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 MKMORANDUM 
 
 ON 
 
 THE MILITIA 8 Y ST KM 
 
 flF 
 
 CANADA. 
 
 X 
 
 BY 
 
 LIIUIT.-OOLONEL FLKTCHI-K. 
 
 ■ ' SCOTS FUS1L1K1# ^^/i/^/^y 
 
 Mthtani SecreOiri/ lo Ilin Errelleney the Governor General. ' 
 
 ■i^'S'"- 
 
 OTTAWA: •; ;r' ■ 
 
 PRINTED BY THE "CITIZEN " PRINTimi COMPANY, SPARKS STREET 
 
 1873. 
 
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 - ■■*-■ - 
 
 n 
 
 V 
 
 vIEMOUANDUM 
 
 o«r 
 
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 THK MTLITIA SYSTEM 
 
 oit 
 
 CANADA. 
 
 BY 
 
 IJiU T.-COLONKL FIKTCHER, 
 
 SCOTS ¥USIUE^$, ^^a^^/ 
 
 Military Secretary to ffin Excellency fite Governor General. 
 
 OTTAWA : 
 j'){i\TKi) i»Y rriK nxr/KN phinttn(! company, sparks .street. 
 
 1H7:{. 
 
// 
 
\ 
 
 4 
 .1 
 
 MEMOllANDUM 
 
 
 ON Tim 
 
 MTLTTIA SYSTEM OF CANADA 
 
 At a time when changes in the Military Organization of the country seem to be 
 impemling, and when the managomoat of the Militia has pasHcil into new hands, it 
 may not be considered out of phice if 1 otfer a few observations on a subject in whic'i 
 I talcc a deep professional interest. The question at, issue i^< not one of mere detail ; 
 it involves pi'inciplea of wliich a due consideration is absolutely necessary if aiij- 
 important changes be made in the present system of militia, or if ajiy broad scheme 
 be yjroposed of national defence. . ' 
 
 Now in iill matters involving large military expenditure there is one problem 
 presenting itself under different a.spects, which simple in its formula, is yet extremely 
 difficult of solution. The problem may be stated in these terms: — Given v.ie number 
 of men required, and the efficiency to which they are lo attain, wliat amount of 
 money will be annually neces.sary ? Or as it is stated in Canada — Given the amount* 
 of money voted, and the number of men required, what is to be the standard of 
 efficiency ? Or again — Given the amouat of mc/uej'^ and the requii-ed efficiency, liow 
 many men can be raised ? This problem comprises the whole principl<> of the 
 organization of a ijiilitary force under ordinary conditions, when the natl(mal spirit 
 is not excited by eminent danger, or not roused by enthusiastic feeling. 
 
 Jf these sirMems be accepted, as containing at least the germs of truth, it may be 
 well — before enunciating any new ideas — to see how they liave been worked out 
 during the last few years, and what are the pi-eseut results of the militujy organiza- 
 tjou in Canada. , . , • , 
 
 Now it appears that when it became probable that the onus of providing tor the 
 
 national defence would, In- the withdrawal of the Imperial forces, be thrown ufton 
 
 the Dominion, a Commission was issued in the year 1862 to re])ort on a system of 
 
 militia suitable for the requirements of the country. On this commission, Sir John 
 
 Macdonald, Sir George Cartier, and other well-known statesmen — assisted by Colonel, 
 
 now General Lysons — served, and the result was a report, of which the substance was 
 
 as follows : — It was considered that the number of the active force shoul(i be fifty 
 
 thousand, and that even thi force (a very lai-ge increase on any numl>er prm'iously 
 la 
 
or^uni/.wl) would be insufficient in the event of invtiHion, without the ashisfunco of a 
 Htron^ body of regular troops, and Ji powerful fleet of ^unlxmtH on the hii<es. It was 
 reeoininentlod thai Ihe (tountry pshouhl bo divided into Military l)i^.tricts, which 
 nhouid comprise iie<j^itnetilal Divisions; that a permanent liead-ciuai'ter, district, and 
 regimental staff .should bo niaiutaineil, and Lliat ihe usual ]«eri(>d oi" ti'aining should bo 
 lor twenty-eight days. 
 
 Kiui this I'Gport been acted n[)on, a force roi^p^ctable both in regard to numbers 
 and etticiency would Iiave been created ; but unfortunately, owing to the expenditure 
 necessary to cany out the plan, it M'as not plci,siiig to the House of Assembly ; con- 
 Hequently the (iovei'nment whii-li iiad ombodj.'d it in a l^ill was defeated, and was 
 obligisd 1,0 resign. JIotHuur it was unl^ ' fur a .«.liuil linn that ihvy ttci e out ufufllc o, 
 juulSn IHii'ii a Militia Bill was passed, considerably moditied in regard to its provisions 
 from that which vw)iild have been requisite had the repoi-t of the (AimmisHion been 
 approveiL %mm Act continued in force until the Confederation of the Dominion, ■ 
 when in 18d8 t)»e present Militia Hill received the Koyal ABsent. 
 
 The basis of the system is the eni'olment of the whole of the male population 
 between the ages of eighteen and sixty, not exempted oi- dis(|ualiticd by law, and 
 being British subjects by birth or naturalization. This force — numbering in the 
 Ibui- Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, 094,008 — is 
 divided into four clasHes. The tirst comprises the unmarried, and widowers witliout 
 children, between the ages of eighteen and thii'ty ; the second, the same description 
 of {»ersuns under forty-fiv-e years of age ; the third class includes those between 
 eighteen and forty-five who are mari-ied, or who are widowers with children ; and the 
 fourth class comprises the whole of the enrolled population between forty-five and 
 sixty. From the total number thus enrolled, the Active Militia — which, as the law 
 now stands, is limited to 43,000 men — is raised by voluntary enlistment, and engaged 
 tor three years. Power is given to fill up the ranks by means of the ballot ; but this 
 power is in abeyance, and has not been resorted to even when the numbers of the 
 Active Militia have fallen short of those demanded. The command of the whole 
 force is vested in the Queen, and through Hei-, in Her representative, the Governor 
 (^enera!, who is jul vised on all questions relating to the Militia by the Minister of 
 Militia and Defence — a Minister similar, as regai'ds his functions, to the Secretary of 
 State for War. The actual discipline is under the Adjutant-General, who must be a 
 field officer in the regular army, and has the rank of Colonel in the Militia. Each 
 district, of which there are eleven, viz. : — Four in Ontario, three in Quebec, one in 
 New Brunswick, one in Nova Scotia, one in Manitoba, and one in British Columbia, 
 is under the command of Deputy Adjutant-tTenerals, who have the rank of Lieut.- 
 Colonels, and who are assisted by Brigade Majors. The period of drill during peace 
 time for the Active Militia is to be not more than sixteen days and not less than 
 eight. The fbire assembled in 1872, and who performed their regular period of 
 
i 
 
 rtixteon days' drill, vvus 30,141, includin;^ ofHcon'!. Of these, 25,72-1 wcro iufuiitry, 
 1,(566 cjivalry, 951 — with 40 guiH— tiold ai-iillory, and 1,697 gairiHon Rrtillery. 
 The ostimutos tor that year amouiitod to $1,549,400 ; of wliich 8550,000 was appro- 
 priated to the pay and allowances of tlio troojjs during tlieir annual trairung, including 
 the expense attendant on ciicam(ting a portion of tlic force. In the present year 
 the estimates were reduced, and the camps in which the Militia have for the j)ast few 
 seasons heen exercised, wore not formed. The minimum ainount ol' mone}' to lie ap- 
 plied to national defence wa:4 tixed at one million of dollarr* ($1,000,000) when the 
 several Provinces wore united by (confederation, and it ap))ears i)robahle that unlees 
 the Ilonse of Commons had thus been tied down to the expenditure of a specified 
 Kum, the estimates woulil have been still further I'educed. 
 
