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Ne* York URC^ h<;a ^''6) 482 ^ 03G0 - Phone ^ T\ i y^ THE RUSH-BAGOT AGREEMENT AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BY The Rt. Hon. Sir CHARLES FITZPATRICK CHIEF JUSTICE OF CANADA AT THE LAWYERS' CLUB IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK MARCH 17. 1917 THE RUSH-BAGOT AGREEMENT AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BY The Rt. Hon. Sir CHARLES FITZPa -RICK CHIEF JUSTICE OF CANADA AT THE LAWYERS' CLUB IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 18349—1 MARCH 17. 1917 AN ADDRESS DCIUKKKI) UV SIR CHARLES FITZF'ATRICK Before llw Laiivers' Cltih. .\n, York Cit\\ Mardi 17, 1017. I want to thank >.,ii, Mr. Cliainnan, I..,- vour vi-is .ncn.iis rHiTt-nci-s t.. myself. 1 ,|,. n,.t. of .o„rM.. prftr,.,! to .Umtn.. tlKMU. but I approciatc the >• irit whi. h inoxv,! voti to >|„..,k of iiif as yni havf do-u-. I fell much honourt-d. (;fnlltnu'M, l.v thr invitation to appear l)efore you on this occasion, hut, as Mr. Spencer has just told you, it was not without inisgivinR that I accepted it i felt then, and now that I lune attempted the task, I feel to i miK-h larger .legree. the truth of the sa> iug of the writer in the Hook of hcde.Masticus. •'tjiai the wisdom of the scribe eometii «.l the oi,,M,rtimity of lei.-,ure." It is one of the manv ,lraw- back^ of a fairly bu.sN professicmal and jx-iitical life. that, however Kreaf on. s interest may be in subjects conceminK the histor, <•♦ '«nc- s . n country, even if allied to the work of one's j.rofe.-^- 'Mun. .r ijutt, xer strong one's vi(>ws. the time necessar> to man.fesi isefullv the one. or to giNv practical effect to' the olhei i, .*=most invarial)ly wanting. Th =t,i,.ct ; .ii,,., in Nuviinlirr, ISI.S, 011 lull ill" i>| tlu- (ioMninunt at W.i^hinnK'ii. ' "^l ai>i)ri>iiih.il I.oril (a^lk-rtauli \villi .1 pn>iM)'Hil for nuilual (lisinnaiiu lit on i lie (In at Lakts, lu- \v.i-< ha])])!, ill hi^ oi)i)orttiiiity. Tlic iiU'»am , wliich, as the I nittd Stati's Miiii^tir in l,oii ol l"-nrope were lilindly (<■ ': lluir way, and ►^ropinn out towardr^ sonu' happier >\st »\hi(h would rid the world of war for ever, .\lready sMtesnien wen- huildi eloud-eastles in the air, and drcunin^; ol the rei^;n of univers..! jn-aee, entireU ohlivious of thi' fact that, as Jo-eph de Maistre said, "deiuiis le jotir ou Cain tiia Abel il y a toujours "eu ea et la siir la surface du ^lohe les mares de sanj;, ([ue n'ont "pu desseihcr, ni les vents avee leurs hrulantes halehies, ni le "soleil avee. tons ses feux." \'isionar> si hemes were the suhject of eager diset.ssion, and found a re.idy welcome, and some of the hest minds of Europe were being dazzled by the dream which afterw irds took form as the Holy .Alliance, — thai strange system by which the banded kings were pledged to regard each other as brothers, and their peo' • as their children, and to ensue the (io-iin-l of Christ. '1 Alliance has been well described as a "])iece of sublinu m\sticism and ncmsense." The (ireat Powers who were i)ariies to it ditl not realize that wc live "in a world of thix and changi." and that with ]x?()plcs as with individuals "growth and develoiiment are among the conditions of life." The politii.d situation in Kurojje proves the futility of "an attempt to tit growing organisms into iron cases." Then suddenly came the short ]>ractical message from across the Atlantic. It offered no revolution in the world's .iftiiir-. anil lul.! . wl r... -iK.i.i! |.i..iiii-,' ..i j.. rin.uini. \ ; hm its wlaiul ill thru.iv '-• llif.mil.iii<.ii.(l.vi^„,,,t ,iii,„.n,i...,n(| kiiik>, nliilsi ,,, oiluis, .I'^rf. niriMs m.-.m tlif i.liKliiid \v<.nl .111(1 Iiavi- tluir -.iiHiioii ii, il,c DiNi,,.' pnrfpi wlii, h .tiioiiis that I'Mii miiM, in piil.lir as in ],iivatf lil, . "kw], v.„r,.l hi, fovn .iiil." I "Ilii- iiifomiatioii yon ^\\v, ,,\ onliT^ liaxiii^ l<«tn ^issued I)y tlic Hritisli ( '.oNcrniiuiii. to incrtasc its nav.il "tore- on the l,ala>, is conliniu'd \,\ iiiuiiim-ni c from that "qua, ter. of nu-asuri>s h.uiiiK },vv,\ actiiallv aioii will he auKinented in like decree. 