon the subject in con- 
 troversy, against his interest, and when he could have no conceiv- 
 able interest to declare that wliich was not true." Peace v. 
 Jenkins, 10 Ired. 355 (1849); Swan v. Morgan, 88 Hun, 378 
 (1895). 
 
 So to prove payments of money to A., the receipt of his deceased 
 attorney acknowledging such payments are admissible, on an action 
 between third parties, to prove the fact and dates of payment. 
 
 (^ 
 
452* 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part in. 
 
 Wh 
 
 Taylor r. Gould, 67 Pa. St. 152 (18G8). "The objection is that 
 it was hearsay evidence. ]5iit it had been proved that the attorney 
 was dead. If there is anything settled, it is that the rule exclud- 
 ing hearsay evidence does not apply to oral or written declarations 
 of deceased persons made against their interest." Lowry /■. Moss, 
 1 Strob. 03 (1840). 
 
 To prove the purchase by B. of A.'s one-half interest in certain 
 property, entries made by showing the receipt of the nioney and 
 other facts relating to the transaction, are, together with policies 
 of insurance taken out by him on the property, competent in a suit 
 between third parties. " While the general rule is, that the 
 declarations of a person, as to a transaction with another, being 
 regarded as hearsay, do not bind a third person, whose rights are 
 involved, such declarations, when contrary to the pecuniary or pro- 
 prietary interest of the declarant, and he is deceased, are compe- 
 tent evidence against third persons, though their rights may be 
 aft'ected. The entries, and the representations in the policies as 
 to the ownership, were declarations of H. C. Hart, against his pro- 
 prietary and pecuniary interests, showing that he had sold an 
 interest and received payment, and were relevant to the issue of 
 adverse possession." Hart v. Kendall, 82 Ala. 144 (1886). 
 
 Henekicial Declaration's against Interest. — It frequently 
 happens that a declaration apparently clearly against the interest 
 of the declarant, when made, is really either at the time, or later, 
 highly beneficial. 
 
 The general rule under such circumstances is, that the declara- 
 tion is admissible if prima facie against the interest of the declar- 
 ant, even if, in certain contii.gencies, to his advantage. 
 
 Still, wL. i"e a deceased person had signed and placed among his 
 own papers what purported to be a receipt signed by himself, 
 acknowledging the receipt of .f 48 as interest on £300, it was held 
 liable to the objection of manufacturing evidence in his own favor, 
 in a suit involving the question whether this £300 was a loan or 
 the purchase-money of an annuity. Ganton v. Size, 22 Q. B. U, 
 C. 473 (1863). The court say: — " It contains an admission to the 
 extent of £12 against the maker, but it contains also an admission 
 of £300 directly in his favour, so that it is by mere pecuniary com- 
 putation twenty-five times more in his favour than it is against him; 
 and to say that this is an admission against interest is to read the 
 authorities to which we have been referred backward, for nothing 
 can be more unlike the entry of forty years' standing made by so 
 disinterested a party as was the case in Higham v. Ridgway, or 
 more unlike the entry of nearly thirty years so completely against 
 the maker's interest as was the case in Gleadow v. Atkin, than this 
 memorandum made by the person who only could be directly bene- 
 fited by it, and made so very shortly before litigation did take 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4526 
 
 place upon it." Ihid. To tlie same effect. Confederation Life 
 Ass'n. of Canada v. O'Donnell, 13 Can. Supreme Ct. 218, 225 
 (1886). 
 
 It has been found necessary to alter the rule admitting beneficial 
 declarations prima facie against interest in at least one particular. 
 Where the effect of endorsing the receipt of money upon a bill of 
 exchange, promissory note, bond or other specialty would, if made 
 at a certain time, operate to remove the bar of tlie statute of limi- 
 tations, it has been held that the endorsement, though prima facie 
 against the interest of the declarant, is in reality so greatly and 
 obviously in his favor as to warrant the courts in requiring that it 
 should be affirmatively shown by evidence dehors the endorsement 
 itself that it was made at a time when it actually was against the 
 interest of the declarant to make it. Roseboom v. Billington, 17 
 Johns. 182 (1819); I3eatty v. Clement, 12 La. Ann. 82 (1857). 
 
 Where the endorsement must have been made before the run- 
 ning of the statute, it is competent. "The endorsement was then 
 clearly against his interest, furnishing proof that he had received 
 part of the contents of the note. This never could have been done, 
 if the sum endorsed had not been paid." Coffin v. Bucknam, 12 
 Me. 471 (1835); Beatty v. Clement, 12 La. Ann. 82 (1857); Ad- 
 dams V. Seitzinger, 1 W. & S. 243 (1841). 
 
 " With this qualification, such evidence cannot operate injuri- 
 ously; for it is not to be supposed that a creditor could so far mis- 
 take his interest as to sacrifice a part of his debt to save the 
 residue, when no part of it was in danger." Addams v. Seitzinger, 
 1 W, & S. (Pa.) 243 (1841). 
 
 The rule as to endorsements upon specialties was statutory in 
 England, 9 Geo. IV., Ch. 14, § 3. Similar statutes have been 
 enacted in many of the United states. 
 
 The same rule has been applied to an open account. Where the 
 account sued on would be barred by the statute of limitations, 
 unless the bar was removed by partial payments, the courts refuse 
 to receive entries of such payments as credits by a deceased part- 
 ner upon the firm books as sufficient evidence of the payment. 
 Libby V. Brown, 78 Me. 492 (1886); Hancock v. Cook, 18 Tick. 30 
 (1836). 
 
 Declarant must be Dead. — The supreme court of Connectij- 
 cut, in excluding declarations of a living person made against his 
 then existing interest, say : — " These declarations are from a person, 
 not a party, or a witness, and who might have been called as gi 
 witness. The general rule is, that if the party whose declarations 
 are offered, is living, and can be a witness, his declarations are not 
 evidence." Fitch v. Chapman, 10 Conn. 8 (1833). 
 
 " If these declarations were offered as the declarations of de- 
 ceased persons, while occupying the premises, they would have 
 
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 1 1 
 

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 ii- 
 
 i 
 
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 "Mrs! 
 
 452« 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAItT m. 
 
 been therefore admissible. On the other hand, if they were 
 offered as the declarations of persons now alive, they ought to be 
 rejected." Currier v. Gale, 14 Gray (Mass.) 504 (18G()); Lowry 
 V. Moss, 1 Strob. 63 (1«4G); Trammell v. Hudnion, 78 Ala. 2'J2 
 (1HH4). 
 
 Hut it has been held that where the declarant is a firm consist- 
 ing of two persons, and the only one familiar with the business is 
 deceased, the evidence is competent, in the absence of objection on 
 that specific ground. Heidenheimer v. Johnson, 76 Tex. 200 
 (ISUO). 
 
 The suggestion has been made that these declarations are re- 
 ceived from tlie necessity of the case, the declai-ant being dead. 
 
 "The declaration made by Worthington — that Hudmon had 
 paid liim all he owed, and that nothing remained due — altliough 
 competent as an admission against the defendant, was not binding 
 on a third person wliose rights might be affected by it. Such 
 declarations, although made against interest, are regarded as mere 
 hearsay, except when it is shown that the declarant is since de- 
 ceased, and then they are admitted only on the principle, that they 
 constitute the best evidence of which the nature of the case will 
 admit." Trammell v. Hudmon, 78 Ala. 222 (1884). 
 
 Natiike of the Lvtekest. — The interest of the declarant must, 
 as in England, be pecuniary or proprietary. 
 
 A power to dispose of property by will is regarded as a proprie- 
 tary interest, and declarations tending to reduce the amount are 
 within the rule. Hosford v. Rowe, 41 Minn. 245 (1889). 
 
 A mere receipt by a bailee for certain uunds wliich charges him, 
 if at all, only for gross negligence in their custody, is not, being 
 "contingent and improbable," a declaration against interest. Tate 
 V. Tate, 75 Va. 522, 5;i2 (1881). 
 
 But a statement by A., a person since deceased, that certain 
 property in his possession is owned by B. is competent. Walker 
 V. Marseilles, 70 Miss. 283 (1892). 
 
 Interest other than proprietary or pecuniary is not within the 
 scope of the rule. A statement against the social or moral inter- 
 est of the declarant is not comi)etent. 
 
 On an indictment for murder, declarations by the deceased in 
 favor of the accused, not made in articulo mortis or admissible as 
 dying declarations, are not admissible for the accused, as declara- 
 tions against interest. "The record shows that this testimony was 
 sought to be introduced as containing the dying declaration of the 
 deceased; but this proposition is so palpably indefensible, that it 
 is abandoned here, and its attempted introduction sought to be 
 justified on the ground that they were declarations made against 
 the declarant's interest, and therefore admissible here, as in civil 
 proceedings. This doctrine has never received the sanction of any 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 452T 
 
 it 
 
 be 
 
 list 
 
 vil 
 
 my 
 
 court, 80 far as we are advised, nor does the able and acute counsel 
 titter any support derived from reason. Wv, cannot see tiie sliglit- 
 est analogy between declarations made against interest by a suitor 
 in a civil proceeding and declarations by a slain man, not made in 
 ai'tlciilo mortiH under a sense of impending dissolution, and after 
 an abandonment of all hope by tlie declarant. How any declara- 
 tion can be said to be against the interest of a man already passed 
 into the other world, and beyond the reach of every earthly tri- 
 bunal and all earthly power, is wholly incomprehensible by us." 
 Helm V. State, G7 Miss. 502, 572 (IHUO). 
 
 A statement by a person, "on his death bed," that he had killed 
 the deceased is not admissible on behalf of the accused. " It was 
 but hearsay." West v. State, 76 Ala. 98 (1884). 
 
 A., when accused of larceny, cannot prove by a witness present 
 that B. admitted having stolen part of the goods. "The court 
 would not admit it — saying it was no more than hearsay. If a 
 person other than the defendant had stolen the goods, it was un- 
 doul)tedly competent to the defendant to prove the fact, in excul- 
 pation of himself — but not by the mode of proof now offered." 
 Com. V. Chabbock, 1 Mass. 143 (1804). 
 
 It has, however, on the contrary, been held that a declaration by 
 an offender that he has committed a serious criminal offence, will 
 be admitted as evidence of that fact in an action between third 
 parties. Coleman v. Frazier, 4 Rich. (S. C.) 14(5 (1850). " I think 
 it is true that a declaration, made by the party who does the act, as 
 in this case stealing the letter containing the money, is admissible. 
 It is very true that the rule that, where an entry or declaration, 
 made by a deceased person, is against the interest of the party 
 making it, it is admissible as evidence, was qualiiied by Gilchrist 
 & King V. Martin & West (Bail. Eq. 492), and waa restricted to 
 cases where there was no interest to falsify the fact that it was 
 made against the interest of the person making it, and that the entry 
 or declaration was so ancient as to preclude suspicion that it was 
 manufactured for the occasion. Under it alone, therefore, this 
 declaration would not be admissible. But when it is remembered 
 that this is not of a matter of business, like those spoken of in 
 that case, but was a criminal act, of which none could be so cogni- 
 zant as the party, I think a reason will be found for its admission 
 arising out of the rule, as qualified in the case just alluded to. 
 The admission of such testimony arises from necessity, and the 
 certainty that it is true, from the want of motive to falsify. Both 
 these are apparent here." 
 
 FouM OF Declaration. — The declaration may be oral. Hos- 
 ford V. Rowe, 41 Minn. 245 (1889) ; Humes v. O'Bryan, 74 Ala. 
 64 (1883). 
 
 If 
 
4528 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [PAliT III. 
 
 « S-'S 
 
 it ^ 
 
 ml 
 
 5 ' 
 
 «! 
 
 »ih ,.; 
 
 In Massachusetts a distiiiotioii outaius between deolarations 
 against ptiouniary and those against proprietary interest. As to 
 pecuniary interest, the unusual ruh? prevails that the dechiration 
 must be in the form of writing. Thus, where a suit was brought 
 to recover back the amount of a tax collected by the defendant, a 
 collector of taxes, from the plaintiff, who claimed to have paid the 
 same to the defendant's predecessor in office, evidence was rejected 
 of oral statements by the deceased collector that he had received 
 the amount of the plaintiff's tax. " It was argued," the couit say, 
 "that this was within another exception to the rule respecting 
 hearsay, viz. that the admission was made by the collector, in a 
 matter against his interest at the time, inasmucih as it rendered 
 liim liabh* to the town as for so much money collected. . . . lUit 
 as we think this has been confined wholly to the case of entries 
 made in books, or other receipts, documents, or written memo- 
 randa, made by a person deceased, in relation to a matter contrary 
 to his interest at the time, and which went to diarge him with 
 some debt or duty. ... It was founded mainly on the considera- 
 tion of tlie clearness and certainty of such written nn^moranda, 
 made by a party, against his interest, in contradistinction to the 
 looseness and uncertainty of verbal statements, or even of letten;." 
 Lawrence /•. Kimball, 1 Mete. oL'i (1<S4()), relying on Franiingham 
 Mfg. (\i. /•. Harnard. '2 Tick. r>:VJ: {\H'2A); JoiiesV. Howard, li All. 
 L'L'.'i (1S()1). 
 
 Tlie same strictness is not ajtiilied to declarations in derogati(m 
 of proprietary interest. Such declarations may be oral. Tlius, on 
 an issue involving the nature oi' A.'s possession, the statement of 
 H., wliile occupying the land, that he was merely holding as a ten- 
 ant of A., is competent. "We are of opinion, that this (juestion 
 was admissible asa-es gestie. It is true that this was a declaration 
 only, and consisted in words; but they were words qualifying his 
 act of possession and in dis]iarageuu'nt of his own title, so far as 
 that circumstance is of importance." Marcy v. Sione, 8 Gush. 4 
 (ISr.l). 
 
 Not Admissions. — To speak of declarations against interest as 
 "admissions '' seems unnecessarily confusing. The statement of a 
 relevant fact by a party is itself a fact, which, under the name of 
 an "admission," the rules of procedure, the "rules of the game," 
 so to speak, constitute a waiver of proof. Certain rules of posi- 
 tive law, relating to privity, agency, &c. , enable the statements 
 of persons standing in certain definite relations to a party to be 
 received, under jjrojier circumstances, as being equally binding 
 \ipon him as if made by himself. 
 
 An admission is not necessarily against the interest of tlie party. 
 Its force in evidence, like that of a presumption of law, is not 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AMKlllCAN NOTKS. 
 
 4r)2» 
 
 V):ised on logic, but upon procedure. It is not a pnOutlo ; it is a 
 Iciutmen jirobationis ; — not ])r()of, but a waiver of it. 
 
 The declaration against interest is made by a person, not a 
 party, or enabled by privity or agency to speak for the party. 
 It is not, therefore, an admission in any proper sense. Its proba- 
 tive force is due to the observed fact that men do not, as a ruh^, 
 state what is against their interest — unless it is true. Very 
 possibly tliis is an "admission " in the popular, colhxiuial ns(! of 
 the word ; — but not in any sense that is of value to the law of 
 evidence. 
 
 The rule now under discussion goes beyond privity or agency; 
 it makes the declaration evidence between tliird parties. As was 
 said in Currier v. Gale, 14 Gray (Mass.) .'>()4 (IHGO), speaking of 
 tlie declarations of one in possession of land that he held merely 
 as tenant of another, "The defendant insists that it was compe- ' 
 tent, luider the general rule of admitting the declarations of a 
 party in possession, adverse to his own interest. Sucii decliirations 
 have in various forms and under different (nrcMimstances been 
 decuned admissible. Tlie principle upon whicli they are held 
 admissible is not very clearly settled. Wlien the declaration has 
 been accompanied witli an act pointing out some monument or 
 existing mark of boundary, it lias been allowed. So also as evi- 
 dence against the party making the declaration, and all persons in 
 l»rivity with liim, or claiming under him, it is comptttent. l>\it the 
 adjudicated eases go somewhat further, and hold tiiat his declara- 
 tion in disparagement of his apparent title, as indicated liy liis 
 possession, may be used as evidence that his occupation was an 
 occupation uiuler another person, and tlius make his ])ossession to 
 avail in favor of the person stated by him to be his landlord." 
 
 A limitation upon the rule tliat only as to facts of long standing 
 are sucli declarations comj)etent, has been attempted. Gilchrist )\ 
 ]\Iartin, I Rich. (S. C.) K>\. W2 (IS.",]). 
 
 The rule has been held, in the sanui state, to apply to criminal 
 acts. Coleman r. Frazier, 4 Rich. (S. C.) 140 (lsr»(»). "I think it 
 is true that a declart'ition, made by the party wlio does the act, as in 
 this case stealing the letter containing the money, is admissible. 
 It is very true tliat the rule that, where an entry or declaration, 
 made by a deceased person, is against the interest of i\w party mak- 
 ing it, it is admissible as evidence, was qualified by Gilchrist & King 
 *'. Martin & Wtist (Hail. Kq. 4i)L'), and was restricted to cases where 
 there was no interest to falsify the fact that it was made against 
 the interest of the person making it, and that the entry or declanir 
 tion was so ancient as to preclude suspicion that it was manufac- 
 tured for the occasion. Under it alone, therefore, this declaration 
 would not be admissible. But when it is remembered that this is 
 
 il 
 
'I 
 
 51. . 'I 
 
 45210 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 not of a matter of business, like those spoken of in that case, but 
 was a criminal act, of which none could be so cognizant as the party, 
 I think a reason will be found for its admission, arising out of the 
 rule, as qualitied in the case just alluded to. The admission of such 
 testimory arises from necessity, and the certainty that it is true, 
 from the ' .*nt of motive to falsify. Both these are apparent here." 
 Coleman v. Frazier, 4 Rich. 146 (1850). Apparently no such modi- 
 fications have been generally adopted. 
 
 r, 
 
 I 
 
 .1 
 
 
 ',■' ! ■ 
 
 h\ 
 
CH. VII.3 DECLARATIONS IN BUSINESS, WHY ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 DECLARATIONS IN THE COURSE OF OFFICE OR BUSINESS. 
 
 § 697. The class of cases which forms the fifth exception to 
 the general rule, that hearsay evidence must be rejected,' consists 
 of declarations in discharge of duty in the ordinary course of business 
 or professional employment. The rule is very commonly, but 
 inaccurately, stated to be that all entries " made in the ordinary 
 course of business " are admissible. But this is not so, and entries 
 gratuitously made by a man, even in the ordinary course of 
 business, merely for his own satisfaction, and not in the discharge 
 of any duty, will not be admissible in evidence after his death.* 
 The considerations which have induced the courts to recognise this 
 exception apjKVii' to be principally these: — that, in the absence of 
 all suspicion of sinister motives, a fair presumption arises that 
 entries made n the ordinary routine of duty are correct, since, 
 the process of invention implying trouble, it is easier to state what 
 is true than what is false ; that such entries usually form a link in 
 a chain of circumstances which mutually corroborate each other; 
 that false entries would be likely to bring clerks into disgrace 
 with their employers ; that as most entries made in the course of 
 duty are usually subject to the inspection of several persons, an 
 error would be exposed to speedy discovery ; and that as the facts to 
 which they relate are generally known but to few persons, a relaxa- 
 tion of the strict rules of evidence in favour of such entries may 
 often prove convenient, if not necessary, for the due investigation 
 of truth.8 
 
 I I 
 
 (fl 
 
 ' It will be recollocted that there 
 are six such exceptions. See ante, 
 § 607. 
 
 • See Hope v. Hope, 1893, 0. A. 
 
 » Poolo V. Dicas, 18;!.} fTindal, 
 O.J.); 1 Ph. Ev. 319; 1 St. Ev. 348, 
 349. 
 
 153 
 
in " 
 I 111 
 
 r-m 
 
 
 'I I' ', 
 
 8' i 
 
 
 DECLARATIONS IN COURSE OF BUSINESS [PAliT III. 
 
 § 098,* One of the earliest cases,^ illustrative of this subject, 
 was an action for beer sold and delivered. The plaintiff was a 
 brewer, and to prove the delivery it was shown that, in the usual 
 course of plaintiff's business, it was the duty of his draymen to 
 come every night to the clerk of the brewhouse, and give him an 
 account of the beer delivered during the day, which he entered in 
 a book kept for that purpose, to which the draymen set their 
 hands. An entry in this book, stating the delivery of the beer in 
 question, and signed by a drayman, whose signature and death 
 were proved, was put in, and was held to be suiRcient evidence to 
 maintain the action. This decision has since been followed in 
 many cases. For example, the service of a notice to quit has been 
 held, after his death, to be sufficiently proved by the indorsement 
 of service upon a copy of the notice, made by the attorney who 
 served it ; it being shown to be the ordinary course of business in 
 his office to preserve copies of such notices, and to indorse the 
 Bervice thereon.* 
 
 § 699. Similarly, it has been held that a payment of rates is 
 sufficiently shown by an entry of the receipt of rates made in 
 his book by a deceased clerk of a collector, who had been duly 
 appointed ; * that the dishonour of a bill of exchange by the acceptor, 
 and notice thereof to the indorser, is proved by entries in the books 
 of the messenger of a bank, and of the clerk of a notarj', shown to have 
 been made in the usual routine of business ; * and, upon like proof, 
 proof of a letter having been sent, and (after notice to the other 
 side to produce it) of its contents, is afforded by the letter-book of the 
 plaintiff, a merchant, in which a deceased clerk had inserted what 
 purported to be the copy of a letter to the defendant, and had 
 further made a men)orandum stating that he had sent such letter.** 
 
 » Or. Ev. § 116, in pnrt. 
 
 » Price V. Torriiigtou, 1703 (Ld. 
 Holt) ; 1 Sin. L. C. '211. See, also, 
 Pitman v. Maddox, 1(598 ; Rowcroft 
 V. Basset, 1802 (liO Blunc, J.). 
 
 ^ Doo V. Turford, 18;{2 ; R. v. Copo, 
 18;}5 (Ld. UonmanJ ; R. v. Dukin- 
 tield, 1848; Stapyiton v. Clough, 
 18o;). 
 
 * R. V. St. Mary, Warwick, 1853. 
 
 » Sutton t'. (Jregory, 1797 (Ld. 
 Kenyon) ; Poole v. IJicas, 1836 ; 
 
 Nichols?.. Welib, 1823 (Am.); Welch 
 V. Barrett, 1819 (Am.); llalliduy v. 
 Miirtinett, 1822 (Am.); Butler v. 
 Wright, 1829 (Am.); Hart <;. Wil- 
 liams, 1829 (Am.); Nicholls v. Gold- 
 smith, 1831 (Am.). 
 
 » Prittj'.Fuirclough. 1812; Tinge- 
 dorn V. Rcid, 1813. See, also, Champ- 
 neys v. Pock, 1816; Doo v. Lang- 
 tield, 1847 ; East Union Ry. Co. v. 
 Symonds, 1850. But see Rowlaada 
 V. De Vecchi, 1882 (Day, J.). 
 
 4.51- 
 
 
CHAP. VII.] MUST BK MADE IN DISCHARGE OF DUTY. 
 
 On the same principle, where a pohce-constahle had, in the couise 
 of his duty, made a verbal report to his inspector, stating where he 
 was going and what he was about to do. proof of such report was 
 held to be admissible evidence for the Crown on the trial of an in- 
 dictment charging the prisoner with the murder of the policeman.' 
 § 700. Of late years, great (ii-siiiclination has been evinced by the 
 courts to extending the principle of allowing entries which have 
 been made in pursuance of duty in the ordinary course of business 
 to be admitted as evidence further than the decisions have already 
 carried it.^ Accordingly, it has (as already mentioned) been held 
 that, to be admissible, an entry by a deceased person must have 
 been made in pursuance of some duf;/.^ It has further been held 
 necessary that the person who made such entry should not only 
 have done so in the course of some duty, but should also have had 
 personal knowledge of the statements contained therein.^ In 
 accordance with this latter principle, in an action'' for the price 
 of coals sold at the pit's mouth, an entry, made in the folluwiug 
 manner, was rejected. In ordinary course, it was the duty of one 
 of the workmen at the pit to give notice to the foreman of the coal 
 sold ; and the foreman, who was not present when the coal was 
 delivered, and who was unable to write, used to employ one Bald- 
 win to make entries in the books from Ids dictation, and Biihlwin 
 read them over every evening to the foreman. The ioreinan and 
 the workman, whose duty it was to give notice to him, being both 
 dead at the time of the trial, Baldwin was called to produce the 
 book, to prove thereby the delivery of the coal in question. 
 Such book was, however, held inadmissible, since the entries, 
 although having been made under the foreman's direction tliey 
 might be regarded as made by him, as suoli foreman had no personal 
 knowledge of the facts stated in them, but derived his informa- 
 
 ' R V. Buckley, 1873 (Lush and 
 Mellor, JJ.). 
 
 2 See Doo v. Skinnor, 1848; Smith 
 V. Blakov, 1807 ; The Henry Coxon, 
 1878 ; Massoy v. Allen, 1879. 
 
 ' Hope V. Hope, 1893, C. A., where 
 it is pointed out that the case of 
 Rawlins v. Rickards, 1860 fin which 
 it was held that an entry by a de- 
 ceased solicitor in his diary, noting 
 the fact of his having attended a 
 
 client on a certain d'ly on her exe- 
 cuting a deed of appointment was 
 admissible in evidence), is of very 
 doubtful authority, since it is ex- 
 tremely hard to see in that case what 
 (hill/ the solicitor was under to make 
 the entry ; see also Bright n. Logertou, 
 18()()-1, and Kerin r. D.ivoren, 1601 
 (Ir.). 
 
 * Ryan v. Ryan, 1£8!) (Ir.). 
 
 ' Brain v. Preece, 1843. 
 
 '' I 
 
 455 
 
It'! ii 
 
 h r 
 
 i i- . 
 
 
 i'' 
 P 
 
 LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF RULE. [PART III. 
 
 tion at second-hand from the workman, did not possess the same 
 guarantee for the truth of the entries as existed in the cases 
 establishing the principle of receiving entries by a deceased person 
 in the usual course of business, — in all of which cases the party 
 making the entry had himself done the business, a memorandum 
 of which he had inserted in his book. 
 
 § 701. Where, to show that a Jew was of age, it was proved 
 that Jewish children are usually circumcised on the eighth day 
 from their birth, and that it belongs to the office of the chief llabbi 
 to perform this rite, and to make an entry thereof in a book kept at 
 the synagogue, and upon proof that the Rabbi was dead, this book 
 was tendered in evidence, it was rejected, probably on the ground 
 (none is stated in the report) that there was no legal dufi/ to make 
 the entry ; ' while in another case,^ an entry made by a deceased 
 employer in a book in which he had in the course of his business 
 been in the habit when hiring farm servants of always entering 
 the time and terms of such hiring, was -'ected. The decision in 
 this last case was expressly (while, as we have seen, that in the 
 case of the Rabbi was probably) on the ground that, although it 
 might be the practice, it was not the duty, of the person who, in 
 fact, generally did so, to make such entriep 
 
 § 702. The Legislature itself has, in at least one instance, 
 
 recognised and acted upon the exception under discussion.^* For 
 
 the statute, which regulates the Civil Bill Courts in Ireland,' 
 
 enacts that " a book or books shall be kept by every officer 
 
 appointed for the service of process, in such form as el .,11 be 
 
 directed or approved by the chairman or assistant barrister; in 
 
 which shall be entered the names of the plaintiff and defendant by 
 
 or against whom any process shall be issued, the cause of action, 
 
 the day on which such process shall be received to be served, the 
 
 day on which such process shall be served or execute'I, the place 
 
 where, and the name or description of the person on or with whom, 
 
 such process shall be served or left, and in case any such process 
 
 shall not have been duly served or left, then the cause of such 
 
 person in the course of his duty or 
 business, to bo I'eceived as evidence. 
 » 14 & 15 V. c. 57 ("The Civil 
 
 ly.wmcn Bill Courts (Ireland) Act, 1851"), 
 
 deceased § 10. 
 
 456 
 
 > Davis V. Lloyd, 1844. 
 
 » B. V. Worth, 1843. 
 
 '• -'. <"., the oxcM^ption to the general 
 rulo afjiuiiNt admitting hearsay, which 
 allows entries made by a 
 
C. VII.] ENTRIES AND ACTS MUST BE CONTEMPORANEOUS. 
 
 service not having been efFccted shall be stated; and each and 
 every process-officer shall attend, and produce such book or books 
 to the chairman or assistant barrister, at each and every sessions 
 of the peace, or shall cause such book or books to be produced to 
 such chairman or barrister in case of the unavoidable ahueuce of such 
 process-officer; and in case of the death y illness, or such absence as 
 aforesaid of any such piv^jess-officer, the book or books of such 
 process-officer, kept by him as aforesaid, verified on oath as to his 
 handwriting by some credible person, shall be produced at the 
 sessions, aud phall there be prima facie evidence of the truth of the 
 several matters entered therein as aforesaid." 
 
 § 703. The rules which regulate the reception of entries as made 
 by a deceased person in the regular course of business, are, in many 
 respects, the same as those which prevail with respect to declarations 
 against interest. For instance, the death/ the handwriting, and 
 the official character,^ of the person who made the entry must be 
 proved ; and it should further appear that he had no motive to 
 misstate. In some other particulars, however, a marked distinc- 
 tion exists between the two classes of cases. 
 
 § 704. In the first place, to render entries made in the course 
 of office or business admissible, they must, — unlike declarations 
 against interest, — be proved to have been made contemporaneously 
 with the acts tihich they relate? " It is to be observed," said a 
 learned judge, " that in the case of an entry against interest, proof 
 of the handwriting of the party, and of his death, is enough to 
 authorise its reception ; at whatever time it was made it is admis- 
 sible : but in the other case [of an entry made in the course of 
 business], it is essential to prove that it was made at the time it 
 purports to bear date; it must be a contemporaneous entry."* 
 The word " contemporaneous," does not mean that the entry mrst 
 have been made at the immediate time of the occurrence ; but it 
 will be sufficient if made within so short a time after as reasonably 
 to be considered part of the transaction. Thus, if the business be 
 
 ' See Cooper r. Marsdon, 1793 (Ld. 
 Kenvon). See ante, § (j(J9. 
 
 » i)oe«. Wittcomb. IHol. 
 
 » Eyan v. llyiin, 1889 (Ir.); Doe 
 V. Beviss, 18-18; Due v. bkiuDer, 
 
 1848 (Pdike, B,). 
 
 « I'aiko, 15.. -n Doe v. Turford, 
 1832; approved ly Park, J., in Pjole 
 V. Dicas, 1835. 
 
 467 
 

 ii. . 
 
 f 
 
 ENTRIES NO EVIDENCE OF INDEPENDENT MATTERS, [p. III. 
 
 dono in the morning, and the entry be made in the nvening of the 
 same day,' or perhaps even on the following morning,^ it will be 
 sufficient. Where, however, several intermediate days had elapsed 
 between the date of the transaction and the time of inserting an 
 entry of it in the book, the evidence has been rejected ; ^ and in 
 one American case, the interval of a single day was held to con- 
 stitute a valid objection.* The fact that the entry was made 
 contemporaneously may, like any other fact, be established either 
 by direct testimony, or by proof of any circumstances sufficient to 
 raise a reasonable inference that such was the case.' 
 
 § 705. Secondly, while declarations against interest are often 
 admissible to prove independent matters, which, though forming 
 part of the entry, are not in themselves against the interest of the 
 declarant," a stricter rule prevails with respect to official or business 
 entries. For, " whatever effect may be due to an entry made in 
 the course of office, reporting facts necessary to the performance of 
 a duty, the statement of other circumstances, however naturally 
 they may be thought to find a place in the narrative, is no proof of 
 those circumstances."' Accordingly, a certificate of a deceased 
 sheriff's officer, which had been returned by him to the office in 
 the ordinary routine of his duty, and which specified, among other 
 circumstances connected with the arrest, the phice where it happened, 
 was held not to be evidence to show the particular spot where the 
 caption took place, that circumstance being a mere incideut of the 
 performance of the officer's duty." " This decision turned on the 
 circumstance that the sheriff's officer was going beyond the sphere 
 of his duty when he made an entry of the ^^/rtce of arrest, and that 
 euch an entry therefore had no claim to be leceived as evidence of 
 that fact." 9 
 
 § 706. Some persons, indeed, have contended that the admissi- 
 
 mi. 
 
 :..Ji. 
 
 ' Price V. Tomngton, 1703; Eay 
 V. Jones, 1836 ; Curien v. Crawford, 
 1818. 
 
 * Ingrahamv. Bockins, 1823fAm.V 
 
 ^ Forsythe v. Norcross, 1836 ( Am.l. 
 
 « Walter v. Bollman, 1839 (Am.). 
 Contra, in England, The Henry 
 Coxon, 1878. 
 
 " lOast Union Ey. Co. v, Symonds, 
 1850. 
 
 « Ante, §§ 667—679. 
 
 ' Chambers v. Bernasconi, 1834 
 See, also, I'ercival v. Nanson, 185 
 (Pollock, C.B.); and Polini v. Gray 
 and Stiirla v, Freccia, 1879, C. A. 
 1881, 11. L. 
 
 " Chambers v. Bemasconi, 1834. 
 
 » Poole V. Dicas, 1835 (Park, J.). 
 See, also, id. (Tindal, C.J.). 
 
 458 
 
C. VII.] ADMISSIBLE, THOUGH BETTER EVIDENCE EXISTS. 
 
 bility of entries made in the course of business is also subject to a 
 third rule, which certainly does not apply to declarations against 
 interest. Such supposed qualificatiru has been alleged to be to 
 this effect ; — namely, that entries »nade in the course of office or 
 business cannot be admitted, unless corrohorafed by other circum- 
 stances which render it probable thtd the fuvtn then in recorded recdly 
 occurred. The supposition that any such qualification exists appa- 
 rently rests, partly, on a supposed dictum of Taunton, J, ; ' partly, 
 on a misapprehension of the rule, adopted by Lord Wensleydale, 
 that an entry made in the course of business is admissible " where 
 it is one of a chain or combination of facts, and the proof of one 
 raises a presumption that another has taken place ; " ^ and partly 
 on the circumstance, that, in one or two of the later cases on the 
 subject, confirmatory evidence has in fact been adduced, and its 
 existence has been noticed by the court as tending to establish the 
 correctness of the entry.' However, the existence of any such 
 qualification is denied by Mr. PhilHpps, who contends that, though 
 corroborative evidence must naturally add to the value of entries, it 
 cannot be deemed essential to their admissibility* and this view is, 
 it is submitted, the correct one. 
 
 § 707. However this may be, the further contention that entries 
 in the course of business will only be received when the nature of 
 the case is such as to render better evidence unattainable, has, at 
 all events, been expressly rejected, since "it would operate as a 
 great hardship to require the testimony of the persons who might 
 have been presant. The clerk who presented the bill could scarcely, 
 at the distance of two years, point out who it was that answered 
 his application ; and if it were necessary to call all the persons 
 who resided at the place of presentment, the expense and incon- 
 venience would be enormous. The rejection of the evidence which 
 
 > Doe V. Turford, 1832, making 
 his lordship pay, " A minuto in 
 writing like the present, made at 
 the time when the fact it records 
 took place, by a person since de- 
 ceaiied, in the ordinary course of his 
 business, corroborated by other cir- 
 cumstances which render it probable 
 that * that fact occuiTed, is adniis- 
 eible in evidence. Those corrobo- 
 rating circumstances must be proved: 
 
 and here many such circumstances 
 did a])p('ai'." Mr. Pliillipps suggests 
 that the words, ' ' the entry was made 
 when," have probably been omitted 
 by accident at the place marked with 
 the star : 1 I'h. Ev. a24. 
 
 ■i iJoe V. Turford, 1832. 
 
 3 Id. ; Poole v. Dicas, 1835. 
 
 « 1 rh. Ev. 324. See R. v. Cope, 
 183a (Ld. Uenman). 
 
 459 
 
BHOP-nOOKS OF PARTIES, HOW FAR ADMISSIBLE, [p. III. 
 
 \h'\i 
 
 
 
 tiin' 
 
 u 
 
 has been received, would be a great injury to the comraeroial 
 classes, by casting an unnecessary difficulty on the holders of bills 
 of exchange."* 
 
 § 708. To render an entry in the course of business, then, 
 receivable in evidence, it must have been made contemporaneously 
 with the matter to which it relates, and in the usual routine of 
 business, by a person whose duty it was to make the whole of it,* 
 who was himself personally acquainted with the fact, who had no 
 interest in stating an untruth, and who is since dead ; ^ and, 
 provided >.ll the terms of this proposition be satisfied, it seems to be 
 immaterial, excepting so far as regards the weight of the evidence, 
 that more satisfactory proof might have been produced, that the 
 declaration is uncorroborated by other circumstances, or that it 
 consists of a mere oral statement, which has never ]»een reduced to 
 writing.* 
 
 §§ 709 — 10.' In the United States the doctrine that entries 
 fulfilling the above requirements are admissible in evidence has 
 been extended to entries made by the party himself in his own shop- 
 books ; " at least, where they were evidently contemporaneous with 
 the facts to which they refer, and formed part of the res gestae. 
 Being the acts of the party himself, they are received with the 
 greater caution ; but still they may be seen and weighed by the 
 jury. This doctrine is not in accordance with the principles of the 
 English common law, as now understoo'' ' but in the time of 
 James I. it seems to have been regarded as sound. For in 1609 
 an Act was passed* "to avoid the double payment of debts," which 
 clearly recognised a tradesman's shop-books as instruments of 
 evidence on his behalf, since it provided that entries in them shoiild 
 
 « Poole V. Dicas, 1835 (Tindal, 
 C.J.). The same rule prevails with 
 respect to declarations against inte- 
 rest : ante. § 681. 
 
 ' Stapylton v. Clough, 1853 ; 
 Trotter v. Maclean, 1879 (Fry, J.). 
 See, however. Miller v. Wheatley, 
 1890 (diss. O'Brien, J.) (Jr.). 
 
 3 See Doe v. Wittcomb, 1853, H. 
 L. ; Miller v. Wheatley, supra. 
 
 ♦ Ante, § 672. 
 
 « Or. Ev. § 118, in part. 
 
 ° For the American statutes and 
 
 decisions on the above subject, see 
 notes to § 641 of the first three edi- 
 tions of this work ; also notes to 
 Gr. Ev. § 118. 
 
 ' Ellis V. Cowne, 1849 (Wilde, 
 C.J.). In Smyth v. Anderson, 1849, 
 the plaintiff's books were tendered 
 in evidence by him to show that he 
 had, throughout a sale effected by 
 means of an agent, debited the de- 
 fendant as principal, but were re- 
 jected. 
 
 • 7 J. 1, c. 12. 
 
 460 
 
C. VII.] SHOP-BOOKS OF PARTIES, HOW FAR ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 not be evidence after the lapse of more than twelve nioiith-t. This 
 Act is no doubt, in practice, always treated by our courts of law as 
 a dead lettei'. Yet it, in truth, is still unrepealed, and was in fact 
 recognised and made perpetual by the Statute Law Revision Act, 
 1863,' which repealed a few words in it which had originally mad© 
 it only temporary. It is therefore necessary that the original Act 
 should be inserted in this place.^ The reason for this no doubt 
 largely is that, while the statute is never noticed, tradesmen's books 
 may, by the common law, be referred to to what is technically 
 called "refresh the memory." They thus, in effect, and for 
 practical purposes, become evidence, though not technically so 
 called, and not being technically " evidence," the prohibition 
 against those which are more than twelve mouths old does not 
 attach to them.' 
 
 re- 
 
 ' 26 & 27 V. c. 125. 
 
 * The statute of Jamos I. is ex- 
 pressed in the curious language 
 then current, and it is as follows : — 
 "Whereas divers men of trades, 
 and handicraftsmen, keeping shop- 
 books, do demand debts of their 
 customers u])on the; .■ shop-books long 
 time after the same hath been due, 
 and when, as they have supposed, 
 the particulars and certainty of the 
 wares delivered to be forgotten, then 
 either they themselves, or their ser- 
 vants, have inserted into their said 
 shop-books divers other wares sup- 
 posed to be delivered to the same 
 parties, or to their use, which in 
 truth never were delivered, and this 
 of purpose to increase by such un- 
 due means the said debt : (2.) And 
 whereas divers of the said tradesmen 
 and handicraftsmen, having received 
 all the just debts due upon their 
 said shop-books, do oftentimes leave 
 the same books uncrossed, or anyway 
 discharged, so as the debtors, their 
 executors or administrators, are often 
 by suits of law enforced to pay the 
 same debts a^ain to the party that 
 trusted the said wares, or to his exe- 
 cutors or administrators, unless he 
 or thejr can produce sufficient proof, 
 by writing or witnesses, of the said 
 payments, that may countervail the 
 credit of the said shop-books, which 
 few or none can do iu any long time 
 
 after the said payments : (3.) Be it 
 therefore enacted by the authority 
 of tliis present Parliniiient, that no 
 tradesman or handicraftsman ki.'op- 
 ing a shop-book as is aforesaid, his 
 or th'iir executors or administrutorB, 
 shall be aUowed, admitted, or re- 
 ceived, to give his shop-book in evi- 
 dence in any action for any money duo 
 ly^j wares hereafter to be delivered, 
 or for woi'k hereafter to be done, 
 above one year before the same ac- 
 tion brought, except he or they, 
 their executors or administrators, 
 shall have obtained or gotten a bill 
 of debt or obligation of the debtor 
 for the said debt, or shall have 
 brought or pursued against the said 
 debtor, his executors or adminis- 
 trators, fome action for the said debt, 
 wares, or work done, within one year 
 next after the same wares delivered, 
 money due for wares delivered, or 
 work done. II. I'rovidud always, 
 that this Act, or anything heroin 
 contained, shall not extend to any 
 intercourse of tratiick, merchandiz- 
 ing, buying, selling, or other tiadinfj 
 or denlir.,; for wares delivered or to 
 be delivered, money due, or work 
 done or to be done, btitween mer- 
 chants and merchants, merchant and 
 tradesman, or between tradesman and 
 tradesman, for anything directly fall- 
 ing within the circuit or comjjasa of 
 their mutual trades and merchan • 
 
 '.', 
 
 461 
 

 m 
 
 i^^ 
 
 R ■JilF^ 
 
 MERCIfANTS' ACCOJNT-nOOKS, WIIKN ADMISSIBLE. fP. HI. 
 
 §711. Iiulopondontly of all Btntiifiihlo sanction, our courts of 
 equity liave for yours past, to a curtiiin extent, acted upon the 
 principle of admitting shop-books in evidence, in taking accounts 
 in cases in wliicli the vouchors have been lost.' And now, by 
 11. S. C, 188;], the court or a judge may, at any stage of the 
 proceedings in a cause or matter, direct any necessary accounts to 
 be taken, and " may, either by the judgment or order directing the 
 account to be taken, or by any subsequent order, give special 
 directions witli regard to the mode in which the account is to be 
 taken or vouched ; and in particular may direct that, in taking tht 
 account, the books of account in wliich the accounts in question 
 have been kept shall be taken as prima facie evidence of the truth 
 of the matters therein contained, with liberty to the parties inte- 
 rested to take such objections thereto as they may be advised."' 
 
 § Tl^.'' In the administration of Roman law, the production of a 
 merchant's or tradesman's book of accounts, regularly and fairly 
 kept in the usual manner, was deemed presumptive evidence (semi- 
 plena probatio) * of the justice c£ his claim ; and in such cases, the 
 suppletory oath of the party (juramentura suppletivum) was 
 admitted to make up the plena ^irobatio necessary to a decree in 
 his favour.* Several modern systems of jurisprudence follow this 
 
 fP 
 
 II: ,;! 
 
 dizc, but that for such thinp;8 only 
 thoy and every of them shall be in 
 case as if this Act had never been 
 made ; anything herein contained 
 to the contrary thereof notwith- 
 standing." 
 
 ' Lodge V. Prichard, 1853. See, 
 post. § 812. 
 
 » Ord. XXXIII. rr. 2. 3. See 
 Ixidge V. Prichard, 1853; NewbeiTy 
 r. Benson, 1854; Ewart ?'. Williams, 
 1855; Cookes i>. Cookes, 1863, 
 O'Grady v. Con-. 187G (Ir.) ; Alford v. 
 Clav. 1875 (Ir.). 
 
 »'Gr. Ev. § 119, verbatim. 
 
 * Tills degree of truth is thus 
 dffinod by Mascardus: — " Non est 
 ignorandura probationem semijjle- 
 niim cam esse, per quam lei gcstse 
 jhles (ili(/ua fit judici : non tamen 
 tantaut jure debeat in pronuncianda 
 8ontcntia earn sequi": 1 de Prob,, 
 Qusest. 11, n. 1, 4. 
 
 ' " Juramentum (suppletivum) de- 
 Vi'i lur ubicunque actor habet pro se — 
 
 aliquas conjocturas, per quas judex 
 inducatur ad suspicioncm vel ad opi- 
 nandum pro parte actoris" : 3 Masc. 
 do Prob., Ooncl. 230, n. 17. The 
 civilians, however they may differ as 
 to the degree of credit to be given to 
 books of account, concur in opinion 
 that they are entitled to considera- 
 tion, at the discretion of the judge. 
 They furnish at least the conjeduroi 
 mentioned by Mascardus ; and their 
 admission in evidence, with the sup- 
 ])letory oath of the party, is thus 
 defended by Paul Voet, De Statutis, 
 § 5, cap. 2, n. 9: — " An ut credatur 
 libris rationem, seu registrisuti loqu- 
 untur. mercatorum ot artificum, licet 
 probationibus testium non juventur ? 
 Eespondeo, quamvis exemplo porni- 
 ciosum esse videatur, quemque sibi 
 privata testatione, sive adnotatione 
 facere debitorem. Quia tamen hrec 
 est mercatorum cura et opera, ut 
 debiti et crediti rationes diligonter 
 conficiant. Etiam in eorum lore et 
 
 462 
 
 ,i 
 
til. VII.] MF.UCIIANrs' HOOKS SHOULD BR ADMISSFULK. 
 
 doctrine. Thus, by French law, the books of mcn^hMnts and 
 tradesmen, regularly kept, and written from day to day witliout 
 any blank, when the tradesman has the reputation of probity, 
 constitute a semi-proof, and, with his 8up[)letory oath, are received 
 as full proof to establish his demand.' The doctrine is also acted 
 upon in Scotoh law, by whidi the books of merchants and others, 
 if kept with such a reasonable degree of regularity as to be satis- 
 factory to the court, may be received in ovidenof, the party being 
 allowed to give his own " oath in supplement " of such imperfect 
 proof ; though a course of dealing, or other " pregnant circum- 
 stances," must apparently be, in general, first shown by evidence 
 aliunde, before the proof can be regarded as amounting to that 
 degree of semi-plena probatio, which may be rendered complete by 
 the oath of the party.* 
 
 § 713. Reference to these laws is made here because it is con- 
 ceived that the adoption of a somewhat similar praotieo in all the 
 English and Irish courts of justice would jirove highly beneficial ; 
 especially in cases where actions are brought or defended by the 
 representatives of persons deceased. 
 
 tnusis, ox aequo ot bono est juciican- 
 (ium. Insiiiior iion admisso uliquo 
 litiuin acccknandarum romedio, com- 
 mercioruin ordo et usus evcrtitur. 
 Neque onim ouinos pra.'sonti pi'cuiiia 
 inei'cc'8 sibi compuiant, nwiuo cu- 
 jusqiio r(!i venditioni testes udhiboii, 
 qui pretia mercium noverint, aut 
 cxpodit, aut coiigruum est. Non 
 iuiiiuuni vidcbitur illud statutum, 
 quo domosticis talibus instrumcntis 
 additur fides, mode aliiiuibus ad- 
 miuiculis juvontur." See, also, 
 Heitius, de Coll. Leg. § 4, n. 68; 
 7 8tiyk. de Sem. Piob., Di.sp. 1, 
 cap. 4, § 5 ; Monoeh. do Prses., 
 lib. 2, Prses. 57, n. 20, and lib. 3, 
 
 Proo8. 63, n. 12. 
 
 1 Poth. Obi., Part iv. ch. 1, art. 2, 
 § 4. By th<3 ("ode Nujxih'oii, mer- 
 chants' books are requiriMl to bo k(!pt 
 in a jiarticular iniiuuor therein jjre- 
 ecribed, and none otliers are ad- 
 mitted in evidence : Code de Com- 
 merce, liiv. 1, tit. 2, art. 8 — I'J. 
 
 * Tait, Ev. (Sc.) 273-277. This 
 degi-ee of j)root' is thoro defined aa 
 " not merely a 8Us])icion, — but such 
 evidence as produces a reasonable 
 belief, though not complete evi- 
 dence." See, also, 2 Dickson, Ev. 
 (Sc), §§ 1179 et seq. ; Glassf. Ev. 
 (Sc.) 650; BeU, Dig. (Sc.) 378, 898. 
 
 463 
 
4631 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 AMEEICAN NOTES. 
 
 f 1 
 
 Shop-Books. — Books of Account. — The proof of matters of 
 account, frequently embracing numerous items but slightly appeal- 
 ing to the memory, offers a Held where the regular rules of evi- 
 dence can be ajjplied only with much hardship and exi)ense. 
 
 In mercantile eomnuirities, where many accounts are carried 
 along on books of entry, where many clerks are employed, fre- 
 quently changed and lost from knowledge or beyond the reach of 
 process, a natural importance attaches to the book entry itself. It 
 is felt that the fact of tiie entry is, to a certain extent, circum- 
 stantial evidence of its truth; that there is an inherent accuracy 
 in an entry made, without motive to misrepresent, by a quasi- 
 machine in the course of business, where it is both easier and 
 better to enter the truth than anything less likely to adjust itself 
 to other entries. 
 
 A persistent feeling of this kind could hardly fail to impress 
 itself upon courts, and tlie rules to be here briefly considered show 
 a very important tendency to relax, in a common-sense sort of 
 way, the rules of evidence in favor of written entries in books of 
 account. 
 
 Shoi-Hooks. — The historical development of the rule admit- 
 ting the entries on books of account began with the "shop-book," 
 technically so callf>d. The statute 7 Jac. 1 C. 12, 1 Kng. Kev. 
 Stats. GDI, refers to the use oi the "shop-book" as already 
 existing. 
 
 The early use of tl'e ".«iiop-book" was largely from necessity. 
 Parties had not as yet oetn m ide competent witnesses, and yet, 
 except where a clerk had been kept and could testify to the ac- 
 count, the evidence of the tfader or mechanic was absolutely essen- 
 tial to ijroof of the claim. The ''sutil rules of evidence had there- 
 fore to be relaxed to a certain extent in favour of trade; but 
 to a certain extent only. A tradesman or iiandicraftsman who 
 offered his "shop-book" in evidence, did not testify to the entry; 
 he was not a witness to that extent. The book spoke for itself as 
 to the entry. The tradesman merely swore to his book, that it 
 was regularly kept as iiis original book of accounts, &c. The oath 
 was not that of a witiu'ss. The relation of tlie witness to the book 
 was more nearly analogous to the semijtlciia jn'ohati-) and the plena 
 probittto of the civil law. 
 
 Probably the oath was required to be administered in court. 
 Frye i\ IJarker, 2 Tick. (;r» (1S1.'.'{). 
 
 The admission of such evidence is, for the most part, rested 
 upon tliis supposed necessity; — many nuM'chants and shojj-keejiers 
 are not able to keep a clerk, and would not, being themselves in- 
 
("HAP. VII.] 
 
 AMKUICAN N()Ti:S. 
 
 4G82 
 
 competent as witnesses, be able to prove their accounts at all if 
 such evidence were excluded. Cole v. Dial, 8 Tex. 347 (1S52). 
 "liooks of original entries, verified by the truth of the party, and 
 that the entries were made by him, have always been received in 
 evidence in Tennsylvania, from necessity, as business is very often 
 carried on by the principal, and many of our tradesmen do not 
 keep clerks. ... It must be in an account of the daily transac- 
 tions of the party, and not in the nature of a receipt-book. It 
 must be in a course of dealing between the parties, and the entries 
 made about the time of the transaction. . . . The law fixes no 
 precise instant when the entry should be made. At or near the 
 time of the transaction, they should be made. It is not to be a 
 register of past transactions, but a memorandum of transactions as 
 they occur." Curren v. Crawford, 4 S. & K. .3 (1818). 
 
 The statement of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, in 
 Harwood v. Mulry, 8 Gray, 250 (1857), that "the extent to which 
 such evidence was admissible has not been marked with entire uni- 
 formity in the diiferent states of tlie Union, but each has ado})ted 
 its own system," seems entirely correct. 
 
 In Connecticut, it is said that the rule as to shop-books is 
 "coeval with the government." Terrill v. Beecher, 9 Conn. 344 
 (1832). 
 
 Tlie rule and its statutory enlargement Avere adopted by certain 
 of the American colonists. The Massachusetts rule is thus stated 
 in 3 Dane's Abr. Ch. 81, Art. 4, p. 318. "The rule in Massachu- 
 setts is, and ever has been, to admit in evidence books of accounts, 
 kept in tlie daybook or ledger form; as to the sale and delivery of 
 goods; as to the jjayments of sums of money not exceeding .f().(>7; 
 and as to labor jierformed; with these restrictions, tliat tlie origi- 
 nal entries or first charges be produced to tlie court and jury. The 
 creditor must swear,, if the charge was made by himself, that he 
 mnde it at, or very ne.ar, the time the thing was done; and that it 
 is true, and, if required, tliat it has not been paid. If a clerk 
 made tlie charge, he must swear to like facts; and if the jterson 
 who made the charge be dead, his handwriting must be jiroved; 
 and if a clerk, &c., that he was usiiiilly intrusted by the creditor 
 to make suidi entries in his books, and that tiie books produced in 
 evidence are or were the ])laintiff's account-books. A book ac- 
 count .annexed to the writ or filed in, is tlie thing to be jiroved, 
 and by the party using this kind of evidence; and as this is evi- 
 dence from the interested party himself, and reimgnant to the gen- 
 eral rules of evidence, though perli.a])s of necessity, it is to bo 
 .admitted under every guard and security the nature of the case 
 .admits of; .and therefore it is one of the best precautions to require 
 the jiarty, so proving his account, to file, in the case, all the items 
 of it, as early as he must have his writ served, or his account, if 
 
4633 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 ilia 
 
 I 
 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 defendant, filed in, in order to give the opposite party reasonable 
 time to prepare to meet them; and so lias been our practice arising 
 from ancient statutes revised and included in the act of Oct. .'}(), 
 1784, and of Feb. 27, 1794." 
 
 Under certain circumstances, the shop-book was admissible to 
 show the delivery of goods or the performance of work for third 
 persons. 
 
 Where A. directed B. to get C. to do, on A.'s account, wliat 
 blacksmith work B. wished to have done, and agreed to pay C. for 
 it; and B., when called as a witness in a suit by C. against A., 
 was unable to recollect the dates or items of the account, it was 
 held that C.'s shop-book, with his suppletory oath, was admissible 
 in evidence to prove his charges against A. "Tlie rule, that 
 where there is a delivery of goods to third persons, the book can- 
 not be admitted, is not without exceptions. In cases of small 
 articles procured by the members of a family, and delivered to 
 children or servants, from time to time, it would be impossible that 
 such delivery could generally be proved. To enforce this rule, as 
 inflexible, would therefore produce much more serious injury than 
 the relaxation of it, under circumstances where the book itself 
 contains the articles, as delivered, and whicli is subject to the 
 examination of tlie debtor." Ball r. Gates, V2 Mete. 491 (1847). 
 
 In New Hamj)shire, the evidence is rejected where otlier evi- 
 dence — e. ;/., that of tlie servants to whom the articles were (h^liv- 
 ered — is available. Kicdiardson, C. «I. says: — "As this is in trtitli 
 the admission of a party to 1)0 a witness on his own cause, tlie 
 jn-actice (of admitting acccmnt-books of the party supported by 
 his oatli) is ronfiiied to cases in 'vliich it may be presumed there is 
 no better evidence, and has many limitations. ... In tiie first 
 place it must appear, tliat the charges are in the handwriting of 
 the i)arty, who is sworn;" because if they are not, tlie third 
 party making them can be sw(n-n, and there is no use of calling tlie 
 party himself. So if the charges do not a])iieiir to he the fair record 
 of daily transactions, free from susi)icioiis circumstances of fraud, 
 &c., the book is not admissible. If the account has been trans- 
 ferred to another book, it must be produced. If it ajjpears by 
 the book itself on the examination of the party that there is better 
 evidcnrt", the book cannot go to the jury. Kastman v. Moulton. 
 .'{N. H. irtii (ISIT.). 
 
 LiMiTKi) TO sMAi.r, .\MorNTs. — The shoji-book was limited to 
 petty tradiug. Probably the usual limitation to forty shillings (or 
 its equivalent in the dei)reciatt'd American currency of the differ- 
 ent states) may be traced to the influence of another early English 
 statute, ."{ Jac. cliap. li") (160.")), in the preamble to which it is 
 recited that "whereas by virtue of divers acts of Common Council 
 made within the City of London, tlie Lord Mayor and Aldermen 
 
CHAP. Vll.] 
 
 AMERICAN NfJTES. 
 
 4G3* 
 
 ..'I i 
 
 of tlie same City, for the llelief of poor Debtors dwelUii.t:; within 
 the said City, have accustomed monthly to assign ' Two Aldcniuii 
 and Twelve discreet Commoners to be Commissioners, and sit in 
 the Court of Kequests, commonly called the Court of Conseicnce, 
 ill the Guildhall of the same city, there to hear and deteriiiine all 
 Matters of debt not amounting to the Sum of forty Shillings, to be 
 broug't before them,' " tlierefore the procedure is amended. 
 
 The same limitation of forty shillings (see IMyinouth Colony 
 Laws, p. 128 (ICGO)) was preserved among the colonists. 
 
 As early as 1782, in Cleaves' Case, in Essex County, as cited in 
 3 Dane's Abr. Ch. 1 Art. 4 § 2, the supreme judicial court of Mas- 
 sachusetts "decided that in proving money payments by book- 
 charge and the party's suppletory oath, no one item or charge in 
 cash must exceed 40.s. or !i)!0.t)7, that originally it was found neces- 
 sary to limit this kind of evidence to some moderate sum; and it 
 appeared from immemorial practice that this was the sum." In 
 Davis V. Sanford, 9 All. 21(5 (18(54), the same court say: — "The 
 l)rincipal charges are for cash, and the items exceed forty shillings 
 in amount. The book is inadmissible in proof of these charges." 
 Davis V. Sanford, 9 All. 216 (18G4); Burns v. Fay, 14 Tick. 8, 12 
 (183;}). 
 
 "The account-books of a party are admissible, with his supjde- 
 tory oath, to prove a charge of money to the amount of .fiG.GT." 
 Kelton r. Hill, .W Me. 114 (187<»). 
 
 "The book of the deceased, if shown to be in his own handwrit- 
 ing, would not be evidence of the payment of such a sum as this, 
 as was ruled by the court, nor indeed of an}' cash payment exceed- 
 ing JSii.Oi)." ilich )'. Eldredge, 42 X. II. IT).'} (ISOO). 
 
 In Ohio, charges for money loaned, there being no mutual items 
 of acc(mut, have been rejer'cd. Hough )•. Ileiik, 8 Oh. Circ. (jt. 
 iViA (1894). See also, to same effect, r>urns v. Fay, 14 Tick. 8 
 (1833); K-lton v. Hill, r>H Me. 114 (1870); IJnssett i-. Spottord, 11 
 N. TI. 1()7 1840). 
 
 ]iut wheri^ such mutual items of account are included, the mere 
 fact that certain of the items are for cash loaned in the usual courso 
 of b\isiness is not sudicicnt to exclude any part of the account. 
 Cargill /'. Atwood. (li. I.) 27 Atl. 214 (I89.'i). 
 
 In North Carolina, under a statute, the shoji-book was "good 
 evidence for small articles . . . proved to be delivered within two 
 years." Alexander v. Smoot. l.". Ired. (X. C.) Law, 4(11 (I8ri2). 
 
 The later di'velopnicnt of the riilc of sliop-books has adiiiitteil 
 them as evidence of larger sums than forty shillings. Wilson v. 
 Wilson, () N. J. Law 9n (1822). 
 
 For example, an account of .i?lo21.84 was allowed in White v. 
 Whitney, 82 Cal. 1(53 (188i)). So of one of .1^98.40 in Kichardson 
 V. Emery, 23 N. H. 220 (1851). 
 
 I-, 
 
 .( 
 
4636 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part in. 
 
 S 1 
 
 3. t 
 
 H- 
 
 Nature of Charge Limited. — The rule being established in 
 favor of small tradesmen for petty amounts of goods sold, work 
 done, &c., the innovation was limibed to the precise case covered 
 by the rule. Other items than those usually embraced in such an 
 account cannot be proved by the shop-book and suppletory oath of 
 the tradesman. 
 
 " A book charge for three montlis' service as one item, was inad- 
 missible, according to all the authorities." Henshaw v. Davis, 5 
 Cush. 145 (1849); Karr v. Stivers, 34 la. 123 (1871). 
 
 An item of "7 gold watches, $308," is not a proper subject of 
 book charge. " This species of evii > ;ice was not the proper e\ 'ence 
 to establish a sale of this magnitude and character." Buy. n v. 
 liogers, 11 Cush. 346 (1853). 
 
 Items for cash have been rejected. Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 
 Johns. 461 (1816); Davis v. Sanford, 9 All. 216 (1864); Carman v. 
 Dunham, 6 Halstead (N. J.) 189 (1830); Cole v. Dial, 8 Tex. 347 
 (1852); Wilson /-. Wilson, 6N. .J. Law, 95 (1822). "The necessity 
 of tlie case, however, which gave birth to our practice in this par- 
 ticular, by no means warrants that entries in day books should be 
 considered as evidence of money lent or cash paid. In those in- 
 stances the necessity does not exist; for the party has it in his 
 power to take notes or receipts, in the ordinary course of dealing." 
 Ducoign *•. Shreppel, 1 Yeate's, 347 (1794). 
 
 So, under a statute in Connecticut, modifying the early law of 
 shop-books, it is said that the rule " has not been extended so as 
 to embrace property loaned, and not returned; nor to compensa- 
 tion for injuries of any kind ; nor to recover money jiaid on a note, 
 which had not been applied. . . . For similar reasons, it ought 
 not to be extended to money or other articles, delivered in fulfil- 
 ment of any contract." Terrill *'. lieecher, 9 Conn. 344 (1832). 
 
 The consideration of a promissory note cannot be jtroved in this 
 way. "It would be extending a rule of evidence peculiar to some 
 of the New England states, greatly beyond any of the precedents." 
 Rindge r. Breck, 10 Cush. 43 (1852). 
 
 The evidence is not admissible to prove a charge of $19.06 for 
 labor on a petition to enforce a mechanics' lien. "To admit 
 them in this proceeding would be a step beyond any case yet 
 decided. . . . Tlio party has it in his power to secure other evi- 
 dence of the work wliirh he has performed, either by the testimony 
 of the contractor, or of his own fellow workmen." Lynch r. Cro- 
 nan, 6 Gray, 5.31 (1856). 
 
 The books of a keeper of a billiard-table are not comnetent under 
 this rule. Hoyd /•. Ladson, 4 M'Cord, 76 (1826); or for "billiards 
 and drinks" and "games." Baldridge r. Penland, 68 Tex. 441 
 (1887). 
 
 But the accorints of an attorney may be proved in this way. 
 
 W \ 
 
 U-' 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 AJUERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4t;c6 
 
 Codinan r. Caldwell, .31 Mo. mO (l.Sr>0). An attorney at law can 
 l)rove tlio rendering of services b}' his day-book and aiijiarently also 
 by a private trial docket. Uriggs r. (ieorgia, IT) \t.. ()1 (184.3). 
 This has, however, been qua-riid in Pennsylvania, and, so far as re- 
 lates to a charge for commissions on colleetion it has been held in 
 that state that "cash is not a proper sid)jeet for book charge, neither 
 is interest or commission as casli." ilale r. Ard, 4S Pa. St. 22 
 (1SG4). In Connecticut, a jiarty was not allowed to show the pay- 
 ment of tlie hnndred dollars on a note in this way. Tlic court 
 say ; — "It would be difficult, perhaps, to lay down any geneial prin- 
 ciple, which would determine, in all cases, what articles may and 
 what may not be charged on book. Put, no charge can be admitted 
 on book, unless the right ko charge exists -t the time of delivering 
 tlie article, and arises in consequence of such delivery." Pradley 
 /'. Goodyear, 1 Day, ll>4 (1(S0,3). In North Carolina, by statute, the 
 amount of charge is limited to sixty dollars. Pland c. Warren, 
 05 N. C. ,".72 (1871). 
 
 The entry is not admissible to show 'the t.me during which a 
 vessel was at a wharf. " This suit is neither for goods sold, nor 
 for work done, and it lias been always understood, tliat entr'^s 
 made by the plaintiff himself, are evidence in no other cases. It la 
 dangerous to allow a party to make evid^^ace in his own favour. 
 The rule must be confined, to the two cases that have been men- 
 t'oned; we see no distinction between tlie plai itt's giving his 
 book of original entries in evidence, to prove the use and occupa- 
 tion of a wharf, and giving it in evidence, to ])rove the use and 
 occupation of a house, or of anything else." Wilmer v. Israel, 1 
 Browne, 257 (1811). 
 
 CoxFiUMATioN Aui'NDE, — Where such proof is possible, the 
 plaintiff is at liberty, e\'en if not required to do so, to coniirm his 
 book by evidence of its correctness, from sources other than his 
 own supjdetory oath. 
 
 For example, by the evidence of other customers, "that they had 
 dealt and settled with tlie ]daintitt's, and tliat they kept fair anJ 
 honest books." Linnell r. Sutherland, U Wend. "iflS (18.'I4). 
 
 The delivery of certain of the items charged may also be proved, 
 in confirmation of the account. Linnell /•. Sutherland, 11 Wend. 
 r)()8 (18.34). In Vosburgh /•. Thayer, 12 .Johns. 401 (1815), it is 
 said to be necessary to show tlie course of dealing, that the party 
 has no clerk; that some of the articles l-.ave been delivered; that 
 the books and the account-books of the parVy are fairly and honestly 
 ke^it, .ind tliis by those who have dealt and settled with him. 
 Another reason given is vhat the ])arty debited is shown to liave 
 reposed confidence by dealings with and being entriisted by the 
 other party. Vosburgh r. Thayer, 12 .Tohns. 401 (1815V 
 
 "lleputation in the neighbourhood of keeping correct accounts " 
 
463' 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 m.\ 
 
 m 
 
 
 'ii ■■( 
 
 :M 
 
 has been considered a sufficient confirmation. Landis /•. Turner, 
 14 Cal. 57'A (1860). 
 
 The defendant may ascertain, "by cross-examination, the cir- 
 cumstances under which the entries are made." Thomson v. 
 Porter, 3 Strob. Eq. oH (1800). 
 
 The court may admit the book de bene, conditional upon corrob- 
 oration being i'urnislied, and if corroboration is not furnished, re- 
 ject it. " The judge couhl not know, until the end of the trial, what 
 corroborating evidence there would be; and after the evidence 
 was all in, it was propei- for the court to decide upon the compe- 
 tency of the book. This is a species of evidence peculiar in its 
 nature, of the competency of whicli, in each case, the court must 
 decide." Henshaw r. Davis, 5 Cush. 145 (1849). 
 
 1'relimixaky Pkook to thk Couht. — As in other cases where 
 the admissibility of evidence depends on proof of some ])rt'liminary 
 fact, it is for the court to decide upon inspection wliether the shop 
 books offered in evidence are fairly kept, in good faith, as a con- 
 temporaneous record of daily transactions. 
 
 For example, in Davis n. Sanford, 9 All. 21(5 (18G4), the court 
 say: — "A few of the entries for goods sold contain the dates of 
 the sales, and ap[)ear to be original charges made at or near the 
 time of the transactions to be proved. But most of the entries are 
 without any date; and on some of the pages the handwriting and 
 ink are so much alike as to indicate that the entries wore all made 
 at one time, tliougli they relate to separate sales which were prob- 
 ably made on different days. The book does not, on inspection, 
 sulticiently appear to be tlie daily minutes of the party, made at or 
 near the time of the transactions to be ]irovpd, so as to be admissi- 
 l)le in eviilence within the rule stated in Cogswell r. Dolliver, 2 
 Mass. L'LM. and I'rince /•. Smith, 4 ]\Iass. ir);"*. 
 
 In Wilson v. Wilson, X. J. Law, 9;") (1S22) the court refuse to 
 permit evidence of cash clmrges written on one of tl>e last leaves 
 of a book, detached from tlie daily entries and at^counts by sundry 
 intervening blank leaves and dated during the ti;ne of such on- 
 tries and accounts. The decision, however, '-an hardly be regarded 
 as of great authority, because of the three? judges composing tlie 
 court, one tliouglit the entries should be rojoctcd on tlint ground; 
 another that all entries of cash were inadmissible; and tlie third 
 judge was in favor of admitting tlie entries. 
 
 Statutoky MoniKicATiox. — The rule respecting sho])-books 
 had received, for reasons in part stated stijira, an extended statu- 
 tory developnu'iit in various of the United States, even jirior to 
 the general removal of the restrictions disqualifying parties as 
 witnesses. The general effect of these provisions was to authorize 
 tlie reception in evidence in behalf of a party of all account-book 
 entries which the court felt were made as a daily bona fide record 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 4G38 
 
 of contemporaneous transactions. Robinson r. Dibble, 17 Fla. 4.')7 
 (1880); Marsh v. Case, ao Wis. TWU (1872); Patrick r. Jack, 82 111. 
 81 (187(5); Thomson ik Porter, 4 Strob. (S. C.) Eq. r)8 (LSaO); 
 Woodbury n. Woodbury, 50 Vt. ir>2 (187(;); Pay l: Cook, 22 N. J. 
 L. ."U.S, .'353 (1850); Ganahl /■. Shore, 24 Ga. 17 (1858); Williams 
 V. Gunter, 28 Ala. 081 (185()); Neville r. Nortlicutt, 7 Cold. 294 
 (18G9); Morse v. Congdon, .'{ Mich. 549 (1855); Anderson v. Ames, 
 6 la. 480 (1858). 
 
 The distinctive reason for admitting shop-books fell with the 
 enactment of statutes permitting parties themselves to testify as 
 witnesses. As the supreme court of Pennsylvania say: — "Ques- 
 tions in relation to books of entry as evidence, since the Act of 
 18G9, making the parties witnesses, stand upon a different footing 
 from that on which they stood before. Then, the book itself was 
 the evidence, and the oath of, the party was merely supplementary. 
 Now, the party himself is a competent witness, and may prove 
 his own claim as a stranger would have done before the Act of 
 1809. That the facts contained in the book, either of charge or 
 discharge, of cash or goods, or whatever else is in his personal 
 knowledge, might be proved by a stranger, no one doubts. A clerk, 
 for instance, could prove the account, including rash items, from 
 his own knowledge, and might use the book to refresh his memory. 
 The ])arty now stands by force of the act on the same plane of com- 
 petency' as the stranger stood upon, and therefore muy make the 
 same proof that a stranger could; he may also refer to entries made 
 at the time of tlie transaction in corroboration of his testimony." 
 
 Nichols )•. Haynes, 78 Pa. St. 174 (1S75). The person making 
 a memorandum may u.se it to refresh his memory. Price r. Gar- 
 land, .'} N. M. 505 (1885). 
 
 An interesting illustration of the development of the law in tliis 
 branch may be found in Wilson /•. Wilson, (! N. J. Law 95 (1S22), 
 where the court are willing to admit entries regardless of amount, 
 but, in the case of at least one judge, consider tbat cash payments 
 cannot be so proved. "According to the principles of the coniinon 
 law, a man's book of account cannot be ])roduced in evidence in liis 
 favour; but a contrary ])ractice has jrt-evailed for sucli a great 
 lengtli of time througliout all tlie courts of judicature m tliis state, 
 as t' have formed a general rule quite the other way, that every 
 man's book of account is evidence in his favour, ])rovide(l the en- 
 tries therein made are original entrit's, and were made at tlie time 
 the transactions took place, or as nearly at tlie time as is usual. 
 But this general rule never obtained in such latitude as to make 
 everything lawful evidence that a man chooses to write in his book, 
 for then he might enter in it the testimony of an absent witness, 
 the confession of an adversary, or the service of a notice. The 
 general rule extends to no other entries than for goods and articles 
 
4t)39 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT III. 
 
 r^nj.-'ilj "! 
 
 sold; work, labour, and services performed by a man, his ser- 
 vants, and means, and materials found and provided. Beyond 
 tliese limits, wliich take in all trades and professions, entries in a 
 man's book never were, and never ought to be evidence in his 
 favour." 
 
 Hooks of Accoi'XT. — While this rule respecting the use of 
 shop-books was in operation, another rule, — /. e. , that respecting 
 entries made in course of business was shaping itself; — to the effect 
 that, under practically the same conditions of contemporaneous- 
 ness, bond Jide keeping in course of business, absence of motive to 
 misrepresent, &c., any entry which a person was under a legal or 
 professional duty to make, or which was made, in tlie course of 
 business was admissible, after the death of the declarant, in ac- 
 tions between third parties. 
 
 When almost universal legislation made parties competent wit- 
 nesses in most instances, and thereby removed, as above stated, 
 the original reason for the rule regarding "shop-books," the con- 
 venience of the use of this species of evidence was by no means 
 lessened. Stroud c. Tilton, 4 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. ;m (18(50). 
 On the contrary, the growth of commercial transactions ratiier 
 tended to increase its value. The party, now a witness, became 
 entitled to use his original books of account, when made by him- 
 self, in the usual course of business, and at about the time of the 
 trai! ''action, as a memorandum to refresh his recollection, regard- 
 less of the amount or nature of the transactions. If his recollec- 
 tion were not refreshed, but he were enabled to state that the 
 entry was accurate when made, the entry itself became evidence, in 
 connection with his statement. 
 
 A note to Price /•. Torrington, 1 Smith's L. C. (9 Ed.) p. 566, is 
 cited with approval in Culver ;;. Marks, 122 Ind. .'554, 5(54 (1889) 
 as fidlows: — " * A party's own books of account and original en- 
 tries are now. in most, if not all, of the United States, received as 
 evidence of a sale and delivery of goods to, or of work done for, 
 the adverse party.' On the same subject it is iurther said: ' The 
 reason for its introduction has never been placed, by any court, on 
 higher ground than that of necessity. For, in view of the number 
 and frequency of transactions of which entries are daily required 
 to be made, the difficulty and inconvenience of making formal com- 
 mon law proof of each item would be very great. To insist upon 
 it, therefore, would either render a credit system impossible or 
 leave the creditor remediless.'" 
 
 It is, of course, necessary, that the account be relevant to the 
 issue. Jones /•. Henshall, 3 Col. App. 448 (189.3). 
 
 And book entries may be competent for other reasons, — i. e., as 
 admissions. German Nat. Bank. v. Leonard, 40 Neb. G70 (1894); 
 First Nat. Bank v. Huber, 75 Hun, 80 (1894); Looniis v. Stuart, 
 
CHAr. VII.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 40310 
 
 (Tex.) 24 S. W. 1078 (189,'?). Or as part of tlie res gesto in a scheme 
 of fraud; Fleming v. Yost, ].'?7 Ind. 95 (189.'}). Or as cironmstan- 
 tial evidence, e. fj., where tlie effort is male to show tliat no inter- 
 est had been ])ai(l by A. in a certain obligation l)y (evidence that 
 A.'s a('(!Ount-b()()k showed many otiier payments of iiiti-rest. I'eck 
 V, Pierce, (Mi Conn. 310 (189.'!). That all A.'s payments of interest 
 are not entered on this same bonk is a matter merely of the weight 
 of the evidence. Jhh/. But the book of deceased attorneys is 
 not admissible of itself to prove that they did not receive a 
 payment of money upon a judgment, in the absence of proof that 
 this is the attorneys' only account book. Shaffer r. j\IcCraekin, 
 90 Ta. 578 (1S94). 
 
 Tlie rapid extension o1 the rules respecting eiitries in course of 
 business and nunnoranda to refresh recoHection, when combined 
 with the dillieulty, expense and frecpu'iit imjiossibility of making 
 other proof of book-accounts, could hardly fail, after parties be- 
 came competent as witnesses, to affect the rule res])ecting "shop- 
 books," which had so many important elements in common with 
 the other rules. Legislative enactments and judicial legislation 
 combined to make the extension a rapid one. 
 
 The old term "shop-book" is fretpuuitly retained, but the rule, 
 as it obtains in the most of the different jurisdictions of the United 
 States, has dropped every limitation of amount and allows, undertho 
 old conditions prescribed for the use of the shop-book, original 
 entries on books of account, of merchants, tradesmen and others, 
 made in the usual course of business, as a contemporaneous record 
 of current transactions, by a party, or those in his employ, to be 
 given in evidence whether in favor of or against the party who 
 offers them. Probably the rule in Missouri is a fair examjde of the 
 growth of this development. "Since a party may testify in his 
 own favor, it must bo conceded that he, as well as his clerk or 
 book-keeper may refresh his memory from entries made by him, 
 or under his eye and then testify as to the fact with his memory 
 thus refreshed. Now in case of an account composed of numy 
 items, all this means nothing more than reading the book in evi- 
 dence. This we all know fro.n daily experience in the trial Courts. 
 It is out of all reason to say tliat a merchant or his clerks can 
 recall each item of the account, and a fair-minded witness will 
 generally decdine the attempt. Account-books are admitted in evi- 
 dence from the person by whom they are kepi when the entries are 
 made at the time, or nearly so of doing the jirincipal fact, because 
 entries made under such circnimstances constitute a part of the res 
 gestae. An entry tlius made is more than a mere declaration of 
 the i)arty; it is a verbal act following the princi[)al fact in the 
 orderly course of business. Such is certainly the custom and 
 course of business at the present day." Hissrick /•. Mcl'herson, 
 
 I '-1 
 
463" 
 
 AMEHICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AUT III. 
 
 If 
 
 '.I <, ■■ 
 
 
 >!> 
 
 ill 
 
 20 Mo. 310 (1850); Railway Co. v. Mui'iiliy, GO Ark. 'X\\\ (IKOo); 
 Irish /'. Horn, 84 Ifim, IL'I (liS<)o). In Maryland, entries in course 
 of business are not admissible in favoi of tlie jiorson niakinfj tlieni, 
 though adniissibh; to refresh his recollection. Stalling.s c. (Jott- 
 schilk, 77 Md. 429 (1893). 
 
 "Tradesmen's books of original entries, made in the ordina"" 
 course of their business, are admitted in evidence under certain 
 restri(!tions, on account of the impracticability of making better 
 proof of the sales and delivery of articles in the course of a busi- 
 ness conducted from day to day between parties; in reference to 
 which it is not usual to make or evidence contracts in the methods in 
 which isolated transactions are ordinarily transacted or evidenced. 
 Certain facts must be shown, however, before such books are ad- 
 missible. 1. It must be shown that the books offered contain the 
 daily record of tlie business of the ])erson for whom they are kept, 
 as it transpires from d'ly to day between himself and customers, 
 and that the entries therein are ori%'in;il entri<'s, made contempora- 
 neously with the transaction of the business which the enti -s are 
 intended to evidence. 2. The entries must relate to the busi. ^s 
 carrieil on by tlie person for whom the books are kept, and not to 
 matters in no way connected with that business. .3. The entries must 
 be sufficient to show with reasonable certainty what thing is made 
 t!ie basis of the charge. 4. The book must be on its face regular, 
 and the entries free from suspicion of alteration. .5. The person 
 offering su(!h books, if tliey be kejjt by himself, must ordinarily, 
 if living, make oath to their correctness; and we tliink further, 
 that he should be held to make proof tending to show his probity 
 and fair dealirg; as that the accounts of other persons kept in the 
 same manner are usually found correct, or so treated by custom- 
 ers." Haldridge i-. renlimd, (>8 Tevns, 441 (1887). 
 
 Hooks of OitioixAii Extuy. — As in case of the "shop-book," 
 tlie account-book, to be admissible, must be the book of original 
 entry. Wall r. Dovev, (JO Pa. f^t. 212 (18C)9); Huston's Estate, 
 1(57 Pa. St. 217 (1895); Jones v. Henshall, 3 Col. App. 448 (1893); 
 ]\[eetli >'. Rankin Brick V.o., 48 111. App. 602 (1892); Durkheimer 
 V. Heilner, 24 Oreg. 270 (1893); Skipworth v. l)eyell,83 Hun, 307 
 (1894). For couvenience, a ])roj)(;rly verified transcript of the ac- 
 count has been admitted, the original entries bein-^ in court. Texas, 
 &c., Coal Co. '•. Lart-son, 31 S. W. (Tex.) 843 (189,")). 
 
 A "inemoranduui-book from which to enter up the charges 
 against parties in what is called the sales book," cannot be 
 received. Hancock r. Hintrager, 00 la. 374 (1882). 
 
 Ho "cash books and other books of occasional entry" cannot be 
 admitted under the rule. Kotwitz v. Wright, .37 Tex. 82 (1872). 
 
 It is not ill itself sufficient ground for rejecting the evidence that 
 the book of original entries is kept in ledger form. Hoover r. 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4(38'^ 
 
 Gehr, 62 Ta. St. 136 (1869); Swain ■::. Cheney. 41 N. H. L*.'$2 
 (18(;()); Wells V. Hatch, 43 N. H. 246 (1861); Faxon /•. Hollis, 13 
 Mass. 427 (1816). 
 
 Hut a single item constituting an account, and shown only on 
 the ledger for a lump sum embracing many separate items, is not 
 admissible. "It was not an entry upon a merchant's book, but 
 was, on the contrary, an independent entry, by a party to tlie 
 suit, of evidence in his own behalf." Doty r. Smith, 68 Hun, l'.)*.) 
 (18U3). 
 
 When it appears that charges have been posted into the ledger, 
 the latter book, however, is a necessary part of the jiroof. I>on- 
 nell r. i\[awha, 37 X. J. L. 198 (1S74). 
 
 A check-book stub, from which the checks have been rut off, is 
 not evidence for a plaintiff of the facts stated on it. "That is no 
 book account. It is a check-book, a mere memorandum of a 
 merchant, of the checks he draws on his banker. He cannot be 
 •sworn to such memorandum in his own case." Wilson v. (Joodin, 
 Wright (Ohio Supreme Ct.) 219 (18.33). 
 
 So an invoice book of an agent is not evidence of the sale and 
 delivery of goods. "The day-book containing the original traus- 
 actions as they occurred, proved on oatli or admitted, must l)e i)ro- 
 duced,or i)arol evidence given of the delivery of the merchandise." 
 Cooper ('. Morrell, 4 Yeates (Pa.) .341 (1807). 
 
 • Where "the book produced was a small memorandum book, 
 apparently carried in the pocket, consisting of ten leaves and con- 
 taining sundry minutes, some in pencil and some in ink, of money 
 paid out and money received," and nn account therein contained 
 was offered with the plaintiff's "own oath " to prove sale and de- 
 livery of forty-five cords of wood, this being tlie only cliarge of 
 such a nature, the book was rejected. "There is no princijde on 
 which such extremely loose papers as those offered by the plaintiff 
 are admissible in evidence, as a book of accounts. They do not 
 possess that intrinsic evidence of their truth, without which the 
 admission of account books is extremely dangerous to the cause of 
 justice. In the lirst place, the charges in the hand-writing of the 
 party, must appear in such a state that they may be jiresumed to 
 have been his daily minutes of his transactions and business. . . . 
 It would be much easier to manufacture a book containing the 
 plaintiff's statement of a single transaction, than a regular account 
 book containing the minutes of his business from day to day. . . . 
 Undoubtedly tlie practice has l)(>en very lax on this jwint . . . and 
 the exidanation ... is to be found in the fact that the great 
 cheapness and convenience of this mode of proof has insensibly 
 introduced a laxity in tlie practice, which the courts in question 
 found it difficult to limit to the cases for which such evidence was 
 originally designed. We have already held that there is no par- 
 
4(iy''' 
 
 A mi: I lie AN NOTKS. 
 
 [rAi'.T in. 
 
 It ' 
 
 ticiiliir ronii ill wliicli the iiccoiint liook of ii [KU'ty iimst lie kept; 
 Ciiinuiiii-s r. Nichols, l.*{ N. H. llM); and wi- an! (Icsivcms of adai.t- 
 iiii,' Lht' ink' r(',L;iiIatiiiy tlio ailiuission uf it to tlu? practical liiisinfss 
 of life, so far as tiiiit may bu ilouc without violating' the principlo 
 tliat a iKirty siiall not lie a witiit'ss in cliiuf in his own casu," 
 Kii'hanison r. Kiiu-ry, Ll.'i N. 11. L'L'O (18.")1). 
 
 A tiuio-liook which hail only the name of the party and marks 
 inidcr particular dates, has been received. Afathes r. liohinsoii, 
 8 Mete. L'd'J O*^'-!); l>ii!k<'i> '•• Winters, IGl) I'a, St. lUd (1811,")). 
 
 In Maine, marks on a shingle or notches on a stick have been 
 received. Kendall /•. I'Meld, II Me. iH) (I8.'i0). So of an aceoiint- 
 book where statements of weight, &c., were omitted from the 
 items, lloojier r. Taylor, .'W Me. L'L'4 ( IS"*")). So in Massachu- 
 setts, as to this last point. I'ratt /•. White, l.'W Mass. 477 (I881i). 
 
 Original entries of charges in a diary have been re;!eived as orig- 
 inal entries. (Jleason r. Kinney, (!5 Vt. ;")(»(» (ISD.'V). 
 
 Even a letter may be. "a sort of original entry." Houghton /•. 
 Paine, L'i) Vt. r>7 (KSaC)). 
 
 ]iiit it has been held that the register of a loan agent is not a 
 "book of account," but merely a private memorandum of the owner. 
 U. S. Hank r. Mur.son, 90 la. li)l (181)4). 
 
 If account-books offered in evidence are so kept as to be intelli- 
 gible, there is no reason why they should not be etiually admissilile, 
 whether kept by double or single entries, or by setting apart Tv 
 ptage, or part of a page, for each customer and exhibiting in one 
 w the whole account. Toomor r. (Jadsden, 4 Strobh. (S. C.) 
 VXi (18.-»()). 
 
 A party is entitled to explain any ])eculiar or unusual marks 
 appearing on his account-book. Singer .Mfg. Co. *'. Leeds, 48 111. 
 App. 21)7 (1 SOL'). 
 
 "In the United States, a tradesman's book of original entries is 
 in most jurisdictions received in <'vidence as prima facie proof, 
 when supported by the tradesman's oath." White r. Whitney, 82 
 Cal. UMi (1889); Thomson c. Torter, li Strobh. (S. 0.) Eq. 08 
 (isr,0). 
 
 It is a requirement that the entry should be made in the course 
 of business. Karr r. Stivers, .'U la. 123 (1871); Thomson /•. Por- 
 ter, 3 Strobh. (S. C.) Eq. 'tH (18r)0). 
 
 The entrj' must not only be made in the course of business, but 
 it must relate to the declarant's business. "The rule is hard 
 enough to include merchants, shop-keepers, tradesmen, mechanics 
 and farmers, in all that jiertains to their callings. Put it would 
 be dangerous to open the door of admission wider than this. The 
 inclination of the court is not to extend this kind of evidence 
 beyond its succinct limits, and we think it has not been so far 
 stretched as to include the casual sale of an article not in the 
 
n\Av. VI 1. 1 
 
 AMKUir.VN NdTKS. 
 
 4(;3>* 
 
 fiourao of tlio ijartios' Inisincss, mid of wliicli it is uHiuil to tiiko 
 otlier i)ro()l' or evidence of salo. ... It is mucii iM-ttcr to adlicm 
 to tiiis practice tiiaii to overstep the aiicdeiit iiiiiits of the rule, 
 sanctioned only throu{,'ii necessity, and tlieii run the hazard of 
 olditeratin.!,' the only int(dli},'il)lc lint; (jf distintaion." Slioeuiaker 
 V. Keiio;,', II I'a. St. .'MO (1841)). 
 
 The entry is re<,'arded as none the less "ori,i,'inal " that the first 
 actual record is made upon a slate, and allerwards transferred there- 
 from into the book offered, if practical convenience and the course of 
 business refpiirt! it. I''axon /•. Mollis, I.'l .Mass. ILT (18ir>) — a 
 cast! of work and labor broii^dit by a blacdisniith; Uarker c. Has- 
 kell, 9 Ciudi. L'lS (iHr.li); Landis V. Turner, II Cal. oT.'J (\m)); 
 Hall *'. (Hidden, .'{'.) Me. ■{{:> (l.S,'.r>); PiUsbiiiy /-. Locke, ;{;5 N. H. 
 •.)() (iMrKI); Redlich /;. l{aiierlee, <».S 111. l.'M (l.SSI). 
 
 So also where the ori^'inal entries of a butcher were in the form 
 of "chalk scores on the curt, stating' to whom the meat was sold, 
 and the (piantity aiul price; from which scores, on the return of the 
 cart on the same day, and before it went out a^'aiii, it was the cus- 
 tom of the otlier partner to make entries in the book of oriijinal 
 entries," the book was held admissible. Smith /•. Sanford, 12 
 rick. i;{.S (1831). 
 
 So where work was done by the servants of a painter, who testi- 
 fied that they broutj;ht home memoramla of the items of service 
 and of the amount of jiaint furnished, and from thesi- memoranda 
 the chartjes were made in the book, it was ludd the bocjk account 
 was admissible. Morris /•. liri.<,'<,'s, .'? Cusli. ."»J2 (ISlit). 
 
 The book ort'ered is none the less a book of ori<,MiKil entries, that 
 it is made up from information ori},nnally furnished by loose mem- 
 oranda. Hoover r. Gehr, i)li I'a. St. \'M\ (ISC)'.)). Or "entered 
 each day on a slate, by those doing it, or under whose eyes it was 
 done." And where "the book-keeper entered these charges from 
 day to day in the books and effaced them from the slate." Stroud 
 »;. Tiltmi, 4 Abb. (^t. of App. Dee. IVJ-i (\H{\(\); Nichols /•. Vinson, 
 9 Houst. L'74 (1891); or that the account is kept liy the use of 
 simple straight marks, the maker being unable to write. Miller v. 
 Shay, 14") Mass. 1(>2 (1887). These memoranda need not, and 
 usually cannot, be produced, l.andis r. Turner, 14 Cal. r»73 (18(»()). 
 
 But where sales were entered at the close of day U]>on a ledger 
 from loose slips, by items which did not show the kind of goods 
 sold, it was htdd that the ledger was not admissible as a book of 
 original entries. Way i>. Cross (la.) (;.*{ N. W. G91 (189")). This 
 ruling was correct ui)on other grounds. 
 
 The memoranda must be transferred to the book of original 
 entries within a rea.«onable time. 
 
 Three days is not an unreasonable length of time. Landis v. 
 Turner, 14 C'al. 57.'{ (1860). 
 
 lU 
 
8' ■!' 
 
 W I 
 
 463" 
 
 AMEKIUAN NOTES. 
 
 ti 
 
 1:, 
 i 
 
 [part hi. 
 
 Where tlip plaintiff, a rord-waiiipr doing a very small business, 
 made his oliarges ■'iiitoii a slate until it was full, and in from two 
 to four weeks from tlie time they were so entered, when the worit 
 was done, he transferred them to his book," it was held "properly 
 received." Hall r. (ilidden, .*«) Me. 44.') (IH.V)). 
 
 Where the entrii's are transcribed from a pass-book "within a 
 couple of days," when tiie plaintitt' was sick, and every evening 
 when ho was well, it wa,; held snttleiently contenii)oraneous. Hoo- 
 ver /•. Gt'hrf iVJ J 'a. St. I'M (ISC)')). 
 
 Wiiere entries are transferred from memoranda, it was held in 
 an early case in i'ennsylvania that tlie entries ought in each ease 
 to be transferred "at least in tlie course of the day succeeding " the 
 day of entry on the memorandum, reje(!ting the book where some 
 of the entries had been transferred on tiie third day. Cook r. 
 Ashmead, li MiL (I'a.), L'CS (IS.'iS). 
 
 ExTuiKs Mi'sr Ki'.sT ON I'ldssoNAL Kxowi.KDoi:. — The entry 
 nius be verilied by the evidence of the person who made the entry 
 or appropriate ])roof of his handwriting. State v. Hopkins, "»(( Vt. 
 2r.(>, L'ivS, (l.S8;i): Coi'.ntryman r. lUmiier, 1(»1 Mich. L'lH (1S'.»4); 
 M.'cth r. Kaidiin Hrick Co. 48 HI. App. Odli (18!»L'); V. H. Hill 
 Co. <". SoMimer, ■)"> HI. App. 34.5(181)4); Skipworth /•. Dryell, 8.'1 
 Hun. .107 (18<»4). 
 
