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33 WIST MAIN STRUT

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LETTER

•

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1 ^^i >^^

TkOit TUK

liON. TIMOTHY PICKERING,

A SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES

•♦. y " FROM TBB ','"*'^""''' ",'** ■<

V*- ■ '"

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS,

EXHIBITING TO HIS CONSTITUENTS

< -- ,.1

" s ■

A VIEW OF THE IMMINENT DANGER

rip

OF AN

1 . (■;,-•.

UNNECESSARY AND RUINOUS WAR.

ADDRESSED TO

MIS EXCELLENCY JAMES SULLIVAN,

COVBRNOB. OP TBS tAID JT^l,

lOSTON :
fKINTBO Br CKKBNOUaH AND tTtBHIfi,

■ M W M I M It >»»M«f>

1808.

#*'?&■* "H

^,-

TO THE READER.

THE following is a publitk Letter. It is very properly addressed
to the Govwrnor, and through him to the Legislature : by this channel it
would have come most regulady to the eye of the whole people. It is not
known to the publishers why it has not been already printed for the use. of
the pubUck ;— whether it is only delayed, or intended to be entirely with-
held. But a copy, which was sent from Washington, after the original, to a
private friend, has been happily obtained for the press.

If at this day any honest citiecn can doubt of the great credit and
weight to which the facts and opinions of the Writer are fairly entitled, such
citizen is referred to the Writer's enemies for information. Among these
many of the most respectable will say, that his pure patriotism and intrepid
publick virtue have honoured the name of Republican in our country, ancl
would have honoured the best of the Romans, in the best days of Rome.
A//MI, Manh 9/£, 1808.

CITY OF WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 16, I«ft§.

SIR,

IN the even cuirent of ordinary timei} in
addrefs- from a Senator in Congrefs to his conftituents might be
difpenfed with. Ta {iich times, the proceedings of the Executive
and Legiflatur^ of the United States, exhibited in their ,^/tVi4^,rf
Blight be fufficient. But the prefent fingular condition of our
country, when its mod interefting concerns, wrapt up in myftery^
excite univerfal alarm, requires me to be no longer filent. Perhaps
X am liable to cenfure, at fuch a crifis, for not fooner prefenting, to
you and them, fuch a view of our national affairs as my official fitu*
ation has placed in my power. I now addrefs it to you, Sir, as the
proper organ of communication to the legiflature*

The attainment of truth is ever defirable : and I cannot per*
mit myfelf to doubt that the ftatement I now make mull be accept*
able to all who have an agency in direding the affairs, and who are
guardians of the interefts of our Common'o/ealth, which fo materiaUy
depend on the meafures of the Government of the Nation. At the
fame time, I am aware of the jealoufy with which, in thefe unhappy
days of party diffenfions, my communications may, by fome of my
conftituents, be received. Of this I will not complain : while I
earneftly wiHi the fame jealoufy to be extended towards all pub-
lick men. Yet I may claim fome (hare of attention and credit-
that (hare which is due to the man who defies the world to point,
in the whole courfe of a long and pubUck life, at one inftance of
deception, at a Angle departure from truth.

The EMBARGO demands the firil notice. For perhaps no aft of
the National Government has ever produced fo muoh folicitude, or
fpr^ad fuch univqrfal alarm, Becaufe all naturally conclude, that a

meafure pregnant with incalculable mifchief to all daffes of our fel-
low^itizens, would not have been propofed by the Prefident, and
adopted by Congrefs, but for caufes deeply affeaing the int-refts
and fafety of the nation. It mud have begi under the influence of
this opinion that the legiflative bodies of lome States have expreff-
ed their approbation of the Embargo, either explicitly, or by im-
plication.

The following were all the papers laid by the Prefident before
Congrefs, as the grounds of the Embargo.

1. The pmrlaoiatinn of the King of Creat.Bntam requiring the
return of his fubjefts, the fcamen efpecially, from foreign countrie*,
to aid, in this hour of peculiar danger, in the defence of their own.
But it being an acknowledged principle, that every nation has a
right to the fervice of its fubjefts in time of war, that proclamation
could not furnifli the flighteft ground for an Embargo.

