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1 2 3

4 5 6

WORD

T O A

Right Honourable

COMMONER.

«« A Word to the Wife is enough.'*

Trite proverb.

LONDON:

Printed for J. Dixwell, in St. Martln's-lane, near

Charing Crofs :
And M. Cooper, in Pater-nofter-row.

MDCCLXI.

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i B T O T

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^'"^i

T O T H E

RiGiiT Honourable

WILLIAM PITT,

Principal Secretary of State.

/ .:

S I R.

jinaOaQopwl Prefumc not to approach you a^
1 I H ^ Minifte.r or a Senator, but aS
( S a private Man; independent of

^)e()e()G(ji ^1 PQ^g and Employments. I

fpeak the free unbiafled Sentiments of my
own Confcience; I defire no Man to be of
my Opinion who thinks I am wrong; nor
do I vvilh to continue in any of them longer

A 2 ' than

!
I

. (iy) .....

than I may be removed to better ones : but
until that Time I mufl beg to remain as
I am. It is by that inellimable, I had
almofl iaid Cicred, Liberty of the Prefs,
which every Briton enjoys, that I am en-
abled to make this Addrefs to you ; nor
am I forry that i have no other Means j:
becaufe Addrefies made in public are fure
to be feen, while thofe delivered privately
are not always certain of gaining Admit-
tance, ^, . II fil

It is reported, upon how fure a Foun-''
dation I know not, that Diffeienees have

lately arole among the M-= , if it be

true, I tremble for the ponfequences of fa
great a Misfortune to this Nation, at aTim^
when its Ai*ms have been attended ,widi
Succefs and Vicloiy in every Qjiarter of
the Globe. That happy Unanimity which
has fo eminently diftinguiflied the Years
X758 and 1759, is iai4 to be broken in

t^f

* »•

> 1

the Year 1760, and its Members divided
among ihemfelves in the Year 1 76 1 . •.

"iWe are induced to give Credit to thefe
TaleSy becaufe our Fleets and Armies have
been ahnoft totally inaftive during the
whole lail Year. It is a Myftery why the,
grand Armament failed before it was car-
ried into Execution ; the Caufc we are but
too apt to attribute to fome Difagreement

in the M . The People whofe Gene-

rofity has lately feemed to know no Bounds,
have certainly a Right by the Laws of our
excellent Conftitution, to expedl an Ac-
count how their Millions are expended.
If the Caufe is owins: to the Machinations
of your Enemies j you have Friends -, the
Friends of their Country, who it is hoped
are more numerous, aiid who will not fee
you degraded with Impunfty,

We remember the Time when yon cla-
moured againil the Mifmanagcment of a

weak

( vi )

v/5ak and ddrriipted Miniftry ; wie remem-
ber the Time when you moft happily
united thofe Divilions, which were fatal to
ffie^'Intereft of your Country; but now
unfortunately we are told the Seeds of
Party are again Ipringing up, thefe Caufes
arc unknown; but their Confequences are
evident ; and no Man fteps in to turn thefe
two Extremes into their medium Courfe*

"^ We have had it confirmed on all Hands,
that the French have been vigilant in
equipping a Fleet at Breft, which is faid to
have taken on board a body of Troops, and
a Quantity of Warlike Stores, and to be
deftined for the Ifle of Martinico; in or-
der to prevent our becoming Mailers of it.
Surely, Sir, you are not fo great a Sceptic
as to doiibt the authenticity of this IntcJ-
"" ligence: nay, Suggeftion itfelf, is fuffi-
cLent to convince us, that a Nation lefs
^ politic than France, would not fuffer its
'^"'- ■ ■ ,. . laft

( vii )

kft valuable Plantation to fall into the
Hands ofher Enemies, and rivals in Com^
merce, if they could any way prevent it.
And muft this Fleet arrive at the irapofw
tant Place of its Deflination before we
attempt to take it ? Or, are we to fpend
a Million of Money in making this Con-
queft ? Or, Sir, are we to have it at all ?
We remember, that when the French
were equipping an Armament at Toulon
for the Gonqueftof Minorca, it was ow-
ing to a difbelief of it in the late M ,

that we loft that valuable Ifland; and have
we, or are we to lofe the fairefl Opportu-
nity of taking Martinico, from the fame
Caufe ? rw}^ ,

"'' ^Whatever occafxoned the Failure of the

grand Expedition, or where was the Ob-

jcdi of its deftination, I enquire not; they

, : are, perhaps, Secrets only fit to be dif-

jiClQfed to proper Heads: but it mufl be

fui obferved.

•Sv

( v»ii )
©bfcrvcd, that another Year's War, carried
on in the fame expcnfivc and inadtivc
manner as that in 1760, will be injurious,
almofl fatally injurious, to this Nation;
public Credit will not have that influence
it has had; and the People will ceafe to
give when they fee no ufe made of their
Money: therefore, Sir, we muft-in earneft,
have either Peac^ or Warj this mediuni
between them, is extremely prejudicial to
the Nation: if our Enemies will not grant
us the former upon honourable Terms, we
muft vigoroufly purfue the latter by Sea.

'-*; e ■•5 '> f. ''

f-rr

tA.

Your Admirer,

'. j;

Friend, and Servant,

FIVE MILLIONS!

ti'.

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)3i'

W ^f."**^^ "^V '^'^w "trJ^r "Jtfwr "WW lijjf -Mri

WO R D

V-

To a Right Honourable

COMMONER.

vsiSi:^

c S 1 R,

^,>^)^,XJHK Eyes of the People are now fo
)*( T 5 ^'^^ opened, as to fee the Evils at-
^;^ ^ tending a Continental War ; they

k.)^)«(^JHf ft-e that our fupporting it is quite
foreign to our i.iterefts, and therefore injurious
ro ourfelvcs. That Tide of Popularity, and

B moil

if '
lit

.r.r

moH egregious Affront on commort IfJndei*-
ftanding, has changed its Courfe-, inftead of run-
ing v/ith an impetuous Precipitation among
Rocks and Shoals, it has made a Channel on a
much founder and lefs dangerous Bottom.

Thofe fanguine Friends of the German War,
who urged the entering upon it with fo much
Violence, begin now to retraft in their Compli-
ments beftowed on Frederick and Ferdinand ;
they now fay, ihey were never fuch very great
'Admirers of thofe Men -, they liked them indeed^ he-
caiife they are fine Generals. The mighty Probus,
that remarkable Foreman of the Mob, is moft
defervedly funk into a State of Q)n tempt : his
' ftiff and fulfomc Adulation on the Union of two
Proteflant Powers, to defend their Religion and
fight it to the laft, is now clearly difcovered to
be only the Product of blind Enthufiafm, a
■weak and ignorant Mind. It has been propofed,
that he colle(51: into the Fields his loyal and zea-
lous Followers \ Followers in Opinion, fuch as
cannot but fee the Proteflant Religion is adually
in Danger from theUnion of twoRomanPowers,
and harangue them on this favourite Point j in

order

•o-o

.'k.

> (

» <

( " )

order to prove the Falfity andDifloyalty of that
feditious Libel, entitled, Conjiderations on ''the
-prefent CermanJVar\ and indeed in this Cafe he
would aft fo like the Oracle at the Tottenham-
Court Tabernacle, who lately harangued his
eager-believing' Flock, on that irreligious and
blafphemous Piece, the Minor ^ that the liiftory
of the two Inlpoftors would well deferve beinp;
.recorded in our Annals.

'/>(.•

bfif-t^'^^"' f

OV
hi

o:
rib

'bi6

ft n?ay be obferved in moft public Com-
panies, that the hot Friends of the German War
are alhamed of the abfurd and ridiculous
Opinions they once fb eagerly embraced,
^'hey avoid talking on Politics, becaufc^that it
is a Subjefl which would expofe their Weaknefs.
The Noife of the Tower Guns, the Bonfires and
Rockets, had fo effedtually lulled all their Senfes
afleep, they were not able, of themfelves, to
diftinguifh what were real and folid Advan-
tages to their Country, from thofe which were
entirely foreign to its Interefts. They made
more Rejoicings at the Birth-day of the King of
Prufiia, than for the taking of Louifbourg and
;Qiiebec ', and teflified in a more noify Manner

B 'i their

)r-

( 12 )

their Approbation of the little. Skirmifh at
•Corbach, than the Taking of Gnadalupc. Tin:ie
has decovered v/hat fhallowPoliticians thefc are-,
•iind hov/ infenfibly and blindly they have fol-
lowed that Tgmis luiitfus, called the Balance of
Power •, a Balance which Great-Britain has la-
vished Millions of Pounds and Lives to equili-
brate ; and yet it is as doubtful and precarious
as ever ; an Affair which no fcnfible Man could
ever prove us to hzve any interefling or proper
Concei n in -, an Abfurdity fo clearly laid open,
by the Author of the Ccnjiderations on the pre fait
German War, that furely, hereafter, no honeft
EngliHiman will attempt drawing his Country
into a Conne6tion with the Quarrels of German
Princes-, Meafu res which common Difcernment
may fee are defiruftive of the true Interellsr^of

thefe Km^doms.

^ . • r. to rnii. r..y^'^^

,iilii V

England, by purlumg her real rnterefls on .
her natural Element, may bid Defiance to tliQ.-^
Machinations of her Enemies on the Continent;
they may threaten to invade her; but tney .
will be only 1 hreats ; for while' fhcicdvefs the
Seas with her Fleets, none, nor all of them,

( 13 )

^. J.-,. ^.-» L -ii'i»f(*

-ts'ill proceed on (o hazardous an Enterprizc*;
which mud be attended wkh certain Deftrvic-
tion, either before they can attempt to land,
er before theycan return to \heir own Country.

*^* The Continental Powers very well know, that

while we have a H to maintain, fupport

and preferve, it is tb re they mufl attack ou^
Vitais; th.re we fhall feel them mod fenfibly;
they can double our Number, and at half the
Expence j and if they fuffer a defeat, it is eafily
repaired, and all the loft Advantage regained.
Whereas, Ihould they meet us at Sea, we can
double their Number, and give them a total
Deteat.