 It is believed that the rule laid down in the supreme court of 
 Mississijipi in tlie following case is too liberal, unless the person 
 oil whose information the entry i made is also proiluced as a wit- 
 ness. "The rule is that to authorize the introduction of books of 
 account as evidence of the facts entered, it nnist be shown that 
 they have beiMi fairly and hoiH.stly kept, that they are the books 
 of a party engaged in the l»iisiiiess to wliicli tliey refer, that the 
 I'ntries were made in tlie usual course of business, at or abcmt the 
 time the fact;; entered transpired, that the entries are original and 
 made by a party having knowledge of the f-vcts entered, or that 
 information thereof was communicated to the party by wiiom the 
 entries were niatle .ly some person engaged in the business whose 
 duty it was to transact tiie jiarticular business and make the report 
 tliereof for entry on the books, and such re[(ort and entry must be 
 made at" the time of the occurrence or before the facts can be sup- 
 jiosed to iiave passed from liis recollection." Cliicago H. Co. v. 
 I'rovine. C.l Miss. L'S8 (188;{). "Plaintiffs' l>ooks of account will 
 not be ex(duded on the ground tliat plaiiitilfs kept a clerk during 
 tlie time of the dealings svliicli were the sul)ject of the action, 
 where ]daiiitilfs testily that, iliiring such time, they <lid not keep a 
 regular (derk, Init sometimes emphtyed jiersons to help them for a 
 few thiys or iiioiitlis. and also emidoyed ])ersons to assist tempnni- 
 I'ily ill posting the books, anil that the book entries by others than 
 id lintili's were made under their siipervision. in their presence, 
 
CHAP, vn.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 463>8 
 
 and at their suggestion, though they state on cross-examination 
 that they cannot say that they were always present when the 
 charges in the books were made, or that tliey saw or gave din'otions 
 as to every charge." Atwood v. r.arney, L'»J X. Y. Siip't. HU) (l.S<>4). 
 
 This requirement tliat the entry must have been based upon tlie 
 personal knowledge of the declarant must necessarily he relaxed 
 where, as frefiucntly happens, the entry is made by one jjcrson 
 upon information furnished him, and the remainder of the trans- 
 a(!tion is completed by another. Under these circumstances, if the 
 party making the entry can testify that lie has accurately entered 
 what he was told (or, in case of his decease, if his liandwriting ami, 
 possibly, general accuracy be proved) and the truth of the informa- 
 tion which was entered, be testified to by those on whose knowl- 
 edge it rests, it will b« sufficient verilication of tlie account. 
 
 "The decided cases have also sanctioned tlie rule that where 
 there is more than one individual connected with the sale and 
 delivery of the goods, and the making of the charges on tlie liook, 
 it is proper to introduce as witnesses all those persons wlio are 
 thus connected with the transaction, and whose testinionv is 
 necessary to establish those facts which would be retpiiied to be 
 proved by a single person, when such jjcrson had been the sole 
 actor, as vendor and book-keeper.'" Harwood r. Mulry, S(iiay, 'jr>{) 
 (18."»7); Miller i;. Shay, 14r» Muss. KL' (1.SH7) ; 1-ittlelield r.'lJn-e, 
 10 .Mete. 1'87 (l«l.")); Faxon v. Hollis, l.'J Mass. 41'*; (ISH',); Smitli 
 r. Sanfonl, IL' Pick. I'.V.) (IS-'U); Morris r. Uriggs, .'{ ('u^sh. 'M'J 
 (18r>7); Marker /•. Haskell, <> (Jush. L'18 {\Hr>'J). 
 
 A foreman, h;vving general charge of the work, with two gan*;- 
 foremen undtir him, each in charge of a separate gang, kept a time- 
 book, in wliich was entereil the name of each man employr'd; visited 
 the work twice a day, and checked oif on the time-iiook the time cd' 
 each nuin as reported to him by tiie gang-foremen, recognizing 
 .some workmen by their faces. I'lie gang-foremen did not see the 
 entries, liut testified that they had correctly reported the time of 
 ea(di workman to the general foreman. Held, tliat the Ixiok was 
 admissible, in connection with the eviih-nceof the general foreman. 
 " We are of opinion that the rule as to the admissdiility of memo- 
 randa may i)ro]ierly Ic extended so as to endiraee the cahc before 
 us. Tin* case is ni' an account kejit in the ordinary course of busi- 
 ni'ss, of laluirers emidoyeil in the |iriPsecution of work, l»nseii upon 
 daily reports of foremen who had cliar^'e of the men, and wiio, in 
 accordaiii-e with their duty, reported the time to another sulmidi- 
 natc of the same common master, but of a liit^dcr ^rade. who, in 
 time, also in accordance with his duty, entered tlie time as reported. 
 We think entries so made, with the evidence of the foremen that 
 they made true rcjxirts, and of the person who made the entries 
 that he correctly entered tliem, are admissible, it is substantially 
 
463" 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 T *"1 
 
 
 [PART in. 
 
 by this method of accounts, that business transactions in numerous 
 cases are authenticated, and business could not be carried on and 
 accounts kept in many cases, without great inconvenience, unless 
 this uietliod of keei)iuy and i)r()ving accounts is sanctioned. In a 
 business wiiere many laborers are employed, the accounts must, in 
 most cases, of necessity, be kept by a person not personally cni^ni- 
 zant of the facts, and from reports made iiy otliers. The iii-rson 
 in charge of the laborers knows the fact, but he may not have tlie 
 skill, or, for other reasons, it may he inconvenient that he should 
 keep the account. It n>ay be assumed that a system of accounts 
 based upon substantially the sanu; methods as the accounts in this 
 c;ise, is in accordance with the; usages of business. l;i admitting 
 an account veritied, as was the account here, there is little danger 
 of mistake, and tin; admission (d' such an account as legal evidence 
 is often necessary to jirevent a failure of justice. We are of 
 opinion, however, that it is a projier (lualilication of the rule 
 admitting such evideni'e, that the acount most have been made in 
 the ordinary course of business, and that it should not be extended 
 so as to admit a mere private nu'morandum, not made in pursuaiu-o 
 of any duty owing by the person making it, or when made upon 
 information derived from another who made the communication 
 casually and voluntarily, and i\iit iinder the sanction of duty or 
 other o!)ligation. The ease before us is within the <iualitication 
 suggested." Mayor, etc., of N. Y. r. Sec. Ave. \l. It. Co. lU'J \. V. 
 o7U (ISS(J). The evidence of tlie immsou having actual knowl- 
 edge of the time employed is necessar}', even if such person is 
 without the state. Little Uock Granite Co. v. Dallas Co. (>(! Fed. 
 Kep. r.L'2 (ISIM.) 
 
 Wiiere logs were measured as they werc^ saweil, and a memo- 
 randum of tJKiir contents marked on them liy the party sawing, 
 and at the end of each week the figures on the board were tran- 
 scribed into a book by one of the measurers, who, liowever. cnuld 
 not reeogni/.e the work of the other measurers liy tlieir lii,'ures on 
 th(^ boards, it was Indd tli;it the liook was not evidence of the 
 ipiantity of logs sawed without culling all the ])artics who had 
 measurt'd the logs. Leslie v. Hanson, 1 Ilannay (New Mruiis.) 
 2(»;< (ISCh); Chicago Lumbering Co. v. Hewitt, 04 Fed. Kep. ."{U 
 (IH'.M). 
 
 The rule being considered h:is no application to the ease, where, 
 though the actual entry is made by H,, its accuracy has been ascer- 
 tained by \. who has reported the fiicts which are Mie b;isis of the 
 entry to it. In such a ease the evidence of A. is sufHcieiit. 
 
 Tims where a witness took ilown ujum a slate the (|uantity in 
 each stick of timber drawn l»y him, added up the several i|nantities, 
 and gave tlieir sum to his wife or daughter, who entered it in his 
 presence upon a niemoi'.iiuluui book, and he then examinetl the 
 
P 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 403" 
 
 entries and found that they were correct, it was held that the hook 
 might he submitted to the jury in connection witli the testinumy of 
 the witness as comi)etent to show the quautity drawn by him. 
 I'illshury v. Locke, 33 N. H. % {iSm). 
 
 Kntkiks mist hk Contemporaneous. — As in tlie case of the 
 sliop-book, the entry must be made at sidjstantially tlie same 
 time as the transaction. It is for this reason, in part, tliat tlie 
 book of original entry is alone admissible, lientley v. Ward, IIG 
 iMass. 333 (1H74); DaVis r. Sanford, 9 All. 21<> (1804); Martin u. 
 [Nichols, ~}i Mo. App. ~>\H (1<S',)3); Collins I>ros. Drug Co. r. 
 (Jraddy, .57 Mo. App. 41 (IS'.M); llailway Co. r. Murphy, 00 Ark. 
 333 (189.")); Skipworth v. Dryell, 83 Ilun, 3(»7 (1894). The onus 
 of showing this, as other reipiisites of admissibility, is on the 
 jiarty ottering the account. l>rown v. Williams (Tex.), 31 S. W. 
 L'-.") (189")). In an action against an estate upon a book accoui.*- 
 for "drinks," "billiards,'' etc., the c(mrt say, "It was shown that 
 the otlier entries in the books were in tlie handwriting of the 
 appellee, but tiiere wa:; no evidence to show that the entries made 
 by him were cotemporaneous with the transactiim of the matters 
 to which they relate." Haldridge v. I'eidaud, 08 Tex. 441 (1887). 
 
 It is not fatal that a physician's book of cliarges contains entries 
 in which the work of several days for the defendant is consolidated. 
 "The charges of J^/i, in s(!veral instances, embracing services of two 
 or three days, are neither contrary to law nor the ])ractice that 
 jtrevails with men who keep their books of account at home, while 
 their labor and services are rendered elsewhere." Uay v. Cook, 
 '22 X. J. L. .34.3, 3r)3 (18r»()). 
 
 Wliere a laborer works by the day for a single employer, it is 
 sufficient if he sets down his time at the end of the week. He 
 "ouglit not in reason to bo held to nuike daily entries in his books." 
 Yearsley's Ajjpeal, 48 Pa. St. .')31 (hSfio). 
 
 In a Massadiusetts case where the entries were made u)) from 
 daily memoranda furnished by the servants, ".sometimes on tlie day, 
 sometimes every two or thrtie days, and one or two at longer 
 intervals," the entries were admitted. Morris v. liriggs, 3 Cush. 
 342 (1849). 
 
 "In this particular, every case must be made to depend very 
 much upon its own peculiar circumstances, having regard to the 
 situation of the jiarties, the kind of business, thi' mode of conduct- 
 ing it, and the time and manner of making the entries." jiarker 
 t;."na.skell, 9 Cnsh. 218 (I8r)2). 
 
 TijooK oi- Kntuv. — If the i)arty making the entry be alive, he 
 must l)e produced. 
 
 To entitle a memorandum to l)e read in evidence, it is indispens 
 able that the witness should verify tlie handwriting as his own. 
 (Jilchrist v. Brooklyn Grocers' Man. Assoc. 09 N. Y. 495 (1875). 
 
468» 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part ra. 
 
 Ml?' 
 
 W'^^ti 
 
 1|,J1|S 
 
 I 
 
 If the clerk or writer is available as a witness, he must be pro- 
 duced, Bartholomew v. Farwell, 41 Conn. 107 (1874). Or his 
 absence satisfactorily accounted for. Trice v. Garland, 3 N. M. 
 285 (188o). 
 
 A dictum in Connecticut suggests that in the case of a "book 
 debt," the evidence of the person making the entry, even if avail- 
 able as a witness, is not required. Bartholomew v. Farwell, 41 
 Conn. 107 (1874). 
 
 Where the clerk is dead, his handwriting should be i)roved. 
 Stroud V. Tilton, 4 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 324 (18G<)); McDonald v. 
 Carnes, 00 Ala. 147 (1890). 
 
 " Where the entries are in the liand-writing of a deceased person, 
 it is not enough, under any of the cases, for the administrator to 
 swear to the general conclusion that the books came to his hands as 
 administrator as tlie books of original entry of his intestate, and 
 that he believes the debt was unpaid." In all such cases there 
 must be proof of the handwriting of the deceased, whether prin- 
 cipal or clerk. Robinson /'. Dibble, 17 Flu. 457 (1880). 
 
 If the party making the entry is deceased, or otl orwise incompe- 
 tent, his handwriting should be proved. Hoover v. Gehr, (i2 I'a. 
 St. 130 (18()!)); Union Bank v. Knapp, 3 I'ick. J)(i, 100 (1825). 
 
 If the person who made tiie entry is ''dead or beyond reach, or 
 incompetent, his testimony is dispensed with ex no'e.initat^,''' 
 Bartholomew v. Farwell, 41 Conn. 107 (1874). 
 
 And this is true, t''oi. ;h the entry was originally made upon 
 information furnished by another person who delivered the goods, 
 performed the work, etc., provided .such second jjerson is presented 
 as a witiu'ss. Hoover /-. (iehr, (52 Fa St. 130 (18()'.)). It is also 
 settled that "original entries made by i\ person in his own books, 
 or made by his clerk, when done in the ordinary course of business, 
 and conti'mi)orane()Usly with the transaction to which such entries 
 relate, are generally atlniissilih^ in evidence to jirovc the correct- 
 ness of all items within the knowledge of the person making tlieni. 
 Before admissible, the entries must be sworn to as having been 
 nnidc by tlie party who made thcni, and that he knew of tlieir 
 correctness at tins tiim^ they were made, if such party is living." 
 
 It has been said in an early case, that it is not sutlicient to admit 
 proof of his handwriting that the writer is without tlie state, 
 Douglass r. Hart. 4 .McCord. 257 (1827). 
 
 But being lieyond the reach of process has gene.ally been 
 regarded as a satisfactory reason for admitting evidence of 
 handwriting. 
 
 Where a partner named Buck, in whose handwriting certain 
 entries were, had gone to jiarts unknown, the court in admitting 
 evidenct! of his handwriting say, "The same necessity therefore 
 existed for receiving the books in evidence that would have existed 
 
 '-!-. . Jl 
 
CHAP, vir.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 4t>3»» 
 
 if liuck had been dead at the time of trial." Mew Haven &<;. Co. 
 V. Goodwin, 42 Conn. 2.'J() (l.S7r)). 
 
 Other excuses will be acceiited for the noii-production of the 
 evidence of the person who made the entr) . 
 
 So where a party is insane, the account is admissible as proof of 
 his handwriting verified by the oath of the guardian. Whether 
 the person is sufficiently insane to justify admitting the evidence 
 is a preliminary question of fact for the i)residing justice. Holbrook 
 V. Gay, G Cush. 215 (1850); Union Bank v. Knapp, .'{ Tick. %, 
 108 (181>r)). 
 
 If he is dead, or insane, or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, 
 proof of his handwriting will be sufficient. Helling v. Fannin, 97 
 Ala. GIS) (1893). 
 
 Natukk ok Ciiarok. — Even where account-books are freely 
 admitted, regardless of amount, certain of the old limitations upon 
 the use of shop-books are still retained, as to the nature of tiie 
 charge in proof of which such books art; .vdmissible. 
 
 For example, in New York, account-books are not admissible in 
 proof of items of cash. "The rule which prev;iils in this state 
 (adopted, it is said, from tne law of Holland), that the books of a 
 tradesman, or other person engaged in busiiu'ss, coMtaiiiing items 
 of account, kept in the ordinary course of book-aectounts, are 
 admissible in favor of the person keeping them, against tlie party 
 against whom the charges an; made alter certain preliniiiiury facts 
 are slu wn, has no application to the case of books or entries reb.t- 
 ing tc cash items or dealings between the ])arties. ... 7 lie 
 rule admitting aecionnt-books of a Jiarty in his ^,\\\\ favor in any 
 case, was a departure from the ordinary rult^s of '.'vidence. it was 
 founded upon a supposed necessity, and was intended fur eases (jf 
 small traders who kept no clerks, and was eoniined to transactions 
 in the ordinary course of buying and selling or the ri'iidition of 
 services. In tliese casef, some protection against fraudulent entries 
 is afforded in the ])ublieity whi(;h to a greater or li'ss extent 
 attends the manual transfer of tangible articles of property, or the 
 rendition o. services, and the knowledge whicli third [lersons may 
 have of the transactions to whi(,'h the entries ndate. Hut tiie 
 same necessity does not exist in respect to cash transactions." 
 Smith V. Hentz, l.'Jl N. V. Kl'.) (1S92). 
 
 "The book to be admissible, it is said, must be a registry of 
 business actually done, and not of orders, executory contnicts and 
 things to be done subsequiuit to the entry." Hart ( . Livingston, 
 29 la. L'17 (1870). It was aeeonlingly held that an entry. " I'.o't 
 of Livingstons 25 fat hogs, 12 head delivered immediately, balance 
 when fatteiuid, )id. .f! 15.00," was not admissible. IliUl. 
 
 A United States marshal's book of fees and disbursements is 
 competent in favor of his administration. Kinney v. U. S., 64 
 Fed. Hep. 313(l"9;n. 
 
 I W 
 
 !l 
 
46321 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part in. 
 
 
 " Nor is it any objection . . . that the labor and services charged 
 were performed under a special contract as to the price." Swain 
 V. Cheney, 41 N. H. 232 (1860). 
 
 If the correctness of the orij^inal entries is proved, they may be 
 shown by secondary evidence in case of their destruction by tire. 
 Ins. Co. r. Weide, '.) Wall. G77 (iSGt)). 
 
 If tlie shop-book is otherwise competent, it is not necessarily 
 fatal that other outside a('(M)unts are put in at the close of the 
 shop account. White r. Whitney, 82 Cal. IG.'} (1889). 
 
 Statutory Extkxsio.v. — .Much of the rapid growth of this 
 branch of the law has resulted from statutory enactment. Hancock 
 V. Hintrager, GO la. 374 (1882); Wall v. Dovey, GO l*a. St. 212 
 (18G'.)). 
 
 Collateral Facts. — Whether an entry in course of business is 
 evidence of collateral facts is in disi)Ute. 
 
 Tliat A. is debited on the plaintiff's books is not "conclusive 
 evidence that the credit was given to liim, but only a circumstance, 
 strong it is true, to be submitted witli all the otlier evidence in 
 the cause to the jury." Myer v. Crafflin, 31 Md. 350 (1.SG!)). 
 
 Tiiat the plaintiff debited a person other than the defendant is 
 admissible as being "in the nature of admissions." Bentley v. 
 Ward, IIG .Mass. 333 (1874). 
 
 A plaintiff's books are not evidence to prove a promise of payment 
 by the defendant. Somers v. Wriglit, 114 Mass. 171 (1873). 
 
 A charge on a plaintiff's books is not conclusive as to the 
 ptirson to whom credit was given, (lilbert v. Porter, 2 Kerr (Xev 
 Bruns.)31)0 (1844). 
 
 A bo(»k account is said not to be "evidence in reference to the 
 amount of the claim due to the other ])arty, and of the true state 
 of t!ie account between the parties." Alexander v. Smoot, 1.3 Ired. 
 L. (X. C.)4G1 (1852). 
 
 ('oXKiRMATio>f Aliunde. — "The rule requires, in addition, 
 the suppletory oath of the party, and that it must be ])roved 
 aliunde, that lie was in the habit of keeping correct and j>ist 
 accounts." IJurleson v. Goodman, .32 Tex. 229 (18()9). "In order 
 to entitle books of acccmnt to reception as evidence, it must a])pear 
 tliat tlie party keeping and j)roduciug them is usually precise and 
 jjunetilious respecting tlie entries therein, and that they are 
 designed at least to embrace all the items of tlie account which 
 are proper sutijcts of entry." Countryman »'. Hunker, 101 Mich. 
 218(1894). 
 
 In a (leorgia ease, in reversing judgment for the plaintiff, the 
 court say : "To say notiiing of the character and condition of the 
 books themselves, not a witness swears that he kept correct l)ook8 
 from his own knowledge of his dealings; nor does any one depose 
 that he knew of any dealings between Cheever and lirowu. To 
 
CHAP. VII.] AMEKICAX NOTES. 4(ur^ 
 
 allow a thousand dollars to l)e recovered upon sikjIi proof, world 
 perhaps be going too lur." Clieever v. l>r<iwn. ,'!() (ia. <.)04 (LSOO). 
 
 It is immaterial thut the witnesses who testily to the general 
 correctness of the i)liuntirt''s books settled tiieir own aeconiits by 
 the ledger or did not verify the original entries. .Stroud /•. 'lilton, 
 4 Al)b. Ct. of App. Dec. 324 (l.SG()). 
 
 It ia sulficient confirmation if the plaintiff call as' witnesses 
 several persons who have kept tlie books oftered in evidence, "and 
 who testitii'd that tiie books were correctly and accurately kept, 
 and on tliese Dooks were daily entered the items. ... It is no 
 longer necescary to call as witnesses others who have settled by 
 the books." tieventli Day &c. Association r. l'"isher, '.io Mich. 274 
 
 Tlie testimony of a book-keeper to the accuracy of his accounts 
 has been regarded as a suHicient verification. Cleland r. Ajjplegate, 
 8 Ind. .\pp. 4'J'.) (189;'.). 
 
 Testimony of witnesses that they had dealt with jdaintitTs, and 
 had settled from plaintiffs' books of account, which they found to 
 be correct, is sufficient evidence that the books were fairly and 
 honestly kept to authorize their admission in evidence." Atwood 
 V. IJarney, 2*) N. Y. Supp. 810 (18'.)4). 
 
 "The j»resnmption, prima facie, is, that the book of a decedent 
 was regularly kept as a record of his daily transactiims. If testi- 
 mony is subsequently introduced whieli raises any question ujion 
 the 8iibje(!t it is for tlie jury to determine, under projier instruc- 
 tions from the court." Hoove, . . Cehr, (i2 l*a. St. l.'U! (^ISGi)). 
 
 I'ltKMMi.vAKY IxQi'iuiKs KoK TUK CiMitT. — As with otlicr mat- 
 ters of fact, incidental to tlie receiiit of evidence, the pndiminary 
 inipiiries relating to tliis class of evidence must be decided by the 
 court. "Such ])rivate entries of a party himself, made in the 
 reguhir routine of iiis business, are considered, especially in modern 
 times, as legal testimony, however weak it may be regarded, if 
 upon inspection of tlie l)ooks by the court trying a cause, they 
 appear to have been houestly kept, and tlu' entries, witho\it 
 erasures or interlineations, regularly and chronologically made." 
 ]{u:les(m V. (loodnnui, 32 Te.\. 22!» (ISC'I). "It is for the ccmrt to 
 decide upon the admissibility of the book offered, although the 
 weight to be given to it afterwards must be largely a (piestiou for 
 the jury, in connection with lis ippearance, the manner in whieli 
 it is kept, and the other evidence in the ease. It must ajipear to 
 have been honestly kept, and not iiitentionally erased or altered, 
 and to have been the record of the daily business of tin- party, 
 made for tlie purpose of estaldishing a charge against another. 
 Necessarily, regard is to be had to the education of tlie Jiarty, his 
 methods and knowledge of business, etc., in deciding this (piestion. 
 Cogswell I'. Doliiver, 2 Mass. 217; I'rince v. Smith, 4 Mass. 454. 
 
sir 
 
 46323 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 The decision of the court to admit the book is final and conclu- 
 sive, unless from its character, or troni that which was soiijjht to 
 he proved by it, it couhl not have been admitted even it it met 
 tliose tests." I'ratt v. White, 1.32 Mass. 477 (1882). 
 
 In Florida the rule is stated thus: "Originally book accounts 
 wtM'C' not adniissildc! in evidentse in this state. Higgs i\ Shehee, 
 4 Kla. .'{82. Subscfiuently to this decrision the Legislature passed 
 an act that shop books of account of either party, in which cliarges 
 and entries shall have been origiiuilly made shall be admissible 
 in evidence in favor of such party, and the credibility of sucli evi- 
 dence shall be judged of by tlie Jury in cases at law, and by the 
 court in cases of t |. ity. ( haptsr 0(52, Acts of 1854, Hevised 
 Statutes sec. 1120. d' i this statute, as construed by our 
 
 decisions, before the h s c; ii be admitted in evidence they must 
 be submitted to the i.. -jectio;' f the judge, accompanied with 
 proof tliat tlie entries therein wo .. originally made, that is, made 
 by the party contemporaneous witli the transactions tiu-rein 
 recorded, in due course of his business, and if they exhibit a fair 
 register of the daily business of the party, and appear to have been 
 honestly and regularly kept, they are admissible as evidence to 
 be judged of by the jury." Lewis v. ^leginniss, 30 Fla. 419, 
 428 (1802). 
 
 The party againsv whom such entries are offered may call the 
 attention of the couri, to inaccuracies and circumstances of suspicion 
 in the entries of the book, even as to .iccounts other than tlie one 
 otTered in the case. 
 
 If the liook is admitted to go to the jury, the party can introduce 
 intrinsic or extrinsic evidence as to tlie accuracy and goo<l faitli of 
 tlie book as to tlie account in litigation or any other, open cr closed. 
 "Wlien a book of original entries is offered in evidence, sun)K)rted 
 by tlie oath of the party, the court examines it to see if it appears, 
 prima facie, to be what it purports to be. If there are erasures 
 and interlineations, and false or impossible dates, touching ])oints 
 that are material, or if for any reason it clearly ajtpears not to be 
 a legal book of entries, the court may reject it .as incompetent: 
 (Churchman *'. Smith, (» Whart. 14r>; Cnrren i\ (;iawford, 4 S. 
 & It. .'{. If this does not clearly appe:ir, it is to be submitted to tlie 
 jury to judge of, and then it is competent for the adverse i)arty to 
 show its general character by jiointing to charges and entries att'ect- 
 iiig other parties, and by calling witnesses to jirove such entries 
 false and fr.iudulent. That this investigation may not run into 
 excessive departure from the issue on trial, the court should limit 
 it to the time, or near the time, covered by the .account in suit, 
 and should suffer no more examination of collateral ca.ses than 
 would bear directly on the general character of the book. If a 
 shop-book exiiibit, in respect to customers generally, illegal dates. 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 463»* 
 
 as on Suiulay, or impossible dates, as .'list of June or 30th Febru- 
 ary, or altered dates, or earlier dates after those that are later, or 
 any other su(di (foudenuiiug features, they are evidence for the jury 
 upon the general character of the book. The jury may form simu' 
 opinion from such examination, how far it is entitled u> weight in 
 the scales which they are holding. Whilst they should mal<e all 
 due allowances for mistakes, for ignorance and unskilfulness in 
 book-keeping, and for peculiarities in the plaintiff's business, they 
 should insist on the general honesty and accuracy of the book, 
 made in secret by one party against the other, and now ottered 
 as a guide to the conscience of the jury." Funk v. Ely, 4;") Vn. St. 
 44-4 (18G3). 
 
 Wkioiit kou tiik Juky. — Once admitted, the evidence of 
 account-books is entitled to such weight as the jury see tit to give 
 it. "Of these attributes and pre-recpiisites of the book accounts of 
 parties, the judge who tries the cause and has the opportunitj* to 
 inspect them, is better qualified to form an opinion than this coi' , 
 unless the books themselves are brought under review here. W !' n 
 they are admitted before the jury, as testimony, the jury alone are 
 to be the judges of the weight to be given to them." I'urles'.. v. 
 Goodman, 32 Tex. 229 (18G9); Dicken i;. Winters, 109 F.i. St. 
 126 (1895). 
 
 ;<i 
 
\!n 
 
 4G326 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 i^ -'-m 
 
 [I'AIIT III. 
 
 Entries in Course of Business. — I'roniiiient among exceptions 
 to the hearsay rule is that whicii admits oral declarations or written 
 entries made by a deceased person in the usual course of i)rot'es- 
 sional or otticial business, or in discharge ot some duty. 
 
 " We think it a sale principle, fliat memorandums made by a per- 
 son in the ordinary course of his business, of acts or nuitters wliich 
 liis duty in sucli business reipiires liim to do for others, in case ot his 
 deatli, are admissible evidence of the acts and matters so done." 
 Niidiolls i>. \V.d)b, S Wiieat. ,'iliG, :y^7 (IH'SA). On an a(!tion by 
 indorsee of a promissory note against an indorser demand and 
 notice may be proved by an entry of a notary's chuk since de- 
 ceased. " It has been recently settled, that the memorandums 
 made at the time by a person in the ordinary course of his business, 
 of ai'ts and matters which his duty in such businees rec^uired lum to 
 do for otliers, are admissible evidence of the acts and matters so 
 done after his death." Farmers' IJank v. Whitehill, IG S. & U. 89 
 (iSliT). 
 
 In a similar case, a protest of a note found among the jjapers of a 
 deceased notary pul)lic is good evidence of the dennind and notice. 
 
 " Notaries are iisually employed for that purpose by holders of 
 notes, and are trustworthy persons conversant with such business, 
 and tlierefore suitable and proper agents to 1);* so employed; and 
 tiieir written memoratula, after their decease, tliougli not competent 
 evidence in chief, yet from necessity are good secondary evidence, 
 becinse it is the usual course of tlieir duty and business to keep 
 such memoranda. Porter /•, .Indson, 1 (}ray 17") (1S54). 
 
 See also Sliove o. Wiley, l.S Pick. .loH (1S;U')), wliere no attention 
 is apparently paid by the court to the fact that the writer was 
 alive. 
 
 Entries in the private book of a deceased town treasurer made 
 in the usual course of his official duty, are competent. Rindge v. 
 Walker, 01 N. H. 58 (1881). 
 
 Kntries in tiie account book of a deceased physician of cliarges 
 for services as a surgeon in setting a fractured leg, made in course 
 of business are C()mp(!tent evidence, in a pauper settlement ca.se, 
 though not against the interest of the declarant. Augusta w. 
 Windsor, 19 Me. 'M7 (1S41). 
 
 Entries by a deceased jeweller as to the repairs, number, make, 
 «&c., of a certain watcli, made .according to the course of Iiis busi- 
 ness, are competent evidence of the facts set forth. State v. 
 rhair, 48 Vt. .'JfiG (ISTo). 
 
 "The entry by an attorney in liis register of the making of an 
 order or decree in a jjroceeding conducted by him, is admissible 
 within this rule. The order or decree is the act of the court, but 
 it is procured upon the apjdirntion of the attorney, and tlie fact of 
 obtaining it is a part of the history of the proceeding, which prop- 
 
 i\f'-: ■'! 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 4«;a26 
 
 erly and usually is insortetl in tlio rc-^ister. Tlioro is no absolute 
 duty rostiuK upon an attorney to make such an I'utry, but this is 
 not essential, it is suliicient it' the entry was tlu* natural conconiitant 
 of the transaction to whieli it relates, and usually accompanies it.'" 
 Fisher ;•. Mayor, 07 N. V. 7.'!, 77 (lS7(j) 
 
 So an entry of demand «)f payment of a certain note made in a 
 book kept, as recpiircd \ty the by-laws of tlu. hank by a deecascd 
 messenger, is competent evidence of demand. Welsh v. iJarrctt 
 ICMass. ;i71) (hsiy;. 
 
 The record of a station agent as to the movement of freight cars 
 at his station, made in the course of his duties as agent of the 
 company, is competent. K. 11. Co. v. Henderson, rij Ark. 402 
 (1«9;{). 
 
 It is not necessary that the duty should be one which is pre- 
 scribed by law. 
 
 The entry of a baptism, contemporaneously made by a Roman 
 Catholic jiriest, in th(! discharge of his ecclesiastical duty, in his 
 church record of baptisms, is eomiu'tent evidencu', after his death 
 of the date of the baptism, if the book is jiroduced from the pro)ier 
 custody; althongh he is not a sworn oflifer, and the record is not 
 required by law to be kept. Kennedy v. Doyle, 10 All. 1(51 
 ( ISGy). '• In the ca.=i before us, the book was kej't liy the deceased 
 l)riest in the usual cours<' of his ofliee, and was j)rod)iced from the 
 custody of his successor; the entry is in his own handwriting, and 
 appears to have been nuule contemporaneously with the perform- 
 ance of the rite, long before any controversy had arisen, with no 
 inducement to misstate, and no interest except to perform his 
 official duty. The addition of a memorandum that he had been 
 paid a fee for the ceremony could not have added anything to the 
 competency, the credibility, or the weight, of tin? record as evidence 
 of the fact. An entry made in the perfonnance of a religious duty 
 is certainly of no less value than one made by a clerk, messenger 
 or notarv, an attorney or solicitor, or a iihysician, in the course of 
 his secular occupation." See also Wliitcher v. McLaughlin, 115 
 Mass. 107 (1S74). 
 
 So the ofticial registers ke]»t by ])ublic officers for entry of official 
 transactions to discharge the duties of their offices iirc ailniissible, 
 though no statute rcfpiires the books to be kept. r>ell r. Ilcndrick, 
 LT) Fla,. 778 (ISSO). 
 
 "Official records, or books kept by persons in ])ublic oliice, in 
 which they are required to write down the i)roceiMlings of some 
 public body or corporation, are generally admissible in evidence, 
 although their authenticity be not confirni<'(l by an oath, or the 
 power of (^ross-examining the persons on whose authority their 
 truth and correctness depend." Little u. Downing, ."7 N. H. 355 
 (1858). 
 
403" 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AliT III. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 Hut it is requisite tli.it tlH>r(' shmilil be ii duty of soiik! kind. A 
 Holf-iiiiposed, optional task does tiot nonic within the rule. 'I'Iiuh 
 th(? snpienic jiidiciiil court of .VraHSiiclmsetts lias refused to admit 
 entries made by a deceased person of payments of money enlere<l 
 in a diary in wliicli he made daily entries. (Jostelo w. Cruwcdl, l;{!> 
 Mass. r.SS aSHo). 
 
 'I'lie hook must have a "connection with the busines.s of the 
 plaintiff."' Avery r. Avery, 4<.) Ala. l!*.'{ (l«7;j;. So a lawyer 
 cannot fix a date by proof of an entry in his diary, th(ni(,'h such 
 entry mi},'ht be used to refresh his recollection. Whitaker i*. 
 White, <;•> Hun, 'S>H (1S'.«). 
 
 Where the owner of a business, suspectinjj that an employee 
 was not aocoiintinj,' to him for sales, had another employee make a 
 list of sales on a slip of paper, it was h(dd that this was not an 
 entry in course of business. I'eck r. Valentine, 1)4 N. Y. iiUy 
 (1H,S4). 
 
 FiViiiKMK ( K Com. ATr.it A I. Facts. — The declaration is not only 
 evidence of t!ie jirecise fact which it was the duty or custom of the 
 declarant to enter, but of collateral facts stated at the same time. 
 
 So the entry on the baptismal register of a iJoman Catholic 
 priest "IS.'iT, December 17th. ISaptized .loanna, born iL'th," is 
 evidence not only of the date and fact of baptism, but of the date 
 of Itirth, thoui^h it was no part of the priest's duty to record the 
 date of birth. Kennedy v. Doyle, 1(1 All. 1(51 (iSOfi). Kntries on 
 the books of a deceased jeweller, showing the charges tor repairs 
 made on a (M-rtain watch, are competent evidence of its number, 
 maker, style, itc. in any suit svhere such facts are material. State 
 V. l'hair,"4S Vt. 'MW (IS?".). 
 
 On the contrary, it has been held in Pennsylvania, that tlie 
 record of a Lutlicran minister showing the burial record of certain 
 persons was iMcompetent to show the names of their parents, their 
 l)irthplaces, and the dates of birth, though this "was the usual way 
 of keeping the record." The court say: "This burial list was 
 com[)etent to show the death .'iiid burial of these ladies, but what 
 the pastor \n\t down in the i)ook as t«) their ])arentage, and the time 
 and jtlace of their buth, was incompetent, for the plain reason that 
 it was no part of his duty to make such entries. Stiea registers arc 
 not, in general, eviileuce of any fact not required to be recorded in 
 them, and which did not occur in the presence of the registering 
 oiKcer." Sitlcr v. Cehr, 105 I'enn. St. .'".77, (UlO (1SS4>. 
 
 "Apart from any statute reiiuiring it, the baptismal register of 
 a church, in which entries of baptism are made in tiie ordinary 
 covirse of the clergyman's business, is ;idmissible to jirove the fact 
 ami date of baptism, but not to prove other facts, as, ex. gr., that 
 the child was baptized as the lawful child of the parents, and hence 
 to infer a marriage between them." IJlackburn t'. Cr.awfords, 3 
 Wall. 17.-. (1S(m).' 
 
CMAI'. VII.] 
 
 AMKHHAN NOTES. 
 
 408!" 
 
 So it liivs been held in Michigan tli.it "tlie reoonl of .a laptisni, 
 when iulinissihle in evidenoe, is evidence of the diite of Itaptism, 
 but not of birth, although .stated therein.'' Durfec; r. Alibott, (51 
 Mieh. 471 (l.SSi;). And, in the same court, tliat :i book entry 
 cannot be u.sed as evidence not only of a certain jiaynu'Ut, but ahso 
 that it was "in full.'" "It is well settled lh;it such an entry cannot 
 jirove anythiu},' more ';han the ohar^je of such an amount, if it proves 
 that. Any further ei-try can have no \v('it,'lit to jirovc sucli a set- 
 tlenu'iit as is relied on iiere. I'look-entries, when receivaliie, are 
 not allowed beyond t!ie purpose for which the exception in tlieir 
 favor is made m the usual cour.se of business." Kstate of Ward, 
 73 Mich. '-"-'0 (\SS\)). 
 
 And it lias l)ccn hehl that a stranger cannot be a declarant of a 
 man's age, — e. tj., the secMctary of a lodge cannot make his state- 
 ment of the age of an aiiplicant upon the lodge books evidence of 
 su(di age. (Connecticut, &c., Ins. (.'o. i'. Schwenk, '.(4 l'. S. TiO.'l 
 (iSTCi). Similarly, on an indictment for cohabitation with a female 
 under eighteen years of age. the annual reports of tiie clerk of the 
 school district where the girl went to sciiocd — which stated the 
 age of the pupils — were rejected, as the clerk "was not re(|uired 
 to include in his report the names of the children or the a(;tual age 
 of any child." State ,•. Woods, 4'.l Kan. l.'.'!7 (1S'.»L'). 
 
 Mist hk Contkmi'ouaxkois. — If the declaration takes the form 
 of a written entry, such entry must be ma(h' at sid).staiitial]y the 
 same time as the occurrence of the fact wliicli it imrports to state. 
 ChafTee r. V. S., IS Wall. olCi. ".41 (IST.'i); Kennedy r. Doyle, 
 ]() All. IC.l (ISC.r.); I{. K. Co. r. Henderson, r.7 Ark. 4(lL' (1S<.).'"{). 
 
 Tliis must be shown by other evidence than the mere production 
 of a survey(M''s minutes. "The jirojiosed evidence falls under the 
 class of hearsay testimony, as to which the general r\de is that it 
 is inadmissible, to which nile, however, there are several excep- 
 tions, of which the present with certain (lualitications is one. 
 liusiness entries of deceased persons, when made in the line of 
 their duty are admissible in evidence. This is the rule, but it is 
 fiubject to the ijualitication that sucli entries to be admissible must 
 b<', first, original; and second, contemporaneous with the facts they 
 record; and these refjuisites must be established by evidence other 
 than what may be flerived from the entr'.'s themselves. The tield 
 notes (d' a surveyor sinct' deceased, nr le in the disidiarge of his 
 official duties ami contemiiomncoiis .rli tlie survey, are admissible 
 because siich eiitries an- made under a sense <d' business responsi- 
 bility, and b m otiicer liaving no interest to make untrue entries. 
 
 It li.as been held that where an entry has been m.ade against 
 interest, proof of the hand-writing of the j.arty and his death is 
 enough to auth.nize its reception at whatever time it is m.-de; 
 but in the case of entries in the course of business, they must be 
 
 1 
 
'I. 
 
 f 
 
 4i;!P 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTK8. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 (ionU'iiiporaneous with tlio tniusjKitioii, and if tlici-f is any doubt 
 wli('tii«'r til*' iMitries were made at the time of tht^ transaction, tliey 
 ari' aduiissihlf." Kay /•. Castle, 71) N'o. C. TiSO (1,S7S). Tlic evi- 
 «lence tliat an entry was eunteniitoraneous cannot Im- proved l»v a 
 presumption arisiny Irom the contents of tlie entry itself. 15arton 
 r. Dnn.iaH, L'l Q. H. V . 0. 1'7.S (1.S(m). 
 
 " Wiien a witness is sliown to he dt^ad, or beyond tlie jurisdiction 
 of tl»>(!ourt, written entries and memorials of a transaction, cnti-red 
 in tlu' usual course of business, and wiiidi are shown to be in tlie 
 handwriting; of the absent or deceased witness, and purport or are 
 shown to have b 'cn made at or about the time of such alh'i^ed 
 transaction, arc admissil)le evidence, in any issue involvinj; the 
 transaction to which they relate." Elliott v. Dycke, 7N Ala. loO, 
 
 iru (isHi). 
 
 ICntries. if made by one i)arty to a transaotion after the transac- 
 tion had l)een completed, are inadmissilde. '"Tiu' rights of tiie 
 defendant could not be varied by entries thus made, because tiicy 
 were not contemporaneims entries, made in the due c<PMse of the 
 business, as a part of tlie res gesta', but wcrt; made by one of the 
 parties after the riglits of tlie otlier p'.ity had become iixed. Hurley 
 V. (icrman-.\iii. Mank, 111 U. S. L'KJ (1SS;{). 
 
 This reipiircme it of contemporaneousness is the jjrobable basis 
 for saying that such declarations are admissibh* as part of the res 
 gesta". It may well be doulitcd. however, wiiether such a chissili- 
 oat' n be riot rather mi-^h-ading than otiierwise. To be part of 
 some princijial n-s gcstiu f.ict, a ilcclaratiou must also, it is tru:-, 
 he contemporaneous with such principal fact. Ihit here its re- 
 sembl ,u.. " to a (h'cdaration in course of business neases. The mere 
 fact tiiat an entry has been made contemporaneously with the 
 ::'ansaction it Nets fortii, is not in itself (dr.Mimstantial evidence 
 of tlie trut'> of the statement concerning the transaction. The 
 declarant must be di'ad; it must be made in the course (d duty or 
 l)usinc;^s — i'.i;ie of which ri'ipiircments a:e made as to a ilcdara- 
 tion |ta t of the re.' gesta) or part of a res gest;e fact. 
 
 An interesting ease in New llaiiipshire decides that an entry in 
 a book of accounts, niadi' in the usiiil course of business liy a jier- 
 son si;ice deceased, is admissible in a suit liehveeii third p.irtii'S, 
 there being evii' nee d/lum/r that he had means of knowledge, 
 even if the ei''ry l>e in bis fa^or. On an action against a railroad 
 company ""-ir a collision td' a crossing, by which the plaintiiT's 
 wagon .vas injured, it liecanm important for the plaintilT to show 
 the character and extent <d' the injury to one of the hind wheels. 
 
 « Mie W Iword, a wlieelwright, who repaired the woodwork (d' the 
 
 wheel, died liefcrc the trial. The plaintilf called his administrator, 
 who testilied that he had \Voodw<ird's account book, kept by Wood- 
 word ill liis lifetime, on which appeared a cliargo "June Stli, 1887. 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 AMKUK'AN NOTICS. 
 
 4(18a» 
 
 luittci 
 bot 
 
 WPCl 
 
 To sixteen spokes, twenty eents iijiiece, .f.'J.L'O," Tlii.s \v;is jul- 
 )ver objeetion, aiul lield, eoirfctly . " Tlicre is ;i (list inction 
 entries made in the ii.inal and rc^'ular conrse of bnsincss. 
 and a private meniorandnni. The latter is men? Iiearsay, and inad- 
 missible in evidence after tlie deatli of tlie person wlm made it. 
 Kntries made in the rej,Milar and iisnal conise of hnsiness stand 
 differently. When shojj-books are ki'pt and the entries are miid(« 
 contemporaneously with the delivery of piods or the perforiiianeo 
 of labor by a ptison whose dnty it was tn make them, they aro 
 admissible, nnless tin? natnre of the subject is such as to rend«'r 
 iMjttcr "videnee attainable. Mr. (Jreenleaf says the remark tiiat 
 this evidenee is admitted contrary tn the rules of the common law 
 is incorrect; that' in >,'eneral its admission will be found iu perfect 
 harmony with those rules, the entry benif,' admitted only when it 
 was evidently contemporaneous with the fact aud pait v( the res 
 gcsta!.' " Lassone v. Kailroad, (id N. II. .'Mo. .'laS (IS'.Mi). 
 
 l)K<;i,AiiANT MIST UK Dkao. — F,e\vis *•. Kramer, .'{ Md. L'(!5 
 (ISoli); State i;. Hopkins, 5(5 Vt. '.'50 0«s;{); Smith v. Lane, lli S. 
 & K. NO (I.SIM). 
 
 Where it appeared that certain entries of sales upon the book.n 
 of a stock e,\chanf,'e ottered in evidence in a .suit lu'twceii third 
 parties, were written by a seenhiry who was alive and iu the city 
 of trial, the evidence was rejected. Terry /•. llirmiugham .National 
 IJank, •.).'{ Ala. .'i'.M) (IHUO). 
 
 Disahii.itv ornKit than Dkatm. — The strict requirement that 
 the declarant must be dead in order to n'lider his declaration 
 admissible has been f,'reatly relaxed in the United Slates. 
 
 It is sutlicient if the declarant is insane. (!haffee r. V . S. IK 
 
 "Wall. r.in. n\i (is?;?). 
 
 Or " beyond the rejieh of the process or commission of the court," 
 Chaffee v. V. S.. 18 Wall. .'".IC. .Til (1S7;{); .lames r. Wliarton, .'» 
 McLean, 4'.»L' (ISJl); Vinal c. (iilman, 'JI W. Va. .'{nl (iS.siJj. 
 
 Or has absconded to p.irts unknown 
 stances we think it is cl 
 
 I 
 
 niicr these ctrcnni- 
 
 ear that, by tlie l.iw (d" this state, tho 
 books should have been r-'ceived in cviilencc without the Icslimony 
 «if lbi(d( in re^'ard to them, lie had i;oiie to parts iii, known, 
 and could not be produced as a witness. The same necessity tiiero- 
 fore existed for receiving tin? books in e\idciicc that would liave 
 existed if l?\U'k had been dead at tlie time of trial. If si {•!■ had 
 been the case they would nndonbti'illy have been evidence." New 
 Haven Co. »• (Joodwiu. I'J Conn. L'.'io (1S7.".); North liaiik r. Ablmt, 
 
 \'.i Pick. inr. (1H.T5). 
 
 Such entries have been held admissible even if the declarant 
 is iilive and present in court. Chalfee c. I'. S., IS Wall. rilCt. 5I1 
 (187.'i). 
 
 Apparently, such is tho effect of the decision by the suprcmu 
 
408'" 
 
 AMKItUAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 m^ 
 
 I: 
 
 judicial court of Massaclmsctts in Shove v. Wiley, IS Tick, ry^f^ 
 (18;{(1) wht-re tin* cntrit's of a bank lut'sscnf^cr sliowing the giving 
 of notice to an indorsiT, were held adniissiltle on being identified 
 by tlie iiicHsenger as in iiis iiandwriting and undoulttedly eorrect 
 when made; thougli tlie messenger had no independent recollection 
 of tlie oecurrenee. 
 
 The court seem at times (hiring their opinion inclined to treat 
 the entry as a memorandum tu refresh recollection, and the decision 
 seems soumler when rested ii|)on that ground. 
 
 It is said that it will be presumed that a deceased clerk, who 
 madi' the entry on a merchant's liooks. delivered the goods. Clarke 
 r. Ma:,'nider, L' Mar. it .Fohns. 77 (]S(»7). 
 
 I'kiisovai. Knowi-ki»i:k llKgiinKh. — It is essential that the 
 declaration sliould be iiy one who has personal knowledge of the 
 existence of th(! fact which lu^ declares. 
 
 Accordiugiy, -m an action against distillers for selling untaxed 
 Rullonsof whiskey, siiipped over the Miami Canal, the government 
 i{i not allowed to put in evidencic entries in the (iertificate liooks of 
 r.ertain c(dlcctors of ttdls on the canal, in the handwriting (»f 
 deceased (derks, showing the arrival of freight at their respective 
 ports, wlicre these entries were made u|> principally from informa- 
 tion furnished by tlie freight biils presented liy the captains, and 
 €)ceasi(mally friuii the simple statements of tint I'aptains thenisidves 
 if di-emed rclialilc, many of tin* capt:iins not iicing produced, or 
 accounted for, at the trial. "If now we apply the rule which we 
 have mentioned to the certillcate-books of tlie canal c(dlecUirs their 
 inailmissibility is evident. They were not competent evidence as 
 declarations of the collectors, for the ctdlcctors had no |iersoiial 
 knowlcd-.' (li tiie matters stated; they derived all their information 
 either from the hills of lading or verbal stateiiu'nts of the captains. 
 Nor Were the books competent eviiliMice a.-; de(darations of the 
 «Mptains, liecause it does n(<t appear that thi' bills of lading were 
 prepari'd by them, or that they had personal knowledge of their 
 correctness, or that their verbal statements, when tin- bills id' lad- 
 ing were not proiliiced, were founded upon personal knowledge; 
 nnd besides, many of ilic certilicates were admitted without calling 
 the (Mptains who signed them, and without proof id' their death or 
 inaccessibility." Chaffee v. V. S., IS Wall. Tilt;, .-.i;j (l,S7;i). 
 
 A reciird, made in eottrse of business, of the amount of plaintiff's 
 Hour delivered to the did'endantH, kept by a miller's book-keeper, 
 and fre(piently made up fnun niemmanda lilcd with him by some 
 one who had delivereil tloiir in his absi-nce, are not competent. 
 Smith r. Liine. 12 S. & It. SO (ISLM). 
 
 If, however, A. can testify to the existence of a fact, and that 
 hn eujiectly reported it to It,, It.'s entry, in the usual course of 
 buHiness, is admiHstble, in connection with A.'s testimony, alter 
 II. "s decease. 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4r.3« 
 
 An excellent illustration of tho extent to which modern methods 
 of doing business liiive forced a moditicatioii of the re(iuiremeiit 
 of jiersonal knowledge may l)e fduiid in Mayor itc. of New York 
 V. Second Avenue K. IJ. Co., KH' X. \. ')7'J (iSSCt). Tin. action 
 was one (d" contract to recover against the defendant lor work and 
 materials in jmving tlie tracks id' tlie defendant road. In attenijit- 
 ing to prove these, tlie city introduced a tiiue-hdok, kept Itv one 
 Joiin H. Wilt, a foreman in tiu' employ of the department of 
 jiuhlic works. In tliis hook he entered the nauie of each man 
 employed. He visited the work twice a day. cliccki'd tlic time of 
 each num as represented to him by the two gang foremen or iuad 
 bosses, 'i'he latter did not see Wilt's en|-rics. Wilt said tliat lie 
 knew tiit> faces id' the men and checked tliem ofl". <iang foremen 
 testilied tiiat they hail re|KMteil time <'orrectly. 'i'iie jwilgi' ad- 
 mitted book. He also admitted an aicount in Wilt's haudwritiiig 
 (if materials used. This was made u]i in tlie same geiicr;il wav. 
 e.xcept that the gang forenuMi claimed no present kiiowleili,'c o( tlie 
 fpiantity. They said they had reported correctly. One .said tliat 
 the count of stone was reported to him by the carmen wlio drew it, 
 but not verihed liy him. The carmen were not called. .\s to this 
 last item, the court say that it was mr-re liearsay, and if a specilio 
 objection liad lieeii taken against it tliat it wmdd iiiivc been good. 
 Ibit lieing general, and tlie others being good, that also must be 
 overruled. (!ouri .say liusiness is, and must lie ciirried on in way 
 mentioned. It is '"an account kept in the ordinary course i>( bu.si- 
 ni'ss, of laborers employed in the proseculion of wiuk based upon 
 daily reports of foremen who had charge of the men, and who, in 
 accordaiKM' with their duty, reported the time to another subordinate 
 of the same coii.nion master but of higher graih . who, in time, also 
 in accordance with his duty, entered the tiaie as reported." Mayor 
 iVe. of N. V. r. Second Ave. li. K. Co., KH' \. V. '.71' (ISSC). 
 
 " I'liit at coimiion law, where the ideik who made the entries had 
 no knowledge <>{ the correctness ol the entries, liiit miide them as 
 the items were furnished by another, it was essential that the party 
 furnishing the items should testily to their correctness, or that 
 hatisl'aetory proof thereof (such as the transactions were reasonably 
 suseeptilile of) from otlier sources should be produced." Stettauer 
 c. White, W 111. :'-• (ISSI). 
 
 Whet hi '• a surveyor's minutes would be evidence where a (diain 
 bearer "ealh d olT" without prodin'ing the chain bearer, see Kay r. 
 Castle, 7'.» N. C. r.H(> (1S7,S). 
 
 I'uoMi' OK Kntuv. — That the entry in course of business was 
 actually made by the deceased piMson whose decdaration it purports 
 to be, inav be shown bv oroof of his hamlwritiiig. Chalfee v. V. 
 S.. IS Wall. r,U\, r.li '(1K7;{); Welsh r. Ilarrett, IT. Mass. .TiO 
 (1H1<»). 
 

 \l 
 
 
 46883 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part ; :. 
 
 But a copy iu ;.ho handwriting of a clerk cannot be prov* ^ Dy 
 
 ( . itl«»ice of !iis hundwrltin''. Janu's c. Wharton 
 
 Mi; Lean. »'.»'.; 
 
 (IHit). "This is not a book of orij^inal entries, but a mere 
 transcript from that book, luatle by ach'rk, who did not make tliose 
 entries. The ground on wiiich ah)ne jiroof of tlie liandwritiiig of 
 the (dcrk i,'ives validity to the book of at'(!ouiit,s is, tiuit it is the 
 book of original entries; that the clerk is sui)[iosed to be cognisant 
 of the tr.insai-tions which it rt.'cords; and, tluit tiu' entries niaih' 
 by liini, were luiuUi at (»r lU'ar tlic time tin-y purpor., to iuive been 
 luadc; and are, therefore, a part of the res gestie As a mere lopy, 
 made by a clerk who did not keep the origiiuil book, proof of Ins 
 iiand writing in no way conduces to establish tlie authenticity of 
 the hook ollVreil in evi(h'U(;i'; iind it is, therefore, excluded from tiie 
 consideration id' the jury." 
 
 See also Creswell c. Slack. CS la. 110 (iHSo). 
 
 In K. 11. Co. /'. Henderson, ,')7 Ark. K»J (l.SU;}), the entri"s of a 
 deceased clerk must, it is said, "be autlienticated by his oath if he 
 is living and liis testimony can be procured. If he is dead, or is 
 out of tlie jurisdiction (d' thi' (lourt, or cannot be found, tliey may 
 be admittfd on proof (d' ids hand-writing." 
 
 An k.xtkn'oko Dkvki.oi'.mknt. — It is easy to recognize a pro- 
 gressive ti'ndency toward e.\tending tiie rule so f.i • as to iu(dude 
 all writings made in the course of business and witliout motive to 
 deceive. 
 
 'I'lie distinction has not in all cases been (d»scrve<l between the 
 rules governing account boolis (Ui lu-lialf of a party or nnuiioranda 
 to refresli the recollection of a witness ami tiie rule under 
 consideration. 
 
 Tlie supreme (iourt of tin* United States, speaking of tlie entries 
 on the books of collectors (d' tolls on a canal iiiadi^ in the usual 
 
 — "Their ad miss i- 
 ■ije whi(di governs 
 the admissibility of entries n.a.le by privat > jMrUes in the ludinary 
 
 course of business, lay down the rule as follows: 
 bility must, therefore, be deteruiiiu'd by U' 
 
 course o 
 
 f th 
 
 leir liusiness. 
 
 And tiiit rule, with some exceptions not imduding the present 
 case, rcipiires, for the admissibility (d' the entries, not iiiendy that 
 they shall be ccuit'Muporanenus with the facts to which they relate, 
 but shall bt( m ide by parties having personal knowledge of the 
 facts, and be corroborated liy their testimony, if living and accessi- 
 ble, or by proof of tiieir handwriting, if dead, f>r insane, or beyond 
 the reaeli (d' the proeess or commission of the court. The testimony 
 of living witnessrs pers(nially cognizant of the facts of which they 
 speak, given under the sanction of an oath in open court, where 
 they may be Hiibji'cted to cross-exainination, alTonls the grei*test 
 security for truth. Their di'(darations, verbal or written, must, 
 itowever, soieetimes be admitted when tht>y themselves cannot be 
 
cjivr. va.] 
 
 AMKUIOAN NOTES. 
 
 4<!3« 
 
 called, in ordor to prevont a faihite of jisticie. The adniissilulity 
 of tilt! declarations is in su.;a casca lii.iitcd by t'u' necessity upon 
 whioh it i.s founded." Cliatl'cio & (jo. c. IJ. S., .S Wall. o\(\, 540 
 
 (1 «:.'{). 
 
 'i'lic hooks of a bank showing tlio stato of a tlopositor's aecoiint 
 liavc b'cn admitted, in a well considered Indiana ease, under a 
 line of reasoning' wiiioli would praetically admit any at-eount book 
 kept in the usual course of business as evidence per sr ; iuid it is 
 ]irol)able tiiat such, ander certain safe},'iiiirds, is destined to become 
 tiie settled state of the law on tiiis siibjetrt. "'I'he next (luestion 
 for consideration is the ex.M'ption of the aiijiellant to the rulini,' of 
 the court to the admission in evidence of the entries in the books 
 of tile First National Maiik made in the usual (ioiirse of liusiness, 
 showiii',' the state of the account of saiil Moses (,'. Culver at and 
 8ubse(iu(Mit to the execution of the checks sued upon. As pndiin- 
 inary to the introduction of the entries in these books in evidence, 
 it was shown l)y the clerks and oHicers of the Itank produceil in 
 court as witnesses, and as to the (uitries made by such witne.'^-.es, 
 that they were, at the time the entries were made, the jtrojier and 
 authorized liook-keepers to make sucii entries; that the entries were 
 made by them in the due course of business in the discharj,'fi of 
 their duties, and were correct when made; that the entries made 
 by them were orij,'inal, and entered by tlieni in books kept for that 
 l)urpo8e, and that they had no recollection of the facts represented 
 by the entries. 
 
 As to the entries made by parties who were not witnesses, it was 
 shown that the enterer was, at the time the entry was made, the 
 jiroper book-keeper and ajjent of the bank to make the entries in 
 the due course of business, that the entries wen* orif,'inal entries on 
 ()ri^,'inal l)ooks inadi' bv such liook-keejicis in due course of busi- 
 ness, and were in the known handwriting of sudi book-keepers, 
 and that tiie enterer was dead or a non-resident of the State of 
 Indiana. After the making <if 8U(di ]iri'liminiiiy proof tin- entries 
 were admitted in oviilence over the objection of the appellant. . . . 
 
 The bank with whom he did business, and upon whic'ii lie drew 
 the check, kept books and made an entry of all their business, of 
 the money deposited by (!ulver, and (diecks drawn by him and paid 
 by the bank. The books were kept by disinti'n-sted parties, Some 
 of the persons who at the time of the transactions kept the books, 
 took the deposit, and plai-ed it to (,'iilver's credit, paid the checks 
 drnwn by him, and entered them on the books or charged them to 
 his account were dead, others were beyond the jurisdiction of the 
 court, and others had no jiersonal r» iMdlection of the tniiis .etion 
 oxce])t to know that the books wore kept in due ctiurse of the 
 banking business, and were correct, and showed a correct state- 
 ment of the account." Culver r. Afarks, IL'li hid. fiol, ML' (1889). 
 
 V5 
 
40836 
 
 AMEKICAN NOTK». 
 
 [hart 111. 
 
 Mi'. 
 
 ,1- 
 
 In the case of Feunerstein's Cliuiiipague, on an issiu; af the 
 market value of ci^-tain invoicu-s of cliainpague at tlu; place of 
 iiianufacturt", a lettur from a sflh'r of similar champagnes at about 
 the same placo written to a tiiiril party has been received, tliougli 
 by a divided court, in the absence of evi(h*nce that the writer was 
 deceased. " \V»! think the letters in ipaestion in this case were 
 properly admitted, in reaching tliis conclusion we do not go 
 lieyond the verge of the autliorities to which we have referred. 
 In some of th()S0 cases tiio person asserted to be necessary as a 
 witness was (U;ad. Hut that can make no ditfereuce in tlie result. 
 The rule rests u^ion the consi(L'ration tliat tiie entry, other writing, 
 or parol declaration of the author, was within his ordinary busi- 
 ness. In most cases he must make the entry contemporaneously 
 with the occurrence to which it relates. In all he has full knowl- 
 edge, no motive to fiilseliooil, and tliere is the strongest improba- 
 i)ilitv of untrutli. Safer sanctions randy surround the testimony 
 of a witui'ss examined under oatli. The rult^ is as lirmly tixed jis 
 )ri; geiHM-al rule to whicli it is an exception. .Modern legisla- 
 
 th 
 
 e UK 
 
 tion has largely and wisely liberalized the law of evidence 
 
 \\< 
 
 feid no disposition lo contract tliu just operation of the rule lure 
 under consideration." Fein>crstein's l.'hampagne, .'J Wall. 1 1.> 
 (1«(m). 
 
 On the o'^'-er hainl, evidence of entries in an account-bo(»k by a 
 deceased ns'ichant, proved to l)e in iiis handwriting, have been re- 
 jeeti'd because, as is siid, it is "a general rule of law tliiit a jiarty 
 cannot wuiko evidence for himsulf, and that a party cannot intro- 
 duce his own dcidaralions, (u-al or written, a.i evi<lenci' in his owji 
 Ixdialr. . . . It i-i true that when rntries liave been made, in the 
 usual course of bi-.sincss, by merchants' clerks, and sucii clerks are 
 ilcad, these entries thus made are admissible as evidence; but we 
 kn«»w of no case wlu're such entries have Iteen lield admissible when 
 
 in the Inm'-writing of the jiarty himself. 
 
 N. c. .{7-' <is:i.) 
 
 IM: 
 
 inu >< 
 
 W 
 
 incn. (i.'i 
 
 The state of judicial feeling on this suliject is tluis given in 1 
 
 Smith's I,. (' 
 
 \m. Kd.) rui). 
 
 " \ pail) s own books id' account and original entries are now, in 
 most, if luit all, of tlie I'nited States, r '(ieived as eviden<'e (d' a sale 
 and delivi'ry oi "oods to <u* ol wink (bine fcu" the advenie party. 
 The practice is s mctiomd in some jurisdictions by the decision «>f 
 the c«)urt • ; ru other by express legislative enactmeut. Ihit even 
 in those > iates where ir is admitted by force of the common law, it 
 is reganN' ' uh a depart i^re from the <dd common-ljiw rule that u 
 party shall not nni c ( idence in his own fav(U', and if we nniy 
 juilge from the languagt! .f the ()ourt8, is coubidered of (juestionable 
 policy. The ti.. -on for its introdui-tmn h.'is never been placed, by 
 any court, oti hijfh'M ground tlian that of necessity. For, in view of 
 
CHAl'. VI..] 
 
 AMEKK'AN NOTES. 
 
 4G8» 
 
 the numbor and frpquency of transactions of wliich entries iin- thiily 
 required to be made, the dittieulty and ineonvenicnce of niakinj,' for- 
 mal common hiw proof of each item would In- very j,M'eat. To insist 
 upon it, therefore, would either r(Mider a credit system impossihlu 
 or leave the creditor remedih^ss. IJut where a course of dealing 
 between parties is shown to have existed, a degrcf of creilit, moro 
 or less, will naturally attach to the rej^istration by the proper person, 
 in the proper book kept for such purpose, in the usual course or 
 business, of such transactions lus occur In^tween them. The admis- 
 sion of books of account in evidence, therefore, inider proper 
 restrictions and limitations, is not calculated to product- injurittus 
 consequences, liut, inasmuch as the situation and circumstances of 
 trade are gradually becoming such as very much to diminish tho 
 reason of the departure from the common law rule, tlu; Courts in 
 some of the states are inclined to restrain rather than enlarge 
 the exception itself; Sickles '•. Mather, !.'(> Wi-nd. 7-; Larue v. 
 ilowland, 7 Barb. 107; Dunn v. Whitney, J Karif. D." 
 
DHNQ DECLARATIOiCS, WHY ADMISSIBLE, f PAKT m. 
 
 CJ3APTER Vm. 
 
 D'rlNO DBCLARATIONS. 
 
 f 
 
 I, ' 
 
 i ' I 
 
 I ''^i 
 
 •5 714.' The last of tho six exooptions, which it has been pointed 
 out * that there nro to the general rule that hearsay evidence must 
 bo r('j(!ctod, arises in tho case of (fi/iiiff decldrntionH. The principle 
 on which evidonco of this description is admitted is " that such 
 dwliirations are niiulo in extremity, when the party is at tlio point 
 of death, and wliun every hope of this world is gone ; when every 
 motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the 
 most powerful considorations to Hpoak the truth ; a situation so 
 solemn and so awful is considered by tho law as creating an 
 obligation, oqiial to tliat which is imposed by a positive oath in a 
 court of justice."' At one time an opinion prevailed that this 
 general principle warranted the admission of dying deolaratijiii! 
 in all eases, civil and criminal.* A contrary doctrine, howo/er, 
 
 • Or. Ev. 5 1 50. iu part. 
 
 Suiira, § 607. 
 
 » B. t». W<hmI «*k, 17N)» (Kyro, O.B.) ; R. v. Dnuninond. 178|. Shakosponre 
 mnkoH tho wuiiiiiIimI Moliin, tiiiditi^ hiiiiKcIf diHhi'liuvuJ while uunouuciug 
 the iatoudud trfnchory of thu I)iiii))hiii I.uwiH, uxchtim : — 
 *' lliivii I not hid<«)UM doiith within my view, 
 Kt'tainin^^ hut a (|uuntity of lifo, 
 Which l)h't'dH awuy, ovon uh ii form of wiix 
 Ifi'Holvt'th from hix fi^fuit! 'gainst tlio hro!' 
 Wliat in tho woi Id ►'liouhl nrnko mo imw deceive, » 
 
 Pini'o I muHt loHo tho uh(( of all dccoit f 
 Wliy hIiouUI I tlicn W ful«o. ninco it in true 
 That I muHt die horo, uiid livo honco liy truth ?" — 
 
 Kiiii/ John, A.vt 5, to, 4. 
 
 * ThuH, tho dying dfclarations of 
 a HuhHoriljing witni'ss to a forgi.'il in- 
 Hti'umont could \w givou in ovidonoe 
 to impeach it : Wriglit c. Littler, 
 1701 (lid. Mannliold) ; wliich, how- 
 f'vor, ftH rc|tort<'d in Mlackstono, 
 fitatcd that no general rule could hn 
 druwu from the udniiMiou of tho uvi- 
 
 donrn in tliat |)ai'ti(;ular caHO : Anou. 
 (undated. Heath, J.), <!itod by I A, 
 i-lllenliorough (who ap|)arontly ap- 
 pntved of it) in .\veHon v. I<d. Kia« 
 naird. ISO.'), and in llji. of I>urhu« 
 r. Ileauniont, I.S08; oxplainnd Uy 
 Hayley. .1., ui I>ik' i'. Uidgway. IS'.'U. 
 Moruuvur, thu dyuig docluratiuuit uf 
 
 40i 
 
en. VIII.] DVlNd DKCLAKATIOXS, WHKN ADMlSSHH-i:. 
 
 now prt'Viiils,' l»i)th in I']iip;lmi(l uiid .Viin'rica, an 1 cviilcn •(> (»f lliis 
 d('st'ri|itiiiu is not lulnii-^sildti in any civil dusi'. In criniiniil 
 ciisfH it is HO only in th« ono cumi oI" Initniriilr,- '• win r.- flit» dnatli of 
 tlin (It'CiMiscd is tlio 8ul»jt'i't (if till" cliai;^!', jind tlio tiircnmslunccs of 
 tilt' di'iith art! thti Bnl)jt>t4 t>f tlit> ilwnfj; do' laralion,"'' iintl wlitTo it 
 itt oIl'tTt'd in tilt) vory words of iho tlfccuM'd, hith tjucstions and 
 answirs bi'inp; given when* tjui'stions have hccn |tiil ^ 
 
 S 71"). A utronjf instant't) of tlit» adinissihilily of tl^'infr do- 
 clnnitions as ovidt-nt'o in cliarj^cs of honiiiidi' ' is, that wimro a 
 prisontT who was chargfd with tho ninrdtT of A. had, in jxiisoning 
 A., inailvtdttMitly also iioistHiftl \\. (whitjh was in law a niunlor of 
 IJ.), thti dying tlfpositions id' H. wiro adnuttttl as t'vidcnotj for tlie 
 ]tr<)st!fntion on jirisoner's trial for tht) ninnlcr of A., — for tho act 
 which eanstid thts di-ath of A. also causi'd that of 15., md it was 
 all one transai-tion.* On tho otlnr hand, tht) )irini!i|ilc tiiat tlying 
 di'clarations aro only admissihlo as ovitltnco on charges of hoinicitlu* 
 is shown by dying doclarutions of tin* party robhtid having boon 
 rt'jootod on a trial ft)r robbery ;" ami by her statcnit^nts /// rxtirmiH 
 being littld inatlniissiblo on an inilittinont fur administering ilrnga 
 to u wonnin, with intont to procnro abortion;' whilo in Iroland, 
 oven on a trial for niurdor, tho stattMnent of a thinl prrxon, who 
 IiUB on his ileathbfd confessed that lit! comniilteil the olfcnco, has 
 been rejecteil.* Where, too, a party, eonvitftttd of jiorjury, aftt)r 
 obtaining a rnlo nisi for a new trial, shot tliti prosetrutor, the 
 court rejected an aflidavit of tho dying declarations of the latter, 
 as to tho transaction out of whiijh tho prosecution for perjury 
 art)so.® As to civil cases, the dying declarations of a servant of tho 
 
 u piiupor rt?»iit'ftiiiB his settleniont 
 wi'K! (iiK'ti ii(liiiih(sil(le : It. r. limy St. 
 KiIiiiiiimIh, 17>>-t ; Aldxitnii c iMins- 
 wi>ll, !(>!)!). Hut ttiin ilui'triiie liiis 
 Imi^; Ih'cii it\|i1ii(li'<l See l{. I'. .MiiT- 
 1,'willy, 18(11 ; Stobart i'. Diyiloii, 
 IMKJ. 
 
 ' S.'t! Stobiut I'. Diytlt'n. IH.'Ki, 
 wliero tln! ciiM'S citecl in the |ir<!- 
 cet'.in^ imto w '111 viituully nveriiili'd, 
 Ulld iiIhii ('uses eiteil iti llotu *, illl'l'U. 
 Hi'tl, t<i(), lllite, § .JtlH. 
 
 • i.e., iiiiinler or iiuinsliiufjfliter. 
 ' It. r. Me.el, IHJl; li. r. liilld, 
 lN(iO; WiJBou V. Itooruiu, lnl«(Ani.). 
 
 ♦ R. V. Mitcliell, iKilJ. 
 
 * 11. <■. linker, IS;i7 ;('<iltll!llll, J., 
 aftt^r ciiiisiiltiti;; I'arke, It.;, 'I'lio 
 jiiiiiit ciiiilil not lie reH(ii'vt!il, uh pri- 
 
 MIIHT WHS ll(l|llilt<'li. 
 il II I I ...I I will 
 
 40.5 
 

 n-^ 
 
 
 WHY LIMITED TO CASES OP nOMICIDE. [PAUT III. 
 
 party last seised, as to tlie relationship of such party witli tl>o lessor 
 of the plaintiff, have been rejected in an action of ejectment.' 
 
 § 716.' The reasons for thus restricting the admission of this 
 species of evidence may be,— first, the danger of perjury in fabri- 
 cating declarations, the truth or fahehood of which it is impos- 
 sible to ascertain, — secondly, the danger of letting in incomplete 
 statements, which, though true as far as they go, do not consti- 
 tute " the ichole truth," — and thirtUy, the experienced fact, that 
 implicit reliance canaot in all cases be placed on the declarations 
 of a dying person ; for his body may have survived the powers of 
 his mind ; ' or his recollection, if his senses are not impaired, may 
 not be perfect ; or, for the sake of ease, and to be rid of the impor- 
 tunity of those around him, he may say, or seem to say, whatever 
 they choose to suggest.'* As these, or the like considerations, are 
 thought in ordinary cases to counterbalance the force of the general 
 principle above stated, the exception to the general rule against 
 admitting hearsay evidence, which is now under review, is restricted 
 to cases of homicide, and is there recognised on the solvi ground of 
 public iKTCHiiitf/. For as in such cases it often happens tliut no thinl 
 person was present as an eye-witness to a murder, and as the party 
 injure<l, who is the usual witness in other CBf"* of felony, cannot 
 himself be called, it follows that if his dying docdarations could not 
 be received, the murderer might often escape justice.'' It will be 
 remembered, moreover, that the restriction of their adniissihility to 
 oases of homicide applies only to such declarations as are teiidcrcd 
 merely because they were made in extremis. Declarations (whether 
 made by a dying person or not) which constitute port of the rea 
 gestoB, or come within the exception of declarations against interest, 
 or the like, are admissible as in other cases. 
 
 S 717." Persons making dying declarations are considered as in 
 the same situation as if they were sworn, the danger of impending 
 
 • Doe V. Ridjot'iiy, 1H20. « Or. Ev. § 15(i, in part. 
 
 • Thus, in Kin;/ John, Prince Iloury is mado to siiy : — 
 
 " Donth's Hit'ffo is now 
 Against t}ie mind, the which he pricks imd wounds 
 Witli liiiiny hipionH of Htrangit funtiiHicH ; 
 Which, iu th(*ir throntr and presH to that lust liold, 
 Confound thoniHclvtm. — Act 5, so. 7. 
 
 • JaclcBon r. KnilTon, 180(5 (Am.) (AmJ. 
 
 (liiviiiL'ston, J.). • Or. Ev. § 167, in part 
 
 » 1 East, P. 0. 353; 2 Johns. 3.5 
 
 4b6 
 
CHAP. VIII. ] DAXaKR AND FEAR OF DEATH NECESSARY. 
 
 death being equivalent to the sanction of an oath. Therefore, 
 when the declarant, if living, would have been legally incompetent 
 to testify (by reason of imbecility or tender age, &o.), his dying 
 declarations are inadmissible.' On the other hand, as the testimony 
 of an acoomplice is admissible against his fellows, the dying declariv- 
 tions of a felo-de-se are admissible against one indicted for aHsisting 
 the deceased in his self-murder.' And when a husband is charged 
 with the murder of his wife, or a wife with the murder of lior 
 husband, the dying declaration of the deceased will bo received.'* 
 
 § 718. It is essential to the admissibility of dyin^' declarations, 
 first, that the declarant should have been in actual (lanijvr of death 
 at the time when they were made ; secondly, that he should then 
 have had a /all apprvhcmion of hin daiiyvr ; * and lastly, that death 
 nhould have ennaed} These three things must be proved to the 
 satisfadion of thn judge before a " dying doclaratiou " can bo 
 received.^ It ' is not, however, necessary that the dcclarniit should 
 have expressly said, in so many words, that he was speaking nnder 
 a sense of impendinij death. It will be enough if it satisfactorily 
 appears, in any mode, that the dedarai ions were really made under 
 that sanction ; as, for instance, if tliat fact can be reasonably 
 inferred from the evident danger of the declarant,* or from the 
 opinions of the medical or other attcnilants stated to him. or from 
 his conduct, such as settling his affairs, taking l(>nve of \m reliiMons 
 and friends, giving directions rc^'^'•'ctiIlg his funeral, receiving 
 extreme unction, or the like. In short, all the circumstiuices of the 
 case may be resorted to, in order to ascertain the state of the 
 declarant's mind.' The length of tim<< which elap.sod between the 
 
 ' H. V. Pike, 1829; R. v. Dnim- 
 moiid, 17N-4. 
 
 ^ 11. I'. TiiickUir, \-H\. 
 
 » K. 1'. Woodcock, 1789; Stotip's 
 C8P0, 171H). 
 
 ' 11. r. Cleiuv, 18«'.». 
 
 • In .SuHHcx I'.'or., 184-1, 11. L., I,d. 
 Doniuiiu thuH laid down th« law : — 
 " Witli ri'pird to dt«liirationH iiiado 
 by piTHoim in oxti'uniiH, HU|ii)ONin(;ull 
 iiocL'hsiirv niiittorH coiuiuitihI, hucIi uh 
 iictuul (fiinptr, deuth following it, 
 und u full u|)|)rt)h«>nm<)ii, ut tho tiino, 
 of tho ditnp')', itnd of dfiith, Huch 
 doclurutioutt cuu bu rucuivod in uvi- 
 
 donpo ; })Ul (/// thf'O Diimj^ inimt runriir 
 to I'fndvr Hiii'li ili'i'luriitiotiH iidiiiiH- 
 
 nililu. Sllcli iiVlilclK (', ImWuViT, oll^'ilt 
 
 to h<> I'l' ivcd witli caution, ln'cauHU 
 it i8 Huiijoct to no cro.>*«-f.\iinunu- 
 tioii." 
 
 • Anto,.§2;}. 
 
 ' (ir. Kv. § l'')8, ill jmrt. 
 
 • .Seo U. i: Moipm, IHTS (I)(>n- 
 inan, J.). lu H. c, Kcdiii^tiild, 
 18"!*, ('ockbiirn, C.J., di'diiird to 
 r«ly I'll sui'li nvideni'o. Scd (ju. I' 
 
 » K. V. Wooilumk, 17Ntt; K. «, 
 John, 17»t); U. v. HoiiniT. 1h;J4 ; 
 li. V. Vuu Butcholl, 182J; li. v. 
 
 4G7 
 

 
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 (716) •7a-4$03 
 
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 BELIEF OF IMPENDING DEATH NECESSARY. [PART III. 
 
 declaration and the death of ihe declarant, furnishes no rule for 
 the admission or rejection of the testimony ; though, in the ahsenoe 
 of better evidence, it may serve as one of the exponents of the 
 deceased's belief, that his recovery was or was not impossible. It 
 is the imprcmon of impondiiuj death,' and not the circumstance that 
 death in point of fact followed very soon after the declaration was 
 made, which renders the testimony admissible. If, therefore, it 
 appear that the deceased, at the time of the declaration, had any 
 expectation or hope of recovery, however slight it may have been, 
 and though death actually ensued within an hour afterwards, the 
 declaration will be inadmissible.* On the other hand, a firm belief 
 that death is impending^— hy which is meant, not, as once thought,* 
 a belief that it will follow almost immediately, but that it will 
 certainly happen shortly in consequence of the injury sustained,^ — 
 suffices to render the statement evidence, though the sufferer may 
 SHb.scqueiif/i/ express a hope of recovery,^ or may chance to linger 
 on for some days, or even for two or three weeks.' 
 
 § 719. In Scotland it is immaterial, except as regards the weight 
 of the evidence, whether or not the declaration be made under the 
 impression of impending death ; but where a party has received a 
 mortal wound, an account of the matter given by him at any time 
 
 I 
 
 n 
 
 Mosley, 1829 ; E. i'. Spilsbury, 1835 
 (Coloriilgo. J.); R. v. Mintou, 1800; 
 1{. r. Scalliui, 1838 (Ir.). See R. v. 
 Nicolas, I8.>2 ; 11. v. Qualter, IHoi ; 
 K. V. reikiiis, 1840. 
 
 ' R. v. Fon-ster, 18G6 (Byles, J.), 
 whoro tlio law sucms to havo been 
 laid down ssoimnvhat too strictlj'. 
 
 ■^ R. V. W.'llioni, 1702; R. v. 
 ChriHtio, 1821; R. v. Jenkins, 18(50; 
 R. r. Mackiiv, 18(18; R. ». Hay ward, 
 IHXi; R. iC Crockett, 18;J1 ; R. v. 
 Fa-^ent, 18;{,j; R. v. Mc'son, 1840. 
 Dying declarations by persons who 
 Buid, " 1 iiave no hope of recovering, 
 unless it be the will of God" (R. v. 
 Murphy. 1841 (Richards, B.) (Ir.)); 
 "I think myself in great danger" 
 (R. V. Errin'gton, 1838) ; or by a 
 person previously t'.id by a doctor 
 tliat there was '' L'tlr ar no hDjm of 
 recovery" (R. ''. Mitchell, 1892), 
 have been respectively rejected. See 
 U. V. liowoll, 1840. 
 
 ' R. I'. Goddard, 1882 (Hawkins, 
 J., and Baggallay, Ij.J.). 
 
 * HuUock, B., in R. v. Van 
 ButchoU, 1829. See, also, R. v. 
 Forester, 186() (Byles, J.); R. v. 
 Osman, 1881 (Lush, L.J.). 
 
 ' R. V. Reancy, 18J7. 
 
 « R. i\ Hubbard, 1881 (Hawkins, 
 J.). 
 
 ' In R. i;. Woodcock, 1789, the de- 
 clarations were made two days Ixjforo 
 death; in R. v. Boiuier, 1834, thn^i 
 days ; in R. v. Whitworth, 18,58, six 
 days; in R. «'. TinckJer, 1781, ten 
 days; in R. c Reaney, 18.i7; in R. 
 V, Mosley, 1825, eleven days; and in 
 R. V. Beinadotti, 18(i0 (Brett .*t Lush, 
 JJ.), nearly throe weeks ; yet they 
 were all received. In R. r. Mosley, 
 182J, and in R. r. Wliitwortli, 18o8, 
 it a]ipearcd that the surgeon did not 
 think the cus(! hopeless, and told the 
 patient so : but the patient thought 
 oth(nwise. See, also, R. v. I'eel, 
 1800 ; it. V. Howell, 1845. 
 
 468 
 
 \i 
 
C. T'.Il.J WHAT DYING DECLARATIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 8uV)sequont to the injury will be admissible in the event of his 
 death, provided it were made seriously and deliberately, and whilst 
 the deceased ai)peared to be aware of what he was doing, and in 
 the possession of his faculties.* 
 
 § 720.2 l^he dying declarations of a deceased are admissible only 
 as to iiKitfcru to irldcli he would hare been competent to tcxtifji, if sworn 
 in the cause. Therefore they must in general narrate i'ucts only, 
 and not mere opinions ; ' and they must be confined to what is 
 relevant to the issue. But it is not necessary that the examination 
 of the deceased should have been conducted after the manner of 
 interrogating a witness in the cause, though any departure from 
 this mode may affect the credibility of the declanitions. Therefore, 
 in general, it is no objection to their adniimhillti/, that they were 
 made in answer to leading questions,* or obtained by earnest 
 solicitation.* But where a statement, ready written, was brought 
 by the father of the deceased to a magistrate, who accordingly 
 went to the deceased and interrogated her as to its accuracy, 
 paragraph by paragraph, it was, in Ireland, rejected, the judge 
 observing that, " in the state of languor in which dying persons 
 generally are, their assent could be easily got to statements which 
 they never intended to make, if they were but ingeniously inter- 
 woven by an artful person with statements which were actually 
 true ; " and adding, " the magistrate should not have trusted to 
 the relation of a third person, but should have taljen down the 
 deceased's declaration from her own lips, or at least have had it 
 taken down in his presence." •* Dying declarations by the victim 
 of a homicide are, if properly made, equally admissible in favour 
 of an accused as well as of the prosecutor.' 
 
 S 721.** Whatever the declaration may be, it must be compJetr in 
 itself ; for, if the dying man ajjpears to have intended to qualify it 
 
 > Alison, rnic. Cr. L. (Sc.) -JlO- 
 512, «l»4- ()()■; 2 lluiiK!, Coin. ;i!)l — 
 3i»3; 1 Dickson, Kv. (iH, OT. The 
 Rdino liiw scfnis to havd ])roviiilf'(l in 
 En-^liind a cuntury iigo. iSoo 11. v. 
 Bliindy, lTo2. 
 
 * (Jr. Ev. § 150, in part. 
 » 11. V. Sollovs. 17!)(). 
 
 * li. V. Smith, 1SG5. 
 
 ' R. V. I'lif^ont, 18 to ; I?, v. Reason, 
 17;H: Com. r. Vnss, IN.'U (Am.) ; II. 
 V. AVhitwortli. In.jH. 
 
 « K. r. iMtzfroralJ, 18-11 (Tr.) 
 (Cnimpton. J.). 
 
 1 R. V. Siuifo. 18:50. Thn snme 
 law jm'Viiils in ,'>c'-ithiiifl, 2 Iluriio, 
 Coin. (Sc.) I{n3; op. R. i'. Orny, unto, 
 § 77"). 
 
 Or. Ev. §§ 159 and 101, in part. 
 
 469 
 
! I 
 
 I 'HA 
 
 m 
 
 I. ,. 
 
 VALUE OF DYING DECLARATIONS. [PART in, 
 
 by other statements, which he in prevented by any cause from 
 making, it will not be received.* Again, if the statement were 
 committed to uriting at the time it was made, this writing must be 
 produced, or its non-production accounted for ; and neither a copy, 
 nor parol evidence of the declaration, can be admitted in the first 
 instance to supply the omission." But where three declarations had 
 been made at different times on the same day, one of which was 
 made under oath to a magistrate, and reduced to writing, but the 
 other two were not, it was held that these last two might be proved 
 by parol, though the written statement was not produced.' If the 
 deposition of the deceased has been taken under any of the statutes 
 on that subject, and is inadmissible as such, iur want of compliance 
 with some of the legal formalities, it seems that it may still be 
 treated as a dying declaration, if made by a declarant who was in 
 extremis.* 
 
 § 722.* Though declarations, deliberately made under a solemn 
 sense of impending death, and concerning circumstances wherein 
 the deceased is not likely to be mistaken, are entitled to great 
 weight, it should always be recollected that the accu&ed has not 
 the power of cross-examination, — a power often as effectual in 
 eliciting of the truth as the obligation of an oath ; — and that 
 where a witness has not a deep sense of accountability to his 
 Maker, feelings of anger or revenge, or, in the case of mutual 
 conflict, the natural desire of screening his own misconduct, may 
 affect the accuracy of his statements, and give a false colouring to 
 the whole transaction. Moreover, the particulars of the violence to 
 which the deceased has spoken are likely to have occurred under 
 circumstances of confusion and surprise, calculated to prevent their 
 being accurately observed, and leading both to mistakes as to the 
 identity of persons, and to the omission of facts essentially import- 
 ant to the completeness and truth of the narrative.^ 
 
 > 3 Leigh, R. 797. 
 
 » R. V. Gay, 1835 (Coleridge, J.) ; 
 R. V. Reason, 1734. But see ante, 
 $415. 
 
 ' R. V. Reason, 1734, Piatt, C.J., 
 dubit. See R. v. Scalkn, 1838 (Ir.). 
 
 « R. V. Woodcock, 1789; R. v. 
 Callugban, 1793. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 162, in great part. 
 
 * Jackson v. Knitfon, 180() (Living- 
 Bton, J.) (Am.). ; R. v, Awhton, 1837 
 (Aldorson, B.). See, also, Mr. l-'vans's 
 obsei-vations on the groat (auli in to 
 bo observed in the use of thi.s kind of 
 evidence, in 2 I'oth. VIA. 255 ('293) ; 
 2 St. Ev. 307 ; an' 1 Th. Ev. 292. 
 
 470 
 
 ml 
 
CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4701 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 Dying Declarations. — An exception to the rule rejecting hearsay 
 is that which on indictments for homicide admits statements by 
 the deceased as to the circumstances attending the fatal injury, 
 provided that the presiding justice is satisfied that sucli statements 
 were made under a sense of immediately approaching death. 
 "Dying declarations are made in extremis, wlien the party is at 
 the point of death, when every hope of this world is gone, when 
 every incentive to falseliood is silenced, and the mind is induced 
 by the most powerful considerations, to speak the truth; and is 
 considered, in law, as creating an obligation as great as that created 
 by an oath; and in prosecutions for murder, it is the common prac- 
 tice to admit as evidence, the dying declaration of the person, 
 with whose murder the prisoner stands charged." Hudson v. 
 State, 3 Cold. 355 (18G6); State /'. Tool, 20 Ore. loO (1890); State 
 V. Umble, 115 Mo. 452 (1893); Crump c. Cora. (Ky.) 20 S. W. 390 
 (1892); People v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648 (1893). 
 
 " When dissolution is approaching, and the dying man has lost 
 all hope of life, and the shadows of the grave are gathering in 
 around him, and his mind is impressed with the full sense of his 
 condition, the solemnity of the scene and hour gives to his state- 
 ments a sanctity of truth, more impressive and potential than the 
 formalities of an oath — and such declarations ought to be received 
 and considered by the jury, under the charge of tlie Court, as to 
 their effect and weight, in all cases where the evidence of fact 
 Avarrant their admissibility." Hill v. State of Georgia, 41 Ga. 
 484, 503 (1871); State v. Fearce, .56 Minn. 226 (1894). 
 
 A Restkictkd RiTLK. — The limitations of the rule, as stated 
 in the first paragraph of this note, are rigidly maintained. Tlie 
 rule cannot be said to be one whose extension is judicially favored. 
 In a deeply religious Christian community, thoroughly impressed 
 with the certainty of a future existence of rewards and punish- 
 ments, it is possible to believe that in the supreme moments of 
 approaching dissolution, every other consideration and motive 
 except that of a desire to tell the exact truth fades into the mental 
 background, and the solemnity of den.th is equivalent to tliat of an 
 oath. Under changed conditions, and, possibly, changed religious 
 views, the force of this reasoning has been much shaken. The 
 absence of cross-examination and the stringent consequences to 
 the prisoner of admitting such evidence are compensated for to a 
 very limited extert. Indeed, it is probable that at tlie present 
 time it is mainly the supposed necessity of the situation which 
 admits dying declarations rather than any equivalence between the 
 sanction of consciously appro.aching death and that of an oath. 
 
4702 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTK 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 li'l'.W, 
 
 ir ^T^ 
 
 "Thpve would he tlie most lamentable failure of justice, in many 
 cases, were the dyiii.^.deelarations of the victims of crime excluded 
 from the jury." I'eople >;. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32 (18o8); :Morgan i: 
 State, :n Ind. VX) (LSd'.)). 
 
 The tendency to restrict the scope of this kind of evidence is 
 marked. "The exception is in derogation of common right, for, 
 independent of constituticnis and laws, an accused ])erson has the 
 right to have the witness, who is to condemn him, in his jiresence, 
 so that he may be subjected to the most rigid iiupiisition. To 
 hang a man on the statements of one who is on his dying bed, 
 racked with pain, incapable, in most cases, of giving a full aiul 
 accurate account of the transaction, weakened in body and in mind, 
 and though in. <irficii/o iiiorfis, harboring some vindictiv^e feeling 
 against him who has brought him to that condition, is, to say tin; 
 least, and has always been, a dangerous innovation ui)on settled 
 princii)les of evid and no court ought to be disposed to extend 
 
 it to endirace cases uo which it did not, in its inception, api)ly." 
 Marshall i>. G. E. 11. 11. Co. 48 111. 475 (18G8). "For the reason 
 that the admission of such statements is exceptional, the}^ ought 
 always to be excluded unless they come within the rule in every 
 respect." State v. ISelcher, l.'J S.' C. 4')'.) (1880). 
 
 Of a ruling that dying "statements are worthy of more credence, 
 under such circumstances, than ii made under the sanction of an 
 oath, duly administered according to law," the supreme court of 
 Texas say: "We think the charges here cited are clearly errone- 
 ous, because they raise hearsay evidence to the highest testimony 
 known. This is in conflict with the (dearly enunciated rule laid 
 down by every writer on evidence to which we have had access, 
 and contrary to the reason for ohe admission of proof to establish 
 any fact. Hying declarations are admitted as evidence under an 
 exception to the general rule, which is founded upon public neces- 
 sity, and not because they are more worthy of credence than other 
 testinu)ny. They are admitted under restrictions, and when so 
 admitted, they are raised to the cliaractei if other evidence, which 
 may, or may not, hiive great weight, according to the circumstances 
 under wlii(di they were made; and it is for the jury, and not the 
 court, to judge of those circumstances, and the credence to be 
 given to those declarations." Walker v. State, 37 Tex. 3(j(), 380 
 (1872). An instruction that a dying declaration of deceased was 
 as much entitled to (M'edit as the evid'^nce of a witness under 
 oath was held properly refused in Campbell v. State, 38 Ark. 498 
 (188?). 
 
 "As there can be no cross-examination of the declarant, as the 
 accused can rarely meet his accuser face to face, and as there nu;st 
 of necessity exist great danger of abuse, it should clearly appear 
 that the statements offered in evidence have been made under a 
 
CHAr. Vlll.] 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 4703 
 
 full realization that tlio solemn hour f)f dcatli has conip, and tho 
 court should be satisticd that the decdanitiou was made nudcr an 
 impression of almost immediate dissolution." State v. Simon, ;">(> 
 Mo. 370 (1.S72); Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 1!)3 (IMGiJ); Lewis v. 
 State, <J Sui. & M. 11") (1847). 
 
 "It may be affirmed that no well-considered case lias varied 
 from these rules, and that the teiideney is to greater stringeney, 
 rather than to any relaxation in applying tliem to cases." State r. 
 Medlieott, 1) Kans. 'jru , L\S3 (LS7L')- 
 
 The modern feeling of restriction has followed on an early effort 
 to make dying declarations admissible in eases other tlian those of 
 lioniiciiki. Tlius, in Soutii Carolina, in a civil action on the cas^? 
 for seducing the plaintiff's (huighter, her dying de(darations tliat 
 the defendant was the father of her iinhoru cliild were held 
 competent. McFarland v. Shaw, 2 Cai'olina Law Repository, lOli 
 •(ISlo). This ijrecisB point was, however, decided the other way 
 by tlie su[)reine court of Georgia. AVooten v. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223 
 (l.S()'.)), the court remarking as to MeL";irland /•. Shaw, "It is 
 directly contrary to the wiiole current of autiiority." 
 
 And the rule is now well settled that dying (U'clarations are not 
 admissible in civil cases. Wilson v. IJoerem, l~> .lolins. 2.S(J 
 (1818). So the dying stateiuents of one killed iiy a railway acci- 
 dent are not coiupetent in an action for damages. Marshall v. 
 Chicago &c. 11. li., 4S 111. 475 (1868); Waldide v. New York 
 Central &c. R. K., 19 Hun, 69 (1879); Kast Tennessee &c. K. K. 
 V. Maloy, 77 Ga. 237 (1886); Daily /•. Xew York &e. K. \l., 32 
 Conn. 356 (1865). 
 
