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Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc.. peuvent 6tre fiim^s d des taux de reduction diff^rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour §tre reproduit en un seul clich6, il est film6 d partir de Tangle sup^rieur gauche, de geuche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images n6cessaire. Les diagrammas suivants illustrent la m6thode. 1 2 3 4 5 6 CHRISTIAN PRAYER AND GENERAL LAWS. t I; CHRISTIAN PRAYER AND GENERAL LAWS, BEING THE BURNEY PRIZE ESSAY FOR THE YEAR 1873, ^n %^pntik, THE physicaj^ efficacy of prayer. BY GEORGE J. ROMANES, MA., LATE SCHOLAR IN NATURAL SCIENCE OF GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. Hontron : MACMILLAN AND CO. 1874. [A/l Rights reserved.] I I, I I.RINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY I'liEsS. TO P. VV. LATHAM, M.A., M.D., F.R.C.P., etc., AS A TOKEN OF THE AUTHOR'S GRATITUDE FOR PROFESSIONAL AID OF THE HIGHEST VALUE GENEROUSLY RENDERED UNDER PECULIARLY ADVERSE CONDITIONS, THIS ESSAY IS AFFECTIOxNATELY INSCRIBED. ADVERTISEMENT. The late Richard Burney, Esq., M.A., of Christ's College, Cambridge, previously to his death on the 30th Nov. 1845, empowered his Cousin, Mr Archdeacon Burney, to offer, through the Vice-Chancellor, to the University of Cambridge, the sum of ;^3,s 00 Reduced Three per Cent. Stock, for the purpose of establishing an Annual Prize, to be awarded to the Graduate who should produce the best Essay on a subject to be set by the Vice-Chancellor. On the day after this offer was communicated to the Vice-chancellor, Mr Burney died; but his sister and executrix, Miss J. Caroline Burney, being desirous of carrying her brother's intentions into effect, gene- rously renewed the offer. The Prize is to be awarded to a Graduate of the University, who is not of more than three years' stand- ing from admission to his first degree when the Essays are sent in, and who shall produce the best English Essay " on some moral or metaphysical subject, on the Existence, Nature, and Attributes of God, or on the Truth and Evidence of the Christian Religion." The successful Candidate is required to print his Essay; and after having delivered, or caused to be delivered, a copy of it to the University Library, the Library of Christ's College, the University Libraries of Oxford, Vlll Advertisement, Dublin, and Edinburgh, aiid to each of the Adjudicators of the Prize, he is to receive from the Vice-Chancellor the year's interest of »iie Stock, from which sum the Candidate is to pay the expenses of printing the Essay. The Vice- Chancellor, the Master of Christ's Col- lege, and the NoiTisian Professor of Divinity, are the Examiners of the Compositions and the Adjudicators of the Prize. In the event of the exercises of two of the Can- didates being deemed by the Examiners to possess equal merit, if one of such Candidates be a member of Christ's College, the Prize is to be adjudged to him. The thesis proposed by the Vice-Chancellor for the year 1873, was as follows: — " Christian F^rayer considered in relation to the belief that the AlmigJity governs the World by gcjieral laivs." « The prize was awarded to the author of the follow- ing Essay. 4 cators icellor tn the ,ssay. s Col- re the tors of ,e Can- possess nber of im. for the to the 01 Id by follow- PREFACE. As the subject of this Essay was expresFl>' confined to Prayer in its relation to General L^wj, I was precluded from discussing any of the purely (I posteriori objections which have been urged against the doctrine of the physical efficacy of Praye; , Similarly, such of the h priori objections as are not founded on the conception of Natural Law, had to be neglected. The former category includes Mr Galton's article in the Fortnightly Review for August ist, 1872, — an article which, in my opinion, is of greater argumentative worth than all the rest of the literature upon the same side put together ; — and the latter, most of the views set forth by the Rev. Messrs. Robertson, Brooks, Kni ^ht, and others. in making this apology, I should like it to be understood that I deem the limitation imposed by the Title of this Treatise a very wise one. The subject embraced by that Title is amply sufficient for a single Essay to discuss, if the discussion is to be in any wise exhaustive. And, I may add, in the present case it seems to me especially desirable :mm^ ■1 • I X Preface. that the discussion should be, as much as possible, of this character; seeing that this aspect of the Prayer-question is so closely allied to the yet more important question, regarding the antecedent im- probability attaching to the occurrence of Miracles. As, therefore, in dealing with the former, I felt that I was also of necessity dealing with the latter; I trust that any arguments which, in view of the one question, may be thought to be over- elabor- ated, will, in view of the other, be acquitted of this charge. It may be stated that all additions which have been made to this Essay since the decision of the Adjudicators was given, are shewn to be such by the date which is appended, thus [1874]. May, 1S74. :) 1 (, CHAPTER I. § I. History may be defined as the record of human thought. No doubt, as a science, history refers to the words and the deeds of previous generations, no less than to their intellectual processes : forasmuch, however, as the two former are but the sensible expressions of the latter, history may be considered as being, in its broadest and its truest sense, the record of our intelligence. If then this is the; essential nature of history, it follows that the highest function devolving upon it to perform, is the registration of that which most characterizes human thought in its relation to time, viz., its progress. Hence it is that all other interest attaching to the study of history, dwarfs in the presence of this its highest func- tion. Taking a general survey of the world's intellectual progress as chronicled by history, the most s^-^'king feature presented is certainly the ever-increasing per- ception of the truth that Unity pervades Nature. The primitive religi..iis (with the conspicuous exception of the Jewish and its derivatives) agreed, amid their dis- cordance on all other subjects, in teaching Polytheism, or the doctrine of a multiplicity of powers in the Uni- verse. Gradually, and in direct proportion to the pro- R. \ 'A i! ii I ! » 9^ 2 Christian Prayer and General Laws. gress of intelligence, the diffused and segregated influ- ences previously believed in became more and more concentrated, and so few in number ; until, in the days of the Classic Mythology, every deity, or class of deities, had its specified name. As the Classic Philosophy, however, gradually enfolded the Classical Religions, the multifarious gods and demi-gods of the former became less and less the objects of general credence, until they finally disappeared before the advance of Christianity. The latter, hand in hand with Philosophy, extirpated during the middle ages every vestige of the Polytheistic creeds, and the recognition among civilized men of the One God, as a Power if not a Person, became all but universal. A great advance, however, yet remained to be achieved. Although a Unity of Power became thus generally acknowledged as a principle pervading the Universe, the variety of its manifestations appeared no less endless than were the gods and demons of the primitive reh'gions. Indeed, as these gods and demons were but the personifying explanation of the more strik- ing among these manifestations, the latter were more numerous than the former. So long, therefore, as man continued to regard the innumerable diversities occurring in nature as so many disconnected results, due to causes independent of one another, save through their depend- ence upon their common source ; he had merely suc- ceeded in divesting his mind of the superstitious belief in a multiplicity of personal agents. The disconnected results he perceived at this stage, presented themselves to his understanding as an infinitude of variations in the character of the Supreme Essence : — he saw a Unity of Being manifested in a Diversity of Operation. ■•'J % Laws. ^regated influ- Dre and more il, in the days lass of deities, c Philosophy, Religions, the ormer became ice, until they f Christianity, hy, extirpated le Polytheistic ;d men of the ecame all but nained to be became thus pervading the appeared no emons of the > and demons he more strik- er were more efore, as man ities occurring due to causes their depend- d merely suc- ■stitious belief disconnected 16. themselves iations in the aw a Unity of n. Chi'istian Prayer and General Laivs. 3 Thus, although the intallect of man had doubtless rr.ade a great advance when it recognized Unity as an essential attribute of the Self-existing Substance, it was not until that intellect began to look without its owu nature, and seriously to contemplate, in the objective Cosmos around it, the modes in which that Substance proximately manifested itself, that human intelligence began to see how the order of that Cosmos was main- tained, not, as hitherto tacitly or avowedly supposed, by a multiplicity of ever-changing agencies continually emanating from the Indivisible Substance, but, as it were, by a Unity within a Unity : — by a Uniformity of Action within a Unity of Being. The birth of the Physical Sciences thus marked an era in Philosophy of unparalleled importance. It then became "obvious to the deeper thinkers, that external nature lent itself readily to the subjective conditions under which alone observation is possible. Similarities without lendered possible conceptions within.... There evidently was not a chaos without, a cosmos within, but the macrocosm responded to and harmonized with the microcosm'." And as thus at their birth, so throughout their development, the Physical Sciences have uninterruptedly tended to establish the doctrine, as the guiding principle of their methods, that all causes and effects with which they have to deal are mutually inter- related, and so inter-related, that, were the knowledge of them sufficiently extended, all natural phaenomena would be reducible " to logical deduction from one permeating principle^:" and this cardinal doctrine of the Physical Sciences, thus primarily elaborated for their own guid- ^ G. G. Scott, Blimey Prize, 1868, p. 58. "^ James Stuart. I — 2 f' :\ i' ( \ f I i 1, I Christian Prayer and Gaicral Laws. ance, has throughout its progress continually reacted upon Philosophy; until the original and diffused con- ceptions as to cause and effect entertained by the latter, have gradually undergone a process of concentration, if not of agreement ; each embodying more or less of the Physical conception, which has for its nucleus the doctrine of necessary, unconditional sequence, or, at least, of the perpetual uniformity of Natural Law. § 2 . Thus, as in early times. Polytheism was gi*adu- ally supplanted by Monotheism, so in later times, An- thropomorphism has been steadily superseded by modern Deism — ^belief in the immediate nature of the Supreme Government, by belief in the conduct of that Govern- ment through General Laws. This one doctrine which all the sciences unite in teaching, and all the modem systems of philosophy unite in echoing, has now attained i<.s highest phase of certainty. For, whatever may be the number and im- portance of the General Laws which yet remain to be dis- covered, their discovery, when made, cannot any further idvance the doctrine we are considering; since men's minds are now, or ought to be, prepared for any amount of further development in this direction. Thus it is that the influence of Science upon Religion must now be considered as having ceased. For it has been in respect of this doctrine, and this doctrine alone, that Science has exerted upon Religion an influence of any kind — in this respect, and in this alone, is it true that the former has always been " the purifier" of the latter\ But in this respect it is most true; and the fact of its being so has ever been the cause, and the only cause, of that intense embittermeni which has, from the first and un- ^ Herbert Spencer, First Principles^ p. 102. i » \ I Laws. lually reacted diffused con- by the latter, concentration, Die or less of :s nucleus the uence, or, at 1 Law. sm was gradu- ter times, An- led by modern f the Supreme ■ that Govem- ;nces unite in of philosophy ghest phase of mber and im- nain to be dis- lot any further since men's y[ any amount Thus it is that must now be een in respect that Science any kind — in lat the former ter\ But in |f its being so ause, of that first and un- .■s Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 5 interruptedly, characterized the relations between tlese two great departments of thought. " Of all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the most profound, and the most important is that between Science and Religion'." Why is this? Not, surely, from any mere speculative interest attaching to the great question in dispute? Assuredly not. At each stage of advance men felt that the God, whom even their forefathers had called "a God that hideth Himself," was receding yet further and further into the dimness of mystery; and as concession after concession was wrung from Theology, men felt more and more that Prayer was in danger of being shewn, in cruel truth, but a " vain beat- ing of the air." In proportion as the dominion of.' General Laws was advanced, men began to fear that Re- > ligion was losing all that made it religious; that belief in \ the " Living God" as the Upholder of the Universe, was becoming progressively absorbed by the antagonistic demonstration, that if such a God exislcu ctv all. His action must be removed to an indefinite degree. Men began to fear that the Deity their prayers addressed was in danger of being shewn a mere spiritual idol, fashioned by their own intellect and now in course of demolition, as the grosser idols "made with hands" had been be- fore. For men began to feel that the attribute which in their minds was most characteristic of their spiritual Deity, was precisely that with which the former material deities ' "■ been most universally accredited — super- intendence of physical phaenomena; and this was just the attribute v/hich the doctrine in question assailed. Men began to feel that the ardour of growing intelli- gence, which had previously melted down the grosser 1 Ibid., p. II. In ] ■' 4f ! k i! 1 -i ri : I \i ' \ Christian Prayer and General Laws. superstitions of their forefathers, had now begun to thaw out their own ; that their more advanced concep- tions as to the ultimate mystery of the Universe served but to merge the difficulty one stage higher ; that these more advanced conceptions were now beginning to reveal yet a higher phase, and to shew that the theory of Personal Agency, which Superstition had embodied in one form and Religion in another, was a theory which, as it had ever been entertained without reason, so could now only be entertained against it; that the human intellect in its progress, had now at last caught sight of the great and fundamental truth that the Deity, Avhom all nations, races, and religions, from all time had dehghted to invoke as " Father," was really only such to them in the sense that a cause is father to its effect; that the God of the Universe was the self-adjusting suffi- I ciency of Nature ; and that the Reign in Nature was the Reign of Law. Shall we say that men thought thus? — Shall we not rather say that never, " since the world be- gan," have men thought thus so much as now? For we are not so much concerned with the masses of mankind, as with the leaders of their thought; and now, when men of Science, Literature and Philosophy, not in iso- lated instances, but as the intellectually orthodox posi- tion, bow to this Dominion of Law as being to them supreme, confessing as their belief that that Religion is only truly religious, which beyond this Dominion aspires to know naught else; now, when the demonstration of this Dominion has thus been steadily pushed to its high- est phase of certainty, and the minds of men are confi- dently awaiting the discovery of other General Laws, and Laws which are yet more General; — now, surely, it be- comes the duty of each individual to pause and con- it Laws. low begun to anced concep- niverse served ler; that these beginning to hat the theory had embodied was a theory dout reason, so : it; that the at last caught that the Deity, )m all time had ily only such to r to its effect; f-adjusting suffi- ISlature was the bought thus? — e the world be- now? For we es of mankind, ,nd now, when ly, not in iso- orthodox posi- being to them lat Religion is )minion aspires monstration of led to its high- men are confi- eral Laws, and surely, it be- ause and con- Christian Prayer and General Laws. ) sider for himself the bearing of this new doctrine upon the old faith. Is it true that " The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, in those that hope in His mercy"? — Or have we found the true reason why "the wicked live, become old, yea are mighty in power," why "the rod of God is not upon them," and why "they spend their days in wealth"? Even because we have proved that theirs is the only true philosophy, so tersely / contained in the words that follow: — "What is the Al-j mighty that we should serve Him? And what profit' should we have if we pray unto Him?" § 3. In the present discussion it is desirable, for the sake of definition, that the following points shouM be noticed at the outset. It is necessary to assume intelligence and regard for man as attributes of the First Cause : otherwise there is / no room for argument. These attributes have indeed been wisely granted in the title of this Essay ; but, even had they not been so granted, they would require to have been assumed. From this assumption two ideas naturally arise. Firstly, as the intelligence of the First Cause is not an idea which Science or Philosophy is bound to accept, does not an assumption of this attribute tend to pre- judicate the question at issue, i.e., unfairly to invalidate the Scientific^ and Philosophical objections to Christian Prayer^? The discussion of this point is of so great importance, that it had better, for the present, be deferred. ^ For the sake of brevity, the word Science will throughout be used in the sense of Physical Science only. ^ For the sake of brevity, the word Prayer will throughout be used (except when other qualifications are stated) in the sense of prayer for physical results. II ! 8 Christian Prayer and General Laws. I \ 1 Secondly, supposing an Intelligent First Cause to answer Prayer, does the wording of the belief set forth , in the Title necessitate the further belief, that such i/i fj^UyO' i 1. U 1 1 ■ ! i j f i 1 . 1 1 \ i i 8 i 1 1 10 Christ iati Prayer mid General Laws. ^A«,/<- as we have just seen, an important difference between the two cases ; and for this reason. When this element is observably present, the mind at once feels that it is in proximity with a power sufficient either to suspend / or to modify the ordinary course of Natural Law. S Why? Because the production of this feeling is the / end for which the miracle is wrought. Hence, when the I proximity of this power is not intended to be sensibly recognized, then, manifestly, the ultimate effect will appear to result (whether or not it really does so) in the ordinary course of Natural Law. So that the two cases may be stated antithetically thus : — A miracle (sup- /posing it to be real) is an ultimate result, in which I la power is sensibly exhibited over the normal action of Natural Law ; but whether exhibited by a suspen- sion or by a modification of such Law is unknown. An answer to Prayer (supposing it to be real) is an / ultimate result, in which there is no sensible exhibition of power over the normal action of Natural Law; and whether it is effected by a suspension or by a modifica- tion of such Law is unknown. Hence, so far as the belief in government by General Laws is concerned, the question as to whether or not the case of an answer to Prayer differs from other modes of Divine action may be dropped ; although it must subsequently be resumed in another connection. Further, it is hoped that the point has now been made clear, that whether or not Prayer is answered through ,the normal action of General Laws, it must equally in all /cases, excepting in those of miracles, appear to be so ^answered. § 4. We may now briefly indicate the nature of the objections which it is the purpose of this Essay to Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. 1 1 discuss. It has already been pointed out that the greatest conquest of human thought which history records, is the recognition of the truth that General Laws pervade the observable Domain of Physical Nature ; and it has been likewise shewn that this conquest has been effected solely through the agency of Science. Now, as this conquest was originally due to the scientific methods, so at the present day, a mind versed in these methods feels, with a force almost impossible to others, the magnitude of the present difficulty. There is, indeed, not'ing easier to understand than the general nature of this difficulty, but it requires a scientific training to appreciate its weight. " It is hazardous ground for any general moral reasoner to take to discuss subjects of evidence which essentially involve that higher ap- preciation of physical truth which can be attained only by an accurate and comprehensive acquaintance with the connected series of the physical and mathe- matical sciences." It is only when a man has spent years of toil, in thoroughly acquainting himself with the investigations of others in the field of Natural Science, or in pursuing such investigations of his own, that the conviction is forced upon his mind as an axiom, that the operation of Law does not admit of differential rigidity. An ordinary man may assent to this proposi- tion, but it is almost impossible for him to realize it — to feel that it is inconceivable that it should be other- wise — with the same intensity as a man, who has long been disciplined in taking minute quantitative cognizance of natural phsenomena. Science asserts as loudly as she asserts any one of her most indisputable demon- strations, that " without the disturbance of a natural law quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse, or the i J \M ii i: 13 Christian Prayer and General Laws. rolling of the river St Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara, no act of humiliation, individual or national, can call one shower from heaven, or deflect towards us a single beam of the sun'." A man of Science will continue: — *I do not say what the Almighty can or cannot do, and it is for each of us, no doubt, to frame our own conceptions as to what He does ; but I do say, and say most con- fidently, that supernatural power does not admit of degrees, — that every time the Litany is rehearsed in our churches, we ask for prodigies of power quite as great as any of those we have just heard read from the Old Testament. Such being, I will not say my faith, but my knowledge, I balance the probabilities in my own mind, and I discover the difference between them to be so ludicrously disproportionate, that I feel it is only a question of the time which must elapse, before an adequate knowledge of the Physical Sciences filters into the minds of the people at large, when the present wide-spread belief will be assigned to its place beside those in sorcery and witchcruft. Such being my per- suasion, I long for a better inculcation of this know- ledge among the masses ; for men would then abandon this the last of their pernicious superstitions; they would then, instead of wasting their time and energy over senseless oblations, apply themselves to help them- selves by the modes and means appointed in Nature; they would then perceive that the study of Nature's Laws conduces more to their well-being than ignorant addresses to the Law-Maker ; for they would then begin to notice that savants have lived where saints have perished, and to acknowledge that the Anti-Christ of ^ Prof. Tyndall, Fragments of Science, p. 36 (" Prayer and Natural Law"). azi's. s of Niagara, can call one , single beam inue : — * I do do, and it is 1 conceptions ay most con- lot admit of rehearsed in wer quite as ead from the lay my faith, •ilities in my •etween them ; I feel it is lapse, before :iences filters the present olace beside ing my per- this knovv- len abandon ions ; they and energy help them- in Nature; of Nature's an ignorant then begin saints have iti-Christ of (*' Prayer and I Christiati Prayer and General Laws. 13 Daniel is right where it is written of him, " In his estate he shall worship the god of forces." ' § 5. Such is a type of the objections raised from the Physical Sciences. Before commenting on them, it is desirable in this place to state some further objections which have been raised from Metaphysics. Without pausing to give the stereotyi)ed proof of the existence of the First Cause, the Infinite, and the Abso- lute ; we may proceed at once to the difficulties which are raised upon it. ' How can the Caused react upon the First Cause ? for, if it does so, the latter has ceased to be the First Cause. It profits nothing to say that the First Cause acts from condescension, for then the desire of man becomes the true First Cause of the particular effect desired and executed. But if the First Cause ceases to be the First Cause of one effect, it ceases to be the First Cause of any effect ; for the only meaning of the term First Cause is, that it is the First Cause of all effeits. * How can the Finite act upon the Infinite ? for the Infinite must include all existence, and so all action; if, therefore, it is acted upon, it ceases to be the Infinite. * How can the Relative influence the Absolute ? for the only meaning of the term Absolute, is that which is beyond relation; whereas influence of necessity implies relation.' 'These remarks would apply to Prayer under any creed, that recognized the necessity of believing in the existence of the First Cause, the Infinite, and the Abso- lute. But how does the superadded belief in the govern- ment by General Laws affect the question ? Manifestly it increases the difficulty of believing in the physical I i' '■Jl 14 Christian Prayer and General Laws. efficacy of Prayer ; for it is a positi\e argument added to the negative ones above stated. It is just such a practical out-come as we should have expected: from our metaphysical conclusions. The First Cause is now sup- posed to be removed indefinitely far off from this the sphere of its ultimate effects. Penetrate as we may into ever-increasing generalities, there is always a dim horizon of generalities lying beyond. To suppose, then, that Prayer is physically efficacious, becomes more mentally inconceivable than ever. We do but multiply impossi- bilities of thought by this addition to our creed ; for we are now required to believe, not only that the Caused, the Finite, and the Relative, react upon the Uncaused, the Infinite, and the Absolute ; but also that they thus react through the intervention of a practically infinite series of changes. If it is difficult to conceive of A acting immediately upon B; much more is it difficult to con- ceive of such action, when A is separated from B by a chain of practically infinite length. If it is hard to imagine a floating leaf at the origin of a great river, di- recting the course of the rushing stream ; much more is it hard to imagine thpt same leaf, when it has eventually arrived through ever widening and deepening channels at the broad delta belcw, reacting against all that mighty length of current it has traversed, and, with the power of a deity, changing the course of that current at its fountain-head.' § 6. Such are the objections raised by the Physical and Metaphysical Sciences. If the former have been understated, it is merely from the want of space to render them more fully ; for, myself a student of these Sciences, I am thoroughly alive to the potency of their influence upon the mind in this connectioL; and I w^itftt Christian Prayer and General Laws. i^ know from experience the magnitude of the difficulty which a mind so influenced is obliged to encounter, when it endeavours to emancipate itself from the thral- dom of its petty conceptions, and to take a broader and a deeper view of the mystery that surrounds us. Such being the case, I can offer no apology for confining the subject of this Essay to the almost exclusive con- sideration of these objections. On he one hand "in an age of physical research like the present, all highly cultivated minds and duly advanced intellects have imbibed, more or less, the lessons of the inductive philosophy';" and, on the other hand, this philosophy "is a system far enough from the surface to make it appear deep, but does not go sufficiently far down to reach the foundation ^" There are, hence, numberless minds at the present time, too much prepared to deem the scientific aspect of the present question a foregone conclusion. And this tendency is increased by the fact, that the other aspect requires for its justification an honest effort of thought, in a direction in which, of all others, the scientific mind is least disposed to travel. For the latter reason my endeavour throughout will be, above all things to avoid abstruseness. Metaphysics, indeed, cannot be avoided (even were it desirable in a Burney Essay that they should) — the subject being purely metaphysical : but that abstruseness which so often occurs in this department of thought, and of which the scientific mind is so particularly intolerant, will, as far as possible, be avoided ; not only for the last-named reason, but also because I conceive that an argument which admits of a thorough institution upon a lower 1 Essays aud J^etiiews, \). 133. s Dr M'Cosh, Method of Divine Government, 7th edition, p. 183. u VJ m iiii /.' t\i>^ t I. V • '■ 1 6 Clirisiian Prayer and General Laivs. stage of speculative abstruseness, should not, on principle, be raised to a higher \ since every advance in abstruse- ness is a further indication of the intrinsic difficulty of the subject, and so of the liability to error. Thus it is that, were I not persuaded that the objections to Prayer which we are about to examine admit of easy refutation by "common sense metaphysics," I should not have undertaken to write upon the subject at all ; conscious as I am that this subject belongs to such a province, that it would then have required for its adequate treat- ment a writer who had given his principal attention to Philosophy. § 7. We must now recur to a question already pro- pounded, viz., does not the assumption of the existence of the Almighty unfairly invalidate the scientific position?! No doubt, in strict argument, a writer upon the present subject is not necessarily required to entertain this ques- tion : forasmuch, however, as I am convinced that it is mainly from a want of giving it due attention, that the objections we have to consider appear to some minds so plausible, I deem it highly desirable to expose its shallowness, for the sake of intensifying conviction by the removal of an unfair prejudication. What is the character of Science considered as a , department of thought ? Clearly, in the first place, it y^l ' ii«'-* is purely intellectual. The moral feeling of individuals may be moulded or affected by contact with Science, but this does not affect the character of Science itself; and so doc3 not modify the weight of objections raised by Science to any belief external to itself. The present objections, then, in so far as they are scientific, must be purely intellectual. But not only is Science \ sly intellectual ; it is likewise purely objective : it deals with ..''-. ' ^ '% Chrlisiian Prayer and General Laws. 17 the concrete and the actual, not with the abstract and the hypothetical. No doubt a mind engaged in scientific enquiry must frequently make draughts upon the Un- known ; and the ** imagination," guided by previous knowledge, is of indispensable "scientific use" when roaming in the regions of the Probable. Nay, it is not too much to assert that Science would have made no progress whatever, had not this its pioneer always preceded it into this region. But we must be careful to distinguish between the process of scientific thought, and the product of scientific thought, i.e., scientific dis- covery. While it is necessary for a scientific investiga- tor to quit the region of the Known for the Unknown — a journey implied by the very term " scientific re- search," — yet in doing so he leaves, for the time being, the territory of Science proper; and he only extends that territory in the direction of his advance, when he has succeeded in reclaiming a portion of the Unknown or the Probable to the Known and the Proveable'. But, although there is thus a great difference between scien- tific thought and scientific discovery, they are alike in this, — they both refer to the Proximate : for the object of the former is the attainment of the latter, and the Discoverable must always be the Proximate. Hence, in whatever degree scientific thought wanders from the contemplation of the Proximate, in that degree it has ceased to be scientific — has become specu- lative. Thus, Science is the child of Physical Law, and is but true to its genetic nature when it seeks to resolve all things into terms of matter, force, and motion. ^ This statement is not strictly accurate, because a proliability may be so hii^^h as to amount for practical pui-po?es to a certainty. R. 2 i y 1 1 I I H 1 8 Christian Prayer and General Laws. Materialism is the philosophy of Science, not by con- vention, but of necessity; for Science deals exclusively with the Proximate, and the Proximate is Material. But after Science has attained its highest successes, — after it has reduced all things to terms of its ultimate ideas, and reconstructed these ultimate ideas again into the comprehensible '* How" of all things, — even after it has shewn us the physical basis of life and the mechanical equivalent of thought, — Science has done nothing more than systematize our experience — it has left us still within the Proximate. " The utmost pos- sibility for us, is an interpretation of the process of things as it presents itself to our Umited consciousness ; but how this process is related to the actual process we are unable to conceive, much less to know." If Physical Law is, as we have said, the mother of Science, it is no less certain that it is destined to be its tomb : it is to Science the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end. § 8. Religion refers to the Ultimate or it refers to nothing. Further, that Ultimate is to Religion a Person'. This is true of the religious sentiment in general, but that special phase of it with which we are concerned is not a sentiment only. It is not the presence of the soul's aspirations, nor a recognition of our dependence upon a higher power, and the desire to express the consequent feelings of praise and thankfulness, — it is not even the beautiful adaptation of the Christian ^ Spencer's definition of Religion, viz., " an d /Wm theory of the Universe" is true so far as it goes; but belief in personal agency in some form or other is of the essence of religion. In other words, to apply the term "Religion" to any other form of belief is merely to abuse it. Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. ic> religion to these the highest wants of man — that has gained for that religion the adherence, through many centuries, of the choice of human intellect. Let us take what view we may regarding the truth of Chris- tianity, but — in common argumentative justice, if not in ordinary respect for our own intellectual faculties — let us acknowledge that Christianity has done in the world's history what it has done, an' I is now what it is, in virtue of the evidence — be it true or be it false — in favour of a Revelation. This is not the place to vindicate that evidence, but it is necessary to dwell briefly upon its character. From what we have just stated, it must be seen that Christianity differs from Science in being partly moral and partly intellectual — there being a great difterence between a Ecligion and evidence in favour of a Revelation. Considered as a whole, it may be defined as a department of thought having reference to the Ultimate. In so flir as it is moral, it is independent of all other departments of intellectual enquiry; but in so far as it is intellectual, the condition of its existence is that of dependence upon other departments. Our present object is to see how this dependence is reduced to a minimum. While the intellectual credentials of Christianity penetrate many departments of intellectual operation, such as history, philosophy, and morality ; the evidence itself, considered in its totality, is rendered by this very diffusion, unique. The very multitude of the intellectual pillars on which it is supported makes it independent of each constituent individual ; so that it cannot be destroyed without the destruction of all the chief departments of human thought. But not only is the evidence in favour of a revelation rendered inde- 2—2 m Vm ill : ! ,t *. i«w t^**^ 1^ v"" mmmmmmmm '^ 20 Christian P raver and General Laws. pendent of each department of thought by its diffusion through all : it is further insulated by its intrinsic cha- racter. For it is self-evident that the character of a department of thought is determined by the character of its object ; consequently the Evidences, considered merely as such, i.e.