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Tous les autres exempl«ires originaux sont film6s en commengant par la premidre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernidre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la dernidre image de 'Saque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole ^*^ signifie "A SUIVRE", le syr.ibole V signifie "FIN ". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre filmis d des taux de reduction diffdrents. Lorsque le document est trop gran J pour dtre reproduit en un seul cliche, il est film6 d partir de Tangle supdrieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images ndcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 i ♦ ' 5 6 f 1 I THE STORY OK THK MALAKAND FIELD FORCE 1^ MAI()K-(il.;N,,KAI, SIK 1!IM)„N ni.OOl., K.C.I)., COMM.ANDINC, MAi AK vM, w w ^4/ 'A[.'i\\Vi» !!;:M) [■OkcI: ^* !:•;<* 'I i-. I ^\ .\ u i; ': >.: I'!! f ' V. I r r ni ; Ma ■ s, r; .\.>cs, kT' E.-t*. ,-. i t.'.K'. 'N TO I. ^ 'NOON -' '^^^^ .KKKX. ANn CO. * mtt^ded for rao.l^tion onlv ui Indm atid ^# y.AH'f i.i. -.,.> \i v., i* i M. n i ir Longmans' Colonial Libra >^4/. ••y TflE STORY / OF THE MALAKANI) FIELD FOKCH AN EPISODE OF ERONTIEK VVAK BY WINSTON L. SPENCER CHURCHIU Lteuttnant, the 4th Queen's Own J/ussurs Lord Salishury, Guildhall, 1892 WITH MAPS. PLANS. ETC. TORONTO THE COPP CLARK CO., LIMITED LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 1898 This Edition is intended for circulation only in India and the British Colonies 40':>'> C v^ \J Rr vii Lv ;v;j^ :* THIS BOOK IS INSCKIUEI) TO Major-General Sir BINDOX HLOOD, K.C.B., UNDER WHOSE COMMAND. THE OPERATIONS THEREIN RECORDED, WERE CARRIED OUT; BV WHOSE GENERALSHIP THEV WERE BROnOHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION; AND TO WHOSE KINDNESS, THE AUTHOR IS INDLBTED. FOR THE MOST VALUABLE, AND FASCINATING, EXPERIENCE OF HIS LIFE. I I i ? PREFACE. I HAVE always thought thrt if an author cannot make friends with the reader, and explain his objects, in two or three hundred pages, he is not likely to do so in fifty lines. And yet the temptation of speaking a few words behind the scenes, as it were, is so strong that few writers are able to resist it. I shall not try. While I was attached to the Malakand Field Force I wrote a series of letters for the London Daily Telegraph. The favour- able manner in which these letters were received, encouraged me to attempt a more substantial work. The original letters have been broken up, and 1 have freely availed myself of all pas- sages, phrases, and facts, which seemed ap- propriate. The views they contained have not been altered, though several opinions and expressions, >-hich seemed mild in the invigorating atmosphere of a camp, have vni Preface. been modified, to suit the more temperate climate of peace. I have to thank many gallant officers for the assistance they have given me in the collection of material. They have all asked me not to mention their names, but to accede to this request would rob the story of the Malakand Field Force, of all its bravest deeds, and finest characters. The book does not pretend to deal with the complications of the frontier question, nor to present a complete summary of its phases and features. In the opening chapter I have tried to describe the general character of the numerous and powerful tribes of the Indian Frontier. In the last chapter I have attempted to apply the intelligence of a plain man, to the vast mass of expert evidence, which on this subject is so great, that it staggers reason, baffles memory, and exhausts patience. The rest is narrative, and in it, I have only desired to show the reader the theatre of our operations. As I have not been able to describe in the text, one-tenth of those instances of conduct and courage which occurred, I have included in an appendix, official despatches with the records of official approbation. The impartial critic will at least admit that Preface IX I have not insulted the British public, by writing a party pamphlet, on a great Imperial question. I have recorded the facts as thev occurred, and the impressions as they arose without attempting to make a case against any person or any policy. Indeed, I fear that assailing none, I may have offended all. Neutrality may degenerate into an igno- minious isolation. An honest and unpre- judiced attempt to discern the truth, is my sole defence, as the good opinion of the reader has been throughout my chief aspira- tion, and can be in the end my only support. WiN.sTON L. S. Churchill, Cavalry Barrack.s, Bangalore, 30M Decanter, 1897. "According to the fair play of the world, i/Ct me have audience." "^ingjohn," Act v., Sc. 2. CONTENTS. CHAP. I. The Theatre or- War * ' • • The Scenery-The Flora and Kauna-The Fcople-Their Weapons-Thcir Disposition-Tlie Ambitious Pathan -guarrds with the Britisli-'Iheir Honour- \ Re- deemmg Feature-The Darker Side-The Other Point of View-The Scale of the Work-Its Scope-Its Objects. PAQB I >C. 2. 11. The Malakand Camps Nowshera-The Road to the Malakand-At the Top of the Pass-The Camp- Life on the Frontier-Tlie Swat Valley-The Chitral Road-The Retention of Chitral. 15 III. The Outbreak The Causes — P; rosperity - The Undercurrent-The Means-The Miracles-Rumours of VVar-l>rep'ira tions-The Movable Column -The Storm ftur.r.' IV. The Attack on the Malakand The Surprise-The Defence of the Defile-" Rattray's S.khs"-The Central Position-The Fight for the Quarter Guard- Lieu tenant Costello, V.C.- Repulse of the Enemy-Casualties-Evacuation of the Xor'h Camp-Approach of Reinforcements-The Night of the 27th~The 6■m^^•_Lieutenant Clime's Counter Attack-Merciful Courage-Tlie Night of the 29th- The Repulse of the Enemy-Casualties. 36 49 Xll Contents. \i CHAP. PAGE V. The Relief of Chakdara 76 The Force of Circumstances— Formation of the Malakand Field Force — Sir Bindon Blood — Chakdara in Danger — First Attempt to Relieve Chakdara — Arrival of the Genenl — His Dispositions — The Key of the Position — The Morning of the and of August — Rout of the Enemy — The Cavalry Pursuit — Vengeance — Chak- dara Relieved — Casualties. VI. The Defence of Chakdara go The Fort — The Warning — A Gallop Home — The First Attack — The Cavalry Dash — Continued Assaults — The Signal Tower — Exhaustion of the Defenders — Sepoy Prem Singh — Critical Situation — The Urgent Appeal — The Final Attack — The Cavalry to the Rescue — A Finish in Style — The Casualties. VII. The Gate of Swat 107 Formation of the 3rd Brigade — The Marks cf War — Submission of the Lower Swatis — The Special Force— The Action of Landakai — The Artillery Preparation — The Flank Attack — Capture of the Ridge — Pursuit — A Disastrous Incident — A Gallant Feat of Arms — The Victoria Cross — Knights of the Sword and Pen — Buddhist Remains — The Light of Other Days — Buner — Return of the Troops. VIII. The Advance Against the Mohmands . . 127 Causes of the Expedition — Summary of the Action of Shabkadr — The Forces Employed — General Plan of the Operations — Advance of the Malakand Held Force — The Passage of the Panjkora — Political Aspect of the Country. I IX. Reconnaissance The Jandol Valley— The Seven Khans— Frontier Diplomacy — Barwar — An Afghan Napoleon — Un- practical Reflections — Under the Chenars — The Arms Question— Its Significance — The Utman Khel Passes —A Virgin Valley— A Successful " Bluff"— The Camp at Night. 146 Contents. xui CHAP. X. The March to Nawagai ' • • • • March to Shumshuk-The First Shot-The Koh-i-Mohr -The Rambat Pass-The Watelai Valley-N.-ht of the 14th of September— The Camp at Inayat Kila XI. The Action of the Mamund Valley, i6th Sept. . The Cavalry Skirmish-The Advance on Shahi-Tangi- The Counter Attack-Retirement Down the Spur- Repulse of the Enomy-Second Attack and Capture of Shahi-Tangi-Darkness-The Guides to the Rescue— The Rear-guard— The Night. XII. At Inavat Kila • • • • • The Relief of Bilot-The Story of the Night-Rest and Recuperation-Domodoloh-Zagai-Negotiationsfor Peace— The Situation. PAGE 181 200 XIII. Nawagai " The Light of Asia "-The Strategic Situation-Decision of the General- Rival Inducements— Alarms and Excursions-The Night Attack-The Casualties- Dismay of the Tribes-The Mohmand Field Force- Sir Pertab Singh— Polo as an Imperial Factor— De- parture of the 3rd Brigade. 222 XIV. Back to the Mamund Valley ■ • • » Dulce i9c?w?■/',! r- The F'olitical Oftictrs — Tho Last of Inayat Kila — Matashah — Submission of the Salarzais — The Sikh and the Pathan : A Comparison — The Return to Malakand. XVII. Military Obskrvations 283 Transport — Camps — Attacks — Retirenu'iits — Kmploy- ment of Artillery— Signalling — The I)uni-Dum Bullet —The Military Problem — The Young Soldier — Short Service— The Courage of the Soldier. XVIII. AND LAST. Tm. Riddle of the Frontier . 302 The Question — The "Forward Policy"- Its Present Results — What nughl have t)een — Actuality — The Responsibility — At Sea The Course — Silver 7'. Steel — Looking Backward— The Knd. APPENDIX. Extracts from Official Despatches 315 PAOE , 269 5 — of ais he 283 ,y. iet irt LIST OF MAP). KTC. 302 315 Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., Commanding Malakand Field Force 1. Map of N.W. Frontier of India, showing the Theatre of the War .... 2. Sketch of the Malakand Camps . 3. Rough Sketch of the Cavalry Action of ist August ^. Map of the Operations in Bajaur . 5. Sketch of the Mamund Valley— with plan of the Action of the i^ith September . 6. Rough Sketch explaining the Attack upon Agrah, 30th vSeptember .... Frontispiece facing piifre i M 49 11 76 1. 14O 163 242 I / 70 7:\ - f- Sumh lierutJunR IKhmmiUk W FOKCK K A ¥.i R/l i 35 1 — J4^««rA«» -•/?r^ d K o._h rpool. THE STORY OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE. CHAPTER I. THE THEATRE OE WAR. The Ghilzaie chief wrote answer : " Our paths are narrow and steep. The sun burns fierce in the valleys, and the snow-fed streams run deep ; So a stranger needs safe escort, and the oath of a valiant friend ". " The Amir's Message," Sir A, Lyall. The Scenery— The Eloraand Eauna-The People— Their Weapons —Their Disposition— The Ambitious Pathan— Quarrels with the British— Their Honour— A Redeeming Eeature— The Darker Side— The Other Point of View- Ti.;.- Scale of the Work— Its Scope— Its Objects. All along the north and north-west frontiers of India h'e the Himalayas, the greatest disturbance of the earth's surface that the convulsions of chaotic periods have produced. Nearly 400 miles in breadth and more than 1600 in length, this mountainous re- gion divides the great plains of the south from those of Central Asia, and parts as a channel separates opposing shores,the Eastern Empire of Great Britain I 71 - -^ . i BuT'tJy \ V, Chitralif \ ^. MHO r / KhiiMok i I K A yA R/,1 S ' i'A. N ^ i^ / ^ # I 1 \ i V i [ \ ^' ~ Jl/ifidi-awnf- ■^ ^ — ^ In iiiri ihiryo. J ' x^ I ^Haii'ltimiih / / s ■1 i-.e.!., in ■ ,^^ '^^' Vi^. I . ■" Ml. rj.-^*' d K o h .-^' jo>i,.v'A J, _/l'»ii4Wm'' \P ■' 1^ ^ ■'' .1 .IJ 71 7...<-/,i inv hlii'nliiiii . 1.' _ Loai^ inJ.ARAN!) kI'eLP FOKCK S«u* "lie Mi'i'K ^ Tnl j / p. [.V"'' •' ./-"^f /-/^ VI ! d WmyAxAV. ^y - "p. vd"'^/ In ini't' .hil.'h, ^ \- f or'S>^bi-ri '^o ^i' / ikii ha/ft/ - -:u y .1! 'j.ocl-i I i '^^---v_^- i'ninU jj v.. — . If '^ .-' ,-, .- .y-^::^^^" -'^■--.-.r ^' '-vJ ■ 111— III t i^*W^wri^^ji%hiiMrBfc*->irtj . «i.— ■WfiWL'iat.- .Jt:i(^ -4r.*t«rf»t»tJ 'M X C.' I.Oildoij N'^v. Y.M-k ,>^ b. ;;,!;,•, /■ I'htii^'Si Son, Lott holds to-day: when the true religion strodeproudly through the earth and scorned to lie hidden and neglected among the hills: when mighty princes ruled in Bagdad, and all men knew that there was but one God, and Maiiomkt was I lis prophet. The young warriors as they listen to these words will grip Iheir Martinis, and pray Allah, that one day He will bring some Sahib — best prize of all — across their line of sight, at seven hundred yards, so that they at least may strike a blow for insulted and threatened Islam. The general aspect of the country and character of its inhabitants have thus been briefly described. At this stage it is not necessary or desirable to descend to detail. As the account proceeds the reader may derive a more lively impression of the sombre mountains^ and of the peoples who dwell beneath their shadow. The tale that I have to tell is one of frontier war. Neither the importance of the issues, nor the num- bers of the combatanth, are on an European scale. The fate of empires docs not hang on the result. Yet the narrative may not be without interest, or without material for reflection. In the quarrels of civilised nations, great armies, many thousands strong, collide. Brigades and battalions are hur- ried forward, and come perhaps within some fire zone, swept by concentrated batteries, or massed musketry. Hundreds or thousands fall, killed and The Theatre of War. M wounded. The survivors struggle on blindl)', dazed and Jumfoundered, to the nearest cover. Fresh troops are continuously poured on from behind. At length one side or the other gives way. In all this tumult, this wholesale slaughter, the individual and his feelings are utterly lost, only the army has a tale to tell. With events on such a scale, the hopes and fears, the strength and weakness, of man are alike indistinguishable. Amid the din and dust little but destruction can be discerned. But on the frontier, in the clear light of morning, when the mountain side is dotted with smoke puffs, and every ridge sparkles with bright sword blades, the specta- tor may observe and accurately appreciate all grades of human courage — the wild fanaticism of the Ghasi, the composed fatalism of the Sikh, the stubbornness of the British soldier, and the jaunty daring of his officers. He may remark occasions of devotion and self-sacrifice, of cool cynicism and stern resolve. He may participate in moments of wild enthusiasm, or of savage anger and dismay. The skill of the general, the quality of the troops, the eternal principles of the art of war, will be as clearly displayed as on more historic fields. Only the scale of the statistics is reduced. A single glass of champagne imparts a feeling of exhilaration. The nerves are braced, the imagina- tion is agreeably stirred, the wits become more nimble. A bottle produces a contrary effect. Excess causes a comatose insensibility. So it is with war, and the quality of both is best discovered by sipping. I propose to chronicle the military operations H The Malakand Field Force. I : of the Malakand Field Force, to trace their politi- cal results, and to give, if possible, some picture of the scenery and people of the Indian Highlands. These pages may serve to record the actions of brave and skilful men. They may throw a side- light on the great drama of frontier war. They may describe an episode in that ceaseless struggle for empire which seems to be the perpetual in- heritance of our race. They may amuse an idle hour. But the ambition I shall associate with them is that in some measure, however small, they may stimulate that growing interest which the Imperial Democracy of England is beginning to take, in those great estates that lie beyond the sea, of which they are the proprietors or the trustees. I* I-? 15 CHAPTER II. THE MALAKAND CAMPS. Ibam forte via sacra. Nowshera — The Road to the Malakand — At che Top of the Pass — The Camp — Life on the Frontier — The Swat Valley — The Chitral Road— The Retention of Chitral. The town and cantonment of Nowshera was the base from which all the operations of the Malakand Field Force were conducted. It is situated on the India side of the Cabul River, and is six hours by rail from Rawal Pindi. In times of peace its garrison consists of one native cavalry regiment, one British, and one native infantry battalion. During the war these troops were employed at the front. The barracks became great hospitals. The whole place was crowded with transport and military stores ; and only a slender force remained under tne orders of Colonel Schalch, the Base Commandant. The road from Nowshera to the Malakand Pass and camps is forty-seven miles long, and divided into four stages. Usually there is an excellent tonga service, and the distance is covered in about six hours ; but while the Field Force was mobilised so n ich traffic passed and so many officers went up and down the line, that the tonga ponies were soon reduced to a terrible condition of sores and i6 The Malakand Field Force. emaciation, and could hardly drag the journey out in nine, ten, or even twelve hours. After leaving Nowshera, and crossing the Cabul River, a stage of fifteen miles brings the traveller to Mardan. This place — pronounced Merddne — is the perman- ent station of the Corps of Guid-^s. It is shady and agreeable, though terribly hot in the summer months. It boasts an excellent polo ground and a comfortable rest-house. The passer-by should pause to see the guides* cemetery, perhaps the only regimental cemetery in the world. To this last resting-place under the palm trees, close to the fields where they have played, and the barracks in which they lived, have been borne the bodies of successive generations of these wardens of the marches, killed in action across the frontier line. It is a green and pleasant spot. Nor is there any place in the world where a soldier might lie in braver company. After Mardan the road becomes more dusty, and the surrounding country, barren and arid. The mountains are approached, and as the tonga ad- vances their shapes and colours are more distinctly seen. A few knolls and ridges rising from the level plain, mark the outposts of that great array of hills. Crossing a shallow stream — a tributary of the C'^bul River, /^/rt/rt: — the second stage is reached. In peace time a small mud fort is the only indication, but this is expanded by the proximity of war, to a considerable camp, with an entrenchment around it. Stopping only to change ponies, for it is a forsaken spot, the journey is resumed. The avenue of trees on either side has ceased. The road is seen simply /'■'< The Malakand Camps. 17 in -J i I as a white streak stretching towards the mountains. 4 It is traversed in a sweltering heat and choking '■¥■ I dust. All around the country is red, sterile and \ k ;{| burnt up. In front the great wall of hills rises up dark and ominous ; at length Dargai at the foot of the pass is reached. It is another mud fort, swelled during tht operations into an entrenched camp, and surrounded by a network of barbed wire entangle- ment. The Malakand Pass can now be seen — a great cleft in the line of mountains — and far up the gorge, the outline of the fort that guards it, is distinguishable. The graded road winds up, and with many a turn, the long ascent from Dargai to the top of the pass, The driver flogs the wretched sore-backed ponies tirelessly. At length the summit is neared. The view is one worth stopping to look at. Behind and below, under the haze of the heat, is the wide expanse of open country — smooth, level, stretch- ing away to the dim horizon. The tonga turns the corner, and enters a new world. A cooler breeze is blowing. A single step has led from peace to war ; from civilisation to savagery; from India to the mountains. On ail sides the landscape is wild and rugged. Ridge succeeds ridge. Valley opens into valley. As far as the eye can reach in every direction are jagged peaks and spurs. The country of the plains is left, and we have entered a strange land, as tangled as the maze at Hampton Court, with mountains instead of hedges. So broken and so confused is the ground, that I despair of con- veying a clear impression of it. The Malakand is like a great cup, of which the 1 1 '•• i8 The Malakand Field Force. rim is broken into numerous clefts, and jagged points. At the bottom of this cup, is the crater camp. The deepest cleft is the Malakand Pass. The highest of the jagged points is Guides Hill, on a spur of which the fort stands. It needs no technical knowledge to see, that to defend such a place, the rim of the cup must be held. But in the Malakand, the bottom of the cup is too small to contain the necessary garri.son. The whole position is therefore, from the military point of view, bad and indefensible. In the revised and improved scheme of defence, arrangements have been made, to command the available a[)proaches, and to block such as cannot be commanded with barbed wire entanglements, and other obstructions ; and by a judicious system of works much of the rim is now held. But even now I am told by competent judges that the place is a bad one for defence ; that the pass could be held by the fort alone, and that the brigade stationed there would be safer, and equally useful, if withdrawn to Dargai. At the time this story opens the Malakand South Camp was an impossible place to put troops in. It was easy of access, it was cramped, and com- manded by neighbouring heights. Tlie small area of the camp on the Kotal neces- sitated the formation of a second encampment in the plain of Khar, This was about two miles from the pass, and though it was close to Khar village, was called for political reasons North Malakand. The position of this camp was probably much stronger than that on the Kotal. Though sit- uated in broken ground, and among rocks and The Malakand Camps. 19 )s m. com- leces- nt in from lage, us "I I I villages, some of which contain large populations, are scattered about. It is a beautiful scene. The cool breezes of the mountains temper the heat of the sun. The abundant rains preserve the verdure of the earth. In ancient times this region was the seat of a Buddhistic kingdom, and was known as Woo- Chang or " Udyana," which means " the Park," and proclaims the appreciation, which its former pos- sessors had of their pleasant valley. " The people," says the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hien, who visited the country in the fifth century, " all use the language of Central India, * Central India ' being what we should call the ' Middle Kingdom '. The food and clothes of the common people are the same as in that Central Kingdom. The law of Buddha is very flourishing in Woo-Chang." " The Park," which includes all the country on both banks of the Swat River — then called the Subhavastu — but which was perhaps applied more particularly to the upper end of the valley, was famous for its forests, flowers and fruit. But though the valley retains much of its beauty, its forests have been destroyed by the improvidence, and its flowers and fruit have declined through the ignorance, of the fierce conquerors into whose hands it fell. The reputation which its present inhabitants enjoy is evil. Their treacherous character has dis- tinguished them even among peoples notoriously faithless and cruel. Among Pathans it is a common saying : " Swat is heaven, but the Swatis are hell-fiends". For many years they had lain under the stigma of cowardice, and were despised 22 1 !i, r'. 11 The Malakand Field Force. as well as distrusted by the tribes of the border ; but their couduct iti the recent fightini^ has cleared them at least from this imputation. Several minor chieftains now divide authority in the Swat Valley, but till 1870 it was governed by a single ruler. The Ahkund of Swat was by origin a cowherd : an office considered most honourable in India. The cow is a sacred beast. His service is acceptable to the Gods and men. Princes glory in the name — though they do not usually carry their enthusiasm further. "Guicowar" translated literally means " cowherd ". From such employment the future Ahkund received his inspiration. He sat for many years by the banks of the Indus, and meditated. Thus he became a saint. The longer his riparian reflections were continued, the greater his sanctity became. The fame of his holiness spread throughout all the region. The Swatis be- sought him to come and live in their valley. After dignified and diplomatic reluctance, he consented to exchange the banks of the Indus, for those of the Swat. For some years, he lived in the green valley, and enjoyed the reverence of its people. At the time of the great mutiny, Said Akbar, the King of Swat, died, and the saint succeeded to the temporal as well as the spiritual authority. In 1863 he preached the y^//^;^ against the British, and headed the Swatis and Bunerwals in the Ambeyla campaign. The power which the Sirkar so extravagantly dis- played to bring the war to an end, evidently im- pressed the old man, for at its close he made fnends with the Government and received from them many tokens of respect. The Malakand Camps. 23 Before he died in 1870, he summoned his people around him atul declared to them that one day their vailey would be the scene of a strui^^ie be- tween tiie Russians and the British. When that came he charged them to fight on our side. The saying is firmly fixed in thi? hearts of the tribes- men, and is associated with the memor)- of their famous priest, known to luiglish minds chief!)' through the medium of the " Bab Ballatls ". His two sons are dead, but his two grandsons, both quite young, live on in the valley, and are the owners of the Ahkund's freeholds, which are in every section of the Swat country. They have very little political influence ; but their persons and property are respected by the people and by the British for the sake of their grandfather, who sleeps in an odour of sanctity at Saidu, near MiNOAOkA. From the Malakand the signal tower of Chak- dara can be seen eight mi'es away to the eastward. Thither the broad graded road runs like a ribbon across the plain. Seven miles from the Kotal Camp, it cros.ses the Amandara Pass, a gap in a consider- able underfeature, which juts from the southern mountains. After this it turp.<^ more to the north and leads to the fortified bridge across the river. I invite the reader to remark this road, for it is historic. It is not only the route by which the Malakand Field F'orce was able to advance, but it is the very reason of their existence. Without this road there would have been no Malakand Camps, no fighting, no Malakand Field Force, no story. It is the road to Chitral. Here then, at once, the whole vast question of 24 The Malakand Field Force. frontier policy is raised. We hold the Malakand Pass to keep the Chitral road open. We keep the Chitral road open because we have retained Chitral. We retain Chitral in accordance with the " forward policy ". I am thus confronted at the very outset of this book, which was intended to be devoted chiefly to the narration of military events, and small incidents, with that wide political question, on which the keenest intellects in England are in doubt, and the most valuable expert evidence in India is divided. The reader must not think me pusillanimous or weak if I postpone the discussion of so great and controversial a matter, till a later chapter, when I may perhaps enjoy a larger measure of his sympathy and agreement. After the story has been told, it may be not inappropriate to point the moral. Prudence encourages pro- crastination. But while the consideration of the advisability of the retention of Chitral may be deferred, a description of the means is convenient if not necessary to the present chapter. Nowshera is the railway base of the road. Thence we have followed it to Mardan and across the frontier. Here the new and disputed portion begins. Passing at first through the Lower Ranizai country, it climbs the Malakand Pass, descends into the valley beyond and runs thence through Upper Ranizai territory and Lower Swat to Chakdara. Here it crosses the Swat River by the fine suspension bridge which the fort guards. The three spans of this bridge are together nearly I5(X) feet long. It was constructed in 1895, during the operations, in about six weeks, and is a very remarkable piece of military engineer- The Malakand Camps. 