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32X
1
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T
::45:«T
,. '"."/A-
(• J -,-■'' t ,'
4,
LETTERS
-■.;.■ :•"«-»._•»•;
,">««., ^.;.r.«t
Bf
MAJOR NORMAN PRINGLE,
LATE OF THE 21.st ROYAL SCOTS FUSILEERS,
■',.'ft:
I
■ ■XL'i*
<••. .1*
> . VINDICATING
THE CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH ARMY,
■ EMPLOYED IN NORTH AMERICA IN THE YEARS 1814-15, • *
_ FROM ASPERSIONS CAST UPON IT
>.-'<., *-W- .• f "^J
> ^a i-
■1.1-c
STUART'S
"THREE YEARS IN NORTH AMERICA." .
,.:.-,.•, v--/
i ,•
'ff ". i
;t • 1.. .
..ir-ic ;i-?W»
£#■-
■v-'t
LETTERS, &c.
LETTER I.
"
TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBUIIGH EVENING COUBANT.
Edinhuryh, 29</< October, 1833.
Sm, — Having within these few days read Mr Stuart's work on America, I was
particularly struck with the manner in which the conduct of the British troops
serving under General Ross tit the attack on Washington, is described. In vol.
ii. p. 83, after commenting upon the merits of the exp' dition, and lamenting the
destruction of the Capitol, War Office, and the ^rea^ br'ulge across the Potomac, Mr
Stuart proceeds to say, pp. 86, 87, that the library, and a great part of the state
papers, were destroyed. I shall here quote the author's own words : — "I heard
many anecdotes of this much-to-be-regretted incursion. The commanders had
directed private property to be respected, but it was impossible to restrain the
soldiery. Much private property was destroyed. Mr p]lliot was with the army ;
his house was sacked. The destruction of Mr Gules' printing establishment was
the most pitiful of all the proceedings." Now, sir, I am desirous of putting the
public in possession of a few facts, which, I trust, will be the means of rescuing
the character of the British soldiery from the imputation cast upon it. Subsequent
to the defeat of the Americans at Bladensburg, General Ross advanced towards
Washington with 1000 men, and about eight o'clock in the evening arrived at an
open piece of ground two miles from the Federal city. Soon after our arrival, I
was informed by the adjutant of the regiment that General Ross wished to see
me immediately. On coming to the General, I was informed by him that lie
had ordered the grenedier compatiy of the 21st regiment to parade for a particular
service, and that I was to command them, and about 39 men more, making in all
100 rank and file. The General stated to me that be was about to advance into
Washington, accompanied by this body of men only, who were to act as his
advanced guard in approaching the city. That, on my arrival, I was to take up a
position with my men, to place sentries at the different entrances into the city,
to send patroles round every half hour, to prevent any soldier or seaman belonging
to the expedition from entering the city, and on no account whatever to permit my
men to go into any house. These orders were most punctually attended to. I
went round with every patrole myself, I paraded my men every hour to see that
none were absent, and for twelve hours held possession of the capital of the
United States, with that handful of British soldiers, and preserved its peace.
To one species of plunder I and many of my comrades must indeed plead
guilty. The inhabitants of Washington, with becoming consideration, had
provided an ample repast in every house for the conquering army, which was to
return from Bladensburg with the British in chains ; but, in its hurry to cross
the Potomac, they swept past like its torrent, and left all the good things behind
them. Then, indeed, there was a sad destruction of private property, —
ducks, geese, hams, turkeys, bufTalos' tongues, and buffulos' bumps, were devoured
by wholesale ; nor was Mr Maddison's health forgotten, in his own best claret,
for being so good a fellow as to leave us such a capital supper. This fell to the
share of those who were employed in destroying the Capitol, &c. For myself
and men, we were most kindly treated by an honest barber, who came to me in
great distress, saying, that he had provided an excellent supper, but that he had no
one to eat it. He accordingly brought us out ham and fowls, various other
good things, and he gave the men a quantity of bread and very good cider ; and
what remuneration did this excellent citizen demand for his kindness ? Why,
that I would allow one of my soldiers to remain in his house, to protect him
against a set of rascals who were prowling about the city taking advantage of its
distress. At eight o'clock, in the morning of the 25tb, I was ordered to return
I
'
plead
bad
^
3
to the bivouac of the army, two miles distant from Washin^toii ; and previous to
our mureliin^ off, the men iiiidei* my commai.l had not only the aatisfac-tion to
receive the 'lanks of the ever-to-be-lamcnted General Ross, for the manner they
had preserved the peace of the city, but my friend the barber, and a great many
other inhabitants of Washington, thanked the General and the soldiers, /or the
protection they had (fforded them from the marauding attacks of their own country-
men. In adverting to what is said about the destruction of the great bridge across
the Potomac, I have yet to learn, that a prudent military measure is contrary to
the usages of war, particularly as the Americans themselves had destroyed the two
bridges crossing the eastern branch.
I shall now, in corroboration of the facts which came under my own observa-
tion, quote one or two remarks from American publications. The Columbian
Centinet says, " The British officers pay inviolable respect to private projxrty,
and no peaceable citizen is molested." A writer from Baltimore, under date of
27tn August, 1814, says, " The enemy, I learn, treated tlnj; inhabitants of
"Washington well ;" and what says Mr Gales, the mouth-piece of the Government,
and the bitter enemy of the British ? " When we remarked," iays he, " in our
paper of yesterday, that private property had, in general, been /respected by the
enemy, we spoke what we believed ; greater respect was certair^ly paid to private
property than has usually been exhibited by the enemy in his ir'arauding parties ;
no houses were half as much plundered by the enemy as by the /Inavish rogues about
the town, who profited by the general distress." (National Intelligencer, Slst
August.) I shall close my quotations with one from the George Town paper,
8th September : — " The list of plunder and destruction, copied from a vile and
libellous print of that city (Washington) into several Federal papers, is a gross
and abominable fabrication, known to be such by every inliabitant s most of the
plunder was committed by rabble of the place, fostered among the citizens, and
subsequent to the departure of the British troops ; it is but justice to say, that the
British army preserved moderation and discipline, with respect to private property,
unexampled in the annals of war."
I have not, sir, the honour of a personal acquaintance with Mr Stuart, the
author of " Three Years in North America." I trust he will forgive me for
saying, that I think he has allowed himself to be imposed on by American mis-
statements, in almost every instance, where the operations of the British army
are describeii ; and that he will believe, I publish the above in no spirit of
hostility towards him, but simply, as far as in me lies, to put the character of my
fellow-soldiers in a true light before the eyes of their countrymen, in justice to
the memory of many brave men and valued friends, and in justice to that army
of which I was a member for nine-and-twenty years, and with which I served in
almost every quarter of the globe. — I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient
servant,
Norman Pringle,
Late Major 2 1st Royal Scots Fusileers.
LETTER IL
TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBUROII EVENING COURANT.
of its
13th November, 1833.
Sir, — In addressing this letter to you, I trust it will be found that I am
actuated by no motive but that which I declared in my letter published in your
paper of the 31st ultimo, namely, the strong desire of doing justice, in every
point of view, to the character of the British troops employed during the last
American War. Mr Stuart says, in his letter to you, •• I am therefore most
culpat'e if even a single material error in this part of my work can be pointed
out." Is it no material error to state that the British soldiery could not be
restrained from plundering private property, when there is direct evidence, both
British and American, to shew that such an accusation is not correct ? Is it no
material error to state that the British force at New Orleans was 12,000, and
the American only 3000 or 4000, when the reverse is much nearer the truth, as
official documents run shew ? Is it no material error roundly to assert thnt the
British never reached the ditch, when there are many living witnesses to testify
that they did, and when even Amerieun authority eiui he produced to shew that,
the British not only reiu-hcd the ditch hut ^ot into their lines?
