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Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la m6thode. f errata id to It ie pelure, pon d n 1 2 3 32X 1 2 3 « 1 I 2 A LETTER T O T H E People oF ENGLAND, UPON THE MILITIA, Continental Connections, Neutralities, AND Secret Expedttions. Hie efl, aut nufquam, quod quarmus, Hor, Mulfa putansy fortemque animo miferatm ini^ ?^^^' ViRG. iEN. LONDON: Printed for J. Scot in Paternoftsr-row^ ^757* li '1 I' t 4» L E T T E R T O T H E People of England^ k§c. [ijt F It were heceifary to make art i 35 Apology for this Addrefs, I might ^5 inform you, my Countrymen, that the ill Succefs of the executive Part of the Militia Bill ; the fatal EfFeds of our late Continental Meafures j the men* acing Afpedt of certain Neutralities, and the Fate of our Secret Expedition^ admitted of fufficient Excufe for the penning of this Letter, which, without the Acrimony of Party Zeal, dares fpeak Truth for its own fakey and make fuch Obfervations upon it, as, I flatter myfelf, will fhew you in a clear Light, your prefent Situa- A z tion> ( 4 ) tion; andby ihePurluitofwhatMeafures you are likely to continue a free and in- dependent People. W II E N we confidcr how clamorous every anti-miniilcrial and unconftitutional Paper was for a Militia, with what Rage thefc Authors exclaimed againft the Game Atty which divefled the Subjects of the Ufe of Arms, and how they infinuated that the Militia Bill was procraftinated in 17565 in the Houfe of Lords, in order to prevent us defending ourfelves againfl our Enemies, that Mercenaries might be caird over, and they have the Appearance of Utility : When we refledl with what becoming Zeal every Addrefs to the Throne implored, and every Inftrudlion to our Reprefentatives recommended a national Militia, and when we con- fider with what true Joy every Britifh Heart exulted, at reading his Majefty's Royal Recommendation for framing one, to his Parliament Can it be credited that we ourfelves fhould oppofe it ?— will it be believed by Pofterity that Britons, who had long follicited the \^k of x k ( 5 ) of Anns, after being indulgd by their Reprefentatives, by their ParHament and King, the free Exercife of them — in a time of open War — when the Enemy was at the Gate, and threatned De- ftrudlion to every the remoteft Province— refufed to accept them for their own Defence, and prevent Foreigners (who under the fpecious Pretence of defending, might fubvert their Conftitution) being called even for their Protedlion— whom they had already experienced, to be a heavy — a difagreeable — a dangerous Bur- den ? No future Hiftorians may relate the Event, but in vain will they endeavour to be credited — it will be looked upon as fabulous ! I F we view the Matter in an oeconoml- cal Light, we fhall be more enamoured with it. If we have r.ot fufficient martial Courage and Bravery, animating our Hearts — fmall Remnant, of that noble glorious Blood of our Anceflors ! — to excite us to ad: like Men, for Honour and our Reputation fakes, let Frugality plead the Caufe of an almoft Banki:upt Nation. A3 Will ( 6 ) Will not our Neceflities point out fo us the Ufe of Arms for our Defence, to favc what we otherwife mufl fpend in Mercenaries? Is not Bread at a fufficiently high Price? Would the Importation of Thirty Thoufand Foreigners reduce or increafe it ? and who knows how foon the French may make a Defcent upon this Ifland, as a Diverfion for the Queen of Hungary in Germany y as we muft then be obliged to call over our HeJJianSy and what other Mercenaries we can engage in our pay to protedb us ? Anfwer thefe Queries to yourfelves ye head-ftrong Englijhmen^ who oppofe the framing of a Militia ! { \ \i B u't let us examine into the Pretext of oppofing the Execution of this Law. I have made much Enquiry, and I can find none that goes beyond " the Inability *' you have of fparing the Time requifite " for perfecting you in the Ufe of Arms", ftrange Infatuation ! Would you not rather fpare Twenty Days in a Year for the Exercife of Arms, though it were at the Price of your Days Work, than labour all your Life for a Tyrant— who-^would not only make ( 7 ) niake you Fight for him when and where he pleafed, but pay you what he pleafcd ? Would you not give Three -f- Half Crowns for infuring your Wives — your Daughters from the Brutality of Tygers, yourfelves from Death, and your Pofterity from Popery and Slavery? Thus then the Pretext for dlflenting to the Execution of the Militia Adt, is (hewn to be an Argument in it's Favour— and indeed, now that Ad: has been fo much amended, and thofe Claufes which were before difagreeable (particularly to the Diflenters,) * are