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MDCCXLVllI. ) ~> r t» jrfi^ k t 5 ] ^ THE STATE - - - O F T H E NATION. THERE are four capital Funds, which to- gether conflitute the Sum and Savings of the National Debt. Thefe are the South Sea, the General, the ^ggrc^ate, and the Sink- ing Fund, It is fufficient to fay here, that they all I ov/e their Origin to Debts- contraded previ- ^ ous to the Year 171 6. The three firlt have pe- culiar Duties appropriated to anfwer the Intered ow their refpedVive Capitals, with a Surplus; which Surplus, by a Claufe in the general Fund- A£l, is to be referved and employed to and for the dif- charging.the Principal and Inter eft ofjiich National Debts and Incumbrances as were incurred before the 2^th of DeccmhcY 171 6. and is now called the Sinking Fund, When the Intereft of Money was at Five per Cent, the Surplus does not appear to have been much above 400,000 L, but on lowering of the Interefl, on feveral of the publick Debts, to Four, and of fome to Three per Cent, it rofe confiderably ; and we find it, in 1738. ? 5^58,74 1 L. There is befides a confiderable Dif- ference in War-Time, in proportion to the Dc- A creafcc crcafce of Trade ; and in the Year 1744. we find the Accompt Hand thus. Surplus of the Aggregate Fund L, 568,096 Ditto of the General Ditto — 417,885 Ditto of the South-Sea Ditto 1 6,070 1,002,051 The Cambrick Duty, as being unappiopriated, likeways falls into this Fund, but, not being clear in the annual Amount, 1 have not added it, nor, as IS the Cale all along, given the Fradions. The Exchequer Accompr, for the above Year, m^es the Sinking Fund above 120,000 L. more; but that being by Ca(h brought from the preceeding Years, is here oipitted. The Inconae of this Fund feoms rather to have decreafed fince, and to barely complete the Million ; but as it is now Pcac« again, and as with more Taxes it is pre- fumed>ithe Surplufages will increafe, as alfo by the Return of Trade into its ordinary Channel ; foit is mere than poflible that we may fee this Fund foon above 2,000,000 L* , My Meaning for beginning at this Period is, becaufe all the above Funds were then regulated mid eltablifhed, when the National aud Navy Debt.ftood thus. rTlte -National Debt was L. 50,024,767 i'Thb'Navy Debt — — i,043»336 iif^"^ .-Total, Dec, 24. 1716, ••fi't;? ^-: ■■' .- 5 1, 068, 1 Q3 Thcvc we find ^8,096 1^17,885 1 6,070 02. 051 -> ^riated, g clear t, nor, s. The makes e; but ceding this and s now prq- fo by mnel ; :e this 3d is, ilated S^avy Z6 »0 t 5 ] There was between this Time and the entering on the laft War with Spain a Space of twenty four Years, during which Interval only A flighc Skirmilh happened between us and Spahp and the reft was a profound Peace, or, at leall^ what we efteemed lo, though often thrown into vio- lent Paniucks, which occafioned additional Ex- pence ; but that being made good by anincrcafce of Taxes, we had, or ought to have had, by the moft modeft Computation, at leaft one Million a Year paid ofT, as the Land-Tax at two Shillings in the Pound, and the Malt-Duty, anfwered all the common Emergencies of Government in Time of Peace, and the Sinking Fund lay wholly applicable to the difcharging of the National Debt, which, upon an Average, is at leaft one Million, two hundred and fifty thonfand Pounds. The Re- venues of the Civil Lift have always anfwered, whatever may have been pretended to the con- trary, and the Salt-Duty fometimes unappropriat- ed : It therefore might have been expeacd, that, with the lowering of Intereft, Aid of Inlalls, and the Sinking Fund, that our Debts, by the Year 1740. had been difchargtd. But itappearSj by the Parliamentary Accotiipts, that 'the National and Navy Debt, m 1740. were Forty /even MiU lions, tvjQ hundred forty five thoufiind^ four hundred aiidfeveyity one Tounds ; which, dedu(n;ed from tlic Debt of 1 71 6. produces only a Balance of T^^^ Millions, eight hundred twenty two thoufimi^ fix hundred and thirty two Tounds. And fome, who are very curious in thefe Matters, pretend to fay, that this flippofcd Redudion is mere LegerdemiJil ; f, ' I [ 6 ) but I do not ^hufe to puzzle the Reader with a Jtoo j^elicate Difquifition into an Accompt that is ititreilf introdudory to the main Point in View, wi which at lall muft (land as we find it. Here is fufficiently (hewn on what Footing we began the War with Spain, and are next to fee what lEflefts that produced relative to the publick Cre-^ dir.' The 3 1 ft of D^f ^wz/'f r 1743. then entering bn a War with both France and Spain, the Nati^ bnal Debt was Fifty one Million, forty three thoU'^ fand, three hundred forty fix Toundsy thus charged i ^ On the Exchequer ) India Company Bank South-Sea Company • L. 6,441,143 — 3,200,000 — 14,100,000 — 27,302,000 51,043,143; • ••]*-.• '' ♦ • - # ». I ' 1 'iffie'TJ'avy Debt, what allotted out of future ^uppKes in Difcharge of it, and what i(rued out 'of ihe Sinking Fund, to le(ren the National Debt, arb'here omitted, as they will appear in the do- ling' of the AGCompt. On the 31ft of December '1747. the National Debt appears to be Sixty four ^Millions, five hundred ninety three thoufand, feven hundred and ninety fix Tounds, thus charged ; — L. 5,305)193 4,200,000 .. Oil the F^xchcnuer * ' - Ifklld Carried over 9,505,193 ^ «.fc «•* I i •H " • r with 9. )t that is n View, Here e began :e what ick Cre-^ entering le Nati- ve thouy hargedi 141. H3 :oo,ooo 00,000 02,000 43,143 future led out ll Debt, the do- ecember 302,jro3 South-Sea — — Navy Debt ^4»593»79^ 5»337,939 ^9i93i.73:? There is to be added to this Debt, Annuities on the two Lottery Subfcriptions of 1745 and 1746. the firft of nine Shillings a Ticket, amount- ing to 22,500 L. a Year on finglc Lives; the Oj* ther of eighteen Shillings a Ticket, amounting t ealily come at. I think it is agreed, that the > Charges 931,73/ 500,000 ^3o,ooo 5 Navy fidencc, cannot myfelf perhaps ; a Pro- 3 draw, Troops I as dif. le great ndNa- ftands, ion has " might a War. L9 1 ■ Charges of tlie State iu lime ofPcucc, cxclufive 9f what is called the Civil Government, is f 1,840,000 I J. thcrefoie all that has been giaiitcd f above that Sum, and not made g(;od out of the Supplies, is ib much to be charged to the AccompC 6f the War, and is as follows: ! To eipht Years Land Tax, 7 f >- ^ " • ,1 D 1 ( J^' 16,000,000 at 4 J", in the Pound 5 ' ' To ditto Malt • — Out of tiic Sinking Fund To eiglit Years Expencc in Time of Peace 6,000,000 7,800,000 29,800,000 \ 14,720,000 r - <- Remains i5,o8o,oock Debt contradled «/y/v'/>rfl — 30,616,2^4^ J Expcnce of the War 45,696,264 This is exclufivc of the Debtj real or fuppofiti- tious, contracted by the ('ivil Lift. The four Years War with Spaitt, I fuppofe, might colt us twej^e Millions, and the Relidue is to be charged to the four Years general War, at 8,424,066 L. a Year'''^; which added to the current Charge in Time of Peace, 1,840,000 L, makes 10,264,066 L. fome- thing near the total Charge. Independent of the faid current Charge in 1 laie ol Peace, and vaii- . B ous *. The Million grantrJ hy the Sixp-'nny Afl on PcnHons. ^' have not brought to Accompt, as not b^ing clear how to place ili". [ 10 ] ons other incidental Expenccs, mentioned in the Eftimates annexed, or artfully fecreted, is feen in the following Articles : To our own Guards and Gari- fons, ^c. more than in Peace . To 15,196 Men, Officers, ^r. for Flanders To 5,000 Horfe, and 13,000 Foot, Hanoverians To 1,264 Horfe, and 4,908 Foot, Heffian Troops. To enable the Queen of Hun- gary to maintain (ixty thou- fand Men in Flanders, To the King of Sardinia — • - To the Eledor of Bavaria To the Elector of Cologjt — To the Eledor of Mentz L, 300,000 372,788 410,000 161,607 433,333 300,000 26,846 24,299 8,620 To 1 1,550 Marines 2,037,493 — 206,253 To Ordinance Stores by Land and Sea 58^,2 1 3 To the Navy and Tranfports, 7 more than in Peace, about 5 2,000,000 I » ■' 4)^24,959 The reft is made out by Deficiencies, Intercfl, Premiums, or. as may be fccn more particularly in the annexed Eitimates, with the refpcdivc Charges for the Year 1747. The above are on- ly fo placed, to mark out what it is that more re- markably g cl in the is feen in •: , 300,000 372,788 ^10,000 ^33,333 100,000 26,846 24,299 0,620 37,493 06,253 84,213 00,000 ■■■' • I ■* •4,959 itercjf!-, :ularly edlivc re 011- re re- kabJy j ■; [Ml markably brings fo heavy a Burden upon us by a War, and to (hew the Reader, that the Money given for Subfidies, the Land Tax at two Shil- lings in tlie Pound, and Produce of the Sinking Fund, would have been fufhcicnt to have carried on a fuccefsful Naval War, and not perhaps dimi- nifhcd the National Calh a Halfpenny, as but a fmall Part of our Naval Expences go out of this Kingdom, and them amply made up by Captures. I apprehend the Reader has by this Time pretty well fatisfied his Curiofjty as to the Magnitude of our Debt, and of the Particulars which compofe it, and will probably conclude with me, that it is not likely to fall fhort of eighty Millions; and how that is to be fatisfied commands our next At- tention : For, (ince Matters have been carried fo far as not to be recalled, I think it my Duty, be- fore I enter on a general Courfc of Reafoning, to give fome Hints towards the preferving us from a Bankrupcy, and, if poflible, to carry us back to the Point we firlt fet out at. It was made an Argument for the Deficiency of the Civil Lift, that we had lefs Trade in War than in Peace ; but as this will anfwer alilce as to the Sinking Fund, it may be honeftly concluded, that both will grow richer by the Peace ; and it is to be hoped that fo good a Peace is made, as will be likely to continue many Years : And it is like- ways reafonably to be hoped, that as his Majefty's Revenue is vaftly larger than his Predeceflbrs, and has it made up to him when deficient, he will be gracioufly plcalcd to difclaim all Surplulagcs,, s^nd makq llich a Part of the Fund for the Payment ,f / • of the publick Debts ; and that his extra-Reve* nucs, Inch as Principalities, Fines, Seizures, Sales, Lcafes, i^'c, 6*c. may be brought into t)ie general Accompt, and this to be applied in Aid of, and to pay off all Incumbrances on the Sinking Fund, which, I take it, will bring that up to two Millions a Year clear; which, with the Affiftance of an annual Lottery, w ill enable the Parliament, in the firft Place, to bring down the Four per Cents to Three ; and which to ef!ed more ealily, there needs only an Ad to reduce the National Intereft to Foqr per Cent, by which Means the other will fall of Courfe, if Money be ready to difcharge the richer Stockholders, and thereby Gende- mcn, who have incumbred Eftates, will be en- abled the better to pay their Taxes. 