 Taking the year 1S72 as a sample of the last few years, wc find that rather over 
 a million and a half of dollars was voted, and that about .'JO, 150 men were provided 
 as the force of the active militia On these data the following questions arise: 
 Wrist, — To what efficiency did this force attain? And given the amount of money, 
 would it be better to diminish the numbers and increase the efficiency, or to keep the 
 force as it is? For to lower the average standard of efficiency without altogether 
 doitig away with even the appeanince of military training, would be almost impos- 
 sible. To reply to the first question is difficult, as the rosults in the several Pro- 
 vinces of the Dominion were not identical. There were great differences betweea 
 the regiments, some comparing very favourably with the best of the rnilitia of England, 
 otliers inferior, in the matter of training, to the very worst. li would be of little 
 avail to criticize sharply where the difficulties to be contended with are so great, and 
 where those who have overcome them deserve lauch praise. The most noticeable 
 point was the apparent ignorance, in some instances, of the existence of faults 
 which would attract the attention of all who ai'e conversant with military affairs; 
 thereby forcing the conclusion that unless some pattern should exist to which the 
 regiments might conform, officers and men wonkl be unaware of their shortcomings; 
 and gradually, but surely, the efficiency of the whole force would yearly deteriorate. 
 The second question involves so many considerations that its solution cannot be 
 given in any dogmatic form, but may receive an answer from the teachings of 
 history, and from the example of other nations. To revert to first principles, — For 
 what is a Military Force required? First, to defend the country against external 
 foes; Secondly, to act as a last resource in maintaining the powei: of the law; 
 Thirdly, but far in the background, to be a symbol of the state wliich pertains to 
 all nations aspiring to rank as such among their compeers. . 
 
 Now the tix'st and most important requisite of a military force depends so entirely 
 on tlie position of the country to which it belongs in regard to its neighbors, that it 
 is impossible to consider it abstractedly, and consequently the case as regards Canada 
 must present itself per se in respect to the question at issue. This great and growing 
 
 
Dominion strotohini^ from tho Atla.itio to tho Pacilic, hoiindodon itw wmtlu'rii frontier 
 by tho United Stute-^, iin<i oxUnidin^ nortliwanls info tho forests and desortn of the 
 Arctic regions, cotni-risos a population of not more tlian 4,000,000 of which by fur the 
 ijroatcr portion reside between tho houtli eastern shores of [iake Huron and the 
 Atlantic. Puttin<^ asi(U) therefore the Province of Hritish (^oluMiMa, which if war 
 were to break out must rely for its defence on other helpthati could be furnished iVom 
 Canada; and tiie newly settled Province of Manitoba, wliich, bordering on a country 
 almost as thinly populated as itself, has at present more to fenr from Indint\s, or tho 
 lawless hunters and ti-aders of the west, that from a regular enemy, what may be 
 called Canada proper and tho Maritime Pro- inces remain to be dealt with. These 
 present a frontier, contiguous to the United S ates of about one thousand (1,000) miles 
 whilst ahmg the coast many harbours, for the most part closed during tlie winter 
 months furnish shelter for shipping and points of defc'ice in case of war. The only 
 enemy that appears likely seriously to threaten (Canada is her jiowertui and now 
 friendly neighbour the United Stat,e.-« of America. There, in contra/iistinclion to the 
 condition of Europe, tho military force is reduced very low, the total number of 
 regidar troo[)s being about 30,000, scattered for the most part on tho Indian frontier ; 
 whilst since the great civil war, tho Militia and Volunteers which constituted on 
 either side the vast majority of the army have received but little training. In fact 
 the aspect of affairs appeal's so peaceful that some may be tempted to question the 
 necessity on the part of (Canada of keeping uj) any military force, and to ask why 
 the money so a])plied .should not rathei* be em])loyed in developing the resources of 
 the country. No reply except a reference to history can be given to those who 
 broach such opinions. There, however, the lessons have been so often repeated that 
 they may bo considered as conclusive. Pojuods of peace have never continued 
 for any length of time, and clear as the political hori/iOn now is, thei-e are still clouds 
 no lai-ger perhaps than a man's hand which may be seen by those who are not dazzled 
 by its bi'illiancy. On the other hand, the smallness of the force at the disposal of the 
 United States, permits hei' neighbour to di.spense with all but a skeleton of an army, 
 oufticieut to be a nucleus of a larger force in the event of war, and adapted for the 
 minor but still necessary purposes ali'cady indicated. What descripton of force is 
 best suited for these requirements is tlie queetion at issue. 
 
 As long as a garrison of Imperial troops remained in Canada (for the present 
 small force at Halifax is far too feeble even to man its forts, and therefore cannot be 
 counted for the defence of the country generally) the Active Militia formed the 
 second line, whilst the main body of enrolled men was av!iilal>le as a reserve. The 
 regular troops furnished also a standard to which the militia were bound as far as 
 possible to conform, and the several stations where they were quartered served as 
 schools at which its officers and non-commissioned officers might acquire tho rudi 
 ments of instruction, d become imbued with a proper military spirit. With the 
 departure of the Imperial troops these advantages have disappeared, and although it 
 
>rn frontier 
 iortK of the 
 1 by fur tlie 
 in uixl till' 
 licli if w:ir 
 lishod iVoni 
 ) ji country 
 inns, or the 
 lat may be 
 th. ThoHO 
 ,0(M»)nHloH 
 the winter 
 
 The only 
 il and now 
 etion to the 
 nunjliof of 
 m frontier ; 
 Htituted on 
 lu;. In fiiC'L 
 uestion the 
 ,0 ask wli_\- 
 esources of 
 tlioso who 
 peatod that 
 
 continued 
 still clouds 
 not dazzled 
 )Osal of the 
 )f an army, 
 itcd for the 
 of force i- 
 
 the present 
 3 cannot he 
 brnied the 
 crve. The 
 i as far as 
 I served as 
 e the rndi 
 With the 
 although ii 
 
 I 
 
 %r 
 
 1 ( 
 
 may truly bo naid that a <j;roat and j^rowin^ nation huch an Canada now is, will foe! 
 its responsibilities and act \\\ to them, and will even by relying on itw own strength 
 ijiercaso iii vigor when the artili(!ial Mipports are withdrawn, yet the diUleidties 
 engendered by the absence of nil prol'e^.-ional soMlcrt- must bo faced, and the want 
 they supplied must be met, b}- some well digested plan. There is a feeling In lh«' 
 Dominion that the [ii-esent militia system, admirable in its concei»lion, and good in 
 many of its details yet scarcely fultils the expectations entertained when it 
 was fns' framed, and Miat (he time has ((^me for a modilication of hon-o of ItK 
 features. To suggest any alterations without tirst stating tho grounds for ho doing, 
 would bo pi'o.sumpt(iouH, and it is oidy by appealing to the teachings of recent events 
 on both sides of the Atiantie, thai any opinions that may be urged would merit con- 
 sideration. 
 
