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A DSFENGE

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BIBUO 1 1 1 .-QLE N A 1 pN Al£

.■-i"

MODERN THOUGHT.

IN REPLY TO A RECENT PAMPHLET, BY THE
BISHOP OF ONTARIO, ON

"AGNOSTICISM."

I
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W. 1). IE SUEUli, B.A.

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HUNTER, ROSE & COxMPANY.

L-. 1884.

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■5 ••

A DEFENCE

MODERN THODGPIT.

The Bishop of Oatario has been moved, like many another
Bishop, to bear his testimony against an evil which, it is stated,
is niakinj^ serious ravages in the Christian world — an evil
which goes by many names, but which his Lordship finds it
most convenient to deal with under the name of Agnosticism.
His views on this important subject were first delivered orally
to the Synod of the Diocese of Ontario, and were subsequently,
at the request of that body, given to the world in pamphlet
form. We have therefore before us one more recognition of
the fact that the ancient doctrines are becoming harder and
harder for modern men to believe. The opposition to tliem,
the Bishop of Ontario informs us, is no longer confined to pro-
fessedly " rationalistic writings, but is manifest in conversa-
tion, magazines and newspapers." " It has crept," he adds,
*' into our churches ; and heads of families, who are churchgoers
and outwardly believers, are at heart Agnostics." This is very
true, and should always be borne in mind when attempts are
made to estimate the strength of the churches on the basis of
their nominal adherents. A man who is outwardly an '• agnos-
tic" may be relied on to be one in reality ; but an outward pro-
fession of orthodoxy calls for confirmation, a Bishop being the
witness.

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

(Seeing that the Church is tlius face to face with a movement
of the most hostile kind, it would certainly seem desirable that
in calling attention to the fact some distinct attempt should be
made to determine the probable limits of the movement — to
show how far it can proceed and where it must stop. For men
may reasonably ask, " How do we know that this falling away
from the faith, as you call it, is not in reality the rise of a new
fiiiLh destined to overspread the world "i You say that the old
doctrines are ceasing to be believed by many : how do wc
know that a hundred years hence they will be believed by
any ? If the doctrine of Evolution can so shake the founda-
tions of orthodoxy, what may not be expected from some
further, and possibly still more important, scientific construc-
tion ? " It would be easy to answer these questions by simply
quoting certain alleged Divine guarantees of the permanence
of the Church ; but such an answer would not be to the purpose
in what claims to be a philosophic discussion. What, after
all, is the Church 1 Surely it consists of its members, and if
one member may be lost to it why not one thousand 1 If one
thousand, why not one million, or one hundred millions ? All
must be held to be alike in the Divine eye ; that is to say, of
equal interest and value. The Church is really overthrown
every time it loses a member — as much overthrown, so far as
that member is concerned, as if all his fellow-believers had fal-
len away with him. We only have to conceive the operation
that takes place in the individual case multiplied a certain
number of times, and, lo ! there is no Church. Of course, as
already observed, it is possible to rely on a promise given that
this result will never befall ; but an enquirer of anything like
a scientific turn of mind would like to have the matter other-
wise and more satisfactorily explained to him,

J ■

-— 'W W ii M llpi*

A DEFENCE OF MODERN TttOUGlIT. 3

From tlie point of view of the present writer, there are good
reasons for believing that a general readjustment of thought
is now in progress, and that it is destined to go on until old
forms of belief, inconsistent with a rational interpretation of
the world, have been completely overthrown. This progres-
sive readjustment is not a thing of yesterday ; it is simply that
gradual abandonment of the theological standpoint which has
been taking place throughout the ages. As a modern philoso-
pher has remarked, the very conception of miracle marks the
beginnings of rationalism, seeing that it recognises an estab-
lished order of things, a certain " reign of law," with which
only supernatural power can interfere. The progress beyond
this point consists in an increasing perception of the universality
of law, and an increasing disposition to be exacting as to the
evidences of miracle. No candid person can read the his-
tory of modern times without arriving at the conclusion that
the whole march of civilization illustrates, above everything
else, this gradual change of intellectual standpoint. Man's
power keeps pace ever with his knowledge of natural law, and
his recognition of the uniformity of its operations. What we
see to-day is simply the anticipation by thousands of the con-
clusion to which all past discoveries and observations have
been pointing, that the reign of law is and always has been
absolute. This is really what " agnosticism " so called means.
It means that thinking men are tired of the inconsistencies of
the old system of belief, and that they desire to rest in an order
of conceptions not liable to disturbance. The great Faraday,
who had not brought himself to this point, used to say that
when he had to deal with questions of faith he left all scien-
tific and other human reasonings at the door, and that when
he had to deal with questions of science he discarded in like

A DEFENCE i)V MODEUN THOUGHT.

The legion of

manner all theological modes of thought,
science was one region, tliat of faith was another ; and be-
tween these he [)laced a wall so high that once on either side
he could see nothing that lay on the other, lie did not at«
tempt to reconcile faith with science as some do; he separated
them utterly, feeling them apparently to be irreconcilable.
Thus he virtually lived in two worlds — one in which no mira-
cles took place, but in which everything Howed in an orderly
manner from recognised antecedents, and another in which the
chain of causation might be broken at any moment by super-
natural power. Since Faraday's time, however, men of science
have grown bolder. They have renounced the attempt to live
a divided life. They do not believe in insuperable barriers
between one field of thought and another. They believe in
the unity of the human mind and in the unity of truth. They
have made their choice — those of them at least whom the
Bishop of Ontario designates as agnostics — in favour of a world
in which cause and etlect maintain constant relations. In doing
so they do not act wilfully, but simply yield to the irre-
sistible weight of evidence. Miracle is a matter of more or
less uncertain testimony, while the unchangeableness of natural
law is a matter of daily observation. Miracles never happen
in the laboratory. Supernatural apparitions do not haunt the
museum. Distant ages and countries or lonely road-sides reap
all the glory of these manifestations. What wonder then that
the man of science prefers to trust in what his eyes daily see
and his hands handle, rather than in narratives of perfervid
devotees or in traditions handed down from centuries whose
leading characteristic was an omnivorous credulity. There is
nothing negative in this attitude of mind. On the contrary, it
is positive in the highest degree. The true man of science

A DKFKNCK OF :\10DERX TTrormiT. 5

wants to know and believe as mnch as possible. lie desires
to know what is and to adapt his thon;2;hts to that ; and the
nni verse is to him simply an inexhaustible treasure-house of
truths, all of more or less practical import.

It is right, however, before proceeding further, to examine
this word " agnosticism" a little, to see whether it is one that
is really serviceable in the present controversy. That some
have been willing to apply the term to themselves and to re-
gard it as rather hen trovato, 1 am quite aware ; but I think
there are good reasons why serious thinkers should decline to
call themselves by such a name and should objoct to its appli-
cation to them by others.

A question proposed for discussion either can or cannot be
settled ; it either lies within or beycmd the region in which
verification is possible. If it lies within that region, no mail
should call himself an agnostic in regard to it. He may with-
hold his judgment until the evidence is complete, but suspen-
sion of judgment is not agnosticism which, if it means anything,
means a profession of hopeless and, so to speak, invincible
ignorance in regard to certain matters. But if it wouhl be ab-
surd for a man to profess himself an agnostic in regard to pro-
blems admitting or believed to admit of solution, is it not idle
for any one to accept that desiignation because he believes that
there are other problems or propositions which do not admit of
solution 1 All one has to do in relation to the latter class of pro-
blems is to recognise their unreal or purely verbal character.
It is the nature of the problem that requires to be character-
ized, not our mental relation thereto. The latter follows as a
matter of course from the former. Moreover, why should any-
one wish or consent to be designated by a term purely negative
in its meaning 1 It is what we know, not what we do not

( I

A DKFKNCE OF MODEHN THOUGHT.