^ in reference to their one Object, are essentially distinct from all other departments of thought. Thus we find that the Christian Evidences are not only rendered independent (so far at least as the maintenance of their intellectual character admits), of all other departments of thought considered severally ; but that they are further insulated from all such de- partments considered collectively. § 9. These considerations then, viz., that the Evi- dences are partly moral and partly intellectual, — that in so far as they are moral they have nothing whatever to do with Science, Science being purely intellectual, — that even in so far as they are intellectual they are rendered by their diffusion almost independent of Science, — and lastly that, considered as a department of thought, they are, in their intrinsic nature, distinct from all other departments consic'ired collectively; — these considerations render obvious what we are now engaged in shewing, viz., that it is no disparagement to the objections raised by Science to assume that the First Cause possesses an intelligent regard for man. For these considerations clearly establish two positions : firstly, that any reasons we may have for believing this to be the case, are reasons independent of Science; and, secondly, that the department of the Evidences is so fundamentally distinct froai that of Science, that the latter can have no voice in the general question as to wb'^'-her the First Cause is, or is not, " the Almighty." I christian Prayer and General Lazes. 21 Now, no matter how small our " independent " reasons may be in fiivour of an affirmative to the general question, it can be no disparagement to this special objection to assume the conclusions to which these reasons tend. For we are not endeavouring to ascertain any probability relating to the general question, but merely to consider the two sides of this particular question; and to do this most fairly we should consider it as separate from the general one. Only if Science- were able to demonstrate the falsehood of the Evidences of Christianity, and so to settle the general question in the negative, would the assumption of its affirmative be a disparagement to this special question. It may be asked, — But why are we not entitled to add whatever strength of improjability there is as to the general question, to the imi)roba])ility we can shew to obtain regarding the special ? We answer, — Because to do this would be to confuse the functions of the departments of thought widi those of thought itself. After an indi- vidual mind has satisfied itself regarding the weight of the objections advanced by Science, it is then, no doubt, the duty of that mind to add this result to any im- probability which it believes to exist on the side of an affirmative to the general question ; but the only fair way of estimating the value of the special improbability, is to consider it apart. § 10. At the risk of being tedious I shall adduce an illustration, in order to render this point perfectly clear. Probabilities may be foirly likened to forces, existing only in relation to other forces : they are the resultants, 1.10th in direction and magnitude, of previous prol la- bilities. Like forces, too, probabilities are usually com plex; the resultant being caused by the incidence of m .„ ._..-..J».,..J*JWiiyWiPiP — ■■IP" \i I 1 i / V, if 23 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. numerous other probabilities, most of which are them- selves the resultants of previous systems. Now the probability that Prayer is ineffectual is compounded of two other probabilities ; first, the proba- bility that the Trpwroi/ kwovv is not even a 0«os ayvwo-Tos, much less a lIoTT/p tXei^'/xwi/ ; and, second, the probability that if the First Cause has an intelligent regard for man, this regard should not manifest itself in answering Prayer; or, which is the same thing, the improbability that it should. Now concerning the first probability, Science has no voice — the evidence by which it is increased or decreased being, as we have seen, altogether without the range of scientific enquiry. Those who have most honestly examined that evidence, best know the number and complexity of the contending resultants of the many systems of probabilities which contribute to form the final resultant, the assumed direction and magnitude of which the title of the present Essay sets forth. Now, in making this assumption, we are in nowise invalidating the scientific objections; for the only business on which we are now engaged is to discover, as nearly as possible, the value of the scientific element in the system, — the other element belonging, as we have repeatedly seen, to a distinct and widely different department. As the total resultant regarding the specific question is not granted, it can only be ascertained by a composition of its constituents ; and the fairest way of arriving at the true value of each constituent is to consider it separately — to assume the other constituent neutralized. When, by another line of investigation, an individual mind has, to the best of its ability, ascertained in the other department the resultant probability as to the general question, both in magnitude and direction ; then, I them- Chrlstian Prayer and General Laws. 23 no doubt, it becomes the duty of that mind to com- pound that resultant with this probal/ility established by Science as to the specific question, in order to obtain the ultimate and total result with regard to the latter; but it is no less clearly the duty of each department to abstain from encroaching upon the other. Before, however, such a mind can make this composition, it is necessary that it should know the measurement of this scientific constituent. For the sake, therefore, of measuring, in the fairest possible manner, the degree of strength residing in the scientific constituent, let us assume the other neutralized. § II. We are now in a position to appreciate the nature of the purifying influence, which, as we saw at the commencement, Science has continuously exerted upon Religion. The human mind will not rest satisfied with the single contemplation either of the Proximate or of the Ultimate; and this necessity in the human mind of dual thought, because natural, must be deemed legitimate. But this duality of human thought is not confined to its process, it is projected more or less into its product — is not restricted to the intellect, but colours reciprocally the two corresponding departments of intellectual enquiry. This mutual diffusion of in- fluence between the two departments is no doubt theo- retically illegitimate, but is practically unavoidable. The consequence is that each department, in so far as it penetrates the other, becomes liable to be influenced by whatever changes that other department may have to undergo: but this liability is incurred only to the extent in which the penetration has obtained. Were the line of demarcation between the departments as clearly defined in thought as it is in reality, no such i 'I V f 1 ^ :« •■ II I • 24 Christian Prayer and General Laws. liability could exist : as it is, this liability increases in direct proportion to tlie want of this definition. Hence, as we should have expected, in all the accounts which history affords of the controversies between Science and Theology, the battle-ground has ever been this border-land of illegitimate diffusion ; and it is within the precincts of this territory alone that the purifying agency of Science on Religion has been exerted. Briefly then, Religion transcends Science, — the former reposing upon the Ultimate, and the latter upon the Proximate. Any modification, therefore, which Science may impose upon religious ideas of the Proximate — ideas which are, in reality, extra-religious, — cannot influence religious ideas of the Ultimate — ideas which are, in reality, the only truly religious. § 12. We have arrived, then, at the following general conclusions. We have seen that it is no disparagement to the scientific objections, to discuss them upon the supposition that the First Cause has an intelligent regard for man : — on the contrary, to discuss them upon any other ground, or ground on which this supposition is not clearly defined, would be to endow these objections with an initial bias that would be argumentatively unjust. We have also observed that the legitimate sphere of Science is rigidly confined within the Proximate, while that of Religion is similarly restricted to the Ultimate ; and we have noticed, as a striking illustration of this point, a fact, which is, indeed, its necessary consequence, viz., that great difficulties are encountere when the two provinces are made artificially to overlap. Lastly, we have observed that the purifying influence of Science on Religion, has ever been confined to the filtering of the scientific element from the religious when I CJiylstiau Prayer and General Lazvs. 25 these had commingled, — to the correction of rchgious ideas as to the proximate government of God when these were erroneous, and which, in so far as they had ob- tained, were extra-rehgious. The point, then, which we have specially to bear in mind throughout the following chapters is, that Science deals exclusively with the proximate government of the First Cause ; while Religion refers to that Cause as a Person, to its character, its relations and intentions towarc's man', — but is in no wise concerned with causation. ^ Tt will be seen that this definition of religion differs from that of S])encer, who maintains, in effect, that Religion becomes irreligious in the proportion in which it endeavours to explain the mystery it acknowledges — i.e., in the proportion in which it aspires to deal with the character and intentions of the First Cause. It may be well to point out that this difference between the two definitions does not arise from any defect in the logical sequences by which they are respectively attained, but merely from a dif- ference of premises. For while Mr .Spencer tacitly ignores the possibility of a revelation, such possibility is in the present treatise recognized. The logical consequence of the former premise is, that religion is not merely irreligious but irrational, in proportion as it aspires to know the Unknowable ; while the logical conse- quence of the latter premise is, that religion is not merely irre- ligious but irrational, in proportion as it fails to respond to whatever degree of evidence there may exist in favour of a revelation. I cannot lose this opportunity of noticing the singularly un- fortunate character of the term "Unknowable," as applied by Hamilton to designate tlie Ultimate, and afterwards approjiriated by Spencer as a verbal epitome of the doctrine of Comte. It is unfortunate, because the assertion that the Ultimate is unknowable involves, not only the unphilosophical assumption that a revelation is in the nature of things impossible, but likewise a necessary contradiction — to wit, that we possess at least this mucli knowledge concerning the Ultimate, that if it is intelligent, it cannot reveal 1 i,' 26 Christian Prayer and General Lazes. The establishment, therefore, of the scientific doc- trine of the government of the world by (leneral Laws, which we at the beginning saw v/as the only sense in which Science has been the purifier of Religion, but which in the process has been throughout its develop- ment the only cause of antagonism between Religion and Science, is thus seen to be altogether foreign to Religion as a department of thought ; and while, at each successive stage of Science's development, Religion seemed to be losing all that made it religious, by the withdrawal of the object of its worship within ever- increasing shades of distance, — this has only been the case because Religion has never fully recognized the magnitude of its office. Far beyond our faculties of sense, of thought, and of imagination, — indefinitely itself or its wishes to man. [The Author finds that thus far he has been anticipated in his criticism by Mr J. Martineau. 1874.] The first-mentioned fallacy appears to reside in not recognizing the ambiguity which attaches to the verb io knmv, and its derivatiyes. As applied to causation — that is, in a scientific sense— it simply means to have explained, — that is, to have perceived a cause more ultimate than that to which the verb is applied. Now, as self- existence is clearly not susceptible of explanation, the Ultimate must of necessity be, in a scientific sense, unknowable. In other words, if the Ultimate is intelligent, its existence must, in this sense, be a mystery to itself; or, to descend to our own level, even if an intelligent First Cause were to impart a revelation of demonstrative value, this revelation could tell us nothing more of self-existence than that it is what it iS. This fact, however, is widely different from that which the un jualified use of the term Unknowable conveys ; viz., that not only the existence, but likewise the modes and the attributes of the Ultimate are beyond the limits of possible knowledge. It may be true that on philosophical grounds alone these modes and attributes are beyond these limits : it certainly does not follow, that in the nature of things a partial revelation of these modes and attributes is therefore impossible. Chrislian Prayer and General Lazes. 27 fur without the region of this the proximate manifesta- tion of His power, is the tabernacle of the dwelling- place of the Most High; and if Religion has felt that the extension of the dominion of General Laws has, in the smallest degree, affected its relation to its Object, it is only because Religion has foiled to see that that Object is rendered none the less personal, because the further removed, — nor the less moral, because the more incomprehensible. With these picliminaries thus vrell understood, let us now proceed to investigate the objections raised by Science to a practice sanctioned by Religion. It is a (juestion which Science, as a department of thought referring to the Proximate, has a full and perfect right to raise ; and it thus becomes a question, the discussion of which Religion, inasmuch as it is intellectual, is bound to entertain. CHAPTER 11. 1 i § I. As the metaphysical objections are of a merely technical nature, it is better to dispose of them before discussing the physical. It is a sufficient answer to the first of these objec- tions, that the frame of mind conducing to any petition is as much an effect of the First Cause, as would the answer be if vouchsafed. For the petition being thus equally with its answer contained within the First Cause, we have no better reason to say that the former, any more than the latter, reacts upon that Cause. This difficulty is one which can only be raised by novices in speculative pliilo- sophy. They have an undefined notion of human will differing from all other created things in its freedom of action ; and they carry this notion into tho highest term of the speculative series : now, this term has been arrived at by a wholly different route from that by which the freedom of the will is inferred : placing, then, the one doctrine in opposition to the other, they point to the antithesis as an insuperable obstacle to the belief in the validity of Prayer. This difficulty, however, is no greater in the case of Prayer, supposing it efficacious, than in the case of any other effectual action of which the human will is capable. The only difference is that in the case Christian Prayer and General Laves. 29 of Prayer the difficulty is rendered more apparent, in consequence of the influence of the First Cause being directly involved, instead of being tacitly assumed \ § 2, Taking the other two objections together, we have first to observe that there are two very different sig- nifications attaching to the words infinite and absolute. If they are used as subjects, they become mere abstractions; if they are used as predicates, they become intelligible con- cretes. We may, for instance, speak of infinite space, or absolute goodness, with a definite meaning; but when we speak of the Infinite, or the Absolute, as substantives, we employ indefinite abstractions. It would be a mis- take, however, to brand the latter as " senseless abstrac- tions V since, as abstractions and when not unphilosophi- cally treated, they are at least as valuable as any other ^ The objection thus refuted has been advanced in a great variety of verbal forms. As the above statement of it, however, is the essence of all such, the refutation tliere given must be considered general. As an example of the various forms we may take the following. "Were they (the series of physical pre-arrangemcnts) ever altered at the suggestion of a creature, either they were imperfect before the suggestion was made, or they were made less perfect by means of it. If previously peifect, the change would be undivine ; if not perfect until the change, we could with difficulty believe in the perfection of Ilim who made it." "Belief in an all- comprehending Intelligence which saw the end from the beginning, and deternuned beforehand the history of every inorganic atom, and the evolution of each sentient structure, is r jiustulate of rational theology : and that in the guidance of the Universe its great Superintendent acts according to laws set up from everlasting is no less axiomatic." All such objections, involving as they do the mo, e ultimate difficulty of fore-ordination and free-will, should be rigidly excluded from the present specific question ; since they have no more bearing upon it than ujjon any other in which the human will is concerned. '^ Mill, Examittaiion of HamUhm., p. 45. in. 50 Christian Prayer and Gcncrt.1l Laws. mere abstraction. Now, it seems to me that it is of the essence of an abstraction, to contain all the possible con- cretes of which it is the abstraction ; and that it is of the essence of concretes that they should not be mutually annihilative : if so, it follows that no abstraction can con- tain two mutually annihilative concretes. An abstraction may thus be looked upon as a genus which contains all its possible concretes as species, and which is by this very fact precluded from containing the opposites of these species ; since it is of the essence of these species that their opposites should be non-existent. If this view is correct, v/e can perceive and avoid errors occurring upon both sides of the issue between Hamilton, Mansel, Spencer, etc., on the one hand, and Mill on the other. The latter, it must seem, is perfectly right in shewing that it is as unphilosophical to attach any concrete mean- ing to these abstractions, as it would be to do so in the case of any other abstraction whatever, — to suppose that these abstractions themselves and as such have a concrete existence*. But Mr Mill is wrong in asserting that "the Infinite" must be at once "infinitely great," and "infi- nitely little j" and " the Absolute " " absolutely wise and absolutely stupid^" The Infinite may be cither infinitely great or infinitely little, and the Absolute may be cither absolutely wise or absolutely stupid ; but neither can be both the one and the other, since the species are oppo- sites, and so mutually exclusive. Applying then these considerations to the case before ' , it is evident that the objections can have no rational meaning, unless the terms in question are employed in their concrete sense. Now there is nothing inconceivable in the idea of an infinitely powerful and absolutely bene- 1 Ibid, chap. IV. ' p. 43. i Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 4 ticent Being answering the petitions of His sentient creatures : on the contrary, this idea is the very ground from which these petitions take their rise. To those, however, who are not satisfied with these views concerning the species of the U" conditioned, but adhere to their strictly logical significations, it must be sufficient to answer, as we answered when treating of the First Cause, that the difficulty which arises from our collision with the Infinite and the Absolute in this sense is not confined to Prayer, but extends to every subject concerning which it is possible to think. And this argu- ment is here intensified by the fact, that the very same ' )gical processes which prove the logical existence of the abstractions we are considering, likewise and as incon- testably prove that they are mutually annihilative when predicated of the same Being. All adjuncts to these metaphysical objections, such as the rhetorical metaphors of the type before given, rest upon the physical objections. To these, then, as con- stituting the subject of the present Essay, let us now, at length, proceed. § 3. Mr Herbert Spencer' has somewhere observed, that it is necessary to the discussion of any subject that it shou^ i bL "educed to a single proposition. Hence it is for^n it l'V'\t, in the present case, no one can experience any dni i' .j in throwing the scientific objections into this form, 'i me it is that writers upon this subject almost invariably obscure the real question at issue, by intro- ducing other cind altogether distinct questions, such as the pernicious influence on man of belief in the efficacy of Prayer, the impossibility of answering con- tradictory petitions, the impiety of addressing suggestions ^ lYinc'iplcs of Psychology^ Vol. 11. , h) I", ' !' ! ( (I i; ' -( 32 CJiVlstian Prayer and General Laivs. to the Deity, and so forth. All such questions, how- ever, being entirely extraneous to the one in hand, will be carefully excluded, as they should be from all writings professing to deal with the scientific objections to Prayer'. Now, into whatever verbal form we rnay choose to throw the proposition we have to consider, that proposition itself must possess two characters : it must be con- ditional, and it must be universal. No one can assert that the Almighty does not answer Prayer, but merely that // He does He must interfere with the normal course of nature : 1 e proposition must be universal, in no case ivhatcvcr ca rayer be answered without such interference. The examination, then, of this proposition forms the main subject of this Essay. Let us first enquire whe- ther it is adduced as establishing a necessity or merely a probability. The answer lies on the surface : if the pro- position is adduced as establishing a necessity, it mani- festly should not be thrown into a conditional form. That it must be thrown into a conditional form is self-evident ; but, lest the reason why it must, should not be at once perceived, it may not be superfluous to give it. A neces- sity can only rest upon a demonstration ; but from the nature of the case science is unable to demonstrate that Prayer is never ans. ered, because the sphere of science is, as we have seen, restricted to the Proximate. All, therefore, that science can do is to argue from the known to the unknown, and thus, by analogy, to infer that Prayer is ineffectual. By the mere fact, however, of this appeal to analogy, science has ceased to be scientific — 1 1 liavc entertained the foregoing metaphysical objections, because the term " Ahnii.;lily " includes the conceptions on which tlicy ate founded. Christian Prayer and General Laius, has become speculative ; has ceased to prove, and en- deavours only to presume. But although analogical arguments cannot /rom their nature establish a necessity, they may, as we shall subse- quently see, establish any degree of probability. Hence the business before us is critically and impartially to analyse the scientific proposition, with the view of ascer- taining as nearly as possible the degree of probability which it contains. § 4. As the term " Physical Law," or its equivalents, must occur in the proposition we have thus to analyse, it becomes necessary to point out what has already been pointed out by other writers times without number, viz., the ambiguity which attaches to it. The only rational interpretation of the term admits, indeed, of an easy and precise definition, which may be thus stated : — A Phy- sical Law is the formula of a physical sequence, which, so far as human observation extends, is invariable '. But from this definition there immediately arises the ques- tion, — Is this sequence necessary? — is that, which obser- vation has determined to be invariable relatively, also invariable absolutely? These are, manifestly, questions which cannot be answered, and hence the ambiguity of the term. Now this ambiguity is not, as a rule, suf- ficiently recognized by disputants, and even when it is so, the balance of probability appears to some minds to preponderate towards an affirmative answer to those questions, as decidedly as to other minds it seems to tend towards a negative. Hence to those of the former school, the term Physical Law habitually bears the signification of * The Duke of Argyle in his Reign of Laio gives five distinct de- finitions of this term ; but in so far as they do not embody the meta- physical conception of cause, the above definition includes them all. R. 3 34 Christian Prayer and General Laws. V. \ a mere instrument of the Divine Will, perfectly obe- dient in its ministry, and indefinitely plastic in its opera- tion; while to those of the latter, it no less constantly represents a practically independent directive influence of unalterable rigidity, upon which eternal order univers- ally depends. Without pausing to examine the respective merits of these rival creeds, we shall, for the sake of definition in argument, assume that the latter represents the truth. It is the belief entertained by those who raise the class of objections to Prayer which we are considering, and the belief upon which those objections are founded. The supposition, therefore, of its truth, while it endows these objections with their full weight, likewise, in so doing, affords the most unprejudiced ground for their dis- cussion. § 5. We have recently seen that Science, in order to establish its universal proposition, is under the necessity of appealing to Analogy. The reason of this necessity is our inability to follow the sequence of cause and effect in any one line beyond some determinate point. The fact of this barrier to our p'-ogress existing on all sides, is but the practical expression of our ignorance of second causes. It now devolves upon us to estimate the proba- ble amount of this ignorance. The endeavour is not, of course, to estimate the extent of the Unknown, whicli would be absurd ; but merely, from the data afforded us by the known conditions of knowledge, to indicate by (i priori considerations the probabilities there are as to that extent. In dealing with this subject it would be as impossible to attain, as it would be undesirable to attempt, complete originality. So far, however, as the general doctrine of X \ ;l Christian Prayer and General Laws, 35 " the relativity of knowledge " admits of special develop- ment in its bearing upon the subject before us, so far is originality desirable. Further, as it is also desirable, for reasons before indicated, to avoid abstruseness as much as possible, the conclusions which by other writers have been attained by metaphysical considerations of a more or less technical kind, will now be reached by considera- tions more in accordance with the disposition of a mind accustomed to scientific thought. As the vastness of this subject, however, is only equalled by its vagueness, if these considerations are sometimes found to be deficient in precision, it must be remembered that they are only advanced in order to test the direction in which the general cuiTent of probability in this matter is flowing. Every oscillation of the needle need not be observed, if only it eventually points with certainty in one direction. § 6. One great section of writers upon miracles employ an argument against the ^ /mA-/ objection to them, which, although its manner of presentation usually admits of im- provement, is nevertheless undoubtedly valid^ In the form of an exhaustive statement the argument may be rendered thus: — The whole (t priori objection to miracles, so far as it rests on the doctrine of General Laws, goes upon the implied supposition that a miracle, to be such, must be supernatural — i.e., a violation of the established Laws of Nature. But this character is not necessary either for the nature, or for the object of a miracle. For the nature is maintained, and the object answered in the same de- gree, if the miracle is merely superhuman — i.c.^ produced by secondary causes to the knowledge of which human experience can never attain. That such a class of secondary causes should exist, may appear more or less improbable, but can never be -onsidered impossible, 3—2 \'': ir ? rum m m iv 36 Christ iaji Prayer and General Laivs. without assuming that our knowledge of physical causa- tion is absolute. Now this applies with equal force to the subject of the present Essay, and to develope it will be the object of the first step in the following examination. It must be observed that this first step in our argument is not in- tended \o prove that such a class of second causes exists; but merely to shew that it is more or less probable that they may; and, further, that if they do, they nmst of necessity escape the scrutiny of Science. § 7. He who is most conversant with the natural sciences, either singly or collectively, and with the me- thods of scientific research, will be the man who will most readily admit how limited is the range of our scien- tific knowledge. The fact of the practical results of science having been so numerous and important, added to the fact that the field of scientific research afibrds the best opportunity for intellectual competition, and so the best background for throwing out into strong relief those individuals who possess the greatest powers of mind — these are the lenses which magnify science in the eyes of the people at large. But the natural philosopher, while he may justly plume the science which he follows on the enormous progress it has recently made, and as justly complain that the uninitiated are unable intelligently to appreciate its amount, is nevertheless conscious that the very training which enables him to value the attainments of science, compels him at the same time to feel, with an intensity impossible to the untrained, how utterly insig- nificant they really are. Considered relatively to former centuries, the dimensions to which science has developed in this are certainly astonishing; but, considered abso- lutely, these dimensions dwindle almost to nothing — serve V I 4 :al causa- abject of le object ; must be s not in- is exists ; able that must of 3 natural ; the me- who will )ur scien- esults of it, added fords the d so the lief those mind — c eyes of r, while s on the as justly gently to that the linmcnts with an rly insig- former ^veloped ;d abso- -serve 1-'ii ,•;';;% Christian Prayer and General Laws. 37 but to indicate the magnitude of that which lies beyond. For every fresh discovery, and every new district that is opened by it for further investigation, while it enlarges the sphere of the Known, still more increases our percep- tion of the magnitude of the Unknown. So that not only is it true that Discovery can never satisfy Inquiry, but, since the sphere of the Inquirable always encloses that of the Discoverable, the increase of the latter entails that of the former, not in a similar degree, but, as it were, in accordance with the law of areas varying as the radius squared. How long this process is to last, it would be foreign to our subject to inquire : we must observe, how- ever, that there is much misapprehension in some quar- ters with regard to this matter. Mr Mill's arguments are irrefutable, and they lead to the conclusion that when all generalizations shall have been merged into the fewest possible number, the latter must still be numerous. To this we should add that, even when all the sciences shall have become purely deductive (if this be possible), al- though the sphere of the Researchable will then, com- paratively speaking, have been filled up, the sphere of the Inquirable will never have been so large. Thus the prime result of scientific investigation is to reveal to ourselves the denseness of our ignorance. So far no one will be more willing to go with us than a man of science. We will now ask him to go with us in the opposite direction. As he acknowledges that the greatest organizations of scientific thought land us in ignorance comparatively total, we will now ask him to reduce those organizations to terms of their ultimate ideas. In each of these, viz., space, time, matter, force, and motion, every reader of modern philosophy will recognize that which is wholly inconceivable. It is not a matter m 38 Christian Prayer and General Laius. WA-^^ iti of knowing or not knowing, of understanding or not understanding; but, in dealing with these ultimate scientific ideas, all alike must acknowledge that they are mere symbols of thought, which must for ever remain utterly unthinkable. From this it follows that the only office of Science is the tracing back of phenomena to the point at which they emerge from the ocean of the Un- knowable, and the following of their course forward until they are again engulfed by its waters. And if such is the indisputable nature of that which underlies all science, it follows that even what we think we know we do not understand — that all our knowledge, absolutely considered, is merely another phase of our ignorance. '* We know phtenomenally and yet, marvellous as it is, we know that we know phcenomenally." We know that our ignorance is great, and yet we know that w^e know not how ignorant we are. Thus, whether we follow Science upwards to its highest generalizations, or down- wards to its fundamental data, we find it alike embraced by ignorance — a sphere "hung upon nothing," floating in a boundless space of Nescience. § 8. In the last section we have briefly considered what may be termed our objective ignorance of second causes, or ignorance entailed by the nature of the things examined. We shall now briefly consider our sub- jective ignorance of second causes, or ignorance entailed by the nature of our faculties. The one class of con- siderations is, of course, but the obverse aspect of the other ; but it is necessary that we should ente"* upon it, in order to bring out into a yet stronger relief the profound nature of our ignorance. " Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis." Nothing can be more evident than that we are entirely. 'I 4 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 39 dependent for our knowledge of the Universe upon our five senses : what are the diameters and the directions of these our intellectual apertures ? § 9. We sliall first consider the negative aspect of the case. Descartes and Berkeley may be deemed the founders of the doctrine that man, being dependent upon his senses for his information regarding the external world, can know nothing of things as they are in them- selves. The doctrine may be summarized thus : — We can only maintain consciousness in one of two states, viz., either in a state of sensation (including perception), or of reflection. Now the only change that can be pro- duced in consciousness by external objects must be so produced through the medium of the senses ; and, as consciousness can only exist in virtue of a change of states, it follows that external objects can only be repre- sented to the reflective state, by first being presented to the sensational state. Hence, the mind receives notliing from external objects, save the changes in sen- sational states which the latter occasion. But it is evi- dent that these sensational states cannot exist, as such, in the objects themselves — that they are merely sub- jective affections of the percipient mind. Hence, it is utterly impossible for man to know or to conceive of any objective reality as such ; since, before he can be aware even of its existence, the reahty must be translated into the appearance, which alone he can appreciate. Now the reasoning so far is incontrovertible, and it may well appear strange how any dispute could have arisen out of it. The fact, however, is, that the confusion of thought upon this subject is not in anywise occasioned by the above considerations, but arises from endowing them with a force they do not possess. Although it is- J i, III I: 1 n si 1 lil 40 CJiristian Prayer and General Lazvs. perfectly true that we cannot know anything in its reahty, it is evidently a case of non scijuitnr to suppose that on this account no such reality exists. Whatever basis "material idealism" may have to stand upon, it best consults its own interests by refraining from the endeavour to press this truth into its service. The point then which we have to bear in mind as admitting of no dispute is, that we are precluded by the nature of our faculties from knowing any objective existence, as it is in its substantial reality. This truth has great importance for us at the stage we have now reached. § 10. Let us suppose that any object X is present to our senses, and that its attributes as apparent through their medium to the mind are A^ B, C\ and that the realities corresponding to A, B, C are respectively a, b, c. Now it is evident that although A, B, and C are each present to consciousness as simple and inde- composable attributes of X, it by no means follows that their corresponding realities are in truth elemental. On the contrary, the group rit, /^, rmaybe compounded to any extent in each of its divisions, e.g., thus: a, a\ a", a'" ) /;, b' ; c, c', c" : or a, a' ; b, c, c ; a", b', c'\ a". Further, although ^presents only the qualities A, B, C, it does not follow that its substantial actualities are confined to even complex groups in which the elements a, b, c are variously compounded; for other and wholly different elements, //, e,f, &c., may well be present in X, although not appreciated by the senses : and these latter elements may likewise occur in groups variously compounded. Thus, an entity which is phoenomenally simple may be noumenally complex. Conversely, an entity which is phaenomenally complex may be noumenally simple ; for A, B, C, although apparently widely different attributes, Christian Prayer ami General Laws. 41 1 may in reality be but slight modifications of a single element, a. Thus in no case does the testimony of the senses afford any guarantee that a])parent differences or similarities are, either in kind or degree, even ai)])roxi- mately identical or commensurate with the actual ones. " The only relation between the two (/. c. * the mental modifications of Brown,' and 'the objects which excite them') is that of cause and effect'." Now the bearing of these reflections on our present subject is very direct. For it must be the underlying realities, and not the superficial appearances, that are the true causes of the effects occurring in nature. No doubt it will appear at first sight that this distinction is immaterial, since, the causes and effects being alike to us phcenomenal, the issue, so far as our knowledge of sequence is practically concerned, is the same as it would be were we acquainted with the corresponding realities — the sense, as it were, not being impaired by its translation into a language we can understand. That this view of the case is erroneous, we can readily perceive by the use of symbols. Suppose X, V, and Z to be three objects, possessing respectively the phaenomenal attributes a, b, c, d, e,f; ,(,»•, h, i\ and the noumenal attributes i and i', 2 and 2', 3 and 3', 4 and 4', 5 and 5', 6 and 6', 7 and 7', 8 and 8', 9 and g' ; and let us suppose these three objects inter- acting upon one another as cause and effect, in such a manner that the resulting combination is X, V, Z: the phaenomenal attributes would then be present to the mind thus : — a, l>, c, d, c, /; g, h, i ; and the noumenal attri- butes might be arranged thus : — i and i', 2 and 2', 3 and 3', ... 