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Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mAthode. ata slure, d : IX 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 / ■v., ,' '^■' ;*' "»■ -■ i /^ C3 JrXiL ^^4M^^A^ ^\«.- ■ >r OX THE NECESSITY OF A MORE EFFECTUAL SYSTEM ov NATIONAL DEFENCE. \.' ,-V.t 5^^ I' /?. ,N »1- '-'-v^',:^ ^ t .it. N \ ■\ '•■> /-if,,,** I f ¥i :rrlT *. ?j^^.' ■i»r •rf iff yMitcKi^ itoii- '^'» / s •^ •^v ^ '■.(/' ■- ■',■->• .' ., >, t /-^ ? i. » t , -• '■"-. V, '»■! . ^' I. • J * ■ r •■V, I # 'J^ OM :^i THE NECESSITY MORE EFFECTUAL SYSTEM •f ■■>^ "i '':f'f\:'SMh 'i.; ?!:-.•!•«■ NATIONAL DEFENCE, • :!, AND ■, THE ME4NS OP ESTABLISHING \! > THE PERMANENT SECURITY if THE KINGDOM. h^ \. BY THE EARL OF SELKIRK. H...-,>: )■; •' ILoiUicn: PRIITTED BT RICHARD TA^w^ AHD CO,, MOE-LAWB, « FOH J. HATCHAHD, PICCADILLY, . AND A. CONSTABLE AND CO., EDINBURGH. .% 180S. .*"■' ". V ' .-' V , r •■* ^ . f I r . ^ A J "J » .' 'Ml "> ' I ',1 • . ' ADVERTISEMENT. In the course of the following pages, gome topics occur, into the discussion of which it rnay seem presumptuous to enter, without hav- ing had direct experience of military affairs. As an apology for this, I may be allowed to mention that, on every question of this na- ture, I have studied to correct my own ideas by a reference to the opinion of professional men. The military reasonings which I have ventured ' to introduce, may, perhaps, meet with some attention from the public, when it is known that they have received the approbation of men highly distinguished by their military talents. It forms no part of my object to discuss the merits of a plan, which has recently been submitted to Parliament by His Majesty's Ministers. Before that plan was brought for- ward, fi ADVERTISEMENT. ward, these pages were nearly ready for the public eye. I have entered, however, into many general reasonings, which may, perhaps, be found to bear upon the proposal. • 71ie term ** Local Militia,** which I have had occasion to repeat very frequently, has been applied by Lord Castlereagh to an establish- ment of a very different nature, and upon a much more limited scale. I could have wished to avoid the ambiguity to which this circum- stance may give rise. But in the actual state of my publication, I found it impossible to altei' the term which I had adopted. I must therefore entreat the reader, not to confound the Local Militia, which I have ventured to recommend, with that which is proposed by the noble Secretary of State. CONTENTS. CONTENTS. SiCTiON 1. p. U Inadequacy of ^r present StaU of Defence, ' «. p. 19. Proposed Organization of the Lo^ cal Militia, 3. p. dB. Consequences of this Institution to the Security of the Kingdom. *. P'69, Local Militia compared with the Volunteer System, and general Array, - J. p. 1 1 1. Defence cflreland^MilitiaEsta^ Iflishment. P' ^^3, Conclusion. Appbkdix 161— 179. ^ l t THE NECESSITY IT A MORE EFFECTUAL SYSTEM NATIONAL DEFENCR ill/,, ,. (^(('^l:. .-ri ' W I T n I N the last three years an entire change has taken place in the aspect of Eu- ropean affairs. A train of disastrous events, terminating on the plains of Friedland, has annihilated every appearance of a balance of power on the Continent. The main principle and foundation of the system of European politics is thus at an end. A new a;ra in history is begun; and the maxims on which the conduct of nations has hither- ,'ty "ou . to I' terfergfi "" g overned,' cafi" no longer Tiii re- ferrecl to, as applicable to the actual cir- cumstances of the world. . . ' rrn^rp O T '■S T "X ' f T 1 ' Though Great Britain has not been im- mediately involved iri the catastrophe of thcContine^nt, yet her policy cannot remain uninfluenced hy so vast a change in all that surrounds her. To u», as well as to the na- tions of the Continent, this must be a .new «em : ' oiirarransrements, internal as Well as external, must be adapted to our new cir- cumstances. Britain has long maintained a rivalship against a country containing more than double her population, and, in point of natural advantage.s»,stil) more ]|?r superioi;. If, against so great adisprppor-i tion of physical strength, we have beei^ enabled hitherto to maintain an equal cpxi* test, jit,;s not to be entirely ascribed to the advantage of our insulai* situation. Oiii; itnferiority in r«j;gular military force has not yet occasioned very imminent danger U>^ur national independence, because the, grea$ milit^ary powers of the ppntinent kept our adversary ol a ,-. ' • . %r ■l*'-'. ' / / 1 t .*• ) f adversary in awe, and prevented the full '. exertion of her strength against us. That check is now no more. We are deprived of all extraneous support, while the force against which we have to contend, haa b*fr '.'*: ■ /->J '^ %f K if L'.' Jt* sprung ! Whether invasion be an event remote or near at hand, we have no reason to ex- pect long previous notice of the movements of the invading force. In the ports of Hol- land the enemy may collect a multitude of coasting vessels and river craft, which, with their activity and skill, may be con- verted, even in a few days, into a most formidable military conveyance. I shall not here enter into any minute investiga- tion of the means, by which such a flotilla maybe enabled to elude or to defy our naval superiority. It is enough that such men as Lord Nelson and Sir Sidney Smith have deemed the attempt not impracti^ cable. Difficult it is, undoubtedly; and a concurrence of favourable circumstances may be requisite to give it effect. These difhculties, however, do not amount to m\ impossibility : repeated experience has "■'i^""^ . . ^ proved , I fiii jit ij-i proved that the greatest naval superiority may be eluded ; and a successful landing of the enemy is still to be reckoned among the events, for which Great Britain ought to be prepared. i lu;;/.' . i.;.;if# > True it is, that invasion has often been threatened by our enemies, and they .have never seriously made the attempt ; but to infer that they never will, would be rash indeed. We are placed in circumstances 50 entirely new, that the events of other times afford no criterion, by which to judge of future probabilities. A successful in-* vasion of England would not be more re-» mote from the course of ordinary events, than many of those which the history of the last three tremendous years will record. Four years ago, Napoleon must have staked both his power and his personal safety on the success of the enterprise : his situation is now such, that the failure of an attempt at invasion would endanger neither. We are engaged with an enemy, whose impla- cable i iii^ii 7 k cable rancour can only be equalled by bis formidable power, and the singular ability 'with which all his enterprises are concerted. The dangers which in former times may have deterred men less bent on their pur- pose, will now be little regarded. We may be certain, that no sacrifices will be deem- ed too great, if they can purchase our de- struction ; that the lives of 100,000 men will be counted as nothing : and if our enemy be thus determined to despise every hazard, there is no enterprise, however desperate, in which a concurrence of fortu- nate accidents may not open the road to success. "'?iti.>Ji«. uvn '..-'11. -"%.''.•; .i-'u Jiv .» Those even who rely the most on our maritime superiority, — those who are the least disposed to admit the possibility, that, by any contingency, our fleet may be dis- abled from intercepting the passage of the enemy, — must rest their confidence on the presumption, that our fleet is always to be managed with p'':rfect judgement, and in the most effectual manner. But is this a ■■■''■'" supposition n!l! supposition upon -which we can safely pro- < ceed ? Can no instance be pointed out, in which an Enghsh admiral has been guilty, . even of an error of judgement? When the misconduct of one man, the mismanage- ment of a single day, may open our country to that foe, who has laid the powers of the Continent in the dust, shall we think it unnecessary to provide against the dread- ful consequences which might ensue ? The fleet is, indeed, our proper weapon of at- tack, the instrument of the greatness and • the glory of England ; but to rest our de- fence on that alone, is only for men who dare not look their real situation in the face. Our wooden walls are with us a never- ceasing theme of praise ; and of praise well- merited: but it is no disparagement to our wooden walls, that we should not rest content, while the garrison within is in such a state, that the first breach may prove our ruin.,., ...,:j r..,^ ..^^^v. .,>r.c,r.y Without pretending, therefore, to de- fine at wha,t , period invasion is to be exn pected,— whether a few weeks onlv or years may intervp'^e, — we cannot lose sight of the probability that it will be attempted, unless we are soon in a better state for resistance. It is on shore that we must ultimately be prepared to defend the Hberties of our country ; and unless we can maintain the contest upon our own ground, we have no right to expect that our existence, as a nation, will long be preserved. *• ' '^i^^ ''-''*' .-^^iJ^V'^^-'i *!> . r. ^' 1 Jl Since, then, the obstacles to the passage of the enemy are not physically insupe- rable, it is at least a possible supposi-^ tion, that they may succeed in landing an army of 100,000 men on the coast of Kent or Essex. It becomes us to consider cooly ly whether our means of defence are now sufficient to afford a certainty, or even a fair probability, that we may overcome such an invading force. . .i No one, I presume, will venture to as- '=/ •■' , - , ""-sert, Cr m i»i n 10 iert, that our regular forces lire adequate to the contest even with the addition of the miUtia. Of the numerous army main« iained by this kingdom, a great part ia detached into f^istant colonial stations^ u'hile those at ho.iie have so extensive a tract to guard, that there is much difficulty in collecting any considerable number in on3 place. Those who are best acquaint* ed with the actual state of our military establishments, with the present distribu"> tion of our forces, and th^ extensive de- mands upon their service, will not be ready to believe that we could easily collect an army, bearing as great a proportion to the supposed force of the invaders, as the Prussians did to the French in the cam* paign of 1806. ;, . 'r'-:. U -fx If our commanders attempt to make a stand with a force much inferior in num- bers to the enemy, may we not see another such catastrophe as that of Marengo, or of Austerlitz, or of Jena? Our country does not If!' '1 1- 11 not abound in military positions of sutii-* cient strength, to compensate for a very great disproportion of numbers. It is tho system of our enemies to trust much to fortune ; they will risk every thing to bring the contest to the issue of a battle ; and if, in so many enterprises of desperate hazard, they have hitherto been the favourites of fortune, may they not be favoured again ? In their style of operations, if the hazards are great, successes are decisive ; and if once they prevail in a general engage- ment, we can have little hope that our army could again collect to make a se- cond stand..'' .'■'! V]\'! Confident as we may be in the loyalty of the people, we cannot expect the ne- cessary degree of promptitude in their ef-» forts, except by means of complete previ- ous arrangements. Not a day can be lost without additional danger; and in the critical momentwhich must decide the fate of the country, any doubt as to the duty required from each individual, may be productiv'e of an embarrassment and con- fusion, not less fatal than if cowardice and disaffection were the prevailing habits of our people. Every man ought to know exaotly what his task is : — How that task ..Ui u 14 w to he perfonmofl, w not a leSAon to be tau«;lit to luin when tlie cneiu)' is on liii- glisli ground. '< It uill not he a>M4>rted, that our ar- rangements are already surticit nt for giv- ing the utmost pos»ihl«' viYcct to the exer- tions of the people at large ; and those men whose opinions upon military suhjects h<>st deserve attention, are not in general sanguine enough to helieve, that our domestic force, in its present state, could give such cftec- tual support to our regular army, as to en- able it to cope with a very superior arn>y ot* invaders. The Volunteer establishment is universally admitted to have lost much of its discipline, and to be in a lower state of efhciency than at any former period. The benefits wliich have been deriveii from that institution, the salutary effects which it has produced on the public mind, the brilliant display which it has afforded, of the energy and patriotic ardour which pervade this country, form no argument Ibr adhering to a system of defence, ).:: which m I-I "' ' IJi •' > / • / f 16 •.. ,\ which is not adapted to our present cir« caipstances. .niiiAvjii^ m^^KV^ 4di;^^i4 .■■'• ■-■ '^'^hj ' ... Since the first institution of the volun- teers, our relative situation to the rest of Euro*^e is totally changed. Our danger might then have L«ien expected to pass away : it has now assumed every appear- ance of permanence, and cannot be ward- ed off by any momentary effort of spon-» taneous zeal. The most zealous advocates of the volunteers seem now to be satisfied of the instability, which is involved in the very principle of their formation. It is by na means improbable, that the spirit of the nation might again be roused, that the Vo- lunteer establishment might be restored to as great a state of efficiency as it had formerly attained : but this, even if it were enough for our present emergency, could not be done without great exertions on tha part of the people^ and great expense to the public treasury. It is to be consi- dered, whether that expense and. these ex- ertions may not be better applied ; whether* ^■iA A'^iiVif with 17 tfith the same burden ort the cotintfy, Ivc may not obtain a domestic force more effectually organized, liable to no ft actua- tion, and to no principle of decay,— a force which will not oniy provide for the exi- gency of the moment, but lay a solid and permanent fouf^ation for our future safety. Impressed t^ith a conviction that, under the present circumstances of the country, the means of defence hitherto adopted are not sufficient, I took occasion, in the course of the last session of Parliament, to state my opinion of the necessity of providing against the permanent dangers with which we are surrounded, by measures of as permanent efficacy. In that view I ventured to recom- mend the establishment of a Local MiHtia, in which every young man, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, through- out Great Britain, should be enrolled, and completely trained to military discipline. Not having then an opportunity of en- tering into minute details, it was not easy c for '^Il i ,n :i!^l: 18 9 for me to explain completely the nature and consequences of the proposed institu- tion. I now lay before the pubhc a more enlarged view of the plan, rather for the purpose of illustrating the general principle, and of showing its practicability, than with any idea of exhibiting a perfect system. On a subject so extensive, it is perhaps im- possible to bring forward at once such a complete arrangement, as to leave no room for objection or amendment. I trust, how- ever, that the imperfections to which these suggestions may be found liable, will not be so great as to affect the general prin- ciple, on which the outlines of the plan are founded. I hope at least to satisfy the reader that, in our own exertions, this nation may find security from every foreign attack. With- out pretending to deny that an institution, such as I recommend, must be, in some degree, inconvenient and burdensome to the public, I may boldly appeal to the feelings of every thinking man, whether the ! I'i 19 the demands I would make, on the time and the exertions of tb people, are such as to bear any proportion, to the inestimable va- lue of the obj cts for which the sacrifice is required. We have no alternative be- tween such sacrifices and the prospect of subjugation by an inveterate foe ; nor do t\vi exertions which I propose, appear to be greater than the circumstances of our situation justly demand. In a case in which every thing is involved, that is va- luable to us as a nation, it would be a mean and a short-sighted oeconomy to be sparing in our preparations. Better, sure- ly, to make sacrifices rather greater than may be absolutely necessary, than to l*^ave our ultimate security in any hazard! ; to t ■• That the Government has a right to Sect. 2, call for the personal service of every man , capable of bearing arms, in the defence . c2 of 'P III' I I! t :'''l lllll 120 of the country, la a position which no loyal subject will deny. This principle is recog- nised in many of our laws, and is the only ground on which an attempt can be made, to justify the hardship imposed on indi- viduals by some of our institutions. The present system of militia ballot is an ap* plication of this principle ; but it is an in- judicious and improper application. That service, which is equally the duty of all, if now unfairly distributed, and thrown with oppressive severity on a few. Such an in- stitution must necessarily be the occasion of murmurs; but if the burden of the public service can be so equally dwided, a^ that each individual sbtdl scareely perceive his loafl, the country will be served with cheerfulness, whilst the national strength may be augmented in a degree almost in- calculable. At the age of 18, at that period of life when a young man has scarcely determined on his profession, when he is unfettered by the ties of a family, and his habits are 21 are u yet unfixed, it is proposed, that three months shall be devoted to the ner- vice, which his country has a right to de^ mand of him. Every youth may be allowed to enrol his name for service in any district which he prefers, and the period of the year, at which he is to perform his three months du^y, may be left to the determination of the magistracy of the district, so that the convenience of individuals may, as far as possible, be consulted. From the age of 19 upwards, only three weeks, at a fixed period of the year, will be required annually, till the age of 25, after which no one will be subject to any further demands of mi-» litary service. I m In the performance of this duty, no in^ dividual will be under the necessity of going to a great distance from his usual residence^ The period of three months, employed in the first training, may be spent entirely within his own county. For the exercises of the subsequent years, he may perhaps be called a little further; but» except ts 22 except in the case of actual invasion, never to any remote part of the king- dom. The sacrifice of tiiiie required of him, not amounting altogether to eight months in the course of seven years, can- not form an interruption of serious detri- ment to the plans of life, which any indi- vidual may have laid down for himself. The lower orders will not be oppressed by any pecuniary burden, such as the present mihtia ballot imposes. An adequate al- lowance of pay will be made by the pub- lic to defray all their expenses. The ser- vice required does not essentially interfere, either with their domestic ties, or with their prospects of advancement in life; und there is no ground to believe, that great anxiety will be felt to avoid the duty required. By young men in general, it is more probable that the proposed mi^ litary exercises will be looked upon as a scene of animated recreation. The demand which is thus made on the exertions of each individual is surely mo- derate ; 23 the ral, a Ithe 10- Ite; derate; yet the aggregate of these small contributions will be sufficient to establish the public security on an immoveable basis, and to render every foreign attack abso- lutely insignificant. 