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:. /

THE

MILITARY DEFENCES

CANADA,

Considered in respect to our Colonial Relations

WITH

GREAT BRITAIN,

In a Series of Letters Published in

THE QUEBEC « MORNING CHRONICLE,"

(Revised and corrected^ with Notes and additions^)

AN UPPER CANADIAN.

••iimiiwc

QUEBEC :

PRINTED AT THE OFFICE OP THE " MORNING CHRONICLE," FOOT OF MOUNTAIH HILL.

1862.

OUR MILITARY DEFENCES.— THE MI-
LITIA.

To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle.

Sir, — Although the recommendations of the Military
Commission, now in session, as to the best and most feasi-
ble means of organizing the military resources of the Pro-
vince may undergo modifications in Parliament, it is of high
import that those gentlemen should agree on a system as
little open to censure as possible. There are, no doubt,
many persons of excellent judgment, as well as experience,
whose views would be appreciated by the Commission, but
who may be prevented by diffidence or the fear of being re-
garded as obtrusive, from communicating their ideas to this
military board. Hence there can be no impropriety in ex-
citing a public discussion, which may call forth such opin-
ions as I have referred to. It is with this aim that 1 propose
to offer some remarks.

The subject, as I view it, naturally divides itself into
three propositions. 1st — ^The organization of the land forces.
2nd — The defences of the lakes ; and 3rd, (as auxiliary to
these) the fortifications of the country. These 1 propose to
consider separately in the order in which I have stated them.

On the subject of the first — the organization of the land
forces of the Province — I have very decided opinions, and I
may here add that I am glad to find them very well expres-
sed in the Toronto Leader of the 7th instant. If the ex-
pression of these views in a leading Ministerial journal may
be regarded as indicative of the policy likely to guide the
gentlemen of the commission in making their report, the
country will have no cause to regret their appointment.

There is one important point which must not be lost
sight of — and that is the fact, that in anticipation of hostili-
ties with our neighbors, we must rely mainly on ourselves
to resist invading armies. The troops which England may
be able to spare must hereafter be regarded as allies and
auxiliaries. The sooner our authorities recognize this fact
the better for us, and the more self-reliant shall we become.

Our system should therefore be made to conform to this view
of the case — a view which British statesmen liave long en-
deavored to impress on us by words and policy. As yet we
have done little or nothing to acknowledge this policy, or to
prepare for our altered relations with the mother country ;
and hence we found ourselves at the commencement of the
present winter, suddenly menaced with danger, and totally
unprepared for any unexpected emergency. It is unjust to
censure England lor leaving us in such a defenceless con-
dition, for we are ourseWes wholly to blame for it.

The old proverb says, * forewarned, forearmed.' It is
fortunate for us that the * Trent' aliair occurred as it did,
and at the time it did. We now see what our condition
might have been had the exigencies of the great civil war
between the two sections of the old Union been such as to
have warranted the United States in accepting a war with
England. We cannot, now, without being criminally guil-
ty of inviting an attack next winter, or on some future oc-
casion from our vain-glorious and ambitious neighbors any
longer delay the energetic exercise of a clear and manifest
duty to ourselves, our children and the empire at lurge.
That duty is to provide the best, and in 'jvery way the most
efficacious means of resisting iiivasion, and if necessary of
carrying the war into the enemy's country. We shall thus
greatly lessen the chances of war.

To accomplish either of these objects requir>^s a well
organized and efficient army. Organization requires time
and practice, and England can no doubt supply us with ex-
cellent drill sergeants ; but where are we to get a supply of
experienced officers to command our Canadian army ? Shall
we invite the supernumeraries of the British army, if any
such there be, to conimand our battalions and to be cap-
tains, lieutenants and ensigns ? Admitting that a sufficient
supply can be had for the asking, would such a policy, car-
ried out on a large scale, be acceptable to Canadians, or
even practicable ? It is all very well to assert that there
should be no invidious distinctions, bat would Canadians
be content to yield positions of honor and responsibility to
their transatlantic brethren ? Here i? a possible stumbling
block which the commission will no doubt find means of
avoiding. But I have been told, lately, by military gentle-
men, that wt hav2 no men in the country fit to command
regiments, and but few fit to fill the subordinate positions.
This is a mistake that is too apt to be made by those who
are strangers to the country. Canada is full of intelligent

and high spirited young gentlemen who only require to bo
educated in military science to make them first class offi-
cers.

How is liiis to be done ? A few weeks ago you did me
the favor to publish in your columns a 'etter in which I
pointed this out. I then stated that in addition to the cele-
brated military school at West Point, there were numerous
private ' military academies' in the Northern States — mostly
started since the commeuccment of the civil war, which are
conducted by old West Point men. These schools are all
filled with youths who are acquiring a scientific knowledge
of every branch connected with the military art. I pointed
out the necessity of emulating our neighbors in this respect,
and starting one, if not two, such schools in Canada, under
governm-iut patronage. To those young men who may not
afterwards choose, or do not have the opportunity of follow-
ing a military profession, such an education will not, by any
means be lost. They will come out every way improved,
both physically and mentally, and be prepared to fill any
position in life to which they may be called— because a
course of military instruction comprises, in addition to the
necessary professional studies, a thorough education in those
branches that are regarded as parts of every gentleman's ac-
quirements.

But it will no doubt be urged that the advantages pro-
posed by providing the means of military education in the
Province are tqo remote to merit the consideration of the
commission, whilst the emergencies of the times require im-
mediate action. This would be quite correct if the dangers
which menace us were only of a temporary or limited na-
ture. Such, however, is not the case, and we ought not to
neglect the future whilst we prepare for the present. The
United States must, for a long time, if not permanently, be
regarded as a great military power. Whether the Confed-
erate States succeed in establishing their independence or
not, the necessity for a large standing army will remain.
This imposes on us a higher degree of forecaste as to our
defences, than the military status of the United States has
hitherto done.

The commission will no doubt see the impolicy of plac-
ing any great reliance on our present or any future organi-
zation of the militia. The only use of a militia organiza-
tion, it is to be presumed, from past experience, will be to
preserve an enrolment of the men capable of and liable to
service. In modern warfare discipline and excellence in

the theory and practice of the military art outweigh mere
numbers. The commission will not undervalue the sort of
experience which our neighbors are acquiring, and will, if
possible, improve on their method of organizing the avail-
able material of the country. The great success which has
attended the volunteer system in England may well suggest
valuable points for our consideration. But it must not be
forgotten that, as a general thing, the classes from whom
these admirable military forces have been drawn are much
more limited in Canada in comparison with our population.
To form an efficient volunteer force of 50,000 men in Cana-
da — a number in my judgment below the re(|uiremenls of
the times, if we wish to preserve peace, we must incur a
considerable outlay. The men must be paid during the
time deemed necessary for riilc practice — and it is only this
practice that will make such a body of men valuable. Al-
though we have many fine shots amongst our Canadian
youths, they will have to acquire a different description of
skill, to enable them to judge correctly of distances, and to
become accurate shots beyond point blank range.

There is little doubt that many thousands would, from
the novelty of the thing, turn out and learn the drill and ball
practice ; and a very moderate inducement in the shape of
pay might for a time suffice. There is a natural exciternent
attending rifle-shooting, which, whilst the novelty lasts,
ought to be turned to account. But we arc now told by the
English press that something must be done to prevent a ra-
pid decadence of the volunteer force of England. The Sa-
turday Review^ a very able and reliable journal, suggests
that so valuable a means of defence should not be allowed
to fall away for the want of a little of the " sinews of war."
It suggests that the force be paid for the time required to
keep up its efficiency. It takes a very sensible view of the
principles of all military organizations which are formed for
the defence of the whole community. Why should any
class of men be called on to sacrifice their time and their
money for an object in which all are alike interested ? Be-
sides, let it be considered, what a responsibility will attach
to those who may claim the merit, or have to endure the
disgrace of a break-down. The question is one which
ought therefore to be well considered, and its solution placed
beyond the chance of failure.

An Upper Canadian.

Quebec, 10th February, 1862.

II.

THE DEFENCES OF THE LAKES.

.'i

Sir, — " What is wanting in Canada is not a Generui,
" or general olKcer.s and troops, but a naval superiority on
"the lakes; till that superiority is established it is impossi-
^^ble to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep an
" enemy out ol' the frontiers, much less to make any con-
quest from them." Such was the opinion given in his own
words, of tJKj great Duke of Wellington in 1814 just before
the clo.se of the American War.

The Governor of Michigan, in a recent message to the
I '.>gislalurc of that State, says : "I think we need not so
"much fortifications, as a full supply of arras for the people,
" and a powerful marine on the lakes. Michigan is to be
" defended, if it comes to that, not on our own ground, but
" on the soil of Canada. Give us arms for the people, and
" the undoubted control of the lakes, and fortifications may
" safely be left to the most convenient season."

" Kxperience confirms the truth of a maxim, that the
" master of the sea will always acquire the dominion of the
"land."— Gi66on.

