J-'(,;Aii.^;ii ■.„,'>.ih< i.>.^-rr\ ■■',^ . /J, ,•,„■■; V,. ijj^
THE
elemen'ts
Intelleotcial Philosophy.
BY
REV. J. DE CONCILIO,
Author of ^'■Catholicity and Pantheism," '^'■Knowledge of Mary ^^ etc.
'How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose;
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of iiectar'd sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns."
• —Milton's Comut,
New York:
D. & J. SADLIER & CO., 31 BARCLAY STREET.
Montreal : 275 Notre Dame Street.
' 1878.
Cop)'right,
D. & J. SADLIER & CO.,
1878.
n. J. HKwnr, mhntek, 97 rosE street, new yosk.
CONTENTS.
■*
PAGE
Introduction to Philosophy 7
LOGIC.
Introduction 21
Part- First.
CHAPTER
I.— Matter of Reasoning, 25
II. — Cf the Different Objects which a Universnl Idea may
Represent, and of the Different Modes of Represent-
ing them, 44
III. — Of the Expression of Ideas or of Terms, ... 54
IV. — Proximate Matter of Reasoning ; and, first, of the Na-
ture of Judgment and Proposition, .... 59
V. — Different Species and Properties of Propositio iS, . . 65
VI. — Truth of Judgments and Propositions, .... 74
Part Second. — Form of Reasoning.
I. — of the Essential vStructure of Reasoning, ... 78
II. — Different Species of Reasoning, 95
III. — Of the Expression of Reasoning, 102
IV. — Faults of Reasoning, 104
Part Third. — End of Reasoning.
I. — Of the Nature and the Necessity of Method, . . . 107
II. — Elements and Means of Method, 113
III. — Division of Method — that is, of Method of Invention and
of Discipline 120
m
24535
iv Contents,
•
CHAPTER PACE
IV. — Of Science according to its Strictest Acceptation, inas-
much as it is Knowledge, 125
V. — Of Science in its more Enlarged Signification, inasmuch
as it is a System of Truths, 131
ONTOLOGY.
Introduction— Object of Metaphysics— Definition of
Ontology, 141
I. — Of Being, considered in Itself and in a most General
Way, 143
II. — Of the Determinations of Being in General — Essence
and Existence, 152
III. — Of the Manner in which Essence and Existence co-ope-
rate to form a Real Being, 161
IV. — Of the Properties of Being, 164
v.— Of the Causes of Beings, 1S5
VI. — Division of Being, . . . , ., . . . 206
VII.— Of the Use of Ontology, 230
i ' ANTHROPOLOGY.
Introduction, 241
I. — On the Nature of Man in General, 242
II. — On the Principles from which the Nature of Man Re-
sults — Soul and Body — and, first, of the Soul, . . 252
III. — Of the Human Body 274
IV. — Of the Manner according to which the Soul and the
Body are united together and conspire to form Man, . 276
.-..A ' K , , . . , . , •• '
■,>v^ ^'V^
PREFACE.
THE author who should attempt to write a book
on the elements of intellectual philosophy
should in our opinion strictly attend to, and be
guided by, the following principles, which have re-
ference to the language, to the style, and to the
matter of the book.
I. The book should be written in English. The
matter treated of in philosophy is hard enough to
understand, even by the brightest intellect which
., just comes from the study of belles-lettres, fascinated
by the matchless beauties of the ancients clothed
in the finest language, to undertake to master hard,
dry things, without flesh and blood, but abstract
and immaterial. Now, to present such things in a
foreign language is to render the difficulty of appre-
hending them unnecessarily greater, and to heighten
the aversion which young minds naturally feel for
abstract ideas. It is like covering a beautiful paint-
ing with a double veil. For language, after all, is a
veil which covers the idea. Now, if you clothe an
idea in language foreign to the student, no matter
how well he may be supposed to know it, you oblige
him, in order to look at the idea, first to uncover
j^ Preface,
the veil of the foreign language to make room for
the veil of his own native language, and then to
catch the idea. In other words, you oblige the
student first to translate into his own language, and
then to grasp the matter. In the second place, to
write a book on the elements of philosophy in the
Latin language is to confine the study of this most
necessary science only to those who have gone
through a classical course ; whereas we know by sad
experience how necessary and how important it is
for all our young men to be imbued with proper,
true philosophical principles, to the absence of which
we may attribute all the errors and evils which afflict
society.
With regard to the style, of course it must be of
a didactic nature — that is, brief and concise, but
above all perfectly clear. Nor would we be averse
now and then, when the occasion presents itself,
from changing the nature of the style for one a
little more pleasing and attractive, so as to lighten
the difficulty and mix the useful with the sweet.
Finally, with regard to the matter, a book of
elementary philosophy should contain nothing but
the_doctrijifi.,j;eceiveiLJijr_th^^ and_greatest oJL
Christian schools, the^ (^iM:t|;ine most receiveTTn the
Churcli^Jhat_iipon^ which the^Holy See h^s_always
lookedjipon with marked and never-ceasingpartial-
ity.
These are the principles which have guided us in
writing these Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
I
Preface, ^
As to the language, not only have we written it in
English, but we have been most chary and particu-
lar in our choice. Whenever we had two words to
choose from, we always preferred that which was the
easiest of comprehension and of Anglo-Saxon origin.
We have thought proper to discard, whenever it was
possible, all words which may remind one too much *
of the schools, always translating into the best
English we could muster, anything of such a na-
ture ; so that in reading our Elements the young
student will meet with no hard word which may
require the use of the dictionary, or which may
stop him in his endeavor to catch the idea.
With regard to the style, it has been our constant
effort to make it as clear as possible, at the same time
that we have tried to be brief. There is hardly a
theory laid down which is not illustrated by one or
more examples. ArA we venture to assert that owing
to this lucidity of style onr Elemcttts could be studied,
and in great part understood, without a teacher by
any young man of parts. We have also, whenever
we possibly could, tried to illustrate our theories by
quotations from the poets, to loosen the tension of
the mind by something pleasing and interesting. At
the end of Ontology we have shown by an abstract of
all the natural sciences how they are an application of
the principles of Ontology.
With regard to the matter, we have followed Iff
throughout the philosophy of the "Angel of the * • •
Schools," in which we were brought up from our youth,
4 Preface,
and from which we have never swerved in our man-
hood, experience and more profound studies having
led us to adhere to that philosophy more tenaciously
and more ardently. Every one knows that all modern
errors have originated in the abandonment of Catholic
philosophy as embodied in the Catholic schools, and
especially in that of St. Thomas. Consequently the
only way to put a barrier to these errors, to refute
them, is to turn back to that grand philosophy created
by geniuses as great as Plato or Aristotle, and guided
by the truth of God, which those heathen geniuses
had not.
Of course, these being only elements, we have used
a great moderation in the treating of all the questions
connected with this science ; yet it will be found
that nQ_ sij igleimportant question has been^mitted
of which it is necessary for the student to know
something.
Besides the usual parts, our Elements will close
with a book on the external and internal evidences of
Christianity as a complement of this science — that is
to say, we shall in an elementary way, and without
going too deeply into the matter, show the philoso-
phical force of the proofs of the divhiity of Chris-
tian revelation.
All this we have attempted to do. Tut have we
succeeded ? No effort on our part has been or will
be spared to make this book come nearer to these
principles we laid down for our guidance. As for
the rest, it is not for us to pronounce judgment,
Preface, ft
but others, and especially for the learned professors of
this study scattered throughout the land, from whom
we shall thankfully receive any suggestion or correc-
tion which they shall see fit to make.
At present only Logic, Ontology, and the first part
of Anthropology are published. Next year, if God
gives us strength, we shall publish the rest.
Jersey City, Feast of SS. Peter and Paul,
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ELEMENTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.
ARTICLE I.
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.
Q. What is the meaning of the word philosophy?
A. It means love of wisdom, and a philosopher is
a lover of wisdom. This word was used for the first
t*me by Pythagoras, who, on being asked what art he
professed, answered that he was a philosopher.
Q. What did the ancients mean by the science
of philosophy ?
A. They meant the knowledge of everything.
This could well be in olden times, when, sciences
being in their infancy, all human knowledge could be
collected into one science. la this sense philosophy
was defined by Cicero the science of all huinaii and
divine things and of their causes.
Q. Does it embrace the same objects now?
A. Sciences being so much developed in our times,
it would be utterly impossible to comprehend them
all in one. Hence they have been divided, a particu-
lar object being set apart for each one ; therefore the
object of philosophy has been also narrowed down.
Q. Explain the object of philosophy.
A. The better to do so we will premise a few
remarks.
7
8. Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
1st. Science consists in understanding the princi-
ples from which a thing is derived: Scire res per
causas — to know things by their causes.
2d. There are two kinds of knowledge, common
and scientific. The first is satisfied with merely know-
ing the existence of a thing ; the second goes beyond
that, and is not content with merely apprehending
the existence of a thing, but wants to find out why
the thing is so and not otherwise, and what is the
principle which causes it.
For instance, who had net seen, from the time of
the first man who made a lamp and suspended it to
the wall of his cottage or to the roof, that when first
hung in its place it oscillated for some time from
side to side until at length it came to a perpendicu-
lar? Men before Galileo perceived this fact, and
passed on without seeing anything more in it. This
is common knowledge. One day Galileo, observing
this very fact, and noticing by more accurate observa-
tions that the oscillations were regular, perceived
in this fact the principles of the law of gravitation
and motion, and invented the pendulum. This is
scientific knowledge.
3d. We remark that all the sciences, though dis-
tinct and different from each other according to their
different objects, are yet connected together by the
necessary fact of the dependence of one upon the
other. For particular sciences depend upon those
which are less so, and these in their turn upon those
which are more general. Chemistry, for instance, is the
science of the elements of bodies and of their proper-
ties, but it could not exist without another less par-
ticular science which must precede it, called physics.
This latter science, which treats of the phenomena of
bodies and their causes, could not exist without an-
. Introduction to Philosophy. 9
other science more general which treats of the nature
and properties of bodies and of all the material world,
together with their causes, and which is called cos-
mology. But the world is a being, an existence, and
therefore it could not be properly understood without
the science of being in general^ its properties and causes,
which is called ontology. We conclude, therefore,
that, as every particular science depends upon another
science less particular and more general, there must be
a science which investigates the most c )mmon princi-
ples of being, and which depends on no other, but on
which all others depend. This science is philosophy.
The objects, therefore, of philosophy are the most
common principles of being.
Q. What do you mean by the most common prin-
ciples of being ?
A. As St. Thomas has remarked, the most common
principles of being are the first and supreme principles,
beyond which there can be no other. Thus the last
end, being common to all beings, is also the first and
supreme end ; the most common cause, being that
from which all things are originated, is the first cause,
upon which every other cause depends; the idea of
being, as it is the most common idea and the simplest,
is also the first idea, on which all others depend and
from which all others originate. Therefore by the
most common principles arc meant the first and su-
preme principles, from which everything proceeds and
draws its existence. And because principles of this
kind are not the property of this or that particular
being, but of all beings in general, it follows that the
objects of philosophy are the supreme principles of
everything, and not of this or that particular thing.
Q. Give the definition of philosophy according to
the preceding remarks.
lO Ele^nents of Intellectual Philosophy.
A. Philosophy is tJiat' science which ifwestigates the
first and supreme principles of being.
It is called science because it investigates principles
and cause, and therefore is a knowledge of an object
by its causes.
0/ the first and supreme principles, because the
other sciences investigate this or that principle and
cause ; philosophy only investigates the supreme and
highest principles.
Of being, because philosophy does not take as its
object any particular thing, but whatever comes
under the denomination of being.
ARTICLE II.
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY.
Q. How is philosophy divided ?
A. The objects of philosophy are the supreme prin-
ciples of being. Therefore the parts of this science
must be as many as there are natural divisions or
parts of being. Now, being may be divided into
three parts, rational, realy and moral. The rational
is that which exists only in the mind as its own
work. The real is that which has true existence
outside and independent of us. The moral is that
which originates in the will of man in its relation with
moral law. The rational is called logic, and has for
its object the order which our mind puts in its ideas.
The moral is the science of ethics, and treats of the
free actions of men as directed and guided by moral
law. The real is called metaphysics, and is subdi-
vided into three parts, because, as St. Thomas ob-
serves, real being may be classified under four heads.
It may be either material or separated from matter.
If separated from matter, this may proceed from
Introduction to Philosophy. ;- la
two causes. It may be separated from matter, not
because it is so in reality, but because our mind,
in considering a material object, may choose to leave
aside the material part of it, and fix its attention only
on the interior nature of the thing, which operation
of the mind, as we shall see, is called abstraction, and
the thing thus obtained an abstract ; or it may be
separated from matter because it is so in reality, as
spiritual substances, of which there are two, God and
the human soul. The objects of metaphysics are,
therefore, the material being, the abstract being, the
soul, and God. Hence there are four parts of philo-
sophy — cosmology, which treats of the material world ;
ontology, which speaks of being in common and in the
abstract ; anthropology, which treats of man, and of the
human soul especially ; and theology, which treats of
God as he can be known from reason.
. ARTICLE III.
USE OF PHILOSOPHY ; OR, ITS CONNECTION WITH
ALL THE SCIENCES AND ARTS.
Q. What is the use of philosophy ?
A. The use of philosophy cannot be fully pointed
out in this introduction, but will be seen at the end
of the course. Yet, to excite in the student an ardent
desire and love for such a study, we shall briefly point
out its use and its connection with all the sciences
and arts by developing the following argument. All
the sciences and arts depend upon philosophy as to
their certainty, as to their principles, and as to their
method. Therefore all the sciences and arts depend
upon philosophy and are impossible without it. And,
first, as to their certainty. Philosophy has for itg
object the supreme principles of everything. CoQ-
12 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
sequently its objects are also those supreme principles
of certainty and evidence, those criteria of truth,
supported by which our mind clings to tiuth without
hesitation or fear of the contrary, and with perfect
assurance and satisfaction. In this sense philosophy
has a character of universality which subjects to it all
the sciences and arts. For instance, physical sciences
have for their object everything which comes within
the observation of the senses. But is what falls
under the observation of the senses a true and ex-
terior reality, or merely a sensation and a modifica-
tion of our soul ? If what falls under our senses is
not an objective reality, but merely an internal modi-
fication ; if our souls perceive no more than the im-
age of objects, as some of the ancient philosophers
thought ; if odors, colors, figures, and forms are not
qualities of real bodies ; if these bodies and these
qualities are not the determining causes of taste, of
smell, of sight, etc., is it not evident that the base
of all physical sciences crumbles down, and that all
those sciences play about mere fictions of our mind,
sheer and useless idealities ? The natural philosopher
studies the body. But what is a body? Is it an
illusion, a sheer appearance, as was pretended by the
Indian pantheists, and as was held by Berkeley only a
century ago ? And is it not clear that upon the solu-
tion of all these questions depends the certainty of
all physical sciences ? Again, the natural philosophers
seek for the causes of all the operations of bodies.
For, by examining a sufficient number of operations
and constant facts, they endeavor to explain the
causes of such operations and assign laws by which
the material world is directed. Now, if, as Hume pre-
tends, the idea of cause is a chimera, the certainty of all
physical sciences is shaken, and we must consider as
Introduction to Philosophy. 13
dreams and visions all those pretended laws of the
universe of which natural sciences endeavor to demon-
strate the reality, generality, and permanence. Then
all the relations of causality become simple relations
of succession and time, all the operations of nature
become isolated ; we have no longer any co-ordination
or union among beings, and that magnificent and ad-
mirable connection which binds the facts of the sensi-
ble world to each other and to their universal princi-
ple vanishes from our eyes to make room for a com-
plete chaos. In the second place, all the sciences and
arts depend upon philosophy for their principles,
because the objects of philosophy are the supreme
principles of everything. Thus physical sciences are
founded upon the idea of being, of substance, of
matter, of quality ; upon the ideas of cause and effect.
Without these ideas they could not proceed one step
in these investigations. But what is being ? What is
substance ? What is matter, and what distinguishes
it from spirit ? All these ideas must be given by
philosophy.
Mathematical sciences depend upon it. Arithmetic
is founded upon the idea of number, and consequently
upon the ideas of unity and distinction; algebra upon
the idea of signs representing known and unknown
quantities; geometry upon the ideas of form and
size, and consequently upon the idea of extension
and space ; mechanics upon the ideas of force, of move-
ment, and of weight. Consequently, all mathematical
sciences depend upon philosophy for their principles.
Moral sciences depend upon it, because they depend
upon the ideas of the good and the just. Now, to deter-
mine what is really good and just depends absolutely
upon a true and correct system of philosophy. For
if we hold, with the sensists, that man is but an ag-
14 Elements of IntelUobual Philosophy.
gregate of sensations, we shall have the consequence
that that only is good which is agreeable or which is
useful, and Jience the moral of pleasure and of in-
terest.
Political sciences, legislation, civil and social right,
the right of nations, social and domestic economy,
public and private education — in fact, all the sciences
which have more or less connection with the govern-
ment of nations, of the family, and of the individual,
borrow from philosophy their principles and their
rules : because none can govern a man, a family, or a
nation without having studied the human soul, its
laws and its destiny ; without knowing its nature, its
faculties, the motives which can influence the human
heart and the human will ; without knowing" the
objects which one must propose to it for its actions.
And are not all these things the essential province of
philosophy ?
Medical sciences are closely allied to psychological
and moral sciences. Our soul and body are united
with a bond too intimate to permit the physiologist
to Ignore the influence of the organism on the soul
and of the soul on the organism. The most perfect
knowledge of the organs, and of the physical causes
which derange them, would be incomplete and almost
useless, if he who practises the art of healing, directing
his attention exclusively to physical causes, were to
disregard moral causes ; if a deep knowledge of the
passions, of habits, of their influence, could not enable
him to combat the derangement of the organism by
re-establishing order and tranquillity in the thoughts
and mental functions of the patient ; because man is
not merely passive, and none can determine how far
the free development of his activity may modify the
power which he has of imagining and of feeling, and
Introduction to Philosophy. 15
in a certain way change all his different modes of
existence.
But does philosophy rule over the aesthet'cal sci-
ences, over literature as forms of our thought.-,, over
arts? Certainly, because it furnishes the idea of the
beautiful, as well as of truth and goodness. All
ideas depend on it, and by the very fact that it
seeks truth in all things it is its office to determine
what is really beautiful. And, first of all, is not truth
eminently beautiful? What strikes the intellect more
than the splendor of evidence, than the light of com-
plete knowledge which illumines objects? What
more pleasant and more keenly delightful than that
which arises from the contemplation and possession
of truth?
Order also has a secret charm for us which entices
us and causes us to reproduce it in all our works. But
what is order? Order in th > disposition of objects,
order in the distribution of colors, in the reproduction
of sounds and forms, is regularity, fitness, and harmo-
ny; order in the imagination is the conformity of our
fancy images with the realities of nature ; order in our
thoughts is their logical concatenation ; order in our
actions is the accomplishment of our duty, the con-
formity of the same actions with moral law ; order
in society is subordination, in the family obedience
and love, in the individual is the subjection of his
passions to his will, and of the latter to God ; order
in the exercise of authority is the general good, in the
exercise of the intellect is truth, in the object of our
love is perfection. Now, all this is assuredly beautiful
and is taught by philosophy ; and this science does
not leave it to the individual caprice to determine the
notion of the beautiful, but from the constant expe-
rience of all that which mankind calls beautiful in
1 6 Elements of Intellectua I Ph ilosophy.
nature and art, in man and in society, rises to the
essential and universal idea of the beautiful and de-
termines its laws. If the idea of the beautiful were
something changeable, individual, and relative ; if its
essence could be modified according to the difference
of sensations, of tastes and temperaments, then all
arts would be at an end, because there can be no art
where science has not discovered fixed principles and
laws. All esthetic sciences, therefore, depend upon
philosophy.
All industrial sciences depend upon it for its prin-
ciples, because all these sciences have for their object
that which is useful, and that which is useful is inse-
parable f^om the true, the good, and the beautiful.
Run over all the arts which are destined to provide
for the wants of men, to increase the sum of their en-
joyments, and you will not find one which can be con-
sidered truly useful if it is in opposition with the im-
mutable ideas of the true, the just, and the beautiful.
Let human industry create and multiply wants unna-
tural and fictitious, contrary to man's true nature, and
it will be highly injurious to man ; let human in-
dustry create and multiply wants contrary to his intel-
ligence, to his morality, to the physical laws of his
body, and their usefulness disappears, and they be-
come dangerous, and sap the very foundation of
man's happiness.
History depends upon philosophy ; for devoid of it,
it would be a catalogue of facts and events without any
connection, without cause, without any warrant of
authenticity, if it confined itself to gather up indiffer-
ently whatever is transmitted to it by the memory, too
frequently fallacious, of men and peoples. But history
becomes science when one seeks the laws and the moral
causes of events, when a sound criticism discusses
•^ Introduction to Philosophy. 1 7
with seventy the proofs and motives of credibility —
in one word, when one studies to reconcile in all the
annals of nations human liberty with the providen-
tial action of God, and thus creates a philosophy of
history.
Finally, all the sciences depend upon philosophy
for their method. Man, in all his investigations, must
use certain rules to discover truth, to prove it when
found, to illustrate, to defend it from the attacks of
its enemies, to explain it to others. All this is called
by the general name of method. And where shall we
find the proper rules to discover truth, to prove it, to
defend it, and to explain it toothers, if not in philoso-
phy — in that part which teaches the laws for directing
and guiding human thought in its researches? And,
last of all, our faith, without which we cannot attain
our eternal destiny, depends in a certain sense upon
philosophy, ist. Philosophy must enable us to find
out the true Church, by examining the motives of cre-
dibility upon which it rests and recommends itself to
our minds, and by proving the necessity of an infal-
lible guide for the solution of problems which it
cannot solve, and which it is absolutely important for
it to know. When this infallible guide is found and
accepted, it io true that philosophy must bow then
in silent submission to the dogmas which the Church
proposes as the object of its acceptance as solution
of philosophy's own problems, and of others far
greater, because the Church teaches the philosophy of
God, who, being infinite, has truths to tell far above the
ken of human philosophy ; but even after accepting
this philosophy of the infinite, this supreme science of
man is eminently useful in putting these supernatural
and superintelligible truths in scientific order, in illus-
trating them by means of created images and simili-
tudes which may bear a faint impression of those
1 8 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
truths, and which may serve to recommend their ac-
ceptance to man, and in defending them from the at-
tacks of their enemies.
These are in a few words the use of philosophy, so
neglected and despised by the ignorant crowd. We
will conclude these remarks with the words of the poet :
"With thee, serene Philosophy, with thee
And thy bright garland let me crown my song,
Effusive source of evidence and truth !
A lustre shedding ovt-r the ennobled mind.
Stronger than summer noon, and pure as that
Whose mild vibrations soothe the parted soul
New to the dawn of celestial day.
Hence through her nourished powers, enlarged by thee,
She springs aloft with elevated pride
Above the tangling mass of low desires
That bind the fluttering crowd, and, angel-winged,
The height of science and of virtue gains.
Without thee what were unenlightened man ?
A savage running through the woods and wilds
In quest of prey, and with the unfashioned fur
Rough clad ; devoid of every finer art
And elegance of life. Nor happiness
Domestic mixed of tenderness and care,
Nor moral excellence, nor social bliss.
Nor guardian law were his ; nor various skill
To turn the furrow or to guide the tool
Mechanic ; nor the heaven-conducted prow
Of navigation bold that fearless braves ' , '
The burning line or dares the wintery pole, >
Mother severe of infinite delights !
Nothing save rapine, indolence, and guile,
And woes on woes, a still revolving train,
Whose horrid circle had made human life - v
Than non-existence worse ; but, taught by thee.
Ours are the plans of policy and peace •, ^
To live like brothers, and conjunctive all
, Embellish life. While thus laborious crowds "^ "*•
Ply the tough car. Philosophy directs "^'^
The ruling helm ; or, like the liberal breath '
^ ' Of potent heaven, invisible, the sail
' Swells out and bears th' inferior world along."
— Thomson, Summef.
LOGIC
'• He that is of reason's skill bereft,
And wants the staff of wisdom him to stay,
Is like a ship in the midst of temi)est left,
Without an helm or pilot her to sway."
— Spenssr.
it , ■■. U.
i^: >.
LOGIC.
JNTROD UCTION,
Q. Give a general idea of logic.
A. Logic may be generally understood as meaning
the right use of those faculties which are destined to
acquire knowledge.
Q. How many kinds of logic are there?
A. Two, natural and scientific. The first is that
disposition of our mind by which we are enabled to
use rightly the faculties destined to acquire know-
ledge. Every one knows by experience that men
without education acquire ideas of many things, pass
their judgment upon them, deduce one idea from
others, and this they do more or less happily in pro-
portion to the talent which nature has given them.
This natural aptitude or facility to use rightly the fac-
ulties destined to acquire knowledge is called natural
logic. But as natural aptitudes are mostly imperfect,
and must go through a certain training and discipline
to become perfect, so it is with the natural faculty of
reasoning. It must be regulated and trained to dis-
charge its office properly and perfectly. And as rea-
son, reflecting upon the operations of other faculties,
has invented so many arts, so, reflecting upon its own
acts, it has given origin to a science which directs and
brings to perfection the natural ability for reasoning.
This science is called artificial or scientific logic, and
in this limited sense may be defined : that science or
part of philosophy which treats of reasoning in order
to direct the mind in the acquisition of truth.
Q. Explain the definition. *?jt>'
22 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
A. It is called science because logic is neither art,
rfor science and art together, but simply a science, since
a science is a knowledge of a thing deduced from its
principles. Now, logic treats of reasoning not merely
by inventing rules to form it, but by considering it in
the principles which originate it. Therefore logic is a
science and not an art.
Q. What is the exact difference between science
and art ?
A. Art is that which gives certain rules hoiv to do a
thing. For instance, the art of building is that which
gives rules how to build ; grammar is the art which
gives rules how to write and speak correctly ; rhetoric
the art which gives rules how to convince and to per-
suade. Science, on the contrary, is a knowledge of a
certain object drawn from the cause anc' principles of
the object. From this distinction it is clear that sci-
ence also may give rules how to do a thing, but it
draws them from the principles constituting the thing,
whereas art only gives rules and knows nothing of the
principles from which they are derived. A carpenter
applying his level carries out a rule of his art to see
if a piece of wood is perfectly level, but he knows
not from what principles that rule is derived. He
has art, but not science ; if he knew the principle
of that rule, then he would have science.
Q. Continue the explanation.
A. We have said that logic treats of reasoning in
order to state its peculiar object. For if logic be a
science, it must have an object to treat aboi^t. Now,
this object cannot be words, as some of the ancients
thought ; nor can it be the acts of the mind, inasmuch
as they really exist, because real things are the object
of metaphysics ; therefore the object of logic is that
order which our reason puts in its conceptions to
form reasoning. Finally, we have said ; In order to
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 23
direct the mind in the acquisition of truth, to deter-
mine tlie true nature oi logic ; because the true na-
ture of logic is not to give directions how to act ex-
ternally, as moral sciences, but how to speculate^ how
to enquire after truth.
Q. How is logic divided ?
A. Philosophers have distinguished three things in
reasoning: the materials of reason, called the matter ;
the combination and construction of those materials,
called \.\\t form ; and the purpose or object for which
we reason, called the end. Take, for instance, this
rearoning :
That which is spiritual is immortal.
But the soul is spiritual.
Therefore it is immortal.
In this reasoning the propositions and ideas are what
philosophers call the matter; the order and the locat-
ing of the propositions is called the form ; the result
of the reasoning is called the end. Now, in viev of
these three elements, we shall divide logic into three
parts. The first will treat of the matter of reasoning ;
the second of the form, and the third of the end, oi"
reasoning. This division is both clear and accurate,
because, to have a scientific knowledge of a thing, one
must know its principles and causes. Now, there are
four different causes for everything — the material, the
formal, the efficient, and the final. Take, for example,
a building. What is its material cause ? Bricks, mor-
tar, lumber, etc. What is its formal cause ? The de-
sign in the mind of the architect, and which, carried
out, gives it shape and form. The efficient causes are
the architect and all those who construct it. The
final cause is the object for which the building is
wanted — for instance, to live in it in comfort and
elegance. Say the same of reasoning. The efficient
24 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
cause of reasoning is our intellect, of which we shall
speak in anthropology, or the science of man and his
faculties. The material cause of reasoning are ideas
and propositions ; the formal cause is the order and
location of the propositions; the final cause is the
science which we intend to acquire and which results
from our reasoning.
PART FIRST.
CHAPTER I.
MATTER OF REASONING.
Q. How many kinds of matter has reasoning?
A. Two kinds ; one is called remote, the other
proximate or near. The remote matter are ideas or
terms, the proximate are judgments and propositions;
because, strictly speaking, reasoning results from judg-
,ments and propositions, and these, in their turn, from
terms and ideas. We shall speak first of ideas, and
then of judgments.
Q. Of what ideas shall we treat in logic ?
A. It has been remarked by eminent philosophers
that in logic we consider ideas, not inasmuch as they
are ideas of. this or of that particular object, bi'*^ in-
asmuch as they can be the object of all sciences.
Now, no other idea can represent the object of all
sciences except a universal idea. Therefore, in logic
we treat of universal ideas. For instance, if in logic
we gave the idea of a body as an extended substance,
then this idea of body could not be applied to all the
sciences treating of bodies, but only to geometry,
which is founded on extension. We must, therefore,
in logic treat of ideas in such a way as to render them
applicable to all sciences ; and this can be said only
of universal ideas.
We shall divide this chapter into three articles.
The first will treat of universal ideas considered in
themselves ; the second will treat of that thing which
as
26 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. :
universal ideas represent ; the third will treat of the
expression of ideas — that is, terms or words.
ARTICLE FIRST.
0/ Universal Ideas considered in themselves ; and, first,
of Idea in general.
Q. What remarks rnust be made in order to under-
stand what an idea /^ in general?
A. Reflecting upon the fact of our knowledge, we
find that we cannot know any object, of whatever
nature it may be, unless the object enters in some
way or other into our minds, and thus presents itself
before it ; because, on the one hand, we know from
experience that the operation of knowing takes place
within us, and for that reason is called an immanent
act, to distinguish it from those acts which are called
transient, or passing, because they are accomplished
outside of us. On the other hand, we cannot deny
that, in order to effect an operation, the subject and
the object must come in a certain kind of contact wit!
each other. Therefore, if the act of knowing is accom
plished within us, and if to do that the intellect mu^
come in contact with the object it wants to know, it \
absolutely necessary that the object should enter ii
some manner or other into our minds. But how cai
this be done? It is certainly impossible that object
could enter as they are in nature into our intellect.
for this would be absurd, and we might say with thi!
poet: «' , • ^:* ,.;_,- .>,;,.
" Then what vast body must v/e make the mind, '*<
..J Wherein are men, beasts, trees, towns, seas, and lands,, ~
., And yet each thing a proper place doth find,
And each thing in the true proportion stands."*
■ * Davies' Poems, * ', /'
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 27
How, then, can the act of knowing be accomplished?
Thus : As objects, to be known, cannot enter into our
mind as they exist in nature, they must enter therein
by means of their image and similitude. This image,
as it may be called, or similitude, or impression, of
the objects which enter into our minds is called idea.'^
An idea, therefore, taken in this sense, may be defined,
the image of the nature of things existing in our intel-
lect, by means of which lue apprehend them.
Q. What consequences can you draw from said
definition?
A. The following: i. An idea is neither exclusively
objective — that is, the object itself— nor exclusively
subjective, mere work of the mind, but something
between the two. It is objective inasmuch as it repre-
sents the nature of things ; it is subjective inasmuch
as it is an image dwelling in the subject or intellect,
and is the principle and cause of its knowledge.
2. That, though the image o idea represents ob-
jects to the intellect, yet it is not the image that the
intellect apprehends. The idea is only a means by
which objects enter in communication with the intel-
lect and present themselves before it to be known.
Suppose I want to know my own face, what do I do ?
I go before a mirror, and an image of my face is in-
stantly reproduced in the glass. But is it an image of
my face which I know, or my own face by means of
that image ? Surely my own face through that image.
Or suppose I want to see an object at a distance from
me which my ordinary power of vision cannot reach,
what do I do? I use a telescope, which puts me in
contact with the object I want to see. But is it the
telescope I see, or the object ? The object, certainly ;
♦ St. Thomas, P.P. qu. 12, art. 2 ; qu. 79, art. 3.
2 8 Elements of Intellectual Pk ilosophy.
the telescope is only a means to put me in communi-
cation with the object. Likewise, the intellect cannot
know any object except it comes in contact with it.
But it cannot come in contact with it as it is in nature,
substance and modification together. Therefore it
comes in contact with it by its similitude.* But, this
done, is it the idea I perceive or the object ? Evi-
dently the object, as the idea is only a means of con-
tact.
3. The idea, strictly speaking, resides in the intel-
lect, and does not represent anything else except the
nature of the object, and, in this sense, it differs from
the sensible image, which, as we shall see, is also
necessary to render sensible knowledge possible ; be-
cause a sensible image is also necessary for sensitive
knowledge, and is both objective and subjective.
When I see a geranium or a rosebush, the image of
those objects must enter into my eyes, else I could
not see them. When I touch a hard body, such as
stone or iron, an impression of those bodies or an
image must enter the sense of touch, or I would never
feel them. But a sensible image differs from the idea
in this ; that the former resides in the senses and re-
presents the exterior qualities of bodies, whereas the
latter is in the intellect and represents the nature of
objects. Hence we have defined it an image of the
nature of an object residing in the intellect. ' * r v
. 4. Finally, the idea being a means and principle of
knowledge, it is followed by an act of the mind called
apprehension. This may be defined that operation
of the mind by which it knows an object without
affirming or denying anything about it. I hear the
words *• soul," " body," " world " mentioned ; the act
* How this similitude is effected will be seen in anthropology.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 29
of the mind by which I know these objects is callec'
apprehension. We liave added, without affirming or
denying anything about it, to distinguish apprehen-
sion from judgments, which always affirm or deny a
predicate of a subject.
Q. How many kinds of ideas are there?
A. Ideas are intellectual images. Now, images can
differ from each other for two reasons: either because
the objects they represent are different, or because
they have a different way of representing them. The
picture of a flower-garden and that of a shipwreck are
two different images, because each represents a differ-
ent object ; as likewise the representation of a storm
in verses and another in music are also two different
images, because, though they represent the same
object, they exhibit it in different ways. The differ-
ence of ideas, therefore, may originate from the differ-
ence of the objects which they represent, or from the
different way of representing objects.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Difference of Ideas according to the Difference of Objects,
Q. How many kinds of ideas are there according to
this difference ?
A. There are, first, concrete and abstract ideas. Be-
fore defining them we must remark that whatever
exists in nature either exists in itself, not requiring
anything to lean upon, to cling to, in order to exist, or
it must lean on something to exist. When a thing
does not require any other object to lean on in order
to exist, but is self-supporting, it is called substance ;
when it requires sohiething to hang on in order to ex-
ist, it is called accident^ modification^ or quality. The
30 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
tendrils of the vine winding around the oak for sup-
port may be an image of the accident, whereas the
stronor and robust oak which defies wind and storms
may be taken as an image of the substance, but
only as an image, because, after all, in nature both
the vine and the oak are substances. Here is a better
example : a table is a substance because it exists in
itself; the roundness or the squareness of the table are
an accident, because neither could exist without the
table.
We must remark, in the second place, that all ob-
jects in nature are substances accompanied by their
accidents or modifications. But it is clear that our
mind, which is endowed with the faculty of analysis or of
dividing, can separate one from the other and consider
them apart. In the example just given the mind may
consider the substance of the table independently of
its form or shape ; or it may lay aside the substance
of the table and fix its attention upon the size and the
shape The apprehension by the mind of an object just
as it is III nature^ substance and modijication together, is
called a concrete idea. The appreheiision by the mind of
a substance without its modifications, or of modifications
without their substance, is called an abstract idea.
Again, ideas according to this difference may be sim-
ple or composite: they are simple when they repre-
sent an object not composed of parts, as God, soul ;
they are composite when they represent an object com-
posed of parts, as the idea of a building, a steam-
engine. Absolute and relative : they are absolute when
the object represented by the idea does not involve
any relation with any other, as exist e7ice ; they are
relative when it does involve it, 2js> father, son, effect.
Positive diad negative : the first is such when the idea
represents the reality of a thing, as fruitful, perfect ;
Elements of Intellccttial Philosophy. 31
the second is such when it represents that which a
being is wanting in, as barren, imperfect.
Finally, it may be collective, singular, particular, and
universal. An idea is called collective when it repre-
sents the union of various individuals, as an army, a
congregation, a people. It is singular when it repre-
sents an individual, such as Napoleon, Washington,
Irving. It is called particular when it represents an
object less extensive in relation to another, as the idea
of man is a particular idea in relation to thot of ani-
mal. We shall speak of universal ideas in the next
article.
Q. How many kinds of ideas are there in respect to
the manner in which they represent objects?
A. It is an ordinary fact that sometimes our mind
perceives objects in such a way that it can easily dis-
tinguish them from all others ; and oftentimes it per-
ceives them in such a way that it cannot distinguish
them from others. For instance, if I should see the
hemlock, the pine, the oak-tree, I could easily distin-
guish them from all other trees, my acquaintance with
those trees being very accurate. But if an exotic plant
were put before me I could not distinguish it from
others. When we perceive an object in such a way as
to be able to distinguish it from all others, then our
idea of the object is called clear ; otherwise, obscure.
But if we have such an idea of the object as to be able
not only to distinguish it from others but to distin-
guish its particular properties from the particular pro-
perties of other objects, then our idea of the object
is called distinct; otherwise, indistinct. But if we
should have such an idea of the object as to be able
not only to distinguish it from others in itself and in
its properties, but could tell the peculiar nature and
characteristics of the properties of that object from
3 2 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
the peculiar nature and characteristics of tiie proper-
ties of other objects, then our idea of it is called ade-
quate^ and its opposite inadequate. To give an in-
stance of both distinct and adequate ideas, we will
take a plant with which we are so well acquainted
that we can tell the particular size, shape, and color of
its trunk, its bark, its foliage, its flowers, and its fruits.
This certainly would be having a distinct idea of that
plant. But a botanist could go further, and be able
to tell not only the particular nature and properties of
that plant, but the particular nature and properties of
each part of the plant. He would have an adequate
idea of the plant.
ARTICLE SECOND.
On Universal Ideas.
Q. What is the meaning of a universal idea ?
A. If an i'^ea be an image, a universal idea must
mean nvc .al image. The word universal is derived
fror tne L" .n Avords unuin versus a/ia, and signifies a
thing .. ^iicli refers to many ; so that, in order to call a
thing universal, t'lese two elements are required, o?te
and many. Hence a universal image means an image
representing a thing common to many. Now, the ques-
tion arises — Is it possible that an idea can represent
something common to many? This question, upon
which all philosophy rests, has been discussed at
all times, and more especially from the eleventh cen-
tury to the fourteenth, and has been answered dif-
ferently, but the principal opinions may be reduced to
four.
Q. State distinctly the state of the question and
give the opinions of the various systems.
A. As an idea is an image, we repeat, a universal idea
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 33
must be a universal image. Now, an image represents
a reality, as it must be the image of something. There-
tote a universal image must represent a universal reality,
or some real thing common to many. This is agreed
upon by all philosophers. But the question comes
up. Is there in nature such a thing as a universal object
which a universal idea may represent ? According to
the different answers which philosophers have given
to this question have arisen different opinions with re-
gard to the nature of universal ideas. The first opin-
ion, held by philosophers called Nominalists, holds that
in 'lature there is no such thing as a universal object
common to many, and that consequently what we call
universal ideas are mere words or names, or at most
certain conceptions of our mind representing a number
of individual things. In the first sense this opinion
was held by the Epicureans, and in the eleventh cen-
tury probably by Roscellinus. In the second sense it
was taught by Occam in the middle ages, and was held
in modern times by Hobbes, Robinet, Condillac, and
other sensists.
The second is the opinion of the Conceptualists.
They maintain that a universal nature or object cannot
possibly exist either actually or potentially — that is to
say, that it neither exists nor is there any cause which
could ever make it exist ; but they contend that the
mind can conceive such a thing as a universal nature
merclyasitsown offspring, not as representing anything
really existing or possible to exist, and consequently
universal ideas are nothing more than mere concep-
tions of our mind, representing nothing real. This
opinion was held by the Stoics of old and by Abelardus
in the middle ages, and is maintained by all the
idealists of our time.
The third is the opinion of the Realists. They
34 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
teach that universal natures do really exist, and that
therefore they can be represented by a universal image.
This opinion was held by the Platonists, and is held by
the Pantheists of our days, with this difference : that
Platonists taught that these universal natures existed
in themselves and were the types of individual things,
whereas Pantheists contend that they exist in indi-
vidual natures but with a distinct existence.
The fourth is the opinion of St. Thomas, and lies
between the opinion of the Realists and that of the
Conceptualists. He teaches that natures represented by
universal ideas are not mere intellectual offspring and
forms with no foundation in nature, as is held by the
Idealists, nor that such universal natures exist in fact,
but that such ideas are formed by our mind not arbitrar-
ily, but with a foundation in reality. Hence St. Thomas
holds that universal Jitures exist formally in their
universal form in the mind, but fundamentally in re-
ality ; and consequently a universal idea is formally so
in the mind, but receives its foundation from reality.
To give the four opinions in a few words, we say a
universal idea is like a universal portrait. Now, a por-
trait must have an original. Is there a universal
origin'al in nature from which to draw this portrait ?
Some answer no, and say that this universal por-
trait is a mere word having no meaning whatever.
Others answer : There is not, nor can there be, a univer-
sal original, but the mind may invent one as its own
fancy work. Others say: To be sure there is such a
universal original, and the portrait may represent it
exactly. Finally, St. Thomas comes in and says: Let
us distinguish ; in nature there is no such thing as a
universal original from which to draw a universal por-
trait, and yet this universal portrait, which we call uni-
versal idea, is not altogether a fancy work of our mind,
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 35
because the mind has a reason and a foundation for
this work, as it makes the universal portrait from find-
ing in reality one nature common to many individuals.
Hence this universal portrait as such is a work of the
mind, but the original is supplied by that one nature
found in real things to be common to many indi-
viduals. I see, for instance, Peter, John, James, etc.,
all with their peculiar and individual differences. But
amid all these differences I perceive two elements
common to them all, rationality and animality. I
form of these two elements an idea which is com-
mon to all three ; I compare this notion with all the
men I can see, and find in them the same common
elements. I have therefore good reason to form the
universal idea of the species man, consisting of the
elements of animality and rationality. But every one
can perceive at a glance that that universal idea, as
such, does not exist in nature, for in nature I find
those two elements determined and contracted by in-
dividual conditions in each man, and therefore form-
ally the universal idea exists only in the mind. But
can any one say that I have no foundation in reality
for such an idea, since I have drawn it from the obser-
vation of many individuals of the species in which it
is found contracted, and I have formed it by elimi-
nating from those two elements all individual con-
ditions, and then by comparing the notion of those
two elements with as many individuals of the species
as I can observe, and by finding it always as agreeable
to them ?
ARTICLE THIRD.
True Opinion about the Nature of Universal Ideas.
Q. What do you think of the opinion of the Nomi-
nals?
/ ,»,- ,• '> '.■■ > ■
o
6 Elements of hitellectual Philosophy,
A. They say that universal ideas are mere sounds
or conceptions of a number of individuals. Now,
such opinion is false. i. Universal ideas cannot
be mere words, for words, as every one knows, are
signs of ideas. Now, a sign cannot exist without a
thing signified by the sign ; therefore all these words
which the Nominals call universal must always sup-
pose a universal conception of the mind.
2. It will not do to say that the best part of the
Nominals admit that a certain conception of the mind
corresponds to these words, because this conception is
not a universal idea, but a conception of a plurality
and number. For how could such a conception re-
present a plurality of individuals? Only in two
ways — either they represent this number of indi-
viduals distinctly and severally, or they represent it
in common and confusedly in consequence of a cer-
tain similitude among them. The first supposition
is impossible, because individuals are surrounded by
so many qualities and accidents that each one of
them has an existence all its own and distinct from
that of others. Therefore each one of them implies
an idea and a conception all its own, and consequently
it is impossible that one idea could represent distinctly
and severally a number of individuals as individuals.
How could I, for instance, express distinctly and seve-
rally by one idea Washington, Shakspere, Homer,
Michael Angelo, Titus Oates, Arnold, Robespierre,
and Joan d'Arc ? If it is said that one conception re-
presents a number of individuals in consequence of a
certain similitude among them, then we say that, by
the admission of the Nominals themselves, that which
is represented by universal ideas are not individual
things as such, but that in which they resemble each
other. Therefore a universal idea must be something
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 3 7
common to many. 3. Besides this, we always attribute
to individuals that which is signified by the universal
idea, or words, as the Nominals call them. For in-
stance, we say Peter is a man, the horse is an animal.
Now, in the opinion which we are refuting such expres-
sions would be absurd, because they would mean no-
thing, as they would amount to this : Peter is a mere
name, the horse is a mere sound. We conclude with
the remark of Leibnitz, that if the opinion of the
Nominals were true, all the sciences which rest on
universal ideas would be a mere empty sound and
sceptics would win the day.
Q. What is to be said of the second opinion ?
A. That it is also false. i. Because it is a fact
that we divide all real existences and individuals ac-
cording to the various universal ideas of genus, spe-
cies, and the like ; for instance, we refer Peter and
Socrates to the genus animal and to the species mariy
and the horse and the lion to the species brute. Now,
if nothing real and objective in nature corresponded
with these universal ideas, by what right could we
refer the horse and the lion to the species brute and
man to the species man? We could only say that
Peter corresponds with a certain fancy work of our
brain called man.
