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Toua laa autraa axamplairaa originaux aont film^a an commandant par la pramlAra paga qui comporta una amprainta d'Impraaalon ou d'illustration at an tarminant par la darnlAra paga qui comporta una talla amprainta. Un daa symbolaa auivants apparaltra sur la darnlAra imaga da chaqua microficha, salon la cas: la symbola -^ signifia "A SUIVRE", la symbola ▼ signifia "FIN". Laa cartaa, planchaa, tablaaux, ate, pauvant Atra film As A daa taux da rAduction diffArants. Loraqua la documant ast trop grand pour Atra raproduit an un saul cllchA, il ast filmA A partir da I'angla supAriaur gaucha, da gaucha A droita, at da haut an baa, an pranant la nombra d'imagaa nAcassaira. Las diagrammas suivants illuatrant la mAthoda. urad by arrata rafilmad to »/ illamant ata, una palura. J da fa^on A sibla. 30X 1 2 3 32X 1 2 3 4 5 6 0[ i AN EXAMINATION OF THE UTILir/\RIAN THEORY OP mUU BY THfi: REV. F. R. BEATTIE, M.A..B. D.,Ph.D, Exanlner in Knox College, and in the University of Toronto, Canada Pastor of Frst Presbyterian Church. Brantford, Ont. BRANTFORD: J- & J. Sutherland, Publish 1885. ERS, c . / tX\ 'i'^O Entereil, acoording to Act of Parliament of Canada, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five, by the Rev. Francis li. Beattie, Brantford, in the office of the Minister of Agriculture. PRINTED BY Watt & Shenston, BRANTFORD, ONT* t^?')41 \ i '^'J 1 PREFACE. p one is 11. ire. This little treatise is but an unpretending contribution in the department of Moral Science. Written by snatches amid the varied duties of ministerial life, it lays no claim either to be profound in matter, or complete in foru). Much less does it pretend to any originality The practical importance of correct views on the ques- tions of Moral Science may be underestimated. Sound ethical' principles are closely related to religion, just as the Theistic position is vital to sound opinions touching ethical principles. An attempt is made to keep this in view in these pages. The value of well-founded doctrines in morals, both to the individual and to society, is of great moment in this age of independent research, and almost restless enquiry, when soine even venture to propose reconstruction in religion and morals. Reflection on such things led the writer to examine and compare the two leading opposite schools of Moralists, with a view to discover the merits of their respective claims to acceptance. The result, in the form of a brief summary, is contained in the following pages. No one can be more sensible than the writer, of the many imperfections in the attempt he has made to carry out his purpose, yet it is felt that the careful reader can scarcely fail to be helped to see the inadequacy of the Utilitarian System, and the sufficiency of the Intuitional Theory, to answer all the demands of an ethical system. Ethical Empiricism is radically defective. In regard to the plan of the work, it is proper to state that fault may be found with the method of treatment. It may be thought by some that to sketch the whole ground continuously in the first part of the treatise, and then to rU Kl< AC K. review the same topics in tlie s«'cond part, is not in accord- ance with strict logical method. Some may have the feeling that it would have been better to have completed the statement and criticism of each topic by itself. Both methods were before the writer's mind, and after consider- ation he decided to adopt a plan which may he open to criticism, yet, which, it is believed, will best gain the end he has in view. If any reader preiers the other order, he can secure it by reading consecutively the corresponding chapters in the first and second parts This prefatory note would be incomplete without mention of the aid received, and of the thanks due to some of the kind friends whose assistance has done much to make this treatise what it is. Professor Young, L. L D., of Uni- versity College, Toronto, whose able teaching in Mental an'l Moral Science can never be forgotten, is mentioned, with grateful memory of profitable hours spent in his classes. Principal Oaven, I). D., of Knox College, Toronto, whose valuable aiil and wise counsel was so cheerfully given, deserves the warmest gratitude of the writer. To other friends who have encouraged him in various ways thanks are likewise tendered. . It may be added, that while the manner in which the topics are treated may render the book of interest chiefly to students in College or University, or to readers who have enjoyed some tuition in mental and moral science, it is hoped that the general reader may also be able to peruse its pages with intelligence and profit. Such as it is, it is sent forth with the earnest hope that it may at least inspire in some minds a deeper interest in the great problems of Ethics. F. R. BEATTIE. The Manse, Brantford. Ontario, January, 1885. CONTENTS. PUEFACK. - iNTKODUmoX. I'AOE. 3 7 T^.A.TIT' I. STATEMENT AND EXPOSITION. Pkkliminary. CHAPTER I. Thk Theory of Knowledge. - - . . CHAPTER II. The Theory of Life. CHAPTER III. The Nature and Origin of Moral Distinctions. - CHAPTER IV. Conscience, or the Moral Faculty. - CHAPTER V. The Ethical Standard. - .... CHAPTER VI. Moral Obligation. - - - _ . . CHAPTER VII. Disinterested Affections and Benevolent Actions. CHAPTER VIII. Motive and Action. - CHAPTER IX. The Will - . Conclusion. ... 15 24 32 40 50 68 65 72 78 84 93 r 6 CONTENTS. ANALYSIS AND CIIITICISM. PAOE. Preliminary. - - 95 CHAPTER I. The Theory of Knowledcje. ----- 105 CHAPTER If. The Theory of Life. 116 CHAPTER III. The Origin and Nature of Moral Distinctions. - 126 CHAPTER IV. Conscience, or the Moral Faculty. • - 142 CHAPTER V. The Ethical Standard. 155 CHAPTER VI. Moral Obligation. 173 CHAPTER VII. Disinterested Affections and Benevolent Actions. - 178 CHAPTER VIII. Motive and Action. 188 CHAPTER IX. The Will. ----.-. 201 Conclusion. 216 .X THl UIILIFARIAN. THEORY OF MORALS. TNTR()|;i:iTI()\ The aim of these pages is to discuss, in a somewhat general way, those views in regard to the questions of moral philosophy which, taken together, are now usually known as the Utilitarian System. It is clearly impossible in the narrow limits of this little treatise to give detailed exposition of the different phases which this system lias assumed, or to enter into elaborate criticism of its various positions. The hope is cherished, however, that though only a very general survey can be taken, yet a somewhat concise and intelligent view of the system, in its strength and weakness, may be presented. ill t ' 'i ) ll < I i S UTIMTAItlAMSM Hv wav of introduction, a very l)rict* liistoii- cjil outline of o])inion in n^i^ard to th(Mloctrin(\s of moral pliiloso])hy may ))o j^nvcn. Such a sketch will provide a basis of discussion, and will rentier historical reference less necessary as the exposition proceeds. Moral philosophy really l)e.')() I>. (■.) .L,mve tli(^ study of Kthies a more practical turn, and connected it with ilio voluntary ac- tions of men. The <|uestions were ti'eated in their bearing;' on human conduct, and the liest interest of the indivi(hial and society. The tiue ,y;ood for man is happiness, and virtue is to he found in the ch(M*ce of the mean lu'tween extremes. Sul)se(iuently to Phito and Aiistotle we find various one-sided developments of Socratic doctrines. On the one hand Antisthenes (380 B. C) founded the Cynic school with which Diogenes is to be connected, and out of which the system of the Stoics grew (:]()() I^>. C). In a <»eneral way, and with cold severity of spirit, this school held that virtue is the only good, and that the rule of human conduct is right reason, with its practical maxim -" Live ac- c(jr(ling to Nature." On the other hand Aris- tippus (390 B. C.) founded the Cyrenaic school, in which we find a clearly defined Hedonism, and out of which the Epicurean system was developed, (300 B. C). Here hapi)iness, vari- ously regarded, is die chief good of man, and its attainment is the proper end of human con- duct. It is here that some of the leading prin- ,ciples which underlie modern Utilitarianism m rv il 10 TTTTLTTARIANTSM. t first clearly appear, though their germs may be found in tbe sensual notions of Democritus ; just as the germs of modern Materialism are to be found in his atomic doctrines. During the early ages of Christianity moral philosophy was generally viewed in its connec- tion with the doctrines of the Church, and in its relation to the life and conduct of the Chris- tian. Occasionally it sought a rational basis in Neoplatonism on the one hand, or shaded off into vague Mysticism on the other. In the Scholastic philosophy of the middleages (1100- 1400 A. D.) we find Ethics bound up with Christian doctrine and the Aristotelian philoso- . phy. The questions chiefly debated were, the nature of moral distinctions, and the founda- tion of virtue Aquinas (1250 A.D.) held that moral distinctions exist in the very nature of things, whilst Scotus (1350 A. D.) maintained that they depend on the will or authority of God In this latter notion we have the germ of one phase of the Utilitarian system, in which law, human or divine, is made the foundation of virtue. As modern philosophy on its intellectual side begins with Descartes, (1620 A. D.) so on its moral side it may be said to commence with Hobbes (1650 A. D.), of whose opinions a good i I !i I I UTILITARIANISM. 11 (leal will be said in explaining and reviewing the Utilitarian system. From Hobbes onward we find a two- fold development in moral phil- osophy. Along one line we find the various forms of the Inductive theory, and along an- other the different phases of the Intuitive system. As illustrations of the former the following names may be mentioned : — Bentham (1770 A.D.), with his fundamental principle of the greatest good of the greatest num- ber ; Paley, (1775 A. D.) who gives pro- minence to the Divine Law as the moral standard, as Hobbes does to the law of the land ; Hume, (1760 A. D.) who found the rule of right in the principle of Utility ; Mill (1850 A. D.), who endeavors to transform the principle of Utility into a doctrine of general benevolence, in which he is followed, in a general way, by the modern advocates of the most fully matured forms of Utilitarianism. As illustrating the Intuitive system we may mention: — Cudworth (1650 A D.), who held that there is an eternal and immutable distinc- tion between right and wrong, both in the Di- vine mind and in the human reason ; Shaftes- bury (1700 A. D.;, who first gave the name Moral Sense to the ethical faculty ; Butler (1730 A.D.), who emphasized the doctrine that 7i i! f f ' 12 rTILITAllIANISM. conscience is an original faculty, and sIiowcmI its proper place and paramount authority ; Hutcheson (1740 A. D.), who developed and gave more systematic form to the doctrines of Shaftesbury; Reid (1780 A D.) Stewart (1800 A. D.) and the Scottish School generally, who upheld the Intuitive'system, alike in the intellectual and moral spheres. There are some writers on moral philosophy who cannot properly be classified with the two Schools just outlined. We may name : — Smith (1750 A.D.), with his peculiar doctrine of sym- pathy ; Clarke (1700 A. D.), with his theory of the eternal fitness of things. Others of lesser note might be named did space permit. In France and Germany ethical problems have received some share of attention. In the former country Helvetius (1730 A. D.) and his followers maintained, along side of a most thorough going Materialism, a Hedonistic sys- tem of a selfish and sensual character. The pursuit and attainment of pleasure is all and all for man. Cousin (1840 AD) and the later Eclectics tend much more decidedly to the In- tuitive doctrine. Amongst the Germans Leib- nitz gave much attention to ethical questions, discussing especially the problem of evil ; but it was not till the time of Kant (1780 A. D.) W' J < UTILITARIANISM. 13 that moral philosophy assumed definite sys- tematic form in German} . According to Kant we find in the Practical Reason, with its cate- gorical imperative, the eternal and immutable principles of morality, and the authoritative rule of conduct, absolutely binding upon all. While modern Utilitarians impatiently declare that the word ought should be banished from the terminology of morals, Kant ascribes to this very notion fundamental importance and paramount authority. Later developments in Fichte fl800 A. D.; and Hegel (^1820 A. I).) need not be followed out, and it may only be stated in passing that the Modern Positivist School, both in France and Britain, is to be ranked among the Inductive Moralists, and is more or less distinctly Utilitarian. In America there are also names worthy of mention. At the head of the list stands Ed- wards fl740 A. D.^, whose labors both in Moral Philosophy and Theology have left an enduring monument for posterity ; McCosh, who is an advocate of the Intuitive system both in the mental and moral spheres. Others we may merely mention — Wayland, Bowen, Hickok, and Haven, in the United States ; and Young and Watson, in Canada. Having given this brief sketch, it only re- iTT^ M^ ! iv i Si UTILITARIANISM. mains to be further stated that, in discussing the Utilitarian theory of morals, the task in hand will be two-fold in its nature In the first place a general statement and exposition of the system will be given ; and in the second place an analysis and criticism of its various positions will be offered. To this task we now proceed. It ^' / THE UTILITARIAN ' THEORY OF MORALS. :e>.ajsvt Z. GENERAL STATEMENT AND EXPOSITION. PRELIMINARY. The facts with which any system of moral philosophy has to deal are those connected with man's moral nature, and those arising out of his conduct in its ethical relations. Such questions as the following at once arise: — What is the constitution of man's nature view- ed as moral, and what the guiding principle of its activity? What is the essential nature, and what the origin of the conceptions of right and wrong ? Wherein consists the obli- gation to do certain things, and to refrain from doing others? Why is it that approbation attends certain actions, and disapprobation actions of a different kind ? What is the r|T i(j nTII.ITAKlAXIS.M. I! M motive which prompts men to act in any par- ticuhir way, or is human conduct determined by a variety of motives ? What is the funda- mental relation of man to his fellow men, and how does he stand related to the Divine ]3eing ? Are the principles of morality sub- jective merely, and hence variable, or are they objective really, and hence immutable ? Is man a free a<^ent, or is he under the law of necessity, consciously or unconsciously ? These and many similar (questions arise when we look at the facts which come before us, and with these the ethical system h is to deal, and endeavor to give satisfactory solutions to the various problems. In seeking to deal with these questions moral philosophers have both approached them l)y different paths, and have sought the funda- mental principles of the ethical system in widely different regions. The enquiry has been made upon two distinct lines, and along these the solution of the problems has been attempted. Some writers have directed tlieir attention almost entirely to the inner sphere of human consciousness. These give prominence to our notions or conceptions of morality, and seek by analysis of these notions, as well as of the feelinusand emotions connected with them, t TILITAUIAMSM. 1 to elaborate an ethical system. In this point of view tlie enc^uii-y is directed chiefly into the nature and validity of the notions expressed by the words, right, irrong, dutij, obligation, t&c , and into the chaiacter of the emotions flowing from the exercise of the moral faculty in the conduct of life. Others have viewed moral principles chiefly in an objective light, and hence such moralists seek the solutions of the problems of Ethics in some (quarter beyo4id man's moral nature and consciousness. They deal specially with the standard of morals, and give prominence to something in the objective sphere, which may be regarded as the rule of right. One will give prominence to Law, human or Divine ; another to the necessary relations, or eternal fitness of things ; and another to General Utility in some of its forms. According to this point of view the explanation of all questions in morals is to be found in some external ground, or objective principle ; either Law, General Utility, or some other feature in the nature of things It will be observed that the enquiry here is directed chiefly to the question of the ethical standard, and to the question of the foundation of virtue, rather than to an explanation of the origin of our moral conceptions, or to an analysis of our ethical sentiments. rr 18 UTILITAKIAMSM. i i m I it'll iili !i! Examples, did space allow, could easily be given of both of these tendencies all along the history of speculation. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson may serve as examples of the for- mer, while Hobbes and Clarke will suffice for the latter. As to these two ways of consider- ing the questions which present themselves in morals, it may be remarked that both are true in a measure, but neither is complete in itself. Moral principles may be justly regarded as having an external ground and objective valid- ity of a certain well defined nature ; and yet ou!' knowledge of these principles, as well as of all moral emotions, must in the very nature of the case be subjective, and must be studied on the arena of consciousness. Every system of Ethics to be complete must deal with both, and seek to present each in its proper place and relations. It is necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to make another preliminary remark. Much obscurity has been imported into discussions on moral philosophy, by failing to keep quite distinctly apart two closely related questions. The question of the nature and origin of moral distinctions, and the question of the ethical standard should never be confounded. In answer to the former question, some theory rTIIJTAKIANISM. lU sufficient to account for the facts of aian's moral nature, and ethical conduct and relations, must be propounded ; while, as to the latter, some law, rule, standard, or principle, must be laid down, by the use of which the moral sig- nificance of actions may be deteriiiined. Any theory to be complete must discuss both the theory of the moral sentiments, and the (|ues- tion of the ethical standard ; yet they are to be treated as quite different, though closely related questions. An adequate system of moral philosophy nuist account for the origin, and explain the nature of all moral facts ; and at the same time it nmst announce such a clearly defined rule, or well understood stand- ard, as will suffice to direct personal conduct aright. It only remains to em^uire in regard to the method to be pursued, whether we should pro- ceed inductively or deductively. Must we from observed facts reason back to principles, by the ordinary methods of inductive enquiry ; or must we start out from certain assumed, though it may be well founded principles, and from these principles explain the facts accord- ing to the rules of deductive reasoning ? What- ever theory of morals is held, it is clear that the truly scientific method is the inductive, by f ^pp 'I 20 I TIMTAIIIAMSM. ■ ■f mejins of which the facts are ()l)serve(l, classi- fied, and their hiws or i)rincii)les unfolded. This is true whether the field of ohservation be outward nature, human society, or man's con- sciousness. At the same time induction, to he complete, involves deduction, if not as a direct aid, at least as an instrument of verifica- tion. This then j^ives us the true method in nioials as in any other science, and to employ induction and deduction in their proper rela- tions will render our method complete, and our results assured. This remark concerning*; method suggests another important point which concerns the nature and order of the facts, with which we shall have oresently to deal, and an allusion to this point will pave the way for entering intel- ligently upon the consideration of the main topics to come under review. When the order of the facts and their real nature is considered, we find that the term Inductive stands over against the term Intuitive, as in a measure indicating the nature and order of the facts, as well as hinting at the only possible method available in ethical enquiry. According to the distinction which thus appears all ethical sys- tems fall more or less completely into two classes. The one regards the conceptions of rTIUTAIUANISM. •21 ]i.L,^lit and wron;^', of duty and oMij^ation, as simple, ultimate, and underivcMl, and as sucli, not c'ai)al)le of l>oin<;' rosolvcMl into any simplcM* (•(mcoption. The otlier class maintains that these concej)tions are not simi)le, and underiv- ed, but nmipound, seeonchviy, and derived