9 and 9'. But, although the latter might be 1 Mill. ■y-Hiv 11 ' '[ 'i 1 * :t • 't ) J ' 'k I a 'i' 1 't' I 1 ' f. , 1 ;{ 1 I [ ' 1 '1 , ' . ■ ,■.' '•, '1 •01 I ^1 '^'- M 42 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. arranged thus, it does not follow that they must ; for it is evident that one half of the figures, viz., those to which the dash is appended, may be transposed amongst them- selves, and amongst the other half, widi every variety of permutation, without the order i, 2, 3 ; 4, 5, 6 ; 7, 8, 9 (that is, the order of which alone the senses can take cognizance) being in any way affected. This is a simple case, but any amount of complexity can be conceived as existing, by adding to the groups I and i', 2 and 2', 3 and 3', 9 and 9', other entities which the senses cannot perceive \ and this may be done ■n the form of other groups, thus: — 10 and 10', 11 and 11', 12 and 12', &c. ; or by increasing previous groups, thus: — I and i', 2 and 2' 3 and 3', V, X, L; &c. Lastly, the noumenal groups may undergo the reverse process of simplification, thus : — • a, b, c,= i + "GOO I + "000001. Hence we are not justified in assuminr^ that our appreciation of causes and effects is in all cases a fair measure of the inscrutable realities. For, although it is no doubt true that, in many cases, experience of super- ficial appearances informs us correctly of the underlying realities, it is, to say the least, perfectly conceivable, — especially in a complex series of causative interactions among objects, such as A, B, C, Z, — that the un- observable qualities, by a cumulative influence, should at last affect those realities which in turn affect con- sciousness. And, \2 this be admitted, it necessarily follows that there may be two series of causes and effects, A, J3, C, Y; and A, B, C, F; to all appearances identical, but which are in reality very dissimilar, (either in consequence of one series having inappreciable attributes which the other scries has not, or Christian Prayer and General Laws. 43 from liavmg the same inappreciable attributes differently arranged, or both these reasons,) and this dissimilaiity, hitherto obscured, mdy, at the last stage in the se- quence A, B, C, y, Z, affect one of the observable attriljutes, and so become apparent ; the final result being (to appearance) indifferently A, B, C, F, Z; or A, B, C, F, Z'; or A, B, C, Fa/iy, &c. i^ II. This reasoning will perhaps appear to a man of science, at first sight, almost ludicrous. If, however, he will take the trouble to analyse his emotions, he will find that the only excuse he can frame for them is, that experience never displays such irregularity in natural sequences. This fact, however, has no bearing upon the present argument, as we shall immediately perceive. Without entering into the most vexed of all philo- sophical quesjtions, the true nature of a cause, we find, upon the very threshold of the metaphysics of causation, a fact, wh ch all modern philosophers of any ability agree in recognizing, and which affords a complete and sufficient answer to the argument grounded on the uniformity of experience. This fact is that the invariable sec[uences patent to experience, and which are ordinarily "dignified with the name of cause" and effects, can really only be supposed such in a metaphorical sense; or, at least, that we have no means of ascertaining in any one case, whether in an invariable sequence we have really perceived the true cause of a true effect. That a true cause in every case of such sequence does exist, is readily admitted ; but that we cannot take cognizance of this true cause, or, at least, cannot know in any one case whether or not we have taken cognizance of it, is a doctrine upon which metaphysicians are ever tending I 44 Christian Prayer and General Laws. more and more to agree. " The notion of causation is deemed, by the schools of metaphysics most in vogue at the present moment, to imply a mysterious and most powerful tie, such as cannot, or at least does not, exist between any physical fact and that other physical fact on which it is invariably consequent, and which is popularly termed its cause '." There is nothing mystical about this conception — nothing that need repel a mind disciplined in regarding physical sequences as the most real and invariable objects which it can contemplate. The considerations already briefly advanced as to our entire dependence upon our senses for information regarding the external world — con- siderations which are surely the reverse of abstruse — are alone sufficient to indicate that there must be a broad distinction between the ontological and the phgsnomenal order of things, and so between an ontological and a phoenomenal cause. " Quis enim me doceat quid sit substantia, nisi miseris illis verbis, res subsistcns ? Sci- entiam ergo nostram constat esse umbram in sole." Thus much then being premised, it is evident that the objection founded upon the uniformity of experience, or, which is the same thing, upon the assertion that the sense of the real order is not impaired by being translated into the apparent, has no bearing upon our present argument. For if (to use the terms of R.cid) an efficient cause must in every case include the physical, it is evident that the field in which the forr.ier operates is not that of the super- ficial appearances ; or, rccurning to the symbols of Sec- tion 10, it is among the figures, and not among the letters, that the actual causes are at work. Now it is, no doubt, perfectly true that in all simple cases the real order (so 1 Mill. or, CJiristian Prayer a) id General Laivs. 45 far at least as is practically necessary) is foithfully re- flected into the experiential order. This fact is indeed indisputable, both on a priori and a posteriori grounds, it is indisputable on d, priori grounds, because, unless this flict were a fact, human existence would have been impossible; since it would have become impossible to adjust internal relations to external with any degree of certainty. It is indisputable oxv a posteriori gxoviVid:%^ because exi)erience is but the empirically corrected regis- ter of such efficient causes and of such of their mutual interactions, as present to consciousness the outward and visible aspect of ph}sical causes. But although this fact is indisputably true when applied to comparatively simple cases of sequence, it by no means follows that it is like- wise true when applied to complex cases — and it is only with complex cases that we are concerned, for the rea- sons mentioned in Chap, i. Section 3. This is evident from the consideration that the utilitarian necessity for the trustworthiness of experience demands only that the register shall be correct for simple cases ; and even were this not so, we may be sure that, if there are t^ ms two currents of causation, a real and an apparent, a |- 'int of complexity must r-omewhere be reached at which it would become impossible for the former to keep pace with the latter ; and if thi? point happened (so to speak) to have been below thai at which the utilitarian iiceessity for the accurate representation of experience comes in, human existence would have been impossible. Hence, it is evident that whatever degree of strength our present argument may be supposed to possess, it is wholly unaffected by the objection raised from the uni- formity of experience. Experience must, in any case, be uniform; but this fact has nothing to do with the question m il * 1 Hi ."'' '* -i ,1 .' .!■! j 1 1 1 ) i< 1 ' 1 ', 1 ^ '' i . — 1 46 Christian Prayer and General Laivs, at issue. The only bearing which experience has upon this question is that which has aheady been discussed, viz., the excent or degree of its abihty to symboHze through the senses the interaction of efficient causes upon one another. This degree it is, as before observed, manifestly impossible even approximately to determine, since one term in the comparison is a negative of the most universal and inconceivable kind. It is hoped, however, that the foregoing brief discussion of this nega- tive part of the subject is sufficient to indicate, that from the known conditions of obtaining such knowledge as we possess on the one hand, and the known imperfection both in kind and extent of those conditions on the other, we are amply justified in inferring, or rather the inference is forced upon us, that not only is all our knowledge of second causes merely symbolical, but that even of this symbolical knowledge our attainment is indefinitely small; and that even could we attain to the topmost pinnacle of such knowledge as with the medium of our present senses is potential, Ave should still be enveloped by a vast and seething cloud-land of mysterious though interoperating causes, the confines of which we could neither see, nor be able to conceive. § 12, Let us now turn to the positive aspect of the subject before us. We know what each of our senses perceives, and so can estimate precisely the amount of knowledge which would have been subtracted from the race, had any one of our senses been absent. If sight, for instance, had been wanting, we should have known of the existence of light only by the occurence of a few chemical reactions, such as the union of chlorine and hydrogen, the decomposition of carbonic anhydride in the presence of chlorophylle, of some of the silver and "^ iSl 4 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 47 gold salts, and, as recendy observed, the decreasing of the electric conductivity of metallic selenium '. How vast would have been the knowledge of the Universe thus excluded ! Yet, on Darwinian principles, the occurrence of the eye depends, as it were, upon the merest accident, or rather on a concurrence of many accidents ; and whe- ther or not we subscribe to these principles, they may be taken as a fliir index of the probable chances there are as to the presence or absence of a possible sense. Had then nerve-organization (not to go further back) never been sensitive to light, the peripheral portion of a sensory nerve could never have become modified into an ocellus. Further, had the perception of light not been for the benefit of species, or had the requisite variations never arisen, or had they arisen in an improper order or relation to other variations ; or again, had the varying organisms not been subjected to adequate competition with otlier and kindred varying organisms; an ocellus could never have advanced in structure. Yet the degree of this advance is so great, that Mr Darwin himself admits the difticulty of believing it due to natural selec- tion to be " insuperable by our imagination." It detracts nothing from the force of this example to assert the obvious truth, that human intelligence would have been impossible had the race been destitute of vision. Indeed this assertion is merely a repetition of our argument. For the fact that, in the absence of the visual faculty, intelligence could never have become human, merely aflbrds a high presumptive proof of the probability we are endeavouring to establish, viz., that ^ There arc many other chemical changes which light is able to effect ; but as these are very minute and insignificant, they do not affect the illustration. T-*' r '■I I ) n f' -: ; E '.I !: 48 Christian Prayer and General Laws. were we endowed with senses additional to those we possess, our intelHgence would have been superhuman. The sense of vision has been chosen as an example, because it stands mid-way in importance between that of touch and the other senses. The ancient doctrine of De- mocritus, that all the senses are but modifications of touch, although long rejected, is now universally recog- nized. Hence, as we before likened the sum of our sensual abilities to five intellectual apertures, so Ave now see that they may be diagrammatically represented as four small tubes, surrounding a fifth and larger one, and all alike pointing in the same direction. § 13. To these views it may be objected, that the fact of all animals possessing the same senses, is a suf- ficient pledge that no sense of any importance could be superadded. We reply, It is quite the contrary. The fact of all animals possessing the same senses, only proves that this possession represents the approximate maxi- mum of adaptation between an individual and its environ- ment, attainable by the plasticity of nerve-organization. The fact, therefore, that man possesses these senses in common with animals proves nothing, except that equally with them he is, in his animal capacity, adapted to his environment. Indeed, this fact only tends to intensify the present argument ; for when we reflect upon the ela- borate care (so to speak) with which nature has provided for the animal wants of creation, it becomes a highly sig- nificant consideration that man should have no additional senses. For I do not think it is too much to assert, that all the four sense-organs occur upon a fundamentally different type, in each of the sub-kingdoms in which they appear \ Yet, notwithstanding all this wealth of adap- * By this is not, of course, meant that the same type never' .m Christian Prayer and General Laws. 49 tive power, man — the only animal endowed with reflec- tive faculties — is unprovided with any special senses to minister to them. Why is this? Surely not because nerve-organization, being as we have just seen so mar- vellously plastic, is unable to respond to the demand ; or that nothing remains to be taken sensible cognizance of beyond what we perceive. The counter hypothesis is certainly on ^ /;w/7 grounds the more rational, viz., — that the four sense-organs having reference to the escape from enemies, and the procuring and examination of food, are of vital importance to the animal existence of their possessor, and so have undergone innumerable modifi- cations ; while any additional sense, having exclusive reference to the intellect, being useless to the animal, has never appeared in man. Whether or not, therefore, we accept the theory of evolution, thus much seems plainly indicated, viz., that the quality of the senses on which we depend for our knowledge of second causes, is determined with reference to our animal welfare, and not to our intellectual curiosity. Could we perceive the vibrations which give rise to the phasnomena of magnetism, in the same sensible manner as we can those which occasion light, how profoundly might our conceptions of the physical universe be modified. Under existing conditions, we only know the presence of these vibrations by the occurs in different sub -kingdoms ; but merely that each sub- kingdom has a characteristic type. The Vertebrate's eye is won- derfully imitated in the Cephalopoda, while the molluscous type of eye occurs in the Annulosa ; yet no one would hesitate to say which is the characteristic type in each of these sub-kingdoms. Simi arly. the otolithic type of e.ir occurs in at least three sub-kingdoms, but is characteristic of the Mollusca alone. K. 4 \.' tT •n t f ^ t mt ^* ! • ' I ^ I '4 ■ !Ht t ,f tm i ^ 1 i '■ 1 I \ if ■'' i ■ \ '' i '■ I 50 Christian Prayer and General Laws. occurrence of a few phainomena analogous to those chemical decompositions, v*v:c., upon which, as we jire- viously saw, we should have depended for our knowledge of light, had we been destitute of vision. Had it not been for the apparent accident that a particular ore of a single metal, or that this metal when placed under very exclusive conditions, becomes affected by these vil)ra- tions in a sensible manner; we should have been ignorant of the very existence of a force in its nature as cosmical as heat. From these considerations it becomes evident that, unless we make the highly improbable supposition that the portion of our environment which is potent to evolve' senses necessary for the maintenance of our animal existence, is the entire Universe of second causes, we must believe an unknowable of suth causes to exist. HavTCOv Xpry/u.ttTwv fiirpov av^pWTros. To this must be added the consideration, that with whatever degree of i)lasticity we may suppose nerve- organization to be endowed, it must have a limit some- where ; so that even if our senses were determined with reference to our intellectual instead of to our animal nature, we might still feel that an unknowable of second causes probably existed beyond our cognizance. To yiyvwcTKOv Kara. Trjv Iuvtov ytyvwo-Ket t the theory of evolution, it is evi- dent that iu t/iings physical our mental faculties are moulded by our sensual abilities ; for our reflective states ^ Whether a real force or a metaphorical is here given to this •word is immaterial, the fact of our adaitation to our environment being all tlut wo aie concerned with. See § 15. •# Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 5 1 are all ultimately dependent upon our sensational states. — thought, humanly speaking, being impossible in tin- total and /tv/^Y/i'^!'/ absence of sensation. To this it may be retorted, — ' It does not follow that because thouglu is impossible in the absence of sensation, therefore in the i)resence of sensation thought has no other source from which to draw its ultimate materials.' And this rejoinder would be sufticiently cogent, were we speaking of thought in general, for then our proposition would be incapable of proof. Far from this, however, we are only dealing with our ability to apprehend i)hysical pha;nomena, and that such ability is wholly dependent u[)on our sensational states, our hospital reports abim- dantly prove'. And if this is the case, the considerations Just advanced seem to justify the belief that our mental faculties themselves are, in their appreciation of things physical, determined with exclusive reference to cur animal requirements. No doubt by cultivation in certain directions, by habits of reflection acquired by indi- viduals and ever intensified during transmission, and by the (a» vision of intellectual labour; the human mind has developed its innate faculties to a degree so tar excelling that which is required for a mere animal existence, that it might well be supposed to refer to an altogether different order of things, — the animal existence being the adjunct to the mental, rather than the reverse. Never- theless, a difference of degree, however great, does not constitute a difference of kind ; and however far the 1 For the psychological condition of a man bom blind and suddenly restored to sight, see Adam Smith's Mi'tapltysic^ and External Senses: for that of a person deaf and l)lin(i, "Lauri I5ridgnian." Compare also Carpenter's Hitman J'/iysitlogy, 7th lOd. p. 61 1. V'l i 52 Ch'istian Prayer and General Laws. human intellect may have succeeded in extending the lines of its initial endowments, it can never alter the inxture of these endowments themselves. However un- like the growing organism may be to the germ from which it originated, the former is dependent upon the latter for its substance, its dimensions, and its form. § 15. The conclusions thus arrived at admit of easy confirmation from psychological deductions. Long be- fore the evolution theory was thought of as applying to psychology, it was pretty generally recognized by students of the science that objective existence can only be perceived by the mind in certain modes relative to our fliculties, sensational and intellectual, since objective CKistence can only be known by the mind "under modifications determined by these faculties themselves'." 'J'his general inference, however, it seems to me, admitted of the retoi*^^: — How are we to know that the mind is not originally endowed with powers of intuitively appre- hending objective existences in their reality? Some one mode of internal perception must, as it were, have been chosen by the Deity as the endowment of human intelligence, and is it not, at least, just as probable that that mode is the one which most harmonizes with external realities, as that it should be any other single mode"? * Hamilton. * It is to be observed that in the absence of the evolution theory this question is unanswerable : it is not, however, on this account formidable. On the contrary, it is feeble to an indefinite degree, because embodying a conjecture which can never be raised even to the lowest stage of probability. All that ui)on this subject can be legitimately su]iplied by any system of psychology is, that the mind "instinctively infers unknown causes from known [because subjective] etfects;" but whether or not the inference concerning V? Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 53 As the science of psychology is still, in respect of progress, in its infancy, and the theory of evolution, as distinguished from a mere speculation, not yet a gene- ration old, we need not wonder that opinions may now legitimately vary as to the extent in which that theory affects that science. As, however, many among students of physical science recognize in the evolution theory a proximate, or scientific, explanation of the pha^nomena of mind ; and as not a few among students of philosophy subscribe to the belief that " it is this theory alone which furnishes a solution of the controversies between the disciples of Locke and Kant;" it would be a serious omission not to point out in this place how that theory, if accepted, cuts to the root of natural realism, in so far as this is distinguished from cosmothetic idealism of the third order. It does so because it sup- plies the reason why intelligence has, in all its rela- tions to the external world — sensational and otherwise — been moulded to the pardcular form in which it exists. Hence, if we accept this theory, we cannot, without violating the law of parsimony, look for other causes. The law of intelligence is formulated by the author and master of the philosophy in question as being, " that the strengths of the inner cohesions between psychical states must be proportionate to the persistences of the outer relations symbolized'." Such being the case, the development of intelligence is " secured by the one simple principle that experience of the outer rela- tions /traduces inner cohesions, and makes the inner the character, as distinguished from the existence, of these causct is correct, and if so to what degree — these are matters, not of probability, but of opinion. * Psychology, Vol. I. p. 439. ■ W^v h' I 54 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. I «y II I' 11 (I ■! W .1 <:ohesions strong in i)roi)ortion as ihc outer relations :ire persistent'." Again, "wiiat do we say of cases in which the inner order does not completely answer to I he outer order ? We say that they imply a low degree of intellect, or a limited e\i)erience, or but a partial enlightenment. And the disappearance of these dis- crepances between thoughts and facts, we speak of as an advance in intelligence"." If then these are the conditions under which human intelligence has become existent, it follows deductively iVom the nature of these conditions, that intelligence (an never contemplate physical events from other than .1 single stand-i)oint ; and that this stand-point is deter- mined with exclusive reference to our animal necessities. Whatever degree of advance intelligence is destined to make in the future, we may be sure that it can never ' se above its source — can never take cognizance of other relations in its environment than those which pertain, however remotely, to that class under which and by which alone it has been evolved. If there exist any such other relations (and we cannot but suppose that there must), their perception has, as it were, been carefully sifted away from our intelligence, — that class alone being eliminated, as the objects of possible thought, which there was a dire necessity for retaining. § 1 6. It is almost unnecessary to point out that the foregoing considerations have no reference to man's spiritual nature, since whatever view we take of this — whether we consider it as separate from, or as including his animal intelligence, — his moral obligations would be equally unaffected by the proximate source of his intel- ^ Psychology, Vol. I. p. 440. 2 Ibid. p. 410. Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. 55 ' Icctiuil faculties. Man would be none the less human were his origin proved to be derivative, nor wouU! conscience be the less supreme even though evolved. All we are now engaged in shewing is, that in the inter- pretation of natural jjliajnomena we are re-tricted to the use of intellectual Acuities, whose character is determined with reference to our animal wants and not to our mental desires. And just as we appear to have a con- necting link between the sensible and the insensible in magnetism, so we appear to have a similar link between the intelligible and the unintelligible in the interstellar ether. We are bound to think of it as possessing some of the essential properties of matter, and not others : it thus becomes semi-intelligible, because partially op- posed to faculties which refer exclusively to the material order. We might add that in the case of consciousness and the intellectual operations, we happen, as it were by jiccident, to be acquainted with the existence of a wholly unintelligible order, because, so far as we know or are able to conceive, wholly removed from the material. It thus becomes evident that, even apart from the evolution theory, not only is there probably a region of second causes which is imperceptible, but also that, even could it be perceived, it would probably be unintelligible. And the easy corollary on the preceding is, that even that which is perceptible is not necessarily intelligible'. 1 This presentation contains and extends that of Sir W. Hamilton. "The relations of knmuh'dge are those which arise from the reciprocal dependence of the subject and the object of thought" [Lectures, Vol. i. p. 146), "If the condition of relativity be not purified, there results the impossible to thought, that is what may exist but what we are unable to conceive as existing" [Discus- smts, pp. 178, 179). L ('(,'■ ;| * I II »«l>'iw—»»ii' " ft — ' i iw»*ii»i" "' *) ' ''fl>* ^' ' ' 'i ■ I, "] h i I fj ' f. I' ' 1 i Ni 1 1 i ' 1, ! 11 ^ 1 1 ^ ■; 1 i i i iL 56 Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. For if the perceptible and the intelligible are determinecl with reference to our animal exis 3nce, it follows that the one need only coincide with the other in so far as the coincidence is necessary or desirable for that exist- ence. And this h priori conclusion is supported by the indisputable couplet of facts before noticed, viz., that whether we trace scientific ideas to their source or to their term''"'ation, we are alike landed in the domain of the inconceivable. We have, therefore, no warrant for sup- posing that even what our senses are able to perceive, our intellectual faculties are able to appreciate. There may be ultimate scientific ideas of which o'^r "uelligenct- is unable to take cognizance ; and there may be innu • merable combinations amongst the ideas we have, of which, nevertheless, we are unable to conceive. § 17. Most of the foregoing considerations will, no doubt, appear to the man of science to be of little value because of so indefinite a character. He has been accus- tomed in his modes of thought co rigour and exactitude — ■ to believe only so flir as he can prove. But to carry th's affection of mind into a province which confessedly tran- scends knowledge, is meidy to take a dwarfed and nar- row view of the case. No doubt conservatism of thought is most desirable when the subject investigated admits of precision j but where this is not the case, it becomes irrational to close our eyes to probabilities merely be- cause they are not precise. In short, that mode of thought which is the only legitimate one to apply to the knowable, is just the mode of all others the most illegiti- mate when applied to the unknowable. The general conclusions, then, which the foregoing considerations establish, may be thus briefly summarized. Our ignorance of second causes is not only certainl) Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 57 great, and great to an indefinite degree, but in all proba- l)ility necessarily so — not only is there certain /an indefi- nitely large tract of second causes unknown, but in all probability there exist innumerable second causes in their nature unknowable. *' The philosophy of the conditioned proves that things there are which may, nay must, be true of which the understanding is wholly unable to con- strue to itself the possibility'." § 18. To a mind acquainted with the cl priori argu- ment against miracles and the kind' ^d subject we are now considering, the above conclusions Avill, no doubt, appear beside the question. Fully admitting that our ignorance of second causes is indefinitely great, such a mind will feel that we are, nevertheless, sufticienUy acc^uainted with them to know that their action is determined by " ada- mantine Lav ." And to such an extent will such a mind be imbued with this conviction, that it will be irritably intolerant of any suggestion to the contrary. * As well,' it will be said, 'might we belie/e with our grandfathers that the geological strata had been purposely interfered with by miraculous agency in order to deceive the im- pious, as brook the idea for a moment that the Reign of Law terminates with human experience. What then is the use of shewing how limited that experience is, so long as it is sufficient to indicate that Reign?' All such statements as these have the appeal to ana- logy at their foundation. It therefore becomes imperative briefly to enunciate the character of analogical arguments. We have already seen that science in making this appeal to analogy has ceased to be scientific ; if, therefore, men of science object to logical enunciations in this matter, ^ Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 597. ! 41 '■" Ills 51 ^:^ ■ i m if: I 1 M i = 1 ■' P. I* 'A |!'i iff « P ' Hi 31 »' (-. ^ i 1 '1 \\ ■ 1 ! (' 1 '[ J ' i ■ 1 A ' \ ' 1 i Lj L r 58 ChrisUan Prayer and General Laivs. they must remember that they have brouglit them upon themselves ; — if they have quitted their own province, they must expect to encounter the forces of the province they invade. § 19. Analogy is strictly a Aoywi/ o/xoioriys ', or resem- blance of relations. *' There is no word, however, that is used more loosely or in a greater variety of senses"," " In ordinary language it has come to mean any resemblance between things which enables us to believe of one what we know of the other\" Further, there is no mode of argument which admits of such a variety in the degrees of its cogency : " it may amount to nothing, or it may be a perfect and conclusive induction*." But whatever the sense in which the word analogy may be used, or what- ever degree of cogency arguments founded upon it may possess, the latter must, all admit of being reduced (in accordance with the primary conception of the process) to a formula of proportion. " In every analogical argu- ment there must be two ratios, and, of course, two terms in each ratio. 'J'he ratios must be distinct, but all four terms need not ; one term may be repeated in each ratio, and so three distinct terms are sufficient. One ratio being better known than the other, serves to explain it\" Thus much as to the essential nature of analogical argu- ments in general being premised, I think no logician will take exception to the following canon : — The argumenta- tive ^•alue of any particular analogy, varies inversely as the difference between the ratio known and the ratio un- ' Aristotle. See Whately's Rhetoric, p. 58. ^ Mill, Logic. ^ Jevons, Logic, 226. * Mill, Logic. * Wilkinson. Christian Prayer and General Laius. 59 known ; whether this difference consists in the number or in the importance of the relations involved'. Now this is true of all cases, but it will, I think, be further conceded that there are two essentially distinct classes of the un- known ratio ; one in which its limits are perceived, and the other in which they are not joerceived. In cases where they are perceived, the exact value of the analogy can be determined : in cases where they are not per- ceived, the value of the analogy fails in direct proportion to the degree in which such perception fails. For any fliilure in such perception entails, not only a corresi)ond- ing degree of ignorance as to the amount of difference between the two ratios in respect of their extent; but also an indefinite amount of possibility that the imknown ratio may present a difference from the known in respect of likeness or kind. As these distinctions will subsequently be found of great im[)ortance in the general argument, it may be de- sirable to render them more evident by means of an illustration. Let us suppose that a geologist is exploring a newly discovered country, and finds in the first portion of it which he examines a certain complex superposition of strata, which he recognizes as identical with that of another country where he knows this order of superposi- tion to be uninterrupted and universal. If the limits of the country he is exploring are known to him, he will be able to estimate the exact degree of analogical probability there is, as to whether the particular superposition of strata in question is likewise in this case universal. But ^ When tliis I'^ssay was almost completed, tlie Author's attention dh-ected itself for the first time to I'rof. Bain's canon (see Inductive Logic, page 143). The striking similarity between that canon and the above, is therefore purely unintentional. (1 ii ( 1 ! iii 6o Christian Prayer and General Laws. \\ if the limits of the country he is exploring are unknown to him, it is manifest that he is, proportionably to his ignorance upon this point, precluded from estimating this analogical probability. And his inability to make this estimation refers, not only to the probable extent of the observed superposition, relative to the sizo of the whole country; but also to the probable degree in which the rest of the strata differ from the observed portion in character. § 20. Applying then these considerations as to the nature antl value of analogical arguments to the case of the scientific appeal to this method, we have first to observe that the analogy instituted is not unassailable even in its known ratio. In other words, we have no v/arrant to predicate of anv Natural Law whatever that it is eternal and universal. For the only means we have of ascertaining the existence of any Law, is by observing its operation within the limits of experience. When, there- fore, we pass beyond the jurisdiction, so to si)eak, of those limits, we are necessarily unable to bring any particular Law to the test of experience; and consequently we are unable to assert whether or not beyond these limits it is in operation. This view is upheld by Mr Mansel vvith great ability, who extends it even to the law of causation ; asserting it to be quite possible that beyond experience the sequence of phenomena may be either independent of all Laws whatever, or be determined by Laws which are continually changing. " We cannot," he says, " conceive this state of things, but we can suppose it ; and this very inability to conceive a phjenomenon as taking place without a cause — in other words, this sub- jective necessity of the law of cause and effect — results merely from the conditions of our experience." "We Christian Prayer and General Laws. 6 1 cannot," he continues, "conceive a course of nature without uniform succession, as we cannot conceive a being who sees without eyes, or hears Avithorit ears ; because we cannot, under existing circumstances, expe- rience the necessary intuition. But such things may notwithstanding exist ; and under other circumstances, they might become objects of possible conception, the laws of the process of conception remaining un- altered'." It is so rare a thing to find the opinions of this author endorsed by Mr Mill, that the eulogy of the latter upon those just set forth is significant. He writes, " This expo- sition, I do not hesitate to say, contains more sound phi- losophy than is to be found on the same subject in all Sir W. Hamilton's writings." Again, in his system of logic, Mr Mill says : " It must be remarked that the reasons for this reliance [/. e., even in the law of causa- tion] do not hold in circumstances unknown to us, and beyond the possible range of our experience. In distant ji.'irts of the stellar regions, where the phaenomena may be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted, it would be folly to affirm confidently that this general law l)revails, any more than those special ones which we have found to hold universally on our own planet"." Now it is evident that if we suppose any known Law to be of a merely local or relative application, the whole of the a priori objections which we are considering immediately disintegrate. For, if any one Natural Law is granted to be variable, either in respect of the extent or the manner of its operation ; it becomes impossible to assign the diversity of the effects which may ensue upon its being ^ Prolegomena Logka. p. 149. ^ Logic^ \q\. II. p. loS. u^t Biff ^Mil m ;(•;■ %m tl 62 Christian Prayer and General Laws. life I 'I ■ 1 ! 