PUBWCATIOffS OF

Th« Amertcah ACAJDiaarsf op Powticai:* and Sociai, SciEiica,

No. 141.

lesaed Fortsigflitlv.

Febraary 26^ 1895.

Elected or Appointed Officials ?

J G. BOURINOT, CM. a, LLD., DX.L, Lit D.

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ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICIALS?

A CANADIAN QUESTION.

The subject to which I am about to direct the attention of
the members o^ the Academy is not simply a question in
which the Canadian people alone have a deep intercut. On
the contrar>^ I think I shall be able to show, before I have
concluded my argument, that it necessarily brings up con-
siderations affecting the political system of the United States,
and is consequently of much importance to all who are in-
terested in the problems of government, federal, state and
municipal, on this continent, and are endeavoring, with
patriotic zeal, to reach a solution that will remove many
difficulties and evils that are now deeply injurious to the
working of democratic institutions.

Some months ago the government of the Province of On-
tario, which comprises nearly one-half of the total population
of the Dominion, and is in ever^^ way the most wealthy and
influential section of the federation, appointed an important
commission, composed of one of the ablest judges of the
Canadian bench, Mr. Chancellor Eoyd, of the Honorable

[653]

2 Annals of the American Academy.

John Beverly Robinson, late lieutenant-governor, and of three
other gentlemen of less national repute, but chosen from their
knowledge of county and municipal affairs. The object of
this commission is to consider the best mode of appoint-
ing and paying a certain class of provincial officials. Its
significance lies in the fact that it indicates the existence
of a disturbing element in the province, having in contempla-
tion a change in the present mode of nominating and
appointing public officers by the crown or lieutenant-gov-
ernor on the advice of his constitutional council; that is to
say, by the cabinet or ministry, w^ho are responsible at once
to the crown and to the legislative assembly in which they
have seats, and by w^hose support only they can retain office.
An agitation has been commenced which has, happily, not
extended beyond a ver>^ limited area of influence in this one
province, to make certain appointments elective, as in the
United States, or else give them to the municipal councils of
the counties. This agitation has obtained a slight headway
by the fact that it is fostered by a few politicians who have
either not given the subject the least reflection, or felt they
can gain an evanescent political advantage by concurring in
the opinions that appear to be entertained in some rural con-
stituencies where sound principles of political science are not
well understood, or w^here the hope of obtaining control of a
few important public offices has outv^reiglied those consider-
ations of sound public policy and public interest which lie at
the foundation of the present S3^stem of appointments. Al-
though, as I have already said, the movement is not sup-
ported by any large section of people — indeed, the inquiry
before the commissioners fully proves that fact — still the
existence of the commission gives a positive gravity to the
subject w^hich otherwise, possibly, it w^ould not have, and
renders it necessary that all those who value the welfare of
the communit3^ — for its w^elfare is obviously involved in its
conditions of government — should seriously consider the
matter in all its bearings with the view of informing the

[654]

Elected or Appointed Officials? 3

public mind in case it has doubts, and of leading it from any
fallacious conclusions to which a few thoughtless persons
have been attempting from time to time of late to lead public
opinion in a province whose action on political or other ques-
tions naturally attracts much attention throughout the Do-
minion.

II.

In order that all the issues involved in the inquir>' before
the commission may be thoroughly understood it is necessary
that I should at the outset make some explanations with re-
spect to the present system of appointing and paying officials,
and in doing so I may state that the one which obtains in
Ontario, is that of all the other provinces of Canada — in
fact, the system which has come from England in accordance
with the principles of parliamentar\^ or responsible govern-
ment, and prevails from one end of the Dominion to the other,
including the Northwest territories. At the present time
there are in the Province of Ontario the following function-
aries and officials, legislative, executive, administrative and
judicial, who legislate, expound the law, and administer the
affairs of the province generally, in accordance with the
British North America Act of 1867, which is the funda-
mental law which regulates the jurisdiction of each province
within its territorial and legal limits:

I. The Exeaitive Departmeiit : A lieutenant-governor,
appointed practically for five years, and removable for
cause by the governor-general in council — that is, by the
government of the Dominion.

An executive or advisor\^ council, composed of the follow-
ing ministers, called to office by the lieutenant-governor,
having seats in an assembly, elected by the people, and
holding office only as long as they retain the confidence of
the majority of that house: an attorney- general, generally
the prime minister, as at present; a commissioner of crown
lands, a commissioner of public works, a provincial secre-
tary, a provincial treasurer, a minister of education, a

[655]

4 ANNAI.S OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY.

minister of agriculture, and sometimes, as now, one or more
executive councilors without a departmental office.

Under these several executive and administrative political
heads there is a large permanent body of public officials,
consisting of deputy ministers, secretaries and clerks, who
perform all the duties that devolve on the several depart-
ments in accordance with law and custom. The officers and
clerks come under statutes regulating appointments and
promotions. Every candidate for a clerkship at the seat of
government enters, after an examination as to qualifications
and character, on a probation of six months. No appoint-
ment or promotion can be made except under the authority
of the lieutenant-governor in council, upon the application
and report of the head of the department in which it is to
be made.

2. The Legislative Department : The lieutenant-governor,
who is not only the executive, but the first branch of the
legislature*; a legislative assembly, consisting of ninety-
four members elected by universal suffrage (only limited
by a short residence and actual citizenship), for a term of
four years, unless sooner dissolved by the lieutenant-gover-
nor acting in his executive capacity. Attached to the legis-
lative assembly are a speaker, elected by the house; a clerk,
a sergeant-at-arms, appointed by the lieutenant-governor in
council, and a number of clerks, messengers and pages
appointed by the speaker and government.

3. The Judicial Department : A supreme court of judica-
ture, consisting of a court of appeal, composed of a chief
justice and three justices; a high court of justice in three
divisions, as follows: queen's bench, with a chief justice and
two justices; chancery, with a chancellor and three justices;
common pleas, with a chief justice and two justices.

All the foregoing justices are appointed and paid by the

• At the present time, of the seven provinces of the federation only two have an
upper chamber, or legislative council — Quebec and Nova Scotia. Ontario has bad
none since 1867, when the union was inaugurated. The legislature of the terri-
tories also has only an elective assembly.

[656]

Bisected or Appointed Officiai^? 5

Dominion government, and can be removed only for suffi-
cient cause by an address to the governor-general from the
two houses of the Dominion parliament. In connection
with this supreme court of judicature there are five regis-
trars, ten clerks, seven criers and minor servants, all ap-
pointed by the lieutenant-governor in council. Their
salaries are, as a rule, fixed by law, and all fees received by
them are payable into the public treasur>'.

In addition to this supreme court, there are the following
judicial officers:

County judge — in the majority of cases, a senior and a
junior in each county— appointed, paid and removable for
cause by the Dominion government. Surrogate judge,
whose duties are generally performed by a county judge
under the provincial statute; master in chambers, master
in ordinary, official guardian, inspector of local offices,
inspector of titles, accountant of supreme court, inspector
of public offices, clerk of the process, clerk of assize,
reporters, shorthand writers, master of titles—all of whom,
as well as a number of minor clerks and servants, are
appointed by the lieutenant-governor in council. Several of
these offices may be held by one person at the same time.

