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32X

[Published under the auspices of the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec.]

■

A DIALOGUE IH HADES.

A PARALLEL OF MILITARY ERRORS, OF WHICH THE FRENCH AND
ENGLISH ARMIES WERE GUILTY, DURING THE CAMPAIGN
OF 1769, IN CANADA. -

The Marquis de Montcalm : — Having ardently desired a
conversation with you, sir, upon the operations of a
campaign which proved to both of us so fatal, I have sought
you continually amongst the shades ever since I descended
here, where I soon followed you.

General Wolfe : — I can assure you, sir, I was equally
impatient to meet with you. Some of my countrymen,
arrived here since the battle of the 13th September, informed
me that there was only an interval of a few hours in our
sharing the same hard fate. They gave me some accounts
of that event which joined Canada to the British dominions ;
but as they had a very imperfect knowledge of the
circumstances, and entirely ignorant of your plan of
operations, I have little information from them, and I am
heartily glad that chance at last has procured me the pleasure
of seeing you.

Montcalm : — Will you permit me, sir, before our conversa-
tion becomes serious, to offer some reflections upon ihe
difference in our destiny. Your nation rendered you the
greatest honours : your body was conveyed to London, and
buried there magnificently in Westminster Abbey, amongst
your kings. Generous Britons erected to your memory a

(2)

superb monument over your grave, at public expense ; and
your name, most dear to your countrymen, is ever in their
mouths, accompanied with praise and regret. But in my
country what a strange indifference ? What sensation did
my death make upon my compatriots ? My conduct denounced
and censured without measure, is the continual subject
of conversation for gossiping fools and knaves, who form the
majority in all communities, and prevail against the infinitely
small number to be found of honest, judicious, impartial
men, capable of reflection. The Canadians and savages
who knew the uprightness of my soul, ever devoted 1o the
interests of my beloved king and country, they alone rendered
me justice, with a few sincere friends, who, not daring to
oppose themselves openly to the torrent of my enemies,
bewailed in secret my uniiappy fate, and shed on my tomb
their friendly tears.

Wolfe : — Inthis blessed abode, inaccessible to prejudice, I
vow to you, sir, I envy your condition, notwithstanding the
horrible injustice and ingratitude of your countrymen. What
can give more pleasure and self-satisfaction than the esteem
and approbation of honest men ? You were severely regretted
and lamented by all those who were capable of discerning
and appreciating your superior merit, talents, and eminent
qualities. Disinterested persons of probity must respect
your virtue. All officers versed in the art of war will
justify your military tactics, and your operations can
be blamed only by the ignorant. Were my army consulted,
they would be as many witnesses in your favour. Your
humanity towards prisoners won you the heart of all my
soldiers. They saw with gratitude and veneration your con-
tinual care and vigilance to snatch them from out of the hands
of the Indians, when those barbarians were ready to cut their
throats, and prepared to make of human flesh their horrible
banquets ; refusing me even tears at my death, they weeped
and bewailed your hard fate ; I see in my mausoleum the
proof only of human weakness ! What does that block of
marble avail to me in my present state? The monument

9 l^i«f

„

remains, but the conqueror has perished. The afTection,
approbation and regret of the worthiest part of mankind is
greatly preferable and much above the vain honours conferred
by a blind people, who judge according to the event, and are
incapable to analyse the operations. 1 was unknown to
them before the expedition which I commanded in Canada ;
and if fortune, to whom I entirely owe my success, had less
favoured me, perhaps, like Byng, I would have been the
victim of a furious and unruly populace. The multitude
has and can have success only for the rule of their judgment.

Montcalm : — I am much obliged to you, sir, for your
favourable opinion of me. Let us leave weak mortals to
crawl from error to error, and deify to-day what they will
condemn to-morrow. It is at present, when the darkness is
dispelled from before our eyes, that we can contemplate at
leisure the passions of men, who move as the waves of the
sea, push on each other and often break upon the rocks ; and
in our present state, when ail prejudices are at an end, let us
examine impartially the operations of 1759, which was the
epocha of the loss to France of her northern colonies in
America.

Wolfe : — Most willingly sir, and to show my frankness, I
own to you I was greatly surprised on arriving with the
English fleet at Quebec without meeting with any opposition
by the French in the river St. Lawrence.

Montcalm: — You had reason to be so. It was not my
fault that you did not meet with many obstacles in your way.
I proposed to have a redoubt and battery erected upon Cape
Tourmente, which is a rock above fifty feet high, facing the
Traverse at the east* end of the Island of Orleans, where all
the vessels cross from the north to the south side of the St.
Lawrence river. They are obliged to approach very near the
Cape before they enter into the Traverse, and its height
above the men-of-war would have secured it against the

* Formerly, inward boand Bbips, instead of taking the sontb channel lower
down tlian GrooBe Island, struck over from Cape Tourmente, and took tbe aoath
channel between Madame Island and Pointe Argentenay.

ctVect of the artillery. Besides, this rock, almost perpendicular,
commanding all round it, the fort would have been
impregnable, and not susceptible of being besieged. Thus
the first of your ships which approached to pass the Traverse
would have been raked by the plunging fire of the battery
from stern to bowsprit, and must have been sunk. I had
likewise the project of placing a battery and a redoubt
upon the upper point of the bay which is opposite to the
west end of Isle aux Coudres. The current between this
island and the main land being incredibly rapid at low
water, all the vessels coming up the river must have cast anchor
there to wait until the next tide ; and my artillery upon the
point of that bay would have battered your ships at anchor
from fore to aft ; have put in a most terrible confusion
your ships, who could not have taken up their anchors without
being instantly dashed to pieces against the rocks by the
violence of the current, forced, as they would have been by it,
to have their bowsprits always pointed to the battery, without
being .able to fire at it. Your fleet would have had no
knowledge of the battery until they were at anchor, so you
may easily judge how it would have distressed them. I
proposed this, but I did not command in chief: it was the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, Governor General of Canada, who
should have ordered it to be put into execution.

Wolfe : — If they had executed your project, it would have
puzzled us, and retarded for some time our operations.

Montcalm: — That was all I could wish for, as I was
always sensible of the great advantage, in certain situations,
of gaining time from the enemy, especially in such a climate as
Canada, where the summer is so short that it is impossible to
keep the field longer than from the month of May till the
beginning of October, and your fleet arrived at Isle aux
Coudres at the end of June.

Wolfe : — There is no doubt that you are in the right.
Our fleet arrived in the river St. Lawrence six weeks too late,
which is commonly the fate of all great naval expeditions.
Fleets are seldom ready to sail at the time appointed ; and

lliis often renders fniiticss the best concocted enterprise by
sea, from the uncertainty of the arrival of the army at its
destination. The smallest delay is often dangerous, as it
gives the enemy the time to prepare themselves for defence,
without hurry or confusion.

MoNTCAT.M : — I will not conceal from you, sir, that I
always looked upon the distribution you made of your army
upon your landing near Quebec, as diametrically opposed to
the established principles in castrametation. It is a known
axiom in the art of war, that an army ought to be encamped
in such a manner as to have a free and easy communication
with all its parts; that they may unite quickly without any
obstruction, and be able to defend and sustain each other
reciprocally over the whole extent of the camp, in case any
part of it is attacked. You divided your army in three different
camps; one of them upon the Pointe Levis, another upon the
Island of Orleans, and the third at the SauJt de Montmorency
The two branches of the St. Lawrence river, which forms the
Island of Orleans, each of them about half-a-mile broad,
separated your three camps, without a possibility of
establishing a communication between them ; and your
camp upon the Pointe Levis was at a distance of six miles from
your camp at the Sault de Montmorency. Your position
was such that had we fallen with our army on any of your
three camps, we would have cut them to pieces, before those
of your other two camps could have come to their assistance.
The knowledge for choosing an advantageous ground for
encamping an army, always appears to me to be one of the
most essential talents requisite in a general. How could
you remain quietly in such a dangerous position during two
months, without trembling.

Wolfe : — What hindered you then, sir, from executing
that which appeared to you so easy ?

Montcalm : — We attempted it, but with very bad success.
Seven days after your landing at the Pointe Levis, Mr. Dumas,
Major of the ('olony troops, was sent to attack your camp at the
Pointe Levis, with a body of fifteen hundred men, who in the

night crossed the river St. Lawrence at Quebec, without
being discovered by your advanced guards. But they were
no sooner landed and marching, than, struck with a panic,
the utmost disorder suddenly ensued ; their heads turned,
and, losing their senses entirely, they fired at each other,
believing themselves attacked by your army. In short, they
immediately fled back to their boats with the greatest
precipitation and contusion. Discouraged by this bad
beginning, M. de Vaudreuil would never listen to any
proposals of further attempts upon your camps ; and it was
decided to keep ourselves for the future upon the defensive.

WoLFB : — It appears to me, however, that you were not
encamped in a proper manner to be upon the defensive.
Your army did not amount to ten thousand men, and your
camp extended seven or eight miles.

Montcalm : — I agree with you, and am sensible that the
longer the line, the weaker it is in its several parts. I am
convinced that it is impossible to prevent a line from being
forced ; and 1 believe likewise that, landing on a coast where
there are several leagues of it to be defended, equally
susceptible of descent, is the same case as lines. He who
attacks has all his force concentrated at a single point, which
he may choose as he pleases, any where in the extent of his
lines ; on the contrary, he who is attacked in his entrench-
ments has his force divided over the whole extent of his
lines, and does not know on what part of them the enemy
has the intention to make his real attack, so that he must be
everywhere equally strong and guarded over all the 'ground
occupied by his army. Thu the head of a column of a great
depth of ranks must infallibly pierce through lines who have
only at most two or three men deep ; and by feint attacks all
over the front of a line, you cannot weaken one part of it by
drawing troops from it to fortify another part of it, unless the
point of the enemy's principal attack is manifestly known.
It is certainly the same with regard to landings, where all
the extent of the sea coast may be threatened at the same
time, although it is a common opinion that a coast may be

..,'^/

, (

defended, and that an enemy may be repulsed in his attempt
to make a descent by open force.

I know not a better method to oppose a descent than to
have bodies of troops in batlle, ready to rush upon the
enemy, with their bayonets upon their musk&:<), attacking
the moment the enemy land, whilst they are yet few and in
confusion from the disorder which must necessarily happen
at their coming out of their boats, and before they can
present a considerable front in battle.

My project of defence was to encamp on rising ground at
Quebec, called by the French, Les HoMteurs (PMraham, and
make Quebec serve as the centre and pivot to all my
operations, since it was evident that the fate of Canada
depended entirely on its being preserved to us or taken by
you, which decided whether that colony should remain to its
ancient possessors or become your prize.

With this in view, I intrenched the borders of the St. Charles
river, and remained encamped at Quebec until, receivingtidings
of your fleet having arrived in the St. Lawrence river, M. do
Levis, an officer of great merit and distinction, proposed to
change the position of our camp, by carrying our left wing to the
Sanlt de Montmorency, and our right to the St. Charles river :
this, as you say, made it six miles long on the north side
of Quebec, and gave us greater appearance of being on the
offensive liian on the defensive.

He pretended that the presenting a great front to the enemy
would give us a bold look, and inspire respect. As there
can be no positive certainty in any military operation, from
unforeseen accidents which often overturn the best combined
project, I readily sacrificed to him my opinion, without
insisting upon it. In this new position M. de Vaudreuil
commanded the right of our camp, near Quebec ; M. de Levis
the left, at the Sault de Montmorency ; and I commanded
the centre, at Beauport.

WoLrB : — Had you continued on the heights of Abraham
you would have saved Quebec, but you would have
abandoned to me all the country, where I might have

destroyed, burnt and ruined all the setflements at some
leagues round it.

Montcalm : — That may be, but Canada would not have
been taken, and certainly you durst not penetrate far into
the country, leaving Quebec behind you. Had you attacked
me, I would have had the advantage of the rising ground,
which I would have foitified with intrenchments, and .with a
chain of redoubts from Quebec to Cap Rouge, where these
heights terminate in a deep ravine, with a small river at the
bottom of it, overhung with rocks, at three leagues from Quebec.
This advantageous position, not to be successfully attacked
by any number of men, would have been my advanced post.

