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 V COLOxXLST 
 
 ON 
 
 THE C0L0A7AL aUESTlOK 
 
 m 
 
 JEHU M A T H K W S, 
 
 TOJIOXTO, CANADA. 
 
 LONDON: 
 h O \ G AI A N S, U K E K X, A \ I) ( : (j. 
 
 TORONTO: AUAM. STKVKN.sox, ANO CO. 
 1»72. 
 
C.3 
 
 KxTKnF.n A(cniiniNG ro tiik Act civ the Pauuamint 
 OK Canaiia, is tiik YKAii IS'J, iiv Jkhu Matiikw.s, in 
 
 THE OKKICK of tiik Mi.VISTKH Of A<ilUCUl,IUIlK. 
 
iiTmni MHiMnnni 
 
 PEEFACE. 
 
 Tiifi ruitrouT of the accompanyino- treatise may be 
 
 explained in a few words. ' Colonijil Kmancipa- 
 
 tion ' is now warmly advocated by a pretty strono- 
 
 party in Kngland, and the policy adoi)ted by the 
 
 Glad.stone Administration wonld seem to indicate 
 
 that the minds of some of our leadini,^ statesmen 
 
 are becoming imbued with ' emancipationist ' [)rin- 
 
 ciples. These principles appear to me to be highly 
 
 incorrect; but I am forced to admit that the 
 
 presen*^, relationship of Fatherland and Colonies 
 
 cannot possibly form the basis of a permanent 
 
 connection, ami that, in the absence of ii modiH- 
 
 cation of the terms of union, a disruption of the 
 
 Empire is not likely to be long delayed. I have 
 
 consequently sought to set forth the reasons which 
 
 lead me to believe that ' emancii)ation ' would be 
 
 at once most disastrous to England and very 
 
VI 
 
 IMiKI-'ACK. 
 
 iniscliiovous to tlio Colonies ; jind have endeavoured 
 to prove tliat in the application of tlic Federal 
 system of <^()vernincnt to the Knipire is to be found 
 the means, not only of averting di.sruption, with 
 all its evils, but als(j of pormanc^ntly stren^T^theninu; 
 the intef!:rity of the Empire, and lari^cly augment- 
 ing the benefits of imperial imity. 
 
 The contro\'ersial character of the earlier part 
 of the work is to me a matter of regret. l»ut I 
 felt that r should not be doing justice to the 
 subject were I to lay before my readers only one 
 side of the case, and that in no manner was it 
 possi1)le to bring both sides before them so effec- 
 tually as by allowing the op[)onents of my own 
 views to speak for themselves. ( )ur controversy 
 is merely in reference to the means whereby the 
 interests of our fellow-countrymen may best be 
 advanced. 
 
 T do not for a moment suppose that I have 
 exhausted the immense subject under review. 
 The labours of our wisest statesmen and most 
 careful thinkers would be requisite for the accom- 
 plishment of that task. My highest hope is that 
 what I have written may perhaps induce some 
 such men to turn their attention to it. Since the 
 
ritKIWCK. 
 
 Vll 
 
 MS. was coiupleted, I luivu had the i)I('asiire of 
 seeiiio- that in the second series of ' Sliort Studies 
 on Great Sul)jects ' one of the latter lias ah-eady 
 done so. 
 
 I must warn Englisli n^-iders against takin.<r me 
 for an exponent of Colonial, or even of Canadian, 
 public opinion. The policy which I recommend 
 has not been sufficiently discussed to admit of the 
 formation of any public opinion on the subject. 
 I speak to my countrymen both at liome and in 
 the Colonies, but for nobody except myself. 
 
 J. M. 
 
 Toronto : March 9, 1872. 
 
r^Hi 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 INTIJODrCTION. • 
 
 State of the Colonial Question -Mo.lorn T.^lonisation-Advanfftpos mnght 
 from it-Clmnp:,.. in tl.oory .u..! ,,ra,.tio., - Froo Tra.l..-('oI..nial sclf- 
 povrnment- Their off.K-ts on the Kmpiro-Km.noipation not a.lvi- 
 
 . . . . . I 
 
 CHAPTKR I. 
 
 THE COMMEUCIAl. ASPECTS OF EMANCIPATION'. 
 
 ^Ir. Smith on Colonial Tra.le-Mi.stafomcnt of its amount-Tneorroot 
 estimate of its value-Proportion of l-npHsh rocmIs eonsnnicl l.y oacli 
 colonist ami each foreigner- A f.,reiy:ner takes only one-twenfiVtl. „f 
 that taken l»y a colonist -Maintenance of the diffen-nee dependent on a 
 ^ontmuanee of the eonni«otion-Re]ativn pmwth .,f the colonial and 
 foro.ffn tmdc- Colonial tmde growing twice as fast as that with 
 foreigners ... 
 
 • • • * ' . . . }j 
 
 CIIAPTKR 11. 
 
 niPLOMATIC, MILITAKY, AND KIXAN'CIAl. ASPECTS OF EMANCIPATION. 
 
 Canada and the United Stntos-Canada not a standing .„,.„, A.W_she 
 may act as a paoificator-In war she would be a valuable ally-Without 
 her England would bo exposed to attack-Saving to be 'effected bv 
 emancipation-Its amount overstated -Review of Mr. Smith's argument's 
 m lavour of Inipen.il disruption . .' 
 
X 
 
 CONTKNTS. 
 
 CIIAPTKK III. 
 
 COUNTEUVAII.INCl CONSIUKKATIOXS, 
 
 Niiviil suiircTiiiicv'flif lif»' of Knpland — Knmnoi|mtii)n rould not justifv a 
 rcducliuu ol' licr flt'ctH— It would (liminisli her iiiival rcsoiiivfH — Naval 
 (Icfiiit iiivolvi'M l'n^li»li ruin IiKiciHiKUiKV of cinancipatt'd Colonios 
 would lie vcr^' iiisiciiri' — l^n^ilainl iiii)ilit hcc rivals in j)os.xf.ssion of tlumi 
 — rrcc tradf in Kn^^laml impractioalilo witlioiit coniini'roial Mipn'macy— 
 I'os.siliilify of its loss n-nders niianciiiation iiii|ioliti(' — It nii^rlit fiulaiiffcr 
 Enfflish invtstnn Ills in tin- Colonics — AhandiuinH-nt of licr llolonifs 
 would brin^ l-A^ahnnl a ])rcnfi(/c of iufutny — New udvaiitaj,'cs which 8h(> 
 nuiv derive from tlicni .11 
 
 CIIAPTKR IV. 
 Tin; i;i;mki)Y. 
 
 WcakupfcS of Imperial political connection— Withdrawal of colonial pirri- 
 Kons — Australian statcsincp on the situation — Policy of the Ciladstonc 
 Adniinistralioii t lit! worst possildc— Growth of the Colonics reiiders an 
 early diajijri' incvitahlc- -Lonl 3Iacaulay on n similar case — An Imperial 
 Federation the sohnion — I)erniitioii of such Federation- ^Ir. Smith and 
 Mr. 3Iill on tho scheme — Our issue with them . . . . (iU 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 I'llYSUAL DIITICILTIES. 
 
 Want of geographical unity in the Kmpin; — Obstacles to Federation theneo 
 arising usually exaggerated — The Imperial (iovernment I'ulllls the duties 
 of a Federal Ivvecutive —The Legislature could be assembled almost us 
 easily as tho American Congress — I'rovision for cases of I'luergency — 
 Financial \inity — A Federal budget practicable — Probable expenditure- - 
 Ways and nnans of raising it e(inilably — Thesrc ob^-tacles surmounted, 
 Federation is accomplished ........ 71 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 CONSTITUTIONAL UIFFICULTIES. 
 
 Formation of n Federal Legislature — Countries which should be re])resenfed 
 in it— A Legislature at once national and Federal — Hov»- to frann; it out 
 
rONTKNTS. 
 
 xi 
 
 of tlu- Imporial I'arliamfnt AflvanliigO'* niiil ilisathai.lapis (»f tliin 
 cotir.Mf A jiiircly I'iMlnal I,c;:i.slatiir(' -IJaMs nf njutsi nlaliuii in it - 
 I'avnicnf of iiifmlirrH -The scntntl cIhuhImt Ntnl of ri'i'r)ii»tnu'tiiiic tlu' 
 lIoHsp of Lords -Mo lo of so doiii^; -(lain tlcrival'lc from it — I'llay in 
 ai'iipaliiij; to the jicoplf — Advantage of atrording time for tlioiiglit . 'J I 
 
 (•IIAl'Ti:i{ VII. 
 PHAt'l'lCAI. Kll I KUI.TIKS. 
 
 (lovommcnts must l)r adapted to tlic circninstaiici.s of pnuntrios-V'oidJ 
 ri'dcrulisiu suit (lie Hrilisli Kinpirt- Mr. I'l-t'iiiiaii on I'ldcraliHiii — His 
 vifWM applied to tlio .nitiiatioii of the Kiiipiiv .Mr. ^Mili uii I'udtTiil 
 riovornnient.s — Apjilication of his prinoiplcN — I'urtlnr tlitfii nil it's coii- 
 Bidcn-d— Tlic inlialiitaiifs of tlic Einjiire not out' piiMii- iJifK-nMU'cs in 
 file framework of Hoeiety — Proportion of eoluiiial repres"'iitation- 
 Possible ulllcts of the new sy.stem of govirnnuiit . . . .117 
 
 CIIAPTKR VIII. 
 FKDEIUTION V. COLON lAI, INI>KPENnKNTE. 
 
 New stage of in(|uirv — Is Federation politie as well as possible? — (Question 
 must bo reganled from Knglish and Colonial standpoints — Colonial 
 objpction.s considered — Local self-govi rnnient safe — Unjust taxation 
 impossible — Liena-iC of taxation less tlian under indepeudenee — Inde- 
 jiendeiu'e woiild bring some Colonies to ruin — It would i.xpose others to 
 serious internal perils — And all to external aggression — \tlav'k on Canada 
 almost a eertainty Suceessfid resistanee imiio'isilde — Aiinexat'on would 
 be an unmixe<i evil to Canada — Dii'ect gains afforded liy Federation — 
 Constitutional freedom — .Sovereign riglits — Splendiil career for geniu.* - 
 Historic glories — Kapid development of resources . . . . 142 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 ri;i)i:i;ATio.N r. i;noi.i.<ii i.^i'i.mio.n. 
 
 KiiL'lisIi interests and I'ederation — All the disadvantages of eiManeijiation 
 are arguments I've Pederation— lt,s direct benefits — It wouM augment the 
 revenue — It would induce jtresent and future reduction of taxation — It 
 would provi<le means of furnishing iniproved legislation — It would 
 secure outlets fur surplus population — It would reuder omipration a 
 
IHifBMIi 
 
 xu 
 
 CONTEXTS. 
 
 source of strength— It would provide a nooded inercase of naval and 
 military power— It would bo almost unobjectionable to England— It 
 would bring her immense increase of safety, strength, wealth, and 
 
 *^'g»'fy ' .... 187 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Course of action which should be pursued— Generosity of feeling essential 
 to success— .Suljject should be kept clear of partyism— All should unite 
 in striving to discover the truth -Mode of inquiry and of legislation 
 suggesti'd— To avoid some change impossible— Earl Grey on Imperial 
 unity— Early action necessary to its JUiiinten'inco— Friendship between 
 England and her Colonies— Political connection its safeguard . 21 1 
 
 Errata. 
 
 I'agc 1. line ^,for Times read Dailij Nni's. 
 ,. <■•"). ,, from bottom,. /(>r her rm*^ its. 
 ., 10;"), „ G, for as usual, was read was practically. 
 „ ]C;"). ., 10, after pretaiion, add, while offering access to all flie 
 fisheries on payment o{ a small license-fee. 
 
•;«iT;i'-»-i*j)r 
 
 THE 
 
 COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 -»o«- 
 
 11 the 
 
 Many years since it was predicted by far-soeiiifr men 
 that the terms of the connection between England and 
 her Colonies, and the comparative expediency of main- 
 taininnr the tie or severing* it, would form one of the 
 leading political questions in the next generatii)n. The 
 time has arrived, and the prediction has been fulfilled. 
 Ever since the publication of Mr. Goldwin Sni'th's letters 
 1 in the Times, the subject has taken a firm hold on Eng- 
 lish thoufjlit, and been discussed with a lartre amount of 
 earnestness. As yet, however, the only conclusion which 
 seems to have been reached in England is that matters 
 are in an unsatisfactory condition. Emancipationists not 
 only assert that all the advantages which have been sup- 
 posed to be derived from ' an Empire on which the sun 
 never sets ' are, in fact, ' a mockery, a delusion, and a 
 snare,' but also declare that the Colonics constitute a 
 positive burden to England. Their oj)poncnts, whilst 
 stoutly denying the correctness of these doctrines, find 
 themselves, apparently, rather at a loss to indicate the 
 nature of the benefits which are derived by England from 
 her Colonial Empire. Both agree that it is a source of 
 expense ; that so long as England undertakes the defence 
 
■.»•!>!> ..••.!« ':o.te?af.i>lUH«HS(.:j«aSTti'.a,-i»' 
 
 t 
 
 A COLONIST ON Till-: COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 of the Colonies the expense must Increase ; and that 
 Enfflish ratepayers should not be taxed for the benefit of 
 colonists. But having gone thus far together, they seem 
 unable to concur in anything further, save that if the 
 Colonies wish for independence they are perfectly Avelcome 
 to it, for never will England draw the sword to retain 
 unwilling subjects beneath her sway. It is true that of 
 late years signs of better things have api)eared. IMen of 
 eminence have begun to hint that a reorganization of the 
 Em])ire might be both practicable and beneficial ; and a 
 jNIinistry acting on what is practically an emancipationist 
 policy has been checked in its course. But all parties, 
 nevertheless, seem to believe that the present relations 
 l)etween England and her Colonies cannot long constitute 
 a basis of union. It is impossible that in a free country 
 any political question of im[)ortance can long remain in 
 this condition ; least of all in an age and country so fond 
 of innovation as our own have now become ; and this more 
 ])articularly Avhen a reduction of taxatioii is promised as 
 the fruit of an adoption of the emancipationist policy. 
 An early sett.hment is inevitable ; and that settlement, 
 be it what it may, cannot fail to influence the whole 
 future of the British race in both hemispheres. Under 
 these circiunstances, Ave have been led to think that a 
 connected review of the whole controversy by a colonist 
 might help to clear up misunderstandings on both side^s 
 and thus assist to hinder the decision of the question 
 taking the form of* a leap in the dark.' 
 
 Before entering on the meritc of the case, it may be 
 well to cast a glance backwards, with a view to discover 
 the causes of the crisis in Avhich the Em})ire is now in- 
 Aolved. How does it happen that parties have come to 
 contend that the possession of an immense Colonial Em- 
 ])ire is not only not advantageous,but j)Ositively pernicious, 
 to England ? The solution of this question is to be found 
 
■■.-mti^'-z.-^ 
 
 MODERN COLONISATION. 
 
 o 
 
 1 that 
 lefit of 
 f seem 
 if the 
 elcome 
 retain 
 that of 
 Men of 
 I of the 
 ; and a 
 ationist 
 parties, 
 slations 
 tistitute 
 country 
 nain in 
 so fond 
 lis more 
 lised as 
 policy, 
 lenient, 
 Avhole 
 Under 
 that a 
 colonist 
 sideL>, 
 Inestion 
 
 Hiav be 
 liscover 
 low in- 
 iome to 
 a Em- 
 licioiis, 
 found 
 
 % 
 
 in certain social ehanires which have occurred in Encfhuul, 
 and certnin political changes which have been established 
 in the relations between the Mother-country and the 
 Colonics. 
 
 ^Modern colonisation may be considered to have bcirun 
 with the discovery of America. The objects sought to 
 be gained by it seemed to have been : — First, the a('(|ui- 
 sition of increased revenues, cither bv the workinij: oi" 
 mines, or the enlargement of the national territory and 
 resources; scccmdly, an outlet for criminals and a surplus 
 po})ulation ; thirdly, a supply of those fruits of the earth 
 not to be produced at home ; fourthly, a market for honK> 
 manufactures ; fifthlv, an increase of martial strmuth, 
 through an increased population, and the possession of 
 important strategical positions. 
 
 In order fully to attain these ends, colonies were gene- 
 rally treated as subject and inferior states. The mother- 
 country ruled them absolutely ; and, in some cases, went 
 so far as to prescribe when, where, and how they sluuild 
 trade. English Colonies were ruled much more mildly 
 than those of other European states ; but even Englal^d 
 j)ievented her Colonies frimi trading with foreign nations, 
 and })rohil)ited colonial manufactures, in order to <t'cure 
 to hei'self a m(mo])oly of their trade. 
 
 But in course of time England began to think that 
 some of these things were unattainable by means of 
 colonies; and that their possession was not essential, (»r 
 Avas i)erha[)s prejudicial, to the attainment of others. It 
 came to be consiilered inexpcMent for the state to work 
 mines. An attempt to tax the Colonies failed miserably, 
 and drew after it a formal abandonment of the policy. 
 The Colonies refused to receive the ofl-scourings of the 
 iMother-country. It was found that the mere fact of 
 countries being British Colonies did not always suHice to 
 attract emigration to them. And instead of the Colonies 
 
iiTo h; ;,?5"atJ»;?t t»H»<"»Wi;;> .ntvr.r.i.'jr 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 proving a source of martial strength, it appeared that 
 they drew aAvay from England a large number of troops 
 Avho might otherwise have been employed in her own 
 defence. Thus, commercial advantages, in the shape of 
 a monopoly of colonial trade, were thought to be the 
 only benefits derivable from the Colonies, and ere long 
 this tie, too, was snapped. 
 
 Possessed of a monopoly of colonial trade, inhabited 
 by an energetic race, holding by her ships the dominion 
 of the seas, receiving from men of genius discoveries of 
 inestimable value, England attained such success in com- 
 merce that she feared no rival, and felt herself strong 
 enough to allow her Colonies freedo)a of trade and to 
 comi)ete with the world for their custom. She came to 
 rcfjuire more raw material for manufacturing purj)oses 
 than they were producing. She also saw that she could 
 ])urchase it cheaper from foreign nations than from her 
 Colonies whilst possessed of differential duties ; and 
 thought that, by purchasing from foreigners, she would 
 gain their custom for her manufactures, while retaining 
 that of the C<jlonies. Hence the adoption of free trade, 
 by wliich the commercial ties between the different parts 
 of the Empire were reduced to the level of those with 
 foreigners, as they were allowed equal commercial privi- 
 leges with those accorded to Britons in all parts of the 
 Empire. This step alone was a most serious blow to 
 Imperial unity, but it induced yet another. Under the 
 old system of colonial administration the Imperial Parlia- 
 ment not only possessed and wielded all the prerogatives of 
 a Federal Legislature, but also could interfere in the local 
 affairs of each colony. Whilst commercial advantages 
 were derived from the connection, the Colonies sub- 
 mitted to this polity, though not without sundry com- 
 plaints. But on the inauguration of free trade they lost 
 any motive for submitting to it, and as England thought 
 
 I 
 
«\i:fi'^-XV.^-i;i* 
 
 COLONIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT. 
 
 '(1 that 
 troops 
 
 er own 
 
 lape of 
 be the 
 
 re long 
 
 habited 
 Dniinion 
 cries of 
 in com- 
 ■ strong 
 and to 
 came to 
 )iirposes 
 :ie could 
 her 
 
 •om 
 
 and 
 ould 
 
 e w 
 
 etaining 
 iG trade, 
 nt parts 
 Qse with 
 al privi- 
 s of the 
 blow to 
 ider the 
 Parlia- 
 itives of 
 he local 
 antages 
 les sub- 
 ry com- 
 hey lost 
 thought 
 
 that she had lost anv motive for insistinjx on its retention, 
 she established a system of colonial self-government, in 
 order to reconcile the Colonies to the loss sustained by 
 them through the repeal of the differential duties. Hence 
 has sprung the danger of a disruption of the Empire, as 
 these commercial and political changes destroyed old 
 motives for amity, and furnished new means of quarrelling. 
 For althoujrh the concession of colonial self-government 
 has unquestionably increased the loyalty of the Colonies, 
 the peculiar system adopted contained some defects which 
 have practically destroyed the unity of the Empire. It 
 endowed different })arts of it with prerogatives more lofty 
 than had ever before — unless, jierhaps, in the case of the 
 Dutch liepublic — been wielded by any save the su})reme 
 ])ower. It failed to establish any arbiter in case of 
 difhculty arising from the exercise of these prerogatives ; 
 and it omitted altogether to define the duties which the 
 several countries thus endowed, and owning one and the 
 same sovereign, owed to each other. Under the circum- 
 stances each Avas left free to consider its own interests 
 exclusively, and did not fail to do so. Hence it followed 
 that in the Colonies the newly-acquired right of self- 
 government was stretched to its utmost limits, producing 
 some results not at all expected by its English advocates; 
 who, thercui)on, began to declare that there was no 
 benefit derived from trade with the Colonies which would 
 not be derived from trade with the same countries as in- 
 dependent states ; that their possession tended to involve 
 the mother-country in war on their account, and that their 
 garrisons not only cost her a large sum annually, but also 
 weakened her military resources. As these parties had 
 before arrived at the conclusion that the only benefit 
 derivable from colonies was their trade, the inevitable 
 corollary of their commercial theory was that tlie Colonies 
 were useless to England ; and, as they held that all re 
 
mmtm^miimmmmmmmmmm 
 
 6 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX, 
 
 (luctions of military cxjienditnre wore so much clear gain 
 to the nation, the conclusion to which their second theory 
 led was that the Colonial Empire was j)ernicious to her 
 host interests. These sentiments are so well expressed 
 in the following extract from INIr. Goldwin Smith's 
 writings, that we quote it in illustration of them : — 
 
 * In ancient times empire Avas emj)ire. The Roman 
 extorted from his dependencies both military force 
 and revenue. JS])ain extorted revenue. AVe are too 
 moral to extort either force or revenue from our depen- 
 dencies, even if we had the power. AMiile we monopo- 
 lised their trade in a general reign of monopoly, they 
 brought us a real advantage, though of a narrow and 
 st'ltish kind. Now they bring us no advantage at all. But 
 the system has been established ; many prejudices and 
 some interests are bound up with it, and reasons must be 
 found, or i' 'onted, for maintaining it. The reasons 
 found, or invented, are, as might have been expected, 
 various and discordant enough. Now it is the amount 
 of colonial trade; now it is the ])reference of our people 
 for the Colonies as places of emigration. When facts 
 overturn all these arguments, it is glory, national spirit, 
 prestige. I give an agent an immense sum of money to 
 invest for me. He tells me he has bought me an estate. I 
 ask to see the estate ; he tells me that the money is laid 
 out not in an estate, but in houses. I ask to see the 
 houses ; he tells me that it is not laid out in houses, but 
 in railway shares. I ask for my scrip ; he tells me that 
 it is not laid out in railway shares, but invested in the 
 funds. I ask for the transfer receipt ; and he tells me 
 that it is not invested in the funds, but in something 
 nuich better and nobler — in prestu/e, I look in the 
 l^^rench dictionary for prestif/e, and find that it is an 
 illusiim, a juggling trick, an imposture.' 
 
 (Such are the opinions of a large and powerful party in 
 
•'«-rr.i.'.:r.-# 
 
 COLONIAL EMAN'C 1 1' AT I ( )N . 
 
 England ; and such the course hy wliich, in our opinion, 
 they liavc been led to their conclusions. \Vc admit that 
 oircunistanecs have been very nuich altered during the 
 last twenty-five years ; but we do not think that these 
 alterations render a disruption of the Empire incvital)le, 
 or that they should lead either England or the Colonies 
 to desire it. To the Colonies ' emancipation. ' would 
 bring evils which they should strive, by every means in 
 their power, to avert ; to England it would bring but 
 few of the promised benefits, and those few would have 
 to be paid for so dearly that it is pretty certain the 
 bargain would be an exceedingly bad one. Bui, l)esides 
 this, there are, \\c believe, means by which all dl!Hculties 
 may be permanently settled, leaving England in j)osses- 
 sion of all the benefits ori";inallv souy;ht for from colonies, 
 and the Colonies in possession of all the advantages 
 derivable from British connection and self-ir<>vernment. 
 For the i)resent, however, we have nothing to say as to 
 the manner in which we believe that these ends may be 
 attained. Our first duty is to examine the correctness of 
 the emancipationist theories. If the Colonies are really 
 useless to England, and their abandonment windd be 
 beneficial, it is absurd to sup[)ose that she will retain tli<:' 
 burden, even if it were not asserted that a termination of 
 the connection would be advantageous to the Colonies 
 also. As nobody has advocated colonial emancipation 
 so boldly and fully as Mr. Goldwin Smith, we shall take 
 him as the champion of the emancipationist party, con- 
 sidering that we do them full justice when we quote his 
 arguments in support of any of their theories. As the 
 corner-stone of their position rests on the assumption that 
 the ' emanci})ation ' of the Colonics would not induce any 
 commercial loss to England, we shall, in the first place, 
 examine the correctness of that theory. 
 
msmmmm 
 
 mmm 
 
 8 
 
 A COLONIST ON inK COLONIAL QUESTION, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF EMANCIPATION. 
 
 "tViiEN Mr. Smith asserts that there is no advantaije in 
 the shape of convict stations, revenue, or military force 
 derived by England from the Colonies, we are content to 
 admit that he is right, though we are of opinion that all 
 these advantages might he derived from them. But 
 ^\'hen he goes on to say that the colonial trade is no 
 more valuable than that with foreign countries, and that 
 there is no benefit gained from the trade with the Colonies 
 which would not be gained from the trade with the same 
 countries if independent states, we dispute both propo- 
 sitions, and join issue on their correctness. Mr. Smith, 
 replying to the Times, states his case as follows : — 
 
 ' But figures, as it happens, prove that the Times, in 
 estimating the value of our export trade to the Colonies 
 so highly as it does in comparison with our export trade 
 to foreign countries, is the victim of a great though not 
 uncommon error. Our exports in 1861 Avere: — 
 
 To foreign countries . . . . • 
 
 To the East Indies. Cej'lon, Sing:apt>re, and 
 
 Hong Kong, which arc not British Colonies, 
 
 liut only dependencies ... 
 
 To the British Colonies in : 
 
 North America 
 
 Australia .... 
 
 The West Indies 
 
 82,854,000 
 
 19,606,000 
 
 3,696,000 
 
 10,701,000 
 
 2,463.000 
 
 16,860,000 
 
 
 Thus the export trade to the British Colonies was less 
 by three millions than that to India and China, while it 
 
THE COLONIAL TRADE. 
 
 9 
 
 was only about one-fifth of that to foreign countries.' — 
 The Kmjnre, p. 25. 
 
 The above statement is incorrect in point of fact ; the 
 conchisiDns drawn from it are incorrect in princii)le. Mr. 
 Smitli omits several most important coKmies from l)is list, 
 and this Avithout transferring them to his list of ' dc])en- 
 dencies,' so that, in his calculation, the exports to them 
 do not appear either amongst tiiose to foreign countries, 
 colonies, or dependencies, but are quietly ignored I This 
 is rather a serious error, as its effect is to make the 
 colonial trade of 1861 appear almost one-sixth less than 
 its real amount. We will, hoA\ ever, remedy the omis- 
 sion. There are such places as Cape Colony, Xatal, 
 ^lauritius, Honduras, the West African Settlements, 
 and detached countries like St. Helena, Bermuda, and 
 the Falkland Islands, the exports to which amount, in 
 the aggregate, to a very considerable sum. Taking 
 these places into consideration, we would submit the 
 following statement as affording the correct view of 
 England's exports to the Colonies in 1861. The returns 
 of population are taken from the Statistical and otlier 
 Tables relating to the Colonial and other Possessions of 
 the United Kinqdom^ 1861, p. iii. : — 
 
 British America 
 
 West Indies 
 
 Australia .... 
 
 Cape Colony and Natal 
 
 Mauritius .... 
 
 Gold Coast 
 
 Sierra Leone 
 
 Gambia .... 
 
 Honduras .... 
 
 Other possessions 
 
 Total . 
 
 Imiiorts from 
 Kngliind 
 
 Population 
 
 1 
 Rate i>er 
 lleiul 
 
 £ 
 
 3.696,000 
 
 2.463,(100 
 
 10.701,t'00 
 
 1,986,000 
 
 551.0(»0 
 
 144.000 
 
 180,000 
 
 56,000 
 
 201,(»00 
 
 76,000 
 
 3,305,000 
 
 1,081,000 
 
 1,333,000 
 
 419,000 
 
 322,000 
 
 151,000 
 
 41,000 
 
 6,000 
 
 25,000 
 
 20,000 
 
 £ «. <i. 
 
 1 2 4 
 
 2 5 6 
 
 8 6 
 4 14 9 
 1 14 2 
 19 
 4 7 9 
 
 9 6 8 
 8 9 
 
 3 16 
 
 20,054,000 
 
 6,703,000 
 
 2 19 10 
 
Ksmsv^ 
 
 I^RHMWRn 
 
 10 
 
 A COLONIST OX TIIH fOLOXIAL QUKSTIOX. 
 
 It will be seen that we here concede Mr. Smith's «lls- 
 tinction between colonies and (lei»endencies, and that we 
 have inclnded in our list none which do not strictly come 
 under the fonner title. We have adhered to the trade 
 returns of 18()1, as we wished to meet jSIr. Smith on his 
 own iiround. Hut we wish here to notice the fact that 
 the returns of that year do not convey a correct idea of 
 the quantity of Edi^'HsIi goods usually consumed in IJritish 
 North America. The four years endin<^ with isfil wore 
 the least pros[)crous period known in Canada for twenty 
 years previously. The averat^e exports to the Jiritish 
 American provinces in the five years ending with l8o«') 
 were, Mr. Smith tells us, 4,l81J,()0()/., and the exj)orts to 
 them in the years 1862-3-4 were 3,993,000/., 4, 811) ,()()()/. 
 and 5,G 11,000. Ilence it aj)pcars that these Colonics 
 usually consume English goods to the extent of 1/. IOn. 
 per head of their poi)ulation. From these facts it follows 
 that not only has Mr. Smith misstated the value of the 
 colonial trade in 1801, by omitting exports to the amount 
 of 3,194,000/., but also that the exports of that year are 
 likely to lead to an under-estimate of its value. 
 
 These })oints, however, are not the circumstances to 
 which we invite the special attention of our readers. All 
 that for which we have contended may be admitted, and 
 still the gross amount of the colonial trade api)ear small 
 in comparison with that to foreign countries. Emancipa- 
 tionists argue that this fact proves it to be less valiuiblc : 
 their reasoning is about as correct as that of a buyer who 
 estimates the value of goods irrespective of their (juality. 
 The colonial trade is less valuable than that with all the 
 rest of the world only as the trade Avitli Belgium or 
 Denmark must be less valuable than that with all Europe, 
 or as a })art must be less valuable than the whole. Colo- 
 nists numbered by the million cannot consume as much 
 English goods, in gross, as can foreigners numbered by 
 
Tin: FOUi:iGX TRADE. 
 
 11 
 
 tlie hundred-million, since to effeot this it would be rc- 
 (juisite that each colonist should consume one hundrcil 
 times as much Kn":lish y;oods as a forciiiiicr. This colo- 
 nists do not, and cannot, do. lint as the total value ot" 
 English exports in iSfil wis 12.j.(H )(),()()()/., of which 
 2(),().')4, ()()()/. went to the Cohmics, with a |)oj)nlation ol 
 6,7()(),()()0, against 10r>,0()(),()()()/. to all the r<>st of the 
 world, the )>oj)ulation of which, to he within the mark, 
 we will estimate at 7<)0,()()(),()<)(), it a])])ears that foreign 
 countries and (lei)endencies imported from England at 
 the rate of 'h. per head of their po|)ulation, and the 
 Colonics at within a fraction of 'M. ^Vhich of these is 
 the more voludhlc trade — that in which each consumer 
 takes goods to the amount of three shillings or oi' three 
 pounds? AVhat say emancipationists on the question — 
 Ought we, in computing the value of a trade, to consider 
 only its sum total? As well migiit we estimate the chea))- 
 ness of ii'oods hv comi)aring prices whilst iunorini; qualities. 
 Did the Colonies import from England only at the same 
 rate as does the rest of the world, the ex])orts to them in 
 18G1 would have amounted to only 1,0()0,0(H)/., instead of 
 2(),()00,()()()/. This fact, we think, is decisive as to which 
 is the more valuable trade. 
 
 It may, perha[)s, be alleged that, notwithstanding the 
 facts adduced, our statement is calculated to mislead, as 
 by far the largest j)art of foreign consumers consist of 
 half-civilized peo})le who do not take anything like even 
 three shillings per head, whilst civilized nations take much 
 more ; and that if the exports to the Colonies be compared 
 M'ith those to nations which have arrived at a like stage 
 of civilization, the difference between the colonial and the 
 foreign rate of im})ortation will appear nujch less, if not 
 disap})ear altogether. It will certainly aj)i)ear less than 
 in the total ; but will still show a large balance in favour 
 of the Colonies. This will be seen from a survey of the 
 
12 A COLOXrST ox THE COLONIAL Ql'ESTIOX. 
 
 following statonuMit slunving the exports from Kiij^lnml in 
 1H61 to the different countries of Europe, excepting 
 Russia and Turkey, whieh we omit as heing uncivilized, 
 and to include which would make the result much m(»re 
 in our favour : — 
 
 Swcili-n mid Norway 
 Dotiniurk 
 
 Prussia . 
 
 HiiiiDVcr 
 
 ll.iiisc Towns 
 
 IlDlliind . 
 
 1?( l<,'iiiin . 
 
 Friiiu'o . 
 
 rortiitril 
 
 S)iiiiii 
 
 Sanliiiiii 
 
 Aiistria . 
 
 Tuscany 
 
 Papal States 
 
 Two Sic'ilii'3 
 
 Greoci- . 
 
 Wallaoliia and Moldavia 
 
 Total 
 
 £ 
 
 1,0'.HJ.(H)0 
 
 y 13,000 
 
 2,4i)-1.0()0 
 l.(»20,()00 
 9,'218.000 
 6,439.000 
 l,lfJ(!,oilO 
 H.HDO.OOO 
 1,087.000 
 2,930,000 
 2.198,000 
 
 9(;h,0()0 
 l,0H2,O00 
 
 447,000 
 2,071.000 
 
 28fi.000 
 
 102,000 
 
 44,159.000 
 
 We shall not trouble our readers with a recapitulation 
 of the rate per head taken in each of these countries. 
 For our present purpose it is enough to remark that as 
 their collective pojuilation in 1801 was about 160,000,000, 
 and they imported from England in that year to the 
 extent of 44,159,000/., the rate of export to them was 
 about 5s. C)(l. per head. 
 
 In view of the facts revealed by these statistics a quo- 
 tation from the Empire on the value of different sorts of 
 trade may not be Inappropriate. Mr. Smith says : — 
 
 ' The best of all trades is the home trade with the 
 butcher and baker, which cheap governments foster and 
 governments of in perial aspirations bring to decay. 
 The next best trade is that with neighbouring countries, 
 
A COMPARISON. 
 
 18 
 
 hocausc in that trade tlic expense of earria«;e is not p^rcat, 
 and the state oi' supply and diinand arc eertainly known. 
 The worst is that with distant count rics like; Australia, 
 hocausc the carriage is exi)ensive, and the speculation 
 hazardous.' ' 
 
 The facta of the case scarcely warrant these conclu- 
 feions. The trade which Mr. Sniitli pronouiiccs the worst 
 was, in the year under review, fifteen times as great, 
 proportionately, as that with Holland, the neighliouring 
 state Avhich imported most largely from England, and 
 thirty- two times as great as the average taken by all the 
 'neighbouring states.' It is also probable that a large 
 ])art of the goods imported into Holland was for export 
 to its own colonics; and, conscciuently, that the entire 
 importation should not be credited to it. J5ut even 
 allowing this doubt to g<t against us, the result is not 
 only enormously in favour of the [)roportionatc value of 
 ' the worst trade,' but even its sum total, 1 0,701, 000/., 
 largely exceeded the exports to any one European state. 
 That it is unwise to state theories without examining 
 facts is a proposition to which we believe that Mr. Smith 
 would assent; but the most charitable view which can be 
 taken of the conduct of himself and his school is that they 
 have forgotten to i)ut it in ])raeticc. Here the facts are 
 again in favour of the colonial trade, for the total exports to 
 ' neighbimring states ' inhabited by 100,000,000 of civil- 
 ized "peojile were little more than double the amount of 
 those to the Colonies with a population of 7,000,000, and 
 the 5s. Gd. per head taken in the neighbouring states is 
 only one-twelfth of the 3/. i)er head taken in the Colonies. 
 Were the Colonies ' emancipated ' and importing from 
 England at the same rate as those countries, the exports 
 to which, according to Mr. Smith's theory, constitute 
 the most valuable exterior trade, they would have taken 
 
 > The Emiire, p. 93. 
 
T 
 
 14 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 from England in 1861 goods to the value of only 
 1,750,000/. 
 
 Still Mr. Smith has one last ho})e. His stronghold is 
 the United States. There it is that we have the bright 
 results of the ' emancipation ' policy ; there is the happy 
 sample of the spectacle which the Colonics would ])resent 
 if only freed from the influence of their Fatherland : why 
 not let them enter on the same glorious course which the 
 States have pursued ? Such seem to have been Mr. 
 Smith's feelings when he i)ublisliedthe Empire ! and such 
 are still the feelings of the more advanced liberal emanci- 
 ])ationists in England to-day. The course which has led 
 to the ascendancv of an aristocracv of demagogues, and 
 their rule to national disruption and civil war, the full 
 (consequences of which are yet undeveloped, are not 
 calculated to induce less veliement progressionists to 
 emulate them. We shall have something to say on 
 this point hereafter. At })resent we have only to examine 
 the relative value of the colonial trade and of tliat with 
 the United States. 
 
 In 1861 the exports from England to the States 
 amounted to 9,Oo8,000/., and their population in the 
 ])rcceding year was 31,445,000, which gives bs. 9(/. 
 ])er head as the amount of goods imported from England, 
 or about one~twelfth of the amount consumed by each 
 colonist. 
 
 It may be rei)lied, liowever, that the year 1861 was an 
 exceptional period, owing to the troubles which then fc'l 
 on the States, and that the returns of other years would 
 show a nuich more favourable result. This is true, but 
 the issue will still be f)und to be in favour of the colonial 
 trade. It is ditHcult to ])resent a clear view of this 
 subject, but Ave will strive to do so. 
 
 The population of the United States in 1850 was 
 23,191,000, and iii 1860 31,445,000, showing an increase 
 
TRADE WITH THE lXITED STATES. 
 
 15 
 
 of 8,254,000 within the decade, or at tlie rate of 825,400 
 per annum. We are, of course, aware that the increase 
 was not equal in each year, and as tlie nearest approxi- 
 mation to the actual poi)uUition in the five years prior 
 to the civil war, we take the figures of a statement 
 ])ublished in the New York Tribune, showing the popu- 
 lation of the United States in each year from 17D0 to 
 1H67. According to the Tribune's estimate and tlie 
 ]iritish trade returns, tlie population of the States and 
 tlieir imports from England in each of the five years 
 ending with 1861 were as follows:— 
 
 Year 
 
 Population 
 
 Imports 
 
 18.57 
 18,-)8 
 1 8,J9 
 18(j() 
 18G1 
 
 28,097,89-) 
 29.084. GGO 
 3i),49.'S.S20 
 31,443.321 
 32,392,909 
 
 & 
 
 18,98.5,939 
 14,491.448 
 22, .5.53.40(5 
 21.007.06,5 
 9,0,58,320 
 
 152,017,6] 1 
 
 80,756,183 
 
 From this it appears that, taking one year witli 
 another, the average imports of British goods l)y the 
 inhabitants of the United States during the above period 
 Avere at the rate of about ll.s-. 4f/. per head, being about 
 one-sixth of the amount taken by colonists in the"" aggre- 
 gate, o.ie-half that taken by much- abused British Anierica 
 at the period of its greatest de])ression, and one-third or 
 tlie proportion usually consumed by it; nay, le.ss than 
 that taken bij some European countries ! AV^e fear that wc 
 cannot compliment Mr. Smith on his talents as a sta- 
 tistician, seeing that, altliough a cursory glance at tiie 
 figures would seem to confirm his views, a close exami- 
 nation proves them to be utterly erroneous. Mr. Smith, 
 and emancipationists generally, in comparing the value of 
 
7 
 
 -J'B. :;»«»lr>^»»t^5««t>^**«W':^w^»rf^»»«^t■,^!!.^«^?^',i) ;, .^s^ 
 
 1 
 
 I* 11 
 
 16 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 foreiirn and colonial trade, omit to notice the most 
 important point in any comparison — the relative resources 
 of the competitors. When these are thrust aside the 
 strongest, of course, will be awarded the palm. But 
 when it can be proved that a given amount of power in 
 one party has accomplished more than a like amount in 
 the other, that party has fairly proved its superiority to 
 its competitor, even though overcome in the contest, 
 inasmuch as it follows that, if resources were equalized, it 
 Avould conquer. This, it seems to us, is exactly the position 
 of the colonists. Each of them consumes 2,000 per cent, 
 more of British goods than is consumed by each foreigner 
 generally, 1,200 per cent, more than is consumed by each 
 inhabitant of civilized Europe and 550 per cent, more 
 than is consumed by each American. 
 
 This brings us to Mr. Smith's great blow on the sub- 
 ject of colonial trade. He remarks, very justly we admit, 
 that— 
 
 • Arguments drawn from the amount of the colonial trade 
 prove nothing, unless it can be shown that the prosi)erity 
 of the trade in some way depends on the continuance of 
 the political connection. The immense increase of our 
 trade with the United States since the severance of their 
 political connection with the mother-country proves that 
 the reverse is the truth ; the defenders of the system of 
 dependency seem always unwilling to face this fact.' ' 
 
 We are not at all unwilling to face the fact, or to accept 
 the challenge. The facts which we have already noted go a 
 long way towards proving, if indeed they do not conclusively 
 prove, that the prosperity of the trade does depend on the 
 continuance of the political connection. Here are certain 
 countries which consume British goods to the amount of 
 3/. per head per annum, against lis. Ad. per head consumed 
 ill the States. Is it unfair to suppose that if they were 
 
 ' The Empire, p. 41. 
 
 1 
 
COLOXrAL PROTI'X'TIOXIST TKXDKXCIKS. 
 
 17 
 
 Lccept 
 Id go a 
 jsively 
 
 )n the 
 lertain 
 
 mt of 
 
 lumed 
 were 
 
 to follow in the same path as that in which the States 
 have walked, their imports from England would decline 
 to the same })roportion ? in which case they would have 
 im[)orted in ISGl only to the amount of ;i,,j()0,()0O/., 
 instead of 2(),00(),()00/. We will show that there is 
 ahundant reason to expect the occurrence of such a 
 decline ; and we will prove that the history of En^jjlish 
 trade with the States authorises a conclusion directly con- 
 trary to that which emancipationists draw from it. 
 
 If the Colonies were separated from En<:;land, thev 
 would he forced to imdertake the hurden of their own 
 defence ; and we sui)p()se that, in face of the history of 
 the Avorld since 184S, even a (Quaker would not assert 
 that armaments could he dispense*! with. The cost of 
 these armaments would larp;cly increase tiie sum which 
 thev Avould re(|uire to raise bv taxation. In what manner 
 would the increased revenue be sup})lied ? j\[r. Smith 
 and his friends will say that it should be raised by direct 
 taxation. But even the fiercest free-trader amongst them 
 will now ])robablv hesitate to sav that what men sJiotild 
 do thev irill do. Mr. Smith, Avritino; several vears since, 
 com[)lains of the disposition on the part of the Colonies to 
 ado])t a i)rotectionist ])()licy. Subse(|uent events show 
 tliat the same disposition still exists. Thou[>-h such a 
 policy has not yet been adoj»tcd in its entirety in any of 
 the Colonies, every weakeninu" of the ties which unite 
 them to the Mother-ccunitry is evidently sti-ennthenino- the 
 ixtsition of the i»rotectionlsts and iiivinii- them a stron<>-er 
 hold on po])ular feelinjx. It can scarcely be supjjosed 
 that this tendency could be successfnliv resisted in case 
 of se])aration from Enu'land and need of increased revenue 
 occnrrinn;, as they would, simultaneously. It is almost 
 certain that these events Avoulil at once i;'ive the victory 
 to the protectionists ; for they would quickly be reinforced 
 by many who would now sui)port them did they not con- 
 
 c 
 
fi 
 
 - JIIUI. "UW-^IW^^WI 
 
 wmi 
 
 mmi 
 
 18 
 
 A rOL(K\IST ox TIIR COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 Ml 
 
 hider protection to be unfair to England ; and by those 
 ■Nvlio liold Avitli Dr. Arnold that 'the sutnmuin honutn of" 
 political economy and of human life are not identical ; 
 and, therefore, many questions in "vvhich free trade is 
 involved and the advantages of large capital, &c., 
 although perfectly sim])le in an economic point of view, 
 become, uhen considered politically, very complex ; and 
 the economical good is very often, from a neglect of other 
 points, made in practice a direct social evil.' Jioth these 
 parties would, after separation, join the j)rotectionists on 
 j)rinciple ; and the mass of the people, if confronted, as 
 they would be, with the alternative of new direct, or in- 
 creased indirect, taxes, would certainly choose the latter. 
 It is an indisputable fact that all countries Avhich possess 
 any connnerce have always preferred indirect to direct 
 taxation, and customs to excise duties. Nowhere is this 
 tendency stronger than in the young nations of the earth, 
 as is demonstrated by the connucrcial i)olicy of the United 
 States. But even if inclined to adopt direct taxation, it 
 w^ould be im})ossible for the Colonics to do so to the re- 
 el ulsite extent. In the most thickly-settled districts in 
 Canada, collectors would have to walk about two miles to 
 call at five pro[)erties, as five ' lots,' each of which usually 
 constitutes a farm, cover that frontage ; and in the newlv- 
 scttled districts they might have to walk five miles to find 
 one or two. In xVustrallan })astoral districts the case 
 would be still worse. These facts, we think, prove de- 
 cisively that any attempt to raise by direct taxation such 
 an amount of revenue as would bo required in case of 
 se})aration must necessarily fail ; and that that event 
 Avould conq)el the Colonies to increase their customs 
 duties, even if not inclined to do so. 
 
 It has been said, however, that protectionist tariffs have 
 already been adopted, aud that England has conse- 
 quently nothing to fear on this head. iMr. Adderley, in 
 bis letter to Mr. Disraeli, published in 18G2, remarked 
 
 
GROWTH OF TRADH WITH THE STATES. 
 
 la 
 
 by those 
 ')()/iu)n of 
 dcntical ; 
 trade is 
 tal, &c., 
 of view, 
 )lex ; anil 
 t of other 
 ,()th these 
 ionists on 
 rontcd, as 
 2ct, or in- 
 the latter, 
 ch possess 
 to direct 
 3re is this 
 ' the earth, 
 he United 
 ax at ion, it 
 to tlie re- 
 listricts in 
 'O miles to 
 ch usually 
 lie newly- 
 cs to find 
 the case 
 )rove de- 
 ition such 
 n case of 
 Kit event 
 r customs 
 
 arifFs have 
 as conse- 
 derley, in 
 remarked 
 
 that Entiland was ulreadv confnmtcd by ]M()rrill tariffs. 
 This plea is easily answered. The tariff of Canada, tlicie 
 referred to, was raised solely from necessity, and as soon 
 as that necessity had been overcome it was reduced. 
 The general rate on manufactured goods in the Canadian 
 tariff is now about fifteen per cent. This is certainly 
 not a protectionist tarift', as is proved by the very large 
 increase of imj)ortations which has occurred of late. As 
 to other colonies, Australia more particularly, there is 
 yet time to stop the advance towards protection by deal- 
 ing Avith the Avhole of the colonial question in a states- 
 manlike manner ; l)ut, most assuredly, should England 
 adopt the emancipationist })olicy, she will thereby render 
 inevitable the establishment of protectionist tariffs in all 
 the Colonies. 
 
 ]\Ir. Smith, however, does not care for this contingencv. 
 He tells us that ' the enormous increase in our trade with 
 the United States since the severance of the connection 
 proves that the pros])erity of the trade is not dependent 
 on the continuance of the political connection.' We reply 
 that he has si)oken rather rashly. The total amount of 
 British ex[)orts to the States has, of course, increased 
 since their separation Irom England : it would l)e strange, 
 in<lccd, if (in 1861)81,000,000 or (in 1870) ;58,0O0,O00 
 ])cople did not consume more goods than did .3,000,000 
 in 1774. But notwithstanding this increase, it is perfectly 
 easy to pi »ve that the trade with the States is nnich less 
 valuable than was the trade with the same countries Avhilst 
 colonios, and immoasuraldy inferior to what it would have 
 been to-day had the connection been maintained. 
 
 According to the article ' Imports and Exports,' in 
 ^IcCulloch's Commercial Dlctioiuirtf, the average of the 
 exports to the North American Colonies from 1749 to 
 1755 was 1,238,000/. per annum; and of those to the 
 United States from 1784 to 1792 2,800,000/. Mr. Ban- 
 
 c 2 
 
20 
 
 A COLOXIST ON THE COLOXIAL QUKSTIOX. 
 
 croft, in his J/iston/ of the United Stntea, vol. ili. p. 90, 
 estimates the population of the thirteen Colonies in 1750 
 at 1,200,000; and from 1784 to 1792 the averajre jjopu- 
 lation must have been somewhere about ;5,;jOO,()0(), for it 
 was 3,900,000 at the first othcial census, taken in 1790. 
 Thus it appears that in the middlo of the last century the 
 Colonics imported from Eni^lar.d at the rate of a])ont 
 1/. ])er head |»er annum; and from 1784 to 1792, inune- 
 diatcly after their inde[)endence, at the rate of Ids. In 
 1861 the rate had fallen to lis. -id. per head; and this 
 despite the enormous increase in the quantity of manu- 
 factured ffoods consumed bv all ranks and conditions of 
 men everywhere since 1750 and 1784. Besides, in 
 1750, En<rland was the sole and onlv manufacturer for 
 the States, and in 1784 ])rol)ably remahied in a similar 
 position. The exports at these periods, therefore, re[)re- 
 scnt the entire amount of manufactured goods consumed 
 in the States, l^ut in 1801 the States manufactured to 
 such a large extent for themselves that it is probable 
 thev did not draw from Enii'land more than one-fourth or 
 one-fifth of their total consumption of such goods. Had 
 England supplied as large a proportion of the goods con- 
 sumed in the States during the five years ending with 
 1801 as in either of the former periods, her annual exports 
 to them would probal)ly have been nearer 100,000,000/. 
 than 17,000,000/. But leaving this plea out of sight, 
 ffood and true though we believe it to be, it is evident 
 that between 1784 and 1801 the population of the States 
 had increased about 900 ])er cent. ; that if the English 
 trade Avith them had increased in the same proportion, the 
 average exports to them would have been 25,000,000/.; 
 and that, if they had been imi)orting from England between 
 1857 and 1861 at the same rate as from 1749 to 1755, 
 they would in 1800 have imported within a few thousands 
 of 32,000,000/., instead of at th rate of 17,000,000/. 
 These figures, we think, prove that Mr. Smith is alto- 
 
(illOWTIl OF TRADE WITH TlIK COLONIES. 
 
 21 
 
 ii. p. 90, 
 In 17.30 
 e ])()i)U- 
 0, for it 
 In 1790. 
 itury the 
 
 [)f Jl])OUt 
 
 2, hnme- 
 lO.s-. In 
 and this 
 if manii- 
 Itions of 
 sides, in 
 turer for 
 I similar 
 e, repre- 
 onsumed 
 pturcd to 
 probable 
 ourtli or 
 s. Had 
 )ds con- 
 ing with 
 exports 
 00,000/. 
 ^f sight, 
 evident 
 e States 
 English 
 ion, the 
 0,000/. ; 
 3etween 
 ) 1755, 
 ousantls 
 )0,000/. 
 is alto- 
 
 crether wronir in assumlnij that * the enormous increase 
 in our trade with tlie United States ])roves tiiat tlie pros- 
 perity of tlie trade is not dependent on the political 
 connection ; ' but, (m the contrary, j»rove that it is so 
 dej)endent, and, when conjoined witli tlie statistics of the 
 foreign and coh)nial trade at ju-esent, ai)i)roach as nearly 
 to a demonstration as is j)ossible, save in mathematics. 
 Colonics now take a larger j)roi)ortion of liritlsh goods 
 than Is taken by foreign States ; a foreign State now 
 takes a smaller proi)ortlon of IJritlsh goods than it took 
 Avhen It constituted a group of British Colonies, and, in 
 common Avith all the civilized world, consumed nnich 
 less manufactured goods than at j)resent. If this be 
 not sutKcIent proof, very little reliance can be placed 
 in inductive reasonino;. 
 
 Mr. Smith next attempts to institute an invidious 
 comparIs(jn between the rate of Increase in the colonial, 
 as comi)arcd with that of the Ibrelgn, trade, in the fol- 
 lowing language: — 
 
 ' The export trade to foreign countries has been in- 
 creasing nuicli more ra[)idly and steadily than that to the 
 liritlsh Colonics, although the markets in Australia have 
 been multljdylng so fast. The Ibrelgn trade has increased 
 over 4().()()0.()()()/. since 1S47 ; the colonial trade only 
 10,OOOX)()0/.' ' 
 
 Assuming the amounts to be correctly stated, the con- 
 clusion Is incorrectly reached. As Mr. Smith states the 
 foreign trade In 1861 to have amounted to 82,()0(),()0()/., 
 an increase of 40,000,()0{)/. Avould show that It had just 
 (louhU'd \ as he estimates the colonial trade at lOjHGOjOOO/., 
 an increase of 10,000,000/. would show that it had almost 
 trebled ; or, taking it at what we have i)roved to be the 
 correct amount, the increase from 1S47 would show It to 
 have much more than trebled. Which Is, 100 or 200 
 per cent., the more rapid rate of increase ? In 1847 the 
 
 ' The Em])irc, p. 26, 
 
T 
 
 '>9 
 
 A COLONIST OX Till-: COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 colonial was about onc-sevciith of the foreign trade. In 
 1861 it was one-fourth ! 
 
 We cannot help sayinpf tliat arguments such as those 
 used al)ove by Mr. Smith arc not such as we should have 
 expected from that gentleman. His conelusicms are 
 usually based on a single jmint of the case, an ignore- 
 ment of all other ])oints, and even of the causes which 
 have i)roduced the fact on Avliich he relies. Is it not evi- 
 dent that such a course of reasoninn; must, almost ahvavs, 
 lead to error ? And is it not self-evident that the trade 
 with countries whose population is recruited by immigra- 
 tion as well as by natural increase nmst augment much 
 more rajjidly than that with countries recruited by natu- 
 ral increase only? On the increase of colonial trade we 
 copy from the Westminster Review for July 1870, j). 23, 
 the following extract from an essay read by ]Mr. Hyde 
 ClarjvC before '^'c Society of Arts : — 
 
 * We liave seen that the combined trade of these reo-ions 
 [the British Possessions] has in the space of sixteen years 
 increased fourfold, that is, from 05,000,000/. in 1850 to 
 280,000,000/. in 1866. We have seen that at the be- 
 ginning of that period the aggregate of colonial imports 
 wa- 33,000,000/., and of exports 31,000,000/., and that 
 at the end of it these figures had become 137,000,000/. 
 and 143,000,000/. respectively. But, what to my coun- 
 trvmen will be a still more interestin<»; result, is the fact 
 that the consumption by the Colonies of British manu- 
 factures has kept ])ace with the rest of their trade, the 
 imports from the United Kingdom having been in 1850 
 18,000,000/., and in 1866 61,000,000/. The exports 
 from the Colonies to the mother-country have increased 
 in a yet greater ratio. In 1850 they cori-cspond with 
 the imjiorts, being 18,000,000/. ; in 1866 they were 
 74,000,000/. In sixteen years, therefore, the trade of 
 the United Kingdom with her Colonies advanced from 
 37,000,000/. to 135,000,000/. If we exclude India from. 
 