 The rule is confined strictly to indictments for homicide. On a 
 statutory criminal action for an abortion, dying declarations are 
 incompetent, though death result from tlie illegal act. "Sucli evi- 
 dence is admissible, in cases of Homicide, only where the death of 
 the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstan(!es of 
 the death are the subject of the dying declarations." People v. 
 Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 (18*74); State /•." Harper, ;!5 Uh. St. 78 (1878); 
 Railing v. Com. 110 I'a. St. 100 (1885). 
 
 Such declarations iiu»y be made competent by statute, Com. 
 V. Thompson, 159 Mass. 5() (189.".). 
 
 Scoi'K OK Dk( LAUATiox LiMiTico. — A dying declaration, more- 
 over, must b(! confined to the circumstances immediately attending 
 the fatal injury. 
 
 It is not iieces.sary that the declaration should directly charge 
 the defendant with being the assailant. State r. Cronin, 64 Conn. 
 293 (1894). 
 
 The previous bad state of feeling between the prisoner and the 
 deceased is not uch a fact as can be proved by a dying declaration. 
 Ben V. State, 37 Ala. 103 (18(51). Or that deceased was uiuirmed. 
 
470* 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES, 
 
 [part III. 
 
 ['^ t n ; 
 
 » ' , 
 
 .1 
 
 }■= 
 
 ■ i. 
 
 State V. Eddon, S Wash. 292 (1894). Or that defendant had 
 threatened to slioot the injured person through a window, though 
 the deatli shot was delivered in this way. Benns v. State, 46 Ind. 
 311 (1S74). Or that deceased prayed God to forgive defendant. 
 Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135 (1893). 
 
 In other Avords the dying dt^laration relates to the res gesttB of 
 the particular case under consideration. Where the fatal affray 
 extended over a considerable period of time, this is a decisive test 
 us to the admissibility of the declarations. Wilkerson v. State, 91 
 Ga. 729 (1893); Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135 (1893); Clark "w. 
 State (Ala.), 17 So. 37 (1895); State v. Shelton, 2 Jones (N. C.) 
 L. 360 (1855); Leiber v. Com. 9 liush, 11 (1872); State i;. Jones 
 <Ia.) 56 N. W. 427 (1893); Hackett v. People, 54 liarb. 370 
 (1866); State r. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873); Archibald v. State, 
 122 Ind. 122 (1889). "To render these declarations admissible, it 
 was only necepaary that the trial judge should be satisfied, 1st. 
 That the death of deceased Avas imminent at the time the decla- 
 rations were made. 2nd. That the deceased was so fully aware of 
 this as to be without hope of recovery. 3rd. That the subject of 
 the charge was the death of the declarant and the circumstances 
 of the death was the subject of the declarations." State v. Banister, 
 35 So. C. 290 (1-891) ; Blackburn v. State, 98 Ala. 63 (1892). 
 
 A short temporary interruption of a fatal assaiilt does not pre- 
 vent the previous facts being admissible in a dying declaration. 
 U. S. V. Heath, 20 D. C. 272 (1891). 
 
 ''• ';re a portion of a written declaration m extremis does not 
 ieu/.-i oO the res gestae of the particular transaction, tlie remaining 
 p.''i+"jn of the declaration may be submitted to the jury. Temple 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 304 (1883). 
 
 It is not essential that the dying declaration should be adverse 
 to the accused. It is equally competent, other conditions being 
 present, if in his favor. Hurd v. People, 26 Mich. 405 (1872); 
 Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764 (1848); State v. Saunders, 14 Ore. 
 300 (1886); Mattox v. U. S., 146 U. S. 140 (1892); Com. v. 
 Matthews, 89 Ky. 287 (1889); Brock v. Com., 92 Ky. 183 (1891). 
 
 But it is necessary tliat the declaration should be by the person 
 for whose homicide the indictment is found. The dying declara- 
 tion of one of two alleged murderers, killed while resisting arrest, 
 that he alone conmitted the crime, is not competent. Mora v, 
 Peoide, 19 Colo. 255 (1893). 
 
 Who may Declakk. — The general rule is that the only person 
 whose dying declaration is aiiniissible is the person for whose 
 homicide the indictment has been found. 
 
 Consequently it is not competent for the accused to prove his 
 own statements relative to the homicide, although made immedi- 
 ately thereafter, and while he su]iposed himself to be mortally 
 wounded. Brabston v. State, 68 Miss. 208 (1890). 
 
CHAP, vm.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 4706 
 
 Neither is "the unsworn confession by another, that he had 
 committed the crime, competent evidence for the accused," though 
 made under a sense of impending death. West v. State, 76 Ala. 
 98 (1884). 
 
 The dying declarations of a person wounded at the same time 
 with the person for whose homicide the indictment is found are 
 not competent. Radford v. State (Tex.) 27 S. W. 143 (1894). 
 
 Form of Dkclauatiox. — The form of a dying declaration is 
 immaterial. It may be in writing, reduced to that form by a 
 witness and read to and assented to by deceased and signed by 
 him. State v. Kindle, 47 Oh. St. 358 (1890); Drake v. State, 25 
 Tex. App. 293 (1888). 
 
 Or may have been reduced to writing at the dictation of deceased 
 and signed by him. King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617 (1892). Or 
 reduced to writing by a third person in response to (questions asked 
 deceased by a witness and signed by the deceased with his mark. 
 Com. V. Haney, 127 Mass. 455 (1879). 
 
 If the dying declaration be in writing, the "best evidence " rule 
 applies to the document. The original must be produced or its 
 absence satisfactorily accounted for, in order to permit secondary 
 evidence to be given of the contents. People v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32 
 (1858); State v. Tweedy, 11 la. 350 (1860); Drake v. State, 25 
 Tex. App. 293 (1888) ; Collier v. State, 20 Ark. 36 (1859) ; Krebs 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 1 (1880); Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547 
 (1890); Boulden v. State (Ala.) 15 So. 341 (1894). 
 
 " But where the accused, for any reason, procures the rejection 
 of the writing, as he did in this case, it does not lie in his mouth 
 ,0 object to 01 .1 testimony detailing what the deceased then said, 
 p.'ovided it be shown that the statement was made under the condi- 
 tions necessfi^y to render a statement admissible as a dying decla- 
 ration." Mines v. Com. 90 Ky. 64 (1890). That there is a written 
 declaration does not prevent the reception in evidence " of inde- 
 pendent oral evidence of the same or similar dying delaratioi.s of 
 deceased." People v. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49 (1868). A written 
 declaration may be used as a memorandum to refresh the memory 
 of the witness. State v. Whitso.i, 1 N. C. 695 (1892); Com. v. 
 Haney, 127 Mass. 455 (1879). But the memorandum is not itself 
 admissible. Beets v. St-*--, Meigs, 106 (1838). Where the witness 
 took memoranda in writing and has lost them, the fact affects 
 not the admissibility but the credibility of his evidence. State v. 
 Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). 
 
 Where the dying declarations were uakon down in writing by a 
 witness but not read to, signed or as3cntea to by the deceased, tlie 
 supreme court of Iowa held that the absence of the original need 
 not be accounted for. Speaking of the opposite contention, the 
 court say: "This would have been correct if the writing had been 
 
%' 
 
 4706 
 
 AMEUIOAN XOTES. 
 
 [PAllT II r. 
 
 m: 
 
 tll 
 
 signed by deceased, or, itrobably, road to .and i)ronounced by him 
 correct." Htate v. Snllivan, 51 la. 142 (ISTD). 
 
 It is not a valid objection to a dying dcchiration tliat it is nuub- 
 in response to questions. Ihuinicutt *•. State, 1<S 'I'ex. A\>\). V.)H 
 (18.S5); Anderson v. State, 7*.) Ala. o (ISS")); U. v. Si):irliau'. L'o 
 C. W U. C. 14;; (IS75); r.oyle v. State, <)7 Ind. '.Vr2 (1SS4); V.iss 
 V. Com. , .'] Leigh, 7.SG (bS.'il ) ; State v. Foot You, 24 ( )re. (U (IS'.).'}). 
 
 Even tlion'^h tlie (juestions iire leading. 1!. /•. Smith, 2.'! ('. 1'. 
 U. ('. .'512 (lS7;i). Or was made under oath. State c. Talhert, 41 
 S. C. r)20 (l.S<.)4). 
 
 If the (leclar.ition is complete in itself, it is no objection that 
 the deceased is unable, by reason of weakness, to answer a, subse- 
 quent (jiu^stiou. McLean i\ State, 10 Ala. (')72 (1S-1;>). Or did 
 iu)t state the entire transaction. State v. I'atterson, 45 Vt. 308 
 (l.SV;5); State (•. Nettlebush, 20 la. 2."')7 (l.S(!()). 
 
 Tliat tlie deceased was obliged to express his meaning by signs 
 is witliout importance on the question of admissibility. Junes v 
 State, 71 Ind. GG, 7;") (ISSO); I'.axter *•. Stiite, l.** Lea,'(ir)7 (l-SS;")); 
 Cou'. V. Casey, 11 Cush. 417, 421 (iSo.'!). "'I'iu' principal objec- 
 tion relates to the admission in evidence of certain dying declara- 
 tions of the deceased. There was a written dechiration and verbal 
 declarations made at different times. They were all admissible. 
 ' The prosecutor in a murder case cannot be confined to proving 
 dying declarations made at one time, if tliore were others nuule at 
 other times. All are competent. Nor can he lie coniined to prov- 
 ing what was said at one time, when the statement was reduced to 
 writing and signed at another.' G Am. & Eng. Enc. T^aw, l.'U; 
 People V. Simpson, 48 ]\rich. 474, 12 N. W. G(!2." State v. 
 Walton, 61 X. W. (la.) 170 (18<>1). 
 
 CoxKiNKi) TO Dkath OF Dkclaiiaxt. — The ])revailing rule is 
 to the effect that the declaration must relate to the death of the 
 decl.ar.ant and even where others are killed at substantially tlie 
 same time the scope of the declarations cannot be extended so far 
 as to cover any injury except to him for whose death the indict- 
 ment is brought. 
 
 A wider scope has been given in certnin stntes. 
 
 Thus where sever.al were claimed by the prosecution to have been 
 poisoned by the prisoner, one Terrell, by strychnia, disguised in 
 liquor, at about the same time, evidence is competent tiiat* one of 
 the vic^tims, in view of apin-cacliing death, said, "There was some- 
 thing strange .about the way ^Ir. Terrell h.ad acted;" "he Terrell 
 had never left him in the store before .and told him to invite 
 persons in to drink liquor;" "he was poisoned for the first time 
 in his life," etc. State v. Terrell, 12 Rich. (S. C.) Law, .321 
 (1850). 
 
 So where the decduraut "w.-.s wounded mortally by the same 
 
cHAi'. yui.] 
 
 AMKIMCAN NOTES. 
 
 470" 
 
 shot, or at least at the sanio time tlmt A. (for wliosc imirdor tlie 
 ])risoiier is on trial) was killed. State c. Wilson, -'.'> I.a. Ann. 
 55.S (1S71). 
 
 Tlie rule lias, however, been held to be otherwise in a majority 
 of states. Thus in an Iowa case where several persons liad been 
 killed at about the same time in a general fight with r(!volvers 
 between two families in an attempt to settle a family feud, the 
 dying deelarations of one son that tiie defendant killed him is not 
 admissible on an indictment for the munh'r of liis brotlier, though 
 the wounds were apjiarently made by tlie same instrument. "As 
 to this case they were (dearly hearsay declarations, relating to a 
 crime for which defendant was not on trial. This illegal testi- 
 mony could not have been otherwise than prejudicial to tiie 
 defendant. Its admission was erroneous.'' State v. Westfall, 4!) 
 la. 3L'8 (1878). 
 
 So where husband and wife were apparently killed in the same 
 attempt at robbery of their house, the dying declarations of the 
 wife are not competent on an indictment for the murder of the 
 husband, lirown v. Com. 73 Pa. St. 321 (1873). " We do not 
 think such declarations can be received, except as comin" from the 
 deceased person for whose murder the prisoners are indicted." 
 State V. Fitzhugh, 2 Ore. 227(1807); Hudson v. State, 3 Cold. 
 355 (18()6). 
 
 "The decided weight of authority on the subject seems to be to 
 the effect that it is a general rule that dying declarations, although 
 made with a full consciousness of ajiproaehing death, are only 
 admissible in evidence where the death of the deceased is the 
 subject of the charge, and the circumstances of the death the sub- 
 ject of the dying declaration. 
 
 The admission of dying declarations as evidence being in deroga- 
 tion of the general rule which subjects the testimony of witnesses 
 as ordinarily received to the two important 'tests of truth,' an 
 oath and a cross-examination, it is obvious that such evidence 
 should be admitted only upon grounds of necessity and public 
 policy, and should be restricted to the act of killing and the cir- 
 cumstances immediately attending it and forming a part of the 
 res gestfe." Leiber v. Com., 9 Bush, 11 (1872). 
 
 The cases which admit the dying dpclarati(ms of a person killed 
 at about the same time as the perscm for whose homicide an 
 indictment is bi^ught, may perliaps be most satisfactoi'ily explained 
 as part of the res gestaj. The reasoning of the court, liowever, 
 frequently relies on the rule under consideration. Thus in the 
 case of State v. Wagner, where several i)ersons were murdered on 
 "Smutty Nose" Island, on an indictment for the murder of one, 
 the outcries of a j^rior victim were held competent. "The doctrine 
 which we hold is this: The outcries of a person deceased during 
 
4; 
 
 Kj 
 
 I , 
 
 i 
 
 ^!' ' 
 
 47U8 
 
 AMKUKJAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AllT HI. 
 
 tlie perpetration of the assault which results in death, or upon tin; 
 approach of the assailant, are (competent evidence upon the trial of 
 a party charged with the murder of such person, and may be con- 
 sidered by the jury with other circumstances and testimony u])on 
 the question of the identity of the accused. The outcries of 
 another person who Avas murdered by the same party a few minutes 
 previously during the perpetration of one and the same burglary, 
 but on anotlier part of the premises, are admissible under like cir- 
 cumstances for the same purpose upon such trial. 
 
 Such outcries certainly partake much of the nature of res gestae, 
 more distinctly so than the statement in Com. v. MePike, ubi 
 supra, which accompanied the sending for a jihysician; but we 
 think that the precise ground upon which their admission should 
 be placed in a case like this, is substantially the same as that upon 
 which dying declarations are declared admissible. 
 
 Speaking of dying declarations, Koscoe says (Crim. Ev. p. .30): 
 ' Evidence of this kind which is peculiar to the case of homicide 
 has been considered by some to be admissible from necessity, since 
 it often happens that there is no third person present to be an 
 eye witness to the fact, and tlie usual witness in other felonies, 
 viz., the party injured himself is got rid of; but it is said by Eyre, 
 C. li., that the general principle upon which evidence of this kind 
 is admitted is that it is of declarations made in extremity, when 
 the party is at the point of death, . . . when every motive to 
 falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most power- 
 ful consi<lerations to speak the truth. A situation so solemn and 
 so awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal 
 to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.' 
 Roscoe adds: ' I'robably it is the concurrence of both these reasons 
 which led to the admission of this species of evidence.' 
 
 Both these conditions exist in the case at bar. There is as truly 
 a necessity to corroborate the test'mony of a surviving witness, 
 whose testimony to the identity of the murderer and the accused 
 may be attacked on the ground that in the darkness and excite- 
 ment she was liable to mistake, as there is to furnish evidence 
 when no person who witnessed the assault remains alive. More- 
 over, it is the danger that no surviving witness can be found, which 
 operates to establish the rule, which is of general ai)plication, and 
 the fact that in the particular case one did survive would not 
 abrogate it. 
 
 And as to the second condition, no one can doubt that the excla- 
 mations of these two women embodied the truth as it appeared to 
 each, and that the cries of alarm or supplication uttered by any 
 and all human beings under similar circumstances, would express 
 their perceptions of existing facts as truly as if backed by the 
 sanction of all the oaths known in Christendom, To reject the 
 
 ki 
 
 fT' ■ I 
 
f 
 
 CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTES. 
 
 470» 
 
 I ^ 
 
 ?A>.i 
 
 evidence afforded hy the agoiiizod entreiities of one standinjj laet* 
 to face witli death in the person of a niuiderer wilh iiplilied 
 weapon, when we would accept the account of tlie affair afterwards 
 given by the enfeebled victim, witli perceptions and recollfctious 
 darkened and dimmed l)y the mists and sliadows of approucliing 
 dissolution, would be, we think, but a bad sample of ' the perfec- 
 tion of luiinan reason.' It is not to such exelamiitions thiit any of 
 the substantial ol)jections to hearsay testimony can be held to 
 apply. Those outcries were as plainly circumstaiKies proju'r for 
 the consideration of the jury in tiie attempt to ascertain whether 
 the prisoner was guilty of that crime, as any other portion of the 
 circumstantial evidence in the case." State v. Wagner, Gl Me. 
 178, l'.)4 (IST.'i). 
 
 Exi'KcrrATio.v of Dkath. — The fact that the declarant at tho 
 time of his statement expected to die may be proved by parol and 
 need not .appear in the declaration itself. State v. Wilson, 2.'i La. 
 Ann. 5r,H (1S71); R. v. Smith, 2.3 C. V. U. C. 312 (187.3); People 
 V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17 (1864); Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 I'a. St. 11)8, 
 215 (1858); Hill v. Com. 2 Graft. 5!)4 (1845); Com. v. Silcox, 161 
 Pa. St. 484 (1894); Wills v. State, 74 Ala. 21 (188.3); State v. 
 Fletcher, 24 Ore. 295 (1893) ; Dixon p. State, 13 Fla. 636 (1869) ; 
 Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577 (1890); Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 
 193 (1869); Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229 (18.39); State ?,-. Russell, 13 
 Mont. 164 (1893). This is true even where the declaration is in 
 writing. Com. v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455 (1879). Such a belief 
 must, however, be made to appear in an affirmative manner. 
 People V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17 (1864); Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 Pa. 
 St. 198, 215 (1858). " It is enough, if it satisfactorily appears, in 
 any mode, that they were made under that sanction ; whether it be 
 directly proved, by the express Language of the declarant, or be 
 inferred from his evident danger, or the opinions of the medical or 
 other attendants stated to him, or from his conduct, or other cir- 
 cumstances of the case, all of which are resorted to in order to 
 ascertain the state of the declarant's mind." Montgomery v. 
 State, 11 Oh. 424 (1842); Graves u. People, 18 Col. 170 (189.3); 
 State V. Nocton, 121 ISIo. 537 (1894). 
 
 The court, in deciding whether a <leclaration was made under 
 a sense of impending death may consider ''the evident danger and 
 all the surrounding circumstances." Com. v. Matthew;?, 89 Ky. 
 287 (1889); McHargue v. Ccnn., (Ky.) 23 S. W. ,349 (1893); 
 Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353 (1852); Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 
 261 (1895); McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672 (1849); Miller v. State, 
 27 Tex. App. 63 (1889); Sullivan v. Com. 93 Pa. St. 284, 296 
 (1880). -'The injured party need not, in express words, declare 
 that he knows he is about to die, or make use of e(iuivalent lan- 
 guage." Com. V. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287 (1889). 
 
47010 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part nii 
 
 
 W il 
 
 I 
 
 The declarations are still admissible though the declarant subse- 
 quently entertains hopes of recovery. State v. Reed, 53 Kaus. 
 707 (1894). 
 
 It is not required that such declarations should be made in 
 artk'iilo mortis. State v, Johnson, 102 Ala. I (l.SO.'J). 
 
 Ill Dunuis V. State, 02 Ga. oS (1S78) the supreme court of 
 Georgia sustain a charge to the jury tliat "the fact of conscious- 
 ness of his condition may be shown by circumstances or by expres- 
 sions made by deceased himself. You can take one or the other, 
 or both together, and determine whether he Avas in exfreini's at the 
 time tlie alleged declarations were made." 
 
 As bearing on the question of tlie deceased's expectation of 
 death, the fact that she had received the extreme rights of her 
 (ilomaii Catholic) Church is competent. State v. Swift, r>7 Conn. 
 40(i (1.S8'.)); State v. O'Hrien, 81 la. 88 (18<)U). I'.iit the mere 
 facts that declarant v.-as praying and in suifering are not sufHcient. 
 Cole /;. State, (Ala.) 10 So. 702 {18i)4). 
 
 While the consciousness of impending death may be proved by 
 evidence afiiinde, there is no doubt that the natural evidence that 
 th'2 deceased knew of his ajjproaching deatli, like jiroof of any other 
 mental state, lies in his declaration to that effect. State v. Fitzhugh, 
 2 Ore. 227 (1807); Ilunnicutt ?». State, 18 Tex. App. 498 (188r)); 
 Anderson v. State, 79 Ala. 5(188.-)); K. v. Sparhan, 25 C. V. U. 
 C. 14;) (1875); St.ite r. P.lackburn, 80 \. C. 474 (1879); State v. 
 pniiott, 45 la. 480 (1877); Com. v. Thompson, 159 Mnss. 50 (189.*)). 
 Such a declaration is not conclusive. Bell v. State, 72 JMiss. 507 
 (1895). 
 
 Declarations made either before or after the dying declaration 
 are admissible on the question of knowledge of impending dissolu- 
 tion. State V. Vaughan (Xev.) .'«) I'ac. 7.".3 0895). 
 
 If the declarant "had any expectation or hope of recovery, how- 
 ever slight it might have been, and though death ensued within an 
 hour afterwards, the de(darations are inadmissible." Com. v. 
 Koberts, 108 Mass. 290 (1871) citing State n. Center. 35 Vt. 378 
 (1802); People r. Knickerbocker, 1 Parker C. C. .'502 (1851); 
 Sr.arkey !'. People. IT 111. 17 ( 1 8.T.) : Smith i-. Stiitc 9 Humph. 9 
 (1848)'; P,rown v. State. .12 Miss. 4.33 (18.-)0); .Moore v. St;ite, 12 
 Ala. 704 (1848). A written statement made while tiiere is hope 
 of recovery b.ecomes comi)etent if affirmed after consciousness of 
 impending death. Mockabee v. Com., 78 Ky. .380 (1S80); Million 
 t.. Com., (Ivy.) 25 S. W. 1059 (1894); People v. Crews, 102 Cal. 
 174 (1894). 
 
 It is not ai»iiavently neces.sary that the deceased should feel a 
 sense of i.nmediately aiiproMching death. It is suflicieiit if he feela 
 conlident tlint he has received a fatal injury. Kv;ins r. State, 58 
 Ark. 47 (1893). "Neither would it lie sufficient tli;it the declarant 
 
 
CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 470" 
 
 despaired of ultimate recovery, because that is consistent with the 
 hope of indetinite continuancti of life, lint exactly how immediate 
 must be the expectation of death, the authorities do not seiin agreed 
 or clear. Some would seem to conlinc tlio rule of admi jility to 
 those made at the very point of deatii. 
 
 Tiie wciight of authority, however, does not seem to require so 
 strict a rule, but to justify the admissions if the declarant does not 
 expect to survive the injury from whicii he actually dies, and the 
 injury is such tliat if must be expected to result s[ieedily in death." 
 U. S. y. Schneider, L'l D. C. 381, 40;5 (iSiKJ); People i: Chase, 79 
 Hun, L'!)G (181)4). 
 
 Where the deceased was infornuMl that her only liopc of recovery 
 was through an operation, and nothing appeared to control this 
 fact, the declaration was held inadmissible. Peak v. State, uO N. 
 J. L. 17'.), 221 (1S8S). 
 
 The fact that deceased desired the services of a ])hysician is 
 immaterial. McQueen v. State (Ala.) 15 So. 824 (181)4) ; State v. 
 Evans, 124 Mo. 307 (18<)4). 
 
 Hut the expectation of death may exist notwithstanding that a 
 physician extends hope of recovery. People r. Grunzig, 1 I'arker C. 
 llt"p. 2!)l) (18.->1); State v. Caldwell, 115 X. C. 794 (18114). Fear 
 of death is not sulficient. Certainty is required. iJrakelield v. 
 State, 1 Sneed, 215 (1853). [t is not enough tliat deceased was 
 actually in a dying condition and nodded his head when so informed. 
 People'/?. I'erry, 8 Abb. I'rac. X. S. 27, 34 (1870). Or that he was 
 in great pain, sent for a physician, and said he ('ould not stand it 
 much longer unless relieved. Justice v. State, 99 Ala. 180 (1892). 
 
 The definition is tlms given by the supreme court of Illinois. 
 " Dying declarations are such as are made, relating to the facts of 
 an injury of which the party afterwards dies, under the fixed Ixdief 
 and moral conviction that immediate death is inevitable, without 
 ojjportunity for repentance, and without hope of cscajjing tin; im- 
 pending danger." Simons v. People, 150 111. 00, 73 (1894). 
 
 Using the jjlirase " If I die" is not ncMicssarily fatal to the decla- 
 ration if it appears upon all tlie statements of deceased that tlie 
 certainty of death was recognized. 11. v. Sjjarham, 25 C. P. U. ('. 
 143 (1875). 
 
 In a Missouri case, however, where the same expression, "If I 
 die," was employed, the court held that, in the absence of ex])lana- 
 tion, the uncertainty was fatal to the reeejjtion of the evidenco, 
 and ]iroceed to m:ike tlie following excellent suggestions. " Any 
 ])erson v/ho has been accustoiued to attend on those wlio are injured, 
 or are very ill, knows how common it is for them to say that they 
 will never recover, or that they will die. when there is no good or 
 suHicient reason for the apprehension, and they are not conscious 
 themselves that they are in any real danger. Such expressions 
 
47012 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 ism 
 
 are often the result of impatience, restlessness, or great suffering. 
 liut at the same time let the attending ])liysician inform them that 
 tliere is no liope, and that they must die, and they will be perfectly 
 startled." State i\ Simon, 50 ]\[o. .'370 (187U). To the same effect 
 is State v. Medlicott, 9 Kans. 257, 2S2 (1872). Such vague phrases 
 as "I will die of it," "It is all over with me," "I will never 
 recover," are insufficient. K. v. Peltier, 4 L. Can. Kej). .'! (1S53). 
 
 "The admissibility of such declarations does not depend upon 
 any particular forms of expression, for these will vary indefinitely; 
 but it depends upon the view which tlie deceased took of his own 
 case when in imminent danger of death." Com. v. Roberts, 108 
 Mass. 29() (1871). 
 
 P.ut see State n. Center, 35 Vt. 378 (18G2). In rcoi)le v. 
 Hodgdon, 55 Cal. 72 (1880), where the phrase was "P.elieving that 
 I am very near death, and realizing that I may not recover," the 
 fact that all hope was not abandoned was held fatal. 
 
 It follows from wliat has been said tliat it is not sufliciont that 
 these declarations are, in fact, mad>( la extremis. "Tliey arc only 
 admissible where the party .laking them knows or thinks tliut he 
 is in a tlying state. ... It is this ronsciousiifHs, coupled witli the 
 condition of tlie i)arty, wliich sup[)lies tiie place of an oath, and 
 peculiarly distinguishes <lying declarations from liearsay." l>ixon 
 V. State, 1.') Fla. (J.'JG (18()0), citing with ajiproval ]\[ontgomery's 
 Case, 11 Ohio, 424 (1842). 
 
 " It is the impression of almost immediate dissolution and not 
 the rapid succession of death in jioint of fact tliat rentiers the 
 testimonv a<lmiss;ble. Vaughan v. (,'om., 8(5 Ky. 431 (1887); Starr 
 V. Com.,\Ky.) 30 S. W. 397 (1895). 
 
 On the otlu'r liand, tin; fact that (U'ath fails to ensue, as antici- 
 pated by deceased, for a period of seventeen days is imniatcrial. 
 State r. Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91 (1879); Cum. *•. Cooper, 5 All, 
 495 (18r)2). "Our judgment concurs with that of tiie Kni,'lisli court 
 of criminal appea.l, as expressed by chief Haron Pdllnck, in \\w 
 latter of tlu.se eases. K. i\ Peaney, V Cox C. C. 20'.>. ' In order,' 
 he says, 'to render such a declaration admissible, it is necessary 
 tliat it slumld be made under the apprehension of deatli. The 
 books certainly speak of near approacliing deatli; but there is no 
 (\ase in which any particular interval, any number of hcmrs (ir 
 days, is specified as the limit. In truth, the questicui does not 
 depend u|)on the length of interval between the death and declara- 
 tion, but on the state of the man's mind at the time of making the 
 declaration, ami his Indief that he is in a dying state.' " Com. v. 
 Cooper, 5 All. 4'.»5 (18(;2). The case is cited with approval in 
 Com. »'. Koberts, 108 Mass. 29G (1871), where the interval was the 
 BanH>. 
 
 If the other conditions are present, a dying declaration is none 
 
CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 470W 
 
 1. 
 
 11. 
 irt 
 
 r, 
 
 ll.> 
 
 11(1 
 
 dl' 
 
 .lb 
 
 la- 
 
 lio 
 
 V. 
 
 in 
 
 the 
 
 the less admissible if death does not ensue for twenty-five days. 
 State V. Oliver, 2 Houston (Del.) 585 (18().'i). So of fourteen days. 
 Jones V. State, 71 Ind. GG (1880). Ur sixteen. Baxter v. State, 
 15 Lea (Tenn.) 657 (1885). So an interval of six days. State i-. 
 Center, 35 Vt. o78 (18(j2). Twelve: days. I'eople v. Grunzig, 1 
 Parker C. C. 21)0 (1851). Forty days. State r. Wilson (ISIo.) 20 
 S. W. ."557 (181)4). Or even two iiionths. Houlden r. State (Ala.) 
 15 So. 341 (181)4). 
 
 iMPKAeuMKN'T. — It hardly need be said that the accuracy and 
 veracity of the dying declarant may be impeached; e. g., wliere 
 the declaration was as to the identity of the accused, by evidence 
 that the deceased was in the habit of mistaking her friends for 
 persons whom they did not resemble. " A defendant against 
 whom dying declarations are received has not the o]iportiiiiity of 
 cross-examining the declarant. Hence it is justly held that he is 
 entitled to every allowance and benelit that he may have lost by 
 the absence of the opportunity of a more full investigation by 
 means of cross-examination." Com. r. Cooper, 5 All. 4115 (1S(J2). 
 
 So the "peculiar character of the deceased for wicUcdncss and 
 disregard of the law of God in his ()ut[)ourings of Idasphemy," is 
 comi)etent evidence for the jury. "For if a man, even without 
 hope of life in this world, nevertheless without belief in (Jod or in 
 the divine revelation, while his declarations woulil l)e admissible, 
 their weight and consideration should be weighed by the jury." 
 Nesbit ". State, 4.'J Ca. 2.'>8 (1871). So it may be shown, to dis- 
 credit the dying declaration, "that the deceased was a ilisbeliever 
 in a future state of rewards and jmnishments." (loodall v. State, 
 1 Ore. .'};]3 (1801). 
 
 The lack of belief in a future state, though usually not a grouml 
 for rejecting the evidence, may still be received at least to iletraet 
 from the value of a «lying declaration. Hill r. State, 04 Miss. 4.'il 
 (1880); State v. Elliott, 45 la.. 48() (1877). 
 
 Or the declarant may be iinpeaclu'd by proof (if his inconsistent 
 statements whether made !ii <:r/rt'iiii's or not. "'i'lie (inly case 
 ludding otherwise is that of Wroc r. State, 20 Oh. St. 100 i 187(t). 
 This case has never been followoil. so far as wc have licea able to 
 discover, and its reasoning is narrow and unsatisfactory. . . . To 
 de[)rive thci defendant of the only possible method of iinpcacliing 
 the credit or memory of the dctdarant, by proof of contradictory 
 statements, would be a gross injustice." .Mondock r. State. IW) 
 Tenn. 528 (181)1). "There is no reason why tiic same ]irinci]ile 
 of law should not be apjilied to the contradictory statements of 
 persons in. rxfn-inis and those of a jicrson on examination under 
 oath. The court upon this point sliould have charged the jury, 
 that if they believed that the contradiction in the dying decdara- 
 tions of the deceased, were produced by ignorance on her i)art as to 
 
470" 
 
 AM El! IC AN NOTES. 
 
 [PAltT m. 
 
 wlio had committed the offence, and a mere surmise that it was the 
 I)risoner, the}' ought to be rejected and not permitted to have any 
 weight in coming to a conolusiou upon wliich their judgment was 
 to be based; but that if tliey believed that tlie contradictions were 
 produced by appreliension and fears of her husband, or an unwil- 
 lingness to cliarge him with the offence, and not from ignoraiK^e 
 as to liis guilt, then the contradictions might be reconciled, and 
 that portion of her declaration charging the prisoner witli tlie 
 ott'ence ought to be taken into consideration by them, and such 
 weight ought to be given to it as from all the circumstances in the 
 case they might think it justly entitled." McPherson v. State, 9 
 Yerger, 279 (1.S36). 
 
 The declarant can not only be impeached ; he may be sustained 
 by appropriate evidence. 
 
 It has been held that where there is evidence tending to destroy 
 the effect of dying declarations, it is competent for the state to 
 corroborate them by showing that deceased made similar declara- 
 tions a few minutes after the fight, though it did not appear that 
 he was then UTuler the apprehension of immediate death. State v. 
 lil'ickburn, 80 N. C. 474 (J.879). 
 
 A Qi'ESTiox Foit TiiK CouBT. — Whether the circumstances 
 necessary to entitle an alleged dying declaration to be received in 
 evidence actually exist is a preliminary question for the court. 
 "It is the duty of the court to determine, in the first place, \\\w\\ 
 the admissibility of such declarations, and then it is for the jury 
 to determine upon the weight, or credibility of them." Moore v. 
 State, 12 Ala. 764 (1848); Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463 
 (18r.7); Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 424 (1842); States. Foot 
 You. 24 Ore. 61 (1893); Roten v. State, 31 Fla. .514 (1893); State 
 V. Center, 35 Vt. 378 (1862); liull «. Com., 14 Gratt. 613 (1857); 
 State V. Simon, 50 Mo. 370 (1872); State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 
 1086 (1880); State v. Aldrich, 50 Kans. 6()() (1893); State v. 
 Johnson, 118 Mo. 491 (189.3); State v. Nocton, 121 Mo. 537 (1894). 
 
 Tlie court, it has been held, cannot leave the entire question, 
 including admissibility, to the jury. State v. Center, 36 Vt. 378 
 (18(;2). Roten v. State, 31 Fla. 514 (1893). 
 
 The decision is however subject, it has been held, to review. 
 Donnelly v. State, 26 X. J. Law, 463 (1857). 
 
 "The court does not discharge this duty l^y simjdy hearing the 
 evidence produced upon the part of the State. Evidence, if offered, 
 sliould be received upon the part of the defendant, and it should 
 be weighed upon the determination of the question of admissibility. 
 The declarations of a dying man are admitted on a sujiposition tliat 
 in his awful situation, on the confines of a future world, he had 
 no motive to misrepresent, but, on tlie contrary, the strongest mo- 
 tives to speak without disguise and without malice. Roscoe's 
 
'^10^' 
 
 CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 AMEKICAN ^'OTKS. 
 
 470^5 
 
 m 
 
 Criminal Evidence, p. 35. Before tlio judge decides the question 
 of admissibility he hears all the deceased said respecting the 
 danger in which he considered himself, and he should be satisfied 
 that the declaration was made under an impression of almost 
 immediate dissolution.'' t^tate c. Elliott, 45 la. 48G (1.S77); State 
 V. Johnson, 118 .Mo. 41)1 (1893). 
 
 The preliminary inciuiry may, it is said, be held either in the 
 presence and heltiH^ig of tl"^ juiT) or otherwise, as the discretion of 
 the trial judge may' dictate. .State c. Shaffer, 23 Ore. o'k) (18'.).'!). 
 
 In a Georgia case it was held "tliat the proper course to be 
 pursued was this: that a prima facie case of the moral ronscious- 
 iiess required, should be exhibited to tlie Court in tlie Hrst instance, 
 as preliminary to the admission of the testimony. This done, the 
 evidence sliould be received and left for the Jury to determine 
 whether the deceased was really under the apprehension of death 
 when tlie declarations were made, which they might infer either 
 from (iircumstances or the expressions used." Campbell v. State 
 of Georgia., 11 (ia. 353, .376 (1851.'). 
 
 Even if admitted by the court, the weight of the evidence is 
 entirely for the jury. State /■. Elliott, 45 la. 480 ('877). "This 
 preliminary adjudication of tl.e court upon the question as to the 
 admissibility of the testimony, in case the evidence bo allowed, 
 has decided nothing in regard to its credibility. That peculiar 
 province still remains for the jury. It is every day's practice to 
 admit evidence as competent, which the jury have no hesitation in 
 disbelieving. The court may decide, U[)on examination of ])roofs, 
 tliat a witness is not incompetent for want of reason or understand- 
 ing; tlie jury may, notwithstanding, determine witliin their 
 ])roviiice, what is the weight of his testimony, and may graduate 
 tlie credit they will repose in it, from tlie point of total disbelief 
 to tliat of the most implicit contidence.'' Vass's C'ase, 3 Leigh, 
 78(), 7!)4 (1S31); State v. Cameron, 2 Chandler (Wis.) 172 (18.-)0); 
 Caniplxdl r. State, 38 Ark. 4i)8 (1882); State v. Foot You. 24 Ore. 
 61 (18!);}); TJrock v. Com. 92 Ky. 183 (1801); Jon.-s v. State, 70 
 Miss. 4(11 (1892). 
 
 The supreme court of Georgia in Huiiias v. State, 62 Ga. .^8 
 (1878) sustained the following ruling on this point. "If the court 
 is satisJied jirima fa,cie that the deceased is in extremis and eon- 
 scions oF his condition, it will allow the flying declarations to go 
 to the jury. The jury will look to the evidence to see if the ]MM'son 
 making tliem was in extremis at the time, and was conscious of his 
 condition.. If the jury believe the fact that the person was in 
 extremis, and conscious of his condition, then they may consider 
 the dying declarations as evidence." To same effect. Wallace v. 
 State", 90 Ga. 117 (1892). 
 
 In Com. V. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296 (1871) the ruling to the jury 
 
iSr 
 
 470^6 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part UI. 
 
 was "that the credibility of the evidence was entirely within the 
 province of the jury, and they were at liberty to weigh all the 
 circuiustances under which the declarations were made, including 
 those upon which the court had already passed merely as i)relinu- 
 nary to their admission; and tliat the jury were to determine Die 
 state of mind under which the testimony was given, and its weight." 
 This ruling was apparently sustained, svh silentlo. 
 
 Leaving the question in this way to the jury does not, however, 
 make either the ruling of the court on the admission of the evi- 
 dence or the decision of the jury as to the .existence of the facts 
 re'juired by the court, final so as to prevent the ruHng being 
 reviewed upon exceptions. ''It was a ruling in matter ot" law; anil 
 the life of a defendant may be involved in a ruling on this point. 
 In many of the cases reported, the ■;',ourt have discussed the evi- 
 dence on which the question turnod." Com. r. lloberts, 108 Mass. 
 296 (1871). 
 
 The court will exclude tlie dying declaration where it appears 
 tliat the declarant had no belief in (Jod or a future state of reward 
 and punishment. Donnelly v. State, 2G N. J. Law, 4().'5 (ISi")?). 
 
 Such disbelief will not be presumed. It must ap])ear by affirma- 
 tive evidence. Ibid. 
 
 Slaves are supposed to have a religious belief. Lewis r. State, 
 9 Sm. & M. 115 (1847). 
 
 Opinion Exclitdkd. — The declarant should sta,te facts rather 
 than conclusions. Mcliride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91 (1804). 
 Where a declarant, liowever, used tlie expression, "lie sliot me 
 down like a dog," the expression was held admissible. "Declara- 
 tions of a party in extremis, in order to be admissible, must be as 
 to facts and not conclusions. They are permitted as to those 
 things to which the deceased would have been competent to testify, 
 if sworn in the case. But I do not think tlie expression of the 
 deceased a eonclusion. It was given as a i)art of liis narrative 
 relating to the affair, and I think it was merely intended to illus- 
 trate the lack of provocation and the wantonness in whicli the 
 appellant did the act. It was descriptive of the manner in whicli 
 the act was committed. It conveyed the idea that tlie ai)])ellant 
 disregarded the claims of humi-nity, and, without giving him any 
 warning, wantonly shot him. It was the statement of a fact made 
 by way of illustration." State c. Saunders, 14 Ore. .300 (1886). 
 So of a declaration, "It was done without any provocation on his 
 part." Wroe v. State, 20 Oh. St. 400 (1870). Ov that deceased 
 was "butchered." State r. (Hie, 8 Wash. 12 (1894). 
 
 "A mere expression of opinion by the dying man is not admis- 
 sible as a dying declaration, and it is immaterial whether the fact 
 that the declaration h mere opinion appears from the statement 
 itself, or from other undisputed evidence showing that it was 
 
';hap. vm.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 470>" 
 
 iinpossible for the declarant to have known the fact stated. If, 
 upoiT a'.iy view of the evidence, it is possiLil, for the dechirant to 
 know tlie truth of what he states, his declarations, being otlierwise 
 competent, should be received and considered by the jury in the 
 light 01 all the evidence." Jones v. State, 52 Ark. M'> (1881)); 
 Einns v. State, 46 Ind. .'ill (1874); State r. Arnold, 13 Ired. L. 
 184 (1851); State v. Parker, % Mo. OSli (1888). 
 
 A declaration by a deceased who was shot at niglit in a house 
 from the outside through an aperture in the logs, made wliile 
 in extre.iiis, "It was E. W. who sliot me, though I did not see 
 him'* was accordingly rejected. State v. Williams, (57 N. C. 12 
 (1872). But the statement that deceased and accused "were play- 
 ing, and that it was an accident" is competent. "To be competent 
 as a dying declaration, the statement must not only relate to the 
 immediate circumstances of the transaction resulting in the 
 inquiry, but it must detail facts, and not the opinion of the declar- 
 ant. In our opinion, the statement in this instance conforms to 
 this rule. It is unlike the case wliere tlie injured party declared 
 that he liad been killed for nothing. This was ]mrely his opinion 
 and inference. Here the injured man said that lie and the accused 
 were engaged in play, and that the sliooting was an accident. 
 This, in our opinion, was the statement of a fact, more than tlie 
 giving of an opinion, and the court properly permitted it to be 
 proven." Com. v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287 (188!)). 
 
 The use of the phrase "Believing myself to be now on my death 
 bed" does not imply opinion, and such a declaration is admissible. 
 Doolin r. Com. 95 Ky. 29 (189.'}). 
 
 " We apprehend there is a decisive test to which ' dying declara- 
 tions' must be subjected, and by it their admissibility as testimony 
 can be readily determined. That test is, whatever may be stated 
 by a witness under oath, is admissible in evidence as dying decla- 
 rations, made l)y one under the consciousness of approacliing death. 
 The statement, under sucdi circumstances, is held to be as truthful 
 as if under oath, and equivalent to a statement sworn to. But the 
 opinions of witnesses under oath, as a general rule, a.re inadmis- 
 sible in evidence in criminal cases, and hence opinions in dying 
 declarations are excduded." Whitley r. State, 38 Ga. 50 (1808). 
 
 The statement that the accused had no reason for the felonious 
 assault is not objectionable as being an expression of opinion. 
 Boyle V. State, 97 Ind. 322 (1884). 
 
 MixoR CoxsiDEKATioxs. Thf admission of dying declarations 
 does not infringe the ])ris<)ner's riglit to be confronted with the 
 witnesses against liim. Bretwn r. ''im.. 73Ta. St. .'J21 (1873); 
 State V. Saunders, 14 Ore. 3(10 (l.S.-iO); State v. Kindle, 47 OIi. 
 St. 35S (1890); People v. Glenn. 10 Cal. 32 (1858); Walston v. 
 Com., IC B. Monr. (Ky.) 15 (LS.m); Com. r. Carey, 12 Cush. 246 
 
 . t 
 
470'8 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AllT i:i. 
 
 jfjill 
 
 m 
 
 
 I 
 
 l" n 
 
 I ,JU 
 
 
 Wl 
 
 SI I 
 
 m 
 
 (185;5); Cami)bell v. State, 11 Ga. 353 (1852); Bobbins r. State, 8 
 •Oh. St. 131 (1858). 
 
 "Tlie rule, however, was well settled before the adoption of our 
 constitution, that the declarations of a dying person were admissible 
 in cases of lioniicide 'where the death of the deceased is the subjeot 
 of the charge, and the eircunistanc'es of the death are tlie subject 
 of tlie dying declarations;' and we have no idea that it was the 
 object of this provision in the bill of rights to abrogate this rule of 
 evidence." .Miller r. State^ lio Wis. ;;.S4 (1870). 
 
 "The Constitution does not alter the rules of evidence, or deter- 
 mine what shall be admissible testiiiu)ny against the prisoner, but 
 it only .secures to him the right to confront the witnesses who may 
 be '• troduced to prove such uuitters as, according to the settled 
 principles of law, are evidence against him. This objectitu, if 
 carried out fully, would result in the rejection of ail dechi rations, 
 even where they constitute part of the res gestcc. The law deter- 
 mines the admissibility of testimony — the Constitution secures to 
 the accused the riglit to meet the witness who deposes face to face. 
 But what the witness, when thus confronted, shall be allowed to 
 state as evidence, the Constitution does not undertake to prescribe, 
 but leaves it to be regulated by the general principles of the huv of 
 evidence. When the declarations of the deceased are offered to 
 the jury, they cmstitute facts in legal contemplation, wliioh 
 tend to establish the truth of the matter to which they relate. The 
 l)osition, therefore, that their admission as evidence infringes upon 
 the constitutional right of the prisoner to confront the witnesses 
 against him, is wholly without foundation, and cannot be main- 
 tained." Walston V. Com. 16 B. Monr. (Ky.) 15, 35 (1855). 
 
 " The argument for the ex(dusion of the testimony, proceeds 
 upon the hlea tliat the deceased is the witness, when in fact it is 
 the individual who swears to the statenu".its of the deceased, who is 
 the witness. And it is as to him that the ])rivileges of an oral and 
 cross examination are secured." Campbe ' v. State of Georgia, 11 
 Ga. 353, 374 (1852). 
 
 " This objection is founded in a misconception of fact. The 
 accused is confronted by the witness on his trial. The deceased 
 person is not the witnes.s, but the person who can relate, on the 
 trial, the death-bed declarations, is the witness. The objection, if 
 there be one, is to the competency of the evidence, and not to the 
 want of the personal ]iresence of the witness. And it appears to 
 be well settled, that dying declarations, within the restricted rule 
 prescribed, fall within the exceptions to the general rule that hear- 
 say is not evidence." Jtobbins v. State, 8 Oh. St. 131, 103 (1857). 
 
 The sapreme court of Iowa, in a case where the point was not 
 fully considered, suggest that if the question were a new one they 
 might feel constrained to decide contrary to tiie existing rule on 
 this subject, stated supra. State v. Nash, V la. 347 (1858). 
 
CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 47019 
 
 IS 
 
 is 
 id 
 LI 
 
 le 
 •d 
 le 
 if 
 le 
 to 
 
 The dying declarations of a Imsband arc evidence on an imlict- 
 ment against the wife. Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 704 (1S4(S) ; Pcoiile 
 V. Green, 1 Ueuio, 614 (1845); "'jate v. Belclu-r. Hi H. C. 45U 
 (1880). 
 
 If the deceased die before comjileting his declaration that wliicli 
 remains is incompetent and the conclusion of tlie declarant tliat 
 the corrections were " immaterial " does not affect tlie rule. " \ f too 
 much has been said, the narrative may be as damtiging to the 
 accused as if it was i)artial. If it needs correcting, the defect — 
 the error to l;j corrected — may be as injurious as if it were partial 
 and inco-n!,4ete." Drake *-. State, L'5 'lex. App. J',),'] (1888). 
 
 It is sufficient if the reporting witness is able to state the sub- 
 stance of the dying declaratious. Such evidence is admissible 
 "although the witness was uual)le to give the precise words." 
 Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 4L'4 (1842); Ward v. State, 8 lilack. 
 101 (184(5) r Murphy v. People, ;]7 111. 447 (18(55). 
 
 It is not necessary that the reporting witness should be sure of 
 the precise order of the statements. King v. State, (Tex.) 29 S. 
 W. 1086 (1895). 
 
 The fact that a dying declaration was in a foreign language 
 (dliinese), and introduced in evidence through an interpreter, 
 affects merely the weight of the evidence. State v. Foot You, 24 
 Ore. 61 (189.3). 
 
 Part of a dying declaration may be received and the rest rejected 
 on a general objection by the defendant. State v, Wilson, (Mo.) 
 26 S. W. 357 (1894). 
 
 "The true grounds upon which tlie declarations are receivable as 
 testimony" are thus staged by the learned Judge Kedtield. " It is 
 not received upon any other ground than that of necessity, in order 
 to prevent murder going unpunished. What is said in the books 
 about the situation of the declarant, he being virtually under the 
 most solemn sanction to speak the trutli, is far from presenting the 
 true ground of the admission; for, if that were all that is requisite 
 to render the declarations evidence, the apprehension of death 
 should have the same effect, since it would place the declarant 
 under the same restraint as if the apprehension were founded in 
 fact. But both must concur, both tlie fact and the apprehension of 
 being in. extremis. And although it is not indispensahle that there 
 should be no other evidence of the same facts, the rule is no doubt 
 based upon the presumption that in the majority of cases there will 
 be no other equally satisfactory proof of the same facts. This pre- 
 sumption and the consequent probability of the cvinie going un- 
 punished, is niiiuestionably the chief ground of this exception in 
 the law of evidence. And the great reason why it couhl not be 
 received generally, as evidence in all cases where facts involved 
 
47020 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAItT III. 
 
 should thereafter come in question, seems to he that it wants one of 
 the most important and indispensable elements of testimonj', that of 
 an opjiortunity for cross examination by the party against whom it 
 is offered." 1 Greenlf. Evid. § 150, note. 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS AND CONFfSaiONS. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ADMISSIONS. 
 
 § 723.^ Admissions and confessions are often considered as decla* 
 rations against interest, and, therefore, probably true. With 
 regard, however, to many admissions, and especially those implied 
 from conduct and assumed character, it cannot be supposed that 
 the party, at the time of the principal declaration or act, believed 
 himself to be speaking or acting against his own interest ; but 
 often the contrary. Such evidence seems, therefore, more properly 
 admissible as a substitute for the ordinary and legal proof ; ^ either 
 in virtue of the direct consent and waiver of the party, as in the 
 case of explicit and solemn admissions, or on grounds of public 
 policy and convenience, as in the case of those implied from 
 assumed character, acquiescence, or conduct.' Many admissions, 
 
 > Largely Gr. Ev. § 169. 
 
 * A8 to when the admissions of a party with respect to written instru- 
 ments may be substituted for the ordinary proof of such instruments by 
 their production, see ante, §§ 410 — 414. 
 
 ^ According to Mascardus, this is the light in which confessions and 
 admissions are regarded by the Eoman law. Illitd igitiir in priviis, ut 
 hinc potiasimum exordiar, no7> est ignorandnm, quod etsi cimftsaioni inter pro- 
 bationum species locum in prcusentia tribueritnus ; ciincti tamen fere Dd. 
 unanimes sunt arbitrati, ipsam jintius esse ah onere prahundi nhvationem, 
 giiam proprie probadonem : 1 Masc. de Prob. quaest. 7, n. 1, 10, 11; 
 Menoch. de Prces. lib. 1, quaest. 61, n. 6; Alciat. de Proes. par. 2, n. 4. 
 We fmther find that Eoman law distinguishes, with great clearness and 
 precision, between confessions extra judicium, and confpssions in judicio; 
 treating the former as of very little and often of no weight, unless corro- 
 borated, and the latter as generally, if not alwaj's, conchisive, even to the 
 overthrow of the presumptio jxiris et de jure ; thus constituting an excep- 
 tion to the conclusiveness of this class of presumptions. But to give a con- 
 fession this effect, certain things are essential, which Mascardus cites out 
 of Tancred : — 
 
 " Major, spont^, sciens, contra se, ubi jus fit ; 
 Nee natura, favor, lis, jusve repugnet, et hostis." 
 
 Masc. ub. sup. n. 15; Vid. Dig. lib. 42, tit. 2, de confessis; Cod. lib. 7, tit. 69; 
 Van. Leeuw. Comm. book v. ch. 21. 
 
 471 
 
!•' :: I 
 
 w 
 
 ,*T- 
 
 ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS — DISTINCTION. [PT. III. 
 
 however, being made by third persons, are recti viiblo on mixod 
 grounds ; partly, as belonging to the res gestiu, partly, as nmdo 
 against the interest of the person making thoni, nnd i»artly, bcfiniso 
 of some privity with him against whom they are ofT<'red in evidence. 
 
 § 724.' In our law, the term adinmiun is usually ajipliod to riril 
 traimiction.s, and to those matters of fact, in criminal cusps, wliich 
 do not involve criminal intent ; ^ while the term fDnfrxsion is gene- 
 rally used in crhniml law, and as denoting an (irknoukdgmrnt of 
 (juilt. This distinction will be better understood by an example. 
 On the trial of Lord ^lelville, who was charged (amongst other 
 things) with crimiiMl misapplication of moneys received from the 
 Exchequer, the admission of his ogent and authorised receiver was 
 held suffioiont proof of the fact of such agent having received the 
 public money. But had such admission been tendered in evidence 
 to establish the criminal charge of misapplication of money it would 
 have been rejected.' 
 
 § 724a. As the rules of evidence, respectively applicable to 
 admissions and confessions, differ in some respects, the two subjects 
 will be discussed in separate chapters. 
 
 § 724a (i). With regard to all Admissions, the law, after several 
 changes,* is now embodied in the li. S. (^ , 1883, Order XXXII. 
 
 § 724a (ii). By Eule 1 of the Order just mentioned, "Any party 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 170, almost verbatim. 
 
 » Ld. Melville's trial, ISOU. 
 
 ' Loid Chancellor Erskino said : — 
 " Thi.s first step in the proof " (namely, 
 the receipt of the money by the agent, ) 
 "must advance by evidence applic- 
 able alike to civil, as to criminal 
 cas(!S ; for a fact must be established 
 by tlie same evidence, whether it is 
 to be followed by a criminal or civil 
 consequence ; but it is a totally dif- 
 ferent question, in the consideration 
 of criminal as distinjruished from civil 
 justice, how the noble person now on 
 trial may be affected by the fact when 
 BO established. The receipt by the 
 
 Paymaster would in itseli involve 
 im civillj% but could by no possi- 
 bility convict him of a crime " : 29 
 How. St. Tr. 7H4. 
 
 * See Beg.-Gon., 2 W. 4, 1832, 
 
 reported in 3 B. & Ad. 392, ;«I3 ; 
 Reg.-Gen., H. T., 4 W. 4, r. 20, 1832, 
 reported in 4 Vt. & Ad. ])p. 2 — 8 ; 
 Reg.-Gen., II. T., 1SJ3; 15 & 10 V. 
 c. 70, §§ 117, 118; K. S. C. 1873, 
 Ord. XXXII., rr. 1—4. Eor the 
 practice on the llovenue side of the 
 Queen's liench Division, see lleg.- 
 Gen., 24 V. r. 17 ; 6 H. & N. xiii. ; 
 for that in proceedings under the 
 Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874. 
 37 & 38 V. c. 85, see Reg.-Gen., 22 
 Feb. 1879, r. 40, and Form 39, cited 
 4 P. D. 201, 284 ; for that to bo used 
 in the Court of Probate, see Rules of 
 1802, for Ct. of Prob. in contentious 
 business, r. 72, and Form No. 2t). The 
 Rules of 1805, 1809, 1875, 1877. and 
 1880, for the Ct. of Div. and Mat. 
 Causes, are, for some unaccountable 
 reason, silent on this subject. 
 
 472 
 
C. IX.] H. C. liULES A8 TO NOTICES TO ADMIT DOCUMF.NTS. 
 
 to a cause or nrnttpr may give notice, by his pleading, or otherwise 
 in writing, that ho admits tlie truth of the whole or any part of 
 the case of any other party." ' 
 
 § "tiU (iii). Admissions,* properly so called, are properly the 
 Bubjoot of a treatise upon Practice, and Practice is not the subject 
 of this work. Therefore the matter of admissions will be only hero 
 dealt with in a cursory way, and with a view to those points which 
 are most likely to arise in actual practice at Nisi Prius. For further 
 information the reader is referred to one of the well-known works 
 upon Practice. 
 
 § 724 A (iv). Subject to these general reservations, it may be noted 
 that admissions are principally of two kinds, viz., (a.) Admissiona 
 of (foeiiniciitii ; and (b ) Admissions oi facts. 
 
 § 724a (v). As to admissions of documenU in the High Court, 
 Rule 2 of R. S. C, Order XXXII., provides that "Either party 
 may call upon the other party to admit any document, saving all 
 just exceptions ; and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after 
 such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid 
 by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the 
 cause or matter may be, unless at the trial or hearing the court or 
 a judge shall certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable ; and 
 no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such 
 notice be given, except where the omission to give the notice is, 
 in the opinion of the taxing officer, a saving of expense." * 
 
 § 724b. The rule governing notices to admit documents, which 
 has been set out in the preceding paragraph,'' does not specify any 
 exact time at which such notice must be given. But such a notice 
 must be given a reasonable time before trial. Where, however, it 
 was given on a plaintiff's behalf to the defendant's ageiit in town 
 
 . (■ 
 
 
 ' If a partj' admits all the facts 
 pleaded against him, the other side 
 cannot call evidence. See The Hard- 
 wick, 1883 (Sir James Hannen) ; 
 Urquhart v. Butterfield, 1888, C. A. 
 
 ' Admissions between co-defen- 
 dants under this rule, to which the 
 plaintiff is not a party, are not in- 
 cluded in an order against him or in 
 his favour for general costs of the 
 
 action. See Dodds v. Freke, 1884. 
 As to the practice gcnerallj-, see 
 Order XXXII. in the Annual Prac- 
 tice. 
 
 » By Eule 3 of Order XXXII., a 
 Porm of "Notice to admit Docu- 
 ments" is furnished, which is Form 
 No. 1 1 in Appendix B. 
 
 * Viz., Order XXXU. r. 2. 
 
 473 
 
DECIMIONS AS TO NOTICES TO ADMIT DOCUMENTS, [p. III. 
 
 
 m 
 
 ^ 
 
 i 
 
 . 
 
 
 1 
 
 ->.<■■ . 
 
 ) 
 
 ■.;■«-■ i 
 
 i 4 
 
 I, i 
 
 only four days before the oomrnission day at Newcastle, ^-lio two 
 days afterwards refused to almit the documents without oljooting 
 to the sufficiency of the notice, or requirijig further time, — the 
 plaintiff was, however, held entitled to the .>osts of proof.' If an 
 admission be made " with a saving of all just exceptions," it so far 
 recognises the general character and accuracy of the documents, 
 that no objection can subsequently be token to the nnthodiritii of 
 any part of them,' or to their reception in evidence on the ground 
 of any interlineation, however material, appearing upon them.' 
 Unless this were so, great inconveniences would follow ; for as 
 one main object of inducing a party to admit under notice, is to 
 dispense with the necessity of formal proof of the instrument, it 
 would obviously open a door to fraud, if the party admitting were 
 at liberty afterwards to object to an interlineation, which the 
 attesting witness might alone be enabled to explain.^ Accordingly, 
 where a party admitted a deed as "the counterpart of a lease," 
 an objection at the trial, that it was in fact a lease, and as such 
 inadmissible for want of a sufficient stamp,'' was overruled ; ^ and 
 a party who admitted an instrument, specified in the notice as 
 bearing date the 10th August, was not allowed to call on his 
 opponent for an explanation, though on the production of the 
 instrument it was evident that the date " August " had been 
 written on an erasure.^ 
 
 § 724 c. A variance, too, in the description of the document, if 
 not of a nature to mislead, will not release the admitting party 
 from his obligation. For instance, an admission will not be 
 vitiated because the date of a promissory note, otherwise correctly 
 described in the notice to admit, is misstated.* A party will not, 
 however, be entitled to the costs of proving any document specified 
 in the notice, unless the witness called to establish this proof has, 
 at least in his examination in chief, been questioned to no other 
 faot.^ And, when a notice to admit documents is given, all that 
 
 > Tinn v. Billingsloy, 1835. 
 
 • Hawk I'.Freund, 18o8 (Byles, J.). 
 
 • Freeman v. Stoggall. 1849. 
 
 • Id. 208 (ColoridKO, J.). 
 
 • 8oe now o4 & 65 V. c. 39 ("The 
 Stamp Act, 1891 "), § 72. 
 
 • Dog V, Smith, 1838. 
 
 ' Poolo V. Pulmor, 1842 (Rolfe, B.). 
 
 • Field V. Hemminfj, 1830 (Ld. 
 Abinger) ; Bittlcston v. Cooper, 1H45. 
 
 » Stracey v, Blake, 1835 (Ld. 
 Abingor). 
 
 474 
 
C. IX.] DECISIONS AS TO ADMISSIONS OF DOCUMENTS. 
 
 can fairly be asked is, that the handwriting or due execution of tho 
 papers specified should be admitted; so that where a party includes 
 in his notice a demand to admit the authority by which the docu- 
 ments had been written, and, on the other side refusing generally 
 to make the admission as prayed, proves the documents at the trial, 
 he is not entitled to recover from his opponent the costs of such 
 proof. ^ 
 
 § 724d. It is not necessary to show that the admitting party 
 has actually examined the documents mentioned in the notice, 
 if he has had an opportunity of doing so ; ^ and it seems to be 
 unnecessary to identify the document produced at the trial with the 
 one inspected, provided that it corresponds with the description 
 contained in the notice.' On two occasions, however, the necessity 
 for such evidence has been urged"* (if not acknowledged by tho 
 court) ; and it will generally be prudent to be prepared with such 
 proof, or, at least, to have the documents that are to be produced 
 signed or marked by the party making the admission. 
 
 § 724i) (i). Though a notice to admit do not contain any saving 
 of all just exceptions, the party admitting may still rely on any 
 valid objection to the admissibility of a document specified in it. 
 Therefore, where a plaintiff admitted that a paper was a copy of a 
 letter from himself to a defendant, who had suffered judgment by 
 default, this was held not to entitle the other defendant to put in 
 the copy, without first accounting for the non-production of the 
 original, or tracing it to the plaintiff's possession, and proving the 
 notice to produce.* 
 
 § 724e. Rule 2 of Order XXXII. extends, moreover, to every 
 document which a party purposes to adduce in evidence, whether 
 or not it be in his custody or control,'' and whether or not it be 
 put in issue by tho pleadings.' Neither will the case bo varied 
 though the opposite party may have already, irrespective of the 
 
 > Oxford, Wore, & Wolvorh. Ey. 
 Oo. V. Scudamore, 18j7. 
 
 » Doe V. Smith, Iti^JS (Piittoson and 
 Coleridge, JJ.). 
 
 * Id., Coleridge, J., who observed, 
 that " t) ro(juii'o such ovidc i! would 
 be multiplyiug pruufs, so ad to defeat 
 the rule ol' court." 
 
 * Clay ('. Thacknih, 1839 (Ld. Den- 
 mun); Doo d. Tiuilal v. Koo, 1836 
 (Ld. Abiiigor). 
 
 " Shaipoi-'.Lainb.lSlO. SooOoldie 
 V. Shuttl.'worth, 1807; R(,ehfort v. 
 Sodloy, 18()1 (Jr.). 
 
 ' liuttev ('. Chapman, 1841. 
 
 ' Spoucer v. Buiough, 1842. 
 
 476 
 

 :| 
 
 
 
 ;' y 
 
 ul] 
 
 C. C. RULES AS TO NOTICES TO ADMIT DOCUMENTS, [p. III. 
 
 notice, refused in positive terms to male any admission on the 
 subject.* A party may even, as it would seem, be served with 
 notice to admit a foreign judgment, or other documents in a 
 foreign court, provided that his opponent will give him time to 
 inspect them abroad, and pay his expenses incurred in so doing.'^ 
 Still, the rules do not apply where ancient records of a public 
 nature require, not proof, but translation and explanation, or 
 where affidavits which have been filed must be produced by an 
 officer; and, consequently, a party is entitled to the costs, either of 
 a witness called to explain and translate the records, or of the 
 officer who produced the affidavits, even where the other side were 
 not previously called upon to admit these documents.' 
 
 § 724f, In consenting to admit for the purposes of a trial, care 
 must be taken lest, by the words used in the notice to admit, the 
 party admitting should be entrapped into making a larger admis- 
 sion than he intended. Where* the holder of a bill of exchange 
 sued the acceptor, and the defendant's solicitor had written a letter 
 admitting " that the acceptance to the bill on which the action is 
 brought is in the defendant's handwriting," it was held that, 
 though a plea denying the acceptance had been subsequently 
 pleaded, the admission contained in the letter established a prim§. 
 facie case on behalf of the plaintiff without the production of the 
 bill itself. Again, in an action ' against three persons on a bill of 
 exchange alleged to have been accepted hy tbem im-^or the style of 
 " The Newbridge Coal Company," an admission under a notice to 
 admit, which stated the bill to have been "accepted by Bishop /or 
 the dt'fcndauts as the Newbridge Coal Company," was held to be 
 not only an admission of the actual signature of Bishop, but to 
 preclude the defendonts from, denying that he had authority to 
 bind them by his acceptance. This last decision is certainly one 
 Btrictissirai juris; and probably it would not be upheld at the 
 present day." 
 
 § 724g. In the County Courts, the Rule which governs notices to 
 
 > Spencer v. Bivrouprh, 1842. 
 
 • Smith ('. Bird, \WAb. 
 
 • IJiistnrd V. Smith, 1839. 
 
 • Chaplin v. Levy, 18J4, 
 
 » Wilkos V. TIopkinB. 1845. See, 
 also, Hunt V. Wiso. IS.M). 
 
 ' Soerilgrimv. Uorchosterfiy.Oo., 
 ISiid 
 
 476 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 NOTICES TO ADMIT FACTS. 
 
 admit documents is as follows:— "Where a party desires to give in 
 evidence any document, he may, not less than fire clear days before 
 the trial, give notice ' to any other pjirty in the action or matter 
 who is competent to make admissions, requiring him to imped and 
 (idtnif such document ; and if such other party shall not within 
 three days after receiving such notice make such admission, any 
 expense of proving the same at the tri.nl shall be paid by him, 
 whatever be the result of the action, unless the court shall other- 
 wise order ; and no costs of proving any docuniont shall be allowed 
 unless such notice shall be given, except in cases where, in the 
 opinion of the registrar on taxation, the omission to give such 
 notice has been a saving of expense.^ 
 
 § 7"J4h;. Coming now to the subject of notices to admit facts m 
 the High Court, Rule 4 of R. S. C, Order XXXII., provides: — 
 " Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not later than 
 nine days before the day for which notice of trial has been given, 
 call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of the cause, 
 matter, or issue only, any specific fact or facta mentioned in such 
 notice. And in case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within 
 six days after service of such notice, or within such further time 
 as may be allowed by the court or a judge, the costs of proving 
 such fact or facts shall bo paid by the party so neglecting or 
 refusing, whatever the result of the cause, matter, or issue may 
 be, unless at the trial or hearing the court or a judge certify that 
 the refusal to admit was reasonable, or unless the court or a judge 
 shall at any time otherwise order or direct. Provided that any 
 admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be 
 made only for the purposes of the particular cause, matter, or issue, 
 and not as an admission to be used against the party on any other 
 occasion, or in favour of any person other than the party giving 
 the notice : provided also, that the court or a judge may at any 
 time allow any party to amend or withdraw any admission so 
 made on such terms as may be just." * 
 
 ' C. C. R. l.SSi), Form 00. This is 
 the Hiuno lis Form II in Ai)pi>ii(lix B, 
 to U. S. ('., roforrod to ante, p. 47^. 
 
 » C. C. H. 1H8!), r. 5. 
 
 ' Rule J ])rovi(lo8, that "A notice 
 to admit facts shall be in the Form 
 
 No. 12, in Appendix B., and admis- 
 8i(ms of facts nhall \w in the Form 
 Nil. i;j ill Ap])en(lix B., with Hiich 
 variations as ciiiiumstauces may re- 
 quire." 
 
 477 
 
Ii J 
 
 IN HIGH COURT.— TN COUNTY COURTS. LPAUT III. 
 
 Rule 6 provides, that " any party may at any stage of a cause or 
 matter, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the 
 pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the court or a judge for such 
 judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled 
 to, without waiting for the determination of any other question 
 between the parties ; and the court or a judge may upon such 
 application make such order, or give such judgment, as the court 
 or judge may think just." 
 
 Rule 7 provides, with respect to the mode of proof, that " an 
 affidavit of the solicitor or his clerk, of the due signature of any 
 admissions made in pursuance of any notice to admit documents or 
 facts, shall be sufficient evidence of such admissions, if evidence 
 thereof be required;" and by virtue of Rule 9, the costs occasioned 
 by any notice to admit unnecessary documents, " shall be borne by 
 the pru Lv giving such notice." 
 
 § 724i. In the County Court, notices to ndmit fach and admis- 
 sions thereof, are governed by the following Rules of County 
 Courts, Order IX. : — 
 
 (7.) "Any party may by notice in writing, according to the 
 form in the Appendix,' at any time not later than six clear days 
 before the return day, call on any other party to admit,^ for the 
 purposes of the action, matter, or issue onl\% any specific fact or 
 facts mentioned in such notice. And in case of refusal or nesrlect 
 to admit the same by the delivery of a written admission of tlie 
 fact or facts as aforesaid, signed by the party, his solicitor, or 
 agent, within three clear days before the return day, the costs of 
 proving such fact or facts shall be paid by tlie party so neglecting 
 or refusing, whatever the result of the action, niattei-, or issue may 
 be, unless at the trial the court certify that the refusal to admit 
 was reasonable, or unless the court shall at any time otherwise 
 order. Provided tluit any admission made in pursuance of such 
 notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the 
 j)articular action, matter, or issue, and not as an admission to bo 
 used against the party on any other occasion or in favour of any 
 
 ' Appendix to C. C. Rules, Form 
 ft2A. corrospoiuliiifr to Fonu No. 12 
 in AppeucUx li. to R. 8. 0. 
 
 ' Id., Form 93b, corresponding 
 to Form No. 13 in Appendix B. to 
 R. S. 0. 
 
 478 
 

 CH. IX.] WHOLE ADMISSION MUST BE TAKEN TOGETHER. 
 
 person other than the party giving the notice : provided also, that 
 the judge or registrar may at any time allow any party to amend 
 or withdraw any admission so made on such terms as may he 
 just." 1 
 
 (8.) "An affidavit of the solicitor or his clerk of the due 
 signature of any admissions made in pursuance of this order, shall 
 he sufficient evidence of such admissions, if evidence thereof be 
 required." ^ 
 
 § 725. It will now be convenient to discuss the general law of 
 admissions, apart from any mere rules of Practice. Here the firsi 
 imporfaiit rule to be borne in mind is, that the whole stutcment 
 containing the admission must he taken together; for though some 
 part of it may be favourable to the party, and the object is only to 
 ascertain what he has conceded against himself, and what may 
 therefore be presumed to be true, yet, unless the whole is received, 
 the true meaning of the part, which is evidence against him, cannot 
 be ascertained.' But though the whole of what he said at the 
 same time, and relating to the same subject, must bo given in 
 evidence, it does not follow that all the parts of the statement 
 should be regarded as equally deserving of credit ; but the jury 
 must consider, under the circumstances, how much of the entire 
 statement they deem worthy of belief, includiug as well the facts 
 asserted by the party in his own favour, as those making against 
 him^ 
 
 § 726. Simple as this rule appears, its practical application is not 
 without difficulty. It will therefore be convenient briefly to refer 
 to a few of the leading decisions on it. First, such rule applies 
 oqualhj hath to written and to xrrlai ud/iiisaion-s. Consequently, 
 where a defendant has rendered a debtor and creditor account to 
 the plaintiff, which the latter produces in proof of his demand, it 
 will be equally admissible in evidence of the defendant's set-off ; *• 
 
 ' This ruf corresponds to R. S. C. , 
 Old. XXXII. r. 4, supra, p. 477. 
 
 * Covrespondinp; to R. S. C, Ord. 
 XX XII. r. 7, supra, p. 478. 
 
 3 Thomson v. Austen, 1 823 (Abbott, 
 C.J.); rictchcr r. Frof>:gutt, 1827 
 (id.); Cobbettj;. Grey, 1849. 
 
 * Ijeimou V, Woodbridge, 1781 
 
 (Ld. Mansfield) ; Smith v. lUandy, 
 1825 (IJest, C.J.); Cray v. Halls, 
 182,j (Abbott, (\J.). "Soo, also, 
 Whitwell V. Wyor, 1814 (Am.]; 
 Oarey v. Nioolson, 1840 (Aui,); Kel- 
 8cy r. Rush, 1842 (Am.). 
 » Raudio V. lilackburu, 1813. 
 
 479 
 
I^li 
 
 WHOLE ADMISSION MUST BE TAKEN TOGETHER. [p. Til. 
 
 though the plaintiff will generally be at liberty, while relying ou 
 the creditor side of the account, to impeach items which appear on 
 the debtor side.' Where, however, to an action on an attorney's 
 bill of costs, the defendant pleaded a set-off, and put in an account 
 furnished to him by the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff credited 
 himself for the amount of his bill, and debited himself for the 
 amount of goods sold, it was held that the defendant could not 
 exclude from the cons^ideration of the jury so much of such account 
 as related to the bill of costs, on the ground that no signed bill had 
 been delivered; since the non-delivery of a signed bill does not 
 bar the debt, but merely, if insisted on, prevents its recovery by 
 action.^ 
 
 § 727. When the admission is contained in an affidavit, written 
 examination,' signed pleading,'* answer,* plea^ in Chancery, or 
 other document complete in itself, delivered under the old system 
 of pleading and practice, the whole document is required to be 
 read, though the jury are not bound to give equal credit to every 
 part of it, and they frequently lent an academic faith to such 
 portions as make in favour of the declarant.' So stringent is 
 this rule, that where, in consequence of technical objections which 
 had been taken to the first answer to a bill in Chancery, a second 
 answer had been sent in, defendant was allowed to insist upon 
 having such second answer also read, in order to explain what he 
 had sworn in his first answer.* Moreover, a party, against whom 
 an answer in Chancery is produced, may have the whole bill read 
 as part of his adversary's case, on the ground that, like the ordinary 
 case of a conversation, the answers of a party cannot be given in 
 evidence against him without also proving the questions which 
 
 > Hose V. Savory, 1835. See Moor- 
 house V. Newton, 1849. 
 
 '■' Harrison v. Turner, 1847. 
 
 ' In Prince v. Samo, 1838, Cole- 
 ridge, J., asked whether the question 
 had ever been decided as to deposi- 
 tions ? Counsei replied that no ex- 
 press decision had been found. 
 
 * Mariaiiski v. Cairns, 1851-2. In 
 the Supreme Court the rule respect- 
 ing the signing of pleadings is R. S, C. 
 18N3, Ord. XIX. r. 4. 
 
 » See Cons. Ord. Ch. Ord. XV. 
 rr. 5, 6. 
 
 • Pleas in Chancery, where the 
 matter of the plea did not appear 
 upon record, must have been upon 
 oath, and be signed by the parties 
 pleading : Cons. Ord. Ch. 186U, Ord. 
 XIV. rr. 2, 3. 
 
 ' Bermon v. Woodbridge, 1781 
 (Ld. Mansfield) ; Blount v. Buitow, 
 1792 (Ld. Hardwicke); Baildon v. 
 Walton, 1847 ; Percival v, Caney, 
 1851 (Knight-Bruce, V.-C). 
 
 8 R. V. Carr, 1669 ; Ld. Bath v. 
 Bathersea, 1695; Lynch v, Clorke, 
 1690. 
 
 480 
 
 full 
 
CH. IX.] WHOLE ADMISSION MUS"" BE TAKEN TOGETHER. 
 
 drew forth the answers.' The jury, however, might in such case 
 he warned, that the statements in the bill were not admissions of 
 the facts contained therein ; it being notorious that allegations, not 
 consistent with fact, were frequently introduced into a bill, for the 
 sole purpose of eliciting the truth from the oppo,-ite party. ^ 
 
 § 728. Whore ^ plaintiffs, who were assignees of a bankrupt, 
 gave in evidence an examination of the defendant before the 
 commissioners, as proof that he had taken certain property, it was 
 held that they thereby made his cross-examination evidence in the 
 cause ; and as, in this cross-examination, he had stated that he had 
 purchased the property under a written agreement, a copy of which 
 was entered as part of his answer, this statement was considered as 
 some evidence on his behalf of the agreement and its contents ; and 
 fJiat, too, though the absence of the docunxent was not accounted 
 for, nor had notice been given to the plaintiffs to produce it. 
 Again, in an action against a magistrate for as.>^ault and false 
 imprisonment, the warrant of commitment which had been put in 
 by the plaintiff was held to be proof on behalf of the defendant of 
 the information recited in it ; * and in an action against a sheriff, 
 an undersheriff 's letter which had been produced by the plaintiff to 
 affect the defendant, was held to be some evidence also of certain 
 facts stated therein, which tended to excuse the sheriff.* 
 
 § 729. It seems on the whole, however, to be now tolerably clear 
 that where a sheriff or bailiff seeks to justify a seizure as against 
 any party but the execution debtor, he must produce both the writ 
 of execution and the judgment, and he cannot be relieved from 
 offering such proof by any recital in the warrant which his 
 opponent may put in evidence." 
 
 § 730. The rule requiring the whole statement containing the 
 admission to be taken together, has long prevailed to a consider- 
 able extent in equity. Therefore, wher ) a defendant had been 
 
 • Ponnell v. Meyer, 1838 (Tiudal, 
 C.J.). 
 
 = "id. 
 
 ^ Goss V. Qiiinton, 1842. 
 
 * Haylofk v. Sparko, 1853. 
 
 This 
 case seems to ovomilo Stevens i'. 
 Clark, 1842 (Cresswell, J.). 
 
 * Haynes ?;. Hayton, 1h;}7; recog- 
 nized in Bessey v. Windhuui, 1844. 
 
 « White V. Morris, 18,32 ; Glave v. 
 Went )rth, 1844 (Piirke, H.); Mar- 
 tin V. Podger, 1770 ; I-ake v. Hillera, 
 1698. See, also, Bowes v. Poster, 
 18j8 (Watson, B.). See, however, 
 contra, Bessey v, Windliain, 1M44 ; 
 and see, also, Ogduu v. iloskuth, 
 1849. 
 
 481 
 
 ' ■) 
 
READING OLD ANSWERS IN CHANCERY, [PART III. 
 
 examined on two days before commissioners of the Court of 
 Bankruptcy, and the plaintiff read the examination taken on the 
 first day, he was compelled to read that also which was taken on 
 the second day ; * and where a plaintiff in equity read that part of 
 the defendant's account-book which charged the latter, the defen- 
 dant was allowed to read the discharging part as evidence for 
 himself.* With respect, however, to the old answers and examina' 
 tions in Chancery, — which have now been superseded by statements 
 of defence and anstcers to interrogatories, — the equity rule was far 
 less comprehensive than that which was recognised at common 
 law ; and although, if a party in equity admitted, in his examina- 
 tion or answer, that he had received a sum, and then added in the 
 same sentence that he had immediately paid it away, — or if he 
 stated in a still more general form, that a person gave him 100/. 
 as a present, — the charge and the discharge would be so blended 
 together that the one could not be admissible without the other ; * 
 still, if he once admitted the receipt of money as an independent 
 fact, he could not refer to other parts of his examination or answer, 
 much less to affidavits sworn by him, or to schedules attached to 
 his answer, for the purpose of showing that he had liquidated the 
 amount so admitted to have been received, by separate and inde- 
 pendent payments.* So, if a plaintiff read a passage in the answer, 
 as evidence of a particulnr fact, the defendant could not read other 
 parts, even though grammatically connected with such passage by 
 conjunctive particles, unless they were really explanatory of its 
 iT'^aning.^ If, in order to understand the sense of the passage on 
 ,»ch the plaintiff relied, it was necessary to read on the part of 
 the defendant other portions of the answer, these portions would 
 be evidence only so far as they were e.\planatory ; and any new 
 facts introduced therein, though so immediately connected with 
 the parts admitted as to be incapable of subtraction, would bo con- 
 
 » Smith V. Biggs, 1832 (ShadweU, 
 V.-C). 
 
 * Carter v, Ld. Coleraine, 1740; 
 Blount V. Burrow, 1792 (Ld. Ilard- 
 wicke). 
 
 3 Ridgway V. Darwin, 1802 (Ld. 
 Eldon) ; Thompson i'. Lamlio, 18()2 
 (id.); llobiusou v. Scotuey, ItJlG (Sir 
 
 W. Grant, M.E.). See, also, Awd- 
 ley V. Awdley, HJOO; Hampton v. 
 Spencer, 169a ; Freeman t;. Tatham, 
 1846. 
 
 * Cases cited an last note. 
 
 • Davis V. Spurling, 1829 (Leach, 
 M.R.). 
 
 482 
 
CH. IX.] RULE AS TO ANSWERS TO INTERROGiATORIES. 
 
 sidered as not read.^ This rule seems to have been adopted in 
 consequence of the subtle contrivances of equity draftsmen, whose 
 skill formerly consisted in so grammatically blending important 
 points of the defendant's case with admissions that could not be 
 withheld, as to render it necessary that both should be read in 
 conjunction, and thus to prove their client's case by means of his 
 own unsupported statements.* 
 
 §731. In accordance with the practice in' equity as explained in 
 the preceding section, it now is provided,' that " any party may, at 
 the trial of a cause, matter, or issue, use in evidence an}' one or 
 more of the answers or any part of an answer of the opposite party 
 to interrogatories without putting in the others or the wliole of 
 such answer : Provided always, that in such case the judge may 
 look at the whole of the answers, and if he shall be of opinion that 
 any others of them are so connected with those put in that the last- 
 mentioned answers ought not to be used without them, he may 
 direct them to be put in." 
 
 § 732. The whole of a document may, as a general rule, be read 
 by the one party when the other has already put in evidence a 
 partial extract.* But this rule will not warrant the reading of 
 distinct entries in an account-book,^ or distinct paragraphs in a 
 newspaper,^ unconnected with the particular entry or paragraph 
 relied on by the opponent ; nor will it render admissible bundles 
 of proceedings in bankruptcy, entries in corporation books, or a 
 series of copies of letters inserted in a letter-book, merely because 
 the adversary has read therefrom one or more papers, or entries, or 
 letters.^ If, indeed, the extracts put in expressly refer to other 
 documents, these may be read also ; but the mere fact that the 
 remaining portions of the papers or books may throw light on the 
 parts selected by the opposite party, will not be sufficient to warrant 
 their admission ; for such party is not bound to know whether they 
 will or not ; and moreover the light may be a false one.* 
 
 § 733. A similar rule prevails in the case of a conversation, in 
 
 > Bartlott V. Gillard, 1826 (Ld. 
 Eldoii). 
 
 « Gr. Ev. § 13. 
 
 3 By E. S. C. Ord. XXXI. r. 24. 
 
 * R. V. Queen's Cy. JJ., He Feehan, 
 1882 (Ir.). 
 
 » Catt v. Howard, 1820 (Abbott, 
 C.J.); Itoevo V. Whitmore, 1865. 
 " Daiby v. Outseley, 18o(). 
 ' Stiirp;o V. 15\u-hanan, 1839, 
 * Id. (Ld. Denman). 
 
 483 
 
DISTINCT MATTERS IN CONVERSATION. [pART 111. 
 
 If 
 
 \t 
 
 % 
 
 '}■; 
 
 1 V 
 
 ill' ' 
 
 ' f 
 
 
 which several distinct matters have been discussed. If a part of a 
 conversation is relied on as an admission, the adverse party can give 
 in evidmce o«/y so much of the same conversation as may explain 
 or qualify the matter already before the court.' For example, a 
 witnesM who has acknowledged on cross-examination that he has 
 heard the plaintiff admit on oath that he had repeatedly been 
 insolvent, cannot be asked in re-examination whether tlio plaintiff 
 liad not, on the same occasion, expressly stated that certain money 
 was given to him, and not lent.^ 
 
 § 734. With regard to kftcm, a party may put in such as were 
 written by his opponent, without producing those to which they 
 were answers, or calling for their production.' For, in such a case, 
 the letters, to which those put in were answers, are in the adversary's 
 hands, and he may produce tliem if he thinks them necessary to 
 explain the transaction.' But if a plaintiff puts in a letter by the 
 defendant, on the back of which is something written by himself, 
 the defendant is entitled to have the whole read ; * and whore a 
 defendant laid before the court several letters between himself and 
 the plaintiff, he was allowed to read a reply of his own to the last 
 letter of the plaintiff, it being considered as a part of an entire 
 correspondence.* 
 
 § 735. Questions not unfrequently arise as to the admissibility 
 of letters, account-books, -^''c, which are tendered as admissions, 
 in cases where their existence or contents have been discovered by 
 means of a compulsory examination or answer of the party either 
 in previous bankruptcy proceedings, or in some other legal inquiry; 
 and it is often contended in such cases that the documents referred 
 to therein cannot be read, without first producing the examination 
 
 ,t - 
 
 * It was at one time held, on high 
 authority, that if a witness weie 
 questioned as to a statement made 
 by an adverse party, such party 
 might lay before the court all 
 that was said by him in the same 
 conversation, even matter not pro- 
 perly connected with the statement 
 deposed to, provided only that it re- 
 lated to the subject-matter of the 
 suit (The Queen's case, 1820 (Abbott, 
 C.J.), H. L.); but a sense of the 
 extreme injustice that might result 
 
 from allowing such a course of pro- 
 ceeding has induced the courts, in 
 later times, to adopt the stricter rule 
 stated in the te.xt : Prince v. Samo, 
 1838. 
 
 » Prince v. Samo, 1838. 
 
 ^ Ld. Barrymore v. Taylor, 1795 
 (Ld. Kenyon) ; De Medina v. Owen, 
 18o0 (Parke, B.). 
 
 * Dagleish v. Dodd, 1832 (Taun- 
 ton, J.). 
 
 » Eoe V. Day, 1836 (Park, J.). 
 
 484 
 
CHAP. IX.] DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN EXAMINATIONS. 
 
 or answer. But — whatever the correct doctrine may be witli respect 
 to documents referred to in and actKalhj annexed to an examination 
 or answer — no rule of law will, in other cases, compel a party to 
 treat the document on which he relies as part of a previous exami- 
 nation or answer.* 
 
 § 736. It is even doubtful whether, if a document be annexed to 
 an old answer in Chancery, the answer need be road, if it liave no 
 connection with the cause in which the document is produced.^ If, 
 however, the ktter in question be not written by the party against 
 whom it is offered, though contained in the schedule of his answer, 
 and if it be merely used against him, as raising an inference from 
 possession that he knew of its contents, and had acted upon it, 
 common fairness requires ^ that the letter should not be read 
 without the answer; for the answer of the party might contain 
 such an explanation of the circumstances under wliich the letter 
 came into his possession, as also such a contradiction of any 
 passages in it which seemed to bear against his rights, as utterly to 
 neutralize its effect. If, in making a verbal admission, a persou 
 refer to a written paper, without which the admission is incomplete, 
 such paper must be produced, before the statement can be used as 
 evidence against him.* 
 
 § 737.' Where an admission, whether oral or in wi-itiug, contains 
 matters stated as mere hearxai/, it is questionable whether such 
 matters can be received in evidence. If tendered a</ainsf the party 
 making the statement, they would seem (like hearsay declarations 
 against interest*-) to be inadmissible unless coupled with a simul- 
 taneous statement by the party who has made the admission that 
 he believes such hearsay to be true, and at any rate they are 
 entitled to very little weight. When they are offered in favour of 
 the party making the admission they would appear to be equally 
 inadmissible or worthy of weight. This is on the ground that one 
 
 ' Long V. Champion, 1831 ; Stiu'ge 
 V. Buchanan, 18;i9; overruling pre- 
 vious Nisi Prius decisions in Yatos 
 V. Carnsew, 1828 (Ld. Tenterden) ; 
 Holland v. Eeeves, 18bj (Alderson, 
 B.). 
 
 ^ Long V. Champion, 1831 (Ld. 
 Tenterden). 
 
 8 Hewitt V. Piggott, 1931 (Tindal, 
 C.J.). 
 
 * Jacobs. Lindsay, 1801; Falconer 
 V. Hanson, 1808. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 202, in part. 
 
 " As to whidi see Ld. Trimlos- 
 town )'. Iveuiuiis, 18-13, H. L. ; ante, 
 § 685. 
 
 485 
 
'P 
 
 
 m 
 
 w'^ 
 
 I'i 
 
 ^■'' ■ '■- 
 
 
 |j:'li. 
 
 k^ ra 
 
 HOW FAR HKAHSAY MADK KVIDENCE BY ADMISSIONS, [p. III. 
 
 party, by rending a part of the answer which hia ojiponent had 
 pleaded to ii Ijill filed for discovery, " makes the whole admissible 
 only 80 far aa to waive any objection to the competency of the 
 party making the answer, ami he does not thereby admit as 
 evidence all the facts which happened to have been stated therein 
 by way of hearsay only." ' On the other hand, it may perhaps be 
 successfully urged, that since an answer is offered as the admission 
 of the party against whom it was read, the whole should be laid 
 before the jury, for the purpose of showing under what impressions 
 the admission was made, though some part of it were stated only 
 upon hearsay and belief. 
 
 § 7;58. The rule requiring the whole of an admission to be taken 
 together is so important, that a judge will always do well to 
 explain distinctly to the jury its bearing and e.xtent, whenever any 
 portion of it is favourable to the jiarty against whom a statement 
 is read ; but his neglecting to do so in a case where it is clear that 
 the jury, in fact, took the whole into their consideration, will not 
 amount to such a misdirection as to warrant a new trial. ^ 
 
 S 739. A second rule respecting admissions is, that they are 
 receivable in evidence tliongh thoi/ rchdo to the confpnts of a wriftcn 
 imtrumenf, even v/hen such contents are directly in issue.' This 
 rule has already been discussed, and it is therefoic needless to do 
 more here than thus shortly to refer to it.* 
 
 § 7'39a. a third rule as to admissions, is that any verbal adrais- 
 Bions or declarations of the parties ic/iieh are not put dircdli/ in issue 
 lij the pleadings, and which, consequently, have not been open to 
 explanation or disproof, must be rejected, or at any rate musf n^t 
 be relied upon.* This rests upon the ground, that under such 
 circumstances the reception of evidence would facilitate tho pro- 
 duction of false testimony.* The rule does not strictly extend to 
 trritten admissions ; yet the fact of their not being put in issue by 
 the pleadings will naturally detract from their weight, as the party 
 
 ' 1^00 V. Ferrars, 1801 (Chambre, 
 J.). See, also, Kahl v. Jansen, 1812. 
 
 ^ ]3eckhain v. Osborne, 18413. 
 
 3 Slattorie v. Tooley, 1840. 
 
 * Ante, §§ 410—415. See, also, 
 ante, § 413, as to the admissibility of 
 
 a confessio juris. 
 
 ^ Austin V. Chambers, 1837, H. L. ; 
 Attwood V. Small, 1838; Copland v. 
 Toiilmin, 1840. 
 
 ^ Austin V. Chambers, 1838 (Ld. 
 Cotteuham). 
 
 486 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS OF PARTIES TO TlIK RECORD. 
 
 against whom thoy are offered in evidence will, in such case, have 
 had no oj)[)ortunity of explaining them.' 
 
 S 740.^ With respect to the pcvmn, irfioxr adiuimoun tnni/ be 
 rrcrircd, the general doctrine is, that the declarations of a parfi/ to 
 t!ie record, or of one identified in interest with him, are, as against 
 such party, receivable in evidence.' Declarations proceeding from 
 a stranger, who is still living, are, however, almost uniformly 
 rejected ; * and, though the declarant be dead, his declarations can 
 in general only be admitted upon some of the special grounds 
 already considered.* The admissions of parties to the record are 
 receivable in evidence whether made before or after the party had 
 arrived at full age ; and, therefore, in an action against an adult 
 for necessaries supplied during his minority, admissions made, and 
 letters written by him while under age, may be proved on behalf 
 of the plaintiff.8 
 
 § 741. The courts, however, now recognise a wide distinction 
 between nominal and real parties. Therefore, if a consignee use 
 the name of the consignor in proceeding against a shipowner, or if 
 the assignee of a bond sues the obligor in the name of the original 
 obligee, or if a cestui que trust brings an action in the name of his 
 trustee. Courts of Nisi Prius, recognising the principles of equity, 
 will reject the admission of the nominal plaintiff as evidence for the 
 defendant.' For example, although a receipt in full may have 
 been given by the nominal plaintifi to the defendant, the parties 
 really interested may show that the money has in fact never been 
 paid : ** and if a release from a nominal plaintiff were i)leaded in 
 bar, a prior assignment of the cause of action, with notice thereof 
 
 838 (Ld. 
 
 » McMahon v. Biin'hcll, 18-l(i (Ld. 
 Cottenham) ; Crosbie v. Thoiiipson, 
 1847 (Ir.) (Brady, C); Swift v. 
 M'Tiernan, 1848 (Ir.) (id.); Mal- 
 colm V. Scott, 1843 ; and soo Mar- 
 garoson. v. Saxton, 1835; Fitzgerald 
 V. O'Flaherty, 1827 (Ir.) ; and Steuart 
 t;. Gladstone, 1878 (Fry, J.). 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 171, in part. 
 