2. In the second place, if the opinion of the Concep-
tualists were admitted, all the sciences would be at
an end, because all the sciences cannot be possible
without universal propositions and ideas. If, there-
fore, universal ideas represented nothing real and ob-
jective, the sciences founded upon them would be
mere fictions of our mind and not sciences of real
things.
Q. Examine the third opinion.
A. I. Universal natures cannot exist in reality.
38 Eiemenls of Intellectual P/tiiosophy.
This will be demonstrated when w speak of the
essences of things. We conclude, therefore, that the
third opinion must be false. Besides, ideas must re-
present that to which they are applied. If universal
ideas, therefore, represented universal natures, we
could not apply them except to universal natures.
But all mankind applies them to individual things or
persons ; we say, for instance, Walter is a man, my
horse is an animal. Therefore universal ideas do
not represent universal natures.
Q. Prove the fourth opinion.
A. According to the doctrine of St. Thomas, uni-
versal ideas, as such, exist formally in our mind,
but fundamentally in individual things. Now, that
natures represented by universal ideas exist funda-
mentally in individual things is proved from this:
the nature which the intellect perceives in the uni-
versal ideas is the same which, restricted and contracted
by individual conditions, is found in individual things.
This is so true that we predicate it of each individual,
and say Peter is a man, the horse is an animal.
Therefore it is clear that natures represented by uni-
versal ideas are the same as those of individual objects.
But they exist formally, as universal, only in the intel-
lect, and are its own work. In fact, the natures of
things may be supposed to be universal in a threefold
sense : i. In themselves, considered in the elements
which make them such natures; 2. Inasmuch as
they exist in individuals; 3. Inasmuch as they exist
in the intellect. But we cannot admit the two first
suppositions, because the natures of things cannot, in
the first place, be supposed to be universal in them-
selves, for the reason that all that which belongs to
the nature of an object, considered in itself, must
belong to every individual possessing that nature ; for
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 39
instance, all the elements composing human nature
must belong to every man. If, therefore, universality
belonged to human nature in itself, every man would
be a universal, which is absurd. We cannot admit
the second supposition, that a nature possesses uni-
versality as it exists in individuals, because everything
which is found in an individual is contracted and
determined by its individual conditions. Therefore
universality must be attributed to the ^natures of
things, inasmuch as they are found in the intellect
— that is to say, the nature of things, being found in
the same things contracted by individual qualities, is
lendered universal by the consideration of the intel-
lect, which deprives it of its individual qualities and
considers it as common to all.
Q. Define, then, a universal idea.
A. It is an idea representing a common nature y found
out by the intellect in a number of individuals of that
nature,
ARTICLE FOURTH.
Observations respecting the Nature, Elements , and Pro-
perties of Universal Ideas.
Q. What remarks should we make in order to illus-
trate the definition just given ?
A. 1. We must observe in what manner an idea
is rendered universal. The natures of things, as we
have said, are singular. In what manner, then, can
our intellect render them universal? We answer, by
way of abstraction and reflection. Our intellect is en-
dowed with a certain faculty of separating, in a given
object, one thing from another, and of fixing its atten-
tion and consideration upon one, laying aside all others ;
as, for instance, having before it the object man, it
40 Elemenis of Intellectual Philosophy.
can separate it in all its elements and take the element
animality for its present consideration, laying aside
reason ; or it may put on one side animality and take
reason for its consideration. Our intellect exercises
this faculty especially about individual things ; be-
cause, seeing that its proper object is not the indi-
vidual and the singular, but the nature of things, and
on the other hand finding all the objects of nature
clothed with individual qualities by the faculty of sepa-
ration, it takes off from those individual objects quality
after quality until the bare nature is left. The nature
of things thus deprived of and purified from its indi-
vidual qualities is called universal inetaphysic, and the
operation by which the intellect has reduced it to that
state is called abstraction. The nature thus deprived of
its individual conditions is neither universal nor singu-
lar. It is not singular, because it has been stripped of
all those individual qualities which made it so. It is
not universal, because it only exhibits the essential
elements of a nature which, in themselves, are not uni-
versal ; else all individuals containing those elements
would be universal. Hence, for an idea to be truly
universal, it is not sufficient that the essence repre-
sented by it be only abstracted from its individual
qualities, but something else is necessary. It is abso-
lutely necessary that the intellect, liaving abstracted
the essence from individual things, should consider it
fit to be found in all individuals which lie under it.
Then only can we say with propriety that the idea is
universal, because then only we find in it unity and
plurality — uttity the abstract nature, plurality the
individuals possessing it. 'Such an idea is called uni-
versal logic, or, strictly speaking, universal, and the
second operation of the intellect, seeking for the same
nature in \x\dW\d\x2iXs, comparison or reflection. By two
. Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 41
ways, then, an idea is rendered universal — by abstrac-
tion and reflection.
" Doubtless this could not be but that she* turns
Bodies to p )irits by sublimation strange ;
As fire converts to fire the things it burns,
As we our meats into our nature change,
From their gross matter she abstracts the forms,
And draws a kind of quintessence from things,
Which to her proper nature she transforms,
To bear them light on her celestial wings
This doth she when from things particular
She doth abstract the universal kinds, §
Which bodiless and immaterial are,
And can be only lodg'd within our minds." f
Q. How is a universal idea distinguished from all
other ideas ?
A. It is easy to distinguish it from singular and
particular ideas. The only idea with which it might
possibly be confounded is the collective. But it is
easy to distinguish one from the other if we attend to
these two observations: i. The universal idea can be
predicated of all individuals comprised within a spe-
cies or a genus, whereas the collective idea can only
be predicated of many, but not of all, which are com-
prised in a species. . For instance, take the species
man; that idea, man, applies to all the individuals of
the species, but the idea army cannot apply to all in-
dividuals of the species man, but only to a number of
them. 2. The universal idea can be predicated of
every individual of the species separately, whereas the
collective idea cannot be predicated except of all indi-
viduals taken together. For instance, we apply the
specific idea man to every individual man taken
separately, but we could not predicate the collective
* The soul, t Davies' Poems,
42 Elements of Iitie Hectical Philosophy. • .
idea people of every separate individual forming a
people.
Q. What are the elements of a universal idea?
A. Two : conipreJiensioti and extension. To have a
universal idea it is necessary that the nature repre-
sented by it be abstracted from its individual condi-
tions, and also that it be thought as applicable to
many individuals. Tfie essential constituents of the
abstract nature are called the comprehension of an
idea. Its capacity of being applied to many is called
the extension of an idea.
These two elements are governed by the following
law : They are always contrary to each other. In pro-
portion as the comprehension or the contents of an
idea increases, its extension or applicability to many
diminishes ; and, on the contrary, in proportion as
its extension increases its comprehension diminishes.
This law is expressed by the following formula : The
comprehension of an idea is in the inverse ratio of its
extension. For instance, if to the idea animal you
add the element of reason, you increase its compre-
hension or contents, but you belittle its extension ; as
in the former state it could be applied not only to the
human species but also to the brute species, whereas
by addir ^ that element you can only apply it to the
human species.
Q. What are the properties of universal ideas?
A. A universal idea represents a nature capable of
being attributed to many individuals or species. This
capacity of being attributed to many individuals or
species is called Predicability of an idea.
Again, this nature included in the universal idea is
abstracted from all its individual conditions which make
it belong to this particular individual place or time.
Now, by the abstraction these particular conditions
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 43
are thrown aside, and, therefore, in this state the
nature belongs to all time and place. This property
is called Perpetuity of an idea. This must not be
understood in the sense that it does positively exist at
all time and is eternal; because the actual and real
existence of the universal idea is in our mind and
follows the conditions of our mind. Our mind not
being eternal, neither is the universal idea eternal.
The universal idea, therefore, is perpetual in a nega-
tive sense — that is to say, inasmuch as it bears no par-
ticular traits of this or that time, place, and indi-
vidual.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE DIFFEREXT OBJECTS WHICH A UNIVERSAL IDEA
MAY REPRESENT, AND OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF
REPRESENTING THEM.
Q. What necessity is there for studying the differ-
ent objects of a universal idea and the different modes
Df representing them?
A. One cannot have a correct notion of an image if
he does not know the objects it represents and the
different ways of representing them. Having, there-
fore, said that a universal idea is an image formed in
the intellect, to understand it well we must study the
objects it may represent and the different ways it has
of representing them. In other words, a universal
idea represents something common to many. We must,
therefore, study what is this something common^ and in
how many ways it may be attributed to many. We
shall begin from the ways or modes in which a uni-
versal idea represents objects — ways or modes which
have been called by philosophers categorema, or, sim-
ply, universals.
Q. How many universals are there ?
A. The idea is called universal inasmuch as it
represents an object as attributable to many. There-
fore the modes or ways of representing an object
universally must be as many as there are ways of
attributing a thing to many. Now, a thing may be
attributed to many in the following ways : It may be
attributed to them as representing an element of
their ess' nee; or as representing that particular ele-
Elements of Intellectua I Ph ilosophy. 4 5
ment which distinguishes them from all others and in
which none other can share ; or as representing the
full and complete essence ; or as something not form-
ing an element of the essence, but a necessary conse-
quence of it; or, finally, as something not at all
necessary to the essence, but accidental to it. For
instance, take the idea animal in respect to man ;
what does this idea- represent with respect to man ?
An element of his essence, because animality enters
as an element in man's essence. Take the idc ' rea-
sonable ; what does it represent with regard to man ?
That peculiar element of his essence which distin-
guishes man from all other beings inferior to himself.
Take the idea reasonable animal ; what does it repre-
sent in respect to man? His complete essence.
Take the idea capable of learning ; what does it
represent with regard to man ? Something which
necessarily follows from his essence. Take the idea
white ; what does it represent ? Something not at
all necessary but quite accidental to the essence of
man.
There are, therefore, five modes of representing
something as common to many: as a part of their
essence ; as their complete essence ; as that peculiar
element which distinguishes them from all others ; as
something necessarily following from, or something
quite accidental to, the essence. There are no other
possible ways of representing something as common
to many. The first — that is, that common thing
which forms an element of the essence of many — is
called genus. The second — that is, that common
thing which represents the complete essence of many
—•is called species. The third is that peculiar ele-
ment which distinguishes the essence from that of
others, and is called differejice. The fourth is that
46 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
which necessarily derives from the essence, and is
called property. The fifth is called accident.
Q. Speak of the first universal, genus, and point
out its offices.
A. Genus is defined : A tiniversal nature, zvhieh may
be attributed to several species as an element of their re-
spective essences. Before explaining this definition we
must remark that we are obliged necessarily to ex-
plain the gemis by means of the species, and vice versd,
as they are relative terms. That they are naturally re-
lated is clear from the fact that two things are neces-
sary to form the nature of genus — first, it must be
found in several species, and not in several indi-
viduals, as some have said, because genus is attribut-
able only to that which is immediately under it. But
directly under the genus is the species, not the indi-
vidual. Therefore genus must be attributable to
several species. The second is, that genus is at-
tributed to species as an element of its essence,
which it has in common with other species. Thus
animal, which is genus respecting man and the brutes,
contains only an element of their essence.
Q. What is species ?
A. A universal notio7i which can be attributed to many
individuals as their complete essetice. To have the
nature of species, therefore, two things are required :
I. It must be applicable to many individuals, be-
cause it is a universal notion, just because it is attri-
butable to many individuals. 2. It must be attribut-
A ed to many individuals as their complete essence.
Thus, man is attributable to Peter, John, Walter, and
all individuals of the human species, as representing
their com ple te essence.
Q. What is difference ?
A. A universal idea which can be attributed to many
\
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. /^*j
individuals^ as that clement ivhich distinguishes their
essence from all other essences. Reasonableness in man
is just the difference wliicli distinguislics liis essence
from all others. And it is to be remarked that differ-
ence is a universal idea, inasmuch as it is predicated
of many individuals as the distinj^uishing element of
their essence, and not in any other sense. We con-
clude, therefore : Genus is a universal idea which repre-
sents a common element of the essence of a number
of species. Difference represents that element which
distinguishes the species from each other, species the
complete essence of many individuals.
Q. What are the degrees of universals?
A. Three : supreme, middle, and loivcst. Genus is
called supreme when it has no other above it, as sub-
stance. It is called middle when it has other genuses
above and under it, as body, which has the genus sub-
stance above it and two before \t, living bodies and
inorganic bodies. It is called lowest when it has no
genus under it but species, as the genus animal, which
has two species under it, reasonable and unreasonable
animals. Likewise species and difference are called
supreme if they have no species or difference placed
above them ; middle if they have them above and
below them ; lowest when they have none but indi-
viduals below them.
ARTICLE SECOND.
On Property and Accident.
Q. Define the universal called property.
A. It is rt universal idea representing something coin-
mon to many individuals, as necessarily emanating from
their essence. Freedom in man, for instance, is a pro-
perty, because, though it is a quality which does not
I
48 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
enter in the definition of his essence, is yet neces-
sarily flowing from it. And if so "owing, it is
clear that it must have the same qualifications as
the essence. Now, the essence has three qualifications :
I. It is applicable only to the species, because by
means of the essence individuals are classified in their
own species. 2. It must be applicable to all the indi-
v'iduals of the species. 3. And that for ever, because
neither the species nor the individual can ever exist
without their nature. Property, therefore, must be
applicable to one species, to all the individuals of the
species, and for ever. These three qualities distin-
guish property from all accidents ; from those acci-
dents which are applicable to the species, but not
to all individuals. We can say, for instance, that
every man is free, but we cannot say that every man
is a poet, the latter being an accident which be-
comes some of the species, but not all ; from those
which belong to all the individuals of the species, but
not exclusively to that species. I can predicate free-
dom of man alone, but to have two feet or to possess
teeth 1 can say of man and many of the species brute.
' Q. Define accident.
A. It is quite the contrary of property, and may be
defined : That universal notion wJiich may be fomid
or not in a number of individuals tvithout at all inter-
fering with their nature. Hence, in order to have the
idea of accident it is not necessary that it should be
separable from an individual ; it is enough that we
may conceive the individual as without that accident,
leaving at the same time his nature unchanged. To
be black is inseparable from the raven, yet that quality
is an accident in the raven, as we can easily think its
essence without that quality.
Q. How can universals be predicated of a thing?
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 49
A. Before answering the question we must make
two remarks: i. That universals may not only be
predicated of real objects, but may be predicated of
each other ; as, for instance, accident may have its
genus, species, difference, property, and accident.
Thus the accident red is a species under the genus
color, the difference of which might be determined by
a given shade of red, etc.
Second remark. Universals may be predicated in
the abstract form or in the concrete, as we may say
animality and animal, reasonable and reasonableness,
free and freedom, learned and doctrine.
Having premised these two remarks, we give the
rules how universals may be predicated of things :
1st rule. Difference^ property^ and accident arc never
predicated of a subject in the abstract form,. but always
in the concrete. Because these universals represent a
quality, and therefore must be applied as adjectives
which qualify a thing. Now, adjectives are concrete
and not abstract; hence we must say man is reason-
able and free, and not man is reasonableness and free-
dom ; Peter is learned, and not Peter is doctrine.
2d rule. Genus and species are predicated in the con-
crete form when it is question of substances. Ilcncc it
is right to say Peter is a man, but wrong to say Peter
is humanity. The reason is that substances are attri-
buted in their true and complete sense, and therefore
in concrete.
3d rule. Genus and species^ when it is question of
accidental things, are predicated in the abstract. I can
say, for instance, whiteness is a color, but not that
which is white is colored, because when the accident
is expressed in a concrete form, as when we say
colored instead of color, the principal idea which is
meant is no longer the accident but the substance
50 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
which upholds it, and therefore there would be no
more question of accidents but of substances.
4th rule. Universals are predicated in alt their com-
pre/iensioUy but not in alt their extension. Because, in
order to attribute a universal idea to a thing, it is
necessary that I shouW find all the elements compos-
ing that universal idea in the thing to which I wish to
attribute it ; but it is by no means necessary that that
thing should be the only one to which the universal
may be applied, otherwise it would no longer be uni-
versal.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Of the Objects of Universal Ideas, or of Being and its
Categories.
Q- What is the object of universal ideas?
A. It is being, or one of its determinations. Because
the idea, inasmuch as it is an image which represents
things to be known, is a means of knowledge; there-
fore all that which can be an object of our knowledge
can be the object of our ideas. But the object of our
knowledge can only be being or one of its determina-
tions, as a thing can be known inasmuch as it is. These,
therefore, are the objects of universal idea.
Now, that being can stand for the object of uni-
versal idea is beyond doubt, as we daily say being is,
being is not. Nothing can be and not be at tu. same
time. But we must remark that when the idea has
being for its object it does not represent it, in any of
the five modes above spoken of — that is, as genus,
species, difference, property, or accident — because, as we
shall see in Ontology, being in general cannot be any
of these things.
Q. How many are the determinations of being?
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 5 1
They are innumerable, as every being is a determi-
nation of being. But here we intend to speak only of
those supreme divisions and classifications of being in
which all other beings are included, because the object
of logic is not this or that particular being, but the
order of the conceptions of our mind. It is necessary,
therefore, to explain those common divisions and uni-
versal conceptions which put in order and distribute
all beings into so many classes and categories.
Q. How many categories are there ?
Ten ; because being, universally considered, can be
divided into substance and accident, meaning here by
accident everything which is not a substance. Sub-
stance, being the base of all the variety of accidents,
and hence fixed and determinate in its idea, is taken
always in the same for all substances, and therefore is
not divided into other genuses. Accident, being more
vague and confused and various, in order to determine
and to fitly classify it, is divided into nine classes.
Because accident is added to substance and deter-
mines it. Now, substance maybe determined by nine
things — by quantity, relation, quality, action, passion^
time, place, site, and habit. Hence accident is divided
into all these classes. Being in general, therefore, is
divided into ten grand orders, which are called cate-
gories — that is, supreme genuses of things — and which
are substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion,
time, space, site, habit. This is the celebrated division
of being accepted and illustrated by the greatest
thinkers of antiquity. We shall give here the defini-
tion of substance, accident, relation, and quality, as
they occur so frequently in logic, and shall speak of
the rest in Ontology. • '
Substance is that which exists in itself, and not in
another^ as Peter, tree, stone. By this substance is
52 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, ^
easily distinguished from accident, Avhich is that
which must lean on another in order to exist, as
white, square, round, etc, — things which cannot exist
without leaning on another.
It is to be carefully remarked that the essence of
the substance is to be in itself and not by itself. The
first means that the substance requires no other being
to lean on in order to exist, which is true ; the second
would mean that substance does not require a cause
to create it, which is false of finite substances.
Relation can be defined that order luhich an object
has with regard to another ; how an object lies to an-
other. For instance, paternity is a relation which im-
plies the order in which a father stands to his son.
This category may be real or logical : it is real when
it exists actually in nature, as the relation of pater-
nity ; it is logical when it is placed by our mind.
Quality. This accident may be defined tJiat ivhich
of itself gives a special manner of being to the sub-
stance.
It is called an accident to distinguish it from the
specific difference, which is also a quality, but consti-
tutes tlie essence. The other words distinguish it
from other accidents because other accidents modify
the substance more or less, but this they do not by
themselves, but in consequence of something else ; as,
for instance, quantity qualifies the substance, not
by itself, but by the extension of parts which it pro-
duces in it. But when I say Peter is good, this
quality gives of itself a new mode of existence to
Peter.
Q. Recapitulate all we have said in this chapter.
A. From what we have said in this chapter it is
evident how many and what are the different species
of universal ideas. A universal idea is an intellectual
Eleinenls of Intellectual Philosophy, 53
representation. Now, these representations or forms
are as different as are the objects they represent
and the modes of representing them ; and, as there
are five modes of representing an object in a universal
way—genus, species, difference, property, and acci-
dent— so, under this respect, there aie five universal
ideas— those of genus, species, difference, property,
and accident. With regard to the object, as there are •
ten most universal objects, so there are ten universal
ideas— substance accident, and this subdivided into
relation, quantity, quality, action, passion, time, place,
and habit,
•
CHAPTER III.
OF THE EXPRESSION OF IDEAS OR OF TERMS.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Definition and Division of Terms.
Q. What are terms ?
A. Among the many means we have of manifesting
our ideas, words claim the first place.
" The words . . . the speaking picture of thn mind,
The extract of the soul, that labor'd how
To leave the image of herself behind."
— Daniels* Poems.
Words, inasmuch as they form a part of a proposi-
tion or reasoning, are called terms, because they are
the very thing to which a proposition or reasoning may
be finally reduced ; though the idea itself which forms
part of the judgment or proposition is oftentimes called
term. A term, therefore, strictly speaking, may be
defined that into which a simple proposition may be
resolved. For instance, God is holy; this proposition
mav be resolved into God and holy ; these, therefore,
are e terms of the proposition.
Q. How are terms divided inasmuch as they are
signs of ideas?
I. A term may be of as many kinds as there are ideas,
because they are destined exactly to express ideas,
and everything which has relation with another object
may easily be called after it, as we say generally
wholesome food, drink, and so forth, not because such
54
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 55
things are subject to health, but because they have
relation with it, inasmuch as they are either its
cause or its sign. Likewise, terms having relation to
ideas may reasonably be called after them. Hence, as
there are abstract, concrete, collective, particular,
universal, and individual ideas, and so forth, so there
are also abstract, concrete, collective, particular,
universal, and individual terms. But besides, terms
as signs may be divided into three great classes.
Some signify a thing by themselves, such as the term
man ; others cannot express anything by themselves,
but must be joined to others, as some^ every^ which
uttered by themselves mean nothing, but have a mean-
ing when united to those of the former class, as some
mcn^ every tree; others, finally, may or may not
signify something by themselves. The first are called
by modern philosophers terms significative by them-
selves ; the second, significative by means of others ;
the third are called mixed terms. The first, however,
strictly deserve the name of terms.
Q. How are terms significative by themselves sub-
divided ?
A. I. Into positive and negative. The first signify
something, as wrt'w / the second express the absence
of something, as impotent — that is, the absence of
power. About the latter we must remark that some
of them are negative as to the word, but positive as
to the meaning, as innocence, immortality, infinity^
which imply a positive perfection ; others are positive
as to the word and negative as to the sense, as jnortal,
corruptible, blind.
2. Into complex and incomplex, the first are those
which are formed of more than one significative word,
as Washington Irving ; the second of one, as tree^
spiritual.
56 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
3. Into nnivocal, equivocal, analogical. The first are
those which are applied to several objects under the
same signification, as animal, which is applied to man
and to beasts.
The second are those which are applied to several
things in a different meaning, as scorpion, which means
the animal of such name, and is also given to one of
the signs of the Zodiac.
The third are those which lie between the two for-
mer ones, and which are not applied to more than one
thing in the same meaning, nor in a meaning alto-
gether different, but are applied to something in con-
sequence of a certain similarity with other things ; as
when we say the air is very healthy, the term heal-
thy is analogical, because, although the term can be
strictly applied only to the human body, it is yet by
analogy or resemblance applied to air, to food, to
color, etc.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Properties of Terms.
Q. How many are the properties of terms?
A. Five : supposition, alienation, amplification, re-
striction, and appellation ; because every term may be
applied either in its proper meaning, and then we
have supposition ; or in a meaning not its own, and
then wc have alienation ; or in a wider meaning, and
then we have amplification ; or in more restricted
sense, and we have restriction ; or it may be added to
illustrate another term, and then we have appellation.
The supposition of a term is, therefore, nothing
more than the use of the word in its proper sense.
The appellation may be twofold. It is material when
the term is used not for its object but for itself, as in
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 57
that sophism mentioned and refuted by Clement of
Alexandria : ** What thou utterest passeth through
thy mouth. But thou utterest house ; therefore
house passeth through thy mouth." The supposition
of the term here is material ; it means the word house,
but not the object signified by the work. On this also
is founded that beautiful impersonification of the five
vowels :
"We are little airy creatures,
All of different voice and features ;
One of us in glass is set,
One of us you'll find \njet.
T'other you may see in tin,
, And the fourth a box within ;
If the fifth you should pursue,
It can never fly from you"
— Swift.
When the term is used to mean the object, then the
supposition is formal, as a house must have walls and
roof.
Q. How is formal supposition subdivided ?
A.. I. Into logical and real. It is logical when the
term expresses that which exists only logically, as
animal is a pred?cable called genus. It is real when
the term is used to express that which really agrees
with the object, as the animal is sensitive.
2. Into collective and distributive. It is collective
when we use a common word for all the objects signi-
fied and taken together, as the apostles were twelve.
It is distributive when the term can be used not only
for all but for each one, as man is rational. But with
regard to this distributive supposition we must remark
that the individual objects may be either each indi-
vidual, or not each individual but each species, as all
animals were in Noe's ark. The sense here is that
5 8 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
not each individual animal was there, but each indi-
vidual species.
Q. What is appellation, and how is it subdivided ?
A. It is the application of one term to another, and
it is formal and material — formal when it naturally
agrees with the other, as the physician cures ; material
when it is merely accidental, as the physician sings or
dances.
Q. What is alienation ?
A. The use of a term not in its own proper mean-
ing, but in another, as the Lion of jfuda, the Sun of
Jiisiice.
Q. What is amplification ?
A. It is the extension of a term from a less compre-
hensive sense to a greater, as great men will always be
honored — meaning not only great men of the present
time, but of all time and place ; and that playful
amplification of Pitt :
" From the small acorn see the oak arise,
Supremely tall and towering in the skies !
Queen of the groves ! her stately head she rears,
Her bulk increasing with increasing years ;
Now moves in pomp majestic o'er tlie deep,
While in her womb ten thousand thunders sleep —
Hence Britain boasts her far-extended reign,
And by the expanded acorn rules the main."
- Q. What is restriction ?
A. The use of a term which has a broader significa-
tion in a more narrow one, as Eve was the mother of
all living. Living, in this phrase, is taken in a more
restricted sense than it has, naturally meaning every-
thing which has life, from the plant to God, whereas
in the phrase it is merely to express men.
>■«
CHAPTER IV.
PROXIMATE MATTER OF REASONING ; AND, FIRST, OF THE
NATURE OF JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Nature and Definition of Jndgment.
Q. What is judgment ?
A. We have said that our mind acquires universal
ideas when it considers a quality as applicable to a
number of subjects. If, then, the mind applies a
quality to one or more subjects, or removes it from
them, we have another act of the mind called judg-
ment. For instance, our mind may reflect on the
quality rational^ as applicable to Peter, John, Walter,
Andrew, and to all men, but it may do more : from
the possibility it may pass to the fact and actually
apply that quality to them, and say Peter is rational,
John is rational, all men are rational ; or it may
deny a quality of a subject, as man is not bird. In the
first instance we have a universal idea ; in the second,
a judgment.
Q. In what exactly lies the nature of judgment?
A. To be able to affirm or to deny a quality of a
subject it is necessary that the mind should, in the
first place, compare the idea of the subject with the
idea of the quality ; and, next, that it should perceive
the agreement or the disagreement which may exist be-
tween the two, otherwise it could not affirm or deny
one or the other. Now, though the comparing of
89
6o Elements of hitellectual Philosophy.
the quality with the subject be necessary to render a
judgment possible, yet the true nature of judgment
lies exactly in the agreement or disagreement of the
quality with the subject, and in the affirming or de-
nying on or the other. Because to form a judgment,
as we have said, the actual application to, or the re-
moving of a quality from, a subject is necessary. But
in the mere comparison of the two terms that appli-
cation is wanting. When I raise, for instance, a ques-
tion in my mind. Is Peter honest ? and begin to com-
pare the two terms, I have not pronounced a judgment
as yet, because I have made no application. When I
say Peter is honest, then I have formed a judgment.
The essence, therefore, of the judgment lies not in
the comparison of the two terms but in the discovery
of the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas,
subject and quality, and in the affirmation or denial of
the same. And as definition must express the nature
of a thing, so we may rightly define judgment the per-
ception of the agreement of a quality with a subject,
or the disagreement of a quality from a subject ; or,
with St. Tliomas, that act of the mind by which it unites
or divides by affirming or denying. The thing which
is affirmed or denied is caXX^d predicate ; that of which
something is affirmed or denied is called subject ; and
the judgment, if it affirm something of the subject, is
called affirmative ; if it deny, is called negative.
Q. What conclusions do you draw from the nature
of judgment? •
A. I. That judgment is a more perfect knowledge
relatively to ideas, because by means of the idea no-
thing is affirmed or denied of a subject, and hence
its knowledge is not complete ; whereas the nature of
judgment consists exactly in that affirmation or nega-
tion. Therefore judgment is a more perfect know-
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 6i
Icdcje than simple apprehension, and is therefore a
proximate matter of reasoning, as being a more per-
fect knowledge of a thing. '' 1 '..,.'1
2. In judgment there is always found a universal
percepL'on ; because, the essence of judgment consist-
ing iii affirming or denying a predicate of a subject, or,
in other words, in saying that one of the terms is the
other, as man is rational, there lurks in that affirma-
tion the perception of the unity of being between the
subject and the predicate, man and rational. But to see
unity common to a plurality is a universal perception ;
therefore in every judgment there is always a univer-
sal perception. This is also the case when the judg-
ment is negative, as when wp say Peter is not a phi-
losopher, because I discover that not to be a philoso-
pher is common also to Peter, from which it is evident
how important to reasoning and logic are universal per-
ceptions.
ARTICLE SECOND. . , .
Nature of Propositions.
\
Q. Give the definition and elements of a proposition.
A. Judgment is so called when confined within the
mind ; when it comes out of the mind clothed in words
it is called proposition. Man is a reasonable being is
a judgment expressed in words, and therefore a pro-
position. And because judgment affirms or denies
something of a subject, according to this a proposition
may be defined a discourse, by which we affirm or
deny a quality of a subject. Hence three elements
enter into a proposition — the thing of which something
is affirmed or denied, and which is called subject ; the
quality which is affirmed or denied, and which is called
predicate ; and, finally, the verb is or is net, which,
62 Elements of IntellecHial Philosophy.
strictly speaking, expresses the essence of judgment —
that is, the act of the mind forming tlie agreement
or disagreement. Tiie first two are called the terms
of a proposition. The verb is, because uniting them
together, is called copula.
Q. What remarks ought to be made as to the
copula in a proposition.^
A. I. The copula is always necessary in a proposi-
tion, and no proposition can be formed without the
verb to be. Because to establish a proposition it is
not sufficient to express the subject and the predicate,
but it is also necessary to express the agreement or dis-
agreement which one has with the other. Now, this
agreement or disagreement cannot be expressed by
means of the predicate only, because the predicate
without the copula would imply no relation to the
subject. Therefore the copula is necessary in every
proposition.
2. Having established the necessity of the copula,
and having said that it is a verb, we must pay atten-
tion to its signification, to its mood, its tense, and to
the special manner of using it. As to its significa-
tion, we must remark that to be, in the proposition,
docs not mean to exist, because the copula docs not
express the real existence of the terms ; as, for instance,
when I say Shakspere is the greatest English poet,
I do not mean to say that Shakspere does actually
exist now, I mean merely to unite that predicate to
Shakspere. Therefore the copula in propositions
merely expresses the agreement of the predicate with
the subject, or the act of the intellect applying the
predicate to the subject. Whether the objects signi-
fied by the terms exist or not it is no business of the
copula to express. It is by a different act of the mind
and by investigating the nature of the terms that it
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 6
■>
can be found out whether they be r:al or logical. Nor
is it contrary to this theory to say that there are some
propositions in which the copula expresses the real
existence, as Socrates is ; because that proposition
amounts to this: Socrates is existing; in which case
also the copula expresses the union of the two terms.
Q. Of what mood and tense must the copula be?
A. As to the mood, it must be the indicative mood,
because the copula in a proposition is used to affirm
and declare a predicate of a subject or to deny it of
the subject. But of all the moods of a verb only the
indicative has the office to afifirm, to declare, to deny.
Therefore the copula in a proposition must be in the
indicative mood.
As to the tense, it must be the present tense, be-
cause the copula, as we have said, does not express
the real existence of the terms, but the act by which
the mi'^J unites the predicate with the subject or
separates one from- the other. But this act is done
when the mind judges — that is, in the present time.
Tlicrcfore the copula must be in the present tense.
If there be any propositions having the copula in the
past or future tense, the time past or future must be
applied to the tenses, and not to the copula. The pro-
position, for instance, The Messias was the Redeemer
of Israel, must be understood to mean the Messias is
he who was the Redeemer of Israel, the predicate
being zvho was the Redeemer of Israel.
I'inally, we must remark that the copula in a pro-
l)osition may be incorporated in the predicate, as,
for instance, in the proposition John is sleeping, the
predicate sleeping may be incorporated in the copula,
and we can say John sleeps. From this originate
those verbs which grammarians call adjective — that is,
tliose which contain the verb to be as an attribute to
64 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
distinguish them from the verb to be as substantive.
In conclusion one must pay close attention to the
nature of the copula, because from it all these things
proceed. The copula is nothing else but the act of
the mind uniting or separating the predicate from the
subject, in which the essence of judgment consists. It
follows from this, ist, that the copula is as necessary
to the proposition as that act is essential to judgment ;
2d, that the copula does not express the real exis-
tence of the subject or predicate, but merely the act
of the mind uniting or separating them ; 3d, that that
act being nothing else but an affirmatJon or negation,
the office of the indicative mood, the copula expressing
it must be also in the indicative mood ; 4th, that, the
act being performed in the present time, the copula
must be in the present tense ; 5th, that in that act
the predicate being considered as applicable to the
subject, it may easily be incorporated in the copula,
the office of which is just to refer the predicate to the
subject.
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/ •' ; '■ '■!(' li. :'■•'■''''. ^ "''■■ . ■ . • ' ' ' ■ :
t
. I I - , J < ' .« . ' . I " i • '■'•.'
.■l(Vf ■ I •{ . I ,.■"•'•' ,•''■'"
,1 (i ; • ''.i • ' 1 . >! ( ' • , , ' . ' , ■ ■• "■
' • (■ >
CHAPTER V.
DIFFERENT SPECIES AND PROPERTIES OF PROPO-
SITIONS.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Difference of Proposition considered as to the Copula.
Q. What causes the difference of propositions?
A. From the nature of a being immediately arise
its difteren^ species and properties, because the spe-
cies of a thing is nothing more than the nature of the
thing itself differently modified, and its properties are
an immediate consequence of that nature. Having,
therefore, determined the nature of judgment and pro-
position, it will be easy to deduce from it their divi-
sion and properties. The nature of judgment or
proposition lies in applying or not a predicate to a
subject ; therefore propositions must be different, ac-
cording to the difference of such application. This
application may vary from two causes, from itself
and from the way it is made, or from the terms
which are applied — that is, either from the copula or
the terms.
Q. How many different propositions are there, con-
sidered as to the copula?
A. In propositions the predicate may either be ap-
plied to the subject or denied of the subject ; or it
may be denied of the subject, but at the same time
insinuating that another may be agreeable to it.
When the predicate is applied to the subject, then the
proposition is affirmative, such as God is infinite, the
H
66 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
Church is imperishable ; when the predicate is denied
of the subject then t^e proposition is negative- — man is
not a pure spirit, beauty is not imperishable ; when it
is denied of the subject, insinuating that some other
predicate may be agreeable to it, then the proposition
is called indefinite ; as, The brute is not man, in which
proposition, if we remove the predicate man from
brute, we insinuate that some other attribute may
apply to it. Hence, an indefinite proposition is nei-
ther affirmative nor negative, but partakes of both.
These propositions, liowever, are not so common or
important ; more common and important are the
affirmative and the negative.
Q. To what law are affirmative and negative propo-
sitions subject?
A. To the following : In affirma<^ive propositions
the predicate is applied in all its comprehension or in
the totality of the elements of which it is composed,
but not in all its extension — that is, not in its full capa-
city of being applied. Homer is an epic poet ; Bacon
is a naturalist ; the predicate epic poet in the first
proposition is applied to Homer in the totality of
elements composing that idea — that is, every quality
forming an epic poet agrees with Homer — but not in its
full capacity of being applied, as that predicate may
be applied, to others, as to Dante, Milton. Virgil, etc.
In the second proposition the predicate naturalist
agrees with Bacon in the same sense — that is, in the
totality of elements forming that idea — but may be ap«
plied to others, such as Locke, Hobbes, Condillac,
etc. The reason of this law is drawn from the very
nature of affirmative propositions, because when we
affirm a predicate of subject in a proposition we say
that one thing is the other. Now, we could not say
that unless all the elements of the predicate agreed
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 67
with the subject ; therefore, in these propositions, the
predicate must be taken in its comprehension, but
not in all its extension, because when we affirm a pre-
dicate of a subject we want to express the quality
with which the subject is endowed, and not the num-
ber of individuals which may have it.
In negative propositions the predicate is not denied
in all its comprehension but in all its extension, be-
cause, in order to say that a thing is not another, it is
sufficient that a single element of the one is not found
in the other; but it is denied in all its extension, be-
cause if that which is signified by the predicate could
agree with any part of the subject, we could not sim-
ply remove the predicate from the subject. For
instance, when we say The circle is not square we
mean to say that no possible circle can ever be square,
otherwise we could not say, absolutely speaking, the
circle is not square.
Q. In how many ways can we affirm or deny a pre-
dicate of a subject ?
A. In two ways : by simply affirming or denying the
predicate of a subject, or by expressing the manner or
mode in which a predicate may be applicable to a sub-
ject. In the first case we have simple propositions, in
the second w^^/rt-/ propositions. Thus, when I say The
rose is fragrant, I utter a simple proposition ; when I
say ^lan is necessarily reasonable, I pronounce a modal
proposition, because I express the manner in which
the predicate agrees with the subject.
Q. How many ways or modes are there by which a
predicate may agree or disagree with a subject ?
A. Four; and hence there can be four species of
modal propositions. The predicate may agree or dis-
agree with a ^v\i]Qzt possibly ox impossibly ^ necessarily or
accidentally ; and, therefore, propositions may express
68 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy
the possibility or impossibility of a predicate agreeing
with a subject, the necessity or contingency of its agree-
ing or not with it. If they express the possibility they
are called possible, as Man can be a philosopher ; they
are called impossible if they express the impossibility
of the predicate agreeing with the subject — as, Man can-
not be infinite ; necessary if they express the necessity
— as. The soul is necessarily immortal ; contingent if
they e?;press the contingency — as, The Ethiopian is
black by accident.
Q. What other modes of affirming or denying, and,
consequently, how many kinds of propositions, are
there ?
A. Two, absolute and hypothetical. We can apply
or not the predicate to the subject absolutely, without
expressing the case when it may or may not agree
with the subject, or we may express the case when
it may or may not apply to the subject. In the first
case we have absolute propositions — as, Man is a rea-
sonable animal ; in the second we have hypotheti-
cal or conditional propositions — as. Where there is
smoke there must be fire. These latter propositions
are threefold, connex, conjunctive, and disjunctive.
The first is that in which the condition is expressed
by the word if; as, If there are footprints some one
must have walked. This proposition is formed of
two, one which expresses the condition, and is called
antecedent — as. If there are footprints; the other
affirms or denies the predicate, and is called conse-
quent, because depending on the first — as, some one
must have walked. The truth of these propositions
does not lie in the truth of the antecedent or conse-
quent, but in the connection ; if the connection is
true the proposition is true; if false, false — as, If
donkeys had wings they would fly. This proposition
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 69
is true, though it is not true that donkeys can have
win^Ts because the connection is true. On the con-
trary, if I said, If America exists Rome exists, both
antecedent and consequent are true, but the proposi-
tion is false, because there is no connection between
the two.
The conjunctive proposition is that in which the
propositions are united by the words and, not ; as, for
instance, He is not both dead and alive. Conjunctive
proposition, then, is that in which is expressed the
impossibility of two things being together, and in
order to be true it is necessary that there should be a
repugnance between the two. Hence the following
proposition is not true : Peter cannot both sleep and
breathe, be -use those two things can go together.
A disjunctive proposition is that in which proposi-
tions are united together by the words either, or; as,
for instance, It is either night or day. This propo-
sition, to be true, two conditions are necessary: i.
That there be a true opposition between the proposi-
tions of which it is composed. 2. That the enume-
ration of parts be complete, otherwise the adversary
may catch at that which is omitted.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Difference of Propositions^ Considered as to their Terms.
Q. How are propositions divided under this respect ?
A. The other cause of difference in propositions, as
we have said, is the difference of terms. Terms may
be different either on account of their extension or
of their number. Hence we have difference of pro-
positions from the difference of terms as to their
extension and as to their number.
As extension renders terms singular, particular, and
5 o Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
universal, so propositions under this respect may be
singular, particular, and universal. They are called
singular if their subjects be singular — as, Peter is a
philosopher ; particular if the subjects be particular —
as, Some men are good writers ; and, finally, universal
if the subjects be universal — as, All men are rational
animals. Let it be carefully remarked that the ex-'
tension of propositions is taken from the subjects, and
not from the predicate. Because the predicate is at-
tributed in the proposition only to the subject men-r
tioned, therefore the subject must determine the ex-
tension of the proposition ; as when I say Peter is a
philosopher, Longfellow is a poet, the predicate philo-
sopher in the example is applied only to Peter, there-
fore Peter must determine the extent of the proposi-
tion.
Q. How are propositions divided as to the number
of the terms?
• A. Into single and multiple. Are called single
when they are formed of one subject and one predi-
cate — as, Blessed are the meek. Are multiple when
they are composed of more than one subject or more
than one predicate ; as, Franklin was a mechanic, a
philosopher, and a statesman. This proposition is
equivalent to these three : Franklin was a mechanic,
Franklin was a philosopher, Franklin Avas a statesman.
There are different kinds of single and multiple pro-
positions. As to the single proposition, it may be so
by itself or by reduction. The example. The nieek are
blessed, shows a proposition single in itself. They arc
called single by reduction when, though we may affix
to the subject or to predicate various terms and other
propositions, yet they can all be reduced to one idea.
For instance, He who betrayed the cause of American
independence was Arnold, called emphatically the
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 7 1
Traitor. All this can be reduced to one idea — Arnold
betrayed the cause of American independence.
Multiple propositions are divided into explicit or im-
plicit. They are called explicit when openly they
have more than one term or proposition ; implicit
when apparently they seem to be one, but ♦^heir mean-
ing is equivalent to more than one, proposition — as,
Among animals man only is reasonable ; the word
only turns that proposition into two : all animals do
not reason, man reasons.
ARTICLE THIRD, i.
Properties of Propositions.
Q. What and how many are the properties of pro-
positions ?
A. Property is called that which follows necessarily
from the nature of a thing, which always accompanies
it and is never separated from it. Now, admitting
the nature of proposition, three things follow from it
— opposition^ conversion^ and equivalence. These are
consequent upon every species of proposition ; every
species of proposition being able to have its opposite,
its converse, and its equivalent. Therefore there are
three properties of propositions, opposition, conver-
sion, and equivalence.
Q. What is opposition? .
It is the affirming and denying in two propositions
the same predicate of the same subject, at the same
time and under the same respect. This opposition may
be threefold, contradictory, contrary, and subcontrary,
and hence there may be contradictory, contrary, and
subcontrary propositions. Propositions are called con-
tradictory when of the two propositions onq is uni-
versal, the other is particular — as. All men are just, some
72 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
man is not just. They are called contrary when both
are universal — as, All men are just ^ all men arc not just ;
subcontrary when both propositions are particular —
some men are just ^ some men are not just. Of these last
St. Thomas observes that, properly speaking, they can-
not be called opposite, because, in order to have oppo-
sition, it is necessary that the subject be the same in
both propositions. Now, in subcontrary propositions,
the subject, being taken in particular, is not the same
in both.
Q. What have you to observe with regard to the
truth of such propositions?
A. I. Contradictories cannot be both true or false,
but one must be true and the other false. Because
otherwise the same thing would and would not be at
the same time. As in the example, All men are just,
some men are not just, it is evident that one of them
must be false, otherwi - one thing would and would
not be at the same time, since one proposition is in-
cluded in the other.
Contraries cannot be both true, because if the
affirmative is true the negative must be false, since
the predicate is affirmed and denied of the same sub-
ject in an universal sense. They can be either one true
and the other false when the predicate necessarily
agrees with the subject — as, All men are reasonable, all
men are not reasonable ; or may be both false when
the predicate only accidentally agrees with the sub-
ject — as. All men are philosophers, no man is a
philosopher.
Subcontraries cannot be both false, but must be
either both true if the predicate agrees with the sub-
ject only accidentally — as, Some men are rich, some
men are not rich; or one false and the other true
when the predicate agrees necessarily with the sub-
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 'j'},
ject — as, Some men have a soul, some men have not
a soiil.
Q. What is the meaning of equivalence of propo-
sitions? • • V .
A. When we please we can reduce opposite propo-
sitions to the same signification, and when this is done
we have the equivalence of propositions. This is ac-
complished by means of the particle not, thus : Con-
tradictory propositions are rendered equivalent by
placing the particle not before the subject of either
proposition. For instance, the contradictories, All
men are rich, some men are not rich, I can make
equivalent by saying not all men are rich, and I re-
duce to the same sense as some men are rich. Con-
traries are made equivalent by placing the particle
not after the subject of the affirmative ; as, for in-
stance, All men are just, all men are not just. I can
put not after men in the first proposition, and reduce
the sense to no man is just.
Q. What is conversion?
A. The changing of the place of the predicate into
that of the subject, and vice versd, keeping safe the
truth of the proposition — as. Every man is a reason-
able animal ; I could say every reasonable animal is a
man.
Q. What is the use of equivalence and conversion?
A. They are of very great use in discovering soph-
isms of adversaries, in understanding obscure and
difficult propositions by reducing them to a clearer
form.
r
J -1 .
