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'ts» Condii<5t of the M — — rs in Alliances, Fleets, and Armies, fince the firfl Differences on the Ohioj to the taking of Minorca by the French, Jocerne tecum per littoras? cl-ueni viehercule non puto effe, qui tempo- ribus his riJere pojjit ; it a f tint omnia debilitata jam prope et extinfla, Cicero. LONDON: f Prinrcl for M. Qollkr, Bookfcller at the Rn\^al Exchange. * M D C C I. V T. r^ ^M I, LETTER TO THE People of *ij LETTER IV. AT length the long predifted confequences and fa- tal cffedts of m 1 mifconduft, fo much derid- ed by thofe who gave and thofe who received the wages of iniquity, are become too alarming to be de- nied by the moft hardy and inured to that pernicious practice. Even thofe who traffic in your undoing, acquiefcein this truth, and prefume to vindicate themfelves by af- lerting ye were found undone, when the ad n was delivered into their hands, and that no remedy has fuf- ficient efficacy to fave you from perdition. The dire dilemma into which ye are brought, your diftreflfed fituation, the loads of accumulated taxes, the diminution of trade, the negle£l of Englijh welfare, the attention to Germanic interelts, the rehances on foreign mercenaries, and contempt of Britijh fubje£ls fcr the de- fence of this ifland, the whole conduct of affairs, both at home and abroad, in Europe :ind America, and that defpi- cable appearance to which ye are reduced in the fight of every nation upon earth, render this too vifible to every eye the leaQ. inquifiiive, and too afflicting to ever)' heart not yet transformed to done by the long praftice of plun- dering its native land. In I H A To ^l^^-- ia^-*iimJr / '^-^fm^^m' 7 ( To avoid all nppci\rance of inllammntory rleclamation, and filencc the delamatory tongues of all who fliarc their country's fpoils, who affcrt that every attempt to eman- cipate you fromyour evils, is a malignant dcfi^n to depre- ciate the m -y ; Ictus impartially recall to your eyes the molt material articles of ihc ad n, fince the commencemcnc of diifcrcnces between tlie Biil^Po and French fubjc»5ls on the banks of ti.e river Ohio. In this place, the more efTcftually to lay before you the real caules of this war, it will be neceflary to lead you back to a tranfa^lion not fufiicienily known by all of you, which pafled between the m y o? Frame and England, In the year 1750, or 1751, fome y/wifnV.^;? traders, fubjcds of the king of Great Britain, travelled to the borders of the Ohio, to traffic with the natives of thole parts. This being known to the C^Kddir.n Ficnch, mef- icngers were difpatched to acquaint them, that unlef? they withdrew from their maflcr's territories, their ef- fects would be confifcatcd, and themfelves carried to prilbn at ^tiekc. This mefTage the traders thought fit to obey, and withdrew in conlequence of it. The luccccding feafbn, another company of Britijfi fubjcfts came to trade on the Ohio, and not withdrawing on a like mefHigc with the former, their goods were confikated, and themfelves carried prifoners to ^ichec^ from wlience they were brought to Rochclle in France, and fiiil detained in prifcn. Not confdous of having vi- olated the laws of nations, or traded on any ground to which the king of Great Britain had not an undoubted right, they remonflrated to the B — ' — -Jh m — -y, infifl- cd upon being claimed as B -Jh fubjefts, and ho- nourably diicharged from prifon, as perlons unoffending the laws of nations-, nay, they entertained the honour- able hopes of Eiiglijljmen^ that the m y of £ d would not ccafe to demand an indemnification for the lofs of that merchandize which had been unjuflly taken from them, and rcparatioii for the infult and long im- prifonment of their perfons \ expectations becoming mer\ vv ho value their liberties, properties, and nation's ho- nour J ™ £1 atl tc tl] nl tH fci o^ oil \\ fni ^mmmmm 1 ^,,^|^^^^ mm nation, c their eman- (fcprc- eycs ! the (h and ™ ( 3. > nour. In this they were deceived : the true fpirit of iui liyi — (}j ni r no Ioniser dwelt ainongrt usj thcamli — r at Paris^ inltead oF dcmamlins tliefc fubjccls of his ma(- tcr, as men iinjuftly held in prilon, and reparation for the injuries they had received, was ordered by the m y to follicit, as a favour froti the court iii' France^ the dilcharge of them only, acknowledging their of- fence. Were not your f n's rights, and your own privileges flian-icfully given up? Were not the lands on the Ohio confclled to belong to the king of France? Were not the French ]\^{{\{^CL\ in imprifoning your fcllovv fubjc^ts, and confifcaring their efTects, by this tame be- haviour of the B -Jh m r? After this daftardly concefTion in thofe whofc duty ic is to defend your privileges, can it be a wonder, that that country was claimed by the French as their own, or that they began to build forts and block-houles to fecure the trade, and afcertain the property of it ? Little as this tranfaftion was known or attended to in E d, the taking poIIefTion in this manner of the fron- tiers of ^/'r^/'«w, alarmed the people of that province i in confequencc of which Mr. IVaJhinglon attacked them in thofe parts, and was defeated. It feems, however, that before this timid acquiefcence of the B — (h m r, in thus acknowledging that part of yf a to be the property oi France^ he had grant- ed the lands on the Ohio to a quaker of the city of Lon- don^ and his aflbciate?. Thus caught between the king of France and a qua- ker, like the mariners of old between Scyiia and Cha- rybdis, he became unequal to the dangers and difticulty of theftcerage, and fell into great embarralTments. He now perceived, that though he had pufdanimouf- ly given up to enemies his malter*s rights and your pri- vileges, that iht French miniffcr, tenacious of both, and his own honour, could not be negociated into recedinir from what had been granted him : he perceived alfo, that the quaker, fortified by a pertinacious adherence to his own intcrelt, could not be ibothcd into relinquidiing the grant which had been made him. Jf the French A 2 monarctx \i -..^ ( 4 ) monarch was backed by the arm of flcdi, and 200,000 men to fupport his claim to the Ohio^ the qiiakcr was fuftuincd in l\is by the fpirit of obftinacy, and intercft of the legion of I'edarics. On one fide a Frtnch invafion and a war filled the m r with horrid apprciicnfions ; on the other, he was greatly dilquieted, Icit, by the defcrt- ing the quaker, he fliould oncnd the money-jobbers of the city, and be unuble to raife the lupplies. I o lirengtlien this dilemma of tho m r, there was added to the inluperable propenlity in a quaker of never relinquifhing an advantage, a iecondary motive, which probably at that time elcaped the fliarp-fighicd ken of our m 1 Lynccus. The grant of the Ohio, however great it might be conceived, was a dillant and proble- matical advantage only •, a war on the continent o^ Ame- rica was a prelent and pofitive one, as the remittances to the armies in thole parts, an objcfl of great gain, would pal's through his hands, and by means of this money lent to America, his debtors in that country woukl be enabled to difcharge thofe debts, which othcrwife he entertained but little hopes of receiving. Urged by thefe motives, this ion of mceknefs and re- fignation prefTed the m r to fend thole fubjeffs, whofe loyalty to their king, and love to their country, are above all fear of danger, to facrificc their lives in reco- vering the lands of men whofe principles will not per- mit them to defend the caufe, or fight the battles of their king or country. Thus, nt firft, the want of fpirit in the m r, to vindicate his f n's rights and fubje^ls privileges, timidly befeeching as a favour, what he had a right to demand injuflice from the French, has given that nation a better foundation to the claim of the Ohio. And, laftly, the dread of being deferted by money-job- bers and le£iaries, has prevailed over the terror of the Frmch arms, and induced him to attempt recovering by force, what he had renounced by conccfTion : happy that nation which is deflined to the a -*— — . — n of fuch con- fillent m ■ rs. 4 ha^ in nf^ mi^ of rcl th( ccl ,j& If m If it be asked, whence it comes to pafs, that this be- haviour of ilic B — -/h m— — r has never been mentioned in the Fremh memorials relative to the difputes in Ame- rtca, it may be anlwercd, with truth, that tlie Ftencb minifhy perfcftlv knew, that this ceding the territories of Englan>\ by the timidity of the m - r, was no legal reiinquifliing the h — (h right to thcfe lands, and that the K — g and people would never acquielce in this con- ccirion. They therefore made no public ufe of this argument, referving it only between the B — jk m r and them* fclves, Icfl: a public declaration of this affair might re- move him from the ati n, and the French mo- narch lofe an ally of greater confcquence to his fuccc^c than any potentate in Europe:, for what can impart fuc'i ftrength to an enemy, as the want of courage and capa- city in the man who oppofes him ? The French m y had proved in a former war, and by long experience in peace, the inconfiftency, inabili- ty, and timidity of this man. To thefe they were great- ly indebted for their fuccefs in the late war •, on his dif- pofitions and capacity they prcfumed to encroach upon us during peace; on the fame qualities they promiled themlelves the like advantages for the future. To difco- ver his timid and abfurd behaviour was to rifque his re- moval, a., event to be dreaded by all French fubjc^s. They concluded, p'irhaps too raflily, th"t as no nation ever had furniQied two m— - — rs, fucceedmg each other, fo unequal to the tafk of governing as this man, that there- fore no nation could; and in confequence of this man- ner of thinking, fecreted this behaviour with refpciH: to the Ohio^ and chofc rather to make Nova Scotia the ob- jeft of the quarrel to the public. This they determined to luftain by arms, when they found themlelves defeat- ed in argument. After a mod gracious fpeech from the throne at the be- ginning of the felTion, when all was gentle and pacific, on ^uefdaythe 2 ^ihof March 17^$, the fcenefuddenly changes, war becomes the uni\'^rfal ccnverfation, and a meflage was lent from his m'«*-«— y to both houfes, importing that the i 7 the prefcnt finiation of affairs rcqulrcil an aucjmcntarioii of his forces by (ca aiul land, to defend hi'-, jull rights in ^merica<, and repel whatever attempts miglic be made a- gainfl his kimrdoms ; not doubting but liis faithful p 1 would enable him to make luch augmentations as the c- mergency of affairs fhould require. To this mefTagc both houfes prefcntcd very loyal ad- drefles, expreHlng their utmoft zeal and affedlion (or his majcfty's royal perfon, family, and government, alTuring him of a ready compliance in fupporting him to repel all attempts which may be made to dilturb, orde^.avc him of his kingdoms. Let us now fee what provifion has been made in defence of all parts of his m y's dominions by his ni r, in confequencc of this refblution of hoftilities. Mr Brad- {Jock had been jufl: fcnt to Virginia with Englifn forces ; the fatal efTefts of that expedition, the weaknefs of the defign, and ineffeftual execution of it, have already been been laid before you. The defeat of that officer being accompanied with his death, a miftakc, not inferior to the fird choice of this commander, was difcovcred to every eye; it feems there was no officer amongft the remaining military force which had been fent to America, equal to a command of fuch oon- fcquence. The m r then, who planned this expedition, mufl have concluded that Mr Braddock was both invincible and immortal; otherwife, as a difeafe might defeat all the fuccefs which the greatefl courage, prudence, and capacity might atchieve, and the Fr^^^ arms prevail by the lofs of a general whom death only could conquer, he would have fent a fecond, equal to the task of com- manding an army. My realbn for faying this, is, that when opportunity had proved, contrary to m 1 wii- dom, that this general was neither invincible nor im- mortal, the command did not devolve on any officer fent from hence with Mr. Braddock. Now to me it feems, that nothing can be a more con- vincing proof of the m r*s imagining Mr Braddock fuperior to death and defeat, and of the fuppoied kifuf- ficiency :i i C 7 ) ficicncy of all the officers who accompanied him, than the coiiimaiul in cliief flilling on g 1 S y. This pcntlcman hail been bred at the bar, and was grown old in the praftice of it; by unforfecn accidents he at lad became g r of a province in New Eng- land ; he had never been ptcfcnt at fiegc or battle, and liis talents, however nicely adapted to his profeffion of the law, and other departments of a g r, promil'ed but little f'uccefs in the management of military afl'airs, being by nature flow, diffident, and inert. Him, not- withlianding, the E — -//j m -r fclefled to command the king's armies in Jmerica, accompanied with the ap- pointments and piyof the late duke of Marlborough. It is remarkable alfo, that the m 1 choice falling on this gentleman, proved a more favourable circum- llance to our enemies, than could have happened in the appointing of any other American governor. What a Jurprifing genius for deviating from the right, is this na- tion blelt with in a m r! The character of every other governor In America be- inc; unknown to the French court, whoever befides h«d been appointed g ], they might probably have con- cluded, that as he ought to be, lb he was, equal to the command of an army. This would, a: leaf^, have made our enemies lefs languine in their hopes of fuccefs ; but Nlr iS y was as well known al Paris, where he refid* ed a long while com y for fettling Nova Scotia, as in London ; fb that the French miniflry being perfectly ac- quainted with his talents, the apprehenfions of danger from fuch a commander, were but little in their minds, or in thole who vixre to oppofc iiim. Nay, lb full were the Parifians, on the newo of his being appointed commander in chief in Ameiica^ that the firlt (alutation amongft thofe who were acquainted with him was, ^e penjez vous monfteur, le minijlre d* An- gle terre a nomme noire ami monfieur S '■j