1 1. ;rio> From the tables constructed by Dr. Price, grounded on a general enumeration of the population of Sweden, and on the registers of mortality kept in that kingdom, it is calculated that, in a population of 100,000 persons of all ages and descriptions, there will be about 811 males between the ages of 18 and 19, and 4724 between 19 and 25, making in all 5535 between the ages of 18 and 25. According to this propor- tion, the population of Great Britain, amounting to nearly eleven millions, should contain about 605,000 males within these ages. Of this number, however, besides those disabled by infirmity, there must be a considerable proportion already engaged in the army and navy. Sea-faring men too, of all descriptions, being subject to the impress, are justly exempted from all demands Iff r'' demands of military service on shore. To ascertain, with precision, the deduction^ to be made on account of these and other exceptions, would require documents, which are not, perhaps, attainable at present. Bui: some approximation to an estimate may be formed, from the enumerations made in the year 1803, under the General Defence Act. At that time, returns were made of 1,831,315 men in Great Britain, eifec* tive and liable to duty, between the ages of 17 and 55. According to Pr, Price's tables, the total number of maten, between these ages, corresponding to tiie population of Great Britain) would be about 2,766,000, which is nearly in the prppor* tion of 3 to 2 of those returned in 180^ 99 effective. If, therefore, from the ascer^ tained population of any district, we ealr culate, by the tables, the proportion of inales betwen the ages of 18 and ^5f and taen m^ke a deduction of one thii-dt we ^hall obtain a result, not very wide, prpT bably, of the real number of men who mv^y he found eflfeetiv?, in the proposed enrolment* i -i i 26 enrolment. According to this estimate, ttie yovmg men between tlie age of 18 and 25, liable to serve in the Local JVIilitia, will, amount to about 400,000, pf whom nearly 60,000 will be between 18 and 19*. I V.J Variations from this rule must, no doubt, be expected, as there are some districts from which a larger proportion of men may have been drawn off to the army, or to the sea, than from others; but these local varieties will not affect the general re- sult, 9Dd their amount will not, in all probability, be auch, as to deserve at- tention in the practical arrangement of the measure. A dQubt of more importance m?iy perhaps arise on another point: ThPMgh it is ascertained that the persons, effective and liable to military duty, ac- cording to the principles of the General Defeuee Act, between the ages of 17 and * See Appendix, A. 56y mir [i|ii '■! 26 55, amount to two-thirds of the total num- ber of males between these ages, yet it may be questioned whether the same pro- portion will hold good between the ages of 18 and 25. It is probable that a greater proportion of young than of middle-aged men arc absent from their native places, in the army, and in the royal or commercial navy. On the other hand, a smaller ^pro- portion will be disabled from service by infirmity in the early periods ot life. If, however, on the whole, it should prove that the effective men between 18 and 25 fall very far short of the proportion which has been supposed — that the number of men, requisite for the defence of the country, cannot, therefore, be found within these ages, the deficiency may be supplied by extending the period of seiTice a year or two further. • - •»; ' ' ^ The arrangements necessary for the in- struction of these men in military disci- pline, will be most readily understood by taking ii 27 taking as an example a particular district, as, for instance, the county of Kent. If the proportion above stated should hold good, the young men in that county be- tween 18 and 19 will amount, after all de- ductions, to about 1662* liable to duty as local mihtia. These men may be allotted into four different divisions, and in- structed in succession by the same of- ficers. As soon as the men of one division have been brought to a due degree of discipline, they may return home and be replaced by another ; and three months being allotted to each division, the whole will be gone through in the course of the year. - '''•'' ■ ■ ■ • I 'i I The training of the young men through- out the kingdom may thus proceed in a continual succession, and afford uninter- rupted employment to a permanent esta- blishment of regular officers. Men of ex- * See Appendix, A. Table 1. penence n»iyp' Ij 1:3^' t8 prrirnrr in actual service ouglit to be se- h'cted for thin purpo.se ; tuid, undrr their command, each flucceasive bodjr of recruits •hould be organised into a battalion* and instructed in all the manoeuvres of regular troops. The total number of recruits to be an- nually trained in this county may be di- vided into four divisions, of 415 each. That arrangement would have the advan- tage of simplicity, but it would involve one inconvenience, that, at the end of every three months, the ofHcers would have to begin anew upon a whole bat- talion of recruits totally uninstructed* In order to distribute the burden of duty more equally over the year, it may be advisable to form the recruits into a greater number of divisions. Thus, for instance : — let the whok*? be allotted into ten divisions of 166 mt">j each; in the com- mencement, let only one division be as- sembled, 80 that the attention of the offi- cers ■ • • 1 99 cew may be devoted to them ulontj for four weeks. After this period, the firMt divi« lion will be, in some degree, advanced in discipline ; a second division may then join them, and after foar weeks more, a third. The drudgery of instructing the first di- vision may tlius, hn a considerable degree, be over, before that of the second \» begim : the men of the subsequent divisions, benig mixed among those already in a state ©f some proficiency, mus-t derive benefit from tbe example of their comrades, and ttieir instrnction will be a less laboi'ious task, than if the whole battalion were to be taught at once from the beginning, '"^^ch division being supposed to remain 12 weeks on duty, the first may return to their homes at the time when the fourth joins the bat- talion ; and at the end of every four weeks, another division will be dismissed, and re- placed by a similar number of men entering upon their period of duty. ."■•if Thus, through tbe greater part of the year, ?i!j' ■: i 'I W 30 year, there will be constantly assembled three divisions of l66 men each^ or in all about jOO men, a number ^vbich r^ay be conveniently manoeuvred as one battalion. To the corps thus composed, I would give the name of the Training Battalion. In such a county as Ktnt, it will, require an establishment of two field officers, eight captains, eight lieutenants, and thirty- two Serjeants. When the recruits of the first division only are assembled, l66 men^ bting divided into eight companies, there will only be about 20 men in each, to oc- cupy the attention of two commissioned and four non-commissioned officers. There can be no doubt, that in the course of four . weeks, they may bring this small number of men into such a state of proLciency, that, during the next four weeks-, their chief attention may be devoted to the se- cond division. When the third division joins, the companies will be at their full complement of about 60 men each ; and by this time, it is probable that some of the . / most t;. 31 moat intelligent men of the first division may have made a sufficient progress, to be capable of acting as non-commissioned of- ficers, under the direction of those of more experience. According to this progressive plan of in- structing the Local Militia, it will be thii ty- six weeks, after the commencement of the rotation, before the tenth, or last divisica of the recruits of the year, will enter upon their period of duty in tiie Training Bat- talion, and after twelve weeks more, all will have gone through their allotted course of discipline. Four weeks will still remain to complete the year, in the course of which, I wouW propose a general assem- blage of the whole Local Militia of the county, including the recruits vho have been trained durmg the preceding eleven months, along with all other young men between the ages c^ 19 and 25. The whole should remain encamped for about three weeks, practising the duty in which they d\ r f m 32 they have been instructed, and applying themselves more particularly to those rish nceuvres, which can only be executed by large bodies of men, and to those exercised which have the nearest resemblance to the operations of real warfare. When this plan has arrived at mattirity^ all the young men included in the Local Militia will have been formed to military discipline, by three months drilling in one or other of the seven preceding years^ The annual recurrence of a suflicient period of exercise will serve to keep up the hiabits of discipline, which have been acquired in the first training ; so that the eldest classes of the Local Militia will con-* tinue as completely masters of their duty^ as those who have been recently instructed.^ At the same time, the exercises of the an-> uual assemblage may be made to give, both to the officers and men, a more perfect idea of their duty, tlian can be imparted by any drilling of separate battalions in quarters. I n 'I 'I id. JCt tjUarters. The whole body of Local Mi- litia will be formed according to the same organization, and will go through the same operations as if they were in presence of the enemy ; and every man will learn exactly the duty which may then be re- quired of him* .J *i •!.,'• ?.;*;■., ' ),iU /J - » . ■ • I - . If the akrm should be given in the course of the ensuing year, every individual, on joining his battalioii, will take the same place which he occupied at the general as- semblage. These exercises will thus form a rehearsal of the duties to be performed, in' case the aictual services of this militia should be i*equired . Following out this principle, it must be observed that the young men who, being in their first year's training, have never vrt joined in the general assemblage, will 'C be reckoned among those from whom real service is to be expected. Thus eacb individual, though enrolled for training at the age of 18, will not be called upon for real duty ag&inst the enemy till he is 19; and, on the other hand, though his last D attendance I 'fW] 1 1 34 attendance at the ordinary exercises of tlm Local Militia will be at the age of to, yet during the ensuing year, he must still be ready for duty, if an occasion of emergency should occur. , ' • ,, ,- • '111 ill li ' '8! The period of the general assemblage may b-^ ^ixed at any season of the year least , likely v . ^erfere with the labours of agri- culture. A he beginning of summer, after the business of the seed-time is brought to a close, and before the harvest is likely to commence, will probably be found the most convenient. From the difference of climate in different parts of the island, it may be advisable that the mihtia of the southern counties should assemble earlier than those of the northern. It is by no means ne- cessary that the assemblage of all adjoining counties should be at the same time ; — on the contrary, many reasons may be stated for appointing them at established intervals: but, in each particular county or district, it should be permanently fixed at one con- stant period. All the other arrangements for 35 for the Local Militia will be determined by the time of the general assemblage. Im- mediately after it, the annual enrolment should be made, of the young men who, in the course of the preceding year, have attained the age of 18. The progressive plan for their instruction will then com- mence, and will occupy the officers during the whole interval till the next general as- semblage. •.J ■M, In the county which has been taken a^ an example, it has been calculated that the Local Militia, united in the general assemblage, will form a body of above 11,200*. This number may be convenient- ly divided into l6 battalions of 700 men each. The different battalions should be assigned to different local subdivisions of the county, to be arranged according to the population of each district. These may be called the Local Battalions, as di- stinguished from the Training Battalion, of . ; It , ; * See Appendix, A.— Table I. ! !> 2 which i »i 'I I I '1(1 ■ 1:3! f I Hi J hi:!!; li I 56 which the drsjanization has already been explained. The Training Battalion is sup- posed to be constituted merely for the purpose of instructing the successive divi- sions of recruits ; and, at the end of every year, when that purpose is accomplished, the battalion will no longer remain as n separate body ; the men who have passed through it being parcelled out to the dif- ferent Local Battalions, to which by resi- dence they are naturally attached. The Local Battalions, on the other hand, though in ordinary circumstances meeting only once in the year, are to be considered as permanently constituted for actual service, and to be ab^ays ready to assemble when- ever invasion takes plaice. These Local Battalions must therefore be fully officered, ajid completely organized for real duty against the enemy. The chief command of each battalion I would propose to be given to Br gentle- man of respectable property and popular character in the county; and, as far as ^ ■ possible. Hi,;,. !'il|jli' > 37 possible, resident, or personally connected with the district to which the battalion be- longs. ' ' ' ' ' • • If this country has hitherto resisted the storm which overwhelms the rest of Eu- rope, it is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to the internal energy, resulting from that happy connection which subsists between the different orders of society. The insensible gradation of ranks, the mu- tual dependence of the aristocracy and their inferiors, arising from the peculiar nature of our govern iiicnt, diffuses widely the in- fluence of public opinion, and binds the nation into an united mass, by the firm chain of reciprocal good offices. Hence it is, that the law, which in other coun- tries seldom obtains more than a reluctant obedience, or, at best, a cold acquiescence, is here the object of zealous and affection- ate support from the great mass of the na- tion. Thi^ principle it is of infinite conse- quence to preserve unimpaired ; and in all 11 I 38 i! m. i; life. all our arrangements, military as well «« civil, the surest road to success is, that every new establishment should be ad- apted to the general spirit of our national institutions. fif Tlie personal influence of popular cha- racters will at all times be of importance, in smoothing the difficulties which may oc- cur in the execution of such measures as those now suggested. In the first esta- blishment of a system so new, as well as so extensive, this aid must be of peculiar value. Besides this, we adhere to the principles of our original militia establish- ment, in giving the command of each bat- talion to a gentleman of respectable pro- perty in the county. The volunteer system has dilTused a degree of military know- ledge so extensively, that there will pro- bably be no great di Acuity in finding persons properly qualified for such a com- mand. But, that there may be no risque from a deficiency of professional know- ledge, »' 39 ledge, the second in command in each battalion may be an oHicer of the regu- lar service. The persons who, during the course of the year, have acted as captains and Heutenants in the Training BattaHon, should, in the general assemblage, act as majors of the Local Battalions. > • r . > • ' ' t / J i 1 V • , I . ■' ' 4 . J ■ ■ ■ ' ■ I » * * ( It has beea observed that the Training Battalion of the county of Kent may be conveniently arranged into eight companies ; 'and two commissioned officers being allow- ed to each, will aflbrd one field-oflicer to each of the 16 battalions, into which the whole Local Militia of the county may be arranged. These battalions being assigned to local subdivisions of the county, it would be advisable that the Training Battalion should be apportioned into companies, on the same principle. This battalion being divided into eight companies, each of these will require for its supply an eighth part of the county, or two of the sixteen districts to which the Local Battalions are assigned. The I !i 40 ■i:.' nv fr:: Th(j recruits from each particular district |)eing placed in a particular company of the T^'iining Battalion, all the men who have been trained under the same captain and lieutenant, will be distributed into twp Local Battalions. To one of these two battalions the captain, and to the other the lieutenant should be appointed to act as major, in the general assemblage of the Local Militia. They will thus hjjive under their command the same men whom they havfe previously had under their charge in the Training Battalion ; they will have an opportunity pf displaying the proficiency of those whom they have instructed. The prospect of this continued personal connect tion with the same individuals, will be a spur to the exertions of th^se officers, and insure their attention to the improvement of the men whom it is their duty tp train. On the same principle, the Serjeants of each training company ought to be ap- ■ ,] r pointed 41 pointed to some ofllc*^ of distinction, in tlie two buttiilions connected witii tiie couvf pany wluch they imv^ been empluytd in training. -i • . • (. •' . • I'' jiiii. !