2^ the be nient lera nave tier. sing mbs ond ory the the are ted ^ks, jer- ing. Beyond the Swat the road runs, through the territories of the Khan of Dir, north and cast to Sadu, an obscure village thirty-five miles from Malakand. This marks the end of the first section, and further than this, wheeled traffic cannot go. The road, now become a camel track, winds along the left bank of the Panjkora River to within five miles of Dir, where it crosses to the right bank by another suspension bridge. Thence it continues to the junction of the Dir stream, along which it finds its way to Dir itself, some fifty miles from Sadu. Beyond Dir camels cannot go ; and here begins the third section — a path practicable only for mules, and about sixty miles long. From Dir the road is a triumph of engineering. In many places it is carried on wooden galleries perched on the faces of steep and tremendous cliffs, and at others it works round spurs by astounding zig-zags, or is .scarped from the mountain side. At the end of the road is Fort Chitral with a garrison of two battalions, one company of sappers, and two mountain guns. The road is maintained and protected by the tribes through whose territories it passes ; but the two principal points where it might be closed are held by imperial garrisons. The Malakand Fort guards the passage of the mountains. Chakdara holds the bridge across the river. The rest is left to the tribal levies. The Ranizai tribe receive an annual subsidy from the Indian Government of 30,000 rupees, out of which they maintain 200 irregulars armed with sniders, and irreverently called by the British officers, " Catch-'em-alive-Os ". The.se drive away marauders and discourage out- 26 The Malakand Field Force. ^ i :i ., I ; rage and murder. The Khan of Dir, throufjli whose territory it runs for seventy-three miles, also receives a subsidy from Government of 60,000 rupees, in consideration of which he provides 400 irregulars for the service of the road. Until the great rising these arrangements worked admirabl)'. The tribesmen interested in the main- tenance of the route, were most reluctant to engage in hostilities against the Government. The Lower Ranizais, south of Malakand, abstained altogether. The elders of the tribe collected all the arms of their hot-headed youths, and forbade them to attack the troops. The Upper Ranizais v/ere nearer the scene of the disturbance, and were induced by superstition and fear to join the Mullah ; but very half-heartedly. The Swatis were carried awa^ fanaticism. The Khan of Dir throughout behc...-u loyally, as he is entirely dependent on British support, and his people realise the advantages of the subsidy. If the road is interesting its story is more so, and a summary of the events and causes which have led to its construction, may also throw some light on the political history and methods of the border tribes. The uncertainty and insecurity of their power, has always led petty chiefs to seek the support of some powerful suzerain. In 1876 the Mehtar of Chitral, Amman-al-Mulk, was encouraged to seek the protection, and become the vassal of our vassal, the Maharaja of Cashmere. In accord- ance with the general scheme of advance, then already adopted by the Indian Government, a British agency was at once established at Gilgit on the Chitral-Cashmere frontier. Amman-al-Mulk The MalikaFid Camps. 27 iged i\ of lord- Ihen a ilgit ulk was presented with a certain supply of arms and amniunition, and an annual subsidy ol^fxx) ruj)«H's, afterwards raised to I2,cx)0 rupees. 'I'he Hntish thus obtained an interest in Clu'tral, and a point of observation on its borders. In 1881 the agenc)- was withdrawn, but tlie influence remained, and in 1889 it was re-establislied with a much larger garrison. Meanwhile Amman-al-iMulU ruled in Chitral, showing great respect to the wishes of the Government, and in the enjoyment of his subsidy and comparative peace. Hut in 1892 he tlied, leaving many sons, all equally ferocious, ambitious and unscrupulous. One of these, Afzal by name, though not the eldest or acknowledged heir, had the good fortune to be on the spot. He seized the reins of power, and having murdered as man}- of his brothers as he could catch, proclaimed himself Mehtar, and invited the recognition of the Indian Government. He was acknowledged chief, as he seemed to be "a man of courage and determina- tion," and his rule afforded a prospect of settled government. His surviving brothers fled to neigh- bouring states. Nizam, the eldest, came to Gilgit and appealed to the British. He got no help. The blessing had already been bestowed. But in November, 1892, Shere Afzul, a brother of the late Amman, returned by stealth to Chitral, whence fraternal affection had driven him, and killed the new Mehtar and another brother, both of whom were his nephews. The " wicked uncle," then ascended the throne, or its equivalent. He was, however, opposed. The Indian Government refused to recognise him. Nizam, at 28 The Malakand Field Force. Gilgit, urged his claims. Finally, Nizam was allowed to go and try to regain his inheritance. The moral support of 250 Cashmere rifles brought him many adherents. He was joined by the people. It was the landing of William of Orange on a re- duced scale, and with Cashmere troops instead of Dutch Guards. Twelve hundred men sent by Shere Afzul to oppose him, deserted to his side. The avuncular usurper, realising that it might be dangerous to wait longer, fled to Afghanistan, as James II. had fled to France, was received by the ruler with hospitality, and carefully preserved as an element of future disorder. Nizam now became Mehtar according to his desire. But he did not greatly enjoy his power, and may have evolved some trite reflections on the vanity of earthly ambition. From the first he was poor and unpopular. With the support of the Government of India, however, he managed to maintain a weak, squalid rule for a space. To give him countenance, and in accordance with the policy, Captain Younghusband was .sent to the country with a hundred bayonets. The Gilgit garrison was increased by a battalion, and several posts were established between thit place and Mastuj. Thus the imperial forces had entered Chitral. Their position was soon to become one of danger. They were separated from Gilgit by many miles of bad road, and warlike tribesmen. To move troops from Gilgit, would always be slow and difficult. Another route was however possible — a route northwards from Peshawar through Dir — shorter and easier, starting from British territory and the s The Malakand Camps. 29 tral. |ops ult. lute ^ter the^ railway. Towards this h'ne of communication the Indian Government now looked. If British troops or agents were to be retained in Chitral, if in other words their recognised policy was to be continued, this route must be opened up. They sounded the Home Government. Lord Kimberley replied, de- precating increase of responsibilities, of territory and expenditure, and declining to pledge himself to support such a scheme. At the same time he sanctioned the temporary retention of the troops, and the agent, in the hopes of strengthening Nizam.^ At this point Umra Khan must enter the story. The Gilgit agency report, dated 28th April, 1890, speaks of this chief, who was the Khan of Jandol, but whose influence pervaded the whole of Bajour as " the most important man between Chitral and Peshawar". To this powerful ruler, another of the sons of Amman, named Amir, had fled from the family massacre, which followed his father's death. Umra Khan protected him and determined io turn him to his own advantage. In May, 1894, tiis youth — he was about twenty years of age — returned to Chitral, professing to have escaped from the hands of Umra Khan and was kindly received by Nizam, who seems to have been much hampered throughout his career by his virtue. On 1st Januar)', 1895, Amir availed himself of his welcome, to murder his brother, and the principal members of the Chitral Cabinet. He proclaimed himself Mehtar and asked for recognition. The imperial officers, though used to frontier politics, refused to commit themselves to any arrangement * Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 34, ist Sept., 1893. 30 The Malakand Field Force. ! with such a villain, until the matter had been con- sidered in India. Umra Khan now advanced with a large force to the head of the Chitral Valley, nominally to assist his dear friend and ally, Amir, to consolidate his rule, really in the hopes of extending his own territories. But Amir, knowing Umra well, and having got his kingdom, did not desire to share it. Fighting ensued. The Chitralis were beaten. As he could not make any use of Amir, Umra Khan invited the wicked uncle to return. Shere Afzul accepted. A bargain was struck. Shere Afzul claimed to be made Mehtar. Umra supported his claims. Both threatened force in the event of opposition. But the Imperial Government rose in wrath, refused to have anything to do with the new claimant, and informed him that his language was impertinent, and warned Umra Khan to leave Chitral territory forthwith or take the consequences. The answer was war. The scanty garrisons, and scattered parties of l^ritish troops were attacked. A company of the 14th Sikhs was cut to pieces. Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes were taken prisoners. Fort Chitral, into which the rest of the Chitral mission and their escort had thrown them- selves, was closely and fiercely besieged. To rescue them was imperative. The ist Division ol the Field Army was mobilised. A force of nearly 16,000 men crossed the frontier on the 1 st April, from Mardan, to advance to the relief by the shortest route — the route through Swat and Dir — the line of the present Chitral wall. The command of the The Malakand Camps. 31 con- vrath, new was leave nces. and ked. eces. laken the lem- To n of arly "rom test line the expedition was confided to Sir Robert Low. Sir Bindon Blood was Chief of the Staff. So far the tale has been of the steady increase of British influence, in accordance with an avowed and consistent policy — primarily in Chitral, and ultimately throughout the border tribe.s. One movement has been followed by another. All have been aimed at a common end. Now suddenly we are confronted with an act by which the Govern- ment of India with open eyes placed an obstacle in the path, which they had so long pursued, and to follow which they had made so many efforts themselves and demanded so many sacrifices from their subjects. Perhaps from compunction, but probably to soothe the Liberal Government, by appearing to localise the disturbances, and disclaim- ing any further acquisition of territory, they issued a proclamation to "all the people of Swat and the people of Bajans who do not side with Umra Khan," in which they declared that they had " no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct" might " force them to pass, or of interfering with the inde- pendence of the tribes "} If this proclamation was intended for political purposes in England, it, from one pent of view, succeeded most admirably, for there has been nearly as much written about it as about all the soldiers who have been killed and wounded in the war. It had, however, no effect upon the tribesmen, who were infuriated by the sight of the troops and paid no attention to the protestations of the Government. ^ Proclamation, 14th March, 1895. % 32 The Malakand Field Force. Had they watched with care the long, steady, de- liberate advance, which I have so briefly summarised ; had they read the avowed and recorded determina- tion of the Indian Administration "to extend and, by degrees, to consolidate their influence " ^ in the whole drainage system of the Indus, they might have even doubted their sincerity. Instead, and being unable to make fine distinctions, they saw only invasion in the military movements. They gathered accordingly, to oppose the ad- vance of the troops. To the number of 12,000 they occupied the Malakand Pass — a tremendous position. From this they were driven with great slaughter on the 3rd of April, by the two leading brigades of Sir Robert Low's force. Further operations resulted in the passage of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers being effected. The road to Chitral was open. But the fort had already been relieved from Gilgit. Umra Khan fled to Afghani- stan, and the question of future policy camij before the Government of India. Two alternatives presented themselves : either they must ** abandon the attempt to keep * up any effective control ' " over Chitral, or they must put a sufficient garrison there. In pursuance of their recognised policy, the Council decided unanimously that to maintain British influence in Chitral was " a matter of first importance ". In a despatch '^ to the Home Government they set forth all their reasons, and at the same time declared that it was impos- ' Letter from Government of India, No. 407, 28th February, 1879. "^ Despatch of Government of India, No. 240, 8th May, 1895. The Malakand Camps. 33 ther my |put leir ,sly a Ithe >ns, los- P95- sible to garrison Chitral without keeping up the road from Peshawar, by which the relief force had advanced. On the 13th of June Lord Rosebery's Cabinet re- plied decisively, with courage if not with wisdom, that " no military force or European agent should be kept at Chitral, that Chitral should not be fortified, and that no road should be made between Pesha- war and Chitral ". By this they definitely and finally repudiated the policy, which had been con- sistently followed since 1876. They left Chitral to stew in its own juice. They overruled the Govern- ment of India. It was a bold and desperate attempt to return to the old frontier line. The Indian Government replied: "We deeply regret but loyally accept decision," and began to gather up the severed strings of their policy and weave another web. But in the nick of time the Liberal Government fell, and Lord Salisbury's Cabinet reversed their decision. It is interesting, in reading the Blue Books on Indian questions, to watch the emotions of party principles, stirring beneath the uniform mask of official responsibility — which the most reckless of men are compelled to wear as soon as they become ministers. The language, the style, the tone of the correspondence is the same. It is always a great people addressing, and instructing their pro- consuls, and administrators. But the influence inclines backwards, or forwards, as the pendulum of politics swings. And as the swing in 1895 was a very great one, a proportionate impulse was given to the policy of advance. "It seemed " to the new 3 l\ •'H ni; 34 The Malakand Field Force. ministry ** that the poh'cy . . . continuously pur- sued by successive Governments ought not to be lightly abandoned unless its maintenance had be- come clearly impossible ".^ Thus the retention of Chitral was sanctioned, and the road which that retention necessitated was made. I approach with nervousness so great a matter as the "Breach of Faith" question. In a book devoted chiefly to the deeds of soldiers it seems almost presumptuous to discuss an affair which involves the political honour of statesmen. In their unnecessary and gratuitous proclamation the Government of India declared, that they had no intention of interfering with the tribes, or of per- manently occupying any territory, the troops might march through ; whereas now they do interfere with the tribesmen, aud have established garrisons at Dargai, Malakand, Khar and Chakdara, all of which are in the territory through which the troops passed. But it takes two to make a bargain or a breach of faith. The tribes took no notice of the proclamation. They did not understand it. They did not believe it. Where there is no faith there can be no breach of faith. The border peoples resisted the advance. That opposition annulled the proclamation, and proved that it was not credited by the tribesmen. They do not think they have been tricked. They do not regard the road as a " breach of faith ". What they do regard it as, is a menace to their independence, and a pre- lude to annexation. Nor are they wrong. Look- ing at the road, as I have seen it, and have tried ^ Despatch, Secretary of State, No. 30, i6th Aug., 1895. sly pur- )t to be had be- ition of ch that matter a book : seems which en. In :ion the ^lad no of per- i might re with ons at all of troops "ain or tice of ind it. o faith border Dsition it was think -d the *egard a pre- Look- '■ tried 95- The Malakand Camps. 3^ to describe it running broad and white across the valey; at the soldiers moving along it; at the pohtical officers extending their influence in all directions ; at the bridge and fort of Chakdara ; and at the growmg cantonment on the Malakand Pass It needs no education to appreciate its significance' Nor can any sophistry obscure it fl 36 CHAPTER III. THE OUTBREAK. Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum. Lucretius, The Causes — Prosperity — The Undercurrent — The Means — The Miracles — Rumours of War — Preparations — The Movable Column— Tne Storm Bursts. The historian of great events is always oppressed by the difficulty of tracing the silent, subtle in- fluences, which in all communities precede and pre- pare the way for violent outbursts and uprisings. He may discover many causes and record them duly, but he will always be sensible that others have escaped him. The changing tides of public opinion, the undercurrents of interest, partisanship and caprice, the whirlpools of illogical sentiment or ignorant prejudice, exert forces so complex and numerous, that to observe and appreciate them all, and to estimate the effect of each in raising the storm, is a task beyond the intellect and industry of man. The chronicler of small things lies under even greater disabilities. He has fewer facts to guide his judgment, nor is it as easy to read small print as capital letters. In an attempt to state the causes of the great tribal upheaval of 1897, these difficulties are increased by the fact that no European can gauge the motives The Outbreak. 37 2TIUS, ins— The Movable pressed btle in- nd pre- irisings. them others public >anship lent or and m all, ng the istry of under lets to small X tribal sed by lotives or assume the points of view of Asiatics. It is, however, impossible to pass the question by, and ignoring the detail, I shall endeavour to indicate some at least of the most important and apparent forces, which have led to the formidable combina- tion, with which the British power in INDIA has been confronted. The most marked incident " in the forward policy " has been the retention of CllITRAL. The garrisons, the road, the tribal levies have made the tribesmen realise the proximity and the advance of civilisation. It is possible — even probable — that with all their love of independence, the majority of the inhabitants of the mountains would have been willing, until their liberties were actually curtailed, to remain in passive submission, soothed by the increase of material prosperity. During the two years that the British flag had floated over Chak- DARA and the Malakand the trade of the Swat Valley had nearly doubled. As the sun of civilisa- tion rose above the hills, the fair flowers of com- merce unfolded, and the streams of supply and demand, hitherto congealed by the frost of bar- barism, were thawed. Most of the native population were content to bask in the genial warmth and enjoy the new-found riches and comforts. For two years reliefs had gone to and frr n ClllTRAL with- out a shot being fred, not a post-bag had been .stolen, not a messenger murdered. The political officers riding about freely among the fierce hill men were invited to settle many disputes, which would formerly have been left to armed force. But a single class had viewed with quick in- 38 The Malakand Field Force. telligence and intense hostility the approach of the British power. The priesthood of the Afghan border instantly recognised the full meaning of the Chitral road. The cause of their antagonism is not hard to discern. Contact with civilisation assails the superstition, and credulity, on which the wealth and influence of the Mullah depend. A general combination of the religious forces of Indl against that civilising, educating rule, which unconsciously saps the strength of superstition, is one of the dangers of the future. Here Mahom- medanism was threatened and resisted. A vast, but silent agitation was begun. Messengers passed to and fro among the tribes. Whispers of war, a holy war, were breathed to a race intensely passionate and fanatical. Vast and mysterious agencies, the force of which are incomprehensible to rational minds, were employed. More astute brains than the wild valleys of the North produce conducted the preparations. Secret encourage- ment came from the South — from India itself. Actual support and assistance was given from Cabul. In that strange half light of ignorance and superstition, assailed by supernatural terrors and doubts, and lured by hopes of celestial glory, the tribes were taught to expect prodigious events. Something was coming. A great day for their race and faith was at hand. Presently the moment would arrive. They must watch and be ready. The mountains became as full of explosives as a magazine. Yet the spark was lacking. At length the time came. A strange combina- The Outbreak. 39 and and , the /ents. their ment eady. as a bina- tion ot circumstances operated to improve the opportunity. The victory of the Turks over the Greeks ; the publication of the Amir's book on " Jehad " ; bis assumption of the position of a Caliph of Islam, and much indiscreet writing in the Anglo-Indian press, united to produce a '* boom " in Mahommedanism. The moment was propitious ; nor was the man wanting. What Peter the Hermit was to the regular bishops and cardinals of the Church, the Mad Mullah was to the ordinary priesthood of the Afghan border. A wild enthusiast, convinced alike of his Divine mission and miraculous powers, preached a crusade, or jEHAD, against the infidel. The mine was fired. The flame ran along the ground. The explosions burst forth in all direc- tions. The reverberations have not yet died away. Great and widespread as the preparations were, they were not visible to the watchful diplomatic agents who maintained the relation of the Govern- ment with the tribesmen. So extraordinary is the inversion of ideas and motives among these people that it may be said that those who know them best know them least, and the more logical the mind of the student the less he is able to under- stand of the subject. In any case among those able men who diligently collected information and observed the state of feeling, there were none who realised the latent forces that were being accumu- lated on all sides. The strange treachery at Maizar in June was a flash in the pan. Still no one saw the danger. It was not until the early 40 The Malakand Field Force. days of July that it was noticed that there was a fanatical movement in Upper Swat. Even then its significance was disregarded and its importance underrated. That a Mad Fakir had arrived was known. His power was still a secret. It did not long remain so. It is, thank heaven, difficult if not impossible for the modern European to fully appreciate the force which fanaticism exercises among an ignorant, war- like and Oriental population. Several generations have elapsed since the nations of the West have drawn the sword in religious controversy, and the evil memories of the gloomy past, have soon faded in the strong, clear light of Rationalism, and human sympathy. Indeed it is evident that Christianity, however degraded and distorted by cruelty and in- tolerance, must always exert a modifying influence on men's passions, and protect them from the more violent forms of fanatical fever, as we are protected from smallpox by vaccination. But the Mahom- medan religion increases, instead of lessening, the fury of intolerance. It was originally propagated by the sword, and ever since, its votaries have been subject, above the people of all other creeds, to this form of madness. In a moment the fruits of patient toil, the prospects of material prosperity, the fear of death itself, are flung aside. The more emotional Pathans are powerless to resist. All rational con- siderations are forgotten. Seizing their weapons, they become Ghazis — as dangerous and as sensible as mad dogs : fit only to be treated as such. While the more generous spirits among the tribesmen, be- come convulsed in an ecstasy of religious blood- The Outbreak. 41 thirstiness, poorer and more material souls, derive additional impulses from the influence of others, the hopes of plunder and the joy of fighting. Thus whole nations are roused to arms. Thus the Turks repel their enemies, the Arabs of the Soudan break the British squares, and the rising on the Indian frontier spreads far and wide. In each case civilisa- tion is confronted with militant Mahommedanism. The forces of progress clash with those of reaction. The religion of blood and war is face to face with that of peace. Luckily the religion of peace is usually better armed. The extraordinary credulity of the people is hardly conceivable. Had the Mad Mullah called on them to follow him to attack Malakand and Chakdara they would have refused. Instead he worked miracles. He sat at his house, and all who came to visit him, brought him a small offering of food or money, in return for which he gave them a little rice. As his stores were continually re- plenished, he might claim to have fed thousands. He asserted that he was invisible at night. Looking into his room, they saw no one. At these things they marvelled. Finally he declared he would destroy the infidel. He wanted no help. No one should share the honours. The heavens would open and an army would descend. The more he pro- tested he did not want them, the more exceedingly they came. Incidentally he mentioned that they would be invulnerable ; other agents added argu- ments. I was shown a captured scroll, upon which the tomb of the Ghazi — he who has killed an in- fidel — is depicted in heaven, no fewer than seven h I 42 The Malakand Field Force. I !