2. The extraft of a letter from the Grand Judge Regnier to
the French Attorney General for the Council of Prizes. This
contained a partial interpretation of the imperial blockading decree
of November 2 i, 1806. This decree, indeed, and its interpreta-
tion, prefent flagrant violations of our neutral rights, and of the ex-
ifting treaty becween the United States and France : but ftill, the
execution of that decree could not (from the fmall number of
French cruifers) extenfively interrupt our trade. Thefe two pa-
pers were publick. '

3. The letter from our Minifter, Mr. Armftrong, to Mr. Cham-
pagny, the French Minillcr of Foreign Afltfiis : and

4. Mr. Champagny's anfwer. Both thefe ought, in form or
fubftance, alfo to have been made publick. The latter would have
furniflicd to our nation fome idea of the views and cxpedations of
France. But both were withdrawn by the Prefident, to be depof-
ited among other Executive fecrets : while neither prefented any
aew ground to juftify an Embargo. '

In the Senate, thefe papers were referred to a committee. The
committee quickly reported 9. bill for laying an Embargo, agreea-
bly to the Prefident's propofal. This was read a firft, a fecond,
and a third time, and pafled ; and all in the (hort compafs of about
four hours ! A little time was repeatedly afked, to obtain further
information, and to confider a meafure of fuch moment, of fuch
univerfal concern : but thefe requefts were denied. We were hur-
ried into the paiTage of the bill, as if there was danger of its being
reje6led, if we were allowed time to obtain further information,
and deliberately confider the fubjeft. For to that time our veffeh
were freely failing on foreign voyages ; and in a national point of
view, the departure of half a do/en or a dozen more, while we were
inquiring into the neceility or expediency of the Embargo, was of
little moment. Or if the danger to our veflels, feamen and mer-
chandize had been fo extreme as not to admit of one day's delay,
ought not that extreme danger to have been exhibited to Congrefs ?
The Conftitution which requires the Prefident " to give to Congrefs
information of the ftate of the union,*' certainly meant, not partial,
but complete information on the fubjed^ of a communication, fo far
as he poffeffed it. And when it enjoins him " to recommend to
their condderation fuch meafures as he fhould judge neceifary and
expedient," it as certainly intended that thofe recommendations
lliould be bottomed on information communicated, not on fa3s with-
held, and locjced up in the Executive cabinet. Had the publick
fafcty been at ftake, or any great publick good been prefented to
our view, but which would be left by a moment*, /'-lay; there
would have been fome apology for difpatch, though non< for a£ling
nvUhout due information. In truth, the meafure appeared to me
then, as it (lill docs, and as it appears to the publick, without a
fufficit^nt motive, without a legitimate objeft. Hence the general
inquiry — " For what is the Embargo laid ?" And I challenge
any man not in the fecrets of the Executive to tell. I know. Sir,
that the Prefident faid the papers abovementioned " (howed that
great and increafing dangers threatened our veflels, our feamen, and
our merchandize :" but I alfo know that they exhibited no netu
dangers ; none of which our merchants and feamen had not been
well apprized. The Britifh proclamation had many days before

been publiflied in the newfpapen [the copy laid before us by the
Prefident had been cut out of a newfpaper ;3 and fo had the fub>
fiance, if not the words of Regnier's letter. Yet they had excit-
ed little concern among merchants and feamen, the prefervation of
whofe perfons and property was the profejfed obje6: of the PreG-
dent's recommendation of an Embargo. The merchants and fea^
men could accurately eilimate the dangers of continuing their com-
mercial operations ; of which dangers, indeed, the adtual premiums
of infurance were a fatisfadtory gauge. Thofc premiums had very
little increafed : by the Britifli proclamation not a cent : and by
the French decree fo little as not to ftop commercial enterprises.
The great numbers of veflels loading or loaded, and prepared for
fea ; the exertions every where made, on the firft rumour of the
Embargo, to difpatch them ; demonflirate the Prefident's dangers
to be imaginary — to have been ajfumed. Or if great and real dan-
gers, unknown to commercial men, were impending, or fure to fall*
how deiirable was it to have had them officially declared and publifli-
ed ! This would have produced a voluntary embargo, and prevent-
ed every complaint. Befides, the dangers clearly defined and un-
derftood, the publick mind would not have been difquietcd with im-
aginary fears, the more tormenting, becaufe uncertain*