My right would have been applied to Quebec, and
sustained by it. I never could guess, sir, your idea in
reducing that town to ashes as you did, by throwing upon it
continually, from your batteries on the opposite side of the
river, that immense number of carcases and shells.

It seems to me that when an army besieges a town, it is
with the intention, on its surrendering, to keep possession of
it, and have houses in it to lodge the troops, instead of heaps
of ruins. This conduct was still more essentially necessary
from the season being advanced, and from the impossibility
of carrying-on any kind of house building during the winter.
More-over, the utter destruction of that town reduced to ashes
could not hasten its being taken a moment sooner. You
could do no harm to our batteries, which were much higher
than yours ; it is not by destroying houses that towns are
taken. You always battered houses, without reflecting that
it is only by ruining the fortifications — the defences — and by
a breach in the walls, that success may be hoped for in
sieges ; and it is certain that you lavished a prodigious
quantity of warlike stores very uselessly.

What advantages could you expect by ruining and dis-
tressing the inhabitantsof Quebec, whose houses you burnt?

It was destroying alone for the pleasure of doing injury,
without any advantage accruing to you from it.

"Wolfe : — My inaction during the whole summer should
have made you perceive what little hopes I had of succeeding
in my expedition ; should it turn out fruitless after the sum
it had cost England, the news of Quebec being reduced to
ashes might blind the extravagant English populace, and
blunt their fanatical fury.

Montcalm: — The day that you landed at the Sault de
Montmorency, where you encamped immediately with a
body of four thousand men, in all appearance you did not
know that the river Montmorency was fordable in the wood
about a mile to the north of your camp, where fifty men in
front might pass the ford with water only up to their knees.
Had you passed it immediately, you might have fallen
upon the left of our army, cut them to pieces, and pursued
them two mHes, as far as the rivine of Beauport, before they
could assemble a sufficient /^umber of men to be able to
resist you. You might have even encamped upon the north
side of that ravine, which, having it before you, would have
been a very advantageous post, and brought you several
miles nearer to Quebec. In this case it is highly probable
«hat we would have been obliged to abandon to you all the
ground between the St. Charles river and the ravine.

To return to my first project of encamping upon the heights
of Abraham, our left was in the greatest security, not
knowing that there was a ford in that river until some hours
after your landing at the Sault.

Wolfe : — Is it then surprising that I should be ignorant of
that ford, since you did not know it yourself? besides, it is
only the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of rivers, swamps
and lakes, who can give positive and sure information about
them. And supposing I had found some of your Canadians
at their houses there, they are so inviolably attached to their
religion, king and country, that they would sooner have
led me into a snare than instruct me in anything that could
be prejudicial to their army.

Those whom a general sends to examine the locale of a
country must do it very superficially upon their own obser-

^iii

vations, without consulting or interrogating the peasantff
in the neighbourhood.

Montcalm : — Whilst your soldiers were employed in
making their camp, and pitching their tents, M. de Levis and
his aide-de-camp Johnstone, were looking at yon from tho
opposite side of the Sault. His aide-de-camp having asked
him if he was positively certain that there was no ford in the
Montmorency river, M. de Levis answering that there was
not, and that he had been himsell to examine it to its source.
At a lake in the woods, about ten or twelve miles from the
Sault, an inhabitant who overheard this conversation, told
the aide-de-camp: **The General is mistaken; there is a
ford which the inhabitants thereabouts po.HS every day in
carrying their com to a mill ;" and he added that he had
crossed it lately, with water not above his knees.

The aide-de-camp related to M. de Levis immediately hit
conversation with the Canadian, who would not believe there
was a ford, and, examining him roughly, the Canadian
was seized with awe, and respect for the General ; his tongue
faltered in his mouth, and he durst not boldly assert
the truth. The aide-de-camp, in a whisper to the Canadian,
ordered him to find out a person who had crossed the ford
lately, and bring him immediately to M. de Levis'
lodgings. The Canadian came to him in a moment, with a
man who had crossed it the night before, with a sack of
wheat upon his back, where he had found only eight inches
deep of water.

The aide-de-camp being thus assured of the fact, ordered,
in M. de Levis' name, a detachment to be sent instantly,
with the necessary tools to intrench itself.

Wolfe : — Had I been so lucky as you, sir, to discover
that ford, there is no doubt I would not have let slip so
favourable an opportunity of distinguishing myself, and
would have fallen like lightning upon that part of your
camp. There can be nothing more dangerous than the
neighbourhood of rivers and swamps, that have not been
sounded and examined with the greatest care and attention.

1
:

Negligence, ignorance and headstrong obstinacy are equally
fatal in military affairs ; and the misfortune of a Lieutenant-
General, in Scotland, against the Highlanders at the battle of
Prestonpans, made so deep an impression upon me that lam
always on my guard when near such places.
. Montcalm: — How can you, sir, justify your imprudence
in running headlong into the woods opposite to our intrench-
ments, with two thousand men, who naturally ought to
have been cut to pieces, and neither you nor any man of
your detachment escape ? Nine hundred Indians had
invested you all round at a pistol shot from you, and had
already cut off your retreat, without your perceiving it.
So soon as the Indians had surrounded you in the wood, they
sent their officer Langlade to acquaint M. de Levis that they
had got you in their net, but that your detachment, appearing
to be about two thousand men, greatly superior to them in
number, they begged earnestly of M. de Levis to order M.
de Repentigny to pass the ford with eleven hundred men,
which he commanded in these inlrenchments, and join them ;
that they would be answerable upon their heads if a single
man of your detachment should get back to your camp ; and
they did not think themselves strong enough to strike upon
you without this reinforcement of Canadians. There were a
great many officers at M. de Levis' lodgings when Langlade
came to him on behalf of the Indians, and this Gkneral having
consulted them, after giving his own opinion on the aflair :
**• that it was dangerous to attack an army in the wood, as
"they could not know the number of men there; that it
'* might be all the English army, which consequently might
** bring on a general engagement without being prepared for
** it ; and that if he happened to be repulsed, he would be
** blamed for engaging in an affair, without holding previously
** an order from his superiors, M. de Vaudreuil and M. d6
** Montcalm." The officers respected too much the General
not to be of his way of thinking, and it must ever be so from
flattery. His aide-de-camp alone maintained a diflerent
opinion, out of a real friendship forM. de Levis. He told

I!*

li!

' I'
i

1:1

them that there was not the smallest probability it could be
all the English army, since the Indians, who never fail to
magnify the number, computed them at only two thousand
men. That even supposing it to be the whole Rngiish army,
it would be the most lucky thing that could happen to us to
have a general engagement in the woods, where a Canadian
is worth three disciplined soldiers, as a soldier in a plain is
worth three Canadians ; and that nothing was more essential
than to select the propitious moment and the way of
fighting, for those who composed the two thirds of the army,
which was the case with the Canadians. On the contrary,
the English army was almost entirely composed of regulars,
with very few militia. *^*'^ ' "

That M. de Levis could not do better than in ordering M. de
Repentigny to cross the river immediately with his detachment
en ^cheloHf and join the Indians, without losing moments
very precious ; that at the same time he should send
instantly to inform me of his adventure, in order to make all
the army advance towards the ford, each regiment taking
the place of the other marched off; so that the Regiment
Royal Roussillon, the nearest to the ford, should go
off directly to take the post that Repentigny would quit in
crossing the river, and observing the same for the rest of the
army ; that by this means the engaging a general affair was
much to be wished for, supposing all the English army to be
in the woods opposite the ford ; in short, that it there was a
possibility of our being defeated and repulsed in the woods,
which could scarce happen, according to all human probability,
we had our retreat assured in the depth of these woods, well
known to the Canadians, where the English troops could not
pursue them, so that in no shape could M. de Levis run the
least risk. .,

His aide<le-camp added, that when fortune offers her
favours, " they ought to be snatched with avidity." These
leasons made no impressions on M. de Levis, and Langlade
was sent back to the Indians with a negative reply.

There was two miles from M. de Levis' quarters to the

place where the Indians were in ambush. Langlade
came back with new entreaties and earnest solicitations to
induce M. de Levis to make Repentigny cross the ford with
his detachment, but the General could not be prevailed upon
to give a positive order to Repentigny to join the [ndians.

He wrote a letter to Repentigny by Langlade, wherein he
told him ** having the greatest confidence in his prudence
and good conduct, he might pass the river with his
detachment, if he saw a certainty of success." His aide-de-
camp told him, whilst he was sealing the letter, that
Repentigny had too much judgment and good sense to take
upon himself an affair of that importance ; and his opinion
of Repentigny was immediately justified by his answer; he
asked M de Levis to give him a clear and positive
order. After thus loitering about an hour and-a-half, M. de
Levis resolved at last to go himself to the ford, and give there
his orders verbally ; but he had scarce got half way to it
when he heard a brisk fire. The Indians, losing all
patience, after having remained so long hid at a pistol shot
from you, like setter dogs upon wild fowl, at last gave yon
a volley, killed about a hundred and fifty of your soldiers,
and then retired without losing a man. It is evident
that had Repentigny passed the river with his detachment
of eleven hundred Canadians, you must have been cut to
pieces, and that affair would have terminated your expedition.
Your army could have no more hopes of succeeding after
such a loss; their spirits would have been damped, and
Canada would have been secure from any further invasion
from Great Britain.

Fortune was always as favourable to you, as she constantly
frowned upon us. M. de Levis is not to be blamed ; an
officer who serves under the orders of others can only
be reproached when he does not execute punctually the
orders he receives from his superiors; and he has always
reason to be cautious and diffident in such cases where his
honour and reputation mav be engaged, as none can be
positively certain of the issue of any military enterprise,

.Ik

and if success does not crown the venture, of which you have
voluntarily burthened yourself, though undertaken from the
best of motives and apparently for the good of the service,
thousands of mouths will open to spit venom against you.

But of all others, the ignorant amongst the militaiyi mud
the knaves, to screen themselves, will surely be violent : this
is so much the more astonishing, in the profession of arms,
where sentiments of honour and honesty ought to be the
foundation.

Wolfe : — My intention in approaching so near your post at
the ford was to examine it carefully, as I then had formed the
design to attack it, little imagining that such a considerable
detachment as I had with me would have been exposed to
be set on by your Indians. Accustomed to European warfare,
I could never have thought th it a body of men should have
been so long, so close to me without discovering them. Your
intrenchments there appeared to be very trifling, but the
sight of earth thrown up is respectable, and not to be despised.
' Montcalm : — Your attack of the 31st of July, at the only
place of our camp which was inaccessible, appeared to me
unaccountable. From Quebec to Beauport, which was about
four miles, it is a marshy ground, very little higher than the
surface of the St. Lawrence at full tide. The heights begin at
the ravine at Beauport, and rise gradually all along the border
of the river, until at Johnstone's redoubt and battery — where
you made your descent and attack — they become a steep high
hill, which ends in a deep precipice at the Sanlt de
Montmorency. Opposite to Johnstone's redoubt it is so steep
that your soldiers could scarce be able to climb it, even without
the encumbrance of their arms. ^

' Besides this natural fortification, we had a continued
intrenchment all along the edge of the hill, from Beauport to
the Sanlt, so traced and conducted by M. Johnstone that it
was everywhere flanked, and the sloping of it served as a
glacis ; thus the fire from the front and flanks would have
destroyed the three-fourths of your army before they could
reach the top of the hill.

But supposing that some of your troops had reached the
top of the hill, up to our trenches, after surmounting these
difficulties, my grenadiers were drawn up in battle behind
them, ready to charge upon them, with their bayonets upon
their musquets,the instant any of your soldiers should appear
at the trenches.

The swampy, sinking ground, from the redoubt to the foot
of the hill, was not one of the smallest difficulties you had in
your way to come at us.

It is true the Scotch Flighlanders, who were your forlorn
hope, had got over it and had reached the foot of the hill,
though certainly very few returned ; but these turfy swamps,
when a certain number of men have passed them, become
at last impassible, and your soldiers must have sunk down in
it above the head, multitudes of them perishing there in the
most useless and disagreeable manner. Thus, sir, I hope
you see clearly the folly and rashness of that attack, and that
your army must have been totally destroyed, without hope,
had not heaven wrought a miracle in your favor, after a long
cessation of them, which alone could save you.