The civil service act, it is necessary to mention here, can
be applied to the master in chambers, master in ordinary,
registrars of the court of appeal and of the several divisions
of the high court of judicature, accountant, surrogate clerk,
clerk of records and writs, clerk of process, and clerk in
chambers. The statute, however, leaves this within the
discretion of the lieutenant-governor in council.

4. Provincial Officers in Districts : The foregoing officers,
for the most part, are connected with the supreme court of
judicature, which reside at the political and judicial capital,
the city of Toronto. But in order to make this review as
intelligible and valuable as possible, I shall also specify the
various officers and other persons connected with the whole
public and municipal service, as necessarily involved in the

[657]

6 Annai^s of thk American Academy.

argument and in the conclusion to which I wish to come.
In every county of the province there are, in addition to the
county judges mentioned above, the following executive and
quasi judicial officers: Sheriff, local and deputy master,
deputy registrar of the high court of justice, deputy clerk
of the crown, clerk of county court, registrar of surrogate
court, county crown attorney, clerk of the peace, coroner, di-
vision court clerk, division court bailiff, criers and constables.

In addition to the foregoing officials, we have in the large
cities and towns of the province one hundred and twelve
police magistrates.

All these officials, as enumerated above, are appointed by
the lieutenant-governor in council. Police magistrates are
paid fixed salaries, but sheriffs, registrars, and other persons
in the list receive fees, out of w^hich they pay their own
salaries and all the expenses of their respective offices. In
the case of registrars the salaries are regulated by statute, as
I shall show presently. Ever>^ officer receiving fees must
send a return of the same every year to the proper authority
at Toronto, and it is published in the official statement laid
before the legislature. The division courts, registry and
other offices are regularly insp-^cted by officers appointed by
the lieutenant-governor in council.

5. Mimicipal Coimcih : Warden of county, appointed by
every county council, from among the reeves and deputy
reeves that compose that body. Mayor of city and town
elected by the ratepayers on a general vote. Reeve and
head of to^vnship and village councils, elected, as a rule, by
ratepayers in such mimicipalities. Aldermen in cities,
councilors in towns, villages and townships, elected by the
ratepayers in their respective municipalities, to constitute the
councils thereof. All these municipal authorities are an-
nually elected in the month of January.

Attached to these several municipal corporations are the
following officers, appointed in all cases by the councils:
Clerk, treasurer, assessment commissioner in some cities,

[658]

Elected or Appointed Officiai^? j

city engineer, assessors and collectors, auditors, valuators,
pound-keepers, fence- viewers, overseers of highways, road
surv^eyors, road commissioners, game inspectors and other
officials necessary for the administration of municipal affairs.
All important officers, like clerks and treasurers, remain in
office during good behavior.

High school trustees are appointed by the councils of the
municipalities. Public school trustees are elected by the
ratepayers in the several municipal divisions. Inspectors
of public schools are appointed by county councils for counties,
and by board of trustees for cities, from persons who have a
regular certificate of qualification according to the regula-
tions of the educational department. Inspectors of high,
normal and model schools are appointed by the govern-
ment.

6. Special Classes of Officials : In addition to the foregoing
municipal officers there are the following classes of officials of
a special character, and confined to a few localities: Chairman
and members of provincial board of health, appointed by the
lieutenant-governor in council. Superintendent, officers and
servants of reformatories, by the lieutenant-governor in coun-
cil; superintendent and bursar of insane asylums, by the
same authority; keepers and attendants, by the superinten-
dent; inspectors of prisons, public charities, asylums and
reformatories, by lieutenant-governor in council; keepers and
turnkeys of county gaols, by sheriff of county; but the ap-
pointments are subject to the approval of the lieutenant-gov-
ernor in council, and salaries are fixed by the county coun-
cils. Constables in charge of lock-ups in municipalities, by
the magistrates in courts of general sessions. High and
other constables, by the general sessions, or county judge
or police magistrate; members of the police force in cities
by the board of commissioners composed by law of the
county judge, police magistrate and the mayor; in munici-
palities where no such board exists the appointment of peace
officers rests with the councils.

[659]

< Annals of the American Academy.

III.
From the foregoing summar>' of the legislative, adminis-
trative, judicial and municipal machinery of the province,
from the head of the executive to the crier or pound-keeper,
it will be seen that there are practically no persons having
executive or ministerial functions to perform — apart, of
course, from the political heads — who are elected by the
people. The legislative functions of government are kept
distinct from the purely administrative and judicial depart-
ments. The people legislate and govern through their
representative assemblies, in accordance with the wise
principles of English government. They elect in the first
place to the provincial legislature men to legislate for the
whole province; in the next place, they select councilors,
mayors and reeves, to legislate for them in certain definite
municipal divisions, on such matters as local taxes, sewage,
water, and other necessities and conveniences of life, as
provided and limited by the law of the general legislature.
The head of the executive authorit}^ and also of the legis-
lative branch is the lieutenant-governor, who holds his office
by virtue of the highest authority of the Dominion, and
quite independently of the provincial government. His
advisers, the executive council, are not appointed directly
by the legislature, to whom they are responsible, but by the
lieutenant-governor whose choice, however, is limited by the
unwritten law, or the conventions and maxims of the con-
stitution, to those representatives who have the confidence
of the majority of the people's house. All provincial or
public officials, apart from municipal officers, are appointed
by the lieutenant-governor on the advice of his council.
The sheriffs, registrars, county clerks, and those other
officials in counties, already enumerated, are not appointed
or even nominated by the councils of those districts, but by
the Ontario government, since their duties are provincial in
their nature. The students of English history will remem-
ber that the sheriff or shire-reeve was one of the most

[660]

ElectivD or Appointed Officiai^? 9

important judicial officers of early English times. While
acting in a representative capacity he was elected and pre-
sided over the scirgetnot or shire-mote. But many centuries
have passed since he was deprived of his important functions
in the administration of the king's justice, and became a
crown officer, performing important executive and ministerial
duties in connection with the courts. Such officers as
masters, county clerks, county attorneys, and clerks of the
peace as well as others, having certain defined duties to dis-
charge in the courts, are also eSvSentially crown appoint-
ments. The fountain of justice is the crown as represented
in the courts, and it would be an anomaly in the English or
Canadian system to make such officers elective or to hand
them to merely local administrative bodies of a limited
sphere of authority like municipal councils. Even in the
case of the municipalities it has been considered wise to limit
the privileges of the people, and give their representatives
alone the right of electing such officers as clerks, treasurers,
auditors, who have clerical and ministerial duties to perform,
and whose qualifications can be best tested and understood
by a small body of chosen men. The most important count}'
officer, the warden, is not elected by the people generally,
but by a special body of men, the reeves and deputy reeves,
or heads of councils of the townships of the county munici-
pality. The heads of councils in cities and other munici-
palities, into which the county is divided, are elected
directly by the ratepayers of those municipal divisions, —
a departure apparently from the principle observ^ed in the
case of the warden, and other officers of the municipalities.
Experience shows that the election of such heads of councils,
who are elected on short terms of office, only for one year in
all cases, and may have no experience whatever of municipal
work, does not work very satisfactorily in cities, where
knowledge and experience, longer tenure of office, and
larger control over work of administration are so very
desirable.