general des armiesi du roy en Amerique, Notwithflanding this appellation of friend by the French, I am convmccd it did not arife from any pre- vailing inclination imagi xd in g 1 $ -y towards \ w h T I w '( 8 ) that nation ; nor would I be thought to blame him for accepting this pofl:, lb honourable and lucrative; to have reFufed it, would have been an unexampled inftance of felf-denial ; an expectation not founded in the nature of man: nothing is more natural than to imagine ourlclvcs equal to every undertaking which our fuperiors conceive us io be ; without this prevalent and encouraging fclf- opinion, the m r muft have long fmce refigncd his charge. In confequence of being dcftined to the chief com- miind, Mr S y repaired to Albany, where, after long imitating the celebrated Fahius in delay, he, at length, with the fame deliberation, began his march, counting his (teps, towards the Lake Ontario, where being, alas, too maturely arrived, and perceiving that nothing was to be done againft the enemy, he as deliberately march- ed back again, meeting no oppofition which he did not cafily overcome : and thus began and ended the expedi- tion of g 1 o' y , exaftly as it had been predift- cd by all who knew him, imitating the great Lewis in going up the hill and coming down again. In this, how- ever, the whole blame rcfls on him who chofe, and not on him that was chofcn j the g 1 furely is to be par- doned who failed in his expedition, when the m r was (bmuch miftaken in his judgment of him. Notwithftanding this raanifefl deficiency in the B~fh m y, in the choice of their generals, that of the Anericans was as remarkaMy jult. General John/on^ formed by nature for the military art, whom lagacity blended with courage, r-.ftivity with patience, rendered what is not always to he found amongfl feen-fervice and regular bred warriors, was ihc objcft of their choice. This gentleman, with the militia of the provinces, took the Lrench general prifoncr, and defeated ten times the number of thofe brench troops, before which Mr Brc.dcck and I. ;s regulars fliameluliy retired ; and though this miliiary fuccds was followed by no farther advan- tage to thcJmeyiian caufe than that of taking pritbncr the enemy's general, it mud be imputr-d entirely to the jar- ring councils of the difl'eicnt provinces, delay in lend- 11.^ inj rioi ■iii>WMiiili ri KlllUlUM'i"- com- . ( 9 ) . ing provifions and recruits, envy of his fucccfs, and va- rious other caufes. Let us now turn onr eyes on what was tranfa^led in another part of America. It fcems the inhabitants of New England, being thoroughly acquainted with the im- portance of Nova Scotia., had reloivcd to drive the French frorfi their forts in that part of Ameri'a. With this view general Winjlouo and 2000 militia lailcd f x Halifax » where being arrived, and it)incd by about 2 or 300 re- gulars only, under the command of Col. iMoncUon, they look Beau fjoiir^ and immeJ lately all the other forts furrendered. Thus the only advantages which were derived from all the military preparations againfi: the Fremh in Ameri- ca, were afT'e<5led by a general unknoun to the B -Jh m r, and a militia o^ American. , and b\ an expeUiti- on planned by the provinces of New En^hnd., the la(t of which exploits the Amtncam had aKvays in their power ■jMSk to accomplifh, unaflluetl by men, money, or flii; s, from ^^ this ifland : whili'l the generals and the expeditions ap- pointed by the m r were either ignomniioufly de- feated, or rendered inetfeflual. The lall fummer then was productive of the redudli- on o^ N-va Scoiia, Mr Bradcioc/c's defeat, Mr A >'*s in- effe<^u3l march to Ofwego, general ychnJon*s vidlory un- purfued through deficiency of powers, and his rclin- qui/hing the fervice through difgufh The campain^n being termmated fo little to the ad- vantage of the Aijieri cms, the moft natural thought which could employ the attenuon of a flatefman, was that of fpeedily reinforcing thofe parts againft theFrt;/f^ attempts, which would undoubtedly be more vigorous the luc- ceedlng fummer than the former, as men and ammuni- tionwould be fent them to fuitain the eflabliihments they had made on the back of the Btiti/h fectleaients. Let us fee what provilion has been made, and how fpeedily af- fiflance has been tranimitted to your fellow fubjedls in thof'e parts, ^rom whence the great fource of your - i wealth and commerce is derived. B The !'!i The firft artempt in their favour was that of creating a regiment o^ Germans to be cnlilled in Europe, and fent thither ; whole officers were to be compofed of men ilrangers to this land, and aliens to its liberties and pri- vileges, unproved by experience, guiltlefs of (lege or battle, in whofe favour the Britijh fubjc^ls of untainted loyalty and approved courage were rcjc6led, and even an exprefs article, in an a6l relating to the fettlement of the prefent augull family on the throne, was (ufpcntied by a particular bill in parliament. Notwithftanding all this, tranfafted in favour of foreigners, no advantage has hi- therto accrued to the plantations from that defign, nei- ther men or officers being yet failed to that part. The winter pafled away, the fpring was advancing ! No g 1 appointed ! No Englijh troops deftined for the luce jur oi America, till on April 15th, the tranfports fet fail with Otway\ and Murray*^ Regiments for America, too late to be of any alTiftance 'till next fpring, unlefs the French may, peradventure, poflefs themfelves of Virginia^ or fome other ill defended colony, before their arrival. In fuch fituation and diftrefs as the provinces remain- ed at the end of Jaft autumn, when the deficiency of ge- nerals was fo apparent to all comprehenfions, is it to be believed, that the commander in chief fliould have been •with held 'till the latter end of 1\/Iay ? and yet this has been the real (late of the cafe. That man, who was to fuperfede all others in com- mand, has not been fent 'till it is probably become too late for him to perform any thing of confequence this fummer. The general in chief, who fliould have been fent lad autumn, and been prefent in a new country as long as polTible before his entering upon aftion, to be acquainted with the different relblutions of the various provinces, to have known the genius of the inhabitants, planned the expeditions, and created a confidence in thofe who were to obey him, was the laft perfon dif- patched on this occafion. It is but lately that even any one has been fent to yinurica. Within two months Mr lyebb has fuperfeded Mr 5 -J, general Abercrombie Mr Webb» and lord London, the I firlll putJ lievj acql l| whii lore croii iin( whj m- ( " ) I Loudon all of them : by this deep contrivance, indeed, '^ the m r has fulfilled the fcriptures, >vhich fay, the fird /hall be laft, and the laft firfl ; yet without the im- putation of infidelity, there are thofe who cannot be- lieve that the chief in command ought to be the leafl acquainted with the bufinefs he is to undertake, * Is there another head in Europe^ befides the m 1, which would havfc fcnf commanders in this manner ? If lord Loudon had gone firll, Mr. Webb and general /her- cromhie would have followed.naturally ; and, as they were under him in command, fallen into their places of duty, which are to obey his orders and difpofitions; but as the m r has dcltined the affair, the commander in chief muft now follow the plans of men inferior to himfelf in military knowledge, or remain ina^live ; for certainly the preparation for every military expedition, muft have been too far advanced before lord Loudon^s arrival, to ad- mit of any confiderable alteration ; nay, even before Mr. IVebb and Abercrombie arrived ; fo that Mr S y is, in fa£t, general in planning the operation of this campaign alfo. How ridiculous then was this m 1 difpofition in fending out the commanders ? Lord Loudon mult, from the nature of his commidion, which fuperfedes all others, be imagined fuperior in every thing relative to the com- manding an army, to all who were ftnt before him \ otherways it is the greatefl abfurdity to have fent him at all; r.nd yet, by pure lubtilty of m 1 contrivance, he muft nccefiarily be the Icaft acquainted wich what he is to undertake, if he arrives time enough for adion this campaign ; and bound to follow operations already concerted by a man proved unequal to the undertaking, ^ cr remain on the defenfive. Is not this cunningly fub- jecling a foldier and man of capacity to all the inlufficier\- cy of underllanding, in that very pcrfon who was fo much complained of in the conduti of the laft fummcr*s campaign, and defeating the whole expedition for this year? Admirable fi\gacity ! Befides this inverfion of^ wrong for right, fo natural to m 1 underftandings, in fending the officers of higheft rank, it is to be obfsrved, that even the inferior ofiiccri; of i^^ ^■K. of lord Loudon*?, regiment, together with arms, amunitl- o/, and otiicr military prcp.irations. lie at this time * at Portfmouth ; and, what ^s nor a lirtlc extraordinary, tlie muskets, and other military weapons, lay a long while on the wharfs, waiting for tranlports, which were not then hired to take them on board. I fay nothing of the fagacity ot that m 1 conception, which fliipped the carriages of the cannon on board one (hip, the cannon on another, the ball on a third, and the powder on a fourth; a contrivance not eafilyto be paralclled in any ad n. Hence, by this fubuilty of thouglit, the chance of de- feating the whole expedition was increafed as four to one ; for if each article liad been proportionably mixed in the cargoes of the four Ihips, the taking one fliip could have defeated bur one fourth of ihe intension, and fo in proportion ; but, as it wasdcfigned, the taking one fliip rent-lcrs the whole iifclcfs; how complaifant are the m s in all their undertakings to your enemies ? To rhii might be added the 500 Barrels of gun-pow- der purchal'cd untried of the Dutch, cunningly to pre- vent it's falling into our enemies hands ; which, upon ex- periment, proved as cxplofive as faw-dud. 1 hefe lalt mentioned affairs, however, muff be con- (idered as below the attention of m s, whole capaci- ties are fo different from the common, and are only a farther conhrma.ion of that great faculty of rightly di- flinguilhing and lelcdr.g men, fit to be employed in all fituations under ihc'r d. regions. If deficiency in the fupplics granted by parliament had been the cauie of this de.ay, and inattention to tlie mofl valuable of all our loreign poireflions, much might have been offered in vindicati n of a m r; but fmce our fnofl royal maffcr, our moft gracious l()vereign, in his mofl gracious Ipcech from the thion< , has been pleafed to thank liis people for the vigorous and effc^fual fup- port, which has been granted him, what can be faid in defence of men, who have rhu aSfurdly api;Iicdit, fhame- fully neglcffing the mofl important ( bj( dl of this king- dom ? It would be ridiculous to name the caufe of this delay ; dcla; lanii ed. If a m- aa icaci und m t'j i: attel witl lang ing mu( dur has fen( I2ih of J unci m V ], ( ^6 ) clelay •, it mud be affigned to that which no man in Eng- land IS weak enough not to perceive, the m r except- ed. If then fiiperior knowledge of mankind be necefTary in a ni r, to direct him in his choice of thofe who are to aft under him ; irom thele inrtances, not purpofely Ic- Icftcd, what hopes remain in you of him who always, uiuieviating, appoints the lealt qualified for the taJc com- m tfed to their care ? Having thus fet before you the deficiency in m 1 attention towards providing for the American colonics, without the commerce of which this kingdom muft foon languifliinto a total decay, and (hewn, that even the trifl- ing liiccour hitherto defigned fince Braddcck\ defeat, niuft, by the delay in lending it, be rendered incffeftual during this fumnur, let me now turn your eyes on what has been tranladed in Europe during thac time, in de- fence of Gr^ t Britain and Ireland, together with anoiher dominion, not belonging to this crown, and which to the prelent minute has been no great fource of acquidtion to this nation. . • ■ In 1755, during the time which pafHd between the melfage to both hcu'es, and the prorigation of p 1 on the 28rh oi' April, no addition was made to our land forces: no law paffcd to arm the lubje6ts oi^ Great Britain againft any invafion from the French, a negleft which there is too much reafon to fear may one day prove fatal to this kingdom; but great Jums of money were grant- ed, and the equipping a refpedable navy engaged the whole attention of the adm n. His m y having put an end to the feflion the fame day, tuat no time might be loif, defpifing the menaces and invafions of the French, (et out from St. Jaines's, great] u nfquing his (acred perfbn, through feas and tem- peits, to provide for the defence of his dominions. Dur- ing hi'; ablencj, let us recollefl: what were the occupati- on-^ of the m y at home towards this attainment : they were employed in committing violence on your liberties, deprcding the courage of failors by compuKion, manning fleets, which have been aimoil uieiels by their deflina li- on. i^ !l! Cm) on, and leaving the ifland cpen to the hourly invafion of the French, through deficiency of donieftic force. However, to the immortal memory of the m r, this inattention at home was amply recompenfed by his care on the other fide the water. Two treaties, fuppofed to be teeming with advantages to this nation, were con- cluded ; one v/ith the emprefs of Rujfia, and the other with the Landgrave of heJfe-CaJfJ -, the firll (igned at PetersburghyXhc 30th o^ September 17 SS^ ^^^ other at ha- nover the i8th oVJune the fame year. The firll article with Rtiffiay confirms the treaty con- cluded in 1744, by which the emprels agrees to furnifli the kingof GV(?