You were no sooner hotly eng*aged in the attack, without
a possibility of withdrawing yourself out of the scrape, when
from a clear sunshine there fell in that most critical junc-
ture, of a sudden, the most violent, even down pour of
rain from a cloud, which, as the cloud that saved Eneas from
the fury of Diomed, placed you immediately out of our
sight, so that in an instant we could not see half way down
the hill. You profited, as a wise man, of this event to make
good your retreat. When the shower was over and we
could see you, we found, to our sorrow, that you had escaped
us, and that you were then out of the reach of our fire, march-
ing, in a well-formed column, back to your camp at the Sault,
well satisfied to have got out of that adventure with the loss
only of between five and six hundred men.

It was a long time before I could be persuaded that you were
in earnest. I had always expected your descent and attack
would have been betwixt the St. Charles river and the ravine

!' ,

of Beauport. All that tract of ground, about four miles extent,
was every where favourable to you, il you had made your
real descent in the middle of it, opposite to M. Vaudreuil's
lodging, with feint attacks at Johnstone's redoubt, and at the
Canardi^re near the river St. Charles, forcing our intrench-
ments there, which could not resist an instant a well-formed
column. The head of it, composed of the Scotch Highlanders,
might have easily penetrated into the plain, separating our
army into two parts by the centre, having lodged yourself
in the south side of the ravine of Beauport, and have taken
the hornwork upon the St. Charles river, sword in hand,
without much difficulty or loss of men. In short, all this
might have been effected in an hour's time, without meeting
with any considerable resistance from our army,thus divided
and opened by the centre ; and a complete victory, which
would have crushed us to pieces without hope, would have
crowned you with justly merited laurels.

Wolfe : — I own to you, sir, I was greatly deceived with
regard to the height and steepness of the hill, which did not
appear considerable, even with a telescope, from the river St.
Lawrence ; it was only when I got to the redoubt, that I
saw it such as it really in. I began at seven in the
morning to fire at your camp from my battery at the Sault (of
forty cannons) mostly four-and-twenly pounders. The Cen-
turion^ a man-of-war of sixty guns, did the same, as also the
Two Cats, which had on board all the tools necessary for the
workmen. They gave you continually iheir broadsides, firing
upon your camp, as I did from my battery, like platoons of
infantry. , -.

I dare say you never saw artillery better served and kept
up until six in the evening when I began my landing at low
water. I imagined that this terrible cannonade all that day,
without a moment's intermission, would have intimidated
your Canadians, and make them quit the trenches ; my bat-
tery at the Sault being thirty or forty feet higher than your
camp, we saw them down at the shore. Certainly you must
have lost a great number of men.

Montcalm : — That brave militia deserves justly the greatest
praise. Not a man of them stirred from his post, and they
showed as much ardour, courage and resolution as my regular
troops. I had no more than fifty men killed and wounded
by your furious cannonade, which proves how little cannons
are hurtful in comparison to the dread and respect they inspire.
Permit me, sir, to tell you that your countrymen, the English}
appear to me, from their conduct in Canada, to be as rash,
inconsiderate and hot-headed as the French, who have ever
enjoyed that character, notwithstanding your countrymen's re-
putation for coolness and phlegmatic bravery, since I have seen
several examples of their attacking us before they had exam-
ined the locale^'or known our position ; and if the two nations
ard compared impartially, I am persuaded that you will do us
the justice to own that in our operations in Canada we have
shown much more circumspection and coolness than your
English generals. Your attack of the Slst July, without hav-
ing procured beforehand an exact knowledge of the hill and of
the places adjacent, is not the first example of great temerity
and impatience on their part.

The proximity of your camp to this hill might have fur-
nished you the means to have a thorough knowledge of our
position, by sending proper persons to cross over the ford of
the river Montmorency where it falls into the river St. Law-
rence, and where it is fordable at low water.

They might, in a dark night and bad weather, have not
only examined the steepness of the height, but have even gone
over all our camp without being discovered ; I always
imagined you did so until the day of your attack, which soon
convinced me of the contrary. Your brother in arms, Aber-
crombie, your predecessor in the command of the army, com-
mitted the same fault at Ticonderoga as you did the 31st of
July ; but it cost him much dearer, the clouds which saved
you not having come to his assistance.

I set out from Montreal on the 5th of May, 1758, to go to
Ticonderoga, with all my regular troops — the regiments of
La Sarre, La Reine, Royal Rousillon, Berne, G-uienne,

' si

Languedoc, Berry of two battalions, and the independent
companies of the marine detached in Canada ; the regiments
from France not being recruited, the whole amounted to only
about four thousand men.

I had no positive information that the English army had
formed the design to come by the lake St. Sacrament in order to
attack Ticonderoga (Carillon), and from thence to go to Mon..
treal — but I suspected it, from the proximity of this ford to
your settlement upon lake St. Sacrament ; nor did I cease
beseeching continually M. Vaudreuil, who was then at
Quebec, to send me with all possible diligence the Cana-
dian militia, which was the principal force for the defence
of the colony. » . . . i.n:,

M. Vaudreuil, who has neither common sense, nor judg-
ment, could not find out that my military conjectures were
grounded ; and instead of sending me the Canadians, he gave
them permission to remain at Montreal, sixty leagues from
Ticonderoga, to attend to their agricultural pursuits.

I dare not allege that he was informed, by the Indians of the
Iroquois nation, that the object of the English was to invade
Canada ; that their army was on their way to lake St. Sacra-
ment ; that it was with the view of sacrificing me, and
making me the victim of a cabal, who led him and governed
him blindly, that he kept from me the Canadians.

The 7th of July my conjectures were verified by the arrival
of the English army at the Chflte, where lake St. Sacra-
ment terminates, about four miles from Ticonderoga, con-
sisting of six thousand three hundred men, commanded by
General Abercrombie, who had succeeded to General Brad-
dock, killed the year before at the river Ohio.

The return of a detachment which 1 had placed at the ChAte,
as an advanced post, who had lost an hundred and fifty men,
killed by the English on their arrival there, was a sad con-
firmation of the bad news. It is scarce possible to imagine a
more dangerous and critical situation than mine — without the
aid of Canadians, whose way of fighting was so essential to
me in the woods — more useful in those countries than regular

troop:*. Fort Carrillon, or Ti nderoga, was a square, rega*
larly fortihed, each face of it about seventy fathoms in length.

It had four bastions — the walls of masonry, doubled with
a rampart, as likewise a ditch, covered way, and glacis. M.
de Bourlamarque, an officer of great merit and intelligence,
had added a half moon to it.

To retire with my four thousand troops would have been
abandoning the colony to G-eneral Abercrombie, as the fort
could not hold out long against so considerable an army ; and
being on that side the key of Canada, with the possession of it
in the hands of the English, they might godirectiy to Montreal,
and be there in fifteen days, without finding on tlieir way the
least obstruction ; on the other hand, the match was very un-
equal in opposing four thousand men to thirteen thousand.
There was, however, no room for hesitating, in the choice,
and I was soon resolved to save the colony by a bold and des-
perate stroke or die, gloriously, sword in hand. I made
everybody work hard all the night between the 7th and 8th
July, cutting down trees to make an intrench ment (CCCC),
which, when finished, was very weak, trifling, and could
scarce serve as a breast-work to cover the troops.

The engineers, having cut off the branches, laid the trees
upon a line on the heights, three or four of them placed hori-
zontally one upon the other, which scarce made it above
three feet high — so low that your soldiers might easily have
jumped over it ; — they made a line of the branches, at two
paces distance, on the outside of the trenches (HH). It is cer-
tain that if the engineers had only thrown the trees with their
heads outwards, and their branches sharpened in pricking
points at their ends, it would have made a much stronger in-
trenchment, more difficult to be forced, and built much
sooner.* I had not the time to continue the trenches down to
the hollow (DD), at the foot of the height, and I placed there
two companies of grenadiers. . „ ,. .. ^. .. ,

* General Aberorombie's army oonaisted of 6,000 regular troopa and 7,000
proTlnoiala, according to the English ; but the French gave them oat to be 6,300
troops, and 13,000 proTiodala— in all 19,300 men.

I I
i-
i

!
1

The hollow upon the right of the height, where the in-
trenuhment was the worst of all my lines, was the post of the
companies of marines (C) ; the regiments lined the rest
of the trenches. Next day, the 8th of July, the English army
appeared on the borders of the woods, about three hundred
fathoms from the front of our intrench menl on the height, and
instantly advanced to the attack, formed in three columns
(EE), without halting a moment to examine the locale. Two
of the columns attacked the height with the utmost impe-
tuosity, but being very soon entangled among the branches,
on the outside of the trenches, and impeded by them, they lost
there a great many men ; some few got through and, jumping
into our trenches, were killed by our soldiers with their
bayonets.

The American riflemen were posted on two heigl.ts (GG),
which commanded our trenches, from whence they saw side-
ways in some parts of them, and in others the rear of the
soldiers (K).

The regiment of Berry was, above all others, worried and
tormented by their fire — one of these heights being scarce
above eighty paces from the intrench ments. The third column
attacked the hollow upon our right ; but receiving a brisk fire
at its front from the colony troops, and at the same time upon
its right flank from the regiments on the height, the column
soon wavered, wheeled to the right, and, presenting its front
to the height, got out of the reach of the fire from the right of
the colony troops ; upon which M. Raymond, who command-
ed them, went out of the trenches with the right wing of these
troops, and attacked the left flank of the column, whilst its
head and right flank were fired at from the height and from
the left of the colony troops in the trenches.

The column, distressed by this firing, yet, nevertheless, keep-
ing firm at the foot of the height, put in disorder the regiment
of Berry, who abandoned that part of theintrenchment (II)
above it.

The moment I perceived the disorder, I ran there, encouraged
the soldiers of the regiment, made them return to their post,

and supported them by the grenadiers, whom I had kept in
order of battle, at a small distance from the trenches, as a
reserve, to be employed wherever the line might be forced by
your troops, to charge upon them headlong, their bayonets
Upon their muskets, without firing : having neglected nothing
that the short time allowed me to do, in order to make a
vigorous defence — without aught to reproach myself with —
had I been overpowered by your army; and having always
preserved coolness and presence of mind so as to be able to
remedy immediately any disorders during this long, well and
disputed attack.

G-eneral Abercrorabie was at last obliged to retire, after
having continued for some hours, with the greatest obstinacy,
his attempt to force our intrenchments, — with the loss of two
thousand men.*

I acquitted myself of my duty : this always affords a
sweet satisfaction in all the events of life ; and, even to the
vanquished and unfortunate, it must yield great comfort
and consolation. I had only twelve hours to prepare
to defend myself with five thousand men against thirteen
thousand.

How can General Abercrombie's rash and blind conduct
be accounted for, for attacking us without examining or
knowing our position ? It is astonishing.

During twelve hours that he remained at the Chdte after
landing there, he had time to send and examine the ground
round the fort Ticonderoga ; and they might have had a
perfect knowledge of our position from a hill, covered with
big trees, on the opposite side of the river of the ChAte (P); f
this hill was much higher than any part of our intrenchments,
and not a musket shot from them ; he might Ijave gone there
himself with safety, having that river between us.

Had he halted only a short time after his arrival on the bor-
ders of the wood, about six hundred paces from our trenches,
he might, even from thence, have examined the locale at his

* The French say the EDglish lost between four and five thousand men.
t Unfortunately, the plans here alluded to do not accompany themanusoript.