fi'om scmie simpler notion, or fact. To theories of the foimer class the name Intuitive is j^enei- ally ^nven, and to those of the latter the term Inductive is usually applied. All foinis of the Intuitive theorv, however nuich thev mav differ in details, a<»'ree in holding;- that the concep- tions denoted ])y the words, ri^^dit and wron<»;, &c., are ultimate and underived, and as such, they are regarded as the primitive deliverances of an original faculty ^i^enerally called i\m- science, but sometimes known as the Moral Sense, or as the Practical Reason. This School may be traced from Socrates and Plato, down to Cudworth and the Scottish Intuition- alists, and it is found in Kant and his followers in (lermany and elsewhere. In like manner all phases of the Inductive system, however much they may differ in de- tails, are at one in denying that ethical concep- tions, or moral principles are simple, ultimate and underived. They further profess to show how, by association, education, external re- 00 rTfMT.MtlAXISM. III' i 1 ! I ■'; I straintH, &c., all our moral toiiceptions may bo derived from, and can be resolved into some simple ecmception or more fundamental prin- ciple. To this theory in its various modifica- ticms diffei'ent names are <>iven. The j^^eneral U'YUi Inductive is the most comprehensive ; the name Associational denotes the prominent part which the laws of association play in the genesis of moral conceptions ; the term Ex- peri emtal implies that (m the field of experience this development takes place ; the word Devel- opment points to the fact that our ethical notions, as we find them, are the result of evolution ; and the name Utilitarian denotes that the fundamental principle or conception is that of General Utility. It is with the partic- ular aspect of the Inductive theory indicated by the last mentioned name that we propose to deal. The term Utilitarianism is a very distinc- 3y Intui- lUy, the eonnee- generic be con- Both are with this the feel- lence to sensation ;o have a :ical facts is that tical, and The next important point has reference to the higher forms of knowledge, and the manner in which these are reached. That which re- mains to the mind after sensation is termed an idea. This element is retained by the mind, and as it were recorded there, so that it may be reproduced by the exercise of what is called Memory. The process by which the higher forms of knowledge, and more purely intellec- tual results are reached, has been somewhat happily termed Ideation, To this process, viewed by itself, the direct operation of the senses is not necessary. Sensation leaves a certain result or effect with the mind, and in erecting the fabric of knowledge, the process consists essentially in reproducing, construct- ing, or reconstructing the mental product of sensation, thereby giving us all the cognitive results we are capable of. The last point in this statement concerns the law, or method according to which this process of Ideation is carried on. Memory, as we have seen, has a very important function in retain- ing, and reproducing that which sensation leaves to the mind. Then the laws of mental Association are brought into play upon the product of sensation in order to work it up into all the forms of knowledge. Different views "5P 3 30 UTILITARIANISM. 1 : .; . 1 i ■ ' ■ 1 II i!^^ -» ' i 1 ■ 1 ■ . 1 ■ i! 1 . 1 1 1 ! i • • 1 i 1 ! ijiiltli!' \ i' ; ' 1 ■ 1 i ■ ! • , ■ li.::: are held in regard to the precise nature, num- ber, and operation of these laws, but there is substantial agreement among writers of the Empirical School in regard to the results reached by tlie working of these laws. All our knowledge, even our highest conceptions both in the intellectual and moral spheres, are held to be fully explained and accounted for in this way. Even the conceptions of necessity and universality, which are felt to be con- nected with certain elements of our know- ledge, are thought to be fully accounted for by the force of repetition and habit, under the working of the laws of Association. It is to be remarked, however, that Empiricists do not allow these conceptions absolute validity as mental principles. Whatever the fabric of knowledge is, it is reared from sensation alone, under the architecture of the laws of mental Association. What has just been presented is believed to be a fair statement of the leading prin- ciples of the Empirical School, of which James Mill, J. S. Mill, Alexander Bain, and Herbert Spencer, with Auguste Comte and the Positivists generally, are the leading modern exponents. It need only be added that Inductive Moralists of the Utilitarian THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 31 type all lean towards, or distinctly bold, the Empirical Theory of Knowledge. It is clear, also, that if this theory be the true one the Intuitive Theory of Morals has no intellec- tual basis. Empiricism must rule through- out. I til . ''II 1! 11 CHAPTEK II. THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF LIFE. Tlie (question here relates to the highest good of human life, the nature of the desires and dispositions in the constitution of man, and the impelling power which leads men to action. What is the summum bonum of human life, and what is the motive which leads men to act, or deters them from acting ? Utilitarians of all shades of opinion are vir- tually at one on this point, and as their theory of morals is built on the theory of human nature and life now to be sketched, it will be necessary to give as clear an exposition as possible of this important point. The theory may be briefly stated in the following way : — Pleasure in some form is the only good, and pain the only evil. The one great motive which leads men to action is a regard for their own happiness ; a desire to avoid pain, and secure pleasure. That there is in human nature a lili m THKOUV OF LIFK. 03 variotv of desires orirOUAL SKNTIMKXTS. 41 tions before us then are : — What is the precise character of moral conceptions ; and how do they arise ? How shouhl we descril)e them as they actually are, and what account should we give of how they come to be what they are ? The answer to these (juestions is usually known as the Theory of the Moral Sentiments, and is fundamental in any system of monxl philosophy. It is no easy matter to present in a few pages a clear and adequate statement of the general doctrine of Utilitarians on this important question in Ethics. There is considerable var- iety of opinion, and much of their writing is at best vague and indefinite, if not irrelevant alto- gether. Their fundamental intellectual prin- ciples limit their enquiry to the purely Empiii- cal sphere, so that the}' cannot hold that moral conceptions are simple and ultimate in their nature, nor are thev free to maintain that their origin is to be sought anywhere else than on the field of experience. It is evident, therefore, that the question of the nature, and the (|ues- tion ol the origin of moral conceptions, are closely related, and their relation is such that from the ;,candpoint of Utilitarians very gi'eat confusion is sure to arise. They deny that the notions of right, wrong, duty, &c., are simple !;l V m I i \] i < t, ■ -J ill I ■ Hi 42 UTILTTATUANTSM. and ultimate in their nature ; and from this it follows that in regard to their ori<>'in they can- not be Intuitive. It follows, also, that if they l)e in no sense Intuitive, the field of enquiry must lie almost entirely in the external or ob- jective sphere, and that from experience, in relation to some external fact or facts, the explanation of our moral notions and senti- ments must be derived. The ({uestion will further arise whether there can l)e such a thing as absolute validity to our moral conceptions, or whether there can be any such thing as im- mutable principles in morals, if experience gen- erates these notions, and if there be no Intui- tive element whatever in them. In the light of these remarks it will be readily perceived what a difficult task the Utilitarians have liefore them, and how they naturally, and often ingen- iously, evade the real problems of a proper theory of the moral sentiments, and busy them- selves with discussions concerning the ethical standard ; thus confounding the two (piestions which should ever be kept distinct. The facts are such, however, that they cannot be passed without an attempt at adequate ex- planation, and we now proceed to notice some of the main accounts which have been given of the nature and origin of our ethical conceptions. «. ! THKOHY OF MOUAF. SENTIMENTS. 43 Wo have already stated that the Utilitarian position involves the distinct conclusion that these conceptions are not original and simple, and that thev must therefore be secondarv and derivative in their character. When, however, they come to state the fundamental fact or principle from which our moral possessions spring, and when they endeavor to give a philosophicfil account of hoiv they are derived, we find such a variety of opinions as would require a whole volume to set forth even the outline of them. Some, having regard exclu- sively to an external or objective rule, take law in one form or other to be the fundamental fact; others, looking to the tendency and conse- (juences of actions, find in General Utility the basal ftict in the ethical system; and yet others, considering men as in society, find in some sociological fact the primitive principle of moral philosophy ; while a few do not entirely neglect the subjective sphere in their system, but hold that the primitive notion is an intellectual judg- ment of some kind, not at first moral in its nature, but the moral element comes as a growth or development from an intellectual principle or judgment. Hobbes, for example, finds the origin of our moral conceptions in the Civil Code, with its m ' i / i 1 i 1 1 ( ! t i i ! •l fiM;! 1.1 i 11 m I : ; I i jj|!'i ^ll 44 t'TILITARTANISM. penal consequences ; while Paley ascribes their origin to the Divine Law, with its sanctions. Back of our ethical notions, and of all our sen- timents connected with moral distinctions, lies Law in some form, and from this fundamental legal notion, the conceptions of right, duty, obligation, &c., have their origin and develop- ment. These moral conceptions are not them- selves original or primitive, but spring out of t*^ e ' action we have that we will fall under the [ p ities of the (yivil C-ode on the one hap 1. or of the Law of God on the other, if we act in oppose' io^x to the requirements of Law. With a knowledge of the Law, and by means of education or experience under it, the notion of moral distinctions is generated, and all the experiences of our moral nature arise. Paley's system is sometimes termed one of Expediency ^ but in its deeper analysis it is rather a legal sys- tem, differinsj from that of Hobbes in that it puts the Divine Law in the place of the Civil Code. Paley's system may be higher in its general character than that of Hobbes, but their fundamental principles really belong to the same category. With both the notion of Law is fundamental, and from that notion the conception of right arises. Bentham, the great jurist, discovers the ori- THEORY OF MOllAL SKNTIMENTS. 4.-) !.• .1 gill of tlie notions of right and wrong in the tendency of actions, as estimated l^y us, to produce happiness, or the reverse. Those ac- tions whose general tendency is to produce the greatest good of the greatest number are right, and ought to be done ; and those actions of an opposite tendency are wrong, and ought not to be done. Let the calculation be made in re- gard to any action or class of actions, and according as pleasure or pain predominates, the action is right or the reverse. In this tendency our moral conceptions have their origin. Thus Bentham's system, though connected chiefly with his able writings on Jurisprudence, involves a distinct ethical theory, which, on the one hand denies that our moral conceptions are original, and on the other, in the "greatest happiness" principle, discovers their origin and by means of that principle accounts for their development. Bentham's theory is inter- esting, not only in itself, but because of its re- lation to modern Utilitarianism, for the same general principles underlie both. General Utility, rather than the notion of Eight, is the basal fact in Ethics. , In the later forms of the Utilitarian system as sketched in the preceding chapter, there is not much clear positive statement in regard to m -.1 ■I m 46 UTILlTAlttANlS.M. ^1^' if lllli; i M-/i the nature and origin of our ethical notions. Its advocates are usually content with denying that they are ultimate and underived, and busy themselves with discussions concerning Utility as the ethical standard, and with an endeavor to show how, in relation to that princii)le or standard, .all our moral ideas may arise and be accounted for, so that without the assumption of any original notions all moral facts and experiences may be explained. In general, later Utilitarians substantially agree with Ben- tham in regard to the nature and origin of our moral conceptions. They make the general good, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or General Utility in some form, the basal fact, and they proceed to show how, by education and association, working on the tield of human experience, and guided by the tend- ency of actions to produce the greatest good or happiness, or the reverse, all our moral con- ceptions arise and are developed into definite form, and the character of the individual is formed. In the more refined phases of modern Utilitarianism, such as that advocated by J. S. Mill, we find great care taken to give the the- ory as decidedly as possible the cast of general benevolence. It will appear, however, that such writers must leave their fundamental f - THEORY UK MOllAL SKNTLMKNTS. 47 position as Utilitarians before tliey can find a sound basis for <»eneral benevolence. In all these doctrines the notion of Ri^ht is secondary and derived ; the foundation principle in Ethics is General UtiHty. It will be observed that this theory does not so much provide a Phil- osophy of our moral nature, with its facts and experiences, as give us what may be termed a Natural History of these facts and experiences. It is one thing to account for the facts ; it is another thing to arrange and describe them. Even if the facts are correctly arranged and described, their philosophy must still be given; unless we deny, as many Utilitarians do, the possibility of philosophy properly so called. It may be added here that in much current literature found in modern magazines, and lighter publications, as well as in much political and social writing of the present day, there is a great deal of moralising which involves the fundamental principles of Utilitarianism. Questions in Jurisprudence and Sociology are discussed with much ability in certain quarters, but the ethical doctrmes involved in the theories advanced for the elevation of the race, and the regulation of society, by such writers as Herbert Spencer and AugusteComte, must be placed under the same category, as at li 4S LTILITAKIAMSM. . 1 'I loast boloiij^ing to the Inductive school, if not to the Utilitarian branch of that school. In these writings there are many things of value. There are many judicious remarks regarding society, and acute reflections upon the socio- logical aspects of man's nature, but the defect consists in the want of any sound and broad ethical basis for society itself Sociological facts, not the notion ef Kight, are made funda- mental ; and the Natural History of these facts, rather than a Philosophy of Morals, is given. 11 !>> It is proper, in closing this chapter, to make a remark in regard to the way in which we obtain a knowledge of moral distinctions. This is a somi^what different question from that of the nature and oriain of these distinctions though they stand closely related. The latter leads us rather to look at moral facts as exist- ing, and bids us ask what is their precise nature, and what their origin ; the former leads us to look at the mental process involved in the knowledge of these facts at which we ar- rive, and bids us ask what is the knowing pro- cess. The question is : — How do we arrive at the knowledge of the distinctions which our moral conceptions imply ? On the Utilitarian Theory this process must be entirely empirical. tllKoRV OF MoUAL SKN'TIMENTS. 49 There are no intuitive convictions original with the mind, and no a-priori processes possible in its exercise, and hence, in obtaining a know- ledge of the moral qualities of actions, or of ethical distinctions in general, the mind must proceed by strictly empirical methods, and reach its results by means of inductive pro- cesses. As the two points above indicated are often confounded, this briefreference will serve to show their difference, and to indicate the position of Utilitarians in regard to each of them. Ethical Empiricism rules in both^ If i^ii ■ i ■ CFIAl'TEH IV. Ill I; 4 ij; i. 1 \ ;' .1 ::. 1 1 1 I :!■, ''',i THK I'TIUTAUIAX TilKOUV OK CONSCIENCK. Eii(j[uiry must now be made as to the Utili- tarian doctrine in re«»ard to the Moral Faculty. What account does it give of the facts of our moral nature and ethical conduct denoted by the term Conscience. Is there or is the "^ not a faculty or power of our being-, meanin ere- by an original capacity by whic-h we have our knowledge of moral distinctions, are conscious of moral obligation, and ex[)erience certain emotions conse(iuent on our actions jvnd mental states ? If there be no such original faculty or primitive capacity of our nature, what view are we to take of Conscience, or are we justified in speaking of it as a faculty at all ? In this connection we make a remark which really belongs to the second part of the dis- cussion, but which is of value here when we speak of the faculties of our nature, or of our mental or nioral faculties. How are we to m 1 CONSCIKNCK. 51 think of these faculties in reh^tion to the niincU In rei)ly we express tlie o[)iniou that we are not to think of the nnnd, however we may regard the l)rain as the or<»'an of the mind, as parcelled out into a number of sections, each of which is called a faculty — memory, undei'- standin<^', ima<;i nation, conscience, &c., as the case may be. By faculty we are rather to understand a capacity of the whole mind, its attitude and activity in relation to its object in its various experiences, mental and moral- We thus call memory a faculty, but it is the mind or ego which remembers ; and we speak of the faculty of imagination, but it is the whole mind which imagines ; and so with all our other so called mental faculties. The same thing holds good in the region of morals. When we speak of Conscience as the moral faculty we are to think of the mind as a whole, and to regard it as having a certain capacity by which it apprehends moral distinctions, and is the subject of certain sentiments in relation thereto. The mind is spiritual, one, and indi- visible, and the entire mind is concerned in this particular activity in relation to its appro- priate objects, mental and moral. Conscious- ness is a unit, and the whole mind, as conscious subject, is the seat of morals, just as it is the \/\ III 52 CTILITAUIAXISM. j.) i^' '! ": 11 ■) r'hii ■lit'' mind which remembers, reasons, imagines, &c., though we speak, and speak properly enough, of the faculty of memory, of understanding, of imagination, &c. The question now is con- cerning Conscience, as the moral faculty, using the word faculty in the sense just defined, and not intending thereby to determine whether the capacity of mind denoted by the so called faculty of Conscience be original or acquired. What are the general views of the Utilitarian School in regard to Conscience or the moral faculty ? Utilitarians deny that Conscience is an original faculty. They fill agree in holding that the mental capacity which relates to moral distinctions is not original but, accjuired through experience. They maintain that the assumption of such a faculty is quite unneces- sary, inasmuch as our knowledge of moral dis- tinctions can be accounted for, and all the facts of our moral nature and experience can be explained, without any such assumption. Not only do they assert that the hypothesis of an original faculty is unnecessary, l)ut they urge certain things which they think render it quite unlikely, if not impossible, that any such original faculty is part of our moral furnishing. Holding, as we have seen, an empirical '-M CONSCIENCE. 