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6
OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE
AN ADDRESS
Delivered before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh,
on Friday f "November 5, 1875
BY
THE RIGHT HON. W. E. FORSTER, M.P.
REVISED BY THE AUTHOR.
EDINBURGH:
EDMONSTON AND DOUGLAS.
1875.
Price Sixpence.
I f
Kdinburgh : Printed by Thorruu and Archibald Constahle,
FOB
EDMON8TON AND DOUGLAS.
^
LONDON HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND d
surface of the earth. Whai, then, is the coast-line of the
12
OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE.
English-peopled countries ? Again excluding India and West
Africa, incluuing only that portion of British territory which
is within the temperate regions — excluding therefore the north
coast of America — we have a coast-line of more than 21,000
miles. The coast-line of all the temperate regions of the earth
is about 70,000 miles. We therefore have more than two-
sevenths of the whole. The coast-line of the United States,
with so much of Alaska as is below the grain line, is more
than 8000 miles, so that English-speaking men have about
three-sevenths of the coast-line of all the temperate regions in
the two hemispheres.
If we take the coast-line of the temperate regions of North
and South America, Australia, and South Africa, we find that
we have more than one-half, and we and the United States
together about four- fifths, or the same proportion as of the
«,rea.
So much for area, and now a word on Population. The
"Parliamentary return estimates the population, in 1871, of
'British North America as about 3,750,000 ; Australia, includ-
ing New Zealand, about 2,000,000 ; the Cape and Natal, about
850,000 : or in round numbers, a total of 6,600,000. The
dame return shows the numbers in 1850 to be less than
3,500,000, being for British North America about 2,500,000,
Australia and New Zealand about 550,000, the Cape and
Natal about 400,000. This shows a total increase in the
twenty-one years of more than 88 per cent. What will be the
future increase ? Who can tell ? No trustworthy answer can
be given, except that it will be very great. Suppose an in-
crease for th3 remainder of this century proportionate to that
since 1850; these colonies would then start in the twentieth
century with a population of at least 15,000,000. Many of
you will live to know whether this estimate is too sanguine.
I believe it will be found to be under the mark. There is
reason to expect that future emigration will be conducted on
a greater scale than at present ; and, indeed, we are only now
beginning to open out the fertile portions of the North-west
t i
OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE.
13
Territory of tne Dominion. By the last census, the population
of the United Kingdom was about 31,500,000 ; and the Eegis-
trar- General informs us in his Preliminary Report that, at the
rate of increase for the last ten years, this population would
double itself in eighty-four years, that is, it would be about
63,000,000 in 1955. It may well be doubted whether our
two small islands could support so dense a population ; but
every one admits that there is room in the Colonies, and, sup-
posing their increase to be at the rate of the twenty-one years
from 1850 to 1871, their number, at the end of the eighty-four
years, would become more than 82,000;000. Their proportion
to the United Kingdom, instead of 66 to 315, would be 82
to 63.
You may or may not accept these calculations, or rather
these guesses ; but I think we shall all accept almost as cer-
tainties these three probabilities : — First, that by the end of
this century our colonies within the temperate zones will be
strong enough to assert their independence, if they please —
will, in short, be able to shift for themselves. Secondly, that
whether they do or do not assert their independence, they will
be too mighty to be treated any longer as dependencies. And
lastly, that before the middle of next century, their population
will outnumber ours, and still leave room for indefinite increase.
And if I had time, I could show that there is every reason to
expect that their progress in wealth and in culture, and in all
the conditions of power, will at least keep pace with their
population.
With these facts and probabilities before us, let us consider
the arguments of those who look forward to the loss of these
possessions not ordy without regret, but with satisfaction. I
can only give these arguments very briefly, but I will try to
give them fairly.
I think they may be stated as follows : — The loss of our
Colonies would in reality, it is said, be a gain to us, because it
would relieve our taxpayers of a large pecuniary burden ;
because, also, it would make wars wicii other nations less
t !
M\\\
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It!
III!
u
OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE.
likely to occur, and less difficult to wage, or would, in fact,
diminish our danger, both of war, and in war. And as regards
the Colonies themselves, it is stated that the severance of their
connection with us would increase their safety and diminish
their burdens ; would prevent their being involved in wars in
which they are not interested ; would stimulate their progress
in population and in wealth ; would train them to self-reliance ;
and is, indeed, the only mode by which they can become fit to
fill their proper place, and to fulfil their duties in the world.