• I degrees above the Caaba itself. Even after the fighting — when the tribesmen reeled bar': from the terrible army they had assailed, leaving a quarter of their number on the field — the faith of the sur- vivors was unshaken. Only those who had doubted had perished, said the Mullah, and displayed a bruise which was, he informed them, the sole effect of a twelve-pound shrapnel shell on his sacred person. I pass with iclief from the tossing sea of Cause and Theory to the firm ground of Result and Fact. The rumours and reports which reached the Mala- kand of the agitation in Upper Swat and among the surrounding tribes were fully appreciated by the Pathan Sepoys of the garrison. As July ad- vanced, several commanding officers were warned by their men, that great events were impenc ''ng. Major Deane, the political agent, watched with great anxiety, the daily progress of the fanatical movement. No one desires to be thought an alarmist, least of all on the frontier where there 's always danger. At length, however, he felt com- pelled to officially report the disquieting signs. Warnings were then issued to the officers in charge of the various posts, and the troops were practised in taking up alarm stations. By the 23rd of July all had been infornr!,ed that the aspect of affairs was threatening, and ordered to observe every pre- caution. But to the last everybody doubted that there would be a rising, nor did any one imagine that even should one occur, it would lead to more than a skirmish. The natives were friendly and respectful. The valley smiled in fertile prosperity. Tlie Outbreak. 43 It was not strange, that none could foresee the changes a week would bring, or guess that in a few days they would be fighting for their lives ; that they would carry fire and sword through the peace- ful landscape ; that the polo ground would be the scene of a cavalry charge, or that the cheery bar- barians among whom they had lived quietly for so many months would become maddened and fero- cious savages. Never was transformation scene more complete, or more rapid. And all the while the rumours of coming war grew stronger and stronger The bazaars of India, like the London coffee-houses of the last century, are always full of marvellous tales — the invention of fertile brains. A single unimportant fact is exaggerated, and distorted, till it becomes unrecognisable. From it, a thousand wild, illogical, and fantastic conclusions, are drawn. These again are circulated as facts. So the game goes on. But amid all this falsehood, and idle report, there often lies important information. The bazaar stories not only indicate the state of native opinion, but not infrequently contain the germ of truth. In Eastern lands, news travels by strange channels, and often with unaccountable rapidity. As July advanced the bazaar at Malakand, became full of tales of the Mad Fakir. His miracles passed from mouth to mouth, with suitable additions. A great day for Islam was at hand. A mighty man had arisen to lead them. The English would be swept away. By the time of the new moon, not one would re- main. The Great Fakir had mighty armies concealed 44 The Malakand Field Force. i ! i I among the mountains. When the moment came these would sally forth— horse, foot and artillery — and destroy the infidel. It was even stated that the Mullah had ordered that no one should go near a certain hill lest the heavenly hosts, should be prematurely revealed. So ran the talk. But among all these frothy fabrications there lay a solemn warning. Though the British military and political officers were compelled to take official notice of the reports received with reference to the tribal gathering, and to make arrangements for the safety of their posts, they privately scouted the idea that any serious events were impending. On the afternoon of the 26th July, the subalterns and younger officers of the Malakand garrison, pro- ceeded to Khar to play polo. Thither also came Lieutenant Rattray, riding over from Chakdara fort. The game was a good one, and the tribes- men of the neighbouring village, watched it as usual in little groups, with a keen interest. Nothing in their demeanour betrayed their thoughts or in- tentions. The young soldiers saw nothing, knew nothing, and had they known would have cared less. There would be no rising. If there was, so much the better. The\' were ready for it. The game ended, and the officers cantered back to their camps and posts. It was then that a strange incident occurred — an incident eminently characteristic of the frontier tribes. As the syces were putting the rugs and clothing on the polo ponies, and loitering about the ground after the game, the \\ etching natives drew The Outbreak. 45 near, and advised them to be off home at once, for that there was going to be a fight. They knew, these Pathans, what was coming. The wave of fanaticism was sweeping down the valley. It would carry them away. They were powerless to resist. Like one who feels a fit coming on, they waited. Nor did they care very much when the Mad Fakir arrived. They would fight and kill the infidels. In the meantime there was no necessity to deprive them of thei. )onies. And so with motives, partly callous, partly sportsmanlike, and not without some faint suspicion of chivalry, they warned the native grooms, and these taking the hint reached the camp in safety. Late on this same afternoon Major Deane re- ported to Brigadier- General Meiklejohn, who com- manded the Malakand garrison, that matters had assumed a very grave aspect ; that a great armed gathering had collected around the Mad Mullah's standard, and that an attack was probable. He advised that the Guides should be called up to reinforce the brigade. A telegram was immediately despatched to Mak \n ordering them to march without delay. At 8-30 LIEUTENANT P. Eliott- LOCKHART, who was the senior officer then with the regiment, received the order. At i'30 A.M. they began their now famous march. After sending for the Guides, the brigadier, at about seven o'clock, interviewed his different com- manding officers, and instructed them to be pre- pared to turn out at any moment. Major Deane now reported that the Mad Mullah and his gathering were advancing down the valley, and 46 The Malakand Field Force. p I recommended that the Amandara Pass, four miles away, should be held. GENERAL Meiklejohn accordingly issued orders for a movable column, to be formed as follows : — 45th Sikhs. 2 Cos. 31st Punjab Infantry. 2 Guns No 8 Mountain Battery. I Squadron nth Bengal Lancers. This force, under Cv,mmand of Lieutenant-Colonel McRae, 45th Sikhs, was to start at midnight and would be supported by the rest of the troops under command of the brigadier at 3 A.M. All preparations were swiftly made. At 9"45, a telegram from Chakdara — which got through just before the wire was cut — reported that large forces of Pathans were rapidly moving towards the camps. A quarter of an hour later a Jemadar of the Levies galloped in with the news that, to quote the official despatch : " The Fakir had passed Khar and was advancing on Malakand, and that neither Levies nor people would act against him, and that the hills to the east of the camp were covered with Pathans". As soon as the officers had returned from polo, they found plenty of work waiting for them. Bandsmen and boys incapable of carrying arms had to be hurried up to the fort. Indents had to be made out for transport, rations and ammunition. There was much to do, and little time to do it in. At length all was finished, and the troops were in readiness for their early morning start. At 9-30 the officers sat down to dinner, still in their polo kit, which there had I The Outbreak. 47 been no time to change. At lO o'clock they were discussing the prospects of the approaching march, and eagerly weighing the chances of a skirmish. The more sanguine asserted that there would be a fight: a small one it was true ; but still a skirmish. Many of those who had never been in action before congratulated themselves on the ur looked -for opportunity. The older and more experienced regarded the matter in the light of a riot. They might have to fire on the tribesmen, but Swatis were such cowards that they would never stand up to the troops — still it was a chance. Suddenly in the stillness of the night a bugle- call sounded on the parade ground of the crater camp. Every one sprang up. It was the " As- sembly". For a moment there was silence while the officers seized their swords and belts and hurriedly fastened them on. Several thinking that it was merely the warning for the movable column to fall in, waited to light their cigarettes. Then from many quarters the loud explosion of musketry burst forth, a sound which for six days and nights was to know no intermission. The attack on the Malakand and the great frontier war had begun. The noise of firing echoed among the hills. Its echoes are ringing still. One valley caught the waves of sound and passed them to the next, till the whole wide mountain region rocked with the confusion of the tumult. Slender wires and long- drawn cables carried them to the far-off countries of the West. Distant populations on the Continent of Europe thought that in them they detected the 48 The Malakand Field Force. dull, discordant tones of decline and fall. Families in English homes feared that the detonations marked the death of those they loved — sons, brothers or husbands. Diplomatists looked wise, economists anxious, stupid people mysterious and knowledge- able. All turned to have the noise stopped. But that was a task which could not be accomplished until thousands of lives had been sacrificed and millions of money spent. Families ; marked »thers or Dnomists jwledge- ;d. But npHshed ced and t.ri 49 e •J? .! CHAPTER IV. THE ATTACK ON THE MALAKAND. Cry " Havoc " and let slip the dogs of war. "Julius CiESAR," Act iii., Sc. i. The Surprise— The Defence of the Defile— " Rattray's Sikhs"— The Central Position — The Fight for the Quarter Guard — Lieutenant Costello, V.C. — Repulse of the Enemy— Casualties — Evacuation of the North Camp — Approach of Reinforce- ments — The Night of the 27th — The Serai — Lieutenant Climo's Counter Attack — Merciful Courage — The Night of the 29th — The Repulse of the Enemy — Casualties. It has long been recognised by soldiers of every nation that, to resist a vigorous onslaught by night, is almost the hardest task that troops can be called upon to perform. Panics against which few brave men are proof, arise in a moment from such situa- tions. Many a gallant soldier has lost his head. Many an experienced officer has been borne down unheeded by a crowd of fugitives. Regiments that have marched unflinchingly to almost certain death on the battlefield, become in an instant terrified and useless. In the attack on the Malakand camp, all the elements of danger and disorder were displayed. The surprise, the darkness, the confused and broken nature of the ground ; the unknown numbers of the enemy ; their merciless ferocity ; every appalling circumstance was present. But 4 i I \\ ( I "\ 50 The Makkand Field Force. there were men who were equal to the occasion. As soon as the alarm sounded Lieutenant-Colonel McRae of the 45th Sikhs, a holder of the Gok Medal of the Royal Humane Society and of long experience in Afghanistan and on the Indian frontier, ran to the Quarter Guard, and collecting seven or eight men, sent them under command of Major Taylor, of the same regiment, down the Buddhist road to try and check the enemy's ad- vance. Hurriedly assembling another dozen men, and leaving the Adjutant, Lieutenant Barff, with directions to bring on more, he ran with his little party after Taylor in the direction of the entrance gorge of the Kotal camp. Two roads give access to the Malakand camp, froi, :he plain of KHAR. At one point the Buddhist road, the higher of the two, passes through a narrow defile and turns a sharp corner. Here, if anywhere, the enemy might be held or at least delayed until the troops got under arms. Overtaking Major Taylor, Colonel McRae led the party, which then amounted to perhaps twenty men, swiftly down the road. It was a race on which the lives of hundreds depended. If the enemy could turn the corner, nothing could check their rush, and the few men who tried to oppose them would be cut to pieces. The Sikhs arrived first, but by a ver}' little. As they turned the corner they met the mass of the enemy — nearly a thousand strong, armed chiefly with swords and knives, creeping silently and stealthily up the gorge, in the hcoe ?.nd assurance, of rushing the camp and massacring every soul in it. The whole road was crowded with the wild figures. McRae opened fire The Attack on the Malakand, 5^ i at once. Volley after volley was poured into the dense mass, at deadly range. Then the Sikhs fired independently. This checked the enemy, who shouted and yelled in fury at beini^ thus stopped. The small i)arty of oldiers then fell back, pace by pace, firing inccssantl\', ;ind took up a pcisition in a cutting about fifty yards behind the corner. Their flanks were protected on the left by high rocks, and on the right by boulders and rough ground, over which in the darkness it was im- possible to move. The road was about five yards wide. As fast as the tribesmen turned the corner they were shot down. It was a strong position. In mat strait path a thousand Might well be stopped by three. Being thus effectively checked in their direct advance, the tribesmen began climbing up the hill to the left and throwing down rocks and stones on those who barred their path. They also fired their rifles round the corner, but as they were unable to see the soldiers without exposing themselves, most of their bullets went to the right. The band of Sikhs were closely packed in the cutting, the front rank kneeling to fire. Nearly all were struck by stones and rocks. Major Taylor, displaying great gallantry, was mortally wounded. Several of the Sepo\'s were killed. Colonel McRae himself was accidentally stabbed in the neck by a bayonet and became covered with blood. But he called upon the men to maintain the good name of *' Rattray s Sikhs!' and to hold their position till death or the regiment came up. And the soldiers I 5* The Malakand Field Force. ii I I ! i It 1 replied by loudly shouting the Sikh war-cry, and defying the enemy to come on. After twenty minutes of desperate fighting, Lieu- tenant Barff arrived with thirty more men. He was only just in time. The enemy had already worked round Colonel McRae's right, and the destruction of the few soldiers left alive could not long have been delayed. The reinforcement, climbing up the hillside, drove the enemy back and protected the flank. But the remainder of the regiment was now at hand. Colonel McRae then fell back to a more extended position, along a ridge about fifty yards further up the road, and reinforcing Lieutenant Barff s party, repulsed all attacks during the night. About 2 A.M., the tribesmen finding they could make no progress drew off, leaving many dead. The presence of mind, tactical knowledge and bravery displayed in this affair are thus noticed in the official despatches by General Meiklejohn : — "There is no doubt that the gallant resistance made by this small body in the gorge, against vastly superior numbers, till the arrival of the rest of the regiment, saved the camp from being rushed on that side, and I cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of Lieutenant-Colonel McRae and Major Taylor on this occasion ". While these things were passing on the right, the other attacks of the enemy had met with more success. The camp was assaulted simultaneously on the three sides. The glow of the star shells showed that the north camp was also engaged. The enemy had been checked on the Buddhist road, by Colonel McRae and the 45th Sikhs, but another The Attack on the Malakand. 53 1 great mass of men forced their vva)- along the Graded road in the centre of the position. On the first sound of firing the inlying picquet of the 24th Punjab Infantry doubled out, to reinforce the picquets on the road, and in the water-gorge. They only arrived in time to find these being driven in, by overpowering numbers of the enemy. Hundreds of fierce swordsmen, swarmed into the bazaar, and into the serai, a small enclosure which adjoined. Sharpshooters scrambled up the sur- rounding hills, and particularly from one ragged, rock-strewn peak called Gibraltar, kept up a tremendous fire. The defence of the left and centre of the camp was confided to the 24th Pun- jab Infantry. One company of this regiment under Lieutenant Climo, charging across the football ground, cleared the bazaar at the point of the bayonet. The scene at this moment was vivid and terrible. The bazaar was crowded with tribesmen. The soldiers rushing forward amid loud cheers, plunged their bayonets into their furious adversaries. The sound of the hacking of swords, the screams of the un- fortunate shopkeepers, the yells of the Ghazis were plainly heard above the ceaseless roll of musketry. The enemy now tried to force their way back into the bazaar, but the entrance was guarded by the troops and held against all assaults till about 10*45. The left flank of the company was now turned, and the pressure became so severe that they were withdrawn to a more interior line of defence, and took up a position along the edge of the sappers' and miners' enclosure. Another company held the '« 54 The Malakand Field Force. 1 i approaches froui the north camp. The remainder jfthe regiment and No. 5 compr^.ny sappers and miners, were kept in readiness to reinforce any part of the line. It is necessary to record the actual movements of the troops in detail, but I am anxious above all things to give the reader a general idea. The enemy had attacked in tremendous strength along the two roads that gave access on the eastern side to the great cup of the Malakand. On the right ro-'.d, they were checked by the brilliant movement of Colonel McRae and the courage of his regiment. Pouring in overwhelming force along the left road, they had burst into the camp itself, bearing down all opposition, The defenders, unable to hold the extended line of the rim, had been driven to take up a central position in the bottom of the cup. This central position comprised the sappers' and miners' enclosure, the commissariat lines and the Field Engineer Park. It was commanded on every side by the fire from the rim. But the defenders stood at bay, determined at all costs to hold this position, bad though it was. Meanwhile the enem\' rushed to the attack with wild courage and reckless fury. Careless of life, they charged the slender line of defence. Twice they broke through and penetrated the enclosure. They were met by men as bold as they. The fighting be- came desperate. The general himself hurried from point to point, animating the soldiers and joining in the defence with sword and revolver. As soon as the enemy broke into the commissariat lines they rushed into the huts and sheds eager for plunder and victims. * The Attack on the Malakand. 5S Lieutenant Manley, the Brigade Commissariat Officer, stuck stubbornly to his post, and with Sergeant Harrington endeavoured to hold the hut in which he lived. The savage tribesmen burst in the door and crowded into the room. What followed reads like a romance. The officer opened fire at once with his revolver. He was instantly cut down and hacked to pieces. In the struggle the lamp was smashed, the room became pitch dark. The sergeant, knocking down his assailants, got free for a moment and stood against the wall motionless. Having killed Manley, the tribesmen now began to search for the sergeant, feeling with their hands along the wall and groping in the darkness. At last, finding no one, they concluded he had escaped, and hurried out to look for others. Sergeant Harriigton remained in the hut till it was retaken some hours later, and so saved his life. Another vigorous attack was made upon the Quarter Guard. Lieutenant Watling, who met it with his company of sappers, transfixed a Ghazi with his sword, but such was the fury of the fanatic that as he fell dead he cut at the officer and wounded him severely. The company were driven back. The Quarter Guard was captured, and with it the reserve ammunition of the sappers. Lieutenant Watling was carried in by his men, and as soon as he reached the dressing station reported the loss of this important post. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn at once ordered a party of the 24th to retake it from the enemy. Few men could be spared from the line of defence. hi 1 1 i r HI « I :':| Si 'I n '1^ ^i 1:1 56 The Malakand Field Force. At length a small but devoted band collected. It consisted of Captain Holland, Lieutenant Climo, Lieutenant Manley, R.E., the general's orderly, a Sepoy of the 45th Sikhs, two or th .:;e sappers and three men of the 24th ; in all about a dozen. The general placed himself at their head. The officers drew their revolvers. The men were in- structed to use the bayonet only. Then they advanced. The ground is by nature broken and confused to an extraordinary degree. Great rocks, undulations and trees, rendered all movements difficult ; numerous tents, sheds and other build- ings increased its intricacies. Amidst such sur roundings were the enemy, numerous and well armed. The twelve men charged. The tribesmen advanced to meet them. The officers shot down man after man with their pistols. The soldiers bayoneted others. The enemy drew off discom- fited, but half the party were killed or wounded. The orderly was shot dead. A sapper and a havildar of the 24th were severely wounded. The general himself was struck by a sword on the neck. Luckily, the weapon turned in his assailant's hand, and only caused a bruise. Captain Holland was shot through the back at close quarters, by a man concealed in a tent. The bullet, which caused four wounds, grazed his spine. The party was now too few to effect anything. The survivors halted. Lieutenant Climo took the wounded officer back, and collecting a dozen more men of the 24th, re- turned to the attr rk. The second attempt to regain the Quarter Guard was also unsuccessful, and the soldiers recoiled with further loss ; but with that The Attack on the Malakand. 57 undaunted spirit which refuses to admit defeat they continued their efforts, and at the third charge dashed across the open space, bowling over and crushing back the enemy, and the post was re- covered. All the ammunition had, however, been carried off by the enemy, and as the expenditure of that night had already been enormous, it was a serious loss. The commissariat lines were at length cleared of the tribesmen, and such of the garrison as could be spared were employed in putting up a hasty defence across the south entrance of the en- closure, and clearing away the cook-houses, and other shelters, which might be seized by the enemy. The next morning no fewer than twenty-nine corpses of tribesmen were found round the cook- house, and in the open space over which the three charges had taken place. This, when it is remem- bered that perhaps twice as many had been wounded, and had crawled away, enables an esti- mate to be formed, of the desperate nature of the fight for the Quarter Guard. All this time the fire from the rim into the cup had been causing severe and continual losses. The enemy surrounding the enclosure on three sides, brought a cross fire to bear on its defenders, and made frequent charges right up to the breastwork. Bullets were flying in all directions, and there was no question of shelter. Major Herbert, D.A.A.G., was hit early in the night. Later on Lieutenant- Colonel Lamb received the dangerous wound in his thigh which caused his death a few days afterwards. Many Sepoys were also killed and wounded. The command of the 24th Punjab Infantry de- r V 1 II 1 1 'I 1 1 i 58 The Malakand Field Force. volved upon a subaltern officer, Lieutenant Climo. The regiment, however, will never be in better hands. At about one o'clock, during a lull in the firing, the company which was lining the cast of the enclosure heard feeble cries for help, A wounded havildar of the 24th was lying near the bazaar. He had fallen in the first attack, shot in the shoulder. The tribesmen, giving him two or three deep sword cuts to finish him, had left him for dead. He now appealed for help. The football ground on which he lay was swept by the fire of the troops and overrun by the enemy's swordsmen, yet the cry for help did not pass unheeded. Taking two Sepoys with him Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 24th Punjab Infantry, ran out mto the deadly space, and, in spite of a heavy fire, brought the wounded soldier in safely. For this heroic action he has since received the Victoria Cross. As the night wore on, the attack of the enemy became so vigorous, that the brigadier decided to call for a reinforcement of a hundred men, from the garrison of the fort. This work stood high on a hill, and was impregnable to an enemy unprovided with field guns. Lieutenant Rawlins volunteered to try and reach it with the order. Accompanied by three orderlies, he started. He had to make his way through much broken ground infested by the enemy. One man sprang at him and struck him on the wrist with a sword, but the subaltern, firing his revolver, shot him dead, reached the fort in safety, and brought back the sorely-needed reinforcement. It was thought the enemy would make a effort to capture the enclosure before dawn. (\. .al that t • i The Attack on the Malakand. 59 being the hour which Afghan tribesmen usually select. Hut they had lost heavily, and at about 3*30 A.iM. be«;an to carry away their dead and wounded. The firing did not, however, lessen until 4' 1 5 A.M., when the sharpshooters withdrew to the heights, and the fusilade dwindled to " sniping " at long range. The first night of the defence of the Malakand camp was over. The enemy, with all the advan- tages of surprise, position and great numbers, had failed to overcome the slender garrison. Every- where they had been repulsed with slaughter. But the British losses had been severe. i British Officers. Killed — Hon. Lieutenant L. Manley, Commissariat Department. Wounded dangerously — Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs. Wounded severely — Lieut. -Colonel J. Lamb, 24th P.L „ ,, Major L. Herbert, D.A.A.G. ,, ,, Captain H. F. Holland, 24th P.L „ „ Lieutenant F. W. Watling, Q.O. Sappers and Miners. Of these Lieut. -Colonel Lamb and Major Taylor died of their wounds. Native Ranks. Killed 21 Wounded 31 As .soon as the first light of morning began to grow in the valley, two companies of the 24th advanced and cleared the bazaar of such of the enemy as had remained behind to plunder. The whole place had been thoroughly ransacked, and everything of value destroyed or carried off. The native manager had had a strange experience, and }^ff*r^ 6o The Malakand Field Force. one which few men would envy. He had remained hidden in the back of a tent during the whole night in equal danger and terror of the bullets of the soldiers and swords of the enemy. Hearing the friendly voices he emerged uninjured from his retreat. Desultory firing was maintained by the tribesmen all day. Wiiile the close and desperate fighting, which has been described, was raging in the south camp, the north camp had not been seriously involved, and had spent a quiet, though anxious night. On the sound of the firing on the Kotal being heard, four guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery were moved over to the south-e.ist side of the camp, and several star shells were fired. No large body of the enemy was however discovered. Twice during the night the camp was approached by the tribesmen, but a few rounds of shrapnel were sufficient to drive these away. When General Meiklejohn found that the garri- son of the north camp had not been severely engaged, he ordered a force consisting of two guns and the 31st Punjab Infantry, under Major Gibbs, covered by forty Sowars of the nth Bengal Lancers, and supported by a wing of the 24th, to move out, reconnoitre the valley and clear it as far as possible of the enemy. The column advanced in pursuit as far as Bedford Hill. Here they came upon a large gathering of tribesmen, and as it was now evident that a great tribal rising had broken out, Major Gibbs was ordered to return and to bring his stores and troops into the Kotal camp without delay. The infantry and guns thereupon I The Attack on the Malakand. 