know that should furnish us with a name, if it is necessary to
have one. The little that a man knows is of vastly more con-
sequence to him than all the untrodden continents of his ig-
norance. The chemist calls himself so because he professes to
have a knowledge of chemistry : he does not invent for himself
a name signifying his ignorance of political economy or meta-
physics. AVliy then should any man adopt a name which de-
fines his relatioji not to things that he knows or to questions to
which he attributes a character of reality, but to things that he
does not know and to questions which, so fiir as he can see, have
no character of reality ? Let others give him such a name if
they will, but let no man voluntarily tie himself to a negation.
There are some, as I believe, who have adopted the appella-
tion of agnostic thoughtlessly ; some through indolence, as ap-
pearing to exempt them from the necessity of a decision in
regard to certain difficult and, in a social sense, critical ques-
tions ; and some possibly for the reason hinted at by the Bishop
of Ontario, namely, lack of the courage necesnary to take up a
more decided position. Whatever the motive may be, how-
ever, I am persuaded that the term is a poor one for purposes
of definition ; and I should advise all earnest men, who think
more of their beliefs than of their disbeliefs, to disown it so far
as they themselves are concerned. If it be asked by what ap-
pellation those who do not believe in '' revealed relision"
are to be known, I should answer that it is not their duty to
coin for themselves any sectarian title. They are in no sense
a sect. They believe themselves to be on the high road of na-
tural truth. It is they who have cast aside all limited and
partial views, and who are opening their minds to the full
teaching of the universe. Let their opponents coin names if
they will : they whom the truth has made free feel that their
creed is too wide for limitation.

A DKFENCE OF MOOEIIN TIIOUiJlIT.

, >»

Tlio I'ishop of Ontario stands forth in the pamphlnt before
U8 simply as the champion of the two great doctrines of God
and Immortality. In reality, however, he is the champion of
rauch more, for ho does not profess that these doctrines can
stand by themselves apart from a belief in revelation. The
issue between the Bishop and those whom he styles agnostics
is not really as to these two abstract doctrines, bnt as to the
validity of the whole miraculous system of which liis Lordship
is a responsible exponent. If we can imagine a person simply
holding, as the result of his own individual reasonings or other
mental experiences, a belief in God as a spiritual existence
animating and presiding over the works of nature, and a further
belief in a future existence for the human soul, I do not see that
there would necessarily be any conflict between him and the
most advanced representatives of modern thought. No, the
trouble does not begin here. The trouble arises when these
beliefs are presented as part and parcel of a supernatural sys-
tem miraculously revealed to mankind, and embracing details
which bring it plainly into conflict with the known facts and
laws of nature. To detach these two doctrines therefore from
the system to which they belong, and put them forward as if
the whole stress of modern philosophical criticism was di-
rected against them in particular, is a controversial artifice of a
rather unfair kind.

We are reminded by the right reverend author that no chain
is stronger than its weakest link, and we are asked to apply
the principle to the doctrine of Evolution, some of the links of
which his Lordship ha3 tested and found unable to bear the
proper strain. The principle is undoubtedly a sound one ;
but has it occurred to his Lordship that it is no less applicable
to the net-work of doctrine in which he believes than to the

A deffi:nce of modern tttought.

■ I

» t

doctrine of Evolution ? Some links of that net-work arc snap-
ping every day under no greater strain than the simple exercise-
of common sense by ordinary men. It is a beautiful and well-
chosen position that his Lordship takes up as champion of the-
doctrines of God and Immortality against " agnostic " science ;.
but it would have argued greater courage had the banner been
planted on the miraculous narratives of the Old and New Tes-
tament. A gallant defence of the Scriptural account of the
taking of Jericho, of the arresting for a somewhat sanguinary
purpose of the earth's rotation, of the swallowing of Jonah by
a whale, and his restoration to light and liberty after three days
and ni<jhts of close and very disagreeable confinement, of the
comfortable time enjoyed by Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego
in the fiery furnace, of the feeding of five thousand men with
five loaves and two fishes and the gathering up of twelve bas-
ketsful of the fragments — a gallant defence, I say, of these
things would be very much more in order ; for these are the
links tliat criticism has attacked and which the common judg-
ment of the nineteenth century is daily invalidating. Modern
philosophy in its negative aspect is simply a revolt against the
attem])t to force such narratives as these upon the adult intelli-
gence of mankind — against the absurdity of assigning to
Hebrew legends of the most monstrous kind a character of
credibility which would be scornfully refused to similar pro-
ductions of the imagination of any other race. Let there then
be no misunderstanding : science is not concerned to prove that
there is no God, nor even that a future life is an impossibility ;
it simply obeys an instinct of self-preservation in seeking to
repel modes of thought and belief which, in their ultimate
issues, are destructive of all science.

One has only to reflect for a moment, in order to see how
much theological baggage the orthodox disputant throws away,

<ti

i ^

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

rcise-

the-
ice;
een.

es-
he

'* y

when he confines his arfi;unients to the two points of God and
a Future Life. Were it tlirown away in sincerity argument
might cease ; but no, the manoeuvre is first to make a formid-
able demonstration as champion of two cardinal doctrines
which in themselves arouse little opposition, even where they
do not commend assent, and then to apply the results of the
proceeding to the benefit of those parts of the system wliich
had been kept in the background. It is not in the interest of
a sim.ple theistic belief, unconnected with any scheme of theo-
logy, that the Bishop of Ontario writes : vvhat he has at heart,
I venture to say, is that men may believe as he does. The
theism of Francis Newman, or of Victor Hugo, or Mazzini —
all convinced theists — would be very unsatisfactory in his eyes,
and it may be doubted whether he would take up his pen for
the purpose of promoting theism of this type. It should there-
fore be thoroughly understood that while his Lordship is pro-
fessedly combating agnosticism, he is really waging war on
behalf of that elaborate theological system of which he is an
exponent — that system which bids us look to the Bible for an
account of the creation of the world and of man; and which
requires us to believe that the Creator found it necessary in
former times, for the right government of the world, to be
continually breaking through the laws of physical succession
which he himself had established. In arguing against the doc-
trine of Evolution, he labors to establish the opposite doctrine
of the creation and government of the world bf/ miracle.

The question therefore is : — Can science be free and yet ac-
commodate itself to the whole elaborate scheme of Christian
orthodoxy ? The great majority of those who are most enti-
tled to speak on behalf of science say No : and it is this nega-
tive which his Lordship of Ontario converts into q, denial of the

i-o

A Om-NCE OP MODEB^. THOUGHT.

t«'o doctrines above-mentioned. But let .. ' [
familiar with the course of «,..! 1 "'" "'''<' ^^^ at all

y -call in ehe wri^ oTl?/'"^'" ^^"^ ">--- if
Jay arguments specially diree ed" J f ? ''""'"•'"'«'' "^ ">«
--en against that oL polSr '^''"'''"'^ »'■ ^od
h"»anity. What every one c ' It " °'''' "' ''"^'^""^ ''«'
:"'e.yvho are called'.. agnoTti ."r 7"'" '' '''^' "-
^3'ndalls, and Darwins plead fl! tV '''"'=•'''' Huxleys,

'-^ and the abiding '„n'f: n," * ^^--lity of nature's
-'•at they are concerned to T^^ ' 'T P^~^^^«^- That is
'•l^.'^" -ience depends Sere S?' '""-^ '' -Pon that

'''f ''imposed to disturb any one- ,r;" ^"^"^ "« "^-^
«» '0"g as these doctrines are no/ ""^ "' ''""'"■'^"'y.