'I'he " I're.sident is sincerely desirous i,i pie\ent an evil which, '■a IS |)resiiined, is ef|iiaily to it- deprecated l»v both Coverii- ^inents. He therefore authorizes you to projioM- lo th«' "(iritish (ioxcrninent such an .irr.inKenieiit rtsiK'CtiPK the ■'naval force lo be ke[)t on the L.ikes by both Covt rnnients, "as will denionstiate their pacific policy and secure their "peace. He is w illinj; to confine it on each side to a certain • noderate lunnber of armed vessels, and the smaller the '■number the more ajireeable to him; or to abstain alto-' "aether from .-m armed force be\(,nd that used for the "revenue. Von wiH brinj; this subject under the ( on- 'sidcration of the British Government immediateU after "the recei{)t ot this letter." Lord Castlereagh was surprised .ind ptri>li\ed. .md natur- ally inclined at first to be a little .sus])i( ious. Such an enj^aye- 18349— 2 J 6 ment would tie the hands of both Jiartics until war should have commenced, and the Americans, by their proximit\-, would be able to i>re[)are armaments for attack, much sooner than those of the British could be prei)arcd for defence. ()n January .M, 1816, Adams writing to Monroe says: "I think the ]>roi)osal will not be accepted." But the jiroposal was renewed in a note of which the following extract is far-sighted: — "The increase of naval armaments on one side upon "the lakes during jwace, will necessitate the like increase "on the other, and besides causing an aggravation of use- "less expense to both parties, must operate as a continual "stinnilus of sus|)icion and of ill-will upon the inhabitants "and local authorities of the borders against those of their "neighbours. The moral and political tendency of such "a system must be to war and not to ix.>ace." Words ])regnant with wisdom and i)olitical foresight. One would imagine that when he wrote that letter Mr. Monroe had present to his mind this i)hrase from Bacon (Essay of Empire): "Let men beware how they neglect and suffer matter of trouble to be ])rei)ared; for no man can forbid the sivark nor tell whence it ma>- come." Certainly if ("astlereagh hail been inclined to take a narrow view of the situation, there was abundant ground for hesitation. At that ^cry time (ircat Britain was making a determined effort to secure a superiority of naval force on the Lakes. At Kingston a shii)-of-the-line built to carry 110 guns and two vessels that were able to mount 74 guns, were being hurried to comiiletion. Moreover insistent demands were behig made in both Houses of Parliament for a more vigorous jxilicy, and the building of a formidable fleet for Canadian waters. Still the folh- and waste of such a competition were ai)])arent, aTul in A])ril .Adams was able to re])ort Castlereagh as atlmitling, that "to keep a number of armed Aessels parading about iii)on "the Lakes in times of i)eace would be ridiculous and absurd. "There could he no motive for it, aiul everythinK bexoml what ^^ should be necessary to yuard against smuggling," would be "calculated only to jmxluce mischief." But he then jiointed out, that though dis;irmament was so desirable in itself, the disiuivantages attending it would Ix- felt only by t;reat Britain. If war broke out .suddenK . and found both countries without a naval force (jn the Lakes, clearly the I'liiteil States would be in a much better i)osition than C.reat Britain to extemporize a Heet. In those da>s of wooiKn vessels, the building materials were ready at hand in the forests along the shores of the Lakes, and Creat Britain from the geographical i)osition would be hopelessly handicapi)ed. For her, if she looked for war, the ])olic>- of a perjictual preparedness was absolutely essential. Happily Lord C'asllereagh took the larger view. He was keenly alive to the waste of competitive armaments, and admitted all Mr. Adams had to urge in regard to the constant occasion of jmnocation, which must arise on lK)lh sides, out of the presence of armed vessels in the same inland waters. What a danger to international pi^acc, this ])ro\imity of naval fleets in confined waters, nuist have jmAed will be apparent if we consider for a mcmient the case of the C.reat Ocean fleets of the world. Vou will remember how, in the days before the war, the naval estimates and progrannnes of the great Powers were always the object of jealous scrutiiu in cNcrx countr>-. No exception was made «'Ven in the case Of Creat Britain, for whom a su])reine fleet is simi)h- a life belt ; w ithoui it she sinks at