1 mufl here obferve, that the natural Produce of the SiFik- ing Fund, in Peace, is One MiUion fix hundred thoufand Tounds, The Average jfirft hinted at, of One Million two hundred and fifty thoufand Toitnds^ fiippoies a Deficiency by the War, and Inrercft to be paid of Debts charged upon it. The Civil Lift is laid to have been deficient the latl fevcit Years, ending at Midjianmer 1746. Four hundred ffty fix thoufand feven hundred and thirtj three Tounds ; belldcs the odd Money omitted, as in all my Calculations, which muft primarily be dif^- charged, as well as the Debts on the Sinking Fund. But perhaps it may be thought molt eli- gible to throw the Civil Liil Debts into the Siy^ Million nine hundred and thirty thoufand Tounds^ and, adding thereto what is expended on the Vote oi Caniidci-ce of la(l Sellions, make them inro^ Four \ tra-Reve* res, Sales, e general 1 of, and ig Fund, Millions :c of an ^t, in the Cents to there Interefl her will i /charge Gentle- be en- >Tft here e Sink- hundred ^iar, of "Pounds^ ntcrcfir e Civil tmdred three i in all )e dif^ nking >lt eli^ e Si^ ounds^ Vote I Four />fr Cent, Annuities. The Suih total ma^ Chen be, '^\' -* r""'-''^--^ ;-.'Jx-/ V, r-n .'./,5 -. i^* ' ^~in l\\ i/i// 'd'. ':m On Five per Cent, on dry Goods L. 6,930,000 Civil Lift Debt Mtdjmmner 1746. 456,733 On the Vote of GonfideiKe ' '5oo,oo<^ ■^.i".- , . 7.886,733 What Dcficiences there are in the Civil Lift fince, or what will be brought in as expended on the Cirdit of the Vote of Confidence, noc yctap-. pcaring, is the Reafon of my having leit thofe Sums out of the general Accompt above. The Debts charged on' the linking Fund, as may be in the Ultimate, are, ^t 3 L\ 10 s. per Cent, 1731. Ac Ditto 1736. *— - At Three /»^r Cf«/. 1738, At Ditto 1742. — K.' • • ■» X. 400,000 — ' "-600,000 — 300,000 — .800,000 •^ '-'^ . . — ,^, , 2,190,000 siii'i One Million at Three and One Half per Cent^ and eleven hundred thoufand Pounds at Tliree per Cent, the Inrercfl: w-hereof i^ Sixty eight thou-' J and Toitnds^ feems to be the whole annual Charge on that Fund ; and asthat Fund produced, bef6re the War, One Miilion fix hundred fifty eight thou- fand feven hundred and forty one 'bounds, and the C^rvil Lift above 200,000 L, more than it was given for ; and as there will ddubtlels be a large Surplufage 1 * •/ [ 14 ] Surplufage to the Sinking Fund, if the Five per Cent, on dry Goods continues, it is evident that the Whole will not fall much Ihort of two Mil- lions clear annual Revenue. And whether this be applied to the annihilating of the Four per Cents f or the reducing them to Three, the Dif- ference is only : Suppofe the total Debt, De- 7 r o cemkri74S. — — J i- 80,000,000 The Fow per Cents f includ-^ .,-. ing 6,930,000 L. raifed laft > 47j^i 9)003 ► Year — - — ^ 2' Kemauis o Annuities for long Terms on Lives by Survivorfhip, and on two or three Lives 32,380,997 2,045,823 \v At 3 L. 10 /. per Cent. — ..,_ Total Three /^r Cf/;// 30,335,^74 1,000,000 29>335»i74 The reducing of 47,619,003 L. to Three per Cent, is a Saving ^ 476,000 of -— . .— Of one Million from 3 L. i o J. to Three per Cent, is a Saving ^ 5,000 i^> of — r, .> Carried ov^r 48 1,000 Five per lent that wo Mil- cher this our per the Dif. OOOjOOO Si 9,003 j8o,997 )45,823 >oo,ooo 35,174 76,000 . -v "\ Brought over ^ To Lives falling in yearly 481,000 2,000 483,000 hjOOO This Sum carried to the Sinking Fund, to which it muft naturally belong, can only be appropriated to the paying off of new Debts ; for if the Creditors of the old Debts confent to a Rcdudion of their Intereft, they will not think it right to be firfl: difcharged ; but this is imma* terial to the main Point, the difcharging of the National Incumbrances. For though the Re* dudlion of the whole to Three per Cent, would bring the Intereft down near to what it was before the War, yet as, upon no Emergency, it could be reduced lower, and, if another War happens, it would caufe a terrible Fall upon the Creditors Capital, which is very eflential to thofe that want to fell out ; fo upon this Redudion the Debt would be virtually the fame as before, as the raid- ing Money afterwards on a higher Intereft, the old Creditors muft have the fame Benefit, or it will appear to he only another Way of annihi- lating their Capital without any Advantage to the Community, though an utter Difgrace to publick Credit. It follows that there is an abfolute Neceflity of paying off as well as lower- ing the Intereft, and that the laft will materially contribate to eiledt the firft. The next Means is by not parting with any of the appropriated : ■" ' Duties, / . Puticsi until fucji a Fund is eftablifhed as may, if\ a few Years, pay ofTall the new contracted Debts, or lay others lefs burden fom in Lieu of them, which, I think, may be eafily cf!eded. And if by that Means the Sinking Fund fhall produce two Millic^ns from the refpedive Sur- plufages the firlt Year, the Payment will be Iboner made than our Calculators generally dream, of, as it will leflen the Debt all that Intereft, and ^t the fame Time incrcafe the capital Fund. The Criticks in this Kind of Writing mufl not be too wife in obferving, that I am here making the Sinking Fund general, which was only origi-, nally intended to pay off the old Debts previous to the Year 171 6. becaufe it is obvious to me, that if we, out of it, firft pay off the new Debts, the old will be fecured in Proportion, while nei* then, as Matters ftand, can be reafonably thought fefe. But if, in a few Years, one Half of the pu- blick Debt can be difcharged, the Remainder will not only be fecure, but, if higher Interefl is given on any future Emergencies, the publick Credi- tors may be affured of having theirs equally raifed; which is not poffible to be effected in the prefent Situation of Things* In Truth there is a certain Point, beyond which there is no moving. Eighty Millions Teem to be near our Ne plus tiltra^ and the going a Step farther endangers a general Bankrupcy j therefore the highelr Prudence to get fome Part of our Debts early difcharged, left it becomes our laft Refuge to throw the whole nito the Hands of the Crown, and Parliaments thence totally ufelefs. Every Age and'Time has evin- ced, \ 15 .1' as may^ Lieu of ef3[e6leci* nd (hall :ive Sur- will be y dream. eft, and id. The not be king the y origi-, previous to me, i^ Debts, lile nei- tiiought the pu- der will is given Credi- ^ raifed;- prefent I certain Eighty ra, and general ?nGe to :1, left it :>\q into thence IS evin- ced| I 1 T t7 1 ced, that however juft and wife the Governors of any State or Nation may be» the People can never be efteemed happy and (ecurc, unlefs the Revenues that fupport the Government are well ordered and regulated* There is truly no Medi- um in this Branch of governing. The Art is, ai perfect Knowledge of what the Community can conveniently aftcjrd to raife, and in the leaft bur- denfom Way, and never to go beyond fiich Bound, but in Cafes of Self-Defence ; all clfe IS laying a Foundation for Gonfufion, and finally terminating in the Ruin of the Prince, or in the cnllaving of the People. - - , • It is no unpleafing Profpedt of our own fu- ture Happinefs, to fee that fuch Nations, with whom we have been hitherto allied, and whom we have, under all Engagements, fupportcd with our Wealth, are now forming Plans for their own future Prefervalion, without burdening their Friends. This is an honeft Scheme, and would have been a very happy one for us, if it had taken Place ten Years before ; we had not then, perhaps, as now, been driven to our laft Stake, and thrown into a Situation meriting Pity. The above Calculations fliew us the Con- dition we are in as to our Debts, and give feme Hints of the Poflibility of retrieving our Affairs ; but as, before that can be done, fcveral Particulars in publick Condud muft neceflarily be amended, it is proper to make them our firft Conlkieration, as they are the Bafis whereon the whole Structure is eredted. Nor can the State of the Nation be clearly underftood, until we are thoroughly conver- ,/- C fant ■/ [ i8 1 fant in the Nature and Operation of our Debts and Taxes. Our Civil Lijiy which was former- ly in the Gift of the Parliament, is now abfolute- ly veiled in the Crown, and the feveral Duties that fupport it irredeemable, with this Difadvan- tage annexed, that the Publick are obliged to make good any Deficiencies, without Authority to inquire whence fuch Deficiencies fpring, whe- ther from a Failure in the appropriated Duties, or from thofe who attend on the Revenue under his Majefty not being duly paid ; from whence it feems that we re as liable to make good what Minifters fquandtr, or fuffer to be fquandered a- .way, as any real Defe(^s in the Duties ; but arc to have no Benefit by Savings, which indeed fig- nifies little, where it is determined that none fhall be made. But the worft of all is, that fuppofe the Duties fuflicient, yet if they do not come in to a Day, whether kept back by Art, or the Nature and Neceffity of the Manner of receiving them, they are called Deficiencies, though they come in afterwards ; which appeared fo flagrant on the lait grand Inquiry, that it has been thought proper, by the Court Advocates, not to enter again into the Argument, which brought more to Light than the 1 1 5,000 L. got by it. The Keafon I am more particular in this is, that it ap- pears evident we (hall never know what we are about, until every Branch of the publick Revenue is fo afcertained, as that a formal Judgment may be made of what Taxes ought to be annually railed, and how particularly applied, in lelTening the publick Debt in Time, of Peace, or of pre- ::r r '' "^ - - venting our Debts as former- 1 abfolute- ^al Duties Difadvan- Dbliged to Authority ing, whc- Duties, or under his whence it ood what uidered a- ; but are ideed fig- none (hall t fuppofe come in , or the receiving Ligh they flagrant a thought to enter ^ht more it. The at it ap- t we are Revenue ent may annually lelTening of pre- venting I venting its growing enormous in Time of War ; for on exac^tly the fame Principle we ac> by, in relation to the Civil Lili, lecms to be the wild Guide in all the rell of our Expences. Our Elti- mates have always Deficiencies at the Tail ; and when we are told that fo much will anfwer the Service of the current Year, the contrary ever ap- pears ; and the Supplies of the one are ufually more to make good the Deficiencies of another, than to anfwer the Purpofe of the current Service; which is running into Debt hoodwinked, and a Species of Chicane contrived to cover a Kind of Management our Circumftances are not in a Con- dition to bear. It indeed, by blinding their Eyes, fatisfies the publick for the prefent, but, in the Event, opens them too much for the Tran- quillity of thofe who govern ; in this Track we have gone ever fince the Revolution, with fome remarkable Improvements during the kit three or four and thirty Years, whether it has been Peace or War. In the Navy Part, the EUimate has been during the War regularly two Millions, the Expence above three Millions ; one Million has been fome Years paid out of the future Sup- plies, and yet the Navy Debt gone on increafing. The Error of this is plain, as the Effect is evident, that we were defirous of carrying on