[661]

lo Annai^ of the American Academy.

Before I continue this argument it is interesting to com-
pare the foregoing list of persons engaged in Ontario in
legislative, administrative, judicial and municipal work,
with similar classes in the great State of Ohio, whose natural
resources, population, educational and political progress and
wealth naturally lead one to make comparisons with the
Canadian province.

At the present time citizens in Ohio vote for the following
classes of officers and representatives: *

1. Federal Officers: Electors of the President of the United
States, once in every four years. Members of the House of
Representatives of the United States, once in every two years.

2. State Officers: Members of the board of public works,
(for three years' term) ; judges of the supreme court (for
five years), once in each year. Governor, lieutenant-gov-
ernor, secretary of state, treasurer, attorney -general. State
senators (elected in each territorial district), members of the
State House of Representatives (elected in each representa-
tive district) , once in two years. State commissioner of com-
mon schools, clerk of the supreme court, once in three years;
auditor of the State, once in four years.

3. District Officers: Circuit judge (for six years), once in
two years. Judge of the court of common pleas (for five
years) , once in five years. Member of the State board of
equalization, once in ten years.

4. County Officers: County commissioners (for three
years), infirmary directors (for three years), once in each
year. County treasurer, sheriff, coroner, once in two years.
County auditor, recorder, surveyor, judge of probate, clerk
of court of common pleas, prosecuting attorney, once in three
years.

5. City Officers: Members of the board of police commis-
sioners (in the majority of cities), members of board of

* I have taken the foregoing list from Bryce's " American Commonwealth " (II,
pp. 430, 431. First ed.) after comparing it with the latest edition of the "Ohio
Voters' Manual." This list, as given above, omits all officers appointed by
'Councils, as not material to my argument.

[662]

Elected or Appointed Officials? ii

infirmary directors (for three years), trustee of water- works
(for three years), once every year. Mayor, city clerk, audi-
tor (if an}^, treasurer, solicitor, police judge (in large cities),
prosecuting attorney of the police court (in large cities),
clerk of the police court (in large cities) , city commissioner
(in second-class cities), marshal (only in small cities), street
commissioner, city engineer and fire surve3?^or (when elected
at the polls, as city council determine), superintendent of
markets (when elected at the polls as city council deter-
mine), all once in two years.

IV.

It will be seen from the foregoing comparison between a
great Province of Canada and a great State of the Federal
Republic, that the legislative departments of both countries
— the House of Commons of the Dominion and the Legisla-
tive Assembly of the Province, and the House of Representa-
tives of the National Congress, and the two houses of the
State Legislature — are elected directly by the people in their
respective electoral districts. That is to sa}-, the principle
of electing men who act in a legislative and representative
capacity is strictly observed in each countr>\ But here the
comparison practically ceases. In the Province of Ontario
all public officers who may be compared with those in Ohio
— and a reference to the two lists will show that both coun-
tries have necessarily similar classes of officials — are ap-
pointed by some permanent or responsible authority,
removed from direct popular influence, while in the Ameri-
can State they are elected by a vote at the polls in all cases.
The mayors and reeves of Ontario, as I have already said, are
somewhat exceptional, but their terms of office are very brief
unless they are re-elected, — which frequently happens, — and
they do not fall within the strict category of such permanent ex-
ecutive, clerical or administrative officials, as clerks, treasur-
ers and auditors, who are appointed by the councils in Canada

[663]

12 Annals of the American Academy.

while they are elected directly by the people in Ohio. In
that State, as Dr. James Bryce has pointed out, there are
twenty -two different paid ofl&cers — ^including, for argument
sake, legislators in that class — which a voter annually has to
allot by his vote; that is to say, '* he must in each and every
year make up his mind as to the qualifications of twenty-two
different persons or sets of persons to fill certain offices.'*
** As nearly all these offices are contested on political lines,'*
continues the same high authority, * * though the respective
principles (if any) of Republicans and Democrats have no
more to do with the discharge of the duties of the State and
local offices than the respective principles of Methodists and
Baptists, nominations to them are made by the respective
party organizations. Candidates for all, or nearly all the
foregoing offices, are nominated in conventions composed of
delegates in primaries." On the other hand, in Ontario,
the electors have to consider the claims of candidates for
election to the House of Commons of the Dominion only
once every four or five years (unless sooner dissolved, and
that happens only imder very exceptional circumstances) ,
and of candidates for election to the House of Assembly of
the Province only once every four years (unless sooner dis-
solved, which only happens under rare circumstances). All
public officers connected with those legislative bodies, or with
the public service, are removed fi-om the immediate opera-
tion of these elections since their tenure is permanent, and
certain classes of appointments, when vacant^ — such as
shrievalties, registrarships, county attorneys, etc., are alone
influenced by the result, since political patronage necessarily
rests with the successful party as an incident of party gov-
ernment. I ask my readers to keep these important facts in
view when I come to show the positive advantages the pub-
lic derive from the infrequency of elections, and from the
checks that are imposed on popular caprice, prejudice and
passion by the system of appointments to all offices of an
administrative or judicial character.

[664]

Elected or Appointed Officiai^ ? 13

As I have previously shown, it is not a question of elect-
ing judges or the officers immediately connected with the
civil service that is directly at issue, but the discussion is
confined for the present in Ontario to certain persons whom
it is attempted to class as county officers. But the nature
of the discussion will best be understood by referring to the
following questions which appear in the circular that has
been distributed among those who have been called upon to
state their opinions on the subjects of the inquiry before the
provincial commission:

*' Assuming that the following officials are those under considera-
tion :

Registrars of deeds,
Local masters,
Sherififs,

Local and deputy registrars of the high court of justice,

Deputy clerks of the crown,

Clerks of county courts.

Registrars of surrogate courts,

County attorneys and clerks of the peace,

Division court clerks,

Division court bailiffs —
"Do you approve of the appointment of any, or all, of the above
officers being in the hands of the provincial government (as at present),
or should they, or any of them, in your opinion be otherwise selected-
if so, by whom, and for what reasons ?

" If you advocate a change in the mode of appointment of any of
the above officers, how, and to what supervision should the officer be
amenable for efficient and faithful performance of duty during the
term of office ?

" Do you approve of the system of paying any, or all, the above
officers by fees (in whole, or in part as at present) ? If not, what other
or better plan do you suggest, and for what reasons ?

" If you approve of election by the people of the above officerj, or
any of them, what method of public inspection, during the term' of
office, do you suggest for securing uniformity of procedure, and the
safety of the public ?

" If you approve of selection by the municipal council, what method
of public inspection do you suggest with a view to securing the objects
mentioned in the previous question ?"

[665]

Annals of the American Academy.