-ard as involving others ^h^ ealir ""?' "'*' '' P"' <•-
ence and tend to cast uncerU „tv "^ '"^'''^ *^ ''"'^'^ "f ^ci-
. I« -ekingtoaccount or ..he'";'' "^''"'^^'""1 -«•''•
;-V' the Bishop finds that it i to "t™ 'T' "' ^=""-«-
'^"^y of the theory of Evolution IJ ""''^ ^P^^^^ P°P»-
al>sm," that the phenomenoT?\"^ '' " '^"'^^ *<> "^ateri-
,«>^ theory of Evolution Lusl 17: '"''T'"' ^""-^"-"^
'- gone forth, and the en ieo , kT'' '''*' ^P'^'^^P^' ^^icl
""! 'ater Carthage of infid J'^^ f 7: ^ ^-^ against
ently appear that the right Sere d . ' " "^"'^ "»' «"«»'•
;^-tands either the natu o the ta ^Tl' "' "^^ ^'^=- -
' - significance which would attach '^ '""'"'^'^«» <»•

"• . To take the latter poiit: '" "'='=^^^ -"^ »« achieve
^ap.d progress before the evolu '' IT""" ^"^ "^'''"S -^^
-de popularity, before „ act I ' '''' ^"^"'-^ »'
«'de of one or two speculative t . '° "'^^ known of it out-

of m.racle.working power w! f,'' ""^ ^*'"' "'« theatre

P was well-marked. Twenty-two

II »

^ *

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

at all
vea if

fthe
God
e for
the

ire's

years ago, when " The Origin of Species " was but two years
old, and had still a great deal of opposition to encounter even
from men of science, before even the term Evolution had any
currency in the special sense it now bears, a leading prelate of
the Church of England, Bishop Wilberforce, discerned a scep-
tical movement " too wide-spread and connecting itself with
far too general conditions " to be explained otherwise than as
" the first stealing over the sky of the lurid lights which shall
be shed profusely around the great Antichrist." * To charge
the present intellectual state of the world therefore on the doc-
trine of Evolution is to ignore that general movement of
thought which, before the idea of evolution was a factor of any
importance in modern speculation, had already, as the Bishop
of Oxford testified, carried thousands away from their old theo-
logical habitations, and which, with or without the theory of
evolution, was quite adapted to produce the state of things which
we see to-day in the intellectual world.

The doctrine of evolution is simply the form in which the
dominant scientific thought of the day is cast. As a working
hypothesis it presents very great advantages ; and the thinkers
of to-day would find it hard to dispense with the aid it affords.
But supposing it could be shown that the doctrine, as at pre-
sent conceived, was untenable — what then > Would men of
science at once abandon their belief in the invariability of na-
tural law and fly back to mediaeval superstitions 1 By no
means. If there is any class of men who have learnt the les-
son that the spider taught to Bruce, it is the class of scientific
workers. Destroy one of their constructions and they set to
work again, with unconquerable industry, to build another.
In fact they are always testing and trying their own construc-

*Vide Preface to " Kepliea to Essays and Keviewa,"

/ *.

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT

tions ; and we may be sure that if the evohition theory is ever
to be swept away it will be by scientific not theological hands.
It holds its ground now, because it is a help to thought and
investigation ; if it should ever become so beset with difficul-
ties as to be no longer serviceable it will be withdrawn from
use, as many a theory has been before it, and as many a one
will be in the days to come. Amongst contemporary men of
science there is probably none who believes more strongly in
tiie doctrine in question than the Editor of the Popular Science
Monthh/, Prof. E. L. Youmans ; yet in a recent number of his
mai-azine he has marked his attitude towards it in a manner
which for our present purpose is very instructive. " It is un-
deniable," he writes, " that the difficulties in the way of the
doctrine of evolution are many and formidable, and it will no
doubt take a long time to clear them up ; while the solution
of still unresolved problems will very possibly result in im-
portant modifications of the theory as now entertaii>ed. But
the establishment of the doctrine of evolution, as a comprehen-
sive law of nature, is no longer dependent upon its freedom
from embarrassments, or that absolute completeness of proof
which will only become possible with the future extension of
knowledge. Notwithstanding these drawbacks the evidence
for it is so varied, so consistent, and so irresistible, as to com-
pel its broad acceptance by men of science, who, while disa-
greeing upon many of its questions, find it indispensable as a
guide to the most multifarious investigations."

We come now to the further question of the validity of the
criticisms directed in the pamphlet before us against the doc-
trine of evolution, in discussing which the competency of the
critic for h' f imposed task will necessarily come more or
Jess under w^iisideration, Let us first notice the quQt^tiqnss

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THDUGIIT.

which his Lordship brings forward, rem3mbering that the
doctrine of evolution in its present shape may be said to be
the work of the last twenty years. Well, his Lordsliip quotes
three leading scientific authors, Owen, Agasi^iz and Lyell ; but
it is noticeable that, in no case, does he give the date of his
quotation, and in the case of the first two does not even mention
the work in which the passage he refers to is to be found. The
quotations are intended to show that these eminent authors re-
jected the doctrine of the "origin of species by natural selection."
As regards Agassiz, who died ten years ago, every one knows that
this was the case ; and most are also aware that the great Swiss
naturalist left behind him a son, a naturalist almost equally
great, who supports the Darwinian theory as strongly as his
father opposed it. Owen, though not a Darwinian in the full
sense, held views which were clearly in the direction of natural
selection. It is, however, when we come to Lyell that we have
cause for ast' .nent. Here we have the most eminent of
English geologists, whose adhesion to the Darwinian theory,
announced for the first time in 1863 — the date of the publica-
tion of the first edition of his ''Antiquity of Man" — created
such a sensation in the scientific world, quoted, at this time of
day, as an anti-Darwinian ! What are we to think of this ] I
cannot and do not believe, nor would I wish to suggest, that the
Right Reverend the Bishop of Ontario was carried so far in his
zeal against evolution as deliberately to misrepresent Sir Charles
Lyell's attitude towards that doctrine. The only other hy-
pothesis, however, is that of extreme ignorance. Of this his
Lordship must stand, not only accused, but convicted. The
fact of Sir Charles Lyell's conversion to the views of D irwin
on the origin of species was one of which the whole reading
world took note at the time, and which has been known to

A DEFENCE OB^ MODERN THOUGHT.

every tyro in general science from that day to this. His Lord-
ship, quoting from the " Principles of Geology," but without
any mention of edition, represents Sir Charles as holding
" that species have a real existence in nature, and that each
was endowed at the time of its creation with the attributes and
organization by which it is now distinguished." That these
were Sir Charles Lyell's views when the earlier editions of his
Principles were published everyone is aware ; but it is a most
extraordinary thing that anyone should have quoted them as
his full twenty years after he had distinctly abandoned them.
The preface to the fourth edition of the " Antiquity of Man "
opens as follows : — " The first edition of the " Antiquity of
Man " was published in 18G3, and was the firat work in which
I expressed my opinion of the prehistoric age of man, and also
my belief in Mr. Darwin's theory of the ' Origin of Species ' as
the best explanation yet offered of the connection between
man and those animals which have flourished successively on
the earth." In the 10th edition of his " Principles," published
in 18G8 he says (page 41)2) that " Mr. Darwin, without abso-
lutely proving this (theory), has made it appear in the highest
degree probable, by an appeal to many distinct and indepen-
dent classes of phenomena in natural history and geology."
Darwin himself would not have claimed more for his theory
than this. Professor Huxley would not claim more for it to-
day. Enough for either of them the admission that, by argu-
ments drawn from many quarters, it had been rendered " in
the highest degree probable." In his " Antiquity of Man,"*
Sir Charles Lyell expressly acknowledges the inconclusiveuess
of the arguments he had used at an earlier date to prove that
" species were primordial creations and not derivative." His

* See 4th edition, page 4G9.

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGH r.

•SI

reasonings, he frankly confesses, could not hold their ground
'* in the light of the facts and arguments adduced by Darwin
and Hooker." As regards the " descent of man," after quoting
a passage from Darwin to the effect that " man is the co-de-
scendant with other mammals of a common progenitor," he
observes that " we certainly cannot escape from such a conclu-
sion without abandoning many of the weightiest arguments
which have been urged in support of variation and natural
selection considered as the subordinate causes by which new
types have been gradually introduced into the world." On every
point, therefore, the real views of Sir Charles Lyell, as formed
in the light of the facts adduced by Darwin and of his own
maturer reasonings, were totally opposed to those quoted in the
Bishop's pamphlet. Is it not remarkable, such being the case,
that not one member of the reverend and learned clergy of the
Diocese of Kingston, by whose special request this document was
given to the world, should have suggested a correction on this
point 1 Was there not a lay delegate who could have done
it; or were they all — Bishop, clergy, and laymen — equally in
the dark 1 It would really seem so. Who can wonder that
the doctrine of evolution does not make much progress in cer-
tain quarters 1

Sir Charles Lyell unfortunately is not the only author mis-
represented. Huxley is said to " discredit" the origin of life
from non-living matter. Huxley does nothing of the kind ;
he simply says that the experiments heretofore made to show
that life can be so developed have not been successful. On
the page of the pamphlet immediately preceding that on which
this statement is made in regard to Huxley, we are informed,
correctly, that the same great naturalist professes " a philoso-
phic faith in the probability of spontaneous generation."