the War, without being able, or willing, to fee the Coiv fequence, until too late to remedy it. The Ar- my-Eftimates have been all formed on the fame ftditious Plan, and fo every other Branch of Ex- pence ; when, if Peace had been really the mini- iterial View, as has feemcd fo ardently pretended; - ^ fuielv / ^ [ 20 1 furcly the Way to have had the Opinibn 6f the People with them, was to l.avc let them known the worit of a War ; and ifthc ncceflury Supports coukl not be raileil within the current Year, they might calily liavc been advifed not to have mort-* gaged their Eltares, for a Purpofe that in no Seiile concerned them. Here Prudence calls up* on every Man to uiideriland the Force of this Ar- gument, as their tliates or Induflry are bound to make good whatever Debt their Superiors think proper to create; and therefore this Kind of Working, from the Civil Lilt di^wnwards^ merits a fpeedy Remedy ; for I lee no Rcaibn why the worft cannot as well be known at firit as at lafl ; our Debts fo ftated, and our Taxes (o adjufted, as that fomc Judgment may be made by all Man*» kind indifferently, how far ir is eligible to enter into a War, and on what Footing the publick Accompts fland in Time of Peace, Bqt, on the contrary of this, we have been treated like Chil* ,dren, and foothcd on from Error to Error, un-^ til we are at hi\ brought to the^rink of DeftruC" tion, aiul from which only a thorough Change in publick Mcafurcs can poffibly retrieve us. ..Future Ages will hardly credit what Expencca "we have been at in this War, when, on feeing the annufil Ellimatcs, they only find fo many Sea and fo many Land Forces direfted to be employ^ cd at fuch a Computation as appears ; they wiU with DiiHculty conceive how the Parliament could millake above a Million in one Article.; and that while the)' allotted forty thoufand Seamen, above fixty thoufand muft have been employed. I :)n 6f the I known Supports ear, they ve more* at in no calls up^ ' this Ar- e bound Superiors Kind of s» merits why the s at lad ; adjufted, all Man** to enter publick , on the ke ChlU Tor, nn^ DeilruC" Change us. -xpencca n feeing lany Sea employ-p ley wiH rliamcnt Article.; beamcu, iploycd. But this will be ftill more furprifing when Hiftory (hall relate, that we had, in cflcd^, no Enemy to contend with ; and that though we employed fo many Men, we could never afford a proper Con- voy for our Wcji'lndia Trade, when we had no- thing near fo material to attend to. Nor will ic feem lefs extraordinary, that we maintained, on on our Bottom, independent of the Dutch^ Ninety nine tboufand three hundred and Jixty eight Land Forces in Flanders^ only to (ee the French over- run the Country, with twice the annual Charge for Ordinance-Stores as in the Navy, though we had no Cannon but what the Army carried about with them ; fince an annual Sum of 284,000 L. could hardly have been prcfumed to an Allot- ment of our own proper Troops of 15,196 Men, and without any Garrifons or Sieges, the Artillery for the hired Troops being charged feparately. How much lefs will any Body hereafter be in- duced to imagine that there is no Millake in aH this, or that fuch ftrange under and over Charges appear in diiierent Articles, purely to perplex and render unintelligible the general State of the Nati- onal Accomprs, and feemingly calculated for a Purpole one would not chufe to mention? But this, as well as the Nature and Situation of our Affairs, evidences the Neceffity of our falling in- to fo iTve clear and regular Method of eftablilhing our Taxes, fixing and appropriating our Funds;, and, on one well concerted Plan, making fuch Ap^ propriations abiblute and unalterable. This will, at the fame Time, give the Nation fuch right Cre- dit, and keep the Price of the Stocks fo even in War i. War as well as in Peace, as will make it indif?ereni to Thoufands what Intereft they are paid. A Par- cel of Stock will then negotiate like a Bank- Bill, as Notes or Bonds for the fame might be deliver- ed out in the like Manner ; arh' will anfwcr the Purpofe of the trading World, at f wo per Cent. better than now fubjedl to Stockjobbing at Four per Cent, On the contrary, if we cotitinue that Courfe of Chicane we (et out with in 1716. the Credit of the Nation will be eternally unliable ; and on every Emergency of State the moneyed Men will, as hitherto they have always done, make a Property of the common Neceflity. And, for my Part, I cannot fee how his Majeliy can be offended, if, in a general Rectification of our Af- fairs, a certain, inllead of an uncertain Sum be allotted for the Support of the Civil Government. This would help to bring us back to a fimilar State to that we were in at the firft coming of his late Majcfty to the Throne, when the f our great Funds were ellablifhed, and a fair Scheme formed for difcharging the jpublick Debts ; but by being managed and played Tricks with, as all our Accompts have fince been, is now only to be re-^ covered by a new Plan more certain and perma^ nent ; without which I am apprehenfive we fliall be like a confumptive Man, kept alive by Art, which muft fail us at lad ; or be undone at once by fome violent Operation: And of one of thelc a few Years will give us a too fatal and convin-* cing Proof This brings us to confider what we have beea doing, to what End or Purpofe, or how we came tQ idif?ereni . APar- 3ank-BiII, c dclivcr- fwcr the per Cent, at Four inue that 716. the jnftable ; Tioncycd ^s done, :y. And, y can be our Af» Sum be ?rnment. a fjmilar >ming of he f our Scheme ; but by s all our :o be re* perma^ we fliall by Art, at once of theie convin-* ve been e came tQ i I t 23 I to be reauced to our prefcnt melancholy State. •The Reader therefore will pleafe to rccollcdl, that •we entred into a War with Spairty on a Suppofi- tion that tiie Merchants defired it, in order to re- drefs the Grievances they fuffered from that Crown, by the Capture of their Ships not con- cerned in an illicit Trade on the main Continent of America ; but the Difpute on this Head fomc- tinic»s blending the illicit with the non-illicit Tra- ders, and this blending again with a Controverfy b' 'tween the South-Sea Company and the fame Crown, they together produced a new Scheme of Negotiation called a Convention ; in the conduct- ing whereof both Sides thinking, or feemingly thinking themfelves equally in the right, and both ti lead equally obftinate, the Court of France took the Advantage, and knowing chat they (hould find their Account in fetting us together by the Ears, foon blew the glowing Embers into a Flame at the Court of Spain, On the Part of Great-Bri- tain, our own Patriots, as has fmce been proved, having more in View the raifing of themlelves by the Fall of the then reigning Minifter, than At- tention to the publick Welfare, acled the fame Part here, at the Court of Britain, as the Agents of France did at the Court of Spain ; and toge- ther engaged us both in a War, which the Patri- ots promifcd to fupporc here, and the Crown of France to come into on the Behalf of Spain, if we Ihould prove too hard for that Crown. The reign- ing Miniftcr here was in effet^l at laft forced to con- cur ; for, having been notorioully lavilh both of the publick Money and of his own, he had not where- T 24 1 fupporthim, ..-wherewith to purchafe being overpowered by the Patriots, a War enfu» cd. But as he flill kept his Poft, and was to con-* dud the War, he only took Care that it fhould not want Expence ; but was very far from fore- warding of it, as plainly perceiving at once tlic Defigns of France, and the Views of the Patriots. Thefelaft Gentlemen finding that they could not thus efle<^ their Defigns, formed a Scheme that had a very noble Profped for its Bafis, and, if at- tended with Succefs, would ciiedually have an- swered the End propofed ; that is, the making of the War general, and ruining the Minifter ; and thereupon engaged Admiral Verffcn in an Expedi- tion that proved extremely happy for their Scheme, and fully anfwered the Intention of it on one Part: And Spain on the other began now to demand the AfHftance of France, which, at length, afrer various Shifdngs, and with great Rehidlance, was forced into a Concurrence. During the Interval, our Ex- pence increafed with but little Emolument; and, on theMinJfter*s quitting his Power,Peace was thought on no more. If a War had been in any Senfe jieceflary, it is very true, the GcnHemen who fucceeded, not only condudled it with Spirit, but formed very fair Schemes to have reiidred it fuccelsful. But they neither confidercd how the Nation wa- able to go through with ir, nor how to fecure themfelves in the PoirtrlTion of Power which they had with fo much Labour attained to. The old Minifter's Friends got Ground of them daily, partly owing to their Power in Par- liament, and partly to the Neglc^^thefe new Mi- niilers him,' and ^ar enfu^- s to con^ it fhould Dm forc- pnce tlic Patriots, ould not Mne that id, if at- lave an- aking of XT; and Expedi- Scheme, nePart: )and the " various s forced our Ex- and, on thought ly Senfe n who irit, but dred it ow the or how Power iftained fund of in Par- jw Mi- nivers V; toilers dMcovered for their old Friends ; as weJi as for thole tl i late Winifter had left behind on his Party, and fo made both equally their fcne-^ mies. However, the War was eftabjifhed, and the Opinion of their Mailer fixed, that it ought to be continuedj and to pleaie him was conti- nued, though the Fautors of it loon gave Placd to another Set of Men, who in no Senfe approved it, and who conduced it in fuch a Manner, thai it is extremely hard to fay, what would have bceri the Event, if their PredeeelFors had continued iii Power long enough to have brought it to a Con- dufion. Men differ in their Opinions greatly^ but as few arc unbiafTed, I (hall here let that Part of the Argument drop; tlow it has fince beeii conduded, and how ended, is now to be (hewn; It may be remembered, when the War was proclaimed vyith France^ that the Briiip) and Hmoverian Troops were marched out of Ger- many into the Low Countries^ and wei*e put under the Command of Marlhal Wade j that they Were! there joined by the Auftrians under the Dlike i* Ar ember g: This brought the War nearer Horne^ and pulhed the Dutch^ wavering before^ into a Kind of Neceffity of joining fome Troops with thofe of the Confederates, and together much too ftrong for the French in the Fieki The prcfenic Miniftry were then approaching gradually td- ^vards that Power they foon after attained ; and it is fuppofed had then enough to prevent their Ad- Verfaries acquiring any Gloryj or making the French feel the Erfeds of their Superiority, tho* the Khig of Sardinia was then firmly engaged, D and r 2<5 1- . .. and the King of Trujfia on the Point of joining in the Alliance, which would naturally have fol- lowed, if a ftrong Pulh had been then permitted to have been made, and the Houfe of Aufirta been indemnified in the hoij Countries for what it had ceded in Germany^ which feems