 The tirst instance that occurs is that of the United States when the greui war of 
 1H()1 broke out, and when the luition divided into two hostile cam})s strove to put 
 forth its whole strength either for aggression or defence. Previous to that event but 
 a very small regular force haU been maintained; but the several States had organizeil 
 a system of militia, some States excelling othcr.s in military ardour and consequently 
 in the number and eflficioncy of their troops. War commenced, large armies were 
 organized, the .small regular force fui'ni>-hed officers as far as it was able to do so; but 
 on both sides during th.) tii'st compaign, the troops were little better than armed 
 iii')bs. The result was that the war was greatly prolonged, and much useless slaughter 
 of men and expondi'iure of money were the result. It is almost certain that if either 
 side had possessed but a small bodyof wvil disciplined troops to loaven the larger 
 masses, the battle of Bull's Run would have resulted in the capture of Washington or 
 Richmond, according to the weight thrown into tho scale by the regular ti*oops. Jt 
 was only gradually that the belligerents fully recognized the fact that the military 
 profession meant more than the mere wearing of uniform. The regular officers were. 
 at the comiTiencement of the war, looked upon with jealousy and their opinions 
 icgarded as the results of professiotuil j)edantry. Gradually, hoAvevei", public feeling 
 >n this point changed, and it is a remai'kable fact that with scarcely an exception no 
 (;fficers acquired any wide renown on either side excepting th- i who had been 
 ('(lucated in the United States i-egular army. This example is citod as showing that 
 |>rinciples recognized in Europe have been proved by practice as applicable to the 
 condition of society on this side of the Atlantic. t 
 
 To take more recent instances, the teaching of the last wars in Europe appears 
 f » point to two great results. One is that modei-n annies will in future be of vast 
 size and beyond the possibility of being maintained at full efficiency during times of 
 peace, consequently the greater portion of the force will partake of the character of 
 Militia. The second is, that these short service men, and, when the reserves are 
 called out, these soldiers who have returned to civil life, require highly educated 
 
8 
 
 oiticc's ajid Mioro'ighly ti'siined non-coinmiHsioncd officers to lead them in time of 
 active Hcrvice. This is the system npproved of in tl>e most highly organized of 
 f'iUropcan nvmies, where the short service legular troops, und tlie landwehr are 
 officered by men who have received considerable professional instruction.* 
 
 Now, to advt.cate for ('anrda any phui approachin<>; to that which prevails in 
 <lermany, would be manifestly ubsu'-d; as, happily, the political condition of the two 
 nations, in regard to the necessity for ndlitai-y preparation, is as different as it woU 
 can be • whilst .m attempt lo enforce compulso y service in Canada would, even if it 
 were approved by the people thn)ugh theii rcj)resentatives, tend to injuro the pros- 
 perity of the country by the check it would ( ause to emigration. The instance is 
 merely quoted to show the opinion held in the most military nation in Europe of tne 
 necessity of training for those who aspire to lead troops, whether as officers or in the 
 lower gi-ades. 
 
 The inference to be di-awn from the instances quoted would i'ppear to l)e — Thai 
 a small force, well trained, and officered by men who have learned their profession, 
 has become a necessity for Canada ; this force being intended to serve as a training 
 school, and as a standard of comparison for the real army of the country — i e., the 
 Active and the Heserve Militia, An argunient may be raised against this scheme, 
 on the ground that the Imperial forces, although removed from the countrj'', Avould, 
 in the event of war, supply skilled officers to train the militia; and that consequently 
 the expense which the small force here proposed would necessitate, might be an un- 
 necessary burden on the resources of the countr^^ To this it may be replied, — That 
 a war that would involve Canada in serious hostilities, would be also one which would 
 tax to their utmost the resources of Great Britain, both in officeivs arid men. Her 
 own reserve forces would require a supply of trained officers, and it would be 
 difficult to provide sufficient young and energetic officers and non-commissioned 
 officers for her increased needs. Tlie most that Canada could expect, irrc'-pectivo of 
 any troops that m.ight be sent to her aid, would be a staff; and, as a matter of course, 
 a supply of the material of war. 
 
 There is another argument in favor of the plan proposed, wiiich won. " anpear 
 likely to occur to those who believe in a future for the T)omirion. Can a country 
 as], re to greatness which neglects its own means of self-dcicnce ; and would the 
 people of Canada be satisfied to provide men insufficiently trained, and ^o rely for 
 officers from the re-^ular Imperial Army? Does not the proper organ i.^^ation of a 
 defensive force, including training for its officers, devolve on a country as much as 
 the formation of the moans for administering justice, or of a Department to preside 
 
 *NoTB. — In a receut report on tho Swiss Militia, whcro itn many shoitcomings are pointed o'- , it i» 
 recogniKcd as a fact by all who advocate reform, that a civic force requircH a thoroughly trained staff 
 to guide it, mor^, rather than lets, than a professional anny. 
 
n time of 
 !;anizod of 
 hvchr are 
 
 »ro vails in 
 if the two 
 as it well 
 even if it 
 9 the pro.«- 
 nstanee is 
 •ope of tne 
 8 or in the 
 
 l)e~Thal 
 ])rofcsHion, 
 a training" 
 y — i e., the 
 19 scheme, 
 irj"", Avould. 
 isequcntly 
 : be an xm- 
 ied,— That 
 lich would 
 |nen. Her 
 would be 
 imlssioned 
 ■pective of 
 
 of course. 
 
 I. ar)pear 
 a country 
 would the 
 p rely for 
 ation of a 
 s much as 
 to preside 
 
 itod o'- , it is 
 trained staff 
 
 over its maritime interests ? In nil that concerns sclf-;.^ovcrnniont, the Dominion has 
 made rapid strides ; its civil service is well oriijanized, its public dcpartmenta carefully 
 managed. Would it not therefore Ibllovv that steps should be taken lo provide for 
 the eiiieiency of the military establishment by supplying the want whicii the with 
 drawal of the i-egular troops has created ? This want is ordy beginnin*^ to bo felt ; 
 as vet, otiieei's who have received instruction in the volunteer schools formed in con- 
 action with the regular regiments, which were iirt^t established in Caiuuia, and 
 afterwards introduced into England, hold commands in the militia; And non- 
 coniinissioned ofHcers, formerly soldiers of tlie Imperial army, are still i!v:iilal>le to 
 instruct the reoruifs \n the I'Ufiiments of drill. Tiiese cor.ditions will, however, soon 
 cliange; and even supposi>ig the schools formerly establisiied continue to maintain 
 their eiiieiency when dei)rive!i of the assistance the regular regiments afforded, there 
 is no body of men with professional training to inaire the a;lva)ice of military 
 science, and to profit by the experience which the Continental nations of lOurope 
 have earned at the cost of blood and treasure. Without a professional ly trained 
 force, tl'.e standivd ''>f off'cie"f'y T^il' <jv<idnn11v bofvime lower, and the foi'm of 
 military service will be maintained, wliilst the ppirit will be dead. There will be 
 plenty of officers in gay uniforms too clos'Vly resembling those of the Imperial army, 
 and at parades there will be some showy manoeuvres ; but th*? true instruction of the 
 modern soldier, to the^necessity of which, all who think seriously of war are awaken- 
 ing, will be neglected, and even ignorotl. A revolution is even now passing over the 
 organization and training of European armies, and if Canada wishes to profit by the 
 changes which will follow, she must ha\-e men whose business it is to study the art of 
 uar as professionals, and not as amateui'S. 
 
