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Pr
THE
ADMINISTRATION
O F T H E
COLONIES.
LONDON.
Printed for J W,tK,E, at the Bible and Sun.
.. .j- in St. Paul's Church-yard.
' MDCCLXIV.
.'■ -.St
>
f'f
» •
THE
ADMINISTRATION
O F T H E
COLONIES.
PART I.
THE feveral changes In Intererts and
territories, which have taken place
in the colonies of the European
world on the event of Peace, have given a
general imprefTion of fome new ftate of
things arifing. One cannot but obferve, that
there is fome general idea of fome revolu-
tion of events, beyond the ordinary cour/e
of things ; fome general apprehenfion, of
fomething new arifing in the world j of
fome nev.' channel of bufinefs, applicable to
B new
( 2 )
-fomething that Is to be
new powers ; —
guarded againfL, on one hand, or that is to
be carried to advantage on the other. There
is an univerfal apprchenfion of fome new
crlfis forming: yet one does not find. any
where, in all thefe various impreflions of the
matter, any one precife compiehenfive idea
of this great crifisj and confequently, all
that is propofed, is by parts, without con-
nection to any whole j in temporary expe-
dients \^ ithout general reference to that even-
tual ftate of things which may be the ef-
fed: thereof; with regard only to particular
branches, that may be a foundation to fome
fpecial advantages, without any fyftematical
police, diredled to the intereft of all as a One
Whole.
This has tempted me to hazard my fen-
timents on this fubjed. My particular fitua-
tion gave me early opportunity of feeing and
obffving the ftate of things, which have
been long leading to this crifis. I have feeti
and rnark'd, where it was my duty, this naf-
cent crifis at the beginning of this war, and
may affirm, have forefeen and foretold the
events that now form it.
In the firfl uncultur'd ages of Europe,
when men fought nothing but to pofTefs,
and to fecure poflelTion, the power of the
Jword
jJ!
I
• ( 3 )
/ivorJ was the predominant fplrlt of the
world i it was that, which formed the Ro-
man empire; and it was the fame, which,
in the declcnfion of that empire, divided
again the nations into the fcveral govern-
ments farmed therefrom.
When men afterward, from leifure, be-
gan to cxercife the powers of their minds in
(what is called) learning; religion, the (nly
learning at that time, led them to a concern
for their fpiritual interefts, and confequently
led them under their fpiritual guides. The
power of religion would hence as naturrjly
predominate and rule, and did adually be-
come the ruling fpirit of the policy of Eu-
rope. It was this fpirit, which, for many
ages formed, and gave away kingdoms ; this
which created the anointed Lords over them,
or again excommunicated and execrated thele
fovereigns ; this that united and allied the
tarious nations, or plung'd them into war
and blooiifhed; this, that formed the ballance
of the power of the whole, and a(Sluated
the fecond grand fcene of Europe's h'iftory.
But fince the people of Europe have
formed their communication with iht com-
merce of Alia ; have been, for fome ages pafl,
fettling on all fides of the Atlantic Ocean,
and in America, and pofTefling every feat and
B 2 channel
( 4 )
channel of commerce, and have planted and
raifed that to an intereft which has taken
root; — fince tliey now feel the powers that
derive from this, and are extending it to,
and combining it with others; the fpirit of
conuncrce will become that predominant
power, which will form the general policy,
and rule the powers of Europe : and hence
a grand commercial intcrcfl, the bafis of a
great conimercial dominion, under the prc-
fcnt (cite and circumftances of the world,
will be formed and arife. The rife and
forming of this commercial dominion is what
precifely conltitutes the prefent crifis.
While each country fuppofes, that its
own government adluates and governs the
trade of its refpedtive fubje(5ts and dependen-
cies, there is in fad: a general kind of lead in
commerce^ dif.ifi^ from any of the govern-
ments of Europe, a general intereft that is
not concerned in, nor governed by the re-
fpecflive intcrefts of Europe, that flows in its
own channel, and is held in motion by the
laws of its own nature. Whether this idea
may be thought real or vidonary, whether
we attend to it or not, is of no confequence
as to the exiftence and proceffion of it. It
is not in the power of human wifdom, ei-
ther to form it, or to oppofe it ; it is formed,
and it will become the balls of a commercial
domi-
t
J
( 5 )
dominion. The being able to difccrn this
ilatc of things, at their firfl birth, is of great
ufe to any nation j but to be in Tuch circum-
flances, as to interweave thcfe nafccnt povvcis
into, and to combine their inBiicuce with,
the fame interefls that aduate our own go-
vernment, muft be of the lail importance
to the glory, and perhaps the being, of fuch
government. In the coinfes of the procef-
fion of mankind, as in the operations of na-
ture, all that we can do is, to mark the naf-
cent flate of things, that, when a crifis is
forming, we may fo conned: and combine
our operations with it, as to partake of its
influence, and to build on its power. It is
not men that form great events, but the crifis
of events duly poiTelled and actuated that
form great men.
It is not in the pofTihility of all the power
and wifdom of our government, to form this
great commercial power ; but it would be
the wifdom, and is the duty of thofe who
govern us, to profit of, to poflefs, and to
take the lead of it already formed, and arifing
fafl into dominion. This lead feemed at
the beginning of the war, to ofcilate between
the Englidi and French j and it was in this
war that the dominion alfo hath been dif-
puted. The lead is nov/ in our hands i we
have fuch hold of the ballance, that when-
B 3 ever
( 6 )
ever this lead becomes the foundation of a
dominion, it mud be ours.
It is now the duty of thofe who govern
ns, to carry forward this (late of things, to
the weaving this lead into our fyftem, that
our kingdom may be no more confidered as
the mere kingdom of thi.> ifle, with many
appendages of provinces, tc Ionics, fctde-
ments, and other extraneous parts ; but as a
grand maiine dominion, confifting of our
pofleflions in the Atlantic and in America
united into a one intereft, in a one center
where the feat of government is. As the
fifing of til is crifis, above defcribed, forms
preciftlv ihc objecl on which government
Should be employed j fo the taking leading
meaTures towards the forming all thefe At-
lintic and American pofll-flions into a one
dominion, of which Great Britain Hiould be
the commercial center, to which it fliould
be the fpring of power, is the precifi duty
of government at this crifis.
I fuppofe nobody can be fo .ignorant, or
Imagine me to be fo ignorant, as to conceive,
that this dominion is adlually and in fadl,
to be eftabliChed at this moment; or that
thofe circumilances, and that ftate of things
which will in the jiatural coiirfe of events
arifc in future, can be new artificially brought
on
( 7 )
on by the force of policy; but left any fucli
niifconception (hoiild be received, I mull beg
that it may be diftindly underftood, that
notwithftanding it be a fundamental maxim
and law in every kingdom and ftate, that the
trade of its refpedlive colonies fliall be con-
fined folely to the intercourfe and commerce
of the mother country; — -yet fuch is the
ftate, and fuch are the circumftances of thcfc
colonies univerfally, that without an abfo-
lutc and entire inflation of this principle,
they would neither have any trade, nor even
fubfiftence ; and the fa6t is, that this maxim
is univerfally through all the Spanifli, Dutch,
French, Danifli and Britiili colonies broke
through. If the colonics may be fuppofed
to be naturally as well as artificially united
in the intereft, and fubmitted to the domi-
nion of the mother country, ti.eir intercll:
and actions muft follow the fate of that mo-
ther country; but, tliat thefe colonies may
be at war, when the mother country might
otherwife be at peace, the Spanidi war is a
proof; that they may be in the full exercife
of the commerce of peace when the mother
countries are at war, I believe every war is
a proof. If therefore, having an interell
which requires a trade, diredly contrary to
the fundamental maxims and laws of the
mother country, and if thefe feveral inter-
efts in the colonies of the different nations
B 4 through-
( 8 )
throughout the Atlantic, thus abfolutely dif-
ferent from the particular intereft of their
refpedlive mother countries, muft neceffari-
1^ fo combine, as to form a one general
commercial intereft, different and diftindl
from the general and European intereft of
the feveral powers on which they depend :
I do repeat, that there is a general commer-
cial intereft of the Atlantic and American
fettlements, peculiar to thefefettlements, and
diftindl from either the particular interefts of
the relpccflive mother countries, or the ge-
neral intereft of their European policy ; that
this general intereft will, in its natural ten-
dency, lead under the influence of that branch
of buflnefs, and thofe merchants who actu-
ate it, which predominates in the general in-
tercourle and operation of its necellities ;
that this lead will difTolve the eflfedl of all ar-
tificial connexions which government would
create, and form the natural connediions un-
der which thefe interefts actually exift, —
will fuperfede all particular laws and cuf-
toms, and operate by thofe which the nature
and adual circumftances of the feveral in-
terefts require. This lead, 1 repeat it, is
the foundation of a commercial do.jinion,
w^hich, whether we attend to it or not, will
be formed ; for the intereft, that is the ba-
fis of it, is already formed : incapable from
JDOth internal and external caufeg, to become
as
in-
is
m,
ill
as
i
i
/.
( 9 )
as well Indepcndant as diftind, it muft, and
will fall under the dominion ofjome of the
potentates of Europe. Tbe great qucjiirji nt
this crifis isy and the great jiriiggle will be,
which of thefe ftates will be in thofe cir-
cumftances, and will have the vigour and
wifdom fo to profit of thofe circumftances,
as to take this lead under its dominion, and
to unite it to its government.
The forming therefore fome general fyf-
tem of adminiftration, founded on this ac-
tual flate of things, fome plafi which fnould
be, (whatever may be the changes of the
miniflry at home, or in the governors and
oilicers employed abroad) uniformly and
permanently purfued by meafures founded
on the adtual ftate of things as they arife,
leading to this great end is, at this crijisy the e>^ft< »- ^^
precife duty_o£^governme72t . This is an oh- r%^r<j^'"*' •'"■ '
je^ which ought not to be overlooked or ly^ia^^'^' ^'^P*^'^
miflaken. It ought not to be a flatc m^iiXQ'^'^^''*^.' "^ "^IS'^
*" '.
ry, nor can be a fecret. If the Spanifh, '
French, and Dutch governments caii op-
/w*^
pofc it, they will ; but if it be founded in ag^^p^'
.-»/,-/'^' "^'-'<-
t/j'-^T
nature, fuch oppofition will only haflen M^^^ZtJuY ^>^ '^
completion, becaufe any meafures of policy ^z-*^/ ^^-^'*"^~^
which thev can take to obllrudl it, muft t\'»^^*~*^^
ther deflroy the trade of their own colonies, or J^^^^*^^ ""^ ,
break oif their connection. If :hcy attempt /^^'^'^ j .
to do this by force, they muO firfl form an -^y^^' t^^ ^
alliance, ^ ^i>9u^'*<^ilh
^^^^^j2;.
M^ '
I ^
( '° )
alliance, and fettle the union of their mu-
tual interefts, and the eventual partition of
the efFedt of it ; but this will prove a matter
of more difficulty, than can eafily be com-
pafled, and under the difadvantages created
thereby, there will be much hazard of the
utmoft effort of their united forces.
To enable the Britlfli nation to profit of
thefe circumftances, either at prefent, or of
the future events, as they fhall fucceflively
arife in the natural procelfion of the efifeds of
thefe circumftances, in its dominions, poflef-
iions and commerce abroad, it is neceffary, that
the adminiftration form itfelf at home, into
fuch eftablifhments for the direction of thefe
interefts and powers, as may lead them in
their natural channel, under due connedtions
with the government, to the utmoft effect
they are capable of producing towards this
grand point.
The firft fpring of this diredion, the ba-
fis of this government, is the adminiftration
at home. If that department of admini-
flration, which fhould have the diredtion of
thefe matters, be not wifely and firmly bot-
tomed, be not fo built, as to be a fraSlical —
be not fo really fupportcd by the powers of
government, as to be an efficicut adminiftra-
iiorii all meafures for the adminiftration of
thefe
I
I
( " )
jhefe interefts, all plans for the government
of thefe powers are vain and felf-dclufive ;
even thofe meaiures that would regulate the
movements and unite the interefts, under a
pradlical and efficient adminiftration, become
mifchievous meddling impertinencies where
that is not, and mud either ruin the inter-
efts of thefe powers, or render a breach of
duty neceflary to avoid that ruin.
That part of government, which fliould
adminifter this great and important branch
of bufinefs, ought, in the firft place, to be
the center of all information and application
from all the interefts and powers v/hich form
if ; and ought, from this center, to be able,
fully, uniformly, and efficiently, to diftri--
bute its diredlions and orders. Wherever
the wifdom of ftate fhall determine that this
center of information fhall be fixed; from
whatever department all appointments, or-
ders, and executive adminiftration fhall iflue,
it ought fomewhere to be fixed, known,
of record, and undivided; that it may net
be partial, it ought to extend to all times,
and all cafes. All application, all communi-
cation, all information (hould center imme-
diately and folely in this department: this
fhould be the fpringof all nominations, in-
ftrudlions, and orders. It is of little con-
fequence where this power of adminiftration
is
T[!!l
I ,
( 12 )
is placed, fo that the department be fuch, as
has the means of knowledge of its bufinefs —
is fpecially appropriated to the attention nc-
cellary to jt — and officially fo formed as to
be in a capacity of executing it. Whether
this be a Secretary of State, or the Board of
Trade and Plantations, is of no confequence;
but it ought to be intirely in either the one
or the other. Where the power, for the di-
rection is lodged, there ought al! the know-
ledge of the department to center ; therefore
all officers, civil and military, all fervants of
the government, and all other bodies or pri-
vate perfons ought to correfpond immediate-
ly with this department, whether it be the
Secretary of State or the Board of Trade.
While the military correfpond with the Se-
cretary of State, the civil in one part of their
office with the Secretary of State, in another
with the Board of Trade -, while the navy
correfpond in matters not merely naval with
the Admiralty, while the engineers cor-
refpond with the Board of Ordnance, offi-
cers of the revenue with the feveral boards
of that branch, and have no communication
with the department which has, or ought
to have, the general diredtion and admini-
flration of this great Atlantic and American,
this great commercial intereft, who is to col-
lect ? who does, or ever did colledl, into a
all thefe matters of information
and
,;S
one view.
I
( »3 )
and knowledge? What department ever
had, or could have, fuch general dire<itiori
of it, as to difcufs, compare, redlify
and regulate it to an official real ufe?
In the firrt place, there never was yet any
one department form'd for this purpofe;
and in the next, if there was, iet any one
acquainted with bufinefs dare to fay, how
any attempt of fuch department would ope-
rate on the jealoufies of the others. When-
ever, therefore, it is thought proper, (as
mod certainly it will, fome time or other,
tho' perhaps too late) to form fuch depart-
ment, it muft (if I may fo exprefs mylelf)
be Ibvereign and fupreme, as to every thing
relating to itj or to fpeak plainly out, mi^
he afecretary of ft ate s office in it/elf. When
fuch is form'd, although the military, na-
val, ordnance, and revenue officers, fhould
correfpond, in the matters of their refpedtive
duties, with the departments of government
to which they are more immediately fubor-
dinate and refponfible, yet, in general mat-
ters of information, or points which arc
matters of government, and the department
of tills ftdte office, they fhould be inftrudted
to correfpond and communicate with this
minifler. Suppofe that fome fuch minifter
or office now exifted, is it not of confequence
that he fliould be acquainted with the Geo-
graphy of our new acquilitions ? If, there-
fore.
( H )
lore, there have been any adual furveyS
made of them, fliould not fuch, or copies
of fuch, be fent to this minifter, or office ?
If a due ind official infornsation of any par-
ticular condu(5l in our colonies, as to their
trade, might lead to proper regulations there-
in, or might jioint out the neceffity of a re-
vifion of the old laws^ or the making fur-
ther provifion by new ones, would it not
be proper that the cuftom-houfe officers fet-
tled there fiiould be diredcd to correfpond
and communicate with this minifter, or of-
fice, on thefe points? Would it interfere
with their due fubordination, as officers of
the revenue, to the commiffioncrs of the
cuftoms ? — If there were any events arifing,
or any circumftances exifting, that might
afFed the ftate of war or peace, wherein the
immediate application of military operations
were not necefTary or proper, (hould not the
military and naval officers be diredled to
communicate on thefe matters with this mi-
nifter, or office ? Should not, I fay, all
thefe matters of information come officially
before this minifter, if any fuch ftate mi-
nifler, or office, was eftabliflied ?
As of information and knowledge centering
in a one office, fo alfo of power of execut-
ing, it (hould fpring from one undivided
department. Where the power of nomi-
iiating and difmifling, together with other
powers.
li'
( «
( '5 )
powers, is feparated from the power of di-
recting, the firft mud be a mere privilege
or perquifite of office, ufelefs as to the king's
bufinefs or the intereft of his colonies, and
the latter n*afl: be inefficient. That office,
which neither has the means of information,
nor can have leifure to attend to the official
knov/ledge produced thereby, nor will be
at the trouble to give any official diredlions,
as to the ordinary courfe of the adminiftra-
tion of the American matters, muft certainly
be always, as it is, embarrafTed with the
power of nomination, and fetter'd with the
chain of applications, which that power
drags after it. On the other hand, what
effcd will any inflrudtions, orders or direc-
tions, have from that board, which has not
intereft to make or difmifs one of the mean-
eft of its own officers : this, which is at pre-
fent the only official channel, will be de-
fpifed ", the governors, nay, every the meaneft
of the officers in the plantations, looking up
folely to the giving power^ will fcarce cor-
refpond with the dire^iing — nay, may per-
haps contrive to make their court to the one,
by paffing by the other. And in any cafe
of improper condudt of thefe officers, of
any negleft of duty, or even of mifdemean-
our ; what can this direding power do, but
complain to the minifter who nominates,
againft the officers appointed by him ? If
there
( i6 )
there be no jealoufics, no interfering of in-
tererts, no competitions of interfering inends,
to divide and oppofe theL- two ofTices to each
other : it the minifler is rot influenced to
continue, upon the fame motives upon which
he firft appointed ; if he dues not fee thefe
complaints in a liglit of oppofition to his
nomination and interefl ; fome rcdrefs may,
after a du hearing between the party and
the office, be had ; — the authority of the
board may be fupported, and a fort of reme-
dy appUcd to the king's fervice.
Thefe difficulties and interferings are the
natural effed:s of human condudt aduatinga
divided and indeterminate power; and every
mifchief that can arife from thence in the
king's fervice, muft be the certain confe-
quence. But happy it is at prefent for the
public in this very important crifis, that
although thefe be the ufual effedts of fuch
circumftances, yet fuch is the temper of
particulars, fuch the zeal of all for his Ma-
jefty's fervice, fuch the union of his fervants,
that the fpirit of fervice predominates over
thefe natural defefts.
It is not only from the natural imprac-
ticability of conducing this adminiftration
under a divided State of power and diredion,
that the necefTity of forming a fome one
ftate
( 17 )
(late oflicc, or miniflcr of ftate, for the exe-
cuting it arifcs : but the very nature of the
bufinefs of this department, makes the otH-
cer who is to adniinifler it a ftate oflicer, a
minifter for that department, and who ought
to have immediate acccfs to the clofet. I
mufl: here repeat, that I am no partizan of
the fecrctary of ftnte's othce, or for the
board of trade: I have ceafed to have any
connexion of bufinefs with either, and have
not the leaH: degree of communication with
the one or the other. Without reference,
therefore, to either, but with ail deference
to both, I aim to point out, that the depart-
ment of the adminidration of Trade and
plantations, be it lodged where it may, fhould
be a State office, and have a miniiter of fl.itc.