It will be seen that there are practically two questions in-
volved — one in relation to the payment of public officials,
and the other in relation to the mode of appointing them.
It is the latter question which is of greatest importance, since
on its judicious solution rests, in a large degree, the future
efficient and honest administration of government; but before
I give my reasons for this emphatic opinion it will be well if
I dispose of the first or subordinate question of salaries, v/hich
has its interest for American readers since so many impor-
tant officers are also paid by fees in the several States. The
majority of the officers in question are paid by fees regulated
by statutes applicable to their respective offices, but it is
only sheriffs and registrars who receive a large amount of
money paid this way, and whose salaries, in some instances,
are believed to be larger than their services merit. As a
rule the sheriffs are paid entirely by such fees as remain to
them after paying all the necessary expenses of their office.
The registrars are also entitled to a certain amount of the
fees that they collect under the law, but the statute regulat-
ing their office limits the sum they can retain for their own
use up to $2500. Beyond that amount they can retain:

Ninety per cent in excess of $2500, and not exceeding $3000.

Eighty •* ** *• 3000, ** " 3500.

Seventy ** *' " 35oo, " " 4000.

Sixty " " '* 4000, " " 4500.

Fifty " " •* 4500.

This regulation appears to bring the salaries of registrars,
as a rule, within a ver>^ moderate amount, while it appears
from the official returns yearly made to the goveniment of
the gross and net amounts of fees collected by the sheriffs
and other officers named above, none of them are paid what
may be considered in any vSense extravagant sums or beyond
what they ought to receive in view of their responsible and
onerous duties; indeed, in the new and thinly populated dis-
tricts, the government is, by the law, obliged to make up
the deficiency of fees, and pay them an amount which will

[666]

Elected or Appointed Officials? 15

bring up their salary to at least $900 or $1000. The follow-
ing tables will show fairly enough for our purpose the
average amount received in cities and counties of the
province by the officers in question.

In the county of Carleton, which has a city, Ottawa, within its
limits :

Sherifif, average salary for five years previous to 1893, foo3i

Surrogate judge (held by county judge), commuted at, .... 500

f Local master,* average for five years, 2294

i Deputy registrar,* ** ** »* 5^^

f County attorney,* ** " ** 540

i Clerk of p3ace,* •« ** " 1062

C Deputy clerk of crown,* '* •• " 812

(( i(

J County court clerk,* *• ** •*

Surrogate registrar,* ** '♦ ••

{County court clerk,* ** 034

Surrogate registrar,* " " " ........ 920

County of Huron, without a city:

Sheriff, average salary for five years, f 2013

Surrogate judge, commuted at, ^^2

Local master and deputy registrar,* commuted at, 1250

f County attorney,* average for five years, 564

i Clerk of peace,* " " " 862

r Deputy clerk of crown,* " ** " 830

710

1191

Then there are the salaries of registrars, who received in
1893, in the most populous legal divisions — the city of
Toronto, East and West — fees to the gross amount of $24,797
and $16,719 respectively, of which the registrars received
tmder the statutory limitations from $4000 to $4500 each.
As a rule, $3000 is the highest average amount received as
salary in the counties, and $500 is the lowest in a very few
and small municipalities.

Much misconception exists as regards the amount of
salaries received by the sheriffs and registrars, and has con-
sequently originated the present agitation on the subject;
but the figures I have just given clearly show that none of
these officers are overpaid, as is the case with sheriffs, county

* The offices named in the brackets may be, and are generally, held under tbc
Iftw by the same person.

[667J

i6 Annals of the American Academy.

clerks, and other officials, elected b}^ the people in some
cities and counties of the States of the American federation.
In the case of registrars the law practically recognizes the
advisability of limiting the fee system, and of fixing salaries
as far as possible. ^ >r my own part I agree with those who
believe that fixity of salary and permanency of tenure are
the true principles to be followed in the case of all public
officials. Every officer should receive an exact sum, equiva-
lent to the value of his ser\'ice to the public, and commen-
surate, of course, with his position and responsibility.
Especially should the respoUvSibilities of sherifFs be carefully
considered in case of a change of system. These officers
are liable to litigation arising from the mistakes of their
deputies and agents. Consequentl}^ in fixing their salaries
it is important that not only their dignified position as the
highest executive officer of the courts, but also their legal
responsibilities should be borne in mind, and they should be
saved from all personal losses which do not accrue from any
ignorance or carelessness on their part. One thing is quite
certain, that such officers should have full control over the
appointment of their deputies and officers, for otherw^ise it
would be unfair to make them responsible for the acts of
officers through whom they necessarily execute many of
their functions. But while we may see the difficulty of a
change of system in the case of sheriffs, there is none in
respect to the other officials in question, and they should
receive a fixed salary from the public treasur>% and pay into
it all fees they collect by virtue of their offices. As things
are now, the fee system is not liable to the great abuses to
which it is necessarily subject under the elective system in
American States. Politics run high in Canada, but contri-
butions to corruption funds are not made by public officials,
and the political manager is unable to avail himself of the
advantages which the fee system gives him in the States of
the Federal Union in the case of candidates whose election
depends on skillful party manipulation and all those arts

[668]

Ei,ECTED OR Appointed Officiaus ? ij

which the "machine" practices to carry their ticket If
the fee system were entirely swept away in every State of
the Union, the party machine would be deprived of a large
amount of funds that now periodically go to corrupt the
electors and place certain professional poUticians in office.

VI.

Coming now to the important question at issue, it is sug-
gested, for reasons which are entirely inadequate, to change
the system which has always obtained in Canada, and give
to the people a direct choice of certain public officers who
are ministerial and executive, and have also important duties
to perform in connection with the administration of justice
The crown, neither in England nor in Canada, has ever
yielded its right to appoint such officers; in other words
such patronage has always been one of its prerogatives In
old times of English history-, when the sovereign' was
attempting to push his prerogative to extremes and to limit
the powers of the House of Commons-in those times when
paihamentary government was in a process of evolution-
offices were a prolific fund of corruption in parliament and
constituencies. Now, with the limitation of the powers of
the crown, the old prerogative right of appointments has
been practically handed to the constitutional advisers of the
sovereip, responsible to parliament. With the development
ot parliamentarj- government and the establi.shment of wise
rules which regulate appointments and promotions to the
permanent civil service, the flagrant abuses that crept into
the old system and disgraced the whole body politic of
England have gradually disappeared. The ' ' spoils ' ' system
is entirely unknown in Great Britain. At the present time
says an authority* on such subjects, "it is worthy of note
that direct election to office-supposed to be characteristic

rl!«' %rT'^': "P'"t-^^^ "° Pla^ in English political
laeas. The few instances in which it occurs are regarded

• Professor Robertson, M. p., LLD., article, " Government," in Rncy Brit

[669] ■ •

i8 Annai3 of the American Academy.

with indifference. The election of coroner by the electors is
universally condemned. In the few parishes where the
clergyman may be appointed by the parishioners, the right
is often left to be exercised by the bishop. ' ' Canada, as in
the case of her legal and political institutions generally, has
closely adhered to the practice of the parent state with
respect to appointments. In the years that preceded the
establishment of responsible government in a complete sense
— from 1 791 to 1841-54 — the appointment of public officials-
of all classes was in the hands of the governors, cliques and
compacts. Those were the days of irresponsible officialism
and famil}^ compacts, when Downing street ruled in purely
local affairs, and favorites of governors and high officials
were selected with an utter indifference to the wishes of the
majority of the people, or the popular assembly. According
to Lord Durham, who reported in 1839 on the state of affairs
in Canada after the Rebellion of 1837-38, what was known
in Upper Canada, now Ontario, as "the family compact " —
a combination of aristocracy and officialism rather than a
purely family connection — " possessed almost all the highest
public offices, by means of which, and of its influence in
the executive council, it wielded all the powers of govern-
ment; it maintained influence in the legislature by means of
its predominance in the legislative council; and it disposed
of the large number of petty posts which are in the patronage
of the government of the province. ' ' The executive councils
in those days of struggle for popular government ' * enjoyed
the confidence of no considerable party, whilst the family-
compact was in fact supported by no very large number of
Dersons of any party." Such things were possible in days
when the executive council owed no responsibilitj^ to the
people or their representatives in the popular branch of the-
legislature.