TlIK COLONIAL TRADK IX I'^ro. 
 
 u 
 
 ,tle. In 
 
 IS tlio.se 
 lid Imve 
 oils are 
 
 ignore- 
 !S wliicli 
 not cvi- 
 
 ahvavs, 
 lie trade 
 Tiinifjra- 
 it much 
 )y natu- 
 radc we 
 ), ]). 23, 
 :. Hyde 
 
 regions 
 Ml years 
 
 850 to 
 tlie be- 
 ini ports 
 nd tliat 
 )0,000/. 
 y couii- 
 tlie fact 
 
 niaim- 
 ide, the 
 n 1850 
 ex})orts 
 creased 
 d with 
 y were 
 rade of 
 
 d from 
 ia from. 
 
 tlie estimate, we find that wliat may he strictlv recrardcd 
 as the colonial trade of Great Britain — the simple result 
 of AiiLrlo-Saxcm cohniisation during the last twentv 
 ^l years — the finiits of the effln'ts and enterprise of Aiiglo- 
 % Saxon colonists in Australia, Cvinada, South Africa, and 
 the Indian islands, has advanced from 34,000,000/. in 
 1850 to 157,000,000/. in 1800.' 
 I These facts constitute pretty strong evidence that 
 
 \ colonial trade is not such a 'slow coach 'as ]Mr. Smith 
 I would fain represent it to be. A\'e close the commercial 
 'l side of the question with the followino; tables showinn; the 
 '}• value of Euglish goods exported to the Colonics and 
 I certain foreign countries in 18(59 and 1870, and their 
 \ ])oi)ulation according to the latest returns. The tables of 
 .. exports are coi)ied i'rom the Board of Trade returns, as 
 J ])ublishc<l in the London £'cv;y<ow/.v/, ]\Iarch 4, 1871 : and 
 those of i)opulation — save for British America, which we 
 state accordinc; to the census of 1871 for the Dominion, 
 and the latest estimates for provinces not comin-ised in it 
 — from the Year Book for 1871. An examination (if 
 them Avill show that the relative i)roportioii of goods con- 
 sumed has chann-ed verv little since 1861 : — 
 
 
 18IJ9 
 
 1S70 
 
 Poijulnti'jfi 1 
 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 
 British America . 
 
 o,lo9,000 
 
 6,800,000 
 
 3,903,000 
 
 West Indies 
 
 l,S;34,OOt) 
 
 2,4G'2,000l 
 
 1.097,000 1 
 
 Guiani\ 
 
 GokOOO 
 
 8.") 1.000/ 
 
 Humlunis . 
 
 llifJ.ODO 
 
 HJO.OitO 
 
 2.'). 000 1 
 
 Austnilasia . 
 
 13, 4 11, ()()() 
 
 9,902,000 
 
 l.GSo.oOO 
 
 Cape Culdiiy and Natal 
 
 I,o72,()li0 1 
 
 1,807.000 
 
 709.000 
 
 3Luu'itiiis . 
 
 381,0(10 
 
 483,000 
 
 322,000 
 
 Western Africa . 
 
 6l';'.oiio 
 
 0.")S.(IOO 
 
 •IS. 000 
 
 Other possessions 
 
 88,000 ] 
 
 79,000 
 
 say 2."), 000 
 
 Total 
 
 23.848.000 ' 
 
 23,202.000 
 
 7,802,000 ; 
 
 The exports to Western Europe and the United States 
 — the countries with which we compared the colonial 
 trade of 1861 — were in the same years us follows: — • 
 
I 
 
 24 
 
 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUL.STION. 
 
 H 
 
 i i 
 
 
 imt 
 
 1«7(> 
 
 riipiihitlon 
 
 
 A 
 
 « 
 
 j 
 
 Swt'ilon ainl Nnrwiiy . 
 
 l.rwi 1,000 
 
 2,(t 14,000 
 
 /•),8!t7.000 j 
 
 Dciiiiiiirk 
 
 l,.')74,000 
 
 2,02:5.000 
 
 1.7H:i,ooo 
 
 < icriiiiuiv 
 
 ;^. 2:50.000 
 
 lll.liOl.OOO 
 
 2.o:is,()00 1 
 17,t;52.oooj 
 
 38.0 14. 000 
 
 ll(.llaiia . 
 
 i(»,7oo,(ioo 
 
 11.222.000 
 
 ;5,7:5i"),ooo 
 
 IJclL'iiim 
 
 4.oo;5,ooo 
 
 4.470.000 
 
 4,8;50,(tOO 
 
 !'"nme(' 
 
 ll.ClS.OOO 
 
 11.(1 IT), 000 
 
 38,007,000 
 
 I'ortii^fiil 
 
 i.();5»,ooo 
 
 1.027.000 
 
 ;i.087.ooo 
 
 Spain .... 
 
 2,204,000 
 
 2..")i:5,ooo 
 
 10.301.000 1 
 
 Italy .... 
 
 G,Hi2,000 
 
 r),2()f;.ooo 
 
 24.273,000 
 
 Austria 
 
 I, :m 1.000 
 
 1.714.000 
 
 3.j.l^l 3.000 
 
 (ircici' 
 
 !»74.000 
 
 842,000 
 
 1,3:52.000 
 
 Wallai'liiaanil Moldavia 
 
 007.000 
 
 659,000 
 
 :i,80i.ooo 
 
 Total . 
 
 G(5,3.")4.000 
 
 04,.J71.0I)(» 
 
 I78,r)3r).o()0 
 
 United .States 
 
 24,024,000 
 
 28,:5;3 1.000 
 
 38,.")5;"),O00 
 
 From the above tables it can be seen tliat in tlie years 
 18(59 and 1870 eacli colonist consnnied Eiii^Iish ffoods to 
 the amount of U/. Ids. llr/., against 7.v. 3r/. taken by each 
 inhabitant of Western Euro|)e, and I'As. Hd. l)y each 
 American. AVe have previously shown that Americans 
 ■\vlien colonists, and Avhen they, in common with all the 
 world, consumed much less inanni'actured goods than they 
 do at present, iin])ortcd from England at the rate of 1/. per 
 head. Do not these facts decisively ])rove that the colo- 
 nial trade is much more valuable than that with foreigners, 
 and that maintenance of the connection is requisite to 
 keep it so ? 
 
 As we remember to have seen a statement to the eifect 
 that tables similar to the above had lately been published 
 in England, it may be as well to state that we have never 
 seen them ; that the above argument was set forth by the 
 Avriter six years since in a Toronto newspaper, and that 
 the original idea of the relative superiority of colonial 
 trade was derived from a passage in the second volume 
 of Alison's Europe, 1815-52, vol. ii. p. 6. 
 
 li 
 
25 
 
 CIIAPTHK IT. 
 
 DIl'LO-MATIC, .MIMTAllV, AM) FINANCIAL ASl'KCTS 
 OF EMANC'JJ*AT1<)N. 
 
 x uro-mcT 
 
 the di 
 
 )f the !«: 
 
 )leas h 
 
 I 
 
 lie (lisruplion or the r^mj)ire on ])leas hasec 
 on di|»h)niatic', niilitarv, and financial consicUn'ations, 
 emancipationists tai<c liii^hcr ground than tliat which thev 
 occupy when survcyiuf:; the commercial aspects of the 
 question. There tliey only say that the Colonies are useless 
 to En<i;land, and tiiat no Iosk would accrue from se[)aration. 
 ]kit, in urginu^ the latter pleas, they contend that the 
 Colonies are positively prDiicluiis to the mother-country, 
 iiiasnuu'h as they tend to involve her in war for theii' 
 defence, draw aAvay her troops for their garrisons, and 
 her revenue for paying them ; and that, as emancij)ation 
 Avoidd deliver her from the dangers of war to which tiiey 
 now expose her, and would, j)ractically, strengthen her 
 army by enabling her to concentrate it in England, 
 besides relieving her from the charge of paving the colonial 
 garrisons, she would be a positive gainer in a di])lomati(', 
 military, and financial ])oint of view I>y its adoption. All 
 these pleas are urged in the strongest manner against 
 British America, as it is — or has been — the most vulner- 
 able of the Colonies on each of these points. ]Mr. Smith 
 thus states the case : — 
 
 ' If there had been a war with the United States, the 
 " Trent " would have been the occasion, but Canada 
 would have been the cause. It Is because we have a 
 
■■i 
 
 20 
 
 A COLO.NLST ON TllK COLONIAL Ql'lvSTION. 
 
 (loiKMidoticy on that rontinont oiislly sis8:iil.*il)lo, and wliicli 
 bccaiiso it is a (IcpiMxlciicy it is not tlmii|i;ht immoral to 
 assail, that the idoa of a quarrel with lCii<i:laii(l rises in 
 the minds of the Amerieans whenever their tempei* or tiie 
 desire of relief iVoni internal difliculties leads them to think 
 of foreijijn Avar.' ' 
 
 And, ao;ain, even more distinctly, he alKrms that Canada 
 is the sole cause wiiieh can inchiee a war Avith tLc 
 States : — 
 
 * For Canada, and i'or Canada alone, we stand alwavs on 
 the hrink of a war with the great Anujlo-Saxon Kepuhli'', 
 our hest mart, and, if we were not eomjtelled to stand in 
 the path of her udvaneinj^ greatness, our closest and sure>t 
 allv."^ 
 
 On the (»thcr hand, Canada's only danger of aggression 
 is said to arise from her connection with England: — 
 
 ' There is hut one way to make Canada im})regnal)le, 
 and that is to fence her I'ound with the malestv of an 
 inde])endent nation. To invade and conquer an indc- 
 j)endent nation without ])rovocatIon is an act from -which, 
 in the present state of opinion, even the Americans would 
 shrink/ And in a note he adds — * even the Americans 
 as they were while their (rovernment Avas filled Avith the 
 aggressive insolence of the Southern slave-owner. I 
 know not Avhat reascni avc have for helleving that a 
 Government rej)resentlng the iiidustiious and thrifty citi- 
 zens of the North is llkelv to he military and aimresslve." ■' 
 
 Perhaps after having seen the history of the 'Alahama' 
 controversy, Mr. Smith may he less confident of the 
 ])aclfic temj)eranient of his Xorthern friends than he Avas 
 when Avriting the ahove. It is ])retty certain that a good 
 many other people have altered opinions much the same 
 as those expressed hy him. But hoAvever this may he, 
 the sentiments conveved in the above extracts must be 
 ' The Empire, p. 1. = Ibkl p. 131. » iUfi p_ 2. 
 
CANADA N'oT A * f'ASr.S BKLM.' 
 
 27 
 
 111 
 
 ct ; for tliov reprosrnt liviii;; issues, hold even more 
 
 good 
 
 strongly to-day lliaii when tluy wcic writtc 
 
 Tl 
 
 10 
 
 whole course of reasoning is a »iiass of inconsistencies 
 which go far to destroy it- entire f()rcc. 
 
 ]SIr. Smith tells us that the States neither are, nor are 
 likely to heconie, aggressiye, and fills seyeral jtages with 
 arguments intended to estahlish these propositions. If 
 this view be correct, England need not fear that Canada 
 Avill oyer form n cf is us /WZ/hetween herself and the States, 
 and the first plea which einan<'ipationists urge in favour of 
 its ahandonment is inoperative. There is no danger, or 
 rather no /mssihillff/, of aggression from a non-aggressive 
 ])eoi)le and government. 
 
 Mr. Smith, however, in defiance of his own argument 
 to prove that the States are not aggressive, maintains 
 that ' th(! j)ossession of Canada, and that alone, keeps 
 Kuirhmd constantly on the hriidv of war with the si'cat 
 Anglo-Sax(m Ke})uhlic,' and not oidv this, hut also that 
 Canada's sole danger of attack arises from the connection 
 with lOngland. One of these ])ropositlons may he correct, 
 hut both of th'^m cannot be so. If the States be aggres- 
 sive, and entertain hostile feelings towards both England 
 and Canada, it is plain that a severance of the connection 
 would not alter this feeling. If they had hostile feelings 
 or det-iixHs a}j;ainst one of them only, then it is true that 
 the other would esca})e being drawn into war when the 
 victim was attacked by having ])reviously dissolved the 
 partnership ; but that tir(f countries can e\ or escape an 
 assault directed against one only, by severing their ])oli- 
 tical connection, is clearly impossible. Therefore, before 
 we can be sure that this new, honourable, and truly British 
 mode of averting aEcgression — by running away from 
 aggressors ! — would be effectual in the case of either 
 England or Canada, avc nuist be sure that one only of 
 these countries is in danger of aggression from the States, 
 
»■ 
 
 28 
 
 A COLOXIST ON THE COLOXIAI. QUKSTIOX, 
 
 'I 
 
 k 
 
 r I 
 
 II '' 
 
 ■i ^k 
 
 and must know which of them it is. This we cannot tell ; 
 and, therefore, must remain ignorant as to which of them 
 might gain safety by the above device ; but we may be sure 
 that, in case of the States becoming aggressive, emanci- 
 j)ation could not bring safety to both England and Canada. 
 If the assault were directed against one only, that one 
 Avould still remain open to attack ; if against both, it would 
 be their interest to form an alliance to resist it. 
 
 These inconsistencies j>ervatle the reasonings of the 
 whole of the emancij/ itionist school on this subject. 
 They hold up Canada as a standing casus helli between 
 England and the States ; but as it would be too cruel a 
 blow to their feelings to admit that their model lie))ublic 
 could be aggressive, and as they know that the British 
 ])CO[)le would never abandon their oifsj)ring to the tender 
 mercies of an aggro.-sor, they stoutly deny that the States 
 are aggressive, and assert that Canada's only danger of 
 attack is to be found in her connect' . w'tb England; 
 for(j('ttiii<i tluit, if this Jtc true, it invdli'^uUs their former 
 tJieorj/ that it is Canada which hriuf/s </a/ff/er to England; 
 whilst there can be no doubt that, if Canada really does 
 bring danger to Enoland, the dani2;er to herself must 
 continue to exist after the severance of the connection. 
 Thus, in establishing either one of these theories, they 
 overturn the other. 
 
 But is the doctrine witli which we are now more inmic- 
 diatcly concerned, that ' for Canada, and Canada alone, 
 England stands always on the brink of a Avar with the 
 great Anglo-Saxon Bepublic,' correct? AVe say that it 
 is grossly incorrect. The * Trent ' affair is a case in point. 
 Mr. Smith says that had hostilities arisen out of that 
 event Canada would have been ' the cause,' though the 
 * Trent ' affair avouUI have been ' the occasion.' We are 
 unable to extract any other meaning from this nice dis- 
 tinction than that the ' Trent ' affair would have been seized 
 
CAXADA MAV I'ROVK A PACIFICATOR. 
 
 29 
 
 nmc- 
 
 oiic, 
 
 tlie 
 
 at it 
 
 •oiiit. 
 
 that 
 
 the 
 
 ii])on as affording; a pretext for an attempt to annex Canada, 
 wiiich, we snp})()se, is very far from Mr. Siuitli's idea. 
 But wliatever meanino; lie mav liave intended to convev, 
 the glaring fallacy of the ])ro})().siti<Mi that Canada would 
 have been ' the cause ' of war in that case is sufficiently 
 proved by the fact that, had Canada been sei)arated from 
 Enu'land at the time of the connnission of the outrage, 
 reparation must have been demanded all the same, and 
 war ensued had it been refused. The same reniarks 
 aj)i)ly to the enlistment f[uesti()n (during the Uussiaii 
 war) and the subsequent long controversy on the '.Vla- 
 bama' claims. What had Canada to do with any one 
 of these difficulties? The emanci[)ationist theory on 
 this subject is c(|uivalent to saying that geograi)hicid 
 contiguity is essential to the creation of a casus helli, 
 which is a manifest absurdity. It is, therefore, ridiculous 
 to say that Canada is the sole cause which can induce 
 war between England and the States, though it may be 
 one of the causes which can induce that event, as both 
 the people of the United States and their rulers set a 
 much higher value on Canada than is done by British 
 emanci[)ationists. 
 
 To this possibility there are, however, countervailing 
 considerations. Does Canada act only as a casus hclli? 
 jNIay she not also act as a pacificator? In the ' Trent' 
 affair we are j)retty sure that she did so act. For in 
 Canada Hno-land was furnished Avith a base of operations 
 for her army, ready access to the States' northern frontier, 
 and the means of streno-theninu; her forces by the addition 
 of from 50,(300 to 80,000 hardy recruits. May not these 
 things, and the consequent fact that a Avar Avith England 
 and British America is certain to be more dangerous to 
 the States than a Avar Avith Enirland single-handed, de- 
 nuded of Canada, and thus able to assail the States only 
 as a naval poAver, have been the causes, as they certainly 
 
w^ 
 
 mmm^mmm!imi''m 
 
 wmmmm 
 
 30 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 ^ |:i 
 
 I! 
 
 were amongst the causes, which led the States to yield, 
 and so averted war ? And as we have shown before that 
 war, on account of Canada, can arise only in case of the 
 States being an aggressive Power, the question arises 
 whether considerations such as these are not much more 
 likely to avert aggression than is any flattering of their 
 van'ty by withdrawing from their neighbourhood in fear 
 of encountering their prowess; nay, whether such are 
 not the only arguments which can prevent aggression on 
 tlie part of a PoAver inclined to attemi)t it. 
 
 It thus appears that the only event in which the 
 emancipationist theories on this subject can prove correct 
 is in that of the States desiring to annex Canada, and of 
 Knrjland consentiMcj to stand aside and allow them to do 
 There can ])e no danu'cr of a<)i:£jrcssion from a non- 
 
 on 
 
 SO. 
 
 aggressive Power, and if the States were aggressive, and 
 their hostile foelin<i's directed aii'ainst Eno-jand alone, she 
 would not esca|)c tiie assault by cutting Canada adrift. 
 The increased chances of war with t!ie States which 
 Canadii brings to England are consequently reduced to 
 very small proportions; and still further reduced when 
 on the other side of the account we place the motives for 
 keeping the peace Avhicli are furnished to them by the 
 union of the two countries, rendering a war Avith both 
 nuich more dano-erous than with Eiifi;land alone — a motive 
 which orows with the i»:ro\vth of Canada. As to the 
 other Colonies, we do not think that they have, during 
 the present century, created a single ditficulty with any 
 foreign Power. 
 
 The })osItion which we have taken, in reference to the 
 connection with Canada rendering Enji-land more formid- 
 able in a war with the States, Avould certainly be disputed 
 by any logical emancipationist, for the party contends 
 that the military strength of England is weakened by the 
 
IXVASIOX OF ENGLAND POSSIBLE. 
 
 81 
 
 dispersion of lier army in colonial garrisons. Mr. Smith's 
 argument in support of this view is as follows : — 
 
 ' As regards the position of England in Europe, I con- 
 tend that she would become not more, but less, insular, 
 Avhen disencumbered of her distant dependencies. AVhy 
 cannot she now speak the one word of spirited foreign 
 })()licy that is worth s})eaking — the Avord that -would set 
 Italy free? Because her armies and fleets are scattered, 
 and she is in fear of her dependencies all over the globe." ' 
 
 There is no doubt that this view of the case is, in some 
 measure, correct. If the colonial garrisons Avere Avith- 
 drawn to England, and still kept in pay there, England 
 Avould, under present circumstances, have a larger army 
 disposable for operations in Europe Avithout her Colonies 
 than Avith them. But for a Avar with the States such a 
 policy Avould certainly Aveaken her. For it should be re- 
 membered that Avith Canada for an ally England could 
 find employment for at least 200,000 American tro(){)s in 
 their own country, or on its borders, and that Avithout 
 Canada these troops Avould be disposable for action else- 
 Avhere. Has it never occurred to Englishmen that their 
 scene of action might be in the British Islands? We are 
 tolerably sure that it has not ; and, also, that the sugges- 
 tion of such a possibility may, at first, rather tend to 
 excite the risible muscles of the reader than his appre- 
 hensions of such an event. But reflection Avill soon alter 
 this. Sixty years ago England transported her forces 
 across the Atlantic and attacked the States at many points 
 on their OAvn soil. Since that time steam navifjation has 
 innnensely lessened the difficulty of expeditions across 
 the sea, as has been repeatedly ])roved by experience. 
 Under these circumstances, there are but two means by 
 Avhich such an invasion could be prevented from reaching 
 the British Islands. One is that England should possess 
 
 ^ The Empire, p. 35. 
 
 r 
 
 I 
 

 A COLONIST OX TFIE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 va 3i 
 
 such a su])oriority at sea as would enable her to blockade 
 the States' seaports, and so hinder the sailinn; of the arma- 
 ment, and the other Is that she would be able to destroy 
 it at sea. The former continj^ency, however, is very 
 unlikely to prove a fact, and the latter is dej)endent on 
 tlic chance of meeting the hostile fleet. Hence, there are 
 no other difficulties in the way of an invasion of the 
 British Islands by the States than such as are peculiar to 
 any niilitary enterprise undertaken across the sea; and if 
 anybody should suppose that it Avould not be attem})te(l, 
 or the requisite force not forthcoming, he would labour 
 under a sad delusion. The population of the States now 
 exceeds that of the United Kingdom by about twenty- 
 five per cent. They have raised armies quadruple those 
 of England, and the rnatericl of an inunense force is still 
 avaihible at almost any moment. Their navy is pretty 
 formidable ; and a war with ICngland would cause an 
 enormous fleet to spring into being with mushroom ra- 
 pidity, by letters of marque bringing ])rivate enterprise 
 to the work of its autrmcntation. How can En<ilishmcn 
 sup[)0se that so terribly energetic a peoj)le as the xVmeri- 
 cans would employ their immense resources in watching 
 for some expeditions of 10,000 or lo,000 men, which 
 England might send over to make casual landhigs on 
 their coasts, instead of emi)loying them to strike at the 
 heart of their foe. If there were any doubt on the 
 matter at any time, there certainly can be none while 
 Fenianism exists in both Ireland and America; and this 
 under so strong a form that not only are raids from the 
 latter country into British territories planned, but also 
 executed, in time of peace. What, then, would be done 
 in time of war? And what would be a more eft'ectual 
 check on any scheme of invasicm than the fact that, before 
 attacking other ])eople, the States would require to guard 
 their own laud against the assaults of from 100,000 to 
 
 I 
 
^ 
 
 CANADA A GUARDIAX AGAIXST IXVASIOX. 
 
 33 
 
 200,000 men in Canada? Enp;lancl complains of havino; 
 to undertake the defence of Canada, whilst the fact is 
 that, in a war with the States, Canada would constitute a 
 breakwater to defend England against the storm, for 
 unless she were defending herself in America, she wouM 
 probably have to do it at home. It is really strange to 
 hear British statesmen talking of Canada beincr likelv 
 to prove a weakness to England in a war with the 
 States ; or, averring that it is impossible to defend Canada 
 in Canada, and that the only way to defend her is to 
 withdraw the British troops and strike elsewliere. If 
 Canada be indefensible by the union of English and 
 (>anadian forces, how can she be defensible by those of 
 Canada alone? and if England could not confront the 
 States in a friendly country with those united forces, how 
 could she confront them in a hostile country with her 
 own alone? For a war with the States, emanci|)ation 
 would unquestionably weaken England, though we will 
 grant that, by enabling her to withdraw the colonial 
 garrisons, it would strengthen the force dis})osable i\n' 
 o})erations in Europe, if the troo})S were still kejjt under 
 pay.' 
 
 lil 
 
 uie 
 
 ' Early in 1870. and subsequent to the writinii uf the above, some in!- 
 niirable letters from a gentleman subscribing himself 'A Colonist' wt-re 
 |nil)li^hfil in the Tiincs. In the second of thcsr htters the writer takt s 
 prci'isrly the same ground that we have done. He says: — 
 
 ' In my last letter I contended that the colony whicli is most exposed I'f 
 all '.vas defensible in case of war, and that uii the grounds of military expi'- 
 diency it wi.idd be more to the advantage of Entrland to defend than to 
 rniire from Canadii. Let me now look at the alternative of the case: that 
 ('anada is given up and that the whole C'onfetleration in any future strngirlo 
 is neutral. This, it is to be kept in mind, involves the consequence tiiat on 
 no part of the Atlantic coast north of l>irmuda, nor on the American sido 
 of tiie Pacific Ocean, would England possess a siuirle harbour where she 
 could coal, or retit a vessel, or obtain supplies. To repair damages a ship 
 must return to England, and if the United .States were left free to operato 
 with all their power against Bernuula. how long could that island be held y 
 
T 
 
 34 
 
 A COJ.OXIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION, 
 
 The niuincial argument is the hist plea in favour of* a 
 disruption of the Empire Avliich we liave to consider. 
 England has been accustomed to garrison the Colonies, 
 and the expense of so doing would, it is contended, be 
 saved by declaring the Colonies independent, and ceasing 
 to garris( n them. The following is Mr. Smith's estimate 
 of the ex})ense : — 
 
 ' The military expenditure on the whole of the depen- 
 
 n 
 
 i .ft 
 i I 
 
 t 
 
 h 
 
 1 
 
 [ 
 
 
 '[ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 ft 
 
 b 
 
 It'iiiir wiihiii (■;l^ ;• necfss to the United States, it must, at all evciit.«. Iidw- 
 ever guv ■ f>i " reduction or actual capture, be closely blockaded, and, 
 
 fur all cm I. ir; es. would be useless. If I'ernuida fell, how lonj^ 
 
 would the 'V -I 1. II, '(.-.' remain British ? And might not the contairion of 
 (lissohition i"vt(ii<l to Australia and the other Colonies of the empire? If 
 Canada wer 
 
 ijaii''o 
 
 ined >n ^hc jrround that she Wiis difficult to defend, 
 would the PaciHc or ..as^raj/- n ( 'onies not claim the right to be neutral ? 
 In the lancuaire uf Lord Grrev, "the policy of abandoning a pnrt of our 
 Colonial empire could scai'cely be adopted without giving so great a shock to 
 tht^ feeling of confidence and security in the remainder as greatly to increase 
 the ditficulty of maintaining it." England would thus br deprived of active 
 allies, numbering nearly seven millions of people, all over the globe, and 
 her enemy would gain inmiensely in the means of inflictina- injury on her 
 coninieree in every sea. And what of the fact that Newfoundland is within 
 six days' steaming of Ireland? If all the ships of England are to lie with- 
 drawn from the Anu'rican possessions, that island at once Ijecoraes a safe 
 lia.>e of operations against Ireland, whence men and munitions of war could 
 and Would be despatched as opportunity or the chances of success war- 
 ranleil. 
 
 ' To >um up. therefore, in such a war, if the policy of abandonment is to 
 be followed. England loses whatever advantage is to be found in the alli- 
 ance and active support derived from Camuia alouo of half a million of 
 flLihtinsJ: men. of whom 7(b"0() are as hardy seamen as tlie world can pro- 
 ttuce : of till' employment of a. very large sliare of the enemy's resources and 
 men in dilHcult and exhaustinc expeditions; in having no harbours to 
 repair and coal her ships and to tit out expeditions within easy access of 
 the enemy's country, and of so being able to harass a coasting trade which 
 extends tY'im Elaine to Cape Horn, and from Cape Horn to the Columbia 
 Iiiver. She reliiujuishes, besides, all lu)pe of executing ^hat some regard 
 as a stratetretic oper.ition possessing elements of probable success — a descent 
 on California by a force drawn from India and collected at Vancouver's 
 Island : and, above all, she risks alienating the active support of every 
 other possession, and turnincr them, if no worse befalls, into the condition 
 of neutrals ; and she furnishes a safe footing to a liostilo force on an island 
 less than six days' sail from Ireland.' 
 
 "1 
 
MILITARY KXPRXDITURE ON TIIR COLONIES. 
 
 .');") 
 
 ir of a 
 nsider. 
 )lonies, 
 led, be 
 [^easinu: 
 stimate 
 
 depen- 
 
 tits. liow- 
 ulcil. mid, 
 iiosv luiifi 
 rairion of 
 pire ? If 
 
 defend, 
 iieutriil ? 
 
 irt I if our 
 a shock to 
 :o iiK'rertJjo 
 
 1 of active 
 sliilie. and 
 ry 'in her 
 
 i> within 
 
 le with- 
 
 ■8 a satV 
 
 ■;iv cuuld 
 
 jcess war- 
 
 nt'iit is to 
 the alli- 
 illion of 
 .•an pro- 
 ui'cos and 
 'bours to 
 iicccss of 
 le which 
 Columbia 
 ;it' regard 
 -a descent 
 ncoi'.ver's 
 of every 
 condition 
 an island 
 
 dencics for tlic vear ciidlni; March I808, was .S.oOO,!)!)'*/. 
 Tlie cx})eiuliture on the Nortli Ainerieau Colonies was 
 473,000/. ; on tlie West Indies, ;}84,()0O/. ; on the 
 Australian Coh)nics, 340,000/. At tlie Cape we had an 
 army of 10,759 regular troojjs, and tlie military expendi- 
 ture alone was 830,687/.' ' 
 
 As these statistics are now somewhat old, it may be 
 well to turn to some of a more recent date- \\'e find it 
 stated in the Year Bixfki'oY 1871, j)]). 278-9, that aceonl- 
 inacto a parliamentary return issued in the session of ls70, 
 the cost of the colonial ))()Ssessions of the Kmpire falliiio- 
 to the charge of the British Exchequer was 4,100,000/. 
 in the financial year 18f)()-7, and 3,969,426/. in 1S67-8. 
 Full deiails are o-lvcii of the cost in each colony or 
 station, but with these we shall not trouble our readers. 
 Following the classification which avo have ado[)ted when 
 examining the amount of the colonial trade, we deduct 
 the items for Gibraltar, Malta, Hong Kong, Ceylon, 
 Labuaii, and the Straits Settlements, amounting collec- 
 tively to 1,012,914/. in 1866-7, and 1,106,306/. in l,s67-8, 
 leaving the cost of colonial garrisons in the former vear 
 3.090,090/., and in the latter 2.863,120/. It is certain 
 that since then still further reductions haye been made ; 
 but we shall not take tlie expenditure under the Glad- 
 stone Administration as a fair test of the cost of the 
 Colonies, as we i)elieve the measures adopted by it to be 
 inconsistent either with the security of the Colonies or 
 the integrity of the Empire. AVe are, therefore, content 
 to admit that the defence of the Colonies must ctnistitute 
 a charge of from 2,500,000/. to 3,000,000/. on the Im- 
 perial Exchequer. 
 
 There is no doubt that if England were to abandon 
 the Colonies, withdraAV their garrisons to the United 
 Kingdom and there disband them, she would save the cost 
 
 ' 7'^e Empire, p. 7o. 
 D 2 
 
00 
 
 A COLOXIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX. 
 
 i 
 
 kl 
 
 of their maintenance. But as many i)eople are led to 
 believe, by the confusion of emancipationist arnuments 
 on this subject, that by the adoption of that })olicy 
 England would gain both a saving of expense and an 
 increase of her available force, wc think it right to 
 indicate the fallacy of that idea. Were the Empire dis- 
 solved and the troops re([uired to garrison the Colonies 
 concentrated in England, they would certainly be more 
 easily moved to any point in Europe, and more available 
 for her own defence than if scattered over the Colonies, 
 but they Avould still have to be kept embodied and i)aid. 
 To save the expense, it would be necessarv to disband them : 
 and were this done, England's available force would not 
 be one whit greater, but decidedly less, than with these 
 troops in the Colonies. Either the advantage of a decrease 
 of expenditure, or a concentration of troops, nn'ght be 
 gained, but not both of them. Against this, however, is 
 to be placed the loss of certain benefits derived from the 
 Colonies of which people seem to be strangely forgetful, 
 and which we shall stiive to indicate further on. 
 
 Mr. Smith's case against the Colonies is sunnnarised in 
 the extract which we quoted as a fair sam})le of the 
 emanci})ationist s])irit, and which we reproduce here for 
 the pur})ose of analysing it : — 
 
 ' In ancient times empire was empire. The Roman 
 extorted from his dependencies both military force and 
 revenue. Sj)ain extorted revenue. We are too moral 
 to extort either force or revenue from our dependencies, 
 even if we had the poAver. While we monopolised their 
 trade in a general reign of monopoly, they brought us a 
 real advantage, though of a narrow and selfish kind. 
 Now they bring us no advantage at all. But the system 
 has been established ; many prejudices and some interests 
 are bound up with it, and reasons must be found or 
 invented for maintaining it. The reasons found or in- 
 
AX ANALYSIS. 
 
 37 
 
 vcntctl fii'G, as might be expectetl, various and discordant 
 enough. Now it is the amount of tlie colonial trade ; 
 now it is tiic ])reterence of our people for the Colonies as 
 l)laces of emigration. AVhen facts overturn all these 
 arguments, it is glory, national spirit, yrvatUje. I give an 
 agent an immense sum of money to invest for me. lie 
 tells me he has bought me an estate. I ask to see the estate: 
 he tells me that the money is laid out not in an estate 
 but in houses. 1 ask to see the houses : he tells me that 
 it is not laid out in houses but in railway shares. I ask 
 for my scrii) : he tells me that it is not laid out in railway 
 shares but invested in the funds. I ask for the transfer- 
 receii)t, and he tells me that it is not invested in the funds 
 but in something much better and nobler, in prestiijc. I 
 look in the French dictionary for prestUje, and find that 
 it is an illusion, a juggling trick, an imposture.' ' 
 
 A vigorous and well-written outburst, we must say, 
 ])ut a very poor argument is the above. * AVe are too 
 moral to exact either force or revenue from our depen- 
 dencies,' though the burden of Mr. Smith's argument is 
 the injiistu-c Avhich the Colonies inflict on England bv 
 drawing on her force and revenue for their defence, in- 
 stead of furnishing the requisite armaments from their 
 own resources. His ideas of morality and justice would, 
 tlierefore, seem to be that thev conflict Avith one another — 
 in this case, at least. Besides, his memory must be 
 rather bad if he fancies that England is so ' moral ' as to 
 believe herself bound to present her dependencies w'ith 
 forces and refuse to take anything from them. Canada 
 has furnished troops when attacked ; offered to furnish 
 them during the Kussian Avar, and raised a reiiiiuent of 
 the line Avhilst the Indian rebellion Avas in })rogress. 
 India furnishes double pay for British troops Avithin her 
 limits, and her native troops have been employed on 
 
 » The Emjnre, pp. 93, 94. 
 
r 
 
 ;■ 
 
 i 
 
 i i 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUKSTIOX. 
 
 exterior expeditions more than once. Tlicse facts dispose 
 of tiie ' too moral ' theory, ^vhIch is in direct opposition to 
 all the rest of Mr. Smith's ideas ; but one who writes so 
 hotly can scarcely be expected to perceive the contradic- 
 tion. •• While we monoj)olised their trade in a general 
 reiii'n of monopoly, they brouoht us a real advantage, 
 thouiih of a narrow and selfish kind.' This is the most 
 astounding sentence in the book. We are much sur- 
 ]»rised that jNIr. Smith has not been denounced by his 
 ])olitical friends for the ])ro])osition. It is almost enough 
 to make Adam Smith, Peel, and Cobden stir uneasily in 
 their graves: an advantage gained by a Protectionist 
 j»olicy and lost by that of free trade I Seriously, it 
 would seem as if ]Mr. Smith did not know^ his own mind. 
 Anybody reading his letters would take him for a free 
 trader jxtr iwccl/oice ; and the ideas of free traders on 
 this subject were in direct contradiction to the theory 
 broached by him. They held that, under that monopo- 
 li>ing process which jNIr. Smith declares to have been ' a 
 real advantage,' Canada cost Kno-land some millions 
 annually, through differential duties on her timber and 
 wheat ; the AVest Indies some more throuii'h those on 
 su^ar ; and Australia vet others throujTh those on wool : 
 C(msequently, that the Colonies were, under this 'general 
 reign of monopoly,' a })0sitive loss to England in a com- 
 mercial point of view, but would become an advantage 
 under a free trade policy, as England would thus im- 
 ])ort from them less the differential duties, and export to 
 them as fully as before by being able to undersell any 
 competitor. This seems to have been the case, as articles 
 of colonial produce did decline in value in the English 
 markets, and English exports to the Colonies have nearly 
 (juadrupled in amount. If the colonial connection Avere 
 an advantage to England under the reign of monopoly, it 
 assuredly remains so under free trade, whatever may be 
 
A SUM^^ARV. 
 
 '30 
 
 the case with the Colonies. * Tlie reasons invented an- 
 various and disconlant enou<rh. Now it is the amount ol' 
 the colonial trade.' A very good argument, we should 
 sav, seeino- that the amount of that trade is twentv times 
 greater, j)ro})ortionately, than is the i'oreign trade. 
 ' Now it is the sceuritv of the colonial trade.' No small 
 heneKt at any time, but stronger than ever Avhen the 
 reign of universal j)eace promised by Progressionists still 
 seems to lie in the dim future. ' Now it is the preference 
 of our people for the Colonies as places of emigration.* If 
 the people do not prefer them they could easily be led to 
 do so by a slight departure from the ' let alone ' policy. 
 ' When facts overturn all these arguments, it is glory, 
 national spirit, ])rest/(/e. ... I look in the French dic- 
 tionary for prcstlffc, and find it is an illusion, a juggling 
 trick, an imposture.' But facts, as we have seen, do not 
 overturn these arguments ; and, as we shall see, there 
 are some others to offer. 
 
 Having thus followed Mr. Smith's arguments in favour 
 of enianci}>ation — for the points on which we have quoted 
 from him are really the only reasons which he (ttlers in 
 favour of that policy — we think we may sum uj* the 
 result of our inquiries by saying that the value of the 
 strictly colonial trade was, in 1861, 2(),()0(),0()0/. per 
 annum, or about one-fourth of the foreign trade ; that 
 between 1847 and 1861 the trade with the Colonies, 
 according to Mr. Smith's own showing, increased twice 
 as fast as that with foreii^n countries — thouo:h this rate 
 of increase does not seem to have been maintained since 
 that date ; that the comparative value of the colonial, as 
 compared with the foreign, trade was as 20 to 1 in 1861, 
 and about 15 to 1 in 1869 and 1870 ; that there is strong 
 reason to believe that the maintenance of the political 
 connection is essential to the continuance of this difference, 
 and that the Colonies, if ' emancipated,' would import 
 
 
 . 
 
 I 
 
T 
 
 40 
 
 A rOLOMST ON THE tOlOXIAL QUKSTIOX. 
 
 
 oiilv at the fanio rate as foreiijn countries, in wlnrli case 
 Kniiland Wduld iinincdiately lose from 15,(M)0,(H)()/. to 
 2(),()()0,()()()/. j)C'r ammm ; that tlie possession of bases of 
 military operations in the CoKmies may sometimes serve 
 1() maintain peace, and almost tihvays to secure victory 
 ii» Avar, by makinijj Enghmd a more formidable foe than 
 hhe would be without them ; but that if England were 
 to adopt the emancipationist policy she could, by with- 
 drawing lier troops and disbanding them, save the cost of 
 the colonial garrisons; or, by still keeping them under 
 arms, strengthen \wr army in Euroj)e. Hence it ap])ear8 
 that the sole and only argument established in favour of 
 emanci])!itu)n is that one or other of these advantages 
 could be fjained from it. In forming a iudjjment on the 
 (luestion, however, against this single advantaiie must be 
 placed those disadvantages which we have endeavoured 
 to show that it would induce. Even on these i)oints 
 alone, judgment, we think, ought to go against emanci- 
 j)ation ; but as our readers may not agree with us, we 
 fihall s1k)w them some further evils which a disruption of 
 the Empire would bring on England. , 
 
 4 
 
 ! It 
 
 >Vl 
 
41 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 COUXTEIIVAILING COXSI DERATIONS. 
 
 It has been well observed by De Tocqiievillc that 
 ' Reason shows and experience proves that no connnercial 
 j)rosperity can be durable if it cannot be united, in ease 
 of need, to naval force.' Of no country w;i , or is, this 
 j)ro})Osition so true as of the United Kingdom. Naval 
 su[)remacy is the life of England. Let her fleets bo 
 conquered and she is ruined ; because, in that event, not 
 only would the trade on Avhich millions of her peo})lo 
 depend for subsistence be destroyed, but even the food 
 which they consume would be hindered from reaching 
 her shores. The maintenance of that supremacy shoidd, 
 therefore, be the supreme object of British statesmen 
 and the British people. All other objects should be 
 made subordinate to it, and anything tending to diminish 
 England's naval resources should be looked on with 
 intense suspicion, if the mere fact of its having such a 
 tendency should not alone suffice to lead to its rejection. 
 Colonial emancipation Avonld have such a tendency. 
 
 The emancipation of the Colonies would not lessen the 
 amount of naval force which England would require to 
 maintain. So lono; as her commerce extends to every 
 quarter of the globe, so long will she require to maintain 
 fleets in every quarter to protect it. But fleets, to be 
 efficient, must be kept in repair ; and to keep them in 
 repair it is necessary to possess harbours in which they 
 
 I u 
 
 l;1: 
 
Ij 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 ]. 
 
 M 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 may be refitted, and ])rocure supplies at pleasure. At 
 j)resciit British fleets enjoy this advantage most com- 
 pletely. There is not an ocean in the world Avithout a 
 British port on its shores. In these ports are, or may he, 
 tiie means of keei)ing the fleets efficient, and of securing 
 thein shelter if pursued by the foe. But let colonial 
 emancipation be adoi)ted and how different would be the 
 situation ! Fleets thousands of miles from England with- 
 out a spot where they could refit, or keep u|) that supi)ly 
 of coal which has now become as much a naval requisite 
 as guns and powder. How would a British fleet stand 
 after a battle if it had no means of refitting nearer than in 
 England? Is it not evident that defeat, under such cir- 
 cuinstances, woidd he ruinous, and victory useless, if the 
 enemy had a port to whicli they could retu'e, seeing that 
 in such a case they would be prepared to re-enter the 
 lists sooner than their ojjponents could be ready to meet 
 them? If it be said that certain ' stations ' could be re- 
 tained for iiiivnl [)urposes, the answer is that to fortify 
 and oarrison them would cost as much as the colonial 
 garrisons have done, whilst the objects in view would not 
 be attained nearly so completely as under the present 
 ref/i>nr. 
 
 The creation of a marine power is the work of a con- 
 siderable time, since to form a sailor recjuircs mjiny 
 years' apprenticeship and to commence early in lil'e. Thus 
 the naval strength of any nation is proportionate to the 
 amount of its shipping and sailors. Were the Colonies 
 separated from England, their shipping au'l seamen would 
 ii'o with them, and the force available to man the British 
 navy would, thereby, be very seriously reduced. 
 
 According to the St<itcst)i<uis Year Book for 1869, ]>. xx. 
 the total number of vessels, steam and sailing, belonging to 
 Great Britain and Ireland at the end of 186G was 28,971, 
 with a tonnage of 5,779,000 tons. In the same publica- 
 
 I 
 
COLOXFAL SHIPPING. 
 
 43 
 
 re. At 
 ?t coin- 
 thout a 
 
 nay ^'e, 
 ecurinir 
 colonial 
 I he the 
 id witli- 
 supi)ly 
 equisite 
 it stand 
 than in 
 ich cir- 
 ;s, if the 
 no; that 
 iter the 
 to meet 
 [ be re- 
 fortify 
 colonial 
 uld \V)t 
 )i'esent 
 
 a con- 
 man V 
 Thn's 
 
 to the 
 
 Colonies 
 woidd 
 
 Briti>h 
 
 ,]>. XX. 
 
 gintif to 
 28,971, 
 lublica- 
 
 tion, p. 308, it is stated that * at the close of 1806 the 
 Colonies and possessions of the United Kino-doni had 
 12,146 vessels of 1,458,000 tons re«(istered at their ports, 
 an increase on the previous year of above 1,700 vessels, 
 and above 160,000 tons.' According to these statistics 
 the colonial marine was, in 1860, equal to about one- 
 fourth that of Enurland, to -vvhich extent her naval re- 
 sources would be at once reduced by emanci})ation.' 
 To how mui'h the loss would amount in the future it is 
 difficult to say. Detailed calculations in reference to the 
 future are never very reliable. In the present instance 
 the various returns of the tonnao-e of the colonial marine 
 at different ])eriods, which have fallen under our notice, 
 contain so many discrepancies that we shall refrain from 
 (luotin": anv statistics in reference to its rate of increase. 
 lint throunhout all there shines forth the broad truth 
 that colonial is increasing so much more rapidly than 
 English shipi)ing that, should the same rate of growth l)e 
 maintained on both sides, it Avili have gone a good way 
 towards equalling that of England by the end of the cen- 
 tury. At present, however, we may be sure that eman- 
 cipation would reduce the marine resources of England 
 by one-fourth. Nor is it by any means certain that 
 the immediate diminution of English sailors or shii)ping 
 would stop here. It is, on the contrary, highly probable 
 that, in the event of emancii»ation, the colonial marine 
 would be enlarged, and that of England diminished, by 
 the transfer to the former of a j)ortion of the English 
 vessels engaged in the trade with the Colonies ; and 
 from the very large proportitni of English shipping em- 
 
 ' It is true that in tlnse returns the shipping of India, wliirh country 
 (i'H's nnt onie under emancipationist tlieories, is ineluded. The t(junai.i:e of 
 tliat eountrv and the Asiatic Colonics in 18(J0 amounted to 21.S,<)(M) tuns. 
 Ihit. allowinc: for suhseiiuent inereaso. \\v tliink there ean Ite uu doubt that, 
 jijw the loss would be us above stated. 
 
 ft 
 
 m 
 
 I 
 
44 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 j 
 
 ) 
 
 j 
 
 jjloyed In the colonial trade, such a loss might prove 
 very serious. The proportion of British shipping thus 
 employed at present we have not the means of ascer- 
 taining. But in 1861, the tonnage of British shipping 
 entered in the United Kingdom from foreign ports was 
 5,400,000 tons, and cleared to them 5,200,000, whilst to 
 the Colonies there were cleared 2,500,000 tons, and en- 
 tered from them 2,300,000 tons. Thus it appears that 
 in 1861 the colonial trade employed one-half as much 
 British shipping as did the foreign trade, although the 
 total amount of the former >vo,s only one-fourth tliat of 
 the latter. Is it unlikely that the emancipated Colonies 
 might desire to have some of the shi})})ing transferred to 
 themselves, or that they might enact navigation laws to 
 secure it ? And is it not almost certain that if they Avere 
 to enact such laws they would secure such a transfer ? 
 AVhat Eno;lishman can req-ard a measure Avhich would 
 ensure an immediate, and render probable a future, 
 weakening of the maritime strength of his country with 
 complacency, when he remembers that England now 
 imports from one-third to one-half of the breadstuifs con- 
 sumed by her people ? The fact that she requires to do 
 so is alone sufficient to prove that maritime supremacy is 
 to her a matter of life and death, for if the importation of 
 this food could be prevented her people must starve ; there 
 is no other alternative. It is impossible to blink tlie fact 
 that war without command of the seas brina;s starvation to 
 England, as she is dependent on foreign countries for a 
 large part of her supply of food, and the loss of maritime 
 supremacy would render her unable to get it. No need 
 have England's enemies to invade her shores, or land a 
 single battalion on her coasts, to conquer her. If they 
 can only blockade her ports their work is done, and Eng- 
 land lies prostrate at their feet. She must yield to their 
 demands or see her people without the means of support- 
 
 i 
 
MARITIME WAR AXD ENGLISH COMMERCE. 
 
 45 
 
 it prove 
 ns thus 
 f ascer- 
 shipping 
 )rts was 
 vhilst to 
 and en- 
 iars that 
 as much 
 lUffh the 
 1 tliat of 
 Colonies 
 fcrred to 
 \ laws to 
 bey Avere 
 transfer ? 
 ;h would 
 I future, 
 try with 
 Old now 
 ufts con- 
 es to do 
 emacy is 
 tation of 
 ve ; there 
 the fact 
 vation to 
 les for a 
 maritime 
 Xo need 
 »r land a 
 If they 
 and Eng- 
 \ to their 
 support- 
 
 ing life. An uneasy consciousness of the possihility f)f 
 this catastrophe, and of the fact that a maritime war 
 would, in any case, so much disarrange the complicated 
 machinery by which British commerce is keptinmotiim as 
 to leave millions of En<ilishmen starvinfj, is the real cause 
 of that nervous fear of war which seems to rule botli 
 Biitish peo])le and statesmen with absolute sway, and 
 which has reduced her influence in the councils of Euroj)e 
 to that of a second-rate Power — if, indeed, it now stands 
 so high. To have the ocean covered Avith hostile cruisers 
 c(»uld not fail seriously to deranije her commerce. This 
 event is always a heavy disaster to any nation ; but to 
 England, at the present time, it might be a death-blow, 
 shice the whole framework of her society has become 
 interwoven with foreign commerce. In other countries 
 commerce is, generally, the exchange of the surj^lus })ro- 
 duce of their own soil, I'aw or manufactured, for that of 
 other nations. It thus ])artakes princi[)ally of the cha- 
 racter of a purchase of luxuries, leaving the nation 
 possessed within itself of all the necessaries of life. But 
 with Enolii^h commerce this is not the case. Enfjland 
 exports little of her own produce in a raw state, but a 
 great deal of manufactured goods. And she exchanges 
 her ex})orts not only for products peculiar to other 
 countries, but also for the food with which many of her 
 j)eo])]e are fed, and for the raw material which, after 
 manufacturing, she exports. An intcrrui)tion of her 
 commerce would, consequently, leave her not only with- 
 out the luxuries which she imports, but, by hindering the 
 ini})ortation of raw material for manufacturing ])urposes, 
 one portion of the connnunity without the means of earning 
 a living ; and, by sto])i)ing the imjwrtation of breadstuff's, 
 another portion without food at any price. These 
 calamities would, in themselves, be pretty severe ; but 
 when to them we add the influence which the distress of 
 
 111 
 
40 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 . I.' 
 
 tf 
 
 , 
 
 the suffering poo])le would exercise on others tlcpendent 
 on tlieir expenditure for support ; the influence wliich the 
 distress of all might exercise on public credit, and the 
 manner in which almost the entire realised wealth of 
 I'^ngland is dependent on public credit, the i)rospect 
 becomes perfectly a])])alling. England may strive to 
 l)lind herself to the fact that it is a dread of these 
 calamities, and a conse([uent national bankru})tcy, which 
 leads her to desire peace so ardently, and to view any 
 ])ros})cct of war Avith a degree of nervous apprehension 
 that is well understood bv foreigners : but that such is 
 the case is none the less true. But the more dangerous 
 to Euijlaiid is war, the o-reater n^ed is there that she 
 should be prepared for it. To be j)re])ared it is necessary 
 to be jtossessed of warlike resources. Emancipation would 
 instantly lessen by one-fourth, and ultimately by a great 
 deal more, her resources for maintaining that maritime 
 su})rcmacy the loss of which would ])robably involve her 
 in absolute ruin, since without it she could, in time of 
 war, neither carrv on her trade witli foreign nations, 
 im})ort lor her people the necessaries of life, nor keep 
 hostile battalions away from her shores, and a failure to 
 clfect these things woidd exi)Ose her to the risk of a 
 deranL''ement of the framework of societv in Enjrland. 
 
 This consideration alone should, wo think, suffice to 
 prove the im[)olicy of a disruption of the Empire. But 
 besides the fact that emancipation would weaken Eng- 
 land's resources for wao-inij a maritime war, there is a 
 very strong ])robability that it might tend to involve her 
 in war with her resources thus weakened. The Colonics 
 are now held up as being a fruitful source of dij)lomatic 
 difficulties. They may be so, but what security is there 
 that new difficulties of a like character miiiht not follow 
 on cmancipaticm ? The emancipationist seems to consider 
 the Colonies as each affording a ready casus belli to any 
 
IXSP:CURITY of COLOXLaL ixdepexdente. 
 
 47 
 
 icndent 
 ich the 
 ,iul the 
 laltli of 
 ro.s[)ect 
 rive to 
 f thes^e 
 , which 
 3w any 
 hcusion 
 sucli is 
 meroiis 
 liat she 
 jcessary 
 11 would 
 a o;reat 
 laritime 
 Ive her 
 time of 
 nations, 
 )r keep 
 
 ure to 
 of a, 
 ncl. 
 
 fice to 
 But 
 Enir - 
 
 I. 
 
 •e is a 
 Ive her 
 olonies 
 h)niatie 
 there 
 
 follow 
 onsider 
 
 to any 
 
 11 
 
 s 
 
 Power which may desire it, and as forming so many 
 points of weakness in war. We have endeavoured to 
 prove that, even in the case of the Colony most o})on 
 to these charo-es, there is somethinsi; to be said on the 
 other side of the fjuestion ; whilst we do not think that 
 a single difficulty has arisen concerning any other of the 
 Colonies during t1»e present century. But granting us 
 to be wrong and emanci[)ationists right, would emanci- 
 ])ation mend the matter? Supposing it to be accom- 
 jilished, and the Colonies independent states, what 
 security has England that they would remain so, and 
 Ljive her no further trouble ? Mr. Smith contends that 
 the colonial empire is useless to England, but he does 
 not say that under no circumstances can a colonial 
 empire prove advantageous to its possessor. On the 
 contrary, he tells us that ' in ancient times empire was 
 empire. Rome exacted force and revenue from her 
 colonies ; Spain exacted revenue.' All ([uite true, but 
 not the whi)le truth, for even more than these has tiie 
 rulini)' ])0wer generally exacted from its colonies. Their 
 governments furnished i)laces for its statesmen, their mines 
 and revenues filled its coffers, their inhabitants frequently 
 fought its battles, and their connnerce Avas always 
 arranged in subordination to its interests. Has it never 
 occurred to men of the emancipationist stamp that it' 
 Eno'liind were to abandon her Colonies thev miiiht fall 
 under such a rule as this? We sus])ect that it has not, 
 and that at first they Avould hoot the idea, savinjji: that 
 such thin<z;s mio'ht have been dreaded in other times but 
 not in ours, that men are too enlightened to act in such a 
 manner now-a-duys, and that ' the age of con([uests is 
 past.' But, unfortunately, the stubborn logic of facts 
 l)roves that these theories are incorrect. The man who 
 first declared the age of conquests to have de}>arted, 
 himself renewed them, and has not wanted followers, as 
 
 4 
 
 lis 
 
 'it 
 
 I 
 
■"BBBBsaaiBs: 
 
 S33 
 
 48 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 If 
 
 ! : > 
 
 i 1 
 
 he has found to his cosit. His attempt on Mexico was 
 very much such a case as we have supposed, and its failure 
 can be ascribed only to the fact that the States, after bav- 
 in;;' conquered the Southern Confederacy, stood, flushed 
 with victory, and with a mighty army and navy, ready to 
 enforce the * Monroe doctrine.' How would Enjrland 
 like to see her ancient Colonies falling under the sway of 
 jiolitlcal or commercial rivals, and being ruled for their 
 selfish purposes ? Is it not evident that such an event 
 would not only crip[)le English commerce most seriously, 
 l)ut also increase the naval power of her rivals to such 
 an extent as might enable them to destroy it, and with 
 it almost the existence of England ? And what security 
 is tliere that if the Colonies were emancipated this result 
 would not ensue? Can we sup[)ose that French ambition 
 has been destroyed by the campaign of 1870, or that 
 anxiety to escape from her present degradation will not 
 tend to increase it? Has not Spain given forth signs 
 that her peo})lc are recovering their ancient energies ? 
 Are not the nations arising in Italy and Germany likely 
 to prove formidable naval powers ; and is not the latter, 
 in consequence of the great emigration from its shores, 
 likely to covet a colonial emi)ire ? Are not our Yankee 
 neighbours strong, energetic, and ambitious, and ready 
 to hold a ])eople in bondage if they believe it to be con- 
 ducive to their own interests ? And is it impossible that 
 even Australasian Colonies might turn to them for pro- 
 tection ? Is it }»ossible that any one of the Colonies 
 could, single-handed, resist successfully an attack from 
 such Powers? and are not Australian gold-fields, West 
 Indian soil and commerce, and Canadian territory, bono 
 and muscle likely to prove temi)ting objects of pursuit 
 to those who would use them for their own benefit ? 
 How would England like to see them turned against 
 herself, and what security has she that they would not 
 
THE ' SPIRIT OF THE AGE. 
 
 49 
 
 be so turned? If it be said that England would not 
 permit the conquest of any of the emancipated Colonies, 
 the answer is that * prevention is better than cure," and 
 that she is likely to find their defence easier whilst they 
 form a part of her empire than it would be when they 
 were independent states. 
 
 If it be rei)licd that the * spirit of the age ' affords 
 jH'otection against any attempt at conquest, Ave would 
 inquire, in the style of Frederick the Great, 'How many 
 battalions can he bring into the field ? ' and what state 
 will treat a violation of the spirit of this doubtful cha- 
 racter as a casus hdll ? Tried by this test we fear that the 
 protection derivable from the * spirit of the age ' vanishes 
 into thin air. But it may be said that, although tho 
 ' spirit of the age ' cannot array battalions, it can prevent 
 their being arrayed, and that this is the security which 
 it offers. A very good security it would be if one could 
 only be sure that it Avere in existence and Avould so con- 
 tinue. But what is the ' spirit of the age ' on this point ? 
 AVe very much fear that it is the spirit of war and conquest, 
 especially against Aveak PoAvers. Ever since 1848, Avhen 
 Euroj)e had recovered from the lethargy caused by the 
 Xp.poleonic Avars, avc have had Avars in plenty, and QxoAy 
 one of them has been induced by the most unblushing 
 aggression. Witness Kussia against Turkey, France 
 agahist Austria, the series of intrigues by Avhich Cavour 
 annexed Naples and the Legations to Sardinia, Germany 
 against Denmark, Prussia and Italy against Austria, 
 France against Prussia, and the terrible re])risal. If this 
 be not enough, Ave point to America, Avhere one-half of 
 ISIexico has been annexed by tlic States, and the re- 
 mainder of it Avas conquered by France : and to the Avar 
 Avagcd against the Southern Confederacv in defiance of 
 the principle declared l)y the States to be a self-evident 
 truth — that the sole right of government is derived from 
 
 
 I 
 
 
11 
 
 jl 
 
 'I f' 
 
 50 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 the consent of the governetl. jNIoreover, in all these 
 cases, neutrals have manifested a decided disinclination 
 to interfere unless their own interests were directly 
 involved, as England well remembers in the case of 
 Denmark, thou2:h she could go to Avar with China for a 
 boat worth 80/. We, therefore, hold that the ' spirit of 
 the age ' is more likelv to induce atiffression on the 
 emancipated Colonies than to afford any guarantee 
 against it. Is England pre])ared to face the risk ? Is 
 she determined, in the event of an attack on any of her 
 offspring, to refrain from extending her arm in their 
 defence? If not, let her hold on to the Colonies, as she 
 can assuredly aid them much more easily and effectually 
 when united to them than when separated from them. 
 