These opinions, coinciding as they do, will scarcely be
disputed by any one. It is only necessary to ascertain with
accuracy the present actual condition of the balance of
power on the Lakes, in order to determine what must be
done by our authorities in regard thereto. In the recent
report of the Military Committee in the Congress of Wash-
ington, it is asserted that the United States commercial ma-
rine on the Lakes numbers 1,200 vessels, whilst that of Ca-
nada only amounts to 300 — or in the proportion of four to one
against us. But this is not the worst feature of the case.
They have 107 Screws (which alone are available for war
purposes) measuring in the aggregate 60,018 tons, and ave-
raging 467 ; whilst we have b'-t 15 with a gross ton-
nage of 4,562 tons and an average of 304. I have in my
possession a list of the names and tonnage of 104 vessels,
on these Lakes, the majority of which are screws too large
to descend the Welland Canal. This list was made out in
the autumn of 1860, and the average burthen may be set
down at 600 tons. Since then a great number of these large

sized vessels has been added to the Upper Lake United
States fleet, whilst th(;re is not a single one of the class re-
ft^rred to owned in Canada. A' both governments are de-
barnid by treaty from establishing naval stat'ons, and ship-
yards, or maintaining armed vessels on the lakes, the Com-
mittee of Congress relies on their |)owerful commercial ma-
rine, as the Government of Washington is doing to some ex-
tent in their present coast operations, for defensive and of-
fensive war. That many ot these screw steamers, could
speedily be made available for such purposes has been well
demonstrated by the improvised fleets so recently fitted out
at New York, Boston and other ports.

This, of course, is a game at which two can play. But
do we hold the cards? If we do not how are we to get
them ? Our neighbors, moreover claim that Lake Michigan,
being wholly an American Lake, is exempt from the stipu-
lations of the treaiy, and the authorities of that State have
sent agents to Washington to urge the propriety of building
a number of war vessels at Grand Haven and other points
on the Lake, and to form a regular ship yard, and naval
station at some of the ports in Michigan.

Every body knows or ought to know what has given
our neighbors the commercial supremacy of the Lakes, and
yet our merchants either from apathy, or want of capital and
enterprize have scarcely put forth a feeble effort to counter-
act these obvious causes. Prior to 1825 the whole trade of
the West found its way to market by the St. Lawrence.
The opening of the Erie Canal in that year caused an im-
mediate diversion of the rising commerce of the Lakes to
New York, and at the same time added such a stimulant to
the settlement of the Western States, that from a population
of about a million in the whole of them — including Ohio,
they have increased to 7,000,000 and the trade has kept pace
with the population.

To counteract this state of things our Provincial Grov-
ernment set to work and built the magnificent system of ca-
nals which overcome the rapids of our river and form a na-
vigation of almost infiiiitely superior capacity. There was
one mistake committed in the design of these truly grand
works. The Canal which connects the lower with the four
great upper lakes, the shores of which are the granaries of
the West, is of smaller magnitude except as regards depth,
than those of the St. Lawrence. This circumstance nas,
until recently, interposed an insuperable obstacle to our en-
tering into successful competition, for the trade of those

Western Lakes. It liaH b(M»n demonHtmlcd within tlio last
two years, that we can, as regards tlu; grain Irado, which is
the chief cominerc*? of \\\v West, mai<e our short lines of
railway available as connecting links between the upi^er and
lower navigation. This is due to the wonderl'ul economy of
" handling" the grain by means of steam ehivators, ancl to
the inclination of the gradients in the direction of the trade.

My remarks, however, thus far mainly apply to the Un-
per Lakes. I have one or two to make; respecting the trade
of Western Canada, the bulk of which has been drawn lo
New York, although our St. Lawrence canals have been
completed for nearly twenty years. It is certainly a strong
reflection on the spirit and energy of our merchants, and es-
pecially those of Quebec, that lliey have not yet built a sin-
gle freight vesscd up to the capacity of those canals. Whilst
our neighbors are able to maintain almost a monopoly of the
Western trade, through their "ditch" of a canal, we with
our magnificent lakes, canals, and river, have looked on in
stupid amazement at the strange phenomenon. But after
all there is no mystery about the matter. The circumstance
of New York being a larger ocean freight market, taken in
connection with the greater size and economy of their upper
lake vessels, more than counterbalances the drawback of
their smaller canals. If we think it worth while to enter in-
to competition on a large scale, for this trade, thus to regain
or divide the control of the lakes with the Americans, we
must establish lines of screw freight vessels on the upper
lakes, as well as on Lake Ontario, to run in connection with
the several railways connecting these waters — and these
vessels must meet other and more economical freight steam-
ers at Montreal and Quebec than those subsidized to carry
the mails. But first of all let us attend to the inland necessi-
ties and the ship-owners and merchants of England will pro-
vide the ocean craft. When this is done we shall impose
additional motives on our Western neighbors to preserve the
peace. Chicago, Milwaukie, Detroit and the cities of Wes-
tern Canada will then meet London, Liverpool and Glas-
gow at Montreal and Quebec, instead of at New York.

It is all very well, in speaking of the defences of the
Lakes, to rely on the numerous gunboats of England, pro-
vided they can be got in position in time of need. If a war
unfortunately arises out of the present volcanic influences at
work on American society, I venture to say that the English
gunboats will not be in tlie right place at the right time, if
they get there at all. Besides, England will need them all

If;

■\'\

to blockade two thousand miles of a sea coast, where none
but vessels of light draft can impose an effectual blockade.
If we sincerely desire to obtain maritime supremacy on our
great inland waters, we must do so by entering on a new
race of competition for the Western trade, in the manner I
have pointed out. The history of the world demonstrates
that maritime power has invariably followed, and not pre-
ceded, commercial greatness. The merchant navy has in
all ages and countries been the school for the sailors who
have manned the war navies.

Let Canada not ignore this principle — a principle that
hay raised England to the highest pitch of maritime renown.
Besides to encourage the establishment of a commercial
navy on our inland Avaters will effect both objects in view.
Money so laid out does not lie dead or inactive capital. It
is like the seed cast on the waters, which in due lime bringeth
forth a rich harvest. If our merchants have not the neces-
sary capital, let such assistance be offered as may lead to an
early and powerful demonstrution towards regaining for the
St. 1- iwrence her natural and indefeasible rights. Are not
the Western American merchants clamorous for the very
improvements I have hinted at ? Do they not frequently in-
timate, that, if Canada belonged to the Union they would
speedily enrich our Atlantic ports with the vastly increased
stream of commerce, which they would pour through the
Si. Lawrence ? It is time that such a reproach was wiped
away.

The truth is, that the capital of New York has built up
the United States' Western trade, and the capital of Eng-
land has been poured with a lavish hand into the lap of
New York, until she has grown insolent in her unparalleled
prosperity. Her clipper ships swarm in every sea, and her
merchants trade in every port. English companies are
formed to supply inland vessels for India and China, and
Brazil, but Canada is regarded as a hyperborean region,
chiefly celebrated for its products of timber. It is not con-
sidered that, although the St. Lawrence is closed five
months in the year, the Erie Canal which carries 80 per
cent of the western trafiic, is likewise closed an equal length
of time ; nor can it be known that Upper Canada pro-
duces a million quarters of wheat for foreign export, and
that more than half of this goes to enrich the New York ca-
nals and ship-owners.

An Upper Canadiam.
Quebec, 11th Feb., 1862.

III.

THE DEFENCES OF THE COUNTRY.-
FORilFICATIONS.

" Britannia needs no bulwarks,
No towers along the steep ;
H«r march is o'er the mountain wave,
Her home is on the deep."

[Patriotic song.

" The experience of the world from China to Britain has exposed the vain
attempt of fortifying an extensive tract of country. An active enemy who
can select and vary his points of attack, must in the end discover some feeble
spot, or some unguarded moment. The strength as well as the attention of
the defenders is divided." — [Gibbon's Decline and Fall.

The experience of past faults, which may sometimes correct the mature age
of individuals, is seldom profitable to the successive generations of man-
kind."— Idem.

As we are about entering on a new epoch in our
national progress — an epoch which will be noted by the
future historian of Canada and the Empire, it may serve
some good purpose to ventilate those important questions at
present engaging so large a share of public attention —
questions in fact of momentous importance. In approaching
a subject on which there has often been great differences of
opinion, even amongst professional men, it will be more
becoming an unprofessional writer to weigh opposir;: views
and arguments, than to express a decided judgment, One
class of persons will be found condemning fortifications
almost in toto ; whilst another, with equal obstinacy, de-
clares them to be indispensable to the safety of a country.
The scientific and public opinion of mankind will also be
found to have fluctuated from age to age, on this vexed ques-
tion. It was once the boast of Sparta that the smoke of an
enemy's watch-fire had never been visible from their capital,
and the bravest race of warriors the world ever saw» held
stone walls in utter contempt. There is no country, perhaps,
where the question of fortifications has been more discussed
and where the views of great authorities have differed more
widely than in our own beloved mother country. Each suc-
cessive improvement in the military art has brought out
new points, requiring attention. At one time stone walls
have risen high in public favor. At another there was noth-
ing like the " wooden walls of old England." Very

recently, a first Lord of the Admiralty, at a public demons-
liation given to the first Admiral of England, on the eve
of his departure for the Bahic, felt it necessary to restrain
his supposed rashness of character by admonishing him to
be careful of England's ships, and to beware of the stone
walls of Russia. That Admiral, at the close of the sea-
son, after having but too faithfully observed his superior's
admonition, returned home amidst the clamors of the nation
and the jeers of the press. When parliament met, he turned
on his assailants and brought them to bay, by quoting his
instructions and demonstrating the folly of attacking stone
walls with wooden ships. His bravery was vindicated, and
the nation set to work to meet the now acknowledged dif-
ficulty which presented itself to the power of the Empire.
The result has been the ])roduction of the iron Warrior.
Alas for the " wooden walls!" Iheir glory and their might
have departed. Hereafter, an iron age will require iron
walls, and the future poet will sing of the " Iron walls of
old England."*

France and America follow in the wake of England,
and the time is at hand when the battles of the sea will be
contested between iron navies, propelled at enormous speed
by the giant steam. If Sir Charles Napier were living, he
might now bid defiance to Cronstadt — whose walls could be
made to crumble before the tremendous missiles sent with
almost unerring aim, from an impregnable floating iron
battery, which, by changing its position under dexterous
management, is able to avert the effects of the enemy's fire.
Stone walls, like wooden walls, have had their day. This
fact may be noted as historical. It is therefore to be presum-
ed, that the Imperial commission, now sitting on the question

* About a month after the publication of this letter the Naval en-
gagement at Newport News took place, affording the first practical illustra-
tion of the efficiency of iron clad Steamers. The iron plated Steamer Merri-
mac (a razeed, 50 gun ship) mounting ten heavy guns and in no respect
equal to the Warrior, attacked four U. S. frigates, the Cumberland of 24
guns, the Congress of 50 guns, the St Lawrence of 50 guns, and the Minne-
sota of 40 guns — 104 guns in all. She first run into and sunk the Cumberland,
and then engaged captured and burned the Congress, and would have des-
troyed the others had night not put an end to the battle These and other
vessels in the port were saved, on the renewal of the attack next morning, by
the timely arrival of Captain Ericssons new, turretted iron clad Steamer
Monitor mounting two 180 lb. guns, which engaged the Merrimac at close
quarters for saveral hours and finally drove her off.