CHAPTER VI.
TRUTH OF JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS.
ARTICLE FIRST.
What is Logical Truth f
Q. Give an idea of truth in general.
A. To answer this question, we must remark that
whatever exists may have a twofold relation with the
intellect. Things may be related to the intellect
inasmuch as they draw their existence from it, or in-
asmuch as they are known by it. Thus, a house is
referred to the intellect of the architect in a different
way from that in which it is referred to the intellect
of the beholders. To the intellect of the architect it is
related inasmuch as it originates from it ; to that of
the beholders inasmuch as it is known by it. Now, it
is evident that things could not exist except they were
conceived by the intellect, which is their cause, in
which case the relation they have with such intellect
is an essential relation ; but things could exist very
well without any other intellect knowing them, conse-
quently the relation they have with the intellect
which merely knows them is an accidental relation.
The house spoken of in the example is related essen-
tially to the intellect of the architect ; whereas it is
related only accidentally to the beholders' mind. We
must remark, in the second place, that between the
object and the conception of the intellect either pro-
ducing it or merely knowing it there may pass a re-
lation of agreement and conformity, or disagreement,
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 75
because oftentimes the object does not correspond
with the intellect of the artist, and frequently the in-
tellect does not apprehend a thing just as it is. The
(V^rconcnt of the thing with the intellect from ivhich tt is
p'odiiccd is called metaphysical truth. The agreement
of an object ivith the intellect knozuing it is called logical
truth. On the contrary, the discrepancy of the thing
ivith the intellect which originates it is called metaphysi-
cal falsehood ; and the discrepancy of the object zvith Uic
intellect knowing it is called logical falsehood. Both
kinds of truths are defined by St. Thomas the equation
of the object with the intellect. We shall speak in this
article only of logical truth, which we have defined
the agreement of the object with the intellect which
knows it.
Q. How many kinds of logical truths are there?
A. Logical truth may be different, according as we
coi\sider the things which are known and the manner
of knowing them. Considering the manner of know-
ing things, logical truth may be mediate or immediate.
It is called immediate when the intellect discovers the
truth of a judgment the moment it is presented to it,
— as, The whole is greater than any of its parts ; of this
judgment the intellect perceives the truth the moment
it perceives the terms. On the contrary, when the
intellect, in order to know the truth of a judgment,
must make use of other truths better known to it,
that truth is called mediate ; as, when hearing that the
human soul is immortal, in order to perceive the truth
of that proposition I must have recourse to other
propositions better known to me. As to the terms,
logical truth may be of fact and of reason. It is truth
of fact when the objects are subject to experience ; it
is of reason when the terms ar : concerned about ab-
stract principles.
76 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Is Truth found in the Act of Apprehension or in that
of Judgment ?
Q. In what act is truth found ?
A. The acts of our mind are three — apprehension,
judgment, and reasoning. Reasoning is nothing else
but a series of judgments and ideas formed by the
mind. Hence, truly, the acts of knowing are ideas
and judgments. Besides, strictly speaking, reasoning
is nothing more than a third judgment deduced from
two others, and is true or not according to the truth
and order of the two first. Hence truth can only be
sought in ideas and judgments. It is found perfectly
in judgments. Locke, Rosmini, Galuppi, and others
contend that it can be i'ound in ideas. We follow the
opinion of St. Thomas, whose doctrine on this point
seems to us more simple, natural, and true. It is as
follows :
1. Truth, really and perfectly, is only in judg-
ments. We prove it as follows : Truth consists in the
agreement between the object and the intellect, and
hence to know the truth is to know just this conform-
ity. But to know that the apprehension of the intel-
lect is conformable with the object is the work of
judgment. Therefore truth perfectly can be found
in judgment, because then only the intellect possesses
truth perfectly when it not only has it, but when it
knows that it has it.
Truth is that thing after which the tendency of the
intellect is drawn, and is, therefore, the perfection of
the intellect. Therefore, truly and perfecMy, it is
found only in that act of the mind which is a com-
plete and true knowledge, such as judgment.
2. Truth is found imperfectly in apprehension,
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 'jy
inasmuch as by means of the simple apprehension
the intellect apprehends something as true, but does
not know it to be such. In fact, simple apprehen-
sions of the intellect represent the essence of things,
as we shall see; and therefore they must be comform-
able to the things apprehended. Now, in this con-
formity between apprehension and the object appre-
hended lies truth. Therefore, even in aoprehension
we can find logical truth. But logical tru.a is said to
be imperfectly in apprehension and in an incipient
state, because the intellect, by means of the simple
apprehension, does not know this conformity, as this
belongs to judgment.
♦ . • . • • •
. ...^
!;^v\^'Vo^A■•>■^;.'■.^•:v'..^^'■ vi"' V' '.-.^o^V'.
PART SECOND.
FORM OF REASONING.
Having treated of the matter of reasoning, which
are terms and propositions, we must now speak of
the form — that is, we must see how those terms and
propositions must be placed together in order to form
reasoning. All that can be said, however, with
regard to the form of reasoning may be brought
under four heads — first, the essential structure and
order of reasoning; second, its different species;
third, its external expression ; fourth, its defects.
CHAPTER I.
OP THE ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OP REASONING,
ARTICLE FIRST.
Of the Structure of Reasoning in General,
Q. What is reasoning?
A. Propositions which may appear before the mind
are of two kinds. Some are so evident that the mo-
ment they "are presented before the mind their truth
can be at once perceived ; as, The whole is greater than
one of its parts; ,a thing cannot be and ffot be at the
78
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 79
same time. These are called truths evident of them-
selves, or first truths. Others, and they the greatest
number, are such as cannot be at once perceived by
the mind. For instance. The soul is immortal ; a spiri-
tual being cannot occupy space ; time is the measure of
movement, and so forth. Now, in order to know these
truths our mind must employ others better known to
it, and which have some connection and relation with
those it wants to know, and by placing and comparing
them together comes to the knowledge of those it did
not know. This operation is called reasoning or dis-
course, and may be defined tliat act of the mind by which
from two judgments a third is deduced, or that act which
deduces the unknown from the known. For instance,
the miiid cannot see the connection between the sub-
ject soul and the predicate immortal. What does it
do? It compares both with a third idea, to see
whether they agree or disagree with that third idea,
and if it discover that they do agree it draws the con-
clusion that they must agree together. This third idea
may be spiritual, and the reasoning may be constructed
as follows :
That which is spiritual is immortal.
But the soul is spiritual.
Therefore it is immortal.
Q. What is the order of reasoning ?
A. It consists exactly in this: The mind wishes to
know if a proposition be true or false ; in other words,
if a predicate agrees with a subject. In order to find
this out, the mind does nothing more nor less than
what men do when they wish to find out if the length
of two bodies is tne same or not: they take a tiiird
one as a rule, and try it first with the one and then
with the other ; and thus they can tell if their length
agrees together or not. The mind does the same
8o Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
when it wants to know if a predicate agrees with a
subject. It takes a third idea, and makes it, as it
were, the rule or measure, and compares it first with
the subject and then with the predicate. Now, natu-
rally three suppositions can result from this compari-
son : I. That third idea may be found to agree both
with the predicate and the subject. 2. It may be
found to agree with the one and not with the other.
3. It may be found to agree with neither. In the
first case, when the third idea is found to agree both
with the subject and the predicate, then the mind
knows and concludes that the predicate and subject
agree together, founded on that principle that two things
which agree zvith a third agree together. For instance,
the mind does not know if the soul is simple. It takes
for a third idea that which has no parts, and compares
subject and predicate with that third idea, thus: That
which is simple has no parts. But the soul has no
parts ; therefore it is simple. These reasonings are
called affirmative. In the second case, when the
third idea is seen to agree with the one and not with
the other, the mind concludes that they do not agree
together, on the principle that i7vo things^ one of which
agrees zvith a third and the other 7iot, do not agree to-
gether. For instance, the mind knows the disagree-
ment between these two ideas, a material substance
and the human soul, by means of the third idea, a
thinking substance, and reasons thus : A thinking
substance is not material. But the soul is a thinking
substance; therefore it is not material. Here the
third idea, a thinking substance, agrees with the sub-
ject soul, but not with the predicate material. In the
third supposition nothing can be concluded, as, the
third idea not agreeing with any of the terms, no con-
nection whatever is established between them.
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 8 1
Q. What are, then, the elements and fundamental
principles of reasonini^?
A. It must result from three propositions, and
these ordained in such a way that the mind may see
the last proposition as included in the two first.
It must be formed of three terms : the subject, the
predicate, and the third idea.
We have said three propositions ; because in every
reasoning three comparisons are made, one of the
predicate with the third idea ; the other of the third
idea with the subject ; the third of the subject with
the predicate. And from each of these comparisons
arise a judgment and a proposition. They must be
arranged in such a way that the last be contained in
the two first ; otherwise there would be no reasoning,
but three unconnected propositions. The three terms
are called as follows : The predicate the major term,
because ordinarily speaking it is more extensive ; the
subject the minor term, because generally more re-
stricted ; the third idea the middle tQrrc\y from the office
which it exercises. Likewise also the propositions :
that in which the third idea is compared with the
predicate is called the major proposition ; that in which
the third id^a is compared with the subject is called
the minor ; that in which the subject and the predicate
are compared is called consequent or consequence.
And because ordinarily in the first proposition the
predicate is compared with the third idea, and in the
second the subject is compared with the third idea,
the first is always called the major, the .second the
minor, and both together, in regard to the conse-
quence, are caW^d premises.
All reasonings are either affirmative or negative.
The foundation of the affirm:*tive is that principle
that tivo things which agree with a third agree together*
82 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
.'
Of the negative the principle is tivo things of which
one agrees with a thirds ami the other does not, cannot
agree together.
Now, gathering together all wc have said, it is
evident that in order to have reasoning the following
things are necessary : ist. That the mind be respect-
ing the truth of a proposition in the state of doubt,
desirous to rem v^e it ; this is the end of reasoning.
2d. It must have a third idea, which is the means
whereby it reasons. 3d. It must compare this third
idea with the terms of the proposition it wants to
know, which constitutes the nse of that third idea.
4th. It must deduce from that comparison the truth
it wants to find out, which is the effect of reasoning.
We shall speak of each of these separately.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Of the End which causes the Mind to Reason.
Q. What are the difierent states the mind may find
itself in with regard to truth ?
A. The end which incites the mind to reason is
that it may remove that state of doubt in which it
finds itself with regard, to a certain truth, and take up
another state. To explain this properly we must
give an idea of the different states in which the mind
may find itself with regard to truth. Our mind,
when a truth is presented before it, may be affected
if. three different ways. It may adhere to it without
any hesitation or fear of its contrary ; it may adhere
to it with a certain hesitation and fear of its con-
trary ; or it may not adhere to it at all and remain in a
state of suspense, hanging, as it were, between yes and
no. Each of these things constitutes a state of the
mind with regard to truth : the first is called certainty ;
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 83
the second is called probability or opinion ; the thir<l
is called doubt.
Q. What is certainty ?
A. That state of the mind by which it firmly adheres to
a known truth ivithoiit fear of the opposite. It may be
metaphysical, physical, and moral. It is called metaphy-
sical certainty when it is founded on the very essence
of things ; for instance, it is metaphysically certain
that a square has four sides. .It is called physical
when it is founded on the constancy of natural and
physical laws, as it is physically certain that a body
gravitates towards its centre. It is called moral when
it is founded on the testimony of men and the laws
governing human acts ; as, for instance, it is morally
certain that Washington was the first President of
the United States. Hence, ?is it is evident, meta-
physical certainty is absolute, as founded on the
essences of things which are immutable. Physical
and moral certainties are hypothetical, as they
are founded on the supposition of the constancy
of the laws which govern the physical and the
moral world. This last observation gives rise to an-
other distinction of certainty, intritisic and extrinsic.
It is intrinsic when it arises from the knowledge of the
thing itself. It is extrinsic when it is founded on the
testimony of others.
O. How many degrees of certainty are there?
A. Certainty is made up of two elements the cling-
ing of the mind to the truth ; and the exclusion of
any tendency to the opposite. Now, as regards the
second element, certainty has no degrees, because this
excluding all fear of the opposite is incapable either
of increase or diminution. As regards the first ele-
ment, the clinging of the mind, .this may admit of
degrees, as the mind may cling to a truth with more
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
or less tenacity ; for instance, in metaphysical cer-
tainty the clinging of the nnind is stronger and more
tenacious than in the other two.
Q. What is probability ?
A. That state of the mind in ivJiich it adheres to a
truth luith a kind of fear of the opposite. It may be
also intrinsic and extrinsic. It is intrinsic when
founded on the essence of the thing itself, extrinsic
when it is founded pn arguments outside the thing
itself. M ,
It may have different degrees, according to the va-
lue and number of arguments and motives which sup-
port it. Because an opinion in respect to another
opinion may be equally probable, more probable,
most probable in proportion as the arguments sup-
porting it grow in weight and number. But it must
be remarked that all these degrees of probability can
never, no matter what their weight or number may
be, reach to certainty, because if they remain probable
they must always imply some fear of the opposite,
and no being by mere union with another of the
same kind can change its nature, hence, even united
together, all these degrees of probability must imply
some fear of the opposite. But certainty essentially
excludes all fear. Therefore a number of degrees of
probability can never give certainty.
Q. What is doubt?
A. That state of the mind in which it does not
adhere either to one side or the other of an object
proposed, but haags in suspense. It has been beauti-
fully personified by Spenser in his " Faerie Queene " :
'* His name was Doubt, that had a double face ;
Th* one forward looking, th' other backward bent."
J , - ■
As it is clear, doubt differs from certainty and pro-
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 85
bability.. because both imply adliesion ; doubt implies
suspension.
It may be positive or negative, because the mind
may withdraw its adhesion either because it sees no
reason in the one or other of the two things, or be-
cause it perceives equal reasons on both sides. From
which it appears that a negative doubt cannot have
any degrees, whereas the positive can, in proportion as
the reasons pro and con diminish or increase ; in the
latter case the doubt approaches nearer to probability.
Q. Wiiat is ignorance \
A. The absence of knowledge. \Vc have not
enumerated it among the states of* the mind because
it is rather the absence of a state.
Q. In what state is the mind before reasoning?
A. In the state of doubt. It could not be in igno-
rance, because he who is ignorant about something
cannot wish for nor seek it. Now, to reason is to
seek for something. Therefore, when the mind pro-
ceeds to reason it cannot be in ignorance. It' cannot
be in a state of adhesion or certainty* because if it
knew a truth it would not seek for it. Therefore, in
order to reason the mind must neither be in itjnorance
nor in the state of adhesion, but must be wavering
between the two ; neither be ignorant altogether nor
certain, but in the state of doubt. Doubt, therefore,
must always go before reasoning and demonstration.
Hence the truth which the mind wants to find out by
reasoning before the demonstration is called the qtics-
tion ; after, it is called thesis. This do '.bt is called
methodical doubt. And it is distinguished from that
of the sceptics and from that of Descartes. Sceptics
doubted of everything, and wished to remain in doubt ;
whereas the doubt called methodical is invented just
to bring one out of doubt, and it is called methodical
86 Elements of Intellectual Pkilosophy.
because it is taken and supposed by necessity of
metliod, whereas the doubt of the sceptics is called
systematic because assumed on system. It is dis-
tinguished from that of Descartes, who held that
science must proceed from doubt; but his doubt was
universal, extending to all first and self-evident truths,
whereas oui' doubt is particular, extending only to
those truths of mediate evidence which need to be
demonstrated.
Q. What does the mind aim at in reasoning ?
A. It seeks to remove the state of doubt and to as-
sume another state. But doubt excluded, there are no
other states but that of probability and certainty.
Therefore the mind in reasoning aims at probability and
certainty. From this arises the division of reasoning
\vito probable and apodictic^ though strictly speaking the
mind in reasoning properly aims at certainty, and at
probability only indirectly and incidentally. The rea-
son is this : In probability, as we have said, two ele-
ments are found, the adhesion of the mind to the object
and the fear of the contrary. Now, the mind when it
aims at probability in reasoning is not led to do so from
the fear oTthe opposite, for in this respect probability
is akin to doubt, and the mind would shrink from it as
it does from doubt. Therefore it aims at probability,
to adhere to the truth and to avoid the fear of the
opposite. Hence it strictly aims at certainty, which
excludes fear and implies firmness of adhesion. When
it cannot possibly attain certainty, then it aims at
probability; but only indirectly and accidentally. We
may, therefore, draw as a general conclusion of the
whole article that the mind in reasoning aims at cer-
tainty as the proper end of that operation.
. Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 87
ARTICLE THIRD.
Of the Means which the Mind uses in Reasoning, or
of the Middle Term,
Q. What is meant by middle term ?
A. It is that third idea with which the mind com-
pares the predicate and the subject. It finds it out as
follows : When the mind doubts about a proposition
it shows that it does not know its truth or its false-
ilood. Now, to know the truth or falsehood of a pro-
position does not mean anything else but to know the
unity or non-unity of being between the predicate and
the subject ; or, in other words, to know if the predi-
cate be or not the same as the subject ; since the
whole form of a proposition consists in telling if the
subject be the predicate or not. To reason, there-
fore, is to endeavor to know the unity or non-unity of
being between the subject and the predicate. Hence
to find the middle term is nothing else than to find the
similitude or agreement between the predicate and the
subject. Now, when we want to find out a similitude
between two things which is not yet apparent, the
way we follow is this : to consider both things from
every side, to see if we can find out some com "^n,
point of resemblance. In the same manner the m: *
acts when it proceeds to reason ; it considers from
every point of view the subject and the predicate, to
see if it can find some point wliich may present a
similitude with or difference from the other. This
point of similitude which it finds first in the one and
then in the other, or of difference which it finds in. one
and not in the other, it assumes as the middle term.
Hence to find the middle term we must consider both
subject and predicate from every possible side.
Q. What and how many are these sides according
88 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
to which we may consider the terms of a proposition,
and from them draw the middle term ? - ; »
A, They are ten ; and from the office they fulfil
are called common points, or topics, of argumentation,
because the predicate and the subject cannot be con-
sidered except from these points of cause, effect, subject,
adjuncts, contraries, similes, name, dejinition, division,
and authority. From all these we can take ,the mid-
dle term. -^ ^ •= . .i •
Q. Give an example from each. >f •: ." o^^ ";-fi;
A. We take the middle term from cause when we
show the effects from these causes ; as, for instance,
showing from its material cause that the human body
is corruptible ; thus, that which is made of matter is
corruptible. But the human body is made of matter,
therefore it is corruptible.
From the effects we take the middle term, showing
the cause from its effects. The most wonderful dra-
matic productions argue a most powerful imagina-
tion. But Shakspere has produced the most won-
derful plays, therefore he must have had the most
powerful imagination. *' f'i^'' '/**'• ■■ " >.'*''. :
We take the middle term from the subject when we
show of the accident something deduced from its sub-
ject ; for instance, that quality which leans on a more,
noble subject is in itself more noble. But the quali-
ties of the soul lean on a subject more noble than the
•body, therefore they are more noble than those ot-
the body. -nur, •!»> njrA-^
'j^-From the adjuncts or circumstances when we show
something from all that surrounds the subject, such
as t.'me, place, persons, means, and the like.
Fiom contraries, making one contrary exclude an-
other ; as, for instance, T'^uth is a good of the intel-
lect, therefore falsehood is its evil
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 89
From similes, showing one to be like to the other ; as,
Americans gained their independence by those virtues
which make up pure patriotism, therefore they will
continue to preserve it by the same virtues. v?;**
We take the middle term from the name in two
ways: i. From its signification; as, Angel mean? a
messenger, therefore angels are messengers between
God and men. From its etymology philosophy means
love of wisdom, therefore philosophers love wisdom.
From the definition is drawn the middle term when
we argue from those elements which compose it ;
as, science is to know a thing from the principles
which constitute it. But I know the principles of a
certain subject, therefore I have the science of that
subject.
From division we take the middle term when we
argue from the parts to the whole, and from the whole
to the parts. As, for instance, the head, the arms, the
hands, the fingers, and all the other parts of the
human body are animated, therefore the whole body
is animated. <.. , ... ' ,> .. .. . ..'\^:uu
Finally from authority, when we take the middle
term from the authority of others.
Q. What criterion must guide us in assuming the
middle term? .,, , ,. , ,(;.,i,..| ,..;> •; ■ .
A. In assuming the middle term we must pay atten-
tion to two rules : ist, In affirmative propositions the
middle term must never be more extensive or ample
than the predicate. For instance, to show that man
is an animal I could not take the middle term, sub-
stance, and say. Man is substance; but the substance
is animal, therefore man is an animal. This reason-
ing proves nothing, because the middle term, sub-
stance, is much more extensive than animal. Again,
the following reasoning would be vain : Peter is a man;
go Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
but John is a man, therefore John is Peter. Here the
middle term, man, is more ample than Peter.
I 2d. On the contrary, in negative propositions the
middle term must not be more restricted than the
predicate. The following reasoning would, therefore,
be bad : The finite is material ; but the soul is not
material, therefore it is not finite. The reasoning is
false because the middle term, material, is taken in a
more restricted sense than the predicate, finite. The
reason of both rules is found in what we have already
said. The middle term is that side of similitude or
difference by means of which the predicate agrees with
the subject in force or not. But in affirmative propo-
sitions the predicate must agree with the subject in all
its comprehension ; therefore the middle term, which
must represent that comprehension, must not be more
extensive than the predicate, otherwise it would have
less comprehension. On the contrary, in negative
propositions the predicate must be denied of the sub-
ject in all its extension. Therefore the mrddle term,
which must represent that extension, must not be less
extensive than the predicate. , .. .; , , , ,,,.; j
■ri.,,. ;, . ARTICLE FOURTH. ., ..: . \ .U
Of the Use of the Middle Tcriiiy or of Figures and
Modes.
, Q. How is the middle term to be used ?
i A. The use of an instrument or means consists in
making it available for the end for which it has been
invented. Now, the middle term is intended for the
object of comparing it with the two terms of the pro-
position by means of the artificial structure of the
premises ; therefore the proper use of the middle term
consists in this comparison and in the artificial struc-
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 91
ture of the premises. This comparison may be made
in different ways. Because the middle term in that
comparison may vary in two ways, either because of
the place it occupies in the structure of the reasoning,
and of the figure it makes in the premises, now ap-
pearing as predicate and now as subject, or because
of the manner according to which propositions are
formed, negative or affirmative, universal or particular,
by the help of the same middle term. The diversity
which the structure of the reasoning takes from the
figure the middle term makes in the premises is called
the figure of syllogism ; that which arises from the
second — that is, the different manner of propositions —
is called the mode of syllogism. Hence, to understand
what and how many are the uses of the middle term
we must speak of the figures and modes of syllogism.
Q. What is a figure?
A. That different disposition which the middle tertn
takes in relation to the extreme terms in the premises.
This disposition or placing may be made in^ three
different ways. The first is, when the middle term is
subject in the major and predicate in the minor, as in
this reasoning : Every animal (middle term subject)
has a sensitive appetite ; but man is an animal (middle
term predicate), therefore man has a sensitive appetite.
The second way is, when the middle term acts as
predicate in both premises. Every man is endowed
with reason ; but no horse is endowed with reason ;
therefore no horse is man. • ' ''•"'^ " ^ i ^^ u
The third is, when the middle term officiates as sub-
ject in both premises ; as, for instance, Being is op-
posed to nothingness. But being is identical with
good ; therefore good is opposed to nothingness.
There is a fourth figure which can be reduced to the
first ; therefore we do not speak of it.
92 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
Q. V^XxdX 2S^ modes ? :;;;!," ...
1 A . 7 Z/^y may be defined the disposition or locating of the
premises according to their universality or particularity,
their affirtnation or negation, , - r. ;; ^ ;•,
Q. How many modes can a syllogism have?
A. Sixty-four; because every figure can have six-
teen modes, since in every figure the premises may be
either both universal or both particular, or the major
universal and the minor particular ; and each of these
modes has four others under it, according to affirma-
tion or negation, because the premises, either univer-
sal or particular, may be both affirmative or both
negative, or the major negative and the minor affirma-
tive, or vice versa. Of all these modes only ten arrive
at a conclusion. Each one may amuse himself by
enumerating them for exercise.
'■*■"
' ARTICLE FIVE.
Of the Deduction of the Consequent from the Premises.
: Q. In what manner is the consequence deduced
from the premises known by the intellect? . ,' ,
f A. We can gather from all we have said that in
reasoning the mind in the major compares the middle
term with the predicate, and sees that they agree to-
gether ; hence, when in the minor it comes to compare
the middle term with the subject, it may be really
said to be comparing the predicate with the subject,
because it knows and has seen in the major that the
predicate is the same as the middle term. In a word,
in the minor it sees the predicate in the subject by
means of the middle term as through a lens. From
this we can conclude how the mind comes to the
knowledge of the consequence. Because that which
it affirms without hesitation in the consequence it has
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 93
already seen in the minor, and would contradict itself
if it affirmed in the consequent something contrary to
what it has said in the premises. Hence, it has been
rightly said that the premises stand to the knowledge
of the consequences as the cause to the effect, because
the mind, having known the premises, cannot ignore
the consequences, as, having supposed the action of
the cause, the effect must follow.
ARTICLE SIXTH.
Rules of Reasoning,
Q. How many rules of reasoning are there ?
A. The following: 1st. There cannot be more than
three terms in the reaso7iing. The reason of the rule
may be gathered from all we have said. But here we
must observe that oftentimes a fourth term is hidden,
and this happens when a term is used equivocally, now
in one sense and then in another — as, for instance, the
rat is a syllable; but a syllable cannot eat cheese,
therefore the rat cannot eat cheese.
2d rule. In the conclusion no term must be taken in a
more extensive sense than it has in the premises ; be-
cause that which is more extensive and universal can-
not be found in that which is less so. Hence, if the
term in the conclusion is taken in a^ more universal
sense, it cannot be found in the premises and could
not be deduced from it. Against this rule is that
sopl.ism of Cellius: "You are not what I am; but I
am a man, therefore you are not a man."
3d rule. The middle term should not enter into the con-
clusion, because its use consists in comparing it with
the other two terms, which is only done in the pre-
mises — as, for instance. Napoleon was a general ; but
Napoleon was poor, therefore Napoleon was a poor
94 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
. , '■ ■ '
general. Shakspere was a poet ; but Shakspere was
poor, therefore he was a poor poet.
4th rule. The middle tertn must be takett in a uni-
versal sense^ at least in one of tJie premises ; because if
it was taken in a particular sense in both premises we
should have two terms and not one — as, for instance,
a certain animal is endowed with reason ; but the
nightingale is a certain animal, therefore the nightin-
gale is endowed with reason.
5th rule. No conclusion can be drawn from two nega-
tive propositions, because when both are negative it is
clear that the middle term agrees neither with the
predicate nor with the subject, and therefore nothing
can be concluded from them. Hence the following
reasoning would be bad : Man is not eternal ; but the
animal is not eternal, therefore man is not an animal.
6th rule. No coficlusion can be drawn from two par-
ticular premises^ because in this case the middle term
would be taken in particular senses in both premises.
7th rule. The cojiclusion must share ifi the fortune of
the zueaker party ; that is to say, if one of the premises
is particular the conclusion must be particular, be-
cause otherwise the terms would be more ample in the
conclusion than in the premises ; if of the premises
one is negative, the other affirmative, the conclusion
must be negative, because in this second case the mid-
dle term agrees with the one and not with the other,
and therefore subject and predicate do not agree
together.
8th rule. We cannot draw a negative conclusicn from
two affirmative premises. The reason is clear.
V ♦ .{-
CHAPTER II.
DIFFERENT SPECIES OF REASONING.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Of the Variety of Reasonings ; and, first, of the Indue-
tive Syllogism.
Q. Whence arises variety of syllogisms?
A. We must distinguish three things in the mid-
dle term : i. What it is in itself. 2. The connec-
tion which it has with the extreme terms. 3. The
special form by which they are connected. Because,
the middle term must be something in itself, and in
order to become the middle term must have some con-
nection with the extreme terms, and also have such
connection under a certain form. Now, since the
variety of syllogisms originates in the middle term, it
is clear that such a variety arises from the three heads
just mentioned — that is, from the intrinsic diversity of
the middle term, from the different connection it has
with the extremes, and from the difference of form.
Q. What is the division arising from the first head ?
A. From the first head arises the division of syllo-
gisms into inductive and deductive, or into indtiction
and syllogism properly so called. Because the middle
term, considered in itself, may represent either a uni-
versal idea or particular ideas ; in other words, it may
represent a whole from which a part is deduced, or
the parts from which the whole arises. In the first
case the syllogism is called deductive or syllogism
96 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. ,
simply, in the second it is called inductive or induc-
tion simply.
Q. What is induction ?
A. That kind of reasoning in which, from the
enumeration of the particular parts of a subject, is
•gathered the whole and the universal. For instance,
the lion, the horse, the ox, the leopard, man, and the
like are sensitive. But all these constitute the genus
animal ; therefore the genus animal is sensitive.
Induction may be of two kinds, complete and in-
complete, because the enumeration of the particulars
may be complete or incomplete, and according as it
is the one or the other induction is complete or incom-
plete. I
O. What is to be observed as to the incomplete
induction ?
A. Wc must carefully observe in what sense we
can say that the enumeration of its parts is not com-
plete. Because if by this it is meant to convey the idea
that from an incomplete enumeration of parts we
can draw a general consequence without adding to or
supposing anything more in that incomplete enu-
meration, as some modern logicians have thought, it
is false, and would be contrary to that rule of reason-
ing which forbids 'the consequence to have a greater
extension than the premises. The whole is certainly
more ample and universal than some of its parts.
But in the incomplete induction, according to these
logicians, the consequence contains the whole because
universal, and the premises contain only some parts
because the induction is incomplete ; therefore the
incomplete induction, as it is explained by some
modern logicians, is repugnant to the fundamental
rules of syllogisms, because in it the consequence is
more ample than the premises. Therefore, in order
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 97
to avoid such inconvenient, if the enumeration of
parts is not complete it must be made so in some
way. This is done by adding after the incomplete
enumeration of parts the phrases and so forth, and the
like^^s the ancients observed, who held that induction
could conclude nothing except to the enumeration of
parts one could add and so on of the rest.
Q. For what reason and upon what foundation
could you add and so on of the rest ?
A. That phrase is added in force of the principles of
analogy, that nature is limited to one thing ; that nature ^
ivhen not prevented^ zvorks always in the same manner.
Upon this, having observed that a certain property is
constantly found in many individuals, we become as-
sured that it belongs to their nature ; and because
nature works always in the same way in all individu-
als, we attribute the same property to the rest of the
individuals not mentioned in the enumerations. The
true difference, therefore, between complete and in-
complete induction is this : that in the first the enu-
meration of parts is actually complete ; in the other
it is not actually complete, but becomes so by means
of the phrases, and so on luith the rest, and the like.
Q. What is the principle on which both deductions
rest?
A. That which agrees or disagrees ivith all the par-
ticidars implied in the idea of the subject agrees or dis-
agrees with the subject taken as a whole or universally.
Q. What has Bacon done with regard to induction?
A. Modern philosophers sing loudly the praises of
Bacon for the services he has rendered to philosophy
in teaching the inductive process. But we have to
observe that he has done nothing as to the logical
form of induction which was not known and tauejht
by the ancients. All that Bacon has done is to point
98 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
out the way how to proceed in the observation of par-
ticular facts by way of negation and affirmation, so
that truly he has treated only of the most common
part of induction.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Of Deductive Syllogism and its Species.
Q. What is deductive syllogism ?
A. If, in reasoning, instead of particulars we take
the universal as the middle term, then we have the
inductive syllogism, or syllogism properly so called,
which may be defined that reasoning in which from
the luiiversal is deduced the particular contained in it —
for instance, Every animal is sensitive ; but man is an
animal, therefore he is sensitive.
Q. How many kinds of syllogisms are there?
A. Several, i. The syllogism h priori and ii pos-
teriori. The first is that in which the middle term is
something which by its nature is understood before
that which it is intended to demonstrate, and acts as
the cause of that which is demonstrated. Hence it is
called also from the cause — for instance, every being
endowed with reason has a will ; but man is endowed
with reason, therefore he has a will. Here the middle
term, reason, is the true cause of the will, as reason io a
rational tendency. The second is when we assume as
middle term something which is conceived by the
mind as posterior to the thing which we want to de-
monstrate, as when we prove a thing from its effects
or properties.
2. Syllogisms from the proximate reason and from
the remote, reason. The first is that in which the mid-
dle term contains the proximate and adequate reason
of the thing. The second is that in which the middle
term contains only the remote cause of the thing.
Elemenis of Intellectual Philosophy. 99
3. Direct and indirect syllogisms. The first is that in
which the middle term contains a truth which has some
connection with the proposition to be demonstrated.
It is called indirect when, having supposed, as hypothe-
sis, the contrary proposition, we take as middle term
an absurdity, and show that the absurdity proceeds
from that hypothesis. It is called also demonstration
from absurd consequences. For instance, wishing to
demonstrate the free will of man, we take as middle
term the absurdities which would follow from the de-
nial of it — for instance, the destruction of virtue, of
reward and penalty, etc.
4. Syllogisms from statements admitted by adversa-
ries, called ex datis, and it is that in which the middle
term is something admitted by the adversary.
ARTICLE THIRD.
Of Demonstrative or Apodictic, and Probable Syllogisms,
Q. What is the next thing to be considered in the
middle term, and what division of the syllogisms arises
therefrom ?
A. The next thing to be considered in the middle
term is the connection it has with the extremes, and
from this arises another division of the syllogism — that
of demonstrative and probable. This division of the
syllogism is made from its efficacy in demonstrating a
truth. But the efficacy of reasoning results from the
connection which the middle term has with the ex-
tremes; therefore this division of the syllogism into de-
monstrative and probable depends on the connection
which the middle term has with the extremes. Thus,
in order to have a demonstrative syllogism, it is neces-
sary that the middle term should be so connected with
the extremes as to contain tho: proximate, necessary, and
I oo Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
proper cause of a thing. Cause ^?\\\zf^ the syllogism is
intended to produce science, that is, knowledge certain,
necessary, and evident. But science is knowledge de-
duced from its cause ; therefore the middle term of the
demonstrative syllogism must contain the cause. This
cause must be necessary, because, if it were acciden-
tal, the conclusion would not be necessary, and hence
unscientific. It must be the proper cause, because a
common cause would belong not only to the thing we
want to demonstrate, but also to others, and therefore
could produce only probable knowledge. It must
be tic proximate cause, since the remote cause would
give but an inadequate knowledge.
Q. What is probable syllogism, and by what criterion
may we distinguish it from the other?
A. The syllogism is called probable when its middle
term has no necessary connection with the extremes —
as, for instance, when the middle term is drawn from
etymology, from authority, from a common cause, from
effects not necessarily connected with that reason
alone and such as can originate in some other cause,
etc., or from some accident, etc. By keeping in view
all these things one can have a criterion to distinguish
the probable from the demonstrative syllogism.
ARTICLE. FOURTH.
Of Categorical and IlypotJictical Syllogisms.
Q. Define these two kinds of syllogisms.
A. The connection of the middle term with the ex-
tremes must be put in a special form. Now, gene-
rally speaking, the middle term may be conwected with
the extremes in two forms, either in an absolute way
or conditionally; hence the division of syllogisms
into categorical and conditional or hypothetical.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. loi
The categorical or absolute syllogism is that in
which the middle term is connected with the extremes
in an absolute way. The conditional is that in which
the middle term is connected by way of a conditional
proposition in the major. iVIoderns call the first sim-
ple and the second composite.
Q. What are the species of conditional syllogisms? •
A. A conditional syllogism is that in which the mid-
dle term in the major is bound by a certain condition.
Therefore this syllogism may be of as many kinds as
there are ways in which a term may be bound to an-
other by way of condition — that is to say, as there are
species of conditional propositions. Now, these pro-
positions are of three kinds — connex, conjiuictive, and
disjunctive. Therefore there are three kinds of condi-
tional syllogism — connex, conjunctive, and disjunctive. .
The first is that in whir': ihe major is a connex pro-
position. For instance, If the soul is a spiritual princi-
ple, it is immortal ; but the soul is a spiritual princi-
ple, therefore it is immortal.
The second is that in which the major is a conjunc-
tive proposition ; as, One cannot sleep and be awake
at the same time ; but John is asleep, therefore he is
not awake.
The third is that in which the major is a disjunctive
proposition ; as, Peter is either alive or dead ; but he is
alive, therefore he is not dead.
.-■ V '■■'■■ ■ ' ' ' '■ * I. y ■« ■ . ' s ' . ' . '
CHAPTER III.
OF THE EXPRESSION OP REASONING.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Different Ways of Expressing a Reasoning.
(^. Define the different ways of giving expression
to reasoning.
A. Besides syllogism and induction, of which we
have spoken, there are the enthymeme, the epichi-
lema, the sorites, the prosyllogism, and the dilemma.
Oftentimes in reasoning the premises are so easy
and clear that we omit one of them — as. Virtue is the
greatest good in the world ; therefore it should be
practised. Here the major is left out ; that is, that
which is the greatest good should be practised. When
the reasoning is so expressed it is called enthymeme.
On the contrary, we have the epichirema when to
one or both premises we add proof — as, Idleness is
hurtful because the parent of all vices. But what is
hurtful should be avoided, therefore idleness should be
avoided.
The sorites is a reasoning composed of several pro-
positions, so arranged that the predicate of the first is
the subject of the second, and so on until in the conse-
quence the predicate of the first proposition is united
with the subject of the last — as. Truth is the object of
the intellect. That which is the object of the intel-
lect perfects it. That which perfects the intellect is
the proper good of man. That which is the proper
to*
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 103
good of man is to be followed. Therefore truth is to
be followed.
The prosyllogism is the union of two syllogisms so
connected together that the consequence of the first
officiates as the major of the second. For instance,
Sensible goods do not fully satisfy human aspirations ;
but that which does not fully satisfy human aspira-
tions is not the true happiness of a man, therefore
reasonable goods are the true happiness of man. But
that which is not man's true happiness must not be
exclusively sought for ; therefore sensible goods must
not be exclusively sought for.
The dilemma is a syllogism which has for its mrjor
a disjunctive proposition, and from each of the
members of which we endeavor to draw a conclusion
against the adversary. For instance : Christianity was
either propagated by the force of miracles or without
miracles. If it was propagated by miracles, it is
divine ; if it was not propagated by miracles, this is
the greatest of all miracles, that a religion opposed by
the whole world and contradicting all human passions
should subdue this world and should be propagated
all over by twelve rude and ignorant fishermen.
All these expressions of reasoning can be reduced to
the syllogism, as one can easily see by himself; as, for
instance, the dilemma given above may be reduced to
the following syllogisms : If the Christian religion was
propagated by means of miracles it is divine. But it
was propagated by means of miracles, therefore it is
divine. The minor is proved by this other syllogism :
If we deny that miracles propagated it, we must ac-
count for that propagation effected without miracles.
But this would be a greater miracle under the circum-
stances ; therefore the Christian religion was propa-
gated by means of miracles.
CHAPTER IV.
;; FAULTS OF REASONING.
'* ARTICLE FIRST.
Sophistries of Thought,
Q. What is a sophism ?
A. Reasoning is intended to bring us to the know-
ledge of the truth ; therefore it is faHacious when
under the appearance of truth it insinuates falsehood.
This fault is called sophism. This insinuation of
falsehood under the appearance of truth may arise
from two sources: cither from \.\\q. form when the
rules laid down to construct reasoning are not kept, or
from the matter when this is in reality false but ap-
pears under the garb of truth. We shall say nothing
of the fallacies originating from the form, as they can
be easily detected by means of the rules laid down.
We shall therefore speak of the faults proceeding from
the matter. These may be divided into two, fallacies
of thought and fallacies of words.
Q. Speak of each of them.
-' A. Among the fallacies of thoughts the first is that
called of accident^ which occurs when we attribute to
a subject a predicate as substantial and necessary
when it only agrees with it accidentally. For in-
stance. Reason is oftentimes faulty, therefore it is an
evil.
The next is the fallacy of passing from the absolute
to the relative, and vice versd. It is committed when
we attribute something to the subject In an absolute and
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. t o 5
unconditional manner when It may be attributed to it
only under certain respects and conditions; as, Medi-
cine gives health to the body, therefore it should al-
ways be taken.
3. The fallacy of false cause. This is perpetrated
when we assign as the cause of something that which
is not really so ; as. The soul united to the body thinks,
therefore the soul separated from the body cannot
think.
4- I^^M^^^^ ^^^^ question or principle. This is com-
mitted when we assume as the premises of reasoning
that which must be proved, though we use different
words — as. The human soul is imperishable, therefore
it is immortal.
5. The ignoraniia elenchi. It is incurred when the
adversary tries to evade the question and to find a
contradiction against our statement which is really not
to be found therein.
6. Fallacy of mafiy questions. This is committed
when the adversary, to the many interrogations which
he heaps one upon the other, wants a single answer,
either affirmative or negative, whereas, in order to an-
swer properly, it would be necessary to distinguish and
give an answer to each question in particular.
ARTICLE SECOND.
. Fallacies of Words.
O. What are the fallacies of words?
A. I. Figure o{ expression. This proceeds from the
fact that an expression may seem like to another
when in reality it is not.
2. Equivocation — when we make use of. an am-
biguous term in the same argument, •. • > ' ^r^ . :v
3. Fallacy of pronunciation, when we use promis-
I o6 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
cuously a word which by a slight variety of pronun-
ciation may be made to signify different things.
4. Amphibology — when, in consequence of the
structure and placing of words — there arises an am-
biguous sense which may be applied to one or to the
contrary part. For instance, that answer given by the
oracle of Apollos to Pyrrhus, King of Epirus: Aio te
JEacida Rofnanos vincere posse (" Pyrrhus the Romans
shall, I say, subdue ") — which closely resembles, as
Shakspere remarks, the witch prophecy, "The duke
yet lives that Henry shall depose."
5. Fallacy of composition. This is committed when
that which is only true in a divided sense is taken in a
composite sense — as, Every man can live and die.
6. Fallacy of division. This is the contrary of that
of composition, and is committed when that which
is true in a composite sense is used in a divided sense.
Q. How are fallacies refuted ?
A. If the syllogism be false in the matter, then we
must deny that proposition which contains falsehood.
If it be faulty because the fallacy renders the sense
ambiguous, then we must clear up the meaning of that
proposition which presents the ambiguity.
PART THIRD.
END OF REASONING.
Q. Of what shall we treat in the third part of logic ?
A. The end of reasoning being certainty or science,
since a knowledge which is certain and acquired by
reasoning is called science, it follows that we must
speak of science in this third part. But in science we
must distinguish two things — that which is properly
so called and th^ way by which we arrive at it, which
is called inethod. Therefore, in treating of science we
must speak of science and of method. And because
in everything we find first the way to it and then the
thing itself, therefore we shall speak of method first
and then of science. We shall treat of method in
three chapters: i, its nature and necessity; 2, its
elements and means ; 3, its divisions.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE NATURB AND THE NECESSITY OF METHOD.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Definition and Necessity of Method in general.
Q. Define method and its nature. '
A. If science is to be acquired by means of reason-
ing, it is evident that it is Jiidden and fav from us, and
X07
1 08 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
that we arrive at it by a slow process of the mind.
Now, that which is far away and is cicquired slowly by
a process of the mind sup^^oses a way which leads to it ;
therefore scierce supposes a way which leads to it.
This way is called method, which may be defined
that way or order which the mind follows in the ac-
quis it ion of science.
From this definition it appears what things are neces-
sary to have method, and in what the nature of the lat-
ter properly consists. The method is a way or road.
Now, we find three things in a road — the starting-point,
the term at which we arrive, and the means, which lies
between the two. Three things, likewise, are neces-
sary in method : the principle, from which it starts,
the means, and the end. The principle or principles,
which may be different and various, are those truths,
of immediate evidence, and indemonstrable, which are
always supposed in science, and which are taken as a
starting-point, and maybe of fact 3.\\6. of reason : of
fact — as, The ivorld exists ; of reason — as, Nothing can
be and not be at the same time. The end, or term, is sci-
ence, because it is that which method aims at. The
means is that order or process of acts which the mind
pursues to arrive, from the principles, at science.
Now, the nature of method does not consist in the
principles or the end but in the process, because, as to
the principles, they must be already known ; as to the
term — that is. Science, or the acquisition of truth — this
follows, and is a consequence of, the method. There-
fore, strictly speaking, the nature of method lies in
the order and process of the mind.
• Q. What is the difference between method and
reasoning ? .^ii:-<'. h ; ^
A. A doubt might arise from what we have said
whether method and reasoning be not the same thing ;
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 109
because if method is a process, so is reasoning ; if
method arrives at science by that process so does rea-
soning; if method starts Irom indemonstrable princi-
ples, so does reasoning. In what, then, are they distin-
guished from each other ? To answer this question we
must distinguish with St. Thomas* two kinds of pro-
cesses in human science ; " The first is a process of suc-
cession (and time), as when, after having considered one
thing, we turn around to consider another, and thus
complete our first knowledge. The other process is
by way of causality, when from the principles we draw
conclusions which naturally originate from them."
The first process is that of one who views a variety
of objects one after the other ; the second is that
of one who considers the light as springing from the
sun, the flower as budding from the tr ^, etc. The
first process is method ; the second is reasoning.
