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It is not, 1 think, necessary to take up the time of those who may peruse these pages, by arguments to prove tlic importance of the subject on which I liave felt it my duty to address a few words to my fellow countrymen. No one who has attended to passing (and more especially to recent) events can be insen- sible to it, and when we see the principal Maritime Powers augmenting their fleets, and perfecting their arrangements, there can surely be no impropriety in reviewino; our own system, and considering;, while we have still time and opportunity, whether we are also advancing equally in the march of improvement, and adapting our measures to the various changes of cir- cumstances which have taken place. Before, however, I commence this discussion, I am most anxious to premise that I have not the slightest intention of imputing blame to any individual or department. — Our present mode of manning the Navy has existed under all governments during the last and present century, and, I trust I may be permitted to suggest some ameliorations without being considered B 2 i : t i!r ;■ i.' 1i; ' ■i-4 »H'. It I TN'' "I ; mm ":i:?l •■ '% ■■\m to cast censure on those wlio have liitherto l)ecn pre- vented by a tliousand difficulties, and more especially by those fearful words "Incrkask of Expense" from etl'ectiug chaiii^es which would place our Naval orga- nization on a more satisfactory footing. I may perhaps be asked, why I have not submitted my suggestions to the Board of Admiralty, instead of laying them in tlieir present shape before the public? and my reply is, that I am perfectly aware the same magical words to which 1 have already referred would liave been used to convince me that my proposal was an impracticable one, and I have therefore preferred an appeal to those who are in truth the principal causes of the present evil, by their own injudicious clamours for reduction and retrenchment, and to call on my countrymen to untie the hands of the Admiralty, and to release the Government from engagements unwisely demanded, too hastily entered into, and too literally fulfilled. It may perhaps also be asked what right have I, a single unit in a numerous profession, to ofl'er my opinion at all on a subject which all will allow to be of such vital importance, and why I do not leave matters of this magnitude to the care and judgment of my supv^riors? I answer, that the two greatest improvements in- troduced since the peace of 1815, have arisen from tlie suggestions of two officers, at that tlmo wliolly unconnected with office — Sir Howard Dou<,':las and Sir W. Symonds— and, beUeving as I do, that our present arrangements for the equipment of our Navy are as defective, and calling as loudly for amomlmont as our instruction in Artillery practice, and our Naval Arcliitecture, at the period in question ; I see no reason wliy an officer who has during forty-four yean^ of service been more constantly in command, than per- haps any other of his rank and standing, and who has therefore enjoyed ample opportunities for forminjT a correct opinion on professional subjects, may not presume to offiir that opinion in respectful and tem- perate language. I am ashamed to have detained my readers so long with these preliminary observations, which I felt, however, were due to them as well as to myself; and I will now endeavour to lay before them, as clearly as I can, — first, the system we have hitherto pursued in manning our Navy during peace; secondly, the objec- tions, to which it iv liable; and, thirdly, the improve- ments I venture to suggest. Nothing can be more primitive and defective than our present mode of proceeding. A ship is required to relieve another for foreign service. She is selected, reported ready for commis- sion, the captain and officers are appointed, and then M, 1 K,-. r. (> voliiuU'ors nYii advertised lor — They come in slowly and uncertainly, if the ship is a Iar<>,'e one the men w ill not enter until the heaviest part of tin; work of* fitting' is coinpleted, the equipment proceeds slowly and carelessly, hecauso energy and rapidity are imprac- tical)le, hut even then those who enter first feel they are unfairly worked, and the seeds of discontent and desertion are sown at the very commencement of their service. Three or sometimes four months thus pass away before the ship's complement is complete, and in the meanwhile little progress is made in disci jdine or instruction. She at last sails for her destination, and relieves