redified, it is avowing onefelf a profeffed Jacobite, an Enemy to our Conftitution in Church and State, to be any wife inftrumental in preventing fo falutry a Law taking Place- It is true I believe, many of you my Countrymen, who compofe the giddy Multitude that oppofe, it are Friends to the Conftitution — but you think not for yourfelves t A Gentleman at Newcajile freed every one that save him that Sum, from ferving in the Militia. vide all the public Papers. f Among others that for exercifmg on Sundays* ( 8 ) yourfclves — you take Reports for I'acfls, and credit Hearfays — and thofe who fet are fuch as I rcprcfcnt them — Enemies to their Country, Think them firfl Abroad 'mies Ives, for irfeh yourieives, examine the Adl with Attention — confidcr the State of the Nation — the Dangers that threaten us — the moft probable Means of extricating ourfelves from the prefent Dilemma — and if you can get the better of your former Prejudices, you will view this Bill in the moft favourable of Lights — you will fee that it was intended to qualify you to protect your Country, your Liberties— and to prepare you for a daring Enemy, who has long looked upon this Nation with the Eye of Malevolence, and only waits for a favourable Opportunity, to wreft from you every thing that is dear to you and your Pofterity. As to a moft invidious Report, that you are to be fent Abroad, as occafion may require ; it feems to carry with it many Marks of its original Manufad:ure — it has the Stamp of French Politics upon it, as configned to fome jefuitic Emiffary here. i I ( 9 ) here for public Vent. If fuch Reports as thefe gain Ground, what may we not cxpedt to find credited, fuice in contra- vention of the public Faith of an Adt of Parliament, which has never yet been violated, you are taught to believe you are to be tranfported like Felons at the Nod of a prime Minifter? — How diffe- rent is the Intent of the Adl, fince you are not even to go out of your own County, but in Cafe of adual Invafion-— which may never happen, if you are una- nimous in acquiring the Ufe of Arms ; for it is your Ignorance in this Refpeft, that flatters the French with the Hopes of an eafy Conquefl — refolve but once to be as expert as they in the Field of Battle, and the darkeft Nights and mofl South- Weflerly Winds, that may keep our Ships in Harbour, will never intice them to make a Defcent upon this Ifland. Need you then be under any Apprehenfion of being feparated from your Family or your Friends, fince you are never to be fent out of the Kingdom upon any Account what- ever-— fince you cannot even be called out cf your County but in Time of open Re* B bellion. t * t lO ) bcllion, which furely none of you would hefitate to oppofe with your Lives and Properties — fince if it were to fucceed there is an end to both — and as Six Miles are the fartheft Extent of travelling upon cxercife Days ^ What, then, are the Hardlhips you complain of? Is there any Partiality ia the Cafe ? Is not every one of us, from the Age of Eighteen to Fifty, equally obliged to ferve ? (the Exception is fo trif- ling, it would be vague to argue it) ; and would you not rather truft your Country, your Religion, your Liberties, your Wives> your Families, — and yourfelves in the Hands of thefe, your Countrymen, Su- periors and Equals, Men of Property and Probity, all interefted in the general Weal, —rather than to a Rabble of Mercenaries, either Natives, or Foreigners — they that fight for Hire, may as well be Enemies as Friends — a Penny a Day more in their Wages may ballancc the Scale. Think of the Truft you repofe in them— think of the trivial Objed that may biafs their Integrity, This, ( " ) This, then, is the Burden you labour under — Tou are to defend yourfehes^ ^g^inji an open an avowed Enemy ^ that threatens DeJiruBion — to your King — your Country^^ your Religion — your Liberties — your Pro^ perty — your Wives — your FamJies — your fehes — in a Word to every 7'hi?jg that is dear to you! Confider, my Country- men, what was the Situation of your An- ceftors in a State of Vajj'alage — were they not obliged to fight for their Barons — not for them/elves — to combat for Tyrants^^ jzot fpr Liberty? — what a Contrail! But after all, I will humour your Pre- judices, and own your Complaints are juft-^What Chance do you (land of ferv- ing in the Militia ? not a greater than you would of getting a Prize in a Lottery where there were a Hundred Blanks to a Prize, and you had but one Ticket. I have already mentioned the fmall Sum for which many of you have been fo foon rid of all your Fears ; let us now enquire whe- ther there are no Immediate and, what may be