That oflice, or ofncer, in a commercial na-
tion like this, who has the cognizance and
direction (fo far as Government can interfere)
of the general trade of the kingdom — whofe
duty it is to be the depofitory and reporter of
the ftateand condition of it; of every thing
which may advance or obftrud; it, of the
flate of manufactures, of the fitlieries, of the
employment of the poor, of the promoting
the labour and riches of the country, by ftu-
dying and advifing every advantage, that can
be made of every event which arifes in com-
mercial politics ; every remedy, which can
remove any defedt or obftrudlion j — who is
C • OiH-
..II
( i8 )
officially to prepare every provifion or re-
vifion necclliry in the laws of trade, for the
coiifidcration of parliament j and to be the
coiulLnftar of fuch thro* the ncceflary mea-
fiires — is certainly an officer of ftate, if the
fecretary of flate, fo call'd, is. That oflice,
or ofiiccr, who has cognizance and di-
redion of the plantations in every point of
government, in every matter judicial or com-
mercial J who is to diredl the fettlements of
colonics, and to fupcrintend thofe already
fettled ; who is to watch the plantations in
all thcfe points, fo far as they ftand related
to the government, laws, courts and trade
of the mother country is certainly an
officer of llate, if the fecretary of flate, fo
called, is. That office, or officer, who is to
report to his Majefly in council on nil thefe
points } whofe cfPid;\\ JI(7fy or negative, will
be his Majefly 's information in council, as
to the Icgiflature in tlie colonies — is certainly
an officer of Hate. That office, or officer,
who is to hear and determine on all matters
of complaint, and mal-admini(l ration, of
the c.own officers and others, in the plan-
tations j and can examine witnelfes on oath
— is lureiy an officer of flatc. That office,
or officer, who is to correfpond with all the
fervants of the crown on thefe points, and
to be the ifluer of his Majefly 's orders and
inflrudions to his fervants, on thefe many,
2 great
I
( '9 )
great, and importdnt points ofilatc — is cer-
tainly his Majclly's fccrctaiy, and certainly
a iccretary of ihuc.
But if it be confKlercd further, vvlio tiie
pcrfons are, that conP/itute the very great
and extenfive conimidion of the board of
trade and plantations ; namely, all the great
officers of (hte f ;r the time being, with the
bifliop of London, the fccrctari; s of Hate for
the time being, ami thole more crpccinliy
called the commiffioncrs of trade, it will be
fcen, that it is no longer a doubt or a quc-
fliion, as to its being an office of flate : it is
adlually fo ; and has, as an otiicc, as a hoard,
immediate acccfs to his Majeily in council,
even to the reporting and recommending of
officers. This was the plan whereon it was
originally founded, at its fu-il inlf itution, by
Lord Sommers.
The only queftlon, therefore, is, w!)o
fli.ill be the executive officer of this depart-
ment of Hate; whether the fecretary of
flate, properly fo called ; or the firil lord,
and other commjffioners, properly called the
board of trade -J or whether it ffiall remain
divided, as it is, between the feveral great
departments of adminlilration ; or whether
fome more official and practical divihon of
this adminiflration may not be made.
C 2 Sup-
( 20 )
Snppofc now, it flioiild be thought pro-
per, tliat this lulininillratioii be phiccil U) the
I'c'crctnrv of ilatc's oflicc, all the adminillra-
tioii of the pliiitations may be given to the
fuuthern flcpnrtmcnt : yet the great objc(fl
of the general trade of Great Britain muft
be dl\idcd between th'^ fouthern and the
northern, as the matters of confiderution
h.ippen to lye in the one or in the other dc-
paruncnt; and how will the fouihern de-
partment . d, when any matter of commerce
arifcs in the plantations, that has fpecial con-
jK'dions or intcrfcreings wiih the Dutch,
llamborough, Danidi, or Ruffian trade ?
It cannot lie in the board of trade, pro-
perly lo called, until it be found proper, and
a meafure of government to ere<^t that board
into a fecretary of ftate's office for that
department, which, firft or laft, it mofl: cer-
tainly will do. That, therefore, the great
bufinefs of trade and plantations may not
run into confufjon, or be at a (land j — that
it may be carried to the effc-tft propofcd,
held forth, and defired by government, and
rectffary to it ; all that can be done at pre-
fcnt is, to put the whole executive ad mini-
fy
ration,
th
e noniination, corre
fpond
ence.
illuing of inftrudions, orders, &c. under the
fecretary of (late, if he has leifurc to attend
to it, andean undertake it 3 and to make the
board
1
th(
I ( 21 )
board of trade a mere comniittce of refcrfnc^
and report ; infteud of reporting to the king
in council, to report to the fccrctary, who
fliall lay the matters before his Miijcliy, ami
receive and ifluc his orders ; — who fhall re-
fer all matters to tliis committee, f )r their
confideration, and fliall condudl: through the
legiflaturc all meafures necelTary to be deter-
mined thereby. If this be not pra(!iicab!c,
there is no other alternative, than to do di-
redlly what ought to be done, and what,
fome time or other, muft be done -, the
making the officer who condu(n:s this de-
partment a miniflcr for that department,
with all the powers ncceflary thereto. For
until a prad^ical and cfHcient adminiflration
be formed, whatever the people of this
country may think, the people of the colo-
nies, who know their bufinefs much better
than we do, will never believe government
IS in earned about them, or tlieir intcrefi,
or even about governing them ; and will,
not merely from that reafoning, but from
neceflity of their circumftanccs, ad ac-
cordingly.
Knowing, therefore, that finl or lad:,
the nature and Hate of the king's fervice
muft, in fpitc of every idea to the contra-
ry, bring this meafurc into execution, 1
have only curforily fuggefted fome hints of
C 3 the
>/
-|iMi
( 22 )
tl)e grounds on which it will arlfe : but
removed as I am from every communication
with adminiflration in this department, and
uninformed, I have not prefumed to enter
into the difciifTion cf this great point.
Wlierever it is taken up, it muft be by per-
fons who, with the benefit of real, official
information, and confidential knowledge of
I ^eafures, mufl have fuperior, and the only
lights, in which it ought to be viewed, and
determined.
Upon a fuppofition, therefore, that this
matter is fettled, as moft certainly it will
be, fome time cr other, I will pro' ^ed, con-
fining myfelf foleiy to the matters of the
colonies; to review fome points that ajferve,
and will require, the confideration of go-
vernment, if it ever means to profit of, and
lead the great Atlantic and American inte-
refl which it has acquired, and to unite
it to its dominion.
Before entering into thcfe matters, I do
liOt think it would be impertinent jufl to
mark the idea of colonies, and their fpe-
cial eircumdances, which makes it a mea-
fure in commercial governments, to eila-
blilli, cultivate, and maintain them. ' '
The
i
nea-
( 23 )
The view of trade in general, ns vveU
as of manufadures in particular, terminates
in fecuring an extenfive a.:d permanent vent;
or to fpeak more precifely, (in the fame
manner as fliop-keeping does) in having
many and good cultomers : the wifdcm,
therefore, of a trading nation, is to gain,
and to create, as many as pofllble. 1 hoic
whom we gain in foreign trade, we poffcfs
under reflridlions and difficulties, and may
lofe in the rivalfhip of commerce : thole
that a trading nation can create within it-
felf, it deals with und«;r its own regulatioi>s,
and makes its own, and cannot lofe. In
the eftablifliing colonies, a nation creates
people whofe labour, being applied to new
objed^s of produce and manufjdure, open
new channels of commerce, by which they
not only live in eafe and affluence within
themfelves, but, while they are labouring
under and for the mother country, (for
there all their external profits center) be-
come an increafmg nation, of appropriated
and good cuflomers to the mother country.
Thefe not only increafe our manufadures,
encrtafe our exports, but extend our com-
merce .; and if duly adminiflcred, extend
the nation, its pov/crs, and its dominions,
to wherever thefe people extend their fettle-
men ts. 'I
is, and
1,
IS IS, therefore, an intereft which
e dear to the mothe
4. country
oughi to be dear to the mother
'C
o:<
/
iO'L
I :
Jii
,:!!<;
( 24 )
country : this is an objed that deferves the
bed care and attention of government : and
the people, who through various hardfhips,
difafcers, and difappoiiitments ; through va-
rious difficuhies and almoft ruinous ex-
pences, have wrought np this intereft to
fuch an important ohjedt, merit every pro-
tection, grace, encouragenrient, and privi-
lege, that are in the power of the mother
country to grant.
It becomes the duty of thd mother coun-
try to nourifh and cultivate, to protedt
and govern the colonies — which nurture and
government (hould precifely direct its care
and influence to two eflential points, ift,
That all the profits of the produce and ma-
nufadures of thefe colonies center in the
mother country : and 2dly, That the colo-
nies continue to be the fole and fpecial pro-
per cuftomers of the mother country. It
is on this valuable confideraiioriy (as Mr. Dum-
mer, in his prudent and fpirited defence of
the colonies uys) they have a right to the
grants, charters, privileges and protedion
which they receive ; and alfo on the other
hand, it is from thefe grants, charters, pri-
vileges and protedion given to them, that
the mother country has an exclufive right
to the external profits of their labour, and
to their cuftom. To thefe two points, col-
lateral
es the
: and
llliips,
^h va-
s ex-
eft to
y pro-
privi-
nother
coun-
protedt
ire and
ts care
. I ft,
id ma-
in the
; colo-
j1 pro-
y. It
Dum-
nce of
to the
edion
other
s, pri-
that
2 right
', and
I, col-
lateral
( 25 )
lateral with the interefts, rights and welfare
of the colonies, every meafure of admini-
ftration, every law of trade fhould tend: I
fay collateral, becanfc, rightly iinderflood,
thefe two points are mutually coeval and
coincident with the interefts, rights and
welfare of the colonies.
It has been often fuggefted, that care
fliould be taken in the adminiftration of
the plantations ; left, in fome future time,
thefe colonies fhould become independent
of the mother country. But perhaps it may
be proper on this occafion, *iay, it is juftice
to fay it, that if, by becoming indepen-
dent is meant a revolt, nothing is further
from their nature, their intercft, their
thoughts. If a defedion from the alliance
of the mother country be fuggefted, it ought
to be, and can be truly faid, that their fpi-
rit abhors the fenfe of fuch j their attach-
ment to the proteftant fucceflion in the
houfe of Hanover will ever ftand unftiaken ;
and nothing can eradicate from their hearts
their natural, almoft mechanical, afi^edlion
to Great Britain, which they conceive under
no other fenfe, nor call by any other name,
than that oi home. Befides, the merchants
are, and muft ever be, in great meafure
allied with thofe of Great Britain : their very
lupport
M m
:, irj I
( 26 ) .
fupport confifls in this alliance. The liberty
and religion of the Eritifli coIonies^ are in-
compatible with either French or Spanidi
. government; and they know full well, that
they could liope for neither liberty nor pro-
tection under a Dutch one ; no circumrtan-
ces of trade could tempt them thus to cer-
tain ruin. Any fuch fuggeftion, therefore,
is a falfe and unjufb afperfion on their prin-
ciples and affe(ftions ; and can arife from
nothing but an intire ignorap.ce of their cir-
cumftanccs. Yet again, on the other hand,
while they remain under the fupport and
proteiftion of the government of the mother
country ; while tht:y profit of the beneficial
part of its trade; while their attachment to
the prcfent royal family flands firm, and
their alliance with the mother country is
inviolate, it may be worth while to inquire,
whether they may not become and adt in-
dependent of the government and laws of
the mother country : — and if any fuch fymp-
toms fliould be found, either in their go-
vernment, courts, or trade, perhaps it may
be thought high time, even now, to inquire
how far thefe colonies are or are not ar-
rived, at this time, at an independency of
the government of the mother country : —
and if any meafure of fuch independency,
formed upon precedents unknown to the
go-
'^
t
1
■
tit
01
cc
\
tr;
in
1 r
al
n(
tli
to
of
ri:
( 27 )
government of the mother country at the
time they were form'd, /liould be infiflcd
on, when the government of the mother
country was found to be fo weak or dif-
traded at home, or fo deeply engaged abroad
in Europe, as not to be able to attend to,
and aflcrt its right in America, with its own
peopJe : — perhaps it may be thought, that
no time lliould be lufl to remedy or redrefs
thcfe deviations — if any fnch be found -, or
to remove all jealoufics arifing from the idea
of them, if none fuch really exifl.
If the c'jionics are to be pofT-fTed, aT"of
right, ajid governed by the crown, as do-
mains of the crown, by fuch cliarters, com-
miirions, infliudions, ^<r. as the crown
fliall, from time to time, grant or iffue ;
the;n a revifion of th'efe charters, commiilions,
inftru6lions, fo as to eflablKh the rights of
the crown, and tiie privileges of the people,
as thereby created, is all that is necelTary.
Eat while the crov/n may, perhaps juftly
and of right, V2 theory^ confider thefe lands,
and the plantations thereon, as its domains,
and as of fpecial right properly belonging to
it; not incorporated and of common right
with the dominions and realm of Great Bri-
tain : in confequence of which theory, fpe-
cial rights of the crown are there cflablifli-
Cd;
I
'I!
i!l
[ 23 ]
cd ; and from which theory, the fpecial
modification under which the people poflefs
their privileges is derived. — While this is
the idea on one hand, the people on the
other fay, that they could not forfeit, nor
lofe the common rights and privileges of
Engliflimen, by adventuring under various
difaders and difficulties 3 under heavy ex-
pences, and every hazard, to fettle thefe
vaft countries, to engage in untried channels '
of labour, thereby increafing the nation's
commerce, and extending its dominions ;
but that they muft carry with them, where-
ever they go, the right of being governed
only by the laws of the realm j only by laws
made with their own confent : — that they
muft ever retain with them the right of not
being taxed without their own confent, or
that of their rcprefentatives j and therefore,
as it were by nature divided off from the
fliare of the general repieien nation of the na-
tion, they do not hold, by tenor of charter or
temporary grant, in acommiffion, but by an
inherent, eflential right, the right of reprcien-
tation and Kgiflature, with all its novvtrs.and-
privileges, uS poflefTed in England, it ^s, ^
therefore, thatthepeojpledo, and ever will, un-
til this matter be fettled, exercife thefe rights
and privileges after the precedents formed here
in England, and perhaps carried, in the ap-
plication^
!Pffi
[ 29 ]
plication, even further, than they ever were
in England ; and not under the rcftridion
of commiffions and inflrudtions : and it
is therefore alfo, in matters where laws,
made fince their eftablifhment, do not cx-
terd to them by fpeclal provifo, that they
claim the right of directing themfelves by
their own laws. While thefe totally dif-
ferent ideas of the principles, whereon the
government and the people found their
claims and rights, remain unfettled and un-
determined, there can be nothing but dif-
cordant jarring, and perpetual obftrudioii
in the exercife of them ; — there can be no
government, properly fo called, but merely
the predominancy of one fadtion or the o- >
ther, adling under the mask of the forms
of government. This is the fhck-t and pre-
cife abftrad; of the long and perplexed hif-
tory of the governments and adminiftrations
of the colonies, under the various fliapes
with which their quarrels have vexed them-
felves, and teized government at home.
If this idea of the crown's right to go-
vern thefe as domains be jug, and be as
right in fadt, as, it is fuppofed to be in the-
ory, let it be fetded and fixed by fome due
and fafficient authority, what it is, and how
far it extends. But this is not all 5 let it be
fo eftabliflied, that where it ought, it may
adually
( ,^0 )
adlually, and in pr?'!lice, be carried into ex-
ecution alio. It this right be doubted ; or
if, being allowed, it fi nd:> itfclf in fuch cir-
cumftanccs as not to be able to carry its
powers into execution, it will then become
an obje(5t of government, to fee that thefe
colonies be governed, and their affairs admi-
niftered fome other way. There is no doubt
in the theory of our conftitution of the
king's right, in time of war and array, to
exercife martial law : and yet in pradlice it
has been found right, (and would not other-
wife be permitted) that this martial law
fhould be confirmed by parliament.
If, therefore, the feveral points wherein
the crown, or its governors av^ing under its
infl:ru(5lions, differ with the people be con-
fidered, and it be once determined what, in
order to maintain the fubordination of the
government of the colonies to the govern-
ment of Great Britain, is neceffary to be
done, — the mode of doing that will beeafily
fettled. If It be a point determined, that it
lies wholly with the crown to fix and adlu-
ate this order of government — the crown will
duly avail itfelf of that power, with which it
is entrufted, to enforce its adminiflratidn.
But if it be found that, howover this may
lie with the crown as of right, yet the
crowa. is not in power to eftablilh this right,
it
i
'.J
[ 31 ]
— It will of courfc call in aid the povverVf
the Icgiflnturc, to confirm and e(labli(li it.
But if, finally, it fliould appear, that thefe
colonies, as corporations within the domi-
nions of Great Britain, are inchided within
the imperium of the realm of the fame, — id
will then of right become the duty of legi-
flaturc to intcrpofe in the cafe ; to regulate
and define their rights and privileges ; to
edablifli and order their adminiflriition ; and
to dire6l the channels of their commerce,
Tho' the firft of theie meafures ihould be,
in ftridl juflice, the crown's right — yet the
fecond is the only next pradicable one: and
altho' the fecond, as fnch, may mod likely
be adopted — yet the third is the only wife
and fare mcafure. In the fecond caie, the
crown, havino; formed its feveral j^eneral in-
flru(5tions for the feveral governments, ac-
cording to their various charters, grants,
and proprietaries, will order the fime, in
thofe points which it cannot influence and
determine by the eflfecfl of its own negative,
to be laid before parliament, lo be confi-
dered and confirmed by the legiflaturc, in the
fame manner as arc the rules for governing
the army. In the third cafe, tlie crown will
order its minifiry to lay before parliament,
the rights and powers of the crown •, the
rights, privileges and claims of the people ;
with a general flate of the colonies, their
intcrell
. [ 32 1
ititercft and operations, as related to the
crown, as related to the moihcr country, as
related to foreign powers and intcrefts, and
to the colonics of foreign powers, as related
to the laws and government of the mother
country; — perhaps pointing outfome general
plan of government, judicatory, revenue and
commerce, as may become, what I hinted
at in the beginning of this paper — a leading
meafure to the forming Great Britain, with
all its Atlantic and American pofleflions,
into one great commercial dominion. In
the one cafe, the inftrudVions of the crown,
^ither fome general form of fuch, or the
fpecial ones given to each governor, on each
frefh nomination, will be confirm'd by par-
liament, as the rules and orders for govern-
ing the army are. In the other, a general
bill of rights, and eftablifhment of govern-
ment and commerce on a great plan of uni-
on, will be fettled and enaded : the govern-
ments of the feveral colonies, on the conti-
nent and in the illands, will be conlidered
as fo many corporations, holding their lands
in common foccage, according to the manor
of Eaft Greenwich, united to the realm;
fo that, for every power, which they ex-
ercife or poflefs, they will depend on the
government of Great Britain ; fo that, in
every movement, . they may be held, each
within its proper fphere, and be drawn and
conne(fted
yr^:
[ 33 J
connected to this center : and as forming a
one fyftem, they will be fo conncdted tn
their various orbs anu fubordination of or-
ders, as to be capable of receiving and com-
municating, from the firft mover (the
government of Great Britain) any po-
litical motion, in the dircdion in which
it is given. Great Britain, as the center
of this fyftem, mud be the center of at-
tradion, to which thcfe colonies, in the
adminiftration of every power of their go-
vernment, in the exercife of their judicial
pjwers, and the execution of their laws,
and in every operation of their trade, mufl:
tend. They will be fo framed, in their na-
tural and political interefts ; in the rights,
privileges, and proteftion they enjoy -, in the
powers of trade, which they aduate, under
the predominating general commerce of the
narion, that they will remain under the con-
ftant influence of the attradtion of this cen-
ter; and cannot move, but that every di-
rection of fuch movement will converge-
to the fame. At the fame time that they
all confpire in this one center, they muft be
guarded againft having, or fuming, any
principle of coherence with each other above
that, whereby they cohere in this center;
having no other principle of intercommuni-
cation between each other, than that by
which they are in joint communion with
D Great
( 34 )
Great Britain as the common center of all.
At the fame time that they arc, each in
their rci'pcdive parts and fubordinations, lb
framed, as to be aduited by this firft mov-
. cr, — tliey fliould always remain incapable of
any coherence, or of fo confpiring amongft
themidvcs, as to create any other equal force,
which might recoil back on this firft mover :
nor is it more necelTary to prcferve the feve-
ral governments fubordinate within their rc-
fpedtive orbs, than it is efl'ential to the prc-
lervation of the empire to keep them dif-
conncifted and independent of e?ch other :
they certainly are fo at prcfent ; the diti'erent
manner in which they are fettled, the diffe-
rent modes under which they live, the dif-
ferent forms of charters, grants and frame
of government they poffefs, the various prin-
ciples of repulfion, — that thefe create the
different intcrefts which they aduate, the
religious interefts by which they are actuat-
ed, the rivahhip and jealoufies which arife
from hence, and the impradlicability, if not'
the impoffibility of reconciling and accom-
modating thefe incompatible ideas and claims,
will keep them for ever fo. And nothing
but a tampering adivily of wrongheaded in-
experience milled to be meddling, can ever
do any milchief here. The provinces and
colonies are under the beft form as to this
point, which they can be. They are under
. - .. the
( 35 )
the bcft frame and cliTpofition for tlie go*
vcrnmcnt of the mother country (duly ap-
plied) to take place. And as there cannot
be a more juft, fo there cannot be a wifer
incafure than to leave them all in the free
and full poflbflion of their fcveral rights and
privilegej, ns by grant, charter, or commif-
fion given, and in the full excrcifc thereof,
fo far, and no further, than as derived therc-
;i from. If, upon a revifion, there be found
I any, and perhaps fonie one fuch at leafl:,
may be found, who have grofhly and inten-
tionally tranfgreflcd thefe bounds, fuch
(hould be an exception to this rule, and be
made an example alio to others.