It is true that confiderable numbers of veflels were collcded in
our ports, and many held in fufpenfe : not, however, from any.new
dangers which appeared ; but from the myflerious conduct of our
aflairs, after the attack on the Chefapeakc ; and from the painful
apprehenflon that the courfe the Prefident was purfuing would ter-
minate in war. The National InteUigencer (ufually confidered
as the Executive newfpaper) gave the alarm ; and it was echoed
through the United States. War, probable or inevitable war, was
the conflant theme of the newfpaper 3, and of the converfations, as
was reported, of perfons fuppofed-to be beft informed of Executive
defigns. Yet amid this din of war, no adequate preparations were
feen making to meet it. The order to detach a hundred thoufand
militia to fight the Britifli navy (for there was no appearance of an
enemy in any other fliape) was fo completely abfurd, as to excite,
with men of common fenfe, no other emotiou than ridicule. .Kok

..■»■:

•■-;■*:

the ihadow of a reafon that could operate on the mind of a man of
common underftanding can be oifcred in its juilification. The re-
fufal of the Britifli officer to receive the frigate Chefapeake as a
pr'i%ei when tendered by her commander, is a demonftration that the
attack upon her was exclufively for the purpofe of taking their
deferters ; and not intended as the commencement of a war be-
tween the two nations. The Prefident knew that the Britiih had
no invading army to land on our (hores ; and the detached militia
would be ufelefs, except againft land-forces. Why then was this
order for the Militia given ? — The nature of the cafe, and the aAu-
al (late of things, authorize the inference, that its immediate, if not
its only object, was to increafe the publick alarm, to aggravate the
publick refontnipnt againft Great- Britain, to excite a war pulfe;
and in the height of this artificial fever of the publick mind, whick
was to be made known in Great-Britain, to renew the demands on
her government ; in the poor expeflation of extorting, in that ftate
•f things, concefiions of points which (he had always confidered as
her rightst and which at all times and under all circumflances, (he
had uniformly refufcd to relinquKh. The refult of the fubfequent
negociation at London has (hown how utterly unfounded was the
Prefident's expe£katiun, how perfeAly ufelefs all this blufter of war.
While no well informed man doubted that the Briti(h Government
would make fuitable reparation for the attack on the Chefapeake.
The Preiidcnt himfelf, in his proclamation, had placed the affair on
that footing. A rupture between the two nations, faid he, ** is c-
qually oppofed to the interefts of both, as it is to affurances of the
moil friendly difpofitions on the part of the Britiih Governmenty
in the midft of which this outrage was committed. In this light
the fubjeft cannot but prefent itfelf to that Government, and
ftrengthen the motives to an honourable reparation for the wrong
which has been done." And it is now well known that fuch rep-
aration might have been promptly obtained in London, had the
Prefident 8 inftruftions to Mr. Monroe been compatible with fuch
an adjuftment. He was required not to negociate on this fingle,
tranfient aft (which when once adjufted was for ever fettled) but
in connedion with another claim of long (landing, and, to fay the
leaft, of doubtful right ; to wit, the exemption from impreffment

of BritUb feamen found on board American merchant vcffels. To
remedy the evil arifing from its exercife, by which our own citizeni
were fometimes impreffed, the attention of our Government, under
every adminiftration, had been eameftly engaged : but no praftica-
ble plan has yet been contrived : while no man who regards the
truth, will qucilion the difpofition of the Britifh Government to a-
dopt any arrangement that will fecure to Great-Britain the fervices
of her ovmfuhjeBs. And now, when the unexampled fituaticn of
that country (left alone to maintain the conflict with France and
her numerous dependent States — ^left alone to withiland the
Power which menaces the liberties of the world) rendered the aid
of all her fubjedls more than ever needful ; there was no reafonable
ground to expeA that (he would yield the right to take them when
found on board the merchant veflels of any nation. Thus to infill
on her yielding this point, and infeparably to conneA it with the
affair of the Chefapeake, was tantamount to a determination not to
negociate at all. .