 The question of the dej)endence of the prosperity of 
 the colonial trade on the continuance of the political 
 connection has been already considered. If we have 
 succeeded in establishina; the correctness of our view of 
 the case, it of course forms a most important argument 
 against emancipation. But behind this there lies another 
 question, which is, how far it is safe for England to rely 
 on being able to retain that commercial su])remacy in 
 virtue of which she is able to permit the unrestricted im- 
 })ortation of foreign manufactured goods ; and whether, if 
 she should need to return to her old colonial policy, it 
 would not be well for her to have Colonies to which it 
 could be applied. That such a contingency is possible is 
 beyond doubt. For, without entering on the question of 
 the l)alance of trade, it is undeniable that to import goods 
 without being able to pay for them by exports is im- 
 jiossible, and a nation can find a sale for Its exports only 
 so long as it can furnish them as cheaply as others in 
 the same market. England now exports manufactured 
 goods chea])er than other nations ; but is she sure of being 
 able to continue to do so ? and if her ability to do so 
 
FREE TRADE XOT AUYAYS PRACTICABLE. 
 
 51 
 
 I these 
 1 illation 
 lirectly 
 case of 
 a for a 
 spirit of 
 on the 
 arante(! 
 sk ? Is 
 ' of her 
 n their 
 , as she 
 actually 
 leni. 
 
 erity of 
 
 [)olitical 
 
 e have 
 
 view of 
 
 o'liment 
 
 another 
 
 to rely 
 
 lacy in 
 
 ted im- 
 
 ther, if 
 
 licy, it 
 
 hich it 
 
 slble is 
 
 tion of 
 
 t jxoods 
 
 is iin- 
 
 ts only 
 
 lers in 
 
 ictnred 
 
 f beino; 
 
 do so 
 
 should fail, could she continue to ])ractisc a free triidc 
 l)olicv? We think not. In vounu; countries like tiie 
 Colonies, having boundless unoccupied lands on which 
 their peo])le can readily find homes, and Avhcre there is 
 plenty of work for all, free trade is always j)racticaljle, 
 because, having witliin themselves all the necessaries of 
 life, they can, at a })inch, dispense with imported luxuries ; 
 but in thickly peopled countries like Enghmd, free trade, 
 or unrestricted importation, is j)ossIble under peculinr cir- 
 cumstances only. England now imports breadstutls and 
 raw material for manufacturing purposes, and piys tin- 
 tliem by exporting manufactured goods. This i,>, done on 
 the princi})le that to ' buy in the chea})est market and sell 
 in the dearest ' is the true way to wealth for nations no less 
 than for individuals. But supposiiuj that for cii/n markets 
 .yltonld become the clicapest fur manvfctcturcd (joods as iccli 
 as for hreadsti/Jfs, horv ico/dd the case then stand? Sup- 
 ])osing that Belgium could supply hardware, France 
 cotton goods, and Germany woollen goods che:ij)cr than 
 they could be manufactured in England, would it suit her 
 then to abandon the manufacture of these o-oods and follow 
 the policy of 'buying in the cheapest market and s/llinn- 
 in the dearest' hi/ import/nc/ mannfactul^d r/nods as ire// 
 c/.s- hreadstt/ffs? Whatever reply some enthusiastic free- 
 trader may make, it is certain that this could nut be 
 done. The acjricultural communitv miirht, indeed, nrefi r 
 to buy cheap foreign, rather than dear English, good?-. 
 and be willing to export their produce in payment, but 
 tliey certainly could not be allowed to do so. All the 
 grain which they raise, and a great deal more, is con- 
 sumed in J'^.ngland, consequently if any of it were tc- Ijc 
 exported in the absence of foreign receipts, a lai'uc oart 
 of the consumers would be involved in starvation, and 
 the manufacturing population thrown out of employment, 
 
 £ 2 
 
 ir- 
 
 ■i1 
 til 
 
 ii 
 
 If 
 
 II 
 
■^ 
 
 « 
 
 '■' 
 
 52 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 •! •'; n 
 
 from the loss of both foreio;n and home markets. There- 
 fore, in the event of foreign markets becoming cheaper 
 tlian those of England for manufactured goods, England 
 would be forced to abandon free trade and close her 
 ports against foreign manufactures, or else see her j)eople 
 not only without the means of purchasing food but also 
 without food to purchase. But even a less imj)rove- 
 ment in the arts of manufacturing on the part of 
 foreigners than that requisite to enable them to undersell 
 Enolish manufactures at home would suffice to destroy 
 free trade in England. Let them improve only so much 
 as to be able to dispense with English imports, and free 
 trade is ruined. For although they might be willing to 
 export to England the goods which she now imports from 
 them, and she willing to receive their exports, she would be 
 unable to do so, because to buy anything Ave must be 
 able to pay for it ; and if foreigners could buy clieaper at 
 home th )se goods which they now import from England, 
 they would not buy from her ; and England, having lost 
 the means of paying for the goods which she now imports 
 from foreigners, would be unable to obtain thorn. In 
 either of these cases the only manner in which England 
 could procure a suj)ply of those goods Avhich are essential 
 to her existence — breadstuffs and raw material for manu- 
 iacturing pur})oses — would be by entering into treaties 
 with other countries, granting them an advantatje in her 
 markets on condition of receiving a like advantage in 
 their own. This she might do with the Colonies and 
 with them only, since it is only young countries that can 
 import their manufactured goods and yet find emi)loy- 
 ment for all their people, and because their extent and 
 the variety of their produce would enable them to 
 supply the diversified goods which she Avould require. 
 This possibility of England being obliged to abandon free 
 trade and return to her old commercial policy constitutes, 
 
EXGLAND's commercial supremacy IX DANGER. 53 
 
 >'land, 
 
 we believe, a valid and practical argument in favour of 
 the retention of the Colonies. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be replied that the argument would 
 be valid and practical if there were any prospect of such 
 a contingency arising ; but as there is none, it is worth- 
 less. We shall not enter into a controversy on the 
 greater or less probability of the contingency, but we 
 may remark that, as British commerce has not extended 
 itself since 1866 at the rate at which it was formerly 
 growing, and as the manufacturing interest has, in some 
 casesj begun to call for protection against foreign com- 
 petition, there seem to be reasonable grounds for fear- 
 ing that English commercial supremacy may already be 
 in danger. Besides this, there is no doubt that the 
 natural course of events for a nation which has begun 
 manufacturing is to go on copying from its rivals until 
 it overtakes them, and manufacturers all over the civilised 
 world have been copying those of England for at least a 
 quarter of a century, so the contingency is not impossible, 
 it may be, not improbable. Along with this it should be 
 remembered that in almost every civilised age some one 
 nation has enjoyed a commercial supremacy, and that it 
 has always })roved to be a fleeting possession. It is well, 
 therefore, for England to kee[) the possibility of its 
 fleeting from her in view, and to retain in her hands the 
 means of securing a trade which would always leave her 
 a great commercial Power ; more especially as we know 
 not yet whether the signs of the times do not indicate 
 that it has begun to slip from her, and are still ignorant 
 of the changes which the gold discoveries, by the influence 
 Avhich they are exerting on prices, may work in the com- 
 merce of the world. 
 
 It should be remembered that the arguments In refer- 
 ence to the dependence of the prosperity of the colonial 
 trade ou the continuance of the political connection are 
 
 
 ill 
 
54 
 
 I ill 
 
 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 !l 
 
 ■ / 
 
 I 
 
 ','1 
 
 I! 
 
 ■; '^^ 
 
 h 
 
 altogothor unaffected by the correctness, or incorrectness, 
 of our views on this luttcr i)oint. Tiic two should never 
 l)ecome mixed in nnvbodv's thoun-lits. It nuiv he good 
 ])f)licy for England to retain her Colonies as a precaution 
 against the loss of her connnercial su})remacy, so that in 
 ease she might cease to be able to compete with the Avorld 
 for their cust(mi, or to meet the foreigner in his own 
 market, she would have at hand the means of revertin<j; 
 to her old system of colonial monopoly with differential 
 duties on colonial products ; and it may be good jjolicy 
 for England to retain her Colonies, though sure of re- 
 maining tlie first connnercial Power in the world, because 
 her trade with them as colonies might be more prosi)erous 
 than it would be if they were to become independent 
 states. Both points we believe to form important argu- 
 ments against the emancipationist policy; but neither 
 is, in any way, dependent on the other. 
 
 There is now a large and almost annually-increasing 
 amount of British capital invested in colonial securities, 
 the safety of Avhich might be seriously affected by eman- 
 cipation. The latest estimate, that of ]Mr. Dudley 
 Baxter, states the debts of British Americaat 20,920,000/., 
 and those of Australasia at 35,744,000/. If to these we 
 add the debts of the AVest Indies, South Africa, and 
 ^Mauritius, we shall have a total of about 60,000,000/., 
 nearly all of which is held by parties resident in tlie 
 United Kingdom. 'Nov does the amount invested • I 
 here. Colonial railways have been, and are being, 
 in nearly every instance by the monev of British - i-e- 
 holders, aided by grants from the local Governments ; and 
 there are, also, very many miscellaneous joint-stock 
 enterprises peculiar to the Colonies, in Avhich large sums 
 are locked up. We shall certainly not exaggerate by 
 estimating the amount of these latter securities at 
 40,000,000/., maldng a total of 100,000,000/. due by the 
 
EXGLISII INVKSTMKNTS IN THE CO|/).\IK,S. 55 
 
 Colonies to British investors. "We do not, for a moment, 
 moan even so mucli as to hint that the emancipated 
 Coh)nies mlglit think of a<loj)tin^' a ])olicy of ro])U(liation ; 
 hut we do mean to say that the safety of these invest- 
 ments would he much lessened by the establishment of 
 colonial independence. The value of any, and every, 
 stock security is dependent on the maintenance of order 
 within and safety Avithout on the part of the country froui 
 which it is held. It is by no means certain tluit these 
 conditions would l)e fulfilled by tiie new nations. War 
 abroad, and civil strife at home, are certainly amongst 
 the possible se(|uences of emancipation. Nations involved 
 in either ol' these pursuits do not pay much regard to the 
 claims of foreign creditors, for the simide reason that they 
 cannot. We may feel jn-etty sure that in the event of 
 any of the Colonies becoming thus involved, English 
 securities would quickly become worth little more than 
 the }>aper on which they were written. But even a less 
 amount of disorder than the above would suttice to en- 
 danger their safety. The Erie scandal has not yet been 
 lorgotten in England. It is the fruit of a social ami 
 govermnental organisation similar to that whicli, under 
 the most favourable circumstances, would be induced bv 
 emancii)ation. AV'ould England like to see similar re- 
 sults follow? If not, let her retain her hold on the 
 ( 'olonies. Whilst she does so, there is not much danger 
 of invasion from abroad, and there is none of disorder 
 within, ller influence supj)lies precisely the conservative 
 force which is needed to prevent young commiuiities 
 rushing headlong into a career of democratic innovation 
 which cannot fail to result disastrously ; and if any in- 
 justi< should be done to the investors, they have always 
 ojien an ap})cal to the House of Lords, which tribunal 
 they can safely rely on to rectify it. To adopt emau«- 
 cipatit a is to expose every penny now, or hereafter to be. 
 
 4 
 
 f 
 
 ; 1 
 I'.' 
 
 in 
 
irw 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 1 
 
 
 !' !;, 
 
 
 invested in the securities of the emancipated countries to 
 tlie chance of the rule of an unbridled democracy pro- 
 ducing a reign of external peace,, and internal order, jus- 
 tice, and purity. To retain them is to provide guarantees 
 against the threatened danger and the means of redress in 
 case of its occurrence. And whether we consider the 
 large amounts already involved, or the splendid field for 
 the employment of British capital and enterprise likely to 
 be afforded by the Colonies in the future, there can be no 
 question whatever as to the expediency of securing the 
 former, and keeping the latter open, by maintaining the 
 Integrity of the Empire. 
 
 Granting the preatu/e of glory which England derives 
 from her colonial empire to be a 'juggle," &c., the pre.stif/e 
 of infamy which the abandonment of it Avould entail on 
 her would be a stern reality. Britain cannot tell other 
 nations that she is afraid of them, and suppose that they 
 will continue to respect her Avill. To abandon outlying 
 provinces because it is feared that their possession may 
 induce complications with their neighbours is, in effect, 
 to proclaim this statement most distinctly ; and the 
 natural deduction from.it is that England Avill yield any- 
 thing if only pressed hard enough. Does it suit her that 
 such an impression should go abroad ? Can she doubt 
 that (f it does the pressure will be apjilied? Does she 
 not present any point f^v aggression ; and does the history 
 of oiu" time seem to say that the passion for national 
 aggrandisement, or even for warlike renown, is either 
 extinct or likelv to become so? If not, can it be anv- 
 tliino; short of absolute madness to tell the world that 
 she prefers abandoning half a contincrt to facing the 
 chances of meeting a nation in search of one or both of 
 these things ? However conducive peace may be to her 
 }irosperity, it will never do to act meanly in the pursuit of 
 its maintenance? War never was averted by running 
 
PRESTIGE IS NOT ' A JUGGLE.' 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 
 , 
 
 away from it. England may practise non-intervention 
 to the extreme point to which it can be pushed ; she may 
 abandon Coh)nies to p^et clear of bellicose neighbours ; she 
 may forsake her allies and leave them to be swallowed up 
 by their foes ; her statesmen may ' hoi)e that Ave shall 
 never be involved in a war with America or any other 
 nation ; ' but all this unmeasured craving after peace will 
 not save her from having to appeal to the sword some 
 time, and oftentimes, until we have a new dispensation, 
 seeing that war is one of the consequences of the Fall, 
 and will endure as long as any other of them. Therefore, 
 instead of adopting the whimpering notes of cosmopolitans 
 and emanci})ationists, let her rather brace her nerves to 
 their old vigour, if they have ever really relaxed, and 
 stand ready to meet difficulties and dangers witli the 
 same spirit which brought her through the most tre- 
 mendous contests of modern times victorious in arms and 
 unscathed in honour. The spirit which led to the de- 
 claration that ' unless mercy were shown to the people of 
 God, the English guns should be heard in the Castle of 
 St. Angelo,' and which enabled her unflinchingly to con- 
 front the might of Xapoleon the Great Avith all Europe 
 at his feet, Avill sit on her much more o-racefullv than that 
 Avhich moans for ' peace at any price, and cheap at that ; ' 
 and Avill, assuredly, do quite as much toAvards keeping the 
 Avorld quiet as an advertisement to the effect that England 
 ])refers abandoning an empire to risking a Avar. Let her 
 infuse into the Colonies the spirit of those Avhose deeds are 
 recorded in her history, and she need not to fear either 
 for them or for herself. Let her yield to the cravens Avho 
 tell her to forget her historic "-lories, and she invites the 
 Avorld to insult her, and may feel tolerably sure tliat it 
 Avill acce})t the invitation. Fresthje is not a juggle. It 
 is an influence Avhich enables its possessor to effect l)y a 
 Avord Avhat requires force Avithout it; and Avhich often 
 
 
58 
 
 A COLOXIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX, 
 
 I 4 
 
 ii I 
 
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 trebles the effective power of a given amount of force, as 
 has been well exemplified on the plains of Hindostan. 
 * It is the imagination which jjoverns the world,' said one 
 on -whom was showered ' the pomp and i)rodigality of 
 Heaven ' more abundantly than on any other man of our 
 era. This imagination is — or at least has been — swaved 
 by England; and, if she will rise to the grand destiny 
 o])ening before her, may continue to be her property. 
 Let her forsake her colonial dnpire from a principle of 
 fear, and she will cease to swpy it for ever, and come to 
 mourn her loss in tears of Ijlood I 
 
 To those of our readers who may be of o})inIon that "we 
 fail 3d to dis})rove the advantages promised from emancipa- 
 tion we offer these considerations of its disadvantages in 
 the shape of a weakening of England's naval supremacy 
 thi'ough the loss of sailors, shipping, and harbours ; the 
 di[)lomatic difficulties which might ensue from the creation 
 of a number of weak Powers offering a ready })rey to 
 aggressive nations or ambitious potentates ; the lament- 
 able position which England without her Colonies would 
 occui>y if compelled to abandon free trade ; the danger 
 to Avhich her investments might be exposed in young, 
 weak, and democratic communities confronted with the 
 world ; and, more important than all, the ill-fame which 
 would be gained by retreating in the face of a foe. We 
 :idniit that some saving of expenditure would be effected 
 l)y emancipation, but think that we have proved the 
 ])ecuniary loss in commerce likely to be much greater 
 than that of the saving in taxation ; and if to this we add 
 the above naval, military, economic, and moral considera- 
 tions, it seems to us that, even on the present terms of 
 union, England would find an enormous balance aoainst 
 oniancipation. We do not, however, believe that the 
 Empire can be maintained on that basis. The circum- 
 (jtances of Fatherland and Colonies alike render it im- 
 
A NEW COLONIAL POLICY INEVITABLE. 
 
 59 
 
 possible. They must draAv nearer to one another or 
 separate. Our reasons for holding this opinion Ave shall 
 exi)lain further on, and when so doing shall present the 
 question of emancipation in altogether a new light, 
 England — thanks to that glorious modern discovery in 
 jjolitical science, the 'let alone' policy — has allowed 
 matters to ' drift ' into a position which makes it im- 
 possible for her to derive from her Colonies one-tenth of 
 the advantages which she miglit have derived, or may 
 still derive, from them. We have admitted that some 
 advantage would be gained by jmrsuing an emancii)a- 
 tionist policy consistently. But we scruple not to say 
 that all the motives for emancii)ation may be destroyed, 
 all the present advantages of the connection main- 
 tained, and m.any new ones added to them, by the 
 adoption of a new and nobler colonial policy than any 
 yet pursued by our rulers ; that England may gain 
 soldiers for her army, sailors for her navy, money for 
 her revenue, and commerce for her merchants, from the 
 Colonies; and may find in their boundless extent happy 
 homes for those of her people who live at home in misery, 
 and whose existence is probably sapj)ing the foundations 
 of society, and, possibly, prepanng for it an awful down- 
 fall. Moreover, v»e say that these gains in revenue, 
 armaments, and commerce would grow witli the ijjrowth 
 of the Colonies ; and that, in consequence, the British 
 Em])ire would, ere twenty years, be the mightiest State 
 on the face of the earth, without whose permission not a 
 irun should be fired in anger in the world. And all this, 
 Ave add, can be done, not by degrading the Colonies, but 
 bv exaltinn; them. If Ave are rif.dit in tlnnkinLC that these 
 ends can be achieved, Avho then Avill advise emanci- 
 pation ? 
 
GO 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 if 
 
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 i II 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE SITUATION AND THE REMEDY. 
 
 When examining the emancipationist theories, we came 
 to the conclusion that it woukl be better for EngLand to 
 retain her Colonies, even under that which we must noAv call 
 the httc colonial policy, than to ' emancipate ' them ; but 
 added, that we did not attempt to shut our eyes to the 
 fact that matters could not long remain in their present 
 condition, and that to conserve the Empire some change 
 had become inevitable. Our reasons for entertaining this 
 opinion, and the changes which we think requisite to 
 place Fatherland and Colonies on fair terms towards each 
 other, as well as to render their connection permanently 
 beneficial to both parties, we shall now endeavour to 
 explain. 
 
 Foremost amongst our reasons for believing some change 
 in the relations of England and her Colonies to be inevit- 
 able is the fact that the coLM3Ction between the several 
 countries constituting the British Empire is much less 
 intimate than that by Avhich federal democracies are 
 united, and bids fair to be still further weakened. The 
 members of the Gladstone Administration seem fully to 
 share in the views of those who look on the weakening of 
 the colonial tie as a cause for congratulation. They 
 have reduced colonial garrisons to an extent altogether 
 
WITHDRAWAL OF COLOXfAL GARRISOXS. 
 
 6t 
 
 unexampled ; left not a British soldier in Ontario or 
 Quebec ; settled that even * the Gibraltar of North 
 America ' shall be left unfrarrisoned, and that the entire 
 English force in the Dominion shall consist of l,oOO men 
 at Halifax. They have, also, i)ursued the same policy 
 elsewhere, aud this so recklessly tliat New Zealand was 
 within a hair's breadth of beino; abandoned to Maori 
 savages. Should this course of action ^e definitely 
 adopted as the basis of England's colonial policy, a dis- 
 ruption of the Emj)ire can scarcely fail to ensue. Thi ? 
 has already been very clearly perceived in some of the 
 Colonies. The lioval Commission, consislinn- of Austra- 
 lian statesmen, appointed in 1870 to consider the ex- 
 pediency of forming these Colonies into a Confederation, 
 says in its report : — ' The British Colonies from which 
 British troops have been withdrawn present the unpre- 
 cedented phenomenon of responsibility without either 
 any corresponding authority or any corresponding pro- 
 tection. They are as liable to all the hazards of war as 
 the United Kingdom, but they can influence the com- 
 mencement or contimiance of war no more than they can 
 control the movements of the solar system, and they have 
 no certain assurance of that aid against an enemy at war 
 with the United Kingdom upon Avhich integral portions 
 oi' the Empire can confidently reckon. This is a relation 
 so wanting In mutuality that it cannot .e safely regarded 
 a^ })ermanent, and it becomes necessary to consider how 
 it may Ijecome so modified as to alford greater security 
 for permanence.' The connnlssloners evidently see the 
 goal toAvards which English })olicy is tending ; but, with 
 desperate loyalty to British nationality and institutions, 
 strive to blind themselves to the fact that separation must 
 follow unless a chan<2:e be made. That such is the case, 
 however, none who calmly survey the situation can doubt. 
 The above simple statement clearly proves that, in the 
 
 
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02 
 
 A COLOXIST OX TIIF. COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
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 instance cited, none of the bonds of national unity exist. 
 Under such circumstances it is absurd to suppose that the 
 name can long survive, or that the Colonies will continue 
 to wish it to survive ; and this because, as is above in- 
 dicated, it brings them all the responsibilities and none 
 of the benefits of union. The garrisonincr of the Colonics 
 Avas almost the last existing feature in England's colonial 
 jiolicy which gave her any influence in their councils oi* 
 over their [jcople. Should the troops be permanently 
 withdrawn, and the cost of providing armaments thrown 
 exclusively on the colonists, they will quickly insist on 
 raiding and using their own forces as they may prefer. 
 ' Nothing for nothing ! 'will be the i)opular cry at the polls. 
 If England will not keep one military system for the 
 whole Empire on ibot, it is very im})rol)ai3le that the 
 Colonies Avill care to leave tlie ccmtrol of their foreis;!! 
 relations in her hands, or to run the risk of being in- 
 volved in wars undertaken, it may be, solely from con- 
 siderations affecting the interests of the United Kinn-dom. 
 Still less likely is it that tl'.oy Avill allow her interests any 
 consideration in the adjustment of their commercial polic\'. 
 And should thev act in this manner, it is to be feared not 
 only that the emancipationist programme would quicklv 
 {)ecome po}>ular in England, but that the mutual recrimi- 
 nations which Avould ensue might lead to the separation 
 bf^ing effected on rather unfriendly terms. Indeed, to 
 .suppose that the jHilicy which avc arc criticising can have 
 been ado})tcd with any other design than that of serving 
 as an initiatory stop towards emanci[)ation seems absurd. 
 If the Colonics are to be defended, and are exp,ected to 
 aid in })rovi(ling the requisite armaments, it is evident 
 that means should be taken to have the colouial forces 
 oro'anised on a nermanent footino-, and a svstem leadinix 
 to united action between the Colonial and Imperial Go- 
 vernments arranged. To leave the Colonies ungarrisoned 
 is, unquestionably, to facilitate attacks on them ; hence 
 
PRESENT POLICY ALTOGETHER UXSATISFACTORY 
 
 
 to follow this ' let alone ' policy, whilst intending to brino; 
 the strength of the Empire to their aid, in case of war. is 
 simply to run all the risk of the danger deprecated bv 
 emancipationists, and at the same time to take the fcAvest 
 possible precautions against its occurrence. We will not 
 insult any men Avho have been Her Majesty's ministers 
 by even insinuating that they could ever have supposed 
 that such a policy could be other than tem])orary ; and, 
 therefore, assume that when they initiated it, they in- 
 tended it as a first step in emancipation. They have 
 since declared that they do not desire a disruption of the 
 Iv^ipire ; but to prevent it they must alter their coni^v?^ 
 Whatever else may last, the present colonial policy will 
 not : it must be retraced or a further advance made. It 
 reduces the benefits of union to the mininiuni and raises 
 its evils to the maximnm. Emancipation would bring 
 some benefits to both sides ; but, like all half-measures, 
 the Gladstone policy brings none to either. The United 
 King:dom may still be involved in war on a colonial 
 question ; and as the Colonies are left in a state calcu- 
 lated to encourage the aggressor, and increasinsxly free to 
 quarrel on their own account, the risk is not lessened, if 
 it be not increased; Avhilst they are still liable to be 
 plunged into war for an object of English policy, not only 
 without any voice in the matter, but, also, Avithout the 
 ])rotection of British red-coats. Thus one party loses all 
 the benefits of empire Avithout escaping any of its re- 
 sponsibilities ; and the other loses all the benefits Avhicli 
 may be derived from an alliance Avith a mighty Po^',{'r 
 Avithout gaining those of nationality. This Avill not do. 
 The experience of all nations unites to prove that perfect 
 identity of policy in military and diplomatic services is 
 essential to national unity. The tendency of English 
 l)olicy of late years has been to change unity into division. 
 The result, should this course be persisted in, cannot be a 
 matter of douljt. Nations separated by the ocean can 
 
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M 
 
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 * 
 
 m A COLONIST. OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 remain in -willing union only so long as they gain some 
 advantage from their unity. This none can gain under 
 a ])olicy which labours to make every detail of national 
 life a matter for the sole consideration of each country 
 separr'ely, and discourages any attempt to consider their 
 interests in common. Even ' the bond of affection ' be- 
 comes but a slight tie when people are pursuing different 
 ends in different countries ; especially as this exclusive 
 jtursuit of local ends not only tends to weaken existing 
 tics, but also to create new objects of affection, to which 
 those of other days, when they come in contact, will be 
 sacrificed. Disrujjtion cannot fail to ensue from the 
 j)resent colonial ])olicy ; and this for the simple reason 
 that it retains on both sides all ihe evils of union whilst 
 conferring none, or scarcely any of the benefits of eman- 
 cipation or nationality. 
 
 But irrespective of any question of colonial policy, the 
 circumstances of the Colonies are such as must shortly 
 render some change in their relations with the Fatherland 
 a matter of necessity to both. Theii' inhabited bounds 
 are extending so i-apidly that in a few years some of 
 them will be transformed into mighty nations. For 
 England to furnish, shigle-handed, the men and money 
 necessary for the defence of such territories would pro- 
 bably be an impossibility, even were she inclined to do 
 so. To guard a frontier stretching from the Atlantic to 
 the Pacific ; to watch over a fifth i)art of the world in 
 Australasia ; to garrison a large corner of the African 
 continent, and very many of the West Indian islands, 
 besides numerous outlying stations and India, would 
 be a heavy task. To fulfil it would probably tax her 
 martial resources pretty severely, even did she receive 
 tribute from the subject countries ; and to attempt it in 
 the absence of a direct reimbursement of expenses would 
 be a policy of at least doubtful expediency. But even 
 
EFFECTS OF COLOXIAL GROWTH. 
 
 0)5 
 
 were slie willing to remain in her former petition, it is 
 by no means probable that she would be able to do so. 
 As the Colonies advance towards maturity, they will feel 
 the same desire to wield the i)rerogatives of nationality 
 that youth does to exercise those of manhood. This 
 desire will be intensified by the fact that they have already 
 ac(iuired })erfcct local independence ; and that with their 
 growth diploraatic affairs will become of increasing im- 
 portance to their interests. The foreign relations (»f 
 small conmiunities, such as were most of the Colonies in 
 the first half of this century, are unimportant. They 
 have not suflScicnt comnnnii(!ation with foreiiiMiers to 
 render their interests much involved in diplomacy, ex- 
 cept Avhen their independence is directly threatened, in 
 which case they can only yield, or seek shelter under 
 the wings of a protecting PoAver. AVith their growth, all 
 this is altered. They are able to make some defence of 
 their independence, and are inclined to do so — at least, 
 we are })retty sure that such would be the inclination 
 of British hearts. Their interests become extended, and 
 liable to be affected by the action of their neighbours. 
 The conduct of their forelirn relations thus becomes 
 increasingly difficult, and as its importance Increases in 
 their eyes, they are less likely to consent to that aban- 
 donment of all concern in its adjustment which Is the 
 primary condition of the colonial relationship. That the 
 British dependencies will not long remain Coloides may 
 be confidently predicted, from the fact that the C(Hirse of 
 civilisation will shortly render the maintenance of that 
 relationship with the Fatherland impossible, hy swelling 
 the burden beyond her power to bear, and necessitating 
 an amount of submission bevond that which thev will l)e 
 inclined to render. Emancipationists have, it must be 
 admitted, the merit of perceiving this fiict, and of offering 
 a solution of the problem by means of the destruction t)f 
 
 r 
 
 I 
 
 
 :i| { 
 
C6 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 «! 
 
 f 
 
 iu 
 
 its subject. Such a solution is never very satisfactory, 
 and where the subject is the source of benefits, it is de- 
 cidedly the reverse. The connection has already yielded 
 much jfood to both Fatherland and Colonies, but nothing 
 like so much as it may be made to yield, if each will 
 only consent to accej)t the new relation to the other 
 which their altered circumstances require. Their posi- 
 tion calls for an application of the principles enunciated 
 by Lord ^lacaulay, in his remarks on the Irish woollen 
 manuftictures controversy. He tells us distinctly that 
 ' there cannot really be more than one supreme power in 
 a society. If, therefore, a time comes at which the 
 mother-country finds it expedient altof>;ether to abdicate 
 her paramount authority over a colony, one of two 
 courses ought to be taken. There ought to be complete 
 incorporation, if such incor])oration be possible. If not, 
 there ought to be comj)lete separation. Very few pro- 
 positions in ymlitics can be so perfectly demonstrated as 
 this, that parliamentary government cannot be carried on 
 by two really equal and independent parliaments in one 
 empire.' ^ The remedy which we desire to see adopted is 
 complete incor))oration — though not, perhaps, in the sense 
 understood by Lord Macaulay. If the Empire is to 
 remain united, the Colonies must consent to assume the 
 burdens and responsibilities of maturity, and the Father- 
 land to share with them its sovereign rights and privi- 
 leges. There can no longer be anv inenualitv between 
 them. Equal privileges and equal burdens must be the 
 basis of their future connection. England's only diffi- 
 culty with the Colonies lies in the fact that they act as a 
 charge on her revenue and armaments ; the Colonies' 
 <nily difficulty with England is the fact that she monopo- 
 lises all the prerogatives incidental to nationality, and 
 
 ' History of England, c\\a,T^. xxm. 
 
m 
 
 AX IMPERIAL FEDERATIOX. 
 
 1)1 
 
 the 
 diffi- 
 
 thiis loaves thoin in an inforior ])()sition, cxposofl to 
 (lanjiers wliich tliey may have liad no share in croiitiiiir, 
 and unable to brina; imperial resources to the defence of 
 their own peculiar interests. The ap])iication of tiie 
 FEOEitAL SYSTKM to tlic framework of tiie Imj)erial 
 Government would at once eliminate froui the relation- 
 ship all the evils deprecated, and embrace within it ail 
 the benefits sought, on either side. The establislnnent of 
 
 a FKDEIIATION OF THE EMPIRE on the basis o\' rijiiiilifif 
 of taxntion for Federal expcntUture would immediately, 
 or within a very short time, bring to tlie Knglish coflers 
 contributions sufficient to ])ay every charge to whicii the 
 Colonics now subject them ; and would, consequently, 
 enable the Imperial Government to organise a connected 
 military system for the whole Empire, which would un- 
 questionably leave every member of it a source of strength 
 to the rest — both ofAvhich advantages, it must be remem- 
 bered, would increase at a rate of compound interest. 
 It would place the Colonies in possession of all the 
 prerogatives of nationality, and thus enable tiiem to 
 bring tlie whole strength of the Empire to the dei'ence of 
 their interests against foreign Powers. It would open to 
 colonial talent a career of unexami)led splendour ; and, 
 bvliftino; the Colonies to an equalitv with Enn;land, leave 
 the mass of the colonial ])0])ulation nothing whatever to 
 gain by a severance of the connecticm witii the ^Nlother- 
 eountry. Tiiese benefits comprise all that the imperialist 
 seeks to gain from the maintenance of the Empire, or the 
 the emancipationist from its disruption. Hence Federa- 
 tion would confer on both Fatherland and Colonies all 
 the advantages of separation and connection simulta- 
 neouslv. 
 
 Here it is necessary to explain what it is we have in 
 view when we advocate the establishment of a Federation 
 of the Empire. The basis of any Federation is a perma- 
 
 f2 
 
 (.. ii 
 
 i 
 
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I 1 
 
 ! i 
 
 OS 
 
 A COLOXrST ON' TITR COLOXIAL QUESTION'. 
 
 K'i 
 
 n<?nt (tfTeiiKive and defensive Jilliuncc between several 
 countries, in wlncli all their military resources arc thrown 
 into a common stock for the ])uri)()se of preservinj^ j)eace 
 at home and of increasing their martial power abroad. 
 
 This union necessitates the creation of some rulinu,' 
 power, usually styled the Federal Government, which 
 shall enforce its terms over all the members of the 
 Federation. As the several countries are to be one 
 l)efore foreigners, the Federal Government must have 
 control of diplomacy. As their alliance is offensive and 
 defensive, it must possess the power of raising, equipping, 
 kee})ing on foot, and controlling military and naval 
 forces. As these require to be paid, it must possess a 
 revenue, to raise which it must enjoy, directly or in- 
 directly, the right of taxation. As taxation can scarcely 
 tail to interfere with commerce, and as a Federation is 
 one nation externally, the Federal Government nuist be 
 allowed to regulate trade. And so closely connected 
 with trade are the monetary system and the post-office, 
 that it has generally been found requisite to })lacc these 
 also under the control of the Federal Government. The 
 exact limit of its prerogative is, however, a matter of 
 detail. Any authority enjoying the power of making- 
 peace and war, with its accessories, for several countries 
 which possess Governments empowered to regulate their 
 internal affairs, is, in effect, a Federal Government. 
 
 If these principles arc correct, it follows that the ruling 
 powers of the United Kingdom already constitute, to 
 some extent, a Federal Government, and the countries 
 comprising the British Empire a Federation. Questions 
 of peace and war are decided by the Imperial Govern- 
 ment. The conduct of diplomacy is in its hands, the 
 only exception ever made being, we believe, the per- 
 mission accorded to Canada to decide for itself on the 
 reciprocity treaty. The army and navy are raised. 
 
 I 
 
 
 I 
 
now TO VOllM TIIH FHDKRATIOX. 
 
 09 
 
 ruled, ami paid solely l»y the same power. The dis- 
 cliarge of these functions comprises most of the duties of 
 a Federal CJovernment; and in them the Colonies have 
 IK) share. lUit they have, on the other hand, local 
 (lovernments which conduct ♦he administration of their 
 internal affairs, just as in a Federation is done hy the 
 State Govcriunents. Here we have almost the whole 
 framework of a Federal Government already in existence. 
 All that is needed to convert the Empire into a Fede- 
 ration is to place its several members on terms of equality. 
 To effect this, there are necessary only the following 
 measures :- — 
 
 I. That the Colonies should be left in possession of the 
 system of local self-government at ])resent enjoyed by 
 them. And that means should be taken to secure the 
 same privilege to the United Kingdom. 
 
 II. That the revenue required to meet the expenditure 
 of the Federal Government should be raised on a uniform 
 rate of taxation, though not necessarily on a uniform 
 system, over the whole of the Empire, and that the 
 inhal)itants of every part of it should be eciually liable to 
 militarv and naval service. 
 
 in. That a Federal Legislature, consisting of tAvo 
 chambers, should be formed, the Lower House to consist 
 of representatives returned on one uniform system by the 
 British Islands and' the Colonies, and that provision 
 should be made for colonial representation in the Upi)er 
 House also. 
 
 IV. That the Federal Legislature should succeed to 
 all the prerogatives now enjoyed by the Imperial Par- 
 liament, excei)ting only those granted to the body, or 
 bodies, ai)pointed to legislate for the local government of 
 the British Islands ; and should also enjoy the right of 
 taxation all over the Federation. 
 
 It will be granted, we presume, that were these 
 
 if Srt 
 
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TTT 
 
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 A COLOXIST ON THE COLOXIAL QUESTIOX. 
 
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 h 
 
 measures accomplished, a Federal union between Eii£jla?Kl 
 and her Colonies, on terms of equality, would he esta- 
 l)li.shed. Whether they arc capable of accom})lishment 
 has next to be considered. 
 
 At this point emancipationists meet us with the most 
 uncompromising resistance. Some refuse even to discuss 
 a scheme which they regard as an ahburdity. Against it 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill and Mr. Goldwin Smith have argued 
 with a force ])eculiarly their own. AVe reproduce their 
 arguments here in order that we may give our opponents 
 a fair hearing, and lay both sides of the case before our 
 readers. I\Ir. Smitli's language is as follows : — 
 
 ' Tiie scheme of giving the Cohmies rej)resentatives in 
 our Parliament may l)e said to have been generally 
 abandoned. Independently of the obstacles arising 
 from distance, from the difi'orence of the franchise in 
 the several c(.mntries, and from the hopeless difficulty of 
 settling the pro})ortion between the numl)ers of the 
 En(>;lish and the colonial members, there is a decisive 
 objection arising from the fact that the Colonies have now 
 Parliaments of their own. Such a piece of political 
 snachinevy as a set of Parliaments, one of vv'hich would be 
 at once national and federal, while all the rest were 
 national onlv, would scarcelv fin:', an advocate even 
 among the defenders of Imperial unity at all costs. 
 
 ' The other scheme is a vast federation. It is almost 
 enough to say that if there is a federation there iiiust be 
 a federa' Government, and that this federal Government 
 must be made, in the matters belonging to its jurisdiction, 
 supreme over all the national Govermnents, including the 
 British Crown. We need not discuss in detail the 
 ])ossibility or expediency of sununoning from the ends of 
 the earth peoj)le who could not be convoked in less than 
 six months to decide whether Eng-land slK»uld jjo to war 
 upou iMue question solely affecting herself, and not ad- 
 
MR. SMITH OX FEDERATIOX. 
 
 71 
 
 the 
 
 mittinjx, perhnps, of an hour's delay. The German Con- 
 federation has been cited as an example of the iederal 
 union proposed. In the German Confederation, the 
 Diet, in tlie matters Ijelonging to it, is supreme over all 
 national Governments, and the Germans on the Danube 
 are not three months' sail from the Germans on tlie 
 lihine. Do not these schemes of " Universal Em[)ire," 
 and a Universal State of which -vve and our anLijiodes are 
 to be citizens, spring from an exaggerated estimate of 
 the moral grandeur to be derived from enormous political 
 combinations. A political unity is not a moral unity, 
 nor will moral grandeur be gained by stretching it until 
 it bursts. If people want a grand moral unity, they 
 must seek it in the moral and intellectual syiheres. 
 Keligion knows no imjje'^iment of distance. The do- 
 minions of science are divided by no sea. To restore, 
 ^r to pave the way to restore, the unity of long-divided 
 Christendom may seem the most chimerical of all aspira- 
 tions ; yet, perhaps, it may be less chimei'ical than tlui 
 proj'.:ct of founding a world-wide State.'' The reckless- 
 ness of Mr. Smith's stvle is well disnlave"! throuiriiout 
 the above quotation; but never, probably, Avas it better 
 manifested than in his assertion that such a federal 
 Government as proposed ' must be made, in matters l)e- 
 longing to its jurisdiction, supreme over all the national 
 Governments, indndbuj tJir Brilisli Cniwn.' As the British 
 Crown is sr,])reme head of the iMnpircit is difficult to see 
 how its rights would lapse on the formation of a I'oderal 
 Legislatnre rejn-esenting different parts of its dominions, 
 or how its relationship to all wouh'. he. affected by a 
 change in the relationshij) of the several parts to each 
 other. Wq notice this ])oint here, l)ecause we shall not 
 liave an ojtportu.iity of doing so elsewhere. 
 
 Mr. Mill is rather more temperate in tone tliaii — but 
 
 ' The Empire, pp. 86. 86, 
 
 
 m 
 
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i.»;^,j,i.!. iAi..aw i»iw 
 
 A COLOXTST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX. 
 
 V i 
 
 '■: 
 
 Ills views are su1)stantitilly i>lcntical vith those of — Mr. 
 Smith, lie criticises the scheme of a federal union of the 
 Enijiire as foHows : — 
 
 ' With this view it has been proposed by some that 
 tlie Colonies should return representatives to the British 
 Parliament ; and by others that the powers of our own 
 as well as of their Parliaments should be confined to 
 internal j)olicy, and that there should be another repre- 
 s.iutative body for foreign and Imperial concerns, in 
 which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be 
 represented in the same manner and with the same com- 
 pleteness as Great Britain itself. 
 
 • On this system there would be a perfectly equal 
 federation between the Mother-country and her Colonies, 
 then no longer de})endencies. The leelings of equity, 
 iind conee])tion of public morality, from Avhich these sug- 
 gestions emanate, are worthy of all praise ; but the sug- 
 U'estions themselves are so inconsistent with rational 
 ])rinciples of government that it is doubtful if they have 
 been seriously accepted as a possibility by any reasonable 
 thinker. Countries separated by half the globe do not 
 present the natural conditions for being under one 
 (Toverimient, or even members of one federation. If 
 they had sufficiently the same interests, they have not, 
 and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking counsel 
 together. They are not i)art of the same public ; they 
 dc iiot discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but 
 apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what 
 jiasses in the n\inds of one another. They neither know 
 L-acli other's objects nor have confidence in each other's 
 }»rinei}»les of conduct. Let any Englishman ask himself 
 how lie should like his destinies to de})end on an assembly 
 of which one-third was British- American, and another 
 third Soutii- African and Australian. Yet to this it must 
 come if there wei-. anything like fair or equal re[)reseuta- 
 
 
 u< 
 
MR. MILL >\ FEDERATIOX. 
 
 i o 
 
 ional 
 
 have 
 
 able 
 
 not 
 
 one 
 
 If 
 
 not, 
 
 Unscl 
 
 they 
 
 but 
 
 'hat 
 
 
 tion ; and would not every one feel that the representatives 
 of Canada and Australia, even in matters of an Ini})eriul 
 character, eould not know or feel any sulhelent concern 
 for the interests, oi)inions, or wishes of Englisli, Irish, and 
 S<\H\h'' Even for strictly federative purposes, tlie con- 
 d'iti'ons do not exist which we have seen to be essential to 
 a federation. England is sufficient for her own i)rt)teetion 
 withont the Colonies ; and would be in a much stronger 
 as well as more dignified position if se})arated from them 
 than when reduced to be a single meml)orofan American, 
 All -tn, and Australian confederation. Over and above 
 the commerce which she might equally enjoy after sepa- 
 ration, England derives little advantage, except in prestuje, 
 from her dependencies ; and the little she does derive is 
 :nite outweighed by the expense they cost her, and the 
 dissemination they necessitate of her naval and military 
 force, which, in case of war or any real a})prehension of 
 it, requires to be double or trv°ble what wouhl be needed 
 for the defence of thir, country alone.' ' Tiie arguments 
 of these gentlemen are, in fact, based on the theories 
 that any attempt to form a Federation of the Em})ire 
 would be useless, as the Federal Government could 
 not discharge its functions if created ; that it AV(juld l>e 
 ho[)eless, as the difficulties in detail are insuj)eral)le ; and 
 that it would be inexpedient, as the practical influence of 
 the Empire would be pernicious. In other woi'ds they 
 tell us that the scheme is at once absurd, impracticable, 
 and impolitic. We are content to join issue with them 
 on each of these propositions. In so doing we shall not 
 confine ourselves merely to the arguments used in the 
 above quotations, but shall carefully consider every 
 difficulty that seems to us to be in the way. Wo, a»k of 
 our readers a })atient and iuipariial hearing. 
 
 -S ^\ 
 
 ' li- preventative Govern/i'- nt, p. 132. 
 
r 
 
 ■jajL.. iBMKLUlxi 
 
 i ■ 
 
 74 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 niYSICAL DIFFICULTIES. 
 
 \'n 
 
 ■! 
 ( 
 
 The first arnfument usually uro;ecl against any scheme 
 lor the establishment of an Imperial Federation is, that 
 the want of geo<Trai)hical unity in the Empire, and the 
 distances by which the several countries which it is pro- 
 pc^sed t( unite are divided from one another, increase the 
 difficulty of communication to such an extent that it 
 would be impossible for any central authority to discharge 
 the duties of even a Federal Govermnent for all of them. 
 The argument is one which must be met. Unless it can 
 be jn'oved that the legislative and executive duties usually 
 assigned to a Federal Government may be fulfilled for 
 the whole of the Empire by authorities located in London, 
 there is clearly no use whatever in considering either the 
 means 1)y which the necessary framework of government 
 might be created or any detail of the scheme effected. 
 JJef'ore adopting any piece of machinery it is necessary 
 to be sure that it will prove competent to accomplish the 
 Avork for which it is designed. 
 
 The argument against Federation on the ground of 
 ])hysical difficulties is asserted by emanr i[)ationists in 
 the most uncom])romising terms. Mr. jNIill tells us that 
 ' countries se])arated by half the globe do not present the 
 natural conditions for being under one Government, or 
 even members of one Fcdei-ation.' Our reply is that 
 experience contradicts this statement. In the cases of 
 
 » 
 
THE I^MPIRE ALREADY A FEDERATIOX. 
 
 < O 
 
 the Roman, Kussian, and Spanish Empires, countries 
 thus divided have remained under one Government lor 
 centuries; and, in the latter case, bad as was tlie old 
 Government, the substitutes do not seem to be any im- 
 provement on it. Still more decisively is this theory 
 confuted by the fact that the very countries now in ques- 
 tion have been, and are, under one Government ; and by 
 the fact which we have already noticed, and wliich is 
 admitted by Mr. Mill himself, that ' the ruling powers of 
 the United Kingdom already constitute, to some extent, 
 a Federal Government, and the countries com})risiiig the 
 British Empire a Federation.'' The Imperial Govern- 
 ment has the exclusive control of diplomacy, and of ques- 
 tions of peace and war, in its hands. It garrisons every 
 part of the Empire, and, until lately, su})})lied all the 
 aimaments needed for its defence. It appoints the head 
 of the local Government in every Colony, and through 
 him can, Avhen it pleases, exercise a very considerable 
 intluence on even local legislation. 
 
 Experience i)roves, beyond the power of dispute, that 
 the Imperial Government can exercise these prerogatives 
 ethciently, successfully, and to the satisfaction of the 
 Colonists, all over the Empire. But these include all 
 the admlnistratwe duties of a Federal Government, with 
 the single exception of that of raising a revenue. To 
 obtain the grant of this revenue, however, it would l)e 
 requisite that the Executive Government should be able 
 to assemble, whenever needed, the Legislature empowered 
 to grant it, which would consist of representatives from 
 both the British Islands and the Colonies ; and that, the 
 grant once made, the Government should be able to levy 
 it. Could the Federal Government assemble the Federal 
 Legislature, and levy the federal revenues as needed, there 
 
 1, H 
 
 ' Rvpresentativi: Government (people's edition), p. 132. 
 
 'i\ 
 

 7G 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION 
 
 . M 
 
 r 1 
 
 11 
 
 can be no doub^ of Its ability to discliarffe all Its other 
 duties, for they either liave been discharged by the Im- 
 perial Government in times past or are being discharged 
 by it to-day. Let this truth be carefully borne In mind, 
 and many of the mountainous difficulties of imagination 
 Avill quickly subside into molehills of fact. 
 
 It Is maintained, however, that to assemble such a 
 Legislature Avould be an impossibility, in consequence of 
 the vast distances by -svliich the several parts of the 
 Empire are separated from one another. Mr. Smith 
 says: — ' AVe need not discuss in detail the possibility or 
 expediency of summoning from the ends of the earth 
 ])eo[)le who could not be convoked In less than six months 
 to decide whether Enijland should go to war unon some 
 (piestlon solely affecting herself, and not admitting, per- 
 haj)s, of an hour's delay.' AVere the facts correctly re- 
 })rcsented by Mr. Smith, we should agree with him. But 
 here he finds It convenient to fbro-et, or Ignore, circum- 
 stances which clash with his theories. He seems to 
 think that the world is to-day In the same state as it was 
 in former o-encratlons. Does not this — horror of horrors ! 
 — seem tu indicate that he Is Imbued with something of 
 the si)lrlt of an Impracticable Tory ? The difficulty of 
 assembling the Leo-ishitiu'c is always much exaggerated. 
 Fifty years ago, there might have been soniu force in the 
 jilca that its accom])lishment was iinjiosslble ; but such a 
 position cannot be maintained to-day. Distance, for pur- 
 j)oses of communication, has been annihilated by the 
 electric telegraph, and, for loc(miotion, reduced about 
 threc-fourtlis by steam. At the beginning of the present 
 century it required almost a week to send a summons for 
 the convocation of Parliament from the ^eat of govern- 
 ment to the remoter parts of the United Kingdom, and 
 another Aveek for the representatives o^' these ])arts to 
 rea London. Now, the sunnnons could be sent to the 
 
 i 
 
coxvocATiox OF TUP: legislatur::. 
 
 i i 
 
 furthest limits of the Empire Instantaneously ; conse- 
 quently, the only delay -would be that of travelling from 
 the Colonies to the legislative halls. AVJiat leniith of 
 time would this journey consume? At present the run 
 between Ireland and Quebec is made week alter week in 
 nine or ten days, and mails and passeng'ers from London 
 are delivered in Toronto witliin eleven, and vice versa ; 
 and, on the completion of the Intercolonial llailroad, it 
 will be possil)le to save another day by fixing the 
 Canadian port of departure at IltUifax. Thus it seems 
 that Canada is practically as near London to-day as was 
 Caithness or Donegal at the beiiinninj^ of the centurv. 
 In the case of Australia, mails are now delivered in 
 liondon within seven weeks. There is no doubt that 
 New Zealand can be reached by Panama in the same 
 time, and it seems ])robable that, by using first-class 
 vessels, some few davs more mav be saved. As theso 
 latter points are the most distant from England of all 
 parts of the Em})ire, the time consumed in travelling 
 from them to the seat of government would determine the 
 ]>eriod Avithin which the Federal Legislature could be con- 
 voked ; and, judging tVom the facts before us, we should 
 say that the time necessary f )r its convocation would be 
 nearer six weeks than the six months alloti'cd bv Mr. 
 Smith to be the shortest time in which that process could 
 be effected. Is this too long to admit of the countries so 
 divided being united in one federation? Should anybody 
 reply in the affirmative we would remind him that, prior 
 to the completion of the Pacific Ilailway, Oregon was 
 practically almost as far from AVashington as Australia 
 or NcAv Zealand is from London to-da\ ; and that even 
 the conii)letivjn of that great work has not reduced the 
 time necessary for passing between the two points to 
 nuich less than that in which a voyage from Canada to 
 England can now be accomplished. It takes seven days 
 
 I *'.] 
 
 H 
 
mmmm 
 
 78 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 { 
 
 io travel by rail from New York or WashiMfjtoii to San 
 Francisco, and tlu'ce and a half more to reach Portland, 
 Orefi;on, by steamer. The Pacific Railway has been 
 opened for only a few months. Prior to its o])eiiinor 
 California had been for nearly twenty years a member of 
 the Union, althongh durinn; these twenty years the most 
 expeditions ronte to that State was by steamer to Aspin- 
 ^vall, thence across the Istlnnus to Panama, and thence 
 aiijain by steamer to San Francisco. The accomplish- 
 ment of tliis journey required twenty-four days, and 
 tiiree more were needed to reach Oreijon. Here Ave see 
 that countries two-thirds as far, in ]»oint of time, from 
 ^Vashiniiton as Australia need be from London, hav^e 
 il)een for nearly a ({uarter of a century loj'al members of 
 a democratic Federation ; and that even to-day they are 
 no nearer to tlie seat of government than Canada is to 
 Downino; Street. Is not this fact a sufficient ansAvcr to 
 those who assert that the distances which divide the 
 liritish Empire render the maintenance of its integrity or 
 the asseml)lage of a Pan-Kritannic Parliament an impos- 
 sibility ? Twenty-eight days' travel has been proved to be 
 consistent with the integrity of the democratic American 
 Union, and the assemblage of its Congress. Why, then, 
 should forty or even forty-five days' travel be inconsistent 
 Avith like results in the case of a Federation in Avhich the 
 conservative tics, both moral and constitutional, aa-ouUI be 
 nuich strono'cr than they are or can be in the States? 
 JOxperience has proved, in the case of the British Islands, 
 tliat distance, measured in hours of travel, as o-reat as 
 that which now divides England and Canada, does not 
 constitute any obstacle to the efficient Avorking of a Icf/is- 
 httioe union. Why, then, should it be declared to form 
 an insui)erable olistacle in the Avav of Avorkino; the lio'hter 
 machinery of a federal union? And Avhen, in the United 
 States, countries practically as distant from the seat of 
 
 
VOTE BY PROXY. 
 
 7Q 
 
 « 
 
 government as some of the remoter Colonies are from 
 England have been actually united in a federal union, 
 why may not other countries similarly divided also he 
 united within similar bonds? That some countries sepa- 
 rated by such distances can exist in the saine Federation 
 is beino; proved every day. Why, then, may not others? 
 The distance to be travelled would not lundcr the ])unc- 
 tual meetinor of the Leu'islature if the members should 
 have fair notice of the time of meetinn;. This thev 
 could have, on ordinary occasions, were the plan pursued 
 at Washington — that of meeting at the same date every 
 year — adoi)ted. AVere this done they would know the 
 time at Avhich they would be wanted, and could be j)unc- 
 tually at their posts. Multiplication of lines of ocean 
 telegraphs and fast steamers, with the adoj)tion of short 
 routes, are all that is needed to bring the remotest ])arts 
 of the Em])ire as near each other as were Washington 
 and San Francisco during the last twenty years. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be granted that this reasoning is 
 correct in reference to ' ordinary occasions,' but alleged 
 that it will not hold good when a])plied to extraordinary 
 circumstances. It is urged, as we have seen, that nations 
 are liable to certain political crises, such as those created 
 by diplomatic difficulties, in which even such a diminished 
 delay as would be necessary under present circumstances 
 could not be borne. We will admit this view of the case 
 to be correct, but we think that the fvbjection is not fatal, 
 and that the difficulty can be overcome. Let colonial 
 members be allowed to vote by proxy, and let them be 
 ])ermitted at the end of each session to elect certain 
 members who should remain in England during the recess 
 holding their proxies, and Parliament could 1)0 assembled 
 as quickly as it is to-day, and the Colonies as truly 
 rei)resented in it as if every one of their rei)resentatives 
 were present. Xay, it is probable that they would be 
 
 
 •11 
 
 : t 
 
L-ijtTir 
 
 i!am 
 
 mnmi 
 
 80 
 
 A COLONIST OX TIIR COLOXIAL QUESTFO.V, 
 
 : I 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 I'' i 
 
 1 ' 
 
 still more cfTiclcntly rcprosentcd, ns the ])r()xies would 
 certjiinly l)e entrusted to the Iciidinn; men of every ))iirty. 
 Avlio would thus have irreater influenec than if they had 
 to lead tlu ir more stupid followers into the ])ath which 
 would be clear to their brighter intellects. There eould 
 not be any difKeultv about finding; a sufHcienev of colonial 
 representatives willinij; to nndertakc this duty, especially 
 if it were accompanied, as it ought to be, by a small extra 
 indemnity. In the f\ict that by availing; ourselves of the 
 resources of modern science we can bring the most distant 
 Colonies almost as near Tiondon as Avere the Pacific 
 States to Washington prior to the construction of the 
 Pacific Railway, is to be found- pretty ])ositive j)roof that 
 the time required to reach the scat of government from 
 the Colonies would not be greater than is consistent with 
 the punctual meeting of a Legislature on ordinary occa- 
 sions ; and in our pro])OPal for colonial ])r()xy-voting is, 
 we think, to be found the means of rendering ])ossible, on 
 extraordinary occasions, as quick an assemblage of a 
 Legislature, in which all parts of the Empire would be 
 represented, as of the Imperial Parliament to-day. 
 
 But supposing that Ave are right in thus assuming that 
 the Federal Legislature, or its ecjuivalent, could be as- 
 sembled whenever needed, it has to be jiroved that its 
 legislation could be promptly executed. We have before 
 seen that all the functions of a Federal Government, save 
 that of raising a revenue, are already dischai'iied by the 
 Imperial Executive. That the proposed Federal Govern- 
 ment could fulfil this duty also, we will now jn-oceed to 
 show. The difficulties in the Avay were pretty well 
 stated by the Times, Avhen, in an article published some time 
 in January 1870, it argued as follows : — 
 
 ' There can be no real political unity Avithout financial 
 unity, and there can be no financial unity Avithout geo- 
 graphical unity. Australia and the Cape, the East Indies 
 
 )!: 
 
A FEDERAL BUDGET. 
 