called, pecuniary Advantages, at* t^ndant upon a Militia Man — Is being ex^ B 2 cmptcd i* h ( 12 ) ctnpted from all Statute Work, and from ferving either as Peace or Pariih Officer none? Is being enfranchifed from bear^^ ing Arms in his Majefl:y*s Land-forces j is being entitled to fet up any Trade, in any Part of the Kingdom (except the Univer-» fities) no Advantages ? they are fiich as entitle you Freemen in every Senfe. But furely as Britons^ as Lovers of our Country, we can view this Adl in a more exteniive Light, than meerly as it relates to our immediate Self-interefl:. If we can protCv5l ourfelves, without the Aid of Mer- cenaries, we fave the Government fo much Money as they would othcrwife fpend in them, for that Purpofe, and which may be properly applied to annoy the Enemy at Home or in her Colonies. Befides we cannot always have Troops for Hire upon an Emergency ; the laft Rebellion was a fatal Experience of it, and the Lofs of Minorca^ and our iU Succefs in the Medi- terranean, as well as in America can be attributed to nothing elle, but the Necef. fity we were under of detaining here a fufficient Number of Men of War and- Troops ^f. •& ) ( 13 ) Troops for our own Security (which, if we had then been fortified with a N^tio- nal Militia, there would have been no Occafion for) while they were abfolutely neceflary abroad. This we feem to have been thoroughly fenfible of, by our In- ftrudions to our Reprefentatives, at the Time of our ill Succefs, in fo warmly re- commending a regular Militia. Thus, then, have I endeavoured to evince from Truth, without Sophiftry or the Parade of Argument, the ISIeceJfity^ Utility y Impartiality^ and Advantages^ of the Execution of the Militia Bill, — which though imperfect, as the Work of Man, is liable to as few exceptions as any Adt, that ever yet was framed into a Law by King,. Lords, and Commons. I {hall now confider the Intereft of Eng-* landy protedled with fuch a Militia Li this Ad propofes, in regard to continental Connexions. However fanguine the French may ap^ pear, to fight the Battles of the Queen of Hungary »' 1 ( X4 ) Hungary in Germany 5 it requires but lit- tle Reflexion to recolle and might be looked upon as our Friend if not Ally ; but fo it has happened that thofe very Rujfiam that were paid by us to wait for our Command upon the Fron- tiers of 'Poland^ have marched and adted againft us, and our Allies. This is a fam- ple of the Faith of Courts, and evinces how far they are to be relied upon, when their Interefts change. However, this does not prove any great Forefight in the then Adm n, for even if the Czarina had affifted us and our Allies with the Number of Troops fhe engaged to march in our Favour, we fhould not have been able to oppofe the Houfes of Bourbon and Aiiftria upon the Continent. Whenever^ we feparate the Emprefs Queen and the King ! 1' ( iM K-lng of Prujpay which foever fides with France againft us, will be too many for U3 and our Allies. This the laft War— this the prefent War evince. Why then in- ftead of engaging RuJ/ians to fight for us, which they never intended, did not wc gain the Qiieen of Hungary as well as the King of Prujjia in our Intereft, if we looked upon ourfelves as obliged to pro- ted: Germanic Interefts, or thought conti- nental Connexions were ufefulto eftablifh owvAmerican Rights ? Rights which fliould have been fettled fo early as the Year thir- teen at the Treaty of Utrecht^ when the Refources of all thePowers oi Europe were exhaufted by a twelve Year's War, which was as profufe of Treafure as of Blood $ and which fucceeding other Wars, that were diverfified only by faint Shadows of Peace, had brought all the Powers, and particularly France (whofe Provinces had fallen a Prey, during the whole War, to foreign Armies on both Sides), to a State of Impotence in Arms, and they were no longer able to do Mifchief — ^had we then fettled the Boundaries of our American Colonies, and particularly that of Nova'- Scotia i I w ^ ( 17 ) Scolui ', or had we at the Treaty of Ax- la-Chapelle had Prudence enough to have forefeen the Confequence of referring the Limits to the Decifion of Commiflaries at Parisy we fhould not now be emerged in fo expenfive and unfuccefsful a War — and which, there is fome Reafon to fear, will never bring France to that State of Reafon fhe was in at the Treaty of Utrecht ^ or even at that of Aix-la-Chapelky but fuch was our want of Difcernment, that after Seven Years Negotiation, the Com- miflaries effedled nothing ; the very Coun- tries in Difpute are wrefted from us — we go to War and fpend Twelve Millions to recover them-^-but inflead oi regaining them, we have already added