1 !■

leisure. But, seized with impatience, he hurried to the attack
without stopping there a moment — and it is not when an action
is engaged that one can then examine the enemy's position ;
or, if he had advanced upon us the moment of his landing at
the ChOte, the 7th instant, instead of loitering there twelve
hours, he would not have found even those shabby intrench-
ments ; and having so few (regular) troops, irrespective of the
Canadians, I would have been obliged, on his appearing, to
abandon to him all that part of the country, and retire to Mon-
treal, leaving only a garrison at Fort Carillon. It was certainly
through his ignorance of the localeXhaX I repulsed him, instead of
being myself cut to pieces ; nor had I any means of retreat, and
my troops must have been all killed or taken prisoners, if his
third column had marched along the borders of the wood
upon their left ; this would have put them out of the reach of
the fire from the height, they could fall upon the right flank of
the trenches of the colony troops, who could not have resisted
a moment the impulse of the column ; instead of wheeling and
changing ito plan of attack by presenting its head to the height,
had he always advanced forward to attack the centre of the
intrench ments of the marine, he would have easily pierced
through it ; then, wheeling to the right, go up the height,
which is there of an easy ascent, and fire upon the rear of
the troops, who opposed your other two columns,
they must have been put to flight, the trenches abandoned,
and, even upon the sight of your third column coming up
the height, I must, of necessity, have instantly retreated
to the fort the best way I could ; there to embark my army in
my boats and carry it down Lake Champlain, without
being able to make a resistance at Fort Frederic, as it is
commanded by hills behind it, about the distance of two
hundred paces from its walls, which makes it a very advan-
tageous post. What would have been still worse for me,
if my trenches had been forced, there is a space of five leagues
between Fort Frederic and Ticonderoga, by the river St.
Frederic, which, about half way, is scarce above fifty or
sixty fathoms broad, and is a most advantageous post, where

' I

i^r

not a boat would pass by, and must cut off entirely the
communication with lake Champlain, as it is an equal dis*
tance from the Chtite or from Ticonderoga.

General Abercrombie might have sent a body of troops to
establish there a post, in wb'ch case we must have laid down
our arms and surrendered ourselves prisoners to him, for
want of subsistence, and from the impossibility of retreating
by land. ♦

General Abercrombie might have likewise penetrated easily
at the hollow, which I had not the time to intrench, where I
had placed two companies of volunteers ; and this would
have had equally fatal consequences for me, as the third
column might have been on the other side of the height, the
ascent there not being steep or of difficult access.

But his attacks were always obstinately directed at the most
difficult places of the height, as if there had been a cloud be-
fore his eyes to hinder him from seeing to his right and left
what was visible to the most ignorant officer.

Wolfe : — That was a most glorious day for you, sir, — wor-
thy of the ambition of a great man. Our columns were
only at ten steps distance from your intrench ments, and all
our army saw you perfectly well, constantly at work en-
couraging and exciting the ardour of your soldiers, hurrying
over your lines perpetually some paces from your trenches ;
exposing your person too rashly compared to the custom of
our army, your eye glancing over the whole, with the atti-
tude of a lion. General Abercrombie perceived, clearly,
the disorder upon your right ivhen the regiment of Berry
was about to retire, and redoubled his efforts to profit by it.
But you were everywhere, travelling from place to
place with the swiftness of the eagle ; never at a loss ;
reforming the smallest disorder so soon as it was visible,
and preventing it from spreading, as it generally does, like a
flash of lightning. This affair won you so great a reputa-
tion in England for capacity and talent, that I own to you,
sir, the idea of having an antagonist of your knowledge and
merit, made me during the campaign always irresolute,

iili

vacillating in my opinions and undecided in my projects. I
cannot condemn my predecessors who had the command of
the English armies in Canada. The way oi fighting of the
Canadians and Indians in the woods is so different from that
practised in Europe, that I readily believe the most able
General, with an army of the best disciplined troops, in follow-
ing exactly the rules of the art of war, — whose principles
are sure, fixed and demonstrable in European warfare, — may
be easily cut to pieces in those vast forests by a very few
Indians. There was an outcry in England against General
Braddock, for allowing his army of four thousand men to
be cut to pieces at the river Ohio,* in the year 1755, by six
hundred and fifty Canadians and Indians only, much more
than they blame General Abercrombie.

The reason of it is clear. *^ Abercrombie lived to return
to England: the living always find means to justify them-
selves. But Braddock was killed : the dead are always
in the wrong, and never find disinterested advocates to plead
their cause. Braddock's order of march — criticised by your
French Generals — may, at first sight, appear singular ; and
many pretend that he must of necessity have been beat, in
consequence of the bad disposition of it. But analize it, and
you will find nothing else than the common rule practised
through all Europe in passing through a wood : an army
formed in three columns — the artillery, baggage, waggons
and cavalry being the column of the centre, between the other
two columns of infantry; half of the Grenadiers at their
head to support the Pioneers employed in opening a road
through the wood for the passage of the cans and artillery,
and the rest in the rear, to close of march. Braddock was
invested on all sides by the Canadians, and dispersed in the
wood, each of them behind a tree, marking out his victim ;

* This contest is generally denominated the Battle of tbe Monongahela. Capt.
Daniel l>i6nard De Beanjeu commanded the Canadians, and achieved a most
brilliant victory over General Braddoclc and George Washington ; tbe English
losing their proviBlonx, bagg-jge, fifteen cannon, many small arms, tbe military
chest, Braddock's paperi*. Washiogton, after tbe battle, wrote : *' Wc have been
beaten, sbamefully beaten, by a handful of French. "—(J. M. L.)

1*1

8o that every musket-shot brought down a soldier, and at
every discharge they flew from tree to tree. What can regu-
lar troops do in such a case ? Close their ranks and filed each
moment, as did Braddock, direct a continual fire at the woods,
without perceiving a man, and be cut to pieces without see-
ing an enemy. There is no other method for troops to defend
themselves against the Indians than what I practised, with
success, when I was surprised by them at the ford of the
River Montmorency : the soldiers, with fixed bayonets, dis-
persed themselves, rushed on in disorder towards the places
where they perceived the smoke of the Indians' discharge ; and
by these means my detachment in the woods chased away your
nine hundred Indians, whoiq»a moment disappeared entirely,
and suffered me to retire at my leisure to my camp.

Montcalm : — I verily believe, sir, that your idea is just.
The Indians told me, on their return, that it was now no more
possible to fight you as formerly, since the English had
learned their (the Indians') way of fighting. There can-
not be a greater advantage for a Greneral than the entire
knowledge of the country — the seat of war: without this, he
must always grope in the dark — be foiled in his operations —
rest often inactive, uncertain in his projects ; and be only
inactive and on the defensive, as you v/ere all the summer as
much as me. You were abs'olutely master of the River St.
Lawrence by your men-of-war, who had ascended it, passing
by Quebec with incredible boldness, and scorning the most
murderous fire from the batteries of the town so near them. You
had an infinite number of boats at your disposal, with all
the sailors of your fleet for rowers. "What, then, could hinder
you from sending a body of twelve or fifteen hundred men in
different detachments, with engineers and able officers, in
order to be continually landing, to get a thorough knowledge
of the country, draw plans of all the advantageous positions
which abound there ; and this detachment, if well led,
might have gone even to. Montreal without finding any oppo-
sition in their course. Their descriptions and plans of the
country would have enlightened you, and furnished the means

of destroying and crushing our army without fighting:
this is the touchstone to prove superior talents and capacity
in a General. The gaining of a battle is very often the effect
of mere chance. But reducing an enemy without fighting
must be the result of well-combined operations, — is the essence
of military science, and was always the most radiant and
distinctive trait in the conduct and character of the great men
whom history has handed down to us. Grounded upon the
instructions received from the engineers and officers of their
detachments, you might have verified their observations by
your prisoners, who say always more than they intend, when
examined with kindness, coolness, and with a seeming indif-
ference. The only achievemeni which you performed during
two months that you lay constantly loitering in your camps,
looking at us, was your attack of the 3 1st of July ; and your
expedition to Deschambault, where you sent a body of two
thousand men, fourteen leagues up the river from Quebec, to
burn and pillage a poor, miserable peasant's house, in which
was the baggage of some French regiments ! But the detach-
ment had no intention of examining the locale of the country.
Had they gone to Jacques Cartier, only three leagues from
Deschambault, they would have discovered there a pest
strong by nature, which certainly cannot be inferior to the
Thermopylae so celebrated by the Greeks, and capable of
being defended — you being the masters of the River St. Law-
rence — by as few men as Leonidas had with him against the
most numerous array. But your detachment at Descham-
bault, upon the appearance of my cavalry, composed merely
of two hundred undisciplined Canadians on horseback, com-
manded by the Chevalier de La Rochebeaucourt, ran to their
boats and embarked with great disorder and confusion, as if
our army had been at their heels, without having remained
there above two hours. Jacques Cartier — which takes its
name from he who first discovered the River Pt, Lawrence,
and who, having lost his ship, passed there the w iuter amongst
the Indians — is an immense ravine, with a rapid, shaggy
river full of large rocks, that runs between the two heights'^

whose tops are about two hundred fathoms distant from each
other; their sides are as glacis, with a view from their tops to
the bottom — four or five hundred feet deep — which stril«es the
eyes with horror on looiiing down that vast precipice. Its
side, facing the River St. Lawrence, is a steep perpendicular
rock ; and the ground to the north is impracticable from the
lakes, swamps, and sinking turf, where at each step a person
must plunge over the head and perish. It must be impossible
to turn round it and leave it behind, since the Canadians and
the Indians never discovered a passage through the woods.
Thus the only means of approaching this fort must have
been by landing at Deschambault. From thence to Jacques
Cartier, it is an easy and gradually rising ascent. Had you
seized this extradrdinary fort, you would have cut otf my
communication with Montreal, from whence I drew daily my
supplies for the array : in this event, I had no other alternative
than allowing my army to perish of famine, or surrender the
colony. But as we had been sent from Europe, not to destroy
the inhabitants, but, on the contrary, to save and defend
them, I must have immediately concluded by capitulating
for Canada upon the best terms I could obtain from you. I
hope I have demonstrated clearly to you that, had you been
acquainted with the locale, you could have made the glorious
conquest of Canada without shedding a drop of blood.

Wolfe : — You argue, sir, at your ease ! How was it pos-
sible to examine and know the locale of that country, your
bloodhounds — the Indians and Canadians — being constantly
at our heels : one cann6t send out scouts in Canada, as is
done in Europe. ^ ^ ■ • ,; -b^; n

Montcalm : — Why not? Men caanot be in two places at
the same time ; and you managed to find everywhere Indians
.and Canadians in your way ! There are many kinds of
irregular troops in Europe as bad to deal with as the Indians
in woods and in wooded countries. But .your army was al-
ways so struck with terror and dread, that, constantly blinded
with fear, the shadow of an Indian set them a trembling.
Nevertheless, the New England independent companies,

formed by Ro^erf who afterwards beat the Indians with equal
numbers in their own way of fighting behind trees, should
have removed the formidable impression they have always-
made upon the English. Selt'preservation is natural to all
mankind, and the hour of death must strike with horror the
bravest man. But fear is pardonable amongst soldiers only
when there exists a real cause for fear ; and is not to be
tolerated when groundless: this is so much the case of your
soldiers with regard to the Indians, that, demoralized by fear,
they suffer themselves to be butchered by a vastly inferior
number of Indians, without ever thinking of defending them-
selves, even when they know they will have no quarter. In
any danger, soldiers ought to be accustomed to look coolly
death in the face, — they, whose duty is' to die when the
Sovereign demands it : such is the contract they sign with
the latter on their entering into his service.

These sentiments may be often the means of one's preserving
life instead of losing it. Nothing is more incomprehensible
to me, in all your conduct in Canada, than your landing at
Ance des Mires on the 13th September (the fatal day which de-
prived us both of our existence, but freed us from mortal folly),
at the foot of a steep hill, where a few men at the top of it,
with sticks and stones only, must have easily beaten you
back on your attempt to climb it, and where we had three
posts of one hundred men each : one of them commanded by
Douglas, captain in the regiment of Languedoc ; another by
Rimini, captain in the Regiment La Sarre ; and the third by
De Vergor, captain in the Colony troops, at whose post* you
made your descent. These three hundred men, had they done
their duty, should have been more than sufficient to have
repulsed you ignominiously at this steep hill ; and you never
would have got to the top had you met with the smallest
resistance. I own that your daring surpasses my conception.