 81 
 
 and tlic Canadian Dominion, are too "widely sundered 
 from each other and from us, too various in tlicir jiroducts 
 and resources, to be embraced in one budget, and to be 
 charged in common witli a single system of military and 
 naval armaments. Tiie man nnist be a visionary indeed 
 who hopes one day to hear Mr. Lowe deal with the esti- 
 mates and the revenues of the United Kingdom and its 
 forty colonics in a Pan-Britannic Parliament, ^'ct be- 
 tween this and the local inde])endcnce which now pre- 
 vails we see no middle way.' 
 
 In case of the establishment of a Federation of the 
 Empire, such as we propose, there would certainly -Ifc no 
 middle way. If ' taxation without representation ' would 
 be tyranny to the Colonies, representation without taxation 
 would be tyranny to the British Islands. In case of 
 rederati(m being adopted, justice requires that all the 
 countries represented in the Federal Legislature should 
 contribute in equal proportion to the federal expenditure. 
 This Avould necessitate a federal budget ; and the Times 
 says that the man who expects to see such a ])hcnomenon 
 is a visionary indeed. We are sufficiently visionary to 
 believe that it may be seen, if our statesmen and people 
 Avill but rouse themselves to the most glorious enterprise 
 ever presented to the ambition of nations or rulers. 
 
 The first point in proving the possibility of framing a 
 budget for the Empire united in one Federation is to 
 discover the amount vdiich it would be requisite to raise. 
 Here we shall find aid in a survey of the expenditure of 
 the United Kingdom. 
 
 The following statement fi-om the Year Booh for 1869, 
 p. 246, exhibits the official account of the ex})enditure in 
 the financial year ending on March 31, 1868, in which 
 year its amount was considerably above the annual ave- 
 
 V 
 
 
 rage of the decade : — 
 
 G 
 
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 iH^ ^^^y^ 
 
 
 
 IMAGE EVALUATION 
 TEST TARGET (MT-3) 
 
 1.0 !i:*- 
 
 .5. 112 
 
 I.I 
 
 M 11 2.5 
 
 Ik IIIII22 
 
 1^ iio 
 
 1.8 
 
 
 1.25 
 
 1.4 
 
 1.6 
 
 
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 V] 
 
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 /2 
 
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 7 
 
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 Photographic 
 
 Sciences 
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 23 WEST MAIN STREET 
 
 WEBSTER, NY. 14S80 
 
 (716) 873-4503 
 
<f, 
 
 ^^ 
 
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 82 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 £ 
 
 .t. 
 
 d. 
 
 Chauoes on Debt 
 
 • • 
 
 
 • 
 
 20,571,750 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 Chaiioes on Consolidated Fund : 
 
 & 
 
 1. 
 
 d. 
 
 
 
 
 Civil list 
 
 405.721 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Annuitios and pensions 
 
 286,839 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 Salaries and allowances 
 
 143,419 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Diplomatic salaries and pen- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 sions 
 
 174,053 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 Courts of justice 
 
 072,559 
 
 13 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 Miscellaneous . 
 
 211,305 
 
 13 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 — 
 
 1,893,898 
 
 3 
 
 ff 
 
 
 
 
 
 Supply Services: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Army .... 
 
 15,418,581 
 
 17 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 Navy .... 
 
 11,168,949 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
 Al)yssinian expedition . 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 » 
 
 
 
 Miscellaneous civil services 
 
 8,491,341 
 
 11 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 Salaries and superannuations of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 customs and inland revenue 
 
 2,481,152 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 Ditto of post office 
 
 2.402,051 
 
 9 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 Packet service . 
 
 808,517 
 
 13 
 
 8 
 
 42,770,593 
 
 12 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 Tofail ordinary expenditure 
 
 71,236,241 
 
 Tr 
 
 ~7 
 
 Expenses of fortifications provided for by money 
 
 raised 
 
 
 
 
 per Act 28 «^ 29 Vic. c. 61 . 
 
 • 
 
 
 « 
 
 530,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total . 
 
 71,766,241 
 
 T7~ 
 
 ~7 
 
 The Government of the United Kingdom is national, 
 which form of administration embraces the duties — and, 
 consequently, the expenditure — which, in a Federation, 
 appertain to both the Local and Federal authorities. To 
 ascertain the probable expenditure of the Federation, it 
 is therefore necessary to distinguish the charges which, 
 under the proposed regime, each of these Governments 
 would have to meet. This can be done by classifying 
 them accordingly as they are expended in meeting the 
 expenses of duties which it would rest with Federal or 
 Local authorities to discharge. 
 
 There are three of these items which would, unques- 
 tionably, fall on the Local Government. As the several 
 colonial debts would remain charges on the countries 
 
 
 F( 
 
 Bi 
 
' 
 
 AMOUNT OF FEDERAL EXl'EXDlTUUi:. 
 
 83 
 
 ,1. 
 
 wliicli had contracted them, so the English national debt 
 should remain a charge on the British Islands exclusively, 
 and he met by their Local Government. As the duties of 
 the local, or state authorities in every Federation are 
 confined almost exclusively to the conduct of the civil 
 government of the countries under their sway, the items 
 for the courts of justice and miscellaneous civil services 
 would also devolve on it. These items collectively 
 amount to 35,735,651/. 7.v. Od. sterling. It is probable 
 tiiat other items might be found properly chargeable to 
 the Local Government ; but as we do not wish to under- 
 state the possible exi)enditure of the Federal Government, 
 we are content to take only those concerning which there 
 can be no doubt. Then deducting the above sum of 
 35,735,651/. 7s. Od. from 71,766,241/. 17.s-, Id., we have 
 36,030,590/. 10s. 7d. as the amount of the Lnperial ex- 
 penditure for the year 1867-8, which would, under 
 Federation, have fallen to the lot of the Federal Govern- 
 ment to discharge. But as there are 2,000,000/. of 
 * extraordinary expenditure ' included in the above sum, 
 and what we seek to discover is the probable amount of 
 the ordinary expenditure, this amount may also be de- 
 ducted, making it aj)pear that about 34,000,000/. would 
 have sutiiced to meet the ordinary expenditure of a 
 Federal Government of the British Empire in 1867-8. It 
 may be thought that the union of the Colonies with the 
 British Islands under one and the same authority could 
 not fail to cause an increase in the above expenditure. 
 If it did so the increase would be very insignificant. The 
 quantity of armaments necessary for the defence of the 
 Emi)ire against foreign foes could not be affected by 
 a change in the political relations of its several [)arts 
 towards each other. Under the above ex{)t'nditure all 
 portions of the Empire were garrisoned by land and 
 guarded by sea ; for which reason we have taken the 
 
iOTBVI 
 
 84 
 
 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 U. I 
 
 year 1867-8 instead of either of the subsequent years, in 
 which these garrisons were withdrawn and the expen- 
 diture reduced, as our standard. In some cases the 
 Colonies themselves spend money on armaments, which, 
 under Federation, would fall as a burden on the Federal 
 Government. It must be observed, however, that this 
 transfer would reduce the colonial local expenditure by 
 the same amount that it would increase that of the Federal 
 Government. There would, indeed, be a new item of 
 expenditure in the cost of collecting the Federal revenue 
 in the Colonies ; but as the above items for collection of 
 customs and excise duties cover the cost of gathering-in 
 a revenue much larger than that which the Federal 
 Government would ordmarily require to raise, we think 
 that the suras above allowed for collection of the revenue 
 could T>ot fail to prove sufficient. There would, probably, 
 be some increase in the charges for packet service ; and, 
 also, in those of legislation. But to meet all these we 
 presume it will be admitted that the sum of 2,000,000/. 
 would be adequate. We are content, in order that we 
 may be on the safe side, to increase the above estimate by 
 this sum, and think it must be admitted that we are safe 
 in assuming that the ordinary expenditure of the Federal 
 Government would not exceed 36,000,000/. annually, 
 which sum is a little over one-half of that expended by 
 the Federal Government of the United States. 
 
 Next there looms up the question of ' Ways and 
 Means.' It is alleged that to form a system of finance 
 for the whole Empire is utterly impossible. The ground 
 of this assertion is, we suppose, to be found in the fact of 
 its being composed of so many countries, and embracing 
 such dissimilar industries. It comprises lands in a 
 frigid zone and in the tropics ; countries peopled thickly 
 and scantily ; communities devoted to agricultural, and to 
 

 WAYS AND MEANS. 
 
 85 
 
 manufacturing, pursuits, and moved by the contending 
 interests of producers and consumers. To form a system 
 of taxation which would deal justly with all these interests 
 is indeed likely to prove rather a difficult task, but we do 
 not think that the difficulty would be insuperable. 
 
 In forming an equitable system of taxation for the 
 Federation, the first step requisite would be to fix a 
 definite proportion of the Federal expenditure for which 
 each of its members would be liable. This is not neces- 
 sary in confederations in which the revenue can be raised 
 on one uniform system throughout ; but as it would 
 clearly be impossible to establish such a scheme of tax- 
 ation for the British Empire, an actual proportion to be 
 paid by each member would need to be definitely fixed, 
 in order to guard against inequality of taxation ensuing 
 from dissimilarity in finance. In fixing it, the prior 
 establishment of some uniform basis of taxation would be 
 indispensable. We assume that none will refuse to admit 
 property to be the most equitable basis of taxation. 
 Hence it follows that the proportion to be paid by each 
 country should be identical with that borne by the pro- 
 perty held by its inhabitants, or within its bounds, to that 
 held in the whole of the Federation. We think, how- 
 ever, that it would be v/ell, for some time at least, to 
 leave personal property out of sight in adjusting the pro- 
 portions, and to assess each country for the same pro- 
 portion of Federal expenditure as that borne by the real 
 property held in it, to that held in the whole of the Fede- 
 ration, as thus only would colonial contributions suffice 
 to cover colonial expenses. As these proportions would be 
 in a state of perpetual variation, it would be essential to 
 have the wealth of the Empire carefully ascertained at 
 each census, and the proportion of each country period- 
 ically adjusted according to the return. Were this 
 
mm 
 
 immmmmmmm 
 
 86 A COLOXIST OX TIIK COLOXIAL QUKSTIOX. 
 
 done, an nbiiiKlant security would 1)g jn'ovidcd ajjainst 
 any nicmhcr of the Federation being subjected to any 
 more than its fair share of taxation. 
 
 In this manner we would propose to fix that proportion 
 of the expenditure of the Federation Avhich should be 
 borne by each of its members. Before considering the 
 manner in which the colonial contributions miiiht be 
 levied, it may be well to cast a glance at their probable 
 amount. To work out the problem in detail it would be 
 re(iuisite to have statistics showing the wealth of the 
 United Kingdom, and of every Colony which it would be 
 proposed to comprehend in the Federation, and thence to 
 assess each member's share of the expenditure. This we 
 cannot do, as we do not possess the statistics ; but we 
 think that we have sufficient information to arrive at some 
 api)roach to a solution. 
 
 The i)rovince of Ontario, late Upper Canada, is cer- 
 tainly by far the most wealthy portion of British America, 
 and ])robably as Avealthy as any other of the Colonies, 
 though it is ])ossible that some parts of Australia may be 
 slightly ahead of it. According to the assessment rolls of 
 18G9, the gross value of real property in Ontario in that 
 year was 240,358,000 dollars, or in round numbers about 
 50,000,000/. sterling. It is true that this assessment is 
 always far below the actual value of the property assessed. 
 After careful inquiry we have come to the conclusion 
 that an addition of about 75 per cent, is needed to show 
 its true value ; but in order to be on the safe side we Avill 
 add 100 j)er cent., and assume the gross value of the real 
 l>roperty of Ontario to be 100,000,000/. sterling. We 
 have next to see what proportion this sum bears to the 
 gross value of the real property of the United Kingdom. 
 
 The annual value of the real property of the British 
 Islands has been shown in a parliamentary return issued 
 ill the session of 1864, and quoted in the Statesman's 
 
 U 
 
 . 
 
^■Vi 
 
 PROPOUTIOX OF COLONIAL TAXATION'. 
 
 Vcnr Book for 18G9, to have been as follows in the yeai« 
 inilicated : — 
 
 Enfrlaiul 
 Soot land 
 Ircliiml 
 
 Total 
 
 1857 
 
 € 
 
 l()3,4'J«,2r)3 
 
 12.r»8'2.74!) 
 ll,!*ir>,286 
 
 127,991,288 
 
 IMS 
 
 120,0(i!),9r)3 
 1.0,1 28. j.'JS 
 13,4(li),.'»16 
 
 148,599,017 
 
 We have here an increase of over 10 per cent, in five 
 years. AVe presume, tlicrefore, that it will not ])e 
 <leemetl unfai if we assume that a like increase lias heon 
 effected in the ensuing six years. This would give an 
 increase of 23,775,847/. lOv. 4d., which added to the 
 above sum would make the annual v.alue of the real })ro- 
 perty in the United Kingdom in the year ISO 9 about 
 172,374,894/.> Its gross value at .33^ years' purchase 
 would amount to 5,745,829,800/., or a little over fifty- 
 seven times the wealth of Ontario, which would conse- 
 quently have to furnish to the Federal revenue a con- 
 tribution amounting to one fiff) -seventh ])art (if that 
 furnished by the United Kingdom. How much money 
 this would be we cannot say, in the absence of statistics 
 showing the relative valuation of the United Kin<>;tlom 
 and all the Colonies. But, taking it on a less favourable 
 basis, and assuming that Ontario would have to furnish 
 one fifty-seventh part of the whole of the Federal ex- 
 l)enditure, estimated at 36,000,000/. per animm, we 
 find that the amount of its annual assessment would be 
 631,403/. 10.S-. 2d. sterling. Its population at the census 
 of 1871 was returned at 1,620,000, so that this sum 
 would amount to about 7s. 9(1. per head. As Ontario is 
 
 ' That this estimate is not excessive lias been proved by the returns hiid 
 before the House of Commons by Mr. (josolien, whieli. aconrdinfj; to a cart^- 
 ful digest in the Economist of April 8, 1871. show the value of rc^l pro- 
 perty in England and Wales to have been 143,872,001)/. in 1868. 
 
 
88 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 I 
 
 probably as rich in real property as any other of the 
 Colonies — it is certainly much richer than any other 
 British American Colony — we think that we shall not 
 err in favour of them if we assume that its rate of 7s. 9d. 
 per head would form the average rate of Colonial con- 
 tribution to the Federal revenue at present. 
 
 The * Ways and Means ' by which this sum could be 
 raised have next to be indicated. Happily the task is 
 not very difficult to accomplish. Whilst treating of the 
 nature of the Federal form of government we said : * As 
 taxation can scarcely fail to interfere with comme /ce, and 
 as a Federation is one nation externally, the Federal 
 Government must be allowed to regulate trade ; or, in 
 other words, it must have control of the customs duties.' 
 It is clear that in the event of union, the colonial con- 
 tribution to the federal expenditure could readily be 
 raised from these duties. Let it be allowed to form a 
 first charge on them, and the problem of * Ways and 
 Means' is at once solved. The customs amount to a 
 much smaller proportion of the revenue of Canada than 
 of any other of the Colonies ; but even there they would 
 furnish nearly double as much money as would be re- 
 quired. The customs revenue of the Dominion in the 
 last three years amounted to 8,578,380 dollars in 1868, to 
 8,272,879 dollars in 1869, and to 9,334,212 dollars in 1870, 
 being equal on an average to about 8,728,490 dollars. 
 Its total population, according to the census of 1871, is 
 3,484,924, on which number the customs would amount 
 to 2*50 dollars, or about lO*. 5d. per head. Hence it 
 appears that, in the least favourable instance which can 
 be chosen, the customs alone would yield almost fifty per 
 cent, over the amount needed at 7s. 9d. per head. But 
 as it is unquestionably true that Ontario is much more 
 wealthy than any one of the other British American pro- 
 vinces, it is nearly certain that the rate of assessment 
 
COLONIAL CUSTOMS REVENUE. 
 
 89 
 
 fur all of them would be at least one shilling below this 
 figure, in which case about one-half of the customs re- 
 venue would suffice to meet the demands of the Federal 
 Exchequer. As to the other Colonies, we appeal to the 
 following statement compiled from Statistical Tables re- 
 lating to the Colonial and other possessions of the United 
 Kingdom (Part XI.), showing the customs revenue of 
 the Colonies for the year 1865, and their population at 
 the latest dates received prior to the above return : — 
 
 
 
 
 CuBtoms Rcvcnno 
 
 Fupulation 
 
 Canada 
 
 £ 
 
 1,169,574 
 
 2,^81,862 
 
 New Brunswick 
 
 
 
 114,626 
 
 252,047 
 
 Nova Scotia . 
 
 
 
 209,678 
 
 330,857 
 
 Princo ildward 
 
 
 
 « 17,000 
 
 84.386 
 
 Newfoundland 
 
 
 
 91,045 
 
 122,638 
 
 British Columbia 
 
 
 
 73,110 
 
 13,671 
 
 Vancouver 
 
 
 
 6,871 
 
 6.000 
 
 "West Indies , 
 
 
 
 661,094 
 
 1,231,967 
 
 New South Wales 
 
 
 
 636,102 
 
 411,388 
 
 Victoria 
 
 
 
 1,192,257 
 
 626,639 
 
 South Australia 
 
 
 
 240,184 
 
 166,605 
 
 "West „ 
 
 
 
 38,771 
 
 20,260 
 
 Tasmania 
 
 
 
 119,461 
 
 96,201 
 
 New Zealand . 
 
 
 
 730,037 
 
 201,712 
 
 Queensland 
 
 
 
 195,541 
 
 87,775 
 
 Mauritius 
 
 
 
 163,912 
 
 322,517 
 
 Natal . 
 
 
 
 42,166 
 
 168,580 
 
 Cape . 
 
 
 
 275,559 
 
 267,096 
 
 St. Helena 
 
 
 
 14,626 
 
 6,860 
 
 Total . 
 
 
 
 5,980,514 
 
 7,288,061 
 
 Estimated : import and excise duties arc stated at ^Afi'iV. 
 have included Honduras and Bermuda. 
 
 Under West ludies we 
 
 Here we see that the population of the above Colonies 
 six years ago was 7,288,061 and their customs revenue 
 5,980,514/. or about 16.s. 4rf. per head. It may very 
 fairly be assumed that in 1870 the population had ad- 
 vanced to 8,000,000, and the customs to 7,000,000/., which 
 
T 
 
 T 
 
 !)() 
 
 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUKSTION. 
 
 I ! 
 
 would loavo a rovciiiic of IT.v. Cxi. ])er head, or more ilmn 
 <loublc tlie amount lor which thoy would be assessed for 
 Federal revenue, assuniinj^ that tlie rate for Ontario 
 wouKl fo?*ni a fair average for the whole of the Colonies. 
 To quiet colonial fears in referen<'e to such an increase 
 of tiixation as this sum represents, we would remark that 
 we shall, hereafter, show that hy savings in the local ex- 
 ])enditure, consequent on Federation, the actual increase 
 could be reduced, in all cases, very considerably, and in 
 some nearly one-half 
 
 It may be remarked, however, that, even granting all 
 our views on this subject to be correct, there remains a 
 practical obstacle in the way of their realisation in the 
 fact that to ])lace the customs duties under the control of 
 the Federal Legislature would be to leave the regulation 
 of the entire commercial policy of every member of the 
 Federation at its disposal ; and that, although the Colonics 
 might be willing to i)ay the amounts for which they 
 Avould severally be assessed, it is very unlikely that they 
 would be content to have their trade regulated by an 
 assembly in which the representation of the British 
 Islands would so Largely outnumber their own. We 
 think that this view of the case would be likely to prove 
 correct ; but we are also of o])inion that a reconciliation 
 of the contending claims could be effected. 
 
 It is self-evident that to establish a uniform tariff for 
 the whole Federation Avould be an im])ossibility, as the 
 stai)le exports of one portion of it are the staple imports 
 of another. The fact of each wanting the goods which 
 otluu'd can supply, is one of the leading arguments in 
 favour of maintaining the integrity of the Empire, since by- 
 it each is secured a su})ply of those goods which it requires 
 to buy and a safe market for those which it has to sell. 
 In order that these advantages may continue to exist, 
 it is essential that no other than * revenue tariffs ' should 
 
 X. 
 
' 
 
 A MAXIMUM RATE OF CUSTOMS. 
 
 1)1 
 
 1)0 levied in any part oftlie Federation. Hut if provisiiui 
 were made to liinder the infrinn;(Mnent of tlii.s rule, it 
 w(»uld not he essential — ^since the tariffs eould not be 
 uniform — that the enartment of them should be in the 
 hands of the Federal Lejjfislature exclusively; and were 
 the Local Legislatures allowed to enact their own tariffs, 
 no dispute as to financial ])oIicy could arise, as each 
 w(mld be able, within certain definite limits, to choose its 
 own policy. We Avould therefore propose that in the 
 Act of Union a clause should be inserted, fixing a tnaxi- 
 muifi rate of duty, never to be exceeded by any member 
 of the Federation, on goods the ])roduct of any other 
 part of it ; and would provide a safeguard against it 
 being exceeded by another clause enacting that the levy 
 of a higher rate of duty by any custom-house official 
 should constitute a misdemeanour, and subject him to 
 instant dismissal, Avith, or without, other pains and penalties, 
 as might seem exi)edient. And in order to jircvent 
 (iapricious variations in financial })olicy, we would require 
 the Local Legislatures at each re-assessment of the 
 Federati(m to fix their tariffs for the ensuino; ten vears, 
 subject to the condition that if at any time in the interval 
 it were desired to effect an alteration, this might be done 
 by petitiim to the Federal Legislature and the i)assage of 
 a bill by it in accordance with the prayer of the petition 
 — but thus only.* 
 
 To sum uj) : Ave propose that the Federal liCgislature 
 
 ' As it would 1)0 desirable to have fret! trade established between colon'al 
 ".'roups, such as British America, the Wist Indies, Australia, and SouOi 
 Africa, it would be necessary to have all the Local Legislatures or authorities 
 of the diiferent provinces in each of these proups meet in congress to fix the 
 tariff at each period of re-adjustment, and to have the balance of customs 
 distributed on the Zollverein system — though we think that property 
 would form a fairer basis of distribution than population. The fact that 
 excise duties would uni)ucstionably be needed to complete the contributions 
 of the British Islands, and. in time of war, might be needed in the Colonies, 
 
92 
 
 A COLONIST O:: THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 Bhould enjoy unlimited right of taxation ; but that, in 
 order to prevent it overtaxing any member of the Fede- 
 ration, each should be liable only for a definite proportion 
 of the Federal expenditure, and that this proportion 
 should be re-adju8ted after the decennially recurring 
 census ; that the Federal rev enue should be collected by 
 officers of the Federal Government ; that the revenue 
 should, in the first instance, be raised from the customs 
 duties of the several members of the Federation ; that 
 ■wherever these should prove more than sufficient to meet 
 the amount assessed, the balance should be paid to the 
 Local Government, and that wherever this should prove 
 insufficient, the deficit should be made up by such ether 
 taxes as the Federal Legislature should see fit to impose ; 
 and in order to prevent the commercial interests of one 
 province being sacrificed to those of another, each should, 
 under certain limits, be allowed to arrange its own tariffs 
 We confess that we are visionary enough * to believe that, 
 under these conditions, a Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 would be able to deal with the [Federal] estimates and 
 revenues of the United Kingdom and its forty Colonies 
 in a Pan-Britannic Parliament.' Not only do we think 
 that he could * deal with them,' but also that he could 
 deal with them satisfactorily. No member of the Fede- 
 ration could be over-taxed without the fact becoming at 
 
 renders it a fair subject for consideration whether it might not be well to 
 place the coUiction of the entire indirect taxation of the Empire, whether 
 imposed by Locivl or Federal authorities, in the hands of Federal officials, and 
 to make the Federal revenue a first charge on all of it, indifferently; also 
 it might be considered whether, in case of Federation being adopted, it 
 might not be possible to allow the Local Legislatures to fix the waj's and 
 means of both Local and Federal revenue, leaving the Federal Legislature em- 
 powered to provide ways and means only in case the Local Legislature should 
 fail to do so. These, however, are all matters of detail, which, along with 
 many more, would require the careful thought of the first statesmen of the 
 Empire. It is our part to prove that the difficulties may be overcome, but 
 not to say which is the best means of meeting them. 
 
PROVISION AGAIXST UNFAIR TAXATION. 
 
 93 
 
 at 
 
 once apparent. No difficulty about ways and means 
 could arise, as the one source of revenue which we have 
 indicated would suffice to pay the colonial proportion, 
 even were the amount which it seems likely to reach 
 doubled, and in the British Islands the same resources 
 would be open under Federation as at present. No 
 obstacle would have to be overcome in recimcilinjr con- 
 flicting sectional interests, as each would be left free to 
 settle its own commercial policy within definite limits 
 agreed to by all. And the distance which separates the 
 several countries would not be any impediment to their 
 financial union, as the Finance Minister in London could, 
 by means of the electric wire, converse at pleasure with 
 his subordinates all over the Empire ; and would thus, in 
 fact, be nearer to New Zealand than his predecessors 
 were to places only a day's journey from head-quarters. 
 
 Such are our reasons for believing that the want of 
 geographical unity, and the long distances by which the 
 several parts of the British Empire are divided, are not 
 inconsistent either with the assemblage of a Federal 
 Legislature as quickly as would be needed, or with the 
 levy of a common revenue for the discharge of Federal 
 expenditure. We have before endeavoured to show that 
 every function of a Federal Government, save these two, 
 is, or has been, fulfilled for the whole Empire by the 
 Government of the United Kingdom — which view we have 
 seen is endorsed by one of the ablest opponents of 
 Federation. Hence it follows that if these, also, can be 
 discharged, the capacity of a Federal Government of the 
 Empire to accomplish all the duties incidental to its office 
 is demonstrated. 
 
 1^: 
 
 but 
 
mm 
 
 mi 
 
 
 04 
 
 A ('OLOXIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION, 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES. 
 
 In the preceding cliapter we have endeavoured to show 
 that if the macliinery of a Federal Government for the 
 Empire were created, it would be competent to fulfil all 
 the duties which are usually assigned to such Govern- 
 ments. Until the arguments by Avhich we arrived at 
 this conclusion have been refuted, any further op})osition 
 to Federation, as being an imi)racticable project, must 
 bo based on constitutional and administrative difficulties, 
 similar in kind to those which are to be encouutered in 
 the formation and administration of any representative 
 Government, though we are willing to admit that in this 
 case they would be likely to prove greater in degree. 
 
 Assimiing it to have been proved that the conditions of 
 existence are to be found, the possibility of creating and 
 maintaining the proposed Federation have yet to be 
 demonstrated. We therefore proceed to consider the 
 nature of the governmental machinery which would be 
 required to call the Federation into being, and the manner 
 in which the difficulties in the way of its formation may 
 be overcome. 
 
 The lirst point, of course, would be the establishment 
 of a Federal Legislature — a Parliament in which the 
 British Islands and the Colonies should be alike repre- 
 sented on terms of equality. 
 
 Here it is necessary, before going any further, to define 
 
 :t ' i 
 
COUNTRIES COXSTITUTIXG COLOMKS. 
 
 95 
 
 the term * Col( 
 
 the 
 
 ine 
 
 tlie sense in -wliich we ii 
 Empire includes many outlyinfj provinces which do not 
 properly come under that appellation. Foremost amongf 
 these is India, and next are fortresses — such as Gibraltar 
 and Malta — and commercial stations — such as HonijKonj;. 
 By the term Colonies avc mean countries in which all, or 
 a very considerable ])ortion, of the population, consists of a 
 British or European stock ; or, to descend to j)articulars, 
 British America, Australasia, South Africa, and the 
 West Indies, with })erhaps Mauritius, and hereafter such 
 other lands within the Empire as may be colonised by 
 emi'i;ration from Great Britain. To these and to the 
 British Islands representation in the Federal Lep^islature 
 would have to be confined : all other parts of the Empire 
 would require to remain in their present position of 
 dependencies, from their incompetency to fulfil the con- 
 ditions on Avhich the Federation would be based. 
 
 Tbe constitution of the Federal Legislature would be 
 a matter of the very highest imjxjrtance. On It ihe 
 success or failure of the new Em})ire would, to a very 
 great extent, depend. For its establishment there are 
 two courses oi)en: the Colonies might be allowed repre- 
 sentation in the Imi)erial Parliament as at present consti- 
 tuted ; or an absolutely new Federal Legislature might 
 be created, whilst the Imperial Parliament should become 
 the local legislature of the British Islands, either remain- 
 ing in its present shape or being divided into three 
 legislatures, accordingly as it might be determined to 
 have one or three Local Governments for England, lie- 
 land, and Scotland. 
 
 On the former of these schemes ]\Ir. Smith has exerted 
 himself to })our a large volume of contempt. ' Such a 
 piece of political n\'>chinery,' says he, ' as a set of Parlia- 
 ments, one of which would be at once national and federal, 
 while all the rest would be national only, would scarcely 
 
 
'■mOmmmtH 
 
 m 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 i; 
 
 find an advocate, even among the defenders of Imperial 
 unity at all costs.' We shall, however, examine the 
 merits of this scheme, notwithstanding Mr. Smith's con- 
 temptuous dismissal of it. The Imperial Parliament 
 already fulfils almost all the duties which in every 
 Federation devolve on the Federal Legislature ; and is 
 legally competent to legislate for any, and every, part of 
 the Empire. The les& violent the nature of political 
 changes by which a desired result is obtained, the better 
 it is for all parties. I.; may therefore be well to inquire 
 if a Federal Legislature could be created by allowing 
 colonial representatives seats in the Imperial Parliament. 
 We must premise, however, that this is not to be 
 taken as indicative of a personal preference for that 
 course. 
 
 The difficulty in the way of this plan lies in the fact 
 that whilst the Imperial Parliament discharges the duties 
 of a federal legislature, it unites with them, as every 
 national legislature must do, those which, in a Federation, 
 are discharged by the local legislatures. It would evi- 
 dently be unfair to the United Kingdom to allow repre- 
 sentatives elected in Canada or Australia to vote on 
 matters affecting the people of the British Islands ex- 
 clusively, whilst their representatives would be destitute 
 of any corresponding influence over the internal govern- 
 ment of the Colonies. We believe, however, that this 
 difficulty might be overcome, and a Federation established 
 with a ' set of Parliaments, one of which would be national 
 and federal, whilst all the rest would be national only.' 
 The manner in which we believe this to be capable of 
 accomplishment is by a classification of the prerogatives 
 of the Imperial Parlinment as a federal and national 
 legislature, and having its duties in each capacity dis- 
 charged in different sessions. 
 
 This classification having been effected, the body now 
 
MODIFICATIOX OF THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. 97 
 
 known as the Imperial Parliament might meet to legislate 
 on the subjects defined as belonging to the internal 
 government of the British Islands. This legislation 
 having been finished, the colonial representatives might 
 be admitted to their seats, and a second session opened 
 for legislation on matters defined as bcioniring to the 
 Federal Government of the Emj)ire. At present the 
 representatives of the United Kingdom discharge the 
 duties of both a federal and local legislature every 
 session. If these duties were distinguished and discharged 
 at different times in the manner })roposcd, there would be 
 nothing to hinder the Colonies enjoying representation in 
 a Federal Legislature, and the United Kingdom retaining 
 the exclusive control of its own local affairs, without the 
 formation of any legislative power at ]>rcsent unknown 
 to the constitution ; though in the Executive (iovernment 
 a slight change would be needed. 
 
 One sovereign and one ministrv now disdiaro-e the 
 duties of both a Federal and Local Executive Goveriunent. 
 But with the Imperial Parliament acting in two separate 
 characters, they could not continue to do so. Ministers, 
 indeed, would not find any increased dilliculty in the 
 discharge of the same duties Avhich they have to fulfil to- 
 day. But ministerial responsibility is now-a-days the 
 corner-stone of the British constitution, and as the 
 Federal Legislature might declare its want of confidence 
 in a ministry sustained by the Local, and vice versa, it 
 M'ouid be requisite to have two ministries — one fo- the 
 Federal, and the other for the Local Government. Each, of 
 course, would be resi)onsible only to that legislature of 
 which it acted as the Executive, and to the Crown actino- 
 as head of both Local and Federal Executives. AVe should 
 not think it requisite to impose any check on the 
 members of either ministry sitting in both legislatures. 
 lu Canada there are Dominion ministers who sit in the 
 
 u 
 
w 
 
 08 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 I 
 
 ■i- 
 , ( 
 
 Local Parliament, and Local Ministers who sit in the House 
 of Conunons, and the results have been to increase the 
 legislative cai)acity of both, and to augment identity of 
 feclino- between them. 
 
 By these means we think that the Im])erial Parliament 
 miirht be made to fulfil the functions of both a Federal 
 and a Local Legislature witht)ut conferring on the United 
 Kingdom any unjust control over the local rights of the 
 Colonies, or on the Colonies any influence whntever over 
 the internal aflfairs of tlie British Islands. There is a 
 iXood deal to be said in favour of this course. England 
 has h.4)})ily been always dis{)osed to look with disfavour 
 on any violent changes, and felt a desire to adapt old 
 institutions to the fulfilment of new duties. The above 
 policy would be in consonance with this feeling. Th*) 
 old P'lrliament of England would remain intact, no new 
 assembly would displace it from the lofty height which 
 it has so long occupied, nor would it be thrust down into 
 any interior position, as would necessarily follow were it 
 confined to the single duty of legislating for the affairs 
 of the British Islands. It would thus leave England 
 somewhat more in possession of her original supremacy 
 in the Empire than would be the case were a legislature 
 entirely new to be created ; and, colonist though we be, 
 we can truly say that Ave would not grudge it to her 
 ourselves, nor do we think that our fellow-colonists Avould 
 disagree with our feeling in the matter. But, besides 
 thus soothing English pride, colonial representation in 
 the Imperial Parliament would secure the great advantage 
 of rendering any collision between the Federal authorities 
 and the Local Government of the most important member 
 of the confederation almost impossible. Such collisions 
 are the peculiar danger of federal institutions. But when 
 the same men would act in both capacities in the United 
 Kingdom, it is pretty certain tliat the two Governments 
 
mmmm'mmmmm 
 
 DIFFICULTIES OF SL'CII .MODIFICATION'. 
 
 0') 
 
 ffairs 
 land 
 Dmacy 
 ature 
 be, 
 her 
 iVOiild 
 esides 
 ion in 
 intage 
 oritics 
 ember 
 isions 
 when 
 nitod 
 mentis 
 
 ■could not fail to act in harmony. The fact of their so 
 doini; would tend both to check throughout the Empire 
 the rise of jealous feeling on either side, and to provide a 
 corrective for any small portion of it that might be 
 developed. Enghmd would thus be })hiced in the j)osition 
 of the conservative power of the Empire. It is a post for 
 which she is eminently qualified; and it is one which it 
 is desirable to have filled by some member in any 
 federation. But, in case England had formally to descend 
 from her present position, and take her place with the 
 Colonies in a new legislature, it is by no means clear 
 that she would be by any means the most loyal member 
 of the Union, whilst the chances of collision between her 
 Government and that of the Emi)ire might be increased. 
 These would be very considerable advantages, but 
 they would be accompanied by some very heavy disad- 
 vantages. It is possible that, were the Imperial Parlia- 
 ment increased by the addition of the colonial repre- 
 sentatives, it would become a body too unwieldy for 
 effective action. Were the Colonies represented in the 
 same pro])ortion as the liritish Islands now arc, they 
 would, probably, start with from 80 to 100 members ; 
 and there can be little .loubt that an assembly consisting 
 of 750 members is likely to be too numerous for efhcient 
 action. Then the labours of the English, Irish, and Scotch 
 members would be seriously augmented, as they would 
 have two budgets to pass, and two ministries to watch, 
 instead of one of each, as at present. There seems to be 
 no doubt that their duties are already too heavy to be 
 efhciently discharged ; and that were this plan of ac- 
 comi)Iishing Federation adoi>ted, it woidd be absolutely 
 indisi)ensable to establish some means of relieving them, 
 from the ' i)rivate bills' which now consume a large part 
 of their labours. Neither is the formation ol'a new Ijody to 
 fulfil the duties of a Federal Legislature without arguments 
 
 H 2 
 
i!^ 
 
 100 
 
 A COLOXIST OX THE COLONIAL QUKSTIOX. 
 
 to recommend it on its own merits. The machinery of 
 government would then be more simple than in case the 
 members of the Imperial Parliament Avere to act in two 
 distinct ca})acities. It would afford the Local Governments 
 of the British Islands less oj)portunity of encroaching on 
 the prerogatives of the Federal authority than they would 
 enjoy when the same men who would be resi)onsible for 
 any encroachment would form a majority of the body 
 whose prerogatives would be infringed. It would render 
 tlie labours of the English, Irish, and Scotch representatives 
 lighter than they would be under the other scheme. It 
 would afford an ojjening for obscure talent to find its way 
 into j)olitical life. It wovdd place the Colonies more on 
 terms of equality with the Fatherland. It would facilitate 
 the formation of a lejfislature accordiufij to the latest 
 discoveries in political science, and with a single eye to 
 the especial duties Avhich it Avould be called on to perform, 
 ■which would be, as Ave shall show hereafter, a matter of 
 considenible importance, especially in reference to ^.le 
 Upper House ; and, besides this, it would render possible 
 the establishment of separate Local Governments for 
 England, Ireland, and Scotland, which we are strongly 
 inclined to think would be likely to prove a decided ad- 
 vantage to each of them, and, perhaps, to the whole 
 Federatim. 
 
 Our principal reason for holding this oi)inion is that Ave 
 very much doubt the possibility of maintaining, under 
 present circumstances, the union Avith Ireland by any 
 other means than the indefinite suspension of liberty in 
 that country. None Avho have any knowledge of Ireland 
 Avill deny that the cry for * repeal ' is one that finds an 
 echo in every Celtic heart. Nor can it be denied that 
 the Liberal policy towards Ireland has been one long 
 series of failures. Catholic emancipation •, the reduction 
 of the Protestant episcopate ; the abolition of tithes ; the 
 
IRELAND NOT YET PACIFIED. 
 
 101 
 
 ' 1 
 
 Maynooth errant ; free trade ; tlie Orann;e Processions Act ; 
 the disestablishment of the Protestant Ciiurch ; the Land 
 Bill, and the handing over the patronage of Ireland so 
 completely to the Romanists that, at one time, ten of the 
 twelve judges were Catholics, — all these, and many more 
 measures of a similar spirit have successively been h(;ld 
 up as unfailing remedies for ' the Irish difficulty.' If at 
 any time they could have produced a good effect it would 
 have been at present. For along with them came social 
 changes which destroyed many of the most crying evils 
 prevalent in Ireland. Emigration cleared away a large 
 part, if not all, of the surplus population, and increased 
 the rate of wages probably 400 to 500 per cent. The 
 Encumbered Estates Court swept out of existence a race 
 of bankrupt landlords and bloodsucking middlemen, and 
 induced some influx of English capital. It was all in 
 vain. Increased prosperity, social equality, and political 
 supremacy did not render the Celtic Komanists of the 
 present day less ready to become Fenians than were their 
 fathers and jxrandfathers to become United Irishmen. 
 Still from all went up the cry — 
 
 'Tis little I cure for emuncipution, 
 'Tis littlo I cure for such laws as that; 
 "What I ask is to seo old Erin a nation, 
 And niyhelf with a siiamrock in my hat. 
 
 With the experience of the effect of forty years' con- 
 cessions before her, England destroyed in 1869 the insti- 
 tution which had ever formed a rallying-})oint for her 
 supporters, and affection for which had prevented them 
 from allying themselves with their Catholic countrymen 
 in their cry for repeal. Will they do so any longer ? It 
 is rather too soon to s[)eak with confidence, but the signs 
 and tokens seem to indicate that they will not. ^> either 
 rich Protestants nor Irish landlords have now any cause 
 to fear the advent of a repeal of the Union. Should 
 
 a 
 p 
 
 1 
 
r 
 
 ^-^^ri^mnmimmm^ 
 
 m 
 
 III 
 
 t 
 
 '•1 
 
 102 A COLONIST OX Tlir-: COF.O.MAI. (iUKSTIOX. 
 
 Catholics and Protectants unite in the a<^itatioii to <;ain it 
 >vliat could Knjjjland do? One tliiiifr she certainly could 
 not do, and that is resist it successfully whilst niaintainini:^ 
 j)olitical liberty in Ireland. Neither do Ave believe that 
 .she either could, or would, rule Ireland pennanently by 
 the sword. Yet the history of the two conntries from 
 1782 to the Union has proved pretty conclusively that 
 the existence of tAvo sovereign legislatures in one empire 
 is an impossibility. If this be so, a repeal of the Unicm is 
 clearly impracticable under present circmnstanccs. But 
 it is erpially clear that, in the event of a Federatiou of the 
 Emi)ire, it would be jn-acticable to make Ireland one of 
 the members of the Union, and to grant her a local legis- 
 lature for the discharij-e of the same duties as would 
 belong to similar legislatures in other parts of the Empire. 
 There could be no legal or constitutional difficulty in 
 this course, for the question which it Vvould involve 
 w^ould be that of the number of states or provinces into 
 which the Empire should be divided; and, so far as the 
 exercise of the h'</(/I powers of the Irish Legislatiue Avas 
 concerned there wcmld be no more danger of a collision 
 with the Federal Government arising therefrom than must 
 exist in any, and every, federation. The fact that 
 Ireland is, in reality, inhabited by two races who hate or 
 have hated each other about as intensely as it is possible 
 for people to do without flying at each other's throats 
 renders us somewhat doul)tful whether they could safely 
 be entrusted with even the limited powers of local self- 
 government. But Avhen we remember that this, or a full 
 and comi)lete sei)aratIon from English connection, has 
 been the desire at the root of all the Irish agitations of the 
 last century ; and when Ave see that almost all really 
 active causes of discord betAveen the two local races have 
 no\v been removed, avc have no hesitation in saying that 
 we think the risk should be run. It is, we believe, the 
 
 M 
 
ENGLISH, IRISH, AND SCOTCH LKfllSLATUUKS. 108 
 
 hi 
 
 IS 
 
 n 
 
 
 only lucfisure tliat can ever render Ireland a really loyal 
 member of the Kinj)lre.' 
 
 But, besides these facts In rcj^urd to Ireland, there are 
 reasons in favour of local legislatures in the case of both 
 England and Scotland. The fcclinu; of Ireland is dii'ectly 
 antagonistic to that of England, and, although fricn(lshi|) 
 is maintained with Scotland, the feelinus of the two 
 countries are by no means identical, and it seems pro- 
 bable that, in reference to local matters, each would be 
 better able to judge ibr itself than could any united legis- 
 lature. Xor is this all ; the ])roccss of centralization of 
 the national energies at the capital which has produced 
 such alarming results in the case of France is at work also 
 in the United Kingdom. 01' course, we do not for a moment 
 suppose that It Is on anything like the same scale ; or, so 
 long as the framework of sociiety remains as it is, can be. 
 But we think that the intellectual strcin/th of the country 
 Is becoming centralized to an alarminii; de<iree. The 
 press at the present day is not so much the fourth as the 
 firat estate of the realm. The influence of that j)ortion 
 of it located in London Is probably, or almost certainly, 
 greater than that of the residue all over the liritlsh 
 Islands. The fact Is not one to be regarded with com- 
 placency, as It tends to render this mighty thougiit-ruling 
 machine more liable to be swayed bycliciues, parties, and 
 philosophical theories than would be the case were it 
 scattered more widely over the land. W^e are aware 
 that there are many counteracting influences at work ; 
 but still think that It would not be amiss to have other 
 
 ' The above was written before the morotnent in favour of ' Irish Fede- 
 ralism ' had got into shape, and before we had seen Mr. Butt's pamphlet 
 on the subject. We need scarcely say that tiie subsccjueiit spread of tlio 
 movement — verifying, as it does, some of the above speculations — and the 
 arguments adduced by Mr. Butt, have strengthened our couvictions in favour 
 of the above policy. 
 
Ksm 
 
 111 11' i I ' 
 
 liii 
 
 ': 
 
 104 A COLOMST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 centres of political activity, such as would be furnished 
 by the creation of local governments, brought into 
 existence. 
 
 Thus it seems that there are many considerations in 
 favour of each of these courses. Our own feelino: is in 
 favour of the latter; both because we should anticipate 
 nmch good from the formation of local legislatures in 
 each of the three kingdoms, and because we fear that 
 under the former the lal)ours of English, Irish, and Scotch 
 representatives would be too severe for any men to dis- 
 charge etKciently. But, Avhilst discussing the principles 
 on which the Federal Legislature might be formed, we must 
 not ibrget that the possibility of forming such a legisla- 
 ture at all is vehemently denied. Mr. Smith has indi- 
 cated ' the ditference of franchise, and the hopeless difficulty 
 of settling the proportion between the English and Colonial 
 members,' as amongst the obstacles. As to the former of 
 these it has been solved by the Reform Bill of 1866. The 
 franchise in Eno-land is now as low as it is in most of the 
 Colonies, so that that difficulty has disappeared since the 
 gentleman wrote. Independently of this, however, it 
 may be remarked that, were a new legislature created, it 
 could fix a new and uniform rate of qualification at its 
 j)leasure. As to the difficulty of settling the proportion 
 of English and Colonial representatives, it does not seem 
 to us to be very formidable. The rapid growth of the 
 Colonies would, of course, render necessary the adoption 
 of a basis under which periodical readjustments could be 
 made at diiferent intervals, as is done in the United 
 States. Such a basis could be found in either population 
 or taxation. Our own belief is that neither of them would 
 alone serve for an equitable basis, but that such a basis 
 might be found in a combination of the two. If popula- 
 tion were to be ignored in the distribution of taxation, it 
 ■would clearly be unjust to make it supreme in the adjust- 
 
 ' 
 
 I 
 
A BASIS OF T^EPRKSKXTATIOX. 
 
 105 
 
 ment of representation. To do so would he to arrange 
 burdens acoordin<; to tlie system of rthitivc equality, and 
 privileges according to that of absolute equality. It is 
 true that modern democracy always insists on such a 
 distribution of privileges and burdens ; but it is clear that 
 the equality which im])oses on one man the payment of a 
 sum of money perhajts one hundred times as great as that 
 which it imposes on another, is fundamentally difl'ci'cnt 
 from the equality which makes the power of each man to 
 influence his neighbours, or the State, precisely the 
 same. The injustice of such a system when ap|)lied to 
 communities will be recognised by many who refuse to 
 admit it to be inequitable towards individuals ; conse- 
 quently we should never think of proposing that each 
 country should be represented in the Federal Legislature 
 proportionately to its i)opulation,and taxed proportionately 
 to its proj)erty. Neither do we think that the basis of 
 representation and taxation should be absolutely identical. 
 Some natural instinct always seems to hinder the ])arties 
 on either side carrying their principles to their logical 
 results. Men who announce as the first article of their 
 political creed the sovereignty of the people and the in- 
 fallibility of the majority, yet seek in an Ui)i)er House a 
 check on the free exercise of the popular will ; and men 
 who declaim loudly ccmcerning the rights of property are 
 never found to maintain that political influence should 
 increase in the same ratio as do contributions to the 
 revenue. We would act in the same way. We think 
 that one half of the members of the Federal l-icgislature 
 should be distributed according to the 2)opulation, and 
 the other half according to the taxation of the several 
 countries therein represented; and that a readjustment 
 should take place at the completion of the decennially- 
 recurring census. At all events, in some such basis 
 means could be found of overcoming the ' hopeless diffi- 
 
 
 1 
 
 'is 
 
 ■ i : 
 
100 A COF.DMST OX THK COLONIAL QrKSTION". 
 
 ciilty of scttlinn- tlie j>r<))M)rti()U between tlie I'lif^llsli 
 aiid tlic Colonial meinlxiis ; ' but, for reasons hei( at'tcr to 
 be explained, we do not tliink tiiut the first bu^is tshould 
 be rejiank'd as unjilteral)le. 
 
 It may be urj^ed, however, that, even were the rehitivo 
 representation of tlie British Islands and tlie Colonies 
 satisfaetorily adjusted, it would be impossible for (Colonists 
 to find amonixst themselves a sufficient niunber of men 
 duly (|ualified to act as their representatives. The 
 Colonies, it may be argued, are destitute of anything like 
 a landed aristocracy, or a body of men ])osscssing realised 
 wealth ; and, in the absence of such classes, none could be 
 found who could afford to surrender so much of their 
 time as would be consumed in travelllnii; to and from the 
 seat of government and in there discliarging the duties of 
 legislators. It is perfectly true that the Colonies could 
 not suj)ply men who could afford to undertake the dis- 
 charn-e of these duties without rcnnmeration for their 
 services, or an indcnmity for expenses. But let such an 
 indemnity be granted to the members of the le<;isluture, 
 and the difficulty would at once vanish. We are aware 
 that a strong feeling against paying legislators exists in 
 England. But it may fairly be doubted Avhcther the 
 feeling is well founded. It is thought, Ave believe, that 
 to grant any remuneration to the representatives would 
 be to o[)en the legislature to demagogues. It might, 
 possibly, lead to that result in England, where Parliament 
 is practically closed to any save men of wealth ; but it 
 Avould simultaneously provide safeguards against their 
 ])ower to do mischief in the opening Avhich it would afford 
 to men of tale^it ;iiid education, avIio now in the periodical 
 ])ress furnish many of the thoughts of statesmen, to offer 
 their views on the floor of the House, and bring their 
 ])Owers to the elucidation of political problems in the 
 arena where the course of action in reference to them 
 
 I V ^ ■ 
 
IXDK.MMTV TO MK.MnK'.lS. 
 
 TO" 
 
 must at last \)V decided. Nouo n\n douitt lliat sueli 
 men would he uuich iui»re useful in tlu; leLfisliture than 
 iu their |)rcsent sjihere ; or that the ehi.^s disposed to -ei d 
 denui;i;o<^ues to i'arliauient would listen to them inueli 
 more contidin^Iy, and respeetl'ully, than thoy woidd to 
 mcmhers oC the class which they look upon as their 
 oppressors. The want of such politicians — men who prior 
 to the passage of the first Uel'orni liill, used to he returned 
 by the nomination boroughs — has been felt ever since 
 1832; and, unless the House of Conunons is permanently 
 to deteriorate, some means of introducing them into it 
 must be found. The i)ayment of members would probably 
 furnish one nutans of attaining this di'sidcnitinif. So long 
 as the intellectual calibre of the House is kept at a high 
 mark, the demagogue, even if he should find his way into 
 it, would, when there, be powerless to effect any mischiel'; 
 whilst his power wM)uld increase pi'eeisely in the sanu; 
 dejxree as the intellect of the House declIiuMl. It Is vcrv 
 doubtful whethei' the landed and moneyed aristocracy of 
 England can alone furnish as hum' an amount of talent 
 as is requisite to maintain the intellect of the House at a 
 ju'oper jMtch ; and, therefore, eyen were there no question 
 of colonial rei)resentation in the way, it might be well to 
 adopt the indemnification of mendicrs iu order to re- 
 open the House to indigent talent and learning. lUit 
 should this view not be thought correct, an indemnity, 
 say 500/. or 600/., might be granted to colonial uumu- 
 bers exclusiyely, in c(msideration of the fact that, in the 
 dischartje of their duties as members of Parliament, thev 
 would be forced to make much greater sacrifices than 
 would the English members. AVe will not suppose that 
 anybody can be so foolish as to imagine that the re({uisitc 
 amount of talent would not be forthcomino; in the Colonies. 
 All who know the Colonial Legislatures must be aware that 
 it exists iu plenty. It follows that an adoption of the in- 
 
^t^K!^smmi 
 
 ih 
 
 108 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 >! Pi 
 
 \\4 
 
 
 (Icmnity system would at once render it avail !il)le for the 
 Federal Le<^islatiir3. 
 
 There remains to be solved the problem of providing 
 the means of fiirnisliing a colonial representation in the 
 Ui»per House. 1'liis, it will probably be said, is insoluble, 
 i'rom the absence oi' anything like an hereditary aris- 
 tocracy in nearly all the Colonies. The ditficulty, 
 nevertheless, is cliiefly imaginary. An hereditary aris- 
 tocracy is not essential to the formation of a second 
 chamber; nor does its existence [jreclude the construction 
 of it on p. non-hei-cditary basis. Neither equity, nor policy, 
 requires that the lJj)por House of the Federal Legis- 
 lature should be of an hereditary character. The right 
 to one privilege does not convey a right to another still 
 greater. When the union with Scotland was effected, the 
 fact that Scotch peers formed the Upper House of the 
 Scotch Leji'islaturc was not held suthcient to entitle all of 
 them to seats in the House of Lords. They Avere instead 
 allowed to elect a certain niunber of the body to represent 
 them in that House. In like manner, on the union Avith 
 Ireland, the Irish })eers Avere not admitted bodily to the 
 Uj)[)er House, but were allowed a re[)resentati()n in it. 
 We should j»ro[)o;<e to follow the precedent set on each 
 of these occasions, only acting more mildly towards the 
 ])eerage than Avas done in either ijistance. The peers of 
 Ireland and Sc(jtland Avere utterly dispossessed of the 
 right previously enjoyed by them of forming the U})per 
 House of the Legislature in their respective countries. 
 This right might, and should, l)e left intact in the present 
 instance; and the U}»[)er House of the Local Legislatures in 
 England, Ireland, and Scotland be made to consist of the 
 hereditary })eerage of (!ach country. The members of these 
 Ixulies are unquestionably the fittest jiersons Avho can be 
 found to fill that position ; and, if custom can create ii 
 right, they are undoubtedly in possession of it to this 
 
TIIK HOUSE OF LORDS. 
 
 100 
 
 extent. lUit as the ri«2:ht to a seat in the Local Lef!;isla- 
 tures of Scothxnd and Ireland was not considered a 
 sufficient title to anythinfj; more than representation 
 in tin more important Legislature oi' the United Kinj:;- 
 dom, neither do we think that the right to a seat in the 
 Uj)per House of the L^nited Kino-dom forms a title to 
 anything more than rej)resentation in the body which 
 would constitute the still more important Ijcgislature of 
 the United Empire. We would, therefore, in addition to 
 leaving the j)cers in possession of their hereditary rights in 
 the Local Legislatures, allow them to elect, from their own 
 ranks, a certain proportion of the second chamher of the 
 Federal Legislature. This slight concession on the part of 
 the English ]»eers is all that is requisite to ])ave the way 
 for the formation of the Upj)er House of the Federal 
 Legislature on a non-hereditary basis. That once done, all 
 colonial difficulties are at an end, nor are there wanting 
 important considerations in favour of the change on its 
 own merits. 
 
 It is not any hostility to an hereditary chamher or a 
 landed aristocracy which leads us to this conclusioi";. We 
 ap[)rove of the bestowal of hereditary honours on the 
 irround tliat, as the fruit of the lives and labours of j^reat 
 men extends to an indefinite future, so should the rewards 
 of them. As to a landed aristocracy, we believe that, 
 when patriotically inclined, it forms ])robably the most 
 valuable element for the c<mstruction of a representative 
 Cxovernment, as is proved on almost every ])age of the 
 history of England. But none, in view of that history, 
 can contend that the existence <if an hereditary chamber 
 is essential to its utilisation ; or that the power of the 
 L^I)per House is necessarily increased by seats in it being 
 hereditary instead of for life only. We fear, on the 
 contrary, that the exclusively aristocratic character of 
 the House of Lords is tending to reduce its influence to 
 
 m 
 
ir 
 
 110 A COLONIST OX Till-: COLONIAL QUKSTION. 
 
 
 )!i 
 
 a point inconsistent with a due fulfilment of the objects for 
 wliich such a body exists ; and it is chit fiy for this reason 
 that we should desire to see the second chamber of the 
 Federal Legislature formed on a somewhat different 
 basis. 
 
 There cannot be any doubt tliat for the last forty years 
 the House of Lords has been })assing bills which were 
 distasteful to a large majority of the members ; and that, 
 since 1866, it has ajireed to measures which were conscien- 
 tiously disapproved of by almost all of them. Now, whether 
 the Lords were right or wrong in these opinions, it is 
 equally clear that a body which is afraid, on account of 
 the circumstances under which it exists, to act accord- 
 inijly as it believes to be for the good of the common- 
 wealth, is not likely to conduce much to the national 
 benefit. If it is wrong in disap})roving of the measures 
 which it unwillingly adopts, it acts as a bar to the 
 triumph of Truth, and furnishes permanent sources of 
 ill-will in the community. If it is right in believing 
 them to be pernicious, it fails in the discharge of the 
 very first duty for which it exists, and allows error to 
 gain sway in the liope that, by so doing, it may esca])e 
 unpleasant consequences to itself. This state of affairs 
 must always be mischievous. No prerogative should ever 
 be entrusted to men, unless it is intended that they should 
 use it whenever they believe it to be for the permanent 
 interest of the trustees to do so. The great object for 
 which a second chamber exists is to furnish an answer 
 to the question, What is truth ? It should, therefore, be 
 constructed in such a maimer that its members will 
 neither prejudge the case, nor, having once reached an 
 intellectual conviction, hesitate to maintain it. We fear 
 that the House of Lords does not at present fulfil these 
 requisites. It must be admitted, we think, that many of 
 its members inherit their political theories; and that 
 
IlErOXSTRlTTIOX OF TIIK I'PPER HOUSE. 
 