To attack us by Land has been always the

great Aim of France-, H er only was the

deftined Mai*k of her Force to Ihoot at : For
it was never intended, becaufe it is not con-
fiftent with the true Intereft of France, to (ro
any further than H . We have a very con-
vincing Proof of this, only three Years ago ;
when Marechal D'Etrees defeated the Duke of
Cumberland at Haftenbeck, the French en-
tered

K H )

tered Hanover immediately ; but though they
had above half a Campaign to piifh on their
Conquefls in, they never fo much as once en-
tered Magdebourg, to favour the Defigns of
the Emprefs-Queen ; they ftaid only in
Hanover. TheReafon of this is plain-, becaufe
it is not for the Interefl: of France to fee the
King of Pruflia crufhed i for he will always
be a Rival to her natural Enemy, the Houfe
ofAuftria. '^ '''^" -'r^'^

If theEngliflh fuffered the French to go into
Hanover, and even to plunder it, did (he but
ceafe to defend it, the French would feek an
Opportunity of reftoring it •, and make an At-
tenement for all the Damages they committed
in it -, provided Great Britain, in the Interim,
heartily attacked them by Sea. It is evident that
France only threatens to conquer Hanover,
becaufe fhe knows England will at all H vents
defend it, however inconfillent it is with her
real Intereft. While we fpend millions in this
uncertain Defence, we feed the Politics of
France; and fhe by putting us to. this Expence,
is playing a winning Game for hedelf. Surely

every

( ts )

every fenfibl': M-in who is acquainted with the
Strength of France will allow, that fiic can
conquer H^povcr if Die heartily fets about it,
againft all the Defence which England is able
to make for it j but were llie to do this,
Great-Bricdin muft in confequence be obliged
to fpend her Millions elfewhere : A Meafure
which France moft dreads. If France, at
this . tirtie, wanted to make Conquefts in the
Empire, why does fhe not attack the other
States, who are lefs able to defend themfelves ?
Her Friendlhip for the Emprefs-Queen can be
no Obftacle. The Truth is, it would not now
fo .efTedbually anfwer her prefcnt Purpofes ;
which are only to diftrefs England, and wbich
i^iiihc can only do by drawing our Men and
Money into Germany, and protrading the
•War till our Coffers are drained of the laft
Guinea in fupporting it.

A.N

- ^^^

If we reflcft a Moment on what are the true
Interefts of France, Reafon will point out to
us that new Acquifitions in the Empire, at this
Time, would prove burthenfome to her -, Ihe
therefore docs not feek them, becaufe the Ex-
pence

:•« i

( i6)

l-vr- yi.- ..,;,,'i.»+ ^i,H»^,,j'l

pence of garrifoning their fortified To^vna''
wotild be greater than her Finances can at prt^-t "^i
fcnt fuppty ; hefides, fhe is afraid left England .,
fhould vigoronfly arrack her by Sea, and then:!
(ht would not luve a fufficicnt Force at hand f
to defend her Maritime Towns land oppofe th« I
Invader-, whereas an Army can with muchv^
greater Facility, and much lefs Expence, '
be moved about, than thole Troops in Gar- ^
rifon.

•'.'>■

The State of the Intercfts of the Belligerant i

Powers is fuch, that it is not for the Interefts V

of all the Confederates on either Side, to fee ?

all their Enemies deftroyed ; therefore thefe • t

are impolitic Unions • fmce the Powers, for i

the Sake of themfelves, will never I^artily I

affift their Allies. The old Proverb, ff^'bcfr / ?
Jjcive ferved myfelf^ I will help my Friend^ is un-
deirftood in all Nations.

-For the Reafon already affigned, France will
never fuffer the Downfall of Pruflia ; and fe-
vcrai States in the Empire will join with her
in this Caufe.. The two Emprcfles are the only

Powers

( 17 )
Powers who can defirefuch an important Stroke.
The lower the Houfc of Auftria is kept, the
ftrong' - will be thePov/er of France. Again, it
is the Intereft of Pruflia and Auftria to keep
Rufsia out of the Empire: But if PrufTia flioiuld .
ever become too powerful for the Imperial j,.
Force, and (hould overthrow it, Rufsia muft
expedl to be next attacked by the Conqueror.
Therefore a Balance of Power is eflentially ne-.
cefiary between thefe four Potentates.

'■■'^

France and Auftria areOppofites by Intereft;
but the Interefts of France and PrufTia are fy-
nonimous, viz. to check the Ambition of the
Houfe of Auftria: Rufsia indeed can no way af-
fed the Interefts ofFrance, except by ftrength-
ening the Hands of the Emprefs Queen againft:
her. It is the Intereft of Pruflia to keep the
Ruflians at a Diftance, and to humble the Pride
of the Houfe of Auftria. Ruflla is confultino:
and purfuing her own Advantage in the moft
certain Manner •, flie has gained a Footing in
Germany, and will doubtlefs keep it : She
can be no otherwife ferviceable to Auftria, than
by giving her AlTiftance in cafe of an Attack

C from

( i8 )

frot;i^ the Infidels. The Emi^refs Queen, it is
evident, has fufFercd her PaHlon to carry iicr
beyond herRcafon: it was a wrong Step to
bring the Czarina into the Confederacy againd
Prunia, for fne has thereby got footing in
Germany, ai ' may, in future, become her moil
dangerous Enemy: She has done right in mak-^
ing War witli PrufTia, becaufe it is Iier Interefl
to crufli that Monarch-, but then France will
not fee that done-, therefore here again fiie hns
chofen a wroiig Ally.^ PrufTia andAuftria may
be faid to be Principals in the prefent Quarrel,
becaufe it is their Interefl to humble one ano-
ther -, but their Allies are unfkllfully chofen.
The German Allies of Prufsia can e'ive him no
A uiRance, except they neglect to defend them-
felves ; and his Treaty with Great-Britain,
wlio has fypported him with Money, will
expire at tlie Clofe of the pr^feht Year ; and
fae now feeing the injurious Effe^ls of it^ to
hei^v'lf, win hardly renew that Treaty. As
for the Allies, or Audria, France will never
fcncl a* helping Hand' towards dtthronmo-
the Prufsian Monarch i nor was*it for the
interefc of AuHria to invite the C'/arina to

fuch

( 19 )

fuch a Mealui'c, as fhewill thereby become too
near and powerful a Neighbour to the Impe-
rial Dominionn.

Tlie King of PrufTia tbrefaw the Impropriety
and dangerous Confequence of fufiering the
Ru/fians to come into the Empire : when Great
Britain made a fubfidary Treaty with RufTia,
whereby a numerous Army of that Crown were
to march into Hanover for its Protection, he
boldly declared, ]\e would I;ccp all fjrc*p;n
Troops out of the Empire. Thi.:; Declaration'
was founded on the Principles of trvie Germarr
Policy i and thereby he fhev/ed, he was in the
Intereft of himfelf.

Had England not been concerned in the
German Qiiarrel, which, whatever partiiii
Writers fay to the contary, v/as entirely inde-
pendent of the Bifpiites in America*, it is

* If it fliould be thought this Aficrtion is falfe, becaufe
of our Connexion with Hanover; I beg to obfcrve, that
a Rupture was unavoidable between Pruflla and Auftria,
in which, I hope, it will be allowed, our Affairs in America
had no Concern.

C 2 certain

'•t ,il

( 20 )

certiin that Pruflla and France would have
united againft Auftria and Riiffia: a convincing
Proof of which intended Union h in a Letter
which the K— of P — fent to the late K — of

Gi B in the Year 1757, juft after the

Battle of Colhn (June 18); aTranflation of it,- )
from the French, in which Language it was
written, you will find in the Note f . If thir :
Letter was not authentic, it would have been
contradided by the fuppofed Receiver; but fo
far from that,a Declaration was delivered to the

Hil.

f ** I am informed, that the Defign ofaTreaty of Neu-
trality, for the Eledorate of H- is not yet laid afide. -

Is it pclnble that your M can have fo little For-<

titude and Conftancy, as to be difpirited by a fnwU
Reverfe of Fortune ? Are Affairs fo ruinous, that they
cannot be repaired ? I hope your M — ^ will confider.. .
the Step you have made me hazard ; and remember,
that you are the fole Caufe of thcfe Misfortunes, which
now impend over my Head. 1 Jhould never havt abarr~ ^
dcnedthc Alliance of France, but for your fiattcring,^J[uy,':
ranees. I do not now repent of the Treaty I have CQn-,

eluded with your M ; but I expedl you will m ,. in-"

glorioufly leave me at the Mercy of my EiiemJes, ^ft^i'--^
having brought upon me all the Forces of Europe. Ide^ji,
pend upon your adhering to your repeated Engagements ..,
of the twenty-fixth of lalt Month, arid' that you williilVeff '
to no Treaty, in which I. am not comprehended.'*

<(
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■ m

( 2r )

P*- ReficWnt in London, which appears t#D

have been calculated as an Anfwer to it. \y,Mnu

On the prefentPlan of fighting, France andgy
RulTia are the only Powers who can be foli43
Gainers; and, except the Emprefs-Quecn geti'l
Silef-S for which, it mull be acknowledged, ^
file has already fpent more Money than it is '/
worth, and even this Advantage may be over- X
'balanced by the dangerous Nearnefs of her >
new Neighbour, the Rufsians, all the reft of .t
the Powers are wafting their Subftance on dc-
fenfive Meafures; by which they can have no
Hopes of being Gainers. While Auftria ex-
haufts herfelf in ftriving to regain Poffeflfion of
Silefia, ftie is, in the moft effectual Manner,
ferving the Intereft of France •, for the weaker
fhc makes herfelf, with the greater Facility-
can France over-run the Empire on fome fu-
ture Occafion. France has already got Pof-
feflion of Oftend and Nieuport, as Keys to
the A uftrian Netherlands; and when ftie has
tired the Patience of England, or exhaufted its
Treafure, in defending Hanover, Ihe will next

attack

»i

( 22 )

•track the Houfc of Auftria, her old and na-
tural Enemy.

