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REMARKS
ON
THE MILITIA
OF
CANADA.
KINGSTON:
PRINTED AT THE DAILY NEWS OFFICE.
1364.
J
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PREFACE.
Ill offering these remarks to the consideration of the Canadian public,
and more especially of my brother legislators, I have to apologize for the
haste with which they have been unavoidably thrown together.
I think, however, that they will find the fa(!t3 stated correct, and not
without interest to those who wish to examine this subject for them-
sclvs.
To avoid increasing the length, already perhaps too great, I have
added in an appendix some extracts and speeches which deal in detad
with one or two points only slightly alluded to in the main body of the
pamphlet, but to which I think some attention should be directed.
R. J. CARTWRIGHT.
Kingston, Aug. 26th, 1864.
1!-
"A:
It is now not much leBS tlian four years since the outbreak
of the American civil war disclosed alike to Canada and to
England how completely this Province was placed at tho
mercy of its republican neighbors, so long as it continued in
its present unprotected state, and how enormous were the
resources of the enemy with whom it might bo called to
contend.
It is nearly three years since the capture of the Confederate
Ambassadors revealed with equal clearness the deep-rooted
feeling of jealous enmity by which the bulk of the American
people are actuated towards Great Britain and her dependen-
cies, while it showed also how flimsy were the barriers which
commercial interests could interpose to prevent collision
between the two nations, when once their angry passions were
aroused.
It is two years and more since the rejection of the Militia
Bill brought in by the Cartier Government drew forth from
the English press and from not a few English statesmen the
most emphatic declarations — many times repeated since — that
England could not and would not undertake the defence of
Canada, unless Canada was prepared to contribute, and that in
no slight measure, towards her own protection ; — and about an
equal space of time since the special commission, appointed
by the Imperial and Colonial Governments to inquire into the
position and resources of this coimtry, reported in due form
that without a thorough and effective organization of the
militia, entirely apart from the volunteer c()ri)S, it would be
impossible to make anything like a proper provision for that
purpose.
Nevertheless, in spite of all this, and although the leading
English journals have of late (under a misconception of the
real facts of the case, which would be ludicrous if it were not
calculated to do immense mischief) ceased commenting on our
alleged indolence and apathy, and instead betaken themselves
to expressing their surprise that, to use the words of the
Times, " The Canadian Parliament should have adopted the
" measure introduced by Mr. Sandtield Macdonald almost
" unanimously, after rejecting the much moi'e moderate scheme
" oj M. Cartler and his colleague ! ! /" it is unfortunately too
true that up to the autumn of 186-i not one single company
of militia has been oi'ganized, or received even the miserable
six days' drill which is the maximum permitted, not enjoined,
by the much lauded enactment of Mr. Sandtield Macdonald
above referred to.
K either is tlie recklessness of our present course much
lessened by the reflection that in thus leaving the whole
burthen of our defence to rest on our volunteers in the event
of any sudden emergency like the affair of the Trent, it is
thrown on a body which, however valuable as an auxiliary,
and however creditable to the zeal and patriotism of the people
as apart from the Government, has been again and again pro-
nounced inadequate to such a task, not only by the special
commission above named, but also by each successive Minister
of Militia who has spoken oflicially on the question, and who,
no matter of what party, have all concurred in declaring that,
without in the least disparaging the gallantry of the volunteers,
the simple facts that they have the power of disbanding them-
selves, in most cases at two and in all at six months' notice,
and are drawn in most disproportionate numbers from one
particular section of the population — four-fifths being supplied
p towns and villages, i.e. by about one-tenth of our people
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— would, 2^(f '''^1 niako it unfair, iiulecd imposj^iblc, to treat
them as a regular force available for continuous Bcrvico.
Such, then, in brief, after four years' warning anil -wrangling,
is the position in which we find ourselves — without one bat-
talion of organized militia — without any embodied force whoso
services we could command for six weeks together — relying
on a i»lind belief in tho utter exhaustion of the North at the
cx])iration of the present contest, or on the equally gnmndless
KU})position that if liostilitics occur at any future period, wo
shall be sure to have ample notice, ample time to organize and
discipline our forces and obtain succor from abroad — choosing
utterly to ignore the fact that we are now, f» r the first time in
our history, side by side with a first class military power ; and
that wliile the very geographical position of Canada, wedged
midway between the north-eastern and north-western Bectif^ns
of the Federal States, is avu-e to render her acquisition an
object of inteuFo desire to the ambition of American statesmen
— if not indeed absolutely indispensable to tho preservation of
the remainder of the Union* — so our enormous frontier and
conq)arative total want of back country, coupled with tho
extraordinary facilities allbrded by modern science for tho
transport of large bodies of men at short notice, render it to
the last degree improbable that any lengthened breathing time
will be allowed should the Northern Goveniment ever resolve
on assailing us.
That such an attitude is likely to redound to the credit of
Canada at home or abroad, few, we think, are likely to main-
tain; and w^hile we admit that it is quite possible that no such
invasion may ever take place — especially if proper precautions
were taken to repel it — it still becomes all who have the honor
or the safety of their country at heart, who prefer to hold it by
some better tenure than the pleasure of an arrogant and capri-
cious neighbor, and all who know the vigor and celerity with
which the Americans are wont to push any scheme of conquest,
•Vide Appent'uc A.
i '
to considor well how they would propose to resist the onset of
200,000 or 300,000 Holdiors trained in no lioliday school of war
and led by commanders who, whatever their technical deficien-
cies, arc at least well used to handle largo masses of men, and
reckless at what cost they achieve their end.
Two things at any rate seem obvious — that in a country like
Canada, which is for the most part singularly devoid of natural
defences,* such an attack can only be combatted successfully
by opposing to it a very considerable numerical force of disci-
plined trooi)8 ; and secondly, that while it is always a matter of
doubt how far England may bo able to assist us with additional
soldiery at the critical moment, no one can believe that our
10,000 or 20,000 volunteers and garrisons of perhaps half as
many regular troops could stand the shock for a fortnight;
or that if Canada was once overrun and occupied by the
Americans, they could be expelled without an expenditure of
blood and treasure frightful to contemplate.
It follows therefore that any scheme which proposes to pro-
vide eflfectnally for the defence of Canada must do three thingb.
It must provide a large numerical force.
It must ensure this force being so far disciplined as to permit
of its being embodied at short notice.
And lastly, it must oifer a reasonable prospect of hok'ing the
enemy at bay long enough to admit of assistance arriving from
England, and to allow for the chance of her being engaged in
other wars.
That such a scheme is feasible, and even easy of execution,
we fully believe — nay, more, we are prepared to show that in
the end, calculating the expense over a reasonable term of
years, it will be found both relatively and absolutely cheaper
than the most unsatisfactory system now in vogue, though wo
do not pretend to say that it is capable of being carried into
eifect without some sacrifice on our part, or without the active
and energetic co-operation of the mother country.
•Vide Appendix A.
th
w
9
Before entering on details, however, it may not bo amiss to
contrast the present relative expenditures of the two countries in
this direction. On doing so wo find that England, or rather the
British Isles, with a population of about thirty millions and a
revenue of seventy, expends jmnually rather more than one-
third on her army and navy, while Canada, with a population
of two millions and a half and a revenue of two millions
sterling, has consented latterly, not without reluctance, to
devote one hundred thousand pounds, or one-twentieth of her
income, to the same purpose.
In like manner, while England maintains a standing army
(vide estimates for 1864) of about 146,000 men all told, inde-
]>endently of volunteers or militia, at an annual cost of fourteen
millions* (allowances to non-etfectives included), and while she
sends some 12,000 of these to form the garrison of Canada, at
a yearly cost of some five or six millions of dollars to her, and
a proportionate benefit to the country for whose sake this
expenditure is being incurred — Canada on her part, leaving
army and navy entirely out of the question, has not seen fit
hitherto to i)rovide one single regiment of militia, preferring
to rely wholly on a body of volunteers whoso services are
terminable at brief notice at their own will and pleasure.
The bare recital of these facts, it must be confessed, goes far
to justify the censures wiiich have been heaped upon us for
our lukewarmness in this matter ; and indeed so keenly has the
utter indefensibility of our present position been felt on all
sides, that no party has had the hardihood to defend it in the
abstract, but have rather confined themselves to idle assertions
that there can be no war, and will bo no war bet\. • 3n England
and the North — or else that we will always have a.^andance of
time to prepare for it if it does come, and that at present our
poverty is so great, and tlie expense of any really efficient
scheme so heavy, that it is quite out of our power to do any-
thing. And indeed it is but fair to say in mitigation of the
*The exact sum is £14,844,888 stg. for 1864-5, but this includes a little orer
a millioQ for volunteers and militia. Vide Appendix D.
10
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apparent apathy of the Canadian Legislature, that this last plea
is so far true, that besides being heavily in debt, the amount of
accumulated taxable wealth is relatively much siiialler in a
country like ours ; and that on the occasion of the rejection of
vhe first Militia Bill our Paiiiament had been frightened out
of its proprietj'' by the introduction of a very heavy budget,
showing a deficit of nearly one-fifth as between regular annual
income and outlay — wholly apart from proposed cost of militia.
Possibly, had a British minister been obliged to come down to
the House of Commons with a statement that there was an
annual deficit of fourteen millions for which it waa necessary
to provide by laying on fresh taxes, and a further intimation
that he would require about ten millions more for an entirely
new purpose, he too might have encountered similar diflSculties.
Be that as it may, however, it is apparent that now that the
deficit has been provided for in a most satisfactory manner, all
these arguments ad miseric(yrdiam have lost their force, nor
would they at any rate have affected the main point at issue,
vi?:., under what system the sum voted by the Legislature can
be expended to the best advantage, whether the amount of the
grant be large or small.
Hitherto, so far as we are aware, but three distinct systems
can be said to have been brought under the notice of Parlia-
ment.