Under the guidance therefore of thcfc
principles — that the final external profits of
the labour and produce of colonies (hould
center in the mother country, — that the co-
lonifts are the appro^-riatco fpecial cullom-
ers of the mother country, — that the colo-
nics, in their government and trade, (hould
be all united in communion witli, and fub-
ordination to the government of the mother
country, but ever difconnefted and indepen-
dent of each other by any other commu-
nion than what centers here : — Under the
guidance of thefe principles, with a temper
and fpirit which remember that thefe are our
own people, our brethren, faithful, good
D 2 and
./
"^
( 36 )
and beneficial fubjedls, and free-born Eng-
Hfhmen, or by adoption, ppffefling all the
right of freedom :• — Under the guidance of
thefe principles, and with this temper and
fpirit of government, — let a revifion be made
of the general and feveral governments of
the colonies, of their laws and courts of juf-
tice, of their trade, and the general Britifli
laws of trade, in their feveral relations in
which th'^y fland to the mother country,
to the government of the mothrr country,
to foreign countries, and the colonies of fo-
reign countries, to one another , and then
let thofe meafures be taken, which, upon
fuch a review, fliall appear neceflary ; and
all which government can do, or ought to
do at pref'^nt, will be done.
Upon luch review it will appear, under
this iirH: general head, in various inftances,
that tlic two great points which the colonifts
labour to eftablifh, is the exercife of the!, fe-
veral rights and privileges, as founded in the
rights of an EngliQiman ; and fecondly, as
what they fuppofe to be a necefTary meafurc
in a fubordinate government, the keeping in
their own hands the command of the reve-
nue, and the pay of the officers of govern-
ment, as a fecurity for their condud towards
them. '
3 Upon
4
- ( 37 )
Under the firft head come all the dif-
putes about the King's inftrudlion?, and the
governor's power.
The King's commiflion to his governor,
which grants the power of government,
and directs the calling of a legillature, and
the eftablifhing courts, at the fame time that
it fixes the governor's power, according to the
feveral powers and directions granted and ap-
pointed by the commiflion and inflrudions>
adds, *' and by (uchfiiriber powers ^ in/lrtiolwns,
" and authorities, as (hall, at any time here-
** after be granted or appointed you, under
" our fignet or lign nanuai, or by our order
** in our privy council." It fhould here
feem, that the fame power which framed
the commiflion, with this claufe in it, could
alfo ifllie its future orders and infirudiions in
confcquenc? thereof ; but the people of the
colonies fay, that the inhabitants of the
colonies are entitled to all the privileges of
Engliflimen ; that they have a right to par-
ticipate in the legiflative power : and that
no commands of the crown, by orders in
council, inftnidions, or letters from Secre-
taries of State, are binding upon them, fur-
ther than they pleafe to acquiefce under fuch,
and conform their own aBions thereto ; that
they hold this right of i?egiflature, not de-
rived from the grace and will of the crown,
D 3 and
■i/ M^ *•/■
J
f >
/:.!? d>
/•.^/
( 38 )
and depending on the commlHion which
continues at the will of the crown ; that this
right is inherent and eflential to the com-
munity, as a community of Engliflimen :
arKTlrjat therefore they muft have all the
rights, privileges, and full and free exer-
cife of their own will and liberty in mak-
ing laws, which are necelTary thereto, — un-
controuled by any power of the crown, or
of the governor, as derived therefrom ; and,
that the claufe jn the comjriiffion, directing
the governor to call together a legiflature by
his writs, is declarative and not creative ;
and therefore KeTiTdlreded to adt conform*'-
ably to a right a(flually already exifling ) ^ r.
people, &c. , . , . .> . .
I Jufl, as this reafoning may be, and right,
as it may be, that tht aflembly, in its Icgif-
lative capacity, as one branch, (hould be in-
dependent of the governor as another branch
in the legiflature, — yet fure, fo long as thefe
governments are fubordinate to the govern-
ment of the mother country, even the le-
giflature cannot adt independent of it, nor
\.of that part of it which the conftitution has
.determined is to govern thefe colonics. I
do not here enter into the difcuflion of this
point ; I only endeavour fairly to ftate it, as
I think, it is a matter which ought to be
fettled ibme way or other, and ought no
4' ■■"■
longer
A.ft ■ ^''
^
^
\
/
L (■■
C 39
longer to remain in contentipn, that the fc-
veral matters which fland in inllrudion, and
in difpute in confequence of it, may be
finally placed upon their right grounds ; in
the doing of which it muft come under con-
lideration, how far the crown has or has not
a right to dired or reftrid the legiflature of
the colonies, — or if the crown has not this
power, what department of government has,
and how it ought to be exercifed; — or whe-
ther in fad or deed, the people of the colo-
nies, having every right to the full powers
of government, nnd to a whole legijlative
fowcKy are under this claim entitled in the ;j^'
powers of legiflature and the adminiftration
of government, to ufe and exerclfe in con- -'''A '//<
formity to the laws of Great Britain, the 4^,^^,^^; /;/j!^^ji^v
fame, full, free, independent, unreftrained —
power and legiflative will in their feveral cor- --'i-
porations, and under the King's commiffion
and their refpedive charters, as the govern-
ment and legiflature of Great Britain holds
by its conflitution, and under the great char-
ter. . ^
Every fubjed, born within the realm, un-
der the freedom of the Government of Great
Britaii;^ or by adoption admitted to the fame,
has an eflential indefeafible right to be go-
verned, under fuch a mode of government as
has the unreflrained exercife of all thofe
D 4 powers
'i'-i^t
■— ^'
r ■
- »s^
4
^ ..^f/-
^J
^ H
c^
-;>//>)&:<,
7 4
(
i
U^''
( 40 )
powers which form the freedom and rights
of the conftitution; and therefore, " the
** crown cannot eftablifli any colony upon —
** or contract it within a narrower fcale than
*' the fubjed: is entitled to, by the great
** charter of England." The government of
each colony muft have the fame powers, and
the fame extent of powers that the govern-
ment of Great Britain has, — and muft have,
while it does not adl contrary to the laws
of Great Britain, the fame freedom and in-
dependence of legiflature, as the parliament
of Great Britain has. This Right (fay they)
iii 'mded, not only in the general prin-
cipic. of the rights of a Britifli fubjedt, but
is acf^ually declared, confirmed, or granted
to them in the commiffions and charters
which gave the particular frame of their re-
fpedlive conftitutions. If therefore, in the
firft original eftablifhment, like the origi*.
nal contract, they could not be eftabliflied
upon any fcale fhort of the full and corn-
pleat fcale of the powers of the Britifli go-
vernment, — nor the legiflature be eftablifl:!-
ed on any thing lefs than the whole legifla-
tive power; much lefs can this power of
I' /^/S^ 4^-"^^ government and legiflature, thus eftabliflied,
be governed, direded, reftrained or reftrid-
ed, by any pofterior inftrudions or commands
by the letters of Secretaries of State. But
!y/M v '^^ upon the fuppofition, that a kind of gene-
J . ..' ral
^^<f/<
'^\ti^'i ^
J"
fi '^
i^^;,t./sV^f*-''
■ A.
( 41 ) v/^
ral indetermined power in the crown, to *^\ ^
fuperadd inftrudions to the conimiflions and ^'^^ '
charter be admitted, where tlie coTonifts do
not make a queftion of the cafe wherein it
is exerted, yet there are particular cafes
wherein both diredtive and reftridive in-
ftrudtions are given, and avowedly not ad-
mitted by the colonifts. It is a ftanding in-
ftrudion, as a fecurity of the dependance
of the government of the colonies, on the
mother country, that no ads wherein the
Kings Rights, or the rights of the mother
country can be alFedled, ihall be enaded in-
to a law without a claufe fufpending the ef-
fed thereof, till his Majefly's pleafure fhall
be known. This fufpending claufe is uni- ;f -
verfally rejeded on the principles above, be- >^> :<
caufe fuch fufpenfion disfranchifes the inhe-
rent full power of legillature, which they
claim by their rights to the Britifh liberties,
and by the fpecial declarations of fuch in
their charters. It does not remove this dif-
ficulty by faying, that the crown has al-
ready in its hands the power of fixing this
point, by the efl^ed of its negative given to
its governor. It is faid, that if the crown
ihould withdraw that inftrudion, which al-
lows certain bills to be pafTed into laws with
a fufpending claufe, which inftrudion is not
meant as a reftridion upon, but an indul-
gence to the legiflatures 5 that if the crown
, fhould
.^f
1^'
A\
X
r
}1l---<-'i
^ ■■<■■> *"*"'"
.>^
'.fC:
TJ
^
a*^•^^^ -.'^ '■
I ' "J"' I
-^?. .<'('■•/'•■'
i*...
( 42 )
(liould withdraw this inflrudlion, and pe-
remptorily reftrain its governor from enadt-
ing laws, under fuch circumftanccs as the
wifdoni of government cannot admit of,
that then thefe points arc adlually fixed by
the true conflitutional power ; but where-
ever it is fo iaid, I mud repeat my idea, that
this does not remove the difficulty. For
waving the doubt which the colonics might
raife, efpecially in the charter colonies, how
far the governor ought, or ought not, to
be rcflrid:f'i from giving his afTent in cafes
contrary only to inftrudlions, and not to the
iaws of Great Britain ; waving this point,
'^^'^/P'^^^" ^ f, let adminiftration confider i , eSeds of this
f^h v/tjiiif/'- riieafure. In cafes where tho bills, offered
- - '>it\.>''r'Tt, \^y (i^e ^^Q branches, are for providing laws,
abfoluttly neceffary to the continuance, fup-
port, and cxcrcife of government, and where
yet the orders of the crown, and the fenfe
of the people, are fo widely different as to
ihe mode, that no agreement can ever be
come to in thefe points. — Is the government
and adminiflration of the government of the
colonies to be fufpended ? The intereft, per-
haps the being of the plantations, to be ha-
zarded by this obftinate variance, and can
the exercife of the Crown's negative, in fuch
emergencies, and w^ith fuch effedt, ever be
taken up as a meafure of adminiflration ?
And
/c.
■•■»* ..«*
■:k,
*A,
%-.^
y?
^
■'.t
( 43 )
And when every thing is thrown info con-
fufion, and abandoned even to ruin by fuch
meafure, will adminirtration juflify itfelf by
faying, that it is the fault of the colonics ?
On the contrary, this very ftate of the cafe
ihows the necellity of fome other remedy. • . ^
" ♦
The fettling and determining this point Is
of the moft eflential import to the liberties
on one hand, and the fubordination on the
other, of the government of the colonies to
the government of the mother country.—
In the examination of this point, it vvill come
under confidcration, firft, Whether the full
and whole of legiflature can be any way, in
any fpecial cafe, fufpended ; and next, whe- /"
ther the crown, by its inftrudtions, can fuf-'^-'^^'^ *^/^'' ^
pend the efFedt of this legiflature, which by ^^^^'^.t. ;..'>*
its commiflion or charters it has given or de-
clared ; if not, the crown, whether the par-
liament of Great Britain can do it, and how;
whether it (hould be by adl of Parliament,
or whether by addreffing the crown upon
a declarative vote, that it would be pleafed
to provide, by its inftrudions, for the carry-
ing the effed: of fuch vote into execution, as
was done in the cafe of the paper-money
currency.
■Ur-
/iif < ''
l/L '■;}
5 .
/ •-
In the courfe of examining thefe matters,
will arife to confidcration the following very
material
?r
'J
( 44 )
matcilal point. As a principal tie of the
iubordiiiation of the legiilatures of the colo-
nies on the government of the mother coun-
try, they are bound by their conftitutionb and
V *?^.'» ^ ^» • ^^^^'"'^'^'j '^ ^*^"^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ legiflature
y/..\^(, ^^ England, to be confirmed or abrogated by
the crown; but if any of the legiflatures
fliould be found to do almofl every adt of
legiflature, by votes or orders, even to the
._ repealing the efFe<5ts of afts, fufpending efta-
^ bhriiments of pay, paying fervices, doing
chancery, and other judicatory bufinefs : if
/ ^/^, ^ matters of this fort, done by thefe votes and
orders, never reduced into the form of an
adl, have their effed: without ever being fent
n.^ ?^•^■ V
%'>>/>
J.'"" A
/y<
•> *
/./'
if^
U^J
\/f ^) j/aS ^i^jfi-hhovj^Q as ads of legiflature, or fubmitted to
I '^ ^ ^ the allowance or difallowance of the crown :
p/'ii-f- ft^^ '■ if it fhould be found that many, or any of the
legiflatures of the colonies carry the powers
of legiflature into execution, independent of
the crown by this device, — it will be a point
to be determined how far, in fuch cafes,
the fubordination of the legiflatures of the
colonies to the government of the mother
country is maintained or fufpended 5— or if,
from emergencies arifing in thefe govern-
ments, this device is to be admitted, the
point, how far fuch is to be admitted, ought
to be determined ; and the validity of thefe
votes and orders, thefe Senatus Confulta fo
far declared. For a point of fuch great
import-
I
t
:4
■,r
( 45 ) ,
importance In the fubordinatlon of the co^
lony legHlatures, and of fo qiicftionablc a
caft in the valid exercife of this Icgiflative
power, ought no longer to remain in qucf-
tion.
'^ ' ■ .
The next general point yet undetermined, X^'" ^'^^^^-^
the determination of which very eflentially . Xy'".
imports the fubordination and dcpendance
of the colony governments on the govern-
ment of the mother country, is, the man-
ner of providir- for the fupport of govern-
ment, and all the executive officers of the
crown. The freedom and right efficiency
of the conftitution require, that the execu- .
tive and judicial officers of government
fhould be independent of the legiflative,
and more efpecially in popular governments,
where the legiflature itfelf is fo much influ-
enced by the humours and paffions of the
people; for if they be not, there will be
neither juflice nor equity in any of the courts
of law, nor any efficient execution of the
laws and orders of government in the ma-
giftracy j according therefore, to the confti-
tution of Great Britain, the crown has the
appointment and payment of the feveral exe-
cutive and judicial officers, and the legifla-
ture fettle a permanent and fixed appoint-
ment for the fupport of government and
civil lift in general ; This therefore the crown
■ •- has.
V,
I'-
( 46 ) •
has, afcrtiori^ a right to require of the colo-
nics, to whom, by its commiflion or charter
it gives the power of government, (and does,
by its inftrudion? to its governors, diredt
them to require ot' the legillature) fuch per-
manent fupport, appropriated to the offices,
not the officers of government, that they
may not depend upon the temporary and
arbitrary will of the legiflature.
This order of the crown is generally, if
not univerfally rejedled, by the legiflatures
of the colonies. The alTemblics who quote
the precedents of the Britifli conftitution,
in all the rights and privileges which they
claim on the principles thereof, allow the
truth and fitnefs of this principle in the Bri-
tifli conftitution, where the executive power
of the crown is immediately adminiftred by
the King's Majefty; yet fiy, under the cir-
cumftanccs in which they find therafelves,
that there is no other meafure left to them
to prevent the mifapplications of public mo-
ney, than by an annual revenue ifluing from
monies lodged in the hands of a provincial
treafurcr appointed by the aflemblics. For in^
thefe fubordinate governments, remote from
his Majefty's immediate influence, admini-
ftred oftentimes by neceffitous and rapacious
governors who have no natunl, altho' they
have a political connexion with thccountry,K
dxpe-
iiii'
( 47 )
experience has fliewn that they Iiav<? mif-
anplicd the monies raifed for the fupport ut
government, lb that the civil OiTiccis have
been left unpaid, even after having been
provided for by the alTembly. The point
then of this very important qucflion comes
to this ifllic, whether the inconvcnicncics
arifing, and experienced by fome inflanccs
of mifapplications of appropriations (for
which however there are in the King's
courts of law, due and fuffieient remedies
againft the offender) are a fuflicient reafori
and ground for eflablidiing a mcafure fo di-
redly contrary to the Britifh conflitution :
and whether the inconveniencies to be traced
in the hiflory of the colonies, through the
votes and journals of their legiflaturcs, iii
which the fupport of governors, judges,
and officers of the crown will be found to
have been withheld or reduced on occafion?,
where the affemblies have fuppofcd that
they have had reafon to difapprove the no-
mination, — or the pcrfon, or his conduit ;^
whether, I fay, thefe inconveniencies have
not been more detrimental and injurious to
government j and whether, inflead of thefe
colonies being dependent on, and governed
under, the officers of the crown, the fcepter
is not reverf'^d, and the officers of the crown
dependent on and governed by the aflem-
blics, as the colonics themfelves allov/,
tliat
( 48 )
that this mcafure * " renders the govcrnofi
•* and all the other fcrvants of the crown,
•* dependent on tlie aflembly." This is
mere matter of experience ; and the fadt,
when duly enquired into, muft fpeak for it-
felf :— but the operation of this meafurc
does not end here ; it extends to the afTuin-
ing by the aflemblies the adlual executive
part of government in the cafe of the re-
venue, than which nothing is more clearly
and unqueftionably fettled in the crown ; the
treafurer is folely and entirely a fervant of
thft aflembly; and altliough the monies grant-
ea and appropriated be, or ought to be,
granted to the crown on fuch appropriations,
the treafurer is neither named by the crown,
nor its governor, nor gives fecurity to the
crown or to the Lord High Treafurer, ( 'lich
feems the mofl proper) nor in many .he
colonies, is to obey the governor's warrant in
the iflue, nor accounts in the auditor's of-
fice, nor in any one colony is it admitted,
that he is liable to fuch account. In confe-
quence of this fuppofed neceflity, for the
afTembly's taking upon them the adminiftra-
tion of the treafury and revenue, the go-
vernor and fervants of the crown, in the
ordinary revenue of government, are not
only held dependent on the affembly, but
• Smith's Hiftory of New York, p. ii8.
all
I 49 ]
all fcrvlces, where fpccial appropriations arc
made fur the cxtraordinarics which fuch
fervices require, are adlually executed and
done by coinmifTioners appointed by the af-
fembly, to whole difpofition fuch appropria-
tions are made liable. It would be perhaps
invidious, uud might tend to prejudging on
points whi^ ii ought very ferioufly and dif-
pafl'ionately to be examined, if I were here
to point out in the feveral inftanccs of the
acftual execution of this aflumed power, how
almoft every executive power of the crown
lodged in its governor, is, where money is
neccfl'ary, thus exercifed by the alTembly and
its commilTiopers. I beg leave here to re-
peat, tha; I do not enter into the difcufliou
of thefe points J my only aiui is, fairly to
date them, giving the ftrongeft and clearell
explanations I am capable of to both i]dcSt
that the difcuflion may be brought to fome
determinate ifluej — and from that flate of
them to fuggeit, the abfolute neceflity there
Is of their being determined by that part of
•government, which (hall be found to have
the right and power to determine them ;
and to be fo determined, that while the
rights, liberties, and even privileges of the
colonies are prefervtd, the colonies may be
retained in that true and conftitutional de-
pendance to the mother country, and to the
, E govern-
'.I
ill'!'
[ 50 ]
government of the mother country, which
may unite them to it as parts of one whole.
f3
But hi nothing is a review and fettlement
of doubted points more necefTary, than in
the maxims and rules of their law, and the
flate of theii courts. It is a rule univer-
fally adopted through all the colonies, that
they carried with them to America the com-
mon law of England, with the power of
fuch part of the ftatutes (thofe concerning
ecclefiaftical juriididion excepted) as were in
force at the lime of their eftablifhment ;
but, as there is no fundamental rule where-
by to fay, what rtatutes are admiflible, and
what not, if they admit all, they admit the
full eftabliiliment of the ecclefiafticai juril-
didlion» from which they fled to this wilder-
nefs for refuge i — if they once make a dif-
tindtlon of admitting fome, and rejedling
others, who (liall draw the line, and where
fhall it pafs ? Befides, as the common law
itfelf is nothing but the pradice and deter-
mination of courts on points of law, drawn
into precedents ; where the circi.mflances
of a country and people, and their relation
to the flatutes and common law differ fo
greatly, the common law of thefe countries
muil, in its natural courfc, become different,
and fometime even contrary, or at leafl in-
compatible, with the common law of Eng-
land,
land!
natic
comi
the
and
This
take!