Jii

France would beconic formidable by tlic
Hum of tlie Houfc of Audria, and RufTia by
rliat of Brandenburgh; for obfcrvc, the In-
tcrcfts of France and Prufsia only agree in
humbling the Floufc of Auilria; and when that
is fuffiiciently done, France will not care wheUier
the Czarina dethrones tlie Monarch of Prufsia,
C)r he drives her to the Gates of iVIofcow. I'he
Rul^rians having footing in the limpire, will
not fo much affe6l France, as Auftria's be-
coming too formidable for her to enter
the Empire hereafter-, becaufe the principal
Strength of the former will always be too far
diflant-, whereas that of the latter may be
brought, at a fmall Expence, to her own
Frontiers, as Hie hath often experienced.

If the Emprefs of Rufsia fteadily purfue^
her own Intereft, as, hitherto, her Condu6l in
the prefent War hath plainly evinced, there is
no room for the King of Prufsia to hope Ihe
will ever accede to a general Peace, without

retaining

• ( ^3 )
rfctainii'.g PruHiia in her I lands •, nor will this
perhaps content her : it iy now her grand Aim
to Icizc Pomerania, not fo much becaufe it is
coiitiguoLis to Prui^ia, a:; the Empire. It is
not a Malfpenny M.irtcrtohcr, wlicthcr Prufliia
or Aiillria pofTefll-s Silefiai fhe does not IV
much endeavour at wrelHng Silciia out of the
Hands of the Prufsian Monarch, as Pomerania;
therefore (lie may be faid to be figlitin;^ lier czjv
Battles, not thole of her Ally the Kmpreis-'
Qiieen.

The Situation cf Prufsia and Pomerania is'
Rich, that if they were annexed to the KufsiaJi
Crown, that Empire would tiiereby become
one of the mod formidable Potentates in Eiv^
rope •, for thefe Acquifitions wouid in the moll:
cffcflual Manner pave her a Way into die veiT
Bowels of the Empire. They are not of that'
ImpT)rtance to the King of Pnifbin, becaufe
they border on the Sea ; therefore all their
maritirne Advantages are lofb to him, through
the Want of a mercantile Trade, and a FJeec
to over-awe the Swedes and Danes, who air
by Intcrert jealous of hisS ambitious Pafsion.

Riif^ii

( 24 )
Rufsia having a large mercantile Trade, and a
Fleet the moft formidable in the Baltick, can
make them produdtive of infinite Advantages.

Iff

Having endeavoured to explain the fcveral
Interefls of the belligerant Powers, will any.
fenfible and unprejudiced Englifhman fay, it
is for the Service of his Country to intermeddle
with the Concerns of thefe foreign Princes ?
Or, that England has any natural or advan-
tageous Connection with fuch Concerns ;
Would it be one Penny a Year D' ference to
Enorland, whether Auftria pofTefTed Silefia or
Prufsia ? whether the Prufsian Monarch was
circumfcribed within the original Bounds of his
Dominions, or permitted to conquer as far as
he had Troops to garrifon ? Whether Saxony
is indemnified for the Ravages committed in it
by the King of Prufsia, fince the Quarrel was
purely his own ? Whether Prufsia reverts to
its Monarch, or is retained by the Czarina? or
whether fhe or he pofTefTes Pomerania ? If any
of thefe can afFc6t the Intereft of Great-Britain,
it is what I cannot perceive ; if not, why arcr

( ^5 )
we to expend Millions on the Continent in ad-».
jafting Difpntcs which, are none of our own ? ^

':;0

If there is a NecefTity for our being con-
ne6led witli the Continent for the fake of de-
fending Hanover, and the Treaty with thc^
King of Pruflia was made with that View y
would not the fending a Britifli Fleet into the
Baltic Sea, have been a lefs expenfive Meafure
to England, than fending our Men into Ger-
many, and more effeftually anfwering all the
Furpdfes of this continental Alliance ?

'^^Had England two Years ago fent a Fleet
Into the Baltic, fhe hadafsifted her Ally in a Man-
ner which was confillent with her own natural
Strength. But unhappily, there were a Party
who oppofed this falutary Meafure with their
utmoft Force. They alledged, that the King
of Denmark would fend Thirty-fix Thoufand
to join the Swedes, in order to plunder Hano-
ver, as ibon as a Britifh Fleet fhould appear in
the Baltic •, which would alfo draw upon \is
tlie Refentmcnt of the Ruflians and Swedes ;
wlio mmht with their combined Fleets, fail

D out

if r

jput of the j^^ltic, and land upon the Coall of
Ireland or Scotland, Tweniy-thoufand Men.
Such were the Reafons againft our fending a
]^\c^l into the Ealtic \ which, you will eafily
perceive, are far from being founded on
JVI^xims of true Policy.

-. AsfQoiia? the King of Denmark heard it
^.}).^(^\^Qi\ propofed in P^ngland to fend a Fkec
into, the Bpiltic, he concluded a Treaty with
Jlufsia and Sv^dcn -, whereby tjiey agreed to
proted the Commerce of the Baltic from all
'1 Moleftation. The King of Denmark, it fnuft
be acknowledged, moft prudently confuked
the Interefts of his People by this Meafure -,
ftnd while thi^ir Gornmerce flourilhes without
Interruption, he receives large Subfidies in
.Confidcration of his Neutrality j therefore his
Kingdom will in all probability, become fo
enriched and powerful, as tp be the Wonder
of a future Age.— But if a ifritifli Fleet com-
pelled him to a Neutrality, he woujd no
longer receive large Subfidies in confideration
of his Forbearance. Upon what Account

..I -

is England Tq tacitly obliged to iconfult the

Intereft

•-. 1>

( i7 )
Intercft of this Monarch ? Is it becaufe when

the Rebels had penetrated . as far as Derby,
in the Year 1 746, flie demanded of hhn the
Number of Troops ftipulated by Treaty, and
he refufed to corpply with this equitable Re-
queft, though then aSon-in-law to thelateKing ?
Had England as prudently confulted her own
Intereftjlhe would not have negleded fendlng'a
Fleet into the Baltic. The v/eakeft Reafons
urged againft this moft neceflary Meafure, by
the weakeft Men, filled the Northern Powers
with art Apprehenfion that we were afraid of
giving them Umbrage j therefore the Court of
Peterfburgh behaved with a haugjity Infolence
to the Britilh ^inifter. It was an Error in

the Condud of the B G 1, to

fuffer a few fallacious Reafons againft fending
a Fleet into the Baltic^ to over-rule Common
Senfe, and Common Policy. The united na-
val Strength of Denmark, Rufsia and Sweden,
is not fufBcient to oppofe a Fleet which Eng-
land could fpare for this Purpofe. If the
Danes refufed it Admittance, their Maritime
Towns and Fortifications might foon be de-
molifhed and razed to the Ground j their Troops

D 2

alfo

V-

( 28 X

would then findEmployment enough at Home
ta-pfeverit theirjoining the Swedes j who would
^Ifo feel fuch a fevere Scourge from, a vigilant
Englifh Admiral, as not to be able to invade
Pdmerania again during the prefent War;
Rufsia would no longer be able to ke ep poiTel-
fion of Prufsia, nor to harrafs its Monarch ;
if her numerous Armies had net Work enough
to proteft Peterfburgh and Cronftadt, the reft
would ftarve on the Weft Side of the Vji^
tula, for want of Provifions, which are always
brought to them by their Fleet y a Navigation
which would be totally deftroyed, as foon as the;
Britifli Fleet appeared in the Baltic : and, is it
not reafonable to urge, that tlie King of Pruf; ,
fia would, if he acted the Part of an honeft
Ally, in Confideration of fuL> material Af-
fiftance, fend thofe Troops to join the Allied
Afmy, whom he now Employs againft the
Rufsians and Swedes : the Britilh Troops in .
Germany might then be brought Home, and
employed on Services purely Enclifh. ,ii [yhr.

"XL

I know, and am extremely forry for it^.thaC.-

the K — of P can refuie, by the Tenor :

' of

'iT

of thcTre'aty, of rather Convention^ whichEng^

r;;,%f.nn'i :'fi'jfo'7H>t^V''--^'^,^'

land has concluded with.him^ to Tend or lend
a finglc Man, either for the Protciflion of Han-
over, or any Service which is not purely ; hii
own. We have bound pyrfelves to pay hinil
annually, and at one Time, Six Hundred and
Seventy Thoufand Pounds Sterling -, but we
have only bound him to employ it in tlie moflr
advantaecousMannerfor himfelf. What Britifli
Subjed could be fo very erroneous, as to alTert^
luch a Stipulation was to the Honour of his
King? w'hatBntilhSubjed: could befo ignorant,"
astothinkfuch astipulation was for thelnterells
of his Country ? Will it be faid, in Oppofition
even to common Reafun, it is for our Advan^
tage to fend Millions to Germany to fupport a
Conteft, which no Matter who gets the better;
will not make a Penny Difference to us? I faid^r
if tljie King of Prufsiaaded the Part of an honeft
Ally, he would fend his froops againfl: the
French, in cafe a Britifn Fleet found the Swedes
and Rufsians E^iiployment enough at Home.;
hi^ not being obliged to do this, nor any thing
elfe, witliout he pleafes, induces me to hope
he would ad", at ieait, upon the Principles of

Gratitude ;

|;ij

Gratitude ; but to confefs my real Sentiments,
I doubt his Gratitude.