I hope Mr Stujrt will have the kindness to excuse me if I repeat, what, in
charity to him, I continue to tliink, that he has allowed himself to lie imposed on
by American mis-statements; and if any reli.ince is to he placed on official
documents, I hclicve I shall he enabled to shew that Mr Smart has bud bad
•".iformation respecting the Britinh troops employed in the United States.
Mr Stuart, in his letter to the Editors of the Conrant and Caledonian
M(!n'iiry, says, that I have impnj;Mcd his statement reurardin^' the behaviour of
the Britisli troops at Wasliinf,'toti. I shall now beg leave again to call in
question the coi reduces of his iti formation, come from what source it may, and,
in military phrase, break frcsli ground with hi;n, and the field shall be New
Orleans.
In vol. ii. page 253, of Mr Stuart's work, the author says, " The British are
understood to have had bi'twccn 10,000 and 12,000 men in this engagement, and
the Americans between :)000 and 4000." Now, sir, as I happened to have an
official return of every regiment of the British army employed on that expedition,
I shall give the list : Mr Stuart can refer to the Horse Guards to know if I am
correct. The list is of British infantry employed in the attack on the lines of
New Orleans, on the morning of the 8th January, 1815: — 4th foot, 747 ; 7th
do. 750 ; 21st do. 800 ; 43d do. 820 ; 44th do. 427 ; 85th do. 298 ; 93d do. 775 ;
95th do. 276 — making in all 4893 rank and file British; there remains to be
added to this 200 seamen and 400 marines. For the amount of the American
force, I shall leave the public to draw the inference from Mr Stuart's own words,
merely stating, that I have now before me a very beautiful plan of the operations,
and of the American lines before New Orleans, executed by Major Lacarriere
Latour, principal engineer, 7ih military district, U. S. army, which line?, to use
the Major's own expression, "were a mile in length, and filled with men." In
vol. ii. page 952, Mr Stuart says, " General Jackson placed his riflemen, each of
whom had one, two, or three men behind him ;" and again he says, " the fire of
the American militia was most unintermitting — (no wonder) — the men in some
places ranged six deep." Now, sir, taking for grunted that Major Latour's plan
is most perfectly correct, and that Mr Stuart's information is in this instance
good, I shall split the difference with him, and allow the Americans to have
stood four deep, and each file at one yard distance from the other, (good elbow
room, as every soldier will allow,) there being 1760 yards in a mile, will make
the American force, by Mr Stuart's own account, amount to 7040. That the
Americans had many more men is my firm belief, as General Jackson was much
too skilful an officer to throw up lines a mile long, unless he had masses of men
to fill them ; and I am sure I shall be borne out by my brother officers in saying,
that such a torrent of fire (if I may so express it) as poured on the British troops
that day along the whole extent of the line, was, perhaps, never witnessed, not
even at St Sebastian. In page 253, Mr Stuart says, " the British never reached
the ditch." I think I can easily disprove this assertion, and by American
authority too. In consequence of an unfortunate mistake, the facines and ladders
had never reached the head of our column. Major-General Gibbs, leading on
the attack at the head of the 21st regiment, finding that the facines were not
forthcoming, ordered the two leading companies of the 21st regiment to move
forward in double quick time under Major Whitaker, the senior Major of the
regiment, for the purpose of making a lodgment in the ditch. Almost imme-
diately on giving this order. General Gibbs was mortally wounded, and, at the
same instant, the enemy commencing a destructive fire, our column was absolutely
mowed down. The smoke was so great that we could not see our two companies
which had been sent in advance ; but those brave men, under their gallant leader,
pressed on, got into the ditch, made steps with their bayonets in ths parapet, and
succeeded in getting into the American lines, where, from want of support, they were
made prisoners. There are many of the officers still alive who can vouch for
this fact. Major Whitaker was killed in climbing up the parapet. At the first
burst of the fire from the American lines, Colonel, now Sir William Paterson
%
that thu
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1 vouch for
At the first
(n Paterson
of the 2l8t, was badly wounded ; Major Aiexai.der James Ross Wu^ iilso most
severely wounded, from the effects of which lie never recovered, and died in
Edinburgh some years after.
The command of the '2Ist regiment devolved on the junior field officer. From
the effects of the tremendous fire, the advancing cuhimn was for a moment thrown
into confusion. Tlie comiiiauding officer of the regiment ordered a bugle to
sound the advance, called to the men to follow him, which they did with cheers.
They adviiMced to the ditch ; some of the men were already in it i the present
Lionteiiant General Sir Joim Kcaiie, with tliut g.illantry for which he is con-
spicuous, arrived, and, in the act of Icudin;? on and cheering the men, was badly
wounded, and carried off tiie field ; at tiie same instant, a stafF ollicer came up,
and ordered the officer commanding tlie 21st rc^iimcnt to collect the remtiunt of
his corps, and retreat to a wood in the rear. General Jackson in his despatch
says, *' Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness
wliich reflects upon them the highest credit. Twice the column which approached
my left was repulsed, and twice they formed again and renewed the assauft."
(Assault of whiit ? why, of the ditch and parapet.) And now, sir, from my
heart I thank Mr Stuart for giving me an opportunity of paying a tardy but just
tribute to the memory of one of my earliL-st and most esteemed friends — to one
of the bravest soldiers that ever drew u sword — I mean the late Brevet
Lieutenant- Colonel Reniiie of the 21st Scots Fusileers, nephew of the late Sir
David Btird. This officer had been wounded severely in the knee at the attack
on Washington, still more severely on landing at the attack on Baltimore.
Neither of these wounds were as yet healed, but nothing could prevent Rennie
,^ from performing his duty. Sir Edward Packenham had given Colonel Rennie
"^ a separate command, for the jiurpose of acting on the American right Hank, and,
as I am unwilling to make the ]>ul>lic trust to the partial testimony of a friend, I
shall forego the privilege, and recount the gallantry of Colonel Rennie in the
words of his enemy, and I shall quote them from General Jackson's biographer,
(Mr Eaton) : — " Colonel Rennie, of the fusileers, was ordered to storm a redoubt
on the American right. Rennie executed his orders with great bravery, and
urging forwiiid, arrived at the ditch, and reaching the works, and passing the ditch,
Rennie, sword in hand, leaped on the wall, and culling to his troops, bade them
follow him. He had scaniely spoken, when he fell by the fatal aim of one of
our riflemen. Pressed by the impetuosity of superior numbers, who were
mounting the walls, and entering at the embrasures, our troops had retired to the line
in rear of the redoubt. To advance, or maintain the point gained, was equally
impracticable for the enemy. The situation of these brave fellows may be easily
conceived. They were nearly all killed or taken prisoners."
There is another circumstance connected with my gallant friend's death, which
I cannot refrain from relating, as it gave me then, and does now give me, the
greatest ple>is»re, to think that he was not only regretted by his friends, but that
ho, in his death, was honoured hy his foes. The night previous to the action of
the 8tli of January, Rennie said to me, " I am always hit, and in case I should
fall to-morrow, 1 bog you will use every endeavour to recover this ring, this
brooch with some hair in it, and my watch, and if you survive, deliver them to
my sister." After the attack on the lines of New Orleans had failed, a flag of
truce was sent from Sir John Lambert to General Jackson. I wrote a few lines
by the officer who carried it to the American general, mentioning my friendship
for Colonel Rennie, and his request to me. On the return of the flag of truce,
I received a polite message from General Jackson, saying that it gave him the
greatest pleasure to comply with any request made by the friend of such a gallant
soldier as Colonel Rennie — that he had taken care to protect his remains, and
to order for them an honourable grave. The watch, ring, and brooch, were all
returned to me.
Accustomed as we had been for years to oppose an honourable and a courteous
enemy, it was a green spot in the wilderness of American campaigning to find
one of the same stamp in the present President of the United States.
