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 LEOr©!^ 
 
 lore 
 " MOBlLI(fc'n%(?N " 
 
 OR 
 
 v%* 
 
 u 
 
 How to enable the Canadian Militia%tl| the Field." 
 
 BY 
 
 ( Professor of S^j^tsgy^ 
 
 A. XI. LEjEj, It.i^. , 
 
 Tactics, Royal Military College.) 
 
 Delivered at Autumn Militia Camps, 1896, as follows : 
 
 \ 
 
 London, Sept. 17. 
 Niagara, Sept. 18. 
 
 Kingston, Sept. 21. 
 
 St. John's, Sept. 23. 
 Laprairie, Sept. 24. 
 
 Levis, Sept. 25. 
 
V 
 
I 
 
 HEAD-QUARTERS, 
 
 Ottawa, 24th October, 1896. 
 
 This lecture is printed by order of the General 
 Officer Commanding the Militia, for the information 
 of such officeis of the Militia as were not present at 
 its delivery. 
 
 By order, 
 
'' MOBILISATION " 
 
 OB 
 
 •' HOW TO ENABLE THE CANADIAN MILITIA 
 TO TAKE THE FIELD." 
 
 The "Active Militia" of Canada, some 35,000 strong, 
 is undeniably as fine a body of men as can be found 
 anywhere in the world, and it contains within itself 
 an enormous warlike potential — if only thatpower can 
 be given full acope and be directed to the best advan- 
 tage. 
 
 Mere numbers and ill-directed valour are, however, 
 of little avail in modern warfare, and science has long 
 since taken the place of mere brute force. 
 
 To use a homely illustration, a lever has in 
 itself no special strength or virtue, but when properly 
 applied and scientifically handled it can overcome the 
 resistance of masses infinitely weightier than itself. 
 
 So with modern armies. Science, and a clear per- 
 ception of how to make the very most of the forces 
 at one's disposal, are absolutely essential to success. 
 
 The shorter and weaker the lever, the more scienti- 
 fically it has to be applied ; and the smaller and weaker 
 the army the more essential becomes the utmost 
 development of its powers. And. few will be disposed 
 to deny that the present strength of the Active Militia 
 would be found uncomfortably small if Canada were 
 unhappily engaged in the defence of her enormous 
 frontier. 
 
 But, granting our slender numbers, we can no 
 longer fall back upon the excuse of bad workmen and 
 complain of our tools, for we have the finest of 
 material in the way of men, and, thanks to the little 
 New Year's greeting that our worthy cousins across 
 the line thought fit to send us, we have — or shall 
 shortly have — the very best that science can produce 
 in the way of arms and equipment. 
 
 So the time has come, I think, for the Militia to 
 take itself more seriously, and to really consider Jioiv 
 it would prepare itself for war, if such an unpleasant, 
 but always possible, contingency should arise. 
 
6 
 
 In more precise and technical lanfjuage, the problen- 
 of " Mobilisation for War," must be thoroughly 
 worked t)Ut, and be universally understood. 
 
 " Mobilisation " is the name given to the i)roces8 
 by which an army is made vioveable, and rendered 
 ca])able of taking the field a^jainst an enemy. 
 
 As you know, the military forces of a country, in 
 peace time, are made up of a number of separate 
 units : — regiments of cavalry, batteries of artillery, 
 battalions of infantry and so on. These are scattered 
 all over the country and have no connection with 
 each other, they are kept at peace strength in men and 
 stores, they keep no camp equipment or transport in 
 their possession, and in no sense can they be said to 
 be ready for active service. 
 
 To enable any one of these units to take the field 
 as a fighting body the following 8tei)S have to be 
 taken : — 
 
 (1.) To fill up to war strength in men and horses. 
 (2.) To receive and issue to these, arms, clothing, 
 
 saddlery, &c. 
 (3.) To obtain camp equipment, ammunition, and 
 
 other war stores. 
 (4) To obtain the necessary transport for the 
 above. 
 