Foremost of these stands the measure introduced by the
Hon. John A. Macdonald in May, 1862, shortly after the
Trent difliculty, which proposed, in brief, to enrol from thirtv
to fifty thousand militiamen, and to drill these for one monia
each year for three or five years, and which, whether or not
objectionable in some minor details, was probably the best
suited to begin a piv per militia c"ganization on a scale suffi-
ciently large to be useful in that particular emergency, and
was besides recommended by the special commission, and we
understand approved by the Imperial authorities. At the same
time, while doing full justice to the merits of this plan as a
whole, and as adapted for an extraordinary crisis like that
I *
"
I *
n
which it was designed to meet, we may be permitted to express
some doubts whether it would work equally well as a permanent
system of instruction. There seems reason to think that the
withdrawal of so large a body as 50,000 men from industrial
pursuits, though only for a short time, might cause inconve-
nience, and, which is much more important, that the constant
recurring service for five years would worry and annoy the
men, be much more expensive, and leave them, after all, far
less efficiently disciplined than an equal or even shorter period
of continuous instruction. ,
The second scheme, of which Mr. Sandfield Macdonald is
the author, and which is the one now actually in operation,
can hardly be said to propose the organization of a militia at
all, as it barely permits the Governor to call out a part of the
first class, i.e. the unmarried, militiamen for six days' drill in
each year, without specifying any number whatever ; and in
fact relies almost entirely for efficiency (in Mr. S. Macdonald's
own words) on the establishment of a couple of military schools,
to be attached to regiments serving in Canada, in which the
militia officers were to be trained for some two months, if they
chose to attend — a very useful and proper measure in itself,
but hopelessly inadequate to meet the exigencies of the case.
The third system, which it is the object of this pamphlet to
explain and discuss, may be best described as consisting of the
following propositions : —
1st. That taking into consideration the peculiar position of
Canada, it is indispensable to have a distinct understanding —
most probably a formal convention, treaty if any like to call it
80 — with the Imperial Government, in which the contribution
which Canada, as a Province of the Mn^pi/re, ought to make
towards her own defence, should be precisely defined.
2nd. That it should be laid down as a fundamental principle
that the volunteers were to be regarded purely as an auxiliary
body, and that the chief portion of our expenditure ought to be
devoted to disciplining a certain proportion of the regular first
doss militia, the total number to be fixed by convention as
12
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it
above stated, but supposed likely to range from 50,000 to
100,000 men.
3rd. That as the number required would probably be too
large to admit of their being called out simultaneously — even
were it desirable to do so — they should be drilled in annual
instalments of so many thousand a year, each detachment to
serve for say six months in open field.
4th. That these militiamen, after having once received six
months' instruction, should be thenceforward free from all
further duty in time of peace, but should continue liable for
actual service for a period of ten years, and thereafter be
formed into a reserve, not to be called out except in extreme
emergency.
5th. It was further proposed* — though not at all as part of
the original system, which contemplates the formation of a well
organized militia on a footing suited to the resources of the
country, and so adjusted that it might bo kept up by ourselves
without any extraneous aid — that as Canada was very much
in arrear, and a sudden emergency might arise before such a
scheme could be fairly carried out, a special offer should be
made to the English Government, agreeing to train a double
or treble number of men in the first two or three years, pro-
vided they would* assist us with a loan of money for that
purpose at three per cent, and allow a portion of the troops in
garrison here to be brigaded with and act as instmctors to our
militia — ^by which means, without any actual outlay on their
part, we could probably afford to drill twice as many men as
we could otherwise.
It ought perhaps to be noted in connection with this project
that the demands proposed to be made on England are made
solely on the ground that such a war would be in the strictest
sense Imperial, and not Colonial ; and in the next place, that
althe^igh the author does undoubtedly believe that Canada is
quite able to maintain a militia 100,000 strong, giving each
*yide Appendix B.
It
13
00 to
e too
-even
mnual
tent to
ed six
om all
ble for
fter be
xtreme
part of
f a well
} of the
arselves
y much
) such a
lould be
I doable
are, pre-
fer that
Toops in
rs to our
on their
r men as
B project
ire made
strictest
ace, that
Canada is
ing each
man six months' actual discipline in the manner above detailed,
the system itself might be applied equally well to any smaller
number of men, serving for a shorter period, provided it be not
less than three months; and therefore, that those who shrink
from the cost of disciplining 100,000 men for six months, might
be ready to consent to that of maintaining 60,000 men for
three.
Apart from this, it only remains to observe that none of the
systems we have been endeavoring to describe are intended to
conflict with those fundamental provisions of our original
militia law which have subsisted from the very earliest period
in Canada, and by which every adult male inhabitant between
the ages of 18 and 60 is placed at the disposal of the Govern-
ment in case of war or imminent danger thereof, and are
capable of being called out in due order — ^first, the unmarried
men from 18 to 45 ; pecond, the married men between the
same ages ; and lastly, those between 45 and 60.
This power, whatever its value, remains untouched *, and
when it is remembered that the total number liable to serve
under this law, which is not only unrepealed, but actually
repeated and embodied in our very latest enactment,* is little
short of 500,000 men — that 25,000 youths annually attain their
majority in Canada, and that there are now on our militia
muster rolls nearly 200,000 u/imarried men, almost all under
thirty years of age, all of whom are bound by law to serve in
the militia when called out, it certainly does not seem an ex-
travagant proposal that 10,000 or even 15,000 of their number
should be embodied in rotation for a few months each year,
and taught the duties of a soldier's life by actual experience in
open field ; while it may be afiirmed with some confidence,
that six months of such discipline would imprint the lesson so
indelibly on our hardy rural population that they would con-
*Vide Dep. Adj. Gen. Keport for 1863, by which it appears that we have some
470,000 militia of all ranks, and about 160,000 first class service men. These
numbers are estimated from returns confessedly imperfect, and from comparing
them with the census of 1861 there seems reason to think the figures in the text
are nearer the real number.
14
tinue perfectly able to take their places in the field, at very
short notice, during the whole term for which it is proposed to
hold them liable to active service.*
It is not pretended, of course, that such a force can be looked
on as the equals of regular troops, though it has been proved
repeatedly that they very soon attain a wonderful degree of
proficiency if mixed with a fair proportion of veteran soldiers ;
but it must always be borne in mind, that except in the now
improbable contingency of an immediate contest with the
North, they would probably be found not much inferior to
their antagonists in point of mere discipline, and, which is of
yet more importance, that since it is impossible, in cases where
a large numerical force is to be organized with but limited
means, to give each man more than a few months' drill in any
given number of years, the question is narrowed down to this
— not whether six months' drill is enough to make a man a
good soldier for the rest of his life, but whether, having only
six months' instruction to give him altogether, it is better to
instruct him for that period continuously and once for all, at a
time of life when such lessons have a natural tendency to infix
themselves in mind and body — or whether it is better to call
him out for a week or a fortnight for ten or twenty years in
succession, taking care to allow plenty of time to elapse on
each occasion to enable him to forget any smattering of drill
he may have picked up before.f
It may be added that, independently of the fact that this
plan of training men for a few days every year has proved a
most signal failure in many of the American States, one-half
at least of a militia disciplined by annual instalments would
always be pretty fresh from their instructors' hands ; and it is a
fair question whether the volunteer movement, if judiciously
managed, might not be turned to good account as a means of
keeping a considerable number of these men in a very respect-
able state of discipline. While as regards the continuous length
*yide Appendix C. f^ide Appendix B.
very
ed to
15
of service which some parties may consider objectionable, wo
are convinced, after careful inquiry, that the majority of our
agricultural classes, so far from looking on it as excessive, wonld,
decidedly prefer undergoing the necessary amount of training
once for all in early life rather than be dragged away from
their business year after year, as they must be under any other
system which proposes to create any eflfectnal organization
at all.
These considerations, however, are of the less consequence,
because, while most objectors are willing to admit the superior
efficiency of such a militia, at least as compared with any
other within our power to raise, they are wont to take refuge
in the alleged enormous expense of such a course of discipline,
conveniently ignoring the fact, that although it may make a
vast difference in the ultimate efficiency of the men themselves,
it can make none in the absolute cost to the people of Canada
whether they drill a given number of militia for a fortnight a
year for twelve years, or drill one-twelfth of that number for
six months each year during the same period — unlcES indeed
it should prove that the former operation costs considerably
more than the latter, owing to the larger and proportionately
more expensive drilling apparatus, staff, etc., which would be
required to impart the least semblance of instruction to a large
number of men suddenly called together.
But waiving this point, and taking it for granted that all
parties, convinced of the practical uselessness of these six
day militia musters, tacitly allow them to drop into oblivion,
as there seems much reason to suppose will be the case — it is
evident to demonstration that we are about to expend within
the next ten years, in the mere payment of staff and volunteers'
allow^ances, a sum fully adequate to train and discipline a most
respectable militia.
In proof of this it is only necessary to call attention to the
following figures, which can be verified from our own official
BtatisticB : —
*!W
t lu
I f
16
Ist. It appears that in the years 1863 and 1864 Parliament
has voted about a million of dollars for military purposes,
though it is probable the entire appropriation may not be
expended.
2nd. That we are now committed to an annual expenditure
in this direction of some half a million of dollars, which, if the
militia get any drill at all, will probably be increased to three
quarters.
3rd. That up to this moment every penny we have spent
has gone to staif or volunteers, with the exception of the grant
to schools for officers.
4th. That it is manifest, therefore, if we go on as we have
begun, we will expend a sum of five millions of dollars, perhaps
much more, within the next ten years — while as sole result of
this large expenditure, we will have possibly 10,000 or 12,000
volunteers (the latest returns to March, 1864, show the average
attendance at drills to be under 7,000 men, and we know they
have not increassd since) free by operation of law at the end
of each term of five years, even if they do not choose to avail
themselves of their right of disbanding on giving two months'
notice, and all for the self-same cost for which we might obtain
a most efficient* militia 50,000 strong, every one of whom
would have undergone his six months' service, and who would
be completely at our disposal if required through the whole
period of vigorous manhood I
Startling as these facts really are, and incredible as they
may appear to those who are ignorant of the prodigious
wastefulness of a false economy and a Radically bad system, we
think a very little reflection will serve to convince our readers
not only of the real extravagance of our pr «sent arrangements,
but also of the truth of the remaining pf ,rt of our proposition,
viz., that it is quite practicable to drill, leed, pay, clothe, and
maintain any reasonable number of our unmarried youth at a
cost of $100 per head for the six months — or at least that there
•Vide Appendix C. : I ; =^
"^
'H
[iture
the
three
17
is noting prima facie absurd in declaring that a lew thousand
lads of eighteen or twenty with no families to provide for, may
be support 'jd comfortably and even remunerated, in spite of
all deductions, at the rate of three shillings per working day,
which is quite as high a rate of wages as they would probably
obtain in most parts of Canada. Even were it otherwise, and
were the drawbacks for their rations and other inevitable
deductions so heavy as to absorb the great proportion of their
wages, the sacrifice of a few months' time in early life would
be no great price to pay for being taught to defend their
country efficiently, and would be amply compensated by the
moral and physical advantages which every man, high or low,
derives from being subjected at some time or other to strict
military discipline and systematic training in any athletic
exercise.