Q. Is method necessary?
A. By the nature of our mind we are so constituted
that we cannot understand everything at once and sim-
ultaneously, but must understand things successively,
and part after part. Now, to do this well we must
follow an order of some kind. Therefore it is neces-
sary, in order to acquire science, to follow a certain
order. But the essence of method lies just in this
order ; therefore method is necessary.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Method must be One and Definite — Eclecticism,
Q. What can you say of the eclecticism of Cousin ?
A. This philosopher has broached a very strange
theory about method. He maintains that pure error
is not to be found in the human mind, and that error
♦ I p. qu. 14, art. 7.
no Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
is an incomplete truth. From this he concludes that
all the erroneous systems of philosophers cannot be
called so in the sense that they do not contain any
truth at all, but only in the sense that they contain
truth in an incomplete manner. This truth, in the
long succession of centuries up to our times, has al-
ready been exhausted by philosophers, some of them
pvesenting one part and some another, but none ex-
hibiting the whole truth. Hence we cannot find any
new truth ; but our business is to gather the truths
scattered here and there. From these statements he
concludes that it is not proper to have any determi-
nate and definite system in the nineteenth century,
but that we should gather all that is good and true
here and there in every system, and, rejecting the
false, endeavor to reconcile all systems. This sort of
method is called eclecticism.
Now, without entering into the examination of the
principles assumed — that pure error is impossible, that
error is an incomplete truth; for this shall be done in
Metaphysics — we say that this theory is contradictory,
because at the same time that it rejects all sorts of
method it supposes already a definite method. Be-
cause how could the mind gather the truth here and
there in this system or in the other, separate it from
falsehood, and keep the one and reject the other, with-
out a rule to guide it in this selection and discrimina-
tion ? Now, this rule guiding the mind in this process
implies a method. Therefore eclecticism, which re-
jects all method, supposes a method. We conclude,
therefore, that a method is necessary to acquire science,
and that this must be definite. In fact, a method
must start from a definite point. Now, a definite point
of starting renders the way also definite. Method,
therefore, must be one and definite.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. iii
ARTICLE THIRD.
Q. How can we determine the true method ?
A. This is a very difficult question, and cannot be
answered here in consequence of the many controver-
sies which have arisen on the point, and to answer
which more knowledge of philosophy is needed than
we hitherto acquired. We must, therefore, leave the
answer to this question for another part of this work.
Here we shall give those essential characteristics
which must accompany a true method, whatever it
may be. Now, the first essential character of true
method is that it must be agreeable to the nature of our
intellectual faculties. Because method is that process
which our mind follows in the acquisition of truth.
But our mind and our intellectual faculties in the
acquisition of truth follow always that way which is
natural to them ; therefore true method must be
agreeable to the nature of our mind. Moreover,
method is a guide and a help to lead our faculties to
science. But a guide contrary to the nature and
faculties of a being would be a hindrance rather than
a help ; therefore true method should be agreeable to
the nature of our faculties. ;,
From this it follows that a true method must pro-
ceed after these laws : i. In the investigation of truth
it must start from that which is better known to come
to that which is less known. This law is clear, and
we shall only explain what is meant by it. That
which is more knowable may be understood in two
ways — m itself and according to its nature^ or in rela-
tion to our mind. A thing is called better known in
ttself and according to its nature when it is naturally
first and more perfect than another, as the cause with
regard to its effects. Hene God, who is most per-
112 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. v
feet and necessary, is, according to his nature, the most
knowable of all beings. But oftentimes that which is
most knowable according lo its nature is less known
in regard to us — as, for instance, some cause which,
according to its nature, is always more knowable than
itt effects, may, with regard to us, be less known than
its effects. Now, in the law laid down, when we say
that we must proceed from that whicK is better known
to that which is less known, we mean with regard to
what is better known to our mind, and not with re-
gard to that which is better known in itself and by its
own nature. The reason is easily understood. In
every road the starting-point is that which is nearer
to the one who is to go. But the method is the road
of our mind ; therefore its starting-point should be
that which is nearer to, and better ktioivn with regard
to it.
The second law is that the mind should proceed
from the better known to the less known gradually,
and not by leaps ; because the last conclusion results
from the preceding conclusions, and hence the know-
ledge of the last conclusion is the effect of the pre-
ceding conclusions. Whenever one of tbem is missing
the knowledge of our mind is no longer perfect.
The third law prescribes that between the various
gradations and conclusions there should be a con-
nection. ,
7 'r^'^v ■^,-. '• . '«%.'.' .^t'' v:>'»' .1-..' '
t"
\.
CHAPTER II.
ELEMENTS AND MEANS OF METHOD. '
ARTICLE FIRST.
Of the Elements of Method ; and, firsts of Analysis and
Synthesis.
Q. What are the elements of method ?
A. The essence of method, as we have seen, consists
not in the principles from which Jt starts, nor in the
term where it ends, but in that process by which from
the principles we arrive at the end. Now, this pro-
cess implies an order of operations which must be gone
through to obtain an end. The elements of method,
therefore, are those operations by which the mind, by
means of reasoning, arrives at science.
Q. How many of these operations are there?
A. Two, analysis and synthesis. The first is that
act of the mind which resolves a certain subject into
its elements ; and because we cannot resolve anything
except it is composite, therefore analysis is that opera-
tion of the mind which travels from the composite to
the simple. And, again, because the whole is more
complex than its parts, the effect more complex than
the cause, the particular more co.nplex than the uni-
versal, the example more so thau the rule, and the fact
more so than the principle, hence analysis, after all,
is that operation which travels from the whole to the
parts, from the effects to the cause, from the particular
to the universal, from the example to the rule, from
the facts to the principle. Thus, when the natural
113
114 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy^
philosopher, from the experience of natural pheno-
mena, discovers a law, he proceeds by way of analysis ;
when an artist, from the various examples, draws a
rule, he also makes use of analysis.
The following lines of Pope are a specimen of the
finest analysis. He wants to prove the superiority of
reason over the senses, as he states in the first two
lines :
" Far as creation's ample range extends.
The scale of sensual, mental powers ascends."
And he proves it by the following analysis :
" Mark how it mounts to man's imperial race,
From the green myriads in the peopled grass ;
What modes of sight betwixt each wide extreme.
The mole's dim curtain and the lynx's beam ;
Of smell, the headlong lioness between,
And hound, sagacious, on the tainted green;
Of hearing, from the life that fills the flood,
To that which warbles through the vernal wood ;
The spider's touch, how exquisitely fine !
Feels at each thread, and lives along the line;
In the wise bee what sense so subtly true
From poisonous herbs extracts the healing dew!
How instinct varies in the grovelling swine,
Compared, half-reasoning elephant, with thir .' 1
'Twixt that and reason, what nice barrier,
For ever separate, yet for ever near I
Remembrance and reflection, hvnv allied ;
What thin partitions sense from thought divide !
And middle natures, how they long to join,
Yet never pass the insuperable line I
Without this just gradation could they be
Subjected, these to those, or all to thee?
The powers of all subdued by thee alone.
Is not thy reason all these powers in one ?" - ■■ '
"■ -■ — Essay on Man,
Synthesis is the opposite of analysis. It means
composition. But only the simple is put together.
Hence synthesis, after all, means that act of the mind
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 1 5
which proceeds from the simple to the composite ;
and as the parts are more simple than the whole, the
cause more simple than the effect, the universal more
so than the particular, the principle more so than the
fact, the rule more so than the example, hence we
have the operation called synthesis, when from the
parts we go to the whole, from the cause to the effect,
from the universal to the particular, from the principle
to the fact, from the rule to the examples.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Use of Analysis and Synthesis. '
Q. When and how must these two operations be
used?
A. A great dispute has arisen among philosophers as
to when and how to use these two operations; some
wanting to use synthesis first, and then analysis, and
others wanting to use analysis first, and synthesis after-
wards. To resolve this question we must observe, in
the first place, that when the mind* sets out to inves-
tigate an object, it must know it somewhat, at least
confusedly; because if it knew it net it would not set
out upon its investigation.
2. In force of the nature of our intellect, this object
to be investigated must be presented before it in a
complex state.
3. The mind truly knows it when it knows all its
parts and the manner by which they are knit to-
gether. If this last observation needed any proof it
might be demonstrated thus : Then only have we a
true knowledge when it corresponds to the reality of
the object. Now, to get at the reality of an object
which is complex two things are required ; the parts
and their union, made according to the nature of the
Ii6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
object. Therefore it is only when we know the parts
of a complex object, and the manner after which they
are knit together, that we can be said to have true
knowledge of it.
Having premised these things, we come to the solu-
tion of the question, Which must we use first in the
acquisition of science, synthesis or analysis? We
say, in the first place, that it is impossible not to make
use of analysis in science ; because, when we come to
know and to distinguish the parts of a whole appre-
hended in a confused manner at first, the process
which we follow is analytic. Again, it is impossible
not to use synthesis ; because, to have a perfect
knowledge of a whole, it is not sufficient to know its
pr.rts, but it is necessary to know how they lie to each
other and to the whole. This process, as it is evident,
is synthetic ; therefore in science we must use both.
Besides, we are so made by nature that our know-
ledge ordinarily begins from experience and from
facts, and from them arises to principles. Now, this
is analysis. On the other hand, experience is not suffi-
cient to give us science, because it does nothing-more
than to affirm a fact ; hence we stand in need of syn-
thesis also, which shows the connection of facts with
principles; therefore science needs both these opera-
tions. The second question is, How are they to be
used, supposing that they are both necessary?
We have said that the first thing we do after that
confused knowledge of an object is to separate and
distinguish the parts, and then we study the i.ianner
in which they are used. Therefore we begin first by
analysis and then use synthesis. Again, we have said
that our knowledge starts from experience. Now, ex-
perience implies analysis^ therefore in science we
begin first from analysis. This, of course, '- under-
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 117
stood in a subjective sense, inasmuch as science is an
act of our mind, but not inasmuch as when, after hav-
ing acquired science, we wish to impart it to others.
In that case we use analysis first and synthesis
afterwards, or vica versa, just as we see it more con-
ducive to our object of imparting it.
ARTICLE THIRD.
On Definition
Q. What is definition ?
A. Whatever may be tne starting-point of our
minds, either analysis or synthesis, it must have some
fixed limits, in order not to be too much distracted and
wandering about. These limits are appointed by defi-
nition and division.
Definition is a short discourse which declares what
is that of which we are treating. It may declare a
name or a thing, and hence is distinguished into no-
minal and real. It is called nominal when it explains
the signification of a name ; r^«/ when it manifests the
nature of the thing signified by the name. Both may
be formed in different ways, and, therefore, are of dif-
ferent kinds. The nominal definition may be formed
in three different ways: i. From the etymology, as
when we say, TJie word philosophy means love of zvisdom.
2. From the common use in which a word is taken —
as, A wise man is understood by all to mean one who
judges from the standpoint of the highest causes. 3. From
our special signification — as, / mean by eloquejice the
present impassioned state of my soul transfused into
words.
A real definition maybe also formed in three ways:
I. By giving the essential constituents of a being; as,
Man is a reasonable animal. 2. By explaining the man-
ii8 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
ner in which it has been produced ; as, The circle is a
figure described by the extremity of a straight line
turning upon the other fixed extremity. This is called
genetic definition. 3. By describing the thing by its
most important accidents and exterior causes ; as,
Man is an animal, provident, sagacious, full of reason
and counsel. This is called descriptive and is used in
oratory. The nominal definition must always precede
the real, it being of the utmost importance in a dis-
pute to be agreed upon the signification of the terms
used. But to determine the nature of a thing the
real definition is the most important and necessary to
a methodic process.
Q. Give the laws of definition.
A. I . The definition must be clearer than that which
is defined^ because the whole object of the definition
is just this.
2. The thing defined must not enter into the definition^
at least under the same respect in which it is defined^
otherwise we should declare the unknown by th^ un-
known.
3. It must be convertible tvith the thing de fitted.
4. // must be formed from the proximate genus and
the specific difference of the thing to be defined, because
the definition must fix the proper limits of a being.
Now, every being agrees in some things with other
beings and disagrees in other things; therefore a defi-
nition must express that in which the object defined
agrees with others and that in which it differs from
them. This is done by using the proximate genus
and the specific difference.
'■}■•', \:-,.y^^: i:''.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 119
ARTICLE FOURTH.
Of Division.
Q. What is division, and how many kinds of divisions
are there ?
A. Division is the distribution of a whole into its
parts ; it is of as many kinds as we may suppose a whole
to be. Now, a whole can be so actually or potentially.
It is actually so when it is really composed of parts,
which may be physical, as in a house the walls, the
roof, etc.; metaphysical, as in man animality and ra-
tionality ; accidental, as the modifications of a being ;
logical, when they are supposed by the mind.
It is potentially so when it actually has no parts,
but can have them as the universal relatively to the
particular ; genus, for instance, respectively to species ;
because, though genus actually does not contain the
species, yet it maybe divided according to the species,
as animals may be divided into reasonable and unrea-
sonable. Division, therefore, may distribute the ac-
tual and the potential whole.
Q. What are the laws of division?
A. The following: i. It must be entire; that is,
that no part of the subject must be left out, so that
all the parts put together may be equal to the whole.
2. The parts must be somewhat opposed to each
other, so that the one does not contain the other.'
3. The division should be effected in an orderly
way; that is, a subject should be divided first in its
more general parts, and these in their turn subdivided,
and so on.
4. It should not be too minute, which would engen-
der confusion.
• .^ -*
■? ■■
CHAPTER III.
DIVISION OF METHOD— THAT A5, OF METHOD OF INVEN-
TION AND OF DISCIPLINE.
Q. How many kinds of method" are there?
A. Two, method of invention and method of dis-
cipline. We can attain science in two ways : either by
discovering it ourselves or by learning it from one who
has already found it. The first is called method of
invention ; the other, of discipline.
Q. What are the truths which the intellect may
discover ?
A. Four questions may always be raised upon a
subject: i. Whether it exists? 2. What is it? 3.
What are its qualities ? 4. What originates its ex-
istence, and for what does it exist ? Hence there are
four truths which may be discovered in a subject :
existence, essence and nature, qualities, and the causes
of existence. Of these four truths two properly be-
long to science : What is it, and from whence comes
it, and why ? That is the essence and the efficient
and.final cause of a thing. The others are subject to
experience, and are a way to science, but not science
itself.
Q. What are the means to obtain truth ?
A. They can be of two kinds, direct and indirect,
because we can either discover truth by ourselves or
learn it from others ; the first is called direct, the
other indirect. The direct may belong to sensitive
and to intellectual knowledge. Now, using these two
means to arrive at science, two things may happen :
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 121
either we arrive at the. knowledge of the principles and
of the nature of a thing or we do not. If the first, then
our mind is satisfied and rests ; if the second, the mind,
to be satisfied, seeks some other means, and supposes
a principle which may explain all the accidents of the
subject, and which may fulfil the office of its nature
for the time being until it succeeds really to find it
out. This supposed principle is called hypothesis.
Such is the way which the mind follows in the pursuit
of truth. Of t.he senses and of the intellect, and of their
value as means of truth, and of the indirect means—
that is, the testimony of others — we shall speak in
another place. Here we shall say a few words with
regard to experience and to hypothesis.
Q. What is experience, and what are its laws ?
A. Experience has often been confounded with
observation. To observe is to look at the facts jii"*-
as they happen, and nothing more, whereas experience
means always a certain knowledge of some properties
revealed by observation. Hence is it that, though
observation is satisfied with one fact, experience
requires several, and most rarely is satisfied with
one, and when this happens the fact must be of
the highest importance and equivalent to many facts.
This is the reason also why the word experience has
been extended not only to mean the gathering of a
property of an object from the observation of many
facts, but is used to mean the artificial reprbduction
of facts to force, as it were, the object more clearly
to reveal its properties. Thus chemists, for instance,
make experiments by reproducing facts and pheno-
mena to force the object to reveal itself. In one
word, experience and experiment are ordained to
gather from the observation of facts the properties
and qualities of beings.
122 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy
»
The laws which must guide us in the experience of
facts are: i. We must pay attention to the least
circumstances of place, of time, of manner, because
the least influence of these things causes a variation
in the experiment. 2. We must repeat and vary
the experiment, try it with other instruments and
under different circumstances, oftentimes using a con-
trary process, in order that the phenomenon may be
known under all its aspects. 3. We must protract
the experiment for a certain time, and pay attention
to those more constant and stable effects and con-
ditions which may accompany the phenomenon.
These laws require the utmost diligence in their ob-
^ servation, and the greatest patience in continuing
them.
Q. What is hypothesis, and what are its laws ?
A. We have said that oftentimes, in spite of all our
constancy in experimenting, we cannot find the prin-
ciple and reason of a phenomenon. Then we put
forth a principle which may better explain it ; this is
called hypothesis, which may be defined : A probable
opinion put forth to explain the nature and reason of
a phenomenony which nature and reason are not known
by experience^ nor as yet demonstrated by reason. The
laws are: i. We must only take as an hypothesis that
principle which may explain most of the circum-
stances, and these the most important.
2. That it contain nothing repugnant to the laws
of nature already known.
3. That, among the hypotheses, should be chosen
which proceeds in the most simple way. ■
If in the prosecution of the experiments we find out
that that hypothesis explains the true nature of the
phenomenon, then the probability becomes certainty
and the hypothesis becomes thesis.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 23
ARTICLE SECOND.
Of the Method of Discipline.
Q. What is meant by teaching?
A. When science is found the method employed to
communicate it to others is called didactic, or of dis-
cipline. In order to understand the nature of this
method we must see what it is to teach science.
To teach is to manifest the science which we know,
and to cause others to learn it. But to know, in a
scientific way, means to deduce a conclusion from
principles certain and evident ; therefore to teach
science implies inducing the mind of the pupil to
draw consequences from known principles. Hence it
appears that the teacher is not the principal cause of
the science in the disciple, but a guide who, by means
of signs — that is, words — leads the disciple and induces
him to draw conclusions from known principles in the
same manner as he drew them himself. "Hence the
principle or cause of the science in this case is not
the teacher but the reason of the disciple.
From this appears the strangeness of the opinion of
those who hold that the analytic method is good to
discover science, the synthetic to impart it. We say
that in general the best method of teaching science is
the same one which discovered it. Because to teach
is to incite the mind of the disciple to form those
same demonstrations which are in our mind; there-
fore the easiest method is the same followed by us in
the formation of those demonstrations.
Besides, between the method of invention and
that of discipline exists the same difference which
intervenes between nature and art, because the in-
ventive method is natural, that of discipline is arti-
ficial. But art must imitate nature ; therefore the
124 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
method of discipline must imitate the method of in-
vention.
This, however, must not be understood so strictly
as to forbid the use of any other method. The best
rule in this matter is, that method is the best which
best facilitates the acquisition of science, and there-
fore when the analytic answers the purpose let the
analytic be followed ; when the synthetic, let the latter
be followed, because the easiest and the clearest way
is always the most natural.
, i ;rf , ;
■(
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CHAPTER IV.
OF SCIENCE, ACCORDING TO ITS STRICTEST ACCEPTATION,
INASMUCH AS IT IS KNOWLEDGE.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Idea of Science.
Q. In how many ways can the word science be
used ?
A. In two ways, though both are connected to-
gether. In the first place, science implies a particular
knowledge of an object. But our mind can have also
several distinct ideas of an object, and form several
distinct conclusions about it, which it may put to-
gether in order and form a whole body of knowledge.
Hence, in the second place, science may be used also
to express that orderly series of scientific knowledge
we form about an object. In this chapter we shall
treat of science in the first signification, leaving it to
the next to treat of it in its second acceptation.
Q. Give an idea of science inasmuch as it is a spe-
cial knowledge of an object.
A. It is called a special knowledge of a set purpose,
because science does not mean any knowledge what-
ever, but only a perfect knowledge. This sense is
attached to science even by common sense, because
men generally attach a different sense to the word
knowledge and to that of science, meaning by the
latter a fuller, more evident, and more noble know-
ledge. Science, therefore, implies a perfect knowledge.
From this idea we can draw the elements necessary
and essential to the conception of science, because
126 Elements of Intellectual Philosophyi
three things are necessary to have a perfect knowledge :
1. It must be certain, because, besides certainty, there
is nothing but doubt and probability, or opinion. But
doubt is the want of knowledge, and probability is an
imperfect knowledge, always implying a certain fear
of the contrary ; therefore we can call perfect only
that knowledge which is accompanied by a certainty.
2. It must be evident, either mediately, or immedi-
ately ; because, if knowledge is certain, it is necessary
that the mind should have no fear of the contrary.
To have no fear of the contrary the mind must feel
perfectly secure about it. To feel perfectly secure
it is necessary that it should sec clearly into the
principles on which it is founded, and discover the
connection between those principles and the conclu-
sions drawn from them ; therefore science must be
evident knowledge. Moreover, if this knowledge were
not evident but obscure, it would not be perfect but
imperfect. 3. It must be a k*' 'ge deduced from
its causes, because otherv. it c ild be neither cer-
tain, evident, nor perfec - -^♦^ .ertain, because then
only can we be said to have certainty when not only
do we know that a thing is but also that it must be so,
which absolutely excludes all fear of the opposite.
But the necessity that a thing must be so is only
known when we discover the cause and the connection
which it has with it. Therefore knowledge, to be cer-
tain, must be deduced from its causes. It could not
be evident, because when the mind can see no connec-
tion between a thing and its cause it cannot have true
evidence, as it can see a void, and never can rest until
it discovers that connection. It could not be perfect,
since that knowledge alone is perfect which leaves
nothing to discover, and when we know not the cause
of a thing we cannot say that there is nothing more
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 127
to discover; therefore science must be a knowledge
deduced from its principles.
Q. Give a full definition of science according to the
above principles.
A. A knowledge, certain and evident, deduced from
its principles or causes. Here a difficulty might be
raised. We cannot always investigate the cause of an
object, and yet we can have a scientific knowledge of
it. For instance, God has no cause, and yet we can
have the science of Him, which is called Theology.
In answer to this difficulty we say that when we
cannot investigate the cause of an object, in that case
the knowledge of its effects performs the office of the
cause, as when we say God exists because He has
created the world, God is most perfect because He
is the cause of all the perfections of creatures ; here
the knowlec-^e of the effect performs the office of
cause.
O. How can we make the effect officiate as cause?
Is not this contradictory?
A. When a cause has produced a certain effect, it
has imposed the necessity of its own existence for
having produced that effect, and of its being such by
nature as the effect produced requires ; because as, on
one side, the effect must necessarily exist since the
cause has acted, and must be such, and not otherwise,
as the cause has made it, so likewise, on the other
hand, the cause must necessarily exist because its
effects exist ; it must necessarily have produced it,
because the effect is already produced, and must
necessarily be so-and-so, because the effect is so-
and-so, and not otherwise. Therefore in this case
the effect performs the office of cause in the con-
struction of science, since we can argue from a certain
effect the existence of the cause, its being produced
128 Elements of Intelleclual Philosophy,
by the cause, and somewhat the nature of the cause.
Hence St. Thomas has observed that when we de-
monstrate the cause by its effects, then the effect
officiates as the cause, and the definition of the effect
is (nven instead of that of the cause. Here we must
observe that we do not say that the effect is the cause
of the existence of the cause, as Hegel objected
with regard to the demonstration of the existence of
God from His effects. We only say that the effect
merely officiates as the cause in the demonstration, in-
asmuch as we have said every effect necessarily sup-
poses a cause, and such a cause as befits the effect ;
and, therefore, supposing the existence of the effect,
the cause also must exist, and be such as the effect
requires. Besides, by the same cause we do not
merely understand the efficient and the final causes,
but also the principles essential to a being, ^ hich form
it, which may be reduced to the formal cause. But
the essential principles of a being may be easily read
and discovered in their effects more or less, according
as the effect approaches the cause and equals its
power, as we must find the similitude of the cause in
its effect. Therefore, even when we demonstrate from
effects, science is knowledge from its causes. It may
not be quite perfect, but it is science for all that, be-
cause containing all the elements of science.
Q. What must you observe as to the object of
science ?
A. I. Science must have for its object the essence
and the immutable relations of the essence of things.
It must have for its object the essence, because science
is knowledge certain and universal. But such know-
ledge must have an Qbject, which cannot be otherwise
than immutable; therefore the object of science must
be immutable. But only essences are immutable;
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 129
therefore the object of science must be the essences
of things.
Of these essences we must know the elements and
their immutable relations, because science lies in the
knowledge of the connection and relation between
effects and their causes. But we could not know this
connection between effects and their causes without
knowing the elements and the immutable relations of
the essences of things ; therefore, etc.
The second observation is in relation to what is
necessary in the intelligent subject in order to have
scientific knowledge. Because it is not necessary, in
order to have a scientific knowledge of an object, to
have been able to produce it, as was asserted by Vico,
who held that the intellect knows only what it docs ;
but it is sufficient that there exist a means which may
represent to our mind effects and their causes, their
relations and essences, in which means the mind may
see all those things. This means we have in ideas,
and the force of reading them lies in our intellect.
The principle of Vico would only render possible one
science — that is, mathematics, which is the creation of
man ; and upon this principle the German panthe-
ists have constructed their system, as we shall see in
its proper place.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Of Science in Relation to Opinion and Faith.
Q. How is science distinguished from opinion and
faith? : ,.,-.: ^ ,
A. As to opinion, science Is distinguishable from it
in four ways: i. \n knowledge, \^\\\q\\ in science most
firmly clings to the object known without the least
1 30 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
fear of the opposite, whereas opinion impHes an adhe-
sion of the mind with fear of the opposite.
2. As to the matter; this in science being always
necessary and immutable, whereas in opinion it is
oftentimes mutable and contingent.
3. For the means, which in science is the demon-
strative syllogism, deducing certain and evident know-
ledge from its causes, whilst in opinion the means
is the probable syllogism.
4. For the manner according to which they are pro-
duced, science being produced by one efficacious de-
monstration, whilst opinion is engendered by the
aid of various syllogisms in consequence of their
weakness.
As to faith, science can be distinguished from it
for two reasons: I. The certainty of science consists
in two things — in the intrinsic evidence of the object
and in the firmness of adhesion of the mind. On the
contrary, faith consists only in the firmness of the ad-
hesion of the mind, not caused by the internal evi-
dence of the object as perceived by the mind, but by
the external evidence only if we speak of human
faith, and by other causes if we speak of divine faith,
the clinging of the mind which the latter implies being
caused also by an internal operation of God upon the
soul.
2. In science we adhere to the qqx\z\w^\ox\ forced by
the necessity of the principles. In faith we cling to
the object prompted by the will, which presents that
belief as good. r" .
'^\«\\y^X\^:'S"^ ^ ','>•-•.'-:.. \\':VW\' '-^ ^-t\
CHAPTER V.
OF SCIENCE IN ITS MORE ENLARGED SIGNIFICATION INAS-
MUCH AS IT IS A SYSTEM OF TRUTHS,
ARTICLE FIRST."
Idea of Science in this Second Sense.
Q. What do you mean by science in this second
sense ?
A. Any system of truths belonging to a definite
order of things and presented in one body.
Q. Is not science, understood in this latter sense,
confounded with art, in which truths and rules are
also presented in one body ?
A. Art is only an order of rules upon some particu-
lar thing, whereas science is always a deduction. In
art we do not always find the evidence of principles ;
in science always. In art the order of rules which it
gives cannot, strictly speaking, be called a system ; in
science the body of truths which it exhibits is always
called a system. Three things, therefore, are the pro-
perty of science in this second sense : principles, de-
duction, and system.
Q. What about principles?
A. A principle is that from which a thing proceeds ;
and because we here speak of knowledge, the principle
is that by which a thing is known. But we do not
know by means of another principle, except that
which cannot be known by itself; therefore we must
call principles those propositions known of them-
selves, and which are the cause of the knowledge of
»3I
132 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. ,
many others — for instance, Every effect supposes a
cause ; Those things which are equal to a third are
equal to one another. NotJmig can be and not be at the
same time ; from which it appears that there are three
properties of a principle — evidence, necessity, and
universality. Evidence is that property by which
a thing, in being presented to our mind, makes itself
known most clearly. It is of two kinds, mediate
and immediate. It is called immediate when the
thing can be known by itself without the need of any
other, as the principles above mentioned. It is called
mediate when the truth cannot be known by itself,
but stands in need of other truths to be known. The
evidence of principles must be immediate, because it
must be the cause of the knowledge of other truths.
From this property of evidence flows the other, of ne-
cessity. Because if the thing is evident by itself the
mind cannot refuse its adhesion to it, but must neces-
sarily give it. This is called the necessity of a prin-
ciple. Finally, universality, the third property of a
principle, is a consequence flowing from the very na-
ture of a principle. A principle is that which is the
cause of knowledge of many other truths. Now,
this must be understood, inasmuch as these truths
are contained in that principle. Now, this property
of being able to extend to many truths, and in all
cases, is called the universality of a principle ; there-
fore a principle must be universal.
Q. Can there be one principle for all sciences?
A. This is impossible, because, i, the principles of
sciences must correspond with the real and objective
principles of things. But the species of things which
are the object of our knowledge are many and various ;
therefore many and various must be the principles
of sciences. 2. A principle is a law — that is, ex-
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 133
presses a certain respect according to which things
comprehended in it are regulated. But things are
many and various, and various are the respects under
which they may be regarded ; therefore various must
be .the principles of sciences. It is true that there
exists one principle which is the foundation of cer-
tainty, the principle of contradiction, but this can
never be such as to enable us to derive from its first
cause the science of an object. This principle does
not regard any matter of science.
Q. How are principles divided ?
A. Into proper and common. Common principles
V. are those which are used in all sciences ; as, Nothing is
done witho7tt a sufficient reason ; It is impossible that a
thing be and not be at the same time, of the same kind.
Proper and other principles are those which regard
the special matter of a particular science ; as, Do as
you would be done by, which is a principle of the
moral science.
Into analytic and synthetic. The first are those in
which the predicate is found in the idea of the sub-
ject ; as. The ivhole is greater than any of its parts.
The second are those in which the predicate is not
included in that of the subject, but is attached to it in
force of our experience ; as. Every body tends towards
its centre. In other words, the one originates in the
nature of the subject, the other does not.
The opposite of the analytic principles is absolute,
repugnant, and contradictory, and not even God him-
self could effect it ; but the opposite of synthetic
principles is contradictory only hypothetically, that is,
supposing that the laws according to which bodies are
governed be maintained constant. For instance, it is
an absolute contradiction to say that a thing is and is
not at the same time, and God himself could not effect
134 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
such a thing; but it is not contradictory in itself to
say that a body, instead of tending towards its centre,
should tend upwards, because this may be done by
suspending the law of gravitation, which is net essen-
tial to the nature of the body. It is only contra-
dictory in the hypothesis that the laws now governing
bodies be constant ; hence, admitting the law of gravi-
tation actually in force in a given body, it is a contra-
diction to say that it could tend upwards.
Q. What is the means of science?
A. The other thing most necessary to science is
reasoning. Some philosophers, as the school of Locke
and Condillac, pretend that the only means of science
is induction. But such a theory is absurd. Induction,
of itself, does nothing more than generalize a fact, but
says nothing of the reason why such a fact is so and
not otherwise, and why it takes place, nor discovers
the connection between cause and effect. Now, all this
is necessary to science ; therefore induction alone can-
not suffice for science. Therefore we must hold that
the primary and essential means of science is the apo-
dictic reasoning. And as science, inasmuch as it is a
system, cannot prove everything apodictically, so all
other kinds of argumentations are most useful, even
those which produce nothing more than probable
knowledge.
Q. What is the last thing necessary to science ?
A. The connection, or order. For science must
equal its subject ; and as then only we have truth
when the form of the intellect is equal with the
thing, so science is true and perfect only when it is a
true image of its object. But the object is in itself
perfectly well arranged and set in order ; therefore
science also must be well arranged in its cognitions.
Here we may recall the observation of Vico, that in
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 1 3 5
knowing an object we should divide it in its parts and
construct it gradually in our minds, as if we were
making it. Nay, this is just what gives to a treatise
the character of science — the order and connection of
the deductions. ;
ARTICLE THIRD.
Distinction and Order of Sciences.
Q. What is there to be observed about the unity
and distinction of sciences?
A. The true and principal criterion of the unity of
sciences is their object. Science, in this second sense,
is a system of knowledge belonging to a certain order
of things ; therefore, if that order of things be one,
the science will be one, and hence the unity of each
science depends upon the unity of its object. But we
must draw a distinction here. The object of the sci-
ence may be considered materially and formally. We
consider it materially when we look it everything and
every element which constitutes its being ; we consider
it formally when we look only at that respect accord-
ing to which it is the object of a given science. Now,
the unity of a science is constituted by its formal ob-
ject, but not by its material ; hence it may happen
that many things materially different from each other
may form one object of a science, being regarded
under one peculiar aspect. For instance, how many
are the material objects of physics? Numberless;
yet they form one object of that science, inasmuch as
they are regarded under the one aspect as phenomena
of bodies. On the contrary, it may happen that an
object materially one may form the object of many
sciences, in each of them being considered under a
peculiar aspect. Man, for instance, one material ob-
136 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. -
ject, may be the object of anatomy, physiology, pa-
thology, psychology, and so forth. The formal object,
therefore, is that which gives unity to a science.
As to distinction, we say that unity is the foundation
of distinction, because a thing is distinct from others
because it is in itself one. But unity is given to science
by its formal object ; therefore from the formal object
arises the distinction of sciences. Hence a science is
different from others, according as its formal object. is
more or less different ; as, for instance, theology is dis-
tinct from cosmology, because their formal objects are
different ; natural theology is distinct from revealed
theology, because their formal object is different.
Omitting all other distinction^ of sciences, we shall
say a word of that well-known distinction into specu-
lative and practical. A speculative science is that
which regards its object only as truth ; practical, that
which regards its object as to be acted on ; or, in other
words, speculative sciences are those which have for
their object the contemplation of truth ; practical,
those which have for their end action.
Q. What is the order and dependence of sciences?
A. Though sciences be different, yet they must be
set in order and be dependent. When many things
are destined to one end it is • ecessary that one of
them should govern and regulate the others. But all
sciences and arts are destined to one end — the perfec-
tion of man ; therefore it is necessary that one of them
should govern and regulate all others and take the
name of wisdom. But one may ask. What is that sci-
ence which may rule and govern all others? That
which has certainly the aptitude to govern and rule
others. But, as Aristotle remarks, among men those
are naturally able to govern who have more intellectual
power ; and those who are more robust in body but
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 3 7'
wanting in talent are naturally liable to be governed.
Hence that science must be the first and govern all
others which is most intellectual. But that which is
most intellectual is occupied about those objects which
are most intelligible. The intelligible is the universal ;
therefore that science is first which has a more uni-
versal object. But philosophy has an object more
universal than other science ; therefore philosophy is
that first science on which all depend. And here we
conclude this first part of philosophy with that from
which we started, after having given a brief idea of
the matter, the form, and the end of reasoning.
M ' '■ . V '- 1
ONTOLOGY
»39
/ '1^;-! . ' '
1i;i
':■ riK'ji
ONTOLOGY.
INTRODUCTION— OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS— DEFINI-
TION OF ONTOLOGY,
Q. Give the object of metaphysics.
A. In Logic we have spoken of being inasmuch as
it is the product of the mind, and have explained the
nature of reasoning. This was obliged to be done be-
fore all things else, not because of the dignity of the
object, but by necessity of method, as we have shown
in the Introduction to Philosophy. We proceed now
to speak of real being, which forms the object of meta-
physics. This word, composed of two Greek words,
means that which follows physics, and was given by
the compilers of Aristotle's works to those thirteen
books in which they found the philosopher treated
of real being, the name happily chiming with the ob-
ject of these books, since metaphysics treats of things
separated from matter either by abstraction of the
mind, as being in common, or by their nature, as the
soul and God, and if it treat at all of material
things it does so in a more noble way than physics.
Q. Give the division of metaphysics.
A. It has been divided into four parts — Ontology,
Anthropology, Cosmology, and Natural Theology.
Q. What is Ontology, and what are its parts ?
A. Ontology is that part which treats of real being,
X4X
142 Introduction.
considered in common and in a general way. But
about real being, considered in a general way, our
mind may naturally enquire the following things :
I. What is the nature of real being, considered in a
general way ? 2. What are its properties ? 3. What
are its principles and causes? 4. How is it divided?
Therefore, according to this natural order, we shall
treat of these four things : of the nature of real being
in general, of its properties, of its causes, and of its
divisions. Beginning from the first, we shall treat of
it in the following chapters: i. Of being considered
in itself and in a most general way ; 2. Of the first de-
terminations of being — that is, of essence and exis-
tence ; and 3. Of the manner in which these two last
concur in forming real being.
\ .■:-
•«:S' «■;*
^.».v
l.„.
CHAPTER I.
OF BBING^ CONSIDERED IN ITSELF AND IN A MOST
GENERAL WAY.
ARTICLE FIRST.
Of the Idea of Being in Itself
Q. Can you give a definition of being?
A. We cannot, because a definition must be com-
posed of the proximate genus and of the specific dif-
ference of the thing defined. Now, being can have
neither; therefore it is incapable of being defined.
The minor is proved thus: Every genus must have
specific dift'erences, which are not comprehended in
the essence and idea of the genus, but lie outside of
it. For instance, the genus animal has two specific
differences, reasonable and brute. These are outside
the essence and idea of the genus. Now, there can
be nothing which is not comprehended in the idea of
being; therefore being cannot be defined. It may be
declared by saying that being is everything which is
in any way whatever, or that which can be positively
conceived.
Q. What consequences do you draw from this doc-
trine?
A. I . That being is the most general and simple idea..
The most general, because nothing can be more inti-
mate and essential to all things than that of being
something. Now, this is just what is meant by being.
Therefore this idea is applicable to all things, and
hence most general. Again, being agrees with, and is
144 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
attributed not only to, all things but also to all con-
ceptions and ideas ; therefore it is the most general
of all ideas.
It is the most simple — that is, it has a less number
of elements and a more restricted comprehension than
all other ideas, because, as we have said in Logic, the
comprehension of an idea is in the inverse ratio of its
extension. Consequently, this idea, being the most
general, is the least comprehensive, and hence most
simple.
2. Being is the first idea, both in the chronological a7id
logical order. This idea is first in the chronological
order, inasmuch as it is acquired by our minds before
any other idea. For our mind is so constructed that
it must travel in its investigations from that which is
less perfect to that which is more so, and hence from
that which is more general and confused to that which
is less general and more distinct. But no idea is more
general than that of being ; therefore it is the first
which is acquired by the mind. Hence the first thing
we perceive in all things is that they are, that they
are something, and, gradually proceeding forward in
the knowledge of them, we come to know them more
perfectly and more minutely.
This idea is also first in the logical order, by which
we understand that all other ideas are subject, and can
be reduced to the idea of being. In fact, everything
can be resolved into its primitive and more simple ele-
ments. But the idea of being is common to all ideas,
and is the most simple of them all ; therefore they all
can be reduced to that idea.
Again, all other ideas are determinations of the idea
of being ; therefore they can be reduced to that idea.
Take, for instance, the idea of Shakspere. This is
an individual idea of the greatest of our English poets,
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 145
the most individual expression of somebody. But let
us resolve that into its more general elements, and
ask, What is the greatest of English poets ? A man —
something more general yet. But what is a man ?
A twofold substance, spiritual and material, united
together by one personality — more general still. But
what is a substance ? It is a being that stands by it-
self. Here we have reduced the idea of Shakspere
to the idea of being by stripping it of its determina-
tions ; therefore the idea of being is the first in the
logical order.
Being is the best known of all ideas, because we be-
come acquainted with things unknown by means of
that which we know. But we have the idea of being
by itself, and by its means we are introduced to the
knowledge of all other things ; therefore being is the
best known of all ideas.
The idea of being, therefore, does not include in
itself any determination of substance or accident, of
essence or existence, of reality or possibility ; because
with none of these conceptions can we reconcile the
characters and properties which become the idea of
being.
Q, What is the idea of not being ?
A. The negation of the idea of being — that is, Jtot/i-
ing. But nothing has not an idea of its own, since every-
thing is known inasmuch as it is, and nothing is the
negatioii of being ; therefore not/iing cannot be known
by itself or possess an idea of its own, but must be
conceived through the idea of being.
I
46 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
ARTICLE SECOND.
Of the Univocal Attributio7i of Being and of the Principle
of Contradiction.
Q. In how many ways can a nature or property be
predicated of various subjects?
A. In two ways, univocally and equivocally. The
first is when that nature or property is attributed to,
and found in, the subject in the same degree and un-
der the same signification. The second is when that
nature or property is attributed to many, not because
found in them in the same degree, but in consequence
of a certain resemblance and proportion between the
subjects. For instance, we attribute the nature of
reasonable to all the subjects called men, in the same
degree and under the same signification ; therefore we
attribute it univocally. But we attribute the quality of
healthy to the animal body, to food, to air, to place,
not in the same sense and degree, but on account of
the resemblance between the objects called healthy ;
we attribute it, therefore, equivocally.
Q. To what can the idea of being be attributed
univocally?
A, Only to itself, as when we say. Being is ; then
being is attributed to itself in the same identical signifi-
cation. From this manner of attribution proceed va-
rious analytical judgments, as that which we call oiidcn-
iity, and which is expressed thus : That ivhich is^ is; that
which is not, is not. The judgment called of excluded
means — as. Something either is or is not ; or as that
spoken of — Being is. But on close consideration all
these judgments may be reduced to one, which is the
foundation of all judgments, and which is called the
principle of contradiction, which is expressed thus :
A thing cannot be and not be at the same time.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 147
Q. Is this principle important in science ?
A. It is most important, as that which comprehends
all the judgments which arise from the univocal attri-
bution of being.
Q. What are its properties?
A. \. It is knoivn by itself.
Principles called self-evident, or known by them-
selves, are those in which the predicate is contained in
the idea of the subject ; so much so that the moment
we know the terms, that very mome.it we perceive the
truth of the judgment. Take the principle, for in-
stance, The whole is greater than any of its parts.
All we have to do to perceive the truth of this judg-
ment is to understand the terms, in which we find
that any part of a whole is contained in it as one of
its elements, and that, therefore, the whole is greater
than any of its parts, as a total is greater than the
units composing it. Now, in no other principle is this
quality of self-evidence found better than in that of
contradiction, because in it the predicate enters as
identical with the subject, since the terms of such
principle are, Being is being, not being is not being;
therefore the principle of contradiction is self-evident.
2. It is the most universal judgment and principle.
The narrowing of a judgment arises from two causes:
from the subjects to which they extend, and from the
matter of which they treat. For instance, the fol-
lowing judgment, Man is a reasonable animal^ is nar-
rowed down by the subject, because it extends to man
only, and even as to him it applies neither to his will,
his liberty, his body, his soul in general, but only to
his specific difference of being reasonable. And be-
cause the matter of which a judgment treats is repre-
sented by the predicate, as may be seen in the above
judgment, and in any other like it, we may say that a
148 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
judgment is restricted and determined by .the predi-
cate and the subject. Hence the greater or lesser
universality of a judgment depends exclusively on the
terms composing it. Now, among all judgments,
there is none which has such universal terms as the
principle of contradiction, because its terms are being
and not being. Therefore it is the most universal prin-
ciple, and there can be no judgment not contained
therein.
3. It is the first and supreme principle.
A principle, to be such, must have two qualities :
I. It must be self-evident. 2. To it we must be able
to reduce all other principles. But we have shown
that the principle of contradiction is self-evident. We
can show also that we can reduce all other principles
to it, because principles and judgment are reducible
to another when they can be resolved into another,
more general, in which they are contained. For in-
stance, the principle, TJie head is smaller than the body,
is true, because it can be reduced to that other more
general principle, The part is siuallcr than the whole.
But the principle of contradiction is the most common
and universal principle; therefore to it can be reduced
all other principles ; therefore it holds the primacy
over all other principles. This is so true that no other
principle can be produced which may claim the prece-
dence over the principle ^f contradiction. Attempts
have been made by sevei. philosophers to bring for-
ward a principle which could pretend to this prece-
dence, but they have all failed. Des Cartes produced his
pet theory: I think, therefore I am ; but this principle
is true, because founded on that of contradiction. A
thing cannot be and not be at the same time, because
if the latter were not true how could one say, I think,
therefore I am ? since in that case it would not be con-
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 149
tradictory that one should think and not exist at the
same time. Leibnitz proclaimed his principle of suffi-
ciont reason, Nothing can exist without a sufficient
reason^ and pretended partial primacy for it ; but all
in vain, since, if the principle of contradiction were
not true, it would be possible for a thing to exist and
have no sufficient reason to account for it. Conse-
quently, Leibnitz was wrong in saying that the princi-
ple of cu itradiction was first among necessary truths,
and the principle of sufficient reason was first among
contingent truths, since all truths depend upon the
principle of contradiction, and it holds precedence of
them all.
ARTICLE THIRD.
Of the Analogical Attribution of Being.
Q. Of what is being predicated analogically ?
A. We have said that being is predicated univocally
only of itself; therefore it is attributed analogically to
all other subjects. These may be God and the crea-
ture, and the latter may be a substance or an accident ;
therefore being is predicated analogically of God, of
creatures, of substances, and of accidents. This may
be briefly demonstrated as follows :
I. We can attribute something univocally to a
number of subjects when they agree in the same spe-
cies, or at least in the same genus. When they do not
agree even as to genus, then we attribute the same
thing to them only in consequence of a certain com-
mon aspect or relation. Now, being cannot be genus,
as we have shown in the first article ; therefore we
cannot predicate being of God and creatures, of sub-
stances and accidents, univocally, but equivocally in
force of a certain common aspect we discover between
150 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
them. Therefore God and the creature agree in the
common attribution, being, but only by a certain ana-
logy between them, and not because they belong to
the same species or genus or have tlie same being.