 Ill 
 
 ever 
 Ihoiikl 
 lueiit 
 t for 
 iswer 
 e, be 
 
 will 
 (1 an 
 
 fear 
 these 
 ,ny of 
 
 that 
 
 many more, who have ])erf;onally tlioiiirht them out, sacri- 
 fice convictions in a manner which, did they sit in the 
 Commons, they would consider to be highly unbecoming. 
 AVe are well aware that it is a generous and ])atnotic 
 desire to avoid anything like a dead-lock which induces 
 the/n to act in this manner. But, even in the United 
 Kingdom, a time must come when this course of action 
 will reach an end, and something be demanded that the 
 Lords will refuse to grant; and in the proposed Federa- 
 tion it would not work at all. In such an Em})ire the 
 Ui)])er House would be a much more important element 
 of the Legislature than it is in the United Kingdom at 
 ])resent ; and it Avould be essential to form its constitution 
 in such a manner as to make it emphatically a ' chamber 
 of statesmen.' 
 
 It seems to us that the course most likely to lead to 
 the formation of a chamber embodying this and the 
 various other qualifications needed in the Upper House 
 of the Federal Legislature, would be to open different 
 means of access to it. W^e would suggest that one j)ro- 
 ])ortit)n — we will not say how much — of the Mouse should 
 be elective ; that a second proportion should consist of 
 men who had filled certain offices in the State, as is pro- 
 ])osed by Mr. Mill in his hypothetical scheme for a second 
 chamber in England ; • that a third proportion should 
 
 ' ' Were the place vacant in England tor sucli a senate (and I need 
 scarcely say that this is a mere hypothesis), it might W eoniposfd of sonic 
 sucli elements as the following. All who were or had been members of the 
 Legislative Commission described in a former chapter, and whicli I regard a.s 
 Hn indispensable ingredient in any well-constituled popular Go\ernnient : 
 ■ill who were or laid been chief justices, or heads of any of tlie superior 
 courts of law or equity: all who hud for five years filled the office of 
 puisne judge: all who had for two years tilled any cabinet oifice ; but 
 these should also bo eligible to the House of Commons, and, if elected 
 niembcrs of it, their peerage or senatorial office should be ludd in suspense. 
 The conditiuu of time is needed to prevent persons lieiiiiz named cal)inet 
 ministers merely to give them a seat in the senate; and the period of two 
 
 
■MP 
 
 -^r-^-^^ 
 
 I) t 
 
 
 M I 
 
 fi 
 
 112 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 consist of members to be appointed by the Crown uncon- 
 ditionally ; and that a few hereditary seats mi_g;ht, j)erhaps, 
 be sprinkled in with advantage, to keep alive the principle. 
 The elective members we would have chosen, in the 
 Colonies, by both branches of the Colonial Legislatures, 
 and in the British Islands, by the Upper Houses only, 
 in order to leave untouched the hereditary rights of the 
 peerage. It would of course be requisite to allot a 
 certain number of these representatives to each province, 
 and this number, for reasons hereafter to be explained, 
 we do not think should vary : and it might also be need- 
 ful to exact, in the case of the colonial members, certain 
 qualifications of residence and property, and to grant 
 them, as well as their brethren in the Lower House, an 
 indemnity. Seats, of course, should beheld for life; but 
 whether a seat should carry with it a title is a question on 
 
 years is suggested, that the same term which qualifies them for a pension 
 might entitle them to a scnatorship : all who had filled the office of coni- 
 mandei'-in-ehief ; and all who. having commanded an army or a flett, had 
 been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes : all who had 
 held during ten years first-class diplomatic appointments : all who had 
 been Governors-General of India or British America, aud all who had held 
 for ten years any colonial governorships. The permanent Civil Service 
 blunild also be represented ; all should be senators who had filled during 
 tun years the important offices of Under-Secretary to the Treasury, perma- 
 nent Under-Secretary of State, or any others equally high and responsible. 
 If along with the persons thus qualified by practical experience in the ad- 
 ministration of public atfairs any representation of the speculative classes 
 were to bo included — a thing in itself desirable — it would be worth con- 
 sideration whether cei-taiu professorships in certain iiational institutions, 
 after a tenure of a few years, might confer a seat in the senate. Mere 
 scientific and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable ; they 
 imply a power of selection, whereas the other appointments speak for them- 
 selves ; if the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected 
 witli ]>olitics they are no evidence of the special qualities required, whilst if 
 political they would enable successive ministries to deluge the House with 
 }>arty toolis.' — Rrprcf^nifativ Croi'mnninf, chap. xiii. [We see nothing 
 wanting here save some special representation of the interests of Christian 
 morality.] 
 
ADVANTAGE OF SUCH IlECONSTRUCTIOX. 
 
 113 
 
 if com- 
 vt, hiid 
 10 had 
 no had 
 id held 
 Service 
 during 
 perma- 
 iisible. 
 ho ad- 
 classps 
 |th con- 
 Itulions, 
 Mere 
 le; they 
 r them- 
 inneeted 
 hilst if 
 se with 
 nothing 
 hristiiin 
 
 which we need not here enter, as it is not of a very 
 j)r!U'tical cliaracter where titles are a recognised j)art of 
 the institutions of the Empire. We believe that such a 
 body as we have sketclied could not fail to prove as great 
 a blessing to the British Empire as is the Senate to the 
 United States. The members personally qualified would 
 brii>g to it the highest statesmanlike exi)erience of the 
 day ; through the Crown-nominated members obscure 
 or unpopular talent and ballast could be introduced ; by 
 nominees of the Local Legislatures, some of the ' sj)irit of 
 the age ' would find its Avay into a place where it is often 
 wanted ; and we need only point to the history of the 
 United States Senate to prove that these bodies gene- 
 rally choose to be represented by the best talent avail- 
 nl)le. The peerage would be fairly influential in it, and 
 l)y means of a few hereditary seats, the historic names of 
 the Empire could be kept in that place of honour which 
 is their right. In such an assembly all sides of every 
 question would be sure to find advocates of the very 
 highest ability, in which case it could not fail to discharge 
 its duties fearlessly and efficiently, and by the sheer force 
 of genius to command respect for its decisions. But 
 should this scheme not be approved of, there is a simpler 
 means of settlement available. Peerages for life are, in 
 the opinion of many eminent lawyers, already constitu- 
 tional. At all events, a bill could be passed legalising 
 them, and the Crown could then call to the House of 
 Lords a suflScient number, or a definite proportion, of 
 colonial life peers. Th other mode of settlement, how- 
 ever, we believe to be much uku'c likely to prove beneficial 
 to all parties. 
 
 Such is the manner in which we think it possible to 
 overcome the constitutional difliiculties in the way of the 
 I'ormation of a Federal Legislature for the Empire. As 
 to the possibility of creating such a body, and the necessity 
 
1 
 
 i) ■ 
 
 ■j 
 
 ' i; 
 •3i 
 
 M\ : 
 
 114 A COLONIST OX TIIH COLONIAL QUKSTION. 
 
 for so (loin*; if it is desired to maintain tlic intojrritv of 
 the Emjure, we have no doubt whatever. But when con- 
 sidering the details of such a measure, we feel painfully 
 the difficulties of a task which would tax severely the 
 intellects of the foremost statesmen of our age and 
 country. In the language of Dr. Arnold on Church 
 Keform, we would say : ' As to the manner of carrying 
 these principles into effect, I am far from jiroposing any- 
 thing with equal confidence. Nor am I anxious about 
 any particular measure which I may have ventured to 
 recommend, if anything can be suggested ])y others which 
 may effect the same great object more comjjletely.' For 
 this reason it is that we have not hesitated in any case, 
 where two courses seemed available, to indicate both, 
 leavinjj their relative merits for further discussion. AVe 
 know that, in having attempted so much as we have done, 
 W'C have acted in opposition to the views of an able 
 advocate of an Imj)erial Federation ' Avho condemns 
 attempts ' to limn out in detail the form of a British 
 Federal system,' and alleges that ' at present it is for 
 the federalist simply to show his doctrine to be reasonable, 
 his suggestions to be pr hud facie practical, his system to 
 be desirable, and to demonstrate that it deserves to be 
 made the subject of united conference and negotiation.' 
 We fully endorse the views enunciated in the latter quo- 
 tation, but do not see how it is possible to prove the 
 scheme to be either reasonable, practicable, or desirable, 
 otherwise than by refuting the arguments put forth 
 against it as unreasonable, impracticable, and unde- 
 sirable, to e.Obct which an explanation of the manner 
 in V. ! ' ' '.stacles may be conquered is essential. 
 
 * n. e i •'^ more objection, of a constitutional charac- 
 ter, V uich )j~ V possibly be urged against Federation. It 
 
 
 ■• The author of ' Ginx's Baby,' in the Contcmporari/ lit view for April. 
 
L'cll 
 
 itish 
 for 
 able, 
 m to 
 o be 
 tion.' 
 
 quo- 
 the 
 rable, 
 
 forth 
 Linde- 
 aimer 
 
 larac- 
 It 
 
 pril. 
 
 DELAY IN APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE. 
 
 115 
 
 arises from the need of making ajjpeals to the people by 
 means of a dissolution of Parliament, and a general election 
 when the Executive and the House of Commons are at 
 variance. It may be aroiied that, even supposing the 
 whole framework of a Federal Government erected, it 
 would be impossible to carry out such appeals within a 
 reasonable si)ace of time, in which case tliere would 
 remain no means of carrying on the Quoen's government 
 by bringing the executive and legisl'itive autliorities into 
 unison. It is quite certain that such appeals are a 
 necessity of the constitution as at present administered; 
 and also that to comj)lete the process in the proposed 
 Federation would require about six months. The delay, 
 however, seems to us more likely to be beneficial than 
 pernicious. The questions on which these direct appeals 
 are made are almost always those of internal policy. It 
 is, consequently, jtrobable that such appeals would be 
 less numerous under a federal than under a national 
 government. But we will not insist on this point. The 
 only evil which would ensue from the lengthened time 
 consumed in making the ai)peal would be that a defeated 
 ministry could remain in ofKce some three or four months 
 longer than at present. This evil, Ave think, would be 
 very light; and nuich more than compensated by the 
 increased probability of obtaining an equitable and in- 
 telligent response, which would be induced by the electors 
 haviuir had tune to weii>;h the merits of the case. It has 
 been well observed by Sir Henry Bulwer that ' Ileason 
 predouunates at the end of every crisis, but has her 
 voice drowned at the commencement;' and by Sir 
 A. Alison that ' Public opinion is almost always wrong 
 in the outset, but almost always right in the end ; and 
 the reason is that in the former case it is formed by the 
 unthinking many, and in the latter by the thinking few.' 
 These observations arc true in reference to all times ; 
 
 I 2 
 
 i . i 
 

 It ' 
 
 f 
 
 ;■?! 
 
 
 m t 
 
 t ! 
 
 
 111) A COLO.Vr^T ox TIIR COLO.VIAL QUKSTION. 
 
 but are cinj)liati('iilly so in rco'iird to our own era ; be- 
 cause never before could thought be utiU.sed so rapidly as 
 it can now through the press. But raj)idly as it can be 
 utilised, it is still impossible for it to gain sway during 
 the few weeks now consumed in making an appeal to the 
 |)eo])le; and the consequence is that erroneous decisicms 
 arc frequently returned and rash measures adopted, the 
 full meaninn; of which is not realised. This danii;er would 
 be nmch lessened by the increased time afforded for a 
 discussion of the mei'its of the points at issue ; and when 
 we remember the enormous importance of arriving at the 
 truth in such cases, it seems to us that the minor evil of 
 delay is one which might be very cheerfully borne, in 
 consideration of the safeguard afforded by it against the 
 greater evil of the ascendancy of falsehood. 
 
 There is also another important constitutional question 
 which would be raised by the establishment of an Imperial 
 Federation. It is >,hether, un'^T this system of govern- 
 ment, it would be requisite to establish a Supreme Court, 
 similar to that of the United States, to act as arbiter 
 between the several authorities of the Empire, or whether 
 Parliament coidd remain as at present practically omni- 
 })otent in the sphere of government. The subject Avonld 
 deserve more careful consideration, probably, than any 
 other involved in the scheme ; but as it does not touch 
 the possibiliti/ of the establishment of such a polity as 
 we advocate, we shall not here enter on the consideration 
 of it. 
 
 Having thus endeavoured to prove that it is practicable 
 to overcome the alleged difficulties in the way of the for- 
 mation and working of the machinery of a Federal 
 Government of the Emjnre, we have next to examine the 
 probability of such machinery proving stable if erected. 
 
117 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 r U A C r I C A L D 1 F F I C U L i' I K S. 
 
 
 MoiiE impoitunt, and more deserving of careful attention, 
 than any of tlie ohs^taclcs in the way of Federation whicli 
 we have yet considered is that l)raiich of the subject 
 M'hich now rises before us. We liavc no doul)t whatever 
 that, in the event of a Federal (iovernnient of the Enij)ire 
 being establisiied, it would j»rove fully equal to the dis- 
 charge of its duties, despite the absence of geogra})hical 
 luiity in the countries under its sway. E(jually are we 
 convinced that the constitutional ditliculties in the way 
 of the foi'niation of such a Government could be overcome ; 
 and if our readers are not of the same o[)inion, we can 
 attribute the fact only to our own bad advocacy of a good 
 cause. But we are well aware that every word which we 
 have written might be perfectly unimpeachable, and yet 
 the scheme which we advocate completely impracticable. 
 It is clear that there is nothing in the physical conforma- 
 tion of the United States, or of England, to -render im- 
 l)0ssible the rule of an absolute monarch in the former 
 instance, or that of a democratic; republic in the latter ; 
 and it is also evident that a poj)ular i)arty })ossessed of a 
 majority in the legislature of either country might efiect a 
 revolution initiating the new system in it. But how long 
 would the new form of government continue in existence, 
 under present circumstances, in either case ? Would it 
 contain in itself the elements of stability ? This is the vital 
 
FF 
 
 J18 
 
 A COLOXIST OX TTTE COLOXIAL QIHSTIOX. 
 
 ^' 
 
 I* 
 I' 
 
 point in any, and every, schoinc afFocting tlio political 
 interests of nationf^. It is evident that despotism would 
 not ' AV(uk ' in the States, nor democracy in Eno:land, as 
 the conditions under whidi either may prove beneficial are 
 wanting, (lovernmental constitutions must everywhere 
 be adapted to the wants of the j)eople to be governed. 
 No nation will tolerate a form of government which 
 it dislikes, if there be any reasonable chance of over- 
 throwing it ; and no form of re})rescntative govern- 
 ment, at all events, can long exist unless the great 
 majority of the people are satisfied that it conduces to 
 their benefit. There was no doubt of the ability of the 
 Federal (iovernment of the United States to fulfil all 
 its functions; the manner in which it exercised its prero- 
 gatives was the cause which led to secession, and a fierce 
 civil war, which have probably sown the seeds of dissolu- 
 tion in the American Union. The discontent at its 
 course of action was induced by the existence of hostile 
 feelings and interests in different parts of the Union, 
 rendering it possible to secure the loyalty of one 
 section only at the cost of the disloyalty of another. 
 Wherever such hostility of interest or of feeling exists, 
 there it is useless to attempt to form a Federation. Free 
 nations will remain united politically only so long as they 
 are united in heart. Are, then, the feelings and interests 
 of the several parts of the British Empire which we have 
 ])roposed to unite in one great Federation, sufficiently in 
 unison to render it probable that, if such a scheme of 
 government as we have sketched were established, they 
 would accept its results harmoniously ? Would the 
 enforcement of the terms of union on all be likely to 
 induce discontent with union on the part of any ? Unless 
 favourable ansAvers can be returned to these questions, 
 physical and constitutional difficulties may be annihi- 
 
 
Mil. fi{i:i:ma\ ox fkukijalism. 
 
 ir.) 
 
 latcd, and still any attempt to form a Federation of the 
 Empire utterly useless. 
 
 In considerinj^ these questions, it may be well, in the 
 first instMuee, to turn from details to principles; to 
 examine the eonditions requisite for the sueeess of the 
 Federal form of <;overnment ; then to in(juire Avhether 
 they are to he found in the countries to which it is j)ro- 
 ])osed to apply it; and finally to consider the prohahilitv 
 of bcinj^ able to overcome the difficulties peculiar to th« 
 ])resent case. The 'circumstances under which a Federal 
 Union is desirable' have been set forth so clearlv bv 
 Mr. Freeman in his Ilistort/ of Federal Govcrnmnitx, 
 that we think we shall be most likely to arrive at a cor- 
 rect conclusion on the abstract question by endeavourini^ 
 to a})ply his })rincij)lcs to the case before us. Mr. 
 Freeman writes of Federalism as fcrllows : — 
 
 ' It is a system eminently suited for some circumstances, 
 eminently unsuited for others. Federalism is in its place 
 whenever it ai)]>cars in the form of closer union. 
 Europeans, accui^tomed to a system of large consolidated 
 States, are a})t to look ujjon Federalism as a system of 
 disunion, and therefore of weakness. To a Greek of the 
 third century B.C., to an American in 1787 it presented 
 itself as a system of union and therefore of strength. The 
 alternative was not closer union butAvider separation. A 
 kingdom of Peloponnesos or of America was an absurdity 
 too ijreat to be thousj-ht of. A single consolidated 
 republic was almost equally out of the question. The 
 real question was, Shall these cities, these states, remain 
 utterly isolated, perha})s hostile to one another, at most 
 united by an inefficient and precarious alliance ? — oi* 
 shall they, while retaining full internal independence, bi; 
 I'used into one nation as regards all dealings with other 
 Powers ? Looked at in this light, the Federal system is 
 emphatically a system of union and of that strength 
 
 
 :r 
 
 v^\ 
 
 ;:j 
 
 I. i 
 
120 A COLONIST ON TIIF. COLONIAL Ql'KSTION. 
 
 if. i 
 
 ! 
 
 I !i 
 
 in 
 
 
 lilii 
 
 wliiclj follows upon union. TIk; Fedorjil connection is in 
 its place wlierever the several nienibers to l)e united nra 
 fitted for that specie*.^ of union and for no other. It re- 
 quires a sufficient dei^iree ofconununity in orin;in or feelin<jj 
 or interest, to allow the several nienihers to work together 
 up to a certain point. It requires that there shoidd not 
 be that ])erfect de<j!;rec of connnunity, or rather identity, 
 which aUows the several menihers to be fused to<rether 
 for all purposes. Where there is no conuinmity at all, 
 Federalism is inappropriate ; tlie cities, or states, had 
 better remain wholly indc'pendent. Where comnumity 
 rises into identity, Federalism is c(jually inapj)ro|n'iate ; 
 the cities or states had better sink into mere (lounties <»f 
 n kinjjjdom in' (consolidated rej)ublic, and take their 
 chance of the advantages or disadvantages ol' lar^e states. 
 But in the intermediate set of circumstances, the circum- 
 stances of Peloponiu'sos 8tru<;<^ling against Macedonia, 
 of Switzerland strugglinnj against Austria, of the 
 Netherlands struggling against Spain, of the American 
 colonies struggling against Fngland, Federalism is the 
 true solvent. It gives as much of union as the members 
 
 need, and not more than they need Wherever 
 
 either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, 
 Federalism is out of ])lace. It is out of place if it 
 attempts either to break asunder what is already more 
 closely united, or to unite what is wholly incai)able of 
 union. Its mission is to unite to a certain extent what is 
 capable of a certain amount of union and no more. It is 
 an intermediate point between two extremes, capable of 
 being either des])ised us a compromise or of being extolled 
 as the golden mean.' ' 
 
 The circumstances of England and her Colonies seem to 
 answer almost exactly to those in which ]Mr. Freeman de- 
 clares Federalism to be in its place. It would there unite 
 ' History of Federal Governments, pp. 108-110. 
 
ITS SIITAIUIJTY TO TIIK KMIMRI'. 
 
 r.M 
 
 • ill closer union' tli;m at prosctit cduutrios t«» nliicli flic 
 altcniativo is, not ;i .still more intimate union, l)Ul * wider 
 separation.' As in the cases of I'eloponnesos ami .America, 
 a consolidated rei)ul)lic is ' an absurdity toe ^reat to 
 l)e thou<;lit of, ' and the real choice lies betwci'ii ' utter 
 isolation ' and * unity as rcixards all dealinus with other 
 Powers,' accom|)anied hy ' full internal independence.' 
 We have tidier prool' than existed in the case of I'clo- 
 ponnesos or vVmerica that ' the several nu'inhers to he 
 united are fitted lor that speci(!s of union and for no other,' 
 in the facts that they have for a lonj^ time constituted a 
 harmonious modified Federation, and that a system of 
 •^overnnumt under which certain mend>ers were dcjirived 
 of' full internal itidependeiice ' has been tried ai»d failed. 
 Their history proves indisputably that there is ' a sutK- 
 cient de<^ree of community in origin or feeling or interest 
 [or rather in origin, feeling, and interest] to allow the 
 several members to work together up to a certain ])oint;' 
 and it is etiually indisputable that they cannot be ' fused 
 together for all purposes.' The mend)ers ai"e not, indeed, 
 struggling for national independence against foreign foes, 
 as in the cases mentioned; but the Colonies are, one and 
 all, incapable of maintaining their indejx'ndoncc single- 
 handed ; and the growth of mighty empires on every sidt; 
 of Enghuui renders it essential to her safety to be able 
 to keep ])ace with their growth, which can be done only 
 by utilising the resources of hei' n;rowini>- em])ires bevond 
 the sea. For these j)urposes a Federal union would give 
 'as much of union as the mend)ers need, and not more than 
 they need.' It is affirmed that, ' wherever either closer 
 union or more entire separation is desirable. Federalism 
 is out of i)h)cc.' In the present instance it is certain that 
 closer union is not desirable ; and, if our arguments be 
 correct, neither is entire se[)aration ; conse([uently we 
 may conclude that Federalism would not be ' out of place. 
 
 \''. I 
 
122 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION, 
 
 f • 
 
 ■I 
 
 And if it be a correct statement that * ITS MISSION is 
 
 TO UNITK TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WHAT IS' CAPABLE 
 OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF UNION AND NO MORE,' Can 
 
 there be tlie shadow of a doubt that it is exactly the 
 remedy needed to-day by the British Empire, inasmuch 
 as its history i)roves incontestably that its members are 
 capable of a certain amount of union and no more ? Almost 
 every one of Mr. Freeman's theories as to the * circum- 
 stances under whicli a Federal union is desirable ' finds 
 its counterpart in the present relations of England and 
 her Colonies. Hence, if that gentleman be correct, the 
 Empire is admirably suited to const'tute a Federation 
 such as we propose should be formed. 
 
 Another great thinker, however, has enunciated his 
 views on this subject. Mr. Mill, in his work on Repre- 
 sentative Government, has devoted a chapter to the Federal 
 form of it ; and in it he carefully inquires into the 
 qualifications calculated to fit different countries for be- 
 coming members of a Federation. We will not say that 
 we endorse all he says ; but as we do not wish to si? . 'k 
 from meeting 'the whole truth' wherever it may bo 
 found, we shall endeavour to apply his principles to the 
 case before us. The first requisite for a Federation is,, 
 according to Mr. Mill, the existence of a large amount of 
 mutual sympathy amongst its members : — 
 
 ' To render a Federation advisable, several conditions 
 are necessary. The first is that there should be a sufii- 
 cient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. 
 The Federation binds them always to fight on the same 
 side ; and if they have such feelings towards one another, 
 or such diversity towards their neighbours, that they 
 would generally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the 
 Federal tie is neither likely to be of long duration, nor to 
 be well observed Avhilst it subsists. The sympathies 
 available for the f^irpose are those of race, language, and 
 
m 
 
 MR. MILL OX FEDERALISM. 
 
 123 
 
 religion, and, above all, of political Institutions, as conducinjjf 
 most to a feeling of identity of political interest. When 
 a few free states, separately insufficient for their own 
 defence, are hemmed in on all sides hy military or feudal 
 monarch s, who hate and despise freedom even in a 
 neighbour, those states have no chance of preserving 
 liberty and its blessings but by a Federal union. The 
 common interest arising from this cause, has, in Swit- 
 zerland, for several centuries, been found adequate to 
 maintain efficiently the federal bond, in spite not only of 
 diversity of religion, when religion was the grand source 
 of political enmity throughout Europe, but also in spito 
 of great weakness in the constitution of the Federation 
 itself. In America, where all the conditions for the 
 maintenance of union existed at the highest point, with 
 the sole drawback of difference of institutions in the 
 single, but most important, article of slavery, this one 
 difference has gone so far in alienating from each other's 
 sympathies the two divisions of the Union that the main- 
 tenance or disruption of a tie of so much value to them 
 both depends upon the issue of an obstinate civil war.' 
 
 We are content to endorse the whole of the above 
 extract, and to undertake to prove that such ' an amount 
 of mutual sympathy ' as is therein described exists between 
 the several members of the Em])ire which it is proposed to 
 unite. In i)roof of the existence of such sympathy we 
 j)oint to tho existence of the Empire under present con- 
 ditions of union. For the senior member of a firm to 
 inform the junior partners that they can leave Avhenever 
 they please, is a course not very likely to strengthen their 
 affection or respect for him : sympathetic feelings will, in 
 such a case, continue to exist rather in spite of his conduct 
 than in consequence of it. Yet what other conduct than 
 the above has the ruling })arty in England been ])ursuing 
 towards the Colonies for the last twenty-five years ? 
 
 i"ij 
 
m 
 It 
 
 ;!l 
 
 (, 
 
 ll 
 
 Hi 
 
 124 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 Ever since the adoption of free trade an ostentatious 
 repetition of the statement that they could have their 
 independence whenever they wished, has been dinned in 
 their ears ; Canada, in fact, has been all but told to ' get 
 out.' But what is the reply of one and all? At the 
 present day how stands the case ? Canada has been, and 
 is, wooed by Yankee annexationists; insulted by English 
 emancipationists ; told that, in tiic event of war, her lands 
 and cities must be the battle-ground of England and 
 America ; enjoys a foretaste of sucii a lot in being ex- 
 posed to Fenian raids; sees British troops withdrawn even 
 whilst these ruffians sit in council on projects of attack ; 
 hears that she must bear the cost of ercctin<x fortresses and 
 of raising a provincial force to garrison them, and provide 
 for her own defence in a war which nuiy arise in consequence 
 of quarrels in which she has not any direct concern ; and 
 this whilst her influence avails not the Aveight of a straw 
 in favour of either war or peace. Yet does she flinch ? 
 New Zealand is exposed to the inroads of raging savages ; 
 and troops, alone able to defend her people, have been or- 
 dered to be withdrawn whilst they Avere being massacred. 
 Cape Colony is told that it will soon be left in a like 
 position to New Zealand, and that against a race Avhose 
 ])rowess has been significantly displayed in times past. 
 The West Indies stand almost ruined by English legis- 
 lation during the last forty years. And all find those 
 matters on which their very life de[)ends settled for them, 
 without appeal, by English ministers, intent above all 
 things on conciliating a majority of the House of Commons, 
 and are left in the position of inferiority necessarily 
 incident to Colonies ; yet what signs of disloyalty are to 
 be seen ? The reality, or the prospect, of troubles from 
 Maories, Kaffirs, Negroes, Fenians, Yankees, subor- 
 dination and possible ruin, are calmly faced ; and from 
 one and all is heard the steady asseveration of love: ' " For 
 
 !. I 
 
m* 
 
 MR. MILL S FIRST CONDITION FULFILLED. 
 
 125 
 
 better for worse ; for richer for poorer ; in sickness or in 
 health, till death do us part " will we stand to old Kngland I ' 
 Or, in the language lately used by a New Brunswick 
 minister : ' Though she slay us, yet will we trust her.' 
 Surely Avhen, under a system of government which in- 
 duces so many of these disturbing causes, such a burning 
 spirit of loyalty to the Fatherland can exist, it would not 
 l)e lessened under another system w^hereby many of them 
 would be removed ? 
 
 If any of our readers should doubt that this would be 
 the case, we advise him to pay a short visit to ' this Canada 
 of ours,' and see for himself the almost romantic love and 
 admiration for everything British that therein exists, and 
 which we doubt not is, from similar causes, developed in 
 other Colonies. It can never be otherwise in any of 
 them until such a quarrel as was waged with the United 
 States has trans[)ired. To the colonist his Fatherland 
 is classic ground. The man who has exchanged it for 
 a new land looks back with a sort of happy melancholy 
 on the scenes of his childhood, and feels for them much of 
 the holy reverence with which we recall rominiscences of 
 a beloved parent in the grave. The native colonist has 
 his ears fed from infancy Avith accounts of the glories of 
 the old land beyond the sea, and of the greatness of the 
 sovereign who rules over it and over him. He passes to 
 the village school and drinks in the Ifistort/ of Eiif/lnnd 
 with greedy appetite ; finds his bosom swell with that 
 exquisite joy which every ardent youth experiences on 
 learning the glories of his Fatherland ; but in the present 
 instance, that land being at a distance, has cast over it, to 
 his eyes, a 'dim religions light ' which makes those glories 
 appear more exquisitely beautiful, and thus renders them 
 still more heart-entrancing, than in ordinary cases. He 
 grows to manhood, and learns that all the liberties which he 
 enjoys he inherits from Britain ; that the conservation of 
 
T 
 
 ilU.i^.J..!..J.J._JU! R_ll.l»» 
 
 ]2G A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 his national freedom mainly depends on the alliance with 
 her ; that much of the garments in which he is clothed, of 
 the tools with which he works, and, more important 
 than all, of the books which he reads, have been derived 
 from the same source ; besides Avhich, he sees that the 
 development of the Land he inhabits must be effected 
 mainly by the importation of British labour and capital. 
 Thus, veneration for the past, pride in the present, and 
 hope for the future, all combine to turn his heart towards 
 the Fatherland with feelings akin to those with which a 
 lloman of old looked on the City of the Seven Hills, and 
 to make him boast his British citizenship with as much 
 jjr.ide as ever any man felt on being able to say : ' Civis 
 Romanus sum!'' One point, at all events, is certain; and 
 that is, that should an adequate amount of sympathy be 
 wanting, the deficiency will not be found in the Colonies. 
 On the other hand late events, and the reception which 
 an emancipationist policy has met with in the United 
 Kingdom, seem to indicate that something of the same 
 sacred flame which glowed in the breast of the immortal 
 Chatham when in his dying moments he prayed that if 
 Britain must fall she might at least fall with honour, still 
 warms the hearts of the great-grandsons of those who 
 heard him. When that spirit has become extinct the 
 sym[)athy requisite to keep the Empire united will be 
 wanting — but not until then. 
 
 Mr. Mill goes on to say : — 
 
 ' A second condition of the stability of a Federal 
 Government is that the separate states should not be so 
 powerful as to be able to rely for protection against 
 foreign encroachment on their individual strength. If 
 they are, they will be apt to think that they do not gain, 
 by union with others, the equivalent of what they sacrifice 
 in their own liberty of action ; and consequently, when- 
 ever tlie policy of the Confederation in things reserved 
 
 i I ; 
 
nv^^ 
 
 MR. mill's second coxditiox fulfilled. 127 
 
 to its cognizance is different from that wliicli any one of 
 its members would separately pursue, the internal and 
 sectional breach will, through absence of sutficient anxiety 
 to preserve the union, be in danger of going so far as to 
 dissolve it.' 
 
 AVe will grant these theories, also, to be correct. In 
 the case of the Colonies it is clear that ti»e condition is 
 fulfilled. There is not one of them that could ' rely for 
 j)rotection against foreign encroachment on its own in- 
 dividual strength.' A consciousness of this fact is one of 
 the causes which to-day render them so intensely desirous 
 as they are to maintain the connection, and the motive 
 would exist as strongly after Federation as at present. 
 It may be said that the contrary is the case as regards 
 England — that she could not only maintain her in- 
 dependence alone, but much more easily when alone than 
 whilst united to the Colonies ; and that a consciousness 
 of this * fact ' is what renders some of her peo})le anxious 
 to end the connection. This, also, may be correct. But 
 if we have succeeded in proving that England would be a 
 direct loser by emancipation — of which proposition it is 
 certain that she would have to be convinced before agree- 
 ing to adopt the Union proposed — such a feeling could 
 not continue under the new regime^ even did the military 
 relations remain on their former footing ; and much less 
 could this feeling last were the martial resources of the 
 orowins: Colonies utilized and brouj^lit to increase the 
 common fund, as we propose should be done. \\e. shall 
 show, hereafter, that by this means the martial strength 
 of England would be enormously increased, which fact 
 would render her probably as anxious as other members 
 to maintain the connection on account of the increased 
 strength which would be derived therefrom. Hence we 
 conclude that Mr. Mill's second condition wnuld be ful- 
 filled in the present instance. 
 
 t 
 
 
 I ! S 
 
128 A COLONIST ON THE COLON FAL QUESTION 
 
 
 ; 
 
 I 
 
 U i 
 
 n 
 
 l':i 
 
 a 
 
 f 
 
 The next, and concluding, condition which Mr. Mill 
 declares to be essential to a Federation is stated as 
 follows : — 
 
 * A third condition, not less important than the two 
 others, is that there be not a very marked inequality of 
 strength among the several contracting states. They 
 cannot, indeed, be exactly equal in resources: in all 
 Federations there will be a gradation of power among the 
 members; some will be more populous, rich, and civilised 
 than others. There is a wide difference in population 
 and wealth between New York and Khode Island ; 
 between Berne and Z ,' y, ris. The essential is that 
 
 there should not be an/ c^ ir. • • so much more powerful 
 than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with 
 many of them combined. If the.-^^ ^^e such a one, and 
 only one, it will insist on being ; it r of the joint 
 deliberations ; if there be two, they will be irresistible 
 when they agree ; and whenever they differ everything 
 will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the 
 rivals.' ^ 
 
 It must be admitted that this condition is not fulfilled 
 in the case of England and her Colonies. The British 
 Islands would be much more powerful than all the 
 Colonies, and could for many years outvote them in the 
 Federal Parliament. Their division into three states by 
 the formation of separate local Governments for England, 
 Ireland, and Scotland, as we have proposed, would bring 
 the situation more into accordance with Mr. Mill's theorv 
 than if they formed only one state ; though even England 
 alone would probably return at first one-half the members 
 of the Lower House. But let it not be inferred that 
 Federation is impossible, in consequence of the non- 
 existence of this one of Mr. Mill's conditions for a Fede- 
 ral Union. The danger which he indicates is that of one 
 ' Representative Government (People's edition), pp. 124, 126. 
 
 
MR. MILLS THIRD REQUISITE EX^VMIXED. 129 
 
 as? 
 
 state capable of vying with many, insisting on being 
 master of the joint deliberations. Before this can be done, 
 the people and re])re.sentatives of that one state must be 
 united against all the rcf^t. But the interests and feelings 
 of the inhabitants of P^ngland are so very various and 
 conflicting that the formation of such a union seems to be 
 almost beyond the reach of possibility, and is certainly 
 beyond probability. Moreover, England is precisely the 
 country which, from the character of its people, and of its 
 legislators, would be least likely of all the members of 
 the Federation to seek for an unfair advantage at the 
 expense of the Empire. The single point on which it is 
 possible that these moral influences might be overcome, 
 is that of the acquisition of commercial ascendancy ; and 
 that is exactly the point on which it is most improbable 
 that the representatives of her rural, manufacturing, and 
 mercantile interests could unite. Besides this, such a 
 union would be almost useless ; if, according to the scheme 
 which we have sketched, the arrangement of the details 
 of the commercial policy of the several members of the 
 Federation were left to be settled by the local legislatures, 
 and its grand principles fixed once for all on the initiation 
 of the Union. On other matters there would be scarcely 
 any temptation for England to unite against the rest of 
 the Empire ; and on this one it is scarcely possible that 
 such a union could be either effected or effective. But 
 in considering the ])ositi()n which England vvould occupy 
 in the proposed Federation, that occupied by the Colonies 
 hi the Emj)ire of to-day should not be forgotten. Thoy 
 now possess no injiuence whatever in reference to the sub- 
 jects which would fall under the action of the Federal 
 Government. Under a Federation of the Emi)ire they 
 would enjoy a considerable amount of influence imme- 
 diately, and more with the la])se of years. If they are 
 loyal to England at present, Avhen she monoi)olises all the 
 
 f 
 
 
 l^il' 
 
;^,iwmxr\.m.j%jmw\... 
 
 'li 
 
 1 
 
 
 H' 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 lv)0 A COLOMST ON THE COLOXIAL QUESTION. 
 
 prerogatives of the Federal Government, would they he 
 less loyal if she, ceasing to do so, should admit them to a 
 share in the loftiest sphere of government, to all the 
 honours of her time-honoured Parliament and of the 
 ]\linisterial henches, to the glories of the army and navy, 
 and to the viceroyalties of mighty kingdoms? If the 
 influence of England over the destinies of the Em{)ire to- 
 day is not too great to be consistent with its voluntary 
 and loyal union, could it be too great if diminished, as it 
 necessarily would be, under Federation? 
 
 The results of an application of Mr. Mill's principles 
 to the case before us may not be so encouraging as those 
 whi(!h followed from tho similar operation with those of 
 Mr. Freeman ; but we are, nevertheless, of opinion that 
 nearly all the conditions which he declares to be requisite 
 to render a Federation advisable are to be found in it ; 
 and that counteracting influences may be relied on as 
 substitutes for the little that may be wanting. We are 
 aware that Mr. Mill takes a different view of the case : 
 but his arguments to prove that these conditions are 
 wanting are based on emancipationist theories, and of 
 course fall with them ; other difficulties which he sujiffcsts 
 we shall consider further on. Meanwhile we think it may 
 fairly be assumed that tlie circumstances of the British 
 Empire approach very closely to those under Avhich these 
 gentlemen affirm an application of Federalism to be prac- 
 ticable and desirable. The circumstances which would 
 tend to hinder the administration of the government of 
 the Empire according to the 2)roposed system have next 
 to be considered. 
 
 1. When inquiring into the possibility of a Federal 
 Government fulfilling its duties to the Empire, we quoted 
 ]\Ir. Mill's opinions on the feasibility of a Federation of 
 its parts, but omitted to analyze any other portion of them 
 than that which related to the point immediately under 
 
FURTIIKR DIFFICULTIES CONSIDKRHD. 
 
 131 
 
 ey be 
 n to a 
 ill the 
 of the 
 nav V , 
 If the 
 lire to- 
 iintary 
 1, as it 
 
 nciplesj 
 s those 
 lose of 
 m that 
 iquisite 
 in it ; 
 on as 
 ^Ve are 
 e case ; 
 t)ns are 
 and of 
 Lijisests 
 it may 
 British 
 h thes(; 
 e prac- 
 would 
 nent of 
 ve next 
 
 ederal 
 quoted 
 tion of 
 )f them 
 
 under 
 
 review. The statements tlien left unnoticed must now 
 be examined. Mr. Mill says of England and her 
 Colonies : ' If they had sufficiently the same interests, 
 ihey have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of 
 taking counsel together. They are no j)art of the same 
 ])ublic; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same 
 arena, but apart, and have only an imperfect knowledge 
 of what passes in the minds of one another. They neither 
 know each other's objects, nor have confidence in each 
 other's principles of conduct.' We are willing to admit 
 that a difficulty might be found to exist here. But we 
 think that it could within a very short time be overcome. 
 The fact is that the disciple of ' progress ' here shuts his 
 eyes to the effects of progress. This is nothing more than 
 is done by his brethren whenever progress seems likely 
 to sap the foundations of any darling theory, so he must 
 not be judged very severely ; but the effect of his action 
 is to lead to a false conclusion. Were communication 
 now as tardy as it was at the beginning of this century, 
 there could be no doubt of Mr. Mill's theories proving 
 correct. It is different, however, when the proceedings 
 of the Imi)erial Parliament are read in Canada, and will 
 shortly be read in Australia, much sooner than at the 
 former period they were read in Ireland, or even in Scot- 
 land, xilready such news is greedily sought after, giving 
 proof of an earnest interest in the affairs of the Father- 
 land ; but how much more earnestly would it be sought 
 after if there were sitting in London a legislature in 
 which the Colonies were represented, and in the pro- 
 ceedings of which they were directly interested? That 
 they have not already ' a sufficient habit of taking counsel 
 together ' is due, in a great measure, to the laborious 
 efforts which have been made to disintegrate them. That 
 they ' never can ' have such a habit, we, who have seen 
 columns of Canadian newspapers filled with Englisli. 
 
 k2 
 
 ¥<'■ 
 
/ 
 
 i 
 
 132 A COLONIST ON thl: colonial qukstion. 
 
 or European, intelligence of the previous day, must be 
 permitted to doubt, nay, even to believe that they tv/w 
 acquire such a habit. The disposition for taking such 
 counsel would be enlarged by the need of it which would 
 be induced by union ; and the means of suj)plying in- 
 stantaneous communication are practically illimitable. 
 The fuller and calmer counsel needed would be supplied 
 by newspapers and periodicals, which could travel across 
 the Atlantic in about ten days, and to or from the 
 Antipodes in about six weeks. The higher class of 
 periodical literature read in Canada already consists 
 almost entirely of English magazines and reviews. Their 
 circulation would certainly be extended in all the Colonies 
 with the increased interest in much of their contents 
 which Avould result from Federation. Finallv, the meet- 
 ing of the representatives of these dift'erent countries in 
 the legislative halls, and their proceedings therein, would 
 constitute an interchange of thought between them, and 
 that the thoughts of their noblest men. We confess that 
 we should not be very sorry to see such men left pretty free 
 to act on their own judgment, and would rejoice if the 
 condition of the Empire should tend to make our statesmen 
 leaders of public opinion instead of its followers, and we 
 admit that we believe they would become such. But, in 
 the presence of such facilities of communication as we 
 have seen would exist, it is just as unlikely that any 
 representative could be led to sacrifice the interests of 
 his constituents through ignorance, or that the feeling of 
 any province regarding the various measures in progress 
 could be mistaken, as is the case to-day with the members 
 and constituencies of the United Kingdom. It is difficult 
 to see what further * taking of counsel ' than that neces- 
 sary to attain such a result would be needed ; the inter- 
 change of this much would be secured by the co-existence 
 of the want and the means of supplying it. 
 
EXCiF.lSH AND COLONIAL SOCIKTV. 
 
 O'} 
 
 rogress 
 
 2. It injiy be said that the framework of socievy in the 
 United Kingdom and in the Coh>nies is essentially differ- 
 ent, being in the former case aristocratic and in the latter 
 democi-atic ; that this fact is likely to render the whole 
 tendency of political thonght diverse in each of these 
 sections of the Empire, and that such diversity would be 
 a standing menace to unity. We are content to admit 
 that it might prove to be a difficulty in the way. Differ- 
 ence of institutions in any form is not calculated to 
 induce that unity of national sentiment which in its 
 fullest development constitutes patriotism. Denuncia- 
 tions of * bloated aristocracies ' might be likely to form a 
 staple ingredient in the harangues of colonial dema- 
 gogues, and assertions to the effect that the interests of 
 the Empire were being sacrificed to those of a selfish 
 oligarchy would, doubtless, not be wanting. But what 
 more would such language be than that which ie now, 
 and long has been, heard almost daily in England itself 
 without inducing any disturbance of the public peace or 
 of the structure of society ? There have always been 
 another side of the case to be presented and a party to 
 present it, and the same would be the case in the Colonies. 
 The distance between the extreme Aving of each party in 
 England is quite as wide as that which exists between 
 English Tories and Colonial Radicals. The latter are, it 
 is probable, much more firmly attached to monarchical 
 institutions than are their Advanced Liberal brethren in 
 Enjjland. ' Distance lends enchantment to the view ' of 
 democracv in the one case, and of a sovereign in the 
 other. And in the case of Colonial Tories, a near contact 
 with democracy has, by forcing them to enter into con- 
 troversy with it face to face, implanted a reason for the 
 faith that is in them, often more clear and consistent than 
 that of English Conservatives. Nor must it be supposed 
 that colonial society is of a cast exclusively democratic. 
 
 iir' 
 
 I!. 
 
 ill 
 
 'iin 
 
T 
 
 f 
 
 ! 
 
 ■ f 
 
 1 ■ 
 
 > I 
 
 |.i 
 
 I - 
 
 4 
 
 1;U A COLOMST OX THK COLOMAh QUKSTIO.V. 
 
 In every couiitiy, poelcty, if allowed ])cacelMlly to devc 
 loj) itself, inihst beeoiue iiicrensiTin;ly aristoeratie with the 
 lapse of years, For the 8imj)le reason that as ' power hej^ets 
 power,' those who have inherited or acennmlated property 
 are constantly being placed in a more advnntai^eons posi- 
 tion for increasing it. The progress of civilization is the 
 progress of inequalities. The wealth or knowledge of the 
 ' labouring classes ' may have been increased very much 
 of late years, but that of the rich or learned has been 
 augmented in a much greater proportion. These natural 
 itifluences are making themselves felt in the Colonies, and 
 will be felt still more in the future. Neither can it be 
 said that that mad worship of ' equality ' which is the 
 leading characteristic of democracies, ])re vails in them. 
 So long as honours are open to all, a colonist feels no 
 jealousy at others than himself gaining them, and always 
 seems pleased at the attainment of them by colonial 
 statesmen from the Im))erial Government. But the main 
 point behind all these facts is that the framework of 
 society in every part of the Empire would be a matter 
 of local concern exclusivelv. AVere the members of the 
 Upper House of the Federal Legislature not hereditary 
 legislators, it would be impossible for any man in the 
 Emi)ire to acquire power otherwise than on the same 
 terms in every part of it. This being the case, and the 
 laws of real property within the control of the local 
 Government in each country, the facts that a different 
 tenure of land, or greater or less equality of condition, 
 prevailed in one part of the Federation than in another 
 could never lead to controversv in the Federal Lcirisla- 
 ture ; and so long as it failed to induce that, it would be as 
 powerless to create ill-feeling between the several parts 
 of the Empire as it is to-day. The Federation Avould form 
 a league of nations united in sympathy by ties of lan- 
 guage, race, religion, and historic glory ; and in interest 
 
SCANTY CULOXIAL UKPKKSK.NTATK ).V. 
 
 1 '"»'i 
 
 I)y commercial aiul polit'u^iil consitlenitions wliich woiilil 
 rcudir tln'ii iiiiidM coiiviucivo to tl>c urowtli of (lu'ii- 
 wc'iilth and iliu (M)nservatioii of tlieii* III)ortIos. Ihidcr 
 tliese ciroumst'inccs, tlicy could suicly allow each m('inl)c'i' 
 to ^^ his own house in such order as he mi<;lit jnefor, 
 wi A quarrelliuf^ in reference to details, when they 
 would be united in a common love of those «>;raii(l j)riM- 
 ci})les of liberty and order enunciated in the (ireat Charter. 
 3. The small proportion of colonial representation in 
 the Federal Legislature at its inception, and its sul)se([uent 
 probable or j)()ssible increase, are alternately used as 
 arguments against Federation. The former dilhculty has 
 come before us in tlie third of Mr. Mill's conditions ; con- 
 cerning the latter he seems des j)erately frightened. ' Let 
 any Englishman,' he says, * ask himself how he should 
 like his destinies to depend on an assembly of which onc- 
 thi' was British-American, and another third South- 
 A 1 and Australian?' It n)ay fairly be replied that 
 
 these different fears, in a great measure, destroy one 
 •another. The Fatherland, profiting by the growth of its 
 offspring, is not likely, in the face of their iiu^reasing 
 power, either to wish or to strive to act unjustly towards 
 them. The offspring, tenderly guarded in youth, and 
 generously treated in maturity, are equally unlikely to 
 feel any jealousy of the guardian to whom they have 
 been indebted for civil liberty, local inde])endence, and 
 imperial nationality, and on whose protection they may 
 still be dependent for the conservation of these l)less- 
 ings. Thus, interest, affection, and prudence would 
 unite to prevent either side from pushing its j)()wers t(» 
 excess. Still less formidable does either danger ai)poar 
 when viewed in detail. It is true that at first the 
 Colonies could not be entitled to over twenty per cent, of 
 the representation. Still such a proportion is by no 
 means insignificant. It is double that which Scotland 
 
 m' 
 
 i'K 
 
 i( ' 
 
 4i 
 
 fl 
 
 t i 
 
mm» 
 
 lo6 A COLONIST OX THE COLOXIAL QUK>TION. 
 
 i:i 
 
 ,1 I 
 
 has possessed in the Imperial Parliament, and which has 
 been found amply sufficient to ensure due attention to all 
 the interests of that country. On questions in which the 
 constitutional riglits of any Colony were involved, there 
 can be little doubt that the colonial representatives would 
 vote together as one man ; for the rights of all the 
 Colonies being identical, to suffer any one of them to be 
 oppressed would serve to establish a precedent against 
 the remainder. As colonial interests are diversified, there 
 might be less unity in the defence of them than of that 
 of colonial rights. But even in this case it is pretty 
 certain that a good deal of fellow-feeling would ])revail, 
 and lead colonists to act together, unless where their 
 interests Avould directly clash. In the former case it is 
 probable, if not positive, that a compact body of one-fifth 
 or even one-sixth of the House would always find suffi- 
 cient support to secure respect for the privileges guaran- 
 teed by the act of union. And in the event of a conflict 
 of interests arising, a similar result would probably ensue 
 from like causes, unless when the policy arraigned should 
 appear favourable to colonial interests generally as well 
 as to those of England, in which case it would not be 
 desirable that the special interest assailed should prevail 
 against them. With each member of the Federation regu- 
 lating its own tariff, as we have proposed, the material 
 interests with which the Federal Legislature would have to 
 deal would be so few that there seems little danger of 
 any conflict arising in reference to them ; and on ques- 
 tions of peace and Avar there is no chance at all of 
 England proving too bellicose for the Colonies, whilst 
 they — with boundless lands uninhabited — are not likely 
 to be affected with any lust of conquest. In no instance 
 could the wishes of any province be neglected, or its 
 interests sacrificed, without its being able to explain and 
 defend its position to a statesmanlike audience. At 
 
CHANCE OF ENGLAND BEING OUTNU.NfBERED. 1 ')' 
 
 re vail 
 
 present, one portion of the Empire can ami does legislate 
 against the interests and wishes of the vest of it, without 
 there being any remedy and scarcely any hearing for the 
 parties aggrieved. Under this system the heart of the 
 British people remains so sound that in the Colonies 
 scarcely .any, and in the British Islands comparatively 
 few, desire dismemberment. Is it not, then, improbable 
 that, under a system of government in which each country 
 would be forced to consider the interests of otheis as 
 well as its own, disturbing causes more powerful than 
 those which have as yet proved insufficient to induce a 
 disruption of the Empire would be introduced ? A small 
 colonial representation would suffice, because colonial 
 rio-hts and intsrests would be otherwise guarded against 
 assault from the legislative majority, whilst that small 
 proportion would steadily increase. In regard to Mr. 
 Mill's bugbear of the ultimate effect of this increase in 
 * an assembly of which one-third was British- American, 
 and another third South-African and Australian,' we 
 Avould remark that the time Avhen the representation of 
 either of these countries would be equal to that of the 
 • British Islands lies so far off" in the dim future that we 
 may fairly be excused from regarding it as a practical 
 point of debate in our day. It is pretty certain, how- 
 ever, that by the time such an event could occur, England 
 would have little reason to fear any hostile combination, 
 as the idiosyncrasies of different parts of the territories 
 indicated would then be so well developed that Xova 
 Scotia would have quite as little in common with British 
 Columbia, or New Zealand with Queensland, as either 
 with England. Furthermore, it is e(iually certain that, 
 should the union last until such changes might occur, its 
 existence could have been maintained only by the disap- 
 pearance of all such local jealousies as are here hinted at. 
 It may, thei efore, fairly be presumed that if our desceud- 
 
 I'lf 
 
 m 
 
138 A (.'OLOXIST ON THE COLONIAL QUIvSTION. 
 
 ■I ! 
 
 ])•( 
 
 ants could agree to live together for so long a period, 
 they could also agree to some measure whereby the difH- 
 culty, should it arise, might be overcome. Nay, we are 
 inclined to think that provision for meeting it might be 
 made even in the act of union ; and, as Mr. Mill's fears 
 are likely to be echoed in England, we shall endeavour 
 to explain the manner in Avhlch \ve think this could be 
 done. It was this difficulty which we had in view when 
 we said that we did not consider the first basis of repre- 
 sentati(m should be regarded as unalterable. 
 
 The proposed Federation would constitute emi)hatically 
 a league of nations, one in race, language, history, and 
 feelings, and probably in interests, but divided Tiom each 
 other by such vast distances that any attempt to intro- 
 duce uniform it If of institutions amongst them would be 
 sheer madness : to keep them always friends and allies is 
 the i»:reat end which should be souuht after in Federation. 
 Under these circumstances the exact distribution of poli- 
 tical power would be of nuich less consequence than in a 
 territory geographically united. AYe are, therefore, of 
 opinion that it would not be essential to the Colonies to 
 insist on- a permanently progressive increase in the pro- 
 portion of their representatives, after their collective re- 
 presentation had become equal to that of the British 
 Islands. We Avould propose to have it provided that, 
 after that j)oint had been reached, the proportion of re- 
 presentation should remain unaltered until the proportion 
 of colonial taxation had become identical Avith that of 
 their representation ; and that thereafter re])resentation 
 and taxation should be apportioned on the same basis, 
 according to which the only title to an increase of repre- 
 sentation would con^st in liability to the payment of an 
 increased proportion of taxation ; and, als' , that a hint 
 should then be taken from the United States, where re- 
 presentation in the two chambers is adjusted on different 
 
MIIANS TO .SECURH EXfiLAND. 
 
 139 
 
 ])rlticiples, and arrangements made to leave the i)rop()rtIon 
 of representation in the Upper House inialtered, save 
 when a new i>rovince should be formed. By means of 
 such measures it is probable that security could be liad 
 against the a|)prehen(led extinction of English influence, 
 without interfering with the o-uarantees for colonial 
 rights. For, in the event of the basis of re))rescntation 
 being made to correspond with that of taxation, England 
 would ])robably be able to hold her own with the Colonics 
 after the time at which it would be established, since 
 the greater part of them would then have ceased to be 
 virgin soil. Or, at all events, the rate of Colonial in- 
 crease would be so slow that the danger foreseen by Mr. 
 Mill might be regarded as postponed sini' (lie, even with- 
 out the security against it afforded by the constituticm of 
 the Upper House. On the other hand, the Colonies 
 would have u'ained, before the chanoe in the basis of 
 representation had been effected, an amount of influence 
 fully sufficient to enforce attention to tlieir rights and 
 interests, and might, possibly, continue to add to it ; 
 whilst the com[)osition of the Upper House, and the fact 
 thjit many of its crown-ap})ointcd mendjcrs would consist 
 of men who had held colonial governorships, would impart 
 to it enough of the judicial character to ren<lcr any iii- 
 cfjuitable action on its part very imj)robal)le. Even 
 diff(;rent principles of action may be needed at different 
 stages of a nation's history; and, l)y thus providing for 
 them in the future, we thiidv that the occurrence of the 
 a})prehended difficulties could be prevented. 
 
 4. It has been seen that the existence of a certain 
 amount of sympathy amongst the [)oj)ulations to be united 
 is essential to rendering advisable the formation of any 
 federation, and we have endeavoured to prove the ex- 
 istence of such sympathy in the ))resent case. But it 
 may be replied that the sympathy now existing is a 
 
 :!«, 
 
 I 
 
140 A COLONIST ON THE COLOXIAL QUESTIOX. 
 
 consequence of the looseness of the connection which 
 binds together the several members of the Empire, and 
 that Avere an attempt made to unite them more closely by 
 means of a common legislature, the increased interference 
 Avith each other's affairs consequent thereon, would tend 
 to destroy it. Tiiis objection is one that may be brought 
 against any projected union, but it will always prove 
 null and void when the advantages to be gained are in 
 excess of the sacrifices demanded. Seldom, if ever, have 
 the sacrifices required been so small as in the present 
 instance. Federal unitv would not interfere with local 
 independence, and more than local independence no 
 colony does, or ever can, enjoy. The United Kingdom 
 possesses to-day — with a single exception — all the pre- 
 rogatives which it would be necessary to confer upon the 
 Federal Government. The change would consist in the 
 fact that whereas the federal prerogatives are now 
 wielded by only a part of the Empire, they would under 
 a federation be wielded by all. But even then the 
 Federal Legislature would have no more influence over the 
 Colonies — save in the imposition of the regulated share 
 of taxation — than the Imperial Parliament has always 
 exercised. The local Governments Avould be almost as 
 strong as ever they were ; whilst the Colonies would, in 
 addition to former rights, enjoy the privilege of a voice 
 in im])erial affairs. One new cause of dispute in the 
 shape of taxatitm would, indeed, be introduced ; but along 
 witli it would come a corrective, in the shape of represen- 
 tation. 
 
 To this it may be replied that the disturbing force 
 would be more i)owerful tlian the corrective. We admit 
 that the influence of money has never been better de- 
 scribed than in the happy term ' almighty dollar,' and 
 tliat in the Colonies the love of money is pretty strong 
 and widely diffused. But we assume that, should a Federa- 
 tion of the Empire be formed, it would be done only after 
 
^ 
 
 THE QUESTION ONE OB^ COMPAR I.SOX. 
 