 This accomplished, the various units have to be 
 organized into war formations, such as brigades, 
 divisions, army corps, etc., and under this head has 
 to be included the organisation of such important 
 items as the transport, supply, medical, and ordnance 
 store services. 
 
 All the above forms the indispensable preliminary, 
 and very backbone of any strategic scheme of oper- 
 ations, and demands the most elaborate and arduous 
 preparations in time of peace. And I paiticularly 
 wish to impress upon you that the working out of a 
 scheme of mobilisation is essentially a task for peace 
 time, and as we are now, I rejoice to say, revelling in 
 unclouded peace, the moment is especially suitable 
 for attacking and mastering this vitally important 
 problem. 
 
 In case there should be any sceptics present, who 
 may suspect that I am laying undue stress on the 
 importance of mobilisation, I venture to support my 
 contention by an appeal to recent history. There is 
 nothing more convincing than history, and no more 
 
1 
 
 atrikinr; proof can be produced than that afforded by 
 the opening events of the great Franco -Prussian War 
 of 1870-71. 
 
 I do not wish to go deeply into the history of this 
 war, but we all know that the French were the agres- 
 S0T3, and, confident in their ability to win, provoked 
 the war with light hearts. 
 
 We may also remember how the French Minister of 
 War reported confidently and gaily that the French 
 Armies were ready " down to the last button on the 
 last man's gaiter," when, figuratively speaking, not 
 even the first man had any gaiters at all. 
 
 However, in July, 1870, the cry throughout France 
 was " On to Berlin," and the immediate advance of the 
 French armies across the Rhine and into Germany was 
 confidently expected not only by the French them- 
 selves but also by the rest of Europe. 
 
 But it soon became evident that for the previous 
 few years France had been steadily provoking the 
 conflict and taking no steps to prepare for it — whilst 
 Germany had as steadily been striving for peace, but 
 at the same time perfecting her military organisation 
 and making the completest preparations for the great 
 struggle, in case it should become inevitable. 
 
 The French plan of invasion, to be successful, neces- 
 sitated the French armies being ready to move several 
 days before the enemy, and it was confidently 
 expected that this would be attained by greater rapidity 
 in mobilisation. 
 
 And yet what was the true condition of the French 
 army at this crisis ? 
 
 No one will deny that it consisted of brave men, 
 but they were ill-trained, ill-disciplined, and ill-led. 
 
 One third of the officers had risen from the ranks, 
 and political influence, the greatest curse that any 
 military force can have to contend with, had filled 
 most of the higher ranks with worthless place-seekers. 
 
 The General Staff was ignorant, and contemptuous 
 of its enemy, tliis last always a bad fault. 
 
 There was no clothing, equipment, or arms ready 
 for the reserves, and owing to the fundamental error 
 of *' over-centralisation" the great depots were hope- 
 lessly blocked, and a proper distribution of even such 
 stores as :vere available became impossible. 
 
 There was an absolute lack of system and organisa- 
 tion, and at the outbreak of hostilities almost two 
 thirds of the regiments found themselves at a distance 
 
8 
 
 from their flei)ots and their raobilisfttioii hampered at 
 every turn. 
 
 There was a jtitiable lack of transport, and the 
 waj^ons necessary foi' mobilisation, being acciiniiilftted 
 only at the great depots, retarded the mobilisation of 
 the army for several weeks by the lateness of their 
 arrival. 
 
 The railways also were used without order or 
 method and endless confusion resulted. The roaila 
 weje blocked, troops were sent to the wrong concen- 
 tration j)laces and were wandering aimlessly over the 
 country ; reserve men kr]»t pouring in, some without 
 uniform, some without arms, and horses, wagons, and 
 staff were all wanting. The artillery was short of 
 reserve ammunition ; the Sujjply Department, never 
 ])ro])erly organised, was in a condition of paralysis, 
 and the troops were i-oon actually starving ; maps 
 were served out to the officers, but mai)s of Germany 
 only which country none of the French ever sav/ 
 except as prisoners ; and the universal confusion and 
 total unpreparedness for war soon became so obvious 
 that all idea of any forward movenient had to be 
 abandoned. 
 