2. Univocals have this special property of their
own : that they are found, according to their common
aspect, in the same manner in all those subjects to
which they are attributed, as man, which is predicated
of many individuals, and is found in all of them in the
same manner. On the contrary, in analogous things
the common feature is found in a different way in the
subjects, as the attribute sound, which may be predi-
cated of food, of the animal body, of the mind, etc.,
and which is not found in the same manner in these
several subjects. But being is not found in the same
manner in God and in the creature, in the substance
and in the accident ; therefore it can only be attri-
buted to them analogically.
3. Univocals are restricted by the difference which
lies outside the common nature, whereas analogicals
are determined always by the different manner in which
they enjoy that common aspect which makes them ana-
logicals. For instance, mtimal is not determined and
narrowed down by the different manner in which it is
found in man and in the brute, because it is the same
in both ; but by the difference of reasonable or un-
reasonable, which lies outside the essence of the ani-
mal. Now, being cannot be narrowed down by any
difference lying outside the nature of being — because
what is there which is not being ? — but it is narrowed
down by the different manner of being. Therefore
being is predicated analogically of those different sub-
jects. That being is found differently in God and in
the creature, in the substance and the accident, as
we have supposed in the minor of all the preceding
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy, 1 5 1
arguments, is evident ; because God is the essential,
most pure, infinite, independent being, the fulness of
all perfections of being ; whereas creatures are not
essential or necessary beings, nor have they the ful-
ness of being, but have a borrowed, finite, dependent
being. ■ v. , . .
Substances are independent of accidents as to their
existence ; accidents cannot exist without the sub-
stance. The latter possesses being directly and in
itself; the accident only indirectly and by means of
the substance. The being of the substance is strictly
such, but the accident is only an adjunct, an appendage
to the being of the substance. Therefore it is evi-
dent that being is found in a different manner in God
and in the creature, in the substance and the accident,
and that, therefore, we can predicate being of all these
subjects only analogically.
^. ^v '■> - ■ ■ --v ♦' ! ■ , ,0 :;-,'^^
CHAPTER II.
OF THE DETERMINATIONS OF BEING IN GENERAL,—
ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.
ARTICLE FIRST.
How are Determinations of Being to be Understood ?
Q. How is the idea of being determined and nar-
rowed down ?
A. Being, as we have described it in the first chap-
ter, indeterminate and common, does not exist in
nature. To represent, therefore, a real being, that
idea, in force of its vagueness and indetermination, is
not sufficient, but must be made more definite and
contracted. But how is this to be done ? How can
being be made definite? AH other ideas can be
made more definite by adding something distinct
and different from them ; as, for instance, the idea
of animal is made more definite by adding to it
the element of reasonable. But this cannot be done
with the idea of being, because what can we add to it
which is not being? To limit, therefore, the idea of
being must be done by the same idea of being a little
more explicit ; because ideas must correspond to ob-
jects, but objects are so many special beings ; there-
fore their ideas can be nothing more than so many ex-
plicit conceptions of being.
Q. What are the first limitations of being ?
A. Two : essence and existence. But to under-
stand these two limitations it is necessary to speak
first o{ possibility. The idea of possibility has been
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 153
variously misrepresented by philosophers. A possible
is that which is capable of being. This aptitude may
be of two kinds: intrinsic and extrinsic. A being is
called intrinsically possible when the elements which
must constitute it do not clash with each other; be-
cause possibility has relation to being, hence all that
which may be is possible. But to prevent a thing from
being can be effected only by the principle of contra-
diction ; therefore all that which does not involve
an interior repugnance is possible. Now, the mere
intrinsic possibility or agreement of the elements
which have to constitute the being would not of
itself be sufficient for a being really to exist. An-
other condition is required, because everything which
may be cannot come from the mere possibility to the
actual act of being, except by means of a being
already in act which may carry that aptitude into
reality. To be able to exist by means of this exter-
nal agent carrying that internal aptitude into the ac-
tual fact of being is called extrinsic possibility. And
because these extrinsic agents or causes may be either
God or creatures, extrinsic possibility is divided, ac-
cording to St. Thomas, into possibility according to
the supreme cause — God — and into possibility accord-
ing to the proximate causes, meaning creatures.
Everything which is contrary to possibility is called
impossible, which may also be of two, kinds, intrinsic
and extrinsic impossibility. The first occurs when the
terms or elements of a thing are contradictory, as a
square circle, a four-angle triangle, a material spirit.
The second is found wjien there is no external cause to
carry the intrinsically possible into reality. From
these definitions we may gather that all that which is
intrinsically impossible is also externally so, and can
never be effected, even by God himself.
154 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
Q. Give the different misrepresentations of this
idea by philosophers.
A. Hobbes, Spinoza, Robinet, doing away with all
idea of the possible, have said that thing only is pos-
sible which really exists. This is absurd. Possible is
that which may be. Now, if we look at the idea of
being in itself, we find tha^ it can extend not only to
things really existing, but also to many more. On
the other hand, if we regard the causes which may
reduce possibilities to act, we find that they could ef-
fect a great deal more than they actually do. We
know by the testimony of internal consciousness that
we could do a great many more things than we do.
God could certainly create many more things than he
has created, else his power were limited ; therefore the
idea of such philosophers is false.
Others have said that the omnipotence of God is
the index and the test of the intrinsic possible, that
alone being possible which can be effected by that
perfection. Now, in the first place, these philosophers
turn around in a circle, for if we ask them what is that
which God's omnipotence can do, they will answer.
That which is intrinsically possible ; and if we beg of
them to tell us what is intrinsically possible, they will
subjoin, That which God's power can do.
Finally, others, like Descartes, have said that the
intrinsic possibility of things depends upon the will
of God. If God wills a thing, well and good ; it is in-
trinsically possible. If he do not will it, it is impos-
sible. Now, according to this opinion, it would follow
that if God pleased to make the circle square he could
do so, or that a triangle should have four angles, which
is absurd, because that which involves a contradiction
is nonentity, a mere nothing. Consequently, in the
supposition of God's effecting that which is intrinsically
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 155
impossible, we would have the infinite power of God
exercising itself about, and resulting in, a nullity worse
than Parturient monies^ nascctur ridiculus mus,
ARTICLE SECOND.
Definition of Essence,
Q. What is essence ?
A. The idea of essence, in consequence of its sim-
plicity, is developed in various ways, and, according to
these different ways, it takes different names. Gather-
ing these different ways under certain heads, we may
say that essence may be considered under a threefold
aspect: i, in itself; 2, relatively to itsefifects; 3, re-
spectively to its conception in our minds. Considered
in itself, it may be defined : That ivhick causes a thing"
to be what it is and distinguishes it from all others.
Under this aspect it is strictly and properly called
essence.
Considered in its effects, it is defined : That first
radical and intimate principle of all actions; and proper-
ties zvhich may belong to a being. In this regard it is
called nature.
Finally, considering it relatively to our way of ap-
prehending it, it may be defined : That which is first
conceived as the first thing in a beings or that which is
expressed by the definition. Under this relation it is
called conception^ or reason.
From these definitions we draw the following corol-
laries :
I. Essence in the first sense— that is, in itself—
can only be attributed to substances, because the es-
sence is that which causes a being to be what it is
ind to be distinguished from all others ; therefore
it can be attributed to that only which strictly and
156 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosopky.
perfectly exists. But this can be said only of sub-
stances, because accidents are imperfect beings or
the mere complement of a being. Therefore essences,
strictly and properly speaking, can be attributed only
to substances. We say this not as meaning that acci-
dents have no essence, but as implying that it can be
attributed to accidents only imperfectly in the same
sense as being is predicated of them.
2. Essences dwell intimately in things, because
they are the principle and origin of the properties and
actions of things. Hence Plato was wrong in admit-
ting essences separated from things and existing in
themselves, and which were the cause of the being and
knowledge of things, because things are what they are
in force of their essence, and become known by means
of the essence. Therefore, if essences were separated
from objects, they would no longer be what they are,
and would not become known.
3. It follows that the essence is that by means of
which things are truly and properly known, and the first
thing we conceive about an object when wc come to
think about it. Hence the opinion of Locke and Gio-
bertl Is false which asserts that the essences of thincfs
are unknowable, and that our mind knows only certain
essences which it forms itself. Such an opinion is ab-
surd, first, because our knowledge can only be called
true knowledge when it corresponds to the reality of
things. But that by which things are what they are
is the essence ; therefore we have a knowledge of
things only when we know their essences. Conse-
quently, if essence were unknowable, we could never
have a true knowledge of things, and would fall into
scepticism.
2. Sciences would become impossible, inasmuch as
they are founded upon the essence of things.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 157
3. It is a fact that we know the real essences of
many things, inasmuch as we perceive in them certain
differences which cause them to be what they are and
enable us to distinguish them from others, and which
differences we perceive as the source of all the pro-
perties of such things. For instance, we can distin-
guish plants from brutes, brutes from men, men from
pure spirits ; and we see something in all these as the
principle and source of their properties. Now, if
this is not knowing the real essence of these things,
what is?
4. Finally, we cannot see why the essences of
things should be unknowable and unthinkable. Every-
thing is knowable inasmuch as it is and in the way it
is. But the essence is that by which a thing is what
it is ; therefore everything is knowable by its essence,
and it cannot be impossible that essences should be
known and be the object of our thought.
Q. How are essences distinguished ?
A. Essences cause beings to be what they are;
therefore they must be different, according to the dif-
ference of beings. Now, beings are first classified
as substances and accidents ; therefore there must be
essences of substances and essences of accidents. The
first are found perfectly in the beings of which they
are the essence ; the second only imperfectly. The
essences of substances, then, are divided into essences
of material substances and essences of simple and im-
material substances. The first are composed of matter
and form, and cannot be without matter. The others
are forms only, without matter, and consequently are
more perfect than the first.*
r. * St Thomas, Z7« £»/a // £'«Mii//a. „ . i . >.* '
f • » " ' ■ ^ .
1 5 8 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
• '•'■■. .- ' ' ARTICLE THIRD. " * '
, Remarks on Essences.
Q. What rema'rks have you to make on essences ?
A. The first is about the indivisibility of essences.
From our having distinguished essences of simple sub-
stances, one must not infer that such essences are simple,
having one single property ; nor from our having dis-
tinguished essences of compound substances has any
one a right to conclude that such essences may be di-
vided into parts like their substances. With the exclu-
sion of the divine essence, all other essences are formed
of more than one property, but they are all indivisi-
ble in spite of that. Essences locate objects in their
proper species and genus, cause them to be what they
are and to be distinguished from all others. Hence
it happens that definitions which express essences
must be composed of the proximate genus and the
specific difference, because the essences of creatures
must have something which agrees with other crea-
tures, and something which may distinguish them
from others. Consequently, they must have at least a
twofold property, that of the proximate genus and that
of the specific difference. But, nevertheless, they are
indivisible, as Aristotle says, like the species of num-
bers, to which if we add or subtract a unit their spe-
cies is changed. Likewise with essences: if we add
to them one property or take away one property, they
are no longer the same essences. For instance, if we add
to the genus animal the species reasonable we have
man ; or if we take reasonable we have the brute.
Essences, therefore, are composed of more than one
property, but are indivisible in the sense that we can
neither add to nor subtract from them any property
necessary to make such essences.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 159
The second remark is that to all essences may be
attributed the three following qualities : immutability,
necessity^ and eternity. But as this may be misunder-
stood, it is necessary to explain in what sense an es-
sence is immutable, necessary, and eternal. Essences
cannot be said to be immutable, necessary, and eternal
in the sense that they have a position and actual exist-
ence in themselves. Before they actually existed in
themselves they did not exist at all ; they were created
in time, and might, absolutely speaking, be destroyed.
Hence in this sense they are mutable, contingent,
and temporary. But they are said to be immutable,
necessary, and eternal in two ways: i. As to the
elements of which they are composed. These, as
we have said, are indivisible, inasmuch as we can
neither add to nor subtract from them, otherwise they
would not form the same essence. In this sense they
cannot change. Now, what is unchangeable is neces-
sary and eternal ; therefore essences, with regard to
the elements of which they are composed, are im-
mutable, necessary, and eternal. For instance, a tri-
angle is composed of three angles and three sides ;
' and hence at no time will it ever be possible that it
could have four angles and four sides and remain a
triangle.
2. Essences are immutable, necessary, eternal in-
asmuch as they are found positively in God's essence
and intellect, because wc know that in God are to be
found the archetypes of all things. Essences, there-
fore, inasmuch as they exist in the divine intellect, in
which are the archetypes of all things, are immutable,
necessary, and eternal. ,"•
But from the fact that essences, as to the elements
from which they result, and inasmuch as they are seen
by the divine intellect in God's essence, are immu-
table, necessary, and eternal, wc cannot infer that they
1 60 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
do or must actually exist in themselves outside the
essence of God. But the only inference we can draw
is that if they ever exist in themselves— :i thing de-
pending on the free-will of God — they must necessarily
be composed of such elements.
The last remark regards essences in relation to
their properties and action.
And, first, as to properties. These being so bound
up with the essence, it follows that by adding or sub-
tracting one of them the essence vanishes ; and, vice
versdy excluding the essence, the properties also van-
ish. This, of course, must be understood 0^ essential
properties.
With regard to the action, we remark that, the es-
sence being the most intimate and first principle of
action in a thing, these actions must be agreeable in
nature to the essence, because every being acts as it is.
If it were otherwise, the being would and would not
be such a being, which is a contradiction.
ARTICLE FOURTH.
Oti Existence.
Q. What is existence ?
A. The idea of existence is so simple that it can
hardly be defined. We shall treat of it as follows : We
have said that in God exist the archetypes of all es»
sences — that is to say, the idea of the elements of
which the essences of things must be composed ; and
we have remarked also that as snch they have no real
existence in themselves. But suppose God determines
to realize those ideas, and does so in fact ; in that case
the essences are actualized. This gives the idea of
existence, which may be defined that by which an
essence is brought out of nothing, or the realization
or actuality of an essence in itself.
CHAPTER III.
OF THE MANNER IN WHICH ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE
CO-OPERATE TO FORM A REAL BEING.
Q. How do essence and existence co-operate to
form a real being?
A. To have real being essence and existence are
necessary. This is proved as follows: First the es-
sence is necessary. The essence is that by which a
thing is what it is and is distinguished from all others ;
the radical, internal principle of all the properties and
actions of the thing — that which is manifested by the
idea of the thing. But all real being is something
in itself, by which something it is distinct from all
others ; it has properties and actions, and, conse-
quently, an internal principle from which its actions
proceed, and is necessarily possessed of a conception
peculiar to itself. Therefore in all real being the es-
sence is necessary.
Existence is also necessary. Existence is the act
of the essence, or that by which the essence is put
beyond the sphere of' possibility by having undergone
the action of the cause. But all essences of real being
must be actual and not potential ; they must have
passed from under the action of the cause, because
when a thing is under the action of the cause it is on
the way to existence, but does not as yet exist, and,
when it is in nothingness, is not real. Therefore
existence is necessary to real being.
We must remark here that essence and existence are
distinct in created beings, but not so in God. In fact, if
iSi
1 62 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
in creatures essence were the same thing as existence,
creatures would always exist by the necessity of their
nature. Because that is indispensable to them which
is required by their essence ; if, therefore, in the sup-
position their essence were the same as existence,
the latter would be indispensable to them, and hence
their existence would be necessary by the necessity
of their nature. But such a thing cannot be said of
creatures, which do not exist by the necessity of their
nature ; therefore in creatures essence is distinct from
existence.
2. If there were a creature in which essence were
not distinct from existence, to it we should naturally
attribute all that which belongs to being, as such. But
it does not become being, as such, to be an effect, be-
cause in that case every being would be an effect, and
God also. Therefore, if in creatures existence were
not distinct from essence, their being would not be
an effect ; in other words, they would no longer be
creatures.
But if essence and existence were distinct in all
beings, all beings would have an existence by acci-
dent ; all would be potential beings first before being
actual ; all beings would be produced without our
ever being able to find a necessary cause always in
act. But this would be a contradiction ; therefore we
must, on the other hand, admit the necessity of a
being in which essence and existence are not distinct,
and which may be the cause of all the others. This
is the uncreated Being. This will be better explained
in Theology.
Q. How are essence and existence distinguished ?
A. They cannot be distinguished as true parts of
a whole, because a part is not the whole. But the es-
sence is not a part of the substance but of the whole —
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 63
that is, of the whole substance. Therefore essence and
existence cannot be distinct from each as true integral
parts, nor concur to form the real being as parts form
the whole. Again, the part does not exhibit the idea
of the whole. But the essence exhibits the idea of
the whole being ; therefore essence cannot consti-
tute the real being as an integral part constitutes the
whole. They concur, therefore, as act and potenti-.
ality, because the act of the essence is existence. We
might also say that they concur as two acts, because
the essence is the act of being, inasmuch as it makes
it be such and no other ; existence is the act of being,
inasmuch as it draws it out of nothing and determines
it to the act.*
* St. Thomas. C0K/r , lib. ii. ch. 34.
itv.:-/ ■■■ ■.. . .. :, . .. . ,■,.. ; ., .. . ... . ■ . ■ . "
.k
CHAPTER IV.
• ., . . OJf THE PROPERTIES OF BEING.
ARTICLE FIRST.
• ■• V . Qn Unity.
Q. How can being have properties, and what can
they be ?
A. In the first place, the properties of being cannot
be something merely ideal or purely negative. Not
ideal, because that which is fashioned by the intellect
and has only a logical existence cannot be the property
of being. Not purely negative, because the idea of pro-
perty implies always something positive and real. On
the other hand, the idea of being is the most common
and universal, and comprehends everything in itself.
What, consequently, is there positive and real in
beings distinct from itself, which may answer as its
properties?
Nothing. Therefore if a property must be some-
thing positive, and if there can be nothing positive
which is not included in being, we must conclude that
the properties of being cannot be anything else than
being itself, inasmuch as it is affected either by some
negation or some other extrinsic relation which may
really be attributed to it. As to negation, this can-
not affect being, except in the sense that we deny of it
its being divided, because being, taken universally, does
not present this or that distinction ; hence we cannot
deny of it this or that particular thing, but only that
164
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 1 6 5
which is opposed to being, which is next to absolute
negation — that is, division, as we shall see.
Division alone, therefore, can be denied of being ;
and this negation of division constitutes the first
property of being, which is unity.
With regard to extrinsic relations, there cannot be
any others than those referring to the intellect and
to the will, because only the relation to the intellect
and to the will is common to all beings. But the
relation of being to the intellect is called truth, and
the relation of being to the will goodness ; therefore
the properties of being are no more than three —
unity, truth, and goodness. And they arise from being
in this order : first unity, next truth, and, finally,
goodness.*
Q. Explain the idea of metaphysical unity.
A. The first property of being, then, is unity. This
may be defined : TJiat property of being by which it is un-
divided in itself and divided from others.
This is called metaphysical unity, but to under-
stand it well it is necessary to carefully determine
it. First, it must not be confounded with numeri-
cal unity — to wit, that unity which is the measure
and principle of number. From this arise two,
three, four — that is, number ; but from metaphysical
unity no number can arise, at least directly, but only
being. Neither must we confound the property of
unity with that quality which makes a thing unique,
because the latter property implies that a thing is
sole, or that which excludes the existence of an equal
thing, whereas the former excludes a division of it-
* This natural m>stery of three distinct things in being, and which, though dis»
tinct from each other, cannot be anything else than one being, can only beexplained by
a higher and more sublime mystery, the principal dogma of our faith — the Trinity.
We shall develop this view in the internal evidences of Christianity in the second
volume of this work.
1 66 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
self. In a word, metaphysical unity adds nothing to
being, except the negation of its being divided. But
from this, however, we cannot deduce that the idea
of unity is a negative one. Also iinmefise, immortal,
immutable seem to express a negative, yet their idea
is positive ; likewise unity, which, after all, does not
imply anything else, except the same entity * of being,
inasmuch as it is not divided. We have added to the
definition that which divides it from others, so that
this unity implies two elements, that of being undi-
vided in itself and divided from others. The first is
necessary and essential to metaphysical unity ; the
second is a consequence of the first, because a being
is distinct from others, for the very reason that it is
in itself undivided.
Q. Prove that every being is one.
A. Everything is and is called being inasmuch as
it has an entity of its own. But that which has an en-
tity of its own does not contain more t' .n one being,
and is, therefore, in itself undivided ; and that which
has an entity of its own does not share it with others,
and is, therefore, distinct and divided from others, all
of which things are necessary conditions to establish
metaphysical unity ; therefore every being is one. 2.
Every being has an essence, by which it is restricted
to be this and not another. Now, to be restricted to a
particular existence means, first, to be confined and
restricted under special form, and not to be divided
into several entities ; besides, if it is restricted to a
special existence it is necessarily distinct and divided
from all others ; therefore every being is one.
3. Finally, a being is either simple or composite —
that is, either immaterial or material. If it be simple,
.* ' *'-'/! !• V • Word uied by Boitley. * ,'
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 6 7
it is undivided in itself, both actually and potentially,
and not only undivided but indivisible, and this by
necessity of nature. If it be composite, then it may
be divisible potentially ; but actually it is always un-
divided, because it does not possess its entity when its
parts are divided, but only when they are united;
therefore every being is itself undivided. Every being,
therefore, is one, and unity is convertible with being.
Q. What remarks must be made on the nature of
unity ?
A. We have said that the idea of metaphysical
unity implies two elements, indivision in itself and di-
vision from other beings — the first necessary and essen-
tial, the second a consequence of the first. Now, we
must make some remarks on both. As to the first, it
is clearly seen that unity, or indivision in itself, is a
perfection of being, and that a being is perfect in pro-
portion to its indivision, and for that reason we say
that the idea of unity is positive.
We have said, moreover, that unity is convertible
with being ; therefore it is different in proportion to
the difference of being. Now, beings may be simple
or composite ; therefore unity may be twofold : the
unity of simplicity^ which consists in a thing not only
being undivided actually, but in being altogether
indivisible ; the unity of composition, which agrees
with composite beings, and which implies actual
indivision and potential division — that is, though
actually undivided it may be divided. Again, this
composition may be essential or accidental — as, for
instance, the union of the body and soul is essential,
the union of many soldiers to form an army is acci-
dental ; hence two kinds of unity of composition,
natural and accidental.
This indivision, whether it belongs to composite or
1 68 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
simple beings, whether it agrees with them naturally
or accidentally, inasmuch as it is considered as really
corresponding to itself, is called identity. Wherefore
identity is, strictly speaking, the absolute conformity
of a being with itself; and only in a loose sense can
we call identity the conformity of one being with
another.
As to the other element of unity — that is, distinction
from other beings — this may be of different kinds and
has several degrees.
Distinction, like indivision, follows the condition of
being. Now, one being may be divided from another
either really or logically ; therefore the distinction of
one being from another may be of two kinds, logical
and real. It is logical when things are not really dis-
tinct from each other, but are so conceived and dis-
tinguished by the intellect ; for instance, in God his
essence and his attributes are not leally distinct, but
our intellect, the better to know them, considers them
separately by a logical distinction. Real is when a
thing is not really another; as, between cause and
effect there passes a real distinction. Both are of dif-
ferent kinds: the real is subdivided into substantial,
accidental, and modal ; the substantial is that which
exists between separate substances — for instance, be-
tween man and the brute, or between the principles
really distinct of a composite substance, as between
the soul and bod} , which are the principles forming
man.
Accidental and modal distinction is that which
exists between the substance and its modifications, or
between one accident and another and its modes.
Logical distinction is subdivided, in a twofold man-
ner, into purely mental or logical and into virtually
logical. The former occurs when the mind makes the
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 69
distinction without having any foundation in reality,
as if one were to distinguish man from reasonable
animal. The second is when it is made with some
foundation in reality, as when we distinguish in the
human soul the rational, the sensitive, and the vege-
tative principle, because, though the soul is but one
principle, it has yet these three faculties and affords
some foundation for that distinction.
Distinction may have different degrees, because
that which is different from another may be so more
or less, according as it is more or less conformable
with the other. Now, the limits of conformity or
non-conformity determine the degrees of distinction.
This gives rise to various notions, i. Things may be
distinct from each other as to the essence, inasmuch
as the essence of one is not the essence of the other,
and in this case they are called diverse^ and the dis-
tinction diversity. 2. Things may agree in the es-
sence or some other common feature, but vary as to
the manner in which the essence or the feature common
to both is found in each; and in this case those things
are called different, and the distinction difference. 3.
Or they may agree in the essence and in the determi-
nations of the essence, but vary as to their qualities;
and in this case they are called dissimilar, and the
distinction dissimilarity ; and if they agree, similar ^
and the agreement similarity. 4. If things agree in
essence, determination of the essence, and qualities,
but vary in quantity, they are called unequal^ and the
distinction inequality ; and if they are even in this,
equal, and the agreement equality. 5. Finally, if
things are considered as divided only in respect to
number, they are called distinct, and the division dis-
tinction, ., . , .... ..
1 70 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
ARTICLE SECOND.
On the Truth of Being.
Q. Give the idea of metaphysical truth.
A. In Logic we defined truth to be the conformity
or the agreement of things with the intellect. Now,
things may Lc regarded as related to the intellect in
two ways : either because they are produced by it, or
because they are merely the object of its apprehen-
sion. For instance, all natural things can be referred
to the divine intellect in the first manner, not only
inasmuch as they are known by it but also inasmuch
as they are created by it. They can be referred to the
human intellect only in the second manner, inasmuch
as they are known by it. From this arises the distinc-
tion of truth into metaphysical and logi«.d. Meta-
physical truth consists in the agreement of all natural
things with the divine intellect, on which they depend
for their existence. Logical truth consists in the
agreement of the conceptions of our intellect with the
things which those conceptions represent. Here we
treat merely of metaphysical truth, to establish which
two things are required : the entity of the thing which
is the foundation of truth, and its agreement with the
type existing in the divine intellect.
Q. What errors were maintained by Wolfius and
Locke with regard to the essence of metaphysical
truth?
A. Wolfius and his followers held that the formal
reason or essence of truth consists only in the entity
of a thing. Locke maintained that it lies in the
agreement of the real existence of things with the
ideas of our intellect. Both these opinions are false.
The first is false because, if the entity of a thing alone
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 171
established \\s truth, truth would not imply any rela-
tion, but would be altogether the same thing with
being, and hence entity and truth would be only two
words meaning the identical thing. But this conse-
quence is false by the admission of the Wolfians them-
selves, who teach that truth is not the thing itself,
but a transcendental property of being. Therefore
the essence of truth cannot consist in the entity of a
thing.
The second opinion is false. The essence of truth
cannot be placed in the agreement of things with an
intellect to which they are related only accidentally,
but witli an intellect to which they are necessarily and
essentially related. Now, things are related neces-
sarily and essentially only to the divine intellect, and
only accidentally to our intellect ; therefore the truth
of things must be found in their conformity with the
divine intellect.
Q. Prove that every being is true.
A. I. Every being is just what i is. But every
being is just what it is because God has thought to
make it so ; therefore every being is what God has
thought it to be, and, therefore, conformable with
the divine type.
2. If things did not correspond with the divine
archetypes after which God made them, we should
conclude that either he knew not or could not create
them just as he thought them out. But the first sup-
position is repugnant to infinite Wisdom ; the second,
to divine Omnipotence. Therefore all beings must be
conformable with the divine archetypes. Hence wich
reason was it said by the schoolmen that being and
truth are convertible terms — that is, that every truth is
being because the truth of things is founded upon
the entity of a thing, and every being is true be-
172 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
cause every being necessarily implies a relation with
the divine intellect.
Q. What remarks must be made on the nature of
truth? :■;. - •■ ,. ;.,
A. From what we have said it is clear that the
nature of metaphysical truth is such that it absolutely
excludes the contrary ; hence it would be abstird to
say thi there can be metaphysical falsehood, and if
we call anything false we do so only in a logical sense
— that is, it is true in itself, but we may misapprehend
it.
It is clear, in the second place, that truth is neces-
sary and universal, because all beings must necessa-
rily be related to their types which are in the divine
intellect; whereas logical truth is accidental, because
things are not necessarily and by their nature related
to our intellect, but, on the contrary, the latter is re-
lated to them. Finally, it is clear also that in meta-
physical truth the intellect is the measure of things,
because things have in themselves just what the intel-
lect has idealized and proposed to create ; on the con-
trary, in logical truth things are the measure of the
intellect, because the latter can know just what things
represent. Hence in metaphysical truth first comes
the operation of the intellect and next the thing ; in
logical truth first the thing and then the operation of
the intellect. , - . r •
Q. Is truth one or manifold ?
A. We must answer by making a distinction. If we
speak of logical truth, then it is not one but many ;
because logical truth is the agreementof the conception
of the intellect with the things which those concep-
tions represent ; therefore there can be as many logical
truths as there are things of which faithful conceptions
may be formed by the intellect. ,
Elements of Intellectual 'Philosophy, 173
If we speak of metaphysical truth, then we must dis-
tinguish again. If we look at truth in its formal rea-
son or essence, that which really makes it truth, then
it is only one ; because that which makes all being-:
true is their conformity with the divine intellect. Now,
this relation with the divine intellect is only one and
the same in all things ; therefore in this sense meta-
physical truth is one. If we look at truth in its
fundamental aspect — that is, at the entity of things
— as there are various entities, so we may say that
there are various truths. But it must be under-
stood that truth in the latter sense is only taken
improperly and analogically, and not in its true and
proper sense.
Q. Is truth necessary, immutable, and eternal ?
A. W^ must again distinguish. If we speak of
metaphysical truth, it is so, because this truth is, pro-
perly speaking, in the divine intellect. But everything
which is found in the divine intellect is necessary, im-
mutable, and eternal; therefore truth is necessary,
immutable, and eternal. But if we speak of logical
truth, then we must again distinguish. If it is ques-
tion of the truth of first principles and their most
immediate consequences, this is certainly necessary,
immutable, and eternal, because no one can be de-
ceived or change his opinion about them. But their
necessity, immutability, and eternity is like that of es-
sences, of which we have spoken. If we speak of those
truths which are discovered by reasoning, and are
deduced immediately from first principles, then the
conformity of our intellect with them may change, not
because what has been once conformable with things
may change in itself but because our intellect may dis-
miss it and turn to error. Hence in the sense ex-
plained we may say w'*^h Shakspere :
J 74 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
"s ) .. " Truth is truth to the end of reckoning";* t> '.V i f
or with Bryant :
" Truth crushed to earth shall rise again: If,,-, •, ; ■
The eternal years of God are hers." f
,/•(•,. . .1. .;?,t^i'n',"U» '>v.; ;.i.;.;:jf •(.iiUiiiiU'!;:.. •; i)..j ^r;, ,
'• • ' ' ARTICLE THIRD. ^' - ■'' it . j:*. ■ ; ' J/i .
Of the Goodness of Being.
.1 i,\ •
Q. Give an idea of the goodness of being.
A. Some have said that, formally speakir ^, good-
ness is the same as being. But if such were the case,
goodness would add nothing to being, and the idea of
both would be the same. Now,, this is false, because
either in speaking or thinking we distinguish these
two ideas from each other. Others have held that
the formal conception of goodness is the same as that
of perfection. This is also false, because we think a
being perfect by considering it alone by itself, and in-
asmuch as it does no't fail to have all those things
requisite for its essence, virtue, and operation, the
very things in which perfection consists. On the con-
trary, goodness always implies a relation to a ten-
dency of which it forms the proper object, because
that which a tendency yearns after is goodness. We
are obliged, therefore, to conclude that goodnesr, for-
mally and essentially considered, lies in its being
sought after by a tendency or appetitive faculty, and
it may therefore be defined: That property for which a
thing is sought after. •'' " '' -'^ ' <* - -. »
Q. How many kinds of goodness are there ?
A. Three kinds, metaphysical, physical, and moral.
The first consists in this, that a being is sought as
being in general ; the second, inasmuch as it is such a
V 'V.i * **■ »*.
• " Measure for Measure." ''i'iW^i^r- lUiVK V,li:i f Bryant's poems.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 171
being in particular ; the third, inasmuch as it is agree-
able with moral laws. We shall speak here only of
metaphysical goodness. • ; •
Q. Prove that every being is good. . . .
A. That this metaphysical goodness is the common
and necessary property of every being is proved thus :
The formal reason of the goodness of a being lies in
the fact that it may be sought after by an appetitive
tendency. But every being may be sought after by an
appetitive tendency ; therefore every being is good.
The major is apparent from the definition of goodness
we have already given. The minor is proved as follows :
A thing is appetible inasmuch as it is perfect, because
every being seeks and desires only its own perfection.
But every being, as being, is perfect, because every
being, as such, is in act, and a thing is called perfect
inasmuch as it is in act. Therefore every being is
appetible.
O. What remarks have you to make on the nature
of goodness?
A. I. It is clear from the reason just given that,
though goodness in its formal idea is distinct from
perfection and entity, it has yet a strict alliance
with both ; because every being is good inasmuch as
it is perfect, and is perfect inasmuch as it is being, so
that being is the foundation of the perfect, and the
perfect the ground-work of the good ; hence in order
being comes first, next the perfect, and last the good.
For this reason it is said that goodness is convertible
with being. ,,.:,. _..yT...M\, ■..:-■• v;;,'.V
■ ,. "t . -■ ■ <■ • . . ■
■ > II Q^Q truth is clear : whatever is, is right."
. «,' ' ; • — roPE.
2. As being may be either essential or accidental,
so metaphysical goodness may be either essential or
176 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
accidental. Essential goodness is that which is be-
coming to essences ; and as essences are incapable of
"rowth or decrease, so neither is essential goodness
capable of such change. Accidental goodness is capa-
ble of 'Tfovvth or decrease, because accident does not
constitute the essence, but is added to the essence
already constituted, as to be learned is accidental to
goodness, and therefore may be pable of increase
or diminution. 3. From this theory of the goodness
of being other most important corollaries follow in
relation to evil.
Evil is the opposite of good, and is defined : The
absence of a perfection required vt a being. For in-
stance, sight is required in man's body, and hence its
absence is a real evil. But if a perfection is not re-
quired by the nature of a being, its absence cannot be
called evil ; hence if a stone is not endowed with a
rational principle, this can nev6r be called an evil.
In this sense Pope has said :
" Then say not man's imperfect, Heaven in fault ;
Say rather man's as perfect as he ought :
His knowledge measured to his state and place,
His time a moment, and a point his space."
—Essay on Man.
From this it follows : i. That evil is not in itself an
entity. Every entity is good, because, as we have
said, good is convertible v/ith being. Now, evil is the
opposite of good ; therefore evil is the opposite of
entity, or the privation of being. 2. Evil is founded
and exists in good. If evil has no entity of its own, it
follows that it cannot exist in itself; therefore it
must exist in some being. But every being is good ;
therefore evil must exist in good. 3. Einl supposes a
cause^ and this cannot be hit a good. Evil is the pri-
vation and the absence of a certain perfection which
Elemenis of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 1 7 7
the nature of being requires and must have. But that
a certain being should be deprived of its natural per-
fection, this must originate in a cause which may draw
that being outside its disposition and order ; there-
fore evil supposes a cause. This cause must be good.
Because a nonentity cannot be cause, as it cannot act ;
if evil, therefore, must have cause, this must be an
entity. But good and entity are convertible ; there-
fore good is the cause of evil. 4. Good is the cause of
evil only accidentally. Every effect must have a pro-
portion and likeness with its cause ; therefore the
proper effect of good cannot be but good. If, there-
fore, sometimes it produces evil, this cannot be but by
accident. 5. Metaphysical evil, propounded by Leibnitz^
is an absurdity. Metaphysical evil, according to
Leibnitz, consists in the limitation of the creature, in-
asmuch as it cannot have other perfections than those
required by its essence and nature. Now, this is not
evil, because evil is the absence of a perfection re-
quired by the nature of a being. But perfections
which are not required by the nature of a being
are not due to it ; therefore their absence cannot be
an evil. Hence metaphysical evil, invented by Leib-
nitz and his followers, does not exist.
Q. What is the order of the transcendental proper-
ties of being?
A. They proceed from being in this manner: first is
unity, next truth, and, last, goodness. That unity
is the first transcendental property of being is evident
because it is absolute, ancf becomes being by itself
and not by any denomination to any exterior thing, as
truth, which implies a relation to an intellect ; and
goodness, which implies a relation to an appetitive
faculty. Now, the absolute is before the relative ;
therefore unity is before truth and goodness. Next
1 78 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
comes truth, because, i. Truth implies a relation to
an intellect, goodness to an appetitive faculty or a
will. But the intellect precedes the will; therefore
truth is before goodness. 2. Because goodness is, in
a certain manner, founded on truth; health, for in-
stance, to be good, must be real, true health, because
if it were false it could not be good health. Now, the
foundation of a thing precedes the thing itself; there-
fore truth is before goodness. From this, of course,
we must not conclude that the aforesaid properties are
really distinguishable from being; their distinction
from it being only logical, without a foundation in re-
ality. ,.•..-
' ' ' . . . . • • ' *
■ ' '• • ARTICLE FOURTH. ,7
The Beautiful.
Q. Why do you speak here of the beautiful, and
what is its definition ?
We speak here of the beautiful because it has such
close connection with unity, truth, and goodness.
Nov/, before giving the definition of the beautiful we
must distinguish three things about it : the formal
essence of the beautiful, its foundation, and its effect.
And, first, as to its foundation. The beautiful is
founded on goodness, because our soul cannot take
pleasure in anything except what it desires and craves
for. But our soul cannot crave except what it appre-
hends as good ; therefore our soul cannot take plea-
sure except in what it appllehends as good. Now, our
soul does take pleasure in the beautiful ; therefore it
must apprehend something good in the beautiful as its
foundation. '^^r. f>^M'<J"r^.: ;>>:>: ,,7,,:' li/v^iI^/ -.? ..ifs.,,.,
'• As to its effect, it is admitted by all philosophers,
and confirmed by the common sense of mankind, that
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 179
the effect of the beautiial consists in giving pleasure.
The simplest child, for instance, in looking at the sky
in its most magnificent apparel, in looking at a land-
scape, cries out, with pleasure beaming from its eyes,
Oh ! how beautiful, how charming. And what the
child does, so do the most consummate artists, as was
the case with Michael Angelo in the presence of the
Apollo of Belvedere, when he stood, day after day,
rapt in pleasure, contemplating that wonderful repre-
sentation of the human form divine, chiselled with
such admirable art and truth, which has not as yet
been surpassed ; the effect of the beautiful, therefore,
is to give pleasure.
As to its essence, the beautiful consists in variety
reduced to unity by order and proportion of the parts
with each other and with the whole.
Q. Explain the definition.
A. The beautiful consists, i, in variety y because if
we were to contemplate unity bare and naked, and no-
thing but unity, we should soon get tired and wearied
and turn a\vay from it in disgust.
2. In unity ; because if we saw a number of objects
without any connection or relation with each other,
the same effect would result : we should take no plea-
sure '\i\ contemplating them.
3. Order is required, because a number of objects
put together without any idea or principle regulating
their arrangement would present nothing but con-
fusion, and be not only unable to cause pleasure but
render impossible the unity required for the beautiful.
4. Proportion is required between the parts and the
whole. This proportion means that there should be
a kind of softening in the variety of each part, so as to
gently make way for the unity of the whole ; because
if the parts were kept in their decided, crude variety
, 1 80 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
unity could never be effected. But if, in the extremes
of each part, a softening of their variety is produced,
so that one part may, by its extreme being softened
down, ahiiost touch the extreme of the other part, also
softened down, the unity is gently procured without
disturbing the variety of the parts. If the extremes
of these parts could not be softened down, their
nature not permitting it, then between one part and
another a third must be placed, of such nature as to
answer for the keeping of the proportions required to
result in unity. To illustrate this theory about pro-
portion we may make use of the parts of creation, the
best representation of the beautiful. God has created
spiritual beings and sensitive beings, living and inani-
mate beings. Had he kept the variety of each of
these species in their crude state, so to speak, thfe har-
mony and the beauty of creation would have been
marred in consequence of the too great contrast be-
tween them. But God put an intermediate species
between each to soften down the contrast and make
way for the unity of the whole. Hence between the
purely spiritual species and the sensitive God has
placed man, partaking of the spiritual and the sensible
softened down in him ; between the sensitive beings,
such as animals, and the living beings, such as plants,
God has placed a kind of animal endowed with one
sense, and that very dull, so as to approach the two
species together, such as the polypus and all corallines ;
between the living beings or plants and the inanimate
God has placed something which seems to be border-
ing between the plant and the animal, such as the fungi,
under which name botanists comprehend also a large
number of microscopic plants forming the appearances
called mouldiness, mildew, smut, rust, brand, etc.
Q. How is the beautiful divided? ^" " t-f '^f
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 1 8 1
A. The beautiful is divided into natural, artificial,
and moral ; and the natural is subdivided into spiritual
and corporal.
The beautiful natural is that which is found in every
being and in the whole assemblage of created beings
forming the universe. That in every being we find a
variety reduced to unity by order and proportion is
evident ; because, first, every nature is composed of
different principles, which are so connected together
by order and proportion as to make a beautiful whole.
Take, for instance, man. He is composed of body
and soul : the body consists of motive, vegetative, sen-
sitive faculties; the soul of intellectual and volitive
faculties. The motive faculties are subject to the
vegetative, then to the sensitive. The variety of the
senses is brought into unity by what is called a com-
mon sensorium. These are brought into communica-
tion with the intellectual faculties by means of the
imagination, which is, as it were, a faculty akin to the
senses and to the intellect. The will governs all these
faculties.
"The elements
So mixed in hitn that Nature mijjht stand up j
And say to all the world, • 7'his is a man.'' "
— Shakspere,
That the same variety reduced to unity by order
and proportion is admired in the universe is too evi-
dent to need any demonstration ; therefore we may
conclude that every being is beautiful.
The spiritual beautiful is that which is admired in
spiritual beings ; the corporal that which is admired in
corporal beings. • „ ... ^x v,.. t^ .:.■,. -..- . •.^,' v-> N-wimrf-
The artificial beautiful is that which is produced by
human genius and art, and must consist of the same
1 8 2 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
elements — that' is, variety reduced to unity by order
and proportion.
The moral beautiful consists in the conformity of
the human actions with the eternal principle of right.
We must remark in general, in support of the theory
of the beautiful given above, that in works, either of
nature or art, where the variety is made of objects
forming each one a whole by itself, and, as it were,
independent, the unity cannot be found as actually
existing in them in a material sense, but results from
the order and proportions of the parts, which all are
made to conspire in l-epresenting and expressing an
idea intended by the artist. Thus in the universe we
cannot find a material unity, as it is made up of a
numberless variety of objects, each forming an indi-
viduality by itself. But all conspire", by their order
and proportion in being and in action, to show forth
the grandeur and the infinite excellence of the Creator,
the idea which God intended to express.
The same must be said of artificial beauty. When in
the productions of art the variety is made up of indi-
vidual objects, each forming a whole by itself, the
unity which must be sought in such productions can
only be ideal ; that is, the artist must so choose its
objects, and arrange and dispose them in such a man-
ner, and put such proportion between them that they
naturally suggest the idea he wanted to incorporate.
Take, /or instance, the " Last Judgment" of Michael
Angelo in the Sistine Chapel. The great artist could
not put in such a picture a material unity, as it is formed
of a great number of objects having an individuality of
their own. But he so chose and arranged each ob-
ject that they all conspire in representing the dread-
ful horror of that day — the idea which he wanted to
express. This he has attained by representing the
Elcfnents of Intellectual Philosophy. 183
Judge with such dread majesty on his countenance,
by surrounding that majesty with such an array of
angels and saints, themselves in awe and almost
trembling, and by a multitude of horror-stricken
wretches awaiting that judgment, that tlie beholder is
at once impressed with the idea of the artist and
almost feels the horror of that day subduing his soul.
The second remark is that, as we have sho\Vn every
being, as such, to be beautiful, it follows that being
is convertible with the beautiful, and that an object is
beautiful in the same proportion as it is a being, and
that consequently the Supreme Being is the supreme
beauty, which beauty in him consists in the infinite
variety of his attributes, reduced to infinite simplicity
of his essence, or rather, as the Christian revelation
teaches us, in the mystery of the Trinity, which is vari-
ety of persons and unity of essence, the supreme type
of all beauty. But enough of the beautiful.
Q. Say a word on the sublime.
A. Being may oftentimes by its fulness seem to
transcend our capacity of apprehension and the
ordinary limits of other beings. Then we are accus-
tomed to call it sublime. Hence the true foundation
of the sublime is the infinite, which alone has natu-
rally no limit ; and in proportion as beings approach
more or less the infinite they assume more or less the
/:haracters of the sublime. Hence it follows that in
the works of art the sublime is obtained by the ideal
and the indeterminate, which, by leaving the object
expressed not deprived of its entity, but in a kind of
ideal and indeterminate condition, enhance its grandeur
before our imagination.
Such is the definition which God gave of himself to
Moses, " I am who am," which has been called sublime
by all the geniuses of mankind. Such is the descrip-
1 84 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
tion of Satan by Milton, etc. The sublime is of
three kinds, because being may transcend the limits
of our capacity of apprehension by its entity, by its
force, by its extension as to duration and grace. If
the being transcend the limits by its nature, then it is
called the sublime ontological ; if by its force, the sub-
lime dynamic ; if by its duration or space, the mathe-
matical sublime.
1 I.'
CHAPTER V.
ON THE CAUSES OF BEINGS.
ARTICLE FIRST.
On the Nature and Idea of Cause.
Q. Why do we treat of the cauiies of being, and
what order shall we follow in speaking of them ?
A. The idea of cause has such connection with that
of being that the mind, in reasoning upon one, cannot
pass over the other ; because every being is either
cause or caused^ hence the idea of cause always follows
being. Hence, having spoken of the properties of
being, we must now speak of its causes. And to give
an orderly and adequate idea of them we shall first
give an idea of cause and of its nature ; 2, of its diffe-
rent species; 3, of the relations they have with their
effects and with themselves.