«/ Britain with 10,000 infantry, and »ooo cavalry, il his m y*s dominions fhould be attacked, or with 500,000 rubles in money, yearly, during the at- tack. Neither of which having been demanded during the lafl: rcbeUion in Scotland^ it leems no unjuft inference to conclude, that that treaty related to H r only; otherwilc, by what argument fliall we juflify our m — y, who, during that time of peril and expence, negleded to make that necefPary requifition of the troops, or mo« ney, in favour of £«//tf«^', ftipnlated in the treaty. Thefe forces being deemed infufficient in the prefent emergency, it was thought prudent to increafe the num- ber to 55,000, 40,000 of which, were to be infantry, and 15,000 cavalry; added to this, 40 or 50 gallics were to hold thcmlelves in readinefs to aft on the liril orders. Befides what has been already faid, relating to the treaty of 1745, which makes the bads of this, the fourth article in the lecond treaty with RuJJia, confirms its being defigned for the defence of H r only. It is there fald, that thele troops and gallies fhall not aft except his Britannic majcliy or his allies are attacked; and then the commanding officer, as foon as he fliall re- ceive his majefty's requilition, fhall make a diversion with 30,000 infantry, and the 15,000 cavalry: and, at the fame time, fhall embark the other 10,00) infaiiiry on board the gallies, in order to make a delcenc according to the exigency of affairs. New ' i wm ( ijr ) Now, doc3 not the fccond article, by agreeing that [hofe troops Ihall be held in readinefs on the frontiers of Livonia, and the gallies cruifing on that coaft, declare the intention to be that of invading the Pruffian territories, if the kin.r of Prw^^Hiall attempt anything againft the// — » dominions? otherways the flipulation, that the command* ihg officer D.iall make a diverfion with 30,000 infantry, ^nd 15,000 cavalry, asfoon as he (hall receive his majefty's fequilition, would appear a palpable abfurdity; bccaufe ihel'e troops, which are to make this immediate diverfion in favour of his majefty, cannot march into France in much lefs time than fix months, if flic fliould invade this ifland : this diverfion then, to be put in execution asfoon is the requifition fhall be made on the part of Great Bri' tain, cannot mean an attack upon France ; much lefs can their marching to the aid of this kingdom be the intenti^ on of that article, unlefs the fame m r, who, twelve months fince, did not know that Cape Breton is an ifland, had not at the time of concluding this treaty heard, that jCreat Britain is furrounded by the ocean. Befides this, gallies being unfit veflels for tranfporting troops on the ocean, and the circumftance of being or- dered to make zddfcent, according to the exigency ofaf- fairs, with 10,000 forces, prove, that thefe alio were dc- (igned to afllfl: the former number, in whatever they fliould attempt, and neither to invade France nor Succour Eng/afid, The term defcent being always underftood in a hofliie fenfe, cannot well be intended to fignify their coming hither as friends, and the number is too fmall tg attempt an undertaking of that kind on the fliorcs o^ France. In confequcnce of this Agreement then for the de- fence of the e 1 dominions, the emprefs o^ Ruffia is to be paid by Great Britain, 100,000 /. annually, during the term of four years in times of peace ; and as foon a? thofe troops fliall pafs the frontiers of her count.y, 500,000/, a year. In confideration of this augmentation of her fubfidy, the emprefs is to take upon herfelf the payment, fubfifl:ence,and tranfporting her troops, where- ever they ftiall be ordered by Great Britain, and not to re-call .< I' *!» t i ( i6 ) re-call them Mil tlie expiration of the treaty, though her own dominions fliould bf attacked. Tl^is article of the treaty is yet another confirmation, that it excludes all idea of \\\c Ruffians being ever intend- ed to defend this ifland ; becaiile the pay of an equal number of Britifh troops, in the lame proportion of horle and foot, would annually amount to 1,700,000/. Now is it pofTible to corceivc, the Rujfian enip'cfs can have a- greed to fupport thole forces in England, where provili- ons are dear, on lefs than a third piirt i/f that ilim,~ and where the pay of each national foldier is butjull fuffici- ent for his fubfiflencei' Would not this be a kind of compaft to flarve her own fubjcs of H — r. Norwithftanding thcfe proofs to the contrary, if any one chuCcs to believe this treaty included any immediate re- ference to ihe aililling this kingdom of G / B «% he has my lull confent, even then it will foon appear I imagine a fmallj unification c^m 1 proceedings. Amongft the many precautions which all wife m s have oblerved in ccncluding treaties, there have been two from which they have nciver fwcrved ; the firll is, that in all fubfcquent treaties they have obferved the flii^tcft care, that no alliance with a weaker potent:ite, fhall defeat the advantages of former treaties made with a flronger ; without attending to this observation, m — s lelTen their powers by every new acquilitiju of allies, a fubtilty not much unlike the denyng the ufe of arms to the fub]e£ts of a kingdom, for their own defence during war, and trullmg to hireling foreigners. The fecond is, rliat the l.onour and intf refl of the na- tion, which they fuperintCiid, arc to be the great objedls of all m s in their treaties with foreign nations, ^Without due regard to this obfcrvation, ftates, like dupes at play, become the beggared objed of ridicule to all crowned heads. Let us now enquire, whether thcfe two cfTential ma?:- ims have been judicioufly purlued by them s of E d, in their treaties with Riifia, HeJfe-CdJJel, and Prujfm. In order the more clearly to effeft this, we muff place things in the fame ficu.uion they were before either of thefe treaties was concluded. Before the conclufion o*^ the treaty with the emprefs of Ruffia, the m s of E d were under no (mall ^ apprehenfions o^ \.\\e.PrvJJian*^ laying hold of the grov\ing differences between G / B n and France, and poffeffing himfelf of fome ofthe ele^oral dominions. This his undertaking, though of no diladvantage to G / B «, might prove, notwithllan'mg, a moft embar- raffing circumdance, if a war fliould break out on the continent, to the m ■ s of this nation, whofe conftanc C pur- ,'i;; ' ijiii .. f I ( i8 ) purruit it has been to prefer the //- intcrcfts. .» to 5. -/. To tlifcngagc thcmfelvcs from this perplexity, it was thought nccclTary to conclude the treaty as above (neci- ficd with RuJJta ; and indeed it mufl: be acknowledged, that the prolpcdof things, by this new alliance with Ruf- Jia, was greatly improved in reCpcdl to H r. The Prujjimu who before this (ubfuliary treaty with the Muf- co%'!ie, had entertained (anguine hopes of enlarging his do- minions, was now reduced to fear left his own territo- ries might be diininilhcd by this new alliance. This treaty then with Rujfia, letting the interefl of this iiland out of the queftion, which it has conflanily been for this forty years, whenever it came in competition with that of Germany, was truly beneficial to the cleftorate of h r •, it included the two advantages above menti- oned, of increadiig power by alliance for the people it was intended, and honour to the m s, if men can mciit fuch reward, who neglect the welfare of their own country to fcrvc that of foreigners. The 55,000 Ruffian troops were undoubtedly an aug- mentation of the powers of //— — r and its allies, as it fubjefted the PruJJiank'in^-, their fiifpefled foe, and whofe interefls are as incompatible with the Aujlrian^ as thofc of heaven and hell, to no fmall terrors on account of 5z- lefia, if the emprels queen fhould fix her heart on rcpof- fenino that gem, which had been plucked from her im- perial diadem, and which fhe ftill beholds with longing eyes. At the fame time then that the Prujfian, by his dread of the Rfijji an arms, was rendered incapable ofan- no}ing the ele 1 dominions; the fricndfhip between h r and the cmprefs queen, who confidered this treaty as made in her favour, was greatly ftrengthened ; particularly as the latter entertained hopes of their being employed in her fervice in the recovery of Si/e/ia, if the Prujfian fnould intermeddle in the quarrel between the king of G / B n and France] or in Flanders, if the French fhould attack th^t part of her dominions. Thus the Prufftun king, by means of this treaty between G — >/ B — n and Rujfia, was placed in that very anxious dilem- ma from which H r had been juft extricated. This ncf^ to e grcal thelf G- m ic it was 2 fpeci- ch Ru/. The Muf^ liis do- tcrrito- of this ccn for 1 with )ratc of mcnti- opic it en can ir own in aiifr. as it whofe J thofc of Si~ rcpofl t^r im- waging ?y his of an- twccn i this ?ned; 3cino[ fthe ) the fthe rhus rj— / lem- Fhis ( '9 ) This was the very fituation in which it was the bufi- nefx of the E — -(h m s to place and Iccurc him, and to extricate himl'clf as cxpcditioully as polTible, was the great objc^l of the Prujftan : let us now enquire whicli of tlicle has ultimately attained the ends of their endeavours. No man law more perfpicuoully than the Prtijfian prince, how greatly the fcale of advantages was turned in favour of /i r and Aujlria, by the treaty between Cj — / B wand Rujj'ia', he therefore fet about deviling; fbmc means, by which to relieve himCelffrom this dil- quieting dilemma ; in conlisquence of which defign, from his own pure inclination, without overture from E d, it Icems, he propofcs a treaty between this kingdom and PruJJia, which was Ipccdily concluded. At this time it was, that the mercenary tongue-pads were let loofe in favour of the wifdom of our m -s in the Ruffian treaty ; the falutary and humiliating conic- qucnces which it had produced on Pruffia, and the be- ne Hcial alliance which had been lb long wifhed, and at length completed between the two crowns. Let us now examine, whether this laft treaty with Pruffia has been produfrivc of all thofe bleHings, which it was beaded to have brought upon its wings \ or whether like the drone it has not brought the fting only without the honey. The two molt material articles in this treaty are, firft, that G — / B n with her allies, and Prujfia, fliall mu- tually afTift each other in endeavouring to keep all foreign troops from entering the empire. The i'econd, that Greai Britain fliall pay 20,000/. as an indemnification for the captures of that merchandize which was taken on board Pruffian bottoms, condemn- ed and fold during the laft war; and in return, that Pruffia fliall pay the iV/^^-loan. And here it teems evident at firft view, that the whole benefit which might have accrued to the Aujhians, and even to the H ns, by this alliance with Ruffiia, was defeated by this fccond treaty with Pruffia. Becaule, as by the Ruffian treaty the B — -/;m r had agreed to employ the Mufcovitesm the empire o^ Germany ^ to the aid and in- terell of // r and her allies ; in this with Fri'Jfia, he C 2 ■ had li, . ->..jJ4„^-«.*»A~— fcfc. I ( 10 ; Imd mod farncioiifly cnr,aj',cJ to keep tlirm from their airiiKincc. Aiul thus tliofc men, vviv valiicii ihcinlllvcR fo hi\;hly for concluJiiv?, ihc treaty wttli RnlJ'ia, to bnncr her Forces into Germany^ wore now aittully cnc;niTcil by the kinp; of Prujfm to oppofc tlic entrance of the very troops which they had hired in their favour. Bv this nn;^le article, did not the kiiv.r ^^^ Prujfia find l/nnfelf quite extricated from all the ddHcultics in\^hich the Rujijtnn treaty had involveil him? It the cm;)ro s Tioidd attack Siiefta. lie had now no other alfair upon his hands but that of oppofinp; her arms; becaufe the m sofG'—- / H »had by treaty aiirccd to keep our tlie Rujfiaus, and free him from apprehen- (ions on that fide ; from this change of circumOances, the cmprcis queen grew difguded with the B — -fh m r ; Ihc fa w herfelfand her interefls dclerted, her friend- ship and alliance rcjcfted and renounced in favour of a weaker potentate : and from that time, being con- vinced of the wcaknefs of the B — ffjm r, en* tertaincd the idea of (eekintr the alliance of a ftronger and wifer power: thus Priijlhi has totally defeated the Jble advantage, which the Ri/Jfan treaty had given the ftates oiE ^ and IJ r over him, and this king- dom and the electoral dominions loll the ulls of the ytuf- trian powers, by preferring a weaker alliance to a ftronger. I .et us now llippolc that France, notwithftanding this treaty between G — / jB— --« and PruJJia^ (hould rclblvc to attack the // n dominions, what advantage can redound to that electorate from this convention between G — / B « and Pru/ia, to oppofe the entrance of all foreign troops into the empire? Will ihem s of this ifle and thofe of // r rely on this treaty with Pruf- Jia, and cOnfide in the forces of that prince to prevent the French from invading the H n dominions? or if they fhould entertain this confidence, and aS: in con- fequencc of it, will the Prujfian inarch his army in rheir defence, and give fuch an opportunity to the emprefs- queen of recovering Silejia, whiUf he is delerting his own dominions, to fight the battles of// r. I 1 ^'" ^WOuld king If with fleacl ry ^'1 ^o bcl Til the pi re torati T with ,po(e( Ir Fren and jn— com foes, Y out to 1 m— fta < thf cor the fin I il ' ■ i-i-*— - --y' • ->•. ..-BtV.