a ship, which having been three or fonr years on active service is, or ought to be, in a high state of efficiency, but on its arrival in England it is dismantled, the officers and crew are paid off, and dis- charged, and we thus proceed on the plan of perpetually creating and as perpetually destroying what we have with so much labour and expense endeavoured to obtain — an effective ship of war. The objections to this mode of proceeding are so numerous, but at the same time so obvious, that they will at once suggest themselves to my readers. To the economists the improvident expense of keeping a ship intended to relieve another three or four months in commission before she can proceed, wi wl ti( hij ar a ail will be sulHcioiitly strikiiij^'; while professioiial nieu who view a ship also as a school tor the risin«;' genera- tion, in which not only mere seamanship, bnt the higher (|nalities of (energy, promptitude, and resource are to be taup;ht, contemplate with anxiety and re<>ret a slow and slovenly system, calculated rather to dain[) and deaden activity and exertion, and to train up the young bep;inner in exactly the way in which he otujht not to walk, and wholly at variance with the Hrst principles of all warlike establishments, discipline, activity, and instruction. I will now proceed to detail the improvements which, if introduced, would, in my ophiion, obviate all these inconveniences, and without any very material increase of expense, when compared with the para- mount importance of the object in view. My leading proposition is to consider a lieserve of, at least, 4000 or 5000 men for home service indispen- sably necessary. The supply of seamen so little exceeds the demand for them, and that demand is so large and increasing, not only in the British Empire, but in almost every quarter of the habitable globe, (the United States, South America, Australia, and India absorbing very considerable numbers) that except we have foresight and arrangement enough to secure a stock in hand, (if I may so express myself) we shall always be i% l^i t 8 exposed to the greatest diHieiilty and dan»>er on any (»inrrf:^(?ncy where eirciimstaiices may, perha[)s render our h.'iving* recourse to irnpressnieiit iin[)oliti(; or unjustifiable, although the necessity for a reinforce- ment to some foreign station, or an increase at home, may be extremely pressing. The events which have occurred within the last two months, sufficiently demonstrate the correctness of my assertion. The French have been for some time endeavouring to outnumber us in the Mediterranean, and after the occurrences of July, it became extremely desirable to dispatch the Vanguard and Rodney (both being ready for sea, and only wanting men) with the least possible delay; but volunteers came in so slowly, that not having, I believe, any disposable men elsewhere, above a month elapsed before these ships were com- pleted, although the whole number required was probably under 500. I will not enlarge on other recent occurrences of a similar nature, which would very materially strengthen my argument, but confine myself to ob- serving, that in the present circumstances of Europe, and viewing the matured and perfect arrangements of other Powers for the rapid equipment oftheir Fleets, no time should be lost in revising our own system, and more carefully adapting it to the existing state of affairs. i 9 Tho number of men I rocommond keopin^ as a permanent reserve, large as it may at first sij^ht appear, would be barely sufficient to ecluip a respect- able squadron for the protection of our coasts and commerce, and to enable the Board of Admiralty to commence a course of exercise and instruction afloat, which has been too long postponed and discontinued. Few officers of the rising- generation have ever witnessed the evolutions of a fleet, or received any practical education in naval tactics. Our foreign squadrons are so constantly separated, and so widely detached for the protection of trade, that it is scarcely possible ever to assemble them, find it is therefore principally at home, where no otlier considerations should be allowed to interfere, that this most im- portant part of the education of every officer can be carefully attended to. The result of the proposed arrangement would be, that instead of six nominal ships stationed at Sheer- ness, Devonport, and Portsmouth, but unmanned and wholly ineffective, we should have six fully manned, disciplined, efficient, and ready at twenty-four hours' notice to proceed to any part of