The New York Herald of the 12th March speaking of this, engagement
says " henceforth not a single wooden war vessel must bo built. We are
indeed entering upon an age of iron — iron in ships, iron in forts, iron in
harbor defences, iron in everything that moves, or floats."

of fortifications in Canada, will learn by ** the experience
of past faults" and I may add present knowledge, not to sink
any more money in the construction of stone fortifications.
If bomb-proof works are required at particular points for
strategic reasons, nothing but iron can be relied on ; and for
temporary protection good earth-works, well flanked by
heavy oak timber, if it can be had.

As I never allow myself, from motives of contempt or
prejudice, to refuse to draw instruction from our neighbors,
who are practising the art of war on each other, I venture to
point attention to the successful application of railway bars
to defensive purposes. This new discovery in fortifications
is due to the ingenuity or the necessities of the Charles-
tonians. It was from behind such an improvised fortress,
that the celebrated Fort Sumpter was reduced to submission.*
Why not then apply the principle so efficacious as it is be-
lieved to be in ocean batteries, to land works ? Its applica-
tion would be much cheaper on land than on water. Oak
timber, two feet square, can be put together and plated on
land, far more economically than the building and adapting
a great ship to the same principle. These, however, are
matters which have no doubt long since occupied the atten-
tion of the Imperial authorities ; and I may, after all, be
incomptent to offer advice on a question tht^t has so much
puzzled professional men. From the fact that England is
laying out fabulous sums of money at this very time in build-
ing stone walls for the defences of her coasts, I infer that I
must be wrong.

Speaking of the coast defences of England, I would
observe, that I happened to be in London at the time the
subject was receiving consideration, in and out of parlia-
ment, and must say I could not help thinking that those who
condemned the lavish expenditure of money for these objects,
at a time when the whole system of warfare was rapidly
changing, had the best of the argument. It is true that the
Warrior was not yet completed ; but a delay of one or two
years could not have made much difference. It so happened
that the whole British nation was laboring under a panic
about a French invasion, and the government thought it
best not to assume the responsibility of delay. It seems
strange, however, now, that new light is shed on the science
of naval architecture, by the reported success of the Warrior

* The deck or roof of the Merriniac, was covesed with railway
bars at the recent battle, and the 32 pound shot glanced off them lili? " peas
from a pop-guns"

and La Gloire^ some material modifications ?re not promptly
made in the mode of constructing coast defences. J&12,-
000,000 sterling would build a great many Warriors^ which*
after all will have to be built, before the perfect safety of
England can be assured. The advantages of floating iron
batteries are too numerous and too important, to be over-
looked or denied. But the dock yards must be defended by
land works — so say the great professional authorities. This
is no doubt quite correct, because they may be assailed by
an enemy superior in the field, who may choose his own
point of landing. England, however, ought never to allow
an enemy to land in force, and that is just what we in
Canada ought to provide against. Let us have the power,
or the means at hand of creating such a power, on our lakes,
as will enable us to resist invasion until England can send
to our aid her iron batteries and gunboats.

I feel certain that I may venture, without presumption,
to say, that I conceive that the best fortifications we can
construct, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, will
be a goodly number of first-class screw merchantmen on our
Lakes capable of being converted into gunboats, and a well
organized army of volunteers.

An Upper Canadian.

Quebec, 13th Feb. 1862.

IV.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CO-
LONIAL DEFENCE— THE QUESTION

OF COST,

Sir, — I am sure tliat every right-minded Canadian
must, in the main, agree with your judicious remarks on
Thursday and Saturday last, on this subject. The difficulty
to which you refer, namely, the mode of settling the pro-
portion of the burthens which shall be borne respectively, by
the mother country and the Province — a term which I prefer
to colony when speaking of Canada — is by no means a new
one. It has often been dissussed, both here and in England,
with a view to arriving at some general understanding. Its
importance at the present time, however, is very materially
enhanced by the possibility of a war arising out of the pre-
sent American complications — either on account of Imperial
. interests and considerations, or by a deliberate attempt on
the part of the Government of Washington or of armed
bodies of disbanded soldiers to subjugate this country.*

The question is so large a one, and has recently been so
fully investigated by a Committee ot the House of Commons,
resulting in a blue-book of truly formidable dimensions, that
it is difficult to bring it within the compass of a newspaper
article. Before offering any observations on it, it may be as
well to explain what has been the theory and practice of
late, in reference to this and the other North American Pro-
vinces. This cannot, perhaps, be more briefly stated than

• The danger to be apprehended from the disbanding of large ar-
mies, has been frequently illustrated both in ancient and modern history.
Gibbon speaking on this subject says " too idle to work, too poor to beg,
" the mercenaries" (of the middle ages), " were accustomed a to life of rapine ;
'^ they could act with more dignity and eftp"*, under a banner and a chief;
" and the sovereign, to whom their service a as useless and their presence
" importunate endeavored to discharge the torrent against some neighboriug
•' countries. Macaulay says, "the peace" (ofRyswick) " had, all over Europe,
" and no where more than in England, turned crowds of old soldiers into
"•marauders."

The several Fillibuster expeditions got up a few years ago in the U. S,
tto subdue Cuba and central America were traceable directly to the discharged
soldiers, employed for a single year by the government of Washington, in the
Hexican war. What will happen when the vast armies of the present civil
war shall be left with out an occupation remains to be seen. A terrible
power is in the course of creation and ihere will not be wanting " a banner
and a chief" tc direct it against " some neighboring countries."

in the words of Mr. Elliot, Assistant Under Secretary of
State for the Colonies, before this Committee. Referring
to the arrangements with the North American Provinces on
the question of military defence, propounded by Lord Grey
in 1851, and subsequently by the Duke of Newcastle and
Sir George Grey in 1854, and Mr. Labouchere in 1856, Mr.
Elliot, says, " the plan was that there should he a certain
" maximu'in force, which should be there on Imperial accoimt
" and paid for out of Imperial funds ; and that if the Colony
" wanted a greater number of troops they should pay for
" their charged

To meet this altered state of things our present militia
system was adopted, which has furnished a volunteer force
— the only branch of the militia establishment in the Pro-
vince of the least value, (as correctly stated by Mr. Elliot in
the course of his examination). This force Mr. Elliot sets
down for Canada at 4456, (page 22 of report). The max-
imum Imperial for^^e thought necessary p,t that time, (10th
of April last), just at the commencement of the American
Civil War, was stated at 2220 of all Rrms. The extraordi-
nary events which have occurred on this Continent since
that time, illustrate the impossibility of laying down any
fixed rule in regard to the proportions of military foi-ce to be
provided by any particular group of Colonies. It ought to
go far to demonstrate that not only each particular Colony,
but that every fresh exigency must he dealt with on its
merits.

As I am not writting a treatise on the subject, it will not
be necessary to discuss the peculiar opinions of Mr. Ad-
derley, M. P., who has given voluminous evidence, and
published a pamphlet and recently a speech, to prove that
England ought to go back to the Colonial system of 100
years ago, which threw all the cost of defence on the colo-
nists. That an Imperial statesman, of Mr. Adderley''s stand-
ing, should revert to a state of things w^hc-n the only de-
fences required by the North Americans were against the
natives of the Continent, or the then distant colonies of
France, must be quite refreshing to those who believe that
" tixoTe is nothing new under the sun," and that all things
revolve in cycles. An ingenious theorist, not a very long
time ago, wrote an essay to prove that bows and arrows —
such as were used by the ancient Britons, and are still in
favor with certain savage nations, who know not the use of
fire-arms — were the best weapons for a warlike people.
Mr. Adderley's theory of Colonial policy may fairly be

classed with that in favor of a return to bows and arrows.
Bui as the bow and the arrow are not likely to change po-
sition with the Enfield rifle, so neither is Mr. Adderley's
Colonial policy likely to prevail — at least in Canada. Nor
can it be supposed that Earl Grey's " plan," though it has
been indorsed by a series of Colonial ministers, and differs
little from Mr. Adderley's, will be available any longer in
British North America. Neither can Canada be property
treated as belonging to the " group" of North American
colonies to which a uniform principle of any kind can be
applied.

The " Lower Provinces" of New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, Newfounland and Prince Edward's Island, being
more especially maritime Provinces may continue to be so
gi'ouped, and may have some uniform plan settled on, as to
the cost of defence, whether in time of peace, or in time of
war. What all the North American Provinces have most to
apprehend, is war with the United States. As regards
Canada, her long inland froniier, which is distinguished
only by an imaginary lino drawn through the lakes and
rivers, or by the monuments set up by the surveyors — her case
is different from the others of the same Colonial office group.