53 an i I ^1 II ,i psychology, they maintain that the natnre and original capacity of the mind is such that there are no original faculties, no such primitive capacities as entitle us to speak of Conscience as an original faculty or capacity of our nature. Utilitarians further argue that the opinion that such an original faculty exists, is shown to ])e erroneous by the great diversity of moral judg- ments found among different men, especially on comparing the moral judgments of different nations, and ages. What is considered right in one age is held to be wrong by men in an- other ; and actions which are praised in one country as highly virtuous are condemned by the people in another. This all goes to show. Utilitarians contend, that whatever view we are to take of Conscience it is at least not an original faculty of our nature. As Utilitarians proless to show how (\m- science is developed, the main en([uiry wiJl now be into the ways in which they seek to explain and account for the facts denoted by the term Conscience. By Utilitarians gener- ally, Conscience is held to be a complex phenomenon of some kind, but different opin- ions are held as to the nature and extent of its complexity. The earlier advocates of the system scarcely broached the question as to V.'i w 54 UTTLTTAUTANTSM. if I.'"" ■ wUiiii m whether Conscience is an original facnlty, nor did they enter into any very rigid analysis of basal facts in the ethical system. Later exponents of the theory, however, have en- deavored to show, not only that Conscience is a complex phenomenon, but also to point out how its development takes place Two or three of the leading attempts to do this may now be sketched, to serve as examples of the way in which attempts are made to explain C.onscience and to show how it is developed, rather than to present a detailed view of all the theories that have been maintained by Utilitarians. The first attempt finds an able exponent in J. S. Mill. In the chapter on the nature and origin of moral distinctions, it has already been hinted that association and education working on the field of experience, and in relation to the principle of General Utility, by degrees generates the notion of duty. In this way a habit of mind is produced, in which a violation of what we conceive to be duty is attended with a feeling of pain more or less intense. This feeling. Mill holds, grows more and more definite under the influence of habit, associa- tion, and education, and eventually reaches the stage of disinterestedness. When it attains •I n ■ j Ji (■:i n n roNsripixcK. oo this stafjc and connects itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, and not even with any accessory circum- stances, this feeling is the very essence of con- science as it actually exists. He adds that this primitive fact is all encrusted over with collateral associations which analysis cannot easily remove. The ditticulty lies in being unable to make the necessary observations when Conscience, as understood by Mill, is making its appeju^ancc in the experience of a child ; and the difficulty is scarcely less when we endeavor to make an analvsis of Conscience as it exists when fully developed. According to Mill, therefore, Conscience is not an original faculty, but a feeling of the mind more or less clearly defined, and the result of association and education working on the field of experi- ence. Mill will serve as the type of a large class of Utilitarian Moralists who find the origin and explanation of (Conscience in per- sonal feeling. A second general class finds a leading mod- ern advocate in Alexander Bain. With Bain the notion of law, or external authority, is prominent. Our moral nature may be regard- ed as a kind of commonwealth within us, cor- responding, in a general way, to some govern- tii iii I ((!■ mw 5f) UTILITARIANISM. ment or recognized authority without us. Under this external authority, with its law prescribing the rule of duty, a certain educa- tional process goes on, resulting in the for- mation of a habit within us, which is Con- science, according to Bain. In its development fear plays an important part ; and Bain pro- fesses to show how, along the line of obedience to some outward authority, and influenced by a kind of dread within us. Conscience is de- veloped stage by stage. A mental association arises between disobedience and the pain or punishment which follows. At first the moral element is very small, but it gradually develops; and when the mind is able to understand and approve of the prohibitions and requirements of the external authority, we have conscience in its fully developed state. Bain thus agrees with Mill in rejecting the opinion that Con- science is an original faculty, but he gives prominence to law and the discipline of obedi- ence, in generating the notion of duty and producing Conscience. .Herbert Spencer may be taken as represent- ing a third attempt to explain the tacts of our moral nature which are grouped under the term Conscience. The point of view here taken is entirely sociological, and the question I ^1 k COXSCfENCK. 57 ^1 1 of C^oiiscieiico occupies a somewhat subordinate place. Society exists ; and it is necessary for the individual to act in such a way that the best interests of the social fabric may be secur- ed. By de<»Tces there grows up within the individual certain notions, and the hal)it of act- ing in such a way as is l)est for society, and of avoiding those courses of conduct which are hurtful to society. There are in our nature certain social dispositions, but these are not originallv moral in their character. The moral is a development from these dispositions re- sulting from the conditions of society, and our sociological relations therein. This will be suf- ficient to indicate the general position of many modern writers who give great attention to social science, incurring the danger of over- looking the important ethical elements which underlie, rather than grow out of, society. According to Utilitarians, therefore, Con- science is not an original faculty, but the result of a development process on the field of ex- perience, by means of association, habit, and education, working in relation to some principle, and under its guidance. M ill makes ( Conscience consist in personal feeling, Bain connects it with external authority, and Spencer gathers it from the essential conditions of human society. ar 1 m iff if!!ii m CHAPTER V. ff THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF THE ETHICAL STANDARD. Here the enquiry relates to the Law/ or Rule, which constitutes the standard of right. What is the rule whereby the moral quality of actions may be determined, and the conduct of practi- cal life rightly directed ? In short, what is the criterion of virtue ? In giving a brief summary of the Utilitarian position here, it is proper to remark that writ- ers of this school usually give great prominence to the question of the ethical standard, and import much confusion into their discussions by confounding the question of the standard with the theory of the moral sentiments. It is one thing to supply a rule of conduct ; it is another to explain the nature and origin of our moral conceptions. Utilitarians being on Em- pirical ground are, of course, limited largely to the sphere of experience, and are led to observe M THE ETHICAL STANDARD. r)9 the results of actions, rather than to encjuire into the notions which lie back of our conduct. The result is that the standard by which our conduct is to be directed comes into promin- ence, for it is from the relation of actions to some external rule or law, that their moral character is determined, and our conceptions of right, wrong, duty, &c , arise. The question of the rule of right is really fundamental with Utilitarians ; and they do not admit the view that, in order to the existence and application ) of such a rule to our conduct, the notion off right must be presupposed. Though Utilitarians thus agree in giving much importance to the question of the stand- ard, yet when they proceed to state in detail Avhat^renll y const jtntps; t.hp st^ndnrd, thf^rnJ^ c onsiderable diver sj t}^ of _Q pmion. Some ob- jective rule or law is generally regarded as the standard, though in some cases the subjective side is not altogether overlooked in this con- nection. Those, again, who agree in viewing the standard as something objective, differ widely as to that which is to be regarded as the criterion of right. Some, as already hinted, fix upon Law — either the (Uvil Code or the Divine Law. Others fix attention chieflv on external actions, and observing in them certain * '^■ '4 I ' Hi "it 11 i'ii J =i'f ■til rililr ■^ m-i- 60 UTILITARIANISM. I inherent tendencies to produce happiness or the reverse, find in these tendencies, as they think, theuthical standard. Thus (Hobbe^ maintained that the standard of right is tlie laiiLJ»f^-theJkind. Society is necessary to tlie well-being of mankind, and in order to preserve society civil enactments are necessary. The State, through its properly constituted head, legislates, and the subject should yield obedience to the (.ivil C.'ode thereby enacted. QPale^, again, holds that the wofGod, with its rewards and punishments especially in the world to come, is the moral standard. Virtue, according to Paley, "con-, sists in doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of Clod, and for the sake of ever- lasting happiness." In acting according to this standard a man may have to deny himself a present gratification, it may be in the first instance for the good of his neighbor, but ulti- mately to avoid future puoishment, or to secure future reward. It may l)e remarked in passing, that there is much to be said in favor of re- garding the Divine Law, as an expression of the Divine will, in the light of the rule of right, yet the way in which Paley views the matter, and the prominence given by him to our own interest, clearly places him among the Utilj- n THE ETHICAL STANDAUI). 01 tariaii moralists. Though his system has a distinctly religious cast about it, yet it is as clearly legal as the system of Hobbes, and partakes decidedly of the selfishness of Utili- tarianism in general. From the earliest times we find many who hold some more or less clearly defined form of the happiness theory, and who profess to find in the tendency of actions to produce the greatest measure of happiness, or to be of the greatest general utility, the test of their moral character, in other words, the ethical standard. In a purely selfish form this view appears in the system of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans. The maxim of Epicurus is ''live while you can." The happiness of the individual is the end to be attained, and whatever conduces most to the happiness of the present moment is right and should be sought after. The ethical standard is the happiness of the individual at the present moment. Then, in modern times, Bentham substan- tially reproduces a similar view, though he seeks to give it a wider application in his well known principle of "the greatest good of the greatest number." General Utility, under- stood in the light of this principle, is the standard by which the ethical character of rr^i < i Jl n w ! k I".: i «: B2 UTnJTAUIANlSM. actions is to bo determined, and the rule accordin<5 to which moral conduct is to 1)0 directed. The advocates of modern Utili- tarianism give gi'oat prominence to (xoneral Utility as the ethical standard. Mill, and those who think with him, emphatically repudiate the term selfish, and do not admit that it is properly applicable to their form of the system. They ovenS'struggle heroically to place their theory on the basis of Ge neral Benevolen ce, and endeavor to explain General Utility in such a way as to involve the principles of benevolence. In this sense, they maintain that General Utility is the criterion of the moral character of our actions, and the true and sutticient guide of conduct. The difficulty of making pr actical use of such ji rule, and o f ^pp^y^'n^ ^t f^mivpinjpTvjjy a nd correc tly to orn? conduct, in th(^ jvariaus c ircumst^m cesJn^jyhidx-^ g^ are plii ced^J^;-evi- I d mvjjy_fn]J^, jr(>ry k^njjr_])y_\^lfca]'^ — of-mie [lltilit|imrL_Si^iool. A pressing sense of the indefinitenoss of their ethical standard pain- fully rests upon them. To give General Utility greater practical value as the rule of conduct, and to render it of easier application to given cases, Bentham took the pains to draw up a kind of scheme or moral calculus, as he THE ETHICAL STANDARD. 63 called it, by means of which useful actions might l)e known, and so their moral signifi- cance determined. Mill and many of the later sociologists dwell on the importance and value of the accumulated experience of the race, in enabling us to decide as to the utility of any given course of conduct. The complex- ity of the facts, and the extent of the induction necessary in such cases, very clearly appear in connection with this view of the ethical rule. It is not necessary to discuss at greater length their doctrines on the pohit before us, nor to sketch other views of the standard held by writers whose general doctrines are Utili- tarian. It would be interesting to notice Hume's view of Utility, Smith's doctrine of Sympathy, Mackintosh's judicious remarks on this important point, and the opinions of other modern writers, such as Grote, who deal with the question. It would be no less interesting to trace in France, Germany and America, some of the chief shades of opinion which have been held by various writers of the Utilitarian School, touching the ethical standard, but our space forbids us. What has been sketched, in this brief chapter, will suffice to show that Utilitarians give prominence to the question of the ethical standard, and that modern leading ill ,1 m 04 t'TlMTAIJlANiSM. advocates of this system agree in regarding General Utility, in some form, as the test by which the morality of human ccmduct may be (leteiniined, and as the guiding principle by which the highest good of mankind is to be attained. 11 i r iir ' \ CHAPTER VI. TIIK UTIMTAIIIAN THKoUV OF MORAL ove the waves of self interest, and are clad with the waving palm trees of unselfish conduct. The whole account here is sociological rather than primarily ethical. Man is a social being. Society is natural to, and uecessary for, him ; and hence an essential part of his happiness. Society is impossible, however, under any other conditions than that the interests of all are to l)e consulted. Hence, men living in society grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of things, or a course of conduct, where they totally disregard the interests of the other members of society. In co-operating with others in society, our ends and aims are identified with those of others, and theirs with ours; and hence arises the conviction and feeling that our inter- ests and theirs are identical . Gradually, through such means, we come, as though instinctively, to be conscious of ourselves as beings who, of course, pay regard to the interests of others in Ml II HKNKVOLENCK. 77 (leterminin*;' our own conduct. The smallest ^ernis of such feelini»s are laid hold of and nourished by association, education, public in- struction, and reli ACTION. known l)y the names — appetites and desires. Otliers are eonneeted ratlier witli the hi*;'lier or inental part of oni* natnre, and are more ch)sely rehited to the emotional and vohmtary in us. These are j^enerally termed the affec- tions and emotions. The cpiestion here is, how do these impulses stand related to our actions 'i What is the real nature of these impulses in themselves, and how far do they properl} pos- sess moral (piality ? U they do not in the first instance possess moral (pialities, at what staj^e and under what conditions do they assume them ? Then a<^'ain, the ({uestion ccmies, what really constitutes motive '( Is it something ob- jective, attracting' the agent towards it, and thus inducing him to act ; or is it .something subjective, impelling the agent, and thus urging him to action ; or is it partly both ? Th(;n, finally, in regard to motive, tlie question is raised whether motives differ in kind, each one leading out to its particular end, or are all motives but modifications of some one funda- mental or generic impulse to action. Then in regard to actions and their moral quality, vital questions arise. What really constitutes action and wherein lies its moral- ity ? Is all action moral in its nature, or does moral quality pertain only to certain kinds of * 1 * I f ■I m I »l / I 80 IITILITAUIANISM. Ill actions ^ Does not the true idea of action in- volve the notion of ethical charactei' ? Where- in consists the difference between si)ontaneous movement, and moral action ? Then in regard to acti(m in itself, we have to en([uire wliether the external movement, for example, of the arm, or the internal determination of the mind which precedes it, is the real action, and the seat of the ethical element? If it he in the mental determination that the action really consists, how does motive, as inward impulse or as direct intention, stand related to action in tliis sense ? Or, finally, if the morality of an action 1)e in the intention, denoting thereby the motive from which it is done, are vv^e justified in indentifying motive and action, and regarding them as only the same thing un- der different aspects ? Such (juestions bring before us some of the facts to be explained. Let us next emjuire what (explanation Utili- tarians supply in regard to these facts. It is not easy to get very definite views or opinions on these topics. Concerned as Utilitarians chiefly are with the tendency of actions to pro- duce happiness on the reverse, or considering the relation of actions to law in some outward form, they do not very formally discuss the general question of motive and action. Their i n MOTIVK AM) A; 1 . f ri !» Jlii .li IM i/ C HAPTER IX. THE UTII.ITAIUAN THEORY OE THE WILL. We now reacli the last nuiiii topic which reciuires consideration, and in this chapter have to treat of the Will, dealing especially with the views Utilitarians take of its nature, its exer- cise, its relation to our other powers, and the question of Freedom. We are thus brought to what Hume termed *' the most contentious cpiestion in Metaphysics, the most contentious science." The problems here involved have ever puzzled philosophers, and opposite views have been advocated by good and able men. The question of the Will, its essential nature, and its relation to our natural impulses on the one hand, and to the rational part of our nature on the other, as well as the relation of motives to its exercise, must be taken up and discussed in the moral system. It Avould be too much to conclude that the validity of moral distinc- tions depends upon any particular doctrine of THE ^VI^L. 8') the Will, for we find ^i>oo(l men possessing deep pliilosoi)liical insight taking the Necessitarian and Libertarian side respectively, in regard to the (question of Freedom ; and we also find many able writers, who have no sympathy with I^tilitarianism, take the Necessitarian position, though w^e find that Utilitarians usually con- cur in holding, in some form, Necessitarian })rinciples. But since morality is connected largely with voluntary action, though it also pertains to mental states and dispositions, it is of importance to know as fully as possible what voluntary action involves, and what })art the Will plays in the detei'mination of our actions, and the production of our character. The problem is an exceedingly deep and ditticult one, as will at once appear if we think for a moment of the (questions involved in it. What is the nature of Will power ? Is it an originating, or merely a controlling power ; or is it partly both ? Does it exercise its infiuenc^e tow ards external things in the way of choice, or does it merely exert a controlling function over our faculties or activities within ? Is its nature and exercise, in the first instance, purely mental, or does it belong primarily and essen- tially to the realm of morals ? Then follows the question of the relation of the Will to our % • 1 . I f: 111 11 m m.