(C
t(
<(
<c
(• SI. )
land, lO as that, in ibme cafes, the determi-
nations arifing both from the ftatute and
common law mu/i be reje&ed. This renders
the judicatories of thefe countries vague
and precarious, dangerous, if not arbitrary :
This leads neceflarily (let what care will be
taken, in forming and enabling their pro-
vincial laws) this leads to the rendering the
common law of the country different, in-
compatible with, if not contrary to, and in-
dependent of^ the law of the mother coun-
try, than which nothing can be more dif-
advantageous to the fubjedt, and nothing
more derogatory from the power of the go-
vernment of the mother country, and from
that fundamental maxim, ihat the colonics
fhall have no laws contrary to thofe of the
mother country.
I cannot avoid quoting herr at length, a
very precife and juft obfervation of the au-
thor of the Hidory of New York. " The
ftate of our laws opens a door to much
controvcrfy. The uncertainty with re-
fpedl to them, renders property precari-
ous, and greatly expofes us to the arbi-
trary decifion of bad judges. The com-
mon law of England is generally received,
together with fuch ftatutes as were enac^l:-
ed before we had a legiflature of our own ;
but our courts cxercife a fovereign autho-
E 2 - *' ritv
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( 52 )
rlty in determining, wto parfs of the com-
mon andjiatutc law ought to be extended;
for it muft be admitted, that the differ-
ence of circumftances necelfarily requires
us, in fome cafes, to rejedi the determina-
tion of both. In many inftances, they
have alfo extended even ads of parhament,
palfed fince we have had a diftindt legifla-
tionj which is greatly adding to our con-
fufion. The pradice of our courts is
not Icfs uncertain than the law. Some of
the EngHfli rules are adopted, others rejec-
ted. Two things therefore feem to be ab-
folutely neccffary for the public fecurity.
" Fiift, ^he pajjing an adi for fettling the
extent of the Englijh laws, , ; ;.viu
• -•* ''■ - •
" Secondly ^ That the courts ordain a ge-
neral fet of rules for the regulation of the
practice." .. / . . ^ :• ' - . . ._ :c '
From this reprcfentation of things, by an
eminent practitioner in thofe courts, it mult
be fcen that fomcthing is wanting, to fix
determinately the judicial powers. But
from a further review made by government
here, it will be found that much more is
wanting. — Firft, to determine (I do not at
all take into confideration which way it be
determined, only) 1 fay, to determine fome
points on this head, which are, and will
other-
I 1;!''
( 53 )
otherwife, remain in difpute ; but wlilch
oueht bv no means to be fuffered one mo-
ment to remain '"n difpute.
The crown direds its governor to erc(ft
courts, and appoint the judges thereto.—
The adual appointment of the judges is no
where dire5lly difputed. But the power
of erecting courts, according to this inliruc-
tion, is, 1 believe, univerially difputed j it
being a maxim univerfally maintained by the
colonics, that no court can be erctficd but
by ad: of legiflature. Thofe who reafon
on the fide of the crown, — ^iv, — that the
crown does not, by eredling courts in the
colonies, claim any right of enacting the
jurifdidion of thofe courts, or the laws where-
by they are to ad. The crown names
the judge, eftablifhes the court, but the ju-
rifdidion is fettled by the laws of the realm 5
—and " * cuftoms, precedents, and com-
** mon judicial proceedings of a rourt are a
" law to the court, and the extermination
" of courts make points to be law."— -
The reafoning of the colonifts would certain-
ly hold good againfl the eredior of any new
jurifdidion, eftabliflied on powers not known
to the lawd of the realm j but how it can be
applied to the oppofing the eftablifhment
of courts, the la^Vo of whofe pradice, ju-
rifdidion and powers are already fettled by
* Rep. 16. 4. Rep. 53. fol. 298.
E 3 • the
.'I
If
%
S:-
•Mil
I: I
( 54 )
the laws of the realm, is the point in ijfue^
and to be determined. It will then be fixed,
beyond difpute, whether the crown can, in
its colonies, eredl, without the concurrence
of the legiflature, courts of Chancery, Ex-
chequer, King's Bench, Common Pleas,
Admirjlty, and Probate or Ecclefiaftical
courts. If it fhould be determined in fa-
vour of the reafoning, and the claims cf the
colonifts, — I fliould apprehend that the con-
fideration of the points under this head,
would become an objed of government here,
even in its legiflative capacity. In which
viev/ it may be of confequence to confider,
how far, and on what ground?, the rights of
the crown are to be maintained by courts of
King's Bench, &c. and how far the reve-
nues by courts of Exchequer, and how far
the crown and fubjedl may have relief by
courts of equity. If in this view we con-
fider the defe<fls which muft be found in
Provincial courts, thofe point out the necef-
iity of the eflablifhment of a remedial gene-
ral court of Appeal j but if we view the
only mode of appeal, which at prefent exifts,
we lliall fee how inapplicable, how inade-
quate that court is. I cannot, in one view,
better defcribe the defects of the provincial
courts in thefe infant governments, than by
that very defcription which my Lord Chief
' if^ice Hales gives of our county courts, in
- nhmcy of our own orQvernment, where-
.... be mentions, ** F^u^f
C(
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cc
t(
it
t(
te
it
( 55 )
" Firft, The ignorance of the judges, who
were the freeholders of the county.
** Secondly^ That thefe various courts bred
variety of law, efpccially in the feveral
counties, for the decifions or judgments
being made by divers courts, and feveral
independent judges and judicatories, who
had no common intereft amongfl them
in their feveral judicatories, thereby in pro-
cefs of time, every feveral county would
have feveral laws, cuftoms, rules, and
forms of proceedings.—
" '^irdly. That all the bufinefs of any
moment was carried by parties and fac-
tions, and that thofe of great power and
intereft in the county did eafily overbear
" others in their own caufes, or in fuch
" wherein they were intercfled, either by
" relation of kindred, tenure, fervice, de-
pendence, or application."
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Upon the firfl article of this parallel, it
will be no diflionour to many gentlemen fit-
ting on the benches of the courts of law in
the colonies, to fay, they are not, and can-
not be expeded to be lawyers, or learned
in the law. And on the fecond article it is
certain, that although it be a fundamental
maxim of colony adminiftration, that tiic
E 4 col^-
■I IV^IIflpil ■» .
t I
I'
m
■i,t;|
! ''i
A-. v
>-'.
( 56 )
colvon'cs fliall hnve no laws contrary to the
laws of Great Britain, yet, from the fluc-
tuation of rcfolution?, and confufion in the
conftrudtion and pradice of the law in the
divers and feveral colonies, it is certain, that
the practice of their courts, and their com-
mon law, muft be not only different from
each other, but in the confequence different
alfo from that of Great Britain. In all the
colonies the common law is received as the
foundation and main body of their law j but
each colony being vefted with a Icgiflative
power, the common law is thereby conti-
nually altered ; fo that (as a great law^yer of
the colonies has faid) *' by reafon of the
" divcrllty of the refolutions, in their re-
" fpedlive fuperior courts, and of the feve-
" ral new adts or laws made in them feve-
rally ; the feveral fyftems of the laws of
thofe colonies grow more and more va-
riant, not only from one another, but alfo
from the laws of England."
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Under the third article, I fear experience
can well fay, how powerfully, even in courts,
the influence of the leaders of party have been
felt in matters between individuals. But in
thefc popular governments, and where every
executive officer is under a dependence for
a temporary, wretched, and I had almoft
faid, arbitrary fupport to the deputies of the
people,
!■ -l-
'lil
f
■'('"■,
( S7 )
people, — It will be no injufllce to the frame
of human nature, either in the pcrfonof the
judges, of the juries, or even the popular
lawyer to ruggeft, how little the crown, or
the rights of government, when oppofed to
the fpiiit of democracy, or even to the paf-
fions of the populace, has to expedt of that
fupport, maintenance, and guardianfliip,
which the courts are even by the conftitution
fuppofed to hold for the crown. — Nor would
it be any injuftice to any of the colonies, juft
to remark in this place, how difficult, if ever
pradlicable it is in any of their courts of
common law to convidl any perfon of a vio- . M/0 ' '
lation of the laws of trade, or in any matter J-^^ ^^ ' "' ' '
of crown revenue. But the defect in moft, ^./>A-V ^'^'- '
and adual dciiciency in many of the colo- 'vv^:^ ^'i^-^-' •
nies, of a court of equity, does ftill more i-s ^ ^^, ^i
forcibly lead to the necelfity of the meafure ' "''' '
of fome remedial court of appeal and equi-- '
t'*«<
//
'^{•j^-*^
ty-
In all the King's governments fo
called, — the governor, or governor and coun-
cil are the chancellor, or judges of the court
of chancery. But fo long as I under-
hand that the governor is, by his general
inftruftion, upon found principles of policy
and juftice, reftrained from cxercifing the
office of judge or juftice in his own perfon,
I own I always confidered the governor,
taking up the office of chancellor, as a
cafe labouring with inexplicable difficulties.
But
li^
,1 >l
1 il
I '
l; .III
!■ :•}■
i':
( S8 )
But how unfit are governors in general
for this high office of law ; and how
improper is it that governors (ho.ild be
judges, where perhaps the confcquence
of the judgment may involve government,
and the adminiftration thereof, in the con-
tentions of parties. But the fadt is, that the
general diffidence of the wifdom of this
court thus conftituted, the apprehenfion that
reafons of government may mix in with the
grounds of the judgment, has had an ef-
fect that the coming to this court is avoided
as much as poffible, fo that it is almoft in
difufe, even where the cftablifliment of it
IS allowed. But in the charter governments
they have no chancery at all. I muft again
quote the opinion of a great lawyer in the
colonies, — ** there is no court of chancery
** in the charter governments of New Eng-
** land [and I believe I may add alfo in Pen-
fylvania] " nor any court vefted with power
to determine caufes in equity, fave only
that the juftices of the inferior court, and
the juftices of the fuperior court refpec-
tively, have power to give relief on mort-
gages, bonds, and other penalties con-
tained in deeds, in all other chancery and
equitable matters, both the crown and
the fubjedt are without redrefs. This in-
troduced a practice of petitioning the le-
gillative courts for relief, and prompted
" thofe
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( 59 )
«* thofe courts to interpofe their authority.
** Thefe petitions becoming numerous, in
** order to give the greater difpatch to fuch
** bufinefs, the legiflative courts tranfadled
'* fuch bufinefs by orders or refolves, witb-
out the folemnity of pafling ads for fuch
purpofes; and have further extended this
power by refolves and orders, beyond
** what a court of chancery ever attempted
** to decree, even to the fufpending of pub-
** lie laws, which orders or refolves are
** not fent home for the royal aflent. The
" tendency of thefe mcafures is too obvi-
" ous to need any obfervations thereon."
Nor do I fee how this meafure of proceed-
ing can be ventured upon in the colonies, or
fuffered to continue by the government here,
if it be fuppofed that by i Hen. 4. 14. " it
** is accorded, and allented, that no appeal
" be from henceforth made, or in any wife
** purfued in parliament in time to come."
The general apprehenfion of thefe defedls
occafioned, that at tuc iirft planting of the
colonies, the King in council here in Eng-
land was eftablidied as a court of appeals
from the provincial judicatories. At
the time of fetding thefe colonies, there
was no precedent of a judicatory befides
thofe within the realm, except in the cafes
of Guernfey and Jerfey, the remnants of the
dutchy of Normandy, and not united within
the
■> '-
'3
ri
,1 V
( 60 )
the rerJm : according to the cuftom of Nor-
mandy, appeals lay to the Duke in council j
and upon this groand, appeals lay from the
judicatories of thefc iflands to the King here,
as Duke in rouricil ; and upon this general
precedent (without perhaps attending to the
peculiar cafe of the appeal, lying to the Duke
of Normandy and not to the King) was an
appeal from the judicatories of the colonics
to the King in council fettled. —But, be-
fides the inapplicahlenefs of fuch appeal to
the modes of the Englifh law ; hefides, that
this appeal does not acltually take place in
general, and is in fome of the charter colo-
nies adlually excluded, except in perfonal ac-
tions, wherein the matter in difference ex-
ceeds 300/. flerling; befidcs the diffi-
culty of this appeal, and inefficiency of this
redrefs, — the King in council never being,
by the conftitution, in any other cafe, be-
tween fuhjedl and fubjedt, formed as fuch a
court of appeal, it fcarce ever, in the tem-
porary and occaiional fittings, looks like fuch
a court ; but is rather accidentally or parti-
cularly, than officially attended.
Thefe general apprehenfions and reafon-
ings, upon experience, have led many very
knowing and difpaffionate men in the colo-
nies, into a convidlion of the neceffity of
fome eftablidied and conftitutional court of
appeal
( 6i )
appeal and redrcfs: and the followlnp; meafurc
has not only been fuggefted, hut even taken
up as matter of confidcration by fome of the
ablcft lawyers in that country ; — namely, the
cllablifhment of a fuprcme court of appeal
and equity, not confined to any one govern-
ment, but circulating through a certain dif-
tridt of governments; perhaps as follows;
one to Nova Scotia and New England ; one
to New York, New Jerfeys, Penfylvania, and
Maryland -^one to Virginia, the Carolinas,
and Georgia. It has been imagined, that this
court ftiould be eftabliflied by a commiflion
iflued to two or more perfons, learned in
the law, not only of the mother country,
but of the feveral governments in its faid
diftridt : that this commiflion fhould give
full powers of a court of chancery, with
power alfo of judging on matters of law, to
be brought before this court, by writ of er-
ror, from the feveral fuperior courts of the
diflrid, which this extended to. Such court
would become an eftahlifhed court of ap-
peals and redrefs, would regulate all the
courts of law, fo that they could not ex-
ceed their jurifdidion ; would have a general
fuperintendency over all inferior courts ;
would tend to eftablifh fome regularity, and
introduce a conformity, not only amongft
the courts themfelves, of the different colo-
nies, but a cpjifprmity alfo to the courts of
.' the
I 1
( 6a )
the mother country, in the conftrudtion and
difpcnfathn of law : fuch court would, more
than any other incafure, not only tend to
prcferve the laws, and pra<5tice of law in the
colonics, under a conflitutional conformity
to the laws of the mother country; but would
alfo maintain that dependency therein, which
is of the efTence of colony adminiflration.
There are gentlemen on this fide the wa-
ter, who feeing the defedls of this meafure
as to a court of appeals, and not feeing the
neceflity of a court of chancery at all, as
there is nothing contrary to the fundamen-
tals of law, that thefe law-courts already
cftablifhed (hould equitize ; (if I may fo ex-
prefs myfelf)— Think, that infteadof efta-
blifliing any new courts of chancery, —it
would be very proper to -abolifli even thofe
already eftablifhed, extending the power
which the law-courts already take in chan-
cering bonds, &c. by impowering them
to equitize : and after that to take fuch mea-
fures as may beft eftablifh a fixt and con-
ftitutional court of appeals here in Eng-
iaud- '' - - ' • • ' ■" ' I-
I' A.
Senlible of the danger of innovations, and
abhorrent from tampering in experiments of
politics, I mention the following rather aS
matter of fpeculation, than to recommend
2 the
■III'
( 63 )
the trial : yet I cannot but ohfervc, that
while the conftitutions of the governments
of the colonics take fo exactly the model of
the BritiOi conftitution, it always flruck me
as a ftrangc dcviatbn in this one particular,
that the governor's council of ftate, although
a diftind, and I had almoft faid, an incom-
patible board, — with the CLuncil, one branch
of the legillature, is yet always conftituted of
thd faniC perfons, in general nominated and
liable to be fuipcnded by the governor.
Oiic may fee many advantages, bcfidcs the
general conformity to the government of the
mother country, in having thcfe boards dif-
tindt irl their perfons, as well as their ofiice.
If the council of ftate remaining under the
faine conftitution as at prefent, was com-
pofed of men of the befl experience, for-
tune, and intereft in the colony, taken in
common from the legiflative council, the
houfe of reprefentatives, or the courts, while
the members of the legiflative council, in-
dependent of the governor for their exigence,
had all and only thofe powers which are ne-
ceflary to a branch of the legiflature, much
weight would be added to adminiftration in
the confidence and extent of intered that it
would thereby obtain ; and to the legiflature
a more true and politicBl diftribution of
power, which, inftead of the falfe and arti-
ficial lead, now held up by expedients, would
throw
i
'*7
*>/.,'' '
>i^*l/
( 64 )
throw the n;al and conRitutional ballancc of
power into the hands of government. ^ ; ..
I did, in this place, intend to have
confidered the nature of the cftabhfhment
of the regular troops now in Aoierica, as to
that relation which fuch eUablifhment ought
to bear to the civil governments in the colo-
nies, in timeofpeace^ ccnfonant to what is ad-
mitted here in Britain, or at leall in Ireland,
fo as to be as little as may be injurious to the
civil conftitutions j but as the unaccountable
embroilment of Indian affairs, and the hof-
tile confequences that have taken place, give
to buiinefs on the continent of America,
the face of war -, I iliall referve my fenti-
ments on this point to a more proper oc-
cafion i obferving only, that where the
office and power, as now exercifcd, of a mi-
litary commander in chief, are not abfolute-
ly necefTary ; neither prudence, juflice, nor
found policy can juflify fuch an ellablifh-
ment. In time of peace it cannot be necef-
fary : in time of peace the civil govern-
ments, in all their powers, as granted by
commiihons and charters, ought to predo-
minate. If there be, in time of peace, in
the civil governors, and oiher officers of the
crown, the lead fubor^Vination to this mili-
tary commander in chief; it will be found
a dangerous thing to have given lb much of
civil
■( 65 )
civil poWer out of the King's hands, and
to have done lb little to maintain tholCj into
whole hands it is entrufted.
* » * '
The feveral points of government, as
above, revifed, maturely ccnlidcred, and
finally determined upon, and an adminiflra-
tion formed, that iliall firmly, uniformly,
and conltitutionally govern the colonies, by
that predominate power, which the mother
country ought to hold over the colonies,
as corporations united to the realm, the
people would become confcientioully in eve-
ry individual, and conflitutionaliy in their
refpedlive governments, difpofed to receive
the legal imprefTion of the fupreme govern-
ment of the mother country, and to commu-
nicate the fame through all its powers, fo
as to form, not a dependant appendix to the
demefnes of the crown, but a fubordinate
united part of a one whole, this great com-
mercial dominion of Great Britain.
Thefe matters fettled j the Indian affairs,
the revenue, and t'-e trade of the colonies
come next under confideration. But for
the fame reafons, f n* which I have omitted
to fpeak to the military eflablifliment of the
army in the colonies, 1 fliall here omit to
mention thole meafures for conducing In-
dian affairs, which, by men beft verfcd thro'
F expe-
/ >/ .
»/
./
U
)
t-J-
.1*
'Mi
%
^S \
■fc? .
( 66 )
experience and fuccefs in thofe matters,
have been thought moft likely to maintain
that relation which Indians and our colonies
ought to bear to each other, and to derive
that utility from thefe Indians, which in po-
licy Hiould be the reafon and grounds of
our connexion with them.