to have been the View of the Parties interefted. But this Plan was efledlually baffled by the Ina(5Hvity of the Allies, and, as was expccfted, vanifhed into Air, on the French having Time given them to bring a fuperior Army into the Field ; fo that by this Step only we loft the Aid of Trufta ; and inftead of ading oflenfively for the future, with the Change of the Miniftry, the Tables were turned upon us ; and v/e had the Misfortune to fee ourfelves unable to keep our own Ground, and the Enemy taking Town after Town without Interruption. The whole Face of A flairs thus changing on the Continent^ it would have been well that wc could have bad an immediate Peace ; but though the Scene was quite changed, and no Hopes ot Succcfs, yet, as the new Miniftry came in on the Promife of continuing the War, con- tinued it muft now be under all Difad vantages. This naturally turned our Eyes another Way ; we had fome Hopes of better Succcfs in Italy, but more in the Superiority of our Navy. The firft anfwered better than could have been well expec- ted, the laft much worfe than we conceived could poffibly have happened. In a Word, the Allies drove the Enemy out oi Italy, and polTeiTed them- felves of Genoa, but our Fleet, it is well known, did nothing more than keep the Sea ; and the Enemy fe-- s * joining lave foU )ermitted ' ^uftria or what to have But this Hvity of led into them to ) that by ffia; and are, with »les were >rtune to und, and without airs thus ave been te Peace ; I, and no iry came ^ar, con* vantages. Vay; we Itafy, but The firfl dl expec- ted could he Allies bd them- I known, and the Enemy [ ^7 ] Enemy the next Campaign, in fome Meafure re- covering their Ground again by a (Irange Negli- gence of our Allies at Genoa and elfe where, and at the fame Time gaining upon us in the Law^ Countries^ the Miniftry had doubdefs very warm Reflections to encounter with, how to get out of this odd condudled War with any Appearance of Addrefs. They had nothing left but to fpirit up the Navy, before almofl dormant, and to fuffer the ylmericans to profecute a Scheme which will be to their eteinal Honour. They propofed, and, under various Difcouragements, effedlcd the Con- queft of Cape Breton ; and hcv much farther they were willing to go, and would have gone, if they had been fuitably aided and permitted, re- gards a future Confideration. The Miniftry had now got fomething in Hand to make ^eace with ; and it only remained to ad as vig(^roufly as poi- fible by Sea, to counterbalance the Enemy's Ac- quifitions in the Low Countries ; but yet not to do too much, left the People o{ Ettgland ihouX^ take it into their Heads, that they had more in their Hands than an Equivalent for the Enemy's Acqui- fitions, and fo prevent the defired Peace, by in- fifting on the retaining of Cape Breton, Thus for the future the War went on, as it were. Hand in Hand ; and the French lofing as much by the Interruption of their Trade, as they got by their Conquefts, it remained only to fee who could hold, out longeft, or, in other Words, which had the moft Money to fpend. The French plainly faw the Difadvantage of this Way of going on } Ijut the En^lijh had difiereut Thoughts of the xMat- ter. [ a8 1 ter, and were not yet run out enough to make them think Cape Breton a proper Equivalent for a Peace ; they rather hoped to have been poffefled QfCurtada^ and to have excluded the French for ^ver out of North America ; and were foothed by the Miniitry with Hopes of being fliccefsful, when, In Fa(i, nothing like it was ever intended. How- ever, a Fleet was fitted out feemingly for that furpofe, whicli, after loitering in our own Ports for fome Time, was fent upon an Expedition as (i'uitlefs as ill conduifted. It was plainly never in^ tended to fucceed, whether we cpnfider the Per- ifon appointed to command it, or the Seafon of the Year. The Seafon proved kind beyond Ex-s peftation, fo tha|: it unluckily fell to the Com-» inander's Share to carefully do nothing ; which Part he ei^ecuted with a Judgment and Addreft, "V^ilich, i think, nothing but particular Orders ^ould have infpired him vvith. The taking of ^ort VOrient v^^ould have been almoft as bad as the Conqueft of Canada^ and either put a Remora to the Peace in En^brip, nqt eafily removed. It flill remained a Difficulty how to bring it about, becaufe there was a Perfon of fome Confequence, "Vvho had the War at Heart, to bring in to their Meafurcs as well as the People ; and their very Exigence as a Miniitry depended on their not difc obliging, or putting too great a Force on that Perfbn's Inclinations, any more than on thofe of the People ; both were to be managed on fimilar Piinciples, therefore a Scheme was formed to lighten them both out of the War; nnd this fiicl^ a Scheme as Machmvel or Richlkit^ I con-r cpive, i to make lent for a pofleffed rench for othed by il, when^ i. How- for that vn Ports dition a$ never in^ the Per- teafon of ond Ex^ le Com-? ; which Addrefs, Orders aking of s bad as i Remora vred. It t about, icjLience, to their [ 29 ]' <^ivc, would never have dreamed of: This was, to nui the Nation fo deeply in Debt, as that they ihould not be able to raile the ncccflary Supplies ; concluding very rightly, that when the People had no more Money to fpend, they would eafily con- ffcnt to a Peace, on any Terms that had a Ipecious Appearance : And that however warm a particu- lar Perfon might be on the other Side of the Qiie- llion, he mult be fatisiied when the current Sup- plies could not be raifed. Within this Circle lay Another Scheme, and as finely fpun as the former, and equally conducive to the main End. This was the concerting of the Whole with thofe we feemed to be engaged againft ; and with their Aid giving the Dutch a new Governor, which pica- fing Circumftance alone, in the Eye of fome JPeo- pie, balanced all our Expences ; and when we had gained that Point, and feemingly no more Money to fpend, all muft be pleafed with a. Peace, without fo much as once recollecting with what Ardour the keeping of Cape Breton was not long before efpoufcd. It was a Matter of fome Curiofity to obferve how whimfically this Notion of wanting Money for the current Sup- plies was contrived to be taken for granted, and univcrfally credited, though not one Title of Truth in it. In a Word, Subfcriptions were dif- pofcd to thofe in general, who were rather in a Condition to borrow than lend ; and becaufe they could not make out their Engagements, it was fairly concluded, and as generally believed, that there was not Money enough in the Nation to do it with. TJ^^'JS, by a Courle of Politicks fuperior- to ( to any preceeding Ages were ever acquainted with, was a War carried on, and a Peace con» eluded ; every Part thereof in Contradidion to the Judgment of all Ranks and Degrees of People ; managed on the Opinion of one or very few ad* bering, and yet at lall fo happily fuccefsful, as to be compleated to the Satisfadtion of all ; at only the poor Expence of little lefs than fifty Millions Stfrling, and on Terms fo advantgeous, as can only ^ fhewn by carefully confidering them as they now come in due Order before us. f In order to enquire properly into the Recfli* tude of the prefent Peace, we muft confider ge* nerally, as well as particularly, on what Princi- ples the Welfare of Nations are founded ; as thereby only we fhall be able to form a fair Judgment, how far our publick Condudl has merited Approbation. The Inter eits of a State or Community, like thofe of private Perfons, are fubjed to great Variety of Opinions ; but there is a certain Bafis, whereon, I think, it is univer- ially agreed that the Interefls of a Nation are conllruded. This is what fome call Reputation, ibme Honour ; they both mean the fame Thing, £ind therefore alike anfwer the great End of Go-^ vernment, which is to make the Sovereign re- vered, and the People refpedled. Venice^ which heretofore the mofl powerful Crowns courted, being funk in Reputation, is regarded no more. This is not owing to that City's being weaken- ed in her inherent Strength, but to the Want of properly exerting that Power which her Cir- wm^anccs and Situation are capable of furnifh* :u.: mg: [uainfed ce con- tion (o ^eople ; few ad- il, as to at only Millions as can iiem as Refli- der ge- riinci- :d; as a fair la has Itate or IS, are t there jniver- ion are 1 tat ion, fhing, of Go- gn re- which >urted, more, saken- ant of r Cir- irnifh- ing: !■ .1 t' i* 1 ing : Perhaps owing to the like Reafons of States as recently made the Dutch fo backward in aA- ing up to their ufual Charadler in publick Mat- ters ; as being more attentive to what refpe^cd the Interefls of Individuals in Power, than to what concerned the Glory of the whole, which the Romans called publick Virtue. In other Par- ticulars, the Honour of a Nation depends more upon judging what Meafures to purfue, and the timing our Anions feafonably, than in perform- ing great Exploits at Random, or, as it were, bemg Vi6lors by Accident. This is capable of being illuftrated by a Variety of Inftances, occur- ring both in ancient and modern Hiftory, and whereof our own furnifh a futficient Stfx:k. As it has appeared, that fome of our Princes have made Europe tremble, by only a Reputation of their Capacity, as well as thofe who carried their Arms into the Heart of an Enemy's Country i And our Reputation, at this Time, of having M/- norca and Gibraltar in Poflcffion, governs more the Councils of the Barbary Commonwealthsi, and commands their Friend fhip on eafier Terms, than could be had by the fingle Credit of our be- ing a maritime Power, or, in other Refpe^s, a great and powerful Nation. • We were naturally as powerful a Nation af^ ter theReftoration, as before; nay, one would lia've thought much more fo, as the Alfedions of tlie People were better conciliated, yet the direft con* trary appeared. As the neighbouring Courts, who were extreme complaifant to the Prote^^or, altered tlieir Manner of Condu^ very remarkabitf ' ' ; •' ia in lefpcdl to the King, which I find others beforci as well as mj^felf, have confidered as owing to the Diflference oetween the Artention of Rulers to publick Affairs, and the Welfare of thole they govern ; and that of merely regarding their own private Interell, how to raife their Families on the Ruin of the People, which a certain Itali- Author of the laO Century has thus explained : Sic qui hodie Politici vocantur^ & propria com- moda, praelentefque utilitates fibi tanquam ulti- niuni finem conllituunt, caufam quam vocant ftatus in capite omnium ponunt j pro ipfi tuenda^ promovenda, amplianda, nihil non facienda pu-; tant ; (j injuria proximo arroganda, {i juftitia honellatifque leges fubvertendae, fi ipfa religio pe(^ fundanda, fi denique omnia jura divina & hiv^ mana violanda, nihil intentatum, nil per fas ne- fafque relinquendum cenfent ; cunda ruant, o- mnia pereant, nihil ad ipfos modo id quod e re fua eflb fibi perfuadent, obtineant, ac fi nullus fit qui talia curet, caftigavere poflit Deus/ which, reduced into a fhort Compafs, is, that mo- dern Governors feek fimply their own private Advantage, and make a Jell of publick Virtue^ and the Honour of a Nation. This, however Avarice may blind the venal Courtier, is not a Phantom of the Imagination. The Honour of a State being one of thofe de- licate Points in Government which great Geni- arefuUy attend to, it is the very Soul of uss Power, and whereof Fleets and Armies are only xhc yfpparat us, C romzi'e IP s fuppoicd Power influ- enced France and S^ain, as much as Marlbo^ rQugff% before^ ving td Rulers r thole \g their amilies n Italic laincd : a com- m ulti- vocant luenckj icfa pu-i juftitias giopcP- &hLH fas ne- ant, o- luod e nullus Dens ;* 3t mo- private ^irtue^ venal lation. A'e de- Geni- >oul of e only infli>- larlbo-- "s? r 33 ] rdttgh*sV\&ox\e^. All £«ro/>f'v- [ 34 1 . . * the Provinces, nor conrciit to his being Captain- * General of their Militia.' It will turn the Argu- ment hard on modern Statefmcn to fay, that Crotn" I 'well, as a Rebel, could do more for the Honour of his Country, than a lawful King ; though it is , poflible, that, rifing to the Protedoratc from the j Degree of a private Man, he underftood the Ge- nius ol' Mankind, and the Intereft of his Country better. This Negative on the Prince of Orange l;'was in conicqucnce of his having afliftcd the , Houfe of Stuart in Exile, and the Dutch ^ we fee, were obliged to iUbmit to the difgracing of the Orange Family, who, in efle^l, gave them their . Being as a free People : So high in thofe Days was the Reputatioix of England, and fuch the glorious E.