•' • With respect to the inferior officers of the Local Battahons ; the captains and fiubalterne, as wdl as non-commissioned officers, may be selected from among the young men who are enrolled for duty. Of tliose who come within tlie general descrip- tion of the Local Militia, and from their age are liable to the proposed military ser- vice, there will, of course, be many of a condition superior to the connnon mass ; and there can be no difficulty in selectincr, from among them, a sufficient nundier of persons, capable of being instructed in the duty pf oilicers, In order to avoid any unpleasant inter- ference with the established manners and accustomed order of society, I would pro- pose that all the young men who choose to II w i|U'i' [■I 4t to svrvp at ihrir own rxprnnr shotilfl he «*nrollo(l in a spparaN^ corps, under the nnmo of Cadets.- Oi' these then* may be two compnnirs, one of ea>alry, and one of infantry, Icnviriij; it to thi* (hscretion of each in(li\i(hial to choose the species of sen ice most .suilahle to his incHnation, or to hit* pecuniary resources. These com- panies may he allowed to drill and to mess apart from the rest, and may be indulged in any other distinction, which is not di^em- ed inconsistent with the acquisition of that military knowledge, and those habits, "which it is the object of the proposed in- stitution to dirt'ust!. In their military duty, however, no relaxation can be admitted ; and there is no probability that their pro- ficiency will be inferior to that of the bat- talion at large. Th(^ Cadet Companies w ill, in general, be composed of young men of better education than the rest of the Local M'litia. Among the volunteers it has been experienced, that men of education have been much more ready in acquiring a knowledge 43 t knoule(la;e of military exercises, than the recruits who coninioniy enter into the rc- guhir army. • i • , * From among these CadttH, all the cap- tains and subaltern ollicers of the LociJ Battalions may be selected. The young men appointed to thest; oflices would other- wise be subject to the duty of privates in their respective companies. It is natural to suppose that the situation of an ollicer will be deemed more agreeable, aiid that most of the Cadets will be ambitious of such an appointment. There is no reason, therefore, to apprehend any dirticulty in finding a sulKcient number of persons will- ing to act as ofiicers; and the duty, either of a captain or a subaltern, is not so difli- cult, but that any young man of intelli- gence may soon render himself master of it. The persons thus appointed cannot in general be expected to take upon them- selves the duty of officers any longer than they !i Si. . r'H I 1i ill Ir' ■ % .i I 7i;rii • ';•*<■,•'- i^/i ».i ' . ■'.}■> • ;•;! 7' : i,-Mr OJ) '?<> n '[{uui ^ The employment thus proposed to be as- jsigned to officers of the regular service, a» field-officers, captains, and subalterns of the Training Battalions, and to act occa- sionally as general and field-officers, in the annual assemblage of the Local Militia, i» a portion of duty for which the experience of real senice is requisite. Many persons, liowever, may with propriety be employed in this way, who are not capable of the se- verer toils, for which an officer must be prepared, when on foreign stations, or in constant active service. The super- intendence of the Local Militia will be a situation highly desirable, and an employ- ment perfectly suitable for officers who, though not entirely disabled, have suffered in some degree from the effects of hard ser- vice,; for those who are past the first vigour of 53 of youth, and for all those who are marri-» ed, and desirous of a more settled life than can he reconciled with a continual change of quarters. This plan would therefore furnish an opportunity of employing, with great advantage to the public, many meri- torious and valuable officers, whose ser- vices are now either lost, for want of a situ- ation suitable to their circumstances, or who are engaged m a species of service for which thev are not so. well calculated. The duty, however, is not such as can be done by mere invalids, nor would it be proper to consider an appointment of this kind as a provision for superannuated officers. If this idea should be acted upon, the whole duty of training the Local Militia would proba- bly be executed in an imperfect and slovenly manner. As a check upon this abuse, there should be an absolute prohibition ag-ainst any offiqer being employed on the esta- blishment ofthe Local Militia unless within some limited age. jitLwv-^ t:; «,i j- mo? "J'I .i Under the organization which has been detailed, the Local Militia, in their general s.i'oj.i a3semblage, 54 II assemblage, will be sufficiently prepared to practise every evolution, which regular troops can be required to perform. As the militia of two or three adjoining counties may be brought together into one encamp- ment for these annual exercises, they may be assembled even to the amount of 20,000 or 30,000 men together. They may then bs manoeuvred in bodies sufficiently nume- rous, to practise all the movements which bear the closest resemblance to the opera- tions of a real campaign. The opportuni- ties of practice thus obtained, will be a school of military science scarcely inferior to any, except to the experience of actual warfare, fl '• ' • 'J' M.!^. I I We cannot, indeed, expect to render the Local Militia equal to troops who are inured to the dangers of real service. The most important lesson which a soldier has to learn, is one which nothing but the presence of an enemy can teach. Men who are completely habituated to situations of peril, and have learned by practice to ,.M,- ;:!'/•"•).•••>;!. preserve 55 preserve their coolness under every circum- stance, must undoubtedly be superior troops to those who have not that expe- rience, however well practised in military evolutic IS at home. The utmost that can be done, by any system of discipUne tor a militia, is to prepare them well for this last, and most essential lesson. This, however, is not peculiar to the proposed plan ; the same disadvantage attends our present militia, and every species of troops that are confined to home service. s I New levies, however, have been known oc- casionally to distinguish themselves greatly in their first action. Troops of this descrip- tion, if thoroughly practised in their ma- noeuvres, if accustomed to prompt and im- plicit obedience to their oilicers, if com- manded by officers in whom they have con- fidence, and who have confidence in them- selves, will certainly be more likely to act with steadiness when brought against the enemy, than if they had been imperfectly instructed, and had to encounter the embaf'- rassment mi i» i 56 mssmcntof a situation tor which they are ill prepared, in addition to the agitation which the presence oF danger may excite. Next to the acquisition ot* habitual coohiess a« midst danger, the most important lesson of miHtary dixty, is the habit of prompt and imphcit obedience to command ,•»— a habit which, when thoroughly impressed on tho minds of soldiers, and accompanied by some degree of awe for their otticers, may go far to counteract the strongest feelings of the human mind, and prevent the in- dividual from yielding to impressions of terror, which his own strength of mjnd could not have resisted^ 'rh> t vii foirfiN Habits of strict obedience arc there-* fore of infinitely more consequence^ to form soldiers for the purposes of real service, than dexterity in the use of their arms, or even precision in their manneuvres. In this re-' spect there seems to be an essential defect in the Volunteer System, in which the au- thority of the officers is necessarily preca* rjousj and precludes the possibility of enfor- ciueen laid in the habits of implicit obedience ; and thus the pains wliich these c6rps have taken in acquiring a proficiency in their ma^ ntvuvres have, in a great measure, been thrown away^ fdij'tiuT I •^H\i\nur) ;),|r .tV In the proposed organization of the Local Militia, this error is avoided. The autho* rity of the officers will be as complete as in the regular service. The men will be, from the first, under the strictest discipline which martial law can enforce ; and this for an uninterrupted space of three months, during which the recruits will be withdrawn from every other avocation, from every thing which can interrupt the acquisition of military habits. Whether this be a suf- ficient period of exercise, to confirm these habits eflf'ectually, is a question upon which professional m- I i ; He professional authorit}/ must decide. Upon this point I find a difference of opinion. Some officers of experience consider three months as sufficient, and in coi^firmation. cf that opinion refer to the French arn.ies,, in which the conscripts are esteemed fit for duty in a still shorter time. There arc on the other hand, officers of great emi- nence, who think this period too scanty, for the complete formation of ^ body of soldiers. It is, however, so much beyond any, which has hitherto been allowed to our domestic forces, that a fair trial may at least be made, before we conclude that more is necessary. If experience prove that it is not sufficient, more time must undoubtedly be allowed, rather than that the Local Militia should remain in a state of inefficiency. . . . , . , , ,,. , . It will have occurred to the reader, that under the arrangements which have been hithsrtc explained, this system of Local Militia cannot, for several years to come, ioiM ■• ^r.'i be k if I 59 (t be considered as in a sta'^e of maturity, and capable of effecting the purposes for "which it is intended. The whole plan proceeds on the supposition, that every re- cruit is, in the \e\y commencement of his service, to be completely instructed in his military duties, and that a space of three months uninterrupted discipline is to be devoted to this instruction In the arrange- ments that have been explained, the means of this instruction are provided only for the young men between 18 and 1.9. In the course of seven years, those who are now 18 will have reached to 25, and every one below that age, will then have gone through the prescribed course of discipline. The observations hitherto made, have been chiefly directed to the regular and perma- nent effects of the proposed plan; and to put these in a distinct point of vi6w, they have been described, as if the plan had been established for some time. If, how- ever, the young men between 19 and 25 were now to be assembled, without any -■'•] further I ^ •I 1 -. I ' r i * % "''''VfjIIWllW"! « I i> !! 60 further preparation than that which has already been explained, they would be in a very different state of proficiency ; they would neither be capable of the duty which is expected from then^ nor prepared to profit by the opportunities of exercise, which the great annual assemblage would , afford to those who have received a suf^ ficient previous instruction.) ;;.;.< oj '.v.), <> o. If the dangers which we have to appre- hend were so remote, that we could safely wait for some years, .the plan, as it has been already stated, would produce the desired effect in a gradual and progressive mariner. But our situation is not su> ../>i.. »..>..,...* To instruct at once so large a body of men, i& certainly a task of considerable dif- ficulty* The regular establishment of the Training Battalions was calculated for the progressive instruction of the young men between 18 and 19 only, and cannot be adequate to the immediate accomplishment of the same object with numbers so much larger. It is a question of great import- ance how this deficiency can be supplied, and officers provided for the commence- ment of this great establishment, j ' i if ■■ ! ■ 1 ■ ■ ,1 .■ ! VI The first resource that presents itself, is the employment of the volunteer officers, among whom there are many, who have rendered themselves fully masters of their duty, and are not inferior in point of skill to many professional men. As it must require some lime before the young officer^, who cire to be drawn from amongr the ca- dets. 'it ' it ■ if ' •' 62 il. lilt m will-, tlets, can be fully instructed, it would he very desirable that a great proportion of the volunteer officers could be induced to ac- cept of temporary appointments in the Local Militia. As an encouragement, the officers who thus agree to serve, though not within the age legally subject to mili- tary duty, should receive higher allowances, than the ordinary officers of the Local Militia, and such as to form an adequate indemnification for the time, which they sa- crifice to the public service. There is a pro- bability, that :i great proportion, and the best of the volunteer officers, may be in- duced to afford their assistance. Men who have taken so much pains to obtain instruction in a duty, remote from their ordinary occupations, must be actuated by motives of zeal and patriotism, which will prompt them to continue their services in a case of equal urgency and importance. They may be the more readily expected ta acquiesce in this, as it is only a temporary jsacrifice, and they may soon be relieved from attendance, when a sufficient num- ber r r: «8 ber of the cadets are prepared for their .duty, i . j4J«ii'i 'jD f'-. ;,.v« f ■ ' i: r"\,,l,'.'' *r* ;>.' The exertions thus to be made, for ren- dering our state of defence adequate to the emergency, may be deemed a burden- some effort; but we have no alternative between making this exertion, and the danger of being attacked before we are prepared to meet *ihe invaders — of being taken by surprise, now after we have had twelve years warning of the designs of the enemy! It is, however, to be observed, that no moment could have been chosen, in which such an effort would have oc- casioned so little inconvenience as at pre- p sent. m m I . f l« II i i!i|r j66 f» sent, The interruption of our communica- tion with the Continent, has created a stag- nation in our manufactures, and has thrown a number of peopl(3 out of employment. In consequence of this diminution in the ge- neral demand for labour, it will occasion no interruption to our commercial concerns if the time of a large number of people should be occupied in the proposed military exercises,)^ '• .f I// ir. /'J 'Jf i:»'j M(i», ^ ^4li■liii— lt m> '■ :» i' This employment will, in fact, be a sea- sonable relief to our manufacturing labour- ers in a moment of difficulty. The advan- tage will not be confined to those who are immediately called upon and drawn out to be trained ; it will operate in an in- direct manner in favour of the whole body of manufacturing labourers, by withdraw- ing the competition of a large portion of the younger workmen, and throwing the employment that remains into the hands of those who are more advanced in life, and more generally burdened with families. This reUef, indeed^ will be only tempora- ry, but it i;» only a temporary relief that is • wanted. 67 ind wanted. Our unemployed tnanufiicttirers will, in the course of time, find other em- ployments for themselves, — employments perhaps still more advantageous to the country ; but time is requisite for this trans- fer of their industry, and it is during the in- terval, that relief is important to soften the abruptness of the change. For the perma- nent consequences of the attack that bur enemies are now making on our commerce, there is no reason for entertaining the slightest uneasiness. On the contrary, we have the strongest reason to believe that the experiment which our antagonist is now compelling us to make may be of essential service. It will prove beyond dispute, that Britain is independent of commerce, that our soil is the essential, the only sure foun- dation of our prosperity and our greatness. When the first pressure of individual distress 18 over, it will soon be discovered how small a part of the nation has suffered by the loss of ou^r intercourse with the continent. When the glare of commercial prosperity no longer throws into the shade the vast F 2 amount ■Ix It t(; ! I' 6s 1)- if (' an^ount of our internal resources, every one hIH perceirc how iricop.siderable a portion of our HHtionul wealtii I.h derived from Ho- rpign couutrie.Hj^iow inferior is the impor- tance of tho^e commercial inu r^sts^ which have long excited such a feverish anxiety, uiid to which our national policy has so of** ten been made to bend. Such is the stable basis of our national strength, that, when altogether insulated, we may fmd the mf ans of making greater exertions, than ^ith all our external connv ions, we have ever \^et made, ',.^^f ►yruc/i^ or i T^vtM »•"; •>jrrtv Sect. 3 Trusting that the preceding observa- tions will have suiiiciently explained the arrangements that are proposed, I shal) DOW proceed to examine the effect which the adoption of this plan may be expected to produce on the pubhc security. I hope it may be assumed as proved, that, with adequate ' exe^- ^ons, !l en tiotis, the plan may be hionglit to a con- siderable degree of niaturity, even in the course of a few months. At nil events, iu a year or two tliere can be no diniculty in bringing the Local Militia to u respectable state of discipline ; nOt indeed such as to put them on a level with regular and prac- tised troops, but sufficient to fender them a useful force, perhaps in point of efllciency nearly approaching to our present Militia. After this has been accomplishrd, the power of the kingdom to resist invasion must be incomparably augmented, and a short examination Vvill suffice to show that Great Britain may then be looked u[)on a.