The attacks to which the Lower or maritime Provinces
would, in the event of war with the United States, be subject,
would be merely of a predatory nature — such as the landing
at some undefended point, of marines from a ship of war or
privateersman, to plunder, or destroy property. The United
States in the face of so powerful a navy as England can
bring to bear on the American coasts, it cannot be supposed,
will attempt to land an army on the shores of any of the
maritime Provinces proper. Their land forces would there-
fore be wholly directed against Canada. By far the best
mode of defending these Lower Provinces would be that
adopted for the coast defence of England, Scotland and Ire-
land during the Russian war — namely by effectually shut-
ting up every port of the enemy, and capturing or destroying
every armed ship of his, which may have the temerity to
keep outside, if this can be done. There being no common
principle on which to found a plan for arranging the propor-
tion of expenses to be borne respectively by the mother coun-
try and the whole of the North American Provinces, it be-
comes quite unnecessary to make further allusion to the
Lower group. For us the question is purely Canadian ;
and must be settled between this country and England on
high national principles and according to the peculiar cir-

cumi^*Dn?es and interests which may have produced a resort
to arms.

Having pointed out the impracticabilily of "grouping
the Colonies" for Colonial office convenience, in such emer-
gencies as the present, and alluded to the circumstances
growing out of boundary and geographical position, which
are peculiar to Canada, we may fairly find a starting point
from which we may possibly arrive at a solution of the ques-
tion now before the English and Canadian public — namely,
what shall hereafter be the relations between the Province
and the mother country, and from this deduce the propor-
tion which each shall bear in the defence of common inte-
rests. In my first letter I stated it as my view of the subject
that we must henceforth, for these purposes, be regarded as
allies, and that when the Province is threatened with inva-
sion the forces of England would in effect become auxiliia-
ries to those of Canada, just as a Canadian regiment sent to
assist England in some foreign war would obtain for us si-
milar designations. By divesting ourselves of mere ideas
and sentiments, which may be embodied in particular ex-
pressions of language, we may often find the solution of a
difficult problem. Although " a rose by any other name
may smell as sweet," we prefer 'o call it a rose — thst being
the nnrrij' most proper for it. But if by any process of nature,
or art, a rose should be turned nto a tulip, it would be very
improper to still call it a rose, and our doing so would only
lead to confusion in the science of floraculture.

Now, if the relations of t Colony with the mother coun-
try, being sui generis, have, from circumstances become
changed to those of an ally we shall gain much by so consi-
dering them. Great inconvenience often arises, in the dis-
cussion of questions, which do not admit of scientific de-
monstration, by the use of inapnropriate terms, and the force
of great moral axioms may be lessened or altogether lost by
a wrong application of language.

To apply these observations, I assume it as an established
and admitted fact, that Canada having grown into national
proportions, and assumed certain independent functions,
occupies a difterent relationship towards the parent ^ tate,
from that which she held in her incipient stages of coloniza-
tion, or nonage, must nou prepare for the new responsibili-
ties which a-e devolved on her. It has, to some extent,
been the policy of British statesmen to urge on us the as-
sumption of these responsibilities, (see Earl Grey's Despatch
of 1851,) and now we can no long?^ avoid doing so. In

considering ihose relations in the light of an alliance offen-
sive, and defensive we open up a large question — namely, how
far a colony may be bound to assist the Mother country in
cases of need? The Greek colonies of antiquity were always
regarded as allies, and went by that name. They were vir-
tually independent of the parent state, which never interfered
in local, or domestic concerns. And yet no people were ever
more loyal to the common head than the colonies of ancient
Greece. They gloried in the name of Greek, for centuries
ifter the prestige of Greece had departed, and gave their
blood to support the honor and the interests of the common
brotherhood. i Such ought to be the relationship between all
the branches of the great Anglo-Saxon family, and such pro-
bably would be the case now, but for that unfortunate policy
which Mr. Adderley so much advises, and which led to the
seperation of the old colonies of North America from the
Mother connlry.2 ]y|r, Adderley, I may here remark, seems
to have shifted his ground cons^iderably, since he gave his
evidence only a few months ago, before the Committee of
which he was a member. His late speech, is, to some

1.— GREEK COLONIES— " The Rreat bulk of the Greek Colonies
« were really independent ; and though they ».ommonly regarded the land o
" their forefathers with filial respect, though they yielded to its citizens the
" place of distinction at public games and religious ceremonies, and were
" expected to assist them in time of war, they did so as allies only, on fair and
" equal terms but never as subjects "

ROMAN COLONIES—" The Roman Colonies were, for the most part,
" founded by and under the authority of government ; being intended to servo
" both as outlets for poor and discontented citizens, and as military stations,

'•' or garrisons The most intimate political union was always

" maintained between them and the Mother City Their internal government
** was modeled on that of Rome ; and while their superior officers were mostly
" sent from the capital, they were made to contribute their full quota of
' troops and taxes to assist in carying on the contests in which the Republic
•' was almost constantly engaged "

MODERN COLONIES.— " The early Colonies of most modern nations
" were founded by private adventurers, influenced either by the, hope of gain,
" or by a desire to escape religions persecution, without any wish to relieve
" the Mother Country of a surplus population or bridle subjugated Provinces
" On their first institution, therefore, the modern colonies approached, though
'' with some essential variations, more nearly to the Grecian than to the Roman
" model — but the period of their freedom was of very limited duration They
" were soon subjugated to laws and regulation framed in the Metropolis, and
" calculated, as was to be supposed rather to promate, its interests than those
" of the Colony. At a later period the foundation of colonial establishments
" was eagerly patronized by most European governments, in the view of ex-
" tending commerce and enriching the Mother Country, by securing to her
" the exclusive possession of the market of distant countries." — McCulloch.

2. — The old colonies threw off their allegiance to Britain because
British Statesmen attempted to tax them for their own defences. Would
Gauada act diSerently, if Mr. Adderley bad the powor to put her to the test?

»^xtent an attempt to reconcile hif» peculiar views to the
important events which have recently happened. But it
will not inte'- "anadian, and will prove only a waste of
lime to poini .lis di8crepanci(;s.

From these obpervationH, it appears to me that the fol-
lowing considerations may be deduced :

1st. That it will be difficult if not impossible to deter-
mine how much of any casus betli^ may be chargeable to
Imperial and how much to Provincial account — speaking
now for Canada alone. This difficulty must necessarily
arise from the impossibility of ascertaining the true motives
of an enemy — inasmuch as some pretext instead of the true
cause is generally set forth, by one, if not by both parties.
No body believes that France and England went to war
with Russia, on account of the quarrel between Russia and
Turkey about the Greek churches at Jerusalem. And yet
that was the pretext put forward by one of the belligerent
parties, as the sole cause of the quarrel, and entered largely
into the declarations of the allies. So, if the United States,
having a furtive eye on Canada, seek a quarrel with England,
it will almost certainly be about something else not having
the slightest reference to Canada. This proves 2ndly,
the im;juiicy of discussing, in advance the question as to
whether a future war may be undertaken on account of Im-
perial, or Provincial interests.

If we are going to measure our loyalty and our aid by
such considerations, England may well weigh the propriety
of casting us off altogether, as a source of weakness, rather
than of strength in time of war-especially with our neighbors.
Let us well consider this view oi the question, before decid-
ing on a niggardly and unstatesmanlike policy. But, for
Canada, England would rely wholly on her navy in case of
an American war. She would thus be able to damage her
enemy more than her enemy could damage her and at
an enormous saving to the Imperial Exchequer. In such a
war, it must be evident to every man of common sense, that
Canada will be England's vulnerable point -., and, if we are
going to open a balance account we ought to take into that
account what it will cost to maintain our independence, if
that can be done at all, if England were to adopt the same
narrow view and cast us off, to shift for ourselves.

If then, we agree on the soundness of this " theory,"
onr government should endeavor to put it into practice, even
if they have to call on our people to submit to a little direct
taxation to meet the present and future exigencies of the

country. We may diflTcr amongst ourHelves as to the nature
and probables duration of the dang(;ra we are now called on
to avert. One; man may think 10,000, another 20,000, and
a third 50,000 enrolled and drilled volunteers may be wuf-
tieicnt, or necessary to stave off the disasters of war. In
considering this (juestion, it may well be affirmed thai it is
better to err on the safe side. One, two, or three millions
promptly and judiciously expended, may save a future
outlay of ten, twenty, or thirty millions in defending our
shores from the disasters of war. This moderate present
expenditure may now fairly be asked for, by England, and
ought to be cheerfully and promptly responded to by Canada
— and the proportions, in case of war, may safely be h^ft till
such a contingency becomes inevitable. It may then be
settled by a convention, similar to that entered into by
France and England when they went to war with Russia —
a convention that constituted them allies in regard to that
particular war, and which has made them friends ever since.

An Upper Canadian.

Quebec, 15th February, 1862.

OUR DL:tENCES FURTHER CON.

SIDERED.

Sir, — Our present relief from the apprehension of war
has been accidental. It may well become us to consider
whether our dimgcrs art; not still pressing, and may not
become perpetual ; and if so, whether we ought not to put
forth, for a time, extraordinary efforts to guard against them.
During the continuance of the American civil war, from
whence the elements of danger have sprung, we may not
have much to apprehend. But we cannot t(.'ll at what
moment, or by what unforseen event that war may be ter-
minated by a peace between the two sections. The South-
erners are beginning to be more severely pressed, and
would probably accept reasonable terms from their old Con-
federates. Or let us suppose the Federal arms to prevail,
in either case, three quarters of a million of men who have
acquired some knowledge as well as some taste of war, will
have to find the means of livelihood in a country, whose
commercial and financial condition will have become greatly
deranged. The Government of Washington must, in any
case, for many years to come, maintain a standing army of
at least 100,000 men. It will every year add to its navy;
and knowing as we do, the reckless enterprize and daring
of our neighbors, it would be incredible folly to trust our
defences henceforth to a few thousand British troops, though
they be the best and the bravest in the world. But I need
not dwell on this point. The necessity of adopting efficient
measures is fully admitted by all classes in the Province.
We have only to determine the nature and extent of the de-
fences to be provided, and to supply die means for carrying
them into effect.