 * Sparge V. Brown, 1829 (Bayley, 
 
 '*" Barough v. White, 1825 (Little- 
 dale, J.). As to when thoy are ad- 
 missible, SCO post, §§ 759 — 7(35. 
 
 * Ante, § C07. 
 
 « O'Xoill V. Road, 1845 (Ir.). See 
 37 & 38 V. c. 62. 
 
 ' Sto Payne r. Rogers, 1785; Lcgh 
 V. Legh, 1820; Innell v. Newman, 
 1821; llickey r. Burt. 181(5; Moim- 
 stephcn v. Brooke, 1819 ; Manning 
 V. (/ox, 1823; Barker?!. Biuhai'dson, 
 1827; Johnson v. lloldswoith, 1835. 
 This is contrary to the j)ractic'0 whidi 
 formerly jjrevailed at common law. 
 
 « See Wallace v. Kelsall, 184() 
 (Parke, B.), exjdaining Skaife ?;. 
 Jackson, 1824 ; and Farrar v. Hutck- 
 inson, 1839, 
 
 487 
 
'•' T 
 
 ADMISSION BY A PARTNER OR CO-OBLIGOR. [PART Ilf. 
 
 to the defendant, and an averment that the suit was prosecuted by 
 the assignee for his own benefit, would be a good answer. The 
 nLminal nlaintiff is never permitted to, in any manner, injuriously 
 afPect the rights of his assignee in an action.^ 
 
 § 74:2, On the principle just stated, the declarations of a proc/icin 
 ami/ or {/ufirdian are not receivable in evidence against an infant 
 plaintiff, since, though the names of these persons appear on the 
 record, they are not really parties to the action, but merely olficers 
 of the court specially ap^ioiuted to look after the interests of the 
 infant.^ A solemn admission may, however, be made in a pending 
 suit, for the purpn&e of that trial only, by a guardian or prochein 
 amy in good faith, and will be equally admissible with like adniis- 
 sioiis by the solicitor in tlie cause.* 
 
 § 743, "When several persons are Joint/// interested in the subject- 
 matter of a suit, the general rule is, that the admissions of any 
 one of these persons are receivable against himself and fellows, 
 whether they be all jointly suing or sued, or whether an action 
 be brought in favour of or against one or more of them separately ; 
 provided the admission relate to the subject-matter in dispute, 
 and be made by the declarant in his character of a person jointly 
 interested with the party against whom the evidence is tendered.* 
 Accordingly, the representation or misrepresentation of any fact by 
 one partner, with respect to some partnership transaction, will bnid 
 the firm;' if it appear on the record, that an agreement sued on 
 was made by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and tlie other 
 projtrictors of a theatre, statements made by one of such projjrietors 
 are admitted on the part of the defendant," and an admission by 
 one of two joint and several obligors is evidence against the co- 
 obligor, even though the joint defence raise a controversy as to the 
 subject-matter of the admission.' 
 
 ' See Welch v. Mandovillo, 181() 
 (Am.); Mandeville v. Welch, 1820 
 
 (A.".). 
 
 - Kc'clpston V. SpoKP, alias I'l'ttv, 
 l(iSi»: Cowliu},' r. IClv. INIS (AlilHPt't, 
 J.); Webb V. Smith, >'J1 (i,ittli(lalc, 
 J.); Mo; ,au c Tiioiiie, 1,S4I (I'aike, 
 B.); Siiioliii V. Siu'.^lair, \H-io; I'leclos 
 V. Harrison, KS4.S. 'I'lu 'so cases over- 
 rule Jiimes r. Hatfield, ITJM, Seo 
 Doo V. lioborta, 1847, cited ante. 
 
 ^ Seo post, § 772. 
 
 * Whiteoml') c. Whitinj?, 1781 ; 
 Wood r. Hiaddiek, 1808. 
 
 » Kapj) r. Latham, 181!); Thwnites 
 V. Iviehardson, l7!Kt; Niiholls r. 
 ])owiiiiij;, 1810 (Ld, J'lUeiiljoroiigh); 
 Lucas V. I)e la ('our, 181.'{. 
 
 « Komblo v. ranen, 1829 (Tindul, 
 C.J.). 
 
 ' Urosau v. Bediugtield, 182L 
 
 4«8 
 
 m 
 
 LL 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 LORD TENTERDEN's ACT. 
 
 § 744. The Legislature has, hoAvever, greatly restricted the 
 common law on this subject. For Lord Tonterden's Act' 
 rendered mere verbal acknowledgments insufficient to take joint, 
 or joint and several, debts out of the Statute of Limitations, by 
 enacting that " in actions of debt, or upon the case grounded upon 
 any simple contract, no acknowledgment or promise by words only 
 shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, 
 whereby to take any case out of the operation of the enactments " 
 contained in the old Statute of Limitations,^ " or to deprive any 
 party of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise 
 shall be made or contained by or in some writing, to be signed by 
 the party churgenhle thereby." It also provides, " that where there 
 shall be two or more joint-contractors, or executors or adminis- 
 trators of any contractor, no such joint-contractor, executor, or 
 administrator, shall lose the benefit of the said enactments or either 
 of them, so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only of any 
 written acknowledgment or promise made and signed by any 
 other or others of them ; ' jyrovidcd alirays, that nothing herein 
 contained shall alter, or take away, or leasen the effect of, any pay- 
 ment of any principal or interest made by any person whatsoever : 
 provided also, that in actions to be commenced against two or more 
 such joint-contractors, or executors, or administrators, if it shall 
 appear at the trial, or otherwise, that the plaintiff, though barred 
 by [the Act of Jac. 1,*] or this Act, as to one or more of such joint- 
 contractors, or executors, or administrators, shall nevertheless be 
 entitled against any other or others of the defendants, by virtue of 
 a new acknowledgment or promise or otherwise, judgment may be 
 given and costs allowed for the plaintiff as to such defendant or 
 defendants against whom he shall recover, and for the other 
 defendant or defendants against the plaintiff." ' 
 
 § 740. This enactment having required that the written acknow- 
 
 • 9 G. 4. c. 14, § 1. Soe ante, 
 § fiOO. Similar rcstrirtions prevail 
 in Ireland (hoo 1(5 & 17 V. c. 113, 
 § 24), and in Masisachiisctts (see Rov. 
 Stat. c. 120, § 14). 
 
 » '21 J. 1, c. 16 ("The Limitation 
 Act, Ui2;}"). 
 
 » tsoe unto, §§ 600, 601. 
 
 * Viz., 21 J. 1, c. 16 ("The Limi- 
 tation Act, loj;}"). 
 
 » § 4 of !) G. 4, c. 14, enacts, that 
 the siiid Act of Jauios, and that /ict, 
 " shall apply to the case of any doht 
 on siinplu contract alleged by way 
 of set-off on the part of any dofou- 
 dant." 
 
 489 
 
MERCANTILE LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1856. [PART III. 
 
 ledgment should be persomllj/ signed by the party cliargeable, and 
 having left untouched the law which allowed part payment by oue 
 of several co-debtors to operate as a bar of the statute with respect 
 to the others, it was enacted by the Mercantile Law Araendiuent 
 Act, 1856,' that* "an iioV-:.owledgment or promise made or con- 
 tained by or in a writing signed by an (trfcnt of the party chargeable 
 thereby, duly authorised to make su(;li acknowledgment or promise, 
 shall have the same effect as if such writing had been signed by 
 such party himself ; " and by another section ^ that " when there 
 shall be two or more co-contractors or co-debtors, whether bound 
 or liable jointly only, or jointly and severally, or executors or 
 administrators of any contractor, no such co-contractor or co- 
 debtor, executor or administrator, shall lose the benefit of the " 
 Statutes of Limitations,'' " so as to be chargeable in respect or 
 by reason only of payment* of any principal, interest, or other 
 money, by any other or others of such co-contractors or co-debtors, 
 executors or administrators." 
 
 § 746. Under this last enactment, where two partners had given 
 a promissory note in the name of the firm, and one of them 
 afterwards died, leaving his co-partner executor; the latter, 
 after continuing to pay interest on the note for some years, 
 became bankrupt ; and, on a defence setting up the Statute of 
 Limitations, in answer to a claim by the holder of the note 
 against the assets of the deceased partner's estate, it was held that 
 the ])ayments nnist be presumed to liavo been made by the 
 bankrupt in his character of surviving partner, and not as executor 
 of his deceased partner." It has also, under such enactment, been 
 ruled that payment by one co-debtor, with the knowledge and 
 mere consent of another, does not deprive that other of the benefit 
 of the Statute of Limitations.' 
 
 > 19 & 20 V. c. 97, ninondod by 
 .•)3 & 54 V. c. 39, nnd by o() & J7 
 V. c. 71 ("Tho Siilo of Goods Act, 
 ISiW"). 
 
 ' § 14. This section apidics to § 24 
 of Hi & 17 V. 0. li:S (Ir.), us woU 
 as to § I of Ld. Tcnti'rdi'u's Act. ^ As 
 to India, ueu tbo ludiuu Act, IX. of 
 
 1871, § 20, niid Dinomovi Di'bl v. 
 lUiy Lucliiiiissiit Siii<;li, 1870 (P. 0.). 
 
 * 21 J. 1, c. K), § ;{("Tho Liiiiitii- 
 tion Act, Ki'JU") ; ;{ & 4 W. 4, c. 42. 
 §a; 1(5 & 17 V. c. ll;5, s. 20 (Ir.). 
 
 ' Si'o ('oi'kiill ('. S])iirkcs, 1802. 
 
 • Thoinjison v. Wiiitlinian, 1856 
 (Kiiidorsl.^y, V. (".). 
 
 ' Jucksou V, Woolloy, 18o8. 
 
 490 
 
CHAP. TX.] REAL rROI'ERTY LIMITATION ACTS. 
 
 § 747. The Real I'roperty Ijimitation Act, 1874,' which came 
 into operation on the 1st of January, 1879, contains a pro- 
 vision^ respecting acknowledgments of a mortgagor's title by one 
 of several mortgagees in possession, which is the same in principle 
 as the enactments of Lord Tenterden's Act. 
 
 § 748. "Where a member of a partnership has been adjudged 
 bankrupt, and an action brought, under the authority of the Court 
 of Bankruptcy, in the joint names of the trustee and of the 
 bankrupt's partner, the latter has no power to release the claim to 
 
 « 37 & 38 V. c. 57. 
 
 ' § 7. This enactment has been 
 substituted for § 2« of 3 & 4 W. 4, 
 c. '27 ("The ]{oiil Property Limita- 
 tion Act, 1S33"), and reduces the 
 period of (wcntij years therein named 
 to a period of huvire years — making 
 nootlieralterationinthehiw — andisas 
 follows; — "When a mortfiaj^ee shall 
 have obtained the possession or re- 
 ceipt of the profits of any land, or 
 the receipt of any rent, comprised in 
 his mortj^iifje, the mortgafror, or any 
 person eluimiiifj; thnnijj;h him, shall 
 not brinp; any action or suit to re- 
 deem the mortfj;af?e but within tmh-r 
 years next after the time at wliii li 
 the mortfrajroe obtained such po-^cs- 
 sion or receipt, unless in the ni> an- 
 time an a('knowled>.!;ment in will iij^ 
 of the titli3 of the mortpij^or, or of 
 his ri<j;ht of red('m))tioii, shall have 
 bei;!! j^'ven to the mortf^aj^or, or some 
 jierson chiimiii}^ his (sstate, or to the 
 aj;ent of such mort^'aj;or or jieisoii, 
 si;;ne(l by tlu^ jiiortu'a^'i'e or th(! ]ier- 
 son elaimin;; throu;;h him ; and, in 
 such case, no siieb action or suit 
 shall be broujrht but within tn-ilvv 
 years nt>xt altt'r the timo at which 
 such acknowlcdjjment, or tlu' last of 
 such acknowledgements, if more than 
 one, was fj;ivun ; ami when there 
 shall be more than one mort^iif^or, 
 or miu'o tluin one jierson claimin,t,' 
 through the moi't;'ai;i)r or mort- 
 {jagors, such acknowledgment, if 
 given to any of such mortgagors 
 or persons, or liis or thciir agent, 
 shall be as elVectuul as if the same 
 had been given to all such mort- 
 gagors or persuus; but where there 
 
 shall be more than one murU/aiier, 
 or more than one person claiming 
 the estate or interest of the mort- 
 gagee or mortgagees, such uc/nioir- 
 ledf/meut, aif/ned by one or mure of 
 such mortgagees or persons, s/iull 
 lie ejfietiinl oult/ u.i tif/uiii-it the purd/ 
 or parties Miininij as aforesaid, and 
 the person en- persons claiming any 
 part of the mortgage money or land 
 or rent by, from, or under, him oi 
 th(!in, or any jiorson or jieisons en- 
 titled to any estate or estates, inte- 
 rest or interests, to take effect after, 
 or in defeasance of, his or their es- 
 tate or estates, interest or interests; 
 and sliitll not uprriifr to i/ire to the 
 morfi/in/ar or mortgagors a right 
 to re<leem the mortgage, as <i<j(tiii4 
 file jivrfoii or ]iersoiis intif/iil to am/ 
 ot/nr iiiiilirlilnl nr diriihd p'irt of the 
 money or land or rent; and where 
 such of the mortgagees or ])ers(>ns 
 aforesaid, as shall have given such 
 ackuow ledgiiieut, shall he entitled to 
 a divided jiart of the land or rent 
 comjinsed in the mniti^age, or snmii 
 estate or interest theiein, and not to 
 any ascertained ])art of tin* moi;- 
 gaged mnney, tiie mortgagor (ir 
 mortgairoi's sliall be enti'leil to i-e- 
 deein tile sami! diviiied |)ait of the 
 land or rent, on payment, with inte- 
 rest, of the part of the mortgage 
 numey which shall bear the same 
 ja-oiiortion to the whohf of the mort- 
 gage money as the value of siieii 
 divided iiart of the land or rent shall 
 bear to thi^ value of the whole of the 
 land <u' rent com])rised in the mort- 
 gaiie," See Uichardsou v, Younge, 
 liSTl, C. A. 
 
 401 
 
JOINT INTEREST — COMMUNITf OF INTEREST. FpART III. 
 
 ',1' '1 . ^ si 
 
 which the action relates, but any attempted release by him,' 13 
 expressly rendered void.* 
 
 S 749. An admission made by one of several parties m fraud of 
 the others jointly interested with him, and in collusion with the 
 opponent, is, moreover, on these facts being shown, invalid as 
 against the others.^ 
 
 S 750. To render the admission of one person admissible against 
 another, it must relate to some matter in which either both were 
 jointly interested, or one was interested derivatkely through the 
 othei ; and a mere community of interest will not be sufficient. 
 Thus, the admission of a servant of a negligent act is no evidence 
 against his master.* Again, if an action be brought against two 
 persons in partnership as part-owners of a vessel, an admission by 
 one, as to a matter which was not a subject of co-partnership, but 
 only of co-part ownership, is inadmissible against the other ; * and 
 where two executors were sued as such on a covenant by a testator 
 for quiet enjoyment, the plaintiff, to establish this fact, was not 
 allowed to put in evidence a declaration by one of the defendants, 
 to the effect that he and his co-defendant both had a lawful title 
 in their own right through the testator," since this admission had not 
 been made by the party as executor, or in relation to any matter 
 touching the testator's estate ; but it simply referred to something 
 of which the two defendants had taken advantage in their individual 
 capacities. Indeed, it may even be doubted whether an express 
 promise by one executor in his representative character will bind 
 the remaining executors in their representative characters." Cer- 
 tainly the admission of the receipt of money by one of several 
 
 » By46&47V.c. 52 ("Tho Bank- 
 ruptcy Act, 1883 "), § 113. It would 
 probably be void even without expro!=s 
 enactment. See next section, and 
 supra, § 741. 
 
 - Hut the interest of the partner 
 may be protected, " notice of the 
 application lor authority to com- 
 mence the action must bo given him," 
 and if he claims no benefit therefrom, 
 " he shall be ir.demnified against 
 costs." 
 
 ' See Rawstorno v, Oaudoll, 184G; 
 
 Phillips V. Clagett, 1843 ; ante, § 741. 
 
 * Johnson c. Jjind.say. 188!). 
 
 * Jaggers c. Binnings, 1815 (lid. 
 Elleuborough). See liiodie v. Ho- 
 ward, 1855. 
 
 « Fox ('.Waters, 1840. See Stanton 
 V. Percival, 1854. 
 
 ' TuUock V. Il.mn, 1826 (Abbott, 
 C.J.); cited with approbation by 
 Parke, B., in Scholcy c. Walton, 
 1844, questioning Atkins v. Tred- 
 goM, 1823 ; and M.'Culloch v. Dawes. 
 182G, contra. 
 
 IP l( 
 
 492 
 
 I '\n 
 
C. IX.] ADMISSIONS BY ONE OF SEVERAL TRUSTEES, ETC. 
 
 trustees, who were joint defendants, but were not personally liable, 
 cannot be re(!eived to charge the others.' 
 
 H 7oi.^ On similar principles, where a joint contract is severed 
 by the death of one of the contractors, nothing subsequently done 
 or said by the survivor binds the personal representative of the 
 deceased ; * nor can the acts or admissions of one of several executors 
 bind any surviving executor ; * nor the admissions of one tenant 
 in common be receivable against his co-tenant.' Moreover, it has, 
 in America, been decided, that no such privity exists among the 
 members of a board of public olKcers,'' or among several indorsers of 
 a promissory note,' or between executors and heirs or devisees,* as to 
 make the admission of one binding on all. Plainly, the admission 
 of one defendant will not be evidence against any other in an 
 action for negligence, or trespass, or other tort.' Still clearer is it 
 that any such admission will not be evidence against anotlier person 
 in criminal proceedings, since the law cannot recognize any partner- 
 eliip or joint interest in wrong, much less in crime.'" 
 
 § 752. An exception to this last proposition at first sight appears 
 to prevail, where the uihabitaiifs of fowitnliipn, counties, or other 
 territorial divisions of the country, sue or are proseouted eo nomine. 
 But here such inhabitants are, in truth, regarded in the light of a 
 corporation, of which each individual inhabitant forms a component 
 part. Therefore the declarations and admissions of any one of such 
 persons are, not really inconsistently with the rule just discussed, 
 receivable in evidence against the collective body. Accordingly, 
 the declarations of all rateable inhabitants, whether actually rated 
 or not, may be given in evidence for the Crown, in a prosecution 
 against a township for non-repair of a highway, while in a settle- 
 ment case its opponents may give in evidence declarations by rated 
 
 ' Pavirs V. Rid-c. 1802 (Ld. Eldon). 
 
 » Gr. Hv. S 17(i. ill i>iul. 
 
 » Atkins c/riv.ljjrold, lS2;i; Ford- 
 ham ('. Wallis, lfto2-;J ; Sliiyinakcr 
 V. Gundatker'M Ivx., l.Sj;j (Am.). 
 
 * Slatrr r. Liiwson, LS.iO; Hatha- 
 way V. IhiskcU, l.S-.:9 fAlii.). 
 
 ° And this oven wnoro hoth are 
 partio.H to the suit, and in the same 
 intort'st: Dan v. Hrown, IH'Jj (Am.). 
 
 • Ldckwodd c. Smith, LSI.' (Am.). 
 ' (Sluyuiakor v, Guiidackoi'a Ex., 
 
 1823 (Am.). 
 
 » Osj;(M)d V. ^fanhiittan Co., 1824 
 (Am.). iSoo, aUo, Fordham y. Wallis, 
 ISVJ-,}. 
 
 " Dani.'ls V. Poltcr, 18;}() (Tinchil, 
 C.J.]; Morso v. Koval, Isofi (Ld. 
 Kiskini)]. Sooll. ,.. I'lardwick, l,s(t.>, 
 wlimv Ld. Elli!iihoi()iiii;h hiys down 
 the rule somewhat too loosely, 
 
 '" Grant y. Jackson, 17U3 (Ld. Ken- 
 yon). 
 
 493 
 
REALITY OF JOINT INTEREST MUST BE PROVED. 
 
 LP. III. 
 
 M: :!■ 
 
 parishioners of a parish.^ In both cases the value of such evidence 
 will of course vary according to the knowledge and position of the 
 declarant, and will in many instances be exceedingly slight.^ 
 
 § 753.3 j^n apparcMly Joint interest is obviously insufficient to 
 make the admissions oi one party receivable against his com- 
 panions, tvhcrc the realiti/ of that interest is the point in controversy. 
 A foundation for such evidence must first be laid, by showing, 
 prima facie, that a joint interest exists. Consequently, where in 
 an action against a party for money had and received, plaintiff, to 
 prove the receipt of the money by defendant, tendered certain 
 statements, which had been made by a person whom defendant had 
 taken into partnership subsequently to the transaction in question, 
 such evidence was rejected because a joint liability could not 
 be presumed merely from a subsequent partnership.'' The existence 
 of a joi' t interest which is disputed cannot, moreover, be estab- 
 lished by the admission of one of the parties sought to be charged, 
 but must be shown by independent proof. Therefore, i xn action 
 against three alleged makers of a promissory' note, the aumission of 
 his signature by one defendant was under the old law insufficient 
 to entitle the plaintiff to recover againbt him and the others, though 
 theirs had been proved ; the point to be established against all 
 being a joint promise by all f and in an action seeking lo charge 
 several as partners, an admission of the partnership by one is not 
 evidence of it whicli is receivable against any of the others ; 
 but it is only after such partnership is shown by indopeiulent 
 proof satisfactory to the judge, that the admisjions of one of the 
 parties are received in order to affect the others.'' The admissions 
 are, however, evidence against the party making them, and he will 
 be bound thereby, either in an action against him as surviving 
 partner, or even in an action in which he is sued on the joiut 
 
 .1: 
 
 Hi I 
 
 Hi"-! - 
 
 p; .ii 
 
 ii- < 
 
 ' R. V. Iluidwick, 1809; R. v. 
 Whitley Lowor, 1811} ; R. r. Woburn, 
 1808. 
 
 « R. V. Addcrbiu-v East, 1843; R. 
 V. Hanlwick, 1809 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough ). 
 
 =» Or. Ev. § 177, in Dart. 
 
 * Catt V. Uoward,"lS20 (Abbott, 
 C.J.). 
 
 • Gray v. Palinors, 1794. 
 
 • Niciiolls (,'. Dowdiiig, l.Slo; Gib- 
 bons V. Wilcox, 1817 ; Grant v. Jack- 
 son, 1793 (Ld. ivonyon) ; Van Roims- 
 dyk V. Kane, 18i;j (Am.); Harris v. 
 \Vil8on, 18;Jl(Aui.); Burgess y. Lane, 
 18'24 (Am.); Dutton v. Woodman, 
 1852 (Am.). 
 
 494 
 
CH. IX.] ADMISSIONS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS. 
 
 promise with his co-partners, iu which they have let judgment go 
 by default.* 
 
 § 754. In general, statements in the defence, or in the answers 
 to interrogatories,* of one defendant cannot be read in evidence 
 either for or against his co-defendant. The reasons for this are 
 that, as there is no issue between the defendants, there can have 
 been no opportunity for cvoss-examinatior ^ and, moreover, if it 
 were allowed, a plaintiC might, by making one of his friends a 
 defendant, gain a most unfair advantage.* Tlie rule dues not 
 apply to cases where the other defendant claims through the party 
 whose defence is otfered in evidence ; nor to cases where they have 
 a joint interest, either as partners or otherwise, in the transaction.* 
 But wherever the admission of one party would be good evidence 
 against another party, the defence of the former may, a fortiori, be 
 read agiiinst the latter.^ 
 
 § 755. There would appear to be little doubt but that statements 
 made by parties suing or sued in a reprcupnUdirc fharmivr hcfofc thnj 
 uerc co)iiph'tehj clutlwd with that chamdci\ are not admissible against 
 them, so as to affect the interest of the persons they represent. 
 Lord Tenterden ruled that they are iiot,^ and it is submitted that 
 he was correct. For it would be startling that the assets of a testator, 
 and the consequent rights of legatees, miglit be all'ected by some 
 inconsiderate statement made by the executor, before the death of 
 the testator.'^ Even the sworn admission of a married woman, iu 
 answering a bill in Chancery jointly with her husband, — cxccjit so 
 far as it related to her separate estate," —has been rejected after his 
 death, as against the wife, as it was considered as the answer of 
 
 ' Snn.LjsUr r. ^Mazarrcdo, 1816 (Ld. 
 Elloiilio'rouirh) ; Ellis t'. Watson, 1818 
 (Abbott, C.'J.). 
 
 « 8oe Meyer v. Moiitriou, 184(5; 
 Stoplioiis )•. lloathcoto, 18(J() ; I'lirkor 
 V. MoiToU, 1S4S (L(l. Cottonliiiin); 
 Iloiiiv i'. Jolui-tono, 1S;J8; Saltiiiiiish 
 V. Iliirdy, 1873 (Ld. Solbovne, C). 
 
 » Joni'S (\ Turberville, 1792; Morso 
 V. Eoval, 18(1(). 
 
 « \Vych V. Meal. 1734. 
 
 » Pethcrick r. Turner, 1802 ; Trit- 
 chavd V. Draper, 1830-1 ; lliliard v. 
 riialey, 1723; Field!-. Holland, 1810 
 (Am.); Clark's Ex. v, Yau liuims- 
 
 dvk, ISl.-) '(Am.). See Talker w. 
 Moriell. 184.S, cited ante, § oli!». 
 
 " Van liciniMlyk v. Kane, l>Sl;i 
 (Am.). 
 
 ' Fenwick v. TlicrntDn, 1S27. Sco, 
 also, jMetteis r. Brown. lN(i3 (Pol- 
 lock, C'.B't Tlant r. M'Ewen, 1S2,3 
 (Am.); contra, Tindal, C.J., iu ISmitli 
 V. Morijan, 1S3U. 
 
 " See l,v\:'^i^ V. Edmonds, 185.5, 
 which couhrms the law as stated in 
 the text. 
 
 a Callow V. Ilowle, 1847 ; Olive «. 
 Carow, 18J9. 
 
 ' n 
 
 495 
 
 t I 
 
ADMISSIONS OF PERSONS INTERESTED IN SUIT. [vT. III. 
 
 irs 
 
 
 the husband alone.' Nor can the affidavit of a guardian of an 
 infant defendant,'- or of the committee of a lunatic,^ be read against 
 the infant or lunatic in another suit ; though it may be used against 
 the guardian or committee himself, if he afterwards be sued in his 
 private capacity, for it is an admission upon his own oath. 
 
 Si 756.'* Persons who are not forraall3' parties to a record, but 
 who are hdcimtrd in its siiliJrrt-iNaffcr, are considered by the law as 
 real parties in interest, and accordingly their admissions have the 
 same weight as tliougli they were formally parties. For example, 
 there may be received in evidence against their respective repre- 
 sentatives the admissions of the cestui que trust of a bond, so far 
 as his interest and that of the trustee are identical ; ' those of the 
 persons interested in a policy effected in another's name for their 
 benefit ; " those of the shipowners, in an action by the master for 
 freight ; ^ those of the indemnifying creditor, in an action against 
 the sheriff ; ^ those of the deputy-sheriff tending to charge himself, 
 in an action against the high sheriff for the misconduct of the 
 deputy ; ° those of rated parishioners, in a settlement appeal, where 
 the churchwardens and overseers of the poor are the nominal parties 
 on the record ; '" and, in short, the admissions of any persons who 
 are represented in the action by other parties." On similar prin- 
 ciples, the declarations of voters against their own votes, whethei 
 made before or after the votes were given,'^ and even though inva- 
 
 ' Hodgson V. Merest, 1821 ; Elston 
 V. "Wood, 1.S33. 
 
 ^ Ecclcstoii V. Spoke, alias Petty, 
 1689 ; Hawkirs v. Luscombe, 1818 ; 
 Story, Eq. PI. § 6G8: Gr. Ev. §§ 24, 
 323; Mills v. Doimis, 1818 (Am.). 
 See ante, § 742. 
 
 3 Bousloy V. Maprrath, 1804 (Jr.). 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 180. in part. 
 
 * Hant^on v. Parker, 1749. See, 
 also, Harrison v. Vallance, 1822; 
 Mav V. Taylor, 1843 (Maule, J.). 
 
 «'Bell (-'.'Ansley, 1812 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough). 
 
 ■' Smith V. Lyon, 1813. 
 
 8 Dowdon t'.'Fowle, 1814; Proctor 
 V. Lainson. 183() (Ld. Abinger) ; 
 Dyke v. Aldridgo, 1798 ; Young v. 
 Siiiith, 1808; Haiwood v. Keys, 
 1832. 
 
 » Snowball v. Goodricke, 1833, 
 (luestiouing the language of Ld. 
 
 Keuyon and Lawrence, J., in Drake 
 V. Sykes, 1797, which Hccms to iden- 
 tify the sherirtwith the luider-shorirt' 
 to all intents : Yabsloy v. Noblo, 
 1G97. The declarations of imder- 
 shcriffs, («• of the shoritt's baililYs, 
 accompanying official acts, are ad- 
 missible as parts of the res gestfe. 
 See Jacobs v. Humphrey, 1834 ; Scott 
 V. Marshall, I8;i2; North v. Miles, 
 1808 (Ld. Ellenborough) ; and ante, 
 §§ 583 et seq. 
 
 '» K. ?•. HarJwick, 1809 ; E. v. 
 Whitlej' Lower, 1813. 
 
 " In Hurt V. Hoin, 1809, an action 
 of replevin, in which the declarations 
 of the person, under whom the defen- 
 dant made cognizance, were rejected 
 (Heath, J.) as eviilence for the plain- 
 tiff, is presumed not to be law. See 
 Welstead v. Levy, 1831. 
 
 " Southampton case, 1833; Kipon 
 
 496 
 
CII. IX.] ADMISSIONS OF PERSONS INTKRI'STKD IN SUIT. 
 
 lidafing such votes on the ground of their having recoived brihns,' 
 arc adniis.^ible hi evidonco ; since, on a scrutiny, each oas-e is con- 
 sidori'd as a separate cause, in which the supporter n the vote 
 under discussion and the voter are tlie paities on tlie cue >:ide, and 
 the opposers of tlie vote are the parties on the otlier.'^ 
 
 S 7'"t7. The doi'hirations or aduiissions must, however, in all cases 
 (as will presently bo seen^), have been made while the party 
 making- them had some interest in the matter; and they, moreover, 
 are reeeivallo in evidence only so far as the declarant's own 
 interests, or the interests of those who claim through him, are 
 concerned. Thus, if an action be brought by trustees, who repre- 
 sent the interests of a variety of cestuis que trust, before the declara- 
 tion of a cestui que trust will be admitted at all against a trustee, 
 the nature of the interest of the declarant in the trust estate must 
 be shown, so that it may clearly appear that he alone is entitled to 
 the benefit resulting from the action,* — so that the statements of a 
 person beneficially interested as tenant for life are, for instance, 
 not evidence to prejudice the rights of the remainder- n:en in fee. 
 
 § 758. In applying the above rule, a distinction exists between 
 the position of a tenant fur life and that of a tenant in tail. 
 A tenant for life cannot — unless empowered by some special 
 statute' — prejudice, by an admission, the interest of a remainder- 
 man or reversioner. But a tenant in tail is regarded as represent- 
 ing the inheritance, and, therefore, what lie says or does will often 
 be bindiug on the persons entitled in remainder. Accordingly, a 
 release of an equity of redemption by a tenant in tail in possession,* 
 or a decree of foreclosure against him, will bind the remainder- 
 man ; ' and an acknowledgment by a tenant in tail of the existence 
 of an equity of redemption which would, in the absence of such 
 admission, have been barred by the equitable rule respecting 
 limitations, has the effect, as against the remainder-man, of 
 restoring the right of redemption.* 
 
 case, 18;j;5 ; retorsfield case, 1833; 
 Now "Windsor. 183.); Eiinis, 183j ; 
 Uroitwich, 183j; licdfoidf^liiie, ITSJ; 
 an<l other cases cited 2 Itog. on Elect. 
 139. 
 
 ' Ipswich, 1835 ; and cases cited 
 2 Rog. on Elect. 139. 
 
 * 2 Hog. on Elect. 139. 
 
 » Post, § 794. 
 
 * Doo V. Wainwright, 1838; May 
 V. Taylor, 1843. 
 
 ° See auto, § 092, note commenc- 
 ing "In Uoddam v. Morlcj-," and 
 j)o.--t, § 1088, note citiuir same case. 
 
 " ]{iynol(lson ?i. I'eikins, 17(!9. 
 
 ' I'undletou i;. liooth, 1809 (Stuart, 
 V.-C). 
 
 » Id. 
 
 ' n 
 
 497 
 
t'' 
 
 
 
 ADMISSIONS OF PERSONS EXPRESSLY REFERRED TO. [p. III. 
 
 § 759.' In some cases, admissions by third persons, who are 
 ttrangera to the suit, are receivable. This is the case when the 
 issue is substantially upon the mutual rights which, at the particular 
 time of the admission, were respectively posse? •id by a party to he 
 record and the person who made such admission ; in which cases such 
 evidence will in general be let in as would be legally admissible in 
 an action between the parties themselves. Thus, in an action by 
 his trustee, the admissions of a bankrupt, made before the act of 
 bankruptcy, are receivable in proof of the petitioning creditor's 
 debt ; ^ but admissions made after the act of bankruptcy cannot 
 furnish evidence against the trustee, bnoanse of the intervening 
 rights of creditors, and the danger of fraud.'' 
 
 § 7G0.'* The admissions of a third person arc also receivable 
 against, and binding upon, a person who has rj.'prvssh) nfcrrcd 
 another to him for information. Thus, executors who wrote to a 
 plaintiff, that if she wished for further information on a certain 
 subject, she should apply to a certain merchant in the city, were 
 held bound by the replies of the merchant ; * whore the fact of the 
 delivery of goods by a carman was disputed, a defendant who said, 
 "If he will say that he delivered the goods, I will pay for them," 
 ■was held bound by the affirmative reply of the carman." 
 
 § TOOa.' It of necessity follows that where a person refers to 
 another, who thereupon makes a statfmient in his presence, proof 
 of snch statement is undoubtedly good evidence.* Whetfier the 
 answer of a person thus referred to is eonc/iisirr against the party 
 seems, however, not to have been finally settled. As a general 
 rule it ought to be held that a party who refers to another is con- 
 clusively bound by that other's decision ; for to make a proposition 
 to be bound by what another may say, and after he has spoken to 
 recede from it, is not only dishonest, but might be turned to 
 
 > Gr. Ev. § 181. in part. 
 
 * See Coole i: Bmliam, 1848. 
 
 > Iloare t'. (\)rvton, 18! '2; Rolison 
 V. Kemp, 18(t;3 ;" Watts v. Thorpe, 
 1808; Smallcombe V. Bruges, 18:24; 
 Taj'Ior V. Kinloch, 1819. Those cases 
 vh'tually overrule Dowton r. Cross, 
 1794. 8ee, also, Heruaseoui c. Fare- 
 brother, 1M52. Of course, even snch 
 admissions are still evidi'nce against 
 
 the bankrupt himself: Jarrott v, 
 Leonard, lis 14. 
 
 ■• (Jr. Kv. § 18i2, almost verhatini. 
 
 » Williams v. Innes, 1808 (Ld. 
 Ellen borongli). 
 
 8 Danirl v. Pitt, 1808; Brock v. 
 Kent, 1807; Burt v. Palmer, 18013; 
 Hood V. Ueeve. 18'J8. 
 
 ' (ir. J'^v. § 104, in p;roat part. 
 
 * li. V. Mallory, 18S4, C. C. R. 
 
 498 
 
 |t;.| 
 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS BY PERSONS REFERRKD TO. 
 
 very improper purposes, such as to entrap a witness, or to find out 
 how far the party's evidence would go in support of his case.' In 
 such cases tlie purposes of justice and policy are sufRtdcnily 
 answered, by (as in the case of any award) throwing tlio biirthon 
 of proof on the party questioning the decision, and holding lilra 
 bound, unless he can impeach the test referred to by clear proof of 
 fraud or mistake.'^ 
 
 § 761. These principles apply whether the question referred be 
 one of law or of fact; whether the porsc^ to whom reference is 
 made, have or have not any pecidiar knowledge on the subjoc't ; 
 and whatever the nature of the action in which the statements of 
 the referee are proposed to be adduced in evidence. Accordingly, 
 where two parties agreed to abide by the opinion of counsel ujjon 
 the construct" u of a statute, the party against whose interest the 
 opinion operated was held bound thereby ; ' and a disputed fact 
 regarding a mine, having been referred by consent to a miners' 
 jury, their decision was afterwards received in evidence.^ 
 
 § 7t)2. A tenant may even dispute his landlord's title if such 
 landlord having to his knowledge agreed with a third person to 
 leave it to counsel's opinion to so/ who is entitled to the demised 
 property, counsel has decided that the third person is entitled, and 
 the tenant has accordingly attorned to such third person.* 
 
 § 763. To render the declarations of a person refeiTcd to admis- 
 sible it is not necessary that the reference should have been made 
 by express words ; but it will suffice if the party by his conduct 
 has tacitly evinced an intention to rely on the statements as correct. 
 For instance, if a party, questioned by means of an interpreter, 
 
 • Per Ld. Jvonyon, in Stovoiis v, 
 Thacker, 179;5; "Lloyd v. Willan, 
 1794; Brotton v. Piettiman, lOfiG; 
 Deleslino ?•. Grconbind, l"9o (Am.), 
 ■where the oath of a thiid person was 
 referred to. But in Garnet v. Balls, 
 18'22, on a question ■whether a hoi'so 
 in defendant's possession ■was identi- 
 cal ■with one lost hy plaintiff, the 
 plaintiff havinc; said that if the de- 
 fendant ■would take his oath that the 
 horse was his, he should keep him ; 
 and ho having made oath aceonl- 
 injrly ; Lord Tenterden observed, 
 that, considering the loose manner in 
 •which the evidence had been given, 
 
 he would not receive it as conclu- 
 sive, though it was a circumstance on 
 which he should not fail to remark 
 to the jury. 
 
 2 AViuteheid r. Tattcrsall, 18.'34. 
 
 ^ Price V. IloUis, 1S13. See, also, 
 Downs r. Coo])er, 1S41. 
 
 * Sybiay v. White, 183(5. 
 
 ' ])iiwiis r. ('oin)cr, 1.S21 In such 
 cases as the above, if the decision bo 
 written, anil do not contain any 
 recitiil of the agreements, it docs not 
 on the face of it jmi'jiort to be an 
 award, and is accordingly admissible 
 in evidence without bi'ing stamped 
 as such. See cases previously cited. 
 
 499 
 
ADMISSIONS BY PERSONS R;'VERRED TO. [l»AUT III. 
 
 1 1 
 
 ' 1 
 
 I 
 
 . -1' 
 
 ^1 
 
 ('■ 
 
 1 " 
 
 \ 
 
 3| 
 
 l. 
 
 
 give answers through the same medium, the langunge of the 
 interpreter is considered as tliat of tlie i)arty ; and may, con'-e- 
 quently, be proved by any person who heard it, witlioiit oiiUin<j^ 
 the interpreter hinisislf ; ' if a party, on motion before a judge, use 
 the affidavit of another person to prove a certain fact deposed 
 to therein, suoli affidavit is, on any subsequent trial, evidence as 
 against him of this fact, an'd that, too, thougli tlie ]ierson who made 
 the affidavit is present in court ;^ and where a petitioning creditor, 
 knowing that his servant could ])rove a ])articular act of bankruptcy, 
 sent hiiu expressly for that purpose to be examined at the opening 
 of the fiat, the depositions then made were held evidence of the act 
 of bankruptcy as against the petitioning creditor on an issue as to 
 that fact in a subsequent action between him and the representatives 
 of the bankrupt's estate.' 
 
 § 7Ij4-j. a party is not bound, however, by what his witness 
 says at Nisi Prius.* 
 
 ^ 760. It remains to consider the effect of ad missions hi/ married 
 women when offered in evidence, either against herself or her 
 trustees, or for or against her husband. 
 
 § 76Ga. If a icifc sue or be sued as a single woman, no valid reason 
 can be given why her admissions should not have the same legal 
 effect as against her as those of any other person.* 
 
 
 il, i: 
 
 lilil: i'ii 
 
 > Fatrigas v. Mostyn, 1776 (Gould, 
 J.). 
 
 » BiickoU V. Ilulse, 1837 ; Boileau 
 V. Eutlin, 1S48; Pritchunl i'. 15ajj;- 
 shiiw(!, ISol ; Johnson f. Wind, 1>S()6 
 (("liiiiiibro, J.). But seo Whito v. 
 Dowliiiir, 184J (Tr.). 
 
 » (iarilncr c. Moult, 1839; Boileau 
 V. liutlin, 18-18. 
 
 * (laidnor )'. Moult, 1839 (Ld. 
 Dennian and Tatto-son, J.) ; BiiekoII 
 V. llulise, 1837 (Ld. Doninaii and 
 Colovidj^o, J.). See, also, ante, § 4()9. 
 Yot, in one caso (("(do v. Ilt'adley, 
 1840), in an action for trespass to a 
 close, tho de]iosition of a witness 
 ■whom the plaintiff had called in a 
 previous proceeding before mmjis- 
 trafes for an alleged previous trespass 
 to tho same close, but who had then 
 disprovt'd plaintiff's possession of 
 such close, was allowed to be read 
 against the plaintiff. This was prob- 
 ably because tho depositions were 
 
 secondary evidence of oral testimony 
 (as to which seo ante, § 4G4), the 
 witness being abroad at tho time, 
 ami the (picstion previously disputed 
 before the magistrati's and that then 
 being tried, being identical. Still, 
 tlio case in<n/ jiossibly have boon 
 decided on the ground stated in § 7G3, 
 tho)igh it is not tho best ground on 
 •whicl) to sujipoi t it. 
 
 '' See Walton ». Greon, showing 
 that a T.-ouian's admission that she id 
 married is inadequate to ])rovo tho 
 fa(^t till her helutlf. In iicconlanco 
 with this ))rinciple, in Wilson v. 
 Mitchell, 1813, where the defence to 
 an action on ccmtract was that tho 
 plaintiff was under covertuie when 
 the cause of action accrued, Iiord 
 Kllenborough is reported to have 
 h(dd— on what grounds it does not 
 apjiear — that it was not sullicient 
 to show that she had acknowledged 
 herself to bo married, v/ithout proof 
 
 500 
 
CH. IX.] wife's admissions EVIDKNCE for HtTSHAVD. 
 
 § 760ii. Again, if the frxstccs of a iiKirricd im„/iiii -sue or fir snrtf^ 
 and tlio opposite party bo a strauger, tlie niarriud woman's adniis- 
 Bions will, liko those of un ordinary cestui que trust,' bo clearly 
 admissible as against the triistocs. 
 
 § 7G(Jc. Where a wife and her husband have hostile intorosts, 
 the wife's admissions ought to be received on his behalf to the 
 same extent as her vivii voce testimony;^ for the principle of 
 policy which admits the one should erpially admit the other. 
 Thus, in an action against a husband by the trustees of his wife 
 under a separation deed for arrears of maiutonaiice, the defence 
 to which is adultery by the wife, jiroof of li(>r admission of 
 criminal misconduct ought, it is submitted,— contrary to what was 
 formerly the law, — to now be received.^ 
 
 § 707. The admissions of a wife cannot, however, be received in 
 evidence ./or /icr Itunhand in any suit between him an<I a stranger, 
 unless, perhaps, in the single event of their constituting part of the 
 res gestaj.* 
 
 § 7G8-H. In connection with this subject of how far a wife's 
 admissions are evidence for her husband, it should be pointed out 
 that in the Divorce Division of the High Court, ^ a person's con- 
 fession or admission is only evidence against that person himself. 
 As against that person such confession or admission may be acted 
 upon even tlionglt there he no other evidence ; but it is not evidence 
 against anyone else. Consequently, a wife's confession of having 
 committed adultery with him is no evidence against a co-respondent, 
 nor is a co-respondent's admission to this effect evidence against 
 a wife.^ Nevertheless, a wife's confession may be acted upon if 
 the co-respondent admits the adultery, as he thereby makes an 
 
 of an actual marriage, or at least of 
 cohabitation. 
 
 ' See ante, § 756. 
 
 » See 10 & 17 V. c. 83. 
 
 • Sclidlcy V. Goodman, 1823. 
 
 * See Walton v. Green, Wlb (Ab- 
 bott, C.J.). In the case cited, in un 
 action ngninst a husbanrl for piods 
 supplied, the defence being that the 
 wife had ccjmmitted adultery, the 
 •wife's confession of it was, indeed, 
 admitted as evidence for the husband 
 as part of the res gesta?. But that 
 case is, as a whole, nevertheless 
 
 submitted to bo cli'aily bad law, 
 since in such cases the real que^tioU 
 is wlu^ther the' wife liad, in fact, 
 committed adulteiy — not wlu'ther 
 the husband had so reasDuably sus- 
 pected her of it that it had justilied 
 liim ill turning her out of docas (as 
 he tliere had done). 
 
 5 The Act of 20 & 21 Y. c. So 
 ("The Matrinu)uial Causes Act, 
 18o7 "), and the Kules which regu- 
 late the ])ractico of the court, are 
 alike silent un this subject. 
 
 « Williams v. Williams, 18C6. 
 
 .01 
 
 (.1 
 
wife's confession of adultery. [part in. 
 
 admission against interest.' But as the unfettered reception of 
 euch evidence might " open a wide door," the court looks with 
 jealousy at confessions. Tlio n-('i(jht of the evidence in such cases 
 is for the court, or for a jury if there he one.^ Accordingly, 
 following the old practice of the House of Lords' Comniittoes, 
 which existed when divorces were only ohtaiuiible by private 
 Act of Parliament, and of the Ecclesi. tical Courts, the present 
 Divorce Court requires corroboration of a confession. It has 
 been said that " corroboration " is the proof of some fact 
 leading to the supposition that a witness has sworn truly 
 upon the matter as to which he has given evidence.'' In other 
 words, "corroboration " is the proof of facts ojusdem generis with 
 those deposed to by the witness.' The Ilimse of Lords, in pro- 
 ceedings upon bil/n of divorce, was in i'lo habit of rejecting letters 
 from the wife to the husband containing confessions of adultery,* 
 unless they were offered in mcr? confirmation of circumstances 
 which tended strongly to prove the defendant's guilt." Under 
 these circumstances, however, such letters, if addressed to a stranger, 
 or even to the husband's agent, were receivable in evidence, after 
 proof that they were not written in conse(iuence of any threat or 
 promise, and that the writer was then livivg apart from her 
 husband ; ' and the wife's oral confes?:"!! of ^uilt to a third party 
 was also admis.sible under like circuii .i uioes."^ Not only, however, 
 were direct confessions rejected in the llouso of Lords, except 
 under the circumstances above stated, bu'' all letters written by the 
 wife after her separation, either to the husband or to tiie adulterer, 
 were generally held inadmissible, unless they were connected with 
 some particular fact," or could be referred to as part of the res 
 ge.sta),'" or were tendered in evidence after a priniti iane case of 
 guilt had been already established." In the Ecch'sinsticul Courts, 
 
 ' liO Miiichiiut V, Le Marchant, 
 l«7ii. 
 » Williams v. "Williams, 1708, 
 « li.Miltoii's case, IH;W) (Ir.). 
 
 * SiimiKiii.s V, Simmons, 18-17. 
 
 6 Lil. Cldiifuny's caso, 1811, U.L. 
 
 • jlnyly'H CII8H, 18.'i(). 
 
 ' L(l! ClDiiciirry's cnso, 1811, If. L. 
 
 " Ld. HlKMilioroujjh's cusk, lH.f(», 
 
 I!. L. But BOO Wi.>i«iauu'sca8o, \H2l, 
 
 II. L. 
 
 » Diindiis's rase, 1814, IT. L. 
 
 '» lioydcll's ca.so, 18;j(), II. L. 
 
 " Kobiiison r. Kdliiiismi, 18.')8. In 
 one caso, wlioio tin' husliaiid held 
 a sitnutidii iit Mutla, ukI his wil'o, 
 ill C(ilis('(|iii'ii; d i;! Iiiid ht>allll, had 
 loft tho island, and had rcsidi'd ia 
 Kiifjland for several yt^ars, during 
 whiih timo uho hud livud with a 
 
 60S 
 
CHAP. IX.] WHEN ADMISSIONS OF WIFE BIND HUSRAND. 
 
 moreover, also formerly (and till they were aLolishel) the practice 
 was siiuilar to that of the House of Lords. A oimon ot 1H03' 
 rendered a mere confession, unaccompanied by other circumstances, 
 insufficient to support a prayer for a separation a mensa et thoro. 
 This rule was there held applicable, though tlie confession was 
 made under the apprehension of approaching dissolution, and was 
 free from all suspicion of a collusive purpose.^ Nevertheless a 
 confession was always admissible in evidence, and, if coupled with 
 other facts of a suspicious nature, generally proved an ini[iortant 
 ingredient in the decision of the court. ^ It was never settled in 
 these courts, however, whether a wife's confession of adultery 
 would be sufficient in itself to repel a suit instituted by her for 
 restitution of conjugal rights.* Tliey had, however, decided that 
 in a suit asking for a decree of nullity of marriage, by reason of a 
 former marriage, the defendant's f-imple admission of such former 
 marriage was not sufficient.* 
 
 § 770." It remains to be considered how far the adniimom of the 
 wife will bind the husband. Generally such admissions only bind 
 him where the wife had authority to make them/ Sucli authority 
 does not result, by operation of law, from the mere relation of 
 Imsband and wife. It is a question of fact, to be found by the 
 jury, as in other cases of agency. For, though the relation of 
 
 parMTnonr and had boriip liiin four 
 childron, tho House of Jjonls tid- 
 iiiitti'd ;i si'iit's of loltors from tho 
 wifn to her liu.sbiuid, wliicli woro 
 tci (l('r('<l us acfountiii}:; for the cir- 
 t',nin»tiiii('n of hi'r not goinp out to 
 rojoin him, and as sliowiiifj thiit who 
 liiid ]iractist'd ujion him the grossest 
 deceit; Miller's ease, 1817. 
 
 ' No. 105. 
 
 ' J.jortinier v. Mortimer, 1820. 
 
 ' In one ease, letters from tiiewife 
 to tlie supposed paramour, taken in 
 conjunctioii with other suspi<'ioiis 
 eireiimstiincc^s, were, in tlie ahsenee 
 of direct ])roof, even considered to 
 estal)lisli her jrwilt, thone:li they con- 
 tained no exi)ress avowal of a(lidtery, 
 and though they never rea<'hed tho 
 hands of the ])arty to whom they 
 were aiMressed, as they weie inter- 
 cepted liy the hnsliand : (irant v. 
 (irai.t, is;{!»; Caton c. Caton, l«li) ; 
 
 Fanssett v. Fanssett. 1849. In tho 
 I'lcclesiastical Courts, lettiMs from tliu 
 alleged jiaiamonr, found in the wife's 
 jiossession, were adniissiMe; but if 
 they did not necessarily imply tho 
 commission of ailultery. or were not 
 su])p(irted by other evithmco of iu- 
 decent faniili.irities, they were in- 
 snllicieiit to siip]iiirt a sentence of 
 separation: Hamerton r. liamei'fon, 
 bSJS. As to tlie admissihility of 
 letters written by the adulterer to tho 
 wile, in proceeiliiigs beloie the 11. of 
 I,., see i,d. (jleraw liv s case, IS'Jl, 
 II. L. 
 » Mortimer r. Moitimer, 1.S20; 
 
 liuige.S r, Ituigess, bSlT. 
 
 » Searle I' J'liio, ISIC. 
 
 » (Jr. Kv. § INJ, ill great part. 
 
 ' Emiuson v. llloiiden, ITl't; An- 
 derson r. Saiidi'rson. 1817; Carey w. 
 Adkins, 1814 ; Meredith v. Footnor, 
 18i;i. 
 
 50.{ 
 
WHEN ADMISSIONS OF WIFE BIND HUSBAND. [PART III. 
 
 mm 
 
 f 
 
 husband and wife is peculiar in its circumstances, from its close 
 intimacy and its very nature, yet there is nothing peculiar in the 
 principles of law which apply to it. The wife is, indeed, seldom 
 expressly constituted the agent of the husband, and the ciises, 
 consequently, almost universally, turn upon the question of 
 implied authority, resulting from the degree in which the husband 
 permitted the Avife to participate, either in the transaction of his 
 affairs in general, or in the jjartieular matter in question.' 
 
 § 771. The inference of the wife's agency to contract or to make 
 admissions from circumstances, used to be left to the jury with 
 great latitude. For instance, they were once allowed to infer 
 authority in the wife to accept a notice and direction, in regard to 
 a jjarticular transaction in her husband's trade, from lier being 
 seen twice in his counting-house appearing to ccjuduct his business 
 relating to that transaction, and once giving orders to the fore- 
 man ; ^ and in an action against a husband for goods furnished to 
 the wife while in the country, where he occasionally visited her, 
 her letter to the plaintiff, admitting the debt, and ajiologizing for 
 the non-i)ayraent, though written several years alter the transac- 
 tion, was held, previously to Lord Tenterden's Act,'' sufficient to 
 take the case out of the Statute of Limitations.'' lint of later 
 years, however, greater strictness has prevailed. Indeed, wliere a 
 wife, by her husband's authority, carried on the business of a shop, 
 and attended to all the receipts and payments, admissions made by 
 
 I " '1 ■ 
 
 I:' i 
 
 'i -1^ 
 
 ' See nnto, § 192. For inwtiince, wife's proiicity, ■which hiiiiponed he- 
 
 wliere. uiidfr the ohl law (a uuiriied i'oiu thc! iii;irii:ijri'. nccivahlo after 
 
 WiPiiiaii may now sue tor waj^es in liis death to allV'ct tlir li^'lit-^ of the 
 
 her own name, 4,j & -Hi V. c. ~o, survivinj^ wile: .Smith r. Scuddur, 
 
 §§ 1. -J), the hiisbaml sued for her 1824 (Am.). 
 
 waj;rs, tlu^ mi'io luit that >*]h: had * I'limmer i'. Sells, 1H:!4. 
 
 caiiK (I thi'iu did not authoii.se her to 
 bind him t)y h<-r admissions of pay- 
 ment (llallC. Hill, IT.JT); noreonid 
 her unautliciiis(Ml declaiatioiiH atlVet 
 him, cviii where he sued with her in 
 hi'r ri,u'lit. ; for in tiioe, ami similar 
 cases, the vv^]d was liis own, thoujjh 
 ii((| ailed tliniu^'li lierinstrnmentalitv. 
 Alhan '•. I'lilihelt, ITHf,; Krilv r. 
 Small, 179!i; Drnn c. White, 17!»7, 
 ns to the wife's admission of a ties- 
 pass. Neither are the luistiaiid's 
 tttl-Uiiasiuus ua to lucts res]ioutiiig his 
 
 ' !» G. 4, c. 14, § 1, wliieh reqtn"red 
 that an aeknnwle(lirnieiit. to tiiki' the 
 ease out of the statute, sli'inld he in 
 wri'in;r, "sijrned l)y the jiarly ejiai jje- 
 ahle thereby." It muy imii' he sif,'n.'d 
 by an authorised ap'Ut ; I!» & 2(1 V. 
 V. !)", § !•■), cited ante, § T4i). Soh 
 post. § 107;?. 
 
 « CiVe>;oi'y v. Tarker, ISIIH ^Ld. 
 Kllenho!(iuj,'ir : Palethiajx' /■. I'ur- 
 uisli, 17.S;t; (lilVoi'd r. liurton. l.S2!l; 
 I'ettv V. Anderson, l62o; Cotes v, 
 Uuvls, 1S08. 
 
 604 
 
CHAP. IX.] INCIDENTAL SOLICITORS' ADMISSIONS. 
 
 her to the landlord of the shop rospeotiiig the amount of rent were 
 held not admissible to bind the hvisbaiul.' 
 
 § 772.'^ The admissions of solicifors bind their clients in all 
 matters relating to the progress and trial of the action. Sometimes 
 thej are even ('onclusive, and may be given in evidence upon a new 
 trial, notwithstanding that, previously to such trial, the party has 
 given notice that he intends to withdraw them, or though, where 
 the alterations do not relate to the admissions,' the pleadings 
 have been altered. To have this effect, however, the admissions 
 must have been distinct and formal, or such as are termed solemn 
 admissions, made for the express purpose of relaxing the stringency 
 of some rule of practice, or of dispensing with the formal proof of 
 some document or fact at the trial. ^ 
 
 *5 773 Admissions made by solicitors, not indeed with the ex- 
 press intent of dispensing with proof of certain facts, but as it were 
 hicidchtaUi/, while they are referring to other matters connected 
 with the action (which are generally the result of carelessness), 
 are not regarded as conclusive admissions. But they, nevertheless, 
 frequently raise an inference respecting the existence of facts, which 
 the adversary would otherwise have been called upon to prove. 
 Consequently, it is very important that solicitors should exercise 
 great caution in the language they employ while corresponding 
 with their opponents. For example, where in an action against 
 the acceptor of a bill, defendant's solicitor served on the j)laintiff 
 a Notice to Produce, which contained a description of the bill 
 corresponding with that set forth in the declavation, and then went 
 on to pay — " which said bil nan accepted by the said defendant" — 
 such Notice was held prima facie evidence of the defendant's 
 acceptance ; ' in an action against the owners of a ship, their 
 joint ownership was infen-ed from an undertaking to appear for 
 
 ' Meiwlitln-.Fontner, 1843. Had 
 the udniiss.'<i()nB related to the receipt 
 (if sliop goodH, they would hiive been 
 evidence ; but the fact tlmt sbe wiw 
 eonductinp a business for her has- 
 bund, did not constituto hor his npont 
 to niiiko ndinisjiions of an nntecedont 
 contract for tho hire of the slioj), or to 
 niako a now contract for the future 
 occupation of it. 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 166, in part. 
 
 ' Elton V. Lai kins. 1R:{2 (Tindnl, 
 C.J.); Jioe V. Bird, l.S;{.'> (Ld. J)en- 
 tnanj ; Lan>,'ley v. Ld. Oxford, 18.'{(i. 
 ,"^ee Ilarfrravo v. Ilargrave, l.S.)0, as 
 to the case where the client ia an 
 infant. 
 
 * See cases cited in last note. Also, 
 ante. § 724a, et seq. ; and Youiir v. 
 Wrijrht. 180" ; Doe v. I^)llinp;H, 1847. 
 
 » Ilolt V. Squire, 1825 (Abbott, 
 C.J.). 
 
 605 
 
 I I 
 
LETTERS BY SOLICITORS WITHOTJT PIIIDUDICE. [iT. III. 
 
 hi 
 
 
 
 Il ;:; 
 
 them, signed by their solicitor, in which tliey were described as 
 owners of the sloop in question ; ' and where, in an action of debt 
 on a bond, the defendant's solicitor had admitted the signature of 
 the attesting witness, this was held to amount by implication to an 
 admission of the due execution of the instrument.' 
 
 § 774.' Admissions contained in the tnere conversation of a 
 solicitor, cannot, however, be received against a client, tliough 
 they relate to the facts in controversy. The reason of this distinc- 
 tion is that a solicitor is merely given authority to manage the 
 action in court, and to do nothing more.* And a letter seut to the 
 opposite party by a solicitor, expressed to be written " uith-Hit 
 prcjudkc" cannot be received as an admission, nor looked at on a 
 question of costs ; * neither can the reply be admitted, though not 
 guarded in a similar manner." However, an admission made before 
 suit will be binding, if it be shown that the solicitor was already 
 retained in the action,' though in the absence of "ny evidence of 
 such I'etainei, some other proof must be gi/en of authority to make 
 ibc admission." Whoxi I he solicitor is retained in a cause, admis- 
 sions made by his managing clerk, or his agent, are received as hia 
 
 own. 
 
 § 783. Admissions made by counsel stand on much the same 
 footing as those by solicitors. Therefore, where a special case had 
 been signed by the junior on each side, on a subse(iueut new ..ial, 
 the production of the case was regarded as containing admissions 
 by the parties ot the facts therein stated.'" As a general proposition 
 indeed, both in the Chancery and Common Law Divisions of the 
 High Court, a consent once given, or an admission once made, by 
 
 Clitf, 1815 (Ld. C. 
 
 ii ■ < 
 
 ' ArursbiiU V. 
 Ellfiilioroufi:!!). 
 
 ■■* Milwunl V. Temple, 1808 (Ld. 
 EllenboidU^^h). 
 
 •' (ir. Ev. § 1H(), ill pint. 
 
 * I'.'tc'h V. I,voii, 184f); Youn^ v. 
 Wrif,'lit. 1807 ; i'arkiiis c. Iliiwkshaw, 
 1817 ; Doo V. ItiLbimls, 181.J. Hue 
 WilsDU w. Turnor, 1808 ; Watson v. 
 Kiiifi. 184(i. 
 
 » Wiilktir V. Wiltshire, infra. 
 
 • TiKidock V. ForroHtor, 1842; 
 lloffhton V. Iloghton, 18,)2. Soo 
 Jiiniiuo V. Sheridan, 184«> ; Williams 
 V. Thoinivs, I8fi2; Kurt/ f. Sponco, 
 1888; Walker v. Wiltshire, 188i>, 
 
 506 
 
 V. ; and post, § 795. 
 
 ' .Marsliall r. ClilV, 181o (Ld. EI- 
 lenbiiroiigli) ; Guinst'ord v. Grammar, 
 18(K». 
 
 « Wufrstaffr'. Wilson, 1832; liurp;- 
 hart r. Angerstiin. 18;i4 (Aldcrson, 
 li.); I'opo i>. Andrews, 18lO (Cole- 
 ridge, J.). 
 
 » Taylor v. Willans, 1831 ; Stand- 
 ape )'. Civighton, 18.'{2; Griffiths v. 
 Williams, 1787 ; Trnslovo v. liurton, 
 1824 ; Taylor v. Forster, 1825. 
 
 «• Van Wart v. Wolley, 1823 
 (Abbott, C.J.) J Kdmunds v. New- 
 man, 1823. 
 
 a ■ 
 
CH. IX.] ADMISSIONS liV CULXSKI., WIIKX i:VII)ENCE. 
 
 counsel under his signature, with the authority of his client, with 
 a full knowledge of the facts, aud without some egregious mistcake, is 
 conclusively binding, and cannot afterwards ha withdrawn ; ' and, 
 after an admission has been made as to a fact, it is wrong to receive 
 any evidence on the matter.^ Moreover, where counsel on both 
 sides so conduct a cause as to lead to an inference that a certain 
 fact is admitted between them, the court or the jury may treat it 
 as proved ; ' and though the coun? el only assumed it with respect to 
 one issue, the fact may be taken for granted for all purposes, and 
 as to the whole case.'* Accordiagly, wh-^re plaintiff's counsel in his 
 opening stated that his client had paid a particular cher^ie, but 
 called no evidence in support of that fact, defendant was, after 
 notice to produce, allowed to give secondary evidence of the con- 
 tents of the cheque, without giving further proof of the plaintiff's 
 possession, since if plaintiff had paid it he would get possession of i ':.* 
 § 784. Where, however, on a second trial of a case, a party, 
 having endeavoured to avoid part of his opponent's demand, by 
 proving a mere statement made on the former trial, in his oppo- 
 nent's presence, by his counsel in his address, the judge rejected 
 evidence of what Lad been then said.'' It may be urged, in support 
 of the above ruling, that statements made by counsel in the course 
 of his address to the jury are often no other than embellisliments 
 of the imagination or suggestions prompted by his own ingenuity ; 
 and that as even bills in equity were formerly so regarded, and 
 consequently were not evidence against the parties who filed 
 them, much less ought parties to be bound by more oral speeches 
 of counsel, which the client has not even had the advantage of 
 considering before they are delivered.' 
 
 • Hurvey v. Cioydon Union, &c., 
 1884, C. A. 
 
 » Urquhurt v. Buttcrfiuld, 1888, 
 C. A. 
 
 3 Stnicy V. IMiiko, 18;}(3; Doc J. 
 Chilli i: Koo, 185'J. 
 
 • JJolton V. Shoruiiiii, 183" (Ld. 
 Abingor). 
 
 ' Duncoinbo v. Daniell, 1837 (Ld. 
 Dantnuu). But seo Muchell v. Ellis, 
 1845. 
 
 • OoUodgov. Horn, 1825. The court 
 in this case Bubsequontly gnuitod a 
 fui'ther new trial ou othur giouuds, 
 
 tho otlicr incuibors of it expressing 
 no ojiinion as to tlio pminirty of tlm 
 course taki'H at the M'ciuid trial, 
 though Iforrougli, J., said tliiit if 
 the j)laintill' was in couit. an<l heard 
 what his cciuiiscl said, and made no 
 objection, lie was bound by tlu^ stafc- 
 Tiient. See 1{. '. Coyh', lcS,),j, llaller 
 V. Wommn, iNfiO (Keating, J.) St'd 
 qu. us Lo this lat-t (use. 
 
 ' As to the autlioritj' of counsel to 
 bind a client by a coiniironiiso or 
 ugroenient mado at tho trial, see 
 tiwiuiuu V. Swiuicu, I8al ; Chambuis 
 
 607 
 
H 
 
 iff- 
 
 
 V '"'. 
 
 ADMISSIONS BY PHINCIPAL, WHEN EVIDENCE. [PART III. 
 
 § 785.' The admissions of a principal can somotimes (though 
 only seldom) be received as evidence in an action agniiist the surety 
 upon his collateral undertaking. In such cases if the declarations 
 of the principal were so made during the transaction of the 
 Lusiness for which the surety was bound, as to become part of the 
 res gestse, they as such are admissible; but in any ether event 
 ihey are not.^ For instance, where a surety has guaranteed 
 ])ayment for such goods as the plaintiffs should send to another in 
 the way of trade, admissions by the principal debtor, made after 
 the time of their supposed delivery, that he had received certain 
 goods, are not any evidence against the surety ; ' neither are 
 confessions of embezzlement made by the clerk or collector after 
 '.is dismissal evidence against a man who became a surety for the 
 faithful conduct of such clerk or collector in his office.* 
 
 § 780.' The declarations of a principal may, in some cases, 
 though rarely, be evidence against the surety. For instance, 
 entries made by the principal debtor in the course of his duty, or 
 whereby he has charged himself with the receipt of money, will, 
 certainly, after his death," and probably after he has absconded,' 
 be received as evidence against the surety. Possibly, too, they are 
 so if the defaulter be sued for his default, and thereupon gives his 
 surety notice of the pendeiivij of the suit upon which the surety 
 requests him to defend it. In such a case judgment against the 
 defaulter is conclusive evidence for the surety in a subsequent 
 action by him against his principal {i.e., the defaulter) for indem- 
 nity, inasmuch as the principal has thus virtuullij become a party to 
 
 V. Mason, 18.i8 ; Swinfen v. Ld. 
 Cholinstord, ISOO; Tifstwich v. Foley, 
 18().); Strauss c.Fiancis.lSOG; Brady 
 V. Curran, 1808 (Jr.); ILdt v. Jesse, 
 187(); Davis r. Davis, 1«8(). 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 187, in great part. 
 
 * So, in the absence of special 
 aprepinent., a judpment or an award 
 njrainst a jiriiicipal debtor is liot 
 binding on the surety, and is not 
 evidence ajrainst him if ho be sued 
 by the creditor : I'lx p. Young, re 
 Kitehin, 1881. 
 
 » Evans V. H(>nttie, 1803 (Ld. Ellon- 
 bnrougli) ; Hacon v. Chesncy, 1816 
 (id.), Longouecker v. Ilyde, 1813 
 
 (Am.). 
 
 *■ Smith V. Whittineham, 1833. 
 See. also. Cutler v. Nfwi. , 1S19 
 (Uolroyd, J.): Dunn r. Slco. 1810; 
 Dawes' »'. Shed, IHIS (Am.); Fox- 
 crolt V. Novens, iMiO (Am.) ; Hayes 
 V. Seaver, 1831 (Am.); IJeuUv. Back, 
 1794. 
 
 » Cir. Ev. § 188, in part. 
 
 « Whitnasii v. Georfro. 1828; Mid- 
 dlet(Wi V. Melton. 18'J!» ; Gossi>. Wat- 
 bn^tou, 1S21 ; M'Gahoy v. Alston, 
 J830. 
 
 ' Ahbeyleix Gdns. v.SntclifFo, 1890 
 Ir.) ((!»'"'• O'Brien. J.): Town of 
 ''nion V. Bermos, 1882 (Am.). 
 
 « 
 
 608 
 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS BY PRIVIES. 
 
 to 
 
 the suit. Accordingly, in an action by tlie sKeritf againirt the 
 surety of a baiiiil', wlio had kept bick money, a written admission 
 by the bailiJf of the receipt of this money was under these circum- 
 stances held to be evidence against the surety, the bailiff being 
 considered as substantially the defendant in the action.* 
 
 § 7>"^7.^ The admissions of a person are also evidence against any 
 other who is in pririfi/ with him. The term pririfi/ denotes mutual 
 or successive relationship to the same rights of property ; and 
 privies are distributed in several classes, according to the manner 
 of this relationship. Thus, there are privies in estate, — as, donor 
 and donee, lessor and lessee, joint-tenants, and successive bishops, 
 rectors, and vicars; privies in blood,— as, heir and ancestor, and 
 coparceners; privies in representation, — as, executors and testators, 
 administratfU'S and intestates ; privies in law, — where the law, 
 without privity of blood or estate, takes the land from one and 
 bestows it upon another, as by escheat. All these are more 
 generally classed into privies in estate, privies in blood, and privies 
 in law.^ The ground, upon which admissions bind those in privity 
 with the party making them, is, that they are identified in interest ; 
 and of course the rule extends no further than this identity. The 
 cases of coparceners, and of joint-tenants, are assimilated to those 
 of joint promissors, partners, and others having a joint interest, 
 which have alieady been considered."* In other cases, where the 
 party by his admissions has qualified his own right, and another 
 claims to succeed him, as heir, executor, or the like, the latter 
 succeeds oidy to the right as thus (jualifiod at the time when his 
 title commenced ; aad the admissions are receivable in evidence 
 against the representative, in the same manner as they would have 
 been against tbu party represented.^ Thus, the declarations of the 
 ancestor, that he held the land as tenant of a third person, are 
 
 » Porcharrt v. Tindall, IT.-o (Ld. 
 Konj'on). Tho gmmul abovo mi'^- 
 j,'L'stod is in iici'urilaiK'o rvitli tlio 
 lulinuf, aud api)eiiia to bo tlio only 
 way 111 which it can bo suppoitcd. 
 A docuuiuut saying, "diwchargo iho 
 dofondant out of custody ; I havo 
 rocuivud tho iiionoy," sij^uod by tho 
 bailiff, was there lield to ho for stamp 
 purposes an authority, not a receipt, 
 but Bulliciuut to charge the witness 
 
 (the bailiff) with tho receipt of the 
 money. 
 
 ^ (Jr. ]']v. § 189, in fjreat part. 
 
 ^ Vi). Lit. 271 a; Cai'vor c. Jack- 
 son, l.^.iO (.Vin.); Wood. Inst. LL. 
 En<j;. 2;J() ; Tonilin, L. Diet. Verb. 
 Pririin. Heo Walktu's case, l.>8(j; 
 Beverley's case, l(il),J-4; unto, § 90. 
 
 * Ante, § 74;i. 
 
 '• Coolo V. Bralium, 184S (Pai-ke, 
 U.). 
 
 1 
 
 609 
 
ADMISSIONS BY PRIVIES. 
 
 fPAUT III. 
 
 IF 
 
 I'.- 
 
 admissiWe to show that person's seisin in an action hj him against 
 the heir for the land ; ' and the declarations of an intestate are 
 admissible against his administrator, or any other claiming in his 
 right.'^ 
 
 $5 788.^ On the same principle, any declaration by a landlord, in 
 a prior lease concerning the estate, is evidence against a lessee, who 
 claims by a subsequent title;* admissions — whether evidenced by 
 writing,'' such as letters, receipts, cases drawn for the opinion of 
 counsel, answers in Chancery, or verbal statements, or even by 
 conduct," — made by former bishops, rectors, or vicars, Avith regard 
 to their several rights, will be evidence against their respective 
 successors, in all cases where the same rights are in question. 
 Ancient maps, books of survey, and the like, though mere private 
 documents, are frequently admissible on the ground that a privity 
 in estate exists between the former proprietor under whose direction 
 they were made, and the present claimant against whom they are 
 offered;' and the declarations of former owners or occupiers, made 
 while in possession, are admitted against those claiming in privity 
 of estate as evidence of the nature and extent of their title.* 
 
 § 789. In general, the nnked declarations of a tenant will not be 
 evidence against the reversioner.^ Accordingly, the declarations of 
 
 • Doe V. VotU'tt. 1821 ; 2 Poth., 
 Obi., 254 ; anto, §§ 684—687, aud 
 cases there cited, 
 
 ' Smith V. Smith, 18156. But the 
 docliiratiiiiis of an executor, though 
 made while ho was actinp; in that 
 capacity, are not admissible ajjainst 
 a spt'ciiil administrator, who has been 
 apjiointed in conse(\ueneo of the 
 exe<'iitor's protracted absence from 
 England : Rush r. Peacock, INIJS 
 (Ld. Denman). There the adminis- 
 trator was appointed nnder ;S8 G. 3, 
 c. 87. As to how far payments made 
 by an executor de son tort to a 
 creditor of a deceased person are 
 binding on the riglitful executor, see 
 Thomson v. Harding, ISj.'j. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 189. in i)art. 
 
 • Crease v. Barrett, 18;ii5. See Doe 
 V. Seaton, 18:H. 
 
 • Bp. of Moath V. M of Winchester, 
 1836; Maddison v. Nuttall, 1829; 
 Doe I'. Cole, 1834 (Patteson, J.) ; De 
 Whelpdale v, Milburn, 1818 ; Carr v. 
 
 Mostyn, lS,-)(). 
 
 * See Lady Dartmouth v. Roberts, 
 1812, where a vicar wlio had filed a 
 bill against his rector and certain 
 landowners of the parivli for tithe 
 hay, having abandoned the suit after 
 the defendants in their answer had 
 declared that the tith"s in ciuestion 
 belonged to the rector, in a subse- 
 quentactionfoi'snnilar tithes brought 
 byasucceedingrectorag.iinst owners, 
 who had j)urchased their lands from 
 the paities to tlie former suit, the 
 answer was held to be strong evidence 
 in favour of the plaintiff. 
 
 ' Bridgman v. Jennings, 1609. 
 
 * Woolway v. Bowe, 1834 ; Doe v. 
 Austin, 1832; Davies v. Pierce, 1787; 
 Doe i;. Jones, 1808 ; Jackson v. Bard, 
 1809 (Am.); Norton v. Pcttibono, 
 1829 (Am.) ; Weidman v. Kohr, 
 1818 (Am.). 
 
 » Tickle V. Brown, 1835 (Patteson 
 J.). 
 
 510 
 
 it: 
 
 ' ;i 
 
CHAP. IX..] ADMISSIONS BY TENANTS. WHEN' EVIDENCE. 
 
 a former occupier of the defendant's land were held rot to be 
 admissible against him, on an issue whether the plaintill had an 
 easement in such land.' But in an action for the recovery of land the 
 admission of the tenant in possession will, from the peculiar nature 
 of the proceedings, be evidence against one who defends as landlord.* 
 And in one case the receipts of a lessee of vicarial tithes wore hold 
 at Nisi Prius to be evidence, in proof of a modus, against the vicar, 
 by reason of priv'^y between them.' 
 
 § TOO.* In consequence of privity of estate between them, ad- 
 missions made bi( the msiynor of a personal contract or chattel 
 previous to the assignment, where the assignee mu.st recover 
 through the title of the assignor, and succeeds only to that title as 
 it stood at the time of its transfer, bind such assignee. This, how- 
 ever, occurs only where an identity of interest exists between the 
 assignor and assignee. Such identity is deemed to exist both wbeu 
 the assignee is either expressly or impliedly the mere agent and 
 representative of the assignor,' and also Avlienever the assignee has 
 acquired a title with actual notice of the true state of that of the 
 assignor as qualified by the admissions in question, or wliere he has 
 purchased a demand already stale, or otherwise infected with cir- 
 cumstances of suspicion. 
 
 § 71U.'' Accordingly, in an action by the indorsee of a bill or 
 note, •which has been taken by the plaintiff either after it was due, 
 or with notice of fraud in its original concoction and without con- 
 sideration, the declarations of the indorser made while the interest 
 was in him, are admissible in evidence for the defendant.' But as 
 " the right of a person holding by a good titl- is not to be cut down 
 by the acknowledgment that he had no title," t lerefore the doolcra- 
 tions of a. former holder of a note, that such note was given without 
 consideration, even though made while he held the note, are not 
 
 ' Scholoa r. Cha<lwick, 18-13 (Cress- 
 well. J.); I'api'Uilick v. Ihidgwater, 
 1855. 
 
 "^ Doe V. Lithoiland. 1836. Seo 
 E. S. C. 1883. Old. XII. IT. 'lb. 2(i. 
 
 * Joues V. Cun-iiifft'in, 1S2-1 (I'tiik, 
 J.). See, also, lllingworth v. licigh, 
 1800. 
 
 ♦ Gr. Ev. § 190, almost verbatim. 
 W'elsUiad v. Lovj, 1831 ; Hani- 
 
 son V. yaliurino. 1822; fiibMehouco 
 V. Stniiifi, \s\V> (Am.); Ilatoh r. Den- 
 nis, ls:i:!(Aiii.); Siiel^rovo c Martin, 
 182;.' Am.). 
 
 « (iv. !•>. § 190, in part. 
 
 ' liBauiliamix'. I'ariv, 18.S0; Pcck- 
 hnm V. Potter, 1824 (Ld. Giltord) ; 
 13onson v. Marshal (undated), cited 
 in Shaw v. Broom, 1824 ; Shirley v. 
 Todd, 1832 (Am.). 
 
 511 
 
'ii; 
 
 ADMISSIONS BY PRIVIES. [PART III. 
 
 arlraissiWe against an indorsee, to whom tlie instrument has hoon 
 transferred for good consideration, and before it was overdue; 
 because sueh an indorsee derives his title from the nature of the 
 instrument itself, and not through the previous liolder.^ 
 
 § 792. The principle that declarations by a person through whom 
 the jilaintiff claims are admissible is further illustrated by a ease'' 
 in which an action was brought for taking three mares, and the 
 defendant justified as lord of the manor under a hcriot custom ; 
 the sole question between the parties being whether the tenant 
 was possessed of the mares at the time of her death. Her declara- 
 tions that she had given them to the plaintiff some time before 
 were held admissible, as they were against her interest, and the 
 right of the lord depended upon her title. Where, however, the 
 issue does not distinctly raise the question whetaer the title of the 
 party against whom declarations are tendered is dependent upon 
 that possessed by the declarant, such declarations will be in- 
 admissible. Therefore, where an issue was directed to try whether 
 goods seized in A.'s house at the suit of the defendant were the 
 property of the plaintiff, the declarations of A. respecting the pro- 
 perty wero rejected.' Had the issue raised the question, whether 
 at the tiittc of the execution the goods belonged to A., it would seem, 
 on principle, that declarations of A. made before the seizure 
 would have been evidence against the execution creditor (since, 
 in an interpleader suit, the execution creditor ought to be con- 
 sidered as claiming under the debtor) when they qualified or 
 affected the debtor's title to the chattels in question.* In accord- 
 
 \\\\ 
 
 !!■ ,11 
 
 * Woolwayv. Eowe, 1834, explain- 
 ing B;ii()iigh V. White, 1825 ; Smith 
 t'. Do Wiuilz, Wlb (Abbott, C.J.) •, 
 Boauchniiip v. Parrj', 183U. In ap- 
 plying the principle indicated in the 
 text, a note piiyable on demand, 
 though not negotiated for some time 
 after its date, will not on that account 
 be treated us a note taken by an in- 
 dorsee when overdue ; for such notes 
 are intended to be continuing secu- 
 rities, and may circulate for years 
 without exciting suspicion : Barongh 
 V. White, 1825; Brooks v. Mitchell, 
 184 1 . Neither will the circumstance 
 that the declarations of the prior 
 
 holder would, if received, prove his 
 fraud in connection with the indor- 
 see, render them admissible against 
 the latter ; because all preliminary 
 facts, which are necessary to .esta- 
 blish the admissibility of evidence, 
 must be proved aliunde, before sueh 
 evidence is received ; Phillips v. Cole, 
 1839. See Heenan v, Clements, 1850 
 (Ir.). 
 
 » Ivat V. Finch, 1808. 
 
 » Stotherd v. Janus, 1843 (Maulo, 
 J.). 
 
 * Coole V. Braham, 1848. In this 
 case a decision of Mr. Justice Wight- 
 man (Ln Pi-osaer v. Qwiilim, 184;i), 
 
 [}\2 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSION BY DECLARANT. 
 
 f'> i 
 
 ance with this view, on an interpleader issue l)ot\vopn tiie boldor of 
 a bill of sale and an execution creditor, where the question was the 
 usual one of fraud in the concoction of the bill of mle, the plaintiff 
 was not allowed to suiiport the genuinone.-'s of the instrument by 
 giving evidence of an admission by the execution debtor that a 
 debt was due from him to the plaintiff, th(jugh stich admission 
 was made prior to the assignment, and also in the absence of the 
 defendant. 
 
 § 79;J.* These admissions by third persons, through whom the 
 person against whom they are received claims, as they derive 
 their legal force from the relation of the party making them to the 
 property in question, may be prorcd by aiii/ witness who heard 
 them, without calling the party by whom they were made. The 
 question merely is, whether the admission alleged was made, and 
 not whether the fact is as then admitted. The truth of it may, 
 where the adnussion is not conclusive, — and it seldom is so, — be 
 controverted by other testimony, and even by calling the party 
 himself ; but it is not necessary to jiroduce him, for his declara- 
 tions, when admissible at all, will be received as original evidence, 
 and not as hearsay.^ 
 
 § 794. With respect to the time and circiinistances of the admis- 
 sion, it may first be observed, that whenever the declarations of a 
 third person are offered in evidence, on the ground that the party 
 against whom they are tendered derives his t'tle from the declarant, 
 it must be shown that they were made at a time when he had an 
 interest in the property in question. For it would be manifestly 
 unjust that a person, after having parted with his interest in 
 proi)erty, should be empowered to divest the right of another 
 claiming under him, by any statement which he may choose to 
 make.* Accordingly, the admission of a former party to a bill of 
 exchange, made after he has negotiated it, cannot under any cir- 
 cumstances be received against the holder;* where a person had. 
 
 rejectinp; flio declarations of the exe- 
 cution (Icbtiir, on the fiioiind that the 
 execution creditcn- ele.inied udversdy 
 to him, is discredited. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. 191, almost verbatim. 
 
 ' Anto. ^§ ,j7(), ()t»2, (iO;i, and eases 
 there cited ; Woolway v. llowo, iy:i4 ; 
 
 Uiickell V. riulse, is;}?. 
 
 ^ Doe i: WVMht, KS;{4 {I A. Den- 
 man); Foster c. M'Mahon, l!S47(Ir.); 
 Lalor V. Lalor, l>S7!t (Ir.). 
 
 * I'oeock i: Hillinj,', l.S'J4 ; Shaw 
 V. IJrooHi, 1824. See Hoboita v, 
 tlustice, 1S43. 
 
 513 
 
 ' .ri 
 
 I' I 
 
•I, 
 
 I'' 
 
 m 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 It ••■ 
 
 11. "I' 
 
 ifr, r 
 
 
 OFFERS OF COMPROMISE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART III. 
 
 by a voluntary post-nuptial settloraent, convpyod away his iutnrpst 
 in an estate, and afterwards executed a mortf^age of the same 
 property, his admission that money had actually heen advanced 
 upon the mortgage was hold not to he admis.sihlo on hchalf of tlie 
 mortgagee, wlio was seeking to set aside the former settlement as 
 V(duntary and void;' and the deolaratiim^ of a bankrupt, though 
 good evidence to charge his estate with a debt if made before his 
 bankruptcy, is not admissible at all if it were made afterwards.^ 
 This most just and equitable doctrine will be found to apply to the 
 cases of vendor and vendee, grantor and grantee, and, geimiall^', to 
 all cases of rights acquired in good faith previous to the time when 
 the adniission was made.'' 
 
 § 79/5. We have before briefly notlned,' that coiiftdriifidl orrr/nirs 
 of parijicfifion, and any other offers or propositions between liti- 
 gating parties, expressly or impliedly made irif/ioiit prrjiidivr, are 
 excluded. This is on grounds of public policy." If this were not 
 60, it would often bo dillicult to take any steps towards an amii able 
 compromise or adjustment. Lord ^Nfansfield has observed that all 
 men must bo permitted to buy their peace, without [)rejudice to 
 them should '''e offer not succeed; such offers being made to stop 
 litigation, without regard to the question whether anything is due 
 or not. If, therefore, a defendant, on being sued for 10(1/., should 
 offer the plaintiff 20/., at the same time stating that he made such 
 offer " without prejudice," evidence of the offer woidd not be 
 adinissible in evidence ; for it is irrelevant to the issue ; it neither 
 admits nor ascertains any debt, and is no more than saying that he 
 would give '20/. to be rid of the action.' An otler made " without 
 prejudice " cannot be looked at even upon a question of costs.' 
 
 • Doe r. Wobbor, 1834 ; Gully v. 
 Up. of Exetor, 1S2.S. 
 
 » Gr. Kv. § 18(1, in part. 
 
 » Batemiin v. Uailcy, 1794 ; Sinitb 
 V. Simuies, 179.J; Deatly v. ilani- 
 Bon, 1815. See, also, Iliirwood v. 
 Keys, 1832; and Koinpland v. Mac- 
 aulov. 1791 (Ld. Kcnyon). 
 
 * Wclstoadv. Low, 1831; Hartlott 
 V. Deljirat, 1808 (Am.); Clark v. 
 Waite, 18i5 (Am.1; IJiid-ro v. Kjrfilo- 
 Bton, 1817 (Am.); rhcnix r. In- 
 praham, 1809 (Am.); I'lackor v. 
 Gunsalus, ISIj (Am.); I'atton 
 
 Goldsboroufrh, 1822 (Am.",; Mwhhv. 
 CU-'Uison, ls2.') (Am.); t'lowdor v. 
 Hopkins, 184;j (Am.); Tadgott v. 
 LiiwRMicc. 1843 (Am.). 
 
 » Ante, § 774. 
 
 • Cory r. Hic'tton. 1830 (Tindal, 
 C.J.); "Iloab-y v. Thatcher, 18;W; 
 Paddock V. Forrester, 1842; Jardino 
 V. Shoridan, 1840; WIiilTcn v. Ilard- 
 wri^fht, 1S48; ]I(if,'lit(m v. Iloghton, 
 18o2; J(.iu'.s c. Foxall, 18.J2. 
 
 ' 15. \. r. 23(). 1). 
 
 « Walker V. AViltshiro, 1889, C. A. 
 
 »i4 
 
 11 
 
' ■« 
 
 CHAP. IX.] OFFERS OF COMPI{0>fISK, WIIKN AHMISSinLE. 
 
 Even tho giving of a small sura in onUtr to ohtiiin tho roleas-'o of 
 a right, ciiunot be considurud as an ackiKtwlcdgnK'nt that a ri«'ht 
 exists ; it amoviiits only to this — " I givo you so much for not 
 seeking to disturb me." ' Perhaps, also, an offer of compromise, 
 the esseueo of which is that the party making it is willing to 
 submit to a Facrifioe, or to make a cm ncssion,- will bo rejected, 
 though nothing at tho time was expressly said respecting its con- 
 fidential character, if it clearly appear to have been made under 
 tho faith of a pending treaty, into which the party hiis been led 
 by the confidence of an arrangement being effcctecl ; ■' though, in 
 this case, if the admission be merely of a coUatenil or indilffrcnt 
 fact, such as tho handwriting of a party, which is capable of easy 
 proof by other means, and is not connected with the substantial 
 merits of the cause, it will be received.'' Tho American courts 
 have held that evidence of the admission of any independent fact 
 is receivable, though made during a treaty of compromise.' 
 
 § 7!)(». In the absence of any ex[)re.><s, or strongly implied, 
 restriction as to confidence, an offer of compromise is clearly 
 admissible as some evidence of liability." The offer of a less sura 
 than the amount demanded will not, in general, support a count 
 on an account stated, since it may be a mere offer to j)urchase 
 peace ; ' — nor, perhaps, will an offer by the drawer of a bill, who 
 is threatened with legal j)roceedings upon it, to give another bill 
 by way of settlement, obviate the necessity of ])roviiig at the trial 
 that he has received due notice of dishonour.* Nevertheless, there 
 are occasions when tho fact of an olfer having been made may be 
 entitled to considerable weight,' as, for in.stance, if the drawer of a 
 bill, whose signature is in issue, has projjoscd a settlement. On the 
 other hand, in a case '" where the defendant was sued for keeping 
 
 ' Undorwood v. Ld. Courtowii, 
 1804 (Ir.) (Ld. Kcdosdale). 
 
 * TJiomson v, Auston, 1823 (13;ij-- 
 ley, J.). 
 
 3 Waldiidge v. Kenuisoii, 17!M {\A. 
 Konvon). 
 
 « id. 
 
 Mount V. Bogort, 181G (Am.) 
 (Thoiiijison, V.J.); Murray r, Costnr. 
 IS'Jo (.\in.); Fuller c. lliiiii)it()ii. 
 1824 (Am.); Suuboru v. Neil.soii, 
 
 1828 (Am.) ; Delogny v. Rontoul, 
 1812 (Am.). 
 
 6 WiilLico V. Small, 1830 (Ld. 
 Toiitenlcn) ; "Watts r. Lnw.-on, is.'iO 
 (id.'i; Nicholseu i: Smith, 1S22 (id.). 
 
 ' Waymaii /■. llillianl, IS.)!!. 
 
 * Ciiiniu;? /'. Frciich, ISdi) (Ld. 
 Elli'nliiiriiii<,'li). See [lost, § 8()(i. 
 
 ' llariliii;,' '•. Jones, 18;)."). 
 
 '" 'I'liomas /•. Miiriraii. lN3j. !^oe, 
 lidwuvoi', Sayers u. WaUh, 1848 (Ir.). 
 
 Ol> 
 

 nil 
 
 
 H^ 
 
 
 OFFERS OF COMPROMISE, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PAUT III, 
 
 mischiovous dogs, which had killed three of the plaintiff's cattle, 
 aiul it n]»i)eared that on being told of the injury done by his dogs 
 he had offered to settle for it, the court held, that though this was 
 a fact, which in strictness should have been submitted to tlie jury 
 as evidence of the scienter,' it was entitled to little, if any, weiglit, 
 "as it might have been made from motives of charity witliout any 
 admission of liability at all." Admissions made before an arbi- 
 trator are receivaljle in a subs(;queut trial of the cause, the reference 
 having proved ineffectual.^ 
 
 8 707. As to a man's purchasing peace, or endeavouring to do 
 8o, the words of Lord EUenborougli,— when Sir WilU.im Scott was 
 sued for illegally exoommunicafiiig one Beaurain, wliose animosity 
 he had endeavoured to stifle by a gift, — are worth reciUing, " Let 
 this action be a lesson for all men to stand boldly forward — to 
 stand on their characters — and not, by compromising a i)rt'stiit 
 difficulty, to actiumulate imputations on their honour."^ 
 
 S 71)8.* Admissions made under circumstances of const mint, 
 cannot be received when obtaiiu d by ///rr/r// duress ; ^ but are 
 adiuissiblo, at least on tlie trial of civil acticms," if the compulsion 
 unihfr which they were made was legal. Thus affidavits sworn by 
 a party in former legal proceedings, answers filed by him in 
 Chancery in a former suit, evidence given uy him in au action at 
 law, or his examination taken in bankrup-tcy, will be evidence 
 against himself in a subsecpient cause. They, under these circum- 
 Btances, are admissible even though the 8ub.se4ueut opponent was a 
 
 !■'<) I 
 
 ' Thi-uhMiuddoctrinoof "BeienttT, ' 
 as ii|i|>li('<ili!t! to uiiscliicvoiiH ilo^^i ■>(> 
 l(»ii;.'iT pit'vuils in ItM fiitirL'fy. In 
 Jri'laiid, '• till) owner of cvciy ilo<j is 
 liiilil'- ill iliiiiii'i,'!!-* ior injury <l(iU(! to 
 uny ^/i"/' liy lii-i <lo;,'," wi.etln'r sucli 
 do;; Itc inisiliii'voiis or not : 'lit \' -'<i 
 V. c. .»!» ("Tlui l)o;,'« (Ircliuid) Ai't, 
 IhirJ "), § I, Ir. Slit), also, I'M it J!» 
 V. c. .)0, Ir. A Hoincwliat similar 
 anxiulnirnt of t!io luw has liccn in- 
 tro lined infi: ivn^laiid and Scotlimd, 
 onil lias lieon extended in tlu'socoun ' 
 tries to inpuies euitsed l>y doj^s to 
 «/,n;. or riiill,-; '.'(> iV •-'" V. c. 101) 
 ("Tlie I)o;{s (Scotland) Art. IHU.'J"), 
 I 1, «c. ; 26 & 2U V. c. (iO (^"The 
 
 5 
 
 "oRsAct, lS(i.)"). Tilt) word "ciittlo" 
 heio used iucluiles horses; Wriglit v, 
 IVarson, iMii). 
 
 ■ (iie-oiy V. Howard, 18()() (Ld. 
 Kenyou); Slack r. liuchannun, 1T(*U 
 (id.). 
 
