OCEAN ROUTE TO AUSTRALASIA THROUGH 
 ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC. 
 
 WHATHVI'lR vjtnv !.> tuld as to the policy i.f li(jldiii^' the Mei]it(>rnin(>iiii 
 and ('an;il route \\\ war \v!tli ii i^'rcaf, Nnvai Power, tliere cai! lie no doiiht 
 whatever tha!, t.lie ditliei.lty ol' [>rotectiUK coiiiinrree helwee.-i i\»rt S;i:d and 
 Cribriiltar will be -rent, especially ^{un\,^ tiie early j.enod of hostilities. 
 
 it seems probable, however, that this period will, to n great extent, 
 iiitliieiK e fiit'ire action 
 
 ij-yde tliverted lor ;i time will not quickly return to its onginai course, 
 lusunmce rates once raised to it hit;h li>.nire will not rapidly fall. (onhd.'iKc 
 shaken ,it the outset by the evident menace of attack at short distances fVom 
 numerous Naval Ports, mi narrow waters, will not be immediately restored unless 
 a great nasal victorx were obtained. Such a victory at the outset of war is not 
 probable, in the present uncertainty, au enemy would be unlikelv to risk a 
 battle, uulest, in t)verpowenng superioritv. 
 
 On all grounds, therefore, continuous manitenanoe of a trade route 
 through the Mediterranean at the outset of war cannot h- coiuited upon. It 
 follows, therefore, that the transport ol Troops ami Stores to the Kast will be 
 oipialJy ha/ardous, at least for a time. 
 
 Of all routes, those of the .\tlantic; and Pacilii' will be safest in war with a 
 Naval Powei . 
 
 f-'ast ships on these routes cannot we!I be captured, except by nu'ie 
 mischance, on the Ocean 
 
 No probable enemy, no natuii', excejit the Cmicd States, is likely iii the 
 immediate fiituri- to develop .uiy considerable nav.il strcigth in the Pacitic, 
 '.vhile the mauitenaiK'e of strong squachMiis m the western verge of the Ulaiitic 
 will be diiruMilt to an\ power not m alliance witli the rnited States, 
 
 Again, these (>ceaa routes pass iicir no naval bases of Kiirc|)eaii I'oueis, 
 whi( h, especiall\ at the outset of wa>. will confer on them practical imiiiiimty 
 from vaids On the Cape route there is tin menace of D.ihk.ir, of h'euniou, a.nd 
 possibly of Diego Suai-ez, whicb cannot be i-noit d. ,ind w hich wotibl nmpie.stion 
 _aiil\ I. list' msiiraiice rates to ,i high figure. 
 
Iti, ,i!l gn.ini.ls. thtTcfoiv, ii st-ciuv rout.' \.n tin- Kasl ut llic oiUsct nf wiir 
 "onld ,(<nffr iocstiniable ..dviuita^'cs upon the Empire. It tuny h.' ar^'u.'d that 
 the route can always Le adopted if the need arisen. ar,d that ru, special {.repara- 
 tion in peace time is roonin d This is ohIv parti.liv true Shipping- can now 
 adapt it^..|ft(. aln.e.st any new co-rse uhicir eireiiiiisti,jiees may r-qiiire, hut. tor 
 the rapid transport of men and stores, special arranj^^'ineiits are entaih'd wlnel, 
 cannot he rapidly extcn.ponsed. .Vn accustomed trade r'aite, re-ularly used m 
 peace tnue, will invariahh (.tier iiiotimahle advanta-es as a communication in 
 war. MonL; it tronps and stores could at once he .',iMijnthly eouveved without 
 delays jr lonfusion. 
 
 I llierefore ciaisidei that, from the purely iiiilitarN point of view, any 
 steps lalien t^ de\elwp the Or-ean route would add >;reatly to tiie pnteiiti.al 
 strength of the llnifiire m war. 
 
 I Ins route ,, nee fully est, iblisiied vwiuld Sdiui become ■^e!f-supportni<,' in 
 peace time, and would lead to the certain ^q-owth of a laru'i- -hippm- m liie 
 Pacil' •, wlieie It IS now e.xtreinely hmited. 
 
 The enoiiiioiis nam in the event of a threat war is evident. 
 
 At siK h a tiiii.' tin: first necessity will he commumcation hetv.een tiie 
 scattered members of the Empire. Thus only can its va->1 resouree.- be tnou^dit 
 mto play. ThIl^ only can its existence be assured. 
 
 .1 have prefen-ed to d-.vell on the .Military advaiitai^es of developm.n- tiie 
 Western coute. and tlnis proxidiu-- an alternative line of commmiication. ratla i 
 than on the politieal and economical advantajfes. The latter must, however, he 
 important and fai-reachhii^. 
 
 Politically, the effect will b.: to hrin- the members of the Empire into 
 closer union. l-.couonn. ally, the opt nin- up of new avenues of trade will 
 Uidiil)itahl\ brni'4 about a wider distribution of products and reduce tin ataKnation 
 which 18 lUAv heavily felt by all (lasses. 
 
 • hi ail these j^'roiinds I str{U.-,dy support th,e pcdicv ur-Cvl. 
 
 it IS, tor the Impiriai (iovernment. a prim.iry duty to .nd a project bv 
 winch National advanr;,-es in peace time and se( urity, at, well as .--trikiu;^' - 
 ni war. will be iniipiestiouahly Ntt.iiiied. 
 
 .\N|i i LAIxKK 
 \'i( ioia.\ OiiicK, 
 
 ■I'DIKillll, iMIf.