Such a sacrifice, if sacrifice it be, is one which every country
has a right to exact in time of need, nor do we fear that many
will be found to murmur at the proposed scale as insufficient if
they will reflect that even now, in spite of many exceptional
circumstances which tend to augment the expense in that
service, the total outlay for an American private soldier is
very considerably less than $300 a year in gold, probably
about $120 for the six months — ^while in the British army,
which we may fairly take as our proper standard, the average
cost of the individual foot soldier is decidedly under £40 stg.
per man, showing that $100, the sum namcc by us, is a very
fair estimate for the half year.* ^ - *
It is of course true — and we call the especial attention of
our readers to the fact, for nothing has tended to create more
confusion on the subject — that the cost of maintaining a
standing oflrmy^ complete in all its branches, staff, cavalry,
artillery, and so on, is vastly greater, in proportion, than that
of maintaining an equal number of trained infantry ; so much
greater indeed, that while the extreme cost of the individual
British foot soldier is less than £40 stg. a year (it appears to be
*yide Army Estimates for 1864 and Appendix D.
i
i
i'
T
"•*»»
18
just that sum if allowances to officers and to higher paid portions
of the service are included), the average cost as a member of
the standing army is swelled to fully £100 stg. per man.
But it must always be borne in mind that it is of the very
essence of our plan to provide a militia and not a standing
arrm/j and to train that militia by actual service in camp
during the summer months, thereby dispensing with all the
costly and cumbrous paraphernalia of stores, barracks, arsenals
and the like, and reducing our expenditure to the very lowest
minimum consistent with the health and efficiency of the men
— a minimum which certainly ought not to exceed the sum
usually spent on an English foot soldier.
If, indeed, the Imperial authorities, not content with this,
were to call on us to provide a standing army adequate to
defend a country one thousand miles long by some fifty deep,
at the odds of ten to one, the bravest might well decline the
hopeless task ; but England, if we understand her meaning
aright, does nothing of the kind.
All she asks, or rather all she warns us of, is simply this —
thai since it is impossible in her peculiar position to keep more
than a small number of trained soldiers at command for a
sudden emergency, it is absolutely necessary that we should
provide a reasonable contingent of disciplined men, the which
if we do, she on her side, as becomes the richest nation and
the greatest naval power in the world, will not stint to supply
us to the utmost with ships, with stores, with arms, with
leaders, with a nucleus of veteran troops, and in one word,
with everything we may need to give strength and stability to
our levies.
As to those cavillers who are perpetually harping on the
disturbance of the labor market, and the demoralization of our
youth by idling about in camps, it is enough to say as regards
the first ground of complaint, that it is as hard to suppose the
withdrawal of 10,000 or even 15,000 lads per annum out of
200,000 first class militia (being an average of say ten per
township or one hundred per county throughout Canada),
19
this,
would bo likoly to interfere seriouBly with industrial pursuits,
as it is to beliovo that our liardy backwoodsmen, half of whom
think nothing of passing whclo winters in the lumber shanty,
scores of miles beyond the furthest verge of settlement, would
bo alarmed at the prospect of spending a few summer months
in open field — though this objection also has been gravely
advanced.
While, as to the other plea, that a camp life of the kind
proposed would tend seriously to demoralize the youth of thh
country, surely these virtuous critics hav« forgotten that there
is the widest possible difference between die life of a finished
soldier in a garrison town and that of a recruit in a camp of
instruction ; and further, that Jioy are most signally mistaken
if they suppose that discipline of the nature and extent of that
to which our militia would be subjected would allow them to
lead a very idle existence, or that six months* steady training
in athletic exercises is one whit more calculated to dispose
those undergoing it to profligacy or debauchery than the com-
paratively idle objectless career of many of these very youths,
if left to vegetate on their fathers* farms.
And lastly, passing by these trivial objections as ones which,
If applicable at all, apply equally to any scheme for creating a
sufiicient force, we would fain ask those Canadians who, careless
of the vast issues involved, still murmur against the expense
incurred by any effective measure of defence, whether, when
they cry out against an annual expenditure of £200,000 stg. or
£100,000 stg. as excessive and disproportionate to the resoiu'ces
of a country numbering near three millions of people, they are
aware, that if we were to adopt the lowest European standard,
which is about one in every hundred of the population — a
proportion which most political economists are agreed is not
too great in any well regulated government — we should be
called on to maintain a regular standing army from 25,000 to
30,000 strong?
Or to pursue the comparison a little further, and assuming
the cost of the English army as a fail* criteiion, are they aware
20
ill:
t i
^1
i: V
f I
that the oxpenne of maintaining a standing army of baroly
2,000 men for one year would equal that of embodying 10,000
militia for six months; or in other words — and we hardly know
how we could well put the whole case more forcibly before the
reader— that in ten years we might raise and discipline one
hundred thousand militia, giving each man half a year's
instruction in the manner proposed, for precisely the sum
which it would cost its to support a standing army of two
thousand men for the same period.
Let us be honest in this matter. We cannot pretend, with
the example of the American States before us, that it is out of
our power to maintain an army of 2,000 men if we choose to
do so; but if we will not do this, or its equivalent, let us at
least cease to delude England and ourselves with idle profes-
sions of loyalty and anxiety to preserve the alliance between
us, while refusing, as a government and in our collective
capacity, to take any sufficient steps to contribute towards our
own defence.
Let us remember that so far, nothing like a fair or definite
proposition has been submitted to the Imperial authorities.
Let us remember that if their demands have in any instance
appeared captious or excessive, they have been made in sheer
despair of seeing us take any action of our own accord.
Let us remember, too, that there are many reasons why such
a proposal should emanate from our own Government, who
may be supposed to know our wants and resources better than
any other parties.
Rarely, if ever, have any two countries been better able to
supplement each other's deficiencies, and rarely have the
elements of strength and weakness been more curiously com-
mingled in any case than in ours.
On the one hand, constituting in ourselves a State far from
contemptible in mere numbers and intrinsic resources, forming
an integral part of one of the greatest empires now existing,
and completely protected from attack on all sides saye one—
^p
barely
10,000
yknow
fore the
ine one
year's
?ie swm
of two
id, 'vrith
Is out of
[loose to
3t us at
) profes-
aetween
jUective
ards our
definite
ities.
instance
in sheer
L
7hy such
Bnt, who
^ter than
r able to
lave the
isly corn-
far from
forming
existing,
76 one—
4
21
wo yet find onrsolvcs, as regards that single enemy, entirely
without defences of any kind, natural or artificial, beyond those
which our own arms and the distant succor of the parent state
can afford.
Ourselves again, without even the semblance of a navy,
without arsenals, without veteran soldiers, and with a half
exhausted treasury besides, we yet possess a brave, hardy, and
intelligent population, containing the best possible material for
the formation of a most efficient militia, and wo are at the
same time most closely connected with a country which is
able to supply us in abundance with the ships, the stores, the
experienced officers, and the available wealth we stand in need
of, and which is deficient only in that one thing which wo
might easily contribute, namely, a body of disciplined men
numerous enough to repel a sudden and vigorous onset.
>/ In our antagonist, on the other hand, we have to deal with
a people who, though possessing, and certain to possess, during
the lifetime of the present generation at least, a very powerful
even if imperfect military organization, and able to hurl an
immense force against us at a very short notice, are withal
likely to emerge from their present conflict seriously exhausted
and incapable of any very lengthened effort for some time to
come.
Surely, we may ask, do not all these indisputable facts prove
beyond a doubt the absolute necessity of coming to some clear
understanding with tho Imperial Government, and of providing
such a force, if we provide any at all, as may enable us to resist
the severe but brief attack of an enemy who knows well that
his only chance is ' to overwhelm us at once before tardy
assistance can arrive ?
Doubtless, in approaching the English Cabinet on this subject,
the offers we should make ought to be of a substantial nature,
if only for the reason that while a proposal to provide a well
trained militia 50,000, much more 100,000 strong, would beyond
question ensure a most attentive consideration of our requests,
it is hardly likely that a demand for aid to carry out our
3Si
%
(
i
H
f f
I' ■
99
present most iliiDBy schomo of defonco could oven obtain a
hearing.
As regards the convention itself, what we believe wo might
reasonably offer on the one hand and demand on the other, is
briefly this.
We should agree to provide within a certain fixed time a
militia of not less than 50,000 men, who should all undergo a
given period of service in open field.
But wo might fairly ask in turn, that the British Oovemment
should allow part of their garrisons to be brigaded witli our
militia iu their camps of instruction, and so soon as a section
had finished the stipulated term of service, that they should
lend us a certain specified sum at three per cent, and, it might
be, supply the militia themselves with arms, drill instructors,
and perhaps uniforms, gratis or at reduced rates.
For it must be remembered by any who object to such
requests as unreasonable, that the task of Canada after all is no
light one, and that such a militia so trained and embodied
would be placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government
and their commanders in this Province in a very different
sense from that in which any body of volunteers can be said to
be so, and consequently (the more especially as they would
remain available for some ten or fifteen years) demands may
properly be advanced on their behalf which it would be
preposterous to urge in the case of a transient and irregular
force such as volunteers must necessarily be.
Neither should it be overlooked that such assistance, though
of the most material benefit to Canada, need not cost the Home
Government one farthing, with the exception of the arms and
clothing, which being actually in store in Quebec, as we are
informed, might possibly be thrown in by way of encourage-
ment in the event of our agreeing to raise the larger number
of militia, a number which it may be as well to observe would
equal one-^fth of our whole adult male population.
Of the great direct advantages to England herself which
would result from the Buccessful establishment of such a
3tain a
) might
>tIior, iB
time a
dergo a
irnment
itli our
section
' shonld
,t might
TUctorB,
to Buch
all iB no
nbodied
smment
different
B Baid to
Y would
odB may
ould be
rregular
, though
le Home
krmB and
s we are
courage-
number
re would
If which
such a
23
ByBteni, both Jii cMiablin}^ licr to roduco l»or garriHonfl hero In
tiinu of i)ea('o, and in freeing lier from the noecsHJty of making
thuHO sudden extraordinary exertions to reinforce us whicli
have already cost her so much, wo have hardly room to speak ;
nor for the same reason can we do more than hint at the
dcrtirability to us in Canada, even if our negotiations failed, of
removing from ourselves the onus of negligence and indilfercnce
to our own defence, and tlie extreme importance in every point
of view of knowing exactly to what extent England could or
would come to our assistance.
At any rate, bo that as it may, whether England aid us or
whether she refuse to aid us — whether we pay six per cent or
three per cent — whether we spend five millions or ten — it is
equally important that the money we do spend Bhould be laid
out as profitably as possible, and that it assuredly will not bo
under a system which at best only promises to supply us with
Bonie 12,000 dissatisfied volunteers for the self-same outlay
which might produce a most excellent militia of at least four
times their strength.*
In conclusion, we may bo pardoned for saying, that momen-
tous as this question undoubtedly is — momentous as it is to
decide on the best mode of employing our resources and to
ascertain how far or on what terni^ we can count on the
assistance of Great Britain in this particular emergency — it is
of yet more importance that some distinct line of policy should
be settled on as between the parent state and her colonies.