I write. Sir, with freedom ; for the times are too perilous to al-
low thofe who are placed in high and refponfible fituations to be
fdent or referved. The peace and fafety of our country are fuf-
pended on a thread. The courfe we have feen purfued leads on to
war — to a war with Great-Britain — a war abfolutely without ne-
ceflity — a war which whether difaftrous or fuccefsful, mud bring
mifery and ruin to the United States : m'tfery by the deftru6lion of
our navigation and commerce (perhaps alfo of our faircft fca-
port towns and cities) the lofs of markets for our produce, the
want of foreign goods and manufaftures, and the other evils inci-
dent to a ftate of war : and ruin^ by the lofs of our liberty and in-
dependence. For if with the aid of our arms Great-Britain '.vere
fubdued, — from that moment (though flattered perhaps with the
name of allies) we fliould become the Provinces of France. This is
a refult fo obvious, that I mull crave your pardon for noticing it.
Some advocates of Executive meafures admit it. They acknowl-
edge that the navy of Britain is our (hield againll the overwhelm-
ing power of France. — Why then do they perfift in a courfe of
condud tending to a rupture with Great- Britain ? — Will it be

believed that it is principatly, or folely, to procure inviolability to
the merchant ^ag of the United States \ In other words, to pro-
tect all feamen, Br'tti/b fuhjeltsy as well as our own citizens, on
board our merchant veflels > It is a faA that this has been made
the greateft obftacle to an amicable fettlement with Great-Britain.
Yet (I repeat) it is perfectly well known that (he defires to obtain
9mly her own fuhjeds ; and that American citizens, imprefled by
miftake, are delivered up on duly authenticated proof. The evil
we complain of arifes from the impoflibiUty of always diftinguiftiing
the perfpns of two nations who a few years fince were one peo-
ple, who exhibit the fame manners, fpeak the fame language, and
poiTefs ilmilar features. But feeing that we feldom hear complaints
in the great navigating States^ how happens there to be fuch ex-
treme fympathy for American feamen at IVaJbington ? Efpecially
in gentlemen from the interiour States, which have no feamen, or
from thofe Atlantick States whofe native feamen bear a ver)' fmall
proportion to thofe of New-England ? In faA, the caufes of com-
plaint are much fewer than are pretended. They rarely occur in
the States whofe feamen are chiefly natives. The firft merchant in
the United States, in anfwering my late inquiry about Britifh im-
preflrnents, fays, •* Since the Chefapeake affair we have had no
caufe of complaint. I cannot find one fingle inftance where they
have taken one man out of a merchant veflel. I have had more
than twenty vcfTels arrived in that time, without one inftance of a
man being taken by them. Three Sivedes were taken out by a
French frigate. I have made inquiry of all the mafters that have
arrived in this vicinity, and cannot find any complaints againft the
Britiili cruifers. '

. 'i'-im

Can gentlemen of known hofliVity to foreign commerce in our own
vejfels — who are even willing to annihilate it (and fuch there are)—
oan thefe gentlemen plead the caufe of ouryrflmrn becaufe they real-
ly wi(h to proteS them ? Can thofe defire to proteff our feamen, who,
by laying an unneceflary embargo, expofe them by thoufands to
ftarve or beg ? — One gentleman has faid (and I believe he does not
ftand alone) that fooner than admit the principle that Great- Brit-
ain had a right to take her ownfuhjeBs from nnr merchant vefels, he

>:iii':

■■&

would abandon commerce altogether ! — To what will every man in
New-England and of the other navigating State8, afcribe fuch a fen-
timent ? A fentiment which, to prevent the temporary lofs of five
men, by imprefs, would reduce fifty thoufand to beggary ? But for
the Embargo, thoufands depending on the ordinary operations of
commerce, would now be employed. Even under the reftraints of
the orders of the Britifh Government, retaliating the French im-
perial decree, very large portions of the world remain open to the
commerce of the United States. We may yet purfue our tiade
with the Britifh dominions, in every part of the globe ; with Afri-
ca, with China, and with the colonics of France, Spain, and Hol-
land. And let me afk, whether in the midll of a profound peace,
when the powers of Europe poffefllng colonies, would, as formerly,
confine the trade with them to their own bottoms, or admit us, as
foreigners, only under gtoat limitations, we could enjoy a commerce
much more extenfive than is prafticable at this moment, if the Em-
bargo were not in the way ? Why then fliould it be continued ?
Why rather was it ever laid ? Can thofe be legitimate reafons for
the Embargo which are concealed from Congrefs, at the moment
when they are required to impofe it ? Arc the reafons to be found
in the difpatches from Paris ? Thefe have been moved for ; and
the motion was quafhed by the advocates for the Embargo. Why
are thefe difpatches withhold by the Executive ? Why, when all
clafTes of citizens anxioully inquire " For what is the Embargo
laid ?" is a fatisfa£lory anfwer denied ? Why is not Congrefs made
acquainted with the ad\ual fituation of the United States in relation
to France ? Why, in this dangerous crifis, are Mr. Armftrong's
letters to the Secretary of State abfoluetly withheld, fo that a line
of them cannot be feen ? Did they contain no information of the
demands and intentions of the French Emperor ? Did the Revenge
fail from England to !• ranee, and tliere wait three or four weehs foi-
difpatches of no importance ? If fo, why, rcgardlefs of the publick
folicitude, arc their contents fo carefully concealed ? If really un-
important, wiiat harm can arife from telling Congrefs and the Na-
tion, ojicially^ tiiat they contain nothing of moment to tlie fafcly,
the hberty, the honour, or the intcreils of the United States ? On
the contrary, arc they fo clofely locked up becaufe they will not