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

Surely his Lorilship couUl not have understood the force of
these words, or he would not have said, almost immediately
after, that " the origin of life on earth * * * is not only
discredited* by Huxley but by many other great scientists."
A writer who finds such comparatively simple language beyond
his comprehension is not, one would judge, very well fitted to
enter the lists against the leading thinkers of the day, except
perhaps for strictly diocesan purposes.

That his Lordship is really hopelessly at sea in discussing
this question is evident by many signs. Such sentences as the
following speak volumes for the mental confusion of their
author : " Agnosticism takes refuge in Evolution in order to
get rid of the idea of God as unthinkable and unknowable."
Here again inaccuracies of language. An idea may be un-
thinkable in the sense of not admitting of being thought out,
but can an idea be said to be '' unknowable ] " What is an
unknowable idea ] An idea must be known in order to be an
idea at all. But this mere verbal inaccuracy is not the worst.
We had been told that Agnosticism was a form of opinion ac-
cording to which nothing could be known of God. Now it
seems that Agnosticism has to fall back on Evolution, " in
order to get rid of the idea of God as unthinkable and unknow-
able." Now the so called Agnosticism could not have been
agnosticism in reality, otherwise it would not have required
the help of evolution in such a matter. If we ask how Evo-
tion helps Agnosticism to regard " the idea of God as unthink-
able and unknowable," we shall only find the confusion grow-

* His Lordship means "discredited not only by Huxley, but by &c."
The inaccuracy of expression observable here is paralleled in many other
passages of the pamphlet. For example, his Lordship says, page 5 : *' They
are not content to speak for themselves, but for all the world besides." A
Bishop should write better English than this.

)}

&c."
ther
^hey
A

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

ing worse coJifoundeJ. Evolution has nothing to do with such
questions : it is a simple theory as to the mode of generation
and order of succession of different forms of existences.

It is, however, when his Lordship comes to discuss the doc-
trine of the survival of the fittest that his sad want of ac-
quaintance with the whole subject shows itself most conspicu-
ously. Let me quote : "By some means or other ' the sur-
vival of the fittest in the struggle for existence' is assumed to
be a law of nature, and if it be so our faith is severely taxed.
Survival of the fittest — fittest for what 1 If the ansvrer be,
fittest for surviving, we argue in a circle, and get no informa-
tion whatever. The only rational answer must be, they sur-
vive who are fittest for their environments in size, strength
and vigour." Let me here ask what sense the learned author
can possibly attach to these last words except the very one he
had just discarded as meaningless — *• fitness to survive." How
is fitness to environment proved except by the actual fact of
survival? Do environments always require "size" as an ele-
ment of fitness ] By no means, they sometimes require small-
ness. When a mouse escapes into a hole, where the cat can-
not follow, it survives not by reason of its size, but by reason
of its smallness. Strength again is one element of adaptation
to environment, but only one; and it may fall far below some
other element, swiftness, for example, or cunning, in practical
importance. The fact however that the learned author sees
no meaning in the answer " fitness to survive," tells the whole
story of his own unfitness for the special environment in which
he has placed himself in attempting to discuss the doctrine of
evolution, and rather tends to create doubt as to the survival
of the work he has given to the world. This is a matter in
which no aptitude in quoting Horace is of any avail. The
'2,

A DEFENCE OF MODERN TIIOUCJIIT.

road to an understanding of the terms and conception ^ of mo-
dern science liea in a careful study at tirst hand of the; works
in which these terms and conceptions are ex[)()undeii. His
Lordship assumes that, if we say that those survive who are fit
to survive, we utter a barren truism. It is a truism we may
grant, but not a barren one, any more than the axioms of
geometry are barren. The simple word " fitness" implies a
definite external something, adaptation to which is the price
of existence. The definiteness of the mould involves the defi-
niteness of that which is moulded ; and all the miracles of life
and organization we see around us are in the last resort
merely examples of adaptation to fixed conditions of existence.
" Born into life we are," says Matthew Arnold, " and life must
be our mould." By "life" understand the universe and we
have a poetical version of the doctrine of the survival of the
fittest. It so happens, and this is a further truth which it
would not be well to pass over, that adaptation does more or
less imply excellence even from the human standpoint. All
those adaptations that favour human life and happiness we of
course call excellent, even though they may not be favourable
to the life and ha})piness of other living creatures. And as
man has thriven mightily and prevailed, adaptation in (jeneral
presents itself to him in a favourable light. Occasionally, when
his crops are destroyed by some insect pest wonderfully adapted
for its work, or when his cattle are infested with deadly para-
sites, or when Kome germ of disease is multiplying a million-
fold in his own frame, he sees that all adaptations are not
yoked to his especial service.

His Lordship seems to suppose that the believers in the
doctrine of the survival of the fittest are bound to show that
there has been a steady improvement of type from the first

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

dawn of life. To show how gross and inexcusable a misunder-
standing tliis is, I need only quote two sentences from Sir Charles
Lyell's " Antiquity of Man " : — " One of the principal claims,"
observes the great geologist, " of Mr. Darwin's theory to ac-
ceptance is that it enables us to dispense with a laio oj progression
as a necessary accompaniment of variation. It will account
equally well for what is called degradation or a retrogade
movement towards a simpler structure, and does not require
Lamarck's continual creation of monads ; for this was a neces-
sary part of his system in order to explain how, after the pro-
gressive pow^er had been at work for myriads of ages, there
were as many beings of the simplest structure in existence as

ever.

"•X-

Writing thus in ignorance of what the law of the survival
of the fittest, as formulated by Darwin, and accepted by
modern men of science, really means, his Lordship is able to
ask such pointless questions as whether the law is illustrated
in the slaughtering of the flower of a nation in war, and whether
it is the fittest who survive famines, pestilences, shipwrecks,
&c. His Lordship evidently does not himself believe there is
any provision for the survival of the fittest in the Providen-
tial government of the world ; yet, strange to say, he taunts
evolutionists with this lack in the general scheme of things.
If it be an embarrassment to their theory how much more
should it be to the Bishop's theology ? The evolutionist might,
however, turn round and instruct the divine out of his own
pocket Bible, where it is expressly stated that the wicked
shall not live out half his days ; and then out of the newspa-
pers which continually show us what happens to the violent
and bloody man, to the intemperate and to various other

* Fourth edition, 4th jjage 45'J.

A DEFENCE OF MUDEllN THOUGHT.

classes of evil doers. The evolution philosophy does not guar-
antee, .IS has been already hhown, continuous progress in what,
from the human standpoint, may seem the best directions ;
but evolutionists are able to note, and do note with satisfaction,
that the qualities which the moral sense of mankind most
ai)proves do in point of fact tend to the survival of their pos-
sessors. War itself illustrates the principle ; seeing that the
most important element of strength abroad is cohesion at home,
a condition which must depend on a rehitively high develop-
ment of social justice. To take an example from our own his-
tory : Eng'ish arms would not have been so successful as they
have been abroad, had there not been an united country be-
hind them. It was the virtues, not the vices, of the Roman
people that enabled them to conquer the world. It was their
vices not their virtues that led to their fall. Fitness to sur-
vive is a quality the import of which varies according to cir-
cumstances. In shipwrecks (to pursue his Lordship's illustra-
tions) the fit to survive are those who can swim, or who have
readiness of resource or strength of constitution. In famines
and pestilences the physically stronger will as a rule survive ;
though here prudence and self-control become also most impor-
tant elements of safety. Let it always be remembered that the
problem with which evolutionary philosophy has to grapple is
not how to account for a perfect world, or a perfect state of
society, but how to account for just such a mingling of good
and evil (accompanied by general tendencies towards good)
as we actually witness. This once settled, most of the objec-
tions of the theologians would be seen to fall wide of the mark.
To persons unfamiliar, or but slightly familiar, with the present
subject, it is possible that the Bishop of Ontario may appear to
have touched a weak point in the doctrine under discussion where

A DKFKNCE OF MoPKUN TIlol'CHT.