- 'M::ik 86 TTIUTARTANISM. otlior faculties. Does it stand above them all, as their governor ; or is it conditioned on some of them in its activit}^ ? What is its precise relation to our natural impulses, and what its bearing in regard to our rational nature ? Do the former affect its exercise ; if so, how ? Does the latter guide it, by supplying to it an intelligent law of action ? Then what about the problem of freedom and necessity ? Is man free in his action, or does he act under moral necessity ? How should the problem itself be stated ? Should we enquire whether the will, the sorcl, or the person is free ? If necessity bo the law under which man acts, how are we to regard this law ? How does the fact or law of causation stand related to the Will and its exercise ? How do motives stand related to the Will ? Is there between the Will and its motives, a con- nection which may be termed moral causation ? Or must we shut off the mental or spiritual sphere from the reign of natural or physical law, and find for it a law of its own ? And this final important question comes up — is the agent in acting self determined, or is his action determined invariably by motive, just as antecedent determines consequent, invariably, according to causation under physical law 'I TUF. WILL. 87 These interronatloiis will suffice to sliow, to some extent, the sphere of the en(|uiry, and to indicate, as well, h )w profound the prol)lem of the Will is. It will also help us to see the bearing of the Utilitarian doctrine here, and to o'ive a general sketch of this we now proceed. W(^ may confine remaik almost entirely to modern forms of the system, so that we will have little to say concerning the opinicms of either ancient or mediaeval times on this point. Our survey can be but brief. In regard to the naturt of the Will, Utili- tarians say but little. In regard to its relation to our other fiiculties, they generally make its exercise depend on our desires or aversions ; and in regard to the bearing of our rational nature towards the Will, they do not lay down any definite doctrine, further than that the Will may be educated, and that a clear intel- lectual standard of right and Avrong is recjuired for its proper exercise. The problem chiefly discussed by Utili- tarians, and in some respects the most important problem connected with the Will, is that of its Freedom. We will now see what treatment it receives at their hands. It may be stated that modern Utilitarians are gener- ally Necessitarians. Those who hold the :.{i ifi 'Hi k % .!i 3 m If 1 -If I IllWIIId I 88 rTTIJTAHIANISM. doctrines of Positivism are necessarily so. There are some who, while virtually necessi- tarian, do not reject freedom ; but when we ask what they mean by freedom, it is simply freedom from restraint ; in acting the agent is free from compulsion. The majority, how- ever, explain the facts relating to the Will and its exercise, in such a way as really to exclude freedom, in the proper sense, altogether. We may take Mill as the exponent of Utilitarian doctrine here, as he has more formally than almost any other dealt with this (piestion, and the treatment it receives at his hand, however defective in principle, has many marks of fair- mindedness and abilitv. Mr. Mill does not like the title Necessitarian and proposes Determinist as a much Ijetter one. We may cheerfully allow the use of this name, for the thing is always more important than the name ; and an exposition of the doctrines held hy Mill and the later Utilitarians will, we believe, go far to show that they really involve necessitarianism of a very rigid kind, it matters not by what name we are pleased to call it. Mill holds that human actions come under the same laws as the uniformities in the natural or physical world. Human actions are hence phenomena connected with .antecedent THK WIM. SO plionoinenti, and tliev nvsiilt as invariably from theso antecedents, and in the very same way, as tlie falling of a stone results from its rela- tion in space to the earth, by which it is popu- larly said to be attracted. His words on this point are as follows — "A voliti(m is a moral effect which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly an^ ;is inv-nriably as physi- cal effects follow their physical causes. Whether it must do so, 1 acknowled<;e myself to be entirely ignorant, be the phenomenon moral or physical ; and 1 condemn, according- ly, the word necessity as applied to either case. All I know is, that it alwavs does." Mill thus makes substantially no difference between physical and mental phenomena, and the invariable connection between cause and effect is the same in l)oth cases. That which precedes action, and which is generally called motive, whether it be disposition, desire, im- pulse, or anything else which influences us, along the line of the Utilitarian theory of life, is an antecedent or cause, and the action which follows is a consequent or effect, and the con- nection is invariable. The antecedent being so or so, the consequent will be so or so. The character of the cause determines the nature of the effect. The motive determines the ac- I c I M if 90 rTIIJTAKTAXTSM. ! li J I ■ m i Iff' InM i tion, and self (letenuiiuition is theieljy excluded. The Will does not possess what may be termed inherent spontaneity. It will be seen that this is the necessary outcome of the t»eneral em- pirical principles held by Utilitarians. If the object determine the sul>ject, then spcmtaneity of the intellect, of the conscience, and of the will is excluded. Each is what it is, as deter- mined by something' outside of itself ; all of which goes to show that a rigid necessitarian- ism prevails in the Utilitarian system. It also gives warning that the morass of Materialism may not l)e far away. Another point to which we may properly allude here has reference to the verdict of con- sciousness in regard to Freedom. Libertarians generally take that verdict as in favour of their view, but Determinists like Mr. Mill deny that consciousness testifies to the fact of Free- dom. His argument may be stated as follows : In saying that we are free we can only mean that, in any given case in Avhich we act in a certain way, we feel that we couhl have acted otherwise had we so pleased. To be conscious of free will, Mill says, must mean to be consci- ous before we have decided that we are able to decide either way. C'onsciousness, he says, only tells me what I actually do, or feel ; what Tin: \\]\A.. 1)1 I niit'ht otlioi'wiso havo donr, can ncncr come within the <;Tasp of consciousness. We only know that we can do a tl)in^' by havin*,^ (h3n(^ it. Of course, Mill admits tliat we nu'ght act in another way did we preftr it, but he denies that we can choose one course wliih^ per- formin<>' another. He, hence, rejects tlu* opin- ion that we are conscious of l)eing able to act in opposition to the strongest present aversion or desire. The ditterence between a bad man and a good man, according to Mill, is not that the latter acts in opposition to his strongest desires, ])ut that his desire to do right and aversion to do wrong are strong enough to overcome any other conflicting desire. In re- gard to the Will, it may further be added, that Mill also holds that it can l)e educated through the aversions and desires, and that herein lies the sphere of moral education. It may l)e remarked here that Mill's position in regard to consciousness and the fact of Free- dom is in some respects the strongest in his whole systeiii. It will still remain, however, to enquire whether he states the prol)lem prop- erly, or no ; and whilst we may freely admit that his criticism bears severely on the doc- trines of some leading Libertarians, yet it may still be maintained that a more accurate state- .1) M m IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 1.25 ■tt liiii 12.2 2.0 HiotDgraphic Sciences Corporation 23 WIST MAIN STMIT WIBSTIR.N.Y. 14SM (716) t72-4S03 ^V ■i i ! 1 jn 92 rTILlTAUIANTSM. mmit of the problem, will shield Freedom from this stron'j^ ass.ault. In regard to the necessi- tarian or determinist doctrines of Utilitarians in general, two cjuestioiis will naturally arise in the mind of the thoughtful reader. How can a valid groinid for human responsibility be provided on their theory ; and how is education of the will possible, of the strongest desire or aversion alwavs rules it ? ^ W §■■ V CONCLUSION. The first part of our task is now completed. We have endeavored to ^ive a general state • ment, and exposition of the Utilitarian system of morals. In doing so we were unable to go into great details on any point, and our space compelled us to be content with a very general survey, even where a more complete .statement might have served a useful purpose. It is hoped that a fair, and somewhat clear, presen- tation of the opinions of Utilitarians on each of the topics discussed has been given. The various leading problems entering into the ethical system have been passed under review, and a very brief summary may gather up results, and prepare the way for the analysis and criti- cism to follow. Utilitarians generally hold an empirical Psychology, and a sensational theory of Knowledge. Their theory of human nature, life, and activity may be tevihcd Eudiemonis- r m H urn' 1 r '!? r^ 94 rriMTAKIANlSM. tic. Ill regard to the nature and origin of moral conceptions they hohl that they are not simple^n d akim ate, but <'ntiipU>v aind_dHv^^<^ : and that our knowledge of moral distinctions is ac(juired l)y purely empirical processes. Con- science is not an original faculty, but a devel- opment ; the product of education and asso- ciation working on the field of experience. The ethical standard is (xeneral Utility ; this is made prominent in their system. The source of obligation is either subjective feeling or objective authority. They generally hold a doctrine of benevolence, and endeavor to show how we take into account the interests of others in determining our own conduct. Tliev maintain that there is but one generic notion, self interest, which prompts men to action, and there is no necessary connection l)etween motive and action. Finally, in regard to the Will and freedom, their doctrine is necessitarian, or, as they prefer to say, deter- minist. The second part of the treatise will contain a critical review of the results thus gathered up, with some indication of the true doctrine on each topic. m t^jA^-rt ir. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM. l1 PRELIMINARY. In Giitering upon the second part of our task, a few introductory remarks are necessary to indicate the general position from which the survey of Utilitarianism we are now about to take will be made, and to mark out the main lines along which our critical review will be undertaken. There are certain questions, rather metaphysical than ethical in their na- ture, which stand so related to the problems of Ethics that they must be kept in view all the time, and tacit, if not expressed, opinions regarding them held. We wish to note three of these related questions, and to express the opinions touching them, which we will carry with us in our analysis and criticism of the doctrines of Utilitarianism, as already sketched. The first of these questions relates to the «■ ; 06 UTILITAKIANISM KXAMfNKD. i n : .. foundation of morality. What, in tlio last analysis, is the basis of virtue or of morals ? It is found in man's moral nature, or nuist we J40 beyond that nature to find it \ Is man, as a moral being, self-contained and independent i Are the facts of conscience, especially that of obligation, and that of the authority of the moral faculty, such as to supply in themselves their own adequate explanation, or do these facts necessarily inii)ly a deeper and a broader foundation ? The opinion is ventured, with some decree of confidence, that our moral nature and con- duct, with their varied phenomena, do not sup- ply in themselves their own complete explana- tion. Conscience cannot be itself the source of the authority it admittedly possesses. This authority demands an objective ground. The moral faculty asserts the obligation under which we are to do the right. This assertion is the echo within us of a voice coming to us from without, and calls for an external basis on which it mav rest. Admitting, then, that we must go beyond our moral nature for the fundamental explanation of its phenomena, the question arises, what beyond that nature is the foundation of mor- alitv — the basal fact in Ethics ? We answer at PllELIMlNAUV. 07 once that in the nature of the Divine l>einj;'we have laid the foundation of moralitv. Tlie fact of the Divine existence is necessary to tlie possil)ility of moral philosophy, as, on the other hand, the ])henoniena of our moral nature af- ford one of the strongest jwoofs of the exis- tence of the Divine Being. The position here may be thus stated. Conscience, or the mor- al faculty, makes known to us the distinction between right and wrong. This distinction im- plies the existenc'e of moral law. This law is engraved on our nature, but it also exists without us, as ruling over us. As thus exist- ing, moral law involves the existence of a per- sonal Being, with a moral nature, who is the author of the law and the source of its author- ity. This Being is Ood. Hence, from the facts of our moral nature, we reason to the existence and moral attributes of the Divine Being, and in that Being as moral gov- ernor, we find the answer to the question what is the foundation of Ethics '( Moral philosophy is only possible on the pre- supposition of the existence of God, as a personal Being and as the moral governor of the universe. Man's moral nature demands this pre-supposition, in order to an adequate explanation of all its facts. Neither man's i 'i m.i At 1 i J I 08 rriLtTAKlANISM KXAMINKI). \$' ■ ' i own moral nature, with its varied resources and wonderful furnishin<^.s, nor mere impers(mal law, of which many make so nuich at the pres- ent day, affords a sufficient basis from which to explain all the facts. The foundation of morality is in the Divine nature, and hence our criticism will be made from the Thtistic stand- point. A second })oint has reference to the view the ethical system requires us to take of the rela- tion of man, as a moral ])ein<^, to the Divine Being-, whose existence and moral character is predicated by the facts of man's moral nature. The question thus raised is very closely related to, if not identical with, that of man's position and powers under the Divine Sovereignty. If (lod be sovereign moral Ruler, has man any disthict personality ? If he has, how does his distinct personality stand related to the absolute and sovereign personality of God, who, by the voice of man's consciousness, is distinctly declared to have paramount author- ity over him ? This, of course, is a question which cannot now be viewed in all its bearings, nor dare we ever hope to fathom the deep problems raised by it ; yet it is of seme import- ance in regard to the ethical system to have a clear conception of the relation of man's moral PHKMMINARV 00 nature, whose facts are the chief subject of study, to tlie Divine Being in whose nature, as moral, tlie foundation of morality for man is to he discovered. Here the opinion is ventured that the abso- hite sovereignty and independent personality of ihe Divine lieing must be held fast ; and at the same time the distinct, though dependent, personality of man is to be as firmly maintain- ed. How the independent personality of (xod, and the dependent personality of man ; how the absolute sovereignty of the moral governor, and the subordinate activity of the moral nature of man, under the divine government, stand related or are to be harmonized, may be very difficult to state ; but as to the reality of the two sides of the problem there can be no doubt. They stand in the relation of distinctly correla- ted facts, as a smaller circle stands related to a larger when contained within its sphere. Each is a circle and has its properties, and is self- contained, but the larger embraces or contains the smaller within it. So in regard to the Divine Being and the moral nature of man. The former is the vast circle which contains all else ; the latter is the smaller circle contained within the larger. In viewing the vast realm over which the Divine Sovereignty thus ex- If i m 100 rTIlJTAltlANlSM EXAMINKl). ;>! I' *i .1 L :ii lii^^:; tends, Ave find varicnis orden's of (?xistonte, animates and inanimate, rational and irrational, moral and non-moral. Each of these has its ])ecuHar constitntion, tand its definite laws of existence and action. This constituti(m anl m I" must ov(M' stand with bowed Iioad and silent lips. All we now venture to do is to assert the fac't that there is somethini^^ wroii'^- in man's moral nature, and that for this disorder we nmst make allowance in our (»thieal system, even tlum^h we cannot tell Just how it aros(», and may not be able to define its exact extent, or state its precise results. We carefully avoid venturin<»' any positive theory in rc\irarrr\Er). ;i -if I I. • leads them to action ; and with the majority of men a great variety of ends is sought. As activity is put forth towards tliese, pleasure or pain may l)e the concomitants. If pleasure be made the end then the normal exercise of our faculties will be disturbed, whereas if our faculties are in proper and harmonious exercise pleasure will usually l>e the result. Another element — that of duty — comes in, and may often call us to do that which is irksome, though the approbation of our moral nature will in the end give satisfaction ; but, as this point will come up in another connection, we simply mention it here. Such, then, is the position we would give pleasure in the theory of Life. Modern Utilitarians, like Mr. Mill, who re- gard pleasure as the only end, and the desire to attain it the only motive to voluntary action, admit that men may aim at the good of their neighbors, or may seek to injure their enemies, without ever thinking of the pleasure they shall obtain thereby. But they deny that, in such cases, the action is voluntary. They say it is spontaneouSj and the result of habit. This position, however, is untenable. It is ad- mitted that we come to do many things spon- taneously, which at first were performed THKORY OF LIFK. 1-21 voluntarily; ))iit this supposition of spontaneous action will not explain every ease. Has the Good Samaritan, for example, stopping on his way to bind up the wounds of the unfortunate traveller, his own pleasui'e in his mind's view, as the end to which his action is directed ? Mr. Mill admits that such a person does not think of himself at all, in other words, that the desire of pleasure is not his motive, but attempts to escape the conclusion which seems so naturally to follow, by asserting that such actions are not performed from motive at all, but are merely the result of habit. The man is one in whom the ha bit of Benevolence has t been formed, and when, therefore, he has a * glimpse of woe, it is a quick stimulus to action. But surely it is far from correct to set motive and habit over against each other in the way of oj^position, as this view does. Motive con- sists in an end, desii*able in the mind's view ; and habit here can only mean, that the effects of the (xood Samaritan's previous course of life have been such as to make the relief of a suf- ferimr neighbor a more desirable end in his view than it is to others, or might otherwise have been to him. Then, too, it may not be forgotten that habit is largely the result of voluntary action ; and in order to the forma- : I, f V -im ill 122 rTTLTTARTANTSM EXAMINED. ^ ! i tion of the Good Samaritan's habit of life, voluntary action looking to the good of others must have had a place, and, in the initial stages, a prominent place ; otherwise habit could not be formed. Those, again, who represent pleasure as the only end of Iniman action attempt to show that, by assuming the desire of pleasure to be the primitive desire of the mind, the formation of all the variety of desires which appear in ma- ture life can be explained. For example, a child begins by desiring pleasure. This is its first and only incentive to action. But it finds , that the acquisition of knowledge, even its first germs, is attended with pleasure, and then by means of association it is led to desire know- ledge for its own sake, and to aim after its acquisition, even when the thought of the pleasure to be obtained therel)y may not be present to the mind at all. This reasoning though very plausible can be shown to be beside the question at issue, and does not relieve the theory of the difficulty which meats it here, but rather shows its in- herent weakness on this point. Of course, it is exceedingly difficult to go back to the first dawn of intelligent activity in child life and experience, and any theory ot the way in which THEORY OF LIFE. 123 particular desires first spring into exercise must of necessity l)e, in a great measure, con- jectural. The burden of proof, however, here rests with Utilitarians. But for the sfike of argument let it be admitted that the theory of Life they propound is the true one, what then is the conclusion ? In order to make its claim good, and its conclusion from the conditions of child life valid, it must show that the desire of knowledge is a modification of the desire of pleasure. Utilitarians do not succeed in this, nor does their theory provide for any har- monizing of these two desires, if the desire of pleasure be made the fundamental one. It only shows that the desire of knowledge comes into exercise under particular circumstances. If, then, a motive consists in a desirable end in the mind's view, and if by any means whatever the acquisition of knowledge comes to be de- sired for its own sake, without any thought of the pleasure arising therefrom, then whatever may have been the history of our being so led to desire knowledge for its own sake, the desire of knowledge is a motive to action, radically different from the desire of pleasure It may be added that a similar line of reason ing in regard to any of our specific desires would show that their respective ends may : ■i^rU PI ] x u 124 UTILITARIANISM EXAMINED. 