 Having thus stated briefly the want which it is believed exists, and the reason, 
 which have led to this belief, it remains to be seen whether, at but little expense, this 
 want can be sup])lieu. It is presumed, as has been already stated, that some small 
 permanently embodied force is necessary; and th«t without it there is a danger lest 
 the whc»h defensive organizati(>n of the Dominion should in a few years deteriorate. 
 Hy merel}' im])roving on M'hat alrea<ly exists, the nucleus of an army could be 
 obtained, and the expense involved would be more than compensated for by the benefits 
 that would accrue. It must, however, always be remembered that the true defensive 
 strength of the country will remain with its militia; the active force, as is the case 
 at present, being in readiness to be called out at a short notice, the reserve forming 
 the second line and serving as a feeder to the active force. With regai'd to the 
 organization of the active militia, it will bo seen on reference to'^the report of the 
 commission above alluded to, to whose labours the oi'ganization of the present sys- 
 tem is in great measure due, that a head-quarters, divisional and regimental statf are 
 r ^commended. But only the two first of these recommendations have been as yet 
 carried out. The third has been omitted, and there is no permanent regimental statf 
 of any description. It is proposed to remedy this defect and at the same time to 
 
m 
 
 avoid the evil of keeping on pay for long periodn of "eacli year men for whom no 
 \voi"k, except during the season of training, can bo found, by a plan of which the out- 
 line only can be furnished, to be fdled up by those who have practical experience of 
 the needs of the Canadian militia. . '. 
 
 It id suggested to establish in the Dominion three training scliools, using 
 rhosc alrcadj' in exi.-^leru-c at Quebec and Kingston and adding another for the mari- 
 time provinces, probably at Halifax, where 'he presence of the regular troops might 
 i)e of advantage. These training schools sh )nld consist of a small forcj of the three 
 arms, viz., cavalry, artlUeiy and infantry, a\ hich should correspond with the active 
 militia of the four provinces. The troop, or even half ti'oop, of cavalry wouM 
 contain the permanent regimental stalf of the cavalry of the distriiit; 11. c bat(er)- of 
 artillery, in the same way, of the iield and garrison artillery ;_and the companies of 
 infantry of the militia infantry. Supposing about o 1,000 men {i. e. rank and tile) 
 to be the numbers of the active militia, divided in equal propoitions botv/een thi-ee dis- 
 tricts; that is, three regimcntsof cavalry equal to 1,800; twelve batteries of artillery 
 ;j,000; and thirty-six regiments of infantry of 28,800, with possibly a small o\ force 
 engineers numbering 200, and of a niilitary train 200.-'^ These troops, as is the cast 
 at the present time, to be called out for yearly training and inspection. The dura- 
 tion of the drill to be tixed by statute, due regard being had to real efficiency. To 
 correspond with this force, at each of the three training schools would be one halt 
 troop of cavalry numbering about 40 non-commissioned officers and men and 3( 
 horses; one batterj^ of artillery numbering about 250 men, of which two gims only 
 \V(,ald be fully horsed, requiring seventy -eight horses; f three companies of infimtry. 
 each section of each company corresponding with a regiment of infantr}', in all 240 
 men, aud a few non-ccmamissioned officers to be instructed in the duties of eugineerH 
 and train ; the whole force at each of the three schools would not be more than 580 
 non-commissioned officers and men. With regard to officers it would probably be 
 necessary at the present time to obtain commandants of these schools from the regu- 
 lar army, as is now done at the artillery schools of Quebec and Kingston. These 
 should bo selected either from officers who have been educated at the staff college, 
 due regard o^ course being had to other qualifications; or from those who, known to 
 
 * Note. — These numbers are given approximately, regard being had to the establishment of the 
 < avalry, artillery and infantry in the Imperial service. 
 
 t NoTK. — The number of horses for the two guns might possibly be reduced, or some of the horses 
 used for other purposes when not required for service or instruction. The proportion of artillery 
 permanently embodied is high in comparison with the infantry, partly berausc the battery is the 
 lowest tactical unit of that arm, partly on account of the additional training required by artillerymen, 
 and the consequent necessity of a larger number of instructed men, and partly from the fact that 
 infantry drill forming a pflrt of the instruction of garrison batteries, a portion of the men would be 
 available as a muans of teaching the infantry officers bataliou drill. 
 
i 
 
 11 
 
 ivhom no 
 1 the out- 
 jrience of 
 
 Is, usinp;' 
 the mari- 
 ps might 
 Lhc three 
 he active 
 y would 
 attcry of 
 ipanios of 
 and li!e) 
 throe diH- 
 artillery 
 11 o\ force 
 ■I tlie cast 
 ?he dura- 
 icy. To 
 one half 
 1 and 3( 
 uns onlv 
 infantry, 
 n all 240 
 sngineerB 
 than 53U 
 hably be 
 the rcgu- 
 Thei^c 
 ff college, 
 <nown to 
 
 acnt of the 
 
 ■ the horsen 
 of artillery 
 itfry is tlic 
 lillerymcn, 
 le fact that 
 n would he 
 
 he goo^' rngirnoTifMl ofTicers, have passed through one or more of the variouH hchoolw 
 at Sliocburyne.-y, Chatham or Ilythe. If Canadians can be found who, having 
 entered the Imperial army, are in all respects; well qualified, preference might be 
 gi\'en to them; but high proficiency should be required, qualitie;* for command being 
 combined with power of imparting instruction. The appointment should be for five 
 years, with ])03sib!y power of renewal for an additional toi-m, and conditional on the 
 officer's visiting Europe and keeping himself acquainted with the changes and 
 improvements in the art of war. It would be a question whether the command of 
 the school could not be united with the Deputy Adjutant (loneralshij) of the district,* 
 the brigade majors acting as seconds in command. A second in command (if the 
 bi-igade majors were not utilized), an adjutant, a doctor and a quarter-master Avould 
 form the staff of the school, whilst a duo proportion of officers, say two for t])c 
 battery of artillery, one for the cavalry, and three for the three companies of 
 infantry, selected from militia officers who, having evinced good capacity, are willing 
 to onibrace the military profession as a career, would receive commissions to act as 
 instructors in the training schools and as staff during the drill season of the active 
 militia. To these schools all gentlemen recommended for commissions in the active 
 militia Avould be required to come for a period of six months on first appointment, 
 when their commissions would depend on the ability tfiey displayed during the 
 course of instruction. In the event of regimental promotion, f and no other promo- 
 tion, except in the permanent staff of the militia, should in peace time be possible, 
 officers should be roquii'cd to attend for three months at one of the schools, passing 
 through a oovorc traii^ing. both bodily and mental; and being required to obtain a 
 qualifying certificate before their pi'omotion could be con^rmed. A judicious trans- 
 ference from the active to the reserve lists, of officers who either from age cr othei- 
 