Cause is understood to be the principle of a thing ;
hence it takes ordinarily the name of principle. But,
strictly speaking, the idea of cause is different from
that of principle. Principle, in its strictest accepta-
tion, means merely something from which another
thing proceeds in any manner whatever. Cause means
something upon which another thing depends as to its
being. Hence the idea of cause implies a certain de-
pendence and inferiority of being in the thing which
is caused, whereas the idea of principle does not imply
a dependence or inferiority of being as regards the
thing proceeding from it.*
♦ Hence the Church calls the Father in God the principle of His Son, but not the
rnnse, because the Son is perfectly equal to the Father in nature and attributes, and
in no way inferior to Him.
185
1 8 6 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
Hence it is apparent that the idea of cause, i, is
narrower than that of principle, because every cause
is principle, but not every principle is cause. 2. Cause
implies always a real and positive influx upon the
being which depends upon it, and which is called
effect. 3. Cause, at least in nature if not in time, is
conceived always before the effect. After all these
remarks we may define cause to be that ivhich posi-
tively concurs in tJie being of a thing. Hence the idea
of cause is always relative, implying a necessary rela-
tion to that thing to the being of which the cause has
concurred.
The term of this relation, as we have said, is called
effect. From this relation arise those principles of
immediate evidence ; Every effect supposes a cause ;
No being can be the cause of itself; All that ivhich
is contained in the effect must be found in the causey
etc.
Q. What was Hume's error as to the idea of cause?
A. Hume asserted that the idea of cause has no
objective value ; that is to say, that it does not repre-
sent a real thing. He proved his assertion thus : Ob-
servation is the only source of our knowledge ; but
observation cannot give us the idea of cause ; there-
fore the idea of cause is not objective. He proved
his minor thus : Cause implies a connection with the
effect; now, observatioi merely manifests a succes-
sion of facts in nature, but not their connection;
therefore observation cannot give the idea of cause.
He concludes from this that the principle of causality
— that is, that every effect must have a cause — is a
prejudice of our mind.
Now, how absurd this opinion is every one can see
by himself, and we could easily pass it unnoticed, as
it is founded on that principle that all our knowledge
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy, 187
is derived from observation, which principle we shall
prove to be utterly false. Yet we shall make a few
remarks upon it the better to illustrate the idea of
cause. We say, in the first place, that the idea of
cause is objective. Hume admits that the idea of
cause would be objective if observation not only mani-
fested to us a succession but also a connection in
natural facts. Now, such is the case ; therefore the
idea of cause is objective. The minor is proven by
the following reasons : Succession implies the idea of
one thing following another, connection the idea of one
thing springing or proceeding from another. Such is
the difference between succession and connection.
Now, observation, manifests not only many things
following one another, but also many things springing
and proceeding from othtrs. In fact, we have our
senses, sight, hearing, taste, and we know that they
were given us for an object — the sight to see, the ears
to hear, and the palate to taste — and we use them
whenever we wish to feel their action or effect.
Again, everybody feels that when he wants to talk
he talks, and when he wants to move he moves, and if
he wants to be at rest he can do so at once. We feel,
therefore, that these facts are not only things which
follow one after the other, but which spring and ori-
ginate one from the other.
Besides, to feel that a certain thing is wholesome
and another hurtful does not exceed the power of ob-
servation, as it Is manifest to all mankind. But this
implies that we can feel that one thing proceeds
from another; therefore observation manifests to us
not only the succession but the connection of facts.
When we eat, for instance, something unwholesome,
and we feel a certain effect from it injurious to our
health, we certainly observe the connection between
1 8 8 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
the eating of that thing and the injurious effect result-
ing thereby, and not merely the succession of one
thing after the other, because we feel that that injuri-
ous effect only follows the eating of that particular
thing; hence we feel their connection.
Now, nothing more, even according to Hume, is nec-
essary to render the idea of cause objective ; therefore
that idea is objective. This we have said, confining
ourselves within the limits of observation, and we add
that our mind, by observing from all these facts and
depriving them of their particular circumstances, forms
the general idea of cause and of effect.
If, then, the idea of cause is objective, it is evident
that what Hume asserts about the principle of causali-
ty — that it is a prejudice of our mind — is false ; because
if a certain reality correspc^ds to the idea of cause —
that is, a thing which really concurs to the existence
of another — it is clear that we can argue rightly from
the existence of the effect to the existence of the
cause.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Of the va'/ious Causes; and, first, of Material and
' Formal Causes.
Q. How many kinds of causes are there ?
A. We have defined cause to be that which concurs
positively to the existence of a thing. Now, four are
the principles which can concur in the existence of
anything; therefore there are four kinds of causes.
Of these four principles two are intrinsic and two ex-
trinsic. The two intrinsic principles, speaking of ma-
terial things, are the matter and the form, both of
which are necessary to constitute composite beings.
Elemen is of Intellectua I Ph ilosophy, 1 8 9
But matter could not have its form if this were not
given to it by an exterior agent, and this exterior agent
would not act except prompted by an end in view.
Therefore, besides the matter and the form, two exte-
rior agents concur in the existence of a thing, the ex-
terior agent and the end which moves it. These,
then, are the four causes: the material (matter), the
formal (form), the efficient cause (the agent), and the
final cause (the end). And as in any given effect of
the kind we are speaking of we first observe the
material cause, then the formal, and afterwards the
agent and the end, so we shall speak first of the
material and formal causes, and then of the other
two.
Q. What is the causality of matter and form ?
A. Matter, or the material cause, is nothing but that
thing out of which something is shaped ; for instance,
the log or block out of which a sculptor makes a
statue is called the material cause. The figure or
shape which the sculptor gives it is called the for-
mal cause. But it is to be remarked that the cau-
sality of matter and form does not consist in any action
which they may perform, because whosoever performs
an action is called agent ; hence action cannot be predi-
cated of the material or formal cause, but of the effi-
cient cause. The causality, therefore, of matter and
form cannot consist in an action. If it does not con-
sist in an action, then their causality lies in their entity,
being used by the agent to form composite beings. To
this causality corresponds a double effect depending
one upon another. The first is proper to each, and it
is for matter to hold the form and for the form to ter-
minate and shape the matter. The second is common
to both, and is the whole composite resulting from the
union of both.
190 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
Q. What is meant by intrinsic and extrinsic form ?
The form, before it is appHedto matter, has another
mode of existence in the efficient cause, and this other
mode is so ncxessary to the form, and has such strict
connection with it, that it could never be applied to
matter if it did not previously exist in the agent. For
it is the agent that must produce such a form on the
matter. But the agent could never intend to intro-
duce such form in the matter if the similitude of that
form were not already existing in him, because none
can give what he has not; therefore there must be
the similitude of the form in the agent. This, inas-
much as it is considered as having to be introduced in
matter, is called extrinsic form to distinguish it from
that which is really introduced in matter, and which is
called intrinsic.
This extrinsic form may be of two kinds, because it
is of such a nature as are the agents in which it is
found. Now, agents may be of two kinds, because they
are distinguished by the manner of their acting, which
may be either byway of nature or by way of intellect.
Hence natural agents and intellectual agents. Like-
wise the extrinsic form is distinguished in two ways
according to agents, by nature, or by intellect ; in those
agents which act by nature the form is found accord-
ing to natural being, as in man when he generates man,
in fire which engenders fire ; in those agents that act
by intellect it is found according to the intelligible
being, as the similitude of a building is in the mind of
the architect. But as agents by nature do not of
themselves intend to introduce the form, but are led
and guided by those who act by intellect, as the arrcw
reaches the mark because it is thrown by the archer,
so agents by nature may be considered rather as in-
struments of the agents by intellect ; hence the name
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 9 1
of extrinsic form has been applied more properly to
the form of the effect which exists in the intellect
of the agent. Taken in this sense, it has been defined
thdit form by looking at which the artist zvorks. This
has received the name of exemplary cause, because, as
it is apparent, it concurs in the production of the effect,
serving as model and example. It was also called
idea, and received for the first time that name by
Plato, and from it the name of idea was applied to
that which serves as means of knowledge.
But one must carefully remark the difference which
exists between them. Both agree in this : that they
are a similitude of something existing in the intellect,
but are distinguished by these several heads: I. The
idea which makes us understand objects is not the
object of our knowledge, but a means by which
the intellect perceives things. On the contrary, the
exemplary cause is not the means but the object at
which the mind of the agent looks. 2. The first does
not always belong to the practical intellect, whereas the
second always does, being intended to be outwardly
expressed. 3. The first has no connection either with
the efficient or the final cause; but the exemplary
cause has, because it has connection with the efficient
cause, inasmuch as it determines and euides the acrent
in its operation. It has connection with the final
cause, in the sense that the end of the agrent is nothing
more than the reproduction of that form.
ARTICLE THIRD.
On Efficient Cause.
Q. Define an efficient cause.
A. The form, as we have said, would not be given
to matter but for the action of the efficient cause.
192 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
This may be defined : That extrinsical principle from
which primarily and properly the movement of the ac-
tion begins. It is called extrinsical principle to distin-
guish the efficient cause from the material and formal
causes, which are intrinsic principles. We have added
frojH zuhich the movement of the action primarily begins^
to distinguish the efficient from the final cause ; be-
cause, though we may say in a certain sense that from
the end everything that regards the causing of some-
thing takes its rise, yet, strictly speaking, the move-
ment of the action begins primarily in the agent, and
the end does nothing more than to excite the agent
to begin the movement. Finally, we have added /r^
perly to distinguish the efficient cause from the sim-
ple occasional cause, from which oftentimes the action
begins, but does not properly proceed from it.
Q. What subjects can be really efficient causes?
A. Malebranche, and many Cartesians with him, are
of opinion that to be really efficient cause can be said
of God only, who alone can really act. Creatures, on
their part, do nothing more than present to God the
occasion for acting, but in themselves are really devoid
of activity. This opinion was called occasionalism, be-
cause it denies to the creature all real activity, and
makes them exhibit only the occasion for God to act
in them.
3. Now, this opinion is false and contains several ab-
surd things. In fact, that it is not impossible that the
creature should have the power of acting can be demon-
strated as follows : If such a thing involved any repug-
nance, it ought to involve it ' .her on the part of God
or on that of the creature, liut it does not involve
repugnance on the part of either; therefore it is not
impossible that creatures should really act.
To act follows to_ be, and is proportionate to the
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 1 93
amount of being. This can be seen in God Himself, to
whom occasionalists allow the oower of acting, because
God acts as He is, and the power of acting is in pro-
portion to His being, and that kind oi poivcr becomes
Him because that (^^/«^ becomes Him. Hence to act
becomes Him, because to be becomes Him. But crea-
tures have a being ; therefore it is not repugnant on
their part that they should have the power of acting.
It is not repugnant on the part of God, because if
God could communicate to creatures their being, why
could not He also communicate them the power of
acting?
2. The principal reasons which occasionalists al-
lege to show that impossibility are derived from two
heads: i. God being a most perfect cause, it in-
volves a contradiction that there should be other
efficient causes besides Him; 2, because God can by
Himself produce all the effects which take place in the
world. If acts, therefore, all other causes are useless.
As to the first reason, if that principle were true we
might conclude from it that not only is it impossible
that any creature should act but that any creature should
exist. God is a most perfect being ; therefore it is
impossible that there should be other true beings be-
sides Him. But as it is not impossible that besides the
most perfect infinite being there should be other true
finite beings created bv the former, likewise it is not
impossible that besides that first and most perfect
Cause there should be other causes created by the
former. On the contrary, the opposite opinion would
involve a contradiction ; because as God's perfection
would not be infinite if He could not give existence to
other things outside Himself, so His action would not
be infinite if He could not communicate it to others.
And this, far from implying necessity or insufficiency on
194 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
His part, would be a sign and an effect of His immense
perfection and goodness, by which He can communi-
cate His similitude not only as to being but also as to
action.
With regard to the second reason, if this were of any
value we could turn it againsi the occasionalists, be-
cause God is fully sufficient, to act all alone by Himself,
and, in that case, not only the action of creatures would
become usehss, but also the occasions, since He could
produce all sorts of effects without waiting for us to
present Him with occasions. Why should God wait,
for instance, that I should put water in my m.outh, in
order to take occasion to quench, by His own ac-
tion alone, my thirst? Could he not do that Himself
without waiting for that occasion? Besides, even
granting that God could do all by Himself, ye<- for '
all that secondary causes would not be useles;-; ; be-
cause, as St. Thomas teaches, it is against the idea of
wisdom that there should be anything useless in the
works of the wise. Now, if created things did not
act in the production of effects, but all was done by
God Himself, he would employ other things to pro-
duce effects uselessly and without reason. By admit-
ting secondary causes, of course, we do not mean to
attribute to them an infinite virtue ; nor is this nec-
essary to the idea of cause, as Malebranche contends.
We say that everything has the power of acting pro-
portionate to its being. But to the creature we
attribute a being, therefore a power acting propor-
tionate to that being.
3. Finally, if the opinion of the occasionalists were
true, God would be the real uithor of all the crimes
which are committed in the worlc, as He would be the
only real agent, which is absurd.
Gathering all we have said together, we say that
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 1 9 5
the nature of cause can be attributed to all those
things which liave being, and can be attributed to
them in the S3me degree and proportion as being;
and because being properly becomes the substance, of
substance alone, therefore, may we predicate the name
of cause. Hence the truth of that saying of St.
Thomas, that every substance has the power of acting.
Q. How niany species of efficient causes are there?
A. The nature of cause lies in, this: that it is a prin-
ciple from which the movement of the action proceeds ;
therefore there are different causes in consequence of the
difference of the movement and the action. But every
movement may be different from two heads, either
from its nature or from its term ; consequently,
causes may differ either in consequence of the nature
of their action, or in consequence of the effect or term
which they produce. As to the manner of acting, the
cause may he: principal or instrumental. The principal
cause is that which acts by itself — not moved by an-
other nor used as a means by another cause ; as, The
artist is the principal cause of his work. Instrumental
cause is that which is used as a means by the principal ;
as, The brush and the colors in the hand of the
painter, which do something, and hence they are called
cause ; but as they cannot do that something without
being handled by the painter, they are, therefore, called
instrumental causes.
2. Free and necessary cause. A free cause is
that which acts with deliberation and choice, as mas-
ter of its action, as the will of man in respect to par-
ticular goods. A necessary cause is that which is im-
pelled to act by the force of its nature, and which does
not regulate its act by deliberation, as all the action
of natural agents inferior to man.
3. First and secondary cause. The first is that
1 9 6 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
which admits of no other cause preceding it, such as
God in respect to all created causes. Secondary is
that which is moved by the primary cause, such as all
creatures relatively to God.
4. Cause by itself and by accidctit. The cause by
itself is that which does that to which it is destined
by its own nature, as for fire to burn, for man to rea-
son. Cause by accident is when to the natural effect
of a cause another effect is added accidentally con-
nected with it ; afj, for instance, a man digging the
foundation of a house finds a treasure. The actual
effect of the man's action is the digging, but accident-
ally the other effect is connected with it.
On the part of the effect, efficient causes may be
univocal, equivocal^ aftalogous. The cause is called
univocal when it produces an effect like to itself in
species, as in the case of the generation of animals
which engender an animal of the same species as them-
selves. It is called equivocal when it produces an ef-
fect similar to the cause as to genus, as the sun in re-
spect to its effects. It is called analogous when the
cause does not agree with the effect either as to spe-
cies or genus, but yet has a certain likeness with it, as
God in respect to His creatures.
Proximate and remote. Proximate is that which
produces the effect immediately, remote when it pro-
duces it by means of other causes.
ARTICLE FOURTH.
On Final Cause.
Q. What is the nature and definition of final cause ?
A. The efficient cause would not be moved to act
but for the final cause. The end can be defined : That
for the sake of which something is done, or that at
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 1 9 7
which one aims in acting. This shows the difference
of the final from all other causes. The mu.ter is that
out of which something is made, the form is that
which gives it figure and shape, the agent is that
which makes it, and the end is that for which it is
made, and is called the end because, having obtained
it, the action terminates and the agent rests.
That the end is a true cause is clear from consider-
ing that it concurs positively in the production of
something by determining the agent and moving it to
act.
. The nature of its causality, besides, consists in
moving the tendency of the agent and in arousing the
wish of the agent to attain it, because, as the influx
of the efficient cause consists in acting, that of the
final cause is in being wished for.
The way by which the final cause acts is by exhi-
biting its goodness, true or seeming. This is ex-
pressed by Pope so elegantly :
" Modes of self-love the passions wc may call :
'Tis real good, or siemingy jiioi'cs them all."
— Essay on Man,
Because every being wishes its own perfection. But
the perfection of a being is its good ; therefore the
end, in order to excite a desire for itself, must show
itself as the good and the perfection of the agent.
Q. On what being can the end exercise its influ-
ence, and for what being is it becoming to have an
end?
A. To act for an end becomes all beings, of what-
ever nature they may be ; be they endowed with
knowledge or not, be they spiritual or material, all
beings must aim at an end.
Q. Prove this.
198 Eleme7tts of Intellectual Philosophy.
A. First proof : From what we have said of causes
we see that by necessity of nature they are subject to
this order : the matter does not receive its form ex-
cept it is given it by the agent, and the agent is not
moved to give that form except when determined
hy an end, because if it were not determined by an
end to a certain special effect, there would be no
reason why it should produce one effect in preference
to another ; therefore once we take away the end,
neither efficient cause aor formalTs possible, and con-
sequently no effect can be obtained.
2. Agents are either free or necessary causes ; but
it is clear that free agents are induced to act by an
end, because, being free, they are indifferent to act or
not to act, to act in this or in another way, to act this
or the contrary way, and the end alone can determine
them to a choice. Necessary agents arc called so be-
cause they are by nature determined and necessitated
to act. Now, this determination comes to them from
the end ; therefore every agent aims at an end.
But it is to be observed that not all agents aim at
an end in the same manner. This depends upon their
nature. Every being acts according to its nature.
But agents are different by nature ; therefore they
aim at an end in a different manner. In fact, all the
agents in nature may be divided into three classes.
Some are gifted with reason and intellect, by which
they cannot only apprehend the end but also see how
it befits their nature, and can discover the aptitude of
the means which exist in order to obtain it. Others
are without intellect, but are endowed with senses, by
which they may apprehend the end at which they may
aim, but cannot see the relation which exists between
it and their nature, nor the aptitude of the means to
obtain it. Finally, others have neither intellect nor sense,
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 199
and cannot apprehend the end at all, as the arrow
which goes to the mark. The first have a perfect
knowledge of the end, and can reason upon the means
to be chosen, and heive no need that any one should
direct them to it, but being, in force of their reason
and will, masters of their acts, go to their end by them-
selves ; and of such, strictly speaking, it is said that they
aim at an end. The second, knowing by the way of
the senses the end, and apprehending it somewhat,
aim at it in a certain way, but according to the man-
ner of their knowledge, that is, instinctively, urged by
nature, and not perfectly by themselves, as they have
not the mastery of their acts. Finally, those that
have neither sense nor intellect are not moved by
themselves to seek the end by an intellect external
to them.
Q. How many different ends may there be ?
A. The nature of the end lies in this : that it must be
intended by the agent as the term of its tendency and
operation. Therefore it may be different, according
to the different way of intending it as a term. Hence
it may be proximate, intermediate, and ultimate :
proximate if it is the first and immediate term of
the tendency : ultimate if it is the very thing which
the agent intends to cease operation and rest after ;
intermediate if it is a term of the tendency, but
neither proximate nor last.
2. Principal and accessory. The first is that which
is principally aimed at by the agent, and hence this
is the principal term of the tendency. The second is
that which is sought by the agent along with the
principal, but not so that, if it could not be attained,
the agent would cease to seek the principal.
End of the action and end of the agent. The
first is the natural term of the action, as the end of
200 Elements of hitellcctual Philosophy.
the act of singing is to sing. The second is that
which the agent proposes to himself, as a singer might
propose to himself riches or delight.
Objective and subjective. Objective is the ob-
ject which is sought for. Subjective is the use to
which the agent intends to put the object.
ARTICLE FIFTH.
Of the Relation of Cause:: ivith their Effects and among
Themselves.
Q. How many are the relations which causes may
have ?
A. Relation arises from the respect which one thing
has to another. Now, a cause may be considered in
respect to its own effects or to another cause with
which it is connected. Therefore causes may have
relations cither with their own effects or with other
causes ; and we must speak first of the one and then
of the other.
Q. What are the relations which a cause may have
with its own effects?
A. That a cause has relation with its own effects is
clear from all we have said with regard to the idea of
cause and effect ; for we have seen that between cause
and effect there is not merely succession but a neces-
sary connection, and that the effect cannot possibly
exist without receiving its being from the cause. A
necessary consequence flows from this, namely, that
between the effect and its cause there is a necessary
and true relation, which consists in the effect depending
as to its being upon its cause. Also from this neces-
sary dependence of the effect upon its cause three
other relations arise which will better illustrate its
idea. Wherever several beings are connected to-
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 2 o i
gether it is necessary that we should find these three
other things r a relatioit of order, htcdiXxsQ conniction
implies order, a certain location of the parts cc inect-
ed in view of an end ; a relation of naturf, because
things, in order to be connected, should have a certain
natural affinity ; a relation of dignity, because where
there is dependence and connection among a number
of beings it is necessary that one should be more
noble than the other. The relation, therefore, of de-
pendence of the effect upon its cause gives rise to
three other relations, that of order, of nature, and of
dignity. We shall speak of each separately.
With regard to the relation of order, this must con-
sist in the priority of the cause with regard to its
effect; because if the effect depends as to its being
upon the cause, a relation of order in this case can-
not consist in anything else except that the cause
must be before the effect. But it must be remarked
that this priority may be of two kinds, priority of
time and priority of nature. The first consists in the
one being temporarily before the other ; the second
consists in this: that though cause and effect may be
supposed to exist simultaneously, yet the cause must
be conceived always first, inasmuch as the effect could
not exist without it. With regard to the priority of
nature, there is no doubt that the cause is always be-
fore the effect. But with regard to priority of time
we must remark that we may consider the cause only
as a certain being in itself, irrespectively of any rela-
tion to any effect, or we may consider it as merely a
cause. If we consider it in the first sense, it is clear
that it can exist before the effect ; and this is not
impossible, especially in what are called successive
causes, in which case it is necessary that the cause
which produces by way of movement and possession
202 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
should exist previously to the effect. In the second
case the cause cannot exist before the effect ; because a
thing is called a cause inasmuch as it produces an effect ;
therefore it cannot possibly be called a cause before
actually producing the effect.
With regard to the relation of affinity or proportion,
this consists in a certain similitude which the effect
must have with its cause ; because the effect, so to
speak, is an emanation of the cause — something
drawn, as it were, from the cause, since no being
gives what it has not. Now, all this necessarily im-
plies "a similitude between the effect and its cause ;
therefore there must be a similitude between the ef-
fect and the cause. This similitude, however, varies
in proportion as the effect is more or less adequate
to the activity of the cause. From this arises the
distinction of effects into univocal, equivocal, and
analogous, which we have already defined above.
With regard to the relation of dignity, we must
observe that it is different in proportion to the manner
according to which the cause concurs in the effect.
Now, to determine this the following remarks are to be
kept in view: If the question is about material and
intrinsic formal causes, they are less noble than their
effect, because the part is less noble than the whole ;
but material and formal causes act as the part towards
the formation of the whole, therefore they are less
noble than their effect. We have said the intrinsic
formal causes, because the extrinsic formal cause —
that is to say, the exemplar and -type which is in the
mind of the artist — may be more noble than the ef-
fect, as are all the types of things existing in the di-
vine mind. If it is a question of the principal final
cause in agents who act according to order, it is al-
ways more noble than the effect, because no man who
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 203
acts according to order will spend more in order to
get what is less, nor employ what is more noble to
attain what is less so. Now, the effect with regard to
the end is like a means to an end ; therefore in one
who acts according to order the end is always nobler
than the effect. If it is a question of the efficient
cause, it is either more noble than the effect or equal
to it, because the cause is either univocal or equivocal.
If it is univocal, it is equally as noble as the effect,
which belongs to the same species ; if it is equivocal,
it is nobler than the effect, because the effect in this
case belongs to a species inferior to the cause.
Q. What is the relation of causes among them-
selves ?
A. A relation always means connection ; therefore
we can have relation between causes only when we
can find 1 hem connected together to obtain an effect.
Beside^, a connection between two things may be
either proper or accidental. We intend to speak here
of the proper connection. This relation between
causes may be of order, of nature, and of dignity,
as we have said of the relations of causes with their
effects.
Of the relation of nature among causes we think
we have said enough already when we spoke of the
proportion which the nature of the final cause must
have with the efficient cause, and the proportion
which the agent must have with the formal cause, and
this with the material. We shall speak of the relation
of order and dignity.
As to the relation of order, we may distinguish be-
tween causes of the same nature from those of a dif-
ferent nature. The first are those which belong to the
same kind, but are all ordained and bound together to
produce the same effect ; for instance, a number of
204 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy .
efficient causes bound together so that one depends
upon the other, and all produce something. The
second are those belonging to difTcront kinds, as the
final, the efficient, the formal; etc., which are different,
but still one depending upon the other.
Now, if the causes be of the same nature, and are, in
themselves, in proper order, whatever other accidental
order may be found among them, it is always neces-
sary that there should be a first and a last one in that
order, and that we should not have a progression ad
infinitum; because, in such a case, in order to obtain
the effect it is necessary that the action of one cause
should pass to another, and from this to a third, and
so on, till we have the effect. Hence if the series of
such causes were infinite, the action and the move-
ment should have to go through an infinite series to
reach the effect. But the infinite, as such, cannot be
outstepped ; therefore we cannot admit an infinite
series of causes.
Besides, in a series of causes naturally in order the
first is the cause of the second, this of the third, and so
on. Take away, therefore, the first cause and you take
away also the last, for the same reason. But in an
infinite series we cannot find a first cause, because
otherwise it would be finite ; and, on the other hand,
without the first there would be no middle, and con-
sequently no last, cause, therefore no effect at all.
Hence, in causes of themselves well arranged there
cannot be an infinite series, but there must be a first
and a last. Therefore in this series of efficient causes
there must be always a first from which all others de-
pend, and in the series of final causes there must be a
primary end to which all other ends are directed.
With regard to different causes, besides the theory
that in them we cannot have an infinite progression,
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 205
for the same reason we may determine also which of
them must be first and which last. In causing, the
first is the end, bee jse it moves the agent ; next
comes the agent, who must act ; and finally comes the
form which the agent intends to give to the matter.
As to the relation of dignity between causes, it is
clear that the formal cause is more noble than the
material, because the form gives being to matter.
Now, that which gives is more noble than that which
receives; therefore the form is more noble than the
matter. Next, the efficient cause is more noble than
the form, because the form is given by it and is its
own likeness. Finally, the final cause is the noblest
of them all, because all causes act in order to obtain
the end. But the end is sought as good and perfec-
tion ; therefore all other causes stand in relation to
the final cause as the imperfect to the perfect.
CHAPTER VI.
DIVISION OF BEING,
ARTICLE FIRST.
Of Substance mid Accident.
Q. What is the subject of this chapter ?
A. Being, as we have said in Logic, is divided into
ten categories, or supreme genera, because it is first
divided into substance and accident, and this latter
is divided into nine other genera. We shall speak,
then, of these ten categories, and first of substance
and accident.
Substance is defined that which exists in itself
and not in another on which it may lean as subject.
We must pay attention to several remarks in order to
understand this definition. What is meant by those
words: that thing which exists in itself? i. They ex-
clude all inherence of the thing called substance in any
other being in order to exist, and cause it to be distin-
guished from the accident, the essence of Avhich is to
lean on, or inhere in, another thing as subject. 2.
Those words, which exists in itself, must not be taken in
such a sense as to exclude from the idea of substance the
idea of an efficient cause, because these words merely
point out to an existence in one's self and not in
another, but may or may not admit of an efficient
cause. If that which exists in itself is infinite, then
the substance does not require a cause in order to ex-
ao6
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 2 07
ist, but exists of its own nature. If the substance is
finite, then, though existing in itself, it requires a
cause to make it so. In other words, to exist in
itself does not mean to exist by itself. The first
means that a thing does not require to lean on any
subject in order to exist ; the second means that the
thing does not require any cause to give it existence,
but enjoys existence in force of its own essence.
2. That which exists in itself and not in another
is called substance, principally from its being the
subject of the accident. For the word substance is
derived from those two Latin words, sub^ under, an'^.
stare, to be placed or located. Now, that the substance
is tile subject of accidents is demonstrated as follows:
If the subject of accidents were not the substance, it
should be another accident. But the accident cannot
exist in itself, but must lean on another in order to ex-
ist ; therefore this same accident, supporting otner acci-
dents, must either lean on a substance or on another
accident, and this on another, and so on ad infinitum.
But a progress ad infinitum cannot be admitted ; there-
fore the substance must be the subject of accidents.
But wc must remark here again that it is not neces-
sary for the essence of a substance to be the subject of
accidents. The essence of a substance is to be in itself.
Besides this, it may or may not be subject of accidents.
Finite substances which are perfectible are all subject
to modifications or accident. The infinite substance,
which is God, being absolutely perfect, is not subject
to modifications.
Q. What are the errors of philosophers as to the
idea of s'^bstance ?
A. First, Locke contended that substance is a number
or an accumulation of accidents, which we perceive by
means of the senses, gathered and co-existing together
2o8 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
in a wp.y unknown to us. We say, in the first place,
that such an idea of substance is false, even accord-
ing to experience, both of the senses and of conscious-
ness ; of the senses, because through them we perceive
bodies under every variety and succession of modifica-
tions, and yet in perceiving them we perceive that
we experience something standing permanent un-
der a variety and succession of modifications, and
even under the conflict of contrary modifications; of
internal consciousness, for we are conscious that our
soul is subject to great variety of thoughts, of desires,
of volitions succeeding each other, and oftentimes
clashing with each other, and yet we perceive at the
same time something standing permanent and the
same under all that variety and conflict of modifica-
tions. In the second place, the opinion of Locke
refutes itself. Because, we may ask, those qualities or
accidents which form the accumulation are either able
to exist in themselves or they are not. If they are,
then they are so many substances; if they are not,
then they must lean on something existing in itself in
order to exist. It will not do to say that those modi-
fications can acquire the force of existing in them-
selves by aggregation or accumulation, because if
the qualities have not singly of their nature the force
of existing in themselves, but demand a subject to
lean on, this want of leaning on a subject must be felt
with stronger reason by the whole assemblage, for the
mere gathering cannot change its nature ; therefore the
opinion of Locke is false. , Spinoza also held an er-
roneous opinion as to substance. He defined a sub-
stance to be that which exists in itself, and can be con-
ceived by itself — that is, that the idea of which does
not require the idea of another in order to be con-
ceived.
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy, 209
This definition of substance can apply only to God,
for a thing which exists in itself, and which can be
conceived by itself, is that only which does not re-
quire a cause in order to exist, because if it required a
cause to exist we could not conceive it by itself, but
would be obliged to have the idea of the cause in order
to conceive it. God alone, therefore, exists in Him-
self in such a way that he does not require any cause
or principle in order to exist or be known. The de-
finition of Spinoza, therefore, would render impossible
all created substances.
ARTICLE SECOND.
Principle of Individuali::ation.
Q. What can be called true substance ?
A. Substance may be divided into first and second,
or into real and logical. The substance first and real
is the individual. The substance second and logical
are the species and genera, because these have not an
existence in themselves, except inasmuch as they are
confined to the individual. The real and proper sub-
stance, therefore, is the individual. This is defined by
St. Thomas, " that which is in itself undivided and dis-
tinguishable from others." The words "that which is
in itself undivided " mean that it cannot be divided and
be applicable to many things, in contradistinction of
the universal, which means something which is com-
mon to many; the words "and distinguishable from
others " mean that it is such a thing, and not this or
that.
Q. What is meant by the principle of individuali-
zation ?
2 1 o Elemeti is of In te lleciual Pli ilosopJiy.
A. We shall answer by an example. Let us take,
for instance, the human species. Thi*,consists of the
elements animality and reason. All the individuals
belonging to this species have these elements, ani-
mality and reason, for every man is a reasonable
animal. Now, we may ask, so long as every indi-
vidual of the human species has all the elements of the
species, animality and reason, what is that thing which
contracts, as it were, the speciesand constitutes the indi-
viduals in each species ; or, in other words, what is that
which makes the number of individuals in each spe-
cies, and makes them undivided in themselves and dis-
tinguishable from others? Now, to answer this ques-
tion accurately we must distinguish between beings.
In material beings the principle of individualization is
matter, because the principle of individualization must
be intrinsic and substantial to the being. But in
material beings there are two things which are intrin-
sic and substantial — matter and form. Form cannot
discharge this office of individualizing, because the
form of its own nature is common to many, and
therefore- cannot be the principle of excluslveness and
incommunicability. This office, therefore, must be
fulfilled bv matter. But it must be remarked that
matter may be considered in two ways — as abstracted
from quantity and extension and common to all the
beings comprised within a species, or as it is found in
the real world marked by quantity. It is in the latter
sense that matter is the principle of individualization.
As to immaterial substances, if these have their ex-
istence in matter as its form, as in the case of the
human soul, their individualization arises from the re-
lation and order which they have to their bodies,
because the same reason given above applies to them
also.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 211
" 'Tis true that the souls
Of all men are alike ; of tlie same substance,
By the same Maker into all infus'd ;
But yet the several matters which they work on,
How different they are I need not tell you."
— RuTTER, Shepherd's Jlolyday.
But if they be purely spiritual, as we know by
revelation angels to be, they are individualized by
their own reality. God is individualized by His very
nature and absolute simplicity.
Q. How many kinds of substances are there?
A. Various kinds ; Complete and incomplete.
Complete substances are those which are not destined
to exist united with another substance, so as to form
together a perfect whole, as man, a tree. Incomplete
are those which are destined to be united, such as the
human soul.
A complete substance may be endowed with intelli-
gence, as man ; or not have inteMigence, as plant. If
it is endowed with intelligence, it is called person ; if
it is not endowed with intelligence, it is called an
individual or siippositwn. Hence the sitppositum may
be defined : An individual and complete substance in-
comnmnicably existing. A person may said to be an
individual and complete substance of the rational nature.
Q. What do you call that act by which the sub-
stance really exists and acts ?
A subsistence, which may be defined : That actuality
by which a complete substance exists and acts without
communicating with another substance. Here two
questions arise of the greatest importance. The first is :
Can a complete substance really exist and act without
a subsistence of any kind ? In answer to this first
question we say no substance can really exist and act
without a subsistence, because, although we can con-
ceive the essence and nature of a thing as possible
212 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
without a subsistence, yet we cannot conceive the
nature as actually existing and acting without it, be-
cause it is just that act or last complement of being
which makes it really actual ; hence the saying of
schoolmen, that actiones stmt suppositoriim — actions
belong to the suppositum — meaning that actions im-
ply a subsistence in order to be possible.
The second question is this : Admitting that no
complete substance can really exist and act without a
subsistence, it is asked : Is it necessary that this com-
plete substance should have its own subsistence, or
can it have the subsistence of another and made ac-
tually to exist and to act by the subsistence of another
nature ; or, in other words, does each nature absolutely
require its own subsistence in order to exist and act ;
or is it possible and sufficient for it to subsist by the
actuality of another nature ?
This question must be answered in the affirmative,
because we can conceive that although a complete
substance cannot exist or act without a subsistence,
yet it is not necessary that this subsistence should be
its own, because this complete substance might be
united in a most intimate manner with a higher sub-
sistence, in which case the subsistence of the inferior na-
ture should give way to the superior. This is the case
of our body. It would have a subsistence of its own
were it not united to the soul, and that in such a way
as to form one individuality. But because of this union
its own subsistence must give way before that of
the soul, a much superior substance. When separated
from the soul our body resumes its own subsistence.
Therefore in created substances nature and subsistence
are distinct and may be separated.*
* Upon this theory and truth is founded the fundamental mystery of Chris-
tianity—that mystery which has ransomed and deified the world— the Incarnation.
Of it more in the internal evidences of Christianity.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 2 1 3
Q. What about the action of substances?
A. With regard to action there is this difference be-
tween complete and incomplete substance : that the
former bears exclusively the attribution of every ac-
tion it performs, whereas, in the case of the latter,
every action it may do is not attributed to it, but to the
suppositum or complete substance resulting from the
union. For instance, man is a complete substance,
and therefore he bears the responsibility of every one
of his actions ; but his soul and body are each an in-
complete substance, and, therefore, whatever action
may be performed by either is attributed not to it
but to the complete substance — that is, man. The
reason of this is because the operation must be of a
piece with being.
**The "work the touchstone of nature is.
And by their cperations things are known."*
But the being of an incomplete substance, though
existing in itself, yet does nc exist for itself, but for
the whole ; therefore it does not act for itself, but for
the whole. On the contrary, a complete substance
exists in itself and for itself; therefore it acts also for
itself and must be responsible for its action.
There is also this difference between substances as
to their actions: that rational substances, or persons,
have a perfect mastery over their own actions, direct
themselves to apprehend the end, and endeavor to
discover the agreement or disagreement between their
actions and the end which they propose to themselves.
Unintelligent substances must be directed to their end
by others.
" What things soever are to an end referr'd.
And in their motion still that end regard,
♦ Davies' Poems.
214 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
Always the fitness of the means respect,
Those as conducive choose, and those reject,
Must by a judgment foreign and urtknowh '
Be guided to their end, or by their own ;
For to design an end, and to pursue
That end by means, and have it still in view,
. Demands a conscious, wise, reflecting cause,
Which freely moves, and acts by reason's laws ;
That can deliberate, means elect, and find
Their due connection with the end designed."
— Blackmore, The Creation,
1
ARTICLE THIRD.
Q. What is an accident ?
A. Tlie accident is opposed to substance, and
therefore is that thing which does not exist in itself^
but is obliged to lean on the substance in order to exist.
There are two kinds of accidents — absolute and
modal. The first are those which lean on the sub-
stance, such as movement, heat, cold. The modal acci-
dents are called the different modes, or manners, ac-
cording to which accidents lean on the substance — for
instance, velocity or tardiness in movement, more or
less intensity of heat, cold, and so forth.
Q. What questions can be raised with regard to ac-
cidents ?
A. Two questions. The first is : Is the being of
the accident different from, or identical with, the being
of the sijbstance? We answer that accidents are
added to a\ubstance — they come, they go. Now, if
the being oi\the accident were identical with that of
the substance, it would follow that the same thing
would be added>to itself, that it would come upon it-
self and go from itself, which is absurd. Therefore
the being of the accident is different from that of the
substance. ' ""' '
The second question is as follows ; Can accidents
'• r
Elemenis of Intellectual Philosophy, 2 1 5
ever exist without their own substance ? with regard to
which question we answer that it is not necessary that
an accident should lean on its own natural substance,
so to speak, but it may be upheld by a foreign force
or substance. For instance, extension, color, taste,
etc., are all accidents of bodies, and, therefore, bodies
may be called the natural and native substance of
such accidents. But it is not absolutely necessary
that these accidents should be upheld by the sub-
stance of bodies. They may be supported by a for-
eign force — a spiritual substance, for example ; be-
cause it is intrinsically necessary for the nature of
the accident to be supported, but it is quite indifferent
to the same nature zuhat it is supported by — Its own
native substance, or any other force sufficient to up-
hold it. God, therefore, could, by His infinite power,
effect that accidents should exist without the sub-
stance. In "ib case they would not exist in them-
selves, but be supported by Omnipotence.*
ARTICLE FOURTH.
Of Quantity, Relation, and Quality.
Q. How many accidents are there ?
A. Nine — quantity, relation, quality, action, pas-
sion, time, site, habit. In this article we shall speak
of the first three.
Q. What kind of substance does quantity belong to,
and what is its definition ?
A. Quantity is a proper accident of corporal sub-
stances, because these alone can have it. But, in order
to give an adequate definition of it it, is necessary to
* This occurs in the mystery of the Eucharist, where the accidents of bread and
wine— that is, the color, the taste, the smell, etc. — are upheld, not by the substances
of bread and wine, because those two substances have been changed into the sub-
stance of the flesh and blood of our Lord, but are supported by Omnipotence.
2i6 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
determine in what its essence consists. Now, in conse-
quence of this accident quantity, corporal substances
are endowed with the following qualities: i. ex-
tension — that is, the possession of distinct parts, one
of which is not the other ; 2, occupation of a certain
locality ; 3, impenetrability — that is, that all these
distinct parts cannot be in each other's places at
the same time ; 4, capacity of being divided, or di-
visibility ; 5, capacity of being measured, or ;«^«^«-
rability. That these qualities belong to corporal sub-
stances in force of their quantity is beyond doubt.
We ask, therefore, in which of these qualities are we
to place the essence of quantity ? Some have placed
it in one, some in another. We hold as follows : The
proper office of the essence is to be that first internal
and radical principle in a being which gives rise to all
its properties. Hence that must be called the essence
of quantity which is the root and principle of all its
properties. Now, among the five properties of quan-
tity just mentioned, that which is the first internal
and radical principle of all others seems to be exten-
sion. In this, therefore, must we place the essence of
quantity. This we prove as follows : It cannot be oc-
cupation of space, because this property belongs to
the corporal substance, inasmuch as it is made up of
parts, and we must conceive the body first as having
parts and then as occupying space. It cannot be im-
penetrability, which also supposes the body first hav-
ing parts and extension, and afterwards the quality
of one part not being able to occupy the space of
another at the same time, both being obliged to hold
their respective places. Neither can it be divisibility
or measurability, for the same reason. Therefore the
essence of quantity lies in extension ; and, as each
thing is to be defined by its specific difference, we
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 2 1 7
may define quantity that accident by zvhich corporrA
substances have extension.
Quantity may be of two kinds — continual and sepa-
rate. The first is that the parts of which exist to-
gether, but united so as to form one mass or a whole,
as a line. The separate is that the parts of which are
disjointed and divided, as number. The continual
quantity has three dimensions — length, breadth, and
depth. If a continual quantity is considered only in
regard to its length, it is called line; if it is looked at
in reference to its breadth and depth, it is called sur-
face ; if it is regarded as having all these qualities, it
is called body.
Finally, quantity may be fiyiite and infinite. The
first is that which has limits; the second is that which
is conceived as having no limits.
Q. Can there be a quantity really infinite ?
A. We answer negatively as to both quantities,
continual and separate. The first cannot be really in-
finite, because a continual quantity may be either a
body, a surface, or a line ; but none of these can be really
infinite. Therefore continual quantity cannot be infi-
nite. The minor is proved as follows :
1. All bodies have a surface; but, surface is the
limit of a body, therefore all bodies are limited, and
cannot be actually infinite.
2. The surface is terminated by the line ; therefore
all surface is limited.
3. All lines are terminated by points ; therefore all
lines are limited, and consequently all continual quan-
tity is limited.
Separate quantity cannot be infinite, because all
that which can become greater or less cannot be infi-
nite. But, supposing a given number, you can always
add to or subtract from it a unity, and thus make it
2i8 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
greater or less. Therefore no separate quantity can
be infinite.
Q. Can any quantity be potentially infinite?
A. If we speak of separate quantity we must
answer, Yes ; because to every number we may
always add other units. But if we talk of continual
quantity, we must make a distinction. When that
continual quantity is abstracted from every sensible
form that is a mathematical quantity, it may be po-
tentially infinite, because it is not impossible to
think of an abstract quantity to which we are con-
tinually adding. But if by continua.1 quantity we mean
that which actually belongs to bodies in nature, then
it is impossible that it should be infinite, because what-
ever exists in nature has definite, determinate being,
and hence the quantity which accompanies it has a de-
finite form also. Therefore in this sense there cannot
be a continual quantity even potentially infinite.
Q. Give the definition and elements of relation ?
A. Relation is defined: the order which a thing has
witJi another ; or, the Jiow tzvq things lie to each other.
From this definition it is clear that to obtain relation
three things are required: i, the subject, or that
which is related ; 2, the term, or that to which the
subject is related ; 3, the principle, or reason why
the subject is related to the term. Thus in the rela-
tion of paternity the father, who generates, is the sub-
ject ; the son, who is generated, is the term; the
foundation or reason for the relation is generation.
The subject and the term, because the relation runs
between them, are called the extremes, and oftentimes
the terms, of the relation. Now, extremes in every
relation must have this proper qualification: that,
considered as such — that is, as relatives — they must
exist together, both as to their being and as to their
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 2 1 9
being known ; as to their being, because the father
could not exist without the son, and vice vcrsd ; as
to their being known — that is to say, that the know-
ledge of the one must necessarily carry along with it
the knowledge of the other — because, when we consider
relative terms as such, the knowledge of one must
necessarily imply the knowledge of the other.
Q. Speak of the distinction of relation.
A. In logic we divided relation into real and logic.
Here we must add that real relation may be mutual
and not mutual. It is called mutual, or strictly real,
when the relation is real in both extremes, as in the
example above given of paternity and sonship. It is
called not mutual when the foundation of the relation
is real in one extreme and not in the other, but placed
there by our mind. Such is the relation of creation.
On the creature's side it is real, because it has placed
in it something real ; on God's side it is logical, be-
cause His creating the universe effected nothing new
in His nature.
Q. Do real relations truly exist?
A. Certainly, i. Because none can doubt that a
father is a true father of his son, and vice vcrsd ; that
two plus two are equal to four; that two red roses are
similar in color. But paternity and sonship, equality
and similarity are mere relations ; therefore there
exist true relations.