ia,y

bear the light ? Would their difclofure roufe the fpirit of the peo-
ple, ilill numbering in bHnd confidence in the Executive ? Has the
French Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals ? Has he
required that our portsy like thofe of his vafTal ftates in Europe, le
Jhut againjl Briti/h ommerce ? Is the Embargo a fubjiitutey a milder
form of compliance with that harfh demand, which if exhibited in
its naked and infulting afpeft, the American fpirit might yet re-
fent ? Are we ftill to be kept profoundly ignorant of the declara-
tions and avowed defigns of the French Emperor, although thefe
may ftnke at our liberty and independence ? And, in the mean
time, are we, by a thoufand irritations, by cherifhing prejudices, and
by exciting frefb refentments, to he drawn gradually into a war
with Great-Britain ? Why amidil the extreme anxiety of the pub-
lick mind, is it ftill kept on the rack of fearful expeftation, by the
Prefident's portentous filencc refpeAing his French difpatcbes ? —
In this concealment there is d^i^^er. In this concealment muft be
wrapt up the real caufe of the Embargo. On any other fuppoH-
tion it is inexplicable.

I am alarmed. Sir, at this perilous ftatc of things, I cannot re-
prefs my fufpicions ; or forbear thus to exhibit to you the grounds
on which they reft. The people are advifed to rcpofe implicit
confidence in the National Government : in that unbounded confi-
dence lies our danger. Armed with that confidence, the Execu-
tive may procure the adoption of meafures which may overwhelm
us witli ruin, as furely as if he had an army at his heels. By falfe
policy, or by inordinate fears, our country may be betrayed and
fubjugatcd to France, as furely as by corruption. I truft, Sir, that
no one who knows me will charge it to vanity when I fay, that I
have fomc knowledge of publick men and of publick afTiiirs : and
on that knowledge, and with folemnity, I declare to you, that I
have no confidence in the wifdom or correftnefa of our publick meaf-
ures : that our country is in imminent danger : that it is efTential
to the publick fafcty that the blind confidence in our Rulers ftiould
ccalV ; that the State Legiflaturos fliould know tiie fafts and rea-
I'ons on which important general laws are founiicd ; and ifpeda'Iy
that ih'jfc Staid nvhoft favnu are on the oceanp and ai'/jo/f hariejls are

gathered in every feayjhould immediately and ferioujly confuler honu to
preferve them. In all the branches of Government, commercial in-
formation is wanting ; and in " this defert," called a city, that
want cannot be fupplied. Nothing but the fenfe of the commer-
cial States, clcarfy and emphatically exprefled, will fave them from
ruin.

Are our thoufands of (hips and veflels to rot in our harbours ?
Arc our fixty thoufaud feamen and fiftiermen to be deprived of em-
ployment, and, with their families, reduced to want and beggary ?
Are our hundreds of thoufands of farmers to be compelled to fuffer
their millions in furplus produce to perifl\ on their handd ; that the
Prcfident may make an experiment on our patience and fortitude,
and on the towering pride, the boundlefs ambition, and unyielding
perfeverance of the Conqueror of l.urope ? Sir, I have reafon to«be-
lieve that thu Prefidcnt contemplates the continuance of the Embar-
go until the French Emperor repeals his decrees violating as well
his treaty with the United States as every neutral right ; and un-
til Britain thereupon recals her retaliating orders ! — By that time
we may have neither fliips nor feamen : and that is pvecifely the
point to which fome men wiHi to reduce us. — To fee the improvi-
dence of this projeft (to call it by no harfher name, and without ad-
verting to ulterior views) let us lookback to former years.