I know nothing of the determination of the Militia Com-
mission, if they have arrrived at any and merely give my views
to the public for what they are worth. The Commissioners,
will, no doubt, deal with the question in a lucid and com-
prehensive manner. But the public opinion of the Province
must, after all, determine whether the recommendations of
those gentlemen shall obtain sufficient vitality to meet the
present and future requirements of the country. As a mem-
ber of that public, and I trust a true hearted Canadian and

a good sul)i«'('t of Ilrr Miijrsty, I have* vrntured to nrgf the
propriety ot cMtiiblishin^ !i iiiililary hcIiooI Tor the education
of young CanadiauM in military .science. Now is a favorable
tiiu« to carry this important desideratum into ellect.

In tile vi(;\v I am taking, and looking forward as I do to
a long I'uliire, I diHcard altogether the idea of ollering a Pro-
vincial subsidy for Imperial trooj)s to defend our frontiers
from attack. Altht)ugh the practice has been a(h)pted in
regard to New South Wah's, Ceylon and Mauritius, I cannot
conc(!ive that Canadian statesm(!n will make such a propo-
Hition to England, Jior is it to be believed that England
would adopt it, if it were made. Such a practice, to use the
words of the Right Hon. llob(*rt Lowe, before the Committee
of the House; of CoMuuons last summer, wouhl be " putting
" the ikitish troops more in tin; position of mercenaries,
" than, if I were a soldier juyself I should like. They hre
*' virtually serving a foreign Government which hires them
" from the Government which they are bound to serve." I
may furtln^r add th;it sucdi an arrangement, if agreed to,
would prove ultiuly unequal to our present and probable
future re(iuirements. England will send us every available
soldier she has, in case of need, and will pour out her trea-
sure as freely as ever. Canada ought not, and must not, con-
tribute in money but in armed, drilled and fully ccjuipped
men to the extent of her abillity, or in such numbers as shall
be settled by a convention, when such a measure becomes
necessary.

What we have, therefore, to consider is, how we shall
provide these men. Shall it be in the shape of a small
standing army — for we are too poor to recruit and maintain
a large one ? Or shall it be by a larger volunteer force, which
shall be fully armed, uniformed and taught the practice of
the rifle ? Which force will prove most valuable in case of
war? How many regulars can be maintained for a given
sum — say of a million of dollars a year, or such an amount
as we may feel ourselves equal to providing ? How many
volunteers would the same sum keep up in time of peace ?
These are questions which enter into the very essence of the
whole discussion.

I have favored the volunteer principle for many reasons,
some of which I will now briefly allude to. First. What
we want, is to develope the military resources and spirit of
the Canadian people. — This is rendered indispensable by
our proximity to a powerful neighbor, who has put in requisi-
tion every available military expedient he possesses to quell

a great civil war, and 1 must take leave to say, that on the
development of this spirit depends the future safety of our
country. Secondly. This neighbor must, for many years,
if not for all future time, remain a great military power, and
in consequence, a dangerous neighbor. The necessity for
having a body of Canadian regulars, in order to add firm-
ness and impose confidence amongst the great body of irre-
gulars, which, after all, must do a large share of the fighting,
will be obviated by the presence of a considerable imperial
force, whose prestige and discipline cannot be equalled.
Thirdly. We can, for the same money, keep in a tolerably
efficient state of organization during peace ten times (the
Commission on Imperial Defences of 1860 say twenty times)
as many volunteers as we can of regulars. Supposing,
therefore, for the sake of comparison, the proportions to be
ten to one, we may well consider whether 50,000 trained
volunteers will not go further to impress our neighbors with
sentiments of respect for us than 5,000 regulars. I know the
contempt the Duke of Wellington had for irregulars. But
his opinions were formed in regard to the Portuguese.
Again I would ask, would not the 50,000 armed and drilled
volunteer soldiers more fully demonstrate the determination
and spirit of our people, and exercise a higher moral in-
fluence than a standing army of 5,000 strong ? These ques-
tions carry their own answers.

But, whether we are to have a standing army or a vo-
lunteer army, we must aim at making it as efficient as pos-
sible, in its way. The first necessity is to have good officers.
Without these, all military organization becomes a mockery
and a useless outlay of public money. The men may be
taught their drill by experienced sergeants from the line, but
the officers can only acquire a knowledge of their duties and
of the science of war by long training in some competent
school, it is obvious that we cannot send a sufficient num-
ber of our piomising youths to England to acquire this
knowledge. We must, therefore, from the necessity of the
case provide the means to secure this object at home. Perhaps
it may not be desirable that the Province should expend at
once a large sum, in providing these means, nor that every
military aspirant should be qualified to command an army,
or even a regiment. What we want is to make a beginning,
and to establish a system which may be enlarged on, where-
by Canadians may qualify in Canada for at least a limited
number of those higher positions, in which such qualifica-
tions are absolutely indispensable to efficiency. There may,

■

< ■

if necessary, be different degrees of education, and the schools
themselves may be attached to the colleges and universities
of the Province, by creating military professor-ships.
Where early indications of military aptitude present them-
selves, such youths might be selected for the higher honors
and a higher class of qualifications. These are details,
but details of the highest importance, and they arc thrown
out as suggestions which court investigation from every
candid enquirer into our present and futures condition,
as a people. — Amongst the ancient llomans a military edu-
cation was considered a necessary part of every gentle-
man's acquirements, and there is no good reason why an art,
now become so important to the liberties of our country,
should not be taught by competent masters in all our higher
places of instruction.

Though these observations are made from a Canadian
point of view, I trust that I have not, as too many imperia-
lists, and perhaps too many provincialists have done, for-
gotten the opposite side of the question. Opinions not based
on large and even generous principles, of mutal advantage
ought to be regarded as unworthy of consideration,

It will, no doubt, have been remarked that the question
of the contingents to be provided by the respective Govern-
ments has been left without a suggestion as to its solution.
This question as, I observed in a former letter, had better be
left until a recessity for its solution arises. Up on this point,
England has done her duty to herself and to us, by the costly
and successful effort she has made to send out reinforcements.
We are the delinquents, and it is not for us to raise such
a question. I admit that there has been quite a demonstra-
tion in our towns, and some thousands of our best men have
enrolled themselves in companies, and are learning the drill.
But what proportion of these could leave their counting houses
and desks or other avocations, and march to the extreme ends
of the Province if required ? Eighty per cent of our popula-
tion is composed of agriculturalists, and it is to this class,
that we must, after all, look for the bulk of our future mili-
tary force. What has been done to organize officer and drill
them? Does not all still doj^^nd on the action of the Legis-
lature, which will not assemble for another month ? By the
slowness of our movement and the consequent delay we
shall gain one advantage — time for deliberation, and this is
what I think ought to be improved.

It is perhaps, needless to observe that the organization
of our military and naval forces, whatever they may consist

!.%

of, must at present be regarded merely in the light of a peace
establishment — but a peace establishment created to meet the
requirements of an exceedingly uncertain future. If war
comes, we will have to draw from such resources, as we
may have created in time of peace, the means, to be used
conjointly with the forces of England, in protecting our
shores from invasion and our homes from destruction. The
peace establishment should therefore be commensurate with
the objects which it is intended to effect. Though England
may speedly increase her ten, or twelve thousand men, of
all arms to 30,000 or 40,000, can we make 20,000 partially
drilled and equipped volunteers into 50,000 tolerable soldiers
at such short notice? If we are invaded, it will not be by a
handful of men ; and if our object is to preserve peace, let
us not by the weakness of our efforts invite an attack.

An Upper Canadian.

Quebec, I8th February, 1862.

VI.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
COLONIAL DEFENCE.

Sir, — It has aflforded me much satisfaction, in reading
your remarks on my suggestions, to find that we so cordially
agree on the main question — namely, the necessity of our
meeting in a reciprocal spirit the liberality of England in
supplying the means of rendering our defences eifectual.
On other points, our difference is rather seeming than real.
I am inclined to say that we substantially agree and that our
apparent difference of opinion is only in the use, or substitu
tion of words.

There are one or two observations, however, in my let-
ter (No. 4,) that appeared in yesterday's number of your pa-
per, which I think you have misconceived, perhaps from
want of clearness of expression on my part. The first of
these is where you have arrived at the conclusion that my
views, after all, difl'er but little from those of Mr. Adderley,
M.P., in regard to Colonial policy. You will therefore per-
mit me to make myself better understood. To do so, I will
state briefly what that gentleman proposed to the Committee
of the House of Commons on " Colonial Military Expendi-
ture," of which he was a member. His proposition was
made in the shape of a series of resolutions one or two of
which I will quote, as being sufiicient to explain his policy,

1. " That every part of the empire which has represen-
" tative government should provide the requirements for its
" own safety.

2. " That the mother country is bound to aid her co-
'* lonies in wars, especially in those which may be the con-
" sequence of her own policy.

3. " And may expect in returi. the co-operation of her
" colonies, especially in wars which concern themselves."

4. Mr. Adderley further proposes that the Imperial Go-
vernment shall encourage a " gradual return to the old Colo-
" nial system of this country, during the continuance of which
" British troops were never employed in Colonies for any
" purpose, but that of aid against foreign enemies in time of
" war."