Ic-

Iv.
lit

lie aays ; — " Laws of nattiro sIiou'kI bo {»l)nyi'(l iind co-operatnl
witli, not fought against and thwarted ; and, if th«^ survival of
the fittest bo one of those laws, we ought to abolish all hospitals
and asylums for the blind, the deaf, the drunkard, the idiot and
the lunatic, and we ought to expose to death all sickly, puny
and superfluous infants." A word therefore in regard to this
objection may not be thrown away. The first observation
to make is, that there is nothing wliatever in the law
of the survival of the fittest, as understood by men of sci-
ence to-(lay, which could possibly be converted into a rule
of conduct. Tiie scientific world is not aware that nature
has any ends in view, or is capable of having any ends in
view, which she needs the help of man to enable her to realize.
Science does not attribute purpose to nature. Science has
simply obtained a glimmering of how, in point of fact, na-
ture works. It sees that survival is a question of fitness, in
other words a question of the fulfilment of the conditions on
which continued existence depends. In some cases, as is well
known, superiority of type becomes an impediment, not a
help, to the preservation of life ; and in a vast number of
cases the differentiations on which survival depends imply
neither progress nor retrogression.* What moral guid-
ance, therefore, can possibly be found in a simple percep-
tion of the fact that in the realm of nature there are conditions
attached to survival ? We imay ask, in the next pliice,
whether there is any single law of nature which men " obey,"
or ever have obeyed, in the sense in which his Lordship bids us
obey the law of the survival of the fittest. When a conflagra-
tion rages, do we "obey" and " co-operate" with nature by

Vide Spencer, '* Principles of Socioloi^'y," Vol. I. pp. 100-7, and
Haeckel, " History of Creation," Vol. I. p. 28.5.

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

i !il

adding fuel to the flames 1 When pestilence is abroad, do we
try to increase its deadly activity 1 When we stumble, do
we make a point of yielding to the law of gravitation and
throwing ourselves headlong ] When the winter winds are
howling, do we throw open doors and windows that we may
feel all the force and bitterness of the blast ? Or do we, in
these and all other cases, seek to modify the action of one law
by that of another — a process his Lordship calls " thwarting" —
in order that their combined or balanced action may yield u^
as nearly as possible, the results we desire. We throw water
on the fire. We use disinfectants and prophylactics against the
plague. We set muscular force against that of gravitation.
We oppose warmth to cold. In none of these cases do we ask
what nature wants ; we are content to know what tve want.
We don't really believe that nature wants anything ; so we
have no hesitation or compunction in letting our wants rule.
In the matter of the weak and sickly, they might perish if un-
conscious forces alone were at work, or even in certain condi-
tions of human society ; but it does not suit our interests, for
very obvious reasons, to let them perish. To do so would
strike at all human affections, and would so far weaken the
bonds of society and render the whole social fabric less se-
cure. Moreover a sick man is very different from a sick animal.
The latter is inevitably inferior as an animal, whereas the for-
mer may not only not be inferior, but may be superior as a
man, and capable of rendering much service to society. Two
instances occur to me as I write — that of the late Professor
Cairnes in England, and of the late Professor Ernest Bersot in
France, both smitten with cruel and hopeless maladies, but
both fulfilling, in an eminent degree, the highest intellectual
and moral offices of men. What the well do for the sick is of

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGUT.

Lhe

course obvious and attracts suflG.cient attention ; but what the
sick do for the well, not being so obvious, attracts less atten-
tion than it deserves. Yet how many lessons of patience, for-
titude, and resignation — lessons that all require— come to us
from the sick bed, or at least from those whom weakness of
constitution or perhaps some unhappy accident has robbed of a
normal activity and health. At times we see superiority of
intellectual and moral endowment triumphing over the most
serious physical disabilities ; as in the case of the present Post-
master-General of England, who accidentally lost his sight
when quite a youth. The late M. Louis Blanc, a man of
splendid talents, never advanced beyond the stature of a child.
The ancient Spartans might have exposed one of so feeble a
frame on Taygetus ; for with them every man had to be a sol-
dier ; but, in modern life, with its greatly diversified interests,
many a man too weak to be a soldier can yet render splendid
service to the community. It will, therefore, I trust, be suf-
ficiently obvious, first, that nature has no commands to give
us in this matter ; and secondly, that there are excellent rea-
sons why we should not treat the sick and weakly, as the
lower animals commonly, but not universally, treat the sick
and weakly of their own kind. *

There is, however, another view of this question which
should not be overlooked. While human beings in civilized
countries manifest, and always have manifested, more or less
sympathy with the physically afflicted, their steadfast aim
has been to get rid of physical evil in all its forms. No care
that is taken of the sick has for its object the perpetuation of
sickness, but rather its extirpation. We do not put idiots to
death ; but when an idiot dies there is a general feeling of re-

* See Romanes, ** Animal Intelligence," pp. 471, 475, as to the sympathy
exhibited by the monkey tribe towards their sick.

A DEFENCE OF MODFT^N TITOTTOTIT.

k'li

IJI

lief tliat so imperfect an existence has come to an end. Were
idiots permitted to marry, the sense of decency of the whole
community would be outraged. Public opinion blames those
who marry knowing that there is some serious taint in their
blood ; and commends on the other hand those who abstain
from, or defer, marriage on that account. There is probably
room for a furtlier development of sentiment in this direction.
We need to feel more strongly that all maladies and ailments
are in their nature preventible, inasmuch as they all flow from
definite physical antecedents. As long as our views on this
subject are tinged in the smallest degree with supernaturalism,
80 long will our efi*orts to track disease to its lair and breeding-
grounds be but half-hearted. How can we venture to check ab-
ruptly, or at all, the course of a sickness sent expressly for our
chastisement 1 Is it for us to say when the rod has been sufii.
ciently applied 1 How do we dare to fortify ourselves in ad-
vance against disease, as if to prevent the Almighty from deal-
ing with us according to our deserts 1 We vaccinate for small-
pox, we drain for malaria, we cleanse and purify for cholera, we
ventilate and disinfect, we diet and we exercise — and all for
what ? Precisely to avoid the paternal chastenings which we
have been taught are so good for us, and the origin of which
has always been attributed by faith to the Divine pleasure.
Evidently our views are undergoing a change. We all wish to
be fit to survive, and all more or less believe that it is in our
power to be so and to help others to be so. We believe in
sanitary science ; and, if we attribute any purpose in the mat-
ter to the Divine mind, it is that all men should come to the
knowledge of the truth, as revealed by a study of nature, and
live.

One might be tempted to bestow a word on the singular
opinion expressed by the right-reverend author that "some

e
d

A DEFENCE OF MOBERN THOUOnT.

t >

> '*

men are born colour-blind towards God.'' This perhaps we may
!say : that, as the Bishop does not believe in evolution, it be-
comes a very critical question on whom the responsibility for
the unhappy condition of these individuals lies. Are they the
predestined vessels of wrath of whom St. Paul speaks % There
are few, it seems to me, who would not be dis])osed to fly to
Evolution or even to Agnosticism as a refao:e from so dire a
doctrine.