1 ! 1 compounded with other and invariahle Laws. To take a simple case, let us suppose that there are five invariable Laws which, by their mutual interoperation, are able to produce as many different efifects as there are possible permutations amongst themselves ; that is, 120'. Let us now suppose that a sixth Law is introduced, subject to the same conditions : the possible efifects would now be 720. But if the sixth Law varied in only one direction — i.r., with one alternative of action — the possible effects would be 1440. Now each of these new effects, viz., 1440-720-720, would themselves become causes of other compounded effects, and so on. No one will be more willing to admit the truth of these considerations than a man of science. They will, however, at first sight, appear to him beside the question ; for, so long as it is admitted (as of course it is) that Natural Laws are relatively invariable, it appears at first sight as though the fact of any Law being variable or non- existent beyond experience, could not affect the opera- tion of that Law within experience. That this, however, is not necessarily so, we can readily perceive. For, taking the case of variability of action, it is evident that a Law X which is invariably x within experience, but which is indifferently x or y beyond experience, if as x produces the effects a be... &c., in the one sphere, will also as x produce a be... &c., in the other. Asj, however, it Avill produce the effects a/Sy... &c., and these themselves be- coming causes in the remote sphere (whether of sj)ace * It is to be observed that Laws difier from Causes. Five in- variable Causes could only produce one effect, but five invariable I^aws could produce an indefinite number of effects, the number depending upon the possible diversity of the material and mechanical agents through which the Laws operate. Christian Prayer and General Latins. or time), may propagate their influence to the sphere of experience — an influence which, although lost to cog- nizance amid the general intermixture of effects, would none the less produce its full measure of result. I do not urge these considerations as being of mixh weight ; and, indeed, should not have advanced them at all but for the sake of a symmetrical argument. At the same time, it must be added, we have no means of gauging the possibilities or the probabilities in this mat- ter ; so that while different minds are at full argumenta- tive liberty to attach any degree of weight they choose to the italicized word may, no one is at liberty to deem his opinion of mere value than an unsubstantiated hypo- thesis. This much, however, we may safely afiirm — if such variability is ever propagated, from no matter how remote a point, into the sphere of experience — such vari- ability must, as we have said, within that sphere produce its full measure of result; so that, //"any Natural Law is not absolutely what it appears to be relatively, it is im- possible for us to estimate the total relative effects of its operation. § 21. We now enter upon a more important and a less mystical portion of our argument, viz., the estimation of the second ratio in the analogy we are considering. It is for the purpose of this estimation that it has been necessary to enter at so great a length into the subject of our ignorance regarding the total operation of second causes. The application of that lengthy discussion to the subject now before us is sufficiently obvious. For, waiving the objection to the first ratio just adduced, and assuming that all Natural Laws with which we are ac- quainted are universal, and absolutely unconditional, it is evident from what has been said upon our ignorance •^^^mfi 64 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. \\ of second causes, that the unknown ratio is in this case not only cert^'inly of very great extent, but also that it has its limits wholly beyond perception. According then to the canon already laid down, the value of the analog)' is not only certainly low, but low to an indefinite degree. And this degree of lowness (whatever it may be) is of the kind which necessitates the presence of an indefinite degree of possibility, that the unknown ratio may differ from the known in likeness or kind. Now, in contradiction to these truths, the scientific appeal to analogy is made with the object of proving, not only that General Laws obtain throughout the entire series of second causes, but also that their character is through- out identical with that which we proximately observe, — that the whole domain of second causes, whatever its extent may be, is precisely the same as that with which we are partially acquainted, and in no wise understand, — that there cannot exist a class of second causes whose operation is (not only other than intelligible, but) other than that class with which experience is thus acquainted. — that the particular interactions among those second causes with which we are thus partially acquainted (and which constitute an indefinitely small portion of the whole), because we have observed them to be true rela- tively to this our limited knowledge, therefore must be true absolutely — cannot be modified by any changes or interactions taking place in the unknown domain of second causes. In other words, this analogy presumes to infer that the Almighty, Whose knowledge of second causes is conceded to be absolute, cannot, without vio- lating their normal course, make them produce any par- ticular effect He may desire ; only because experience shews that we, whose ignorance of their nature and ex- Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 65 tent is confessed, are unable to perceive the mode in which He could so operate. It is of no avail for ob- jectors to employ the /// quoque manner of argument, b} pointing out that it is as impossible for us to prove that the Almighty does answer Prayer through Natural Law, as it is for them to prove that He does not ; for this onl) leaves the matter in uncertainty, which is the only issue we are contending for. We are not engaged in proving that the Almighty does so answer Prayer, but merely in removing a presumption that He does not. Even, there fore, were we able dimly to perceive the manner in which He might so answer it — /. e., the qualities in which the unknowable Laws might be conceived to differ from the knowable — this would not be the place to point theim out '. " On the great Postulate of experience we are to accept uncontradicted experience as true. But where there has been no experience we can believe nothing. We are not obliged to show that a thing is not; the burden lies upon whoever maintains that the thing is^" To sum up. If our knowledge of physical causation were absolute, we might be able to show some necessary reason why the Almighty does not answer Prayer through the normal course of Natural Law : as it is, the proba- bility established is low in proportion to the degree in which our knowledge is removed from being absolute — /. I I'tl 72 CJu'istian Prayer and Gciicral Laws. and the upholding of all things (omnicontinentia). Pear- son more concisely generalizes these meanings, in accord- ance with the etymology of the word, as containing two ideas, viz., that of universal power, and that of universal rule. The first of these establishes an unthinkable rela- tionship, which, nevertheless, must be deemed an actual one, viz., that of potential Creator to the non-existent ; •' God's actual dominion being no otherwise necessary, than upon supposition of a precedent act of creation'." Kant divides the conception of nothing into four parts". The first of these is, " Empty conception without an object" — i.e., an intelligibly possible, though non- existent entity : the second is, " P2mpty object of a con- ception " — i.e., "a conception of the absence of an object :" the third is, " Empty intuition without ob- ject" — i.e., a mere form of intuition, which is itself no object, such as space or time : the fourth is, " Empty object without concej)tion" — i.e., "the object of a con- ception which is self-contradictory," and therefore im- possible. It is only with the first and last of these divi- sions that we are concerned : — with the first, because an Omnipotent Creator must be able at any moment to con- vert an " empty conception " into its corresponding ''object:" with the last, because even an Omnipotent Creator cannot effect contradictories : — " Deus propterea qusedam non potest, quia omnipotens est." In both cases, however, it must be observed that our faculties are inadequate to decide as to what is or is not possible or congruous to the Deity. " God cannot do things which are really contradictory, but He can reconcile things which may seem to us to be contradictory." We must, ^ Pearson. ' See Critique of Pure Reason, Bolin's Trans, p. 208. (I ' , 1 Christian Prayer and General Lan'S. y2> therefore, for the present exceptional purpose, add two other divisions, viz., Empty, and to our faculties incon- ceivable, object of a concejition ', and, Empty, and to our faculties inconceivable, object without conception. The former of these may be of great importance in the rela- tion we are now considering : the latter can be of no importance whatever. No doubt these considerations will appear of so abstract a character as scarcely to merit attention, and they would not have been adduced had they not lain so directly in our path. Nevertheless, it must appear that the relation of an Intelligent and Almighty Cause to an infinity of potential effects, may be of all relations the most profound. We now turn to the other relation implied by the term Almighty, viz., that of Omnipotent Ruler to the Ruled. As this is the relation which the whole of the present Essay is more or less engaged in considering, it is needless in this place to do much more than men- tion it. It must be observed, however, that this relation includes the attributes ascribed to the Deity by Scrip- ture, — not necessarily, indeed, as ascribed, for the ascrip- tion is confessedly adapted to human intelligence ; but as presenting in the language of human ideas the most faithful possible designation of their symbolized realities. § 4. I have now briefly enumerated all the relations which are known to subsist between the Almighty and the Universe ; or, more correctly, all such relations as are necessarily implied by the mention of the former. My object in doing so has been to render yet more con- spicuous the immeasurable extent of our ignorance con- cerning those which remain. We are thus indeed shown to possess a knowledge of a few relations, as it were I' 3' in it ■^ -. ii i.i rirl'i 1 ^ ■ f li ; ! 1. ■ , ^'^ i; fll^h I '' i 74 Christian Prayer and General Laws. in the abstract ; hut, on examination, these will be found to serve only as torches to reveal the immensity of the surrounding darkness. None of these abstract relations supply us with any real knowledge concerning what may be termed the effective ones ; they serve only, like the ideas of space and time, as the formal conditions of an endless number of possible concretes. " I.o, these are part of His ways ; but how little a portion is heard of Him! Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto i)erfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell ; what canst thou know?" Now this fact — the fact that our ignorance concerning these relations is inconceivably immeasurable — being of vital importance to the present argument, it is desirable clearly to understand the position which the objections we are considering occupy with regard to it. § 5. The scientific proposition asserts that a Being, Who is acknowledged to stand to the World in the rela- tions just set forth, never produces a certain class of effects. Now such an assertion can only rest upon one or more of three grounds : — either, proximately, because experience shews that He does not ; or, ultimately, be- cause we have reason to believe that such is not His intention ; or, intermediately, because we have reason to believe that some obstacle prevents Him. Now the first of these grounds must be excluded, unless the defenders of the proposition can show some reason why we should expect this causative influence to be taken cognizance of by our experience, supposing that influence to be exerted. That they cannot do this, while, on the contrary, it can be shewn that there is a necessary reason why such influ- ence, if exerted, should be hidden from experience, we Christian Prayer and General Laws. 75 have already seen. Similarly we have seen that the se- cond ground must be excluded, science having no voice in questions which involve the ultimate volitions of the Deity. We come then to the third ground as the sole and only one on which the scientific proposition is founded. And this is the issue which a thoughtful op- ponent will not hesitate to accept. He will perceive that the whole of the present question arises from the sujv posed existence of such an impedimer': — the existence of General Laws. He will further perceive that it does not signify, for the purposes of the present discussion, A\he- ther this impediment is ultimately supposed to exist in- dependently of the Divine will, or in accordance with it ; that is, whether or not this third ground of objection merges into the second one : for, whether in reality it does so or not, the proposition under consideration is, as we have seen, by its nature precluded from estimating the fact. We may therefore in this place, without any prejudice to that proposition, assume that its sense amounts to this : — The Government of the '\\'orld by (^leneral Laws is to the Deity an obstacle, which effectually prevents his answering Prayer, supposing Him desirous of doing so. Now in estimating the ability or inability of any agent to accomi)lish any definite action, it is surely a sound canon that the value of our estimation de Teases in direct proportion to the decrease in the sufficiency of our know' ., all other i; ii W' ;! 11 mv . ^S^X^tiXJXM^^' 88 CJiristian Prayer and G aural Lazus. ■ ', causes as its effects, — and likewise the Laws according to which these causes act ; it would t eem that, unless we suppose this universal cause itself subject to a Law de- termining the channels, as it were, in which its causative activity is to flow, we must suppose that the production of one series of effects is as easy, so to speak, a.i the production of any other series, — confusion being in all cases equally avoided by the existence of General Laws, which prevent any effects — i.e., any conditioned causes — from interfering with one another so as to produce dis- cord. Now, no series of effects can be considered infinite, without destroying the all-containing nature of their ultimate cause; for the Infinite cannot be itself contained': but, if any series of effects is limited, there is no more reason against the existence of a special series, than of a series more general. Hence the only question that arises is, as to whether the Supreme Cause is subject to any Law such that it must of necessity act in certain directions, or not at all. The answer of pure logic to this question is clear and decided. " If it con- tains something which imposes such necessities or re- straints, this something must be higher than the First Cause, which is ab'^urd. Thus the First Cause must be in every sense peuect, complete, total: including within 1 "'The inference of a First Cause assumes,' says Kant, 'the impossibility of an infinite ascending series of causes.' The manifest convergence of the various systems of causation wulch Science exhibits to us, seems to indicate that in the material world at least such a series does not exist. However far beyond anything that man can ever grasp, that centre lies in which all things meet, it is towards a centre that all his knowledge tends; and indefinitely vast as the stupendous scheme of Nature must be, Infinity is the property not of it, but of its caxise."—Burney Frize, 1868, p. 34. •: Clivistian Prayer and General Laws. 89 itself all power, and transcending all Law'." But, dis- carding logic, is it not as easy, or rather why is it more difficult, to symbolize in thought the origination of a special series of effects, than that of a general? "All change (/'. ^., every effect) is possible only through a continuous action of the causality*:" hence, on the supposition of a First Cause, the origination and continuance of one series of changes, although these may be conceived as less usual, are not a whit more essentially unthinkable, than those of any other series whatever. But the ob- jection that the answering of Prayer through known Laws is inconceivable, requires to its validity as an ob- jection, not merely that the origination of any series of effects should be inconceivable, but that the origination of a special series should be more inconceivable than that of a general, — it being a necessary belief that " God is as universally the final as the efficient cause of His operations'\" The truth appears to be that the real place at which the inconceivable in this matter should be posited, is in the hypothesis of a Self-existing Cause producing all series of effects whatever; there being, as we have just seen, nothing more intrinsically unthinkable in the existence of a special series of effects than in that of a general; and the only difference is that that of the former at first sight appeals to be more so, in consequence of the originating agency (which imparts to each alike its unthinkable nature) being here directly referred to, while in the other case it is but tacitly assumed. But the real diffi- culty is not so much to conceive of this or that class of effects originating, as it is to conceive of any class of ^ Spencer, First Principles, p. 33. * Kant. ' Pearson. H * ; t \ IH? 90 Christian Prayer and General Laws. effects originating, — to conceive of an Intelligence stand- ing in such relation to the Universe that all other causes whatever are but the effects of its Will. § 13. To conclude this division of our subject. It is a favourite argument against the credibility of miracles, etc., that " there is not the slightest analogy between an unknown or inexplicable phenomenon, and a supposed suspension of a known law.... Arbitrary interposition is wholly different in kind," etc. ' Now, there is mani- festly no argument in such statements at all, unless it is assumed that a miracle does entail the suspension of a known Law; and our warrant for this assumption is the subject at present in dispute. How do we know, how can we know that a miracle (supposing it to occur) " is wholly different in kind," with regard to its causation, from any other phaenomenon, whether unknown, inex- plj_.Ki, Qj. otherwise"? All our knowledge and all our ide causation are only and can only be derived from the relation in which observed second causes stand to observed Laws; but once let us overstep the limits of second causes, and we must enter a province where we must suppose that General Laws encounter other and wholly new relations, — i.e., relations of which not only can we have no direct knowledge, but which even ana- logical inference is unable to touch. Yet, once admit that our ignorance of these relations is absolute, and, ^ Essays and Revieivs, pp. T09, 1 10. ^ It will of course be perceived that these remarks do not lend any countenance to the silly argument often met with, viz., that because some natural phoenomena are inexplicable, therefore some analogy exists between them and miracles. I have even heard it stated under the dome of St Paul's, that the fact of Christ turning water into wine is no more difficult of acceptance, than the fact of water becoming grape-juice in the cells of the grape \ Christian Prayer and General Laivs. gi even were our knowledge of second causes no less ab- solute, and were the First Cause proved in all cases to act through the whole course of Natural Law; it follows that we should have no warrant whatever for supposing that the First Cause, in so acting, cannot in any case work a miracle, or produce effects having a special re- ference to Prayer. In the face of such ignorance as this, it is arbitrary assumption to speak of "arbitrary interpositions," if this term is meant to signify any difference in the Divine method of action absolutely considered; that is, considered in relation to the Deity as distinguished from ourselves. It is arbitrary assump- tion because, for ought we can know or even infer, the ultimate relations encountered by General Laws may be such that all effects whatever (including those we are specially considering), are finally due to the same method of the prime directive Power. " Since the mon- archy of the universe is a dominion unlimited in extent, and everlasting in duration, the general system of it must necessarily be quite beyond comprehension. And, since there appears such a subordination and reference of the several parts to each other, as to constitute it properly one administration or government, we cannot have a thorough knowledge of any part without knowing the whole. This surely should convince us that we are much less competent judges of the very small part which comes under our notice in this world than we are apt to imagine'." In a word, once admit that our ignorance of the relations we are considering is total, and it becomes impossible for us to assign limits to the causative ability of the Supreme Intelligence, acting through the agency of Law. 1 'Zw^'sx^ Ignorance of Man, I i !:^! I'v n m T^* 92 Christian Prayer and General Laws, It is no doubt difficult, especially at first, and more difficult to some minds than others, to imagine that a miracle can really .e precisely assimilated to other effects of the Divine influence; but we must all re- member that this difficulty is only what we should in any case expect to encounter. For, whether o" not the relations subsisting between the Deity and His creation are such that all effects whatever stand in the same re- lation to His superintendence; we should alike expect, from our total ignorance of these relations, to find our- selves unable, either to anticipate the possible number of apparently different kinds of effects, prior to obser- vation; or, subsequent to observation, to conceive of the manner in which these relations can be similar. Thus it is manifestly absurd to declare that the Almighty cannot produce this and that effect through this and that agency, merely on the ground that we cannot ourselves so produce it, or conceive of the manner in which it could be so produced. A priori reasoning is a reasoning from cause to effect, and is assuredly a most powerful engine of thought, when we possess some reasonable amount of knowledge concerning the former in its re- lation to the latter: but when the cause is a free and inscrutable Intelligence, whose relation to its effects contains all that is to man unknown and unknowable, — then assuredly the substance of such reasoning evaporates ; and we are left to supply the void with any belief, conceivable or inconceivable, which there may be independent and adequate reason to accept. CHAPTER IV. § I, Thus, the double appeal to analogy v'lich is necessary for the very existence of the proposition wc are considering, renders the probability we are estimating not only certainly very low, but low to an exceedingly indefinite degree. Yet low as we have seen that pro- bability to be, we have not seen how low it is. For, tlie considerations recently adduced to shew our total ignorance concerning — nay, our utter inability even to conceive, the relations subsisting between the Almighty and the Universe, — these considerations clearly shew how completely unwarrantable is the supposition upon which we have hitherto been going, viz., that the Almighty in every case acts through the whole course of Natural Law. Even if Science could render the probability as high as we have seen it to be low, that the Almighty can only answer Prayer through Law by violating Law, — even if Science were able to prove this to demonstration, it would still remain for Science to shew that the Almighty is under some necessity to act in obedience to certain rules. I am aware that in entering upon this division of our subject, I am taking up a position which many of the leading writers in support of miracles have abandoned. i ,i r •! ^ 94 Christian Prayer and General Laws. It ,■ .1 wi The fact of their having done so, however, appears to me an error to be regretted, rather than an example to be followed. It is most certainly the first duty of an advocate for miracles, to shew that it is a gratuitous proposition, beyond proof and even inference, to assert that the Deity cannot produce such and such an effect through the agency of Law ; but it is none the less clearly his duty not to concede even the outposts of his general argument, unless he has thoroughly examined the full intrinsic meaning and all the logical consequences of the adverse argument. I am far from denying that this adverse argument does, in this particular, at first sight appear overwhelming ; but I conceive that this fact only renders a penetrating scrutiny into its essential value the more imperative. By way then of indicating the direction in which such scrutiny should lie, we shall continue our examination into the value of the scientific proposition. § 2. In accordance with the law of excluded middle, we may make the following exhaustive proposition : — Either the Almighty does or does not in all cases act through the whole course of Natural Law'. If we suppose that He does, our supposition, in so far as it is rational, must rest on one or both of two grounds ; — either because universal experience testifies that He does, or because h priori considerations render it im- probable that He does not. Now, as repeatedly shewn, the first of these grounds must be carefully excluded, because, whatever weight any arguments founded upon it may be supposed to possess in the case of miracles, such arguments are, in the present connection, absolutely 1 The supposition that Law is self-acting is considered in § 1 1. Christian Prayer and General Laws. 95 null'. Thus we may at once dismiss all considerations founded on the uniformity of experience. § 3. Nevertheless, it is desirable to notice in pass- ing, that the essentially invalid nature of this class of objections is habitually disregarded by the majority of writers upon the present subject ; arguments being ad- duced of great apparent plausibility, which are, never- theless, wholly valueless, because resting upon this false foundation. As an example of this numerous and mis- leading class, we may notice the following, which is perhaps the most conspicuous. It is said, — " Religious men do not pray for eternal sunshine or for physical immortality. Why? Simply because they recognise tliat such would be contrary to the will of God, as revealed in the laws of external nature, and it rests with them to prove that one single physical event may validly be excluded from the list of the predetermined, before they call on us to pray with reference to it*." Again, "by degrees we learn to include all that seems at first sight anomalous within the majestic sweep of predetermined law. And is it not in exact proportion to our ignorance of what is fixed, that we make it the subject of our petitions'^? " Evidently so, but not neces- sarily for the reason given in the former quotation. Our ignorance on this point is the measure of our inability to appreciate the causative action of God : the faith, \ i 1 The d priori argument against miracles is composed of two factors, ist,the improbability that a Natural Law should be suspended, and idly, the " ^probability that an otherwise uniform experience should be interrupted. These two factors are far from identical; and it is wiih the former only that we are concerned. ' Rev. Mr Knight, Contemp. Rev. Jan. 1873. « Ibid. '■■[ *..;e«.isc!Cje. 1 96 Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. %M therefore, which sees independent reasons for the cessa- tion of that action within the sphere of the miraculous, and yet beheves that it is not on this account in total abeyance, can only be consistent with itself by making the degree of its ignorance the measure of the legitimacy of its petitions. "This argument is against common sense, and is obviously founded on the assumption that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a petition ha^' no bearing whatever upon the possibility of its being granted'." "It is our conviction as to God's will, not any doubt as to His power, or His willingness in itself, to listen to our petition, which sets the limit to what we ask of Him in prayer^" In short, we must "pray with the spirit," but "with the understanding also;" and in the " moral sphere," no less than in the " physical," there are numerous miraculous manifestations of Divine power, which, although conceivable and even desirable, a religious man would nevertheless rightly deem it impious to pray for. Thus, so far as the objection refers to miracles only, it is manifestly absurd. There is, however, another subject touched upon by implication in the above extracts, and expanded by the anonymous writer in the Contemporary Reineiv, with whose uncourteous jargon we must all regret to see Prof. Tyndall's name associated. This writer ironically divides "the realm" "of the natural and invariable order" from that of "the provi- dential," and adds, " Thus it is that class I. grows larger day uy day, while class II. diminishes in like proportion. Where shall this progress stop^?" etc., indicating througli- 1 Argyll, Contentp, Rev. Feb. 1873, ?• 468. '^ Kaislake, Theory of Prayer, p. 32. '^ Coiitcinp. Rci>. Oct. 1872. Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 97 out his argument that the objeccion we have just con- sidered necessarily embodies, or is identical with, the wholly distinct question as to the value of Prayer ignorantly uttered, for things which are seen by a more advanced intelligence to be impossible or inexpedient. This question we shall subsequently have occasion to discuss, and it has only been mentioned here in order to eliminate it from the other with which it has been confused. § 4. We now revert to the cl priori considerations in support of the supposition that the Almighty in every case operates mediately through the entire course of Natural Law. Now it does not devolve upon us to state these considerations, for the attitude we adopt towards them is, that the subject to which they refer is altogether beyond the range of philosophical discus- sion. All these a priori arguments must ultimately ground upon experience ; and, no matter how elaborate or admirably constructed they may be, they are, as arguments, valueless; for they refer to a province which is wholly beyond experience. As, then, the present endeavour is to cut away the very ground on which alone all such arguments can rest — i.e.., to shew that experience is in this matter empty of authority — it would manifestly be a mere waste of time to refute these arguments separately. § 5. As this endeavour will, no doubt, be at the outset considered by opponents over-bold, I have the less compunction in presenting the strongest conceivable case. Before stating it, however, we may observe that throughout the coming argument we are not endeavour- ing to prove, or even to render it in the lowest degree probable, that the Almighty ever acts externally to Law ; R. 7 wm in ii UlJ< illi .l. W 98 Christian Prayer and General Laivs, but merely to shew that we have, and can have, no warrant to assert, or to infer, that He does not. Hence, the only position we are contending for, is, that the question is one which must ever remain in argumentative abeyance. Turning now to the case referred to, there is pro- bably no single proposition that can be propounded, which would appear co a man of science at first sight so extravagant or incredible, as that a physical effect can exist out of relation to other physical effects. Yet, if we allow that we have no right to assume the existence of any analogy between the causative influence of the First, and that of other causes ; by what right can we assert that isolated effects do not exist? If no such analogy obtains, we have no means of even approxi- mately conceiving of the manner in which the First Cause operates, and it becomes a gratuitous assumption to assert that this cause can only produce any single effect, by producing at the same time a variety of other effects. That the production of a multiplicity of effects is the condition of human activity, is axiomatic ; and it is, perhaps, scarcely less so, that throughout the range of second causes, the production of a multiplicity of effects is the condition of all activity whatever. Bat when we have said this, we have said all we can — we are unable, in the absence of analogy, to assert anything farther, or to infer anything more. A man of science will say: — 'But it is simply in- credible that physical effects can exist wholly out of relation to all other physical effects.* But is this true? Is this supposition as to the existence of isolated effects a supposition intrinsically -ncredible, or is it not rendered so only by the super-added belief in the operation of ;ts red of Christian Prayer and General Laws. 99 General Laws ? I think the answer is afforded without investigation, by the fact set forth in the opening section, viz., that prior to the beUef in General Laws, all effects whatever were believed to be more or less independent of one another'. ' But now that we possess the addi- tional belief,' it will be urged, ' the whole aspect of the case is altered : superior knowledge has shewn incredible that which superstition believed.' But the word " in- credible"" here tacitly appeals to the analogy which, as we have seen, we have no right to institute. It may be highly improbable that General Laws in any of their relations admit of the existence of isolated effects — that is, effects out of relation to all other effects, and, consequently, out of relation to these Laws, — but we cannot assert that this is incredible, without assuming an inferential knowledge of all these relations. Indeed, the assumption amounts to more than this ; for, as we have just seen, there is nothing intrinsically incredible in the supposition that the Almighty may produce isolated effects, were it not for the existence of General Laws. Before, then, this existence can be considered an insuperable obstacle to the production of effects out of relation to General Laws, — i.e., before such production can be considered incredible — it is necessary to prove a 1 By this is not, of course, meant that physical causation was not appreciated in ancient, or even in primitive times; Init merely that all physical phcenomena being referred more or less immediately to tl^" T)ivine agency, the necessity on the one hand of a proximate cause, and on the other of a commensurate effect, was not recog- nized : — hence the easy belief in supernatural manifestations. =* This word is here, of course, used in the sense of "l)cing fully persuaded that some opinion is not true," and not in the sense of "a mere absence of belief" from "the insufficiency of proof. "-Mill. !! !'