I have numbered these propositions for the convenience
of reference. As to numbers two and three, taken a8 af-

firming abstract principles, I do not see that any exception
can be taken to them. With regard to number one, it strikes
me as being inconsistent with number two. It certainly
differs widely from the views I have urged. For instance,
I have taken the ground that all general and abstract prin-
ciples fail when applied to particular colonies and particular
cases, which may arise. I have been offering suggestions
in reference to Canada alone. It would be presumption in
me to oflbr opinions about other colonics, and to manifest a
desire to intermeddle in matters about which Canadians can-
not be expected to possess more than a general knowledge.

Aciing on this idea, I have pointed out the impropriety
of applying the same principles and means of defence to the
lower North American Provinces and to Canada. The ma-
ritime Provinces, I contend, must be defended mainly by
the navy of England — whilst Canada must be secured against
attack by a powerful land force and a powerful fleet of gun-
boats on the Lakes. I do not propose, nor do I think any-
thing I have written can be construed into such a meaning,
to " sever Canada from the Lower Provinces," or to urge a
" policy without reference to them." I have simply distin-
guished between the policy applicable to them as maritime
Provinces and that which is imposed on us, by geographical
and strategical considerations. Having drawn this distinc-
tion I confined my observations to Canada.

Between Mr. Adderley's recommendation number four,
and my suggestions, there is a wide divergence.

from there ' '

propositions,

agreement. Mr. Adderley's proposition would leave us to-
day without a British soldier in tnc country, because we
happen to be at peace with our neighbors. My proposition
is, always to have such a British force; in the Province, as
will, conjointly with our own forces of whatever kind, com-
mand the respect of our neighbors and thus avert war alto-
gether. Is there no difference in these propositions I would
a3k ? If not, I confess myself a very poor master of language.

There is, in my judgment, more similarity between the
late Colonial office policy and Mr. Adderley's as expound-
ed by Mr. Elliot the assistant Secretary of State for the Co-
lonies. MrElliott states this plan to be, to maintain " a
" certain maximum force, which should be there on Imperial
" account and i)aid out of Imperial funds, and that if the
*' Colony wanted a greater number of troops they should
''^ pay for their charge.^'*

being

there is a wide divergence. So far

"little essential difference between our

I have endeavored to point out an utter dis-

u»"'*'ii

In quoting this explanation of tho old Colonial office
policy, I have italicised those passages which appeared to
me to be objectionable. It seems to me to have beon a very
loose sort of arrangement, and one which might liave led to se-
rious disasters in this Province. I have already pointed out
the fallacy of attempting to apply a general rule 1o all the
Colonies, or to particular grou))s of them. In doing so, I
have only followed the recommendation of the Committee
of the House of Commons, who say, " taking into consider-
" ation the facts disclosed by the evidence laid before them,
** your Committee are of opinion that no uniform rule can
"be laid down which will be applicable alike to communi-
" ties so various as those, which compose the British Colo-
" nial Empire." The Committee distinguish between those
dependencies which are regarded in tb^ light of military
stations, and such as are "colonies" p per, and advise that
each of the latter shall be dealt with, in regard to tlie expen-
ses of military defences, according to the exigencies of the
case and the times, " having regard to the local resources
of each." The report then goes on to say " with this reser-
" vation, it appears to your Committee that the responsi-
** bility and cost of the military defence of such dependen-
** cies ought mainly to devolve on themselves.'''*

Whilst I am at the " blue book," I tak(; the liberty to
quot^ one more passage to show that I have followed pretty
closely in the footsteps of the illustrious statesmen who com-
posed the Committee of last year. The Report further says,
" that it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colo-
" nial defence to be borne by the Imperial and Colonial go-
** vernments respectively, should be the subject of negotia-
"tions with the various dependeucies." I may make an
observation or two on this point again ; but I desire first to
remark, that I do not think that British statesmen have
shown so much forecaste in regard to the peculiar position
of Canada and the peculiar dangers to which she is exposed
as they might have done. Stretching as the Province does,
from the head of Lake Superior to the New Brunswick line
fully two tho'dsand miles along the borders of a powerful
and perhaps covetous neighbor, Canada never ought to have
been classed, with other members of the Colonial empire in
regard to h.er defences. British statesmen ought to have
considered this great Province as presenting by far the most
vulnerable part oithe Empire, in ease of a rupture with that
neighbor, and should have regarded our defences, both on
the land, gtnd on the lakes, as in the nature of Imperial de

'<1

fences, and Canada ought to have done her part to the rea-
sonable extent of her ability. Had this view prevailed —
had England looked at tiie question in this light, and con-
sidered that the dangers arising from foreign invasion in
1837 and 1838 might be repeated, and iliat the honor and
the power of the Empire might be damaged almost as much
in Canada as they might be damaged on the shores of Kent,
or the coasis of Ireland, we should not have been frightened
out of our propriety at the chances of invasion at the begin-
ning of winter ; nor would England have been put to so
enormous a cost in aftbrding us relief and in imposing res-
pect for her flag on the soil of this Province.

Here let me quote one more paragraph from the Report
of the Committee — the last in that report : — " In conclusion,
"your Committee submit that the tendency of modern war-
" fare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power ; and
" it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required
" for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possi
" ble, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing
" against aggression the distant dependencies cf the Em-
" pire." From what has been said, it will be seen that
this rule, as generally laid down by the Committee does
not hold good with regard to Canada. Regarding the United
States as the great power, with which Britain is most likely to
have the next contest, it may be well for her to consider whe-
ther the " heart of that hostile power" may not have to be as-
sailed on the lakes as well as on the ocean. Be this as it may,
Canada inust be defended there ; otherwise such a war will
inevitably present the spectacle of having her most power-
ful colony detached from her, whilst she remains mistress of
the seas, and holds every Atlantic port of the enemy in close
blockade, if not in actual possession.

Permit me to say, that if, in dealing with actual facts,
some of my observations presuppose a state of Colonial in-
dependence more complete than may be quite agreeable to
a high order of sentimentality, the fault is not mine. It is
the Colonial policy of the Empire that has done this, and we
cannot alter it if we would, and I feel pretty certain that we
would not if we could. Provincial statesmen, though they
are accused by their opponents of doing all sorts of odd
things, will scarcely feel theniselves so embarassed with the
responsibilities of independence, as to implore the mother
country to take back the troublesome gift. A study of Bri-
tish Colonial blue books has a wonderful desentimentalizing
eifect. We are there reminded of reciprocal obligations.

interests and duties, and of the doctrine of quid pro quo.

Now, let us assume the question to bo as you have cle-
verly put it " how^ best to consolidate the interests of the co-
lony and the mother country." This subject I apprehend
would open up too large a field for discussion at the present
time, although I most sincerely hope that the present crisis
will powerfully direct the public attention of England to it.
The object must, I conceive, be accomplished by enlarging
the commercial relations between the two, by building up a
great Commercial Marine on the Lakes, the St. Lawrence
and the Ocean route between the St. Lawrence and Britain.
In the second communication which you did me the favor to
publish on the question of defences, I entered somewhat into
this part of the subject, and need not again dwell on it.

The question we are now considering is how to dove-
lope the largest amount of military spirit and military power
in the Province, and I hope, that the suggestions contained
in my last letter may not be inappropriate to the occasion.
It matters not whether, for the sake of argument, and to got
rid of traditional idea which often embart'ss us in a course
of reasoning, we call ourselves Allies, or Colonies, or Pro-
vinces of England. I used the term ally, as I pointed out,
as being more convenient to express the relations which we
should occupy in case of war with the United States. But
I proposed to leave the application of the principles and du-
ties which such a relationship c?c/acfo, would devolve on us
mutually, until its necessity arose — until the time came, if
ever it should come, when it may be necessary to enter into
a convention about quotas and contingents. " Sufficient un
to the day is the evil thereof," is a maxim which ought ever
to be kept in mind. It may break that charm which you so
well allude to, of considering ourselves a part and parcel of
the great Empire of Britain, when wo have to set down and
possibly wrangle, about how many men and how many guns
each party ought to keep in the field. Another question, I
have said, ought, if possible, never to be raised, namely, on
whose account was the war undertaken ?

In all our discussions, we ought not to forget that it is
our first and highest interest and duty to maintain the most
cordial relations with Britain, and second only to those to
cultivate similar relations with our neig' )rs. By prepar-
ing for war, we are simply providing a guarantee for peace,
and I venture to say that if we do not court the former by
the feebleness of our precautions to preserve the latter, we
shall long enjoy that greatest of blessings, an honorable and

undisturbed peace. And let it never be forgotten that whilst
we are educating our rising generation in the elements of
military science and military duties, we are doing the very
best thing to develope both physical and mental energies.
Nothing 'n my judgment will do more to preserve the liber-
ties of the people, than to raise up a class of citizen soldiers,
by which means wo shall be able to avoid the dangers of a
staiiding army. I trust that I have now shown that we do
not in reality differ materially if at all on any point, and feel
confident that advantage must result from such discussions

Yours, &c.,

An Upper Canadian.

Quebec, 19th February, 18C2.

VII.

OUR MILITARY DEFENCE3— IS CANA-
DA TO BECOiME A TART OF THE
UNITED STATES.

Sir, — I venture once again to trespass on your patience
and to offer a few additional remarks on a subject, in the
discussion of which I have already filled many columns oi
your paper, without, as I conceive, by any means exhaust-
ing it. I do not, however, propose to go over much new
gr und. My object is rather to sum up what I have already
pa° forward as my view of the duty of the Canadian Legis-
lature. The question to be decided in a few months, per-
haps in a few weeks, is one which will determine the future
destiny of this great and rising Province for generations, if
not for all time to come That question is, whether we shall
grow up to nationality under the congenial influences of
British connection and British power, or be speedily absorb-
ed into the Union of the neighborij g States, or become uni-
ted with some detached portion of them ?