once, and starves before she goes under. Her fleet, as a necessity of self defence, is neither a thre.it nor a challenge to any, and her shii)s cruise imi)artiall\- from .Arch- angel to Hong Ksel on tlie C.reat Lakes could have onl\ one p(,ssible oi)])onent, and the p-esence of an .American >h\p (,n tlu> -ame waters 8 lu'ct's^arily sujigeslcd comijarisons, and im'\it]>()rtunities there would he for rumours, and exay;gerali(ms, and the suspicions horn of both, whenever tliere was any s]x-cial activity in the shi])yards at either end of the Lakes, hathiny; the frontiers of hotn countries! And here rememt)er, that at the beginning of the last ceiitury, each lake was a seixirate entity. To-day, there is an uninterru]>ted water- way from Fort William to the Strait of Belisle. Then, Lake Su]icrior was cut off from all communication with Huron, and the canals on either side of the rapids of the Sault Ste. Marie, which, in the year hefor the war, carried a traffic three times as great as that of the Cireat Waterway at Suez, had not even been thought of. In the same way. Lake Ontario was cut oft by the rapids of the St. Lawrence and the Falls of Niagara, while the Falls of the Ste. Claire River eftectively dosed Lake Erie, so that any shij) built on the border f)f one of these lakes had to be maintained there, and spend the rest of its existence on that imrticular lake. Its sole function anil jnirpose was to counteract the inftuence of some ri\al \essel on the other side of the lake. L(jrd Casllereagh could not forecast the future, but he was a good judge of the present, anil had schooled him- self to the thought that to i)revent war was better than jire- paration for it. Mr Adams wrote to the impatient Monroe on March 30, 1816:— "You may consider certain that the proposal to dis- "arm on the Lakes will not be accei)ted;" But a fortnight later the principle of the ])ro])()sal had been accepted. Before this conclusion, howe\tr, was arrived at. Lord ("astlereagh took the op])ort unity to remind Mr. Adams, that there w(juld have been no need for the j^resent a])prehen- sions if only the recommendations of the British Commissioners at (ihcnt had been adopted. Mr. Adams reported as follows: 9 "He then pointed (JUt that C'.reat Britain had proposed, at the "negotiations at Ghent, that the whole of the Lake^, including "the shores should belong to one ])art\. In that case there "would have been a large and wide natural se])aration l)etween "the two territories, and there would have been no necessit>' "ior armaments." Surely here was insight and vision! If all the Great Lakes, and their coasts, to a suitable depth, including the sites now occupied by Chicagc; and Milwaukee. Detroit and Buffalo had been assigned to Canada, there would have been no (luestion of ri\al naval forces, and I would be depri\ed of the pleasure of being your guest today. But if Lord Castlereagh sighed like a statesm.m over the vanished scheme, he proposed like a i)ractical man to deal with the facts as he found them. ()n .August 13th, 1816, the new British Minister at WashingKm, Mr.' Charles Bagot. was able to give the assurance that "all further augmentation of the British "naval force now in commission on the Lakes will be immediately "suspended." In August, matters were carried a step further when Bagot gave Monroe full ])articulars of the existing Briti.sh fleet. Considering that, in those da>s, it often took months to get a reply between London and WashingKjn, it cannot be said that the negotiations had been unduly protracted. But they were not quick enough to please Mr. Monroe. And here let me remark that in the past, in her dealings with England, the United States has generalU- had this advantage, that her troubles have come to her singly and not in battalions. On the other hand, the harassed statesman who rejjresented Great Britain has often had urgent claims on his attcnti(jn from maii\- parts of the world and so bceii tempted to let one care (lri\e out another. In that way delays and silences have often followed, which have given occasion for sus])icions of rudeness or indiffer- ence. In November. 