 So much for the French mobilisation ! 
 
 Let us contrast with it the German arrangements. ^ 
 
 Besides the preparation of comprehensive strategic 
 plans to meet any possible action on the part of the 
 French, a vast and elaborate mobilisation scheme had 
 been drawn up years before by Von Moltke, and was 
 now put into operation with unerring certainty and 
 smoothness. 
 
 Both officers and men were well equipped and 
 highly trained, and the staff was thoroughly com- 
 petent. 
 
 The German system, in contrast to the French, was 
 essentially one oi de-centralisation, and each army corps 
 was assembled simultaneously in its own territorial 
 district, complete in men and stores, and with its own 
 staff. 
 
 Each corps, when ready to advance, was then moved 
 to the frontier by its own separate line of railway, 
 and this same railway was afterwards used to bring up 
 supplies, re-inforcements (Sec, direct to the corps from 
 its own home district. 
 
 Thus the burden of supplying the armies was 
 distributed over the whole of Germany and the strain 
 '^'as very light in consequence. 
 
9 
 
 ^ 
 
 In France, on th^ other hand, the supplies had all 
 been collected in a f 3W great depots, and whilst the 
 French railways were scenes oi hopeless disorder, 
 obstruction and purposeless movements, those of 
 Germany were acting with the unity and certainty of 
 full rivers flowing onward to the sea. 
 
 To give an idea of the minuteness of the German 
 preparations, I may state that time-tables indicating 
 the day and hour for the departure and arrival of 
 every regiment had been drawn up years before, and 
 when war was declared all that was necessary to set 
 the immense machine in motion was the telegraphing 
 to each military centre of the one word "Mobilise." 
 
 And the result showed the perfection of the German 
 plans, for in exactly one week the mobilisation of the 
 vast host of nearly half a million men was complete 
 in every detail, and in seventeen days from the decla- 
 ration of war the three great German armies were 
 actually concentrated, across the Rhine, and ready to 
 advance into French territory. 
 
 What followed is well known— the absolute down- 
 fall of a mighty nation — and the French paid dearly 
 for their over-confidence and lack of preparation. 
 
 And the moral is obvious. In modern warfare a 
 campaign cannot he rapidly opened or pushed to a success- 
 ful conclusion, unless complete mobilisation schemes and 
 plans of operation are drawn up and practised beforehand. 
 
 Having thus, I hope, impressed upon you the vital 
 importance of this question of mobilisation, and 
 indicated roughly what it implies, let us now turn to 
 the consideration of our ovm needs, and consider step 
 by step how we should set about mobilising our own 
 little army—" The Active Militia " of Canada. 
 
 The foundation of any scheme of mobilisation is of 
 course the strategic scheme of operations which it is 
 proposed to undertake in case of war. 
 
 Such strategic schemes are drawn up to meet all 
 possible contingencies, such as the defence of im- 
 portant points along one's own frontier, or con- 
 templated invasions of the enemy's territory. 
 
 For obvious reasons, however, all such schemes 
 must be kept strictly secret and be known only to the 
 chief military advisers of the Government, but in any 
 scheme of operations the mobilisation principles will 
 be the same, and we can discuss the general course of 
 procedure quite efficiently without pre-supposing any 
 particular emergency. 
 
10 
 
 The main idea is that in any given strategic scheme 
 the Militia available is divided up into divisions, 
 brigades, garrisons or detachments, each with a 
 definitely allotted place of concentration, and that 
 these divisions, brigades, etc., will be collected at 
 their respective concentration stations as rapidly as 
 possible, there to be welded into ])erfect shape, com- 
 plete with staff, equipment and transport, ready to 
 meet the enemy as soon as may be necessary. 
 