Wolfe : — I do not pretend to justify my project by its suc-
cess, but by my combinations, which answered exactly as I

* De Vergor's post apparently stood about a 100 yardn to the east of the spot on
which Wolf0's*Field cottage has siace been built. The ruins still exist.— (J. M. L.)

had foreseen^ and which demonstrate my scheme to hare
been well concerted. In giving you this account of it, I am
persuaded that you will not blame me for undertaking an at-
tempt so absurd in appearance, and yet most reasonable when
examined impartially. In all expeditions composed of sea
and land forces, it seldom fails that disputes, animosities,
jealousies and quarrels arise between the different com-
manders equal in authority ; and it is a miracle if you see
the Admiral and the General unanimously of the same opinion
with regard to operations. The sea and the land serrice are
sciences whose principles are entirely different ; as certainly
there can be no analogy between the working of a ship and
the drill of a regiment. Nevertheless, the Admiral meddles
continually with the land operations, and the General will
have the fleets do things that are impossible — both of them
equally ignorant o'i each other's service ; from whence results
a clashing discord in their operations, when sent out with
equal power. If each of them would confine himself to that
part of the art of war which he has studied, and have only in
his soul the good and welfare of his King and Country,
these mixed expeditions of land and sea would succeed
much better than they generally do. The naval officers tor-
mented me a great deal, and were still more troublesome as
the season advanced. They held a council of war on board
the flagship on the 10th September, when it was determined to
set sail immediately for Europe, seeing the imminent dangers
to which His Majesty's fleet would be exposed in those tem-
pestuous seas by remaining any longer before Quebec ; and,
in consequence of this decision, orders were given to some
men-of-war to take up their anchors and foil down the river,
while orders were issued at the same time to begin the
general preparations for the immediate deparlnre of all the
fleet. The 12th, there came two deserters to me from one of
your three posts you just now mentioned, who belonged to
the French regiments, and were well informed. Upon ex-
amining them, I discovered that your posts were guarded
very negligently ; that de Bougainville, who was at Cap Rouge,

proposed to send down, the night following, some boats load-
ed with provisions, and that your three posts had their orders
to let these boats pass unmolested. The idea inManlly oc-
curred lo me to profit by this discovery ; and I ran to the Ad-
miral, communicated to him what I had learned from the
French deserters, begged him most earnestly to suffer me to
make a last attempt before the embarkation of my army. I
promised him that if there were twenty muskets fired from
your posts, I would then desist immediately without further
thought than to embark speedily in order to return to Eng-
land. The council consented to my demand, and I began my
landing at eleven at night. When ray boats approached the
two posts of Douglas and Rimini, upon their sentinels calling
" Qui vive /" my soldiers answered them in French, '^Bateaw,
des vivres;'*'* upon which they suffered them to go on without
stopping them, as they might have done, in order to receive
the password. Not finding a sentry at your third post, com-
manded by De Yergor, I landed there with diligence, and all
my army was ashore before this post perceived our men,
without firing but one musket, which wounded De Vergor in
the heel, who was immediately taken prisoner without find-
ing any man of his detach ment with 'tim.* I began my opera-
tion by landing there a Sergeant with ten Grenadiers, order-
ing him to advance always straight before him briskly, with
long steps, and not to halt unless he was discovered by the
enemy. A Lieutenant, with a detachment of G-renadiers,
followed him, having the same orders, to halt instantly if they
fired at him. The silence continuing, 1 then landed all my
Grenadiers, who followed the Sergeant and the Lieutenant ;
and by degrees all my army landed without the least noise,
disorder or confusion. The silence soon convinced me that
they were not discovered ; dissipated my fears, and assured
me of the success of my enterprise The head of the column,

* De Vergor's gnard was composed chiefly of Militiamea from Lorette, who
on that day bad obtained leave to go and work on their farms, provided they
also worked on a farm Captain De Vergor owned — " Memoir e% 8ur le$
Affaires de la Colonie de 1749-60." Some historians have intimated that De
Vergor— a protige of Bigol'e— was a traitor to his King.— (J. M. L.)

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which was the guide to the rest of the army, got up the hill
with difficulty, the others following them at their heels. If
your guards had been vigilant and done their duty, all I risked
was the Sergeant and Lieutenant, with a few Grenadiers. I
would have stopped at the first discharge, as it would have
been madness and unpardonable to attack by main force a
hill so inaccessible that, even without an enemy at the top to
repel them, my men had much difficulty to climb it. More-
over, I was assured by your deserters you had no troops on
the heights of Abraham. You see low, sir, that it was not a
heedless, ill-concerted project, — but a sure operation, without
risking much. An Invariable principle with me has ever been
to make an attack where it appears the most difficult ; and it
generally meets with success, as the point is commonly ill-
guarded, frequently entirely neglected, and scarcely compre-
hended in the plan of defence. I am not alone of this opinion.
Cardinal Ximenes says, that " Ferdinand, King of Arragon,
** fitted out two armies against the Moors, under th^ conduct
** of Count D'Agnilar, and ordered them to enter into the
" mountains of Grenada at the same time, by the places the
*' most difficult," and consequently the least guarded. He
gained a most complete victory over the Moors. The most
difficult gorges of mountains, when not guarded where only
a single man can pass, a hundred thousand may do the same.
It is then an easy operation, by forming your men in battle as
soon as they get through the passage, and provided that they
are not immediately discovered by the enemy. When once
you have a front capable to oppose and stand firm, it increases
every instant, as you may be convinced that the soldiers go
through the dangerous passage with great quickness. Be-
sides, the enemy is always disconcerted by a surprise : de-
moralized by an unforeseen incident, he becomes timid and
alarmed, and may be looked upon as already vanquished be-
fore the action begins. The landing at Cape Breton was
executed according to my system. The enemy does not ex-
pect you at a place of difficult access ; it is where he
does not expect me that I would make my principal attack.

■

Commonly, men siiflbr most where they are most seen.* But
if they are entirely neglected — as it happened at Louifibonrg—
it is a fault of the General, who should be answerable for it.
But the General having placed upon them a sufficient number
of troops in proportion to their difficulties, can he be blamed
if the officers of these posts do not do their duty ?
, Montcalm : — Can there be any divine or human law to
punish a man for the faults of others ? Should they not
answer personally? It has often ha))pened that the safety
of a whole army has depended upon a subaltern's guard !
You see that the deserters caused you to make a last
attempt — prevented your embarking your army for England
— your giving up your enterprise — and, in short, ended in
adding Canada to the British dominions; and perhaps a
vigilant officer at that post (Wolfe's (Jove) might have hindered
the soldiers from deserting, which would at once hate removed
a first cause which produced so many extraordinary eiFects.
Your system may be good, if executed with great prudence and
precaution. But should the enemy be informed of your design,
which he may be by a deserter acquainted with your great pre-
parations, as you were with the negligence of our posts, it is
an excellent opportunity to have your army cut to pieces and
catch a tartar; as it must have been your case at the Sault de
Montmorency (on the 31st July), had it not been for that sud-
den shower of rain, which came to your rescue in the critical
moment, when your destruction was otherwise inevitable.
At least, sir, confess the injustice of mankind. They reproach
me with being the cause of your success I They accuse me
of having sacrificed the welfare of my army through jealousy
and ill-feeling ! My king and country — for whom I would have
shed, with pleasure, every drop of my blood — and those who
view my case the most favourably, look on me as a giddy,
ignorant officer! All these scandalous, atrocious lies and

* I incline more to General Wolfe's opinion than what Voltaire reports, in
the war of 1781, to have been the King of PrusBia's maxim :— " 1'hat we
ought always to do what ibe enemy ia afraid of." Where the enemy is afraid
of anything in particular, be has there his largest force, and is there more oa
bis guard than any where else.— [Mandscbipt Note.] r

Btit

calumnies were spread eveiywhere by a setf of men who,
from their immoderate thirst of riches, would, to serve their
interest^ have betrayed their king and country. Those vile,
mercenary souls knew that I detested them as much as I con-
stantly cherished honest men, whose noble sentiments endear-
ed them to me. My death was happy for them. Had I lived
to return to Europe, I would have had no difficulty to justify
all my conduct, and crush these wretches like vermin. Covet-
ousness and avarice carried them to Canada : they left their
honour and honesty in France on embarking, easily forgetting
what it is to be just and patriotic. I would have soon con-
founded them. Truth supports oppressed innocence, and,
sooner or later, dispels the clouds which loo often overshadow
it. I shall give you a faithful and exact account of my con-
duct with regard to the operations of the 13ih September, fol-
lowing scrupulously truth, which has always been the rule of
my actions and is held in great veneration by me ; and I hope to
demonstmte to you that if the end of that campaign covered
you with glory. Fortune was the chief agent, who reunited in
your power a great number of circumstances, the absence of
any one of which sufficed to render your expedition fruitless.
Some days after the action (>{ the 31st of July, M. de Levis
was sent by M. Vaudreuil to command at Montreal, upon a
false report that a body of Finglish was coming to attack
Canada by Lake Champlain — ,; >tory trumped up by my
enemies to deprive me of M. de Levis, in whom I had the
greatest confidence, on uicount i' his talents : I cannot
say he made me a just ackno\vledgment of n:y sentiments
towards him. I went to his lodgings a few hours before
his departure, which was kept a secret from the army;
and as I was little acquainted wiili his plan of defence for the
left < If camp, at the Sault de Montmorency, I begged of
him, as a favour, to leave me his aide-de-camp, M. Johnstone,
who had a peifect knowledge of the locale of that part of the
country. Your boats having caused us an alarm in the night
between the 10th and 11th of September, by their appearance

J Bigot's coterie.— [J. M. L] ,x

.'I

I: I

opposite to the ravine of Beauport, I remained at M. Vbxl*
dreuil's until one in the morning, when I left him in ordef
that I might return to my lodging — having with me M.
Montreuil, Major-General of the army, and M. Johnstone.
On my sending away M. de Vaudreuil, after giving him my
orders, I related immediately to M. Johnstone all the mea-
sures I had concerted with M. de Vaudreuil, incase you (Gen.
Wolfe) made a descent at daybreak. He answered me, that
your army being now assembled at Point Levi, and part
of it gone above Quebec, on the south side of the River St.
Lawrence, it appeared very doubtful where you might attem{^
a descent — whether above the town, or below it towards the
Canardiere ; he added, that he believed a body of troop»
might be advantageously placed upon the heights of Abraham,
where they could with certainty confront you whenever you
landed. 1 approved greatly of his idea. I ctilled back
Montreuil — who was as yet not far from us — and I ordered
him to send the Regiment of Guienne — which was encamped
near the hornwork at the River St. Charles — to pass the night
upon the heights of Abraham. Next morning — the 11th —
I wrote to Montreuil, ordering him to make this regiment
encamp upon the heights of Abraham, and remain there until
further orders. Thus, in consequence of my repeated ordersy
1 had all the reason possible to believe that this regiment con-
stituted a permanent post there ; so that the declaration of thei
deserters from the three posts, who could not know this, might,
have led you into a dangerous snare, worse than that of the^
31st July. Why this regiment continued the 12th in thiS'
camp at the hornwork, in spite of my express orders to en-
camp upon the heights, I know not ; and can only attribute?
Montreuil's disobedience of my orders to the weakness of hia;
judgment and understanding. It is nevertheless evident that^
if you had found the Regiment of G-uienne upon the top of
the hill — where it ought to have been, had my orders beeit
ubeyed — you would have been repulsed shamefully with a.
much greater loss than you met with on the 31st of July at the
Sault ; the height where you made your descent, the 13th of

September, being infinitely steeper than that there wbieb
obliged yon to make a speedy retreat, favoured by the provi'
dential shower. Or, perhaps you would have embarked im-
mediately your army, without any further attempt, to return tax
England, after a most ruinous and fruitless expedition— tbei
campaign ending with an incredible expense to your natioBM-
fruitless ; and, by this means, the colony of Canada woukl
have been for ever delivered from such formidable armies.