 ♦Note. — Tlio appointniont of the Deputy Adjutant General of the district to the command of the 
 Rchool would save expense, hut would render diffioult the selection of an officer to fill the important 
 post. It would have the advantage of couoclidating into one place the military duties of the district, 
 and of keeping the officer in command i.i constant intercourse with military life; whilst during the 
 time of the yearly drill he would he fre'j for purposes of inspection, as the schools would in gieat 
 measure he hroken up by the employment of the officers, ron-commissioncdofficcfrs and men with their 
 several regiments. It miglj; be a question whether the brigade majors could he spared from their 
 several localities, and whether it would not be desirable, in the event of the Deputy Adjutant General 
 being an infantry officer, of the second in comnuuid being an artilleryman, combining, as is at present 
 the case, the inspectornhip of artillery and warlike stores of the district with the work of instruction. 
 If the Deputy Adjutant General were an artillery officer, the second in command should be taken 
 from the infantry, 
 
 t Note. — Tho present system of promotion, viz., that of giving a step in rank after live years' 
 service in the Active Militia (entailing probably not more than eighty days' actual dr.ty) without, 
 regard to the command attaching to rank, will go far to reduce to a minimum the value of military 
 titles, to injure discipline, and to render impossible the proper working tf)gether in time of war of the 
 imperial and colonial forces. It is a most serious mistake, and one that requires immediate remedy. 
 
12 
 
 (•iiuscM appeared unlikely to be fit for service, would keep the senior ranks of the 
 active niililia sulliciently young, and would facilitate promotion. Any proinisini;; 
 young officers who might evince a doj-ire to remain longer at the schools of instruc- 
 tion either wi.h the object of qualilying in the event of a vacancy occurring in tlie 
 permanent force, or with the view of obtaining a deeper insight into their professional 
 duties, should be encouraged to do so; ajid it might be a question whether .some 
 opeinng couhl not be found for them m one or other of the public departments oi- 
 public works after their period of traininj;: military education, both in regard to 
 knowing how to eoninian(i and how to obey jeing no bad qualification for young men 
 commencing life. .'"Jhould those ot!icers elect to remain in the school for a longer 
 {)erio(l thun six months, they should be required to receive instruction in the other 
 arms of the service than in that to which they might fl)"st have been appointed, and 
 to pass a second and more severe examination, care being taken that the time passed 
 at the schools should he uiilizeci to i.-ie iiLnnn-it. IL may be oljjoctod that there would 
 bo risk lest young men, having received a military education, might decline to give 
 the country the benefit of their instruction, b}' refusing to serve in the militia. Sate- 
 giiards might possibly be pi'ovided against this eventuality, but the best guarantee 
 would be a good selection of cadets for first appointments. Again, there may be a 
 ditficulty in inducing young men to come forwai'd ; shoukl this be so, inducements 
 must be ottered, but if a check be placed on the assumption of rank and uniform by 
 those who are not really qualified and ready to servo in the active militia, much will 
 be done to exalt the position of the officer. At present, the Dominion swarms with 
 officers of high raidc who have received little instruction and have seldom or evei* 
 held proportionate commands; conseqiicntly, as is the case in the United States, 
 military titles are hekl in little esteem. Tliere will unquestionably be a difficulty in 
 procuring trained officei*s of local standing for some of the country corps, but if the 
 system proposed be adopted gradually, i. c, instruction previous to first appointment 
 being insisted on, anil a pro])ortion of qualified non-commissioned otfieeirs being also 
 jirovideti, the officers at present holding commissions as field officers and captains 
 will feel themselves morally obliged to learn their professional duties. 
 
 With regard to the non-commissioned officers and to the rank and file of the 
 schools, men should be enlisted for one year, if possible from the "localities to which 
 the regiments of active militia of the district belong, with power, in the event of theii 
 showing efficiency, to re-engage for five or more years. From these latter, non- 
 comnussioned officers will be selected first for the school itself, both as staff sergeants 
 and as pay-sergeants of the companies, ami then for service in the active militia when 
 embodied or called out for trainin<r. These latter would loam the duties of non- 
 commissioned officers, but with the exception of the few who would be required for 
 duty would serve, when at the schools, as private soldiers, being excused the more 
 ii-ksome work which would tiiU on those who did not aspire to rise above that grade. 
 
1:5 
 
 iks of tlio 
 
 )i' instnu'- 
 iii/j; ill tlic 
 ofessioiKil 
 thor some 
 tnients or 
 regard to 
 Min^' men 
 r a Ion*;er 
 the other 
 ill led, and 
 no parsed 
 icre would 
 10 to give 
 tia. Saffc- 
 gviarantee 
 
 may be a 
 liicements 
 milbrm l)y 
 much ^vill 
 arms wilh 
 m or ever 
 led State;*, 
 ifiiculty ill 
 but if the 
 )pointment- 
 
 being also 
 d captain H 
 
 file of the 
 s to which 
 entof thei) 
 latter, non- 
 tt'nergeantrt 
 lilitia when 
 ties of non- 
 required for 
 1 the more 
 hat giade. 
 
 During (he training or embodimont of the active militia, tiiese embryo non- 
 commissioned ollieors woidd act as sergeants and corporals to the companies of tlie 
 I'cgiment (o \vhich each section of the infantry company would correspond, and in a 
 similar way, to the regiment of cavalry and batteries of artillery ; those wlio 
 evince the greatest aptitude lioing selected as sergeant-majors and stafl-sergeants. 
 ft would be well that e\'en in respect to those men, long periods of service shot Id fu.t 
 be exacted or jiermitted ; as, in nuch ca&e, there would be a difficulty in providing Jbr 
 them after th'eir term of service had expired; whereas, if diseharged in the prime of 
 life, they could reiurn to civil occupations, probably remaining in the active or 
 reserve militia, and would easily obtain situations in the railways or in tjie police 
 force, wheie men of good character, with a knowledge of discipline, are constantly 
 in demand. '' ■■ ''' ■.-^' .- >. v^^\ -.- : V. ;■ • \ » ;:^^ ' ''' 
 
 By tlie plan propo.^cd, theie would always be a force of nearly l.fiOO men at 
 hand, in case of sudden emergency, a standard of etliciency would be suj^plicd (which 
 ought to be fully as liigh as that of any Imperial regiment) to which standard the 
 militia might endeavoui' to conform, and there would be the means of training officers 
 and non-commisBioned officers for service in the active militia. The plan would be 
 elastic, as if a more numerous permanent force were recudred, the schools could be 
 enlarged without change of system, half companies, or companies corresponding to 
 the regiments, in place of sections, whilst in the event of danger being apprehended 
 (he efficiency of the active militia might be inci-eased, by Icnghicning their period of 
 drill, or if numbers were required by calling in more men from the re-erves. The plan 
 IP, however, oidy sketched, and its details rcnpiire to l)e filled in. There are doubtless 
 many difficulties attending it and also many defects, but it appears to provide for a 
 want, which is now felt, and which will declare itself more and more, year hy year, at 
 what (is conceived to he) the least possiiile expenditure of men and money. 
 