 But before this main distribution, or rather col- 
 lection, can be arrived at, a vast amount of work has 
 to be done. 
 
 Our squadrons, batteries, and battalions are scat- 
 tered all over the country, and though they would be 
 moved about as little as possible, they have, anyhow, 
 to be collected in one or two big centres, and this 
 speedily and without fuss or confusion. 
 
 The great question for us to consider, therefore, is 
 how can this best be jne ? 
 
 I will endeavour to give you the outlines (and I 
 regret that time will permit of nothing beyond 
 outlines), of a plan which is in general accordance 
 with the latest Europtan ideas, though modified to 
 suit Canadian conditions. You are all, however, pro- 
 bably far more familiar with these local conditions 
 than I am, and therefore I only offer my opinions for 
 what they are worth and am particularly anxious that, 
 as soon as the lecture is over, any officer shall criticise 
 any point that strikes him as unworkable, or ask any 
 questions, so that we may elicit a discussion, and by 
 that means get at the real root of the matter. 
 
 Let us commence at the very beginning and con- 
 sider the case of each separate unit, battalion, bat- 
 tery, or whatever it may be. 
 
 As soon as war appears to be imminent efforts should 
 be made to bring up the numbers of the unit to war 
 strength by recruiting, locally, men who are fit and 
 ready to serve. 
 
 In most cases in this country there will probably be, 
 in the neighbourhood of each company or regimental 
 head-quarters, a sufficient number of men who have 
 already served, and who would be willing to rejoin. 
 And such men, of course, being old soldiers, would 
 generally be preferable to raw recruits. 
 
 To save trouble in hunting up suitable men I would 
 suggest that the commanding officer of each company, 
 
 I 
 
11 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 troop, or battery should keep during peace-time a 
 " War-Service Roll," somewhat as follows : — 
 
 War Service Roll of No. 3 Company, I50th Battalion. 
 
 In the event of the Militia being called out for the 
 defence of Canada, I undertake to serve in No 3 Com- 
 pany, 150th Battalion. 
 
 Rank. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Address. 
 
 Signature. 
 
 Corporal 
 
 T. Atkins .... 
 
 P. 0. London . 
 
 Thomas Atkins. 
 
 
 • • • • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Then if occasion should arise a commanding officer 
 would probably be able to lay his hand upon as many 
 men as he needed at short notice. 
 
 And these men, on being notified by him, would 
 join their companies at head quarters and would 
 there have to be provided with a complete set of 
 uniform, arms and equipment. 
 
 The commanding officer of each company should 
 therefore be supplied with, and have always in hand, 
 a stock of the above sufficient to complete his com- 
 pany to war strength, as it is no good enlisting men 
 if you cannot equii) them. 
 
 Every man, including those already serving, will 
 also have to be furnished with various articles which 
 are required in war but not in peace. Besides arms and 
 equipment each man should be provided with the 
 " necessaries " set forth in Table I. 
 
 These necessaries would, in this country, probably 
 have to be purchased locally, and I am not sure that 
 the best way would not be for each man to procure 
 them for himself, on the understanding that he will 
 be given a reasonable allowance (say $3j upon his kit 
 passing a satisfactory inspection by his commanding 
 officer. 
 
 Besides this equipment of the man, the unit itself 
 now requires its own regimental equipment of many 
 
12 
 
 articles which are necessary to enable it to move and 
 fiKht, but which are in no way personal to the indivi- 
 dual soldier. 
 
 Such stores are divided into two classes, styled res- 
 pectively the First Regimental Equipmmt and the 
 Second Regimental Equipment. 
 
 At first sight the simplest plan would seem to be to 
 keep, during peace-time, all the stores required for 
 war ; at the head-quarters of each unit, so that they 
 could be ready for issue whenever required. But this 
 is not possible for two reasons : — 
 
 Fi/rst. — On account of the expense. 
 