1016. Mr. Mcmroc in a letter to Adams notes Lord Castlereagh's silence and then goes on to use words which show that he was beginning to distrust the good faith of 10 the British representative: "The limited powers that were "given to Mr. Bagot had much ap]iearance that the object was "to amuse us rather than to adopt any effectual measure. The "supply in the interim of Canada with a vast amount of "cannon and munitions is a circumstance which has not "escaped attention." But there was no ground for these misgivings and an exchange of notes ratifying an agreement on the lines originally suggested by Mr. Monroe, took place on the 28th and 29th of April, 1817. This document bore the signature of Charles Bagot, British Minister at Washington and Richard Rush, who was now Secretary of State. Of the two men whose names thus acquired an immortality of fame, Mr. Bagot played the slighter part, owing to the very limited nature of the powers entrusted to him. One hopes he enjoyed his stay at Washington; but as the first representative of Great Britain after a war which had left such bitter memories as those of the fratricidal struggle in 1812-14, his position was a difficult one. That he did not exix;ct to find a bed of roses at Washington may perhaps be inferred, from the following passage in a letter addressed to him, just after his ap]xjintment. by Canning: " I am afraid the question is not so much how you "will treat them (the Americans) as how they will treat you, "and that the hardest lesson which a British Minister has to "learn in America is not what to do. but what to bear. But "even this may come round. And Waterloo is a great help to "you. perhaps a necessary help after the (to say the least) bal- "anced successes and misfortunes ot the .American War." How curious all this reads when one thinks of the leave-taking of Mr. Bryce! However. Bagot went out with instructions to do whatever was possible to promote the restoration cordial good feeling between the two countries. Of Ric. , Rush, who was Secretary of State when the Agreement was signed, and American Minister in London for the greater part of the 11 year which elapsed before the arrangement was finally approved ofl.N- the Senate and proclaimed by the President, we get i)leasant glimpses in the pages of that very entertaining book "Memor- anda of a residence at the Court of London." In its ojiening chapter he thus describes the disixjsitions in which, in his opinion, an American MiTiister to London ought to approach his task: "No language can express the emotion which almost "every American feels when he first touches the shores of "Europe. This feeling nmst have a special increase, if it be the "case of a citizen of the I'nited States going to England. Her "fame is constantly before him; he hears of her statesmen, her "orators, her scholars, her philosophers, her divines, her ])alriots. "In the nurserj- he learns her ballads. Her iK)ets train his 'imagination. Her language is his, with its whole intellectual "riches, past and forever newly flowing— a tie, to use Burke's " figure, light as air and unseen, but stronger than links of iron. "In spite of political differences, her glory allures him; in spite "of hostile collision he clings to her lineage. 'Three thousand '"miles', said Franklin, 'are as three thousand years; interven- "tion of space seems to kindle enthusiasm, like intervention 'of time. Is it not fit that two such nations should be friends? "'Let us hope.' It is the hope which every Minister from the ■• United States should carry with him to England; it is the •'hope in which every British Minister of State should meet "him. If, nevertheless, rivalry is in the nature of things, at "least let it be on fair principles; let it be generous, never i);iltry, "never malignant." Mr. Rush was a man of wide culture and gifted with an historic imagination. When the vessel that was taking him to England was ofT the Isle of Wight, he tells how he reflected that perhaps they were ])assing in the \ery track of the Armada, and how his comrades talked of the "hero Queen of Tilbury." When the Portsmouth bells were set ringi ig in his honour On the evening of his arrival, he says: "It pa- ,cd in our thinights 12 "that the same bells mis^ht huM- rung tlu-ir peals for the victories "of Hawke and Nelson." ' l\-rhai)s,' said one of the party, 'for "Sir Cloudsley Shovel too.' His rereption in !.on-, which were made while Rush was in Ly each (i()\trninenl on tlie (ireat Lakes should l)e Hniited. on Lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding 100 tons l)urd("n and armed with one lX-i)oun(i cannrm: on the U])i)er Uikes. to two vessels of the same Ifurden and armament; and on Lake ("hamplain, to one similar vessel. All other armed vessels on the Lakes were to he forth- with dismantled, and "no other vessels of war" were to he "there Iniilt and armed." 