From 1840 to 1854 a responsible ministr>^ was established
in all the provinces of the present Dominion , although soon
after the legislative union of the Canadas in 1841 one of the

[670]

Elected or Appointed Officials? 19

goveniors-general, Lord Metcalfe, attempted to make appoint-
ments without reference to his constitutional advisers, the last
effort of prerogative attempted by a representative of the
crown in Canada. Since those unsettled times, the rule
that obtains in England has been carried out in all the
provinces of Canada. All the appointments are made by
the governor-general of the Dominion, and by the lieutenant-
governors of the provinces in accordance with statute or
usage. Such appointments, however, as shrievalties, regis-
trarships, and other ofl&ces mentioned above do not come
within the category of the appointments to the civil service,
but are made by the government from their political sup-
porters as a rule, and as a necessary sequence of party gov-
ernment. They are often, though not necessarily, made on
the recommendation of a member and other influential per-
sons supporting the government, whenever a vacancy occurs
in the office; — removals for political reasons or " rotation in
office '* being unknown to Canada's political system — but in
every case they are the subject of discussion in the executive
council, which becomes directly responsible for the advice it
gives to the lieutenant-governor, w^hose duty it is to inform
himself thoroughly with respect to all nominations to office,
before he signs the commission or order in council authoriz-
ing the appointment. Should he believe from facts that
have come to his knowledge, that an appointment is most
undesirable in the public interests — a very rare case indeed
in Canadian political annals — it is for him to exercise that
pressure which he can constitutionally exercise on all
matters on which he is advised and his action is required.
The legislative assembly, as a body, does not assume to
make such appointments or to interfere directly with the
legal powers of the executive authority in such matters;
but it may, and sometimes does, sharply criticise and
even censure the conduct of the executive with respect to
appointments. In every case it has a right to the fullest
information on the subject. Here is one of the advantages

[671]

20 Annate of the American Academy.

of the system of parliamentary government, as worked out
in England and Canada. The presence of the advisers of
the executive — practically the executive itself — in the legis-
lature, gives that body supreme control over its acts. A
house divided into two contending parties, a government
and an opposition, will not fail to give due importance to
any aggravated case of the abuse of patronage. Any gov-
ernment or member thereof, that has been guilty of such
abuse, is open to the fullest criticism in the legislature and
in the public pres* Nothing can be concealed from public
view, and responsibility rests where it should. Ever>' mem-
ber of a government, under the English or Canadian system
of parliamentary government, must act under a feeling of
direct responsibility. Every such minister has his ambi-
tions, and dare not in the face of public opinion to which he
must submit himself sooner or later, make what would be a
notoriously bad appointment. Personal qualifications, char-
acter and local sentiment in the district where the ofl&cer is
placed, are all questions to be immediately considered by the
member and the minister recommending the filling of the
office. Of course there are defects in such a system as in all
methods of government. Some appointments are weak, if
none are notoriously bad; but they are on the whole good.
The public service of Ontario, like that of Canada, generally
has, as a rule, been creditable to the country, and re-
markably free from political influences when men are once
appointed to an office. Corruption and dishonesty are not
charged against it as a class. Permanency of tenure, free-
dom from political intrigue, independence of popular elec-
tions, are the characteristics of the service.

Such satisfactory results, it is necessary to bear in mind,
have been produced by the operation of responsible govern-
ment. It is claimed that the system gives too much power
to the executive authority since all patronage rests in their
hands, but experience shows that the exercise of the power
is on the whole decidedly in the public interest. An executive

[672]

Elected or Appointed Officials? 21

should be strong under such conditions. If the govern-
ment did not act under a sense of immediate responsibility
to the legislature, if appointments were not limited by civil
service rules of law, if all public officials had not practically
a life tenure, then patronage would be dangerous as every
American publicist and statesman knows full well.

It is impossible to believe that, were appointments in any
cases taken from the lieutenant-governor in council and
given to a county council — the less dangerous choice, were
it a practical question between that method and election by
popular vote — the public interests w^ould be better served,
and wiser appointments made. A greater responsibility
must rest on a minister of the crown, and on the govern-
ment who are responsible for the acts of each and all its
members — on a government immediately amenable to the
criticism and censure of the legislature, and later to the
people at the polls — than can be placed on a body of muni-
cipal councilors, acting within an inferior and limited sphere
of action, and not exposed to the wide range of discussion
to which the highest legislative body in the province cim
submit its own committee — the executive council. The
conscience of a man in office must bear some proportion to
his duties and responsibilities. A man in a small area of
action and criticism can never as clearly be brought to see
the consequence of his political conduct as one in the wide
theatre of national action. Noblesse oblige is more heard of
at Washington than even in Boston municipal politics. It
says much for the efficiency and integrity of the public
service of Ontario — and I refer here particularly to the class
of officials in question — of the service appointed under such
conditions as I have mentioned, that it has not been shown
guilty for the past twenty-seven years of such incompe-
tency and malversation of funds as have even occurred in
connection with the funds of a few county councils. What
cases of mismanagement, speculation and jobbery have
come to light of late have been in the administration of the

[673]

22 Annals of the American Academy.

affairs of the largest Canadian cities. At the present time
the city of Montreal appears to require a Parkhurst, and
Toronto has asked the county judge to investigate charges
that have been made — and the inquiry'- has proved, with too
much truth — against certain aldermen of selling their vote and
influence to contractors. It is well to bear in mind that in
these cases it is the elected men, the aldermen, whose conduct
is arraigned. It is the elective principle that is now in ques-
tion, when applied to men whose duties are those of managers
of a corporation. Indeed, there are many influential and
thinking men in Canadian cities — in Toronto especially —
who express the opinion that a small permanent commis-
sion appointed by the government would best manage civic
affairs. Still, in the face of such facts, it is proposed to
extend the principle even further, and disturb a system of
appointments which has exhibited no such discreditable
results as we have seen in pities and even counties.

As things are now, municipal elections are kept fairly
free— in the great majority of counties, largely free — of all
political influences; but it is quite certain that if these
councils are to be made the arena of political intrigue for the
filling of provincial offices, it will not be long before they
will become notorious for political bitterness and worse,*
and the party spirit which runs sufficiently high in Canada
under ordinary conditions will be intensified to a degree,
and bring about results of which every citizen across the
frontier can give Canadians some very practical examples.

VII.