■ f

Thfe real Intention of our Alliance with
JPnlfsia, was the Prefcrvation of Hanover -, par-
ticularly, the keeping the French out of it ;
or, as it Was termed, the keeping of Foreign
Troops out of the Empire ; wliich he, v/ith our
Afsiftance, /!ri;»w/>f/ to do; but he has not ful-
filled this Promife : nay, fo far from it, what
. has he contributed towards it ? A feW of his
Troops have been in the Allied Army, and it
was expeded they would have afsifted in driving
the French to their own Frontiers ; but how great
muft our Surprize be, when we arc told, that
thefe fewPrufsians in theAlliedArmy, aflually
rcfufed to charge the French in the Battle of
Crevclt i and, it is faid, the faireft Opportunity
of defeating the French was thereby loft. Why
was that Affair ilifled up, which, had it not been
for the Author of the Confiderations on the
prefent German War, Nine Tenths of our ho-
neft Englifhmen had never heard of it ? Are
we to pay immenfe Sums to a foreigrrPrince,
and fuffer with Impunity fuch manifeft Ingra-
titude ?

' V

JL'mKM^

*-..:-/•

•

( 3' ) ■ '■

tltude ? I fay Ingratitude, bccaufc we rannot
chlige him to give ns any Afsiftance j that
Treaty, which is perhaps the moft eminent
Demonftration of EngliJJj Sagacity and Prufsian
Policy^ that ever was laid before the Eyes of
the World, now Subfilling between him and
us, allows of no fuch Thing: and ought we
not to be as greatly Surprized, to fee your
Name at the bottom of this more famous Con-
vention, than that of Clofter-Severn ? Is it
becaufe he wants to be Friends with France,
that his Troops would not attack thofe of that
Nation ? or to what fliall we impute this ftranoie
Piece of Mifcondud, which for three Years
has been fo carefully huddled up ?

Though it might be thought injurious to
the future Credit of England to break offher
Alhance with Prufsia, yet furely it will be al-
lowed, by all reafonable Men, that he has not
fulfilled his Promife in keeping all foreign
Troops out of the Empire. Had he done this,
he had been the Defender of Hanover; which,
according to the prefent Syitem of Pohtics,
(however- Inconnftent it may appear to un-
prejudiced

III:

C 3^ )
prejudiced t'yes) is the fame as afsifting Eng-
land i but this being ncglefled, and his Troops
rcftijing to give Afsiftance in an Adtion, partly
on an Englilh Caulc, leaves in our Minds a
veiy difTerent Idea to that which we would
Entertain of an Ally of Great Britain.

■ism

f'4

The Friends of this German War will fay,
that the King of Prufsia attacked and defeated
the Troops of France in the Battle of Rofbach.
I admit it: but need we be long at aLofs to
Account for this Proceeding? Had he not done
this, he would have found it a difficult Matter
to get fo much Money from England as he does.
If the Hanoverians and their Allies, who had
laid down their Arms by the Convention of
Cloiter-Severn, had not been enabled torefume
them, England would not, nay, could not,
have defended Hanover; and except Eng-
land would enter upon that Step, no plaufible
Reafon could be given for fupporting Prufsia :
Therefore he fought the French becaufe they
were joined with the Troops of the Empire ',
and all the World knows, the Hanoverians re-
lumed their Arras in confequence of the Battle

%■

( 33 )
of Rolbach. • For their further Enc6urage-^
ment-he gave them a Prufsian General, which, it
muft be owned, pleafed the EngliQi mightily ;
who were by this Time become fo fond of
every Thing that bore theNaiT«e of PruHian,,
that our Bakers, in Order to Acquire* a greater
Cufl:om,Jiiade Prullian Loaves, Pmnian Cakes,
&c. The Habcrdafliers, in Order ro pleufeour.
Ladies, who bore a Targe Share in the Torrent,
for the Prufiian Demi-God, invented PruflTan
Flics, Pruffiark Caps, &c. and there was Pruf-
fian Purl, and Pruflian Ale, for the IVJob to.
Drinks But to return to our Argument; did
the Prufsian Troops in any other Aftion at-
tack the French when they were al6n6 ? Dicl^
they not in the firft Battle they were in, when
the French were fingly oppofed to them, ab-

folutely refufe to charge the Enemy ? .

'. >

' ■ . ■ J ' ^ •'

Thus it appears the King of Prufsia, wheq it

was in his Power, and when there Was an Op-

portunity, has not even afsifted to keep the

foreign Troops out of the Empire. Would,

not this afford a Nation, lefs Honcft and more

Politic than oarlelves, the mofl: plaufible Rea-

E fons

iSil!

ftft's tot* abkncfohin <▼ (li'dh 'Alliance ?" and woliiTd
not any Nation but ourfelves, have feized that
Opportunity, if its Intereft were as fbreign to
it as ours are ? So wbiild England perhaps, had
not H - ^^ ■ been fituated where it is ; which
is fo convenient for the Prufsian Monarch to
over-run and ravage it, that, however great
the Expence be, we mufl purchafe his Fricrid-
Ihip." ^^ ^"' '^' ' ' '' ^'^^ ^''^-^ ^^ fif^UMf

Milhons of Ehglifh Money' nave^'^beeri' T£-*
viiiied away, in defence and on accourit of this
Eiedorate. The Earl of Sandv^ich, in the
Year 1743, with great Propriety "faid, ** It
" was vain and endlefs to exJiauH: the national
" Treafure, in enriching a hungry and barren
** Eleaorate." And the Duke of Bedforcf,
the Year before, with as great Jufticeobferved,
"Tliat thefe Ele6toral Territories had long
'/ been confidered as a Gulph into which the
" Treafure of Great Britain had been thrown :
*' That the State of Hanover had been changed
*« without any vifible Caufe, fince the Accef-
" fion of its Princes to the Throne of Ensr-

** land : AAluence had begun to wanton in

" their

((

(fc

( 35 )
their Towns, and Gold to gUtter In their;^,
Cottages, without the Difcoyery of Mines,
•' or the Increafe of Commerce •, and new Do-
minions had b( ;n purchafed, of which the
Value was never paid from the Revenues of

'* Hanover." . ,

\' ***•">'»'-•• ,jf,^t^ -J

■■ I have already obferved, it is the tntereil of
Prufsia to keep the Rufsians out of the Empire v
therefore thefe Troops he has frequently at-
tacked i whether in conjundtion with the Auf-
trians or , fingly. Both thefe Powers are his
Enemies, and it is his Intereft to humble thcni
both ; when he attacks the Rufsians, it may.
be faid, he is endeavouring to fulfil tlie Treaty
he made with England, the keeping foreign
Troops out of the Empire ; but it is not
material to Engjland, whether the Rufsians are
in the Empire or not •, they will never attack
Hanover, becaufe of its great Diilance from
their Dominions. England is afraid of France
attacking itj which Prufsia did not in the
leaft attempt to prevent ; he only ftrove at
keeping thofe Troops out of the Empire, whicli
jMH iiis Intereit fhould have footing in it.

If'^'fr;'

E 2

»i ^ifiif X

i'i

( ,5< )
I have but one Thing more to mention, be-
fore I iqint the Aflfkirs of the Continent. It ir,

concerning the Condud of D ' F -— ,

in his Capacity of Co- of the Al

Army, which has not of late extorted from us '
the ulual Exp rcfs ions of Adoration, it formerly
did. Great Faults have been found with him v
and it has been obferved that thefe Cenfur«rs,
are not the MiHinthrope^r of a difcontented'
Party, but the Friends of their Country.
They have obferved that it tarnifhes tht Gk>ry
of this Nation to fufi^er its Troops to iW
cbmmanded by a Foreigner, hired by their
own Money to Command them j who was r^^
commended to this eminent Port: by the King
of PruiTia,'.whom we t-acidypermited to give
us Law: That fuch a Step, before it was taken,
mull by ar Patriot Minifter be well known to be
Diftaileful to the People: That hehaiaDif^
like to feveral of thr: Officers of this Nation; and
that not being zn Englifh General, whether Ke
can, by us,' be ealkd to anAccounrt for his Con-
dud, inGafc it {hould be fouad neccilairy^ TJieftj
are the Objcflions which havenot been Aniweredj
(even by thofe who have avowed thcmfvlves his
Friends, There

:lf

■'Mm

( 37 y

There arc another ftring of Allegations,
which have been printed in the common. News-
papers, with Anfwers to them > and fccm to
have be^n collefted by one of the Admirers
of this German General. But, as I do not ap-
prove of thefe Anfwers as fqfHcientiy refutaryj
and, denying Heathen Mythology, cannoc
deify him in his mortal Capacity, I fhall make
a Reply to them : Perhaps it is becaule I have
never been made drunk, with the pompous.
Taks of a Party, the Admirers of this German
General and Germanic Warfare, tior my
Eyes yet dazzled with his varnilhed Pi£burc»
that I cannot join wjth the Mob in his Defencc*f>

ALLEGATION I.

" The Britifh Generals have not been per-«
*' mittpd to command feparate corps, or dc-
*' tachments.

ANSWER.

■' It is fufficiently known they arc Strangers
^' to the Country and the Language ; therefore
f it would be highly imprudent to give them

( 38 )
" a feparate Co)r>mand whhy they are not able
'<^ toconverfe wirh Spies and Guides.",, ;i

.Hdh c»i Jov •, R E P L Y. -f^ff-j hi)rnf«ib *>
If the Adnnirers of this German GeneraJl had
itudied feven Years for an Anfwer, they could
not have made one more weak and ridiculous.
The Allegation is a Fad, and can be -^nfwered
no other Way, than becaufe he ehuicF to beftow,
fuch Poftb of Honour and Profit on his necefli-
tated Countrymen, who, want to enrich them-^*
felves. The not being able to converfe with^
Spies andGuides is ajeft ; thv'=;re are Interpretersj
but French is fpoke by almoft all of them, and
it furely will be acknowledged that moft of our
Officers can fpeak French. It might very pro-
perly be afked, why the Britifh Generals, '1
the iamc Country, were permitted to hold
feparate Commands in the Duke of Marlbo-
rough's Time ? And it might as very properly
be anfwered, becauie there was an Englilh
Commander in Chief.

-•fU.1

-'M

■.7s-':.A ^M.

«.(

ALTEGATION II.

" There has been iMifunderflandihg amdng
the Officers and private Men, which has cn-
creafed to an Animofity."