,1 I
Government, by thofe minifters, whofc
department it is to fuperintend and admini-
ster the public revenue, having taken the
points of the colony revenue under confi-
deration, I muft, for the prefent, think my-
felf precluded from entei*ing into the dif-
cufTion of thofe points, which I had allot-
ted to this part of my paper. However, I|
will juft venture to fuggeft, — that the bed
and fureft funds of fuch revenue, will be,
firft, the cuftoms arifing from the trade
regulated as hereafter to be mentioned : fe-
condly, a ftamp-duty, which, if duly paid,
will raife, from any fuppofed extent and
number of people in the colonies, near a third
more than it doth raife from the fame extent
and number of people in England. Next,
the quit- rents, if duly laid and duly col-
IcBed. But to obtain thofe points, a tho-
rough revifion of the flate and laws of the
quit' rents is neceflary. Ihere are people in
the colonies, who, knowing the original
defect of, and almofl: inextricable difficulties
attend-
latters,
tain tain
olonies
» derive
in po-
inds of
whofe
idmini-
:en thel
r con fi-
nk my- 1
he dif-l
d allot-
/ever, 11
he beft
A^ill be, I
e trade
d : fe-
y paid,
nt and
r a third
e extent
Next,
{ly col-
a tho-
of the
eople in
originr.1
ficulties
attend-
( 67 )
attending, the ftate of the quit-rents, have
thought, that in thofe colonies, where the
crown has a right to quit-rents, it would be
a wife meafure for adminiilration, and an
equal and eafy one for the landholders, to
eftablilh a general moderate land-tax of
* * * * * per hundred acres, in lieu of fucli ./.
quit-rents. And indeed calculations have
been made, at a very low rate, on this mea-
fure, whereby the fum produced does great-
ly exceed what would be imagined on the
firft caft of thought, and fully equal to the
ordinary expences of government in thofe
provinces. But befides the difficulties, re-
fpedling the rights of the crown, which may
attend this fcheme, it is a point that ought
very deliberately an] dil]3affionately to be
weighed, how far even the fuprcme govern-
ment of the mother country can, confidently //
with general liberty, proceed in laying tixes
on its colonies, where the confent of the
people cannot be, in any conflitutional way
taken. The excife becomes another fund :
but both in this, and in the flampt-duty re-
venue, a point will arife to doubt, how far
thefe colonies, who, for the neceffities of
government, and the emergencies of fervice,
have already, by their proper powers, laid
thefe duties on the people, and granted the
revenue arifing therefrom to the crown, by
ads which have received the confent of the
F 2 crown^
^
_ ( 68 )
crown ♦ how far thofe colonics may, or may
not, be fuppofed to have precluded any ad:
of adminirtration here on thefe heads.
I mention this matter as a point of doubt,
which would unavoidably arife j but do not
pretend to determine upon it. 1 will fur-
ther venture to fuggefl, that, whatever re-
venues are raifed, the y?r/? and fpecial ap^
propriation of them ought to be to the pay-
ing the governors J and all other crown of-
ficers independent of the legijlatures of the
colonies. —
Under this general head of
colony revenue, though perhaps not under
the lame department of adminiftration, will
come the confideration of a paper-money
currency for the colonies. How far fuch
is neceilary, how far fuch is admiilible, and
under what regulations it ought to be ad-
mitted.
As the outrageous abufes committed by
fome of the colonies in creating a paper-
currency, fo far as to affedl the courfe of
juflice amongft themfelves, and to injure
the interefl of the mother country, hath not
only occafioned that an ad: of Parliament
was pafTed to abolifli that fraudulent me-
dium, and to reltrain the making of it for the
future, but hath alfo given caufe of great pre-
judice againft it in adminiflration 5 it may be
of ufe here to fuggefl, that it is not only ne-
celTary
( 69 )
ccflary to the commerce and culture of the
colonies, that they (hould always have a cer-
tain quantity of this paper-currency : but
that it is alfo the beft policy, even for the
felf-lntcreil: of the mother country, that it
fhould be permitted. The thing is palpable,
and a matter of fad:, that the colonies, even
\i permitted under the ufual reftraints, to
trade with the French and Spanifh colonies,
are incapable of creating a filvcr currency,
fufficient for the internal circulation, and ex-
ternal payments of their trade and commerce.
They can derive none from the mother coun-
try, fo long as the ballance of trade is againft
them. Their fhop-trade therefore, the pur-
chafe and culture of fetdements, and their
external commerce mull be fo far forth ob»
flrud:ed, as fuch medium is wanting, where
all the filver that any colony hath is fcarcely
fufficient for the circulation which its inter-
nal exchange and barter require. The im-
ports from the mother country into fuch •
colony muft be proportionably lefTened j and
that colony continuing in fuch circumflan-
ces, may, under every difadvantage, be drove
to the necefTity of manufaduring thofe com-
modities, which it could otherwife much
better import from the mother country. But
permit any colony to have a certain quantity
of paper-money, and all that filver, which
is no longer neceffary at home, will con-
F q ilantlv
y y
li
f
nr?
^.
7 A
,: n^
-t'f
( 70 )
ftantly go abroad to the mother country for
the manufadures, and even luxuries of that
mother country. This argument reaches
only to the convenience and well-being of
the colony, but in cafes of emergency in
war or invafion, the very being of thefe co-
lonies may depend upon their being able or
not, to create a fufficient fupply for fuch
cafes. If therefore, inftead of prohibiting
thefe colonies in general from making paper-
money, the government would, from a pre-
cife and adequate knowledge of the nature
of money, whether paper or filver, fix fome
general rules for the colon Il-s in this point,
there could not be a more beneficial mea-
fure taken up for the welfare of the colo-
nies, or the intereft of the mother country.
Thefe rules would turn upon regulating the
FUND, THE USES, and THE QUANTITY of
fuch medium. The fund fhould at leaft be
adequate to the payment of the principal in
a limited timey and where the paper-money is
treafurer's notes given for money lent to the
government, the fund whereon it is bor-
rowed fhould be alfo capable of paying, ad
interim^ a certain intereft, a? is the cafe of
the treafurer's notes ilTued in the province
of MafTachufett's Bav. On the othei hand,
where the pap^r-money created, is govern-
ment notes, deriving a currency from the
authority and fecurity of government, lent
to
( 71 )
to mortgagees on land or other fecurlty,
where an intereft is paid to government for
this loan, the depofit of lands or chattels,
thus become the fund for which the govern-
ment makes itfelf refponfible, ought to be
futHcient for the re- payment in a given and
limited time; while the interefl paid to go-
vernn)cnt ouglit to be appropriated to the
making good all eventual loffes which may
arife in this fcheme. This paper ifehig 710
legal tender, the payment may be made in
filver, not according to the tenor of the pa-
per, but according to its proportionate value
to filver at that time, while the government,
if it has IfTued the paper on fuch terms as
do not fecure it againfl: depreciation, is bound
to make good the deficiency. On the con-
trary, after the expiration of the loan, and
all charges of the loan oflice, and other
charges paid, the benefit of the agency ought
to accrue to government, the fole benefit
which ought thus to accrue. This medium
ought to be applicable to all the equitable,
as well as legal lifes of filver money within
the colony, except that it Jhould not be a
legal tender. This exception is not meant
to refi:rain, but io fecure the t^es of this me-
dium J for when it cannot be forced in pay-
ment as a legal tender, this very cafe will
oblige that legiflature who creates it, to form
it of fuch internal right conftitution, as fhall
F 4 force
^/A;, n f'^t* -'*'#s.
n
72 )
force its own way on a level, nearly equal io
filver. 'The quantity ought always to be
proportioned to the neceffity of the medium
wanted ; which, (the fund and ufcs being
fairly and abfolutely fixed) may always be
judged of by the rife or fall of the value
in its general currency or exchange : for
where the quantity ifTued is more than ne-
ceflity requires, the value will depreciate :
and where the fund is good, and all proper
ufes of the medium fecured, fo long as no
more paper is ilTued than neceflity does re-
quire, it will always hold a value near to,
though fomewhat lefs than filver. On this
fubjed: I here refer the reader to the follow-
ing very judicious trad:, written and given
to me, kveral years ago, by a gentleman of
Penfylvania, converfant in thefe matters, both
as a lawyer and a merchant. I print and
publifli it by leave of a near relation, and
fubjoin it as containing the moft cxad: and
decifive fent^ments on this fubjedt that 1 have
any where met with. I entitle it, Consi-
derations gN A FAPIiR-CuRRENCy.
or
oui
CO
coi
fhal
thii
by
crei
ALL value is given to things for their
fitnefs or power to anfwer or procure the ne-
cefiary conveniencies or pleasures of human
life. • ■
' ' ' ■ This
of
both
and
and
and
ihave
NSI-
their
ne-
lan
This
( 73 )
This valu'; may be confidcred as abfolute
or relative. Abfolute value terminates in
our cileem of any thing, without referring
CO any other j relative is that, which it has
compared with another. The latter only I
fhall have occafion to treat of.
Men have power to difcover qualities in a
thing, which (hall give it value. They can
by laws, cuftoms, or fafliions, greatly in-
creafe that value ; yet, to know or fix its
worth or price, compared with other things
li priori^ has always been found beyond their
reach and capacity.
This is owing to an Inability to forefee,
eftimate, and govern exadlly all the points
and circumftance?, on which the value of
things turns, which are fuch as are in, or fol-
low the nature and order of things in gene-
ral, and then may be forefeen and judged of
with fome certainty -, or which confift of the
paffions, prejudices, and mifapprehenfions of
mankind, whofe number and influences we
cannot rate or calculate.
From the natural ftate and order of things,
I think it mav be affirmed, that the worth
or price of any thing will always be, as the
quantity and ufes amongft mankind ; as the
ufes
■ >
«.*
■• 1 1
I
I Ml
( 74 )
ufcs dircdlly, and as the quantity reciprocal-
ly or invcrlely. Ufe is the lole caufe of value,
and value the neccfTary efFcdl of ufe. Abat-
ing thefe diftindlions of caufe and cffctt,
ufclefs and worthlefs, are fynonymous terms.
Every man mud agree, that if you pdd to a
caufe, you muft increafe the effedl -, fubftracfl
from it, and the contrary efFcd: muft fol-
low. Let the quantity of any thing be as
20, and the ufes as 20, and let it have a va-
lue J let the ufes be increafed to 30, without
inlarging the quantity ; it is plain, the equal
proportion that every man can enjoy will be
as 20 divided by 30, jds only. But this
being Icfs by 4 ^^^^ ^ach man requires, the
demand for it, and confequently the value
muft rife. Subti. 10 from the ufes when
20, and then under an equal diftribution,
each ftiall have double the value he wants,
which muft lefTen the demand, and the value
dependent upon it.
Governing the ufes is one of the rational
powers, that men have over the value of
things.
Experience teaches the meaneft under-
ftanding, that price depends on quantity, and
that they are to each other inverfely, or the
more of one the lefs the other. Water is
as
( 71 )
as nccefTary as any thing, and a diamond
perhaps as little ; yet the fuperfluous plenty
of one has rendered it of no worth in moll
places, and the fcarcity of the other has car-
ried it to an extravagan'- price.
Limiting the quantity is another rational
power men have over the value of things,
and I do not know a third.
From hence it appears, that increafing
the ufes, and lefTening the quantity, and lef-
fening the ufcs, and increafing the quantity,
muft always have the fame influence upon
the rates and prices ot things. Therefore,
whenever I fhew the effect of one, for bre-
vity's fake let it be underftood, that I fuppofe
the fame confequence will attend the other
refpedlivcly.
Although I affirm, that variation in quan-
tity or ufe fhall caufe a change in the price
of a thing, yet I do not fay, that this change
fhall be in proportion equal to the variation
in the quantity or ufe ; for i think the con-
trary. To inftance in quantity, let it be in
any thing as 30, and let the ufe be as 30,
and it fhall then have a mean value. 'The
ufe unchanged, let the quantity be at one
time as 20, at another 40. Whoever con-
fid ers
ii
( 76 )
fidcrs the prevalence of men's appetites for a
fcarce commodity, under the dreads and ap-
prehenlions of wanting it, with their different
abilities to procure it, on one hand, and their
great contempt of ufelcfs excefs on the other,
muft agree it is more than probable, that the
difference between the means and the ex-
tremes fliall not be the fame in the prices, as
in the quantities. Merchants, by experi-
ence, have found the trujth of what 1 ad-
vance. I think they have obfervcd, that lef-
fening a commodity one third from the mean
quantity, ccvteri^ paribus, nearly doubles the
value J adding a third, fubftradts one half
from it ; and that by further increafmg or
diminifliing the quantity, thefe difpropor-
tions between the quantity and prices vaftly
increafe.
It is extremely difficult, if not ImpofTible,
to inveftigate thefe proportions mathema-
tically j but events fpringing from ufe and
experience have equal certainty in them, and
to all pradical purpofes are as much to be
relied and depended upon.
It is further worth obfervation, that what-
ever fluctuates much in quantity, and confe-
quently in worth, will fink beneath its mean
value.
Sup-
( 77 )
Suppofc the quantity of any thing pro-
duced in every 50 '^^cars be cxadly the lame:
let the annual produdt be as one anfwcralile
to the nccefTitics of mankind, then tlic va-
lue in each year lli til be as one, and the
whole equal to 50. But if the quantity of
the annual produdt fluctuates, there will be
annual Hudluations in the value j but as the
proportions of the decreafe of value, from
experience above ftated, will be greater than
the proportions nf the incrcafc of value, this
fluctuation will caufe a deficiency in the
mean value, which deficiency will always be
in proportion to the greatnels and quicknefs
of the changes. This, 1 prefume, is occa-
fioned by the defire of mankind in general to
reft on certainty, rather th:in rely on what
is fludtuating and inconftant, though they
Ihould cxpcdt gain equal to the rifque, and
by the low circumftauces of the majority of
men, whofe fortunes, in all prudence, diredt
to the firft, rather than the latter. The cafe
lofinfuranccsisai) evident proof of this remark.
If the infurcrs gain, winch I think lUJli be
admitted, then they receive a premium be-
yond the value of the riiquc, and this gain
[the intured pay for certainty again It contm^
\gcnt loljes,
Thefe few rules of eftimating the value
|of things, well applied, will, I prefume,
Hiew
ii I
II
id,
[ 78 ]
ihew when it is convenient to introducs pa-
per-money into a country, and when it will
prove hurtful j what are its advantages and
inconveniencies, general and particular, when
introduced ; of what great importance it is
to prevent an excefs in quantity, and to ex-
tend the ufes; and nearly what its value will
be in any given Aate.
If a nation has a quantity of money equal
to its commerce, the lands, commodities,
and labour of the people fhali bear a middle
price. This (late is the befl, and tends moil
to enrich the people, and make their hap-
pinefs lafting. If they (hould mint paper
to pafs for money, the encreafe of quantity
in the former will lefTen the value of the lat-
ter, will raife the price of lands and rent^,
and make the labour of llich a people, and:^
the commodities, be rated higher than in,
other places. Mens fortunes will rife in no-
minaly not real value ; from whence idlenefs,]
cxpence and poverty Hiall follow. Under |
thefj circiimftances, their real money, in-
(lead of their commodities, fliall be exportcdl
from them. Here the pnpcr will be their
banc and dcAruclion. But if their com*
mcrcc, or uics of money, exceed the quan-l
tity of it, their lands, labour, and comtnc'
^iuici flidl fink beneath their vv^)rth in othcr|
COUK*
( 79 )
countries. Few purchafers of lands will be
found in regard to the fuperior profit that
muft attend the ufe of money in trade : the
weal i by merchant Jhall be at the bead of affair Sy
with few competitions ; he fhall be able to
grind down the farmer in the fale of his com-
modities, and, when thofe fail to fupport him,
in the purchafe of his lands. The artifan's
labour fhall be depreciated by the merchant
who exports it, or the needy farmer that
ufes it. The wealthy only fliall accumulate
riches, the commonwealth iliall decline, and
in time farmers and artifans muft defert the
place for another, where their labour fliall be
better rewarded. Here the ufe of paper- ^j)^ .,
money will Hiake off the fetters and clogs of '
the poor. Merchants will multiply ; they
will raife the price of labour, and of the •
fruits of the earth, and therthy the value of
lands. An equal diftribution of gain and
profit Ihall fucceed and deftroy the partitrl
accumulations of wealth.
I think thefc marks, taken from the value
of lands, labour, and commodities, compar^id
with their worth in other countries, will be
found the only infallible rules to judge of
an equality, cxccU, or dcfcdl oi money in
any place wlicrclocvrr j and confcqucntly
wjll, at all timcb, unerringly (licw the nc-
cefTuy
^1^
>
( 8o )
cefiky of increafing coins, or the contrary.
Had a neighbouring province well underftood
and weighed thefe points, they had not
created a paper credit far exceeding all their
ufcs for money, when they were able .. fup-
ply themfelves with gold eq-ial to their trade,
nor at the fame time have dammed up i'o
many ufes for it, which now cover them
v/ith clouds and confufion, th v. no man can
fee his way through. The bell method they
can ufe is to fink it as faft as poffible, and
not let their fund lie in Britain at an intereft
lefs than ^ per cent, when it is -vorth 6 in
their own country, and their paper pafles 50
fer cent, lefs than the nominal value. But
to return : whf^n it is found neccflary to add
paper- money to the coin of any country, to
*;s value ous^ht to be the main and
ippor'
P
1
nncipai view
Th
IS v;i
11 tur
n u
pon
tl
le
FUNP, the USES, snd the QjiANTixy,
All value arifiug from the ufe, I beg leave
to call cxlrinfick.
Having Hiewn that paper-money acquires
its extrinlic value from the ulc;i, which uicJ
apparently may ht encrea'cd or diminiflicd j
1 think it would be ncedlcfs and n)iii»cndin'/
the reader's time, to demonllratc, that iliis
value p.)u(l be in direct proportion to the
ufts
( Si )
ufes j for it would really i^.mount to no more
than the proof of an axiom univerfally ac-
knowledged, that the effcdt (hall always be
adequate to the canfe. Therefore, in all
future arguments, I fliall take it for granted.
The fund ought to be as fatisfadory to
mankind as human wifdoiu can devifc and
furnifh.
The community fliould become fccurity
to anfvver all deficiencies in the fund ; this
is not only the higheft juftice, but the befl
policy. It is jull: becaufe it is a creature of
their own, calculated for their private utility
and advantage, and is in the management
of the country by their rcprefentacives and
|oi?xers. But when they receive an intcrefl
from the money, the equity of it is unan-
fwerable : for it fccins wholly inconfiflent'
with jufticc, that one fliould receive the in-
|tereft, and another run the rifque of the
principal. Policy requires it, becaufe the
community will certainly receive more profit
from its credit under their fcnport, than,
with due caution, liuy can probably igle by
accidents in the futu}.
Our next confidcr.uion, with rcfpcd to
tl'.c value, turns on %)hat the funJ is» lu pay,
( 82 )
and 'wLen. Thefe are arbitrary, being with J
in the power of thole by whole authority the;
money is eaiittcd. But for the prefcnt pur-
pofe : let us fuppcfe it is to pay lilver moneyj
according to the late Queen's proclaaiation,
to the value of looo/. for lb much of tliel
paper, as, according to the nominal valnc^
amounts to that fum at the end of 1 5 years.l
In this fiate the icoo/. paper, ivk/j regam
to the fund alone, at the time of its emiflion,
is worth no more proclamation money than!
what will produce 1000/. of that money at
the end of the term, at compound intercfl,
under as good fccurity.
For example, take a 1000/. paper, and!
let it reprefent that the polTefTor fliall receivel
1000/. proclamation money for it at thel
end of 15 years, and let the ufe of money"^
be worth (:> per c€?it. per annum \ rebate!;
per cent, per annum with compound intereltl
for I 5 years, and you have the value of u.j
loco/. proclamation money in hand, which!
appears to be but 417/. 5 j. 3-j. ; more kj
cannot be worth> becaule4]7/. ;j. 3,', \\/j;j
6 per ant. per annum compounc intcrctl Iq
1 1 yc-fb added, will amount to loooiL
On this (late it appears, that the longer th
term, the Icfs the value, with rcL^ard to ihcj
( 83 )
fund alone. From whence It follows, tliat
by increafing the teiin, this value may bs
reduced to a deeree beneath cilimation.-
But whatever the value thus proved be, I
call it intrivjick.
The Fund eflaMiiiicd, I proceed to the
USES as they next require our attention in
regard to the value of the paper-money.
If value, in refpedl to the ufes of things,
(liall always be in dirtd: proportion to thofe
ufes, (which I prefume have heretofore
proved in general, and fhall hereafter Hiew
is true in relation to paper-money) p.nd we
defign to raife the power, it follows clearly,
that to bring this to pafs, we ought to give
it all the ufes of money, or coined gold and
filver in other countries. From tlieie ules
alone it muft derive all the worth it (hall bear
beyond what I called the intriujkk value.
For the purpofe take the cafe jl cited on the
Funci only, that the pofTcfTor of \qocjL pa-
per fliali receive icoo/. proclamaiion money
in exchange lor it, at the end of i ^ years.