■ ; ( '' I! m :| ICO Christian Prayer and General Laws. knowledge of all the relations which are encountered by General Laws ; and, by parity of reasoning, whatever degree of improbability that existence may be supposed to impart to the possibility of such production, that degree must be exactly equal to, because solely deter- mined by, the strength of the analogy before mentioned — this being the only other source of knowledge avail- able. § 6. We see, then, that there is nothing incredible in the supposition that isolated effects may exist in Nature. "But," it is retorted, "no physical fact can be conceived as unique, or without analogy and relation to others, and to the whole system of natural causes'." If by this statement is meant that we are unable to conceive of such effects, as it were in the concrete, I am perfectly willing to admit it ; for it is a mere truism to say that we cannot correctly represent that which we have never seen. But, if the word "conceive" is here meant to imply conception of such entities, as it were in the abstract, I meet the assertion with a flat denial. Mr Herbert Spencer devotes his chapter on the "multiplication of effects" chiefly to prove the proposi- tion, that "universally the effect is more complex than the cause." Now this proposition is certainly true so far as it goes, but it is only one side of the truth j for the proposition would be equally true were its terms reversed. Every effect is the resultant, not of a single cause (although one cause may be more conspicuous than the others), but of an indefinite number of past causes, just as it will be a cause of an indefinite number of future efiects. If we take any one of Mr Spencer's ^ Essays and Rcviaus, p. 142. IS Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. loi illustrations we shall find that it applies equally well to the converse proposition — the burning of a candle, for instance, being quite as much the eftect of innumer- able causes, as it is the cause of innumerable effects. There is one case, however, in which the above-quoted formula is most true, viz., in that of the First Cause ; for this includes all other causes as its effects. Now, why is it inconceivable that this all-containing and all- generating cause, can only produce effects which are conformable to rules, themselves ordained by that cause? We have already seen that there is nothing intrinsically beyond conception in the idea of isolated effects existing in Nature, were it not for the existence of General Laws : but if we look upon General Laws as themselves but the directive channels appointed by the Creator, in which some conditioned causes are invariably to flow, it (\)es not follow that all conditional causes must invariably flow in such channels — that those causes which do thus flow exhaust the causative influence of the Being who originated both them and their channels. Suppose the First Cause had only produced one effect : it is manifest that this could never have become a cause, and so could never have been subject to a Law determining its causative action. Suppose now the effects to have been dual instead of singular : does it follow that these must necessarily have stood in any immediate relation of causality to one another — that they could not have co-existed without producing a miniature universe of inter-operating causes ? If not, by what right do we assert that plural effects cannot co-exist without such immediate inter-relation : or, which is the same thing, by what right do we assert that in the Universe, as it at present exists, the First Cause cannot originate a single ;. I: ,:1 1 02 Christian Prayer and General Laws. effect like its only effect just imagined — i.e., an effect out of relation to all other effects ? It appears to me that we have no right whatever, and that the only reason why the idea seems at first sight an inconceivable one, is because we confuse the notion of Cause with that of Law. To us, no doubt, every cause must exist under laws ; but, unless we identify Law with Cause, we can establish no necessity why every cause whatever should so exist — i.e., why the First Cause cannot produce any effects, without simultaneously framing rules under which they are to act as causes. § 7. I say we cannot establish any such necessity : I think another class of considerations will shew that we cannot even establish a probability. This conclusion has indeed been previously arrived at by implication in the closing sentence of section 5* ; but the following confirmations are worth giving, for they arrive at the conclusion by wholly different routes. We have already seen that it is only because of the existence of General Laws that the process of induction is possible. Now all knowledge, save the so-called intuitive, is ultimately derived from induction : hence, in the absence of General Laws, all such knowledge would be impossible. This fact alone is amply suflicient for our argument ; but, more than this, even the so- called intuitive knowledge is, according to the evolution theory, ultimately derived from the action of General Laws — is but the stereotyped adaptation of the race's intelligence to its environment : hence, upon this theory, even intuitive knov/ledge would, in the absence of General Laws, have been impossible. But these two ^ " The strength of the Analogy" having previously been shewn " virtually nil." Christian Prayer and General Laws. 103 kinds of knowledge are together the sole factors of experience : hence, in the absence of General Laws, our experience itself would vanish. I find that Kant has also arrived at this conclusion, although, of course, by a different route. He argues thus : — " Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we always pre-suppose that some- thing precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule. For otherwise I could not say of the object, that it follows ; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not authorize succession in the object. Only, therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phaenomena are determined in their sequence, that is, as they happen, by the pre- ceding state, can I make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it is only under this pre- supposition that even the experience of an event is possible'." Lastly, psychological deduction warrants the same conclusion. For we are able to think only in relations : if, therefore, any effect exists out of relation to other effects, not only is it of necessity insensible (because standing out of relation to our sense organs), but it is also of necessity, as a concrete, unthinkable. Now it has already been shewn that there is nothing essentially or abstractedly inconceivable in the supposi- tion that isolated effects may exist ; and we have just seen that if they do they must of necessity be imper- ceptible : we are hence deprived of all data for estimating the probability as to whether they do or do not. The relations in which General Laws stand to the Law-giver ^ Critique f p. 146. i^ ! s II i n M * ! i It; Mi', [i 104 Christian Prayer and General Laws. may or may not be such as to admit of effects standing altogether out of relation to all other effects; but whether these relations do or do not admit of such effects, and whether, if they do, such effects exist, — these are questions concerning which not only are we ignorant, but as to which we are of necessity unable to distinguish even a shadow of probability. § 8. Now the case of isolated effects is, as before observed, the strongest which it is possible to imagine. If then we admit, as the foregoing considerations appear to compel us, that the question as to whether or not such effects exist — or, which is much the same thing, whether or not they can exist, — is a question altogether beyond the jurisdiction of experience to decide ; it necessarily follows that experience is wholly precluded from adjudicating upon the alternative proposition we are now considering. For, if any effect can exist out of relation to General Laws, it necessarily follows that, if at any point this insulation is broken, and the unrelated effect enters the domain of General Laws, at that point a new cause is introduced — the Almighty may not have operated through the whole course of Natural Law. And, if the existence of even an insulated effect — /. L\o(rocJ3€lv, A man of science, nevertheless, who has been ac- customed to give the rein to his emotions, will deem the foregoing discussion unsatisfactory, even although he may not be able to overturn the argument as a whole. He will not be satisfied to have the subject decided by purely intellectual methods. It is a " case specially bearing on purely physical contemplations, and on which no common rules of evidence or logical technicalities can enable us to form a correct judgment. It is not a question which can be decided by a few trite and commonplace generalities as to the moral government of the world and the belief in the Divine Omnipotence — or as to the limits of human experience. It involves those grander conceptions of the order of Nature, those comprehensive primary elements of all physical know- ledge, those ultimate ideas of universal causation, which can only be familiar to those thoroughly versed in cosmical philosophy in its widest sense'." And how splendid is the conception of Universal Law ! Little as our minds may be, small as our opportunities undoubtedly are, we have yet at last obtained a glimpse of the Govern- ment of God, and we have found, that worthy of the immensity of the Universe, worthy of the infinity of its Author, is the majesty of His Reign. Shall we renounce our ^ Essays and Reviews, p. 133. Christian Prayer and General Lazus. 123 hard-earned attainment of so magnificent a truth, merely for the sake of a few li<-tle, selfish, and absurdly pre- sumptuous hopes; or shall we not rather embrace more nrmly than ever the grand belief, that here we have revealed a truth which does not end within the narrow limits of our faculties — that here we possess a pledge of the one all-pervading, ever-enduring method of the Most High ? And in the presence of so great a thought, shall we not cheerfully submit to take our place within this glorious system of unerring order, — an order which "knows no exception, is all-sufficient, and furnishes to us, its children, the highest type and model" of per- fection ? Nay, shall we not rather rejoice in such a system — " confide, hope, trust in it, know that our own. place is a part of the grand whole, and do our work unquestioningly and unsuggestingly"? "All are but parts of one stupendous whole, Whose body Nature is, and God the soul : That chang'd thro' all, and yet in all the same, Great in the earth, as in th' etherial frame. Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze. Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees, Lives through all life, extends thro' all extent, Spreads undivided, operates unspent^." But there is another side to this matter. While a man of Prayer will feel with the man of Science, that the recognition of Law magnifies his conceptions of the Go- vernment of God, as the discoveries of science magnify his conceptions of His Dominion; such a man will also feel that he cannot, without violating all that is to him most cherished, consent to believe that the morality of 1 1)' mi t '■'i: m Pope. I p^ i i 'I .1 I ' 1! 124 Christian Prayer a}id General Laws. God is swamped by His power. He has loved to believe that that power is infinitely great, and he hails the conception of Law as enabling him in some small measure to realize his belief; but he has loved yet more to think of that power as a watchful, guiding influence, to which the small is as the great, and without which no sparrow falls to the ground ; — an influence which in human form and with human lips has declared, that man is to Him of all that is on earth immeasurably the dearest charge ; that there is no word, no thought, of ours which escapes His loving care ; that mindful through all our forgetful- ness, constant through all our inconstancy. His earnest compassion is over us ; — ihat we have but to ask and it shall be given us^ to believe and we shall obtain. Are we to relinquish this great and hallowed creed, merely for the sake of an empty figment of intellect, which can have no substantially valid reason for its support? Call these hopes and these desires little, selfish, what you will, they are to us, and must be to all, the most momentous and important of all things in life. And how beautiful is th^ thought of our daily depen- dence upon God ! Even had we no external evidence to support the beHef — were it founded merely as the counter-hypothesis is founded, on the authority of our innate intelligence, — it would still appear to us the more congruous of the two ; for surely it is a priori improbable that such a sense of dependence should be present in man, without something to correspond to it in God. But now when natural religion has been endorsed by revealed, all doubt is taken away, and in the light of that finished scheme we can exclaim with an intensified meaning — " I will praise thee with my whole heart ; I will worship towards thy holy temple, and praise thy % Christian Prayer and General Laws. 125 name for thy loving-kindness and for thy truth : for thou hast magniiied thy word above all thy nafrie\'" There is thus no doubt as to the side on which the pre-potency of feeling occurs, and the scientific disputant in prudence, if not in logic, should abstain from allowing this element any part in the controversy. But, as we have seen, it is wholly wrong in disputants on either side to allow their emotions to encroach upon their argument ; it is but "making opinion the test of opinion"," and in whatever degree this is done, we really weaken our argument (although we may illegitimately increase its superficial gloss), for in that degree we virtually deny the presence of external facts or reasons to justify our belief. § 17. A man of science will yet object that, more or less apart from mere feeling, the foregoing discussion is unsatisfactory. Conclusions founded on dry logic alone are not enough for him ; there ap^jears to bt a massive body of common sense to be removed, the inertia of which such flimsy considerations are unable appreciably to affect. But let us ask him, Whence this common sense ? It is not common to us all, or your views would meet with no opposition. His answer would be given without hesitation, and it would be the true one. Men of science obtrude upon us that the speciality of thjir ps,rsuits engenders in them a speciality of thought ; and .h -efore that dieir antecedent conceptions regarding this 3 id k'ndred questions differ from those of other men. But what is this favourite saying adduced to prove ? It is little better than a truism to assert that modes of thouglu and feeling are affected by intellectual pursuits ; * Psalm cxxxviii. i, 2. Cf. John ii. 21. Psalm Ixxv. i, and Rom. i. 20. * Cf. Mill, Logic, I. 419. Cf. John i. 14. Cf. Ii! 126 Christian Prayer and General Laws. but the only influence which these pursuits can be ex- pected to have upon the thoughts and feehngs of those not engaged in them — /. ^., the only extent in which they coincide with "the conditions of external reality," — is strictly limited to the facts and the argumentative pro- babilities which these pursuits may be able to establish. Only if men of science were able to shew that their studies gave them a superior vantage-ground in perceiv- ing or inferring the ultimate methods of the Deity, would there be any argumentative use in pointing to the in- fluence of these ii'-^jps upon their intelligence. As it is, their favourite m.. is a positive detriment to their cause. Substantially u, man of science is in the same condition as other men in respect of knowledge, the only difl"erence being that he has given more exclusive atten- tion to a particular department of the Proximate. Naturally therefore his mind, by being in this department more per- sistently in contact with orderly sequences occurring within the Proximate, becomes more imbued than that of other men with the idea of Law : but, this conception being as a doctrine fully recognized by all educated persons, and so allowed its full doctrinal weight in all arguments, it is an infirmity to be overcome, rather than an advantage to be gloried in, that his intelligence is precluded more than other men's from taking a comprehensive view, in all its bearings, of the question before us. "Any one study, of whatever kind, exclusively pursued, deadens in the mind the interest, nay, the perception of any other /' therefore, " when anything, which comes before us, is very unlike what we uniformly experience, we consider it on that account untrue '." Thus the "common sense," which the man of science ^ Dr Newman, Lectures on University Subjects, p. 322. Christian Prayer and General Laws. 127 opposes to argument, is not merely a sense not common to educated persons ; but, when traced to its origin, is found to arise from no valid principle — when analysed is shewn to contain no pledge of authority. Yet supporters of the proposition we have examined habitually ground their arguments, as well as their beliefs, upon this basis of pre-conceived opinion; avowedly refusing to come into the arena of fair and general discussion. There is a bigotry among men of religion, but it would be hard to find a bigotry surpassed by this, which confessedly turns away from the principles of reason and logic, merely because they cannot be pressed into the service of pre- conceived ideas. Opinion is here again made the test of opinion, and a careful observer cannot fail to see that such argument as may exist is weakened by its very discussion. § 18. Lest these observations should be deemed too strong, I shall, by way of illustration, briefly criticize the most recent presentation of the case by the eminent physicist, who rtiay be said to have revived this discus- sion. I choose this illustration because of its brevity, its clear style, its temperate tone, and the authority of its writer. Prof. Tyndall begins his argument thus : — " I would simply ask any intelligent person to look the problem honestly and steadily in the face'," etc. If by this request is meant an honest investigation of the problem in all its bearings, we have endeavoured to answer the summons, and the result has been to confirm the words of Canon Liddon, " It dissolves into thin air, as we look hard at it, this fancied barrier of inexorable Law." That this, how- ever, is not the Professors meaning, he soon proceeds to shew. "To any person who deals sincerely with the subject, and refuses to blur his moral vision by intellectual 1 Contemporary Review, Oct. 1872, p. 764. i \ \ ! .■ i i f II 128 Christian Prayer and General Laws. ,Vi';i subtleties, this, I think, will appear a true statement of the case." The words I have italicized speak for them- selves. As the result of " refusing to blur his moral vision," Dr Tyndall proceeds to make an extraordinary state- ment, to the effect that a scientific student " claims the right of subjecting" the influence of Prayer *'to those methods of examination from which all our present knowledge of the physical universe is derived;" and so of deciding the question at issue "upon pure physical evidence." It is hard to believe that a man of Prof. Tyndall's attainments can here be in earnest, but if he is so (and those who are acquainted with the general tone of his other writings can scarcely think otherwise), there has probably never been a statement penned by a man of ability, which so well exemplifies the dwarfing influence of too exclusive an attention to a single class of studies. Only if "our present knowledge of the physical universe" included a complete knowledge of its ultimate source, of the relations of this source to it, and a further knowledge of its entire current, would this statement be true. Proximate manifestations of physical energy belong to a wholly different sphere from that to which Prayer refers, supposing it physically efficacious : how then, if it is thus efficacious, can a man in reason expect the methods which apply to one sphere, to be of equal value in the other? If we knew enough of the remote sphere to be deductively certain that no influence could be exerted by it on the observed sphere, without being to perception unusual ; then, indeed, we might subject the whole ques- tion to experiment ; only as there would then be no question, there would be no need of verification. As it is, the institution of experiment is merely an irreverent Christian Prayer and General Lazus. 129 mode of asking the Deity to work any stated number of miracles, at a place and time appointed by ourselves. Not to dwell longer on a proposal, which must appear self-evidently absurd to all who as yet have not "refused to blur their moral vision','' let us, for the encouragement of such, still further observe the effects of doing so. After shewing that there is no "inherent unreasonableness in the act of Prayer," since "from the analogy of an earthly father it is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural phaenomena a universal Father, who, in answer to the prayer of His children, alters the currents of phoenomena," Dr. Tyndall argues, — "But without verification a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect, and I am sorry to find us parting company at this point, — " and so on, explaining the pro- cess of verification. After so noble an admonition to abstain from "intellectual subtleties," it is a pity that the learned Professor should have himself ventured within the treacherous domain of Logic. It is, of course, per- fectly true that a theory without verification has " little other value than that of a conjecture ;" but the fallacy resides in tacitly assuming that verification is the synonym of experiment — that experiment is, in every case, the only means we have of verifying theory. What would a Lawyer or a Statesman say to this doctrine ? Or, would Prof. Tyndall himself undertake to assert that ("hristianity, as a whole, has no more to say for itself than Fetishism ? Again, even in physical science what would become of the statement ? Prof. Tyndall, indeed, tells us elsewhere that he has " not even a theory of magnetism ;" but we cannot suppose this to mean that he regards the impon- * For a fuller refutation of th" proposal, see M'Cosh in the same number of the Contemporary Review. R. 9 i IV "I • ■..<■' ^ -M I I «! fi- ll W: 'ft m Rn II S iTPB' ^■ 130 Christian Prayer and General Laws. derable fluid with the same favour as did his forefathers. This, however, introduces us to another fallacy contained in the above presentation, viz., the implied doctrine that verification must either be absolute or //// — demonstrative or valueless. If Prof. Tyndall's beliefs do not admit of degrees — if he only begins to believe where he can prove, then of all men he must be the least practical, and the most irrational. How does such philosophy contrast, on the one hand, with that of Mill', — "It is in the power of everyone to cultivate habits of thought which make him independent of them {i.e., supposed instinctive beliefs). The habit of philosophical analysis (of which it is the surest effect to enable the mind to command, instead of being com- manded by, the laws of the merely passive parts of its own nature), by shewing to us that things are not neces- sarily connected in fart because their ideas are connected in our minds, is able to loosen innumerable associations which reign despotically over the undisciplined or early- prejudiced mind," etc., etc. ; or, on the other hand, with that of " Butler of the 'Analogy' (who, if he were alive, would make short work of much of the current ct priori 'infidelity') V' — "to us probability is the very guide of life." § 19. In closing this division of our subject we must ask. Whence this violent contrast between the feelings or the preconceived opinions of the disputants on either side ? A mere difference of intellectual pursuits is not sufficient to account for it, since in no other subject does sucli difference engender so great a strength of opposite conviction. The answer is to be found in the fact already discussed, viz., that it is impossible to overrate the influence ^ Logic, Vol. II. p. 98. 2 Huxley, Lay Sermons, p. 69. Christian Prayer and General Laws, 131: of our views as to the truth of Christianity, upon our views as to the antecedent probabiHty of the more special question before us. "This fancied barrier of inexorable law" is, after all, in most cases a mere intellectual scape- goat, made (unconsciously I admit) to carry the weight of our unbelief in the authority of Revelation, "Oncq believe that there is a God, and miracles are not in- credible'," is a maxim which must remain irrefutable, so long as our intelligence remains human'. 1 am aware that the substance of this maxim is contradicted by Hume, and where he has inadvertently stumbled, it is not surprising that others should have fallen. He says : — . " Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed, be in this case Almighty, it does not upon that account become a whit more probable ; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being* otherwise than from the experience which we have of His productions in the usual course of nature^" Now Hume himself elsewhere admits, what all supporters of the d priori objections must admit, viz., that the only ground on which these objections have to stand, is the fact that experience does not supply us with a cause adequate to M \\:\\ 1 Paley. ' In the course of an elaborate disquisition on Miracles, pub-, lished while this Essay was in the press, the anonymous author truly observed that Paley 's '"argument culminates in the short statement" above quoted; but after the word "God" in that quotation, he adds in brackets, ^H.e., a Personal God, working miracles," — thereby reducing the proposition to a comical truism. If this author requires punctilious exactitude at the expense of conciseness, the proposition may be thrown into this form : — To a Theist, as distinguished from a Deist or an Atheist, miracles are ndt incredible. (See Supernatural Religion, Vol. i. p. 209) [1874.] 3 Miracles, 9—2 m iJ fii 1.32 Chris* ia?t Prayer and General Laivs. produce the alleged effect. Upon the premise, however, of an Almighty Agent, the adequacy of an assumed cause is granted ; and the only legitimate conclusion is that a miracle is a more probable event than it would be in the absence of such an assumption. For, in the presence of this assumption, a miracle, as Brown in substance ob- serves, is not a violation, but an instance of law of causality'; and this obvious truth is assented to by Mill, who adds — " Of the adequacy of the cause, if present, there can be no doubt ; and the only antecedent im- probability which can be ascribed to the miracle, is the improbability that any such cause existed'." The true statement of Hume's case is, that although the occurrence of a miracle is much more probable upon the supposition of an Intelligent and Almighty First Cause than it would be in the absence of such a supposition, yet a miracle is still highly improbable — or, more correctly, the fact of its having occurred is highly uncertain, — because we are ignorant as to the other attributes of that Agents When, however, these are supplied, as they are professed to be by Revelation, and when that profession is accepted as authoritative — when, that is, we believe in "///^ Almighty" — then the assumed Agent is supposed to possess not only the ability but also the intention, and a miracle ceases to be improbable, in exact proportion to the ^ Cause and Effect, Notes A and F. ^ Logic, II. p. 168. ' The anonymous author previously referred to, although very jealous of his logical reputation, has nevertheless failed to perceive this obvious inconsequence in Hume's reasoning. It would have appeared somewhat more impartial, if the writer had taken time to consider this point, before adducing the above quotation from Hume, as proof that Mill "apparently overlooked" it. (Vide loc. «V.)[i874.] Christian Prayer and General Laws. 133 degree of belief entertained as to the existence of such an Agent. Thus, while Philosophy alone, even when supplied with the premise of an Intelligent and Almighty First Cause, is logically bound to pronounce the question, as to whether or not a miracle ever occurred, a hopelessly uncertain one ; Philosophy supplemented by Revelation, and thus starting from a new premise, can have no hesitation in pronouncing the occurrence of a miracle credible, in the precise degree in which the premise is held so. And it is evident that these remarks apply equally to the case of Prayer. On philosophical grounds alone no real presumption can be raised against it, and the whole question turns upon the truth of Christianity, and the statements of Scripture when accepted as Divine. Thus Philosophy — even when expanded to its widest meaning, and understood as the unification of all our knowledge ' — Philosophy must how, as in her early home, rear her altkr to the Unknown God; but when she does so let her at least be consistent j and if an Apostle of another system has come to declare that God Whom she ignorantly worships", let her listen to His preaching with an impartial and unbiassed ear — let her decide upon the merits of that system, not by preconceived opinion, but in accordance with its own credentials. And, in any case, let her above all things abstain from the folly of asserting what the Unknown God can or cannot do — what He does or does not desire : — so shall she cease to stultify herself, and to mislead the less thoughtful of her children. 1 Cf. Spencer, First Principles, s Heb. iiL i. n n. CHAPTER V. ,iM § I. Our examination thus far has already been characterized as "an elaborate exposition of the argu- ment from ignorance." That examination, however, would be incomplete, were it allowed to end with this exposition. Our main argument has been, that the question at issue is a question entirely beyond the range of philosophical discussion ; but a subordinate argument remains to be adduced. The scientific proposition rests entirely upon d priori considerations, which, when we shut our eyes to our ignorance, certainly tend to shew that the Almighty cannot answer Prayer through the normal course of Law. There are, however, antagonistic considerations of the same class, — that is, considerations shewing how the Almighty may be conceived to answer Prayer through the normal course of Law, — and the state- ment of these constitutes the subordinate argument. Before commencing this statement, however, it is desirable definitely to understand the position which these h priori considerations are intended to occupy in the general argument. The scientific proposition asserts, that in no case does the Almighty answer Prayer with a physical equivalent : I have endeavoured to shew that the reasons by which this assertion is supported have very little authority; and this point is, as repeatedly observed, the principal one with which the present Essay is concerned. We have nothing whatever to do with the Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 135 question, Hoiu does the Almighty answer Prayer? but merely with the examination of the reasons inducing us to suppose that He does not. Even were science able to shew that it transcends our faculties to conceive of any manner in which the Almighty could answer Prayer, our argument would still remain intact — the whole basis of that argument being, as just observed, that the ques- tion is one which transcends our faculties. Nevertheless, as men persist in applying reason to a sphere that transcends reason, and in supposing that their abstract symbolisms have a concrete value, it becomes desirable to adduce such kindred arguments as tend to support the opposite view ; since the scientific objections to Prayer may thus, even upon their own ground, be neutralized to a greater or less extent — even apart from all considerations as to the essentially invalid nature of the scientific pro- position, that proposition may thus itself be shewn not altogether true. From what has been said, however, it will be evident that in the case of no single method which it is possible to suggest, is it pretended that there is even so much as a probability that such method is really the one by which an answer to Prayer is secured. These suggestions are only made in order to shew, that, even to our present faculties, it is not inconceivable that the Almighty may answer Prayer : they in no wise pre- sume to indicate the manner in which He does. Indeed, on philosophical grounds alone (we must in consistency observe) we have no more adequate data for supposing that the Almighty ever answers Prayer, than we have for supposing that He does not. Our business, however, throughout has been, not with the question as to whether or not He actually does, but merely with the question as to how far it is improbable that He should. It is hoped, !}i^ iiH I ij( 136 Christian Prayer and General Laws. therefore, that che following conceivable possibilities as to the manner in which, so far as we can see, He might, may yet further reduce the improbability which the scientific objections endeavour to establish'. These objections are, as already )bserved, entirely of an d priori character : the antagonistic considerations, therefore, about to be adduced, being of the same character, have the following advantages over these objections : — firstly, These objections endeavour to esta- blish a negative proposition, while the antagonistic con- siderations endeavour to establish an affirmative; and it is "much more difficult to exhaust the field of negation [/. ^., to be sure that an apparent negative is an actual one], than that of affirmation'':" — secondly, The scientific pro- ^ " A thousand possibilities do not warrant a specific or positive assertion on our side. But one possibility is of equivalent power to displace and nullify the objection on their side. We could not, without the transgression of sound philosophy, select the one which is certain out cif the many which are conceivable. But it were a transgression greatly more violent, to affirm of the Eternal and In- scrutable Spirit, who operates unseen through the mazes of His own workmanship, that He could not in the infinity of His re- sources devise a method by which both to uphold the visible uni- formities of nr.ture, and yet to meet and satisfy our prayers." — Select Worlds of Chalmers, Vol. v. " Efficacy of Prayer," § 28. Th"- author suggests several conceivable methods which it is unnecessary to adduce in the following discussion. One of these, however, deserves comment because of its boldness. This is that Prayer and its answer are connected as cause and effect ; — a supposition which, it appears to me, would require to assume the tnith of the philosophy embodied in the proposition, "all force is will-force." But as this proposition can never be disproved, the supposition founded upon it can never be nullified. Upon this supposition, human will in Prayer is acting centripetally, while in all other cases it is acting centrifugally. , • Mill. ■■ Christian Prayer and G mere I Laws. 137 position is universal — there is no method whatever con- ceivable or inconceivable by which the Almighty c-in an- swer Prayer, — ^while the propositions about to be adduced are particular : — thirdly, From this fact it follows that the latter propositions may legitimately be of any degree of vagueness and uncertainty, for the universal proposition lays itself open to any such ; and these more definite pos- sibilities, which are conceivable ., so long as r lolecular motion remains within our cognizance, it is as definite and as indestructible an entity as is molar motion. The fact therefore of its dissipation into space is in no wise equivalent to the destruction of Energy, unless it could be shewn that the medium in which it travels is more extensive than the propagation of the Energy through it. When, therefore, the motion of molecules passes from the range of our experience, are we justified in the inference that it has ceased to be ? Are we not rather justified in the belief, that its dis- appearance from our cognizance is merely due to our inability to trace its further history — an inability arising from the necessary confinement of our intelligence in its relation to space ? But the inference does not stop here. It can be shewn that all scientific inductions whatever are ultimately grounded upon the doctrine that Force is ir! Christian Prayer and General La^cs. 147 persistent : hence, if we deny this attribute to Force, we must of necessity conclude that the entire range of Phy- sical Law with which we are acfjuainted is but of local significance, — that other parts of the Universe are either Lawless, or governed, not merely by Laws that differ from those which obtain in this portion, but by a whole system of Laws which must differ fundamentally from that which here we study. This is a conclusion which we cannot accept without evidence, more especially as it is founded on a mere negative, and this a negative of the weakest possible sort. It is a negative of the weakest possible sort, because we can see the reason why it is a negative — we can see, as already explained, a good, because a necessary, reason why we should not be able to perceive the transmutation of molecular into molar motion, if it ever takes place upon a cosmical scale, as we can and do perceive it upon a local scale.' I have thought it desirable to state thus fully the objections to which the quotation above made is liable, lest the use I intend to make of that quotation might be impaired by the suspicion that I am not sensible of their force. It would, however, be foreign to the present subject to discuss the point raised, because the only object with which I made the extract is to indicate in a concise form that the question is a dubious one. Lest, however, even this statement should be considered by some persons unwarranted, I shall fortify it with some remarks of Mr Spencer, whose mode of presenting the case cannot be improved upon. After dealing at length with the question as to the dissipation of Energy on a universal scale, and subscribing to the opinion that event- ually all the heavenly bodies must come into mutual collision, and that in every such successive case "if stars, 10 — 2 ■ iT ml 'I! 