- ^ u tliclp Illc-Ivcs bring ^'il by I' very >vv no <■* I (if ). I Imagme no man believes, eiihcr that the m— 9 jwouKl confide In Pri'fia on fuch an occafion, or thai kiui? dcfcrf Ills own intereQs to follow ihofc of others. If the frencb then, notvvithftanding this convention with Pruffa, (hould march towards the tcr-iiories of // r, it feems evident that the Rvjfians^ accord- Jnjt ro treaty, muft Hill be invited to the alfilUnce oi 'he {Ic'aor.il dominions; In fuch a cafe, of what contradi^to- y andclafliintr clrcumftanccs will the two treaties appear to be com po fed P The treaty with rruffia obliges the m— -s to exclude the Riilfians, and all foreigners, from the German cm- pirc i that with Kujfia, to call them to the aid of the elec- torate into Germany. I'hus the Ruffian troops, which, by the agreement with that cmprcls, are to come as friends to the aflTiftance pf // r, arc, by the treaty with PruJJia, to be op- .pofcd by thofc very H ns, as enemies. In confequcnce of this alliance with Prujfia, If the French forces fliould march to invade the eiedoral Hate, and the Rujftans to defend it, at the requifiiion of our m s, the II ns are obliged by compaft to be- come fo many drawcanfirs, and kill both friends and foes. By the alliance with PruJJia they arc engaged to keep out the liujjians ; the moment then the Mufcovites begin to march, according to treaty, and the rcqueft of our m r, to the afhllance ofH r, the treaty with Pruf- fia obliges the // m to divide their troops with tlifi'e of that monarch, and march one half to rcfift the coming of their allies the Rujfians, and one half to refill their foes the French: what an illuftrious inflancc of re- fined and profound politics is here produced! By this judicious proceeding, our m rs have fair- ly diverted the // ns of the Ruffian Afliftance •, for, if they rely on the alliance with PruJJia, the Ruffians cannot a6t in their favour; and if they claim the aid of the Ruffians, one half of the H n foldiers are, by com; a£l with i';/^ns en- tirely difengaged from all obligation between him and the B-^Jh m rs, and the // ns arc the firft in- 1 rafters of the treaty. Wherefore, as it is impoflible, from the nature of things, that the // ns can op- pofe th" Ruffians, which they have called to their afTift- ance, it follows, that the Pruffan cannot a£l at all, be- caufe he would injure the H ns more, in oppofing the Ruffums, by caUing off one hnlf of the eleftoral troops, than aflift them in oppofing the /VTW/??. Thus the refult of thisboaltcd wifdorn of the m— — r, in the union between G — / B n and Pruffui, is at laft nr more than a dexterous deliverance of th latter from that peril he was fallen into by the Ruffian treaty. He is at eafc from all the fears whicii that alliance had impr.rtcd on the account ofSi/e/ia; difengaged from all obligation in his agreement with £— - — d, by the ab- furdity of our m s, and the almoft impolTibility of its being put in execution ; and may not improbably, by virtue of this alliance, be fupported ngainll the houfe of Jujlria, by the very Ruffians which our m s original- ly had hired to oppole him. Have they not then thu? cunningly deprived them« felvcsofall the advantages wlich the treaty with Ruffia had given them ? Have they not, by renouncing the Au- Jirian\nte[c{\, difpleafed the emprefs queen; and, by this alliance with a weaker pov/er, rendered themfelves lefs able to refill: the French arms in Germany F Have they not united the houfes o^ Bourbon and /luftria, after hav- ing fpent 300 millions to keep them afunder ? and to '' ion to the former. Is ippc >pp polTi- ble then, that thole m s, who have been fo eafily circumvented by the Pruffian king, could ever have per- ceived * -n- e]iporing ^ic(5toral 1- ui. ■— r, is at latter ■ treaty, nee had rom all the ab- )ility of biy, by loufe of )riginal. 1 them' Ruffia he Ju- id, by nfelvcs 'e they ;r hav- ind to t poffi. eafily k'e per- ceived 1 '■» ( 25 ; ceivcd the force and jfficacy of that treaty with Rujptaf Ouchtnot then the Mufcovite alliance to be deemed the pure effect of chance or malice (which the article on plundering feeras to infinuatc), as that with Pruffia, the legitimate child of ignorance and miftake ? Alter having, in the above manne-, fliown the ef- feds of the firlt article in the Prujjian treaty, which, indeed, concerns the H « welfare immediately on- ly, let us confider the confequences of the fecond article with rcfpeft to G — / B «, in which the B-—fh m rs agree to give 20,000/. to the king oi' Prujfia, in lieu of merchandize taken on board Prujfian bottoms, condemned and Ibid during laft war ; and that prince to pay the fubjeds of this iiland the remainder of the Sile- fia loan. Abfurd as the firft article has been proved to be, this fecond is not one ftep behind it in miftake and ridicule, and even before it in pernicious confequences; for as that firft article, by having united Jujiria and France, may now coft this ifland two millions of money, in fup- porting the Ruffians for the intereft of Prujfian \^ Silejia ftiould be attacked ; fb the fecond article of the agree- ment bids fair lo deftiuy all the commerce of G — / B », at leaft all the advantage fhe can draw from a fuperior fleet in time of war. The merchandize repaid for by this treaty, was what had been legally taken,, condemned, and fold. The equity of this proceeding had been defended, and our right juftified, in a letter from the m r to the Prujfian court; and much more fo in a memorial drawn by a lawyer and civihan, whofe eminence and learning do honour to this nation. Nay, it was even aflerted by thefe men, that the welfare and exiftcnce of this ftate, as a maritime power, eflentially depended on our per- fevering in our right to thefe captures ; and this, I be- lieve, is the opinion o^ all men of underftanding in the nation. Notwithftanding which, in contradiftion to all good fcnfe and found polic}^, reilitution for thefe captures has been made to Prujfia, By I ( »4 ) By this conceflion, we either acknowledge that we have no right to feize military ftores, defigncd for our enemies, on board neutral bottoms; that the decrees of that nation, on board whole (hips they are taken, are valid, though contradidlory to thofe made in the courts of G — / B n\ or that our m s are become fuch timid and abjeft wretches, that whatever crowned head, however contemptible on the Teas, fhall dare to difpute the legality of feizingand confifcating liich (tores, ihall be repaid whatever his fubjefts may lofe. I am fenfible the m — s aflert, that this 20,000 /. was not given to the king o^ Prujfta as an indemnificati- on for the captures made laft war, but becaufe they had a mind to prefent him fo much of that money, which you labour to procure for them to fquander. Is not this anfwer to the full as childifli as the article is pernicious ; like two boys at fchool, where one gives the other money not to be beaten, and yet infills it was not through fear but pure love. Does this excufe him from the imputation of cowardice, or change the motive in the opinion of his fchool fellows? Will not he be in- fulted by all the others as much as if he had conf cded the true reafon f This illuftrious inftance of want of fenfe and want of refolutiru mult have an advantageous tendency at the eve of a war. Will not the Prufftan ftill infill upon the right of carrying ftores in his Jhips to your enemies ? Will not the Dutch, Ruffians^ Danes, and Swedes, with all the other maritime ftates o^ Eur ope , demand, put in ufe, and fupport the li'izz privilege for themfelves, which you have already granted to the Prujfian? and, if you oppofe this liberty, will not your captures of their {hips, however legal, draw the refentment and arms of sM Europe UTpon you ^ • ' What then is the advantage of the payment of the 5/- Jejta loan, when compared to the dreadful confequences of this conceifion ? How will you now diftrefs effeftually the commerce ofyour enemies, if your m — s permit neu- tral (hips to tranl'port and traffic, not only in the com- mon produce and merchandize of France, and her colo- nies. all em] thn fe^ thi| » hot boj \ peil foil :4 ; that we tl for our decrees of ken, are ^e courts become crowned ' dare to ch ftores, 0,000 /. nniftcati- they had which >e article ne gives h it was ufe him e motive le be in- :onfciIed want of / at the pon the lemies ? V, with put in , which if you f their irms of the Si- Licncej ftuaJiy itneu- com- coJo- Jiies, •^ . . .. ( 25 ) ^ nies, but even in milirary {tores, to the dcfirudion of I all your trade and fecurity ? will you longer vaunt your empire of the ocean ? ' " Thus then, as by the former article, the m rs of this k m had effectually deliroyed the good ef- fe<5ls of the Rufsian treaty with refped to H r, in this they have given a fatal wound to the intercfc and V honour of G / B ». Deflined, as ye are, to la- bour for German welfare, how will ye fupport the 0:- \ pence of thofe millions which it muft coil:, when tha Iburce of all your riches, your trade, is deliroyed ? Now let me ask thole hireling trumpeters of the m 1 wifdom in concluding the Prufsian tre--"/, what are the ' boafted advantages which are derived from it to this kingdom ? Is theconclufion (Irongcr in favours ofm 1 wifdom or m 1 weaknefs? and what has this na- tion to expeft under the direction of fuch penetrating and all-leeing m— — — s who have, by two irticlcs in one treaty, driven Auflria from their intcreft, united her with France^ adopted the weak alliance of Friifsia, laid H r open to French invafion, deftroyed the com- merce of G / B n, and rendered our arms and councils contemptible in the opinion of all Europe^ Having thus, in Ibme degree, explained the pernici- ous effefts of the Prufsian treaty, let us examine what advantages are likely to be derived to this kingdom from that with H^f-C^/, and what are the merits of the m — r in making it, and behaving in coniequence of its cou- clufion. The great objcft of this treaty is, that either 8 or 12000 troops, as G / B ;/ Ihidl require, of which the fixth part is to be horfe, arc to be furnifhed by the Landgrave of HeJJs for this kingdom or her allies, and to be paid for by E d only. Now, as increafincj the ftrentnh and fuilaining the honour of a nation lliould always make the great objects of a m ' r in his treaties with foreign nations-, lb frugality, in fupporting and complying with them in the management of the public money, lliould ever be inle- parable from every iirdclc, D Lee l.;l d'l ( 26 ) L€t iir. (ee whether this lall: duty of public parfimony has been more clofely purl'ued in the alliance with Hejje, than thofc of power and honour were cbfcrvcd by that with Prvjsia. By the hfth article it is agreed, that every trooper fhall firft be purchafcd at about 20 /. Sterlings and every foot foldier at about 7 /. which, in all, makes about 1 12,000/. levy money ; befidcs this, the Landgrave is to have about 37,000/. annually before the troops march ; and, as Toon as they march, he is to receive 74,000 /.an- nually, till they enter into pay according to that of //— r or £ d) at which time the fubfidy returns to about 37,000 /, annually; which again, when the troops are fent back, is to return to 74,000 /. a year, during the whole duration of the treaty, which is four years. In tjie mean time, whatever men or horfes die by dif cafe, or are killed in battle, the bead is to be paid for at double the price of the human being ; a blefled confi- dcraiiou for the fubjefts o^ German princes! In like manner, whatever arms or artillery fliall be found deficient, or taken by the enemy, a full recom- pence is to be made by G 1 B <■ •?? to the Landgrave of Heffe. By the tenth article, thefe troops fhall be inftantly lent back whenever the dominions of the Landgrave fhail be attacked. Let us now, in obedience to the inclinations of the m -r, allow, that the Rufsians, as well as the Hefsi- a:is, v/ei e by treaty obliged to come to the affiftance of G / B n. It being at length determined, that Trnnce would certainly invade thisilland; that the B — -Jh forces were unequal to the repelling a holVile invafion ; that the (iibjcctsof^ j fnould not be armed in the defence of themfelves, their king and country i and that foreign mercenaries were necelfary for our protec- tion and laiety ; let us then explain with v/hat admirable fore-!.houghr, prudence, and oeconomy, the rn... s have proceeded with rcfpcct to the fecurity of this land in the requilkion of troops, according to the two treaties. Fifty f,a, land annvl rfimony th Hejje, by that trooper I every about ive is to inarch ; 30 /. an- that of fubfldy » when a year, is four by dif- 1 for at 1 confi- iall be recom- ^dgrave ftantly 'je fhall of the He/si. nee of . that i-jh ifion ; cd in } and rotec- irable i land ■a ties. Fifty ( 27 ) ;! Fifty five thoufand troops are, by compa(rb with Ruf- % f,a, to be fcnt by the cmprcfs of that nation to aflifl E))g- land\ thefc forces fhe is to tranfport and fiiflain for the annual fubfidy of 500,000/. without any farther confide- ration for death of men and horfcs, or lofs of militniy flores, and no return of them is to take place during four years, if the/2///^/rt«'sdominions fliould be hoftilely invaded. I Notwithflanding ihefe conditions of this treaty are fb ' V favourable in price and frugality, no requifition o^ Rufsi- ans has been made in behalf of G / B n, but eight thoufand Hefsians are brought into England, the expence ofwhich will amount this year, as the m s confefs, including levy money, (ubfidy to i\\Q Landgrave, death of men and horfes, tranfporting hither and back i again, and pay, to a million Ster/in^. Thus this military aid in Hefsians, cofting double the money that feven times that alfiflance would have done in Rufsians, is fourteen times as expenfive: a plain proof how different the bargains are which are made between this nation and the Germans, and this nation and Rufsians -, and how much oeconomy in the public money, and the r defence of this ifland, enter into the tranfa£tions of the m r with German princes. One article of frugality in the public money mufl not be omitted. Amongfl: the troops landed in E d, there are about 900 horfes, which, one with another, are not worth more than 4 /. a piece ; notwithflanding which, each of thefe horfes has already coft about 12 /. levy money, and 9 /. in being tranfported hither ; after this, 12/. more is to be paid for each horfe which dies in the ifland ; thus every dead Hefsian horfe will coft this nation ^'^ I. eight times the real value, and becomes to the Landgrave worth three times more dead than alive. Is it not then the intereft of the Landgrave, and tlieduty of the commanding officer, to take fpecial care tbaTnoiTe of thefe cattle ever revifit their native land ; however, if any of them fliould furvive, 9 /. more are to be paid for the re-tranfportation of each; thus the hire of every Hefsian horfe, worth 4 /./will then be only 30/. expence to you } not quite eight times his value. From ^11 i , :if!"i| ( 28 ; From this article may it ncjt be juHly kiferrcJ, that our m 3 are as unskillcJ in bcarts as men, and that this kingdom is the bcil market for German carrion in all Europe ? Another advantage attending the Rujsuv.i treaty, nor to be found in the lit'j'sicin, belides number and cheap- nefs, is, that the Kiifsians aie by agreement obliged to remain here to your afBHancc, though the cmprels, their mifirefs, fliould be attacked. Now, luppofe the cmprcfs queen oflLnii^my, fupported by this alliance with /')i7«<:^, Ihould invade 5/ /tj/7^i; no im- probable event, if the articles fisid to be in the treaty be- tween thofe two powers are true ; and at the (iime time thci-i^^;7d? Hiould attack the dominions of // r or //V^P, "will not this ifland be then inftantly divcftcd o\' all foreign afTiflancc from He/siam, as thefe troops rnutt infhintly re- turn to the defence of iheir prince : thus, as well in uCc as oeconomy, the m — 1 choice of Hefsiaus, who cannot tarry to your aid, in preference to Rujsians, who arc engaged to flay, is moft cgrcgioufly confpicuous and difadvan- ta^eous to this kingdom. This miliake, or (bmcthing more criminal, in prefer- ring the aid of 8000 llefsians xo 55,000 Rufsians\ and wafting a million of money for the fcvcnth part of the affiflance, which may be rendered ufclcfs alfo, one would have imacined mic'ht have been fufficient to aivc the m s an intimation of their error in the application of the treaties. Nothing appears to be lefs true ; it being conceived, that the kingclom was not yet fufliciently pro- te<5lcd from /7-^w/5?invafion, it was agreed to rcqucll the e rof// r, your dear ally, that he would be gracioufly dii'pofed to fave this nation, by afilliing the king of G / B n with 8000 of his troops. Here again the Rujpan treaty was totally ncgleded. It was judged more eligible to apply for H ns, at a frcfh expence, than to make a requifition of the Rujft- ^ will to prc| 6f the be Ip Idiar fonii"'^ two limes Kty .gftan ^tt-.ic ihefc Other fcrvi be ai It %ngl for t Vrert as G defe to b tea 1 'J, that and that on in ali ly, nor cheap- igcd to Is, their pponcd no im- •at) be- ne time or lirjj'e^ foreign nJy re- n Life as :)t tarry njragcd ifadvan- prefcr- w; and of the Would five the ition of t being ly pro- lell the uld be ing the leded. -ns, at Rujfi- — t . 