On this account the paper up; eared to be
worth but 417/. I > i. "^ % But luppolw' thin
1000/. papc may beimtncdiatLly cxcii.inged
for 800 /. [.jrovi.i Ti :iti.)n money, which is
^Cj /. ' 4 i. 8 ; mure th \\\ the nitriiilkk worth,
Ci 2 ho*^
%
( 84 )
liow has It acquired this exceeding price or
value? I tiiink plainly from the riles. To
prove the truth of this, fuppofe all the ufes
as money taken away ; unqueiUonably then
the worth of looo/. paper in proclamation
money will be reduced to what I call the
intriniick value; becaufe, dependint^ upon
the fund alone, it will be exadilv in the ftate
of a fund to be paid at a future day j for in
neither cafe can the creditor ufe it in the
mean time. But if the creditor can by any
contrivance ufe the fuin in that time, as he
may the paper when it pafles for money, that
ulc mull be fomcthing worth. And when
experience ihcws, that under this ufe the va-
hie advances from 417/. 155.3'. to 800/.
I apprehend it is evident to a demonftration,
that the difference is derived from the ufe.
To deny it muft be as irrational and abfurd,
as if, upo.i adding and extracting an ingre-
dient to and from a compofjtion, we per-
ceived properties in the compufition appear
and difappear, and yet were to deny that
iuch ingrciiient was the caufe of thofe pro-
perties. Thit. leads me to attempt the folu-
tion of a queiHon I have known ficquently
mad^. If wc in I'ei.l'ylvania, upon a fufti-
cicnt fund anUverahlc in iilvcr, at a future
iiay, mint a quantity of paper equal to the
ufes of the p epic for muricv, and ihey will-
ingly
( 85 ) ,
ingly and unlverfally accept of the paper in
all payments, why fliould it not, at all times,
have Taltie equal to the nomiJial value ^ or to
the fum chargeable on the fund at the day
to come. This reafon, urged by many, to
fupport the paper to this degree, is drawn
from the nature of money in geF'iCral. Mo-
ney, fay they, is but a ticket or coniUer,
which rcprefents to the mind of the polfell' jr
a quantity or degree of power. No man,
on the receipt ot it, ever examines how, or
from whence it acquired that power, but
in order to difcovcr its reality and duration.
For inflance, when an Englilh crown is re-
ceived, does the acceptor regard any proper-
ties in the metal, or the figures of it, but
thofe which are to convince him that it is
what it appears to be? a crown. It mud
be conicfled, he does not. If fo, then why
may not a piece of paper, under diflinguiOi-
ing chara»^ters and impreflloihs, aflixed bv
law and common content, have the power
of an linglilli crown annexed to it? It is to
pafs in the fume mMiiu^r as a crou-n does,
jind in the end will ab certainly be a crown
ab the real unc.
It
li
'ri]crcf)rc tb y c^'^ncUi.^c, that ihe paper
may, and ' . ^_ at ill titiK», to bv dUtiued
O 3 r(}Uul
( 86 )
equal to the quantity of filver the fund is to
yield for it at the end of the term.
I confef- 1 thin!-: this rcafoning fair, and the
conclufion juft an<] fiUisfiK^lory, if we do not
ufe filver in our commerce, forcip'n or domef-
tick: ctherwilc not. The fad: is, we do
ufc lilvcr in our forc'i^n commerce. I p re-
fume it will be eafily adrnitted, as the paper
reprefents the filver in the fund, and from
thence obtains its credit, that it Ihall always
be at lead of equal ule with^ or he as readily
received as paper. Then if fiber in hand
has one power, one ufc more ihan the paper,
to wit, that of procuring foreign commodi-
ties, it is impolhble wc can elleem them
equally. P'or that would be to controul the
different virtues and intiuenccs of things
over the mind of man, which nece/Tarily
depending upon the things themfelvcs, no
laws or confent can, by any means, vary or
dired^ Wiicreforc, in the cafe rtated, it
fecms to me certain and undeniable, that the
paper mufl have lefs W(n'th than the fdver.
Having faid, that the ufcs of the paper
fliould be as many as poflible, it may be
proper for me to fpeik of fome of thnic ufcs,
the C(|iiity and advantage of whith have been
very nuich voniravcrtcd. Hut here let it be
uiukillood, ihut I proceed upon the cafe
laH
( S7
laft ftated, that the quantity of paper is to
be equal to all the ufes of money ivithin the
country. For that flate, and a partial liip-
ply of paper credit, differing in ^■)rinc!p'cs,
require different reafoning, and infer quite
oppolitc confequences.
Firfl:, then, it feems jufl and rcafonable to
compel all pcrfons contradllng for filver mo-
ney, after the law that raiies the paper mo-
ney to be paid in the country, to receive
the paper in lieu of it, and at the value flruck
from the fund, although that be inferior to
the real value. This perhaps may not be
ffricfl equity between the contrailing p rties,
but it is jufl /;•(?/;; the comvnuvtyy who have
pov/er from the confent of every member,
by laws, to prohibit tlie exercife of a par-
ticular natural right inconfillcnt with the
welfare of tlie whole, and to inflict a pe-
nalty upon difobedicnce to tlie Lnv. To ufc
filver or gold vviih the paper, nuifl depre-
ciate the latter. ThcreA)rc tlic law Icrbiils
it. This can't be unfair, bccauf: every man
has notice of what coin he is to be paiil in,
and /J uut vbligiil to t'xcbange more iur ihe
paper than he thinks agreeable to the real
r^ftrth. And if atiy (houlil ciuicavour fiu h
iiff, the lofb of I he dilleicncr bciwtcn ^ii)\i\
or filver and paper, in u kind of pcndiy i. r
t» 4 violat-
If
( 88 )
violating the law, which muft be as jufl as
any other pc-nalty impofcd on an adt, not
evil in i'f'lj\ but prohibited only.
Again, upon breach of contrnvfls for pay-
ment of money in foreii^i countries, 1 think
it bjrli convenient and iieiU, that fatisfadion
flioLil.l be made in the papjr. The conve-
nience of it will appear, if we fuppofe the
debtor a member of the iocicty amongft
whom the paper pafils j for as luch, being
retrained by law from trafficking for gold
or iilver, and thereby dilablcd from pro-
curing them, he mufl either pay paper in
compenfation, or lie in a goal, if the feverity
of his creditors requires it. In thefe circum-
flances, no man in his fcnfcs would dare to
contract a foreign debt, or transfer foreign
money in the ufual manner, by exchange j
the bad confequences of which are too nu-
merous and obvious to admit of, or need
particular mention, and evidently, prove the
convenience of allowing fatisfadion to be
made in paper.
The equity of this fatisfudion will be in-
difputablc, it the debtor pays a (urn of paper
really of equal value with the foreign mo-
ney. It ib the common c.ii'e on breach of
f])ccirick contradt. 11 it cannot be perform-
( 89 )
cd, the mofl exadl jufticc requires no more
than an cquivalait compcvfation.
Some perfons imaghiing the real worth of
the paper equal to the nominal, have af-
firmed, that it ought to difcharge thefe debts
at the nominal value -y others confcinng a
difference between thefe vahies, under fome
political views, have aiferted the fame. As
I lliall have octafion to fpeak on thefe opi-
nions hereafter, upon a point fimilar to this,
I Hiail only add here, that if this mode of
payment ll^ould take place, it would as ef-
iedually dertroy foreign credit and negocia-
tions by exchange, as if gold or filver were
to be infixed on here, to difcharj^c a fo-
reign debt. In one cafe, it would be the
higheft imprudence to be the debtor, in
the other, it mull be equally indilcrcet to
become a creditor.
Purfuing the ufes, I come to that of dif-
charging by paper, the filvcr debts contrac-
tcti antecedent I the law that ruifes the
paper.
To Haw tlic ncccfiay of admitting this,
I liippo't it vvdl ''C L;rttntc«l mc, that there
miiil at all time:, be n very great Duinber
ui debtors uho dtpcnd r u their future u-
bour
¥
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Photographic
Sciences
Corporation
23 WEST ViAiN STREET
Wt ;'»:«, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503
l-?.
i/j.
^
( 90 )
bour and induftry to pay their debts. Thlj
dependence is reafonable andjuft, founded
on the natural right of all fairly to purchafc
filver, the then current money of the coun-
try. The debtor has the continuation of
this right in view and expedlation at the time
of his contra<fl: ; without it he cannot be fup-
pofed either prudent or honeft to borrow.
If then, for the convenience and advantage
of the whole fociety, this right muft be ta-
ken away by a fubfequent law which he
could not forefee, it cannot be agreeable ei-
ther to reafon or good confcience, to exadt
a payment in fpecie ; for that would be re-
quiring a performance when we had exprefs-
ly taken away the means. Therefore I
think it clear in refpedl to the debtor, that
the paper lliould have this ufe. But how
will this {land with the right of the credi-
tor, who upon the contract as certainly ex-
pedted to be paid filver, as the debtor did
the opportunity of acquiring it to pay.
I prefume, if he receives as much paper
as (hall be equal in power or value to the
filver, it will be jufl in itfelf, and perfedly
fatisfadory to him. But can any man of-
fer fo high a degree of violence to his own
reafon, and the underftanding of others, as
to affirm, if he is forced to accept lefs, that
7 flill
( 91 )
flill he has juftice difpcnfed him. If I bor-
row 100 /. in filver before the law, under
aorrcement to repay it at the end of the en-
faing year, and before the day of puyment
the law takes place, commanding the lender
to receive loo /. paper for it, which (hall be
worth, or have power to procure 82/. filver
money only ; with truth can this be called
a rational or upright law? Certainly no.
Nor fliall it be any juftification to me in
confcience to detain j 8 /. of my creditors
money.
It
ex-
did
s
The rules of natural juftice flowing from *
our fixed and unchangeable relations to each
other, and the invariable nature and order
of thing?, inforccd by the exprefs com-
mands of God, are of eternal and indifpen-
fable obligation. No laws, no combina-^
tions of human. power, cuftoms, ufages, or
pradice, can controul or change them. We
may, by the conf.nt of a majority, tie up
the compulfory hand of the civil magiflrate,
and thereby diflblve the power of coercive
laws, but can no more abfolve from the mo-
ral duty, than we can reverfe decrees in-
rolled in heaven. If mv debtor fhould be
fo extremely weak, as to fuppafe this not
criminal becaufe iC is legal, (which I think-
next to impoflible to imagine of a rational
creature,
II
11
( 92 )
creature, and I make bold to affirm, never
was the cafe of a creditor of underftandine,
fufficient to know the meafure of his de-
mand) his opinion perhaps may ferve for
an excufe, or extenuation of his crime, but
never can prove the reditude of the a(!i, and
flill the guilt muft reft ibmewhere. The law-
makers, the authors of his miftake, are cul-
pable, unlefs they are under the fame de-
lufion, which is yet more difficult to appre-
hend. Some, who give up the juftice of the
law, defend their pradice under it, by fay-
ing, they are creditors as well as debtors j
and as they are obliged to receive, fo they
fhould have liberty to pay. Alas ! what
feeble arguments fatisfy, when they are call
into the fcale of intereft, and gain is the con-
fequence of conviction. If the adlions of
men towards us are, to be the meafures of
our dealing with others, then he that is
cheated by any perfon, may juflly plunder
the next he meets. And truly I can't fee
why it fhould ftop here ; for as we may be
many times defrauded, and not know it,
to be fecure, and keep the balance on the
right fide, we fhould pillage our neighbours
as often as an opportunity offers. This
may feem fevere reafoning, but really I think
it fair from the firft polition ; that becaufe
one keeps back part of another's due, there-
fore
[ 93 ]
fore he may honeftly detain the right of a
third innocent perlbn.
Again, paying an equivalent cannot be in-
jurious to the debtor. For fuppofe he pays
i?,o/. paper. If lOO pounds worth ofcoin'd
filver, reduced to bullion, will then yield
him fo much, what does he more than per-
form his contra(ft to pay loo/. of coin'd
filver ? feeing a compleat recompence is per-
fedtly coniiftent with the right of each con-
tradting party. Any remaining objedlons
muft arife from its being hurtful or injuri-
ous to the fociety in general. This has been
alTerted, and endeavours have been ufed to
fupport the truth of it, by this kind of rea-
ibning.
F/r//j if the law fliould oblige the debtor
(for the purpofe) to pay i2o/. paper in lieu
of 100 1, filver, the legiflature would there-
by confefs the inferior worth of the paper,
which will be attended with this ill confe-
quence, that the general current value of
the paper (hall be lefs than if the law had
declared it equal to filver.
Secondly y That lefienlng the current value
will be a lofs to the fociety in general. To
the firft, That obliging to pay a larger fum
of
( 94 )
of paper for a lefs of filvcr, acknowledges
an inequality of value under the like deno^
ininations is fclf-evident. But from thence
to infer, that the paper fhall pafs in general,
at lefs value than if they had been declared
equal, with lubmifTion, I think miilaken,
and inconclufivc reafoning.
To be clearly underftood, permit me to
examine this upon the fad. Suppofe the
law, in the flrongefl: terms, enadls that the
paper {hall be in value equal to fiiver money,
according to their feveral denominations.
Carry the paper from thence to ufe, by of-
fering it in exchange or payment for fome
commodity, and then I afk a (hort queftion,
Who it is that really fets a value on the pa-
per, the legiflature, or the perfon that has
the commodity to fell ? /fit be anfwered the
iirfl, then I fay, this caniiot be, unlefs they
alfo limit the price of the commodity. For
if the feller can raife and proportion the price
of it to what he thinks the real worth of the
paper, the law maker's declaration notwith-
flanding, it is he that flrikes the value, and
not they. For inflance, put the cafe ; a
farmer, ju ft upon emitting the paper, has a
bu(hel of wheat to fell, which he rates at,
and will not part with, under three filver
ihillings. The future current worth of the
paper being unknown to him, let him by
guefs
( 95 )
guefs imagine tht?fe three (liilllngs equal to
four fliillings paper. A purchafcr then
prefTes him, under the influence of the law,
to accept of three paper ihillings for this
wheat ; but he, without regard to the law,
according to his own opinion, demands and
receives four fliillings for it. Will any man
fiy, the legillature determined tlie value of
the paper here ? Apparently the feller did.
For the leL*iflature commanded, that the three
paper (Ijillings (houid be valued nt three of
iilver, but the farmer has made his eftimate
at three fourths of that value only. Un-
queilionably the vender muft always have
this power, unlefs, as I faid before, the
law-makers can limit the price of all com-
modities, which is not practicable, confid-
ent with the order of things, or the pre-
fervation of men's properties. But it may be
alledged, although the receiver of the mo-
ney is not bound to obferve the legiflative
command, yet llill it may have fome weight.
He may confider it to be the impartial opi-
nion of the wifeft part of the fociety, v/hat
the future current value of the paper fliall
be, and thereby add, in fome degree, to its
worth.
In anfwer I mufl: obferve, firft, this gives
up the point of power, and changes it to a
matter of meer advice. Then, fuppofing that
of
II
( 9*5 )
of any import, furely delivering it in a man-
datory vvayj will be very little able to pro-
ducc the defiled cfFedl. Imperative advice
(pardon the expreflion) favours too much
of felling the rabbit, to prevail or perfuade.
In (liort, the words command and advife,
convey two ideas fo widely different, and fo
oppofite and repugnant to each other, that
it is ablolutcly impoflible we fliould take the
firfl for the lafl:. But granting it to be in-
terpreted as a piece of cordial advice. Shall
it be received implicitly, and pafs without
any examination ? I prefume not. When it
comes to be examined, if the people (hould
be informed, that, upon a nice examination,
the legiflature had found a fourth, fifth, or
iixth difference between filver and paper,
as fuch calculations are generally out of the
reach and comprehenfion of mofl:, it feems
not Improbable that the paper might pafs at
iirft, agreeable to the given difference. I
fay at Jirft ; for I contend, if the calcula-
tion (hould be erroneous, (which the ufe of
the money in time will difcover) this effed:
fhall not be lafting. But if, on the contrary,
they learn that the paper, without any cal-
culation, by guefs, was pronounced equal to
iilver, which every man's judgment, who
knows the fuperior power of the lait, muff
difapprove of, v/hat influence can the le-
gillative advice then have ? Undoubtedly it
will
m
^
legi
( 97 )
will be unlt^erfaliy rcjc(5lcd, and each pCffon
turned at large to make his cflimate as well
as he can, without the Icall regard to the
legiflative opinion.
Once more, take it, that the quantity uf
filvcr in ico fiiiliings proclamation money
is now worth 120 paper fliillings in Penfyl-
vania, and fuppoie this rcquifite had hither-
to been omitted in all laws relating to the
paper : let the fupreme authority to-day
enadl, that from henceforth all perfons fliall
give as much for 1 00 (hillings paper as they
do now for that quantity of filver, would this
make the lead alteration in the current value
of the paper ? Might a man, with reafon,
expedl to buy more bread or wine to-mor-
row with 100 paper fhillings, than he can
to-day ? If the legiflative power can bring
this to pafs, perhaps it may prove more than
fome people defire ; for I conjedure it will
fhew, that we never had any occaiion for
paper. Whatever quantity of filver we had
amongft us, when the paper was ftltuck,
might have been extended in value propor-
tionable to our wants, and all the bufinefs
f! of paper-money done at once. The abfur-
dity of this lies open to the meaneft capa-
city; yet I aver, that to raife the value of
paper by authoritative words or commands,
is equally irrational and unfeafible.
H 'I know
'i.'ij
if
; ■
' / '<
t-Fh
rr
/'.
( 98 )
I know no juft means whereby rtlankind
can give value to things, but incrcafing or
leflening the iifei or quantity. The paper
derives its Intrinfick worth from the fund
which is ftable and fixed. The ufes give
it further value, but that (hall always be in
inverfe proportion to the quantity. The
quantity is abfolutely under the diredion of
the legiflature, but the ufes not. As they
are raifed, fo they muft be limited, by our
neceflities, and the difpofition and order of
things. The utmofl: the legillature can do,
or is needful to be done, is to make the pa-
per a.^fwer all thofe ufes. When they have
afcertained the fund, the ufes and quantity
their power expires. And the current va
lue, if the people receive it, flows from them
by fo unavoidable and a necelTary confe-
quence, that whatever thejeglflature, or others
will or do, (if it alters not the fund, ufes, or
quantity) can work no change in it in gene-
ral. For a time, as long as people are ignorant,
I confefs it may j but when experience, that
excellent miftrefs, has difclofed what worth
they give, all imaginary value ftiall ceafeand
vanifh, and on the three requifites, as on a
folid and firm foundation, it (hall ultimatelj
reft and fettle.
I conclude what I have to fay on thi
poinl; with a (hort obfervation. That all thep
attemi
fitter
wayi
prov
been
tran/j
betwi
' I have
f fb mi
1 any d
I it. S
I reaibn
^ power
Uhatoj
I C(
Ition; (
Idiiadvj
■1
nkind
ing or
paper
FUND
es give
1 be in
The
lion of
Ls they
by our
)rder ot
can do,
the pa-
ley have
juantit)',
rent va-
ini them
J confe-
orotheisl
ufes, ot
in gene-
ignorant,
,ce, that'
it worth!
;eafe aniil
as on a
timatelyl
on this]
It all iU
attempt!
( 99 )
attempts of aflemblies in America in this
way* even by penalties on difobedience, have
proved fruitlcCs and abortive. And it has
been extremely remarkable, that although
tranfgrefling the law, by making a difFerencc
I between (ilver and paper, has been every
1 day's practice, not in fecret, but openly, I
have never heard, that any pcrfon has been
fo much as queftioned publickly, or has loft
any degree of reputation privately for doing
it. So far do the di(5tates of juft and right
rcafon furpafs and tranfcend the force and
; power of any human device or inflitution,
Uhat oppofes or contradicts them.
J I come now to confider the fecond pofi-
|tion; that leflening the current value will be
Idifadvantagcous to the fociety in general.
i ■ ' ■ ■■■..■
} This cannot be maintained without prov-
ling, that it will occafion a lofs, or obftrudl
llbme gain.
I A fociety can gain but two ways, from the
icarth and from their neighbours. When I
i|fay from the earth, I do not mean from
, ler llmple productions only ; for I include
ilhcrein mens labour and manufactures upon
lithem afterwards. Excepting diitinCtion,
^ich has no weight in the prefent qucflion,
;hcy can lofe only by the contrary, negleCt-
H 2 ing
. ir
i
( ^00 )
\\)^ the fruit and produ<fl of the earth, and
fuftcring their neighbours to carry away their
wealth.