 Large store-houses would have to be built at each 
 regimental head-([uarters, store-keepers would have 
 to be permanently paid and a great maps of stores, 
 wagons, &c., would have to be purchased and laid by 
 idle. In the present state of our finances this would 
 not be justifiable. 
 
 Secondly. — If war should break out, there would be 
 quite sufficient confusion and blockade upon the rail- 
 ways, without re(iuiring them to transport, unnecess- 
 arily, huge masses of stores from various parts of the 
 country to the " concentration places." 
 
 Therefore onl}-' such articles and supplies as are 
 immediately required i.e. the "First Regimental Equip- 
 ment," should be collected at the regimental head- 
 quarters, and the bulkier articles, and those which 
 would not be wanted until the unit actually took the 
 field, i.e. the " Second Regimental Equipment," should 
 be collected at the " Concentration Stations " by the 
 district staffs. 
 
 The "First Regimental Equipment " consists chiefly 
 of cooking utensils, butchery implements, intrenching 
 tools. Artillery ammunition, etc., and the vehicles in 
 which these are carried. (For detailed list see 
 Table II.) 
 
 This equi])ment would have to be purchased locally 
 by officers commanding units (not companies or 
 troops), on the receipt of the order to mobilise, and to 
 this end financial authority would have to be fur- 
 nished them bv the Militia Department, through the 
 D.O.C. of the District. 
 
 The Transport, however, will probably all be hired, 
 and Officers (Ilommanding should make it their business 
 during peace time to look around and keep a list of suffi- 
 cient vehicles, with both horses and drivers, that would 
 be immediately available in case of necessity. In fact 
 
 
13 
 
 they might make some kind of conditional contract 
 with local owners of transport and shopkeepers to 
 furnish this " First Regimental Equipment " in case of 
 war. A little previous understanding of this kind 
 would save a great deal of confusion afterwards. 
 
 The " Second Regimental Equipment " consists 
 chiefly of the mobilisation supply of ammunition, 
 tents and blankets, and supply and ambulance 
 wagons. 
 
 (For detailed list see Tnhle ITT.) 
 
 This e([uipment would have to be collected at the 
 main "Concentration Stations " by the officers com- 
 manding those stations and their staff. 
 
 It is presumed that the ammuniiion, tents and 
 blankets will be already permanently stored at these 
 Concentration Stations, and that all the District 
 Officer Commanding mil have to do will be to dis- 
 tribute them to the advanced purties of the various 
 units as they arrive. 
 
 The question of transport, however, remains, and as 
 usual it is the most difficult one. 
 
 The only solution I can see of the matter is this. 
 District Officers Commanding should be furnished, in 
 
 Eeace-time, with tables showing the exact number of 
 orses and vehicles (including horses for divisional 
 and brigade staffs), that would be required at each 
 concentration station in case of war. With this list 
 1o guide him, the District Officer Commanding should 
 prepare and keep a register of such horses and vehicles 
 as would be readily available in case of need. (lu 
 order to meet all possible demands he should allow a 
 margin of at least 50 per cent). 
 
 To assist him in carrying out this very important 
 duty, I am strongly of the opinion that each District 
 Officer Commanding should have permanently attached 
 to his staff an officer, to be called the " District Trans- 
 port Officer," who would be responsible for the proper 
 registration and conditional engagement of all neces- 
 sary and suitable transport, as previously detailed. 
 (Horses should be separately classified as "riding" 
 or "draught "). 
 
 So much for the preliminary arrangements in time 
 of peace, as far as we are concerned. Much more 
 remains to be done, however, at Militia Head- 
 Quarters, notably the preparation of detailed lists 
 showing the composition of the various divisions, 
 brigades, and detachments, anu the names of the 
 officers selected for their staffs. 
 
 
14 
 
 This work, however, like the plan of campaign, is 
 essentially the province of the chief military advisers 
 of the Government, and for many and ohvious reasons 
 would be kept confidential till the last moment. 
 