6i retired and fell back on the camp, covered by the 24th Punjab Infantry, As this regiment was retiring, a sudden attack was made from the high ground above the Buddhist road, and directed against the left flank of the troops. A front was immediately shown, and the 24th advanced to meet their assailants. Lieutenant Climo, who commanded, detached a company to the right, and by this turning move- ment drove them off, inflicting some loss and capturing a standard. This officer's skill and con- duct in this retirement was again the subject of commendation in despatches. The troops reached their respective camps at about 1 1 o'clock. Mean- while the cavalry, who had pushed on a consider- able distance, found themselves seriously involved with the enemy, and a retirement being both diffi- cult and dangerous, Captain Wright, with great dash and presence of mind, decided to go on to Chakdara. The situation was one of considerable danger, but by crossing and recrossing the Swat River, the squadron managed to cut their way through the tribesmen and reached the fort with slight loss. This brilliant ride will receive a fuller description in a later chapter. The evacuation of the north camp proceeded very slowly. The troops packed up their kits with great deliberation, and applications were made for transport. None was, however, available. All the camels were at Dargai, on the India side of the mountains. Repeated orders to hurry were sent from the Kotal. All hated leaving their belongings behind, having no confidence in the liberality of a ■:i 62 The Malakand Field Force. :f: if ■li < m I ... ( paternal Government. As the afternoon passed the aspect of the enemy became very threatening and formidable. Great numbers drew near to the camp, and the guns were compelled to fire a good many rounds. At length, at 4 o'clock, impera- tive orders were sent that the north camp was to be at once abandoned, that the force there was to march to the Kotal, and that all baggage and stores not yet removed were to be left where they were. All the tents were struck, but nothing else could be done, and to the deep disgust of all — officers and inen — their property was left to the mercies of the enemy. During the night it was all looted and burnt. Many of the officers thus lost every stitch of clothing they possessed. The flames rising from the scene of destruction were visible far and wide, and the tribesmen in the most distant valleys were encouraged to hurry to complete the slaughter of the accursed infidels. It cannot be doubted, however, that the concen- tration of the troops was a wise and judicious step. The garrison of the Kotal and south camp was insufficient, and whatever happened it was better for the troops to stand or fall together. The situa- tion was also aggravated by the appearance of large numbers of tribesmen from the Utman Khel country, who crowded the hills to the west of the camp, and thus compelled the defenders to hold a greatly extended line. The abandonment of the north camp was carried out none too soon, for the enemy pressed the withdrawal of the troops, and they reached the south camp under cover of the fire of the 24th Punjab Infantry, and the Guides The Attack on the Malakand. 63 Cavalry. These had arrived in camp at 8*30 that morning after marching all night. They found plenty of employment. The telegraph had carried the news of the events of the night to all parts of the world. In luiglaml those returning from Goodwood Races read the first details of the fighting on the posters of the evening papers. At Simla, the rvtHcrninent of India awoke to find themselves confronted with another heavy task. Other messages recalled all officers to their regiments, and summoned reinforce- ments to the scene by roacl ai\d rail. In the small hours of the 27th, the ofticers of the nth Bengal Lancers at Nowshcra were aroused by a frantic telegraph operator, who was astounded by the news his machine was clicking out. This man in his shirt sleeves, with a wild eye, and holding an unloaded revolver by the muzzle, ran round waking every one. The whole country was up. The Malakand garrison was being overwhelmed by thousands of tribesmen. All the troops were to march at once. He brandished copies of the wires he had received. In a few moments official in- structions arrived. The nth Benijal Lancers, the 38th Dogras and the 35th Sikhs started at dawn. No. I and No. 7 British Mountain Batteries were also ordered up. The Guides Cavalry had already arrived. Their infantry under Lieutenant Lock- hart reached the Kotal at 7-30 P.M. on the 27th, having in spite of the intense heat and choking dust covered thirty-two miles in seventeen and a half hours. This wonderful feat was accomplished without impairing the efficiency of the soldiers, who I n 64 The Malakand Field Force. 11^ I' .1 were sent into the picquet h'ne, and became en- gaged as soon as they arrived. An officer who commanded the Darcjai post told me that as they passed the guard there they shouldered arms with parade precision, to show that twenty-six miles under the hottest sun in the world, would not take the polish off the Corps of Guides. Then they breasted the long ascent to the top of the pass, en- couraged by the sound of the firing, which grew louder at every step. Help in plenty was thus approaching as fast as eager men could march, but meanwhile the garrison had to face the danger as best they could alone. As the 31st Punjab Infantry, who had been the last to leave the north camp, were arriving at the Kotal, about 1000 tribesmen descended in broad daylight, and with the greatest boldness, and threatened their left flank. They drove in two picquets of the 24th, and pressed forward vigor- ously. Lieutenant Climo with two companies advanced up the hill to meet them, supported by the fire of two guns of the Mountain Battery. A bayonet charge was completely successful. The officers were close enough to make effective use of their revolvers. Nine bodies of the enemy were left on the ground, and a standard was captured. The tribesmen then drew off, and the garrison pre- pared for the attack, which they knew would come with the dark. As the evening drew on the enemy were observed assembling in ever-increasing numbers. Great crowds of them could be seen streaming along the Chakdara road, and thickly dotting the hills with ! I The Attack on the Malakand. 65 spots of white. They all wore white as yet. The news had not reached Buner, and the sombre-clad warriors of Ambeyla were still absent. The glare of the flames from the north camp was soon to summon them to the attack of their ancient enemies. The spectacle as night fell, was strange, ominous, but not unpicturesque. Gay banners of every colour, shape and device, waved from the surround- ing hills. The sunset caught the flashing of sword- blades behind the spurs and ridges. The numerous figures of the enemy moved busily about preparing for the attack. A dropping fire from liie sharp- shooters added an appropriate accompaniment. In the middle, at the bottom of the cup, was the crater camp, and the main enclosure with the smoke of the evening meal rising in the air. The troops moved to their stations, and as the shadows grew the firing swelled into a loud, incessant roar. The disposition of the troops on the night of the 27th was as follows : — 1. On the right Colonel McRae, with 45th Sikhs and two guns supported by 100 men of the Guides^, Infantry, held almost the same position astride the Buddhist road as before. 2. In the centre the enclosure and Graded road were defended by- 31st Punjab Infantry. No. 5 Company Q.O. Sappers and Miners. The Guides. Two Guns. 3. On the left the 24th Punjab Infantry, with the two remain- ing guns under Lieutenant Climo, held the approaches from the abandoned north camp and the fort. Most of this extended line, which occupied a great part of the rim, was formed by a chain of picquets, detached from one another and fortified 5 it! 5)'!' ! ■lit IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) h /.^ 1.0 I.I 1.25 • 50 "^^ t lis. Illjlio 12.5 IIIIIM 1.4 1.6 Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 873-4503 iV iV ^^ :\ \ ^ ... * -^\ <^^<^^ V A I ^ 66 The Malakand Field Force. 'a \i' by stone breastworks, with supports in rear. But in the centre the old line of the sappers' and miners' enclosure was adhered to. The bazaar was left to the enemy, but the serat, about a hun- dred yards in front of the main entrenchment, was held by a picquet of twenty-four men of the 31st Punjab Infantry under Subadar Syed Ahmed Shah. Here it was that the tragedy of the night occurred. At eight o'clock the tribesmen attacked in tremen- dous force all along the line. The firing at once became intense and continuous. The expenditure of ammunition by the troops was very great, and many thousands of rounds were discharged. On the right Colonel McRae and Ms Sikhs were re- peatedly charged by the swordsmen, many of whom succeeded in forcing their way into the picquets and perished by the bayonet. Others reached the two guns and were cut down while attacking the gunners. All assaults were however beaten off. The tribesmen suffered terrible losses. The casualties among the Sikhs were also severe. In the morning Colonel McRae advanced from his defences, and covered by the fire of his two guns cleared the ground in his front of the enemy. The centre was again the scene of severe fight- ing. The tribesmen poured mto the bazaar and attacked the serai on all sides. This post was a mud-walled enclosure about fifty yards square. It was loopholed for musketry, but had no flank defences. The enemy made determined eiTorts to capture the place for several hours. Meanwhile so The Attack on the Malakand. 67 tremendous was the fire of the troops in the main enclosure that the attack upon the serai was hardly noticed. For six hours the picquet there held out against all assaults, but the absence o{ flank de- fences enabled the enemy to come close up to the walls. They then began to make holes through them, and to burrow underneath. The little garrison rushed from place to place repelling these attacks. But it was like caulking a sieve. At length the tribesmen burst in from several quarters, and the sheds inside caught fire. When all the defenders except four were killed or wounded, the Subadar, himself struck by a bullet, ordered the place to be evacuated, and the survivors escaped by a ladder over the back wall, carrying their wounded with them. The bodies of the killed were found next morning extraordinarily mui.'lated. The defence of this post to the bitter end must be regarded as a fine feat of arms. Subadar Syed Ahmed Shah was originally promoted to a com- mission for an act of conspicuous bravery, and his gallant conduct on this occasion is the subject of a special paragraph in despatches. On the left, the 24th Punjab Infantry were also hotly engaged, and Lieutenant Costello received his first severe wound from a bullet, which passed through his back and arm. Towards morning the enemy began to press severely. Whereupon Lieu- tenant Climo, always inclined to bold and vigorous action, advanced from the breastworks to meet them with two companies. The tribesmen held their ground and maintained a continual fire from Martini-Henry rifles. They also rolled down great ■ 68 The Malakand Field Force. stones upon the companies. The 24th continued to advance, and drove the enemy from point to point, and position to position, pursuing them for a distance of two miles. "Gallows Tree' hill, against which the first charge of the counter attack was delivered, was held by nearly 1000 tribesmen. On such crowded masses, the fire of the troops was deadly. The enemy left forty dead on the field of Lieutenant Climo's counter attack, and were observed carrying oh many wounded. As they re- treated many took refuge in the village of Jalal- KOT. The guns were hurried up, and ten shells were thrown into their midst causing great slaughter. The result of this bold stroke was, that the enemy during the rest of the fighting invariably evacuated the hills before daylight, and enabled the troops to assume the offensive. Thus the onslaught of the tribesmen had again been successfully repelled by the Malakand garrison. Many had been killed and wounded, but all the tribes for 100 miles around were hurrying to the attack, and their numbers momentarily increased. The following casualties occurred on the night of the 27th : — British Officer. Wounded — Lieutenant E. W. Costello. Native Ranks. Killed Wounded 12 29 During the day the enemy retired to the plain of Khar to refresh themselves. Great numbers of Bunerwals now joined the gathering. The garrison were able to distinguish these new-comers from the I The Attack on the Malakand. 69 I SWATIS,UTMANKHELS,MAMUNI)S,SALARZAISand Others, by the black or dark-blue clothes they wore. The troops were employed in strengthening^ the defences, and improving the shelters. The tribes- men kept up a harassing, and annoying long-range hre, killing several horses of the Guides Cavalry. Towards evening they advanced to renew the attack, carrying hundreds of standards. As darkness fell, heavy firing recommenced along the whole front. The enemy had apparently plenty of ammunition, and replied with effect, to the heavy fire of the troops. The arrangement of the regi- ments, was the same as on the previous night. On the right Colonel McRae, once more held his own against all attacks. In the centre severe fighting ensued. The enemy charged again and again up to the breastwork of the enclosure. They did not succeed in penetrating. Three officers and several men were however wounded by the fire. Lieutenant Maclean, of the Guides Cavalry, who was attached temporarily to the 31st Punjab Infantry, had a wonderful escape. A bullet entered his mouth and passed through his cheek without injuring the bone in any way. He continued on duty, and the.se pages will record his tragic but glorious death a few weeks later at Landakai. Lieutenant Ford was dangerously wounded in the shoulder. The bullet cut the artery, and he was bleeding to death when Surgeon-Lieutenant V. Hugo came to his aid. The fire was too hot to allow of lights being used. There was no cover of any sort. It was at the bottom of the cup. Never- theless the surgeon struck a match at the peril of 70 The Malakand Field Force. his life and examined the wound. The match went out amid a splutter of bullets, which kicked up the dust all around, but by its uncertain light he saw the nature of the injury. The officer had already fainted from the loss of blood. The doctor seized the artery, and, as no other ligature was forthcom- ing, he remained under fire for three hours holding a man's life, between his finger and thumb. When at length it seemed that the enemy had broken into the camp he picked up the still uncon- scious officer in his arms, and, without relaxing his hold, bore him to a place of safety. His arm was for many hours paralysed with cramp from the effiscts of the exertion of compressing the artery. I think there are few, whatever may be their views or interests, who will not applaud this splendid act of devotion. The profession of medicine, and surgery, must always rank as the most noble that men can adopt. The spectacle of a doctor in action among soldiers, in equal danger and with equal courage, saving life where all others are taking it, allaying pain where all others are causing it, is one which must always seem glorious, whether to God or man. It is impossible to imagine any situation from which a human being might better leave this world, and embark on the hazards of the Unknown. All through the night, the enemy continued their attacks. They often succeeded in reaching the breastworks — only to die on the bayonets of the defenders. The guns fired case shot, with terrible effect, and when morning dawned the position was still held by the Imperial Forces. The casualties of the night were as follows : — The Attack on the Malakand. 71 British Officers. Wounded severely— Lieutenant H. B. Ford, 3i8t Punjab Infantry. It t, I, H. L. S. Maclean, the Guides. Wounded slightly— Lieutenant G. Swinley, 31st Punjab In- fantry. Native Ranks. Killed 2 Wounded 13 On the morning of the 29th signalling communi- cation with Chakdara, was for a few moments re- established. The garrison of the post announced their safety, and that all attacks had been repulsed with heavy loss, but they reported that ammunition and food were both running short. During the day the enemy again retired to the plain to rest, and prepare for the great attack, which they intended making that night. The hour would be propitious. It was J U MARAT, on which day the prophet watches with especial care over the interests of those who die for the faith. Besides, the moon was full, and had not the great Fakir declared that this should be the moment of victory ? The Mullah exhorted them all to the greatest efforts, and declared that he would himself lead the assault. To-night the infidels would be utterly destroyed. Meanwhile the troops were busily employed in spite of their terrible fatigues in strengthening the defences. The bazaar and the serai were levelled. Trees were blown up and a clear field of fire was obtained in front of the central enclosure. Great bonfires were also prepared in front of the defences, to enable the soldiers to take good aim at their assailants while they were silhouetted against the 72 The Malakand Field Force. light. In such occupations the day passed. The tribesmen continued to fire at long range and shot several horses and mules. These sharpshooters enjoyed themselves immensely. After the relief of Chakdara it was found that many of these had made most comfortable and effective shelters among the rocks. One man, in particular, had ensconced himself behind an enormous boulder, and had built a little wall of stone conveniently loopholed to protect himself when firing. The overhanging rock sheltered him from the heat of the sun. By his side was his food and a large box of cartridges. Here for the whole week he had lived, steadily dropping bullets into the camp and firing at what an officer described as all " objects of interest ". What could be more attractive ? At four o'clock in the afternoon Major Stuart Beatson, commanding the i ith Bengal Lancers, arrived with his leading squadron. He brought a small supply of ammunition, which the garrison was in sore need of, t'.ie expenditure each night being tremendous, some regiments firing as much as 30,000 rounds. The 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras under Colonel Reid arrived at Dargai, at the foot of the pass, in the evening. They had marched all day in the most intense heat. How terrible that march must have been, may be judged from the fact that in the 35th Sikhs twenty-one men actually died on the road of heat apoplexy. The fact that these men marched till they dropped dead, is an- other proof of the soldierly eagerness displayed by all ranks to get to the front. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, feeling confidence in his ability to hold The Attack on the Malakand. 73 his own with the troops, had ordered them to remain halted at Dargai, and rest tlie next day. The attack came with the night, but the defences in the centre had been much improved, and the tribesmen were utterly unable to cross the cleared glacis, which now stretched in front of the enclosure. They, however, assailed both flanks with deter- mination, and the firing everywhere became heavy. At 2 A.iM. the great attack was delivered. Along the whole front and from every side enormous numbers swarmed to the assault. On the right and left, hand-to-hand fighting took place. Colonel McRae again held his position, but many of the tribesmen died under the very muzzles of the rifles. The 24th Punjab Infantry on the left, were the most severely engaged. The enemy succeeded in breaking into the breastworks, and close fightin;^' ensued, in which Lieutenant Costello was again severely wounded. But the fire of the troops was too hot for anything to live in their front. At 2*30 the Mad Mullah being wounded, another Mullah killed and several hundreds of tribesmen slain, the whole attack collapsed. Nor was it renewed again with vigour. The enemy recognised that their chance of taking the Malakand had passed. The casualties were as follows on the night of the 29th : — British Officers. Wounded severely — Lieutenant E. W. Costello, 24th P. I., who had already been severely wounded, but continued to do duty. „ „ Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, R.A. Native Ranks. Killed I Wounded 17 i; 74 The Malakand Field Force. All the next day the enemy could be seen dragging the dead away, and carrying the wounded over the hills to their villages. Reinforcements, however, joined them, and they renewed their attack, but without much spirit, at 9*30 P.M., but they were again repulsed with loss. Once during a thunderstorm that broke over the camp, they charged the 45th Sikhs' position, and were driven ofif with the bayonet. Only twenty men were wounded during the night. In the morning the 38th Dogras, and 35th Sikhs, marched into the camp. The enemy continued firing into the entrenchments at long range, but without effect. They had evidently realised that the Malakand was too strong to be taken. The troops had a quiet night, and the weary, worn-out men got a little, needed sleep. Thus the long and persistent attack on the British frontier station of Malakand, languished and ceased. The tribesmen, sick of the slaughter at this point, concentrated their energies on Chakdara, which they believed must fall into their hands. To relieve this hard- pressed post now became the duty of the garrison of Malakand. The chapter, which may now appropriately end, has described in detail, and, necessarily, at length, the defence of an outpost of our empire. A surprise followed by a sustained attack has been resisted. The enemy, repulsed at every point, have abandoned the attempt, but surround and closely watch the defences. The troops will now assume the offensive, and the hour of reprisals will commence. The Attack on the Malakand. 75 The casualties sustained by the Malakand garrison between 26th July and ist August were as follows : — British Officers Killed and Died of Wounds — 3. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Lamb, 24th Punjab Infantry. Major W. W. Taylor, 45th Sikhs. Lieutenant L. Manley, Commissariat. Wounded — 10. Major L. Herbert, D.A.A.G. Captain G. Haldwin, D.S.O., Guides Cavalry. Captain H. F. Holland, 24th Punjab Infantry. Lieutenant F. A. Wynter, R.A. „ F. W. Watling, R.E. „ E. W. Costello, 24th Punjab Infantry. „ H. B. Ford, 31st Punjab Infantry. „ H. L. S. Maclean, Guides Cavalry. 2nd Lieutenant G. Swinley, 31st Punjab Infantry. „ C. V. Keyes, Guides Cavalry. Native Officers Wounded — 7. Total Officers Killed and Wounded — 20. British Non-Commissioned Officer Killed. Sergeant F. Byrne, R.E. Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates. Killed. Wounded. No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery - nth Bengal Lancers No. 5 Company Q.O. Sappers and Miners - 24th Punjab Infantry 31st „ „ 38th Dogras 45th Sikhs Q.O. Corps of Guides Total Non-Commissioned Officers and Men Killed and Wounded — 153. .'.'." 3 3 18 3 14 12 32 . . • I 4 28 3 27 76 CHAPTER V. THE RELIEF OF CHAKDARA. The Force of Circumstances — Formation of the Malakand Field Force — Sir Bindon Blood — Chakdara in Danger — First At- tempt to Relieve Chakdara — Arrival of the General — His Dispositions — The Key of the Position — The Morning of the 2nd of August — Rout of the Enemy — The Cavalry Pursuit — Vengeance — Chakdara Relieved — Casualties. While the events described in the last chapter had been watched with interest and attention in all parts of the world, they were the subject of anxious consultation in the Council of the Governor-General. It was only natural that the Viceroy himself should view with abhorrence the prospect of military opera- tions on a large scale, which must inevitably lead to closer, and more involved relations, with the tribes of the Afghan border. He belonged to that party in the State which has clung passionately, vainly, and often unwisely, to a policy of peace and re- trenchment. He was supported in his reluctance to embark on warlike enterprises, by the whole force of the economic situation. No moment could have been less fitting : no man more disinclined. That Lord Elgin's Viceroyalty and the Famine year should have been marked by the greatest Frontier War in the history of the British Empire in India, vividly displays how little an individual, however earnest his motives, however great his 1 4 'J \ . ^-. . A. ■3: mt It authority, can really direct or control the course of public affairs. The Council were called upon to decide on matters which at once raised the widest and most intricate questions of frontier policy ; which might involve great expense ; which might well influence the development and progress of the great popula- tions committed to their charge. It would be desirable to consider such matters from the most lofty and commanding standpoints ; to reduce detail to its just proportions ; to examine the past and to peer into the future. And yet those who sought to look thus on the whole situation, were immediately confronted with the picture of the rock of Chakdara, fringed and dotted with the white smoke of musketry, encircled by thousands of fierce assailants, its garrison fighting for their lives, but confident they would not be desc; ^d. It was impossible to see further than this Governnicnts, all Rulers, meet the same diffic Wide considerations of principle, of policy, of conse- quences or of economics are brushed aside by im- petuous emergency. They have to decide off-hand. The statesman has to deal with events. The historian, who has merely to record them, may amuse his leisure by constructing policies, to ex- plain instances of successful opportunism. On the 30th of July the following order was offic- ially published : " The Governor-General in Council sanctions the despatch of a force to be styled the Malakand Field Force, for the purpose of holding the Malakand. and the adjacent posts, and operating against the neighbouring tribes as may be required ". 