^ nearly invulnerable. llie true criterion of an effectual defen- sive system is, whether, independently of arty advantage in the leUst degree preca- rious, we cah be sufficiently strong to carry on a regular campaign oii English ground, \Vlth a prospect of decided supe- riority. To try our arrangements by that test, let us imagine a French army to be established I 1 ill i*: ' i !l 111! f" 'Wjpw-'^W 70 I C8tal)H»hed on Rn^liwh p;roiin(l. I do not mean to undtTvalue citlitr tlio difliculties of the passage, or those of tlie disem- barkation, — tar less to say that our com- manders should neglect the opportunities which they may have, of attacking the enemy while entangled in the embarrass- ments of ^Janding ; — but as every advan- tage of that kind is more or less precarious*, we ouglit to consider, what our case would be, if the enemy had overcome or eluded every such obstacle. Let us suppose, then, that amidst the accidents, to which all na- val affairs must be liable, the enemy have found an opportunity of eluding our fleet and landing 100,000 men on our coast. In order that the proposed arrangements may be put to the severest test, let it be sup- posed not only that the invaders have got over the embarrassments of the disembark- ation, but that the arrival of a part of their flotilla on our beach has brought us the first intelligence of their movements. V • See Appendix, C. i-»: '», The 71 Thfi first object of the enemy will uri- dovibtedly be to gain posfle^siun of London, and of our great arsenals in its vicinity t the first point of incjuiry therefore, is what force our (^onunanders.can collect with suf- ficient promptitude for their defence. The regular troops stationed along the southern and south-eastern coast will of course be drawn together, to obstruct as much as pos- sible the progress of the enemy ; but as there is no probability that they can be sufficiently numerous to risk a decisive ac- tion, they must retreat before the enemy till they are sufBciently re-inforred. It will depend on the individual ability of our commanders, how long they can retard* the approach of the enemy to the metro- polis, without exposing themselves to be> drawn into a general engagement. In the mean time, however, the alarm will spread, and the Local Militia will be assembling from all quarters. At all events, those of the metropolis itself, of the country in its immediate vicinity, and of the counties through which the enemy must advance, may I I - in? Ill Hit; 72 may be brought into action, before the con- tending armies can arrive in the vicinity of London. According to the calculations, which have already been referred to, the numbers of Local MiHtia who will thus be available in the course of three days after the alarm is given, will be at least 60, 000* ; in two days more, further re-inforcements may arrive from all the country within sixty miles of London, and this number will be swelled to 85,000*; in four days more, or in nine from the time the alarm is spread and that orders are dispatched from London, the Local Mititia may be a«sen>* bled from all the country within one hun-. dred and twenty miles, to the amount of not less than 160,000* men ; for some time longer every successive day will bring in a further re-infbrcement of about 15, (XX) men. So far tJierefore as numbers can ensure ^ .. J ■ . ■ - ■ * See Appeadi;c, A, Table IIT. success 78 success we must soouer or lutcr obtain a decisive superiority. But it may be alleged, that the forces thus assembled must be no inferior in point of discipline, that they cannot be relied on when opposed to the legions of Bonaparte, inured to warfare and flushed with success. After every arrangement that can bu adopted, for training the Local Militia in the com- pletest manner, it is still to be remem- bered that they are home troops, unac- customed to the perils of real service. When troops of this description are brought for the first time to encounter the enemy, it is impossible to rely on their steadiness, with the same confidence as if it had been repeatedly proved in severe actions. The first engagement of a new regiment is an experinMnt, which will often have a glori- ous issue, but of which the success cannot beforehand be considered as certain. It is a .nown fact, that the great Frederick himself, in the first battle at which he was present, felt the infection of a panic, and fled from the field. It is no imputation, then, ' r. t i I s V i "J , I'. 74 then, on the national character, if it be considered as a possible occurrrence, that our inexperienced troops may at first ex- hibit some such lamentable proof of human weakness. » .' r m 'I ' 'U I The management of an army chiefly composed of new troops, is indeed a deli- cate task ; but the vast superiority of our numbers, will compensate for many disad- vantages. The war of the French revolution has afforded one splendid instance, that such troops may obtain success against veterans ; and in the judicious conduct of Pichegru we may find an apposite example of the best mode of turning to advantage the re- sources of our situation. After Dumourier had retired, the Re- publican arms met with a continued serie» of disasters. The French armies, con- sisting of innumerable hordes of new levies, repeatedly sustained disgraceful checks from very inferior nr.mbers of the Austrian veterai^b. Pichegru saw the w the error of his predecessors : — when, with such troops as they had to com- Tnand, they engaged in general actions, a panic in any part of the line soon spread to the whole, and rendered the greatest su- periority of numbers unavailing. He there- fore employed his ardenc but inexperien- ced troops in a multitude of partial actions. Expecting that the first division would give way, another body was always ready to replace them ; and these again were suc- ceeded by another, and another. The first division had an opportunity of rallying be- hind their comrades, and were refreshed by an interval of repose ; recollecting them- selves, after the first impression of terror was over, they were eager to wipe off their disgrace, and again, perhaps, in their turn, were brought up to a second charge. The best troops were unable to withstand such a continual succession of fresh assailants, and always gave way at last, exhausted by mere fatigue. . It would be impossible to devise a plan more ■A: . 'n ■I I '11' 76 more admirably adapted than this system of Pichegru, for obtaining the greatest pos- sible advantage from his superior numbers, and from the enthusiastic ardour with which hia young soldiers were inspired ; and at the same time for guarding against tht? dangerous consequences of that unsteadi- ness, to which all troops must be liable in their iirst essay. In our own case, if we profit by this illustrious example, there will be the less reason to apprehend a general panic in our armies, because our command- ers will always have the means of support- ing their inexperienced home troops by a powerful reserve of steady veterans, and thus retrieving the consequences of any partial misfortune. 'M Granting then that the Local Militia cannot be equal to practisexl soldiers, it does not follow that they may not be ren^ dered of great service in the hands of a judicious commander. If, indeed, the li- berties of England should hang on the is- sue of a battle fought entirely by untried soldiers, 77 soldiers, our fate would be in a state of awful hazard. Such, however, is not the plan here suggested ; nor is the Local Mi- litia to be looked upon in any other light than as an accessory force, assisting the re- gulars, not vainly pretending to rival or to supersede them. A strong body of regular troops, inured to real action, must be tho basis of our defence, the firm phalanx around which all our reinforcements of do- mestic forces must rally, and on which, on every occasion of decisive consequence, our commanders must place their ultimate dependence. f i I 'i^i Such being the case, no one will be dis- posed to deny that every exertion ought to be made, for increasing as much as possible the numbers of regular and experienced troops in that army, which, in case of in- vasion, is destined first to meet the enemy. In this respect the proposed establish- ; ment of Local Militia will have a collateral effect of great value, as it will enable our Ciovernraeat to concentrate in the most JiTiportant ■■• 5l1^- 1: i I 78 important stations the troops on whose steadiness the greatest reUance may be placed. A 'vfl >i v»»i ; ). ?.- p'\»t» rv^^i <:.; v On the necessity of concentrating our forces as much as possible, there is but one opinion among men of the highest mi- litary reputation. The campaigns on the Continent have taught a tremendous lesson on this subject. The disgraces of the Austrian arms are chiefly traced to a per- tinacious adherence to the idea of guard- ing equally the whole of a long line of de- fence ; while the French, by the opposite system of bringing their whole force to bear upon the point of chief importance, have gained the most splendid successes. In spite of this experience, we see a great proportion of our resrular troops spread out along the whoie •-xtent of our coast, in places where it is very improba- ble that the enemy should think of makmg their principal attempt at invasion ; and where, if they nhouUl effect a descent, it could 79 could scarcely be more than a petty diver- sion, or a marauding expedition. By at- tempting thus to guard every point, the main army on which our national ex- istence depends, must be weakened. It would surely be more proper, to collect the whole of our best troops towards the most important scene of action, and to devolve upon our less experienced domestic force the task of guarding the remoter parts of the kingdom : — those where there is less probability of a descent being seriously at- tempted, and those where, a temporary success on the part of the enemy would be less likely to have consequences fatal to our independence. , i ji t The errors to which I advert, are perhaps chiefly to be ascribed to the mistaken anxiety and importunity of the inhabitants near the sea-coast, who can never imagine the country to be safe, when they see their own particular neighbourhood destituUi of troops. While the regular army affords the only protection to which they can trust, ^tm 80 trust, that anxiety oii^ht not perhaps to excite . surprise. If, however, an ef- fective Local Militia were established, a defensive force would every where be in readiness, sufficient to remove all ground of anxiety. According to the proposed ar- rangement, every district will possess with- in itself the means of repelling a preda- tory attack. The places which, by their wealth, are most likely to allure the enemy, will be capable of turning out a consider- able body of men at once. There is no part of the coast of England, where a bat- talion of Local Militia might not be as- sembled in the space of five or six hours after the appearance of an enemy ; and 5000 men within forty-eight hours. No great apprehension, then, need be enter- tained of the consequences of any maraud- ing expedition. llti If, on the other hand, the enemy should try to make a diversion in the distant parts qf the kingdom, he could not succeed in- drawing away our army from the scene of the 81 the main attack, since the Local Militia \vould be able, with little assistance, to meet any force that could be sent for this purpose. One of the most hkely places perhaps for an attempt of this nature, would be the Frith of Forth. It would probably be a more difficult task for the enemv to reach that station with 12,000 or 15,000 men, than the coast of Essex with 100,000. In three or four days, how- ever, 20,000 men might be collected at Edinburgh from the south of the Forth, and 12,000 more at Stirling or Queens- ferry from the north *. Trusting therefore to the Local Militia for the ordinary defence of the coast, the regular troops should be reserved for sta- tions of paramount national importance. In the south, Portsmouth and Plymouth must not be left exposed, and some troops must remain in garrison at each of these placies. It is evident, however, that before -:;'7' n * See Appendix A, Tabic II. G th^ riM! :ii i I 83 fhe enemy can undertake a regular sieg©, opportunities must occur for throwing into these fortresses ample reinforcements of the Local Militia ; and it cannot therefore be necessary to keep large regular garrison* there permanently. On the northern coasts two or three places* may be pointed out, as military positions of peculiar importance* In these also a small regular force ought perhaps to be left, to serve as rallying points for the asseniblage of the Local Militia. , f :.!.-. There are but few stations, for which the Local Militia will not alone be a sufficient defence ; and when our regular forces are thus relieved from so great a proportion of the demands which are now made on their services, it is not, perhaps, too much to expect, that the army collected to oppose the main invasion may thereby be nearly doubled. — The immense value of such ^ reinforcement can require nq comment, In the event of the French effecting a land- ing aj f >f 36 a »S 4ng in England, it is ea«y to fbresee that all tlieir operations will be marked by an excess of boldness. When, by the very act of embarkation, the existence of their army has been placed on the hazard of the die, we cannot expect that in their subsequent operations they will be deterred by very nice calculations of risk. On the Continent, and in situations where no peculiar disad- vantage would have attended a more cau- tious mode of proceeding, we have seen the French generals throw themselves into perils the most extreme, for the purpo^ of rendering their successes splendid and decisive. If, on the Con- tinent, they have n«lopted this system from choice, in Engii id they must follow it from necessity. — Landing in the manner which has been supposed, they can have no assurance of an\ reinforcement or sup- ply from their own country, and cannot even subsist, except by the fruits o( their victories. Success, rapid and decisive suc- ceSvS, is necessary to their very existence. G 2 An U 1- i ,!■ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) ^^^^ 4i. 1.0 I.I 1^ I2£ ^ m m . ... 1^ ^ us, 1.25 1.4 1.6 ^ 6" ► % 0> /i 7: /^ ''W 7 Photographic Sciences Corporation 33 WEST M/.t^' STREET WEBSTr-R. N.Y. 14580 (716) il:7?-4503 /j c^ II ,l.o m >l::.i.' S4 An absolute defeat could scarcely be more . pernicious I ito them than the consequences of delay. If, on the other hand, they can bring on a general action, we have reason to apprehend, from the daring and de- cisive character of their tactics, that a victory onr their part will be followed by consequences of iio trifling amount. If, in this first action, the flower of our regular 4trmy, the main dependence of our defence, should be cutoff, it is impossible to* dis- guise the extreme difficulty of the task which would remain, of retrieving our af- fairs with our domestic forces alone, hoW'-- ever well organized, iaoii bw« .J>iuia.^i(|K It appears then, that our commanders, if they engage in a general and decisive action^ without the most pressing necessity, must be considered t,s staking the existence of the empire on the. precarious issue of a single day : and it is scarcely possible that there can be an absolute necessity for incurring this ha^^rd.. When our army i/. f) :i IS, \ ' 85 u pressed by the cncniy, the necessity df an immediate action may be eluded by a retreat. If, by giving up some miles of ground) the moment of action be protract^ ' ed for a day^ it is no small gain ; for in the mean time, our army has approached to their reinforcemerits, and these reinforce-^ ments bave accomplished another day's . march. Every d^y that is thus gained will bring into action an addition of 15,000 or 20,000 Local Militia, while the enemy will be drawn so much further away from any magazines, which he may have formed on the co^st* !' vfc *^<)i«ri^; }g} ijhk •■p^n\ im V. We have seeii tHdt in the course of 10 or 12 days, l60 or 200,000 Local Militia niay be brought into action. Of these it may be necessary to throw some into gar- risons : but 15 or 20,000 men will proba* bly be amply sufficient for every purpose of this kind. The rest added to our regular forces will form a body too numerous to act' together with advantage in one army* 'i- After :^ i / i'i [Li H ^ If if.. 86 1' : 11'^ I' After reinforcing, the main body, to at great an amount as our generals can ^lesirey numbers will still remain. Those may be formed into, subsidiary armies to acton the flank and rear of the enemy, to harass his detachments, to prevent his collecting pro* visions, and to intercept the communica* tion with his magazines. Every istep by which he advances must increase these difficulties ; and before he has been, a fortnight on Englijsh ground, he will find l^imself surrounded by numbers at least double of his own ; he will be hemmed in on every side by armies of respectable force, and unable to collect provisions ex- cept from the spot which he immediately occupies. If in these circumstances he ad-^ vance against the main body of our array, and our commanders persist in eluding a ge- neral action by retreating before him^ to what purpose is it that he gains a few miles of exhausted country oii one side, while our forces still close in upon him on the otlier» .and prevent his spreading himself :.j:iL ' . i • over '»• I • ' .^•^jfr yny ' 67 . bver a sufficient extent of grounc! to afford subsistence ? In the course of these opera- tionsf a large portion of fertile territory must be' kid waste ; but it does not seem to ad- mit of a doubt, that sooner or later the enemy may be reduced by absolute fa- ' ^^*e^Wy' cil^^Umstkh^ri^ich' s^^iris fe^ throw a doubt, upon the efficacy of this plan of operations, is the vicinity of London to the probable scene df action. If the enemy caw advance with sufficient rapidity ; andT if before his provisions are ej^hausted, he can press our army so close, that no further retreat is lefl, without exposing the capital, we have no alternative but to absindon it, or to risk an action. If our army be not then so strong, as to' render their success nearly certain, we have' to rec6llect that however important the protiection of London may ]3e, London is i\ot the kingdom of England. It is better that the capital should be' for a few days in ' ^ possession 6& possession of the enemy, than that th^f army, on -which the safety of the whole empire depends, should be broken by de-^ feat*. — If the great body of our regular forces be kept in a concentrated posi- tion, we may reasonably hope that, with the assistance of the Local Militia im- mediately on the spot, they may be able to cover the metropolis from insult. But in any event, we can have no reason, under, the proposed system, to entertain doubts as tp^, the fipal discomfiture of the enemy, and the preservation of the liberUea ofEnglanc}.