 It may not be out of place if I allude, very briefly, to other minor points con- 
 nected with the instruction to be given at these schools. Their object must be clearly 
 kept in view, viz : That besides maintaining' a body of regular troops, ready to be use«i 
 as such, if required, they are above all schools of instruction. The work and tlie dis- 
 cipline must, therefore, fulfil both objects, and as it is very necessary that the time spent 
 there should l>e fully occupied, and habits of discipline inculcated in the shortest possible 
 time, variety of instruction to prevent tedium becomes necessary. The officers 
 aspiring to fir.st commissions, should be treated as cadets, and should learn the duties 
 of the private soldier equally with those of the officers. They should be taught to 
 impart insti-uction, and the examination at the end of the six months should be severe 
 as well as pnictical. The simpler principles of field engineering, almost necessary for 
 all officers campaigning in a country like Canada and the United States, should be 
 inculcated theoretically and practically, whilst to those who might elect to remain for 
 an additional period, the principles of the other two arms might bo taught in the cranio 
 
u 
 
 way as I believe ij> done at West Point.* Above all the instruction bJiouId be practical 
 nothing Bhould bo Bacrificed to mere hIiow ; order, clealinesi*, steadiness under arms 
 are all essentials to discijdine, whilst individual activity, mental and bodily, skill in 
 the use of weapons and an intelligent appreciation of the principles of fighting in 
 open oi'dcr are cqualh' necessary to the modern ini'antry soldier. The cavalry should 
 be carefully tauglit the principles of patrolling and vidctte duty, wliilst instruction in 
 the duties of field and garrison artillery would probably necessitate for the officers 
 of that arm a longer period than six montl s training. When officers of the awtive 
 Militia join the schools previous to promotion, opportunity would offer to ascertain 
 whether in body and mind they are fit for comnuind. The instruction given would 
 correspond with their higher rank, but shoould be scvci'w with the double object o^ 
 attaining efficiency, and of weeding out men whom age might have rendered more 
 suitable for corresponding rank in the reserve Militia. All details connected with the 
 military districts would probably bo kept at these schools, and information would thus 
 be collected, which would prove of invaluable assistance in the event of wai\ Encour- 
 agement would bo given to qualified officers to attend the manceuvrers of the English 
 array, and to avail themselves of the instruction afforded at the various military 
 schools. Arrangements might j)robably be mode with the Imperial authorities to 
 admit a certain number of officers to the Staff College, to the Artillery School at Shoo- 
 buryness, the Engineering School at Chatham, and the School of Musketing at llythe. 
 In the event of young Caiuidians entering the Imperial servico, and showing them- 
 selves able officers, their services should not be lost to the Dominion. Pjvery effort 
 should, in fact, be made to provide officers and non-commissioned officers for the 
 militia, both active and reserve 
 
 The scarcity of labour, the scattered settlements, the short summer, all rendei' 
 it most difficult in ordinary times, except at a great sacrifice of money, to assem- 
 ble together any large body of troops for the annual drill. Fi-equently the best men 
 are not found in the ranks of the active militia during the yearly training, although 
 more than one instance has proved that they are ready to come forward at the leaat 
 (hreat of war. Owing to these causes the militia will (at all events for the present) 
 receive but little military instruction and in the event of emergency must depend 
 for its efficiency on possessing ready at hand a proper staff with each of the regi- 
 ments. By the method proposed, some at least of the officers will have received 
 the rudiments of military training, whilst a permanent staff of nmi-commissioned 
 officers will, if occasion so require, be in readiness to join the regiments and companies 
 of the respective localities to which they belong. 
 
 There is much in the life of the Canadian that qualifies him for military scx'vice. 
 As a result of the scarcity of labor and of the comparative isolation of the scattere(i 
 
 J 
 
 •Note. — This principiu is stroTigly advocated by recent German writers, in order to insure th« 
 tliree arms worUing well and intelligently together. 
 
15 
 
 practical 
 [ler arms 
 , skill in 
 !;hting in 
 vy Hhould 
 Miction in 
 e ofticera 
 ho autive 
 ascertain 
 on would 
 object o^ 
 fed more 
 I with the 
 ould thuH 
 
 Encour- 
 9 English 
 
 mili tary 
 oritioa to 
 1 at Shoe- 
 it llythe. 
 ng them- 
 sry effort 
 
 for the 
 
 ill rendei- 
 to asaem- 
 best men 
 although 
 the leatit 
 ! present) 
 it depend 
 the regi- 
 ! received 
 iiissioned 
 ompan'.oH 
 
 7 sci'Vice. 
 Bcattered 
 
 insure th« 
 
 furmH, owing also to the great changes of climate from an almost arctic winter to an 
 Italian sumraor, men have to adapt ihomsclves to various conditions of life and 
 Co accomodate themselves to circumstances not met with in l<]iigland. The aptitude, 
 the skill, the energy and the patience derived from such training form no slight found- 
 ations for the highest discipline and for the most perfect military eflficiency. In one 
 especial branch of industry common to all four provinces, qualities that should chai'- 
 iicierize the officer and the soldlor nro called forth in no ordinarv dc<i:ree. The organiza- 
 tion of the gangs of lumberers, their provisioning, their discipline, and in fact the care 
 taken of their genei'al well being, demand many of the characteristics which .should be 
 long to those high in command of a military force. The foremen of the several gangs 
 have duties to do not dissimilar to those expected from officers and non-com missioned! 
 officers in charge of companies of soldiers, whilst tne actual work pei-formcd by 
 the men is such as would serve, mentally and physically to train them for much that 
 would bo required of troops in actual war. Their skill in road making, in hutting 
 themselves, and in the rougher engineering works, might prove invalmdile to soldiers 
 campaining in a forest country, their practice in driving teams over ri'i'iiirhwn which 
 an English carter would consider impn.'^sible, might go far to qualify them for artillery 
 drivei-e, whilst the excitement and even danger attending a portion of their labors 
 would tend to bring out qualities not dissimilar to those called forth by active service. 
 Then again, the very mixture of races in Canada ought to furnish the essentials for a 
 good army, the intermingling of English, Scotch, Irish and last but not least of French, 
 sliould combine the military qualities of each nation, and should tend to that whole 
 some rivalry which adds stimulus to war-like enthusiasm. What Canada ought to 
 strive for is a^ood organization, and a sufficient force to resist any sudden raid 
 arising from turmoils on the frontier, until help could arrive from the opposite side of 
 the Atlantic. She must remember tiiat her neighbour although friendly, and with but 
 a very small army, yet possesses a vast element of strength and experience which 
 has been gathered in the great civil war, and which now lies dortr'ftnt. In the event of 
 hostilities there would be no lack of experienced officers and of men able quickly to 
 organize troops, and peaceful as the aspect of affairs now is, and improbable as any 
 disturbance of friendly relations, appears, yet it behoves Canada to counterbalance 
 these advantages by a careful training of a small force, which, while providing for 
 defence could not be mistaken for a menace to her powerful neighbor. It is as diffi- 
 cult to keep the necessity for military pre])aration before the eyes of a free and 
 peaceful population bent on energetically developing the vast resources which 
 surround them, as it is to preserve from rust and fi*om the deterioration of prolonged 
 . peace, the military institutions themselves. 
 