78 The Malakand Field Force. I The force was composed as follows : — ist Brigade. Commanding — Colonel W. H. M -iklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., with the local rank of Brigadier-General. I St Border Royal West Kent Regiment. 24th Punjab Infantry. 31st Punjab Infantry. 45th (Rattray's) Sikhs. Sections A and B of No, i British Field Hospital. No. 38 Native Field Hospital. Sections A and B of No. 50 Native Field Hospital. 2nd Brigade. Commanding — Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B. ist Border East Kent Regiment (the Buffs). 35th Sikhs. 38th Dogras. Guides Infantry. Sections C and D of No. i British Field Hospital. No. 37 Native Field Hospital. Sections C and D of No. 50 Native Field Hospital. Divisional Troops. 4 Squadrons nth Bengal Lancers. 1 „ loth „ ,, 2 ,, Guides Cavalry. 22nd Punjab Infantry. 2 Companies 21st Punjab Infantry. loth Field Battery. 6 Guns No. i British Mountain Battery. 6 ,, No. 7 M ,, „ 6 ,, No. 8 Bengal „ ,, No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. No. 3 „ Bombay „ „ Section R of No. 13 British Field Hospital. Sections A and B of No. 35 Native Field Hospital Line of Communications. No. 34 Native Field Hospital. Section B of No. i Native Field Hospital. This complete division amounted to a total available field strength of 6800 bayonets, 700 lances or sabres, with 24 guns. The Relief of Chakdara. 79 The command of this powerful force was en- trusted to Brigadier- General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., who was granted the local rank of Major- General. As this officer is the principal character in the tale I have to tell, a digression is necessary to introduce him to the reader. Born of an old Irish family, a clan that has been settled in the west of Ireland for 300 years, and of which he is now the head, Sir Bindon Blood was educated privately, and at the Indian Military College at Addiscombe, and he obtained a commission in the Royal Engineers in December, i860. For the first eleven years he was stationed in England, and it was not until 1871 that he proceeded to India, where he first saw active service in the Jowacki Afridi Expedition (medal with clasps). In 1878 he returned home, but the next year was ordered to the Zulu war. On the conclusion of hostilities, for which he re- ceived a second medal and clasp, he again sailed for India and served throughout the Afghan war of 1880, being for some time with the troops at Cabul. In 1882 he accompanied the Indian Division to Egypt, and was with the Highland Brigade, which was the most severely engaged at Tel-el-Kebir. He received the medal and clasp, Khedive's star and the 3rd class of the Medjidie. After the campaign he went home for two years, and in 1885 made another voyage to the East, over which the Russian war-cloud was then hanging. Since then the general has served in India, at first with the Sap- pers and Miners, with whose reorganisation he was closely associated, and latterly in command of the So The Malakand Field Force. Agra District. In 1895 he was appointed Chief of the Staff to Sir Robert Low in the Chitral Expedi- tion, and was present at all the actions, including the storming of the Malakand Pass. For his ser- vices he received a degree of knighthood of the Military Order of the Bath,and the Chitral medal and clasp. He was now marked as a man for high com- mand on the frontier, at the first opportunity. That opportunity the great rising of 1897 has presented. Thirty-seven years of soldiering ; of war in many lands ; of sport of every kind, have steeled alike muscle and nerve. Sir Bindon Blood, himself, till warned by the march of time, a keen polo player, is one of those few officers of high rank in the army who recognise the advantages to soldiers of that splendid game. He has pursued all kinds of wild animals in varied jungles, has killed many pig with the spear and shot every species of Indian game, including thirty tigers to his own rifle. It would not be fitting for me, a subaltern of horse, to offer any criticism though eulogistic on the commander under whom I have had the honour to serve in the field. I shall content myself with saying that the general is one of that type of soldiers, and administrators, which the responsi- bilities and dangers of an empire produce, a type which has not been perhaps possessed by any nation except the British, since the days when the Senate of the Roman people sent their proconsuls to all parts of the world. Sir Bindon Blood was at Agra when on the evening of the 28th of July he received the telegram from the Adjutant-General in India, appointing him I The Relief of Chakdara. 8i ( to the command of the Malakand Field Force, and instructing him to proceed at once to assume it. He started immediately, and on the 31st formally took command of the force at Nowshera. At Mardan he halted to make arrangements for the onward march of the troops. Here at 3 A.M. on the 1st of August, he received a teleg;ram from Army Headquarters informing him that Chakdara Fort was hard pressed, and directing him to hurry on to the Malakand, and attempt its relief at all costs. The great numbers of the enemy, and the shortness of ammunition and supplies from which the garrison were suffering, made the task difficult and the urgency great. Indeed I have been told that at Simla on the ist of August it was feared that Chakdara was doomed, and that sufficient troops to fight their way to its relief could not be concentrated in time. The greatest anxiety pre- vailed. Sir Bindon Blood replied telegraphically that "knowing the ground" as he did, he "felt serenely confident ". He hurried on at once, and in spite of the disturbed state of the country reached the Malakand about noon on the ist of August. The desperate position of the garrison of the Chakdara, was fully appreciated by their comrades at the Malakand. As the night of the 31st had been comparatively quiet, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, determined to attempt to force his way to their relief the next day. He accordingly formed a column as follows : — 45th Sikhs. 24th Punjab Infantry. No. 5 Company Sappers and Miners. 4 Guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery. 6 1 f H 82 The Malakand Field Force. At 1 1 A.M. he sent the cavalry under Lieutenant- Colonel Adams, of the Guides, to make a dash for the Amandara Pass, and if it was unoccupied to seize it. The three squadrons started by the short road to the north camp. As soon as the enemy saw what was going on, they assembled in great numbers to oppose the advance. The ground was most unsuitable for cavalry. Great boulders strewed the surface. Frequent nullahs intersected the plain, and cramped the action of the horsemen. The squadrons soon became hr)tly engaged. The Guides made several charges. The broken nature of the ground favoured the enemy. Many of them were, however, speared or cut down. Jn one of these charges Lieutenant Keyes was wounded. While he was attacking one tribesman, another came up behind, and struck him a heavy blow on the shoulder with a sword. Though these Swatis keep their swords at razor edge, and though the blow was sufficiently severe to render the officer's arm useless for some days, it raised only a thin weal, as if from a cut of a whip. It was a strange and almost an inexplicable escape. The enemy in increasing numbers pressed upon the cavalry, who began to get seriously involved. The tribesmen displayed the greatest boldness and determination. At length Lieut.-Colonel Adams had to order a retirement. It was none too soon. The enemy were already working round the left flank, and thus threatening the only line of retreat. The squadrons fell back, covering each other by dismounted fire. The 24th Punjab Infantry pro- I \ by ro- •^ ; The Relief of Chakdara. tected their flank as they reached the camp, cavalry losses were as follows : — British Officers. Wounded severely — Captain G. M. Bald vin, the Guides. „ slightly — Lieutenant C. V. Keyei, the Guides. Native Ranks. Killed. Wounded. 83 The nth Bengal Lancers Horses - Guides Cavalry Horses - Total casualties- 3 4 10 18 • 16 men and 26 horses. The vigorous resistance which the cavalry had encountered, and the great numbers, and confidence that the enemy had displayed, effectually put an end to any idea of relieving Chakdara that day. The tribesmen were much elated by their tem- porary success, and the garrison, worn and wearied by the incessant strain, both mental and physical, were proportionately cast down. Every one antici- pated tremendous fighting on the next day — make the attempt they must at all hazards — but there were not want-ng those who spoke of " forlorn hopes" and "last chances". Want of sleep and rest had told on all ranks. For a week they had grappled with a savage foe. They were the victors, but they were out of breath. It was at this moment that Sir Bindon Blood arrived and took over the command. He found General Meiklejohn busi.y engaged in organising a force of all arms which was to move to the relief of Chakdara on the following day. As it was dangerous to denude the Malakand position of troops, this force could not exceed 1000 rifles, the 84 The Malakand Field Force. available cavalry and four guns. These arrange- ments Sir Bindon Blood approved of. He relieved Brigadier-General Meiklejohn of the charge of the Malakand position, and gave him the command of the relieving column. Colonel Reid was then placed in command of Malakand, and instructed to strengthen the picquets at Castle Rock, as far as possible, and to be ready with a force taken from them, to clear the high ground on the right of the Graded road. The relieving column was composed as follows : — 400 Rifles 24th Punjab Infantry. 400 ,, 45th Sikhs. 200 „ Guides Infantry. 2 Squadrons nth Bengal Lancers t under Lieutenant- 2 „ Guides Cavalry ) Col. R. B. Adams. 4 Guns No. 8 Mountain Battery. 50 Sappers of No. 5 Company. Hospital details. Sir Bindon Blood ordered General Meiklejohn to assemble this force before dark near the centre of the camp at a grove of trees called *' Gretna Green," to bivouac there for the night, and to be ready to start with the first light of morning. During the afternoon the enemy, encouraged by their success with the cavalry in the morning, advanced boldly to the picquets, and the firing was continuous. So heavy did the firing become between eleven and twelve o'clock at night, that the force at " Gretna Green " got under arms. But towards morning the tribesmen retired. The reader may perhaps have in his own mind the description of the Malakand as a great cup with jagged clefts in the rim. Much of the rim was still held by the enemy. It was The Relief of Chakdara. 8s to the cess dly So and 2tna the nave and uch was necessary for any force trying to get out of the cup, to fight their way along the narrow roads through the clefts, which were commanded by the heights on cither side. For a considerable distance it was impossible to deploy. Therein lay the difficulty of the operation, which the General had now to per- form. The relieving column was exposed to the danger of being stopped just as Colonel McRae had stopped the first attack of the tribesmen, along the Buddhist road. On the 1st of August the cavalry had avoided these difficulties by going down the road to the north camp, and making a considerable detour. But they had thus become involved in bad ground and had to retire. The Graded road, if any, was the road by which Chakdara was to be relieved. Looking at the tangled, rugged nature of the country, it seems extraordinary to any untrained eye, that among so many peaks and points, one should be of more importance than another. Yet it is so. On the high ground, in front of the position that Colonel McRae and the 45th Sikhs had held so well, was a prominent spur. This was the key which would unlock the gate, and set free the troops who were cramped up within. Every one realised afterwards how obvious this was, and wondered they had not thought of it before. Sir Bindon Blood selected the point as the object of his first attack, and it was against this that he directed Colonel Goldney with a force of about 300 men to move, as soon as he should give the signal to advance. At half-past four in the morning of the 2nd of 86 The Malakand Field Force. y August, he proceeded to " Gr»..n,i Green " and found the relieving column fallen in, and ready to march at daybreak. All expected a severe action. Oppressed with fatigue and sleeplessness, there were many who doubted that it would be success- ful. But though tired, they were determined, and braced themselves for a desperate struggle. The General-in-Chief was confident and serene. He summoned the different commanding officers, ex- plained his plans, and shook hands all round. It was a moment of stern and high resolve. Slowly the first faint light of dawn grew in the eastern sky. The brightness of the stars began to pale. Behind the mountains was the promise of the sun. Then the word was given to advance. Immediately the relieving column set off, fours deep, down the Graded road. Colonel Goldney simultaneously ad- vanced to the attack of the spur, which will ever afterwards bear his name, with 250 men of the 35th Sikls, and 50 of the 38th Dogras. He moved silently towards the stone shelters, that the tribes- men had erected on the crest. He got to within 100 yards unperceived. The enemy, surprised, opened an irregular and ineffective fire. The Sikhs shouted, and dashed forward. The ridge was captured without loss of any kind. The enemy fled in disorder, leaving seven dead and one prisoner on the ground. Then the full significance of the movement was apparent alike to friend and foe. The point now gained commanded the whole of the Graded road, right down to its junction with the road to the north camp. The relieving column moving down The Relief of Chakdara. 87 the road were enabled to deploy without loss or delay. The door was open. The enemy, utterly surprised and dumfoundered by this manoeuvre, were seen running to and fro in the greatest con- fusion : in the graphic words of Sir Bindon Blood's despatch, " Like ants in a disturbed ant-hill ". At length they seemed to realise the situation, and, descending from the high ground, took up a position near T^edford Hill in General Meiklejohn's front, and opened a heavy fire at close range ; but the troops were now deployed, and able to bring their numbers to bear. Without wasting time in firing, they ad- vanced with the bayonet. The leading company of the Guides stormed the hill in their front, with a loss of two killed and six wounded. The rest of the troops charged with even less loss. The enemy, thoroughly panic-stricken, began to fly, literally by thousands, along the heights to the right. They left seventy dead on the ground. The troops, maddened by the remembrance of their fatigues and sufferinr^s, and inspired by the impulse of victory, pursued them with a merciless vigour. Sir Bindon Blood had with his staff ascended the Castle Rock, to superintend the operations gener- ally. From this position the whole field was visible. On every side, and from every rock, the white figures of the enemy could be seen in full flight. The way was open. The passage was forced. Chakdara was saved. A great and brilli- ant success had been obtained. A thrill of exulta- tion, convulsed every one. In that moment the general, who watched the triumphant issue of his plans, must have experienced as fine an emotion as !;li 88 The Malakand Field Force. is piven to man on earth. In that moment we may imapjine that the weary years of routine, the long ascent of the lower grades of the service, the fre- quent subordination to incompetence, the fatigues and dangers of five campaigns, received their com- pensation. Perhaps, such is the contrariness of circumstances ; there was no time for the enjoyment of such reflections. The victory had been gained, it remained to profit by it. The enemy would be compelled to retire across the plain. There at last was the chance of the cavalry. The four squadrons were hurried to the scene. The nth Bengal Lancers, forming line across the plain, began a merciless pursuit up the valley. The Guides pushed on to seize the Amandara Pass, and relieve Chakdara. All along the rice fields and the rocks, the strong horsemen hunted the flying enemy. No quarter was asked or given, and every tribes- man caught was speared or cut down at once. Their bodies lay thickly strewed about the fields, spotting with black and white patches, the bright green of the rice crop. It was a terrible lesson and one which the inhabitants of Swat and Bajaur will never forget. Since then their terror of Lancers has been extraordinary. A few Sowars have fre- quently been sufficient to drive a hundred of these valiant savages in disorder to the hills, or prevent them descending into the plain for hours. Meanwhile the infantry had been advancing swiftly. The 45th Sikhs stormed the fortified village of BUTKHELA near the Amandara Pass, which the enemy held desperately. Lieut-Colonel McRae, who had been relieved from the command I The Relief of Chakdara. 89 of the regiment by the arrival of Colonel SAWYER, was the first man to enter the village. Eighty of the enemy were bayoneted in BUTKHELA alone. It was a terrible reckoning. I am anxious to finish with this scene of carnage. The spectator who may gaze unmoved on the bloodshed of the battle, must avert his eyes, from the horrors of the pursuit, unless, indeed, joining in it himself, he flings all scruples to the winds, and, carried away by the impetus of the moment, in- dulges to the full those deep-seated instincts of savagery, over which civilisation has but cast a veil of doubtful thickness. The casualties in the relief of Chakdara were as follows : — nth Bengal Lancers — killed and died from wounds, 3 ; wounded, 3. Killed. Wounded. Guides Infantry .... 2 7 35th Sikhs 2 3 45th Sikhs . 7 24th Punjab Infantry - - - ... 5 No. 8 Bengal Mountain Battery - ... i Total Casualties — 33. The news of the relief of Chakdara was received with feelings of profound thankfulness throughout India. And in England, in the House of Commons, when the Secretary of State read out the telegram, there were few among the members who did not join in the cheers. Nor need we pay much atten- tion to those few. 90 CHAPTER VI. THE DEFENCE OF CHAKDARA. . . . That tower of strength Which stood four-square to all the winds that blew. Tennyson. The Fort— The Warning— A Gallop Home— The First Attack— The Cavalry Dash — Continued Assaults — The Signal Tower — Exhaustion of the Defenders — Sepoy Prem Singh — Critical Situation— The Urgent Appeal— The Final Attack— The Cavalry to the Rescue — A Finish in Style — The Casualties. The episode with which this chapter is concerned is one that has often oc':urred on the out-post line of civilisation, and which is peculiarly frequent in the history of a people, whose widespread empire is fringed with savage tribes. A small band of soldiers or settlers, armed with the resources of science, and strengthened by the cohesion of mutual reliance, are assailed in some isolated post, by thousands of warlike, and merciless enemies. Usually the courage and equipment of the garrison enable them to hold out, until a relieving force arrives, as at Rorke's Drift, Fort Chitral, Chakdara or Gulistan. But sometimes the defenders are overwhelmed ; and as at Saragheri or Khartoum, none are left to tell the tale. There is something strangely terrible in the spectacle of men who fight — not for political or patriotic reasons, not for the sake of duty or glory — but for dear life itself; not The Defence of Chakdara. 91 because they want to, but because they have to. They hold the dykes of social progress against a rising deluge of barbarism, which threatens every moment to overflow its banks, and drown them all. The situation is one which will make a coward valorous, and affords to brave men opportunities for the most sublime forms of heroism, and devotion. Chakdara holds the passage of the Swat River — a rapid, broad, and at most seasons of the year an unfordable torrent. It is built on a rocky knoll that rises abruptly, from the plain about a hundred yards from the mountains. Sketches and photo- graphs usually show only the knoll, and buildings, on it ; and any one looking at them will be struck by the picturesque, and impregnable aspect, of the little fort, without observing that its proportions are dwarfed, and its defences commanded, by the frowning cliffs, under which it stands. In its con- struction the principles of Defilade have been completely ignored. Standing on the mountain ridge occupied by the signal tower, it is possible to look or fire right into the fort. Every open space is commanded. Every parapet is exposed. Against an enemy unprovided with artillery, however, it could be held indefinitely ; but the fact that all interior communications, are open to fire, makes its defence painful to the garrison, and might by gra- dually weakening their numbers lead to its capture. The narrow, swinging wire bridge across the Swat, is nearly 500 yards long. At the southern end, it is closed by a massive iron door, loopholed for musketry, and flanked by two stotie towers, in i ! 92 The Malakand Field Force. one of which a Maxim gun is mounted. On the further side is the fort itself, which consists of the fortified knoll, a strong stone-horn work, an en- closure for horses, protected by a loopholed wall and much tangled barbed wire, and the signal tower, a detached post 200 yards up the cliff. The garrison of this place consisted at the time of the outbreak of twenty Sowars, of the nth Bengal Lancers, and two strong companies of the 45th Sikhs, in all about 200 men, under the com- mand of Lieutenant H. B. Rattray.^ As the rumours of an impending rising grew stronger and stronger, and the end of July approached, this officer practised his men in taking stations, in the event of an alarm, and made such preparations as he thought necessary for eventualities. On the 23rd he received an official warning from the D.A.A.G., Major Herbert (that a tribal rising was " possibiv but not probable "). Every precaution was henceforth taken in the fort. On the 26th, a Sepoy who was out sketching hurried in with the news that a large body of tribesmen were advanc- ing down the valley, and that he himself had been robbed of his compass, his field-glasses and some money. But, in spite of the disturbed and threatening situation, the British officers of the Malakand garrison, though they took all military precau- ' The actual strength was as follows: nth Bengal Lancers, 20 sabres ; 45th Sikhs, i8o rifles ; 2 British telegraphists ; i Hospi- tal Havildar ; i Provost Naick (24th Punjab Infantry) ; i Jemadar (Dir Levies). British Officers — 45th Sikhs, Lieutenants Rattray and Wheatley ; Surgeon-Captain V, Hugo ; Political Agent, Lieutenan Minchin. .4 The Defence of Chakdara. 93 tions for the defence of their posts, did not abandon their practice of riding freely about the valley armed only with revolvers ; nor did they cease from their amusements. On the evening of the 26th, Lieu- tenant Rattray went over to Khar as usual to play polo. Just as the game was ended he received a letter brought in haste by two Sowars from Lieu- tenant Wheatley, the other subaltern at Chakdara, warning him that a great number of Pathans with flags were advancing on the fort. He at once galloped back at full speed, passing close to one large gathering of tribesmen, who for some reason of their own took no notice of him, and so reached the fort in safety, and just in time. Formidable masses of men were then closing in on it. He telegraphed to the D.A.A.G. at the Malakand reporting the impending attack. Immediately afterwards the wire was cut by the enemy and the little garrison got under arms. A havildar of the Khan of Dir's Levies, had promised the political agent to give warning of any actual assault, by lighting a fire on the opposite hills. At 1015 a solitary flame shot up. It was the signal. The alarm was sounded. The garrison went to their posts. For a space there was silence ; and then out of the darkness began a fusilade, which did not stop until the 2nd of August. Immediately the figures of the tribesmen, as they advanced to the attack on the western face of the fort, became visible. The defenders opened fire with effect. The enemy pressed on vigorously. Their losses were severe. At length they retreated repulsed. vl ' ill w\ ''^ ' m |;| |i! ; ||: II 94 The Malakand Field Force. A second attack was immediately delivered against the north-east corner, and again beaten off by the garrison. At 4 A.M. a third assault was made upon the cavalry enclosure. The tribesmen carry- ing scaling ladders, advanced with great determina- tion. They were received with a deadly fire. They then drew off, and the first night ot" the siege was terminated by desultory firing. The garrison re- mained at their posts all night, and when it became day the enemy were seen to have retired, to the hills to the north-west, from which they maintained a ceaseless fire. Although the defenders were pro- tected by their stone walls, many had strange escapes from the bullets which fell incessantly into the interior. Meanwhile, in spite of the vigorous attack that was being made on the Malakand, it was decided to send some assistance to the little band at Chak- dara. Captain Wright and forty Sowars of the nth Bengal Lancers with Capiain Baker of the 2nd Bombay Grenadiers and transport officer at the Malakand, started at dawn on the 27th, by the road from the north camp. Before they had gone very far they came under the fire of the enemy on the hills. These did not dare to venture into the plain, but availed themselves of the broken nature of the country. As the squadron reached the road leading to the polo ground. Captain Wright received information that the enemy were collected on the plain, and immediately the pace was quickened in the hopes of a charge being possible. But the tribesmen ran to the hills at the sight of the Lancers, and maintained a constant, though luckily, an ill- 1 The Defence of Chakdara. 