'I'his stipulation was to remain Iti effect till six months after either ])art\ should have given notice to the other of a desire to terminate it. The British authorities at once dismantled, or hroke u]), three ships-of-the-line, six medium-sized vessels and a ninnher of smaller craft, while the hlessed work of destruction was carried on in the American harhours «m a still more extensive scale. It was only some months later that douht arose as to the validitv of the Agreement, as to whether it so far partook of the nature of a foreign treaty as to recfuire the assent of the Inited States Senate. It was thought hetter to avoitl all jiossihle complications on this score hy hringing the matter formalh- hefore the Senate. This was tlone in due course and, on Ai)ril 16. 1818, the Senate "ap])roved and consented," and a few days later, the terms of the agreement were formally ])rocIaimed hy President Monroe. To this day, however, "the Rush-Bagoi Agreement" has never heen regarded or s])oken of as a formal international treat}-. It was an Agreement hy an exchange of notes to which each side gave effect. The arrangement worked well and smoothly from the first, and its conditions have heen faithfully kept, in the spirit, if not always in the letter, hy hoth sides. During the years 1838-41 the rehcllion in Canada led the British Government to increase somewhat its naval force on the Lakes. 14 American remonstrances were met by the explanation to the effect, that the measures taken were i)urely defensive and temiK)rary, and that the normal state v)f thini;;, would be restoreper Lakes as that of an armed vessel of much K^'^iter toniiajje than the aKreemenl allowed. That, on this occasion, the British P'oreign Office was not over-hast>' to take offence, may i)erha]>s be inferred from the fact that the "Michigan" had been on the Upper Lakes for thirteen years before this objection was raised. In reply the United States (iovenimenl at once admitted that the "Michigan" was many times too big, but urged in extenuation that it was armed only with ihe sort of toy gun which the Agreer jnt sanctioned. I vmilerstand this vessel is still aHoat.-an historic relic.-as the "Wolverine". Nine years later, g\aver issues were involved. Parties of Confederaus. using Canada as their base, had cai)tured Federal steamers on lake Erie, and had raided a town in Vermont. Mr. Seward, the American Secretary of State, ga^■e notice that "owing to recent hostile and piratical ])roceedings on the lakes" it would be necessary to increase "the observing force" main- tained there. At the same time, following the precedent set at the time of the Canadian rebellion, he explained that the stei)s taken wore merely defensi\e. and would be discontinued as soon as the d.mger they were designed to meet had i)assetl away. Mr. Seward further and rightly insisted that "neither "party meant to relinquish the right of self-defenc»' in the "event of civil war." At the same time, to make the position of his Government absolutely correct, and to secure a free hand in the future, he ga\e the requisite six months' notice to termin- ate the Agreement. This was acce])ied by (ireat Britain with the expression of a hojjc that the old arrangement might be restored after ])eace. This action of Secretary Seward was formalh" api)roved at a y>'m\ session o*^ Congress in Fel)ruary, 15 1855. Hut at 'hat liim- the triii iijili of ilu- NOrlluTii Arniii-s was in si>{ht, ami hvUnv the -ix montlis had tla])>f(l, tlu- tioticc tf) t(.Tiniiiate the AKreeint'iit was wiihdrawii. Ilic liiiti'd States (.oNtrmii it iiifornu-d Hi> Maji.-st\'s ( .(.viTiiiiiciit llial tlu-y wire willii n that the Auretinent should riniaiu "practi- "tally" in fora-, which has lu-en construed to mean that tlie arranminent must l»e renanled as still in existence. It would he hard to overrate the l)Iessi:i}j;s that that .