2. It is certain that there exists in the universe an
admirable order of different beinni. and none could
assert that it is merely a fiction of our fancy, or a
pure extrinsic denomination, because in that order
and harmony lies the whole good of the universe.
But such order is nothing more than a real chain of
relations; therefore there exist true relations.
' ■ 3. We judge of the rights and duties in civil society
220 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
by merely considering the relations among indivi-
duals ; but if the relations between individuals were
not real, the rights and duties emanating from them
would not be real. Therefore we must admit real
relations.
Q. Under how many heads may we bring all these
relations?
A. Under three heads. Relation is the order which
a thing has with another; therefore there are as many
relations as there are ways by which a thing may have
order with another. Now, a thing may have order
with another (i) inasmuch as it forms one of its essen-
tial elements, and both together constitute a genus
or a species, as the relation which exists between the
human soul and the body. 2. A thing may have
order with. another as the cause to the effect — as the
relation of a father to his child, of an architect to the
building, etc. 3. A thing may have order with an-
other in consequence of the agreement or disagree-
ment of both in some accidental quality — as two
red roses, two white lilies, etc.
Q. Give the essence and definition of quality.
A. Quality is a name which is given to different
things, and also to all the categories of accidents ;
but, taken as a special category, it is defined : that
accident which modifies and affects the substance in
itself. Upon which definition we observe that it is
called accident to distinguish it from the specific
difference which also qualifies the substance ; but
spirituality, for instance, qualifies the substance of
the soul, yet it belongs to its essence, and is not
an accident. We have added which modifies and
affects the substance, to distinguish it from other acci-
dents. Because, though all accidents are affections
of the substance, and are added to it to supply some
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosopky. 2 2 1
defect or imperfection, yet the quality properly and
intrinsically is that which modifies the substance.
Quantity, for instance, is given to the substance to
give it extension and impenetrability of parts ; re-
lations are effects, as it were, of substances. Other
accidents might more properly be called adjacent,
rather than intrinsic, perfections of the substance ;
but quality alone is intrinsic to it, as healthy food,
fresh air, strong man, charming sky — all qualities
inherent to these various substances.
Q. How many kinds of qualities are there?
A. Four: those which modify the substance in it-
self — as to be well, to be healthy ; those which affect
it in its operation by adding or diminishing efficacy —
as the power of vision in a young person, the weak-
ness of the same in an aged man ; those which affect
it according to physical movement, inducing some
sensible transformation — as hot air, cold air, moist
air, etc. ; those which affect the form or figure of the
substance — as a square table, an oval face, a hooked
nose. The first qualities arc called disposition or
habits; the second, power or impotence ; the third,
alterations ; the fourth, /(?r;« and^^//r^.
The following lines may be taken as an example of
the different kinds of qualities:
** Queen of fragrance* lovely \ Rose,
The beauties of thy leaves disclose !
The winter 's past, the tempests fly,
SoftX gales breathe gently through the sky ;
The lark, sweet warbling on the wing,
Salutes the gay return of spring ;
^ The silver dews, the vernal showers,
Call forth a bloomy waste of flowers ;
1\i^joyotis fields, the shady woods,
Are clothed with green or swell with buds ;
* Quality of power. t Of disposition. :( Of power, etc.
2 2 2 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
Then haste thy beauties to disclose,
Queen of fragrance, lovely Rose ! "
— Broome, The Rosebud.
ARTICLE THIRD.
Action mid Passion.
Q. What is action, and how many kinds of action
are there ?
A. In another chapter we have spoken of causes, and
especially of the efficient cause, or of the agent, and of
the effects which emanate from it. This emanation
from the cause producing the effect is called action.
From this we can understand how, in order to have
action, three things are required : i, a principle which
acts — that is, the substance ; 2, a principle accord-
ing to which the action is performed to determine its
kind — that is, the essence, which is the interior prin-
ciple of every action ; 3, a principle through which
the substances may act — that is, the faculties, which,
as we shall show, in creatures are the proximate
principle of operations distinct from the essence.
Action is of two kinds — immanent and transient. The
first is that which terminates in the subject, acting
in such a manner that it is itself both the principle
and the term of the action. The second is that which
terminates outside the subject — that is, the action
begins in the subject and terminates outside of it.
Q. What are the opinions of philosophers as to both
kinds of action ?
A. As to immanent actions, some have said that
they are not true actions, inasmuch as they have no
real term. Against transjent actions, Leibnitz has
said that they are impossible, on the plea that in order
to have a transient action something must pass from
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 223
the agent to the subject acted upon, but this is im-
possible ; therefore, etc. Now, both these opinions
are false. i. As to immanent actions. When I
study, for instance, I perform an immanent action,
because the term of the action remains in me. But is
the result of mv action less real because it takes place
in myself? Certainly not, since the perfection of
my intellect, the consequence of my study, is surely
something real — as real as the distinction which exists
between a learned and an ignorant man, between a
cultivated man and a boor.
" Base-minded they that want intelligence ;
For God himself for wisdom most is praised,
And men to God thereby are nighest raised."
—Spenser,
With regard to the possibility of transient actions,
we deny that it is necessary that an accident should
travel from the agent to the subject acted upon to
render possible such actions ; because all that is ne-
cessary in this case is that the agent should apply its
efficacy and force upon the subject to produce in it a
new state. Secondly, if this possibility were denied,
many absurd consequences Vv'ould follow ; for if all
those actions which do not terminate in the agent did
not exist, man would no longer be responsible for all
those actions which pass from him, such as theft,
murder, etc. ; he would no longer be liable either to
reward or punishment ; all the order and harmony of
the universe, which is kept by one series of beings
acting upon another, would be a mere optical delu-
sion.
Q. What is the term of both actions?
A. The direct term must always be something posi-
tive, but as to the indirect term it may be negative.
In fact, every agent acts always for an end; but the
224 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
end is equivalent to good ; therefore every agent in
acting intends some good. But good is convertible
with being, and being is something positive ; there-
fore every agent in acting intends something positive.
But that which the agent intends is the term of his
action ; therefore the direct term of every action is
something positive. The negative, therefore, can
only be an indirect term, since to destroy can never
be meant by any agent positively acting, but only
indirectly.
Q. What is passion?
A. To receive in one's self the term of the action of
the agent is called passion^ and the subject patient.
Now, though action and passion agree in one act and
one movement, the principle of which is the action,
the term the passio'i, yet they are distinguished from
each other; betnuse, certainly, it is not the same
thing to give and to receive, to do and to suffer, to
perfect and to be perfected, to be principle and end.
But action implies to give, to do, to perfect, to be
principle; passion means to receive, to suffer, to be
perfected, to be the term ; therefore action and passion
are not the same thing. This truth is more evident
in transient actions. In them the action is in the
agent, the passion in the subject outside the agent.
But the same universal accident cannot be in two
subjects at the same time ; therefore action and pas-
sion are in reality distinct from each other — two acci-
dents really and specifically distinct, hence two cate-
gories.
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 225
ARTICLE FOURTH.
Of the Categories Where, When, Site, and Habit.
Q. Give the definition of the category Where.
A. Bodies are circumscribed by place. Now, this
circumscription of tlie body proceeding from the de-
termination of place constitutes the category ivJiere,
to understand which we must first speak of place.
This is defined by Aristotle the surface of body
which first and immovably surrounds and circum-
scribes another body. We say which first surrounds
and circumscribes, because place is that surface which
immediately surrounds and touches the body. For
instance, suppose I lay a book on a table, the table
is the place with regard to the book ; but the table
serves as a place to the book, not as a whole, but in
part ; that is, that part of its surface which imme-
diately touches the book. We say immovably be-
cause, though that surface could be moved and
changed, yet it could not have the name of place if
it is not considered as immovable in respect to the
body which it circumscribes and contains.
This circumscription coming to a body from its be-
ing in a place constitutes the category where. But
here we must make a most important observation. The
determination proceeding from place is twofold. The
determination or boundary which a body receives
from a place is called being circumscribed by a place.
But, besides the body, a spirit may be in a certain
place, and the spirit may not be infinite or immense
like God, who is everywhere, but limited and finite.
Now, when a spirit is present in a certain place it can-
not be said to occupy that place or to be bounded by
such a place, because this would require juxtaposition
of parts, and the spirit has none; it can only be said
226 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
to be destined to, ( to bo designated by, that place.
Now, this determination which a created spirit re-
ceives from place is called to be in a definitive place ^
because place merely defines or designates where the
spirit is, but neither contains nor surrounds it.*
Q. What is space ?
A. It is very difficult to define space, and philoso-
phers have broached all sorts of opinions about it.
On the one hand, space cannot be what our fancy
imagines — something really existing as containing
an immense number of bodies — because extension can-
not exist as something separate from bodies. What
could it be but a body? And where could the body
be contained? In another? And where would this
third one be ? In a fourth, and so on ad infinitmn ?
On the other hand, it seems contradictory to sup-
pose that that which contains all bodies is the same
thing with that which it contains. If, therefore, space
must not be something separate, and at the same time
it must be something distinct, from bodies, what else
can it be to satisfy both requirements except what
St. Thomas defines it to be, tJic extension of bodies, in-
asimicJi OS it is considered to contain either the same
body to which it belongs or other bodies ?
Having thus explained the idea of space, it is hardly
necessary to prove it, because if the capacity to con-
tain must be found in a body, what else can it be but
its extension and dimension? Therefore it is clear that
the nature of space lies in extension. Hence it is that
whenever we want to measure space we only measure
extension. From this it appears that that space which
we imagine to exist outside the limits of the universe,
*' The, schoolmen called the manner in which a material object is in a place esse
in loco circumscriptive. The manner in which a spirit is in a place esse in loco de/I-
nitivt. We have rendered in the text the idea of the schoolmen as accurately as we
could.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 227
and in which we fancy the world to have been created,
is not a reahty but a fiction, which St. Augustine jest-
ingly calls spacious nothing.
But it may be asked : Where is the world ? What
vast body contains it? The world is nowhere but in
itself. It is not contained in any other space or
body, but God's infinite power upholds it.
Q. Give the idea of the category When.
A. Things may be bounded not only by place,
but also by time. Now, as the boundary of bodies
proceeding from place gives the category where, so
also the determination of things arising from time
gives the category when.
To understand this we must give the idea of time.
Time is a kind of duration by which we mean, the
permanence of a thing in its existence. Hence dura-
tion may be of as many kinds as there are modes of
existence. The first is that of the Being absolutely
immutable, which is God. The second is that of
beings immutable as to their being, but chJingeable as
to their operations. The last is that of being change-
able as to both being and operations. According to
these three modes of being we may distinguish three
kinds of duration. The first is called eternity, the
perfect possession of interminable life all in one — that
is, having neither beginning nor end nor succession.
The second is called csvnni, which is an interminable
life of a being created but naturally imperishabl'\ and
belongs to immortal spirits. The third is that of
beings mutable as to being and operations. Time,
therefore, is nothing more than the duration of beings
mutable as to being and operations. And because by
time we measure the changes and movements of
such mutable beings, determining the beginning and
the end of such movements, Aristotle has defined
228 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
time to be the measure of movement by marking its
before and its after.
" Time past and time to come are not,
Time present is our only lot."
— Montgomery.
O. What is the idea of site ?
A. The disposition or location of the parts of a
body with regard to a place is called site. From
this it might appear that the category site is con-
founded with that of where ; but if we consider both
accurately we shall find a great difference between
them ; because where implies merely that a body is
found in such a place, whereas site implies the manner
and the how it is found — perpendicularly, horizontally,
leaning, or lying, etc. Site, therefore, is the how a body
is found in a place. Here we may remark that we are
accustomed to apply the idea of site to spiritual
things ; but this we do metaphorically. Hence God,
says St. Tht)mas, is said to be sitting in consequence
of His immutability, to be standing in cortsequence
of His power to repel His enemies.
Q. What is habit ?
A. That determination or distinctiot. which ac-
crues to bodies from that which clothes them. From
this definition we can see that, in order to have this
category, two or more substances are required — one
which is clothed, the other which clothes ; that this
accident consists in neither of these two substances,
but in the contact of both or in the clothing.
Q. Give a r6sum6 of the whole of ontology.
A. We can see now as in a picture the whole series
of truths explained in ontology, and how they descend
one from another in beautiful order from the idea of
being. Setting out from the idea of being, we have
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy, 229
investigated its nature universally considered, then wc
have studied its elements and Jioiv they constitute
being, then we have studied its properties of unity,
truth, goodness, and beauty. We have enquired after-
wards into the causes of being, and have acquired a clear
and distinct conception of them. Finally, we have
proceeded to study the divisions of being, and have
seen that it is divided into ten classes — first, substance
in its complete and incomplete state, and then the
accidents of quantity, quality, relation, action, passion,
space, time, site, and habit, and thus we acquired the
most general idea applicable to all things. We con-
clude with the words of the poet, which recapitulate
the whole ontology, and especially the two supreme
categories — substance and accident.
The poet introduces a sibyl foretelling the fate of
the eldest son of Being, which is Substance:
" Your son, said she, nor can you prevent it,
Shall subject be to many an accident.
O'er all his brethren he shall reign as king,
Yet every one shall make him underling ;
And those that cannot live from him asunder
Ungratefully shall strive to keep him under.
In worth and excellence he shall outgo them ;
Yet, being above them, he shall be below them.
From others he shall stand in need of nothing,
Yet on his brothers shall depend for clothing.
To find a foe it shall not be his hap,
And Peace shall lull him in her flowery lap ;
Yet shall he live in strife, and at his door
De. ouripj? War shall nev3r cease to roar ;
Yet it shall be his natural property
To harbor those that are at enmity.
What power, what force, what mighty spell, if not
Your learned hands, can loose this Gordian knot ? "
—Milton.
■v''- ■
CHAPTER VII.
OF' THE USE OF ONTOLOGY.
Q. What do young people think of ontology?
A. That it is a hard, dry study, of no practical use
whatever.
Q. Is that so?
A. It is certainly a little dry and hard to under-
stand ; but as to its use, it is of the greatest importance
to understand anything scientifically, and every science
and art is founded upon ontology.
Q. Can you give any example in art and science
showing how they are founded on ontology ?
A. In art we will take as an example grammar,
which is the art of speaking and writing correctly.
In the first place, the foundation of the whole gram-
mar is the substantive verb to be, which implies real
existence. Without it language would not express a
reality, but would be merely a construction and ar-
rangement of words having no real meaning what-
ever. The substantive verb to be, therefore, makes
our grammar and our speech real and objective. But
this substantive verb corresponds to the universal
idea of being as described in ontology.
Next come the nouns, which are divided into sub-
stantive and adjective. These correspond to the
great division of being into substance and accident.
The pronouns, personal or indicative, are founded upon
the idea of the person or the individual ; / express-
ing always a personality, this or that expressing an
individuality.
330
Elements of hitellectual Ph ilosophy. 2 3 t
Next follow the numbers, which are singular, plural —
collective and universal. These are founded upon
the property of being nnity^ which gives rise to dis-
tinction and plurality.
As to the verbs, they are active, passive, and neuter.
The active verb, which means to do or to act, is
founded upon the idea of cause and action. When
the verb expresses an immanent action it is called
active intransitive, as I sleep, I think ; when it ex-
presses a transient action it is called active transitive,
as I strike ; the two grand divisions of action.
The passive verb, which means to be acted upon, to
suffer, is founded on the idea of passion, the neuter
on both.
As to the moods of verbs, they are the infinitive,
the indicative, the subjunctive, the potential, and the
imperative. For this division there is no real ground,
at least so far as the potential and subjunctive are
concerned. The subjunctiv^e is merely an elliptical
mode of expression, and the potential is made up of
two or more verbs, and therefore it canno:, with any
propriety, be called an inflection of any of them.
This leaves us the indicative, by which simple assertions
are made ; the imperative, by which commands are
given; and the infinitive, which expresses the meaning
of the verb in the abstract, as to love, to do, to think.
The indicative is founded on the idea of being as as-
serting something, the imperative on the idea of
cause, the infinitive on the idea of action or passion.
The tenses, present, past, and future, are founded upon
the idea of time.
The adverb is a qualification added to a verb, such
as to do well, to do quickly ; and is founded on the
ideas of quality — as to do ill, justly, wisely ; on the
idea of quantity — as v;o work so much, considerably ;
232 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
of time — as to do it now, then, soon, when ; of place
— as to write here, hence, there, where.
The preposition is a word connecting two words
together so as to indicate the relation which the things
or ideas signified by them bear to each other, and, as
it is evident, is founded on the idea of relation — as the
heavens above us, the enemies of our salvation about
us, the regret after sin, friendships among equals,
love between brothers, etc.
F'inally, the conjunction, which joins words together,
is founded also on the idea of relation.
The syntax, which is that part of grammar which
teaches how words are to be arranged and connected
together, is also founded pre-eminently on ontology,
because its fundamental rule is to arrange and con-
nect words in such a manner as to maintain the proper
relations of being. For instance, if I should in speak-
ing break that first rule of syntax that a verb agrees
with its nominative in number and person, and 'w\-
stGa.d o( ssiylng, *' I read, PeUr /cams," I should say,
** I reads, Peter learn,'' I would break the proper rela-
tions of being; for if it is I who read I cannot
express that relation of being in the nominative and
then deny it in the verb ; if it is Peter who learns, one
person, I cannot contradict that and express in the
verb that they are many who learn. ,
Grammar, therefore, which takes its objective reality
from the idea of real being ; which finds its ideas of the
substantive and adjective nouns in the conception of
substance and accidents ; which forms its verbs, active,
passive, and neuter, on the ideas of cause, action, and
passion ; its tenses from the idea of time ; which
takes its ideas of adverbs, prepositions, and conjunc-
tions from the various kinds of accident ; which give§
rules of syntax from the natural and essential relations
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 233
of being — is altogether founded on ontology, and can-
not be known scientifically without it.
Q. Show by the example of the natural sciences
how they are founded on the ideas we acquire in on-
tology.
A. The first natural science is physics, the object
of which is to study the causes of the phenomena
which h.ini»eii in matter and which do not cause any
change in the composition of bodies. A physical
phenomenon is any fact which is accomplished or
takes place in matter \ ithout altering its composition.
A body which falls, a sound which is produced, a cer-
tain quantity of water which is frozen, are so many
phenomena. Now, to enquire into such facts which
do not alter the composition of bodies is the object
of physics. We say of phenomena which do not alter
ths composition of bodies, because to enquire into
those facts which modify more or less the nature of
bodies is the object of chemistry.
it is evident that physics is an application of on-
tology to a particular object, for the first question
which this science puts is. What is matter, or a body?
— that is, it studies the nature of the object it works
upon, and finds out that any limited quantity of mat-
ter is a body ; that a body is not formed by a con-
tinual quantity of matter, but of elements infinitely
small, which cannot be physically divided, and are"
placed in juxtaposition with each other without
touching each other, being designedly maintained at
a distance by mutual attraction and repulsion, which
elements are called atoms, and a group of them mole-
cules. It finds out also that a body may be in dif-
ferent states: the solid state, as stone, metal; the
liquid state, as water, oil; the gaseous state, as
steam ; that the difference of these three states con-
234 Elements of httelLctual Philosophy.
sists in the cohesion of the parts or molecules; in
solids the cohesion being so strong as to require a
great effort to separate them; in liquids much less
effort, as the cohesion is weaker ; in gases much less,
as the cohesion is the weakest.
Having enquired into the essence and nature of
bodies, it passes on to investigate their properties,
some of which, because found constantly in all bodies,
it calls essential, such as extension, divisibility, im-
penetrability, elasticity, mobility, inertia; others it
finds only in some bodies, and it concludes to be acci-
dental to bodies, such as solidity, fluidity, ductility,
porosity, compressibility.
Physics proceeds next to enquire into the causes of
t\vQSQ phenoituna, in order to understand them scientifi-
cally. We say phenomena and not bodies, because to
enquire into the cause of bodies belongs to cosmology.
It discovers that the followincr are the causes for the
phenomena of bodies: attraction, heat, light, mag-
netism, and electricity. These are called physical agents
or forces. After studying these causes the natural
philosopher, by observing the constant relations be-
tween the phenomenon of a body and its cause, dis-
covers and assigns what are called physical laws, and
attains the object and use of this science. For in-
stance, after studying attraction and finding it to be a
force inherent in matter by which particles and masses
of matter are drawn towards each' other, and carefully
observing that this force increases in proportion to the
quantity of matter which the attracting body contains
and in proportion to the diminishing of the distance be-
tween the bodies, it establishes the law that the force of
attraction in bodies is in proportion to the mass and to
the greater or less distance, the attraction increasing
as the mass increases and as the distance diminishes.
Elanetits of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 235
The student will here carefully remark how ontology, or
the general science of being, has guided' the natural
philosopher to his science ; for as ontology enquires
into the nature and essence of beings so the natural
philosopher enquires into the essence and nature
of bodies ; as the first enquires into the proper-
ties of being, so does the second enquire into the
properties of bodies ; as the first enquires into the
causes of being, so does the latter seek into the
causes of the phenomena of bodies; as the first
investigates the most general division of being, so
does the second enquire into the most general di-
vision of bodies, which division gives rise to all
natural sciences.
Q. Give a brief idea of the different natural sci-
ences.
A. The body may be inorganic, living, and animal.
This supreme division of general physics gives rise
to a host of natural sciences. When natural science
analyzes the inorganic body into its elements and its
constituent principles it is called chemistry,, which is
the science of whatever has relation to the simple or
elementary — that is, bodies which invariably present
the same characteristics however they may be divided.
On the contrary, those bodies which are composite
are aggregations of several elements combined in
a different way and united by their natural affinities.
Now, these bodies present themselves to our observa-
tion in different states — the gaseous, the liquid, and
the solid. The science which investigates the nature,
properties, causes, and action of gases, together with
the laws which govern them, is called gasology.
That which studies liquids is called hydrology. The
science which studies the nature, properties, causes,
action, laws of the solids is called mineralogy. With
•J
236 Elements 0/ Intellectual Philosophy.
regard to organic bodies, the science which studies the
first organic bodies— that is, the plant — is botany.
That which studies the organic life of animal bodies is
called zoology, which is divided into two sciences —
anatomy and physiology; the first is the study of the
nature, properties, causes, functions, and use of the
elementary parts of the animal body or of the skele-
ton ; the second is the science of the nature, proper-
ties, causes, functions, and uses of th.e organs of the
animal body. Medicine, with all its subordinate sci-
ences, is the science of the causes of the alterations
produced in the animal organism and of the means of
repairing them.
The next grand division of bodies is that which
separates them into celestial and terrestrial. The
celestial bodies are the object of a particular science
called astronomy^ the object of which is to ex-
plain the phenomena and to account for the move-
ments of those huge bodies which gravitate in Bpace.
To this another science is allied, called cosmo-
graphy, which teaches the structure, the form, the
location, and the relations of the parts which com-
pose the universe.
The terrestrial body is the object of two other
sciences, geography and geology. The first gives the
description of the earth, its exterior figure, its division,
and all those particulars presented by its surface. The
second penetrates into the very bowels of the earth,
aNd seeks to know its interior structure, the different
materials of which it is composed, their formation,
their relative location, and the different revolutions to
which it has been subject.
These divisions arise from considering bodies in their
concreteness, but there is another branch of physical
science which di cs not consider them in themselves
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy, 237
and in their elements, but in tlic abstract as to their
quantity, number, or extension.
Arithmetic -d^wd ali^cbra consider quantity in itshit^h-
est abstraction, and treat of the combinations of
quantities which can be expressed by simple relations
of number. ]hit every specified quantity may be re-
garded from a twofold relation — that of time and of
space, because time and space are the necessary con-
ditions of all reality which is capable of measure. The
relation of a particular quantity to space exi)ressed by
a figure is the object oi geometry — a Science which has
received such a name from the use to which it was
formerly destined, that of measuring the earth, and
which has retained its primitive name, though it has
made such immense progress.
The relation which a dcfmitc quantity bears to time
is exjiressed by movement, because we may say that
it is through movement that time is rendered visible
in space. Now, movement cannot be conceived ex-
cept as the product of a force. The science of the
forces which cause movement is called mechanics.
These forces may l)c considered under two aspects, in-
asmuch as they neutralize each ether, and under this
aspect they are the object o( staties ; inasmuch as they
produce the movement, and then they are the object
of dyiuimics. Of co-irse the science of mechanics is
subdivided into several branches, according to the na-
ture of the bodies to which the moving forces arc
applied, such as hydraulics, which considers the move-
ment of fluids; hydrometry, which h, s for its object
the weight, the force, the intensity of fluids, etc.
The student will sec by this brief sketch of natural
sciences how they are nothing else than an application
of ontology; how each studies first the nature of its
object, its properties, its causes, and its laws. Onto-
238 Elements of Ijitelkctual Philosophy,
logy, therefore, which teaches the native properties,
causes, divisions, laws of being, is of the utmost im-.
portance to all sciences which treat of a particular
being.
ANTHROPOLOGY
•• Know then thyself; ....
The proper study of mankind is man." — Pope.
839
ANTHROPOLOGY.
INTRODUCTION.
Q. What is anthropology ?
A. The science which has for its object man. The
science which treats of the human soul is called psy-
chology ; but as in philosophy we cannot speak of the
human soul without mentioning its union with the
body, so we must treat of the whole man, and there-
fore study anthropology, which means the science of
man ; yet we shall principally occupy ourselves about
the soul.
Q. What method shall we follow in speaking of
man, and principally of his soul?
A. We shall follow the method of St. Thomas, who
says: "In every spiritual substance three things are
to be remarked — the essence, the faculties, and the
operations." Hence he concludes, with regard to the
soul, that three things are to be remarked in it — its
essence, its faculties, and its operations. W^e shall
follow this method, and shall enquire into these three
things: What is the nature of the human soul? what
are its faculties ? and what are its operations ? This
method and order will render the things to be treated
clearer and more easy of comprehension.
941
CHAPTER I.
ON THE NATURE OF MAN IN GENERAL.
ARTICLE FIRhl',
That Man is not Body alojie, but is made up of ancthc?
Principle called the Soul.
O. What is the definition of man ?
A. Man is defined to be a reasonable animal^ be-
cause lie not only lives and feels but reasons. In call-
ing him an animal vio. determine his proximate genus,
in which he agrees with all those beings which have
souls. In calling him reasonable we define the specific
difference of man which distinguishes him from all
other animals. Hence man must result from two
elements — a body and a reasonable soul — both of
which make one substantial whole.
Q. Is this admitted by all ?
A. No. In Germany, in England, France, and our
own country some would-be philosophers have held
that man is nothing more than a well-organized body.
But, because there are certain operations in man
which seem to suppose another principle in him be-
sides the body, these philosophors, in order to ac-
count for such operations, and unwilling to admit a
reasonable soul in man, have been forced to invent
different systems. Some have said that these opera-
tions — such as the act of judgment, of reasoning, and
so forth — can be easily accounted for by means of
chemical forces and laws. .Others, following the prin-
ciple of Descartes, that whatever happens in the body
242
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 243
is the result of mechanical laws, have held that all
the operations of man can be easily explained by
means of the laws of movement. Others, finally, see-
ing that these operations of man cannot be accounted
for by means either of chemical or mechanical laws,
have invented certain forces which they call vital^
different from physical properties, but, like these, in-
herent in the very matter of the organs. To these
vital forces they attribute all the distinctive opera-
tions of man. The first system has been called cJienii-
calisin, the other mechanicism, and the last organicism.
We shall prove first in general that in man, besides
the body, there is another principle distinct from the
body; that the simplest operations of the mind can^
not be explained without this principle. Next we
shall say a word on each system in particular.
Proof I. The human body holds the first and mosf.
perfect rank among living bodies. But such a body
cannot exist by itself alone, but must have another
principle ; therefore there must be another principle
in man besides his body. The minor is proved : if a
body is living, there must necessarily be some princi-
ple which gives it life. Now, this principle must be
either the body itself or something distinct from the
body. But it cannot be the body itself, because, as
St. Thomas remarks, it is evident that to be the
principle of life does not become the body as body,
otherwise all bodies would be living, which is contrary
to experience ; therefore in living bodies life must
arise from a principle other than the body.
2. It is evident that we have ideas or forms of many
things in our mind. We have the forms or ideas of
the firmament, of the sun, the stars, the sky, the
forms of mountains, of the boundless ocean, and so
forth. But this would be utterly impossible if in man
2 44 Elements of Inieliectual Ph ilosopJiy.
there were nothing more than the body ; therefore,
etc.
The minor is proved from the principle and the ex-
perience that it is impossible for a body to have more
tiian one form at a time. No mechanical or chemical
process can make a body take two different forms at the
same time. A sculptor, for instance, cannot by any
mechanical skill make a block of wood take the form of
a man and a serpent at the same time ; a chemist by
no chemical skill can make a body take the solid, the
liquid, and gaseous forms at the same time. Conse-
quently, if man were nothing more than a body, he
could only have the form of one thing at a time ; but
man has the ideas or forms of different things at the
same time ; therefore there must be in him another
principle besides the body.
" No body can at once two forms admit
Except the one the other do deface ;
But in the soul ten thousand forms do sit,
And none intrudes into her neighbor's place."*
3. It is a principle of reason as well as experience
that a thing which is received into another must take
the shape and the form of the recipient. This princi-
ple was expressed by the schoolmen as follows :
Omne quod rccipitur ad inoduvi rccipientis rccipitiir ;
and by the poet :
" All things received do such proportions take
As those things wherein they are received ;
So little glasses little faces make,
And narrow webs on narrow frames are weaved." f
Now, in consequence of this principle, if man were
only a body the forms of things which he apprehends
* Davies's Poems. t Ibid.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 245
should take the form, shape, and size of the body.
But this is contrary to experience, because we have
ideas of all things conformable to their actual reality;
for we are those
" Wherein are men, beasts, trees, seas, and lands,
And yet oach thing a proper place doth find,
And each thing in the due proportion stands."*
Q. Say something of each system in particular.
A. Having proved that man could not perform the
simplest operation of the mind, which is apprehension,
if he were only a body, we proceed to make some re-
marks on each system, and first against those who ex-
plain the operations of man by means of chemical forces
and the laws of movement, i. We know by experience
that oftentimes we are undecided which operation to
choose ; we discuss the question with ourselves to see
which we should choose ; and finally, we know that we
choose that which seems to us best, or, in fact, which
we wish to choose.
But the freedom of doubting, consulting, and choos-
ing cannot possibly belong to chemical forces, or be
done by mechanical laws, for all these acts are done
necessarily ; therefore all these operations of man can-
not be explained by those forces.
2. We know also by experience that after having
commenced a certain action we can upon the instant
stop it and begin another, and drop it again to under-
take a new one. But this would be impossible under
the laws of movement and mechanical forces. How
often, for instance, would the engineer wish to possess
this power of instantly stopping the engine he is guid-
ing, and cannot under the laws of movement, but
must let it go on to carry death and desolation to
hundreds !
* Davies.
246 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
Finally, we remark against the third system that
to have recourse to vital properties to explain the
operations of man is only confoundirig the question
more and more, because a property is not a principle,
but the consequence of some vital principle ; therefore
that from which property originates, and not property
itself, must be th'^^'principle of life. But these philoso-
phers contend that these properties are properties of
organic bodies ; they come to admit, then, that, after
all, the body is the principle of life. But we have
shown, with the clearest evidence, that a body cannot
be the principle of life; tbTefore we must admit an-
other principle in man besides the body. This is
called the soul, which, as far as we have described it,
may be defined as the first principle of life in things to
which we attribute life.
ARTICLE SECOND.
This Principle called the Soul is One, but does not Form
the Whole Man.
Q. Is the soul a single principle or multiple ?
A. Some philosophers, having admitted in man,
besides the body, another principle which causes
him to move and to act, and having examined these
operations and found them different in nature, have
come to the conclusion that the principle which
causes man to perform all these operations must
be more than one. Some have admitted a dou-
ble principle — one which performs intellectual ope-
rations, another which feels and vegetates. Others
have admitted three — one the principle of intel-
lectual operations, another the principle of sensa-
tion, the last the principle of vegetation. But these
opinions are false, and we must admit only one
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 247
principle of all these operations and prove it as fol-
lows :
I. Because we know by experience that an opera-
tion of the soul, when it is too intensely attended to,
hinders other operations. For instance, when a man
is absorbed in an intense intellectual work the opera-
tions of the sensitive and vegetative life are either
suspended or imperfectly carried on ; and, contrariwise,
when a man is plunged into some sensible operation
he is unfit for intellectual work. This principle ex-
plains all those anecdotes of absent-minded persons,
of which we have so many examples.* Now, this
would be impossible if the principles of action in man
were multiple, because in that case each one would
attend to its own department without any trouble or
hindrance — one could attend to thought, another to
sensation, and another to vegetation and locomotion ;
therefore there must be one principle in man.
The common sense of mankind rejects such an
opinion of more than one principle, because all men in
sp'iaking not only say, I understand, but also, I feel, I
live, I move, I grow, and such like expressions, attri-
buting all these different operations to one subject, the
me. Now, this they could not do if they were not con-
scious that the principle of all these operations is the
same and identical ; therefore we must admit one prin-
ciple in man.
" And these three powers f three sorts of men do make ;
For some, like plants, their veins do only fill :
And some, like beasts, their senses' pleasure takj ;
And some, like angels, do contemplate still.
* That, for instance, of the man who, passing by a toll-gate, cried out to the
keeper, " What's to pay?" The man at the gate replied, " Kor what ?" "' How for
what ?" replied the traveller ; " for my horse." " What horse ?" rejoined the keeper.
Whereupon the traveller, looking at his legp, exclaimed : " Excuse me, I thought I
was on horseback."
t Intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative.
248 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
Tlicrcfurc the fables turned some men to flowers,
And others did with brutish forms invest,
And did ot others make celestial powers,
Like angels, which still travel, yet still rest.
Yet these three powers are not three souls but one.
As one and two are both contained in three,
Three being one number by itself alone
A shadow of the blessed Trinity."
— Davies.
But as some of the operations which man performs
cannot be accounted for by tlie soul alone, but require
the body also, such as sensation, so we must admit
that man consists of a body and a soul united to-
gether.
ARTICLE THIRD.
Man results from the Substantial Union of Body and
Soul.
Q. Is this union between the body and soul of man
accidental or substantial ?
A. Plato, who held that the soul is the whole man,
and who could not deny that there is a certain union
between the soul and the body, contended that this
union was merely accidental and exterior — the same
union, for instance, which exists between our bodies
and the clothes we put on, between the engineer and
the locomotive which he runs, or between the pilot
and his ship.
The true opinion is that the union between the soul
and the body is intrinsic and substantial.
Q, What do you mean by substantial union ?
A. To explain this we *^nust recall some points of
ontology. I. Subsistence is that last complement
of a substance by which it obtains the mastery over
itself and its own acts, becomes responsible for its
Elements of hiiellectual Philosophy, 249
actions, and is incommunicable to all others. This is
called a complete substance or suppositum.
2. Every substance existing in nature is a supposi-
tum.
3. The subsistence of a created substance is neces-
sary only in thi.j sense : that no substance can possibly
exist without a subsistence. But it is not necessary
in the sense that every substance should have a sub-
sistence of its own nature and species, because it may
happen to subsist of the subsistence of another.
4. This happens when a substance is intended to
form such an intimate union with another substance
of a superior nature as both to form a complete subject
and individual. Because in this case, as nature in-
tends to form of two substances one complete indi-
vidual, it is evident that both substances cannot be
each one an entity perfectly complete, havinj^ the
mastery and attribution of its own acts, and exclusive
and incommunicable ; because in that case there would
be two perfect individuals, which is a^c^ainst the sup-
position, as we are speaking of a case where nature
intends to form one individual of two substances.
5. We understand also in this case which of the two
substances would have to yield, its own subsistence.
It must be the substance of the auporier nature — that
is, the inferior nature must have no last complement
of its own, but must be completed by the last comple-
ment of the superior nature ; so that the superior na-
ture's subsistence is that which completes both and
forms the individual. This is called substantial union,
which may be defined : the union of two substances
both made to subsist by a single subsistence, that of
one of the substances united.
The substantial union of the body and the soul in
man means that, so long as the body is actually united
250 ElemetUs of Intellectual Philosophy
to the soul, it has no subsistence of its own, but sub-
sists on the substance of the soul ; that the soul gives
its own coinplcment to the body, and has the owner-
ship of both, and of the acts of both, is responsible for
them, and is exclusive and incommunicable to all
others.
The proof of this truth lies in the fact that man is
considered by all as one individual. We do not say
the hand of Raphael painted that Madonna, the hand
of Apelles made that statue, the hand of Homer
wrote the Iliad and the hand of Pope translated it,
but Raphael made that Madonna, Apelles made that
statue. Homer wrote the Iliad and Pope translated
it ; because, although these actions were done im-
mediately by their hands, guided by their mind, which
conceived their masterpieces, yet the actions of either
are and must be attributed to one individuality, be-
cause both the body and the soul of those geniuf s
subsisted in one subsistence, that of the highest prin-
ciple in them — the soul.
We conclude, therefore, with the poet :
"Then dwelleth she not therein as in a tent,
Nor as a pilot in his ship doth sit,
Nor as the spider in his web is pent.
Nor as the wax retains the print in it,"
but is substantially united to the body, inasmuch as
it causes it to subsist of its own subsistence, so that
both form one individuality and one person.
ARTICLE FOURTH.
Of MatCs Essence,
Q. What is man's essence ?
A. The essence of man consists in those elements
which are absolutely necessary actually to constitute
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 251
man. Ikit for this three things are necessary : an in-
telhgent soul, a body, and a substantial union between
them in the sense just explained. By these three
constituents of his essence is man distinguished from
all other animals, to which he seems to bear a certain
likeness. Inasmuch as he has a body he is like to
animals, but is distinguished from them inasmuch as
he is endowed with a rational soul. Again, inasmuch
as he is a rational substance he agrees with all intelli-
gent substances, and differs from them in consequence
of his possessing a body ; hence by his essence man is
placed as a link between the pure, intelligent sub-
stances and the sensitive substances, thus binding to-
gether the chain of beings which the Creator has
mode.
*' How poor, how rich, how abject, how august.
Mow complicate, how wonderful is man !
How passint>; wonder He who made him such !
Who centred in our make such strin\^c extremes^
From dilFcrent natures niaivellously mixt,
Conne tion exquisite of distant worlds !
Distinguished link in being's endless chain 1
Midvsay from nothing to the Deity !
A beam ethereal, sully 'd, and absorpt f
'1 ho' sullj-'d and dishonored, still divine!
Dim miniature of greatness absolute !
An heir of gl jry ! a frail cliild of dust !
lleli)lcss immortal ! insect infinite!
A worm ! a god ! "
— Young.
It is clear from all we have said that the genetic
definition of man may be the following: An indi-
viduality rr'^ulting from tivo substances, a body and a
rational soul.
We say genetic, because this definition gives the
genesis ..rcording to which man is formed, yet we
shall retain the more conmion definition, that of
rational animal.
CHAPTER II.
ON Tim PRINCIPLES FROM WHICH THE NATURE OF MAN
RESULTS—SOUL AND BODY— AND, FIRST, OF THE SOUL.
ARTICLE FIRST.
The Sold is not a Material but a Simple Being,
Q. How shall vvc proceed in the knowledge of the
soul?
A. Havinij seen that there are two principles which
form man, and beginning to treat of the soul as the
principal part of man, we must remark that we are so
made by nature that, when we cannot perceive things
directly in themselves, we endeavor to become ac-
quainted with them by removing things from them
and by comparing them with other objects — that is to
say, by investigating which things agree with thosj
we want to know and which things do not. Now; it
is certain that the soul is in the body, and that it is
distinct from it, and yet we cannot perceive it directly
in itself and know that it is there, in consequence of
observing certain operations which the body could
not perform ; therefore the most natural method of
coming to the knowledge of the soul, as we cannot
perceive it in itself, is to remove from it certain things
which cannot possibly agree with its operations.
The first of these things which cannot agree with
the operations of the soul is mnleriality; hence we
must say that it is simple.
Q. What do you mean by material, simple, and
spiritual?
A. Material is that which is composed of parts
3sa
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 253
which are divisible, as bodies. Simple is that which
has no parts, and which is incapable of separation,
division, increase, or diminution. If a being not only
does not result from pc.rts, but is independent of the
body for its specific and distinctive operations, then
it is called spiritual.
Before proving that the soul is not material, we
must remark that although we have proved it to be
distinct from the body, yet this question must not be
confounded with the present, which enquires whether
this principle is of the same nature as the body,
since some philosophers have admitted that the soul,
though a distinct principle from the body, is yet
of the same nature as the body. Democritus and
Leucippus contended that it is a little globe of fire.
The Pythagoreans held that it is formed from atoms
floating in the air, and which, differently united, take
different shapes. The materialists are those who
maintain that the soul is composed of parts.
Q. Show the simplicity of the soul.
A. The soul perceives, judges, reasons, and has the
consciousness of itself and of its acts. But these
operations would be impossible if the soul were ma-
terial.
Therefore the soul is not material but simple. The
major is admitted by al! ; the minor must be proved.
And, first, the soul could not perceive if it were ma-
terial. Because all things which may be perceived
are either corporal or simple substances. But if the
soul were material it could perceive neither; tliere-
fore if the soul were material it could not perceive at
all. It could not perceive material substances ; be-
cause if it could perceive them, being itself material,
two suppositions could be made, either that each part
of the soul perceives each part of the object appre-
254 Elements of In tellectua I Ph ilosophy.
hended, or that each part of the soul perceives it whole
and entire. If the first supposition is admitted we
could never have an entire perception of the object.
But we do have entire perceptions of objects ; there-
fore the first supposition is inadmissible. The second
supposition cannot be made, because in that case we
would have as many entire perceptions of the object
as there would be parts of the soul, the same as a
glass broken in a hundred fragments ; each fragment
represents the same object whole and entire. But
this is contrary to experience, as we are conscious
that we have only one entire perception of each object
we apprehend. Therefore, if the soul were material,
it could not perceive material substances.
It could not perceive simple substances, because a
material thing, being composed of parts, could not per-
ceive that which is indivisible, except the latter could
be cut up into parts. But this is impossible, as that
which is naturally indivisible cannot be divided with-
out changing its nature ; therefore, if the soul were
material, it could not apprehend simple substances.
2. If the soul were material it could not form judg-
ments. I. Because judgment is made up of percep-
tions and ideas. But we have shown that if the soul
were material it could not perceive at all ; therefore
it could not form judgments.
2. Judgment requires that two ideas, that of the
subject and the predicate, should be compared to-
gether, put face to face, to discover whether they
agree or disagree.
But this comparison would be impossible if the soul
were material.
Therefore, if the soul were material, it could not
judge.
The minor is proved from the principle that a com-
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosopliy. 255
parisoti between two thin^js cannot be made unless
both tilings exist simultaneously in the same subject,
else how could the subject compare the two together,
put them face to face, if both did not exist in it at the
same time ? But if the substance forming the subject
were material and composed of parts, the idea of the
subject and the predicate could not be found in the
same subject, but one part would perceive one term,
the other the second term. Therefore, if the soul
were material, it could not judge,
3. It could not reason, because in reasoning it is
necessary that the same subject which perceives the
premises should draw the conclusion. But the same
subject could not be had in a material substance, as
we have proved ; therefore, if the soul were material, it
could not reason.
4. It could not have consciousness of itself and its
acts, because consciousness is a reflex operation and
takes place when the soul turns in upon itself to in-
vestigate its own actions. But matter, which has one
part outside the other, could not return upon itself;
therefore, if the soul were material, it could not have
the consciousness of itself and its actions.
Second Dcuionstration.
If the soul were corporal, all its operations would
be so many movements, because all the operations of
bodies can be reduced to movement. But the ope-
rations of the soul cannot be explained by means of
movement ; therefore the soul is not material.
That the operations of the soul cannot be explained
by means of movement is clear: i. Because no body
by means of motion moves itself, but must be moved
by another ; but the soul moves and determines itself,
as we know by experience. 2. Because the acts of
256 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy
thinking and of knowing arc immanent and terminate
in tile soul, whereas movement is a transient act, pass-
ing from one body into another ; therefore the act of
knowing is not movement.
3. The power of movement in material substances
becomes by use weaker and weaker until it ceases al-
together ; whereas the intellective faculties are per-
fected more and more by exercise.
" If rJie the body's nature did partake,
Her strength would with tlie body's strength decay;
But when the body's strong sinews shxke
The soul is most active, quick, and gay."
— Davies.
4. The soul can perceive contrary things at the same
time, so much so that by means of the knowledge of
one it comes to know the other. For instance, we ac-
quire the idea of eternity by the ideas of time and of
succession, the idea of the most perfect by that which
is imperfect, the idea of the absolute by the idea of
the contingent, etc.
Kut the same parts of the body cannot receive con-
trary movements ; therefore the operations of the soul
cannot be explained by movement.
Q. What answer would you give to a materialist
who should object to this doctrine thus : The soul is
in the body, but there can be nothing in the body ex-
cept a material thing ; therefore the soul is material ?
A. The soul is in the body as a body, each part of
which touches the corresponding parts of the body,
just as putting one hand against the other, or as fill-
ing a pitcher with water, we deny ; because if the
soul were in the body in this manner it would be ma*
teriafl. The soul is in the body inasmuch as it acts in
and upon it, we grant ; and this is the manner accord-
Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy. 257
ing to which immaterial things are in space and
matter.
Second Objection.
The soul is subject to the same vicissitudes as the
body, and the faculty of intelligence is developed in
man according to the age, sex, temperament, and dis-
position of the individual; therefore it is clear that
the soul must be of the same nature as tlie body.