1^ be sought for their own sake. This, then, is a principle generically different from the love of pleasure, and wherever this principle comes upon the scene and impels to action, the Utilitarian theory proves to be defective. This, it will be seen, brings us back to the former position that in our nature there are many desires leading our activity out to their respective ends, and that these, by no possilUe alchemy, can be reduced to the love of pleasure alone. One other remark will close this chapter. It relates to the indefinite or ambiguous way in wdiich Utilitarians use the word good, and regard pleasure in relation to the good. They often use it in a way that does not necessarily imply moral good, that is, the Right. Pleasure may be called a good of a certain kind, but not necessarily good, in the ethical sense. When it is said that pleasure is the only good, and the desire to attain it the sole motive of human action, the word good is evidently used in a wider sense than that of moral good. Many things are good, i ^his general sense, and amongst these dsiire may in many cases take rank, which no proper ethical significance. In Moral Philosophy we have to do with moral good, |>.-.-u h^x^.^ mWtii THEORY OF LIFE. 125 and tlio remark here made is tliat Utilitarians use the word good in a very ambiguous way. We conclude that the Utilitarian Theory >f Life is not the true one, and the attempt to build an Ethical Theory on their conception of pleasure and pain nuist })e a failure. It is a house built on the sand. ;l0 tliey have readier I substantial ajL^reciuoiit ainon^^st theniselves, as to the })riiiiai'y prin- ciple, fact, or concei)tion, from which all our moral })ossessions are (leveloi)ed or derived. This remark, it may l)e added, a}»plies not simply to the (question now under review, but to the (piestions of the origin and nature of Conscience, and of that which constitutes the Ethical Standard. The allusion we now make to it, and the remark here ottered upon it, will 1)6 sufficient, so that it will not be necessary to repeat it when we reach the chapters which treat of these topics. In regard to the nature of moral conceptions it is held, in opposition to the Utilitai'ian view, that they are simple in their nature, and in capable of being resolved into any simpler notion. As there are in the intellectual sphere ultimate principles or intuitive convictions, which cannot be further explained than that they are what they are, so in the realm of Morals there are certain simple and ultimate notions, which are incapal)le of further analysis. The Intuitional l*sychology outlined in a former chapter lays the foundation of a sound Ethical Psychology as well. According to this the notions of right, wrong, obligation, &c., are original, and primitive, simple and ultimate ; lit f it til ill' I ';{'* ■'■k r.i -i • 'I ij*' J-. ..J a. . ."• V;' ;' i ,^ I: JO ITrUTAUIANISM KXAMINKI). and tliey are what they an^ by virtue of their own essential nature. Tliey are also j^enerieally different from all our other notions or mental possessions, in that the one cannot be resolved into the other. An intellectual judgment and a verdict of the moral faculty are very different things, however they may stand related as facts. The mind viewed as cogn'tive purely, and as moral as well, gives us very different results. I Understanding and Conscience are diverse. The conclusion reached in the chap- ter on the theory of knowledge, provides a proper intellectual basis for this view, and we Vi'est in the conclusion that the notionjifjaght lis suchjjiat u^^imther 4iccQimt of it can be givenJJiaji that it comes to-tSisJJielTatufal niul^mivpl e d(diverimi :ft- of (mF ^^im^d^jnintiirn . It is notnecessary to adduce jletailed proof of t his ])osit iQiiJiey o, inat j mu clLjisjvl iat we m ay lu Lve t o_s ay, concem iiitf-the-ttttentp ts made by Utilitarians to explain how our moral concep- tions are derived from some other principle or notion, will go far to show^ what their true nature is, and to entirely destroy the claim put forth that they are complex and derivative. To this point we at once proceed, and in the criticism upon which we enter the two closely related questions of the nature and origin of 1' TIIKUKV OK Mora I, SKNTIMF.MS. i:;i the I of our moral conceptions will both be considm'cil, and our <^cneral conclusions reached. In our exposition of tlu^ Utilitarian do'trine on this point, we saw tiat certain writers found the ex]»lanati(ni and source of our moral conceptions in some form of Law, either human or Divine ; while others discovi^'cd the same in General Utility, either in its individual or sociological aspects. In regard to the former of these views, which regards either the Law of the land or the Divine Law sim[)ly, as the fundamental principle of Ethics, we would otter the criticism that every one of these theories necessarily makes the assumi)tion that the notion of right is already in our possession. The notion of moral distinctions is presupposed, before the conception of Law is possible. Without the notion of ugh t underlying it, Law can have no real significance, and nmst be devoid of its chief characteristic of rational authority. In- stead of founding moral conceptions on any form of Law wo would advance the view that the notion of Law involves the assumption of these conceptions ; and, hence, the notion of Hight is the fundamental one. The notion of Right then appears as the basis of Law ; not Law the ground of the idea of Right. Utili- . I ■i m m m l:]2 tTILITAlUAXlSM EXAMINED. -Mm tariaiis of the Legal School, therefore, confound the notions of Law and Right, and make Law the basal fact, where as the notion of Rioht. is presupp osed in that of Law, and hf^n ^r^ oannfyt be derived froniJ t. Another critical remark naturally follows. If Law be talvcni as the fundamental fact in Ethics, then liimfht: ^ind Obligatioii _too, must depend on the mere will of the person who ])romulgates the Law. The only way to avoid this conclusiou is to maintain that this Law is the outcome of moral principles pertaining to the nature of the Lawgiver; but it will be ob- served that this supposition involves the exist- ence of a moral nature, and of the notion of Right prior to that of Law and iii:. its ground. The Utilitarian position here evidently makes moral distinctions depend on the will of the author of the Law, without providing any Ethical guide to the exercise of that will from which the Law flows. This is a view which all but destroys morality, leaving it at best but varialjle, and Avithout proper foundation. The conception of Right, as we take it, is not only fundamental, but it is of something which is eternal and immutable. Not even the will of Ixod, in itself, constitutes anything right. The Divine will, it is true, will always be found THEOllY iW ^[ORAL SKNTINFKNTS. 133 coiiKtident witli what is right, and our conduct will be concidont too, if we obey tlie Divine w4ll ; Imt the basis of the Divine will expressed in the Divine La\v is the essential rectitude of the Divine nature, s<> thi\t t he n^Hi^ n nf Tli(vli t lies de(>pest of ni l. What is true of the rela- tion of Law^ as the expression of Will, and Iti<»ht as connected with nature in regard to (rod, is, in a measure at least, true in the case of man ; so thpt bnt h n^ fhf^ Divinp Hpm^r mul i n human nature the fundamental notion^ he f/ro und principle, in morals is that of RiciJ i t. When we thus sav that the foundation of morals is in the nature of (lod, we should also add that we carefully guard against the view that it is the Divine will that is meant. The final ground of Ethics is the inherent rectitude of the Divine nature, from which the Divine Will springs, and of which the Divine Law is the correct expression. Corresponding to this we have, in our moral nature, a reflec- tion of the Divine Nature, Will, and Law; and with us, 100, the notion of Kight is the deepest of all, and springs up as an original deliverance of our moral nature. The Utilitarian view we are now dealing with, derives the notion of Right from that of Law, which is an expres- sion of Will, whereas we would connect the 134 UTTLITARTANISM r<:XAMrNED. notion of liidit with the natnre of the Law- iLifiver, and regard it as fundamc^ntal, and as •'o* / V givino' the Rule to Will, and the Authority to LaAV ; and hence it is simple and underived. In regard to those forms of Utilitarian- ism in which Self-interest, or General Utility, is made the foundation and source of the prin- ciples of the iLthical system, much the same lines'^of criticism may be followed. The notion of Utility, individual or general, can only pos sess ethical significance under the assumption that the principles of morality already exist. The generally useful and the morally right are entirely different conceptions ; and, instead of the former determining the latter, the latter rather determines the former. That which is right will, in the long run, turn out to be the generally useful, and the generally useful will, in the end, coincide with the right ; but we are not thereby to conclude that the notion of right grows out of that of generaLUtilit v . The idea of Utility will have no ethical basis, nor can the generally useful ever be transformed into the ethically right, unless we presuppose the conception of right already existent in the mind. Thus, while no possible process in the ethical laboratory can ever transform the U seful int o timMioht the conception of Right THEORY OF MOHXL SEXTIMKXTS. U'y affords a solid pliil(jsoplncal basis on which the useful mav be founded, and from which it may be derived. The conception of Right, we again conclude, is seen to be the fundamental one in the Ethical system, and we are as far as possible from admitting that moral conceptions can ever l)e evolved out of any considerations ()f Utility. Unless we presuppose the moral "element, the useful must ever remain without ethical significance, if indeed we might not be entirely unable to speak of anything ^^unpful at all. The conception of Right is hence one of the root notions of our nature, not capable of being resolved into anything other, or simpler, than itself. Those Sociological forms of the Utilitarian theory which find many able advocates at the present day, can in like manner be shown to be entirely deficient as ethical systems, inas- much as they fail to supply an adequate account of the nature and origin of our moral conceptions and sentiments. Instead of seek- ing to evolve an ethical system out of the conditions and demands of society, it is main- tained that these very conditions and demands of society are such as to involve, of necessity, the supposition of moral principles, and that these principles really lie at the foundation . f t 3 j^ ' fii m lJ]f5 UTILTTA1UANI8M EXAMINKD. s biw ; laAv_piiiSiippiJses riglit ; Conscience gives this conception. Hence, the external authority from which Conscience is said l)y some Utilitarians to be developed, takes for ^jx UJited the very thing to be explained, viz : — The existence of Conscience, which is hence to be regarded as an oriirinal facuU v. It is admitted that external authority, paternal or civil, may exert a considerable influence over Conscience!! either for good or for evil ; but it is held that it j cannot produce Conscience, or account for its supremacy. It is also maintained that unless there be some such order and uniformity in the conditions of external authority, as can only spring from the original and immutable con- ceptions of right and wrong, and the eternal distinction between them, our experience under such external authoritv must be confused, chaotic, and purposeless. It is only on the supposition of an original faculty, giving us these immutable conceptions, that external authority can possess any moral ■'1^ I y i(»i| .ft'N (ill m mm m ^i 1 i I 148 UTILITARIANISM EXAMINED. $1 li ' / significance, or that a discipline, ethical in its nature, can be exercised. In asserting and defending the doctrine that Conscience is an original faculty, there is a difficulty which Utilitarians parade as a fatal objection to the Intuitive doctrine. The objection may be stated thus : If Conscience be an original faculty, and its deliverances ultimate, we would expect to find uniformity in men's moral judgments. As a matter of fact, they say, there is great diversity ; one man judging one thing right, another declaring it wrong ; one nation and one age approving certain courses of action, another condemning the same. Thp oonfOnsion is ^tUftU— lirnwn t hat Cojiscience^ f^nriTu ^bp an oj4gini^] fjfi.f^nlty The fact of diversity is admitted, though it is held that ITtilitarians give too great prominence to this di^ersity. It is maintained, however, that the nature and extent of the different judgments men pass on the same courses of action does not invalidate the doctrine that Conscience is an original or intuitive faculty. Let us look somewhat carefully at this point. It is to be borne in mind that, though men may differ in regard to what is right and what lis wrong, t hey aU agreainj:u^5yar.d to the re^4ity lof moral distinctions. It is always implied m rONSCIENCK. 140 that there is a ri^ht and a wrong, even though there may be diversity in the apphcation of this distinction to particular cases, but the fact that the distinction involves moral con- ceptions is sufficient to justify the position of the Intuitionalist in regard to Conscience, which gives us the conception of right. As^ already hinted, an exercise of thp undrrritnnd ii i^ may be required in determin inf** w^^^ ^'"1 rio ht or wrong in pnrtienlaj :-fnses. This general view will justify us in removing from the discussion all those so-called diversi- ties of moral judgments, which result from the different ways in which different men may re- gard a complicated and many-sided case. To illustrate, take the conduct of the son, spoken of by Paley, who betrayed his father to death. Was the son right or wTong ? In reply, we say that Conscience cannot really pronounce on the case in this form. As we have seen in other connections, the understanding must come in to decide in what aspect the case is to be viewed. The understanding may regard the act of the son as one of patriotism, and it may| present it in this light to Conscience for de- cision as to its moral quality. But in doing so the understanding may be wrong. It may be wrong in representing it as an act of patriotism :•! .•^i t.i'fl Ij I Ah ni ;:r.: ■I. ill I' 150 UTILITARIANISM EXAMINED. at all, and more particularly it may be wrong in looking at it in that light alone. Now with such errors of the understanding, which go far to produce the diversity of moral judgments seen amongst men. Conscience has nothing whatev(5r to do. Conscience can only deal .. with the act as brought before it, and in so far as the different decisions which the Consciences of different men pronounce on a complicated case, arise from the different aspects in which that case is set before them. Conscience is in ino respect at fault, but the understanding has [erred in its judgment. We are also justified in leaving out of the problem those moral judgments closely allied with the foregoing, which arise from the differ- ent conclusions which the understanding may come to, as to the best way of reaching a par- ticular end. Suppose we have a simple case, such as that of the Hindoo mother casting her child into the Ganges. The end she has in view is to please her god, and this she thinks is the proper way to do it. Conscience does not tell us how best to secure the end. Here again the understanding must inform us what is the proper means to secure the end in view, and when the understanding brings its judg- ment before ('Onscience, the latter gives a ver- CONSCTENTE. 151 tf diet as to its moral signiticaiice. Here, again, with errors of the understanding Conscience has nothing to do, and so diversities of moral judgments, in cnses of this nature, are not to be charged against Conscience, and hence do not affect the conclusion that it is an original faculty. It would appear, therefore, that the sup- posed diversities of moral judgmcmts among men do not belong so much to Conscience as to the TT nderstand ing. As an Intuitive faculty its province -is not to judge in the proper sense of the term, but to give us the distinction between right and wrong, to put us directly in possession of the notion of right, and command us, with inherent and absolute authority, to do the right and avoid the wrong. The chief source of diversity lies with th*^ Understanding as the judging faculty; and, even when we speak of the education of Conscience, we have to bear in mind that probably the chief part of that so-called education belongs rather to the Understanding than to (Conscience properly so-called. When we speak, as we have done, of the education of Conscience, and admit that, in a certain sense, it is capable of education we speak in a somewhat general way, and take into account the relation between Conscience h ■m m m m tu 1 52 rTILITAKTANTSNr KXAMIXKD. !;:•' ! ui and Understanding' in the matter of our mor«al judgments. The Understanding, as the judg- ing faculty, may be enlightened ; and Con- scie.:ce, as the moral faculty, may be strength- ened as the educati'ig process goes on. The former will discern more and more clearly the truth, in regard to the things with which it has to deal, a!id then Conscience will comma? d more and more imperatively that the right ought to be done. In regard to these diversities, further, it may be remarked that we must also.lje prepared to make allowance for the disorder of our moral nature in its various aspects, and rela- tions. This disorder admittedlv exists, and making proper allowance for it in our system may do something to remove such supposed diversities as are not accounted for by the views already presented. That a faculty is disorder- ed, or capable of suffering disorder, is not proof that it is not an original part of our nature. On the contrary the very fact that a faculty is capable of disorder is rather a pre- sumption, and a strong one too, that such faculty is an original partof that nature which suffers from, and is the seat of, this moral disorder. . . , ). We therefore conclude that the Utilitarian CONSCIENCE. 153 explanation of Conscience is entirely insuffi- cient ; and that no proper theory of its origin, growth, and authority, can be pres(mted on the the principles of that system. We adopt the Intuitive Theory in its general outlines, as af- fording us the true and adequate explanation of Conscience, finding it not so much a judg- ing faculty, as the faculty by which we have the notion of right with all that notion involves. / It Js^Ji akl to be an original facult v ; and*' neither the moral disorder of our nature, nor the diversity of moral judgments found among men, invalidates this conclusion. Con- science may, hence, be defined as an original faculty, or an intuitive element in man's nature, by means of which he has the notion of Right given him, and is enabled to appre- hend moral distinctions and acquire ethical conceptions ; and by which he is impelled to, or restrained from, certain actions, according as they are right or wrong; and by which, also, he becomes the subject of certain peculiar emotions of approval or disapproval, according as he does, or fails to do, the right. Into fur- ther details we need not now enter, and it is the less necessary to do so as some of these points will come up again, when i .'I,--: ';*•.! ¥ i li' 1.54 T'TILITAltlANTSM KXAMINEI). we examine the question of moral obligation connected with the peculiar authority which Conscience is felt to possess. ' If i ' li v. \» =\' "■I Ii ■^. CHAPTEK V. THE ETHICAL STANDAKD. In our analysis and criticism we reach what in some respects is the most prominent point in the Utilitarian system, and have to examine the view taken as to what constitutes the Ethical Standard or Rule of Right. Without entering into detailed consideration of the various views held even by Utilitarians them- selves, we shall chiefly enquire into the validity of (leneral Utility as the rule of right or criterion of virtue. We shall also take sub- stantially the description of General Utility given by Utilitarians themselves, though even that is open to criticism, and the chief enquiry will be, whether there is good ground to justify the claim that the principle of Utility is sufti- cient in itself to serve the purpose of an Ethical Standard which has a sound philoso- phical basis, and which is convenient for practical purposes in the conduct of life, so i 1 ,.