If, sir, I ha\ e expressed myself strongly, I have felt deeply. In that expedition
I lost three of my earliest and most intimate friends, and there is u bond of
afFection between those who have stood by each other in many a well-fought field
T
h
M
which men in ordinary life run hardly know. I have now to apologize to you
and to the public for tri'RpasHing so long upon your time, hut I hope you will
both admit that it is a little too hard that men who are willing to Huffer every
privation, and to shed the la»t drop of their blood in the defence, or for the
honour of their country, should have their " good name filthM from tlicm" by
those who are (no disrespect to Mr Stuart) equally unwilling to allow and
unable to oppreciate their worth. I have the honour to be, wir, your obedient
tiervant,
NonMAN I'lllNGLE,
Lute J)Iajor2lst Uoyul Scots Fusileers.
LETTER III.
TO THE EOITOH OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT.
29/A Novmbcr, 1803.
Sir, — In addressing the following re-marks to the public, I do not now come
before it as merely wishing to defend the character of the British army from
aspersions which have been cast upon it, and trust I have not infringed the rules
of courtesy in not waiting longer for Mr Stuart's documents, but I wish to claim
for that portion of the combined British forces employed in the expedition to
!Nevv Orleans the merit they so well deserve. In tlic work already alluded to in
letters published by me in the Edinburgh newspapers, where the author has
thought it necessary to mention the failure of our attack on the lines of New
Orleans, I was in hopes I might have found some description of other circum-
stances connected with that expedition, but I um sorry to say there is no page
allotted to praise of the British seaman or British soldier in that work. Censure
alone finds ample room.^ Why are the unparalleled exertions of our seamen and
our soldiers withheld ? Why is the gallant action fought by Captain Lockyer
near the pass of the Rigolets with the enemy's gun-boats — why is the capture of
the whole of the American flotilla by that officer, with the boats of the British
fleet, withheld? Why is the action fought by our troops under Sir John Keane
(under every disadvantage) withheld ? After being exposed to the most severe
weather in open boats for nearly twenty-four hours, the troops landed on a shore
unknown to them, — they had laid down to rest in their bivouac, when, in the
darkness of the night, they were suddenly attacked by 5000 Americans under
General Jackson himself. (See Sir John Keane's despatch, December 28,
1814.) The British stood to their arms, repulsed the enemy at every point!
and took up a position in advance of the one originally held ! The action fought
by the troops and seamen under Colonel (nov/ General) Thornton, and which
action was completely successful, on the right bunk of the Mississippi — why is
this not mentioned ? I shall take the liberty of doing so in General Jackson's
own words, given in his despatch of iith January, 1813. The General says,
" These" (meaning the British) " having landed, were hardy enough to advance
against the works of General Morgan ; and, what is strange and difficult to
account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for,
the Kentucky reinforcements, in whom so much reliance had been placed,
ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the
forces, (about 1600,) and thus yielding to the enemy that most formidable position."
Well might the late Sir Alexander Cochrane say, in bis despatch to the Admi-
ralty, dated January 18, 1815, " That ihe hardships undergone by the seamen
and the troops had rarely been equalled." 1 will venture to assert, that in the
whole annals of his own glorious service, that respected admiral never knew the
combined energies of British seamen and British soldiers more severely put to
the test. All were animated by the same enthusiasm. Officers and soldiers,
admirals and seamen, were seen hauling on the same rope, and dragging at the
same gun. It is not for British soldiers nor British sailors, any more than other
mortals, to command success, but in this expedition they did deserve it.
I shall now speak of the retreat ot our troops from the American shores. It
will be naturally supposed that we were harassed to a degree by the enemy, —
I
f
to you
you will
t-r every
r for tliu
icm" by
How und
obedient
tilecrs.
1883.
ow come
rmy from
tlie rules
to claim
L*(lition to
ided to in
utbor has
of New
r circum-
I no page
Censure
lamen und
Loc'kyer
capture of
lie British
ihn Keane
ost severe
on a shore
en, in the
uns under
ember 28,
ery point!
:ion fought
and which
i — why is
Jackson's
iieral says,
to advance
diflicult to
ooked for,
len placed,
der of the
e position."
the Admi-
:he seamen
that in the
r knew the
rely put to
d soldiers,
;ing at the
! than other
t.
shores. It
; enemy, —
that be followed up his victory in the lines by driving uh before him, and
8'.vccping us from the face of the eartli. No, General .lackson knew better than
to leave his stronghold, — it was the |)ruyer of every soldier that he would do so.
The IJritish lion had, indeed, been sorely stricken, but he was the lion still.
Well has it been said by the eloquent author of the I'cninsular War, — " A
Briti!«li army may be gleaned, but it caiuiot be reaped." We remained until tho
18th in our original position, and commenced our retreat on the evening of thut
day, — a retreat equally honouralile to the general commanding, (Lieutenant-
General Sir John Lambert,) and to the holdiers under him.
It is easy for gentlemen to sit at home and criticise the operations of an army
or the movements of a fleet, — they little know the ordeal to be passed ere thut
victory is won which may bring sorrow or rejoicing to their lireside. Hut the
liritish public may rest assured that its seamen and its soldiers are ever the
same. On the shores of the Mediterranean as on the banks of the Mississippi,
one feeling alone animates them — the faithful discharge of their duty.
*' England expects every man to do his duly ; " or the simple but characteristic
appeal of the greatest (Captain of ANY agi: — " What will they say in England ? "
these are signals British seamen and British soldiers will fly to ans'ver. These
AUK watch-words they will cheer to ! Look on the deck of the Victory ! look
oti the field of Corunna ! or on the green turf, the humble death-bed of the
humblest soldier — one sentiment pervades them all. Listen to the last sob
of the dying man, and in it you will find u whispered hope that he has done his
duty ! It is also very easy for gentlemen, either in books or in House of
Commons harangues, to send forth to the world systems hyi»othc; 'ally got up
for the proper management of British soldiers, to tell us that thi.s puniishment is
right and that wrong. I will take leave to tell those gentlemen, they do not,
they cannot know, the true character of u British soldier. They must have
served with him for years — they must have studied the dispositions of individuals
of the three countries from whence the British ranks are recruited — they must
have feasted with him to-day, and fasted with him to-morrow — they must have
dwelt with him in palaces, and couched with him in hovels — they must have
stretched their limbs with him on the sands of Egypt, or in the swamps of
Louisiana — they must have witnessed his utter contempt of all danger und hard-
ship, his perfect devotedncss to the cause in which he is embarked — they must
have shared with him the triumph of victory or the mortitication of defeat !
Then, and not till then, can I admit them to be proper judges of the character
of a British soldier.
I shall conclude this communication, as I commenced my correspondence, by
stating, that I have no motive but that of doing justice to my fellow-soldiers in
every point of view. With whatever spirit of hostility I might have fought in
1815, in 1833 I write with none. As I have before stated, we ever found in
General Jackson an honourable and a courteous enemy, and all our prisoners
were tieated with kindness and generosity. I shall venture again to assure the
author of " Three Years in North America," thut he hus been misled, and I
would fain flutter myself thut one day he will admit it. In the meantime our
cause is before the public ; to it I look for judgment, and with submission will
await the verdict, whether for those who have mude the charges, or for him who
very humbly has offered the defence. I have the honour to be, your obedient
servant,
Norman Pringlk,
Late Major 2 let Scots Fusileers.
LETTER IV.
9
TO THE EUITOK OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT.
January 24, 1834.