But Canadians need not go far to come to a conclusion as
to the effects of an elective system when applied to any class
of public officials. Their neighbors in the States of the
Federal Republic have been, for many years in their history,

* Read what Mr, Fiske says (" Civil Governraent in the United States," p. 135)
with respect to the evils that have ariseu from "the encroachments of national
politics upon municipal politics."

[674]

Elected or Appointed Officials? 2$

-giving the world ver>' significant examples of the results of
such a system. Their experience is submitted to the serious
reflection of those who would change the law which makes
the government responsible for all public appointments, and
give in its place a system which places the responsibility
nowhere. Can any one argue that the body of the voting
public who "elect can be made responsible for the result?
The legislature in the first place, and the people at a final
stage, can censure a government, or turn it out of office,
since ministers are directly responsible for every act of
administration. But Qia's custodiet custodies ? Who will
check the people ?

Among the sources of the strength of the Canadian
system of government are these: the infrequency of political
•elections; the holding of elections for the Dominion parlia-
ment and for the legislative assemblies of the provinces at
different dates; the separation of federal issues, as a rule,
from provincial questions — though the attempt is too often
made to mix them ; the practical separation of municipal from
provincial or other political questions; the permanency or
non-political tenure of the civil service. On the other hand,
the weaknesses of the American system — in fact, the evils
that are sapping the republican and purely democratic insti-
tutions of the States — mainly arise from these causes: the
intimate connection between national, State and municipal
politics; the frequency of elections which bring into play all
the schemes and machinations of the party managers and
*' bosses;" the popular election and short tenure of so many
public officials who, as a consequence, become more or less
partisans, and supply even now, in defiance of the law in
many States, a considerable proportion of the corruption
funds of political parties.

The conclusions, then, to which an impartial and honest
observ^er of contemporary^ political management in the
United States must inevitably come are these, briefly
summed up:

[675]

24 Annals of the American Academy.

•

That the party machine, as managed by the boss, is de-
structive of public morality.

That it is the elective and the " spoils " system by which
a horde of public officials obtain office that gives vitality to
the machine and its creatures, and Is weakening the founda-
tions of republican or democratic institutions.

That rings and bosses will exist and thrive as long as the
great majority of public officers, including judges, are
elected or appointed on political lines.

That the security of the commonwealth depends on the
establishment of a permanent public service in every State,
in the appointment of the judiciary by a regularly constituted
authority like the governor or the legislature; on the removal
of municipal contests from Federal or State elections; on lim-
iting in every way the number of civic or court officers
elected by the people and placing them in the hands of
mayors or councils; on giving a life tenure — that is to say,
during good behavior — to all important executive, judicial
and administrative officers; on the effective operation of the
Australian ballot in every election, civic. State or national,
and on the general adoption and execution of most stringent
laws against bribery and corruption in every possible form.

That by such measures the machine will soon break down,
since the party boss will not have the same facilities for
exercising his peculiar arts that he has at present, while he
can practically control the election or patronage of so many
public offices.

VIII.

No one who studies the condition of affairs in the United
States, or who has had opportunities, like the writer, of
conversing with men of intelligence and education whose
minds are not warped by party prejudice, and who believe
that frankness is better than silence when their coimtry's
honor or stability is at stake — no one under such circum-
stances but must come to the conclusion that there are

[676]

Bisected or Appointed Officials? 25

already a number of people in the republic — a small frv-.'tion,
it is true, of the nearly seventy millions of people, but still a
•* saving remnant " perhaps — who are striving for a radical
change in their elective system. We have evidence of this
wise and growing sentiment in the strenuous and, in part,
successful efforts made of recent years to build up a perman-
ent civil service for the nation, in such constitutional changes
as have been passed in the State of New York for the separa-
tion of municipal from State elections,* in the strengthening
of the executive authority of the mayors in numerous cities
and giving them control of important civic appointments, in
the lengthening of the term of office of the State judiciary
and other officials in several States, and lastly, though not
least, in the adoption of the ballot system of Australia.

The proposition that has been sometimes urged that the
Presidential term should be at least six years is also an
evidence of the current that is setting in against too frequent
elections, which keep the public mind in constant state of
agitation, unsettle business, and give ready occupation to
the professional politician. Perhaps in no respect has there
been a more earnest effort to limit the elective principle than
in the case of the judiciary. Everyone will admit that the
strongest judiciary, for learning and character, is the Federal
bench, which is removed from all popular influences, since it
is nominated and appointed by the President with the con-
sent of the Senate, has practically a life tenure, and cannot
have its compensation diminished during the term of office
of a judge. It is needless to cite instances of the w^eakness

* It is an interesting fact which may here be mentioned, that Canada has had, by
law and practice, for years, the reforms that the New York convention recom-
mended and the people of the State recently ratified : a separation of municipal
from State elections ; naturalization laws ; civil service statutes ; prohibition of
riders in appropriation bills ; printing of all bills before passage ; prohibitions
against pool-selling, book-making and lotteries. The Australian ballot and
stringent anti-bribery and corruption laws have been in operation for years.
Contract labor in prisons is permitted, not disallowed, as in the New York con-
stitution—confessedly its weak point, showing the influence of the labor element
on the politicians of the convention. All these Canadian reforms have been
among the results of a strong executive, represented in and responsible to parlia-
ment.

[677]

26 Annals of the American Academy.

of the State judiciary which owes its position to party — we
have had recent illustration of such weakness in the case of
a judge at Albany — but happily for the interests of justice
the consequences have never become so serious as one would,
with some reason, suppose they would be ; and that chiefly
on account of men, once on the bench, wishing to earn the
good opinion of the better elements of the bar — notably higk
in every State — and feeling that respect for law and its attri-
butes which animates all men brought up under the influence
of English legal institutions once they are placed on the
judgment seat. Nearly forty years ago John Stuart Mill,'*^
writing on this very subject, apprehended ' ' that the practice
of submitting judicial ofi&cers to periodical popular re-electioa
will be found to be one of the most dangerous errors ever
yet committed b^'' democracy, and were it not that the prac-
tical good sense, which never totally deserts the people of the
United States, is said to be producing a reaction likely in no
long time to lead to the retraction of the error, it might with
reason be regarded as the first great downward step in the
degeneration of modern democratic government." Writing
a quarter of a century later Dr. Bryce tells us that ' ' in many
American States the State judges are men of moderate ability
and scanty learning, and sometimes vastl}^ inferior to the
best of the advocates who practice before them. ' ' He admits
that pecuniary corruption seems to be very rare among them,
but ' * there are other ways in which sinister influences can
play on a judge's mind, and impair that confidence in his
impartiality which is almost as necessary as impartiality
itself." And, he adds, with obvious force, *' apart from all
questions of dishonesty or unfairness it is an evil that the
bench should not be, intellectually and socially at least, on a
level with the bar." But while the mischief that has arisen
from the application of the elective principle to the State
judiciary is undoubtedly "serious " in a measure, justice is

♦ See " Considerations on Representative Government," Chap. XIV. AL9»
remarjcs of Mr. Fiske, '* Civil Government," pp. 179, 180.