ANSWER.

k- .'A

" It Ihould be^ Gonfidefed, who firft treated
*' the German Officers with Contempt, and
*' defpifed them becaiife they were not fo rich,
*^ nor their Pay fo great as themfelves." ^^

"The brutifh Behaviour of the Germrn^OifH-
cers is alone fufficient to make them defpifed,
even by the juft-civilized Indian. They are
dead to every generou.< Sentiment, and un-
tin<5lured with the leaft Spirit of Affabilhjr;'
that broody Morofenefs and fullen Selfiflinefs,
fo confpicuous even in their very Countenances,
fetting afide all external Marks of Difguft in
their Condu6t, renders iiieir Company fcarcc
endurable 5 fo very far is it from being agree-
able. If they were Objects of Contempt in
the Eyes of the Englifh, the Commander, had
he afted prudently, would, inflead of foment-
ing this Animofity, have endeavoured to check
it in its Infancy, and united the Divifions in
his Army. The Truth is, the two Parties
were headed by their Commanders in Chief,
who heartily hated each other.

.>[.

^.. ,,ALLE-

-A rf

( 46 )
. ALLEGATION lit

« Vr,Thi'. firitiOi Troops have always be^ft
placed in the warijieit Parts of every A(ilioft/*it

A N S \y E R. .

" It was agreeable to their Requeft, which
has always bccn^ to haye the Poft of
**- -Honour.'*^

((

:■>

iV- 1,

I ':':'?

REPLY.-

. If the Troops defire to faGriike themfelve:~.
miiffc the General grant them that Requefl? Or
isit bcc^ufe they know" not how to run away,
tkat^hey are plaG€4 # ^^s warmeft Parts: of the
A^c«i ? Are the Germans fo eager for the Poft
of Honour ? If joj why are tliey not pit in it I
If not (whieii is mofl likely) are the Germans
only placed there to write endlefs Encomiunwi
on the- Britifli Troops conquering without
them ? ■ An impp^-tial Perfon wi*o has. read xho.
AccpuQts from the AJlied Army, will fay^ the
Germans have never rbeen very forward; in aA
fiiting the Bi-itifh Troops in the Day of A6tion>
but i>ther on the contrar)^ Wiiat Honoun
does fuch Conduct refled on thofe Men, who
. . ' ' niay

( 41 )

may be faid to be the Principals ? The Britilli
Troops fight their Battles, and have been fa-
crificed, that they may retreat iri Safety*, in
their ownCaufe j for it is inDcfente cf Hanover,
not England, that tliey are fightiiig.

ALLEGATION IV.
" There has been a Scarcity of Forage and
" Provifion in the Army, which has been fre-
" quently in great Want."

- i

ANSWER.
" This is true ; but the Purveyors, and hot
" the General, are to be blamed and called to
" Account for it. This Scarcity has prevented
" his making feveral bold Strokes, whereby he
*' might have gained fome folid Advantages."

,. '^^

• It is acknowledged, even in the London G^ette,
July 22, 1760, That, at the Sldrmifh at Corbach, the
Retreat was attended with a little Confufion. The Truth
is, the Heffians and Hanoverians had given Way ; and
a Squadron of Bland's, and another of Howard's Regi* ,
ment of Dragoons, were allowed to fuiFer, that the others

REPLY.

k; )

! I

'I i

la-

-.1.1 .

(42 )

REPLY.

, It was a Maxim of the famous Marechal
Count 4e Sax^f whp the ^Admirers of Duke
^Fc^dinand, I fuppofe, will> at leaft^ allow to
be equal to him, *V That it (hould be, ^nd
always was, the firft and principal Care of a
prudent General, to proidde Proviflons and
Forage for his Army, and tO" provide for its
Health and Prefervation.'* The Purveyors
may indeed be blamed; they may be indolent ;
they :'^^v be villainous •, but all this will not
cxtenu. :he Commander in Chief : He is to
fuperintend them, and, where they are faulty,
to punifh them according to their Delertsi/ If .
this is not his Bufinefs, he istrobbed of h?ilf*
' the Refped that is due to him. If it is, ^^d
there is no Precedent to the contrary, is not he
to be called to an Account for fu,ch a Dearth in
his Camp ? The Money fent froni England is
Sufficient to provide continual Plenty for that
Army, and there is Provifion enough in Ger-
many to be had for Money, exclufive of the
large Exports made to it from England, which
ouc^ht to be confidered as an Overplus, or at

ieaft given in at the Bargain. ,

iU.

•/<;a

3fi e^

ALLE-

» r

K 1

'.'o'i

T 3 JJ

^iuQ lo A L L' E G A 1 1 6 N V.

c?/w(»i-*Thfc Erigli-fh liavefceen 'obliged to {5ay
i)Tf» double tbr every thing tlie'y bouglit.'^ \\ .,

bnc ?nqnr/:.iV ^ANSWER.

211 ;:c^ :It is well known that wherever the Enprliih

'•'^••^: come they fpoil the Market." , '•',

:o« fliwriH r REPLY.

*^^^ Admitting them to have fpoiled the Market,

■ , . . . . , . ^ . . f

/..does thzt oblige them to pay them double?
^IWhyis'not ttie Market alfo fpoiled for the Ger-
^^feans ? The Englifh can fcarQe fpoif ,it for
-^'thenifelves only, why are not the -Germans
■'t)briged to pay double by tlie famq Rule ? Such
i iiirange Partiality can never be accounteci for^
^^by the Engliih endeavouring tamake theii:

<jwn

ition worfe.

->/:

,< ..;.;4iS:^\rrt

..?-■

t-i

ALLEGATION VI.

«,-•-:« j.ja(j ^j^g General not been fo fond to put
*' the Money in his Pocket, fome important
Action had been performed with fuch an

as he now commands.

F 2

ANSWER

((

( 44 ) •
£iu^ruuYi.r-\^A. N S W E Kar'^i'i- . [-i
^*' H^ has' not' had the Fingering of the <^
Money, confcquehtly could not put any ofv
it int6 hisFocktt. He has^ften fcprefented
that the Enemies were twice the Nuniber of
his Army ; and he has not received a IJein-
forcement that might enable him tp &d Of-
fenfively." - • ^fiirn

■> -

11.
Ill

|i i

REPLY.

A Falfity is here propofed to invalid • a
iTuppofed l^ad. He is by right of his fqp. io^],
Command allowed to have th^ .Fingering ofrr
the Money :^ And has he , hot then an Oppor-
tunity of putting what he pleafes into Hjs
tocl^ett Is he not Avaritious ? Are.thert any^
Proofs to the contrary ? What :^hejj muft wc
fhihk 6f' a General who has evtr^vagaat Re-/]
mittances of Money, receives Prpvifions and
Forage, from^ England befi^es,^ arjd yet fufFer^ ^
his Army j:o be on the Ppmt of ftajcvi/ig? The :
Enemies were never twice hijs Number : A^
this Time the Arrnie§ are nea^e;* ^quaU tjian
ever they were. It is well known, tjiat the ^un^ t

of Twelve Hundred Forty-four Thoufand, one .'

Hundred

( 45 ) )

Hundred and Seventy-fevon Pounds, Niru:teea
Shillings, and Nine-pence Thr^e Farrfiriigs,
was granted by the BritiH^ Parliament for Main-
taining, in the. Year 1759, Fifty-feven ; Thou-
fand and Twehrd Germans. Ta which- Num-
ber we may add. Twenty Thoufand Eno-Ii(H^
and was it ever known ths^C the French >n Ger-
many during the prefent War wqr^ twke chat
Number ?

It may be very juftly aflced, why Puke Fer-
dinand, with iiich an Army- a^ he iiow Com-
mands, was inaiftive almoft the whole laft
CamJ)aign ? And what Anfwer caii be given;
that he is defirous of protrafting > the War,
only that he may enrich himfelf by it ? And let
it be obferved that he has with him a greater
Number of Bfitifh Tfroops than ever the great
Duke of Matiborough had> who it mufl be
allowed fi;equ<&ntly did mor^ iaone Campaign
than he has done in three. -'-v

t) • ■ '

^; After fuch api/cuffion of Circumfliances an4

Llterefts, will it be faid it is our Concernf
who is Emperor of Germany, gf Ruffia, .of

■ J^r.Ji. I

King

•1
ir »

liH-l '■

i J !
I!"' II I

ill'

i • ■■

( u )

tftiig of Pniwa ? If they Quarrel it is am^Mjgll
tliemlelves •, which ever are Gainers by it \wjll

« . . . ' - ■ '

hot d-ffeft our Intercfts •, but ifw^ intermeddle
•we are fare to be lolers by it. ,Cpmtnerce
ilone is the Wealt;h of thefe, Kingdoms, aad
tommerce alone ought to b|e theObjcft of
their Attention -, and whatever Power attejftpts
to mtef nipt us, it becomes our immediate Con-
cern and Intereft to repel Force by Foiice* 10

It is a weak, abfurd, and fallacious Argu-
ment^ made up to ferve the Purpofes of a Party,
which endeavours to provi?, tjjat our Cqnquefts
in Alia, Africa, and America, ^re in fx)ni^-
quence of our drawing the French into Germa-
ny 1 firft let it be obferved, that we have i>ot
drawn the French into Germany -^ but all the
World knt)ws they have drawn us thither : the
French art 4t this Time only profecuting their
original Intention ; namely, the caufing us to
fpendMillionsin deftndingHanover, and dying
the German Plains with Britifh piopd. H^ .wc
fuffered the French to go into Hanover, aod
further if they chofe it, would that have pre-
vented our making Conquefts of the French
' ^ . Settle-

( 47 )
Settlements, in the more diftant Parts of the
"World ? Surely not, but rather have facjl'
tated ir, at our Troops might have been cpi-
ployed there *, while how they are flaughtered
in defending what is foreign to our Intereft.
Had the French never marched into Germany
it all, but employed their whole Force in de-
fending their Settlements^ could not we have
nken them ? the hood-winked Friends of the
Getman War fay no : but the difcerning Part
of MSi; cind, and the Friends of their Country,

anfwer in the Aifirmitive.