^Q^ of its being honoured and revered. . t^v;. *■ At the Relloration our political Maxims vari- ed extremely, when, from making France and ..:Holland readily comply with any Thing, our So- I vereign became a Pcnfionet to the one, and was daily bullied by the other; .nor did the Revolu- tion redeem our Glory but in Part, and, at a vaft Expence of Blood and Treafure, we recovered by our Arms, in Ibme Meafure, what had been loit by bad Maxims, and thereby futficiently conviu- • ced France, that it was not inherent Weaknefs, - but Want of applying ouriStrength Abroad, and governing well at Home>; that could in giny Senle weaken a Reputation which we had previoufly acquired without fighting, and that commanded our own Terms on the Continent, as well as on the Ocean. But the Difference between preferving our Credit by good Condud, and the being obliged to j ^A recover ptain- Argu- Crotn" onour |gh it is m the he Ge- ountry Orange cd the we fee, of the m their ays was glorious OS vari- mce and our So- ^nd was Revolu- at a vaft ^ered by )€en loil con'viu- eaknefs, »ad, and \y Senle evioufly idcd our 1 on the ang our }liged to recover i .t 35 1 recover it by fighting, had a very different Eflev^l on our future Affairs, as by the firlt wc continu- ed an unincumbered People, and by the lall were loaded with an irredeemable Debt, nearly wcakned as much one Way, as the Glory of our Arms raifed us another. This, by a Tiain of fubfequent ill Conducft, has reduced us at la(t be- low the Confideration of our Neighbours, and is, as I take it, the true Fovindation of the prefent Peace, which I am led to make a few curlbry Remarks upon, as they will contribute to prove the Importance of the Reafoning 1 am here en- gaged in ; and, 1 think, evince to a Demon flrati- on what a poor Figure this Nation makes now its Reputation is no more, though we have a bet- ter Navy, as good Men for the publick Service, - and more of them than ever. - ^ - ,A* The third Article c. the Treaty confirms the preceeding ofWefiphalia, Madrid^ Nimegueti, Rv/- *wick, Utrecht, Baden, the Hague, the !^adniple j^lliance, and the Treaty of Vienna, except as is therein particularly excepted. Thefe Specificati- ons being difficult to be underftood, until all the publick and private Articles appear by Authority, . I (hall only take Notice of fuch Things as I can- . not well be miltaken in. The Treaty of Weji-^ phalia, is, I conceive, either miflaken in the pu- blifhed Articles for that o^ Breda \66y, or miidat- ed. In the firft England is not concerned, in the . lall y^ccadia is ceded to France, and again re- granted to England by the Peace of Utrecht; - "whence I conclude, that, as one is fet againft the pthcr, they are both in that rcfped out oi' the ;.- QuQ*' '1 t 3^ 1 Qucftion. The Treaty of Madrid^ in 1670, concerns us eirentially, as thereby our Sugar Co- lonics are confirmed to us by Stain without Re- fer ve : It regulates the Condua to be obferved in regard to Trade on both Sides ; but, as at that Time it might not have been prefumcd that the . Spaniards had a Right to fearch our Ships on the High-Seas, (o nothing is there faid about it ; and therefore, ii' this Treaty be barely confirmed, ■without any Notice taken of the fearchine our Ships, I am afraid that the Caufe of this War is not removed, For, to iiippole that the Spaniards l>ave no Right to fearch, may be, and doubtleft is, a true Suppofition ; but as it has been made queftionable by the K^% of the Spaniards^ a War enfued upon it, and yet the Point not abfolutely receded from by them in any fpecial Article, it looks to me like giving it up in iavo^fs of Spain^ /ince the Treaty of Madrid was the fame before the War as it is now j and the Confirmation of it noway refpcds the Merits of the Caufe for which we begun the War ; therefore, from any Thing that yet appears, all the Advantage over Spainy by this War, have only left us where we be-* gan, with the Balance of our Expences againft us, which, I think, cannot be efteemed honourable, nor at all fuited to the End of a firm and lading Peace. For although I take it for granted, that .y/xj/w will not prcfuiic fuddcnly to infult us on this Head, as having lately felt the ill Efle6ls of it, yet it will be remembred hereafter, that, as in the Struggle, that Crown got the better of us, or at leall: left the Difpute undecided, whenever the ill 1670, ar Go- ut Re- >fcrved at tha( lat tho on the t; and irmcd, ic our War is anlards )ubtle(s made a War blutely icle, it " Spain^ before tion of Life for •m any ;e over we be-* linft usy lurable, lading d, that us on Is of ir, ; in the 1, or at ^er the iU t 37 1 ^ ill Humours break out again, we (hall have the fame Trouble as heretofore, and perhaps engage in it when our Abilities arc meaner. From whence I conclude, that it would have been ex- tremely agreeable to the trading Part of the Nati- on, if this Point had been fomc Way or other af- certained, that they might have known what they had to depend upon, and might have condudled their Affairs accordingly, which is what they had a Right to expcd from the Gonclufion of the pre- fent Treaty, — I take it for granted, that we were rather too much in Hade about this Treaty, or podibly fhould have concerted it better. My Regard to the Ho- nour of my Country, on the Principle 1 have form- ed the Argument, naturally brings me now to to th« ninth Article, whereby it is faid, that we are to give two Hoftages, who are to remain in 'France until certain Intelligence is received of the .Evacuation o{ Cape-Breton^ and of all the Places that may happen to be taken in the Eajl-lndies, The giving of Hoftages at all feems very ftrange to ^ Nation unaccuftomed to fuch Kind of Con- "defcenfions, and who were under no Kind of O- bligations to do any fuch Thing, But, when we conlider the Nature of the Agreement, it is very extraordinary. The French we know are pofleA fed of one of our principal Factories in the Eaft^ Indies, but it is very far from being clear that we ^re poflefled of any of theirs, yet we give flo/?a- ges to deliver up what we may not be poflfefled of, but the French give none to us for what they are certainly poflefled of. This feems to regard our biir Honour eflentially ; it is fnppoflng, what ne- ver was before fuppofed fince we were Nations, that the Word of a Frenchman is as valid as the Bond of ail Englijhman : This is charging Tunick Faith upon the Romans, and turning the common Experience of Ages quite upfide down. As this regards our Reputation in the future, as well as in the prefenr, I muft confefs, as an Englijhman, that I would fooner have given up Gibraltar and Minorca, than even have given two of the mean- eft People in the Kingdom as Ho/lages, much lels any of our Nobility, tho' the >A^ound does not regard the Perfons, for the Stab is given to the vital Spirits, to the Heart's Blood of the State; and, in my poor Opinion, is never to be cured. It will operate on our foreign Aflfairs like a ma- lignant Star, that (heds its baleful Influence where- cver it appears. It fcems to have been a Snare laid for an unexperienced Negotiator, '.vhich the Hurry of his Principals for a Peace naturally pufh- ed him into. There is a Fatality likely to attend this Part of the Treaty, which I am perfuaded the Negotia- tors were not aware of, nor their Principals; '.'''at is, it will quite give up the Difpute for and a- gainft the Treaty o( Utrecht to the Tories, They will now brandi(h their Weapons, and without much Difficulty convince the World, that in Treaty-making they confulted the Honour of "their Country more than the Whigs, and made a ' better Treaty than ever they were capable of: It will raifc the Credit of that Peace, wherein ap- * pears a Variety of Advantages, which this has i^ '^-'-^ Kind I 5 It ne- tions, the 'unick [imon 8 this rell as r and nean- hlefs not to the State ; cured. :s a ma- vhere- Snare :h the pufh' 'art of [^gotia- j ; I'^at md a- They ithout hat in uir of nade a le of: ■in ap- las 1^ Kind J Kihd of Claim to, and will difgrace our new-mp- delled Whig-Fa6lion to all Eternity* I muft con- fefs I always thought my felf a Whig, but now I am quite afhamed of the Charader. By the Treaty of Utrecht we recovered ^ccadia^ given to France by a former ; had Gibraltar and Mmrca as an Equivalent for our Expences ; the Enemy's beft Port in Flanders demoliOied ; Italy fccured to one of our Allies j a good Barrier for another; and an Improvement of Territory to a third. In a Word, ourfelves and all of ovir i Allies, ;^ere fome W^ay or other provided for at the Expqnce of the Enemy. Yet this was faid to be a wielded Peace, and the Perfons who made it efteemcd>in- famous. In the War preceeding k we won ryi^- ny important Battles b^ Land, but made very little Progrefs in *)ur Maritime Affairs; .1 thi^k we loft more Men of War, adually taken, than the Enemy, and in Merchant Ships the Balance was greatly in our Disfavour.. In the Warprepeed- ing the prefent Peace, that we made but a.