'ViW ■ m M HI iA '1 148 Christian Prayer and General Laws. con jcntrating to a common centre of gravity, eventually reach it, then the quantities of motion they have acquired must suffice to carr)' them away again to those remote regions whence they started in the shape of diffused masses ';" Mr Spencer adds as follows : — "One condition, however, essential to the literal fulfilment of this result must be specified ; namely, that the quantity of molecular motion radiated into space by each star in the course of its formation from diffused matter, shall either not escape from our sidereal system, or shall be compensated by an equal quantity of molecular motion radiated from other l)arts of space into our sidereal system Here, indeed, we arrive at a barrier to our reasonings ; since we cannot know whether this condition is or is not fulfilled If throughout boundless space filled with ether, there exist no other sidereal systems subject to like changes, or if such other sidereal systems exist at more than a certain average distance from one another ; it seems an unavoid- able conclusion that the quantity of motion possessed must diminish by radiation ; and so that on each successive resumption of the nebulous form, the matter of our sidereal system will occupy a less space, until it reaches either a state in which its concentrations and diffusions are relatively small, or a state of complete aggregation and rest. Since, however, we have no evidence shewing the existence or non-existence of sidereal systems throughout remote space ; and since, even had we such evidence, a legitimate conclusion could not be drawn from premises of which one element (unlimited space) is inconceivable; we must be for ever without answer to this transcendent question H' 2 )> 1 First Principles, p. 534. 8 Jbid. pp. 535—36. h il I. Christian Prayer and General Laws. 149 § 5. The question, then, is one which we are quite justified in declaring dubious. To this fiict we must now add the consideration of the truly inconceivable magni- tude of the Energy, sensible and insensible, that is inherent in the visible Universe. The riomentum of the earth's motion is such, that were it suddenly arrested, its resulting equivalent in the form of heat would be "equal to that produced by the combustion of fourteen such earths of solid coal If then the earth should fall into the sun the quantity of heat developed by the shock would be 400 times greater'." Yet the earth is but one of the smaller planets : what must be the momentum of their sum ? — The size of the sun is 1,400,000 times that of the earth, and, in addition to his axial motion, he is, to- gether with all his planets, travelling at a rate which must be at least much more than 300 miles per minute. What must be the momentum of the entire system ? — Further, nelecting the planetary heat as being indefinite, and fixing our attention only upon that of the sun : the energy re- ceived by the earth from him in the form of light and heat constitutes only of the entire amount ^ 2,300,000,000 he radiates into space : yet the energy, in the form of heat alone, so received by the earth in one year, is such, that " if distributed uniformly over the earth's surface, it would be sufficient to liquefy a layer of ice 100 feet thick, and covering the whole earth. It would also heat an ocean of fresh water 66 miles deep, from the temperature of melting ice to the temperature of ebullition*." What must be the Energy inherent in the solar system ? — Yet 1 i' \U % * Prof. Helmholtz, Essay on the Interaction of the Natural Forces. 2 Tyndall, Heat a mode of Motion , p. 477. I! J-r ^mt F?»»^*^^F^^W"Wr^H" \ ■ '4 :^ 1^; I I 150 Christ iaji Prayer and General Laivs. this system is but a drop in the sidereal ocean ! Never does the mind feel itself so utterly baffled, as when it endeavours to symboli/.e in tliought the actual power of Omnipotence. § 6. It will then on all hands be admitted, that the foregoing facts have fully established two positions : — first, that the Energy inherent in the Universe is virtually if not actually infinite ; and secondly, that even the finite por- tion of it which we are able to appreciate is continually radiating into infinity, and this in quantities of utterly u'-ithinkable magnitude. When this is the acknowledged state of our ignorance regarding the disposition of the Energy inherent in the Universe, does not the whole a priori objection to Prayer assume an almost < hildish aspect ? Far from grounding an d p-iori objection against the validity of Prayer, the doctrine of the Con- servation of Energy, when regarded otherwise than super- ficially, affords a positive presumption in its favov For, whether or not the amount of Energy inherent in the entire Universe is invariable in quantit_;, the foregoing considerations render it obvious that if it is ever added to or subtracted from, we can have : lO means of ascer- taining the fact. An alteration in the total sum of Energy requisite to produce any physical result in answer to Prayer, might, in comparison with that sum, be in- adequately represented by the difference between the mass of a chyle molecule, which is indefinable by the highest powers of the microscope, and the mass of the solar system. To this must be added the important consideration that, apart from all comparisons, if the sum of Energy is ever altered, such alteration must in all cases, excepting that of miracles, be unobservable ; for, as Kant concisely observes, "creation cannot be adioitted Mjmm Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 151 among phaenomena, because the very possibility of it woi'ld annihilate the unity of experience ;" and it is no less evident that destruction would do the same. In connection with this point also we may notice the fact so repeatedly insisted on by Comte — and this is highly im- portant — viz., that those physical phoenomena which are most simple as to the composition of their causes, are the phgenomena which, being likewise of the most extensive significance, are therefore the "farthest removed from humanity;" and, coui.ierwise, that those phainomena which most affect humanity are the most complex and the least extensive. I'he latter, therefore, being natur- ally the objects vi petition, it follows that, if Energy is ever created or destroyed in order to accomplish such phoenomena, the amount affected would be quantitatively of the smallest, while the greatest latitude of possibility would be allowed for the introduction of the external change being imperceptible. All, therefore, that, in its bearing on the present question, Science has done by establishing the doctrine of Force being, in its relation to us, persistent, is to indicate an am])ly conceivable manner in which the Deity may produce any special effect, and yet so produce it without in any wise altering the opera- tion of Natural Laws. Taking the word "cause" in its widest, and, to science at least, most unobjectionable sense, as the collocation of all the antecedents which unconditionally produce the consequent ; it is evident that it is only because Force is persistent, that the con- sequent is thus unconditional. In other words, were not Force present in a definite and indestructible amount in all the antecedents, the consequent would not be a necessity. We are hence constrained to admit, that the smallest accession or diminution in the amount of Force ! ;,( i i f'^' \m m •( lii 11 I i It f ! • II. 152 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. forming a condition of any one of the antecedents (no matter how numerous these might be), would of necessity give rise to an entirely different set of inter-relations among the antecedents, and so to an entirely different cause. The very rigidity of the relations by which the first set of conditions were held together, would now become the best conceivable guarantee for a new result. However small a change there might have been made in the amount of Force at any point in the total physical nexus which constituted the original cause, its discovery, so to speak, would be most certainly secured by the very unconditional nature of the Laws in operation. The sum of the conditions having been altered, in no matter how slight a degree, the same Laws, which by their invariability in the one case would have wrought out a (to adequate intelligence) foreseen result ; would in the other, and in virtue of their same invariability, work out a wholly different though equally foreseen result. § 7. It will, no doubt, seem strange to those who have been accustomed to employ the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy, as one of their most trusty weapons against the doctrine of the physical validity of Prayer, to find it thus turned against themselves; and being long accustomed to consider their argument irrefu- table, they will no doubt think there must be some fallacy in the reasoning which tends, not merely to ignore, but to reverse it. Hence it is desirable to estimate the com- parative value of our respective arguments. The following may be taken as a concise expression of the objection to Prayer, so far as it is grounded upon the doctrine in question. "It is supposed that the destination of a physical force can be arrested, and the otherwise inevitable result prevented, by an act of Divine !i Christian Prayer and General Laws. 153 volition. But the antecedent force must spend itself, and determine some consequent. It simply cannot be ar- rested, or lifted out of its place amongst the links of physical causation, without the whole chain falling to pieces. Its efficiency in giving rise to a new sequence is involved in its very existence; while the discovery of the correlation and transmutation of the forces proves that the prior agent is still present, and operative under an altered form'." These assertions may, of course, be elaborated; but they contain, as I think a man of science will admit, the full force of his objections. Now in the first place they are mere assertions^; and in the next they do not follow as necessary conclusions from the premise, that the sum of Energy existing in the Universe is undiminishable ; for, as we .have seen, the supposition of a neutralizing force being originated de noi'O, i.e., that the sum of the Energy inherent in the Universe is not unaug- mentable, is sufficient to annihilate these objections. Mr Knight himself recognises the force of this converse supposition. He says : — " But it is said that while the chain of physical sequence remains unbroken, the local incidence (if we may so speak) of each link may be deter- mined by some etherial wave of hyper-physical energy, transmitted along the entire line from its fountain-head, in delicately subtle undulations, resembling the waves of light and sound, or the flash of electricity through a telegraph wire ; and that the course of this hyper-physical energy may be determined in answer to the prayers of man^" Mr Knight adduces a series of objections to this view, but the only ones bearing upon the question (and Ml 11 ; ! m\ I V.J i 1 It'!. iiiffi ■"Bi ^ Rev. Mr Knight, Contem. Rev. Jan. 1873, p. 186. ' Cf. Argyll, Content. Rev. Feb. 1873, p. 463. 3 Ibid. p. 186. i* '•mm^fmn"" '' i. 154 Christian Prayer ajid General Laivs. indeed the only ones that can bear upon it in so far as the persistence of force is concerned), are as follow : — "Again, suppose that there be no physical 'fountain- head' but an endless cycle of recurrent energy; and what becomes of the hypothesis? For, though hyper- physical in its origin and character, the effect it is said to produce is not hyper-physical (in that case we should have no controversy with its advocates), but physical ; and it is believed to give rise to an interminable series of fresh physical results ^" Now it is to be observed that such terms as " hyper-physical waves," etc., can only be legitimately employed as thinkable illustrations of the manner in which the Deity operates when creating Energy — a question altogether distinct from the hypo- thesis that He does so operate, and a question which it is in no wise incumbent on that hypothesis to entertain. Turning, then, to tae real point at issue ; — the whole of this class of objections, and so, as we have seen, the entire cl priori objection to Prayer, is founded upon the supposition "that there is no physical fountain-head," but "an endless cycle of recurrent energy." This sup- position has, as we have seen, a basis of inferential probability for its support, but it is, as we have also seen, a supposition which has never, and can never, be ren- dered other than dubious. The syllogism which supports the present inference contains, and must contain, the very same fallacy which we have previously supposed the man of science to have pointed out in the contradictory syllogism, viz., the fallacy of a term — to wit, experience — distributed in the conclusion, which cannot be distributed in the minor. For ought that science has shewn, or from the nature of things can ever shew, the supposition that ^ Contem, Rev. p. 187. all Energy whatever is, in its ultimate origin, a continually emanating influence from the All-sustaining "fountain- head," is just as probable a supposition as that of a "continual cycle of recurrent energy." The mere fact that we observe on an indefinitely small scale that Energy is recurrent, affords no manner of presumption that it is likewise so upon a universal scale, unless the quanii^^ative relation of experience to actuality — of unity to iwiinity — were known. In short, we here return to the kind of reasoiiing which has been already refuted at length. The inference is, that because the doctrine of the persist- ence of Force is true with reference to the Proximate, therefore it is likewise true with reference to the Ulti- mate — an analogy which is certainly invalid, since one of its ratios is not only indefinite, but also inconceivable. § 8. Passing on, however, let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Cycle theory is the correct one, and that Force once generated, in no matter how small a quantity, can never become entirely dissipated in space, "without the whole chain of physical causation falling to pieces ;" and yet the proposition on which the entire d priori objection to Prayer is founded, has only been supplied with one of its two data. The other datum is that the Energy inherent in the Universe is unaug- mentable. Now we have seen that the inference which established the former premise was indefinitely weak, in that the thing inferred contained an infinite term ; yet this much might be said for that premise — vaguely weak as it was, it was yet founded for what it was worth upon a positive basis. We are able to take cognizance of Force so long as it remains within the sphere of our senses, and during that time we perceive that it has, in its relation to uSj the property of persistence. Our infer- I ii'J ill (!.' I i I)M Wr^ i. ' hi :„i , ,, t" I t; 156 Christian Prayer and General Laws. ence, therefore, that it is in all its relations persistent, however unwarrantable, is at least founded, for what it is worth, upon positive knowledge. Even this much, how- ever, cannot be said for the other premise. The inference that the Force inherent in the Universe is absolutely unaugmentable can only be drawn from a knowledge of negation — we can only argue, Because we do not know that it is so, therefore we infer that it is not so. Now there is thus shewn to be an important distinction be- tween the inferential value of the premise that Force is indestructible, and the premise that Force is unaugmenta- ble. For the argument from the cl priori probability that Nature is everywhere uniform, coupled with the in- disputable fact that in the portion of the Universe falling within the range of experience, the persistence of Force is the most ultimate, because the most inclusive, of Natural Truths, certainly establish a valid, though, as we have seen for other reasons, a highly dubious inference, that Force is everywhere persistent. The other inference, however, and one which is equally necessary for the scientific position, has no shadow of d, priori probability for its support*. Freely admitting that Force once gene- rated is permanent, we may still argue : — If Force is ever added to, we should not expect to be cognizant of the fact : on the other hand, we are ignorant concerning the origin of all existing Force ; how then can we found an d, priori argument in favour of the belief that Force is unaugmenta- ^ "That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, Ex nihilo nihil fit, by which the creation of matter was excluded, ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not only the will of the Supreme Being may create matter, but, for aught we know h priori, the will of any other being might create it, or any other cause that the most whimsical imagination can assign." Hume, Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section xii. Part ill. note. m Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. 157 ble ? It cannot be done. And this is a fact habitually overlooked by those who have touched upon this subject. There is, indeed, one consideration of a negative character, which seems at first sight to invalidate the conclusion thus arrived at, viz., that the idea of Force being created is unthinkable '. Let us suppose, in the first instance, that it is so, and what follows? Surely not that Force is uncreatable, for this would be to limit the ontological order of things by the intelligible. As Mill observes, when dealing with this very question, " It does not follow that this is really the fact, for there are many things, inconceivable to us, which not only may, but must, be true ^" Besides, upon the Theistic theory, al! existing Force was once created ; and it is no more easy to conceive of this primordial act than of others similar in kind. Further, as we have seen, the primary conception attaching to the word "Almighty" is " Omni- potentia," — power, that is, to create without limit ; and we hence saw that the relation of the Almighty Creator to an infinite potentiality of existence may be of all rela- tions the most profound. ^ Mr Knight advances two arguments on the same side, but they are not worth stating in the text. He says, "That it should be in the power of any creature thus to launch a new agency into the pre-arranged system of nature, and thereby to begin a new series of changes which are absolutely interminably in their effect, is simply incredible." It is evident, however, on the one hand, that the power is not under any view believed to reside in the creature ; and on the other, that the doctrine of fore-ordination here introduced has no bearing whatever upon the subject; since it is no more difficult to believe that any fresh increment of force should have its functions for all time assigned to it, than that any equal quantity of previously existing force should originally have had its eternal cycle of transformation foreordained. ^ Examination^ p. 290. .'\ -■ k I' ■^^P" ' <* I " W W Wi I rf I III 158 Christian Prayer and General Laws. Whether or not, therefore, the idea of Force being originated is unthinkable, the argument that it may be is ahke unaffected. But now let us enquire. Is it true that the idea is unthinkable ? Have men in all ages and in all conditions of culture failed to think of creation ? Is the doctrine conspicuous by its absence from all religions? If not, then assuredly creation is not unth'nkable'. What is unthinkable is Self-existence ; and it has been to stave off this impossible conception one degree further, that all religions have agreed in teaching the doctrine in question. It is the Being and not the Action of the Creator that is to man unthinkable. Granted the exist- ence of the Unconditioned, and the mystery of the Conditioned is absorbed. This question, however, has, as we have seen, only an indirect bearing upon the present argument; since whether or not creation is deemed unthinkable, we must I' I' i * Compare Bain, Inductive Logic, p. 37, and for obverse aspect, Mill, loc. cit. Also the admirable remarks of Mr Scott, Biirney Prize 1868, pp. 41 — 2. Mr Spencer uses the word "unthinkable"' in a very loose manner. If asked for a definition to cover all the cases to which he applies it, his answer would probably be : — That concerning which it is impossible to establish relations in thought. But this genus includes two widely different species, — as different, says Clarke, as light is from darkness — viz., the case where the correlatives are, as such, incomprehensible ; and the case where they are, as such, contradictory. In the former sense, all things, or any thing, may be said, in the last resort, to be unthinkable ; for all our ultimate ideas are incomprehensible. To this category belongs the idea of creation, which can only be said to be unthinkable, not because something and nothing are contradictory, but because something and nothing are incomprehensible. Primitive man, on seeing the formation of a cloud, has no more difficulty in thinking of its creation, than he has in thinking of its existence after it is formed ; — the correlatives in each case being the same. Christian Prayer and General Laws. 159 alike, upon the Theistic theory, believe that it is pos- sible. § 9. Let us now turn to the question, How far, from ci priori considerations, is it probable ? We have just seen that the only argument against this probability utterly fails for two reasons : firstly, because the proposi- tion itself admits of grave dispute; and secondly, because, even if established, would be immaterial. There is there- fore no argument in support of the belief that the Creative Energy is spent or suspended. Have we any .auL. \0 i ■ -.IT ' 170 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. \\\ ' *, J. from a Revelation can we define the utility of Prayer. Nevertheless, there are at least two a priori arguments which, independently of any doctrinal authority, tend to answer this question in the affirmative. Although these arguments are confessedly feeble, they are worth ren- dering because of their independent character. We have already seen that fore-ordination may be pointed to as an ami)ly conceivable manner in which the Almighty could answer Prayer without violating Law. i think that this argument admits at once of intensifica- tion and of extension thus : — By our fundamental postu- late, the Almighty is the Author both of Nature and Morality; and as on the one hand Christianity is His scheme, and on the other the order of Nature but the expression of His Will, it is from these data d, priori probable that in the framing, as it were, of the great conjoint scheme of Nature and Morality, the one should have been fore-ordained to harmonize with the other. " There must not only be a correlation of physical forces and a correlation of moral forces, but the physical and moral forces must be also mutually correlated'." Now every ])etition for physical benefits must be deemed acceptable to the Author of Christianity, for, as we shall subsequently see, whatever view we take on Biblical grounds as tw the efticacy of such petitions, there can be no doubt that they are not unchristian. But the con- sideration, that every really Christian Prayer of this kind is acceptable to God, surely intensifies the argument from fore-ordination ; for it carries that argument further than is required — it not only shews that we have a con- ceivable manner in which the Almighty may answer Prayer, but it also establishes an a priori probability ^ Dr Litlkdale, On the Rationale of Prayer. Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 171 that He does. We have already seen that we cannot suppose the Divine activity to be impeded by its own methods : consequently in the fore-ordination of all things that Will mast (so far as we can see) have pro- vided, that every petition acceptable to itself should be so related to the co-existing physical conditions, that the latter should coincide with tiiC foimer. § 3. The other independent argument alluded to is as follows : — We have already seen that, Natural Law being on the Theistic hypothesis but the synonym of the Divine Will, it follows that so long as this Will remains con- sistent, so long must the sequences occuring in Nature be necessary — otherwise such sequences would cease to be included within the domain of second causes, and so would require, either to become independent entities, or cease altogether to exist. But it is evident that this necessity of sequence obtains only because the Divine Will is consistent — that we cannot argue from this con- ditioned necessity (so to speak), that the Unconditioned Cause is itself under any external necessity to produce any one series of effects rather than another. The ques- tion, however, remains — Is it under any subjective necessity? — How far is it congruous in the Divine Na- ture to answer Prayer with physical equivalents? This question merges into that as to the nature of the Divine attributes ; for on the one hand, it is a contradiction in terms to say that a free will can act in opposition to itself; and on the other, we are precluded from thinking of the Divine Will in this matter as we do of human. For while the attributes of human intelligence are frequently in mutual opposition, to suppose the possibility of a corresponding conflict among the Divine attributes, ,1 ., . i i "A f' ill I I' I i&. •'I ■i I t. • 1 I . ii r •J i- 172 Christian Prayer and General Laws. would be to mar the perfection of the Divinity, if not to destroy the unity of the First Cause. From these considerations it follows that, so far as Natural Theology supplies any evidence of the Divine Beneficence, so far have we cl priori reason for thinking it probable, that the Deity is not indifferent to the peti- tions of His sentient and intelligent creatures ; and there- fore not inactive in granting physical equivalents, whenever such equivalents would really be for the benefit of the petitioner. And the obvious rejoinder that the maximum degree of our physical happiness is in every case enjoyed independently of Prayer, is not merely a refined mode of begging the whole question in dispute ; but is an assumption, for making which we can have no warrant whatever. This argument, supplied on a priori grounds by Natural Theology, is greatly intensified when Revelation is accepted as authoritative ; for the general and unde- fined indications of the Divine Beneficence, afforded by Nature, are immensely extended and particularized by Revelation; so that the present argument is correspond- ingly strengthened when supplied with this additional standing-ground. § 4. The principal bearing of Revelation, however, upon our present subject, is not that of affording a priori deductions from the character of the Deity as there declared, but that of supplying didactic information with expressed reference to this subject. It now devolves upon us briefly to investigate this information. The question we are now considering, viz.. Ought we to believe in the physical validity of Prayer? manifestly involves the more ultimate one as to the r '1 ! I Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 173 authority of Revelation. This more ultimate question, however, is no less manifestly much too extensive for us even cursorily to enter upon. We are then in this posi- tion : — If we reject Revelation, the specific question we are considering lapses : if we accept Revelation, this question remains open for discussion : we are unable to enter upon the argumentative merits presented respec- tively by the two aspects of this alternative : we must therefore for the purposes of our subsequent, as of our previous argument, assume without reserve the truth of Revelation. As we have hitherto been groping our way in the dim obscurity or utter darkness of philosophical speculation, concerning a subject transcending philo- sophical enquiry; we now "give heed" to Revelation as " to a light shining in a dark place : " as we have hitherto been endeavouring to ascertain the probability regarding the method of the Divine Government in a certain par- ticular from experience alone, we now come for express information to the "oracles of God." Given then a belief in the Divine authority of Scripture, and the field of enquiry now opening to us is one of greater promise than that which we are leaving. § 5. Indeed at first sight it appears as though under this division there were nothing to discuss. To an ordinary reader, the voice of the Bible upon this subject appears so uniform and explicit as not to admit of eva- sion. Again, the Fathers are unanimous in not even being conscious that it is possible to urge any rational or plausible objection to the physical efficacy of Prayer. Lastly, the present authoritative expounders of Scripture, viz., the Christian Churches, are no less unanimous upon this subject than were the Fathers. It appears then, at first sight, as though there were no possibility of raising :;. .4.1 1/4 Christian Prayer and General Laivs. an objection to Prayer on theological grounds. Yet this has already been done to some extent, and no doubt will be done yet further by subsec^uent writers. Let us then here make an exhaustive statement of all such objections as it seems possible to raise, with the view of shewing their futility. . The argument open to those who feel to conviction the force of the objections raised by Science to Christian Prayer, and who wish to compromise their conviction in this respect with their Christian Faith, runs thus : — ' We must altogether neglect the opinion of the Fathers, because the difficulty was not extant in their time. Similarly, the teaching of the Churches must by Protest- ants be neglected, because, in consequence of the time of their foundation, this teaching is but the reflection of that of the Fathers — so far, at least, as ignorance regard- ing this particular difficulty is concerned. We must, therefore, derive our opinions solely from the Scriptures, in accordance with the belief that these are of perennial adaptation to human intelligence. 'Now the objections raised by Science to Prayer are, in their essential nature, identical with those raised by Science to Miracles. But we Protestants all admit that the age of miracles is past; and, although we believe that they, or their equivalents, took place, yet the fact of their having now ceased shews that practically (whether really or not is here immaterial) there is some force in these h priori objections. In other words, it may be doubtful whether or not genuine miracles ever occurred, but there can be no doubt that they never occur now. But the Bible speaks of the physical validity of Prayer in precisely the same terms as it does of miracles, that is, as being among the things which are "not impossible to him that be- Christian Prayer and General Laws. T75 lieveth." Nay, the two are expressly identified by Christ in at least two passages, viz., •' For verily I say unto you, That whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea ; and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that those things which he saith shall come to pass, he shall have whatso- ever he saith'." Again, ** The Lord said. If ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye might say unto this sycamine tree, Be thou plucked up by the root, and be thou planted in the sea, and it shall obey you^" Now the fact that miracles, supposing them to have been pre- viously wrought, have now ceased, coupled with the fact that Scripture nowhere predicts their cessation, seems to form on mere Scriptural grounds a strong prima facie case against the efiicacy of Prayer. For the hypothetical case is strictly parallel with the demonstrable : in both physical results are involved, and in the same manner ; both are spoken of in Scripture in exactly the same tone ; and the cessation of neither is predicted. The fact, then, that the one class of physical results is at present non- existent, affords a strong indication that the other is likewise so. For the only objection which can be urged against this commentary on Scripture is, that the one class had a special function to serve which the other had not — viz., attestation to Divine authority. But this has not much force, seeing that it is founded on no Scriptural warrant whatever — is merely a somewhat subtly-devised loop-hole to escape from an unpleasant conclusion. Further, nearly all the Apostolic miracles were wrought /;/ a7iswer to Prayer: hence it is but natural that a confusion sbo.ild have arisen in the minds of believing writers — the^' supposing the miracles wrought by them- 1 Man. xii. 13, 24. ^ Luke xvii. 6. t! I.* f \\ r I IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) k <5 10. It will be observed, that while commenting upon the passages mainly relied on by those who ob- ject to Trayer on Theological grounds, no allusion was made to the supposed dilhculty which arises from Christ having there identified answers to Prayer with miraculous manifestations, and having nowhere else predicted the cessation of either. Now, even if this diliiculty were conceded insuperable, it would surely be a matter of grave respon ' /for any commentator deliberately to expunge the !n and only meaning of these and numerous other ])assages, merely on the ground that they vaguely embody an intellectual difficulty of a highly ' Prof. Tyndall quotes James iv. 3, and takes advantage of tlie ambiguous nature of the English translation "ask amiss," to in- sinuate that the only allusion is to praying ignorantly for things inexpedient. Worse than this, Dr Tyndall further quotes Matthew V. 45, " lie maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust," as though these words "enfolded the philosophy" the Professor is contending for. A more outrageous commentaiy can scarcely be imagined. The words in question M'ere spoken to exemplify the Divine beneficence and long-suffering, without the least shadow of ini])lication that they were intended to cover the entirely distinct question, as to whether or not the children of God are a greater care to Him than the impious. Indeed, so far as this passage bears upon the subject at all, it clearly tends to the inference that they are so ; for if the Lord is merciful even to th le nnpious, to His children who ask Him. give good gifts I- 1 Cliristian Prayer and General' Laws. 185 transcendental nature. On the same principle nii^'lit we — nay, in consistency ought we, t(j expunge many of the chief among Christian doctrines, l^ut now, Is this difficulty insuperable? Is it even serious? Let us sup- pose, for the sake of argument, that the identification relied on is very much clearer than it really is ; and fur- ther, that we can see no reason why miracles should have ceased : — even in the presence of these suppositions it would surely still be an extravagant inference, that because miracles have ceased, therefore answers to I'rayer have likewise ceased. It would be an extravagant inference, because unconditionally founded upon a gratuitous hy- pothesis, to wit, that answers to I'rayer have no object to serve apart from some connection with miracles. We assume that the Divine superintendence of the World is such, that in no case does our " Almighty and most mer- ciful Father" "save those out of their distresses," who " cry unto the Lord in their trouble ;" we assume that because " the Lord is merciful" in making " his sun to rise on the evil and on the good," and " in sending rain on the just and on the unjust ;" therefore the complement cannot be true, viz., that we " have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread," and that *' in the days of famine the upright shall be satisfied." But not only do we assume that the " Hearer of Prayer" does not "attend unto our cry:" we also assume that in no case does He see fit to improve the moral nature of man through physical agency. We assume that all the numerous instances recorded in Scripture of Faith strengthened, Hope sustained. Thanksgiving occasioned, " Rejoicing in spirit " increased, and Praise evoked, in virtue of the perceived influence of God in Nature, are so many misconceptions worse than delusions. We \ 1 86 Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. .'» further assume that all lessons such as the discipline of unanswered Prayer from the c. .e of the Syrophojnician woman, the benefit of Faith from that of the centurion, and the duty of Obedience from that of the man born blind ; — we assume that these and many similar lessons are utterly fallacious, in so far as they are drawn from their illustrating examples. And we assume all this, not only without any shadow of warrant from the teaching of Christ, but, as we have seen, against His express declaration. To this must be added, that, on the one hand, we can see a perfectly satisfactory reason why miracles should have ceased — the Christian system no longer requiring their support, — while, on die other, we can see no corresponding reason why answers to Prayer should have ceased. True it is that Scripture nowhere expressly predicts the cessation of miracles j but before this fact can be raised to a presumption against the validity of Prayer, it must be shewn that we should antecedently expect such a prediction, if Prayer is of any validity apart from the function of a miracle. How this can be shewn, however, it is hard to see. Scripture nowhere warrants the inference that the validity of Prayer depends upon the function of a miracle — on the contrary, the warrant is, as we have seen, altogether the other way. If then such validity exists apart from such function, we can have no reason to expect that on this account the cessa- tion of miracles should have been predicted. The inference which, it is said, we should expect Scripture to rectify if erroneous, is an inference which is really drawn, not from Scripture but from Science ; as we may readily perceive by asking the simple question : — Even if Scrip- ture had predicted the cessation of miracles, will any one Christian Prayer and General Laws. 187 i undertake to say this fact would materially have altered the case ? Now it is simply childish to assert that this obvious distinction between the function of a miracle and the efficacy of Prayer, is " a subtly-devised loop-hole of escape from an unjileasant conclusion." Such subtlety as there is resides with those who would so amalgamate answers to Prayer with miracles, as to deduce the cessa- tion of the former from that of the latter. To those who do not endeavour to twist every available fact into their argument, it must appear that the only bearing which miracles have upon the question before us, is that, of demonstrating the existence of a Power adequaie to produce any pn^oical effect in answer to Prayer. And this bearing is highly important. As Christians we must all believe in the occurrence of miracles, since the system we accept is inex'.ricably bound up with them. Any antecedent objections, therefore, which on Scientific grounds we may feel to the belief in the efficacy of Prayer, are thus, on Scriptural grounds, removed ; for in the presence of the fact that inscrutable causation is sometimes employed by the Deity, all theoretical objections to the belief in the possibility of such employ- ment must disappear. To this it should be added, that the fact of Christ having performed most of His miracles in answer to Prayer ought to be taken as of doctrinal import; for, as the learned and gifted author of Ecce Homo observes, the teaching of Christ was remarkable from the significance which he attached to symbolical action. Lastly, it must be observed that the doctrine as to the physical efficacy of Prayer is in perfect accordance with the general spirit of the New Testament. I will not, «i ijim ■*.' 