Sir, — In answering portions of a pamphlet just published by Mr Stuart,
purporting to be " A Refutation of Aspersions on Stuart's Three Years in
America, " I a.n afraid I shall be obliged to trouble you with more than one
h '
Iftter, but I ithuil muko each ai brief as eircumntunces will alluw. In the Hmt
plucv, Mr Stuurt myt*, thut "if I had allowed his buok to speuk for itself,
iriMtcad of giving my reudern piirtiid extructn from hiti iiiirrative, it would have
been hardly requisite for him to nay u word in vindication of it." Ho farther
states, that " the quotatiotin are ohviouHly extracted with a view to serve u
purpose." Undoubtedly tliey were ko, and the purpoNe wiih to contradict certain
HNHcrtions made by \[r Stuart in his work, and which I have quoted in uiy
letters already publiHiicd ; and why Mr Stuart hlamcH me for not quoting more
largely, I am really at a loss to under>tand. Mr Sluart'ri book was before the
public, and tho^e who wished to read it had the opportunity of doing so for
months before the publication of my letters. In that book I found aKHertions
derogatory to the character of that part of the IJritish army with which I acted
in America, and thc^e H«xertionN I contradicted. In page 12 of the pamphlet,
Mr Stuart sayn, "that I neither defend the proceedings at Washington, nor call
in question the propriety of his remuiUs — cxcupt in so far as concerns the private
property de8t"o;'pd by the soldiery, and the dentructioii of the bi'dge across the
Potomac." * .', I did not profess to do more. With regard to the merit or
demerit of the expedition to Washington I h.ive nothing to say. With regard tu
the burning and destroying public buildings, or what nuty have been considered
public property, I have nothing to suy. i\Iy sole object was to shew that Mr
Stuart's Htatemeut was incorrect when he declared that the liritish noldiery could
not be restrained from ptumlerimj at Washington. In my letter to you of the
29th of October, I stated that I was in command of a small force sent to
Washington for the porpose of protecting private property ; that I rema'ned in
possession of the city from the evening of the 24lh to the morning of I'le 2ath,
when I returned to the bivouac of the army, two miles from the ci^y. I will
a;^ain assert, that during my occupation of the city no private poperty was
plundered by the soldiery. The army, with the exception of my small detach-
ment, and those employed in the destruction of public buildings, was in bivouac
two miles from the city, where it remained until the evening of the 2oth. Page
14, " Mr Stuart says that my testimony comes no farther down than to eight
o clock of the morning of the 25th. It is, therefore, good for nothing. Every
house in Washington might have been plundered between ei{;ht o'clock in the
morning and the night of the 25th, when General Ross commenced retiring."
If the plunder of private property did commence after my leaving the city, it
must have done so under the eye of General Ross himself, which I think Mr
Stuart will hardly venture to iiffirm. From what I know of the character of
General Ross, I am convinced had any soldier been found plundering, or in any
way molesting an unoffending citizen, in twelve hours he would have been shot,
and the whole army must have known it. I beg JMr Stuart clearly to understand,
that my orders from General Ross were, to let no stragglers from the army, on
any condition, enter Washington ; hut I had nothing to do with detachments of
men employed under the commiind of other oflicers in the destruction of public
buildings, or what might have been considered public properly. In page 13 of
the pamphlet, Mr Stuart says, " Major Pringle would have us to believe, that
he was omnipresent in u city above four miles long, and of very considerable
breadth."
This sounds very well, until we fmd that the city contained, at that time,
about 400 houses ; and therelcre I think it will be allowed, that 100 well
disciplined British soldiers, under the immediate eye of their oflicers, could
insure the safety of the inhabitants f and that they did do so, I will again prove by
American testimony. The Columbian Centinel of the 31st of August says,
" The British officers pay inviolable respect to private property, and no peaceable
citizen is molested." A writer from Baltimore, under the date of August 29th,
says, " The enemy, I learn, treated the inhabitants of Washington well." T4ie
George Town paper of 8th September suys, " The list of plunder and destruc-
tion, copied from a vile and libellous print of tl.at city, (Washington,) into
several Federal papers, is a gross and abominable lalsilicution, known to be such
by every inhabitant. Most of the plunder was committed by the rabble of the
place fostered among the citizens. The Eiitish army, it is no more than justice to
say, preserved a moderation r.nd discipline, with respect to jirivati persons and
I
I
property, uiifxatiiplfd in tho unniilM ot' war." Mr Stuiirt complains of my
iinfiiiriii'Ns ill not quoting Mr GiiUh' >v|ioIc pRra^riipli. Mr Stiiiirt \h quite
welcomo to the t'lili heiiclit of it nil. Mr (»Hlt!s miys, " TIutl- wort', howovor,
Ncvonil privaie buildiiiKN wantonly dt'Htroyfd, and moiiiu of those pcrNoim who
rLMnuined in the city were KeitndahMi«iy innltreated ;" mid what cvideiiee is there
liere thiit tlie " liiiavisli roBnett" Mr (iaIeM already mentions were not tiio
perpetrutorH of these seandaloiis proeeedinKs? as it is well Unown in siieli times
every advanta},'e i.s taken of the eoiifiiNion and panie wliieh rei^n. The latter
paragraph of Mr (rales' lemaiks, legardiiiK Admiral Coekbiiiii, is lienealli notice,
for which, Hue |)amplilet, page 18. With respect to the desirnction of the
bridge, I again repeat, that it was u pnidunt military measure. A very small
British force had penetrated u con ,iderable distance into an enemy's country,
they colli. 1 not know from what (luarfcr u large force might be brought against
them.
In page "24 of the pamphlet are these words, " Major Fringle woul.l have the
world to believe that the Uritisli, on alt occasianii, respected private property." I
have read my former letters over, and I cannot find any expression in them which
wurr lilts this remark — I cannot plead guilty to such an absurdity. Mr Stuart
goes on to say, "but it is hardly possible that he can be ignorant of all that was
taking place iiroiind him." Mr Stiiurt then carries me oH' bodily from Washington
to Alfcxaiidria on the Potomac, to Captain Gordon and tlie Sea-horse, to 15,U(N)
barrels of tloiir ! and 800 hogsheads of tobacco ! What lias that to do with Mr
Stuart's assertion that the British soldiery couM not be restrained from plunder
tit Washington. What impression does Mr Stuart suppose the world in general
would have of an army whose soldiery could not be teslrainrd frum plunder /
Why — that such an army had become an ungovernable rabble ; that the men had
shaken ofT the restraint of discipline, and set at nought the authority of their
oflicers ; that they had delivered themselves over to evry sjieeies of enormity
which an excited soldiery can commit. Does Mr Stuart mean to say, that this
was the state of the army under General Koss, at Washington ? He cannot
believe it, the public will uot believe it. Mr Stuart accuses me of only quoting
those |)arts of documents which suit my purpose. What does he think of the
following specimen of his own candour ? In page 20 of the pamphlet, he says,
" INIajor Priiigle cannot be ignorant that Sir Alexander Cochrane's celebrated
communication to the American Government, uiiiunincing that it was his purpose
to employ the force under bis direction in * destroying and laying waste such
towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable,' became a subject
of a proclamatidii by the President of America." Mr Stuait has (pioted part of
Sir Alexander Cochrane's letter. I shall give the wfivle. '* From Vice-
Admiral Cochrane to Mr Muiiroe. — Sir, — Having been called on by the
Governor- General of the Canadas to aid him in carrying into tfTect measures of
retaliation against the inhabitants of the United Stales, for the wanton destruction
committed by their army in Upper Canada, it has become imperiously my duty,
con/brmab!y with the nature of the Governor- General's application, to issue to
the naval force, under my command, an ordtr to lay waste such towns and
districts upon the coast as may be found assailable. I hud hoped that this
contest would have terminated without my being obliged to resort to severities
which are contrary to the usages of civilized warfare ; and as it has been with
extreme reluctance and concern that I have found myself compelled to adopt
this system of devastation, I shall be equally gratified if the conduct of the
executive of the- United Slates will authorize my slaying such proceedings, by
making reparation to the si/^^-W//^' inhubitunts of Upper Ciinada; thereby mani.
festiiig, that if the destructive measiiris pursued by this army were ever sanctioned,
they will no longer be permitted by the Government, I have the honour," &c.