95 aimed fire. At length the village of Butkhela was reached, and beyond it the Amandara Pass came in sight. This is a gap in a long spur which runs from the southern side of the valley to the rapid river in the middle. As the river was then in full flood and unfordable, the only road to Chakdara lay over or through the spur. But the pass was held by the enemy. Captain Wright had by this time realised what probably no one at the Malakand then knew, that the enemy's numbers were enormous. The whole way from Malakand to Amandara — every ridge and hill was crowned with their banners ; wherever the ground protected them from the horsemen they gathered thickly. Cemeteries, nullahs and villages swarmed with men. Their figures could be seen in all directions. Far beyond the Amandara Pass bands of tribesmen, of varying strengths, could be seen hurrying, with their standards, to the attack. But these formidable signs, far from deterring the cavalry soldier, only added to his determination, by displaying how great was the need of Chakdara, that he should force his way through at all costs. Under a dropping fire from the cemetery on the right of the road, a brief consultation was held. The Amandara defile was occupied on both sides by the enemy. With the loss of perhaps a dozen men the squadron might gallop through. But this meant leaving all who fell, to perish miserably, by torture and mutilation. To attempt to pick up the wounded, would lead to the annihilation of the squadron. Any alternative was preferable, though if there were no other way, the dash would have to 96 The Malakand Field Force. be made, and the wounded left. A Sowar now said there was a path round the rock by the bank of the Captain Wright determined to take it. river. The path was bad. After about half the spur had been passed, it ended abruptly in a steep white rock. It was, in fact, a path leading to a point where the natives were in the habit of floating across the river upon '' niussacks" (inflated skins). To go back now was to fail. Without hesitation the horsemen turned to the right up the hill and among the rocks, trusting to get through somehow. After passing over ground, which would be difficult to move across on foot, they saw a gorge to their left which appeared as if it would lead to the open plain, on the other side of the ridge. Down this gorge forty horses huddled together, with no room to pick their way, were scrambling and jumping from rock to rock, apparently as conscious as their riders, that their lives depended on their cleverness — when, suddenly, the enemy appeared. As soon as the tribesmen, who were holding the pass, saw the squadron trot off to their right towards the river, they realised that they intended to make a desperate effort, to get through to Chakdara. They knew what the ground was like, and confident they would kill them all, if they could get there in time, ran swiftly along the spur. It was a race. The leading tribesmen arrived in time to fire on the cavalry while they were in the gorge. So close were they that the officers used their revolvers. But the Pathans were out of breath and shot badly. Several horses were hit, including Captain Wright's, but though the large thigh bone was shattered, the The Defence of Chakdara. 97 gallant beast held on, and carried his rider to Chakdara safely. By the extraordinary activity of the horses the rocks were cleared before the enemy could collect in any strength. But to the dismay of all, the gorge was found to lead, not to the plain, but to a branch of the river. A broad, swift channel of water of unknown depth confronted the cavalry. To go back was now, however, out of the question. They plunged in. The nth Bengal Lancers, are perhaps better mounted, than any native cavalry regiment in India. Their strong horses just held their own against the current. Several were nearly swept away. Ccptain Wright was the last to cross. All this time the enemy were firing and approaching. At length the passage was made, and the squadron collected on an island of flooded rice fields, in which the horses sank up to their hocks. Beyond this ran another arm of the river about fifty yards wide, and apparently almost as deep as the first. The bullets of the enemy made "watery flashes" on all sides. After passmg this second torrent the squadron found themselves again on the same bank of the river as the enemy. They were in swampy ground. Captain Wrigh^ dismounted his men and returned the fire. Then he turned back himself, and riding into the stream again, rescued the hos- pital assistant, whose pony, smaller than the other horses, was being carried off its legs by the force of the water. After this the march was resumed. The squadron kept irt the heavy ground struggling along painfully. The enemy running along the edge of the rice fields, maintained a continual fire, 7 I |||!' 11 11 ; j II mM 11 98 The Malakand Field Force. kneeling down to take good aim. A Sowar threw up his hands and fell, shot through the back. Several more horses were hit. Then another man reeled in his saddle and collapsed on the ground. A halt was made. Dismounted, fire was opened upon the enemy. The wounded were picked up, and by slow degrees Chakdara was approached, and then the Bridgehead Maxim g"n compelled the tribesmen to draw off.^ Thus the garrison of the fort received a needed reinforcement. I have given a somewhat long description of this gallant ride, because it shovi^s that there are few obstacles that can stop brave men and good horses. Captain Wright now :*o- sumed command of Chakdara, but the direction of the defence he still confided to Lieutenant Rattray, as fighting behind walls is a phase of warfare, with which the cavalry soldier is little acquainted. At II' 30, in the heat of the day, the tribesmen attacked again. They surrounded the north and east sides of the fort, and made strenuous efforts to get in. They suffered heavy losses, from the musketry of the defence, and their dead lay scat- tered thickly on the approaches. Nor were they removed till nightfall. Many Ghazis, mad with fanaticism, pressed on carrying standards, heedless of the fire, until they fell riddled with bullets under the very walls. To communicate with the Malakand was now almost impossible. To heliograph, it was necessary that the operator should be exposed to a terrible * For the particulars of this affair I am indebted to Captain Baker, and Bombay Grenadiers, who shared its perils. The Defence of Chakdara. 99 . i fire. In the evening the signal tower was sur- rounded by men in stone siui^ars, who kept up an incessant fusiladc, and made all exposure, even for, an instant, perilous. At midday, after the repulse of the main attack, the guard of the signal tower was reinforced b}' six men, and food and water were also sent up. The difficult operation, was protected by the fire of both the Maxims, and of all the garrison who could be spared from other points. Until the ist of August water was sent up daily to the signal tower in this way. The distance was long and the road steep. The enemy's fire was persistent. Looking at the ground it seems wonderful that supplies could have been got through at all. As night approached the defenders prepared for a fresh attack. Lieutenant Wheatley, observing the points behind which the enemy usually assenibled, trained the Maxims and the 9-pounder gun on them while daylight lasted. At 1 1 P.M. the tribesmen advanced with shouts, yells and the beating of drums. The gun and the Maxims were fired, and it is said that no fewer than seventy men perished by the single discharge. At any rate the attack was delayed for an hour and a half. All day long the garrison had remained at their posts. It was hoped they would now get a little rest. But at I o'clock the attack was renewed on the north- east corner. Again the enemy brought up scaling ladders and charged with desperate ferocity. They were shot down. Meanwhile every spare moment was devoted to improving the cover for the garrison. Captain lOO The Malakand Field Force. If If i Baker applied himself to this task, and used every expedient. Logs, sand bags, stones, boxes filled with earth were piled upon the walls. It is due to these precautions that the loss of life was no larger. Continuous firing occupied the 28th, and at 530 P.M. the enemy again assaulted. As in previous attacks they at first advanced by twos and threes, making little dashes over the open ground, for bits of natural cover, and for the stone sungars they had built all round the fort under cover of darkness. Some of these were within 200 yards of the wall. As they advanced the fire became intense. Then the main rush was delivered. In a great semi- circle round the face of the fort held by the cavalry, and displaying nearly 200 standards, whose gay colours were representative of every tribe on the border, they charged right up to the walls. Some of them actually got across the tangled barbed wire and were destroyed in the enclosure. But a'l efforts were defeated by the garrison, and towards morning the attack melted away, and only the usual sharpshooters remained. Some of these dis- played a singular recklessness. One man climbed up into the barbed wire and fired three shots at the defenders at close quarters before he was killed. Thursday morning dawned on similar scenes. The garrison employed such intervals as occurred in strengthening their defences and improving their cover, particularly in the approaches to the Maxim and field gun platforms. At 3 P.M. the enemy came out of Chakdara village, and, carrying ladders to scale the walls, and bundles of grass to throw on the barbed wire, made a formidable effort. They The Defence of Chakdara. lOI 1. to directed the attack, mainly against the signal station. This building is a strong, square, stone tower. Its entrance is above six feet from the ground. All around the top runs a mackicoalis gallery, a kind of narrow balcony, with holes in the floor to fire through. It is well provided with loopholes. At 4 o'clock it was closely assailed. The garrison of the fort aided the tower guard by their fire. So bold were the enemy in their efforts, that they rushed in under the fire of the defence, and lighted a great heap of grass about three yards from the doorway. The flames sprang up. A howl of ferocious delight arose. But the tribesmen relapsed into silence when they saw no real harm was done. At sunset the fore sight of the fort Maxim was shot away, and the defenders were temporarily deprived of the service of that powerful weapon. They soon managed, however, to rig up a makeshift which answered all practical purposes. At 8 P.M. the enemy wearied of the struggle, and the firing d'*ed away to desultory skirmishing. They toiled all night carrying away their dead, but next morning over fifty bodies were still lying around the signal tower. Their losses had been numerous. The morning of the 30th brought no cessation of the fighting, but the enemy, disheartened by their losses of the previous night, did not attack until 7 P.M. At that hour they advanced and made a fresh effort. They were again repulsed. Per- haps the reader is tired of the long recital of the monotonous succession of assaults, and repulses. What must the garrison have been by the reality? Until this day — when they snatched a few hours' t '; , ); m 102 The Malakand Field Force. sleep — they had been continually fighting and watching for ninety-six hours. Like men in a leaking ship, who toil at the pumps ceaselessly and find their fatigues increasing and the ship sinking hour by hour, they cast anxious, weary eyes in the direction whence help might be ex- pected. Hut none came. And there are worse deaths than by drowning. Men fell asleep at the loopholes and at the service of the field gun. Iwen during the progress of the attacks, insulted nature asserted itself, and the soldiers drifted away from the roar of the musketry, and the savage figures of the enemy, to the peaceful unconsciousness of utter exhaustion. The officers, haggard but tireless, aroused them frequently. At other times the brave Sepoys would despair. The fort was ringed with the enemy. The Mala- kand, too, was assailed. Perhaps it was the same elsewhere. The whole British Raj, seemed passing away in a single cataclysm. The officers en- couraged them. The Government of the Queen- Empress would never desert them. If they could hold out, -hey would be relieved. If not, they would be avenged. Trust in the young white men who led them, and perhaps some dim half- idolatrous faith in a mysterious sovereign across the seas, whose soldiers they were, and who would surely protect them, restored their fainting strength. The fighting continued. During the whole time of the siege the diffi- culty of maintaining the signalling communication with the Malakand was extreme. But for the The Defence of Chakdara. 103 heroism of the signallers, it would have been in- superable. One man in particular, Sepoy Prem Singh, used every day at the risk of his life to come out through a porthole of the tower, estab- lish his heliograph, and under a terrible fire from short range, flash urgent messages to the main force. The extreme danger, the delicacy of the operation of obtaining connection with a hclio, the time consumed, the composure required, these things combined to make the action as brave as any which my pages record.^ Early on Saturd.iy morn- ing a supply of water was sent to the guard of the signal tower. It was the last they got until 4" 30 on Monday afternoon. When the attack on the fort began the enemy numbered perhaps 1500 men. Since then they had been increasing every day, until on the ist and 2nd, they are estimated to have been between 12,000 and 14,000 strong. Matters now began to assume a still graver aspect. At 5 o'clock on the evening of the 31st a renewed attack was made in tremendous force on the east side of the fort. But it was beaten back with great loss by the Maxims, and the field gun. All night long the firing continued, and Sunday morning displayed the enemy in far larger numbers than hitherto. They now captured the Civil Hospital, a detached building, the walls of which they loopholed, and * A proposal has recently been made to give the Victoria Cross to native soldiers who shall deserve it. Ii would seem that the value of such a decoration must be enhanced by making it open to all British subjects. The keener the competition, the greater the honour of success. In sport, in courage, «nd in the tight of heaven, all men meet on equal terms. I04 The Malakand Field Force. from which they maintained a galling fire. They also occupied the ridge, leading to the signal tower, thus cutting off all communication with its guard. No water reached those unfortunate men that day. The weather was intensely hot. The fire from the ridge made all interior communication difficult and dangerous. The enemy appeared, armed to a great extent with Martini-Henry rifles, and Sniders, and their musketry was most galling. The party in the tower kept sending by signal, pressing requests for water, which co'.ild not be supplied. The situa- tion became critical. I quote the simple words of Lieutenant Rattray's official report : — *' Matters now looked so serious that we decided to send an urgent appeal for help, but owing to the difficulty and danger of signalling we could not send a long message, and made it as short as possible, merely sending the two words, ' Help us ' ". Stiil the garrison displayed a determined aspect, and though the enemy occupied the ridge, the Civil Hospital and an adjoining nullah, noie set foot within the defences. At length the last day of the struggle came. At daybreak the enemy in tremendous numbers came on to the assault, as if resolute to take the place at any cost. They carried scaling ladders and bundles of grass. The firing became intense. In spite of the cover of the garrison several men were killed and wounded by the hail of bullets which was directed against the fort, and which splashed and scarred the walls in every direction. Then suddenly as matters were approaching a crisis the cavalry of the relieving column appeared The Defence of Chakdara. 105 At ame e at idles of lied was and over the Amandara ridge. The strong horsemen mercilessly pursued and cut down all who opposed them. When they reached the Bridgehead, on the side of the river remote from the fort, the enemy began to turn and run. The garrison had held out stubbornly and desperately throughout the siege. Now that relief was at hand Lieutenant Rattray flung open the gate, and followed by half a dozen men charged the Civil Hospital. Captain Baker and Lieutenant Wheatley followed with a few more. The hospital was recaptured. The enemy occupying it, some thirty in number, were bayoneted. It was a finish in style. Returning, the sallying party found the cavalry — the nth Royal Lancers — checked by a sungar full of tribes- men. This they charged in flank, killing most of its occupants, and driving the rest after their com- rades, in rout and ruin. The last man to leave the sungar^ shot Lieutenant Rattray in the neck, but that officer, as distinguished for physical prowess as for military conduct, cut him down. This ended the fighting. It is not possible to think of a more fitting conclusion. The casualties in the siege were as follows : — nth B. L. _ Killed. I Wounded. I 45th Sikhs - 4 10 Dir Levies - I * * * Followers - I 2 /otal, all ranks— 20. This was the loss ; but every man in the fort had held death at arm's length, for seven nights, and seven days. It is a significant fact that though the cavalry i\ 11:11 III!' Ilji 106 The Malakand Field Force. horses were exposed to the enemy's fire the whole time, hardly any were killed or wounded. The tribesmen feeling sure that the place was theirs, and hoping that these fine beasts would fall into their hands alive, had abstained from shooting them. As far as could be ascertained by careful official inquiries the enemy lost over 2000 men in the attack upon Chakdara.-^ ^ The following statistics as to the expenditure of ammunition may be of interest : — Rounds. 28th July. Maxim - ^^43 >> Martini-Henry - - - 7-170 29th July. Maxim - •667 »» Martini-Henry - - 4'020 30th July. Maxim - I '200 u Martini-Henry - - - 5"53o 31st July. Maxim - •180 »> Martini-Henry - - 2700 This is approximately twenty rounds per man per diem fire control must have been excellent. The i ' 'i 107 whole The theirs, 1 into Doting )fficial in the lunition The CHAPTER VII. THE GATE OF SWAT. Formation of the 3rd Brigade — The Marks of War — Submission of the Lower Swatis — The Special Force — The Action oi Landakai — The Artillery Preparation — The Flank Attack — Capture of the Ridge — Pursuit — A Disastrous Incident — A Gallant Feat of Arms — The Victoria Cross — Knights of the Sword and Pen — Buddhist Remains — The Light of Other Days — Buner — Return of the Troops. The Malakand Pass gives access to the valley of the Swat, a long and wide trough, running east and west, among the mountains. Six miles further to the east at Chakdara, the valley bifurcates. One branch runs northward, towards Uch, and turning again to the west ultimately leads to the Panjkora River, and beyond to the great valley of Nawagai. For some distance along this branch, lies the road to Chitral, and along it the Malakand Field Force, will presently advance against the Mohmands. The other branch, prolongs the valley to the east- ward. A few miles beyond Chakdara a long spur jutting from the southern mountains, blocks the valley. Round its base the river has cut a channel. The road passes along a narrow stone causeway be- tween the river and the spur. Here is the Landakai position, or as the tribesmen have for centuries called it, the " Gate of Swat ". Beyond this gate is Upper Swat, the ancient, beautiful and mysterious " Ud- ■ ll ll t io8 The Malakand Field Force. yana". This chapter will describe the forcing of the gate and the expedition to the head of the valley. The severe fighting at the Malakand and Chak- dara had shown how formidable was the combina- tion which had been raised against the British, among the hill tribes. The most distant and solitary valleys ; the most remote villages had sent their armed men to join in the destruction of the infidel. All the Bajaur tribes, had been well repre- sented in the enemy's ranks. The Bunerwals, and the Utman Khels, had risen to a man. All Swat had been involved. Instead of the two or three thousand men that had been estimated as the extreme number who would follow the Mad Fakir, it was now known that over 12,000 were in arms. In consequence of the serious aspect which the military and political situation had assumed, it was decided to mobilise a 3rd and Reserve Brigade composed as follows : — ^rd Brigade. Commanding — Brigadier-General J. H. Wodehouse, C.B., C.M.G. 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry. 1st ,, Gordon Highlanders. 2ist Punjab Infantry. 2nd Battalion ist Gurkhas. No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners. „ 14 British Field Hospital. „ 45 Native „ „ ,, I Field Medical Depot. The fighting of the preceding fortnight had left significant and t'=;rrible marks on the once smiling landscape. The rice crops were trampled down in all directions. The ruins of the villages which had The Gate of Swat. 109 been burned looked from a distance like blots of ink. The fearful losses which the enemy had sustained, had made an appreciable diminution, not of an army, but of a population. In the attacks upon the Malakand position, about 700 tribesmen had perished. In the siege of Chakdara, where the open ground had afforded opportunity to the modern weapons, and Maxim guns, over 2000 had been killed. Many others had fallen in the relief of Chakdara and in the cavalry pursuit. For days their bodies lay scattered about the country. In the standing crops, in the ruins of villages, among the rocks, festering bodies lay in the blazing sun, filling the valley with a dreadful smell. To devour these great numbers of vultures quickly assembled and disputed the abundant prey w'th the odious lizards, which I have mentioned in an earlier chapter, and which emerged from holes and corners to attack the corpses. Although every consideration of decency and health, stimulated the energy of the victors, in interring the bodies of their enemies, it was some days before this task could be accomplished, and even then, in out-of-the- way places, there remained a good many that had escaped the burying parties. Meanwhile the punishment that the tribesmen of the Swat Valley had received, and Lheir heavy losses, had broken the spirit of many, and several deputations came to make their submission. The Lower Swatis surrendered unconditionally, and were allowed to return to their villages. Of this per- mission they at once availed themselves, and their figures could be seen moving about their ruined no The Malakand Field Force. I ^;' I; i i I 'i i t' II li'i homes and endeavouring to repair the damage. Others sat by the roadside and watched in sullen despair the steady accumuht'on of troops in their valley, which had been the only result of their appeal to arms. It is no exaggeration to say that perhaps half the tribesmen who attacked the Malakand, had thought that the soldiers there, were the only troops that the Sirkar possessed. " Kill these," they had said, "and all is done." What did they know of the distant regiments which the telegraph wires were drawing, from far down in the south of India ? Little did they realise they had set the world humming ; that military officers were hurrying 7000 miles by sea and land from England, to the camps, in the mountains ; that long trains were carrying ammunition, material and supplies from distant depots to the front ; that astute financiers were considering how their action had affecttid the ratio between silver and gold, or that sharp poli- ticians were wondering how the outbreak m Swat might be made to influence the impending bye- elections. These ignorant tribesmen had no con- ception of the sensitiveness of that modern civilisa- tion, which thrills and quivers in every part of its vast and complex system, at the slightest touch. They only saw the forts and camps on the Mala- kand Pass and the swinging bridge across the river. While the people of Lower Swat, deserted by the Mad Mullah, and confronted by the two brigades, were completely humbled and subdued, the Upper Swatis, encouraged by their priests, and, as they believed, safe behind their " gate," assumed a much i The Gate of Swat. Ill more independent air. They sent to inquire what terms the Government would offer, and said they would consider the matter. Their contumacious atti- tude, induced the political officers to recommend the movement of troops, through their country, to impress them with the determination and powerof the Sirkar. The expedition into the Upper Swat Valley was accordingly sanctioned ; and Sir Bindon Blood began making the necessary preparations for the advance. The prospects of further fighting were eagerly welcomed by the troops; especially by those who had arrived too late for the relief of Chakdara, and had thus far, only long and dusty marches to perform. There was much speculation and excite- ment as to what units would be taken, every one asserting that his regiment was sure to go ; that it was their turn ; and that if they were not taken it would be a great shame. Sir Bindon Blood had however already decided. He had concentrated a considerable force at Aman- DARA in view of a possible advance, and as soon as the movement was sanctioned organised the column as follows : — 1st Brigade. Commanding — Brigadier-General Meiklejohn. Royal West Kent Regiment. 24th Punjab Infantry. 31st „ „ 45th Sikhs. With the following divisional troops : — loth Field Battery. No. 7 British) o r> 1 f Mountain Batteries. „ 8 Bengali „ 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners. 2 Squadrons Guides Cavalry. 4 „ nth Bengal Lancers. 