As soon as your army was reunited in a single cansp at
Pointe Levi, after having been so long separated, upon yon)
sending a body of troops up the River St. Lawrence, I de^
tacbed M. de Bougainville, with fifteen hundred of |my besH
troops — composed of all my Grenadiers, of the Volunleefi)
from the French Regiments, of my best Canadians and faii'
dians ; and I likewise gave him some small guns. I- ordered
him strictly to follow all your movements, by ascending the
river when you went up, and descending as you did the
same : in short, to be an army of observation, with only the
river between you^-never to lose sight of you^— ever leady^
to oppose your passage up the river, and to fall on you with*
the swiftness of the eagle the moment you attempted to 1«mI
on our side of it. He sent to inform me, the 13th of Septem*
ber, that all your army had descended to your camp at Pointe
Levi. But he remained loitering with his detachment at
Cap Rouge — three leagues from Quebec ! Why did he not
follow you to the heights of Abraham, according to hie
orders ? Why did he not send me back my Grenadiers and
Volunteers — the very flower of their Regiments ? informing
me, as also the posts of Douglas and Rimini, that he wouldi
send down that night. I cannot conceive the reasons for such'
conduct : it is beyond all conception ! He was informed, be-
tween seven and eight in the morning, by the fugitives fVomi
the thre-i posts, that our army was landed and drawn up in'
battle upon the heights of Abraham ; upon which he left Cap'
Rouge with his detachment, no doubt with the intention to
join me. But, instead of taking the road to Lorette, or to the
General Hospital along the borders of the Rivex St. Chaxles,

i I

ri I

which led both of Ihem to our camp, he followed the heights
of Abraham, where he was evidently certain by his informa-
tion to find there your army to intercept him ; and it could
never be his design to fight you with filteen hundred men !
He found a house on his way, with three or four hundred of
your troops barricading it, and was very desirous to take
(hem prisoners. M. le Noir, Captain in the Regiment La
Sarre — having more bravery than prudence and knowledge of
the art of war — attacked the house with the most astonishing
boldness, and had more than half of his company of Volun-
teers killed : he received himself two wounds — one of them
by a ball through the body, and the other in his hand,
de Bougainville, intent on taking the house, waited there the
arrival of the cannon, to force it ; but when the cannon arrived,
it unluckily happened that the balls had been forgotten at Cap
Rouge, which obliged him to return there, abandoning the house
without a moment's reflection. How much more important it
would have been to direct his march towards the General Hospi-
tal, in order to join my army ! Thus were precious mo-
ments wasted ridiculously in the most trifling manner. De
Bougainville — who has a great deal of wit, good sense, many
good qualities — was protected by a very great person at Court ;
he is personally brave, has but little knowledge in the military
science, having never studied it.

The night between the 12th and 13th of September, when
you made your descent, M. Poularies, Commander of the
Regiment Royal Roussillon, who encamped behind my lodg-
ings at Beauport, came to me, at midnight, to inform me that
they saw boats opposite to his regiment. Upon which I im-
mediately ordered all the army to line the trenches ; and I
sent Marcel — who served me as Secretary and aid-de-camp —
to pass the night at M. de Vaudreuil's, giving him one ol my
Cavaliers of Ordnance, ordering Marcel, if there was any-
thing extraordinary in that quarter, to inform me of it speedily
by the Cavalier. I was out and walked with Poularies and
Johnstone, between my house and the ravine of Beauport,
until one in the morning, when I sent Poularies to his regi-

iMII

inent, and I continued there with Johnstone* All night my
mind was in the most vioiont agitation, which I believe pro-
ceeded from my uneasiness for the boats and provisions that
de Bougainville had acquainted me, would be sent down the
river that night ; and I repeated often to Johnstone, that I
trembled lest they should be taken, as " that loss would ruin
" us without resource, having provisions only for two days'
" subsistence to our army." It appears to me that my extra-
ordinary sufferings that night were a presage of my cruel fate
some hours afterwards. At daybreak they fired some cannon
from our battery at Samos, near Sillery. I then had no more
doubts of our boats being taken by you. Alas ! I would
never have imagined that my provisions were in safety at
Cap Rouge with de Bougainville, and that you were upon the
heights of Abraham since midnight, without my being in-
formed of an event of so great importance, and which was
known through all the right of our camp.

Tne day clearing up, having news from Marcel at M. de Vau-
dreuil's, who had always my Cavalier of Ordnance with him,
and perceiving no changes in your camp at Point Levis, my
mind was more composed on reflecting that, if anything
extraordinary had happened, I would certainly have been
informed of it. I then sent Johnstone to order all the army
to their tents, having passed the night in the trenches, and
retired to my lodgings after drinking some dishes of tea with
Johnstone. I desired him to order the servants to saddle the
horses, in order to go to M. de Vaudreuil's and be informed of
the cause of the firing from our battery at Samos. Not a soul
having come to me from the right of our camp since mid-
night when 1 sent there Marcel, I set out with Johnstone be-
tween six and seven in the morning. Heavens, what was
my surprise ! when opposite to M. de Vaudreuil's lodgings, the
first news of what had passed during the night was the sight
of your army upon the heights of Abraham, firing at the Ca-
nadians scattered annongst the bushes. I met at the same
time M. de Vaudreuil coming out of his lodgings, and haying
spoke to him an instant, I turned away to Johnstone, and told

I i

! !

■M

him : " the affair is serious ! run with the greatest speed to
** Beauport ; order Poularies to remain there at the Ravine
** with two hundred men, and to send me all the rest of the
*• left to the heights of Abraham with the utmost diligence."
Johnstone having delivered my orders to Poularies, he
quitted him an instant to give some instructions to my ser-
vants at my lodgings ; returning to rejoin me, he found
Poularies in the Ravine with M. de Sennezergue, Brigadier-
General and Lieutenant-Colonel oi the Regiment of La Sarre,
and de Lotbiniere, Captain of the Colony troops and aid-de-
camp to M. de Vaudreuil. Poularies stopped Johnstone to make
him repeat to them my orders, which he did ; and at the same
time advised Poularies, as a friend, to disobey them, by com-
ing himself to the heights of Abraham with every man of the
left, since it was evident that the English army — already
landed near Quebec — could never think of making a second
descent at Beauport ; and that it was manifest there would be
in a few hours an engagement upon the heights which would
immediately decide the fate of the Colony. Poularies then
showed Johnstone a written order — signed "Montreuil" —
which Lotbini^re had brought to him from M. de Vaudreuil,
** That not a man of the left should stir from the camp !"
Johnstone declared to them, upon his honour, that it was
word for word my orders and my intentions ; and he entreat-
ed Poularies, in the most pressing manner, to have no regard
for that order signed " Montreuil," as the want of two thou-
sand men, which formed the left of our camp, must be of the
greatest consequence in the battle. M. de Sennezergue — an
officer of the greatest worth and honour, who fell a few hours
afterwards — told Johnstone : " That he (Johnstone) should take
" it upon him to make all the left march off immediately."
Johnstone answered : " That, being only the bearer of my orders,
♦* he could take nothing upon him. But if he was in M. de
'* Sennezergue's place, Brigadier-General, and, by M. de Levis'
** absence, the next in command of the army, he would not
** hesitate a moment to make the left march, withqjit any re-
^* gaxd whatsoever to any order that might be hurtful to the

l\'i

i>»

** King's serYice, in that critical juncture.'' Johnstone left
them irresolute and doubtful how to act, clapped spurs to his
horse, and rejoined me immediately upon the heights.

I don't know, any more than a thousand others, the particu-
lars relative to the action of the ISlh of September. 1 am
ignorant of who it was that made our army take their abo-
minable and senseless position, by thrusting it betwixt your
army and Quebec, where there were no provisions, and the best
of our troops absent with de Bougainville ; it certainly must
have been dictated by an ignorant and stupid blockhead ! I
certainly had no hand in it : the piquets and part of the troops
were already marched up the heights before I came to the
Canardi^re, or ever kne\ * that you were landed ; and all the
right of our army was marching after them when I arrived at
their encampment. The only proper course to be taken in
our position, and which would have been apparent to any
man of common sense who had the least knowledge of the
art of war, was to quit our camp coolly— calmly — without
disorder or confusion, and march to Lorette ; from thence
cross over to St. Foix — which is two leagues from Quebec
and a league from Cap Rouge — and w*hen joined there by M.
de Bougainville's detachment, to advance then and attack you
as soon as possible. By these means you would have found
yourself between two fires, by a sally from the town the mo-
ment that I attacked you on the other side. I was no sooner
upon the heights than I perceived our horrible position, —
pressed against the town-walls, without provisions for four-
and-twenty hours, and a moral impossibility for us to retire,
being drawn up in battle at the distance of a musket-shot from
your army. Had I made an attempt to go down the heights,
in order to repass the River St. Charles and return to my camp,
I would have exposed my left jflank to you, and my rear would
have been cut to pieces without being able to protect and
support it. Had I entered into the town, in an instant you would
have invested us in it, without provisions, by carrying down
your left wing to the River St. Charles — an easy movement
of a few minutes. I saw no remedy other for us than to

■11

'ii

1 ' :

■It;:

worry your army by a cannonade, having the advantage
over you of a rising ground suitable for batteries of cannon,
hoping, by thus harassing you, that you might retiie in the
night, as certainly you could never be so rash as to think of
attacking us under the gnna of the town ; at least I would
have made my retreat, taking advantage of the darkness of
the night, to get myself out of the scrape where the ignorance
of others had thrown me. I sent several persons with orders
to M. de Ramsay, King's Lieutenant (Deputy Governor), who
was in command at Quebec, to send me, with all possible
haste, the fivre-and-twehty brass field pieces that were in posi'
tion on the palace battery, near our army ; and precisely at
the same instant when Johnstone came to me on the heights,
with the news of the order which prevented the left of our
army to join me, a sergeant arrived from M. de Ramsay — the
fourth person I had sent to him with my orders — with a cate-
gorical answer from him : ^* That he had already sent me
** three pieces of artillery ; and that he could not send me any
** more, having his town to defend !" What could be de Ram-
say's reasons for such a monstrous conduct, or who it was who
inspired him with such a daring disobedience, I know not?

1. "His town" — as he called it — was defended by our
army which covered it, being drawn up in battle about two
hundred fathoms from it ; and its safety depended entirely
upon the event of a battle.

2. There were in Quebec about two hundred pieces of
cannon, most of them twenty-four and thirty-six pounders.

3. Small field-pieces, two or three pounders — such as the
palace battery — could they be of the least service for the de-
fence of a town ?

4. A Commander of Quebec, as King's Lieutenant or sub-
Lieutenant, such as de Ramsay was — not Governor,— or even
M. de Vaudreuil himself, Governor General of Canada, at that
moment in the town,— could they have any authority to refuse
me all the assistance I could desire from Quebec, by my par-
ticular commission of Commander-in-Chief of the troops in

Canada, when my army was at the gates of the town, and
your army deployed ready to fight ? A thousand other queries
suggest themselves ; but of what avail ?

I assembled immediately a council of war, composed of all
the commanding officers of the several regiments, to hear
their opinion as to what was to be done in our critical situa-
tion. Some of them maintained you were busy throwing up
breastworks. Others, that you appeared bent on descending
in the valley, in order to seize the bridge of boats on the St.
Charles river with the hornwork, with the object of cutting
off our communication with the left wing of our army, which
remained at Beauport pursuant to the order signed by Mon-
tteuil. In effect, a movement your army made in that moment
towards the windmill and Borgia^s house, upon the edge of
the height, seemed to favour this conjecture. But an instant
afterwards, the Canadians having set fire to that house and
chased you from it, you retook your former position. Others
alleged, that the more we delayed attacking you, the more
your army would be strong — imagining that your troops had
not yet all landed. In short, there was not a single member
of the war council who was not of opinion to charge upon you
immediately. Can it be credited that these officers — to the
dishonour of mankind — who were the most violent to attack
you, denied it afterwards, and became the most ardent censors
of my conduct in not deferring the battle ! What could I do
in my desperate situation ? Even a Marshal Turenne would
have been much puzzled to get out of such a dilemma, in
which they had entangled me either through design or
ignorance. I listened with attention to their opinion, without
opening my lips, and at last answered them : — " It appears to
" me, gentlemen, that you are unanimous for giving battle ;
" and that the only question now is, how to charge the
"enemy?" Monlreuil said it would be belter lo attack in
columns. I answered him : — " That we would be beat before
" our columns could be formed so near to the enemy ; and,
" besides, that our columns must be very weak, not having
" G-renadiers to place at their heads." I added, that " since

1 1

** it is decided to attack, it must be in Front Baudiire {})**
I sent all the officers to their posts, and ordered the drummert
to beat the charge.