1'. I 1 88 C/iristt'an Prayer and General Laivs. however, pause to develop this point, because I conceive that the difficulties raised upon Scriptural grounds have already been thoroughly quashed. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that this point is one of great importance, not only because Christ habitually attached more doctri- nal weight to the general spirit of His system than to any particular words or deeds of His own or of His followers; but also because in the case of a genuine Revelation, which appeals largely to the emotional and aesthetical parts of our nature, we should antecedently expect that the feelings should have been endowed with a consider- able degree of authority in deciding such questions as the present. i \ § II. There is still one question which is covered by the title of this Treatise, and which remains to be dis- cussed. Those who have previously considered Christian Prayer in the relation there expressed, and have arrived at conclusions opposed to the foregoing, do not restrict their contemplations to the efficacy of Prayer, but extend them to the raising of a question as to its duty. Without a single exception do these writers contend, that the doubt which they think their arguments have thrown over the benefit of Prayer, proves its obligation a nullity; and when even a Christian minister has written, "Such stammering becomes irreverence in mental manhood ; and in this matter emphatically, when * we become men, we must put away childish things';'" it is no longer in our choice to abstain from discussing this subject — briefly to demonstrate that, even if Scripture had left the ques- tion as to the efficacy of Prayer in as great uncertainty as we have seen it to be left by Philosophy ; and even if the ^ Mr Knight, Contein. Rev. p. 193. 1 ■^ Christ ia?i Prayer and General Laivs. 189 writers against such efficacy had estabhshed a probabiHty as high as we have seen that probability to be low ; even then the duty of Prayer for physical benefits would have remained above suspicion. § 12. The Theory of Prayer, whether Christian or otherwise, is that of a petitioner recogi.izing his depend- ence upon a higher intelligence. Now in the Christian system. Prayer, which is thus by the act of offering a confession of dependence, is expressly declared to h^ for this reason a mean, not only to benefit man, but also to glorify God. And in harmony with this doctrine we find, that while the first sentence of the Lord's Prayer ex- presses our dependence upon God, the second refers to His glory. Prayer then no less, if not more than Praise, is a duty which we owe to a Prayer-hearing God, quite apart from all hopes of receiving that for which we pray. Thus the more truly "Christian" any petition is, the more intense will be the appreciation of this its two-fold character ; and the more ardently we pray for any result, the more truly are we, in virtue of the act, praising God. Now the recognition of this two-fold character of Prayer is highly important in estimating the duty of Prayer for physical benefits. It is not in the nature of man to be indifferent concerning such benefits ; so that the fact of wilfully excluding their mention from our petitions, would be tantamount to refusing to " give unto the Lord the glory due unto Ilis name." Only if Reve- lation had expressly prohibited such prayers, or if Philo- sophy could demonstrate their futility, would we be justified in abstaining from their expression. " For of Prayer there are two uses. It serveth as a mean to pro- cure those things which God hath promised to grant when we ask ; and it serveth as a mean to express our i *^ i J J- !.-?>! H I 190 Christian Prayer and General Laws. lawful desires also towards that, which whether we shall have or no we know not till we see the event. Things in themselves unholy or unseemly we may not ask ; we may whatsoever being not forbidden either nature or grace shall reasonably move us to wish as imparting the good of men, albeit God himself have nowhere by pro- mise assured us of that particular Avhich our prayer craveth. To pray for that which is in itself and of its own nature apparently a thing impossible, were not convenient Whereas contrariwise when things of their own nature contingent and mutable are by the secret determination of God appointed one way, though we the other way make our prayers, and consequently ask those things of God which are by this supposition impossible, we notwithstanding do not hereby in prayer transgress our lawful bounds'.". The closing sentence of this quotation introduces us to another point. It is no doubt perfectly true (as so often insisted by writers on the other side), that from the nature of the ':ase, religious men are much more liable to pray for things inexpedient or impossible within the physical sphere, than within the moral. Yet, if it be true that although in ignorance thus asking for impossi- bilities, "we notwithstanding do not transgress our law- ful bounds;" it appears to follow that such Prayer is, so to speak, wasted. There is thus at first sight an awkward doctrinal difficulty, which writers upon the other side have, without exception, draughted into their service. The difficulty, however, is only apparent, for common sense and Scripture alike furnish an obvious solution. Every Prayer, in so far as it is "Christian," may be considered as composed of three factors relating to our- 1 Hooker, Eccl. Polit. Book v. ch. XLVlll. § 4. Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 191 selves, and one relating to God. The last-named Hictor is our desire for the Divine glory ; but it is with those relating to ourselves that we are now concerned, viz., Self-love, Trust in God, and sense of dependence upon Him. Now the former of these, in its rela*;ion to the other two, clearly ensures that, apart from all considera- tions for the Divine glory, every Prayer shall be condi- tional upon the desired result being in accordance with the Divine Will. For, in proportion to our trust in the goodness of God, and to our sense of dependence upon Him, will be our persuasion and our prayer, that He will vouchsafe Plis answers only " as may be most expedient for us;" and consequently Self-love will dictate that the most ardent of all our requests shall be the one which throws all the others into this conditional form. "Thy will be done" is therefore the implied or expressed foundation of every Christian Prayer. Hence, although it is certainly our duty "in all things to make known our requests unto God," it is no less certainly our wisdom to request most fervently of all, that the disposition of results shall be left in the hands of a merciful Providence — even in our punishment to say, " It is the Lord : let Him do what seemeth Him good.'' But now, are we to believe for this reason^ that those prayers only are valid, in which the results designated express a coincidence between "the particular subjective will and the universal objective will?" To admit such a doctrine would be to violate both Scripture and common sense. If prayers uttered in ignorance for impossibilities are supposed to be but vain beatings of the air, it must be either because the fact of the thing being impossible proves that it was not our duty to ask for it, or that, although it was our duty, yet because the thing asked for happened to be impossible, I II, 11 1^ WHS i\ \l ' Mi I' I 192 Christian Prayer and General Lazvs. therefore a fulfilled duty is not recognized by God. The former of these suppositions is conspicuously illogical, for, if Prayer is a duty because a recognition of our de- pendence upon God, the mere fact of the element of ignorance occurring in it cannot affect the duty of offering it ; for the petitioner is, by the supposition, recognizing that dependence as fully in this as in any other case. The latter of the above suppositions is as unscriptural as the former is illogical ; so that, the dilemma being thus complete, we are free to fall back upon the deliverance which accords alike with Reason and with Scripture. When we pray for any particular benefit, we pray for it because we deem it conducive to our own or other's good. But if the Deity sees that the granting of our request would really be to our injury, the same spirit which prompts the request secures its denial — provided that the prayer is answered according to the spirit of its utterance '. But the petitioner is conscious that the Deity, to whom " all hearts are open, all desires known, and from whom no secrets are hid," knows of innumerable other benefits \\f^ require, for which notwithstanding "in our blindness we cannot ask." The same spirit therefore which prompts the original, and as to its expressed result, ineffectual petition, is really pleading, not for that result, but for some unknown equivalent. The fundamental clause " Thy will be done," refers not only to the granting or the non-granting of the particular results expressed, but likewise to the disposition of all results whatever. " Sed hoc devotionis debemus Domino Deo nostro, ut si ea (/. I! f I 194 Christian Prayer and General Laws. the Divine Purpose: — >ve are free to glorify God by our submission to His Will. The first three petitions of the Lord's Prayer are thus seen to be virtually one ; and when we ask that His Will be done, towards us — that He grant us only such equivalents as may be most conducive to our ultimate good, — we not only consult our own interests, but we fulfil the main duty of Prayer. "'Father, glorify thy name.' As if He had said, Though life be naturally dear, and the cup which I am to drink very bitter, and the wrath that I am to undergo heavy and infinite, yet all these things are not so considerable to me as thy glory; and therefore, though it be by ago- nies, by death, by the cross, yet. Father, glorify thy name. The same mind should dwell in us likewise, and we should hereby be instructed to desire and pray for other things with limitations and restrictions, but for the glory of God absolutely and simply. 'Father, glorify thy name ;' and if in the counsel of thy will, and the course of thy providence, it cannot be otherwise than by my suffering or sorrow, yea, or death itself ; yet. Father, even in this glorify thy name; and out of my very ruins erect thou a trophy and monument to thy praise ; be thou hallowed and sanctified, although at my cost, and with the loss of all'." § 14. The discussion of our subject is now com- pleted. Throughout the pages in which it is contained, there has been much that will appear unsatisfactory to a man of Science ; and much likewise that will appear so to a man of Prayer : this, however, is but the penalty which attaches to most writings whose aim is at impar- tiality rather than eclecticism. To him who has read ^ Bishop Hopkins on the Lord's Prayer. H. Christian Prayer and General Laivs. 195 these pages in this the spirit in which they have been written, it cannot but appear, that amid much that is argumentative, much that is uncertain, and much that is obscure; one truth has been rendered as clear as it is cardinal, — the truth that the scientific proposition is vir- tually valueless. On each of three successive platforms of argument we have shewn in a cumulative manner, that the probability upon which this proposition depends, is not only to perception exceeding low, but is yet lower to an indefinite, because an imperceptible degree : and we have further shewn that, apart from all considerations as to the lowness and the vagueness of such probability, <^he scientific proposition itself is not altogether true — there are several methods by which it is amply apparent, even to our limited faculties, that the Almighty may answer Prayer, without in any way violating the course of Na- tural Law. And some such conclusion is only what must have been anticipated by a man v\''o believes in the authority of his religion. If it is true that the voice of Revelation upon this subject is explicit, a man who accepts its teaching as Divine can only be consistent in his beliefs, by maintaining a serene confidence that his persuasions concerning this subject are founded upon a basis which Science must ever remain powerless to subvert. For, as we saw at the commencement, this is certainly a subject in connection with which the purifying influence of Sci- ence upon Religion can never be exerted ; and we may now add, that those votaries of the former who are thoughtless enough to confuse this subject with others in which the exercise of such influence is possible, are not only failing in their endeavours to purify Religion, but even were these endeavours capable in any way of affecting the if 1 - ^ ''Wp '>! i! I li 'ii 196 Christian Prayer and General Laws. latter, their influence would be to its detriment. For, on the one hand, each of the analogical arguments upon which the scientific proposition has been seen to depend, is in truth but an inference, from the nature of our own existence and the conditions of our own activity, to the nature of the Deity and the method of His Govern- ment ; while, on the other hand, as before pointed out, the purifying influence of Science upon Religion has ever been exclusively confined to increasing our perception of these ultimate mysteries. When men of old could look upon the starry heavens, and feel that they were created by the breath of God — that He led out their hosts by the right hand of His power, and called them all by their names ; they acknowledged a mystery, but it was proxi- mate; His action was immediate, and His presence was near. To us how changed ! But if the great mission of Science has been to render the Mystery of Things more inscrutable and sublime, let not her own disciples try to oppose that mission : let them not seek to pene- trate the mystery she has intensified, or to substitute an Anthropomorphism more unworthy than that which she has dethroned. The real interests of Science and Religion are there- fore not "antagonistic but complementary;" and the present is most emphatically a subject in which the true character of each can only be maintained, by their meet- ing on the common ground of that Philosophy, at once the oldest, wisest, and most beautiful : — " The things which are hidden belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children for ever." wm wmmmmm wm wmmm ■P r, on jpon lend, own r^ to vern- out, ever on of look eated y the their proxi- s was ission 'hings ciples pene- te an ;h she m there- d the le true meet- t once things )d, but md to (1 r fi •:-f i .ii') [I ^i '1 i 1 I ' 1 ^^ j ^1 f i I 1 > ■ f i s ; i POSTSCRIPT. The following Essay was originally intended to appear in a separate form ; but, as the previous one was longer in passing through the press than I had anticipated, I have taken the opportunity afforded by this delay of publishing the two Essays in one volume. It is desirable to insert this statement, partly in order to shew why the one Essay is always alluded to in the other as a distinct publication, but chiefly in order to explain why the two Essays differ so much from one another in style. It must be added that the Adjudicators of the Burney Prize are in no way responsible for any part of the following Examination. Octohei'f 1874. THE PHYSICAL EFFICACY OF PRAYER, DEDUCTIVELY AND INDUCTIVELY CONSIDERED : REINCx AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS SET FORTH HY MESSRS. KNIGHT, ROBERTSON, BROOKS, TYNDALI,, AND GALTON. AN ESSAY BY GEORGE J. ROMANES, M.A. hi* 'rl PREFACE. The subject discussed in the following pages was first prominently brought under my notice in February 1873, in consequence of its being then set for the JJurney Competition of that year. As the Thesis pro- posed on that occasion, however, was expressly limited to Prayer in its relation to General Laws, and as the numerous objections which have been urged against the doctrine of the physical efficacy of Prayer have not been so limited ; I felt that the resulting exclusion from that Thesis of a large portion of the adverse argument, might be deemed unsatisfactory by those who may read the former with a view of settling their opinions upon the question as a whole. As soon, therefore, as the decision of the Adjudicators was given— viz., in May 1874,— I undertook the following examination of such among the adverse arguments as remained; so that the present Essay is to be regarded merely as a supplement to that which obtained the Burney Prize of 1873. I may take this opportunity of stating that my inves- tigations from the first have been conducted with a strictly unprejudiced mind, notwithstanding I regard the i!|l 'mW^ ^Esrr^ssasB I „ I ii ■ ■ '■\ 204 Preface. question as one of great impoi Lance. There are, at the present time, thousands of religiously-disposed persons "painfully perplexed" concerning this question; and such a fact alone is sufficient to justify a Writer in taking more pains over his analysis, than has been taken by any of those who have hitherto dealt with the subject. Lest, however, the pains I have taken may be thought to indi- cate an anxiety to uphold a cherished conviction, I deem it desirable to state that such is not the case. If those whose arguments I examine are able, either to sheAv that some misunderstanding exists on my part regarding the arguments already adduced, or, on their own part, to adduce others of a less objectionable character ; and if they are then able to shew that their case, as thus re- argued, presents enough of logical cogency and common- sense sufficiency, to cause a preponderance of rational probability on their side ; then no one will be more ready than 1 am to disbelieve in the Physical Efficacy of Prayer. Until this is done, however, I cannot but argue on the side of conservatism. It devolves upon those who attack a well-founded belief of any kind, to make out a reasonably strong case against it ; so that, in the present instance, only if I disbelieved in the Christian system as a whole, should I feel that time was ill spent in refuting erroneous arguments against one of its leading doctrines. July, 1874. 'iv THE M PHYSICAL EFFICACY OF PRAYER, im DEDUCTIVELY AND INDUCTIVELY CONSIDERED. The writers who of late years have challenged the doctrine as to the physical efficacy of Prayer, may primarily be divided into two classes. Those who form the one class approach the subject on its d priori asi^ect: they argue, Seeing the constitution of the world to be what it is ; seeing that the Divine government is every- where conducted through the mediation of natural law; seeing that, even if the Deity has any special regard for man, yet it is almost impious to imagine that He should alter his administration at the suggestion of man ; seeing the imposiubility of answering contradictory petitions ; seeing, in short, a vast number of such antecedent ob- jections attaching to the belief in question; we cannot but consider that belief as in a high degree irrational. Those who form the other class approach the subject on its (\ posteriori aspect : they argue, Without troubling ourselves al)out the metaphysics of the subject, o^ ♦^he antecedent improbability of this and that opinion, we consider the (jucstion simply as a matter of fact ; for to say that Prayer is physically efficacious, is to say that Prayer is able to accomplish definite physical results, and SO by implication to say that in this respect the value of ,1 ■ 'p I 206 The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. Prayer is determinable by the scientific methods : we therefore appeal to these methods, and, apart from all theory, with unbiassed judgment are content to abide by the result. Now of these two classes, the former admits of being again divided into two sub-classes — or, more cor- rectly, the arguments employed by writers of this class admit of being so subdivided. One section of these argu- ments rests upon, or is deduced from, the now well-esta- blished belief in the universal operation of natural laws : the other section is deduced from the various antecedent opinions of the different writers, as to the nature and attributes of the Supreme Being, the position of man in this world with reference to the rest of the Divine works, the relation of the Deity to these same works, and in particular to man. Now it is clear that there is a great difference between the argumentative weight of propo- sitions, logically deducible from the admitted fact that our lot is cast under a Reign of Law, and propositions resting merely on the individual opinions of different writers regarding questions of a highly transcendental nature. It is desirable always to bear this distinction in mind, when reading discussions upon such subjects as the present ; but it is not only for this reason that I have drawn so sharp a line between the two sub-divisions of the h priori school. In order to make the following pages as concise as possible, I intend altogether to avoid the discussion of the Prayer-question, in so far as this rests upon our belief in the existence of natural law; for I feel that, if I did not make this limitation, either the fol- lowing criticism would require to expand to a length that would be tedious to the general reader, or I should be compelled to mar the argument by its i 'ue condensa- tion. It is so easy for writers on the other side to take The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 207 up the ordinary or scientific conception of natural law as a weapon ready fashioned to their hand, and then to wield it to the easy apparent destruction of our belief in the physical validity of Prayer, that it be- comes difficult to impress upon the impartial reader how lengthy an examination of sach views must neces- sarily be. Of course, if natural law is everywhere and always such as we know it; if we are quite sure, or reasonably satisfied, that it is absolutely what we see it to be relatively; if there is no rational probability that in its relation to the Deity, it differs widely from that which we perceive it to be in its relation to us ; if it is but a confused mysticism to argue that natural law is after all but a merely human conception ; — then, assuredly, it becomes an easy matter to overturn any belief, wliich is confessedly in direct antagonism with such truths. But the whole question turns upon that as to whether or not these statements are truths ; so that those who take up the ordinary, or physical, conception of natural law, and carry it without modification into their metaphysical dis- cussions, are really begging the whole question in dispute; and can therefore well afford to be at once brief and convincing. When, however, it devolves upon another writer to examine such arguments, the task is of necessity a more laborious one ; seeing that he is in no wise con- cerned with their obvious conclusion except through the validity of their premise, and that the adequate exami- nation of this premise is one of the most difficult which it can possibly fall to the lot of metaphysical analysis to conduct. For these reasons I can make no apology for omitting to entertain this aspect of the controversy, even though I know that by so doing I tacitly deprive my adversaries' position of its principal support. As, how- I m mmmm '^ !l t; I i'r i 208 T/ic Physical Efficacy of Prayer. ever, this aspect of the controversy has been already exhaustively treated elsewhere, I have no compunction in now depriving that position of this support. The following examination, then, while it entertains all the ci posteriori objections, is restricted to such of the ct priori ones as are independent of our belief in the ubiquitous operation of natural law. Let us begin with the latter. Of the writers who have treated of the Prayer-question according to the deductive method, the most prominent is the Rev. Mr Knight — not on account of the cogency of his arguments, but because his articles in the Con- temporary Review have occasioned more popular excite- ment than has any of the other Essays upon the same side. For this reason I shall examine his views at greater length than those which have been advanced by the other writers named in the Title; and, presuming that the reader is already acquainted with the doctrine of " The Two Spheres," we may most fitly begin by observing that Mr Knight himself strangely eviscerates his argument, by virtually abstracting from it the scientific doctrine as to the unalterable rigidity of natural law. That is to say, Mr Knight himself in effect observes the distinction recently drawn between the two sections of the h priori class of arguments, and altogether abandons that section which is based upon the physical dogma, that the Reign of Law is universal. As this representation of Mr Knight's opinions will probably be somewhat startling to those who may have read his Essays, and would perhaps appear to Mr Knight himself entirely erroneous ; I shall adduce and comment upon some of the passages which occur in those Essays, and which seem to me incontestably to The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 209 justify such representation. But, if Mr Knight or his adherents can point to other passages occurring in the same Essays, and possessing a directly opposite significa- tion, still the case will not be much bettered ; for it will then become necessary to reconcile the one set of state- ments with the other. Natural law must be either alterable or unalterable in a human sense — it cannot consistently be assumed to oscillate between these two characters, according as the exigencies of an argument require. To take, then, a single passage among several that might be quoted : — "The plasticity of nature is conceded the moment you admit the agency of a living Spirit within the whole [which, of course, Mr Knight does admit], and interpret its laws as the mere indices of his activity. But this theistic axiom " etc. (p. 31). Now the language here is unequivocal, so that if Mr Knight's adherents point to others of his expressions, such as "the absolute fixity of physical law," " the rigour of adamantine law," etc. ; they can only save their Author from the charge of inconsistency, by supposing that in such phrases as the last-quoted, the term "law" is intended merely to signify law in its relation to man. But if natural law is " con- ceded " to be everywhere " plastic " in its relation to the Deity — or, as we are elsewhere told, the mere expression of His will — it brooks nothing to argue that it is of adamantine rigour in its relation to us; for it is the former relation alone which, in any case, is supposed to be the effective one. Whether or not the Deity chooses to answer Prayer for physical benefits, is another question : that if He does so, the existence of general laws affords no obstacle to such execution of His will, is here plainly conceded. And if the fact of natural law being of I mfsamm i I 210 T/ic Physical Efficacy of Prayer. adamantine rigour in its relation to us, establishes no probability that it is likewise of adamantine rigour in its relation to the Deity, we may as well discard the notion of law altogether ; and the argument, so far as it rests upon a foundation of physical truth, is at an end. Once let us discard this relative notion, and we shall then come face to face with the real difficulties of the subject. What these difficulties are (according to Mr Knight), we shall presently have occasion to observe : meanwhile we have only to notice, that this concession to theism deprives Mr Knight's case of all the force it obtains from ,the terse antithesis of Prof. Tyndall — "Prayer and Na- tural Law." I have said that Mr Knight can only be saved from the charge of inconsistency, by the supposition that he uses the word " law " in two diiferent senses ; and that if we, suppose this to be his usage, the argument, so far as it depends upon the conception of "law," entirely col- lapses. Mr Knight himself feels his liability to this charge, and likewise perceives the futility of the deliver- ance here suggested. I e therefore affirms that his *'theistic axiom carries with it a consequence which makes the assertion of flexibility barren and useless. For if the existing order be changed, the changed and the previous order being equally the outcome of the same governing Intelligence immanent everywhere in the whole, they would together afford but a slightly varying evidence of one and the same Supernaturalism " (p. 31). It is evident, however, that there is here no argument at all — the latter proposition being no proof of the former. Indeed it is worse than no proof, for it tends to a contra- diction. If the previous order and the changed order are equally the outcome of the same Intelligence, and TJic Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 2 1 1 therefore equally and in the same sense supernatural, far from making " the assertion of flexibility barren and use- less," this fact only serves to remove any presumption against the probability of a change. Consequently, we find the writer in the next sentences observing : — "There is no difficulty in supposing a change to occur in the common order of events, which we may call 'miraculous;' but the events preceding it and those which follow would be equally the result of divine preadjustment, as the particular change which arrested and elicited the wonder or the admiration of men. The speciality in some, which we call 'extraordinary,' to distinguish them from others which we term 'ordinary,' is due, not to a superabundance of divine agency within them, but to such a significant display of it as rivets and awakens us by its unwontedness. Were our vision perfect, we should discern speciality in all." Thus we again see that the position of the Physicist is distinctly resigned ; but in order that there may be no doubt whatever upon this head, it may be well to quote another passage in which miracles are alluded to. "It is a simple contradiction in terms to suppose that, with a perfect foresight of the whole process of evolution, the divine Evolver should alter that which His omniprescience predetermined, and bring about an equally perfect result. Doubtless the phases which that perfection assumes may be very various ; and a new manifestation wholly different from the old, may be equally perfect, being the outcome of the same animating and directing Intelligence. It is on this ground that the occurrence of a miracle can be vindicated before the tribunal of reason. But a miracle involves neither the violation of natural order nor the uprooting of existing agencies." (p. 26.) Now, we are not at present engaged with Mr Knight's views upon 1 i ' i! ■ i'! b urn ■■' '■ill . I'.H.'.r'.gg L5JW ri m ! 'I ,■ U I'l' 212 T/ie Physical Efficacy of Prayer. " omniprescience," and so may pass over the first period without comment. But how about the others ? If it is admitted that the phases of the Divine operation admit of being " very various " in the direction of miraculous manifestations, why may they not be equally various (so far as natural law is concerned) in the direction of an- swers to Prayer? If "it is on this ground that the occurrence of a miracle can be vindicated before the tribunal of reason," why may not an answer to Prayer (so far as natural law is concerned) be vindicated on the same ground? The concluding sentence, perhaps, ap- pears to imply a reason, viz., that an answer to Prayer would *' involve the violation of natural order," etc. But if such implication is intended, it is clearly no answer whatever ; for (so far as natural law is concerned) we can see no more reason why a miracle should be less a ** violation of natural order," than an answer to Prayer would be, if granted. Perhaps it is so, but if it is so, we can have no means of distinguishing between the two cases ; and to say that there is any distinction is me^-ely to make an arbitrary assertion, not only incapable of proof, but destitute of any assignable degree of likelihood. In short, once admit the possibility of miracle, and all difficulties attaching to the belief in the physical efficacy of Prayer, (so far as natural law is concerned,) im- mediately vanish ; for no one who asks the Deity to effect any physical change, expects to receive more than a miracle in reply. Mr Knight will perhaps point to the unverifiable nature of physical answers to Prayer, in antithesis to the conspicuous nature of a miracle, but this is clearly quite beside the question; for, while it is evident that the ,element of conspicuity is a mere accident of the one ^ t ^ ' iy . rifiable to the y quite hat the he one The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 213 case — i.e.^ necessitated only by the ///;^^J(? of the miracle, — it is no less evident that the absence of this element in the other can be no proof (so far as natural law is concerned), that a physical change has not been wrought. There may be other objections to our believing in the physical efficacy of Prayer, which do not apply to our believing in the occurrence of miracles ; but in so far as the common objection urged by the Physicist applies to the one case, so far, most assuredly, it applies to the other; and if this objection is negatived in the case of miracles by the assumption of a "theistic axiom," it is idle to suppose that both the objection and the axiom are in force in the case of physical answers to Prayer. And this, I think, is a conclusion which Mr Knight cannot refuse to accept. So far as an attentive reading of his two articles has made me arquainted with his meaning, this appears to be the point at which he diverges from those who have founded objections to Prayer upon the conception of natural law. Mr Knight concedes the abstract possibility of the occurrence of any physical change, however unusual ; and even goes so far as to maintain that this abstract possibility has been realized in the case of miracles : but the very possibility of such unusual changes in any case is denied by the thoroughgoing Physicist, as being tantamount, if re- alized, to the entire destruction of existing order. No doubt, in speaking against answers to Prayer, Mr Knight's articles are full of such expressions as, "It is blasphemous to imagine that God ever violates a law;" but in such expressions the writer must intend us to understand the word " law" in some transcendental sense ; for if he means by it the meiely human every-day conception, not only would most of us feel that it is yet more " blasphemous " ;i; if R. 15 f } < 214 T/ic Physical Efficacy of Prayer. to assume so intimate an acquaintance with the Divine modus operandi as would be required for the logical support of such assertions ; but these assertions could not, by any amount of paring, be made to square with- for instance, the following statement : — " In both cases (/.