the Lofs of much more important Pofl^eflions to them. • - ' • . * The Guaranty of the Treaty of We/l" phaliay is the Pretence for the Incurfion of the French into the Empire. — -This Treaty which afcertains and fhould fecure the ci- vil and religious Rights of the Proteftants in Germany y is the Pretext for its own Vi- olation 1 The Fre?tch crofs the Rhine^ feize EmbdcHy and take Hafiover for the C Prefervation I ■' ( i8 ) Prcfcrvation of the Liberties of the Em- pire! the H — ;/ — nsy feemingly confcious of the Juftice of their Caufe, capitulate to the French Generaly when, inflead of re- tiring to Stadcy where they muft be hem- med in on all Sides, if they had marched Eaftward to Wolfenbuttle or Brunfwick^ they could have preferved the Communi- cation with the Prtiffian Territories j and if they had been compelled to an entire Evacuation of thofe of Hamvery they might, with great Facility, have retreated into the Dutchy of Magdeburgh^ where they would have been affifted by the King of PriiJJtay and might have adled in Con- cert with him ; but by their retiring to Stadcy they muft have refolved to abandon the Intereft of the King of P a^ with- out waiting for the Confent of his Britan- nic * Majefty's Council ; and Forty Thou- fand Men are to be left inaSlhe during the whole War, when we ftand in fuch great Need of them. * Vide Lord Holdernefeis Letter to the foreign Miuifters Refident here. This iS it ( '9 ) This ftep muft undoubtedly attract the Attention of all the Powers of Europe, who will find fome Difficulty to afcribc the true Caufe of this political Phoenome- non ; and we need not be furprifed to find the King of P a fo nettled in his Let-^ ter *; nor need we wonder, notwith- Handing the Anfwer that has been made him that we pall inviolably fulfil our En* ^a^ementSy that he fliould pack up a Con- * Je viens d'apprendre qu*il eft encore que- ftion d*un Traite de Neutralite pour I'Eledlorat d'Hariovre. V. M. auroit die aflez peu de con- ftaiice & de fermeie pour fe laifTer abbattre par quelques fevers de Fortune? Les Affaires font- elles fi delabrces, qvi^on ne puifle fe retablir ? Qge V^ M- faffe attention a la demarche qu'elle m'a fait faire. Elle eft la caufe des malheurs prefts a fondre fur moi. Je n'aurois jamais rcnonce a TAlliance de la France fans toutes le« beHcs promefles qu*elle m'a faites. Je ne me repens pointdu traitp que j'ai fait avec V.M. mais qu'elle ne m'abandonne point lache- ment, a Ta merci de mes Ennemis, apres avoir attire toutes les forces de I'Europe centre moi. Je compte que V. M. fe reflbuvjendra de fes engagemens reiteres le 26. du pafle, et qu'elle n'entendra a aucun engagement que je n'y fois ^ompris. C 2 vention ' ; ( 20 ) _ ,. vention with Fra?2ce, compromife his Dif- ferences with the Queen of Hungary^ evacuate Saxony, and leave us and the French to fight it out; and indeed this feems to be the moft probable Event, as it is the current Report that Count Podevils^ his Miniilcr of State, is gone incognito to P^w upon that Errand. ,^ , _ . ,,, ^,.: , If we can fecure Hanover , and make the K. of P. forget our Ungratefiilnefs, or rather that of the // ns, perhaps this Step might turn out more to bur Advan- tage, than fupporting his P^j-r^^ — n M iry againft the French, the Quten of Hungary^ the Czarina^ the King of Snjvcden^ the Elector of Saxo?2y, &c. For as we cannot fend a fuflicicnt Number of Troops into Gcrmaiiy to make Head againft the Pr^;z^;&, upon their own Frontiers,, and as they will never come to any decifive Adtion, but w^hen it fuits them, w^hen they are not fighting for theinfeives ; fo all our Efforts upon the Continent without we were engaged in fuch grand Alliance as that of the Year 1 70 1 . ( but without the Stipulations that were there annexed ) muft ( 21 ) muft be Ineffedhial and put us to a greater Expence than the Amount of any Advantages we can reap from them. Such an Alliance indeed, fupported by us with pecuniary Afliftance only, might be a Means of attracting fufficient Numbers of French Troops into the Empire to weaken their Nation, and prevent them fending fuch Reinforcements to America as would be abje to make fiead againft us there, I N this Place I muft take Notice of the Caufe of the ill Succefs of our Ex- pedition this Year upon Cape-Breton^ which can be attributed to nothing elfe but the tardy Arrival of Admiral Holbourn% Fleet in America ; for it is not owing to the Superiority of the French Fleet, "f- in that Part of the World, as fome have imagined, but to the French Fleet being poffeffed of Louijbourg Harbour, from whence •f- We have Nineteen Ships of the Line, and Eighteen Frigates in Americay and the