the world; while an equal number of frigates might be kept in the same state of preparation for any service not requiring ships of the line. Our Naval Arsenals, instead of being as they now i^ I 'i:, 1 • f^i 10 are, scliools of idleness, in which officers are allowed to serve out their sea time (as it is called), without ever seeing an anchor weighed, or a sail set, would then become excellent Depots of Instruction, and there appears to be no reason why the routine of foreign service might not be taken by the whole Navy in connnission, shortening the periods of absence, espe- cially in unhealthy c'imates, and withdrawing our younger officers, as far as might be practicaWe, from the temptations to extravagance and dissipation, insepa- rable from a long confinement at Malta or Lisbon. The confidence which a respectable reserve at home must give to any Naval Administration, would very probably tend much, on many occasions, to diminish the necessity of keeping so large a permanent force abroad, knowing as they would do, that well disci- plined ships were constantly in readiness, and that not a moment's delay need elapse in dispatching reinforcements when called for. Sir Thomas Cochrane communicated some years since to the First Lord of the Admiralty,* and has since printed for private circulation, some observations so nearly resembling, and so perfectly coinciding with my own opinions, that, I hope, although I have not at this moment an opportunity of asking his permission, that he will not object to my quoting some very * To Lord Melville, in 1826. HI 11 striking- and excellent passages from his little pamphlet in corroboration of my own assertions. At a time when a peace of ten years ihiration has reduced tlie number of ships in commission, as well as the proportion of men employed in them, to a force that formerly con- stituted but a small squadron, it becomes desirabk^ to know how far the services of that force are available in the event of any unforeseen rupture — and in the persuasion that there is no person more alive to the best interests of the naval profession than your Lordship, or more convinced of the necessity of the peace establishment being in an effi- cient state for war, (however much we may hope for a continuance of tlie blessings of peace for many years to come,) I venture to address a few observations to your Lordsliip, being the result of nearly four years and a lialf's service and experience in the command of a ship u[)Ou the peace estaldishment. " I do not know whether it has or has not reached your Lordship, but it is no less true, that notwithstanding the few men employed, tliere is a general complaint as to tlieir inferiority, and not one captain in ten tliat acknowledges his having a crew with whom, either in strength, quality, or character, he is at all satisiied; and, moreover, that although these men enter voluntarily, desertion is carried on to an extent never known in time of war. For this there cannot but be some cause, and I think it may be traced to the mode in which the peace establishment is at present con- ducted. When a ship is first connnissioned, men are brought together from wherever they can be collected — ', . •i-..'JL 4 ■3T iii! m > .It'; ii.) «•• ■,:? i-'i 12 i unknown to the ofticers as well as to each other: after their ship shall have been nominally ready for sea, (which is seldom under four, five, or six months,) she yet has a great deal to do with respect to her equipment and her internal arrangement, and it is still some months more before that most necessary part of their instruction is taken in hand, their gunnery, and on which the Admiralty have most justly laid considerable stress; and there is no captain who has been employed during peace that will not tell your Lord- ship that he did not consider his ship in all points an efficient man-of-war until she had been from twelve to eighteen months in commission, and particularly in relation to the management of her guns. However anxious a captain may be to have his ship perfect in that respect, he at first meets an obstacle at every step; to exercise the guns as they ought to be, breaks in upon the whole day's work; it is therefore postponed from time to time, and just enough exercise performed to fill up the quarterly report. I believe I exercised more in the Forte — certainly fully as much as any ship in the navy, and to which I was led from my anxiety to give Congreve sights (a complete set of which I had managed to obtain) a fair trial, and seldom anchored anywhere