 ' Fid. Mldon's Life, hv Twiss, vol. 
 ii. jpi). -I'M -IVi, 'Jiid edit. 
 
 * (ir. l'',v. § n».>. in part. 
 
 » Stoekllrt'h r. DeTasti't, ISl I (Ld. 
 I'lllenlioroufjh); I!o1)m)U i\ AlexaiidiT, 
 IH'.'M. As to what (|Ue>tioiis ii wit- 
 ness may refuse to answer, 8t>o post, 
 
 §^ ll.").'i et se(|. 
 
 • As to their adniissiliility in 'Timl- 
 in// pi-oufodings, r;cu pvj.-t, J§ fcOfl— 
 
 IG 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS MADE UNDER CONSTRAINT. 
 
 utraTiger to the prior proceeding,' — tliougli the party who made tho 
 admit^sion might, had ho thought fit, have siiccessfidly demurred to 
 <he questions,'- — or though tho questions were irrelevant to the 
 matter before tho court at tlie time of the examination, and were 
 l)ut for the purpose of procuring evidence in another action 
 depending against him,' — or thougli tlie witness had no oppor- 
 tunity of fully exjdaining the testimony ho had given. For 
 example, in an action^ for taking the plaintill's ship, the teslipiony 
 given by the defendant as a witness in an action between other 
 ]»arties, in which he admitted tlie taking of the ship, was idlowed 
 to be proved against him, though it appeared that when, in giving 
 his eviilence, ho was proceeding to state his reasons for taking tho 
 ship, the judge had stopped him by saying that it was unnecessary 
 for him to vindicate his conduct ; and where a defendant had been 
 examined in bankruptcy, and, though the whole of what he said 
 had not been taken down, the portion that was reduced to writing 
 had been read over and signed by him, such portion was held to be 
 receivable against him as a statement of facts, the truth of which 
 he had admitted.* 
 
 § 7!)9. An admission, obtained un<ler a conijiulsory examination, 
 may, it is submitted," be evidence of an (ircottiif xfafai. If, for 
 instance, an admission were contained in an answer to interro- 
 gatories, it would most probably be regarded as good evidence of 
 an account stated.' 
 
 § 8(i0.* Passing now to a consideration of the nfttiire of ailmis- 
 sions, it may bo ohscrved that no diffenMico exists, in regard to 
 their admissibility, between direct admissions, and those which are 
 
 ' Grant v. Jucksnn, 1"!>:{ (I-il. Ken- 
 yon); Afhuioror. lIanly,l«H(J(l'iitto- 
 Min. J.). 
 
 - Smith /•. HfiulncU, 1807 (I.<1. 
 I'illc'iilinnmjrli). 
 
 ' Stoukllutli V. Do Taslct, IHIJ. 
 If an t'xuniiniitinn has hfcii jht- 
 vi'itt'il to iinpnipi'i' i)nri)i).-<'s, tlw 
 rcnii'dy is by an ajijilicatimi f<> liavc 
 thiM'xaniiiiation (akcn from lln' lilt'^* 
 uiid cancelled (l,d. Mlleiilioroujjli'. 
 
 ' Collett V. 1,(1. Keitll, lH(i;l (l,e 
 I'.laiic. .1.). 
 
 ■ Mil ward I'. Foibort, INO') (I,d. 
 I'.lli'lihorouull). 
 
 ' Tho contrary has been snpposi d, 
 but til" case ill \vhi<'ii tliis jioinrr 
 arose |irol)iilily restM on tlii^ j^roind 
 tliat the iidiiiis-ioii was flure niiiclo 
 to a thud ]iaity (Tucker c, Harrow, 
 ls2N ;l,itth'>iale, .).)), while to h;ij)- 
 jiort an account stated the udiuission 
 must be made, either to tlie person 
 to whom the money is owin^, or to 
 Homeiine sent by him : Itieckon e. 
 Smith. IN.M; ItateH v. Townh-v, 
 IKIS. 
 
 ' See MateH V. Towiiloy, 184!* 
 (Ahh-rs!.n, II. \ 
 
 - (ir. Kv. § nil, in paii. 
 
 617 
 
NATUUE OF ADMISSIONS — DIRECT — INCIDENTAL, [p. III. 
 
 I 1 ii 
 
 V' mj 
 
 I ':•' 
 
 k! 
 
 iuci(h'uf(il, or made in some other connexion, or involved in the 
 admission of some otlier fact. One or two illustrations of this have 
 already been noticed while treating of admissions made by soli- 
 citors,' and the following may here bo added. In an action by the 
 assignees of a Lunkruiit against an auctioneer to recover the 
 ])roceeds of a sale of tho bankru[it'8 goods, the defendant's adver- 
 tisement of the sale, describing the goods as " the projterty of D., 
 a bankrupt," was held to be a conclusive admission that D. was a 
 bankrupt, and that the defendant was acting under his assignees ; "^ 
 and a party who, with a view of mnking a trader a bankrupt, had 
 made an allidavit that the trader owed him 100/., and was become 
 baukruiit, was not allowed to dispute the bankruptcy, when after- 
 waids sued in trover by the assignees.'' 
 
 ?i SOI."* Admissions are sometimes iinplivd from the assiimplioii 
 or the rrrni/iiifion of a chnrnctor. Whenever the existence of ny 
 domestic, social, or official relation is in issue, any recognition, 
 whether by word or deed, of that relation, is prima facie evidence 
 of its existence, as against tho person making such recognition.'* 
 Thus, where one has (insitnicil to nvf in (in ii/ficiti/ c/inrnrfcr, this is an 
 admission by him of his appointment or title to the office, so far as 
 to render him liable, even criminally, for misconduct or neglect in 
 6uch office." This doctrine has been applied, among other cases, in 
 actions or prosecutions against clerg^'men, for non-residence;' 
 agiiinst military officers, for returning false musters;^ against 
 j'Opish [iriests, for remaining forty days within tho kingdom, when 
 this was considered an offence of no less magnitude than high 
 treason ; ' against letter-carriers, for embezzlement ; "" and against 
 eolicitors," toll-gatherers,'^ and collectors,'*' for penalties. 
 
 ' Ante, § 773, 
 
 ' Maltlty V. Clnintio, 179j, as ox- 
 
 tlaiiicd (lid. Klli'uhoroiif^h) in Han- 
 iii r. lloiii.T, IHl'.', 
 ' l..'ilhclt.T M. SiiU, 1S28; IlaiintT 
 t'. Ihivis, 1.S17. Mot) poHt, § Hj(), ad 
 fin. 
 
 * (Jr. l',v. § 19<>. in jiart. 
 ' hickitiso'n V. ('..ward, 181M (Ld. 
 
 I'llli ii1hh(i\i;;1iJ ; rccojj^nizi'd (Lil. 
 TiVndlmi'st) in Infills v. Sponco, 
 
 l^<;tl. 
 
 • iSno ante, § 171. 
 
 ' Bovan v. Williams, 1776 (Ld. 
 Manslinhr. 
 
 « It. I'. Gardner, 1810 {lA. Ellen - 
 b(>ronjj:li). 
 
 » 1{. r. K.'rni!, Unit; R. v. Broni- 
 niich. I(i7i); K. v. Atkins, 1(J7!>. 
 
 '" 11. r. IJoirott, l.s;j;i (Littl.idalo 
 and H()xan<ini't, .FJ. ; Itolland, B.). 
 Thu jirisnncr was indi(;tc'd under 
 2 \V. l, c. 4, now ro))t'aUid by 24 iSc 
 2.") V, c. !»,i, 
 
 " ("rosH /•. Kiivo, 17!l(i, 
 
 '•' Tio\vl)iid!r<'V. I'.iik.T, lK23(Am.) 
 
 " i<istt;r l: i'rifBlly, ISIO. 
 
 518 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
CHAP. IX.] RECOGNITION OF CHARACTER OF OTHERS. 
 
 § 802. Again, whore a man lias recofjnised the official character of 
 another, by treating with him in such character or otherwise, this is 
 at least prima facie evidence of his title against the party thus 
 recognising it.^ For instance, where a person had obtained 
 credit from the renter of turnpike tolls, and had afterwards 
 accounted with him in that character, and made him a partial 
 payment, he was not permitted to question the legality of his 
 ap[iointment ; * where a farmor-genernl of post-horse duties 
 brought an action for certain statute penalties against a person 
 who let out horses for hire, proof of plaintiff's appointment was 
 waived, the defendant having previously accounted with him as 
 famier-goneral ; ' the clerk of the trustees of a turnpike road has 
 been prevented from r-howing that a person who had acted as a 
 trustee, and whom he had himself, while clerk, treated as such, 
 was not duly qualified ; ■* in an actioii by the trustee of a bankrupt 
 against a debtor, who has made him a purtial payment,* or has 
 acknowledged his title in letters to the solicitor under the bank- 
 ruijtcy," the plaintifE need not prove his title as trustee, though 
 notice to dispute it has been given ; in an action by a solicitor for 
 defamation, in charging him with swindling, and threatening to 
 have him struck off the rolls, this threat was held to imply an 
 admission that the plaintiff was a solicitor ; ' and in a similar 
 action by a physician, where the plaintiff was spoken of as 
 " Doctor L.," and the defendant had, as an apothecary, made up 
 medicines prescribed by him, the Court of Common I'loas was 
 equally divided upon the question, wliether the defendant's words 
 and conduct amounted to an acknowledgment of the plaintiff's 
 character.* In actions of this kind, however, if the words com- 
 plained of charge a uant of qualification and not mere misc(mduct, 
 the plaintiff must prove that ho posse8.«es the diaracter which has 
 been impugned." 
 
 ^ S0;{. Thus, in an action by a surgeon for work and labour, 
 
 ' I'.MKOrk l\ IIlMTis, 1808. 
 
 * S('t> iiiitt', §§ 1".'{ ' 17o. 
 
 » IJadfoid r. M'lnt.ish. 1700. 
 
 ♦ rritclmnl v. Walker, 1827 
 (ViiU(xhim, H.). 
 
 * Itickiiison r. Cdwiird, 1818. 
 
 • Iiiglis i'. fjiuact), \M\ ; Crofton 
 
 V. I'dolo, ih;jo. 
 
 ' ItcriTiiiuii i\ Wiso, 17!M. 
 
 • Smith i\ Tnylcir, IHOJ; Sir J. 
 MiiiiNlioliI mill Iji'itth, iT.,iilV., ]{<)(ikn 
 ami Cliiiiiibni, J.F., neg. 
 
 • 111. ; ('i)lliiiM (1. Camcgio, IMM 
 (Lit. l>('iiiiiau). 
 
 61!) 
 
ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT. [PART III, 
 
 
 where' the defence was that the plaintiff was a physician, and 
 therefore incapable, by the law then in force,'" of maintaining an 
 action for fees, it having besn shown that the ])laintiff had written 
 prescriptions and signed hiniself M.D., Lord EUiMiborough was on 
 the point of nonsuiting him— saying that " if a person passes 
 himself off as u physician, ho miisi take tlie character cum onere" — 
 when it ajipeand that the defendant liad paid money into court ; 
 on this, his lordship thought tluit this act was tantamount to an 
 admis>ion >u the phiiutiff's right to sue as a surgeon, and got over 
 the objecition. 
 
 S S04.'- Admissions may (as has already been mentioned wliile 
 treating of presumptions'') be implied from the coiKliicf of the 
 party. Thus, an attemjtt by a plaintiff to suborn false witnesses is 
 cogent evidence that his cause is an unrighteous one;'* the sujjpres- 
 sion of documents is an admission that the contents were deemed 
 uufavoural'le to the party supfiressing them ; ^ tlie entry of a charge 
 to a j)iirticular person in a tradesman's book, or the making out of 
 a bill of parcels in his name, is an admission that the goods were 
 furnished on his credit ; " the delivery, by a tradesman, of an 
 invoice or account in whieli goods are deserihed as bonght from 
 hira, is strong, but not conclusive, evidence that he was the real 
 vendor ; ' the omission of a claim in a sclieJule of the debts due to 
 the framer of it, which is given on oath, is an admission that such 
 debt is not duo ; * and payment of money is an admission against 
 the payer, that the receiver is the proper person to receive it, — 
 
 ' Lipscoinbo r. llolmos, 1810. Sw, 
 furtliiT, (111 this 8ul)j<'i'i, \l. V. l>iini(3s, 
 ISI'!; Ciiinmin ('. siaitli, IHKi^Am.); 
 Divoll c. Iiciiill)cttia-. lM2«i(.\m.). 
 
 i« Sfo now '21 i^i '11 V. 0. !M), § ;{1 ; 
 (Jil)')iiii i\ llinlil. lS(i:{; imd hye-liiw 
 (if 'hi' Unviil (Julli';;(i of I'liysiciiiiis, 
 thiit. no FilltiH! i\i tliii Colli'^"' sliiill 
 bt! ontilli'il ID suo for ffes. This bj-c- 
 lii.v, it will Im ohsoi'vixl, (loi'S not 
 oxtiMiij to oi'.liiuiiy iiiniilicri of tlio 
 Colli'^i'. iiml si'cli |)mMi>ns iiiiiy now 
 sno hv virtlio of the Medical .Vet. 
 
 ' (Jr. \'W. § 1!»IJ. in jKirt. 
 
 ^ Aiitf, $§ Ml7, llii. 117, ITS, j.').5. 
 
 * Moiiiuty V, Lontl. Clmt. & I). 
 Kiiil. Co., 1^70. 
 
 » Juiuu» V. Uiou, anil Owon v. 
 
 Ki.ick, 18'.>(5; Ui-U v. rrankis, 1812; 
 (.'uricwis ('. CoifiHld, 1811; I'liftou 
 IK U. S., 181(5 f.Vm.); U. r. J.oud. 
 HriKht. & S. Cimst Kiiil. Co., 18Jl 
 {('oli'rid;^(\ J.); Sutton r. Dovoii- 
 l)ort, 18.'i7 ; Kduionda v, Foster, 
 187.>. 
 
 ' .Storr c. Scott, is.'J.'J (|,d. Tivnii- 
 hurst). Sou Thomsou c. l)iiven|)iii't, 
 1820. 
 
 ' IFoldin'j; i-. Elliott, \HoO. .See 
 post, § 1 1. ■).'!. 
 
 * In N'icholls r. DowncB, \>,M), Ld. 
 Tentcrdcii hold it to bo conrbisivo, 
 iippiircntly (|o('stioiiiny; lliiit c. Ncw- 
 nnin, 1811, where lA. Mlli-iilioroiiKh 
 troiitt'd it lis cntitli'd to little weij^ht. 
 Sco Tilyiuniiu c. Fiwliur, 1840 (Am.), 
 
 m 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT. 
 
 although not against the receiver, that the payer was the person 
 who was bound to pay it ; for the party receiving payment of a 
 just demand may well assume, without inquiry, that the party- 
 tendering the money was the person legally bound to pay it.* 
 
 H i<0o. Admissions from conduet may also arise in settlement 
 cases. Thus, relief given at various times to a pauper while he is 
 residing in fiuotlicr parish, is cogent, though not conclusive, ovideuce 
 that liH is settled in the relieving parish.^ 
 
 i^ ^00. Admissions by ooiulaot also arise in actions connected 
 with bills of exohange. Thus, a distinct promise by the drawer 
 to pay, or indeed any anknowleJgment by him of liability upon, a 
 dishonoured bill, — as, for example, the suffering judgment by 
 default in a prior action, brought by a former holder of the instru- 
 ment, — w'U raise an inference that he has either received o" 
 waived due notice of dishonour,' and, in the case of a foreign bill, 
 that it has been duly protested;* and a jury will be justified in 
 coming to the same conclusion on less positive evidence ; as, for 
 instance, if the drawer, in disclaiming liability when threatened 
 with an action, did not rest his defence on the want of notice, but 
 on some different ground.* The maxim, expressum facit cessare 
 
 ' Jamos V. Biou, 1826; CbapL.un 
 V. Bounl, 1707. 
 
 ' U. V. Burnsley, 1813 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough) ; R. V. WakoHold, 1804; 
 11. V. Stanley cum Wrenthorpe, 
 1812; K. V. East Winch, 1840; R. 
 r. Yarwoll, 1829; R. v. Carnarvon- 
 shire JJ., 1S41. Formerly the roliof 
 must have bwin pivon by the church- 
 wardens and oversowrs in order to 
 furnish evidence against tiie parish, 
 but the board of miiirdians now rc- 
 priwont for this purpose every parish 
 witliin the luiion (see 11. v, Cron- 
 dall, 1847); and the clerk to the 
 guardians n^jjri'nenfs the board (R. 
 V. Wiffan, 184!>). Even a sinjfie iii- 
 fitaiico of such relief having boon 
 given will warrant a similar conclu- 
 sion (R. V. Edwinstowo, 1828). Of 
 course, the elVect of such ovidonco 
 will Ihj much stronger if the exinni- 
 natioii statt'sa distinct head of Lcttlo- 
 inent in the rtilieving parish, thuu .di 
 
 the technical proof may fail to esta- 
 blish it satisfactorily (R. v, Bnding- 
 ham, 18H (Ld. Donman)). On the 
 other hand, the relief of a pauper, 
 while residing in the relienini/ parish, 
 is no evidence whatev^jr of a settle- 
 ment, however frequently it may 
 have boon bestowed: R. v. Chatham, 
 1807 ; R. V. Trowbridge, 1827; R. v. 
 Coleorton, 18:{(t; R. v. St. Giles-in- 
 the- Fields, 1841. 
 
 » Kabey c. Gilbert, 18(51 ; "Woods 
 1'. Dean, lH(i2; Cordery '•. Colvin, 
 18();l; Kiliby v. Rochussin. \HIW). 
 
 * lli.ks i'". L>. of Ueaiitnit, IS.JS; 
 rampbi'll I'. Webster, I84,j; Patter- 
 son r. HccUer, 1821 ; Brownoll ><. 
 ]\i>uno.y, 1841; Fardoo d. O'Connor, 
 1848 (Ir.). See Boll /'. Frankis, 1H42; 
 Ilolnu'; i\ Staines, 18.'»0. 
 
 » Wilkins r. Jadis, 1831 (Ld. T.n- 
 terden); Curlcwis v. CorfielJ, 1841. 
 See ante, § 7UG. 
 
 521 
 
 
ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT. fPART III. 
 
 i: 
 
 I I 
 
 hM 
 
 ^\k 
 
 K 
 
 taciturn, will here raise a presumption, which a defendant may Bud 
 it difficult to rebut. 
 
 § 807. Again : conduct may create a waiver of a determination 
 of the relationship of landlord and tenant, which has previously 
 been brought a>'out by forfeiture, under the terms of the holding, 
 or by notice to quit. Such determination is waived by the land- 
 lord's suing,' or distraining,- for rent accruing due since a forfeiture 
 of which the lessor iias had notice, as also by the acceptance of such 
 rent,' and perhaps by even the mere demand of it,* — unless, indeed, 
 an action to recover the property has actually been brought 
 previously.^ For those acts amount to an acknowledgment of the 
 tenancv on tlie pait of the lessor." If, however, a breach be a 
 continuing one, as the using rooms in a prohibited manner, or the 
 omitting to keep premises insured or repaired, the acc('i)tance of 
 rent after such breach will not waive the forfeiture incurred by 
 subsequent user or omission.' A notice to quit will also in general 
 be regarded as waived, if the landlord anrpfn rent subsequently 
 accruing due, or puts in a distres.s for .such rent, or does any otlur 
 act amounting to a rocognition of an existing tenancy, after the 
 oxpiiatiou of the time when the tenant ought to have quitted 
 according to the notice.** Wht^tlier a simple denutml of rent subse- 
 quently accruing due, or the bringing of an action for such rent, 
 will operate as a waiver of a notice to quit, is a question not of law, 
 
 h ;l; 
 
 ' Kno V. Minshiil, 17.')9: Dnndy '•. 
 Nioholl, IHolS. Seo Tok'inim v. I'ort- 
 Imrv, 1!S72. 
 
 ■•'"Don V. r.rk. 18:U); Cotoswortli 
 r. S]iukfs, ISiil ; Ward i\ Diiy. I.s<i4. 
 
 •' WiirwicU r. JioHii.T, lS,-)0 (I,il. 
 Truro, C.) : Crol't »: I,uiiil(!V, IH.m-S, 
 11. L. : I'rici) c. Worwooil. lHo<»; 
 lliivinjxirt *•. The (iudcu. 1S77, 1'. T. 
 Sec Jv'tMii i\ Miscoo, liS78. 
 
 * Doo I', r.inli, ISiJt). 
 
 ° (iiiiinvcKMl c. Mdss, 1872. 
 
 " Gooihivjlit '•. l»iivitlH. 1778; Wal- 
 nmil ('. lliiwkins, l.s7o; Koo r. lliini- 
 wiii, 178H; l»<ic /■. Alli!ii, 1810; Doo 
 '. Hci's, is;!8 ; Anihlty I'. Woothviinl, 
 1H27. In Inland, however, it has 
 now for some yi'iirw boon providod 
 l.y statuto(-j:S & 24 V. c. l.)4. § 4:») 
 iliat where uuy lease, made after the 
 
 1st of Jaimary. 18()1, shall contain 
 or ini])ly any condition, covenant, or 
 a^^'rt'cnicnt to ho oh'^orvod or por- 
 fornicd on the jiart of thi> tenant, no 
 act done or sutfered hy tlie landlord 
 shall h(! deemed a dispensation tliero- 
 with, or a waiver of the lienetit of 
 tiio sani" in respect of any hreach 
 thereof, iiidess such dispensation or 
 w. liver shall he si.Miitied hy the 
 landlord, or hi-i autliorizod agent, 
 in wi'itin;? under his hand. 
 
 ' Uoo i\ Woodi,ri(U'e, 18.!!»: Doe 
 V, I'eck. ' i(»; Hyde v. Watts. 1H4;1; 
 i'rico r. Worwooil, 18.')!) ; Doe u, 
 niadwin, l8|i'); Doo c. Jones, I8<j(). 
 Seo jiost, § 847. 
 
 " /oucli c. \Villinf,'ule. K'.H); Oood- 
 right u. ('ordwt.'ut, 17!l'>; Doe v. 
 Hatton, 1775 ; Doe c. Culvert, 1810. 
 
 622 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS IMPLL:D PROM ACQUIKSCENCE. 
 
 but of fact, which must consequently ho determined hy the jury.' 
 When a valid notice to quit^ has had the legal effect of determiuiiig 
 a tenancy, the waiver of such notice does not revive the tenancy 
 thus determined, but creat'^s a now one.' 
 
 § 808. To the instances above mentioned, in which the common 
 law infers a waiver of the determination of a tenancy by conduct, 
 must be added a case in which the TjPgislature * has provided a 
 conclusive inference from particular conduct. For it has provided 
 that if a lease granted under a powei- be invalid by reasou of some 
 deviation from the terms of the power, the acceptance of rent under 
 it shall be deemed a confirmation of the lease as against the person 
 iiccepting the rent ; provided such person, or some one else by his 
 authority, shall, before or at tlie time of accepting the rent, sign a 
 receipt, memorundum, or note in writing, confirming such lease. 
 
 S 809.' Admissions may also be implied from the acqiuon't'inr of 
 tlio party. Acquiescence, to have the effect of an admission, must 
 exhibit some act of the mind, and amount to voluntary demeanour 
 or conduct of the party.*' And whether it be acquiescence in the 
 conduct or in the language of others, it must plainly appc ar tliat 
 such conduct was fully known, or such language fully understood, 
 by the party, before any inference can be drawn from his passive- 
 ness or silence.' The circumstances, too, must be u^ nly such as 
 afforded him an opportunity to act or to speak, but such also us 
 would properly and naturally call for some action or repl^' from 
 men similarly situated.* Examples of ac(]uiescence are as follows. 
 As between laudlonl and tenant, a landlord quietly suffenng a 
 tenant to expend money in making altciations and improvements 
 on the premises, is evidence of his consent to the alterations ; '•• and 
 
 ' IJlytli j;. Dcniiott, 18.)3; Doo w. 
 l?iitton, 17"j; Vuiico v. Vuiico, 1871 
 
 (Ir.)- 
 ' Sec Holme i'. Uniiiskill, 1S77, 
 
 0. A. ; Aliourn v. liolhnun, lb7i», 
 
 C. A. 
 
 » Tavlfur v. Wildin, 186S. 
 
 • lJyl;J & 14 V. c. 17, §2. 
 
 • 1 Gr. Kv. § 107, ill j^ioat part. 
 
 • AlUm I'. McKccn, ls:t:{ (Am.). 
 
 ' Soo Smitli i\ lliiyi'y, lHf)7 (Ir.) ; 
 IJuvicB 1'. Miir.xhall, 18G1 ; Bickott c. 
 Morria, IbUU, U. L. 
 
 " R. V. ifitclu'll. 1802: ^[.■loI, ,., 
 Aiidli'ws, ISJil; ('xpliiilicil in Siiri]i- 
 sou ('. l{ol)ins()ii, ISIS (1,(1, ])i'niii:ui); 
 i{. ('. Xtnvmiiu, lS,j2; Hovil ''. Itiil- 
 toii. ISI 1 (Ir.). Sou Bigjj' V. Strung, 
 1S,)7. 
 
 » Doo I'. Allen, 1810; Doe v. I've, 
 179j (fid. Kciivon); Noulo v. Puikiii, 
 179.) (ill.). See, also, .Stiinlctv u. 
 White, 1811; Cotchiii}? v. Ha'ssct. 
 18()2. But merely lyinj; liy iiiul 
 im.asivoly wilucssiuj^ a hreacli iif 
 cuveiiuut lor hovuiuI years iu uut 
 
 623 
 
ADMISSIONS IMPLIED FROM ACQUIESCENCE. [pART HI. 
 
 a tenant who, on pemonallif receiving notice to quit on a particular 
 day, makes no objection, will generally, in England,' be deemed to 
 liave admitted that his tenancy expires on that day ; ** but if he 
 cannot read, or even if he did not read the notice in the presence 
 of the person serving it upon him, it will be trciited as a notice not 
 jiersonally served, and will go for nothing.-" For the purposes of 
 the bankruptcy laws, a debtor wbo hears liimself inquired for and 
 denied, thereby furnishes some evidence against himself that he 
 is beginning to keep house with intent to defeat or delay his 
 creditors, and, consequently, is committing an &' of bankruptcy.' 
 In general, wherever one knowingly avails hiis " ci inother's 
 acts done for his benefit, the jury will be justified i co it dering 
 such conduct as an admission of his obligation to paj a reas .v:Me 
 compensation.* Thus it was held that an executor who, having 
 been served with notice of motion to pay into court part of the 
 testator's estate, which was sworn by affidavit to have reached his 
 hands, had, by his silence, and by refraining from disputing the 
 facts deposed to, made a sufficient admission of their truth to 
 justify the making of the order.* And where two brothers, 
 claiming derivative settlements from their father, having been 
 removed by successive orders, and the examination of the 
 father proving his settlement having been served upon the appel- 
 lants together with the firt^t order, against wliich tliere was no 
 appeal, the fact of the appellants not objecting to the ground of 
 
 such an acquiescence as to amount 
 to a waiver of the forfeiture : Doe v, 
 Allen, 1«10; Perry »,'. Davis, 1858; 
 Macaulav v. Robertson, l>S8G(Ir.); 
 But see Iveatinfjw. Bolton, 1887 (Ir.), 
 and also ante, § 808. 
 
 ' The Irish law is regulated, in 
 part, by § G of 23 & 24 V. c. 154, 
 which enacts that "every tenancy 
 from year to year shall be presumed 
 to have commenced on the last gale 
 day of t!.e calendar year on which 
 rent has become duo and payuble in 
 respect of the premises, until it shall 
 appear to the contrary;" and, in 
 l)art. by § 58 of 3;J & 34 V. c. 46. 
 
 ^ Doe V. Biggs, 180!); Thomas v. 
 Thomas, 1811; Doe v. Forstor, 
 1811; Oakapple v. Copous, 1791; 
 
 Doe V. Wombwell, ISll (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough). See Walker v. Qode, 
 18(51. 
 
 >» Doe V. Calvert, 1810 (Ld. Ellen- 
 borough), explained Thomas v. 
 Thomus, 1811; ])()o v. Forster, 
 1811. 
 
 ' Key r. Sliaw, 1832. See 4G & 47 
 V. c. 52. §4, subs. 1 (F)). 
 
 * In Morris v. Buidttt, 1808 (Ld. 
 EUenborough), a candidate not bf)und 
 by statute to piy for the hii>tiiigs 
 erected for an electio!i, bad made use 
 of them. In Abl>ot v. IL inion, 1830 
 (Am.), a schoolimuso had been used 
 by the school district: Ilaydon v, 
 Madison. lS;iO (Am.). 
 
 » Freeman i'. Cox, 1878 (Jessel, 
 M.R.); Hampden r.Wttllis, 1884, C. A. 
 
 624 
 
 P 
 
CHAP. IX.] NOr OBJECTING TO ACCOUNTS SENT BY POST. 
 
 removal when they received the first sf>n, was lielil sHglit evidonce 
 of an admission that the father was settled in their parish.' 
 
 § 810. There, moreover, may, as between debtor and creditor, 
 also be admissions by conduct. Thus, raising an objection to one 
 item of an account and making no remark as to the rest, will be 
 evidence of an account stated as to those items to which no objec- 
 tion has been made;* and, (itnoiuj iiirrr/imifs, an aceoniit rendered 
 will V)e regarded as allt)wed, if it be not objected to within a second 
 or third pust,^ or, at least, if it be kept for any length of time 
 without making an objection.'' Ordinary accounts which have 
 been sent by letter are not admissible against him, as evidence that 
 he had acquiesced in their contents, merely because they have been 
 kept by the addressee without remark.* But what a party sni/s 
 when an account is delivered to him by hand, or upon a statement 
 made in his presence, may be given in evidence against him along 
 with the account or statement, becanse what is thus offered is the 
 act or declaration of the party to be affected by it, and the account 
 or the statement is by reference made a part of such act or decla- 
 ration ; though here, again, the naked fact that an account remains 
 in the possession of a party to whom it was sent, does not amount 
 to an acquiescence in its contents.* 
 
 § 811. Lord Tenterden remarked' that " what is said to a man 
 before his face, he is in some degree called on to contradict, if he 
 does not acquiesce in it ; but the not answering a letter is quite 
 different ; and it is too much to say, that a man, by omitting to 
 answer a letter at all events, admits the truth of the statements 
 that letter contains." A later case in the Court of Appeal also 
 supports this view,* and it appears to be the law.^ Lord Denman 
 
 > R. V. Sow, 1843. 
 » Cliisiuiiii V. Count, 1841. 
 ^ ."^lieniiiin v. Slicniiun, 1787 
 (Iliitfliins, Jid. Com.). 
 
 * Willis V. Joiiiegim, 1741 {I A. 
 lliinlwirke) ; Tickel v. Slioit, I'M 
 (ill.), wIr'Io the account had boon 
 kcjjt without objection for two years. 
 
 » Price V. Kainsay, 1840 (In). 
 
 • I'lico V. Jiain'say, I8i0 (Ir.) 
 (lluslio. C.J.). 
 
 ' in l-'uirlie v. Donton, 1828. 
 
 * Wiedt-nian v. Walpolo, 1891. 
 
 • However, in OaokiU v. ykeene, 
 
 18.i7, the (iuecii's Hcnch lii'ld, tliat 
 letters conlainin}^ a di'iiiaiid, wiittiMi 
 to a di'l'i'iKJaiit, and unanswered by 
 him, were admissilde in evid(n<'e for 
 tlie |daiiitilT, thoiij^li tliey also stated 
 facts siiowinj; lunv the demand aroso ; 
 but i)o>Hil)ly that case rested on tho 
 grouiul, that the defeiaiant had made 
 sonm nnsatisfactorj' statemi'nts re- 
 spectinj; theso letters, in a subso- 
 queiit conversation willi tho plain- 
 titV's ajjent. On this last {;;round 
 luianswered letters written to a farty 
 have been udniittud us oviduncu iu 
 
;■• ri 
 
 .1/',. 
 
 IV <|. 
 
 EFFECT OF NOT ANSWERING LETTERS. [PART IH. 
 
 too, once doelarod, that " it was a great deal too broad a proposition 
 to Bay. that every paper wliich a man might hold, purporting to 
 cliarg)> him with a debt or liability, was evidence against him if he 
 l)r(Kluf'e(l it." ' 
 
 5i 812. An admission by conduct may, too, be made by being 
 found in possession of lt'tt(!r8 and other papers, as it is a primA 
 faeio inference that the jierson in whose possession tliey are found 
 knows their contents and has acted upon them.^ Such evidence is 
 occasionally available in a civil suit.* It is freipiently received in 
 criminal prosecutions, especially those for conspiracy and treason, 
 though its weight, as evidence against the prisoner, will in a great 
 measure depend on the fact, whether answers to the lett(;rs or 
 papers can be traced, or whether anything can be shown to have 
 been done upon them.'' The mere ^ opportunity of constant access 
 to documents may, indeed, sometimes, by raising a presumption 
 that their contenta are known, afford ground for all'ecting parties 
 with an implied admission of the truth or correctness of such 
 contents.* Thus, the rules of a club, or a record of the proceedings 
 of a society, contained in a hook kept by the proper officer and 
 accessible to the members," — charges against a club, entered by the 
 servants of the liouse in a book kept for tliat pm'pose oj)en in the 
 club- room," and the like, — are admissible against the members ; 
 their knowleilge of the cout(Uits of the books, and their a<'(juies- 
 cence therein, being itnsuuiablo under the circumstances. On 
 similar grounds, books of account which liave been kept between 
 master aiid servant, tradesman and sliopnian, banker and customer, 
 oi co-piirtners, will occiisionally be admitted as evidence even in 
 favoui of the party by whom they have been written, ])rovi(le(l 
 that the opposite parly has had ample ojiportunities from time to 
 time foi- testing tlic aciiuraey of the entries." 
 
 Amorioa: DuUon r. Wondinaii. IS.VJ * Seo, Iiowcvcr, T^illlIn:n■k'^^ case, 
 
 (Am.). Si'f, also, Kci^ii r. l'i'n>st, 1S7«S, C. A.; (lisappritviii;.'!!!' Wlii-at- 
 
 l.s.'iiS; I.iii y '■. Mtiiilli't, lS(iO; Caviio tiolt's rasf, lsT3 ; ami J'^x partu 
 
 '•. St(«T. l.sdd; and (Joro c. Ilawsoy, liiowii, IS,) J. 
 
 IS()2 (Martin, 15.;. « lfa--olt r. Mtis-ravc, 1H27 
 
 ' In l)()i' c. Fiaiikin, IWd. (Abliott, ('..!.); AIiIimmiu v. flay, 
 
 ••' ILnvitt r. J'i;:.u(ilt, hs;n. 181(1 (I-c). Kllfiil>onm},'ii) ; Ashjiit'ul 
 
 =• K. r. Ildiiii' Todko, 17JM (Eyre, v. Sercoiiilxs lsr»(). 
 
 r.J.); ]{, V. Watson, ISlT. ' Wiltzic c. Atlamson, 17WI. 
 
 * Ur. liv. § 1118, in i)art. * Symouds v. Gas Light uud Coke 
 
 626 
 
ClI. IX.] SILENCE OF ACCUSED IN JUDICIAL INQUIRIES. 
 
 § 813.' Admissions are too, sometimes, inferred from ncquicHceme 
 in the oral sfatnin'iifx of otlivrn. At the same time the maxim, (iui 
 tocet consentiro vidotur, — liowevor it may be recognised by the 
 lover, — must bo applied by the lawyer with careful discrimination. 
 " Nothing," it has been observed, " can be more dangerous tlian 
 this kind of evicb^nce. It should always l)o ro(!eived with caution ; 
 and never oixght to bo received at all, unless tlie evidence is of 
 direct declarations of that kind which naturally calls for contra- 
 diction — some assertions mado to the party with resjjcct to his 
 right, which by his silence he acquiesces in." ' A ilistinrtion has 
 accordingly been taken hetircrn (Icclarntioiix mado by a parfif 
 iittcresfcd and those made hj/ a Htraiifjer ; and wliile what one jtarty 
 declares to the other without contradiction is admissible evidence, 
 what is said to a party by a third person may well bo ina<lmissible. 
 It may be imijcrtincnt, and be best rebuked by silence.' Still less 
 will statements made by strangers in the presence of a party be 
 receivable against him, if they be not (linrth/ (ittdirnsitl to him ; 
 because, in such case, he can scarcely under any circumstances be 
 called upon to interfere.^ 
 
 § 814. Moreover, to affect one person with the statements of 
 others, on the ground of his implied admission of their truth by 
 silent acquiescence, it is not enough that they were made in his 
 presence, or even to liimself, by parties interested, but they must 
 also have boon made on an orc/tsioii ir/ini a rrjthi from Iiiiii n'lii/Zif Itc 
 proptr/i/ cxiicrtcd} Depo.sitions, therefore, taken in the prt'scncc of 
 a party during a judicial investigation, observations made by a 
 mtigistrate to the parties before him, and confessions of an accom- 
 plice criminating his co-prisoner before the justices, will not, in 
 general," be evidence in any subsecpient trial, whether civil or 
 criminal, against the part}' who heard thenx in silence ; because in 
 
 \ 
 
 Co., ISIS; liounlinan v. Jackson. • Tliis cuiuint lii> laicl down as a 
 
 1H1;{ (ir.); Kilbco v. Sney.l, IS.'S strict vnh' of law iippliciihli- on all 
 
 (Ir.); I.o(!p( /•■ I'lichai'cl. iS.j.'J; ()('('a>iou- ; for, as ],il. Di/iinian oli- 
 
 l. S. C. l.SS;i. Ord. XXXIir. r. 3. scrv.'il in Siiii|..-.ou c Ito'.inM.n, iSlS, 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 1!*!(, in fj;rcat ]iart. " (mscs may (•(■rtaiiilv li' coiti'i'ivi'il 
 
 * Mooro 1'. Smith, lS:;(i (.Vni.) in wliich u jiaity. liy not diiiyin'/ a 
 (Diuican, C.J.). (:liarj.'(! niadt! a;:ain-t liini in a cdiirt 
 
 ^ Cliild r. (iravo, 182.) (B(>>t, O.J.). of jnstico, niiiy ]io-sil(ly alTord stron.i^ 
 
 * Moore I'. Smith, l.SJd (Am.). proof that the imi>ntution is just." 
 » Boyd V. lioltou, 1S4 1 (Ir.). See ii. v. Cojlo, 18 jj. 
 
 527 
 
SILENCE WEAK EVIDENCE OF ACQUIESCENCE. [pART HI. 
 
 • * ' 
 •i t 
 
 judicial iiuiuiries a strictuess of proceeding is adopted, which often 
 preveiitb a person from interfering when and how he phrases, as he 
 naturally would do in a common conversation.' The same inferences 
 cannot, therefore, be drawn from his silence or his conduct on such 
 occasions as might reasonably result from similar L'haviour, were 
 he under no restraint ; and as it is only for the Hake of these 
 inferences that the statements of ot\u)r parties can ever be admitted, 
 they are properly rejected whenever they do not warrant the 
 inferences sought to be drawn from them. A similar distinction 
 has been recognised in the civil law, by which " confessio facta seu 
 prajsumpta ex taciturnitate in aliquo judicio, non nocebit in alio."' 
 
 § M5. If, however, the statement of one person calls forth a 
 rrp/i/ from another, such statement may then be read in conjunction 
 with the reply, and will become evidence a gainst the party replying 
 so far as the answer directly or indirectly admits its tnith ; and it 
 will make no difference in the application of this rule, whether the 
 words were spoken by an interested party or a stranger, — whether 
 they were addressed or not to the party replying, — or whether they 
 fell from the parties, the witnesses, or the court, in a judicial 
 pro(>eeding, or were uttered during the oo\irse of an ordinary con- 
 versation.'' 
 
 ^ 816.* But the mlence of the party, even where the declarations 
 are addressed to himself, at a time, too, when he is at full liberty to 
 reply ab he thinks fit, is, at best, worth very little as evidence of 
 acquiescence ; * and if he has no means of knowing the truth or 
 falsehood of the statement, the fact that he did not in terms deny 
 it is almost valueless.^ In all these cases it must be distinctly 
 remembered, that the statement made in the party's presence or 
 hearing ' is not evidence against him, but his own conduct in con- 
 sequence of such statement is the sole evidence. Magistrates often 
 
 ' Melen v. 
 J.); Short V 
 
 Andrews, 1829 (Parke, 
 . ytoy, i8;{(), cited in 
 Boscoe, Ev. 54, 55, as ruled by Aldor- 
 fon. n. : 11. V. Aiiploby, 1N21 (IIol- 
 loyd. J.); K. v. Turnor, 1«3'2 (I'atto- 
 Boi), J.); Child v. Grace, 1825. 
 
 ^ 1 Masc. do I'rob. coucl. 348, 
 n. 31. 
 
 3 Child V. Grace, 1825; Jones v. 
 Morrell, 1844 (Ld. Denninn| ; R. v. 
 
 Edmuude, 1833 (Tindal, C.J.); Boyd 
 
 V. Bolton. 1844 (Tr.). 
 
 ♦ Gr. Ev. § l!«>, in part. 
 
 » See Ch, 26 of St. Matthew, v. 69 
 —63; and Ch. 27, v. 12—14. 
 
 • Ilayslcp V. Gynier, 1834 (Parke, 
 J.). See, further, on tlio subject of 
 tiicit adnuHsions, The State v. liawla, 
 1820 (Am.); Butturs V. Sellers, 1820 
 (Am.). 
 
 ' See Noile v. Jaklo, 1849. 
 
 528 
 
CHAP. IX.] EFFECT OF ADMISSIONS WllKN IMJOVF.D. 
 
 make mistakes on this subjoot ; but it is hijj'lily innxjituut that the 
 distiiiotion hhould bo observed.' 
 
 *i 817.* The rjf'ed of admissions, when proved, must next bo con- 
 sidorod. With regard to their coiic/ii.sifriif-s.s, the policy of the hiw 
 favours tho investigation of truth by all expedient methods ; the 
 doctrine of estoppels, by which further invfvstigation is pn-cludod, 
 being an exception to tho general rule, and bs'iiig adopted only for 
 the sake of general convenionce, and for the j revention of fraud, is 
 not to be extended beyond the reasons on wliich it is founded.' It 
 is also to be observed, that estopi)el8 bind only parties and privies ; 
 and not strangers. Hence a sheriff, who, in favour of a creditor, 
 seizes goods as the property of the debtor, is not bound by an 
 estoppel which would have prevented the debtor hiinself from 
 claiming the goods.* Neither are the creditors or the trustee of a 
 bankrupt bound by the bankrupt's admissions, because the court 
 regards them as claiming adversely to the bankrupt.* Again, 
 though a stranger may often rely on an admission, which parties 
 or privies might set up as an estoppel, yet, in his case, it is only 
 matter of evidence to be considered by the jury. 
 
 §818. In an action" in which an alleged bankrupt sought to 
 dispute his bankruptcy, the defendonts contended tliat the plaintiff 
 was estopped from bringing this action, as (in addition to other 
 evidence of his ac(piiescence in their title) he had given notice to 
 the lessors of a farm which he held that he liad become bankrupt, 
 and was Avilling to give up tho lease, whereupon the lessors had 
 accepted such lease, and taken possession of tho premises. Upon 
 the (piestion whether the jtlaintiif was precluded by this surrender 
 from disputing the commission in the present suit, Bayley, J., 
 said: "There is no doubt but that the express admissions of a 
 party to the suit, or admissions implied from his conduct, are 
 evidence, and strong evidence, against him ; but we think t).at 
 
 ' Per Aldorson, B., at Maidstouo 
 Sp. Aws. lH-i'2. MS. ; Dou V. I'ruukis, 
 1840 (lid. Deniiiiin). 
 
 « Gr. J'^-. § •i()4, in part. 
 
 » See unto, § HiK 
 
 • Eic'hards i\ Johnston, 1839. 
 
 » Ilairis r. IJicki'tt, l.S,')!t (Kram- 
 wfdl, U.); ]')x paito Hovoli, In ro 
 TollouittcLo, No. 1, 1884. 
 
 « Iloane v. ]?o<,'ors, 18 "' See 
 Morsiun c. rouchnian. IS.'iU; I'uintfr 
 r Vh.>l. lS(i2 (Krl,., (\J.); W.dlund 
 ( . .ill Co. r. Hiitliiiwav, IH.TJ (Am.); 
 Jei. lings r. Wluttiikcr, 1820 (Am.). 
 See, also, I,d. I.cinili'slicprnii^h's ca.so, 
 185."{; and l,d. LuudusbuiX)U<jh t». 
 Fostui, 18UJ. 
 
 629 
 
ADMISSIONS WHEN NOT CONCLUSIVE. [PAUT III. 
 
 
 ho is nt Hborty fo provo that such adtniBHions woro miHtakon 
 or were untrue, and is not ostoppod or conchidetl by them, 
 uiiliws iniothor pcrHon lias boon indiioed by thorn to alter Ins 
 (■i>nditi(«ii ; in sudi a case tho party is estopped from dixpiiting 
 tlit'ir truth with ros[toot to that porgon (and those olaimnig under 
 liini), and tluit trans, otion ; but as to third persons lie is not 
 bound. It is a woll-ostablisliod nde of law, that estoppels bind 
 only parties and privies, not strangers.' The (.ffor of surrender 
 niaile in this ease was to a .sfnint/rr fo f/iix miil ; and though tho 
 bankrupt may hav«j boon bound by his represent at ion that he was 
 a binkrupt, and his acting as su:h, as between him and the 
 stranger to whom that rospresontatiun was made, and wh » aeted 
 upon it, h<; is not bound as betwoi'u him and the dof«>ndants, who 
 did not aet on the faith of that representation at all." 
 
 § Hi!). The doctrine propounded in the above judgment, that a 
 party is always at liberty to prove that his admissions we''o 
 founded on iiiistii/,< , unless his opjioncut has been iniluc(;d by 
 them to alter his <'on(liiion, is as applicable ui mistakes in respect 
 of legal liability, as to thoHo in rcspc.t of niuttcrn of fact ' In all 
 eases of this natur<>, the jury with the view of estimating tho 
 effect tlue to an admission, will bo juslilicd in considering tho 
 eircumstancos under which it was made; and if it sliould aiipear 
 
 to iuive 1 n made under an orr<).'i> ous notion of legal liability, 
 
 they may ipialif its oUcc; ccordingly.' 
 
 ii ."^'Jii. Hut while a<lmisM(»ns are, ax !i ruli', not iimr/iisirr, and 
 may be shown to havti been made \ind«r '* n:istake, certain admis- 
 »ions undoiditt'dly are eom-lusivo. I'irst amongst these are fift'ppvfM, 
 which have bo(>n eonsideretl in a former jiart of this work: W(* havo 
 then* treated of estoppels by deed, alluded to th tsc by record, an<l 
 discussed that particular <lass ni esti p|iels in pais, which relates to 
 the rights of laixlloi and tenant.^ In 'lie | resent chapter it has 
 alreadv been ;.liown that admissions hi|i ninly niaiie in the course 
 of judicial proceedings, whether .is a substitute for regular proof, 
 or iu a case stated for tho 'pinion of tho eourt, are, on mofives of 
 
 ' (' 
 
 I, II. 
 
 .1..) 
 
 tiin. 
 
 i 
 
 IHk. » yewlon I'. H.'l.l,,!', 1818; and 
 N'Wlnii I'. I.iiiiliiiil. IM8. 
 
 Newt. Ill V. I.iailiun!. l«»H (I.<1. 
 
 IIIUIIj. 
 
 Ant", Si Hi»-io;i. 
 
 6ao 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS IN PLKADINO. 
 
 poUoy nnd justice, deemed to be conclusive." It only remains to 
 exiimin»* the law as it regards other co/ic/iisivf (nliiiixsioiiH ; and these 
 will, in general, bo found to range themselves under one or other 
 of the f(»llowing heads. First, admissions expressly or taritly made 
 hy phwIliKjH ; secondly, admissions which have been acted upon by 
 others. To these may be added a few oases of fraud and illegality, 
 and some admissions on oath, where the party is estopped on 
 grounds of public policy. 
 
 H 821. With respect to (nhtii-sKionx In/ phtaliiKi, the law at present 
 seems to be that statements which are containc<l in any pleading, 
 though binding on tlie ]iarty making them for all purposes in tho 
 caiise, ought not to be regarded in any Kid)se4U<'nt action as admis- 
 sions.* It was at one time, indeed, thought that a parly might, by 
 bringiug an action (m a contract, (sstop hinisell' from dcnyitig tho 
 obligatory fo;'<'e of it as an agreement in a subsc([ucnt action iigainst 
 himself. Accordingly, Tiiidal, C J.,'' once expressed a strojig 
 opinion that if a corporation were to make an executor}' contract 
 invalid against themselves for not being under seal, and then to 
 sue thereon, this woidd amount to an admission on record that 
 Buch contract was duly entered into on their part, so as to be 
 obligatory on them ; and would e.stop them, in answer to a 
 counterclaim in the same action, or to another action by tho 
 defendants in a cross acfion, from setting up that it was not sealtMi 
 by their common seal. 15ut the doctrine as a whctle on which this 
 expression is founded, although uinpies',ioind)ly basinl on sub- 
 stantial justice, has hitherto met with little favour, and will 
 jirobably ere long Ix' expressly overruled.* 
 
 S H'2'2. At any rate, an admission, iiiritloitfilli/ or tmUlii nuide in 
 pleading in one suit, will not, as a rule, estop the party who has 
 made it from denying in another suit, where ///vc/vf/y ///, sdinc, 
 tntiffrr is not /ifii/n/n/, the fact so admitted. For instaiiie, wln-ro a 
 pica to an action on a bond set out a corrupt agreement bettveen 
 the parties irre.>*pective of the bond, and went on to aver that tho 
 
 ' Ante, §5 772, 7N;«. * '^'•n ('..|.|m! Miii.'iV Co. r, Kox, 
 
 ' Cum. M (lied in imte • ; N'ecHon V. \H,%\ ; Miiili'iin ' . Itiilliii, IH IS I'mke, 
 
 Wnlter-, INlMi. n.); liiukiiiii-ler -. Miikd i.ilin, IN.VI 
 
 ' l''iM)ini(iiijj)ti'H' Cu, V. ItulHTlHoii, (ill,): Tin' M.iy. nl' KiililiTiiiiuHtor v. 
 
 I14U. Ilunlwirke, |!s7:i. 
 
 IH'IU. 
 
 6ai 
 
 M\ 
 
ADMISSIONS IN PLEADING. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 i'l ■• 
 
 bond was given to secure, among other moneys, the sum men- 
 tioned, in ihoNfiid a^^roomont; and tho replication, tacitl}' admitting 
 the corrupt agnHMUi-nt, traver«ed the fact of tlie bond having been 
 given in considciration thmoof, but tlio plaintiff failed on this 
 issue ; the adnii«sion was hold available for the purpose of that 
 suit only ; and the plaintiff was consociuontly allowed to dispute 
 the corrupt natiire of the agreement, in a subseipiont action on a 
 collateral security.' 
 
 51 823. An o.xeeption to this general rule arises, however, where 
 the second action is brought on a juilgraont recovered in the first. 
 For example, an executor or administrator who confesses judgment, 
 or suffers it to go against him by defaidt, thereby admits assets in 
 his hanils, and is estopped to say the contrary in an acti(m on such 
 judgment, sugg(?sting a dovasfavit.'- In ordor to charge the exe- 
 cutor or ailininistrati)r, indeed,* ven in such a ease, noiuf proof nnist 
 be given tbat the assets have been wasted; but the slightest evi- 
 dence will suflieo for this purpose ; and the more issuing of a writ 
 of fieri facias, directed to the county where the action was laid, 
 and a return of nulla bona thereto, has, for a long time past, beon 
 deemed evidencit enough.' In aeeordanee with these principles, 
 where, in an action against three executors, two had jili'aded plono 
 administraverunt, and tins third admitted a.ssets to the amount 
 of ''\HU,, in a sub.scipuint action against the third executor, sug- 
 gesting a devastavit, the plaintiff was luild entitled to recover; 
 defendant's admissions in the f<n'mer action being an admission of 
 assets to the amount of 3H.'{/., and the fact that she hail givtm a 
 ohetpie for that amount (which had been in fact dishonoured), 
 bein;,' prima facie evidence of n t/rnisfarif to that amount /* 
 
 S ■'^J f. Questions with respect to admissions in ])leading, chiefly, 
 liowever, arise with reganl to their effect in the mmr suit. In 
 Admiralty, for in.stanee, where a statement of claim in a salvage 
 ai'tinii is admitted, no eviilence at all is in general receivable 
 (unle>8 special leave for its reception is given) in support of the 
 plaintiff's ease, whicsh the statement of claim is rocpiiied to state 
 
 ' ("urtor I'. Jainos, 1S4 1. Sen Ili^^i 
 V. Huiliiiljjf, INKi; iiihI lluttc, Mor- 
 roll. IHI!» I'oll.Mk, V.W.). 
 
 « Sk.'lloli r. Ha\vlm«, I7»l»; l{n 
 TiiihUo lloliof Act, UigKiiib' Tnists, 
 
 IHdI. 
 
 • F.connr(l c Simpson, 18U3 (Tiu 
 (lul. ('..!.). 
 
 « Ct)opor 11. 'Jttjlor, 1844. 
 
 631^ 
 
 'I I 
 
 el 
 
CHAF. IX.] ADMISSIONS IN PLKADINO. 
 
 completely.' Andbotli in the Qiuh-h's l*>enoli and Chancery Divi- 
 sions the brodd rule is tliiit " t-vcry iillfgiition of fiiot in any 
 pleading, not being a petition or summons, if not denied specifi- 
 cally or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in 
 the pleading of the opposite party, shall be tnhiti to he n/htiiffx/, 
 except as against an infant, lunatic, or peri^on of unsound mind not 
 BO found by inquisition."* The proper understantling of tliis rule 
 is tlie province of the pleader :'' and a dolailcd explanation of its 
 effects must be sought iu works on pleading. The rule, however, 
 operates only with respect to nuitti-iul allegntions. If, therefore, 
 a statement of defence denies a particular fact alleged in the state- 
 ment of claim, it does not thereby admit all the immaterial aver- 
 ments, which the pleader has chosen to introduce as part of tho 
 plaintilf's case.^ 
 
 S H'Jf). Accordingly, where a plaintiff's claim — after slating that 
 the defendants were oiiucrH of a vessel, on which the plaintiff caused 
 to bo shipped some potatoes to bf» carried by tliem, as oirnrrs of the 
 vessel, to Liverpool; and that in consideration tlH'icoj', and of 
 freight, they j)roniised to carry the potatoes safely ax ajhirmid — 
 alleged as a breach, that through their negligen<!e the goods were 
 damaged; it was held, that a defence of tlu* genend issue in 
 answer to such claim did not by implication admit that the 
 defendants were owners, so as to niise the inference that the 
 captain was their agent, since tho allegation of ownership was 
 ininuiterial. Tho claim would have been eqtially good had no 
 such allegation been nuide.* 
 
 8 8,'(). liut the omission to traverse a tnatniiil allegation, so 
 far conclusively admits it, that the jmrfi/ iihu Ihim ji/nitJn onr 
 cdinivf tlinprori' it. Therefore, where, in trover for goods, defendant 
 pleaded that A. was factor of the plaint ills, and as such, before and 
 at t/w tiitii' of the pledge mcntiomul in the plea, was iiitiuxtnl l>i/ tin in 
 with, and u<ih in ixmrnHivn uf, dock- warrants relating to the goods ; 
 
 ' Tho llimlwukc, 1kn;j. 
 
 » U s. (). imn;i. Old. XI.X. r. i;». 
 
 ]lut SCU, uml Uttl'llljit to li'i'cilii'lle, 
 
 this rule Willi r. 13 of Onl. XXVll., 
 ciliid i»iNt, ^ H-2i). 
 
 * \'iiii Siimlttu V. Turuur, lN't<J(I.<l. 
 iJHMiiau). 
 
 * See liilijjhiilll r. Stiilih'y, IN 11; 
 i'l'liliiiiii I'. 1 liivi-'dli, 1n;{M; J)iiiiIiii(1 
 r. iMittlex, IMI ^I'alki', It.); King 
 (', Nol Ihllll, IN'17. 
 
 » Itiiiiimu 1 . I'livixiii, IHIIH (I'lirku, 
 11.); ie(i>>,'iii/e(l (.Mill iKim, It. in 
 Jiiitil'iinl ' . 'I'liittli'N, IH'14. bvu, uhtu, 
 (iiuw t'. ilill, 164U. 
 
 ft.'W 
 
ADMISSIONS IN PLEADING. 
 
 [part in. 
 
 m 
 
 that ho lelivered the doel -waiTiin'^« to the de'crdftDt, nnd pledp^ed 
 •with him tho goods, aa secnril;; for a loiui whioii the defendant then 
 advaiictjd to liini on 'hv 1 uih of Dio said dock- warrants ; and that 
 tho di'fomlant liad j.m notion that tli« factor was not tlio actual 
 owni T ; tho ithiintill't; woo lu)ld to bo doharnMl from jtroving that 
 tlio dock-wurrants liud not hoon deposited at tho time of tho advance; 
 and won*, in fact, not then in existc^iuo, wljore thoy liad simply 
 traversed tlio aUogation that tlie dofendant advan<'od tho money on 
 the faith of tlio dock-wan-ants.' 
 
 t^ 827. Un.hT 11. S. C, 188.'}, Ord. XXX IE., r. 6, " any party 
 may, at any stage of a canso or matter, wliore admissions of fact 
 have been made, cither on tho jiloiidings, or otherwise, apjily to the 
 court or a ju<lgo for such judgment or order as, upon such adiniti- 
 8ions, ho nuiy he entitled to, without waiting for tiio detormiuation 
 of any other (piostion between the parties ; and the court or a 
 judge may upon sucli application make such order, or give such 
 juilgmcnt, as the* court or judge nuiy think fit." Under this rule, 
 in a jiartitloji action, wlurc tho defendants have, by their sfatcmcfnt 
 of ilofcMico, admitted the fuels stated in tho claim showing tho 
 jilaintilf's tith', the jdaintilf has a right, — lastttad of having tho 
 0(!tion set down for hearing, — to an order on mf)tion, dirouting tho 
 usual impiiries us to the persons interested in the property ; * la an 
 action betweon partners,* and in one between principal and agent,' 
 un oi(h>r for iin account ami for tho delivery of securities has Im-oii 
 made on motion bof(,ro the hearing, tho judge acting solely on tho 
 admissions contained in tho pleadings ; * and a plaintilf may m<A>o 
 fur juiigment upon admissions, although ho has joined i' i>o on the 
 defence, and given notice of trial." But in eases under ihe rule, 
 us the judge bus a disenttion whether ho will grant relief on motion 
 or not, ho will s(>ldom take that step when any cpiestion of ililliculty 
 is laisi'd ; n»>itlior will tho (yourt of Appeal, except in a cli-ar ease 
 ol error, interi'oro with tiio judge's excr<is(> of his discretion.' 
 
 1 
 
 ' Ilciii/.i I'. Stewiirt, \Hi'2. S(>o, iiIho, 
 Cniter c. JiiiiicH, IhH. 
 
 ' (iillmit I'. Siiiilli, 1H7(J, i'. A.; 
 Il"'llc iiiij.'1'iii V. l.oiij^rijTK. ••**"" 
 (ll,.ll, V. -<*.). 
 
 ' 'r.in|llilli(l I'. WiUnM, I' ':0, 
 ^ iluiiiMiy (', liuutte, i6o. 
 
 • Sec, uIkii, Ji'tikiiiM '•. MiivicM, 
 ISTii; la I'll Siiiitli'iH I'iHtiito, Iti'iilHiiii 
 r, Smith, isTii JIM, y.-C); lu ra 
 
 lliilkoi'M I'lHtilte, IISTM (ill.). 
 
 " lliowii.', I'dHKiiii, lN.sj(|''ry, J.). 
 ' Moilur V. Hitlubiittiiiu, \H'l. 
 
 534 
 
 h 
 
CIT fX.J ADMISSIONS bi n^.M^TnTTING UNDKU OLD LAW. 
 
 § 8'<S. IT?, del tho olu rules of pleading, a demurrer wns regarded 
 by Co»ate :h Equity as simply raising the question of law v.ithout 
 any numi^siou of the truth of the allegations in tiic bill ; hut in 
 Courts of Law it was held to amount to an ahsolute admission of 
 the facts stated in the paragraphs (hmmiTed to.' The Hli. S. C. of 
 IHM have ahoiished demurrers altogether hy Ord. XXV., r. 2, and 
 Buhstiluted i erlain other proeeedings.'* 
 
 J) H'Ji>. Tt is further provided, by 11. S. C, 1888, Ord. XXVII., 
 r. 13, thit "if the plaintiff does not deliver a reply, or any 
 ])arty does not deliver any sub.se<iu('nt pleading within the period 
 allowed for that purpose, the pleadings shall he deemed to he (dosed 
 at the expiration of that period, and all the material statenuMits of 
 fact in the pleading last delivered shall ho deevud to hace brni (Iviiivd 
 and put ill issue,"* 
 
 S 8;{(>. Marriages which took place between 30th July, 1874, 
 and 1st January, 1^83, are governed by the Married Women's 
 i'mpcrty Act, 1871,'' which enacted, with respect to such inarriiiges, 
 tluit husbands and wives should bo jointly sued for debts incurred 
 or t'tits committed by tlio wife before marriage, but that the luis- 
 I'.nid shouhl be liable! to the extent only of tho assets thi>rcin spe- 
 cified,^ provided that, if no jdea denying liability be jiltMuh'd, " t!io 
 husband shall be deemed to have confessed his liability so far as 
 osrtcts are concerned."* 
 
 t^ 83 i. Next, as to the (dfect by way of admission of p'li/ing 
 tt/oiii'i/ info cotirf,'^ and of tiii<lrriiif/ voiiipciisafioii. Payment of 
 niont-y into court may be made, as of course, in ««//' acti(m which 
 is bri Might to recover a debt or damages.'' Amends may also ho 
 
 ' S.H M.'troj). Hail. Co. i'. Di'fri''^, 
 IHTT; and IJiilfs i)f 187a. Old. 
 A.Will. 
 
 '■• .Sup, iils'i, rr. •'!, •!, Mlltl .') of HUinn 
 
 Orti.T. S.M. ltm>tull .■. Mrvt'uH. IHHI. 
 C. A 
 
 « S.r. iilMo, 1{. s. r. Onl. .XIX. 
 r i;i, (iti'ii unto, § MJt. 
 
 » ;i7 iV ;tN V. o .Mi. 
 
 ♦ §§ I, 2, unil .'». 
 
 » I •!. S«.r MatthcwH I'. Whittle. 
 IHMO (J(-MM.'I, M.l{.). Thi' Manit'tl 
 'NViiiiifU'H l''()]i<ity .\«'t, 1N"1, wan 
 I(|ii iiliil liy I.I \ Hi V. c. ".') (■' I'Ih' 
 Muriii'il Wciiii'irH l'ni|it'rty .Vet, 
 
 tliii i'i'N|H!ctiv<t lialiilitirs of IiuhIiuikIs 
 mill wivi'H iiianii'il Hinrc Ist ilaniiaiy, 
 1sn:1. 
 
 • It iiiiiHt i'Xii'|it, jMiMsilily, ill Olio 
 or two otIuT casi's ,a< to \vli!''h i-ch 
 alili', § .'tl.'i, ail (ill.) 1)1' liiaili' iii'tnro 
 ili'livri'iii;; a ili'fi'iii'i', ami iinint in 
 any caM' ln' pliailiil. tlioii;;li it ma)' 
 iii> Hii |>|i'ai|i'ii til till' wlioli' or any 
 part lit till' )iliiiiitit>'s claini, Si'U 
 1{. .S. C. I SMI, (till. AMI. I. I. 
 
 ' Sfi' ll!iwk«li'VC. i'.iailr^haw, I.SNO, 
 ( '. .\., from wliirli it will ill' ...I'll that 
 tlii'ri' ail! oni' or two f;i;i|itio i-. 
 
 " H. .s. C. l.YSi, Oril. XXII. r 1, 
 
 lb»2"), ij U, 10 of which ii'gniiilii Sihi, fuitiior, id. rr. !^, 4, und fl. 
 
 636 
 
ADMISSIONS BY PAYING MONEY INTO COURT. [PART III. 
 
 paid into ooiirt in sonio ^^teoiiil actions under the provisions of 
 jmrtii'ulur stiitutos. l\»r iuHtiuK^e, in an notion for a lihcd contiiiiiod 
 in any nowspapor or other jvMiiHlical pultlicafioii, whotlicr in 
 England or Ireland, tho defendant may plead that the laiigii ijje 
 eouiplained of was inserted without aetual malice, and without 
 gross negligence, and that at tlie earlie;.t opportunity he had 
 puhlished, or, in sonu) eases, had otVered to ]iuhlish, an ample 
 apology, and that a (-(utain sum of money lias heeii paid into court 
 by way of amends.' Many (tther statutes also authorise tho tender 
 of amends and pleas of payment of money into court.' 
 
 5i iS;{'J-7. In these and other cases u payment into court, when 
 nnac(M)jnpanied hy any defence denying lial)ility, is "taken to 
 admit the claim or cause of action in respetit of which the payment 
 is made." Defendants may now in any (fause, except in actions or 
 counterclaims for lihel or slander, plead payment of money into 
 court together with any other pleas, either denying tho pluiutiif's 
 right of action, or set tin;.' up some special defence.' 
 
 !i 838.^ Wlien judi( ial admissions, — hy which are meant admis- 
 sions entered into in the tlut* course of legal j>roce(>ding», — have 
 hecn I'litilf thi'oiiijli initilrortt'iu'i' or iiiistdkr, Uie court, in its discre- 
 tion, wiii in sumo manner relievo the party from the oonseciuonces 
 
 R. 7, Viy impiwnj? upoa the iiliiintilV the court: riruy v, Umtholoinew, 
 
 thi> (hiiy "f giving tho (tel'cn.laiit ii 1H!M, ('. A. 
 
 N|iicii»l iicti,! . ,>>;i'>«>i* hiia to the '' Thrsd pMienilly a|iply to ut'tii>ns 
 
 risk ot' losiiiLr lii^ ■'> ts in tlic event hrou;;ht a^'iiiii'-t ]ii'I'hoiis tor nets 
 
 et his uc(;lcctiii); to i'oin]>ly with tliiit done hy thciri. cither in exi ■ iitioii of 
 
 riih\ See Liiii>.'[i.lp< I'. ('iini|il)ell, tlieiri>'li('e!«, or ill imiviiiUK r uikUt 
 
 IS,",, lis exiiliiiiii'il hy lliiektou v, 
 iliL'^'"*. "^T!) See, also, (Jn-iivos v. 
 I'Meiniiiir. 1M7H. 
 
 ' See Ii iV 7 V. e. !>li (" The Liliel 
 ,\et. IHI.T"), § "J, ax iiini'iKhMl hy 
 \1 \- til V. c. .■»!); iiii.l S \ !l V. c. 7.") 
 ("Tlie I.ihel Act, Hi.r'), i J, as to 
 Kniihiti.l: '..1(1 s \- it V. <•. 7.V § 'J. 
 let to Ireliinil. In li- uhsi'iice of flie 
 iillei.Mtiiin of piiytiit lit into Court, 
 jilaintilY may treat the jileii iin ii 
 nullitv. Tlie |>hiintilV is iihsoliitely 
 entitled to money |i,iiil into court 
 under thin .\ct, wluitever diima^res 
 lie recover; I>iinn c heven, iVc. 
 Nevvii.iiiier Co,. IXIM; hut nuuiev 
 jmid into eomt under Old. .\ .\ 1 1 
 r. 6 la 8uhjuct to tho jurisdiction of 
 
 the iiiitholifv ol A "ts of r.llliiiliiellt 
 
 (see ante, J5i .'ill ;.!'»); and :'iiioiig 
 these iiiav he mentioned, "Tin- l''lliiic 
 Authorities I'lolection Act. ls;t;{" 
 ;,')i|\ .?" V. c. (il), § 1 (e). set ml ante, 
 |j 7i;a. "The Seamen'H Clotliiii^ .Vet, 
 istllC" (;»•,> & ;i:t V. c. .•.7. § <>). " Tlio 
 .Vrniv Act. isNI" (11 iV: ^.■> V. e, oS, 
 § 170. siihs. J , and ••Th.- Militia .\et, 
 1H.S'.»" ; ,&. M> ':'. e. 4I», § ttl. Miih.s. ;i), 
 
 " !i \. 0. l>>i. '»rd. XXli. r, I, 
 cite.i Hilt!, \ ,h;>;, n. ". e\|Mes>ly 
 roiH u' . Ihsi ei • triti"" illowiu',' sieh a 
 defeiK .; in litwl e' sliw ler lueviously 
 (•Htiiblished hy 'laws,- <ley r. Mrad- 
 nhiiw, IHNO, c" .A, H .. a'l*j, Uerdiia 
 ,'. (iieonwo. !, 1N7H, C. A. 
 
 * Ur. Kv. S .:u(5, uoarly vorliutiia. 
 
 • • 
 
 caa 
 
 i&i 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON RY OTMKRS. 
 
 of liis error.' Even agrnomnnts tiiikIm out of court Ix'fwpon 
 solicilorH, ('oiicfrniug iho oourso of pro(!(MMliii}»H in (;ourt, lire, iu 
 olftK.'t, ('qually uiulcr tl>o court's control, by niciins of its cocrcuve 
 power over tlic solicitor in all matters relating to professional 
 character ami conduct. But, iu all these cases, the party will bo 
 held to his adnsission, uulous it vU-arly appear that ho has auted 
 through niistako.* 
 
 {5 H.'{!).' It is a broad rule of law tliat every admission, which has 
 bocu made with the intention of being ac^ted upon, and which has 
 been uvted upon hi/ (ino//irr ptrsoii, is condusivft against the jiarty 
 making it, in all cases between him and the individuid whose 
 conduct he has thus influenced ; and this, whether suc^h admission 
 be nuide in express language to the person who acts upon it, or be 
 implied from the general (conduct of the party making it. In tho 
 latter ease, tho implied declaration will be consid(*rcd as having 
 been addressed to every one in particular, who may have had 
 occasion to act upon it: and the rule of law is clear, that, where 
 one by his words or conduct »///«//// (diuscs anoth(!r to believe in 
 tho existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act 
 on that belief, so as to alter his own jjnfvious position, the former 
 is concluded from averring against the lattei a different state of 
 things as e.\isting at tho sam<> time.'' Indeed, tho primiido may 
 lie laid down still more broadly, as precluding any party, who 
 negligently or culpably stands by, and allows another to contract 
 <in the faith and understanding of a fact which he can contradict, 
 from disputing that fa(!t in an acti(m against the person whom ho 
 has lumself assisto*! in d(H;eiving.' In such case tlie party is 
 pstoppeil, on tho grounds of ])ublic policy and good faith, from 
 ropuiliating his own representations.'' 
 
 ' I >!«. lib. 42, tit. 2. 1. 2. 
 
 * Si'c I'l-iirso ii. (»ri>v<i, 17-I7 (I.d. 
 Iliii'ilwicki')' Tln' l{niiiiin law was 
 iiiliiiiiii.-<ti'H'(l in flic sumo Hiiiiit. "Si 
 is, cum i|ii<i Iicp> Ai|uiliii af^itur, 
 t'oiifcHHUH est sorvuia (icciilissc, licot 
 IKH) occiilcrit, si (anicn occiHUH sit 
 Imnii), «'x cDiil'i'Mso t<'iicttu'": Diff. 
 lib. 12. tit. 2. 1. 4; i.l. 1. «. S»m. 
 al(«>, Van Lemiw. Ciinun., I). V. 
 I'll. 21 ; b^vurh, t'ouu. loo, a. '<i. 
 
 "ronfcHSUH pro judicuto est": Dig. 
 lib. 12, fit. 2, 1. 1. 
 " (ir. V.v. § 207. in part. 
 
 ♦ I'ickaril r. Sarn, INU7 (1,(1. Ken- 
 man); M'cii^'ni/iMl (Wiiiid, V.-C.) ill 
 Att.-(rt>n. '•. Stephens, In.),). 
 
 * I'er I,ii. |)cniiian, in <ir»>pr;; v. 
 WcHm, 1h;{!»; rccuirni/.cd bv I'iirko, 
 Ji.. in Ilarrinon ''. Wright, 1S40. 
 
 • tioo uuto, 55 ao ot st-q. 
 
 oa? 
 
ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [.PAR" III. 
 
 § 840. The meaning of the word " wilful," as used above, has 
 been tho subject of divergent judicial remarks.' 
 
 § 841. Another instance of a conclusive ailmission arises where a 
 party, having a secret equity, chooses to stand by, and permit, the 
 apparent owner to deal with others as if he were the absolute owner, 
 in which case he will not be permitted to assert such secret equity 
 against a title founded on such apparent ownership.'' For e.\ample, 
 where'' a lan<lowner had signed, ami put into the hands of his 
 agent, an autliority to consout to any exchanges uudei' an Inclosuro 
 Act, and had directed him not to act upon this authority o.\('ej)ting 
 under certain circumstances ; but the agent, in br( ach of liis private 
 instructions, hud produced the authority and agreed toun exchange 
 not under the stipulated circumstances, tlie landowner was held to 
 be bound by the agreement made under these circumstances. The 
 courts liave also acted upon this doctrine on several occasions, 
 
 ill 
 
 ' In Fri'dimn r. Ctxiko, IHJH. 1,(1. 
 Wi'Uislt'ydtli' olisi'ivi'il :-" " I5y tliu 
 tonii ' wilfully," wo iimst uiiiIit- 
 stiiiul, if nut that tlm jmrty ri'- 
 jircuciits tliiit !i> bti triK! which hi; 
 
 klloW'S f(i be 1; , .('. Ill Icil.st ;llllt ho 
 
 iiK'Uim lii.s ri']»ri'sriitiiti<iii to In- acted 
 )ili(pii, and that it is acted u])(Hi ac- 
 cordiii'jrly : and if. wiiatevcr a man's 
 real int'iitiiin niay lio, he so cim- 
 diicts himself tliat a reasonalile man 
 wiinld take tlic ic|ii('sc:italion tn he 
 trne, and helieve that it was nieaiit 
 that he shiMild act njHin it. and 'hd 
 act n|Min it, as tnie, tlie pai ly making' 
 the lejHoentatidn would he I'lpially 
 ]ire('hided from ciinle.-tin;; its truth 
 [the inle, as lieni eiinnciated, was 
 cx])re>sly udii]iteil hy the Court of 
 l'',\clie(|uer in Cornish r. ,\liine:ton, 
 IS.V,), See, too, Sweeny r, i'romoter 
 Life .\.ss, Co., ISd;; (ir.^ ; 'riinmas 
 c, jirown, I'^TO; and .NI'K'enyie v. 
 iiriti-l, Linen Co., IsM, 11, J-.]; 
 and conduct hy ne;,'li^'enc(i or omis- 
 sion, wliere there is ,' duty tiist 
 n])ou a person hy usay:e <if trade or 
 otlielwi.se to disclose the truth, may 
 
 often have the sann- elTect ; as, for 
 instance, a n'tirin;; partner omittini: 
 to inform his customers of the /i(i<, 
 in till' usual mode, that the continu- 
 ing jiartners were no longer autho- 
 
 rized to act ns his aponts, is boiiinl 
 hy all cold racts made hy them with 
 third ]iersons on the faith of their 
 heinj; so anthoiized." Jn Howard c. 
 Hudson, l.S.VJ, Ld. Camphell nh- 
 served: — '-'rhe party settin;; \ip suith 
 a har to tho I'eception of the truth 
 must show, both that there was a 
 irll/'iil intent to make him act on tlio 
 faith (d the represeidation, aial that 
 heiiid soacf ," jtut Cromplon, N'.-C., 
 says: "'riie rule takes in all tho 
 inj]ioitant commen i:d cases in which 
 a re])re-.entation is nuide, not wilfully 
 in a'.v had sense of the word, not 
 main 'limo, hut so far wi'''Mlly that 
 the )ia(ty makine; the repivseuiatiou 
 on which tiie othi'r acts iiiiiium it to 
 he acted upon in that way. That is 
 the true criterion," See, furtlii'r, 
 on this subject, l'"oster <■. .Mentor 
 Lit'.' .\ss. Co.. ',,s.VI. 
 - .Man^'les r, Dixon. 1HJ{) (Ld. 
 
 Cotteuhani). See, also, Att,-(iea. 
 
 c, Navlor, isiil (W.ioil, V.-C,); 
 Kamsden c. lt\son, isti.'i, II. L. ; 
 l.'olt r. White, jsii-j (I,d. W.stbmy^ 
 •' Itukeof lieautort r. Neald, IM-Vl, 
 II, L. See (iralnon r. Ilirkenhead 
 Kail. Co., Is.-id; Kent «. .lackson, 
 I.S,-.l ;l{()milly. M.K.); Trickett «. 
 'i'oinlin.smi, iMOii ; Pole v. Ijuask, 
 istil, 11. L. 
 
 oas 
 
 h % 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON DY OTRERS. 
 
 where negotiations Imve boon entered into pn'pnratory to marriage. 
 Tlie abstract rule deduciblo from the autboiitifs on tlio whole is, that, 
 whenever a representation' of mmo fucf, — as contradistinguished 
 from a mere represiiiitiition of infciifion,- — ^liaa been made by one 
 party for the purpose of influencing the conduct of luiotlier, and 
 has been acted upon by the latter, this will, in gcnei-al, be suflicient 
 to entitle hira to the assistance of the court for the purpose of 
 realising such representation.' 
 
 § 842.* A further e.\am[ileof a conclusive admission arising from 
 conduct occurs in the case of a man cohabiting with a mistress, and 
 treating her in the fact* of the world as his wife. Here, though Im 
 thereby ac(juir(>s no rights against others, they possibly way ilo so 
 against him. For instance, if the woman during such cohabitalicm 
 bo supplied with goods ostensibly for the use of tlie joint household, 
 and the reputed husband be sued for their price, he will not bo 
 '-ermitted to disprove the marriage, but tlm jury will be justified. 
 08 in the case of a real wiife, in dealing with the question as one of 
 ordinary domestic agency.* Tlie old doctriiu) of th(^ presuniptivt» 
 agency of a real wife has, however, been t^nc rna(lie<l upon, if not 
 actually set aside, by an eniurtment in fhe Married Wnmeu's 
 Property Act, 1S!);{," that^ "every <'oiitract hereafter entereil 
 iuto by a married wtmum, otherwise than as an agent, Hhall be 
 deemed («) to be a contract enteretl into by her with respect to and 
 
 ' Till. Cranworth is xiiid to luivo i: llesHitor, 18.)4-.'i; Pulsfoid c. 
 
 held tli;it till! rule d'n.s not apiily l{l^■llald^', IS.'il (linmilly, .M.lt.;; 
 
 unless lliere l>e iiiisii iirrmiiltit i^ii . Vi'oniaiis r. Wdliailis, Isti.'); llod^r- 
 
 Sed (HI. !^ee Miiiifv r. .lurdeii, 1(S.)2 ; Hint I', Iliiti^hi'iiMiii, ITIli; t 'uokrH c. 
 
 I'uUfuid c. lin haii'l^, iNVi. MaMcall, HUM; \\ ^mklDii! r. IuIIiit- 
 
 ■•' .Ii.ldilir. .Mi.liey. l^.VI.H.Ti. (I.il. ley. ItliM; Jilld.lH v. All-tiy, 
 
 CriinwDilli, t'.. ami i.d. r.ri>ii;:lii4iii ; !7'.tii; Miildletini c I'lilliick. Ia |p..iiii 
 Ld. St, l.eiiiiards diss.), iiViTiidiii^ a W'ltln mil, iHTli. ,*<ic Wri;_'li; r. 
 
 .Sliowe, IMS; MauuKell /•. W liifr, 
 IN.VI, 11. ii. ; liold ''. liiitcliiiisoii. 
 iN.Vt : 'I'raill I', liaiin;:, isiil, 
 
 * (ir. Ilv. § 'J07, ill jLiil, an tti lii.-l 
 Bi'V-'ii lini'H. 
 
 » WmI-oii c. 'riuilUiild, ITIIS ; 
 ii'iliiii.-Miii . .N.iliuii, l.sos; .Miiiiiii 
 V. Ill- t'liiMiaiit. isl.i. Si'i- aiiti', 
 § \M\>. AIhu, .Mail' r. ("ad-!l, I77»; 
 ri'i'ii;;iii/i'd ill Itatllii'W.s c, (iaiilido, 
 
 Ld. .'^t, l.eiinanls (lis.-*.), oviTnilm^' a 
 duiisiiiii lit lliiiiiilly, Nl.K., m Mimey 
 V. Jiildeii, lS.'»J. Sii' .Ma IdisDii c, 
 AldiisMii. is.s;!, II. I,., and iiin'stiiii- 
 iu;.' LdlViis V. Maw, ISd'J ^Ntiiait, 
 V.-t'.'. Si'e, al.so, itii.-.t. § l(l|:i, 
 
 ^ llainnii'ihliy c. liamn di- lii'l, 
 1M». II. li (I'.'l. t'littenliain;; id. 
 (I.d. ('anii>lM-ll) : Neville r. Wilkin- 
 Heii. 1"N2: Moiiteliori r. Jiinitelii'ii, 
 17(>J; Iktntlev I'. .Maikav. I«'>:i 
 ^Hnmilly. M.ll.); Uv.fi' r. FieldiT. l»2.s, 
 IMJiJ ill.); 'nile V. l.iado, 18.S7 ; • .V. iV -57 V. e. tiiJ. tioo Mylu.s t 
 
 Jdrdeii V. Mi.ney, is.VI, II. I,.; Hiirl.ii, 1H84 (Ir.). 
 Moiuy I'. Jtudiii, Its.VJ; llultiili ' J !• 
 
 539 
 
ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART IH. 
 
 <"'' I 
 
 '■" L 
 
 m 
 
 to Wnd her separate property, whether she is or is not in fact 
 ])oss<sHO(l of or entitled to any separate property at the time when 
 bIic cntors into such contract ; {b) shall bind all separate proporfy 
 which she may at tliat time or thoreaftor bo possossod of or entitled 
 to ; jind (<•) shall also be enfon.'eublf by prouess of law against all 
 jiKipcrty which she may thereafter while discovert be possessed of 
 or entitled to: rrovitlcil that nothing in tliis section contained 
 shall rend('r available to satisfy any liability or obligation arising 
 (mt of such contract any separate pro[(erty which at that time or 
 thereafter she is restrained from anticipating." By § 2 of the 
 same Act,' a married woman's sejtarate property which she is 
 restrained from antici^"\ting may be made liable for costs, and a 
 rec«nvi)r or a sale of it directed. 
 
 S 843.* Yet another example of a conclusive admission arising 
 from conduct is where a person knowingly permits his niuno to be 
 used as one of the partners in a trading tinn, or an existing joint- 
 stock company, under such circumstances of publicity as to sntisfy 
 the jury that a stranger know of it, and believed him to be a partner, 
 tor under such circumstances ho is liable to such stranger in all 
 transactions, in which the latter engaged and gave credit upon the 
 faith of his being such partner.' The mere fact of a i>orson 
 ngie(<ing to become a member of the j'rocinional coiiimKtfe of an 
 intended railway company, or even the fact of such person autho- 
 rising his name to be published in a prospectus, which contains 
 nothing more than the i> .■nos of the provisional committee-men, 
 wjU not indeed render him liable for contracts nuuio by the other 
 members or by the solicitor, for the purpose of promoting the 
 objects in view; because such an intended ascociation does not 
 amount to a jtartnorship, as it constitutes no agreement to share in 
 protit and loss.* But if there bo eviilence that such person has 
 «(/((/ with relaiioD to tho proposed schenn), as by attending meet- 
 ings, giving directions, and the like, it will be for tho jury to 
 
 ' 5(i & .)" V. c. (i:j. 
 
 ' (ir. I'.v. 2(17, ill piirt. 
 
 ' Dickiiisnn I. Valjiy, IH'JO (Piirko. 
 J.); W.Mi.l V. I hike i.f Aruvll. \Mh 
 (( 11 '^'NWcll. J.); lliii I'isiiik I', lii'utlioru, 
 lMi;j (TLiiilul.'C.J.); I'ox v. Clifton, 
 ]s;i(i^iil.). Si!i), iiIho. Kfll I'. Nuiiiby, 
 Wi'iM; Uuiiluu t^. liobiiuu, 1609 ^Li<i. 
 
 KUoiilxinDi^h). 
 
 * l{cyiit'll V. lifwin. 1111(1 WyM v, 
 Ilopkili!*, lH((i. Sec lv\ |iiiitiC 'little, 
 Ih/iO; Kx iPiOtc lidlii'iis. l.v.')(i; Niinia 
 I'. Ciittli', is.'id. 11. L. ; lluttDii V. 
 I'lilill, IN.VI, ll.I,. ; I'.nv'lit r. llnttoii. 
 anil lliittiiti ('. Knvlit, iN.°)l-.>.. 11. li.; 
 M'Kwiiii V. (.'uiiipbvU, 1807, U. L. 
 
 640 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON HY OTHERS. 
 
 deterinlno' wliotlior ho has not thereby aiilliorisoil the innnaginp 
 committoo, or the other nioinhors of the i)roviHioniiI (ioinmittoo, or 
 the solicitor or socrotary of the iiitondoil (•f)niii!niy, to plodgo his 
 (Todit for tilt) noct'Hsiiry and ordinary oxjmmisos to Ito iiiciirroil in 
 foriniiifj the company ; and if tiioy docido this question in the 
 idiinniitivc, tlmy may then }^ivo a vcrdirt nj^ainst liim, on furthnr 
 findin",' that tlio work was done, and tho credit givou, ou the faith 
 of hi« hcinp; liahlc' 
 
 § HU. (Ju the Baino principlo, if a man, by holding out faLsc 
 colours, induces a railway ooinpany to register him as a proprietor 
 of shares, ami, subsotpicntly, to bring an action iigainst him for 
 calb) on such shares, ho will bo [trocluded from disputing tho validity 
 of the transfer to him, or from otherwise denying his character as 
 u shareholder.' And, on tho other hand, where a company has 
 registered a j)orson as a sharoholdor, and has induced him, on the 
 faith of 8U(;h registration, to pay a call, thoy will not bo allowed to 
 dispute his title to tho shares.'' Again, on tho same i»rinciple, an 
 infant who has deceived a trailesman by fraudub'ntly representing 
 himself to bo of full age, and thus obtained credit for goods, will 
 bo held b(mn<l by his statijuient,'* and liable to pay tho debt; 
 and a person who has assumed to act as a broker of the city of 
 London cannot, as against a party who has omployoil him, protect 
 himself from a discovery of his dealings with sudi party, on tlxt 
 ground that his answer may expose him to jtcnalties for having 
 acted as a broker without being duly tpialitied." 
 
 > Williiinis V. Pi^ott, 1818 ; T.iiyrht * Unit r. Vr<mt\m.S;r.niM Miiiiii>r 
 
 V. Ilultdii, iind lliittim i: Hri^(ht, Cm., 1,S70; !{•• liuliii iV Knincisro 
 
 1H,J1-.,'J, II. L. IJiiil.Cii. r. Tiittcii, '><1^. Sci', ulso, 
 
 ' Iti'viicll i: LowIh, and Wylil v. AVfliln'. lli'iiie l!:iv li]i|>mviiii,' < 'oiii., 
 
 Hopkins. IH Hi; l,iiko r. I). 1)1' Xr'.'vll, LSTO; anil .'^iiniii r. Anglo-Ainor. 
 
 l.SH. Sou lli;,'i;inMC. llupldiis l.s'lS; T.'li'j,'. Co., ISSH, ( ' A. 
 
 P.uriiMiilo i: Dayrcll, 1HI<»: Itnil. y r. " V.x ]iiiit.' I'nity Jt. St. Mutuiil 
 
 ^laciinluv, iNto"; Itcnnic r. ('liii'kn. Hunk. Assodut., In iv Kinj.', Is.'jH; 
 
 ISJO; U'cnnic f. Wyuii, 181!); V.x N.'lsoii r. Sticker, iSoS*. Tho olil 
 
 paitt! He-ley, iS.'iO. eoniinon law rule, iis recoffnised in 
 
 ' Shi'ilii'lil & Manch. n"il. Co. v, the folio win;; easiw, is no longer law. 
 
 "Wooleock, IHII ; Clicltoniiani \- Ot. I'rico r. ll.'Wctt. IK.V.'; Liv.-rpool 
 
 Wont. Union Hail. Co. ''. I'aniel, 
 1811; In re \oith of Mnp. .It. St. 
 Ilk. Co.. Kx parte StralTon's l].xors., 
 IH.'i.'l; Tavior >'. llnjfheH, 18M (•'••)• 
 Sec Swau I'. North Brit. Austrul. Co.. 
 
 i»6a. 
 
 Ad-'lplii Loan A-o iat. r. I-'airhurst. 
 1,S.-)I: llartli'tt r. Wells, I.S()1; licUoo 
 
 V. iM.-ter, ISli'i. 
 
 " UohinsoM r. Kitcliin, 1866; Qreeu 
 r. Weavor, 1827. 
 
 641 
 
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 Photographic 
 Sciences 
 
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 ■b^ 
 
ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART lU. 
 
 § 845. (Conduct, again, furnishes an admission which is conclusive 
 where parties have acted upon a state of facts mutually assumed as 
 existing. In such a case their rights between themselves will 
 depend on such assumption, and not upon the truth.* Accord- 
 ingly, if a party has taken advjintage of, or voluntarily acted 
 under, the bankrupt or insolvent laws, he will not be permitted, as 
 against parties to the proceedings, to deny their regularity ; ^ the 
 grantee of an annuity, whose duty it formerly was ' to have the 
 memorial properly enrolled, was not allowed to take advantage of 
 his own neglect, and set up the want of enrolment against the 
 grantor, although the statute declared that in case of non-enrolment 
 annuity deeds should be void ; * an agent or a workman who has 
 knowingly rendered an untrue account to his princ'i[)al or em- 
 ployer, whicli lias been adopted by the party to whom it wjs given, 
 cannot afterwards gainsay it ; * the receipt of a man who thereby 
 has acknowledged that he has received money from an agent on 
 account'of his principal, and accredited the Jigent with the principal 
 to that amount, is conclusive as to payment by the agent ; ^ a land- 
 lord who has, with knowledge of all the facts, reccnved rem, from 
 the widow of his lessee for several years is estopped from alleging 
 afterwards that she has not taken out probate ; " if a person having 
 a right to property, whether real'' or personal,^ permit or encourage 
 a purchaser to buy it of another, the purchaser shall hold it against 
 the person who has the right ; and if the owner of an instrument 
 
 ' M'Ciinco V. Loud. & N. W. Rail. 
 Co., 1S()4. 
 
 - Like *■. Howe, 180G ; Clavko v. 
 Cliuko, hSOG; Gouldie v. Gunston, 
 ISUi; Wiit.-^oii V. Wace, 1826, cx- 
 jdiiini'il hi Honne v. Hop^ors, 180(5; 
 Moiior V. \Vis(\ liSOO ; Iliiniiar v. 
 Davis, 1817 ; Flower i\ Ilurbert, 
 1S51. Sccanto, §§ 817, 818. 
 
 ^ Under 53 (i. 3, c. 141, now re- 
 pealed by 17 iV 18 V. c. !)(». 
 
 * Molton r. Ciunroux, 184!). 
 
 » Cavo V. Mills, 18(i'J; Skyriii^ 
 
 Ciroenwood, 18'J.) 
 18'J,J. 
 
 8 ;5 St. Ev. 9o(i. 
 18j;j; llunter i 
 
 Shaw r. I'ieton, 
 
 See Kico v 
 Walters, 
 
 liice, 
 1870. 
 
 .. -„„ , »—.- — -, 
 
 The usual a(knowled{;;uieiit m a 
 policy of inmiranco of tlio receipt 
 of premium from the as.sured is ac- 
 
 cordinn:ly conclusive of tlio tict as 
 between the underwriters and the 
 assured, although not as betwei'n 
 underwriters and bi )kers : Dalzel) r. 
 Mair, 1808 (Ld. Ellenbonnigh) ; Do 
 Ganiinde r. Tifrou, 1812; Anderson 
 V. Tliornton, 18j:j (I'arke. H.). 
 
 ■ Kiinkeu r. M'Murphy, 18S!) (Jr.). 
 
 " a Su>,'. V. & P. 428; 10th edit. : 
 and id. (ill, l.'ith edit.; r('con;niz(^d 
 by tlie court in Sandys n. Hodgson, 
 18;i!). See, also, Kanisden i: Dyson, 
 18()j, II. L. ; and Doe v. Groves, 
 1847 ; Dixon v. Miicklestone, 1872 
 L. C. ; Ho Lambert's Estate, 1884, 
 C. A. (Jr.). 
 
 " I'ickard v. Sears, 18;}" ; Gregg v. 
 Wells, 18;J9 ; Coles i-. Bk. of England, 
 1839. 
 
 642 
 
 1 1 
 
 1 1 '; , 
 
 hi"; 
 
 ■c 
 
CHAP. 
 
 IX.] 
 
 ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. 
 
 which purports to be transferable by delivery, deposit it with his 
 broker or banker, he will be estopped, as against a bona fide holder 
 for value, from denying that it was transferable.^ 
 
 § 846. Further examples of the doctrine that where both parties 
 have acted upon a state of facts assumed by mutual consent are as 
 follow : — Trespass is not maiutaiuable against a sheriff's officer 
 who executes process against a man by a wrong name, either by 
 taking his person, or seizing his goods, if before the process bo 
 sued out, he is asked his name, and gives such wrong one ; '^ a 
 party, who has entered into a bond by a wrong name, and is sued 
 in that name, would be estopped from denying that the name in 
 which he was sued was his real name.^ Where, on a compulsory 
 reference, although the award was not made within the period 
 limited by the statute, both parties have after the lapse of that 
 period continued to attend before the arbitrator without olijecting 
 to his jurisdiction, the losing party is estopped from alleging that 
 the time has not been enlarged, either by the court, or by the 
 written consent of the parties;* and where a judge, having tried 
 a cause without a jury, with the couso;it of both parties who 
 appeared before him, the unsuccessful party was not allowed after- 
 wards to object that no written consent had been drawn up as the 
 statute required.* 
 
 § 847. Again, if the members of an incorporated company allow 
 a solicitor to appear for them as defendants, and he consents to 
 a reference, they cannot, after the award is made, object to the 
 submission, on the ground that the solicitor had no authority under 
 seal to defend or refer the cause ;^ a judge's order which was bad 
 
 > Goodwin v. Eobarts, 1S7(), H. L.; 
 Eunibiill r. Mctrop. Ilk., 1877. 
 
 * Seo JJuiiston v. I'atovson, 18J7 ; 
 Kelly V. liawreiico, 18(14; Price v. 
 Harwood, 1811 (IaI. Kllcnborough) ; 
 citi'd and recofrnized (Crosswull, J.) 
 in Fisht>r v. Magiiay, 184;}. Si'o, 
 also, Eeovcs v. Slater, 1827. As to a 
 ca. sa.. see Morgans v. Biidjjos, 1818, 
 and Magnay v. Tishcr, 184;}, ajipa- 
 retitly overruling Cooto v. Lcigli- 
 worth, lo'.X!, and dictum (Ld. Halo) 
 iu Thurlmno ot al., 1(1()4, though in 
 Freeman v. Cooke, 1848, Parke, 15.. 
 intimated that it had alwavs been 
 
 the oiiinion of tlie jtrofession that 
 Coote i\ Leisrliwinth, loOli, was law. 
 3 R. ('. Woohhile, 1844 (Wight- 
 man, J., citing Maby v. Sheplu'rd, 
 KJ'JIl, and livckman v. fShotbolt, 
 1 o()7). See, al">o, ;{ & 4 W. 4, c. 42, 
 § 11, and Willianis v. IJryaiit, 18;i!), 
 
 * Tyerman i;. Smith, 18Jf). See, 
 also, Haines v. E. India Co., 18JG 
 (Sir J. Patteson), P. C. 
 
 » Andrewes v. Elliott, 1856; 17 & 
 18 V. c. 12o, § 1. 
 
 • FavioU V. East. Cos. Bail. Co., 
 1818. 
 
 043 
 
ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART III. 
 
 as a proceeding under a now repealed Interpleader Act,' for want 
 of a statement of consent upon its face, was nevertheless held to be 
 conclusive upon the parties, as they had by their conduct agreed to 
 submit the matter in dispute to the decision of the judge ; ^ a lessor 
 who, after giving notice to his lessee to do repairs within the period 
 pres(!ribed by the lease, so conducted himself as to lull the lessee 
 asleep and to lead him to suppose that he might refrain from doing 
 the repairs, was not allowed (although a mere parol licence to break 
 such covenant will not justify a breach thereof^") to insist upon a 
 covenant of forfeiture, on the ground that the repairs had not been 
 finished within the time fixed for them ; ^ an action for forfeiture 
 by breach of a covenant to insure on the tenant's part, qualified by 
 an option given to the landlord to insure if the tenant made 
 default, and to add the premiums to his rent, was allowed to be 
 defeated by proof that the landlord had represented to the tenant 
 that he had exercised the power, and had himself duly insured the 
 premises ; ■* while a tenant who has paid rent, and acted as such, is 
 not (as stated more fully in another place,') permitted to set up a 
 superior title of a third person against his lessor, since he derived 
 possession from him as tenant, and therefore caanot be allowed to 
 repudiate that relation. 
 
 § 848. The doctrine of estoppel (or admission) by conduct is also 
 applied to the respective relations of licensor and licensee, bailor 
 and bailee, and principal and agent ; it being clear that neither 
 licensees, nor bailees, nor agents, can be permitted to dispute the 
 respective titles of their licensors, bailors, or principals." Accord- 
 ingly a licensee imder a patentee is estopped from disputing the 
 validity of the patent, so long as the licence continues in force ; ' 
 and a warehouseman, wharfinger, banker, solicitor, agent, or other 
 de])0sitary of goods or moneys (not being a mere pledgee) who has 
 
 « Ante, §§ 101—103. 
 
 6 Dixon V. JIamond, 1819 (Ab- 
 bott, C.J.) ; Collctt V. Hubbard, 
 184(5; Zuliiota v, Vinent, 1851-2; 
 Phillips V. Hall, 1832 (Am.) ; Drown 
 V. Smith, 1825 (Am.); Eastman v. 
 Tuttle, 1823 (Am.) ; M'Neil v. Philip, 
 1821 (Am.); Chapman v. Searle, 1825 
 (Am.); Jewott v. Terry, 1814 (Am.)j 
 Lyman v. I;ynuin, 1814 (Am.)- 
 
 ' Crosslov V. Dixon, 1«G3, H. L. ; 
 Clark V. Adie, 1877, H. L. 
 
 > 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 58. 
 
 * Harrison r. Wrip^ht, 1845. 
 2» Doo V. Gladwin, 1845; West v. 
 
 Blakowuy, 1841. 
 
 '" Uu-riics V. Motrop. Eail. Co., 
 1877, H. L. But see Kennedy v. 
 Earl of Essex, 1891 (Ir.); Eobinson 
 V. Wakeliel.l, 1892 (Ir.). 
 
 * Don V. Sutton, 1841 ; explained 
 by Patteson, .1., in Doo v. Gladwin, 
 1,S4.'); Doe v, Howe, 1825. See ante, 
 J§ 804—808. 
 
 544 
 
 ir 
 
CIIAT. IX.] ADMISSIONS ACTKD UrOX BY OTHERS. 
 
 once aoknowletlgod a person's title, and agreed to bold goods or 
 moneys subject to bis order, or to sell goods and to account for tbe 
 proceeds, will be estopped from setting up tbe title of a tbird 
 person to tbe same goods or moneys, or from ot])erwise defeating 
 tbe rigbts of bis bailor or principal, against bis own manifi^st 
 obligations to bira.^ An exception to tbe general rule will, 
 bowever, be allowed, wbere tbe bailment bas been determined by 
 wbat is equivalent to an eviction by title paramount,* and, also, 
 wbere tbe bailor or principal bas obtained tbe goods fraudulently 
 or tortiously from tbe tbird person,^ provided tbe defendant in such 
 last case can sbow, tbat be was unacquainted witb tbe circumstances 
 wben be made tbe admission,* and tbat such tbird person has 
 actually made a claim to tbe goods or moneys in question.' 
 Perhaps tbe bailor's title might also be impugned, should the 
 circumstances show that he, in connexion with some third person, 
 had practised a fraud on the bailee, by representing goods to 
 belong to the bailor, which, in fact, were the property of such 
 tbird person, if proof were also given, tbat the defendant, in 
 consequence of the fraudulent misrepresentation, bad sustained any 
 real injury.® 
 
 § 841). Moreover, where a person pfrd(jrx property to which he 
 has no title, tbe pledgee is not estopped from delivering it to the 
 rightful owner. For, on an ordinary pledge, the pledgor impliedly 
 undertakes tbat the {)roperty is his own, and che pledgee merely 
 undertakes tbat he will return it +o the pledgor, providcl it be not 
 shown to belong to another.^ A common carrier, also, being bound 
 to receive goods for carriage, and having no means of making 
 inquiry as to their ownership, is at liberty to dispute the title of 
 tbe person from whom be has received them ; and may establish a 
 
 > Goslinp: V. Birnio, 1831 ; Wood- 
 loy V. Covontry, 18().'i; Stoiiiiid i\ 
 Duiikin, 18H) (Lil. Ellonl)()nmf,'li) ; 
 Ili.nnan v. Aiideraiiii, 1809 (id.); 
 Knijihts v. WitVcn, 1870; lluwes v. 
 Wiitson. 18:i4 ; Dixon r. lluiiunond, 
 1819; IJohi'its v. OKilby, 1821; Anon. 
 (Gould, J.) (iiiidiitod), iHM'ojinif'ed by 
 Ld. Kouvon in Liicl<)iif,'li r. Towlc, 
 IhOO; l'atrinj;don r. Clt'ik. 178J ; 
 UoIl V. Ghtlin, 18;W; Nickolson r. 
 
 Knowlos, 18'20; Evans r.Xichol, 1841. 
 lSei',lio\vi'vur,Thiiriio '•.Tilbiii'v, 1858. 
 
 » Bid.Uo r. liond. IMJ.5. 
 
 3 IIiudnKiiw.Wilcock,lS32; Biddle 
 v. Bond, is(i'). 
 
 * I'er AldiTson, J., in Gosling v. 
 Birnio, l8'il ; Ex puit<? Davies, Be 
 Siidlcr, 18,S1. 
 
 * lk'tt.l.'v r. Kfid. \Hr.i. 
 
 « Scott (•.■Cra\viV)id. 1842. 
 ' C'hecsnian c. Exall, I8jl. 
 
 645 
 
ADMISSIONS ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART III. 
 
 defence by proving that he has delivered the goods to the real 
 owner on his claiming them.* A vendor, however, who has sold 
 goods to a party as a sole purchaser, and has directed his factors 
 to weigh them over to such party, and to enter them in his name 
 in their books, cannot, after such sale and transfer, dispute his title 
 as sole proprietor, or detain the goods, on the authority of a third 
 person, who claims to be a joint purchaser.^ 
 
 § 850. Further examples of conclusive admissions (or estoppels) 
 by conduct arise in connection with bills of exchange. Thus, in an 
 action against the acceptor, the defendant cannot show that his 
 signature has been forged il he has accredited a bill, and induced 
 the plaintiff to take it, by saying that it wus his, and would be 
 luly paid.' Moreover, althougli at one time it was deemed law, 
 that no consideration of estoppel as between the parties could have 
 any weight where the rights of the rcirnnr intervened ; and that, 
 consequently, the maker of a cheque payable to bearer on demand^ 
 might defraud even a bona fide holder for value, bj' proving that 
 the cheque was post-dated, and, as such, inadmissible in evidence 
 without a bill stamp,^ this doctrine has now been repudiated." The 
 law now is, that if a cheque, — whether payable to bearer or to 
 order, — appears, wlien tendered in evidence, to bear on its face a 
 sufficient stamp, the court will receive the document, and will not 
 allow any proof to be given that it had actually been post-dated, 
 and that the holder had taken it with knowledge of that fact.' 
 
 § 851. The acceptance of a bill is, moreover, deemed a conchime 
 ai/mmion,^ as against the acceptor, of the signature of the drawer,^ 
 and of his capacity to draw ; '" and if the bill be payable to the 
 order of the drawer, of his capacity to indorse ; " and if it be drawn 
 
 • Sheridan r. The New Quay Co., 
 1858. 
 
 * Kiorun v. Siiiuliirs, ISUT. 
 
 3 Leach v. IJudianan. 180;5 (Ld. 
 EUonborough); recnfiniziHl (Jiliskino, 
 J.) in 8a!itler.s()n c. CoUiiian, 1842. 
 
 * Whistler t). Fnrstor, 18;}.'5; Austin 
 V. Bunyard, 1805 (^Cockburn, C.J.) ; 
 Bull i..'()'Sunivan,'l871. 
 
 ' Field r. Woods. 18;}7; reco<j- 
 nii^ed ill Stcadniim r. l)uhiiinol, 18-15. 
 
 • All-till r. Huiiyaiil. |S()5. 
 
 ' Galty V. Try, 1877 ; Emanuel v. 
 
 Eoharts. ISOS. 
 
 » See 45 I't 4() V. c. fil ("The Bills 
 of ExehiiiiKe Act, 1882 "), § 54. 
 
 " Saudeis(in c. CoUnian, 1842; Bass 
 V. Clivo, 1815. 
 
 •0 Id. See Haly v. Lane, 1741 (Ld. 
 Ilardwieke). 
 
 " Taylor v. Croker, 1803 (Ld. El- 
 lenboroufrh) ; Pitt v. Chappelow, 
 1841 ; Drayton v. Dale, 182;j. All 
 thi^so cases were recosj-iii/ed by the 
 court in Saiul< rsou r. Colliiiau. 1842. 
 See, ulbo, Jjiaithw :utu v. Oardiuer, 
 
 546 
 
 liii 
 
C. IX.] WHAT ACCEPTOR OF BILL OF EXCHANGE ADMITS. 
 
 by procuration, of the authority of the agent to draw in the name 
 of the principal.^ In this respect it matters not whether the bill be 
 drawn before or after the acceptance.*^ But the acceptance is not 
 an admission on the part of the acceptor, either of the signature 
 of the payee, though he be the same party as the drawer,^ or of that 
 of any other huloner ; * and this, too, although, at the time of the 
 acceptance, the indorsements were on the bill. * Nor does it admit 
 that an agent, who has drawn a bill by procuration, payable to the 
 order of the principal, has authority to indorse the same ; ^ nor, 
 Avhere the bill has been drawn in the partnership name and made 
 payable to tlie firm's order, does it estop the acceptor from showing 
 that such bill was in fact not indorsed by the firm nor negotiated 
 for any partnership purpose ; ' nor does it if it be given on a bill 
 payable to the order of the drawer on which the name of a real 
 person as drawer and indorser is forrjed, if given in ignorance of 
 the forgery, preclude the acceptor from denying the genuineness 
 of the indorsement, though it be in the same handwriting as the 
 drawing which he is bound to admit.^ If, however, an acceptor, 
 with hnou-leclge of the forgery, puts the bill in circulation, he will 
 be estopped by that conduct from disputing the validity of the 
 indorsement equally with that of the drawing.^ And if a bill be 
 drawn in a wholly fictitious name, and the handwriting of the 
 indorsement be the same as that of the drawing, the acceptor will 
 also be estopped from denying it, because he admits that the bill is 
 drawn by somebody, that is, by the person who indorses in the same 
 handwriting, and the fair construction to be put on his undertaking 
 
 1845, where, in an action by indorsee 
 agaiiif<t acceptor, dct'ciidaiit was held 
 estopped from pleadin" that the 
 drawer and first indorser was an 
 uncertificated bankrupt when tlie 
 acceptance was given, and that his 
 assignees had demanded payment. 
 So, in a siniihu' action, it was held 
 that the defendant could not plead, 
 under the old law, that the drawer 
 and first indorser was a married 
 woman from the date of the drawing 
 down to the time of the indorsing of 
 the bill : Smith v. Marsack, lfS-18. 
 See ante, § ,S4'J. 
 
 ' I'obiiison '•. Yarrow, IHIT ; Jones 
 V. Turnour, 1H30 (Ld. Teiiterden). 
 
 * Sclniltzi'. Astlov, 1836; Ilallifax 
 V. Lyle. l.qf) ; I.ond. & S. West. Uk. 
 ?'. Wontworth, 1880. lint see Baxen- 
 dale V. Bennett, 1878, C. A. 
 
 ^ Forster v. Clements, 1809 ; Mac- 
 fei'sou ('. Thoj'tes, 17!)(); Bosanquet 
 V. Anderson, 1800 (Lord Ellen- 
 borougli); Cooper v, Meyer, 1830 
 (Ld. Tonterden). 
 
 * Id. 
 
 ' Smith V. Chester, 178"; Eobarts 
 V. Tucker, 18,)1. 
 
 ^ lioliin.'ion r. Yarrow, 1817; re- 
 cognised in Bei (nan r. Duck, 1843. 
 
 ' Garland v, Jacomb, 1873. 
 
 " 1 iceman v. Duck, 1843. 
 
 ■ Id 
 
 64: 
 
WHAT INDORSEMENT OF BILL OR NOTE ADMITS. [p. III. 
 
 is, that he will pay to the signature of the f.ame person who signed 
 for the drawer.' 
 
 § 852. The difference which arises as regards their being 
 estopped hy their action between the position of a drawer and that 
 of an indorser, who signs the bill before the acce^jtance, will have 
 been noticed. The reasons usually assigned for this difference 
 are, that an (ircrj)foi' is only presumed to be accpiaint'^d with the 
 handwriting of the drawer, and it consequently is sutR(nent if he 
 ascertains that his signature is genuine ; that he is not bound to 
 look at the back of the bill at all ; that, even if he were, he could 
 not be supposed to know the handwriting of indorsers, who would 
 probably be strangers to him ; and that a different rule would 
 raise nice questions of fact in every case as to whether the bill 
 was indorsed before or after acceptance, and would consequently 
 embarrass the circulation of negotiable securities, by rendering the 
 position of acceptors hazardous and undefined.' 
 
 § 853. By analogy with the law which estops an acceptor from 
 disputing the genuineness of the drawing, the indorsement by the 
 payee of a promissory note is a conclusive admission of the hand- 
 writing of the maker;' and the indorsement of a bill of exchange 
 will also operate as an estoppel on the indorser to deny any of the 
 preceding signatures* 
 
 § 854. Having now fully discussed the effect of admissions 
 which have been acted upon, we may point out that those admis- 
 sions, which have not been acted upon either because t/ie// irere 
 orUjinaUij made uithout any intention of being acted upon, or because 
 for any other reason they, in fact, remain not aeted upon, or have 
 not altered the -situation of the opposite party, are not conclusive, 
 though they are receivable in evidence against the parties making 
 tham.^ Thus, if A. contracts to sell goods to B., and gives him a 
 delivery order, he may, on B.'s bankruptcy, provided B. has 
 
 » Cooper V. Meyer, 1830 (Ld. Ten- 
 terdon), oxpliiinod and recognised by 
 Paike, B., in Ufeman v. Duck, 1843. 
 See, also, .Sshpitel v. Bryan, 18G4 ; 
 Phillips V. Im Tliurn, ISfUi. 
 
 2 See Story, Bills, § •Jfi.'i ; l<oi)inson 
 V. Yarrow, I'SIT (Park, J.) ; Smith v. 
 Chester, 1 787 ; Canal Bk. v. Bk. of 
 Albany, 1841 (Am.). 
 
 ' Free v. Hawkins, 1817 (Gibbs, 
 C.J.) 
 
 * 4.5 & 46 V. c. 61 ("The Bills of 
 Exchange Act, 1882"). § oj. 
 
 ' See Howard ;;. Ilndson. 1853; 
 White :•. Greenish, 1861 ; Foster v. 
 Mentor Lit" \ssiir. Co., 18.)4; Carr 
 V. Lond. it N West. Eail. Co., 1875; 
 Coventry c Gt. East. Rail. Co., 1883. 
 
 648 
 
 !' 
 
CHAP. IX.] ADMISSIONS NOT ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. 
 
 neither paid for them, nor sold them to a third party, show that 
 the delivery order was invalid, and tlu-refore did not amount to a 
 constructive delivery of the goods ; ' the court will not treat the 
 alter.tion of its locality, after complaint, as conclusive evidence 
 that a trade was a nuisance ; " nor will it, in a petition for damages 
 by reason of adultery,^ regard an admission by the defendant 
 that at some othor and different time the " tetririma caimi " was 
 the wife of the plaintiff as conclusive evidence tliat she was the 
 wife of the plaintiff at the time when the adultery was com- 
 mitted;' a sheriff's return, though con('lut<ive, in the particular 
 cause in which it is made, or for the purposes of an attacliment, 
 does not, in any other action or proceeding, operate as an estoppel, 
 either against the sheriff or against his bailiff;* a creditor is not 
 estopped from bringing an action against a sheriff for a false 
 return, by accepting the amount levied on account and towards 
 the satisfaction of the debt mentioned in the writ;** and a person 
 who brought an action of trover for a dog, was held not to be 
 precluded from proving his title to it, though he had previously 
 authorised a third party (against whom the defendant had brought 
 an action) to deliver it to the defendant, at the same time demand- 
 ing it back on behalf of the plaintiff as being the hitter's pro- 
 perty.' In these,^ and the like casee,'' no wrong is done to the 
 other party, by receiving any legal evidence to show that the 
 admii^sion was erroneous, and by leaving the whole evidence, 
 including the admission, to be weighed by the jury. 
 
 § y55. The doctrine that a person is not estopped by representa- 
 tions which were not intended to be acted upon, or have in fact not 
 been acted upon, has in one case b ^en extended to cases in which 
 the representations were such that they ouijht not to have been 
 acted upon. In an action against a sheriff for seizing the 
 
 * Lack.iigton v, Atherton, 1844. 
 
 » R V. Neville, 1791 (Ld. Kenyon). 
 
 » See 20 & 21 V. c. 85 ("The 
 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857"), 
 §33. 
 
 * Moriis V Miller, 1707; t'uither 
 explained in Kio;g v. Curgonven, 
 1769. 
 
 * Standish v. Ross. 1849 ; Brydgcs 
 V. Walf'ord, 1817 ; Jackson v. liiJl, 
 
 1839; Eemmett v. Lawrence, 1850; 
 Levy V. Ilule, 1849; Stinison v. Farn- 
 ham, 1871. 
 
 " Holmes V. Clifton, 1839, over- 
 ruliny; Beynon v. Gun at, l.Si!4. 
 
 ' Sandys c. Hodgson. 1839. 
 
 « Gr. Ev. § 209, four lines. 
 
 ' See ante, §§ 804— 80S. See, also, 
 Machu V. Lond. & S. "West. Kaii, Co., 
 1848; Grefii)i=V' « White, 1801. 
 
 549 
 
 .4 
 
ADMISSIONS NOT ACTED UPON BY OTHERS. [PART III. 
 
 plaintiff's goods under an eyecution against his brother, where 
 the plaiutill', fearing an execution, liad removed his goods to the 
 brother's liouse, and when tlie sheriff's officer came there had 
 (erroneously supposing that the writ was against liijnself) warned 
 tlie officer not to seize the goods, as they belonged to his brother, 
 but on the officer jjroducing a writ against the brother, before the 
 goods were actually seized, told him that such goods were the 
 property of a third party, and the officer, disregarding this last 
 statement, seized and sold the goods, as belonging to the brother ; 
 the jury having fomid that the goods were the plaintiff's, but that, 
 bi'foio the seizure, he had falsely stated to the officer that they 
 belonged to his brother, and tliat the officer was thereby induced 
 to seize them as his brother's, a verdict was entered for the 
 plaintiff, on the grounds, first, that the plaintiff did not intend to 
 induce the officer to seize the goods as those of the brother ; and 
 next, that no reasonable man would have seized the goods on the 
 faitli of the plaintiff's representations tahcn altogctlipr} 
 
 % 9>')(S} Admissions l.ave also been held conclusive on grounds 
 oi public po/ic// in some few cases connected with public justice and 
 government. For instance, in an action for penalties for election 
 bribery, a man who had given mc-iey to another for liis vote is 
 not permitted to say that such latter had no right to vote;' where 
 the owners of a stage coach took up more passengers than allowed, 
 and an '"njury was alleged as having arisen from overloading, 
 their conduct was held to be conclusive evidence that the accident 
 was occasioned by the cause assigned ; * one who has officiously 
 intermeddled with the goods of another recently deceased, is, in 
 favour of creditors, estopped from denying that he is executor;' 
 an executrix who treats the goods of her ' estator as the property 
 of her husband, will not be allowed to object to their being taken 
 in execution for her husband's debt;" where a statute made it 
 illegal to publish reports of the meetings of suppressed associations, 
 a report stating that a suppressed association lud held a meeting 
 and purporting to report the proceedings at that meeting, was 
 
 » FrcGman v. Cooke, 1848. 
 » Gr. Ev. § 210. in part. 
 ■> Combe v. Pitt, 17(54 ; Eif 
 Cui'guuvon, ITCy. 
 
 * Israel v. Clark, lO.'J (Ld. Keiiyon, 
 rccojrnised by Ld. EUciiborough). 
 
 ■g V 
 
 * lleade's case, 16()4-.j. 
 6 Quick ('.Staines. 17'JS. 
 •wick V, Laycock, 1841. 
 
 650 
 
 See Fen- 
 
CHAP. IX.] SWOKN ADMISSIONS— ADMISSIONS IN DEEDS. 
 
 held, even in a criminal case, to be an admission that such a 
 meeting had in fact taken place;' and a shipowner, whose ship 
 after being forfeited for broach of the revenue laws, had been 
 given up to him on making an application, verified by oath, that 
 the forfeiture had been incurred by the master iguorautly and 
 without fraud, was not permitted afterwards, in an action by the 
 latter against himself for wages on the same voyage, to gainsay 
 this statement, and to prove the misconduct of the master, even on 
 proving that the fraud had come to his knowledge subscijuoutly.^ 
 
 § 857. '^ Moreover, an admission is not rendered conclusive 
 against the party by the mere fact tliat it was made imder oath ; 
 though this circumstance greatly adds to its weight ami tlirows 
 upon the party the burthen of showing that it was made under a 
 mistake which was both innocent and is perfectly clear. Thus, in 
 a prosecution under the gnme laws, proof of the defendant's oath, 
 under an Income Act then in force, that the yearly value of his 
 estate was less than 100/., was held not quite conclusive against 
 him, though very strong evid 'ice of the fact.* The same principle 
 is applitd where the fact sworn to was not, as it might be considered 
 in the above case, a matter of judgment, but was purely a matter 
 of fact within the knowledge of the party swearing.* Tlie defen- 
 dant's belief of a fact, sworn to in an old answer in Chancery, is 
 also admissible evidence against him, but no conclusive.^ 
 
 § 858." Admissions in dcedn have alread 1' ii considered in 
 regard to parties and privies,* between wli -y are generally 
 
 ' Reg. V. Suftivan, 1887 (Ir.). 
 
 » Freeman v. Walker, 1829 (Am.). 
 But a sworn entry at the custom- 
 house of certain premises, as being 
 rented by A., B., and C, as partners, 
 for the sale of beer, though conehi- 
 sivo in favour of the Crown, is not 
 conclusive evidence of the partner- 
 ship, in a civil suit, in favour of a 
 stranger. Ellis v. Watson, 1818. The 
 dilforenco between this case and that 
 in the text may be that, in the latter, 
 the owner gained an advantage to 
 himself, which was not the case in 
 the imtry of ])artn(!rship ; it being 
 only incidental to the principal ob- 
 ject, nitniely, the designation of the 
 place where an exciscable commodity 
 
 was sold. 
 
 3 Gr. Ev. § 210, in part. 
 
 * E. V. Clarke, 1799. 
 
 » Thornes v. AVhite, 1833. 
 
 « Doe V. Steel, 1811 (Ld. EUen- 
 borougli). Statements of fact con- 
 tained in answers in Chancery were 
 at common law always admissible 
 agiiinst the party ; but not strictly 
 conclusive, niorelj' because they were 
 sworn to. See B. N. P. TM, 237; 
 Cameron v. Lightfoot, 1777 ; Grant 
 V. Jackson, 1793; .Studdv v. Sanders, 
 1823; Do Wheljjdale 'v. Milburn, 
 1818. Cf. infra, note '^ § 8o9. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 21 1, in great part, 
 
 » Ante, §§91—100. 
 
 551 
 
Ill ul; 
 
 ADMISSIONS IN RCCEIPTS, PASS-BOOKS, ETC. [pART III. 
 
 regarded as estoppels, if properly pleaded.* Siicli adiiiisHions, even 
 when not technically estoppels, are entitled to groat weight, from 
 the solemnity of their nature.'' When, however, they are od'ired 
 in evidence by a stranger, tlie adverse jiarty may repol tlieir 
 effeot, in the same manner as though they wore only parol 
 admissions.' 
 
 § Hij\).* Various other admissions, even when they are in writing, 
 are not conclusive if they have never been acted upon by another 
 to his prejudice, nor fall within the reasons before mentioned for 
 est()]i])ing the party aguiust gainsaying them. Such admissions 
 are left to bo weighed with other evidence by the jury, lirccipts, 
 mere acknowledgments, either for goods or money, and wliother 
 on separate papers,'* or indorsed on deeds," or on negotiable 
 securities,' are of this nature, as are also bankers' pans-hooks ; * an 
 adju^inent of a loan on a policy of insurance, which has been made 
 without full knowledge of all the circumstances, or under a mistake 
 of law or fact, or under any other invalidating circumstances;" 
 and so, too, are acvonntH rendered, such as a solicitor s bill,'" and the 
 like." An old bill in Chancery is not admissible at all against the 
 plaintiff in proof of the admimo>iH it contains, since the facts stated 
 thei'ein are regarded as nothing more than the mere suggestions of 
 counsel.'* 
 
 § 860, An inventory of the personal estate of a deceased person, 
 exhibited by a personal representative on the citation of a person 
 interested, either in the Ecclesiastical Court under the old law, or 
 
 1 Fislimonsfers' Co. v. Robertson, 
 184;J ; Bowii.an v. Rostron, 1834. 
 
 ' Doe I'. Stono, lH4(i. 
 
 3 R. V. Nevillo, 1791; Woodward 
 V. liiirkiiifi;, 1M)1 ; May. of Carlisle 
 V. lilamirn, 1807. 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 212, in great part. 
 
 6 Skaifo ('. Jack<on, 1824 ; Farrar 
 r. Tlutchinson, 18;ji»; Wallace w. Kel- 
 eall, 1840 (Parke, B.); Bowes v. 
 Foster, 1858 (Martin, B.); Loe v. 
 Lane. & Yorks. Rail. Co., 1871. 
 These cases have virtually overruled 
 Alner v. George, 180S. For Ameri- 
 can cases, see Haidun v. Gordon, 
 1823 ; Fuller v. Crittenden, 1N32 ; 
 Ensign v. Webster, 179!); Putnam 
 V. Lewis, 1811; Stackpole ?;. ArimM, 
 1814; Tucker v. Maxwell, 1814; 
 
 Williamson v. Scott, 1821. 
 
 * Straton v. liastall, 1788; Lampon 
 V. Corko, 1822 (Ilolroyd and Best. 
 JJ.). As to cast's whore the receii)t 
 of money is mentioned in the deed 
 itself, see ante, § 9G. 
 
 ' Graves v. Key, 18J2. 
 
 * Commercial Bk. of Scotland v, 
 Rhind, 1800, II. L. 
 
 * Luckio ('. Bushby, 1853; Reyner 
 V. Hall, 1813 ; Shepl'ierd v. Chowter, 
 1808 ; Adams v. Sanders, 1829 ; 
 Christian v. Coombe, 1790. 
 
 '" Loveridgo v. Botham, 1797. 
 
 " See Bacoa v. Chesney, 1816; 
 Dawson v. Bomnant, 180(5. 
 
 " Boileau v. Rutlin, 1848 ; Doe v. 
 Sybourn, 1790 (Ld. Kenyon) ; of. 
 supra, note * to § 857. 
 
 552 
 
C. IX.] INVENTORY, HOW PAl! AN ADMISSION OF ASSKTS. 
 
 in tlio Probate Division of the TTigli Court under the now law,' 
 being sworn to by the oxhihitant, will \w iirima i':icio evidence of 
 assets ; and so also will a dn /((ration of the personalfy of a testator 
 or intestate, wliioh has been made on oath by his representative 
 before a final stttlenient of accounts,^ and since the 1st of June, 
 1H81, an affidavit received by the Commissioners of Inland 
 lievenue from any person ap[)lying for probate or letters of 
 administration, verifying the account of the deceased's estate or 
 effects ; ' and the executor or adniinistrntor, if ho has pleaded plone 
 administravit, will be forced to show, cither the non-existence of 
 such assets, or that they have not reached his hands, or that they 
 have been duly administered ;* and perhaps in the case last named 
 the afTidavit will even be sufficient proof that such assets have been 
 realized in due course.' An old probate stamp," though slight 
 evidence of assets to the amount covered thereby, was not alone 
 sufficient to throw upon executors the burthen of proving the non- 
 receipt of such assets.' Coupled, however, with proof, either of 
 long acquiescence in the payment of the duty, or of other sus- 
 picious circumstances, it furnished a presumption of assets received, 
 which executors found it difficult to rebut.* 
 
 § 861.^ Evidence of oral admissions ought always to be received 
 with great caution}^ Such evidence is necessarily subject to much 
 imperfection and mistake ; for either the party himself may have 
 been misinformed, or he may not have clearly expressed his 
 
 » 20 & 21 V. c. 77 (" The Court of 
 Probiito Act, 18j7 "), as amended by 
 "Tlio Stiituto Law Revision Act, 
 1892," (55 & 56 V. c. 19); Rules of 
 1862 for Ct. of Prob. in contentious 
 business, r. 76, and Form No. 27. 
 
 '■' See Rules of 1862 for Reg. of Ct. 
 of Prob. in non- contentious business, 
 Form No. 18 ; and Rules for Dist. 
 Reg. of Ct. of Prob., Form No. 18, 
 and cases cited in note *, infra. 
 
 => 44 v. 0. 12 (" The Customs and 
 Inland Revenue Act, 1881 "), §§ 27— 
 29. This law has prevailed in Ireland 
 for some years past. See Rowan v. 
 Jebb, 1846 (Ir.). 
 
 * Giles V. Dyson, 1815, explained 
 in Stearn v. Mills, 18;}3 ; Parsons v. 
 Hancock. 1829 (Parke, J.) ; Hickey 
 V. Ilay ter, 1795 ; Young v. Cawdrey, 
 
 1819. SeeHuttonv. Rossiter, 1854-5. 
 
 * 44 V. c. 12, § 31. To understand 
 the new law respecting probate and 
 legacy duty, and duties on accounts, 
 see, and study, 44 V. c. 12, §§ 26— 
 43. 
 
 * An affidavit stamp is now substi- 
 tuted for the probate stamp. See 
 44 V. c. 12, § 27. 
 
 ' Mann v, Lang, 1835 ; Steam v. 
 Mills, 1833. These cases overrule 
 Poster V. Blakelock, 1826. 
 
 « Mann v. Lang, 1835 (Ld. Den- 
 man) ; Curtis v. Hunt, 1824 (Ld. 
 Tenterdenl; Rowan v. oebb, 1846 
 (Ir.); Lazonby v. lUwson, 1854 (Ld. 
 Cranworth). 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 200, in part. 
 
 »" See post, § 862. 
 
 553 
 
ORAL ADMISSIONS TO BE RECEIVED WITH CAUTION, [p. III. 
 
 meaning,' or the witness may have misunderstood him,^ or may 
 purposely misquote the expressions used.' It also sometimes 
 happens, that the witness, by unintentionally altering a few words, 
 will give an effect to the statement completely at variance with 
 what the party actually said.^ But where the admission is delibe- 
 rately made, and precisely identified, the evidence it affords is often 
 of the most satisfactory nature.* 
 
 » See Gospel of St. John, cL. 21, 
 w. 21—23. 
 
 2 See St. Matthew, ch. 27, vv. 46, 
 47. 
 
 ' See, and compare, St, John, 
 ch. 2, w. 18 — 21, and St. Matthew, 
 ch. 26, vv. 60, 61. 
 
 * Ante, § 216, n. *. Alciatus ex- 
 presses the sense of the civilians to 
 the same effect, where, after speak- 
 ing of ihe weight of a judicial ad- 
 mission, "propter majorem certi- 
 
 tudinem, quam in ee habet," he 
 adds : ' ' Qure ratio non habet locum 
 quando ista confessio probaretur per 
 testes ; imo est minus certa cceteria 
 probatiomhus," &c. : Alciat. de Proos., 
 Pars. 2, Ccl. 682, n. 6. See Poth. 
 Obi. App. No. 16, § 13; Lench v. 
 Lench, 1805. 
 
 ° Riffgv. Curgenven, 1769; Glassf. 
 I'W. 356 ; Com. v. Knapp, 1830 (Am.) 
 (Putnam, J.). As to Admissiuns by 
 J.genta, see ante, §§ 602 — 605. 
 
 654 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 5541 
 
 amp:rican notes. 
 
 Admissions. — As stated in the text (§ 723), an admission, in the 
 law of evidence is rather a leviuiicn probatlonis than ajwuljatio; — 
 a fact to be proved by evidence iian evidence to prove a fact. In 
 popular acceptation, an "admission" is a statement made by n party 
 against his interest. Such is not the legal meaning of the phrase. 
 A rule of procedure prescribes that no proof need be oifered of a rele- 
 vant fact which the other sido has stated. It is, so to speak, 
 one of the rules of the game ; — analogous to that wliich exemjited 
 a party under common law pleading from the necessity of proving 
 a fact not denied by his opponent. The statement of the relevant 
 fact may have seemed liighly favourable to the interest of t'he declar- 
 ant at the time it was made. It is competent evidence, notwith- ' 
 standing. It is naturally to be inferred from the circumstance that 
 the statement has become relevant to the cause of tlie opposite side 
 that, in many instances, tlie declaration as made is really against 
 the interest of tlie declarant. But the statement is not rendered 
 competent by this fact. It is admissible because the other side 
 made it. Powell r. Tarry, 77 Va. L'.jO (1SS3); I'otter r. Mellin, 41 
 Minn. 487 (1881)); (loodnow r. ['arsons, .% Vt. 40 (ISCS); Kobiii- 
 son V. Stuart, G8 :\[e. fit (1878) ; Crowe v. Colbeth, Go Wis. 043 
 (188;")); Com. v. Gay, 102 Mass. 4r)8 (1894) ; " Tlie admissions of a 
 party, if material to the issue, are always competent." Mears /•. 
 Cornwall, 73 Mich. 78 (1888). Where part of a conversation, claimed 
 to amount to an admission, is given by one side, the remainder of 
 the conversation modifying the part given in evidence may be called 
 for by the other side, though consisting, in jjart, of declarations in 
 the declarant's favor. Williams v. Mower, 21) S. C. 332 (1888). 
 " Where an admission against interest is offered in evidence, it 
 must be taken together as a whole. The triers of the fact may give 
 credence to that part only which is against the interest of the de- 
 clarant, but the court cannot reject that ])art which is in the declar- 
 ant's favor as having no probative force." JLormann v. Wirtei, o*,) 
 Mo. App. 040 (1894). ''It is a wholesome rule, tliat where part of 
 what a man says is used to charge him, he is entitled to the balance 
 of what he said to discluirge lumself." Steele r. Wood, 78 N. C. 
 305 (1878). 
 
 Tlie interest may be proprietary; as the admission of a tenant as 
 to the character and extent of his tcnaney. Secor r. Testana, 37 
 III. 525 (1865) ; riummer /•. Currier, 52 X.'lE. 287 (1872). 
 
 Form ov Declakatiox. — The form in which an admission is 
 made is immaterial, so far as its competency is concerned. Various 
 obvious considerations, arising from the circumstances under which, 
 or the form in which, such au admission may affect the weight to be 
 attached to it. 
 
5542 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part UI. 
 
 
 ill 
 
 An admission may be contained in a deposition, though " the cap- 
 tion might have been irregular or even unjustifiable." Carr v. 
 (Jrilliii, 44 N. H. 510 (1803). Or in an affidavit filed in court on 
 removal of a case. Baker v. Hess, 53 111. App. 473 (1893). Ad- 
 missions made in tlie defendant's answer in another case have been 
 held competent. J'rintup v. Patton, 91 Ga. 421! (1893) ; Hadcl.vtTe r. 
 IJarton, IGl Mass. 3L'7 (1894). It may consist of evidence gi\eii in 
 a former trial, and is competent in this form even if the declarant 
 is j)resent in court and can be called as a witness. Jiuddee v. 
 Spangler, 12 (Jul. 210 (1888) ; McAndrews r. Santee, 57 l'.arl). 193 
 (1809); Lorenzana v. Camarillo, 45 Cal. 125 (1872); Woods v. 
 Gevecke, 28 la. 561 (1870); German Nat. Bank v. Leonard, 40 Neb. 
 070 (1894). Such suit need not have been between the same parties, 
 'looker v'. Gormer, 2 Hilt. 71 (1858). 
 
 If evidence, itself incompetent as an admission, is read over 
 and assented to by a defendant, it becomes competent as his admis- 
 sion. Beeckman v. Montgomery, 14 N. J. Ecp 100 (18()1). 
 
 On an issue as to the value of certain premises taken by a rail- 
 road, evidence is competent of the plaintiff's declarations, as to its 
 value, of an offer to sell it at a certain price and of his sale of a 
 portion of it at a certain price. East Brandywine &c. E. R. v. 
 Banck, 78 Pa. St. 454 (1875). 
 
 The admission may take the form of an entry upon an account 
 book. McNutt V. IMcDonald, 3 Nova Scotia, 175 (1873) ; Robert's 
 Appeal, 120 I'a. St. 102 (1889). 
 
 An admission may be contained in a common law pleading. 
 Soaps V. Eichburg, 42 111. App. 375 (1891). 
 
 It is not objectionable that an admission is contained in an in- 
 strument which is legally inoperative as to its own intended effect. 
 The admission is still competent. Ilickev v. Hinsc.ale, 12 Mich. 
 99 (1803) ; Reis v. Hellman, 25 Oh. St. 180 (18^4). 
 
 So a written promise made on Sunday, to j)ay a debt, while invalid 
 as a new promise, is competent as an admission of the existence of 
 the debt. Ay res v. Bane, 39 la. 518 (1874). 
 
 So an admission contained in a sealed instrument executed by an 
 agent who has merely a jiarol authority, may still bind the ])rinci- 
 ])al. Morrell /•. Cawley, 17 Abb. Prac. 70 (180.'!). So of an admis- 
 sion containcnl in an instrument executed by an agent without 
 authority. Huffman r. Cartwright, 44 Tex. 290 (1875). 
 
 Admissions may relate to the contents of a written document. 
 Loomis V. Wadhams, 8 Gray, 557 (1857) ; Taylor c. I'eck, 21 Gratt. 
 11 (1871); Denver &c. K. K. r. Wilson, 4 Col. App. 355 (1894). 
 Or even of a record. Smith t'. Palmer, Gush. 513 (1850). 
 
 To the contrarv, see Jameson v. Conway, 10 111. 227 (1848). 
 Threadgill c. White, 11 Ired. Law, 591 (1850). The contents of a 
 record cannot be proved by an admission. Smith v. Palmer, Cush. 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 AMERICAN XOTKS. 
 
 5548 
 
 51.3 (1850). They may enure to the benefit of one not a party to 
 the litigation. Burleson v. Goodnuin, 32 Tex. 220 (1869). They 
 may be used to prove a book account. IJonnell v. Mawlia, 37 X. J. 
 L. 11)8 (1871). 
 
 FoucK OK AuMis.sioNS. — The weight to be attached to admissions 
 lias been variously stated by difTerent courts. In IVuce r. ^Makepeace, 
 (35 lud. 345, 3(55 (1879) the following charge to the jury was ap- 
 proved l)y the supreme court of Iu<lia".a. '•Verbal admissions or 
 statemoiits. consisting of mere re[H'titions of oral stateuu'iits made 
 some time ago, are subject to mucli imi)erfection and mistake, for 
 the reason thai the party making tliem may not have expressed his 
 or her own meaning, or the witness may have misuu'lerstood him or 
 her, or, by not giving their exact language, may have clianged the 
 meaning of what was said ; such evidence should, therefore, be re- 
 ceived by the jury with great caution. But adniissious deliber- 
 ately made, and well understood, are enUtled to your consideration, 
 especially when made against a party's own interest." Pence v. 
 Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345, 305 (1879). 
 
 " We do not think tliat admissions by parties are to be regarded 
 as an inferior kind of evidence ; for, on the contrary, when satis- 
 factorily proven, they constitute a ground of belief on which the 
 mind justly reposes with strong confidence." Ector r. Welsh, 29 
 Ga. 443, 450 (1859). 
 
 "The following instruction was proposed on behalf of the defend- 
 ant, and refused: 'Admissions not being under oatii, and liable to 
 be misunderstood, as against sworn testimony, are considered very 
 feeble evidence, unless fully corroborated. The instruction was 
 properly refused. Wiien a deliberate admission of a party against 
 his own interest is satisfactorily proved, it is not necessarily feeble 
 evidence, and does not require corroboration. It may be that the 
 instruction was intended to refer to the proof of admissions, and 
 not to tlie admissions themselves. Conceding tiiat the instruction 
 admits of that inter[)retation, we still think it was |)n)])iTly refused. 
 Tiie weight to be given to testimony of mere aduiissions is to be 
 determined by the jury; yet it may be jjroper for tlu' court to say 
 to tli(> jury that such testinu)ny is usually unsatisfactory and should 
 b(' received with great caution. JJut it would scarcely h;' correct to 
 say in every case, without (lualii'.cation or exception, that it is very 
 feeble testimony unless fully eorroliorated ; for cases may readily 
 be supposed, where an admission might in' satisfactorily proved by 
 tlie uncorroborate<l testimony of a single witness.' " Saveland v. 
 (ireen, 40 Wis. 431, 441 (187()). 
 
 It lias even been held that where .admissioiis are not denied or 
 controlled tliey "must be taken as true." Robinson v. Stuart, 08 
 Me. 01 (1S78). 
 
 The probative force of admissions is naturally increased where the 
 declarant was aware that tlie statement was against his interest. 
 
554* 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT III. 
 
 ,i:"j 
 
 
 III 
 
 To Whom Made. — Declarations may be made to any ono. 
 " There is no rule of law requiring such admissions to be made to 
 the party or liis agent." Secor r. I'estana, 37 111. 525 (1865). 
 
 Privity. — Under certain circumstances, the admissious of one 
 porson bind another equally as if made by himself. These circum- 
 stances substantially vary with the rules of positive or substantive 
 law regulating the particular relationship existing between the de- 
 clarant and the person claimed to be bound by his declaration. 
 Whether, for example, the declaration of an agent binds his prin- 
 cipal is a question in tlie law of agency. Whether sufficient privity 
 exists between A. and his predecessor in title that A. is bound or 
 affected by a statement made by the pr(>vious owner while in the 
 possession of tlie jjroperty in question is to be decided by the law of 
 property. When tlie rules of substantive law prescribe tliat certain 
 of A.'s admissions may be taken to be those of 15., tlie ordinary rules 
 of evidence admitting B.'s admissions are applied. 
 
 Admission by Silkxck. — The rule regarding admission has 
 been so far extended in many of the states of the American Union 
 as to consider competent the fact that certain statements of relevant 
 facts have been made under circumstances calling for denial it' un- 
 true, in th(! presence of tl >' opposing party, and tliat he has not 
 denied tliem. Cors<M- v. Taul, 41 X. H. 24 (1S(!0) ; .rolmson r. Day, 
 78 Me. 224 (ISSC) ; Humes v. O'P.ryan, 74 Ala. ()4 (l.SH.") ; Evans v. 
 Montgomery, <J5 Mich. 497 (18915) ; Des Moines Savings 15anl<: (;. 
 Colfax Hotel Co., 8S la. 4 (1S93) ; Wisdom r. Reeves (Ahi.), 18 So. 
 Hep. lo (1895). So where repeated interviews took plac' 1) 'tween 
 the ])laintiff and the officers of a (h'Tendant corporation, it is com- 
 petent to sliow that tlie latter made no pretene(> that tlie defendant 
 was not liable. Proctor /». Ol.l Colony K. K. 154 .Mass. 251 ( 1S91). 
 " [t is somewhat like an omission to testify, or to i)ro(luce hooks, or 
 to fnrnisli exjjlanations, when called on to do so." Proctor r. Old 
 Colony 1{. II., 154 Mass. 251 (1891). 15y a parity of reasonin;-, 
 •• The omission of a party to reply to statements in a letter about 
 which he has knowledge, and which if not true he would naturally 
 deny, when he replies to other i)arts of the letter, is evidence timd- 
 ing to show that the statemiuits so made and not denied are true." 
 Fen no t'. Wi'ston, ;]1 Vt. :545, .'552 (1858). 
 
 15nt a mere failure to answer a letter does not make its statements 
 competent as admissions by sileiuM^ Li^irned /-. Tillotson, 97 \. V. 
 1 (1884) ; Thomas r. Gage, 141 N. V. 50G (1894) ; St. Louis, &c. K. 
 ]{. /•. Thomas. 85 111. 401 (1877); Meguire ?;. Corwine, 3 McArthur, 
 81 (1879); Waring r. U. S. Telegraph Co., 44 Howard's (N. Y.) 
 I'rac. ()9 (1873). 4Mie -'ule obtains in criminal cases. " A state- 
 irent is made either to a man, or within his hearing, that he was con- 
 cerned in tlie commission of a crime, to whicii ho makes no reply; 
 the natural inference is that the imputation is well founded, or he 
 
 m 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 AI^IERICAN NOTES. 
 
 5.545 
 
 would have repelled it." State v. Roed, C2 Me. 120, 142 (1874) ; 
 Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 (1S88) ; State /•. Crockett, 82 N. C. 
 5;)!) (1880) ; Ettinger v. Com., 98 Ta. St. 3:58, Sir, (1S81); Miller v. 
 State, (58 Miss. 221 (18<)()) ; (tarrctt r. State, Hi Ala. 18 (1884). 
 Wliere the defendant's wife in his presence exchiiiufl, •• We will 
 sell liquor in s^jite of all the officers of station 1," the defeiidatit's 
 failure to deny the stat(!nient was held " some evidence of an ad- 
 mission on his part, if the declaration was undi'rstood by him in the 
 sense first mentioned (that husband and wife were engagt-d in sell- 
 ing liquor), and if the circuiustances were sucii that acconling to 
 human experience he naturally would have repudiated it, if the 
 iMii)lied assertions were not true." Com. r. Funiii, 14(j Mass. ~>~0 
 (18SS). The rule has been applied not only to the defendant in a 
 criminal ease, but to the prosecuting witness. State c. Burton, •)4 
 N. C. 1)47 (188()). 
 
 A Xkikssauy (JiJALii'MrATiox. — To render an unehalleng^d decla- 
 ration maile in a [jcrson's presence evidence against him, it is essen- 
 tial that he be in a position to reply, if so mind<'il. •• If a party is 
 so situated that he is not called upon to say anything, and does not 
 say anything, his silence under such circumstani'i's is not to be 
 taken as furnishing any ground for an inference that he thereby 
 made any admission." Proctor v. Old Colony \i. II.. 1.">1 Mass. 
 251 (18<)i) ; Corser v. I'aul, 41 N. H. 21 (isilO); (iibn.-y v. Mar- 
 chay, 34 X. V. 3I>1, 305 (ISfKi) ; Loggins r. State, 8 Tex, App. 434, 
 444 (1880) ; Kaelin v. Com., 84 Ivy. 3.')4, 3(;7 (ISSO) ; P.-rk /•. Ryan 
 (Ala.). 17 So, Rep. 733 (1805). It has been held by tli.- supreme 
 court of Georgia that uncontroverted sr^tatcments made in presence 
 of a party ar<! iuctjuqictent, '•uide>s it was at a time and inider eir- 
 eumstances when it was his duty to speak. " Ciles /,•. Vimliver, 01 
 (}a. 102 (1802). Thus wheri>, in tlie course of jirevious judicial pro- 
 ceedings, a statement is made in tlie jjresenee of the defendant, as 
 he is not at liberty to interpose when and iiow he jileases, tliough a 
 jiarty, no inference can hi; drawn, in a suliseipieiit eivil action, from 
 the former silence. Johnson r. lloUiday. 70 Uu\. 151 (1881); M.. 
 IClmurray ('. Turner, 8(1 Ca. 215 (1800); I'.ro.vles ,-. .State. 47 I-.id. 
 251 (IS74). So the defendant, not being at liberty to interrupt the 
 taking of a dei)osition of a witness by a magistral ■. is not atfected by 
 his failure to deny a statement containeil in sueli cleposition. tliough 
 made in his presence. Tobacco Co. r. M dChvee. <);; X. C 71 ( 1S87). 
 So when^ a derendant attended a certain interview on condition that 
 he would '• let the old man say wiiat he pleased," no inference of 
 an admission can be drawn from his silenei- under aei-nsation by the 
 person rcd'erred to. Slatterv c. People, 70 111.217 (1^(75). "The 
 defendant is not called upon to dispute the account on every occa- 
 sion, and care should be exercised in determining whether the cir- 
 cumstances called for it, so as to cause his omission to have weight 
 
VV 
 
 55# 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT III. 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 against him." Cliurchill v. FuUiani, 8 la. 45 (1859) ; Ilviston's 
 Estate, 1G7 Pa. St. 217 (189-'>). A plaintiff who has been seen ex- 
 amining the defendant's books of account without objection has not 
 thereby furnished evidence that he lias admitted the correctness 
 of certain payments therein contained. Cheney v. Cheney, 1G2 Mass. 
 591 (18;)5). 
 
 A married woman is not required to object, under jienalty of 
 acquiescence, during a conversation held witli her husband, nor 
 when, just before tlie death of her husband, when he could scarcely 
 hear or speak, she, as the medium of communication between him 
 and another person, repeated similar expressions without contradic- 
 tion. " The interview was with her husband, not with her; it does 
 not appear that she was inquired of in the matter. If she was not 
 called upon to speak, was not inquired of, and made no response, then 
 tlicre was no such acquiescence as would bind her, nor justify the 
 master in finding from her silence any admission of the trutli of 
 Nathan's statements. Whether a person is bound to speak when 
 statements and declarations adverse to his interests are made, is 
 often a perplexing question, and it is difficult to state a rule appli- 
 cable to all cases, as the question so often depends upon the circum- 
 stances attending each case. It has often been before our courts 
 and the rule dedncible from the cases seems to be this, evidence 
 tliat a party remained silent when declarations adverse to his inter- 
 ests are made in liis hearing and presence, may be heard by the trier 
 when the occasion upon which the declaration is u.ade calls for ad- 
 mission or denial on liis part. In other words, vhenever he is 
 called upon to speak ; whenever the circumstances demand a reply." 
 Pierce v. Pierce, CG Vt. 3(59, 375 (1894). 
 
 A minister cannot be allowed to prove his contraet with a reli- 
 gious society by reading extracts from a sermon preached by him in 
 their church, to the terms of which no open contradiction was made. 
 It was litdd to have been " made under circumstances which could 
 hardly require or admit a contradiction or disclaimer." Johnson n. 
 Trinity Church Society, 11 All. 123 (18G5). So where the state- 
 ment, though made in the presence of a party, is made when he is 
 unable projjerly to understand or repl}' to it, no admission is implied. 
 A statement is incompetent if made in the ])resence of a person 
 asleep. Lanergan v. People, 39 M". Y. 39 (18G8). Or if made in pres- 
 ence of a person so far under the influence of intoxication as not to 
 understand what is said, — a question of fact which may be left to 
 the jury. State v. Perkins, 3 Hawkes, 377 (1824). So statements 
 made in tlie presence of a deaf person are mere hearsay. Tufts c. 
 Charlestown, 4 Gray, 5.37 (1855). Where a defen;lant is under ar- 
 rest, no inference can be drawn from his failure to answer charges 
 made in his presence. State v. Howard, 1(»2 Mo. 14'J (1890). It natu- 
 rally follows that where silence is due to al)sence of informition no 
 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 554- 
 
 inference can legitimately be drawn. "The silence of the party, 
 even where the deelarations are addressed to hiujself, is worth very 
 little, as evidence, unless where he had the means of knowing the 
 truth or falsehood of the statement." Corser o. I'aul, 41 N. 11. 24 
 (18()0). 
 
 So where the silence comes from the fact that tlie statement is 
 not heard, no admission can be predicated on it. Cabiness r. Hol- 
 land (Tex. Vav. App.), ;](> So. W. 6;i (l.S'Ja). "This kind of evi- 
 dence should always be received with caution." Corser n. Paul, 41 
 N. II. -J4 (ISCiO). Whether the cireumstancH's are such as to call 
 for a reply is said to be a preliminary question for the courts. 
 Pierce v. Pierce, (W) Vt. .300 (1S04). 
 
 CoMPUOMisic Nkgotiations. — The [)revailing opinion in the 
 United States is to the effect that offers made in the course of com- 
 promise negotiations are not competent as admissions. Harrington 
 i\ Inhabitants of Lincoln, 4 Gray, HOS (lS.")o) ; Molyneaux v. Col- 
 lier, 13 Ga. 4()() (IHoS); Commissioners v. Verbarg, 03 Ind. 107 
 (1.S7S) ; Daniels v. Woonsocket, 11 K. I. 4 (1874) ; Louisville &c. 
 K. K. V. Wright, llo Ind. 378 (18S«) ; Montgomery v. Allen, 84 
 Mich. 056 (1891) ; Pelton v. Schmidt, (.Mich.) 02 X. W. 552 (18S)5) ; 
 Smith V. Shell, 82 Mo. 215 (1884) ; Kierstead /;. Prown, 23 Neb. 
 595, 611 (1888) ; Smith /■. Satterlee, 130 N. Y. 077 (1891) ; Inter- 
 national &c. P. P. /•. Pagsdale, 07 Tex. 24 (1880) ; Ibune Insurance 
 Co. V. Paltimore Warehouse Co. 93 V. S. 527, 5-18 (1870) ; Perkins 
 V. Concord P. P., 44 X. H. 223 (1,S02) ; Draper v. Inhabitants of 
 Hatfield, 124 .Alass. 53 (1878) ; Wregc /•. Westcott, 30 X. J. Law, 
 212 (1802); Arthur r. James, 28 Pa. St. 230 (18.57) ; Parker v. 
 Piishnell, 75 111. 220 (1874); Pichards v. Xoyes, 44 Wis. 609 
 (1878); Peynolds /•. .Manning, 15 Md. 510, 526 (1859); Darby w. 
 Poberts, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 427 (1893) ; Olson (;. I'eterson, 33 Neb. 
 358 (1891) ; Huettenuin /•. Viesselmann, 48 Mo. App. 582 (1892); 
 CJorham /;. Auerswald, 59 Mo. App. 77 (1894) ; Collier v. Coggins, 
 15 So. Pep. 578 (Ala.)' (1894) ; Columbia Planing Mill v. Ins.^Cc, 
 59 Mo. App. 204 (1894) ; Fowles v. Allen, M Conn. .350 (1894). 
 
 •' The facts attenii)ted to be proved by plaintiifs are not facts 
 admitting a distinct liability, l)ut were proposals that occurred in 
 the conversation or negotiations to effect a settlement of the claim. 
 This evideiHie was, therefore, properly rejected." Chaffe v. Mac- 
 kenzie, 43 L;i. Ann. 1002 (1891). 
 
 Where the offer of settlement is not for the sake of peace but for 
 another consideration e. g. the contimuince of the case for three 
 weeki- the offer is competent evidence of liability. Clapp v. 
 Foster, 34 Vt. 580 (1861). Where an offer was made, "without 
 prejudice" to a party claiming to have been injured in a railroad 
 collision chat if he would submit himself to treatnuMit by certain 
 doctors the company would settle by their report, the offer being 
 
5548 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT III. 
 
 t 
 
 expressly made for the purpose of being used, if not accepted, at 
 the trial as evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, it was 
 held that the entire offer was competent evidence for the jury at 
 the instance of the plaintiff. Clark i\ Grand Trunk, '2[) Q. U. U. 
 C. ]3() (IS(il)). 
 
 A )iior<! offer to pay, not made on the faith of any pending treaty 
 of settlement is of course competent. Smith »». Whittier, D;") Cal. 
 27!) (W.yj); Molyneaux r. Collier, 13 Ga. 40G (1853). JStato r. 
 l>ru(!e, 33 La. Ann 18(J (1881). So of an olfer to pay if a survey 
 shall show the existence of a trespass. Ashlock v. Linder, oO 111. 
 1G9 (18(59). The fact that an offer of settlement of a contested 
 insurance loss has been made is competent though " dangerously 
 near transgressing the settled rule that offers of compromise are not 
 admissible" where the offer is not received as evidence of the plain- 
 tiff's claim Init solely on the question of waiver of tlie requircMuent 
 of i)r()ofs of loss within a limited })eriod. Gould r. Insurance Co., 
 134 Ta. St. r)70, 589 (1890). 
 
 Where an ivinount is lixed arbitrarily, as being what a person is 
 willing to pay rather than have a suit, " the rule is well settled that 
 no advantage can be taken of otters made by way of compromise ; 
 that a party may, witli impunity, attempt to buy his peace." Ten- 
 nant o. Dudley, 144 N. Y. 504 (1895). 
 
 So where a defendant, whose horse had run away and injured tlie 
 plaintiff's horse, said to the ])laintift' that " it was an accudent and 
 accidents would happen, but he would do wliat was right about it ; 
 that he woiild ])ay the veterinary surgeon's bill and would let the 
 plaintiff' have the use of a horse wliile tlu' injured horse was laid 
 up," tlie statement is said to be "to some extent an iunnission.'' 
 Bassett V. Shares, 63 Conn. 39, 44 (1893). "An offer of ]iaynient, 
 whether accepted or rejected, is evidence when the ]»arty making it 
 understood it to be, and made it as, an admission of his liability. 
 It is not evidence when he made it for the purpose of averting 
 litigation, not intending to admit his liability." This ((uestion is 
 one of fact for the court. Colburn v. Groton, 6G N. If. 151 (1889). 
 
 The Canadian practice places more insistence upon the forui.al use 
 of the phrase " without prejudice " tiian is usual m the United 
 States, ririe /•. Wyld, 11 Out. 422 (tS8()) ; Clark v. Grand Trunk 
 1\. R.. 29 (>. lb 1'. C. 130 (18G9) ; Burns r. Kerr, 13 Q. B. U. C. 
 
 4(58 (I8r,(;). 
 
 It is believed that the following statement, iiulorsed by the court 
 of appeals of the state of jMaryland in IJeynolds v. iVfanning, 15 
 Md. 510, 527 (1859), is correct at the present day; "The most, it' 
 not all, of the American cases have . . . gone on the intrinsic 
 character of the transaction, without requiring an exjiress declara- 
 tion that the CMmmunication should be without prejudice." 
 
 It has been held by the supreme judicial court of Maine that 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 AMEUICAN XOTES. 
 
 5549 
 
 wluMi evidence is objeoteil to on tlie ground that it is a statement 
 made in course of an effort to compromise a dispute, and it does not 
 as yet appear that such is the case, the court may properly receive 
 the evidence de bene and h'ave the wliole matter to the jury, " with 
 direction not to consider the eviiUMice if they found that tlie parties 
 were trying to compromise when tlie admissions and offer were 
 made." Webber v. Dunn, 71 Me. y;il. .'540 (ISSO); Hall v. Brown, 
 58 X. II. ();5 (1877). 
 
 When negotiations for a .settlement luive failed and the confer- 
 ence is breaking up, what is said by the ])arties is no longer priv- 
 ileged. l?roschart ^■. Tuttle, 59 Cor.n. 1 (1S!)0). Conversely, where 
 the offer of compromise has been accepted its terms may be shown 
 on a bill in ecpiity to enforce it. Omnium Securities Co. v, llichard- 
 son, 7 Ontario, l82 (1884). Communications made to a third party, 
 not during the ])endency f oom])roniise negotiations, are competent. 
 Moore /•. Gaus, 113 Mo, 98 (UV.)!')- 
 
 T?;;.\s()\s FOK TiiJia^xcLi'sio.v. — Two reasons are assigned for 
 the exclusion of compromise offers. First: — that it is against 
 public policy that attempts to ttrminate litigation should be bur- 
 dened by the danger of having any statements made in the course 
 of them used against the declarant. 
 
 So where the attempt was made to prove the plaintiff's admission 
 of what he had offered to settle for, the court, in rejecting the 
 evidence, say : — "It was but one of the modes of proving a fact 
 which, upon the soundest principles of public policy, cannot be 
 proved at all." Harrington v. Iidiabitants of Lincoln, 4 Gray, 563 
 (18.55). " Parties negotiating for a settlement woidd be shy of 
 offering their best terms if their offers were not privileged.' 
 Daniels v. Woonsocket, 11 K. I. 4 (1874). "The autiiorities seem, 
 though not very numerous, to be clear upon the first j)oint, that 
 letters written or communications made without prejudice, or offers 
 made for the sake of buying peace, or to effect a compromise, are 
 inadmissible in evidence. It seemingly being considered against 
 public policy as having a tendency to promote litigation, and to 
 prevent amicable settlements." I'irie v. Wyld, 11 Out. Kep. 4L'2 
 (188()). In Perkins v. Concord K. K., 44 N. H. 223 (18()2) the 
 exclusion is said to be "on grounds of public policy." "This rule 
 is founded in policy, that there may be no discouragenuMit to ami- 
 cable adjustment of disputes, by a fear, that if not comi)leted, the 
 party amicably disposed may I)e injured." Gerrish i'. Sweetzer, 4 
 rick. 373, 377 (1826). "This rule is well settled that no advan- 
 tage can be taken of offers niude by way of compromise ; that a 
 ])artv mav, with impunity. atteni[)t to buy his peace." Tennant v. 
 Dudley, 144 N. Y. 50 1 (1895). 
 
 Second; — because a statement made, not because it is believed 
 to be true but as an inducement to the jiurchase or sale of peace is 
 
654i'> 
 
 AMKltlCAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT III. 
 
 1 
 
 not siifflfiently probative of tlie truth of the statement as to war- 
 rant its Ix'ing reet'ivetl in evidence. " I'eace is of such worth that 
 a reasonable man nxay well be [iresumeil to seek after it even at tiio 
 co'.t of his strict right, and l)y an abatement from his jtist elaiiii. 
 Tile offer which a man makes to imrchase it is to l)e taken, not as 
 Ills judgment of what lie should receive iit t-''> cud of litigation, but 
 what he is willing to n ceive and avoi( larringtou /•. Inhair 
 
 itauts of LiiHioln, i (ira\, ^(1;! (l!S,V»); ^mltll ik Sludl, .SI,' Md. 2ir> 
 (1.S84). '■ To permit the introduction of such offers tends to dis- 
 courage the adjustment of suits, and for that reason is against the 
 policy of the law. If the object of the party in nuikiug the offer 
 was to buy his peace (which is impliedly manifesteil by a mere 
 proposition to pay a sum in settlement), it is deemed to have been 
 made without preju'lice and will be excluded." International (See. 
 R. K. V. liagsdale, 07 Tex. 24 (1«8G) ; Draper o. Inhabitants of 
 llatheld. 124 .Mass. ,76 (1878). 
 
 " It was a mere offer to pay a sum of money to get rid of a law 
 suit, and was in no sense an admission that In? owed the plaintiff 
 that or any other sum." Richards /•. Noyes, 44 Wis. (509 (1878). 
 
 " It is never the intendment of the law to shut out the truth ; but 
 to repel any inference, which may arise from a proposition made, not 
 with design to admit the existence of a fact, but merely to buy one's 
 peace. If an admission, however, is made, because it is a fact, the 
 evidence to prove it is competent, whatever motive may have 
 prompted to the declaration." Hartford IJricige Co. v. Granger, 4 
 Conn. 142 (1822) cited with a])proval in Fuller v. Hampton, o 
 Conn. 410, 420 (1824). 
 
 Where an offer is not an effort to settle a disputed claim but an 
 admission of liability, it is competent. ilcKinzie v. Stretch, r>3 
 111. App. 184 (18!);}). 
 
 Where a conversation is held, not "for the purpose of endeavor- 
 ing to make a compromise; of disjiuted claims, or tluit an offer or 
 offers might be made to purchase peace, but for the purpose of 
 ascertaining the claims really existing ai\d justly due from one 
 party to the other, that they might be fairly adjusted " such a con- 
 versation, it has been held, " could not have been excluded by any 
 well established rule of evidence." Cole v. Cole, 33 Me. 542 (1852). 
 Similarly, where the conversation relates not to the existence of 
 a liability but concerns contemplated methods of paying an ad- 
 mitted claim, it is not i)rivileged. Hood t: Tyner, 3 Ind. App. 51 
 (1891). 
 
 The question whether an offer is an admission of liability or a 
 mere purchase of peace is a question of fact for the court, the 
 decision of which may ha set aside when against the evidence. 
 Colburn v. Groton, 0(5 X. 11. 151 (1889). 
 
CHAP. IX.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 r);J4'i 
 
 Tndki'icndknt Facts. It is Piitircly consistoiit with the reason- 
 ing oil wliic'li offers of coniproinisc aro oxchuled as adinissii)iis tliat 
 statements of independent facts, thoiigli made in tlie course of (Mun- 
 promise negotiations, are reganU'd as competent. Sucli independent 
 facts are presiinnibly stated, not i'or tin; sake of peace, hut because 
 they are believed to be true. So, wliih; an offer of settU-iuent of an 
 injury caused by a defect in a liighway is incompetent, statements 
 of tlie parti(!ulars of tiie injury arc! admissibh'. "Tlie presiding 
 judge ruled that no offer of settlement, made by the j)laintiff in a 
 conversation had with the agents of the defendants, with a view to 
 tlie adjustment of the controvers}-, was competent; but that state- 
 ments of independent facts, made in the course of such conversa- 
 tion, might be admitted. The distinction is sound. The facts stated 
 were capable of being jiroved by any competent evidence, iiududing 
 the admission of tlie plaintiff. 'I'lie amount of a docttor's bill, the 
 cost of board during sicdiiiess, the loss of time by absence from the 
 service of his employer, were simple facts, capable of exact certainty 
 — facts, the statement of which would not be modified by the occa- 
 sion on which it was made, certainly not to the prejudice of the 
 party making it." JIarrington r. Inhabitants of Lincoln, 4 Gray, 
 o03 (lS5"i). " An admission of an iiide[)endeiit fact in no way con- 
 nected with the offer of compromise, although made during the 
 negotiations, is competent evidence.'* Louisville, &c. If. It. /•. 
 Wright, 115 Ind. 378 (1888); I'erkins r. Concord K. \l., 44 \. H. 
 223 (1802) ; Draper r. Inhabitants of Hatti.dd, 124 Mass. 53 (1877) ; 
 Wrege v. Westcott, 30 X. ,J. Law, 212 (I8(i2). "This rule seems 
 coniined to the mere offer of compromise, for it is held that any 
 independent facts admitted during the treaty for a compromise, may 
 be given in evidence as confessions." (lerrish /•. Sweetser, 4 J'ick. 
 374, 377 (1820). '• The authorities seem well agreed that projHJsals 
 made while a compromise is in treaty between the parties cannot be 
 offered in evidence, but conversations in which an independent fact 
 is disclosed may be admitted to prove it." Uroschart v. Tuttle, 59 
 Conn. 1, 23 (1890). So a statement by a plaintiff when approached 
 witli a view to settling a cas(! that he knew nothing about it, that it 
 was A.'s doings and A. "would have to foot it in the end" are couipe- 
 t 'lit facts. " It was not an offer for a couipromise, but an uiupialiHed 
 admission of a fact. This is the true distinction between such state- 
 ments of a party as are admissible, and such as should be rejected 
 on the principle that men must be allowed ' to buy their ])eace ' with- 
 out prejudice." Marvin r. Uiclimond,3 Denio, ."8 (1840); McP^hvtM? 
 Mfg. Co, V. Trowbridge, 08 Hun, 28 (1.S93). "The rule is strictly 
 held in this State that an offer to compromise is not to be sliown, 
 on account of the tendency such a jiractice would have to discourage 
 the settlement of disputes. IJut it is at the same time held with 
 equal clearness, that any independent admission, though made ia 
 
564>a 
 
 AMEiaCAN NOTK8. 
 
 [I'AUT III. 
 
 II 
 
 i| 
 
 the coursn of iiPKotiatioiis for a (•oini)r()inise, may be shown." 
 I'lumiiicr c. Currier, ")!' N. H. L'«7 (1871'). In the hist-named ease 
 it was ucc'irdingly hehl, in a case where a (inestion was as fo whether 
 a tenant was to jiay rent, that an oifer by the defeuihint to submit 
 tiie (juestioii iiow niiu-li rent was due to an award, was a competent 
 laet. ////(/. "Admissions made on tiie occasion (d' an attempted 
 settlement, if iiarcel of tin- treaty tor a eompromise, and ma(h' in 
 furtiierance of tlie treiity, are privilei,'ed, and cannot bo given in 
 evi(k'nee against tiie party malcing them, beeause they an; madt; 
 upon a eontiih'n(;e and trust, and ant received as such l)y the party 
 to wliom tliey are aihlressed. I?ut if a party during such treaty 
 admits a fact to l)e true becanse it is a fact, and not because he is 
 willing to treat it as a fact for the purposes of tiie tlien ]ieiiding 
 compromise, it may properly be shown in evideiict ," Doon r. 
 Kavey, 4'.) Vt. 'J'Xl (1877): Kalin r. Traders" Ins. Co. (Wyo.), ;i4 
 J'ac. liej). lorv.) (18'.)o). So, an admission tliat tlicre is iiotliing 
 tiie matter with tiie plaintitFs side of an account, though n>ade in 
 tlie course of an effort to settle a dispute, is competent. Goodnow 
 ('. Parsons, 80 Vt. 40 (ISOo). A distinct admission of a contract 
 may be shown even if made in tlie course of compromise negotia- 
 tions. Scofield /•. I'arlin, &e. Co., 01 Fed. Kei). S()4 (1H<J4). 
 
 " It is tiie policy of tiie law to facilitate! the settlement of contro- 
 versies, and therefore an offer to pay a sum of money to compromise 
 u dispute, is not admissible in evidence to prove that the sum offered 
 was admitted to be due. P)Ut it is also the object of tlie law of evi- 
 dence, to ascertain tlie truth, and therefore the distinct admission of a 
 fact in a h iter or conversation, is not to be excluded beciuise it is 
 accompanied by an offer to compromise the suit. l*roposals made 
 while tlie compromise is on the carjjct, do not bind, but conversations 
 in which a fact is disclosed may be admitted to prove it." Arthur 
 V. James, 2S I'a. St. 2.">G (1857). So the payment of a sum of money 
 to tlie mother of a bastard lor its support is acompetent fact thougli 
 efforts at a compromise were still pending. Fuller v. Hampton, o 
 Conn. 416, 420 (1S24). " Although the policy of the law fiivors 
 ainiciible settlements of controversies and therefore iirohibits evi- 
 dence of negotiations made by a party for the purpose of buying 
 his peace, when during negotiations for a comjiromise a fact is con- 
 ceded as in this instance without reservation, evidence of such ad- 
 mission is competent against the party." Kutcher v. Love, 19 Col. 
 o42 (1894). " Offers of compromise do not bind; but admissions 
 or statements of the facts are evidence, though made in an endeavor 
 to effect a settlement." Thoni i>. Hess, 51 111. App. 274 (1893). 
 "The letter was a mere offer to accept $15.00 in satisfaction of the 
 jilaintiffs' demand, and as such was properly excluded as an offer of 
 coiniiromise. . . . Tlie question is a very different one from that 
 which would have been presented had the letter stated that the 
 
ClIAI'. IX.] 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 r)04'8 
 
 wood ill iiucstion was wortli only JjilO.OO. KowIps v. Allen, (U 
 Conn. ;!;")() (1894). 
 
 So iiii iKlinission that one is a partnor, though niado in the course 
 of ooininoinisf! negotiations, is eoiiipeteiit. (ianier /•. Myriek, '60 
 Miss. 4J.S (ISoo). 
 
 So '' where tli(> execution of the contract sued on is denied by the 
 defendant, a letter offering to conipioniise the claim, and making 
 an express recognition of the contract, is admissible in evidence as 
 an a<liiiission of the execution of the contract." Scotield v. I'arlin, 
 Gl Fed. Rep. 804 (I8U4). 
 
 An (lifer by the defendant to a bastardy complaint to pay half the 
 expenses of putting the prosecutrix away from home is coiinjctent. 
 Kobb V. Hewitt, .S!) Neb. 217 (181)4). 
 
 Admissions and statements of facts are competent, though made 
 in an effort to effect a settlement. Thoin v. Hess, ol ill. A])p. L'74 
 (180.3); Kutcher r. Love, 19 Col. o41i (1894) ; Tavlor v. U. K. Co., 
 101 Mich. 140 (1891). 
 
 liut it has been held that the fact that a p:irticular claim is not 
 made during the j)en(lency of compromise negotiatious is not com- 
 peteiit. Kierstead v. Brown, 'J'.i Neb. r)9o (1888). 
 
 Where the ot?er of compromise. actually contains cr amounts t;o 
 an admission of liability, that fact is competent. McKinzie n. 
 Stretch, r>3 111. App. 184 (18D;5). 
 
 The su]ireiiie court of Indiana have apparently added a further 
 (pialilication upon the rule admitting in evidences an admission of an 
 independent fact made in the course of compromise negotiation, viz., 
 that the admission of such independent fact should not have l.ieen 
 designed to further the reaching of a compromise. This certainly 
 seems within the " equity of the rule." "Even if it be conceded 
 that the conversation between the parties related to a compromise, 
 still a specific admission of a fiict, because it is a fact, maile in the 
 (ioursc of such a conversation, and not made to open tiie way to a 
 compromise, is admissible. The rule on this subject is thus stated 
 by the court in one of the cases referred to by the appellant : 
 ' An offer, concession, or admission, made in the course of an 
 ineffectual treaty of compromise, and constituting, in itself, the 
 ])oint yi(dded for the sake of ])pace. and not because it was just or 
 true, is not competent evidence against tli(> party making it; but the 
 law is otherwise with regard to an independent fact admitted to be 
 true, but not constituting such yielde(l point.' Wilt v. P>ird, 7 Bhu-kf. 
 2oS. Substantiallj^ the same language is used in Cates v. Kellogg, 
 9 Ind. oOG ; and in Pattison r. Norris, 29 Iiid. lOo, a somewhat 
 broader statement is made. The rule stated governs here, for the 
 defendant admitted, as an independent substantive fact, that he had 
 uttered slanderous words, imputing to the plaintiff a want of chas- 
 tity, and did not make the admission for the purjiose of securing a 
 comi)r(uuise." Binford c. Young, 115 Ind. 174 (1888). 
 
554" 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT 111. 
 
 "NVjikx conclusive. — Admissions, as a nilc, are cai)able of ex- 
 planation, and tlieir effect may l)e controlled by other evidence. 
 Biizard tf. McAnulty, 77 Tex. 438 (1890); Kinney r. Farnswortli, 
 17 Conn o55 (184')). " Receipts and other admissions of parties are 
 always oi)en to explanation, niiless under particular ciicumstaiiccs 
 as where they have led to conduct in other parties, involvini'- loss to 
 them, by reason of their having acted n|)on the faith of such admis- 
 sions : or unless they can be treated all the way through as conclu- 
 sive." Cuvillier (•. Browne, 4 Q. B. U. C. 10.") (10 Vk-.). ''it is 
 insisted that tlie [jlaintiif had, after tlie accident, made certain state- 
 ments or admissions tliat lie was walking backward at tlie time tliat 
 his foot got cauglit, which were inconsistent with his testimony. 
 Such statements go to the credibility of his testimony merely, and 
 are for the jury."' Eastman c. Kailway Co., 101 Mich. 597, GO.'i 
 (1894). 
 
 Ho a pleader may show that his admission in pleading was made 
 inconsiderately and without ade(piate knowledge of the facts. Smith 
 V. Fowler, 12 Lea, IC'J (1883); Buzard v. McAnulty, 77 Tex. 43S 
 (1890). 
 
 So an admission in court may be retracted at a subsequent trial, 
 though the fact of the previous admission is still com])etent. Terry 
 r. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 40 Conn. 31.') (187.'!). See also 
 Stowe /•. IJishop, 58 Vt. 498 (188()), to the effect that wiiere a man 
 admitted negligence he can show that upon reflection he became 
 convinced that his conduct was justified. ''In the circumstances of 
 the case, negligence was a question of fact and not of law, and de- 
 fendant's statements were evidence against him on that jioint; but 
 as they wore non-contrac^tual and non-dis|)ositive admissions, ti\ey 
 were not conclusive proof of that which he stated, but were open to 
 neutralization by showing that on reflection and consideration he 
 had come to think otherwise. Dennisou v. Miner, L' Atl. llei). 561 
 (Sup. Ct. of Pa.), is exactly in point." 
 
 CoxcM'sivK AoMtssioNs ARK EsToi'i'Kt.s. — I'lulcr wliatcircum- 
 stanccs an admission is conclusive is a ([uestion decided by the 
 ordinary rules of equitable estoppel. Admissior.s, by silence or 
 otherwise, which have been acted on by the j)erson to whom made, 
 cannot be denied if their denial would work injury to one who has 
 acted upon them in good faitli. Corser -<». Paul, 41 X. II. 24 (18G0) ; 
 Cuvillier r. I5rowne, 4 (,). 15. U. C. 105 (1847); Welland Canal Co. c. 
 Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480 (1832). 
 
C. X.] ORAL CONFESSIONS TO BE RECEIVED WITH CAUTION. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 § 862.' The only topic under the general head of admissions 
 which remains to be discussed, is that of confessions of guilt in 
 criminal cases. In such cases evidence of oral confession of guilt 
 ought — as just remarked in regard to admissions in civil pro- 
 ceedings,- — to be rrccivod with great caution.^ Not only does 
 considerable danger of mistake arise from the misapprehension or 
 malice of witnesses, the misuse of words, the failure of the party to 
 express his own meaning, and the infirmity of memory,* but the 
 zeal which generally prevails to detect offenders, especially in cases 
 of aggravated guilt, and the strong disposition which is often 
 displayed by persons engaged in pursuit of evidence to magnify 
 slight grounds of suspicion into sufficient proof, ^ — together with 
 the character of the witnesses, who are sometimes necessarily called 
 in cases of secret and atrocious crime, — all tend to impair the value 
 of this kind of evidence, and sometimes lead to its rejection, where, 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 214, in great part. 
 
 * Ante, § .SOI. 
 
 ' Mui'iiulay has romarked, "Words 
 may easily be niiaunilerstood by an 
 honest man. They may easily be 
 misconstrued by a knave. What was 
 ppoken nictaplioriciilly may be»j)j)re- 
 hended literally. What was s])oken 
 ludicrouhly may bo apprehended 
 seriously. A particle, a tense, a 
 mood, an emphasis, may make the 
 whole difference between Ruilt and 
 innocence." History of England, 
 vol. 1, ch. 5, p. oH:i. 
 
 ♦ See Earlo v. I'icken, 1833 (Parke, 
 B.); R. V. Simons, 18;H (Ahlerscm, 
 B.); Coloinan'H case, 1718 (Ir.1. in 
 Ho~p. 7'. Fields, 18'_>'2-4 (Am.), the 
 court observed, ' ' llow easy is it for the 
 
 hearer to take one word for another, 
 or to take a word in a sense not in- 
 teniled by the speaker ; and for want 
 of uu exact ropr(!sentati(m of the tone 
 of voice, emphasis, countenance, eye, 
 manner, and action of the one who 
 made the confession, how almost im- 
 possible is it to make third persons 
 understand the exact state of his mind 
 and meaning ! For these reasons such 
 evidence is received with great dis- 
 trust, and uiul(>r apprehensions for 
 the wrong it may do." 
 
 ' For a curious instance of this 
 kind of exaggeration, see the evi- 
 dence adduced in support of Hugh 
 Macauley Boyd's claim to the author- 
 shi]) of Junius. 1 Woodfall's Junius, 
 •133— Ma:. See ante, §67. 
 
 565 
 
 i! L, I t 
 
ORAL CONFESSIONS TO BE RECEIVED WITH CAUTION, [p. Itl. 
 
 in civil actions, it would have been received. The weighty obser- 
 vation of Mr. Justice Foster should also be kept in mind, that 
 " this evidence is not, in the ordinary course of things, to be 
 disproved by that sort of negative evidence, by which the proof of 
 plain facts may be, and often is, confronted." ' 
 
 § 863. In addition to these sources of distrust, which are often 
 sufficient to raise a serious doubt whether the confession given in 
 evidence was actually made by the prisoner in the words, or to the 
 effect, stated by the witnesses, there is yet another reason why 
 caution should be employed in receiving and weighing confessions. 
 The statements, though made as deposed to, may be fahe. The 
 prisoner, oppressed by the calamity of his situation, may have 
 been induced by motives of hope or fear to make an untrue con- 
 fession ; - and tlie same result may have arisen from a morbid 
 
 'I 
 
 > Fost. C. L. 243. See, also, 1 Ph. 
 Ev. 307 ; Lench c. Li'iu'h, 1805 ; 
 Smith V. Burnhain, ls;i.S (Am.); 
 E. V. Cro,ssHchl, lT9(j, per Mr. 
 Adiuiis, iu hi.s luldrtss to tlio jury. 
 The civilians plucod littlo roliaiico 
 on nuked contossioiis of guilt, not 
 corroboiiitod by otluu' tostiniony. 
 Carpzuvius, after citing the opinion 
 of Severus to that cttect, and onunic- 
 ratiiig the various kinds of misery 
 whieli tempt its wretched victims to 
 this mode of siiicid(\ adds -"(juorum 
 omnium ex his foritibus contra .so 
 emissa pron>uiciati( , non tarn drlicti 
 cronfcssiont' llrniati (^uf>"' vox '/c/cr/s, 
 vel iiimiiifidiH oratio c.^t": Ca. t' 
 Tract, lier. Cr. Pars 111. (iiv.st. 114, 
 p. KiO. So. also, in the Kccles. (,'ourts 
 it is regarded witii great distrust. 
 S'>o per Sir W. Scott, in Williams /'. 
 Williams, 17i»8. 
 
 - In (InMi'.ioaf on ]']vidcnce, liith 
 edit,, liSd'.', p. -1)0, various cases and 
 dieta aie cited of confcssioUH which 
 w ro false, and llnis show the nccnl 
 of extreme eiiution as to acct'j)ting 
 all confessions, .\mong other in- 
 stances ([noted is the remarkable 
 case of tlie two JJoorns (Am.), con- 
 victe(l in tlie S',i])r. Court of Nei'inont 
 in Sei)tember, l.Sl!>, of the nuirder of 
 Russell Colvin, May 10th, 1812. It 
 appeared that Colvin, wlio was the 
 brotlier-in-law of the prisoners, was 
 a pursoiJ nf weak mind ; that he wa« 
 
 considered burdensome to the family 
 of the ]>risoners, wlio were obliged 
 to .snp])ort him ; that on the day of 
 his disappearance, being in a distant 
 held where the prisoners were at 
 work, a violent quarrel bioke out 
 between them; and that one of them 
 struck him a violent blow on the 
 back of the head with a club, which 
 felled him to the ground. Some 
 suspicions arose at that time that 
 he was murdered, which wcie in- 
 creased by the linding of liis hat in 
 the same field a few montlis after- 
 wards. Thi'so suspicions in process 
 of time snlisided ; imt, in 1810, one 
 of the neighbours luiving lepeateilly 
 dreamed of the niurdei', with great 
 minuteness of circumstance, both 
 in regaid to his death and the con- 
 cealment of liis remain *, tlie jjrisoners 
 woie veliemently accused, and gi^no- 
 rally believed guilty of tlie murder. 
 Upon strict search, the ]inckct-knifo 
 of Colvin aiul a button of his cletlies 
 were found in an old <ii)encellar in the 
 same field, and in a hollow stumj) not 
 many rods from it wen^ discovered 
 two nails and a number of bones, 
 b(!lieveii to be those of a man. Upon 
 tliis ovidenci', together with tlieir 
 deliberatn confession of tin? iact of 
 the minder and concealment of the 
 body in thosi^ ]>la<'es, the jirisoners 
 woi'o convicted and sentenced to die. 
 On the same day they applied t*) the 
 
 
 wa 
 
CHAP, X.] INSTANCES OF FALSK CONFESSIONS. 
 
 ambition to obtain an infamous notoriety,' from an insane or 
 criminal desire to be rid of life, from a reasonable wish to break 
 off old connexions, and to commence a new career, from an almost 
 pardonable anxiety to screen a relative or a comrade,- or even from 
 the delusion of an overwrought and fantastic imagination.^ 
 
 § 864. Still, the actual instances of fahe confessions of crime 
 are very rare, and^ their just value has been happily stated by one 
 of the most accomplished of modern jurists. " Whilst such anoma- 
 lous cases," says the writer, " ought to render courts and juries at 
 all times extremely watchful of every fact attendant on confessions 
 of guilt, the cases should never be invoked, or so urged by the 
 accused's counsel, as to invalidate indiscriminately all confessions 
 put to the jury, thus repudiating those salutary distinctions which 
 the court, in the judicious exercise of its duty, shall be enabled to 
 make. Such an use of these anomalies, which sliould be regarded 
 as mere exceptions, and which should speak only in the voice 
 of warning, is no less unprofessional than impolitic ; and should 
 be regarded as offensive to the intelligence both of court and 
 jury."* 
 
 Legrislaturo for a commutation of the 
 seutouco of death to thiit of j)mi)utual 
 imprisoiimont ; wliich, as to ouo of 
 thoiii only, was {iraiitcd. Tho con- 
 fession buiuf^ now witlidrawu and 
 contradicted, and a reward offered 
 for tlicdiscoveiy of tlie missing man, 
 he was found in New Jersey, and re- 
 turned homo in tiuK! to ])revent the 
 execution. Ho liad tied for fear that 
 th((y would kill him. Th<' boni's woio 
 those of S(nue animal. Tliey had been 
 advisiKl by some misiu(l;|r^i"ji i'ii"nds 
 that, as they would certainly bo con- 
 victed upon the circumstances proved, 
 their only chance of life, by coininu- 
 tation of punishmi'nt, depended on 
 their makin^ra jienitential confession, 
 and thereui)ou obtaining,' a recom- 
 mendation to mercy. This case, of 
 which there is a l?e])oi t in the Law 
 liibrary of Ilarvaid IJniveisity, is 
 criti(Nilly examined in a learned 
 article in the Noitli Anu<r. l{ev. 
 vol. X. ]>p. US 'fJit. For another 
 of false confession, under a ])ro- 
 
 case 
 
 {)anl 
 ^ari 
 
 note to WarickshrtU's case, 1783. 
 
 * One or other of these motives 
 probably induced Hubert falsely to 
 confess that ho set fire to London in 
 l(!f)(). His confession cost him lus 
 life. See (i How. St. Tr. 807— 809, 
 81!»— 821 ; and Wills, Cir. Ev. 70-7o. 
 See, also, (leni'ialLiMi's assertion that 
 he was the author of Junius, as nar- 
 rated in 1 Woodfall's Junius, 'Vl'l, 
 •12;j. 
 
 ' Mr. Joy mentions the case of an 
 innocent person makinj,' a false con- 
 structive confession, in ord(>r to fix 
 KUsi)icion on liims(,'lf alone, that his 
 guilty bidthirs miu'ht liave time to 
 escajK!, — a stratagem whicli was coni- 
 pletely successful ; after wiiicji lie 
 ])roved an alibi in the most satisfac- 
 torv manner, Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 107 ; 
 1 ('hit. Cr. L. 8,j, S. C. 
 
 ^ This is probably th(> true key to 
 the frequent (unfessions of tlie poor 
 Wl'etcli(!sin old times tried for witch- 
 cralt. See Mary Smith's case, KJUi; 
 Essex witches, \M'>\ SulVolk witches, 
 I()()5; Devon witches tried in 1082. 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 214, n. 2. 
 
 » 1 Hoffman on Leg. Study, p. 367. 
 
 667 
 
DELIBERATE CONFESSIONS — JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS, [p.lll. 
 
 11 
 
 § 865.* Indeed, all reflecting men are now generally agreed, 
 that (IcUbemt)' and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved, 
 are among the most effectual proofs in the law; their value 
 depending on the sound presumption, that a rational heing will 
 not make admissions prejudicial to his interest and safety, unless 
 when urged by the promptings of truth and conscience.^ Such 
 confessions, therefore, made by a prisoner to any person, at 
 any time, and in any place, are at common law receivable in 
 evidence,^ while the degree of credit due to them must be esti- 
 mated bj the jury according to the particular circumstances of each 
 case. 
 
 § SfiG.* Confessions may be divided into two classes, namely, 
 judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial cvifessions are those which 
 are made before the magistrate, or in court, in the due course of 
 legal proceedings ; and it is essential that they be made of the 
 free will of the party, and with full knowledge of the nature and 
 consequences of the confession. Of this kind are the preliminary 
 examinations taken in writing by magistrates pursuant to statute ; 
 and the plea of guilty to an indictment, made in open court. 
 Either of these is suffiifient b}'- itself to support a conviction, though 
 followed by a sentence of death, they both being deliberately and 
 solemnly made under the protecting caution and oversight of the 
 judge. Even on trials for treason or mispri>ion of treason, where 
 the law in its clemency affords to the accused unusuul protection, a 
 " willing confession without violence in open court," renders it un- 
 neccfsary to call witnesses in support of the charge ;' and, perhaps, 
 also, — though this would seem to be highly qTiei^tioiiable," — a con- 
 fession made during the solemnity of an examination before a 
 magistrate or other person having autliority to tnke it, will, if 
 satisfactorily proved by two witnesses, be deemed sufhtieut evidence 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 21o, in part. 
 
 " Wiivickshiiirscasu, 1783; Lambe's 
 cnsc, ITHl ; ^tovtitiier v. Mortiiiior, 
 1820; Ilanis r. Hiinis, 1829; 1 Gilb. 
 Ev. 21(1 ; Dig. lib. 42. tit. 2. tu^ Con- 
 fess.; Van Lccuw, Comni. b. v. i-h. 
 xxi. § 1 ; 2 I'oth. Obi. Apj). Numb. 
 
 xvi. §■ i;{. 
 
 • Lambo's case, 1791 ; M'NuIly, 
 
 Ev. (Ir.) 42, 47. 
 
 ♦ Gr. Ev. § 216, as to first twelve 
 lines. 
 