> m m 'ii 156 UTILITARIANISM EXAMINED. v ) vi \ H T! ■ P ii *^' ' that hy means of it the moral (quality of actions may be discovered, and our ethical conduct rif^ditly directed. Before taking up those views which specially regard (leneral Utility as the Ethical Standard, we may make brief reference to those ethical systems which are usually classed under Util- itarianism, but which take Law in some form to be the Standard of right. There is a sense, as we shall see further on, in which the Divine Law especially may be regarded as the moral Standard. Even in this case, however, we have carefully to observe that the notion of right is presupposed, and thus the question of the origin of moral conceptions, and the ques- tion of the 7'ule of right have ever to be kept distinct. Further remarks on this point may be reserved till we seek to unfold the true view of the Standard. A general defect of all inductive systems of morals is that they begin with the objective sphere, and make the subjective arise from, and be dependent upon, the objective. As in the Divine nature we think of the notion of liight as prior to that of the Divine Law — the latter being merely the expression through the Divine Will, in the objective sphere, of the rectitude of the Divine nature — so in regard ! !; i THK ETHICAl, STANDAUD. li)7 ( lU to iiuiu's moral nature, any ohjeciive principle or outward fact cannot be the starting point of morals or supply the Ethical Standard. Even General Utility, were it much more definite than it is, is merely an objective rule, which of itself can never supply unfiiilin m V 1 4 THE KTHK'AL STANDAHP. 165 tht latter enquiry takes for granted the former, and assumes that the more distinctly philosophical question of the Theory of the Moral Sentiments has been setth'd, and that the conceptions of right, wrong, &c., are before us, and their nature properly understood. Then, when we come to the enquiry concerning the Standard, we are led to seek some rule or law, by the employment of which we may be able to de- cide the particular actions which are right or wrong as the case may be, and by the use of which we mav be able to have our conduct, in an orderly intelHgent way, guided in accord- ance with the conceptions of right and wrong, which come to us as the primitive deliver- ances of the original faculty usually termed Conscience. In reaching the true doctrine here, it is well to take a wide view of the Moral Order of the Universe. We have hinted that there is such a moral order just as there is a well defined natural order in the system of existing things. Each part of the great whole has its own nature, place, and functions in the system. This great moral system of the Universe em- braces all intelligent beings possessing a moral nature, and placed in ethical relations. At the head of this vast moral Commonwealth I ■ -m m *..' i m ii m m -fmti 11:.. m' p. M 14 ill. H ■■ r too IT I LIT A UI A N ISM EX A M INED. stands the Divine Being ; the perfect rcctituch* of his nature is the foundation of morals for the whole . system ; and in the last analysis morality, whether for men or angels, will be found centering there. The Divine Will ex- pressed in whatever way it may be made known is the Divine Law, and this Law is the ultimate standard of right, perfect in its nature, and of universal application. Man, as a factor in the system of the Universe in which moral order prevails, and over which the Divine Law rules, is endowed with a moral nature, as has already been clearly shown. This moral nature is not entirely independent and self-contained, so that it does not in itself contain the full ex- planation of all its facts. For the final explan- ation of many of its facts, especially that of the peculiar authority of Conscience, which gives us the sense of obligation which we are con- scious of, we have to go beyond our own moral nature and rest again in the Divine Being. This being the case, we are justified in conclud- ing that our moral nature is the reflection or counterpart of the Divine nature in its moral aspects ; and hence, between the Divine Law, as the expression through the Divine Will of the rectitude of the Divine nature, and our moral nature and its deliverances when it is 11 i, I THE ETHICAL STANDARD. 167 rightly attuned, there will be harmony. This will give us a two-fold view of the standard ; first as the Divine Law, and second as a rule proceeding from our moral nature. Thus we may find the standard in the form of Law, as for example in the Decalogue, which is an expression of the Will of God in harmony with his perfect nature, and in keeping with the standard of the absolute recti- tude of that nature. So amongst men w^e mav find it in civil enactments or in the maxims of society ; but neither the Moral Law, nor the Civil Code, nor anythingy external, can have meaning as a moral stand-] ^ ard, save as it is the expression or reflection \ of a subjective moral principle, stamped on I our nature as an original part of it, and 1 founded finally in the rectitude of the Divine nature. The ultimate ethical standard then is the Divine Law, in whatever way made known to us. This is our clear and unmistakeable rule of duty. Even if we have not the Divine Law as mact^ known in the Decaloo ^np, wf^ fi^d tn^\}^ \v\th nnthnrity Hence, for US the rule is pr^'^nrily '^^bje^tive in t^^ Diyinix-J^flw,, ^mA^ t his is the onlv im mutably anrl infhlliblp atand- n rfl to test ( hft rightness or ^wi-ongness of ■^■!| H- it 168 UTILlTAUIANrSM KXAMINED. Ill, , lit 1 particular actions and mental states. Any subjective principle pertaining to our nature, and capable of being formulated in some ex- ternal law lias significance, and can have binding authority, only in so far as it reflects corre ctly the Divine L aw, under which we are placed in the moral order of the Universe. Moral Law rules throughout this realm, and our duty is only properly attended to when we conform to this moral Law. This moral Law is the Divine voice speaking to us ; our moral nature is the ear by which we hear that voice, so as to obtain guidance for the proper exercise bf our powers. In order to use this standard whether con- ceived of as external Law from Clod, or as made known to us through our moral nature, the understanding will come into exercise in mak- ing application of this standard to particular actions. Conscience gives the notion of Eight, and asserts categorically that the Right ought to be done. But when we ask what particular actions are right and what wrong, we then need, on the one hand, an ethical standard, and on the other, the use of the understanding. The understanding views the actions in ques- tion, and judges whether they possess, when compared with the ethical standard, those • J THK KTIITCAL STANDAUD. 100 featiiros wliicli entitle them to be called nt»lit or not. Then when this judgment is passed, Conscience, which has already supplied the fundamental notion of Right, says this, which is right, ought to be done. Then if I do it approval will follow, if not disapproval is felt. We are satisfied that any theory of the standard which does not regard the Divine Law as the ultimate rule of duty, must neces- sarily be defective in theory and unsatisfactory in practice. Nor let it be thought that in as- serting the validity of the Divine Law in this connection, we are leaving timG_4ilHloHepliical cy^j^]indj nnd— a.ngwfH»uy p xpip4lie dogmaticmethoil. In the first place, the sphere of sound morality and the sphere of true religion will in the end be found to coincide ; and in the second place, the more fully our con- d act is conformed to the Divine Law the more harmonious will the operation of all our powers be, and the more satisfactory will our conduct be found to the dictates of our moral ijature itself. The system is but one. It is a mistake, we believe, to separate as widely as some do the questions of morals and religion, of Con- science and the Bible. Their field is the same. The one gives light where it is needed, and H '^\ m J m 4 tl m If- P 170 UTILTTAUTAXISM EXAMINED. n: t; ., i supplies tlio full answer to problems which the other can only partially solve ; and so in close relation, though with distinct treatment, we would be inclined to bind moral philosophy and religion, and take the position most decidedly, that Moral Science can only be properly treated from the Theistic standpoint. In closing this chapter it may be proper to add, in regard to General Utility as the ethical Standard, that as a matter of fact any course of action which advances the general good will be foimd to be right, and should be followed ; and any action which is not for the general weal is wrong, and should not be done. We may even say that it is right to seek the general good, and that it is our duty to do it. In saying this, the reader may think we are falling back on Utilitarian ground. But not so. That any course of action tends to the general good is merely an indication that it is in all probability right ; but it is neither the source of its moral quality, nor the real test of its ethical significance. And fur- ther, when we say that it is right to seek the general good the question remains, why is this right ? We answer that the right is useful because it is rifjhf, and not that the useful is light because it is useful. This clearly involves 1 THK KTHITAI, STAN I >A HI). 171 a standard lying back of Utility, and in relation to which Utility ma^ he a kind of finger post. Turn the matter over as we may, we will ever find that we are without an immutable and inftiUible rule till we rest in the Divine Law as the ultimate standard of right. It appears that because Utility has the function we have just indicated, it finds such a very prominent place in the writings of Utilitarians, who treat the whole subject from the standpoint of ethi- cal Phnpiricism. The ol)jection to our doctrine here, that if we make the Divine Law tlie ultimate rule, we leave all those who have no clear knowledge of the ethical standard with- out a rule, has no real weight. In the first place, the fact that some men have no know- ledge such as the Bible gives of the true and final standard of duty, is only an acknowledg- ment of their sad condition, and an explana- tion of the low state of morals among them, as well as a reason why this knowledge should be given them as soon as possible. In the second place, God's Law is written_orreflected in man 's moral natur g, and men are respon- sible for the use they make of the knowledge thus given them, so that they are not entirely without a knowledge of the Divine Law. The more closelv a man follows the liojht of % ["■A\ I ' ill fir: ' ii mm \\ It, I In ! • 17'2 UTTMTAIUANISM EXAMINED. lleason, and the more carefully he ()l)eys the dictates of Conscience, the more will his con- duct conform to the requirements of the Divine Law ; and even though Keasonand Conscience in man, with the disorder of his moral nature I'esting on him, may be unable to direct his conduct aright, yet they point to, and afford evidence of, the true and only perfect guide of human conduct, the Divine Law, natural or revealed. \y 1 f CH APT Ell VI ■^i| MUKAL OUMGATIOX. We now reach another of the deep problems of Ethics, and have to enquire in particular, if the explanations given by Utilitarians of the fact of Moral Obligation, or of the absolutely binding authority of C^onscience, will stand examination. Unless their system provides a proper place for the fact of Obligation, and supplies an intelligible explanation of its peculiar binding nature, then the system fails. It will l)e found that on this point Utilitarian- ism meets with one of its most searching tests. If the tendency to produce happiness, if general Utility in any form, determines the rightness of an action, how can we get beyond the sphere of the agreeable or useful, for our explanation of the imperative, as distinguished from the optional ? " How are we to pass from the desirable which is optional, to the dutiful which is obhgatory V s ■J it, , '', . ^ M !!'■ : ' '"■ lu 1^ I I IJl I ' ! 174 UTILITAIUANISM EXAMINED. The fact that some writers, such as Bentham and many Positivists, deny the fact of ObHga- tion altogether, and the fact that uphoklers of the Utilitarian system differ greatly in their mode of expounding the fact of Obligation, goes far to cast a measure of doubt upon their doctrines, and to suggest the question whether adecjuate provision can be made in that system for the ftict of moral obligation. After what has already been said in the chapters on " Conscience " and " The Ethical Standard," it is not at all necessary to enter into lengthened analysis and criticism of the sul)ject of this chapter, as much that has ali'eady been brought out has gone to show, that no valid ground for moral obligation and the binding authority of (conscience, is pro- vided on tlie ground principles of Utilitarian- ism We need now only add a paragraph or two respecting the two main forms in which Utilitarians pier^ent the ground of Obligation in their ethical system. The one of these finds the source of obligation in jiersonal feeling, the other in mere external authority. Uet us examine each a little. Of the first view Mill may be taken as the representative. On his view the general good is the standard of right ; and unless he can MORAL OALKIATIOX. 1/0 answer the question, why am T obliged to promote the general good, his theory fails. If the source of obligation be personal feeling, then the degree of that feeling will be the measure of obligation, and if the feeling be wanting, as in the case of a very hardened man, then the obligation has no existence for him. The measure of obligation is not in the degree of our /eeling, but in the binding author- ity of the deliverances of the moral faculty. Another mistake Mill makes is to confound obligation with obedience. Some of the best things Mill has written on moral philosophy are found in this connecticm : but while thev are excellent as connected with obedience, they are (juite irrelevant so far as a true doctrine of obligation is concerned. The difficulty of obedience is one thing, and the ground of obligation is another. His remarks are admirable in regard to the former, but provide no ground for the latter. Mill is also a.t fault in regard to the nature of the eeling of which he speaks, when he says, "it is substantially the same in all sys- tems, viz. : — a feeling of the mind." The mental feeling he speaks of is merely a nega- tive thing, and is a pain c(mnected with diso- bedience ; and the keener this pain is, the UK^'e ^Ml lit 1 176 UTILITARIANISM EXAMINED. SO u ■ i (letinitc is the development of C^onsciencc. The true feeling connected with obligation is one of approbation or disapprobation ; and this feeling, instead of constituting the source of obligation, involves the assumption of obliga- tion, as already existing. Did obligation not thus exist as a fact, the feeling could never be icenerated. The feeling Hows from the fact of ol)ligation, and cannot possi])ly be its source or ground. The other leading form of the Utilitarian theorv of Obligation connects that fact with mere external authority. Of this view Bain is a leading representative. When we speak of external authority in this connection we do not take into account the Law of Ood, but simply civil, parental, or social restraints, and these by some Utilitarians are made, alike the source of our ethical conceptions, and the ground of moral obligation. This external authority is the ultimate fact, and it is not admitted that there is a deeper notion, that of Right, which is really the source of obligation. The main criticism ^ve offer here is that exter- nal authority, whether it be civil, parental, or social, only receives validity on the supposition of moral obligation as already resting upon us. Mere external law in itself has no necessarv if'W^ MoiiAL oijlu;atiun. 177 ethical significance. It must rest on a moral ground of some kind, in order to give it uni- formity of operation and binding authority. The magistrate, the parent, society, has no right to compel ()l)edience where no moral basis for the command exists ; and it is main- tained that there can be no moral discipline under mere blind authority. Under such training or experience, Conscience with its cb^liverances would l)e destroyed rather than developed. The discipline and restraints ot external authority must presuppose the notion of oughtness as well as that of Tightness. Again, if mei'e external authority be the ground upon which I ought to do any particu- lar thing, it follows, since that authority implies a person or body politic, that the mere arbitrary Avill of the sovereign, of the parent, or of society must constitute the rule of right, and provide the source of ol)ligation. This con- clusion contains its own refutation. Either the authority is entirely arl)itrary in its nature, or the notion of right with its binding authority is presui)posed. This goes to show that where- ever obligation finally rests, it cannot l)e in mere external authority apart from a deeper ethical foundation. .Vnother radical defect in this view is that ^ i [ ::.■■ 178 UTILlTARIAXISiM EXAMINED. I'l ' I' ■(.I M : . I, m :•■": IK) proper ^roimd of ol^ligatioii is provided for what may be called the positive part — often the largest part — of morality, and in a certain sense the more important part. External authority provides merely for the negative part of morality, while we recpiire a ground of obli- gation which will l)e sufficient for both the positive and negative parts. Mere external authority says, "thou shalt not," while we need a ground which will enable us to say, " thou oughtest," and so cover all the ground. In the "Categorical Imperative" of our moral nature we find this notion of oughtness, a})pli- cal)le alike to tliat which is prohibitive and to that which is 'preceptive, and here, so far as our nature is concerned, we would discover the source of moral obligation. Conscience, as an original faculty, gives us the conception of liight. This conception carries with it the authority of Law, and provides an adequate basis for moral obligation. There is thus a voice lifted up within us, which cannot be silenced even if it be ignored, and that voice declares an obligation from which we cannot escape even though we may repudiate or vio- late it. No form of the Utilitarian system can ever explain the de-jure authority which rules us, even when de-facto obedience is not Moral chjluiation. 170 rendered. The useful can never be translated into the obligatory, and until this is done the theory is insutticient. The Intuitive theory alone can provide an adequate philosophy of obligation. In the C'ategorical Imperative ofthe Practical Keason, as Kant would say, or in the First Principles of Morals, as the Scottish In- tuitionalists would say, we find what is needed, and what no mere Empirical or development Theory of Morals can ever provide — an ex- planation of the authority of Conscience, and an all-sulticient ground for Moral Obligation, , alike on its negative or prohibitory side, and on its positive or preceptive side. In completing the brief statement of this chapter it is of importance to add, in regard to the source of ol)ligation, that in its deepest; ground we will find it resting in the Divine nature. Man's moral nature, as we have seen, is dependent, and does not contain in itself the final explanation of all its facts. Man is but a factor in the vast Moral Commonwealth of God, and it is only when we go out and up to the Divine Being that we fully understand the deepest prol>lenis of man's moral nature and conduct, as well as his various experiences which are ethical in their nature. The final answer to the (juestion, what is the ultimate f !