 Let us now suppose that all the foregoing having 
 been long worked out in time of peace, an emergency 
 should arise, and the order to " Mobilise for war," 
 should be telegraphed from Ottawa. 
 
 This order would be sent direct to officers com- 
 manding districts by the Adjutant General, who 
 would at the same time despatch the already prepared 
 and detailed tables of the exact distribution in the 
 mobilisation scheme of each unit in the respective 
 districts. These tables would also include full details 
 of such divisions, brigades, etc., as had to be formed, 
 together with their staffs. 
 
 Officers_ commanding districts, on receipt of the 
 telegraphic order to mobilise would immediately 
 notify officers commanding units by wire, and at once 
 set about the collection and distribution of the 
 "becond Regimental Equipment," and the arrange- 
 ment of the camps or cantonments. 
 
 We will now pass on to uyiits and first consider the 
 case of a City Corps. 
 
 On receipt from the District Officer Commanding, of 
 the order to mobilise, the officer commanding would 
 at once : — 
 
 (1.) Inform all officers and men, and recruit up 
 to war strength. 
 
 (2.) Arrange for a medical inspection of both 
 officers and men. (The services of any who are 
 found to e medically unfit to be at once dis- 
 pensed with). 
 
 (3.) Arrange for receiving, and accommodating in 
 tents, hired buildings, or billets, men as they 
 join. (Company officers would of course see 
 that their men are supplied with " necessaries "). 
 
 (4.) Collect the " First Regimental Equipment " 
 and its transport, detailing a horse party and a 
 subaltern officer as " regimental transport 
 officer " to see after the collection of the necess- 
 ary horses and vehides, and to allot the same 
 for the various services required. 
 
 (5.) Detail, and despatch to the " Concentration 
 Station," the " advanced party " to draw the 
 " Second Regimental Equipment " from the 
 
15 
 
 District Officer Commanding and to have it 
 ready for the unit on arrival. 
 
 (6.) Engage, or arrange for, the railroad or other 
 transport for the unit, complete with its " First 
 Regimental Equipmeot," to the " Concentra- 
 tion Station." 
 
 (7.) As soon as the unit is ready to start telegraph 
 the fact to the District Officer Commanding. 
 
 (8.) Proceed with the unit to the "Concentration 
 Station " and be there joined by the " advanced 
 party " who will have collected the " Second 
 Eegimental Equipment," and probably also- 
 pitched tlie camp. 
 
 The mobilisation of that unit would then be com- 
 plete. 
 
 In the case of rural corps, the duties of officers 
 commanding would be practically the same, except 
 that each troop or company would be assembled and 
 supplied with its personal outfit at the troop or com- 
 pany head-quarters. 
 
 As soon as this is effected, the troop or company 
 would proceed to the regimental head-quarters with 
 the least possible delay, and there receive its " First 
 Regimental Equipment." (In very exceptional cases, 
 troops or companies might be detailed for detached 
 duty, or to proceed direct to the concentration station, 
 without previously joining at the regimental head- 
 quarters, but this should alwaj'S be avoided if pos- 
 sible.) 
 
 In the case of artillery batteries, as they have the 
 larger proportion of their ammunition always with 
 them, no transport will have to be collected for them 
 at the concentration stations beyond what is needed 
 for the extra mobilisation ammunition. 
 
 On leaving its regimental head-quarters each unit 
 would come under the immediate orders of the officer 
 commanding the brigade, detachment, or other for- 
 mation to which it is allotted in the mobilisation 
 detail. 
 
 The problem of transport is, as I have said before, 
 the most difficult and unsctisfactory one, and would 
 in most cases have to be a' ^. ed locally. 
 
 In the English service, as in most modern armies, 
 regular military wagons are kept always ready in 
 store, and are specially designed for the stores they 
 have to carry. Such wagons are known as " general 
 service," " artillery," " S.A.A." &c. 
 