^,^ on ■'•'.MO'') To'tjd ;{»/U J' »' i * Though the temporary, possession of London by the enemy wcnild have no effects necessarily fatal to ihe independence of the kingdom, yet the s»ame can-' not be said of our great military depdts, which, are all accumulated in the capital and its im-, mediate neighbourhood. To allow our whole military stores tb remain in oncf . place, and that place w tiear the scene of probable invasion^ 'seem» indeed the extreme of imprpvidence. ;)•."; v qiU ij^rj t 89 w* Th^ reasonings which have here been Sect 4. urged, ^Ja^y seem to contradict an assertion made in the outset of these observations, that the nature of our country io adverse to ',*i, those plans of protracted warfare, which, might be followed with effect by an inferior army, in an extensive country full of forests, mountains, and morasses/' But the cases suppose^ are widely different; plans which could be. of no avail to an inferior army, will be of certain efficacy when we can bring against the enemy an immense supe- riority of numbers. For that superiority we must be indebted to our domestic force. It is utterly impracticable for this kingdom to keep up a regular army, capable of maintaining a contest with the myriads which the despot of the Continent may bring against us. •;,,;;!o. :;".)' 'li ^ it i .'■ »/ j , 1 1 ' It seems therefore to require no argu- ment to prove, that unless the resources of our domestic force be effectually called into action, our independence cannot be i, maintained. I -■■■'■ w .4 maintained. The only question is, whether thc3 organization which has been here sug- gested is the best : or whether some othe^ plan may be entitled to a preference. In tins view the Volunteer system calls for our attention, as standing in some measure in competition with the proposal of a Local Militia; •i<\il"i /\Uv;o) -r^ii-u^/.-i rutVi .v-urx;;; . , .^>. . 7ri> LiAiiii^i* 'Vkflft I The Volunteer system has the advantage of being already established, — an argu- ment which, in the eyes of some, may per- haps outweigh all others ; but to those who are capable of reflection, this must appear a very inadequate consideration, to recom- mend a system, which Is subject to essen- tial disadvantages. The decline which has taken place in the numbers and dis- cipline of the Volunteers is not to be con- sidered as an accidental circumstance : it has arisen from the very nature of the institution. A system, the efficiency of which rests so entirely on individual ex*' ertion, cannot be permanent and steady in" its efieCtS. ' ■xl.J^.-^^iyj■''-y ■ '^••- ri- ■-■-■• ■:.'-•»* Av)fii in.: At 9t ' ' At the period M^hen the Volunteer est»« blishmeni was formed, the loyalty and pa* triotic spirit of the people had been roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. The obvious danger of the country called forth unprecedented exertions of spontaneousi zeal ; but as the exigency became leas ap^ parent, these exertions naturally relaxed. Such vehement efforts of enthusiasm could not be of long continuance: the public mind had been on the stretch, and natut rally sunk back into a state of languor, i j SifiM' J ;;',*4 it i* O J (i u . i ; » ti it n uii rtj^ juoii ii if Though it had been possible to keep up that spirit in its full vigour, much would still have been wanting, to render the Vo- lunteers thoioughly efficient as a military k>rce. Men of education, sensible of the importance of the object for which they are associated, may be induced to pay that zealous attention, which will enable them to acquire a considerable proficiency in military evolutions. But. for the common mass, of the people something more is re* quisita tQ impress those habits of. ready and L ni: U>. m )l: n and implicit obedience, to acquire wHicb hi ode of the most i important and most dif-> fiouk leBBons that a soldier has to Ifarn^ w fijIThi |lfivilege of every individual to quit his corps at pleasure, is an insuperable oIh stacle to the acquisition of military habits^ The slender tenure upon which the officers hold their authority, compels them to hu« mour every caprice of the men under their command : and precludes the possibility of enforcing discipline, with that steadiness without which it is in vain to expect that we can form good soldierd^ -.The effect of these circumstances Ba^ been aggravated by the desultory nature of the exercises which have been pre-" scribed. The greatest part of the time^ wJiich the Volunteers devote to this pur- pose, is spent in drilling on detached days or half-day*. Among the most intelligent Volunteer officers, however, there is but one opinion as to the trifling utility of these daily ^drills, and the incomparably superior ti^? importance 95 ' ■ _ ^ 9 9 impbrtartce of a period of permahif»nt duty.— Few corps of Volunteers, however, find it convenient to assemble for a Ion|; time at once. Scanty as the period t6 which they are limited may appear, it iii with difficulty that the men can be drawn from their homes for a continued absence even of 15 or 20 days. Nor is this sur- prising, when we consider how great a pro- portion of the Volunteers are heads of fa- milies, and men who have to superintend agricultural, commercial or manufacturing concerns more or less extensive. ^I'urij'^js^i ' At the time of the original formation df the Volunteer establishment, many inciden- tal motives contributed to induce meil of the middle classes of society to enter very generally into these corps, while the lower order* have been in a great measure d^ terred by the expense, which frequently at- tends this service. It is evident that the time of such men as those who are now en- rolled, must be of incomparably^^ter i^ - , value. 94 value^ than that of a set of young men takeh indUcriminately from all claMes. A young journeyman, or fi^rm-servant, might ccr- .tainly be sjsared from his occupation and his home, with infinitely less inconvenience .than hi« master. ^ a/ft ^jlt tHn-/ , f nThis circumstance deserves consideration in another view. If it be difficult for the .Volunteers to assemble for long periods of exercise, it must also be a matter of great and perhaps insuperable difHculty to bring together a large body of Volunteers for real service, or to keep them embodied for a ''great length of time. The operatioris of the .finemy may, however, render it indispen- ■«able to require this sacrifice from the per- sons who compose our defensive forc«. Previously to the grand attack, we may be J^arass^d by frequent false alarms. The . Volunteers may thus be fatigued by long continued preparations; a^id if their iabsence .froxp home be long protracted, the inter- ,vu{»tion Ao th^ir domestic <;on(;erns will be HfltiT of ■ *«. y '.' 9^ of Intolerable inconvcnitince : nor b it etay to judge, how fur these clrcumstanoes may affect the efHcicncy of this branch of our force, ^^.-iiy .i,;.t j, mj-ro') « it* ,«^ii^f>fn* While the Volunteer system thus involves 60 great an interruption to the affairs of individuals, it throws the perils of warfare in an undue proportion upon Others of families, and the fatigues of military duty on men, who in many cases aro not the most capable of sustaining them. On the other hand, the young men, of whom it is proposed to form the Local Militia, are physically the best calculated for the service required. They may be ren* dered good soldiers with a much smaller sacrifice of time and labour than men of a more advanced time of life. They ajre of that age, at which new habits are acquired with facility, and at which the fatigues of real service will occanon the least personal suffering. The Volunteer corps include un^' doubtedly a great number of able and ac* live young mei>; but they also contain , „ ■ ^ 3 many. 'ii <:<' 96 '^^./ many, whose habits are too much fixed t6 ' sustain without inconvenience the hard- ships, which they may be called upon to endure. In a corps of this mixed descrip- tion, the less active men will be an impe- diment to the rest : and it is therefore a material advantage in the Local Militia, that the whole are alike in the prime of youth and vigour. , ..>, o i;It is impossible to expect by any modifi- cation ot the Volunteer corps, to give them as effectual a training as that which has been proposed for the Local Militia. Per- manent duty, and that for a considerable period of time without interruption, is indi- spensably necessary to the acquisition of military habits. The sacrifice which this would require from men established in life, and engaged in business, is too great to be proposed, while to a young man of 18 the inconvenience must be comparatively tri- "fiing.— If the present establishment of Vo- lunteers be continued, their exercises cannot |)erhap8 be extended much beyond what they u,. they now perform. But can any long ar- gament be necessary to point out the dif- ference between a training of two or three weeks, and one of three months ; between strict discipline enforced by martial law, and a precarious command over men who may quit their corps at pleasure ; between exercises limited to one or two battalions, and those which may include an encamp- ment of 20 or 30,000 men ? \yhen such u the difference between the means of instruc- tion afforded to the Volunteers and the Lo- cal Militia, can we imagine that no differ fence will be found in the result ? Those who have considered with atteiir tion, the probable consequences of the land- ing of a French army in England, and the nature of the campaign v/hich may be ex- pected to ensue, must be sensible of the infinite importance of having our domestic forces fully prepared for immediate action, and as perfect in their duty as they can be rendered by previous instruction. The dangers which are to be apprehended from H panic mi M 9S panic among inexperienced troops have al- ready been adverted to, and it is evident that when soldiers are imperfectly in- structed in their duty, the probability of their being seized with a panic must be doubly great ; for then, in addition to the agitation of a new and untried danger, they have the embarrassment and indeci- sion of conscious ignorance. Every step by which troops advance in military know- ledge is thus of importance. The imperfections of the Volunteer system are now every day more generally felt; and few perhaps will be disposed seriously to recommend that system as our permanent and only dependence for internal defence. Objections may indeed be felt against any great and immediate change on an in- stitution already established. But if we examine minutely the actual state of the Volunteer corps, it will, I am afraid, appear that they are at this moment far from adequate to the task which may be requi- red of them, and that we have no time to . lose ""T 99 lose in organizing our domestic force oil a more effectual principle. - * • J/ . , » ■ ^ Among the Volunteers some corps may be found in a high state of discipline, and fit perhaps to act along with troops of the line. These however are but a small propor- tion of the whole establishment: a much greater number are only half-disciplined. In many cases their deficiency might be reme- died by a short period of the severe disci- pline of an actual campaign. But when the enemy have effected their landing, it will not be the time for our domestic forces to learn their duty : if in th.' '• ) 'Tot./ J I J. . i»' ,, I • • . From these considerations it is evident, that a material advantage will arise from selecting the youngest men to be trained, rather than taking an equal number of mis- cellaneous ages. — If, instead of training the young men of eighteen, an equal number of men in 107 I men be taken annually by a pronu4Cuou» ballot, as tor the present militiu, from the whole mass of the people between eighteen and forty-five, a considerable proportion of those who are instructed, will very soon bo past the age of military service, and the instruction given to them, can be of no use except during the immediate. period of the duty imposed. Assuming, therefore, that a certain number of men must be trained, regimented, and kept in constant readiness for immediate military service, there is in every point of view an advantage to the public in selecting the youngest men. ., . •I .1 J* I I >• ( •* The other classes are less fit for the duty which may be required ; and it would be a needless burden on the country to include them also in the arrangements for military instruction. There may be an advantage, however, in a more general enrolment of the male population, not with a view to any services strictly military, but to ob- tain with more certainty and effect their ,i assistance >J 108 issifltancA for ol9[jccto of a fuKsi^liary na* ture. ■» •>»'•■ •U h There are many Bcrviccs in which men, totally iininAtructed in military evolutions, may facilitate the operations of our ar- my, and throw obstructions in the way of the enemy. In cutting up roads, break* ing down bridges, driving off cattle and horses, destroying provender, and any other articles that may be useful to the enemy, in assisting our soldiers to construct en- trenchments and field fortifications, in transporting every thing requisite for the ^ use of our army, and in an infinite va- riety of other operations, the assistance of the mere peasantry may be of essential value* •.' >>»■;.'.»'/ viij i.i» t* :..'i»M 4«^ .r>A".i -li There is no reason to doubt, that our peo^ nle would be ready voluntarily to render every service of this kind ; but these sponta- neous services will not be sufficiently prompt to be of real use. It must be ever borne in ^•- :♦ ' ' mind, 109 iniml, that if the enemy land in En^)aniJ,% very aliort period must decide the content. In a fortnight, or three weeks, after they act foot on Enghsh ground, they must be our prisoners or our mo/tters. No aid, therefore, can be of any vahie, tlmt is not given with instantaneous readiness ; and that prompti- tude cannot possibly be expected withouC previous arrangement and organization. '\ ^ . This subject seems of late to have been little attended to, though in the early pe^ riods of the present war it had attracted the attention of Government. Many judicious regulations were then adopted, ^ but have since been allowed to drop ; though subsequent events ought rather to have called for redoubled vigilance, and for the adoption of those improved ar* rangements, which experience might na- turally have suggested, ,> ,ji , ,» f . It has been very judiciously remarked*, i u * General Observations upon the probable Effects of any Mefisure?, which have for their Object the Increase of the Hegular Army, &c. by a Country Gei^tleman. . » that ■*. i' ".I- i 110 that, m tlie peciiiliar state of society whith prevails m England, we have no class of men corresponding to the peasantry of some of the less commercial countries on ther Continent,— -men, vrho, from the variety of their occupations, and their hahit9 of life, £ 'e capable of acting as irregu- lar troops, almost wlchout instruction or direction. Our people are all so much confined, each to his own particular em- ployment, that they cannot be capable of judg'ng for themselves with respect to any military object. They must Ls superin- tended and directed in every operation i • and their services, of whatever nature, will bo of little use, unless, through various gradations of authority regularly organized^ the whole mass can receive its impulse from Government, This object may perhaps be attained without much difficulty, by a geiieral enrolment of the whole effective male po-^ pulation in their respective districts. The individuals must be classed according to ■ r theif m their isige arid personal qualifications ; and from among those of superior condition a sufficient number of persons must be ap« pointed to act as officers, with a gradation of command so arranged, that, through the mediuin of the Lieutenancy of the different counties, the whole may receive the orders of Government with rapidity, and be employed in any operation in which they may be deemed most useful. Without any very burdensome sacrifice of time, every individual might learn who is the of- ficer to whose orders he is to attend ; and the people in general might be impressed with some ideas of regularity aud obedience to command, sufficient to prevent confu- sion in the moment of alarm. "mpensa- tion, in the fhcrease of our regular force- by volr.ntary'enhstment, since already, it appears, they do not bear their full share in the common defence- From the internal state of Ireland, it is impossible to obtain from the people that ser Acq !?■§■ 115 service wftich is imposed on the dtlier parts of the kingdom. Can it therefore be deem- ed improper, if this exemption be counter- balanced by a corresponding demand of compulsory service, in a different form, but for the same general purpoae of the defence of the country ? On these grounds I will venture to suggest a measure, which is per- haps as little open to essential objections, as the circumstances of so difficult a case will admit. I would propose, then, that in place of the establishment of a Local Militia, similar to that of England, a levy should be made of a body of Fencibles, to serve for three years only, in any part of the United King- dom ; that this levy should be made by ballot, among the men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five; that any person within that age, on previous payment of a fine of 10/., should be exempted for the next three years from standing the chance of the ballot, but that no person balloted I 2 should if 116 should be admitted to serve by substi- tute. ,. -J,, _,;■ ;: ,*, * ■':r'-'' In the appointment of officers to these regiments, attention should be paid to give the chief command of each to persons of popular character and local influence, in the district where the regiment is raised. A chaplain of the established church should be appointed to each regiment ; but, in case one third of the men be of any commu- nion of dissenters, a clergyman of their own persuasion also should attend them, at the expense of Government. In the Roman Catholic districts, a proportion of the oflUcers should always be of that per- suasion. The situation of the officers . must be rendered more advantageous, than in the fencible regiments raised in the late war, in order to encourage persons of a pro- per description to enter into this service., This may be done, cither by an assurance of '.