8000 is pro- 3 i for hough ( 59 ) PiongU the fum granted on this account is vaflly fhort )f what the m s confefs will be the expence of the IJeJjians, without the gift of prophecy one may venture to predict, that, at the conclufion, when the application t)f the million, granted by the vote of credit, comes t» be Ipccitied, this expence v/ill be equal to that of the Hef- "iMs; becaufel am convinced, the great wifdom andknow- fdge of the e — ; — r of H r, in concluding all fub- jdiary treaties, is in no fenfc inferior to that of the '.nndgrave of Ikjj^ Cajfel. According to this way ofrea- Ibning, 8000 Ilijfians and 8000 H ns may coft tvvo millions of money •, four times the fum of almoft four dmcs the number of Ruffians. Add to this, the probabi- Jity of the H m being lefs liable to tarry to your af- ■ JIftancc than the Heffians^ as H r vrill mere hkely be j|ttacked than Heffe, k may not improbably happen, that thefe tvvo millions will be ufelefsly wafted in fubfidies and other cxpences on foreign troops, which cannot be of fcrvlcc in protecting G — iB », whilft thofe that might be are entirely neglefted and unrequefted. It was expefted indeed, by every fenfible and honeft %nglif}man^ that ai the Ruffians were now vifibly hired for the defence of // r only, that the H —-ns Were to come hither in lieu of thofe Ruffians-, and that, as G / B n now paid 55,000 Mufcovite forces to defend the ele — — e, that the 8000 H —ns were to be at the fame expence by way of exchange to pro- tea E d. This fuggeftion, however reafonable it may feem, proves by no means true in the event ; for not only the //— ns as well as Rufftans are paid byG — / B ;/, but there is too much caufe to fufpedt, that yet another bargain is concluded for 8000 Holjieiners^ fince even the m r had not the hardinefsto contradi£l that affertion, v/hen he was called upon to be paid for with B — -fh mo- ney, that H liHI ly -r may lofe no defence by the abfence of thole troops which are arrived to the aiTiftance of ■£' d. \Vhat a ftupendous inftancc is this again of m 1 profufion in favour of German dates and ne- glea of E J}} : 500^000 /. annual fubfidy to Ruffia, added '1 w If: ! ( 1 i \ I ( 30 ) , added to a million for hJ ns, tnckM to half that fiim, fuppole for Holjlciners^ make two mill'u/.is of money for the feeble fuccour of 8000 // »/, to be paid by E d, v' xh troops after all, it i'J probable, may not tarry four months tor the prote thirds r cc; in- ley can rebate. I urchafc, the love of their king and country, ann-nated y the defence of their wives, children, and properties. This niealure, fo necefTary in itfelf, which would have rendered you at the fame time free from the fears of ho- ftile invafion, and the conquefl: of mercenary and pre- tended friends : this meafurc, reputable for tlic liibje(S, •oarfimonious of public money, honourable to the m r> jlorious to thck g, ialutary to the conilitution, and jBcncficial to the country, was rejedled for inattention, jprofufion, difgrace, diflionour, infecurity, and ruiir, free- men gave way to ilavcs, Britons to foreigners, liberty to thraldom : is there then the bofbm of one Erigii/hmaUj which ftill remains unwounded with the idea of this ig- JBominious treatment ? accufed as ye are of cowardice .or difloyalty i cowardice, if your loyalty is unlufpeded ; difloyalty, if ye arc yet clleemed a brave nation ; difloy- ajlty to fuch a 1^ n, as 'till this reign has never filled the throne of E d. For what other realbns can arms be •withheld from your hands ? ; Since then your hands are denied the ufe of arms, ^retch them empty as they are to heaven ; though impo- tent with men, they may yet be prevalent before the Almighty. Ye are not yet denied the privilege of pray- er, implore him to have that mercy on the B -ftj fub- jefts which the m rs have refufed; that fince by mil- conduct, want of underftanding, or iniquity, they have driven every powerful flate in Europe from your alliance, and by profuiion and denial of arms rendered you inca- pable of fighting for your prince, that heaven of its all- gracious favour will be pleafed to preferve and prote<5t him yet to reign over ye a free and happy people ; by this means alone it feems poffiblc, that ye can be extri- cated from the numberlefs perils which furround you. Having now, in fome degree, pUccd the conduft of the m- rs in its juft light, as it rcfpc6ts their beha- viour in providing for America^ H rand G — tB — n^ by land armies and treaties, let me turn your eyes on theadminiftration of naval affairs, and candidly examine, whether fymptoms of a more extenfive capacity and I greater 1* 1; .4 ) , I; ■ ( ! \ \ i ( 3» ) . gfeatcr prudence have appeared In conducting this part ofthem— —1 province than in the former. In January i?^.^* the prels fo* manning the B //» fleet beganwith great violence. Scarce any an;c or qua- lity preferved the brave ieamen from this violation of B- ^liberty, every dock-yard rclbundcJ with in- numerable ftrokcs of axes, caulkitig hammers, i'creaking tackles, and cries of workmen. Pitch, tarr, and uproar, filled the towns of Chatham^ Port/mouth and Plymouth ; difpatch, panegyric, and my lord , were united in the mouths of all men! no time could furnifh an indance of fiich capacity in the head of the ad ;r; the pre- fcnt, and even the diligence of Mr ■"■ ■ ■ at Pl-^mouth dock, who had moft amazingly, by means of thirty coop- ers made loo tons of cask in twenty f6ur hours, to fup- ply admiral Bofcawen^ fleet, was attributed to the great fagacity and forefight of this great m >r in naval af- fairs. And indeed it mufl be acknowledged, that the merit of this expedition in cask-making of the agent viftualler at Plymouth dock, was as much due ru this great naval m — — r (of which he knew nothing 'till it was complet- ed) as any other part of marine preparation. The officers who prefide in the king's yards, have in- deed ajuft claim to the praife of this kingdom for their diligence in equipping fliips of war ; to them, and to the great quantity of naval ftores long laid in, it was owing that fhips were fo fpeedily prepared for the fea; for which reafon, my facrilegious hand Ihall never rob the cottage of the deferving man in low life, to decorate the palace of the undeferving, to whom chance has given riches and titles ; or ercft a trophy to a 1 — d from fpoils which comtnon men have won. A parrot which could have pronounced by authority, equip ten fhips ai Chatham^ ten at Portfmoutht and ten at Plymouth, would as effeftually and as fpeedily have pro- duced a fleet ready for the feas as the voice of the firft 1— d of the ad y, and deferved as great an en- comium for the tranfadion. I fo. The Ills part —J!' lor qiia- jrion of ith in- "eakijig proar, \mouth ; litcd in In fiance (he pre- '/ymouth y coop, to flip. t' great ival af- e merit ^ualler t naval )mplet- ive in- r their to the owing a; for 3h the coratr given from ority, ten at I pro- 1 en- The C 33 ) . The completion of the Inilijicls was cHcclcd where he was not prclcnt, without one new iiivcnrion, uncomnioii exertion, or pecuhar .'mention ofthc underllunding ; aiul which, after the order had elcaped his hps, whctiier he had been ailecp or awake, dreaming or pretending to tliiiil<, in his ealy cliair or on horleback, woidd havebcen equally completed in the lame time. Let us now examine, whether the man who lias in this manner been extolled to the skies, as the belt adapted for navnl ad ii; by the merits of boatCwains, gun- ners, Hiip-wrights, ;ind dock-ollicers, and what he did not perform, has proved himfclr, in the execution of thofe duties wliich belong to him in chief, equal to the poll in which lie has prelided ; and defiirvinjj; that aj)- plaufe, which in the be[2;inning was 'b liberally beitovved upon him. To nccomplifli this, permit mc to enquire in what ma.iner, and to what purpole, the fieets o^ E d have been difpoied and dellincd, Ilncc the firfl naval preparations in T'^m.wy 1755. ' ' The firft initance in which the great knowledge of this prcfidcnt in maritime ad -n was exhibited to the public, was in that ex^.->cdition in which Mr Bofcr.'Vi-cn v,as ordered to intercept the French fleet, defirjned to carry and convoy f>ores to thealfiftance of Canada. The whole of this remarkable exhibition of knowledge in marine af- fairs, has been already explained in a firft letter to the people of E d ; in which it has been proved, thac the number of the enemy's fliips was unknown to ouc ad , or not attended to j that our fieet was infufii- cient to the undertaking, if ihc dellination of It had been, as it ought, before £r^y? ; bccaule MacnamnraW'c[\.\d.(iTon was fuperior to tlie Kn^Hjh at bis leaving that port; for the fame re;ifon had he continued his voyage to America^ Mr Bofcazven and ivir lIolbowH':, by the weaknels and divifion of their fleers, would probably have fallen a prey to that of the Irencb; and even as it did happen, thou-j;h the fieet of France was rendered inierior to that of Mr Bofcaiven by Mr Maaianiaru-, return to Breft, all pv wer of reaping any conflderable advantage from it was defeated, by rfn.- £;,-'/./; fleer being d^flined to cruize on K the \ 1)1 (II 11 if ilk ( ?4 \ tlic btiiiks of Ncwfi.uml/aud \n thofc months v/hcn that (la- tion is CDVcrccl with one rjcnctul fog ami tlai kiicls. The FycKCb licet beinrr arrlvetl in the river 67. I^wretjce, without any injury which could defeat the purpoit ot' their nndeit, iking, the lame genius which had lo mani- felily erred in the dirpuliiiDn oF every article in Mr BoJcimeHtj voyage, was now determined to make ample atonement to his country for this deficiency ot judgment, and by dillnbuting the /i— //' fleet in fuch a manner, that not a Frcmh Ihip of war Ihould elcape it in her re- turn to Diinc:, demonlirate that he was yet equal to the liiprcmc condu(^l of the E — Jh navy. Mr Ih!ciiv>>>i bein(7 onlcred home, Mr Holbourrie was commmanded tocrui/e between cape Breton and the Ibutli woftcrn parts of N^wjomdland, to inteicept the French fleet returninc from the river Si. Lawrence, which fcrvice he punctually perlormed. Now it was that the m 1 advocatci! were extremely clamorous in their panegyrics on the dellinaiion of this fleet, and him who had order- ed it ; nolwithfhnding which, it f'eems impoflible to omit obfervingthc parallelarity of judgment in this affair, be- tween our firli of the ad^ and a juflicc of peace in the \\'cflcrn parrs of England. It Items Ibme time lalt (ummer, a thief wlio had rob- bed, and been apprehended, a defperate fellow, had C' leaped from before the julticc, and flying to another houfc had bolted the door, and fecured himlelf in one room of it. The conllable, who had followed to this re- treat, knowing the raflmels of the man, and the nature of his (luiation, conceived no linaJl apprehenfions of dan- ger in attacking him in that pbcc; he therefore with great prudence acquainted liis worfhip with the circum- fiancesi of the alTair. The jullicc, after mature deliberati- on, wifely confiderrd it was impofllble that the thief, was he; ever lo brave, through want of provifion and other neccflarics, could long remain in that poll; he there- fore ordered inc liege to be turned into a blockade, and bade the conllable and his ainilants to tarry before the door J wutcii the door, Tom, fays his worlliip to the con- ftablc, {Vab tl»e I It fla- \re>ice, \>n oF Imani- b Mr imple ( 3y ) ftabic, tbrouj;h tint door he (null come, tlicrcTorc minJ the door, and he cannot p^lhSly cfcnpc us. This being rcfolvcd on, noihinj'; could be more alert than the fonUabic, rviid no nuMi in hh^bcr fpirils than his ^^an^. The commander, as loon as it was d;iilv, placed a lanrliorn andcaiullo at the door to ice all that mi[!;ht pal's from or to the houlc, and during the whole n't;',ht molt manfully with his afTociates Hood on his arm?, rculy pre- pared, with his UalFin his hand, happily to demolifli tlm thief the moment he Ihould pretend to (ally and clcapo him. This duty being performed through the length of two whole days and two whole nights, thejudiccin momen- tary expectation of hearing that the thief was taken, and the conllable haranguing the mob, which attended on the thief's pcrfcverance; at the fame time wondering, that he had not been obliged to lurrendcr thro' drought and hunger: when an old acquaintance of the beficged arrived with