Notvviiliftanding the well-founded cqmplaints of fome ividividuals,
and the niurn)nr8 of others ; notwithilanding the frequent Execu-
tive decIarntioDS of maritime ajjgrelTioiis committed hy Great- Brit-
ain ; notwithilanding tl>c outrageous decrees of France and Spain,
and the wanton ipoliations pradifcd and executed by their cruifcrs
and tribunals, of which we fumctimes hear a faint whifper ; — the
commerce of t!ic United States has hitherto profpered beyu;id all
ex:imj)le. Ourcilizens havr accujnulated wealth ; and the publick
tcvoiiue, annually increafing, has been the Prefident's annual boast.

Thefe fafts dimonflrate, that although Great-Britain, with her
thoufaiul fliips of war, conld h;ive dellroyed our commerce, flie
has rcaiiy done it no elTentiai injury ; and that the other bdiige^'iiti

heretofore reftrained by fome regard to National Law, and liniit-
ed by the fmal) "inber of their cruifers, have not inflicted upon it
any deep wou Yet in this full tide of fuccefs, oiir commerce is

fuddenly arrelied : an alarm of war is raifed : fearful apprehcnllons
are excited : the merchants, in' particular, thrown into a ftate of
confternation, are advifed, by a voluntary embargo, to keep their
vcflels at home. And what is the caufe of this mighty but mif-
chievous alarm ? We know it in its whole*extent. It was the un-
authorized attack of a Briti/h naval officer on the American frigate
Chefapeahey to fear ch for and take fome deferters known to have been
received on boards who had been often demanded^ and eu often refufedto
be delivered up. As was expedted by all confiderate men, and by
the Prcfident himfelf (as I have before obferved) the Britifh Gov-
ernment, on the firft information of the unfortunate event (and with-
out waiting for an application) difavowed the a£l of its officer— dif-
claimed the principle of fearching National armed veflels — and de-
clared its readinefs to make fuitable reparation, as foon as th^. ilate
of the cafe (hould be fully known.

Under fuch circumftances, who can juftify this alarm of war ? An
alarm which greatly difquieted the publick mind, and occafioned
an interruption of commerce extremely injurious to our merchant*
and fea-faring citizens.

I will clofo this long letter by dating all the exiding pretences —
for there are no caufce — for a war with Grcat«Britain.

1. The Btitifh fiiips of war, agreeably to a right claimed and cx-
ercifed for ages— a right claimed and cxcrcifed during the whole of
the admiiiillrations of Wafhington, of Adams, and of Jcffcrfon, —
rontinue to take fome of the BritHh feamen found on board our
merchant vefTda, and with them a fundi number of ou-s, from the
impoflibihty of always dillinguilhing EiigHflitncn from citizens of
the United States. Oii this point our Government well know
that Great-Biitain is perfctlly willing to adopt any arrangement
that can be devifed, which will fccurc to her fervice the fnmcn who
mc her awti fiiljecit ; and at the fame time exempt ouis from imprell-
ment.

2. The merchant veffels of Fiance, Spain and Holland, being
driven from the ocean, or deftroyed, the commerce of thofe countries
with one another, and with their colonies, could no longer be carri-
ed on by themfelves. Here the veffels of neutral nations came in
to their aid, and carried on nearly the whole commerce of thofe na-
tions. With their feamen thus liberated from the merchant fer-
vice, thofe nations, in th* prefent and preceding wars, were enabled
to man their (hips of war ; and the neutral vcifels and feamen fup-
plying their places, became in fa^j though not in name, auxiliaries
in war. The commerce of thofe nations, without one armed fliip
on the fea appropriated for its protection, was intended thus to be
fecured under neutral flags ; while the merchant veffels of Great-
Britain, with its numerous armed (hips to guard them, were cxpof-
cd to occafional captures. — Such a courfe of things Great- Britain
has refifted, not in tlie prefent only, but in former wars ; at lead
as far back as that of 1756. And flie has claimed and main-
tained a right to impofe on this commerce fome limits and rc-
ftraints ; becaufe it was a commerce which was denied by thofe na-
tions to neutrals in-times of peace ; bccaufc it was a commerce of
immenfe value to the fubjefts of her enemies ; and becaufe it filled
their treafuries with money to enable them to carry on their wars
with Great-Britain.