1 i I I I s 112 The Malakand Field Force. This force amounted to an available fighting strength of 3500 rifles, and sabres, with eighteen guns. Supplies for twelve days were carried, and the troops proceeded on " the 80 lb. scale " of bag- gage ; which means, that they did not take tents, and a few other comforts, and conveniences. Before the force started a sad event occurred. On the 1 2th of August Lieut-Colonel J. Lamb, who had been wounded on the night of the 26th of July, died. An early amputation might have saved his life ; but this was postponed in the ex- pectation that the Rontgen Rays^ would enable the bullet to be extracted. The Rays arrived from India after some delay. When they reached Malakand, the experiment was at once made. It was found, however, that the apparatus had been damaged in coming up, and no result was obtained. Meanwhile, mortification had set in ; and the gallant soldier died on the Sunday, from the effects of an amputation, which he was then too weak to stand. His thigh bone had been completely shattered by the bullet. He had seen service in Afghanistan and the Zhob Valley, and had been twice mentioned in despatches. On the 14th Sir Bindon Blood joined the special force, and moved it on the i6th to Thana, a few miles further up the valley. At the same time he ordered Brigadier-General Wodehouse, to detach a small force in the direction of the southern passes of Buner. The Highland Light Infantry, No. 3 Company Bombay Sappers and Miners, and one squadron of the lOth Bengal Lancers accordingly marched from Mardan, where the 3rd Brigade then The Gate of Swat. 113 by was, to Rustum. By this move they threatened the Bunerwals, and distracted their attention from the Upper Swat Valley. Having thus weakened the enemy, Sir Bindon Blood proceeded to force the "Gate of Swat". On the evening of the i6th a reconnaissance by the nth Bengal Lancers, under Major Beatson, revealed the fact that the Landakai position, was strongly held by the enemy. Many standards were displayed, and on the approach of the cavalry, shots were fired all along the line. The squadron retired at once, and reported the state of affairs. The general decided to attack at daybreak. At 6*30 A.M. on the 17th, the cavalry moved off, and soon came in contact with the enemy, in some Buddhist ruins near a village called Jalala. A skirmish ensued. Meanwhile the infantry were approaching. The main position of the enemy was displayed. All along the crest of the spur of Landakai, could be seen a fringe of standards, dark against the sky. Beneath them the sword blades of the tribesmen glinted in the sunlight. A long line of stone sungars crowned the ridge, and behind the enemy clustered thickly. It is estimated that over 5000 were present. It is not difficult to realise, what a strong posi- tion this was. On the left of the troops, was an unfordable river. On their right the mountains rose steeply. In front was the long ridge held by the enemy. The only road up the valley was along the causeway, between the ridge, and the river. To advance further it was necessary to dis- lodge the enemy, from the ridge. Sir Bindon 8 1 I ( < ! I, ' I I I J; 114 The Malakand Field Force. Blood rode forward, reconnoitred the ground, and made his dispositions. To capture the position by a frontal attack, would involve heavy loss. The enemy were strongly posted, and the troops would be exposed to a heavy fire in advancing. On the other hand, if the ridge could once be captured, the destruction of the tribesmen was assured. Their position was good, but only as long as they held it. The moment of defeat, would be the moment of ruin. The reason was this. The ground behind the ridge was occupied by swampy rice fields, and the enemy could only retire very slowly over it. Their safe line of retreat lay up the spur, and on to the main line of hills. They were thus formed with their line of retreat in prolongation of their front. This is, of course, tactically one of the worst situations that people can get into. Sir Bindon Blood, who knew what the ground behind the ridge was like, perceived at once how matters stood, and made his plans accordingly. He determined to strike at the enemy's left ; thus not only turning their flank, but cutting off their one line of retreat. If once his troops held the point, where the long ridge ran into the main hills, all the tribesmen who had remained on the ridge would be caught. He accordingly issued orders as follows : — The Royal West Kent were to mask the front and occupy the attention of the enemy. The rest of the infantry, viz., 24th and 31st Punjab Infantry and the 45th Sikhs, were to ascend the hills to the right, and deliver a flank attack, on the head of the ^ The Gate of Swat. 115 in front ■e rest antry o the fthe ridge. The cavalry were to be held in readiness to dash forward along the causeway, as soon as the enemy were driven off the ridge which commanded it, and pursue them across the rice fields into the open country beyond. The whole of the powerful artillery was to come into action at once. The troops then advanced. The Royal West Kent began the fight, by driving some of the enemy from the Buddhist ruins, on a small spur in advance of the main position. The loth Field Battery had been left in rear, in case the guns might stick in the narrow roads, near Thana village. It had, how- ever, arrived safely, and now trotted up, and at 8*50 A.M. opened fire on the enemy's position, and at a stone fort which they occupied strongly. A few minutes later No. 7 Mountain Battery came into action from the spur which the Royal West Kent had taken. A heavy artillery fire, thus pre- pared the way for the attack. The great shells of the Field Artillery astounded the tribesmen, who had never before witnessed the explosion of a twelve-pound projectile. The two mountain bat- teries added to their discomfiture. Many fled during the first quarter of an hour of the bombard- ment. All the rest took cover on the reverse slope and behind their sungars. Meanwhile the flank attack was developing. General Meiklejohn and his infantry were climbing up the steep hillside, and moving steadily t< wards the junction of the ridge, with the main hiil. At length the tribesmen on the spur, perceived the danger that was threatening them. They felt the grip on their line of retreat. They had imagined ii6 The Mnlakand Field Force. I ' :i, i: I- that the white troops, would try and force their path along the causeway, and had massed considerable reserves, at the lower end of the ridge. All these now realised that they were in great danger of being cut off. They were on a peninsula, as it were, while the soldiers were securing the isthmus. They accordingly began streaming along the ridge to- wards the left, at first with an idea of meeting the flank attack, but afterwards, as the shell fire grew hotter, and the musketry increased, only in the hopes of retreat. Owing to the great speed with which the mountaineers move about the hills, most of them were able to escape before the flank attack could cut them off. Many, however, were shot down as they fled, or were killed ' the artillery fire. A few brave men charged 31st Punjab Infantry, but were all destroyed. Seeing the enemy in full flight. Sir Bindon Blood ordered the Royal West Kent to advance against the front of the now almost deserted ridge. The British infantry hurrying forward climbed the steep hill, and captured the stone sungars. From this position they established touch with the flank attack, and the whole force pursued the flying tribesmen with long-range fire. The " Gate of Swat " had been forced. It was now possible for troops to advance along the cause- way. This had, however, been broken in various places by the enemy. The sappers and miners hastened forward to repair it. While this was being done, the cavalry had to wait in mad im- patience, knowing that their chance lay in the plains beyond. As soon as the road was suffi- The Gate of Swat. 117 ciently repaired to allow them to pass, in sinc^le file, they bc^^an strupglinpf along it, and emerged at the other end of the causeway in twos and threes. An incident now ensued, which, though it afforded an opportunity for a splendid act of courage, yet involved an unnecessary loss of life, and must be called disastrous. As the cavalry got clear of the broken ground, the leading horsemen saw the tribesmen swiftly running towards the hills, about a mile distant. Carried away by the excite- ment of the pursuit, and despising the enemy for their slight resistance, they dashed impetuously forward in the hope of catching them before they could reach the hills. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, on entering into the plain, saw at once that if he could seize a small clump of trees near a cemetery, he would be able to bring effective dismounted fire, to bear on the retreating tribesmen. He therefore collected as many men as possible, and with Lieutenant Maclean, and Lord Fincastle, the Times correspondent, rode in the direction of these points. Meanwhile Captain Palmer, who commanded the leading squadron, and Lieutenant Greaves of the Lancashire Fusiliers, who was acting war correspondent of the Times of India, galloped across the rice fields after the enemy. The squadron, unable to keep up, straggled out in a long string, in the swampy ground. At the foot of the hills the ground was firmer, and reaching this, the two officers recklessly dashed in among the enemy. It is the spirit that loses the empire many lives, but has gained it many battles. But the tribesmen, who had been outmanoeuvred i'l •'5 f-H I .1 amm ■r ■■ipi Ii8 The Malakand Field Force. I I "V' I it m ! i I I .1 ■' rather than outfought, turned savagely on their pursuers. The whole scene was witnessed by the troops on the ridge. Captain Palmer cut down a standard-bearer. Another man attacked him. Rais- ing his arm for another stroke, his wrist was smashed by a bullet. Another killed his horse. Lieutenant Greaves, shot through the body, fell at the same moment to the ground. The enemy closed around and began hacking him, as he lay, with their swords. Captain Palmer tried to draw his revolver. At this moment two Sowars got clear of the swampy rice fields, and at once galloped, shouting, to the rescue, cutting and slashing at the tribesmen. All would have been cut to pieces or shot down. The hill- side was covered with the enemy. The wounded officers lay at the foot. They were surrounded. Seeing this Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and Lord Fincastle, with Lieutenant Maclean and two or three Sowars, dashed to their assistance. At their charge the tribesmen fell back a little way and opened a heavy fire. Lord Fincastle's horse was im- mediately shot, and he fell to the ground. Rising, he endeavoured to lift the wounded Greaves, on to Colonel Adams' saddle, but at this instant a second bullet struck that unfortunate officer, killing him instantly. Colonel Adams was slightly, and Lieu- tenant Maclean mortally, wounded while giving assistance, and all the horses but two were shot. In spite of the terrible fire, the body of Lieutenant Greaves and the other two wounded officers were rescued and carried to the little clump of trees. For this gallant feat of arms both the surviving officers, Colonel Adams and Lord Fincastle, were <:, J! The Gate of Swat. 119 recommended for, and have since received, the Victoria Cross. It was also officially announced that Lieutenant Maclean would have received it, had he not been killed. Many of his friends on the frontier, where he was well known as a fine soldier and a good sportsman, think that the acci- dent of his death should not have been allowed to interfere, with the reward of valour. The extremes of fortune which befel Lord Fin- castle, and Lieutenant Greaves, may well claim a moment's consideration. Neither officer was employed officially with the force. Both had travelled up at their own expense, evading and overcoming all obstacles in an endeavour to see something of war. Knights of the sword and pen, they had nothing to offer but their lives, no troops to lead, no duties to perform, no watchful com- manding officer to report their conduct. They played for high stakes ; and fortune, never so capricious as on the field of battle, dealt to one the greatest honour that a soldier can hope for, an honour as some think, the greatest in the gift of the Crown, and to the other a glorious death. The flight of the enemy, terminated the action of Landakai. Thus in a few hours, and with hardly any loss, the " Gate of Swat" which the tribesmen had regarded as impregnable, had been forced. The cavalry pursuing the enemy had a successful skir- mish near the village of Abueh, and returned to camp about 6*30 in the evening. During the fight about lOCXD tribesmen had threatened the baggp^e column ; but these were but poor-spirited fellows, for they retired after a short skirmish with two ff! ■ f : I I !•) t ■i I I : 111 1 i ; i 1 i sn >; ■ III (i 1 I20 The Malakand Field Force. squadrons of the i ith Bengal Lancers, with a loss of twenty killed and wounded. The total casualties of the day were as follows : — British Officers. Killed — Lieutenant R. T. Greaves, Lanes. Fusiliers. „ „ H. L. S. Maclean, Guides. Wounded severely — Captain M. E. Palmer, Guides. Wounded slightly — Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, Guides. Native Ranks — Wounded— 5. Followers — Wounded — 2. Total Casualties — 11. It must be remembered that but for the incident which resulted in the deaths of the officers, and which Sir Bindon Blood described in his official despatch as an " unfortunate contretemps,'^ the total casualties would have only been seven wounded. That so strong a position should have been cap- tured with so little loss, is due, firstly, to t^ '^ disposi- tions of the general ; and secondly, to the power of the artillery which he had concentrated. The account of the first attempt 'o storm the Dargai position on the 20th of October, before it had been shaken by artillery fire, when the Dorsetshire Regi- ment suffered severe loss, roused many reflections among those who had witnessed the action of Lan- dakai. The next morning, the i8th, the force continued their march up the valley of the Upper Swat. The natives, thoroughly cowed, offered no further opposi- tion, and sued for peace. Their losses at Landakai were ascertained to have exceeded 500, and they realised that they had no chance against the regu- lar troops, when these were enabled to use their powerful weapons. The Gate of Swat. 121 \\ As the troops advanced up the fertile, and beauti- ful valley, all were struck by the numerous ruins of the ancient Buddhists. Here in former times were thriving cities, and civilised men. Here we learn from Fa-hien ^ were " in all 500 Sangharamas," or monasteries. At these monasteries the law of hos- pitality was thus carried out : " When stranger bhiksliees (begging monks) arrive at one of them their wants are supplied for three days, after which they are told to find a resting-place for themselves ". All this is changed by time. The cities are but ruins. Savages have replaced the civilised, bland- looking Buddhists ; and the traveller who should apply for hospitality, would be speedily shown " a resting-place," which would relieve his hosts from further trouble concerning him. " There is a tradition," continues the intrepid monk, who travelled through some of the wildest countries of the earth, in the darkest ages of its his- tory, " that when Buddha came to North India he came to this country, and that he left a print of his foot, which is long or short according to the ideas of the beholder." Although the learned Fa-hien asserts that " it exists, and the same thing is true about it at the present day," the various cavalry reconnaissances failed to di' cover it ; and we must regretfully conclude that it has also been obliterated by the tides of time. Here also, says this Buddhis- tic Baedeker, is still to be seen the rock on which " He dried Hts clothes ; and the place where He converted the wicked dragon (Naga)". " The rock * Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms. Translated by James Legge, M.A., LL.D. i ! J:'( '11 il I I I i 122 The Malakand Field Force. is fourteen cubits high, and more than twenty broad, with one side of it smooth." This may well be be- lieved ; but there are so many rocks of all dimensions that the soldiers were unable to make certain which was the scene of the dragon's repentance, and Buddha's desiccation. His companions went on ahead towards Jellala- bad, or some city in that locality, but Fa-hien, charmed with the green and fertile beauties of "the park," remained in the pleasant valley and " kept the summer retreat ". Then he descended into the land of So-hoo-to ; which is perhaps Buner. Even in these busy, practical, matter-of-fact, modern times, where nothing is desirable unless economically sound, it is not unprofitable for a moment to raise the veil of the past, and take a glimpse of the world as it was, in other days. The fifth century of the Christian era, was one of the most gloomy and dismal periods in the history of mankind. The Great Roman Empire was collaps- ing, before the strokes of such as Alaric the Goth, Attila the Hun, and Genseric the Vandal. The art and the valour of a classical age had sunk in that deluge of barbarism which submerged Europe. The Church was convulsed by the Arian controversy. That pure religion, which it should have guarded, was defiled with the blood of persecution, and de- graded by the fears of superstition. Yet while all these things afflicted the nations of the West, and seemed to foreshadow the decline or destruction of the human species, the wild mountains of Northern India, now overrun by savages more fierce than those who sacked Rome, were occupied by a placid I! II The Gate of Swat. 123 people, thriving, industrious, and intelligent; devoting their lives to the attainment of that serene annihila- tion, which the word nirvana expresses. When we reflect on the revolut'ons which time effects, and observe how the home of learning and progress changes as the years pass by, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, perhaps a mournful one ; that the sun of civilisation can never shine all over the world at once. On the 19th, the force reached Mingaora ; and here for five days they waited in an agreeable camp, to enable Major Deane to receive the submission of the tribes. These appeared very humbled by their defeats ; and sought to propitiate the troops by bringing in supplies of grain and forage. Over 800 arms of different descriptions, were surrendered during the halt. A few shots were fired into the camp on the night of the arrival at Mi jaora, but the villagers, fearing lest they should suffer, turned out and drove the "snipers" away. On the 21st a reconnaissance of the valley as far as the KOTKE Pass afforded much valuable information as to the nature of the country. All were struck with the beauty of the scenery, and when on the 24th the force marched back to Barikot, they carried away with them the memory of a beautiful valley, where the green of the rice fields, was separated from the blue of the sky by the glittering snow peaks of the Himalayas. While the troops rested at Barikot, Sir Bindon Blood personally reconnoitred the Karikar Pass, which leads from the Swat Valley into the country of the Bunerwals. The Bunerwals belong to the ! \ \ " v ![' ■111 ■ ! 124 The Malakand Field Force. Yusaf section, of the Yusafzai tribe. They are a warlike and turbulent people. To their valley, after the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, many of the Sepoys and native officers who had been in revolt fled for refuge. Here, partly by force and partly by persuasion, they established themselves. They married women of the country, and made a settlement. In 1863 the Bunerwals came into collision with the British Government, and much severe fighting ensued, known to history as the Ambeyla Campaign. The refugees from India, renewed their quarrel with the white troops, with eagerness ; and by their extraordinary courage and ferocity gained the name of the " Hindustani Fanatics ". At the cost of thirty officers and 1000 men Buner was subdued. The " Crag Picquet" was taken for the last time by the loist Fusiliers, and held till the end of the operation.-^ Elephants brought at great expense from India trampled the crops. Most of the '* Hindustani Fanatics" perished in the fighting. The Buner- wals accepted the Government terms, and the troops retired. Since then, in 1868, in 1877 and again in 1884 they raided border villages ; but on the threat of an expedition paid a fine and made good the damage. The reputation they have enjoyed since their stout resistance in 1863, has enabled them to take a leading position among the frontier tribes ; and they have availed themselves of this to foment and aggravate several outbreaks against the British. Their black and dark-blue clothes had distinguished them from the other assailants of Malakand and Chakdara. They had now withdrawn to their The Gate of Swat. 125 valley and thence defied the Government and refused all terms. As Sir Bindon Blood, and his escort approached the top of the pass, a few shots were fired by the watchers there, but there was no opposition. All the Bunerwals, had hurried over to defend the southern entrances to their country, which they conceived were in danger of attack from Brigadier- General Wodehouse's force at Rustum. The general reached the Kotal, and saw the whole valley beneath him. Great villages dotted the plains, and the aspect was fertile and prosperous. The unguarded Karikar Pass was practicable for troops, and if the Government would give their consent, Buner might be reduced in a fortnight without difficulty, almost without fight- ing. Telegrams were despatched to India on the subject, and after much delay and hesitation the Viceroy decided against the recommendation of his victorious general. Though the desirability of settling with the Bunerwals was fully admitted, the Government shrank from the risk. The Malakand Field Force thus remained idle, for nearly a fort- night. The news that the Sirkar had feared to attack Buner spread like wildfire along the frontier, and revived the spirits of the tribes. They fancied they detected a sign of weakness. Nor were they altogether wrong. But the weakness was moral rather than physical. It is now asserted that the punishment of Buner is only postponed, and that a few months may see its consummation. The opportunity of entering f ^ i '^r I III l! ii ' r f 1 1 1 :' 1 1 i 1 §i ii 1' SI '1 1 1 ll 1 1 , 1 1 ■'*' ,i 126 The Malakand Field Force. the country without having to force the passes may not, however, recur. On the 26th of August the force returned to Thana, and the expedition into Upper Swat terminated.^ * The following is the most trustworthy estimate obtainable of loss of life among the tribesmen in the fighting in the Swat Valley from 26th July to 17th August. The figures include wounded who have since died, and are more than double those killed outright in the action : — Lower Swat Pathans Upper „ „ Buner proper - Utman Khel - Yusafzai Other tribes {. I Buried in the 600 V 500 80 50 150 I graveyards. Total — 2080. I, 2 and 3 are the result of recent inquiry on the spot. 4, 5 and 6 are estimates based on native information. The proportion of killed and died of wounds to wounded would be very high, as the tribes have little surgical or medictil knowledge and refused all offers of aid. Assuming that only an equal number were wounded and recovered, the total loss would be approximately 4000. A check is obtained by comparing these figures with the separate estimates for each action : — Malakand 700 Siege of Chakdara . . . . 2000 Relief,, „ 500 Action of Landakai ... - 500 Total — 3700. 127 may ;d to Swat ible of Swat iclude those vould idJ.Ccil 1}' an I'ould these CHAPTER VIII. THE ADVANCE AGAINST THE MOHMANDS. Causes of the Expedition — Summary of the Action of Shabkadr — The Forces Employed — General Plan of the Op2rations — Advance of the Malakand Field Force — The Passage of the Panjkora — Political Aspect of the Country. The beginning" of this chapter must mark a change in the standpoint from which the story is told. Hitherto the course of events has been recorded in the impersonal style of history. But henceforward I am able to rely on my own memory as well as on other people's evidence.^ It may be doubtful whether an historical record gains or loses value when described by an eye-witness. From the per- sonal point of view, all things appear in a gradual perspective, according to the degree in which they affect the individual ; and we are so prone to exag- gerate, the relative importance of incidents which we see, over those we hear about, that what the narrative f^ains in accuracy of detail, it may lose in * I do not desire to bCi^e the reader or depreciate the story by the introduction of personal matters. It will be sufficient if, in the interests of coherency, I explain my connection with the Malakand Field Force. Having realised that if a British cavalry officer waits till he is ordered on active service, he is likely to wait a consider- able lime, I obtained six weeks' leave of absence from my regiment, and on the 2nd of September arrived at Malakand as press corre- spondent of the Pioneer and Daily Telegraph, and in the hope of being sooner or later attached to the force in a military capacity. ^i iSiiiiHMb tms 128 The Malakand Field Force. ■| I ' justness of proportion. In so nice a question I shall not pronounce. I remember that the original object with which this book was undertaken, was to present a picture of the war on the North-West Frontier to the Englishmen at home ; a picture which should not only exist, but be looked at ; and I am inclined to think that this end will be more easily attained by the adoption of a style of per- sonal narrative. Many facts, too local, too special- ised, too insignificant for an historical record, and yet which may help the reader to form a true im- pression of the scene, and situation, are thus brought within the compass of these pages. The account becomes more graphic if less imposing, more vivid if less judicial. As long as each step down from the "dignity of history" is accompanied by a corre- sponding increase of interest, we may pursue without compunction that pleasant, if descending path. The ninth chapter also introduces a new phase of the operations of the force. The Mohmands now become the enemy, and the scene is changed from Swat to Bajaur. Before marching into their country, it will be desirable to consider briefly those causes and events which induced the Government of India, to despatch an expedition, against this powerful and warlike tribe. The tidal wave of fanaticism, which had swept the frontier, had influenced the Mohmands, as all other border peoples. Their situation was, how- ever, in several important respects, different from that of the natives of the Swat Valley. These Mohmands had neither been irritated, nor inter- fered with in any way. No military road ran The Advance Against the Mohniands. 