^meaii Figure by Land is very truej but tbut vva§f;moi'e our Fault than our MisfortuiiCi as has^ been previoufly (hewn, and will be more particularly cbnfidered hereafter. By Sea,: I :think, our Ad- vantage was {o great, as might- haye cominfianded any Peace; the Commerce of France in Elten and ?s Men at A^, \ I am Dndu£l ements 1 all its 3ur fti* y j"^i- a»d m \ t 41 1 kj tliat V/c (hall never make a better; TThbngti it had been certainly more for our Intereil to havei then ruined France^ at forty Millions additional Elxpcnce,than now, with thefamelnconvcniehecfji have given her Reafon to hope ihe may one Day retrieve all the Difhonour (he was fubjc£led to by Marlborough^ Vidtoiies. The plain Qiieitiori hpW before us is, not whether we have made fb good a Peace as the Nature and Gircumllances of Things would permit ; but whether th^ War has been lo conduced on the Principles of fair Rea(bn« ing, as that we might at any Time have commdtid* ed a better i And then it remains to be confider« ed, whether, eVen in the Situation we at lad found our(elves, there was any Kind of Neccflity fof fuch extraordinary Condefcenfions^ as is intimated to have been made, at the Expcnce of our Ho* nour as well as Intereft* As to the Gondudl t)f our Navy^ befides what has been (poke of in the proceeding States of the Nation, it ks here farthef to be ob(ervOd, that Great Britain never fitted out fo many Ships of all Ranks, tior to fo litrie Pur- pole. This Matter was as little ebnfideted in Point of Judgment as Oeconothyj as has beeil but too evident in all the feveral AppoinimentS where oUr Navy has been ftationed; In a Book k-i ly' publifhed, giving us an Account of Mr* ^«- /: 'j Voyage, we find this important Remark: Toc X en the Centurions coming out of Canton Ri- ver, a Chinefe appeared on one of the Forts armed Cap-a^pie^ intended, as the Author (eetns to fup** pofe, to ftrike fome Kind of Terror into thoie Who^ beheld his heroick Figure, and confequemly to f deter ' t deCvT them from coming that Way igain. Our Navy Directors feem to have a^^ed the ^tne Part, to have imitated that bullying Hero; for, as we had not any important Naval Enemy to con* lend with, a Genius that Way will be at a Loft to gUels why we fitted out fo many large Ships^ tvhich employed fo many of our Seamen, and proved of fo little Ufe in the refpcdive Stations affigncd them, except in regard to what happen* ed near Home, and that principally performed by thofe not in the grand Seaet. In the Mediter* ranean, it has been obferved before, and but too tvell known, what our Grand Fleet did when lin Enemv appeared; and when all Fears of that Kind diiii^* .\ their Ufe was evident, in that they were **. no Senfe able to hinder Supplies from getting into Genoa, though fometimes turn-* bling in am^^xigit whole Fleets of the Enemy* The Reafon is owing to our having many great Ships of no Ufe, and but few fmall ones that Could only be fcrviceable ; by which Means the Enemy's Itraggling Tranfports eafjly avoided any (ingular Injury ; as the taking of ten or twenty out of an hundred, in no Senfe anfwered the Intent of fo extraordinary an Expence, though it exprefledj in a very glaring Light, the Want both of Judgment and Occonomy in our Ma- nagers ; our great End being, if we meant any Thing, to guard the Coaft of our Allies, and prevent their Adverfaries being fupplied ; which thirty fmall Veflels*, with fifty Men each, cover- ed by Jeven Line of Battle Ships, would have more effedually anfwered, tlian Half die capi- * tal Our le Part, as we :o con* a Loii n, and tacions lappeii* ned by ^editer* ut too when of that in chat supplies es turn-* ilnemy* ly great ics that rans the led any twenty ed the though Want ir Mbi- int any », and which cover- I have e capi- tal ^ ' Navy of England Rationed on the Italian^ Coaft. The Men that ferved four Second Rates, would have manned all thoie thirty Veflels ; and the Expence of building or purchafing thirty fuch VelTels, and fitting them out, not Half thp Charge of one Second Rate i And I think 1 may, without Prefumption, fay, that had fjxty fuch Veflels been employed, as there might always then have been thirty on Service, it would havQ been morally impoffible for Genoa to have held out, or thofe Fleets which found their Way fo eafy, to have pafled us. The common Excufe is, that we had no fuch VefFels, fo could no5 empby them ; for every Sea-Officer knows thq Fitnefs and Utility of this Argument. But her^ I fix the Error of our Management, that we run into Wars inconfiderately, and unprepared for all the Incidents of a War ; throw ourfelves there- by into great needlefs Expences ; anfwer no Purr pofe for which a War is made j and confequently are puQjed with equal Precipitation into an in- glorious Peace, A War well concerted always makes it (hort, cheap and fuccefsful ; but, as wa run into it without Wit or Grace, mult prove, in every Refped, the direct contrary ; it being as necefTary to think as adt, to reaibn, conCder and judge, as to determine ; and, had this been tha Cale, 1 have do Doubt, but that the Parliaments Allowance, of Forty thoufand Men, would have done all the Bufinefs required by a Naval War^ But this Solecifm in Condud does not relate to the Mediterranean alone, but in all the different aflign- ^J St^tipns where our Ships have been placed ;, rind while wthave paraded with our great Shipf, «s if we intended to bully the Skies, we have neither had Convoys to proted our Trade, nor Cruizers to defend our j^merican Coaft. And though more Ships have been fitted on private Account, than ever was known before, and more Service done by them than by the Navy, yet Jias the Enemy gained Ground upon us, if 1 may >vith Propriety lb expreffi myfelf ; coafted y^wf r/Vtf , ^iid even entered our Harbours unmolcfled, pluii-r dcring and deftroying our Plantations at Plealiire, while we wifely diverted ourfelvcs at Home, with glorious, magnificent Royal Fleet. This may truly be called the Nonfenfe of making War, And as to the Weft-Indies^ until Mr. A'«owApj'sAr-» rival there, which was but very lately, it ketcin f d quite determined that our Navy fhould do nothing : For though, as it appeal's, our greai Ships aire only ufcfulin fighting the like of the £•» penny, when an Enemy was heard of it was ne^ elected, and, when undeCgnedly feen, carefully livoided engaging with j fo that, befidcs the na^ tural Ufefuliiefs of great Ships, we have had the Misfortune, not only to fee them generally, but particularly ufelefs in America as well as in the Me<> v-n Shipffy s have ?, nop And >rivate imore y. y« I may neriea^ , pluivr eailire, ?, with 8 may War, j'sAr^ feem^ bid do greai the£<» irasne^ relully he na* ad the y, but in tho brious Imoke, Britam lies as ^dyan-» dthout en by Head of [ 45 ] of the Navy, that thofe who wanted Judgment, or Honour, or both, upon the whole, did not want Cunning in a ungle Particular. 1 hey look good Care that our Coafts (hould be well guarded at Home, and that ifanyAdlion of Eclat occurred, it (hould be where it might come more immediately to the Ear of the People ; conclad- kig, that however defectively Affairs were ma- naged at a Diilance, which they had a thouland Arts to e' ^de, and which required Time to prove, we (hould be foon acquainted with any 1 hing in our Favour. Thus we faw our Coaits covered with fmall cruizing Veilels, and afufficicntNum* ber of large Ships to anfwer any fuddeu Emer- gency; which feemsto indicate, thai either fome* thing worfe than Ignorance prevailed abroad, or that every Trah(aaion at a Diliance, was cal- culated to coincide with the main Point in View, and attending to that loft Sight of our Honour, our Engagements with our Allies, our Trade, and our Plantations. But this Thought may be turned too often, and (hall therefore be conclud- ed v/ith this fingle Remark : That though it was refolved to have a Peace, it is to be wilhcd that we had come at it a more rational Way, by ex- erting ourfelves properly, and commanding it, ra- ther than by weak and unprecedented Conduft obliged to beg it. This 1 am vain enough to be- lieve every Body will agree with me in ; and that in brisk and fpirited Wjir would not only have faved us many Millions, but crowned the End WithGlory, - , , , . --.:.. yl. •■ ■' ■-■■•-■' ■^V-^- '' '' Iwi(h^ .>ii t 4< 1 I widi what has been faid about the Navy was aloivj the Subject Matter of Complaint, or that our m''i'ary Proceedings, in general, were not fo f ^ • jly conduded as to bring all our Affairs togc'tb. . to one unhappy Period. And as a vio« lent Prefuraption of this being but too true, t Ihall only beg the Reader's fobcr Attention to tho following Fads. In the Beginning of the laft Spring it was obferved that the French medi-» tated Tome important Enterprize ; Marlhal Saxe ordered the fevcral Bodies cantoned about Brufi fels^ Antwerp, Mechlin, Louvain^ &c. .to aflemblo at a Time, and by a Rout appointed. At tho feme Time other Bodies, cantoned on the Side of Alface, Givety 6cc. were direded to aflemble Bnder Count Lorwendahl in the Neighbourhood' o^Namurf, A great Part of the Allied Army were then in Quarters about Liege, Maeftricht^ ^nd fo on to Kuremonde, All the Enemy's Motions fufficiently evinced their Defign was upon Maeftricht -, though, upon Marfhal Saxe drawing his Troops together, he marched a large Detachment quite off another Way, which, appeared afterwards was purely to guard their Convoys to Bergek-op-Zoom ; however, the main Army took a different Rout; and, as vafl Quan* tiries of warlike Stores were amafling about Na*, mure, and in other of the Enemy's Poxls on the Maefe ; and the refpedive Corps under the two Marihals plainly purfuing one and the fame Di**. redion by two diferent Routs, it was fufficiently cvitlent that the Defign was not againll Breda^ Marihal Sa:^''s Corps of about thirty five thou- fand i was that not ifiairs I vio Je, I o the t lafl: medn Saxe Brufi mblo \t the ide of emble irhood Army firichtt lemy'* 1 was ,1 Saxe :hed a which I their z main Quan-» Lit Na< on the le two ne Dit, ciently Breda^ \ thou- fand t 47 1 fend Men took the dired Road by Louvmn^ and Marlhal LoiuentJahi's from Namure, through tlie Country of Limburg^ by the Margin of the Maefcy with about forty thoufand Men, fifteen thoufand whereof he polled on the Banks of the River, to prote(^^ the Veffels coming from Namure with Battering Cannon, Stores, and Provifions to the Army. During thefe various Motions of the Enemy, the Allied Troops drew gradually ofTtowards Ruremonde, and to occupy the Coun- try between that Town, Venlo and Breda ; and great Pains was taken to difperfe a Notion, that the Enemy's Dcfign v/as really againft Breda^ whatever Appearances might feem to intimate to the contrary. But there was a Reafon then given in Oppofition, which fet all this Matter right ; an Officer of great Note remarking, that •• J was perfuaded the Enemy had no Defjgn on Breday and that the Allied Generals knew as much, by their drawing their Forces together on that Side, This Thought had too much Truth in it at this Jun^^ure, as it will evidently appear by what follows, that the adverfe Armies never intended to face each other again in Anger. It was about the I5ih of j4pnl, N. S. when the two Marfhals, on different Sides of the River, in- verted Maeftricht, which being known to the Allies they could not be longer in any Concern about Breda^ nor