Oar onset was neither brisk, nor long. Wo went on in
confasion— ^were repulsed in an instant ; and it conld not
naturally be otherwise from the absence of our Volunteers and
Grenadiers, and de Bougainville at Cap Ronge with the best of
our Canadians; the Montreal regiments with Ponlaries at
Beauport, a league and a half from the battle-field. The ex-
ample of the bravest soldiers in a regiment — the Grenadiers
and Volunteers — suffices to infuse courage in the most timid,
who can follow the road shown to them, but cannot lead the
way. The brave Canadian Militia saw us with heavy
hearts, grief and despair, from the other side of the St. Charles
river, cut to pieces upon the heights, stopped, as they were,
in the horn work, and prevented by superior orders from
rushing to our assistance. About two hundred brave and
resolute Canadians rallied in the hollow at the bakehouse,
and returned upon the heights. They fell instantly upon
your left wing with incredible rage ; stopped your army for
some minutes from pursuing our soldiers in their flight, by
attracting your attention to them ; resisted, undaunted, the
shock of your left ; and, when repulsed, they disputed the
ground inch by inch from the top to the bottom of the height,
pursued by your troops down to the valley at the bakehouse,
opposite to the hornwork. These unfortunate heroes — who
were most of them cut to pieces — saved your army the loss of
a great many men, by not being hotly pursued ; and if your
left, who followed these two hundred Canadians down to the
plain, had crossed it from the bakehouse to the River St.
Charles, only three or four hundred paces, they would have
cut off the retreat of our army, invested the three-fourths of
them in Quebec, without provisions, and M. de Vaudreuil, next
day, must have surrendered the town and asked to capitulate
for the colony. But your conduct cannot be blamed, as it is
always wise and prudent in giving — as Pyrrhus advises— a
golden bridge to one^s enemy in flight.

i !

ill

You see, sir, by this trae and faithful account of thn battle
of the 13th September, and of what preceded it, how many
different and unforeseen events, fortune was obliged to unite
in your favour to render you successful in your expedition
against Canada ; the failure of any one of which would
have sufficed to frustrate your enter;:, ise. It would appear that
heaven had decreed that France should lose this colony. Let
us now conclude, sir, that I have as little deserved the blame,
scorn, contempt and injustice which my country heaped on
my memory, as you do the excessive honours they lavished
on yours in England ; and that the ablest General in Europe,
placed in my circumstances, could not have acted otherwise
than I did. Moreover, I was under M. de Vaudrcuil — the
weakest man alive, although a most obstin: ) automaton —
and could not freely follow my ideas as if I had been
Commander-in-Chief. In my country the law 'is equal : we
neither punish, nor recompense.

The Marquis of Montcalm, endeavouring to rally the troops
in their disorderly flight, was wounded in the lower part of
the belly.* He was conveyed immediately to Quebec, and
lodged in the house of M. Amonx, the King's surgeon, who
was absent with M. de Bourlamarque : his brother— the
younger Amoux — having viewed the wound, declared it
mortal. This truly great and worthy man heard Amouxf
pronounce his sentence of death with a firm and undaunted
soul : his mind calm and serene ; his countenance soft and
pleasing ; and with a look of indiflerence whether he lived
or died. He begged of Amoux to be so kind and outspoken
as to tell him how many hours he thought he might yet live?
Amoux answered him, that he might hold out until three in
the morning. He spent that short period of life in conversing
with a few officers upon indifferent subjects with great cool-
ness and presence of mind, and ended his days about the
hour Amoux had foretold him. His last words were : —

* It WM reported in Canada, that the ball whlob killed tbat great, good and
b<Hieat nan, was not fired by an Engiisb maeitet. Bat I never credited tbii.
t A mom gave me tbis aoconnt of bis last Qoments.— MAMinoRiFT Nona.

\}l

i ■

il«

** I die| content, since I leave the affairs of the King, my
** dear master, in good hands : I always had a high opinion
** of the talents of M. de Levis." I will not undertake the
panegyric oi this great man : a true patriot and lover of his

X The plaoe where Ifontoalm died appears yet abrooded la doobt. It is
stated, in Koox's Journal, that, on being wounded, Montcalm was conTeyed to
the General Hospital, towards which the French squadrons in retreat bad to
pass to regain, over the bridge of boats, their camp at Beaoport. The General
Hospital was also the bead-quarters of the wounded— both English and French.
It has been supposed that Arnoux's bouse, where Montcalm was conveyed,
stood in St. Louis street. No where does it appear that Montcalm was
oonveyed to bis own residence -on the ramparts (on which now stands the resi*
denoe of B. H. Wurtele, Esquire). As the city surrendered five days after the
great battle, it was likely to be bombarded— and, moreover, one*thIrd of the
hoases In it bad been burnt and destroyed — we do not see why the wounded Ge-
neral should have been conveyed from the battle-fleld to the Cb&tean St. Loui? —
certainly an exposed sitnation in the event of a new bombardment ; and, moreover,
the city Itself, after and during the battle, was considered so insecure that the
French army. Instead of retreating to it for shelter, hurried past the General
Hospital, over the bridge, to their camp at Beauport. There is a passage in
Lleatenant-Golonel Beatson's Notes on the Plains of Abraham, which we give :—
** The valiant Frenchman (Montcalm), regardless of pain, relaxed not bis efforts
" to rally bis broken battalions in their hurried retreat towards the city until be
*' was shot through the loins, when within a few hundred yards of St. Louis GBte.( 1 )
'^ And so invincible was bis fortitude that not even tlie severity of this mortal
" stroke eonld abate his gallant spirit or alter bis Intrepid bearing. Supported
" by two grenadiers— one at each side of his horee— be re-entered the city : and
" In reply to some women who, on seeing blood flow from his wounds as he rode
'* down St. Louis street, on bis way to the Gbtllean, exclaimed Oh, mon JHeu !
" mon Dieu ! le Marquis est tue ! ! ! be courteously assured them that be was not
*' seriously hurt, and begged of them not to distress themselves on bis account. —
" Ce n^eat rien ! ee ti'eat rim ! Ne vouu affligez paa pour moi, tnea bonnea
" amiea." (2)

,J !

(1) M. Garni AU, in his Histoire du Coiuufa, Ra}^!:—" The two Brigadipr-Oenerate, M. do
" Seiinezergues and the Baron de St Ourf, fell mortally wounded ; and Montcalm (who had
" already received two wounds), while exerting hinirelf to tlie utmost to rally his tmons
"and preserve order in the retrpat, was aI»o mortally wounded in the loins by a musket>ball.
" He was at that moment between Les Buttfs-ti-Neveu and St. Ixiuis Gate." From the rity, on
the one side, and Trom the battle-iifid, ou the other, the ground rises until the two slopes meet
and form a rir'ge ; the «:unimit of which was formerly occupifd by a windmill belonging to a man
named Nfveu, or Nepveu. About midway between 1hi8 ridge and St. Louis Gate, nnd to the
southward of the St. Louis Road, are sonie Hlipht eminences, still known by the older French
residents as Les Buttes-a-Ifepveu. or Neveu's hillocks, and about three-quarters of a mile distant
from the spot where the British line charged.— R. 8. Bbatson.

(2) For these particulars I am indebted to my friend Mr. G B. Faribault— a gertleroan well
known iu Canada for his researches Into the historj' of the Colony : whose information on this
su^ect was derived from his much respected fellow-cit>zen the Hon. John Malcolm Frazer—
grandson of one of WoLTE'soflicprs, and now (18S4) one of the oldest inhabitants of Ouebec ;
where, in his childhood and youth, he had the facts, as above narrated, often described to him
by an elderly woman who, when about eighteen yean of age, was an eye-witneas of the icene.—
a. 8. Bbatson. •

king and country, possessing many rare and good qualities.
Had he by chance been born in England, his memory would
have been celebrated, and transmitted with honour to pos-
terity. Illustrious by his virtue and genius, he deserves to
live in history ; he was an unfortunate victim to the insatiable
avarice of some men, and a prey toMhe immoderate ambition
of others. His ashes, mingled with those oi Indians, repose
neglected far from his native country, without a magnificent
tomb or altars ; General Wolfe has statues in England in
commemoration of the many faults he committed during his
expedition in Canada. " How many obscure dead," says a
modern author, ** have received the greatest honours by titles
yet more vain? O injustice of mankind! The mausolea
adorn the temples to repeat continually false praise ; and
history, which ought to be the sacred asylum of truth, shows
that statues and panegyrics are almost always the monuments
of prejudice, and that flattery seeks to immortalise unjust
reputations."

When I was informed of M. de Montcalm's misfortune, I
sent him immediately his servant Joseph, begging him to
acquaint me if I could be of any service to him, and in that
case I would be with him at Quebec immediately. Joseph
came back in a moment to the hornwork, and grieved me to
the inmost of my soul by M. de Montcalm's answer : "that
it was needless to come to him, as he had only a few hours
to live, and he advised me to keep with Poularies until the

arrival of M. de Levis at the army." Thus perished a great
man, generally unknown and unregretted by his countrymen
— a man who would have become the idol and ornament of
any other country in Europe.

The French army in flight, scattered and entirely dispersed,
rushed towards the town. Few of them entered Quebec ;
they went down the heights of Abraham, opposite to the In-
tendant's Palace (past St. John's gate) directing their course
to the hornwork, and following the borders of the River St.
Charles. Seeing the impossibility of rallying our troops, I
determined myself to go down the hill at the windmill, near

the bakehouse,* and from thence across over the meadows to
the horn work, resolved not to approach Quebec, from my ap*
prehension of being shut up there with a part of onr army,
which might have been the case if the victors had drawn all
the advantage they could have reaped from our defeat. It it
true the death of the general-in-chief — an event which never
fails to create the greatest disorder and confusion in an
iarmy-*may plead as an excuse for the English neglecting so
easy an operation as to take all our army prisoners.

But instead of following immediately my ideas, I was
carried off by the flow of the fugitives, without being able to
stop them or myseli until I got to a hollow swampy ground,
where some gunners were endeavouring to save a field-piece
which stuck there, and I stayed an instant with them to
encourage them to draw it to the town. Returning back
vpon the rising ground, I was astonished to find myself in the
teentre of the English army, who had advanced whilst I was
in the hollow with the gunners, and taking roe for a general,
on account of my fne black horse, they treated me as such
by saluting me with a thousand musket shots fiom half of the
front of their army, which had formed a crescent. I w^,
nevertheless, bent on reaching the windmill, and I escaped
their terrible fire \7ith0ut any other harm than four balls
through my clothes, which shattered them ; a ball lodged in
the pommel of my saddle, and four balls in my horse's body,
who lived, notwithstanding his wounds, until he had carried
me to the bornworic.