■ 4 1 ■'' '■')! ISO UTILITAKIAMSM EXAM tNKD. source of moral obli<;atiou for man, is to bo found in tlie natmx* and rectitude of the Divine Being, under whose Divine Law as an expres- sion of his Will, we are placed ; and of this Divine Law we have the echo in our moral nature, which voices the Will and Law of God, and which, as an expression of the perfect rectitude of the Divine Nature, supplies us, in the last analysis, with an adequate ground of moral obligation. It is quite true to say that Conscience is the source of obligation, and has paramount authority. Still the language is popular rather than philosophically accurate, if we have reference to the ultimate source of C 'onscience itself, and the final ground of moral obligation. This latter rests in the nature of the Divine Being. b. ' \ 'V CHArTER VII. DrSINTIiHESTKD AFFKfTIOXS AND IJKXEVOLEXT ACTIONS. Our endeavor in tliis chapter will be to look as carefully as possible into the account Utili- tarians i^ivc? of disinterested affections and benevolent actions. Is their view in regard to the origin and growth of these affections, and of the way in which men come to perform unselfish actions the correct one '( Is their philosophy of Benevolence valid ? Does their system provide such a philosophy ? In the exposition of their views given in the first part of this treatise, we found that Utilitarians were chiefly engaged in giving, along sociological lines, the natural history rather than the philosophy of the affections and actions now under review. Whilst most earlier, and some later Moralists deny the reality of the existence of such actions, yet most modern Utilitarians admit their exist- ■;' s f If,': 'I' ( I 1: •'9 I fh 182 TTILTTARIANTSM EXAM FNED. (Mice. Even Paley, whose system is often called one of Expediency, thouj^li this descrip- tion is scarcely correct, admits the existence of l)enevolent affections. Mill makes their exist- ence a very prominent part of his system, and endeavors to build up therefr(^m his theory of general benevolence. Utilitarians deny that they are original, however. The first obvious difficulty which meets th(^ Utilitarian theory here is the evident incon- sistencv between its theory of life, and its doc- trine of general benevolence, and the weakness of its attempts to harmonize these two parts of the system. If we start out with the T Utili- tarian theory of life, how can we reach a sound philosophy of benevolence ? If happiness, in any form, l)e the end of human life, if self- interest be the sole motive to action, it must be the happiness or interest of that particular life of which it is the end. So soon as we make the interest of others for its own sake, an end of individual life, we leave the basis of Utilitarian principles, by deserting their fundamental position in the theory of life. The theory which lays its foundation on the prin- ciple of personal happiness, or self-interest in any way considered, cannot but be illogical when it attempts to set up a theory of uni- RKNKVOLKNCK. 183 vorsal l)eiiov()lonc(\ All that can l)e loi^ically concluded :s, that a man niav do what is for the good of his neiuhl)or, only that his own interests may be advanced thereby. This, howoyer, is not beney(dence. Here selfishness not disinterestedness is seen. The only con- sistent form of the theory is that of Hol)l)os and others, who virtually deny that there are any disinterested affecticms or dispositions in our natnre. 1'his, however, is to ctuifess that ITtilitarianisni has no place for a theory of benevolent dispositicms and actions. The de- votion of the mother, the patriotism of the soldier, the heroism of the martyr, and the self-sacrifice of the philanthropist, remain un- explained on this theory. The above criticism is almost all that is needed to show the radical defect of the Utili- tarian doctrine here. We can, however, carry the war into Africa and show that the accounts given by Mill, Bain, and Spencer, &c., are not sufficient to provide anything* like a basis lor a philosophy of benevolence. The desire for sympathetic unity which is a natural instinct in men, and the operation of habit and associa- tion thereon, may do much to give direction to our actions, and complexion to our senti- ments ; yet it is contended that these actions, It. ^'il 1«4 ^TlLTTAltTA^TS^r kxamixkd. U \f r i dispositions, and sentiments, conld never be produced by these means. Hutclieson and Butler arc undoubtedly right in the view they take of our nature, that it possesses as an original part of its furnishings, dispositions, desires, and sentiments, which are disinterest- ed and which look to the good of others as their natural and proper end. There are then, benevolent dispositions in us, and in this fact the possibility of benevolence lies. Wc may indeed stand related to others as Utilitar- ians say, and there is no doubt nuich that is sound in what they state regarding the effect of habit, &c., on human life in the individual, and in society as well, but we yet seek the good of others for its own sake. If asked why we should do so, we can only answer that it is right to do so. We are thus brought back again to the fundamental position of the Intu- itional theory. The conception of right is a simple and ultimate deliverance of the moral fiiculty, which is an original part of our nature. It is right to seek the good of our neighbors, and what is right we ought to do, and when we do right we experience moral approbation, and when we fail we have an experience of an opposite nature. Unless we begin with ethi- cal elements, no development by means of 1 m \) JIKNEVOLDNCK. IH.-) habit or anything else in the indivitUial, can ever justify the application of ethical predicates. The notion of right lies at the basis of our disinterested affections and benevolent actions, and affords their true philosophy. They exist as an original element in our being, and are closely related to our moral nature, receiving alike theii* moral character and their law of operation or exercise therefrom. Without the moral element in them at the outset, no ex- perience of the individual nor influence of so- ciety could call that element into existence. That element, however, being presupposed, habit and other external influences may exer- cise a modifying influence upon it. A few words may be added respecting those theories which are more distinctly Sociological. Here it is contended that, if there be no original disinterested affections or sentiments in the individual, the proper basis for society is entirely wanting. It is not enough to say that man, as he now is in society, possesses these sentiments, and to maintain that these sentiments arise out of the conditions of society, which conditions are themselves constituted by these sentiments. Society presupposes the principles of morality. The notion of right, in its broadest application, lies at the founda- i am M' If IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I ^^ §22 ■M mo M I^otQgrsfM] Sciences CorporattGn ks ^ ^^>^ ^v^^ V III— IIIM Ii4 ^ 6" ► 23 WIST MAIN STRHT WnSTIR,N.Y. 14SM (716)t72-4S03 ■ o y fl \f 18f5 t'TTLITAKTANTSM EXAMINED. I ti: i U ■t \ ;1 tion, (letGrmiiiin<»' the duty and obligcation of each individual in all his relations. The prin- ciples of morahty proclaim that it is right to act for the welfare of society, and hence bene- volence is commanded as rii^ht and ()blienevolent feel- ings and acticms. Its denial of l»enevolent dispositions as an original element in our nature is not valid ; its account of the origin and growth of benevolent affections and actions is entirely insufficient ; and its theory provides no proper moral basis for society. The Intuitional theory provides an ample explanation, which is both in keeping with the facts of man's nature, and consonant with his sociological ccmditicms. \ i CHAPTER VIII. MOTIVK AND ACTION. We have now to investigate the Utilitarian doctrine of Motive on the one hand, and Action on the other. A very special part of the discussion will concern the peculiar view of some leading advocates of the system respecting the relation between motive and action. The Utilitarian doctrine of motive is simple and clear ; its conception of moral action seems confused and indefinite ; and its theory as to the relation between motive and action is boldly stated, and not easily mis- understood. We have thus three topics to deal with in this chapter. The first is the Utilitarian idea of Motive. Are there many motives, or but one general one, which assumes a variety of forms ? Recalling the Utilitarian theory of life, we get the answer that there is but one motive to human action, and that is the love of pleasure. MOTIVE AND ACTION. 189 in some form or other. Hence, if asked what motive is, we must answer that it is some pleasure, happiness, or selfish end, which, being in the mind's view, leads to action. This theory denies that there is a variety of motives or ends which lead to action. As happiness or self-interest is the sole end of human life, so the desire to secure this is the only motive by which men can be actuated in life. No further exposition is needed. Now, we deny that the love of pleasure, or the desire of self-interest, is the only end which prompts men to action. As already shown in a former chapter, there are many different desires in our nature, and these prompt us to seek the attainment of then* respective ends. The desire of knowledge is one motive, the love of fame another, andthe good of society a third. These are generi- cally different in their nature. They cannot be resolved into each other, much less can they all be resolved into the love, or desire, of pleasure in any of its forms. It being admitted that there are various motives which influence us to act, and that the desire of pleasure is only one amongst others, and by no means the highest one, we have next to define as clearly as possible what is to be !|" im V'V 1 1. IT A 1 1 1 A N I SM K\ A M I N K I ). understood by Motive, tor this is one of tlie points in which there is olten want of clearness in writers on mural philosophy. The word motive and the word end are often used to de- note the same thing, thou<,di the former popu- larly denotes that which lies at the source of an action, and the latter expresses the object towards which it is directed. Motive and end are really the same thinjj;: under different points of view. A motive is constituted 1)V an end which, being in the mind's view, prompts to voluntarv action towards its attainment. A desirable end is a motive to action. Such desiraV)le ends are numerous and of great variety, and this fiict overthrows the Utili- tarian theory here entirely. The word desirable, when we say that a motive is a desirable end, is to be carefully con- sidered. It is not to be confounded with 'pleasurable, as some Utilitarians very ingeni- ously maintain. An end may be really desir- able, even when it gives no pleasure, or when the thought of possible pleasure is entirely wanting. The morally desiral)le is one thing, the merely pleasurable is another ; and we ob- ject to Utilitarians building up their theory by playing upon the supposed ambiguity of words. In themselves, some ends are intrinsically MOTIVK AND ACTION. ua hi<^'her and more desiiablo than others, and to some natur(\s one kind of end will have stronger motive power than another. Bnt this does not really affect the theory. A desiral^le i?nd, or where there are conflicting ends, the more desirable end, is a motive to action. A desir- able end thus being a motive to action, enters into the very conception of voluntary action ; that is, it is performed from motive, and volun- tary action is what we have to deal with in all this discussion. The desire of pleasure is not the only motive, for it does not enter into every voluntary action. We voluntarily direct our attention to other ends than our own happi- ness. We seek as a desirable end the good of others, and that in many different forms. We next e)\deavor to present as clear an idea as possible of what is to be understood by Action in the ethical system. Utilitarians naturally give prominence to the external action, or rather the actual result of action. Finding the moral quality of actions in their tendency to produce happiness, and testing that quality by the standardof general Utility, their attention is turned chiefly to the outward sphere; and they dwell rather on the conse- quences of actions rather than on the real action, or the action as a whole. - . . . i m ■i 19l> LT I L IT ARI A N ISM KX A M 1 N K D. i This wo take to be a very imperfect concei)- tion of moral action. The actual brin^in<^' about of a certain result in the outward sphere is not the real essence of moral action at all. Its essential character is to be found in the subjective determining energy of the being whom T call myself In this the true notion of action lies. There may be real moral action, and no definite observable result in the exiernal sphere ; and there may be this definite result, and tb.e character of moral action may be wanting. Mere movement of a limb is not of itself moral action ; and there may be no movement of the limbs, and yet moral action may be present. The inner mental determination, decision, or resolve, is the sphere of moral action. This is what gives moral quality to the result in the external world ; and, if this be wanting, then moral quality could never pertain to the ex- ternal. Thus a man may hate his neighbor, and resolve to kill him, but never get a good chance to bring about the result in the ex- ternal world. He has performed a moral action, however, and bears the responsibility of it. Another man kills his neighbor by mere accident, and we never say that that man has performed an action with which Motive and action. 193 the quality of niunler is connected. The worUl's gi'eatest Teacher has said that he who hateth his brother without cause, is really guilty of murder. The notion of action in the ethical sense belongs to the subjective sphere, and the so called external act is rather a result of the real action, than anything else. The moral quality of the action is determined, not so much by the external result, as by the internal deter- mination. Whatever enters into that gives it its moral complexion. The nature of the internal determines the character of the exter- nal, when both exist ; but the internal may have moral significance when the external is absent, while the external can have no such significance when the internal is wanting. This view of moral action, it is believed, will clear away many difficulties, and cover all the ground, as well as lay a broad solid basis for responsi- bility. It embraces all the feelings or emo- tions which we voluntarilv cherish, all the envy, hatred, ambition, and lust, of the inner life is included under this notion of moral action, while all accidental events in the outer world, of which we may be but the occasion, are removed from the moral sphere. This is surely a simple way of conceiving of action* I" m ft 1J)4 UTILITAlilAMSM KXAMINKD. i It is voluntarv mental detennination directcMl to some eml N. Hn5 the destruction ot* moral distiiKtions entirely. • Their ve of i)U»asure and the desire to avoid i)ain l)eing the only motive which can affect or influence men to action, is full of confusion. Thev confound our natural impulses with motive in the moral or ethical sense. The natural impulses are those impelling;" powers we find within us, some connected with our i)hysical and some with our mental nature, and these mav or may not have moral quality. A motive on the other hand is an end, desirable in the mind's view, consciously and voluntarily sou»^ht after. Here in every case there is moral (piality, and an action is such an action because done with such a motive. When pleasure is made the sole motive of human activity, it can only mean in the majority of cases, if we read human nature rightly, that by our very constitution we are impelled to seek pleasure and avoid pain. But this does not make the love of pleasure a motive, such as a true ethical system demands. In order to this, pleasure must be regarded as an end desirable in itself, and which is consciously and voluntarily sought after. It is admitted 11= I 190 UTIUTAKIANISM KXAMINED. that j)loasure may be a motive in this sense, but cmly one of many motives or desirable ends. The mistake which umUn'lies muc!i Utihtarian writin^^ concernin^'^ tlie theory ot life, and the theory of motive, is in confound- ing the mere blind instinctive natural impulse to attain pleasure and avoid pain, with motive. But we can go further, and say that the connection between motive and action is so vital, that the ethical significance of the action is determined by the motive by which we are influenced in doing it. A motive being a de- sirable end in the mind's view prompting to action, and action being subjective determina- tion put forth with a view to secure that end, it is evident that motive and action are closely bound up together. Motive, in fact, enters into the very conception of action. An action is such or such an action, in virtue of being directed to such or such an end The moral quality of the action depends on the motive. Change the motive, and the moral character of the action is altered. The motive is the end, the action is voluntary determination to gain that end ; and so, wherever action is, there motive is, to give moral significance to the action. Motive and action are mutuallv inter- dependent. The idea of motive enters into ~1 MOTIVK AM) Af'TION. 19; that of action, and action is (lc|)(m(lcnt on motive for its paiticnlar moral ((nality. Tliis is substantially tlio same theory as that of those who say tliat tlie moral quality of an action inheres in the intent i(tn >yith \yhich it is (lone. But intention is simply the mind direct- ed towards some desirable (»nd, and this is better termed motive. According" to this doctrine it is easily under- stood why precisely the samci outward acts may have entirely ;hl)or, and this was the motive which led him to act, and wliich gave moral (quality to his action. Now, ob- serve in this case, that the same moral quality would adhere to the inner resolve to kill the neighbor whether he actually succeeded in kill- ing him or no. If he missed his aim, or his gun missed fire, he is a nuu-derer all the same. In the latter case, when the shooting was acci- dental, there was no motive, hence no personal action, and hence no moral quality. It is thus evident that motive and action are very closely related. Motive is an element in aiction, and action has no moral quality apart from motive. '' It may occur to some to remark in this connection, that there are general rules, or principles of morality, by which actions can be judged as right or wrong in themselves, without any reference to the motive from which they are done ; and thus after all, the morfJ quality ot an action be independent of motive. In reply, we remark that we cannot, according to the view just stated, separate motive from action. Tfike away motive, and no moral action remains. >rOTTVK AND ArtlOX. 199 For example, it may be asked, is not justice riirht from whatever motive it is done ? Is it not rij^'lit for a man to pay liis debts, even if liis motive bo to establisli a repntation by means of wliicli he may be al)k^ to swindle a score of men afterwards ? We answer that Justice and honesty are in all cases ri^ht, but mark, they cannot be performed from any other motive than a desire to do rii^ht, and to act honestly, for the motive enters into the act and makes it such an act as it is. If any other motive comes in, such as self-interest, then the moral complexi(m of the action is entirely changed If, therefore, a Judge gives a seem- ingly righteous decision, only because he does not wish to be wearied by an importunate suitor, his act does not possess the quality of Justice at all, so tar as he is concerned. So with the seemingly honest man. This con- clusion, it will be seen, goes far to confirm the view expressed concerning action, in which it was confined to the sulyective voluntary determination of the being I call mvself The general conclusion we reach is, that the Utilitarian doctrine here is confused and erroneous. In regard to the notion of action it is confused ; in regard to motive, 1., -' !