I prcfumc It will be very hard to (hew,
liow a different valuation of the money can
influence the induftry of the land-holder or
the aitifan.
Upon the quantities of the fruits of the
earth, and inanufadtures produced, entirely
depend the wealth of the country. A far-
mer and tradefman, for a certain portion of
their commodities one year receive 8 (hil-
lings, and with them can purchafe an ounce
of filvcr. The money being raifed in va-
lue next year, they can get but 7 (hilling!
for the fame quantities j but ftill that fura
will buy an ounce of filver. Can this dif-
ference, in the value of the paper, caufe
the one to till more or lefs ground, or the
other to make a greater or lefs quantity ofl
his manufadlure ? What is it to them how
the money is rated, if they receive and part
with it at the fame value ? Gold, comparing
quantity to quantity, is more valuable than
filver. If filver was to vanifh out of the
world, and gold ftiould be made the only
medium of commerce, can any one imagine
that mankind would grow more induftrioiis
to procure it, becaufe more valuable thaa
filver,
are t(
mere
to tt
ther !
reflect
ter.
rived
The
ihort
reign
portal
tions
afFort
to get
Su
clajp?
1
1, and
y their
► flicw,
ley can
)lder or
of the
entirely
A far- 1
irtion of
8 Ihil.
n ounce
I in va-
(hillingj
hat fura
his dif-
r, caufc
or thel
mtity ofl
:m howl
nd part
mparingi
ble than
of the
he only
imaginel
iuftrioiis
)le than
filver,
( 101 )
filvcr, when the quantity they fliall get inuft
be proportionably icfs ? Do we in fadl find
theic different efFedts from gold or (ilvcr ;!t
prcfcnt ? I think we may as rcaf(3nably ex-
pcdt, that varying the meafure of the bu(hel
or yard, will induce people to rnakc more
or lefs corn or cloth, as tiiat chaiiging the
value of the money, which is another kind
of meafure for commodities, fliould excite
or abate men's diligence to raife and make
them.
All gain from our neighbours mud he by
getting their money or their goods. Thcfe
are to be acquired only by conqueft oi com-
merce. The firft I pafs over as impertinent
to this purpofe. Then let us us fee whe-
ther advancing the value of the money cm\
refledt any gain to us from them in the lat-
ter. Gain in trade may be confidered as dcf
rived from the manner of the meafure of it.
The manner of trade in general is of
ihort circuit, and confifts of importing fo-
reign money or commodities, and the ex-
portation of our own. In thcfe nqgocia-
tions we fhall find the worth of the paper,
affords us no advantage over, or opportunity
to get from our neighbours.
Suppofe a foreigner imports 8oo/. pro-
clamation money, and finding That not the
H 3 mcdiuiA
w
««Mt^
(
102
)
medium of our commerce, propofes to ex-
change it for paper. Let the value of the
paper be fuch, that he can get but 800 /. of
it for h'ts filver. With the paper he pur-
chafes corn, which he tranfports. What
have we got from this foreigner '' 800 /. ia
lilver. Should we have got lefs had he re-
ceived 1000/. for his filver, and with it
bought the fame quantity of wheat ? Cer*
tainly no. Neither cafe makes us richer or
poorer than the other ; and the fame confe-
quence will be found to attend all foreign
imports whatever.
When we export our commodities, the
value of the paper is quite out of the quef-
tion ; for in their fales, or the returns, it is
in no fort concerned. If we fend the pa-
per abroad, and fell it, unlefs it be kept in
expectation of what the fund will yield for
it at the end of the term (which I intend to
fpeak to hereafter) we fhall find it but an
exchange of merchandizes between us and
them. For the feller brings the goods he
receives here, and the buyer, by means of
the money, carries back our goods ; the pa-
per is but a meafure, as it was in the cafe of
imports and exports in return ; an^ if it be
rated alike abroad and at home, no lofs or
gain can enfue to either country, or to the
traders from a high or low valuation of it.
He
tl
\
■'■I
( 103 )
He, that is not fatisfied by thefe reafons,
niay perhaps be convinced by the experience
of others. The coins of England being finer
than thofe of Holland, quantity to quantity,
are of more value ; but was it ever thought
the Englifh had therefore more power or
trafEck, to obtain the money and merchan-
dize of other nations, than the Dutch ?
Were it poflible that the profit of trade
could be affecfled by lowering the coin, that
cunning and fkilful gener?ition would hardly
have debafed theirs by defign, much lefs
have continued for fo long a time as they
have done. The paper-currency of New
England, by a great excefs in the quantity,
is funk to a fliameful degree. From hence
we hear of much fraud and diflionefty
amongft them -, but it was never yet objected
that it injured them in trade. In truth, if
It had, as they principally fubfill by com-
merce, they muft have been ruined and
undone long agp.
The currencies of North and South Ca- //
rolina are in the fame condition ; but flill
their trades go on as ufual, without the leaft
alteration. In rcfpedt to the meafure of oar
commerce, it is evident that cannot be im-
paired by i^xducing the value of our money,
unlefs we are thereby deprived of a fiiffici-
H 4 ent
)
.J'- i/
\i
'7
'■)'
t, >
( 104 )
cnt quantity to carry it on : for inftance, If
60,000 /. proclamation money be necefTary to
carry on all our trade, and we (Irike 60,000 /.
paper, in hopes it (liall have that value, upon
experience it proves worth but 50,000 /.
proclamation. Then, for want of the remain-
ing 10,000/. fome of the wheels of trade
muft ftand ftill or move flower, which ap- |1
parently will obftrucc a part of our gain.
But the impediment vanifhes, by raifing an
additional fum of paper equal to the 1 0,000 /.
deficiency. The power of doing this we
have hitherto enjoyed and exercifed with-
out any reflraint ; and probably fhall retain
as long as we ufe it with difcretion and pru-
dence. . .
i
"^
t
i-%
Seeing then, that by raifing the value of
our money, we are not likely to get any thing
from our neighbours, let us now try whether
by lowering it they can get any thing from
us. I prefume I have proved, that in com-
mon commerce, receiving and returning thq
money for merchandizes, they cannot j confe-
quently no method remains, but keeping the
money to receive filvcr from the fund at
the end of the term. By thefe pradlices,
they can gain from us only upon one fup-
pofition. That they purchafe the money at
lefs than what I call the intrinfick worth ;
for if at more ihey lofe by it, and we gain
from
.■ ■■k
m
froi
cfl
pay
50(
neig
fron
800
us 8
diffe
foun
near
thefe
have
their
hearc
litical
and (
that i
cffed
fuppc
mine
:e, if
iry to
DOO/.
upon
DOO /.
main-
trade
h ap-
gain.
ing an
,000/.
lis we
with-
retain
d pru-
alue of
^ thing
hether
; from
|i com-
ng thq
confe-
ng the
nd at
dtices,
e fup-
ney at
crth ;
X gain
ffom
( 105 )
from them. I have (hewn, rating Inter-
ell at 6 per cent, per anniim^ that loooA
payable at the end of 15 years, is worth
500/. to take a round fum, in hand. If our
neighbour can buy it for 400 /. he gets 100/.
from us. But on the contrary, if he gives
800/. for it, he lofes3o:>/. For he lends
us 800/. for 15 years, at 2 /. 8 j. per cent, per
annum, when it is really worth /. and the
I difference, which on computation will be
found in the whole to amount to 300/. or
nearly, we gain from him. But neither of
thefe cafes can poffibly happen while men
have the leaft capacity todifcern and preferve
their own interell. Indeed 1 have never
heard one found reafon, either moral or po-
litical, for this manifeil: deviation from juftice
and equity. So far is it from good policy,
that if I am not miftaken, it muft work an
cffedt contrary to the defign 3 and inftead of
fupporting the credit of the paper, under-
mine and diminifli it,
The publick authority is guarantee for the
payment of alljuft debts. Every body muft
agree, that the value of paper money is no-
thing but fo much publick credit. Now, is
it pofTible for the publick authority to break
its own engagements, in refpe(^ of the pay-
ment ^ debts, withput in feme degree blaft-
ing
r
i
( io6 )
ing that credit which is to be the Aipport of
the money ? Publick and private faith are,
in this refpedt, exadtly alike ; and it is as
cafy to fee how violating one publick obli-
gation fhall impair the value of the paper-
money, as how a known breach of private
contract in a goldfmith fliould leflcn the
worth of his bills or notes.
A fecond inconvenience attending it, is
lofs of foreign credit, which *^uft.be a great
misfortune to a trading country. This is
occafioned in the fame manner, by which ]
juft now fhewed the value of the money
might be affedledj and let it not be thought
amifs, that I mention a third inconvenienccj,
namely, proftituting and debafmg the dig-
nity and excellence of the divine and moral
law^s in the eyes of the people, and encou-
raging them by ill practices and examples, to
depart from true honefty and viitue. For
if a man can once believe, he m^y juftly, by
human authority, tranfgrefs thofe laws, he
lofes much of the due and neceflary Refped
that ought to be paid them, and fhall after-
wards be able to refift their checks and ad-
monitions with greater eafe and facility : and
he that owes to 20 people, and pays them
with five fixths of their due, and fees hiii
neighbour do the like, under coloui[ of law
to-day,
jufti
V,
It, IS
great
^his is
bich I
noney
lought
lience,
le dig-
moral
encou-
)les, to
For
tly, by
ind ad-
lees hi
of law
( 107 )
to-day, will, I am afraid, with Icfs regret
and compun(5lion, defraud his creditors with-
out a law to-morrow.
But now, granting entire rccompence ought
to be made, it may be afked how the quan-
tum of paper to be paid for antecedent fiU
ver debts (hi^ll be afccrtained.
The legiflature cannot fettle it with exaft
jailice, becaufe no ikill can difcover what the
future current value (hall be ; and if the
people are left to do it themfelves, it will in-
troduce many law-fuits and oppreflions, and
ftill they may be as far from right as if the
legiflature had done it. The greater incon-
veniencies in the latter, rationally determine
the power to the former. When they come
to exercife it, if it is the firft experiment of
the kind, I imagine they can do little more
than guefs at the value. But as it is within
demonftration, that the paper cannot be
equal to filver, furely it ought not to be
rated fo. Impartiality requires the guefs to
be as near as may be, and then, although it
may be miftaken upon the laws of change,
it may be perfed:ly equal, becaufe either par-
ty may lofe or gain. It is a common cafe
in ^'fe, and muft be alwayr fo in untried
things, and no man can juftly complain of
the
4
( >o8 )
the event, bccaufe all errors are owing to
our weaknefs, not our faults.
If any of our neighbours have ifrue(^ paper-
money, the value of tbdrs will afford us
ilrong lights to difcover the worth of our
own, and allowing for different circumftan-
ces, we ought to rate ours as they have found
theirs upon trial. But when experience has
taught us the true worth of the money, all
difficulty ends, and whatever debts or pre-
contracts remain (as many from their grow-
ing nature mufl) fhould be fatislied accord-
ing to that Value.
I have now run through all the ufes that
occur to me worthy of obfervation ; and
therefore ihall proceed to the quantity.
When it is deligned, that paper fhall be
the only money of a country, the quantity,
according to the nominal value, ought to be,
as near as poflible, adequate to the nfes,
or in other words, to all commerce, foreign
and domeftick. It is eafier to fee the truth
of this rule in fpeculation, than tc reduce
it to prad:ice ; becaufe the number and ex-
tent of the ufes of money, in a populous
and induftriaus country, are far beyond our
knowledge and comprchenfion. From the
circumftajices of other places, the quantity
of
''.'■i
m
ig to
apcr-
d us
our
iflan-
bund
e has
h
all
• pre-
;row-
cord-
s that
; and
ill be
ntity,
to be,
ufes,
)reign
truth
educe
d ex-
ulous
d our
1 the
intity
of
S.11'
■:|
( 109 )
of money current before ifluing the paper,
and the value of the exports, r?lional con-
jedtures may be formed, but experience alone
can teach us what fum will fuffice. To
ftrike the neceffary quantity at once, would
be moft advdntageous to the fociety, and
equal with refped to individuals ; but as that
cannot be known, let it be approached as
near as may be. And fince wc may expert
to err, I prefume it will be better to err on
the fide of defici^nicy than excefs, feeing ad-
ditions are eafy, but fubrtradions oftentimes
very difficult after emiflion.
FROM the above reafoning, the follow-
ing proportions, which I apprehend to be
truths, do arife. That in colonies, the ef-
fence of whofe nature requires a progreflive
iacreafe of fettlements and trade, and yet
who, from the balance of trade with the
mother country being againft: them, muft
fuffer a conftantly decreafing quantity of
filver-money, a certain quantity of paper-
money is necelTary. It is neceflary to keep
up the increafing operations of this trade, and
thefe fettlements j it is alfo necelTary, in fuch
circumftances, to the equal diftribution and
general application of thefe benefits to the
whole colony, which benefits would other-
wife
\\
( tio )
wife become a monopoly to the monied mer^
chant only : it is prudent, and of good poli-
cy in the mother country to permit it, as it
is the fureft means of drawing the balance
of the colony trade and culture to its own
profit.
Thefe reafonings further fhow, how by
fecuring the fund^ extending the ujes, and
regulating i] * quantity, this meafure of a pa-
per-currency may be carried to the utmoft
extent of which it is capable. Nor do they
flop here 5 for as they give the rule whereby
to judge of the excefs or defed: of money
in any place whatfoever, fo do they, at all
times, fliew the neceflity of increafing it, or
the contrary.
Although the reafonings, which, from my
own fentiments of the matter, I have applied
to this fubje<3:, and thofe, with which I am
able to oblige the world, by publifhing the
above very judicious and able tradt, do per-
fectly coincide in thefe points : yet upon the
point of the uses, in confidering ,the reme-
dies to be provided againft: the iniquity of any
fallacious depreciation of this paper-money,
our reafonings feem to divide on quite dif-
ferent lides of the queftion. The author of
the above tradt afferts, that in colonies, where
paper-money is created, the people of that
colony
( lit )
coiony jhould he compelled by law to receivi
it in payments : and he dates two or three
different cafes in proof of his aflcrtion. My
opinion fuggefts, that this paper-money
ought by no means to be a legal tender : and
yet, different as thefe propolitions may ap-
pear, they will be found to coincide in the
application of the remedy ; in the only pro-
per and radical remedy, the not permittmg
the fafcr-money to be a legal tender. This
gentleman experienced in the politicks of
the colonies, and knowing the danger, if
not the impradticability, of any legiflature in
thefe colonies adopting this maxim, takes up
the reafonablenefs and necefTity of this paper-
money being forced into payments by law ;— •
but then, in all the cafes wherein he dates
the remedy in equity, againfl the injuftice,
which may arife from the artificial value of
this paper-money thus declared, he firmly
and juitly declares, that the payment thus
by law forced upon the creditor in papery
ought not to he according to the nominal legal
value of that paper, but according to the
real value, an equivalent to the debt.-
This judgment totally deftroys the maxim
of its being a legal tender. In the applica-
tion therefore of the remedy, our opinions
do not differ, but the truth of them becomes
the more elucidated by this coincidence of
two thus feemingly different propofitions. —
1 will
'.'\
vy/
( «12 )
I will therefore proceed in faying, that by
the reafonings above it appaars, that the only
and proper remedy, againft the iniquities
of a fallacious, depreciating paper-currency,
is that radiccil one^ of not permitting this paper ^
money to be a legal tender, 'On the other
hand, fo confirmed am I in my opinion of
the ncceflity and propriety of a certain quan-
tity of paper-money in the colonies, that
were I not convinced, that the reftraining of
it from being a legal tender, will not deftroy
the exiftence of it, but, on the contrary,
amend its currency j I would even facrifice
my convidion to this point of utility : but
whatever apparent value this paper-money
may feem at firft view to lofe by reftraint of
this one ufe, this very reftraint, (if the co-
lonies will have paper-money) muft become
an occafion of fo meliorating and fecuring
the fu?2d, of fo exactly regulating /^^ quan-
tityt and of adding fome other "caluable ufcy
namely an intereft, or fome premium equi-
vc^nt to it ; that the paper-money fhall be-
come thus intrinfically, and of Its own na-
ture, a better and furer currency than all the
power and authority of government could
make it. For not being forced into cur-
rency, by any external value derived from
authority, it mufl, like bullion in coin, de-
rive its currency from its intrinfick value and
applicablenefs to the purpofes of money ; —
fo
( "3 )
[o thnt thu*^ becoming, from ncccfljty, a
niorc determinate mcafurc, a n>ore pra«fti-
ii! inllrumcnt of trade, and a more bene-
ficial dopofit, as bearing an intcrell even
while in currency, it becomes to have all
//';' ufi's of bullion in coin, and one more, —
f) as even to bear a preininm, — which in
f.id^ is the Ciife of the trcadirer's notes in the
piovir.ce of the Maflachufetts-bay in New
I'.ngland, though they are not a legal ten-
der.
However, here, as on every other point,
1 hiive Hated the reafonings on both fides of
the queilion : 1 have brought the quef-
tion to its ilTue, and left thof^.', whofe duty
it is, and who have a right to do it, to de-
I termine the quefti'. n.
If with the fame fpirit, guided by the
f:ime principles, a revifion was made of the
laws of trade, fo far as they refpecfl: the co-
lonies, it would anfwer more wile ends of
o-overnment, and more the intereft: of tbe
governed, both here as well as in the colo-
nies, than any endeavour, even though fuc-
cefsful, to carry the prefent laws into execu-
tion.
The principles on which the 2S: of navi-
gation is founded are jud, and of found po-
1 licy,
I
(
Qi! 'A'< y
i
/>
%
r*'
114 )
licy, but the application of them, by the
modes prefcribcd, as the laws now (land, to
the prefent ftate of the colony trade, is neU
ther founded in juftice or prudence. Any
fpirit that would force this application, wouKi
injure the principles themfclvcs, and prove
injurious to that commercial intcreft, which
thofc very afts of trade mean to fecure to
Great Britain : whcre::s, upon a due rcvifion
of thofe laws, it would appear that there are
means of producing this fame end confiftent
with the particular interefl: of the colonies,
and what would carry the general commer-
cial uncrcfl of the mother country to the ut-
mod: extent that it is capable of.
The general principle of the laws of trade
regulating the colony trade, is, that the co.
lonies fliall not, on one hand, be fupplicd
with any thing but from a Britijh market^
nor export their produce any where but to
a BritiJh market. In the application of this
principle, the prefent laws diredt, except in
fome fpecial particulars, that the colonies
fliali import all their fuppliesyrow Briiabh
and carry all their produce to Britain,
If now, inflead of confining this market
for the colonies to Britain only, which is
a partial and defective af^lication of the ge-
neral principle whereon the adt of Naviga-
2 tion
tion I
amid;
rf ef
count}
to th
geous
colon 1
inutuc
the gc
poles,
the fei
of it t
rertrid
tlie pr
kct, 01
colonic
du€e (1
any Br
to fc^re
I any Bf
and we
fuppliei
thole p
natural
manufa
iJritifli
to fome
i in the c(
have pj
dities ii
the prin
( "5 )
tion is founded i this colony trade wasmadoi,
atnidll other courfcs of trade, an occafion
t>f cftabii^Viing BritiJJj markeis even in other
cfjuntrieSi the true ufc would be derived
to the general intcrcft from thd'e advanta-
geous tircumflances, while in particular the
colonies and the mother country would be
mutually accommodated. In the fird: ca'c,
the general intercfl, perverted to partial pur-
poles, becomes fo far forth ob(lru(i:l:ed ; in
the fecond, it is carried by the genuine fpirit
of it to its utmofl: extent. — I'i^ undet certain
reliridtions, fecuring alfo thofc duties which
the produce of the colonies, carried to mar-
ket, ought to pay to the mother country, the
colonies were permitted to export their pro-
duce (fuch as are the bafis or materials of
any Brilifli manufadure excepted) dire<ftly
to foreign countries, if fo be they fold it to
any Britijh houje eftablifhed in fuch place,
and were alfo permitted, if they botight their
fupplies from a Britijh houJe eftablillied in
thofe parts, to fupply themfelves with the
natural fruits and produce of that country (all
manufadures that any way interfere with the
tJritiih manufadories excepted) paying there
to fome British officer, or upon their arrival
in the colonies, the fame dairies as they would
have paid by purchaling tlie fame commo-
dities in Englano, every end propofed by
the principle of the ad of navigation would
I 2 be
! I-
f \
id
( n6 )
be anfwered ; the exports of the colonies
would be encouraged -, and the Britijh mar-
ket greatly extended.