■•-*5l. ^ 117 of of half-pay, or more effectually, perhaps, by affording to the officers of these regi- ments, some advantageous opportunity of entering into the regular army. Thus, for example, to each of these Fencible Regi- ments, may be attached a second battalion, recruited for general service, on the same permanent establishment as the rest of the army. Into this battalion, any of the bal- loted men may be allowed to volunteer ; and, in case of a certain proportion of men entering in this way for general service, a corresponding number of officers with per- manent rank, should be appointed from among those of the first battalion. 1^'^ The fines levied for exemption from the ballot, should be applied in aid of a fund, for the relief of the families of balloted men who ar^ married, or the parents of those who are dependent on their children for support. If the fines should not prove sufficient for the purpose, the deficiency must be made up by the county in which the ' HI ' I XIB the men are rulsed ; the support which is given by law to the tamihes of niiUtiamen, must, on every principle of justice, be ex- tended to men of any compulsory levy. In nddition to this, a bounty should be paid by Government, fully proportioned to that given for voluntary enlistment, regard being had to the duration of the engage-? ment. Means may, perhaps, be found of bestowing this bounty in a more useful manner to the recruit, than by a sum in hand ; but the essential principle to be at-* tended to, is, that the recruit who is com-' pelled to serve should be as liberally re-r warded, all circumstances considered, as if he had enlisted voluntarily into a regi- ment of the line. Any attempt to oecono- mize at the expense of men who are forced away from their homes to serve their coun-r try would be truly despicable. If a dif- ference is made, the balance should be cast in favour of the man who js taken for corn'* pulsory service, to compensate, in some tlegree, for \\ioX interference with his per-^ spnal 1X9 sonal liberty, which, however mitigated, cannot be totally freed from the character of harshness. ...;., ... If, however, the demand of compulsory service be accompanied by every attention to the feelings of the men, which can tend to obviate their prejudices against a mi- litary life, the odium of the ballot will be very much removed. Under the modifica- tions proposed, a large body of men might be raised, with fur less dissatisfaction to the people, than under the for;n of ballot now established for the militia ; and, at the same time, such a levy would interfere in a much smaller degree with the recruit- ing of the regular army. 1o la Hn^.^Jif; '£-« To what extent this levy of Fenciblea should be carried, is a point of some diffi- culty. Considering it as a substitute for a Local Militia, it ought to be of such amount, as to afford, if possible, the same degree of security to the empire, yet with- in n out ' :tl ii| ■ '■*,r . V20 .out pressing harder on tlie people. Theae, however, are two conditions not easily re- concileable. • ' •.--. » ' • Were the circumstances of Ireland such as to admit the establishment of a Local Militia, on the same principles as that of England, it would amount to 160,(XX) or 170,000 men. If these were all well af» fected, it would require a very large levy of Fencibles to afford as powerful a defence. A permanent force of 50,000 cv 60,000 men, could scarcely appear more than an adequate compensation ; but a compulsory levy, to this amount, would be a much greater burden on the people. If, in an establishment of 160,000 Local Militia, we add together the number of weeks which each individual must annually devote to military exercises, they would not amount all together to more of their time than equi-^ valent to the service of about 14,000 men for the whole year. If the levy of Fencibles, in Ireland, be carried further than this, it must ^^t 121 M^, must be considered as a greater demand upon tlie people than is made on the cor- responding classes in England. "^ .vth-.'^-* On the other hand, there is a greater disproportion in Ireland, than in other parts of the kingdom, between the popu- lation, and the opportunity of industrious employment to which the people have ac- cess ; and, on this account, it >^'ill occasion less inconvenience, if a larger proportion of men be taken for the public service, than in a country where the demand for labour is so great as in England. To this consideration, we must add the urgent necessity of putting the defence of Ireland on a secure foundation, not only in justice to those who are* interested in the property of that kingdom, but with a view to the general safety of the empire. If, on these grounds, the levy of Fencibles in Ireland be extended to 30,000 or 40,000 men, it will not, perhaps, be a greater drain than its population can afford, without material inconvenience. These tl 12:2 Ml if! ' These Frncihlew, being a contribution for the imincdiato local dcfuiico of the country, must be cons'rdemd a* peculiarly belon<];inp; to the |)lac(?s vviiore they nro levied. There are very evident reasons, however, which dictate the removal of these regiments into other parts of the kingdom. But this ought only to be an interclinnge ; and for every regiment of Fencibles thus withdrawn from Ireland, another regiment, composed of natives of England or Scotland, should take their place. By the proposed levy, a uett ad- dition would thus Ih) made of 3(),(X)0 or 40,000 men to the number of troops al- ready stationed in Ireland, a force which would establish a degree of security to •which that part of the kingdom has long been a stranger. .91 ^ . > ■ f ■ ' ,t ■ 1 ■ , ; I ' ri 1 • • . • I ■'' • •< t ■' y ' Tlie protection thus afforded to the pro- perty of Ireland, is too apparent to need any comment. It may not, perhaps, so readily occur, that the proposed arrange- ments would be materially conducive to c>: )*. ' the I9.'3 the inlcrcsU of ihoM* again^it whom ihrmi precnutioiiH may nppeur to he (iirertod — i\\v, lower ordciH aiul the great ImmIv otthe Cutliolics. • f '^M r */ / .4 ; ,,i . • ii.t, . t ii>ii •!Ml» «»..>f^ Nl. .li The harshnoMs with which the lower or- ders in IrelHnd are too lVer|iU'ni!y treated by their imint'diute HUperiors, <:;m never Ix* «'rt'ectnally checked, till the pjovtrnnient is rendered stronger than it has hitherto been— *stronn; enough to maintain its own nnthority, independently of the aid of any party. It is with great injustice, that the English Government ha?? been accused of encouraging a system of proscription and rigour in Ireland. On the contrary, the Cabinet has, for a long time back, shown a disposition to mild and conciliatory mea- suiTis ; and, if our Ministers have erred, in not following out these principles v.ith suf- ficient steadiness and system, the failure is to be ascribed to the deep-rooted pre- judices of persons to whom they felt a ne- ^•essity of yielding. They could not .^hut tjioir eyes on the daugerou.s situation of Ireland, ■ I m 124 (T ' I]u\ €:. ;. 'i n Ireland, arising from the extensive preva^ lence of a refractory spirit, not to be re- pressed, except by the strong hand of power ; f^ey were not in possession of a military torce, adequate to the main.e- nance of tranquillity ; and no choice was left but to have recourse to the aid of those among the inhabitants, most imme- diately interested in the preservation of order. Ii* this way a powerful force was obtained to assist in repressing disturb- ance ; but it was composed of men too much under the influence of ancient pre- judices, and too much goaded by the irri- tating circumstances of their situatior , to act on all occasions with coolness and mo- deration ; nor was it an easy task to curb the violence of men, on whose assistance the preservation of the country appeared to depend. Such is the mutual rancour of the different classes of peopk in Ireland, that, while Government are under the ne- cessity of compromising their principles, and of propping up their authority by the aid of a party, they never can maintain a steady system ^ -. — k_ 1S5 system of impartial justice and modera* tion. By the establishment of a large military force, suflicient both to repel in- vasion, and to overawe the disaffected, Government will be freed from the tram- mels in which they have hitherto been entangled, and will be left at liberty to Dursue the obvious policy of imposing a restraint on the violence of all parties in that distracted country. i\ . The effectual protection of such a force; as that which has been proposed, will re- lieve the Protestants in Ireland from a ha- rassing state of insecurity; the feverish jealousy, which attends their present situa- tion, will be diminished ; and they will then have less difficulty in opening their eyes, to the perfect 3a^ety with which the political cla'ms of the Catholics may be admitted. II: I We ma^ expect, too, that the mutual rancour of the different parties in Ireland, would in time wea^ away, if the country were maintained in a state of continued tran- 126 m lii'-' If/''. tranquillity. Every successive disturbance serves to revive tl e spirit of animosity, by tlie repetition of mutual injuries. Much <^ood may indeed be expected, with the aid of time, from the abolition of odious and uimecessary exclusions ; but all will not avail to restore harmony, without the aid of a firm and eflicient government; — a government capable of repressing violence, whcrevei it may be found ; of maintaining tranquillity by the strong hand of power ; and of maintaining it with moderation and impartial justice to alL It has been observed, that there are evident political reasons for removing into, England the Fencible Regiments raised in Ireland, and replacing them by other* troops. The same reasons would apply to the Irish militia ; and if an interchange of stations could be effected between these and an equivalent number of the English militia, it cailnot be denied that aik^ im^^ portant benefit would be gained to the public service ; that many regim«iits wouid be 127 be rendered for more efiicient, than tliey can be in their present situation. Accord- ing to the actual constitution of the miUtia> however, this interchange cannot legally be made; and objections have been stated against any alteration, chiefly on the ground of personal inconvenience. - In a review of our permanent means of defence, it cannot be deemed improper to enter into some discussion of the reasons, which have led to the establishment of a species of force so eytremely limited in its service, that it is not only confined to home duty, but cannot be applied even to the defence of that part of the kingdom, which. is generally acknowledged to be the most vulnerable. The militia regiments of our present, establishment are not less expensive to the nublic than regular troops. They appear, Uideed, rather less burdensome to the. Treasury ; but if to the charges which ap- pear in tlae public accounts, we add those incurred Ui •! 1 I i 1 "4: \ .If. 4: i US incurred by the diflferent counties, thell^ establishment will be found fully as expen^ sive as the regiments of the line. The money paid for substitutes must also be taken into account: it is a part of the ex- pense of the militia establishment, as much as the recruiting bounties form a part of the expenses bf the army. The burden of pay- ing for substitutes is a real addition to the taxes whic^ the people have to pay — a taxy too^ most u./ <-.! and oppressive ; laid on without any regard to the ability of those on whom it is levied* ■ While the militia regiment? are thus equally expensive to the nation, it is evi- dent that they cannot be so useful as an equal number of regulars. They cannot be sent on foreign expeditions, which may occasionally be of great importance, with a view to our own immediate defence. They cannot be sent into that part of the united kingdom where their services may be of most value. Even in the case of an in- vasion of England, they cannot be equiva- lent 129 k»nt to regulars ; from the wantof experience in real action, . they must be exposed to much of the unsteadiness of new levies. The officers, too, can have,- in general, only a theoretical knowledge of their duty. They have no opportunity of acquiring any ex- perience of real service in their Own regi-* ments ; nor can it be expected that men of professional experience will accept of situa^ tions, in which no length of service can ob- tain any permanent advantage or prospect of promotion. Thus, with an equal, or, perhapS) a heavier burden on the finances of the country, we have a force very infe- rior in utility. : If any thing could place in a stronger light the disadvantage of the militia esta- blishment, it would be the comparison be- tween the expense of these regiments and that of the proposed Local Militia* If the period employed in the first traij;iing of the Local Militia be sufficient for the complete formation of soldiers, and if the subsequent exercises be sufficient to prevent these ha- K bits it" ti 'I r. :• mil ' iii i.h l-i;. i ' i fa is ■. I.- ISO] bits from being forgotten, daily paraded will not make them better soldiers for ac- tual duty. The expense, however, of one of our present militia regiments, is scarcely different from that of a regiment of the line, or about 30/. per man, while the Local MiUtia will scarcely cost 4/. per man. — The whole establishment for 400,000 men has been calculated to amount to about 3 ,600,000/. *, a sum which would scarcely maintain above 50,000 men on our present militia establishment. He must be a bold disputant who will venture to maintain, either that the militia are as useful to the state as an equal number of disposable troops, or that one man of our present mi- litia can be as useful as seven or eight of the proposed establishment would be. What, then, can be the inducement to persist in keeping up an establishment that is Hable to such objections? The difficulty of raising a -sufficient number of men for * See Appendix, B. the 131 the army may have had some weight ; but it has been proved, with the evidence of demonstration, that the facihty afforded by the mihtia ballot is merely apparent, and that the deficiency of recruits for the line is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to the effects of the ballot, as the high pre-^ miums offered for substitutes attract those who are disposed to enlist, and prevent them from accepting of the bounty offered in the regular recruiting service. The mi-r litia is thus composed, for the greater part, of the very men who, but for this institu- tion, would have entered into the army ; and if we had no such establishment as the militia, our regular forces might be exactly so much the more numerous. , ' ' ■ • , ■ • ■ . In opposition to these strong objections, there is little to be stated, except an old prejudice in favour of the militia, and those magical words, " the constitutional force of the country.'' The mihtia, however, has deviated so entirely from the original spirit of its institution, that nothing now remains k2 of .(■■■]■ ff h 132 of those qualities, which at first reconir mended it to so high a degree of popu- larity. •» ' The militia originated in a jealousy of the standing army. It is needless now to enter into any discussion how far that was well founded. The fact is, an idea did prevail, that the standing army might be made an instrument to establish the arbi- trary power of the Crown ; and it was sup- posed, that this danger might be counter- acted by training the people at large to arms. It was intended that the militia should train, in rotation, the whole, or at least a large proportion of the people ; for this purpose, the service of each individual was limited to three years, at the end of which period he was to retire, and to be replaced by another. The officers also were intended to be all men of landed pro- perty, naturally connected with those whom it was their duty to command. Such was the militia in theory. One erroK 133 error in practice has subverted the whoU of this speculation, — the admission of ser- vice by substitute. Substitution was not the prevaiUng custom for some years after the first institution of the mihtia. The establishment was formed in the course of Lord Chatham's war, not very long before peace was concluded. In the commence- ment, the country gentlemen were eager to support and to take a share in a service, which they had warmly recommended. Men of the highest rank were willing to accept of commissions even as subalterns ; and this popularity naturally had its effect among the lower orders. The tenantry did not wish to avoid a service, in which they saw their superiors engage with so much zeal. This spirit continued during the re- mainder of the war, which terminated be- fore the ?est of novelty had worn off. Du- ring the peace, the service of the militia being confined to a single month in each year, was not a severe burden. But, in the course of the American war, an impor- tant change took place. The m 1 1 1 ll"! ]IH 1-^4 m ■H t. ^^ i The number of our regular army wuth tlien by no means a{lmu^ be men of the same description, as those who enter into the regulars by voluntary enli tment, Thus the original intention of the 137 tht! miluiii act, to estuhlUh a rotation among tlie privates, unci to train in HUccesHion a nnniher of men from the muMS of tho peo- ple, is absolutely at an end. Nor an; tlux orticers any longer cofiiposed of coinitry gentlemen of considenible property, us in the theoretical view of the militia. Ex- cepting the Colonels, and a few others of the highest rank, the officers of the militia, in general, are but little connected by pro- perty with tlie counties to which the regi- ments belong. With the great muss of the landed property of the kingdom, the offi- cers of the militia are certainly less con- nected than those of the line, directly or indirectly, are. Whether, thertifore, wq look to the officers or to the private men, yve have no reason to believe that the mili- tia can participate more in the principles and sentiments of the people than the regular army. The single difference, that the officers lire not appointed directly by the Crowp, is certainly a very slight foundation on which to build the idea, that the militia cap be used jas ^ balance a^inst the reg^idur army. After 158 •; After what has been said, it must ap- pear quite superfluous tb enter into any discussion concerning this idea, of setting Up one part of the milita ry force of the na- tion as a balance against anothfsr, or to ex- pose the contradictions and the lab}Tinth of impracticabihty in which the whole sy- stem is involved. The original idea of the militia, whether well or ill managed, is now completely lost. The present militia ha« no resemblance whatsoever to the species of force which it was intended to form j and we only repeat words to which no ideas are aftixed, when we persist in calling the militia the Constitutional force of the Country. '>; 'JO ■■■yt\. .r>f . ;Ck • When we take an impartial view of the militia, we see regiments of a very fine ap- pearance, as pe.fect in their duty, perhs^s, as can be expected of those who have never seen service. The question, however, is not, whether these are good regiments, but, whether they might not be more useful, if they were on the same establishment as the •»:. ^. rest tSQ m rest of tlie arn^y? The militia establish- ment would appear to have been contrived with singular ingenuity, so as to lose all peculiar advantages both of a regular army and of a militia. A real militia should be composed of the mass of the people, of those who have a direct interest in the de^ fence of the country ; every man fighting by the side of a neighbour or a friend, all united under their natural superiors, and commanded in the field by the same men^ whom they have been accustomed to rer spect in the ordinary intercourse of civil Jife. Siich a force may be expected nat- turally to possess a degree of patriotic spirit, which cannot easily be infused into the ordmary description of recruits ; and if inferior to an army of professional soU dier^ in regular discipline, and technical dexterity, the disadvantage may be in som^ jijeasure covnterbalaiiced by a superior de»» gree of enthusiasm for the cause in whicj^ they are engaged. Of these advantages our present militia is not, and cannot be .possessed; while, oa the other hand, thp . incoi>» i i'i'^9 ■ i ¥ I 140 inconveniences, which are inseparable from a permanent military force, are not in them compensated by the means of attaining to the highest degree of professional excel- lence. The men are as little accustomed to the sight of an enemy as any of the mass of the people. The officers have had no opportunity of exercising their judge-, ment on occasions of real service, and they are deprived of that spirit of emulation which would be excited, if they might aspire to the highest honours of the pro- fession. Without any advantage to coun- terbalance the inconveniences of an army, the militia are excluded from all but the parade of a military life. Can it admit of a doubt, that these regiments would be- come more effective, if their establishment were so altered as to assimilate them to the regiments of the line, and if the same pro- spects of promotion could be opened to their officers? - .