-[fni/v ?f.'»^'« •''^*-^ ''•"■

r' ' As this is the main Pillar of our Argument,
it is proper to wave all other Things till this
Point is cleared. The Admirers of a Ger-
manic Warfare fay, the French out-did us in
America before we made our Alliance with the
King of PrufTia., The Aflertion, literally, is
tfiie-, but our Alliance with the King of.
Pruflia, a Power entirely foreign to us, and
our Affairs in America, was not the Caufe of
their difcontinuing victorious there. Until
Admiral Bofcawen, and the Generals Amhcrll
and Wolfe, took the Iflc of Cape-Breton, al^
'•nti-^/ our

• I i

( 4S )
Otir Commanders were either imprudent or In-
dolcht. The Raflinefs of Braddock and Aber-
crortibie excited Difpleafure. The Condu(5\: o^'^'
Mt. Shirley and Lord Loudon was far firbnt ''
being Satisfa(5tOry. It \Vould be ih invidious '^
Tafk to enquire into the Caufes of their Mii-;'^
carriages and Ina(5livity ; but it may be ,ob- •'
fenred, that the Affairs of thq Britifh Nation
were not attended w^ith Succefs during their'-
fevcral Commands. PruITia nor Hanover had
nothing to do with this. — ^Wq come now to'
another Article in our main Argument ; that
had we not found Employ for the French
Troops in Germany, they would liave fcnt-'
them to America. The Aflertors of this muft *
deny our Sovereignty over the Sea ; or, at leaft,
aver, that the French muft btibe our Admirals
and Captains to connive at fuch a Tranlporta-
tion. How abfurd muft ^is Notion appear,
to thofe who do but for a Moment confider ^'
the formidable Strength of the Britifh Navy,
and the ruined State of that of France ; whofe .
very Commerce' is almoft totally deftfoyed -,
whofe Ports have been fo blocked up, that
eten a fmglc Cfyi^ef Or Advice Boat could

not*

(49)

not get in or out without the greateft Daiiger
of being taken by (qiu^ of r^/e Britilh Navy,
ftationed before them, i Tow then could they
fend Troops to America ? Had but one Third
of pur Money been expended in America, that
, is annually exported to Germany, the French-
would not, at this Time, have in their Hands
thai raft and important Province, Louifiana ;
nor the IQe of Martinico. But while wc
wafte Millions in fupporting a German War,
from which, all impartial and fenfible Men will
readily allow, we can reap no real Advantage;
we cannot afford Thoufands to be expended in
enlarging our Commerce, without being loaded
with the moft grievous and infu^portable Im-.
pofiuons. It ought to be a Maxim with the
Englifh Government, that whenever they are
determined to attack France by Land, they
muft engage in a powerful Confederacy again (I;
her •, for when we take Pruflia alone, or Auftria
alone, the throwing the other into the Arms of
France is the certain Confequence; and the
Interefts of Pruflia and Auilria are fo different,
they ^an never fee, brought to unite agajiift
France. Therefore we, in (lead of having an

G ufeful

■ ; '

I t *

( 5'^ )
ufeful Friencl, have only a needful Ally ; whicfi
turns the Scale againft iii\ ' ' --- -^^^-a •'^'^ ^^ ' •

i Having cleared myfelf of Continenta^ Con-
nexions, I will next fpcak of Hiings nearer

o 0. . .;, u.i;f ..,;

Our late intended Expedition has brouglit
upon us the Ridicule of all Europe. The fp^.
reign Gaz .CCS tell us, with a Sneer, " The
Englifli Admiral at length found the con--
trary Wind he was ordered to look out
^' for'* J and apply the trite Proverb with at^,
uncoffimon Satisfadion, " The Mountain
" in Labour has brought forth a Moufe." Is
it not owing to fome ftrange Mifcondud in

our M , that we are expofed to thefe,

and many other fuch-like Infults? Shall a Na-
tion, whofe Arms have been vidorious in the
four Quarters of tlie World, be the Scoff and
Laughing-flock of its Enemies ? Have we not
national Pride that difdains the very TJioughts
of it? . . ^ ,

It has been conje(5lurcd, that tlie grand Ar-
mament was deflincd to make a Conqueft of

the

( 51 )
the Ifland of Bclleiflc -, the Importance of it,
and the great Service it would be to England,
put a Probability on the Conjecture. It is af-
lirmed, the I (land has one good Harbour, can
afford plenty of Provifions to a Fl^ct itationcd
in the Bay, and fliould it be conquered, may
be held as eafy as we do tlie Iflands of Jerfey
aftd'Cuernfcy. France would fu{lai|i an in-
finite Lofs by it ; her naval Communication
between all her northern and fouthern Ports
would he entirely cut off, or at leall rendered
extremely hazardous and diflknk. A further,
and fuller Account of its Importance was In-
ferred in one of the public Papers ; an Ac-»'
count, which fo evidently fhews the NccefTity
of taking i:, by pointing out its real Ufe and
Advantage, to either France or Kngland, that
I cannot omit the Inferting it.

*' The Attacking the Ifleof Bellein-e,at this
*^ Time, would put the French into as great '
" an Alarm, and draw as many of their Troops
** that Way, as if we were to Attack any
" Part of their main Land, becaufe it lies
" in the Center of their principal trading "

Towns, and almofl as near the main Land as

G 2 " tLe

((

I"' '*'

h ;i

m ■

'''■iv

(5* )
« the Ifle of Wight is toPortfmouth, arid vkhld
^^ confequently put them into as great aCon-
^'' ftertlation as wefhould be in, if they Were
^< MaftersofthdSea and the Ifle of Wight; from
" not knowing which Part of our Coaff might
" be attacked next: for which Reafon they
" mull fend for a large Body of Troops
'* from the Rhine or eifewhere, to cov^r all
*' their Weftem Coaft; and they muft fend* a
" great Number of Troops to guard the Iflands
*« of Dieu; Rhee, and Olcron, which li&t6 the
" Southward of Belleifle, and to Uflianf.'^arid
'•^ Groce, which lie to the Northward, m order
^* to prevent, if they can, our becoming Maf-
" ters of thernal-^/'*'^^ " '*'''^'''^^" ' -'-^>»^^j' f'i«*'"j'

2^ "As the Ifland of Belleifle lies direftly op-
*' polite to Fori: Louis and, L'Orlent, none of
*'' their Eaft-India Ships could ever get in br
" out of thofe Ports, if it Was in our Poflef-
" fion J and as Breft has no inland INavi^
" gation to it, nor any Materials whitfoever
in it, for the buiklnig, repairing;* 'or lif-
ting out Ships, but what are bnotJght to' it
^* by Sea, Trom fiayonnevBoUrdeaux, Nantz,

" Rochforts

«(

7i. v

■0

( 53 )
** Rochfprt-,? Port LokM.s* &c, and which tliey*
*^, c-^rry. iJuther in the T'me of W^tr with great
**,,, Safety, between this Ifland and the main
f f. iion^ ixi fpite of' our Ships of War, who
^f(,Jcnow nothing of that Navigation i the tukr
.^^^,,ing of it would. put an End to fudvCona-
*,'. merce; fo that the French would not be iible
j*| to fit put a fmgle Ship froni. Bred:, after
"l-their prefent Store3 are exhauiVed. Belleiflc
*^is the iargeftlfland on the French Cpaft,
*f and moft comnnodious of all to Annoy them:
?*t, It is capable of ^[jaintaining a great maay
.^IjTrojps by ita own Produce; who, ifrtlicy
;^^T were lodged there, might as Occafion fliould
offer, make further Attempts upon the other
Iflands •, • thus keep the French conftantly
alarmed, a^d ftnally ruin the little Remains
" of their Trade. The Road of Bellifliq is as
.^f .good as that of St. Helen's, and our Ships
.•tr of W?.r might lie as fafe there, as they do at
Spithead i and if we Ihould ereft on it Arf-
nels and Magazines, our Ships, Rationed in
the Bay, might be fupplied with every Thing
,.*f.^ the Year round, without combing home,
V*; as they have hitherto donej which has al-

«c

.•!tai/brv/.l

ways

r^'

if'"'

""fv

(54 )
** ?yays given the Enemy an Opportunity to
'V g|^(;jir^and out of their Pons unmolefte^.^^^ ^

,1 have been infoi'med, that the Tranfporti
which failed from Corke to join the grand Ar^.
mament from England, actually made (^s the-
Spa Term is) the Ifle of BcUeifle, but not find-^
ing the reft of the Fleet, returned to England j
for when the Orders for laying the Expedition
afide, were fent to Portfmouth, it was not pof-
lible, on Account of the Wefterly Winds, to
fend Advice of it to Corke, therefore thofe
Tranfports and Ships failed agreeable to their
firft Orders,

If it was the Intention of the B-

M-

to make a Conqueft of this important Ifland,
as there are great Reafons to believe it was,
the Enemy feem to have been informed of it,
if we may judge from the Preparations they ,
made for its Defence : They tranfported to it,
in open Boats, aconfiderable Number of Troops ;
and by the fame hazardous Conveyance, they
fent to it Cannon, Mortars, and all other *ne- ^
ceflary Implements to refift the Efforts of an I

Attack.

■A

t/-

(55)

Death of his late Majefty. But a Circumftance,
perhaps the moft extraordinary, relative to this
Expedition, is in the Bruflels Ga^zette, about
a t^onth before it was laid: afide, where M.
Maubfert fays, the grand Expedition of the
tlngllfh would ndti^ail at all •, and pofitively
aflerts, that In; i little Time it would belaid
afiae. Oiiir/iffews-writers were fo extremely
cautious^ they never tranflated this extraordi-
nai^tjftfticle. His Peh too was the firft Cou-
itierthat told the World of the Scarcity of Pro-
Vifions in the Allied Army, afid of the Faults
which had been found in England with it^ Com-
mander's Conduft, and of the Propofition of

a Party tofubvert him, by replacing the D <

of C- . It is not poffi' V that thefe Ar-
ticles Ihould be the Fruits ot Maubert's own
Invention ; there is the greatcft Probability to
Imagine he is afTifted by fomebody who is, I
am afraid, too near our- ■ — .