A. As we shall see by and by, in consequence of
the union between the body and the soul the hitter
must depend upon the body as the instrument which
furnishes the materials for its operations. Therefore.
it the body is tiny and weak, old and '"lulty, the
instrument also which furnishes the materials for the
soul's operation is tiny, weak, old, and faulty; and
hence the operations of tlie soul cannot be performed
at all, or performed imperfectly, not because the
soul is the same as the body or of the same nature,
but because the body in those conditions cannot fur-
nish the proi)er materials to the soul. Deprive
Raphael, for instance, of canvas and pencil and col-
ors, or give him the worst canvas and pencil and
colors you could find, and, no matter how granci
his conceptions might be in his mind, he cotdd
not carry them out or express them. Likewise,
great as the native power of intelligence may be, yet,
if to come from the power to the act, it needs ma-
terials administered to it by the body ; if the body is
in such a state as to be unable to furnish tiiose ma-
terials, the power will remain power and never come
to the act, not for want of native force (jr because it is
of a material nature, but because the material is want-
ing in conse([uence of the want in the instrument.
258 Elcme7its of hitcllechial Philosophy.
"Tlicsc imperfections, then, we must impute
Not to the ajjent but to the instrument ;
Wc must not blame Apollo, but his lute,
If false accords Irom false strings be sent.
The soul in all hath one intelligence,
Though too much moisture in an infant's brain,
And too much dryness in an old man's sense,
Cannot the prints of outward thiii,ns retain.
Then doth the soul want work and idle sit :
And this wc childness and dotage call ,
Yet hath she then a quiet and active wit,
If she had stulFand tools to work withal."
— Davies.
ARTICLE THIRD.
On the Spirituality of the Soul.
Q. If the soul is not material, can you say, r.t least,
that it depends on the body for its being and ts spe-
cific operations ?
A. No ; but we must hold that the human soul has
a subsistence of its own independent of the body,
and, therefore, is spiritual. Proof:
I. That which acts by itself subsists by itself. But
the soul has operations which it performs independent-
ly of the body — the operation of intelligence ; there-
fore the soul subsists by itself.. The minor is proven,
because, from the objects perceived, it is certain that
the soul can understand the nature of all bodies. But
if the soul were a body, and used bodily orphans, it
could not perform such operations ; therefore in
these operations the soul does not depend upon the
body. In fact, as St. Thomas remarks, that subject
which can know something must not contain in its
nature any element of those things it wants to know,
otherwise that element which would naturally be
found in it would hinder the knowledge of other
V 1
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 259
things, as we see in the tongues of sick people, covered
witli bitter coating: they cannot taste anything
sweet, but everything tastes bitter. If, therefore, the
intellectual principle had the nature of a body it could
not know the nature of all bodies.
Again, how can she several bodies know
If in herself a body's form she bear?
How can a mirror sundry faces show,
If from all shapes and forms it be not clear?
Nor could wc by our eyes all colors learn,
Except our eyes were of all colors void ;
Nor sundry tastes can any tongue discern
Which is with gross and bitter humors cloy'd."
— Davies.
2. If our souls were not independent of the body in
their operations tlicy could not have universal per-
ceptions. But they do have universal perceptions ;
therefore they do not depend upon the body for
their operations. The major is proven : That which
is received into any recipient must take the form of
the recipient. But matter is contracted and particu-
lar; therefore whatever is receivxid in it must take a
contracted and particular form. If, therefore, the
soul depended upon matter for its operation, all the
forms it could take would be contracted and particular.
3. The will has a tendency after intellectual and in-
corporeal good, and is not confined to this or that par-
ticular good, but is drawn towards good in general or
to whatever object in which it can see an element or
feature of goodness. But if the soul depended upon
the organs of the body for its operations, this would be
impossible, because bodily organs always tend toward
some individual object, and never toward general and
abstract objects ; therefore the soul is independent of
the bodily organs in its operations.
26o Ele7iients of Intellectual Philosophy,
4. Wc oftentimes are conscious of a hard struggle
going on between the body i?.nd the soul, and observe
thdt when it wishes the soul can repress, and does in
fact repress, tlie movements of the body. Now, this
is a clear sign that the soul can act independently of
the body; therefore the soul is spiritual.
Q. What remarks are to be made upon what has
been said ?
A. I. That opinion of Locke, Hume, Condillac,
which holdj that a soul is not a substance by itself,
but an aggregate of modifications, is false ; because
we have proved that the soul is a substance, as it has a
subsistence of its own independent of the body.
2. That the opinion of Locke, who doubted whether
it would not be possible for matter to think, is absurd,
because to know and to understand is the act of an.
immaterial subject exclusively ; consequently, not even
God Almighty, as Locke thought, can cause matter to
think, because God cannot effect a contradiction.
3. The human soul has an existence independent
of the body; but it has also sensitive faculties. Now,
as these stand in nedd of the body to perform their
functions, it follows that the soul in man, inasmuch as
it is sensitive, is dependent upon the body in the
sense that it must be united to corporal organs and
stands in"need of them to experience sensibility.
"Mysterious thought, swift angel of the mind !
By space unbounded, though to space coniin'd,
I low dost thou glow with just disdain, how scora •
That thought could ever think thee earthly born I
Thou who canst distance motion in thy flight,
Wing with aspiring plume the wondrous height,
Swifter than light outspeed the flame of day,
Pierce tlirough dark profound and shame the darting ray ,
Throughout the universal systems range,
New form old systems, and new systems change ;
Elements of Intellechial Pli ilosophy, 2 6 1
Through nature traffic on, from pole to pole,
And stamj) new worlds on thy dilated soul ;
(By time unlimited, unbounded by space,)
Sure demonstration of thy heavenly lacc ;
periv'd from that which is derived from none.
Which ever is but of Himself alone."
— Brooke, Universal Beatity,
ARTICLE TIIIKI).
Hoiv the Human Soul Originates.
Q. How docs man's soul originate ?
A. The soul being a spiritual substance, entirely
different from the body, we may ask, How does it ori-
ginate? Is it produced in the same manner as the
body, and by the same principles?
There have been several answers to this question.
Omitting that of the Emanatists, who held that the
soul emanated from the divine substance, as we shall
refute this opinion when speaking against pantheism,
we mention the opinion of the Traducians and that of
some Catholic philosophers. The Traducians main-
tained that the soul of a chihl is transmitted to him
from the body of the parents; and others, from the
soul. Rosmini holds that the soul of a child, inasmuch
as it is a sensitive substance, is transmitted by genera-
tion, and that it becomes afterward rational and intel-
lective by the apparition of the idea of being which
God exhibits before it. Now, all these opinions are
false.
The first is false because bodies cannot give that
which they have not — a thing transcending their na-
ture. But such would be the case if souls were trans-
mitted from the parents* bodies, because souls are
spiritual, the body is material. The body, therefore,
would give that which it has not — that which trans-
cends its own nature and power. It would produce
262 Elements of Intellectual P/i ilosophy,
an c fleet mk- ' r i iM * to its cause ; therefore it is absurd to
hold that souls could be transmitted from the body.
The second opinion, which holds that souls are
transmitted from the parents' soul, is also false.
I. Because the parents' souls are spiritual ; but a i.pir-
itual substance cannot generate — that is, be divided
and corru[)ted — as it has no parts; therefore, etc.
2. If we do not admit that they are generated from
the parents' souls as parts detached from them, we
can make two suppositions: They must either be cre-
ated from nothing by the parents' soul (an opinion
which has been recently broached by Dr. Frohscam-
mer), or we must say that the soul of the parent must
draw them out from some existing matter. Hut nei-
ther supposition is possible. Not the first, because
creation from nothing belongs to God alone:
" For all (liiiifjcs made are cither made of naught
Or nade of stiifTthat ready-inaJc doth stand ;
Of i.;ui.;;ht nn crcr.furo ever forme 1 ai;;;ht,
For th.it is ijropcr to ihc Almighty hand."
The second suppc sition cannot be admitted, because
forms drawn out from matter are always depending
upon it and accidental, not self-subsisting, as the srul.
The opinion of Rosmini is also false, because, I. It
is impossible that the sensitive soul should be derived
from the parents' by way of generation. The nature
of the human soul is one intcHcctual, sensitive, and
vegetative. But it is proper to every being to be pro-
duced in the same manner as its being becomes it ;
therefore for one being it is becoming to be produced
by one agent, especially when this one being is simple
and cannot be divided into parts nor produced suc-
cessively — that is, first one part and then another;
therefore the same principle which produces the intel-
ligent must produce the sensitive and vegetative soul.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 263
2. Eitlicr the sensitive soul, which becomes rational
by tlie apparition of bein^, is destroyed when it be-
comes rational or it is not destroyed. If it is de-
stroyed, then God creates a new soul ; if it is not
destroyed, then we may encpiire Mow is it that it be-
comes, alonjj with the rational soul, one simple and
spiritual being? Doer it change its essence? In
fact, it changes and it does not change its essence. It
changes, inasmuch as the sensitive soul in the suppo-
sition would have another essence and would belong
to another species ; it does not change it, inasmuch
as the sensitive soul would not be destroyed. In that
case it would and would not be. But this is a con-
tradiction ; therefore the opinion of Rosmini is false.
Having excluded all possible suppositions which
might be supposed to account for the origin of the
soul, we must conclude that it is created by God.
" Tlicn if her heavenly form do not agree
With ;iny matter which the world contains,
Then she of nothin^tj must created be ;
And 10 create to God alone pertains."
— Da.'IES.
Objection : If the parent were not the originator of
both body and soul, he could not be said to be the
father of the child, but only the father of the body of
the child.
In answering wc distinguish: If the soul wore not
united to the body at the moment of generation — a
union which causes the action of the father to ter-
minate in a human person — it is granted ; otherwise it
is denied. If the father generated the body of the
chilli first, and this existed by itself as a distinct indi-
viduality for some time, then the objection would
stand ; but the case is otherwise. At the same mo-
ment that the father generates, at that very same in-
2 64 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
stant what is being generated is united substantially
to a si)iritual soul created by God, so that what the
father generates is not an individuality apart from
the soul, but is an individuality, because the soul
makes it subsist of its own subsistence. Therefore
Wvi objection does not stand, because the father's ac-
tion terminates in one individuality and personality
by the union with the soul, and therefore must he be
called the father of the child and not of his body.
ARTICLE FOURTH.
When docs the Soul Begin to be ?
Q. What arc the opinions of philosophers as to the
time when the soul takes its origin ?
A. Pythagoras and i^lato maintained that Immaa
souls, before they were united to a body, lived a bet-
ter life in the stars, and that they would be there still
were it not that some of them became guilty of a
grave crime, and were in consequence cast away from
heaven and condemned to be enclosed in the body as
in a dark dungeon, with the additional penalty of
losing all remembrance of their former state.
Leibnitz held that all the souls of men who were to
be born were created by God since the beginning of the
world and were ci. closed in so many tiny bodies, which
were the germs of their own bodies contained in
Adam, which germs, evolving in the course of time
and actpilring the proper size, constitute men's bodies.
Q. What are we to think of these opinions?
A. That both are false. As to the fust, it is evi-
dent that according to this opinion the union of the
soul and body would be against nature. Now, this
is false, because the union of the soul and body is
intended by nature as the object of generation. But
Elements of Intcllcciiial Ph ilosophy. 265
what is intcncled as the object of a natural action can-
not be unnatural; therefore the union of the soul and
bodv nuist be natural.
2. It follows from this opinion that the union of
the soul and body is accidental ; but we have shown
that it is a substantial union.
3. As there are no proofs allejjed in confirmation of
this opinion as to the pre-existencc of soul, since,
according to these philosophers, Ave have lost all
memory of such a state, we have reason to reject it
as a fiction or dream.
Against the second opinion we observe :
1. The animal is said to be engendered when the
soul is united to the body, but, according to the
opinion of Leibnitz, this could not be in the case of
man, because the animal in his case would already
exist ; therefore in this case we cannot say that the
animal is generated.
2. The principle of sufTicient reason has a great
weight with Leibnitz, but no sufficient reason can be
produced why the soul of men should be created be-
fore man's generation — there is no sufficient reason
why the soul should exist without action for so long a
time; therefore the opinion of Leibnitz is false.
3. We observe also that it is a mere hypothesis,
without any foundation in reality.
Q. What is the true opinion?
A. That the soul is created by God at the moment
when the matter which is to form the body is fit to
receive it. IJut there are two opinions about this pre-
cise moment. Some, like the ancients, liave said that
that moment means when the body is fully organized,
which they suppose to be forty days after the concep-
tion for males and eighty days for females.
Others — and this opinion is held by all modern phy-
266 Elements of Inkllectnal Philosophy,
sioloj^ists and metaphysicians — say that that moment
is when tlic germ administered by the female is fecun-
dated by the male.
The reasons for this opinion arc most convincing:
I. It is impossible that the matter administered by
the female and fecundated by the male could begin to
be organized without an interior living principle.
•* Opera enim vitai non possuntesse a principio extrin-
sic© sicut sentiri, nutriri et augeri " (St. Thomas, qu.
cxviii. art. 2). The acts of life, such as to feel, to be
nourished, and to grow, cannot originate in an extrinsic
principle. Therefore, in order to obtain the process
of organization, we may admit a twofold hypothesis,
either that the soul is there at the moment of the
conception to begin as the interior principle the pro-
cess of organization, or that another internal principle
effects this process and makes way for the soul when
the organization is completed. But the second hypo-
thesis is absurd ; therefore the soul is there at the
moment of the conception. 2. If the soul were united
to the body at any other moment than that of the fecun-
dation, then the parents could not be called the gene-
rators of a human person, but only of a body destined
to be united to a soul and to form a person after the
union, because it is evident that the generative action
of the parents would not terminate in a human person
so long as the soul is not there contemporaneously with
the action. Ikit this is against the common sense of
mankind, who feel and hold firmly that the parents of
a man are the parents of his personality and not of his
body only ; therefore, etc.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 267
ARTICLE FIFTH.
On the Immortality of the Soul.
Q. What remarks ought to be made before proving
the immortality of the soul?
A. The following: i. That a living being which
has no end to its duration is called immortal^ and this
property immortality.
2. ImnMjrtality may become a living being either
essentially or naturally or by grace. It becomes es-
sentially only that being who exists by necessity of
his nature, and whose existence is identical with his
essence, so that his non-existence would be a contra-
diction. This being is God. It becomes naturally
that being which, though not existing by necessity
of nature, is yet so constituted that it cannot cease to
be except by annihilation effected by almighty power.
It becomes by grace that being which God by His
own grace maintains in existence, though naturally
prone to dissolution.
The second manner of immortality becomes the
soul. To demonstrate, therefore, the immortality of
the soul we have to show three things: i, that it is
naturally indestructible ; 2, that it continues to act
even after its separation from the body; 3, that it
cannot be annihilated by any external cause.
As to the first, a thing may be intrinsically de-
stroyed for two reasons — either because it is composed
of parts distinct from each other, which, once discon-
nected and separated, the thing perishes; or because,
though not composed of parts, it may depend like the
accident on something else, which being destroyed,
it is itsflf destroyed.
But the human r.oul is neither of these things*
therefore it is intrinsically indestructible.
268 Elements of Intellectual 1 'hilosophy.
The minor has to prove that the human soul is not
composed of parts and'-that it is not an accident.
1. Tiuit which is simple is not composed of parts ;
but the soul is simple, therefore it is not composed of
parts.
2. That which subsists of itself is not an accident
dependent upon any other object in order to exist.
lUit the soul subsists in itself.
The jfore it is not an accident dependent upon the
body in order to exist.
As' to the second, that the soul separated from the
body continues to act :
Operation is the action of a substance.
But the soul is a substance, and continues to exist
after the body has been destroyed.
Therefore the soul, after the dissolution of the
body, continues to act.
But action follows the nature of a being.*
Therefore the soul continues the actions, after the
dissolution of the body, agreeably to its nature as a
rational substance, which are acts of intelligence and
will.
" But (as the body h'ving) wit and will
Can judge and choose without the body's aid,
Though on sucli objects they are working still
As through tlie body's organs are convey 'd,
So wlicn the body serves her turn no more.
And all her senses are extinct and gone,
She can discourse of what she learned before,
In heavenly contemplation all alone."
—Davif.s.
Thirdly, we have to prove that the soul is extrin-
sically immortal — that there is no exterior cause which
may destroy it.
• Oferaiio stquiiur «tse.
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 269
The extrinsical cause which might annihilate the
soul may be either a creature or God.
But the creature cannot, and God will not, annihi-
late the soul.
Therefore no exterior cause can destroy the soul.
The first part of the minor is clear.
. The destructive force of a creature is of a piece with
its productive force.
But the creature cannot produce anything out of
nothing; therefore it cannot reduce anything to no-
thing.
That God will not annihilate the soul is also evi-
dent ; for if we regard the power of God in itself,
without reference to His other attributes, God could
annihilate souls as well as other creatures, because a
finite being is in itself indifferent to be and not to be,
and that which fixes it in being is the creative act of
God, and it continues to exist as long as the creative
act continues to determine it to existence. If that
act were withdrawn the creature would immediately
cease to exist.
]Jut looking at the power of God in relation to His
other attributes, we deny that He could annihilate the
soul.
Proof: To annihilate the soul would be contrary to
His providence, wisdom, goodness, and justice ; but
God cannot do anything contrary to these attributes,
therefore God cannot annihilate the soul.
Proofs of the major : i. It is contrary to providence
and wisdom. It behooves the providence and wisdom
of God not to destroy those natural qualities which He
Himself has given to beings, nor deprive essences of
those properties which become them. But immortal-
ity becomes the soul and all other spiritual substances ;
2 yo Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy,
therefore to annihilate the soul would be against the
wisdom and providence of God.
It would be contrary to His goodness.
We have an imperative, ardent, continual desire
after happiness — a desire which cannot be said to be
found only in this or that man, at this or that time,
in this or that place, but is found in all men, at
all times, and in all places. This desire, therefore,
being so universal in time and space, must be said to
have been implanted in man's nature by the Creator's
hand, because whatever is universal in all times and
places is natural and must come from nature's Author.
But this craving after happiness could not be satis-
fied without the soul's immortality ; it behooves,
therefore, God's goodness to keep the soul immortal.
That the craving after happiness could not be satis-
fied without immortality is proved from two reasons :
I. Because happiness is the perfect fulness of inter-
minable life, and if one could entertain the thought
for a moment that this .ulncss of life could after cer-
tain time cease even for a day, the joy resulting from
that exuberant overflow and fulness of life would be
marred and be overcome by the unutterable pain of
having to lose it, and thus it would cease to be hap-
piness.
2. We have an imperative, insatiable craving after
truth and perfection.
" Dive into the l)ottom of the soul, the base
Sustaining all ; what find wc ? Knowledge and love.
As light and heat essential to the sun,
These to the soul ; and why, if souls expire ? "
—Young.
But if the soul is not immortal this craving could
not be satisfied, as nothing in this world can appease
Ele7Hen(s of hitellcctual Ph ilosophy. 271
it. One thing can fill up that void, and one thing
only: it is the contemplation of infinite truth, of im-
mense beauty, and the possession of infinite and most
enticing loveliness — that is, the vision and the posses-
sion of God.
" How littio lovely here ! IIow little known !
JSinall knowledge we tlig up with endless toil,
And love unfeigned may purchase perieci hate ;
Why starved on eariii our angel appetites
While brutal are indulged their fulsome fill ?
Were their capacities divine conferred,
As mock diadem in savage sport?
Rank insult of our pompous /^^rr;//,
Which reaps but pain fioin set ming claims so fair?
In future ages lies no redress ? And shuts
Eternity tiie door on our complaint ?
This cannot be. To love and kno-u> in man
Is boundless appetite and boundless power,
And these demonsiiate boundless powers, too.
Objects, power, appetites— Heaven suits all."
— Young.
It is contrary to justice.
It IS an established fact that on earth there are
good and wicked men ; it is also certain that Divine
justice must give a fitting reward to virtue and due
punishment to vice. But we do not observe this just
and equitable distribution of rewards and punish-
me:its, because too often we see the wicked prosper and
enjoy the fruits of their iniquities, whilst frequently
we see the just oppressed and down-trodden by the
wicked. There must be, therefore, another life after
the body is dissolved, where the accounts will be
balanced, where the rewards and punishments will be
distributed equitably according to the good and t*vil
which men have done. But if the sotd were not im-
mortal this future life would be impossible; there-
fore it behooves tlie justice of God to keep the soul
immortal.
272 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
It will not do to say that a fitting reward of the just
is the peace and tranquillity of conscience and the
satisfaction and pleasure which accompany the doing
of good, and, on the contniry, that the fitting punish-
ment of vice is the remruse of conscience wliich follows
crime; because this reward and punishment would be
reduced to very small proportions. IJesidcs, we know
by cxpcrienro that the more the wicked man plunges
into vice the less lie feels the pangs of conscience, and
we know also that it is not always true that the just
feels peace and tranquillity; he is too often agitated
by doubts, perplexities, and scruples suggested to his
n^ind by his over-delicate conscience, and is tossed to
and fro by a variety of conflicting emotions, so as to
feel very little peace. In this case Avhere would his
reward be? And when the just has to suffer death
for the sake of his principles, what would then be his
reward ? It is clear, therefore, that the pleasure of
doing good is not a fitting reward of virtue, nor the
remorse of conscience a proportionate doom for vice.
" The soul, of origin divine,
God's glorious image freed from clay,
In heaven's eternal sphere shall shine,
A star of day.
" The sun is but a spark of fire,
A transient meteor in the sky ;
The soul, immortal as its sire,
Shall never die."
— MoNTnOMRRY.
Q. Give the definition of the soul.
A. We may define the soul in general to be that first
principle of life in those things which by experience we
know to be living. To illustrate this definition we must
remark first that of bodies some are living and some
are not living. Those are called living which move
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 273
themselves in force of an interior princii)lc ; not living
are those whicii are moved by an exterior principle.
Now, this principle of life interior to livin,c; bod'cs is
calleil by a general name, soul. Jiut not every princi-
ple of life may b< called soul, because, thou<jh some
other part of tlie body may be a [jrinciple of life, such
as the heart in nvm, yet that part would not be called
soul. The soul must be the first i)rinciple of life. We
have said, finally, in those tliiiii^s lohicli we know by ex-
perience to live^ because (lod also lives ; spiritual sub-
stances entirely separated from matter live, yet they
arc not called souls, because we do not know them
by experience. From the definition of soul in
general we may frame the definition of the human
soul. If the soul be the first principle of life, it is
clear that this life is different in different animals in
proportion as life is manifested in them. IJut in
man all kinds of life arc manifested, vegetative, sen-
sitive, and intellectual ; therefore the human soul
must be the principle of these three kinds of life, and
may be defined that first principle by ivhieJi man vege-
tates, feels, and reasons. Or it maybe defined in the
words of St. Augustine, which amount to the same:
" A certain substance endowed with reason and fit to
govern a body." * It is called substance to show that
it is not an aggregate of qualities or modifications;
endowed with reason, by whicli it is to he understood
that it is simple, spiritual, ingenerable, incorruptible,
and immortal ; fit to govern a body, because the
human soul is destined to form a whole with the body
which it animates.
* " Sulmtantia quxdnm ratinnif particeps rcgcndo corpori accommoda.a." — Dt
Quantilalt Animct, q\\, iii, n. 22.
CHAPTER III.
OF I IJI-: HUMAN noDY.
Q. How must \vc> treat of the body in i)hiIosopliy?
A. Various sciences treat of tlje liunian botly, sucli
as analouiy, pliysioioi^y, etc. ; but in philosoijliy \vc
must treat of the human body in rehition to that
wiiich is first and sujireme in it, because philosophy
treats of things accordin;^ to their supreme causes.
Now, tiiat which is sui)reme in tiie body is its relation
to the soul witii whicli it is united and which it serves;
lience wc shall say a few tlun^^s respcctinij this rela-
tion and aptitude. i. I'lic liuinan body is the most per-
fect of all liviiii^ bodies in couseqiience of tins relation to
the soul. \\\ the univi-rse there is a woiuhrrful con-
nection nmotif^ bei»v.js. We find always that that whicli
is the least and most inferior element of a supreme
j^enus touches the boundaries of that whicli is the su-
preme part of an inferior '^<rnus. This is clearly seen in
the ^^cnus animal. The least of this f^enus, likcr the
moUusks, which liave barely the sense of touch and are
affixed to the earth like plants, touch the cf)nfines of
the supreme one of the inferior ^enus, livinij^ or plant,
such as the polypsjs and the corals. Accordiii'^ to this
theory, therefore, we must admit, in the pjenus of cor-
poral thin<4s, bodies snp(;rior to all others and more
noble, such as touch on the boundaries of the least
amonjf spiritual things, and that is the human body;
therefore the human body is the most perfect and
noble of all living bodies.
'74
Elements of Intellectual Pk ilosophy. 275
•' Look nature tliroii;(h ; 'lis neat gradation all.
Hy wliat iiiinuti; d(Krci;s her scale ascends!
Kacli middle naiure joined at each exirouie,
'i'u that alcove joined, to tliat beneath :
Parts into parts reciprcically siiot
Abhor divorce ; wiiat love of union rcijjns I
Here dormant matter waits u call to life ;
Half life, half death, joined there. I!er«: life and sense ;
'Iherc sense frum reason steals a giitnmerinK rn) •
Reason shines in man."
— YouNd.
Q. In wliat (Iocs this perfection consist ?
A. In the j^reatest possible variety of or^^ans. Be-
cause the body is made for the soul. Now, the soul
stands in need of the body for this reason, tlfat, not
possessinp^ truth in itself, it must acquire it from sensi-
ble objects; hence the necessity of the senses and of
the faculty of feeling. But the operation of fcelinj^
cannot be performed without corporal organs; hence
the need of corporal organs ; and as the faculty of
feelinj^ is manifold, various, therefore must be the
orfjans (jf feeling. Hut all these or^^-lns nmst be sub-
ject to ii j,'eneral organ mf)st excpn'sitely made, in
order that it: may feel • ""erent and contrary sensa-
tions and brine; them to .nity. This common and
general sense is the touch. Of these senses, and espe-
cially of the touch, we shall speak in the second part of
Anthropology. Wc conclude for the present that the
human body is sitperior to all living bodies, because
no other can feel so exquisitely and so delicately as
the human body, and because of the variety of its
organs, superior in their nature, structure, uses, and
functions to those of all other living bodies.
• -:.)'- CHAPTER IV. .^'
OF r/r^ MANNER ACCORDING TO WHICH THE SOUL AND
THE BODY ARE UNITED TOGETHER AND CONSPIRE TO
FORM MAN. ,,,....
ARTICLE FIRST.
Ufiion of the Body and Soul as to Being — Seat of the
Soul. . , ■
Q. Under how many aspects may we consider the
union of the soul and the body? ' '■■■' ""':
A. Under two aspects: the soul is united to the
body as to being and as to action. As to being, we
have seen that both soul and body form one complete
substance, that both substances, the body and the
soul, meet together in one single subsistence — that
of the soul — so that the soul causes the body to have
actual reality and existence. Hence the soul has
been called the living and substantial form, or the
actuality of the body. Of this we have spoken before,
but closely connected with the present topic is the
question of the seat of the soul. Since the soul is the
living form of the body, it must be somewhere in the
body. But where? Philosophers have answered this
question in different ways. Descartes held that the
seat of the soul was in the pineal gland, whence, as
upon a throne, it gives direction and movement to the
whole machine. A poet has wittily expressed this
opinion as follows :
** Alma, they strenuously maintain,
Sits cock-horse on her throne, the brain,
376
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 277
(T
And from that seat of thought dispenses ''; '
Her sovereign pleasure to the senses.
Two optic nerves they say she ties
Like spectacles across the eyes,
By which the spirits bring her word
Whene'er the balls are fixed or stirred. . .
Wise nature likewise, they suppose,
Has drawn two conduits down our nose ;
Could Alma else with judgment tell
When cabbage stinks or roses smell?
By nerves about our palate placed
She likewise judges of the taste ;
Else (dismal thought !) our warlike men
Might drink thick port for fine champagne.
Hence, too, that she might better hear,
She sets a drum at either ear,
And loud or gentle, harsh or sweet,
Are but th' a/a;-?/;;/j which they beat. '
Last, to enjoy her sense of feeling
(A thing she most delights to deal in),
A thousand little nerves she sends
Quite to our toes and fingers' ends ;
And these in gratitude again
Return their spirits to the brain,
In which their figure being printed
(As just before I think I hinted).
Alma informed can try the case, '
As she had been upon the place."
— Prior, Alma,
Others maintain that the soul is in tlie heart, and
others in some other part of the body.
Now, all these opinions which locate the soul in a
particular part of the body are necessarily false, be-
cause you can locate, enclose, surround, circumscribe,
bound off only that which is extended, as that which
is extended, having parts, can be surrounded by cor-
responding parts of another body. That which is ,
simple cannot be surrounded, not having parts which
can be circumscribed by parts of a body. Hence
those who locate the soul in a particular part of the
278 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
body and enclose it therein have been rightly accused
of making the soul material. ^ ■■, ■-:'.■'■■'■ :, ,
The true opinion is that the soul is whole and en-
tire in the whole body, and whole and entire in each
part of the body. This doctrine of the Christian
schools of the Middle Ages has been cried down by
modern wiseacres ; but reason is on the side of the
Christian schools. In order to illustrate and prove
the scholastic doctrine we must recall a few princi-
ples:
1. That the soul is simple and cannot be divided
into parts.
2. That simple things abide in a place not by con-
tact of extension but contact of action.* We say
that a thing is in space by contact of extension when
the parts of this thing are located in, and put in jux-
taposition with, the corresponding part of space. If I
lay a book on the table, the different parts forming
the extension of the book touch the corresponding
parts of the table. The book, therefore, is on the
table by contact of extension. Now, when a thing
is simple and has no parts, it is evident that it can-
not be in a place by contact of extension, when this
very extension is wanting to it ; it can only be in a
place by acting upon or in it. Having recalled these
principles, it is easy to demonstrate our thesis.
1. Incorporal things are said to be in space not by
contact of extension but by contact of action. But
the soul acts in the whole body ; therefore the soul is
in the whole body. v' , .^ .
2. The soul is the substantial form of the body, in-
asmuch as it makes it real and living ; therefore the
soul is in the whole body.
'I' " Incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum quantitatis, sed per contactum vir^
tutis."— St. Thomas.
Elements of Intellectual Phibsophy. 2 79
3. Demonstration that the soul is whole and entire
in each part of the body.
The soul acts not only in the whole body but also
in each part of the body. Now, if it were not whole
and entire in each part of the body, it would have to
divide itself and be part in one part of the body and
part in another. But this is impossible, because the
soul is simple ; therefore the soul is whole and entire
in each part of the body. ' ■ '"
Q. Please to illustrate this point by analogy.
A. Great opposition has been raised against this
doctrine because persons want to see this truth by
imagination ; by figuring to themselves how can it be
that a being is whole and entire in the whole and in
each part of the body, forgetting that we cannot form
any sensible image of a spiritual fact. Yet, to en-
able the student to perceive this truth, we shall make
use of some comparisons. Take, for instance, light.
Light, apparently, is in the air in the same manner
as the soul is in the body. First, it penetrites the
whole air through and impregnates it with its beams;
secondly, it seems to be whole and entire in each par-
ticle of air. This is gathered from two facts : first,
when air is divided light remains whole and entire, aS
in each particle of air the same amount of light is
seen ; secondly, when air becomes foul and corrupted
light continues always pure.
" But as the fair and cheerful morning light
Doth here and there her silver beams impart,
And in an instant doth herself unite f ?>;;,- t
To the transparent air in all and every part —
Still resting whole when blows the air divide,
Abiding pure when th' air is most corrupted ;
Throughout the air her beams dispersing wide,
And when the air is tossed not interrupted —
.-(■..
2 8o Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
> So doth the piercing soul the body fill,
Being all in all, and all in part diifus'd ;
Indivisible, incorruptible still,
Nor forc'd, encounter'd, troubled, or confused."
— Davies.
Take another instance. An orator is speaking be-
fore a large audience ; he develops his subject with
the greatest force and earnestness, and his audience
are enlightened and carried away with enthusiasm. His
voice, which is but a sound, is divided, each one of the
audience receiving more or less ; those who are nearest
to the orator receiving a stronger sound, those furi:hest
from him the least sound — each, in one word, receiving
a varied quantity of sound. But thought is indivisible,
and each one of the hearers receives it whole and
entire, all equally, those who sit near as well as those
who are afar. Because thought — that is, that which is
spiritual — is indivisible ; wherever it penetrates it must
penetrate whole and entire ; wherever a spirit exists it
must exist whole and entire. It is the same of the soul,
which is a spirit. It communicates itself to all the
parts of the. body, it lives in each of them, and
wherever it is it must be whole and entire. .; o,i
Take another example. My mind develops a
thought, and after this one another thought, and then
another, and so on, a great number of thoughts follow-
ing one another, agreeing with one another or clashing
with one another. In each of these thoughts, in each
of these intellecLual acts, my rr'iid is whole and
entire; and yet it differs in each one of them, being
sometimes right, sometimes wrong, sometimes false,
other times true; in other words, my intelligence
manifests itself in different ways, though it is whole
and entire in each. Now, the same must be said of the
soul. It acts in one way in one organ, and in another
Elements of Intellectual Pk ilosophy. 2 8 1
organ in another way, but in every act and in every
mode of acting it is itself which acts, and itself whole
and entire ; it is its activity which appears in all these
different modes.
■ '.'.■•'..'
>. -.' ' ' ARTICLE SECOND. . , , ,
Of the Union of the Soul and Body as to Action.
Q. Is there a union of the body and soul as to
action ? .... ,^ ., ., ; ,
A. That there should be a union and a mutual cor-
respondence of action between two beings, one of
which subsists on the subsistence of the other, is evi-
dent from reason and is confirmed by experience.
For we know by experience that, given certain
thoughts and feelings of the soul, certain correspond-
ing movements result in the body; and, vice versdy
given a certain state of the body, a corresponding state
manifests itself in the soul. This mutual correspon-
dence between the soul and the body as to their
action has been called communication or commercium.
Q. How *j this communication between the soul
and the body explained?
A. Various systems have been invented to explain
this mutual influence of the soul over the body, and
vice versd, but they may be reduced to five : occa-
sionalism^ pre-established harmony, plastic mediator ship,
physical influx, and substantial union. '■■' -i ::-.
Q. Explain and give your opinion of the first system.
A. It was taught by Malebranche, who started from
a principle of his own, that in the universe there are
no efficient causes and that God alone does every-
thing. From this principle he concluded that neither
the soul can really act upon the body nor the latter
on the soul, as neither of them can be real agents.
282 Elements of Intellectual Ph ilosophy.
Against this doctrine the opponents of Malebranche
said : If what you say is true, if God alone acts in
every being, and consequently neither the soul can
act upon the body nor the body upon the soul, how
do you explain that harmony and correspondence
which exists between the soul and the body ? — for when
certain thoughts and feelings arise in the soul, a cor-
responding movement succeeds in the body, and vice
versd. Suppose a man has received an insult, which
just at this moment has come to his knowledge, and
which has put his soul in a fierce rage ; do we not see
corresponding movements in the body, the eye shoot-
ing fire, the face becoming first blanched and then
crimson, the lips compressed, the. hand clenched, and
the utterance interrupted? How do you explain this?
How do I explain it ? says our philosopher. Nothing
easier. I have said that God is the sole agent, and I
cling to that, and explain that correspondence of
thoughts and movements by saying that God takes
occasion from that modification of the soul to ex-
cite a corresponding movement in the body. Hence
the thoughts and feelings of the soul are mere occa-
sions which God takes to act upon the body, and vice
versd. This system is therefore called occasionalism^
or the system of occasional causes. : ?.,,
Now, we may remark upon this system : i. That it
is founded on the assumption that there can be no real
efficient causes in the universe besides God, from
which principle Malebranche deduces that whatever
happens either in the soul or in the body must be
effected by God. But we have shown in Ontology
that this principle is false. Therefore the system
raised upon it is false.
2. This system destroys the substantial union be-
tween the soul and the body. Because what kind of
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 283
union can there exist between two machines, if the en-
gineer alone is the agent who produces similar move-
ments in both independently of either, and without
the least communication between them ?
Q. Explain the second system.
A. Leibnitz admitted that finite beings can be real
agents, but denied that the action can pass from one to
another, and therefore arrived by another road at the
same conclusion as Malebranche. The latter denied
that the soul and the body could act upon each other,
on the principle that they are not real agents. Leib-
nitz denied that they can act upon each other, be-
cause the action of one cannot pass over to the other.
Hence the same objection was made against Leibnitz:
How do you account for the harmony between the
actions of the soul and the movements of the body,
and vice versd ? How do I account for it ? Thus :
All you have to do is to suppose that each being of
the universe is a simple substance called a ino?iad, and
that each of these monads is a representative force and
can represent all that which happens in the universe;
that God has established among all these monads a
parallelism of perceptions, of wishes, of actions, and
motions in such a manner that without communicating
anything to each other they all move in a most per-
fect harmony, each one representing what the other
does and suffers. So that in our case, the soul being a
representative force, and the body being also a repre-
sentative force, God has established such a parallel-
ism between them that in proportion as perceptions,
wishes, and actions are developed in the soul they
are immediately represented by corresponding move-
ments in the body, and vice versu. This system is
called pre-established harmony. #*;n^t^r .e/jn / -^
Now, we observe that this system, though eminently
284 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
ingenious, is false for the following reasons: i. Be-
cause it is founded on the principle that transient
actions are impossible. For this is the fundamental
principle of the whole system of Leibnitz : as the
action of one agent cannot be communicated to an-
other, it follows that the interchange of modifications
between the body and the soul are effected by a pre-
established harmony of affections and movements.
Now, we have shown this principle to be false ; false,
therefore, is the system which rests upon it.
2. This system destroys altogether the substantial
union which we have proved to exist between the
body and the soul. But this substantial union is ad-
mitted even by Leibnitz ; therefore his system is false.
That Leibnitz admits a substantial union between the
body and the soul is evident from these words of his
Theodicea : "There exists between the soul and the
body a true union, from which results the suppositum."
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the
system of Leibnitz destroys the substantial union be-
tween the body and the soul. Because whence would
this union result, if the soul cannot act upon the body,
nor the body upon the soul ? Nay, instead of finding
any substantial union between the soul and the body
in the system we are refuting, we could not even dis-
cover between these two terms a collective union
such as would exist between the different parts of
a machine. The system of Leibnitz, therefore, is
false.
Finally, in this system and in the other God would
be the author of all the errors, crimes, and disorders
which occur and are perpetrated among men.
Q. What is the third system ?
A. To obviate the difficulties which are brought
forward against occasionalism and pre-established bar-
Elemejtts of Intelledua I Ph ilosophy. 285
mony, John Clerc hit upon a new expedient : You
say the body cannot act upon the soul ; I grant that.
You insist that the soul cannot have any influence
upon the body; I admit that also. Therefore to
render possible this apparent mutual communication
and interchange of actions between the soul and the
body, all you have to do is to suppose a third sub-
stance intermediate between the soul and the body.
The soul gives its commands to this intermediate
substance, and this transmits them to the body ; the
body communicates its sensations to this medium, and
it humbly transfers them to the soul. This interme-
diate substance between the soul and the body was
called the plastic mediator,
Q. What do you think of this system ?
A. That it is even more absurd than the two former
ones. I. What is this third substance ? Is it a spirit
or a body? If it be said that it is neither the one nor
the other, but something partaking of both natures —
something between the spiritual and the corporal — we
say that such a thing is a contradiction.
2, This system destroys also the substantial union
between the body and the soul ; for in what does this
union consist ? It does not consist in two things
being brought together by means of a third, but its
nature lies exactly in the fact that two substances
meet together directly, touching each other, so to
speak, by means of the subsistence of one of those
substances. Now, if we explained the communication
of the body and the soul by means of a third sub-
stance, partaking of the nature of both, we should
have to suppose that the body and soul do not meet
directly together, that the two substances do not
touch each other; therefore, by admitting a plastic
mediator to explain the communication between the
286 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
soul and the body, we would destroy their substantial
union.
Q. What is the next system ?
A. Physical influx, invented by Eulerus and held
by all the followers of Locke. This system explains
the union between the soul and the body by means of
the mutual action of one upon the other. The body
incites and induces the soul to choose those percep-
tions and those acts which correspond to its organic
movements, and on the other hand the soul moves and
induces the body to make such movements as are
agreeable and befitting to the soul's perceptions and
acts. In this real and mutual influence of the soul
upon the body, and of the body upon the soul, lie
the union and communication between the two; hence
the system is called //y/j/c^/ iVi/?^^.
Q. What do you think of such a system ?
A. Though this system avoids the error of Male-
branche that there are no efficient causes besides God,
and that of Leibnitz that an action cannot pass from
an agent to an object acted upon, and though it rejects
the plastic mediator, yet we cannot admit it for the
following reasons :
I. Because it destroys the substantial union be-
tween the soul and the body. For, according to this
system, the union between the soul and the body is
explained as follows : the body acts upon the soul and
incites it to have perceptions and to elicit acts, and
the soul, in its turn, incites the body to movement ;
therefore in this system the body and the soul are
two separate beings, and do not form one complete
substance, but are two complete substances accident-
ally united in order that one may act upon the other.
But this implies that there is no substantial union be-
tween the soul and the body ; therefore this system
Elements of Intellectual Philosophy. 287
destroys the substantial union between the soul and
the body.
2. In this system it is said that the body acts upon
the soul. Then it acts without the soul ; because how
could it otherwise be said that it acts upon the soul?
But if it acts without the soul, then what gives it
movement, since no body can produce movement ex-
cept it be moved by some other agent ? Therefore
this system leads to absurdities.
In one word, in the examination of all these sys-
tems we ought to keep carefully in view the theories
already established. Man's nature results from the
substantial union between the body and the soul. If
we deny this union, or do not carefully describe its
exact nature, we destroy man's nature and necessarily
fall into absurdities. Now, in all the aforesaid systems
we fail to observe that this substantial union between
the soul and the body is maintained. Therefore they
destroy man's nature and lead to many errors.
Q. What is the true system about the union be-
tween the soul and the body?
A. The system of the schoolmen, which may be
formulated in a few words, as follows: If the soul be
the subsisting principle of the body, as we have de-
monstrated, or, in other words, if the soul be the
living, substantial form of the body, it follows that
the soul must necessarily act upon the body, and that
the movements of the body should be felt in the
soul.
We prove this system as follows :
The operation of anything emanates from its sub-
sistence. But the body receives its subsistence from
the soul ; therefore it must receive from the soul the
power of acting. Now, if the soul be the principle
from which the body derives the power of acting, it
288 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy.
is necessary also that the soul, along with the body,
should be the subject of those powers by means of
which the body acts. And if not the body alone, but
the whole composite — that is, the body and the soul —
is the subject of all the bodily powers, it follows
necessarily that not only the soul should be able to
incite the members of the body to operation, but also
that the operations of the body should be felt in the
soul.
For the sake of clearness we shall put the same
argument in another form. We have proved that the
body subsists on the subsistence of the soul. Now,
what does this imply ? Does it imply that the body
has no radical power to act without the soul ? Cer-
tainly not ; the body is a substance, and, as such, has
a natural radical power of acting. But, admitting this
radical natural power of acting, does it follow that
the body can actually and really act without the soul?
Certainly not ; because actiones sunt siippositorwn.
Action implies subsistence, which is that last comple-
ment of a being which causes it to be distinct from
others, independent of and incommunicable to others.
Without that a substance is an abstract thing and
not a reality — a potentiality, but not an actual exist-
ence. Now, the body has no subsistence of its own,
but subsists on the subsistence of the soul ; therefore
it really receives the power of acting from the soul.
The soul, then, is the principle from which the body
derives the power to act. Now, the consequence which
results from this truth is that the soul, along with the
body, must be the subject of those powers by means
of which the body acts, because originally the power
emanates from the soul ; those powers, therefore, by
which the body acts must be in both. But if the
whole composite — that is, the body and the soul — is
EUments of Intellectual Philosophy. 289
the subject of those powers by which the body acts,
who can fail to see the consequence that not only the
soul must be able to move the body to act, but that
the movements of the body should be felt in the soul ?
In one word, the body subsists on the subsistence of
the soul ; therefore it receives the power to act from
the soul. If this power of the body is received from
the soul, it follows that it must be found in both con-
jointly, and that, consequently, not only the soul
must be able to move the body, but it must feel
somewhat the movements of the body.
Q. Give a resume of all we have said in this first
part of Anthropology.
A. We have treated of man's nature, and to treat
of it accurately we have considered it first in general,
and then we have distinguished those elements from
which it results — soul and body ; then we have con-
sidered each element in particular ; and, finally, we
have investigated the manner in which these elements
are united together. In other words : Two things are
necessary to constitute man — i, body and soul; 2, a
substantial union between the two; therefore, to
speak of man properly, it was necessary to consider
two things— his body and soul, and the substantial
union of both. This we have done in two ways, first
in general, and then in particular. And with this we
end the first part of Anthropology.
" O ignorant man ! what dost thou bear
Lock'd up within the casket of thy breast?
What jewels and what riches hast thou there,
What heavenly treasures in so weak a chest?
Look in thy soul, and thou shalt benuties find
Like those which drown'd Narcissus in the flood :
Honor and pleasure both are in the mind,
And all that in the world i? counted good.
290 Elements of Intellectual Philosophy,
Think of her worth, and think that God did mean
This worthy mind should worthy things embrace.
Blot not her beauties with thy thoughts unclean,
Nor her dishonor with thy passions base.
And when thou thinkest of her eternity,
Think not that death against her nature is,
Think it a birth ; and, when thou go'st to die.
Sing like a man as if thou went'st to bliss."
—Davies.,
Jt