 141 
 
 the assent of the Colonies had been obtained, and we 
 think that, if they were to enter into it Avith their eyes 
 open to the increase of taxation, they would l)e prepared 
 to abide by tlieir bargain. That they would voluntarily 
 accept it we are led to believe from the fact that Federa- 
 tion would involve a smaller increase of taxation than 
 would separation, and that when forced — as both Eng- 
 land and they soon must be — to choo'^c between these 
 alternatives, they would choose the least onerous, even if 
 there were not many other considerations to recommend 
 it. In this, as in every other case in this world, that 
 which we have to accept is not absolute good but com- 
 ])arative superiority : some objection will appear to every- 
 thing. The best course is that which jn-omises the 
 greatest amount of advantage at the cost of the smallest 
 amount of sacrifice. If it can be shown that, in the case 
 before us. Federation is the course which answers to this 
 description, it is evident that it should be adoj)ted. We 
 are not afraid to attempt to prove that it would bring to 
 both Fatherland and Colonies all the benefits of connection 
 and separation simultaneously, and this at the cost of 
 smaller sacrifices to either side than would inevitably be 
 induced by separation. Should these benefits follow, as 
 we assert they would, the fact of their so doing would 
 constitute the most powerful element pos.^ible in the 
 stability of the system which had induced them. A flood 
 o^' loyal admiration would be created by which any such 
 diflliculties as those arising from want of taking counsel, 
 slight diversities of landed tenure, differences of repre- 
 sentation, or a slight increase of taxation to sonic of the 
 members, would be crushed out of existence. If Federa- 
 tion should prove to be beneficial, it could not fiil to be 
 stable. We are thus led to the last stage of our subject, 
 viz., whether, supposing Fedoi-ation to bo practicahle, it 
 promises sufificient advantages to render its adoption 
 expedient ? 
 
'ih: 
 
 142 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL (QUESTION. 
 
 \\i 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 :,( 
 
 h!! 
 
 I" 
 
 mi 
 
 FEDERATION V. COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE. 
 
 The last stage of our inquiry has now been reached. 
 V^c have examined the projtosed emancipationist policy, 
 and jriven our reasons for pronouncing it to be essentially 
 pernicious. Admitting, at the same time, that the re- 
 lations between the mother-country and her Colonics 
 cannot long remain on their j)resent footing, we have 
 propounded a scheme in which we believe that a })ractical 
 solution of the colonial question may be found. It re- 
 mains to prove that this solution would be a good one : a 
 practicable solution of a difficulty is one thing, a politic 
 solution is another. Granting that a Federation of the 
 Empire could be established, would it be for the ad- 
 vantage of the parties concerned to adopt it in preference 
 to sc])aratioh ? This, we think, is the fair statement of 
 the question. It is not Federation in the abstract which 
 we have to consider, but Fodei-aticm as comjjared with a 
 disruption of the Empire. )Ve neet not here re})eat our 
 reasons for believing one or other of these measures tt) be 
 inevitable ; we think that very few will dispute the point. 
 In fact, as Lord Bury has well pointed out in the con- 
 cluding chapter of his Exodus of the Western Notions, 
 the separation is already, de facto, concluded. We are 
 lui[)py, however, to be able to add that, as it has not been 
 concluded by law, there is yet time to retrace unfortunate 
 
 J 
 
TIII<] COLOxMKS NOT A(iGKli:\ KU. 
 
 14:l 
 
 steps, and re-establish the union on a new and lasting 
 basis. 
 
 To arrive at a fair conclusion on the relative merits o(" 
 Federation and separation, it is necessary to survey tlie 
 (juestion from an English and a Colonial 8tand[)()int, as 
 advantages to one of these parties might be obtained at 
 the cost of disadvantajjes to the other. We shall first 
 consider the colonial side of the case, and in so doing shall 
 confine our observations to a comparison of the increased 
 responsibilities which either independence or Federation 
 would necessarily involve, and eschew, as far as ])os- 
 sible, any expression of opinion on details, as a know- 
 ledge of the local affiiirs of each Colony would be 
 requisite to the formation of a correct judgment on 
 them. 
 
 The spectacle of Colonies being informed that they 
 can become independent at pleasure, and yet refusing the 
 boon, is almost unicjue in the history of the world. It is 
 undoubtedly due to the fact that the governmental, social, 
 and connnercial peculiarities of England, foi the last fifty 
 years, have been such as have led her to confer on the 
 Colonies an amount of freedom from control on the jiart 
 of the su}n'eme Government almost unexam})led ; and, as 
 is now appearing, inconsistent with permanent unioii. A 
 desire to escape from oppression and tyranny on the pai-t 
 of the parent state, is the motive which has usually led 
 colonies to desire nationality. I>ut, in the })resent 
 instance, this motive has no existence. No colonist even 
 attempts to charge the Fatherland with any act of op- 
 pression. For any local evils the Colonies have only 
 themselves to blame, seeing that their local indei)endence 
 is much greater than that of the States of the American 
 Union, and for the same reason the remedy for any evils 
 which may exist is in their own hands. The only charge 
 which is ever made against the connection Avith England 
 
IH A COLONIST ON THE COLOXIAL QUKSTION. 
 
 '\i 
 
 il ■: 
 
 11 
 1'! 
 
 is that by it they may be involved in wars in which they 
 have no interest ; but, as it certainly preserves them 
 from other Mars in which they would have a very great 
 interest — as we shall prove liereafter — we have no hesi- 
 tation in saying that the Colonies have no reason to 
 desire independence as a means of escape from ex- 
 ])erienced evils, — indeed, we feel confident that ninety- 
 nine per cent, of our fellow-colonists are of the same 
 opinion. 
 
 It is possible, however, that some of them may reply 
 that they wouhi cease to be of this opinion if tlic terms 
 of unicm were modified according to the basis which we 
 have sketched for a Federation of the Empire, as that 
 measure would interfere with their local indej)endence, 
 and impose on them burdens from which they are now 
 free. We must again remind such parties that unmixed 
 good is to be found nowhere upon earth, and that the 
 loftiest political height which we ever can reach is that 
 state in which the good most preponderates over the 
 ovil. Separation would certainly secure local indepen- 
 dence from the danger of infringement to which it might 
 be exposed under Federation ; but for this security a 
 very heavy price would have to be paid, in the shape of 
 a sacrifice of all the benefits of connection ; and before 
 consenting to its payment, it is at least necessary to be 
 sure that the a})prehended danger to local independence 
 is a reality. 
 
 There seems to us to be no reasonable ground for siicli 
 apprehension. The union of the Empire would be 
 federal in all its characteristics. Under it certain ])re- 
 rogatives would be granted to each member of the Federa- 
 tion, and would be much more firmly secured than are 
 those enjoyed by the Colonies at the present day, as they 
 would haverepr( sentatives in the Federal Legislature ready 
 to repel any attempt to infringe them, whilst to-day the 
 
LOCAL INDEPEXDENCE SECURED. 
 
 145 
 
 o 
 
 Licll 
 
 be 
 )re- 
 'ra- 
 are 
 
 ley 
 uly 
 :he 
 
 Imperial Parliament is legally supreme, and the Colonies 
 are absolutely unrepresented in it. Federation would 
 provide the legal security against aggression which is now 
 wanting. As to the prerogatives to be possessed by the 
 Colonial Governments, the only points in which any cur- 
 tailment of those now enjoyed would be needed are the 
 control of local armaments, but lately forced upon them, 
 and the imposition of a maximum rate of customs, with 
 iir -'^hibition to alter their tariffs save at each decennial 
 adjustment of the assessment of the Empire. It is plain 
 that the former of these curtailments could not, in any 
 way, interfere with local independence, and that thc^ 
 latter would still leave each of the great divisions of the 
 Empire free to arrange its own commercial policy — an 
 amount of independence far in excess of that enjoyed by 
 the States of the American Union. Yet the guarantees 
 against federal oppression would not end here. An un- 
 just distribution of the burdens of taxation, either 
 upon sections or classes, is the form most frequently 
 assumed by the legal injustice in which oppression is usu- 
 ally veiled under representative government. The evil is 
 almost always irremediable when tlie control of the 
 legislature has been acquired by any class or section. 
 But, in the present instance, a most effective security 
 against any such legislative tyranny would form part of 
 the basis of Federation. Neither in the amount of taxa- 
 tion, nor in the manner of raising it, could the Federal 
 Legislature favour any one member, section, or class of the 
 Federation at the expense of another, even should it desire 
 to do so. The liability of each member would be distinctly 
 defined ; hence none could have imposed on it a sum 
 above its fair share. The choice of the ways and means 
 of raising: it would be in the hands of the local Govern- 
 ments ; hence no form of local industry in one section 
 could be sacrificed to benefit a different interest in 
 
 L 
 
 ■m 
 
 hi 
 
 i': < 
 
 W:\ 
 
140 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 M 
 
 anotlicr. Property lieing thus guarded aicainst injustiee, 
 no other form of federal o))[)resHion need be feared by any 
 Colony, slriee the British Islands, if not all parts of the 
 Empire, would be equally interested in opjtosiug it. In 
 coiisi(lerin<r this questicm, an iidiabitant of the Colonics 
 nuist remember that he would, imder Federation, oeeu|)y 
 a })osition altogether different from that whieh he holds 
 as a colonist. lie and his fellow-eountryinerj in the 
 IJritish Islands would stand on exa(;tly the same footitig 
 — perfect equality would be established between them. 
 And instead of the whole force of the United Kingdom 
 beinii" brouiiht to the aid of the Federal Government, as 
 was formerly the case, its inhabitants would have a 
 common interest with those of the Colonies in forcing the 
 Federal Government to keep within its constitutional 
 limits. This tendency on their part, would, moreover, 
 increase Avith the growth of colonial representation, 
 with which would also increase the power of the Colonies 
 to repel any infringement of their rights. It is agreed 
 that the ' composite state system,' or that in which the 
 federal authority acts directly on the inhabitants of the 
 Federation, and not on the local Governments, is the only 
 form of federal government which possesses the elements 
 of stability. It is that which is established in Canada 
 and in the States. Yet it is very improbable that, if 
 Canada were to become independent, the prerogatives of 
 the local Governments would be increased at the expense 
 of those appertaining to the Government of the Dominion ; 
 and it is certain that no Canadian, West Indian, or 
 Australasian would oj)pose annexation on the ground that 
 the American constitution, legally administered, fails to 
 grant a sufficient share of local independence to the 
 States. Yet local independence under the Canadian 
 form of Federation is less than that existinc; hi the 
 States, and that existing in the States is less than that 
 
IXCRHASE OF TAXATION'. 
 
 147 
 
 which would exist under the proposed terms of union. 
 It' local Indepcndinice would be safe in the former cases, 
 surely it would be safe in the latter, when special pro- 
 vision would be made against almost the only form of 
 federal oppression which the Colonies would have any 
 reason to fear from English selfishness or sectionalism. 
 The fact is that, so long as these terms were observed, 
 the auiount of local inde[(endence would be much in excess 
 of that ever enjoyed umlerany composite state goverument. 
 It is im[)ossil)Ie to provide (Constitutional securities against 
 daniiers arising; from violations of the law; but the circum- 
 stances of the Jiritish Empire are such that any attemjjt 
 tt) destroy I'lcal independence in it would be an absurdity 
 too great to be entertained. The fact of its being physically 
 impossible for any one legislature to attend to all the 
 concerns of the Em})ire would alone form a strong 
 guarantee against any illegal attempt being made to 
 render the Federal Government, or the British Islands, 
 absolute ; though we think that few colonists would 
 refuse to take the ])lightod faith of the ' old country ' for 
 this and a great deal more alst). As to legal securities, 
 we have seen that they would be much greater than 
 could otherwise be attained. 
 
 The colonists, however, may reply that, even admitting 
 local indei)endence to be safe under Federation, a further 
 objection to it is to be found in the increased taxation 
 which it would induce. The objection is of a really 
 practical character ; but the mere fact that such an 
 increase would follow on Federation does not carry with 
 it a condemnation of the scheme. Independence would 
 likewise induce increased expenditure and taxation, ji> 
 the Colonies would then be forced to supply the arma- 
 ments needed to maintain order ajxainst internal, and 
 freedom against foreign, foes. Increased taxation being 
 thus inevitable, they nmst, to judge fairly, compare the 
 
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 148 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QIKSTION. 
 
 increase which Federation and separation would each 
 induce. We have no doubt of being able to satisfy any 
 impartial inquirer that, in such a comparison, the balance 
 would be in favour of Federation. 
 
 We have already seen that in the case of Ontario the 
 probable increase would be only 7s. i)d. i)cr head, and 
 this althouj^h we omitted to take the wealth of any other 
 part of the Empire than those of it and of the United 
 Kingdom into account in estimathig the assessment, and 
 stated that the wealth of that province is indisputably 
 much greater, proportionately, than that of any other 
 ])art of British America. Allowing for these circum- 
 stances, there can be little chance of the rate for any other 
 of the Colonies proving to be in excess of that for Ontario. 
 We believe that, on the contrary, many of them would 
 not have to pay nearly so much, but are content to let 
 this pass, and, assuming 7s. 9d. per head as the average 
 amount of federal taxation to which colonists would be 
 liable, to compare it with the probable increase which 
 would be induced by separation. Independence would 
 bring to each Colony fresh charges, in the shape of expen- 
 diture necessary to maintain an army and navy, and 
 diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. No 
 nation has, in time of peace, ever reduced these charges 
 to such a low point as have the United States. We may 
 therefore fairly conclude that the Colonies coukl not 
 escape at least as high a proportion of taxation for these 
 purposes as the States have to bear. 
 
 According to the report of the U. S. Secretary of the 
 Treasury for the year 1870, the expenditure of the War 
 Department in the year ending June 30, 1870, was 
 57,655,675 dollars ; that of the Xavy Department 
 21,780,229 dollars; and that of the Diplomatic Service 
 1,490,776 dollars. We have here a total of 80,926,681 
 dollars, which sum divided by 38,555,000, the population 
 
w 
 
 TAXATION UXDKR I.N'DIII'K.VDKXCK. 
 
 140 
 
 of the States in the aamc year, f^ivcs t>To dollars ami 
 ten cents, or 8.v. 9^^. sterling per head — an exi)enditiire 
 about l.s\ j)er head greater than that whieh Federation 
 would bring to Ontario. It is true that since the above 
 year a reduction of expenditure has been effected by cut- 
 ting down the army ; but even after this the decrease is 
 very slight. The ' appropriations,' or sums voted, for the 
 financial year ending June 30, 1872, were 38,727,172 
 dollars for the army; 21,122,657 dollars for tlie Navy 
 Department, and 1,529,134 for the Diplomatic Service, 
 befng a total of 61,378,963 dollars, or 6.?. 7j^d. per head. 
 And the estimates for 1873 were 52,224,033 dollars for 
 war, 20,586,498 for the navy, and 1,208,634 for dii)lo- 
 macy, making a total of 74,019,165 dollars, or 8*'. sterling 
 per head. 
 
 Hence it appears that, even if the emancipated Colonies 
 could reduce their military, naval, and diplomatic expen- 
 diture to the same rate per head as that of the United 
 States, they would have to pay, according to the returns 
 of 1870, about Is. per head more than the increase 
 which Avould be induced by Federation ; according to the 
 appropriations for 1872, Is. l^d. less, and according to 
 the estimates for 1873 about 3d. more. But it is per- 
 fectly certain that even if the lowest rate of expenditure 
 should suffice for the States, it Avould not prove sufficient 
 to keep on foot anything approaching to a force adequate 
 to guard effectually the liberties of the new nationalities. 
 Sup[ j; troops to cost as much in the Colonies as they 
 o in the States, which it is certain that they would. It is 
 clear thu* the Colonies could, at the States' rate of expen- 
 diture per head, raise only a force beaiing the same pro- 
 ]iortion to the population which the American army bears 
 to that of the Union. The population of the States in 
 1870 was 38,555,( Oil ; their army at the same time num- 
 bered 37,383 men, or one for every 1031 of the population. 
 
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 1 50 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 Taking it, for the sake of round iiuni1)ers, at one in 1,000, 
 we find tliat the States' rate of expenditure would enable 
 Canada, with a poj)ulation slightly under 4,000,000, to 
 raise at most an army of 4,000 men ; Australasia, with a 
 ])()pulation under 2,000,000, one of uot more than 2,000 
 men ; the AVest Indies, with about 1 ,100,000, a regiment of 
 1,100 men; and South Africa, with 427,000 inhabitants, 
 less than half a regiment. AYe do not think that even 
 Canadian or Australasian Josei)li Humes would dare to 
 j)ropjse smaller standing armies than these, or fleets less 
 than a tenth and twentieth })art that of the States, if 
 they had any intention whatever of eschewing a ])olicy of 
 non-resistance, or making any effort at all in defence of 
 their national and political freedom. But to maintain 
 even forces such as these would require an expenditure 
 one-seventh greater than that Avliich we have seen to be 
 the heaviest rate of contribution likely to be induced by 
 Federation. 
 
 This single fact is of course sufficient to prove that. In 
 the matter of taxaticm, the balance is in favour of Fede- 
 ration and against ind'^j)endence. But this is not all. 
 \Vhen examinirig the probable increase of taxation which 
 would be induced by Federation, we said that we would 
 thereafter show how the ap})arent increase of 7.v. dd. per 
 head, would be largely reduced through the transfer of 
 certain charges, now borne by the Colonial Governments, 
 to the Federal excliequer. The Federal Government 
 would have exclusive control of armaments ; consequently 
 colonial local revenues would be relieved from all charoes 
 for militia, volunteers, oi* naval forces. It would derive a 
 revenue from the Colonies, and would have to defray the 
 cost of its collection ; and if the management of the Post 
 Office should form one of its duties, it would ha\c to 
 meet all the charges of the packet service. In the 
 liuancial year ending June 30, 1870, Canada expended 
 
SAVINGS !>' J.OUAL EXPEND ITLRi:. 
 
 151 
 
 1,245,972 (lolliirs on militia and defence, 343,.3()8 dollars 
 on ocean and river steam service, and .30,3,109 dollars in 
 the collection of customs. These items amount collect- 
 ively to 2,094,.')y9 dollars ; but, as about lialf the customs 
 revenue would have sufficed to meet the chari^cs of the 
 Federal revenue, we deduct 2o2,.3.34 dollars, l)ein;j!; half 
 the cost of their collection. This leaves a total of 
 1,841, SIM dollars, or 3H0,o44/. sterling, of annual expen- 
 diture from vhicli Canada would be relieved by Fedei-a- 
 tion. This sum, distributed over a |)oi)ulation of 3,484,924, 
 l)ein<'* that of the Dominion acc(/rdiny: to the census of 1871 , 
 would be ecjual to a reduction of about 2.v. 7(i. per head, 
 and would bring down the increased taxation conseciuent 
 on Fedei'ation from 7.s". \)d. })er head to about o.s. '2d. 
 As wj are not in possession of details of the expenditure 
 of other Colonies on these services, we cannot say to what 
 sum the saving would elsewhere amount. It is pretty 
 certain, however, that the reduction conseciuent on the 
 transfer of these items from the Colonial to the Federal 
 Government, would tend to reduce the increase of taxa- 
 tion very consiilerably everywhere ; nor can it be said thiit 
 the transfer of these items would increase the Federal 
 expenditure proi)ortionately, so that the saving anouM not 
 be real. \V'e have, in calculating the probable amount 
 of Federal exi)enditure, allowed 2,000,000/. to meet such 
 increase as might result from the transfer of these items. 
 The saving to the Colonies would consist in the fact that 
 whilst they are now liable for the whole of those charges, 
 they would, under Federation, be liable only for their 
 jToportion of then). 
 
 Savings on these items WM)uld be indubitable, and could 
 scarcely fail to reduce the increase of taxation to about 
 one-half that which would ibllow on indcjiendence with 
 an expenditure at the same rate as that of the States. 
 But it is by no means impossible that a still iurther reduc- 
 
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 152 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 tion might be made. Should the Colonies consent to bear 
 equal taxation with England for Federal expenditure, 
 the Fatherland, we presume, would be inclined to help to 
 render their burden as light as possible. This we think 
 that she might do by simply lending them her name. 
 Colonial debts generally bear 6 per cent, interest ; none 
 less than 5, save when guaranteed. England can borrow 
 at 3 per cent., or, to be within the mark, we Avill say 3^. 
 Of course the Federal Government would be able to do 
 the same. Were it to borrow money sufficient to dis- 
 charge the colonial debts, pay them, and lend the money 
 to the Colonies at the reduced rate of interest, the saving 
 would, in some cases, not only suffice to pay the whole 
 contribution to the Federal revenue, but also leave a 
 handsome balance behind. Mr. Baxter, we have seen, 
 estimates the debts of the Australasian Colonies at 
 35,744,000/. Much the greater part of it bears interest 
 at 6 per cent. A saving of 2^ per cent, on this rate 
 would aggregate 893,600/. sterling per annum, being 
 about 9.9. per head, or far above the entire sum for 
 which they would be liable to the Federal revenue. In 
 the case of Canada there is a debt of 31,824,000 dollars, 
 bearing interest at 5 per cent., payable in London ; 
 another of 34,289,000 dollars, at 6 per cent., also payable 
 in London, and 7,479,300 dollars, at 6 per cent., payable 
 in Canada. On the first of these debts a saving of 1^ 
 per cent, would amount to 477,360 dollars ; on the second, 
 a saving of 2^ per cent, to 857,225 dollars ; and on the 
 third, a saving at the same rate, to 186,982 dollars, being 
 a total saving of 1,521,567 dollars, or 314,373/. sterling, 
 or about Is. dd. per head on the population of the 
 Dominion, according to the census of 187 1 , which, deducted 
 from 5s. 'Id. per head — the rate to which we have seen 
 that the increase would be reduced by the transfer of 
 expenditure on militia, &c. — would reduce the increased 
 taxation on Canada to about 3a\ 5d. per head. In the 
 
 4' 
 
TAXATION LIGHTEST UXDER FEDERATIOX. 153 
 
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 H 
 
 the 
 3tecl 
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 sed 
 the 
 
 West Indies, owing to the small amount of the debts and 
 the fact that many of them are already guaranteed, the 
 saving would be small. But in South Africa, where, in 
 1868, the debt of Natal was 263,000/. at 6 per cent. ; that 
 of the Cape 846,2oOZ. at the same rate, and 255,400/. at 5 
 per cent., the saving would amount to 6,575/. for Natal, 
 and 24,987/. for the Cape, or almost J. v. 6d. per head on 
 their population of 425,476, as it was stated in the same 
 year. Thus it appears that, if this measure could be 
 adopted, the savings in local expenditure conse(j[uent on 
 Federation would reduce the increase of taxation very 
 largely in South Africa, to a very insignificant sum in 
 British America, and cause,, not an increase, but a 
 decline of taxation in Australasia ; and that, leaving the 
 payment of debts out of sight, the sure and certain 
 reduction in local expenditure from the transfer of certain 
 charges to the Federal Government, would render the 
 balance of cheapness enormously in favour of Federation 
 against independence, since we have seen that in the case 
 of British America, the former would at the worst induce 
 an increased taxation of only 5s. 2d. per head, and the 
 latter one of Ss. 9d. So far as taxation is concerned, 
 there can be no doubt that there is an overwhelmino" case 
 in favour of Federation.' 
 
 But the relative amount of taxation is only one point 
 in the coni))arison : the returns to be received in cxcliange 
 for taxation are quite as important couiridenitions as the 
 sums which may have to be paid. Suj)j)0sing tlie Colonies 
 to be indej)endent, and taxing themselves 8*-. \)d. })er head 
 for armaments, Sec, would tiiis ex})enditure secure order 
 against internal, and freedom against external, foes as 
 effectually as would the lesser ex[)enditurc under Federa- 
 tion? We have no hesitation in saying that in the case 
 of some of the Colonies a reign of terror might fairly be 
 
 ' See Appendix. 
 
l')4 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 1 1 ' 
 
 'ii 
 
 tr 
 
 H 
 
 
 cx})ected to lollow on separation; that in otliers^ it is c^ortaln 
 that order and i)eace could not be secured ; that, even in 
 the countries l)est ada|)ted for indepenchniee, their attain- 
 ment wouhl be at least doubtful ; and tliat in none couhl 
 there be gained, l)y any expenditure whatever, as good 
 security for peace and ])r()spcrity as is now afforded by 
 the aUiance Avith the Fatlierhmd. 
 
 The CoKjnies in whic-li we shouhl expect a reign of 
 terror to follow on scj)aration are the West Indies. 
 Whatever may be the case in other Colonies, it is clear 
 that these, at all events, are not fitted for indei)ondence. 
 Their poj)ulation consists of a minority of wealth and 
 intelligence and of a majority of })overty and savage 
 ignorance. Even the minority is not of a homogeneous 
 character, and would not be likely to be able tt) agree on 
 the form of government to be established, to say nothing 
 of working it. Ilecent events have proved that the 
 hostility of the black population to the whites is un- 
 abated by over thirty years of freedom, and that it 
 is impracticable to work a representative government 
 for local purposes. What, then, would ensue when, in 
 addition to the task of local c;overnment, these Colonies 
 had also thrown ujwn them tlie resj)onsibilities of nation- 
 ality ? Might we not fairly expect to see the history of 
 St. Domingo repeated, unless the States, or some other 
 power, should step into the position from which England 
 had shrunk ? 
 
 In South Africa the danger of internal dissension would 
 not be so great as in the West Indies ; but even there 
 materials for strife are not wanting. AVe i;ave a ])opula- 
 tion consisting of British, Dutch, German, and native 
 races, differing in antecedents, manners, and language. 
 Some of the natives are warlike, and have already given 
 serious trouble to the colonists. Is it improbable that 
 they might seize the opportunity aftbrdcd by the colonists 
 
DANGER OF IXTERXAL DISSEXSIOXS. 
 
 ir>5 
 
 given 
 3 that 
 oiii;?t.s 
 
 being left alone to assjiil them; or that a Avell-organiscd 
 attack might bring much mischief and misery on the 
 colonists ? Or, supposing this (hmger surmounted, is it 
 likely that the different elements of the population could 
 combine harmoniously to work a national government 
 such as would be re({uired ? or is it at all unlikely that 
 some one of the j)olitical, or national, })arties which would 
 be engendered might look for aid to the parent stock in 
 Europe and receive it? 
 
 In the case of Australasia the difficulties in the way >r 
 the establishment and workino; of an efficient Govermncnt 
 are much less than in the previous instances ; indeed, it 
 may be said that there is a fair })rospect of its being able 
 to discharn;e its duties to the extent of maintainino- order 
 within. The population is almost entirely British in race, 
 and intellifjent in character. There are no neighbours 
 either to foment internal disputes, or to stand waiting for 
 a chance to destroy the new-born state. On the whole 
 we are of oi)inion that Australasia constitutes the grou}) 
 of Colonies best fitted for independence. Y-it it would 
 be Avell for the inhabitants to remember that party spirit 
 amongst them has run to a very high point, and that 
 self-government has been by no means an unmixed suc- 
 cess in each of the provinces, before making up tluir 
 minds that they c<)uld all unite under one Government, 
 and work together harmoniouslv in a wider field of action 
 than the smaller one, which seems to tax their cnerL;;ies 
 pretty severely at present. 
 
 Passina: over the l*acific we reach British America, 
 now united under one government from Halifax to 
 Vancouver. The machinery of a national government 
 is here already in existence, and England has retired as 
 far from interference as is possible without utterly sever- 
 ing the connection. Nevertheless, we should not ex})ect 
 to see independence succeeded by a harmonious political 
 
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 156 
 
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 A COLONIST OX TV7. COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 There would be several incongruous elements 
 
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 system. 
 
 at work. The population consists of two races, professing 
 two religions, each of which differences has formed the 
 ba.sis of fierce ])arty disputes. Not long since, parties in 
 Canada were for several years almost identical with 
 sectional divisions ; and it was simply the deadlock thus 
 induced that led to a coalition which alone rendered 
 possible the union of the provinces. Nor has that event 
 destroyed sectionalism. The maritime provinces are still 
 hostile to the union, and the same differences of race and 
 religion which induced previous quarrels between Ontario 
 and Quebec, are still in existence, and likely to produce 
 similar results in future. Then the provinces on the 
 Atlantic, in the north-west, and on the Pacific, are sepa- 
 rated by immense tracts of wilderness. And all are 
 close on the frontier of a subtle and ambitious neighbour, 
 ready to seize any chance of extending its territory, and 
 having in each of its citizens, when in contact with a 
 foreigner, a political missionary, to proclaim its unex- 
 ampled and unapproachable glories, and to promise a 
 share in them to all who will enter into the ' glorious 
 Union.' It is surely improbable, when sectionalism 
 has been so strong under the colonial riujime that ex- 
 tremists on one side have talked of ' looking to France,' 
 and, on the other, of ' looking to Washington,' that it 
 would disappear in the ftice of the new and more exciting 
 controversies which would be induced by inde})endence, 
 or that a discontented province could resist the entice- 
 ments of the syren deceiver. Yet, if either of these 
 improbabilities should fail to occur, Canadian independ- 
 ence would soon cease to exist. 
 
 It may be inquired, however, what reason there can 
 be to expect difficulties in the internal government of the 
 emancipated Colonies when they are already in some 
 cases in the full enjoyment of local self-government. 
 
^1 
 
 DANGER OF FOREIGX AGGRESSION. 
 
 157 
 
 ■( 
 
 We reply that the influence of the Imperial Governor is 
 in no case a dead letter, but frequently ])roves of the 
 utmost importance in restraining the violence of local 
 partyism ; that the moral weight of English opinion, 
 public and governmental, the fact that British troops 
 are — or were formerly — at hand to enforce order, and 
 the knowledge that the Imperial Parliament possesses 
 the power to legislate for the Colonies, and in cases of 
 extremity will not fail to do so, tends to keep all the 
 elements of strife quiet. On the other hand, were all 
 these influences withdrawn, every man would seek to do 
 ' that which was right in his own eyes ; ' and when, even 
 in presence of these influences, we have seen a sectional 
 deadlock in Canada, two or three ministries in a session 
 in Australia, and the deliberate abandonment of self- 
 government in Jamaica, we might expect to see much 
 more disastrous events in their absence. 
 
 The task of maintaining order within would, however, 
 be only one part of the work devolving on the new 
 nationalities. They would also have to maintain their 
 national independence and political freedom against 
 foreigners. It will, we doubt not, be re})licd by many 
 parties in both the United Kingdom and the Colonies, 
 that the task would be an easy one, as the only cause 
 which could lead to these countries being involved in war 
 is to be found in their connection with England. But 
 this conclusion is most glaringly shortsighted. Its fallacy 
 has been well exposed by Mr. Adderlcy, whose argu- 
 ments are the more worthy of the attention of colonists 
 from the fact that he is by no means a meniber of the 
 emancipationist school. In his letter to ]Mr. Disraeli on 
 ' The Present Relations of England and her Colonies ' 
 [1862], he asks very pertinently, 'Does England now 
 draw her Colonies, or her Colonies draw her, most into 
 war? If England were a foreign power to them, in place 
 
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■^HJSHBBBW^^ipiiPI 
 
 158 A COLO.VIST ON TlfH COLOXIAL (H'f'^lSTIOX. 
 
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 1 1 
 
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 of beinn; tlioir slilcld affainstthe interference of all forci<>n 
 powers, they avouIcI soon learn how they might be more 
 involved in war. They have, on the other hand, them- 
 selves the chief influence in Imperial implications in war. 
 It is their being s})read over all the world wiiich brings 
 lis in contact at so many })oints with the sensibilities, 
 jealousies, and cin)idities of other nations, and makes Avar 
 so wide a concern to us. Though the Irish temj)erament 
 enters into but one-third of our national com])osition, we 
 cannot help our skirts of em])ire being spread about the 
 earth on which anyone may tread his challenge. AVhat 
 brought us to the verge of hostilities on the ]\Iaine 
 boundary, or, more lately, on the Musquito shore, or at 
 St. fluan's, or about the Newfoundland fisheries ; or why 
 are wo now (1802) sending troops to Canada?' 
 
 We think everybody must admit that ?{r. Adderley's 
 position is very strong; and that Eng.' li connection 
 tends to avert war from the Colonies at least as much 
 as r,o induce it. And in regard more particularly to 
 Canada, the same idea Avas Avell put by Lord Palmer- 
 ston, Avhen, in his usual style of strong common sense, 
 he said : — 
 
 ' Sup[)ose these provinces separated from this country 
 — suppose them erected into a monarchy, a republic, or 
 any other form of government. Are there not motives 
 that might lead a strong neighbour to pick a quarrel with 
 that smaller state, with a view to its annexation ? (Hear, 
 hear.) Is there nothing like teri'itorial ambition ])er- 
 vading the })olicy of great military states ? The example 
 of the world should teach us that, as far as the danger of 
 invasion and annexation is concerned, that dantrer would 
 Ije increased to Canada by a separation from Great 
 Britain, and Avhen she is deprived of the protection that 
 the military power and resources of this country may 
 alford.' (Cheers.) 
 
m* 
 
 GAIN FROM IMrKRIAL LMTV. 
 
 V)i) 
 
 i'lev'> 
 
 Tliese arguinents arc unanswerable. It is Inipdssihlc 
 to consider them fairly and refuse to aeknowledi^e that 
 Lord Palinerston and jNIr. Adderley liave said quite 
 enough to silence all colonial grunihlers who refuse to see 
 anythini]^ else than the single fact that they may be 
 involved in war by a quarrel peculiar to En<r|and, and 
 who seem to think that, once separated from her, a millen- 
 nium of peace would dawn on them. Tt may be true that 
 conne(;tion with an Enij)ire having ramifications all over 
 the world does tend to l)rin<>; the Colonies into contact 
 Avith ])owers to which they might, perhaps, otherwise be 
 strangers, and thus escay)e any chance of collision with 
 them. But, independent of the difficulty of attaining 
 such isolation, and the disadvantages which could not 
 fail to result therefrom, it must be remembered that 
 foreiiiuers arc much more likelv to defer to a miulitv 
 l^m})irc than to a Aveak nationality: that, even granting 
 the connection with England to bring to the Colonies a 
 slightly increased risk of war, the aid of her fleets and 
 armies brings them, surely aiul sinudtaneously, a irreat 
 increase of the prospect of victory in the strife; that the 
 danger of defeat is the oidy effectual preventive of 
 aggression on the ])art of an ambitious power, and that 
 separation would certainlv increase the risk of airiiression, 
 as all the motives to induce it would remain undiminished, 
 whilst the chances of success against a small nationality 
 beiuir enormously in excess of those against a mi<;htv 
 em], 're, the deterrent causes wotdd be lessened. The 
 certain increase in diph^natic influence and martial re- 
 sources may thus be taken as balancing the very doubtful 
 increase in the risk of war. For althoujih the uain from 
 victory in war may not always comjx'usate for the loss of 
 ])eace, defeat, puch as that to which the Colonies would 
 be exposed, would almost surely })lace them under the 
 rule of a foreign state, and that means conquest and ruin. 
 
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 1(')0 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 which they should run any risk of war and spill their 
 last drop of blood to avert. 
 
 There is, however, another point in connection with 
 this part of our subject which must not be forgotten. 
 Were the Colonies independent nations, it is pretty 
 certain that the form of government adopted in nearly 
 all cases would be democratic ; since it is almost that 
 already, and the tide has not yet turned sufficiently 
 against it to enable them to get rid of its essential cha- 
 racteristic — a suffrage at once equal, and in effect almost 
 universal. The chief increase of prerogatives which 
 would accrue to the new Goverimients would be the right 
 of making peace and war, and of controlling their own 
 diplomacy. But this task is precisely that which a 
 democracy is least capable of accomplishing. * As for 
 myself,' says De Tocqueville, ' I have no hesitation in 
 avowing my conviction that it is most especially in the 
 conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments 
 appear to me to be most decidedly inferior to governments 
 carried on upon different princi})les. Foreign politics 
 demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy 
 possesses : and they I'equire, on the contrary, the perfect 
 use of almost all those qualities in which it is deficient. . . . 
 A democracy is unable to regulate the details of an im- 
 portant undertaking, to i)ersevere in a design, and to 
 work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. 
 It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and will 
 not wait their consequences with patience. These are 
 qualities which more es])ecially belong to an individual 
 or an aristocracy ; and they are i)recisely the means by 
 which an individual people attains a predominant j)osi- 
 tion.' The name of De Tocqueville may alone almost 
 suffice to command assent to any of his unfavourable 
 theories regardiiiu' the workings of democracy, for the 
 event has nearly always justified them ; and, at all events. 
 
 1' 
 
 fr M 
 
MAUTIAT. WKAKNKSS OF TriK COLOXIMS. 
 
 KU 
 
 their 
 
 with 
 (tteii. 
 retty 
 early 
 
 that 
 iently 
 I cha- 
 ihn()«t 
 which 
 ; right 
 r own 
 lich a 
 As for 
 tion in 
 in the 
 nments 
 timents 
 
 politics 
 locracy 
 
 perfect 
 
 t. • • • 
 an inl- 
 and to 
 istacles. 
 tid will 
 |ese are 
 lividual 
 pans by 
 \i\t posi- 
 
 almost 
 lonrable 
 Ifor the 
 
 events, 
 
 the Colonies sjionld he careful before assniniii<; thes(» 
 powers, wliich they would be least fitted to wield, when :i 
 fUilurc io wield them arijiht inijiht endanj^er both their 
 national and political freedom. 
 
 These several consideratit)ns should, we think, convince 
 any candid inquirer that the Cohmies would be in at 
 least as much danirer of beinii- involved in war if inde- 
 jjcndent as if united to Entrland, and this with much less 
 power to resist aggression : which brings us back to the 
 question of their ability to maintain their newly-acquired 
 independence. 
 
 In the case of the West Indies and in that of South 
 Africa, it must, we think, be admitted that such ability 
 does not exist. The islands could be defended only by a 
 ])ower having the control of the sea, which they certaiidy 
 could not have ; and South Africa would be utterly 
 unable to jdace in line a I'orce sufficient to resist success- 
 i'ully half a division of a Euro[)ean army. 
 
 It is more difficult to sj)eak confidently of the prosj)ects 
 of Australasia than of those of the above countries. The 
 population is homogeneous, and the country is isolated 
 and out of the way of enemies, exce])ting the French 
 settlement in New Caledonia, an exce})tion, however, 
 worthy of attention. It is a case in which a considerable 
 amount of local knowledge is needed to authorise the 
 utterance of any very decided opinion. Still the broad 
 facts remain clear to all, that the population would be 
 less than 2,000,000 ; that a part of it would be se})a- 
 rated by the ocean from the centre of power and the seat 
 of government, and the difficulty of defence thereby 
 increased ; that, the greater part of the coast-line being 
 nncolonised, it presents a tem[>ting opportunity for any 
 nmbltious power to establish itself, vvithout direct aggres- 
 sion, on the territories of the new nationality ; that, this 
 
 (lence would be in a constant state of 
 
 lepenc 
 
 M 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 ' I? f 
 
 i' 
 
 ii 
 
 102 A COLONIST OX TMH COLOXfAL QIKSTIOX. 
 
 itoril ; that to resist anv nillitarv Twition thus ostjil)lisho(l 
 would, with Austr.'ihisian rcsourccH, he an impossihility ; 
 and tliat tlic circnmstaiiees of the country are such as 
 wouhl ])e likely to lead an anibilious potentate, or greedy 
 ])eoi)le, to turn towards it as a most valuable ]»rize. It 
 may he, however, that Australasians would think more 
 confidently than an outsider of their ability to maintain 
 their iiuh'jtendenee ; but wc cannot lielj) advisirifjf them to 
 ' take counsel whether they be able with ten tliousand to 
 meet him who cometh aj^ainst them witli twenty.' 
 
 There remains the case of British America. That 
 country has tlie advantap^c of ])ossessin|nj a ])oj)ulation 
 more than double that of Australasia ; but it is of a less 
 houiofjeneous character, and alonjrside the frontier lies a 
 mi'ditv country wliose inhabitants everv day declare, 
 until by the sheer force of repetition they have come to 
 believe, that it is their * manifest destiny ' to unite the 
 whole of the North American ccmtinent under their sw.ay. 
 Before Canada can })ecome independent, she must be able 
 to present to the United States a front sufficiently strouf^ 
 to convince tliem tliat any attempt at conquest could 
 result only in defeat. 
 
 It is possible that some English readers may deny the 
 correctness of the preceding proposition, and affirm that 
 were Canada separated from England, the States would 
 cease to have any feeling against it, and that the interests 
 and feelings of the two nations would become so identifird 
 that those interests and feelings would suffice to render 
 war between them next to an impossibility. To this re- 
 hash of the Peace Society's twaddle we would reply by 
 Dointino; to the Americans themselves — united by ramifi- 
 cations of commerce extending into every hole and corner 
 of the land- -united by the still stronirer ties arising from 
 that community of feeling produced by a common na- 
 tionality, and the recollection of perils, difficulties, and 
 
ny the 
 ■in that 
 would 
 itorcsts 
 entifiod 
 render 
 Ills re- 
 ply by 
 ramifi- 
 corner 
 l\cr tVom 
 
 r 
 
 CAXADA AND THR STAIRS. 
 
 ir,:] 
 
 a('hlcv(>ments shared in eoniinon, and whose ener^r'ies had 
 l)een directed almost entirely to paeific, pur^uits. If 
 (!ver a peo|)le were interested in rcinaininf:^ at peace, and 
 i'avourahly situated for so doinj^, it was this. Vet we 
 have seen tluMU hurstinu; these ties, and rushinui: nuilually 
 to arms, with an amount of hatred and ferocity almost 
 unexampl(!d. Is it })ossil)le that Canada and the States 
 ever can feel as many, or as stronnr, inducements to main- 
 tain peace with one another as those \vhi(di failed to pre- 
 serve it in the Union? They form two separate nations. 
 They inherit traditions of each other rather hostile than 
 pacific. The States, as we see by their press, coiilinu(> 
 to view it as Canada's destiny to he absorbed by them. 
 They now contain thousands of men ex])erienced in arms. 
 In face of all these facts, favourable to i)eace in one case, 
 and unfavourable in the other, can we hojie that, if sepa- 
 rated from England, j)acific interests would suftice to 
 secure the new nation from beiuf; assailed bv its neiiih- 
 hour? 
 
 Some obstinate oi)timists may, ])erhaj)s, reply in the 
 affirmative, on the fjjround that the States would <^ain 
 nothing by the annexation of Canada. The fact that the 
 States are of a different opini(m is a sufficient refutation 
 of this theory, for men's actions are governed not by 
 their actual, but by their supposed, interests. That the 
 States believe the annexation of Canada likely to conduce 
 to their benefit, and that they ardently desire it, has been 
 ])roved decisively during the last six years. The i-eci[)ro- 
 city treaty, extolled as a glorious triumph of modern (Mi- 
 lightenment, has been repealed ; and this avowedly in the 
 hoj)e that the commercial distress thereby induced might 
 lead Canada to seek a remedy in annexation. A crowd 
 oi' British traitors have been allowed to form an innnense 
 oroanization throughout the length and breadth of the 
 Uni(»n, and actually to make two hostile incursions into 
 
 M 2 
 
ss .i. riiSiSWa 
 
 mt 
 
 ■■HI 
 
 f 
 
 101 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 Canada, witliout a single atteni])t being made by the 
 Government to hinder tliem, or anything more than one 
 voice in a thousand being raised in condemnation of tlieir 
 nefarious iiiffianism. In rej)elling these raids many 
 Canadians lost their lives; many more were disabled; 
 heavy expenses were incurred, and commerce suffered 
 severely. Yet, v/hen England actually ventured to sug- 
 gest, at the conference of 1S71, that some reparation was 
 due for these wrongs, an unmistakably clear refusal was 
 given and accei)ted. lic})aration was demanded for 
 damages inflicted on American commerce by a ship which 
 escaped from an English hai'bour, but was refused for 
 those inflicted by a })ermanent organization, existing in 
 the full light of day, and proclaiiniiKj its purpose to 
 be the Avaiiinti' of Avar against a country with which the 
 United States were at })eacc. And this in face of the fact 
 that when, in 1864, a band of about fifty Southerners 
 made a rush from Canada on the States, not only was it 
 demanded that the men should be given up, but when, 
 through a legal technicality, they escaped this fate, a 
 hoAvl of raije was heard all over the North ; and not (mlv 
 had Canada to make reparation in hard cash for the in- 
 juries <l(me, but to line the frontier with her volunteers 
 to render iriipossible a repetition of the offence. Canaila 
 asked England to seek nmcii less reparation and secuvitj'^ 
 than in a siiuilar case she had been instructec^ to yield, 
 and had yielded, to the States ; but even this was dis- 
 tinctly refused, and Canada lives to-day not knowing 
 when a third Fenian raid may bring death and destruc- 
 tion on her borders, those who are to be such loving 
 neighbours in the future i ot so much as lifting a finger 
 to avert it, and the vast majority of the American pecfple 
 bidding Fenianisni go on and j)ro!-j»er. 
 
 If these facts be not cnouu'h to foreshadow i)rettv <lis- 
 tinctly the feelings with which the States are likely to 
 
 \ 
 
■n 
 
 AMERICAN' r.T.-WILL TO CAXAPA. 
 
 105 
 
 j 
 
 roi,^ar(l Canada as an indopcTidont nation, wo can go a little 
 f'urtlicr. In faro of a troaty wliicli distinctly declared 
 that tlioy should not fish within throe miles of anv hav, 
 creek, or headland, thev asserted their rio-ht to fish in anv 
 hay provided it Avere more than six miles wide, The 
 point, as usual, was yielded to them, and, as usual, they 
 took something mnve and fisiied within three miles of the 
 shore. C'anada thereupon set to work to enforce the 
 observance of the treaty ,(trct>rdi)if/ to tltc Aincricdii 'nifrr- 
 ])r('tnt}o)i. Forthwith it ap[)eared that the rights and 
 dignities of the States were being shamefully violated, 
 and a demand was made not only of free entrance to the 
 great marine treasures of the niaritime provinces, but for 
 the ' free navigation of the 8l. Lawrence,' and this in 
 face of the facts that American vessels were allowed to 
 use the canals on the same terms as Cana<lian, and that 
 Canadian vessels were not only excluded from American 
 rivers and canals, but were not allowed to carry a cargo 
 from one American lakeport to anotlier. These pro- 
 ccediiiii's certainlv auo-ur a most friendiv disijosltlon on 
 the part of the States, and a disposition to let Canada 
 go on her own way peaceablv ! 
 
 It is, moreover, altogether absurd to allege that the 
 States would have no motive to lead them to desire the 
 annexation of Bj-ifish America al'tor it iiad been separated 
 from Eni>:land. There are ot'ier advantaixes to be ii'alned 
 by its annexation besides exiiclllng England from the 
 North American c<nitinent, and these are of no iusigidfi- 
 cant character. To annex British America would re- 
 move the only possible chance of any power finding a 
 base of operations against the States' nortliern frontier, 
 seeing that it would then stretch to the Arctic ()ce:".n. 
 This would be no small matter, for though they v»'ould 
 not fear Canada as a foe, they might fear her as the ally 
 of another power, VV ith Canada in the Union they would 
 
 H 
 
 i:| 
 
 1 
 
u.'.i„m.Vij;^.."Ri.!wii^.L-f-.-i 
 
 lOCj A COLOMST OX TIIK C'OLOXIAL QLJ'>.ST(0\. 
 
 II 
 
 constitute the mightiest power in tlie workl, and one 
 against Avliich it would be ahnost inij)ossihle for a foe to 
 find a basis of ()})erations. Besi(h^s tliis the expendituri^ 
 of the Federal Government, inelnding the sums spent in 
 the redenii)tion {>f the debt, is about ten dollars j)er head 
 uf the population, and without them would be about 
 eight. Let British America be annexed, and its popula- 
 tion taxed at the same rate, and the taxation would vield 
 thirty-two milli(ms of dollars in the one case, or forty 
 millions in the other. It is certain, however, that the 
 cost of its government to the States would not be over 
 ten millions at tlic utmost ; leaving a balance of from 
 twenty-two to thirty millions of dollars, which would be 
 so nuich clear gain to the Federal excheciuer. These fact.s 
 constitute i)retty strong motives to lead the States to 
 desire Canadian annexation ; and if any other were 
 wantino' it would be found in their belief in the ' mani- 
 fest destiny.' This belief has become so deeply im- 
 bedded in the heart of almost every American, that a con- 
 viction of the im})ossibility of realising it is the only thing 
 which will hinder the nation from pursuing it. The late 
 Avar was less against secession than to preserve the Union 
 for the * manifest destiny' to Aviiich ii was believed to be 
 temlino;. That the ])assion still burns as briiihtlv as ever 
 is demonstrated by the piu'chase of that lum[) of ice and 
 snow known as Alaska, or Kussian ^Vmcrica, and by the 
 efforts made by a large party in 1871 to carry the San 
 Domingo scheme. Let Canada put lierself in a positioji 
 whicii would enable the Americans to carry out tiiis 
 leading idea of their })olitical life, and she will not have 
 long to wait for its accomplishment, even if there were 
 no other motive to induce them to desire her annexation. 
 It is j»ossible. however, that sonu; may be found who 
 will say that Canada could repel an invasion from the 
 States and maintain iicr independence single-handed. 
 
^f^ 
 
 CANADIAN L\I)i:iM:X])lL\CE IMIUSSIBLE. 
 
 1G7 
 
 For such we liave a short answer. The Soutlicriiers were 
 about twice as numerous as Canadians would be. They 
 were animated by a unity of sentiment which tlie Latter 
 will never tec! whilst Canada is inhaljitcd by two races, 
 and by a j)atriotism -which it would re({uire years of 
 nationality to engender in them for Canada separated 
 from the old flag. They were led by men of genius, 
 whoni it is not |>ivbable that Canada could rival. They 
 inhabited a country far more defensible than Canada, 
 and \"et .m y were conquered. How could Canadians 
 SU' > , li against the whv»le Union, when the Southerners, 
 under so much more favourable circumstances, failed 
 against haU'ol it ' Their fate is proof sufficient that, so 
 long as the States remain united, a British American 
 nationality is impossll)le, seeing its existence would de- 
 pend on the''* ^'>rbearance. That forbearance there seems 
 no reason t • expect would be exercised; and, even if tliere 
 Nvere, we do not tliink that Canadian- would choose to 
 hold their independence on sufl^^'erance. 
 
 It is highly probable that, whilst perusitig the above, 
 some of oiu* readers may have mentally inquired, Why, 
 then, should not Canada solve all difficulties in her case 
 by becoming annexed to the States? The answer is to 
 be found in the fact that the States are labouring under 
 such serious financial, political, and sectional difficulties 
 that for Canada to adojjt annexation would be simj)ly 
 equivalent to a merchant embarking his all in a crazy 
 craft. 
 
 The fiii.'incial history of the Union since the conclusion 
 of the war has proved decisively that the cy[)enses of the 
 Federal Govenunent cannot be reduced below .'i(){),()()(),()(M) 
 dollars, and that if the present policy of striving to dis- 
 charge the debt as soon as possible should be adhered to, 
 the aniuuil exi>enditure must reach close on 4(>0,(H)(),()()() 
 ik)llai"s. The po})ulation of Canada and the States is 
 
 dl 
 
 I , 
 
r 
 
 mamm 
 
 n :; 
 
 ■■^i 
 
 MjS a colonist ox the colonial question. 
 
 iilinut 42,000,000. Annexation would, consequently, 
 sMl)jcct Canadiuns to taxation at the i-atc of about seven 
 dollars per head per annum under the former rate of taxa- 
 tion, or about nine and a-half dollars under the latter. 
 It is possiblt' that the increase of taxation might not 
 amount to these sums. But, o;rantini»; that annexation 
 Avould induce a saving in the local expenditure of the 
 provinces ; that no counterbalancinij increase Avould be 
 induced by the addition of Canada to the Union ; that 
 (^anadians would consume less dutiable o-oods than 
 Americans, and consequently would have less taxation 
 to endure, the fact remains that an increase of <>nly one- 
 Jfii/foi' the lowest of tlie above rates of taxation would 
 l)e almost quadraph: that which we have seen might be 
 expected to result from Federation. 
 
 The political system established in the States is ])ro- 
 ducing most deplorable; misgovernment, and promises to 
 induce still worse results. Lord Macaulav said, in his 
 letter to Mr. Randall, on that gentleman sending him a 
 co[)y of his Life of Jeffrrson : ' I have long been con- 
 vinced that a system of unmixed democracy must, in the 
 end, destroy either liberty, or civilization, or both.' It 
 seems pi'obable that in the States it will lead to one of 
 these goals, and by a much quicker route than that which 
 ]\Iacaulay had in view. Unmixed democracy has theie 
 led to the country falling under the rule of an aristocracy 
 of demagogues, consisting of the members of the several 
 partisan conventions existing in every state, county, and 
 township in the Unicm. Their sway is so absolute that 
 without an endorsation from them no man need ever 
 think of even offering himself to the electors as a candi- 
 date for any ]>ublic position whatsoever ; and they exact 
 such disgraceful conditimis in return for a ' nomination ' 
 that no honourable man will com]>ly with them. Their 
 riile has culminated in a ])artisan strife so furious, uud a 
 
■■■I 
 
 AXAiuiiv i:xri:cTED ix tiii: statks. 
 
 Id) 
 
 system of (iorruptioii so widesju-ead, tluit we find some oi' 
 tiie foremost men in America seriously alarmed at the 
 ])rospects of their country. Mr. (ireeley admits that— 
 ' By means of " log-rolling," American statute-books are 
 filled with acts which subserve no eml but to illl the 
 pockets of the few at the expense of the interests, or the 
 rights, of the many.'' Mr. Fisher confesses that — ' A 
 degree of corruption prevails disgraceful to the country 
 and the age. Bribery is almost acknowledged as a j)art 
 of legislation, whilst dishonest jobs and contracts so 
 abound that thev are regarded as thino's of course.'^ 
 And Mr. Seaman alleges that — ' Unless some remed\- 
 can be devised to correct the corruj)t j)racticcs and evils 
 which have grown up under our system of party organisa- 
 tions, nominating conventions and caucuses, and electing 
 j)ublic officers, t/icre is great danger of siieh iridespreaa 
 corruption and dit^triist of all public officers and of legis- 
 lation and the administration of Uue, that toe shall sink into 
 anarchy and a chronic state of recolution and civil war — 
 as Mexico has done.^^ 
 
 It is now six years since the civil war was ended, but 
 it is evident that the ' lleconstruction of the Union ' is 
 still incomplete. The heroes of the south are the traitors 
 of the north, and vice versa. In the Southern legislatures 
 the majority of the members generally consists of frecd- 
 men, ignorant of the three K's, and voting at the dicta- 
 tion of northern ' carpet-baggers.' Such is the state o{' 
 feelinu; of the two sections towards each other that Con- 
 gress in 1871 [)assed an act authorising the President to 
 establish martial law in the Southern States, and that ho 
 iias seen fit partially to exercise the power. For our 
 
 ' ^ 
 
 • "",' American Covflict, pp. 209, 210. 
 
 - Trial of the Conxtitutioii, p. 3 {(J. 
 
 ' The American System of Goccrnmrnf, p. G6. 
 
 i 
 
■ I 
 
 J i ' 
 
 m = 
 
 ii 
 
 I* 
 
 170 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTIOX. 
 
 ])urpose we need not attempt to jn'ove that t.liis act was 
 needed ; we only refei- to it as proof positive of tlie 
 eniiiity existing between tlie two sections. l>ut still 
 more significant is the following confession in the re[)ort 
 of the Secretary of War, j)resented to Congress on its mcet- 
 hig in December 1871. He says: ' It has been abso- 
 lutely necessary to retain about one-sixth of the army 
 in those States of the south, east of the Mississip[)i, which 
 were engaged in the war of the rebellion, liidisputable 
 evidence establishes the fact, which is proven too by the 
 ex})erience of numerous sufferers, that an armed rebellion 
 of regular orijanisation and srrength now exists in i)arts 
 of those States, and, so long as it exists, so long will it 
 be necessary to aid the civil authorities with the armed 
 force of the nation in putting down this seccmd rebellion 
 and in bringhig its leaders to speedy i)unishment.' 
 
 AVe mio'ht o-o on to slio-v that the love of wealth and 
 physical enjoyment has obtained such mastery of the 
 American mind as to sap the foundations of commer- 
 cial morality and lead to the establishment of a system 
 of clieating in trade, and to weaken the influence of the 
 lioliest feelings of our nature, by triumphing even over 
 mateiiial love. But here we forbear. Suilicient evi- 
 dence is })robably to be found in the facts and confessions 
 to which we have referred to })rove that for Canada to 
 adopt annexation Avould be nothing short of madness. 
 The States are, in fact, in the stage of political develop- 
 ment described by Washington in that portion of hit 
 farewell address where, after warning them that '• the 
 alternate; dominion of one faction over another is itself 
 a most horrid despotism,' he goes on to say : ' But this 
 leads at length to a more formal and permanent desi)()tism. 
 The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline 
 the minds of men to seek security and repose in the 
 absolute power of a single individual; and soi»ncr or 
 
bi:m:fits or xatioxalitv. 
 