16 
 
 In this country, however, economy prohihits the 
 provision and collection of .such s]iecial transj)ort, in 
 time of peace, and when an emer},'ency arises we shall 
 have to use just such wagons as can he locally pro- 
 cured. It seems to me, liowcvcr, that the ordinary 
 four- wheel wagon of the country with two horses should 
 be easily adaptable to almost all needs, and has a good 
 capacity, (some 2,000 pounds.) This is a point, how- 
 ever, where local knowledge is of especial value, and 
 I should be glad to elicit opinions as to the anost 
 suitable wagons that can be easily procured. 
 
 In fact any expressions of opinion on the question 
 of transport, probable rates of hire, &c,, will be very 
 welcome, as my one object is to net at the actual 
 truth. And in view of the fact that we are more than 
 likely to be short of regular artillery ammunition 
 wagons, I should be specially glad to know if artil- 
 lery officers are agreed as to the best type of wagon 
 to carry their heavy ammunition. 
 
 With reference to the horses required, I understand 
 there would be no difficulty about hiring as many as 
 would be necessary, but in England this is far from 
 being the case. There, a method has been introduced, 
 with success, of paying a small annual retaining fee 
 to horse-owners, who then bind themselves by con- 
 tract to sell the necessary horses at a fixed rate in case 
 of war. There would probably be financial objec- 
 tions, however, to buch a plan in this country. 
 
 One point I have not touched U])on yet is the ques- 
 tion of recruiting during the actual progress of hosti- 
 lities, to meet wastage and to keep the regiments at 
 the front up to strength. 
 
 A large number of recruits would be continually 
 required, but there should be no difficulty about 
 getting them, as miblic enthusiasm is usually stirred 
 up during a national campaign and. the best of the 
 youth of the country would probably flock to the 
 colors. 
 
 The question then arises : where should they flock 
 to, and how are they to be equipped and trained 
 after they have flocked ? 
 
 In England this training is all done by the per- 
 manent instructional slaif at the various regimental 
 depots, but there is, of course, nothing corresponding 
 to these at the regimental head-quarters in this 
 country. 
 
 The only feasible plan appears to be to constitute 
 the present permanent corps statioris as recruiting cen- 
 
17 
 
 tres, and to accept only such men as present them- 
 selves there. 
 
 An instructional staff of officers and non-commis- 
 sioned officers would then have to be detailed from 
 the Permanent Corps to train the recruits as they 
 came in, and although this duty might not be so 
 popular or exciting as fighting at the front, it would 
 be one of the most important and responsible that an 
 officer could be called upon to perform. 
 
 Large reserves of clothing, arms, and equipment 
 would have to be accui lulated at these recruiting 
 centres, and be kept at sufficient strength to meet all 
 possible demtnds. 
 
 In the case of Infantry depots, the recruits would 
 probably be formed into a " depot battalion " so as to 
 receive a proper regimental training, and every effort 
 would have to be made by the depot staff to equip 
 men, and teach them the use of the rifle and the 
 elements of drill, as rapidly as possible. Then as the 
 campaign progressed, and as demands came from the 
 front for fresh men, the best would be selected and 
 sent forward as required. 
 
 I have now indicated, briefly and in outline, how 
 the mobilisation and concentration of individual 
 units would be carried out, and that is as far as it is 
 necessary for us to follow the subject at present, as it 
 is all that directly concerns regimental officers. 
 
 It must not be sujiposed, however, that what I have 
 described completes the mobilisation of an army. 
 ^ The great questions still remain of forming divi- 
 sional and brigade staffs, ammunition columns, bearer 
 companies^ and field hospitals, supply and ordnance 
 store services, remount centres, military police, and 
 other very large and important items. These, how- 
 ever, are more the concern of the Head-Quarters 
 Staff, and in any case are far to^ comidicated and 
 lengthy to be dealt with in a lecti .e of this nature. 
 