It is time, however, that I should deal in a more direct and
independent manner with the question as to the moral and in-
tellectual status of those who reject the Bishop's theology.
One's own position is not made good by simply showing that
the particular criticisms directed against it by a particular ad-
versary are of no weight. The Bishop in this case may be all
wrong, but those whom he qualifies as agnostics may be all
wrong too. Are they right or are they wrong 1 — that is the
main question. In discussing this question I desire to speak
with the greatest frankness, knowing how pressing is the need
for sincere utterance, in order that the true thoughts of manv
hearts may be revealed. " Not every one who saith unto me
Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven." Not
every one who says that the old theology is false has entered
truly into intellectual or moral liberty. The division of men
into orthodox and heterodox is, after all, a very superficial di-
vision. It is possible, we are told, to ** hold the truth in un-
righteousness," and, if so, it is no doubt conversely possible to
hold error in righteousness. The best thing in the old theo-
logical system is the inspiration it affords, or has afforded, to-
wards right living ; and this again is the best fruit we can ex-
pect from the new beliefs. Only in so far as they yield this
fruit can they be depended on to supersede the old. The ag-

A DKFENCE OF MODERN TlIOUfJlIT.

nostic, as such, liaa, I freely grant, no particular inspiration
towards any line of conduct ; and this, if all other reasons were
wanting, is reason enough for not making profession of agnos-
ticism. Moral inspiration and guidance can only come from
realized knowledge, however moderate in amount; not from
the negation of knowledge on however magnificent a scale.
The question therefore is : Upon which resources can we depend
for the moral future of humanity if the creeds cease to be
believed 1

This question can perhaps best be answered by considering
what we should do if, in point of fact, it were demonstrated
beyond all possibility of doubt that the theological system of
Christendom had no better foundation than any of the theolo-
gies it has superseded. Let us try to imagine the situation
for a moment. The discourses of the clergy, the services of the
several churches, would (let us say) come to a stop, and there
would be a general feeling of amazement and uncertainty
amonurst the vast multitude of those who had held to the
creeds with entire confidence. But when people had had time
to talk the matter over, and to consider what it was best to
do under the circumstances, is it in the least likely that the
conclusion would be to abandon all attempts at a recognition
of moral obligation and to make selfish appetite their sole
guide 1 I do not in the least believe that any such decision
would be arrived at, any more than I believe that the decision
of a ship's crew cast upon a desert island would be that the best
thing to do would be to sit down passively and starve. No,
men would very speedily set about adapting themselves to
their new circumstances. Some would perhaps refuse their aid
or sympathy to any efforts made to establish a new order and
new moral sanctions ; yet none the less, I imagine, would these

^
t

# ,

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

individuals wish to profit by the labours of others in that direc-
tion. They might talk as they liked about the vanity of trying
to establish, or even recognise, any moral law in the absence of
a clear knowledge of the existence of God and of a law re-
vealed by Hirn : yet none the less would they crave justice from
their fellow men : none the less would they feel aggrieved if
that justice were denied. I imagine that, under the circum-
stances described, men would begin to betliink themselves how
the various situations of life call for duties to which the heart
of man instinctively responds. They would think at once of
the famil}!, that training-school of the affections, that sphere
which types to us what the constitution of society in general
may some day be. They would remember that, even in the
lower creation, the beginnings of family and social life are
seen ; that brute parents will sacrifice themselves for their off-
spring ; that when one of a pair is killed, the survivor will
show a sense of bereavement ; that to many animals com-
panionship with others, even not of their own species, is a
visible source of pleasure. These are not merely curious
facts ; they are facts of the most important significance for the
true understanding of human life ; for they show us how
deep the foundations of affection and therefore of morality
are laid. The theologies that have talked so much to us of
better worlds — that, as Matthew Arnold says, have "long fed(us)
on boundless hopes" — have caused us to ignore this world, and
the ample provision it makes for our moral life. For what is
society among the brutes to society among men ? There we see
but the rudiments, as it were, of those sentiments that in the life
of humanity are destined to reach the perfection of their devel-
opment, and which in some individuals of the human race, we
might almost say, have already reached that perfection. True,

T.>

A DEFENCE OP MODERN TTTOUOItT.

there are wars amongst men — and no more potent breeder of
wars than theology ever visited this earth — but wars are the
natural results of ignorance and as yet untamed individualism.
The starting-point of man was perfect ignorance and complete in-
dividualism. Let us never forget tha.t little by little he is learning
the true laws of life, learning to adapt himself to his environ-
ment, and to live a wider than a merely individual existence.
Shall we despair because everything is not done in a day? If it
takes a thousand years to bring some trees to maturity, how long
may we expect it to take to mould into perfect harmony all
the complex elements of human existence ? In the ties and
affections that grow out of family life, we see the force that
has worked, and yet is working, the elevation of our race ; we
see the leaven that yet will leaven the whole lump.

I say that, were the theological beliefs of society to be sud-
denly smitten, as with a blast, men would begin to think of
these things, and of all the noble words that have been spoken
and the nobler deeds that have been done with no help from
supra-mundane hopes or fears, but in the mere native strength
of humanity. There is a fine passage^ in the 6th volume of
Merivale's " History of the Romans under the Empire," where
the author pays a just tribute to the devotion and patriotism
of many of the generals of the Empire, though serving under
most unworthy masters and in an age of great corruption and
licence. " Human nature," the historian goes on to say, " like
running water, has a tendency to purify itself by action ; the
daily wa'its of life call forth corresponding duties, and duties
daily perforrrc T .ottlc into principles and ripen into graces." *

* Loc. cii;. i ee ^88. I low much nobler a view of human nature this gives
than thatWx.'«.U ts oi^dirurily presented in the pulpit! There is much of
wisdom packed in the simple Lucretian phrase : " constietudo concinnat
amorem." The distinct recognition by the ancients of duty as something

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

e
e

■ H

We need bub to open our eyes in order to see and feel what
treasures of moral force we have been trampling under our feet,
at the bidding of a theology that teaches us to regard this life
as a poor blighted thing, of value only as it may serve to pre-
pare us for another state of being. At present whatever of
good we discover in human nature we are told to attribute to
a higher source ; whatever is in us of evil we are to consider all
our own. Is it any wonder that, after the world has listened
to such teaching fur centuries, and to hardly any other, there
should exist grave doubts in men's minds as to whether the
natural conditions of human life furnish any basis for mor-
ality ? Kather is it matter for astonishment that there are
still a few found to-day who dare to raise their testimony for
poor depreciated human nature, who dare to trust it, who dare
to say that, without any knowledge or any distinct hope of a
life beyond, men might, on this earth, cultivate justice, love
mercy, and walk in the light of truth.

We have been considering what mankind would do if some
unexpected disproof of all their most cherished theological be-
iefs were suddenly presented ; and in doing so we have per-
haps succeeded in showing what are our grounds of hope for
the future of humanity. What men too aid do, under such
circumstances, is what it would be well if they would set
about doing now — namely, endeavouring to discover what are,
in the normal conditions of human life, the springs of right and
useful action. Let any one try to imagine what an enormous

springing out of the ordinary conditions of human life stands in admirable
contrast to much of the teaching of later Chiistian ages. Take for example
a very familiar passage oi Cicero : " Nulla eidm vitae pars ne<iue publicis
neque privatis, neque forensibus, neciue domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum
agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest ; in eotiue
colendo sita vitae est honciitas omnis, et in negligeudo turpitudo." De
Officiis, Lib. I., Cap. 2.

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

y- II

15 J
I I!

difference it would make in all our thoughts if, instead of lis-
tening continually to a teaching which represents huraan nature
as fallen, and the earth as curst, and which justifies the most
contemptuous disparagement of mere human goodness, we were
with (.(jual regularity instructed by grave men who had pa-
tiently studied the nrtural order of things until it had become
luminous to their minds with lessons of the highest import to
mankind, men who, while cognizant of the weakness of human
nature, yet knew and reverenced its strength, men who would es-
teem it blasphemy to weaken any impulse to right action or to
quench the light of hope in any human heart, men with a pro-
found interest in ail the problems of life, and whose every word
would be an incitement to put forth all our powers not to-
wards the attainment of supernatural grace or favour, but
towards the realization of the best in thought, feeling, and ac-
tion which the conditions of our finite existence place within
our reach ! The difference would be enormous and all in favour
of the teaching which, leaving what is or may be beyond this
life to take care of itself, should make a religion of a know-
ledge of this life and a careful obedience to its ascertained
laws. I do not say that there never was a time in the world's
history when it may have served a useful purpose to concen-
trate men's thoughts upon a supernatural order of things. In
times of great ignorance and confusion this may have been one
of nature's own methods to prevent men from giving way to
too great discouragement ; or, from an intellectual point of
view, losing all power of systematic thought. Theology was,
to a certain extent, the mathematics of the middle ages — an
instrument of mental discipline. When therefore the profound
author of the *' Imitation" utters the sentiment : *' Ista est
summa sapientia per contemptum mundi tendere ad regna
coelestia," we can bear with him, remembering the time.