confequently needed the Main of the Army on that Side. There was now a Kind of Neceffity of looking again upon Maeftricht, to (hew, at leart, that fomething was conllilting for its Relief, if not really iutentied. Accordiji^ly the ^AUied [ 48 1 AlKed Troops began to aflbmble about Vehio and Ruremonde^ and a large Body occupied that Neigh- bimrhood, generally efteemed at 40,000 Men^ befides Irregulars. — Ruremmde is about twenty fix Englijh Miles from Maejlrichty and a good Coui>' try to march O'ftr ; and, when the Stream of the Maefe is not violent, a convenieijt Water-Carriago and Communication with Venlo : n the one Side below, and Maejlrlcht on the other above ; and about thefe the Allied Troops chiefly lay* The Siege of Maeftrkht was formed, and {ix Bridge* of Communication thrown over the Maefe ^ when the Rains fell very heavily, and raifed the Waters h much, that Marfhal L(rwendahl\ Camp on tbo Wyck Side was Knee deep under Waters M. dt Alva^ the Governor o^ Maejlricht^ fuppofing that the Allies would attempt to raife the Siege, if any fair Profpe<^ of Succeft prefented, he fent the neared commanding Officer Advice of his lutein* lion, and then loading a Number of fmall Velit^ls with Stones, which, being turned a^lrifi, carried away all the Enemy's Bridges, and intiroly pre* vented any Communication between the two Ar* mies for (even Days after. If now the Relief of Maeftricbt had been intended, or it had been de- figned that the cutting and coiiclufive Stroke ihould have been given by the Allies, it was pro- bable that Lowendahl^sPan of the Enemy's Army might have been totally ruined, his Camp being very fickly, and no Poffibility of recreating, in cafe any Light Troops were thrown behind him- But as no Motion was made to this End, though the Advantage very weL^ underflood, and at any •»...-. '■ other i (o andl Jeigh- Men^ ity fix oun-' of the rriago Side and The ridges when ATatera on (ha M. ^* ig that if any nt the Intent* Vefi^is carried y pre* vo Ar* clief of ;en dc- Strokc as pro- Army I being og,, in id him* hough at any other r 49 1 ether Time would have been warmly embraceeJ, it is fulficiently clear Maejlricht was intended as the iinilhing Stroke of the War^ and the Induce- ment to recommend a Peace previoully concerted j for, when the Enemy's Army had recovered them- felves again from this apparent Danger, and the Siege pulhed on to a certain Pointy that made the taking of it foon unqucflionablc, then was the Cue given, and the Preliminaries {igned» This confjdered, without the previous attendant Cir- cumftances, puts it out of Doubt that a Peace was determined upon ; but why, or for what particu- lar RcafoU) docs not as yet appear, except that Suppofition takes Place» that we could not aflbrd to carry on the War any longer : But in this our Helmfmen feemed to a6t like peevifh Gamefters, who forfeit the Chance of winning, by inconfi- derately throwing up their Cards* We perhaps judged worfe of our own Situation, and better of the Enemy's, than was in Reality the Fad:, or die it would have been of little Significance what Acquifitions the French could poflibly make* when the Allies were ripening daily into Confidence with each other, and the Dutch Troops forming for Service ; which, to all that were acquainted with the Part they a(^€d before, was a confjdcrable Augmentation of the Strength of the Union ; and therefore, fuppofing that the taking of Maeftricht could not have been prevented, it is more than probable that the Enemy would not have been able to have made farther Acquifitions. It v^ cs prefumed at this Time, and from the beO: Autho- rity, that the Allies had in the Field, including G the the Dutch Contingent, about one hundred arid fifty ihoiifhiid Men in good Pay, and well clothed and difciplined, and the Rttfum IVoops approach- ing, which would at leaft have anfwered the Puf- poie of making a good Stand, and of impeding the Enemy's farther Progrefs, which was all that Teemed ncceHary to finilh the Campaign happily; our Bulincfs there, as Affairs became at laft cii*- cumlianced, was purely to keep the Enemy out of the Dutch Provinces ; for it is more than pro- bable, that, had we an equal Army in the Field, and the French thereby in any Danger, the King o(^ruffia would have marched to their Afllflance, induced thereto by the very Nature and NecelTity of his Affairs; for, if the French had been over- powered, the Qiiecn of Hungary would not have treated Trujfta with more Complaifaiice than Po- lyphemus did Olyfjes ; that is, fhc would have fa- voured him with being the lall ddhoyed: So th? as to any other Succcls than what might be f Rcfult of at^'^ing on the Dcfcnfive, was not to be expc(5ted on that Side; but that fcemed fufficient to liave commanded a good Peace. The Weight of this War, as to the Enemy's Part, muft haVc been fupported by one or both of the Kingdoms ^\'\2;^^^t^ as Principals, though it is reported that Spahi was to bear the largelt Share; but where either of them was to get Money was the Qiie- 'ilion. France^ that is naturalise the richeft Coun- try, feemcd pretty well exhauiled, at leaft was, 'more Ways than one, vadly on tiie Decline, both on account of the Failure of her Commerce, and . tlic large Drains -upon her from abroad, not only jf.i; w of \ lothcd roach- le Pur- )eding til that ippily; ift cii'- y out n pro- Field, e King iftance, xcffity II over- 3t have an To- ave (•;i' o tht^ i: be i Dt to be Lifficicnt Weight ift haVe Ingdoms ed that where ic Qiie- \ Coun- ift was, e, both CO, and lot only of* ^' mcy, but of Men, to the Prqudicc of lier Maiiufachnes. The Crtjwn of Spatn, ic is well known, nevor hoards up I rcufuics, nor is the Country capable ofaHording anv; their whole Dependence is upon the Ameridin Returns, whiih had of late been lo backward, that the Court was a good deal diltiellld for their own ncccllary Supplies ; therefore could, at this Time, lend France no other Aid than their Credit on the future Returns of the Galeons ; which, though Xio\ to be defpifed, was very far from anfwering the like Purpofe as the having Cafh of their own. The Armies of both Crowns in Italy were ex- tremely expeniive, as they were generally lodged in dear or exhaulied Countries ; and as, meeting many Impediments by Sea, they were moll ge- nerally obliged to fupply their Army by Land- . Carriage, and often through very rough and dif- ficult Roads. The French Army in Flanders drew ConliderableSums out of the conqucied Provinces; but as Money levied that Way is ufually told to the Government over a Gridiron, as the old Phrafc has it, and, if they had it all, ic would n(Jt have maintained a fourth Part of their Army, there was an ablblute Neceflity for it that Way, as well as in Itu!)/ ; and that the Finances fell very (hort is now clearly known. In a Word, the Ex pence of France was about fourteen Millions Sterling yearly, which no Nation in Europe can afford, without conltant Supply by Trade ; the principal Branches of which are the EaJl'India, IVeft-India, North America^ and Great-Britain, And the Spa- ttijh Trcafure not coming in Aid, nor, as Matters itood, could they have much Credit abroad, ns we t 54 ] . wc got moft of the Ca(h which Foreigners had to fpare, and their Friend old Gen9a in a bad State, it is very difficult to conceive how France could have fublirted her Troops another Seafon. While the Trade was open, France could not want Refour- ces infinite, more eljpccially if allied with Spain^ and the Treafures of America find their Way home freely ; but when neither of thele are the Cafe, as I think none will difpute, the Notion of the Refources of France tqrns out a meer Chimera. I am apprehenfive we have as much running Cafli in England as they have in France, and our Outgoings, ^his War, I conceive, not fo much ; our Trade open, that of France (hut up in a good Meafure j fcveral Millions of real Cafh have been biought into England by Cap- tures, and fome by the Returns on captured Goods, an Advantage Frame has not fignificant- \y fhared ; And if it be true that Money fell Ihort here, what muft it have done under all thefe Confiderations in France ? I apprehotid this Kind of Realbniug comes the neareli Truth, that -^ny Thing, but a certain Knowledge of the State of the Wealth of France, can poflibly do. And when hereto our bejft Advices inform us, that France was really in a deiperate State, I cannot help thinking but that we were unfortunately hurried into an untimely Peace. It is more than probable that a moderate Degree of Patience would have f.t us right, when we had a Winter interfering, and the Chance of a Summer, with- out any additional Expence. That is to fay, we might at lait have made Uie Peace in Winter, if .. . ^ " . th«. lad to Itate, it a have lile the Lefoiir- Spain^ Way ire the lotion meer much rancej ve, not ce Ihut of real y Cap- aptured lificane- ley fell icier all biid this th, that he State . And us, that cannot :unately >re than ^atiencq Winter •, with- fay, we inter, if . th«. I 53 ] the Summer had not anfwcred our warmeft Eie* pe6lations from it. As it is, we are in a Situation to be pitied, and if the general received Notion be true, that Gibraltar^ in fome Shape or other, is to follow, it will be very difficult to defcribe our State. The Reafon pretended for giving up Gibraltar is founded on a notorious Miftake; it is, that all our Quarrels with Spain are upon that Score, which 1 aflert to be a falfe Facft on the Fa:e of it. The firil Quarrel we had with Spain^ fince the Peace oi Utrecht ^ was, becaufe we de« flroyed their Navy without declaring War, and helped the Emperor to drive the Spanifh Army out of Sicily. To falve which Sore, and to be good Friends with Spain again, our then Mini- dry commited a very vain and empty A61 in Politicks ; which was, the making a Feint, and, in feme Meafure, engaging his late Majefty's Ho- nour, that it Ihould be given up; which, I ap- prehend, was the firft Time the Spaniards ever thought about it. When that could not be done, we made them Reparation, by efcorting Don Carlos into Italy\ fince which Time, until the Ap- proach of the prefent Peace, Gibraltar has not been talked of. The War in 1740. is well known to have been commenced on a very different Ac- count, and, in Truth, had no Relation to it: What Whim brought it upon the Carpet now, I know not ; but I iiwi^ another Pretence, equally wife as the former, and indeed Part of the lame, though it furnidies another Kind of Rcafoning ; it is, they fay, to re-eftablifh our ancient Amity with ^he Crown of Spain. But how is this to be made out^ -«if" UikiMaMlllliMiM I t 'Hi out? Wc are to fuppofe, that, as wc are now forty Millions poorer than when we began the War, and have loft our Reputation by the prelent Treaty, we are to recover jt again by giving a- way the moft important Place we have;. and when we have given it up, how will it appear we fhaU be nearer the Amity of the Houle of Bourbon than before? The Poor are always morq liable to be inlulred