3. The third and only remaining pretence for war with Great-
Britain, is the unfortunate affair of the Chefapeake ; winch having
been already ftated and explained, I will only remark here, that it is
not to be believed that the Britifh Government, after boing defeated,
as before mentioned, in its endeavours to make reparation in Lon-
don, for the wrong done by its fervant, would have fent hither a
fpecial envoy to give honourable fatisfaftion , but from its fiiicere de-
firc to clofe this wound, if our own Government nuouldfiiffcr it to Ir
healed.

Permit me now to alk, what man, impartially viewing the fub-
joct, will have the holdiiefs to fay that then- exifts any caufe for
plunging the United States into a war with Great-Uritain ? Who
that refuedls his reputation a* a man of common difcernment v.iU

£ay it ? Who that regards the interefts and welfare of his country
will fay it ? Who then can juftify, who can find an excufe for a
courfe of conduft which has brought our country into its prefent
ftatc of alarm, embarraffment and diftreft, ? For myfelf, Sir, I mull
declare the opinion, that no free country was ever before fo caufe-
Icfsly, and fo blindly, thrown from the height of profperity, and
plunged into a ftate of dreadful anxiety and fuffering. But from
this degraded and wretched fituation it is not yet too late to efcape.
Let the difpatches from our Minifter in France be no longer con-
cealed. liCt the Prefident perform the duty required of him by
the Conftitution ; by giving to Congrch full information ofthejlate
of the unwn in refpoA tu fureign nations. Above all, let him unfold
our atlual fituation with France. Let him tell us what are the de-
mands and propofals of her Ruler. Had thefe been honourable to
the United States, would not the Prefident have been eager to dif-
clofe them ? that they are of an entirely diiTerent nature, that they
are rlifhonourahle, that they are ruinous to our commercial interefis, and
dangerous to our liberty and independencCf we are left to infer.

I hope Sir, that the nature and magnitude of the fubjeft will
furnifli a fufficient apology for the length and ftyle of this letter.
Perhaps feme may deem it prefumptuous thus to queftion the cor-
reftnefs of the proceedings of our Government. A ftrong fenfe of
duty, and diftreffing apprehenfions of National ruin, have forced the
taflc upon me. To fome the fentiments which, in the fincerity of
my heart, I have expreflcd, may give offence : for often nothing
offends fo much as truth. Yet I do not dcfire to offend any man.
lUit when I fee the dangerous extent of Executive influence : when
I foe the Great Council of the Nation called on to enaft laws deep-
ly affei^ing the interefts of all clafTes of citizens, without adequate
information of the reafoiis of that call : when I obferve the decep-
tive gloflfs with which the mifchiefs of the Embargo are attempt-
ed to be palliated ; and p'flirior events adduced ar. rcafons to juftify
the meafure : when I know that tlie rifles of continuing their com-
mercial purfuits aj:jainft all Itwwn diingers can and will be more ac-
curately calculated by our mercliaiHs than by our Government :
when if anv tic-.o dun^rrs t<n commerce were impondinjj, of which

iUljrf

our merchants were uninformed, but of which the Government ob-
tained the knowledge through its Miniller at Paris, or elf^where,
it was plainly the duty of the Executive to make thofe dangers
known to Congrefs and the Nation : and fuice if fo made known,
the merchants and fea-faring citizens would, for their own interefti
and fafety, have taken due precautions to guard againll them : and
M it hence appears certain that an Embargo was not neceffary to
the fafety of " our feamen, our veflels, or our merchandize :''—
when, Sir, I fee and confider thcfe things, and their evil tendency :
in a word, when I obfer\'e a courfe of proceeding which to me ap-
pears calculated to miflcad the publick mind to publick ruin ; I can-
,.1, not be lilent. Regardlefa, tlicrefare, of pcrfonnl confequencet, I

have undertaken to communicate thefe details ; with the view to
diflipate dangerous illufions ; to give to my Conilituents correft in-
formation ; to excite inqtiiry ; and to roufe that vigilant jealoufy
which is charaaeriftick of REPUBLICANS, and effential to the
prefervation of their rights, their liberties, and their independence.

I have the honour to be,

very refpeftfully,
^-v Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

His Excellency JAMES SULLIVAN,

Gtvermr of the Commontuealth of MaJfachufeUs.

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