■ ; ■ .'^ 'iu .• On these grounds it seems to be evident that e militia, as at present constituted, ought # 141 ought not to be kept up as a separate esta- blishment, and that our whc]<^ permanent force oughts as far as possible, to be on the footing of regular troops. If the militia regiments were not now embodied, there would be no motive for the formation of such a description of force. When the regular service is rendered so advantageous to the soldier as it now is, there can be no doubt that a sufficient number of men may be obtained by voluntary enlistment, for .all the foreign duty which oi:'* national interests can require ; and the Local Mili- tia may be considered as superseding the necessity of any other demand of com- pulsory service for home defence. If, therefore, we had to begin, as on the break- ing out of a new war, no inconvenience would arise, if the militia f our present establishment were never agaiii to be called out. In our present circumstanc( ^ how- ever, we cannot dispense with the imiUe- diate services of the regiments now em- bodied. Our only choice, therefore, lies between keeping up these regiments, such -. . ■ "as as they are, or attempting to render them more useful to the pubhc service, by assimi^ latiiig them, in some degree, to the troops of the line.' * .•' » *l » » f .*., -v,. a'1 >•':•!.( ?' ']o Those principles of good faith, which it is the pride of this country to maintain in* violate, form a bar against any alteration on the present constitution of the militia, except with the consent of the individuals engaged in these regiments ; but it does not seem impossible that this consent may be obtained, without any extravagant sa- crifice on the part of the public. ,;The pernicious consequences to the discipline of the militia regiments, which have arisen from allowing individual soU diers to volunteer from the militia into the line, ought to discourage any renewal of that expedient; but if the militia could be induced to volunteer by whole regimertts for general service, or, -at least, for more extensive service, it would be a great gain to^ the public. If the constitutional pro* hibition Kt I43r hlbitlon were removed, if His Majesty werei empowered to accept of their extended) services, it does not seem improbable that the consent, both of the officers and men,< might be obtained, by an offer of bounty- to the men, accompanied by a grant of permanent rank in the army to the officers. It might be too much to propose, that they should enjoy the full advantages of. the rank corresponding to that wliich they hold in the Militia; but an arrangement of this nature would admit of a great va- riety of modificaaong, among which some plan may probably be found to reconcile the interest of the militia officers with the public advantage. > ' ,/ >' Prom all the arrangements which have Sect. 6, been proposed, it is sufficiently apparent that a great accession will be obtained to the national strength, and an immediate 1 now press upon relief from the dangers whicl: uopn us. This, however, b but a small part of the considemtions which recom- mend these measures ; for it is only through the establishment of an effectual system of national defence that we can bring the hos- tilities in which we are now engaged, to a satisfactory termination ; or, indeed^ that we can hope in future to enjoy the blessings of peace. If, without any better organizar> tion of our defensive force, than that which now subsists, we should be induced to conclude what some people call a Peace, the hand that signs the instrument, will seal the doom of our national independence. We may be well assur "^ that our an- tagonist will not reduce his military es- tablishment: there will be no relaxation in his naval preparations: an interval of peace will only enable him to carry them on with increased activity. What, on the other hand, would be the necessary effect of peace upon the naval and military establishment of this country.'* The reduction of the militia might perhaps be 145 be compensated by an immediate and osteiisible addition to our regular army* But except on the principles which have here been urged, we can have no compen- sation for the loss of the Volunteer force. Uiider any semblance of peace, that esta- blishment must immediately fall to pieces^ It is inipossible to suppose that any thing short of the immediate prospect of im- pending invasion, can induce this great body of men to neglect their private con- cerns^ and to make a spontaneous siacrifice of their time to the public service, — can animate their exertions, or keep alive that zeal without which they cannot be an efficient military force* , / I .. V s '--Li Thus a peace, however hollow and inse- curcj must reduce our defensive force to the regular army alone ; and no one will venture to assert that this kingdom could maintain a regular army sufficient by itself, to resist the immense numbers of the enemy. What then is to be our situation, if the empty show of L paci-' S'! ' ill ' 146 pacification should disband our VoIun« teers, without any effectual means hav-* ing been adopted to replace them b j a , more permanent establishment? Disarmed in (>resence of an enemy who is armed at all points, we may submit to a superior power, but peace we cannot have ; unless that is to be called a peace^ with which Au- stria and Russia have been honoured, or that of which Spain is now reaping the fruits. • ' By the establishment of a numerous and well organized Local Militia, we may se* cure the permanence of an effective domestic force : our means of resisting in« vasion will then be liable to no fluctuation^ — our enemy can never find us unprepared. The training of the youth to arms will go on with a regular and ploady progress, in peace as well as in war : e^ery year will im» prove the discipline and the efficiency of our internal defensive force,— every year will add to the numbers of those who are prepared to assist in the defence of their country. Whatever addition the enemy can 147 can make during peace to his natal power and to liis means of attack, wc shall be able fully to keep pace with him in the improvement of our means of defence on shore. Should the War be renewed, whether sooner or later, we shall not have lost in our relative strength during the interval : nor shall we return to the contest under circumstances of comparative disadvan- tage. Thus, and thus only, can we con- clude peace with undiminished security, and with any prospect of permanence. Thus, and thus only, can we obtain its blessings without the saciifice of national honour. If it be imagined, that the proposed esta- blishment would be too great a burden on the finances of the country, I may boldly aver, that by no other method can the same degree of protection be afforded with ^ small an expense. Many plans have, of late years, been suggested for the in- crease of the regular army; and, in all the discussions to which they have given L 2 rise, us rise, no one ever called in question the advantage ot* adding to our military fnce, though such an increase must undoubtedly have led to an increased national expen- diture. The failure ol* so many successive schemes for raising men seems to indicate, that we are not far from the utmost limit of the numbers, which our population can afford for regular military service. If, however, means could be pointed out of making an addition of 50,000 or 100,000 men to our regular army, who is there that would object to it on the ground of expense ? Since it is impracticable to ob- tain an adequate regular force, the defi- ciency must be supplied by measures of a different description ; and if these be eifectual for their purpose, the expense can- not be a valid objection, any more than it would be against the increase of our regu- lar army. If at present, with an annual expenditure of more than 40 millions, our national independence is not secure, and if by an addition of 6 or 800,000/. an- nually, it can be placed beyond the reach of 149 of hazard, what part of our expenses can We have less reason to regret? . . * ; .^ i .ui^ • By the formation of a Local Militia, the Volunteer establishment will be rendered superfluous, and this will make a great de- duction from the expense to be incurred. That of the Volunteers, at present, is not much less than a million ; and to bring it even within these bounds, it has been ne- cessary to reduce their allowances, and to limit their opportunities of exercise to a degree quite inconsistent w;ith the acquisi- tion of military habits. If real services are to be looked for from the Volunteers, it will be necessary, at least, to replace their establishment upon its original scale, and to incur a corresponding expenditure. In the first three years, the Volunteer esta- blishment was reckoned to have cost the public five millions ; while the Local Militia, at its regular and permanent establishment, would cost little more than 1,600,000/.* . . ..,,;n )*> .♦ See Appendix, B, : . ' : annually. 150 annually. Thus, there would bo no great diiference between the annual burden of our domestic force on either plan of or- ganization ; but, in tho result, tliere would be this immense diiference, that in the one ease we should have a force which can only remain in vigour during a short period of universal zeal and national enthusiasm ; and in the other, we should have a per- manent system of defence, liable to no fluctuation, continually improving in iti CillCaCy* •-■' >. -fijuura J Ji'-.tiV H -j; • .J ..I i/MH»r^o orfJ il;"..' J-'irrJ-tc^-i. > •ji'im) •..;.*-{> To the regular annual expense of the (^ocal Militia, we have indeed to add tha extraordinary charges of the first year, amounting, in all probability, to nearly three miUions,— a large sum undoubtedly, yet not greater than we have paid in sub- sidies to continental powers, for the ex- penses of a single campaign. But, on what occasion could we entertain an expecta^ tion, that, fron> the co-operation -of a con- tinental power, we should derive any be- nefit to be cotnpared to that, of placing the 151 thf: security of England now and for evet beyond the roach of all foreign attack? When we look at the cheerless prospect of unceasing dangers, which our present situa- tion exhibits, and comp ire to this the per- fect security within our reach, may we not consider the pecuniary burden, which must attend the first establishment of an effectual system of national defence, as the premium which we have to pay for a new charter of our national privileges ? Let us reflect on all the blessings which this country now enjoys, and all which a French tyrant would annihilate, and then think whether it be a dear purchase, when for three millions we secure the independence pf thq Crown, and the liberties of England. That the plan which has been here laid down would interfere, in some degree, with the industrious pursuits of the country, and that inconvenience would arise in the course df its execution to many of those who fall within the range of its operation, or to those connected with them, are points which » ! l:V ■.'' 1 !■ 1' ■ 1^ . *\ ii t . -J i' ('■ • i; ;/ 11 Si ^1 1 ^^^^^^^^^M i • which it is needless to deny. The farmer may be deprived of ths labour of his serr vant: th'i merchant or the manufacturer may be put to inconvenience by the abt- sence of a clerk, a joi rneyman, or an apr prentice. If there he any persona v/ho think these of sufficient importance to be stated as grounds of objection against the measure, I would only wish to ask, wiif^ther these inconveniences outweigh the horrors of French conquest ^ To any man, who pan lay much stress on such topics, it is, perhaps, in vain to talk of the conse- quences which a deficiency of preparation would produce to the country at large: if, however, he think little of the loss of the constitution and liberties of England, let him at least recollect, that if this coun- try follows tha fate of Holland, the case will conie Jipm^ to his own pecuniary in-? terest. 5 ;):i 'C: ii-ti'i^l i-"' '•'■'■ ■>'a:i Those who may not see absolute and unqualified personal ruin in the pillage aiid the confiscations of a conquest, or in . * ' ; th^ 153 dip general subversion of public and pri- vate credit, must expect to pay contribu- tions more rigorous and oppressive than the richest cities of the Continent have had to submit to. It is stated, by persons who have ample opportunities of information, that the repeated contributions levied by ■the French in Holland, have drained off fully two-thirds of the capital which every merchant was possessed of under the go- vernment of the House of Orange. We have no reason to suppose that less rigour will be used towards the citizens of London than of Amsterdam. On the contrary, the commercial prosperity of England has been so long an object of envy and jealousy to the French, that our merchants must ex- pect to feel a double weight of vengeance and rapacity. Ir addition to this, the French appear to entertain such extra- vagant and exaggerated ideas of the wealth of England, that, after our money- ed men are reduced to absolute beggary, it will still be believed that they have concealed treasures, to obtain the disclo- sure of which, personal violence, and, perhaps, ii^i|j ! 'l IP;: 154 perhaps, torture, may be deemed a pro- per expedient. .iti -!4.> 'r4im .n>,:yi > '::h* f-L ..■.■, ^:. ' [ 11 (> . i '« ' ,.j'; : V »■'.' 'i ' i' ?ikfVj'f Trifling, indeed, must be the greatest inconvenience that can possibly be appre- hended from the operation of these defen- sive measures, in comparison of the evils which they are calculated to avert. The only question, then, which a reasonable man can admit is. Whether any other plan can be devised to give us the same degree of security with less inconvenience, and to nvoid the objections which may be made to a Local Militia, without being less effi- cacious ? The force, however, against which we have to contend, is not to be resist- ed, without the combined exertions of a very great proportion of our people; and when such efforts are required, it is impos- sible to suppose, that the ordinary business of the country must not suffer some inter- ruption. It will not be easy, consistently with the effectual attainment of the object, to give less interruption than by the plan which has been laid down ; for the young men, on whom it imposes the burden of military 135 4- military service, are, of all classes of peo- ple, those who can be. be spared from their ordinary occupations. ft /Jt;^ 'fc 1, In the arrangement of the details of the measure, it must certainly be an object of attention to mitigate, as far as possible, those inconveniences which cannot be en- tirely removed. Regulations must be ad- opted to obviate personal wrong, from the interference with the rights of masters over their apprentices, and other similar rela- tions. In all indentures already executed, it would seem equitable, that the period in which the labour of the apprentice is witli^ drawn from the master, should be made up at the end of the engagement : on the other hand, the corporation laws, which require specific periods of apprentice- ship, to entitle a young man to particular privileges, should be so modified, that the time legally employed by an apprentice in military duties, should be reckoned, as if no interruption had been given to his in- dustrious pursuits^ The 11 1, " <• II!.'' 1^6 The various regulations which may be adopted, in order to alleviate, as far as pos- sible, the personal inconvenience arising from the proposed measures, would lead to a minuteness of discussion, into which it does not appear necessary now to enter. I shall only further observe, that if, with this view, any species of substitution should be admitted, any exemption in favour of the higher ranks of society, or any which can be purchased by pecuniary sacrifices, the whole principles and foundation of the plan would be subverted. That all should share alike in the burden of defending their country, is a fundamental principle, not only of justice, but of policy. To lay the burden of compulsory service upon the poor, and not upon the rich, would be con- trary to the spirit of that constitution which it is our ambition to preserve. If such a line of policy should be adopted, and if, under the impressions to v hich it might naturally lead, the mass of the peo- ple should contribute the service required of them with reluctance and discontent, the 157 the consequences might be most fatal. How would the national character be degraded ! how would the loyal spirit of the country be undermined, if, in the defence of our liberties, those who are the most deeply interested, should manifest a disposition to throw every burden on their less fortunate neighbours! w • , The preservation of that Government, under which this country has attained a de- gree of happiness scarcely paralleled in hi- story, cannot be a matter of indifference even to the poorest man in the realm. But, assuredly, the man of superior condition has a stronger interest in the preservation of that order of things, upon which his greatness depends. In the subjugation of the country, and in the subversion of pro- perty which must accompany it, the se- verest fall awaits those whose situation is now the most elevated. It is, therefore, incumbent on the rich and powerful of every class, and chiefly on the landed aris- tocracy. 