 What I wish to particularly impress upon you is 
 that the vital essence of ar/ mobilisation scheme will 
 be the practical details as carried out by officers com- 
 manding units, and I cannot too strongly impress upon 
 them the enormous importance of the subjects which 
 I hav'j endeavoured to outline this evening. 
 
 Every officer should endeavour to picture in his 
 niind all the little details and difficulties which are so 
 inseparably connected with the mobilisation of even a 
 company of infantry, and to grapple with and work 
 
18 
 
 them out for his own command, noic, in time of peace. 
 Otherwise there will be inevitable confusion when war 
 breaks out, and when weighed in the balance he will 
 be found wanting. 
 
 In case Canada should be unfortunately involved in 
 a contest with her great neighbour to the South, her 
 chief military advantage would lie in the possibility 
 of swifter mobilisation. 
 
 And this possibility is based upon the fact that the 
 Canadian Militia is a homogeneous force, uniformly 
 armed and equipped, and under the control of one 
 central authority. 
 
 In the United States this is, as you know, very far 
 from being the case, and this fact makes up very 
 largely for our inferior numbers ; and it now lies in 
 your nands whether this great national advantage 
 shall be thrown away or retained and made the 
 most of. 
 
 And for my concluding word let me repeat once 
 more, and with all earnestness, the apparent truism : 
 
 " To be successful in war you must organise in 
 peace." 
 
 >> 
 
 ARTHUR H. LEE, 
 
 Captain, R.A. 
 
 i 
 
19 
 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 enable unit8 to takra m ll '*;i"*^>,°^^^««a^y to 
 detail., if required are to tj ^^' -^'^f ^"^"'her 
 ment Regulations." ' ^^""^'^ ^^ the " Eciuip. 
 
 TABLE I. 
 
 "Necessaries," to be provided for each man. 
 1 pair canvas shoes. i nah^ e 
 
 extra ,>air of socks. comb "'^• 
 
 1 f-ei or flannelette shirt. \ ^e pot. 
 
 1 kmfe, fork and spoon. 
 
 TABLE IL 
 
 "First Regimental Equipment." 
 Cooking utensils ;— 
 
 Butchery implements :— 
 
 Tenon saws, *n , . ,. 
 
 Meat choppers, *.? P^"" l^attahon. 
 
 Butcher's knives (cutting) *2 
 
 p ^ , do (flaying),' *2 
 
 Butcher's steels, "^ ^'^' 4 
 
 ^teel-yards, ^ 
 
 Dressing hooks, #« 
 
 f%-D> 1 o ao 
 
 halVtL',eTSeS"uffll'f'"'-^ ''''"-- one. 
 
 Intrenching tools, etc •— 
 
 (Artillery batteries only ) 4rnrnnr.,-f 
 of 160 rounds per ann /t^^JJ^^ition at the rate 
 
 sary wagons to^cafry'sail!*^?^ w th the neces- 
 possession of batterTes! ' ''''^ ^^'^^^^ ^^ 
 
 do 
 do 
 do 
 do 
 do 
 do 
 
so 
 
 TABLE III. 
 
 "Second Regimental Equipment." 
 
 Mobilisation ammunition : — 
 
 At the rate of 185 rounds per rifle, Infantry. 
 
 do 80 do per carbine, Cavalry. 
 
 do 140 do per gun. Artillery. 
 
 (In addition to the 160 ])oundspergun in possession 
 of batteries). 
 
 Tents: — 1 per officer, 1 per 12 men. 
 
 Blankets or Rubber Sheets : — I ])er man. 
 
 Ammunition carts : — 
 
 2 per battalion, Infantry. 
 I per regiment, Cavalry. 
 
 Wagons : — 
 
 (Supply and ambulance), 4 per battalion, Infantry, 
 do 3 per regiment. Cavalry, 
 
 do 2 per Field Battery. 
 
 Water Carts : — 1 per unit.