It is impossible to imagine the disorder and confusion that
I found in the homwork.f The dread and constematicNi was
geneml. M. de Vandrenil listened to everybody, and was
always of the adviee of he who vpake last. No order

* Thto bakdioaie •ppetn to lmv« been eome whM« tt tbe fo«t of Aimbmm^
hlU.

t The exoATaUona of tbeee Freoeh works tre very vidble to tbii day behind Mr
Q. H. Fwke'i reaideaee, Bingfleld, OhMrtoebonrff roed. Tbe homworit sppesfsio
haiH eovBted aboat twelve aera 'ignMiid, aartoaaded bf a dUoh.

lows to
my ap*
r array,
iwn all
. It it
ti never
I in an
sting 80

^ I was
able to
ground,
Id-piece
them to
sg back
sifinthe
t I was
general,
as such
ilf of the
I w^s,
escaped
»ur balls
»dged in
3'sbody,
i canried

ision that
ition was
and was
fo Older

AbnbMi%

r behind Xr
ksppciri^

vras given with reflection and with coi^lness, none knowing
what to order or what to do. When the English had repulsed
the two hundred Canadians that had gone up the height at
the same time that I came down from it, pursuing them down
to the bakehouse, our men lost their heads entirely ; they
became demoralized, imagining that the English troops, then at
the bakehouse, would in an instant cross the plain and fly
over the St. Charles river into the hornwork as with wings.
It is certain that when fear once seizT3 hold of men it not only
deprives them totally of their judgment and reflection, but
also of the use of their eyes and their ears, and they become
a thousand times worse than the brute creation, guided by
instinct only, or by that small' portion of reason which the
author of nature has assigned it, since it preserves the
use of it on all occasions. How much inferior to them do the
greater portion of mankind appear, with their boasted reason,
when reduced to madness and automata, on occasions when
they require the more the use of their reason.
. The hornwork had the River St. Charles before it, about
seventy paces broad, which served it better than an artificial
ditch ; its front facing the river and the heights, was com*
posed of strong, thick, and high palisades, planted perpendi-
cularly, with gunholes pierced for several pieces of large
cannon in it; the river is deep and only fordable at low
water, at a musket shot before the fort. This made it more
difficult to be forced on that side than on its other side of
earthworks facing Beauport, which had a more formidable ap-
pearance ; and the hornwork certainly on that side was not
in the least danger of being taken by the English, by an
assault from the other side of the river. On the appearance
of the English troops on the plain of the bakehouse, Montguet
and La Motte, two old captains in the Regiment of Beam,
cried out with vehemence to M. de Vaudreuil, '' that the
hornwork would be taken in an instant, by an assault, sword
in hand ; that we would be all cut to pieces without quarter,
and that nothing else would save us but an immediate and
general capitulation of Canada, giving it up to the English.*'

I >i^

Montreuil told them that '' a fortification such as the hom^
work was not to be taken so easily." In short, there arose a
general cry in the hern work to cut the bridge of boats.* It is
worthy of remark, that not a fourth of our army had yet
arrived at it, and the remainder, by cutting the bridge, would
have been left on the other side of the river as victims to the
victors. The regiment * Royal Roussillon,' was at that mo-
ment at the distance of a musket shot from the hornwork,
approaching to pass the bridge. As I had already been in
such adventures, I did not lose my presence of mind, and
having still a shadow remaining of that regard, which the
array accorded me on account of the esteem and confidence
which M. de L6vis and M. de Montcalm had always shewn
xne publicly, I called to M. Hugon, who commanded, for a
pass in the hornwork, and begged of him to accompany me
to the bridge. We ran there, and without asking who had
given the order to cut it, we chased away the soldiers with
their uplifted axes ready to execute that extravagant and
wicked operation.

M. de Vaudreuil was closeted in a house in the inside of
the hornwork with the Intendant and with some other per-*
sons. I suspected they were busy drafting the articles lor a
general capitulation, and I entered the house, where I had
only time to see the Intendant with a pen in his hand writing
upon a sheet of paper, when M. de Vaudreuil told me I had no
business there. Hpving answered him that what he said
was true, I retired immediately, in wrath, to see them intent
on giving up so scandalously a dependency for the preserva-
tion of which so much blood and treasure had been expended.
On leaving the house, I met M. Dalquier, an old, brave,
downright honest man, commander of the regiment of Beam,
with the true character of a good officer — the marks of Mars
all over his body. I told him it was being debated within
the house, to give up Canada to the English by a capitulation,
and I hurried him in to stand up for the King^s cause, and

* It otoned the St. Charles a little higher up than tho Marine HospUal,
at the fiMt of Grown street.— (J. M. L.)

■' \

hom-

advocate the welfare of his country. I then quitted the horn-
work to join Poularies at the Ravine* of Beauport ; but haying
met hira about three or four hundred paces from the hornwork,
on his way to it, I told him what was being discussed there.
He answered me, that sooner than consent to a capitulation,
he would shed the last drop of his blood. He told me to look
on his table and house as ray own, advised me to go there
directly to repose myself, and clapping spurs to his horse, he
flew like lightning to the hornwork.

As Poularies was an officer of great bravery, full of honour
and of rare merit, I was then certain that he and Dalquier
would break up the measures of designing men. Many mo-
tives induced me to act strenuously for the good of the service :
amongst others, my gratitude for uie Sovereign who had given
me bread ; also, my affection and inviolable friendship for
M. de Levis in his absence, who was now Commander-in-
Chief of the French armies in Canada by the death of M. de
Montcalm. I continued sorrowfully jogging on to l>auport,
with a very heavy heart for the loss of my dear friend, M. de
Montcalm, sinking with weariness and lost in reflection
upon the changes which Providence had brought about in
the space of three or four hours.

Poularies came back to his lodgings at Beauport about two
in the afternoon, and he brought me the agreable news of hav-
ing converted the project of a capitulation into a retreat to
Jacques Cartier, there to wait the arrival of M. de Levis ; and
they despatched immediately a courier to Montreal to inform
him of our misfortune at Quebec, which, to all appearance,
would not have happened to us if M. de Vaudreuil had not
sent hira away, through some political reason, to command
there, without troops except those who were with M. de Bour-
lamarque at L'Isle aux Xoix — an officer of great knowledge.
The departure of the army was agreed upon to be at night,
and all the regiments were ordered to their respective en-
campments until further orders. The decision for a retreat

* A small bridge eiipported oa masonry has (>inoe been built ^t this spot,
exactly across the inuin road at Browa'tf oiilli!.— (J. M. L.) . ., <u t

was to be kept a great secret, and not even communicated to
the officers. I passed the afternoon with Poularies, hoping
each moment to receive from Montreuil — Major-General of the
army — the order of the retreat for the regiment Royal Rous*
sillon; but having no word of it at eight o^clock in the
evening, and it being a dark night, Poularies sent his Adju-
tant to M. de Vaudreuil to receive his orders for the left.
Poularies instantly returned to inform him that the right of
our army was gone away with M. de Vaudreuil without his
having given any orders concerning the retreat, and that they
followed the highway to the hornwork. Gastaigne, his
adjutant, could give no further account of this famous retreat,
only that all the troops on our right were marched off. It
can be easily imagined how much we were confounded by
this ignorant and stupid conduct, which can scarce appear
credible to the most ignorant military man.

Poularies sent immediately to inform the post next to bis
regiment of the retreat, with orders to acquaint all the left
of it, from post to post, between Beauport and the Sault de
Montmorency. *

I then set out with him and his regiment, following those
before us as the other posts to our left followed us, without
any other guides, orders or instructions with regard to the
roads we should take, or where we should go to ; this was
left to chance, or at least was a secret which M. de Vaudreuil
kept to himself in petto. It was a march entirely in the
Indian manner; not a retreat, but a horrid, abominable
flight, a thousand times worse than that in the morning upon
the heights of Abraham, with such disorder and confusion
that, had the English known it, three hundred men sent after
us would have been sufficient to destroy and cut all our army
to pieces. Except the regiment Royal Roussillon, which
Poularies, always a rigid and severe disciplinarian, kept
together in order, there were not to be seen thirty soldiers
together of any other regiment. They were all mixed, scatter*
ed, dispersed, and running as hard as they could, as if the
English army was at their heels. There never was a more

those

•I

favourable position to make a beautiful, well-oombinecl
retreat, in bright day, and in sight of the English army
looking at us, without having the smallest reason to fear
anything within their power to oppose it, as I had obtained a
perfect knowledge of the locale from Beauport to the Sault de
Montmorency during some months that I was there constantly
with M. de Levis and M. dc Montcalm. I thought myself in
a position to foretell to Poularies the probable order of retreat,
and the route which would be assigned to each regiment for
their march to the Lorette village. I was greatly deceived,
and indeed could never have foreseen the route which
our entire army followed to reach Lorette, and which
prolonged our march prodigiously for the centre of our army,
and still more for our left at the Sault de Montmorency.
There is a highway in a straight line from the Sault
de Montmorency to Lorette, which makes a side of a
triangle formed by another highway from the Sault to Quebec,
and by another road from Lorette to the hornwork, which
formed the base. In the highway from the Sault to the
hornwork there are eight or nine cross roads of communication
from it to the road from the Sault to Lorette, which are shorter
as they approach to the point of the angle at the Sault. Thus
it was natural to believe that our army, being encamped all
along the road from the Sault to the hornwork, each regiment
would have taken one of these cross roads, the nearest to his
encampment, in order to take the straight road from the Sault
to Lorette, instead of coming to the hornwork to take there
the road from Quebec to Lorette, by which the left had double
the distance to march, besides being more liable by
approaching the hornwork so near to the English, to make
them discover the retreat. - ^ . ■•'! ..:;;*

The army, by this operation, would have arrived all at the
same time in the road from the Sault to Lorette by the dif-
ference in the length of these cross-roads, and would have
naturally formed a column all along that road ; and as it was
not a forced retreat, they had the time from twelve at noon
until eight at night to send off all the baggage by cross-roads

;li

to Lorette, without the English perceiving it ; but supposing
them even fully aware of our design, which might have been
executed in open day, they no way could disturb our opera.
tioRS without attacking the hornwork, and attempting (he pas-
sage of the Hiver St. Charles — a very difficult and dangerous
afiair — where they might be easily repulsed, exposing them-
selves in a moment to lose the fruits of their victory, without
enjoying it ; and consequently they would have been insane
had they ventured on such a rash enterprise. Instead of these
wise measures, which common sense alone might have dic-
tated, tents, artillery, the military stores, baggage, and all
other effects, were left as a present to the English ; the officers
saved only a lew shirts, or what they could carry in their
pockets : the rest ivas lost. In fact, it would appear, by this
strange conduct, that a class of men there, from interested
views, were furiously bent on giving up the colony to the
English, so soon as they could have a plausible pretext to
colour their designs, — by lopping off gradually all the means
possible to defend it any longer. M. de Vaudreuil had still
other kind offices in reserve for the Rnglish. He wrote to
de Ramsay, King-s Lieutenant and Commander in Quebec,*
as soon as the retreat was decided : — " That he might propose
*< a capitulation for the town eight-and-forty hours after the
** departure of our army from our camp at Beauport, upon the
" best conditions he could obtain from the English.*' We
ran along in flight all night ; and at daybreak M. de Bougain-
ville, with his detachment, joined us near Cap Rouge. In
the evening, our army arrived at Pointe aux Trembles — five
leagues from Quebec — where it passed the night, and next
day came to Jacques Cartier. The English had so little sus-
picion of our retreat, seeing our tents standing without any
change at our camp, that Belcour — an officer of LaRochebau-
court's cavalry — having returned to it with a detachment, two

•»,fr hi

* The deliberationt of the ooonoil of war, called at M. Datne'B, Major of
Quebec, oa the 15ib September, 1759, pablisbed in de RamsaT'B Memoirea,
in 1861, by tbe Literary and Historical Society, have doae an elTecUTe, tboogb
ft Urdy, juatlce to de Ramsay'B memory.— (J. M. L.) ' " ' = ^ ' «^5k

^.IM i^

days after our flight, he found every thing the same as when
we left it. He went into the hornwork with his detachment,
and fired the guns (pointed) at the heights of Abraham to*
wards the English camp, which greatly alarmed them. ,

FINIS.

[The remainder of the manuscript alludes more particularly
to the campaign conducted by Chevalier de Levis, which
ended, in 1760, by the capitulation of Montreal.]

ADDENDA.

Extract of the Register of Marriages, Baptisms, and Deaths, of the Drench
Cathedral at Quebec, for 1759 :»

" L'Ha mil sept ceos oinqaante neuf, le qaatorziime da molsde Septembre, •
H6 ioham^ dans I'Egliae dea Rellgieasea Urealines de Quebec, baa( et paisaaak
Seigneur Louis Joaepb Marquis de Montcalm, Lieutenant G6n6ral dea arm^ea
du Roy, Commaudeur de I'ordre Royal et militaire de St. Louie, Commandaot
en chef dea troupea de terre en I'Am^rique Septentrionale, d^e^d^ le mftme jonr
de M8 bletaurea an combat de la veilie, man! des saorementa qu'il a regus aveo
beaucoap de f\6t6 et de Religion. Etoient presents i aon inbumation Mrs.
Reacbe, Cagnet et Collet, cbanoiDJs de la Catb6drale, Mr. de Ramesay, Com*
mandani de la Place, et tout le oorpa dea officiers.

"(Sign*,)

" RESCHE, Ptre. Chan.
"COLLET, Cbne."