In Mr Stuart's book, page 87 of volume second, he mentions the following
circumstance: — He says, " They (the Americans) were not at the time aware
that it was to Sir George C ockburn they were indebted for the vi-it of the
British to Washington ; and it was upon the brave and amiable General Ross,
who afterwards fell in the attack upon Baltimore, that they intended to retaliate
for the devastation at Washington ! It was resolved to send a fast sailing armed
vessel to the coast of Ireland, to destroy Ross Trevor, the beautiful property
10
belonging to General Ross. A party were to land in the night at the entrance
of Carlingford Bay ; they were to burn the house upon' the mountain, and the
village below. The peace put an end to this de!:ign, which was, however,
seriously entertained." I"deed ! Magnanimous resolution of this brave and
generous nation ! A set uf men were to cross the Atlantic with all the malice
prepense of premeditated marauders and incendiaries, fur the purpose of attacking
the property of an unoffending and defenceless woman; whose husband, by the
time th' - design could have been put in execution, bad fallen, in the hour of
victory, and with his last breath had recommended "a young unprovided family
to the protection of his king and country." See Colonel Brooke's despatch after
the action before Baltimore. I trust that it is unnecessary for me to tell Mr
Stuart that I do not quote this passage as receiving from him countenance or
support in any way. i am quite sure that he is as inv.'apable as any man alive of
receiving it in any other light than thiit of unqualified detestation ; but let us
hear no more of these sticklers for the '" usages of civilized warfare." I have
the honour to be, sir, your obliged liutnble servant,
Norman Puingle,
Late Major 21bt Foot.
LETTER V.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COUHANT.
ii
■ n
'H
•' i Edinburgh, '25th January, 1834.
Sir, — Having now answered Mr Stuart's objections to my statement regarding
Washington, I proceed to defend the accuracy of those I made respecting the
attack on the lines of New Orleans. In page 32 of Mr Stuart's pam])hlet, he
says, " It is not by the perusal of garbled and partial extracts from my work, or
the documentary evidence which supports it, that my statements are to be judged
of." I have already said, that in Mr Stuart's work 1 found statements regarding
the British army serving in the United States which I did not think correct, and
I quoted those passages for the purpose of bringing them before the public and
refuting them. In page 48 of the pamphlet, with reference to my list of the
number of British troops engaged on the 8th of January, on the attack of the
lines before New Orleans, are these words, " I confess that the first perusal of
the very distinct testimony thus afforded by a gentleman who, upon the occasion
to which his evidence relates, was himself acting as a field officer, startled me,
and led me to think that I must have relied on defective information ; but upon
again consulting the oflicial documents to which I had recourse in writing this
first part of my work, 1 am glad to be able to prove that it is Major Pringle who
is in error, and that my information was not only correct, but is supported by a
mass of authorities." For the remainder, see pamphlet, page 49. In my letter
to you, sir, of the 13ih November, 1833, I mention that I have an official return
of every regiment employed on the expedition to New Orleans. I then stated
that the list I gave is of British infantry employed in the attack on the lines
at New Orleans, on the morning of the 8th of January. Then follows a list of
the regiments employed in the attack, making 4893 rank and file British. There
remains to he added to this 200 seamen and 400 marines. See my two letters.
In page 50 of t\.e panr-phlet, Mr Stuart says, "Nothing is better known to a
military .nan than that the rank and file of a regiment, or of an army, comprehend
merely the men armed with the bayonet, and that the whole of the officers, non-
commissioned officers, the staff of the army, military as well as medical, the
drum-major, drummers, pipers, &c. are not comprehended under that description.
This is a serious objection to Major Pringle's detailed and conclusive information,
as it is termed by you ; but it is a slight objection, compared with those which
are to follow." Sir, in giving a list of the British infantry employed on the
attack of the lines before New Orleans, I, as a matter of course, designate them
as rank and file, being, what I believe every military man will allow, the fighting
part of a regiment. It may be a st 'r\x--\:^ proposition to the author of " Three
Years in North America" to hear an old campaigner declare that he does not
consider the officers a fighting part of a regiment, and that any officer who goes
11
3 entrance
1, and the
however,
brave and
the malice
■ iittuckinfif
id, by the
e hour of
led family
patch after
to tell Mr
onunce or
tin alive of
)ut let us
" I have
[NGLE,
st Foot.
tj, 1834.
t regardini^
)ecting the
nphlct, he
Y work, or
be judged
I regarding
orrect, and
public and
list of the
»ck of the
perusal of
e occasion
tirtled me,
but upon
riting this
ringlo who
orted by a
I my letter
cial return
len stated
the lines
a list of
<h. There
vo letters,
lown to a
)mprehend
cers, non-
sdical, the
escription.
formation,
lose which
/ed on the
[nate them
he fiyhting
)f " Three
e does not
who goes
into action determined to fight with his own proper hand, is not fit for the
situation he holds ; it is his duty to pay excluHive attention to his men, to see
that they are so held in hand, as to be enabled promptly to obey any orders he
may require to give, emanating from himself or from his superior officer. The
duty of the serjuants is the same ; and in my day they| were annod with a halbert,
which, against an enemy carrying muskets, could not be considered a very offensive
weapon. It certainly would be new to me, to include medical men with their
lancets, or musicians with their clarionets, in the list of fighting men. I have
always understood it to be the duty of the one to carry off the wounded, and of
the other to attend them. The only error I have committed is in placing the
85th regiment in the list of British infantry employed in the attack of the lines
before New Orleans ; this admirable corps was under the immediate command
of their own most distinguished commanding officer. Colonel Thornton, on the
other side of the Mississippi. I have, by including them in my list, made the
amount of British infantry attacking the lines greater, by 298 rank and file, (the
strength of the 85th,) than it ought to be.
I now proceed, sir, to give a list of the killed and wounded in every corps
employed on both sides of the river on the 8th of January, to shew what
regiments bore the bruJit of the action. On that day — 4th foot, 1 ensign,
2 Serjeants, 39 rank and file killed ; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 5 captains,
1 1 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 1 staff, 9 Serjeants, 222 rank and file wounded ; 1 lieu-
tenant, 1 Serjeant, 53 rank and file missing. 1th foot reserve, 1 major, 1 captain,
1 Serjeant, 38 rank ".nd file killed ; 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 2 Serjeants, 47 rank
and file wounded. 21st foot — 1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 2 se^jeants,
65 rank and file killed ; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 2 lieutenants, 6 Serjeants,
1 drummer, 144 rank and file wounded ; 2 captains, 7 lieutenants, 8 Serjeants,
2 drummers, 217 rank and Jile missing, taken prisoners inside the American lines.
43d foot reserve — 2 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 8 rank and file killed ; 2 lieutenants,
3 Serjeants, 3 drummers, 34 rank and file wounded ; 1 captain, 5 rank and file
missing. 44th foot — 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 s'^-rjeant, 32 rank and file killed ;
1 captain, 5 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 5 Serjeants, 149 rank and file wounded;
1 lieutenant, 2 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 76 rank and file missing. 8.')th foot, on the
right bank of the river — 2 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 lieutenant,
3 Serjeants, 2 drummers, 34 rank and file wounded , 1 rank and file missing.
93d foot — 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 captains, 2 serjeants, 5H rank and file killed;
4 captains, 5 lieutenants, 17 serjeants, 3 drummers, 848 rank and file wounded ;
3 lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 1 drummer, 99 rank and file missing. 95th foot —
1 Serjeant, 10 rank and file killed ; 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, 5 serjeants, 89 rank
and file wounded. Royal marines — 2 rank and file killed ; 1 captain, 2 lieu-
tenants, 1 Serjeant, 12 rank and file woundfd. Royal navy — 2 seamen killed;
1 captain, 18 seamen wounded. 1st West '. ndia regiment — 5 rank and file killed ;
1 captain 2 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 2 serjeants, IG rank and file wounded ; 1 rank
and file missing. 5th West India regiment — 1 Serjeant wounded. Royal
Artillery on both sides — 5 rank and file killed ; 10 rank and file wounded.