 The excitcniei\t of danger, consequent on the Fenian raids produced excellent 
 results in the Dominion, especially on the menaced frontier, in inducing milittiry 
 prejiarations. The volunteer system and the responsibilit}' thrown upon the officeps 
 and men for their efficiency appear to suit the I^glish race. In New Brunswick, 
 
10 
 
 ii) the Towiihhipji, and in Ontario, the militia riy.s.cm lias slicwri oxc.ollei)t rosultH. In 
 (^uobuc it has not workc^d ho well, not fiom the want of military qualities inherent in a 
 Ki'ench population; imt from the fact that the ^rcafei- ]):irt of the Pi'oviiu*e heintr 
 removed from the <hvrii(er of invMsion, a feelini^ has arisen arnonji!; the population that 
 they will willingly obey an order for enrollment, but that to volunteer for service in 
 not amonsi; the duties of aeiti/en. In conclusion, 1 would ur'j,e that the sclieme ])ro- 
 ]iosod is merely put fo;"\vard to invito the opinions of those wh.o are well acquainted 
 with the feelin:-s of tlie people and the int( i-jor economy of the militia force. Oni? 
 threat ditficulty lies in the scattered condit!( n of the country regiments which lenders 
 their drill and inspection, ditficuit, another lies in the necessity for taking oHiccr,-; from 
 tlie influential men of the districts without rci'erence to their military qualities, a« 
 unless well known men are chosen, the companies and battalions cannot be raised or 
 kept together. Of course such men will frequently niake the best otficers, but being 
 ahnost always engaged in business operation;; the^' cannot spare much time for military 
 training. These are diiliculties, but six moiiths or a year's training at the com- 
 mencement of life is not long, and may even lie counted as education, whilst threes 
 months on promotion to the rank of field officer, is not a great sacritice with 
 HO honorable a positio/i in prospect. Otiioers would doubtless rcfpiire to be paid 
 <iuring these periods, but the money spent would be well laid out. The same 
 applies to the non-commissioned officers and privates of the embodied force, 
 their career should bo sufficiently promising to induce men of respectability from 
 the various localities to come forward, whilst as thci'c woidd bo two classes, viz : the 
 first class or non-commi-sioned officer when called out for training, and the second or 
 simple private soldier, two rates of pay would probably be considered fair. Above 
 all, the apiiointments should he kept clear from political influence ; at present ofKcors 
 of the militia are recommended for commissions by their several colonol.s, and it is 
 believed the system worlds well. To allow them to be nominees of the House of 
 Commons would lead to the introduction into the force of a political element very 
 prejudicial to military discipline. , , , - 
 
 There are still two important subjects which have not been touched on, one the 
 best method of conducting the yearly training of the militia; the other, the condition 
 (taken generally) of the defences of the Dominion, as handed over by the Imperial 
 authorities on the departure of the troops. In regard to the first, the amount of money 
 to be expended will, to a certain extent, fix the duration of the trainfng, but given a 
 specified sum, it may be a question whether it is better to expend the whole with the 
 object of extending the period as long as possible, or to pay a portion for the assem- 
 bly of the companies into battalions, the battalions into regiments and brigmles.. If 
 the comi^anies be drilled separately the men will, as a rule, live at home, their pay 
 will be less, and the money can be spread over a longer period ; but there is a risk of 
 the drill being slurred over, and at all events, of there being little opportunity of 
 inculcating discipline as well as drill during the instruction. The advantage of 
 
3sult.-i. In 
 lierent in i\ 
 'inec beint; 
 liition that 
 r service iis 
 I'll erne ])ro- 
 iicquninied 
 rcc. One 
 ic'h renders 
 ilicer.-i from 
 [Uiilities, ScS 
 )e raitJod or 
 !, but bei 1 Ig- 
 or military 
 t the eom- 
 bilhl direct 
 '.riticc witb 
 (o be paid 
 Tbe same 
 lied force, 
 jility from 
 s, viz : tlie 
 e second or 
 r . Abt)ve 
 ent otliccrs 
 s, and it is 
 House ol' 
 ment verv 
 
 3, one the 
 
 e condition 
 
 3 Imperial 
 
 t of money 
 
 )ut given a 
 
 e with the 
 
 he assem- 
 
 ;ades._ If 
 
 their pay 
 
 is a risk of 
 
 >rtunity of 
 
 vantage of 
 
 1 
 
 comparison with other eornpanies and of the wholesome rivalry liieroby engendered 
 is wanting, together with the military feeling created by the more assembly of con- 
 si(U)rable bodies of soldiers. The formation of battalion camps appears preferable to 
 drill performed by individual C(jmpanies, jus the officers accpiire practice in providing 
 for the maintenanco, comfort and health of the men; and habits of order are learni 
 by the disciidine of a camp. The larger camps are doubtless the best means <»f 
 training sold-ers, including in that term the higher ofiicers, but the cost of transport 
 is great, and political considerations may soirietime:^^ weigh in determining the desir- 
 ability of forming large camps on or near the frontier. Their advantage lies in the 
 training given to the staff, in the rivalry between battalions, and in the enthusiasm 
 which, both among the soldiers and civilians, is aroused by great niilitaiy spectacle.-. 
 The evil offal.se musters, which i-ecent eiuiuiries have shewn to be too prevalent, is 
 checked, and shoidd be, with care, entirely pre^ inted No doubt if the troops are 
 assembled for any length of time, the practice of mavianm'es, and the working 
 towtbcr of the throe anus would be a means of imparting valunlile instruction ; but 
 where the period of drill is limited to but, at most, a few days, the ground-work of 
 military education can alone be attempted. Careful instruction by cojnpanies is tlu- 
 foundation of all infantry tactics, and under the present conditions of warfare 
 this instruction should be pushed eve.i further than has hitherto been done. 
 
 The solution of the question appears to'bc, to allow of an elastic seheme, and not 
 to draw hard and fast rules for all the provinces or for all the regiments. In some 
 scattered districts where labour is scarce, and where men must per force combine 
 some daily work with drills, training by comjjanies may be the better method of 
 meeting a difficulty whioh, if a strain were put on the men, might break down the 
 organization in that locality.* 
 
 When possible the battalion training will be better, and near towns, the system 
 tried with some success in England by the volunteers of pitching the camp in the 
 vicinity of the ordinary places of labour of the men, and having morning and evening 
 drills might be pursued with advantage. The brigade and division camps should not 
 be neglected. If they cannot be organized yearly in every military district on the 
 score of expense, they might be triennial, so that every man in the militia might 
 (mce in the course of his service receive the benefit of the instnlction thereby afforded. 
 Tbe formation of a cadet camp which met with so great success when organized by 
 General McDougall, might again be tried. The young officers and non commissioned 
 officers who would have passed through the training schools being called on to vol- 
 unteer for the extra education that would thereby be offered. Whatever plan be 
 
 • NoTB. — This may apply to some of the villages in the outlying districts of the maritime proT- 
 inces and on the shores of the lakes, where hatteries of artillery suitable for coast defence might go 
 through their yearly diill in their own localities. 
 