At present it would almost seem as if England, after having
spent two centuries and ransacked half the world to find Bites
for new colonies — after driving off every European rival who
attempted to secure the least fragment for himself — and even
waging the bitterest hostilities with such of her own colonies
as had grown strong enough to aspire to independence — was
suddenly resolved to exert all her energies to rid herself of the
troubles and responsibility of presiding over the immense
empire which is springing up around her.
*yidQ Appendix 0.
24
With this in the abstract wo can have no qitarrel. If the
duties of the position be too great for her strength, England is
in the right to abdicate it as soon as possible ; but it is useless
to deny that the cor tant semi-official proclamations of her
anxiety to be rid of ns, and her inability to protect us, no
matter what the cause or origin of wa/r, while at the same
time she liersclf will take no active step to sever a connection
which on her own showing is full of peril to both — are not
calculated to increase our respect for British statesmanship, or
to lessen the undercurrent of dissatisfaction which is sure to
exist in such a case.
Kor, while we own frankly that wo do not think Canada has
hitherto ta,ken reasonable precautions for her own defence, can
we by any means admit that it lies in the mouths of English
statesmen to speak of our supineness as if they had always
maintained their own country in a perfect state of defence,
much less to talk of the past connection of England with the
Canadas as if it were one long record of benefits and f'^vors on
the one side and apathetic indifference on the other. They
may have forgotten, but we have not, that their only claim on
the inhabitants of one large section of Canada was the forcible
subjugation of their forefathers — while the retention of the
remaining portion is mainly due, not to the success of their
generals or the wisdom of their statesmen, but to the devotion
of a little band of detenuined loyalists who preferred to sacrifice
every jTospect they had in life rather than fail in their
allegiance to the British flag, and whose descendants have,
once at least since then, held their own against as desperate
odds as ever England herself has had to contend with.
Neither can we allow — even without discussing vexed ques-
tions of former interferences in our domestic politics — ^that we
have derived those peculiar benefits ftovL our alliance with her
which most Englishmen choose to assume we have enjoyed.
We believe, indeed, that our union with the British empire
was and is productive of great benefits, both morally and
socially ; but at the same time there is no denying that in order
"!!:
25
to secure those advantages we had to submit to great immediate
material sacrifices, so great indeed that nothing but the peculiar
race and religion of the bulk of the Lower Canadians, and the
peculiar circumstances which attended the foundation of Upper
Canada, could have prevented this country from casting in its
lot with the Union in former days.
Now, no doubt, the position is widely diflferent ; but, even
now, it would be well for our English friends to remember
that wo have risks to encounter and arguments to advance as
well as they.
They may say, and doubtless with tnith, that but for the
position of Canada they might go to war with the United
States, or rather with what is left of them, without the least
fear of consequences.
We on our side might maintain with equal reason, that but
for our alliance with England we would have no fear of going
to war at all.
And if it be urged that we are no help, but vather the
reverse, in carrying out the Imperial policy, it is fairly open
to us to retort that, as we have no voice in deciding what tliat
policy is to be, we ought not to be taxed heavily on account of
or exposed defenceless to dangers which that very policy may
inflict upon us; and that when we find English authorities
expressing their determination not to allow their 10,000 or
12,000 troops to be sacrificed because of our apathy and
neglect, but by no means equally explicit in their assurances
of adequate support even if we do exert ourselves to the utter-
most — ^we Canadians, with certain episodes in our own past
history before our eyes, may be pardoned if we have some
uncomfortable doubts how much worth the assistance of the
mother country may prove should she chance to be engaged in
other wars at. the critical moment, or how far the ravage and
invasion of the richest and most populous parts of Canada
wcild be compensated to us even by the greatest ultimate
success or the most complete blockade or devastation of the
Yankee seaboard.
26
In fact, it is not too mucli to say that there are one or two
questions yet unanswered, floating dimly in the minds of the
people of Canada, and raising doubts which we fear will have
to be removed before any great national effort is to be expected
from them — and these are, first, whether the English Govern-
ment are really willing to assist us to this full extent of their
power; and secondly, whether, granting their willingness, their
and our combined resources are sufficient to hold out a reason-
able prospect of defending Canada as a whole against American
invasion.
As to the firet, the English Government will, wo doubt not,
speak for itself at fitting time and place ; but as to the second,
which is the more important, inasmuch as a very great
immber have secretly taught themselves to look upon it as
impossible to protect Canada, at least beyond the point to
which British fleets can ascend the St. Lawrence, it may not
bo amiss to state briefly the grounds on which a contrary
opinion is advanced. \ -
It may be admitted at once, as now clearly evident to all
parties, that the old United States could have overpowered all
resistance had it chosen to hurl itself on Canada as it did on
its own seceding States ; but granting this, it by no means
follows that it is equally in the power.of the Northern fragment
to crush us altogether, or even to maintain a violent and
protracted warfare.
Kor is this opinion urged merely from considering the extent
to which their resources have been diminished by their present
conflict, severe as it is, but still more from the fact that in any
future war they would never dare to fling their forces upon
us in the same headlong fashion they did upon the South, so
long as that South exists as a powerful and bitterly hostile
nation adjoining their frontier for almost as many hundred
miles as theirs does ours ; or, in shorter phrase, that their power
for mischief is no longer to bo measured as thirty millions
against three, or even as twenty, but rather as 20 — 10 is to 3
— a vastly different problem. ^
27
We may add, too, as a consideration by no means to bo lost
sight of, that whereas the North all through this present war
have been receiving enormous supplies of men and material
from Europe, and at the same time extracting the bulk of their
real reveniie from their customs, all these resources would bo
at once and hopelessly cut off in the event of a war with
England, and they in their turn would find themselves sub-
jected to those privations and inconveniences which have
heretofore pressed so heavily on tlio South — without the
stimulus of fighting for home and liberty which has alone
enabled the latter to bear up under the ordeal.
And though it would be both unsafe and unwise to lay too
much stress on the exhaustion of tho North ; and though wo
do not doubt that even after tho termination of tho present
straggle they could still contrive to array an army of two,
three, or even five hundred thousand men, in any cause they
had at heart, still we think, in view of the imperative necessity
they would labor under of maintaining a large force in reserve
to watch their Southern frontier and protect their seaboard, all
must admit that it is scarcely probable they would be able to
support such an armament for any great length of time, or
that they would ever have more than 250,000 men at the
outside at their disposal for the conquest of Canada — a force
which, how great soever, is yet not so overwhelming but that
the combined resources of England and of Canada might suffice
to meet it, if the former can furnish but 50,000 regulars to
back tho 100,000 militia which, as we have shown above, we
hold it quite possible for Canada to supply on her part.
Large as these numbers may sound, we liave only too good
proof in the recent history of America that it is abundantly
j^osaihle to make such exertions ; and at any rate as resrards
ourselves, we have a right to say that such odds, great as they
are, ought not to terrify men fighting on the defensive and on
their own soil, nor are they at worst one half as formidable as
those which our own forefathers overcame in 1812, or as the
gallant Southerns have defied for four long years of desperate
.1;
; t ft
38
i
struggle, unaided and unrecognized by a single European
Nor is it to be forgotten while discussing this subject, that,
as nothing tempts to crime so much as apparent facility for its
commission, so, on the other hand, the bare knowledge of the
fact that the conquest of Canada would require so large an
armament would operate most powerfully to prevent the
attempt ever being made — not merely from the evident mag-
nitude of the enterprise, but also because that very magnitude
would necessitate such preparation and consequent delay as
would give American statesmen time to reflect, and English
and Canadian ones opportunity to prepare to repel it.
^ But so long as Americans believe (and we admit, looking at
our existing state of preparation, with every appearance of
reason) that an army of 50,000 men, easily collected at a
few days' notice from any part of the North, could overrun
Canada to the very gates of Quebec, before the news could
well reach London — just so long as this continues possible, so
long will the temptation to feed fat their ancient grudge and
repair their losses at our expense continue to be almost too
great for human virtue to withstand, though if it were once
well understood by the people of the North that war with
England for the acquisition of Canada meant a standing army
of half a million, and a bloody, protracted and desperate
contest, neither Congress nor Cabinet would bo likely to drift
into it unawares, or to choose that path as the easiest route te
popularity at all events.
For the rest, we must say plainly that while yielding to none
in our anxiety to see Canada do her duty as a Province of the
Empire, it is not in the interests of Canada alone that we wish
te have that duty clearly defined, and to know whether the
Empire in its turn is prepared to fulfil its part towards its
Province. ., .^^. f .. ,
We desire to see Canada take her proper place as an ally,
and no longer a mere dependency on the mother country, and
we admit distinctly that up to this time she has not folly
29
recognised her obligations in that behalf. But that once done
— those obligations faithfully discharged — we are prepared to
claim for her the privileges as well as the duties of such a
station, and if England disdains our alliance, or professes her
inability to perform her fair share in a contract for mutual
defence, then, in Heaven's name, let us bring our connection to
an honorable close before it involve us and them in further
difficulties, and perhaps in a ruinous and unprofitable contest.
The people of Canada, at least, have no sort of desire to
become a drain or an incumbrance on England. And if the
people of Great Britain have really come to the opinion that
they derive no adequate benefit from their connection with us
— if they are really of opinion that they have nothing to lose
in losing control over half a continent — and in losing the
Ganadas they will assuredly lose every foot of ground they
hold in British North America — ^if they consider that it will
redound to their credit and advantage to let the keys of the
North Atlantic drop into the hands of a bitter and jealous
rival, the only one, too, who has shown the power and the
will to dispute their maritime supremacy — all we ask is that
they should acquaint us with their decision quickly and
explicitly. *Only it is well that the British public should know
that we in Canada are not prepared to admit that England
maintains her connection with\i8 wholly on our account and
for our benefit ; and further, that although unwilling to part
so long as the tie between us is one of mutual affection and
respect, we have no wish to continue as a drag and a burthen
ontheEmpire.