[678]

Elected or Appointed Officials? 27

fairly administered on the whole, not onl}- for the reasons I
have briefly stated above, but because in vSO many States an
upright and good judge has reason to expect a long tenure
of office. The hope entertained by Mr. Mill has not yet
been fully realized, but nevertheless the tendency of a sound
public opinion is shown by the fact that salaries have been
generally raised, and the terms of office lengthened.* Good
judges are continued from term to term, so that a better class
of men are encouraged to accept this high responsible posi-
tion. It is significant that of at least thirty States that have
revised their constitution in essential respects within fifteen
years or so, only one has taken the appointment from the
legislature or governor and entrusted it to the popular vote.
Perhaps the time is not far off when the judiciary will have
a life tenure of office, even though election by popular vote
remains in force in the majority of States, as at present.

IX.

I have dwelt at some length on the experiences of the
United States in working out the elective principle in thei*
system of government and especially in connection with those
classes of public officials who should be non-political in their
tenure, so that my Canadian readers may thoroughly
appreciate the consequences of the arguments of those who
have forced the government of the premier province of
Ontario — a province governed on the whole with discretion
and ability, and where officials are, generally speaking, able
and conscientious in the discharge of their duties — to gather
the opinions of the intelligence of the country, whether they
should not inaugurate a system which has been confessedly
productive of so many injurious results on the other side of
the border. I believe that one or two thoughtless and ill-

* Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Delaware alone retain a
system of life tenure or of good behavior. In the other States the longest term is
in Pennsylvania, 21 years ; the shortest in Vermont, 2 ; in one State it is 15 ; in
another, 14 ; in four, 12 ; in one, 10 ; in three, 9 ; in seven, 8 ; in ten, 6 ; in the re-
aiaining States, from 4 to 7.

[679]

28 Annals of thk American Academy.

informed persons have ventured to go so far as to urge the
election of the minor judiciary like police magistrates and
county judges; but such persons do not in any way represent
the intelligence or wisdom which governs the great body of
the people in a province, which, above all other sections,
prides itself in its complete and well-administered system of
local government, and in its free education, which gives
every boy and girl in the land admirable opportunities from
the common school to the collegiate institute or high school
or the provincial university with its large professorial staff.
Canada has one of the best devised systems of government
in the world. Its strength consists in the fact that it is
based on the experiences of the two great countries to which
Canadians naturally look for instruction or warning — Eng-
land and the United States. Its institutions have kept pace
with the development of the sound principles of parlia-
mentary and federal government, and possess all that
elasticity and capacity to meet critical situations as they
arise, which is wanting in the too rigid system of the United
States whose constitution is mainly based on principles which
existed in the middle of last centur>% and are now not quite
equal to the conditions of modem political progress. Neither
at Washington nor in any State of the Union is there a
ministry owing responsibility to the people's representatives,
and the consequence is a constant friction between the
executive and legislative authorities, and an absence of all
such control of legislation and administration, as exists
under a system of parliamentary government. On the other
hand, there is at Ottaw^a and in ever}^ province of the
Canadian federation, a cabinet which represents the majority
of the people as represented in the legislature, which is
constitutionally bound to explain and defend every executive
and administrative act, from the appointment of a lieutenant-
governor or a judge to a sheriff, registrar or county attorney.
Its tenure of office depends on the confidence of the legis-
lature and if its members forfeit that, then they may appeal

[680]

Elected or Appointed Officials?

to the people in accordance with the practice and rule of
responsible government. Such a deadlock as may occur at
any time between President and Congress within the next
two years is impossible under the Canadian system. The
executive in Canada is always represented and consequently
able to exercise a potent influence in the halls of the legis-
lature by the means of ministers responsible to the popular
house. An appeal to the people as a consequence of a dead-
lock or crisis, will immediately settle all difiiculties and
bring in either the same ministry or a new cabinet with
adequate support to carry their measures in parliament, and
administer public affairs. The remedy under such circum-
stances is speedy and decisive — not delayed, as in the United
States, by the checks and guards that prevent popular
opinion acting immediately on the executive and adminis-
tration. In Canada the judiciary is independent equally of
the crown and of popular influences, since a judge can only
be removed during his life tenure of ofiice by successful
impeachment in parliament. The public service enjoys all
the advantages that arise from permanency of tenure and
independence of a popular vote. The people know on whom
to fix responsibility for every bad appointment. Under the
system of the United States an incapable and even unworthy
man may be appointed to an ofiice, and continue in it in the
majority of cases as long as he can retain the confidence and
support of the party manager of his district. An incom-
petent man may be elected time and again, and the nation
know and care nothing about it, but in Canada the humblest
appointment may be subject to the rigid scrutiny of the
parhament of Canada or of the legislature of a province,
according as it is of Dominion or provincial character. All
the debates of the parliament and the legislatures of Canada
are reported in the press to an extent that is not customary
in the case of Congress or of the State legislatures, and what
is said reaches every corner of the Dominion. Canadians
can fix the blame on some one, but who is to punish the

[681]

30 Annals of the American Academy.

party manager or the people misled by him ? A system of
government like that of Canada which places the respon-
sibility on a body of legally constituted advisers of the
crown, or in other words a committee of the legislature, has
clearly enormous advantages in the case of appointments to
public office over a system like that of the United States
which spreads responsibility over so wide a surface that no
one may be reached.

The writer believes, after giving much consideration to
this important subject, that it would be indeed an unhappy
hour for the good and efficient government of Canada,
were the intelligence of any section to be so blinded as to
lead it away from the sound doctrines that have hitherto
preserved us from the evils which have weakened the po-
litical structure of the Federal Republic. If in a moment
of indiscretion any Canadian legislature were to yield to
the ill-advised demands of party in order to obtain a tem-
porary political advantage, and attempt the experiment of
the elective system in the case of the officials whose tenure
of office is now a matter of deliberate inquiry, it would be
literally the thin edge of a wedge which would gradually
and surel}'- split up the durable foundation on which govern-
ment rests. The history of the American States very clearly
shows that when you once give certain privileges and rights
to a people it is not possible to withdraw them directly and
immediately. No politician would dare now" to ask for such
constitutional changes as would suddenly- sweep away the
entire elective principle in the case of all national and State
administrative, executive and judicial officers, except the
president, vice-president, governors, lieutenant-governors,
and political heads of departments who occupy positions
somewhat analogous to those of ministers of the crown but
without their responsibilities.* All that may be attempted

' * " The great number of candidates for election confuses and disgusts the voters
in much the same degree that it makes the business of caucus management
intricate, active and profitable. The election of such officers as constables,
county clerks, secretaries, justices and judges, whose functions are in no sense

[682]

Elected or Appointed Officials?