158 toci^cy, to set an example of zeal and of patriotism, and to be foremost in submit- ting, with alacrity, to the personal sacri- fices and toils, 'A^hich the exigency of the crisis demands. t, <''.■ • ,!; . "r'^i ♦ m) By those, indeed, from whom these sa- crifices are most immediately required, it is scarcely to be apprehended, that they will be at all considered as a toil or a hard^ ship. — Though no exemption can be ad- mitted from those exercises which are re- quisite for the attainment of military know- ledge, yet, as the youth of superior con- dition are not mixed indiscriminately in the general mass, it may be hoped that no- thing will be found in the plan, peculiarly grating to the feelings of the higher orders; and surely it cannot be imagined^ that mi- litary exercises will of themselves be a se- vers burden on the youth of an active and high-spirited nation. Such indeed are the animation and the interesting variety of the occupations of a military life, that by young 159 young men, in general, they are more fre- quently considered as an amusement ; and tlie exercises of the Local Militia will pro- bably be looked upon by most of those on whom they are imposed, as an interval of recreation amidst the drudgery of duller pursuits. There is more probability of objection on the part of some parents, who suffer lesser considerations to press with undue influence on their minds, and who may object to the military duty required of their sons, lest it sliould, in some measure, derange the plans of life which they have laid down for them. I trust that there is little cause for the apprehension : but were even greater sacrifices to be demanded, let them view with attention the awful alterna- tive; let them recollect the miserable and degraded condition in which, but a few years since, we saw the proud nobility of France begging for bread ; let them recol- lect, that this is the fate which every man of property in Britain must expect from the i 160 tile success of our rancorous foe J let theW reflect how thankfully a parent, in these circumstances* would redeem his lost con-" dition, upon much severer terms than the sacrifice of a few months to be spent bjT his son in military education. • .1- •■. I \ .{ ■. ... i ♦ . .. ( * , . ^ s,' ' . ■• .'; 3,470 2,316 514 342 102 Berks . . , 109/215 5,99(1 3,998 885 590 177 Buckingham . 107,444 5,892 3,928 871 580 174 Cambridge 89,34() 4,899 3,266 724 482 144 Chester . . 191,751 10,517 7,010 1,5,55 1,036 309 Cornwall . , 18H/J6J) 10,325 6,882 1,526 1,016 30.S Cumberland I17,2:U) 6,429 4,28() 950 632 189 Derby . . 161,142 8,838 5,898 1,306 870 261 Devon . . , 31-3,001 18,813 12,542 2,781 1,854 555 Dorset . . . 115,319 0-,324 4,216 935 622 186 Durham . 160,361 ^,795 5,862 1»3()0 866 25a Essex . . 226,437 1-2, tl9 8.278 1,,83(; 1,224 366 Gloucester 250,809 I3,75(j 9,170 2»()34 1,356 405 Hereford . 89,191 4,891 .3,260 723 482 144 Hertford . 97,577 5,351 3,566 791 526 156 Huntingdon S7,56H 2,059 1,372 304 202 60 Kent . . 307,624 16,873 11,248 2,494 1,6G2 499 Lancaster . 672,7»1 36,898 24,598 5,455 3,636 1,089 Leicester . 130,081 7,134 4,756 1,054 702 210 Lincoln 208,557 11,439 7,626 1,6^1 l,l2(i 33& Middlesex . 818,129 44,873 29,914 6,63: 4,422 1,326 Monmouih 45,582 2,499 1,666 369 246 72 Norfolk . 273,371 14,99^t 9,996 2,217 1,47^ 441 Northampton 131,757 7,226 4,816 1,068 712 213 Northumberland 157,101 8,6 U' 5,744 1,274 848 252 Nottingham . 140,35(1 7,698 5,132 1,138 758 225 Oxford . . 109,620 6,012 4,008 889 592 177 Rutland . 16,35(5 896 596 132 88 24> Salop . . 167,639 9,194 6,12S 1,359 906 270 Somerset . 273,750 15,014 10,008 2,220 1,492 447 Southampton 219,656 12,(H7 8,030 1,781 1,186 354 Stafford . 239,153 13,116 8,744 1,9.39 1,292 387 Suffolk . . . 210,431 11,541 7.694 1,706 1,136 339 1 M % 164 'I I Counties. Toul Population. Malttmt l 7,«47 5,09- 1,1 MO 752 22.5 Ditto North ditto I5.5,r)()f. 8,52ii 5,686 1,261 84(' 252 Ditto West ditto r»(lS,95^ 30,932 20,620 4,573 .8,048 912 Total of England s,.s:n,4-3'i t56,91^ 'Mn,rm 67,548 45,016 13,458 Anglesey 8.S,fl06 1,85a 1,2.34 274 182 54 Brecon . , . 81,63:i 1,7.34 1,156 2.36 17(» 51 Cardigan . ♦2,9.56 2,355 1,570 S4.S 232 69 Caernnarthen 67,317 3,692 2,460 545 362 108 Carnarvon . • ♦ L-Wl 2,276 1,516 33f) 224 66 Denbigh 60,3.5'J 8,310 2,206 489 326 96 Flint .... 39,622 2,172 1,448 321 214 63 Glamorgan 71, .525 3,92'i 2,614 580 386 114 Merioneth . . 29,506 i,6n 1,078 28fJ 1.58 45 Montgomery 47,978 2,631 1,754 38fi 258 75 Pembroke . . 56,280 3,086 2,056 45(< 304 90 Radnor . . . 19,050 1,043 694 154 102 80 Total of Wales 541,546 29,691 19,786 4,387 2,918 861 Aberdeen . 123,082 6,750 4,500 99? 664 198 Argyle . . . 71,859 3,940 2,626 582 388 114 A-^r . - . . 84,306 4,623 3,0S2 68.S 454 135 BanflF . . . 85,807 1,963 1,308 290 192 57 Berwick . , . 30,62! 1,679 1,118 248 164 48 Bute .... 11,791 646 430 95 62 18 Caithness . 22,609 1,240 826 183 122 36 Clackmannan . 10,85h 594 396 88 58 15 Cromarty . . 3,052 167 no 24 16 3 Dumbarton . . 20,710 1,135 756 167 110 38 Dumfries 54,597 2,994 1,996 442 294 ilJ Edinburgh . . 122,954 6»743 4,494 997 664 Elgin . . . 26,705 1,464 976 2J6 144 42 Fiic .... 93,748 5,141 .3,426 760 506 150 4 (' ' [' 165 (li *25H 336" 66 900 2'2.5 252 912 54 51 69 108 66 96 63 114 45 75 90 SO 861 198 114 135 57 48 18 36 15 3 33 Maict ut llic Ai{« Male* I >l liiv Ag • ol It Counties. 'total Population. of 19 to ifi- to 19. ' 1'oul. mUcut/a, 'I'otal. Elective. rraiiiing. lorfir . . . . }W,127 5,136 3,«Ji 803 534 159 HatAlingtou . . 29,9Hf) 1.644 1,0«XJ 243 162 48 Invemeu 'i ■ • . 74,292 4,074 2,716 «02 400 120 KincardifM . . . 26,349 1,4H 962 813 142 42 Kinross . . . . 6,72.5 368 244 54 S(i 9 Kirkcudbright 29,211 1,601 1,066 €36 ISd 45 Lanark I4«,n99 8,0*6 5,364 1,188 79'J 237 Linlithgow . 17,H44 977 650 144 96 27 Nairn . . . . 8,257 452 300 66 44 12 Orkney & Shetland 4«,H24 2,5(i7 1,710 379 252 75 PeeblM . . . . 8,735 478 318 70 4() 12 Perth . .' . . 12ti,36G 6,930 4,620 1,024 682 204 Renfrew . . • 78,056 4,281 2,854 633 422 126 Ross . . . . 52,29i 2,867 1,910 424 282 84 Roxburgh . • • 33,682 1,847 1,230 273 182 54 Selkirk . . . . 5,070 277 184 41 26 6 Stirling . . . . 50,825 2,786 1,856 412 274 81 Sutherland . . . 23,117 1,267 844 187 124 36 Wigtoun . . . 22,918 1,256 836 185 122 36 Scotland . . . 1,599,068 87,677 58,42S 12,950 8,612 2,547 England . . . WaTes . . . . 8,331,434 456,918 304,598 67,548 45,01 fi 13,458 541,546 29,691 19,78() 4,387 2,918 861 ,.. .^ 10,472,048 574,486 382,812 84,885 56^546 16,866 *■' I ' i. 1 ) 42 150 ,0 iGG TABLE 11. t' < i 'i Ccuntiei. Oittricu, Kent Sussex Surry Middlesex, 3 District Essex SufFolk Norfolk Cambridge Hur.finE;don :?;dford Hertford Bnckingfiam Oxford . Berks . . Southampton Wilts . . Dorset . . Devon . Cornwall Somerset Gloucester Worcester Monmc Herefi. Salop Warwick Stafford Leicester Rutland Northampton icts< " • • • I 3n . . . > • • • •J :} :} } ester . . . .^ ic uth . • • /• I rd ... .J • . : :} an . . .J 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20 21 22 23 Effective Local Militia. 11,248 5,824 9,836 f 10,000 29,914^ 10,000 I 9,914 8,278 7,694 9,996 3,2661 1,372 V 6,954 2,3l6j 3,566 3,928 4,008 3.998 7,494 Training Battalions. 1,326 8,006 8,030 ;;^f*} 10,970 12,542 6,882 10,008 9,170 5 094 "\ 1 ',666 V 10,020 3,260j 6,128 7,612 8,744 4,756^ 596 > 10,168 4,816j { 1441 60 f 102-3 156 \ 174/ 177\ 177/ 300 1 186/ 225) 72 V 144) 210 24 ^13 } 498 258 435 45S 443 440 36S 339 44,1 306 330 354 354 486 555 SOS 447 405 441 270 336 387 447 167 Counties. :} Lincoln . . Nottingham . Derby . . . Chester .... York West Riding, 2"> Districts ... J York East Ditto . . 1 York North Ditto . / Lancaster, 2 Districts Cumberland . . ."1 Westmorland . . J Northumberland . ."5 Durham ... .J Districts 24 or 26 27 28 29 /SO 131 *22 33 EfTecttve Local Militia. 5,k'2 \ 5,898 / 7,626 11,080 7,010 10,310 10,310 Training Battalions. 20,620 / 5,098 1 5,686 / 24,598 I 4,28o 7 1,520 J } 11,606 10,784 12,300 12,295 5,806 5,744 5,862 304,598 Anglesey . Carnarvon . Denbigh Flint . . Montgomery Merioneth . Radnor . . Pembroke . Caermarthen Cardigan . Glamorgan Brecon . . J 34 35 1 ,234' 1,516 2,206 1,448 y 1,754 I 1,078 694 J 2,056'S 2,460 1,570 > 2,614 l,234j 9,930 9,934 2257 261 J 912^^ 2251 253 J 1,089 •[ 189-1 66/ 252 7 258 j 336 486 S09 456 456 477 545 54* 255 510 13,458 11 54- 66 96 63 )• 429 75 45 I 30j 90T 108 69 y 432 114 j 5lJ f^'t N, B. A part of JLancashire might be conveniently added to thi« District. ■M 168 Counties. Dittricts. Effective Training Local Militia. BattaliouD. Berwick .... -k 1,118-1 481 Roxburgh 1,2:50 54 Selkirk . . 184 6 Peebles > 36 318 > 9,090 12 > S9S Haddington 1,096 48 Edinburgh 4,494 198 Linlithgow ^ 650^ 27. DumfriCi . 1,9961 ■ 87^ Kirkcudbright Wigtolin . 1 37 1,066 836 . 6,980 36 f 30^^ Ayr . . * 3,082. 135) Lanark . , Renfrew . ■ 38 2:854} S»218 ?g} 3«* Argyle ^ 2,626' 1 114^ Bute . . Dumbarton } 39 430 ( 7.56 ( >- 5,668 ll\ ^ Stirling . . J 1,856 1 81J Inverness . 2,716" 120- Ross . . 1,910 84 Cromarty Sutherland . . > 40 110 844 > 8,116 3H 354 Caithness . . 826 36 Orkney , . 1,710J 75. Nairn . . . 300- 12- Elgin . . . 976 42 BamiF . . . > 41 1,308 > 8,046 57 > 351 Aberdeen 4,500 198 Kincardine . 962J 42. Forfiir . . ' 3,624" 1591 Perth . . . 4,620 20I- 150 } 52r, Fife . . . > 42 3,426 > 12,310 Kinross , . 244 9 Ciackmanan . J 396 I5J 1 169 TABLE III. The subjoined Table gives a view of the numbers of Local Militia which may be brought into action, within a ^iven time after the appearance of the enemy. On the first alarm, each Battalion is supposed to assemble at its own rendezvous, and, on receiving orders from London, to march separately, by the most direct route, to the place where they are appointed to join th?. Army. Reckoning from the time that orders are di- spatched by Government, the first day may be allowed for the conveyance of these orders, and for the differeni Corps to assemble and prepare for their march. — ^Those from the distant counties are then supposed to march at the rate of 15 miles per day towards London. — All the Corps which assemble at posts within 30 miles of London, may there- fore be reckoned to arrive at the general rendezvous within three days ; — those which are at more than 30, but less than 43 miles, on the fourth day j and so on. — The counties of Kent and Essex being those through which the enemy must advance, their Militia will join the Army near the coast, and may be reckoned, along with those of London itself, as ready almost from the first, or at least before the enemy caa possibly reach the capital. — The total number of Local Mi- litia from each county is taken at the same as in Table IL5 throwing away fractions less than 100-, and these totals are divided into different Columns, according to the propor- tion of population residing within each distance from London. 170 TABLE III. U 1} ; ii It M M m i ;i!i Distance beyond J London . . . ^ Lms than Miles. From 30 to 45 Miles. From 45 to 60 Mi!et. From 60 to fJO Miles. From 90 to 120 Miles. •if -'. .' FromlSO to 150 Miles. Supposed to join . /Within \ 3 Days. 4th Day. 5th Diy. 6th&7th Days. SthfcOth Days. 10th and 11th Days. Kent . . . . Essex , . . . Middlesex . . . Surry . . . • Hertfordshire . . Bedfordshire . Buckinghamshire . Berkshire . . • Oxfordshire Hampshire . . • Sussex . . . • Northamptonshire . Huntingdonshire . Cambridgeshire . Suffolk . . . . Norfolk . . . . Rutlandshire 11,200 8,200 29,900 9,000 " 2,800 V,boo 600 800 "00 l,f(X) 1,700 1,200 600 800 2,200 1,200 1,200 1,500 1,400 2,40e 3,000 700 2,000 4,000 600 4,800 900 i,r>oo 5,000 1,000 2,000 8,000 600 4,700 5,30r 7,500 3,400 3,400 4,000 4^000 400 1,400 600 • 300 1,000 Leicestershire . ^Varwickshire • 2,300 1,(KX) 3,300 Gloucestershire . . 600 Wiltshire . . . Dorsetshire . . . Somersetshire * . 800 5,000 1,000 1,200 Worcestershire , . Monmouthshire Herefordshire . 3,200 ' Carried over -, . 171 Distance beyond f London . . t Supposed to join Brought over Shropshire . . Staffordshire Derbyshire . . Nottinghamshire Lincohishire f 3 Days 4- Days 5 Days 7 Days 9 Days ^ 11 Days bo tn tn fiS o .a rt a, rt u (A 3 z lf^,10() 27,100 112,300 .50,300 162,600 29,90(1 192,.W(; 9,4.00 From 4j to (»0 Miles. 5th Day. Officers for 600 Local Baiialions, at 250/. each Expense of Encampments, 8cc. 153,000 150,000 210,000 127,600 «5 2,000 420,000 150,000 200,000 jf 1,662,600 APPEN- tr •i* is;.i»bi.M*r to l'.'?iau«l t ffc It. •Tl iVi-'.''U!* >i I t . ul HM ifii ;j(L» .t> nV yi»'.*» (• o; ;"l' »i r ♦' il kfin ;ifn.,f} ni") >t, il iy; ,'.'i,.Ji ;r.r >•■{ '^ mo <> iu,05 H' ■Irf iCi^iC* 17V' >'. ►I /■: i« tio J.JT^ «JV' ."" r '. ..■- Ill 'i.{)»'« ? ;>*" •■ .>::iT!r. 177 It cannot be doubted that in the: courie of the diiein* barkatinn^ and of the first days after the enemy may havo made good their landings they must be involved in many embarrassing situations, and will often be in a predicament when they might be attacked with advantage. There is no certainty, however, that our forces can be ready to profit by these cil-cumstances ; and if we rest much of our defence upon that contingency^ it may involve ui ja th^ greatest dangers. -*...-.. .. i .»' .- /> !^ ^*..- It is a supposition destitute of all probability, that our army should be ready encamped exactly at the place at which the eaemy make their landing. We have so ex- tensive a coa.it exposed to invasion, that our army cannot be collected at any one point, without leaving others un* protected. When we hear of the flotilla being in readiness on the shores of Holland, or of Flanders, we have no means of judging wheth'T the destination of the enemy may be for Yarmouth or for Deal. Even when their forces areactuall) embai, d, they may be carried (and in many rMcs with nearly 64 lal facility)* to a number of different points, either north or soutl' of ^he Thames. If, then, our commanders determine to concentrate their forces, and to keep a respectab! army together, they cannot choose any position on the coa.!^, without leaving many otliers where the enemy may land without opposition. If, rn the other hand, they attempt to guard every part of the coast, their M force;! ^, > IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) ''i /. r ^j>^ ■% '^ i? / 1.0 I.I u Ui 122 u US ii& |I25 u Ih < 6" - ► PhotograpMc Sciences Corporation 33 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 072-4503 \ s ^ 17$ « ...:•/• forces must be drawn out along so extensive a line, that they must necessarily be very weak at each particular point. At no one station oould ^ b&ve a sufficient body of troops to resist the invading army. All the natural ob'itacles which the situation can afford, will itot enable a few regiments effectually to resist a powerful army. The enemy may be expected to use every exertion to bring a large force to act together in one combined attack ; and bearing down tho feeble detachments which they meet at the shore, they may attack our forces in detail, and gain important ad- vantages before our scattered troops can be drawn together tuto one army* > ? . ' • » ^f .«v ''In these circumstances, it may certainly admit of a doubt, whether it would not be more prudent to quit the coast altogether, and to occupy some central position^ «rhere a respectable army may remain constantly assembled, and ready to meet the enemy in whatever quarter their at- tack may be made. An intermediate plan may be suggest- ed, and seems, in fact, to meet ihe ideas of Government, that the great body of out forces should not be stationed exactly at the coast, but in a second line, at some distance back. Their positions will thus extend along a narrower tifcle^ and they may be more easily drawn together into j&ne army, than if they were stationed immediately en the shore* if their comm^mications tan be well maintained,, this plan is not, perhapis, objectionable. It certainly has the advantage of enabling our commanders, with a part of their force, to meet the enemy more speedily after their landing, thah if omr whole army were in one camp, at a gtiater distance back. £ven on this plan, however, our tritkips must be stationed at such a distance from the shore, ^hai ati invading army, arriving uncpcp^ctedly, may pro- fit ;%** ... r. bably ■:V ■rr .^ 179 ^- bably establish themselves before a sufHcient force can be brought down to give them effectual opposition* It is not, perhaps, impossible, that an inferior number of our troops may annoy the enemy, to a considerable de- gree, before they make good their landing; perhap» too, a fortunate concurrence of accidents may enable a judicious commander to gain decisive advantages, while the enemy are involved in the embarrassments of a disembarka- tion. If we could obtain sufficiently accurate information as to the movements of the enemy, this might not be im» probable ; but if all the chances of the contrary be con* sidered, we ought perhaps to look upon such an event at one of those contingencies, for which we may possibly be indebted to the good management or the good fortune of our commanders, rather than as an event which we may expect with certainty, and upon which we may »afely rest our defence. The end. •^^^v : « X'M ^' Printed by Richard Taylor and Co., Shoe Lane. ^^afer