' And much as we hear of the risks and the difficulties to
which England and English garrisons are exposed in defending
Canada, it is impossible for us not to remember that such risks
are trifling after all compared with those to which near three
millions of people would have been exposed, for a quarrel in
which they had no sort of concern, had war broken out at the
time of the Trent imbroglio ; and that heretofore, whenever
disputes have arisen in matters where wo were directly inter-
i
11
80
W
m
ested, British statcsraanship has invariably delighted to display
itself at our expense, as in barinj; the channel of the St. Law-
rence to attack, and in surrendering our only path to the
sea through British territory, and thus throwing great and
needless obstacles in the way of our confederation for mutual
support with the maritime provinces. , . -. .;
Of the fact that in the last attempt to conquer Canada we
were left to struggle for full two yeare with very scanty succors,
we say the less, because we are fully awai'o that England at
that crisis was scarce able to assist us ; but if it be made a taunt
to us that our loyalty has risen marvellously since it became
manifest that annexation to the North could hardly benefit
us much in a pecuniary point of view, we may retort that
after disregarding for some sixty years the great material
advantages that union would have bestowed upon us, it is
something more than ungenerous to talk of abandoning us
now when our fidelity to England has lost us all the gain ol
half a century of unexampled progress, and her desertion
might leave us to bear a large share of burthens which we had
no voice m mcurnng. -■■•'- •* < ' « •' ,*.«.!
t^ For it is mere trifling to deny that without a still further
schism among the Northern States, the position o{ Canada or
of British Nortli America, as an independent power, is quite
untenable as yet, whatever [t may become at some future
period ; and therefore, that abandonment of Canada does not
mean the erection of a friendly neutral state, but, in all human
probability, the addition of three and a half millions of people
and the whole North American seaboard to a foe, already too
powerful, who will know well how to extract from such an
acquisition resources and means of mischief of which English
statesmen are perhaps but dimly aware.
Certainly, the events of the last few years, if they have
taught England nothing else, ought at least to teach her rulers
that there lurks deep in the minds of the American people a
feeling of jealous and unreasoning enmity to England, which
needs but a pretext and an opportunity to break out into open
^JLVjLr ._'!„
w ja'.^i*itr> c^i\*^ti
31
name — and if they snppose that allowing the North to acquire
possession of British North America, and with it a hundred
times more facilities for assailing English greatness in its most
vital point — is at all likely to diminish their vindictivenQss
and their determination to wreak a full revenge for the
thousand imaginary, and, it may be, some few real, wrongs
they believe themselves to have sustained at our hands, then
they have paid but little attention to the whole current of
American affairs for the last two generations, or to the effect
which four years of savage civil war have wrought in the
national character.
As for us, though outwardly it may seem as if our fate
depended most on our own exertions, it will turn in reality,
as is oftenest the case with dependencies, however powerful,
on the tone and attitude of the mother country ; hence it is
tliat it is doubly needful her decision should be made and
acted on without delay. ^ ^ ji;. ... , ,.; -;x,yi
• If Canada is to bo held, coute qui coute, we have no more
If Canada cannot be kept, and England wishes us to ask for
our independence— let us know it at once. • '
If, on the other hand, England will stand by us to the last on
certain conditions, it is high time those should bo stated and
our course be shaped accordingly.
In any event, it behoves both parties to put an end to the
vacillating and irresolute attitude in which they stand, each
doubting the other's loyalty or ability to protect or defend —
afraid to break off, and yet unwilling to come to an under-
standing — afraid to give offence, and yet practically in some
measure taunting and alienating each other — >afraid of war, and
yet afraid to act on the supposition that such a thing is
It is time, we repeat, that this state of things were brought
to a close — time that English statesmen should avow their
deteriminations, and caU upon us for ours.
i
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n
it
This at least wo liave a right to require of them ; and if
hcforo tliis he (lone Canada should bo conquered or even over-
run and occupied for any length of time in a war originating
out of some question of Imperial policy, or which had for its
object avowedly the wresting of this country from the domi-
nions of Great Britain — it needs but little foresight to perceive
that the humiliation and soreness which such a calamity would
inevitably produce in the minds of the Canadian people would
be sure to react in the shape of a feeling of bitter resentment
against the parent State for having neither protected them
against such attack, or, if unable to do this, for having allowed
them to drag on a connection which was likely to terminate
in such a result.
How far such feelings would be modified or intensified by
tho reflection that we were ourselves considerably to blame, is
an open question, though wo fear that tho knowledge that
Canada individually has no sort of ground for quarrel with the
l»Jorthem States, (for an assault on us for tho express purpose of
revenging themselves on Great Britain cannot surely be treated
as arising out of any policy of ours, and they would find easier
modes of compelling us to enter their confederacy than open
war, were our connection with England at an end) — would go
far to produce the latter consequence.
And yet, loath as wo are to believe in the bare possibility of
such an issue, none can deny that this or something like it
would bo the natural and appropriate termination of a state
of things like the present, if Canada continue to decline taking
any effective measures for her own defence, and if England
persist in making audible proclamation to all the world that
her colonies are in future to lie at the mercy of any opponent
strong enough to overpower them — nay, that she would be
rather thankful than otherwise to any one who would relieve
her from the care of possessions which it would appear to be
out of her power either to preserve or to relinquish. i
A'i
u
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APPENDIX.
A.
SPEECH ON THE ADDRESS, AUGUST, 1863.
Mn. CARTWRIGHT.— As I have the misfortune to differ from the
member for Brant in toto, in the view he has taken of the position of the
country, I would like, with the permission of the House, to state the
grounds on which I have based my opinion. I confess I have much
hesitation in addressing the House on a subject of so much importance.
But I may, perhaps, be pardoned for reminding the House that there is no
other subject at all approaching this in importance in which so complete
a revolution has been effected by the events of the last few years — none
other in dealing with which we will be so completely deprived of the
benefits of past experience. Formerly, if we had met together to delib-
erate on the best mode of defending ourselves against a like danger, wo
might have fairly argued that it would require many months for the foe
to concentrate x)r organize his forces — that his preparations could never
be made in secret — mat it would be time enough for us to prepare when
we saw his troops assembling on our frontiers, and that even if the worst
came to the worst, as between two brave undisciplined mobs, both
equally brave and equally unorganized, the one which fought on its own
soil, especially if backed by even a very small number of veteran troops,
was almost sure to win against the heaviest odds. Now, however, as
every member of this House well knows, the whole conditions of the case
are completely changed ; and though I would not flinch from the struggle
because it may have to be maintained against heavy odds at the outset— -I
trust no man who hears me would do that — still it is worse than idle to
disguise from ourselves or from the country that now, if war does come
upon us, we shall have to deal with an enemy who has become, whatever he
may have been before, a first-class military power in every sense of the word
— who can bring against us, at the very shortest notice, an immense body
of well-trained troops, amply provided with transports and munitions of
war, and who, despite the deficiencies of some of their leaders, have
proved again and again, on many a hard-fought field, that they possess
their full share of we courage and endurance we are apt to arrogate
as th' birthright of our race. And therefore, Mr. Speaker, although
I am very far from despairing of the safety of our country,
because, as I said, wo may have to hold our ovm against
heavy odds at the outset, I cannot but feel that no ordinary exertions
and no ordinary precautions will be needed to enable us to maiataia
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84
ourselves against an antagonist like this, especially when wo remember
that we occupy a country which is, at this moment, one of the most
defenceless in the world— which, neither by climate, by geographical
position, or by its natural or artificial fortresses, presents one single
obstacle to the invaders' path — which, in one word, if assailed, must rely
almost solely on the courage and the discipline of its sons to stem the
torrent, at least till distant succors can arrive. Such, Mr. Speaker, is the
counti7, and such the position, for whoso defence wo are called to pro«
vide ; nor do I believe we can point out, along a frontier of more than a
thousand miles, one single place of importance, which is two good
days' march from American soil, or one single town, except, perhaps,
that in which wo stand, which could retard an invading army for an
hour. And it may bo well for us to bear in mind that though there are
numerous instances in which small States, relatively weaker than we are,
have baffled all the attempts of superior powers to subjugate them to
their sway, there are none, none at least which I can recollect, in which
the contest has terminated in their favor, except in cases where they were
{>rotected by inaccessible mountain ranges, as in Scotland or Switzer-
and, or by numerous artificial defences as in Holland, or by the very
vastness and solitude of the territory which it was attempted to subdue,
as with the United States themselves some eighty years ago, and with
the Southern States to-day ; or else, gentlemen, mark mo, by the skill
and forethought with which their government had trained their people
to meet the coming shock. And am I to bo told, Mr. Speaker, as some
hon. gentlemen have not scrupled to hint, that, granting all I say is true
— granting that we do actually lie helpless at the mercy of the American
people, still there is no need for apprehension here — that we may all
stay quiet, each man under the shadow of his own vine and his
own fig tree, because the American people are too great and too
mighty a people to care for tho acquisition of such an unconsid-
ered trifle as this Canada of ours — because they are too wise, too
calm, too generous, I suppose, to assail their ancient foe in her only
vulnerable quarter ? If we are to bo told, and if the country is to be
told, that we are in no danger, because it is not worth while for the
Americans to go to war for the sake of obtaining possession of
Canada — that they would have no object to gain in conquering us — then
I beg to call the attention of hon. gentlemen to one or two geograph-
ical facts, which can neither be gainsayed or denied, and which go lar,
indeed, to show that if this present struggle terminates unfavorably for
the North, if the South does succeed in establishing its independence,
then, Mr Speaker, then, and in such case, our Northern neighbors will not
only have the strongest possible interest in obtaining possession of
Canada, but what is more, they must obtain it, unless they are prepared
to submit to yet further disintegrations of their still enormous empire.
I do not know whether it has attracted the attention of the members of
this House, but it is nevertheless the fact that the battle of Antictam
itself was fought a short two hundred miles from the southern shores of
Lake Erie, and that General Lee's outposts during both this and the
preceding campaigns are said to have penetrated to within five or six
days' march of the same quarter — or, in other words, that if the State of
Virginia succeeds in accomplishing her secession, the great regions of the
North-West and the North-East must remain as it were banging apart,
connected only by a comparatively narrow isthmus of temtory, and
lH^iiKliUXi ■•-' :» ;»A^.*.: -
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VJ tpf* >J^«fc'i
35
liable to be rent asunder by a hundred accidontfl. While on the other
hand, juBt between these two great divisions of the North-West and thu
North-East, filling up the gap, and, as it were, the very key-stone
required by manifest destiny to bind them together, lies. Canada, so
completely enveloped by their protecting arms that an air line drawn
from St. Paul's, Minnesota, to the northern boundary of the State of Maine,
wonld pass full one hundred miles north of the most northern portions
of Canada, at any rate one hundred miles north of Ottawa and of Pene-
tanguishine. Are we to be told, Mr. Speaker, that there is no danger
here, that here is no temptation to a warlike and ambitious people?