This will no doubt strike many thinking persons as a
bold, if not an exaggerated mode of putting the subject be-
fore the public. Others may possibly set me down as an
alarmist. It is to prevent such assumptions and meet such
charges that I desire to sum up the dangers of the present
and the menaces of the future, and to urge on the legislature
and the country the necessity of adopting measures for de-
veloping the military spirit of the people and bringing out
the military resources of the country. Since the adjustment
of the Trent affair, the public seem to have settled down in-
to a dangerous state of indifierence or contempt for what
may grow out of the great revolution in progress amongst a
neighboring people, fourteen times more numerous, if not
fourteen times more powerful, than ourselves. It is only a
few brief weeks since we all drew a long and a free breath
at the unexpected relief from the apprehension of a war,
which we were in no manner prepared to meet ; and already
we hear it repeated from mouth to mouth, that " the Ameri-
" cans will so exhaust themselves by their own internal
" strife as to incapacitate them from attacking Canada, or
" measuring swords with England. No, no, depend on it,"

hear it remarked,) " we are now quite safe* The North

(

"will be beaten in the end, and the independence of the
" South will aftord a' guarantee for our safely. If this result
" is not attained by the South, the war will be long, and we
" shall in any case be safe — either from exhaustion of our
" neighbors, or from a divided Union."

Here lies, in my judgment, a serious, if it does not
prove a fatal delusion. VVhether the Union be restored, or
whether it be permanently divided, our risk of attack, at no
distant day, remains pretty nearly equal. Indeed it would
be difficult to say from which event we may have most to
apprehend. If the Union be restored, the United States will
be the most powerful and overbearing nation in the world.
With a million of men who will have acquired a pretty
thorough knowledge of war in the field and in the camp ;
with a navy, which will have become equal to the defence
of her principal seaports, and with the ocean swarming with
privateers to prey on the commerce of England, is there any
one who knows anything of American character and Ameri-
can audacity, who dare assert that the United States will
hesitate one moment to measure strcagth with the rival she
both hates and fears, but which she nevertheless hopes to
humble ? Besides the popularity of such a war, can any
one donl)1 llie policy of seeking it in order to consolidate the
government which just now is shaken with the revolution-
ary earthquake ? The darling doctrine of President Monroe
will be at once asserted, and Canada, Cuba and Mexico
will be promptly invited to join the then irresistible Union.

On the other hand, if there are to be two governments
in the place of one, the government of Washington will be
compelled to maintain a great standing army, and it may at-
tempt to indemnify itself for the loss of the South by the ac-
quisition of Canada. It by no means follows, because th e
government of Washington may be unable to subdue eight
millions, or twelve millions including the slaves (who do the
labor, whilst the whites do tae fighting, and w^ho ought,
therefore, to count in the military resources of the country)
that it may not be able to crush us with only two and a half
millions, although backed by all the power of England.
Look at the map and there it will be seen that the Confed-
erate States are a great compact country, skirted along the
sea coast by a chain of mountains, covering a considerable
breadth and extending many hundreds of miles. This coun-
try too — larger than all that part of Europe lying west of the
Rhine and the Rhone, or rather the mountains of Piedmont,
is filled with rivers and other defensive lines, and has a cli-

tl^

mute unfiivornbh; tomilltury operations at nearly all seasons
ol" tliu year. Now look at Canada, llert; it lies, a lon^,
narrow, and (^oinparalivcly sparsi^ly settled country. From
the head ol" Lake Superior to the boundary line of New
Brunswick, a distance* of mon; than 2000 miles, is bounded
by the territories of this dangerous neighbor.

But we are earnestly reminded of how the brave militia
of Upper Canada, with the aid of one or two regiments of
the line, drove back the 'Yankees' in the war of 1812-14,
when that part of the Provim^e had under 100,000 inhabi-
tants. " If w(! were able then, with such linuled means, to
defend ourselves," it is argued by a porticm of the press and
by gentlemen everywhere, "we shall give good account of
" any foe who diires to set foot on our soil. Look at our
" population — two and a half millions, and look at our rail-
" ways and our steamers, and at the British troo})s already
" in the country and those that will come, when more are
"" needed, and at the British gunboats," (which may never
float on tlie waters of our lakes) " what more do we need,
" than an enrolment of our militia." These are words I have
heard very often of late ,and those who use them pretty gen-
erally do so, deprecating the necessity of additional taxation
to provide defences.

Those who can so readily compose themselves into a state
of fancied security had better reflect on the result of the
American Revolutionary war, as well as on the progress of
events since the war of 1812. Did not a larger British force,
of the hardiest and finest veteran soldiers Britain ever had
— a force larger by half than that now in this country, lay
down their arms to three millions of the old Colonists, and
five or six thousand French soldiers, after an exhausting
war of seven years ? And whilst the population of Upper
Canada has grown from 100,000 to 1,500,000 has not die po-
pulation of Western New York and the Western frontier
States grown from 400,000 or 500,000 to 8,000,000 ?* Then

• The population of Ohio and the territories noAV forming the Western Lake
States contained in 1812, in round numbers about 300,000 souls. Of these
230,000 belonged to Ohio alone, and 70,000 to the Western territories,
In 1860 the Western Lake States contained the following population :

Ohio, 2,339,599

Michigan, 749,112

Indiana, 1,350,941

Illinois, 1,711,753

Wisconsin, 775,873

Minnesota, 172,022

7,090,300
The 30 Western Counties of New York (out of GO comprising the whole
State) contained, in 1812 about 200,000 souls. They had increased in 1860

It I

look at the Mhipping of our neighbors on the lakon, number-
ing four to ont! as compared with ours, ami showing in ton-
nage a still greater disproportion against us. Look at their
lines of railway, tapping our frontier everywhere, and the
vast material of war they will have on hand when the day
of peace amongst themselves arrives. Nor can it be sup-
posed, that in the event of a war with Great Britain, they
will again commit the blunders they were guilty of in the
last contest, of sending small detachments of men against
us at numerous points. Leaving fifty or sixty thousand men
to guard their frontier cities of Detroit, Buffalo, Oswego and
Ogdensburg, and a score of improvised gunboats manned by
a few thousand sailors, to menace our shores of the lakes,
and keep our Western militia at home, they will next time
send a hundred thousand men against Montreal and fifty
thousand against Kingston. Th^ former will endeavor to
cut off all succor from England, and the latter to pierce the
Province through at a vital part. As for Montreal, if at-
tacked by such a force in winter — a ft»rce that can be direc-
ted against it with the utmost facility, by the old line of mi-
litary operations, via the Hudson and Mohawk rivers and
Lake Champlain, now traversed all the way by iron rails,
it can only be defended by an imposing army of the line,
backed by all the irregulars of Lower Canada.f

If we are going to provide the means to avert such dan-
gers, it must appear to every sensible man, clear that those
means must be proporti(>ned to the end they are to accom-
plish. In case of actual war, England will, no doubt
promptly take ?\ir forces into her pay, to an extent to bring
our own burthens within our ability to bear them. But we
must first provide a force, which may be made so available.

to 1,750,000. Western Pennsylvania, which is also a Lake State, contains
fully 750,000. Adding Vermont and Maine, the population of the frontier
States will be as follows :

Western Lake States, 7,099,300

Western New York, 1,750,000

Western Pennsylvania, 750,000

Vermont, 315,000

Maine, 620,000

Total 10,534,300

■J- If Montreal were held in force by an invading army for six months, thus
cutting of all external aid at the point where all our lines of communication
meet, it requires no military prescience to see that all British America to the
West as far as the Rocky Alountains must fall within six months. With the
West gone Lower Canada would no longer be worth holding and must speed-
ily follow.

[tains
pntier

thus

ition

the

peed-

This is what England asks of us and it is reasonable and
jnst, and I say it is most dosirabh; for tlu; Province that wo
should do it ours('lv«!s ; bucausc; it will develope the spirit
and energy of the people, and qualify us to shape and guide
the destinies of the tuture. But if we are going to be nig-
gardly and ort'er 2(),0()() men when 50,000 or more will not
be loo many for a peace establishment on the voluntary
principle, we had better do nothing and leave the future to
chance, or to Providence, or to the forbearance of our neigh-
bors. A let;blo policy would argue that we are (Mther want-
ing in will, or are deficient in resources, and the feebleness
of our preparations would be regarded as an invitation to
detach us Irom our present Imperial connection.

Yours, &c.,

Av Upper Canadian.

Quebec, 6th March, 1862.

Vllf.

OUll DEFENCES— SUGGESTIONS
ABOUT ORGANIZING OUR MILI-
TARY FORCES.

■'1

i I

■' ' i" ■

SiRj — My observations hitherto have been based mainly
on leading general principles, such as a layman might be
supposed to understand or be able to master. Although the
application, or carrying out of such principles in their work-
able details must necessarily be left to more practical and
professional men, 1 hope that the suggestions I am about to
make may advance, in some small degree, the cause which
we ought all to be sincerely desirous of aiding — namely, how
to provide the most efficient means of bringing out the mili-
tary spirit of the country, at the least cost in money. Even
though very different views, in regard to the peculiar method
or organization, may be recommended to Parliament, the ob-
servations of persons having access to common sources of
information, and having the same objects at heart, may be
of some value by affording scope for comparison. At any
rate a mere layman may hope to escape severe criticism from
those who are qualified by professional knowledge for the
exercise of higher efforts of statesmanship and for the sug-
gestion of more practical details

I have favored the volunteer principle, as being calcu-
lated to come within our means, and to develope the largest
amount of military enthusiasm as well as power in ihis
country. Others I notice, favor a small standing army for
Canada. I have seen some detailed estimates for recruiting
and maintaining such a force ; but the writers have evidently
never looked into an English blue book on this subject, as
the figures are absurdly incorrect, and below the mark.