Royal engineers, sappers and miners — 3 rank and Jile wounded. The 14th dragoons
are not mentioned in the list, they having none either killed or wounded. That
Sir John Lambert thanked the officers commanding the Royal Anillery, the
14th dragoons, the West India regiments, the sappers and miners, the seamen
nnd marines, — that he thanked every individual belonging to all these corps, for
the manner in which every duty, of whatever kind, had been performed by them,
for " an assiduity" (I quote the General's own words) " and perseverance, beyond
all example, by all ranks, and the most hearty co-operation which existed between
two services," is well known to me. Rut I wish to ask the author of " Three
\ ears in North America," of what use would dragoons have been in an attack on
lines situated in very wet ground, with a parapet of great height, and a deep ditch
into the bargain ? — of what use would artillery have been in an action where the
troops were to march as fast as consisted with good order, to the attack of lines
yvhere they were immediately to come in close contact with their enemy? — Would
it not have been an equal chance whether they destroyed friend or foe ? The
same holds good with respect to sappers and miners, as far as regards an attacking
force against the lines of New Orleans. The list in my second letter is of
f E
.
12
British infantry employed in the attack of the lines of New Orleans ; the above
list of killed and wounded will shew that my statement as to the attacking force
is correct. On bf)th sides of the river the force ready for action was about 7300.
Colonel Thornton luid of that number 298 rank and file of the 85th regiment,
600 seamen and marines, the 5th West India regiment, which Mr Stuart says
" he believes was the strongest that landed on the shores of Louisiana," and 4
pieces of artillery ; and if the whole British army had been on the right bank of
the Mississippi, I could not iiave included it as being a part of the force which
attacked the lines in front of New Orleans. I of course cannot prove by any
well authenticated account the precise amount of the American force within the
lines of New Orleans ; and if I were to take the reports of Mr Ducros, and
other American prisoners, I mi,t?ht give their statement that there were 13,000 or
14,000 troops within the city of New Orleans ; but I do not wish to avail myself
of testimony which might have been given with a view to intimidate, by exag-
gorating the force we had to encounter. I shall now endeavour to prove that
General Jackson's lines were about a mile long, and that they were filled with
men. I have no hesitation in saying that I take the authority of Major Latotir
as the very best which can be had ; he was the tngineer officer who constructed
the lines, and must have been perfectly acquainted with their extent. He must
have known to a yard what it really was. and I have already s(jid that General
Jackson was much too skilful an officer to construct such lines unless he had
men to fill them, as it is obvious j°o common sense thiit in as much as defences
are extensive, so do they become weak, if not guarded by troops within them.
In page 59 of the pamphlet, Mr StUiU't says, " Latour's calculation of the length
of his line, may perhaps be explained by a statement of Levasseur, though, if
his explaiin/ion be correct, it will not redound to tlie candour of JVIiijor Pringle,
who, having accompanied the army, could not fail to know the real state of the
case. Levasseur's information, iiowever, is probably correct, for he mentions that
the details were given to him on the spot, and that he was possessed of Latour's
memoirs." " The position (he writes) chosen by the American General to wait
for reinforcements, and to arrest the advance of so formidable an enemy, appeared
to me judicious. He threw up intrenchments about five miles below the city,
along an old canal, the left of which was lost in the depths of a swampy wood,
whilst the right rested on the river. The total length of the line was about
eight hundred toises, but as three hundred toises up the left were unassailable,
the eneniy was confined in his attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and
obliged to advance in full view over a perfectly level plain." See pamphlet,
page 60, for the latter part of this paragraph in which Mr Stuart mentions a toise
to be two yards.
Now, sir, I shrill jjroceed to show that the swamp or wooded marsh towards
the left of the American lines, and in front of them, was not impassable. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Rennie, of the 21st regiment, having himself reconnoitered the
wood, made a report to General Gibbs, oflTering to conduct a body of troops
through it. General Gibbs no sconer heard Colonel Rennie's report, than he
accompanied him to the Commander of the forces, Sir E. Packenham. The
consequence was, that, on the 28th of December, a demonstration of the whole
army was ordered, and Colonel Rennie, in command of his own light company
of the 21st regiment, was ordered to penetrate into the wood, as far as he could,
and gain tlie enemy's left. He executed his orders in the most admirable manner,
succeeded in getting the whole of his men through, and debouched from the wood
upon the American left. According to the orders he had received, he kept
up a brisk fire until he was desired to retire. Sir Edward Packenham, not
thinking himself authorized to attack such strong lines with his very small force,
withdrew his troops, determined to wait the arrival of the 7th and 43d regiments,
which reached us on the 6th of J; nuary. On the 8th of January, Jiieutenant-
Colonel Jones, of the 4th regiment, was put in command of a body of troops, I
believe about 400, to make his way through the wood and gain the enemy's left
flank ; in fact, to pursue the route, as nearly as possible, which Colonel Rennie
had done on the 28th. Colonel Jones succeeded, as Colonel Rennie bad done,
in conducting his force through the swamp, debouched at the same spot, but found
the line of defence in a very different condition from what it had been on the
I
t
; the above
tcking force
bout 7300.
I regiment,
Stuart says
iiu," and 4
ht bunk of
>rce which
ve by any
svithin the
ucros, and
13,000 or
vaii myself
, by exag-
prove that
tilled with
or Latoiir
oiistructed
lie must
it General
ss he had
s defences
hin them,
the length
though, if
»r Pringle,
itte of the
itions that
)f Latour's
;ral to wait
r, appeared
V the city,
npy wood,
was about
assailable,
toises, and
pamphlet,
sns a toise
ih towards
le. Lieu-
litered tlie
' of troops
t, than he
am. The
the whole
t company
i be could,
le manner,
I the wood
1, he kept
nham, not
mall force,
regiments,
ieutenant-
' troops, I
lemy's left
el Rennie
had done,
, but found
;en on the
18
28th. The enemy having now found, that what they had ronsidered (previous
to the demonstration) an impassable morass, was no hinderance to our troops ; had,
between the 28th of December and the 8th of January so fortifiud this, the left
of their line, as to make it perhaps the most formidable of their whole position.
Colonel Jones fell, mortally wounded, gallantly leading on his men, composed of
detachments of the 4th, or King's Own, 21st regiment, and 95th rilles ; but no
effort of his troops could surmount the difficulties opposed to them of a high
parapet, deep ditch, and skilful ritlemen to defend tliem. I here subjoin the
copy of a letter which I liav,,' received within these few days from Lieutenant-
Colonel the hoiiom-ahle James Sinel;iir, at that time an olHcer in the 21st
regiment, and who acccompanied Colonel Rennie with t e light company of the
2lst regiment during the demonstration on the 28th of December, and also was
attached to the 400 men under Colonel Jones of the 4th on the 8th of January : —
" Edinbunjh, January 27, 1834.
" Mv Dkar Pringlk, — On the evening of the 27th of December, our ever to
be lamented friend, Lieutenant- Colonel Rennie, in whose company I was,
received orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed with his own company,
and endeavour to make his way through the wood, and turn the enemy's left.