Why, sir, there is not one single statesman in Europe, or in America
either, who would not tell us that the bloodiest wars have been waged,
from time immemorial, for objects not one-tenth part as valuable to thu
people that coveted their possession. They would toll us that God has
provided but two main arteries for the Continent of North America ; that
no dominant State can by possibility exist on this Continent which does
not possess the absolute control cither of the St. Lawrence or the Missis-
sippi. They would remind us that the fate of North America has been
fought out, once and again, on the very ground on which we stand, and
they would warn us that men who, like the loaders of the Northern States,
have trodden under foot their own most sacred traditions — who have
sinned against light and knowledge— who have kindled a conflagration
which may yet wrap the world in flames, and which will most certainly,
I fear, consume their own rights and liberties, and done all this solely to
gratify the insane lust of boundless empire, are not the men who will
pause to count the cost, if any chance presented itself, to repair, at our
expense, the losses and tno humiliations they have incurred. And,
though it is true wo shall not have to face them alone (if face them wo
must), although in our mother-country we possess a most powerful and
determined ally, ready and willing, if only time be given her, to aid us to
the last, sustained by whom, I doubt not, we shall oe able, if we only do
our part faithfully und well, to roll back the fiercest tide of invasion from
our shores ; yet we must never forget that such is the nature of England's
power, such the conditions of her greatness, that the very constitution of
her empire compels her, more than any other people of equal strength, to
scatter her armaments far and wide, over land and sea, and that her aid,
though certain, can hardly help being tardy, too tardy to avoid thu
worst consequences from our negligence, if we cannot provide some efifec-
tual means of self defence till help can come. All that she has to give I
doubt not we shall have in time of need. Arms, supplies, funds, leaders,
ships — ^if we can use them — ^will be furnished without stint ; but men,
trained men, in sufficient numbers to repel a sudden invasion she cannot
supply, for the best of all reasons, that she has not got them to send ; and
even the mightiest nation cannot extemporise them at an hour's notice,
as our Northern neighbors have learned to their cost. Men, therefore, I
repeat — trained men in sufficient numbers to repel a sudden attack — are
what the Imperial Government, and I think justly, demands at our
hands ; and surely the very instinct of self-preservation would teach us to
comply with the request, when we know that our enemy, in six weeks,
could place one hundred thousand men on our frontier, while our protec-
tress could scarcely, in as many months, with pain and difficulty, bring
together half that number to our aid. How and in what manner that
demand can best bo answered, are matters which can be more fitly
H
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86
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discusaed hereaftor. All I can say, in conclusion, Mr. Bueakor, is this,
that I trust thia House will then show itself mindful that it is the choice
of a people who haye made it their proudest boost that, of all England's
hunored colonies, they alone are the representatives of men who sought
this northerp land, not driven forth by the pressure of penuily at home ;
not through restless love of change ; but because they preferred to give
up house and land, to risk life and liberty itself, rather than swerve one
inch from their duty to their country and their sovereign. And I trust
also that they will show by their zeal and liberality on this momentous
occasion that they are determined to wipe off the stain which untortu-
natelv now rests on the loyalty of Canada, and which I believe every
man in this House, bo his politics what they may, regrets as deeply as
I do.
SPEECH ON HON. J. SANDFIELD MACDONALD'S
, ., MILITIA BILL, SEPTEMBER 1863.
Mr. OARTWRIOHT.— Mr. Speaker— I entirely agree with the
honorable introducer of this measure in believing it to bo one of momen-
tous character; probably, all tilings considered, the most momentous
which has ever been submitted to a Canadian Parliament. We may
escape a war with the Northern States, or we may not. I for one believe
that that result is to a great extent under our own control, and that tho
moment which sees us placed in an effective position of defence, sees the
danger largely diminished, if not altogether removed. But war or no
war, every reflecting man must clearly perceive that the time has come
for a thorough reconsideration of our relations with the mother country
— that we must either rise to the rank of allies and confederates of Eng-
land, at least so far as North America is concerned, or else must prepare
to sever a connection whicli we lack either the will or the ability to
maintidn. So long as we remain allies of England, and so long as England
continues mistress of the scab, there is but one foo whom we have to
dread ; and the question is practically narrowed down to this, whether wo
are prepared to face the risk of a collision with that enemy, or whether,
rather than run that danger, we prefer to burst the bond of union and
establish ourselves as an independent State.
We have lived in peace and safety under the el\4dow of tho British flag
for flfty years, but still I think there is no denyir.g that, even though we
be the cause and temptation to war, our chief di'i;ger does arise from our
connection with England. Were we once an in« lependent State, I do not
believe the Northern States would feel at all disposed to molest us,
because they know that in all likelihood the course of events would soon
induce us to unite our fate with theirs, or that even if we proved blind
to our manifest and glorious destiny, a little wholesome pressure on onr
commerce would soon bring us suppliant to their feet. I need hardly
say, Mr. Sj>eaker, which way my own personal wishes tend. All I desire
is that this House should see clearly the issues which really lie before us.
We know that Canada will probably ultimately become independent ; and
if any man or any considerable party in this country honeaUy believe that
87
the time has como to prepare for becoming independent, in the intcrents
idike of England and ouraelvoH, their ari^uincnts miKtit deserve coiiHidora-
tion. At any rate, Mr. Speaker, it would be a fur more lionorable, far
more respectable, attitude to declare themselveH convinced that we ou^ht
to prepare ounelves for independence, than, while outwardly profetwing
the utmost loyalty and anxiety to maintain our union, yet practically
refuse all efficient co-operntion even for our own defence. Be sure, Mr.
Speaker, the people of England will not much longer bear patiently with
the listless indifference our government, if not our people, have displayed,
or consent to add to their own heavy burthens the task of entirelv
providing for the protection of a nation three millions strong, wlto will
not take one effectual step on their own behalf. I wish to be clearly
understood. I have not the least desire to impeach the loyaltv of any
man or any party in Canada. I fear no treason or treachery at the hands
of any Canadian, but I do fear the apathy and listlossness shown in
many influential quarters, and the determined blindness which refuses to
admit th'j least possibility of war. I have no wish to tax the patience
of the House by a recapitulation of the arguments which I used on a
previous occasion to prove the extreme deroncelessness of our position,
and the temptation it presents to the cupidity of our American
neighbors. It is scarcely worth while to argue these matters with men
who will persist in expressing their confidence in the peaceable and
amicable intentions of a people who, according to their own official
statistics, have embodied every third male adult in their country for the
prosecution of a war of conquest — who will persist, in the face of a
thousand proofs, in denying that that people is actuated by a feeling of
the bitterest hostility, if not to us, at all events to the nation of whom
we form a dependency — and who ignore, apparently at least, the fact so
well known to every student of American nietory, that, from the very
moment the pil^m fathers first sot foot upon its shores, the absolute
dominion of this continent has been an object of the intensest desire, not
only to them and their (descendants, but to every Englishman who
inhabited it. Surely, Mr. Speaker, we Canadian" ourselves a living
proof of the desperate struggle the two great powers of Europe so long
maintained for its mastery, must know full well how deeply rooted is
that idea in every American mind, even if we did not now see that
passion culminating in one of the most desperate and desolating wars
which history has ever recorded. But I will not attempt to convince
men who are prepared to assert that we are now in an effective state of
defence, or that the American people do not entertain feelings of hostility
towards England, and have no end to serve in conquering and annexing
us. All these things must be taken for granted, Mr. Speaker, before the
necessity of discussing such a measure as that now before us could ever
have arisen, and we must presume that the government at least are fully
convinced of the truth of these assertions before they would have
consented to introduce it.
As regards the details of this Bill, Mr. Speaker, I shall only say that I
believe many of them may be turned to good account ; and at any rate I
am glad to find that the honorable Minister of Militia has distinctly
enunciated the principle that the country must rely mainly on her militia
for defence. I am as proud as any man, Mr. Speaker, of the zeal and
devotion of our volunteers, and I believe this country lies under a very
deep obligation to them for preserving the courage and loyalty of our
38
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if S ;
I;:
people from the imputations which would otherwise have been thrown
upon them. Bu'; for all that, I must say plainly that the more I reflect
on the subject, the more I am convinced that their proper place is only as
an auxiliary body to a regular force, whether it be composed of an
effectively trained militia, as it should be with us, or a standing army as
with other powers. I believe, sir, that the opinion of the people of
Canada, if fairly ascertained, would be found to agree with what I have
just expressed ; and that they, too, while justly proud of the patriotic
spirit of our Volunteers, do not, nevertheless, desire to place their chief
reliance on that movement as a means of defence. I believe that the
feelings of the people of Canada have been much misrepresented on this
subject ; and while it may be true enough that the utter inefficiency of
previous militia organizutions may have prejudiced then somewhat
against the various systems which have been proposed for their accept-
ance, it was really but the defectiveness of the systems of which they
complained ; and that once satisfied of the possibility of creating a really
effective militia, they will submit without a murmur to any expenditure
which this House may see fit to impose. But I believe also, Mr. Speaker,
that the instinctive good sense of our people has long since convinced
them that it is impossible to obtain an effective solmery, or even an
effective militia, without subjecting them to some continuous discipline
for a reasonable length of time. They know, sir, that something more is
needed to make a man effective than mere knowledge of a few elemen-
tary manoeuvres — that he must be taught how to handle his arms, how to
march, how to encamp; must, in one word, be subjected to actual
military discipline for a length of time, which, without rendering him
unfit for the ordinary duties of life, would make him efficient at short
notice for the whole remainder of his existence. Depend upon it, Mr.
Speaker, we cannot safely entrust the defence of a country to the amuse-
ment of a holiday afternoon. If we arc ever to have an efficient force,
that force must be trained by continuous discipline. I repeat, it is idle
to suppose that a soldier or a militia man needs onl^ to be perfect in his
drill, or even to possess a tolerable aptitude in the use of his weapons-
he requires to be trained to habits of obedience, to acquire the capacity
of undergoing fatigue; habits which can only be attained by some
temporary separation from the ordinary pursuits of life. And I must
say, that I believe it has been a radical defect in many of the systems
which have been proposed for our consideration, that they have all pro-
ceeded on the idea that it was possible to render men effective by training
them for a few weeks or days in each successive year, and then turning
them loose to forget during the remainder of the period all they had
gained in each brief interval. Why, Mr. Speaker, what would be the
result were we to apply such a principle to any ordinary scheme of
education ? I put it to the common sense of this House, were you to take
a lad from the plough and attempt to instruct him in the commonest
branch of learning, on the system of teaching him for two or three
weeks "in each year, and then dismissing him to forget during the
remaining fifty all that he had previously acquired — I ask this House
how long this hopeful system might be prolonged before he would have
mastered the first principles of knowledge ; whereas, had one-tenth part
of the time thus fruitlessly wasted been spent in continuous instruction,
he would have learned the lesson once and forever. Why should we
apply to the education of our citizen soldiery a system which all would
39
admit to be hopelessly vicious were it applied to any other pursuit what-
Boever. Let this House fix the number of men whom it thinks should
constitute the permanent militia of Canada — let it decide how many
months of consecutive training would suffice to render these men really
efficient — ^I am contending for the principle not for the details — but let us
at least determine that the contingent oi Canada, be it large or small, shall
bo e£fective as far as it goes, and that every man it contains shall be so
far trained that he may be able without shame to take his place in the
field beside the soldiers of England.