that, if time permitted, I did not put out a mark to fire at, and I know, by experience, what an incon- venience attended my first doing so. " About the period before mentioned, a ship becomes in all respects in a state a man-of-Avar ought to be : the men know and agree with each other, they v^^ork together, and are comfortable in their messes; the drudgery of the exer- cise of sails, guns, ^rms, &c., is over, and desertion ceases, I 4 a g 13 I and the officers begin to reap the benefit of tlieir exertions. The ship being complete in all respects, the exercising of guns, sails, &c., goes on regularly and without interruption; and this continues for a twelvemonth or a little more, when the prospect of paying off comes in view, and then disci- pline, exercise, (fee, begin to relax, and, if at home, the ship is paid off at tlie end of three years, and all belonging to her dispersed. Re-commission this ship the next day, and she is perfectly a new creation, and the same routine to be repeated already stated to your Lordship. T'e men who were lately in her have no more inducement to return to that ship than any other, as she is but the shell they for- merly inhabited; and although a crew may be collected, all of men lately serving in a man-of-war, yet you will have the same complaint from the present as from her former captain, as to their inefficiency and want of union, and the same discontent will for an equal period exist, and the ship be in a similar state of inefficiency for a similar length of time. " I have always considered that a peace establishment was as much a preliminary preparation for war as for any other service ; that consequently your ships thus employed should be manned with picked men, and that they should be in that state of training and efficiency that each ship, on a rupture taking place, could turn over one watch to form the groundwork of another vessel to be fitted out. To accomplish this much-desired end, allow me to suggest to your Lordship the following plan. " That when a ship is commissioned, she should never be entirely paid off — that if the ship herself become unservice- i' ::-^l Wm -m :ti>'." f|Mitr (sisy to sii|)])ly them witli volunteers ])y the ships fVoui time to time join- ing- tlie station from Eiiglcind — not that I consider such to be nceessary, as there is no want of men abroad Avith whom to fill up the vacancies that may occur, even should most of the men take advantay:e of their discharjic— whi(di I am persuaded woidd not be the case. On this system being* first ado})ted, there would be a little inconvenience at the end of the first five years, as many having entered at the same period Avould be entitled to their discharge at the same time. To remedy this, I would recommend discharg- ing, at the end of the first three years, a certain portion of such as did not intend to enter again for a second term, after which, the entering and discharging would proceed regularly. The army did formerly enlist men in a very similar way, and found no inconvenience from it ; but what state would each regiment be in, if disbanded at the end of every three years ? " I will offer no apology for having troubled your Lord- ship at length on a sid)ject of such vital importance to the naval profession and country at large. I only earnestly request your Lorship's attention to the hints I have thrown out, as, if they strike you as they do myself, I am persuaded in the detail you may so much improve upon them, as not only to secure to the service a better class of seamen, and in a great degree cheek desertion, but to reap advantages for the efliciency and discipline of our fleets that have not entered into my contemplation." If the system on which the Army recruit was more closely followed, volunteers would be niisod for the c ! ■) ■ t I .: i V -f [H Navy iniicli more rapidly and satisfactorily; a ^' m; rospectablc set of officers and men wonld perform tiiis service witli greater credit to themselves and their profession. I^^isioncrs carefully selected, and en- couraged, exhibitin^• in their own persons the reward of long" service and good conduct, would bo the best class of men (nndcr proper officers) for this purpose, and if my suggestions shall be thought worthy of attention, I see no reason why tall, active young lands- men, between 18 and 22, and not nnder 5ft. 7in., should not be admitted into \\ig Reserve, and raised in the Inland Districts as well as at the Sea Poi't Towns. Six months of instruction and discipline at Ports- mouth, Devonport, or