And lastly, it is strenuously urged that any association with
such communities on terms of equality is impracticable — that
no federation is possible — that the difficulties of time and space
would, as it were, drive them to eventual independence, and
that the only tie which can bind them to the mother coimtry
is that dependent relation which is every year becoming more
and more relaxed, and which must ultimately disappear.
Now, first, what is the actual cost of these Colonies ? How
heavy is the burden on our taxpayers ? i believe there are
few matters on which greater misapprehension exists in the
public mind. Some years ago, it is true, we paid largely, not
only towards their military defence, but their civil government.
It was only fair that we should do so. "While we made them
take our criminals, and controlled their markets, and sent out
to them almost all their officials, — while, in fact, we not only
actually governed them, but governed them for what we sup-
posed to be our interests, — it was but just that we should pay
much of the cost of that government. It is true, also, that
we have admitted their right to self-government somewhat
more quickly than we have called upon them to defray its
cost, and for a time our taxpayers had grounds for complaint.
It could not be expected that the inhabitants of these islands,
borne down, as they are, under the load of taxes — the heritage
of past struggles, and forced to pay much in order to meet the
wants of our ancient and complicated society, would patiently
maintain the machinery by which their Colonial fellow-country-
men administer their own affairs, or relieve them from all
OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE.
15
expense in defending the property they are so rapidly acquir-
ing. But this grievance has now little, if any, foundation.
Let me give you the actual figures. Last year there was a
Parliamentaiy "Return of the Cost of the several Colonies of
the British Empire, at the expense of the British Exchequer,"
including not only payments of Governors, but all contribu-
tions towards Police, Schools, and other local charges ; and
the expense not only of the troops we have sent out, but the
money spent on fortifications and other military defences. In
1869-70 the amount was £2,745,980. In 1872-73 (the last
year given) it was £1,817,471. Bat these sums include the
expenses of all the Colonies, If we take only those with
which we are dealing, that is, British North America, Aus-
tralia (including New Zealand), and South Africa, we have
£1,165,316 in 1869-70 against £372,451 in 1872-73, and of
this £370,000, about £160,000 was spent in Nova Scotia,
mainly at the Imperial Station at Halifax, and more than
£40,000 on the convict establishment, which we still maintain
for Imperial purposes, in Western Australia, and of which the
cost is rapidly diminishing. In thus reducing the charges on
the Imperial Exchequer, the late Government has, I believe,
made our relation with the Colonies more close and more
durable, because more in accordance with fairness and justice.
And though this change excited some opposition at first, it was
more at home than abroad. Australia is proud of her pecu-
niary position, and in Canada, where the diminution in Imperial
payment, for the two great provinces of Ontario and Quebec,
has been from £434,223 to £3552, I certainly, in my short
visit last year, found no disatisfaction.
I may be told that the direct charges do not cover the
actual loss, and that we ought to take into account the ships
of-war we have to build and man for the defence of these
communities. I cannot admit that we ought to count any
such indirect charge. It would not he easy to show that,
irrespective of our Colonies, our Navy, as compared with other
nations, is too strong. If all our Colonies were to leave us to-
IC)
OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE.
I i i
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lilln
ill
I I
li
morrow, we still must have men-of-war to protect our com-
merce, unless, indeed, that went also ; and the want of their
ports in which we now coal and refit would, I suspect, soon be
seen in our Estimates. And if we come to indirect effects, we
must consider whether there might not be a diminution in
our trade, and therefore in our revenue. There is no Colonial
question more debated than this effect on our commerce. If
I were to consider nothing else this evening, I could not enter
fully into the arguments on both sides. I must ?.3k you to
look into the facts for yourselves ; and if you do so, I think
you will incline to believe that the balance of evidence shows
that the Trade does follow the Flag. Remember, all tnat is
required to justify this opinion, is to have ground to believe
that we have more trade with the Colonists than we should if
they were foreigners. Take then these figures. We find by
the Parliamentary Eeturns that our exports last year were in
value to
Australia, including New Zealand, more than
France, less than
British North America, more than
The United Stated, less than
The Cape and Natal, about . , .'
China, less than .....