IS to curtail and modify those privileges from time to time,
as has already been done in the case of municipal elective
officers and of the judiciary. If once in Canada the elective
principle were applied to sheriffs, registrars and a few other
officials in the province, it would not be long before a
politician would make himself popular by extending the
system to police magistrates, and all classes of officials. In
all probability, the pressure would be so great even on the
Dominion parliament that it w^juld have great difficulty in
stemming the torrent that provincial indiscretion might set
flowing by the removal of those wise barriers which sound
policy has heretofore raised up against popular and party
license. A federal union rests on a broad basis of states
or provinces and the political conditions of every state or
province must more or less, sooner or later, influence those
of the federation or dominion to which those states and
provinces give life and union. Once adopt the elective
principle generally in the provinces, it is obvious the con-
sequences would be most serious to the Dominion. The
result would be that Canada would be no longer English as
respects a fundamental principle of government. She would
become Americanized by the adoption, not of those features
of the system of her neighbors w^hich might give her addi-
tional strength and unity, but rather of those methods which
would be more or less destructive of political morality and
in direct antagonism to those principles of sound and efficient
government which true Canadians are ambitious to see gather
force while they are laboring to establish on durable founda-
tions a new nationality on this continent.

House 0/ Commons, Ottawa, Canada. J. G. BOURINOT.

representative, and who were appointed until the spoils system had become estab-
lished, is indefensible upon any sound principles. The changes that made theia
elective were naturally desired by all those interested in the patronage of party
chieftains or gains of primary elections. To make the re-appointment of such
oflScers safe and satisfactory, we must reform the civil service. To relieve the
primary system of the demoralizing duty of selecting officers in no sense rep-
resentative, and only ministerial and administrative, we must make such ofl&cers
again appointive." D. B. Eaton in "Cyclopaedia of Political Science," Art.
"Primary Elections."

[683]

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND

SOCIAL SCIENCE.

The American Academy of Political and Social Science
was formed in Philadelphia, December 14, 1889, for the
purpose of promoting the Political and Social Sciences.

While it does not exclude any portion of the field indi-
cated in its title, yet its chief object is the development of
those aspects of the Political and Social Sciences which
are either entirely omitted from the programmes of other
societies, or which do not at present receive the attention
they deserve.

Among such subjects may be mentioned: Sociology ,
Comparative Constitutional and Administrative Law, Phi-
losophy of the State, and such portions of the field of Poll
tics, including Finance and Banking, as are not adequately
cultivated by existing organizations.

A special effort will be made to collect and publish mate-
rial which will be of use to students, and which does not
now reach the public in any systematic way, as, for ex-
ample, the texts in English of the Constitutions of leading
foreign countries; regular accounts of current instruction
in Political and Social topics at home and abroad ; descrip-
tive bibliographies ; discussions of Municipal Government, eta

It will be seen that the Academy thus supplements the
efforts of existing societies of similar aims, and sub-
stantially strengthens their work by contributing its share
to beget a deeper and more widespread interest in the gene
ral subject of Political and Social Science.

The plan of the Academy includes regular scientific meet-
ings for the presentation of papers and communications,
establishment of a library, and the dissemination of knowl
edge on Political and Social topics through its publications
and by such other means as may seem suitable.

During the winter, regular monthly meetings have bee»
held since the Academy was formed at which the papen
submitted have been read and discussed.

■^

*^€aiTj CTH the work of tlie Academy satisfactorily, large
limds are t^ccessary. The mcome of the Academy at present
fa denved from the Animal Membership Fee, which is ,^5,00;
Jie Lite Membership Fee, which is $ioo ; and from tlie contri-
bntions of those who may be ^viilitig to assist in its work It
is desired to secure the establishment of prizes and fellowships.

Anyone may become a member on being approved by
the Couticil and pa>'ing the Annual or Life Membership Fee
Members are entitled to receive the regular publications of
the Academy, submit papers and communications, and to
attend and take part in all scientific meetings. Life mem-
bers are exempt from all annual fees.

The hst of members now includes the names of nearly all
the prominent thinkers and writers on Political, Economic
and Social topics in the United States and Canada, and many
in Europe.

The co-operation of all persons interested in the scientific in-
vestigation of Political and Social affairs is earnestly soHcited

The proceedings of the Academy are published in the
form of a periodical called the Annals of the Americaic
Academy op Pouticai. anb Sociai." ScmNCK, which
together with such other matter as may be published for
that purpose, is sent to aU members of the Academy free
of charge. A copy of the current number of the Annai^
will be sent to anyone for examination.

Papers and communications wMch the writers wish to
submit to the Academy with a view to their being read in a
Scientific vSession and subsequently published in the Proceed-
ings, as well as applications for membership, should be seat
to the following address :

AmericaD Academy of Political aod Social Scieac^

STATION B. PHILADELPHIA. PA.

N. B.— Fees and contributions may be remitted by postal
<xder on Philadelphia, or by draft oo New York, drawn to .

Stieet, Philadelphia.

■ft

* Jie -txmerieaG Auadernv

Political and Social Science

PHII^DELPHIA.

HBNRY C. LEi,

200O Walnut 8tr«;et

Pftsident,
HPMUND J. JAMES, Ph. D.. T7niver?ity of Pennsylvania.

Corresponding Sec'y,
R. P FAI.KNHR, Ph. D..
Germantowa, Phlla.

Secretariei.

STUART WOOD,
400 Cbeuni?t Street.

Pbof. F. H. GIBDINGS, A. M.,
Columbia College.

Pnording Secy,
C. R WOODRUFF,

514 Walnu*. Street.

**^»»»^ ^J^I " — '.-«'^^, Libfarian,

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Ph. D., JOHN L STEWART

3705 1/)cust Street. Manual Training School.

General Secretary,

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

BR. C. K. ADAMS,

President of Wisconsin University.
PROF. C. F. BASTABI,F„

Dublin University.
PROF. F. W. BI.ACKMAR.

T7mvers:tv of Kansas.

J, G. BCTJTliNOT. C.M.G., Ph.I>., B.C.I..,

Ottawa, Canada.
PROF. J. W. BTTRGI5SS,

Colutnbia College.
HON. THOMAS M. COOtKY

Anil Arbor, Mich.
PROF. R, T. J?I,Y,

Wiscourfin University.
PROF. HKNRY W FARNAM.

\ ale University.
PROF. W. W. FOJUWFXI,.

University of Minnesota.
HON. 1.YMAN J. GAGB.

Chicago, 111.

PROF. JOHN K. INGRAM. I,t,.D..

Tnnity College, Dublin.
PROF. T. w. TENKS.

Coraell TJaiversity.

^^'' ■^^ii'RpSTONjrOHNSTON,

President of 1*iilaae University.

RIGHT REV JOHN J KEANF, D.D.,
Catholic Univerf^ity of America.

PROF. BI^RNARD MOSFS,

University of Caliiomta.

^^^^ hB' NICHOLSON, M. A.,
Edinburgh University.

DR. HENRY WADF ROGERS,

President Northwestern Uriversftv
PROF. HENR Y SIDGWICK,

Cambridge TJniversity.
PROF, Wirj,iAM SMART,

Queen Margaret College, Gla^ow.
SIMON STERNE Esq.,

New k ork City. '

HON HANNIS TAyIoR, hU a.
Madrid, Spain.

PROF. J. B. THAYER,

• Harvard Law ScJiooL
PROF. F. N. THORPE,

University of .Penn.^:vama
DR, FR.1NCTS A. WALEER.

Pres. Ma.ss. Institute of Technoioey.

I^ESTER F.WARD. Esq., '

Washington, D, C.

PROF WOODROW W^fXSON.
Princetoii University.

ii «i