intelligence, that he had met the thief the firlt morning after his confinement, at the break of day, twenty miles from that very houfe in which the jullice had to that moment imagined he was clofely fiiut up: in faft, rhc lagacious head of the jullice had never conceiv- ed, that, notwithdanding a door may be bolted ever fo llrong, and watched ever lo diligently, a man might get out at the vvindo\A', as It really happened in this \ery cafe. In like manner, vvhililMr // ;/^, according to the orders of his fupcrior, was cruizing at the door bervvcon Ne-djoundland and capo Breton^ aud the marine m r believed Duhis de la Mothe dill confined and ilarving in the river St. Lamrence, that fly Fremrjman flipt througU the window, between the northern parts of Newfannd- laud and the continent, by the Itrcights of r.eU:fte, uiv ful'peftcd by the penetrating fpirit of our firil d r in marine affairs ; (b that lie heard dc la Mothe and his Iqua- dron were fafcly arrived at Brejt^ before he knew he had quitted the river St. Laivrence. Thus then, in the conduct of this naval tranfadion, there arc to be found five very conlpicuous initances of E2 moll: III 1 f;, mofl: confiimmate ignorance ; firfl the ignornnce of the number of the enemy's fliips', fecondly, the infufficicn* cy of the EngliJIj fleet; thirdly", their not being ordered to cruize before Brejl\ fourthly, their being ordered to cruize where they could not lee their enemy; and fifthly, to cruize between Ne-ivfoufuHan'l and cape Bre- ton, to intercept a fleet which did not pafs that way. This jullice, however, mud be done the marine ni r to his honour; the firfl ignorance of a proper iiation (or cruizing, preferved the litj^/'Jh fleet from the danger of the laft ignorance of the nambcrof theenemy*s fleet, and infulFiciency of our own. Notwithflaiidin? this nniform concatenation of errors, there are thofe who attempt to jullify thi'>- condu(Jl, by faying it was impoflsblc for Mr Hoi bourne' 'S, fleet to "i- tempt intercepting de la Mother's in both pafTages, be- caufc his (quaaron was nor fufficienily ftrnivr to (ufter a dividon for that purpofe ? Why then did the marine m r cxpofe himfelf to ridicule, in attempting to do that which he ought to have known muff have proved incffe£luai, and risk the deftruffion of Ids mafler's flVips, by rocks and tempefls, in thofe leas, where they could iViCcx no aclverfary and do no fervice? did my lord (Vtrt- chcljca ever conceive h fruitlefs an attempt, or commit \o egregious a miftake ? Hence then i: may be gathered, that if hereafter any naval captain, indulged with five fliips, at the expence of 500,000/. of the nation's money, to make a fortune for himfelf, fliall fail round the globe, and by the very litmoff effort of all pofTible chances, like 'hrowing twen- ty aces on twenty dice the firfl time, take a fhip worth a miilion of money for his and his company*: advantage ; that though he does not lurround a weaker man than himfelf, he may yet prcfide and direct the whole navy of is d to the ruin of the kingdom. Such fatality, according to the prefent fafhionable phrafe of excule, having attended the conduct of this nr.val expedition in every particular! 2l fatality doomed to attend infufHcienr judgments nine times in ten, (incc the creation ! a frelh inflance offers itlcif, of reinftating our U> the Icicn- IcreJ :d to and Bre- [oper the iny»s I > "'^ - . ^ 37 ) . . our marihe m r in the popular opinion, which began greatly to decline in his favour. It Iccms monfieur du Guay, a French admiral, was arrived at Cadiz^ with fix lliips of the line, in his way to Brefl. This admiral, and this fquadron, the fame naval renius, who had fo wifely deftined the former fleet of -dy was determined to intercept. He remembered the errors which had been imputed to his charge in the deftination o^ Bofcawen's fleet, infuf- ficiency in force, and wrong appointment in the ftation of cruizing; he was therefore determined to avoid thefe two niifhkes, at leafl: at this time. Accordingly, on the i8tli ot July, Mr Hawke, with eighteen fail of the line, was fent to intercept the fix French (hips under the com- mand of ^« Guay, and with this whole fleet, fo fuperior TO the enemy, "to cruize otT cape Finijterre, 'till the French fhips (hoi.id appear. This exploit again was trL^mpeted forth by m 1 hirelings, as an infuperable proof of great marine know- ledge in the direftor. The ftation was happily chofcn, the number .if the Ihips fuflicient, and the game fure. Here was nothing for the moll malevolent diipofition to blame i^nvy mult now be dumb, or, if it fpoke, fpealc in the praifc of this dcfign : and yet a miftake, much like the former in its confequences, prevailed alfo at this time ; and in this manner it muft prevail, wh' .1 deflgns mifcarry, not from accidents, for which men of (enfe may be pardoned in not forcfeeitig, but from radical infufficiency and underftanding. It fccms that the fame head, which had conceived that there was but one way of failing from Canada to Breji, and had never thought of the llreights of Bellijle, had in this place imagined the fea like Hownjloiv heath, where a man may fit on horleback on one fide and fee what paflcs on the other, and that all fliips which are fteering to BreJi from Cadiz^ are obliged to turn the corner at cape Finifterre^ like race horTes at a pofl:, or lofe their voyage. Probably this great naval m r had reafoned much in the following manner : all fhips, which have no enemy to fgar or avoid, in their courfe from Cadiz to Brefl, I 1 ' m \ % i:i|: : ,( \ ■! I ; I \ i ( 38 ), Brejitindkc cape Timjlene-^ whercfcre, every fliip which knows there is an enemy in the way, and has reafon to be under apprehenfion oFclanger, will certainly fail the fame way -, and therefore Mr Hawke iliall be dcftincd to cruize off' cape Finijlerre to intercept them. Admirable inftance ofiea logic ' Witliout realbning in this manner, is it poflible he could have deftined the fleet as he did ? Monfieur du G,(ay, however, it feems, from the fame principles, drew inferences diametrically oppofite; and in order to avoid the ufualcourfe which is fteered from Cadiz to Brcfi, failed directly weft from Spain into the Atlantic ocean; when being at agreatdiftance from the coaft, he changed his courle and flood direftly for the laiid's-end of jE d. Byihis precaution of failing weft to a great diftance before he fleered towards the channel, he palfed on theoutfide of all our fleet cruizing at cape linijterre\ and arriving fafely in the channel, fell in behind it with his fquadron, and got fafe into the harbour o^ Breji. Such was the event of this fecond exhibition of boaft- cd marine- knowledge ! Avoiding the errors of 'ihe for- mer condu£l generated the very mifcarriage of this ; and lo it will for ever happen to men, who fancy, that by LiUnning the miflakes of paCTcd management they fliall fuccetd in the prefent. Whoever does not intuitively diftinguiih. right from wrong in the conduct of great af- fairs, can never be fuccefsful by judging from parallela- rity; becaufe, as in thcfe two inflances, tho* fliips, feas, and the direfting their fiations, may be the whole con- cern in each, yet the fimilarity in thcfe objects create no reafon, either to avoid miflakes or purfue the advan* tages of a prior deftination, where there is no refem- blunce of circumflances in the undertaking; and no two can be fufficiently fimilar, or fufficiently unlike, to juf- tify a parallel or oppofite conduct ui any direftor of them. The duke du 'tallard, as I have been informed by a gentleman who thoroughly underflands military affairs, made the fame difpofition at Blenheim, that the great Gujiavus Adolphus had done at the famous br.trle which he won againil Valjlein ; yet the b'rench general Wis defeat- ed, and the EngliJIj triumphed. No ciircumftances can bo m «^ i! * frnm^K^^w^ bo . (39 .) be fufRciently alike to juftify flmilar proceedings in men who are to dirert. Imitators want force of undcrftanding to penetrate, purfue, and put in aftion that which the original contrivers had conceived in various ways in lay- ing down their plan. They are mimics of what was done, without comprehending the whole force of what might have been done : wherefore, in the progrcfs of an acti- on planned in imitation of another, when the circum' fiances vary from the former, not feeing the reafon of the defign, they are unequal to the fupplying what the original contriver would eafily have afforded : knowing no more than the hiftorian has delivered, they follow fervilely like copyifls, and are defeated. Had this marine in his deftinations of thefe naval expeditions. m judged from original lights and principles, he mufl cer- tainly have imagined, that du Guay would have avoided thr beaten tra6l in times of peace ; he would therefore ■ ^^ 'ivided Mr Hawke*s fquadron into two equal parts, which making nine in each fquadron, would have been Itill three to two ; a proper and fuperior force wherewith to oppofe monfieur du Guay ; thefe, attended with fmaller Ihips to have been uled us fcouts, by cruizing off cape Finijierre, and in the other ftation thro* which the French fquadron paffcd, there being but thefe two ways of fleering their courfes, without great ill luck, at Icafl without blame to the planner of the cruize, mud have intercepted the French fleet in its coming to Breji, and brought the'.i' /hips into Eng/ifJj harbours. This however not being done, proves that the flying from en.'. ■"<•> 'jUC fide, drives weak minds into an equal millake » ■ 'e oppofite extreme, as young I'pendthrifts frequently bv ohie old mifers. Nor is it in matters of great moment only this infuf- ficiencyofcondudt appears: the floop which carried the field-equipage belonging to the officers of Olivay\ regi- ment from London to Plymouth, becaufe the tranfports were failed before llie arrived at that port, was obliged to vait for orders to follow them, T'v: .ranfports which the m r had cunningly fent to bri.^ ih * Dutch troops over, before he knew they - . would ni ri V ( 40 ) would Come, like a booby who feeks a midwife before his wife is with child, after their fruitlefs and expenfive flay in Holland, failed for the Hcjpans, when it was firfl: difcovered that no orders from the ad had been tranfmitted tojuftify the taking thefc troops on board. This negleft created this expenHve delay, *ti'l a letter could come from and return to that part o£ Europe-, nay, even the H ns, fo very dear to this nation, were permitted to fail hither without convoy, i'o that two twenty gun fhips of France, might have carried them all into Dunkirk with great facility. The fuperintendencyof our iflands In America, is not one iota lefs remarkably provident. Monficur D*Aubigny is too ftrong for our fleet at Antigua and the Leeward iflands, and monfi- \- P^rr/Vr ^(?iS^/t'ave often requefted fuc- *' cours from the m r, I have been as often promif- " ed to receive them, and as conftantly difappointed " in the promife ; this then will, I imagine, terminate '* in my falling a facrifice to their negleft ; however, " though it flioLild Ihorten my days a year or two, it " will the fooner put you in pofTcfTion of what 1 Ihall " leave you, and in which I wifii you happy." Notwithflanding the consequence of that ifland to this kingdom, what had been publifhed by the public, writ- ten by the governor, and believed by all mankind, no attention was paid to the protection of it. No land for- ces fent, though the number within the fortrefs was known to be unequal to the duty and defence of it a- gainfl a ficge ; and whereas in the year 1744 admiral Matthews, with a fleet of 48 fail, 9 of which were three decked fliips, was employed in the Mediterranean ; now commodore Edgecanbe with 3 Ships and 2 frigates only, was Icxam- imber :nown ^f fatal ilief of ( 4? ) ^ was thought a fufficient protection for the Mediterranean trade, and iHand oi^ Minorca. Whatever were the reafons, no attention was paid to this important pofTeflion? Whilfl all Europe beheld this negleft with amazement, and every true Eng/i/h heart trembled for the wound which he faw muft be inflided on his country, our m rs were honourably engaged in laying wagers there was no fleet nor Tailors to man a fleet at 'Toufon-t that if there fliould be any it was not de- figneJ againft iihon\ and treating with derifion the ap- prehenfions of all who forel'aw the event, and whofe love for their country would not permit them to be at cafe i wliilil the honour of the crown, and the interell of -he kingdom, were open to infult and diminution, by ais finifter negleft, and the French attacking Minorca. During this time our royal navy, full manned and pre- pared for the feas, was riding triumphantly At Spilhead, and the head of the ad y paid as an ad 1, ablent on leave, at the rate of a thoufand a year, as if all that had been done in honours and profits had been hitherto inadequate to \\U merit. Glorious pifture of wifdom in your m' — — rs ! illurtrioua anecdote of their priictent ad ■ n, for their fons to read hereafter, and curfe their fires ! but happily providence, in commiferation to this people, has denied that bleffing to the moft ton- fpicuous of them, kindly refufing to their wifhes that progeny, which, treading in their fathers footfteps, muft (till be baneful to this ifle. At length, after four months parted in m 1 inat- tention, and in wonder by gazing multitudes, Mr Byng fet fail on the 5th of y4pri/ from Spithead, with ten (hips of the line for the Mediterranean. During thefe months of inattention and neglcft, La Ga/tffbniere^ with tvvelve fhips of the line and five fri- gates, with tranfports fufficient to carry 15,000 men, am- munition, and artillery for a (lege, commam-ied by the Due deRichclie'iy were gotten ready, and failed from T'ou- lon\ and on the i8ch of /^/>;// landed in the ifland of Minorca^ eii^ht days after our fleet weighed anchor from Si>ithcdj and almoft fix weeks before they arrived near Mahon. ! t| V M'll'Ofj. The confirmation of the French defcent on Mi" norca was tnc firft intelligence which dcmonftrateJ the truth of what all men hclieved except the m rs, and oFwhr .h • \\:<\ ncglcifted in not fending fuccours to Ma m, -^ . Pernici js as tliis delay of fending fuccours now ap- peared to every eye, It was not yet irremediable, tho' the troops were debarked, the citadel was not yet ta- ken, and the avowed bravery of the commander juflificd the belief, that no fliamcful fiirrt ndcr of the fortrcis would Ilain the lafl moments of his life. Notwithfland- ing whicli, it was confidently afTcrted by the m rs and their hireling fpouters, that La Ga/liffoniere's fleet confiited only of eight iliips of the line, and that Mr Byfi^ would blow them out of the water. Here was an opportunity to be envied ofretrteving all the reputation which had been forfeited by the firft ne- glecT:, in not fending a fufficient force to oppofe the ene- my's defcent on Mi?iorca. Men of genius, though hitherto deluded or midaken, would have improved this overflght into an advantage, and by reinforcing ihe fo,uadron u"d<.r Mr^ ^, with a number of (hips equal to that with which he fet fail, would have defeated the French fleet and flarved their troops in Minorca. By preventing military (lores, they would have faved St. Philip's, and by preventing the -ai rival of provihon, have obliged the whole army to have furrcndercd prifoners of war. How capable then was the firfl: negleft of being con- verreci to the glory of the king and kingdom ? but, alas ! they knew not the (Irength of that very citadel, which was to be beflcged ; and the moment they received the intelligence of the French being landed, defponding, they concluded it was taken •, otherways the firft inatten- tion might have been metamorphofed from incapacity to vvifdom, from difgrace to honour, from lofs to advantage, from cenfure to applaufe. All the flates o^ Europe would liave believed the firft behaviour, as dcfigned to obtain, the fecund advantage-, and, converting an egregious im- bcciliiy into a refined ftratagem, conceived highly of that policy, fc: y ■ !