£20,000,000
30,000,000
10,000,000
33,000,000
4,700,000
6,000,000
Taking in each case the last recorded census, this return shows
that our fellow-countrymen at the Antipodes took each of
them last year an average of JEIO worth of our goods ;
while our nearest neighbours, the French, took less than 17s.
per head. The average to the States was rather more than
to France, but less than 17s. 6d, per head, while to our North
American possessions it was more than 53s. I need not
compare the averages of South Africa and China. Again, the
imports from the North American, Australian, and South
African Colonies for the five years ending 1874, were in round
numbers about £148,000,000, and the exports to them about
£142,000,000. Our imports from all foreign countries for the
same period were about £1,350,000,000, and our exports to
OUR COLONIAL EMPIRE.
17
r com-
)f their
30011 be
5cts, we
tion in
iJolonial
rce. If
at enter
: you to
I think
3 shows
that is
believe
lould if
find by-
were in
),000
>,ooo
(,000
,000
,000
,000
shows
each of
goods ;
lan 17s.
>re than
r North
ed not
ain, the
I South
n round
about
for the
)orts to
them about £1,1 25,000,000. These seven millions of Colonists
cannot then be considered bad customei-s. Our import from
them is about 11 per cent. ; and our export to them about 12 J
per cent, of our import and export to and from all foreign
countries. I am not surprised that the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, when consoling us at Middlesborough last month,
for " the falling off in our foreign trade," was able to say it
" was to a great extent couiiterbalanced by the improvement
in our exports to the Colonies."
Nor, while making up our Profit and Loss Account, can
we disregard the pecuniary advantages of Emigration. Here
again there is much dispute. There are persons who believe
that colonisation has had little or nothing to do with the con-
nection of the colonists with the mother country. I am not
of that opinion. The last circular issued by the Emigration
Commissioners tells me that more than a million of emigrants
proceeded from the United Kingdom to Australia and New
Zealand between 1825 and 1873. It is not easy for me to
suppose, that anything approaching to this numb(ir would
have either been willing or able to meet the cost and diffi-
culties of the voyage to the other side of the earth, had not the
connection with the mother country continued, and had there
not been in consequence a successful co-operation of the Heme
and Colonial Governments in aiding and pi'omoting Emigra-
tion. I will not dwell longer on the pocket argument. It is
not easy to bring ourselves to consider this question as simply
one of pecuniary profit or loss. But, if we do so, we find that
the actual profits of the partnership are very large, that the
expenses of the management are very small, and that the pro-
bability is, that no one of the partners would carry on so large
a business by himself. I then, for one, am not inclined to
think that it would be a business-like act to give a notice of
dissolution.
But this partnership, we are told, though profitaM(3 in
peace, may be unprofitable in war ; or may lead to wars which
might swallow up in a year the gains of decades of peace.
18
OUR COLONIAL ^MP'RE.
1
i
4
m
Let us consider this part of the question carefully, for in it lies
much of the gist of the matter. There are two dangers feared.
Our Colonies, it is said, may involve us in war, or their posses-
sion may place us in a worse position when we are at war.
Well, as regards South Africa or Australia, I confess I cannot
see iu what way they could drag us into war with any civilised
nation, or endanger us if at war. I think we may wait till a
probable cause of conflict is pointed out ; and certainly in no
one of our recent wars have we been weakened by their pos-
session. How then about America? Can we protect the
long frontier of the Dominion, with its population, as yet scanty
and scattered, against its neighbours, with their wealth, and
resources, and energy ; with their millions of men, who have
shown how quickly they can learn to be soldiers ? But what
right have we expect that these neighbours will attack Canada ?
I firmly believe that both good sense and good feeling prevail
too much in the great Eepublic to make such an attack possible.
But if this most improbable crime were committed, who can
foretell the result of the contest that would follow? There
would be great suffering in Canada ; for a time, perhaps, a
successful invasion, but, in the end, I believe that the four
millions of freemen would not be conquered.
But the contest, it might be said, if it came at all, would
not come from an unprovoked act of American ambition, but
as the final issue of mutual misunderstandings and recrimina-
tions, of faults on both sides, which might be aggravated by
the fact that the colony knew she had the mother country at
her back. Is it not, then, better to warn Canada without
delay that she must prepare to take care of herself, or, if she
finds that she cannot stand alone, to make up her mind to join
the Union? WeU, this warning I would not give, and for
three reasons. I do not believe that it is necessary. I do
believe that it would be dangerous. I am sure it would be
cowardly. After all, what are the facts? They are very
different from what they were fifteen years ago. When the
slave-owners prevailed at Washington, there was real danger
of war between England and the States, because the principles