Accordingly, on the morning of the 28th we proceeded, and entered the wood,
and made our way with some difficulty, owing to the thickness of jhe wood and
swampy ground. We kept still moving forward cautiously, until we heard two
shots, and saw two of our advance fall, cii which we dashed on, and found
ourselves among some huts, which were occupied by the enemy. We continued
to exchange for some time a pretty hot fire. Colonel Rennie, perceiving that
the firing of our guns on bis left had ceased, (the signal for him to retire,)
commenced his retreat slowly, bringing our wounded with us. We got back
nearly the same way as we advanced, and returned with the main body to the
camp. On the morning of the 8th of January, I was ordered with the light
company of the 2 1st to join a brigade of between 400 or 500 men — the whole
under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. We were ordered to proceed in
the same manner and to the same place we had got to before. After pushing
throuj^h the wood, with great difficulty, we approached that part of the encny's
line we formerly found unprotected. A tremendous fire of grape and musketry
was opened on us, which killed and wounded u great many men, and we found,
with all our efforts, that on this part of the line it was impossible to make any
impression. Jones was wounded towards the enemy's extreme left, when
cheering on his men. We remained under tire a considerable time, and made
several vain attempts to get over, when a staff officer came up, itnd ordered us
to retire into the wood. From the moment we came out of the wood, in
our advance, the whole of the American line from right to left seemed one
sheet of fire, and it never ceased for an instant : as far as I could see, the
men appeared to be in crowds. I have always understood that the Ami rican
lines in front of New Orleans were towards a mile in length. Yours, with much
regard, (Signed) " Jas. Sinclaiu,
Major, H. P."
I have, sir, already taken notice, at page 59 of the pamphlet, where Mr Stuart
gives the information of Levasseur as being probably correct. We find in this
quotation, that Levasseur says, " The length of this line was about eight hundred
toises, but as three hundred toises of the left were unassailable, the enemy was
confined in his attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and obliged to
advance in full view over a perfectly level plain."
I have shewn, sir, by the above letter from an officer who accompanied not
only Lieutenant- Colonel Renr-e on the day of his reconnoisance, but forr^ed,
with the company to which he belonged, part of the force sent to attack the
enemy's left on the morning of the 8th, that it was not wcessary for the British
" to confine their attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and be obliged to
advance in full view over a perfectly level plain ;" that I have proved that a
considerable force, under Colonel Jones, did advance under cover of the wood,
passed through it, and arrived at that part of the enemy's line which, previous to
the 28th December, was considered by Levasseur and the Americans as unassailable,
but which, or ♦he 8th of January, was attacked by the force under Colonel Jones
and found to be full of men, and as strong as any other part of the position. I
14
w
\ ■■■.
r
I
U' !
therefore say, that the American line of defence before New Orleans was, by
Levosseur's own words, (Mr Stuart's authority,) eight hundred toises, or sixteen
hundred yards, the three hundred toises not being unassailable, as found by the
attack under Colonel Jones. Thus making, after all, Levasseur's measurement
'^ithin 160 yards of Major Latour's, with this difference, that Mr Stuart says,
page 39, that " Levasseur's information is probably correct."
With respect to the numb-jr of men composing the American force within the
lines, I, of course, can have no certain mode of calculation ; but convinced, as I
have always been, from every authority I could obtain, that the American lines
were towards a mile long, and considering that General Jackson could not know
in what quarter of his line he was to be attacked, it was necessary for him to be
equally prepared at every point ; and as Mr Stuart has allowed in his book, page
292, that the Americans " ranged in some places six deep," I have a right to
assume that, as the nature of the ground was nearly the same on which the lines
were formed, so was it necessary to have them equally well lined with men ; and
since Mr Stuart nrjects my former calculation, I will abide by his. He says,
" six deep in some places ;" they might have been eight in others ; it does not at
all follow that the tiles are to melt away to suit a particular purpose, there they
stand sijc deep ; and giving up even the odd hundred and sixty yards between
Levasseur and Latour, six times sixteen hundred will come to more than my
former calculation. 1 have always understood, from officers present at that
action, and who had gone through the Peninsular war, (therefore no bad judges,)
that from the extent of the line, and the tremendous Are kept up, the Americans
must have had from eight to ten thousand men within it. I now, sir, come to
that part of " Three Years in North America," where the author says, the
British never reached the ditch. At puge 238, are these words, " The British
never reached the ditch " and in page Gl of the pamphlet, the author says, " It is
obvious to every one who reads my narrative with attention, that it is ordy by a
forced construction, that it can be held to maintain that the British in no part of
the action readied the ditch." The second paragraph, detailing Sir Edward
PackenhanCs attach, contains no srich impression. It is in the third which relates
to the contituiation of the attach by General Gibbs and Keane, that the assertion is
contained, that the British did not reach the ditch. Now, sir, any one acquainted
with the details of the action before New Orleans, is aware, that oiu* most gallant
Commander-in-Chief lost his life in an early part of the action, and before it was
almost possible that the men could have reached the ditch ; and it was when he
was in front of the men, cheering them on, that he lost his valuable life.
Subsequent to his death, owing to the example and exertion of General Gibbs,
the column which he headed, and where he fell, were brought up to the ditch, the two
leading companies of the 21st regiment, under Major Whitaker got into the ditch,
and were taken prisoners inside the lines. The individual who now addresses
you, with the remainder of the 21st regiment, was close to the ditch, some of
his men were in it, when General Sir John Keane came up encouraging the men,
but almost instantly fell, severely wounded, at the same moment a staff officer
arrived, and ordered the ofdcer commanding the 2Ist regiment to retire with his
men. See my second letter. I have thus shewn, sir, that the author of " Three
Years in North America" has been misinformed even with respect to the period
of the action at which the British did reach the ditch ; but he has distinctly
stated, in page 238, that the British never reached the ditch. He now says,
indeed, that he never meant to deny that a few rash men did reach the ditch.
Does Mr Stuart mean to say that two companies of the 21st regiment, with all
the officers that belonged to them, were only a few rash men ? General Jackson
states, in his despatch, that he took 300 prisoners. It is notorious to every one,
that the Americans were never on the outside of their lines And were these
prisoners then, in Mr Stuart's estimation, only a few rash men ? I leave the
public to judge of the word never. At page 60 of the pamphlet, Mr Stuart says,
" I find myself charged with not having thought it necessary, in noticing the
failure of the attack on the lines at New Orleans, to give any description of
other incidents connected with the expedition." Mr Stuart is quite right ; I
ought not to have expected that he would take notice of the actions I mention,
as he very probably never heard of them ; they were successful, and it is not likely
the Americans would dwell much on British victories. At page 43, Mr Stuart
15
wmmm
ns was, by
or sixteen
ind by the
!Hsurement
tuart says,
within the
need, as I
I'icun lines
not know
him to be
)ook, page
a right to
li the lines
men ; and
He says,
lOes not at
there they
s between
! than my
It at that
d judges,)
\mericans
', come to
says, the
le British
ys, " It is
only by a
no part of
r Edward
r'h relates
issertion is
icquainted
3st gallant
ore it was
1 when he
able life,
■al Gibbs,
:h, the two
the ditch,
addresses
1, some of
[the men,
afF officer
; with his
f " Three
the period
distinctly
low says,
the ditch,
t, with all
1 Jackson
3very one,
ere these
leave the
tuart says,
ticing the
ription of
right ; I
mention,
not likely
Ir Stuart
says, " If I had been inclined to accuse the British army of plundering, without
ever considering the evidence on which such charges rested, I might have stated,
that the Duke of Saxe Weimar expressly mentions, that the British carried off
the cattle, and above CO negroes from General Villaret. But as I did not find
this fact staled in the American oflicial accounts, I omitted all notice of it." I
do not, sir, attempt to contradict this statement ; it may be quite true, or it may
not. I certainly saw many negroes in our camp ; but whether they were brought
there by force, or whether they escaped from their masters, I cannot pretend to
say. With regard to the bullocks, I can affirm they did not come my way ; but from
some passages I have read in " Three Years in North America," with respect to
good dinners, if the author had been as Uing eating salt junk and hard biscuit as
we had, I suspect he would have enjoyed a fresh beef steak, and not have been
very particular in his inquiries from whence it came. At page 68, 69 of the
pamphlet, Mr Stuart says, " Sir John Keane's action with General Jackson, to
which Major Pringle particularly alludes, was fought during the night of the
22d December. Major Pringle, it will be seen, describes the British as suddenly
attacked in the darkness of the night, by five thousand Americans, who were
repulsed at every point, the British taking up a position in advance of the one
originally held. Sir J. Keane's account of this action, is, however, very different."