 171 
 
 later the chief of some previiiliiig faction, more abh' or 
 more fortunate than his com{)etitors, turns tliis despotism 
 to the j)ur])oses of his own elevation on the ruins of 
 j)ublic liberty.' Tlie (lisru))tive tendencies at [)resent in 
 force tend very mucli to increase this dan<:;er, and tin- 
 annexation of Canada would airuravate ratiier tlian iin- 
 })rove the situation. The i)resence of a })ossible foe on 
 the northern frontier serves, more than anything else, to 
 nnilvc the different sections, parties, and intei'ests in the 
 Union ' bear and forbear ' towards one another. Thar 
 danger once removed, they would feel free to give vent 
 to their feelings. And just as the concjuest of Canada 
 in I7G() acted as the chief cause of the destruction of the 
 connection between the Thirteen Coh:>nies and EiiLiland, 
 by destroying the most })owerful motive for its conserva- 
 tion, and leaving contrary influences free to act uncliecked, 
 so woukl its annexation act on the Union a century later. 
 Annexation involves an instant realization of many of 
 the prospective evils of independence. 
 
 AVe do not affect to despise the benefits of nationality. 
 Under any other circumstances than the present for 
 Colonies to refuse inde})endence would be sheer madness; 
 and even British colonists cannot foru;et that until a 
 country has become a nation, or part of one, and has 
 control of its own dij>lomacy, army, and navy, and is able 
 to make war or peace at })leasure, it has not reached its full 
 development. The possession of these ])owers acts on 
 countries as does the assumption of manhood on individuals. 
 As the youth sent forth on the world to ' sink or swim ' 
 on his owm resources, becomes conscious of powers and 
 responsibilities of wiiich he was unconscious whilst leaning 
 on another's arm, and has his eneruies ai'oused and his 
 judgment sobered thereby, so do comnumities formed into 
 nationalities find their ener«ries stirred and their intdli- 
 gence sharpened by the new field which is opened for tht'ir 
 
 III 
 
 i1 
 
 U 
 
¥• 
 
 172 A COLONIST OX TIIH COLONIAL (^IKSTION. 
 
 hi! 
 
 exercise, and the neeessity of aetino; in it. And as tliis 
 dcveldpnu'nt is a dirccl improvement of man's faeiilties — 
 an (Mid of i)oth politics and rcll^^ion — a gi'cater benefit it 
 is imj)ossil)l(' to conceive than that wliicii flows from tlic 
 possession of a national antonomy. If we thought the 
 Hritish Colonics were ri])e for natif»nality, and tliat its 
 benefits conld be obtained (mly by separation from 
 England, we should say that it would be for their interest 
 to seize the offered boon ; but, as we do not believe 
 either of these thinn;s, Ave think that thcv had better hold 
 on to the Fatherland. For, althouiih the exercise of 
 these powers and ])rivileges improves the character of a 
 people which is able to use the powers aright, and to 
 sustain the resiKmsibilities bv'ita own unaided resources, 
 it is (juite different when these ([ualifications are Avanting : 
 in that case nationality is as dangerous to its possessors 
 as is a razor to a vounji- child. Colonists may rest 
 assured that, at ])resent, independence Avould be nnich 
 more likely to prove a curse than a blessing. 
 
 But Fedei'ation offers the means of seeming all the 
 l)cneflts of nationality vii/ius its evils. Were it effected 
 the Colonist would find his title of CiviK Britannicna as 
 noble and as awe-inspiring as ever was that of Civis 
 Ronuinus. His political inferiority would be ended. He 
 would stand on a level with his countrymen at home. 
 He would be represented in the same legislature Avith 
 them, and his voice Avould form a real poAver in the 
 decision of any, and every, question of Imperial interest. 
 The loftiest honours in arms, politics, laAv, or diplomacy 
 Avould be opened to his ambition, or as Ave hope Avould be 
 the motive-poAver, to his patriotism. From all these he 
 is practicalli/ excluded at present. But let an Imperial 
 Federation be established, and colonists miji'lit fill the 
 office of constitutional monarchs in countries as larfje as 
 many European states ; might be viceroys, for Imperial 
 
m 
 
 m 
 
 CARKKR OI'IONKD RV FHDKIIATIOX. 
 
 1 
 
 7:; 
 
 11 the 
 
 rccted 
 
 us as 
 
 Chris 
 
 Ho 
 
 home, 
 with 
 the 
 
 crest. 
 
 macy 
 a be 
 I>se lie 
 
 periiil 
 I the 
 ge as 
 )erial 
 
 ])nr|)()«os, over laiuls strctchirifx across half a coiitiiiiMit, or 
 comprising one of the gi'cat divisions of the glohe ; or. 
 sitting on the throne of the Cfrcat Mogul, might rule a 
 |)o[)ulation almost equal to that of all I'^uropc I Xor 
 Avouid the summit he reached even here. All these arc 
 hut suhoi'dimite officers. Above them are a Legislature 
 and an Executive fi'om which thev nuist take their orders. 
 More than ever would it be re(|uisitc in an l']m[)ire such 
 ;js this to have the supreme otKce beyond the rejieh of 
 dispute. But all below the Crown would be open to 
 competition, nor could the Crown exercise any undue 
 fiivoui'itism in the distribution of offices or honours. Coh)- 
 nists would be members of the Imperial Ministrv. 
 leadinji; and n-uiding the affiurs of this tremendous orirani- 
 zation, before the glories of which even those of ohl 
 Home would ])ale ; and should any of them stand first in 
 the Xatio)ial Council, he could not f;iil to stand first in the 
 Executive, filling even the jiroud place of Premier. Can 
 imagination itself j)i(!tui'e a (farcer foi' ])atriotic ardour mon^ 
 gh)rious than that which would exist in the new Empire? 
 Can the Christian moralist ho[)e for a field of and)ition 
 niore pure than that in which all honours could be won 
 only by such deeds as would leave the winner, if not 
 ' first in war, first in peace, and first in the heai'ts of his 
 countrymen,' at least high in some one or more of these 
 lines ? Can the political [>hiloso})her show in what maimer 
 })olitical organisation can be made of so much profit to 
 the governed as in binding together in peace and unity 
 so many different countries, sup})lying the deficiencies 
 of one from the superfluities, or even excrescences, of 
 another, and in securing to all that invaluable heritage of 
 ])olitical fr'3(Ml(nii of which the foundation was laid on the 
 field of Ruimymede? And can the brightest dreams of 
 colonial })rogress conjure up a vision of prosperity and 
 glory to each isolated atom ecjual to that which would 
 
 
 'i 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 1 ^ 
 
 
 M 
 
If 
 
 M\ \ f'OLO.VIST OX THR TOLOXIAL Ql'RSTIO.V. 
 
 IMi 
 
 m 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 oiisnc from tlio uniterl efforts of the British race to deve- 
 lop its niii^iiificent heritage of ahnost a fiftli part of tlie 
 earth, and to maintain its common historic glories strctch- 
 inij from Ilavelock to Alfred? 
 
 This language may, perhaps, be denounced as c(m- 
 sisting of mere rhapsody. In view of such denunciation 
 let us examine in detail the direct benefits Avhich Fede- 
 ration would confer u})on the Colonies. We have seen 
 that possible colonial objections to it are balanced by 
 still more weighty objections of the same nature to inde- 
 ])endence. It w(mld induce increased taxati(m — though 
 in the case of Australasia even this is doubtful — but 
 independence would induce an increase at least double as 
 great. It is barely possible that it might endanger local 
 self-government ; but independence would leave both 
 naticmal and political freedom in very serious danger. 
 These circumstances alone should suffice to induce a 
 choice of Federaticm in i)reference to independence, for 
 ' of two evils choose the least.' But Federation would 
 not be merely a choice of evils. One of the apprehended 
 evils is, we do not hesitate to say, imaginary ; and for the 
 other very slight real evil, large benefits would be gained, 
 which would rei)ay it many times over. 
 
 1. Federation would ensure to the Colonies a con- 
 tinuance of that internal peace and liberty along with 
 that security against foreign aggression and comparatively 
 free commercial access to the rest of the Empire which 
 they now enjoy. Without the former of these blessings 
 there can exist no prosperity of any kind whatever. 
 Neither commerce, arts, literature, politics, nor religion 
 can flourish in a land where law and order are wantino:, 
 or where national rights cannot uncompromisingly be 
 asserted against foreign foes. The alliance Avith the 
 Fatherland secures both oi' those blessing's. Colonists 
 Avill probably admit that the latter of them would not be 
 
 .1 
 
for 
 
 IJTlOll 
 
 ting, 
 be 
 the 
 nists 
 )t be 
 
 COLOXIAF. GAIX F^0^[ rKDKKATIOy. 
 
 1 
 
 <) 
 
 very safe under Indepoiidcnee, and we would exhort tlieni 
 not to feel confident tliat it would be otherwise with the 
 former. Democratic republicanism is not favourable to 
 internal ])eace. It has proved an unmiti<i;!ited failure 
 wherever it has been tried, save in the United States. 
 P^ven there its success has not been by any means en- 
 couragin<r, nor are signs wanting, as we have already 
 shown, that even in that land also it ' must destroy 
 libei'ty, or civilisation, if not both.' These words are 
 n(^t ours. They are those of the great advocate of modern 
 ' progress,' Lord Macaulay. Against disorders within, or 
 subjugation from without, Federation offers a sure and 
 certain guarantee ; and as all the blessings of liberty and 
 civilisation are de])endent on the existence of some such 
 security, it would be nothing short of madness to sacrifice 
 it when once possessed. The gain from commercial 
 intercourse with the rest of the Empire would be com- 
 ])aratively less valuable; but, with the impetus which 
 might be given to such intercourse under the new rer/fmr, 
 it could not fail to conduce very considerably to the 
 material wealth of the Colonies. 
 
 2. Federation would place the Colonies in possession 
 of ' sovereign rights,' with all their accompanying advan- 
 tages. We have already stated our belief that without 
 these no community can reach the full development of 
 wdiich it is capable. Their attainment constitutes the 
 national majority. It is with nations as with men. As 
 each year of growth renders a youth better fitted for his 
 entrance on the rights of manhood, and the possession of 
 these rights of increasing importance to his well-being, so 
 does each step forwards in wealth, pc^pulation, intelligence, 
 liberty, or religion, render a connuunity better qualified 
 to exercise sovereign rights, and the ])ossession of these 
 rio"hts more essential to its welfare. The foreign relations 
 of a few hundred immigrants on a desert shore are simply 
 
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 176 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 I 
 
 ll 
 
 V ; 
 
 nil, because they have neither means nor inclination 
 to bring themselves into contact with the rest of the 
 ■world, and they are too insignificant for it to notice them. 
 But see the same land after the lapse of a century ! The 
 Avilderness has become a fruitful field, and the desert 
 rejoices and blossoms as the rose. The few hundreds 
 of poverty-stricken colonists have swelled into hundreds 
 of thousands of wealthy citizens, gathering riches from 
 the sea, the mine, the forest, and the field ; scattering the 
 fruits of their industry over the world, bringing back into 
 their own midst the luxuries of other climes, and present- 
 ing such a prize as has in every age served to excite most 
 strongly the aggressive propensities of kings or nations. 
 The desert island of San Juan was merely a speck on 
 an unknown sea in 1846, but in 1872 it is a strategical 
 point on which depends the safety of a considerable i)ort, 
 likely to expand into the commercial emporium of a 
 mighty trade between China, Japan, the East Indies, 
 and the northern half of the North American continent; 
 and, perhaps, with England also. Fenian raids into 
 Ontario would have been of slight consequence fifty years 
 ago, when there was little to destroy ; but to-day a rich 
 garden invites the plunderer. A centilry since the 
 wealth that lies hid in the ocean depths around Nova 
 Scotia and New Brunswick was merely tapped by visitors, 
 but now it has become the source from which thousands 
 of families draw their daily bread. The boundary of 
 Maine, or the possession of Oregon, may have seemed a 
 liirht matter when the Ashburton treatv was concluded ; 
 but the former concession has since necessitated the 
 building of a railroad through an almost unproductive 
 territory, whilst a profitable commercial route was open, 
 and even then still leaves it dangerously exposed to a 
 possible foe, and American acquisitions on the Pacific now 
 constitute part of the great wheat-growing region of the 
 
GROWTH TEMPTS AGGRESSION. 
 
 17 
 
 ;linatii)n 
 of the 
 ;e them. 
 ! The 
 ; desert 
 undreds 
 undreds 
 les from 
 ring the 
 ack into 
 present- 
 site most 
 nations, 
 peck on 
 rategical 
 Die port, 
 mi of a 
 u Indie.s, 
 ntinent ; 
 ids into 
 'ty years 
 y a rich 
 nee the 
 id Nova 
 visitors, 
 lousands 
 idary of 
 eemcd a 
 icluded ; 
 ited the 
 oductive 
 us open, 
 ed to a 
 ific now 
 m of tlie 
 
 Union. Canadian trade was a small matter fifty year.« 
 since ; but now it has swollen to large proportions, and i.s 
 daily swelling to still larger. It is the same elsewhere. 
 What foe would have cared to attack the Australian 
 convict-settlements at the beginning of the century ? 
 What enemy would forget Sydney or Melbi)urne to-day? 
 Hence the increasing necessity of growing countries' 
 obtaining j)ossession of sovereign rights, and gaining a 
 ccmtrol over their relations with foreign powers. To 
 obtain this desideratum by means of independence will 
 not do in the present case, because prerogatives are use- 
 less Avithout j)ower to enforce them. But Federation 
 would secure both power and prerogative. The united 
 might of the British Empire would be such as no power 
 Avould care to resist, or would be likelv to resist success- 
 fully ; and a due api)lication of that might to the main- 
 tenance of colonial interests Avould be assured bv means 
 of colonial representation. Can any Camidinn supj)ose 
 that the loner course of truckliniT; to YankiH' aoii;ressivc- 
 ness which has been pursued by England for over thirty 
 years, would have been adopted had there been colonial 
 members of the Imperial Parliament avIio understood, 
 and felt an interest in, the various (|ueslions, to call 
 ministers to account? Canada is now mourninu: over 
 the Alabama treaty, and, tiiough allowed to r.ject those 
 clauses which iunnediately affect her own interests, dares 
 not do so, knowino- that she cannot maintain her riirhts 
 unless backed by tiie power of the C^nitcd Kingdom, and 
 that this, under })resent circumstances, will not be ac- 
 corded. It is the same to (hiy as Avhen, fifteen years ago, 
 IVFr. Howe, in discussing the Colonial (Question, said: 
 ' Your fisheries, if given away to-morrow, would scaicely 
 ])rovoke a discussion in the House of Connnons ; but 
 ])lace ten North Americans there, and no minister would 
 dare to bring down a treaty by which they were sucri- 
 
 I 
 
178 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 ficed.' The same lanjijuaj^e is still applicable to any, anu 
 every, colonial interest ct)rning under the control of the 
 Imperial Government. Ministers do not hesitate to 
 sacrifice it if by so doing they can show a saving of a few 
 thousand pounds in the estimates. If, perchance, there 
 is somebody found to hint that the saving is being effected 
 at the cost of feUow-countrymen, and that it may induce 
 a much heavier loss hereafter, the unfortunate ' alarmist ' 
 is probably coughed down, for the simple reason that no 
 I)art of the House has any interest in supporting him. 
 But let it be knoAvn that such a man has one-fifth, or 
 even one-tenth, of the members ready to back his views 
 with their votes, and we should see leaders on both sides 
 paying all deference to his wishes, if not striving to 
 anticipate them. Colonial questions would no longer be 
 looked upon as * bores,' but would command tlie ready 
 and symi)athising attcnticm of the first intellects and the 
 strongest parties of the day ; and the result would be 
 that, instead of seeing New Zealand on the eve of being 
 abandoned to iSIaori savages, Australia lying almost 
 defenceless, and Can.ada compelled to yield control over 
 her waters, and surrender to Yankee greed those fisheries 
 which are the chief source of wealth to a large part of 
 her i)eople, we should see the whole force of the Empire 
 employed to maintain colonial interests. Every year 
 the importance to the Colonies of their foreign relations 
 is likely to increase ; and if they are wise they will seize 
 on the opportunity of gaining both sovereign rights and 
 the power to make them respected, which is oifered in 
 Federation. One of these is useless without the other ; 
 and they Avill never again have such a fair chance of 
 combining them. 
 
 3. Federation would open to the Colonies that field for 
 patriotic genius and ambition which must ever be either 
 entirely absent or very ill-sui)i)lied in the colonial rela- 
 
[. 
 
 iny, 
 
 niu 
 
 il of the 
 iitate to 
 of a few 
 ce, there 
 ; effected 
 y induce 
 alarmist ' 
 II that no 
 ing him. 
 3-lifth, or 
 his views 
 )oth sides 
 riving to 
 longer be 
 the ready 
 8 and the 
 would be 
 of being 
 rr almost 
 ;rol over 
 fisheries 
 e part of 
 le Empire 
 ery year 
 relations 
 will seize 
 ights and 
 offered in 
 le other ; 
 chance of 
 
 Lt field for 
 be either 
 nial rela- 
 
 FEDKRATIOX AND COLOMAL (JKXIUS. 
 
 17!) 
 
 tionship. It is true that the growth of the Colonics, and 
 the system of local self-government Avhich has been 
 established in so many of them, have done much to 
 improve tlieir condition in this respect, but their situation 
 is still highly unsatisfactory. The C(»lonist is restricted 
 to the narrow bounds of his own province ; and if the whole 
 truth be told, partisan and democratic jealousy oi'ten 
 render local honours by no means desirable. He is 
 practically excluded from the army, navy, diplomacy, and 
 all the higher honours of the Empire, and must remain so 
 as long as the relationship continues on its present foot- 
 ing. But let Federy.tion be established, and a mighty 
 cliange would instantly ensue. Its first effect would be 
 to oi)en the doors of both Houses of Parliament to coh)- 
 nists, and from that one honour all others would quickly 
 follow. We need not attempt to demonstrate this pro- 
 ]>osition, for we feel sure that nobody will dispute it. 
 But we ask colonists to consider in what i)olitical condi- 
 tion would such a s[)lendid career be oi)ened to them as 
 in the Federal Legislature, or in the service of an 
 Empire on which the sun never sets ? The gain to 
 colonial genius would be inunense ; nor would the benefit 
 be confined to men of talent: it would extend to the 
 whole community. The opening of these new fields for 
 genius would, through the necessity of colonial members 
 being able to vie with men from Oxford, Cambridge, and 
 Dublin, tend to induce increased attention to the higher 
 branches of education, and to raise the educational stan- 
 dard generally throughout colonial society. This, again, 
 would impart a higher tone to local ])olitics, Avhich wouhl 
 be assisted by the accjualntance with English political 
 morals and ideas gained by representatives in the Federal 
 Legislature, and scattered over the land by them <m their 
 return. The training which colonial politicians would 
 receive in England would be calculated to fit them for 
 
 K 2 
 
 ;i::; 
 
 '!■ ': 
 
 il I 
 
181) A COLONIST oy Tin: colonial qilstion. 
 
 fillinfjf efficiently the duties of local ministers ; and as 
 jteojile are, at last, beginninj^ to understand that the 
 Avorld before the French Revolution was not entirely 
 astrav in thinkin<; that soniethinu more than the decisions 
 of local and transient numerical majorities Mere necessary 
 to rule a country efficiently, we need not arjjue that 
 colonial communities would reap the benefit of imjuoved 
 local j^overnment from improvement in the (p'.alifications 
 of their rulers, in addition to havinjjj a noble Held for the 
 exercise of jrenius oj)eiied by Federaticm. 
 
 4. Federation would <;ive the Colonies a history. It mav 
 \)G thought by some that this would be a very small ad- 
 vantage, but a little reflection would prove it to be a very 
 large one. Historical recollections are probably the most 
 ]K)werrul lever that can be found to lift each generation 
 out of itself, and impart to the national mind some sta- 
 bility of feeling and <lefinite j)olitical convictiim. With- 
 out national convictions of some sort i)olitical unity is 
 im] ossible, and to create these co<n ictions a national 
 history seems to be almost indispensable. In its absence 
 the public mind finds nothing in the })ast on which it can 
 feed, and as the future is necessarily a regif>n of pure 
 iniagination, it is inevitably turned almost exclu.-ivelv to 
 the ])resent for jxditical food. The conse(iuence is that 
 the events of the passing time become elevated beyond 
 their actual importance, and the j)ublic are led to believe 
 that such times as those in which they live never before 
 fiii'ured in their own or in any other land. Conceit and 
 self-confidence are thereby instilled to a very dangerous 
 extent. Laws, manners, j>olicies, institutions and rulers, 
 not liavinff been liallowed by the hand of time, are all 
 regarded as 'open questions' and ex))'>sod nearly un- 
 ])rotected to the rash assaults of the demagogue. The 
 full effect of such a state of affairs is best illustrated bv 
 
 • 
 
 the cases of Spanish-America and France. Emancipa- 
 
snid as 
 liat the 
 entirely 
 lecisious 
 eeessarv 
 
 • 
 
 fue that 
 mproved 
 ifieatious 
 d i'or the 
 
 , Itinav" 
 Muall ad- 
 )e a very 
 liho most 
 [•neration 
 ome sta- 
 . AVith- 
 unity is 
 national 
 ? absence 
 ch it can 
 of pure 
 isivelv to 
 i' i.s that 
 [] beyond 
 
 believe 
 er before 
 iceit and 
 aiijxerous 
 lid rulers, 
 .', are all 
 •arlv un- 
 ue. The 
 
 1 rated by 
 niancipa- 
 
 S ! 
 
 TITH AI)VANTA(ii:s OF A XATin.NAL HISTORY. 1 >1 
 
 tion in the former countries, and in the latter the Ke vo- 
 lution of 1789, constituted a complete break with the 
 past. After these events all things became new, but in 
 becoming new they became also unsettled. Nobody had 
 a living faith in anything as being beyond doubt just, 
 true, or lovely. The consequence was that, nothing being 
 respected, all fell to pieces. In both countries revolution 
 seems to have become a chronic disease of the political 
 system. Some of the influences by which these countiies 
 have been ruinrd have begun to show themselves in the 
 United States and in the Colcnies; but the hitter being 
 strongly influenced by British traditions, they have not 
 obtained nuu'h sway there, and the States having some- 
 thing of a historv have not vet fullv yielded to them. 
 But let these countries break with the past, and they will 
 follow France or Spanish- America in the future. Living 
 sctlely in the prcr-ent is but, in other words, living solely 
 to self, and this 'bourse will never Avork satisfactorily. 
 Faith, ho[>(', and charity can as little be dispensed with in 
 politics as in any other walk of life. For infusing these 
 virtues into that sphere ol' action there is pi-obably no 
 earthly means so efficacious as is a glorious history. 
 Xoble deeds cannot i'ail to induce respect for their authoi*s 
 and trust in their judgment : that is faith. The inherit- 
 ance of a splendid and ancient [>ro[»erty rouses a desire in 
 the inheritors to prove themselves at least not inferior to 
 their ancestors, by tranmitting it unimpaire<l to future 
 generations : that is hope. ^Vnd an appreciation of tlu? 
 merits of the herita<i;e cannot fail to induce love of it and 
 gratitude towards those who established it, and that is 
 charity. The effect is, in some measure at least, to 
 impress statesmen and people with the mighty truth tha*: 
 ' \o man liveth unto himself.' Each learns to resjject 
 other Avills than his own, to consult not so nnu'h his 
 personal profit as that of the cominonweulth, and this not 
 
 
1(S2 A COLONIST OX TIIR COLONIAL QVESTIOX. 
 
 
 
 merely for liis own time but for so long as Iiis country 
 hIuiII stand above tbc sea ! It is tbis spirit alone tbat 
 can ballow party-strife. In its absence tbe contests of 
 parties first dejienerate into a disgustino; scramble for the 
 lawful, and next for tbe unlawful, gains of office : a contest 
 conducted first by votes, tben by bribes, and finally by 
 tbe sword. But under its influence party struggles 
 ap])roacb as nearly as possible to an honest controversy 
 between bonest men as to tbe means Avliereby tbe welfare 
 »»f their common country may best be promoted. To 
 ])reserve, and still further to infuse, this si)irit amongst the 
 inhabitants of the Colonics it is only requisite that they 
 should continue to be closely identified Avith their glorious 
 aiu'cstors in the Fatherland. Then they nu'ght j)roudly 
 exclaim : * We have classical associations and ijreat njimes 
 of our own which we can confidently opj)ose to the most 
 splendid of ancient times. " Senate " has not to our 
 e.ars a sound so venerable as " Parliament." We respect 
 the (ireat Charter more than the laws of Solon. The 
 Caj)itol and the Forum im])ress us with less awe than 
 our own Westminster Hall and Westminster Abbey, the 
 place where the great men of twenty generations have 
 contended, the place where they sleep together ! The 
 list of warriors and statesmen bv whom our constitution 
 was founded or preserved, from De Montfort down to 
 Fox, may Avell stand a comparison with the Fasti of Rome. 
 The dying thanksgiving of Sidney is as noble as the 
 libation which Thrasea poured to liberating Jove, and we 
 think with far less pleasure of Cato tearing out his en- 
 trails than of Russell saying, as he turned away from his 
 wife, that the bitterness of death was ])ast.' ' Federation 
 would preserve this glorious inheritance to the Colonies, 
 and as the possession of it would contribute more than 
 anything else towards keeping public life pure, and es- 
 
 ' Macaulay. 
 
<. 
 
 FEDKRATIOX AND COLONIAL fiROWTII. 
 
 188 
 
 con n try 
 one tlmt 
 titcsts of 
 e for the 
 a contest 
 Jially by 
 strujjnrles 
 itroversy 
 B welfare 
 ted. To 
 mgst the 
 hat they 
 
 ghn'ions 
 
 proudly 
 at names 
 the most 
 t to our 
 e respect 
 n. The 
 we than 
 >l)ey, the 
 •ns have 
 r ! The 
 stltution 
 down to 
 •f Rome. 
 I as the 
 , and we 
 
 his en- 
 from his 
 deration 
 yolonies, 
 )re than 
 and es- 
 
 tublisliinjr libortv on a siu'e foundation, the ijain wouM he 
 second to none derivable from the establishment of a 
 Pan-Hri tannic Kmpirc. 
 
 5. Rapid as have been the gfrowth of colonial wealth, 
 and the development of colonial resources in the past, the 
 future proj^ress of both would be enormously increased 
 by Federation. The Colonies want only labour and 
 capital to make them vie with the noblest countries in 
 the world ; and to find investments for labour and capital 
 is the problem of the day in the United Kinjjjdom. The 
 Colonies can take all of both that it has to offer, and a 
 srreat deal more, too, and return rich interest on the 
 investment. For half-a-century past, foreign countries 
 have profited by a rich stream of liritish emigration and 
 ca[)ital, which, had it flowed into the Colonies, would 
 have made them thrice as great as they are at present. 
 The causes which have led to its taking this uiniatural 
 course are to be found in foreign j>rrsfif/r' and colonial 
 obscuritv. A fair .amount of knowledge of the resources 
 of foreign fields of emigration has pi'cvailed in England ; 
 c«mcerninir those of the Cohmies comi)arativelv nothing 
 was known, and until lately gross ignorance on the matter 
 existed. The discovery of Australian gold-fields, and 
 the formation of the Canadian Dominion have done some- 
 thinsr to turn attention to the«e countries, but there is 
 still very much room for imjirovement. Canada is yet 
 popularly believed to be another Norway, instead of a 
 land in which the vine flourishes in the open air, and the 
 isothernuil lines of which pass through France. A 
 remedy for this ignorance is the first step towards turning 
 Enjrlish emiirration to the Col{)nies ; and such a reniedv 
 would be found in Federation. Every colonial member 
 would constitute a living advertisement of the resources 
 of his country ; able to correct errors, suj)j»ly information, 
 or offer useful suggestions to all inclined either to cmi- 
 
 " WW 
 
 f 
 
I i 
 ' 'I 
 
 II 
 
 1^ 
 
 1<S4 A COLONIST ON TUi: COLON I. \ I. (^'KSTIO.V. 
 
 grate thereto or invest capital tlioreiii. Tiiis steady 
 suj)])ly of infonnation woiiM alone exercise a most iin- 
 portunt influctice on the course of einiu;ration : and, in 
 connection with the new relations of the several j)arts of 
 the Knipire, could scantely fail to increase its amount, 
 and to turn it almost entirelv into tl>e Colonics. Under 
 Federation the emigrant wotdd continue to enjoy almost 
 the same interest in, and he as closely connected with, 
 the hind of his hirth as when livinir in it. Under these 
 circumstances, cmi<jjration would lose the cliaracter of an 
 act of expatriation in which it n(»w appears. The emi- 
 trrant would leave the Fatherland with the sweet thouj^ht 
 that he would remain as dear to it, and it to him, as 
 when dwelling within its hounds ; and instead of feeling 
 ao'onised as does one who deserts his countrv, a i)atriotic 
 ardour would glow in his breast as he felt that he was 
 going forth to extend its greatness and glory by wiiming 
 bloodless conquests over the waste places of the earth. 
 Thus, all the patriotic; motives which now tend to check 
 emigration would, under Federation, cease to exist, or 
 else be turned to its encouragement. But great as would 
 be the aid g-ained from this fact, still «j;reater would be 
 that gained from the prominence into which the Colonies 
 would be thrown by Federation. Barnum set an ele[)hant 
 to plough a field, in order to make people talk about 
 himself and his museum, in full confidence that if they 
 should talk they would visit. The result proved that he 
 was right. It always has been, and always will be, the 
 same. Let the Colonies be ke[>t constantly before tho 
 eyes of the English public, as they necessarily would be, 
 under the new rcf/itne, and Ave should have eager inquirers 
 into every detail of their circumstances, and thousands 
 instead of hundreds rushing into them to find new homes, 
 and findirg them. The increased infiux of capital would 
 be even greater than that of labour, for the inquiry 
 
X. 
 
 s stcudv 
 most iin- 
 iind, in 
 I piirts of 
 ninount, 
 lIi»(K»r 
 )y almost 
 :cm1 with, 
 Icr those 
 or of ii!i 
 riic cmi- 
 tliouj^ht 
 Ikim, as 
 f ft' cling 
 patriotic 
 t he was 
 winning 
 le earth. 
 io check 
 L'xist, or 
 as would 
 ion Id he 
 Colonies 
 elephant 
 '/{ ahout 
 if they 
 that he 
 be, the 
 fore tho 
 ould be, 
 iquirers 
 ousands 
 ' homes, 
 d would 
 inquiry 
 
 BL'KDKXS AND DKNKKITS OF rDDIllJATIOX. IS.') 
 
 wouhl be most aetivelv itursnod bv men of iiitclli^^ence 
 amongst tin* middle classes, crushed out at honu' by 
 monster capitalists. A mixture of such men in the tide 
 of immiixration would be an immense moral and intellcc- 
 tual benefit to the Colonies, whilst their capital would 
 probably double the productive power of labour. Nor 
 woidd the benefit cud here. Xot thiec years would 
 elapse before the revelations niade, the interest excited, 
 and the experience gained, would induce; the establish- 
 ment of a svstem of (iovernmcnt emii^ration |in»vidin<»' 
 free transit for those unable to j)ay their way. The 
 result of thes!' cond)ine<l iuHuences would be to throw 
 into the shade all the marvels of colonial increase in the 
 past, and to cause new conununities to spring into life 
 with ahnost magic rapidity. N«)t long sh(»uld we have to 
 Avait to see the Uritain of the South covered with home- 
 steads akin to those in tlic Britain of the North : Australian 
 products rivalling those of Sjiain and France, and per- 
 haps those of the 'Cotton States' also; West Indian 
 plantations, instead of being deserted, again as rich as in 
 former davs, and a chain of settlements extendinjj across 
 the \(nth American continent, coimected by an iron 
 road, over which would be I'caliscd ' the north-west 
 passage by land.' The enormous benefits gained by 
 older settlements fi-om such increase is too well known to 
 colonists to render it ncedl'ul for us to >av a sinn;le word 
 on the subject. If anv colonist should still feel chai'v ot' 
 consenting" to a scheme bv which taxativ)n miy;lit possiblv 
 be increased to the extent of o.v. 2(1. })er head, we would 
 ask him to compare the loss by taxation with the gain 
 through the appreciation of property, which couhl not 
 fail to follow on the increased infiux of labour and capital, 
 and say if it would not thereby be repaid tenfold? 
 
 We are thus led to conclude that colonial indepen- 
 dence is, at present, an impossibility ; but that all the 
 
 1 
 
ISO A rOLOMST O.V TIIK COLOMAT. QIT-STION. 
 
 1 
 
 ! 
 
 Ix'tiofits wliich a national antonomv ()ffovH to oountrios 
 <'iipul)le of niiiintninin*!^ it, iiloiij; with a jjood many more 
 &U<), woiild be attained by the Colouios under a Federation 
 (»r tiie I^nipire. How, tlien, ean any colonist hesitate for 
 i\ moment aw to the expediency of adoptinj^ it, in default 
 of bein«( able to prove the course of reasoning; by which 
 we have been led to this conclusion to be incorrect? 
 
 M 
 
18: 
 
 CHAPTKR IX. 
 
 FEDERATION V. ENGLISH ISOLATION. 
 
 The oxpedienoy of Fedorution has now to he eonsidcM'od 
 from an iMijjIish standpoint: having arrived at the con- 
 clusion that the ineaHure woidd he bcneHcial to tlio 
 C/olonies, it remains to inquire whether tliere is fair 
 ground to believe that its influence on the ITnitcil Ivinir- 
 dom would be of a similar character. 
 
 The answer, it seems to us, can be reached much more 
 readily than that to the correspondiiiii^ (|uesti<»n in refer- 
 ence to the Colonies. That the Fiitiieriand would be a 
 ijainer, to an enormous extent, by Federation has been 
 almost proved already. We have seen that einan('i|iation 
 could scarcely fail to present Eni^land to the eyes of the 
 world in a manner which would piin for her a /irrsfif/r by 
 no means enviable, and ]n*etty certain to ])rove Iii2:hly 
 mischievous; that it might tend to endanger Fuirlish 
 investments in the Colonies ; that it could not fail to 
 reduce that maritime strength on which her existence 
 depends; that it would, in all probability, create at least 
 as many new dijdosnatic difficulties as its advocates allege 
 that it would solve ; that heavv connnercial losses could 
 not fail to ensue from it; and that it would, in case of 
 England being forced to abandon free trade, dei)rive her 
 of the only resource Avhereby she could save her com- 
 merce from utter ruin. Against all these circumstances 
 adverse to emancipation can be placed only the single 
 
* 3 
 
 ISS A COLOXIST OX Till-: COLOXIAL QUESTIOX. 
 
 fact lliat it would render [)ossible a reduction of about 
 2,')0(),()()()/. in the military expenditure. But as tlio 
 conuiierc'al loss would probably amount to treble or 
 (jUi\drui)lc the amount saved in expenditure, it folbnvs 
 that crcn tlw jx'ciiitiuri/ huhince would be against emanci- 
 paticm, to say nothing of the other evils, present and 
 ])rospective, which it would induce. Hence it appears 
 that it would be better for Entjland to oarriv*on the 
 Colonies at her own expense, as was done prior to 1871. 
 if that course should prove essential to the maintenance 
 of the connection with its accomi)anvi7i<i: advantatres, 
 than dissolve it in consideration of effectinjj a saving of 
 2,.")()0,()0()/. in her annual ex])enditure. But if the loss 
 of the Colonies would entail on Knijland evils Avhich it 
 would pay to spend the above sum to avert, is it needful 
 to say one woi-d in defence of the exi)ediency of a 
 scheme Avhich would enable her to retain them without 
 the expenditure of one farthing? This, and a good deal 
 more too, would Federation accomplish for England. 
 We shall strive to state categorically the benefits which 
 would thence «iccrue to her. 
 
 1. The one sound argument of emancipationists is that 
 the policy Avhich they advocate would relieve England of 
 the ex})cnse heretofore entailed by the possession of her 
 colonial empire. Federation would accom[)Hsh the same 
 result and leave that empire intact. Under it the Colo- 
 nies would become sources of revenue to England. Tiieir 
 cinitributions to the common fund would, at the outset, 
 probaldy range from 2,500,000/. to 3,000,000/. per annum 
 — a sum which, we have seen, would suffice to defray all 
 the charges which they now entail. This advantage, we 
 doubt not, would be duly api)reciated by England. But 
 the sjain to her would not end here. The growth of 
 wealth and population in the Colonies is not correctly 
 understood by Englishmen. All, lnjwcver, know that 
 
(iAlN TO KXULAXI) FROM FEDKKATIO.V, 
 
 ISO 
 
 of about 
 t as the 
 treble or 
 t follows 
 
 einanei- 
 sent and 
 
 appears 
 
 Mson the 
 
 to 1871, 
 
 ntenance 
 
 ^•aiitaLres. 
 
 I. 
 
 saviiiiji: of 
 the loss 
 which it 
 t nceflful 
 icy of a 
 1 without 
 jood (Ion I 
 t^ug'laud. 
 ts whioh 
 
 ts is that 
 lijlaud of 
 n of her 
 he same 
 he Colo- 
 Tiieir 
 e outset, 
 r annum 
 efray all 
 tage, we 
 d. But 
 •owth of 
 jorrectly 
 ow that 
 
 the rate of increase in new countries must be much more 
 rapid than in those thickly-peopled like Enolaud. Hence 
 it appears that not only the amount, but also the prujfor- 
 tlou of revenue to be paid by the Colonies woidd be 
 continually on the increase, and conse([uently that of 
 lMi<;land on the decline. We do not say that each 
 increase in the colonial contributions to the Fcdei'al 
 icvenue would be so much clear uain to I']nii;land, as the 
 sum total of Federal exj)euditure, and ])robably the 
 amount (tf it s])ent in the Colonies, would o-row with the 
 growth of the Em[)ire. But as tlu- wealth of Knoland 
 has, during the present century at least, increased much 
 moi'e raj)idly than has her ex})enditure, it is almost a 
 matter of certainty that the growth of colonial wealth, 
 and consequently of taxation, would outstiij) that ol* 
 expenditure in a sti'l greater degree; in which case the 
 relief to the English tax])ayei" Avould be ])ci'manently 
 augmenting, fi't)m the mere increase of colonial wealth. 
 Should any contentious colonist here exclaim that this 
 rt'lief would be unjust to the Colonies, we reply that it 
 would be nothing different from that which must occur in 
 every state, since it is impossible to secure an identical 
 growth of wealth in every section ; and that, in the 
 present instance, the accomjianyijig increase of influence 
 in the national council would furnish a c()mi)ensati(tu not 
 usually provided, and enable the Colonies to secure due 
 attention to their interests in the expenditure of the 
 revenue, which is all that they would in ecjuity be 
 entitled to clahn. As we wish to kee[) within i\\v. limits 
 tif sober facts, we shall make no estimate of the ])i'obal)Ie 
 growth of colonial contributions. To any who may feel 
 sce])tical w^e say : Look at the Colonies, see what they 
 were and what they are. AVe say nothing of the dazzling 
 iirowth of Australia, for thar has occurred under verv 
 peculiar circumstances. But we poi:it to the fact that 
 
190 A COLOXIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 f! 
 
 ;f] 
 
 i 
 
 « 
 
 the growth of British America has far outstripped the 
 miich-vaunted progress of the United States. The popu- 
 lation of the entire countries wliich now constitute 
 British America, in tlie year 17o0, has hitely been esti- 
 mated by one of our best statisticians at 81,000, which is 
 certainly a j)retty high estimate. The jwpulatiou of the 
 territories of the present Union in the same year is stated 
 by Mr. Bancroft at 1,260,000. In 1870 it had risen to 
 38,555,000, showing the rate of increase to have been 
 about 2,959 per cent., Avhilst the population of British 
 America in the same year was about 3,800,000, being an 
 increase of 4,710 per cent. In 1750, the Canadian popu- 
 lation was about one-fifteenth that of the States; in 1870 
 it was one-tenth ! If it be replied that this comparison 
 is unfair, as the rate of increase is a})parently more raj)id 
 in the early than in the late stages of society, we turn to 
 the fact that between 1830 and 1871 the po[)ulati(m of 
 the provinces of Ontario and Quebec increased from 
 700,000 to about 2,811,000, or over 300 per cent., whilst 
 the increase in the States during the same time was only 
 i'vom 12,866,000 to 38,555,000, or 199 per cent. The 
 population of these two provinces was about 5^ per cent, 
 that of the States in 1830, and in 1871 it was almost 7^. 
 It is thus clear that the growth of the Colonies is much 
 more rapid than that prevailing in the States, and we 
 have before seen that the establishment of the proposed 
 Federal ret/ime could scarcely fail to increase it very 
 nuiterially. The former fact alone should, we think, 
 suffice to convince the most scepvical that the relief to 
 Knglish finances from emanci[)ation would be nuich less 
 tlian that which would ensue from Federation. 
 
 2. Federation would confer an immense benefit on the 
 United Kingdom by supplying it with legislative machi- 
 nery ade(iuate to its wants. That it does not j)ossess 
 this at present was pithily stated by the Saturdny Riricir 
 
^T 
 
 S. 
 
 BRITISH PARLIAMENT UVKR WORK ED, 
 
 11(1 
 
 )|)e(l the 
 lie popu- 
 onstitute 
 een esti- 
 
 wliich is 
 n of the 
 is stated 
 
 risen to 
 ive been 
 ^ British 
 beinjj an 
 in po[)u- 
 
 in 1870 
 nparison 
 •re rajtid 
 3 turn to 
 lation ol' 
 ed from 
 ;., Avhilst 
 vas only 
 t. Tiie 
 )er cent, 
 most 7|. 
 
 is mu(;h 
 
 and we 
 )ro[)osed 
 
 it very 
 think. 
 
 elief to 
 
 ioh less 
 
 on the 
 niaelii- 
 ])Ossess 
 Ri'vh'w 
 
 ' 
 
 of AiifTust 12, 1871, when it said: 'In every direction 
 it is a{)j)arent that Parliament tries to do too mueli ; dues 
 very badly very much of what it does, and leaves very 
 much undone.' The correctness of this statement is 
 substantiated by the annual ' slaughter of the innocents,' 
 the lai'ge numl)er of emendatory statutes required, and 
 the many important questions awaiting solution and never 
 solved. 
 
 That these evils do not arise from any laziness on the 
 j)art of either ministei's or legislators is confessed by all. 
 The amount of labour which is discharged by a minister 
 of the Crown, or even by a member of Parliament, during 
 the session, is probably much in excess of that fulfilled 
 by the hardest-worked of ' working men.' Theii- in effi- 
 ciency {irises chiefly from the fact that they have a great 
 deal more work on hand than it is possible for liinnan 
 nature efficiently to acconqdish. There is more attempted 
 every session than it is possible to complete, and a know- 
 ledi-e of tiie large measures and careful thought needed 
 in the settlement of great social and political ])robk'ms — 
 such as this very colonial (question, national defence, or 
 pauperism— leads wearied and badgered statesmen actu- 
 ally to shirk them, and l)y so doing to prc})are for their 
 country a terrible awakening. We do not blame them 
 very much. The national ideal for a couple of genera- 
 tions has been a legislature which would follow rather 
 than lead public o})inion ; and i)ublic oj)inion during that 
 time has been chiefly engrossed by matters in which par- 
 tisan or social jealousies and the cheapness of goods were 
 involved, whilst a cerUiin code of opinion was declared to 
 constitute the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
 truth, and any attenq)t to violate it was denounced as 
 political blasphemy. Under such circumstances, rulers 
 cannot fairlv be blamed for the ' confusion worse con- 
 founded ' that reigns in the hnperial Legislature. It is 
 
 !l 
 
H 
 
 1«!» 
 
 !• f 
 
 11 '2 A COLONIST OX TIIK COI.OXIAL QUKSTIOX. 
 
 impossible tliiit the relations of len;isljitors aiul constituents 
 Clin, with safety to the commonwealth, ever be reduced 
 to the conditicm in which the sovereign |)eo])le say to 
 their servant, ' Do this, and he doeth it.' Inde[»endently 
 of the difficulty of ascertaining what the voice of the 
 ])eo|)le really says, the interests of the body ])olitic may 
 demand many measures Avhich that voice never asks for 
 at all, and the Legislature should be both able and 
 willing to supply them. It may demand measures which 
 are either totally impracticable or essentially vicious, and 
 the Legislature should be able to refuse them, and to 
 convince the people or, at least, the intelligent i)art of 
 the c(»nununity, that it does well to do so. And it may 
 be possible t() attain the end desired much moie advan- 
 tageously by means of another [)olicy than that advocated, 
 and the Legislature shoidd c(^nn)rehcnd this policy and 
 substitute it for that proj)oscd. It is, of course, true 
 that to the due fulfilment of these duties the presence of 
 a large amount of knowledge and talent within the 
 Legislature is indispensable. But It Is also true that no 
 anumnt whatever of talent could fulfil these duties unless 
 it ha I time to aj>})ly Itself to the work. This English 
 legislators have not at present, and consequently they 
 fail in the discharge of the duties of their office. The 
 growth of wealth and j)0})ulatIon has enormously in- 
 creased the quantity, and rendered more intricate the 
 quality of the legislation required at their hands ; and 
 ' although this nineteenth century has produced many 
 Avonderful things, it has not ])roduced a new mankind ' 
 who can labour seventeen hours a day with Imj)unity, 
 though even that time does not suffice to enable them to 
 fuliil their Avork. The declaration that representative 
 institutions are on their trial has ])assed into a sort of 
 cant phrase. Let them, at least, have a fair trial ; let 
 them not suffer from legislators being required to fulfil 
 
 m 
 
R1:M1:DY L\ local liEGISLATURi:S. 
 
 193 
 
 tituonts 
 reduced 
 say ti» 
 mlently 
 of the 
 tic may 
 isks ftn" 
 ble and 
 s which 
 )us, and 
 and to 
 part of 
 1 it may 
 advan- 
 vocated, 
 licy and 
 ■se, true 
 :senee of 
 hln the 
 that no 
 s unless 
 English 
 ;ly they 
 The 
 dy in- 
 ite the 
 ; and 
 many 
 mkind ' 
 j)unity, 
 them to 
 ntative 
 sort of 
 ial; let 
 fto fulfil 
 
 isl 
 
 Is 
 
 tasks beyond tlie ])hysical power of man to accomplish, 
 and failinii" to do so. That some relief nnist l)e afforded 
 to Britisli le_<;ishit()!'s is hecoming increasingly apjjarent 
 every session. Federation otters the means of furnislilniji; 
 it. Increase of business must be accompanied by division 
 of labour, it' tlie labour is to be dischari>;ed efficiently ; 
 and division oi' labour is the essence of the federal form 
 of government. With the; Imix'rial ParlianuMit relieved 
 of the mass o!" local and private business, which now con- 
 stitutes really the heaviest ])art of its labours, and new 
 legislatures created for the discharge of this Inisiness, we 
 should soon see an Innnense im])i"o\ement in both local 
 and Imj)crial legislation. The legislatures Avould have 
 leisure sufficient ior the due examination of all (picstions; 
 and conse(juently a decrease In the nuudier of those 
 neglected would ensue. They would be able to weigh 
 all subjects thoroughly, and thence might fairly l)e ex- 
 pected to legislate more wisely. They would possess 
 increased local independence; and, conse(|uently, would 
 \)(i move likely to frame measures suited to local idiosyn- 
 erasi^"'s than would a legislature for the three kingdoms. 
 And if means were ado[)ted to }»romote rhe iiiiiux of 
 talent into them, there would be men at iiand cai)able of 
 grai)pling with the various problems that would arise and 
 of solvhig them. The alternative, in fact, is between the 
 machinery of good government or that of im})erfect legis- 
 lation for the British Islands. There seems no reason to 
 doubt that local (iovernments would prove effective in 
 practice, in Avhicli case the gain to the strictly Ic-cal 
 Interests of England, Ireland, and Scotland from their 
 establishment would be such as should almost alone 
 suffice to induce them to support the scheme of Imperial 
 Federation. 
 
 .1. Federation woidd secui'e to England that outlet for 
 her surjdus [ ojjuiation wlilch it is daily becoming more 
 
 O 
 
 I!; 
 
 
 II 
 
104: A COLONIST O.N THE COl.OMAI. QUKSTIOX. 
 
 I' 
 
 ' I 
 
 '$ 
 
 important that she should possess; indeed its possession 
 niav be said to liave become ahiiost a matter of neeessitv. 
 The sijins of tlie times seem to indicate that in emi<rration 
 ah)ne can the means of em})loyment and su))sistcnce for 
 her teeming millions be found. According to the 
 Vrar Book for 1871 (pj). 24o, 24S, and 2o4), the 
 number of ])aupers in England on the 1st of .January 
 ]8G() was S,") 1,020, against l,07y,.'^*Jl <>" the corresponding 
 date in 1870; in Scotland, on May 14, 18r)(», 114,209. 
 against I28,3.'i9 on the corresponding date in 1800 ; and 
 in Ireland, on January 1, 1801, 50,08;^, against 73,921 on 
 the corresponding date in 1870. The total number of 
 ])au[)ers in the United Kingdom on the former dates thus 
 a])pears to have been 1,01.3,912, against l,28l,0.')l on the 
 latter. The jiopulation in 1861 was 2 9, .3 .'5 8, 000, and in 
 1871, 31,833,000. The increase of population thus aj)- 
 pears to have been about 8^ per cent, whilst the increase 
 in the ])auperism was 20 per cent. It is pretty certain 
 that, should this disproportionate rate of increase continue 
 in force it must result in national ruin. It is still more 
 certain that in a country where all the land available for 
 the i)lough has been brouglit under cultivation, and 
 scientific farming carried to a very high pitch, there is 
 little or no prosj)ect of the increasing populatitm finding 
 em])loymcnt in agricultural labour. Hence it follows 
 that the only spheres of action for it are to be found in 
 manufacturing or commercial industry ; and the above 
 returns prove that even the rapid rate at which these 
 have progressed is insufliicient to keep ])ace with the simul- 
 taneous increase in the supply of labour. Hence it is 
 that England has bect)me the scene of a vast social strife, 
 in Avhich cajntal and labour, employers and emi)loyed, are 
 contending for the mastery, and in so doing becoming 
 daily more estranged, less and less accustomed to think 
 that they have any interest in common ; and in which the 
 
mm 
 
 EM Hi RATION TO THK COLON IKS. 
 
 r.>5 
 
 ' workiii'i'-classos,' tln'oiiiili the inacliinerv of trades unions, 
 are hchv^ led to look u|t(»i all above tlieir own rank in life 
 as foes whose destruction would be conducive to the 
 advancement of their class interests. It is impossible 
 to doubt that this strife must expose the framework of 
 j»;overnment and society to very serious dangers. In 
 this, as in all other cases, the evil can be elfectually 
 eradicated onlv by destroyini; its cause. That cause is 
 an over sup)>ly of labour. There are but two means of 
 reducin<i; the supply to an equality with the demand. 
 The one is by im[)osing checks on the increase of i>o})ida- 
 tion, and the other is by providing an outlet for the 
 excess. The former jxylicy, we fear, Avould i)rove a 
 remedy worse than the disease ; the latter would bring 
 blessings to the sufferers, blessings to England, and 
 blessinii's to the Colonies. Enu'land would find consumers 
 of her manufactures, and contributors to her revenue, in 
 those who at home only contrii)ute to swell the roll of 
 misery, the rate of assessment, and the dangers of social 
 convulsion. The Colonies would find their resources 
 developed, and the value of pre-existent pro^jci'ty in- 
 creased, through the labour of the immigrants ; and the 
 latter would find peace and plenty on a virgin soil, and 
 become loyal Britons, ready, if called on, to die for the 
 Empire, instead t)f dangerous foes, anxious to shake its 
 foundations. We believe that nothing short of Federa- 
 tion will suffice to awaken English opinion to the 
 enormous benefits which must accrue to all ])artics from 
 the establishment of an orjxanized svstem of emiiiration : 
 and we feel sure that without it — unless the increase of 
 j)opulation should be otherwise checked — conununistic 
 doctrines will, within twenty years, become nuich more 
 rampant in England than in France. If it be said that 
 the Colonies would furnish this outlet Avhen emancipated 
 as well as when federated, Ave reply that they could do so 
 
 o 2 
 
190 A COLONIST OX TIIi: COLOMAL (trKSTIO.V. 
 
 only in tlic event of tlie prevalenee of ])eaee nrd pro- 
 sperity in their midst, wliieli we have shown would be at 
 least a doubtful continj^oncy under independence : and 
 that Encrland, in a matter of sueh vital importance to her 
 interests, should leave nothing:; to chance. 
 
 4. Even suj)posing it to be granted that the required 
 outlet for a snrjdus i)o])ulation could be found in the 
 emancipated Colonies, or in foreign states, the fact re- 
 nianis that Federation would convert emigratitm from a 
 negative benefit into a positive gain to I']ngland. When 
 directed towards foreiixn countries, it certainlv serves to 
 diminish Enijlish povertv and discontent, but it also 
 lessens her ])opu]ation and increases that of her rivals ; 
 uhiist, if directed towards the fedi-rated Colonies, it would 
 achieve the former end. and also strengthen her resources 
 instead of weakening them. We have already dwelt on 
 the i)robabilitv of English emiicration beinj;: turned into 
 the Colonies by means of Federation, and on the benefits 
 which would accrue to them from this diversion. But it 
 must not be sui)posed that the gain would belong to the 
 Colonies exclusively. England would })rofit by it almost 
 as much as would they. In a pecuniary point of view 
 she would gain immensely by sending her people to 
 countries in which each emigrant would consume from 
 1/. lO.v. to over 51. Avorth of her manufictures, instead of 
 to the States, where each inhal)itant takes only 13.v. worth. 
 This gain would be pretty heavy, and it is astonishing 
 that it has not received more attention from statesmen 
 and statisticians. But along Avith tliis jiecuniary gain 
 would be acquired a most im])ortant j)olitical advantage. 
 In the Cohmies the innnigrant finds his l()ve of ' home,' 
 or the 'old country,' rather inci'eased than diminished, 
 whilst abroad it either dies out or is converted into 
 deadly hatred. It is surely of no small importance to 
 EntrUind that the men who leave her shores should 
 
K.\ii(;i:.\Tij.\ TO Tiih: states ol'r loss. 
 
 11)7 
 
 m] ])ro- 
 (l be iit 
 e : atul 
 J to her 
 
 equired 
 in the 
 faet rc- 
 fVoni a 
 Wlien 
 rves to 
 It also 
 rivals : 
 t would 
 ^sources 
 welt on 
 icd into 
 ])enefits 
 But it 
 to tlie 
 almost 
 f view 
 pie to 
 from 
 tead of 
 wttrlli. 
 lishiuij; 
 tesnien 
 ■V <ji;ain 
 antage. 
 home,' 
 lished, 
 d into 
 mee to 
 sliould 
 
 serve to iiu-rcase llie numbers of her allies rather than 
 those of hei' jtossible foes. ()l!i('ial returns — quoted in 
 the }\'(/r Uoith for 1871, \). 2'A — state the number 
 of emi^'runts, ineluding foreigners, wh(> left the United 
 Kingdom from IS 15 to the elose of 1869, at fi,7.)(),()t)7. 
 Of these there went 4,270,597 to the United States, 
 1,350,470 to liritlsh Ameriea, 971,358 to Australasia, 
 and 152.200 elsewhere. Thus it appears that almost tiro- 
 thirds of the emigrants embarking from the United King- 
 dom went to the States. The total number of iunni- 
 irrants who arrived in the Union durinn; the thirteen vears 
 from 1850 to 1808 was 2,505,044, of wlutm 1,215,000 were; 
 natives of the British Islands. Ilenee it aj)pears that 
 the emi<!;rants from the United Kiuiji-dom eonstituted 
 nearly one-half of that vast tide of labour and eapital 
 wdiieh has made the l^nion the miglity and insolent power 
 whieli it is to-day. The Irish Celt has gone there, and 
 hr.s carried with him his hatred of Eny-land. Anu'Io- 
 Irish, Seoteh, and English have gone and forgotten the 
 love of country in the love of democracy. Tiie result 
 has been the creation of a power whieli, in spite of all the 
 twaddle that is nnceasingly uttered about the identity of 
 the two pe()[)les, has never yet shown itself to be a cordial 
 ally of England, but has re[)eatedly acted most un- 
 generously towards her, and demanded and obtained con- 
 cessions such as were never even sought by any other 
 country. How very dilferent would have been the 
 l)resent situation had this vast flood been poured into 
 British America! Instead of a 'narrow strip' of terri- 
 tory in Canada, we should have had wide tracts settled 
 and cultivated. Instead of being engaged to-day in 
 opening a way from Lake Superior to the lied Iliver, we 
 should have had it opened fifteen or twenty years ago. 
 Instead of a wide waste in the North- West, we should have 
 had large settlements on the lied liiver and the Saskat- 
 
 ; * ; 
 
 ill 
 

 108 A (OL()\I8T OX Tin: COLOMAL (^I'KSTlo.V. 
 
 chewan. Tiistond of liavini>: no internal connnunication 
 witli JJritisIi Colmul)ia, we sliould pndialtly liavc a rail- 
 way across the continent. Instead of having Irish Celts 
 converted into Fenian raiders, tiireateniiig ns from the 
 States, we shonld have had them ("oiiverted into loval 
 Britons in Canada, ready as any otlier to repel Yankee 
 invaders ; for, with scarcely an exception, IJoman Catholic 
 Irish ai'e as loyal in Canada as are any other class. In 
 a word, instead of having fonr millions in Canada eon- 
 fronting thirty-eight millions of semi-contem}»tiions spec- 
 tators in the States, we should ])i-ol)al)ly have had ten or 
 twelve millions here livin<>- nlonnside twentv-five or twcntv- 
 eiirht millions of resitcctiny; f )rei<i:ners across the line. 
 Putting the connnercial advantages, which would have 
 amounted to a gain of several millions annually, alto- 
 o-ethcr aside, is it ])ossible, we ask, easily to exauiierate 
 the benefit wdiich it would be to England to have such 
 a state of things substituted for that actually in ex- 
 istence ? Is it likely that in such a case we should 
 have seen any Alabama treaty signed, or, indeed, any 
 Alabama difficulty raised ? We believe that neither one 
 nor other of them would have been heard of, and that it 
 would have been the same with many other of our ' diffi- 
 culties' with the States. At all events, it is certain that we 
 should have been much stronger and they nuich weaker 
 than is actually the case, and that this single fact would 
 have compelled them to assiunc a much more modest tone 
 in tlieir dealings with us than they have done for thirty 
 years past. What a strong argument, then, in favour of 
 Federation is to be found in the fact that it could 
 scarcely fail to turn emigration from countries where the 
 emigrant at least ibrgets his Fatherland, into those where 
 he and his children would remain as loyal, and their 
 services be as readily available, as if they had never left 
 its shores ! 
 