 " 7 W. 3, c. 3 ("Tho Tioiiaon Act, 
 1()9.) "), § 2 ; extended to In^land by 
 1 & 2 G. 4, c. 24; Gi(>f;},'"s cu.si>, 1708. 
 
 * Hf'iwiok's casi', 174(); J{. v. 
 Willis, 1710 iWni'il. C.B., and Eyre, 
 8.-0.). 
 
 668 
 
CHAP. X.J 
 
 EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS. 
 
 to warrant a conviction.^ The canon law, too, — scrupulous as it :? 
 on the subject of evidence, — regards a JitiUcial and free confession, 
 made out of prison, and without any just fear or danger, as amount- 
 ing, in the phrase of the Spiritual Courts, to a jdena probatio.* 
 The doctrine of the Roman law, was also to the lilic effect, — con- 
 fessos in Jure pro judicatia hubcri phrrf ; — and, indeed, it may be 
 deemed a rule of universal jurisprudence.'' 
 
 § 867."* Extra-Jmliciol confeifitoHs are those which are made by 
 the party elsewhere than before a magistrate, or in court ; this 
 term embracing not only express confeissions of crime, but all 
 those admissions and acts of the accused from which guilt may 
 be implied. All voluntary confessions of this kind are receivable 
 iu evidence, on being proved like other facts ; and thi.s, too, on 
 trials for treason or misprision of treason, in like manner as on 
 ordinary indictments ; except only that, on these uiore serious 
 occasions, they will not supply the want of tlie two witnesses, 
 whose testimony is required by the Act of William the Third. 
 Conspqut'ntly, confessions, whetht-r proved by one witness or two, 
 can only be treated as corrohoratire evidence of the orert act 
 charged ;•' unless such overt act be the assassination of the Queen, 
 or any attempt to injure her person, in which event the accused 
 may be convicted on the same evidence as an ordinary murderer." 
 
 § 8GS.' Whether, on ordinary indictments for felony or mis- 
 demeiinor, extra-judicial coiifessioiis, uiirorroliorated by any other 
 proof of the corpus delicti,'* are of themselves, in general, sufficient 
 to ju>tify a couviutiou of a prisoner, has been gravely doubted.'* 
 
 > I'o-t. C. L. 'J4(l— 243. 
 
 » Avlilto I'iir. J4J. 
 
 ' C«)il. Lil). 7, tit. 59 ; 1 Poth. Obi. 
 
 ft. iv. eh. ;J, § 1, num. 71)8; Vau 
 iL'Oiiw. Uoiinu. b. o, oil. 21, § 2 ; 1 
 Muse. (U; I'lob. Gone. 344. 
 
 * (Jr. Ev. § 210, us to first fivo 
 linos. 
 
 U. ('. Willis, 1710; Post. C. L. 
 240-243; 11. n. Cios-liuld, 179(i. 
 
 » 3!t vt 40 a 3, c. 93 ("Tho Trea- 
 son Aut, 18(Mt"); 1 & 2 G. 4, f. 24, 
 § 2, Ir. ; o & (i V. c. jl ('• Tho Tiua- 
 eon Act, 1S42"), § 1. 
 
 ' (ii'. Ev. § 217, ill pint. 
 
 "As t" wli'ii the corpus delicti 
 need not bu piuvud, uou auto, § 141. 
 
 Seo. (ilso, R. V. Unklos. 1S73 (Ir.). 
 
 'In iioman law. sucli nuk>-d eon- 
 fusi<iwn-i uiiiDunted oiily it a senii- 
 )iliMi'i pi'iibatio. ujmn wiiji h uion«j no 
 juilj;iii('ut could l>e fmin |i-il ; and, at 
 m()>t, tho uccusrd. in pirticularcases, 
 could Lilly !)•' put to til'.' t<.rtufo. But 
 if volunturily made iu tlie j)rfSf'nce 
 of the iiijurcil party, or if ifitt-rated 
 lit diffcii'iit tiiui'j ill his ab-eoco, and 
 jjorsisti'd in, thuy wcr« ivcfiviHl as 
 plenary pioof: Evorh. Concl. xix. 8, 
 l.xxii. j, cxxxi. 1, clxiv. 1, 2, 3, 
 clxxxvi. 2, 3. 11 ; 1 Masc. do Prob. 
 Coiid. 347, 349; Van Lt'euw. < 'omm. 
 b. 5, ch. 21, «i> 4, .3; ('ai](Z. Pract. 
 Ker. Cr. Pars. 11. Uux-st. 00, n. 8. 
 
 561^ 
 
CONFESSION OF ADULTICRY. 
 
 [part III. 
 
 In each of the English cases usually cited in favour of tlio sufTi- 
 ciency of this evidence, some corroborative circurastanoe will bo 
 found.* One case,^ indeed, seems to be in exception ; but it is far 
 too briefly reported to be relied on as an authority.^ In the 
 United States, a prisoner's confession, when the corpus delicti is 
 not otherwise proved, has been held insufficient to warrant his 
 conviction,* and this opinion certainly best accords with the 
 humanity of the criminal law, with the great degree of caution 
 applied in receiving and weighing the evidence of confessions in 
 other cases, and is countenanced by approved writers on this 
 branch of the law.* 
 
 § 869. However, in the Divorce Division a decree for dissolution 
 of marriage con, as we have seen,® legally rest on the respondent's 
 admission of adultery, though unsupported by any confirmatory 
 evidence. 
 
 § 870.' In the proof of confessions, — as in the case of admissions 
 in civil causes,** — f/ic iv/iok of what the prisoner said on the subject, 
 
 ' Thus, for example, in E. v. El- 
 dridgo, 1821, the piisomn-, wlio con- 
 fessed, was indicted for horse-steal- 
 ing ; the liorse wns found in his 
 possession, and ho liad sold it for 
 I'll., after asking 'AoL, which was 
 its fair value. In iinothor case (E. 
 V. Falkner and Bond, 1>S2l'), the 
 person robbed was called upon his 
 recognizanco, and it was proved that 
 one of the prisoners, who confessed, 
 had endeavoured to send a message 
 to him to keep him from a])pearing. 
 In yet another caso (1\. v. White, 
 182;i) there was strong circumstantial 
 evidence both of the larceny from 
 the prosecutor's stable, and of tho 
 prisoner's guilt ; and in tho caso of 
 another jjHsoncr (11. v. Tippet, 1828), 
 who was indicted for the same lar- 
 ceny, part of this evidence was also 
 given, together with the additional 
 proof that such prisoner was an 
 under-ostler in tho same stable. In 
 all these cases, too, oxcejit in that 
 secondly cited (R. r. Falkner and 
 Bond, 1822). tho confessions were 
 solemnly made before tho examining 
 magistrate, and taken down in due 
 form of law ; and in the caso which 
 forms th(! exception (R. v. Falkner and 
 Bond, 1822) the confessions were re- 
 
 peated, once to the officer who appre- 
 hended tho prisoners, and again on 
 hearing tho depositions read over 
 which contained the chaige. In 
 anoth'>r case, which is contained in a 
 very brief note (Stone's case, l.')()l), 
 it does not uj)pi ar that the corpus 
 dtdicti was not otherwise ])rovod ; on 
 the contrary, the natural inference 
 from the re])ort is, that it was, See, 
 also, R. V. Sutclitfe, 18,>0. 
 
 2 R. r. Wheeling, 1789. 
 
 ' Tho report merely states that, 
 " in tho case of John Wh(M'liiig, tried 
 before liOrd Kenyon, at the (Summer 
 Assizes at Salisbury, 1789, it was 
 determined tliat a i)ri.soni>r may bo 
 convicted on his contession, when 
 proved by legal testimoi\y, though 
 it is totally uncorroborated by any 
 other cvidenc(!." 
 
 * Greeideaf on Evidence, 14th (or 
 1892) edit., citing various American 
 authorities. 
 
 ' See Guild's case, 1828 (Am.) ; 
 Long's caso, 1707 (Am.); and R. v, 
 Edgar, 1831, cited 2 Russ. C. & M. 
 255, 82G n. h ; and see also, 4 Hawk. 
 P. C. 425. 
 
 • Ante, § 768. 
 
 ' Gr. Ev. § 218, in great part. 
 » Ante, §§ 725—734. 
 
 560 
 
CHAP. X.] WHOLE STATEMENT MUST BE CONSIDERED. 
 
 at the time of making the confession, should be taken together. 
 It is not rt. 3onable to assume, that the entire pro])osition respecting 
 the prisoner's connection with the crime, with all its limitations, 
 was contained in one sentence, or in any particular number of 
 sentences. As the meaning of a writing must, in civil cases, be 
 collected from the wliole taken together, and as, when several 
 instruments relating to the same matter have been executed at one 
 time, they are all resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the 
 intention of the parties, so here, if one part of a conversation is 
 relied on, as proof of a confession of the crime, the prisoner has 
 a right to lay before the court the whole of what was said in that 
 conversation ; or at least so much as is explanatory of the part 
 already proved, and perhaps, in favorem vitto, all that was 
 relative to the subject-matter in issue.' For, as already observed 
 respecting admissions,^ unless tlie whole is considered, the true 
 meaning of the part which is evidence against the prisoner cannot 
 be ascertained. 
 
 § 871. But if, after the entire statement of a prisoner has been 
 given in evidence, the prosecutor can contradict any part of it, he 
 is at liberty to do so ; and then the whole testimony is loft to the 
 jury for their consideration, precisely as in other cases where one 
 part of the evidence is contradictory to another.''' Even witliout 
 such contradiction it is not to be supposed that all the parts of a 
 confession are entitled to equal credit. The jury may believe that 
 part which charges the prisoner, and reject that which is in his 
 favour, if they see sufficient grounds for so doing.'* If wliat he 
 said in his own favour is not contradicted by evidence offcnMl by 
 the prosecutor, nor is improbable in itself, it will be naturally 
 believed by the jury ; but they are not bound to give weight to it 
 on that account, being at liberty to judge of it, like other evidence, 
 by all the circumstances of the case'' And if the confession 
 implicate other persons by name, still it must be proved as it was 
 
 > Per Ld. C. J. Abbott in tlio 
 Queen's case, 18'2(», II. L ; as qunli- 
 fled by the court in I'rincc r. Siinio, 
 18;)8; It. V. uoncs, 1827 ; IJ. v. llig- 
 giuH. 18'.'9. 
 
 Ante, §§ 7'25 — 729, and cases there 
 cited. 
 
 » R. V. Jone.s. 1S'J7 
 
 ♦ E. r. Iliy-ins, IS'Jf) (I'lirko, J.); 
 K. V. Stc])t(io, 18 iO (I'lirk. J.) ; Kosp, 
 V. McCaity, 1781 (Am.). 
 
 " Per Ijittledule, J., in R. v. Clewee, 
 1830. 
 
 561 
 
CONFESSIONS MUST BE VOLUNTARY. [PART HI. 
 
 if': 
 
 I 5-' 
 
 it 
 
 made, not omitting the names ; but the judge will instruct the 
 jury, that it is not evidence against anyone but the prisoner who 
 made it.' 
 
 !5 H72 ^ Before any confession can be received in evidence in a 
 criminal case, it must be shown to have been roJutitnrih/ made ; for, 
 "a confession, forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by 
 the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, when it is 
 to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to 
 be given to it ; and therefore it is rejected." ^ The evidence as to 
 whether the confession has been obtained by the influence of hope 
 or fear, being in its nature preliminary, is, — as we have seen,* — 
 addressed to the judge, who will require the prosecutor to show 
 ojfirtnatively, to his satisfaction, that the statement was not made 
 under the influence of an improper inducement, and who, in the 
 event of any doubt subsisting on this head, will reject the confes- 
 eion.* As the admission or rejection of a confession rests wholly 
 in the discretion of the judge, it is difficult to lay down particular 
 rules, a priori, for the government of that discretion ; (md the more 
 60, because much must necessarily depend on the age, experience, 
 intelligence, and character of the prisoner, and on the circumstances 
 under which the confession was made.^ Language sufficient to 
 overcome the mind of one, may have no effect upon that of 
 another ; a consideration which may perhaps reconcile some 
 seemingly contradictory decisions. Still, it cannot be denied, 
 that the principle of excluding all confessions induced by hope 
 or fear on the part of the accused has been sometimes extended 
 much too far, and applied to cases where no reason could be 
 
 ul 
 
 > R. V. Ilearne, 183(>(L:ttleflnle, J.); 
 E. r.Clewes, 18;>U(i(i.); ll.v. Flctdior, 
 LS29 (id.) ; R. v. Hall, lS;3:i (Alilor- 
 6on, B.); R. v. Foster, ]8;};i (Ld. 
 Demiian); R. v. Walklcy, 1833 (Gur- 
 ney, B,, who said it had been much 
 considered by tlio judges) ; I'arke, J., 
 thought otherwise in Barstow's case, 
 1831. A striking example of the last 
 proposition stated in the text was 
 contained in the cose of Robinson v. 
 Eobinson and I,ano, 1858-9, in which 
 a private diary kept by the wife, de- 
 Bcriliiiig her intrigues with the co- 
 res;^)ondeut, yras received as a con- 
 
 fe!=sion against herself, though itwaa 
 held to bo inadtnissible as evidence 
 against her paramour. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 219. in pp.rt. 
 
 3 Per ]-]yro, C.B., in Warickshall's 
 case, 1783; McNully.Ev. -il ; Knapp's 
 case, 1830 (Am.) ; Chabbock's case, 
 1804 (Am.). 
 
 * Ante, § 23. 
 
 « R. V. Wariingham, 1851 (Parke, 
 B.) ; R. V. Thompson, 1893. 
 
 « McNally, Ev. 43 (Ir.) ; Nate's 
 case, 1800 (Ld. Eldon, when O.J.); 
 Knapp's case, 1830 (Am.), 
 
 662 
 
CH. X ] PROMISE OR TIIRKAT BY PERSON IN AUTHORITY. 
 
 given for supposing that the inducement had had any influence 
 upon the miiid of the prisoner.' 
 
 § 873. Although no definite rule can he framed which shall he an 
 unerring guide in every supposable case, there are some points, 
 both in regard to the person hij whom the pi-onme or th-mt is made^ 
 and also in regard to the nntaro of the itiduceittont itself, on which 
 the judges have pretty generally agreed, a knowledge of which 
 will materially assist the inquiry, whether any particular confession 
 should be admitted in evidence or rejected. And ^ first, as to the 
 person In/ irlioin the iiidiiecinont is offered. Here, it is very dear, 
 that if the promise or threat be made by anyone hrin'n;/ anthoritj/ 
 over the prisoner in connection with tlie prosecution,^ — as, for 
 instance, by the prosecutor,* the master or mistress of the prisoner, 
 when the oil'enee concerns such master or nustress,^ the chaivman 
 of the company which is prosecuting him," the constable,^ or other 
 officer,' having him in custody, a magistrate,' or the like,'" — the 
 confession will be rejected as not being voluntary. The same rule 
 will perhaps prevail, though the inducement was not actually 
 offered by the person in authority, if it were held out by ani/one in 
 his pre.seiier, and he by his silence naiietioned it." 
 
 § 874. In these cases, as the authority possessed by the persons 
 who make or sanction the inducement is calculated both to animate 
 
 ' See the (/bservations of the judges 
 in R. V. BalJry, 1852. 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 'I'll, ill part. 
 
 3 E. r. P.iiTittt. 18;U (A!dersoti,B.). 
 which was a confossion by a sailor to 
 his captain, who tlireutoued him with 
 prison on a charge of stoalirij? his 
 watch ; 11. v. Thompson, 1783 ; 11. v. 
 Fleming, lS42(Ir.). 
 
 * E. V. Cass, 1784 (Gould, J.); E. 
 V. Jones, l.SOi); E. v. Jenkins, 18^2. 
 
 » E. V. Moore, 18J'2; E. v. War- 
 ringham, 18,")1 ; E. v. Upchurch, 
 183G; E. V. Taylor, ]8o9 (Patteson, 
 J.); E. V. Ilearn, 1841 (("oltmaii, J.) ; 
 E. V. iluwett, 1842 (Pattoson, J.). 
 
 " E. V. Thompson, 18'J;{. 
 
 ' E. V. Morton, 184:i(rolori(lgc, J.); 
 R. V. Swatkins, KS:)! (Patteson, J.); 
 . E. V. Mills, l,s;i:{ ((Jurm-y. 15.); E. v. 
 Shepherd, 183G (Gasdee, J.). 
 
 " In E. V. Enocli, 1^33, Park and 
 Taunton, JJ., rejotted a confession, 
 
 where the prisoner was left in charge 
 of a woman, to whom slio confessed ; 
 and iiiE. v. Windsor, I8(i4, C'haniiell, 
 B., and Cronijiton, J., laid down the 
 law in a similar manner. Sed qu., 
 and see E. v. Sloeman, 18/3 ; and B, 
 V. Vernon, 1872. 
 
 9 E. V. Drew, 1837 (Coleridge, J.); 
 E. V. Cooper, 1833 (Parke, J.); Guild's 
 case, 1828 (Am.). 
 
 '" Qu. a surgeon ; see E. v. King- 
 ston, 1830; E. c. Gainer. 1S48. In 
 this last case the inducement waa 
 held out by a surgeon, but in the 
 presence of the jirisonnr's master. 
 Uii. also, the husband of the prisoner: 
 E. V. Laugher, 184(). 
 
 " E. V. Ponntney. 1836 (Aldorson, 
 B.); E. V. Tavlor, l'83<»(Patteson, J.); 
 E. V. Drew, 1837 (Coleridge, J.) : R. 
 V. Simpson, 183) (Ir.); E. t<. Laugher, 
 184G (Pollock, C.B.): E. r. Luckluirst, 
 1803. But Rfie li. i;. Parker, 1861. 
 
 663 
 
INDUCEMENT HEI,D OUT BY PRIVATE PERSON. [PT. IH. 
 
 the prisoner's hopes of favour, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
 to inspire him with awe, and in some degree to overcome the powers 
 of liis mind, the law assumes the possibility, if not tlie probability, 
 of his milking an untrue admission, and, consequently, withdraws 
 from the consideration of the jury any declaration of guilt which 
 the prisoner under these circumstances may be induced to make. 
 Moreover, — and this is a more sensible reason for the rule, — the 
 admission of such evidence would naturally lead the inferior agents 
 of the police, while seeking to obtain a character for activity and 
 zeal, to harass and oppress unfortunate prisoners, in the hope of 
 wringing from them a reluctant confession. It has been argued, 
 with apparent reason, that a confession made upon the promises or 
 throats of a person, assuming to act in the capacity of an officer or 
 magistrate, and erroneously believed by the prisoner to possess such 
 authority, ought, upon the above principles, to be excluded ; but 
 the point is not known to have received any judicial consideration. 
 § 875.' Whether a confession made to a prrsoii, who /laciiig no 
 aiif/iorifi/ hciH held out ait iiir/iicnjiciit, will be receivable, is a question 
 upon which judges entertain oj)posite opinions.^ Bosanquet, J., on 
 two occasions, held that the fact of ani/ person telling a prisoner 
 that it would be better for him to confess, would aliraijn exclude any 
 confession made to that jx'r.son ;^ and one or two other cases may 
 perhaps be cited in supnort of the same view.* On the other h^nd, 
 PatL^on, J., is reported to have said, in a more recent case, that, 
 iu the opinion of tlic jadija^, any confession is receivable, unless some 
 inducement has been held out by a person in authoriti/ ; and with 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 223, in part. 
 
 « 11. V. •6\wnwi\ 18'7 (I'lirke, B.). 
 Ppo. also, li. r. roiintiicy, 183(5 
 (Aldorson. B.) ; II. )'. Gibbons. 1823. 
 
 3 R. V. Dunn, 1831 ; R. r. Slau-hter, 
 1831. In R. i: Downin-r. 1810, 
 where a ■w'om.Tn was indicated for 
 cliild-miiriU'i'. u confojssion ihiido by 
 Inr to an eldLM-ly woman, who was 
 liur neighbour and mirso, and wlio 
 told her it was bettor for hor to con- 
 fess, was held by Ld. Abingi^r to bo 
 inadmissible ; and hia lordship re- 
 fused to admit evidence! of a confcs- 
 Bion -subsequently made to a surgeon. 
 Bed qu. 
 
 * I'or instance, R. v. Kingston, 
 
 1830, where Parko and Littledale. 
 JJ., rejected a confession mado to a 
 sur^joon who had held out an induce- 
 ment. I'ei'haps, however, this case 
 may rest f)n the ground that tho 
 surgeon was a ])erson in authority. 
 In R. V. Walkley. 1S3.>, where evi- 
 dence of a confession was held inad- 
 missible by Gurney, B., it does not 
 appear whether or not the witness, 
 to whom tho st:itement was mado, 
 and who had offered tho induriement, 
 was a person in authority ; and the 
 same observation ap])lies to the ease 
 of R. V. Thomas, 18.34 (I'attoson, J.). 
 See, also. Guild's cas(\ 1828 (A.m.); 
 and Kuupp's case, 1830 (Am.). 
 
 i(i4 
 
CUAP. X.] INDUCEMENT HELD OUT BY PRIVATE PERSON. 
 
 reference to the particular facts of the case before him, and to 
 have added that ho would liavo received in evidence the statement 
 made by the prisoner to an indifPeront person, had the inducement 
 been olfored by such person alone.' 
 
 § 87(3. Both these contradictory decisions would seem to be 
 open to one and the same objection ; namely, they endeavour to 
 define, as a -strict nile of lair, what circumstances shall be deemed, 
 in all cases, to have unduly influenced the mind of the prisoner in 
 making the confession. Now, although the general rule which 
 has been laid down with reference to inducements offered by 
 persons in authority, is that as such inducements will probably 
 succeed in a large majority of instances, the presumption that 
 they will have this effect must, for the sake of uniformity and pre- 
 cision, be adopted as applicable to them all ; yet it by no means 
 follows, that the same nde will equally apply to all promises and 
 threats held out by private persons. These last inducements may 
 vary in their effect to almost any conceivable extent. They will 
 often be obviously insufficient to produce the slightest influence on 
 even the feeblest mind ; and, in such cases, the confession, which 
 follows, but which, in fact, is not comcqiicnt on them, should be 
 admitted in evidence. On the other hand, an inducement held out 
 by a private individual may be, and, indeed, frequently is, quite as 
 much calculated to cause the prisoner to utter an untrue statement, 
 as any promise made to him by a person in authority ; in these 
 cases the confession made to sucli private person should be excluded. 
 It is therefore submitted, that, without laying down any positive 
 rule, whether of admission or rejection, the judge should determine 
 each case on its o-wti merits ; only bearing in mind, that his duty is 
 to reject such confessions only as would seem to have been wrung 
 from the prisoner under the supposition that it would be best for 
 him to admit that he was guilty of an offence which he really never 
 committed. - 
 
 § 877.^ A promise or threat made by an indifferent person, who 
 has officiously interfered without any kind of authority, will, how- 
 ovcrj it is dear, nercr operate to exclude a confession made to any 
 
 ' R. V. Taylor, lb39; R. v. Slee- 
 man, 1833. 
 
 2 R. V. Court, 183() (Littledale, J.). 
 
 3 Gr. Ev. § '223, in part. 
 
 565 
 
CONFESSION MAU1-: AFTKU INDUCEMENT HELD OUr. [p. III. 
 
 1:1 
 
 
 ot/ier prison, who has not himself sanctioned the inJuconiont.' This 
 rule is founded, partly, on the supposition that such inducduieuts 
 will seldom much iiitlu (uco tlio conduct of the prisoner; hut ohiolly, 
 on the ground that, were a contrary rule to prevail, it would pro- 
 bably open a wide door to collusive practices, and would certainly 
 go far towards rendering all confessions inadmissible. 
 
 § 878. Where promises or threats have been once used of such a 
 nature as to render a confession inadmissible, all sitbactjiirnt admis- 
 sions of the same or the like facts will be rejected, unless from the 
 length of time intervening, from proper warning of the conse- 
 quences, or from other circumstances, there be good reason to 
 presume, that the delusive hope or fear which iiijfiiriicrd the first 
 confession has been cJJ'eduuUij (Uspelled.^^ Where,^ however, it 
 appears, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the improper in- 
 fiiioire Iran totiilli/ done away hrforc the confession was made, the 
 evidence will be received.-'' For example, where a magistrate told 
 a prisoner that if he was not the actual culprit and would disclose 
 all he knew, he would use his influence to protect him ; but on 
 subsequently receiving a letter from the Secretary of State refusing 
 mercy, communicated its contents to the prisoner, it was held 
 that a confession, which the prisoner afterwards made to the 
 coroner, who had also duly cautioned him, was clearly voluntary, 
 and was admissible;* and wher:. ..a accused had been induced by 
 promises of favour to make a confession, which was for that cause 
 excluded, but some months afterwards, and after he had been 
 solemnly warned by two magistrates that he must expect death 
 and prepare to meet it, again fully acknowledged his guilt, the 
 latter confession was received in evidence.'" Tndeed, it may be 
 generally laid down, that, though an inducement has been held 
 
 » R. V. Gibbons, 1823 (Park, J., 
 and lliillock, B.); 11. v llardwiek, 
 1811 (Wood, 15.); E. v. Row, 180^; 
 E. V. Tyler, lS2;j (HuUock, 13.). 
 
 '» Joy ou Conf. (Ir.) (W ; Guild's 
 case, 1828 .Am.); 11. v. llewett, 1842 
 (Patteson, J.), reeo>;nizing MjyncU's 
 case, 1834 (Timnton, J.) ; Sherring- 
 ton's case. 1838 (Patteson, J.); R. 
 v. Cooper, li-L'S (Paiko, J.); Bell's 
 cose, 1800 (It.), cited in Joy on Conf. 
 
 (Ir.) 71, and in M'Nally, Ev. (Ir.) 
 43 (Ld. Kilwardon, C.J., and Carle- 
 ton, C.J. of C. P.); R. V. Rosa Rue, 
 187(j; Roberts' case, 1827 (Am.); 
 R. V. Walsh, 1843 (Ir.) (Jackson, J.). 
 
 » Gr. Ev. § 221, in part. See R. 
 V. Doherty, 1874. 
 
 » See R. V. Chevorton, 1862. 
 
 * R. V. Clewes, 1830 (Littledale, 
 J.). See, also, R. v. Dinjiley, 1645. 
 
 Guild's case, 1828 (Am.). 
 
 560 
 
CHAP. X.] INDUCEMENT MUST EEFER TO THE CHARGE. 
 
 out by an oflioor, a prosecutor, .or tho like, and thougli a confession 
 has been made in consequence of sucli inducement, still, if the 
 prisoner be subsequently wdrned by a porsou in equal or superior 
 authority, that what he may say will bo oviilenoo against liiiusolf, 
 or that a confession will bo of no benefit to hitn, — or if lie be 
 simply cautioned by the magistrate not to say anytliing ugaiust 
 himself, — any admission of guilt afterwards made, will bo received 
 as a voluntary confession.' More tloubt may bo entertained as 
 to the law, if the promise has proceeded from a person of superior 
 authority, as a magistrate, and the confession is aft(!rwards made 
 to an inferior olHeer ; because a caution from this latter person 
 might be insufficient to effiuio the expectation of mercy which had 
 previously been raised in tho prisoner's mind.'^ 
 
 $i 879. Passing now to the luiture of tho induce mvnt, it may bo 
 laid down as a general rule, that in order to exclude a confession, 
 the inducement, whether it assume the shape of a promise, a 
 threat, or mere advice, must be such as is calculated to influence 
 the prisoner's mind with respect to his escape from the ehurgo. A 
 confession, therefore, will be received, though it were induced by 
 spiritual exhortations, whether of a clergyman,'^ or of any other 
 person ; ■* for such a confession can scarcely be regarded as untrue ; 
 and the law of England and Ireland, — unlike that which prevails 
 in Scotland,* America, and in countries subject to the lloman 
 law,"— does not, as will presently be pointed out,^ regard peniten- 
 tial confessions to a priest in the light of privileged communica- 
 
 • E. V. Ilowoa, 1834 (Ld. Den- 
 man); 11. V. Lingate, 1815; R. v. 
 Er)sii3r, 1821 ; 11. v. Bryan, 1834 
 (If.); Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 72—74. 
 8ee K. v, Eichaids, 1832. 
 
 » 11. V. Cooper, 1833 (i'aike, J.). 
 
 ^ R. V. Gilliam, 1828, explained in 
 Joy on Conf. (Ir.) 52 - 5(J ; Com. v. 
 Drake, 1818 (Am.). But see R. r. 
 Griffin, 1853. 
 
 • E. V. Wild, 1835 ; E. v. Nute, 
 1842 ; recognized in E. v. Hewitt, 
 1S42 (I'atteson, J.); E. v. Gibney, 
 1822 (Jr.); E. v. Hleeman, 1853. 
 
 ' 2 Alison, Cr. L. of Sc. (Sc), cited 
 in Joy on Conf. (Ir.), 57, n. a, 58. 
 
 • In tho Eoman law penitential 
 Gout'essions to the priests are en- 
 
 couraged for tho relief of tho con- 
 science, and the i)riest is bound to 
 secrecy by the peril of punishment. 
 " Coiit'es.-io coram sacerdote in \w\\i- 
 tentiii facta non probut in judicio ; 
 qtiiii K,iiiS(tur /itctii curam Jku ; iuio, 
 si sacerdos eum enunciet, incidit iii 
 pa'uam." 1 Alasc. do i'rob., Concl. 
 377. It was lawful, however, for tho 
 priest to testify in such cases to tho 
 fact, that the party had made such a 
 penitential confession to him as tho 
 Church re()uires, and that he had en- 
 joined penance upon him ; and, with 
 tho exi)ress consent of the jjeniteut, 
 he might lawfully testify to the sub- 
 stance of the confession itself. Id. 
 '• Post, §§ <J1G, 917. 
 
 507 
 
INDUCEMENT MUST RELATE TO THE CHARGE. [PART HI. 
 
 
 1 
 
 tions. But it is not necessary that at the time when the induce- 
 ment is held out the charge against the prisoner should have been 
 actually made ; for where a man was at that time threatened to 
 be given into custody without any offence being then specified, 
 but the nature of the charge was afterwards stated, and he 
 confessed his guilt, the confession was held not admissible.^ 
 
 I 880. A jiromise, too, of some merely colhderal benefit or boon, as 
 for instance, a promise to give the prisoner some spirits,^ or to strike 
 off his handcuffs,^ or to let him see his wife,* or perhaps (where 
 she is a female) to abstain from an examination of her person,* 
 will not be deemed such an inducement as will authorise the rejec- 
 tion of a confession made in consequence. And confessions will 
 in general be admitted, though caused by intimidating language, 
 provided the intimidation has had no reference to the charge, and 
 was not otherwise calculated to produce any untrue statement.^ 
 Moreover, an inducement held out to a prisoner with reference to 
 one charge will generally not exclude a consequent confession 
 wliioh relates to another ; ' unless the two offences be so blended 
 together as to constitute in reality but one transaction.' 
 
 § 881." If no inducement has been held out relating to the charge, 
 it mutters not indeed in what way the confession has been obtained ; 
 f(jr whether it were induced by a solemn promise of secrecy, even con- 
 finned by an oath ; '" or by reason of the prisoner having been made 
 dnt liken ;^^ or even by deception practised upon him, or false repre- 
 sentation made to him for that purpose;'- it will be equally 
 
 > R. V. Lnckluirst, 18j:5. 
 
 » li. V. Sexton, 1>S'J2, cited in Joy 
 on Conf. (Ir.) 17 — 19, is to the con- 
 traiv; but this cuso (cU'citlod by Hcst, 
 .1.) Is probably not hiw. Son obstr- 
 viitioim of Mr. GreavL'8 in 2 iUiss. C. 
 & M. 827, n. (/,■). 
 
 •' 1{. V. (irci'n, 1834 (Bosnnquot 
 and Taunton, JJ.). 
 
 * U. V. Lloyd, 18:t4 (Ir.) (Patteson, 
 J.). 
 
 ^ U. V. Cain, ISIiO. But uudor 
 precisely theso circunistiinces, two 
 abl(^ i'hitrbsh jiidfjes have declined to 
 admit the evidence. 11. c. Bowden, 
 18,")!) (.Martin. B., after consultinfj: 
 \Villes, J.); MS. ox relatione, Mr. 
 Ch. liy. Uopwood. • 
 
 • Sec R. r. Thornton, 1824. 
 
 ' 11. c. Warner, 18H2 (i.ittledale, J.). 
 
 » B. V. llearn, 1841 (('idtman, J.). 
 
 » Gr. I'^v. § 22!), in i)art. 
 
 »" 11. V. Shaw, 1834 (Patteson, J.); 
 Coin. I'. Kna])p, 1830 (Am.). 
 
 " R. V. Spilsbnry, 183.J (ColeridRO, 
 J.), (jn. on the ground that in vino 
 verita.s. In B. v. Si])pet, tried at 
 Maidstone Ass. 183!), a confession, 
 made by prisoner while tnlkiiKj in his 
 slii'i), having been tendered in evi- 
 dence, Tindal, C.J., doubtecl its ad- 
 missibility, and it waa withdrawn. 
 M.S. 
 
 '» R. V. ])errin>;ton, 182<) (((arrow, 
 B.); R. V. Biuley, 1818 (id.), alter- 
 wards confirmed by all the judges. 
 
 ■m 
 
n 
 
 CH. X.] CONFESSIONS MAY BE ELICITED BY QUESTIONS. 
 
 admissible. Much less will a confession be rejected merely because 
 it has been elicited by questiom put to the prisoner whether by a 
 magistrate/ officer^ or private person ;* and the form of the ques- 
 tion is immaterial, even though it assumes the prisoner's guilt. ^ If 
 a prisoner make a confession under the hope, held out by a person 
 not in aut/ion'fi/, that he will thereby be admitted as Queen's 
 evidence, it will be received against him ; * and so it will also, 
 tliough his hopes have been excited by a constable or other officer, 
 if on the trial of his accomplices he refuses to make a full disclosure, 
 and thus violates the condition on which his claim to favour can 
 alone rest.^ What the accused has been overheard muttering to 
 himself, or saying to his wife or to any other person in confidence, 
 is also receivable in evidence;^ though the wife, solicitor and 
 counsel of the prisoner will not, on grounds that will be presently 
 explained, be themselves allowed to reveal what he has said to 
 them.* A voluntary confession, too, is admissible to whom- 
 8oe\er it may have been made, though it does not appear tliat 
 the prisoner was urinied that what he said would be used against 
 him, nay, though it appears on the contrary that he was not so 
 warned." 
 
 § 88'2. In most cases it is indeed advisable and proper to caution 
 
 > R. V. Epcs, 18;<() (L(1. Denman); 
 R. )'. liartlett, IMiT (Holland, B.); R. 
 V. Ellis, 182(> (Littlodule, J.), citing 
 a similar dociBiou of Ilolroyd, J., 
 and ovorriilin<]f R. v. Wilson, 1817 
 (Richards. C.B.). 
 
 » R. r. Thornton, 1824; R. t'. Gib- 
 nov, 1822 (Ir.); R. >: Kerr, ls;57 ; 
 R,"c. Johnston, 18(U (Tr.) (8 r. ;{.TJ.). 
 The caso of R. v. Devlin, 1841 (Ir.), 
 18 contra, hut soonis not to bo hiw. 
 
 8 K. V. Wild, KSJi.J. 
 
 « R. i: Wild, KS:!.-); R. r. Thorn- 
 ton, 1824; R. r. Korr, ISIH (Paik, 
 .).); Anon., undated (liittlcdale, J.). 
 cited 1 I'h. Ev. 4()(). In the case of 
 R. r. Doyle, 1810 (Ir.), a constable, 
 after cantioning the ])risoii(^r, asked 
 hei' how so much of her bine came 
 into the child's stoniacii, and Bnshe, 
 C.J., i.s re))oited to have rejectt'd the 
 answer ; but this case, it is subiiuttcd, 
 is not law. See Joy on (.'onf. (Ir.), 
 32-41, 12 4 1. 
 
 • R. r. ItMijjan, 1841 (Ir.) (Cramp- 
 
 ton, J.). This ease s(H'ms to over- 
 rule R. V. Hall, 17iM) (Mr. Sergt. 
 Adair). See R. v. Boswell, 1S42; 
 R. r. Blackburn, Isjl}. See, also, 
 post, § 88j. 
 
 « R. V. Dinslev, 184:) (Pollock, 
 C.B.); R. V. Barley, 1818, ajiproved 
 of by all the judges. See R. c. (Jillis, 
 18(l«i. 
 
 ' ]{. r. Simcms, 18;il (Alderscm, B.). 
 In R. V. I'anienter, 1872, Kelly, C B., 
 is reported to hav(! held that a hotter 
 written l)y a pi isoncr to his wii'c, and 
 iiiterce]itcd by a constable who had 
 undertaken to jiost it, was iniidniis- 
 sible. ihit this cane wouhl seem not 
 to be law. 
 
 » Post, « !)0i» ill,-,; R. r. Shaw, 
 18;{| (i'attcson, J.). 
 
 » ii. c. Th(ai,ton, 1824 : P. v. 
 Oibnev, 1822 (Ir.); P. v. Magill, 
 17!»!», nt'Ml in McNaliy, Ev. (Ir.) ;{8 ; 
 R. r. P<,:ij.', 1S;« (OuVncy, B.); Joy 
 on Conf. (Ir.) 4.)- -18 ; R. v, liaviu, 
 I84;{(lr.) (Perrin, J.). 
 
 560 
 
now FAR PROPER TO CAUTION PRISONER. [pART III. 
 
 
 a prisoner in general terms that any confession he makes will be 
 admissible against him at the trial, and can do him no service ; ^ 
 the reason for this being that if it be not done in case of its f u ning 
 out that any threat or inducement has been previously hold out 
 by some person in authority, any confession, made by a prisoner 
 wi h<>';t ijaving subsequently received such a caution, will, as bt-fore 
 stated,'- be inadmissible. Still, it is not necessary, in general, to do 
 more than to show that a party receiving a confession left the 
 prisoner at full libeity to act and judge for himself; and though 
 it shouM appear that immediately before the admission was made 
 the accused was in the custody of another person, the court, unless 
 some reason exists for suspecting collusion, will not compel the 
 prosecutor to call such person as a witness, or to prove that he did 
 not hold out any threat or inducement.' In order, however, to 
 free the evidence from all reasonable objection, it will be ])rudent, 
 especially in important cases, to call any persons in authority, who, 
 shortly before the confession was made, either had the prisoner in 
 custody, or held any conversation with liini.'' XotAsitlistanding 
 that the law is as stated above, many justices of the peace, botlx in 
 England and Ireland, are in the habit of (fixsii/idinf/ the culprit, 
 with more or less earnestness, from disclosing any fact which may 
 tend to establish his guilt. This practice (to be adnured for 
 romantic generosity rather than for wisdom or for any beneficial 
 consequences resulting therefrom to the public,'^ has been con- 
 demned by several able judges, as an absurd and improper moJe of 
 shutting up one of the most valuable sources of justice and truth.*"' 
 S^ HKi.'^ It has been thought that illc(j(tl iiDpiiwiiiiivut is calculated 
 to exert such influence upon the mind of the prisoner as to justify 
 the inference that his confessions made during its continuance were 
 
 > R. V. Grcon, 1832 (Guinov, B.); 
 R. V. Arnold, 1838 (Ld. Deiiniun); 
 R. V. Olk'Ulv. 1832 (Jr.) (Bull, J.). 
 
 » Anto, § 878. 
 
 3 R. V. Clcwes, 1830 (Littlediilc, 
 J.); R. V. Swiitkins, 1831 (I'uttesoii, 
 J.); R. t;. Gihiiov, 1822 (Ir.); B. v. 
 Couitnov, 18^0 (Ir.) (Bidl, J.); Joy 
 on Cont.' (Jr.) Ji)— (il. 
 
 * Sec ciisi's cited in last unto. 
 
 » Ediub. Roy., Muich, 1824. 
 
 « R. V. Green, 1832 (Gunicy, B.); 
 R. V. Arnold, 1838 (Ld. Denniiiii). 
 In R. )'. Curt, 18*8, Jjd. Dfuiiiun oh- 
 served to some t'()n>tiibles, who were 
 called as witnesses: — " Tho distinc- 
 tion is very dear; you me not (o 
 Kui)]iress tho truth, but you are not 
 to take any measures of your own to 
 endeavour to extoit it." 
 
 ' Or. Ev. § 230, almost vorbutim. 
 
 570 
 
CHAP. X.] WHAT AMOUNTS TO A PROMISE OR THREAT. 
 
 not voluntary ; and, on one occasion, they appear on this ground to 
 have been rejected.' But this doctrine cannot be considered as 
 satisfactorily established.* 
 
 § 884. The question remains, what language is sufficient to 
 constitute such iuduceinent or threat. Here the reported deci- 
 sions furnish a very unsatisfactory guide. Some reason may be 
 given for applying the rule that the confession obtained by 
 them is inadmissible to such words as these : — " Unless ^ you 
 give me a more satisfactory account, I will take you before a 
 magistrate ',"* " If you will tell me where my goods are, I will 
 be favourable to you ; " ' "I only want my money, and if you 
 give me that, you may go to the devil ; " ^ " If you will not tell 
 all you know about it, of course we can do nothing ; " ' *' You 
 are under suspicion of this, and you had better tell all you 
 know ; " ^ " The watch has been found, and if you do not tell me 
 who your pnrtner was, I will commit you to prison ; " ' " You 
 had better split, and not suffer for all of them ; " '" or the remark 
 to a third person who it is known will probably communicate to 
 him, " It will be better for so-and-so (naming the prisoner) to 
 speak the truth."*' Confessions have, however, been rejected in 
 consequence of such expressions as the following having been 
 used : — " It will be better for you to speak the truth ; " '- " The 
 inspector tells me you make housebreaking tools ; if so, you had 
 better tell the truth, it will be better for you." '^ " It is of no use 
 for you to deny it, for there are the man and boy who will swear 
 they saw you do it ; " " " Now, bo cautious in the answers you 
 give me to the questions I am going to put to you about this 
 watch." '* So anxious, indeed, was the court at one time to 
 
 ' R. V. Ackroyd, 1824 (Holroyd, 
 J.). 
 
 » R. V. Thoniton, 1824. 
 ' (ir. Ev. ^ 220, in part. 
 
 * R. V. Thompson, 1783 (Ilotham, 
 J}.); R. V. Liickhurst, IHM; R. v. 
 Richiuds, 18:{2 (Bosanquot, J.), citod 
 as R. V. Griffiths, 1832; E. v. Walsh, 
 1843 (Iv.) (Jackson, J.). 
 
 » R. V. Cass, 1784 (Gould, J.); 
 Royd V. The Ktato, undated (Am.). 
 
 • R. V. Jones, 1809. 
 
 ' R. V. Partridge, 1836 (Patteson, 
 J.). See, also, Guild's case, 1828 
 
 (Am.). 
 
 * R. V. Kingston, 1830 (Parke and 
 Littled;ile, JJ.) ; R. v. Chevcrton, 
 18()2 (Erie, C.J.). 
 
 » R. V. Parratt, 1831 (Aldorson, 
 J.); R. V. Upchureh. 1830. 
 
 '" R. I'. Thomas, 1834 (Patteson, J.). 
 
 " R. r-. Thompson, 1893. 
 
 " R. V. Garner, 1848. 
 
 " R. V. Fennoll, 1881. See E. v. 
 Mansliehl, 1881. 
 
 " R. V. Mills, 1833 (Gurney, B.). 
 
 " E. V. Fleming, 1842 (Ir.). 
 
 ^' 
 
 671 
 
WHAT AMOUNTS TO A PROMISE OR THREAT. [PAUT IH. 
 
 exclude evidence of confessions, that exhortations not to tell lies 
 but to speak the truth, have been deemed likely to induce a fake 
 acknowledgment of guilt ; and, consequently, admissions made 
 after such exhortations have more than once been rejected.' But 
 this paradoxical opinion is now happily exploded.'* The judges 
 have, however, of late years come to the conclusion that some of 
 the cases of this class have gone too far in the direction of mercy, 
 and have accordingly expressly overruled three of them.' 
 
 § 885. Where the inducement relates to the charge against the 
 prisoner, and comes from a person in authority, it is not necessary 
 that it should be directly hold out to the prisoner himself; but it 
 will equally have the effect of excluding his confession, if there be 
 good reason to believe that it has come to his knowledge, and has 
 influenced his conduct. For instance, where a superior clerk in 
 the post-office said to the wife of a postman, who was in custody 
 for opening and df^taining a letter, " Do not be frightened ; I hope 
 nothing will happen lo your husband beyond the loss of his 
 situation ; " the prisoner's subsequent confession was rejected, it 
 api)earing that the wife might have communicated to him the 
 substance of this statement ; •* and where, in a case of murder, 
 Government had published a handbill, offering pardon to any one 
 of the offenders, except the person who struck the blow, who should 
 give such information as would lead to the conviction of his 
 accomplices, and it appeared that the prisoner was aware of this 
 offer, and was induced by it to make a confession, it was held that 
 what he said could not bo given in evidence.^ And where prose- 
 
 ' E. V. Shcphoid, 18;i6 (Giiscloo, 
 J.); K. V. Enoch, 18;j;{ (Faik, J.); 
 E. V. Wood, IM'J (Ir.) (Ciiiiiipton, 
 J.); E. V. Lim-lior, 18Hi (I'oUock, 
 C. B.); E. f. Lato, 1871 (Montayuo 
 Sinitli, J.). 
 
 '^ E. V. Ecovo, 1872 ; E. v. Ilohnos, 
 184;{ (EoU'o, ]i.); E. v. Court, 18;i(i 
 (Littltidiilc, J.); E. v. II ■iris, 18:52; 
 E. V. Eiildry, 18J2 ; E. v. Jiirvis, 
 18(17. 
 
 3 E. c. Baldry, 18,)2. Thcro, ii 
 policoiiian, who had a piiHoiicr in 
 custody on a chavgo of fohmy, said 
 to hini, "You iiowl not say anything 
 to criniinato youraolf ; what you say 
 •will be taken down and used as 
 
 cvidonce against you." The court 
 liold that a confession subsequently 
 made was admissible, oveiruling, E. 
 ('. Harris, 1814 (jMaule, J.); E. v. 
 Drew, l.s;i7 (Coleridge, J.) ; and E. 
 V. Morton, 18i;j (id.); and followed 
 E. V. Eoason. 1872 (Keating, J.); E. 
 ('. Jonetj, 1872. But some of the 
 Irish judges, neveitheless, appear 
 to bo still inclined to I'oUow the 
 former inaht praxis. E. v, Toole, 
 1S,)7. 
 
 * E. )'. Harding, 1S42 (Ir.). 
 
 » E. i\ Boswell, 1842 (Cresswell, 
 J.). See E. V. Dingley, 1845, and 
 E. V. Blackburn, 1853. 
 
 672 
 
CHAP. X.] OLD PRACTICE OF TORTURE. 
 
 cutor said to prisoner's brother, " It will be better for him to tf 11 the 
 truth," expecting that the brother would, as he did, communicate to 
 prisoner, a subsequent statement by prisoner was held inadmissible.* 
 
 § 886.^ The rule that the confession must be voluntary, is 
 equally applicable to cases where the prisoner has made a statement 
 (luring the pre/iminari/ inqiiiri/ before the magMrate. »The practice 
 of subjecting the accused to a compulsory examination, and even of 
 putting him to the torture, was familiar to the Roman law,' and 
 both these modes of proceeding were legal in Scotland so late as 
 the reign of Queen Anne.* In England, too, down to the reign of 
 Charles the first,^ the rack was occasionally employed,^ and evea 
 Lord Coke was prepared to wink at, if not to justify, its use • ^ 
 while Lord Bacon did not hesitate, as Attorney- General, to super- 
 intend, in person, the torture of an aged clergyman.* But, 
 however, just before the Grreat Rebellion, and in the year 1628, 
 on the trial of Felton for the murder of the Duke of Buckingham, 
 the judges unanimously resolved, that " no such punishment as 
 torture by the rack was known or allowed by our law ; " ' and no 
 attempt has since been made to revive this atrocious practice."' 
 
 § 887. Though torture was thus formally abolished before the 
 middle of the seventeenth century, it was not till after the lapse of 
 many years that the common law doctrine, nemo tenetur proderc 
 seipsum, was fully recognised, or at least was interpreted to mean, — 
 as it does in the present day, — that all confessions should bestiictl}- 
 voluntary, as will be apparent to any careful reader of the State 
 trials. The practice of extorting admissions from prisoners still 
 continues on the continent," and certainly is no mean instrument 
 
 ' R. V. Thompson, 1893. 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 2"_'4, iu part as to first 
 six linos. 
 
 ^ See B. Carpz. Pract. Eor. Cri., 
 Purs, iii., Qurest. llii, per tot. 
 
 * 7 A. c. '21, 8. 6 ("Tho Treason 
 Act, 1708"), abolished torture in 
 Scotland : 2 M'Doiiall, lust. (So.) 
 ()()(). I'or instances of the application 
 of torture there, see G How, St. Tr. 
 1217—1222, and 10 id. G87, 691, 
 726—747, 7j1 — "08. 
 
 » Till 11. V. Felton, 1628. 
 
 * See Campion's case, 1578, cited 
 (Weston, li.) in H. v. Collier, 1680 ; 
 
 Poachani's case, 101.5. 
 
 ' SeeLadyShrcwsliurv'scaso, 1012. 
 
 * I'rachanis case, lOlj. .See thu 
 niastcily life of Ld. Iiacon, in Lil. 
 Caii)i)l>cir.s Lives of the Chanc, 2nd 
 vol., 339— ;M1. 
 
 » 11. r. Felton, 1028. 
 
 '» In R. r. ('.■Iher. 1680, Weston. 
 B., told tlio jury, that no person htid 
 sufl'erod torture in Enj^'iand since 
 Campion the Jesuit, put to tho rack 
 in the 20th of Elizabeth. But this is 
 a strange mistake. 
 
 " Tho Belgian case of Madame 
 Joniauxat end of 1894 and beginning 
 
 673 
 
EXAMINATION OF PRISONER BY MAGISTRATE. [PART III. 
 
 '4 
 
 
 for the discovery of truth, hut has long been regarded in this 
 country, and always in America, as savouring of unfairness and 
 oppression. 
 
 § 888. The first Acts regulating the examination of prisoners 
 before the magistrates were passed in the reign of Philip and 
 Mary.' These statutes, the principles of which have been adopted 
 in several of the United States,'* were followed in England by 
 the Criminal Law Act, 1826, and in Ireland by a corresponding 
 Act.' 
 
 § 888a. The statute, however, which now defines the course of 
 practice in this country is the Indictable Offences Act, 1848.* 
 It is important that the provisions of the law should be strictly 
 complied with, or (as we shall see presently) the statement by 
 the prisoner may not he admissible. The directions of the Act^ 
 are that " after the examinations of all the witnesses on the part of 
 the prosecution as aforesaid shall have been completed, the justice 
 of the peace, or one of the justices, by or before whom such 
 examination shall have been > completed as aforesaid, shall, 
 without requiring the attendance of the witnesses, read, or cause 
 to be read, to the accused the depositions taken against him, 
 and shall say to him these words, or words to the like effect: — 
 'Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say anything in 
 answer to the charge? You aie not obliged to say anything 
 unless y,u desire to do so, but whatever yoii may say will be 
 taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against 
 
 of 189o, as reported in the Times. 
 See Comments on the case of the 
 Due de Praslin, in 7 Liiw Rev. Art. 
 vii. 
 
 ' 1 &2Ph. &M. e. 13; 2&3Ph. 
 & M. c. 10 ; extended to Ireland by 
 10 C. 1, c. 18. 
 
 2 See N. York Cr. Code. Part 4, 
 tit. 3, c. 7, §§ 195—199; Bellinger's 
 case, 1832 (Am.); Elmer's Laws of 
 Kcw Jersey, p. 450, § 6 ; Laws of 
 Alabama (Tonlmin's l)ipr.), tit. 17, 
 ch. U, § 2, p. 219 ; Laws of Tennensee 
 (Carruthcr's and Nicholson's Dig.), 
 p. 420 ; N. Carolina Rev. Stat., ch. 35, 
 I 1 ; Ijaws of Mis.xissippi (Alden and 
 Von iloesou'e l^ig.), c 70, § 5, p. 632 ; 
 
 Laws of Delawaii (Rev. Code of 
 1829), p. 63 ; Brevard's Laws of S. 
 Carolina, vol. i., p. 400; Laws of 
 Missouri (Revision of 1835), p. 476; 
 Laws of Michigan Territory, p. 215. 
 See, also. Massach. Rev. Stat., ch. 85, 
 § 25; Resp. v. McCarty, 1781 (Am.), 
 (M'Kean, C.J.I 
 
 ^ Viz., 7 Ceo. 4, c. 04. The cor- 
 responding statute in Ireland is 9 
 Geo. 4, c. 54. 
 
 « Viz., 11 & 12 V. c. 42. The 
 corresponding statute in Ireland ia 
 14 & 15 V. c. 93. Amended by 52 & 
 53 V. c. 03. 
 
 » In § 18. 
 
 574 
 
CHAP. X.] EXAMINATION OF PRISONER BY MAGISTRATE. 
 
 r m 
 
 of 
 
 s. 
 
 of 
 16; 
 ilo. 
 80, 
 
 you upon your trial ;' and whatever tlio prisoner sliall then say in 
 answer thereto shall be taken down in writing,' and mid over to liim, 
 and shall be xigurd by the said justice or justices, and be kept with 
 the depositions of the witnesses, and shall bo transmitted with them 
 as hereinafter mentioned ;" that is, " the statement of the accused " 
 shall, together with the other documents in the case, " be delivered 
 by the said justice or justices, or he or tlioy shall cause the same 
 to b^; delivered, to tb^* pro[)or ofhcer of the court in which the trial 
 is to be had, before or at the opening of the said court, on the first 
 day of the sitting thereof, or at such other time as the judge, 
 recorder, or justice, who is to preside in such court at the said trial, 
 shall order and appoint ;" ^ " and afterwards, upon the trial of the 
 said accused person, the same may, if necessary, be given in evi- 
 dence against him, witliout farther proof thereof, unless it shall be 
 proved that the justice or justices purporting to sign the same did 
 not in fact sign the same : Provided always, that the ?aid justice or 
 justices, before such accused person shall make any statement, 
 shall state to him, and give him clearly to understand, that he has 
 nothing to liope from any promise of favour and nothing to fear 
 from any threat, which may have been holden out to him to induce 
 him to made any admission or confession of his guilt, but that 
 ■whatever he shall then say may be given in evidence against him on 
 his trial, notwithstanding such promise or threat: Provided, never- 
 theless, that nothing herein enactt d or contained sliall prevent the 
 prosecutor in any case from giving in evidence any admission or 
 
 ' Tho foim is given in Sihod. N. to the Act. This form is legalised by 
 § 28 of the Act, Init is not rcndeieil necessary. It i,s us follov" s : — 
 
 " : A. r>. btands charged helore tho undersigned [oj((-J of Iwr Majesty's 
 
 justices of the peace in and for the [(■««/////] (lf()re^^ald, tliis day 
 
 of in tho >ear of our Lord , for that ho tlie said A. B., on 
 
 at [dc, us in (hf lajition of thf (Ifjinniiidiis} ; and the .said charge 
 
 being read to the i-aid A. B., and tlio witnessi s for tlie pioseeutioii, C. L). 
 and E. F.. being sevrrally examined in his presenio, the said A. 15. is now 
 addres-sod by me us follows : 'Having heard tho evidence, do vou wish to say 
 anything in answer to the charge? Yon aro not obliyi'Ml to say .iJiything 
 unless you desire to do so ; but whatever yon say will i)e taken down in 
 writing, and may be given in evidence against you upon your trial; ' where- 
 wpon the said A. B. su^'") as follows: 
 
 [//ere slate tuhntvvir iiie prinuiitr tuny say, and in his very ivords, us nearly 
 as possible. Git ium to sign it if he will,'} 
 
 "A. B. 
 
 " Taken before mo at the day and year first above mentioned. 
 
 ♦• a. L." 
 •§20, 
 
 575 
 
EXAMINATION OF PRISONER BY MAGISTRATE. [I'MiT III. 
 
 confession, or otLer statement of the person accused or charged, 
 mffde at (dii/ fime, which hy law would be admissible as evidence 
 against such person."' The provisions of the Irish Act* are 
 expressed a little differently, but are, in substance, identical with 
 those contained in the English Act, which are set out above. 
 
 § 889. If the provisions referred to above be read in connection 
 with the Form given in the schedule to the Act,^ it seems that, to 
 render a prisoner's statement strictly valid as a statutory confession, 
 the following circumstances must all have occurred. The charge 
 must have been read to the accused ; ^ all the witnesses must have been 
 examined in his presence,* and the depositions read to him after the 
 examinations were completed ; * he must then, and not till then, be 
 twice cautioned by the justice ; first, generally,' and, secondly, as 
 to the inefficacy of any promises or threats which ma}^ have been 
 formerly held out to him ; ® his whole statement must next be taken 
 down in his own words ; * it must then be read to him,'" and 
 he must be asked for his signature, as the form in the schedule 
 directs, "get him to sign it if he will,"" though the Act is silent as 
 to the effect of his refusing to sign it, or even to admit its correct- 
 ness; the justice must also sign the statement;'* and this being done, 
 it must be kept with the depositions, and be transmitted, together 
 with them and certain other documents, to the court where the trial 
 is to be had, on or before the opening of such court. '^ 
 
 § 890. Notwithstanding these minute directions, it is not easy to 
 see how the prisoner on his trial could avail himself of any neglect 
 of them on the part of the justice, whether intentional or otherwise ; 
 for the statement transmitted, if headed in the manner pointed out 
 by the schedule, is made evidence against the prisoner on its mere 
 
 ' § 18. 
 
 » 14 & 15 V. c. 93, § 14, clause (n) 
 (amended hy 52 & 53 V. c. G3). 
 ^ Cited in last page, n. '. 
 
 * See Sch. 
 
 ' See Sch., and § 1" of the Act, 
 cited ante, § 479. 
 
 * See § 18. 
 
 ' See § 18. As to the old law, see 
 R. V. Green, 1832; R. v. Arnold, 
 1838. 
 
 * See first proviso in § 18. 
 
 » See Sch.; andR. v. Roche, 1S41; 
 R. V. Sexton, 1822; R. ?•. Mallott, 
 1830, cited 2 Russ. C. & M. 8G7. 
 
 «> See § 18 ; and 3 Russ. C. & M. 
 500. 
 
 " See Sch. ; and 3 Russ. C. & M. 
 504 ; R. V. Lambe, 1791 ; Ji.v. Thomas, 
 1794 ; R. V. Foster, 1827 ; R. v. Hirst, 
 1828; R. V. Jelicote, 1819; R. v. 
 Pressly, 1833. 
 
 "See § 18; and R. v. Tarrant, 
 
 1 goo 
 
 " See §§ 18 and 20. 
 
 576 
 
CHAP. X.] EXAMINATION OF PRISONER BY MAGISTRATE. 
 
 product ion, and witliout any proof of the mode in which it was taken 
 down, unless it can be shown that the signature of the justice is a 
 forgery. Whether Ihis was the intention of the Legislature may, 
 perhaps, be doubtea ; but such is the apparent effect of the language 
 employed. It is also clear, from the last proviso which is appended 
 to the 18th section of the Act, that any statement made by the 
 prisoner in the magistrate's presence, before the examinations of the 
 witnesses for the prosecution are all completed, may be proved by 
 parol evidence, and will be admissible against him, even though no 
 caution has been previously given.' 
 
 § 891. The judges originally felt some embarrassment in putting 
 an interpretation on these provisions. It has now, however, been, 
 decided that when an examination has been transmitted by the 
 committing magistrate in the statutory form, it becomes admissible 
 without further proof.'^ 
 
 § 892. But although a written examination, if it purport to be 
 taken in conformity with the Act, and to be signed by the com- 
 mitting magistrate, is in strictness admissible without proof, it still 
 is advisable in serious cases, as a matter of caution, to call either 
 the justice or the clerk, so that it may clearly appear that tlie pro- 
 ceedings have been conducted in the proper manner.' Indeed, this 
 course may become actually necessary, if the document has not been 
 drawn out in the form given in the schedule, or if it contains erasures 
 or interlineations which require explanation.* If, too, the prisoner 
 
 t 
 
 .1 
 
 ' Seo post, §. 894, n. *, and, also, 
 R. V. Stripp, 18o6. 
 
 « E. ('. Saiisome, 1850. See S. C. 
 as reported in 3 C. & Kir. 332. As 
 reported in 4 Cox, 203, this case 
 overrules earlier dicta of Alderson, 
 13. (in R. V. Higson, 1^49), and of 
 Coleridge, J. (after consultation with 
 Cresswell, J., in R. v. Kimber, 1849), 
 as to the formalities in cautioning a 
 prisoner, which are required by the 
 Act. In 1 Den. 545, where the same 
 case is reported, the above ruling 
 will not be found : and this is the 
 more remarkable as Mr. Donison was 
 himself counsel in the cause. Parke, 
 B., is stated to have gone so far as to 
 assert that, in his judgment, it would 
 be receivable in evidence, though 
 neither of the cautions was stated to 
 
 have been given. Too much reliance, 
 however, should not bo jdacerl on 
 this la!5t dictum : and until the * v 
 is more clearly detinod l)v judicial 
 construction, it certaiidy will be pm- 
 dent for committing magistrates not 
 only to ado]it the form set out in the 
 schedule to the Act, but to give the 
 prisoner in all eases the second caution 
 (seo supra, § 88i»), as well as the first. 
 
 •> See R. r. I'ikesley, 1839 ; E. y, 
 Wilshaw, 1841. 
 
 * See E. V. Brogan, 1834; R. v. 
 Dwyers, 1843. In the last edition 
 (1877) of Russell on Crimes, Prentice 
 omits Loth Brogan's cane and 
 Dwyers', but gives no reason for so 
 doing. The cases nah.ed cannot be 
 discovered to hav6"been overruled, 
 and appear founded oa good seuse. 
 
 577 
 
PROOF OF prisoner's EXAMINATION. [PART III. 
 
 m 
 
 tas not signed his name or mark to the paper, some witness, who 
 was present at the inquiry, should, in prudence, ho forthcoraing to 
 speak to its identity, and to prove that it was rend over to the 
 accused, and as ■ nted to by him It would further seem to be 
 necessary to the validity of an examination as evidence per se, that 
 it should appear on the face of the document that it was taken 
 while the prisoner was under examination on a charge of felony or 
 misdemeanor, or of suspicion of one of those crimes, and that the 
 justices signing it were acting as justices pursuant to statute.* 
 Whether these facts must appear by a separate caption is a point 
 which is not yet determined. Tlie form in the schedule gives a 
 separate caption, but that form, though legalised, is not rendered 
 necessary by the Act ; ' and under the old law, provided the 
 examination was written on the same paper as the depositions, the 
 heading at the commencement was held to apply to all the state- 
 ments contained in the document.* In this respect the rule agreed 
 with that which governs examinations taken under the Poor Law 
 Acts ; where it is not necessary, — as Wv.s once supposed,' — that such 
 examinations should have distinct captions, but it will suffice to 
 state the names of all the witnesses in the first caption.' 
 
 ^ .^93. As the admissibility of statutory examinations without 
 proof rests on the presumption that the justices have done their 
 duty, it seems to follow that no evidence can be received tending 
 to contradict or vary the statements contained in the documents as 
 returned. This was the law before the Act under discussion was 
 passed,' and that Act does not appear to have introduced any change 
 in the practice.^ Whether this presumption is of so conclusive a 
 character as to exclude all parol evidence, which is tendered with 
 the view of adding to the written examination, is a question of 
 doubt and difficulty ; but as the Act renders it incumbent on the 
 justice, not only to reduce to writing so much of the prisoner's 
 
 > See E. V. Eeading, 1836; R. v. 
 Ilearn, 1S41 ; E. v. Hopes, 1835; R. 
 V. Hninos, 18;>0. Prentice, in the 
 last cilition of Eussell, also omits this 
 case, but the omission is liable to the 
 same criticism as those in the last 
 note. 
 
 « See E. V. Tarrant, 1833. 
 
 » § 28 of the Act. 
 
 * E. V. Johnson, 1847 (Alderson, 
 B.); E. V. Young, 1850. 
 
 » E. V. Etttclitte Culey, 184fi. 
 
 • E. V. St. Michael's, Coventry, 
 1848. 
 
 ' E. V. Walter, 1836; E. v. Morse, 
 1838. 
 « R. V. Bond, 1830. 
 
 578 
 
ClI. X.] PUISONEli's EXAMINATION — PAROL EVIDENCE. 
 
 examin.'ition as rnny be mntrrinl,^ but to take down his irhole 
 staleniont,^ it would soera riglit to hold that he must be presumed 
 to liave done this, and that no parol evidenne of any additional 
 Btutenient dkkIc at the same time can be received.' 
 
 § 8!)4. If, however, yiarol evidence of such additional statement 
 be admissible on the part of the prosecution, the prisoner, a fortiori, 
 would seem entitled to pray it in aid of his defence* "Whatever 
 may be the rule upon this point, it is clear, from the last proviso, 
 to *i '^ of the Act, that* a written examination will not exclude 
 parol evidence, either of an extr.i-judicial confession, previously or 
 subsequently made ; " or of a statement which has been made before 
 the justice on a former investigation, and not incorporated in the 
 examination returned;' or of anything incidentally said by the pri- 
 soner while the witnesses were deposing against him, ev^n though it 
 were addressed to the magistrate himself,** and no cautior. had been 
 previously' given." So, if it can be proved that the prisoner's exami- 
 nation was nf)t reduced to writing, parol evidence of what he said 
 before the magistrates will be received ; '" though the presumjition 
 that all things were done as the law requires renders it necessary 
 for the Crown to give clear evidence on this point ;^' and the judges 
 more than once have required that the magistrate or his clerk should 
 be called to pio/e the negative fact.'^ Again, if the written exami- 
 nation be shown to have been lost,'' or if it be wholly inadmissible 
 
 ' This was tho lanfjuajje of the old 
 law. Seo 7 Gr. 4, c. 04 ("Tho Criuiiiial 
 Law Act, 18J(r'), §3. 
 
 2 Sio 11 & 12 V. c. 42 ("The In- 
 dictable Otteiices Act, 1848"), § 18, 
 and Sch. N., cited ante, § 888. 
 
 ^ Soe, however, i{owland v. Ashby, 
 1825; 11. V. Harris, 1832; Leach k 
 Sinijjson, 18;i'.» (Parke, B.). 
 
 * This view of the law is sanctioned, 
 not only by the case of Veiiafra v. 
 Johnson, 18134 (Gaselce, J., after 
 consulting judjjes of C. P.), but also 
 by the authoritv of Mr. 8tarkio (3 
 St. Ev. 787 j aiid Mr. Phillipps (2 
 Ph. Ev. 82-88). 
 
 » Gr. Ev. 5 227, in pnit. 
 
 • E. V. Carty, 1797. cited in Joy on 
 Conf. 97 (Ir.), and McXallv, Ev. 45 
 (Ir.) ; 11. V. Keason, 1722 (K'yie, J.). 
 
 ' E. V. Wilkinson, 1838 (Littledale, 
 J., and Parke, B.); E. v. Bond, 1850. 
 
 8 E. V. Bond, 1850 ; E. v. Spils- 
 bury, 1835 (Coleiid^e, J.); E. v. 
 Johnson, 1829 (Parke, B.) ; E. v. 
 Moore, 1831 (id.); E. v. Hooper, 
 1842 (Erskine, J.); all cited in 2 
 Euss. C. & M. 879. But see E. v. 
 Weller, 1840 (Piatt, B.). Sed qu. 
 as to this case. 
 
 » E. V. IStripp, 1850. 
 
 '» E. r. Hall, 1790, cited by Grose, 
 J., in E. V. Lamb, 1784; E. y. Huet, 
 17iiS. 
 
 " E. V. Fearshire, 1779; E. v. 
 Jacobs, 1784; E. d. lliiixiiian, 1791 
 (Ashhurst, J.), and It, c. Eisher, 1785 
 (Ilcnth, J.); E. V. MGovcrn, 185.'. 
 
 '■- E. V. Packer, 1829 (Parke, J.), 
 and E. >: P]iilli]is, 1831 (13o.<aiifiuet, 
 J.), both cited 2 Ituss. 0. & M. 
 870, n. {}>); I'hillips v. Winburn, 
 1830 (Tiiidal, C.J.). 
 
 " E. V. EeQBc>n, 1722 (Eyre, J.). 
 
 679 
 
EXAMINATION TAKEN IMMJOPERLY ON OATH. [PAUT III. 
 
 irii 
 lit 
 
 under tlie statute by reason of irregularity, parol evidence will be 
 received to prove what the prisoner voluntarily disclosed ; * and in 
 this last f;vent of the examination being rejected for infornmlity, it 
 may still be used, either as a contemporaneous writing, to refresh 
 the memory of the witness who wrote it,*^ or if it be signed by the 
 prii'oner, it will be receivable at common law as his confession, 
 the signature being first proved, and it being shown that he knew 
 what it contained.' 
 
 § 890. One species of irregularity, however, is said * to not only 
 exclude the examination as evidence per se, but also to pi'event its 
 being used to refresh the writer's memory, and lo shut out all 
 parol testimony of what was said on the same ' occasion. The 
 irregularity in question is where the prisoner's cxaniiiKition purports 
 to have been ffi/icn upon outh.^ This rule rests upon two principles 
 of law, the policy of both of which is very questionable. The first 
 is the principle that the confession of a prisoner nuist be voluntary: 
 and it is contended, that a statement made under oath is not so. 
 This is certainly true in one sense, though not in that in which it 
 is tised by the advocates for exclusion. A confession which is not 
 voluntary is excluded, because it may be untrue. A confession 
 made upon oath cannot be rejected on this ground; since it is 
 absurd to contend that an oath, which, in all other cases is rightly 
 considered as the most effectual test of truth, should, if taken 
 by a prisoner, be regarded as an inducement to falsehood. But 
 then, it is urged, nemo tenetur prodere seipsum ; a prisoner 
 should not be compelled to criminate himself. Admitted ; but a 
 prisoner, though sworn, is no more bound to criminate himself, 
 than if he were simply interrogated without any oath being admin- 
 istered to him. lie has still full liberty to decline to make any 
 explanation or declaration whatever : though if he does consent to 
 
 > R. V. Reed, 1S29 (Tindiil, C.J.). 
 
 » R. V. Layer, 1722 (i'n.tt, C J.); 
 R. V. Wiitsoii, isjl ; R. V. Wiitkins, 
 1831 (Hiisiinqxiet, J.); R. v. TiinMiit, 
 18:i:J (Pi.ttesoii, J.); R. r. I'ressly, 
 1833 (id.) ; R. v. Dewhiirst, 1825, and 
 R. ('. Hirst, 1828 (Biiyloy. J.); R. v. 
 Jones. 1828 (Biivlevand Gaselee. JJ., 
 and Vaii'Jiiin, 15.)"; R._ v. I'.ell. 1831 
 (G:i^<i'lei'. J., and Ld. Tentenlen). 
 
 * iSeu R. V. Suiisome, 1850. 
 
 *■ Rut see R. v. Chidlcy, 1860, 
 post, § 80!) ; argument, infra, against 
 this view. 
 
 ' R. V. Smith, 181(1 (Le Blanc, J.); 
 R. V. Davis, 18;i3 (Gurnoy, B.) ; R. 
 ?;. Bentley, 18:<3(id.); R. v. Rivers, 
 1835 (I'ark, J.); R. v. Owen, 1840 
 (Gurney, B.) ; R. v. I'ikesley, 1839 
 (I*ark(!, B., and Bosanquet, J.); R. 
 V Wheeley, 1838 (Alderson, B.). 
 
 680 
 
CHAP. X.] EXAMIWATIONS PURPOPtTINO TO BE ON OATH. 
 
 answer the questions put to him, he may, perhaps, incur the 
 penalties of jterjury should ho knowingly utter what is false.' 
 " But a friendless accused is not aware of the law in his favour," 
 This may bo so : but in what other case is a party at liberty to set 
 up his ignorance of tho law ? If the maxim of the common law, 
 ignorantia legis neminem cxcusat, be sound, as it unquestionably 
 is ; and if, consequently, the defence of acting in ignorance cannot 
 protect an offender even from punishment ; on what principle of 
 justice is the accused entitled to say, "I confessed my ciime, and 
 have sworn tliat my statement is true ; but you, tho jury, must not 
 hear what I said, because I was not aware of the existence of a 
 rule of law, which would have expressly justified me in holding 
 my peace " ? 
 
 § 8(;6. The second principle of law on which the rule under 
 discussion rests is, that as the justices, in discharge of their duty, 
 ought to make a true return of what took place bofr them, the 
 court will presume that they have thus acted; and, therefore, as 
 the deposition does not purport to be upon oath, parol evidence to 
 vary or contradict the written document so returned will not be 
 admitted Now, the fallacy of this reasoning is obvious. In the 
 first pliiee, the presumption, omnia rite esse acta, is not conclusive 
 in ordinary cases, and ought not to be so in this ; and next, even 
 supposing that it should, it does not apply. The duty of the 
 justice is two-fold : first, to examine the prisoner witliout adminis- 
 tering an oath to him ; ^ and, secondly, to make a true return of 
 his statement. If, then, an examination be returned, which 
 purports to have been taken on oath, the presumption that this 
 return is true is at least counterbalanced by the opposite presump- 
 tion, that the justice has discharged his duty by not swearing the 
 prisoner ; and the result is, that parol evidence should be received, 
 in order to ascertain which presumption is in accordance with the 
 fact. The principle, that written documents shall not be varied or 
 contradicted by parol testimony, may apply to the body of the 
 examination, which is taken down by the justice or his clerk, and 
 is expressly assented to by the accused; but it should net extend 
 
 ' This, however, seems doubtful, 
 as tho inugistruto has uo authority to 
 
 administer such an oath. 
 2 B. N. P. 242. 
 
 tu 
 
 681 
 
SWORN CONFKSSIOXS, WIIKN ADMISSIBLE. [PART III. 
 
 
 to the mere formal heading or conclusion of the examination, 
 ■which is not, or at loast need not be, read over to the prisoner, or 
 adniittod to be correct by him ; and a mis-statement in which may, 
 and, in fact, notoriou>ly does, often arise from the inadvertence or 
 carelessness of the magistrate or his clerk. If the justice were 
 liable to a penalty, as he ought to be, for taking a prisoner's 
 confession O!' oath, he would clearly be entitled, if sued or 
 prosecuted for such penalty, to show that, though the examination 
 purported ou iis face to have been taken on oath, the prisoner was 
 not in fa(^t sworn ; and no real danger could be apprehended, but 
 on the contrary much benefit would accrue to the administration 
 of criminal justice, if a similar course of proceeding were allowed, 
 when the question was whether a confession was receivable or not. 
 However, ;'-; before stated, the authorities in favour of rejecting 
 examination ) which purport to be upon oath are so numerous and 
 consist'^uf, that, without the aid of the Legislature, little hope can be 
 entertained that a more satisfactory rule will be ado[)ted in practice.* 
 
 § S97. Where a prisoner, on being mistaken for a witness, was 
 partially examined upon oath, but, the mistake being discovered, 
 tho deposition was destroyed, — a subsequent statement made by 
 him, after due caution from the magistrate, was held to be clearly 
 admissible.' 
 
 § 898. ItIi-hiI, tiie rule excluding sworn confessions seems 
 strictly confined, at c >mmon law, to the case of a statement, made 
 by tlio piirty upon oatli, wliile uiu/pv cxainiiidtiou an a prisoner 
 respecting the criminal clicirge.^ Thus, on an indictment for 
 forging a bill of exchange, depos'Hous of the prisoner, taken on 
 oath before commissioners of bankruptcy, after a prisoner has been 
 charged before a magistrate with forging the bill, are admissible 
 
 If 
 
 ' Sco casps litid ante, § 8{)5, n. *. 
 See, also, No. o'l of Law Ma;;, vol. '28, 
 J)]). i;{ -1!», whi'io tlio anoinaiits iu 
 tilt; i)iOM'iit law of conft'ssions ure 
 auiUMiii:;lv f'xposc'd. 
 
 » 11. I'.'VWbl), IHin (Oanow, P.). 
 
 « 8'jo Joy on Couf. (IJ— ()S (Jr.). 
 One or two decisions hy (imiioy, 
 B., iiii;,'lit 1)0 cited, sccininir to ex- 
 ti'iid tho lulo soiiicwliat fiirtiicr, and 
 to I'l'udcr iuiitliiiissibU) coiifcssious 
 niudo oil oath to uiagistiutcs or coro- 
 
 nora by paitios, who, aftcjr being 
 oxamiiK'd as witiitsaes, have thciii- 
 eelvea boon coiiiinittod for trial (11. 
 V. Lewis, 1k;j;{ (Gunicy, 1!.); U. r. 
 Davis, is;j,} (id.); 1{. c. Owcii, 18-10 
 (id.). !Sco, al.so, 11. v. M'lIiiL'h, 18,)7 
 (Ir.) (IV'im-fathor, B., diss,)); but 
 thcso diMisioiia luivo been ovcrnilod 
 bv snbsi'oiiciit cases. (See 11. v, (iillis, 
 18(i() (lr.)(0'lla-an. J.); 11. v.Oooto 
 1873 (Sir K. Uoliioi)). 
 
 683 
 

 CHAP. X.3 SWORN CONFESSIONS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. 
 
 against him.' Where a bantrupt had been examined before a 
 commissioner touching some matter irrespective of his trade 
 dealings, and had not objected to answer the questions put, his 
 examination was held to be admissible evidence against him on a 
 subsequent criminal charge.'^ Where a trader was indicted for 
 obtaining property on credit, within four mouths before his liqui- 
 dation, under the false pretence of dealing in the ordinary way of 
 his trade,^ his examination taken in liquidation under ii 97 of the 
 Bankruptcy Act, 18G9,'* was admitted in evidi^nce against him;' 
 and on a charge of arson, depositions made by the prisoner when 
 under examination as a witness respecting the origin of the fire, 
 have been read ngainst him." 
 
 § 8!)9. Similarly, on the trial of an indictment for conspiracy, 
 the answers in Chancery of the defendants, made on oath by them 
 in a suit instituted against them by the prosecutor, have been 
 received.' An affidavit sworn by him in a suit in Doctors' Com- 
 mons has also been given in evidence against a prisoner;* and 
 depositions made by prisoners, when examined as witnesses against 
 other persons on criminal charges, have several times been admitted 
 against themselves." Upon a trial for manslaughter, the [jrisiuer's 
 deposition on oath, taken by the coroner upon the inquest is, 
 moreover, evidence against him.'" So, the testimony, given by a 
 prisoner before a committee of the House of Commons, may be 
 read against him on a criminal trial. ^' A case '^ which is sometimes 
 
 > R. V. Whcater, ISHS. See R. v. 
 Chony, InTI. 
 
 » R. V. Slojrsott, 18j(). Soo, also, 
 B. V. Scott, 18JG ; and R. v. llillam, 
 1872. 
 
 * Contrary to § U of tlio Dob'ora 
 Act. I8(i!> {:i-2 & ;i;} V. c. 62), uiuonJod 
 bv O'i & .J4 V. c. 71, § 20. 
 
 '« 32 & :j:{ V. c. 71. 
 » R. V. Widdop. 1H72. 
 
 • R. V. C'ootts 187;J. 
 
 ' R. V. Goldshoilo. 1844 (Ld. Don- 
 man); R.i). IIi;;htii'ld,l>2S(Viuighuu, 
 B.), cited 2 Riiss. C. & M. 8.09. 
 
 » R. r. W.ilkcr, 18(i(> (I.d. Kllcn- 
 boroiiffh), cited (Guincy, H.), in R. 1: 
 Lewis, lh:(;i. 
 
 » R. r. llinvorth, lS;{0(Purko, J.). 
 In one ouho the very jioiiit Htut(!d in 
 note, auto, ^ 8}t8, note ^, to liuve been 
 decided by (Jurni'y, H., wu8 distinctly 
 overruled by Cockburu, C. J. ; and 
 
 a deposition was admitted nf!^aiii,st 
 a prisoner, ir/ia liad, iinnle it In/ore 
 tlic jnMicf.-i wliilt iiiidir e.i:<i mi na- 
 tion as (I uitid'sa, and who, in 
 coiiseinienuo of its felt'-criniinatinj^ 
 eharai'ter, had been eoniiiiilti'd to 
 take his trial : R. v. Chidley and 
 ("luimiins, l.Sfid. See, also, R. y. 
 Tolnifr, l,S(i4 (Martin, li.); R. v. 
 Tubby, 18.i;j (Vau-han, B.); li. v. 
 Braynell. IHMt. 
 
 "' 1{. .'. liat.'iiian, 1800 (Martin, B., 
 and WiUes. J.). 
 
 " H. /•. M.'reeron, 1818(Abboft, .1.). 
 This casM is, howia-iM", of little autho- 
 rity <in tlie subject uiulei' discns^Kin, 
 as the evidcui'e couhl hot then havu 
 been j^ivcn en oath. See Ld. Teii- 
 lenleu in \{. r. (lilliaui, l.SJ.S. 
 
 '■■' li. r. Britten, 1833 vi'attosou and 
 Alderson, JJ.), 
 
 683 
 
SWORN CONFESSIONS, WHEN ADMISSIBLE. [PART III. 
 
 0!-!: ! 
 
 
 cited as a decision conflicting with the ahove proposition, is in fact 
 no hostile authority, as it only determined that on an indictment 
 against a bankrupt for not disclosing his efl'ects under the com- 
 mission, his balance-sheet, which was only admissible in the event 
 of the commission being valid, could not be given in evidence to 
 prove the petitioning creditor's debt as a part of the commission.' 
 
 § 899a. On the whole it seems clear, that if a prisoner, on being 
 examined as a witness, has consented to answer queytions, to which 
 he might have demurred as tending to criminate himself, and 
 which, therefore, he was not bound to answer, his statement will 
 be deemed voluntary, and, as such, may be subsequently used 
 against himself for all purposes,* unless he be protected by the 
 special language of some statute.' 
 
 ^ 900. Although, however, a prisoner cannot, at common law, 
 exclude his own confession, on the sole ground that it was made by 
 him while a witness under oath, yet, if he can prove that, when 
 questions tending to criminate him were put, he claimed the 
 piotection of the court, and was still compelled to answer, his 
 answers cannot be given in evidence against himself.* Testimony 
 so obtained is excluded, not, as it seems, because it may possibly be 
 imtrue, but because the right of the witness to be silent has been 
 infringed ; and it is deemed expedient, on grounds of public 
 jiolicy, to uphold the broad legal maxim, that no man shall be 
 forced to criminate himself.* 
 
 § 901. The statute prescribing the duties of coroners enacts that 
 every coroner shall put in writing the evidence given to the jury 
 before him, or as much thereof as shall be material, and shall certify 
 and subscribe the same, and deliver it to the officer of the court in 
 which the trial is to be," and it also contains provisions as to the 
 issue of a warnmt by the coroner for the arrest of every person 
 cliiirgcd on an inquisition found before him with murder or man- 
 On various occasions, too, it has been assumed, that a 
 
 sluiigliter.' 
 
 ' I'attoson, J., in 1?. v. Whcator, 
 IS^IS, cxpliiiiiiiiK tliiit (Icc'iHioii. 
 
 ■' Milt si'o H. v. (iilliw. l.S(l(i (Ti;.), 
 ■n'lioni a liiv;^t' iiiiijiirity of tlio Irisli 
 iuil;^'i's tniik a (liilVrtmt viow of tlui 
 law. Sc'd t\\i. 
 
 ■' Set' iM)nl, § l-io'), as to these 
 Btatiiloh. 
 
 * U. V. Uuibutt, 1847. 
 
 and t>. Ir. 
 See poHt, ^ Id. J 5. 
 
 684 
 
 §§ M.i3 ot Roq., lis to what questions 
 a witnesH niiiv refuse to answiT. 
 
 » 1!. r. Ciiibett. IHIV (Alderson, 
 H.). Hut see cases cit(3(l in § 808, 
 ante. 
 
 « ,50 & .Jl V. c. 71 ("The Coioiiera 
 Art, 18S7"), § 4; 9 U. 4, c. 74, §§ 4 
 
C. X.] rRDPERTY FOUND IN CONSEQUENCE OF CONFESSION. 
 
 coroner has the same authority to take the examination of a pri- 
 soner as a magistrate.' 
 
 S 902.'^ When, in conacqucnce of information obtained from the 
 prisoner in an improper manner, the property stolen, or the instrument 
 of the crime, or the body of the person murdered, or any other 
 material fact, has been dincorcred, proof is admissible that such dis- 
 covery was made conformably with the information so obtained. 
 The prisoner's statement as to his knowledge of the place where the 
 property or other article was to be found, being confirmed by the 
 finding, is shown to be true, and not to have been fabricated in 
 consequence of any inducement. It is, therefore, competent to 
 prove that the prisoner stated that the thing would be found by 
 searching a particular place, and that it was accordingly so found ; 
 but it would not be competent to inquire whether he confessed that 
 he had concealed it there.' So much of the confession as relates 
 diatinctlif to the fact discovered by it may be given in evidence, 
 since this part of the statement, for the reasons already given, can- 
 not have been false.'' 
 
 ^ IfO'J.'' If, too, a prisoner be persuaded, by improper induce- 
 ments, to confess, and to himfietf deliver up the goods stolen, his 
 declarations, contemporaneous with and explanatory of the act of 
 delivery, though they may amount to a confession of guilt, will be 
 admissible.' But whatever he may liave said at the same time, not 
 qualifying or explaining the act of delivery, must be rejected. 
 And iv', — notwithstanding the prisoner's confession thus improperly 
 
 ' R. V. Roid. 18'J9 (Tindal, C.J. 
 R. V. Roche, 1841 (Ld. Doiiinun) 
 Rropun's case (uiidat<!d) (Ld. liyiid- 
 liiiiHt). Soc ri'uuirks auto, iiotus to 
 § 8!ll>. 
 
 ' (ir. Ev. § TAX, in ffVMxt pnrt. 
 
 ^ I'll Ev. 411 ; R. c. Wiiiickshall, 
 17HU; R. V. Mowiy, 1784 (Huller, J., 
 and I't'iiyn, R.); R. c Lockhart, 
 I7N'; 1!. V. (Joiild, 1840 (Tiiidul, 
 ('..[., and l'urk<>, H.); R. c TluutoU, 
 18-22, cited Joy on Conf. 84 (Ir.); R. 
 V. Cain. 18:J!") (Ir.) ('rornniH, J.); 
 Com. r. Kniipp, IK.'JO (.\in.). 
 
 * 1{. V, Hutchor, l"i»8; and soo tho 
 ciis(!H cited lll)ov•(^ n. ••, In Hiirvcy's 
 ca«u, 1800, Lord Eldou laid down 
 
 tho rulo soinewliat more strictly than 
 it in statiMl in tho text, sayinj^ that 
 whi^-o tlu! kiio\vhrdf.fo of any fuel was 
 obtained from a ])risoner, under such 
 a promise as excluded tho (sonfegsion 
 from lieinjj {jivctn in ovi(len(!e, ho 
 kIiouIiI dirt^ft an iUMpiittal, unless tho 
 fact provoil would itself havt» heon 
 sullicii'iit to warrant a conviction, 
 without any confeHsion lendiufj; to it. 
 Hut it is siilmiitted that the lesidt of 
 the authoiitie** cited in the j)''ecediii;» 
 and the fiillowin<7 note is us stated 
 in tho text. 
 
 ^ (Jr. Ev. § T,\l, in part. 
 
 • R. V. Urilliu, 1809; R. v. Jones, 
 INO!). 
 
 686 
 
CONFESSIONS OF ACCOMPLICES — OF AGENTS. [PART III. 
 
 
 
 induced, and any acts done in furtherance of the discovery, — the 
 search for the property or person in question be iiicfcctital, no proof 
 of either the confession or the acts can be received. The confession 
 is excluded, because, being made under the influeuce of a promise, 
 it cannot bo relied upon ; and the acts done uuder the same in- 
 fluence, not being confirmed by the finding of the property or 
 person, are open to the same objection. The influence which may 
 produce a groundless confession may also produce groundless 
 conduct.^ 
 
 § 904. A prisoner is not liable to be afl'^oted by the confesaiom 
 of his accomplices? So strictly is this rule enforced, that where a 
 person is indicted for receiving stolen goods, a confession by the 
 principal that he was guilty of the theft, is no evidence of that 
 fact as against the receiver ;^ audit would be the same, it seemf if 
 both parties were indicted together, and the principal were to 
 plead guilt}'.'* 
 
 § 91)0.* On similar grounds, no person is, in general, answerable 
 criminally for the acts of his servants or agents, whether he be the 
 accused or the principal in the matter, unless a criminal design be 
 brought borne to such person himself.^ The act of the agent or 
 servant may -bo shown in evidence, as proof that such an act was 
 dono; for a fact must be establish' d by the same evidence, whether 
 it be followed by a criminal or civil consequence.' JBut it is a 
 totally different question, in the cousideraticm of criminal as dis- 
 tinguifrhed from civil justice, how the principal may be atret:ted by 
 the fact, when so established. For though the wrongful or fraudu- 
 lent act of the agent may involve his principal civilly,* it cannot 
 
 > E. V. Jenkins, 1822. 
 
 » So is this Itoniiiu law. " Con- 
 fe8>iio imiiis non i)i()l)ut in proojndi- 
 ciiini iilturiuM, quia alias esset in niuuu 
 contitentis dicuro c)uod vellot, ft sic 
 ju.s altuii (lux'sitiuu auferro, (jnando 
 ouiTiino juiii piolubont; ctianisi talis 
 confitt'nst'sst'tijniniexi'ciitioncnmjur. 
 Sed linntaliis, qminilo intiT partes 
 convenit puioro cdufi'ssiiini et dicto 
 unius altoiius." 1 Masc. do I'rob., 
 Coucl. 480, p. 409. !Sco unto, §§ 01)3, 
 bM. 
 
 3 li. V, Turner, 1832 (all tho 
 judgus). 
 
 * Id., citing an anonymous deci- 
 sion of Wood, 13. 
 
 * Gr. Ev. § 234, in ;rnut ])ait. 
 
 • Set! ( 'oopor y. Slade, l>.)7-8, II. L. 
 (Ld. Weusleydalo). liut even in 
 ciiniinal cases there are ceitain ex- 
 cei)tionM to tho gcnoial rulu : soo 
 ante, § 115. 
 
 ' Sco auto, § 724. 
 
 • liaiwick V. Eug. Jt. Stock Hk.. 
 18G7 ; rioudfoot v. Montefioro, lti(i7 ; 
 Moore V. Metrop. Hail, ("o., 1872; 
 Mackay v. Com. 15k. of New liiiins- 
 wiek, 1874, T. 0. ; Swiio i\ Erancis, 
 1877; lluimah Trading Corp. Liuu 
 
 586 
 
I. 
 
 CILVr. X.] CONFESSIONS OF AGENTS — NEWSPAPEKS. 
 
 convict him of a crime, unless proof be also given that the princi- 
 pal has directed, or, at least, assented, to such act.' Wiiere it was 
 proposed to snow that an agent of the prosecutor, not called as a 
 witness, had offered, a bribe to an intended witness, who, however, 
 had not been called, the evidence was ht-ld. inadmissible ; though 
 the general doctrine, as above stated, was recognized.* 
 
 § 906. The rule thus generally laid down is open to an apparent 
 exception in the case of the proprietor of a newspaper, who is, 
 pripia facie, criminally responsible for any libel it contains, though 
 inserted by his agent or servant without his knowledge.' Yet even 
 here the defendant is, b^ Lord Campbell's Act,* now entitled to be 
 acquitted if he prove that the publication was made by his servant 
 without his authority, consent, or knowledge, and that it lid not 
 arise from want of due care or caution on bio part. 
 
 § 1)07. Confessions, like admissions, may be inferred from the 
 cond'icf of the prisoner, and from his si/cut acquiescence in the state- 
 ments of others, made in his presence, respei ting himself;* pro- 
 vided they were not mr.de either before a magistrate, or under 
 circumstances such as to naturally prevent the prisoner from 
 replying." In both the casta just instanced, of course, there 
 can be no admission by silence. In the well-known case of Dr. 
 Newman,' on an information for libel, to which truth was pleaded 
 as a justification under Lord Campbell's Act,* the defendant 
 
 r, Miiza Mahomed Ally, &c., 1878, 
 P. C. See lid. Boliubroke v. Local 
 Bourd of llfiilth of Swindon, lh7 1 ; 
 Sliiiw V. Tort I'hillip, &c., 1884. 
 
 ' Ld. Molville's case, 1800; The 
 Queen's case, 1820, II. L. ; auto, 
 §724. 
 
 « The Queen's case. 1820, H. L. 
 
 * Ld. Teiiterden put this stronfjly 
 (beinj? apparently pr .pared to make 
 the ei'iiiinial liability even more than 
 prima facie) in the following re- 
 inai'ks : — " Surely, aijet'^on who de- 
 rives ])r<)fit from, and uirnishos moans 
 for carrying on, the concern, and 
 iiitriists tlie »;(induct of the publica- 
 tion to one wliom he soledn, and iii 
 whom ho confides, may bo said to 
 cause to bo puV)li.'^hed what actually 
 appear? and ougiit to be answerable, 
 though you cannot show that he was 
 
 individually concerned in the par- 
 ticular publiciition." R. v. Qutch, 
 1829. See, furthei-, as to the acts of 
 agents, ante, § 115. 
 