Nort', sir, I copy the following passages from Sir J. Keane's despatch: — "At
about eight o'clock in the evening, when the men, much fatigued by the length
of time they had been in the boats, were asleep in their bivouac, a heavy slanting
fire of round and grape was opened upon them, by a large schooner, and two war
vessels which had dropped down the river from the town, and anchored abreast
of our fires, &c. A most vigorous attack was then made on the advanced front
and right flank piquets, the former of the 95th, under Captain Hatton, the latter,
85th, under Captain Schaw ; these officers, and their respective piquets, conducted
themselves with firmness, and checked the enemy for a considerable time, but
renewing their attack with a large force, and pressing at these points. Colonel
Thornton judged it necessary to move up the remainder of both corps. The
85th regiment was commanded by Brevet-Major Gihbonsi whose conduct cannot
be too much commended ; on the approach of his regiment to the point of attack,
the enemy, favoured by the darkness of the night, concealed themselves behind a
high fence which separated the fields, and calling to the men as friends under
pretence of being part of our own force, offered to assist them in getting over,
which was no sooner accomplished, than the 85th found itself in the midst of
very superior numbers, who discovering themselves, called on the regiment
immediately to surrender — the answer was an instantaneous attack. A more
extraordinary conflict has perhaps never occurred, absolutely hand to hand with
officers and men ; it terminated iu the repulse of the enemy, with the capture of
30 prisoners. A similar finesse was attempted with the 95th regiment, which
met the same treatment. The enemy finding his reiterated attacks were repulsed
by Colonel Thornton, at half past ten advanced a large column against our centre.
Perceiving his intention, I directed Colont'l Stovin to order Lieut.- Colonel
Dale, with 130 men of the 93d regiment, who had just reached the camps, to
move forward and use the bayoJiet, holding the 4th regiment in hand formed in
line, as my last reserve. Colonel Dale endeavoured to execute his orders, but
the crafty enemy would not meet him ; seeing the steadiness of his smalt body,
gave it a heavy fire, and quickly retired. Colonel Brooke, with four companies
of the 21st regiment, fortunately appeared at that moment on our right flank,
and sufficiently secured it from farther attack. The enemy now determined on
making a last effort, and, collecting the whole of his force, formed an extensive
line, and moved directly against the light brigade. At first, this line drove in all
the advanced posts ; but Colonel Thornton, whose rr'iije exertions had guaranteed
all former success, was at hand ; he rallied his brave comrades round him, and
moving forward, with a firm determination of charging, appalled the enemy, who,
from the lesson he had received on the same ground in the early part of the
evening, thought it prudent to retire, and did not again dare to advance. It was
now twelve o'clock, and the firing ceased on both sides. From the best information
I can obtain, the enemy's force amounted to 5000 men, and was commanded by
General Jackson himself. Judging from the number left on the field, his loss
must have been severe." *
/
U.
"'^
')
-^^^
16
I may now ask in what my account of this action differs from that of Sir John
Keane, except that I do not enter so minutely into detail, nor bestow the same
commendation on the troops who fought it, and "repitUed the tntmy at mtry
point."
I am far, sir, from wishing to detract from the merit the Americans deserve,
for the manner they defended their country ; and if the commendation of an
individual, much behind General Jackson in experience and military rank, can be
at all acceptable to him, I can have no hesitation in saying, that his position at
New Orleans shewed consummate judgment, and the manner in which he w<i8
seconded in the defence of the lines there, reflects the highest credit on the troops
under him. Willing as I am to allow what I have now written, I cannot abate
one iota of the eulogiuro, however ungrateful to some ears, I formerly passed on
the soldiers of my own country ; nor will I admit, that any expression I made
use of in that eulogium, will be cavilled at by those whose opinion I value. I
think, sir, I may venture to say, that I have shewn Mr Sluart has failed to prove
that "the British soldiery couM not be restrained from piander at Washington;"
that I have proved my account of the British force employed in the attach on the
Imei in front of New Orleans to be substantially correct ; that I have proved my
estimate of the length of the lines to be supported by the best authority, — the
officer who constructed them ; and that my inference deduced from that, with
regard to the American numbers, is not an unfair one ; and that I have proved,
even by Mr Stuart's own admission, that " the British did reach the ditch."
I shall now advert to page 42 of the pamphlet, where Mr Stuart Writes these
words : " Moreover, he (Major Pringle) has not scrupled to make it a public
complaint, 'that men who are willing to suffer every privation, and to shed the
last drop of their blood in "the defence, or for the honour, of their country, should
have their good name filched from them by those who are equally unwilling to
allow, and unable to appreciate, their worth.' These are heavy charges ; affecting
as they do, not only the credit of the work, but the character of the writer in
point of veracity, intelligence, and good feeling." Sir, I never made such charges
against Mr Stuart ; I never questioned his " veracity, intelligence, and good
feeling." I knew too well what was diie to his feelings, and to my own character ;
and if Mr Stuart had done me the justice to quote the latter part of my letter, as
it was written, this explanation would not have been necessary. Let him turn
to his own pamphlet, in which my letter is published, and he will 6nd the
passage thus expressed, — « should have their good name ' filched from them' by
those who are (no disrespect to Mr Stuart) equally unwilling to allow, and
unable to appreciate, their worth. '^ It was my firm conviction that Mr Stuart
had received his intelligence from^ persons not capable of giving him correct
information on several points stated in his work. To those persons alone were
my observations directed ; and that no mistake might occur on this point, I
inserted the words, « no disrespect to Mr Stuart," of which he has taken no
notice.
Thus, sir, I have fully proved, in two letters, that my objections to certain
passages in the work " Three Years in North America," (and which related to
the operations of that part of the British army with which 1. served in the United
States) were well founded, and that a pamphlet lately published by the author of
" Three Years in North America," the materials for which he has taken nearly
three months to collect, is no refiitati^ at all. To characterize this pamphlet, I
cannot do it in fewer words than by taaking use of the somewhat trite quotation,
" Parturiunt mantes, nascitur ridiciMU mus." I have now, sir, trespassed long on
your time, and that of the public. I trust the anxiety I have felt that the
character of British soldiers should be put in a true light before the eyes of their
fellow-countrymen, will plead' my excuse, and though now no longer one of them,
I must confess myself their very inadequate, but zealous advocate. — I have the
honour to be, sir, your obliged humble servant.
NOBMAN PbIMGLE,
Late Major 21st Regiment.
EDINBURGH:
Printed by Andkbw Shobtbbdb, Thistle Laoe.
s.
lat of Sirr John
Btow the same
nemy at entry
ricans deserve,
^ndation of an
y rank, can be
lis position at
which he whs
: on the troops
[ cannot abate
irly passed on
ession I made
m I value. I
'ailed to prove
Washington ;"
I attack on the
ive proved my
thority, — the
)m that, with
have proved,
i ditch."
t writes these
:e it a public
d to shed the
luntry, should
Y unwilling to
ges ; affecting
the writer in
'■ such charges
ce, and good
vn character ;
' my letter, as
Let him turn
will 6nd the
rom them' by
o allow, and
at Mr- Stuart
him correct
18 alone were
this point, I
has taken no
ns to certain
ich related to
in the United
the author of
taken nearly
pamphlet, I
te quotation,
issed long on
felt that the
eyes of their
one of them,
—I have the
INGLE,
Regiment.