»•♦■

To fome \maccountable Fatality mufl we im-
pute the Lois of the faireft Opportunity we
ever had, or perhaps ever may have, of taking

Martinico.

i I

( ^ )

MArtinko. What fhall be faid foi* the wholt
of that ftrange-ufvfwccefsful Attempt upon if
in the Year ly^g. We \yere toleU that th«
Troops landed without Oppofition 4t:Pokl|
Negres, in Port Royd Harbour, dcoyc thu
Enemy from their Entrcnchment& and lay ttiu{
der Arms all Night •, that in Confideration of
the badrtefs of the Roads to Fort Kisyiri, wbick
was five Miles diftant, 6eneralJHb$lfoa'{)rd»
poled to Commodope Moore to land the hesr]r
Gannon at the Savannah, which ia b^oiit^ t9
Port Royal; but the latter infornfed Hitfi bQ
could not do it 'tiU the Troops on ShOrpj ^
fUkc^i the Weft-fidle of Jiw Fort. Qm i| N
believed that they preferred theSafoty ^f one^or
two at itioft, of his M-jefly^s Ships to.tketak*
ing tWs important Ifland ? How .fiuU we re^
tontile this, to the Account a Frefieh Officer
has given of the Force atthat Tiipe ift Portj^
Royal. He fays that the Garrifon xpniUled<>f
no more than- TV'o Hundred: and Tliircy-fi*
private Men and Fourteen Officers ; they had
Ibr their Subfiftehce, fays he^ only Ond Wtin-
dred Barrels of Beef, and vdry little Water xa
their Cifterhs. It was a J«^6nfy between the

Officers

.c:

( 57) ^
Officers that did the Mifchief ; therefore tfie
Troops wert re-embarked, when the Garrif m
were beginning to think of capitulating. Had
Unanimity fubfifted, or fome other Perfons
been fcnt on this Enterprize, Martinico had
prol)ably, long jfgo been in our Poflefllon.

*' • The Mifchieft Its Privateers have done our
Trade are inconceivable. At only Six Months
after die taking of Guadalupe there were
'>6nery Privateers belonging to Martinico,
which in that Time had taken not lefs than Two
Himdred Sail of Merchant Ships, vallied, at
feaft, at Six hundred Thoufand Pounds! This
is a convincing Proof that our Trade has fuf-
fefcdmorc, the firft half Year only, after the
taking Guadalupe, than it had done before, du-
ring* the whole Wah It is now two Years fince
the taking 6£ Guadalupe -, and our Trade
has continued to fuffer in Proportion to the
preceding Account. To what ftiall wc at-
tribute this unaccountable, pay, almoll ruinous
Suffrage? To theNegleft of the Fleet and
Cruizers on that Station .? Or to the Obfti-
nacy of thatOHicerwhothought hehad done

H cnoup-li

fill

(.58)

(?nough for his Country at the taking of Qua-
.d^lypc.? Had tlie brave and vigilant Captain
Tyrrel been.jxrmitt^d to carry a broa^Pendant
on this Station, will it be believed our Trade
would have fuft^incd the imn-ienre Damages it
has ? — ^Never — It muft be alloweil too, that
there are very few, if any Captains in theBritilh

;,;Nay7, better acquainted with the Wind^^ Gur-
rents,Creeks, &c. than he, In the earlier Ages

. of the World, thathonefl: Maxim, of Reward-
ing and Promoting Merit was fteadily.ob-
ferved. Now-a-days Rewards and Promotions
are only to be had by Intrigues and Intereft ;
by being a Great Man's Tool, his Dupe, or
Bully. If a Man has too much Pride and
Honefty, to fmk beneath himfelf, to fiiwn, to
cringe, to lye, to flatter^ he gets no Promo-

*^'tion. — So much for tlie unfucceiijful andpaltry
Attempt on Martinicov which, like that on
Quebec, in the Year 1711, has brought Dif-
grace on our Nation, and Rtiin on our Trade.

In Europe we fare no better j every Day ai*e

Advices brought, of Six, Eight, or Ten, of

^*our Merchants Ships being carried into the

diiTerent

( S9 )
ditFcrent Ports bf France, The French Mer-
chants firtding their Trade deflroyed, have Re-
courfe to fitting but Privateers j which if they
indreafe another Year with the fame Rapidity
they did the laft, there will be very little Pror
bability of any of our Ships getting fafe home
from our Colonies. Our Trade is now more
cxtenfive than ever, and our Merchant Vefiels
are more numerous than ever •, therefore the
more Diligent his Ma}$?fty*s Cruizers ought to
be, in clearing the Se^s of ^hofe Swarms of the
Enemy's Privateers, The French Merchants,
notwithftanxiing wc boaft of having ruined
them, will, if we allow the great Succefs of
their Privateering to continue, foon accumu-
late large Fortunes j while ours, of Courfe,
muft be reduced to Bankruptv':y. It would be
a vain Thing for the Englifii Merchants to
equip Privateers, becaufe the Enemies have
very little Trade, and Privateers are frldom
willing to Attack each other, fince it is the
very End of their Errand to Attack the defence-
lefs trading Veffels. It is in yourWifdom, that
we mull exped an Expedient to prevent this
Ruin of our Trade ; we rely on your known

H 2 Abilities,

•■«.«

m
it

''.■■('■

?K'

( 60)

Abilities, Pa»iotic Z&l, and Ihtcgrity, ibr
rirary good M^afurc that is conducive^ of
Advantage to both King und Pcopk. How-
jDvef, we catinot but demur at feeing our Men
of War, nailed as it were on the Coaft of
France, and the Enenrjy's Ships ^fcaping x)ut of
the River Villaine, where they have hctn
blocked up fourteen Months, at an Expence to
England of more than they are worth -, and
efcaping opt of Ilrcft and elfcwhere, with Fa-
cility. Had we taken the IHe of Belleifle,
the Enemy's Ships could not have efcapcd out
of their Weftern Ports •, and all the winter,
and difinal Horrors of a Bay Station, had been
removed •, our Men, and Ships of War, would
have found Refreihments and Security in it$
Harbour and Lee Shore.

Thefe are Fads which attract Public At-
tention. From the Opinion which we enter-
tain of your Wiflies, and unwearied Endea-
vours for th&Good of your Country, we at-
tribute thefe Caufes of general Complaint,
partly, to a Ncgleft in the executive Part of
your well laid Deftgnsj but principally, to the

malicious

( 6i )

tnalidous Machinations of a Party, who ale
envious of your Efteem among honeft Engli(b-
tnth, who hdvd left no Static unturned,' Ao
Step lintaken, nor no Meafurc unpurfocd,
however dangfcroi«, nay ruinous to their GoUn-
-tVy, to degrade the Man who is its great Sup-
port. ^'^^'^ "(^^^ ^'''■'''' ^-itiilU'r !^vlg^^>

iXU.;.Hnov. . y.,.,^ .,,„^, ,:u-u: iv .lyr^.^nt

'^^^^'^ . ^-Kn^ ^: >' yatirlfrfendaridAdnTirer

r^^dhA Mc.h.i?: .rH FIVE MILLIONS!

,. ■ ' ^■' ' ' ■ ■■ ■ ■ ■ •:tjf) ijfter-

■nil

117 '

' »')

IV.

>,! ;!

( 61 )

UJ!in i ibiv/ j^ruiTion^ tux

r»/^»

i3woH (i POSTSCRIPT,

.ilW.i-i.lvJ. ^l«iHiJ>S

^JtJyc"^ Few Minutes ago. Report brought
M ''A yC ^^^ difagreeable News to my Ear,
j5r_,_y«l that England had renewed her
p.'&£jmJK Treaty with PrufTia. Surely this
cannot be true. Is it poflible, that England
can be fo blind to her own Interefts, as to fup-
portthis German War, which Pi-ufTia and Auf.
tria have kindled up in the Empire ? What
Millions have we already fpent on this conti-
nential Service ! and are we to Spend more ?
Are we to exhauft our national Treafure, nay
impoverifh ourfelves, in fupporting a foreign
Prince to fight his own Battles ? Whofe Interefl:
is no way connefted with ours ; who owes us
no more Friendfhip, than while we pay him im-
fhenfe Sums i and who, in all probability, as
fobn as the prefent War is ended, will join in
League with France, our natural Enemy.

( 63 )
I will admit, that his joining with France
cannot afFeft England-, fmce the Dcfign of
fuch a Jun^ion would be only to deftroy the
Houfc of Auftria : but if it was his Intcrcft,
he would perhaps as foon join with any Power
againft England. His Condudl at the E ve of the
prefentGerman War, when the K — of EngJi! nd
was afraid of his entering Hanover, which oc-
cafioned his calling the. RulTians to its Relief,
is alone fufEcient to convince us of this. The
,undcrrhand Dealings of Tradefmen, are not
i^orc common than the Perfidy of Princes,

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»*vn

f?r»:^

If the pruflian Treaty is adhially renewed,
I think it argues fome radical Fault, in: the
Confultations on the Interefts of thefe King-
doms; fome pernicious Partiality of prpft;<:ui-
ing a Continental War, becaufe it is foi:.thc
Benefit of a few who hold lucrative Ppfe, .W"e
may very well aflure ov velves, that D

F , and the reft of the German Officers,

in the Allied Army, are not defirous of pra-
curing a Peace immediately j their Conduct
during the whole laft Campaign, is a ftriking
Proof of this ; It is th^ir Inteteft to pro-
trad

l. s f

Iff

II-.i:

tivft thie War, )»rc3uie they ans^tfil paid vwtlv^
Efigkifll Moaey. Nor would th« ^nifllMr M^ '
' nincti fcafc to nfhac IcRgth f?he Wir was ^on-A
timiedt Mrbsie ius Army ia {>ai<l ^7 tis, if he^
¥•9 iure. of not being cdmpetled tofight ipyr^
tl^manoevresof to Enefliicsj itfid ceitamiaf!
pzocuring Men to repWe thole flam in B«edoi><>

Upon tke ^refent Plan of carry iag on tl^
Wiir, .nothmg U more evident, -tiiafi that thr^
Bricifli Subjects are loaded wkh (ncorbitalit
Taxes, to prevent thofe^fFpuflla paying moifcs'
than their ordinary Revenues, as they are in
the tfane of Peace *, for it is well known, that
the Tpruflian^ Motia^h, has not, fmce the
brejdting Outof the prefent War, impofird one ,
new Taix on his Siitgcfts. s ^ fi. '

Rcijjeding the Interelts of thefe Kingdoms,
1 ha^e but one Thing more to mention •, that a
ftanding Army is, of all Things, one of the molt i
Prejudicial to them. Little need be faid on a
Subjeft fo Ofteh handled. In general Terms,
itisYuffitienf to obferve, thata ftandingArniy
isincbnMent with the nature of EngliTn Ser-t

.~,-i.

vices •,

( 6s)
vkes I had Wc no Connexion with the Conti#.
nertC, wc ftiould have very littleEmplOy for an
Arnoy, and probably one third of that Num*
bcr wc now mainuin, would be fuificient to
gtffifon all the neceflkry Places in the Bi^tifh
Dominions. But it will be aflcedj what muft
become of the other two Thirds, fince they
arc ;drcady raifed ? Allow them certain Pro-
portions of Land in North America, which
they may cultivate, and, with Induftry, accu-
mulate Fortunes. Some fuch Meafure ought
to be confidered, immcdifitely after figning the
nextP^ace.