Sheerness, would niake these very useful men, especially wdien the want of strength in our ships' companies during peace is considered, the merchant service taking the most powerful men, and refusing the small ones. We see how well our new system of taking boys answers, and how soon they become valuable seamen, but this might be still further improved, by having at each Port a small frigate fitted on the plan of the Marine Society's ship at Deptford, with guns and sails, in which the boys might be better looked after, and receive some school- ing, and where the young 1 uidsmen might also be sent to improve themselves, when exercising on board their own ships was inconvenient. c; 10 It is very iiitcrcslino- to observe liow soon the Marine Soeiety boys, few of whom have ever seen a ship in their lives, beeonie extremely smart in eross- injj;* to})oallant yards, fnrlini»* and reefing sails, &(•,; and there is not the least reason to snj)pose that lads of the age 1 reeomnicnd, wonld not, nnder proper care, and with suHieient instrnction, make an e([nal progress. I do not mean to assert that a good seaman wonld not be ])referaljle, but as the Merchant Service Q'ives hi<>her wau:es to this class of men than we can (or choose) to olfer, we must endeavour to manu- facture for ourselves an inferior article, if we cannot atibrd to pay the full ])rice for the best. Having thus stated, in as full detail as appears necessary, the improvements I venture to suggest, to those with whom their adojjtion and execution must rest, 1 will not detain my readers by any further arguments in support of them. Nobody will, I think, deny that a maritime power, like (Ireat Britain, if she intends to preserve her naval superiority, must be prepared at home as well as abroad; and that in proportion as affairs become more serious and critical at a distance, and the necessity of reinforcing foreign stations more apparent, of so much more urgent importance is a well organized reserve at home, since no country can be considered as displaying due vigour, foresight, or arrangement, if, when apprehend- c 2 hi'. u^ '-:! 20 iiij^ uikI j)i'('|)ariiii»' }i«j;jiinst collision jiln'oad, it is deficient in tliost; precautions for tlu; protection of its own coast and coninierce, which at such a moment should l)e most seriously attended to. The annexed extract, from the Journal des Debats, may not be iniinteresting to those who wish for infor- mation on the present state of the French Navy, and the pro<>'ress it has made; while their remarks on our own, and the accurate accounts they appear to i)ossess respecting- it, are not less deserving our fittention. APPKN I3IX. V TKAXSLATIOX FllOM TIIH " JOIRXAL DKS DKIJATS," OF THE 21sf SKlTKMI'.llK 1840. Ul in*' i I'aris. 20t/i Scptcmhcr. — A vcaIcw specially drxotcd to tlu' Kiif^Hsh Xii\ y and Army, and wliicli enjoys in l''nu-]and a cliaracter almost oflicial. the "rnittd Ser\ ice .lonrnal" eontains in its last number, a c()ni])ar;'.tL\e statement ol' tlie Xaxies of [''ranee and Kn^'land. While Ave admit the exactness of the H<;'ures fiix-en. and the fidelity of the quotations made by the author of this article, we cannot, however, ]n"event ourselves from findinu- fault with a tone of "hauteur" and arr()earancc — as in the present case, it conducts them to false and inapplicable conclusions, as happens to the author of the article in question. Doubtless, we do not mean to dis])ute in any manner the numeri- cal s\i])eriority of the Enp;lish X'avy, both in men, and in vessels (materiel.) lint. It does not follow from this, that when they ha\e exhibited to us a threatenin<>- display of 105 ships of the line, antl 80 fri('d in iiltcinptinu' to ape the attltndcs and ht-iiriiiji; of urowu men. There is now -a-(hiy^, ahnost a blind reliance on li;;iins ; they are regarded witli too niiieh coniplaisance as the most antlientic elements of certainty ; they offer so nuieh facility to the carek'ssness and Incapacity of nun's minds, that it is not siifliciently recollected, that (i<;'nres are tlieins(>lves the results of intellectual ()j)crations in which error may ha\c min;;ied ; and as there is nothing which so absolutely resemldes one fi<>ure as another (li;'ure, we too often allow ourselves to (Mjuipare toj;'ether, thinj;s which are essentially different, or which, reseml)lin;4' in appearance, are subject to conditions of existence entirely different. This very articU- of the " Tnited Service Journal." will show us the fallacy of some of those com- parisons which an- foundi'd on