 « & 7 V. c. 96 ("The Libel Act, 
 1843"), § 7; Tv. .. Il'.ll.rook, 1877; 
 S. C. on second trial, 1878. See, also, 
 11. V. IJiimsay, ; SS:{. 
 
 » R. V. Hartlett. 1837 (BoUam', B.); 
 R, V. Smithies, 1832 (Gasclee and 
 I'arke, JJ.) ; ant* . §§ 809-81(5. Seo 
 St, Matthew, ch. L'i, vv. 60—63, and 
 ch. 27, vv. 12—14. 
 
 • R. /•. Appl.b . (821 (Uolrovd, 
 J.); Melen r. Andn-ws, 182!»(l'urlie, 
 B); Joy on Conf. (Ir.), 77—80; 
 ante, § 738. 
 
 ' R. t'. Newman. 1822. 
 
 • (i & 7 V. c. 96 ("The Libel Act, 
 1843"), $7. 
 
 587 
 
' ''Si 
 
 ^i; 
 
 ADMISSIONS BY STI^KXC'E. [PART HI. 
 
 tendered evidence to prove that the very imputationj in the libel 
 had been previously published in another work, and that the prose- 
 cutor, though well aware of this, had taken no steps to obtain 
 redress ; but the evidence was rejected as too vague to be any proof 
 of aoquiescenoe. 
 
 588 
 
 /) 
 
In. 
 
 bel 
 
 CHAP. X.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 5881 
 
 Confessions. — An admission of the commission of a criminal 
 offence is, technically, a confession. Such an admissum is, under 
 proper circumstiinces, competent evidence against tlie maker. 
 State *'. Carrick 16 Nev. 120 (1881); Jilackburn v. Com., 12 IJusli, 
 181 (ISTO); Murphy v. People, G.'i N. Y. 5'.)(» (l.S7<i); State r. 
 George, 9.'} N. C. 507 (1885) j \j. S. v. Kirk wood, 5 Utah, 123 
 (188G); State v. riiillips, 117 Mo. 38!) (l.S')3); I'.ell c. State, 31 
 Tex. App. 270 (1802); State v. Chambers, 45 La. Ann. 3(5 (18!)3); 
 Walker v. State, l.'JG Ind. GG3 (18!)3). 
 
 "The confessions of prisoners are received in evidence upon the 
 presumption that a person will not make a false statement, which 
 will militate against himself." Brown v. State, 32 Miss. 433, 450 
 (185G); IJasye v. State, 45 Neb. 2G1 (18')5). It is not necessary tliat 
 a witness should remember all the confession. State v. Madison, 
 47 La. Ann. 30 (1805). 
 
 CoxKESsioxs AN'i) ADMISSIONS. — Statements by one accused of 
 crime as to the existence of particular facts are designated as 
 admissions. Confession is the term reserved for the acknowledg- 
 ment of. guilt. 
 
 It is error to confuse the two in a charge to the jury. Klet:?hep 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 4G8 (1892). 
 
 "The term admission is usually applied to civil transactions, and 
 to those matters of fact in criminal cases wiiich do not involve 
 criminal intent; the term confession being generally restricted to 
 acknowledgments of guilt. . . . The rules of evidence are in botli 
 cases the same." Colburn v. Groton, (JG N. II. 151, 154 (1889); 
 Taylor /;. State, 37 Neb. 788 (1893) ; .Mora v. People, 19 Colo. 255 
 (1893). So acknowledgment of the possession of goods belonging to 
 a murdered woman is not a confession of nuinler. "lie may have 
 been guilty of no other or different crime than that of whitdi the 
 witness admits liis own guilt, namely, receiving and concealing 
 goods taken from the murdered woman. The fa<'f of his possession 
 of the goods raised a powerful jiresumption of his guilt of the 
 murder. Hut his admission of such ]»oss('ssion was in no sense a 
 confession of guilt. It will not to do to say tliat one on trial for a 
 felony confesses his giiilt by admitting circuiustances tending, 
 however strongly, to establish guilt. A confession of guilt is an 
 admission of tlie criminal act itself, not an admission of a fact or 
 circumstance from wliicdi guilt may be inferred. State r. Glynden, 
 51 la. 403." State v. Jfed, .53 la. GO (1880). "A confession is a 
 person's declaration of liis agency (U- })artici])ation in a crime. The 
 term is restricted to acknowledgments of guilt. An admission of 
 a fact, not in itself involving criminal intent, is not to be rejected 
 
5882 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [part m. 
 
 CH 
 
 as evidence (without the proliminary proof) merely because it 
 may, when conne-ited with otlier facts, tend to estahlisli guilt." 
 I't'ople V. I'avton, 4!) Cal. (jlVJ (1875). "All i)arts of the confes- 
 sion, inculpatory or exculpatory, sliould be weighed tngetJier." 
 State i: McDonnell, J5L' Vt. 4'.)], 532 (1860). 
 
 r.ut tliL witness can give all he heard even if he did not hear the 
 entire confession. People v. Daniels, lOf) Cal. 'Ji>2 (l.SUI). 
 
 On a defence of alil)i tlie defendant's admission of the speed of 
 his liorse is competent. "His sayings are admissihh' agiiinst hiui- 
 self." Inastr r. State, 55 Ga. .'525 (1875). The fact lliat the defend- 
 ant offered $(}i) to settle the case is competent. State r. JJruce, o.S 
 La. Ann. ISO (1881). 
 
 Only such portion of a confession is competent as reliu.es to the 
 offence under investigation. The prosecution cannot introduce 
 admissions l)y a defendant of general bad character. Com. v. 
 Campi)ell, 155 Mass. 537 (1892). 
 
 Judicial and ExTUA-jUDieiAr. Coxfession.s. — A distinction has 
 been attempted between confessions made in court and tliose made 
 in jjiiis. Thus the su])reme court of Missouri sny : " C'onfcssions 
 are divided into two classes, nainely, judicial and cxtia-judicial. 
 . Judicial confessions are those which are made before tlie magis- 
 trate or in court, in due course of legal jtroceedings, and it is 
 essential that tliey be made of the free will of the party, and with 
 full and perfect knowledge of the nature ami consequences of tiie 
 confession. Of tiiis kind are tlie ])reliminary examinations, taken 
 in writing by tlie magistrate, pursuant to statutes, aiul tlie plea of 
 guilty made in open court to an indictment. Either of these is 
 .snilicient to found a conviction upon, even if it be followed by 
 sentence of death, tliey being deliberately made, with tlie advice of 
 counsel, and under the ])rotecting caution and oversight of the 
 judge. Extra-judicial confessions are those wliich are made by 
 tlie party elsewhere tlian before a magistrate, or in court, this term 
 embracing not onl}' explicit and express confessions of crime, but 
 all tliose admissions of the accused from which guilt may be 
 implied. 
 
 '* Whether extra-judicial confessions, uncorroborated by any other 
 proof of the corpus delicti, are of themselves sulficient to found a 
 convi(!rion of the prisoner upon, has not only been doubted, but, in 
 the best considered cases, denied." State r. Cierman, 54 Mo. 526 
 (1874). See also Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472 (1871). 
 
 FoitM OF CoNKKssiox. — The confession may be in the form of 
 evidence given in another case. Dickerson v. State, 48 Wis. 288 
 (187".)); Alston V. State, 41 Tex. 39 (1874); Anderson v. State, 26 
 Tnd. 89 (1860). 
 
 Or as evidence apninst another before the grand jury. State v. 
 Broughton, 7 Ired. (N. C.) 96 (1846). 
 
 :M( 
 
 tr; 
 Cc 
 a 
 Si 
 
ni. 
 
 it 
 
 t." 
 
 iie 
 
 CHAP. X.] 
 
 /.MERICAK KOTKS. 
 
 5883 
 
 Or in a plea of guilty before the lower court. State v. Bowe, CI 
 Me. 171 (1.S72). 
 
 Or on a former trial of the same fase. "The statements made 
 by tlie defendant while testifying at a iormer trial were com[)etent, 
 eitlier as admissions or for the purpose of ".ontraclicting him. They 
 were voluntary statements, in regard to his connection witli the 
 tx'ansaction, and it is immaterial where or wiien they wert! made." 
 Com. ('. Reynolds, X'22 Mass. 454 (1S77). Or before a coroner at 
 a preliminary inquest. Teachout r. I'eople, 41 N. Y. 7 (ISGD); 
 Snyder i\ State, ol) Ind. 105 (1S77); State v. Gilmau, 51 Me. L'(»0 
 (18()li). So of evidence at a tire inquest. Com. v. Bradford, 120 
 Mass. 42 (1.S7S). 
 
 Or befor-^ a committing magistrate. State v. Brauham, 13 S. 
 C. liH\) (1879). 
 
 Sucli confessions are regarded as voluntary, especially where the 
 declarant has been cautioned. Teacliout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7 
 {18()!)); State y. Gilman,51 Me. 200 (1SG2); Com. v. Clark, 130 
 Ta. St. (541 (1880); Com. v. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42 (1878); State 
 V. liranliam, 13 S. C. 389 (1879); Snyder u. State, 59 Ind. 105 
 (1877). 
 
 To the opposite effect, see State v. Garvey, 25 La. Ann. 191 
 (1873). 
 
 On an indictment for bigamy, the fact of the prior marriage may 
 be proved by an endorsement on a pliotograph "your dear hus- 
 band." State V. Behrman, 114 N. C. 797 (1894). 
 
 And it has been held that where A. testified against B. jointly 
 indicted with himself but tried separately as confessions as to his 
 connection with the offence cannot be used against him on liis own 
 trial. "That he was cautioned by the circuit judge, at the time he 
 testified against Robertson, that he need not tell about his own 
 connection with the crime, does not affect tlie result. The prin- 
 ciple is, that no statement made upon oath in a judicial investiga- 
 tion of a crime can ever be used against the party making it, in a 
 prosecution of liim for the same crime; because tlie fact tliat lie is 
 under oath, of itself, operates as a compulsion ujwn him to tell the 
 truth, and tho whole truth, and his statement, therefore, cannot be 
 regarded as free and voluntary." Jackson v. State, 5() Miss. 311 
 (1879). 
 
 If the confession has been reduced to writing, it becomes a 
 written instrument within Mie meaning of the "best evidence" 
 rule. "When confessions are taken by a trial justice, in writing, 
 signed by the parties, such evidence is the best evidence u])on the 
 subject, and if such confessions are relied upon against them, the 
 defendants are entitled to have them produced in the very terms 
 in which they were made. From the infirmity of memory there is 
 always more or less uncertainty about parol testimony, especially 
 
588< 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT 111, 
 
 »■! 
 
 in reference to (lerlaratioiis — nicro spoken words. Even in civil 
 oases the rule is tliat jiarol testimony is not admissible to exjilain, 
 vary or add to written instruments, which must speak for them- 
 selves. In criminal proceedings there is even more reason tiiat 
 only the best and most reliable evidence should be allowed. There 
 may have l)een in the writti'U (ionfessions some ipialitieations or 
 explanations, and, we think, when (U'liianded by the defendants, 
 they should have been offered. It was error to receive parol testi- 
 mony of confessions made in writing where there was no obstacle 
 in tlie way of the written concessions being offered." State v, 
 Branham, 13 S. C. -Wi), :m (187<»). To the same eftect, Cicero 
 ('. State, 54 (Ja. laO (1875); Wright r. State, 50 :Miss. IV,V2 (1874). 
 A letter is none the less competent as an admission that it is not 
 signed. State v. AVinningliam, lL!4 Mo. 4'Jn {18',)4). Or because 
 written at the dictation of another and signed by that other. State 
 V. Sibley, (^lo.) .'51 S. W. Kt.Ti (1895). 
 
 CoxKKssioN Hv SiLKNCK. — .\ confcRsion, like any other admis- 
 sion, may be in the form of a declaration m.. ' in presence of the 
 accused under circumstiinces (tailing for a rejdy; e. g. , by a fellow 
 prisoner. Murphy r. State, 30 Oh. St. (il.'8 (1881); People v. 
 Estrado, 49 Cal. 171 (1874); TIaberty r. State, 8 Oh. C. Ct. liep. 
 L'fi2 (1894); Sparf /•. U. S.,150 U. S. 51 (1895); Com. /•. Trefethen, 
 157 Mass. 180 (189L'). 
 
 Failure to re]dy to an accusation of guilt is, if a reply is fairly 
 called for, a comi)etent fact in tlie nature of a confession. State v. 
 Keed, 02 Me. 129, 111 (1874); Com. >: IJrown. 121 Mass. 09 
 (1870h Kelley v. reo|)le, ru) N. Y. 505 (1874); Stater, r.nwnian, 
 SOX. C. 4;]2 (1879): Drumright v. State. 29 (Ja. 4.30 (1859); State 
 r. r.elknap,39 W. Va. 127 (1894); T.rown v. State, 32 Tex. Ai)p. 
 119 (1893). 
 
 "Wiiero an individual is charged with an offence, or detdara- 
 tions are made, in his jiresence and hearing, touching or affecting 
 his guilt or innocence of an alleged crime, and he remains silent 
 wluMi it would be iu'0])er for him to speak, it is the province of a 
 jury to interi)ret su(di silence, and determine whether his silence 
 was, under tlie circumstances, excused or exi)lained. At most, 
 silence under sucli circumstance- is but an implied acquiescence in 
 the truth of the .statenuMits made by others, and thus itresunqitive 
 evidence of guilt, anil in some cases it nmy be slight, except, as 
 confirmed and corroborated by otlier (dreumstances. ])Ut it is 
 some evidence, an<l therefore, except in those cases where the 
 statements are made n\Hm an occasion and under circumstances in 
 whicli the individual sought to be affected could not witli pro]iriety 
 speak, as in the ])rogres.s of a judicial investigation, or in a discus- 
 sion between third persons not addressed to or intended to affect 
 the accused or imluce any action in respect to him, so that for him 
 
CHAP. X.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 5886 
 
 to speak would be u maniiVst iiitnision into a discourse t(^ wliich 
 lie was not a l)arty, the evidfiiee is competent and sliould be 
 admitted." Kelley c. l'eoi)k', T),") N. Y. od") (1,S74). 
 
 So an uncontroverted statement, made in a prisoner's presenci^ at 
 a judicial hearing, is not eompi-tcnt as an admission by him, 
 "being made in the progress of an investigation before a judicial 
 otKcer, when silence, if not recpiired, was at least justitied as a 
 matter of decorum." Hell v. State. ().'! (Ja. ooT (l.S'.»4). 
 
 It is no objection to the admissibility of sucli statements that 
 tliey were made wliile tlu; accused was under arrest Kelley v. 
 I'eople, ou N. Y. .W') (1874). 
 
 r>ut, as has been said, tlie circumstances must be such as to make 
 ft rejjly proper. Slattery i>. Teople, 7(5 111. -17 (l<S7r)); Kedley i\ 
 People, 5") N. Y. olio (1H74); State v. Murray, (Mo.) lil) S. W. 700 
 (iSi)")); Com. r. Trefethcn, lo7 Mass. ISO (l.S'.tl.',. 
 
 "The inference tiiat silence is tantamount to an admission of 
 guilt must rest upon the idea of acquiescence, and it is not con- 
 sistent with sound reason to imply an a('(piiesccn('e from silence, 
 unless the circumstances are such as to iillord the party an oppor- 
 tunity to act or sjjeak, but such, also, as would naturally call for 
 some action or re^jly from iirudeiit men similarly situated. The 
 rule is well and tersely settled in Com. r. IJrown, 121 Mass. (5!), as 
 follows: *A statement made in the presence of a defendant, to 
 which no reply is made, is not admissible against him, unless it 
 appears that he was at liberty to nuUte a reply, and that tiu' state- 
 nu'ut was made by such ])cr3on and under such circumstances as 
 naturally to call for a. reply unless he intends to admit it. Ibit, 
 if he makes a reply wholly or partially admitting the truth of the 
 facts s'iated, both the statement and the rejdy are competent 
 evidence. Com. v. Kenney, 12 Mete. (.Mass.) 2.'!').'" The circum- 
 stance th<,t the accused is in custody, while entitled to weight, 
 will not, of itsfdf, exclude the statement, if the circumstances 
 otherwise ])roperly called for a replj' or denial by him. Com. r. 
 Brown, 121 Mass. «!); Murphy r. State. .'Ul (»h. St. (;2S: Kellt>y 
 V. People, 55 N. Y. oOo; Teoph' v. Went/. .-57 N. Y. .'{O.'i; McKee v. 
 I'eople, .'!6 N. Y. 11.3; Com. /•. Cuffee. lOS Mass. 2S5; State v. 
 Murray, (Mo.) 29 S. W. 700 (lS<r.). 
 
 And it must be jn'oved that the defendant understood what was 
 said. Sauls *•. State, ;!(> Te.\. \\)]). MO (1S91). 
 
 The entire rule has been severely criticised. Tlius, the supreme 
 court of South Candina say of a cliarge "that if a party hears a 
 criminal cliarge against himself, and made in his pre.seiu'e, and 
 says nothing, it is an admission on his part, ami, in the eye of the 
 law, the i)arty accepts that charge as his confession," as follows: 
 "The effect of this charge was to give the silence of the parties 
 the legal force and effect of confession of guilt. It must, in this 
 
6888 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAUT III. 
 
 respect, be distinguislied from the proposition that tlio conduct of 
 parties under accusation of crime may be given to tlie jury, as 
 circunistanci's to be Aveighed in connection with the ([uestion of 
 guilt or innocenoo. To give the silence of parties such legal effect, 
 is etjuivalent to holding that every person accused of crime by any 
 ])ers(tn, regardless of time, place or circumstance, is bound to deny 
 sucli accusation and alKrm his innocence. It is clear that the law 
 imposes no such obligation on a party accused; but, on the con- 
 trary, it is liis right to stand mute, and the burden of showing the 
 guilt is on tliosc that make the accusation." State v, Edwards, 13 
 So. C. .'{() (l.S7'.>). 
 
 In like manner, the supreme court of Alabama say: "The evi- 
 dence in the cause before us was ])roperly admitted, liut the 
 charge of the court upon it was calculated to mislead the jury, con- 
 cerning the weight it was entitled to. They ought not to have 
 been instructed, ' That the fact that the person who is charged 
 with the commission of a crime says nothing, but remains silent, 
 is a circumstance to which the jury may look as a confession of 
 guilt.' It is often a circumstance, the significance of which may 
 be wholly misunderstood; and it ought, therefore, always to be 
 questioned very carefully, if not distrustingly, by a jury." 
 Campbell v. State, 55 Ala. 80 (1876). 
 
 Foiu'R OF CoxKEssioxs. — The j)robative effect of confessions is 
 frequently more apparent than real. Instances of untruthful self- 
 accusation of the gravest offences have been not infrequent. Cau- 
 tions by the court seem therefore entirely justified. State v. 
 McDonnell, ?>2 Vt. 491, 5;i2 (1860). 
 
 In lirown v. State, 32 Miss. "433 (1856), the Mississippi court of 
 appeals say: "We have no hesitation in saying that the 14th 
 instruction granted in behalf of the prosecution was erroneous. 
 That instruction is in the following words: ' Confessions made by 
 a jjcrson charged with an offence, when made voluntarily, and not 
 obtained bj' force, fraud, or threats, are regarded \)y the law as 
 the highest and most satisfactory character of proof. If, there- 
 fore, tlie jury believe from the confessions of defendant, as given 
 in evidence, tliat defendant shot Tatum, the deceased, at a time 
 when he knew that Tatum had no ])ower to do him any injury, then 
 such shooting was unlawful, and defendant is guilty of either 
 murder or manslaughter, according to his intentic;; at the time of 
 shooting.' 
 
 The confessions of prisoners are received in evidence upon the 
 presumption that a person will not make a false statement, which 
 will militate against himself. And while the elementary writers, 
 and the courts, have not entirely agreed upon the weight to be 
 given to this sjiecies of evidence, it is admitted by all that it 
 should be received with great caution. * For,' says Blackstone, 
 
C1IA.P. X.] 
 
 AMEIMCAN NOTKS. 
 
 5887 
 
 who miiintainod that nniifpssioiis in oasos of felony, wcri' tlic 
 weakest and most suspitiioiis of all tcstinionv ; 'they arc very 
 liable to be obtained by artitioe, false hopes, promises of favor, or 
 menaces; seldom remembered aeeiirately or reported witii preci- 
 sion, and incapable in their nature, of being disproved by other 
 ne,i^'ative evidence. 4 Com. 'Anl. Subject however, to the projier 
 cauti )n in reeeivint,' and weighing them, ' it is generally agreed 
 that leliberaie confessions of guilt are amongst the most effectual 
 l)ro()fs in tlio law.' 1 Clreen. Ev, ij I'lo. I'.ut that they are to bo 
 ' regarded as the highest and most satisfactory character of jjroof ' 
 has never been the doctrine; of this court." 
 
 "Observation and experience have led the most eminent and 
 enlightened Judges in the administration of the criminal law to 
 the conclusion, and it has become the estal)lished doctrine and rule 
 for the government of Courts, that tlie evidence of verl)al confes- 
 sions of guilt is to be received with great caution." Cain /•. State, 
 IS Tex. ;W7 (IS-)?). 
 
 "Where parties make admissions or declarations against them- 
 selves, the law presumes they are true because made against their 
 interest; but this is only a j)resumption and may be rebutted. 
 Statements, confessions and admissions, when given in evidence, 
 must all bo taken together, and the jury will attach such credit to 
 them as they deem them wortliy of. Tiiey may believe everything 
 the party says in his favor, or they may reject the same. It all 
 depends upon the circumstances surrounding the case, and the 
 degree of probability there is in the truth of the statements, wlien 
 viewed in the light of the whole transaction which they purport to 
 narrate." State r. Ilollenscheit, (Jl Mo. .'{02 (LSTf)). 
 
 On tiie other hand, circumstances may give a voluntary confes- 
 sion of guilt very strong probative force;. 
 
 For example, in State v. IJrown, 4,S la. 382 (1S78), "The defend- 
 ant asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: 'Confessions 
 allegeil to have been mnde by the prisoner in tiie presence of tho 
 prosecutor alone, or in the presence of tlie prosecutor and one or 
 more of his select friends, are the weakest of all testimony deemed 
 competent in law, and should be received and considered as such, 
 and confessions made in the presence of any one witness alone are 
 deenu'd in law as weak and unsatisfactory, unless corroborated by 
 other testimony.' This instruction was refused, and the court 
 instructed the jury in tiiese words: ' When it is shown that a 
 public offence has been committed, free and voluntary confessions 
 of guilt, or of facts necessarily tending to show his guilt, by the 
 party accused, are, by the law, jjresumed to be true, and are 
 entitled to the highest credit and greatest weight as evidence of 
 such fact or facts; but such confessions will not warrant a convic- 
 tion, unless they are accompanied by other evidence that the crime 
 has been committed.' 
 
5888 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AKT in. 
 
 "We think tlin instruction asked by defendant was proiioily 
 refused. A voluntary confession of crime is not the weakest of 
 all testimony (loomed competent in law. It is true, evidence of a 
 confe^.si()n sliould bo examined with care; Imt when it is eleiiilv 
 establisliod, whether made in the presence of tlio ijro.secutor or liis 
 friends, or to one person alone, if made viduntarily, it should not 
 ))(' regarded as weak and unsatisfactory. 
 
 The instruction given by the court upon this subject, when con- 
 sidiTod in the light of the facts of the case, was correct.. The 
 evidence, without (n)nHict, showed a free and voluntary confession 
 of tiie crime, with all its j)artienlars. In siudi cases the confession 
 is entitled to the highest credit and greatest weight as evidence." 
 
 The Kentucky court of ajipeals has held that the court is not 
 wirranted in cautioning the jury as to the credibility of eonfes- 
 sioMS. " Kvidenco of confessions, like evidence <tf otlier farts, is 
 to be weighed by the jury, and the court has no more riglit to 
 ca'ition them in reganl to such evidenee than in legard to anv 
 otiier species of ovidenco." lihu-kburn /•. Com., ll' liusli. ISl 
 (1S7G). 
 
 In Com. I). Sanborn, 110 Mass. 01 ^1S74) the course of the nisi 
 ]priMS judge was apjiroved. "At the defendant's rcMjuest tiie jmige 
 instructed the jury that such evidence should be reeeived with 
 great caution. Tlie defendant further re(piested the court to 
 instruct tlie jury tliat no substantial ndiance could be placetl (ipon 
 tills class of evidenee uncorroliorated. This tlie judge refused, but 
 did instruct t, 'in that whether any sultstantial reliance oould lie 
 ]dac,ed u|ion tliis (dass of testinumy depended upon tlie circuni- 
 stances of each case, and that it was for the jury to say in this 
 case how far tliey couM rely upon it." 
 
 A similar view is tiken in Eiland v. State, AL* Ala. '.V2'2, .'!.">"> 
 (1S7")): "CoiifessicMis or declarations, whetiier olf<'red in evidence 
 in a civil or erimiaal case, nnist lie received as a whole The part 
 \>iiie'' criminates nmst be taken eoniieet-ed with that which e,\cul- 
 ]tates. 'I'lie law does not ascertain the creih'nee wliieli siiall be 
 attaidi"d to eitlier ]iart. or to the confession or dcclaiation in its 
 entirety. The jury are ii(»t iMiuiid to attach eipial credeiici' to 
 every Jtart; tliey may, for sutlicieiit ?'e;isons, reject a part ami give 
 eifect to a part; siieli ri'jection cannot be capriciously made, nor 
 can credence lie < in.ricion.dy given to a [tart. 'I'hat wlii(di is favor- 
 nlde to the party should not be rejecteil merely becau.se it is 
 favorable to him. and because of the motives which may have 
 induced him to make it. Tiie confession slioiihl be taken as a 
 wlicde; the time and circumstances (d' its making, — its harmony 
 or inconsistency witli otiier evidence, and tlie motives which may 
 have operated on tlie party in making it, — should all be fairly 
 considered by the jury. Tiieii, without regard to wliether tliey are 
 
CHAP. X.] 
 
 AMERICAN XOTKS. 
 
 5889 
 
 clearly disproved or not, the jury should credit all which they find 
 sufficient reason for crediting, and reject all which they find suffi- 
 cient reason for rejecting." 
 
 (JouRoHouATioN KKQiiKKi). — It has Ijceu held, for reasons partly 
 given above, tliat an \inciirrohorated confession is not sufficient to 
 warrant conviction of a criminal offence. "The elementary hooks 
 generally stat(^ the law to he. tliiit confessions ahme are sufficient 
 to convict; yet it is believed no court wouhl perniil a conviction 
 for felony uiion mere confessions, math' out of court, witliout some 
 proof that a crinu' had in fact been committed, or of circumstances 
 corroborating and fortifying tlie confession. Tiie criminal law 
 requires proof sufficient to satisfy the reason and judgment Iteyond 
 a reasonable ilo\d)t of the guilt of the accused; and anytliing sliort 
 of tliis will not justify a conviction. Mr. Justice lUackstonc, in 
 speaking of confessions not made upon due caution and didibera- 
 tion, and to unauthorized persons, says: ' they are tiie weakest ami 
 most susjiicious of all testimony; ever liable to l)e obtaint'd by 
 artifice, false hopes, promises of favor, or nuMiaccs; seldom remem- 
 bered accurately, or repeated with due precision; and incapable in 
 their nature of being disproved by negative eviilence.' And the 
 same author apju-oves the rules laid down by Sir .Mattlii'w Hale: 
 never to convict of larceny till the goods are jnoved to have been 
 stolen; iu)r to convict of munler or manslaughter unless the liody 
 he found dead. 4 lUack. Com. .T)". .'!.">.S and .'»")'.). Experience has 
 shown that confessions have sometimes turned out unfounded; 
 that the weak, to avoid apparent impending jieril, iind under the 
 force of surroundings, exciting ap]irehensions, and imaginary 
 dangers, iiave Ix'cn induced to state untrutlis which have produced 
 their conviction of supposed (trinu's. 
 
 The humanity (d' the law will not tolerate a general rule wliich, 
 in its o}ieration, endangers the security of innocence, and is unsafe 
 to life or liberty, in the administration of tiie law. Confessions 
 ]iroved ar<' necessarily weak or strong evidence, acconlirig to tlie 
 circumstiinces :itten<ling the niaiiing and the proving of tliem; and 
 we think the oidy safe general rule is to reipiire some other evi- 
 dence corroliorative of tiieir t nitJi." Iiei'gen r. People. 17 111. IL'<> 
 (l.Sr.C); Williams r. State. iLf I,e:i. LMl (ISS;!). 
 
 "An extrajuilieiiil confession, not corroborated by ini1c])endent 
 ovideui^e id' tlie inr/ius ili-Hrfl, would not support a conviction for 
 ftdoiiy." Joiiuson /•. State, iV.t .Ma. .'17 (tS77); State /■. (ierman, 
 r)4 Mo. .".IT. (lS7h; State r. Knowles. IS la. .".'.(S MS7S); Smitli /•. 
 Com., L'l (iratt. S(I<»(IS71); I'eople c. Thrall. .".(» C:il. IIT* ( 1X7.".) ; 
 Pitts >'. St;ite. .|;{ Miss, r.i' (I.S71); V. S. r. Mii.vtield. .V.» Fed. 
 ]{ep. lis (|S<);!): i{,van c. State. 1(10 Ala. •.»} (1S!»;!): Dunn c. 
 Htato (Tex.), m S. \V. '.".'7 (lS<.>ri); Land.riglit c State. .'M Fla. 
 r.ni (I.V.)h; People c. Sjnionsen. 1(»7 Cal. .".ir. (iS'.trO. So in a libel 
 for divorce bir adultery. Lyon c. I.yon. Til' Karl). KJS (istjl). 
 
58810 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT III. 
 
 lint only siioli proof of the corjms delicti, outside the confession 
 is required as tlie nature of the case admits. For example, in ciise 
 of a liomitnde at sea, ]ilfii;iry ])roof of the crime is not required, 
 U. S. 1-. Williams, 1 Clitf. 5 (ISuS). 
 
 iSurrendoring stolen jiroperty with admission of guilt will wiii- 
 raut a conviction. State r. ^lunson, 7 Wash. U,'}9 (ISl),'}). A lil^e 
 effect follows finding property as stated in a confession. State v. 
 Hansen, LT) Orej;. IVM (l.s;»4). 
 
 On the other hand, a confession of guilt given while testifying 
 as a witness on the trial of another has been held sutlicient, witli- 
 out corroborative evidence, to support a conviction for fclonv. 
 ''It would be ditticult to conceive of evidence of guilt onlimiiily 
 more satisfactory to a sensible mind than a party's own statcnnnls, 
 solemnly and freely made under oalh, upon tiic trial of another 
 cause, when not himself accused, and when no motive or induce- 
 ment is perceptible to beget a departure from the truth, and when 
 falsehood would be wilful and corrupt perjury." Amlerson v. 
 State, L'(J Ind. .SI) (ISCG) 
 
 Must hk vollxtakv. — Before the evidence showing a confes- 
 sion can ])roperly be received, it must affirmatively appear that the 
 declarant's statements "have iu)t been obtaim-d by the influence of 
 hope or fear, ajiplied by a third jierson to the jjrisoner's mind." 
 Cain V. State, IS Tex. .^87 (lsr.7); Teople r. Soto, 4<.» Cal. (57 
 (1.S74); State r. Anderson, % Mo. L'41 (ISSS); Creen r. State, 88 
 (ia. .^)1(» (1S«»1); Com. v. Flood, 1")2 Mass. r>'2\) (t8<)(»); Searcy c. 
 State, L'8 Tex. Apj). ol.'J (iS'.Kt); Jolinson r. State, ".'.» Ala. ;{7 
 (1877); State r. Crowson, *.)8 N. C. o'.to (1887); Colburn v. (irotnn, 
 G(! X. H. lol (188<»); May t-. State, (Xeb.) ^G. N. W. S()4 (18'.«); 
 Hubster i: State. 'Mi Neb.GG;] (18<»1). 
 
 "Confessions are inailniissiblt! when induced by threats, or by a 
 ])roniise of favor, made by jiersons apparently acting by authority." 
 Teople >'. Clarke (Mich.), (V2 N. W. 1117 (18<.(r.). 
 
 "We feel constrained by our fornu-r decisions to hold, that a 
 confession induced by ho]ie or fear, exciteil in the mind by the 
 re]»resentations of any one connected with the prosecution, or con- 
 nected with tlic accused, who may, considering his relations and 
 condition, be fairly supposed by him to have power to secure him 
 whatever of benefit is promised, or to intluence the threntened 
 injury, cannot be regarded as voluntary, and ought not to be 
 received in evidence. 
 
 The confessions in this case were made to a jjcrson who was 
 engaged as a clerk in the store-house alleged to have been broken 
 and entered, and the owiu'r of a jiart of the goods sai<l to have 
 been st(den therefrom, 'i'hey were made while the prisoner was 
 in jail, and upon pnuuises that he (the clerk) would not judsecuto 
 him, and W(mld not a])pear as a witiu'ss unless compelled. It 
 
CHAP. X.] 
 
 AjniRICAN NOTES. 
 
 588" 
 
 would be a departure from the current of our former derisions, 
 which have not favored the admissibility of confessions, unless 
 plainly shown to be voluntary — uninfluenced by liope or fear — 
 to pronounce these conlussions admissible evidence." Mnrjiliy r. 
 State, C'i Ala. 1 (ISTD). "Eh-mentary writers of authority concur 
 in saying tliat, whih^ from the very nature of such evidence it 
 must be snbjected to careful scrutiny and received with i,'reat 
 caution, a deliberate, voluntary confession of guilt is among the 
 most effectual pro(d's in the law, and constitutes the strongest evi- 
 dence against the i>arty making it that can be given of tiie i'acts 
 stated in such confession. . . . lint tlie presumption upon which 
 weight is given to such evidence, nanudy, that one wlio is innocent 
 will not imperil iiis safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue 
 statement, (leases when tlie confession ajjpears to liavc bt-en made 
 either in conse((uence of indncenu'nts of a tenqjoral nature, judd out 
 by one in authority, toucliing tlie charge preferred, or because of 
 a threat or promise by or in tlie presence of such person, which, 
 operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in. reference to 
 the i:i.:'.!'g;-, ileprives him of that freedom of will or self-contrcd 
 essential to make his confession voluntary witiiin the meaning of 
 the law. Tested by these conditions, then' seems to have been no 
 reason to exidnde the confession of the ai'cused; for the existence 
 of any such inducements, threats or jtromises seems to have been 
 negi'tived by the statement of the circumstances under which it 
 was made." Hopt v. Utah, llO V. S. nn (1.SS4). 
 
 A curious excejition to the exclusion of a confession under 
 promise of pardon exists. A confession, made under hope of 
 pardon, by one who turns "state evidence " is regarded as "volun- 
 tary " if the jjrisoni'r rrf\ises to testify in ac<'ordance with his 
 confession. " We cannot perceive how the prisoner, thus situated, 
 could have any motive falsely to accuse himscdf, although he might 
 have a motive to coutiniu' his false accusation against iiis accom- 
 plices. And besides, if any sucli motive could be snjjposed to 
 oi)erate, it was a new motive, and not arising from external 
 inHuence. And it is no objection to the adniissinn (d' a conf"ssioi!, 
 that it was made from interested motives and with the hope o[ 
 favor, it' the motive is not excited iiy external inHuence. 
 
 If the accomidices had been up.)n trial, it is clear that the 
 testimony of the prisoner wo\ild have liej'u competent against 
 them. It would be liable to great oliservation, and its credibility 
 would be the fair and just siiliject ol' argunn'ut. I'ut still it wtnild 
 be competent. Ami yet the motives which could operate upon 
 his mind W(mhl be strong, to magnify the evidence against ids 
 accon)pli<'es, but lie would have no motive to < riminate or accuse 
 himself beyond the truth." Com. c. Knapp, 10 Tick. 477, 4'Jl 
 (18;«»). 
 
58812 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AHT III. 
 
 An involuntary confession will still be evidence against another 
 one of the participants in a civil action. Newhall v. Jenkins '2 
 Gray, rM (ISn-i). 
 
 The rejection of a confession regarded as involuntary is not 
 based on any feeling of fairness to the accused. A confession 
 obtained by eavesdropping is conijjetent. Woolfolk v. State H'> 
 Cia. ('•*.), ',)'■) (IS'.K)). A e(>nfessit)n obtained inider promise of 
 scerecy is competent. State r. Mitcliell, I'hilliijs (N. (!.) 447 
 (ISCS); State V. Darnell, 1 Iloust. Crim. Kep. .'!21 (ISTo). So 
 of one obtained by deception. Com. v. Ilanlon, o lirews. 401, 490 
 (1S7<>). Or by falsely informing tluf prisoner that his aceomjjliees 
 had been captured and liad betrayed him. Statt! i'. Jones, o4 Mo. 
 47S (I.S74); Trice v. SLate, IS Oh. St. 4 IK (l.SOS). 
 
 Oi by false information that an accomplice had been shot. King 
 r. State, 40 Ala ai4 (1S(;7). 
 
 The reason for this rule is given in Price v. State (ubi sujira). 
 "Tlie true rule seems to bo, that in order to excdude tlie evi- 
 dence, tliere must have been something said or done calcuhited to 
 induce a hoj)e of advantage, or feav of harm. Tlu^ fact that he 
 was a prisoner, and that a fraud was practiced upon liim, is not 
 stitHcient. Tlu'y have no tendency to make nim swerve from the 
 truth. However we may condemn th(^ fraud, we cajinot reject the 
 voluntary confession." Trice v. State, IS Oh. St. 41S (lS«iS). 
 
 It is no objection to a confession that the detective "got into tlie 
 eouiiilence " of the jirisoner by false jtretences. Cornwall 1:. State. 
 '.tl (la. 277 (1S<)2); Stone ?>. State (Ala.) 17 So. 114 (ISOo). Or 
 tliat the aeeused confessed on being threatt'ued by a f(dlo\v-eitizen 
 witli a prosecution for Ids olfeuce. Uohanan r. State, '.(2 (Ja. 2S 
 (■ISU.".). Or tliat tliere are tirearnis in tiu' room. Stater. Watt, 
 47 La. Ann. (WJO (IS'i.")). 
 
 It lias, on the contrary, been held in Texas that wliere a confes- 
 sion was obtained by false statenu-nts of tin- jirosecuting witnes . or 
 otlier frau<l the ccnifession was not voluntary. Cook v. State, .'52 
 Tex. Ap].. 27 (ISK.'M. 
 
 If a person is aware of wliat he is saying, the fact that advantage 
 is taken of intoxication in procuring his confession does not atYect 
 its admissibilitv. Kskridge r. State, 2r> Ala. .'50 (lsr»4); Williams 
 r. State, 12 l/ea. 211 (ISS;)); Ktate v. 1-eltes, ol ia. 4!>r)(lS70); 
 Lester r. State. .")2 Ark. 727 (1S7S). 
 
 The rule is the same, even where intoxi'-ntiiig liiiuor is furnished 
 bv the olHcer liimstdf. i'eople i\ Kamirez, 'id Cal. 0.'}.'! (ISSO); 
 j'rlfcnls r. JN'oplc. .". i'arker, C. E. '.22, .".47, '.CO (lsr.2). 
 
 Wiiether tiie accused was too intoxicated under the eircum- 
 stmces to know what lie was doing is a (piestion fiu' the jury. 
 "The court instructed tlie jury tliat the evidence of intoxication 
 was an objection to the weight and not to the competency ol the 
 
CHAP. X,] 
 
 AMEIJKWN NOTKS. 
 
 58813 
 
 testimony; and that if the (left'iidiint was so mucli under tlie 
 influeiioe of liquor as not to understand what he was confessing, 
 they sliouUl disregard tiu^ '".nfessings altogetlier. These instruc- 
 tions were entirely right." Com. /•. Howe, '.> <iray, llo (1X57). 
 
 The prisoner is at liberty to prove that lie was intoxicated at 
 tlie time of a (ionfession. Lester v. State. 'VJ Ark. 7L'7 (iSTSj. 
 
 .\nd while such evidence does not exclude the confession, it may 
 affect the weight the jury may give it. White r. State, li'J Tex. 
 A pp. 02.") (IS'.U). 
 
 And the jury in deciding whetlier a person, was under the 
 influence of delirium trenu'iis or knew the ertect of his statement, 
 may he aided by experts. " Where a confession is siiown, and 
 there is evidence tending to show that the defendant, at the time 
 of the confession, was laboring umler d;dirium tremens, or Wiis 
 otherwise insane, we think that the ojtiuiou of an expert may 
 j)roperly be taken upon *■'>(> defendant's nuMital conditicin as indi- 
 c.iteil by the jjroven facts. We see no reas<»n why liis insanity 
 may not be established by any kind of evidence which is eiuphtyed 
 in any ca'^e to establish such a fact." State v. Feltes, ."il la. 41)5 
 (INT'.)). 
 
 A rather anomalous decision was reached in an early California 
 case to the elTect tiiat statements made during sleep were not com- 
 ])etent as confessions. "The hill of exceptions in this case states 
 that certain words uttered by the defe- dant while sleeping were 
 given in evidence against him at the trial, it is difficult to see 
 upon what principle tliis evidence was admitted, and we are of 
 opinion that tlu^ objection to it shoulil have been sustained. If 
 the defendant was asleep, the inference is tlhat he was not con- 
 scious of what he was saying, and wiu'ds spoken by him in that 
 condition constituted no eviilence of guilt." I'ople v. Kol)inson, 
 li)Cal. 40 (ISCI). 
 
 What is I'nihI'; TN'i'r,rK\ri; ? — In many instances, especially 
 where the motives acting on a ju'lsuner's mind ma}' be conjectured 
 to be mixed, it is difficult to draw the line as to what persuasion to 
 confession crosses the legal line. 
 
 Mere adjurations to tell the trutli do not reiidiT a confession 
 involuntary. State r. Anderson. '.Mi .Mo. LMI (ISSS); State c. 
 Habib (R." !.). .'{o .\tl. If..") (1S«M). 
 
 Hut "the words, ' you had lietter own iip. ' folhiwerl by, ' I was in 
 the place when you took it: we liave got you <lown line; this is not 
 tlie first you have taken; we iiavc got other things against you 
 nearly as good as tliis,' spoken by one police officer to another, in .a 
 p(dice station, and in the presence of the superior officer of the 
 person addressed ami of the speaker, who has detected him in the 
 aet of stealing, will render a subseipieiit confession of guilt by 
 the accused person inadmissible at the trial of an imlictment 
 
!■ 
 
 588" 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [l^UlT III. 
 
 ■iHi 
 
 against him for the laroony." Com. v. Nott, 135 Mass. 269 
 (1S83); Com. v. Myers, IGO Mass. 030 (1894). So where tlie 
 prisoner was informed by a constable, v.'hile under arrest, tiiat 
 "the truth wouUl go better than a lie,'' tlie cunlVssion so obtained 
 was held inadmissible. 11. c. Konij). 17 Unt. ~}{\~ (1SS9). So 
 wliere a prisoner was told, "it will be better lor you to make a lull 
 disclosure," tiie eoni'ession so obtained is not voluntary. JVople 
 V. Uarric, 41) Cal. .'542 (IS?."*). Where the prisoner was t(dd that 
 "ii he was guilty, it could not [)Ut him in any worse eomlition, 
 and he had better tell the truth at all times," the statement did 
 not nuike a confession involuntary. Fonts v. State, H Oh. St. 98 
 (18.-,7). 
 
 Where a constable informed a jirisoner, "you had as well tell all 
 about it," a confession made a little later was held involuntary. 
 Vauglian v. Com. 17 Ciratt. 'ud (1867). So where the oilicer said 
 to the prisoner, "if yon are guilty, I would advise you to make 
 an hor st confession; it might be easier for you. It is jdain 
 against you," a confession made later, the indictment not being 
 shown tt) have l)een witlidrawn, is not voluntary. State v. Drake, 
 113 N. C. 624 (1893). 
 
 A remark by a jailer to a female prisoner that "if the common- 
 wealth would use any of them as a witness, he stippo.sed it would 
 prefer her to either of the others," does not render a confession 
 involuntary, there being no threat or promise. Fife r. Com. 29 
 Pa. St. 429 (1807). 
 
 Where the bailiff said to his prisoner that if lie would confess a 
 larceny and tell where the stolen jiroijcrty was, "he should be 
 turne<l loose," it was held tiiat a confession obtained next day 
 was not vohmtary. "We cannot say that the hope thus inspired 
 was not operating on him, when he made the confession on the 
 next day, and during the continuance of the arrest." Ward r. 
 State, .')(> .Via. 120 (1876). A statenu-nt to a prisoner that if Im 
 confessed "it would go easy with him; tiiat it would be better for 
 him to confess; tiiat the door of mercy was ojien, and that of justice 
 closed;" togetiier with a threat "to arrest him, and expose iiis 
 familv. if he did not confess," are suiKcient to make a confession 
 inadmissible. ]5eery r. V. S., 2 C(d. 186 (1873). 
 
 Tlie mere circumstance that a declarant is under arrest at the 
 time is not conclusive against the receipt of a <'oiifession. "The 
 confess lus t)f the prisoner made at the station-iumse in Hoston 
 after ins arrest to the jxdice officer who arrested him, were 
 ])roperly admitted in evidence. The confession was not iiidnced 
 iiy any iiromise or tlireat and so far as appears was entirely v(dnn- 
 tary. (People r. Wentz. 37 X. Y. .309). It is not sufficient to 
 ex(dude a confession by a jirisoner tliat he was under arrest at the 
 time, or that it was made to the officer in whose custody he was, or 
 
 If :;■ 
 
 fi- 
 
' tl 
 
 CIIAI'. X.] 
 
 AMERICAN NOTKS. 
 
 .588" 
 
 . 
 
 in answer to questions put by liiin, or that it was ina(l« under hope 
 or ))ronuse of ii beneKt of a collateral nature." Cox r. l'eo)»l(!, iSO 
 N. V. r>()(», ol.") (1<S8(>); Miirpiiy r. People, 03 N. Y. olH) (1.S7G); 
 lliirilin.-,' V. State, 54 Ind. ooD (187<;); >'<tate r. George, '.).*{ N. C. 
 .■)()7 (ISSo); Com. i\ Sego, 125 Ma.ss. 210 (1878); I'eople /•• 
 ^Ic(;h)iu, !»l X. Y. 241 (188.'}); Veoi-le c. Chapleau, 121 N. Y. 
 2()i» (ISDO); Dickerson /•. State, 48 Wis. 288 (1879); State v. 
 Jiraniiani, 13 S. 0. 389 (1879); I'eople v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 533 
 (1880); State r. Johnson, 47 La. Ann. 1225 (1895); Com. v. Coy, 
 157 Mass. 200 (1892); I'eople v. IHynn, 90 Mich. 270 (1893^. 
 
 Even if the accused is a child of the age of fourteen years. 
 Com. V. Smith, 119 Mass. .'J05 (1870). Or the prisoner is tied. 
 State r. Rogers, 112 N. C. 874 (1893). Or is in irons. Sparf i\ 
 U. S., 150 r. S. 51 (1895). And expecting to die from the effects of 
 poison. State v. Gorham, 07 Vt. 3(55 (1894). Or where the arrest 
 ir, illegal, e. g., without a suitable warrant. lialbo v. People, 
 80 X. V. 484 (1880). 
 
 Hut where the grand jury sent for a prisoner and examined him 
 under oath withcmt apprising him of his rights, it was held that a 
 confession so obtained was not voluntary. State v. Clifford, 80 la. 
 5.j() (1892). 
 
 Tlie fact that the officer used a revolver in effecting the arrest 
 does not render a siibsecpient confession inadmissible. State v. 
 IX'Graff, 113 X. C. 088 (1893). 
 
 A remark by the owner of stolen goods to a clerk nineteen years 
 of agb , V' after the latter had been arrested but was out on bail, 
 •'I should like you to make a (dean breast of this matter," is not 
 suffiident in itself to warrant rejecting the confession. "In this 
 case there was no promise or threat." Com. v. Sego, 125 Mass. 
 21(> (1878). 
 
 A mere undisclosed purpose on the part of an officer to make nv 
 arrest does not so far amount to an arrest as to require tliat the 
 accused should be wariu>d, in a state where sucli warning is 
 required in the case of persons under arrest. Holmes v. State, 32 
 Tex. Cr. 301 (1893). 
 
 " It is also (piite well .settled, as a presumption of law, that the 
 inHuence of threats or promises once made continue to operate 
 until rebutted by proof clearly showing that it had ceased to 
 operate. ... In the case at bar, the defendant, after having been 
 once threatened witli death bv hanging, by ])arties in disguise, and 
 again taken from the jail by the same parties, evidently for the 
 l)urpose of again re])eating the threat, jiossibly in a more effectual 
 manner, and without any assurance or cauti(m, was induced to 
 make the confession proven on tho trial. Under such circum- 
 stances, though one of the witnesses testilied that the confession 
 was voluntarily made, yet without any proof why the deteudant 
 
I 
 
 08818 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAKT UI. 
 
 was so taken from tlie jail, or what was done or said to him to 
 induce tlie confession, it woiihl be exceeding hard to convince a 
 reasonable mind that the iuHiienoe of the former threat had wholly 
 ceased." IJarnes v. State, oO Te.\. ouG (1872); Jieery v. U. S., 'J 
 Col. ISO (1,S7;{). 
 
 Ust; by a sheriff of the language "tiu're is no doubt but that you 
 are one of the guilty parties, and if you will tell nie all about it, 
 so 1 can get all the guilty parties, I will do what 1 can for you in 
 your ease. It may be of interest to you, and to nie, too," to the 
 defendant while a prison'.'r, is sulhcient, though accompanied by a 
 (iaution th wiraev -r was said would be used as evidence, to 
 render a c( ioi' inadmissible. Searcy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 
 ')!;} (1S'.)(»). 
 
 A eonfessio obtainjd by a sheriff when a mob is hanging over 
 tile prisoner, is not 1 ,atary. Taylor v. State, .'57 Neb. 788 
 (iS'.Ki). 
 
 So of a confession obtained by a mob itself, though assuring the 
 declarant tluit only an honest confession was ilesired. Willams v. 
 Stat.', 71.' Miss. 117 (IS'.M). 
 
 "To make a coniessioii, therefore, evidence, it must be male, 
 so far a^• ca?i be ascertaiiii'd, in the absence of any excitement 
 whicrh creites .^ hojie to olitain favor, or to avoid a threatened pun- 
 isliment. ]>ut the Court in such cases must judge of the motives 
 which induce the coniessioii. from the confessicui itself, and the 
 circumstances uinU'r which it was made." L'. S. r. Nott, 1 
 .McLean. \W (l.s;5<)). 
 
 If the same inducements can be supposed to a])ply to a reiterated, 
 as to an original, statement, the later confession is not admissible. 
 Heery r. U. S., 2 Col. ISO (1S7;5). 
 
 l>ut, on the contrary, "the rule, universally H'cognized, is that 
 even though promises or threats have been used by jjersons in 
 autliority. yet if it appears to the satisfaction of the judge that 
 tlieir iidluence was totally done away beiorv' the confession was 
 made, tiie evidence will be received. Early c. Com.. SO Va. '.(21 
 ( IS'.M »). 
 
 "It is not to be |ires\imeil that, if one otlicer makes threats or 
 ])roniises, their inHuence will lead the i)risoner to accuse himstdf 
 falsely to another otlicer." Cdm v. Cutfee. lOS Mass. L'Sr» (1871); 
 C<.ni."/-. .Myer.s, 100 Ma.ss. o.'JO (IS!) I). 
 
 So where indu.'cnients, securing a confession objectionable as 
 involuntary, were maih' by an otticer, but the sanu' statements a 
 few hours later were repeated to the state's attorney after a caution 
 that no favor need l)e expected, the latter confession is admissible. 
 State V. Carr, ;]7 Vt. 15)1 (ISO J). 
 
 Where, however, the confessions are afterwards rejicvted to the 
 same person who h(dd o\it the inducements, it was held that a 
 
CHAP. X.] 
 
 AMEUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 i88'" 
 
 strictiT rule must be apiilied. "How or whenci' does it aiipciir 
 that the inotivcs which iuduecd the tirst confession, had ceased to 
 operate wiien it was repeated; it is not incumbent upon tiie 
 priscmer to show that tliey result' I from the same motives. It is 
 presumed tiiat they diil; ami evidenc(^ of the most irrefraj,'able 
 kind should be produced to sliow tliat they did not. It is sutticient 
 that tliey may proceed from the same cause." State /•. Lowiujrne, 
 GO X. C. ();{s"(l.S72); State i'. Drake, ll;5 N. C. OL't (1S<».'!). 
 
 The opposite result has been reacdied in Massacliusetts, where 
 subsecpient answers, though made to the same officer, were not nnide 
 under circum.stances wliicii the supreme judicial court considered 
 "such as to afford a reasonable presumption tliat the defendant's 
 answers were influenced " by the previous inducements. Com. v. 
 Myers, KJO Mass. .WO (1H<)4). 
 
 The fact tliat the defendant is in fear from causes otlier than 
 threats by tlie officer does not render a '"^Mifession involuntary. 
 Com. V. Smith, 111) Mass. 3()r> (lUTCt). 
 
 A threat or jiromise, in order to render a eon; ision inadmissible, 
 must relate to punishment for the oifenc. tsel''. 
 
 Wiiere a prisoner in solitary continenn'nt and chained was prom- 
 ised by his jailor that if he confessed he ^^hould bi; unchained and 
 allowed to associate with the other prisc.icrs, a confession so ob- 
 taiiKMl was said, n/iitcr, to be uno! >ctionable. "This was the 
 promise of a temporary and collateral ,)on, and not a iiope ot favor 
 held out in respect to the criminal charge.'" State v. Tatro, itO Vt. 
 4.S;{ (1.S78). 
 
 "Confessions obtained by the influence of hope or fear are in- 
 competent evidence. l?ut it is not necessary tiiat the confession 
 shouM be the prisoner's own spontaneous act; and if it be made 
 under the promise of some collateral lienetit or boon, no hcie or 
 fear being held out in respect to the criminal charge against him, 
 it will be competent." State r. Wentworth, ;'>7 X. II. llMi (l.sr»S). 
 
 It is hard to re(!oncile the case of Anderson v. Stati' (Ahi.), 10 
 So. lOS (IS'.M) witli this rule. "On trial for seduction, a witness 
 for the state testilied tiiat, after defendant's arrest, witness told 
 him he couhl not get out of the charge, and that it would be better 
 to tell witness all aiiout it, as he would buy defendant's crop, and 
 assist iiim to h'ave the country, and tiiat defendant replied, ' I have 
 no way of proving myself clear, and am going to leave.' Il(dd, 
 that the confession was not voluntary." Anderson c. State, KJ So. 
 (Ala.) lOS (1S'.)4). 
 
 IM'.usoN's i\ AiTiioRiTY — Where a friend advised a defendant, 
 whos(' house was surrounded by a sheriff's posse for his arrest, that 
 " it would b(! better for him " to confess and turn "state's witness," 
 the confessitms so made were held voluntary. "The general 
 doctrine is indisimtable, tbat confessions which are ' foi-ced from 
 
58818 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [PAllT III. 
 
 \^'i\> 
 
 m 
 
 the niiiid by the flattery of hope or the torture of fear ' are consid- 
 ered as made uncU'r mental duress, and therefore incompetent as 
 evidence; but whether they are so extorted must depend on the 
 character of the autliority, power, or influence by whioli they are 
 in(hu!ed; and it will not be presumed that a person liavinj^ no con- 
 trol over a prisoner, or tlie charge ayainst him, or autliority to 
 make good a promise or execute a threat, could without physical 
 forcf, or duress at least, so far insjjire either iiope or fear in his 
 mind as to induce a false confession of liis guilt. While therefore 
 it is clear that confessions induced by the jjromises, threats, or ad- 
 vice of the prosecutor or officer liaving the prisoner in charge, or 
 of any one having authority over him, or tiie proseciitioii itself, or 
 of ' a private person in the presence of one in autliority,' whose 
 aitfpiiescence may be presumed, will not be deemed voluntary, and 
 will be rejected, the rule is generally the reverse in relation to 
 confessions su})erinduced Ijy inditt'erent persons, acting officiously, 
 without any kind of authority; and confessions made under such 
 circumstances will be admitted in evidence." Young r. Com., 8 
 Husii, 3GG (1871). The supreme court of Alabama has carried the 
 doctrine of "authority" to the extreme in ludding that where a 
 negro woman, suspected of infanticide, was waited on by four self- 
 appointed neighbors to inquire the truth of the matter, and con'- 
 fessed the deed on their assurance that her confession would "be 
 the last of it," such a confession was inadmissible because the 
 declarant must have supposed that her questioners "as clothed 
 with some .authority to institute the investigation." Gregg v. 
 State (Ala.) 17 So. .S21 (181)5). 
 
 A young man living in the jailor's family, who occasionally, in 
 the absence of the jailor, attended on the prisoners, and kept the 
 keys of the jail, is not a person in autliority, whose threat or 
 promise will exclude the confessions of a prisoner in the jail await- 
 ing his trial. Shifflet i\ Com., 14 Graft. (ir>2 (1858). 
 
 A "private detective " employed to work up a case is not a per- 
 .son in authority. Early v. Com., 86 Va. 021 (18!)()). 
 
 In a case of stealing from the post-office, a s]iecial "agent of the 
 jiost-office department" is a person in authority as regards a con- 
 fession made to him. Beery v. U. S., 2 Col. l.iO (l(S7.'i). 
 
 A magistrate examining for committal for the criminal offence 
 of rape is a person in authority. Austine v. People, /il 111. 236 
 (isni)). 
 
 Where a witness for the state told the accused during an inter- 
 view at the jail that if he would confess "he would get clear," 
 prejudicial remarks by the accused, not amounting to a direct con- 
 fession, are incomjietent. Johnson v. State, (51 Ga. .S0.5 (1878). 
 
 Where an accused was visited in his cell after midnight by sev- 
 eral persoi;3 in succession, t(, threaten and cajole into a confession 
 
CIIAl'. X.] 
 
 AMERICAN NoTKS. 
 
 oH8 
 
 10 
 
 of guilt, such confession was lield involuntary. "None of these 
 IHM'soiis was the olHccr in charge; hut tlieir ailniission to tlic (m-I! at 
 siicli an unreas(>nal)le liour carried witli it an iniplicaiutn of the 
 olUcer's (U)nsent to their mission, and respondent could scarcely 
 fail to he inipres.sed that their assurant-es were inatle witli full 
 authority." i'eople c. Wolcott, ol Mich. V,VJ (l.SS;!). 
 
 In a Massachusetts case, it ai»i»eared tliat " the jirisoner was taken 
 and carried to New IJedford liy two police olh<'ers, upon suspicion 
 tliat lie was guilty of tins murder of Ilowai'd; that they stripped 
 him of iiis (dotliing, and searclied him, and placeil liim in a cell at 
 the station-house; and that ahout ten o'clock at niglit tiiey took 
 him out of his (m'H for the purpose of (pu'stionieg and cxaniining 
 him, and examined him from tliat time till midnigld. witliont warn- 
 ing liini of his right nut to answer unless he cimsc to do so, or otter- 
 ing liim an oppiu'tunity to consult witli coiinsid or fricmls. The 
 defendant's counsel objected to tlie atlmission in evidence of state- 
 ments then made by the prisoner to the police officers, tending to 
 show his guilt. l>ut it was ruled tiiat, in the ai)scnce of any evi- 
 dence of threats or promises otiier tlian might he inferred from the 
 above, such statenu'nts were admissible in evidence." The ruling 
 was approved. C(mi. v. CutTee, lOS Mass. L'So (1.S71). 
 
 So where the confession was made to a de]iuty slieriff, but one 
 not having control of tin? jail, it was ludd tliat the confession was 
 voluntary. State *-. (Jossett, 1) Kich. (S. C.) 4liS (1,S.')G). 
 
 I'ractical exi)erience gives much force to the language of the 
 supreme court of Georgia in (Jreen v. State, SS (la. old (1S*)1), 
 "We shall content ourselves, in this (tase. with announcing our 
 jiurpose to a<lhere closely to tlie plain nnindates of our own statute 
 as expressed in §§ .'57'.>w and .'>7!K> of the code, and with juitting the 
 seal of our condemnation upon the practice too nuudi indulged in 
 by officers a'ul qm\si officers, such as detectives, in extorting or 
 otherwise improjierly ol)taining confessions from ]irisoners in tiieir 
 custody. It is a gross and inexcusable^ abnse of authority , on the 
 jiart of men occupying otUcial positions ov assuming t«) -.ct ofH- 
 cialiy, to thus take advantage of the heli)lessness or igr.orance of 
 persons charged with crinu', who are to a greater or less cctent 
 under their control or in their power, and we deiun it our duty to 
 thus rebuke such conduct in nnmistakalde terms." 
 
 IJiMKcrrKo AS rxHKi.iAHM:. — Till' rules regulating the rejection 
 of confessions not deemed voluntary are analogous to those regu- 
 lating the receipt of admissions made as an olfer of compromise. 
 The confession deemed involuntary indeed, to some extent, is an 
 attempt on the jiart of the accused to coniiiromise his offence with 
 those connected with the proceedings, exerting moral or physical 
 restraint upon his freedom of action. 
 
 "In civil cases, what is confessed by way of compromise, or to 
 
riSS^o 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AUT III. 
 
 hi 
 
 m 
 
 fi 
 
 buy peaco, is novor allowod to bo takon advantage of, ami iiia<l»> 
 t-vi(lciicc, inasiiiiudi as tlio admission may have been madf, not 
 trom a (consciousness of the validity or justice of the chiini set \i|i, 
 but from a desire to avoid liti^jation. The rule is not essentially 
 dilTerent in criminal cases. In such cases, a confession, as we 
 iiave before said, can never be received in (evidence, when the 
 defendant has been intiiiiMMM-d by any tiiroat or proinisc. The 
 promise in this case was, that tiic prosecution sliouid be dropped, 
 and it was dropped, on signinj; the paper. IJiuU'r the circum- 
 stances tlien surrounding him. tlie defendant was willing to make 
 any sort of admission, not supposing it would be used against him 
 before a grand jury, or eLsewhore.'' Austine v. I'eople, ol ill. L'.'JG 
 (1S()<)). 
 
 Such a confession, therefore, is rejected because the circum- 
 stances under which it is nuule prevent the statement having a suHi- 
 cient jirobative efl'ect. 
 
 A f(U'(!ed confession is considered made, not booaiise of a belief 
 in its truth, but to secure relief from a ])resent ditliculty. "The 
 law excluding confessions is based in a spirit of charity ior the 
 weakness of liuman nature, and rests upon tiie theory, tliat a man 
 when charged with crime and threatened with the punishment of 
 the law, or ])romised immunity therefrom, may be induced, while 
 in an alarmed and excited con<lition of mind, to make statements 
 that are not true." State /•. Carrick, U> Nev. ll'O, IL".) (IHSl); 
 (Jarrard /•. State, ">() Miss. 147 (1S74); I'eople v. Wolcott, HI 
 Mich. GIL' (ISS.-J); Heckham »-. State. 100 Ala. 15 (1S«.»;{). 
 
 "When tlie comj)etency of a confession is drawn in (pwstion, the 
 correct impiiry in every such ease hs, whether the inducement was 
 such as to lead tlie pri.soner to snjipose tiiat it would be better lor 
 iiim to confess himself guilty of a crime he did not commit." 
 State /•. Harrison, 115 X. C. 70(> (l.S<J4). 
 
 "Xo reliance can be placed ui)on admissions of guilt so obtained; 
 for the very obvi(ms reason that they are not made be(\inse they 
 are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to 
 believe it is for his interest to make them." I'eople r. AVcdcott, 51 
 .Mich. C)\'2 (ISS.'i). "In deciding tliis point the chief (piestion is, 
 wliether the inducement iield out was calculatt'd to make the con- 
 fession an untrue one. If not, it will be admissible." Fife v. 
 Cim. 'JO I'a. St. 4l,'l) (l.S.">7). "In determining this (piestion, 
 it is proper to take into view the reason on wliich confessions .so 
 drawn out are excluded. It is not because of any breach of good 
 faith in admitting thorn, nor because they are extorted illegally, 
 (though there may be cases in which this would exclude them, .as 
 where a magistrate ])uts the accused upon his oath,) but the reason 
 is, that in the agitation of mind in which the ])arty charged is sup- 
 posed to be, he is liable to be influenced, by the hope of advantage 
 
CHAP. X.] 
 
 A.MKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 0882' 
 
 'I 
 so 
 
 y, 
 
 as 
 
 iOIl 
 
 or IVar of iiijury, to state things wliicli aro not true." Com. c. 
 Kiiapp, 9 I'ick. 4%, 503 (IS.'Ki). 
 
 •'Hence we liave the jud^'nient of Knj,'lisli jurists against tlie 
 ailniissiltility of a eonfessi(;n ohtaineti liy teniporal indiieenient, 
 iiehl out in the shape of threat, promise or hope of favor, touehiiij^ 
 one's esea|)e from the eiiari,'e a<,'ainst liim, by a person in authority, 
 (,v wliero such jx'rson appeared to sanction sucli tlireat or induee- 
 nu'iit, and a master or mistress, or ]>roseeutor, is phieed, in this 
 respect, in tlie cate^'(U'y of one in authority. 'I'he fouinhition. of all 
 ruh'S, and of tlu? rulin<^ in eaeli individual cas(! upon this subject, 
 rests upon an anxiety to exclude confessions tliat are jjrohalily not 
 true; ami, tlu^'efore, to ex(dude those that are not voluntitry, he- 
 cause sucli are probably untrue." State v. Vaigneur, "> Jlich. •'{'Jl, 
 
 400 (l.sr>L'). 
 
 The same reasoning, tliat a confession is not admissible whore 
 obtained by the threat or pronuse of one in authority bo(!anse 
 presnmal)ly not true, applies to excludt? confessions obtained by 
 otlier i'orms of duress. State r. Carrick, 10 .\ev. IL'O (INSI). I'\)i> 
 example, to a case when! the dechirant had been captured by armed 
 men and interviewed by the prosecutor in presence of the ollicer. 
 State i>. Drake, SL' N. (i. oDli (ISSO). 
 
 Or where a slave prepared for a whipping was olTcrc<l by his 
 master a lighter punishment if he confessed. Joe v. State, ,'{S Ala. 
 41'2 (1S(>;{). 
 
 Or where tlie dechirant was apprehensive of mob violencu' unless 
 a confession is made. Seef r. State, G l>axter, -44 (iST.'i). 
 
 liut where ;in accuseil was surroumlcd by a large uuinlier of meu 
 who siiggested hanging him, the couit left to the jury to decide 
 "whether the inducement was calculated to make tim testimony 
 untrue." Cady r. State, 44 .Miss. :V.VJ (1870); lUitler /•. Com., 2 
 J)uval, 4.V) (ISGIJ). 
 
 Inoki-knoknt Faits — Further following the analogy of admis- 
 sions in view of compromise, it has been liehl that where indepen- 
 dent facts are admitted in course of an invohmtiirv confession, the 
 facts themselves are coui|)etent. U. S. ?i. \ott. 1 .McLean, 409 
 (IS.'JO); State v. (larrett, 71 N. C So (lS7f); T.owe x. State, 8S 
 Ala. 8 (1S89); Vatcs /•. State, 47 Ark. 17L' ClSSOi; ("Icnmns r. 
 State, 4 I.ea, 'J'.i (T .'9); Dulfv r. I'cople, 2(\ N. V. oSS (ISC.S); 
 Helote r. State, 8C AFiss. 9(5 (1858); Massey /•. State. lo Tex. A]))). 
 045 (1881); U. v. Doyle, 12 Out. IIo]k .'547 (1880): Taylor /•. State, 
 37 Neb. 788 (1893); (Jregg /-. State (Ala.), 17 So. ;!21 (IS05). 
 
 "The general riile is that, after threats or imlncements held out 
 to a defendant, as in this ease, 'it would be better for him to tell, if 
 he knew, where other articles were.' any admission made by him 
 after that, would l)e incompetent. 15ut there are exceiitions to this 
 rule, and it seems to us that this case comes within the e.xceptioii. 
 
i8H22 
 
 A.MKItU'AN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AItT III. 
 
 
 Tliis rule is not iiitendeil for tho benefit of K"ilty (Icfondants, Init 
 
 in till- interest of truth. And it luis 1 n wisely held that sinijile 
 
 declarations and admissions, made under such inducements, are so 
 unreliuhle that tlie law will exelude them from the eonsideration 
 of the jury. I>ut it seems also to Im; well s 'Ith'ii. that any facts 
 asceilained in (•(Mise(juonee of su(di declarations or confessions, are 
 admissil)lt; in evidence. And the declarations, connected with and 
 explaining,' sucli facts, l)eiu^' considered a part of tlie res ijestae, are 
 also admissilile." State v. Winston, \H> N. ('. '.«»(> (1S<.>,".). 
 
 'i'lius where stolen .Ljoods were discovered in tlie possession of a 
 ])artieular person in conse(iuenc(f id' an inv(duntary confession, it 
 was li(dd that the prisoner's statement and tlie corrolioratiui,' dis- 
 covery were competent facts; hut tiiat this diil not rendei' compt'- 
 tent iiis eonfessKUi, at the same tinu'. that he had coiumitted tlie 
 l)ur.;hiry ami larceny if sucii confession was improperly pnu-ured 
 
 l.v 
 
 promises 1) 
 
 r tin 
 
 eats 
 
 It is not the entire confession, however, 
 
 whi(di may he reccdved; it is only so much of it as ndates strictly 
 to tiie material fact discovered, tiiat may he i,'iven in evidence; for 
 the fact discovered hits a reasonalde teudemiy to contirm tliat part 
 of tiie ctinfession, and to e,\(dude the idea <d' its falirication under 
 ui.ilue iiiHiiences. . . , Applyiu}^ this rule to tlu' evidence in this 
 cause, it was proper to leave to the consideration of the jury the 
 
 fact that, in consecpu-nce of the statement made hv the jirisoner, 
 u ]»art of the stolen ^ooiIh were found in the possession of a par- 
 tu'ular person, recently after thi' huri^lary; Imt not his acknowl- 
 edi^'Uicnt that he had liroken and entereil the store, or tiiat he had 
 stiden the (^oods Tiiese are facts the jury must ccdlect or not from 
 
 11 tl 
 
 le circumstances of the cast 
 
 aiK 
 
 1 tl 
 
 lev are ni 
 
 it to 1 
 
 w aided liv 
 
 contessions extorted from tiie excited hopes of the prisoner." 
 .Murphy c Stiitc, ('..'{ Ala. I (1H7".>); State r. (Jarvey, '2H I,a. Ann. 
 '.!'.'."» (isrri); (iarrard r. State, od .Miss. 117 n>i7h. 
 
 " .\ moiIilic;itioii of the rule, whiidi exidmles a confession not 
 rI.owii to lie voluntary, is, that if information, deiived thendrom, 
 leads U) the discovery <d' material facts, which ^t to prove the com- 
 mission of tlie Clime, so iiiuidi oi the confession as strictly relates 
 to the facts discovend. and tin- facts theiuselves, will lie received 
 in testimony, though the confesHion may not he shown to have 
 lieeii viduiitaiy : for the reason, that tin- discovery of the tacts cor- 
 roborates the trutli of the confession, to that extent. . . . 'I'liere 
 is eviilenee showing that the body of the deceased was found at tho 
 ]dace where accused stated it was left, piirtially coveri'd with 
 leaves, as were also a broken-handled knite. watidi-idiain, keys, and 
 a brown soft iuit. near the body." l.owe r. State, SS .Ma. S MHH!»). 
 
 "It is. th'-refore. well settled uiitui reasiui. jirinciple and autluu- 
 itv,that it is competent to show tiiat the witness was directed by 
 the accused where to liiid the j,'oods. and th;it they were found 
 there accordingly." (iarrard r. State, oO Miss. 1 17 (1S7J). 
 
 hi 
 
CHAP. X.] 
 
 AMKKICAN NOTKS. 
 
 ')8S: 
 
 iii 
 
 So whore ;i eonfcssinj; in-isoiicr produced and .identificil a pdrtinn 
 of the stohMi Kdhl (hist at tlie tiim- ol )iis cunressidii, the latter 
 f'aet is eoiiiiieteiit. Heerv /•. l'. S.. 'J {\t\. \S(\ (1S7.">). 
 
 And ulnTc a prisoner is incj,Mliy iiuhircd tu ^;(lllle^s the hiret-nv 
 (if certain hnnher, liis act in produeinj,' and idciitih in^c tlie Iiinilier 
 is c(inii>eteiit. I'. S. r. Ki(diar(h 1' ( 'rancli ('. Ct. I."'.! (INL'.'!). An 
 (lifer til eomproniise a hiroeny is evidence of an aihiiission. Stat(! 
 0. Ko(lri;4Ues, 4.". I.a. Ann. 1(I4(> (ISl).".). 
 
 Tlie witness, after lieiii;,' asked whether lie iiad a eonversatioii 
 with the prisoner, and objection hein;^' made that the eonfcssion is 
 
 iiivo 
 
 Innt; 
 
 irv, niav 
 
 tl 
 
 leii 
 
 furtl 
 
 ler as 
 
 ked 
 
 wiiat he "( 
 
 lid it 
 
 1 eonsc 
 
 (lucnee of what he said aliont if.'" J)iilT\ v. I'cdplc. I'd N. \. oNS 
 (iSCi;!); Com, r. .lames, '.»•.> Mass. l.'tS (l.S(;,S). 
 
 W 
 
 icre till' prisonei', as promised m an incompetent 
 
 ml 
 
 ession, 
 
 pointed out a place where the stolen money was found, that lact is 
 
 (•oiniietent ; liut: the stati'iueiit dii 
 
 nil 
 
 th 
 
 confession. 
 
 liiiried 
 
 the money there," is incompetent. People c. Hoy N'eii, ."tl Cal. 17(> 
 (1S()7). "The indepeiuh'iit fact that the money was found was cer- 
 tainly admissilile in evidence, ami there can lie no donht that it has 
 h(M'ii a rule of law hmj,' and wtdl estalilislied that not only such a 
 fact, lint acts and declarations of the accused, in so far as they 
 
 explain and are ne(^essary to a( nnt for it. whether the acts or 
 
 deidarations he volnnt;iry or involantaiy, may lie received for this 
 purpose. . . . Sindi evidence when admitted for tiiis S(de purpose 
 is not treated as proviiij^ a coiilession, hut as lieiii;,' a p.irt, id the 
 res ;,'estae of the indepeinlent eviileiitiary fact. If what tiic ac- 
 cused did and s.iid w;is the result of cipercion, however lui 
 
 hi, 
 
 It 
 
 W(nild lia\e lieeii in.'idmissilile had not the searcii wiiich was made 
 for the money resulted in its discovery. Tiie discovery lieini: n 
 nuitcrial and reh-vant fact, what would contriliute to account for 
 and explain it would he r(devanl .ilso. not for its own sake, hut for 
 its e.\plaiiatiu'y function and value. It may lie that the wlude of 
 the evidence would he inadiiiissihle aecordiiii,' to tlie trtie iiicaniiij; 
 and spirit of the rule, if it appeared that crimin.il viideneo, siieh 
 as whipping, was tised in coercini,' the act oi extortiiij,' the speech 
 wliiidi led to tlie discovery. The fruits of phy.-ical torture as dis- 
 tin'Oii^iied from tliosi' c'' mere fear, it would seem. (iu;^'ht to lie 
 
 nnavailiUL'. 
 
 iJusher ('. State, '.tl (ia. .'Mi;! (l.S'.H). 
 
 The elfect \l| 
 
 Mill 
 
 tl 
 
 le prisoner s |ios 
 
 it ion of r(d'nsiu<' to admit his 
 
 coiifessioi' of ^;nilt .ind yet reeciviuj; as competent facts jjleaiied 
 thr(ii!j,'li the inf*(mipetent eoiifeHsioii, which, of conrsj', serve to 
 give eoulirmat ion and crcdihilily to that wlii(di has hceii ex(dudeil as 
 not jiroli it ive lieeansc pnihaldy iintiue, is thus disiuissed hy th« 
 suiireme court of .\rkaii>as. "The except i(Ui that exist.H to tho 
 general rule tliat eoiifessions in cases of larceny made under 
 tlireats are not evidence, is shown hv tlie authorities to lie this; 
 
6882* 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 [I'AltT MI. 
 
 it:. 
 
 li- 
 
 I I 
 
 m 
 
 WliPii statomonts are made by tlio aoouscil that lead to tlie discov- 
 ery ol' the stolen jnoprrty, tlieii tlie nilf is tiiat it is adiiiissil)lc to 
 «li()W that tiie property li:id Ix-cii traeed liy means of iiiluniiMtion 
 leeeived from the aeensed; and all that was saitl hy the accused m 
 convey ill!,' the inl'orniation, wliich is din-ctly connected witli oi 
 explanatory ol' the discovery, is also adniissihle. 'I'lie statement 
 as to his knowledge where the stolen property was to he found, 
 heinf,' tims conlirmcd by the fact of lindin^', is proved to he trne 
 and not to ho lahricatcd in (Hiiiseijuence of tin* in'proper iiaMiia 
 employetl to obtain the confession. ]tut tlie rule as to the dinrl 
 confession of K'uilt remains intact, and the discovery of the pro- 
 perty throu^'h information derived from thi' accused does not jus- 
 tify th<' introduction of the confession that it had been stolen by 
 him. That must lie excluded notwitliKtaiidiii;; the facts otherwise 
 proven to be true, leavin;; the prisoner to reconcile, as best lie enn. 
 bis kiiowledj^e of these fiiets with his iiiiioceiKU' (jf the crime." 
 Yates V. .State. 17 Ark. 171,' (IS.S(i). 
 
 Wliethi-r the involnnt iry eonies.-ior. itself, when verified iiv 
 asceriaiiiiiij,' the independent lai-ts. becomes competent as now pre- 
 sumably true is .pieried in Ilelote v. .State, .'Mi Miss. '.Hi (l.srjS). 
 
 In Te.xas it has been held that an otherwise ailmissible confes- 
 sion b« comes eonipetelit if, in <'onse(pience of what is said, the 
 elothin^ of the dec»'aseil is found. Spearman r. State ('l"e.\.), .'Mt 
 S. W. L'li'.l (ISiK't). <ir where, under a statute, stolen property is 
 found in eoiiseipieiicc of sueli confession. .Sands /•. State, ;!(l 'I'cx. 
 Ajip. r.7S (l.S'.U). 
 
 Ill West Vir^iuia, it has been held that an involuntary eonlVs 
 sion becomes itself competent "where the ('(uifi'ssioii is accom- 
 panied with the surrender ami ii'storat loii of the stolen properly." 
 Kn'driek <-. State. ."! W. \a. ("•'.I."'* (1S(1'.»). 
 
 it h;is been riilecl that ".\n admission bv a 
 
 In I 
 
 eiiiisvlvani: 
 
 prisoiii'r not competent as a confession is admissible when its tnilli 
 is proved by the revelation of the fact by scandi." I-aios «•. Com.. 
 HI I 'a. St. '-'<»! (tS77). 
 
 On the contrary, it has been held in Loiiisianii, lh;it "the discov- 
 ery tliroui,di a eoiifessifUi of facts. le|,'.illy admissible in evidence, 
 and tendiii;,' to prove a defendant 1,'niity of the char^je a^-ainst him, 
 
 would not render admissible tl nfession irsidf. if it was not v(d- 
 
 untary and free from eonipul.-,ion or inducement." State c .loiies, 
 ■K*. La". Ann. 1. ".',•.". (l.S'.tli. 
 
 A (,)ri:srioN ion rm Coiiir. — Whether a confession is v(diin- 
 
 tary is a preliminary i\\ 
 
 ic 
 
 t loll to be decided bv I lit urt. 
 
 The 
 
 videiiee to this point, beiiin in its nature preliminary, is addressed 
 to till- .Imlv'e. who admits the proof of the confes^ioii to the jury, or 
 
 rc|( 
 
 'cts it, as he ma 
 
 y or may not liiid it to have been ibawn from 
 the itrisoner by the applic:4tioii of those motives." Cain .•. State, 
 
CHAP. X.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTKS. 
 
 rm^ 
 
 IH Tex. .'W7 (l«r.7); State r. Vann, H'J X. C. G.31 (ISSO); State »•. 
 Crowson, '.»S N. C. r)'.*;") (1SS7); State *•. Vai-,Mieur, ") Ifirli. .•!<»1 
 (IS")!'); State ik Howard. :{.'» S. C. 1<»7 (IS'.tl;; Coin. /•. .Jolmsoii, 
 1()L' i'a. St. ().'{ (1S<)4|; (Joodwiii v. State (Ala.), If) So. IJei,. ."l 
 
 (is'.H); ••••xiy '•• I' 
 
 1 Apii. 1). (". LM(;(1S;»;{); SlM-plianl r. State 
 
 8S Wis. l.S') (ISDt); State c, (Joiliaiii. <;7 Vt. .k;.' ( IS'.M). 
 
 That this tiiuliiiK eaiinot lie reviewed in an apiiellate court, see 
 State V. Vaiiii, SL' N. ('. O.-.l (iSSd). 
 
 "'I'lie.se (tases estahlisli llie (lo(rlriiie al.so tliat while a niliiiy 
 which undertake.s to ileliiie the iiiHiieiiee that exehide.s the eoiili-s- 
 sioii, and does so erroneously, is the suliject of an aiipellate revi 
 sion, its ex<'ieise in l)iin(,'in},' about the eonl'ession in a iiarticiilar 
 instanee l)ein^' a fact, is not subject to the corrective power of this 
 Court." Stato v. Crowson, <.)S N. C. .")'.)"> (1.SH7). 
 
 On the I'ontrary, the suprenie court of rennsylvania holds that 
 the lindiiij,' of the trial jiidije may he reviewed, hut 'Mheir ruiinK 
 will lie set aside only for manifest error." Com. r. .lohnsoii, 1(>2 
 I'a. St. (\:\ (\S'.)\). 
 
 Or as said in tlie court of appeals <if the District of Ctdnmliia this 
 "in necessarily a nii.tter almost entirely within his discretion, the 
 exercise of whiidi should not lie revised excfjit in case id" palpalile 
 almse." iJrady r. V . S, I App. 1). C. I'lC. (1S<.»;!). To the .sanu- 
 effect, see Hartley r. People (111.), 40 N. K. S;{1 (IS'.)".). 
 
 "Whether it was made vcduiit irily, is :i (piestion for the consid- 
 eration aiiit determination of the court, and is usually shown hy 
 ne(,Mtive answers to suidi (inestions, as whether the pri.souer had 
 lieen told it would lie better for him to confess, or worse for him if 
 lie tlid not; or whether similar lan^'uai,'e had been addressed to him. 
 The better test is a fair ami just consideration (d' the a^;e. condi- 
 tion, situation and character id' the prisoner, and all the iiicnm- 
 stances atti-ndiii;.,' tin- eoiifcssion. These may satisfy tin- mind, 
 althou),'h tiie usual pndiniinary (piestioiis are .■iiiswcred in tlie iiej,'a- 
 tive; that the confession was not v(duntary, but sprang,' from the 
 •lattery of hope, or the torliire of fear unduly exeited. Or, tli(>ui,'h 
 these (piestioiiH may not be answered nej;ativ(dy, tin- circnnislances 
 atteiidin;^ the confession, connected with the character of the jiris- 
 oner, may (dearly indicate that it was spontanediis, and not alfected 
 by lunie or feai" sprinyint,' from the words or conduct (d' others." 
 .I(diiison r. State. ■">'.» Ala. ."17 (1.S77). "Mut the principle is well 
 settled that where the admissiiiility of evideiiet' depemls upon a 
 lu'climinarv ipiesti<in td' fact, to be tried by the court, its decision 
 is not to be reversed uiih'ss in a case (d' (dear and manifest error. 
 Till' court that sees and he.irs the witnesses, must be prcsunuMl to 
 have liettcr means nf jnd'jint,'. on a ipicstimiof fact, than the aji- 
 pidlate triiimiil. wlicre the witmsses ar" iniliicr .seen nor heard, 
 an I wlicic it oltcii happens tliat tlieir testimony is very imper- 
 
GHH^*^ 
 
 A.MKKIC.iN NOTKS. 
 
 fi'Mrr II . 
 
 fectly , 'iMirtpd.'* Fifo v. Coin., 20 Ta. St. 429 (ISV). i^.n Aho 
 Miiy 0. State, .*i.S Xob. 211 (1S!»;{). 
 
 It has been lirld to Iti- cnor Id leave to tlie j;ij-v *lic (jues!i,))i 
 wlietliei- a coulessioii is Voluntary. State /•. Duiieuii, (J4 Mo. 2(i2 
 
 (is:*)). 
 
 (til the eiiiilraiy. it lias been deeided tiiat " wiiellier there was 
 any iiidiiceiiieiit held out by the iiiaj,'istriite to make tlie eoulessioii, 
 was a I'aet within thf |iro\iiice of the jury to decide." (iarraid r. 
 State. .'.() Miss. Hi (I.S7I); People i-. "Cisshly, i:\li N. V. 012 
 (IS'.I.'). 
 
 Ill Com. /•. Smitli, ll'.> Mass. .'505 (ISTCt) the (|uesr,ion of llireats 
 or promises was apparently left to the jury. In 'I'e.sas, it lias lieen 
 licdd tlian an involuntary conl'ession may be nse(l to im|ieaeli tlu^ 
 credibility ol the accused as a witness. iJaiiis r. State ('l"ex.), 2(» S. 
 
 ^v. IMS (i,s«j4). 
 
 It is open to tlie defendant to show, if lie can, in opposition to 
 the receipt of the confession in evidciue, that it was imt vobiiita^v. 
 l'co|.le r. Soto, lit Cal. (17 (1S74); Com. /•. Culver, 12(; .Mass. 4(14 
 (1IS7'.I); f^tate /•. .Vnderson. 'M\ Mo. 241 (ISSS). "In tliis state tlie 
 Imrdeii of provin;,' that a confession was involuntary, and thei:|ore 
 not <'onipetent ovidemie at,';»inst iiim, rests upon the accused." 
 Killer i\ The State, 2.") Oliio St. 4(il (lM7h. 
 
 "Where the law imposes upon a party the linrden of establisiuii,:.,' 
 a fact, -'iid upon a trilmnal the duty of determining' its existiMce, 
 it would seem to bdlow, necessarily, that tiie lornier sIk uhl in per- 
 mitted to pi'oiiuee within reasonable limits, and the latter required 
 to hear .iiitl consider, any evidence that in its nature is peiiinent to 
 tlie iiifpiiry. To throw upon a party the burden of proving'; a fact, 
 and at the same time deny to him the ri,i,dit tn adiluce rhe p-ec ssaiy 
 evidence, althoii^^h at hand and tci'dercil lor th.it purpose, is an 
 iuio'iialy only justiliable by peculiar eirciimstaiiet's or eoiniitioiis 
 wliiidi do not seem to ol)taiii in iiiipiiri< s like that under considera- 
 tion." Leb'vre r. 'ate, ."•(lOli. -^!. ., .' (|,S!»;!). 
 
 It is error to refuse to allow iln ('efemlant to introiluoe evi- 
 dence, on the preliminaiy hearinn iiy the court, that the eoiifession 
 was procured by tlireats ami intimidation. Palmer r. Slate I."i(! Iml. 
 
 o'.i;; ( i.s'.i;!). 
 
 Tlie defendant may f ross-pxamiiii' the witnesses testifyiiij,' to tin- 
 vnbiiitary nature id the i-oid'ession. Willis c. State, I,"! Ncli. I<l2 
 (iN'.tl). "It is till' privih'K'e of delcndant',s counsel and the lic'.ter 
 practice." //</»/. 
 
 "When such a confession is oflered in a criminal case, it is in- 
 cumbent upon the prosecution to lay tlie foundation for its intro- 
 duction by preliminary proof showiiij^ prima facie that it was frcidy 
 and voluntarily made." People r. Soto, \\\ Cal. (17 (|S7I); State 
 c. (iarvey. 2S '|,a. .\iiii. '.L'.". (1X7(1); |{railford r. Stale (\la,). 1(1 
 S I. I(i7 (1H',»4;. 
 

 •>l'J 
 
 ats 
 •(•II 
 
 lie 
 S. 
 
 CHAl'. X.] 
 
 AMKUICAN NOTES. 
 
 y88a' 
 
 IJut wliL'i'fi HO o'>j»>ctior ir, !n;v(l(, ti» tlic r('Ofii|)t of the oviih •»(•«•, it 
 is not I'ss 'iitiiil tliiit ii pri'liiimiary investigation Imj l.a.l. State 
 V. M.'ulison, 47 La. Ann. .'M) (IK ). 
 
 In ut-nrn[ia, it i.s .said tliat wliile tlic licttcr jir.icticc is to slmw 
 that the conU-ssion i.s voluntary bd'orc it i.s n-cfivcd, yi't tliis imtof 
 may In- sniiplied, when oniiltt'(l, after the receipt of the evidenee. 
 Sniitli ('. Statf, SS (iu. (VJ7 (IS'.M). 
 
 The (^Mirt .slioiihl, it is said, i-xchnh' the conft'ssion if tJHTf is a 
 rea.sonal)le doiiitt as to its beinf; vohmtary. Williams /•. State, 7- 
 Mis.s. 117 (l.S')4). 
 
 To the contrary, that all (M)ni'('ssions are jirima fa<-ie volnntary, 
 and that it is for tlie dei'<ndaiit to sustain his olijcction by [irovint; 
 the fact of uinhie iidliieiiee. see Com. v. Culver, 11^(5 .Mass. l(»4 
 (1S7'.>)- "i'rinia facie, all confessions are v(duntary, and it is for 
 the party ot)jectiiij; to tiieir admission as evidence to show that 
 they were uttered under such pressure of hope or fear as to raise a 
 doulit (d' their ai-curacy. It is undoul)te<ily the duty cd' the court 
 to f,'uaril (rarefully tlie rit,'hts of a defendant in this res|iect; and 
 more especially so when the prisoner is in the eusto*!}- of tlie law 
 and the hopes or fears are supposed to he raised hy an oflicer of the 
 law. The fact tiiat a defendant may think it will lie Wetter for 
 him if he confesses, or thinks it will lie worse for him if he does 
 not confess, is immaterial, if that condition of luimi is hron^ht 
 about by his own indepeiiilent reasoniii},'. It is when that state of 
 mind is induced by promises or tiiieats or other indiicemciit from 
 without, that the coiife.sfiion is to lie rejected." Coin. *•. Sej,'o, lL'."i 
 Mass. I'll) (1S7S). 
 
 The rule is the same in <Hiio. Lefevre r. State, 'A) (>h, St. ."iSl 
 (IS'.C!). 
 
 Mav srii.i. ciiNrKST i.ikoki; riiK Jikv. — Kveii after a ronfessio'i 
 is admitted by the (roiut, as |irima facie voluntiry, it is still open to 
 tilt* prisoner to contend that it was not .so in point of fact, and c. II 
 U]ion the jury to disre;.,'ard it for that reason. "Iiefore evidence i- 
 a coid'essioii can be ailmitted, it devolves on the proKccution to fl;p - 
 isfy the Court that it was viduutarily made by the |irisoii, r. Hut il 
 after it has been admitted, it appears that it was not so made, it i 
 the duty of the Court to withdraw the evideiic' from the jury ; 
 of the jury wholly to disrei,Mrd it. Where it lias been rec. .:.4, 
 and has pnie to tiie jury, it is the undoubted rii^lit of the prismier 
 to show, if he em. tiiat it was not, in fact, voluntary, and there- 
 fore is not to h.ivc wci;.,dit a^^aiust him; and any evidence whicli 
 eondiices in any detjree to that noncliision is admissible." Cain ;•. 
 State, IK Tex. .'i.S7 I.S,'i7). "The |irisotii has always the ri«ht to 
 reipiiri" of the jud),'e a decision of the <ompetencv of the evidence; 
 and, I'Veii after the jud]LCe has decided the evidenee to be competent, 
 the pris'iier has I lie ri;iht to ask (d thi' jury to ilisrej,'aril it, and to 
 
 ■^■N* 
 
588«> 
 
 AMERICAN NOTES. 
 
 [I'AHT III. 
 
 givfi no weight to it, beciiuse of the cirfiuinstances under wliioli tin; 
 (•oiifcssidiis were ()l»taiiie(l." Com. v. L'lilvcr, IL'O Mass. Kll (iST't); 
 iAIilU'i- V. State, ".M (ia. 1 (I8'.»l); Williams v. State, 7L' Miss. 
 117 (iH<M). .\ii(l tlm court may leave the jury to discnulit Ihr 
 (•(iiil'ession if their opinion of its being voluntary differs from tliat 
 of the presiding justice. C'om. r. Kus.sell, IHd Mass. I'.KJ (IS'.tL'); 
 Willis *'. State, '.Ki (la. I'OS (ISiK!). This ludd a i)roi.er cour.se 
 where the evidence is contlictiiig. (!om, i*. Hurrough, KJli Mass. 
 r.l;{ (1S<.).-.); I'eople i: .Mackinder, SO liun, K. (IStM). The jury 
 may pick out s\ich portions of the confession as they may credit, 
 rejecting the rest. State t'. Dooley, (la.) 57 X. W. 414 (IS'.M). 
 State I'. Johnson, 47 T.a. .Ann. !L'2r. (isnr.). 
 
 ,\itK UKiuTTAiii.K. — Like other admi.ssions, confessions, if be- 
 lieved, are a /eranirn /irti/)iifion!s and may be controlled by evi- 
 dence, "or instance, tiie prisoner m.'iy show, if lit; can, that his 
 words, though retluced to writing, have been misunderstood. State 
 r. llrown, 1 Mo. App. iSG (1S7()). 
 
 1^' 
 
\ 
 
 X 
 
 /