^., ordinary events and miracles) we come to believe in the constancy of law, by a closer scrutiny of what is apparently inconsistent, or has broken away from its ordinary course; the seemingly irregular giving us the hint of a deeper regularity underlying it, while the mono- tone of nature is broken by the momentary flash of its sleeping powers" (p. 27). Without enquiring why a monotone should be broken by a flash, it is evidently a mere juggling with words to speak of "constancy of law" in the case of miracles, and of " violation of law " in that of answers to Prayer, if the word "law" is intended to be understood in some different sense in the two cases. On the other hand, if this is not intended, it is no less evident, as before remarked, that, so far as man can see and natural " law is concerned, the one case shews as much " constancy " or " violation " (whichever alternative we like to adopt) as the other ; and that any endeavour to distinguish between the two can amount to nothing more than unwarrantable assertion. We see then, plainly enough, that Mr Knight has no objections to urge against Prayer on account of the existence of general laws. We may therefore leave this topic altogether, and, as though no question had ever been c .ertained with regard to it, proceed to his real objections. So far as these admit of being condensed into a single proposition, they are as follow : — " We cannot even con- ceive a single occurrence undirected, if the universe be indeed pervaded by an infinite mind, and an omnipresent a single kn con- /erse be [ipresent The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 2 1 5 Will. The error consists in the isolation of any one phenomenon or class of phenomena from the rest, and predicating a special direction of these, while others are left out of the reckoning" (p. 25). Now, to meet this abstract with equal brevity, it may be asked, if *S;// phenomena are invariably under the guidance of a su- preme Intelligence," in what sense can the guitlance of any phenomenon — whether or not effected in answer to Prayer — be said to be '■'■ spcciaV^ 'i The only answer sup- plied to this obvious question is drawn from the doctrine of Fore-ordination. We must, therefore, next address ourselves to Mr Knight's views upon this subject. He says: — "The notion of a pre-established harmony between our petitions for physical blessings and their re- ception, is a widely different one" from "the popular notion that prayer for physical changes can then and /'// !l m mm 1^1 2 1 8 T/ic Physical Efficacy of Prayer. a gateway to his whole position — he affords, by way of necessary consequence, a possible and quite conceivable solution of all his other difficulties. True, he has some objections to the belief that the abstract possibility of fore-ordination being exercised ii» the case of Prayer is ever realized ; and these objections we shall now proceed to examine, — observing only that this question is distinct from the one we are now leaving, ist, "The supposition reduces Prayer to the sphere of mechanical agency" (p. 33). If by "mechanical agency" ij here meant the production (through the Divine Will) of mechanical effects, this, of course, is precisely the point contended for by Mr Knight's opponents, and so cannot be any difficulty in the way of their belief: but if the term is meant to signify physical force, the statement is manifestly untrue. 2nd, "It cuts away the freedom of the petitioner, and interferes with the spontaneousness of his request" (p. 33). To this it will be sufficient to reply in the wcrds of the Duke of Argyll's criticism, although these were written in another connection: — "Can any one suppose that the difficulty here set forth can be con- fined to the sphere of the physical? And can any of us put these difficulties into words without a perfect con- sciousness that we must be calking nonsense — talking about things which we do not in the least understand ?" etc. (p. 472). 3rd, "Results do not prove the existence of any such pre-arrangements. The thousand, the mil- lion of unanswered petitions touching external nature effectually negative it. While were it a matter of pre- determination that there should be a coincidence between the petition and the reception of the benefit, the former automatically performed would invariably coincide with the lat^^er, like the beat of two pendulums,!' etc. (p. 34). , 1 any con- lof us con- f,lking md?" Itence mil- lature pre- :ween irnier with •• 34)- The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 219 4 This, however, is a very erroneous way of stating the case. Those who believe that some petitions have been fore- ordained to be answered accorcHng to the letter, are not therefore bound to believe that all have been similarly fore-ordained. In the case of Leibnitz's doctrine of pre- established harmony between the mind of every man and its environment, invariable coincidence is, of course, essential to the theory ; for otherwise the latter would be negatived by facts. But the present case is in no wise parallel, seeing that it is in no wise necessary for the Prayer-theory of pre-adjustment, that every petition should be literally complied with. Because Prayer is supposed to be but one factor determining physical se- quences in some cases, it does not therefore follow that it must be physically effectual in all cases — more especi- ally as those who practise it believe that other purposes, besides the accomplishment of physical results, are ef- fected by it. Mr Knight continues: — "This idea then, of pre- adjustment between the Prayer (say, for the recovery of the sick), and the physical sequences that tend to the result, helps us no way tov/ards a solution. What we wish to know is, v.'hether the one is to any extent causal of the other." There is a little ambiguity about the word " causal" here. Of course xi it means causal in the sense in which the term is applied to physical antecedents — L e., invariable, unconditional, ex., — there can be no doubt that it is not so. But if by " causal" is meant the validity of means — if it is asked. Is Prayer a mean (to- gether with innumerable others) by which man is enabled in some cases to obtain physical changes? — then the question is correctly stated. Mr Knight proceeds: — "Suppose the petitioner knew the entire course which ^i :r :i r„ -■- -^ npn nHMMMM I ■, [if I I m V. I h I "^1 ii I I 220 T/ie Physical Efficacy of Prayer. the disease was certain to take, his request would simply be, * Thy will be done : ' but, inasmuch as he cannot know its course with certainty, he is tempted to ask that it may be as he wishes it to be, hoping that his request may be helpful toward the desired result." Now this is a perfectly accurate statement of the case. If v ? are able to foresee the result with certainty, then we know that nothing short of a visible manifestation of Divine power could alter it; and feeling that we have no right to expect miraculous interference, we accept the inevita- ble result as the expression of the Divine Will \ The case thus resembles, as Mr Knight points out, that of an event already past, — we perceive that it has been thus for.'- ordained. But when the result is uncertain, who is lo know the Divine Will before the event ? To assume that Prayer in this case can be of no avail, is merely to assume that Prayer has had no place assigned to it in the pre- arrangement of all things, — that is, to assume the whole question in dispute. Such an assumption, whether or not it represenis the truth, is, of course, as an argument, fallacious; but Mr Knight, in the next sentence, strangely concedes that it is itself untrue : — " I have already indi- cated how it may be so in the subjective region of our own personality ; how a suggestion darted into the mind of a physician may be the direct cause of the use of a remedy which results in the preservation of life." Now, this "suggestion" must in all its relations have been fore- ordained ; otherwise the physical results to which it gave rise would escape altogether from the domain of the pre- established. But if all the relations of this "suggestion" were thus fore-ordained, its relation to the "request" that 'darted it into the mind of the physician" must also have been fore-ordained; and this is all that is required * Cf. pp. 95, 6. VM i M' The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 22T by the Prayer-theory. In other words, once admit that a petition to the Deity is capable of " darting a sugges- tion" into a human mind — whether of the petitioner himself or of another, — which suggestion is in turn capable of effecting a ph^'sical change, and any theory of fore-ordination we can rationally frame, must suppose the influence of Prayer to have been so pre-related to the physical forces, that its exercise by man is a mean to the accomplishment of physical results. This curious admission is repeated in another pas- sage : — " By pre-established harmony they [/. ^., spiritual antecedents and physical consequents, and vice versci\ act and react continually. But it is not, for example, the morality or the immorality of an act (a spiritual ante- cedent) that determines the physical consequences that result from the act. It is the physical habit (say intem- perance) that alone produces the physical detriment, injury to the frame ; while that which is spiritual in the act (/. e., its character as moral or immoral) always has its own spiritual consequences within the moral sphere," (p. 24). Now, this admits not only the abstract possi- bility, but the " continually" realized fact of events not, in a physical sense, causally connected, yet, in conse- quence of pre-established harmony, following one ano- ther in a determinate manner. If this is so in the case of intemperance, why may it not be so in the case of I'rayer ' ? Having now examined the two chief peculiarities of Mr Knight's views, we may descend to others; and these we shall take in the order in which they appear in his second article. He first gives us his ideas upon the subject of free- will. I confess, however, that I am wholly unable to 1 Cf. p. 139. !i I ■ ■ ■, 'I m^m ■asp 222 T/ie PJiysical Efficacy of Prayer. '■i comprehend them; and if Mr Knight should ever favour us with a more lucid exposition of his views, this is certainly one of the points upon which his readers will expect some enlightenment. For example, immediately after the last extract we made, occurs the following: — *' Next, I am told that I ' give up the doctrine of free- will altogether,' by the statement that it is vain to reply to the physicist who maintains the invariability of law, that *we are continually interfering with the seemingly fixed 1 ivr.s of the universe, and altering their destination,' etc. Ai) a asked what other answer I have to give? I reply, Th^ jnly answer that is possible, viz., the con- scious fact of freedom. It is *a vain reply' to allege that we can ever escape from the domain of law; because the laws of the physical system always encircle, and inva- riably rule us in the phenomenal sphere. It is not in that region that we are free. It is only in the possession of a transcendental or noumenal freedom, the autocratic power of self-determination." I suppose this "auto- cratic power" in a man is that which determines whether or not, to take Mr Knight's own example, he will follow a course of dissipation : otherwise I cannot see in what this autocratic power consists. I for one am not con- scious of postiessing any such "power of self-determina- tion," excepting in so far as I feel myself able to express this power by pursuing some definite line of conduct; and if Mr Knight tells me that my consciousness of this ability is an illusion on my part, I can only tell him in return, not merely what he says he has been told already, viz., that he thus "gives up the doctrine of free-will altogether," but also that he thus deprives me of my existence as an intelligent being. Whether or not the will is free, we can only know of its existence at all by 1 TJie Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 223 its enabling us to direct our thoughts and actions ; and if anyone supposes that he is " in the possession of a transcendental or noumenal freedom," which is yet inca- pable of expressing itself in action of any kind whatever, we can only leave him with this strange and unintelli- gible " possession," hoping that time and quiet may some day restore him to his right mind. I repeat, then, by " autocratic power of self-determination," can only be meant that which determines a course of action^ — e.g., whether or not a man will commence and continue a course of dissipation. Yet, if this is what the writer means, I cannot see the aim of his discussion. If it is a man's will that brings about the physical results of dissi- pation, then so far has his will been the agent in directing a highly complex series of physical changes: therefore "in that region" (/. ^., the 'phenomenal sphere'), we are free, in the sense of being able to direct the phy- sical forces; and this is the only sense for which the Duke of Argyll (whom Mr Knight is here answering) contends. When, therefore, upon the next page, the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy is referred to in connection with the Divine Will, the difficulty presented is no greater than that which meets us in the case of the same doc- trine in its connection with the human will. When Mr Knight is able to explain how it is, that the old and familiar force of the human will, working under the crust of familiar appearances, and influencing existing pheno- mena, does not make the latter cease to act, although they are modified by it; he may then validly adduce his crushing argument: — "Suppose a new and unfamiliar force to appear breaking through the crust of familiar appearances, and influencing existing phenomena, the t n\ S 11 Ik I s ^; I' ) rl If. ^2\ The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. latter would not cease to act, although they would be modified by it'." We now proceed to another point: "The Duke of Argyll refers us to * the reasonableness or the unreason- ableness of a petition' touching external nature. But who can judge of the reasonableness or the unreason- ableness of such petitions?" (p. 25). This, however, is no answer to the Duke's criticism. Some things we know it would be unreasonable to ask for: the Duke challenges the right of asserting that this knowledge extends to all phenomena, which have nothing 1 (} i^ ;.' ! I ^ It must be obsei-ved that Mr Knight is here dealing with another question, but the above quotation affords a fitting opportu- nity for briefly disposing of those objections in his first article, which are drawn from the doctrine of the Persistence of Force. It should be mentioned also, that Mr Knight has previously noticed a very obvious objection to his doctrine of the two spheres. " The Duke of Argyll affirms that we cannot reasonably assert that the spheres of the physical and the spiritual are distinct, because we cannot tell where in our own organism the one begins and the other ends" (p. 2j). This difficulty is met by a single sentence of studied obscurity ; but Mr Knight can scarcely imagine that he has thus disposed of it. If he is in the smallest degree acquainted with the principal results of physiological enquiry, he cannot fail to be aware that, whatever we may think as to the causality of the connection, there can be no reasonable doubt that every thought and feeling of ours is acco7npanied by corresponding molecular changes in our cerebral substance. And it is to be observed that this fact is as fatal to the doctrine of the two spheres, as would be the fact of a causal connection, if such were proved to exist. If I pray for an event X in the moral sphere, which can only be accomplished by effecting a corresponding change Y in the physical, it is manifestly immaterial, for the purposes of the Duke's criticism, whether or not Fis causal of X Either Prayer is ineffectual in either sphere, or it is effectual in both — at least to the extent of bringing about_moIecular changes in cerebral substance. 'Ti\ in our Lct is as fact of a for an ished by xnifestly iv or not bre, or it Lolecular T/ie PJiysical Efficacy of Prayer. 225 in common but their physical character. To reply that in the doubtful class we can never know whether or not any particular request would appear to ourselves unrea- sonable, were our knowledge sufficiently advanced ; is no answer to the question virtually put by the Duke, — Has Mr Knight any warrant to assume such knowledge as he does, when he asserts that all such Prayers are unreasonable ? Upon the next page the following sentence occurs : — " The rational prayer of the devout mind in reference to the order of physical events is in all cases, * Thy will be done.'" Now this statement, taken in conjunc- tion with that quoted from the Duke, serves very accu- rately to define the position of those who disagree with Mr Knight. They say in effect: — "Some physical changes we do not ask for, because we see that to do so would be manifestly unreasonable : others we do ask for, because we cannot see this. Yet we doubt not that if we could see further, we should perceive that many peti- tions which we now place in the second class should be assigned to the first : we therefore pray with reference to this section of the doubtful class, *Thy will be done.' But in the case of any particular request, we cannot tell whether or not a literal fulfilment would be expedient, or even possible, — /. 'l ^ j k -■H i It ' 226 T/tc Physical Efficacy of Prayer. hints of our finite intelligence are fit to regulate the divine procedure," etc. This, however, is merely a beg- ging of the question; for who is to know before the ei'ent whether or not that it is the divinely directed physical order, which leaves human desires and petitions altoge- ther out of account ? This fallacy we have had occasion to notice before, and, although it is many times repeated throughout this article, it may here be disposed of once for all. At the close of the paragraph from which the last extract is taken, the following sentence occurs: — " The sequences of nature and the ordered evolution of events, are a perpetual revelation of the divine will, and it is for the creature modestly and patiently to discipline his wishes in accordance with it." Most assuredly, after the event; but to say that it is the part of a "creature modestly and patiently to discipline his wishes" (in the sense of abstaining from Prayer) to luhatever may be in store, is merely to make a ^xsgnhtd petitio principii. We are constantly hearing of " the spirit of creaturely sub- mission," of " filial dependence," etc., in this sense, with- out the writer appearing to be aware that his argument is only valid upon the assumption of his own view of the question in dispute. Only if we knew that it is not the Divine Will to answer any of this class of petitions, would there be any room for this " creaturely submission." To shew that we possess this knowledge, is the self-impcsed task of the writer; but it is clearly absurd to imagine that he can do this by pointing to the rational conse- quence of such knowledge, if made out, as the proof of its possession. Mr Knight next deals with an important objection to his case. " I am continually met by the taunt, ' Is man more free than God, because you say he cannot interfere t i 1 be in We y sub- , with- zument of the not the would » To tnpcsed imagine conse- roof of :tion to Is man tnterfere T/ie Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 227 with his own laws?' I accept the akernative. In one sense it is so : in the iion posse pcccare of the schoolmen. The divine will is necessitated to an absolutely perfect administration of the physical universe. The absolute Lawgiver, Artist, Mechanician, cannot undo what He has done, or do otherwise than He does. It is a simple contradiction in terms to suppose, that with a perfect foresight of the whole process of evolution, the divine Evolver should alter that which His omniprescience pre- determined, and bring about an equally perfect result." We have already seen that the last sentence here em- bodies an unwarrantable assumption, viz., that the desires and requests of man have no part or lot in the pre- established harmony of events : the other sentences con- tain an assumption no less unwarranted. Of course, if the direction of the natural forces by the Deity in re- sponse to Prayer is a token of imperfect administration on His part, the whole question is decided — the truth of this assertion being the ultimate question in dispute. When Mr Knight's opponents ask, " Why may not the Deity direct the physical forces in answer to Prayer, when we know that man can do so ?" and when Mr Knight answers, " Because, if He did so, it would be a case of pcccare;" he is merely re-stating his opinion in the guise of an answer. What his opponents want to know is, — why should such direction be a case of pcccare — why should that be the only " perfect administration of the physical universe," which leaves human desires altogether out of consideration? We know that the direction of the physical forces (whether or not in answer to petition) is no sign of error or of imperfection in the case of man, " and we may well decline to accept it as a self-evident truth with regard to God'." * Duke of Argyll ;n Contemporary Review. Cf. Chap. v. §§ 10 — 13. Il i I ! m I ■ I I ! < Hi K 'HI iu 228 77ic' P^iysicnl Efficacy of Prayer. This dogmatic assumption of Mr Knight's is singularly opposed to other passages in his article, e.g., in the next paragrai)h : — "The very essence of my whole contention is that the Divine Nature is so singularly revealed in its omnipresence within every element or movement of the physical universe, that whatever comes to pass is the necessary outcome of its agency ; every force and every change in nature being an apocalypse of God, and every link in the chain of its sequences attesting the indwelling Presence." Mr Knight has doubtless some good reasons for making this broad distinction between the directive influence of the Deity as universally immediate in all physical sequences, and yet absolutely impotent in re- sponding to Prayer ; but if he has such reasons, he surely cannot fail to be aware that their total absence from his writings gives the close apposition of such antithetical doctrines the semblance of a glaring inconsistency. There is another remark to be made on this last quotation. On the previous page Mr Knight objects to Prayer for physical results, on the score of its requesting " an alteration of the course of nature." But, if " every link in the chain of nature's sequences attests the indwelling presence of God," how can there in any case — /. e., whether or not this kind of Prayer is effectual — be such a thing as "an alteration in the course of nature?"— the "neces- sary outcome of the Divine agency" being then only apparent when its effects are accomplished. In a trans- cendental sense, a change may be supposed to take place in the Divine counsels in answer to Prayer (although, if Prayer is effectual, our warrant for this supposition would indeed be hard to establish) ; but if " whatever comes to pass in nature is an apocalypse of God," then, mani- festly, it is only to the mind of God, if to any, that the The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 229 phrase " change in the course of nature " can i)ossess any meaning. The truth is, that Mr Knight, in trying to confine the Physicist's objections to Prayer within the limits of a Christian Theism, has not escaped the cala- mity which is so Hable to attend the putting of new wine into old bottles. The next point of any importance raised, is the very obvious " demand of the scientific world why we should separate a class of physical phenomena from the rest,... — why we should regard the rain-law as more amenable to fresh direction, than the sun-law or the force of gravita- tion." It will be remembered that this ''demand" has already been fully answered, both by the Duke of Argyll and by the present criticism*. Nevertheless, as Mr Knight again presents the same argument in the disguise of an altered phraseology, it may not be superfluous to refute it yet more thoroughly. The argument, then, is palpably illogical, because it clearly has no bearing whatever upon the question in dispute, — it being believed by everyone that Prayer of this kind is only effectual (if at all) in a hidden manner. The supposed argument is therefore nothing more than the statement of an irrelevant fact, — it being no argument against a belief, to make assertions which are admitted as axiomatic by those who hold that belief. The question between Mr Knight and his oppo- nents is not, Are flagrant manifestations of Divine power ever vouchsafed in answer to Prayer? but, Is Mr Knight's classification of the " two spheres " a legitimate one ? Are requests for small physical changes as " unreasonable" as requests for large ones ? Is it the mere fact of an event having a physical character at all (independently of its magnitude), that renders petition for it unavailing ? ^ See p. 216, and pp. 220—1. Also Biirfiey Essay ^ pp. 95 — 6« R. 16 K ; I '■■: ! Urn lil 230 T/ic Physical Efficacy of Prayer. And, in answer to these questions, the burden of proof lies with Mr Knight to shew that his classification is legitimate, — /. c, that things which it is reasonable and unreasonable to ask for, correspond respectively with the moral and physical spheres; — and to do this it can be of no avail to point to some things within the physical sphere, which his opponents concede to be unalterable ; for this in no wise assists him in establishing his classifi- cation — that is, in proving all things within the physical sphere to be similarly unalterable. The point which Mr Knight has to make out is, that those things which agree in possessing a physical character, likewise agree in possessing an unalterable character ; and it is no more a proof of this point to shew that some physical things are likewise unalterable things, than to shew that some animals have four legs would be any proof that al' mals are quadrupeds. In short, the analogy whic Knight endeavours to institute does not support his argument, but depends for its existence upon his argu- ment being made out. On page 30 there is a good opportunity afforded for discussing an argument of which Mr Knight is particu- larly fond. "The evolution and succession of pheno- mena are so infallibly adjusted, the balance is so perfect, that when what we desire to be present around us is absent, it is because it (or its equivalent) if present would be misplaced," etc. etc. This argument is frequently repeated, without the writer appearing to know that it is itself incapable of proof. The most celebrated of our Natural Theologians tells us that in Nature he saw Beneficence, but not Optimism ; and if the poll of the present generation were taken, I think he would have the majority. Be this how it may, there can be no I argxi- id for larticu- (heno- lerfect, us is would [uently Ithat it .ted of lie saw of the Id have be no The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 23 r doubt that the mere assertion of a disputed fact is but of small assistance to either side of a disputed question. In the words of the Duke of Argyll ; " That what we mistake for banes may often be really blessings, is very true, and ought always to be remembered. But that all we enjoy, and all we suffer, are given to us in measure absolutely fixed, and absolutely incapable of any other distribution than that which is determined by a purely physical necessity, has not been proved, or even indi- cated by any fact of science or any analogy of nature " (p. 469). It is a curious fact that Mr Knight himself, a page or two further on (33), expressly negatives his own argu- ment, by conceding the falsity of 'he Optimism theory. He says ; — " Nor do I deny the legitimacy of petitioning God for the removal of disease, or of all that is interfering with the perfection of terrestrial life. On the contrary, I affirm and enforce the duty of doing so. I maintain, however, the unlawfulness of seeking alterations of nature which are interferences with existing law." If these sen- tences mean that disease is not amenable to " law," it is evident that this term must here be used by Mr Knight in some unintelligible sense, or, more plainly, that he is writing nonsense : if otherwise, he flatly contradicts his own assumption as to the truth of Optimism ; and, I may add, dissolves all his previous distinctions between " the two spheres." A few pages further on Mr Knight again returns to his Optimism argument (36), but as he throughout sup- poses that " the felt wants of the suppHant" expressed in Prayer, can in no case, by the mere fact of their presence, render a certain course of events preferable to some other one, which in the absence of such wants might be most 16—3 ■Hi {^I'l I :' .'il ^lll 1' mmmmmmmmmmm r Sj I !'■ 232 T/ic Physical Efficacy of Prayer. so ; even if we grant him his argument, it is invalid except ujion the assumption of the whole question in dispute. The next paragraph is occupied with the same as- sumption in another form, viz., that Prayer in the sense of petition for physical changes is not acceptable to the Deity ; — an assertion whose only value in the absence of argument (and no argument is here possible), is to shew that if the writer were in the position of " the omnipo- tent Administrator," he would altogether disregard such " irregular petitioning'." Another argument is set forth on page 37. "We can never be certain that, if we receive any particular physi- cal blessing, others, who have a better right to it than we have, may not be deprived of it." This is undoubt- edly true, and would be a valid objection to Piayer for such blessings, were Mr Knight's definition of " the warrant for presenting petitions for physical benefits," a legitimate one. This definition is, "tlie felt wants of the suppliant," but such a definition is not complete. To make it so we must add, *' together with his belief in the power and wisdom of God." Now this addition destroys the force of the above objection , for it ex- presses the fact that the petitioner, in detailing his " felt wants," does not do so unconditionally — feels that to do this " would be to invade and not to pray." Conse- quently, if the interests of two petitioners clash, in so far as they are petitioners^ there is no difficulty, for each re- 1 " People in general seem to think that they have used a very powerful argument, when they have said, that to suppose some proposition true, would be a reflection on the goodness of the Deity. Put into the simplest possible terms, their argument is, ' If it had depended on me, I would not have made the proposition true, therefore it is not true.'" — Mill, On the Fallacies of Simfle Inspection. % The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. 233 quests that what upon the whole is best may be that which his petitions shall effect. They both express their desires, yet both agree in leaving the disposition of re- sults to the "wisdom of God" — pray, in the sense pre- viously explained, "Thy will be done',," But this introduces us to another mock-argument. Mr Knight perpetually speaks as if the mere fact of petitioning for a physical change were tantamount to asking for that which the petitioner knows to be against the Divine Will. Throughout both his Essays he assumes that requests for physical benefits are incompatible with "the suppressed premise of all true Prayer," i.e., desire for the accomplishment of the Will of God. But no one is foolish enough to pray for that which he believes to be against the Divine Will. The point that Mr Knight has to establish is, that the results expressed by such petitions are against the Divine Will ; and the mere asser- tion of his own belief cannot influence the belief of those who think otherwise. The reservation, "if it be pos- sible," cannot be shewn incompatible with requests for physical changes, unless it has previously been shewn that the granting of any such request is in the nature of things impossible. Mr Knight then proceeds to another point : " Stress ought also to be laid upon the non-verifiable character of all alleged answers to Prayer for physical good... No record of coincidences can prove a causal connection, or i) i i r« ' It is no doubt true (as may legitima ely be urged), that peti- tions for pliysical benefits are, from the nature of the case, much more lialile in this manner to clash, than are petitions of any other kind. This fact, however, has clearly no bearing upon the only question with which we are concerned, viz.. Are all petitions for physical changes unavailing ? ■!■ mm I liiW I I %-m- ' '• * 234 T/ie Physical Efficacy of Prayer. even suggest it, unless the instances are exceptionally numerous, and unless other causes leading to the result are excluded by the rigid methods of verification." Con- versely, no record of failures are of any avail on the other side (see p. 34), so long as any of these apparent answers remain — unless it could be proved that the causal con- nection between Prayer and its answer, if it exists, must be unconditional. As this position likewise can never be proved, or even suggested as probable, verification upon either side is clearly rendered impossible by the conditions of the case. Still this argument is valid so far as it goes, and will require to be examined at greater length hereafter. As presented, by Mr Knight, however, it is not of much value, seeing that those who believe in the physical validity of Prayer, do not regard such validity as the equivalent of miraculous power. The argument, as it here stands, is at best a negative one ; since it cannot be proved, or rendered in the smallest degree probable, that if Prayer is of any physical validity, it must therefore of necessity be amenable to the "rigid methods of verification." And here we may repeat, that it is no effectual argument against a belief, to make assertions which are admitted as axiomatic by those who hold that belief. On the other hand, those who hold that belief are fully entitled to challenge the right of asserting that any particular coincidence is only a coin- cidence unless those who make the assertion are able on independent grounds to demonstrate, or to render probable, the falsehood of that belief. Mr Knight concludes the list of his arguments by affirming, that the only sense in which we are told to pray for our daily bread, is that of " including within the request all the specific particulars by which the petition m The Physical Efficacy of Prayer 235 could possibly be answered;" and that in praying "Thy will be dene," " our request is substantially, though in- directly, met by whatsoever comes to pass." Surely, then, Prayer for physical benefits ceases, not only to be a duty, but to be an exercise worthy of rational creatures. There can be no doubt that Prayer for Bread refers directly to numerous complex physical changes, neces- sarily involved in the bringing about of the result. If these changes are not believed by the petitioner to be in any way influenced by his petition, where is the sense or the piety in his making it ? As regards himself, his Bread would come to him in exactly the same manner whether or not he asked for it : as regards the Deity, is it reverent to suppose that He looks with favour upon a petitionary form of Prayer, uttered by one who regards all such petitions as ** the most miserable of mockeries"? Surely we may appropriate another sentence from the next paragraph \ and add, "that if Prayer be absolutely powerless as a 'physical' agency in human life, there is not only a logical inconsistency in all ' such petitionary forms,' there would also be a h it hypocrisy in their Mse." Yet Mr Knight adds, " In short, since all unselfish prayer touching outward things contem])b'os the uni- versal good along with the individual benefit, o r special [c'*^ -;erve, special^ requests (say for rain, or an abundant harvest) may be responded to by the descent of the former, or the ingathering of the latter, afiywhere over he whole area of the globe. We petition for rain, and it falls 1 This paragraph deals with another class of petitions, viz., those for spiritual benefits, uttered by men disbelieving in the efficacy oi all Prayer — a precisely analogous case, it seems to me, to the one above commented on, although Mr Knight in the latter case advocates petition, and in the former condemns it. ! i '1 1 1 I' ' I I ' : 236 The Physical Efficacy of Prayer. amongst the Andes : we ask for fair weather, and the sun shines out upon the plains of India; but our requests are fulfilled as truly, and much more wisely, than if we experienced what we sought at home." That our re- quests may be thus fulfilled " more wisely," all will ad- mit ; but that they can be thus fulfilled " as truly," all will deny. If the element of relation is not satisfied by answers to Prayer, it is only by the most violent of meta- jDhors that such answers can be said to be given at all. To tell an agonized farmer that his often and earnestly- repeated Prayer for rain, has been answered by the merci- ful Jehovah, in the form of a copious descent amongst the barren steeps of the Andes ; will convey the impres- sion to his unsophisticated mind, either that his request has been strangely misunderstood, or that he might as well have addressed himself to Baal and Ashtaroth. Philosophy, however, has a widening influence upon the mind ; and those who have pursued its study with the same degree of success as Mr Knight, cannot fail in all things to drink the sweet comforts of religion ; for only by the tutored intellect can that profound consolation of a Scriptural faith be realized, which is so pathetically rendered in the lines "The Sun by night thee shall not smite, Nor yet the Moon by day." !» I Mr Robertson sets forth his views regarding the phy- sical efficacy of Prayer, in a ser;non upon the text, " Not as I will, but as Thou wilt ' I may observe that this sermon contrasts favourably with the articles we have just examined, in respect of its temperate tone. It is also marked by that pleasing lucidity and terseness of style, which is so eminently characteristic of this author. The Phys^'-'^I Efficacy of Prayer. 237 The portion of the sermon with which we are concerned is Section II. — " Erroneous notions of what prayer is." Mr Robertson begins by asserting that all these ** erroneous notions" "are contained in that conception which He negatived, *As I will' In the text it is said distinctly that this is not the aim of prayer, nor its mean- ing. ' Not as I will.' The wish of man does not deter- mine the Will of God." The entire argument, then, is, that because Christ was refused an answer to His petition on one occasion, therefore Christians are not to expect an answer to their petitions on any occasion. Let not this be thought a false representation of the argument : il is merely a statement of its logical basis. If the fact that Christ was once refused an answer to His petition, proves that *' the wish of man does not determine the Will of God (/. !>' ''f ■''^V' -■;■»'.{;. ; iW;.. '*' «