a ^reat display of fitjjurcs. Ijct us sjjcak in the first place of the '* materiel" considered in itself, and afterwards of the wants which it is called to satisfy in the two countries. What do the 105 Hn-flish shii)s of the line consist of? This total comprehends, even according- to the showinf^- of the Kn^lish writer of 28 line-of-battle ships, armed, or kept in a condition of beinj;- so, more or less advanced ; 54 slaps ilisarmed, and afloat ; and finally, 23 ships bulldiufi-. Of the 28 ships of tlie line "• in commission," as the Mni^lish say, we shall sec in the first place, seven which are now incapable of warlike service, viz : — the '• San Joseph, "" taken fnnn the Spaniards, in 1797: the " Mctory," 104, on board of which Lord Nelson died, at Trafalgar; (this ship is now 75 years of age;) the "Ocean," 80, which serves as a depot at Sheerness; the "Donegal," 78, recalled to England to be paid off; the '•' Excellent," 76, which serves as a school for seamen-gunners, at Portsmouth; the -'Magnificent," 72, turned into a hulk at Jamaica; the "Toictiers,"' 72, is the depot of the port of Chatham. 11) 2:\ 'I'lic .01 ships <)!' the liiic iidoiit. Mi'c ((iinpo-id dl I !{ sliips, iVuiii 1()(» ti) I '20 •41ms; K ships ol' K4 ^'uiis, and .'{'I ships ul from 7*2 to 7iS ;^Mins. We uiii^lit to iulmil (hat \\r possess no siitHcli nt incalis of ttscirtiiininy: with any (U'l^ric of ccrfuinty, the actnal state of these Vt'Hscls. liiit however, it must he said, that in ISl.'j. at tlie (lose of the contili''ntal war. l'',n!j,'land had in (dinnii>-.i('n n)ore than "JilO ships of th(> line and fViirati's o|' all classes, and that siu hastened to pa) them off for the most part, when the p'ace had reduced the Work of the iioyal .Navy to crui/iny; against shivers, or Mahiy pirates, Matcinn;j; the coasts, and the carrying of f;;arrisons and dispatciu's over the- inunenst' extent of the I^ritish cm])ire. It is tlu' remains of tlw'se vast armaments of 18I.'>. which now still conij)oses the j^reiit mass of the '■'materiel" afloat in the Mnu-lish |)orts: the ;^reat niunher of \essels wliich were possessed heyond what wire reipiired for the wants of tin.' ser\ice, and which there wcr.' no means of turnini;- to account, was a reason why few have since hren huilt. We shall see a proof of this in the names of these vessels, of w liicli a ^-ood number were known in the time of th<> continental war. Another indication of what we advance, is. that two-thirds of these slii])s are " seventy-fours."' tliat is to say, vessels of a motlel and Kcantlinp;, which are ««-iven up now-a-days. when the force of ships in artillery is almost unreasonably au«;'mented. Now, what is in 1840 the effective value of all this tloatin,ii- " /natericW This is, what wc confess that we do not know: this is. what no one perha])s can tell exactly ; not even the Admiralty; but this is what we may aflirm — that these .'34 shi])s of the line aHoat. are very far from re[)resenting 54 ships ready to be put into connnission. As to the 23 shij)s of tiie line buiklin<^', we have nothing- to say of them, unless it be, that they confirm what we have just advanced ; for of this number there are only three •• 74s, "" and tJiey besides, were perhaps already on the stocks at the peace of 1815. After having quoted these imposin;.; ti<>'ures. it seems that we li;.: I-'"' to n. r< 'I u. it init^lit t'X]n'ri(Mi('o some cnibarrassnu'nt in spcakini,' of tlio 4(i slii])s ol' tlie line whicli I-'rance possesses [23 armed, or afloat, and 23 u])on the stocks;. It must be said, however, tliat we do not reckon aniont;- them any hulk : for. as soon as any of our vessels become unsea worthy, she is forthwith removed from the lists ; it must be said that of our 23 ships afloat, there are 18 completely armed, or about to become so, and of the five others perhaps one only which retpiires some rei)airs. It must be said that in general our ships of the line (we by no means speuk of the extent or courage of the seamen by which they arc manned) are materially superior to the ICiiglish ships, in the excellence of their construction, the perfection of their armament, the solidity of their scantling, the number of guns which they mount, and the dimensions of the calibre of their guns. As to the 23 ships of the line which we have on the stocks, wc may say, that their state of advancement, expressed acc(n-ding to the usage by 24ths. represents 17 ships of the line afloat. Little is jn-oved, therefore, in comparing the 105 English linc-of- battle ships with the 4