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

^y to
it of
(was,
-an

est

pgna
ime.

But the later accents of the same strain fall with a hollow
sound upon the ear. It is not pleasant even to read such a
passage as the following from a letter written by Whitfield to
Wesley when the latter was sui)posed to be dying : " A ra-
diant throne awaits you, and ere long you will enter into your
]M aster's joys. Yonder he stands with a massy crown, ready
to put it on your head amid an admiring throng of saints and
angels. But I, poor I, that have been waiting for my dis-
solution these nineteen years, must be left behind to grovel here
below." " To grovel" — such is Ihe term applied to a life of un-
tiring effort for the good of others — the most contemptuous
word in the language. We hear, however, the same word to-
day in the same application, and on every hand a parrot-like
iteration of phrases full of insult to whatever is natural. Un-
happily the lesson which these phrases convey is only too eas-
ily learnt, and many who cease to believe all else that their
priests have taught them, remember this at least, that there are
no natural sanctions of morality and no reasons apart from the
doctrines of the Church for placing any restraint upon their
passions. It seems to me that it is a terrible thing to stand
responsible for having taught such a lesson as this. According
to all accounts — according, as we have seen, to the testimony of
the Bishop of Ontario himself — thousands are falling away
from " the faith " ; but, instead of having been fitted by the
previous teachings of the clergy to hold fast the cardinal prin-
ciples of morality, they have been encouraged to believe that
the whole basis of moral obligation disappears when once the
supernatural sanction is called in question. To say that this
doctrine acts as a poison upon many natures is to speak strictly
within bounds. It is indeed the most pernicious doctrine that
could possibly be proclaimed. It is intended no doubt to
keep men within the pale of orthodoxy by appealing to their

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

fears ; but it fails sadly of the efi'ect proposed. The creeds
lose their vitality by a natural process ; and then those who
have absorbed this teaching are left rudderless. Some indeed
prematurely emancipate themselves from the creeds in order
that they may cease to feel any pressure of moral obligation.
In this way what is held out as a deterrent, becomes to a cer-
tain class of minds a lure. To think that hereafter it will have
to be said of the Christian clergy that a large part of their la-
bours was devoted to making the natural sanctions of morality
of none effect, to proclaiming the pessimistic doctrine that the
natural conditions of human life furnish no valid canons of right
and wrong, and offer no sufficient inducement for the practice of
virtue ! The credit side of their account will have to be very
heavy to leave a balance in their favour after this has been
charged.

But what, it may be asked, is the intellectual stand-point of
those who find themselves unable to accept the Christian theo-
logy 1 How do they explain the universe to themselves 1 Of
course no individual writer, outside the churches, can presume to
speak with authority for others. Speaking for myself, and for
such as may chance to agree with me, I would say that the part
of wisdom is not to attempt any explanation ; and, for an in-
tellectual stand-point, to assume that of a simple observer of
facts and their relations. Absolute knowledge (if there be such
a thing at all) is interdicted to us ; and it therefore behoves us
to satisf}'' ourselves with relative knowledge, that is to say, the
knowledge resulting from perceptions of agreement and differ-
ence. Of the universe as a whole we know nothing, because
we have never seen it as a whole, nor had any opportunity of
comparing it with other universes. And seeing that such
knowledge is too high for us, and that we cannot attain unto

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

it, we cease to aim at it, and, with due humility, take our place
as mere parts in an all-embracing and thought-transcending
system. It is often said that thouglit cannot acknowledge any
limits, and that the mind must feed upon the ambrosia of met-
aphysical and ontological speculations ; but some dispute this
opinion, and, as 1 venture to hold, with justice. Our minds,
I believe, are just as amenable to discipline as our bodies, and
there is no radical impossibility — I go further, and say, no seri-
ous difficulty — in keeping our thoughts down to their proper
work.

To my mind, and to the minds of many others, the theistic
hypothesis is of no service in an intellectual sense, that is to
say, it does not help to render the universe any more intelli-
gible. What the Marquis de Laplace said to the first Napoleon,
who was scandalized to find no mention of God in the " Meca-
nique Celeste," — " Sire, je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothese-
la " — is an answer which may properly, and without any shade
of irreverence, be given to those who would urge the intellec-
tual necessity of that doctrine. When once we seek to tran-
scend the ever lengthening series of finite causes, it matters little
what hypothesis we adopt, since none can be brought to any
test : each man must then satisfy himself as best he may.
Whether it is a tortoise or an elephant that finally upholds the
world it is for the individual believer to say ; for nobody can
put him in the wrong by going down to see. When, however,
the idea of God is put forward, not as an hypothesis at all, but
as the expression of man's instinctive faith in goodness and
justice, as an instinctive solution, in the interest of goodness
and justice, of all the enigmas of human life, there are few —
and I am not of them — who will not bow in reverent silence.
It may be that, to some of us,the thought has been borne home

A DEFENC'L OF MuDKKN THOUGHT.

II'!

that men in the luLiire will turn more and more from absuhite
ideala — to wliicli of courHe no detinite fttrm can he given — to
the contemplation of gootlnebH and justice as historically mani-
icsted, and that so the spiritual life of the individual will diaw
its nourishment from that of the race ; but meantime the ideal
wo find existing is and should be sacred. The important thing
in regard to any moral belief is that it should be effective, that
it should really sway the hearts of men for good. Its logical
character is of quite secondary consequence. Tlie logical stan-
dards of to-day are not those that will be in force to-morrow,
and th(jsc of to-morrow will in turn give way to the canons of
a yet more eidarged experience. At the same time it should
be remembered that even the most deeply-rooted beliefs do in
lapse of time cease to harmonize with the thought and knowledge
of the age, and that then they lose their moral efficacy, which
was always dependent on a conviction of their truth. Happy
the i)eople who, as one noble ideal fades, can replace it by
another, not less noble, and truer to the thought of the time !

But it may be said: " Do not the specific arguments used
by his Lordship of Ontario move you 1 What have you to say
to them 1 " To this 1 reply that his Lordship's arguments on
this great question seem to me no stronger than those he has
directed against the doctrine of evolution. Let us take an ex-
ample. On page 2 1 he says : " It requires intelligence to un-
derstand natural laws, and much more intelligence to have es-
tablished and worked them. ^ * *■ Whenever and where-
ever we see one intelligence exceeding another, or the highest
human intelligence anticipated or surpassed by some other, we
are led to a belief in a supreme intelligence." The confusion
here is simply lamentable. When one reads this and similar
incoherent passages it is hard not to revert to those lines of
"Lycidas"—

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUOHT.

" I'lu- Imnijry Hhwep look up ami are not fed,

Btit swdUph with wiml an I the r vuk iiii^t thoy Iraw" —

but no, we nued not continue tlio quotation. Wliat ratio is it
possible to establish between the intelligence necessary to dis-
cover a natural law and the intidligonce (assuming that intelli-
gence had any tiling to do with it) necessary to create the law ]
A child may make a puz/le that a wise man cannot unravel.
A fool may ask a conundrum the answer to which wi'.l never
be given unless he gives it Idmself. To know how much " in-
telligence " went to the making of a natural law we should re-
quire to know precisely how the law was made and what were
the difficulties encountered. If there were no difficulties then
there was no need of ititelligence at all. But again : ** when-
ever and wherever we see one intelligence exceeding another
* * * we are led to beli(^f in a supreme intelligence." The
words I have omitted are introduced by what in the old gram-
mars was called a " disjunctive conjunction," and do not in
any way modify the sense of those I have quoted. Think of
the absurdity — the fact of one intelligence exc»»e<ling another
leading to a belief in a supreme intelligence ! When there-
fore we see one horse exceeding another horse in size or strength
we must believe in the existence of a supreme horse. If we
Hpe a difference in stones we must believe in one supreme stone.
Again : " where we see * * the highest human ititelligence
anticipated or surpassed by some other, we are led to a belief
in a supreme intelligence." If we see signs of an intelligence
higher than the human, we have, it seems to me, simply to
acknowledge the fact. Whether the higher intelligence of
which we see the signs is a " supreme " one or not, bow are
we to tell 1 The intelligence of man is superior to that of the
horse ; but that fact alone does not prove man's intelligence
to be " supreme."