The principle I advocate, Mr. Speaker, is neither new nor untried. It
is one which has long been in use among many of the European powers,
with slight modifications, and notably, I believe, in Prussia, from the
time of Frederick the Great downwards ; and it is one which, in somo
shape or other, has always been adopted by small States as the only
mode in which they could possibly raise and discipline a force at once
numerous enough and effective enough to oppose a barrier to the onset
of a much superior foe. It is not my intention, Mr. Speaker, to enter into
any minute details of this measure ; but for the sake of illustrating my
meaning — though I beg the House to remember that I introduce my
figures for tht, sake of illustration chiefly — let us suppose that the House
saw fit to decide on raising and disciplining a militia of 50,000 strong,
to be raised say 20,000 next spring, 20,000 the year after, and thencefor-
ward at the rate of 10,000 men in each successive year, each man to be
subjected to at least six months consecutive actual training (in the open
field if possible), and to be afterwards freed from all further military
discipline, but required to hold themselves in readiness for a period of say
five or ten years in case of actual war, thenceforward to constitute a body
of reserve, only to be called out in circumstances of the most urgent
national peril. Can any man say that such an efibrt would be out of fair
proportion to our population and resources ? I shall not stop to point
out how useful our Volunteer system might become, were such a militia
once trained and distributed through the country, or what privileges and
exemptions might fairly be accorded to these men during the time they
remain liable to active service. Neither will I do more than hint at the
great benefits both physical and moral that would accrue to the vast bulk
of our youthful agricultural population from being subjected to a little
wholesome military discipline in early life. But I do say, that while no
man can justly maintain that our youth would be exposed to any undue
hardships by being obliged to undergo a single summer's training in a
country which sends forth tens of thousands of hardy lumbermen and
woodcutters to brave all the rigors of our Siberian winter, so neither can
any man justly declare that such an exertion would be disproportionate
to our resources and our numbers, whether we take for our standard of
comparison the efforts put forth by the American colonies on many occa-
sions prior to their separation from Great Britain, or of our own
forefathers in the war of 1812, or of the smallest and poorest of the
American States at the present moment.
Why, Mr. Speaker, even the little State of Maine has already furnished
a quota of more than 40,000 men to the Federal Army ; and Illinois,
Indiana, and Ohio, have each severally contributed contingents, as I am
informed, of more than 100,000 each ; and will any honorable member
dare to rise on the floor of this House and declare that it is impossible
40
It I
III :
for Canada, with a population five times that of the former, and I belier*
double that of some of the others, to raise and discipline 60,000 men for
one single summer for the purpose of her own defence, or rather, and
which would be the fairer mode to describe my proposal, to train 10,000
each 8ucc«»siye year ?
I know well, Mr. Speaker, that many, eycn of those who admit the
substantial truth of my assertions, will take refuge in the deplorable
position of our finances as an all-sufiicient excuse for refusing to take one
really effective step in our own defence. If this be all, Mr. Speaker, if
this House be willing to admit the truth of the principle, though
unwilling to incur the cost of carrying it into effect, then I say that,
humiliating as the confession may be to a country like ours to admit that
our own extravagance has deprived us of the power to protect our very
existence, it would be far better to state our real position frankly and
honestly to the Imperial Cabinet, and obtain from them as a temporary
loan, at low rates of interest, the wherewithal to put ourselves at last in
a reasonable state of defence. I know something, Mr. Speaker, of the
temper of the English people, and something of the temper of the men
who now stand at the head of their affi&irs ; and I feel perfectly assured
that, once convince them that we are at last thoroughly awake to the
duty of our own defence, once propose a really satisfactory military con-
vention, and there is no fear that they will turn a deaf ear to our request.
Moreover, there are good and sound reasons why England should gladly
accede to such a proposition. We know that the mere effort of reinforc-
ing her garrisons in North America is stated to have cost her first and
last some ten millions of dollars, and that she is even now annually
expending some $6,000,000 in the maintenance of those very troops ; and
it is hardly to be supposed that her government would hesitate to lend
us the utmost amount which we would require rather than sink perhaps
five or six times the sum in the probably useless attempt to repair the
consequences of our neglect.
But at any rate, Mr. Speaker, be this as it may, let England aid us or
not, I must altogether refuse to believe that while it was possible for us
to expend more than forty millions of dollars in improving our internal
communications, and to squander millions upon millions m erecting an
extravagant and costly pile of buildings at Ottawa, it is utterly out of
our power to incur any extraordinary outlay for the preservation of our
national existence — or that a country like ours, equal in wealth and
numbers to many an independent European Kingdom, can afford to
declare itself a cipher in affairs of peace and war, to act as if it were
practically wholly unconcerned with the question whether or not it
should be made the battle-field of contending armies — ^the theatre of all
the miseries which we have seen infiicted on States that but a few
months ago deemed themselves as safe from the scourge of war as we
can possibly hope to be. And if this were not enough, did we need any
additional incentive to do our duty, we might find it in the consideration
that whatever course we, the premier colony of England, may decide ou
pursuing, will in all likelihood materially affect not only ourselves but
the whole circle of colonial relations with the Empire. If we return a
sufficient answer to England's just demand — if we show that ours is no
fictitious lip loyalty, but that we do earnestly desire to maintain our con-
nection with our parent land, and are willing to bear a fair proportionate
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share in tlie burthen of our own defence, it will go far to prove the possi-
bility of erecting our whole colonial system into a great British confederacy.
If, on the other hand, the people of this country see fit to declare that the
effort is beyond their ability, and that the interest of England no less than
ours requires that we should put an end to a union which, so long as we
continue in our present position, is indeed but a source of weal^ess to
her and danger to us, why then we might have some right to congratu-
late ourselves on our discretion, if not on our loyalty. But if after three
years' warning, we can find no better answer than is contained in this
mockery"of a measure which I hold in my hand, then I do assert, Mr.
Speaker, that we shall stand for ever degraded as a people who, whilo
unable to deny the existence of tiie danger, yet showed themselves devoid
alike of tlie courage to prepare to meet it manfully, or of the prudence
to withdraw from it while there was yet time.
c.
SPEECH ON THE ADDRESS, 24th FEBRUARY, 1864.
Mk. CARTWRIGHT.— Mr. Speakeu— Before this paragraph of the
Address be finally disposed of, there are a few points to which I wish to
call the attention of the House. It will be in their recollection that there
was much difference of opinion last session as to the proper system to be
pursued, both with militia and volunteers. Now, sir, though I am far
from asserting that I have been able to give this matter the attention it
deserves, I may be permitted to say that I have taken some pains during
the recess to make myself acquainted with the condition and feelings of
our Volunteer Force, and the result of my inquiries has been to convince
me that there is a pretty gener»'l and widespread feeling of discontent
amongst them at the treatment they have received from Government. I
must add, in common justice to the Hon. Minister of Militia, that
some of their complaints did not appear to me very well founded, or at
least that they entertained expectations out of the power of the Province
to gratify, if any expense is to be incurred on behalf of the regular
militia. But, at the same time, after making all reasonable deductions,
no oru can deny that there is much in the position in which they find
the:iicjil' o;^ to justify dissatisfaction. Right or wrong, Mr. Speaker, it is
certuiM iat they are the only embodied force now existing in Canada,
and it if c y natural that they should hold themselves entitled to the
special C)^.f4i deration of Government, so long as that continues to be the
case. I have been charged myself, though most unfairly, with depre-
ciating the services of the volunteers. So far from that, I say now, as I
have always said, that they have done a most excellent piece of service,
and that their country will ever owe them a deep debt of gratitude for
throwing themselves into the breach till some proper organization can be
matured — an organization which should distribute the burthen, as
statesmen ought to do, evenly over the surface of the whole nation — not
leave it as now so arranged as to crush to earth the willing few. But
1 ly also, Mr. Speaker, that now that time has been given, it is absurd,
Ir h: unworthy of the Government, to wrest these gallant fellows' devo-
tion into an excuse for throwing the whole burthen of the defence of the
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country upon them — much more, to make it a taunt to men who step
forward to relievo Canada from the ignominy which their factiousness,
their mismanagement, had brought upon us, that, forsooth, the volunteer
movement was a failure, because, though avowedly intended as a
temporary substiflite, avowedly designed as an auxiliary to our regular
militia, it is not of itself enough to do what it never pretended
to do — is not able, with a force drawn from one-tenth of our
population, to defend not merely that portion, but the whole remaining
nine-tenths to boot I Sir, the volunteer movement is not a failure,
but I very much fear Her Majesty's present government in Canada is
a failure — notably in their militia department, and, par excellence, in
that part of it which concerns our volunteers. Why, sir, the whole
system as it stands is an absurdity and an anomaly: the very titles
are misnomers, the very provisions of the law self-contradictory. Wo
have volunteers serving of their own free choice, subjected or attempted
to be subjected to strict discipline — enrolled militia bound by law to do
duty exempt from all drill or training whatever — we have hon. gentlemen
in one breath denying that six. • 'i.^Xa* continued instruction is enough to
qualify men to serve on an emerg r 'a another asserting that six weeks
in a military school will not only. L. ' n to act as officers, but even to
instruct others In the elements of hi dership. We have them at one
moment declaring that there is not the slightest ground for apprehending
danger from the United States, and straightway proposing to appropriate
one-seventh of our available Income to the task of preparing against such
a war. We have them in one and the same speech avowing that volun-
teering was a failure as a means of defence, nnd that it was their fixed
intention to have no other means of defence whatever ! 1 ! If the volun-
teers are to be maintained, as I hope they may be, let us treat them as
such, not attempting to enforce strict discipline upon men over whom,
from the very nature of the case, we can never exercise any real control,
not harassing them and perplexing ourselves with innumerable regula>
tions, or fretting ourselves too much as to how they attain proficiency —
but as is done in England, and as was suggested, I believe, by my hon.