French have only Eighteen Ships of the Line, and Seven Frigates there. ( 22 ) whence there is no driving them j but if our Fleet were to Winter in America this Year, we doubt not but they would be poflefled of Ciipe-Breton next Spring, as the French Fleet cannot Winter there. But to return to the Affairs of the Continent. The Death of Lewis the XlVth, was foon followed by an Alliance, long fought after, between Great Britain and Frayice, From hence arofe a Syftem^ which had all the Appearance of Incon- fiftency, and from whence nothing but the Embarrafments which have fincc fucceeded, could have been produced. . The Regency of France were far from favouring the Views of the Spafiijh Miniftry, and Great Britain devoted her- felf entirely to the Defigns and Interefts of the Emperor, the Increafe of whofe Power ar\d Forces could furnifli no favourable Prognoftics to France, The Affinity of Blood, and the private Intereft of the Duke Regent claihed : This gave Birth to new Meafures, fome of which ftrengthened, while others deflroy^d former Maxims. What was the Confequence ? Th^ le :h i^ ( 23 ) The Regent was fo clofely connedlcd with England^ that Spain declared War againft the Emperor In tlie Mediteranean^ where Hoflilities againft a Power that had no Navy could not fail being fuccefsful. The French took up Arms in Favour of the hereditary Enemy of that Crown, againft the firft Prince of their own Blood — againft a King that they themfelves had fettled upon the Throne, even at the Expence of their own Blood — at the Price of their own Treafures. France^ as Ally of the Houfe of Aujlria^ made fuch Conquefts againft Spain^ as if fhe had been governed by a Defcendent of Ovaries V. and England^ which now Re-echoes with having made the Houfe of Aujlria too powerful!, though fhe no longer pofleffes the Crowns of Sicily and Naples^ procured her the fecond Poffeffion of them.— -Thus we fee what Jealouly and Intereft will operate upon France — and furely the Emprcfs Queen cannot be fo far loft to all fenfe of Gratitude, as not to liften to the Propofal of an advan- tageous Alliance, which might be offered ; cfpecially when (he confiders how much Ihe (he IS the Dupe of France^ whofe Intereft it is to diminifh inftead of aggran- dize the Houfe of Aujiriay to never enter earneftly in her Quarrels, but only excite her and the reft of Germany to cut each others Throats, that in the End they may feparately fall an eafier Prey to the Arms and Ambition of France^^vjho never forgets that Charlemagne Lewis L Charles II. Lewis II. and Charles III. were Emperors of Germany^ and that Lewis 'KV, is their Sueceflbr. But if thefe Conliderations iliould have no Weight with the Emprefs S^ueen — our Fleet in the Mediterranean might bring her back to that Reafon, to that Juftice from which flie has lately fo far fwerved > furely we cannot be afraid of being put under the Ban of the Empire- — ^if fo, how came we to pretend to affift the King of Frujjia againft the Houfe of Aujlria ? It will be fcarce credited in Hiftory, that a Nation, that had 300 Men of War in good Condition, 250 of which were always In Commiffion, and might be ready ta put i ? I i ( 25 ) put to Sea in a few Days, had heed court any Power of Europe into her Alliance, when all the Powers of Europe together could fcarce produce fuch an Armament -—will it be believed that half a dozen rotten RiilJian Ships fhould ride four Months Triumphant in the Baltic^ to oppofe the Commerce and Navigation of our only Ally ? Will it be credited that OJborn did not bombard Leghorn with the Fleet he has in ^t Mediterranean^ while the Emperor was putting the King of Frujjia under the Ban of the Empire, ranfack- ing his Towns, pillaging his Provinces—* alienating his Subjedis ?— However incon- fiftant our Condudl may hitherto appear, in regard to continental Meafures; every Briton is at length convinced that Vigorous ones are to be purfued -'-^ an Armament greater than ever Sailed from England^ is prepared at Portfmouth and ready at Spithead ioint Weeks— -*nay Months ' but why is it detained there ? not to give the Enemy an Opportunity of gaining Intelligence of it's Deftination— for there are but Two Perfons in England that are acquainted with it — but to wait the D Arrival ( 26 ) Arrival of die Tranfports — from the DownSj detained by contrary weftcrly Winds — as they cannot Sail over the Flats^ and as none are to be got at Southampton^ CoweSy Weymouth, Fool, Neivporty or any where in the Neighbourhood^ or to the Weji of Port/mouth. A T length the Tranjports get round— the Fleet Sails upon 2i'^ecret Expedition f various are the Cbnjedlures of it's Deftina- mtion—BreJl