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

11 ■■

■ I

Let us however consider this matter of intelligence a little.
Intelligence implies a condition of mind the result of successive
accretions of experience. That or nothing. Divorce intelli-
gence from experience and it becomes a disembodied ghost fit
only for limbo. Intelligence may be said to mean " reading
between the lines," iti other words, from things known gather-
ing a meaning that does not at first appear on the surface. But
betwe* n what lines could a Supreme Mind read ? What are
the problems with which it might grapple 1 The very idea of
such a Mind grappling with any problem is absurd. Intelligence
is in its very essence limited ; and it can only be attributed,
therefore, to a limited being. Intelligence is the edge put upon
human faculty by contact with the world. Does it follow, be-
cause the world, by the variety of its appeals to consciousness,
creates intelligence, that intelligence must have created the
world ? Because the grindstone gives sharpness to the axe,
does it follow that the sharpness of some greater axe made
the grindstone 1 We recognise the works of human in-
telligence because they stand out distinct from unorganized
nature. We perceive the contrast between the cathedral and
the quarry from whence its stones were hewn. But against
what background of unorganized forces and indeterminate
forms do the adaptations of nature stand out 'i Why the very
atoms, we are told, bear the stamp of manufactured articles —
that is to say, they present definite forms and properties.
Then where in particular is the demiurgic intelligence to be
quoted 1 If we cannot quote it anywhere in particular we can-
not quote it at all. The woiks of man are clearly distinguish-
able from the raw materials furnished to his hand by nature.
We see at a glance where his intelligence has passed and pro-
duced a kind of organization not known in nature. We do

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

not need to look twice to distinguish the city from the forest,
or the printed book from the cotton plant. Well now, will
somebody who wants us to see Intelligence in the world at
large, show us what are its works and what are not its works.
We know that the watch is a product of human intelligence,
because we know, as a simple matter of experience, that watches
do not grow on trees nor fall from the clouds. But the so-called
adaptations of nature do not stand out in contrast to anything
of a totally different character. If we are asked to recognise
the eye, the ear, the hand as examples of intelligence, we can
only say : " Yes, we shall gladly do so if you will only show
us a few things that do not illustrate intelligence in the same
sense. Give us the same means of affirming intelligence in
these cases that we have in the case of the watch, show us first
where a power not elsewhere exemplified in the universe steps in^
and it sufficeth us. Short of this we must be content with
simply recognising the facts of existence without striving to
account for them.'** To put the whole argument in a nut-shell :
We recognise man's intelligence because we see where it
begins and ends. It has a background. But the intelligence
which you say exists in nature has no background ; and there-
fore we have no means of bringing it into comparison with
anything else, or of passing any judgment on it whatever.

Let there be no misunderstanding. I am not arguing now,
nor have I any need or wish to argue, against the theistic
hypothesis. That hypothesis, taken by itself, if it affords no
aid to science or philosophy, certainly causes neither any
embarrassment. But when arguments are brought forth in-

* Mr. Goldwin Smith has somewhere said very forcibly that existence b
the only ultimate mystery. Whatever exists, we may add, must manifest
itself, if at all, under definite forms, and must therefore phow organization.

or what teleologists call design.

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

tended to show that the hypothesis in question has logical
claims on our acceptance, and that it should therefore be made
the basis of all our thoughts and speculations, it is right to
examine those arguments, and, if we find tliera weak, to say so.
And here let a distinction be drawn. There are many lines of
argument which can be used to prove how natural and how
serviceable in many ways is, or has been, the thought of God
as the universal Father, the source of all good and of all law ;
and it might not be difficult to show an identity of nature, an
identity, so to speak, of moral co!itent, between this idea and
any truly regulative conception which it may be given to the
human race hereafter to form. It may be shown that men can
only worship that which is i/()0(/, that their natures can only
gravitate to that which is good ; and it might be asked
whether there is really any very important difference between
one conception of good and another. To this I would reply
that whatever difference may exist between two such concep-
tions is altogt ther unimportant in comparison with the great
fact— if it be one — that, under all varieties of formal belief,
heart and flesh are crying out for some living good, that
the hunger and thirst of our higlier natures is for righteous-
ness. Taking tl^uefore the idea of God as the pole, marked
upon the vast compass of the universe, towards which our
souls are magnetic, what can we say but that it is well —
a thousand times well — tlmt such ludp and guidance should
be afforded us on the vuyage of life ] The arguments which
tend to bring home to our minds all that humanity has
gained by the concentration of its thoughts upon one con-
ception and personification of good have nothing weak about
them ; they are historically irrefutable. Tt is when an at-
tempt is made to translate the hopes and instincts of man-

i ♦■

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

kind into an abstract and absolute dogma that openings are
left for criticism. And for lunate, 1 hold, it is that criticism
does not shrink from her task. The successful building up
of the dogma would be death to the spontaneous activity
of the human mind in its search for what is highest and
best. We see this clearly in the very stereotyped morality
of those who have come most completely under the influence
of dogma. The world is full of people who have lost all
7Horal origumlity^ so to speak. They have lost that which,
according to an apostle, is the very test of spirituality, the
power of judging all things; for they cannot judge anything
as of themselves. Upon their minds dogma has had its perfect
work, and a miserable result it shows.

Let the mind, therefore, we say, weave freely for itself such
conceptions as are for the moment most serviceable, and let it
be free to modify them with the growth of knowledge and
the increasing detiniteness of thought. The time may come
when instead of straining our eyes upon an infinitely distant
horizon for a mark by which to guide our course, we shall
take our direction from things nigh at hand. Is it not written:
"The word is very nigh thee, in thy heart and in thy mouth ? "
What the word will be that shall dominate and inspire the
further progress of society it might be rash to affirm : but
as of old it will be a " word ot faith," a wonl that will sum-
mon mankind to that strong belief which makes all things pos-
sible.

There are two great practical problems with which men of
intellect may grapple to-day. One is how to put hack the
thoughts of men so that all that was credible to their fore-
fathers may be credible to them. The other is how to yut for-
ward men's thoughts so that they may harmonize with the
new knowledge the world has acquired — so that a new intel-
lectual and moral equilibrium may be established. At the lirst

A DEFENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT.

II .

of the setasks the priesthoods arc labouring, with many helpers
from the ranks of the laity. In regard to many of these, both
priests and laymen, one must testify that they have a true
zeal for human welfare. Still, in spite of all the reactionary
efforts made by men who are true, and by men who are not true,
the intellectual standpoint of the world is shifting. Men do
not believe as they once did, they cannot believe as they once
did ; though they may religiously utter the old formulas, and
close their eyes harder and harder against the growing light.
The second cause has as yet bub few avowed helpers. There
are scoffers enough in the world in all conscience. Thone who
confess to one in private that they have ceased to believe
what the churches teach are to be met everywhere ; they seem
at times almost to outnumber the professors of orthodox opin-
ions. But, when it is i question of openly advocating what
they hold to be the truth, the great majority decline a respon-
sibility so fraught with chances of social and public disfavor.
One great reason ibr this timidity is, that hitherto it has
not been seen how a new construction might rise upon the
ruins of the old. To see this, however, all that is needed
is to study closely the framework of things, and mark how
society is actually put together, and how it has grown to-
gether throughout the ages " by that which every joint sup-
plieth." These pages have not been written solely for a con-
troversial purpose. They have been written in the hope that
some may be moved to assert for themselves a larger intellec-
tual liberty, and that the great cause of putting forward men's
thoughts, and preparing the new equilibrium, may in some
humble measure be advanced.