« th ey % olicy, which Is now univcifally dcrplfed and exploded. 5ut, alas ! the fame faiurninc planet rules our m rs alike arbitrarily, at all hours and on all occafions; their ^ genius tending eternally to the center, like a flone thrown into a cavern tells you by every Uroke, that it finks nearer to the abyfs of waters, in which it flounces at lad- and is no more heard of. The error which had been committed in not fending fuccours at firll, improved by fending an infufficicut force under Mr Byni^y was flill continued by ncgledling to fend a reinforcement, which would probably have joined him before he reached Gibraltar •, at Icatt a fliip might have carried intelligence to Corunna ; and as the winds were auverfe for the Iquadron, a courier would have reached Gibraltar before the fleet, and detained it till he was joined by a further force. Notwithilanding this, Mr Byng was fufTercd to pro* ceed with tei. /hips of the line, and the chance of meet- ing Mr Edgecombe^ 13 in all againfl 12 French fail of e- qual force to relieve Minorca ; whilft Mr Osburn, with 15 Jail of the line, remained at Spitbead, and 10 in the har- bour of Portfmouth, Ai length, after long delays from adverfe winds, Mr B — g arrives on the 2 0thof A/^jy within fight of A//- nofca and the enemy's ficet. Imagine then, what muR be the joy which fired the heart of the old gallant Blakeney at the fight of the B (h fleet : warmed with all the fpirit of a true fubje^, he now chcriflicd the fond hopes of obtaining glory to himfelf, honour to his mafter, and interefl: to his country, by this fuccour which he faw, in defeating the enemy's fleet, and rendering all the French fchemes abortive ; llich, probably, was the pleafing en- tertainment of his mind, when the 5— • — -jh flag appeared in ficht. Bur, alas! Mr B g^ after having attacked the French fquadron, with not a man killed or wounded on board his own and many other fhips ; with but 48 killed, imd 168 wounded in the whole fquadron, retires unattempting to relieve the garrifon of Mabon, becaufe the Intrepid had her fore top-mad fhot away, and leaves the ^ ■m M ii 'III i T f the brave general and his companions cooped within the garriCon of St. Philtp\t quite delUtuic of all hopes of re- lief. idgc then, whc brave was the horror of tl knew the behaviour of our fleer, and faw all his expeftations of relief and honour reduced to air; delerted in this manner by the B — Jh navy, he was yet (udained by himf^lf ; his heart felt the behavi- our of Mr B — g with more anguifh than the neceflity of being obliged to capitulate ; he defended the citadel to the laft, and then gave it up reluctantly to your enemies. If you have yet the faculties of human nature, weep o* ver the fcvere fate of that brave man, and the facrificc of your negleiEled fellow-countrymen ! Pay that tribute to the remembrance of their bravery, though ye are de- nied arms to revenge their lofs ; then call to mind by whofc conduft they have perilhed. Refolve me then, thofe who daily fuck the vital blood of J?— < — d, and vociferate in defence of m 1 conduct", whence did it fpring, that the number of the enemy's fleet, which in the beginning was known to all, was ftill ^unknown to the m is? Why a fupcrior force was not lent to deflroy them ? And why, when Fremh forces were landed at Minorca, and the number of the fquadron acknowledged to be twelve, that a reinforcement was not immediately fent after Mr. Byng^ yet to fruftrate the French attempts, deRroy the fleet, and ftarve or take prifoners marllial Richelieu and his whole army ? Tell me ye who are hired or fliare in the fpoiling your coun- try for fuch purpofes •, tell me, or is this behaviour fo heinous, that even ye arc dumb, and afliamed to vin- dicate your m 1 maflers ? How then are thofe oppofite manners of m 1 pro. ceeding, with refpedt to Germany and Minorca, reconcile- able with the intereft of G / B «, and the duty of a B -fi m r ; why was H r fortified and fe- cured by treaties with Ruffians^ Priijfians, Heffians, and holfteii.ers, piirchafed by profufion of E Jh treafure? B r, which has already proved fo latal in exhauflino; the riches of E-^-^d-^ and Minorca, though not the fourcc V lin the h of fe- ll blood ondu£V, enemy's was ftil] rce was h forces ijuadron was not rate the or take f ? Tell ircoun- haviour to vin- — 1 pro. :oncile- diity of and fe- w, and safure ? audino- lot the fourcc t: 1 ( 47 ) . ,. fource of your wealth, the protcftion of it when drawn from other fountains, totally difrctjarded ? what reafon can be adigned for this inverted behaviour, but that hav- ing laviflied millions in confequence of thofe treaties, and the lafcguard of German dominions, there remained not fupplics fi.fficient to protect Minorca: this, tho* the moll profligate, would have been fome excule i but ihelc men are yet more unnatural and abandoned; they have fattened a fpurious race with your heritage, and ftarved their legitimate offspring; whiKl (fiom authority it is pronounced j your annual p y fupplics were vigorous and effeftual. Have they then thus difrelpeflfully treated you, that the fourccs of yoiir wealth from commerce, bemg di- minifhed by the.lols ofMabon^ your declining ftate may Iboner introduce poverty, with dejeftion her companion, and adapt your louls lo the wearing, with tranquillity, thofe chains which the m— -1 pofTpolite is forgmg for you ? or, that your protection being aeltroyed againllthe Barbary corfairs, your honeft failors may fall a prey to that remorfflefs crew, and, learning there, teach at their return, that being y^t one degree above the flaves of Barbary^ you have not equal right to deplore your fate, and thus loothe ye to contentment ? Fatal as this may prove to this once happy country, culpable as the ad 1 may appear in the eyes of all Europe, difgraceful as it is to the B — Jh arms, and dif- honoiirable to the crown of thefe realms, are not thofe who delayed the fuccours at firfl, thofe who left that ne- glect unremedied, by fending an infufficient force, and even providing againfl that fecond error by a reinforce- ment, yet infinitely more the obje(fts of your refentment? fpeaking like men, not blinded with the reigning mala- dies of arrogance and felf-fufiiciency, but from the ex- perience of former times, what expe6)'ations could be reafbnably entertained, that ten E Jh fhips of inferior force, or even when joined by Mr Edgecombe'^ fqua- dron, that equal powers would have had a more than e- qual chance of vi^ory ; or that the event would prove lefs favourable to the enemy than the Englijh. Such ima- ginations 1 f.k \ ? •I m \ ffinaiions ill favour of their countrymen may be laudable, ami of fervicc in the common failor and common loldicr, but in the man who is to appoint fleets and commantlcrs» foolilh, culpable, and dclliudivc. i Let it be imagined, however, that the B Pj fleet, with this equality of force, could have conquered the I'rench't was it reafonablc to believe the vidory would have been lo cheaply purchafcd, and our fi.ips fo little damagco by the engagement, as to keep tlie leas and re* \\c\c Minorca? as it probably would not, and as both fleets were equally excluded trom the harbour of A/rt)6d>;/, would not a conqueft over the French fquadron have been even then attended with the lots of the citadel and ifland ? To what realm could the £- fh fleet have fteered to find materials to repair the injuries of the bat- tle? Would S/>-»« have funplicd them with naval Itores, and indulged them to rent in Carthagena ? No man the leaft acquainted with the prelcnt diipofitions cf that court believes they would j probably then, confidering the prclcnt ftatc of Usbon^ P/ymoutb is the firlt holpitabic harbour that could have afforded them affidance. If a viftory then, offuch a nature as the above, would have prevented the fleet of E • d from keeping the fJsas and fuccouring Minorca, how much lefs likely is it, that effcftual relief would have been the confequence of a drawn battle, or a defeat on our fide ? Does it not ap- pear then too evident, that no fucccfs, which good fenfe has a right to expert with fi.ch parity of force, could have refitvcd the citadel of St. Philip, or juflified the m rs in fending out fo fmall a fquadron for the de- fence of fo important an objcft ? Whatever then may prove the event of this engage- ment to the admiral, let not the depravity of his be- haviour feduce your attention from thofe who fent him fo imcqual to the undertaking. If after a candid and deliberate examination, it fhall appear, that he has been cgrcgioufly rcmifs in his duty to his king and coun- try at the hour of battle; confider how much more thofe are delinquent, who delayed the expedition and fent him at lalt with infufficicnt force. There are men, when fu- , ,' ' • perior •i,i Iiiilabli., |'(jMicr, [antlers, ^J fleer, t\l the WOlllfJ Jittic and vc |as botli hhon, lave ^IcJ and t have he bat- itores, lan the t court ng the pi tabic would ng the y is ir, 'nee of lot ap- i fenfe could ;d the he dc- igage^ is be- ient andid le has coun- thofe t him ;n fu- erior r . ( 49 ) perlor totliclr enemies, who wear the outfidc of gallantry >tiil fuccccil, who perhaps, when on equal terms, from ionfcHinj; ll)me inward Icnfations of danger, may retire ami milLarry, if it was his duty to have rilqued every !thin[', in prclcrvatiun o^ Mahoji, was it lefs obligatory on *thciii, by a fupcrior fleer, to have prevented all probable Iprefumption ol mili'arriagc? After all, if Mr B — '^'s fpi- ftrir proved in the experiment inferior to that of the enemy, '■was not the armauRnt vvhirh the m r gave him to command, inferior to liiat of the French alio? on what account was the ^— /7; fleet obliged to rifquc ihc lofs of .vidlory and Minorca^ by engaging on ron.d Terms, when by being double that number, it niignt liave prcferved ^thc illand, and triumphed over your adverfaries? Whence does it arifc then,- that if the marine m— — -r is by na- ture and capacity adapted to the duty oi his high oflicc, that a man lo obvioully unequal to the task was leletiled to command the fleet of A' ^, and a fleet lb inferior to the duty fent to proted Mabon? "Whatever delinquency may then be imagined to have en committed on tiiis account, are not the m rs ^..il more criminal? The bravclt man on earth, by exert- ing every fupcrior faculty of the human mind, de(>'/;^^i end appointed to command a fleet of that force. ^^vrriu on- ly more confpicuoufly have manifefted the i'llufliciency of the m— •! provifion and judgment, in the conduc- ing this aflair; and proved, that though V/iftorv AduU have crowned his arms, that the fliatterXj condition of his fliips would have rendered it imp*^fpjt)ie to prelcrvc Mahori', whereas the m rs had i^^j^ their power, by augmenting the force of the fleet, n ^^^ only to have 'pre- vented difgrace, but to have comma ^^j^j fuccefs, faved M>;orrrt, defeated their enemies, and c^rowned themfcivcs, the ad 1, their king and countr'^ ^^ith immortal ho- nour. ^ Yet if you ask why more fliips ^ere not dilpatched to the fuccour of Minorca, they anV^^r, no more were manned ready for the fcas. Was it tlf^gj^ through want of power or pecuniary fupplies, vhat tlijg deficiency arofc ? not from the firfl:, bccauie that they • ^xert in a more de- fpotic manner than is known in the A-n^otl arbitrary ftatcs G of 1 f '*f 'Nto(; ( yo ) of r.im'pe, in imprc(ring Icamcn ; not from the fccond, becaulu no oppoluion in p 1 has clolayc'd one mc- iiicnt the levying what ^^ollcy the m r plcafcd: iFothis chcylhall add, that the kinp;clom cannoi furnifh Tailors to mann the fleer with more oxj)C(lition, and that a large number of men of war are neeelfiny for channel iervice, and to prevent invaflons on this iiland, and therefore a greater force could not be ienr to the Medi' ierraman; ask how it was done the lad war? and why, I in the p 1 of 1755, wiien all this that has fwlloweJ,^ and much more was apprehended, a militia bill wa-; ne- glected to be paffed ? this would have permitted the ni r to have deliined your fle;tto ufeful cnterprizcs, and cleared Spithead from flying pendants, and the ule- Ids parade of a large navy without application or advan- tage. Th.is uould have favcd you millions of money, and fecured your fh )re3 from every hoiVile attack, more effectually than all the fliips built fince the a. ., or Argo which let fail with admiral Jafon to fetch the golden Seece noni Co'chos. If then the fouls of our m rs are in unifon. with their country's good, v,'hy did they delay and rejeft this reCo(^^''y ^'^^y ^^ ^^"^^'^^ *^'"S '^'^'^ '■^^*'' fellow Jubjec.s? Lct**inv^ the word miiitm be eternally iialloo'd in their cars; may .