MILITARY WKAK.VKSS OP KX<il,A.VI). 
 
 100 
 
 mention 
 ' a rail- 
 ;h Celts 
 I'om the 
 to loyal 
 Yankee 
 Catliolie 
 iss. In 
 ida eon- 
 US sj)ee- 
 (1 ten or 
 twenty- 
 lie line, 
 lid have 
 ly, alto- 
 a liberate 
 live such 
 in ex- 
 ) should 
 eed, any 
 ther one 
 1 that it 
 iir ' dif!i- 
 1 that we 
 1 weaker 
 't would 
 lest tone 
 or thirty 
 'avour of 
 it eould 
 here the 
 »se wdiere 
 iiid their 
 ever left 
 
 .'). Federation would largely Inerease the naval and 
 military resonn-es of KiiMlaiul. The events of the vear 
 1871 have demonstrated that the warninii' of Solon to 
 Cra'sus is as aj)|»Ii('al)le to our time as to his own. It is 
 as true in the nineteenth century as it was uNcr li.OOO 
 years hei'ore that, ' if anyhody eomi' who has hctter iron 
 than you, he will he master of all this i^old.' Xo country 
 has ii'one so far in ii»;norin!'- this truth as has Kniiland : 
 and this jtreeisely at the time when, from the increase of 
 her tjold, she should have rememhered it most carefulU . 
 The national feeling on the siihject has, indeed, advance<l 
 considerahly heyoml the idiotic phase in which it was 
 gravely ]tro|iosed to swee}) away the army and navy as 
 useless inenmhrances in an nge which had heeome too 
 enlightened to wage war. Some rough exj>erience (iniekly 
 demonstrated the ahsurdity of these theories, and foi-ec*! 
 all, save a few fannties, to admit that armaments were still 
 necessaries of i)olitical life. A new course was, therefore, 
 rcconmiended, and 'non-intervention' projiosed as the 
 hasis of Kniidand's foreign policy. How far it has heen 
 carried, or how far it has heen snccessiul, we need not 
 now impiire. The point which we wish to enforce is that 
 the time has now come when it must, to all appearance, 
 be aban(U)iie(h Conquest and military despotism have 
 enormously increased the military resources of all Con- 
 tinental Europe, an<l the naval force of some parts of it ; 
 whilst any development of those of Englan<l, from either 
 of these causes, has heen impossible, and liritish arma- 
 ments are to-day little, if anything, stronger than in IMM. 
 The consequence has been that the relative imj)ortance 
 of our country has very seriously declined. Jt is an un- 
 deniable fact that Belgium, with about one-sixth tin; 
 population of the United Khigdom, could, in 1871, have 
 brought at least twice as many troojis into the field as 
 could England. But even the 100,()()() soldiers of lielgium 
 
I 
 
 I ^ 
 
 \. 
 
 'JOO A COLONIST ON TIIK COLOVfAf, ()'/!', HloV. 
 
 WOW uttorlv insijxnificiujt in coinpnrisnu with tlic iiiijaitlii' 
 iiiassrs of Fninco sind (icnimiiy, and still n;i'(.at('r than 
 tlit'so were those of liussia. Kiiu'laiid, \v1umi (•(mtVoiitcd 
 i)V them, I'clt hcrscir to ho ultorlv noworlcss. Still more 
 jiowcrloss to meet tlu'in will she he in the I'litiire, when the 
 Prussian military system lias l)een put in loreo all over 
 the Continent, as it is to he. It is imjtossihle for h(?r to 
 leniain in this position unless she is content to let foreitjn 
 potentates erect vast empires, whoso l)ehests she would he 
 I'oreed to ohey from inahility to resist them. All the si^ns 
 of the times unite in indicating that ' hlood and iron' are 
 likelv to he the characteristics of the next ju;eneration. 
 Europe is now coidVonted hy two mighty powers which, 
 for tw(> centuries, have pursued a career of war and con- 
 quest with I'eally alarming success. Prussia has grown, 
 from an insiguilicant electorate, into a mighty military 
 emi)ire, with a population ol' ahout 4(),()()(),0(H), in which 
 every man is a soldier. Russia has now pushed her way, 
 «)n the west, far into the heart of Europe; on the east 
 has advanced into dangerous proximity to the gates of 
 Pekin ; and on the south has estahlished herself on the 
 Oxus, in a position so close to our ln<lian outposts that 
 the <'hances of a struj^U'le with her on the Indus can no 
 longer he rejected from consideration as an e})isode in a 
 new Russian war. This vast empire is i)eoi)ledl)y nearly 
 eighty milliims of peoi)le, who one and all, ' fnmi the 
 liighest nohle to the lowest serf, hclieve that it is their 
 destiny to conquer the world.' In it the resources of 
 harharism and civilisati(m are in dancrerous union, and in 
 Prussia all those of learnincr are carefully utilised for 
 warlike ])urposes. Is it possible to believe that they will 
 now stop short in their career, especially when the Avorn- 
 out dynasties of Asia almost invite Kussian attack ; and 
 in Europe Austria and Turkey stand forth as tempting 
 victims directly in their way ? Besides this, England 
 
r:x(iLAM) AM) rouMKi.v rowiiij." 
 
 !iOl 
 
 lid 1)0 
 
 nptin 
 
 mwA ronioiiihcr that Friiiico, MeediiiL!: nt cvory jioro and 
 Iat»licd into fnrv at licr dc^iradation, is likdv to rniln'aci' 
 any alliance which may cnahlc \\vr to rcc(.\( r lur Inrnu r 
 dignity and iidlncnci', and that in the States there exists 
 a power whoso ai'roiiance and ainhition she lell j>retty 
 t^overeiy in 1S71. 11 we eonii)are thi' I'nited Kingdom 
 with those conntrioM wo find that it is iideri<»r, in extent 
 and popnhition, to any one of them ; that it is ('(inailed 
 ])V !»on»o in arts and ci\ iii/ation ; that its I'aeilitii's for 
 dovelo[)nient aro prohal)ly inferior to thosc^ of any slate 
 in Westell! Kni'ope. whilst with those of Ku>sia and tlu' 
 I'nited States it cannot attempt a comparison ; that they 
 are all ambitions ol" territorial a<:|:;randisement ; that, to 
 j»rocure it, America omidoys democratic; enerLjy, and 
 Europe desj)Otic plotting-, hacked hy armaments against 
 ■which 'the streak of silver sea' which sej>arates Kniiland 
 from the Continent is admitted to he her only security. 
 AVe think that nobody, honestly lookin<»; these facts in the 
 face, can allege that the isolated resources of the United 
 Kingdom could enable it to maintain a position oldpiality 
 amongst such rivals. Yet even a Radical peiiodical 
 has lately cojd'essed that ' it is rccpiisite to maintain a 
 tirst-class rank, if only to kee}> foreign nnu'kets open.' ' 
 It is reciuisite for that reason and a gootl many m(»re also. 
 But how is this to be ilone ? \\'hat course should lOngland 
 pursue in order to attain it? Our answei" is that she 
 should adopt Federation ; unite the Colonies more closely 
 vitli herself; utilise their joint military resources for the 
 conmion benefit ; set to work to erect out of the free lands 
 over which now floats the Union Jack a mighty em})ire, 
 one in history, race, language, and symjjathies; and that, 
 that once done, she avouKI exercise as great an inlluence in 
 the world as in the glorious days of Quebec and Waterloo, 
 
 ' British (Quarter' ij Ik view, April 1871. 
 

 {■'■ 
 
 
 
 !;;■ H 
 
 202 A ( OLOXTST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 and ])G al)lo to confront either despotic or doniocralic 
 anil)ition Avlierever either wouUl require to be cliecked. 
 Tluis it may be done, and thus only. There is no other 
 means open whereby she can increase lier military re- 
 sources, and the increase of these resources in foreign 
 countries renders it essential t(> her safety that she should 
 not be left utterly behind in the race. Federation would 
 probably enable her to hold her own. We think it has 
 been proved that the States would meet a much more 
 formidable foe in Enfrland and Canada than in Enijland 
 alone. If so, an empire embracing iin{)()rtant strategical 
 points in all parts of the world, and containing a })opu- 
 lation of 40,00(),0()(), whose martial re ources were duly 
 developed, would constitute a much more })owerful state 
 than would one consisting of the British Islands alone, 
 peopled by less than 32,000.000 inhabitants, with a 
 large number of them dependent on foreign trade for their 
 daily bread. It may be said that we have previously 
 spoken in depreciatory terms of colonial military resources. 
 It is true that Ave believe those of each Colony would 
 prove incompetent to maintain its independence single- 
 handed. But in this, as in all other cases, it would be 
 found true that ' union is strength. ' AVe do not say that 
 the Ct)lonies would be likely to constitute fertile recruiting- 
 grounds, for there are scarcely any of their inhabitants 
 who could not adopt a calling that would serve their 
 interests better than enlistment. Their forces would con- 
 sist almost entirely of the militia, which would be avail- 
 able to repel attack, and which would probably pour 
 forth crowds of volunteers to fill the ranks of the regular 
 ?irmy operating elsewhere in time of Avar. Without a 
 consistent policy, strict discipline, and a regular army to 
 serve as a nucleus, such a force is useless ; but Avith these 
 adjuncts it can be made most formidable. They Avould 
 he wanting under independence, and would be sui)plied 
 
I' 
 
 THE KMnRE AND FOEEIGX POWHRS. 
 
 2Ui] 
 
 nocral Ic 
 allocked, 
 lo other 
 tiiry re- 
 foreign 
 e should 
 in would 
 k it has 
 ch more 
 Kngland 
 futcglcal 
 a pojni- 
 3re duly 
 •ful state 
 Is alone, 
 
 with a 
 for their 
 •eviously 
 ^sources. 
 y would 
 3 sino-le- 
 v'ould be 
 say that 
 cruiting- 
 
 abitants 
 ve their 
 )uld con- 
 )e avail - 
 )ly pour 
 
 regular 
 ithout a 
 army to 
 ith these 
 would 
 supplied 
 
 y 
 
 under Federation. The Imperial War-office would he less 
 liable than that of a small democratic republic to be dis- 
 turbed by the unceasing changes in the waves of })opular 
 movement, and would therefore be more likely to enforce 
 discipline, and })ursue a consistent policy, whereby all 
 available resources would be developed, while the needed 
 nucleus would be found in the standing army of the Em- 
 pire. Hence it is that resources which would l)e very 
 insignificant if isolated, would become most formidable if 
 united with those of the mother-country. The latter 
 would reap a most important gain almost innnedlately. 
 It is certain that very large armies of colonial militia 
 could be kept on foot ready to move at a moment's 
 warning to repel local attack ; and in case a reserve force 
 were established throughout the Empire, liable to be 
 drafted into the line in case of war, the Colonies Avould 
 already be entitled to furnish one-fifth of it. The gain in 
 naval resources would be still greater than that in military 
 force. The Canadian mercantile marine is now the fourth 
 in the world. The British American fisheries must 
 always nurture a race of hardy seamen. There seems to 
 be every probability of a large share of the carrying trade 
 of America becoming the [)atrimony of Xova Scotia antl 
 New Brunswick, these countries being evidently marked 
 out by Nature as scenes of shipping industry. Add to 
 these the resources of the other Coh)nics, and say, can 
 there be any means of strengthening British naval a>- 
 cendancy so effective as Federation ? The immediate 
 accession of strength in both dej)artments Avould be very 
 great, but it shrinks into insignifican(;e when compared 
 with the prospective gain. The p<)[)u!ation of the more 
 important Colonies has been doubling itself every twenty 
 years ; the growth of wealth has been still more rapid 
 than that of numbers, and the rate of increase in both 
 could scarcely fail to be considerably augmented by Federa- 
 
\i 
 
 !'i! 
 
 ■ m 
 
 K 
 
 fiM 
 
 204 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 tlon. It is in tliis trcnientlous growth of colonial re- 
 sources that Enu'lantrs i>rcat gain would be found. AVhiUt 
 other nations might possibly make conquests by the sword, 
 she would surely make them by the plough and the axe ; 
 and thus keep their relative positi(ms unchanged ; and it 
 is only in so keeping them that security for her national 
 independence, political liberty, or realised wealth, is to be 
 found. It is no small thinjji; thr.t is at stake — it is her 
 life ; and in her life is involved that of her offspring. 
 Let parent and chiklren start to their work; and — if they 
 would retain for themselves and transmit to posterity the 
 mighty roll of gradually-increasing blessings which the 
 present generation has inherited from the labours of forty 
 of its predecessors — form, by the union of their resources, 
 an empire able to stand, if not against the world in arms, 
 at least against the mightiest of those powers which are 
 now beginning to eclipse the ancient glories of the British 
 race. No one member of the ]']m[)ire could stand ahjne 
 against the foes which actually do, or are likely to, 
 threaten its independence, liut let them unite their 
 forces and they will be invincible. 
 
 6. We are aware tliat there are many who refuse to 
 consider an extension of the naval and military jtower of 
 England as an advantage ; who exclaim that a ' moral 
 and intellectual sway ' is not only the most gh>rious, but 
 the only glorious national ascendancy. AVe must refuse 
 to agree with them, (jold cannot be relied on to stop 
 the advance of iron, but still less can rhetoric ; and how, 
 in face of the events of the last twenty years, people can 
 suppose thai martial virtues are not as necessary to the 
 maintenance of liberty in the nineteenth as in any pre- 
 ceding century, is more than we can comprehend. Still, 
 if by a ' moral and intellectual sway ' it is meant that a 
 country should fill a position commanding the respect and 
 afiection of other peoi)leSj should constitute a centre to 
 
 ,:■ i 
 
A MORAL SWAV. 
 
 205 
 
 Avliich their loaders in the field of Thou.fjht should turn for 
 inspiration, and thus have a considerable share in forininnr 
 the institutions, literature, and plHloso})hy of other lands, 
 Ave willincvly admit that it is a very glorious sway indeed, 
 and one well worthy the ambition of Engbind. Has it 
 ever occurred to the special admirers of this sway that 
 emancipation could not fail instantly to annihilate, and 
 Federation firmly to establish it? That such could not 
 fail to be the result of each policy can easily be proved. 
 Like every other sway, it is one which caimot be estab- 
 lished by ap})eals addressed solely to the intellect. Man's 
 ]-eason is that part of his nature wliich often exercises the 
 least influence over his actions. That which we receive 
 in faith from our schoolmaster we dis])ute when conveyed 
 by our schoolmate. Facts which, wlien heard from a 
 mother's lips, seem tales of love and beauty, to doubt which 
 would be perfectly horril)le, too often, alas! are in later 
 years set down by those revelling in the full pride of in- 
 tellect as silly romances. Neither man nor nation Avill 
 ever acknowledge the moral or intellectual sway of those 
 with whom they have no affinity, and towards whom 
 their sentiments are those of dislik(; or contempt: a 
 favourable, or. at least, a fair hearing, is essential to the 
 accjuisition or retention of any such influence. The 
 chances of obtaining suc^h a hearing are in a {)recise ratio 
 to the respect, or affection, felt for the partv seeking it. 
 Therefore England can exercise a ujoral and intellectual 
 i-way over her Colonies only so long as she continues to 
 be to them that object of fervent love and passionate 
 admiration which she is to-day. And this we niav be 
 j^erfectly sure she will quickly cease to be should she 
 thrust away the offsi)ring who lovintxlv clino; to her. 
 telling them that they must shift for themselves; that 
 she is their 'mother-country' no more than is (Jernianv: 
 that they constitute an expense which, she will not bear; 
 
 fi ■ 
 
20G A COLOXIST ox THE COLONIAL QUESTION, 
 
 W 
 
 11 
 
 i 
 
 8 
 
 1^ 
 
 i 
 
 that thev may hr'mcr her into trouble ; and that she 
 desires, above all else, to ' take her ease — eat, drink, and 
 be merry.' Any nation actings in this manner could 
 never command a moral and intellectual sway, for the 
 simple reason that it would present a spectacle at which 
 tlic moral and intolloctual faculties of the race generally, 
 and of the injured parties universally, would revolt. 
 There is, consequently, no surer means of destroying any 
 such sway that England may now exercise than by 
 ad<)})ting emancipation, and, as the directly opposite policy 
 must induce a directly opposite effect, no siu'cr means of 
 strenii'thcning and extcndino; it than bv convertincr the 
 Empire into a Federation. That once dcme she would 
 stand forth to her offspring, united to her by bonds of love 
 and interest, as the Alma il/r/tr-r, to assail whose reputation 
 would be political sacrilege; as the great exemjilar whose 
 course would fix the wav in which all should follow ; and 
 as the supreme court from whose decisicm, in cases of con- 
 troversy, there could be no appeal. Her sway would not 
 extend over all the world ; but it would extend over about 
 a fifth part of its terrestrial surface ; whilst, in case of the 
 occurrence of a disruption of the Empire, it is very im- 
 probable that it would extend beyond her own shores. 
 The materials for a moral and intellectual sway are to her 
 hands in lavish profusion. Emancipation would destroy 
 them ; Federation would erect them into a glorious edifice. 
 Such are the benefits which would, as we think, accrue 
 to England from Federation. It would at once add to her 
 revenue as largely as emancipation would diminish her 
 expenditure, and in future would bring still larger sums 
 to her coffers. Whilst thus accomi)lishing all the good 
 which she could hope to gain from that measure, it would, 
 also, on the one hand enable her to escape its dangerous 
 consequences to her moral influence, her realised in- 
 vestments, her commercial wealth and her maritime 
 
DANG Ell TO ENGLAND OF LOSS OF I'OSITION. 207 
 
 at she 
 ik, and 
 
 could 
 for the 
 
 which 
 lerally, 
 revolt, 
 ng any 
 lan by 
 e policy 
 leans of 
 ing the 
 ! would 
 5 of love 
 )utation 
 X whose 
 iw ; and 
 fi of con- 
 luld not 
 er about 
 se of the 
 ,'erv im- 
 
 ft/ 
 
 shores, 
 e to her 
 destroy 
 edifice. 
 , accrue 
 d to her 
 lish her 
 fcr sums 
 le good 
 t would, 
 mjterous 
 ised in- 
 naritime 
 
 supremacy ; and, on the other hand, it would Immensely 
 augment her naval and military strength, oj>on a secure 
 outlet for her teeming })oj)ulrttion, increase her Irade and 
 place it on a much more secure basis than at present, 
 improve very materially the internal government of the 
 British Islands, and })lace them in a j)0!«ition of dazzling 
 glory at the head of the mightiest Em})ire on the face of 
 the earth. It is impossible to compare the relative ex- 
 pediency of each course, when on the one side there are 
 evils to be encountered, and on the other benefits to be 
 acquired. 
 
 iVt this point it is possible that some English reader 
 
 may object to the above statement on the ground that 
 
 Federation would reduce England from her lofty position 
 
 of supremacy in the Emjure to that of ecpiality with the 
 
 countries which are now her dei)endencies ; and that, 
 
 besides the loss of ]K)sition thus entailed, she would 
 
 become liable to have her will controlled by the Colonies 
 
 and her interests sacrificed to theirs. It is of cou)se true 
 
 tliat in the })rt>posed Federation Enu'land would be no 
 
 more than * first among e(juals.' The Colonics could 
 
 not submit to increased burdens without receivino; some 
 
 compensation therefor. But we utterly deny that anv 
 
 danger to England's local interests, or anv diminution of 
 
 her prcst'nje could result from her new relationship to the 
 
 Colonies. Under Federation they could exercise no moie 
 
 influerice over the internal government of tjjo liritish 
 
 Islands than they do to-day. The colonial will could 
 
 not even interfere with that of England in any other 
 
 matters than those coming under the control of the 
 
 Federal Government, which would be little more than 
 
 the management of the armaments and di}»lomacy of the 
 
 Empire. Even in the legislature which would arrani^e 
 
 the details of these departments, the representatives of the 
 
 United Kingdom would, for a very long time, immensely 
 
203 A COLONIST OX THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 f;' 
 
 fc 
 
 outnumber those of the Colonies, and avc have previously 
 sugo'cstcd means whereby the voice of the Fatherland 
 eould be s^fii'^lcd against that extinction which some seem 
 to dread. But parties who feai- wjiat they Avould call this 
 ' dejijradation ' of Enii-hind must ijo a little further than 
 they generally seem inclined to do. Can this merely 
 apparent ' degradation ' be avoided without running the 
 risk of encounterinn; a real one ? I']no'land to-dav stands 
 forth as the richest country in the world, and this position 
 a great many of her ])eople seem to consider as the 
 suminuni. hoiinm of political life. Granting it to be so, 
 Avill they never ap})ly their own commercial principles to 
 their own case and examine tiis basis on which the wealth 
 of England now rests? The security of any investment 
 is usually the most important element in its value ; but 
 the security of English wealth under the present system 
 never seems to enter into tlie minds of her connnercial 
 j)rinccs or political rulers. The author of The Battle of 
 Dor/iinr/ has well described her ]iosition where he says: 
 ' Our people could not be got to see how artificial our 
 ])ros[>erity was — that it all rested on foreign trade and 
 financial credit ; that the course of trade once turned 
 away from us, even for a time, it might never return ; 
 and that our credit once sluiheu inhjlit nerer he restored. 
 .... They could not be got to see that the wealth 
 heaped uj) on every side ir<is not credted in tJte country^ 
 but in India and China and other })arts of the world ; and 
 that it would be quite possible for the })eople Avho made 
 money by buying and selling the natural treasures of the 
 earth to go and live in other places and take their [)rofits 
 with them.' This language is simply that of sober 
 common sense. England's positi( n is, doubtless, very 
 splendid in a})pearance ; but so long as it rests on foreign 
 trade and financial credit, it may at any moment be 
 shattered : thert! i.s nothing more clearly revealed in the 
 
f 
 
 eviously 
 therland 
 ine seem 
 call this 
 ler than 
 1 merely 
 linfT the 
 V stands 
 1 position 
 • as the 
 
 be so, 
 ciples to 
 e wealth 
 restment 
 ue ; but 
 t system 
 nmercial 
 Battle of 
 lie says: 
 cial our 
 ade and 
 3 turned 
 
 return ; 
 restored. 
 
 1 wealth 
 count ry^ 
 '1(1 ; and 
 10 nia<ie 
 js of the 
 1' [)i"olits 
 )f Sober 
 5S, vei'v 
 I forciiiu 
 mcnt be 
 1 in the 
 
 , I 
 
 DANTiEll OF A STOJTACiE OF FOOD SUITLIES. 209 
 
 history of the world than that such greatness is of the 
 most unstable character. Cxreat as is the danger to-day 
 It would be enormously increased by a disruption of the 
 JMiipire. Urban industry rests upon rural labour, as it 
 IS from the latter that the materials on which its em- 
 ployees work and live are derived. The field for rural 
 labour in England may be considered to have reached its 
 limit. Let the Colonies be cut loose, and she would 
 have no means of finding employment for her increasinrr 
 population within her own bounds, save in manufacturinn- 
 and commercial pursuits. Her urban industry would 
 thus be increased in the absence of any corresponding 
 increase of that other industry on which it depends for 
 working materials and food. Every such increase must 
 add to the delicacy of the social structure. There is no 
 sign abroad to indicate that there will be fewer storms 
 either internal or external, to assail it in the future than' 
 in the past. In that case it must at last succumb to 
 some of them, and with its fall all would be lost. On the 
 .)ther hand, let Federation be adopted, and in the Colonies 
 would be found the means of an almost boundless exten- 
 sion of agricultural industry, which extension would 
 place the urban industry of England on a secure basis 
 by providing a sure supj.ly of the materials and food 
 necessary to its sustenance, an increased number of steady 
 customers for its products, and of fellow-countrymen 
 mterested in its defence. Such a security against the 
 danger of an irremediable degradation would, we should 
 say, be cheaply purchased at the cost of the slight loss of 
 English dignity involved in Federation. As to the loss 
 of prestif/c conse(iuent on this descent, it may also be re- 
 marked that emancipationists who regard it as a juo-o-le 
 cannot object to Federation on the ground that that 
 measure would lessen England's share of so worthless a 
 commodity. And let those who do value prestir^e compare 
 
fl 
 
 ■f! 
 
 :-i. 
 
 jJlO A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION. 
 
 tlie amount of it whieli would be possessed by the sea- 
 girt isles in the Atlantic Ocean when standing alone 
 in the world ; confronted by mighty military mon- 
 archies ; having an imj)ortant member of the family at 
 variance with the remainder; jiopulation ])ressing on 
 the means of subsistence ; one-third of their inhabitants 
 dej)cndent on foreigners for their food, and j)robably as 
 many on their custom for the means of buying it — with 
 the glory, strength, and influence which would surround 
 the same islands when standing forth as the head of a 
 mighty confederacy embracing lands in every clime ; 
 shores on every ocean ; fortresses of ancient note ; i)lains 
 of virgin ])urity ; the fisheries, the timber-lands and wheat- 
 fields of Canada ; the sugar-isles of the Mexican Gulf; 
 the pasture-g'"ounds, the gold-fields, and the diamond- 
 lands of Australasia and South Africa ; the tropic wealth 
 of Ceylon ; the unmatched riches of the Indian peninsula ; 
 the unequalled soil of the Emerald Isle ; and the hives 
 of Scotch and English industry — uniting the realised 
 wealth of the mother-country with the untouched and 
 unbounded resources of the Colonies ; the science of 
 ancient civilization with the energy of modern coloni- 
 zation ; the lustre of historic glory with that gained from 
 the rushing growth of young communities — and say which 
 of these conditions is best calculated to place, not only 
 the glory, but also the wealth, the liberty, and the inde- 
 j)endence of the Fatherland on the most stable basis ? 
 The primacy of such an Empire would carry with it an 
 amount of substantial wealth, power, and prestige probably 
 unexampled in the history of the world, and certainly 
 unprecedented if to these elements of worth we add the 
 fact that the institutions of the Empire Avould be based on 
 Truth, Justice, Liberty, and Christianity ! 
 
X. 
 
 the sea- 
 ig alone 
 ry moii- 
 faiiiily at 
 jssinjj on 
 habitants 
 bably as 
 
 it — Avitli 
 surround 
 eatl of a 
 ' clime ; 
 3 ; plains 
 id wheat- 
 11 Gulf; 
 liamond- 
 c wealth 
 ninsula ; 
 he hives 
 
 realised 
 hed and 
 ience of 
 . coloni- 
 led from 
 ay which 
 not only 
 he inde- 
 e basis ? 
 th it an 
 probably 
 certainly 
 
 add the 
 jased on 
 
 211 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Omx task is done : but ' we linger round a subject which 
 nothing could tempt us to leave but a consciousness of 
 treating it too unworthily ;' and before closing wish to 
 add a few words on tlie course of action to be pursued in 
 case the policy which we advocate should commend itself 
 to our lellow-countrynien. 
 
 The first and most important requisite of success in any 
 attempt to form an Imj,erial Federation would be the 
 absence of jealousy towards each other on the part of the 
 several countries lo be comprised in it. Should they 
 enter on a discussion of the scheme in a niggard spirit ; 
 each anxious to make the smallest concessions, and to 
 gain the largest advantages possible for itself, and 
 makn.g invidious comparisons between the benefits -ained 
 by one party and by another, it may be confidentlv pre- 
 dicted that the movement would end in smoke, and had 
 better never have been begun. The only question which, 
 in a conference on the subject, each country would have 
 any right to ask is, whether it could obtain equal, or supe- 
 rior, advantages, from the adoption (.f any other ,,olitical 
 career open to it. If any part of the Empire would be a 
 loser by joining the Federation, instead of becomin<.- inde- 
 pendent or associating itself with some other country, it 
 would have fair grounds for refusing to do so ; and if the 
 Lmted Kingdom could, by severing the connection, <rain 
 greater benefits than by establishing a union bused on 
 
 P 2 
 
f 
 
 Mi; 
 
 212 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLOXIAI- (^IHSTIO.V. 
 
 pcrfoet equality of privilogos and 1)1ii'(1(mis, it Avould he 
 justified in rejecting the scheme. But neither the 
 mother-country nor a Colony would have any rijjht to 
 reject it merely on the ground that it would subject them 
 to certain <U's<nfrenu'iis from winch they are uow free. 
 That Federation would import local troubles into every 
 ])art of the Em})irc we have no doubt ; but we have 
 equally little dcmbt that it would also import benefits 
 which would heavily overbalance them, and that a dis- 
 ruption of the Empire would induce s;ill greater troubles, 
 without affording any com])ensation whatever. A choice 
 must be made between the different courses open. Hence 
 it is not the (thsoJntr, but the cominirntivf, merits of 
 Federation that should be considered. Should this fact 
 be borne in mind, all will go well ; but all will go ill 
 should ir be forgotten. It may, perhaps, be said that this 
 language is trite. That is true. But it is equally true 
 that, as a perception of the facts, and the existence of the 
 spirit which we have indicated, arc indispensable to 
 success, it is impossible to insist too strongly on atten- 
 tion to them. 
 
 It is also to be desired that the subject should be kept 
 clear of i)arty feeling, in so far at least that no ])arty 
 should make the advocacy, or rejection, of Federation, a 
 plank in its political platform. ^.Vhatever benefits may 
 be derived from {mlitical partyism, it will scarcely be 
 contended that unmixed love of truth is amongst the 
 number. But the need of discovering the whole truth is 
 in an exact ratio to the impoi'tance of the sid)ject under 
 legislation ; and the difficulty of so doing is proportionate 
 to its intricacy. There have been very few subjects 
 before the British Legislature calculated to affect the 
 destinies of our race so seriously as this Colonial Question, 
 and, possibly, none so very intricate. It is, therefore, of 
 supreme importance that every available means of arriving 
 
COLKSl-: OF ACTION. 
 
 lil.'J 
 
 oiild hv 
 lier the 
 riy;ht to 
 3Ct tlicm 
 aw free. 
 () ovcrv 
 we liave 
 benefits 
 it a (lis- 
 tr(nil)le.s, 
 A. choice 
 Hence 
 lerits of 
 tins fart 
 11 (TO ill 
 that this 
 illy true 
 [;e of the 
 ■;able to 
 n atten- 
 
 be kept 
 
 lo party 
 
 ation, a 
 
 fits may 
 
 •eely be 
 
 ijTst the 
 
 truth is 
 
 3t under 
 
 rt ion ate 
 
 subjects 
 
 cct the 
 
 ncstlon, 
 
 fore, of 
 
 irriving 
 
 at the unmixed truth should be put in force. This, 
 certainly, will not be done should existing parties bind 
 their members to an unconditional sn[)|)ort of, or oppo- 
 sition to, Federation. IJut it will be done shonld they 
 proclaim it an oj)en ([uestion, and leave members free to 
 speak their minds on its merits without their jicditieal 
 standing being aifected thereby. In the former case they 
 could act oidy as advocates; in the latter they would be 
 free to act as judges, nor do we think that in this (piestion 
 they would I'all short of that standard. In the Colonies 
 all parties are united In favour of the maintetiance of 
 British connection ; and in the Imperial Parliament an 
 emancipationist party can scarcely be said to have been 
 yet organized. Under these circumstances no l)arty is 
 thus far connnitted to any definite policy on the (juestion ; 
 and all are, conseciuently, perfectly free to a(h»[)t what- 
 ever course may seem to be most expedient. The 
 question, moreover, is not one which s|)eclally affects 
 English, Canadian, or Australasian classes or parties, but 
 all England, Canada, and Australasia alike. It follows 
 that, it" these local parties wish to discharge faithl'idly 
 their duties towards their constituents, they will unite to 
 examine it with a single eye to the interests ot their 
 several countries. 
 
 To this it may be rei)lied that, under British institu- 
 tions, the only means whereby this, or any important 
 measure can be carried is by a ministry ado})ting it as a 
 part of its policy. We are aware that this is the normal 
 state of things. But we strongly suspect that if we nuist 
 wait for a ministry to undertake the settlement of the 
 colonial question iu the face of a hostile 0})p()sition, we 
 shall have to wait until doomsday. The question does 
 not touch any class or party interest, so it will not stir any 
 of those infiuences which force ministries to undertake 
 the settlement of important political questions. It is un- 
 
I 
 
 (I 
 
 I 
 
 214 A C'OhOXIST ox TIIK f'OLO.VlAI. (^I'K'^TIO.V. 
 
 iismlly nli'^tnioo — n siibjort on wliicli nriruinoiits rnti ho 
 foimd botli for and afrainst any dcHnito policy cajialilc 
 of adoption. It tlnis offers bnt few chanro?* of frjilnln"- 
 ])oliti('al Ianrols,so ministers tlionis<^Ivos ^sill wish to avoid 
 a field of action in Avhicli tlioy arc snrc to find tronble and 
 danijoi- in case of liavinu; to fare a Parliamontarv o|i|)(»si- 
 tion. Thus, neither from ahove iku' from helow does 
 there seem to he .any elianec of tlie movinfi;-sj)rini2:s of 
 legislation Ijeinji; set in motion ; ajid it ia unlikely that 
 emaneij)ation theorists, in fare of recent events, will 
 press for any fnrthei" action than tliat which they have 
 won already. Under such circumstances, the adoption of 
 the let-alone policy as that of ministries may he looked 
 upon as almost a matter of certainty, in the ahsencc of 
 .some extraordinary means to facilitate the accomplish- 
 ment of the work. That means of facilitatiiiLi; it can he 
 found Ave are sure ; and eciually so that all Avho desire to 
 maintain the integrity of the Empire should hasten to 
 afford it, since the result of the ])resent colonial jiolicy 
 eannot fail to be a collision between the niothei'-conntrv 
 and the Colonies, which nnist lead to disrni)tion. Almost 
 all parties, politicians, and jjapers at home profess to 
 deprecate such an event, but thei-e are very few of 
 them who will undertake to s:.y that the connection can 
 long be maintained on its present basis. If, then, that 
 hai'inony of opinion which is ex])ressed be really a fact, 
 let the parties so agreeing unite their forces to effect the 
 settlement desired by all, and transfer the question from 
 the realm of partisanship to that of patriotism. This 
 could be done by the party in o])position coming forward 
 with a recognition of the importance of the subject, and 
 an offer to treat it as an open question on condition of being 
 allowed a share of influence in its settlement. This once 
 agreed on, the way Avould be 0})en for a full discussion of 
 the question on its merits. The only i)olicies possible 
 
v. 
 
 (•!i)»;iltl(' 
 
 jjnininix 
 to avoid 
 iible and 
 V opposi- 
 low dors 
 )riiii;s of* 
 vcly that 
 its, Avill 
 hoy luivo 
 option of 
 (? looked 
 )soncc of 
 ;()n)plisli- 
 t can be 
 desire to 
 lastoii to 
 \\ ])oIi('y 
 -country 
 
 Almost 
 ofess to 
 '• few of 
 tion can 
 ion, that 
 y a fact. 
 Hoot the 
 on from 
 . This 
 
 forward 
 jeot, and 
 of bcincT 
 
 his onco 
 
 ission of 
 
 possible 
 
 A SOIATIOX NOT IN I'AKTVISM. 
 
 21:) 
 
 arc tliose (.f i-oooiistruotion iind disruption, as that of drift 
 must ultimatoiy load to one or otiior of them; and this, 
 we thiidx. ctiMld not fail to bo nnivt'rsally soon, should 
 British legislators sot thomsoKH's resolutely to the oxa- 
 niination of the matter. It is probable that a lull exa- 
 miuiition of tlu; merits of the ease could best bo eifocted 
 by a ('oinmittee of both Houses, or a Commission ap- 
 pointed by the C'ntwn, and eonsistin*;' of loatliiio- men of 
 all parties, empowered to sunnnon witnesses from all jiarts 
 of the Kmi)ire, and to end)ody the results of thoir in- 
 (juiries in a report to the Imperial Parliament, but which 
 it would probably be advisable to transmit also to the 
 Coh)nial Lev;islatures for consideration. If suoh a bodv 
 of men, after full in([uiry, should arrive at the conclusion 
 that emancij)ation would be the best ccmrsc for all j»arties, 
 it had better occur under a friendly agreement, and while 
 they could separate with mutual respect and atfoction, than 
 as the fruit of some unfortunate (piarrel which would leave 
 ill-feelinn; behind it. On the other hand, if they were in 
 favour of reconstruction, they could indicate the principles 
 on which it shcmld be conducted, and the course of legis- 
 lation necessarv to rj-ivc them effect. This haviuLi' been 
 done, the rei)ort wcmld come before the Imperial Parlia- 
 ment for discussion, the result of which could scarcely fail 
 to be the ado})tion of its more salient features. The next 
 point would be to embody the principles ado[)ted in the 
 form of law. And this, we think, should be done by a 
 Commission, on which it would be essential to have the 
 Colonies Avell represented throutih their leading states- 
 men, appointed to draft and submit to Parliament a bill 
 to provide for the reconstruction of the ICmpIre, based on 
 the principles previously agreed uj)on. This, having 
 been passed by the Imperial Parliament, should then be 
 submitted to the legislatures of the self-governing 
 Colonies with the alternative of acceptance within a 
 
n 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 liL 
 
 I 'I, 
 
 21G A COLONIST ON THE COLOXIAL (iUlvSTIOX. 
 
 given time or separation. Of tlieir acceptance of the 
 latter, in case they had been made to understand the 
 points at issue, and granted a share in fi-aming the mea- 
 sure, as we have recommended, wc sliould have little 
 fear. 
 
 This course of action, it is true, would be altogether 
 unusual. But its justification is to he found in the fact 
 that the question to be settled would be equally so. In 
 extraordinary circun;stances, extraordinary forces must 
 be called into play. It is impossible to adopt a)i// poliri/ 
 for the settlement of the colonial question which would 
 not be liable to severe criticism, and for that reason no 
 ministry will choose to run the risk of attempting to settle 
 it single-handed. To discover the best policy and to j)ut 
 it into force, it is essential not only that one-half of the 
 statesmanship of the Empire should be free from the 
 op})Osition of the other half, bu ai: j, that all should 
 unite their forces in the work. This they Avill do only 
 on conditiim that the leading ideas of each party are 
 embodied in the [lolicy to be adopted, and their leading 
 men are allowed a share in the glory of the work. Neither 
 has taken any definite position on the question as yet, 
 ai'd until one, at least, has done so, there will be nothing 
 to hiiuler them from uniting as we have proposed. A 
 measure passed in this manner could scarcely fail to be 
 intrinsically suj)erior to any of a partisan character, and 
 would possess the further merit of being likely to satisfy 
 all, save that insignificant minoi'ity of grumblers who 
 can never be satisfied. Every section and l)arty in the 
 Em}>ire would have a voice in determining the policy to 
 be adoi)ted ; and, in case reconstruction were determined 
 on, in framing the measure which would j)ut it into effect ; 
 and alter that, if any part of the Em[)ire should consider 
 that its peculiar interests had been overlooked, it could 
 suggest amendments ; or, in case it saw a better course 
 
■^,,,,u^m m.m^^ ' ammi» mmvai*>*^*f9m^^i^i^^S^Pii^i}i'i*^-*<'^ 
 
 s. 
 
 FURTIIKR ORJI-:CTIO\S COXSIDMIJET). 
 
 in: 
 
 e of tlie 
 tand the 
 he incji- 
 v^c little 
 
 I together 
 
 the fact 
 
 ' so. In 
 
 les must 
 
 >li/ poUrif 
 
 ;li would 
 
 jason no 
 
 to settle 
 
 id to put 
 
 If of the 
 
 rom the 
 
 1 should 
 
 do only 
 
 artv are 
 
 leading 
 
 Neither 
 
 as vet, 
 
 nothinii 
 
 sed. A 
 
 il to be 
 
 tcr, and 
 
 satisfy 
 
 rs who 
 
 in the 
 
 iolicy to 
 
 imined 
 
 ) effect ; 
 
 consider 
 
 ^ could 
 
 course 
 
 open, reject it altogether, ^^'erc an Inn)erial Federation 
 established in this manner, it would be, in some measure, 
 the work of all, which fact would go far towards makiii-!; 
 it an object of aifection to all. 
 
 We believe it to be highly probable that many of our 
 readers may pronounce themselves to be strongly op])osed 
 t(> emanci[)ation, and yet refuse to endorse the jtolicy 
 Avhich we have recommended in its stead. Constituti(^)nal 
 dread of change in some minds, and a like jealousy of 
 authority in others, may lead them to shrink from Federa- 
 tion, and seek the means of maintaining the unity of the 
 Empire at the cost of less innovation, or the concession 
 of smaller })rerogatives to the central government, than 
 it would necessitate. We will not assert that success in 
 such a search would be impossible, and tiiat Federation 
 is the sole and only means whereby disruption can be 
 averted. Hut we do not hesitate to say that it cannot 
 be averted in the absence of a coherent connnercial })()licy, 
 equality of privileges and burdens, and a ruling-power 
 absolute for purposes of peace and Avar with their 
 accessories, throughout the Empire. And we do say that 
 countries standing in this relations^hip towards each other 
 Avould substantially constitute a Federation; and that in 
 this case, as in all (»thers, the wisest course Avould be to 
 recognise the fact and follow it unflinehingly to its eon- 
 se(iuenees. Neither iMigland nor the Colonies can enjoy 
 the benefits of unity and isolation sinudtaneously ; and if 
 it be concluded that unity is more bcnelicial than iso- 
 lation, to be daunted by the nun'e magnitude of tho 
 changes requisite to make it fully effective would be un- 
 mixed cowardice, and to shrink from conferring on a free 
 representative government any amount of authority re- 
 (pjisite to ensure its conservatitm, most disgusting factious- 
 ness. Parties alarmed for ltl)erty we would point to tho 
 facts that federalism, by the large amount of local iude- 
 
h 
 
 ^w 
 
 lip ' 
 
 218 A ro[,OXTST ox THE COLOXTAL QUESTIOX. 
 
 pciidcnce ^vllich it secures, is almost necessarily a stronnr 
 friciul to freedom, and that the prerogatives of the pro- 
 posed Federal Government would he less than those 
 possessed by that of the United States. On parties 
 dreadiiio- chaniTje in itself we would press a reconsidera- 
 tion of the arouments which we have used to show that 
 it is impossible to avoid some change in the rehitionship 
 of the several parts of the Empire to one another, and 
 that, if unity is to be maintained, there must be established 
 some common policy and some supreme authority. Our 
 language on these points, however, may be set down as 
 a piece of self-opinionativeness ; and, in view of such an 
 event, we shall here fortify our position by quoting the 
 words of a man generally admitted to be one of the uiost 
 judicial-minded and liberty-loving statesmen in l']ngland. 
 Earl Grey, in a letter dated September 4, 1869, and ad- 
 dressed to Messrs. Youl, Scwell, and Bhiine, gentlemen 
 who had been strivinn; to form a conference of cohmial 
 representatives, to meet in London, for the ])urpose of 
 considering the Colonial Question, says : ' The breaking 
 up of the great Colonial Empire of England would, in 
 my opinion, l)e a calamity to the Colonies, to this country, 
 and to the world, and I cannot doultt that yon arc rujlit in 
 hplierinri this to be the result which mnst he looked for from 
 the policf/ distinct/// declared hy Her 3IaJesty's Govern- 
 ment. . . The ado|)ti(m of this policy, Avhich 1 consider to 
 be one of selfislmess, quite unworthy of a great nation, 
 and the ])revalence of the opinion which has given rise to 
 it, must be regarded as the direct and natural conse- 
 quence of the claim put forward of late years on behalf 
 of the Colonies, to be free from all control or the exercise 
 of any authority over them by the Imperial Goxernment. 
 There is no one who has always been more o[)posed than 
 myself to meddling and vexatious interference on the 
 part of that Government in the purely local and internal 
 
8»mifa^iirsS!i«ttCMil^i»ail8gfj^»a^^ 
 
 the pro- 
 m those 
 parties 
 )nsi(lera- 
 low that 
 itionship 
 ler, and 
 ablished 
 y. Our 
 lowii as 
 such an 
 iniT the 
 ho most 
 inrrljind. 
 and ad- 
 iitlcmcn 
 colonial 
 •pose of 
 reakinfT 
 
 >uld, in 
 ountry, 
 ^'i(/lit in 
 ) I' from 
 jrovern- 
 sider to 
 nation, 
 rise to 
 conse- 
 behalf 
 xercise 
 nment. 
 3d than 
 m the 
 uterjuil 
 
 II. 
 
 LORD r;REy o\ tiff: situatiox. 
 
 210 
 
 affairs of Colonies of which the inhabitants arc ca]iabl(« .,f 
 l)roperly manaoing those affairs for themselves. I'.ut, in 
 the administration of all Colonial Governments, questions 
 are continually arising ?r///c/^ affW-t the hitm'sts not o„h, of 
 the particular Colonicft, hut of the Empirr as a ivholr ; and 
 it would not l)e difhcult to show that, of late years, tlie 
 inhabitants of many of our Colonies, urged on"^by t'liose 
 M'ho profess to speak for them in this country, have set 
 up a claim (which has been jjractically conceded) to be 
 allowed to deal even witli these questions according to 
 their oavu will, without allowing the Imperial Government 
 to exercise that authority without which a due regard to 
 the general interests of the whole Empire, and ''an ad- 
 herence to its policy, cannot be secured in the measures 
 of the several local Governments. I Jut if the Imperial 
 (jovernment is to exercise no authority over the Colonies, 
 there is no reason why it should incur any responsibility 
 or expense on their behalf, and the feeling against doing 
 so, which has of late years been so strongly manifested in 
 Parliament, has naturally arisen from the exaggerated 
 claims for colonial freedom of action which have been 
 asserted. . . . I am bound to say that, for my own j)art, 
 much as I deplore what I regard as tb.e virtual dissolution' 
 of our Colonial Emi»ire by the adoption of the jjolicv 
 in question, I do not think it ought to be abandoned, cx- 
 <'ept on the condition I have menticmed.' The condition 
 referred to is ' the exercise of a larger measure of 
 authority over the Colonies by the Imperial Government 
 than they have of late been willing to submit to.' Lord 
 Grey's sentiments are almost identical with those which 
 we have expressed, save that we hold an increase of im- 
 perial authority should he accomj)anied by an infusion of 
 the colonial element into it, on which condition alone do 
 we think that the Colonies slumld submit to such an 
 increase. ( )n this point too we should say, from other 
 
.V 
 
 I t 
 
 I' 
 
 i: 
 
 220 A COLONIST ON TIIK COLONIAL QUKSTION. 
 
 parts of tlie letter, tliat Lord Grey's views agree with our 
 own. But, at all events, it is clear that he believes the 
 let-alone i)olicy cannot fail to lead to disru})tion. Coining 
 from su<^l; a source, there arc few who will attempt to 
 dispute the correctness «jf the theory. Let us not then 
 strive to shrink from meeting the inevitable. To do so is 
 at once an act of cowardice and of foolishness, and the 
 disposition so to act an infallible token of the dissolution 
 of the spirit essential to the conservation of national or 
 political freedom. Such a }>olicy, and such a spirit, 
 sluiuld be denounced uncompromisingly in press, i)ulpit, 
 and legislature, by all who value those virtues, in the 
 shape of truthfulness, courage, aid energy, which have 
 made our race what it is to-day, and without which no 
 nation has ever been elevated in the scale of humanitv. 
 Britons must surely have degenerated sadly in political 
 ability if they cannot discover some means of l)indiiig 
 together the several branches of their race without en ■ 
 dani2:erino: the liberties whose oriii'in is lost in the twi- 
 light of Anglo-Saxon history ; and they must surely have 
 lost the spirit which carried their banners up the heights 
 of (Quebec, through the gates of Paris, through the i)asses 
 of the Himalayas, and across the Arctic Ocean — which 
 lias covered the seas with their fleets — which has enabled 
 thousands to trium[)h, single-handed, over nature, beast, 
 and savage, and cover desert lands with hai)py homes — 
 and which has made the Fatherland the great emporium 
 of the wealth of the world, if the mere magnitude of the 
 task will make them shrink from attempting it, or if the 
 surpassing glory of the achievement will not beckon 
 them on to its accomplishment ! 
 
 Whether it wH)uld have been possible to have formetl 
 an Imperial Federation more easily at a former })eriod 
 than at present, is a point which it is now useless to 
 discuss. The scheme would, doubtless, have involved 
 
■^^S^!!^^^^mm^mmmm^iHti^^m^i'j^ 
 
 s. 
 
 witli our 
 eves the 
 Coiuino- 
 einpt to 
 lot tlieii 
 do so is 
 and the 
 isolutioii 
 ioiial or 
 a spirit, 
 , i)LiIpit, 
 , in tlu' 
 ch have 
 liieli no 
 inanity, 
 political 
 IjindiiiiT 
 out en • 
 he twi- 
 )]y have 
 heights 
 i passes 
 —which 
 enabled 
 I, beast, 
 onies — 
 poriuni 
 of the 
 • if the 
 beckon 
 
 formed 
 
 period 
 
 jless to 
 
 ivolved 
 
 Tin: COLOMHS AVKRSE TO SErARATIOX. 221 
 
 much less legislation under the old colonial r,yi'mr than 
 under the present. It might then have been effected 
 simply by the action of the -lm])erial Government, or at 
 least it could have enforced on the Coh)nial Legislatures 
 the ad()i)tlon of any measure which it desired'' to jiass, 
 whilst now it would be necessary to have the reconstruc- 
 ti<m bill freely accepted by them. This fact, it is tru(s 
 would increase the amount of labour to be done ; but the 
 constitutional structure, when comi)leted by the joint 
 efforts of all and adopted by the common voice, would 
 stand on a much more enduring basis than if it had been 
 framed solely by the mother-country, and forced by her 
 on unsym])athising Colonies. The Colonies are now 
 anxious to have the connection maintained, and arc pre- 
 ])ared to give a favourable hearing to any scheme for the 
 accomplishment of this object. It is certainly desirable 
 that action should be taken whilst this feeling remains in 
 force; nor is it likely, under the present relationship, ever 
 to be stronger than at present. The political bonds 
 which unite the different members of the Empire have 
 l)een already rendered so very loose that in many of the 
 Colonies their actual severance would scarcely be felt. 
 This actual dissociation, and the prospect of separation 
 which is so i)ersistently foi-ced on their view by English 
 emancipationists, cannot fail to weaken those moralities 
 the existence of which can alone form a solid foundation 
 for any species of political connection. Hence we con- 
 clude that the earlier the action the greater the chances 
 of success in the glorious wcn-k of forming a world-wide 
 liritish Empire, from every corner of which would ascend 
 the poet's aspiration : — 
 
 The free fair homos of Eiitrliind ! 
 Long, long, in hut iiml Imll, 
 
 May hearts of native proof be roared 
 To guard each hallowed wall : 
 
'^)9 
 
 A COLONIST ON THE COLONIAL QUESTION, 
 
 And green for over be the groves, 
 
 And bright their flowery sod, 
 Where first tlie child's glad spirit loves 
 
 Its country and its God ! 
 
 It may perhaps be said tliat the invocation would arise 
 as readily from the Colonies if ' cmancii)ated ' as if 
 federated. Judging from the history of our relations 
 Avith the United States, we should say that it would not. 
 Indeed, we feel compelled to endorse the weighty words 
 contained in the pages of Tlie Coxttms, and to exclaim 
 with T/orf- Lytton ; ' Depend upon it, t lie New World will 
 he J . ,v <r' hostile to the Old, not in proportion to kin- 
 
 ship q) I uci , but in proportion to siniiluritij of manners 
 and if/.'tifufions.^ Federation offers the best means avail- 
 able for muintaiii r.g ruch similarity of manners and in- 
 stitutions. 
 
 1 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 It must bo carefully borne in mind that the calculation of the 
 probable amount of Colonial liability on pp. 8(3, 87 is not in- 
 tended for anything more than an approximative estimate We 
 are, however, so strongly of opinion that it errs rather ao.ainst 
 the Colonies than in their favour, that we deem it advisable tu 
 bring forward some other poinf ^ of the case. 
 
 Taking the value of the real property of Outnrio, as we have 
 done, at 100,000,000/., it amounts-in round numbers-to about 
 bll. per head of its population of 1,620,842. Sunposiuo- the 
 proportion to be the same throughout all the Colonies, andlbeir 
 populutKui in 18011 at 8,000,000, we should have 4h8,000 000/ 
 as the amount of their realised wealth, and the valuation of the' 
 iiinpire in the above year somewhat as follow.s :— 
 
 Gross value of real property in the United Kingdom 
 
 Gross value of real property in the Colonies 
 
 Total 
 Under this assessment the liability of Ontario would reach 
 
 only one s.xty-second part of the Federal expenditure of 
 db,OO0,O00/. This would amount to 580,045/. 3>^ •>,! or 7s '->,! 
 per head of its population. Deducting from this the -^s"7,i 
 per head which we have shown would be saved bvthe transfer 
 of certain charges from the local revenue to that of the Empire 
 we have the actual increase reduced to 4.s-. 7^1. ■ and 
 
 £';,74o.OOO,0()() 
 !88,0()0,0(,)() 
 
 ded 
 
 . --^^..^ ......v.^.t tu .r^. ,<,.- aiia tieauc 
 
 again tlie 1... !»,/. per head, which might be sav(.l by a Fee 
 guarantee of the debt, we have 26-. l0(/ 
 
 ting 
 
 ,'de 
 
 ral 
 
 per head a* the actual 
 
II 
 
 5 ■! 
 
 I 
 
 121 
 
 AI'IM'LVDIX. 
 
 incrraso of luxation for wliicli Ontario would become liable by 
 Fed enit ion. 
 
 But- even tlie above, we arc inclined to tliink, miq;ht prove 
 to bo too bij^li an estimate for IJritisli America, as the wealth 
 of Ontario is considerably in excess of that of the other jiro- 
 vinees. In the CiDiaiJldn Vrar Una!; for IHtl? a very carefully 
 com) died estimate of the wealth of Ontario, Quebec, Now 
 iJrunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Kdwai'd Island, and New- 
 i'oundlaud, j^ives r)4(V*00,000 dollars as the cash value of farms, 
 and ■200,00(),(M)() dollars as that of real pro])erty in cities, 
 towns, and villai^es, makiny' a total of 71<<»,000,()()0 dollars, or 
 about l-")<»,nno^(i(jo/. sterlinjjf. As the valuation of farm pro- 
 ])orty is based on the census returns of IHdl, we may assume 
 the t!)!al to have since renchcd 200,00(),(»00/. This would 
 leave those six provinces lifible for one thirty-first part of the 
 Federal expenditure of 8(;,O0O,(i007., or l,l(;i,290/. <')«. 4'/. ].er 
 annum. Their population beincr about 3,700,000, this sum 
 would amount to t).s'. '4d. per head. Dcductinof from this the 
 2.S'. 7(L of savin<; in local expenditure!, we have the increase 
 irduced to os. Sd. per head; and deducting from this the 
 saving of l.s\ Od. consequent on a guarantee of the debt, we 
 liave the total increase reduced to l.s". \ld. per head. 
 
 We repeat that our estimates on this point can be taken 
 only as approximative. The statistics requisite to the for- 
 mation of an exact calculation are, probably, not in existence : 
 at all events we have not got them. But it must, we think, 
 1)0 evident that our estimate of the increased taxation which 
 Federation would bring to the Colonies is certainly not too 
 low; nay, that the actual increase would, in all probability, 
 ])rove to be less ; and that as the increase which would be 
 necessitated by independence would be above even the highest 
 estimated increase under Federation, financial considerations 
 are overwhelmingly in favour of the latter policy. 
 
 LONDON: I'HINTF.I) IIV 
 
 :JPOTT!~ VMJOUH AND CO., NKW-8TI1EHT SQUAllE 
 
 AND PAKLIAMl'lX;; El'BKKT 
 
f. ■i:..r;.-r;;:v^^? j^;a*^-.ttfti»b^;agMB«WEm3E 
 
 no liable l)y 
 
 ii'u'lit prove 
 tlie wcalfli 
 
 other jii'o- 
 "V carefnlly 
 iel)cc, Xew 
 
 and New- 
 le of farms, 
 i in cities, 
 
 dollars, or 
 
 farm pro- 
 lay assnino 
 'bis would 
 liivt of tlie 
 <>>'. 4'/. ])or 
 , this sum 
 m this the 
 lO increase 
 [1 this the 
 e debt, wo 
 
 L be taken 
 o the for- 
 existenee : 
 wo think, 
 tion which 
 ily not too 
 robability, 
 would be 
 he highest 
 ^derations