The colonies would not only trade to,
and be fa pplied by, a Britijh market^ but
would become an occafion of ertablKhingthat
Britifh market in foreign countries. The
fiUiie rcafons of commerce, which, in a
narrower view, became the grounds forefla-
blilhing fadto.Ies at Peterfbourgh, Riga,
H.imborough, LiiT^on, Cadiz, &:c. would, on
a more gei eral and extenfive bafis, become
the foundation for eftablilhing and building
up thrfc Britjfi murkcts in every region to
which our trade extended itfelf ; for while
it necefiarily enlarged the fpecial interetl of
the colonies, it would enlarge it ( .ily at Bri-
tifli markets, and to the final profit of the
Britifli general commerce. The pioEtsof
fuch market finally centering in Great Bri-
tain. \i this maxim be not true, that the I
profits of the faftories fettled in foreign ports
finally center in Great Britain, the meafure
of efiabliihing fuch is falfe in policy ; if the
maxim be true, the permitting our colony
exports to go diredly to the ports where
fuch factories are eflablifhed, is not contrary]
to the principle on which the adl of naviga-l
tion arole, but becomes coincident with, and]
aiding tQ it, in extending the Britifh naviga-
tion!
( "7 )
tion and Brlv.fh markets, and fecuring the
final profits thereof to Britain only.
If this method of reafoning be fv)iind not
contrary to the principle of the a^ft of navi-
gation ; if this meafure, at the fiim;- time
that it encourages the trade of our clonics,
is found to do it in a way fubfervient to the*
general commerce of Great Britain, extend -
'\n<^ the Britifh markets, and fecurins: the
final ballance of protit to Britain onlyj if
thisfpirit of adminiflration, (o far as govern-
ment has a right to direcft the courfe of trade,
be adopted in this part of it, the great points
which it has to fecure, are firft, that the co-
lony exports to, and the fupplies purchafed
by them from thefe foreign ports, be fold and
bought at a Britijh market only. The go-
vernment ha''> a right to extend its laws to
thefe colony traders, and to the fadorics
eftablifhed in foreign ports. It can there-
fore, partly by fuch laws as it finds proper
to enadl, for the regulation of this fadory
trade, and partly by obliging thefe colony
traders to give bond before their departure
from the colonies, fecure and confine all
thefe tranfadlions of that commerce, which
is permitted at any fuch port, to a BritiQ) mar-
ket only, ihe laws that eflablirtied thefe be-
ing a favour extended to the colonies, and
promoting the interell of thefe fadories,
1 3 would,
{ "8 )
would, as all laws of trndc (liould do, exe-
cute tlicmfelves ; and, by giving the requi-
iite powers to -a conful or naval officer refi-
dent there, would le eafily adminiftered by
fuch officer.
J
» Jrf
The next point to be guarded, would be
the fecurin^ thofe duties wh jh this trade
ought to pay to the government of Great Bri-
tain ; if the fame duties were paid, or fecu-
rity for them taken in thefc foreign ports, as
would be or mould bu paid by the colony
trade, if the traders weic ftill obliged to come
to Britiin, every end would be anfu'cred to the
government revenue, and thefe ( barges might
be fufficientiy lecured, by obiiging ail thefe
traders to fail under bond. The arrangement
to be taken in fuch cafe, ougiit to be that of
adding to the office of conful fuch powers as
in the colonies, before the eftablifhment of
fpecial revenue officers there, were given to
the nav_al officer, or to eftablifh a naval of-
ficer. The conful or naval officer, in this
branch of his adminifl:ration, fliould be fub-
ordinate to the tommiffioners of the cuflom
and tlie I ords of the treafury. If the duties
were colledled by him, in the ports of his
diflrid, he (hould account and give fecurity
for the fame j if bonds only, as fecurity for
the paymentat fuch Britiffi or plantation ports,
were given, he fhould keep the rcgifter of
the
( '19 )
the fame, and correfpond with the commif-
fioners of the cuftoms, and fuch oflicers as
they dired, as to the fulfilling, cancelling,
or profecuting to effecft faid bonds. Tlrcfc
general arrangements taken, together with
fiich further fpecial regulations, as the ex-
perience of the commiflioners of the cufloms
fliould fugged, the revenue of the colony
and factory trade, under ^his mode of admi-
niftration, would be well fecurcd, chearfully
I paid, and eafily colleded.
Under the adminiflration of fuch meafures,
I there does not appear any reafc)n why all the
produce of the Britifh colonies, which are
not the bads of, or do not interfere \ ich the
Bfitidi manufactures, might not be carried
diredly to a Britifh market at a foreign port,
— and why the carrying of rice to foreign
ports might not be extended, under thefe
laws, to all fuch foreign ports whereat a Bri-
tifh fadory is eftablifhed. Nor under
this mode of commerce can any fufficient
reafon upon earth fubfift, why the colony
traders fhould not be permitted to load at
thefe ports, the fruits, wine, oil, pickles,
the produce of that country, and alfo fuch
raw unmanufadlured produce, as would not
interfere with the manufadtures of Great
Britain, inftead of being obliged to come to
Britain to buy here, after the cxpence of
I 4 an
■ »■
/
u
/'/
^.
t. /
,.''>
,.^P
'/,..
( 120 )
an unneceiTary voyage, thofe very comtno-
dities which they might have bought in a
Britijh market, at the port which they left.
Why not any of thefe as well as fait, as well
as wines FrDm the Madeiras and weflern ifles ?
In the fame manner, by the fame law, our
colony traders, permitted to carry fngar,
ginger, tobacco, rice, &c. to fuch ports in
the rivers Wefcr and Elbe, in the Sound and
in Rufna, whereat a Britilli fadtory is, or
may be ellahlilhed, why m^*y not, (the two
points of a Briiijh market, and the revenue
of the duties being fccurcd) why may not
thcfe traders be permitted to load at thefe
ports dircdly for the colonies, hemp, yarn,
^W'", ^<'' and fuch coarfe linens, as do no way inter-
/, '..,.: fere with the Bntifli manufadtories ? Thefe
meafures taken, which would prove to be
^'^' the true means of encouraging the colony
,.. . , trade, the heft method to put a ftop to the
contraband trjde carried on in this branch
of bulinefs, and the true grounds whereon
to eftabUni the general commercial intereft
of Great Britain, the government could not
be too ftrid in enforcing the execution of the
laws of trade, nor too fevere in punifhing
the breach of them. — Wherever they found
thefe traders endeavouring to carry from thefe
ports to the colonics raw-filk, filks, velvets,
foreign cloths, laces, iron, fteel, arms, am-
Oiunition, fails or rigging, or any manufac-
tures
..^ij'
/iS.::.-^
-7 /\^ ' * ^'
'').
/ -
/
■.- : *', • ^ .; .•■'
( J'l )
tures whatever, that interfere with the m-'-
nufa^fture of Great Brirairm whenever they
found thefe traders endeavouring to carry
from the colonics to thole ports, ;'nv dying-
wood whatevtr, indigo, cotton, filk, bees,
or myrtl'i-wax, flnx-feed, naval florcs, furs,
ikins or peltry, hides, provifion, grain, flour,
bread or bifcuit ; whale-oil, blubber, bone,
or any other filh-oil, or tallow, or candU'S,
with an exception perhaps t,o mirtle and
fpermaceti candles, the government could
not be too ftri<fl and watchful to reltrain
them. Under proper regulations, the rum
of the northern colonies ffiould be carried to
Africa, and the fale of it to ihc French on
the banks of Newfoundland encouraged, if
fuch vent could be procured, as we fliould
thereby reap at leaft fome (hare even of the
French Filhery.
In the above revifion of, and the propofed
regulations for the colony trade, as connected
with that of Europe, it will be feen that all
mention of Eaft India goods is purpofely
omitted. I think a fpecial meafure might
be contrived of fupplying the colonies with
Eaft India goods, in away that would effec-
tually put a ftop to that contraband trade, by
which it is complained they are at prefent
fupplied, in a way by which one of the
greateft marts in the world, with every at-
tendant
y~
V/'^'
; .t
f4'
<^
.V
^'
l*<
'/
t / ,
>l^: ^
( 122 )
tcndant advantage to the Britifli general com-
merce, and the fpecial interefl: of the Eafl
India trade might be eftabhfhed.
If mcafurcs were at this jundure taken,
between the government and the Eaft India
company, io that an Eaft: India fliip might
annually ftop at fome ifland in the Weft In-
dies, the traders, not only of the Weft In-
dies, but of N-:th America, 'vould fupplv
thcmf;^lvcs with every advantage at fuch
mart, not only for their own proper con-
fumption, but alfo for a trade of the great-
eft extent ; and this mart, in return, would
be to the Eaft India company, the collector
of all the furplus filver of America, and per-
haps even of fome of the gold and ivory of
/Africa alfo. The extenfive advantages of
this meafure cannot but be feen -, nor would
this any way interfere with that fupply with
which the Eaft India trade, by way of the
Manilla's, furnifties the Spanifh Weft Indias,
fo far as our Eaft India company may be
fuppofed to be concerned, but would, in
other refpedls, open a better channel of trade
between the Eaft and Weft Indias, which
our company muft command. The difti-
culties in the execution lie in fecuring to go-
vernment the revenue that ftiould arife from
the duties duly paid by this trade, and in fe-
curing the company againft the perverfion
of
( «2,^ )
of this trade to the profit of theij officers and*
'^rvants. If Ibmc of the illnnds furrcn-
dered to us, as the Granadas, or of the neu-
tral iflands, were made the pine of this mart,
with a grant of lands to the c : pany, at the
fame time that a profit might derive hence
to the company, the colhteral good advan-
tage to the puhlick vvo;ild arife, of having
created a very bcueikiai fettlcment.
In the fame manner, fome revifion of the
ftate of the trade of the coiunies of the fe-
veral maritime power'^ nmongfl each other
will be neceflary. The laws and ordon-
nances of thefe do in general prohibit all
trade of foreign colonies 'viin their own }—
and yet, without fome fuch trade as fupplies
the Spanifli provinces with Britifli goods and
provifions, as fupplies the Britifh colonies
with Spanifli (ilver, as fupplies the French
iflands with Britifh lumber, fifh, provifions,
horfes, and live flock, as fupplies the Bri-
tifh colonies with French mololTes, the
trade and culture of thefe colonies would be
greatly obflrudled and impaired j and yet
notwithflanding this fad, our laws of trade,
by an impradticable duty, extend to the pro-
hibiting the importation of French MolofTes
into our colonies. If the government,
under this law, could prevent efFedlually this
importation, not only into the northern co-
lonies.
"N
{ 124 )
lonies, but into the Britifh Ifles alio, the
reward of that pains would be the deftruc-
tion of a beneficial branch of trade, perhaps
of driving the Britifh American dilliilery in-
to the French, Dutch, or Danifh iiles, or
of forcing the French, contrary to their own
falfe policy, into a profitable inanufadure of
that produce which they now fell as refufc
marerinb. I need not point out here the
very eHcntial change that this would m;ik.,"
in the colony trade. On the contrary, it
is the duty of government to permit, nay
even to encourage, under proper regulations,
thcfc branches of trade -, in the firft place,
in order to extradl out of the foreign colo-
nies, to the benefit of the Britifli commerce,
as much as pofiible the profits of thefe colo-
nies, and which is more material, in order
to create a necefiary dcpcndance in the trade
and culture of thofe colonies for their fupplies
on the Britifli commerce. When it is re-
membered that the law, which lays a duty
equal to a prohibition, on the importation
of French mololTes into the Britiih colonies,
was obtained at the folicitation of the Bri-
tiih ides, it will be feen, that the obtaining
this law is not fo much meant to prohibit
totally the introduction of French molofTes
into the Britifli trade, as to determine a
ilruggie between the Weft India and North
American traders, who fliould have the pro-
• fits
H ii
( '2S )
fits of it. And thus, from the predominant
intereft of thefe partial views, has govern-
ment been led to cmbarrafs the general
tourfcs of its trade. But as the Weft In-
dia traders fee that this law has not, never
had, and never will have the effed: pro-
pofcd, they will be better reconciled to its
cc^afing ; and as government muft now, af-
ter the experiment, fee the falfe policy of it,
there is no doubt but that it will ceafe, fo
far as to reduce the duty to a moderate and
pradticable charij^e, fuch as will be paid, and
i'uch as will raife to the crown a very confi-
dcrable revenue thus paid.
As the French ifles, (ince the furrender of
Canada and Louifiana, muft depend intirely
for their fupplies of lumber, ,ftaves heads,
proviftons, live ftock, horfes. Sec. on the Bri-
tifti colonies, immediately exported from
thence to thofe ifles, unlefs by fume means
fupplied from markets created at New Or-
leans and the iflaiKi of St. Peter, it will
be the duty of government ta keep a watch-
ful eye to the formation and extent of thefe
markets ; — fo at Icaft, if they be permitted, as
to have the command of them, and fj as to
prevent their being, to the French traders,
the means of fupplying the Spanifh markets
aho, as well as their own.
Some
::if
i
hi
I
.'(■l!
M^
f ::!' r K
r
( 126 )
Some rcvilion alfo will be neceflary in the
laws about naval (lores, cfpecially that rc-
fpedting the marts. The prefent law, un-
der an idea of prcferving the White Pine or
maft trees, direds, That no White Pines
ftiall be cut or felled within the limits of
any townfliip^ if not actually private pro-
perty. This part of the law arifes from
a miftaken apprehenfion of a townfhip, there
being no lands within fuch but what are
private property. 2^/y, That no Pines
out of a townihip, of the dimenfions of
24 inches and upwards, diameter, at the
height of 20 inches from the ground, (hall
be felled. This part of the law is Jl'k
de fe, Thofe who find their profits in
cutting down thefe trees for loggs or making
ihingles, &c. or who know the embarrafs-
ments which would arife to their property,
if they fhould ever apply for a grant of thefe
lands, by letting fuch Pine-trees, the pro-
perty of the crown, grow there, never (if
they have not other means to evade this law)
will permit thefe Pines to come to thh dimen*
fan which makes them royal property. 'I he
falfe policy of this law, and the defeats in
the eftabliftiment of an office of furveyor-
general of his Majefly's woods, will foon,
if not obviated, be felt in the fcarcity and
price of mafls, which will be the effect of
it.
%
[.■:,t
( 127 )
it. The ncccfTity of their going a great dif-
tdiice from the rivers for the marts has al-
reaiiy taken cffedt, and he cafe of there be-
ing none within any pradlicablc diftance will
foon follow. The navy-office finding that
their mart fhips come regularly hitherto to
England, cannot entertain any fear of fucli
want, and it will be the intercft of others
to fijpprefs and contradi<fl this fa(5t ; yet it
is a fadl, and will be foon knowa in its cf-
fedts. On the contrary, if it is confider-
ed how difproportionate a value the price
of the Pine- tree growing bears to the price
of the maft when brought in the middle of
v/inter, over the fiiow, with 70 or 80 yoke
of oxen to the water-fide j if, inflead of
aiming to make thefe trees, thus growing,
royal exclufive property ^ the crown was not
only to permit a free mafting in lands not
granted, and to make the maft-trces of all
dimenfions, prhatc property on lands ac-
tually granted, but alio (as is done in other
cafes of naval ftores) to give a bounty bc-
fides the price, to the perfon who fliould
bring down any fuch marts to the water-
fide, it would have an immediate effedt in
fupplying the crown with marts at a cheaper
rate, and in the prefervation of thefe trees,
thus become a branch of trade. * '
I ha^
r
*>.
../•
I /'
'*i-
( '^8 )
J have oot gone into the thorough exami-
nation of thc.'j ru!)jc<fls abovc-mcntioncii,
nor have I puintcd out, in all their conlc^k
qucnces, the eflt-ds that this or that ftatc
of them would have. I have only pointed
them out as worthy the attention of govern-
ment; and, I am fure, whenever govern-
ment takes them under confideralion, they
will be better undeillood than any explana-
tion of mine can make them.
Were fome fiich arrangements taken for a
rcvifion and further eftablirhment of the laws
of trade, upon the principle of extending the
Britifh general commerce, by encouraging the
trade of the colonies, in fubordination to,
and in coincidence therewith, the trade of
the colonics would be adminiftered by that
true fpirit from whence it rofe, and by which
it ads ; and the true apphcation of the be-
nefits which a:ife to a mother country from
its colonics would be made. Under this
fpirit of adminiftration, the government, as I
laid abovC, could not be too watchful to carry
its Jaws of trade into effedual execution.
Some of the laws of trade dired the profe-
cution and punishment of the breach of them
to take its courib in the courts of vice-admi-
ralty. And it has been thought, by a very
great praditioner, that if the laws of trade
were regulated, on a pradicable application
of
( 129 )
of them to the ftatc of the colony trade,
that every breach of them fhould be profe-
cutcd in the fame way, by an Advocate ap-
pointed to each court from Great Britain, with
a proper falary, who (hould be dircdled and
impowcred to profccute in that court, not
only every trader that was an offender, but
alfo every officer of the cuftoms, who thro'
negledl, ccUufion, oppieflion, or any other
breach of his truft, became fuch : but I own,
was it not for the precedent eftabliflied al-
ready by fomc of the laws of trade, I (hould
doubt the confiflency of this mcafure with
the general principle of liberty, as cftablirtied
in the trials by a jury in the common law
courts. Under the prefent ftate of thofe
laws, and that trade, whatever be the courfe
of profecution, there is great danger that any
feverity of execution, which ftiould prove ef-
fectual in the cafes of the importation into the
colonies of foreign European and Eaft India
goods, might force the Americans to trade for
their imports, upon terms, on which the trade
could not fupport itfelf, and might become in
the event a means to bring on the neceffity
of thefe Americans manufa(5turing for them-
felves. Nothing does at prefent, with that ac-
tive and acute people, prevent their going into
manufadures, but the proportionate dearnefs
of labour, as referred to the terms on which
they can import > but encreafe the price of
K their
-T.
/.•
4 *-\ .
T y y -;
r- / . .
);■;';
'') •>
f. -i-r
I m
iii
their Impc/rts to a certain degree, let the e:v-
leiit of their fcttlemcnts, cither by poliey
from home, or invafion of Indians abroad be
confined, and let their foreign trade and na-
vi^2;;Uion be, in feme meafure, fupprefled -, —
tlicir money-cu.rency limited within too nar-
row bounds, by a total prohibition of paper-
money j — this proportion of the price of la-
bour, confidering the length of the winters,
when no laboui can bci done without doors,
and confidering how many hands will be
taken from navigation and fettlements, toge-
ther with the want of money, t',ie means
of purchafing, will much fooner ceafe to be
an oLjcdt of obje(flion to manufadturing there,
than is commonly apprehended. And if the
colonics, under any future ftate of adminiftra-
tion which they fee unequal to the manage-
ment of their affairs, once come to feel their
own flrength in this way, their independence
on government, at leaft on the adminiftration
of government, will not be an event fo re-
mote as oar leaders may think, which yet
nothing but fuch falfe policy can bring on.
For, on the contrary, put their governments
and laws on, a true and conftitutional balls,
regulnte their many, their revenue, and
their trade, and do not check their fettle-
ments, they mufl ever depend on the trade
of the mother country for their fupplies,
they will never eflablifh rnanuf^dures, their
haiidb
i!
r
( '31 ) -
hands being elfewhcre employed, and tlic
merchants being always able to import fiich
on terms that nnifc ruin the maniifad:urer?,
unable to rubfift without, or to unite again fl
the mother country; they mull always re-
main fubordinatc to it, in all the tranfac-
tjons of their commerce, in all the opera-
tion of their laws, in every a(5l of their go-
vernment; — and to repeat what I have al-
ready faid, as they will thus become confci-
entioufly in each individual, fo will thcycon-
ftitutionally, in their refpedive governments,
fubordinate, attached, and obedient to the
mother country, and to the fupreme go-
vernment thereof; and the feveral colo-
nies, no longer convidered as dcmefnes of
the crown, mere appendages to the realm,
will thus become, united therein, members
and parts, of the realm, as elTential parts of
a one organized whole, the commercial do-
minion of Great Britain, The taking lead-
ing meafures to the forming of which, ought,
at this jundure, to be the great object of go-
vernment.
■^4^
The End of the First Part.