is to be taken — ^the French Fleet there demoliJhed^^xhQ Magazines burnt the Ammunition dejiroyed^^^xh^ Fortijicatiom rafed — Minorca is to be recovered — Toulon to be Bombarded Martinico to be fuhdued-—^t, whole Coajl of Choramandel to be fubmitted to the Englijh no fuch thing think you fo formidable an * Armament is to be employed * It was compofed of Eighteen Ships of the Line, Six Frigates, Two Bomb Ketches, Two Fire Ships, Two Hofpital Ships, Forty-four Tranfports, and Six Gutters) the beflManned and conditioned, . V :.:, . and I ^^■ % ( 27 ) employed upon fuch infignificant Errands? The IJle of A IX, in the Bay of Bifcay, Five Miles in circumference ^ is to be befieged is to be carried and all our hopeS'-2!A our wijhes are confummated - — // is taken the Governor, and all the Garrifon, compofed of 600 Men, are made Prifoners, and brought away with Forty eight MortarSy and 'Thirty Guns — which we have from the beji Authority-^ the London G/izette, Nevertheless there arefome diflatif- fied People, who complain that this Con- .queft is not equal to thjp Expcnce of the Armament — (which ^cannot be fupputed at above a Mil/ion and Half) — and imagine it was intended to make a Defent upon the Coaft of frmce. Indeed V> Z by il and the moft powerful im the Navy; having on Board, befides Ten Regiments compleat, a large Train of Artillery, and immenfe Quantities of Stores, Provifions> and Ammunition. by Gen- { AM- 28 ) —d— -/*s -f* Orders, given on Board the Ramilies the i jth September^ one would have believed that it was defigned to make a Debarkation upon the Coaft of Frmcey if the Signal . . - of •f- When the Ships come to an Anchor in order to Land, the Colonels are immediately to join their relpcdtive Corps. The Grenadiers and detached Companies, will propably be the Firfl to I^and, and are therefore to be the Firfj: in Rcadinefs, then the Battalions according to their Rank, or as they may happen to be moft conveniently fituated. Every Ship will fend Officers in their Boats, in proportion to their Men. The Soldiers are to have Two go^jd Flints, and Thirty-fix rounds of Ammunition ; except the Grenadiers and detached Companies, who are to have double proportion. The Firfl Body that Lands muft have an Engineer and Intrenching Tools with them 5 and thev muil take their own Hatchets, and Eill'hooks, Tv^'o Days provifion of Bifcuit and I I ( 29 ) of the 1 9th. in the Evening, for the whole Fleet (which was yet upwards of twenty les from the Land a-head j to lay to, thftandin^ the Wind was fair, and ^agues from the Land a-head j to lay to, twithftanding the Wind was fair, and the Leagues no i Cheefe and their Flafks. The Ships of the fame Regiments, will come to An- chor a3 near as poffible to each other. Six Days Provifion of Bifcuit, Cheefe, and Beef to be procured for all the Troops ready to fend on Shore, after the Men are landed. The light Artillery is to be landed as foon as poffible. The Boats of the Ordnance Ships (which Ships (hould like wife anchor near together) are folely to be employed in conveying the Artillery and intrenching Tools on Shore. When the Troops have poffefled themfelves of a Poft on Shore the chief Engineer marks out an Entrenchmient to fecure the Provi- fions, Stores, heavy Artillery, Powder and other Things neceffary for the Army. Then ajl the Tents, Blankets, Watch- coats, Knapfacks, Remainder of the in- trenching Tools, fpare Ammunition, Pro- vifions, ( 30 ) the Night clear, did not evince the contrary. And this will appear flill more evident, if we confider that, after having made our- felves Mafters of A IX (which fome pre- tend coujd as eafily have been done, with vifions, Scaling-Ladders, Petards, Gfr, are to be brought on Shore, that no Time may be loft in frofecuting the Enterprize^ To be carried on Shore after the Men are landed ; the Mens Knapfacks, a Tent, two Blankets, and a Kettle for eight Men. A Soldier's Tent for the Officers of a Company- All thofc Tents muft, when the Army marches, be carried by the Sol- diers, 'till better Means can be had. A Soldier to have only one Shirt, one Pair of Shoes, and one Pair of Stockings in his Knapfack. No Women to be allowed to come on Shore 'till ordered by the Gene- ral. A careful Perfon to be left in every Tranfport, to take Charge of the Bag- gage belonging to the Officerb and Men 'till it is called for. Upon all Occafions, where it is ippofed the Enemy :% got ( 3' ) a Twenty-gun Ship as with the whole Ar-* mament, as it is faid, I fuppofe to fupport the Credibility of this Affertion, that it Vf2i^entirely defencelefs) five Days were fpent in Councils of War, to judge of the Ex- pediency :n )e )t got at, the