^"-'''" ^ii^'^g^"^ 'ions awake, and /leeping be )f haunted wit ^ ^^'^ terrifying negled ; may this idea be ' tvcr- iireleni^^*^ 'l'<^''^' i^f^inds, the ghofl of that blcflln.; which they ib-'ar;^^!'^^' Mil, alarmed by dread, and guili'^ they repent and a("^ ^^"^ defencelcfs land. lo what region ^i^."^^^' ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ panegyric, which wasibiouti 4 t. The trcd the ferprizcs, the ufc- »' aclvan- money, -k, more ' or Argo 5 golden • Ton. with I'jeft this bjcc. s ? 1 in their -piiig be y idea be bJcHing id guilj, The bafclcfs fabric of his tcmp!c of fame then is va- njfhcd; the dcicrted proprlttor oFthat /lior'. lived glare of reputation is now fun' into i aylols oblcurity, like the blifs of Ibme poor cottager, wlio from his dreai'i of mil- lions wakej amidft the i)angs of penury; happy for this iile, could the fatal cfTcdts of his male admiuiliration \a- nifh vriih.thc unmerited reputation of the author. Egicgkriifly delinquent as the m rs have proved themfclvcs in this neglect o^ Minorca, with what accu* ♦iiulated guilt out^ht the}' to be viewed, when the reca- pitulaiion of their whole conduft comes to be confidered by you. , If thofe who have loft Mahon, and permitted your gallant countrymen in hopelels defence to fall the guilt- Jefs facrifices of their negledl, the unavailing yet auguft victims of their own and country's honour, objefts wor™ thy of your adm.iration and affliction, the eternal lligma of an unnatural ad n, have ruined your trade in the Mediterranean^ fubjecfrcd your failors to the captures and llavcry of Barbary pirates, by this one mifcon- du6t, v/hat will be the whole event of ihe aggregate of their imbecillity, wKon by wrong choice o^ commanders in America, and inattention to ihai valuable part of B — fk pofleirions, many provinces are lefto[)en to hollile inroad. May not the French, who have been lome time fending troops to the M-ffiJfippi, this llimmcr become mafters of Georgia ^\\<\ Carolina, fo defencelefs and o[;en; or perhaps fome province more lucrative and beticr adapted to the necclfities of Faance. What have you to expert from yourboafted naval bul- vt'ark, if the lame men continue to direct it, who have already lavifhedin ineffectual dcftination and infufficicnt force ib many millions r Have the French expeditions been rendered abortive in one inftaiice? Have the captures ol their fliips of war exceeded three, equal to our lofs only ? In like manner, behold What jiavc been the fatal con- fequcnccs of their tranladtioii.- ]n Europe -yir cities, ruinous to E i, partial to H r, and yet deftructivc to the welfare of that flate; defcrtion of old allies and . . G 2 moro' .■ 1 n: ^1 (/ ! <; ' b niorc potent fricndfiiips, for conneclicns \\\i\\ weaker an.i more needy powers ; profiifion of public money to hireling mercenaries, national degradation and contempt in forclp^n eyes, imputation of difloyaky or cowardice on yourielve , whill^ yon arc denied the ufe of arms to de- tend yourielver., your wives, and daughters from open enemies, r.nd the facrilcaious hands of venal fcreigncrs, nurtured by your own money, brought on pretended terms of hofpitality, if they Ihould dare to treat you with infolence. In the mean time, your fellow-fubjeifls, fcduced Into the army by promifes of being lifted for three years, and to defend their coimtry only, arc kidnapped, and forced on board fliip by oompullion, treated and tranfported like llaves, God knows where ; to return, God knows when *. Is it not pofTible then, that by continuing to increafe the number of infolenc foreigners, and fending out the na- tive troops, that at length a flandin[^ army of the for- mer may become too formidable to be oppofed by the people of G — / B n, difarmed as ye are ? Or even by ihc military thus daily drrrca(7ng by tranfportation to diihmt parts of the worlds if at length they fhould re- fci.t the v.ant of confidence which is manifeded by thus relying on H ns and II «j, in preference to that loyal body of men. Who then can wonder, if from one continued feries of miftakcs, and flagrant manifeftations of m 1 inca- pacity, the Swedes fliould liiatch this golden opportuni- ty of repolTcHing Bremen and Verdcu^ the Auftrians Sile- jia, the Spanijicis Gibraltar, and the French^ after having j5,^- ^ # ^3. •Public A i) v e r -i- i s e r . Extrafl of a letlcr f,i.>n Plyir.ouih, dattd Mav -I. Yeilcrda) morning col. Cav:fb(L''s nnv-raiicd regiment wai reviewed in the field, and ordered to appear at four o'clock in the at'ternocri oji the dock, without arms ; whioh tliey acfcrd:np,ly did, and, witiioui nivich difiieuliy, rmiciicd into the docJi> yaid, followed to the gates by the panifon, witli their bayonets fixed, and inus- kcti leaded, to keep (_uard whiL ihey v\ti.- again icvicv.cd by general Hoffir, the co- lonel, and admiral /T.'t';yM j alter which the tfn.panies were divided, and a fig- rai-pun being fire>. fvom the adn-iiral's fhip, for all the ln-ats to attend, they were im- ynediately embaiked \\i:j.out any diiturbancc, excipt heavy ccn- plaints at their being fcntalvoad, contrary to the terms of the advcitiiln;cnt, and the promifes made them at ihe^t.tr.t of tiieir inlif jng. fecu- "W"" T 11 weaker money to contempt ''ardicc on ms to de- Tom open "creigncrs, pretended treat you need into y r^cars, and nd forced orted like d knows ^rcafe the t the na- the for- :d by the Or even portation loidd re- i by thus rcnce to :4'' I fee ^• fecnr^d Minorca to themfelvcs, invade the kingdom of Ire/and : jind, to clofe the whole, ranfuck this very ifland ofG — tB n^ Have not the treaty with i-rujiat and defertionof yiuf- trim interefl, laid a probable foundation for the Swedes and Germans to accomphfli the two former ? "Will not the fiiffering Mahon to be taken, and yielding up that harb6i;r to the French,, encourage the Spaniard to at- tempt the third ? and France having no farther objeft for her fleet in the Mcdiierranean, unite and employ ail her fprce in perpetrating the fourth? Will then the ritual polIeiTion of Ibme, and nearer prolpcft of fubduing all thefe places, permit the m -i gang to raife the fupplies for the enfuing year ? Will thofc who have afTifled the m —y, through the lucra- tive view of private interefl, lend them their money when the danger of lofing all exceeds the poffibility of the proHt ? Then will it not too evidently appear, when bankruptcy, dijlrefs, and anarchy are let loofe, that the tinliniited profufion of E — -/h gold for German intereft has at length brought that inundation of evils, fo long prediftcd, on this X^^;,^nrable country ? Who then are friends, and who your foes ? What are thofe men who dare to impute difloyalty to fubjetSts, whofe words and aftions would have contributed to fave this finking Hate, if their counfel had been wiiowed? fliall the tracing a Scotch rencgado jefuit through all his doubling lies and fallacies, to prevent future impofitioa on a few, by the difcovcry, be (as it ought) deemed a laudable and honeft purfuit j and yet the unravelling the mifchiefs which m rs have brought on a whole nati- tion, and attempting to refcue it from their impious hands, be blafted with the appellation of a libel ? Be not, like individual atoms pia^'ing in the fun-beams, de- tached from one another, whirl'd to and fro, as the breath of ra 1 conduct blows amongft ye. Let the ge- neral good, like the general attraftion, hold ye firm to what ye owe yourfelves and country ; otherwife, to v/hat purpoie do yc curfe the 1 that forfbok the caufe of king and country, and praiie the gallant Blakcney who never '\ \ I i! i III 'ra- 7 rfVPr ilrlcilcd histrulV ? Wiiy do yc impoitiinatcly ask, will the Sf^ahia^ds \om \\\c Frrjicb lo \\u:\.c.k. Gibraltar ? AVill the F;r«tiMnvatlc tills kinguoin P Alas! neitlicr im- precaiion nor panccryric, the takmjT or defence of G/^- rcJiar, or even ilic coniinpj of ii\c Fiench, can bring a j:rc'utcr thoiic.li a more liKldcn evil on your condition, Notliino, can long r( hcve or iiivc this nation : if llie lame riders in tlic e.abinet continue to prefide, ye need no ^O' tc\:l}\ enemy to make ye ilaves. Can yc conceive thac the lame men who have brought ruin on your ali'aiis, have either inehuation or abihties to reinflate them in their former hapjy fituation ? inquifitive but fenlelefs of your fate, your fouls feem to have loft all thofc virtuous and quick fenfations, which have hitherto been the intC" parable companions of a free flate. To what purpofe then, when all remedies mufl come too late, will this prcdifted ruin be believed by you ? ^Vhat will then avail that angui/li, wlien you curie your deflroyers and your own inattention? perhaps accompa* nied.v'ith this imbittcring reflexion, that thole wliom ye a(Ii;ted to ruin you have bound your hands in c'^ains, and arc become the arbitrary mailer'; of th*" ivlugttom. Unlcis then yc fuddcniy awake from this trance into which ye are fallen, your foreign or dnieflic enemies wll pre- vent ye, and then yc mull ilecp the flcep of death, Eng- land is no more! However deilructive therefore tliis action of Mr B — g niay appear on enquiry, remember, hc-forc it be too late, once more I cha'ge you to cxaniine vvhethcr the original authors of rh^t evil are not infinitely more cri- niinal ? If it Hiali be f.^iiud, that hi^condu b^as in one inihnce entailed dilgri.cc on this kingdom, let it be ^ccn whether the m is liavc nor, by numberlefs and re- peated acb;, almofi: ovcrvvliciinecl the land wirn inramy; nay tnough he (jould be condeirncd lor want of courage, will it nor be julho enquire whether, if thofc mm have, with unwearied liiiigerice, depreciated every virtue, and lapped ever/ l;.cnouiablc motive of ihehumrai fcul, giv- en power and hono.iVS lo riclieij ^'iib'» •^•^^^^ negk ^led all decrees ^Bsm UVC, and f 55 ) . , tlc{»rec5 of merit; this very imputation or want of rcfo- huion may not equitably be alcribcd to them alio? Is it then a vvoiulcr, thar men in all ran..', corrupted inheail and heart, Ihould be unequal to the tasks whicU honour only can inl'pirc, and virtue accomplilh? Re- member then, if Mr B — g be doomed to punifhmcnt, to wfpich it is not improbable he may, as a fcape-goat oifered toyour relentmentfor Lhe (alvation of the m rs, that this can avail notningin your favour. Will not the fame deheiency of judgment Hill operate in the choice of commanders and deitination of es:pecliti(ins, vvhilli the direction remains in the liime hand? What expectation have ye by his removal, that your national affairs will wear a better lace, or rade the fallen condition of this finking land ? Will it not then be ftriftly equitable, that the fame voice which calls Mr B--^g to a candid examination of his conduct, fliould lunimon alio thofe who have fo long and lo fatally luperiniended the direction cf national affairs to an impartial enquiry, that ye be aicertained why the territories of En^^Und on the Ohio were fhamefuUy con- ceded to xhcFrencb \ to whom, and to what purpoles, your niillions have been laviflied, whether to the ruin or ad- vantage of this illand ; on what account Mahon and Ame- rica were neglected, and H r preferred to aJij and from what caufe it happens, that fix millions and a half in the lart year of queen Anne*% reign, could fuffice for iheintcrellof fifty millions, and the fupport of a vigorou<; war; that now twelve million?, when the annual ex- pence of the debt, by the diminiflied intcreU of money, exceeds not what it was at that time, are not equal to the annual extravagance of the m— — — rs, or produc- tive of one vichM-y ? In her rei^n, though yonr treafures were cxhauflcd, and your lellow-fubje£ls i]a\ightered for Cierman inte- rcfts, ye fuAained the flattc.riiv.v charaftcr of a brave and honell people amongll the nations, and we'-e, by the fu- perb victories which j^our general obtained, honoured and revered; but under the dirccfion of thefe inaufpici- ous m """ rs, ye live wii^houc renown, and die without • * ' ■' "" viaory. \ *« 1/ '' * \ r i Vi«a:ory, fligmatized wlili the infamous biand of thieves and pyrates, by that nation which tlicn dared not to look ye in the face : Shameful akernative! Notwithdandingthis, if before ajufl: tribunal the tranf. a£lions of the m rs fhall be found both honoura' ble and upright, and the approaching fate of B n owing to thcfe irrcfilhble caufes, by which all nations perjfli, and to which they are not acccHary, they will then like fouls pafTcd tlirough Pui-gatory to Paradile, rife from calumny to approbation, from hatred to eitcem, fromi pain to plcafure. What then can be more accept- able to men of integrity, than fuch an enquiry? But if through the evidence of truth, they fhall itand convift- cd of male adin'miflration, let no malevolence prefume to draw comparifons hciween the condu^ ofpaifcd m rs who have luflcred, and the prelcnt who have nor, or attempt incrcaflng the hcinoufnefs of their anions, by truly flating thofe of the fufferers : for the fake of thefe who are yet alive, I wifli you never to recal the decapi- tation of lord 5/r«i/(?r^,or compare his and their conduft* Hevenge is criminal, it is unworthy a BrUan; if the love of your country mufl make yc fcel the paflions to which human nature is fubjefted, remember, though ye are men,that ye are Chriftians alfo; and, notwithflanding the ruin of this land is well nigh completed, implore your f .. n to afford thofe enemies to his realm that mer- cy which they have ever denied his innocent people; and "When he fhall gracioufly preferve them from condign pu* nifhment, that he will mercifully caft an eye of pity alfo on millions of his faithful fubje£ls, and fave them from perdition, by at once removing from his prefence, the jpoilers of the dignity of his crown, and liberties of his fubjedls ; keep then your eyes and attention f^eadily on your prinxie, from him expeft relief j there remains yet one method by which ye may all be faved. /I \ I'J . St' &>: F J N 2 S, \ ,|; I !