Our Artceltof s, for many Generations, fafely
relied on what they called their two great Bul-
warks, the Navy and the Militia : Even during
the Wars between the Houfes of York and
Lancaiber^ the Party that prevailed dilbandcd
their Army as footi as the Aftion wa» over,
and fcorncd to feaire themfelves by a military
government. But now the Times are fo altered,
it is judged almoft an unfafe Meafure to put
Arms into the Hands'' of the People, left tlidy
Ihoiild thereby, bectfttfe enabled to affert their

1 rights,

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Mr
it-

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( SC)

rights, dilcover the corrupted Machines of the
. pafe ai)ci . unworthy ; check the Iiu'luencei or
perhaps feize the Tools of unlawful and arbi-
trary Power. If this is not the Cafe, whj'' is the
Militia for the County of ■' ". ■> ' not yet
raifed? , ,. ' ■'^-

. ,.- - ^

1 am aware of a private Objedion (which
by the bye is a great one) that will be made
to difbanding the grcateft Part of the Army :
JVbai JImII be done with all our Toung 'Nobility I
Many of them have not Fortunes to fupport
their Dignity, therefore it is necellary they
fliould have Pofts in the Army? Either put
them into I'Taval (in which I include the Ma-
rine) or jn,tQ Civil Employments.

1^,-,. As Great Britain is more Refpe61:able hi
confequence of her formidable Navy, than the
intrepidity of her Troops,- our naval Force

, can hardly be too frrcng. It were to be wiflied
that fo many King's Sliips were not put out
of Commifiion at the End of- a War, -as fre-

^ucutly are; for our continuing to be fonni-
dable on the Ocean, ^r. fuch a Check on the
.kii-. ■ Ambition

f.JT U.

•il

i]i\l]n

Artibltloii ' of^ our Enemies, that they "%ift
not hiailily prefume to break the Ties o£
Fri€>iidfliip-, in either attempting to difturb
our Trade, or Plantations ; when our natural
Strength is fo ready to reward their Treachery.

The Inhabitants of this Kingdom reap fome .
Advantage from a Flqet in Commifiion, which
they ;do not from a ftarjding Army. The
King's Ships are always paid at home -, there-
fore the Money is IHII among us ; and it is well
known that non.e are more ready-'to circulate
it,vthan tlxe Sailors: but an Army is frequently
paid abroad -, therefore the Money is exported
from us, to the great DetrimeiU. of cveiy Maji
in Trade.

It would be prefumptious in me to affert how
far the haval Strength of this Nation might, or
ought to be exerted : But it muft be obferved,
it is the only natural Strength which we have ;
and ought to be tiae principal Strength on which
we fhould rely. Hence arifes the important
Queftions, why this natural and principal
Strength has not been lately employed ? And

I 2 why

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( 68 )

^jrMiefiMdnths hive htth (Kffertfd wnfepfe,
WftlraTmoft the whole Royal Navy in Cdrtmif-
fibn arid nothing done ? WE^scini ta bii 4ink
iiitdi State of Lethargy, like thit 'tiit^56t
wh^n We |)emiittcd the French^ ^6 take Mi-
norca, and to make ConqdeH;s'in Anlcrica
agamft a fiiferior Force, - <^^v^> *; -> y.^^, ^

. -r-All attention, in fpite of common Senfe and

common Honel'v, is warped to the Affairs

K^ . <tf ^ Germany j Things which W rujnou^ and

ir foreign to this Nation^ , "When fofne little Ad*

«.. Vantage is gained in that Country (witnefs the

taking of the Town of Fritzjar) though hotr

I. ef half the Importance as, the taking a French

--. Frigate, the G azette, , in prd^r. to intoxi^tc us

a with the grand manoeuvre, gives ^?, a dull,

,',-r tedious, and unintereftinff 'Narrative of the

io, Mariph of the Ariny, oyer a hiindrpd hard

'- , ~ J^^ames, which JSritifli Ears never heard before,

which fwells the tmkno^n 4.4vantage to a Tranf-.

aft ion of great Importance •, as' for inftance,

-ta-j\j ♦* The Hereditary Prince cantoncd-te Corps
"7*" arZafchen> and receiving Advice that the

" Garrifon

./.^ .Qy\ kt- om%rtO ^d.' :■:

.It

H Auack, be vefit thkhcTy with ^kwB^Xf^-
lions, in Hppc? of being alplc to carjythJit
5^.. Place at once. He attacked if with great
ffViSpifit, byt the Enemy defending itjcfgH^te-
^h.^tj^ni taking all Advantages th^if Situation
*' afforded tbemy the Hereditary Prii^cc thPjLight
it advifeable to defift from the' Attempt.*"

brjj)

T'fD:

10, ever 'ctoubted their taking all Advan-

' tages ttieir Situation afforded them ? Did the

, Hereditary I*ririce ? To be fure, it is rieceflary

to tell the Mob, that the French, by taking all

" "Advantages (which they ought not to have

V dor\e) and which was dealing very unfairly

' 'with u^, held the little town of Fritzlar, and

baffled the Defign which the Hereditaiy' Prince

''j had formed a^alnft it. This Ai*t is tofcrefen a

^ badCaufe from a weak Mind, and encourage

Xhe Rabble ftill to adore Prince" F*— — , get

*r 3r.unk at the News of his Vl(5i:ory, and run mad

pa the ry Dicing Night. ^-^ ^^- '^♦'^^ irbr^v;

An Englifliman, who knows nothing of mi-
^T^iitaiy Affairs, Wduld take thefe German Genc-

fiHl T ft'l? '■' ■ ' . .. . ' , ■' ' ., ' .M ■ ■ I . .1 I,

i.j n

nothif.xy

• See the Gazette of Feb. 24.

rats

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'ft;

(70 )

V . : . . ^ . ^. ! . . •, ,^

ral$ to be lis ignorant as himfelf, when he
comes to the following Part of the fame Extra*

crdinary Gazette, ■ . • . ..^.^-..^^ ^,jj ^

" TheHereditaryPrince cantoned hisTroops
*' about Hademar, not far from.Fritzhr. Lieut.
*' Gen. Breidenbach took Pofleflion of a Ma-
" gazine of 40,000 Rations at Rofenthal, and'
" advanced towards Marpurg. The Attempt
" he made upon that Town did not iucce,tdy
" the Enemy being upon their Guard. He himfelf
" was even killtfd in the Attack "

m^. \

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It is not to be imagined that General Brejdea-
bach expedted to find the Enemy upon their
Guard ; no, he expected they would furrender
immediately on his Appearance before the
Town» He was fuch an experienced Officer,
that he could not apprehend the Enemy would be
upon their Guard while he was marching thro'
a Countiy which they poflefled. — ^Did he be-
Eeve they would open their Gates and ftrew
Fipwers in tl>e Roads where he marched? Un-
fortunately, on this little Town he made an
Tinfuccefsful Attack -, in which even he himfelf

was

( 71 )

was killed : But tlie Writer of the Gazette has
fomot to teUus even how many more are killed.

This extraordinc.ry Gazette has another a'/r^-
crdinary Paffage, the moft puzzling of. any 3
for it- furpaflcs all the Logic of Maubcrt>
The Bruffels Gazette Ihall no longer be famed
for falfe Reafoning and unintelligible Accounts;
Maubert fiiall no longer enjoy Pre-eminence in
the Temple of Dulnefs, Ignorance, and FaliV
hood. His Rival on the contrary Side of the
Water will totally eclipfe him in his Harveit of
Laurels. How fair this audacious Rival ftands
for pulling him down from all his Dignities,
take the follov/ing Scrap of his own Rhetoric^
and you will difcover without any Information.

" In the mean while, my Lord Granby
" made iomQ;X)ema}ijfrr4i(ms towards Gudcrf-

'' berg."

The Writer of the Gazette would x'erv

much oblige the Public, if he v/ould, in his
next Number, demoyifirGte what is the Meaning
of the Word Demo-nftrations \\\ this Senfe ; or,
if he cannot, whether he was of Opinion, or

wliethei-

iilf

1^:

^Sether he wis'irtibrmed, and tfionght it im-
prudencr td tea ie-itefby Length, that Lord
Granby had loft himfclf in the Woods ot
HeBfc, and iras therefore obliged' traJ^ijkw^iz/^
by the son and Jiars, m± i Quadrant, wher^
abbutshewas; w^ Z^z/Tttife^he'Win, ^5
4hd Ldnpiude % and-whar Diftanie Gudifdbcrg
i^^from him, Wefti, Ealt;»oiifc WSb^.'^

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