friend the member for Kingston, assigning a certain sum per man to each
efficient corps, and confining our interference to taking careful precau-
tions that no payment be made for any man who is not fully up to the
proper standard. Such a course, I have reason to know, would be at
once far more popular with the volunteers themselves, and far more
economical to the public purse, besides being far more consistent
with what I hold to be the only true theory with regard to volunteers,
viz., that they are to be looked on purely as an auxiliary body, most
useful, most admirable in that respect, but no more to be considered
our sole or even chief means of protection than our volunteer country
justices the sole and final dispensers of justice throughout our commu-
nity. As to the existing Militia Law, Mr. Speaker, for the amendments
to which I see so much credit is claimed, I am not disposed to find
much fault with it — in fact, I believe that with a few alterations it could
be made to suit our purpose well enough. Neither do I know that it would
be advisable to ask for any great addition to our present annual expendi-
ture for military purposes — our yearly outlay being perhaps as much as
we can well afford to incur — but I do deliberately assert that having
regard to our peculiar position, to our internal resources, our means of
defence, our relations to the Imperial Government — and lastly, but not
43
leaatly, to the strength and character of the only antagonist whom vo
have to fear, it would bo hardly possible to spend our money to less
advantage than wc arc now doing ; and, in a word, that given the prob-
lem how to get through the largest sum with the least beneficial result,
our present system would afford an almost perfect solution. It seems to
have been assumed on both sides, Mr. Speaker, that that system having
no other merit that I know to boast of, perhaps because it had no other
merit, must therefore of necessity be a cheap one. The House, and
the country, too, seem to have imagined that it was impossible that
gentlemen whose sole claim to office lay in their supposed frugality, could
have committed themselves to a scheme which, as I shall presently show,
costs us double, nay quadruple, per head more than any other need do if
properly managed. This assumption of cheapness I can by no means
acquiesce in. I maintain, and I think the House will agree with me
therein, that there is but one mode of thoroughly testing any of these
systems. Given the total expenditure for military purposes during a
sufficiently long period, and given also the number of men you have fit for
service at the end of that period, and the total sum expended, divided by
the number of efficient men so produced, will give you the exact cost per
man under that particular system. Now, sir, apply that test to our
present arrangement, and what do wc find ? Why, we find that every
efficient volunteer now produced costs the country on the average more
than $40 per head per annum, that is to say, over |200 each in every
period of five years, and over $400 in every period of ten years ; and what
is more, that even without exercising their right to withdraw on giving
a few months' notice, every volunteer isj ipso facto, free from further
service on the expiration of five years — while on the other hand, a most
effective militia, ready for service during the whole period of manhood,
might be trained and disciplined for a cost of $100 per man, perhaps less.
These are facts worth attention, Mr. Speaker; and surely no man, whatever
his prejudices, will be found to declare that a well drilled militia 50,000
strong is -not in every way preferable to one-fourth their number disso-
luble at a bare six or two months' notice : and yet this is precisely the
result we will arrive at, on the expiration of any given period of ten
years, the cost in either case being exactly the same. It would be easy,
Mr. Speaker, to go on to multiply examples of the absurdities and incon-
veniences of a system which absorbs one-third, if not one-half, of our
whole appropriation in mere allowances to staff officers and instructors,
and which professes to be administered by a gentleman who combines in
his own person the three-fold offices of Minister of Militia, Attorney-
General, Premier, and, we mi^ht almost add, whipper-in for his whole
Cabinet. But, as time is drawing on, I shall merely take occasion to notico
briefly two or three objections which were thrown out to-day against the
scheme which I had the honor of submitting to this House last session.
As to the cost, which is so great a stumbling-block in the minds of many
hon. gentlemen who have chosen to confound the cost of maintaining a
militia with that of a standing army, and who are terrified by visions of
stores, arsenals, barracks, and I know not what costly and cumbrous
paraphernalia thereto belonging, let it suffice to assure them that my plan
contemplated nothing whatever of the kind. All it proposed was simply
this, to assemble a certain proportion of our first-class service men, and to
encamp them for a few summer months in convenient positions in
company with a few detachments of regular soldiers, and my estimates of
44
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the cost were in fact based on the amount requisite for maintaining an
ordinary English or American foot soldier for an equal time, assuming only,
— what we have every reason to expect we may rely on obtaining, m any
such attempt — the active and cheenul co-operation of the mother country.
As to the much more important question whether the amount of training
proposed, viz., six months, would suffice to make them always thereafter
capable of serving in the field at a few weeks' notice — I must speak with
some caution — smce while perfectly certain that it would go much
further towards effecting that end than a much longer period of desultory
instruction, with frequent breaks and long intervals between, nothing
but actual experience could determine this point absolutely. This, how-
ever, may be said, which is indeed well known to every trainer and
gymnast, that when once a certain proficiency in any athletic exercise
has been attained, the person attaining it, though without constant
practice he very soon falls off from any high degree of proficiency, is
always able, so long as health and vigor remain intact, to regain his
former skill in a venr short period; and further, thaC most men can
be brought to the highest point of perfection they are ever likely
to reach in six months or less. If this prove true, as there seems every
reason to suppose it may, with regard to military habits and exercises as
well as athletic pursuits, it would go far to prove my case — at any rate u
brief experience would show whether it is correct or not. As to the
other objections, which, so far as I know, are these three, the injury to
industrial pursuits and demoralization to the young men themselves
caused by withdrawing them from their occupations and shutting them
up in camps, and also the necessity of obtaining them by conscription or
ballot, I have to reply that the slightest consideration might have shown
those hon. gentlemen that the withdrawal of so very small a number as
one hundred lads per county for a single summer can hardly by any
{)ossibility retard the commercial or agricultural interests of a country
ike ours, while as to the demoralization consequent on collecting a few
thousand young men in camp in proper situations, passing over ttie very
bad compliment which these gentlemen pay to our Canadian youth, in
supposing mutual contact is likely to corrupt them to so alarming an
extent, it is as well to remember that theirs will be no life of idleness or
garrison routine, but one which, if properly managed, will provide abun-
dance of healthy exercise for body and mind. And I may add, I have
yet to learn, Mr. Speaker, what there is in strict and systematic physical
training to predispose men to that profligacy and debauchery which some
affect to dread, and which is in truth rather the invariable concomitant
of an effeminate and luxurious mode of living. As for the necessity of
obtaining the re(]^uisite number by ballot, though it ought to be enough to
point out that this is the mode prescribed by our existmg law, I shall just
observe that no man has a right to assume that our militia would refuse
to volunteer for the purpose till the experiment had been tried and failed,
but that even if tney did decline to come forward in that manner,
it would be as absurd to leave the country undefended on that score as to
leave our taxes imcollected because the contributors would not pay unless
compelled. There are some powers, Mr. Speaker, which no nation and no
government can possibly resign without giving up the power of maintain-
ing its very existence ; and if there be one of those wmch is plainer than
another, it is that of requiring that a reasonable number or its inhabi-
tants should submit to be trained to defend themselves and their country
45
in such manner as tho government of that country shall prescribe. But
this, Mr. Speaker, is a point on which it ought to be unnecessary to dwell
at length, nor do I wish to detain the House by entering into more minute
details on the general sut)jcct, though I do unhesitatingly assert that tho
sole and only result of our present system, whether persisted in for five,
ten, or twenty years, will be to leave us in possession of a small and
comparatively inefficient force, over whom we can have no proper
control, for the self-same cost which might furnish us with double, qua-
druple, or octuple their number of disciplined militia, who would always
be thoroughly at our disposal, and who, with the assistance we might
expect from the mother country, would be able to maintain their ground
right manfully against all comers. And I assert also, that while every-
thing that has transpired — (outside the walls of this House, that is to say)
— since the time of the Trent difficulty, has gone to show that thepeoiAe
of Canada, as a whole, are anxious and earnest to do their duty m this
matter, loyal to their ?.llegiance, ready to bear any burthen Ministers may
see fit to impose for that object, those hon. gentlemen on the other hand
have squandered most valuable opportunities and failed most deplorably
in taking advantage of the facilities which the then temper of our people
afforded them for making every reasonable provision for the defence of
this Province. Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, considering the circumstances
under which those hon. gentlemen obtained power, this is not much to
be wondered at — perhaps it may be that their factious folly on that occa-
sion has tied their hands and prevented them from taking those steps
which their better judgment would have dictated had they left them-
selves free agents on this question. Be that as it may, though I fear they
have flung away chances which may never return, I do trust most
sincerely that ere this session be brought to a close we shall see
something like an adequate system of defence set on foot, and may bo
able to return to our homes with the knowledge that we have at last
obtained some better safeguard against danger than our present most
flimsy organization — some better security for peace than the guileless
moderation of our Yankee neighbors — some better means of repelling
attack than a revised militia muster roll.
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D.
The figures from the Army Estimates for 1864-5 arc as follows:—
Ist. Clothing £ 596,694 stg.
2nd. Provisions 520,301 «
3rd. Allowances and Pay 5,051,257 «
Total £6,168,252"
This includes pay ef regimental staff; officers, cavalry and artillery, and
a few other items not at all requisite to include in estimating the true
cost of a foot soldier. Prices of provisions, fuel, and so forth, arc also
much higher at most stations than in Canada.
The number of men (exclusive of those serving in India) is 145,654 of
all ranks, and the total vote demanded for them amounted in 1864-5 to
£8,619,087 stg., of which about two millions and a half were for forage,
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special staff allowances, and some other items no way directly affecting
tuo cost per head.
The remainder of the expenditure required to make up the whole sum
of £14,888,884 stg. consists of votes for stores, ammunition, works and
buildings, and so on.
In the Comhill Magazine for August, 1864, appears an analysis of the
exact cost of a British soldier per week, which wo subjoin : —
«, d.
"5} lbs. of butcher meat, at 6d. per lb 2 10
101 lbs. bread, at lid. per lb 1 4
Expenses of vegetables, tea, coffee, milk, &c., at 2id. per day 1 Si
Washing at jd. per diem 3)
Lodgings, at 3d. per night 1 9
Pocket-money (after deducting washing, and expenses of
clothing for which the soldier pays), at 4d. per day 2 4
(The dragoon clears about 6d.) ,-
Olothing fonnd gratis, value about JC4 per annum 1 6
Advantages of the absolute certainty of these allowances at
the same rates, no matter what the coat to Qovernment
may be, of medical care and attendance, and full pay when
sick, the value of bounty and free kit received on enlist-
ment, the likelihood of a small pension if invalided, pros-
pect of good-conduct pay, promotion, Ac, estimated at. . . 1
Total weekly substantial receipts of the soldier under the
present r«^tm« 12 6"
From this, which appears approximately correct, the probable cost of
rations for a large number might be set down at from 5s. to 6s. stg. per
week. As before observed, there is no reason why this should be
exceeded or indeed equalled in Canada.
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