18 
 
 pur.suod, euro must ho taken that the training period bo porioutly utilized, and full 
 viiluo oI»tainod A)r the nvonoy oxpondod. 
 
 The second suhject which I'oniiiins to he noticed is the condition of the dofenricn 
 ;i-i hiiiulod over to the Dominion hy the Imporiiil authorities. The completion of the 
 •system of f , ! "Ication reoommended by Colonel Jervis and partially commenced 
 ill consequence of his report, will proltahly not bo offocted until an alarm of war 
 should occur; hut fortresses of jicreat value have boon confided to (ho care of the 
 Doniinion, and costly property, such as barracks, storehouses, &e., are awaiting 
 <lecision as to their ilisposal. Many of the lmildinj;;s are in the heart of thrivinij 
 cities, and could be sold at a considerablo gain. The time appears to liave arrived 
 for some decision to be taken in respect to the most fittinjjf mode of dealing with this 
 property, and it seems at first sigl\t consistcTit with proper administi-ation, that, the 
 money obtained should be re-invested for militaiy purposes. Supposing, for instance, 
 that some of (he older fortifications of Kingston should be useless for the purpose of 
 defence in consequence of changes in the art of war, and at the same time, the 
 decision by competent officers should point to the importance of Kingston as a posi- 
 tion to bo defended, might not the older buildings be disposed of and the money 
 obtained be applied to the purchase of land on which fortifications suitable to modern 
 requirements might be raised, when political considerations should point to tho 
 n»!ccssity of doing so? The rent in the meantime l)eing appropriated for military 
 purposes. The sale of old barracks would furnish drill-sheds and storehouses for the 
 militia, and the property would thus be used for the purposes for which it was 
 designed.* 
 
 These are merelj' crude suggestions; indeed, the whole scheme for militia 
 improvement, as given in this paper, is traced out more with tho object of pro- 
 voking thought and criticism than of dogmatically m'ging any particular plan ; 
 and i can only venture to express a hope that those who fire cognizant of the subject 
 will criticize it freely, adopting or rejecting the whole or portions of it as they may 
 consider most applicable for the good of the militia, and for the well being of tho 
 Dominion, . - . 
 
 10- 
 
 10- 
 
 H. C. FLETCHER, 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Scots Fusilier Guards. 
 Military Secretary. 
 
 Ottawa, November, 1873. 
 
 • Note. — In fact, militia property should bo so administered that its proceeds would be expended 
 for the purposes for which it was intended. The maintenance of the necessary forts, drill-sheds, &c., 
 would thus cease to be included in the yearly estimates, but would be provided for out of a consoli- 
 dated fund. 
 
19 
 
 and full 
 
 dofont^oH 
 ion of tho 
 mmonood 
 m of w!ir 
 ,ro of tho 
 jiwsilting 
 f thriviii*; 
 '0 arrived 
 with thiH 
 , that the 
 • instance, 
 mrposc of 
 time, the 
 as a posi- 
 ho money 
 to modern 
 it to the 
 r military 
 e?! for the 
 ch it was 
 
 or militia 
 ct of pro- 
 iilar plan; 
 he subject 
 they may 
 ing of tho 
 
 Guardt. 
 
 ESTIMATE for Pay and SuHsrsTENCE of One Trainincj School 
 for Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, — for One Year, — of the strength 
 of 45 Cavalry, 250 Artillery, and 240 Infantry. 
 
 NO. 
 
 f 
 
 
 10- 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 - 1 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 20 
 
 20 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 2351 
 
 2351 
 
 10—530 
 
 DESCRIPTION. 
 
 PBR DIEM. 
 
 (■ominandant the D.A.G. of the District.. 
 
 Assistant do., — Artillery IriHfriU'tor 
 
 Oai)tairis: — 1 Cavalry, 1 Artillery, and 
 
 I nf antry , to act as i nstructors 
 
 Adjutant 
 
 (Quartermaster 
 
 Surgeon 
 
 Sergeant Majors 
 
 Laboratory Foreman 
 
 Ordiiaucc Armourer 
 
 Small-Arm Armourer 
 
 Miister (i unner 
 
 Sergeants 
 
 C( )r porals 
 
 Bombatl iers 
 
 Trumpet Major 
 
 Trumpeters 
 
 Troopers, Gunners, and Privates. 
 
 .Total for Pay. 
 
 540 Eations of Bread and Moat. 
 
 78 Horses — Forage, 
 
 Fuel, say 1000 Cords 
 
 Light. 
 
 equipment, Medical sup- 
 necessaries. Attestation, 
 
 Clothing, Winter 
 plies, Eegimental 
 Transport, Barrack utensils and equipment, 
 at the most moderate computation, say 
 
 Contingencies say about 
 
 $ cts. 
 
 3 90 
 
 2 
 
 82 
 
 2 
 
 44 
 
 1 
 
 94 
 
 3 
 
 65 
 
 1 
 
 00 
 
 1 
 
 00 
 
 1 
 
 00 
 
 1 
 
 50 
 
 1 
 
 00 
 
 
 
 80 
 
 
 
 70 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 1 
 
 00 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 GO 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 12 
 30 
 
 TOTAL. 
 
 8 Ct8. 
 
 1,700 00 
 
 1,423 50 
 
 5,146 50 
 
 8!)0 60 
 
 708 10 
 
 1,332 25 
 
 1,095 00 
 
 365 00 
 
 365 00 
 
 547 50 
 
 365 00 
 
 5,840 00 
 
 5,110 (/« 
 
 219 00 
 
 365 00 
 
 1,095 00 
 
 86,151 00 
 
 $112,718 45 
 
 23,652 00 
 
 8,541 00 
 
 7,000 00 
 
 500 00 
 
 40,000 00 
 7,588 55 
 
 $200,000 00 
 
 be expended 
 1-shcds, &c., 
 if a consoli- 
 
20 
 
 MEMORANDrM No. 2» 
 
 ■ / 
 
 .# 
 
 KrtTiMATK for maintaining throe training .sohools .; $600, (100 
 
 AijiiOWANCK TO ('adkts Undergoing Training ...i. 1)5,800 
 
 KsTiMATE for Training 25,000 offtcers and men in camp for 
 sixteen days, being the probable number out of tlie 
 34,000 that could be placed in camp 
 
 Ordinary Contin(}ent Militia Services for the year, aft^r 
 deducting the pay of throe Deputy Adjutant 
 Generals, who would receive pay as Commandantu of ^ 
 the Schools; and the items for Drill Sheds, Rifle 
 Ranges, and care of Militia Properties, to be provided 
 for out of funds obtained by the rent or sale of 
 Militia property * 
 
 ■'■ J-.,..;.--.yMy; , ;,„,...;.../. T^ojj^i^ 
 
 |fi95.000 
 
 $400,000 
 
 $489,900 
 
 $1,584,900 
 
 •NoTii. — A further deduction of $10,000 could fairly be made, as the expense of maintaining the 
 Gun Boat might in peace time be very properly transferred to the Marine and Fishery ^Department. 
 
li!if!n5.(MJ0 
 
 $400,000 
 
 $489,900 
 
 1,584,900 
 
 untaining the 
 ^Department.