| li^- 200 UTILITARIANISM EXAMINED. and the relation of motive to action, it is entirely erroneous. This j last point is one of vital importance in the theory of morals, and we have dwelt on it at some length, with a view to make the position as clear as possible. H C^HAPTEK IX. f'i i iii if THK WILL. We now reach the last topic which our plan requires us to take up ; and, as was evident in the statement and exposition already given, we come to one of the most difficult questions in moral philosophy. The question of the Will, though exceedingly difficult and involving mcany obscure psychological and metaphysical problems, must nevertheless receive some con- sideration in the ethical system ; and no theory can lay claim to completeness unless it takes up, and endeavors to resolve, at least the ethi- cal elements of these questions. In the brief space at our command it is manifestly impos- sible to attempt to do justice to a subject, upon which the treatises written would foim a library of considerable size. We shall only endeavor to examine, in a general way, the main positions of Utilitarians on the topic of this chapter — the Will and Freedom — enquir- - M 'm 202 UTT LITA K I A MSM KX A M I N ED. ■1 iiig particularly if the arguments they advance are valid, without venturinijj to announce anv clearly defined theory on such abstruse ^joints. No attempt will be made to allude to all the questions that come up here, nor even to ex- amine all the opinions held l)y Utilitarians. We shall mainly follow the line taken up in the exposition of a previous chapter, and refer to but little that was not dealt with there. It may be proper to remark at the outset that the question of the Will, andof its direct- ing and controlling power, is much wider than at first may be supposed. It extends in some form to all our faculties, though it stands more closely related to some than others. It has relation, not simply to conduct which may be termed distinctly ethical, but it is also connect- ed with the operations of the mind which are purely intellectual. A strong case may even be made out for the conclusion that the purest exercises of the Will arc to be found in this region, and that in some respects the problem of Freedom and Necessity can be best studied there. As has been already stated the leading sup- porters of Utilitai'ianism hold the necessitarian, or, as Mill prefers to say, determinist doctrine of the Will. Many Intuitional Moralists also V, THK WILL. 20:] hold views on this point which aro more or less necessitarian, so that this doctrine is not peculiar to UtilitJirians. We shall be careful, in all our criticism of their views, not to draw the conclusion that the necessitcarian position, properly understood, may not after all have much to support it. We shall simply look at the w*ay Utilitarians state the problem, and consider with some care the soundness of the reasoning, and the force of the arguments by which they seek to support their position. In regard to the nature of the Will, and its peculiar power the Utilitarian doctrine is defective. Their statements on this point are very vague, so that it is not easy to get at their precise meaning. According to them it can hardly be an originating, or even a controlling power in any proper sense ; for, instead of being a diiise or originating power, it is rather an effect, or a necessary result of our mental states. It cannot be even controlling power, for instead of controlling, it is virtually deter- mined by our desires and aversions. This opinion as to the nature of the Will and its power may be seriously ([uestioned, as in accordance with the facts neither of conscious- ness nor of observation. Will, or the mind as Will, possesses in its essential nature, if no ''I. 204 rTIMTAUIANISM KXAMTNED. distinctly causal, at least directly controllino- energy or power. This remark concerning the nature of the Will goes to show that the view Utilitarians take of the relation of the Will to the other faculties is also defective. Such writers as Mill make the Will virtually dependent on our desires and aversions, in such a way that the strongest desire or aversion always deter- mines it. In this case it is virtually deprived of that controlling power which is essential to its very nature. If we allow, as Mill does, that the education of the Will is possible through the desires and aversions, and if we can control or direct these by the exercise of the Will, then we have a modification of the determinist view which virtually destroys it. Such an educational process is possible only on the supposition that the Will is superior to, and can control the desires and aversions, and that the Will can restrain the strongest desire when intelligence says it is best to do so. This may he sound doctrine in itself, but we contend that it has no good ground of support on Utilitarian principles. If the desires and aversions rule the Will, by what possible pro- cess can the Will rule them. The true view of the nature of the Will is that it is at least I l|B P« l|U ^ THE WILL. 205 controlling power. The Will has thus its own peculiar function. The impulses are impelling powers, the intellect is knowing power, con- science is power to discern moral distinctions, and Will is controlling power. Much may also be said in favor of the view that the Will is originating power, but we content ourselves with the statement that it is at least control- ling power, and in the meantime do not even say over what, specially, its control is exercised. Coming now to the question of Freedom and Necessity, and taking Mill a-; a represent- ative of the determinist doctrine from the Utilitarian standpoint, we have to enquire into the soundness of Mill's position, and of the arguments by which he seeks to establish his views. The (question here refers to the rela- tion between motive and volition — between that which underlies the exercise of the Will, and that exercise itself. In this connection Mill denies the fact oi freedom, but he is not willing to accept necessitarianism pure and simple. His doctrine of determinism is, as we shall see, after all but little different from necessitarianism. The principle which under- lies his doctrine on this point is that of Causa- tion In connection with this principle we must remember that Mill's idea of Causation •'Hi '2iH} rTIMTAllIAMSM KXAMINEI). is not that of efficient ugeiicy or cause, hut \\\{iYid\\ physical cause, in the sense of invariable antecedent and conse({uent. Tlie invarial)le antecedent is the cause, and the invariable consequent is the effect. Now, Mill holds that the same; laws and unifonnities are found in the moral and in the natural world. Hiunan actions are co.iseciuents connected with ante- cedents, and followin*^ as invariably, and in the same way, as an effect in the physical world follows its cause. Moral causation thus differs in no respect from physical causation. Invariable antecedent and consequent exist in l)oth cases, and in regard to human actions and the motives from which they spring this fixed sequence holds good. This is determin- ism in the sphere of morals. In examining the soundness of this view, it is well to distinguish between what may be called the metaphysical and psychological (jlements in the discussion. The doctrine of the Will belongs more to Psychology than to Metaphysics. There are certain metaphysical problems involved, but as the Will is properly a power or faculty of the mind, its treatment belongs properly to Psychology. Now, ob- serve that even though Mill scarcely admits the i)()ssibility of such a science as Meta- TIIK WII.L. •J07 physics, yet in roasoniii*; from i)liysical to moral causation he is at least reasoning from a speculative to a psychological (piestion. Our criticism of Mill's position would, therefore, l)e two-fold. In the first place, we think it a mistake to identify the physical and moral as Mill does. There are elements in the Matter which do not belong to the former ; and these elericnts are such as to place each in its own peculiar category, and render it impossible to identify the moral and the physical, and to place them under the same causal conditions. In the second place, it is unscientific, to say the least, to build a theory as to the freedom ol the human Will, on a merely speculative doctrine in regard to the causal relation of purely physical phenomena. It may be per- fectly true that this relation is what Mill says it is, and yet it may be very far from true that the relation between human actions and what leads to them is what Mill holds it to be. The connection between the one set of phenomena does not necessarily determine the connection between the other set. In- variable sequence may rule in the one, but not necessarily in the other. To assume, therefore, that the connection between moral phenomena, and between purely physical phen- : i ' ; 1 208 I Tli.ITAlflANISM KXAMINKI). oinena is the same, is to assume some of the main thiii<^s to be provetl. It, moreover, opens up the way for the opinion that the mental and the material exist under mueh the same eonditions, and are ruled aceording to the same laws. This is tlirowing us on the ^^'ound of a materialism which, instead of explaining the exercise of the Will, destroys its essential nature, and renders moral phil- osophy impossible. liOoking a little more closely at the problem itself, we find a good deal of confusion in re- gard to the way in which Utilitarians conceive of action. Much that they say relates rather to the result of action in the external sphere, whereas action properly so called is the sub- jective determination. When we speak ot motive and action standing in relation to each other, we take action in the sense just defined; and it begets confusion to import the more general and indefinite notion of action into the discussion, as Utilitarians so frequently do. The question then comes to be whether motives determine our volitions, or subjective deter- min{\tions ; or whether the mind has self-deter- mining power, and that the mind as Will determines itself The two doctrines then are mntive determination and sc//'-determination. T^ TIIK WILL. 209 In re^'iii'tl to the hitter we nuiy further ask wliether, thou^^h the niiiid as Will determines itself, it may not after all do so necessarily ? May each mental state not after all necessarily determine the following one ? In regard to the former doctrine, if we think of motive as ji certain mental state in relation to some end desirable in the mind's view, mav not this as- pect of motive enter into the n'lental state from which the volition, i. e. the real action flows i In regard to motive, it is not so much some- thing objective that constitutes anything a motive. It is rather the subjective state — the view the mind takes of the end — which makes it a motive, so that we are led to the conclu- sion that, however the Will is determined, it must be by something within the mind. It seems clear that the Utilitarian discussion is not only confused, but that it does not touch the real ([uestion at issue between Necessitar- ianism and Libertarianism, viz. : — in my ac- tions, ?. e. in my volitions or subjective deter- minations, am I free, or am I under a law of necessity ? Our jmrpose does not re(|uire us to enter fully into the important questions which at once emerge from the criticism just offered. It is enough to have shown the inadec^uacy of the reasoning of Determinists i'm :>lo ITIMTAKIAMSM KXAMINKD. who think as Mill does ; and to show that they neither state the proljlem inoperly, nor ai^ue in a sonnd manner regardini^ it. Keference is made by hoth Necessitarians and libertarians to the facts of Consciousness, and the testimony they <^ive concerninj^* the ([uestiou of Freedom. Here aj^ain we have to take care not to confound (|uestions of Psycho- logy and of Metaphysics. It is one thing to deal philosophically with the facts of con- sciousness ; it is ((uite another to reason speculatively concerning the problem of freedom and necessity. Inductive interpreta- tion of consciousness is one thing ; deductive reasoning concerning the question before us is another and a different thing. Now, Mill, as we have seen, denies that consciousness can give any testimony upon the question of freedom. Consciousness can only give testi- mony to what is, not'to what may be ; and, as what only may be can never be a matter of consciousness, then the fact of freedom can never be proven by consciousness. This necessarily puts the question of freedom beyond the region of psychology altogether, and throws it upon metaphysical or specula- tive ground, where, even according to Mill, it can never l)e resolved. The only conclusion TIIK WILL. •Jll wc can draw is ji kind of atpiostic one, tlmt we cjinnot decide whether frecMhun ov necessity is the true (h)ctnne, so far as the facts of ccMisciousness testify. In re' a s^ood man, resists the temptation and does not steal or cheat ; but the other, l)eing a bad man, yields to the temptation and steals or cheats as the case may be. The character of the man has much to do with the kind of action he per- forms ; and if it were possible to describe pro- perly the essential character of the man, we might be able to predict how he shall act in given circumstances. And the character again is largely the result of voluntary action. ( )ne man acts along the path of right, another along the line of wrong. The character of each de- velops in accordance with the voluntary action, (voluntary being here used in the sense of psychological freedom), so that it would be very difficult for the two men in the same cir- cumstances to act in the same way. In such cases it is scarcely correct to say that the two men act differently from different motives. A motive being an end desirable in the mind's view, and the character of the motive is deter- mined by the view the mind takes of what may be before it, i. e. the real motive is in the •214 UTILTTAIUANISM EXAMINED. subjective sphere, as the antecedent of action. The motives of the two men above mention- ed were quite different, though the external circumstances were the same. The motive, i, e. the desirable end prompting to action, in the one case was a desire to do riglit, and so he did not steal or cheat ; the motive of the other was to get something, or to make the best of a bargain, and so he stole or cheated. The motive enters into the ac- tion and constitutes the action what it really is, in given circumstances. The char- acter of the man has such close connection with his action, that it is at least a con- ceivable view, that the character of a man being given, and that man placed in given circumstances or having given motives acting on him, to hold that the connection between character and action is very close, if not necessary. This, it will be observed, brings us back by another road to the conclusion that the mind, as Will, is determined by nothing outside itself; and that it is in this sphere that the problem between freedom and necessity must find its solution. Though seemingly very different concep- tions, it is possible that freedom and neces- sity are not entirely inconsistent with each THK WFLI.. 21:) other. Freedom on psychological ^a-ouiid may not be inconsistent with Necessity on metaphysical ^cjround. The former siiftices f{)r Ethics. u (t)NCLUSION A brief summary of the results of our analysis and criticism, and a concluding remark or two will bring our task to a close. The Utilitarian Theory of Morals has been passed under review. The results of state- ment and exposition were gathered up in the conclusion of the first part of the treatise, and these results were anal}..c;d and criticised in the second part. This criticism was made from the distinctly Theistic standpoint. In the last analysis the foundation of morals, and the final explanation of many of the moral facts of our nature, is to be found in the nature of the Divine Being. The distinct, though dependent personality of man, as well as the moral disorder of his nature, were also presupposed. An examination of the Psychology pre- supposed, and of the Theory of Knowledge involved in the system, showed that both of CONCLUSION. 217 tliem were iiisutficient, and some form of the Intuitional Thooiy was preferred to any phase of Empiricism. In regard to tlie Tlieory of Life, it was found tliat instead of tlie love of pleasure beini;- the only motive ])y which men are prompted to action, there are many natural impulses in man, each going out to its respective end. These cannot be all reduced to the love of pleasure ; and pleasure itself, instead of being the sole motive to action, is rather an accident or con- comitant of the proper exercise of our powers. As to the nature and origin of moral dis- tinctions, the conclusion w^s reached that, instead of being complex and derived, they are simple and ultimate. They are the primitive deliverances of our moral nature, and we can give no other account of them, than that they are what they are in their own nature. The knowledge of them is not acquired by any empirical methods, but comes intuitively. In respect to Conscience, the result went to show that the development theories of Utili- tarians were not sufficient to account for the origin and growth of this faculty, which gives us the notion of Right, and commands us to do it ; and that none of the objections urged 218 UTI LITARI A N ISM EX AM INED. a*^ainst this view aro sufficient to justify its rejection. In re.i^ard to tlie Ethical Standard, the in- sufficiency of the views hehl by UtiHtarians was clearly manifest, and the position was taken that, in the last analysis, the Divine Will, as expressed in the Divine Law, natural or revealed, was the ultimate standard of rijj^ht for man. This Law was an expressicm, through the Divine will, of the rectitude of the Divine nature, and it thus has an ethical basis. This Law is echoed in man's moral nature, and thereby a knowledge is given us of an infallible Rule of Jtight, and unfailing guide for our conduct. Touching Moral Obligation, we found that its ultimate source can neither be Utility, nor any mere external authority devoid of ethical basis. In one sense, Con:icience is the source of obligation, since ^ve are thereby conscious of it ; in another sense, the ultimate source of obligation is to be found in the Divine Being. We also saw that the Utilitariaa view of tiie Disinterested Affections and Benevolent •' ( tions is radically defective. They cannot, in ^''r.s nature of the case, construct a philosophy oi benevolence., without leaving their funda- (UNCM.SIUN. 210 mental principles as Utilitarians. Their the- ory commits suicide in the attempt. Our criticism likewise showed that the question of Motive and Action, and their relation to each other receives but mea<.^re and unsatisfactory treatment at their hands. Both notions are inadequately conceived, and their doctrine as to the relation between them is entirely unsound. The very difficult question of the Will, and of Freedom and Necessity was but hriefiy touched upon, with the result that it was evident that their general doctrine on this point was imperfect in itself, and but feebly supported by the arguments adduced in its favor. We did not attempt to unfold any general doctrine of the Will, but such views of its nature, and of the question of freedom and necessity, as consciousness testifies to, and as the ethical system requires were briefly hinted at. There are two general remarks with which we wish to close. The one relates to the bearing of the ethical system on Religion and Theology ; the other refers to its importance to Society and Sociological Science. In regard to the first of these questions, the position already- taken that Moral Science can 220 L TILITAIU ANISiM KXAM INED. only l^e properly uiitlerstood and studied from the Tlieistic standpoint, shows hf)W close and vital must be the connection between Moral and Theoloj^ical Science. The former deals with the problems over which we have gone in these i)ages ; the latter deals, in a gen- eral way, with the problems of the Divine nature, works, government, and the position of man under that government. In the former we begin with man and reason up to God, in the latter we begin with (xod and reason down to man. There are many points of contact, and nuich common ground ; and we think that in study and preparation for the ministry, the relation between the two should never be lost sight of. It may be added that there is also a close relation between morals, as bearing on practical life, and the duties of religion in the same sphere. A sound ethical system is ever involved in the duties of religion, and the wider our views the more fully will this appear. In regard to the second point, what was said regarding various sociological doctrines, though mere hints were given, will suffice to show how important a sound moral philosophy is in order to correct views of society. As the individual does not find the final explanation of the facts of his moral nature till he goes be- rONCLUSlUN. 221 yoiid himself, so society does not in itself con- tain its own regulative principles, nor does it afford its own adequate explanation, nnicli less is it able to prescribe its own law and duty. Only when we take the broader view, and re- gard the moral order of the universe, can wo get the true theory of society, and the sound basis on which it may rest. .\ true ethical system, which proceeds upon the supposition that Just as there is a natural order and sys- tem in the universe, so there is a moral order and system, and that the Divine Being is over both, is absolutely necessary, not only for the individual, but also for society. It will thus appear that all those modern attempts to re- construct society upon atheistical principles, as in the case of manv Socialistic theories of the present day, leave out of account the fund- amental basis upon which society must rest, and are fraught with terrible dangers to the social fabric. True religion and sound ethics must go hand in hand, in all that guides and elevates society ; and any attempt to ignore these cannot but bring, under the conditions of the moral order of the universe, terrible, though it may be tardy, retribution. Carefully following the requirements of sound ethics, and of the duties of religion, will secure the •>•>•> UTJUTAItIANI8M EXAMINED. Stability tiiul elevation of society, and the de- velopment of the race in all that is true and good. Mere education of the intellectual faculties of men will not alone secure this. Men may be great scholars yet great rascals. Moral education of the individual, and hence of society, is what is needed ; and this can only be properly done along the lines of a true ethical system, some of whose principles, it is hoped, are set forth in this treatise. ■. /*'* \\ KIMS.