1 shall briefly contrast the two descriptions of force.
According to the report of the Imperial commissioners of
1860, paragraph 14 the cost of raising recruits for the regular
army is £11 and cost of barracks £100 stg. per head. As labor
is dearer in Canada than in England we may fairly set down
the cost of recruiting at double this sum or at least at ^100
per man. All the Imperial barracks in the Province are
required for the Imperial troops. We should therefore have
to set to work to build for ourselves, and we cannot hope to

do so at a less cost than those built in England — say $500
per man — the first cost, therefore, for each soldier will be
$600. Then to this must be added his outfit. This, in Eng-
land is about £6 stg., covering uniform, rifle, knapsack,
cartridge box, and necessary changes of clothing. In Ca-
nada we must not count on less than $50.00 per man, in-
cluding his winter requirements and camp equipage. To
raise and equip 4000 regulars would therefore cost $2,400,-
000.

The annual cost of maintenance of British troops in
Canada, of all arms, appears from the report of the Com-
mittee of the House of Commons on Colonial Expenditure
for 1861, page 279 appendix, to be about $400 per man.

In regard to volunteers, the Imperial Commissioners
estimate such a force at only a little over one-twentieth tiiat
of regulars — as well in the organization as annually. This
of course refers only to the peace establishments ; but that is
just what this country is called on to provide. When it
comes to war England must draw her purse strings, and
take all our troops whom we are unable to keep in the field,
into her pay. But as we have not the same classes from
which to recruit our volunteer army, as the volunteer force
of England is drawn from, we must find the men else-
where. To get them elsewhere we must offer stronger in-
ducements. Instead of merely supplying a musket, or a
rifle, the Government must furnish to each man, and to each
officer, a full suit of uniform, including a winter great coat
and cap — in addition to the rifle and the officer's side-arms.
The first outfit of each volunlner may therefore be set down
at the same as for a regular — say $50. But there will be no
barracks required, and here we shall save $500 per head, as
also the bounty.

We next want to know what each volunteer will cost
per annum. This will depend on the number of days he
may be called out for continuous drill and rifle practice.
If a week were considered sufficient time and a dollar a
day — (including all arms of the service, and officers' pay,)
the wages, per capita, covering also rations, the cost per man
would be $6 a year, to which must be added $2 more for
munitions of war. Add to all these a round $100,000 a year
for the expenses of the war department and incidentals, and
we shall have a pretty fair gu ide as to comparative expenses.
Let us carry the comparison a little further and sec how the
matter will stand.

■ I

'.»■

I assume that this country ought to provide 50,000 vol-
unteers, to be organized on the best plan that can be devised
for efficiency. As there will be no bounties to be paid, the
first cost will be ^50 a head — to estimate lower, for an aver-
age of all arms, will only be to deceive. This will require
an appropriation of ^2,500,000, a sum which, a few years
ago, when railways were all the rage, would only have re-
quired the dash of the Inspector General's pen to carry
through parliament. The annual charge (at ^8 a head)
would be $500,000, the $100,000 for departmental and in-
cidental expenses being added.

It will thus be seen that the first cost of providing 60,-
000 volunteers will be less than that of raising, equiping and
housing 4,200 regulars, whilst the annual charges on the
former will be about equal to the annual maintenance of
1250 of the latter. Those who favor the establishment of u
regular force will do well to study the costliness of such a
forje.

In conclusion of these observations I shall venture to
express an opinion as to how and where the volunteer force
should be enlisted. To incur a large expenditure in raising
men on a wrong principle would be highly impolitic. Those
who may desire to enter a volunteer service should be re-
quired to hold themselves ready to march at any time they
may be called on, and to any part of the Province, and to
serve for a period of not less than a year in case of war, or
threatened invasion. Such as will not enter on those terms
(being provided with pay and rations equal to the United
States service,) are not worth having. Possibly not over
half of those now drilling in our towns and cities would be
able to leave their avocations if asked to do so.

We must therefore look to bur agricultural population
which constitutes about 80 per cent of the whole, for our
volunteer forces. It strikes me that the best mode of dis-
tributing this force would be to give to every township or
parish the right to raise a company of infantry, cavalry or
artillery, of a strengtli proportionate to its inhabitants.
Towns and cities may be better adapted to some branches
of the service. If so, let them have such branches. By this
arrangement every part of the country will have ocular de-
monstration of the result of our military organization. The
people everywhere will see that the money they are called
on to contribute is expended for the object for which it is
raised, and it will be spent equally all over the country.
Besides, it may reasonably be supposed that the presence in

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each local! :y of a company of uniformed and drilled men,
will inspire a certain degree of military spirit amongst all
classes and thus add moral weight to the organization.

To carry out this suggestion, the Province might be di-
vided into a certain number of military districts, which may
be made to correspond we will say for example, with the
48 electoral divisions of the Legislative Council, or accord-
ing to any other more convenient method. Each of these
might form the territorial limits of a regiment — and four or
five of the districts contiguous to each other, might constitute
brigade divisions. The annual trainings or week of drill
and ball practice would naturally take place at regimental
head-quarters, and the volunteers from the mere love of the
thing, and to appear in uniform would no doubt meet, with-
out pay for a few hours each month for company exercises.

Here, we are once more brought to think of the ques-
tion, what are we to do for officers ? This I have already
answered. Establish military professorships in all our high
schools and colleges, on the same principles as other pro-
fessorships, and let all who desire to obtain a military edu-
cation have a chance. If instances of professional merit are
discovered in any of the schools, let such students be pro-
moted at the public expense to a course of higher education.
In a few years we shall thus have the country filled with
competent young men to officer our volunteer army. It is
not too much to say that every township in the Province
might be able to furnish two or three, or more families pos-
sessed of the necessary means to qualify some one or more
sons for such positions. Meantime we must make the best
shifts we can. For instance, it might be made a condition
to the issuing of a commission, that the person seeking it
should attend a school of instruction, to be improvised for
the occasion at some convenient point, for a few weeks or
months.

I have now done with the subject for the present, and
shall rejoice as much as any man in the country to find,
when the Commission on Militia affairs makes its report,
that some equally good, or better and more comprehensive
scheme of organization and defence has been matured.

Yours, &;c.,

An Uppek Canadian.

Quebec, 10th March, 1862.

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ADDENDA.

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Since this pamphlet was in type the mail brings us the
unanimous resolution of the House of Commons confirming
the Recommendation of the Report of the Commissioners on
Colonial expenditure, to which the writer has so often re-
ferred. The resolution was moved by Mr. A. Mills, the
Chairman of the Commission, and is in the following words :
"That this House while fully recognizing the claims of
*' all portions of the British empire to imperial aid, in their
*' protection against perils arising from the consequences of
" imperial policy, is of opinion that colonies exercising the
" rights of self-government ought to undertake the main res-
" ponsibility of providing for their own internal order and
" security ; that such colonies ought to assist in their exter-
" nal defence ; and that^ as a rule, except in the case of great
^''fortresses, no further charge ought to he made upon the
*' imperial treasury for colonial fortifications. '*''

The italicized portion was added as an amendment by
Mr. Baxter, in order to inform the Colonies more explicitly
of the firm determination of the Imperial Governmv'nt to
carry out the recommendation of the Commissioners. Our
Legislature, can therefore have no loop-hole out of which to
escape from the necessity of providing more efficient means
of defence. It is the result of that larger degree of national
independence which mother England has devolved upon us,
and which we have no alternative but to except.

The following ex .ract from a recent number of the United
Service Magazine confirms the assumption of the writer
that the British forces, sent to aid us in case of war must
hereafter be regarded as allies and we as principals in any
such contest.

This writer says, " it is plain absolute infatuation
to ignore or blink at the fact, that either we must
keep a large army permanently in Canada, occupying
in force all the more exposed and important points, or
the Canadians themselves must entirely alter the existing
state of things, and keep up a regular army fairly propor-
tionate to the danger that menaces them. Such danger
has been arrested for the moment, but it is still there, and
in all probability will increase daily. Our utter incapor
bility of being the principals in a land defence of Canada

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" ought to be evident enough. Jf we are to be so, our 1 1,000
" men will need to be doubled or trebled very shortly."

The writer of these letters has not felt it proper to make
specific suggestions about the organization of the Militia, or
Volunteer forces of the country, or in regard to what points
ought to be fortified. To have done so, whilst two Military
Boards were in session to whom these questions have been
referred, would have been presumption. He cannot, how-
ever, allow his observations to go to press in their present
form without pointing out two indispensable objects requir-
ing the earliest attention of the Legislature. The first of
these is the establishment of a capacious graving dock at
Quebec, capable i receiving vessels as large as the War-
rior. To secure this object, important alike io the Ocean
Commerce of Canada, and in case of war, to its military se-
curity, all that is required is to afford the necessary facilities
to the Quebec Harbor Commissioners to raise a revenue, in
the same manner as is done at Montreal and indeed at every
other sea-port of any importance in America, or Europe —
that is by levying tonnage dues.

The second object, of even greater present importance,
is td push forward the completion of the Houses of Parlia-
ment at the permanent seat of government, so as to remove
all doubts on a question calculated to distract the public
mind, and weaken the national sentiment of the country.
Concurrently with the progress of these buildings, some iron
towers , or fortifications should be designed and constructed.
This might be done at a very moderate expense by buying
a few thousand tons of old railway bars, which can be had,
in any quantity at half the cost of new iron. After the ex-
perience of the Monitor and the Merrimac, it cannot be
doubted, that a few such towers mounting heavy artillery,
would defend Ottawa against any force that could be sent
against it.

Quebec, March 22, 1862.