than the Rich ; and how (hall we account to common Senfe, for fayiiig that we fliall be on better Terms with Spain, when we make her more opulent, and ourfelves poorer; when the Spaniards have better Ports than they had before, , and we want them ; when we may not be able to command a fingle Harbour between England 2iX\d Leghorn, nor perhaps that? What Mation was ever the better Friend to ano^ liier for being on the Decline? We havencc the Appearence of an uleful Ally but Holland: And how are we aflured what Turn even that A lit* ance may take hereafter? Is not every little Ani- mal ready to (hare in the Carcafe of the dying Uion ? And would any rcafonable Being in its Scnfes wafte and deftroy itfelf in order to acquire Triendfhips? Fools find this, who wafte their Fortunes in Riot and Extravagance, upon a Sup- pofition ofraifing Friends thereby; they but too jbon fee their Error, by being laughed at, ruined, ^\\(\ defpifed. It is the fame in the Body Poli- tick. 7"his cannot help ftricking every lenfjble Man in the Kingdom ; he mult fee that to give istolofc; but he mult have more Wit than I that can turn. Gifts into Gain, or that can find ; ^.. ., out I now h the refen^: |ing a<- and [ppcar lib of more fhall at we n we orer ; they n we arbour s that? o ano- icc the ; And it AUir le Alii- dying in its acquire 3 their aSup*^ )ut too ruined, r Poli- enfible o give than I in find out : t' 55 ] tht a Way to make himfelf richer, by paring of his Eftate, and dividing it amongft his Neigh- bours. Some pretend to (eparate the Spantfh Nation from the Houfe of Bourbon ; but this, alas, is as chimerical as all the reft; it is at leaft no more probable, than to fee the political Intereft of Holland feparated from that of Great-Britoin. which can only happen by the Ruin of one or both of them. The French have too great an Intereft in the Friendlhip of Spa'm^ to part with it on any Terms ; they will nurle it as the Mine that gives their Commerce a flouriftiing Courfe, furnifhes them with Wealth, and fupports them in Opulence. And, as the prefencFing oi Spain is too nearly allied to France^ not to give that Nation any reafonable Preference, I do not fee that it fjgnifies much what the Old Spaniards think about the Matter. Upon the Whole, we have juft as much Reafon to expcd any Favour from France for relinquifhing ol Cape-Breton^ as from Spain for delivering up Gibraltar^ which the French have given us a recent lixair.ple of, by laying a new Duty of fifty Sol^ per 1 on on our Shipping, immediately after /o contenting to give Cape-Breton up. Wc nad wiih that im- portant Ilia ft d Value enough ?ii hand to have paid all our Debts ; and if our Minillrv Ihall manage it fo well as that can -be Hill done, I think it matters little what they gave up; but to part with fuch Places, and ftili leave us ei^lity Millions in Debt, Iccms not o be ilich a Scljeme as we would have expecled to have been planVi by Gen- tlemen who lo ihcnuouil :s oppclcd Ptr.ce of ^".rrf i' " ■■'' ■' rtPTi -li^ ■j^lV'-''*^'*** ■^^'•«*''-^"»^ [ 56 V of Utrecht. In Conclufion, I have only to ob- ferve, that, if this Peace be right, our fetting out was wrong; for 1 think it concerns the Honour of a Nation, eflcntially, to execute all Engage- ments punctually ; and, if miftaken in entring into them, to rccompenfe fuch Error rather by Vigour and Addrefs, than by tamely fubmitting to Terms, that neither fuit the End of fuch Engagements, nor in any Refped coincide with our own future Interefts. t * < .<■„■■ r-.'i " ■\ Y-^V { ? ■ *} ■lU' ' 1 FINIS. ■ ■ , '.'.■• ■ • • M f ' ■ ■ ' « t 1 ... 1 •■i'-n .' * f ;• J f J'... . • . V V ' » I ' ' .,. ;. ^ .., ,.,.^j IV o ob- ig out on out igage- ig into /igour Perms, ments, future ■V.) iU I ;i:iv#!' ';!i ■f'i ', - O *.. - . 1 - » * » Provided or unprovided fc^ ti '4 '4 .V ■t £f t A f> ANNUITIES for long Terms, bcini; the Remaiiuler of the : ... for Lives, with the Benefit of Survivorrliip, bci . I I - . for two and three Lives, being the Sum reman " I I - - on the Plate Aft, 6 George L Regis - . for Nevis and St. Chrijiopher's Debentures, at > - at three Pounds ten Shillings per Cent, per Am ' 1 I ... it three Pounds ten Shillings per Cent, per An at three Pounds per Cent, per Annum, Anno i: Duties on Salt further continued. Anno 1741 . . . on ditto further continued, ^w»^ 1745 Exchequer Bills made out tor Imcreft of Old Bills Note The Land-Tax, and Duties on Malt being Annual « -: - T>-.,.,^ on Pendons, the Sum 1 -t i ri ! 1 % V f ti 6fz'«zf i9 + zH'ooS ^ 00 i iii*9z f^ Si /gt't 01 Ci^ ■► iff'ft I T9 Si eet'gi 6 y- ''.>r. no { -u ■ ■ I .-', n. -/ s A STATE of the NATIOl^ Provided or unprovided for by Parliament, as it flood on the 31ft of Dec ],!J<> ANNUITIES for long Terms, bcliiij tlic Remaiiuler of tlie Orlt^inal Sum contributed, unfubfcribcd to the South Sea Company - ^ > - .... for Lives, Aviil) the Ikncfit of Siirvivorfliip, being tlie Original Sum contributed ... • for two and tlucc Lives, being the Sum remaining af'icr what is fallen in by Deaths .... - .... on the Plate Af;- Ce»r. per Annum, Anno 173 1 - - - - - j . at three Pounds ten Shillings per Cent, per Annum, Anno 1736, charged on the Sinking Tund - * • ----- at three Vounds per Cent, per Annum, Anno 1738, charged on ditto Duties on Salt further continued, Anno 1741 - - .. . • ,•-- :. - - - on ditto further continued, Anno 17^5 ... . ....... rxchequtr Bills made out tor Intcrelt of Old Bills ..... ... Note The Land-Tax, and Duties on Malt, being Annual Grants, are not charged in this Account, nor the 1,000,000 /. charged on the on of Sixpence per Pound on Pcnflons, the Sum of 500,000 l. borrowed on the Credit of the Supplies, Anno 1748, as the fame paid out of the laid Supplies. - , » . , . I : EAST I NT> I A Company, ' ; ' By two Afts of Parliament, 9 William III. Regis, and tWo other Afl-s, 6 and 9 Ann* ReginA . . ; ;: Annuities, at three Pounds />«r C««r. /"fr ^»««w, anno 1744, charged on the Supplies of the additional Duties on Low Wines, Spirits and Strong B AN K of E NG L AN'D, On their Original Fund at Three />fr Cf»r. ^er -er Cent, per Annum, charged on the Duties on Coals, ©"f. fince I«r Cent, per Annum, Anno 1744, charged on the Surplus of ditto ..---. ..... at Three per Cent. Anno 174s, charged on additional Duties on all Wines imported fince Lady-Day, 1745 - - - - - at Four per Cent. Anno 1746, charged on Duties on Glafs, and additional Duties on Spirituous Liquors, fince Lady-Day, 1746 * .... at Tcour per Cent, per Annum, Anno 1746, charged on Duties on Licences for retailing Spirituous Liquors, fince Jitto . .... at Vouv per Cent, per Annum, for Lottery Anno 1747, charged on Duties on Coaches, cf. - - ' - . ... - at Four per Lent, per Annum, Anno 1747, charged on Duties on Houfes, ere. - - - ; - •• Memorandum. The Subfcribers of 100 /. to the Lottery 174^, were allowed an Annuity for one Life of nine Shillings a Ticket, which : to 22^00 /. And the Subfcribers of 100 /. to the Lottery 1746, were allowed an Annuity for one Life of eighteen Shi Ticket, which amounts to 45000 /. which Annuities are an Encreafc of the National Debt, but cannot be added the no Money was advanced for the fane. , ; SOVTH S E A Company. ' On their Capital Stock and Annuities, 9 Geerge I. Regis - .... ..... NATIONAL DEBT, ' he 31ft of December, 1745, and on the 31ft of December, 1747. Company 3,ooo /. charged on the Dedii£li- dnno 174$, as the fame it to be Wines, Spirits and Strong Waters »ng Waters , fince Lady-Day, 1746 , flnce ditto linings a Ticket, which amounts one JLi(e of eighteen Shilh'ngs a >ut cannot be added thereto, as Amount of the Na- tional Debt, on the 3 ill of Deceml>er,i746. I. 108,100 101,447 3 11,000 37.811 400,000 600,000 300,000 770,050 i,eoo,ooo 1200 s. >7 00 8 00 5 00 CO CO 00 00 00 d. 00 CO 1 1 CO 00 00 00 00 00 3,200,000 00 00 1,000,000 00 00 3,200,000 00 00 500,000 00 00 4,000,000 00 00 499,600 00 CO 1,750,000 00 00 1,250,000 00 CO 800,000 CO 00 800,000 00 00 1,800,000 CO 00 1,800,000 00 00 2,000, 000 00 CO 3,000,000 CO 00 986,800 CO 00 27,502,203 5 6i 59.356^497 16 9? Encrcafed between the 3 1 ft of Dtctmbtr, 1 746, and 3 1. December, 1747. I. raid oft' within that Time. /. /. d. 1700 00 00 161,000 00 00 1,000,000 00 03 4,400,000 00 60 •I 5,400,000 00 00 162,700 00 00 Amount of the Na- tional Debt, on the 3 lA of December, 17^7. I. 1,836,275 108,100 99,747 312,000 37,821 400,000 600,000 300,000 609,050 1,000,000 2200 »7 00 8 00 5 00 00 00 00 00 00 tn 00 H 00 'i CO CO 00 CO 00 00 3,200,000 00 00 1,000,000 00 00 3.100,000 00 00 500,000 00 00 4,000,000 00 00 499,600 00 00 1,750,000 00 00 1,250,000 00 00 800,000 00 00 800,000 00 00 1,800,000 00 00 1,800,000 00 00 2,000,000 00 00 3>00O,000 00 00 986,800 00 00 1.000,000 00 oo 4j400,000 00 00 27,302,203 5 6| 64,593,797 J6 9i: •^ An Eftimate of the after mentioned, J! re- Heads of the Wear and Tear ordi DUE To pny off and difchargc ; the Navy for Stores^ Fi for the Service thereof To pay oft atid difchargc for Prcmiunis, alluyved Stores Tor Freight of Tranfports livcred imo his Majefty' Bills were made out o 1747 J as alfb to fcvera To his Majefty's Yards ai and Extraordinary For Half-pay to Sea Offici ^. made by^ his late Majell Seamenj DUE To pay the Men, i-rc. uni off To Ships in SeaPay»on t To difcharge and^pay off Pilotage, Surgeons, Nee Orphans of Men flain a DUE ■»» Vidiulling Debt, as by\ thofe Com^ For fliort Allowance to thd in Pay, and which have- For paying off all the Bill -For Provifions delivered, no Bills were made out 1747 Tor Neceflary Money, exi change and Contingenci To the Officers, Workme feveral Ports Sick and Wounded, the 7 o®| 10 MfiMORANDUifo. Executors of Thomas Clutterluck r -t ! Executrix of Sir Lharlts Wager, it I \ > 1 i WllUitm Corhet Efcji 6^ ( * Rig. Honouribld Sir John Rujhouf^. '. lo|^ Bart. ;- ^NDUXr. iC s Hands. 3rs of 1] ■4 'j'x of r Wager, I ] ■h ?;> ouribl^- ceml>er, 1747, in Money as undermentioned, and may be reckoned towards laiisfying the aforel'uid Debt ' of the Navy, In what . rreafureri Handi. In Money. On the Heads of Wear and Tear, Or- dinary and Tranf- ports. Fxjcutors of c In Money hemat Clmtrbuck ^ Ditto towards tbe Debt for fick and* £f'li C wounded Seamen - - . <* Executrix of ir Lharlts Wagtr, In Money > . . . Ditto towards the Debt for (Ick wounded Seamen . and i V'tUUm Corhtt •I I Money - - ; ". itto towards the Debt for fick wounded Seamen - and r> -1 [light Honourable r in Money .• - - ,ir John Rufljoutr J Ditto towards the Debt for fick ,Bart. * X wounded Seamen - J'-):^-- 1 • it -^ V-'""* j« and' light Honourable George Honourable tin Dodingtoftf < Di Money .... itto towards the Debt for fick and • wounded Seamen - . . > /. J. d. i,67\ II fi »,I94 13 9 3,875 10 182,687 16 9^ 7.993 1 6f 1} 199>413 15 71 Seamens Wages. i, s. d. I 00 6 719 11 s; 62S 17 3* 5>3 5 6 6,\7t 4 6 264 1 1 7 80 2 %{ 665 18 00 -1 64,781 8 28,439 15 3^ 61 102,267 15 7[ Viauals. /. s, d. J HI I n;? • • • s L t. d. 3.54$ 13 7 JT «7 :'\ " ■'- '\ 1.8 i 1- z6 10 8 % »4.443 4 7f? *