129 through their territory. No fortified posts stirred their animosity, (jr threatened their independence. Had they respected in others, the isolation wliich they themselves have so long enjoyed, they might have remained for an indefinite period in that state of degraded barbarism which seems to appeal strongly to certain people in England. They became, however, the aggressors. In the heart of the wild, and dismal mountain region in which these fierce tribesmen dwell, are the temple and village of Jarobi, the one a consecrated hovel, the other a fortified slum. This obscure and undisturbed retreat was the residence of a priest of great age and of peculiar holiness, known to fame as the Hadda Mullah. His name is Najim-ud-din, hut as respect has prevented it being mentioned by the tribesmen for nearly fifty years, it is only preserved in infidel memories and records. The Government of India have, however, had this man's personality brought vividly before them on several occasions. About thirteen years ago he quarrelled with the Amir, and raised the Mohmands against him. The Amir replied by summoning his re- bellious subject — for Hadda, the Mullah's home and birthplace, is a village of Afghanistan — to answer for his conduct at Cabul. But the crafty priest, who was well acquainted with Afghan legal procedure, declined the invitation, and retired to the independent Mohmand territory, where he has lived ever since. Content with thus inflicting the punishment of exile, the Amir was disposed to forget the offence. In a letter to his Commander-in-Chief, the " Sipah Salar," a great friend of the Mullah, he described .31 I i i if ^ H II 130 The Malakand Field Force. him as a " h'ght of Islam ". So powerful a light, indeed, he did not desire to have in his own dominions ; but across the border it was fitting that respect should be shown to so holy a man. He therefore directed his officials to cherish and honour him. Thus he retained a powerful weapon — to be used when desirable. Whether by instigation or from personal motives, the Hadda Mullah has long been a bitter foe to the British power. In 1895 he sent the fighting men of the Mohmands, to resist the Chitral Expeditionary Force. Since then he has been actively engaged, by preaching and by cor- respondence with other Mullahs, in raising a great combination against the advancing civilisation. In 1896 he terminated a long religious contro- versy with the Manki Mullah of Nowshera and Spinkhara, a comparatively tame Mullah, who now supports the Indian Government, by publishing a book setting forth his views, and demolishing those of his antv'^onist. This work was printed in Delhi, and had an extensive sale among Mahom- medans all over India. Complimentary copies were sent to the " Sipah Salar" and other Afghan notabilities; and the fame of their Hadda Mullah was known throughout the land. Besides increasing his influence, his literary success stimulated his efforts. While the Mad Fakir was rousing Swat and Buner, this powerful priest incited the Mohmands. Though he was known to be a physical coward, his sanctity, the fact that he was their own particular holy man, not less than his eloquence, powerfully moved this savage tribe. A Jehad was proclaimed. How long should Islam be insulted ? How long The Advance Against the Mohniands. 131 should its followers lurk in the barren lands of the North ? I le urged them to rise and join in the destruction of the white invaders. Those who fell should become saints ; those who lived would be rich, for these Kafirs had money an*! many other things besides, for which a true believer might find a use. The combined allurements of plunder and para- dise proved irresistible. On the 8th of August a great gathering, nearly 6000 strong, crossed the frontier line, invaded British territory, burned the village of SllUNKARCiAKH, and attacked the fort of Shabkadr. This place is an advanced post in the defensive system of the frontier, and is situated some nineteen miles to the north-west of Peshawar. Its ordinary garrison consists of about fifty Border Police. It is strongly built, and is intended to attract the attention and delay the advance of a raiding-party, until the Peshawar Garrison has had time to take the field. Both of these objects it admirably fulfilled in this case. As soon as the news of the incursion of the Moh- mands was received in Peshawar, a flying column was mobilised and proceeded under the command of Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Woon, 20th Punjab In- fantry, in the direction of the fort. At dawn on the 9th of August they found the tribesmen in force, in a strong position near Shabkadr. The force at Colonel Woon's disposal was small. It consisted of: — ' I. ) 1 4 Guns 51st Field Battery. 2 Squadrons 13th Bengal Lancers - - 151 lances. 2 Companies Somersetshire Light Infantry 186 rifles. 20th Punjab Infantry 400 „ 132 The Malakand Field Force. n i A total of about 750 men. The enemy numbered 6000. Nevertheless it was decided to attack at once. As the action which followed is but remotely connected with the fortunes of the Malakand Field Force, I do not intend to describe it in detail. The infantry in advancing could only attack on a front of 600 yards. The enemy's Hne, being much longer, quickly turned both flanks. The fire be- came severe. Numerous casualties occurred. A retirement was ordered. As is usual in Asiatic warfare, it was considerably pressed. The situa- tion at about nlae o'clock appeared critical. At this point Brigadier-General Elles, commandmg the Peshawar District, arrived on the field. He immediately ordered the two squadrons of the 13th Bengal Lancers, to move well to the right flank, to charge across the front and check the enemy's advance. The " cease fire " sounded as on a field day. Then there was a pause. The movements of the cavalry were concealed from most of the troops, but suddenly all noticed the slackening of the enemy's fire. Then the tribes- men were seen to be in retreat and disorder. The power of cavalry had been strikingly dis- played. The two squadrons, ably led, had exe- cuted a fine charge o>''er what theorists would call impossible ground for a distance of one and a half miles along the bed of a great nullah, and among rocks and stones Lhat reduced the pace to a trot. The enemy were driven from the field. Sixty were actually speared by the Lancers, and the rest retreated in gloom and disorder to their hills across the frontier. 1 The Advance Against the Mohmands. 133 The casualties were as follows : — British Officers. Wounded severely — Major A. Lumb, Somersetshire Lifi;ht Infantry, „ ,, Captain S. W. Blacker, R.A. „ „ 2nd Lieut. E. Drummond, Somersetshire Light Infantry. Wounded slightly - Lieut. A. V. Cheyne, 13th Bengal Lancers. British N.C.O.'s and Soldiers. Killed. Wounded. 51st Field Battery, R.A. - - - ... 2 Somersetshire Light Infantry - - - 3 9 Native Ranks. 13th Bengal Lancers . . . - 2oth Punjab Infantry ... - Followers ...... Total casualties, all ranks — 72. 12 35 That such an outrage, as the deliberate violation of British territory by these savages, should remain unpunished, "Forward Policy" or no ''Forward Policy," was of course impossible. Yet the vacilla- tion and hesitancy which the Government of India had displayed in the matter of the Bunerwals,and the shocking and disgraceful desertion of the forts in the Khyber Pa.ss, were .so fresh in all men's minds, that the order to advance against the Mohmands was re- ceived with feelings of the greatest relief throughout the forces. The general plan of the operations as ar- ranged by the Commander-in-Chief was as follows: — 1. Sir Bindon Blood with two brigades of the Malakand Field Force and due proportions of cavalry and guns was to move through South Bajaur to Nawagai, and on the 15th of September invade the Mohmand country from that place. 2. On the same date Major-General Elles with an equal force would leave Shabkadr, and entering the mountains march north- east to effect a junction, ! i ^ ' a H UL i M.lfc'B—muM 134 The Malakand Field Force. m 8 3. This having been done, the combined forces under the supreme command of Sir Bindon Blood would be brought back through the Mohmands' territories to Shabkadr. Incidentally they would deal with the Hadda Mullah's village of Jarobi, and inflict such punishment on the tribesmen as might be necessary to ensure their submission. The troops would then be available for the Tirah Expedition, which it had by this time been decided to organise. The fact that after leaving Navvagai, nothing was known of the configuration of the country, of which no maps existed ; nor of the supplies of food, forage and water available by the way, made the prepara- tions for, and the execution of, these operations somewhat difficult. Wide margins had to be allowed in the matter of rations, and in order to be prepared for all contingencies and obstructions of ground, Sir Bindon Blood equipped his 2nd Brigade entirely with mule transport. The 3rd Brigade with camels would follow if the road was passable. The following was the composition of the forces employed : — I. Malakand Field Force. Commanding — Major-General Sir Bindon Blood. 2nd Brigade. Brigadier-General Jeffreys, C.B. The Buffs. 35th Sikhs. 38th Dogras. Guides Infantry. No. 4 Company (Bengal) Sappers and Miners. No. 7 Mountain Battery. ^rd Brigade. Brigadier-General Wodehouse. The Queen's Regiment. ^ 22nd Punjab Infantry. 1 This regiment had replaced the Gordon Highlanders in the 3rd Brigade, The Advance Against the Mohmands. 135 39th Punjab Infantry. No. 3 Company (Bombay) Sappers and Miners. No. I Mountain Battery, R.A. Cavalry — nth Bengal Lancers. Liiic of Communications. \st Brigade. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn. Royal West Kent. Highland Light Infantry. 31st Punjab Infantry. 24th „ 45th Sikhs. No. 7 British Mountain Battery. And the following additional troops :— 1 Squadron loth Bengal Lancers. 2 Squadrons Guides Cavalry. II. The Mohmand Field Force. 1st Brigade. 1st Battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry. Maxim Gun Detachment, ist Battalion Devonshire Regiment. 20th Punjab Infantry. 2nd Battalion ist Gurkhas. Sections A and B No. 5 British Field Hospital. Three Sections No. 31 Native ,, ,, Section A No. 45 „ ,, „ 2nd Brigade. 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry. gth Gurkha Rifles. 37th Dogras. Sections C and D No. 5 British Field Hospital. No. 44 Native Field Hospital. Divisional Troops. 13th Bengal Lancer's. No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery. No. 5 (Bombay) Mountain Battery. No. 5 Company (Bengal) Sappers and Miners. 28th Bombay Pioneers. 1st Patiala Infantry. Sections C and D No. 63 Native Field Hospital. 'ill AM 136 The Malakand Field Force. I * 1' ! 3 lit ' To record the actual movements of troops in a campaign, is among the most important duties of one who undertakes to tell its tale. For the sake of clearness, of brevity, and that the reader who is not interested may find convenience in skipping, I shall at once describe the whole of the marches, and manceuvres, by which Sir Bindon Blood moved his brigades across the Fanjkora River, and after the Malakand Field Force is safely camped at Ghosam, the reader will be invited to return and examine the scenery, and remark the incidents of the way. During the end of August, the 2nd Brigade, equipped with mule transport, was at Khar in the Swat Valley. The 3rd Brigade was at UCH. On the 2nd of September, definite orders to advance were received from Simla. In pursuance of these instructions, Sir Bindon Blood ordered Brigadier- General Wodehouse with the 3rd Ikigade, which in anticipation had been moved from UcH a few days previously, to take over the bridge across the Panj- kora from the Khan of Dir's Levies, and secure the passage. On the 6th, the 3rd Brigade msrched from Sarai to Fanjkora, and obtained possession of the bridge just in time to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy, who had already gathered to seize it. The 12-pounder guns of the loth Field Battery, were placed in a strong position command- ing the passage, and the brigade camped on the left bank. On the same day, Brigadier-General Jeffreys with headquarters marched from Khar, to Chakdara. On the 7th he proceeded to Sarai, and on the 8th effected the passage of the Panj- KORA, and camped on the further bank at KOTKAI. \V\ The Advance Against the Mohmands. 137 On the loth, both brigades marched to Ghosam, where they concentrated. On the Hne of communi- cations to the Malakand, stages were established at Chakdara and Sarai, with accommodation for sick and wounded. An advanced depot was formed behind the Panjkora, to grarc' which, and to hold the passage, an additional force was moved from the Swat Valley. This concentration at GlIOSAM, of which the details had worked out so mechanically, had been necessitated by the attitude of the tribesmen of Bajaur and the adjoining valleys. Great gather- ings had collected, and up to the 7th of September, there had been every sign of determined opposition. So formidable did the combination appear, that Sir Bindon Blood arranged to have at his disposal a force of six squadrons, nine battalions and three batteries, in the expectation of an action at or near Ghosam, which would perhaps have been on a larger scale than any British engagement since Tel-el-Kebir. These anticipations were however doomed to dis- appointment. The methodical, remorseless advance of powerful forces, filled the tribesmen with alarm. They made a half-hearted attempt to capture the Panjkora bridge, and finding themselves forestalled, fell again to discussing terms. In this scene of in- decision, the political officers employed all their arts. And then suddenly the whole huge combina- tion, which had been raised in our path, collapsed as an iceberg when southern waters have melted its base. Whatever the philanthropist may say, it would l! i !! 138 The Malakand Field Force. appear to have been better policy to have en- couraged these tribesmen to oppose the advance in the open, on some well-defined position. Had they done so, there can be no doubt that the two fine brigades, backed by a powerful artillery, and under a victorious commander, who knew and had fought over every inch of the ground, would have defeated them with severe loss. Bajaur would have been settled at a single blow, and probably at a far less cost in lives than was afterwards incurred. Instead of this, it was the aim of our diplomacy to dissipate the opposition. The inflammation which should have been brought to a head and then operated on, was now dispersed throughout the whole system, with what results future chapters will show. Having thus brought the brigades peacefully to Ghosam, I ask the reader to return to the Malakand and ride thence with the Headquarter Staff along the line of march. On the 5th of September, Sir Bindon Blood and his staff, which I had the pleasure ':o accompany, started from the Kotal Camp and proceeded across the plain of Khar to Chakdara. Here we halted for the night, and as the scenery and situation of this picturej^que fort have already been described, the march may be continued without delay next morning. From Chakdara to Sarai, is a stage of twelve miles. The road runs steadily up the valley until the summit of the Catgalla Pass is reached. '* Catgalla " means " Cut-throat," and indeed, it is not hard to believe that this gloomy defile has been the scene of dark and horrid deeds. Thence a descent of two miles leads to Sarai. On the way, we fell in with the The Advance Against the Mohmands. 139 en- 2nd Brigade, and had to leave the road to avoid the long lines of mules, and marching men, who toiled along it. The valley at Sarai is about two miles wide, and the mountains rise steeply from it. On every ridge it is possible to distinguish the red brick ruins which were the dwellings of the ancient Buddhists. These relics of an early civilisation, long since over- thrown and forgotten, cannot fail to excite interest and awaken reflection. They carry the mind back to the times ** when the smoke of sacrifice rose from the Pantheon, and when camelopards and tigers bounded in the Flavian amphitheatre ". And they also lead us to speculations of the future, till we wonder whether the traveller shall some day in- spect, with unconcerned composure, the few scraps of stone and iron which may indicate the British occupation of India. Few, indeed, the remains would be — for we build for immediate use, not future ostentation in these days, and if we should ever cease to be a force in the world, all traces of us would soon be obliterated by time. Yet, perhaps, if that unborn critic of remote posterity would re- member that " in the days of the old British," the rice crop had been more abundant, the number of acres under cultivation greater, the population larger, and the death rate lower, than at any period in the history of India — we should not be without a monument more glorious than the pyramids. We camped with the 2nd Brigade, on the night of the 6th, and next morning, while the stars were still shining, resumed the march. Five miles from Sarai the road dwindles to a mule track, and hence- 1 !• I ,! i! ^ • i 140 The Malakand Field Force. f! forward is not fit for wheeled traffic. In spite of this, the loth Field Battery had succeeded in getting their guns along it, and had brought them safely to Panjkora. But soldiers will accomplish a good deal, to get nearer the enemy. The scenery before the gorge of the river is reached is gloomy, but grand. Great cliffs tower up precipitously on the further bank, and the path is cut in the face of the rock. The river, which ^ows swiftly by, plunges into a narrow cleft about a mile below the bridge, and disappears among the mountains. It abounds in fish, but is rapid and dangerous, and, while the troops were encamped near it, two gunners lost their lives by falling in, and being carried down. Indeed, watching the dead bodies of several camels being swept along, swirled around, and buffeted against the rocks, it was not hard to understand these accidents. At length the bridge is reached. It is a frail structure, supported on wire ropes. At each end are gates, flanked by little mud towers. The battery was established on a knoll to the right, and the long muzzles of the guns, peered through stone embrasures at the opposite hills. It was round the bases of these hills, that much hard fighting took place in the Chitral caii'^paign. About half a mile beyond the bridge, I was shown the place where the Guides had been so hard pressed, and for a whole night, had had to stand at bay, their colonel killed, the bridge broken, and the river in flood ; and against the tribesmen in overwhelming numbers. The field telegraph stopped at the bridge- head, and a small tent with a half-dozen military The Advance Against the Mohmands. 141 operators, marked the breaking of the slender thread, that connected us across thousands of miles of sea and land, with London. Henceforward a line of signal stations with their flickering helios, would be the only links. We were at the end of the wire. I have ften stood at the other, and watched the tape machine click off the news as it arrive.''. ; the movements of the troops ; the prospects of action ; the fighting ; the casualties. How different are die scenes. The club on an autumn evening — its members grouped anxiously around, discussing, wondering, asserting ; the noise of the traffic out- side ; the cigarette smoke and electric lights within, ^nd, only an hour away along the wire, the field, with the bright sunlight shining on the swirling muddy waters ; the black forbidding rocks ; the white tents of the brigade a mile up tfie valley ; the long streak of vivid green rice crop by the river ; and in the foreground the brown-clad armed men. I can never doubt which is the right end to be at. It is better to be making the news than taking it ; to be an actor rather than a critic. To cross the bridge, it was necessary to dismount and lead the horses over in single file. Even then the swinging of the whole structure made it difficult to walk. The passage of the transport under such conditions occupied the whole day, and the unfortunate officers in charge of the mule trains, were working incessantly. The staff passed quickly, however, and riding on about a mile forded the tributary stream of the Jandol, and reached the camp at Kotkai about noon. Thence we pro- ceeded on the following day to Ghosam, but as the III ; i i"i ' ■( i! -lilii^ a^ llll^ , 1 1 1 k li 1 J i 1 1 142 The Malakand Field P'orce. road is uninteresting, and I am be^n'nning to think the reader will readily excuse further description, we need not toil along it in the dust and the heat. The narration of the daily movements of troops, unmarked by variety of incident, is dull and weary- ing. Yet he who would obtain a true idea of the soldier's life on service, must mentally share the fatigues of the march, and the monotony of the camp. The fine deeds, the thrilling moments of war, are but the high lights on a picture, of which the background is routine, hard work, and dis- comfort. At Ghosam the 2nd Brigade remained until joined by the 3rc., and pending negotiations between the political officers and the tribal Jirga/is. The use of purely local terms in all writing is to be de- precated. Perhaps the reason that no popular history of India exists is to be found in the out- landish names of the characters, and the other ex- pressions with which the pages are sprinkled. In this account I have zealously tried to avoid the ugly jargon, of a degraded language ; and to mini- mise the use of native names. The term just employed has, however, been so freely used in the newspapers recently, that it is perhaps as well to explain its meaning. A Jirgah is a deputa- tion of tribesmen. It does not necessarily represent the tribe. It may present — and very often does — a minority report. Occasionally it expresses the opinion only of its own members. What has been settled one day is therefore very often overruled the next. The Jirgah may accept terms of peace in the morning, and the camp I'he Advance Against the Mohmands. 14;^ may be rushed that ni^ht. These were, however, genuine, and spoke in the name, and with the authoritv of t'ne tribes. All day they kept arriving and squ.itting in rows before Major Deane's tent, to hear the Government terms. The chief condition imposed was the surrender of rifles. A fixed num- ber, based on calculation of wealth and population, was demanded from each clan. This method of punishment is peculiarly galling to a people, wl )se life is so full of war. No other course was, however, open but submission ; and promising that the terms should be complied with, the deputations departed. T stimulate their effort and zeal in collecting their arms, the combined movements were delayed for three days, and the forces remained encamped at Ghosam, near Manda. I avail myself of this halt to touch, albeit with no little trepidation, the tangled and obscure subject of tribal politics in Dir and Bajaur. All the people, incited by their priests, are bitterly hostile to the British Government, except those benefited by the subsidies paid. They were now anxious to fight, and were only restrained by a fear, which fury or fanaticism, might at any moment overcome. P'our principal khans, exercise an authority which varies locally, from absolute dominion to a shad nvy suze- raint}', over the whole region. The Khan of Dir, the most important, is a Government nominee. He is supported by the British influence, and is, as I have already noticed, entrusted with the raising of Levies to protect and keep in repair the Chitral road. For these services he receives pay, and a certain allow- ance of arms, and am.munition. His own subjects I: 11 ii f'A' Itl t\ w II 1:1 W ii w I! it > %', '44 The Malakarid Field I'orce. are strongly opposed to his rule from dislike of his British sympathies, and he only maintains himself by the assistance which the Government gives him in arms and money. In other words he is a pup- pet. The Khan of Navvagai is constrained by fear, to display a friendly attitude towards the Sirkar. His subjects resent this, and his position is insecure. He receives some moral support from the British agents, and as his people arc uncertain how far the Government would go to uphold him, and also as they partly realise his difficult position, they have hitherto submitted sullenly to his rule. The position and attitude of the Khan of Jar are similar, but he is a less influential chief. The fourth potentate, the Khan of Khar, is perhaps the most honest and trustworthy. He will appear in a later chapter, and the reader will have the opportunity of judging of his character from his conduct. Thus in these valleys, while the people are all hostile, their rulers find it expedient to preserve a friendly demeanour to the British, and for this they are hated by their subjects. At this stage, the leader of the popular party claims attention. As is usual, he is out of office. After the Chitral expedition of 1895, Umra Khan was expelled from his territories, and escaped to Cabul. There he has remained. The Amir is under an obligation to the British Government to prevent his raising trouble in Bajaur. If the Amir desired war he would send Umra Khan back. This would create a strong faction throughout the whole country — but particularly in the Jandol, I "he Advance Against the Mohmands 145 Salarzai and Mamund Valleys— hostile to the British and the friendly khans. The Amir hinted at this in a recent letter to the Government of India ; and such a step would probably precede his declaration of war, or follow ours. The Afpfhan sovereign is, however, well aware that he has at present nothing to gain, and many things to lose, by provoking a war with the great power which gave him his throne, and has since increased his revenue by subsidies. In the meanwhile, anxious to pre- serve his influence with the border tribes, and to impress the Indian Government with the fact that he could be a powerful foe, he keeps Umra Khan as a trump card, to be played when the occasion arises. That lie may maintain his authority in Bajaur, the exiled khan is well supplied with funds, with which to arm and pay his retainers. The situation I have thus briefly described has been little altered by the operations, with which future chapters are concerned. The friendly khans have been fortified in their allegiance and position by the military demonstration, and by the severe punishment inflicted on those tribes who resisted. On the other hand, the hostility of the people has been not unnaturally increased by war, and one tribe in particular has gained a reputation for courage, which will give them the power to cause trouble in the future. I shall not, however, antici- pate the story. 10 ■11 cl 146 CHAPTER IX. ; \f : RECONNAISSANCE. The Jandol Valley — The Seven Khans — Frontier Diplomacy — Bar- war — An Afghan Napoleon — Unpractical Reflections — Under the Chcnars — The Arms Question — Its Significance — The Ut- man Khel Passes — A Virgin Valley — A Successful "Bluff" — The Camp at Night. While the infantry of both brigades, remained halted at Ghosam near Manda, the cavalry made daily reconnaissances in all directions. Somelimes the object in view was topographical, sometimes military, and at others diplomatic, or to use the Indian application of the term, "political". On the loth, Major Deane visited the various chiefs in the Jandol Valley. I asked and obtained permission to accompany him. A change from the hot and dusty camp was agreeable to all who could be spared, and qui'.e a party was formed, among whom were some whose names have occurred fre- quently in these pages — Major Beatson, Major Hob- day, and Lord Fincastle. A squadron of the nth Bengal Lancers acted as escort. The valley of the Jandol, is about eight miles long, and perhaps half as broad. It runs out of the main valley which extends from the Panjkora to Nawagai, and is on all other sides surrounded by high and precipitous mountains. The bed of the river, although at the time of our visit, occupied only AP OF TffE DNS IN i showing' jgic Situati p of f h« ND FIELD f ai'.' st-pt.iaor 3Lers X uo )lVI J ^Vx\ ^^Ha^d|lldhlu!ri^;^v V'-Ml'NDAH ;masdai t1 "■ /.^ '" fl Philip Sc Son. LoT^ dor St.Ji*fr%\ioL ■'■;? ' MAP OK TKE OPERATIONS IN BAJAITR showing' Strat«*gic Situation of the MALAKAND FIELD FORCE l*'^-ai"' Sept 1807. AFGHAN AHMY UNDER