Lieutenant General commands that the Corps which are direded to at- tack them, do march vigoroufly up, that they referve their Fire 'till they come very near. Upon every Opportunity, the Ge- neral Orders the Troops to run in upon, the Enemy with their Bayonets, in which Method of Attack, the fuperior Strength and Courage of the Britifh Troops mujl meet with Succefs, The Troops may expeB tofnd a Number of Militia of the Country upon the Shore y which they willea/i!y dijperfe. The fhort 3 Pounders, the fhort 6 Pounders, and all the Howitzers are the firft Artil- lery, which will be called for ; and there- fore to be got in Readinefs, as foon as the Ships come to an Anchor. Officers of the Navy will be appointed to diredt the Boats that carry the Men on Shore, and the ( 32 ) pediency of "^returning to Englaftd — they could not deliberate upon the PraEiicahi^ lity of landing their Troops y iince the Ge- neral was fo well apprized of there being nothing but -ffuch a Militia to oppofe theirii as they would cafily dijperfe. But at the End of thele five Days, when the French had been fufficiently alarmed, and they !:.ad taken all imaginable Precaution to prevent our Defcent with Succefs — fuch as planting Cannon, (o as to make it, for many Miles one continued Battery — * colleding their Troops, and making two feparate Encampments it was then judged expedient, at four Miles from Shore, to detach feparately the Grana- diers •4? the Officers of the Land Forces are to take Care that the Orders given by thefe Gen- tlemen, to the Boats Crews are ftridlly obeyed. The Boats will be ranged by Divifions under their refpedtive Com- manders. All Soldiers that are unfit for Duty are to be left on board their Tranf- ports. •f Vide the preceding Orders. '1 vrrr ■s ( 33 ) dlers and piquet Companies in the Men of War's Boats, to make a Debarkation upon the Continent — which Troops muft have maintained their Ground fix or feveii Hours before they could (or, I fuppofe had need) be affifted by a fecond Difem- barkation, — --there being no Hopes of a Retreat, as the Boats were to row imme- diately back, in order to carry the other Troops. ., This, it is imagined by fome ill-natured, and perhaps, difafFedled, Politicians, was to try the Difpofition of the Troops ; as they would infinuate, that if our Soldiers had teftified the leaft Diffatisfadtion, at being detached, in fuch a Manner^ and after fuch Retardment ^ our Gen- Is would have pleaded that as a fufficient Excufe for not attempting to land (which ih^LondonGazette affures us was the Cafe). But as our Troops manifefted the greateft Defire of making a Defcent, and as they were fent off in this manner, all thefe fine fpun Conje(fl:ures of our critical Politicians amount to nothing. It is true, after four Hours rowing, they were recalled — and E the ( 34 ) the Refult of Five Days Deliberations , was found erroneous, in that fhort Space of Time — even without fummoning a Council of War — fo neceflary for the Deciiion of all important Meafures, But it is Time to be ferious — this, then, is the Event of onr famous Expedi- tion ! An Expedition that alarmed all Europe — frightened our Enemies and flat- tered our Allies, with fuch an important Stroke, as would give a new Face to our Affairs, and either enable us to condu<9r' the War with Glory, or produce an ho- nourable Peace — and, indeed, fome pre- tend that a Peace may be the Confequence of it — be it fo, if it prove an honourable one. But furely the original DefHnation of this Armament, could never have been changed by any Remonftrances of the Court of Spain — could we have been afraid that in attacking St. Domingo ( be- caufe the Spaniards have PofTeffions upon the Ifland, whereon it is lituated) we fhould have provoked the Spaniards to de- clare War againft us ? If fo, perhaps, we were afraid of landing at Rocheforty bc- caufe of "fi ( 35 ) caufe it is upon the iamc Co tlnent as Madrid, Is it the FrienJJhip ol ^pain ^hat has had fufficient Weight in the Sea!