\^rec- nient has been t.) both countries. It has been the ki\iiote of their policy of jH-'acc for a hundred \ears. and at the same time has hai>])ily influenced the attitude of both CoviriMuents towards the whole (luestio.' of fortifications. And what an object lesson has been here for the rest of the civili/ed world. The lon^a'st frontier on the earth's surface has at the same time been the most defenceless — and {]v most safe. If there had been the sliRhtesl disposition to bad faith on either si to steam, and wood to iron, and lakes that were then isolateil and inde])endent havo now free access to the sea. while thiir shores which were then almost tractless solitudes are now thick with great and crowded cities. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, sjicaking in the Hou.-e of Comnujns at Ottawa, six \ears ago, tised these memorable words: 'If my voice could be heard that far, I would ])resume to sa\- 'to our American friends; there may be a spectacle, perhaps, "nobler than that ot a Inited Continent — a six.'ctacle that would "astound the world by its ncnelty and grandeur— 'he s])ectacle "of two peoples living in amity side b>- side for a distance of "four thousand miles along a line which is hardh visible in 10 "many «iiiartirs, willi iu> raiitiDH, iiu nuns frowning a« ross it, "with no fortrrsM's on fithir sitlf, with no arnianu-nt ont' "a^;ainst anollur, l)Ut li\ in^ in liannony ai\(l inutnal conruUnci'. "and with no othrr ri\alr> than gnuToiis rnnilalion in the arts "of ]H'.a(t'. I .111- Canadian pcoj)!!- I would >a> that if it is "]M»ssil)!'.' for lis to maintain siicli riiations liftwci'ii these two "urowin^; nations, Canada will lia\e rtndi-rcd to Old KiiRland a "sorviit luuqii.illt'd in its j)rismt i-lftct and still more in its " far-rearhing cfmst'al>le of effective military defence. Hut that would l»e a very su])erficial contention. When the Old WDrld peo])Ies ])lan a readjustment of imeniational houtuhiries the tir.-. If Kiinland, atul tht- for Dominions, of Canada, Australia, South Afriia, and Ntw / .il.uul. aiv at war lo-da\. and havf stakfd th»'ir livis on the issuo, it is jjfiniarily Ikh.ium' thfv an- inimh'd to \>i- faith .'nl to It. Ixiuni aiui tnir i. \\h- trial y which drtat liritain has >i^n oniinw ' ■ rt- olisirvid (\niiall> : "So many vi'ssds hav lriv,nii u^h that tnuur\ -oM a a ' liii ^ ^hrtds a.id ])atih».-s. vur -< "Ships (;f war agnrijj;a "naval volunteers (--in ? the (ircai Lakes." I (luvres are '>rgani/ed u hi to visit the Lake wat Tir.t ..n^ for the benefit of their iy frie He live in a world of rii; » and ■ it. wtiy should the atn emeti' • oriier of things, with uli adaj future as j)rudeiue ma> forer.t«(t Time atid o(c.i-~i v\rll \i> discussion of the ') ^iua* y ' exigencies of the <-l .,ed o 'uh, the prohibition oi constra«t«' n r>rinci]>al source o* trouliie, ' the shijjbuilding establishni Lake shores, to share in thi co. Navy. Is it possible to s.ilisfy thi i^ll wit In it incurring the same dangers as were foreseen, and intended u \i()n n (luircs I muilKd ii» tit the new i: > tin- I'xigcticies of the Tumii ' 1 an> but the briefest ^unt-ment to meet the ! ni'xlern da\s. I supjiose f \ -scls of war is till- 'he very natural desire of ■ h ha\e grown u]) on the 'ii^i of the 1 nited States 18 CniH'*! Stall's, the ImiHrial Navy i^ ii(»i « onstrtH tid on this « of any value. It i^^. howcvir. dirticull to imagine any rcMrit lions which will not In- ojh'U to the siiine obji-ction on ihe jKirl of those who may he j>revenleil hy them from ohiaininK a valuable c-ontrjicl, Tlii^s. it must be remembcTed. w ii>i)ly to shii>s to i)e buill for foreign K'»vemnients as well as for the Inited States. The (lilViculties to be met will be ^re-it. and I eannol atteniiu to offer any satisfaetory solution of them. 1 gladly, however, welaime the oi)]iortunity of sunKeslinn them for the e(msiderati(m of this assembly i.f so much of the most eniinenl legal authority in your eouutry . If my remarks should be the means of lurninj{ your attention to the subject aiul \.)ur wistlont devise provision to attain an object of such iinjKirtance to the welfare of each of our -oimtries, I shall feel that 1 have not idly occupied your time and tor myself shall have obtained a great reward. • .^•rs^^X'^ «!=• "A-. "-'911. -''-•^j*«r-'-;. • ''•''% M-rT'^. 5r~^M?! -rusrwrnssisammi