* of our Judgment, to render infrudtuou. :his Expedition ? Their Impartiality is fu ma- tt ifeft, we have Reafon to hope for its Continuance, though perhaps we fhall rot have another Due de Penthievre car- ried to Cadiz, to determine the Legality of the Capture y when the Spaniards fhall be interefted one third in the Cargo — Per- )iaps we fhall not have another Captain of a Privateer, whofe Judgment will diredl him, in fuch a Circumftance to Cales^ when the fame Wind that will carry him riiere, will carry hin> ito Qibraltar, But if we could even fuppofe, that the Reafon we did not make a dejcent at Rocbeforty was becaufe it is fituated upon the fame Continent as Spain— ihzt would not account for our not attacking tht Hardi (French) Man of War, which failed fome Hours in Company with our Fleet, and was not then within Gun-Jhot of the Land,-"-lt is true, we detached four Ships after her— but flie had than got into the Garonne ( 36 ) Garronne^'^ztidy according to the preced- ing Manner of Rcafoning, would not then have been a legal Capture. However I would be inclined to believe that the M ry ought not to fliarc the blame of this ill-executeu Expe- dition—whatever the firft deftination of the Armament might be, for would it not be abfurd to imagine that our Gen Is were inftrudted to lay in-adive five Days before Rochcfort^ to give the French T^ime to cppofe them? — would it not be ridiculous to luppofe that our Ad 1 was ordered to let the French Ship pafs-^—ov^ blow up half a dozen of our Seaman^ (as has been p:;flitively aflertcd) upon the lile of Aixy in deflroying the Fortifications, to give the Enterprife an Air of Importance ? — We may I think, then, reafonably conclude that the Commanders in Chief, were or-^ dered, when they Jet out^ to make a defcent at Rochefort, But 1 believe no one will pretend to deny, that the Viper Sloop failed from Plymouth with Difpatchcs for Ad 1 H ke. 'i ( 37 ) // kcy and that upon her meeting with the Fleet in the Bay, all farther De- liberations were laid afide ; and whether, or no the Ad 1 wrote to the Gen 1, to enquire if he had any further Occafion for his Majefty's Fleet ; if not he would return to England— this much is certain — // did return^ f If we are not informed of either the Caufe, or Contents of thofe Difpatches, may we not reafonably conclude, that the fame Reafon, that in the laft War, made our Fleet at Gibraltar VQxndXn mildSpedfa^ tors of the French Fleets when it pafled them, in the Gut^ and when they might have taken^ burnt ^ or dejiroyed every one of the Enemy % Ships — has brought our Armament from the Bay of Bifcay to block up Portfmouthf inftead of Rochefort. It is true there was then, no Convention of Neutrality^ which obliged forty thoufand Men in our Pay^ to lay down their Arms, and prevented them ajji/iing^ our oJily Ally, upon the Brink of being fwallowed up, by the Number of his Enemies — but the fame Place was in Danger ; and Pbilofophers ( 38 ) IPhilofophers tell us that the fame Caufeg^ always produce the like Effedts, and where the Caufe is not to be immediately dilcovercd, we can only trace it by its Efp fedts. If fo, there is a moft ftriking pa- rallellarity in the Meafures, (their Confer quences)™ they both refledl agreat lauftre upon our Arms — they both do honour to our Naval Expeditions. But to whatever Caufe our ill Succefs may be afcribed, it is evident, my Country?- Men, you can truft none but yourfelves for your Prote/^ion : This demonftrates, itill farther, the Necejfity^ the Utility^ of a Militia^ and I fhall conclude this Letter, with hoping that this Inftitution may have a more extenfive Influence in our Happinefi and Profperity than is at firfl: perceived— for daftardly Commanders^ bad Condu&orSy and even venal and corrupt M rs win dread the Rejentment of a warlike People. Pojifcript. I :m ( 39 ) POSTSCRIPT. ■ I ■ • Since the preceding Sheets went to the Prefs Mr. P 's Letter to Adm. H and Gen 1 M ty made its Ap- pearance in public ; by which we are in- formed what Orders the V p r S -p carried from him—^*io that we imagine it only remains now for A — i— • H— — and G- M to ckar tbem- felves by acquainting us by what Orders they returned to Spithead^ fince thofe con- tained in Mr. P 's Letter were fo ex- prefsly contrary : and in the Interim I fub- mit the following Queries to you, in order to throw as much Light as poflible upon this intricate Affair. ^ery i. Whether -Mr. P- *s Letter which has been publifhed, comprifed all \\\^ Difpatches fent by the V— p r ? ^ery ( 4^ ) ^ery 2, Whether we were acquainted with the Soundings of the French Coaft, before the Sailing of the Fleet j and whe- ther the gaining that Intelligence may not be pleaded as an Excufe for their Five Days InaSion ? J^ery 3. Whether among the Pilots Lord ^1 prepared yir all Parts of the Worldy he did not omit thofe, acquainted with the French Coaft in the Bay of Bis- cay? \ V. •• . -^ '-.,.,:-• ■. ( 1 .^ \ .'. ^ery 4- Whether the firft Deftinaticin of this Armament was not changed, and any Damage we could have done the French at Rochefort^ would have been equivalent to the Expence of fitting it ©ut, &c? . §luery 5. If the C ders, in Con- travention of their lajl^ reaU and pofttive Orders^ returned to Spitheady when they ihould A ( 41 ) fliould have remained in the %-— we jnay not expe